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AXT XS SCIENTIA VERITA
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
1950–1955
BASIC DOCUMENTS
VOLUME II
JX
1417
'A42
v. 2
1
c. 2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PUBLICATION 6446
GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY SERIES 117
Released December 1957
For sale by the
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
DUPOSICBY : JE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PREFACE
In 1950 the Division of Historical Policy Research of the Depart-
ment of State and the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions collaborated in the preparation of a collection of basic documents
on American foreign policy covering the years 1941–1949. The col-
lection was released under the title A Decade of American Foreign
Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49 as Senate Document No. 123, 81st
Congress, 1st Session. The usefulness of this publication indicated
the need for a supplement that would bring the collection closer to
currency.
The present compilation, like its predecessor, has been designed pri-
marily for official use. The possibility that it might prove useful to
others outside official circles has also played a part in determining the
scope and editorial mechanics of the publication. In some instances
the 6-year span (1950-1955) of the compilation has been violated for
the sake of completeness and continuity, with the reprinting of a few
documents that appeared in the earlier Decade, the printing of a few
additional pre-1950 documents, and the including of some 1956 ma-
terials. Certain international agreements to which the United States
is not a party have been included where the effect of such agreements
on American policy forīnulation is obvious.
Despite its size, which reflects the growth of American responsibility
in international relations, the present collection makes no pretense at
being exhaustive. In many instances, it has proved necessary to
print summaries of developments and of individual lengthy documents
or to provide nothing more than the title of a document, indicating
where its text may be found. While the general rule of chronological
arrangement of the documents within each of the 20 Parts has been
observed, it has been necessary in certain Parts to place some docu-
ments under chronologically overlapping subject headings. This
arrangement, coupled with a list of the documents, fairly extensive
cross-references, and an index, will facilitate use of the volumes.
This collection was prepared in the Historical Division, G. Bernard
Noble, Chief, under the immediate direction of the Chief of the Ad-
visory and Review Branch, E. Taylor Parks, with the assistance of
Peter V. Curl, William Gerber, Robert W. Lambert, Herbert Spielman,
Isaac A. Stone, Yancey M. Taylor, Doris E. Austin, and Margaret
G. Martin. Assistance was also given in the early stages of the work
by Dwight R. Ambach, Laverne Bryck, Helene L. DeLong, Eula
MIcDonald, and Majel Renshaw. Editorial procedures were performed
by the Division of Publishing Services under the immediate direction
of the Chief of the General Editing Branch, Dorothy M. Hine, with
the assistance of Margaret H. Seamon, Anne C. Torwick, John J. Lee,
Joseph J. Moriarty, and other members of the staff.
OCTOBER 1, 1957
IT
CONTENTS
PART I. PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY
Page
1. The State of the Union: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 4, 1950 (Excerpts).
1-5
2. “Total Diplomacy" To Strengthen United States Leadership for
Human Freedom: Summary of Remarks by the Secretary of
State, February 16, 1950 .
5-10
3. Plowing a Straight Furrow: Extemporaneous Remarks by the Secre
tary of State, November 17, 1950 (Excerpt)
10-12
4. The Shield of Faith: Address by the Secretary of State, November 9,
1950 (Excerpts).
13-16
5. The Strategy of Freedom: Address by the Secretary of State, Novem-
ber 29, 1950 (Excerpts) .
16-18
6. The State of the Union: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 8, 1951 (Excerpts).
18-24
7. War or Peace and the Survival of Human Freedom: Statement by
the Secretary of State Before the Senate Armed Services and
Foreign Relations Committees, June 1, 1951 (Excerpt).
25
8. Securing the Peace: Address by the President, October 15, 1951 (Ex-
cerpts).
25-27
9. The State of the Union: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 9, 1952 (Excerpts)
27-32
10. Progress Toward International Peace and Unity: Address by the
Secretary of State, April 19, 1952 (Excerpts)
32-39
11. Continuity and Responsibility in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs:
Statement Issued on Conclusion of Talks Between the President
and the President-Elect, November 18, 1952 .
3940
12. The State of the Union: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 7, 1953 (Excerpts)
40-57
13. Inaugural Address by the President, January 20, 1953 (Excerpt) .. 57-61
14. The State of the Union: Message by the President to the Congress,
February 2, 1953 (Excerpts)
61-65
15. The Chance for Peace: Address by the President, April 16, 1953.
65-71
16. The Moral Initiative: Address by the Secretary of State, November 18,
1953 (Excerpts).
71--77
17. The State of the Union: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 7, 1954 (Excerpts)
77-80
18. The Evolution of Foreign Policy: Address by the Secretary of State,
January 12, 1954 (Excerpts)
80-85
19. Berlin Foreign Ministers Meeting (January 25-February 18, 1954):
Report by the Secretary of State, February 24, 1954 (Excerpts). 85-90
+
VI
CONTENTS
Pepe
0
20. Peace With Freedom and Security: Statement by the Secretary of
State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 19,
1954.
90-92
21. A Just and Durable Peace: Address by the Secretary of State Before
the United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 1954. . . .92-100
22. The State of the Union: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 6, 1955 (Excerpts)
100-104
23. Principles in Foreign Policy: Address by the Secretary of State,
April 11, 1955.
104-111
24. Geneva Meeting of Four Heads of Government (July 18–23, 1955):
Report by the President, July 25, 1955 .
111-114
25. Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers (October 27-November 16,
1955): Report by the Secretary of State, November 18, 1955
(Excerpts)
115-122
26. The Foundation for a Firm Peace: Address by the Secretary of State,
December 8, 1955 .
122-129
27. The State of the Union: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 5, 1956 (Excerpts)
129-133
PART II. THE UNITED NATIONS
Basic DOCUMENT
1. Charter, June 26, 1945.
134-161
TWENTY-YEAR PROGRAM FOR ACHIEVING PEACE
2. Memorandum From the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
the President of the United States, April 20, 1950. .
162-167
3. Statement by the Secretary of State to the Press, June 7, 1950
167
4. Resolution 494 (V) of the General Assembly, November 20, 1950 · 167–168
PEACE THROUGH DEEDS
5. Resolution 380 (V) of the General Assembly, November 17, 1950 . 168–164
UNITING FOR PEACE-COLLECTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEE
6. Address by the Secretary of State Before the General Assembly, Sep-
tember 20, 1950 (Excerpts).
169–179
7. Statement by the United States Representative Before the Political and
Security Committee of the General Assembly, October 13, 1950. 179-186
8. Resolution 377 (V) of the General Assembly, November 3, 1950. . 187–191
9. Letter From the Acting United States Representative at the_United
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Regard-
ing United States Armed Forces Under Resolution 377 (V), June 8,
1951. .
10. United States Working Paper Prepared for the Consideration of the
Collective Measures Committee, August 4, 1954. .
11. Third Report of the Collective Measures Committee, August 27, 1954. 195–200
192-193
194-195
PROBLEM OF DEFINING AGGRESSION
12. Review of the Problem: Statement Made in Committee VI (Legal) of
the General Assembly by the United States Representative, Octo-
ber 15, 1934
200-201
CONTENTS
VI
VI
HUMAN RIGHTS
Page
(Universal Declaration of Human Rights, August 10, 1948]
204
13. Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, June 1952.
204-218
14. Draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, June 1952. 219-227
15. Message From the President to the Commission on Human Rights at
Geneva, April 7, 1953.
227–228
16. Statement by the United States Representative Before the Ninth
Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, April 8,
1953.
228-231
17. Statement by the United States Representative Before the Ninth
Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, May 19,
1953.
231-239
18. Texts of United States Draft Resolutions, May 7, 1953
239-244
19. Resolution 739 (VIII) of the General Assembly, November 28, 1953, 244–245
20. Resolution 833 (IX) of the General Assembly, December 4, 1954 . . 245–246
NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES
.
21. Education for Responsibilities of Self-Government: Resolution 437
(V) of the General Assembly, December 2, 1950 .
247
22. Cessation of Transmission of Information on Puerto Rico: Resolu-
tion 748 (VIII) of the General Assembly, November 27, 1953 . 247-249
23. Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination: Resolution 637
(VII) of the General Assembly, December 16, 1952
249-251
24. Attainment of Self-Government or Independence: Resolutions 558 (VI),
752 (VIII), 858 (IX), and 946 (X) of the General Assembly,
1952-1955
251
A) Resolution 558 (VI), January 18, 1952..
251-252
B) Resolution 752 (VIII), December 9, 1953,
252-253
C) Resolution 858 (IX), December 14, 1954
253–254
D) Resolution 946 (X), December 15, 1955
254-255
25. Factors Indicative of the Attainment of Independence or of Other
Separate Systems of Self-Government: Resolution 742 (VIII) (with
Annex) of the General Assembly, November 27, 1953
255–261
EXPANDED PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
26. Government Contributions, by Years, as of May 31, 1955 (Chart). 262-265
FORCED LABOR
27. Resolution 350 (XII) of the Economic and Social Council, March 19,
1951,
266-267
28. Resolution 740 (VIII) of the General Assembly, December 7, 1953 . 267–268
29. Resolution 842 (IX) of the General Assembly, December 17, 1954. 268
PRISONERS OF WAR
30. Report of the United Nations Ad Hoc Commission, September 12,
269-271
31. Resolution 741 (VIII) of the General Assembly, December 9, 1953 . 271–272
II)
1952.
VIII
CONTENTS
RESTRICTIONS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Page
32. Public Law 495 (82d Congress, 2d Session), July 10, 1952 (Excerpts). 272-273
273
33. Public Law 471 (83d Congress, 2d Session), July 2, 1954 (Excerpts)
UNITED NATIONS EMPLOYMENT POLICIES
34. Statement by the Department of State, October 28, 1952 .
274
35. Report of the Secretary-General on Personnel Policy, January 30,
1953 (Excerpts).
274-292
36. Resolution 708 (VII) of the General Assembly, April 1, 1953 292-293
37. Investigation of United States Citizens Employed by the United
Nations: Executive Order No. 10459, June 2, 1953.
293–298
38. Resolution 782 (VIII) of the General Assembly, December 9, 1953. 298-300
DISPLAY OF THE UNITED NATIONS FLAG
39. Public Law 107 (83d Congress, 1st Session), July 9, 1953
301
WORLD CALENDAR REFORM
40. Letter From the United States Representative at the United Nations
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, March 21, 1955. 301-302
REGIME OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
41. Report of the Sixth Session of the International Law Commission,
June 3-July 28, 1954 (Exerpts).
302-321
42. Note Verbale From the Representative of the United States at the
United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
3, 1955 .
321-323
REVIEW OF THE CHARTER
323-330
330-333
43. Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, January 18,
1954.
44. Statement by the United States Representative Before the General
Assembly, November 17, 1955 (Excerpts).
45. Resolution 992 (X) of the General Assembly, November 21, 1955. 333-334
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS
46. Resolution 817 (IX) of the General Assembly, November 23, 1954 .334-335
47. Statement by the United States Representative Before the Ad Hoc
Political Committee of the General Assembly, December 7,
1955.
48. Resolution 918 (X) of the General Assembly, December 8, 1955.
49. Resolution 995 (X) of the General Assembly, December 14, 1955
50. Statement Released by the Department of State to the Press, Decem-
ber 15, 1955
:
335-336
337
337
:
338
1
QUESTION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA
51. Resolution 490 (V) of the General Assembly, September 19, 1950. 338-339
52. Resolution 396 (V) of the General Assembly, December 14, 1950
53. Senate Resolution 36 (82d Congress, 1st Session), January 23, 1951
339-340
340
CONTENTS
IX
Page
54. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 13, 1951.
340–341
55. Resolution 609A (VII) of the General Assembly, October 25, 1952. 341
56. Department of State Appropriation Act, August 5, 1953 (Excerpt) 341
57. Statement by the Secretary of State, September 15, 1953.
341-342
58. Address by the United States Permanent Representative at the United
Nations, April 19, 1954 (Excerpt) .
342–343
59. Statement by the United States Representative Before the United
Nations General Assembly, September 21, 1954 (Excerpt)
344
ANNIVERSARIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
60. Address by the President Before the General Assembly, October 24,
1950.
345–350
61. Address by the Secretary of State Before the General Assembly, Sep-
tember 17, 1953
350-359
62. House Concurrent Resolution 157 (84th Congress, 1st Session), June
17, 1955
359-360
63. Address by the President at the Tenth Anniversary Meeting, San
Francisco, June 20, 1955 .
360–364
64. Address by the Secretary of State at the Tenth Anniversary Meeting,
June 24, 1955. .
364-370
ENTERING THE SECOND DECADE
65. Address by the Secretary of State Before the General Assembly,
September 22, 1955.
370-380
66. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organ-
ization Affairs, January 13, 1956
380-390
PART III. POSTWAR SETTLEMENTS
TREATIES OF PEACE WITH ITALY, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, AND
HUNGARY, FEBRUARY 10, 1947,
1. Report by the Secretary of State to the President, February 27, 1947 391–395
2. Statement by Former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, March 4,
1947.
395-404
3. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 15, 1947
(Excerpts)
404-419
UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING TRIESTE
4. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the
United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom, May 9, 1952. 419-422
5. Statement Released to the Press by the Governments of the United
States and the United Kingdom, October 8, 1953.
422-423
6. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the
United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia,
October 5, 1954 . .
423-425
SETTLEMENT WITE JAPAN
7. Treaty of Peace, September 8, 1951
425-440
8. Japanese Declaration of Intention To Accede to Certain International
Instruments, September 8, 1951.
440-441
х
CONTENTS
:
Pag
9. Japanese Declaration Regarding Allied Graves. Cemeteries, and
Memorials in Japanese Territory, September 8, 1951. .. 441-442
10. Address by the President at San Francisco, September 4, 1951. .. 442-447
11. Statement by the Special Representative of the President at San
Francisco, September 5, 1951 .
448-462
12. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 14,
1952 (Excerpt).
463-483
RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY
13. Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal
Republic of Germany (Paris Protocol), October 23, 1954 . 483-485
14. Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal
Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, as Amended by Schedule I
to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in
the Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, 1954 .
486–498
15. Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their
Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, as
Amended by Schedule II to the Protocol on the Termination of the
Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, October
23, 1954.
498-538
16. Finance Convention, May 26, 1952, as Amended by Schedule III to
the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the
Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, `1954 . .
539-556
17. Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and
the Occupation, May 26, 1952, as Amended by Schedule IV to the
Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the
Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, 1954. .
557-607
18. Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and Their Members,
May 26, 1952, as Amended by Schedule V to the Protocol on the
Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of
Germany, October 23, 1954
607-610
19. Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic
of Germany, October 23, 1954
610-612
20. Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in the Federal
Republic of Germany, October 23, 1954
(Agreement on the Saar Between the Federal Republic of Germany and
France With Accompanying Letters, October 23, 1954]
21. Report by the Secretary of State to the President, November 12, 1954. 613-623
22. Message by the President to the Senate, November 15, 1954 .
23. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 31, 1955.627-64
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC AUSTRIA
24. Austrian State Treaty, May 15, 1955
643-675
25. Report by the Secretary of State to the President, May 27, 1955. 676–680
26. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 15, 1955. 682–691
619
613
623-62
:
CONTENTS
X
18
PART IV.
ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS: NEAR EAST,
KOREA, INDO-CHINA
11
17
NEAR EAST
Page
62
1. Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, February 24, 1949. 698-707
2. Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, March 23, 1949, . 707-711
83 3. Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, April 3, 1949
712-718
4. Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, July 20, 1949.
719-724
KOREA
85 5. Armistice Agreement Between the United Nations Commander in
Korea and the Commanders of Communist Forces in Korea,
July 27, 1953, Together With Annex and Supplementary Tem-
porary Agreement
724-750
98
INDO-CHINA
6. Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, July 20, 1954. 750-767
7. Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, July 20, 1954. 767-775
38
8. Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, July 20, 1954, . 775–785
9. Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Re-
storing Peace in Indo-China, July 21, 1954 .
785-787
56 10. Statement by the Under Secretary of State at the Concluding Plenary
Session of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954 .
787-788
PART V. BASIC SECURITY TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES
507
THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE (Rio
PACT)
1. Text of Treaty, September 2, 1947
789-796
510
519
2. Report aby the Acting Secretary of State to the President, December 1796–
296-800
1947.
796-800
3. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 5,
1947 (Excerpts).
800-812
519
613
62
67
68
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
62 4. Text of Treaty, April 4, 1949.
.. 812–815
64 5. Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, April 27, 1949
815-825
6. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1949 825–852
7. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece
and Turkey, October 17, 1951.
853-854
697 8. Report by the Secretary of State to the President, December 21, 1951 854-856
9. Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 15, 1952. . 856-858
10. Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, January 15, 1952 .
858–864
XI
CONTENTS
t
1
Pagt
11. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21,
1952. .
864-871
12. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal
Republic of Germany, October 23, 1954
871-873
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
13. Text of Treaty, August 30, 1951
873-875
14. Statement Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Special Repre-
sentative of the President, January 7, 1952 (Excerpts). 875-876
15. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 14,
1952 (Excerpt)
876--877
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, AND
NEW ZEALAND (ANZUS)
16. Text of Treaty, September 1, 1951
878-880
17. Statement Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Special Repre-
sentative of the President, January 7, 1952 (Excerpts). 880-882
18. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 14,
1952 (Excerpt)
882-885
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
19. Text of Treaty, September 8, 1951
885-886
20. Statement by the Secretary of State at the Signing Ceremony, Sep-
tember 8, 1951
886-888
21. Statement Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Special Repre-
sentative of the President, January 7, 1952 (Excerpts)
888-893
22. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 14,
1952 (Excerpt).
893-896
897-898
898-900
902-919
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
23. Text of Treaty, October 1, 1953. .
24. Joint Statement by the Secretary of State and the President of the
Republic of Korea, August 8, 1953
25. Report by the Secretary of State to the President, December 30, 1953.900-909
26. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21,
1954.
SOUTHEAST Asia COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY (MANILA PACT)
27. Text of Treaty, September 8, 1954
28. Protocol to the Treaty, September 8, 1954
29. Pacific Charter, September 8, 1954
30. Statement by the Secretary of State at Manila, September 6, 1954. 917–919
31. Address by the Secretary of State, September 15, 1954.
32. Report by the Secretary of State to the President, November 2, 1954 923–99 1
33. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 25,
1
1955.
912-911
916
916-911
1
1
919-92
929-945
CONTENTS
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Page
34. Text of Treaty, December 2, 1954.
945-947
35. Exchange of Notes Between the Secretary of State and the Chinese
Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 10, 1954
947-949
36. Joint United States-Chinese Statement, December 1, 1954 .
949
37. Report by the Secretary of State to the President, December 22, 1954.950–952
38. Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, February 7, 1955 .
952-957
39. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 8,
957-965
1955.
PART VI. EUROPEAN REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
1. Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective
Self-Defense (Brussels Treaty), March 17, 1948 .
968-971
2. Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To
Accede to the Brussels Treaty, October 23, 1954 .
972
3. Protocol No. I (and Annex) Modifying and Completing the Brussels
Treaty, October 23, 1954.
972-976
4. Protocol No. II on Forces of Western European Union, October 23,
1954.
977-979
5. Protocol No. III (and Annexes) on the Control of Armaments, October
23, 1954 .
979-984
6. Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the
Control of Armaments, October 23, 1954. .
984-989
7. Statement by the President on United States Policy Respecting the
Western European Union, March 10, 1955 .
989-991
THE ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
8. Convention and Supplementary Protocols, April 16, 1948
992-1000
.
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
9. Statute, May 5, 1949, Incorporating Amendments Approved by the
Committee of Ministers at Strasbourg in 1951 and 1953 1001-1012
THE EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION
10. Agreement, September 19, 1950.
· 1012-1037
11. Protocol of Provisional Application of the Agreement, September 19,
1950..
1037-1039
THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
12. Treaty, April 18, 1951 .
1039–1078
13. Protocol Concerning Relations With the Council of Europe, April 18,
1951.
1078-1079
14. Convention Containing the Transitional Provisions, April 18, 1951 1079–1097
15. Agreement Between the United States and the European Coal and
Steel Community, April 23, 1954 .
1097-1107
XIV
CONTENTS
THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY
Page
16. Treaty, May 27, 1952
1107-1150
17. Military Protocol, May 27, 1952 .
1151-1162
18. Financial Protocol, May 27, 1952 .
1163-1170
19. Protocol Concerning Relations Between the European Defense Com-
munity and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 27,
1952.
1171
20. [First] Special Protocol, May 27, 1952 .
1172
21. (Second) Special Protocol, May 27, 1952.
1172
22. Treaty Between the United Kingdom and the Member States of the
European Defense Community, May 27, 1952 .
1172-1173
23. Additional Protocol Annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European
Defense Community, Concerning Guaranties of Assistance From
the Member States of the Community to the States Parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty, May 27, 1952 .
1173-1174
24. Common Declaration by the Foreign Ministers, May 27, 1952 . 1174-1175
25. Protocol Concerning the Interim Committee, May 27, 1952 .
1175
26. Jurisdictional Protocol, May 27, 1952.
1175-1184
27. Convention Relative to the Status of European Defense Forces and
the Tax and Commercial Regime of the European Defense Com-
munity, May 27, 1952 .
1184-1196
28. Tripartite Declaration, May 27, 1952
1197-1198
29. Statement by the President on United States Policy Respecting the
Relationship Between the European Defense Community and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 15, 1954 .
1198-1200
30. Final Communiqué of the Brussels Conference of Foreign Ministers
of the Proposed European Defense Community, August 22, 1954. 1200–1201
THE EUROPEAN (POLITICAL) COMMUNITY
31. Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute, March 10, 1953 .
1201-1230
32. Protocol on Links With the Council of Europe, March 10, 1953. 1231-1237
THE BALKAN PACT
33. Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration Between the Turkish Republic,
the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia, February 28, 1953
1233-123
34. Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance
Between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Balkan Pact), August 9,
1954. .
1235–123
TAE WARSAW SECURITY PACT
35. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between
the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bul-
garia, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic
Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's
Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czecho-
slovak Republic, May 14, 1955
1232-126
S
CONTENTS
PART VII. MIDDLE EASTERN REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Page
1. Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945
1243-1249
2. Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the
States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950
1249-1253
3. Agreement for Friendly Cooperation Between the Dominion of Pakistan
and the Republic of Turkey, April 2, 1954 (and Amendment of
August 19, 1954)
1253–1256
4. Pact_of Mutual Cooperation Between the Kingdom of Iraq, the
Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of
Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Iran (Baghdad Pact), February 24,
1955. .
1257-1259
PART VIII, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEVELOPMENTS
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE Rio PACT
1. The Costa Rica-Nicaragua Incident (1948-1949): Report by the Ad-
viser to the United States Member of the Committee of Informa-
tion, Including the Conclusions of the Committee and Actions
Taken by the Council of the Organization of American States,
June 5, 1949 (Excerpts)
1260-1267
2. The Situation Between Haiti and the Dominican Republic: Decision
of the Council of the Organization of American States, February
25, 1949
1268
3. The Caribbean Situation: Decisions, With an Introductory State-
ment, Adopted by the Council of the Organization of American
States, April 8, 1950.
1268–1279
4. The Costa Rica-Nicaragua Incident (1955): Report of the Investigat-
ing Committee, Presented to the Council of the Organization of
American States on February 18, 1955 (Excerpts)
1279-1283
5. The Costa Rica-Nicaragua Incident (1955): Resolution of the Council
of the Organization of American States, September 8, 1955 1284–1285
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE
COMMITTEE
6. Second Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee, February 3,
1954 (Excerpts)
1285–1290
[a] Establishment and Organization of the Committee .
1285–1286
[b] Situation Between the Dominican Republic and Cuba (1948) 1286-1287
(c) Situation Between Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1949) · 1287
(d) Situation Between Cuba and Peru (1949).
1288
(e] Situation in the Caribbean (1949)
1288–1289
[f] Invitation of the Government of Cuba (1949)
1289
[g] Note to the Government of the Dominican Republic (1949) 1289
[h] Situation Between Cuba and the Dominican Republic (1951). 1289–1290
{i} Situation Between Colombia and Peru (1953–1954).
1290
7. Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee on the Controversy
Between Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, July 8, 1954
(Excerpts)
1291-1292
XVI
CONTENTS
TaE FOUNDATIONS OF COMMON DEFENSE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNISM AND AGGRESSION
Pago
8. The Unity of the American Republics: Final Act of the Fourth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States,
April 7, 1951 (Excerpts)
1292-1299
9. Strengthening Democratic Institutions: The Declaration of Caracas,
Adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference, March 28,
1954.
1299-1300
10. Meeting the Threat to Peace and Security: Declaration of Solidarity
for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States Against International Communist Intervention, Adopted
by the Tenth Inter-American Conference, March 28, 1954 . 1300–1302
11. Reaffirmation of Support of the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity:
Senate Concurrent Resolution 91 (83d Congress, 2d Session),
June 29, 1954.
1302
(Bilateral Military Assistance Agreements Between the United States
of America and Other American Republics, 1952–1955) . . 1303
THE GUATEMALAN SITUATION: AN EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNIST INTERVENTION IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
12. The Guatemalan Communist Party: An Analysis by the Department
of State, May 1954 (Summary)
1303—1307
13. Communist Shipment of Arms to Guatemala: Statement to the Press
by the Department of State, May 17, 1954 .
1307-1308
14. Significant Facts in Judging Communist Influence in Guatemala:
Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, May
25, 1954 (Excerpts).
1308–1309
15. The Status of Consultations With Regard to Guatemala: Transcript
of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, June 8, 1954
(Excerpts)
1310–1311
16. Convocation of a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Resolution
of the Council of the Organization of American States, June 28,
1954.
17. International Communism in Guatemala: Address by the Secretary of
State, June 30, 1954
1311-1315
18. The Extension of Recognition to the New Government of Guatemala:
Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, July 8,
1954..
1311
1316
INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
19. Principles for an Expanded Program of Technical Assistance: Resolu-
tion of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, April 10,
1950..
1316-1325
20. Technical Cooperation Program of the Organization of American States:
Status of Contributions as of May 2, 1955 (Chart)
21. United States-Latin American Relations: Report to the President by
Special Ambassador Milton S. Eisenhower, November 18, 1953
(Excerpts)
1327-1333
22. Understanding and Cooperation: Address by the Secretary of State at
the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth Inter-American Con-
ference, Caracas, March 4, 1954 (Excerpt)
1333-1336
1326
CONTENTS
XVII
Page
23. Inter-American Economic Cooperation: Final Declaration of the
Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy of the American
Republics, December 2, 1954 .
1337-1338
24. United States Economic Relations With the Other American Re-
publics: Summary and Appraisal by the United States Delegation
to the Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy of the Ameri-
can Republics, Quitandinha, Brazil, December 1954 .
1338-1340
(Inter-American Participation in the "Atoms for Peace" Program]
1340
25. The Pan American Highway: Letter From the President to the Vice
President on the Need for Accelerating the Completion of the
Inter-American Highway (With Chart Résumé, by Country),
April 1, 1955 (Excerpt).
1341-1342
26. Jurisdiction Over Fishing Areas: Final Act of the Conference on
United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations, Quito, March 25-
April 14, 1953 (Excerpt).
1343-1346
27. Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the High Seas: Address
by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, May 13,
1955.
1346-1356
28. Fishery Conservation Problems: Article on the Conference Between
Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and the United States at Santiago, Chile,
September 14-October 5, 1955
1356–1364
29. Revision of Prior Agreements Relating to the Security and Operation
of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone: Treaty of Mutual
Understanding and Cooperation, With Memorandum of Under-
standings Reached, Between the United States of America and
the Republic of Panama, January 25, 1955 (Excerpts) ... 1364–1376
30. Entry of Mexican Agricultural Workers Into the United States:
Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951, as Amended, Between the
United States and Mexico, as Extended on December 23, 1955. 1376-1403
CANADIAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS
31. Economic Cooperation: Joint Statement of Principles, October 26,
1950.
1403-1404
32. Establishment of a Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs:
White House Announcement, November 12, 1953 .
1404
33. Trade, Defense, and the Seaway and Power Project: Joint Commu-
niqué, November 14, 1953
1405-1406
34. St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project: Exchange of Notes Between
the Acting Secretary of State and the Canadian Ambassador in
Washington, June 30, 1952 .
1406–1409
35. Applications for Power Development on the St. Lawrence: Order of
Approval of the International Joint Commission on Its Docket
No. 68, October 29, 1952 (Excerpts)...
1409–1413
36. Special Cabinet Committee Recommendations on the St. Lawrence
Seaway Project: White House Press Release, May 8, 1953, 1413–1414
37. The Economic Basis for the St. Lawrence Seaway: Conclusions of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 1953 (Excerpts). 1414-1417
38. St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation: Public Law 358 (83d Congress, 2d
Session), May 13, 1954 .
1418-1424
39. St. Lawrence Seaway Project: Exchange of Notes Between the United
States Chargé d'Affaires at Ottawa and the Canadian Secretary
of State for External Affairs, August 17, 1954.
1424_1427
4159004-57-Vol. 22
XVIII
CONTENTS
Page
40. Cooperative Arrangements for Defense-The “Pinetree” Line: Joint
Statement by the United States and Canadian Governments,
April 8, 1954.
1427-1428
41. Further Cooperation for Defense The "Mid-Canada” and “DEW”
Lines: Joint Statement by the United States and Canadian
Governments, September 27, 1954.
1429-1430
STATUS OF THE ANTARCTIC REGION
42. Memorandum of the Department of State, March 30, 1956.
1430-1431
PART IX. WESTERN EUROPE
1457
1457
A. General
BASIC UNITED STATES POLICY
1. Address by the Secretary of State, May 31, 1950. .
1432-1441
2. Address by the Secretary of State, February 12, 1953
1441-1445
3. Address by the Secretary of State, April 29, 1953
1445-1449
4. Address by the Secretary of State, December 22, 1953 .
1449–1457
(Radio Interview With the Secretary of State, April 4, 1954) .
(Report by the Secretary of State to the President, May 17, 1955).
TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS, 1950–1953
5. Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France (London), May 13, 1950 . 1458–1459
Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, and Canada (London), May 18, 1950. 1459–1460
7. Interim Communiqué on the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France (New York),
September 14, 1950 .
1461
8. Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France (New York), September 19, 1950 .
9. Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France (London), February 19, 1952 .
10. Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France (Washington), July 14, 1953 . 1463–1467
11. Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France (London), October 18, 1953. i 1467-1468
12. Communiqué by the Heads of Government of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France (Bermuda), December 7, 1953 . 1468–1470
THE LONDON AND PARIS CONFERENCES, SEPTEMBER OCTOBER 1954
13. Statement by the Secretary of State to the Press, August 24, 1954 .
1470-1471
14. Statement by the Secretary of State to the Press, August 31, 1954 . 1471–1473
15. Statement by the Secretary of State to the Press, September 18, 1954. 1473–1474
16. Final Act of the London Nine-Power Conference, October 3, 1954 . 1474–1491
17. Statement by the Secretary of State on the Results of the London
Conference, October 4, 1954 .
18. Communiqué Issued at Paris by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine
Powers, October 21, 1954 ·
1492-1493
1462
1463
1492
CONTENTS
XIX
Page
19. Resolution of the North Atlantic Council, October 22, 1954... 1493-1496
[The Paris Conference: Report by the Secretary of State to the President
and the Cabinet, October 25, 1954).
1496
20. Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Mrch 29, 1955 .
1497-1504
B. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ASSIGNMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS TO NATO
21. Statement by the President to the Press, September 9, 1950 . .
1504
22. Letter From the President to General of the Army Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, December 19, 1950
1505
23. Remarks by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, December
22, 1950
1505-1510
24. Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Senate Committees on
Foreign Relations and Armed Services, February 16, 1951 .. 1510–1519
25. Statement by the Consultant to the Secretary of State Before the
Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,
February 26, 1951
1520-1526
26. Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, April 4, 1951 (82d Congress, 1st
1526-1528
0
Session)
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE STATUS OF NATO
0
27. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regard-
ing the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951 .
1529-1544
28. Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
National Representatives and International Staff, September 20,
1951.
1544-1552
29. Agreement Between the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Respecting Service of United States Nationals in
the Organization, September 29, 1951 .
1552--1553
30. Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set up
Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, August 28, 1952 . . 1553–1559
31. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the
North Atlantic Council Concerning the Employment by Inter-
national Military Headquarters of United States Nationals,
February 25, 1953 .
1560-1561
32. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Agreements
Relating to the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters, April 28, 1953. . 1561-1581
33. Understanding of the Senate in Advising Ratification of the Status of
Forces Agreement, July 15, 1953 .
1581-1582
34. Testimony by the Deputy Under Secretary of State Before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Proposed Revision of Agree-
ments Granting Foreign countries Criminal Jurisdiction Over
American Armed Forces Stationed Within Their Boundaries,
July 19, 1955 . .
1582-1593
THE WORK OF NATO
35. First Session of the North Atlantic Council (Washington): Com-
muniqué, September 17, 1949.
1594-1600
36. Second Session of the North Atlantic Council (Washington): Com-
muniqué, November 18, 1949.
1600-1604
XX
CONTENTS
Paga
37. Third Session of the North Atlantic Council (Washington): Com-
muniqué, January 6, 1950 .
1604
38. Fourth Session of the North Atlantic Council (London): Communiqué,
May 19, 1950.
1604-1606
39. First Part of the Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council (New
York): Communiqué, September 18, 1950 .
1606-1607
40. Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council (New York): Communiqué,
September 26, 1950 .
. 1607-1608
41. Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Council (Brussels): Communiqué,
December 19, 1950.
1608-1609
42. Administrative Reorganization of NATO: Communiqué by the North
Atlantic Council Deputies (London), May 5, 1951 .
1609-1612
43. Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Ottawa), September 21,
1951.
1613-1614
44. Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council (Ottawa): Communiqué,
September 21, 1951 .
... 1614–1616
45. Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council (Rome): Communiqué,
November 28, 1951
1616-1618
46. Adoption of the Report of the Temporary Council Committee by the
North Atlantic Council: NAC Press Release, February 24,
1952.
1618-1620
47. Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council (Lisbon): Communiqué,
February 26, 1952 .
1620-1624
48. Remarks by the Secretary of State Before the North Atlantic Council
(Paris), December 18, 1952 .
1624-1629
49. Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council (Paris): Com-
muniqué, December 18, 1952 .
1629-1631
50. Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council (Paris): Com-
muniqué, April 25, 1953 .
.. 1631-1633
51. Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council (Paris): Com-
muniqué, December 16, 1953 .
. . 1633-1636
52. Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council (Paris): Com-
muniqué, Apı il 23, 1954 .
1636-1637
53. Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council (Paris): Com-
muniqué, October 22, 1954 .
1637-1639
54. The First Five Years of NATO: Report by the Secretary-General of
NATO, November 1, 1954 (Excerpt)
1639-1652
55. Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council (Paris): Com-
muniqué, December 18, 1954 . .
1653–1655
56. Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, December
21, 1954 .
.. 1655-1657
57. Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council (Paris): Com-
muniqué, May 11, 1955 .
.. 1657-1658
58. Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council (Paris): Com-
muniqué, December 16, 1955 ..
1658–1660
<
C. Relations With Certain Countries
BELGIUM
59. Communiqué Regarding Conversations Between the Secretary of
State and the Belgian Foreign Minister, March 17, 1953 . . 1660-1661
CONTENTS
XXI
DENMARK
Page.
60. Defense of Greenland: Agreement Between the United States and the
Kingdom of Denmark, April 27, 1951
1661-1667
1Suspension of Defense Support Aid: Summary of Statement by the
Director for Mutual Security, June 11, 1953] .
1667
FRANCE
61. Military Aid to France and Indochina: Statement by the Depart-
ment of State Regarding Franco-American Conversations, Octo-
ber 17, 1950
1668–1669
62. Franco-American Views: Communiqué by the President of the
United States and the Premier of France, January 30, 1951 (Ex-
cerpts).
1669-1671
63. State Visit of the President of the French_Republic: Communiqué
Regarding Conversations Between the President of the United
States and the President of the French Republic, March 29, 1951 . 1672
64. Review of French and American Policies: Communiqué Regarding
Franco-American Discussions, March 28, 1953
1672–1675
65. Assurances to France: Letter From the President of the United States
to the President of the French Republic, June 18, 1954 1675-1676
66. Review of French Interests and Policies: Franco-American Com-
muniqué, November 20, 1954 .
1676–1677
ICELAND
67. Defense of Iceland: Agreement Between the United States and the
Republic of Iceland, May 5, 1951 .
1677-1679
68. Implementation of the United States-Icelandic Defense Agreement:
Statement by the Department of State to the Press, May 26, 1954 . 1679
ITALY
69. Interpretation of the Italian Peace Treaty: Declaration by the Gov-
ernments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France,
September 26, 1951
1680
70. Political Support and Economic Aid to Italy: Communiqué by the
Secretary of State and the Italian Premier, September 26, 1951. 1681-1683
71. Release of Italy from Certain Peace Treaty Obligations: Note From
the Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador, December 21,
1951. .
1683
72. Italian-United States Policy Review: Communiqué Regarding Italo-
American Conversations, March 30, 1955
. 1683-1685
PORTUGAL
73. Military Facilities in the Azores: Agreement Between Portugal and
the United States, September 6, 1951
1685 1689
74. Portuguese-American Conversations: Communiqué by the Secretary
of State and the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Decem-
ber 2, 1955 .
1689
SPAIN
75. Relations With Spain: Letter From the Secretary of State to the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January
18, 1950.
1690-1695
XXII
CONTENTS
Pagi
76. Military Facilities in Spain: Statement by the Secretary of State,
July 18, 1951. .
1695-1696
77. Military Facilities in Spain: Statement by the Secretary of State,
March 12, 1952 .
1696
78. Military Facilities in Spain: Agreement Between the United States
and Spain, September 26, 1953 .
1696–1698
(Report on United States Relations With Spain: Address by the American
Ambassador to Spain, December 10, 1955) .
1698
UNITED KINGDOM
.
79. Joint Political Aims of the United States and the United Kingdom:
Communiqué by the President of the United States and the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom, January 9, 1952 .
1699-1701
80. Allocation of British and American Strategic Materials: Communiqué
by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom, January 18, 1952
1701-1702
81. Anglo-American Economic Policies: Communiqué Regarding Discus-
sions, March 7, 1953 (Excerpt)
1702-1704
82. Exchange of Views on Political Matters: Statement by the Secretary
of State and the British Foreign Secretary, April 13, 1954 . 1704–1705
83. General Policy Review: Statement by the President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, June 28,
1954.
1705-1706
84. Common Principles of Anglo-American Policy: Declaration by the
President of the United States and the Prine Minister of the
United Kingdom (Potomac Charter), June 29, 1954 .
+
1707
PART X. GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
+
A. Relations with the German Federal Republic, 1950–1955
1. Allied Policy Toward Germany: Declaration Issued at London by the
Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, May 14, 1950
1709-1711
2. Allied Policy Toward Germany: Communiqué Issued at Washington
and New York by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, September 19, 1950.
1711-1713
3. Revision of the Charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany:
Agreement Between the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, March 6, 1951 .
1714-1717
4. Revision of the Occupation Statute: Proclamation by the Allied High
Commission, March 6, 1951
1717-1718
5. Revision of Occupation Controls: Decision No. 10 of the Allied High
Commission, March 6, 1951
1718-1719
6. Competence of the Federal Government in Foreign Affairs: Decision
No. 11 of the Allied High Commission, March 6, 1951
1719-1720
7. Inclusion of Germany in the European Community: Declaration
Issued at Washington by the Foreign Ministers of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France, September 14, 1951. 1720–1721
8. Allied Policy Toward Germany: Communiqué by the Foreign Minis-
ters of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France,
September 14, 1951
1721-1723
CONTENTS
XXIII
0
Page
9. Termination of the State of War Between the United States and Ger-
many: Proclamation by the President, October 24, 1951 ... 1723-1724
10. Relations Between the German Federal Republic and the Allies:
Statement to the Press by the Foreign Ministers of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France and the Chancellor and
Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic, November 22,
1951.
1724-1726
11. Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France and the Chancellor of the German Federal
Republic, February 19, 1952
1726–1727
12. The Bonn Agreements: Statement by the Secretary of State, May 26,
1952. .
1727-1728
13. German-American Relations: Communiqué by the President of the
United States and the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic,
April 9, 1953
1729–1732
14. Restoration of German Sovereignty: Senate Resolution No. 295 (83d
Congress, 2d Session), July 30, 1954
1732
15. German-American Relations: Statement to the Press by the President
of the United States and the Chancellor of the German Federal
Republic, October 28, 1954
1732-1734
16. Termination of the Occupation Regime: Proclamation by the Allied
High Commission, May 5, 1955
1734
17. United States Authority and Functions in Germany: Executive Order
10608, May 5, 1955
1735 1736
18. German-American Relations: Statement to the Press by the President
of the United States and the Chancellor of the German Federal
Republic, June 14, 1955
1736-1737
B. Berlin and East Germany, 1950-1955
19. Allied Rights in Berlin: Statement to the Press by the Foreign Minis-
ters of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, May
13, 1950
1737
20. Remilitarization of East Germany: Note From the American Am-
bassador at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Minister, May 23,
1737-1739
21. Allied Policy in Berlin: Declaration by the Allied Kommandatura,
May 26, 1952.
1740-1742
22. Disorders in the Soviet Zone: Letter From the United States High
Commissioner to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in
Berlin, November 3, 1952 .
1742-1744
23. Berlin Uprising: Message From the Allied Commandants in Berlin to
the Representative of the Soviet Control Commission, June 18,
1953.
1744
24. Berlin Uprising: Letter From the Allied Commandants in Berlin to the
Soviet Military Commander in Berlin, June 24, 1953
1745
25. Berlin Uprising: Statement by the Secretary of State at a Press Con-
ference, June 30, 1953
1745-1746
26. Uprising in East Germany: Letter From the President of the United
States to the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, July
23, 1953
1746–1749
27. East Germany--Friendship and Sympathy of the American People:
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 36 (83d Congress, 1st Session),
August 3, 1953.
1749 1750
1950.
XXIV
CONTENTS
1758
Pen
28. Removal of Interzonal Barriers: Note From the United States High
Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner, August 26,
1953. .
1750-1751
29. Removal of Interzonal Barriers: Letter From the United States High
Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner, September 17,
1953. .
1751-1752
30. Removal of Interzonal Barriers: Letter From the United States High
Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner, February 22,
1954..
1752-1754 5
31. Removal of Interzonal Barriers: Letter From the United States Com-
mandant in Berlin to the Berlin Representative of the Soviet High
Commissioner, February 22, 1954 .
1754-17555
32. Removal of Interzonal Barriers: Note From the United States High
Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner, March 17,
1954.
1755-1756
33. Status of East Germany: Joint Declaration by the United States,
British, and French High Commissioners, April 8, 1954 1756–1757
34. Removal of Interzonal Barriers: Letter From the United States High
Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner, May 24, 1954. 1757-1758
1
35. Allied Policy Toward Berlin: Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, October
5
23, 1954 .
36. Road Tolls in the Soviet Zone: Letter From the United States High
5
Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner, March 31,
1955.,
1758-1759
5
37. Road Tolls in the Soviet Zone: Letter From the United States High
Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner, April 15,
1955
1759-1760
38. Road Tolls in the Soviet Zone: Letter From the United States High
Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner, May 2, 1955 . 1760–1761
-17
을
​39. Road Tolls in the Soviet Zone: Communiqué by the American, British,
and French Ambassadors to Germany, May 20, 1955 ..
1761
40. The Soviet Union and East Germany: Statement to the Press by the
Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, September 28, 1955
1761-1769 €
41. The Soviet Union and East Germany: Note From the American Em-
bassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, October 3,
€
1955.
42. Detention of American Citizens in East Berlin: Letter From the
E
United States Commander to the Soviet Commander, November
28, 1955
.. 1763–1764
€
43. Detention of American Citizens in East Berlin: Note From the
American Ambassador to the German Federal Republic to the
f
Soviet Representative in the Soviet Zone, December 1, 1955. 1764-1765
44. Status of Berlin: Remarks to the Press by the Secretary of State,
December 6, 1955 .
€
1769
€
1763
f
f
C. Relations With Austria, 1950–1955
45. Communist Disturbances: Statement to the Press by the Acting
Secretary of State, October 6, 1950
46. Communist Disturbances: Message From the Acting Secretary of
State to the Austrian Chancellor, October 7, 1950.
1786
€
1766–1767
CONTENTS
XXV
Pago
47. Communist Disturbances: Note From the American Ambassador at
Moscow to the Acting Soviet Foreign Minister, November 10,
1950.
1767-1769
48. Travel Requirements: Statement to the Press by the Department of
State, November 20, 1950
1769
49. Soviet Interference in Austrian Affairs: Note From the American
Ambassador at Moscow to the Acting Soviet Foreign Minister,
November 22, 1950 .
1769–1771
50. Reply to Soviet Charges Regarding American Policy: Statement be-
fore the Allied Council by the United States High Commissioner,
October 12, 1951 .
1771-1775
51. Soviet Charges Against Austria: Instruction From the Secretary of
State to the United States Representative on the Allied Council,
May 20, 1954.
1775-1776
52. Austro-American Relations: Joint Communiqué, November 26,
1954.
1776-1777
53. Austrian Neutrality: Note From the Secretary of State to the Austrian
Ambassador, December 6, 1955 .
1777-1778
D. Negotiations With Other Nations Regarding Germany, 1950–1952
54. Statement by the United States High Commissioner, February 28,
1950.
1778-1779
55. Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France, May 14, 1950 .
1779-1780
56. Letter From the United States Commandant in Berlin to the Chairman
of the Soviet Control Commission, May 25, 1950
1780–1781
57. Statement to the Press by the Secretary of State, October 25, 1950 1782–1784
58. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Minister of
Foreign Affairs, December 22, 1950
1784-1786
59. Note From the American Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow to the Soviet
Foreign Minister, January 23, 1951
1786-1788
60. Note From the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Minister, February 19, 1951
1788-1789
61. Note From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Minister, May
31, 1951 .
1789-1791
62. Note From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Minister,
June 15, 1951. ..
1792-1793
63. Declaration by the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France, June 21, 1951 .
1793
64. Note From the Allied High Commission to the Chancellor of the
German Federal Republic, October 15, 1951 .
1794-1795
65. General Assembly Resolution 510 (VI), December 20, 1951 . • 1795–1797
66. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, March 25, 1952
1797-1798
67. First Report of the United Nations Commission To Investigate Con-
ditions for Free Elections in Germany, April 30, 1952 (Excerpt) 1798-1809
68. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, May 13, 1952 .
1809-1813
69. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, July 10, 1952
1813-1814
XXVI
CONTENTS
Page
70. Second Report of the United Nations Commission To Investigate Con-
ditions for Free Elections in Germany, August 5, 1952 . 1814-1819
71. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, September 23, 1952. .
1819–1821
E. Austrian State Treaty Negotiations, 1950–1958
72. Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France, May 19, 1950
182
73. Note From the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet
Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 12, 1950
1822-182
74. Statement to the Press by the Secretary of State, July 12, 1950. 1823-1824
75. Statement Released to the Press by the Department of State, December
15, 1950.
182
76. Statement to the Press by the United States High Commissioner,
October 31, 1951.
1825-182
77. Note From the Secretary-General of the Austrian Treaty Deputies
to the Soviet Embassy at London, January 24, 1952.
182
78. Statement by the Governments of the United States, the United King-
dom, and France, February 28, 1952.
1821
79. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, March 13, 1952
1828-182
80. The Abbreviated Draft Treaty With Austria, March 13, 1952 1829-1831
81. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, May 9, 1952 .
82. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, September 5, 1952.
1832-1836
83. General Assembly Resolution 613 (VII), December 20, 1952
1834-183
84. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, January 12, 1953.
85. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, January 29, 1953.
1835-1836
86. Statement to the Press by the Department of State, February 10,
1953.
1831
(VII
183
1831
183
1837-182
87. Joint Note From the American, British, and French Deputies for the
Austrian Treaty to the Soviet Deputy, May 26, 1953
88. Note From the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Minister, June 11, 1953
F. Negotiations Regarding Germany, Austria, and European Security, 1953-54
89. Note From the United States Government to the Soviet Government,
July 15, 1953.,
90. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, August 17, 1953
91. Note From the United States Government to the Soviet Government,
September 2, 1953. .
92. Statement to the Press by the Secretary of State, September 3, 1953 1843–184
93. Note From the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Minister, October 18, 1953 .
1839-184
1840-184
.....-..,
1841-184
.
1844-184
CONTENTS
XXVII
Page
94. Note From the American Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow to the Soviet
Foreign Ministry, November 16, 1953 .
1846-1847
95. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Minister, November 25, 1953.
1847-1848
96. Note (From the United States Government to the Austrian Govern-
ment, January 12, 1954 .
1848-1849
G. Discussion of the Problems of Germany, Austria, and European Security
at the Berlin Meeting of Foreign Ministers, January 25-February 18,
1964
97. Note From the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet
Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 8, 1953 .
1849-1850
98. Statement by the Secretary of State, January 30, 1954 (Excerpt). 1850–1852
99. Statement by the Secretary of State, February 5, 1954 .
1852-1855
100. Statement by the Secretary of State, February 10, 1954 (Excerpts) 1855–1858
101. Statement by the Secretary of State, February 13, 1954. ... 1858–1861
102. Statement by the Secretary of State, February 15, 1954 (Excerpt) 1861-1864
103. Statement by the Secretary of State, February 16, 1954.
1864-1867
104. Statement by the Secretary of State, February 17, 1954.
1867-1870
105. Conclusion of the Berlin Conference: Communiqué by the Foreign
Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
the Soviet Union, February 18, 1954 (Excerpt).
1870
106. Conclusion of the Berlin Conference: Communiqué by the Foreign
Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France,
February 19, 1954
1870-1871
H. Negotiations Regarding Germany, Austria, and European Security,
1954-1965
107. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, May 7, 1954.
1872-1874
108. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, September 10, 1954.
. 1875–1877
109. Summary of Austrian Treaty Negotiations, December 20, 1952-
November 19, 1954: Report by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, November 19, 1954 .
1877-1881
110. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, November 29, 1954
1881-1883
111. Declaration by the Governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France, April 5, 1955
1884
112. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, April 22, 1955.
1885
113. Statement at a Press Conference by the Secretary of State, May 24,
1955.
1885-1886
1. Discussion of the Problems of Germany and European Security at the
Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955
114, Note From the United States, British, and French Governments to
the Soviet Government, May 10, 1955
1886–1887
115. Statement by the Secretary of State, July 19, 1955 (Excerpts) 1887-1888
116 Statement by the President, July 19, 1955 (Excerpt).
1888-1889
XXVIII
CONTENTS
Pago
117. Statement by the Secretary of State, July 20, 1955 .
1890–1891
118. Statement by the Secretary of State, July 20, 1955 .
1891-1892
119. Statement by the President, July 20, 1955.
1893
120. Statement by the President, July 20, 1955.
1894
121. Statement by the Secretary of State, July 21, 1955 (Excerpt)
1895
122. Statement by the Secretary of State, July 21, 1955
1895-1896
123. Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the
Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955 (Excerpt)
1896-1897
J. Discussion of the Problems of Germany and European Security at the
Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955
124. Proposal by the American, British, and French Delegations, October
27, 1955.
1897-1903
125. Statement by the Secretary of State, October 28, 1955.
1903-1907
126. Statement by the Secretary of State, October 29, 1955.
1907-1908
1.27. Statement by the Secretary of State, October 29, 1955.
1909
128. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 2, 1955.
1909-1912
129. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 3, 1955 .
1912-1918
130. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 4, 1955 .
1918-1921
131. Proposal by the American, British, and French Delegations, November
4, 1955
1921-1922
132. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 9, 1955 .
1922-1926
133. Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, November 16, 1955.
1926–1927
0
1
:
.
PART XI. THE SOVIET UNION
A. General
1. Tensions Between the United States and the Soviet Union: Address
by the Secretary of State, March 16, 1950.
1928-1936
2. Soviet Violations of Treaties and Agreements: Department of State
Memorandum, June 1950.
1937-1944
3. Defending the Peace From Soviet Thrusts: Address by the Secretary
of State, April 30, 1951
., 1944-1952
4. American Friendship for the Soviet People: Message From the Presi-
dent of the United States to the President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet Transmitting a Congressional Resolution, July 7,
1951.
1952-1954
5. Reply to Soviet Charges Regarding the Mutual Security Act of 1951:
Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet
Foreign Ministry, December 19, 1951
1954-1955
6. Travel Restrictions on Soviet Officials in the United States: Note
From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Wash-
ington, March 10, 1952.
1955-1956
7. Recall of the American Ambassador: Note From the American
Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, October 8,
1952.
720
1956-1957
CONTENTS
XXIX
Pago.
8. Subjugation of Free Peoples by the Soviet Union: Letter From the
President to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives Transmitting a Draft Resolution,
February 20, 1953. .
1957-1959
9. Draft Resolution on the Subjugation of Free Peoples by the Soviet
Union: Statement by the Secretary of State Before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, February 26, 1953
1959-1961
10. Condemnation of Soviet Persecution of Religious and Ethnic Minori-
ties: Senate Resolution 84 (83d Congress, 1st Session), February
27, 1953.
. 1961-1962
11. Preconditions for Accommodation With the Soviet Union: Remarks by
the Secretary of State at a News Conference, April 3, 1953, 1962–1963
12. Travel Restrictions on Soviet Citizens in the United States: Note From
the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington,
January 3, 1955.
1963-1968
13. Restrictions on Photography and Sketching by Soviet Citizens in the
nited States: Note From the Secretary of State to the Soviet
Ambassador at Washington, January 19, 1955
1968-1969
14. Prospects for Change in Soviet Policy: Statement by the Secretary of
State Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 25,
1955 (Excerpt). .
1969-1971
B. Airplane Incidents
APRIL 8, 1950 INCIDENT (Baltic Area)
15. Note From the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Minister, April 18, 1950 .
1972-1973
16. Note From the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Minister, May 5, 1950.
1973-1974
OCTOBER 7, 1952 INCIDENT (Habomai Islands)
17. Application by the United States to the International Court of Justice,
May 26, 1955.
1974–1976
MARCH 15, 1953 INCIDENT (Kamchatka Peninsula)
18. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, March 18, 1953.
1977
JULY 29, 1953 INCIDENT (Cape Povorotny)
19. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, October 9, 1954 .
1977-1987
SEPTEMBER 4, 1954 INCIDENT (Sea of Japan)
20. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, September 5, 1954 (First Note) .
1987
21. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, September 5, 1954 [Second Note).
1987-1988
JUNE 23, 1955 INCIDENT (St. Lawrence Island)
22. Note From the United States Government to the Soviet Government,
July 7, 1955. .
1988-1989
XXX
CONTENTS
4
4
19924
4
C. Economic and Cultural Relations
Page 4
23. Imports From the Soviet Union and Other Communist Countries:
Proclamation by the President, August 1, 1951 .
1989-1991
24. Suspension of Publication of Amerika and the U. S. S. R. Information
Bulletin: Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the
Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 14, 1952 .
1991
25. East-West Trade Controls: Statement by the Director of Mutual Se-
curity, March 3, 1953.
26. Allied Discussions Regarding East-West Trade: Statement by the Di-
rector of the Foreign Operations Administration, March 31,
1954 .
1993
27. Visit of Soviet Student Editors: Statement by the Department of 5
State, March 10, 1955 .
1993
28. Discussions Regarding Exchange of Medical Films: Note From the
Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Washing-
ton, March 17, 1955.
1994-1995
29. Exchange of Agricultural Delegations: Note From the American Em-
5
bassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, May 17,
1955.
1995-1996
5
30. Exchange of Agricultural Delegations: Statement by the Departments
of State and Agriculture, June 2, 1955 .
. 1996–1997
:5
31. Proposed Russian-Language Magazine: Note From the American Em-
bassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, September 9,
1955.
1997-1998
32. East-West Trade: Statement by the Secretary of Commerce, Novem-
5
ber 3, 1955 (Summary)
1998
5
D. Entry and Residence Privileges of American and Soviet Clergymen
33. Statement by the Department of State, March 2, 1955 .
1999-2000 5
34. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, June 27, 1955 . .
2000–2002 6
35. Statement by the Department of State, November 15, 1955 . . 2002–2004 6
36. Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
6
Ministry, December 10, 1955 .
2004-2005
I
E. Discussion of Soviet- American Relations at the Geneva Conference of Heads
of Government, July 18-23, 1955
6
37. Address by the President on the Eve of His Departure for the Con-
6
ference, July 15, 1955
2005-2008
38. Statement by the President, July 18, 1955.
2009-2012 6
39. Statement by the President, July 22, 1955 .
2012-2013
40. Statement by the President, July 23, 1955 .
2013-2014
41. Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the For-
6
eign Ministers, July 23, 1955 .
2015–2016
42. Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, July 26, 6
1955.
2016-2018
F. Discussion of Soviet-American Relations at the Geneva Meeting of Foreign
Ministers, October 27- November 16, 1955
43. Proposal Submitted by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdoin, and France, October 31, 1955.
2018-2021
CONTENTS
XXXI
0
+
Page
44. Statement by the Secretary of State, October 31, 1955 . . 2021-2025
45. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 14, 1955 2025-2030
46. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 15, 1955 2031-2032
47. Background Paper Released to the Press by the Delegations of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France, November 15,
1955.
2032-2035
48. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 16, 1955 . 2035-2039
49. Quadripartite Communiqué, November 16, 1955 .
2039
G. Negotiations Regarding a Lend-Lease Settlement
50. Statement by the Department of State, January 5, 1951. ... 2039–2040
51. Note From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Wash-
ington, February 7, 1951.
2040-2041
52. Note From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Wash-
ington, April 6, 1951 .
2041-2044
53. Note From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Wash-
ington, April 27, 1951.
2044-2047
54. Note From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Wash-
ington, January 7, 1952 .
2047-2049
55. Tabular Data Released by the Department of State, April 24, 1952. 2050-2051
56. Note From the Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at
Washington, November 5, 1952 .
2052-2053
57. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy
at Washington, September 11, 1953.
2054-2055
58. Note From the Under Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at
Washington, November 24, 1953 .
2055–2056
59. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy
at Washington, December 24, 1953.
2056-2057
80. Statement by the Department of State, March 26, 1954 .
2057
61. Statement by the Department of State, December 23, 1954 .
2058
62. Statement by the Department of State, May 27, 1955.
2058
H. Repatriation of German and Japanese Prisoners of War
33. Statement by the Department of State, February 3, 1950. .
2059
34. Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France, May 13, 1950.
2060
35. Note From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy at Wash-
ington, June 8, 1950.
2060-2062
36. Note From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires at
Washington, June 9, 1950.
2062
37. Note From the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet For-
eign Minister, July 14, 1950.
2063–2065
18. Letter From the Delegations of the United States, the United King-
dom, and Australia to the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, August 25, 1950.
2065-2066
:
XXXI
CONTENTS
PART XII. EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES AND TH
BALTIC STATES
A, General
BASIC UNITED STATES POLICY
РА
1. Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, February
24, 1950..
2067-20€
2. Statement by the President, February 8, 1955
206
INTERPRDTATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLAUSES OF THE PEACE
TREATIES WITH BULGARIA, HUNGARY, AND ROMANIA
3. Note_From the American Legation at Bucharest to the Rumanian
Foreign Ministry, January 5, 1950
207
4. Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, March 30, 1950
(Excerpts)
2070-207
5. Note From the American Legation at Budapest to the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry, April 26, 1950
201
6. Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, July 18, 1950
(Excerpts)
2078-201
7. Resolution 385 (V) of the United Nations General Assembly, Novem-
ber 3, 1950.
2080-200
8. Note From the Secretary of State to the Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires
at Washington, March 18, 1952 .
2081-20
TRAVEL OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES
9. Statement by the Department of State, May 1, 1952
10. Statement by the Department of State, October 31, 1955
20€
20€
B. Albania
11. Statement by the Secretary of State, November 27, 1954. .
2085-201
C. Baltic States
201
12. Aide-Mémoire From the Secretary of State to the Minister of Lith-
uania, the Chargé d'Affaires of Latvia, and the Acting Consul
General of Estonia in Charge of Legation, August 9, 1950 .
20
13. Statement by the Secretary of State Before the House Committee To
Investigate and Study the Seizure and Forced Incorporation of
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the Treatment of Said Baltic Peoples, November
30, 1953.
2087-201
14. Remarks by the Secretary of State to the Latvian Chargé d'Affaires at
Washington, May 24, 1954 .
15. Statement by the Secretary of State, February 15, 1955
2090-20
D. Bulgaria
16. Severance of Diplomatic Relations: Note From the American Legation
at Sofia to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, February 20, 1950. 2091–20
17. Religious Persecution in Bulgaria: Statement by the Department of
State, October 20, 1952
18. Bulgarian Suggestion for Renewal of Diplomatic Relations: Statement
by the Department of State, September 10, 1953
19. Destruction of Israeli Aircraft: Note From the United States Govern-
ment to the Bulgarian Government (Transmitted by the Swiss
Chargé d'Affaires at Sofia), August 2, 1955 . .
•
2093-20
201
2017
CONTENTS
XXXIII
Page
20. Eighth Anniversary of the Execution of Nikola Petkov: Statement by
the Under Secretary of State, September 22, 1955.
2095
E. Czechoslovakia
21. Closing of United States Information Service Libraries and the Czecho-
slovak Consulate General at Chicago: Note From the American
Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, April
21, 1950
2095–2097
22. Reduction of United States Representation in Czechoslovakia and
Closing of Czechoslovak Consulate General at New York: Note
From the American Ambassador at Prague to the Czechoslovak
Foreign Minister, May 27, 1950 .
2098
23. Czechoslovak Charges Regarding Border Violations and Radio Broad-
casts: Note From the American Embassy at Prague to the
Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, June 19, 1951 ..
2099-2102
24. Airplane Incident of June 8, 1951: Note From the American Ambassa-
dor at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, June 24,
1951.
2103-2104
25. Oatis Case: Statement by the Department of State, July 4, 1951. 2104-2105
26. Oatis Case: House Concurrent Resolution 140 (82d Congress, 1st
Session), August 23, 1951. .
2106
27. Czechoslovak Charges Regarding American Policy in Germany: Note
From the American Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak For-
eign Ministry, September 29, 1951
2106–2108
28. Train Incident of September 11, 1951: Note_From the American
Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, Oc-
tober 1, 1951 .
2109-2111
29. The Slansky Trial: Statement by the Secretary of State, December 10,
1952 ..
2111-2112
30, Airplane Incident of March 12, 1954: Note From the American Em-
bassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, March 24,
2112-2113
31. Czechoslovak Protest Regarding Arrival of American Balloons in
Czechoslovakia: Note From
the American Embassy at Prague to
the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, May 24, 1954.
2113-2114
32. Border Incident of July 4, 1954: Note From the American Embassy
at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, July 7, 1954 2114
33. Airplane Incident of March 10, 1953: Application by the United
States to the International Court of Justice, March 22, 1955 . 2115–2117
1954.
P. Hungary
34. Vogeler Case: Note From the American Minister at Budapest to the
Hungarian Foreign Minister, February 1, 1950
2117–2:119
35. Restrictions on Travel of Hungarian Diplomats in the United States:
Note From the Secretary of State to the Hungarian Minister at
Washington, January 29, 1951
2119 2120
36. Vogeler Case: Statement by the Department of State, April 28,
1951.
2120-2121
37. Hungarian Charges Regarding Activities of American Officials: Note
From the American Legation at Budapest to the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry, July 7, 1951 (Excerpt).
2121-2122
38. Mass Deportations From Hungary: Statement by the President,
July 27, 1951 :
2122-2123
415900_57-Tol. 2
3
XXXIV
CONTENTS
...vai....-;:*:
Pago
39. Airplane Incident of November 19, 1951: Statement by the Secretary
of State, December 28, 1951
2123
40. Restrictions on Travel of Hungarian Diplomats in the United States:
Note From the Secretary of State to the Hungarian Minister at
Washington, October 13, 1953
2124–2125
41. Letter From the President to the Executive Chairman of the United
Catholic Organizations for the Freeing of Cardinal Mindszenty,
February 1, 1954
2120
42. Airplane Incident of November 19, 1951: Application by the United
States to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice,
February 16, 1954.
2126-2128
43. Hungarian Protest Regarding_ Arrival of Balloons: Note From the
American Legation at Budapest to the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry, December 17, 1954 . .
2128-2130
44. Message From the Acting Secretary of State to the President of the
Hungarian National Council, February 23, 1955. .
. 2130-2131
45. Harassment of Local Employees of the American Legation at Buda-
nest; Note and Memorandum From the Ainerican Legation to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, July 1, 1955
2131-2134
46. Hungarian Information Activities in the United States: Note From
the Secretary of State to the Hungarian Minister at Washington,
September 1, 1955. ..
2134-2135
G. Poland
1951.
47. Polish Repatriation Activities in Germany: Note From the American
Embassy at Warsaw to the Polish Foreign Ministry, July 19,
2135-2137
48. Polish and United States Information Services: Statement by the
Department of State, August 9, 1951 .
2137-2138
49, Polish and United States Information Services: Note From the
Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador at Washington,
September 20, 1951
2138-2140 €
50. Polish Charges Regarding Alleged Subversive Activities: Note From
the American Embassy at Warsaw to the Polish Foreign Ministry,
February 9, 1953
.
2140-2143
51. Katyn Massacre: Note From the United States Representative at the
United Nations to the Secretary-General, February 10, 1953 . 2143–2144 7
52, 162d Anniversary of the Polish Constitution: Statement by the Secre-
tary of State, May 3, 1953.
53. Religious Persecution in Poland: Statement by the Department of
21447
2145
54. Closing of Polish Consulates General in the United States: Note
From the Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador at Wash-
ington, February 25, 1954
55. Arrest of Polish Underground Leaders in 1945: Note From the Amer-
ican Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, April 21,
1955..
21457
Р
2146-2147
A
H. Rumania
1
86. American Information and Cultural Activities in Rumania: Note
From the American Legation at Bucharest to the Rumanian
Foreign Ministry, April 26, 1950
2147-21482
CONTENTS
XXXV
Page
57. Restrictions on Travel of Rumanian Diplomats in the United States:
Note From the Acting Secretary of State to the Rumanian
Minister at Washington, May 25, 1950 .
· 2148-2149
58. Reduction of United States Representation in Rumania: Statement
by the Acting Secretary of State, May 26, 1950.
2149-2150
59. Rumanian Charges Regarding Alleged_Subversive Activities: Note
From the American Legation at Bucharest to the Rumanian
Foreign Ministry, June 20, 1950.
.. 2150-2151
60. Rumanian-American Relations: Statement by the Secretary of
State, June 23, 1950. .
2151-2152
61. Rumanian Protest Against Travel Restrictions: Note From the
Secretary of State to the Rumanian Minister at Washington,
July 3, 1950
2152–2153
62. Plocsti Trial of Former Employees of the Romano-Americana Oil
Company: Note From the American Legation at Bucharest to
the Rumanian Foreign Ministry, February 20, 1953 .
2153-2156
63. Cessation of Distribution of The Romanian News and News From
America: Note From the Secretary of State to the Rumanian
Minister at Washington, December 31, 1953
2156
64. Anti-Semitism in Rumania: Statement by the Deputy Under Secre-
tary of State to a Delegation of the American Jewish Com-
inittee, June 3, 1954 .
2157
65. Tenth Anniversary of the Communist Seizure of Power: Statement
by the Secretary of State, August 23, 1954 .
2157-2158
66. Restrictions on Photography and Sketching: Note From the Secretary
of State to the Rumanian Minister at Washington, June 9,
1955
2158-2159
67. Death of Juliu Maniu: Statement by the Department of State, Octo-
ber 25, 1955
2159-2160
I. Yugoslavia
68. Military Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Yugo-
slavia, November 14, 1951 .
2160–2163
69. Hostile Activities of the Soviet Union and Its Allies Against Yugo-'
slavia: Resolution 509 (VI) of the United Nations General As-
sembly, December 14, 1951 .
2163-2164
70. Joint Communiqué Regarding Economic Discussions, November 22,
2164
71. Communiqué by the_Ambassadors of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France at Belgrade and the Yugoslav Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June 27, 1955
2165
72. Joint Communiqué Regarding Visit of the Deputy Under Secretary of
State to Belgrade, October 1, 1955 .
2165-2166
13. Statement Regarding Visit by the Secretary of State to Yugoslavia,
November 7, 1955.
2166
1954.
PART XIII. NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
1. Basic United States Policy
.. Increasing Stability and Security in the Middle East: Message by the
President to the Congress, May 24, 1951 (Excerpt).
2167-2168
.. Six Major Policy Issues: Address by the Secretary of State Upon His
Return From a Tour of the Region, June 1, 1953.
2168-2175
XXXVI
CONTENTS
Pagt
3. Progress in Resolving Major Policy Issues: Address by the Secretary of
State, August 26, 1955
2176-2180
B. Defense Arrangements and Facilities
MIDDLE EAST COMMAND NEGOTIATIONS
4. Proposals Presented to the Government of Egypt by the Governme
of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey,
October 13, 1951 .
2180–2182
5. Rejection by Egypt of the Joint Proposals: Statement by the Secretary
of State, October 17, 1951.
. 2182-2183
6. Guiding Principles of the Proposed Middle East Command: Statement
by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Turkey, November 10, 1951
2183-2185
7. Reply to Soviet Objections to the Establishment of a Middle East Com-
mand: Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 18, 1951
2185-2187
NATO's EASTERN ARM-GREECE AND TURKEY
8. Preliminary Association With NATO: Note Verbale From the Secretary
of State to the Turkish Ambassador at Washington, September 19,
1950.
2187 I
9. United States Use of Defense Facilities: Agreement Between the United
States and the Kingdom of Greece, October 12, 1953 .
2188-2189
10. Defense Support Aid: Communiqué by the Governments of the United
States and Turkey, June 5, 1954
2190-2191
2
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH PAKISTAN
11. Collective Security in the Middle East: Statement by the Department
of State, February 19, 1954.
12. Defensive Purpose of United States Military Aid: Message From the
President of the United States to the Prime Minister of India,
February 24, 1954.
2192-2192
13. Increasing the Defense Potential of Pakistan: Statement by the Presi-
dent, February 25, 1954
2193–2193
14. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States
and Pakistan, May 19, 1954
2194-219
15. Defense Support Aid to Pakistan: Communiqué by the Governments of
the United States and Pakistan, October 21, 1954. .
2198–2193
AIRCRAFT TRANSIT FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA
16. Use of Facilities and Services at Dhahran Airfield by Transient and
3
Supporting Aircraft of the United States: Note From the Ameri-
can Ambassador at Jidda to the Saudi Arabian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, June 18, 1951
2199-2203;
2191
3.
......................
DEFENSE FACILITIES IN LIBYA
17. Use of Defense Facilities in Agreed Areas in Libya: Agreement and
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and
Libya, September 9, 1954
2207-222
rivis..............
CONTENTS
XXXVII
OPERATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL BASE
Pago
8. Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Egypt
Regarding the Suez Canal Base, October 19, 1954 .
2223-2226
9. Conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Suez Base Agreement: Statement
by the Secretary of State, October 19, 1954.
2226
T. Economic Aid and Development
0. An Act To Furnish Emergency Food Aid to India: Public Law 48 (82d
Congress, 2d Session), June 15, 1951..
2227-2229
1. Emergency Food Aid to Afghanistan: Statement by the Department
of State, March 23, 1954 .
2229-2230
2. High Aswan Dam Project: Statement by the Department of State,
December 17, 1955 ..
2230
3. Jordan River Development: Address by the Personal Representative
of the President (Eric Johnston), December 1, 1953 .
2231-2235
4. Principles of the Jordan River Development Plan: Statement by the
Personal Representative of the President, July 6, 1954 . . 2235-2236
5. Tabular Summary of Net United States Grants and Credits to the Near
East, South Asia, and Africa, 1945–1955 .
2236
2. Operation of the Arab-Israeli Armistice Regime
TRIPARTITE DECLARATION REGARDING THE ARMISTICE BORDERS
26. Statement by the Governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France, May 25, 1950
2237
27. Reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration; Statement by the Presi-
dent, November 9, 1955
2238
ARMS SUPPLY POLICY
8. Prevention of Local Arms Imbalance: Address by the President,
October 20, 1954 (Excerpt).
2239
29. Avoidance of an Arms Race: Statement by the Secretary of State and
the British Foreign Secretary, September 27, 1955
2239
0. Shipment of Soviet Arms to Arab Countries: Remarks by the Secretary
of State at News Conference, October 4, 1955 (Excerpts) :. 2240-2241
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES AND BORDER INCIDENTS
1. Authority of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and
of the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission: United
Nations Security Council Resolution, May 18, 1951
2241-2244
2. Respect for the Mandate of the United Nations Conciliation Com-
mission for Palestine: United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
tion: 512 (VI), January 26, 1952.
2244-2245
3. Israeli-Syrian Water Diversion Dispute: United Nations Security
Council Resolution, October 27, 1953
2245
4. The Qibya (Israel-Jordan) Incident: United Nations Security Council
Resolution, November 24, 1953.
2246_2247
5. Israeli Attacks in the Gaza Strip: United Nations Security Council
Resolution, March 29, 1955
2247-2248.
XXXVIII
CONTENTS
Pont
36. Israeli-Egyptian Obligations To Cooperate with the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization: United Nations Security Council
Resolution, March 30, 1955
224€
37. Call for the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution of
March 30, 1955: Letter From the President of the Security Council
to Each Member, June 7, 1955 .
224:
38. Renewed Appeal for Israeli-Egyptian Cooperation With the Truce
Supervision Organization: United Nations Security Council
Resolution, September 8, 1955 ..
2249–2251
39. United States Support of United Nations Efforts To Achieve Peaceful
Settlement: Statement by the Department of State, November
5, 1955
2250-2251
SHIPPING RESTRICTIONS IN THE SUEZ CANAL
40. Egyptian Restrictions on Israeli Shipping in the Suez Canal: United
Nations Security Council Resolution, September 1, 1951 . . 2251-225
41. Obligation of Egypt To Comply With the Security Council's Resolution
of 1951: Statement by the United States Representative at the
United Nations Before the Security Council, March 25, 1954. 2252-225
THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM
(International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and the Protection of the
Holy Places: General Assembly Resolution 303 (IV), December 9,
1949)
225
42. Removal of the Israeli Foreign Office From Tel Aviv to Jerusalem:
Statement by the Secretary of State, July 28, 1953
2254-225
43. Retention of the American Embassy at Tel Aviv: Statement by the
Department of State, November 3, 1954 .
225
Retsin""*7*-*5*2*0.7***,
PALESTINE REFUGEES
44. United Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950: Title III of Public
Law 535 (81st Congress, 2d Session), June 5, 1950.
2256-225
45. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 393 (V), December 2,
1950.
2257–225
46. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 916 (X), December 3,
1955..
2259-226
E. The Iranian Oil Controversy
47. United States Position in Talks With Iran and the United Kingdom:
Statement by the Department of State, May 18, 1951 ..
2261-226
48. United States Nonintervention in Iranian Domestic Affairs: Aide-
Mémoire From the American Ambassador at Tehran to the
Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, May 26, 1951 .
49. Offer To Send a Presidential Personal Representative to Tehran:
Message From the President of the United States to the Prime
Minister of Iran, July 8, 1951. .
2264-226
50. Observations on Iranian Proposals for Settlement of the Controversy:
Note From the President's Special Representative (W. Averell
Harriman)
to the Prime Minister of Iran, September 15, 1951.2265-22
51. Competence of the International Court of Justice in the Controversy:
United Nations Security Council Decision, October 19, 1951 .
226
228
:
CONTENTS
XXXIX
Page
52. Proposals for Settlement of the Controversy: Joint Message and Pro-
posals From the President of the United States and the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of Iran,
August 30, 1952. .
2269-2270
53. Impossibility of Increasing Economic Aid to Iran Pending Settlement
of the Controversy: Message From the President of the United
States to the Prime Minister of Iran, June 29, 1953.
2271-2272
54. Settlement of the Controversy: Joint Statement by the Government
of Iran and the Oil Consortium, August 5, 1954 .
2273-2275
55. United States Gratification Over the Settlement: Message From the
President of the United States to the Shah of Iran, August 5,
1954.
2275
F. Territorial Disputes and Claims
CYPRUS
56. United States Hopes for Settlement of the Cyprus Issue as Between
Greece and Turkey: Note From the Secretary of State to the
Prime Minister of Greece, Released September 18, 1955
2276
57. Inappropriateness of United Nations Consideration of the Cyprus
Question: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 814 (IX),
December 17, 1954
2277
KASHMIR
58. Summary of Developments in the Kashmir Dispute, 1947-1952
(Excerpt)
2277–2286
59. Fifth Report by the United Nations Representative for India and
Pakistan, March 27, 1953 (Excerpts)
2286-2294
Goa
60. Peaceful Settlement of the Goa Controversy: Statement by the Secre-
tary of State at a News Conference, August 2, 1955 .
2294
61. Developments in the Goa Controversy: Transcript of a News Con-
ference of the Secretary of State, December 6, 1955 (Excerpts) 2294-2296
G. Developments in Africa
MOROCCO
62. Rights of American Nationals in Morocco: Statement by the Depart-
ment of State, June 29, 1951
2296-2297
63. Free Political Institutions for Morocco: United Nations General As-
sembly Resolution 612 (VII), December 19, 1952
2298
64. Return of Sultan Mohammed Ben Yousef (Mohammed V) to Morocco;
Statement by the Department of State, November 18, 1955 2299
TUNISIA
65. Free Political Institutions for Tunisia: United Nations General As-
sembly Resolution 611 (VII), December 17, 1952
2299-2300
66. Internal Autonomy for Tunisia: Statement by the Secretary of State
at & News Conference, August 10, 1955 ..
2300
ALGERIA
67. Competence of the United Nations in Relation to the Algerian Ques-
tion: Statement by the United States Representative at the United
Nations Before the General Assembly, September 30, 1955. . 2301-2302
XL
CONTENTS
Page
68. Inappropriateness of United Nations Consideration of the Algerian
Question: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 909 (X),
November 25, 1955
2302
LIBYA
69. Recognition of the United Kingdom of Libya: Statement by the De-
partment of State, December 24, 1951 .
2302-2303
SUDAN
70. Egyptian Abrogation of Condominium in the Sudan: Statement by the
Secretary of State, October 10, 1951
2303-2304
71. Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan: Note From the Secretary
of State to the Foreign Minister of Egypt, February 14, 1953.. . 2304
72. United States Participation in the Mixed Electoral Commission for the
Sudan: Statement by the Department of State, March 23, 1953
(Excerpt)
2304-2305
ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA
73. Federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea: United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 617 (VII), December 17, 1952
2305-2306
GOLD COAST (GHANA) AND NIGERIA
74. Self-Government in the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Nigeria: Senate Joint
Resolution 183 (83d Congress, 2d Session), August 27, 1954 . .
2306
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
75. Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa:
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 615 (VII), De-
cember 5, 1952.
2307-2308
76. Policies of Apartheid in the Union of South Africa: United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 917 (X), December 6, 1955. 2308-2309
PART XIV. THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
A. The Basic Position of the United States
1. Review of the Position as of 1950: Address by the Secretary of State,
January 12, 1950.
2310-2322
2. Review of the Position as of 1955: Address by the Secretary of State,
February 16, 1955 (Excerpts).
2322-2328
B. The Pacific and Southeast Asia
2328-2330
THE ANZUS PACT
3. Establishing the Machinery of the ANZUS Council: Communiqué of
the First Meeting of the ANZUS Council, Kaneohe, Hawaii,
August 7, 1952...
4. The Annual Review: Communiqué of the Second Meeting of the
ANZUS Council, Washington, September 10, 1953 .
5. Collective Defense in Southeast Asia: Statement by Representatives of
the ANZUS Governments at Their Informal Consultative Meet-
ing, Washington, June 30, 1954.
6. The Annual Review: Communiqué of the Fourth Meeting of the
ANZUS Council, Washington, September 24, 1955:
2330-2332
2332-2333
2333
CONTENTS
XLI
THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO)
Pago
7. Establishing the Machinery of SEATO: Communiqué of the First
Meeting of the SEATO Council, Bangkok, February 25, 1955. 2334-2337
THE COLOMBO PLAN
8. The Role of the United States in the Colombo Plan: Address by the
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, October 14,
1954
2338-2344
THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
9. Communiqué of the Conference of Afro-Asian Countries, Issued at
Bandung, Indonesia, April 24, 1955.
2344-2352
BURMA
2353
10. Presence of Chinese Troops in Burma: Resolution 815 (IX) of the
United Nations General Assembly, October 29, 1954.
11. Exchange of Views: Joint Statement by the President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of Burma, July 2, 1955.
2354
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
12. Economic Survey of the Philippines: Summary and Recommendations
From the Report of the Bell Mission, October 9, 1950 (Ex-
cerpts).
2355-2357
13. Progress Report on Developments in the Philippines: Statement to
the Press by the American Ambassador to the Republic of the
Philippines, June 15, 1951 .
2357-2359
14. Establishment of the Council Under the United States-Philippine
Mutual Defense Treaty: Note From the Secretary of State to the
Philippine Chargé d'Affaires at Washington, June 23, 1954 . . 2360
15. Revised United States-Philippine Trade Agreement: Statement by
the Department of State, September 6, 1955 .
2360-2363
:
C. Indochina
UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE COMMUNIST THREAT IN INDOCHINA,
1950–1953
16. United States Recognition of Increased sovereignty in the State of
Viet-Nam: Note From the United States Ambassador-at-Large
to the Chief of State of Viet-Nam, January 27, 1950
2363-2364
17. United States Recognition of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia: State-
ment by the Department of State, February 7, 1950.
2364-2365
18. Extension of Military and Economic Aid: Statement by the Secretary
of State, May 8, 1950 .
2365
19. Economic Aid Program: Note From the American Chargé d'Affaires
at Saigon to the Chiefs of State of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia,
May 24, 1950.
2365–2366
20. The Military Aid Program: Statement by the Departments of State
and Defense, September 23, 1951
2366-2367
21. The Defense of Indochina: Communiqué Regarding Discussions Be-
tween Representatives of the United States, France, Viet-Nam,
and Cambodia, June 18, 1952.
2367-2368
1
XLII
CONTENTS
:
Page
22. Support by NATO of the French Union Defense Efforts in Indochina:
Resolution Adopted by the North Atlantic Council, December 17,
1952. .
2368-2369
23. United States Support of Laos Against the Viet Minh Invasion:
Statement by the Department of State, April 17, 1953. .
2369
24. United States Emergency Aid to Laos and Thailand in the Face of
Viet Minh Aggression: Statement by the Secretary of State at a
News Conference, May 9, 1953 .
2369-2370
25. The Consequences of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in
Indochina: Address by the Secretary of State, September 2, 1953
(Excerpt)
2370-2371
26. Additional United States Aid to France and Indochina: Joint Franco-
American Communiqué, September 30, 1953.
2371-2372
THE INDOCHINA PHASE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, 1954
27. Plans for the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina: Quadri-
partite Communiqué of the Berlin Conference, February 18,
1954.
2372-2373
28. Views of the United States on the Eve of the Geneva Conference:
Address by the Secretary of State, March 29, 1954 . . 2373-2381
29. Views of the United States and France on the Eve of the Geneva
Conference: Joint Statement by the Secretary of State and the
French Foreign Minister, April 14, 1954
2381
30. Preparations for the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference:
Statement by the President, May 5, 1954 .
2382-2383
31. Midway in the Geneva Conference: Address by the Secretary of
State, May 7, 1954 .
2383-2390
32. Conditions for United States Direct Intervention in Indochina:
Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, May
25, 1954 (Excerpt).
2391–2393
33. The Threat of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Indochina:
Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954 (Excerpt). 2393–2395
34. Increased Military Aid to Thailand: Statement Released by the De-
partment of Defense, July 13, 1954
35. Consultations with the French Premier and the British Foreign Secre-
tary: Statement by the Secretary of State, July 15, 1954.. 2396-2397
36. The Cease-Fire Agreements in Indochina: Statement by the President,
July 21, 1954.
2397-2398
E
AID FOR INDOCHINA FOLLOWING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, 1954–1955
37. Assistance to Refugees From North Viet-Nam: Note From the
American Embassy at Saigon to the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry,
August 8, 1954
38. Evacuation of Refugees From North Viet-Nam: Statement Released
by the White House, August 22, 1954 .
39, Direct Aid to the Associated States: Communiqué Regarding Franco-
American Conversations, September 29, 1954 .
2400-2401
40. Aid to Cambodia: Message From the President of the United States
to the King of Cambodian October 2, 1954 .
41. Aid to the State of Viet-Nam: Message From the President of the
United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of
Viet-Nam, October 23, 1954.
*-.-Y.
IT.'
2396
2398
E
2399-2400
5
2401
5
2401–2402
CONTENTS
XLII
Page
42. Mission of the Special United States Representative in Viet-Nam:
Statement Issued by the White House, November 3, 1954. . 2402-2403
43. Direct Aid to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos: Statement by the De.
partment of State, December 31, 1954 .
2403
44. Unification of Viet-Nam Through Free Elections: Statement by the
Secretary of State at a News Conference, June 28, 1955 .
2404
45. Recognition of the New Chief of State of Viet-Nam: Statement by the
Department of State, October 26, 1955.
2404-2405
D. Japan
TRANSITION FROM ALLIED OCCUPATION TO MUTUAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS, 1950-1952
46. Participation of Japan in Technical Agreements and Conferences:
Interim Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, Japan, February 21, 1950.
2405
47. Administrative Agreement Between the United States and Japan
Under Article III of the Security Treaty, February 28, 1952 . 2406–2423
48. Interim Security Arrangements Upon Termination of Allied Occupa-
tion: Exchange of Notes Between the Special Representative of
the President of the United States and the Japanese Foreign
Minister, February 28, 1952. ..
2423–2425
49. Termination of the State of War With Japan: Presidential Proclama-
tion No. 2974, April 28, 1952 .
2425-2427
THE DEFENSE CAPACITY AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF SOVEREIGN JAPAN,
1953-1955
50. Repelling Violations of Japanese Territorial Air by Foreign Military
Aircraft: Note From the American Embassy at Tokyo to the
Japanese Foreign Ministry, January 16, 1953. .
2427
51. American Rights in the Ryukyu Islands: Note From the Secretary of
State to the Japanese Prime Minister, August 8, 1953 2427-2428
52. The Military Security and Economic Recovery of Japan: Joint State-
ment by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
and the Personal Representative of the Japanese Prime Minister,
October 30, 1953
2428-2429
53. Restoration of Japanese Sovereignty Over the Amami Oshima Islands
(Ryukyu Group): Statement by the Secretary of State, December
24, 1953,
2430
54. The Need for a Strong Japan: Address by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, February 6, 1954 (Excerpt) . 2430–2437
55. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, March 8, 1954 .
2437-2441
56. Economic Position of Japan: Statements by the Secretary of State at
a News Conference, August 10, 1954
2442-2443
57. Review of American-Japanese Relations: Joint Statement by the
President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan,
November 10, 1954
2443-2444
58. Beneficent Effect of Japan's Accession to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Statement by the Department of State, July
22, 1955
2445
59. Strengthening the Defense Capacity of Japan: Joint Statement by the
Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister, August 31,
1955..
2446-2448
XLIV
CONTENTS
1
{
Ë. The Republic of China on Formosa (Taiwan) and Communist China
IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF MAINLAND CHINA, 1950
Pagi
60. United States Policy Respecting the Status of Formosa (Taiwan):
Statement by the President, January 5, 1950 .
2448-2449
61. Elaboration of Policy Respecting the Status of Formosa (Taiwan):
Remarks by the Secretary of State at a Special News Conference,
January 5, 1950.
2449-2452
62. Recall of Foreign Service Personnel From Communist China: State-
ment by the Department of State, January 14, 1950 (Excerpts). 2453–2456
63. Review of United States Policy in Relation to China (Replies by the
Department of State to a Series of Questions Contained in House
Resolution 452, 81st Congress, 2d Session): Report of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 9, 1950 .
2456–2461
64. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the
Soviet Union and Communist China, Signed at Moscow, February
14, 1950,
2463–2461
65. Implications of the Treaty of Alliance and Related Agreements Between
the Soviet Union and Communist China: Address by the Secretary
of State, March 15, 1950 (Excerpt)
2465--246
UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA DURING THE
KOREAN HOSTILITIES, 1950-1953
66. Mission of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Formosa (Taiwan)
Area: Statement by the President, June 27, 1950 (Excerpt)
2468
67. Neutralization of Formosa (Taiwan) During the Korean Action:
Remarks by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs, November 15, 1950 (Excerpt)
2469-2470
68. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States and
the Republic of China, February 9, 1951
2470-2471
69. American Friendship for the Peoples of China: Address by the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, May 18, 1951 . 2472-247
70. Revised Mission of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Formosa
(Taiwan) Area: Message by the President to the Congress,
February 2, 1953 (Excerpt)
COMMUNIST CHARGES OF UNITED STATES AGGRESSION IN THE FORMOSA
(TAIWAN) AREA
71. United Nations Consideration of the Communist Charges: Statement
by the Department of State, August 24, 1950
247
72. Refutation of the Communist Charges: Letter From the United States
Representative at the United Nations to the Secretary-General,
August 25, 1950 (Excerpts).
2476-247
73. United States Request That the "Question of Formosa" Be Placed on
the Agenda of the General Assembly: Letter From the Secretary
of State to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, September
21, 1950
74. Postponement of General Assembly Consideration of the “Question
of Formosa" (Taiwan): Statements by the United States Repre-
sentative Before the General Asembly, November 15, 1950 . 2480–248
9
247
2478–248&
9
CONTENTS
XLV
ATTEMPTS TO EFFECT A CEASE-FIRE IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA,
1954-1955
Page
75. Relation of the Tachen Islands to the Defense of Formosa (Taiwan):
Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State,
January 18, 1955 (Excerpt)
2481-2483
76. Employment of United States Armed Forces in Defense of the Formosa
(Taiwan) Area: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 24, 1955
2483-2486
77. Congressional Authorization for the President To Employ the Armed
Forces of the United States To Protect Formosa, the Pescadores,
and Related Positions and Territories of That Area: House Joint
Resolution 159 (84th Congress, 1st Session), January 29, 1955.2486–2487
78. Security Council Consideration of the Question of Hostilities in the
Formosa (Taiwan) Area: Remarks by the United States Repre-
sentative Before the Security Council, January 31, 1955 . 2487-2489
79. Invitation to the "Peoples Republic of China" To Send a Representa-
tive to the Security Council Discussion of the Formosa (Taiwan)
Question: Cablegram From the Secretary-General of the United
i
Nations to the Chinese Communist Premier, January 31, 1955 . 2490
80. United States Assistance to the Republic of China in the Evacua-
tion of the Tachen Islands: Statement by the Department of
State, February 5, 1955
2490-2491
81. Conditions for United States Defense of Quemoy and the Matsu
&
Islands: Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of
State, March 15, 1955 (Excerpt).
2491-2493
82. Defense of the Formosa (Taiwan) Area: Transcript of a News Confer-
( ence of the Secretary of State, April 5, 1955 (Excerpt) ... 2493–2496
83. Relaxing Tension in the Formosa (Taiwan) Area: Statement by the
'1 Department of State, April 23, 1955 ..
2496
84. Possibility of Negotiating a Cease-Fire Arrangement: Transcript of a
News Conference of the Secretary of State, April 26, 1955 . 2496–2503
85. Negotiations With Communist China for a Cease-Fire Arrangement in
the Formosa (Taiwan) Area: Statement by the Secretary of State
at a News Conference, July 26, 1955.
2504–2506
86. Negotiation of a Broad Cease-Fire Arrangement in the Formosa
(Taiwan) Area: Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary
of State, August 2, 1955 (Excerpt)
2506-2510
THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONALS DETAINED IN COMMUNIST
ht
CHINA
87. Imprisonment of United States Nationals by Chinese Communist
II
Authorities: Statement by the Department of State, May 21,
1951
2510-2511
88. Detention of United States Nationals: Statement by the Department
of State, December 12, 1951
2511--2512
#89. Continued Detention of United States Nationals: Statement by the
Department of State, October 9, 1953
2512-2513
90. Negotiations at the Consular Level for the Release of United States
Nationals:Statement by the Department of State, March 1, 1955 2513-2514
91. Rescinding of Restraining Orders on Chinese Students in the United
States: Statement by the Department of State, April 2, 1955 . 2514
92. Continued Negotiations at the Consular Level for the Release of
United States Nationals Detained by Chinese Communist Author-
ities: Statement by the Department of State, June 1. 1955 .
2515
R
XLVI
CONTENTS
Page
93. Negotiations at the Ambassadorial Level for the Release of United
States Nationals: Joint Communiqué by Representatives of the
United States and Communist China, July 25, 1955 .
2516
94. Agreed Measures for the Return of United States and Chinese Civilians:
Joint Statement of Representatives of the United States and
Communist China, September 10, 1955
2516-2517
95. Failure of the Chinese Communist Authorities To Implement the
Agreement of September 10, 1955: Statement by the Department
of State, December 16, 1955
2517-2519
+
SHIP AND PLANE INCIDENTS IN THE CHINA AREA
96. Communist Chinese Attacks on Foreign Ships and Planes in the China
Area: List (July 1950-June 1954) Released by the United States
Mission at the United Nations, September 19, 1954
2519-252
97. Protest Against Attack on British Cathay Pacific Airliner: Note From
the United States Government to the Chinese Communist Author-
ities at Peiping, Transmitted by the British Chargé d'Affaires,
July 27, 1954.
252
98. Protest Against Attack on United States Aircraft in Rescue Work on
the British Cathay Pacific Airliner: Note From the United States
Government to the Chinese Communist Authorities at Peiping,
Transmitted by the British Chargé d'Affaires, July 27, 1954 . 2522–252
99. Rejection of Soviet Charges of United States Interference With the
Soviet Tanker Trapse: Note From the American Embassy at
Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, June 26, 1954 .
252
100. Renewed Rejection of Soviet Charges: Note From the American
Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 4,
1954
252
101. Denial of Any Responsibility in the Case of the Tuapse and Its Crew:
Statement by the Department of State, August 8, 1955 . . 2523–252
102. Denial of Polish Charges of United States Interference With the
Polish Tanker Praca: Note From the American Embassy at
Warsaw to the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 20, 1953 . 252
103. Denial of Polish Charges of United States Interference With the
Polish Freighter Gottwald: Statement by the Department of
State, May 21, 1954
1
104. Denial of Any Responsibility in Connection With the Praca and the
Gottwald and Their Crews: Note From the American Embassy
at Warsaw to the Polish Foreign Ministry, December 8, 1954,2525–252 1
105. Final Rejection of Polish Allegation of Responsibility in the Cases
of the Praca and the Gottwald: Note From the American Embassy
1
at Warsaw to the Polish Foreign Ministry, February 21, 1955 .
2
252
252
PART XV. KOREA
2
2
A. United States Military and Economic Assistance Prior to the Outbreak of
the Korean Conflict
1. Rejection of the Korean Aid Bill by the House of Representatives:
Statement by the President, January 21, 1950. .
2. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States and
the Republic of Korea, January 26, 1950 .
3. Economic Assistance to the Republic of Korea: The Far Eastern
Economic Assistance Act of 1950, February 14, 1950.
2527-251
.
2
2529-251
2532-25
CONTENTS
XLVII
Pago
4. Extension of the Economic Assistance Program for the Republic of
Korea: Statement by the Secretary of State, March 7, 1950. 2533-2536
.
B. Initial Phase of the Korean Conflict, June-October, 1950
5. Announcement of the North Korean Attack: Telegram From the
American Ambassador at Seoul to the Secretary of State, June 25,
1950,
2536-2537
6. Request for Security Council Consideration of the North Korean
Aggression: Letter From the Deputy Representative of the United
States at the United Nations to the U.N. Secretary-General, June
25, 1950.
2537
7. Confirmation of the North Korean Aggression: Telegram From the
United Nations Commission at Seoul to the U.N. Secretary-
General, June 25, 1950.
2537-2538
8. Call for North Korean Withdrawal: Resolution of the United Nations
Security Council, June 25, 1950 .
2538-2539
9. Initial Measures Taken by the United States in the Korean Crisis:
Statement by the President, June 27, 1950 .
2539-2540
10. Call for United Nations Assistance to the Republic of Korea: Resolu-
tion of the United Nations Security Council, June 27, 1950. . 2540–2541
11. Additional United States Measures in Support of the Republic of
Korea: Statement Released by the White House, June 30, 1950. . 2541
12. Offer of Ground Forces by the Republic of China for Service in Korea:
Note From the Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador at
Washington, July 1, 1950
2541-2542
13. Constitutional Authority for Use of United States Forces in Korea:
Memorandum by the Department of State, July 3, 1950
(Excerpts)
2542-2549
14. Designation of the Unified Command: Resolution of the United
Nations Security Council, July 7, 1950.
2550
15. Designation of the United Nations Commander: Statement by the
President, July 8, 1950.
2550-2551
16. United States Views on the Role of the United Nations in Repelling.
the Aggression in Korea: Message From the Secretary of State
to the Prime Minister of India, July 18, 1950.
2551-2552
17. Report by the President to the Congress on the Situation in Korea,
July 19, 1950 (Excerpts). .
2552-2560
18. First Report to the Security Council by the United Nations Command,
July 24, 1950. .
2560-2565
19. Contributions to the Unified Command: Resolution of the United
Nations Security Council, July 31, 1950.
2565–2566
20. Report to the Nation on the Situation in Korea: Address by the
President, September 1, 1950 .
2566-2572
21. Responsibility for the Aggression in Korea: Report of the United
Nations Commission on Korea, September 4, 1950 (Excerpt) .2572–2575
22. Call for the Surrender of the North Korean Forces: Message From
the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the
Commander-in-Chief, North Korean Forces, October 1, 1950. . 2575
23. Establishment of the United Nations Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK): Resolution 376 (V) of
the United Nations General Assembly, October 7, 1950 . : 2576–2578
XLVIII
CONTENTS,
Pago
24. Second Call for the Surrender of the North Korean Forces: Message
From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to
the Commander-in-Chief, North Korean Forces, and to All North
Koreans, October 9, 1950.
2578
25. Coordination of Policy and Strategy Following the Inchon Landing:
Statement by the President on Wake Island, October 15,
1950
2579-2580
C. Chinese Communist Intervention and Its Consequences, November 1950–
June 1951
26. Presence of Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea: Special Report
of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, Novem-
ber 5, 1950.
2581-2582
27. Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea: Communiqué by the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, November 6,
1950. .
2582-2583
28. Ret on of the Korean-Chinese Frontier: Draft Resolution of the
United Nations Security Council, November 10, 1950 . 2583-2584
29. Extent of the Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea: Special
Communiqué by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Com-
mand, November 28, 1950.
2584-2585
30. Establishment of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
(UNKRA): Resolution 410 (V) of the United Nations General
Assembly, December 1, 1950'...
2585-2593
31. Labeling as Aggression the Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea:
Statement by the United States Representative at the United 5
Nations Before the U.N. General Assembly, December 6, 1950.2593-2594
32. Establishment of a Group for a Cease-Fire in Korea: Resolution 384
(V) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 14,
1950. .
2594-2595 5
33. Control of Economic Relations Between the United States and Commu-
nist China and North Korea: Statement by the Department of
State, December 16, 1950.
34. Designation of Korea as a Combat Zone as of June 27, 1950: Executive
Order No. 10195, December 20, 1950 .
2596
35. Report of the United Nations Group on a Cease-Fire in Korea to the
First Committee of the General Assembly, January 2, 1951 . 2596-2601
36. Principles Adopted by the United Nations Group on & Cease-Fire in
Korea, January 11, 1951 .
2601-2602
37. Transmittal of the Principles Adopted by the United Nations Group 5
on & Cease-Fire in korea to the Chinese Communist Regime:
Resolution of the First Committee of the United Nations General
Assembly, January 13, 1951 .
38. Labeling the Chinese Communists as Aggressors in Korea: Resolution
of the House of Representatives, January 19, 1951 . .
39. Labeling the Chinese Communists as Aggressors in Korea: Resolution
of the United States Senate, January 23, 1951 .
40. Condemnation of Chinese Communist Aggression in Korea: State-
5
ment by the United States Representative at the United Nations
Before Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, January 24,
1951. ..
5
2603-2607
41. Condemnation of Chinese Communist Aggression in Korea: Statement
by the President, January 25, 1951 .
2595 5
26025
5
2602
.::.- ....more
2602
2608
CONTENTS
XLIX
Page
1951.
42. Condemnation of Chinese Communist Aggression in Korea: Resolu-
tion 498 (V) of the United Nations General Assembly, February 1,
2608-2609
43. United States Policy in the Korean Conflict: Address by the President,
April 11, 1951
2609-2614
44. United Nations Strategic Embargo Against Communist China and
North Korea: Resolution 500 (V) of the United Nations General
Assembly, May 18, 1951 .
· 2614–2615
45. Review of United States Policy in the Korean Conflict: Statement by
the Secretary of State, June 1, 1951
2615-2622
46. United States Embargo Action Against Communist China and North
Korea: Report Submitted by the Deputy United States Repre-
sentative at the United Nations to the Additional Measures Com-
mittee of the U.N. General Assembly, June 15, 1951 (Excerpt). . 2622–2626
47. Appeal for Additional Ground Forces in Korea: Communication From
the Unified Command to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, June 21, 1951 .
2626
D. Negotiations for an Armistice Agreement, June 1951-July 1953
48. Summary of the Armistice Negotiations, June 1951-July 1953: Special
Report of the United Nations Command to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, August 7, 1953 .
2627-2636
49. Initial Exchanges Between Soviet and United States Representatives
at the United Nations Concerning Negotiation of an Armistice:
Statement by the Department of State, June 28, 1951
2636-2637
50. Proposed Initial Meeting To Discuss an Armistice: Message From the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the Com-
manders-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist and North Korean
Forces, June 30, 1951
2637
51. Agreed Agenda for Armistice Negotiations: Announcement by the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, July 26,
1951.
2637-2638
52. Request for Cooperation of the Soviet Union in Negotiating a Korean
Armistice: Statement Read by the American Ambassador at
Moscow to the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, October 5,
1951.
2638-2640
53. Basis for Establishing a Military Demarcation Line: Agreement
Reached Between Representatives of the United Nations Com-
mand and the Chinese Communist and North Korean Commands,
November 23, 1951
2641
54. Principles for Carrying Out an Armistice: Proposal by the United
Nations Command, November 27, 1951 .
2641-2642
55. Exchange of Prisoners of War: Proposal by the United Nations Com-
mand, January 2, 1952 .
2642-2643
56. Convening of a Special Session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly Upon Conclusion of an Armistice Agreement: Resolution
507 (VI) of the United Nations General Assembly, February 5,
1952.
2643-2644
57. Three-Point Proposal for an Armistice Submitted by the United Na-
tions Command: Statement by the President, May 7, 1952. . 2644–2645
58. Progress of the Armistice Negotiations: Forty-Second Report of the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the United
Nations Security Council, June 13, 1952 (Excerpt)
2646
415900_57_Fol. 2-4
1.
L
CONTENTS
Ivet.. .
Page
1
59. Request for Soviet Good Offices in Obtaining North Korean and
Chinese Communist Compliance with the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion on Treatment of Prisoners of War: Note Delivered by the
American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Minister,
July 23, 1952.
2647
60. Proposal for a Solution of the Prisoner of War Problem: Statement by
the Chief United Nations Command Negotiator at Panmunjom,
September 28, 1952
2647-2649
61. Suspension of the Armistice Negotiations: Statement by the Secretary
of State, October 8, 1952 .
2649-2650
62. Proposals for a Solution of the Prisoner of War Problem: Resolution
610 (VII) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 3,
1952
2651-2654
63. Proposal for the Exchange of Sick and Wounded Prisoners of War:
Letter From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Com-
mand, to the Commanders-in-Chief of the North Korean and
Chinese Communist Forces, February 22, 1953.
2654–2655
64. Request for Communist Command Statement on Repatriation of Pris-
oners of War: Letter From the Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command, to the Commanders-in-Chief of the North
Korean and Chinese Communist Forces, April 5, 1953 (Excerpt). 2655
65. Repatriation of Sick and Injured Captured Personnel: Agreement Be-
tween the United Nations Command and the North Korean and
Chinese Communist Commands, April 11, 1953.
2655–2658
66. Escape of North Korean Non-Repatriate Prisoners of War: Letter
From the Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command at
the Armistice Discussions to the Senior Delegate of the Commu-
nist Command, June 18, 1953. .
2658-2659
67. Escape of North Korean Non-Repatriate Prisoners of War: Letter
From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to
the President of the Republic of Korea, June 20, 1953 . . 2659–2660
68. Escape of North Korean Non-Repatriate Prisoners of War: Letter
From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the
Commanders-in-Chief of the North Korean and Chinese Com-
munist Forces, June 29, 1953. ..
2660-2662
69. Sixteen-Nation Declaration on Korea Issued at Washington, July 27,
1953
2662
70. Tribute to United Nations Forces in Korea: Resolution 712 (vin) of
the United Nations General Assembly, August 28, 1953 .
2663
E. Incidents Involving United Nations Command and Soviet Aircraft in the
Korean Conflict, 1950-1959
71. Shooting Down of Soviet Bomber: Message Delivered by the Deputy
at
Secretary-General, September 5, 1950
2663–2664
72. United States Refusal To Accept Soviet Note Concerning Bomber:
Statement by the American Ambassador at Moscow, September
6, 1950.
73. Soviet Attack Against United Nations Aircraft: Communication De-
livered by the United States Representative at the United Nations
to the U.N. Secretary-General, November 24, 1951 .
2664-2665
74. Shooting Down of Soviet IL-12 by United Nations Aircraft: State-
ment by the Department of State, August 1, 1953 .
..
܂ܟܕܙܕܝ ܕܕܨܢ . ܕܢ
..;- ܝܬ݁ܗܳܝܺ ܕ݁ܗܳܢܐ ܚܐܐܐ ܙ ; ܝܐܳܡܪܝܢ ܕܰܪܝܺܟܚܺܝܚܰܝܶܐܘܺܝܽܦ.ܝܟܙܕ܀ܢ܀ : ܀. . . ... ܢ… -.-
2664
2665
CONTENTS
LI
F. The Communist "Germ Warfare" Campaign, 1951-1953
Page
75. Refutation of Communist Charges of Germ Warfare: Statement by
the Secretary of State, May 7, 1951 .
2666-2667
76. Request for Investigation of Germ Warfare Charges by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Telegram From the
Secretary of State to the President of the ICRC, March 11, 1952. 2667
77. Communist Refusal To Permit Investigation of Germ Warfare
Charges by the ICRC: Statement by the Secretary of State, March
26, 1952
2668
78. Call for Investigation of Germ Warfare Charges by the ICRC: Draft
Resolution of the United Nations Security Council, June 20,
1952.
2668-2669
79. Investigation of Germ Warfare Charges by a United Nations Com-
mission: Resolution 706 (VII) of the United Nations. General As-
sembly, April 23, 1953
2669-2670
80. Communist Failure To Reply to Offer of United Nations Investigation
of Germ Warfare Charges: Report by the President of the United
Nations General Assembly, July 28, 1953
2670-2671
81. Discussion of Germ Warfare Charges in the Eighth United Nations
General Assembly: Statement by the United States Representa-
tive, November 3, 1953 .
2672-2673
G. Efforts To Reach a Political Settlement in Korea, 1953-1955
82. Common Objectives With Respect to Korea: Joint Statement Issued
at Seoul by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Af-
fairs and the President of the Republic of Korea, July 11, 1953 2673-2674
83. Understanding Respecting a Political Conference on Korea: State-
ment by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, July 28,
1953. .
2674
84. Post-Armistice United States-Korean Policy: Joint Statement Issued
at Seoul by the Secretary of State and the President of the Re-
public of Korea, August 8, 1953.
2674-2676
85. Convening of a Political Conference on Korea: Resolution 713 V17676-2678
· 2676-2678
86. Composition of and Arrangements for a Political Conference on Korea:
Proposals Submitted by the Deputy to the Secretary of State at
the Conference Preparatory Talks at Panmunjom, December2848–268
87. Breakdown of the Korean Political Conference Preparatory Talks:
Address by the Deputy to the Secretary of State, December 21,
1953. .
2680-2684
88. Resolution on the Holding of a Far Eastern Conference Agreed to by
the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and the Soviet Union at the Berlin Foreign Ministers
Conference, February 18, 1954
2685
89. Establishment of a United and Independent Korea: Statement by
the Secretary of State at the Geneva Conference on Korea and
Indochina, April 28, 1954
2685-2692
90. Sixteen-Nation Declaration on Korea Issued at the Geneva Confer-
ence on Korea and Indochina, June 15, 1954
2692-2693
91. Transfer to the Republic of Korea of Administrative Control Over the
Region Between the Armistice Demarcation Line and the 38th
Parallel: Resolution of the United Nations Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, August 9, 1954 . . 2694–2695
LII
CONTENTS;
Page
92. Results of the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference on Korea and
Indochina: Letter, Report, and Annex From Certain Members
of the United Nations to the U.N. Secretary-General, November
11, 1954.
· 2695–2701
93. Approval of Report on the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference
on Korea and Indochina: Resolution 811 (IX) of the United
Nations General Assembly, December 11, 1954 .
2701
94. Continuing Consideration of a Political Settlement in Korea: Resolu-
tion 910A (X) of the United Nations General Assembly, Novem-
ber 29, 1955 .
2702
H. The Prisoner of War Problem Following the Armistice, 1953–1955
95. Possible Communist Detention of Korean War Prisoners: Statement
by the Department of State, August 8, 1953 .
2703
96. Authority for Release of Non-Repatriate Prisoners of War: State-
ment by the Secretary of State, November 17, 1953 .
2703–2704
97. Authority for Release of Non-Repatriate Prisoners of War: State-
ment by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,
December 23, 1953 .
2704-2705
98. Authority for Release of Non-Repatriate Prisoners of War: Letter
From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to
the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission,
January 16, 1954 .
2705-2707
99. Reports of United States Prisoners of War Held in Soviet Custody:
Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 5, 1954 .
2707
100. Accounting for Missing United Nations Personnel: Statement by
the Senior United Nations Representative on the Military
Armistice Commission, August 17, 1954...
... 2708-2709
101. Protest of Imprisonment of United States Prisoners of War by the
Chinese Communists: Note From the United States Govern-
ment to the Chinese. Communist Authorities (Transmitted by
the British Embassy at Peiping), November 26, 1954 .
2709–2710
102. Communist Detention of United Nations Personnel: Letter and
Explanatory Memorandum From the United States Representa-
tive at the United Nations to the U.N. Secretary-General,
December 4, 1954
, 2710-2711
103. Communist Detention of United Nations Personnel: Resolution 906
(IX) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 10,
1954 .
2711-2712
104. Communist Detention of United Nations Personnel: Statement by
the Department of State, January 19, 1955 .
2712-2713
105. Communist Detention of United Nations Personnel: Statement by
the Department of State, January 21, 1955 .
2713
106. Negotiations for Release of United Nations Personnel Detained by
the Communists: Report of the U.N. Secretary-General, Sep-
tember 9, 1955.
2713-2714
3:,",
1. Operation of the Korean Armistice Machinery, 1958–1955
107. Communist Obstruction of Inspection Activities in Korea: Letter
From the Senior United Nations Representative on the Military
Armistice Commission to the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission, April 15, 1954
2715–2718
CONTENTS
LIII
Pago
108. Request for Investigation of Violations of the Korean Armistice
Agreement: Letter From the Representative of the United
Nations Command on the Military Armistice Commission to
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, February 21,
1955
2718-2719
109. Termination of the Activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission: Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to
the Swedish Embassy at Washington, March 2, 1955 • 2719–2720
110. Communist Violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement: State-
ment by the Senior United Nations Command Representative
on the Military Armistice Commission, July 5, 1955
2720-2728
J. Relations Between the United States and the Republic of Korea Respecting
Political, Economic, and Military Matters, 1953-1955
111. United States Policy in Korea: Letter From the President of the
United States to the President of the Republic of Korea, June
6, 1953
2729-2731
112. Summary of a Report of the President's Special Representative for
Korean Economic Affairs, June 15, 1953 (Excerpt) .. 2731-2732
113. Reduction of United States Forces in Korea: Statement by the
President, December 26, 1953.
2733
114. Exchange of Views With Respect to Korean Developments: Joint
Statement Issued at Washington by the President of the United
States and the President of the Republic of Korea, July 30,
1954
2733-2734
115. United States-Korean Cooperation: Agreed Minute Between the
United States and the Republic of Korea, November 17, 1954. 2734–2736
116. Termination of Combatant Activities in the Area of Korea as of
February 1, 1955: Executive Order No. 10585, January 1,
1955
2736
117. Economic and Military Discussions: Joint Communiqué Issued at
Washington by the Governments of the United States and the
Republic of Korea, August 15, 1955
2736-2737
118. Monetary Stabilization: Amendment to Appendix A of Agreed
Minute of November 14, 1954, Between the United States and
the Republic of Korea, August 15, 1955.
2737-2738
PART XVI. DISARMAMENT AND THE CONTROL OF
ATOMIC ENERGY
A. The Problem of Conventional Armaments, 1950
1. Basic Principles of International Safeguards: Paper Submitted by the
United States Delegation to the Working Committee of the United
Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments, May 13,
1950.
2739-2741
2. Proposed Conventional Armaments Administration: Paper Submitted
by the United States Delegation to the Working Committee of
the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments,
June 22, 1950.
2742-2745
B. Consolidation of the Approach to Disarmament, 1951-1952
3. Proposed Commission for the Control of All Armaments and Armed
Forces: Working
Paper Submitted by the United States Delegation
to the United Nations Committee of Twelve, May 17, 1951 · 2745–2747
LIV
CONTENTS
Page
4. Establishment of the United Nations Disarmament Commission: Res-
olution 502 (VI) of the United Nations General Assembly, Jan-
uary 11, 1952 .
2748-2750
C. Work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, 1952-1953
5. Disclosure, Verification, and Inspection of Armaments:-Proposal Sub-
mitted by the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Disarmament Commission, April 5, 1952 . .
2750-2759
6. Essential Principles of a Disarmament Program: Proposal Submitted
by the United States Delegation to the United Nations Disarma-
ment Commission, April 24, 1952 .
2759-2760
7. Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces: Working Paper Submitted by
the Delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, May 28,
1952.
2760-2764
8. First Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, May 29,
1952.
2764-2765
9. Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces: Supplementary Working Paper
Submitted by the Delegations of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France to the United Nations Disarmament Com-
mission, August 12, 1952 .
2765-2767
10. Elimination of Bacterial Weapons: Working Paper Submitted by the
United States Delegation to the United Nations Disarmament
Commission, September 4, 1952 .
2767-2768
11. Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces
and All Armaments: Resolution 704 (VII) of the United Nations
General Assembly, April 8, 1953 .
2768-2769
12. United States Efforts Toward Disarmament: Report to the President
by the Deputy United States Representative on the United
Nations Disarmament Commission, January 12, 1953. . 2769-2793
13. New Impetus for Disarmament: Address by the President of the
United States, April 16, 1953 (Excerpt)
2794
14. Endorsement of the President's Disarmament Proposals: Resolution
of the United States Senate, July 29, 1953 .
.. 2794-2795
15. Third Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission,
August 20, 1953.
16. Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces
and All Armaments: Resolution 715 (VIII) of the United Nations
General Assembly, November 28, 1953 .
2796-2798
D. Atoms for Peace, 1953
17. Atoms for Peace: Address by the President of the United States Before
the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953 .
2798-2805
E. Negotiations for the Establishment of a United Nations Disarmament and
Atomic Development Authority, 1964
18. Proposed International Atomic Energy Agency: Memorandum From
the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington,
March 19, 1954 ,
2805-2808
19. Establishment of the United Nations Disarmament Commission Sub-
committee: Resolution of the United Nations Disarmament Com-
mission, April 19, 1954 .
2796
7.2.1, ...wymiana maneno mentionner
2809
CONTENTS
LV
Page
20. Purpose of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Note Submitted
by the Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs
at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, May 1,
1954..
2809-2810
21. Proposed United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development
Authority: Working Paper Submitted by the United States Dele-
gation to the United Nations Disarmament Commission Sub-
committee, May 25, 1954 . .
2810–2817
22. Basis for an Effective Disarmament Plan: Memorandum From the
Department of State to the Soviet Embassy at Washington,
July 9, 1954 .
2818-2821
23. Fourth Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission,
July 29, 1954.
2821-2823
.
P. Efforts Toward the Peaceful Application of Atomic Energy and Toward
the Establishment of an International Control Agency, 1954-1955
24. Proposed International Atomic Energy Agency and International Con-
ference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Resolution 810
(IX) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 4,
1954. .
2823–2824
25. Plans for United States Participation in the International Conference
on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Joint Announcement by
the Department of State and the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, February 23, 1955 .
2825-2826
26. Report on the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy: Address by the Chairman of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission, September 28, 1955 . .
2826–2832
27. Summary of Atomic Energy Negotiations: Report to the President by
the United States Representative for International Atomic Energy
Negotiations, November 30, 1955 (Excerpt)
2832-2837
28. Additional International Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy and Continued Negotiations for an International Atomic
Energy Agency: Resolution 912 (X) of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, December 3, 1955 .
2837-2839
29. Effects of Ionizing Radiation: Resolution 913 (X) of the United
Nations General Assembly, December 3, 1955 .
2840–2841
G. Consideration of Methods of Disarmament Inspection, 1955
30. Aerial Inspection of Military Installations: Proposal by the President
of the United States at the Geneva Conference of Heads of Gov-
ernment, July 21, 1955 .
.. 2841-2843
31. System of Inspection: Letter From the President of the United States
to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union,
October 11, 1955 .
2844
32. Further Study of the Problem of Disarmament: Proposal Submitted
by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom,
and France at the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Novem-
ber 10, 1955 .
2844-2846
33. Reciprocal Inspection and Supervision: Statement by the Secretary of
State at the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, November 11,
1955..
2846-2850
34. Proposal for Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on
the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic,
Hydrogen, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction: Resolution
914 (X) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 16,
1955.
2851-2853
LVI
CONTENTS
H. Sharing of United States Atomic Energy Information, 1954–1955
Page
35. Revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946: Message From the Presi-
dent to the Congress, February 17, 1954 .
2853-2860
36. Stable Isotopes Available for Foreign Distribution: Statement Issued
to the Press by the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
July 1, 1954,
2860–2861
37. Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Public Law 703 (83d Congress, 2d Session),
August 30, 1954 (Excerpts)
2861-2877
38. Atomic Information for Mutual Defense: Agreement Between the
Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom,
June 15, 1955 .
2877–2880
39. Atomic Information for Mutual Defense: Agreement Between the
United States and the Other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty,
June 22, 1955 .
2880-2883
40. Civil Uses of Atomic Energy: Agreement Between the Governments of
the United States and the Turkish Republic, June 10, 1955. 2883–2887
PART XVII. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES-TRADE
AND TARIFFS
2893
[Report to the President by His Special Assistant on Foreign Economic
Policies (Gray Report), November 10, 1950).
2888
[Report to the President by the International Development Advisory
Board (Rockefeller Report), March 7, 1951] .
2888
1. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951: Public Law 50(82d Congress,
1st Session), June 16, 1951 .
2888-2892
[Report of the President's Materials Policy Commission (Paley Report),
June 1952] .
(Report to the President by the Public Advisory Board for Mutual
Security (Bell Report), February 24, 1953)
2893
2. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953: Public Law 215 (83d Con-
gress, 1st Session), August 7, 1953
2893–2898
(Customs Simplification Act of 1953: Public Law 243 (83d Congress,
1st Session), August 8, 1953] .
2898
3. Report by the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall Report),
January 23, 1954 (Excerpts)
2898–2930
4. Recommendations Concerning United States Foreign Economic Policy:
Message by the President to the Congress, March 30, 1954 · 2930–2940
5. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance. Act of 1954, as
Amended in 1955: Public Law 480 (83d Congress, 2d Session),
July 10, 1954; Amended by Public Laws 25 and 387 (84th Congress,
1st Session), April 25 and August 12, 1955 .
2941-2947
6. Foreign Economic Policy: Message by the President to the Congress,
January 10, 1955.
2948-2953
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Text of October 30,
1947, ss Amended at the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties,
March 10, 1955
2953-3013
8. Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC): Agreement Between the
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
March 10, 1955
3014-3021
9. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955: Public Law 86 (84th Congress,
1st Session), June 21, 1955 .
10. Foreign Economic Policy: Recommendations of the Joint Congressional
Committee on the Economic Report, January 5, 1956
3027-3029
():
3022-3026
CONTÈNTS
: LVII
PART XVIII. FOREIGN AID=ECONOMIC, MILITARY,
TECHNOLOGICAL
A. The Lend-Lease Program, 1941-1955
Puge
:
1. Status of Settlements Under the Lend-Lease Program: Report to
Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the Year Ending December
31, 1955...
3030-3037
B. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1949–1951
2. Administering Authority Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act
of 1949: Executive Order No. 10099, January 27, 1950.. 3038-3039
3. Act To Amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: Public
Law 621 (81st Congress, 2d Session), July 26, 1950 (Excerpts). 3039–3042
4. Establishment of the. (Interdepartmental) International Security
Affairs Committee (ISAC): Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and the
Economic Cooperation Administration, Approved by the President,
December 19, 1950.
3043-3045
5. Establishment of the Office of International Security Affairs in the
Department of State: Departmental Announcement 248, Decem-
ber 27, 1950. .
3045-3047
C. Establishing the Machinery of the Point Four Program, 1950
6. Act for International Development (Title IV, Foreign Economic
Assistance Act of 1950): Public Law 535 (81st Congress, 2d Ses-
sion), June 5, 1950.
3047-3054
7. Administering Authority Under the Act for International Development:
Executive Order No. 10159, September 8, 1950 .
3055
8. Establishment of the Technical Cooperation Administration in the
Department of State: Departmental Announcement 212, October
27, 1950.
3055-3058
D. The Mutual Security Program, 1951-1953
9. Mutual Security. Act of 1951, as Amended by the Mutual Security
Acts of 1952 and 1953: Public Law 165 (82d Congress, 1st Session),
October 10, 1951; Amended by Public Law 400 (82d Congress, 28
Session), June 20, 1952, and Public Law 118 (83d Congress, 1st
Session), July 16, 1953 (Excerpts).
3059-3086
10. Administering Authority Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951:
Executive Order No. 10300, November 1, 1951..
3086-3088
11. Coordination of Foreign Aid Programs at the Diplomatic Mission
Level: Executive Order No. 10338, April 4, 1952 .
3088-3090
12. Establishment of the Foreign Operations Administration: Reorganiza
tion Plan No. 7 of 1953, June 1, 1953 .
3090–3093
13. Administration of Certain Elements of the Mutual Security Program:
Executive Order No. 10458, June 1, 1953 .
3093-3095
14. Revised Administering Authority Under the Mutual Security Act of
1951, as Amended: Executive Order No. 10476, August 1, 1953, 3095-3101
E. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Program, 1951-1955
15. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act): Public
Law 213 (82d Congress, 1st Session), October 26, 1951. '. . 3101-3105
LVIII
CONTENTS
F. Mutual Security Program, 1954-1965
Par
.
16. Mutual Security Act of 1954, as Amended by the Mutual Security
Act of 1955: Public Law 665 (83d Congress, 2d Session), August
26, 1954; Amended by Public Law 138 (84th Congress, 1st Ses-
sion), July 8, 1955 (Excerpts).
3105-3141
17. Development of the Technical Assistance Program: Release of the
Foreign Operations Administration, 1954 (Excerpt)
3140-314
18. Revised Administering Authority Under the Mutual Security Act of
1954: Executive Order No. 10575, November 6, 1954 . 3145-315:
19. Additional Revision of Administering Authority Under the Mutual
Security Act of 1954: Executive Order No. 10610, May 9, 1955. 3152–315
20. Countries Having Entered Into Arrangements for Grant Military Aid
Under the Mutual Security Program: Map, December 31,
1955
3156-3157
G. Statistical Review of the Foreign Aid Programs, 1945–1955
21. Post World War II Foreign Aid Legislation Grant and Loan Funds
Authorized and Appropriated for Major Foreign Aid Programs of
the United States, 1946–1956: Tabular Compilation, January 27,
1956.
3151
22. United States Government Foreign Grants and Credits, Postwar
Decade, July 1, 1945, Through June 30, 1955: Tabular Compila-
tion by Program (Military and Others), and by Area, November
4, 1955 (Excerpt)
. 3159-3161
PART XIX. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAI
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
1. Organization of the United States Overseas Information and Educa-
tional Exchange Functions, 1938-1953 .
3161-316
2. The Campaign of Truth: Address by the President, April 20, 1950
(Excerpt)
3163-316
3. Programs Conducted by the Department of State in 1950 To Provide
a Two Way Street: Chart, June 30, 1950
3166-316
4. Establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board: Presidential
Directive, June 20, 1951 .
3168-316
5. Establishment of the United States International Information Admin-
istration (IIA) in the Department of State: Departmental
Announcement 4, January 16, 1952.
3169-317
6. The Overt International Information and Educational Exchange Pro-
grams of the United States: Article by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs, March 31, 1952
3172–318
7. Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 Establishing the United States
Information Agency, June 1, 1953.
3184-3181
8. Establishment of the Operations Coordinating Board: Executive
Order No. 10483, September 2, 1953.
3186-318
9. Overseas Information Program: Publication of the United States
Information Agency, 1955
3188-3191
10. International Educational Exchange Program: Publication of the
Department of State (With Chart), March 1956
3191-3201
.
CONTENTS
LIX
PART XX. ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE
.
ORGANIZATION
Page
(Foreign Service Act of 1946: Public Law 724 (79th Congress, 2d Session),
August 13, 1946).
3204
1. Implementation of the Rowe-Ramspeck-DeCourcy Committee's Rec-
ommendations: Directive of the Department of State for the Im-
provement of the Personnel Systems and Personnel Management of
the Departmental and Foreign Services, April 16, 1951 . . 3204-3210
[Toward a Stronger Foreign Service: Report of the Secretary of State's
Public Committee on Personnel (Wriston Report), May 18, 1954). 3211
2. Recommendations of the Wriston Committee: Letter From the Secre-
tary of State to the Chairman of the Public Committee on Per-
sonnel, June 15, 1954 .
3211-3214
3. Implementation of the
of the Wriston Committee's Recommendations:
Report of the Third Audit Meeting of the Public Committee on
Personnel, December 13, 1955 .
3215-3122
4. Organization of the Department of State, June 1, 1956 (Chart)
3222
5. U.S. Foreign Service Posts and Department of State, Jurisdictions,
June 30, 1956 (Map).
3223
PASSPORTS
6. Authority of the Secretary of State in the Issuance of Passports: State-
ment by the Department of State, May 24, 1952. .
3223-3225
3-322
7. Regulations Concerning the Issuance of Passports, August2 8, 1952. 3225-3228
8. Rules of the Board of Passport Appeals, January 4, 1954 .
3228-3232
IMMIGRATION AND VISAS
(Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952: Public Law 414 (82d Congress,
2d Session), June 27, 1952). .
3232
9. Presidential Proclamation Establishing Immigration Quotas, June 30,
1952.
3232
10. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as Amended by the Act of August 31, 1954 . 3235
11. Report on the Status of the Refugee Relief Program, December 31, 1955
(Excerpt) With Chart
3244
CHARTS AND MAPS
(Exclusive of those bearing document numbers)
420
484
.
O
Trieste
Germany
Austria
Israel
Korea.
Indochina
The Basic Security Treaties of the United States .
Western Hemisphere Defense Area
Membership of European Regional Arrangements
Membership of Middle Eastern Regional Arrangements .
Kashmir.
644
699
725
751
788-789
806
966
1243
2276-2777
+
Part X
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
A. RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN FEDERAL
REPUBLIC, 1950–1955
1. ALLIED POLICY TOWARD GERMANY: Declaration Issued at
London by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France, May 14, 1950 1
1. Following the London agreements of June 1948 2 and the Wash-
ington agreements of April 1949,3 the United States of America, France
and the United Kingdom replaced the military authority and the direct
administration of the occupied territories in force since 1945 by a
civilian regime simply of supervision. By virtue of this regime
Germany was able to produce a constitution, proceed to free elections,
call a parliament, form a government, and elect a federal president's
The Federal Government and the governments of the laender were
able to take over the administration and control of internal German
affairs.
Furthermore, by the agreement of April 13, 1949, the Allies
decided to ease the burden of reparations on Germany. Some months
later under the Petersburg protocol 10 an agreement was reached for a
final settlement in regard to the delivery of plant by way of reparations.
In the domain of foreign relations the Petersburg protocol made
provision for the appointment of German consular and commercial
Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1950, pp. 787–788.
2. See communiqué of June 7, 1948; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp.
Agreements of Apr. 8, 1949; ibid., pp. 585-590.
* The Bonn Constitution: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Depart-
ment of State publication 3526; 1949).
• Elections in the German Federal Republic were held Aug. 14, 1949.
The first session of the Bundestag, elected Aug. 14, was opened Sept. 7, 1949.
The Bundestag elected Dr. Konrad Adenauer Federal Chancellor, Sept. 15,
8 Theodor Heuss was elected President of the Federal Republic, Sept. 12, 1949.
• A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1002–1009.
10 Protocol of Nov. 22, 1949; ibid., pp. 1010–1012. (Note: The date of the
protocol as printed in the Decade should read "November 22.")
1709
1
575-581.
3
1949.
t
1710
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
Wita Swim
representatives abroad. During the last few months steps have been
taken by the Western powers to secure the accession of the Federal
Republic to a number of international organizations including the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
The progress made has been accomplished in large measure thanks
to the action and the influence of the three Allied High Commissioners
in whom the three Foreign Ministers are happy again to express their
full confidence.
2. The Allies are resolved to pursue their aim laid down in the
Washington agreement of April 1949, and reaffirmed at Petersburg
that Germany shall reenter progressively the community of free
peoples of Europe. When that situation has been fully reached she
would be liberated from controls to which she is still subject and
accorded her sovereignty to the maximum extent compatible with the
basis of the occupation regime. This regime is imposed on the Ger-
mans and on the Allies by the consequences of the division of Germany
and of the international position. Until this situation is modified
it must be retained in accordance with the common interests of
Germany and of Europe.
3. In view of the continued refusal of the Soviet Government to
permit the inhabitants of their zone of occupation to rejoin their
fellow countrymen in a democratic and united Germany, it has not
been possible, and will not be as long as this Soviet policy persists, to
proceed to the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Germany. The
Ministers accordingly agreed to set up a study group in London to
undertake the necessary preparatory work to enable the occupation
statute to be reviewed at the appointed time and to make recommenda.
tions for eliminating the major practical inconveniences arising in the
countries concerned from the state of war, on the understanding that
in the present situation of Europe supreme authority must remain in
the hands of the allied powers.
4. While retaining the framework outlined above the Allies intend
to give Germany the possibility of developing freely, while at the same
time safeguarding the possibility of peaceful reunification of Germany,
which remains the ultimate object of their policy. The three Govern,
ments reaffirm the offers which were formulated during the meeting of
the Council of Foreign Ministers last June, and express the hope that
the necessary conditions for the establishment of a government for
all Germany may be achieved which would guarantee to all Germans
respect for their laws and fundamental liberties and they have agreed
upon the conditions which are necessary in their opinion for this
purpose.
1 An instrument of accession to the OEEC Convention of Apr. 16, 1948 (supra,
pp. 992-1000) was deposited for the French Zone of Occupation of Germany,
Aug. 2, 1948, and for the combined U.S.-U.K. Zones, June 15, 1948. The German
Federal Republic became an associate member of the Council of Europe (see its!
Statute of May 5, 1949, supra, pp. 1001-1012), July 13, 1950, and achieved full
membership, Mar 2, 1951.
· See communiqué of June 21, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy
pp. 110-112
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1711
The Western powers desire to see the pace of progress toward this
end as rapid as possible. Progress will depend upon the degree of
confident and frank cooperation displayed by the government and the
people of the Federal Republic. In the first place the pace will be
determined by the extent to which the Allies can be satisfied that
their own security is safeguarded by the development in Germany of
a desire for peace and friendly association with themselves. In the
second place the pace will be set by the rate at which Germany
advances toward a condition in which true democracy governs and
the just liberties of the individual are assured. Therefore, the West-
ern powers wish to emphasize most strongly that the natural desire
of the German people to secure relaxation of controls and the restora-
tion of the sovereignty of their country depends for its satisfaction
only upon the efforts of the German people themselves and of their
government. They earnestly trust that the Federal Republic will
fulfill in this respect the hopes placed in the wisdom of her people and
her leaders. Meanwhile, the High Commissioners in exercising the
powers reserved to them will continue to place their main emphasis
upon essential elements of security and fundamental democratic
issues of real importance.
2. ALLIED POLICY TOWARD GERMANY: Communiqué Issued at
Washington by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, September 19, 1950 1
The Foreign Ministers have reviewed the situation in Germany
and Allied relations with the Federal Republic, in the light of develop-
ments since their last meeting in London in May 1950.2 They have
taken into account in their examination the views which have been
expressed on recent occasions by the Government of the Federal
Republic.
They and their Governments share the desire of the German
people for the unification of Germany on a basis which respects the
fundamental liberties. Despite their efforts to achieve this end,
it will obviously not be realized so long as the Soviet Union continues
to ignore proposals for democratic all-German elections, and to stage
controlled elections such as the one to be held in the Soviet zone
on October 15. Pending the unification of Germany, the three
Governments consider the Government of the Federal Republic
as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted
and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative
of the German people in international affairs.
They reaffirm their desire, of which they have already given many
proofs, to integrate the Federal Republic into the community
of
free nations. They are convinced that the overwhelming majority
of the German people want to take part in building the European
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 2, 1950, pp. 530-531.
? See the tripartite declaration of May 14, 1950; supra.
1
:
:
1712
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
&
A
S
a
t
community, and in strengthening its common civilization. It ap
pears to them that the time has now come to take a new step towar
the attainment of these aims.
In the spirit of the new relationship which they wish to establish
with the Federal Republic, the three Governments have decided
as soon as action can be taken in all three countries in accordana
with their respective constitutional requirements, to take the neces
sary steps in their domestic legislation to terminate the state of wa
with Germany."
This action will not affect the rights and status of the three power
in Germany, which rest upon other bases. It will, however, create
firmer foundation for the developing structure of peaceful and friend
relationships and will remove disabilities to which German national
are subject. It is hoped that other nations will find it possible ti
take similar action in accordance with their own constitutioni
practices.
The three Ministers have given serious consideration to the prob
lem of the security of the Federal Republic in both its external and it
internal aspects. They recognize the fact that outright militar
units have been created in the Soviet zone of occupation ? and thi
fact together with recent events in Germany and elsewhere har
given rise toa situation of great concern.
The Allied Governments consider that their forces in German
have in addition to their occupation duties also the important rol
of acting as security forces for the protection and defense of th
free world, including the German Federal Republic and the Westen
sectors of Berlin. To make this protection more effective the Allie
Governments will increase and reinforce their forces in Germany
They will treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berli
from any quarter as an attack upon themselves.
The Ministers are fully agreed that the re-creation of a Germa
national army would not serve the best interests of Germany a
Europe. They also believe that this is the view of the great majorit
of the German people.
1
The Ministers have taken note however of sentiments recently
expressed in Germany and elsewhere in favor of German participatio
in an integrated force for the defense of European freedom. Tb t
questions raised by the problem of the participation of the Germa
Federal Republic in the common defense of Europe are at present
the subject of study and exchange of views.
As regards internal security, the Foreign Ministers recognize th
necessity for insuring that the German authorities are enabled el 1
fectively to deal with possible subversive activities. To this end
the Foreign Ministers have agreed to permit the establishment !
mobile police formations organized on a Land basis but with prov i
sions which would enable the Federal Government to have adequat
powers to make effective use of all or part of this force in order full
to meet the exigencies of the present situation. The High Commi 5
I
€
€
t
t
I
S
8
1 See infra, doc. 9.
2 See infra, pp. 1737-1739.
(
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1713
1
T
(Department of State publication 3556; 1950), pp. 324-326. . See infra, 1740-1742.
sion and the Allied Forces in Germany will render such assistance
es may be feasible in the rapid establishment of this force.
The new phase in the relations between the Allies and the Federal
Republic will be marked by major extensions of the authority of the
Federal Government. To make this possible, the occupying powers
are prepared to amend the Occupation Statute 1 while maintaining
the legal basis of the occupation, and the Federal Republic will be
expected to undertake certain commitments and other actions con-
sonant with its new responsibilities.
In the field of foreign affairs, the Federal Government will be
authorized to establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to enter into
diplomatic relations with foreign countries in all suitable cases. In
other fields, and particularly in relation to internal economic matters,
far-reaching reductions will be made in existing controls, and the
present system of review of German legislation will be modified. In
certain cases, the Allied powers will cease as soon as the Federal
Government has given undertakings or taken suitable action. The
High Commission will promptly begin discussions with the Federal
I Government to work out the necessary agreements for such under-
takings.
The Foreign Ministers have also agreed that a review of the pro-
hibited and limited industries agreement ? shall be undertaken in the
light of the developing relationships with the Federal Republic.
Pending this review the High Commission has been instructed to
c)
remove forthwith all restrictions on the size, speed, and number of
I commercial cargo ships built for export and to allow steel to be
produced outside the present limitation where this will facilitate the
defense effort of the west.
The three Governments pay tribute to the continued steadfastness
of the people of Berlin in the valiant struggle of the city to preserve
& its freedom. They will continue to oppose aggression in any form
against the people of the city, and are taking steps to strengthen
It Allied forces there. In view of the heavy price Berlin has had to
pay to defend its freedom, the Governments will continue their
efforts to alleviate its economic situation. They have directed the
High Commission to review the statement of principles governing
the relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Berlin, and
to liberalize Allied controls in the city to the maximum extent
el practicable. .
These decisions mark an important stage in the normalization of
th the relations and should contribute toward the creation of an atmos-
4 phere of mutual confidence and understanding. They represent a
né major advance toward the progressive return of Germany to partner-
ship in Western Europe and the consolidation of the western nations
or in their efforts to establish a firm basis for the future peace of Europe
Occupation Statute, Apr. 8, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp.
Agreement of Apr. 13, 1949; ibid., pp. 1002-1009.
Statement of May 14, 1949; Germany, 1947–1949: The Story in Documents
el and the world.
1
586-588.
415900_57_-Vol. 25
1714
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
3. REVISION OF THE CHARTER OF THE ALLIED HIGH COM.
MISSION FOR GERMANY: Agreement Between the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France, March 6, 1951 1
The following modifications are hereby made to the Charter of the
Allied High Commission for Germany signed in Paris on the 20th day.
of June 1949,2 which, as modified by this Instrument, continues in
force:
1. Article I, paragraph 3, is amended to read as follows:-
“(a) The stationing within Germany of forces of the three Occupy.
ing Powers outside of their respective zones of occupation will
be as agreed between appropriate High Commissioners and the
respective Commanders-in-Chief. The forces of any other
Allied Nation participating in the defence of Western Europe
and deployed within Germany for that purpose may be sta-
tioned in such areas of a zone of occupation as are agreed by
the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief of the
zone of occupation concerned.
(6) Command of the forces of the three Occupying Powers is vested
in their respective Commanders-in-Chief, regardless of their
location within the three zones of occupation. If, however,
operational control of all or part of any of the forces of one
Occupying Power located in the zone of occupation of one of
the other two Occupying Powers becomes necessary, such
operational control, together with necessary administrative
arrangements, will be mutually agreed between the High Com-
missioners and the Commanders-in-Chief in the zones of
occupation concerned.
(c) Control of the related military establishments and services of
the three Occupying Powers is vested in their respective Com-
manders-in-Chief regardless of their location within the three
zones of occupation. Administrative arrangements for forces
of one Occupying Power when located in the zone of occupation
of one of the other two Occupying Powers will be as mutually
agreed between the High Commissioners and Commanders-
in-Chief of the two Occupying Powers concerned.
(d) Command and administrative arrangements of the forces of
any Allied Nation other than the three Occupying Powers sta-
tioned within Germany will be a matter for governmental
agreement between such Nation and the Occupying Power
concerned.
(e) Existing agreements which have been concluded between two
or all of the three Occupying Powers will not be altered by the
foregoing without the mutual agreement of the High Com-
missioners and Commanders-in-Chief in the zones of occupa-
tion concerned."
1 TIAS 2235 (2 UST 825); entered into force Mar. 7, 1951. See also Department
of State Bulletin, Mar. 19, 1951, pp. 443-447.
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 603-609.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1715
:
2. Article I, paragraph 4 is deleted.
3. Article II, paragraph 1 is amended to read as follows:-
"The High Commission shall exercise control over the Federal
Government and the Governments of its constituent Länder, as
provided in the Occupation Statute. In the exercise of the powers
reserved to the Occupation Authorities under said Statute, the High
Commission shall reach its decisions in accordance with the provi-
sions of Annex A hereof. These decisions shall constitute a joint
exercise of the authority of all the three High Commissioners.'
4. Article II, paragraph 3 is amended to read as follows:-
"The Headquarters of the High Commission shall be at the seat
of the German Federal Government. The area defined as the Bonn
Enclave will continue to constitute a special area directly under the
administration of the High Commission and excluded from any
individual zone of occupation.'
5. Article III, paragraph 1.-The introductory sentence is amended
to read as follows:-
"The central organisation of the High Commission shall be tri-
partite in character and shall consist of: [&c.).”
6. Article III, paragraph 1 (6) is amended to read as follows:-
"such committees, including the Military Security Board, and
such sub-committees and subordinate groups, with such member-
ship and sucb terms of reference, as the Council may from time to
time approve;"
7. Article III, paragraph 2.—The final sentence is amended to read
as follows:
“Decisions of the Council shall be reached in accordance with
Annex A."
8. Article III, paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 are deleted.
9. Article IV, paragraph 3 (a) is amended to read as follows:-
"recommending repeal or annulment of legislation enacted by the
Land Government where he considers such action appropriate under
paragraph 5 of the Occupation Statute;">
10. Article IV, paragraph 3 (6) is amended to read as follows:
"ensuring due compliance on the part of the Land Government
with the Occupation Statute and with legislation and decisions of
the Occupation Authorities thereunder;"
11. Article V, paragraph 3 is amended to read as follows:
"Each High Commissioner shall be individually responsible to the
Council for the formulation annually, in accordance with tripartite
policies and criteria, of his budget of occupation costs and other
requirements. Such budget shall be formulated and submitted to
the Council, on a date to be determined by it, for consideration and
approval by the Council and for consolidation in a total budget of
the Occupation,
Authorities for transmission to the Federal Govern-
ment. Each High Commissioner shall be responsible to the Coun-
WWW.
1716
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
cil for control of his approved budget in accordance with accounting
standards and procedures established by the Council.”
12. Article VIII is amended to read as follows:
"Foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Federal
Government, together with any foreign representatives accredited
to the Allied High Commission, shall have access to the latter by
procedures determined by the Council."
13. Article IX is deleted.
14. In the Charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany as
revised by this Instrument, the expression "Occupation Statute"
shall; where the context requires, mean the Occupation Statute as
from time to time modified by the Council of the Allied High Com.
mission.
15. The "Agreement as to Tripartite Controls” among the Three
Powers dated 8th April, 1949,1 previously attached to and made
part of the Charter as Annex A, is terminated.
In the Charter as revised by this Instrument of Revision the ex-
pression "Annex A" shall mean the Annex A attached to this Instru-
ment of Revision.
In witness whereof the foregoing agreement has been duly executed
by the respective representatives thereunto duly authorised of the
Governments of the Republic of France, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of Americs
in triplicate in the French and English languages, each text being
equally authentic, and shall come into effect on the 7th day of March,
1951.
Done in London on the 6th day of March, 1951.
ANNEX A
1. In the exercise of the powers reserved to the Occupation Authori
ties to approve amendments to the Basic Law, the decisions of the
Allied High Commission shall require unanimous agreement.
2. In cases in which the exercise of, or failure to exercise, the power
reserved under paragraph 2 (9) of the Occupation Statute would in
crease the need for assistance from United States Government appro
priated funds, there shall be a system of weighted voting. Under suc
system tbe representatives of the Occupation Authorities will have
voting strength proportionate to the funds made available to Germany
by their respective Governments. No action taken hereunder shal
be contrary to any intergovernmental agreement among the signa
tories or to the principles of non-discrimination.
3. On all other matters action shall be by majority vote. It i
understood that agreements between the Governments of the three
Occupying Powers relating to any of the subjects listed in paragraph
1 For the full text of this agreement, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy
pp. 588-590 (where it is entitled "Trizone Fusion Agreement for Western Ger
many").
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1717
2 (a) and (b) of the Occupation Statute may not be modified by a
majority decision of the Allied High Commission.
4. If a High Commissioner considers that a decision taken by a
majority vote conflicts with an intergovernmental agreement which
relates to any of the subjects listed in paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the
Occupation Statute, or with basic tripartite policy, he may appeal to
his Government. Such appeal shall serve to suspend action for a
period of thirty days and for such further period of suspension as any
two of the Governments agree. If such appeal is from a decision of
the Allied High Commission to repeal or annul German legislation,
the repeal or annulment shall not become effective until the expiry of
the appeal period.
4. REVISION OF THE OCCUPATION STATUTE: Proclamation by
the Allied High Commission, March 6, 1951
1
:
The Council of the Allied High Commission hereby promulgates the
following modifications of the Occupation Statute which except as
modified by this Instrument continues in force:
I. In paragraph 2 (b), after the words "nondiscrimination in trade
matters," insert the following:
to the extent required for the purposes of paragraph (g) (2) below:
II. Paragraph 2 (c) is amended to read as follows:
(c) foreign affairs, including international agreements made by or on behalf of
Germany; but the powers reserved in this field
will be exercised so as to permit the
Federal Republic to conduct relations
with foreign countries to the full extent
compatible with the requirements of security, other reserved powers, and obliga-
tions of the Occupying Powers relating to Germany.
III. Paragraph 2 (g) is amended to read as follows:
(8) control over foreign trade and exchange to the extent necessary:
(1) to meet the needs of security;
(2) to ensure the observance by the Federal Republic of the principles of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Prade, until the Federal Republic has become
a party to the Agreement and assumed the obligations thereunder;
(3) to ensure the observance by the Federal Republic of the principles and
practices of the International Monetary Fund Agreement and to control its
exchange rate, until the Federal Republic has become a member of the Fund
and assumed satisfactory obligations thereunder with respect to its exchange rate;
(4) to provide for orderly settlement of claims against Germany.
IV. Paragraph 2 (h) is deleted.
V. Paragraph 5 is amended to read as follows:
(a) Any amendment of the basic law will require the express approval of the
occupation authorities before becoming effective. Any agreement made between
the Federal Republic and a foreign government will become effective 21 days
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 19, 1951, pp. 447-448; effective Mar. 7,
1951. For the text of the Occupation Statute of Apr.
8, 1949, see A Decade of
American
Foreign Policy, pp. 586-588.
Agreement of Oct. 30, 1947 (TIAS 1700; 61 Stat., pts. 5 and 6). See also
infra, pp. 2953-3013.
,
1718
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
after its official receipt by the occupation authorities unless previously disapproved
by them, provisionally or finally. Land constitutions, amendments thereof, and
all other federal or land legislation will be effective without review by the occupa
tion authorities but will be subject to repeal or annulment by them.
(b) The occupation authorities will not disapprove any agreement between the
Federal Republic and a friendly country or repeal or annul legislation unless in
their opinion it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Occupation Statute a
revised or with legislation or other measures of the occupation authorities, or
constitutes & grave threat to the basic purposes of the Occupation.
VI. Paragraph 7 is amended to read as follows:
(a) Insofar as it is based upon reserved powers, occupation legislation will
remain in force until repealed or amended by the occupation authorities.
(b) All other occupation legislation will remain in force until repealed by the
occupation authorities at the request of the appropriate German authorities, or
repealed or amended by the German authorities upon authorization by the t
occupation authorities.
VII. This Instrument shall become effective March 7, 1951.
C
t
5. REVISION OF OCCUPATION CONTROLS: Decision No. 10 d
the Allied High Commission, March 6, 1951
1
In implementation of the decisions taken by the Foreign Minister 6
of the United States, the United Kingdom and France at their Ner
York Meeting on 18 September, 1950,2 the Council of the Alliel
High Commission, having this day promulgated the "First Instrument
of Revision of the Occupation Statute," } has decided to adopt th
following program for further relaxation of controls under thic
Occupation Statute:
1. The powers reserved by paragraph 2 (b) relating to decor
centration will be exercised only to ensure completion of allied pro
grams relating to the steel, coal and motion picture industries, 1. G F
Farben and the Grossbanken and actions which, as of December 31 so
1950, are called for under laws adopted by the Allied High Com
mission or have been initiated through legal process n unde
existing laws. Upon completion of such programs and actions thes
powers will be relinquished.
2. (a) The powers reserved by paragraph 2 (b) relating to de
cartelization will be relinquished upon the enactment by the Feder
Republic of legislation satisfactory to the occupation authoritie
be
including provisions to prevent new concentrations of economi
power.
di
(b) The powers reserved by paragraph 2 (d) relating to displace F
de
persons and the admission of refugees will be relinquished as soon
commitments and other action satisfactory to the occupation St
thorities have been taken by the Federal Government with respe, 19
to
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 19, 1951, p. 448; effective Mar.
1951.
See tripartite communiqué of Sept. 19, 1950; supra, doc. 2.
M:
Supra.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1719
to the admission, care, and protection of displaced persons and refu-
gees, including safeguarding their civil rights, assuring the continued
and effective operation of International and allied agencies established
for their care and resettlement, and compensating victims of Nazi
persecution.
(c) The powers reserved by paragraph 2 (f) relating to respect for
the basic law and the land constitutions will be relinquished as soon
as the Federal Republic has established a judicial authority deemed
by the occupation authorities to be capable of effectively upholding
the civil rights of the individual as defined in the basic law.
3. The occupation authorities will retain the powers necessary to
ensure that the Federal Government carries out commitments under-
taken and legislation enacted pursuant to paragraph 2 above and that
the essential features of such legislation are maintained.
4. The Council of the Allied High Commission will issue further
instruments of revision of the Occupation Statute from time to time
as the conditions prescribed by this decision for the relinquishment of
powers are fulfilled.
5. This decision shall become effective on March 7, 1951.
1
6. COMPETENCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS: Decision No. 11 of the Allied High Commission,
March 6, 1951 1
1
In exercise of the powers reserved by paragraph 2 (c) of the Oc-
cupation Statute 2 as amended by the first instrument of revision, 3
the Council of the Allied High Commission decides as follows:
Article I
The Federal Government is hereby authorized to establish a Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and shall have exclusive responsibility for the choice of the per-
sonnel of its diplomatic, consular and trade missions.
Article II
The Federal Government may conduct relations with foreign countries subject
to the provisions of this decision.
Article III
1. The establishment of diplomatic or consular relations or trade missions shall
be subject to the prior approval of the Allied High Commission.
2. The Federal Government may, however, establish without such approval
diplomatic missions in those countries, other than the United States of America,
France and the United Kingdom, in which prior to the effective date of this
decision it has been authorized to establish consular offices.
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 19, 1951, pp. 448–449; effective Mar. 7,
Statute of Apr. 8, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 586–588.
3 Supra, doc. 4.
* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic was established
1
1951.
Mar. 15, 1951.
1720
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
3. No prior approval will be required for the establishment of consular office
or trade missions in those countries with which the Federal Government hi
diplomatic or consular relations,
Article IV
The Federal Government is hereby authorized to appoint official agents
the capitals of the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom.
Article v
The accreditation and status of foreign missions in the Territory of the Federa
Republic will be governed by the following provisions.
(i) Diplomatic missions and consular offices established in the Territory
the Federal Republic will normally be accredited to and recognized by the Feden
Republic. In exceptional circumstances they may be accredited to or recognize
by the Allied High Commission. In no case will there be a dual accreditation
missions to the Allied High Commission and to the Federal Republic or the issu
of exequaturs to consuls by both the Federal Government and the Allied Hig
(ii) The accreditation of foreign missions to the Federal Government shall
notified to the Allied High Commission and they will thereafter have access
it in all matters relating to the fields reserved to the occupation authorities.
Article VI
The Federal and Land Governments shall keep the Allied High Commissio
informed of any international negotiations. The Allied High Commission ms
intervene in negotiations relating to the fields reserved to the occupatio
authorities.
Article VII
th, LZV.Tutina
The Federal Government shall furnish to the Allied High Commission
appropriate information regarding action taken pursuant to the provisions
this decision.
Article VIII
4**
This decision shall become effective on March 7, 1951.
7. INCLUSION OF GERMANY IN THE EUROPEAN COMM
NITY: Declaration Issued at Washington by the Foreign Ministe
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Septemb
14, 1951 1
The three Foreign Ministers declare that their Governments su
at the inclusion of democratic Germany, on a basis of equality
in & Continental European Community, which itself will form
part of a constantly developing Atlantic Community.
The three Ministers recognize that the initiative taken by
French Government concerning the creation of a European Co
and Steel Community and a European defense community is
major step towards European unity. They welcome the Schum
Plan as a means of strengthening the economy of Western Euro
and look forward to its early realization. They also welcome t
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 485.
? See treaty of Apr. 18, 1951; supra, pp. 1039-1078.
See treaty of May 27, 1952; supra, pp. 1107-1150.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1721
Paris Plan as a very important contribution to the effective Defense
of Europe, including Germany.
The participation of Germany in the common defense should
naturally be attended by the replacement of the present Occupation
Statute by a new relationship between the three Governments and
the German Federal Republic.
The Government of the United Kingdom desires to establish the
closest possible association with the European continental community
ut all stages in its development.
The three Ministers reaffirm that this policy, which will be under-
taken in concert with the other free nations, is directed to the estab-
lishment and the maintenance of a durable peace founded on justice
and law. Their aim is to reinforce the security and the prosperity
of Europe without changing in any way the purely defensive charac-
ter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They reaffirm their
determination that in no circumstances shall the above arrange-
ments be made use of in furtherance of any aggressive action.
8. ALLIED POLICY TOWARD GERMANY: Communiqué by the
Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, September 14, 1951 1
The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the
United States have held meetings in Washington from September 10
through September 14. The three Foreign Ministers have met
frequently in the last few years primarily because of the special and
explicit responsibilities of their Governments in regard to Germany
and Austria. The meetings equally offer a convenient opportunity
for the three Ministers to exchange views on world developments
and informally to review problems of mutual concern to their three
countries.
The Foreign Ministers have noted with satisfaction the results
already achieved by their three countries, together with other free
nations of the world, in order to insure their common security and
to safeguard the peace. They again recorded the fundamental
unity of the policies of their three governments in regard to the many
and acute problems facing them today
The Foreign Ministers have reviewed the relationship of their
countries to the German Federal Republic, and have agreed on
instructions to the Allied High Commission for negotiation of mu-
tually acceptable agreements with the Federal Government, the
effect of which will be to transform that relationship completely.
As a result of the agreement reached by the three Foreign Ministers
in Brussels last December, the High Commission has already ex-
plored with the Federal Government the way to establish relations
1
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486.
Cf. the North Atlantic Council's communiqué of Dec. 19, 1950; supra, pp.
1608-1609.
1722
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
between the three Powers and the Federal Republic on as broad &
contractual basis as possible, in the light of German participation
in Western Defense. The Foreign Ministers have now instructed
the High Commission to proceed to negotiations with the Federal
Government, which will, it is hoped, culminate in early agreements
between the four Governments to enter into effect together with
the agreement for German participation in Western Defense through
the proposed European Defense Community, whose forces would
form part of the joint defense forces under the North Atlantic Supreme
Command.
The Foreign Ministers have agreed on certain general principles
to guide the High Commission in its negotiations with the Federal
Government. As stated in the Tripartite Declaration issued to-
day' the guiding principle of their policy continues to be the in-
tegration of the Federal Republic on a basis of equality within a
European community itself included in a developing Atlantic Com-
munity. Such integration would thus be inconsistent with the re-
tention in future of an occupation status or of the power to interfere
in the Federal Republic's domestic affairs.
The Ministers believe that the agreements now to be reached with
the Federal Government should provide the basis for its relationship
to their countries until a peace settlement with a unified Germany
becomes possible. The division of Germany, however, prevents the
conclusion of such a settlement at this time. This division and the
security problem confronting the Federal Republic obliges the Allies
to retain, in the common interest, certain special rights but only in
relation to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the pro-
tection of the security of those forces, as well as to questions affecting
Berlin and Germany as a whole, including the eventual peace settle-
ment and the peaceful reunification of Germany.
The High Commission will proceed to negotiations with the Federal
Government as rapidly as possible. The Ministers hope to be able
to consider at an early meeting final drafts both of the agreements
to be reached by the three Powers and the Federal Republic and of
the agreement for the establishment of a European Defense Com-
munity including Germany.
The three Foreign Ministers were unanimous in stating that in
the view of their Governments there is no justification for any further
delay in the conclusion of a treaty for the re-establishment of a free
and independent Austria. This has been the constant aim since the
conclusion of hostilities. They will not desist in their efforts to bring
the Soviet Government to the same view and to that end they have
decided to make a new and resolute effort in the meetings of the
Austrian Treaty Deputies to fulfill the long over-due pledge to the
Austrian people. 4
The Italian Government has pointed out the contradiction between
1 Supra.
2 See the Bonn Conventions of May 26, 1952; S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Congo,
2d sess., pp. 9–22, 25-165.
3 See supra, pp. 1107-1150.
4 See infra, pp. 1825–1827.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1723
some provisions of the Italian peace treaty 1 and the present Italian
position in the family of free nations. The Ministers studied sym-
pathetically this question which will be the subject of further con-
versations between the Governments.
Note was taken of the necessity further to examine in collaboration
with the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
the most effective use of their combined resources taking full account
of the social and economic as well as of the military needs of their
peoples.
While recognizing the gravity of the world situation, especially in
the face of the continued defiance of the United Nations by the forces
of aggression in Korea, the Ministers nevertheless found solid grounds
for confidence in the growing strength and unity of the free world.
The three Ministers on behalf of their Governments and peoples
restate their fidelity to the principle contained in the United Nations
Charter that international differences must be resolved by peace-
ful processes and not by force or threat of force. They therefore
express the hope that the forthcoming meeting of the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in Paris? will afford a real opportunity
for contacts and exchanges of views which the three Foreign Min-
isters are, for their part, prepared fully to use.
9. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY: Proclamation by the Presi-
dent, October 24, 1951 3
WHEREAS, by a joint resolution, approved by the President on
December 11, 1941, the Congress of the United States formally
declared a state of war to exist between the United States and the
Government of Germany (55 Stat. 796); and
WHEREAS on December 31, 1946, the President proclaimed the
cessation of hostilities of World War II; * and
WHEREAS it has been and continues to be the policy of the United
States to bring about the conclusion of a treaty of peace with the
government of a united and free Germany, but efforts to this end
have been frustrated and made impossible for the time being by the
policy of the Soviet Government; and
WHEREAS it has nevertheless been considered desirable to bring
the existing state of war with Germany to a close and to remove
Germany from its present enemy status, thus eliminating certain
disabilities
affecting German nationals; and
WHEREAS the rights, privileges, and
status of the United States
and the other occupation powers in Germany, and the rights and
privileges of the United States and its nationals to which it or they
1
Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947 (TIAS 1648; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1245).
the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, Nov. 6, 1951-Feb. 5, 1952.
*i.
e.,
* 66 Stat. c3.
• 12 Ped. Reg. 1.
1
1
Linnati Www
1724
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
have become entitled as a result of the war, as well as the right to
exercise or enforce the same, derive from the conquest of Germany
and the assumption of supreme authority by the Allies and are not
affected by the termination of the state of war; and
WHEREAS the Congress of the United States by a joint resolution,
approved October 19, 1951 (Public Law 181, 82d Congress), has
resolved that the state of war declared to exist between the United
States and the Government of Germany is terminated and that such
termination shall take effect on the date of enactment of such
resolution:
Now, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the
United States of America, pursuant to such joint resolution, do pro-
claim that the state of war between the United States and the Gov-
ernment of Germany declared by the joint resolution of Congress
approved December 11, 1941 was terminated on October 19, 1951.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
:
5
10. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUB.
LIC AND THE ALLIES: Statement to the Press by the Foreign
Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
and the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the German Federal
Republic, November 22, 1951
The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States met today with Dr. Adenauer.
This meeting, the first occasion on which the Chancellor and
Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic had jointly con-
ferred with the foreign ministers of the three Western Powers, marked
in itself a notable advance in the progressive association of the Ger-
man Federal Republic with the West on the basis of equal partner
ship. All participants welcomed the opportunity given for a general
review of a problem of mutual concern.
In the course of the conversation, which dealt with the general
political situation of the Federal Republic in connection with the
present world situation, the four foreign ministers reviewed the prog-
ress so far made in the negotiations carried on in Bonn for the estab-
lishment by freely negotiated agreements of a new basis for the
relationship between their countries.
In particular they examined the draft of a general agreement be
tween the four Governments which had been prepared in Bonn.
This is to establish the main principles of their future relationship
and can only enter into force together with the related conventions
XXL
مطمیه نیوم: ماهان
6
: 05 Stat. 451.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 3, 1951, pp. 891-892.
3 See S. Execs. Q and R, S2d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9–22.
1
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1725
1
referred to below and the treaty establishing a European defense
community,
Certain outstanding points in the general agreement were settled
and, subject to final confirmation by their Governments, the ministers
have approved the draft of this agreement. It will not be signed or
published at present, since the four Governments agree that it must
be completed by a number of related conventions governing in more
detail other important matters arising out of the future relationship
between them. The ministers agreed on the need for rapid progress
in the completion of all these related conventions.
The general agreement will be a concisive step toward the realization
of the common aim of the three Western Powers and the Federal
Government to integrate the Federal Republic on a basis of equality
in a European community itself included in a developing Atlantic
community.
With the coming into force of the general agreement and the related
convention, the Occupation Statute with its powers of intervention
in the domestic affairs of the Federal Republic will be revoked, and
the Allied High Commission and the Offices of the Land Commis-
sioners will be abolished. The three powers will retain only such
special rights as cannot now be renounced because of the special
international situation of Germany, and which it is in the common
interest of the four states to retain. These rights relate to the
stationing and the security of the forces in Germany to Berlin and to
questions concerning Germany as a whole.
The mission of the forces stationed in Germany by the three powers
will be the defense of the free world, of which the Federal Republic
and Berlin form part. Their status will be settled in detail in one of
the related conventions. Any disputes rising from the interpretation
or application of the general agreement or the related conventions---
with the exception of certain special rights—will be settled by a court
of arbitration.
The Federal Republic will undertake to conduct its policy in
accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations and with the aims defined in the Statute of the Council of
Europe.
The four ministers are agreed that an essential aim of the common
policy of their Governments is a peace settlement for the whole of
Germany freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies,
which should lay the foundation for a lasting peace. They further
agreed that the final settlement of the boundaries of Germany await
such a settlement.
They reaffirmed their intention to strive for the establishment of
German unity and agree on the importance of the proposals now
before the General Assembly of the United Nationss designed to
Supra, pp. 1107–1150.
? See S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 25-88.
* See ibid., pp. 89-134.
* Statute of May 5, 1949; supra, pp. 1001-1012.
* See General Assembly Res. 510 (VI), Dec. 20, 1951; infra, pp. 1795–1797.
1726
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ascertain whether free elections can be held simultaneously in the
Federal Republic, Berlin, and the Soviet zone of Germany.
The four foreign ministers consider the contractual arrangement
to be concluded between their Governments as well as the treaties
for the creation of an integrated European community as essential
steps to the achievement of their common aim: A unified Germany
integrated within the Western European community.
11. COMMUNIQUÉ BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE
AND THE CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN FEDERAI
REPUBLIC, FEBRUARY 19, 1952 1
The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United
Kingdom and the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic met for
discussions in the Foreign Office on the 18th and 19th of February
They reviewed the position reached in the parallel negotiations
Paris and in Bonn, now approaching a successful conclusion, for the
establishment of the European defense community ? and for the
creation of a new relationship between the three Western power
and the Federal Republic of Germany based on a series of freely
negotiated conventions.3
The Foreign Ministers and the Chancellor are well pleased with
the results of their work. They reached agreement on outstandin
issues arising from the negotiations in Bonn. The question
Germany's financial contribution to European defense is dealt will
below.
On the difficult problem concerning the future regulation and dis
tribution in the interests of Western defense of arms production i
the states of the European defense community they have reache
cortain conclusions and provided for a series of meetings which the
are confident will produce speedy results.
They reached agreement on methods for dealing with the questio
of war criminals now detained in the Federal Republic.
They reviewed the report made by the Executive Bureau of th
Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ
zation on the financial contribution of the Federal Republic to Wester
defense. The ministers agreed that this report, which reached the
on the 16th of February, should be published tonight. There
every prospect that an agreed decision on the total financial cont
bution of the Federal Republic to defense will be reached by the en
of the current week.
Negotiations on other matters arising out of this report, includi
1
1
1
1
· Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 3, 1952, pp. 325-326.
* See supra, pp. 1107-1150.
: See S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9-22, 25-134.
• See supra, pp. 1618-1620.
- conestiduties
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1727
the distribution of the Federal Republic's contribution, will proceed
at once in Bonn between representatives of the German Federal
Republic and of the three powers.
The four ministers welcome the progress made towards the con-
clusion of the treaty for the establishment of the European defense
community which will provide a solid foundation for the agreements
to be concluded between the three Western powers and the Federal
Republic of Germany. This treaty and the agreements will constitute
a single structure designed to bring about the association of the
Federal Republic with the free world and to solidify the defense of
Western Europe.
The four ministers discussed the relationship between the Euro-
pean defense community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and agreed on certain recommendations which will be made by the
three foreign ministers to the Nato Council for settling this question.
It will be the concern of the four governments, together with the
other interested governments, to ensure the preservation and the
progressive strengthening of the European defense community which,
as a part of the wider Atlantic community, creates a partnership for
peace.
The four ministers are agreed that continuing efforts should be made
to accomplish the unification of Germany through democratic and
peaceful means.
The four ministers are convinced that their meeting has removed
the obstacles which have hitherto delayed the conclusion of the
negotiations and has thus marked a decisive advance in the cause of
peace.
12. THE BONN AGREEMENTS: Statement by the Secretary of
State, May 26, 1952 2
The agreements that u have been signed today 3 are of great impor-
tance for each of the four countries represented here. The Federal
Republic is attaining the independence in foreign affairs and authority
in domestic matters which befit a free state. The United Kingdom,
France, and the United States, together with the other free nations,
are welcoming a new partner in their great effort to establish peace
and security in the world.
Let us take a moment to examine what these agreements mean
and what they are intended to accomplish.
The relations which follow from these agreements are fundamentally
such as exist between countries closely associated in peace and friend-
ship. When the agreements enter into effect, the Occupation will
come to its formal close, and the Federal Government will deal with
2
See supra, p. 1171.
Department of State Bulletin, June 9, 1952, pp. 887-888.
Agreements of May 26, 1952; S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp.
9-22, 25-165.
3
1728
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
other governments on a normal basis. The U.S. Government i
convinced that the agreements are just because problems arising from
the war must be settled, and it is right to settle them in this fashion
The purpose of the agreements is to bring the Occupation to an en
and this will be their effect.
There are still certain powers reserved to the United Kingdom
France, and the United States. But the important thing to remembe
about these powers is that they are not retained for any reasons whic
have to do with the Federal Republic alone. They are related to othe
factors entirely--to the necessity for the presence in Germany
troops whose mission is the defense of German peace and freedor
and of peace and freedom throughout the free world, and to the
unhappy fact that Germany is still a divided country. When thes
conditions no longer exist, the powers retained to deal with them wi
be withdrawn.
It is a matter of great regret and concern to the American Gover
ment that the task of restoring Germany as a whole is not complete
I feel deeply the absence on this occasion of those who might har
represented the people of that part of Germany which is still unde
Soviet occupation. It would have been a more joyful occasion
they had been permitted to join us.
One of the great aims of the Western World, one of the great them
of its culture,
and one of the great achievements of its people, has bee
freedom. Political and social freedom of the individual, freedom
his conscience and speech, have been what the West holds most deal
Since the end of the war the Three Powers have consistently work
to establish freedom throughout Germany, and their efforts har
been met with invaluable cooperation on the part of the people
Western Germany and Berlin. Together, we have succeeded
bringing freedom to the greater part of Germany, but until freedo
can be extended to the entire country, and until all Germans--Es
and West-are reunited in freedom, the goal will not have bee
reached.
I can assure you of my Government's continued determination
press steadily toward this goal until the unity of Germany in freedo
has become a reality.
In anticipation of the day when these agreements will have be
accepted by the legislative bodies of our countries and will enter in
effect, I wish to congratulate the Federal Republic on its new plu
among nations of the world. We have difficult problems ahead,
we can solve them only by working together. We are glad to have
new partner in this great cause. On behalf of the President of th
United States and the American people, I welcome the Federn
Republic on its return to the community of nations.
**************?S***.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1729
13. GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: Communiqué by the Pres.
ident of the United States and the Chancellor of the German
Federal Republic, April 9, 1953 1
The President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and
other members of the Cabinet have met during the past 3 days with
the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and had a full
and frank exchange of views on the world situation in general and on
American-German relations in particular. The conversations took
place in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and revealed a far-
reaching identity of views and objectives.
The President and the Chancellor discussed the effects which recent
developments in the Soviet orbit ? might have on the East-West con-
flict. They were fully agreed that, while no opportunity should be
missed to bring about a general relaxation of tension, the free nations
of the West must not relax their vigilance nor diminish their efforts
to increase their unity and common strength. They were further
agreed that if the Soviet rulers are genuinely
desirous of peace and co-
operation among all nations, they could furnish no better proof of
their good will than by permitting genuinely free elections in the Soviet
occupied Zone of Germany and by releasing the hundreds of thousands
of German civilian deportees and war prisoners still in Sov iet hands.
They further stated their joint conviction that there can beeno lasting
solution of the German problem short of a reunification of Gurmany by
peaceful means and on a free and democratic basis. The ac ievement
of this purpose calls for sustained common efforts of the signatory
powers to the contractual agreements signed at Bonn last year.
There was unanimity of conviction that all concerned should press
forward unwaveringly toward European unity through early rati-
fication of the treaty establishing a European Defense Community.
Achievement of this goal will be accompanied by the establishment of
German independence and sovereignty under the contractual agree-
ments. The Chancellor declared that the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is ready and willing to cooperate on a basis of equality and
partnership with all the free nations of the West in strengthening the
defenses of the free world. The Chancellor was given assurance that
the United States would supply military equipment to the European
Defense Community to assist in equipping the German contingents,
once the treaty has been ratified.
The problem of the Saar was discussed and it was agreed that an
early agreement should be sought in the common interest.5
3
1
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 565–566.
* The "recent developments” here referred to were those which followed the
death of Marshal Stalin, Mar. 5, 1953.
' i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the German Federal
* As of the date of this communiqué, only the Bundestag of the German Federal
Republic had taken parliamentary action (Mar.
19, 1953) favoring ratification of
* See supra, p. 613.
Republic.
the EDC Treaty.
415900—57_Vol. 2
-6
1730
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
........
Consideration was given to the special situation of Berlin and ad-
miration expressed for the political firmness and courage of its in-
habitants. It was agreed that the moral and material support needed
to keep the city strong is a matter of primary importance. The
Chancellor indicated that he had in mind further measures to in.
crease production and reduce unemployment. The Secretary stated
that consideration was now being given to assistance by the U.S.
Government to investment and other programs to improve economic
conditions in Berlin.'
The Chancellor indicated the great difficulties facing the Federal
Republic because of the necessity to assimilate not only the inillions
of expellees who came earlier from eastern areas but the renewed stream
of refugees from the Soviet Zone and beyond. The President and
Secretary of State recognized the great efforts undertaken by the
Federal Republic to care for these homeless persons and to preserve
economic and social stability. The discussion took account of the
possibility that the Federal Republic and Berlin might be unable to
bear this burden alone. The Director for Mutual Security stated
that careful consideration of this matter would be given in the course
of the preparation of the Mutual Security Program for the year
beginning July 1, 1953.2
The Chancellor raised the problem of war criminals. The future of
the war criminals now in U.S. custody was discussed. The U.S.
representative stated that his Government would reexamine the
status of these prisoners and would also look forward to the possible
adoption of new review procedures with German participation, as
soon as German ratification of the treaties was completed.
The representatives of both Governments exchanged views con-
cerning progress toward the freeing and expansion of world trade and
the achievement of currency convertibility. The German representa-
tives expressed particular interest in the reduction of tariffs and cus
toms administrative barriers. For their part, the U.S. representatives
noted President Eisenhower's statement of April 7 that "the world
must achieve an expanding trade, balanced at high levels which wil
permit each nation to make its full contribution to the progress of
the free world's economy and to share fully the benefits of this
3
progress." 4
Representatives of the two Governments discussed a number of
specific problems connected with the normalization of commercial
relations between the United States and Germany, including the
1 See the summary of Feb. 13, 1953, by the Mutual Security Agency of the
study of the Berlin economy made for the MSA by Richardson Wood and Com.
pany (Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 2, 1953, pp. 328–329), and the state
ment on aid to Berlin issued by the President, June 18, 1953 (ibid., June 29,
1953
p. 898).
2 See Section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 as amended by sel.
703 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953; infra, pp. 3060–3061.
3 See the statement on procedures for clemency and parole for war criminals
issued by the Allied High Commission, Sept. 1, 1953 (Department of State
Bulletin, Sept. 21, 1953, p. 391).
* See President Eisenhower's message to Congress regarding renewal of the
Trade Agreements Act; ibid., Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 634-635.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1731
@
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$
n
e
e
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e
I
5 Ibid., pp. 566-567.
prospects for increased use by German exporters of the trademarks
owned by German nationals prior to World War II. It was noted that
considerable progress had already been achieved in making such
trademarks available to former German owners and that future
progress in that direction was being sympathetically studied by the
d
United States.
The Chancellor and the Secretary of State agreed that the conclusion
of a new treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the
United States and the Federal Republic 1 would be of benefit to both
11
countries and that negotiations for such a treaty should begin at a
very early date. Meanwhile, as an interim measure, the two Govern-
ments are negotiating an agreement ? to restore to force the 1923
treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights 3 as it stood prior
to the war, taking into account the requirements of the present
situation. This interim agreement, when ratified in both countries,
would, among other things, re-establish a basis on which businessmen
of each country would be able to reside and carry on business in the
d
other.
The German representatives indicated their interest in the placing
of off-shore procurement contracts in Germany. They were informed
that as soon as the contractual and European Defense Community
of
treaties have entered into force, the same criteria will be applied in
the placing of such contracts in Germany, within the framework of
the European Defense Community, as are applied with respect to
the placing of contracts in other European countries.
In order to foster closer cultural cooperation between Germany and
the United States and promote mutual understanding between their
two peoples, an exchange of notes is taking place.
The two Governments reaffirmed their common interest in control-
ling, together with other nations of the free world, the movement of
strategic materials to nations whose policies jeopardize the peace and
security of the free world. Both Governments undertook to continue
action to that end, and, in particular, to keep under constant review
the list of items which from time to time may be subject to embargo
to Communist China. The representatives of the Federal Republic
IS
also expressed their Government's intention, in cooperation with other
trading and maritime nations, to apply supplementary measures, such
of
as transshipment controls, against violations or evasions of existing
strategic controls.
Announcement is being made simultaneously in the two capitals of
the return to the Federal Republic of approximately 350° vessels
formerly of German ownership. Arrangements for their transfer to
German authorities will be completed by the U.S. High Commissioner
1 A new commercial treaty was signed Oct. 29, 1954. The Senate advised
ratification July 27, 1955. It was ratified by the President Apr. 30, 1956, and
entered into force July 14, 1956; TIAS 3593 7 UST 1839).
Agreement of June 3, '1953; TIAS 3062 (5 UST, pt. 2, p. 1939).
3 Treaty of Dec. 8, 1923; 44 'Stat., pt. 3, p. 2132.
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 567-568.
8
le
IS
4
in Germany.
C
2
4
شدند رخنهه.....
1732
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The President and the Chancellor are convinced that the conversa
tions just concluded have made a solid contribution to the achieve
ment of common goals of the two countries, in strengthening the tie
of friendship now happily re-established and in consolidating the aim
and strength of the free world.
1
14. RESTORATION OF GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY: Senate Res
olution No. 295 (83d Congress, 2d Session), July 30, 1954
Whereas a convention on relations between the United States d
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the French Republic, therein referred to as the “Three Powers,"
and the Federal Republic of Germany, was signed on May 26, 1952
with a view to restoring sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Ger
many; and
Whereas the Senate of the United States gave its advice and con
sent to ratification of said convention on July 1, 1952; and
Whereas, nevertheless, it has not proved practical as yet to brin
the Convention into force in accordance with its provisions: Now
therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President, i
he judges that future developments make this desirable and in
national interest, should take such steps as he deems appropriate and
as are consistent with United States constitutional processes to restor
sovereignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute to the main
tenance of international peace and security.
1767
(For the texts of the London and Paris Agreements of Oct. 3 and Och
23, 1954, see supra, pp. 1474-1491, 483-612, 871-873, and 972–989.
(
15. GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: Statement to the Press
by the President of the United States and the Chancellor of the
German Federal Republic, October 28, 1954 3
I
We
A
During this morning's conversations we took an opportunity
renew the spirit of friendship and confidence which has marked ou
relationship in the past, especially in our efforts to overcome the ver
serious situation which faced us during the past few months.
reviewed the decisions taken at London - and Paris 5 and we are
1 S. Rept. 1991, 83d Cong., 2d sess.
3 S. Execs. Q and R., 82d Cong, 2d sess., pp. 9–22.
Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 8, 1954, pp. 680-681; see also ibid
. 1
pp. 680-683.
* See the Final Act of the London Conference, Oct. 3, 1954; supra, pp. 1474–14919
5 Agreements of Oct. 23, 1954, regarding (1) relations between the Allies an
the German Federal Republic (supra, pp. 483-612); (2) German adherence to
North Atlantic Treaty (supra, pp. 871-873); and (3) the Western European Unio
(supra, pp. 972-989).
8
1
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1733
II
1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954).
convinced that with the coming into effect of the Agreements signed
this past weekend, the road towards a strong and united Europe will
have been paved. We view the understanding reached between the
Governments of France and the Federal Republic of Germany as an
especially encouraging step towards lasting peace in Continental
Europe. This understanding was greatly furthered by the commit-
ment on the part of the United Kingdom to maintain forces on the
Continent. The basis for a European community has thus been
established.
The continued interest in and support of this community by the
United States was reiterated. Together with the strengthened North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, now to include the Federal Republic of
Germany, these new agreements will, we are convinced, serve to rein-
force the defense system of the free world.
We particularly addressed ourselves to the question of German
reunification. The demand for a reunited Germany in freedom is
viewed by us as the legitimate demand of the German people. We
are agreed that this aim shall be achieved only by peaceful means.
We are convinced of the necessity of continued efforts towards this
goal and are agreed that such efforts will be made by the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany together with the
Governments of the United Kingdom and France.
In this connection, we exchanged views on the latest Soviet note.
It is our initial view that this does not seem to offer any new proposal
on the part of the Soviet Union; it appears essentially as a reiteration
of the positions taken by Mr. Molotov at the Conference in Berlin
regarding Germany and European security.“
We have no doubt that the strengthening of free Europe which
will result from the recent London and Paris Agreements will aid
our efforts to bring freedom and unity to all of the German people.
We discussed the unfortunate fact that large numbers of German
prisoners of war and civilian deportees are still held in custody in
areas behind the Iron Curtain, mainly the Soviet Union. The
Chancellor requested the continued assistance of the United States
in obtaining the release of these prisoners. This question has for
some time been the subject of investigation by a United Nations
Commission. The Chancellor was assured that the United States
See Sir Anthony Eden's statement of Sept. 29, 1954, included in the Final
Act of the London Conference; supra, pp. 1487–1489.
See Secretary of State Dulles statement of Sept. 29, 1954; supra, pp. 1484-
Note of Oct. 23, 1954; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 902-
See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18,
* See supra, pp. 269–272.
8
III
1487.
905.
1734
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
stands ready, now as in the past, to offer every support and assist
ance considered useful in accomplishing this end.
IV
We also discussed the question of German assets in the United
States. The President expressed sympathy for the problem raise
by the Chancellor in his letter of July 17, 1954, to him on this sub
ject 1 and again expressed his willingness to explore such problem
along with the question of American war claims. We were agree
that conversations between representatives of our two Government
will soon begin.
16. TERMINATION OF THE OCCUPATION REGIME: Proclama
tion by the Allied High Commission, May 5, 1955 2
WHEREAS a new relationship between the French Republic, the
United States of America, and the United Kingdom of Great Britai
and Northern Ireland, on the one hand, and the Federal Republic
Germany, on the other, has been established by the Convention d
Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
Germany and the Related Conventions which were signed at Bonna
26 May 1952, were amended by the Protocol on the Termination
the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany signed
Paris on 23 October 1954, and enter into force today,
NOW THEREFORE, We,
André François-Poncet, French High Commissioner for German
James B. Conant, United States High Commissioner for German
Frederick Robert Hoyer Millar, United Kingdom High Commi
sioner for Germany,
Acting on behalf of, and duly authorized by, our Governments,
DO HEREBY JOINTLY PROCLAIM:
That the Occupation Statute 4 is revoked; and
That the Allied High Commission and the Offices of the Lan
Commissioners in the Federal Republic are abolished.
This Proclamation shall take effect at noon on the fifth day
May 1955.
Done at BONN, Mehlem, this 5th day of May 1955
5
]
]
within time and want sit üretiasa
]
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 270.
3 Ibid, May 16, 1955, p. 791; see also ibid., pp. 791-795.
8 S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9-22, and supra, pp. 483-485.
• Statute of Apr. 8, 1949 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 586-5
and supra, pp. 1717-1718.
(
citAV.sv.vidutinizin
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1735
17. UNITED STATES AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONS IN GER-
MANY: Executive Order No. 10608, May 5, 1955 1
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the
statutes, including the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 999), as
amended, and as President of the United States and Commander in
Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
1. Executive Order No. 10062 of June 6, 1949, and Executive
Order No. 10144 of July 21, 1950, amending that order, are hereby
revoked, and the position of United States High Commissioner for
Germany, established by that order, is hereby abolished.
2. The chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission to the Federal
Republic of Germany, hereinafter referred to as the Chief of Mission,
shall have supreme authority, except as otherwise provided herein,
with respect to all responsibilities, duties, and governmental functions
of the United States in all Germany. The Chief of Mission shall
exercise his authority under the supervision of the Secretary of State
and subject to ultimate direction by the President.
3. The United States Military Commander having area responsi-
bility in Germany, hereinafter referred to as the Commander, shall
have authority with respect to all military responsibilities, duties, and
functions of the United States in all Germany, including the command,
security, and stationing of United States forces in Germany, the
assertion and exercise of their rights and discharge of their obligations
therein, and emergency measures wbich he may consider essential for
their protection or the accomplishment of his mission. The Com-
mander may delegate the authority conferred upon him. If action
by the Commander or any representative of the Commander, pursuant
to the authority herein conferred, affects the foreign policy of the
United States or involves relations or negotiations with non-military
German authorities, such action shall be taken only after consultation
with and agreement by the Chief of Mission or pursuant to procedures
previously agreed to between the Chief of Mission
and the Commander
or his representative. Either the Chief of Mission or the Commander
may raise with the other any question which he believes requires such
consultation. If agreement is not reached between them, any differ-
ences may be referred to the Department of State and the Department
of Defense for resolution.
4. The Chief of Mission and the Commander or his designated
representatives shall, to the fullest extent consistent with their
respective missions, render assistance and support to each other in
carrying out the agreements and policies of the United States.
5. With regard to the custody, care, and execution of sentences and
disposition (including pardon, clemency, parole, or release) of war
criminals confined or hereafter to be confined in Germany as a result of
conviction by military
tribunals (A) the Chief of Mission shall share
1 20 Fed. Reg. 3093.
: 14 Fed. Reg. 2965.
""'
-'...
: 15 Fed. Reg. 4705.
1736
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the four-power responsibility in the case of persons convicted by the
International Military Tribunal, (B) the Chief of Mission shall ex-
ercise responsibility in the case of persons convicted by military
tribunals established by the United States Military Governor pur.
suant to Control Council Law No. 10, and (C) the Commander shal
exercise responsibility in the case of persons convicted by other
military tribunals established by United States Military Commander
in Germany and elsewhere. Tħe Commander shall, on request of the
Chief of Mission, take necessary measures for carrying into execution
any sentences adjudged against such persons in category (B) as to
whom the Chief of Mission has responsibility and control. Transfer
of custody of persons in categories (B) and (C) to the Federal Republic
of Germany as provided in the Convention on the Settlement of
Matters Arising out of the War and Occupation shall terminate
the responsibility of the Chief of Mission and the Commander with
respect to such persons to the extent that the responsibility of the
United States for them is thereupon terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the said Convention.
6. If major differences arise over matters affecting the United States
Forces in Germany, such differences may be referred to the Depart:
ment of State and the Department of Defense for resolution
7. This order shall become effective on the date that the Convention
on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic d
Germany 3 and related Conventions, as amended, come into force
18. GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: Statement to the Prese
by the President of the United States and the Chancellor of th
German Federal Republic, June 14, 1955
4
The President, the Chancellor, the Secretary of State, and the
advisers met this morning and discussed the problems of concern t
their two nations. They reviewed the political developments which
have taken place since the Chancellor's last visits and noted with
satisfaction that the bonds of friendship between their nations har
become very close. They are of the opinion that the recent favor
able developments in Europe are the result of the consistent, soup
policies followed by the United States, the Federal Republic, ani
their allies.
A large part of their discussion was devoted to the relationshi
between the nations of the free world and the Soviet Union at
particularly the recent developments such as the willingness of the
1 Law of Dec. 20, 1945; Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945)
(Department of State publication 2783, 1947), pp. 144-148.
Convention of May 26, 1952, as amended'oct. 23, 1954; supra, pp. 557-6
3 Ibid.; supra, pp. 486–498.
* Department of State Bulletin, June 27, 1955, p. 1033.
5 See statement of Oct. 28, 1954; supra, doc. 15.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1737
Soviet Union to participate in the four-power conference and the
invitation of the Soviet Government to the Chancellor. They agreed
that one of the objectives of the forthcoming four-power meeting will
be to pave the way for early German reunification. It was confirmed
that in their combined opinion the concept of neutrality is in no way
applicable to Germany and that only in collective security arrange-
ments can Germany assure its independence.
As a result of their discussions, they are reassured that there is a
very broad field of understanding between them. They are con-
vinced that the achievement of the policies upon which Germany
and the United States are embarked will continue to require closest
cooperation in the future. These policies are based on a common
adherence to the furtherance of a just and enduring peace among the
nations of the world.
B. BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY, 1950–1955
19. ALLIED RIGHTS IN BERLIN: Statement to the Press by the
Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, May 13, 1950 3
The three Western Occupation Powers will continue to uphold
their rights in Berlin. They are resolved now as in the past to pro-
tect the democratic rights of the inhabitants and will cooperate with
the German authorities to improve to the utmost the economic posi-
tion of the three Western sectors. Meanwhile the three Govern-
ments will continue to seek the reunification of the city in free elec-
tions in order that Berlin may take its due place in a free and united
Germany.
20. REMILITARIZATION OF EAST GERMANY: Note From the
American Ambassador at Moscow 4 to the Soviet Foreign Min-
ister, May 23, 1950
5
:
I have the honor to express to you the United States Government's
grave concern at a development in eastern Germany which is already
known to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
There has been created in the part of Germany that is subject to
Soviet control a police force which has, by reason of its military train-
detihe Soviet Government's willingness to attend the proposed four-power
The Soviet Government's invitation to the German Federal Chancellor was
extended June 7, 1955.
Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1950, p. 1039.
* Adm. Alan G. Kirk.
5 Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, pp. 918-919.
3
.
:
:
.
1738
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2
ing and equipment, the character of an army. This organization
called the Main Administration for Training (Hauptverwaltung Fue
Ausbildung), and it amounts to about 50,000 men. It is not a
ordinary police force, and it does not have ordinary police duties
It receives basic infantry, artillery, and armored training and
equipped with military weapons, including machine guns, howitzer
anti-aircraft cannon, mortars, and tanks. It must be regarded
therefore, as a military force.
The Soviet Union has many times expressed its adherence to the
principle of the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Ger
many. In particular, you will recall the following internationa
agreements to which the Soviet Government was a party:
A. Joint Report of February 11, 1945,' following the Anglo-Soviet
American Conference in the Crimea:
It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to
ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world
We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break
for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resun
gence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equip
ment;
B. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the As
sumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers, signed by
General Eisenhower, Marshal Zhukov, Field Marshal Montgomery
and General Tassigny on behalf of their respective Govern.
ments on June 5, 1945:
The Four Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complex
disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, as they deem requisite for futur
peace and security.
C. Joint Report of August 2, 1945,3 following the Anglo-Soviet
American Conference in Berlin (Potsdam):
3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Cound
shall be guided are:
(i) the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany
T
these ends: (a) All German land, naval and air forces and all other militar
and quasi-military organizations . shall be completely and finally abolished
in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of Grey
man militarization and Nazism.3
D. Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialis
Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republi
on Certain Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Germany
dated September 20, 1945: *
1. All German land, naval and air forces and all other military ale
quasi-military organizations, shall be completely and finally abolished
in accordance with methods and procedures to be laid down by the Allie
Representatives,
| Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1945, pp. 213-217.
? A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 506-512.
3 Ibid., pp. 34–48.
* Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 7, 1945, pp. 515–521,
WAT**************
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1739
Government for Germany (U. S.), vol. IV (Oct. 1, 1946), pp. 63-64.
2. All forms of military training, military propaganda and military activities
of whatever nature, on the part of the German people, are prohibited, as well as
the formation of any organization initiated to further any aspect of military
training and the formation of war veterans' organizations or other groups which
might develop military characteristics or which are designed to carry on the
German military tradition, whether such organizations or groups purport to be
political, educational, religious, social, athletic or recreational or of any other
nature.
E. Control Council Law No. 34, entitled "Dissolution of the
Wehrmacht,” dated August 20, 1946:
Article 1. all German land, naval and air forces, with all their organiza-
tions, staffs, and institutions, and all other military and quasi-military
organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive
the military tradition in Germany, are hereby considered disbanded, completely
dissolved and declared illegal.
Article II. The maintenance, formation and reconstitution of any of the agencies
or organizations enumerated in Article I under any name or form whatsoever, and
the taking over of all or any of the functions of such agencies or organizations in
the future by other agencies is prohibited and declared illegal.?
It is clear from these agreements that the Government of the Soviet
Union is committed unequivocally to the principle that Germany will
be demilitarized, that her military forces will be completely and finally
abolished, and that no revival of German military activities will be
allowed. The British, French, and American Governments were also
parties to these agreements and are equally committed to the same
principle. They have, accordingly, taken effective steps to prevent
any form of rearmament or remilitarization in their zones of occupa-
tion. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has directly violated all
these agreements. The establishment of a military force, or mili-
tarized police, in Eastern Germany could not have been accomplished
without the deliberate approval of the Soviet Government, and it is
an action squarely in opposition to the efforts being made by the
United States and other nations to create a stable and lasting peace.
Representatives of the Soviet Government have, on numerous
occasions, spoken of the Soviet Government's desire for peace. Such
verbal protestations, however, can hardly be expected to receive
credence among the free peoples of the world when the Soviet Govern-
ment is simultaneously creating a military force of considerable size
and strength in Germany in violation of its solemn international
commitments. By this and other like actions the Soviet Government
has destroyed world confidence in the sincerity of its promises and has
created throughout the world widespread doubt as to its pacific
intentions. If the Soviet Government wishes to restore in some
measure international confidence in its alleged attachment to peace,
it cannot fail to dissolve immediately the militarized
units which it
has set up in Eastern Germany.
Allied Control Authority, Germany, Enactments and Approved Papers of
the Control Council and Coordinating Committee (Legal Division, Office of Military
?
1740
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
--...
21. ALLIED POLICY IN BERLIN: Declaration by the Allie
Kommandatura, May 26, 1952 1
Taking into consideration the new relations established betweet
France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
the United States of America, and the Federal Republic of Germany
and wishing to grant the Berlin authorities the maximum liberty
.
compatible with the special situation of Berlin,
the Allied Kommandatura makes this declaration:
I
Berlin shall exercise all its rights, powers and responsibilities set
forth in its Constitution as adopted in 1950 3 subject only to the
reservations made by the Allied Kommandatura on 29th August
,
1950,4 and to the provisions hereinafter.
II
The Allied authorities retain the right to take, if they deem i
necessary, such measures as may be required to fulfil their inter
national obligations, to ensure public order and to maintain the statu
and security of Berlin and its economy, trade and communications
III
The Allied authorities will normally exercise powers only in thi
following fields:
(a) Security, interests and immunities of the Allied Forces, includ
ing their representatives, dependents and non-German en
ployees. German employees of the Allied Forces enjo
immunity from German jurisdiction only in matters arising
out of or in the course of performance of duties or services with
the Allied Forces;
(b) Disarmament and demilitarisation, including related fields o
scientific research, civil aviation, and prohibitions and restrie
tions on industry in relation to the foregoing;
(c) Relations of Berlin with authorities abroad. However, the ]
Allied Kommandatura will permit the Berlin authorities to
assure the representation abroad of the interests of Berlin and
of its inhabitants by suitable arrangements;
(d) Satisfaction of occupation costs. These costs will be fixe
after consultation with the appropriate German authorities and
]
(
1
{
1952
1
1 Memorandum on the Principles Governing the Relationship between the Allis
Kommandatura and Greater Berlin, 26th May, 1952 (London: H. M. S. O.,
Cmd. 8564), pp. 3–4.
2 Under the Contractual Agreements of May 26, 1952; S. Execs. Q and R, 82
Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9-22, 25–165.
8 1950 Berlin Constitution and Electoral Law (Washington: GPO, 1951).
4 Berlin: Development of Its Government and Administration (Office of the U.S
High Commissioner for Germany, 1952), p. 231.
(
]
]
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1741
visions of the Berlin Constitution.
at the lowest level consistent with maintaining the security of
Berlin and of the Allied Forces located there;
(e) Authority over the Berlin police to the extent necessary to
ensure the security of Berlin,
IV
The Allied Kommandatura will not, subject to Articles I and II of
this Declaration, raise any objection to the adoption by Berlin under
an appropriate procedure authorised by the Allied Kommandatura of
the same legislation as that of the Federal Republic, in particular
regarding currency, credit and foreign exchange, nationality, pass-
ports, emigration and immigration, extradition, the unification of the
customs and trade area, trade and navigation agreements, freedom of
movement of goods, and foreign trade and payments arrangements.
V
In the following fields:
(a) restitution, reparations, decartelisation, deconcentration, foreign
interests in Berlin, claims against Berlin or its inhabitants,
(b) displaced persons and the admission of refugees,
(c) control of the care and treatment in German prisons of persons
charged before or sentenced by Allied courts or tribunals; over
the carrying out of sentences imposed on them and over ques-
tions of amnesty, pardon or release in relation to them,
the Allied authorities will in future only intervene to an extent con-
sistent with, or if the Berlin authorities act inconsistently with, the
principles which form the basis of the new relations between France,
the United Kingdom and the United States on the one part and the
Federal Republic of Germany on the other, or with the Allied legisla-
tion in force in Berlin.
VI
All legislation of the Allied authorities will remain in force until
repealed, amended or deprived of effect.
The Allied authorities will repeal, amend or deprive of effect any
legislation which they deem no longer appropriate in the light of this
Legislation of the Allied authorities may also be repealed or amended
by Berlin legislation; but such repeal or amendment shall require the
approval of the Allied authorities before coming into force.
VII
Berlin legislation shall come into force in accordance with the pro-
Allied legislation, or with other measures of the Allied authorities,
or with the rights of the Allied authorities under this declaration,
Berlin legislation will be subject to repeal or annulment by the Allied
declaration.
...--.-.--...........
Kommandatura.
1742
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
VIII
In order to enable them to fulfil their obligations under this declara-
tion, the Allied authorities shall have the right to request and obtain
such information and statistics as they deem necessary.
IX
The Allied Kommandatura will modify the provisions of this
declaration as the situation in Berlin permits.
X
Upon the effective date of this declaration the Statement of Prir-
ciples Governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatur
and Greater Berlin of 14th May, 1949, as modified by the First
Instrument of Revision, dated 7th March, 1951,2 will be repealed.
22. DISORDERS IN THE SOVIET ZONE: Letter From the United
States High Commissioner 3 to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet Forces in Berlin, November 3, 1952 5
I reject these
In your letter of October 16 you felt obliged to inform me that in
recent months disorders have occurred in the Soviet zone. You
attribute the blame for these occurrences to the activities of or
ganizations in Western Berlin which, for the purpose of your argi-
ment, you describe as centers of espionage and sabotage and which
,
you maintain, indulge in criminal activities directed against the
population of Eastern Berlin and the Soviet zone.
charges, which are baseless and a travesty of the facts.
The organizations which you mention have, with the exception
of RIAS, been voluntarily formed by Germans who have the ir
terest of the German people at heart. So far from committing ang
crimes against the German people of the Soviet zone, these organiz:
tions are concerned only with giving help to the refugees from this
zone who, in increasing numbers, flee from persecution; to assemble
and disseminate evidence about illegal measures and violation of
the rights of man, of which so many Germans in the Eastern zone
are victims; and to tell them the truth about the free world from
which they are separated.
As regards RIAS, the radio in the American sector of Berlin
1 Berlin: Development of Its Government and Administration, pp. 192-195.
2 Ibid., pp. 204-205.
3 Walter J. Donnelly.
4 Gen. Vassily I. Chuikov.
5 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 1, 1952, pp. 861-862. The United King
dom and the French High Commissioners
delivered similar letters. to General
Chuikov.
• Ibid., pp. 862-863.
7 Radio in the American Sector.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1743
you may recall that the organization was established under the
direction of American personnel in 1946 after the Soviet authorities,
i in violation of the principle of Four Power cooperation in Berlin,
I refused to allow any but Soviet influence in radio Berlin. Your
allegations that RIAS is a center of espionage and sabotage are with-
out foundation. On the contrary, RIAS fulfills a much needed
function in providing factual information not otherwise available
in Eastern Germany and it will continue to do so.
I will not enter into the diverse accusations which you make on
the basis of the evidence provided by various "court trials” in the
Soviet zone. Public opinion throughout the world is only too well
informed of the methods whereby so-called "confessions may be
i extracted from those who are accused by such "courts.” Moreover
! these "courts” seem to have acquired the habit of describing as
i "crimes" acts which in democratic countries are considered to be a
normal part of daily life. For example, a person only has to ex-
press an opinion contrary to the Government in power or to repeat
a piece of news which is already known but which the regime has an
ti
interest in suppressing for him to be described as a "spy" or "traitor."
A
Such a perversion of the accepted meaning of words would be laughable
were its consequences not so serious.
In your letter you refer to "forcible abduction of activities of
people's enterprises to West Berlin where they, and the employees
of the people's police, and members of the FDJ, were murdered.”
If there were any truth in this, I would condemn criminal activities
of such a kind just as strongly as you do. But you do not cite any
instances of abduction and murder. I, however, am in a position
to cite instances of abductions from Western Berlin.
I should be obligated if you would give your urgent attention to
the case of Dr. Linse who was abducted from Western Berlin on
July 8,2 and inform me when he will be returned to Western Berlin.
Likewise, I should welcome information about "a certain Weiland”
to whom you attribute one of the "confessions” made before a court in
Greifswald on August 27, 1952. I assume this to be a resident of
West Berlin named Weiland who was kidnaped from the American
sector on November 11, 1950, and forcibly taken into the Soviet
sector. Nothing has been heard of him since then until I received
your letter. I should be glad to have full details about the circum-
stances of his arrest and an account of what has happened to him
since his arrest.
1.
1 In the text (i. e., the translation) of General Chuikov's letter of Oct. 1, 1952,
reprinted in the Bulletin, the passage which is here quoted refers to certain in-
dividuals and then reads,
it was disclosed that these persons
had
forcibly abducted into West Berlin, and there murdered activists of people's
enterprises, employees of the people's police, members of the Free German
Youth"; ibid., p. 862. The FDJ was the Freie Deutsche Jugend ("Free German
Youth”), an organization under Communist control.
2 For a statement relating to the case of Dr. Walter Linse, issued to the press
by Johannes Stumm, Police President of West Berlin, see ibid., Nov. 24, 1952,
pp. 823-824.
1744
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
I
:
I repeat that the activities of the organizations which you mention
have no concern with spying, diversionism, or terror. These or
ganizations would not be necessary and would cease to exist if basic
human rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement
,
and freedom from arbitrary arrest existed in the Soviet zone and
Eastern Berlin. Nor can their activities justify the measures taken
since last May, at the instigation of the Soviet authorities, whereby
the principal channels of communication between East and West
Germany have been obstructed or curtailed. I take the opportunity
of reminding you that I have not received a reply to Mr. McCloys
letter of June 30 * in which your attention was called to this serious
matter. I cannot but conclude that the purpose of your letter was
to attempt, by its many unfounded allegations, to provide a belated
justification of these measures which hinder the reunification of
Germany and which, as you are no doubt aware, have aroused wide
spread and fully justified indignation throughout Germany.
1
23. BERLIN UPRISING: Message From the Allied Commandants i
Berlin to the Representative of the Soviet Control Commission
June 18, 1953 %
As Commandants of the French, British and U.S. sectors of Berlis
and in the name of the Allied High Commission we desire to expres
our grave concern over events which have taken place in Berlin i
the past few days.
We condemn the irresponsible recourse to military force which he
as its result the killing or serious wounding of a considerable numbe
of citizens of Berlin including some from our own sectors.
We protest the arbitrary measures taken by the Soviet authoritie
which have resulted in the interruption of traffic between the sector
and free circulation throughout Berlin.
We formally deny that Willi Coettling, executed after a travesty
justice, was an agent provocateur under the orders of the intelligent
service of a foreign power. His condemnation to death and b
execution on an empty pretext appear to us as acts of brutality which
will shock the conscience of the world.
As the highest Soviet authority in the Soviet sector of Berlin your
share with us the responsibility of guaranteeing the well-being and the
freedom of the people of Berlin. We therefore demand in the interes
of Berlin as a whole that the harsh restrictions imposed on the populs
tion be lifted immediately and that free circulation within
Berlin ki
reestablished.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 319.
2 Ibid., June 29, 1953, pp. 897-898.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1745
24. BERLIN UPRISING: Letter From the Allied Commandants in
Berlin to the Soviet Military Commander in Berlin, June 24, 1953 ?
We, the French, British and American Commandants, have received
your letter of June 20 3 and hasten to reject your allegations that the
disturbances of June 17 were the result of action by groups sent from
Western sectors of Berlin. The statement in the inclosure to your
letter that an American called Heaver who was wearing a uniform
with two stars, which are the insignia of a major general, was seen
giving the instructions to organize the disorders is, we are sure you
will agree, Major General Dibrova, unworthy of serious consideration
and must be held to discredit the rest of the informant's testimony.
You and the world are well aware of the true causes of the disorders
which have recently occurred in East Berlin, and it is therefore
unnecessary for us to tell you that the three powers in West Berlin
had no responsibility whatever for instigating them.
We must therefore continue to demand that the remaining restric-
tions imposed on the Berlin population be lifted and that the steps
which you have already taken to reestablish circulation within Berlin
be carried to their logical conclusions, free and unfettered movement
between all sectors.
We on our side shall continue as always to fulfill our responsibility
for the maintenance of law and order in our sectors, and we are ready
to do our part in reestablishing normal conditions of life throughout
the whole city.
25. BERLIN UPRISING: Statement by the Secretary of State at a
Press Conference, June 30, 19534
I have long believed and preached that the Soviet was overextended
having under its control some 600 million non-Russians representing
what had been 15 or more independent nations. I have been confident
that these people could not be moulded into the Soviet Communist
pattern, particularly if the free peoples kept alive the hope of the
captives and showed them that they were not forgotten.
There has now developed extensive unrest within the satellite
countries of Europe. It demonstrates that the people do retain their
love of God and love of country and their sense of personal dignity.
They want to run their own affairs and not be run from Moscow.
The unquenchable spirit of the peoples was dramatized in East
Berlin, where unarmed youths tore up paving stones from the streets
to hurl in defiance at tanks. Such a spirit can never be repressed,
and this love of freedom is more and more manifesting itself through
the captive peoples.
1 Maj. Gen. P. T. Dibrova.
? Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1953, p. 9.
3 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
4 Ibid., July 13, 1953, p. 40.
415900_57—Vol. 2
1746
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The cry everywhere is for "free elections." The people want to be
governed by those whom they select as responsive to their needs and
their desires, rather than to be ruled by those who take their orden
from aliens and who give their orders with a view to achieving the
own ambitions without regard to the welfare of the people concerned
In my book War or Peace, written over 3 years ago, I said:“... th
Communist structure is over-extended, over-rigid and ill-founded. I
could be shaken if the difficulties that were latent were activated."
I went on to point out that this does not mean an armed revolt which
would precipitate a massacre, but that short of this the people could
demonstrate an independence such that the Soviet Communis
leaders would come to recognize the futility of trying to hold captive
so many peoples who, by their faith and their patriotism, can neve
really be consolidated into a Soviet Communist world.
The developments of recent weeks show the correctness of the
diagnosis.
26. UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY: Letter From the President
the United States to the Chancellor of the German Federal Re
public, July 23, 1953 2
MY DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: During the development of the com
versations between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreig
Ministers of Great Britain and France, it occurred to me that it migh
be helpful if I were to write you a letter in amplification of the thought
so tightly compressed in the final communiqué.3
It seems to me that certain definite patterns are emerging from
the situation in East Germany and the Eastern European satellit
countries-patterns which will unquestionably have a profound effect
upon the future, including the proposed meeting of the Foreign
Ministers of the Four Powers.
I think, therefore, that it will be useful for me to share my thought
with you in some detail at this time.
Great historical developments, such as the recent Berlin and Eas
German anti-Communist demonstrations,4 rarely have single root
Nevertheless, I am quite certain that future historians, in their analys
of the causes which will have brought about the disintegration of the
Communist empire, will single out those brave East Germans wh
dared to rise against the cannons of tyranny with nothing but the
bare hands and their stout hearts, as a root cause.
I think also ths
those same historians will record your own extraordinary steadfastne
in the cause of European peace and freedom over many, many years
In analyzing these recent developments, there appear to be fire
points of greatest significance.
First, this eruption against Communist oppression was sport
j
1
1 War or Peace (New York, 1950), p. 247.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 3, 1953, pp. 147-149.
3 Communiqué of July 14. 1953; supra, pp. 1463–1467.
4 See supra, docs. 23 and 24.
شبیه هم نميخيل ننعننن ننجمن
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1747
3 Should read “July 14"; supro, pp. 1463-1467.
taneous. I know that I need not go into any elaborate denial with
of the fantastic explanation put out by Moscow that the up-
rising was caused by American provocateurs. No provocateur of
any nationality can persuade human beings to stand up in front of
rumbling tanks with sticks and stones. Such action comes from the
heart and not from any foreign purse.
Second, this uprising was not just a momentary flash of despera-
tion. The continuing news of disorders in Eastern Germany indicates
a fundamental and lasting determination to be fully and finally free,
despite long years of stern Sovietization.
Third, nowhere were the rioters "bourgeois reactionaries” or
"capitalist warmongers." They were workers. Therefore, the
martyrs who fell before Russian Communist guns were the very
same workers in whose name the Kremlin has falsely and cynically
built their empire of oppression, their farflung "workers' paradise."
Fourth, the fact of the uprising, the conduct of the German Com-
munist leaders during the event and their actions since the event,
all indicate the complete political bankruptcy of the SED [Sozialis-
tische Einheitspartei Deutschlands].?
Fifth, and to me of utmost significance, when the riots developed
in the Russian sector of Berlin, the workers' chant was, “We want
free elections.” In this phrase, the people clearly and simply summed
up their yearning for the alleviation of their grievances and sufferings.
The combination of these five facts actually forms the background
for that portion of the July 15 Foreign Ministers' communiqué 3
dealing with German unification and free elections. And the com-
muniqué itself, as you know, is actually the diplomatic confirmation
your own earlier statements, of my June 264 cable to you, and
most important, of the resolution of the German Bundestag
of June 10.5
For the past many months there have been endless arguments
and debates on both sides of the Atlantic over the respective priorities
of such words and phrases as "unification," "peace treaty," "free
elections," "withdrawal of occupation troops," etc.
It has always seemed to me and these recent events, to me at
least, clearly confirm the thought--that there can be no solution
without free elections and the formation of a free all-German Gov-
ernment, leading to unification. From that point on can flow a
logical
, orderly sequence of events, culminating in an honorable
peace treaty and the re-emergence of a new united German Republic,
dedicated to the welfare of its own people, as a friendly and peaceful
member of the European family of nations.
To this first step of free elections, the Government of the United
See the letter of June 20, 1953, from the Soviet Commandant in Berlin to the
three Western Commandants; Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1953, pp. 8–9.
mation of the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party in the Soviet
* Should read "June 25”?; Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1953, p. 10.
• Documents on German 'Unity, vol. IV (Bad-Godesberg, 1953), p. 15.
of
Zone of Germany).
1748
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
:
1
1
States will continue to lend the full force of its political, diplomati
and moral support.
There are sincere people in Germany, in the nations of Wester
Europe, and even in my own country, who have come to belier
that free elections, and therefore the unification of Germany, con
tradict and possibly exclude the concept of the European Defer
Community which has been ratified by both your Houses of Parli
ment and is now before your Constitutional Court. I do not an
have never accepted this theory that the EDC and unification
Germany are mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary,
As the three Foreign Ministers stated at the conclusion of the
recent meeting in Washington, since the European communi
corresponds to the lasting needs of its members and their people f
.
peace, security, and welfare, it is looked upon as necessary in its
and not linked up with existing international tensions.
It has
long been my conviction that the strengthening of t
Federal Republic, through adoption of the EDC, the contractu
agreements and further progress in the integration of Western Europe
can only enhance the prospects for the peaceful unification of Ge
many, by increasing the attractive power of this prosperous Wester
Germany vis-à-vis the Soviet Zone, an attractive power which be
already been demonstrated by the steady stream of refugees in rece
months, as well as the demonstrations which began on June 1
This increasing contrast between Western and Eastern Germany
the latter with its bankrupt regime and impoverished econom
will in the long run produce conditions which should make possik
the liquidation of the present Communist dictatorship and of ti
Soviet occupation,
While a future all-German Government must obviously be fire
to choose the degree to which it wishes to enter into defensive a
other arrangements compatible with the principles of the Unite
Nations, I can hardly imagine that it would seek the path of co
plete and premature disarmament in the presence of other natio
still heavily armed. I believe this is a matter worthy of seriu
attention. Those who in Germany believe they can suggest an ex
safe solution through defenseless neutralization should careful
ponder the true wisdom and safety of such a course.
Speaking for America, and I believe the rest of the free wor
shares this view, I can say that there has been enough bloodsb
and enough misery and enough destruction in the past 50 years
deter any people or any Government of the West from any ideas
military aggression. But the peace we all so dearly seek cannot
maintained through weakness. EDC will be the simplest, mm
unequivocal, and most self-evident demonstration of strength
peace.
No one can foretell what the unfolding months will bring, but it a
certainly be said that the workers of Berlin's Soviet Sector and !
workers of East Germany, with the workers of Czechoslovas
1 The Bundestag voted for ratification, Mar. 19, 1953; the Bundesrat ti*
similar parliamentary action, Mar. 24, 1953.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1749
have started something that will have an important place on the
pages of history. May the concluding chapter of that history record
the reemergence of freedom, of peace, and of happiness.
27. EAST GERMANY-FRIENDSHIP AND SYMPATHY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE: Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 36
(83d Congress, 1st Session), August 3, 1953 1
WHEREAS the brutal suppression by the Soviet Communist regime
through the use of armed force and police terror of workers seeking the
rights of free assembly and other rights assured to all in the free world;
the persecutions of members of all religious faiths; the continuing
servitude enforced upon the captive peoples; the systematic repression
of all non-Communist political elements in the Soviet-dominated
countries and most recently the acts against the people of Soviet-
dominated countries, deserves strongest condemnation; and constitute
(a) suppression of individual and human rights, and (b) persecution on
account of race and religion; (c) violate the declarations in the Pre-
amble to the Charter of the United Nations; and (d) violate the
basic principles set forth in the American Declaration of Independence
1
of 1776: "... that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed,
--That whenever any Form
I of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government,
I laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in
| such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety
| and Happiness.
... But when a long train of abuses and usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a design to reduce them
i under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw
off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future
! security."; and
WHEREAS the people of East Berlin, East Germany, Poland
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and other Communist-dominated
U countries have so courageously demonstrated their strong devotion to
these principles of freedom and justice by their heroic resistance to
the Soviet-controlled East German regime and mindful that the
United States secured its freedom by popular revolt against tyranny;
and
WHEREAS the Soviet regime being unable to win the allegiance of
the people under its rule, knows no other method of achieving the
compliance of the people to their dictatorship than by force of arms,
167 Stat. B132-133.
1750
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Zi----------..-...-'.,
terror, murder, imprisonment, reprisals and mass deportation; ani
WHEREAS the cause of freedom cannot be contained and will eventu
ally triumph: Now therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Congress commends and encourages the valian
struggle of these captive peoples for freedom.
Sec. 2. It is further the sense of the Congress that the United State
express in the United Nations and in every other way open to it the
indignation of its people against these suppressions of workers ani
religious persecutions in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ani
the Communist satellites, its sympathy with the tragic victims o
these suppressions and religious persecutions, and its determinatio
that international law and individual and human rights be observe
in the world.
Sec. 3. That the Congress of the United States in behalf of th
American people hereby expresses the firm conviction that the peopl
of East Germany are entitled to their basic, inalienable God-givel
rights and freedoms for which they are now struggling.
Sec. 4. That the Congress of the United States further express
the firm conviction of the American people that the people of German
now presently divided, have the right to be a unified nation governe
by their own consent by the free expression of popular will in fr
elections,
Sec. 5. That the Congress of the United States further express
in behalf of the American people its friendship and sympathy with th
people of East Germany, particularly those who have suffered at th
hands of the Communists because of their patriotic defiance of Com
munist tyranny and denounces the action of the Communist regimei
killing, imprisoning, and deporting those who have openly demo
strated their love of liberty and justice, and asserts that their hero
sacrifice and suffering will aid the cause of freedom in all the Cou
munist enslaved nations and will inspire freedom-loving peop!
everywhere.
Agreed to August 3, 1953.
;
28. REMOVAL OF INTERZONAL BARRIERS: Note From
United States High Commissioner to the Soviet High Comm
sioner, August 26, 1953 3
1
It has long been the policy of my government to remove the barri
which still exist in Germany between our two zònes and to endear
to secure freedom of movement for German Nationals between the
You will recall that for several years German Nationals living in
French, United Kingdom and United States zones have been able
move freely between these zones
without interzonal passes while it
still necessary for Germans to possess them before they can tra
1 James B. Conant.
2 Vladimir Semenovich Semenov.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 21, 1953, pp. 391–392.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1751
4 Ibid., pp. 490–491.
between the United States and Soviet zones. The continuation of the
system of interzonal passes between our respective zones has in my
view no justification and I consequently hope that you will agree that
we should jointly waive this requirement for German Nationals.
I therefore propose to you that we now jointly waive the allied
interzonal pass requirement for the travel of German Nationals
between and through the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics zones. Simultaneously, the present German Aufenthaltser-
laubnis (residence permit] requirement should be abolished by the
German authorities. The responsible German authorities in the
United States zone will suspend the requirement of the Aufenthaltser-
laubnis simultaneously with the waiver by us of the interzonal pass
requirement. I hope that you will accept this proposal and that you
will agree to make the necessary administrative arrangements in the
Soviet zone so that German Nationals residing in Berlin, the Soviet
zone and the United States zone of occupation will be able to travel
freely between and through these zones of Germany and Berlin on the
simple presentation of their identity card. As soon as you have
informed me that these administrative arrangements are to be made
in the Soviet zone, I shall order the waiver of the interzonal pass
requirement for German Nationals traveling between or through our
I am informed that my British and French colleagues are approach-
ing you with similar proposals.
29. REMOVAL OF INTERZONAL BARRIERS: Letter From the
United States High Commissioner to the Soviet High Commis-
sioner,2 September 17, 19533
I have your letter of September 1,4 in which you reply to my pro-
posal of August 26, 1953, that there be waived simultaneously the
interzonal pass which is required by occupation powers and the
Aufenthaltserlaubnis (residence permitſ which is required by German
authorities. I regret that instead of accepting my proposal, you have
devoted the greater part of your letter to unfounded allegations that
German authorities in the Federal Republic are hindering the inter-
zonal travel of German Nationals. These allegations are so man-
ifestly false that I do not propose to answer them. I would however
point out that your claim that these
obstructions exist should have
led you to agree the more readily to my proposal to waive the inter-
zonal pass and the Aufenthaltserlaubnis requirements.
You have proposed that the whole matter be referred to the gov-
ernment of the Federal Republic of Germany and to the German
authorities in the Soviet Zone. You appear to have overlooked the
1 James B. Conant.
2 Vladimir Semenovich Semenov.
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, p. 490.
zones,
3
5 Supra.
1752
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
:
1
fact that the inter-zonal pass system was established by quadripartite
agreement and that therefore the waiver of this requirement is a
matter falling solely within the authority of the occupation powers.
As regards the views of the Federal Republic of Germany on this
subject, I should like to call your attention to the unequivocal state
,
ments contained in the resolution of the Bundestag on July 1, 1953,
calling for free circulation of all Germans throughout Germany, and
in the subsequent decision of the Federal Cabinet of August 25, 1953,
asking for removal of all restrictions imposed on inter-zonal travel
by reason of the inter-zonal pass requirement.
By these actions the Federal Republic of Germany solemnly de
clared its desire and willingness to do everything possible to bring
about conditions permitting unrestricted travel throughout Germany
of German Nationals irrespective of their place of residence. For
this reason the German authorities in the US Zone will, as I have
already informed you in my letter of August 26, waive the Aufen-
thaltserlaubnis simultaneously with our waiver of the inter-zonal pas
requirement, on condition that German authorities in the Soviet
Zone do the same.
I wish therefore to reiterate to you my proposal contained in m
letter to you of August 26, 1953, that we now jointly waive the
Allied inter-zonal pass requirement for travel of German National
between and through the US and USSR Zones."
On condition that you will have informed me in advance of you
agreement to institute similar measures simultaneously, I am pre
pared to waive, effective 24:00 hours September 30, the inter-zong
pass requirement for German Nationals proceeding through estab
lished crossing points to the US Zone from the Soviet Zone of Ger
many or from Berlin. At the same time, I request that you reoper
those inter-zonal crossing points which were closed on Soviet instrue
tions at various dates prior to the middle of 1952.
Since my British and French colleagues are making the same pro
posal, German Nationals would then be able to travel throughou
Germany on the simple presentation of their identity cards.
?
30. REMOVAL OF INTERZONAL BARRIERS: Letter From tb
United States High Commissioner 2 to the Soviet High Commis
sioner, February 22, 1954 4
At the meeting in Berlin on February 18 of the Foreign Minister
of the U.K., U.S.A., France and the U.S.S.R., it was stated the
the governments of the U.K., the U.S.A. and France had initiate
a study of the steps that could be taken to lessen the hardships whic
1 Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Documents on German
Unity, vol. IV (Bad-Godesberg, 1953), p. 43.
2 James B. Conant.
3 Vladimir Semenovich Semenov.
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 5, 1954, pp. 508-509.
5
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1753
1
result for the German people from the present division of Germany.
Although such steps are no substitute for the reunification of Ger-
many and the conclusion of a peace treaty, which remain the objec-
tives of its policy, the U. S. Government considers that it should be
possible for the four occupying powers in Germany to reach imme-
diate agreement on the elimination of a certain number of unjusti-
fiable obstacles which still prevent freedom of movement between the
different parts of Germany. The U.S. Government believes that
the Four Powers could in this way bring about an immediate and
essential improvement in the living conditions of all Germany.
I therefore propose to you that we shall agree that each of us
should, as appropriate, take the following measures:
A. The abolition of the requirement for residence permits for Ger-
mans residing in the Federal Territory who desire to travel to the
Soviet Zone. The maintenance of this formality in fact consider-
ably reduces the effect of the abolition of interzonal passes which
was decided at the end of 1953.
B. The opening of the inter-zonal crossing points which have
been closed by the Soviet authorities on various dates before the
middle of 1952. I would remind you of the proposal on this subject
made to you in my letter of January 8.2
C. The improvement of inter-zonal road and rail transport serv-
ices including the introduction of fast rail services with improved
passenger facilities between the principal cities of West Germany on
the one hand and East Germany and Berlin on the other.
D. The removal of the prohibited zone, the barbed wire fences
and all other barriers placed in the Soviet Zone along the Soviet Zone
border.
E. The abolition of all controls and of all impediments to the free
circulation of printed matter.
As regards Berlin, we should agree upon suitable methods for
re-establishing more normal living conditions for the inhabitants of
the city. In particular, I consider it necessary to reach decisions on
the two following questions:
A. The abolition of all formalities re movement of persons between
Berlin and the Soviet Zone.
B. The removal of all impediments to the free movement of per-
sons and of goods between the Western sectors of Berlin and Western
Germany; in particular the abolition of the requirement for the
endorsement of Warenbegleitscheine (certificates for goods in transit)
for such goods by the authorities of the Soviet Zone and the introduc-
tion of arrangements for the customs-free transit of such goods.
I shall be glad to meet with you at your early convenience to dis-
cuss these proposals.
1 Statement by Sir Anthony Eden; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discus-
sions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399),
p. 129.
2 Not printed.
1754
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
If, as I hope, they are acceptable to you, technical discussion
may be required concerning proposals B and C in paragraph 2 above
In that event I shall be prepared to furnish the names of the Germa
technical experts authorized to deal with these matters in respecto
Western Germany and I would be glad to obtain corresponding infor
mation from you.
I have authorized Gen. Timberman1 to make contact with Mr.
Denginand to transmit to him a proposal dealing with the othe
restrictions which we wish to see eliminated in Berlin.3
31. REMOVAL OF INTERZONAL BARRIERS: Letter From the
United States Commandant in Berlin 4 to the Berlin Representa
tive 5 of the Soviet High Commissioner, February 22, 1954?
In his letter of February 22 8 the United States High Commis
sioner 9 has drawn Mr. Semenov's attention to the necessity of re
establishing more normal living conditions for the inhabitants of the
city of Berlin. In particular he has expressed the desire that the fou
occupying powers should reach agreement on the removal of imped
ments to the freedom of movement of persons and goods betwee
the Western sectors of Berlin and Western Germany and on the
abolition of all formalities re the movement of persons between Berli
and the Soviet Zone.
In the same spirit and in order to eliminate all restrictions
freedom of communications between the four sectors of Berlin,
request you to agree that the following measures should be pų
into effect:
A. The abolition of police controls at the borders and of oth
forms of hindrance to the complete freedom of movement of person
throughout the city.
B. The removal of all street barriers between sectors.
C. The re-establishment of direct tram services throughout to
city.
D. The re-establishment of the automatic citywide telephor
service.
E. The re-establishment of reliable and efficient postal service
throughout the city.
3.visit
1 Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, United States Commandant in Berlin.
2 Sergei Dengin, Representative of the Soviet High Commissioner for German
in Berlin.
3 See General Timberman's letter of Feb. 22, 1954, to Mr. Dengin; infra.
4 Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman.
5 Sergei Dengin.
8 Vladimir Semenovich Semenov.
? Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 5, 1954, p. 509.
8 Supra.
8 James B. Conant.
jump rowwe na mir wieder mit seinen ei tietenkin olemas ka liittimeters the Sitzu
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1755
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 5, 1954, p. 510.
F. The abolition of controls over and interference with the free
circulation of printed matter, films and other cultural media through-
out the city.
I am convinced that an agreement should be reached on these
different proposals for the common good of the people of Berlin and
am ready, for my part, to discuss with you without delay all the
measures required to put them into force.
Should technical discussions be required concerning proposals
C and D above, I am prepared to furnish the names of the German
technicians authorized to deal with these matters for my sector
and would be glad to receive similar information from you.
32. REMOVAL OF INTERZONAL BARRIERS: Note From the
United States High Commissioner 1 to the Soviet High Commis-
sioner, March 17, 1954 3
I have received your reply of March 6, 1954,4 to my letter of
February 22 in which I proposed to you that we should agree to-
gether with the British and French High Commissioners in Germany
to eliminate immediately a number of unjustifiable obstacles which
still prevent freedom of movement between the different parts of
Germany.
I regret, however, that instead of replying positively to my pro-
posals of dealing with the practical and urgent problems with which
we are faced, you have confined yourself in your reply merely to
repeating M. Molotov's proposal for all-German committees 5 which
was rejected by the three Western Foreign Ministers at the Berlin
conference.
The matters covered by my proposal must continue closely to
concern the four occupying powers until such time as the reunification
of Germany takes place. None of these powers can rightly evade its
responsibilities in that respect. It is, therefore, the duty of the four
powers to secure the removal of obstacles to free movement of Ger-
mans between the different parts of Germany, and insofar as the
continued existence of such obstacles is due to action or inaction on
the part of the authorities in Soviet occupied territories, my govern-
ment will continue to hold the Soviet authorities responsible for this
hindrance to further progress in the direction of German reunifica-
tion. It is for this reason that I have requested you, in my previous
letter, to inform me of the Soviet attitude towards the specific pro-
posals which I have made and which I have offered to discuss with you.
1 James B. Conant.
2 Vladimir Semenovich Semenov.
3
* Ibid., pp. 509–510.
5 Soviet proposal of Feb. 17, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Dis-
cussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399;
1954), pp. 229-230.
--
!
-
1756
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
It is clear that certain of the questions mentioned in my letter d
February 22 require only unilateral decision and action by the au
thorities of the Soviet Zone.
These are:
(A) The abolition of the requirement for residence permits for
Germans residing in the Federal territory who desire to travel ti
the Soviet Zone;
(B) The removal of the prohibited zone, the barbed wire fence
and all other barriers placed in the Soviet Zone along the interzoni
border;
(C) The abolition of all formalities regarding movement of person
between Berlin and the Soviet Zone.
If, as I hope, the Soviet authorities share my government's desir
to alleviate conditions which are oppressive to the German people
may I ask you to indicate to me at an early date that you are not
ready to take steps to have the above measures put into effect?
With regard to the further proposals made in my letter of February
22, I suggest that, in every case in which we consider it useful, dis
cussions should take place between German technical experts wit
!
a view to reaching practical solutions which, once they are agreed
should become effective without delay. I shall be ready, as I have
already informed you, to furnish you with the names of the expert
authorized to deal with these matters in respect of Western German
who would then meet with corresponding experts to be nominate
by you. If you agree with the foregoing, I suggest that the firs
step should be for us to meet in order to draw up terms of referend
which would enable the discussions between experts to begin at once
33. STATUS OF EAST GERMANY: Joint Declaration by the Unite
States, British, and French High Commissioners, April 8, 1954
1
The Allied High Commission desires to clarify the attitude of the
governments which it represents toward the statement issued a
March 25 by the Soviet Government, purporting to describe a chang
in its relations with the Government of the so-called German Demo
cratic Republic. This statement appears to have been intended i
create the impression that sovereignty has been granted to the Ge
man Democratic Republic. It does not alter the actual situatie
in the Soviet Zone. The Soviet Government still retains effectif
control there.
The three governments represented in the Allied High Commissie
will continue to regard the Soviet Union as the responsible pove
for the Soviet Zone of Germany. These governments do not recognis
the sovereignty of the East German regime which is not based
free elections, and do not intend to deal with it as a government
1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 19, 1954, p. 588; see also the stateme
issued to the press by Lincoln White, press officer of the Department of State
on Mar, 25, 1954 (ibid., Apr. 5, 1954, p. 511).
* See the New York Times, Mar. 26, 1954.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1757
4 Ibid., pp. 879-880.
They believe that this attitude will be shared by other states, who,
like themselves, will continue to recognize the Government of the
Federal Republic as the only freely elected and legally constituted
government in Germany. The Allied High Commission also takes
this occasion to express the resolve of its governments that the Soviet
action shall not deter them from their determination to work for
the reunification of Germany as a free and sovereign nation,
34. REMOVAL OF INTERZONAL BARRIERS: Letter From the
United States High Commissioner 1 to the Soviet High Commis-
sioner, May 24, 1954 3
I acknowledge receipt of your reply, dated April 17, 1954,4 to the
second letter I had sent you, on March 17, 1954,5 putting forward
positive suggestions for the elimination of unjustifiable obstacles
which prevent freedom of movement for Germans between the different
parts of Germany.
In my letter of March 17, I drew your attention to unilateral
measures which the authorities in the Soviet Zone could themselves
take to this end without the need for any further consultation between
us. I regret to note that no action has so far been taken by the
authorities in the Soviet Zone to put these measures into effect and
that you do not even refer to them in your reply. I further regret
that you have made no response to my suggestion that arrangements
should be made which would enable discussions to begin between
German technical experts on those proposals in my letter of February
22 on which consultation is required.
Instead you have invoked the Soviet Government's statement of
March 26 (March 25] regarding the status of the German authorities
in the Soviet Zone and you have once again repeated the Soviet
proposal, which has already been rejected by my Government, for the
establishment of "all-German Committees”.
I must make it clear to you that my Government still regards the
Soviet Union as the power responsible for the Soviet Zone of Germany.
My Government does not recognize the sovereignty of the East
German regime. In this connection, I take the opportunity of
drawing your attention to the declaration made
on April 8 by the
High Commissioners of the United Kingdom and France and myself,
a copy of which I enclose.
You have also repeated your charges about alleged criminal organiza-
tions which are said to be located in West Berlin. These charges are,
as you have already been informed, without foundation. Your letter
of April 17 therefore, since it introduces clearly unacceptable condi-
1 James B. Conant.
2 Vladimir Semenovich Semenov.
Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1954, pp. 880–881.
3
• Supra, doc. 32.
Supra.
6
1758
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
karen-
tions and unfounded accusations, does not make a positive contribution
to the problem of removing the restrictions on freedom of movemen
for the German people, and serves only to accentuate the presen
division of Germany
So long as this division exists it remains the duty of the fow
occupying powers to do everything in their power to lessen the hand
ships resulting from it. I do not intend to be diverted from thi
constructive proposals I have already made to you and remain read
to take all the measures indicated in my letter of March 17. I hop
therefore that, in order that we may make genuine progress in matter
which are of real importance to the German people, you will accep
my proposals without further objections.
35. ALLIED POLICY TOWARD BERLIN: Declaration by the
Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, ar
France, October 23, 1954 1
With respect to Berlin, in addition to the Allied security guarante
for the city in the London communiqué of October 3, 1954, thi
Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the Unite
States have noted with deep satisfaction the close and friend
cooperation between the Allied and Berlin authorities. The Thr
Powers are determined to ensure the greatest possible degree of sel
government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation
Accordingly, the three Governments have instructed their representa
tives in Berlin to consult with the authorities of that city with a vie
to implementing jointly and to the fullest degree possible the foregoin
principles.
36. ROAD TOLLS IN THE SOVIET ZONE: Letter From the Unite
States High Commissioner 3 to the Soviet High Commissione
March 31, 1955 5
It has been brought to my attention that the East German autho
ties propose to increase drastically, with effect from April 1, the fe
which vehicles not registered in the Soviet Zone are charged for
use of roads within the Soviet Zone. In practice, this measure wou
affect primarily vehicles registered in the Federal Republic and Wa
Berlin.
The reason given for this measure is that additional funds &
required to maintain the roads in the Soviet Zone. Substant
.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 732.
2 See article 5 of the tripartite declaration in section V of the Final Act of
London Conference; supra, pp. 1482–1483.
3 James B. Conant.
4 G, M. Pushkin.
5 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 18, 1955, p. 648. Similar letters.
sent by the British and French High Commissioners.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1759
contributions are already being made by operators of Berlin and West
German vehicles for this purpose. If there were actually any new
problem in this connection, this could most appropriately be discussed
by East German experts with the Treuhandstelle fuer den Interzon-
enhandel.
The proposed increases are, however, so exorbitant that they cannot
be justified purely on economic grounds. Increases which would
amount in many cases to fees of more than ten times the present rate
would be so abnormal that this measure can only be regarded as
politically inspired and intended to impede the free movement of
persons and goods between the Federal Republic and Berlin, as well
as between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone.
Any action which might have this result would clearly conflict
with the obligations contained in the New York and Paris agreements
of May and June, 1949. I hope therefore that in view of the respon-
sibilities of the Soviet authorities in such matters you will have the
necessary steps taken to have the proposed measure withdrawn
without delay.
37. ROAD TOLLS IN THE SOVIET ZONE: Letter From the United
States High Commissioner 2 to the Soviet High Commissioner,
April 15, 1955 4
3
In my letter of March 31% I drew your attention to the proposed
introduction of drastic increases in the fees payable by vehicles not
registered in the Soviet Zone for the use of roads in the Soviet Zone.
I have received no reply to this letter and, despite my request that
you should take the necessary steps to have the proposed measures
withdrawn, the new fees were imposed with effect from April 1.
As I pointed out in my letter to you of March 31, these increases
are so exorbitant that they cannot be justified on economic grounds.
It is estimated by competent experts that the revenue collected from
the road tax in effect prior to April 1, which in 1954 is understood to
have amounted to between DM 4,300,000 and DM 5,000,000, was
sufficient to provide for the maintenance of highways in the Soviet
Zone used by West German traffic. If, however, in view of the
economic difficulties of the Soviet Zone, the East German authorities
have been unable to provide the necessary funds for road maintenance
without increasing their revenues from this tax, this should be a
matter for consultation between the experts concerned. Nevertheless,
although the West German experts in the Treuhandstelle have expressed
the wish to discuss the matter on two occasions since the new fees
were introduced, on April 7 and again on April 14, the East German
See quadripartite communiqués of May 5, 1949 (ibid., May 15, 1949, p.
631), and June 21, 1949 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 110–112).
2 James B. Conant.
3 G. M. Pushkin.
Department of State Bulletin, May 2; 1955, p. 736. Similar letters were
sent by the British and French High Commissioners.
.----.-.
4
Supra.
-..-------
1760
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
representatives have refused to do so. This refusal confirms the vie
expressed in my letter of March 31 that the increases can only b
regarded as politically inspired and intended to impede the fra
movement of persons and goods between the Federal Republic an
Berlin and between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone.
At the sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris i
June, 1949, the Soviet Government gave certain undertakings whil
were set out in a communiqué issued at the close of the conferene
These undertakings included the following statement:
In order to improve and supplement this and other arrangements and agre
ments as regards the movement of persons and goods and communications b
tween the eastern and western zones and between the zones and Berlin and als
in regard to transit, the Occupation Authorities, each in his own zone, will ha
an obligation to take the measures necessary to ensure the normal functioni
and utilization of rail, water and road transport for such movement of perso!
and goods and such communications by post, telephone and telegraph.
The arbitrary action of the East German authorities in imposin
these exorbitant increases, on which there was no prior consultatio
with the West German experts, is clearly inconsistent with th
Soviet Government's undertakings, since it interferes with |
"normal functioning” of road transport in the Soviet Zone.
I therefore consider that the Soviet authorities are responsible :
ensuring that these increases are withdrawn without delay. Sin
a continuation of the present situation can only make for difficult
in interzonal trade, affect the welfare of Berlin and lead to an increa
in tension within Germany, I propose that the four High Commi
sioners should meet in Berlin as soon as possible to discuss the sett
ment of this problem.
38. ROAD TOLLS IN THE SOVIET ZONE: Letter From the Unite
States High Commissioner 2 to the Soviet High Commissione
May 2, 1955
I have received your letter of April 30, 1955 5 in which you indick
your readiness to accept my proposal for a meeting to discuss t
problem arising from the imposition by the East German authorit
of exorbitant increases in the charges payable for the use of roads
the Soviet Zone by vehicles not registered in that zone.
I cannot accept that this matter, insofar as it concerns traffic
tween the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone and between !
Federal Republic and Berlin, is solely within the responsibility
the East German authorities. On the contrary, in view particular
1 See the communiqué of June 21, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Poli
pp. 110-112.
2 James B. Conant.
3 G. M. Pushkin.
* Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1955, p. 834. The British and Fref
High Commissioners sent similar letters to the Soviet High Commissioner.
8 Ibid.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1761
1
!
:
!
1955 3
S
1
!
1
4 Ibid., Oct. 10, 1955, pp. 559-560.
of the four-power agreements of May and June, 1949, I must insist
on the responsibility of the representatives of the four powers in Ger-
| many regarding this matter which directly affects the normal func-
tioning of such traffic.
In the light of the foregoing, I suggest that we meet to discuss this
matter on May 7 at 3 p. m. in the Allied Control Authority Building
in Berlin or, should you prefer, in your office.?
39. ROAD TOLLS IN THE SOVIET ZONE: Communiqué by the
American, British, and French Ambassadors to Germany, May 20,
The French Ambassador to the German Federal Republic, M.
François Poncet, the United States Ambassador, Dr. James B.
Conant, and the British Ambassador, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar,
met today with the Soviet High Commissioner, Mr. G. M. Pushkin,
to discuss the question of tariffs on highway traffic to Berlin which
have been imposed by the Soviet Zone authorities. The meeting
took place at Mr. Pushkin's office in the East Sector of Berlin. The
Western ambassadors proposed that German experts be designated
I to study the problem and agree upon a solution to be recommended.
The Soviet High Commissioner rejected this proposal and declared
that the matter was solely within the competence of the East German
authorities. He stated that the question could be solved only by
direct discussions between the West and East German authorities,
and did not fall within the scope of the Four-Power Agreements of
1949. In view of this attitude, it was decided by the three ambas-
sadors that the question should be referred to their respective
1 governments,
40. THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST GERMANY: Statement to
the Press by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France, September 28, 1955 4
The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom,
and France wish to make known their view on certain points in con-
nection with the agreements of September 20, 1955, as reported in
the
press, between the Soviet Union and the regime in the Soviet
zone of Germany.
They wish in the first place to emphasize that these agreements
See the communiqué of June 21, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy,
pp. 110-112.
2. In subsequent correspondence it was agreed to hold a meeting in Mr. Push-
kin's office on May 20. [Note in Department of State Bulletin.]
Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1955, p. 997.
5 For the texts of these agreements, see Documents on American Foreign Rela-
tions, 1955 (New York, 1956), pp. 108-112.
.
}
i
21
1
415900—-57Vol. 28
1762
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
cannot affect the obligations or responsibilities of the Soviet Union
under agreements and arrangements between the Three Powers an
the Soviet Union on the subject of Germany and Berlin. The Sovie
Union remains responsible for the carrying out of these obligation
Secondly, the three Foreign Ministers reaffirm that the Feder:
Republic of Germany is the only German Government freely an
legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for German
as the representative of the German people in international affair
These three governments do not recognize the East German recin
nor the existence of a state in the Soviet zone.
Finally, as regards a statement which has recently appeared in th
Soviet press on the frontiers of Germany, the three Foreign Minister
reaffirm the repeatedly expressed position of their Governments the
the final determination of the frontiers of Germany must await
peace settlement for the whole of Germany.
41. THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST GERMANY: Note From the
American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry
October 3, 1955
2
The Government of the United States of America, in agreement wit
the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, wishes to mak
known its position with regard to the agreements concluded at Mosco
on the 20th of September 1955 between Marshal Bulganin and M
Grotewohl, as published in the press.3
The three Governments declare that these agreements cannot affen
in any respect or in any way the obligations or responsibilities of thi
U.S.S.R. under agreements and arrangements on the subject
Germany, including Berlin, previously concluded between France, the
United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.
The three Governments consider that the U.S.S.R. remains boun
by the engagements which it has assumed vis-à-vis the Three Power
concerning Germany, and that, in particular, the letters exchange
between Mr. Zorin and Mr. Bolz on the 20th of September 1955 canna
have the effect of discharging the U.S.S.R. from the responsibilita
which it has assumed in matters concerning transportation an
communications between the different parts of Germany, includin
Berlin.
!
:
1 An announcement was issued in Moscow, Sept. 15, 1955, declaring
question of the frontiers of Germany was solved by the Potsdam Agreement
2 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 17, 1955, p. 616. Similar notes were
delivered on the same day by the British and French Embassies. See also th
Soviet note of Oct. 18, 1955 (ibid., Nov. 7, 1955, pp. 734-735) and the America
note of Oct. 27, 1955 (ibid., p. 734).
3 For the texts of these agreements, see Documents on American Foreign Rele
tions, 1955 (New York, 1956), pp. 108–112.
ܐ ܝܘܪܚܚܤܝܫܚܚܫܝܝܺܝܺܪܝܺܚܚܩܫܘܡܚܝܐܚܫܘܰܚ̈ܕܚܚܪܚܕܫܪܝܪܐܩܛܠܐܝܰܫܪܕ݂ܝܺܐܺܚ
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1763
42. DETENTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EAST BERLIN:
Letter From the United States Commander 1 to the Soviet Com-
mander, November 28, 1955 3
4
DEAR GENERAL DIBROVA: I wish to bring to your attention the
latest example of the lawless action of the "Peoples' Police” in the
Soviet sector of Berlin. This incident occurred yesterday about
noon in the vicinity of the Soviet Garden of Remembrance in Treptow.
It involved two members of the Congress of the United States of
America, the wife of one of the Congressmen, and an officer of the
United States Army who is under my command.
As the party was about to leave the Garden of Remembrance in an
official military vehicle of Berlin Command, a member of the "Peoples'
Police” ordered them to remain on the spot. The policeman then
demanded that the keys of the vehicle be handed over to him, and
after a show of reluctance on the part of the United States Army officer
the policeman drew his pistol from his holster and cocked it menac-
ingly. Under this threat, the officer handed over the keys. When
the officer attempted to use the radio telephone in the vehicle in order
to inform this Headquarters of the incident, he was prevented from
doing so by another policeman who likewise drew his pistol from his
holster and cocked it in a threatening manner.
The reason given by the policeman for this ruffianism was that it
was forbidden by the laws of the so-called German Democratic Re-
public for a foreign power to maintain and operate radio transmitters
in vehicles.
After approximately three hours of detention by policemen, the
party was forced to follow a Soviet official in a Soviet vehicle to your
Headquarters at Karlshorst. They were in turn followed by the
armed policemen in their vehicle.
At that time the Provost Marshal of Berlin Command arrived at
Karlshorst and was received by Colonel Kotsiuba. According to the
Provost Marshal's report, Colonel Kotsiuba affirmed the statement
of the policemen that the party had violated the laws of the “German
Democratic Republic."
The party was eventually released approximately four hours after
if their original detention.
I wish you to know, General Dibrova, that of all the incidents which
have affected the relations between our two Commands during the
past few years, I consider this one by far the most serious. I insist
that an explanation be given why the policemen assumed the authority
to interfere with the liberty of the United States officials, and, further-
more, why they acted in a manner so calculated to terrify defenseless
persons, including a woman. I cannot understand how Colonel
Kotsiuba could condone such actions.
1 Maj. Gen. Charles L. Dasher.
Maj. Gen. P. L. Dibrova.
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, pp. 1012–1013,
* Those detained were Rep. and Mrs. Harold C. Ostertag, Rep. Edward D.
Boland, and Lt. James T. McQueen. [Note in Department of State Bulletin).
• Col. I. A. Kotsiuba, deputy to the Soviet Commandant in Berlin.
nie
-cris 2013
2
3
1764
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
If the report of Colonel Kotsiuba's statement with regard to the
laws of the “German Democratic Republic" is correct, I wish to
answer quite clearly that the laws of the "German Democrati
Republic" can have no applicability whatsoever to the incident whid
I have described to you.
Finally, I expect you to take immediate measures to prevent
repetition of such incidents which, I am sure you must agree, are
violation of the established policy of free circulation in Berlin. It
the meantime, I do not intend to alter the practice of maintaining
radio transmitters in vehicles of Berlin Command entering the Sovie
sector of Berlin, nor do I intend to tolerate any further molesting o
United States personnel by members of the "Peoples' Police”.
43. DETENTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EAST BERLIN
Note From the American Ambassador to the German Federa
Republic to the Soviet Representative in the Soviet Zone
December 1, 1955 3
On November 29, General Dasher, the United States Commandar
in Berlin, called on General Dibrova, the Soviet Commandant,
protest against an incident which occurred on November 27.4 Thi
incident involved the unwarranted detention in the Soviet sector
Berlin of an American military vehicle of the Berlin command, an
its occupants, including two members of the Congress of the Unite
States of America,
I am informed that General Dibrova refused to accept Generd
Dasher's protest and that in justification he made certain assertion
concerning the applicability to this case of the laws of the “Germa
Democratic Republic' and the relationship between the Soviet secto
of Berlin and the “German Democratic Republic".
I must renew the protest made by General Dasher against interfer
ence with the freedom of Allied circulation in Berlin and against the
grossly discourteous and threatening conduct displayed toward Unite
States citizens by persons acting under Soviet authority and contro
I do not consider the attempted justification of this incident to
acceptable.
As for General Dibrova's assertions, they are wholly inconsisten
with the quadripartite status of Berlin. The position of my govern
ment as regards the status of Berlin, and its attitude to the so-calle
German Democratic Republic, are well known to you as a result :
numerous communications on these subjects from my government !
your government over a considerable period of time.
You will thus appreciate that the United States Government mu
1
)
1 James B. Conant.
2 G. M. Pushkin.
8 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1013. Notes were au
delivered by the British and French Ambassadors. See also Ambassador Conanti
statement of Dec. 2, 1955 (ibid., pp. 1013-1014).
4 See General Dasher's letter of Nov. 28, 1955, to General Dibrova; supra
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1765
continue to hold the Soviet authorities responsible for the welfare and
proper treatment of all United States citizens during their presence
in those areas, including the Soviet sector of Berlin, which are subject
to Soviet authority and control.
44. STATUS OF BERLIN: Remarks to the Press by the Secretary
of State, December 6, 1955 1
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on the events in Berlin during
the last week?
A. Well, do you refer to the retention, temporarily at least, of
these two Congressmen that were there, or the barges?
2. I was thinking specifically of the barges and the larger issues
raised on the status of the city.
A. Well, the action taken about barges, which now is reported very
largely in the press, is action that was taken last October. It is
nothing that took place last week. So far there has not been any
interruption of the normal movement of traffic through the canals,
and we have no evidence to anticipate that there will be, although
that is always a possibility. But we expect that the Soviet will
respect, and assure respect for, the agreement that was made in Paris
in June, I think it was, 1949 with respect to assuring the normal
access, by rail and water, of the West to Berlin.2 We take the posi-
tion, as you know, that nothing that the Soviet itself can do can re-
lieve the Soviet of its international obligations. We expect to hold
the Soviet to its international obligations. We have no evidence as
yet that those international obligations will be violated.
2. Mr. Secretary, did the United States concur in that British conces-
sion that the East German Government could control the inland water-
ways? This decision, you say, was reached last October.
A. The announcement that the licenses would be issued by the
East German regime, the so-called GDR, with authority in East Ber-
lin
, was, I think, acquiesced in by the British, in whose sector is, I
think, the barge terminal. That took place, as I recall, last October.
Now that did not involve, of course, any recognition of the exclusive
1 authority of those German Communist authorities in that zone over
the area, or any waiver of the rights which we have under the Paris
agreement of 1949. If the Soviet chooses to carry that out through
agents, that is its affair. But to us, the primary obligation still
remains that of the Soviet Government.
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, pp. 1010–1011.
See the quadripartite communiqué issued at Paris, June 21, 1949 (A Decade
of American Foreign Policy, pp. 110–112) and the quadripartite communiqué
released at New York, May 5, 1949 (Department of State Bulletin, May 15,
1949, p. 631).
Oto
vs.
1766
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
C. RELATIONS WITH AUSTRIA, 1950-1955
45. COMMUNIST DISTURBANCES: Statement to the Press
the Acting Secretary of State, October 6, 1950 2
The firmness and determination with which the Austrian peop
have reacted to the recent Communist-inspired disturbances
Austria and the prompt and courageous action taken by the Austria
Government and police to maintain law and order are heartening,
am sure, to the American people as a whole. The actions of th
Austrian Government in this respect have the full support of the
Government.
The agreement on control machinery, signed by the four occupyi:
powers on June 28, 1946,3 provides that the Allied Commission she
assist the Austrian Government to recreate a sound and democrati
national life based on respect for law and order. This agreemer
charges the Allied Commission with responsibility for maintainis
law and order if the Austrian authorities are unable to do so an
authorizes the High Commissioners to act independently to mar
tain law and order in their respective zones in the absence of actid
by the Allied Commission. Needless to say, this Government w
take all proper action to fulfill its international commitments wil
respect to the maintenance of law and order in the areas of its respot
sibility in Austria.
.
46. COMMUNIST DISTURBANCES: Message From the Action
Secretary of State 4 to the Austrian Chancellor, October 7, 1950
:
I have just received your telegram of October 57 addressed
Mr. Acheson in which you refer to the urgent request submitted
your Government to the Allied Council to take immediately appre
priate measures to enable the Federal Government to accomplish
constitutional duties and appeal to the U.S. Government as an occ
pying power to support your Government in its efforts to maintai
order.
The actions taken by your Government to maintain law and ord 1
in the face of recent Communist-inspired and Soviet-supported
turbances 8 have the full support of this Government. I am po
ticularly gratified at the courageous and determined manner in whin
1 James E. Webb.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 616. -
3 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 614-620.
4. James E. Webb.
5 Leopold Figl.
6 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 23, 1950, P, 657.
7 The telegram of October 5 was from Karl Gruber, the Austrian Forex
Minister; ibid.
8 See the note of Nov. 10, 1950, from Adm. Alan G. Kirk, American Ambas
dor at Moscow, to Andrei Gromyko, the Acting Soviet Foreign Minister; in
1
ابان بن تن
8
be
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1767
your Government and the Austrian people have met and are meeting
their responsibilities in the face of these illegal acts. Please be
assured that this Government will take all proper action to fulfill its
international commitments with respect to Austria and in particular
to assure the maintenance of law and order in the areas of its respon-
sibilities in Austria. Appropriate instructions are being issued to
the United States High Commissioner.
I issued a statement to the press along the foregoing lines shortly
prior to the time your telegram came to my attention and I hope that
my views, and I am sure I speak for the American people as a whole,
will serve to assure your Government and people of our confidence in
them and of our deep appreciation of the firmness of purpose which
they have displayed in their efforts to maintain independence and
freedom of action under these trying circumstances.
47. COMMUNIST DISTURBANCES: Note From the American
Ambassador at Moscow ? to the Acting Soviet Foreign Minister,
November 10, 1950 4
3.
The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his
compliments to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
and has the honor to invite the Acting Minister's attention to the
discussions which took place in the Allied Council in Austria on Octo-
ber 13, 1950, during which the Soviet representative maintained the
untenable point of view that mob violence in the Soviet zone of
Austria is not properly the concern of the Allied Council and that
actions taken by a local Soviet commander may not be discussed by
the Council. This assertion cannot, of course, be accepted by the
Government of the United States since the control agreement for
Austria of June 28, 1946, makes it clear that the Allied Council may
and should concern itself with any matter relating to the maintenance
of law and order and with any derogation of authority guaranteed by
agreement to the Austrian Government.
The Soviet Government must be fully aware of the incidents which
gave rise to the statement of the Soviet representative in the Allied
Council, the more so since he, himself, at no time denied that they
had occurred. However, for convenience, they are briefly recapitu-
In the course of demonstrations in the Soviet zone of Austria on
October 4 and 5, 1950, the Soviet commander in the city of Wiener
Neustadt obstructed efforts of the Austrian police to restore general
order and ordered the police to return the federal post office to the
control of the lawless mob, which had been ejected by the police,
after it had illegally occupied the building. Further, this Soviet
lated below:
1
Supra.
2 Adm. Alan G. Kirk.
3 Andrei A. Gromyko.
4
Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 20, 1950, p. 819.
• A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 614-620.
اكلتكهناتهم تتعانقدژنكت عن نفخ
1768
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
I
&
commander ordered the withdrawal of the police sent to Wiene
Neustadt by the recognized Austrian authorities to maintain orde
and to protect life and property from the rioters. In taking these
measures, the Soviet commander threatened that the Soviet armed
forces would act against the Austrian police should they fail to compl
with his orders.
The law enforcement activities of the Austrian Government han
been further hampered by the Soviet officer who commanded the
president of the Vienna police immediately to recall to the Sovie
sector any police forces employed outside that sector, not to execuk
the orders for dismissal and transfer of Austrian police officials withon
the consent of the Soviet element of the Interallied Command, an
to forbid the employment of police forces of the Soviet sector
Vienna in any other sector.
As stated above, the Allied Council, by its terms of reference, cleart
is called upon to concern itself with the maintenance of law and orde
in Austria. Thus, article 3 D of the control agreement requires th
Allied Commission to assist the Austrian Government to assume fil
control of the affairs of state in Austria. Suppression and obstructie
of police is patently inconsistent with this objective, and it is clear
the responsibility of the Allied Commission to assist the Austrik
Government to recreate the respect for law and order. The suppa
of elements of the population acting against the authority of ti
Austrian Government and its police and forcing the surrender of
government building to a rioting mob are contrary to this princip
and call for action by the Allied Commission.
The Allied Commission did not consider that any of the three con
tions set out in article 2 C of the control agreement under which the
were empowered to act directly rather than through the Austri
Government was relevant in this case, The Allied Commission, the
fore, took no action. Paragraph 2 D of the control agreement wbi
authorized in certain circumstances independent action by the Hi
Commissioners in the absence of action by the Allied Commission
equally inapplicable in this case. The Soviet commander had !
justification to maintain law and order at Wiener Neustadt sin
Austrian authorities had already done so.
Article 1 of the control agreement states unequivocally that
authority of the ustrian Government shall extend fully through i
Austria with two exceptions, execution of directions from the AB
t
Commission and questions defined in article 5. In these recent event
the Allied Commission had issued no directives and certainly no siti t
tion existed in which article 5 would apply. Any move to immobil
the police and to establish internal boundaries of their authority is ]
conflict with the duties of the signatories of the control
I
The Government of the United States protests most emphatice
against the perversion by the Soviet representative in the All i
Council in Austria of the clear language and intent of the cont
agreement of June 28, 1946, in attempting to justify unilateral contr
over the Austrian police which would restrict or eliminate the author
of the Austrian Government in a part of its territory. The Unl
a
7
agreeme
T
.
:
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1769
States, therefore, calls upon the Soviet Government to issue appro-
priate instructions to the Soviet authorities in Austria to desist from
interfering in the police functions of the Austrian Government.
48. TRAVEL REQUIREMENTS: Statement to the Press by the
Department of State, November 20, 1950 1
The Department of State announced today that effective December
1, 1950, no Allied Force permits will be required of American citizens
desiring to enter the United States, United Kingdom, or French
zones of Austria. On the basis of a bilateral United States-Austrian
agreement, citizens of the United States will be able to enter Austria
on the basis of a valid American passport only. However, in order to
travel into the Soviet zone of Austria and to Vienna, the occupational
force travel permit (grey pass) will continue to be required.
The United States, United Kingdom, and French Governments
have taken this step in abolishing the requirement of Allied Force
permits into their zones of Austria in accordance with their desire to
normalize the relations between Austria and the occupation powers
and to discontinue as far as possible all restrictive controls in Austria.
49. SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN AUSTRIAN AFFAIRS: Note
From the American Ambassador at Moscow ? to the Acting Soviet
Foreign Minister, November 22, 1950 4
i
1
The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his
compliments to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
and has the honor to invite the Ministry's attention to questions which
were raised in the Allied Council in Austria on November 10, 1950 re
unjustified Soviet interference in the administration of Austrian law
enforcement agencies since disturbances on October 4, 1950, which
were the subject of his government's communication of November 10,
1950. The Government of the United States has been informed
that
, contrary to established Four Power agreements and practices,
the local Soviet authorities have endeavored arbitrarily to prevent
the Austrian Government from implementing disciplinary measures
against certain malfeasant police chiefs in the Soviet sectors of Vienna.
Information available to this government reveals that, under the
protection and orders of Soviet officials, suspended police chiefs have
defied legal and constitutional authority of the Federal Police-
President, and have forbidden their subordinates to communicate
with the central Austrian authorities without their consent. The
1
1
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1950, p. 895.
2 Adm. Alan G. Kirk.
3 Andrei A. Gromyko.
* Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1950, pp. 894–895.
6 Supra, doc. 47.
1770
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Soviet representative in the Vienna Inter-Allied Command has fur
ther aggravated this cleavage in the Austrian law enforcement orga
ization by unilaterally ordering the Federal Police-President to with
draw administrative actions of any nature affecting police personne
in the Soviet Zone unless prior approval has been obtained from
Soviet authorities. Without regard to the obligation for quadr
partite agreement in matters affecting the Austrian police, the Sovie
Commander unilaterally ordered the Austrian Government to quas
criminal proceedings against certain Vienna police officers and other
arising from their violation of Austrian laws during recent disorder
in Vienna. Soviet orders further prohibit either criminal or dis
plinary actions against any Austrian police officers in the Soviet Zon
Such orders not only constitute a violation of the Control Agreement
but a serious impairment of power of the federal police to discharg
their duty of maintaining law and order.
The Federal Chancellor of Austria in letters of October 24 and 2
presented evidence to the Allied Council of the above illegal acts an
clearly established that the Soviet occupation authorities interven
to prevent the exercise of the legal right of the Austrian Governme
to suspend the police chiefs of the second, fourth, twentieth, twenty
first, and twenty-fifth bezirke of Vienna. The Chancellor's com
munication verified the report that the execution of instructions
the central police officials was made dependent upon their approve
by the Soviet authorities,
The position adopted by the Soviet authorities fails to take inte
account the fact that the Allied Council has entrusted til
Austrian Government with responsibility for the maintenance of lo
and order. Their actions likewise clearly contravened the provisio
of Article 2 of the Control Agreement, which sets forth the cond
tions under which any one of the occupying authorities may
independently.
There is no evidence that the Austrian authorities in the admin
tration of their police are or have at any time been unable to mai
tain law and order except to the extent they have been prevente
from doing so by Soviet intervention.
When confronted with the Chancellor's charges in the Alli
Council, the Soviet High Commissioner adopted the indefensil
attitude that he was entitled under the Control Agreement to act
his own authority in questions concerning police in the Soviet secta
of Vienna. Despite the joint responsibility of the four High Comm
sioners for the conduct of occupation affairs, the legal basis of whit
was set forth in this Embassy's note of November 10, 1950,
despite a precedent of four years of discussion of Austrian poi
matters, the Soviet representative in the Allied Council decling
either to deny the Austrian allegation or to present a satisfactof
explanation to other members of the Council. Furthermore, 1
Soviet High Commissioner did not attempt to explain why he by
failed to make use of the facilities established by Article 6 (B) of t
1 See United States Forces in Austria, Report of the United States High Com
missioner, No. 52.
|
82
1
1
!
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1771
1
Control Agreement in order to bring to the notice of the Allied Coun-
cil his disapproval of administrative actions of the Austrian author-
ities, and thus to enable the Allied Council to take, if it thought
necessary, the action foreseen by that article.
These matters, following upon the events communicated in the
Embassy's note of November 10, 1950, are brought to the attention
of the Government of the U.S.S.R. because of the grave consequences
to our common objective in Austria if international agreements con-
tinue to be disregarded. In consequence, the Government of the
United States is obligated to renew most vigorously its protest against
the actions of the Soviet occupation authorities and particularly
against their usurpation of the clearly defined powers of the Allied
Council. The Government of the United States once again requests
the Soviet Government to issue appropriate instructions to its author-
ities in Austria to conform strictly to the solemn obligations entered
into by the Four Powers, with a view to avoiding a serious deteriora-
tion of functioning of the quadripartite machinery in Austria.
50. REPLY TO SOVIET CHARGES REGARDING AMERICAN
POLICY: Statement Before the Allied Council by the United States
High Commissioner, October 12, 1951 2
نشاندهنده بماننشینند
At the last meeting of the Allied Council the Soviet High Commis-
sioner 3 was prompted to make a statement under the item, "Any
Other Business," on a subject which, I should have thought, be
would have preferred to avoid in this body: namely, the exploitation
of Austria, and remilitarization. As I indicated at that meeting, I
also should like to ask the question: "Who is exploiting Austria”
and "Who is supplying visible evidence of militarization” at this
time?
It seems to me that our Soviet colleagues would have the Austrian
people not believe their own eyes. He referred to jet airplane fac-
tories, V-2 plants, and a number of other alleged and mysterious
military enterprises which, he charged, were to be found in the
American zone of Austria. The charges were so preposterous that
I at once extended an invitation to General Sviridov on behalf of
General Irwin 4 to come and see these imaginary installations for
himself. Not having heard from General Sviridov, I took pleasure
in allowing three Soviet newspapermen to tour the zone in hopes
they would present a true picture to General Sviridov. The failure
to accept my invitation can only be taken as an admission on the
part of the Soviet High Commissioner tbat the charges are in them-
Within the mass of Soviet charges I managed to sort out two specific
claims: that the Steyr-Daimler-Puch underground aircraft factory
selves ridiculous.
2
3
Walter J. Donnelly,
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 29, 1951, pp. 691-693.
Vladimir P. Sviridov.
* Lt. Gen. Leroy Irwin.
1772
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
]
1
)
in reviving the Austrian steel and aluminum industry-a vital asset
at Linz and the Eichlinger V-2 factory at Hallein "were fully pre
served.” What nonsense! Categorically, here and now, I should
like to state that all factories in the U.S. zone which formerly pro-
duced armaments for the German Army under the Nazi regime have
either been destroyed, abandoned, or are engaged in the manu
facture of articles for peacetime consumption. The underground
aircraft factory which has so upset the Soviet Element is an empt
hole in the ground. It is a simple matter of arithmetic—when you
remove a hole in the ground you merely leave a bigger hole. The
Soviet spokesman is privileged, of course, to pursue such fantasies to
the end of the rainbow, but I suggest a return to reality.
Today is not the first time that these Soviet charges have been
refuted. The U.S. High Commissioner presented assurances to the
Allied Council on September 13, 1946, that his zone had been properly
demilitarized in accordance with the control agreement. This wa
reaffirmed on several subsequent occasions, notably on December 23
1947. The Allied Council reported to the Council of Foreign Min
isters on February 8, 1947, that there were no military or park
military organizations in existence which were known to the Allied
Council, that all known military armament and equipment had been
destroyed or rendered useless or entirely removed from Austria a
taken over by the Occupying Powers, that all known military instal
lations had been destroyed or dispersed except those in use by the
Occupying Powers, and that all industrial enterprises and all know
technical, scientific, and research institutions formerly employed ir
the production of, or research in, military armaments had been
demilitarized and placed under the supervision of the Occupying
Powers in their respective zones. Again, the Allied Council an
knowledged on December 23, 1947, that all former war factories in
spected by the Military, Naval, and Air Directorates were now engaged
entirely in peacetime production.
ECA CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD AUSTRIA'S REHABILITATION
I would be the first to agree that the Marshall Plan, in which the
Soviet Element sees a spectre of disaster for Austria, has spen
hundreds of millions of Schillings on improving roads and com
munications, building dams, repairing bridges, and providing ner
dwellings along with the power and light to go into them. The US
Element, of course, is proud of the extensive contributions the U.S.
people have made toward Austria’s rehabilitation-and the pattern
of Éca investments represents the most effective use to which the
Austrian Government has been able to apply this aid. The fack
are that, so far, the Austrian authorities have seen fit to invest their
ECA funds as follows: 873 million Schillings in manufacturing
.
2,715,000,000 Schillings toward improvement of transportation and
communications, and 762 million Schillings for other purposes
as housing and the tourist industry. EcA has, in addition, assisted
to this country in its struggle to meet its own needs and win back ik
commercial position in the world. I am sure that the Soviet Ele
sud
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1773
zone,
ment would be pleased to see the discontinuation of Eca with its
consequences of impoverishment and unrest, but I can assure it
that it is our desire and the desire of the Austrian people that it be
continued-and it will be continued.
In the minds of more objective experts, Austrian production,
including that aided by Eca, is entirely devoted to peacetime goods.
In interpreting the Soviet definition of "military-industrial po-
tential" my attention was drawn to a statement by the Soviet
Element in an executive committee meeting some years ago, in which
a button factory was labeled as "military potential,” since it might
be converted to producing buttons for military pants. If buttons
are militarily dangerous, then so are kitchenware, knitting needles,
cosmetics, cigarettes, bicycles, farm tractors, and plows, and alſ
other similar items now being produced in the Western zones-at
least to the person who cannot get war out of his mind.
In expressing compassion for the heavy burden borne by the Aus-
trian workers, the Soviet Element neglects to add that first and fore-
most, they must pay for the continued maintenance of a Soviet
field army of upward of 50,000 men in the Soviet zone of Austria.
The Austrian worker, farmer, and businessman must also continue
to defray in tax payments the cost of housing requisitioned for these
Soviet forcesma mass of buildings which has been estimated as
amounting to one-third of all the available housing in the Soviet
The Soviet High Commissioner speaks of military installations in
Western Austria, which I have invited him to come and inspect. He
does not speak of the vast Soviet training area of Doellersheim,
from which Austrian farmers have been evicted; he says he does not
even know the location of it. Here, to refresh his memory, is a map
showing the location of Doellersheim- an area larger than the city
of Vienna. On it you will also find the Soviet military bastion of
Baden. You will find the Soviet maneuver area at Apetlon. You
will find the locations of the military airfields used by the Soviets for
their fleets of jet and bomber aircraft.
DISMANTLING OF AUSTRIAN INDUSTRY
The Soviet High Commissioner voices his concern about the uses
of some of the Marshall Plan funds that are being put into Austria.
Let me remind him of the extent of what the Soviets, for their part,
are taking out of Austria. Let us begin by recalling that dismantlings
of Austrian industrial equipment upon order of the Soviets reached
a total value of over 200 million dollars. Then, Soviet removals of
Austrian oil, shipping and rolling stock from 1946 through the first
half of 1951' are estimated as having reached a total of another 150
Let us talk about Usia (Soviet-Controlled Austrian Enterprises),
the industrial grab-bag into which the Soviet Element has thrown
some 350 Austrian manufacturing and commercial concerns in order
to serve itself. Yet Usia enterprises, vital to Austria’s lifeblood as
they are, have been snatched away from the Austrian people. They
million dollars.
1774
.
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
pay no normal taxes-a fact which has so far deprived the Austrian
Government and people of fully half a billion Schillings of revenue.
They live outside the law; they ignore all Austrian social security
legislation. They drain off Austrian natural and industrial wealth
to the East-billions of Schillings' worth within the last 4 years,
and bring back nothing in return. It is imperialism of the crudest
sort. It is not only a monopoly, but a colonial monopoly, gutting
the central part of Europe, and this in the year 1951.
I find that the antiquated Soviet charges of Austrian army for-
niations have been well aired in past Allied Council meetings. I
believe the U.S. High Commissioner aptly presented the U.S.
viewpoint in the Allied Council meeting of April 28 last year. The
fact that 5 years after these spurious assertions were begun finds
Austria without a single soldier gives ample proof of the counterfeit
nature of these empty allegations. I need only refer the Soviet
Element to the speech made by Foreign Minister Gruber last Satur-
day for a very effective reply to these charges. The training of the
gendarmerie, to which the Soviets objected, is only that which ang
modern police force receives. The Soviet disappointment at the
existence of an efficient police and gendarmerie is understandable,
since these law enforcement agencies constitute the principal ob-
stacles to the promotion of internal disorders so necessary to the
objectives of Soviet puppets whose loyalty lies not with Austria.
I would like to discuss the kind of peace that reigns in the Soviet
In the last 6 years, the Soviet zone and sector of Vienna have
been the scene of hundreds of abductions of Austrian citizens, al
of whom have vanished without known charge or trial into the dark-
ness of the interior.
Is it "peace” when an Austrian police inspector, Marek, is sud-
denly and secretly whisked away—and when 3 years pass before the
Soviet Element casually admits his abduction? Or take the case
of Paul Katscher, also seized and deported back in 1948. He died
in captivity that same year. How do we know? Because the Soviet
Element finally got around to admitting it—2 years later.
Soviet zone last month, a tank company of the Soviet army wen
out for a shoot and casually blasted a terrified little village named
Breitenbrunn,
I was struck with the peculiar similarity of General Sviridov's
statement and that made by the Soviet Element on January 16,
1948. From a close comparison, they appear to be the same barreu!
tirade. Yet in spite of all the dire predictions of Austria's militar
might, we find 342 years later a country completely devoid of national
military forces, and instead, devoting its energies entirely to peaceful !
pursuits. Such cannot be said of Austria's eastern neighbors who.
under the compulsion of the U.S.S. R. and against their own wishes
.
are now engaged in an intensive rearmament, contrary to the peace
treaties to which they acceded.
zone.
In the
(
1
1
1 Treaties of Feb. 10, 1947, with Rumania (TIAS 1649; 61 Stat. pt. 2,
1757); Bulgaria (TIAS 1650; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1915); and Hungary (TIAS 16516
61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 2065).
: نشعلهعع
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1775
U.S.S.R. CHALLENGED TO ACT ON AUSTRIAN TREATY
General Sviridov's statement is replete with inaccuracies, misleading
statements, and baseless allegations, designed for the sole purpose of
trying to further frustrate a good Austrian people who have been
subject to Soviet obstructionism and delaying tactics for the past
6 years. The Austrian people are fed up with the occupation. They
want the occupying forces to leave the country, and they should
leave, and they should have left a long time ago. If there is one iota
of sincerity in the Soviet statements, then I challenge them to meet
with the Western Powers at the earliest possible moment to conclude
the State Treaty so that all of the occupying forces may withdraw
from this country forthwith. We are sincere in this statement.
It is now up to the Soviets to prove their sincerity, and make it possi-
ble for the hundreds of prisoners of war and the kidnapped Austrians
to return to their families.
The United States has full confidence in the Austrian Government
and the Austrian people, and it is committed to the policy of co-
operating with them in rehabilitating their country and in reestab-
lishing their independence and sovereignty, which was promised to
them as long ago as the Moscow Conference of 1943. We will not
deviate one moment from this policy.
51. SOVIET CHARGES AGAINST AUSTRIA: Instruction From the
Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the
Allied Councii,May 20, 1954 3
The attention of the world is concentrated primarily on the Geneva
conference and Indochina at this time. Because of that, I wish to
express my strong feeling that recent events in Austria should not go
unnoticed. The preservation of the authority of the freely elected
Austrian Government throughout Austria, in accordance with the
Allied Control Agreement,' is, I believe, a matter of serious concern
to all of us who live under similarly elected democratic governments.
As you have reported, the Soviet High Commissioner in Austria
on May 17 peremptorily summoned the Chancellor and Vice-Chan-
cellor of Austria to his headquarters and there delivered a lengthy
and virulent condemnation of the Austrian Government. This
condemnation, which is clearly without foundation, included accusa-
tions of hostile and subversive actions against the Soviet occupation.
The accusations also included those of failure to comply with the
provisions of the Allied Control Agreement and violation of the
decisions of the Allied Council. Moreover, the Soviet High Com-
See the Allied declaration of Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign
Policij, p. 11.
2 Charles W. Yost.
Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1954, p. 824.
4 Agreement of June 28, 1946; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp.
614-620.
3
e
I'A
CI
li
be
Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publi,
1776 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
missioner intensified the allegations, which the Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter made officially at the Berlin conference as an excuse for refusing
to grant Austria her long-promised independence, of Austrian plans
for remilitarization and for an Anschluss with Germany. Perhaps
most revealing of all were the charges against Mr. Helmer, the Aus-
trian Minister of the Interior, and the threat that should the Austrian
Government fail to take corrective action, then the Soviets themselves
will be forced to take appropriate measures.
These efforts are clearly meant to intimidate the government of &
free people. The Soviets had already made plain at Berlin that
they intend to remain in Austria indefinitely. They are not
threatening to strengthen and expand their control in their zone of
occupation. I was gratified to note that the formal charges of the
representatives of the Kremlin were denied by the Chancellor and
Vice-Chancellor in the best tradition of the courageous Austrian
post-war Government coalition. If there have been Austrian ex-
pressions of dissatisfaction over the nine-year occupation of a liber-
ated country, surely the Soviet Government should find them neither
surprising nor a threat to its own security.
The Soviet High Commissioner gave the appearance of speaking
on behalf of the Allied Council. I know of no foundation for the W
Soviet charges, but in order to remove any possible Soviet misunder-
Š
standing of the United States attitude towards its latest actions, I
,
therefore, instruct you to request at the next meeting of the Allied
Council consideration of the Soviet allegations and threats.
Allied Council has not only powers in Austria but responsibilities
toward her government and people.
Any threat of further limitation to Austrian independence is &
matter of grave concern not only to the Austrian Government but
also to the other three occupying powers. Indeed such a threat
could not but be a cause of concern to the entire free world.
th
DE
st
:
52. AUSTRO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: Joint Communiqué,
November 26, 19542
The visit of the Federal Chancellor of Austria, Julius Raab, to
Washington has provided a most welcome opportunity for big
officials of the United States to become personally acquainted with the
Chancellor and to review with him the international situation as
whole. Matters of mutual interest to the governments of Austria add
the United States were discussed. These discussions which began
with the Chancellor's talk with the President of the United State
1 See Mr. Molotov's statement of Feb. 12, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting
cation 5399; 1954), pp. 180-183.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 910.
The
III
So-
50
#
th
罗​,日
​GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1777
and Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on November 22 have
been cordial, informative, and constructive.
The prospects for a Treaty for Austria were reviewed and it was
agreed that both governments would continue with determination to
work together for a State Treaty which would provide for the with-
drawal of all occupation troops from Austria at an early and fixed
date. It was noted that the United States, Great Britain, and France
had on November 18 [19] submitted to the Secretary General of the
United Nations a report of their efforts to achieve an Austrian
Treaty. 1
The Chancellor reviewed the political and economic situation
existing in Austria today. The stability and progress achieved by
Austria, in spite of the devastations of war and the burdens imposed
by the continued occupation of the country, were recognized by the
representatives of the United States as being a remarkable and
concrete proof of the courage, resourcefulness and fortitude of the
Austrian coalition government and its people. The Chancellor out-
lined his plans and hopes for the further development of Austria's
hydroelectric potential for the mutual benefit of Austria and neigh-
boring states. Further development of these plans will be followed
with great interest by United States authorities.
The Chancellor held useful conversations with the Departments of
State and of Defense on the question of further alleviating the burden
of occupation by the release of requisitioned housing presently held
by the United States authorities in Austria. Plans to this end now
under consideration in the Department of Defense were reviewed.
The question of claims by American citizens against the Austrian
government_stemming from the Nazi occupation of Austria was
discussed. It was agreed that a prompt and just settlement of these
claims should be sought.
The discussions held during the Chancellor's visit re-emphasized
the friendly relationship which exists between the governments of
Austria and the United States. By this visit the ties which link the
people of Austria to the people of the United States have been further
strengthened.
53. AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY: Note From the Secretary of State to
the Austrian Ambassador, December 6, 1955 3
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency
the Ambassador of Austria and has the honor to acknowledge receipt
of the note of the Embassy of Austria dated November 14, 1955,
informing him that the Austrian Parliament approved on October 26,
1 See infra, pp. 1877-1881.
2 Karl Gruber.
i Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1012.
4 For the full text of the Austrian note, see ibid., pp. 1011-1012.
415900_57_Vol. 2
9
1778
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
;
and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria declares of her
“The Federal Government is charged with the execution of this Federal
1955, the federal constitutional law relative to the neutrality of
Austria, which entered into force November 5, 1955.1
The Secretary of State has the honor to inform the Austrian
Ambassador, in compliance with the request expressed in the note
under acknowledgement, that the Government of the United States
has taken cognizance of this constitutional law and recognizes the
perpetual neutrality of Austria as defined therein.
D. NEGOTIATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS RE-
GARDING GERMANY, 1950-1952
54. STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMIS-
SIONER, FEBRUARY 28, 19503
I have on two recent occasions in Berlin stated that the political
unification of Germany on the basis of free all-German elections is a
major objective of United States policy.
The aspiration of the Germans for unity and freedom is now chal
lenged by the Communists of the Soviet Zone, who offer the device of
a so-called "National Front" as a means to "democratic unity.
Elections in the East Zone now scheduled for October 15 are pro-
claimed as affording an opportunity of expressing the people's wil
But only one kind of freedom will be permitted expression at these
elections: freedom to vote for a single list of candidates selected in
advance only by the Party elite which executes dictates of the Soviet
Union. In contrast to this travesty, the people of Western German
enjoy the political freedoms so conspicuously absent in the East: the
right to engage freely in party activity and the right to vote freely for
any candidate.
We understand the universal German urge for unification and com
demn the exploitation of that feeling by dishonest
devices such as the
1 The constitutional law provided as follows:
"Article I
"(1) For the purpose of the lasting maintenance of her independence externalle
own free will her perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend this
with all means at her disposal.
"(2) For the securing of this purpose in all future times Austria will not jou
any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of any foreign military
bases on her territory.
“Article II
... ... ... ...
Constitutional Law.”
2
3 Documents on German Unity, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1951), p. 147.
, .
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1779
Soviet-sponsored "National Front" and its proposed plebiscite.
These devices fraudulently excite and exploit the natural wish of the
German people for unity while denying to them the free and democratic
processes by which unity can be attained. The reluctance of the
Communist usurpers of East Germany to submit to free elections, or to
permit the unification of Germany to proceed thereby, makes it
abundantly clear that they are unwilling to trust the choice of the
German people. My Government stands ready to assist the German
people to achieve unity, based on true democratic principles and
reflecting the aspirations of the entire German nation.
Unity and freedom can be attained in Germany only if there be full
and equal opportunity for all parties throughout Germany to propose
candidates, advance programs, and compete for the electorate's favor.
All candidates must be assured complete freedom of action without
discrimination or official favoritism, together with access to all
essential media of communication and material facilities. Every
voter must be assured the protection of the law in the free expression
of his opinion at the polls. The press must have unhindered access to
all areas in order to report the election campaign accurately.
Meanwhile, my Government is extending its full support to the
Bundesrepublik, which has evolved from those democratic processes
to which all Germans can aspire.
55. DECLARATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE,
MAY 14, 1950 1
In reaffirming the determination of their Governments to work
together, in cooperation with the German Federal Government and
all like-minded Powers, for the unification of Germany, the three
Foreign Ministers agreed that German unity should be achieved on
the basis of the following principles:
(a) A freely-elected all-German government.
(b) Individual freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest
and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech,
press and radio throughout Germany.
(c) Freedom of action throughout Germany for all. democratic
political parties.
(d) Independence of the judiciary.
(e) Prohibition throughout Germany of political secret police and
police formations constituting a military force.
(f) Assurance of German economic unity through action by a
German government on matters such as a unified currency and
customs, and through quadripartite agreement on matters such as
cessation of reparations from current production, and prohibited and
limited industries.
Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 885.
1780
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ܚܝܚܪܚܪܪ
* --, ----------------..-w:
(g) Surrender and disposal, in accordance with appropriate Ger-
man legislation, of any industrial enterprise in Germany whose owner-
ship or control was acquired after May 8, 1945 by or on behalf of any
foreign Power, unless such acquisition has quadripartite approval and
the interest so approved is subjected to German Law.
(h) Establishment of quadripartite supervision through a four-
Power Commission, exercising its reserve powers in such a way as to
permit the German Government to function effectively.
The Foreign Ministers further agreed that the first step towards
the restoration of German unity should be the holding throughout
Germany of free elections to a Constituent Assembly. They, accord-
ingly, welcome and endorse the resolution of the German Federal
Republic of March 22, 1950,' inviting free all-German elections for
national assembly empowered to frame an all-German constitution
.
These elections should be held under international supervision and on
the basis of an electoral law to be agreed between the four Occupying
Powers which would take into account the principles set forth above,
The Constituent Assembly when elected should have the sole task of
drafting a constitution for submission to the German people for
ratification.
Finally, the Ministers agreed that with the formation of an all-
German government on the basis of the foregoing principles, the Four
Powers should immediately address themselves to a peace settlement.
.
56. LETTER FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMANDANT
IN BERLIN 2 TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET CONTROL
COMMISSION, MAY 25, 1950 4
DEAR GENERAL CHUlkov: Throughout the five year period during
which our two governments have participated in the occupation of
Germany, repeated efforts have been made to effect the political and
economic unity of the country. The matter was recently reviewed
again by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and !
the United States at London. Their conclusions on the matter of !
German unification and the manner
in which it might be accomplished
are attached. (See Annex A.)5 This document has been transmitted i
to the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic.
You will note that the Ministers agreed that the formation of a
all-German Government on the basis of the principles set forth in
their statement would prepare the way for a peace settlement with
Germany. In this connection, you will also have noted that in the
C
8
t
4
1 Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 885.
2 Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.
3 Gen. Vassily I. Chuikov.
Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, pp. 884–885.
sent on behalf of the United States High Commissioner. The British and French
High Commissioners sent similar letters.
Tripartite declaration of May 14, 1950; supra.
The letter was
1
6
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1781
public communiqué released by the Ministers on May 14,1 it was
stated that the Western Powers did not contemplate the conclusion
of a separate peace treaty with the Federal Republic: one considera-
tion in the formulation of this conclusion was that the Western
Powers believe that a separate peace treaty with one or more zones of
occupation connotes acceptance of a concept of a more permanent
partition of Germany. The Western Powers do not wish to associate
themselves with any such concept.
You will also note that the Ministers endorsed the resolution of
the Federal Republic under date of March 22, which invited all-
German elections to a National Constituent Assembly under condi-
tions found to be acceptable to my government. A copy of the text
of this resolution is attached (See Annex B), and I direct your atten-
tion especially to paragraph i thereof, which suggests that the four
occupation powers should assume the responsibility of framing an
electoral law under which all-German elections might be conducted.
My government would be prepared for me to share in the respon-
sibility of framing an electoral law under which all-German elections,
pointing toward the formation of an all-German Government in
conformity with the principles set forth in the attached statement
of the Foreign Ministers, could be held.
Should your government declare its acceptance of these principles
and be willing to share such responsibility, it is the belief of my
government that any discussions on the subject should be conducted
via the following principles:
1. Conversations would initially be undertaken at the level of the
four Commissioners for the limited purpose of drafting an electoral
law to implement the Federal Republic's proposal of free all-German
elections for a National Constituent Assembly. The proposal to
limit discussions to the framing of an electoral law proceeds from a
belief that it is unrealistic to discuss or arrange the desired peace
settlement until it is established that a unified German Government,
freely elected, can be brought into being.
2. If agreement is reached on an electoral law, the way would be
clear for the drafting by the elected representatives of the German
people of a constitution for all Germany, within the framework of the
principles set forth in the attached statement of the Foreign Min-
isters, and for the emergence of an all-German Government.
3. A basis would thus be laid for the establishment of a four power
commission which should exercise its reserved powers in such a way
as to permit the German Government to function effectively.
I would welcome your views on this subject.
In view of the vital interest of the German people in the unifica-
tion of their country, I feel it appropriate to make a copy of this
letter available to the press and will do so after it has reached you.
:
1 Supra, pp. 1709-1711.
For translation of the resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, June 5,
1950, p. 885.
1782
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
dis-
i
3 Protocol of proceedings of Aug. 1, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy
57. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE, OCTOBER 25, 1950 1
I should like to anticipate your questions and make a few obser-
vations on the communiqué issued at Praha after the meeting of the
Eastern European Communist Foreign Ministers. It is designed
to give the impression that a new approach is being made to the Ger-
man problem. I cannot find anything new in it; in fact, it is a return
to old and unworkable proposals.
The record shows that we have always been eager to cooperate
in the search for a plan which would relieve tensions, restore German
unity, and liquidate the tragic heritage of the last war. But the time
has long since passed when the world can be stirred to hope by gen-
eral phrases from the Soviet Union about disarmament and peace
and German unity. We, who have striven so hard for these things
,
want actions—we want the threatening East German army
banded, the capricious restraints on internal German trade removed
,
and free democratic elections held in all of Germany. We wants
end to threats such as that uttered by the Communist Ulbricht,
deputy head of the East German regime, on August 3 when he de
clared that the Government of the Federal Republic would share
what he hoped was going to be the fate of the Republic of Korea.
The Praha statement makes four proposals in an attempt to de-
ffect us from our resolve to proceed to build real strength in a fres
world as the best means of safeguarding the peace.
First, it is proposed that the United States, British, French, and
Soviet Governments should publish a declaration that they will not
permit the remilitarization of Germany or its inclusion in any sor
of aggressive plans. Why is this necessary? We solemnly agreed
at Potsdam in 1945 to bring about the complete disarmament and
demilitarization of Germany. As a result, Western Germany lies
disarmed today. The Praha communiqué should be directed to the
Government of the Soviet Union, which could make the implementa-
tion of the Potsdam Agreement 100 percent complete in Germany
, by
taking the required steps in the Soviet zone. The only remilitariza-
tion in Germany has occurred in the Soviet zone where factories are
producing armament for Eastern European use and where 50,000
soldiers have been organized, trained, and equipped with tanks and
artillery. And against whom are all these and similar preparations
being made? The United States and the free world which have seer
these developments with increasing anxiety would be a thousand
times more reassured by Soviet
action to implement previous declara
tions than by new declarations, however high-sounding. The West
can find no reassurance of peace in Soviet actions whether these be the
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 6, 1950, pp. 727-728.
2 Resolutions adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union,
German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, an
Bulgaria and the Albanian Minister to the Soviet Union, Oct. 21, 1950; Documents
on German Unity, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1951), pp. 158-161.
ارا
the
pp. 34-48.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1783
1
1
}
| rearming of East Germany, the maintenance of so many mobilized
Soviet divisions, or the hostile Soviet propaganda with which the
world is constantly bludgeoned. These are the reasons why proposals
are made today which would permit the Germans to join their own
defensive efforts with the common efforts being made to strengthen the
1
defense of the West, while preventing the rebirth of a German national
army.
!
Second, the Praha communiqué urges the removal of restrictions
that are obstructing the development of German peacetime economy.
If this demand is addressed to Moscow, we will heartily support it.
1
We have spent billions in an effort to develop the German economy
on a sound and self-supporting basis. We made innumerable at-
tempts-fruitless because of Soviet opposition to bring about the
creation of central German economic agencies and with hopeful, if
1
misplaced, tolerance we long left the Eastern borders of our zones
| open to the free exchange of goods and persons. If the German econ-
omy, as a national whole, is to be restored on a sound basis, what we
need is action from the country which blockaded Berlin, which im-
poses the most arbitrary and erratic restrictions on commerce enter-
i ing or leaving its zone of occupation, and which has destroyed all
economic initiative in its zone by the system of Communist monopoly
of enterprise and industry.
The Praha communiqué demands, in the third place, that a peace
treaty with Germany be concluded forthwith. We state, as we have
so many times in the past, that this cannot be done in the absence of a
unified democratic national government in Germany. The peace
treaty cake looks very delicious, but to whom is it to be served?
There must be a German government with whom a treaty can be
concluded. Let the German people freely elect a national govern-
ment, as we have proposed again and again, and we can then move
toward a peace treaty.
As for the fourth proposal, it is even more insubstantial than the
rest. It suggests that an all-German constitutional convention com-
posed of equal numbers of representatives from Eastern and Western
Germany should prepare the way for the formation of a provisional
all-German government. Would the East German representatives be
appointed by the Communist Party regime or would they perhaps have
the added cover of a fake election of the type held in Eastern Germany
on October 15? And why should the 18 million captive Germans of
the East have equal representation with the 47 million free Germans
of the West? This violates the most elementary ideas of democracy.
We strongly support the views which have been expressed by Chancel-
lor Adenauer and the Government of the Federal Republic. We have
repeatedly urged upon the Soviet Union a plan for free, open, super-
vised democratic elections all over Germany for a new constitutional
convention. Only in this way, can a German Government responsive
to the will of the majority be obtained, and only then can we talk
sensibly of a peace treaty.
We will always hope for and welcome tangible proof that Soviet
intentions have changed. The Praha statement gives us no such
:.
:
1784
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
proof. Instead, it abuses, by its perversion of language, the world's
hope for peace and understanding, for an end to fear and threats
Against that abuse, I raise a solemn protest.
58. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DECEM
BER 22, 1950 2
1. The Embassy of the United States of America has the honor to
acknowledge the receipt of the note of November 3, 1950, of the
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs. This note enclosed the text of 8
declaration published in Prague October 22, 1950,* and proposed &
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.S.R. to consider the question
of the fulfillment of the clauses of the Potsdam Agreement regarding
the demilitarization of Germany.
2. The United States Government has consistently abided by the
principle set forth in the Charter of the United Nations that in-
ternational problems should be settled by peaceful negotiations.
The United States Government takes this occasion to reaffirm
its adherence to this principle. This is in full accord with the spirit
of the recent General Assembly resolution 6 supported by the United
States Government which calls attention to the desirability of con-
sultations which would help to allay existing international tensions
.
Far from having any aggressive intentions toward the Soviet Union,
it is inspired by a genuine desire to put an end to the existing inter-
national tension and will spare no effort to achieve so highly desirable
an end. It is prepared on the basis and in the manner set forth
below to explore with the Soviet, British, and French Governments
the possibility of finding a mutually acceptable basis for a meeting
of the Foreign Ministers of the four countries.
3. The Government of the United States has studied with care
the note of the Soviet Government of November 3, 1950. It has been
obliged to note with regret that the basis proposed in this note is
not such as to afford any prospect of a genuine settlement. The
Soviet proposal to examine the question of the demilitarization of
Germany will not suffice to remove the causes of the present tension.
The only German military force which exists at present is that which
for many months in the Soviet zone has been trained on military
lines with artillery and tanks. If the participation of German units
in the defense of western
Germany is being discussed, it is solely
because Soviet policy and actions have compelled the other nations
2
The British and
1 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 1, 1951, pp. 11–12.
French Ambassadors in Moscow deliveređ similar notes to the Soviet Foreign
Minister on the same day.
8 Ibid., p. 12.
4 Documents on German Unity, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1951), pp. 158–161.
5 Res. 377 C (V), Nov. 3, 1950; supra, pp. 187-192.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1785
to examine all means of improving their security. Contrary to the
entirely false allegations contained in the Prague communiqué,
the United States Government in common with the Governments
of France and the United Kingdom is determined never to permit
at any time or in any circumstance western Germany to be used
as a base for aggression. The United States Government has no
feeling of confidence that the same is true of that part of Germany
under Soviet occupation, in view of the rearmament taking place in
eastern Germany referred to above.
4. It is furthermore impossible to envisage a just settlement of
German problems on the basis of the Prague communiqué. This
communiqué contains no new or constructive feature and the solution
proposed therein has been rejected by the majority of German opinion.
It does little more than reiterate in substance previous propositions
which proved after exhaustive examination to afford no basis for a
constructive solution of the German problem. For the purpose of
ending the present division of Germany the United States Govern-
ment in conjunction with the French and British Governments has
for its part more than once made proposals for restoring German
unity by means of free elections held under international supervision.
These proposals were sent by letter by the three High Commis-
sioners to the head of the Soviet Control Commission on May 25,
1950,' and October 9, 1950.2 No reply has been made to these
letters.
5. The serious tension which exists at present springs neither
from the question of the demilitarization of Germany nor even from
the German problem as a whole. It arises in the first instance from
the general attitude adopted by the Government of the U.S.S.R.
since the end of the war and from the consequent international
developments of recent months. The Governments of the four
powers would be failing in their full responsibility if they were to
confine their discussion to the narrow basis proposed by the Soviet
Government.
Questions related to Germany and Austria would
obviously be subjects for discussion. But the United States Govern-
ment believes that any discussions should include equally the prin-
cipal problems whose solution would permit a real and lasting im-
provement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States, Great Britain, and France and the elimination of the causes of
present international tensions throughout the world.
6. The United States Government is prepared to designate a
representative who, together with representatives of the Soviet,
British, and French Governments would examine the problems re-
ferred to in the preceding paragraph with a view to finding a mu-
tually acceptable basis for a meeting of the foreign ministers of the
four countries and recommend to their Governments a suitable
agenda. It would appear that the presence of representatives of the
above-named governments at the seat of the United Nations in New
1 Supra, doc. 56.
3 Documents on German Unity, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1951), p. 157 (where the date
of the letter is given as Oct. 10, 1950).
1786
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
York presents the most convenient opportunity to conduct such
exploratory discussions.
7. The United States Government would appreciate receiving
the views of the Soviet Government concerning the proposals set
forth in the present note.
59. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT
MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, JANU
ARY 23, 1951 3
A.
The Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America has the home
to acknowledge the receipt of the note of December 30, 1950 * of the
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and, under instructions from his
Government, to reply as follows:
The purpose of the United States Government is to seek to allør
existing international tensions by discussing all problems likely to
threaten world peace with a view to resolving the fundamental
differences between nations. It therefore confines itself in this reps
to a further examination of the question of the basis on which such
negotiations might take place and refrains from refuting in detail the
allegations on a number of points, especially in regard to Germany
,
which are made in the Soviet Government's note. As the United
States Government has repeatedly pointed out, particularly in it
note of December 22, 1950, these allegations are completely without
foundation.
With regard to the substance of the Soviet Government's note, the
United States Government observes that the Soviet Government does
not object to a preliminary conference of representatives of the four
governments but, in view of other statements in the note, the United
States Government feels it necessary to ask for clarification in order
to avoid any misunderstanding and to make it possible that such a
preliminary conference should serve a useful purpose.
The United States Government in its note of December 22 stated
that the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers
confined to considering the demilitarization of Germany in the context
of the so-called Praha Declaration was not acceptable for the reasons
therein given. The note proposed specifically that a meeting of the
Foreign Ministers should include
in its discussions not only questions
related to Austria and Germany but also the principal problems whose
solution would permit a real and lasting improvement in the relations
?
انیشتن نعثذامينجو :-: تو که 6.4.:
3
1 Walworth Barbour.
2 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 5, 1951, pp. 228-229. The British and
French Embassies at Moscow delivered' similar notes to the Soviet Foreigo
Ministry on the same date.
4 Ibid., Jan. 15, 1951, pp. 90-92.
5 Supra.
6 Declaration of Oct. 21, 1950; Documents on German Unity, vol. I (Frankfurt
1951), pp. 158-161.
A>..--'.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1787
between the Soviet Union and the United States, Great Britain, and
France and the elimination of the causes of present international
tensions throughout the world.
In its reply, the Soviet Government limited itself to an indication
that it is willing to discuss questions concerning Germany. In this
connection, the note of the Soviet-Government refers again to the
so-called Praha Declaration which the United States Government as
well as the Governments of France and the United Kingdom have
made clear they could in no circumstances accept as a limitation on or
as a basis for discussions.
The note of the Soviet Government thus does not reveal whether
that government agrees that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of
the four countries would deal with the other questions indicated in
the note of the United States Government. The United States
Government wishes to emphasize, as was stated in its note of December
22nd, that the tension which exists in the world today does not arise
from the German problem. A discussion limited to the questions
proposed by the Soviet Government would therefore be inadequate
and unreal.
Consequently, the United States Government would be glad to
know whether the Soviet Government does agree that those further
questions and problems referred to above will be among those which
the Foreign Ministers may discuss.
In its note of December 22, the United States Government further
proposed that representatives of the four governments be designated
to meet and examine the problems just referred to with a view to finding
a mutually acceptable basis for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers
of the four countries and recommending to their governments a
In the view of the United States Government, these representatives
would need to give some consideration to the questions and problems
involved in order to determine their formulation for inclusion in the
agenda as well as the order in which they would appear so that the
mutually acceptable basis referred to could be established. It would
not be the function of the representatives to attempt to arrive at
solutions of the problems,
this function being reserved
for the Ministers
While the note of the Soviet Government states that it does not
object to a preliminary conference of representatives of the four
governments, it is not clear, in view of other statements in the note,
whether the Soviet Government agrees that the function of such a
preliminary conference should be as stated above. Consequently,
the United States Government would be glad to know whether the
view of the Soviet Government in this matter is the same as its own.
As for the meeting place of the preliminary conference, the United
States Government is prepared to agree on Paris.
The Government of the United States renews its proposal made on
December 22 and hopes that the Soviet Government is prepared to
discuss the elimination of the principal causes of present international
tensions and that it will accordingly agree on the points mentioned
suitable agenda.
themselves.
1788
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
above. If the Soviet Government does agree, the United States
Government for its part is ready to set, in agreement with the
Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union;
the date of the exploratory meeting of representatives.
60. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOS.
COW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, FEBRUARY
19, 1951 3
]
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
The Ambassador of the United States of America has the honor to
acknowledge the receipt of the Soviet Government's note of Feb-
ruary 5, 1951,4 and under instructions from his Government, to
reply as follows:
The United States Government regrets that the Soviet Govern-
ment in its reply repeats and further exaggerates inaccurate state-
ments about the policies and motives of the United States, France,
the United Kingdom as well as the German Federal Republic. The
Soviet allegations are totally without foundation.
The attempt to eliminate the causes of international tension is &
subject which so deeply touches the interests of all peoples that it
demands the most serious and honest consideration. Clearly, if
these causes are to be eliminated, they must first be correctly
identified.
It is obvious that it is not the German problem or the considera-
tion of a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe
which lies at the root of the present tension. The United States
Government wishes to emphasize, moreover, that in Western Ger-
many there do not exist any German military forces, or any German
war industry and that the only fait accompli in this field in Europe is
the existence of the huge armaments maintained by the Soviet bloc
which include forces raised in East Germany. In short,
United States Government stated in its note of December 22 the
serious tension which exists at present arises in the first instance
from the general attitude adopted by the Government of the U.S.S.R.
since the end of the war.
The Soviet Government has referred to the defense program under-
taken by the United States and the free nations of Europe. It must
be as apparent to the Soviet Government, as it is to world public
opinion, that the free nations of the world, confronted with the vast
armed forces maintained by the Soviet Union and
the nations under
its control and in the face of the frustration by the Soviet Govern-
ment of the sincere efforts of a large majority of the members of the
United Nations to obtain the effective international control and re-
duction of armaments, have had no course except to move to redress
as the
}
1 Adm. Alan G. Kirk.
2 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 5, 1951, p. 366.
4 Ibid., Feb. 19, 1951, p. 313.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1789
for their own security the great disparity in armed forces existing in
the world.
The United States Government wishes to insure that the discus-
sion at any meeting of the four Ministers shall include these real
causes of tension and that a suitable agenda to that end be drawn up.
Since the Soviet Government has admitted the possibility of discuss-
ing questions other than Germany, and has itself drawn attention to
that of armaments, the Government of the United States, which de-
sires to raise this question, assumes that the Soviet Government does
not object to the representatives of the four Governments in the pre-
liminary conversations preparing an agenda which will cover the
causes of tension in Europe, including the existing level of armaments;
problems affecting Germany; the Austrian treaty. The formulation
of these and other subjects which may be agreed upon, as well as their
order on the agenda, will naturally be considered at the preliminary
conference.
If the Soviet Government agrees with the basis outlined above for
a preliminary conference in Paris, the United States Government
I suggests that the representatives of the Four Powers meet there on
March 5. If, as the Government of the United States hopes, the
preliminary conference of representatives finds a mutually acceptable
basis for a meeting of the ministers, the Government of the United
States suggests that the Foreign Ministers of the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union meet in Wash-
ington on a date to be recommended by the representatives. The
Government of the United States is informed that these arrangements
lei
would be convenient to the Governments of France and the United
TO 0
Kingdom
PT
.
61. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET
FOREIGN MINISTER, MAY 31, 1951 2
1
l
si
nde
TI
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency
the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
has the honor to refer to the current Four Power negotiations in Paris.
Since March 5 the representative of the United States, together
with the representatives of France and the United Kingdom, has
been engaged in discussions with the representative of the Soviet
Union in a preliminary conference in Paris. This preliminary con-
ference was agreed upon as a result of an exchange of notes which
ended with the note of the United States Government dated Feb-
ruary 19, 1951, and the reply of the Soviet Government dated
March 1, 1951.' As indicated in that exchange of notes, the purpose
of the conference was to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable
agenda for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States,
1 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1951, pp. 933-934. The British
and French Governments sent similar notes to the Soviet Government.
ad
f
dri
2
3 Supra.
4 Not printed.
invitation and stating which of the three agenda it finds acceptable
1790 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
United Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic,
Such an agreement has not yet been reached.
In the course of the discussions, the views of the four delegation
were brought out and clarified. Considering that the discussions hed
provided all the elements necessary for agreement on an agenda, the
representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France
presented to the Soviet representative on May 2 a new proposal com
taining three alternative agenda. The purpose of these three alte
natives was to assure the possibility of the meeting of the four Foreign
Ministers. It has been, and remains, the view of the United Stats
Government that such a meeting is desirable in the interest .
strengthening peace, which is the constant objective of the foreign
policy of the United States.
In the course of the examination of these three alternatives the
representatives in Paris were unable to reach full agreement. A
regards the first alternative, the only difficulty was that the wording
proposed by the three delegations for the sub-item concerning arms.
ments was not acceptable to the Soviet delegation. The thin
alternative was not accepted by the Soviet delegation as a basis for
agreement. In the second alternative, however, modifications were
made in Item 1 and there is now agreement among the four delegation
on the presentation of this item as well as on the inclusion of fou
other items in the agenda and on their wording. Apart from the
final order of these four items, which remains to be determined, but
ought not to present major difficulties, agreement could have been
reached on the second alternative if the Soviet delegation had not
insisted on the acceptance of their proposal relating to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
The United States Government for its part considers that the
amount of agreement so far reached on the agenda makes possible
meeting of the four Foreign Ministers which would permit discussion
among others of all topics proposed by the Soviet Government in the
exchange of notes preceding the
Paris conference and on the 5th and
7th of March at the outset
of that conference. Accordingly, the
United States Government is pleased to invite the four Foreigo
Ministers to meet in Washington
and suggests that the meeting begri
on July 23. The United States Government is prepared to participa
in such a conference not only on the agenda (alternative B) describe
above, but also on either of the two other agenda (alternatives A and
C). The texts of these three proposals are enclosed.
The United States Government hopes to receive an early rep
from the Soviet Government indicating its readiness to accept
for the purpose of holding a meeting of the four Foreign Minister
Any further arrangements for the meeting could be worked out of
receipt of a favorable reply from the Soviet Government.
1 Proposed alternative agenda are printed as an "enclosure” (infra) to thip
document.
8
sari.
thi
.......
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1791
Enclosure:
ALTERNATIVE (a)
I. Examination of the causes and effects of present international tensions in
Europe and of the means to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations
between the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom, and France,
including the following questions relating to: the demilitarization of Germany:
the existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed
jointly by the U.S.S.R., United States, United Kingdom, and France for the
international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces; fulfillment
of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war
and fear of aggression.
II. Completion of the treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and
democratic Austria.
III. Problems relating to the re-establishment of German unity and the
preparation of a treaty of peace.
IV. Fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and
Hungary: 1 agreements of the Four Powers concerning Germany and Austria.
V. Fulfillment of the treaty of peace with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.
ALTERNATIVE (b)
Examination of the causes and effects of the present international tensions in
Europe and of the means necessary to secure a real and lasting improvement in
the relations between the Soviet Union, the U.S., U.K. and France, including the
following questions relating to: the demilitarization of Germany;
U.S., U.K. and France
the existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed
jointly by the U.S.S.R., U.S., U.K. and France for the international control and
reduction of armaments and armed forces;
U.S.S.R.
measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces of the U.S.S.R., the
U.K., the U.S. and France, the existing level of armaments and armed
forces and
the establishment of an appropriate international control;
the demilitarization of Germany; fulfillment of present treaty obligations, and
agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.
Completion of the treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and
democratic Austria.
Problems relating to the re-establishment of German unity and the preparation
Fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary;
agreements of the Four Powers concerning Germany and Austria.
Fulfillment of the treaty of peace with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.
of a treaty of peace.
i
i
ALTERNATIVE (C)
I. Examination of measures for the elimination of the present international
tensions in Europe, of the threat of war, and of the fear of aggression.
II. Questions concerning armaments and armed forces.
III. Questions concerning Austria.
IV. Questions concerning Germany.
V. Fulfillment of treaties and agreements.
Treaties of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1648, 1649, 1650, and 1651 (61 Stat., pt. 2,
pp: 1245-2229).
1792
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
62. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET
FOREIGN MINISTER, JUNE 15, 1951 2
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency
the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
has the honor to refer to the current four-power negotiations in Paris.
1. The United States Government communicated on May 313 to
the Soviet Government a note designed to remove the deputies con-
ference from the deadlock in which it has been for some weeks. To
this end the United States Government proposed, together with the
Governments of France and the United Kingdom, that a conference
of Ministers should meet on the basis of whichever one of the three
agenda which had been submitted to it the Soviet Government should
prefer.
The negative reply of the Soviet Government has put the deputies
conference back to the point at which it was before May 31.
The Soviet Government stated in its note of June 44 that in its view
it would be inexpedient to interrupt the work of the conference
.
The United States Government took account of this recommendation.
As a result the deputies have held further meetings. These meetings
have shown again that it is impossible to make any progress.
The
Soviet representative in fact continues to make the meeting of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs conditional on a demand which it knows to be
unacceptable to the other delegates although the Soviet delegate has
obtained satisfaction insofar as concerns the inclusion in the agenda
of all the questions which the Soviet Government stated that it
wished to have discussed in its notes leading up to the conference or
in the proposals which it made for the agenda at the beginning of the
conference.
2. If the insistence of the Soviet Government on including in the
agenda some mention of "the Atlantic Treaty and the American
military bases" is to be explained by its desire thus to secure directly
or indirectly a decision of the Ministers calling into question a treaty
concluded by twelve powers for the purpose of ensuring their common
defense and to which the U.S.S.R. is not a party, it is clear that this
insistence is entirely unjustified since such a decision does not come
within the competence of the meeting of Ministers.
If on the other hand the purpose of the Soviet Government is
solely to reserve the right of the Soviet Foreign Minister fully to give
bis interpretation of the causes and effects of international tension
this insistence is unnecessary since it has been agreed that the agenda
should contain a general heading which would permit each Minister
to express his point of view on these matters.
}
1 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
2 Department of State Bulletin, June 25, 1951, p. 1021. The British and
French Governments sent similar notes to the Soviet Government,
3 Supra.
4 Text in Documents on International Affairs, 1951 (London, 1954), p. 260.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1793
3. Considering that the further discussions between the deputies
on this question which the Soviet Government proposed in their
note of June fourth have not advanced the prospect of agreement,
the United States Government proposes that the Foreign Ministers
of the four powers without further efforts by the deputies to complete
an agreement on the agenda should meet on the basis of the large
measure of agreement already reached by the deputies in Paris.
Taking into account agenda B1 and the notes which have been ex-
changed between the Soviet Government and the other governments
in which their respective points of view are recorded, the four Foreign
Ministers should be able to proceed without delay to their task of
seeking to reduce the existing tensions in Europe.
63. DECLARATION BY THE DEPUTIES OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KING-
DOM, AND FRANCE, JUNE 21, 1951 ?
+
1. On June 15 the three western governments communicated a
renewed invitation to the Soviet Government to attend a meeting
of the four foreign ministers on the basis of the large measure of
agreement reached at the Paris conference on an agenda and taking
into account the views of the Soviet Government and the three west-
ern governments concerning the chief point in disagreement.
2. As has been fully explained by the three representatives today,
the Soviet Government's reply of June 19 constitutes a rejection of
this invitation since it is a reaffirmation of the position previously
taken up by the Soviet Government. The experience of the deputies
in resuming their meetings in accordance with the proposal made
in the Soviet note of June 4 shows that the continuation of this dis-
cussion has no practical utility.
3. The invitation to the Soviet Government for a meeting of the
four foreign ministers, in accordance either with the notes of the three
western governments of May 31 or those of June 15, 1951, 4 remains
open and the three governments express the hope that the Soviet
Government, after further consideration, will find it possible to
transmit through the diplomatic channel its acceptance of this invi-
tation. In this case, if necessary, representatives of the four govern-
ments could meet immediately in order to settle the date and other
detailed arrangements for the meeting of ministers.
* See enclosure to doc. 61, supra.
Department of State Bulletin, July 2, 1951, p. 14.
2
3 Supra.
* Supra, docs. 61 and 62.
415900-57_vol. 2-10
1794
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
64. NOTE FROM THE ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION TO THE
CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OCTOBER 15, 1951
1
Your letter 202–04 II 11375/51 of October 4 2 was transmitted to
the three Governments represented on the Allied High Commission
and has been considered by them.
In your letter you repeated the proposals made by the Federal
Government on March 22 and September 14, 1950 3 and on March 9,
1951 4 for the holding of free, general, equal, secret, and direct elec:
tions in the whole of Germany. You also requested the Governments
:
of the four Occupying Powers to give the German people the earliest
opportunity to elect under international supervision and under the
legal and psychological conditions specified in the various proposal
of the Federal Government, a constituent and legislative national
assembly. The three Governments, who have always supported
and continue to support the unification of Germany as soon as it car
take place along democratic lines insuring the creation of a free Ger.
many able to play its part in a peaceful association of free European
nations, now renew their support for the idea of elections under the
safeguarding conditions which have been specified as necessary to
protect the individual and national liberties of the German people
.
They refer among other things to the letters sent by the British,
French, and United States High Commissioners in Germany on
May 26 [May 25), 1950 5 and on October 10, 1950 to General
Chuikov, to the statements issued by the British, French, and
United States Foreign Ministers in London on May 14, 1950 and in
New York on September 19, 1950 ? and to the proposals made by
the British, French, and United States Deputies at the Paris Fow
Powers Conference on March 5, 1951.8
In your recent letter you have made an additional proposal. You
wrote:
The Federal Government feels obliged to do all in its power in order to ensure
that the actual conditions for holding of all-German elections, proposed by ,
are given. Vis-à-vis the territory at large, this can only be done by a neutral
international commission--under United Nations control-carrying out investi
:
gations in the Soviet Zone and in the Federal Republic, to establish in how far
prevailing cirumstances make the holding of free elections possible.
Government requests that such an international enquiry be immediately carried
out for the territory of the Federal Republic and would ask the government
represented in the Allied High Commission to propose the establishment of such
a commission to the United Nations without delay. The Federal Government
will in every way facilitate the execution of the tasks of such a commission and
will in particular allow it access to all Federal and Land Administrative office
The Federal
i Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 29, 1951, pp. 694-695.
2 Ibid., p. 694.
3 Documents on German Unity, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1951), pp. 153–154.
4 Ibid., pp. 141-144.
5 Supra, doc. 56.
6 Documents on German Unity, vol. I, p. 157.
? Supra, pp. 1709-1713.
8 Not printed.
....
?!?
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1795
as well as to all official papers and documents which it may require to see in order
to complete its task.
The three Governments warmly welcome the constructive initia-
tive which you have taken in making the proposal for a United
Nations commission to investigate the extent to which prevailing
circumstances allow the holding of free elections in the Federal
Republic and in the Soviet Zone of Germany. They have not failed
to note the desire of the Federal Government that such an inquiry
take place immediately in its territory. The three Governments
desire to inform you that they will, at the first suitable opportunity,
put your views before the United Nations and will propose that the
United Nations undertake an investigation over the whole area of
Germany as is suggested in your letter. They consider that only by
such means can it be expeditiously and satisfactorily determined
whether or not conditions exist in the entire area of Germany which
would make it possible to consider as a practical matter the holding
of general elections.
65. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 510 (VI),
DECEMBER 20, 1951 1
Whereas the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and France,
acting on a proposal made by the German Federal Chancellor, have
brought before the General Assembly a request for the appointment
of an impartial international commission under United Nations
supervision to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany
in order to determine whether existing conditions there make it possible
to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas,
Whereas the statements made by the representatives of the Federal
Government of Germany, of Berlin, and of the Soviet Zone of Germany
before the Ad Hoc Political Committee 4 reveal differences of opinion
with regard to the conditions existing in these areas, which make it
essential that such an investigation shall be carried out by an impartial
body,
The General Assembly,
Having regard to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations
as set out in the Charter, taking due account of the responsibilities
of the four Powers regarding Germany, and desiring to make its
contribution to the achievement of the unity of Germany in the
interests of world peace,
1. Considers it desirable to give effect to the above request;
2. Resolves to appoint a Commission composed of representatives
U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20
(A/2119), pp. 10–11.
SUN. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Annezes, agenda item
65, U.N. doc. A/1938.
* Ibid., Ad Hoc Political Committee, 18th and 20th meetings.
2 See supra.
1796
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
الا و
of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Poland which shall
carry out immediately a simultaneous investigation in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany
to ascertain and report whether conditions in these areas are such as
to make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections
throughout these areas. The Commission shall investigate the
following matters in so far as they affect the holding of free elections:
(a) The constitutional provisions in force in these areas and their
application as regards the various aspects of individual freedom, in
particular the degree to which, in practice, the individual enjoys
freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention
freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press and
broadcasting;
(6) Freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their
activities;
(c) The organization and activities of the judiciary, police and
other administrative organs;
3. Calls upon all authorities in the Federal Republic, in Berlin, and
in the Soviet Zone to enable the Commission to travel freely through-
out these areas; and to allow the Commission freedom of access to
such persons, places and relevant documents as it considers necessary
in the course of executing its task and to allow it to summon any
witnesses whom it wishes to examine;
4. (a) Directs the Commission to report at the earliest practicable
date to the Secretary-General, for the consideration of the four Powers
and for the information of the other Members of the United Nations,
on the results of its efforts to make the necessary arrangements with
all the parties concerned to enable it to undertake its work according
to the terms of the present resolution;
(6) Directs the Commission, if it is able to make the necessary
arrangements throughout the areas concerned, similarly to report
the findings resulting from its investigation of conditions in these
areas, it being understood that such findings may include recom-
mendations regarding further steps which might be taken in order to
bring about conditions in Germany necessary for the holding of free
elections in these areas;
(c) Directs the Commission, if it is unable forthwith to make these
arrangements, to make a further attempt to carry out its task at such
time as it is satisfied that the German authorities in the Federal
Republic, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone will admit the Commission,
as it is desirable to leave the door open for the Commission to carry
out its task;
(d) Directs the Commission in any event to report, not later than |
September 1952, on the results of its activities to the Secretary-
General, for the consideration of the four Powers and for the informa-
tion of the other Members of the United Nations;
5. Declares that the United Nations is prepared, after being satisfied
that the conditions throughout the areas concerned are such as to
1
1 See infra, docs. 67 and 70.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1797
2 Ibid., pp. 531-532.
make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections, to
offer its assistance in order to guarantee the freedom of the elections;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish the Commission with
the necessary staff and facilities.
66. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW
TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, MARCH 25, 1952 1
The United States Government, in consultation with the Govern-
ments of the United Kingdom and France, has given the most careful
consideration to the Soviet Government's note of March 10, 1952,2
which proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany,
They have also consulted the Government of the German Federal
Republic and the representatives of Berlin.
The conclusion of a just and lasting peace treaty which would end
the division of Germany has always been and remains an essential
objective of the United States Government. As the Soviet Govern-
ment itself recognizes, the conclusion of such a treaty requires the
formation of an all-German Government, expressing the will of the
German people. Such a Government can only be set up on the basis
of free elections in the Federal Republic, the Soviet zone of occupation
and Berlin. Such elections can only be held in circumstances which
safeguard the national and individual liberties of the German people.
In order to ascertain whether this first essential condition exists, the
General Assembly of the United Nations has appointed a Commission
to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic,
the Soviet zone and Berlin.3 The Commission of Investigation has
been assured of the necessary facilities in the Federal Republic and
in Western Berlin. The United States Government would be glad to
learn that such facilities will also be afforded in the Soviet zone and in
Eastern Berlin, to enable the Commission to carry out its task.
The Soviet Government's proposals do not indicate what the
international position of an all-German Government would be before
the conclusion of a peace treaty. The United States Government
considers that the all-German Government should be free both
before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty to enter into associa-
tions compatible with the principles and purposes of the United
In putting forward its proposal for a German peace treaty, the
Soviet Government expressed its readiness also to discuss other
proposals. The United States Government has taken due note of
this statement. In its view, it will not be possible to engage in detailed
discussion of a peace treaty until conditions have been created for
free elections and until a free all-German Government which could
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 7, 1952, pp. 530-531. The British and
French Embassies delivered similar notes on the same date.
* See General Assembly Res. 510 (VI), Dec. 20, 1951; supra.
Nations.
1
1798
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
participate in such discussion has been formed. There are several
fundamental questions which would also have to be resolved.
For example, the United States Government notes that the Soviet
Government makes the statement that the territory of Germany is
determined by frontiers laid down by the decisions of the Potsdam
conference. The United States Government would recall that in
fact no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam
decisions, which clearly provided that the final determination of
territorial questions must await the peace settlement.
The United States Government also observes that the Soviet
Government now considers that the peace treaty should provide
for the formation of German national land, air, and sea forces, while
at the same time imposing limitations on Germany's freedom to
enter into association with other countries. The United States Gov-
ernment considers that such provisions would be a step backwards
and might jeopardize the emergence in Europe of a new era in which
international relations would be based on cooperation and not on
rivalry and distrust. Being convinced of the need of a policy of
European unity, the United States Government is giving its full
support to plans designed to secure the participation of Germany
in a purely defensive European community which will preserve
freedom, prevent aggression, and preclude the revival of militarism.
The United States Government believes that the proposal of the
Soviet Government for the formation of German national forces is
inconsistent with the achievement of this objective. The United
States Government remains convinced that this policy of European
unity cannot threaten the interests of any country and represents
the true path of peace.
67. FIRST REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION
TO INVESTIGATE CONDITIONS FOR FREE ELECTIONS IN
GERMANY, APRIL 30, 1952 (Excerpt)
1
Section 1. Preparatory work in Paris and Geneva
27. The United Nations Commission to investigate Conditions for
Free Elections in Germany, held its first meeting on 11 Febru-
ary 1952 in the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. The Commission held
two more meetings in Paris, one informal and the other formal
before its move to Geneva. At these meetings, the Commission
decided on its name, the procedure governing its chairmanship and
its headquarters. It also decided, while in Paris, that its first task
after it had reconvened in Geneva would be to address the responsible
authorities in Germany regarding the arrangements deemed necessary
by the Commission to enable it to undertake its work in accordance
with the terms of General Assembly resolution 510(VI). Drafts
of the letters that it proposed to address to the Chairman of the
1 U. N. doc. A/2122, May 5, 1952, pp. 14-28.
2 Resolution of Dec. 20, 1951; supra, doc. 65.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1799
1 U. N. doc. A/2122, pp. 30–31.
Ibid., pp. 34-36.
Allied High Commission for Germany and to the Chairman of the
Soviet Control Commission for Germany were tentatively considered
and it was decided to postpone further action to a later meeting to
be held in Geneva.
28. At meetings held in Geneva on 21 and 22 February, the Com-
mission approved the texts of its letters to the Chairman of the Allied
High Commission for Germany and to the Chairman of the Soviet
Control Commission for Germany. It decided that it would send
the letters by telegram as well as by air mail and would make the
texts available to the Press forty-eight hours after their despatch
by telegram.
29. In its letter dated 22 February 1952 to the Chairman of the Allied
High Commission,' the Commission sought his good offices to transmit
to the appropriate authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany
and in the Western Sectors of Berlin the wish of the Commission to
discuss with those authorities the arrangements deemed necessary
by it to enable it to undertake its work. The Commission stated
further that it would appreciate it if arrangements could be made
to hold a meeting on 17 March with the authorities of the Federal
Republic, and another on 21 March with the authorities of the Western
Sectors of Berlin. In its letter dated 22 February 1952 to the Chair-
man of the Soviet Control Commission, the Commission similarly
sought his good offices to transmit to the appropriate authorities
in the Soviet Zone of Germany and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin
the wish of the Commission to discuss with those authorities the
arrangements deemed necessary by it to enable it to undertake its
work. The Commission stated further that it would appreciate it
arrangements could be made to hold a meeting on 17 March with
the authorities of the Soviet Zone of Germany and another on 21
March with the authorities of the Eastern Sector of Berlin. The
Commission asked to be informed of the places designated by the
authorities concerned for the meetings it had suggested. It stated
that both the Commission, on the one hand, and all the authorities
in Germany and the German people, on the other, had common
objectives and indeed a good deal of common ground on the basis
of which they could all co-operate to set up the edifice of a free,
united and democratic Germany.
30. The Commission was anxious, if possible, to meet simultaneously
with the authorities in the Federal
Republic' as well as in the Soviet
Zone of Germany on the same date, and similarly to meet with the
authorities in the Western Sectors and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin
on the same date. It was for this reason that, in its letters to the
Allied High Commission and the Soviet Control Commission, the
Commission had suggested meetings with the authorities in both
Western and Eastern Germany on the same dates. If the meetings
it had suggested came about, it was the Commission's intention to
if
%
1800
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
divide itself into two groups so as to be able to meet simultaneously
with those authorities.
31. After considering its rules regarding the quorum required for its
meetings and its voting procedure, the Commission adjourned to
meet again on 10 March. It was decided that during the period of
the adjournment a draft memorandum would be prepared concerning
the arrangements deemed necessary by the Commission to enable
it to undertake its work which would serve as a basis for discussions
at the projected meetings of the Commission with the authorities
in Germany. It was hoped that, by 10 March, replies would have
been received from the Allied High Commission and the Soviet
Control Commission.
32. The Commission next met from 10 to 15 March to consider the
situation. To its letter dated 22 February 1952 to the Chairman of
the Allied High Commission, the Commission had received a reply
dated 1 March 1952, to the effect that the Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany and certain of his colleagues in the Federal
Cabinet would be glad to meet with the Commission on 17 March
in Bonn and that the Federal Government was further prepared
"to afford the members of the Commission every possible assistance
in the performance of their important task”. The Commission was
further informed that representatives of the (West) Berlin Senate
proposed to meet with the Commission on 21 March 1952 in Berlin.
33. Not having received a reply from the Soviet Control Commission
by 10 March, the Commission decided to write again to General
Chuikov, Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany.
In its second letter to General Chuikov dated 10 March, the Com
mission again stated its wish to meet with the appropriate authorities
in the Soviet Zone of Germany and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin to
discuss with them the arrangements deemed necessary by it to enable
it to undertake its work, and requested that this fact be conveyed to
those authorities. The Commission again suggested that it would
appreciate it if arrangements could be made to enable it to meet with
those authorities on 17 and 21 March respectively. The Commission
informed General Chuikov that it was confirming arrangements to
meet with the authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany
the Western Sectors of Berlin on 17 and 21 March respectively,
requested a reply from General Chuikov by 12 noon of 14 March, in
view of the necessity to make final
its travel arrangements by Friday,
14 March. This letter was sent both by telegram and air mail
,
was later released to the Press. The Commission did not received
reply to this letter.
34. The Commission decided that, during its forthcoming visit
Germany, it should also meet with the Allied High Commission te
submit to it the Commission's memorandum concerning the arranger
ments deemed necessary by it to enable it to undertake its work
.
and in
and
1
1 U.N. doc. A/2122, pp. 32–33.
2 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
f
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1801
A/2122, pp. 41-42), the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic (ibid., pp.
2 Statement of Mar. 17, 1952; ibid., pp. 62–64.
The Commission, therefore, arranged to have a meeting in Bonn with
the Allied High Commission on 17 March 1952.
35. During the period 11 to 14 March, the Commission considered
the draft memoranda that it was to submit to the authorities in
Germany that had expressed their willingness to receive the Com-
mission. On 14 March, the Commission unanimously approved
their texts. The memoranda were identic in substance, excepting
only for such changes as were necessary in view of the fact that they
were addressed to different authorities in Germany. They specified, ,
among other things, that during the period of the Commission's work
(a) The Commission and its secretariat be granted by the authorities
concerned the right to travel freely throughout their respective areas
and that the Commission and its secretariat be granted normal and
recognized diplomatic privileges and immunities;
(b) The Commission and its secretariat be granted by the authorities
concerned the right of free access to such persons, places and relevant
documents as the Commission might consider necessary, that the
Commission be granted the right to summon any witnesses it might
wish to examine or obtain testimony from; and, further, that the
Commission be given specific assurance by the authorities concerned
that such witnesses would not be impeded from meeting with it, that
such persons or their relatives would be immune from any manner of
punishment for their having met with and given evidence before the
Commission, and that the witnesses would not be forced to reveal
the contents of their testimony;
(C) The Commission and its secretariat be granted the right by the
authorities concerned to communicate freely and without hindrance
with the people in their areas; that the Commission be
assured by the
authorities concerned that communications to and from the Com-
mission and its secretariat would be immune from censorship, delay
or suppression; and that the Commission be given assurance that
persons communicating with it or receiving communications from it
would not be punished in any manner for having such contact.
36. On 14 March, the Commission also approved the text of a state-
ment to be delivered by its Chairman on its behalf at the forthcoming
meeting of the Commission with the authorities of the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the text of an address to the German
people to be broadcast from Bonn by Mr. Kohnstamm on behalf of
Section 2. Work of the Commission in Germany
37. Leaving Geneva on the evening of 15 March 1952 by train, the
Commission arrived in Bonn the following morning. Mr. Abbasi,
Memoranda to the Chairman of the Allied High Commission (U.N. doc.
45-47), the Chairman of the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin (ibid., pp. 53–55),
and the Mayor of West Berlin (ibid., pp. 57–59).
3 Address of Mar. 18, 1952; ibid., pp. 65–68.
the Commission.
.
1802
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the representative of Pakistan, was unable to join the Commission on
its visit to Germany due to his indisposition, and the Government of
Pakistan appointed Mr. Omar Hayat Malik, its Ambassador to the
Federal Republic of Germany, to take his place pending Mr. Abbasi's
return to the Commission. The Commission would like to place on
record its appreciation of the services rendered by Mr. Malik, who
was called at very short notice to assist it.
38. On 17 March, the Commission met with the Allied High Commis
sion and submitted to it the memorandum already referred to. In
submitting it, the Chairman stated that the memorandum was
couched in broad and general terms, as it was the Commission's view
that at the present stage it might not be necessary to dwell on numerous
details. If agreement on the terms of the memorandum could be
reached, then it would be the Commission's view that, within the
broad scope of that agreement, any detailed arrangements subse-
quently deemed necessary could be made with the authorities con-
cerned. He added that he and his colleagues felt that the assurances
they were seeking from the responsible authorities in Germany were
of very great and fundamental importance for the fulfilment of the
task entrusted to the Commission by the United Nations. The
Commission could hope to fulfil its mission faithfully and successfully
only if the German people, as a result of the assurances and guarantees
it was requesting, felt assured that they could co-operate with the
Commission without fear and in perfect freedom. It had come to the
conclusion, therefore, that it would be necessary to conclude a written
agreement regarding the subject matter of the memorandum with all
the responsible authorities in Germany. The Commission hoped to
be able to make uniform arrangements with and secure uniform assu?
ances from all those authorities. It considered it essential that in
all parts of Germany all the people should have the same safeguards
and that the United Nations Commission should receive in all parts
of Germany identic facilities. The Chairman stated, in conclusion ,
that he and his colleagues would also like to discuss with the Allied
High Commission the question whether it would not be necessary, u
view of the fact that the Governments the Allied High Commission
represented exercised supreme responsibility in Germany, for the two
Commissions to conclude an agreement, at least in regard to those
issues raised in the memorandum which possibly fell within the scopt
of the powers that were reserved to itself by the Allied High Com
mission. The Allied High Commission might also want to convert
the United Nations Commission formally that it would be prepared
to grant it the facilities and assurances it required.
39. Mr. François-Poncet, Chairman of the Council of the Allied High
Commission, in his reply on behalf of his colleagues, stated that then
was nothing in the memorandum that called for a reservation or
negative reply on the part of the Allied High Commission and that
he could forthwith give the Commission the formal assurance that
the Allied High Commission would assist it in every way possible.
so far as it was possible within the limits of its competence, the Allie
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1803
Statement of Mar. 17, 1952; ibid., pp. 62-64.
S
I
S
I
$
e 1
O
18
le
25
le
High Commission would grant the United Nations Commission the
guarantees and facilities it had specified in its memorandum. The
Allied High Commission sent a formal reply on these lines the same
day. At a meeting held on 19 March, the Commission took note of
the reply, expressing its satisfaction therewith.
40. Immediately following its meeting with the Allied High Com-
mission, the Commission met with the Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany and a number of his colleagues in the Federal
Cabinet at the Haus Schaumburg in Bonn. The Federal Chancellor
stated that the United Nations, by setting up the present Commission,
had shown its readiness to investigate whether conditions existed for
the holding of free elections throughout Germany and that it had
provided an assurance that an objective and conscientious enquiry
would be made into that problem of vital importance to the German
people. He gave the assurance that the Federal Government would
give the Commission all the assistance it could to help it carry out those
investigations, and expressed the hope that the Commission would
achieve complete success, and that the delays that might arise would
not persuade it to abandon the pursuit of its objective, which was the
objective of the United Nations, of the Federal Government and of
the German nation, namely, the re-establishment of German unity
in peace and freedom.
41. The Chairman of the Commission, in his reply 2 to the statement
of the Federal Chancellor, after outlining the events that led to the
setting up of the Commission by the United Nations, stated that
the German people, the different German authorities, and the four
occupying Powers had all declared as their common objective the
bringing into being of a free, united, democratic and peaceful Ger-
many, essentially by means of genuinely free and secret elections.
That was also the purpose which the Commission would seek to serve
to the extent that it was empowered to do by its terms of reference.
In the discharge of its task, it was most anxious to assure all the Ger-
man people and all the German authorities of its complete objectivity
and impartiality. Under its terms of reference, the Commission
was required to carry out its investigation simultaneously in all the
zones of Germany. The Commission could carry out its task, there-
fore, only when it was enabled to enter and travel freely in all areas
of Germany and when it was
granted by all the authorities concerned
the facilities deemed necessary by it. The object of its present visit
to Germany, however, was to meet those authorities who had expressed
their willingness to do so in order to discuss and try to make with
them such arrangements as the Commission deemed necessary to
enable it to undertake its work. That was an essential preliminary
task which had to be performed before the Commission could take
10
1
10
I
78
11
11
10
toi
It
8
the next step.
81
42. After submitting to the Federal Chancellor the Commission's
memorandum concerning the arrangements deemed necessary by it
1 U.N. doc. A/2122, pp. 43-44.
2
1804
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
to enable it to undertake its work, the Chairman of the Commission
stated that it would be necessary to publish at an appropriate time
the agreement the Commission hoped to reach with the Federal
Government in order to assure the people of the Federal Republic
that they could co-operate with the Commission without fear and in
perfect freedom.
43. The Federal Chancellor, after stating his belief that his Govern-
ment would provide the Commission with all the facilities and guar-
tees it had requested, replied that, as soon as possible after his Gov-
ernment had had an opportunity of considering the memorandum, &
formal reply would be provided.
44. The Commission further met with the authorities of the Federal
Republic on 18 March to discuss the contents of its memorandum.
Following the clarifications offered by the Commission, the repre-
sentatives of the Federal Republic stated that a formal reply along
the lines agreed at the meetings would be given to the Commission on
19 March and that the Federal Government would, without delay
,
initiate such legislative measures as were necessary to grant certain
of the facilities and assurances required by the Commission.
45. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submitted
its reply to the Commission's memorandum at a meeting on
19 March. The Chairman of the Commission, in acknowledging it
with appreciation, stated that the Commission was entirely satisfied
therewith.
46. During its stay in Bonn, the Commission held a press conference
,
at which over a hundred correspondents were present, to explain the
object of its visit to Germany.
47. On 20 March, the Commission left Bonn for Berlin, travelling by
commercial airline. At a meeting held in Berlin on the evening of
its arrival, the Commission decided that it would submit to the repre-
sentatives on the Inter-Allied Kommandatura, with whom it had
already arranged to hold a meeting the next day, a memorandum
similar to the ones
it had earlier presented to the Allied High Com-
mission and to the Federal Republic, to try and secure from them also
an agreement regarding the facilities it would need in Berlin. At
the same meeting, the Commission approved the text of a broadcast
to the German people to be delivered on behalf of the Commission bp
Mr. Kohnstamm,3
48. The Commission met on 21 March representatives on the Inter-
Allied
Kommandatura and submitted to them the memorandum al-
ready referred to. General Carolet (French Military Governor
1 The legislative measures necessary to grant certain of the safeguards the
Commission had asked for were passed into law by the Bundestag on 26 March
of the Federal Republic on 4 April
1952, and was promulgated on 8 April in the
1952 and by the Bundesrat on 28 March. The law was signed by the President
Federal Gazette. Footnote in original text.) For an English translation of
this legislation, see U.N. doc. A/2122, pp. 50-52.
2 Ibid., pp. 47–49.
3 Address of Mar. 21, 1952; ibid., pp. 69-71,
of
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1805
Ibid., pp. 59-61.
Berlin), Chairman of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura, stated that, in
so far as he, the United Kingdom and the United States Commanders
in Berlin were concerned, he could give the Commission the assurance
that, within the limits of their competence and resources, they would
be prepared to do everything they could to provide the Commission
with the guarantees and facilities it needed. General Carolet con-
firmed his statement in a formal reply? he sent the Commission the
same day. The Commission took note of this reply and expressed
its satisfaction therewith.
49. After its meeting with the Inter-Allied Kommandatura, the
Commission met with Mr. Reuter, Governing Mayor of West Berlin,
and other representatives of the Berlin Senate to submit a memo-
randum similar to the ones it had submitted earlier to the Inter-
Allied Kommandatura, the Allied High Commission and the Federal
Republic. Mr. Reuter, in welcoming the Commission, stated that
the people of Berlin earnestly wished to be reunited with their fellow-
countrymen in the area of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union
authorities under a single Government by means of genuinely free
elections, and assured the Commission of his Government's co-opera-
tion in its work. He said that representatives of his Government
desired to discuss the Commission's memorandum with it at another
meeting, and he hoped to present his Government's official reply to
the Commission the following day.
50. The Chairman of the Commission, in submitting the memoran-
dum, thanked Mr. Reuter for his assurances of co-operation. There-
after
, speaking in German, he stated that the impossible situation in
which the citizens of Berlin were forced to live was a daily reminder
to the world that such division could not and must not last indefinitely.
He conveyed the sympathy of the Commission to the Berlin popula-
tion that was enduring hardships on account of the division of the
city.
51. The Commission held a second meeting the same afternoon with
the representatives of the (West) Berlin Senate. Following an ex-
change of views, Mr. Reuter stated to the Commission that his
Government's answer to its memorandum would be exactly the same
as that of the Government of the Federal Republic, and that the
reply would be delivered to the Commission the next day.
52. On 22 March, Mr. Reuter handed over to the Commission the
reply? of his Government to the Commission's memorandum. The
Chairman of the Commission, in acknowledging it with appreciation,
stated that the Commission was entirely satisfied with the reply.
53. The Commission held on the same day a press conference, at
which about two hundred press correspondents were present, to ex-
plain the object of its visit to Germany and to give an account of
On Apr. 29, 1952, the Berlin House of Representatives
pion in Germany, which was published in the Berlin Law Gazette on May 8, 1952.
For an English translation of this law, see U.N. doc. A/2122/ Add. 1, June 3, 1952.
1 Ibid., p. 56.
2
a
1806
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1
11
1
]
1
1
1
)
the results of its efforts to make with the authorities concerned the
arrangements deemed necessary by it to enable it to undertake its
work.
54. In the seven days the Commission spent in Bonn and Berlin, it
completed the work it had set out to do. It had concluded agree-
ments that it regarded as satisfactory with the Allied High Commis-
sion for Germany, the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Inter-Allied Kommandatura (in so far as the authority of
this body extended over those areas of Berlin over which the French
,
United Kingdom and United States Commanders in Berlin exercised
authority), and with the Government of West Berlin.
55. Before its return to Geneva, however, the Commission met in
Berlin on 23 March to decide on its next step. It agreed that an-
other appeal should be addressed to General Chuikov soon after the
Commission's return to Geneva and instructed its Chairman to
despatch it not later than 26 March. The Commission thereafter
left' Berlin on 23 and 24 March, proposing to reconvene on 8 April
,
or earlier if necessary, to consider the situation.
Section 3. Work of the Commission after its return from Germany
56. In its third letter to the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commis-
sion for Germany dated 26 March 1952, the Commission drew
General Chuikov's attention to its two earlier letters to him dated
22 February and 10 March respectively, and pointed out that it had
not received a reply from him to those letters. The Commission
further informed General Chuikov that it had concluded satisfactory
agreements with the responsible authorities in the Federal Republic
of Germany and in West Berlin, and that its ability "to undertake
the work entrusted to it by the United Nations is now entirely
dependent on the willingness of the responsible authorities in the
Soviet Zone of Germany and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin to con-
clude similarly satisfactory arrangements with the Commission"
The Commission again sought General Chuikov's good offices to
arrange a meeting between it and the appropriate authorities in the
Soviet Zone of Germany and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin to enable
the Commission to make with those authorities the necessary arranger
ments to undertake its work. It transmitted to General Chuikor
for his information the texts of the memoranda it had submitted to the
authorities in the Federal Republic and in West Berlin and the replies
received from them. This letter was sent both by telegram and by
air mail and was later released to the Press. The Commission did not
receive a reply to this letter.
57. At meetings held on 8 and 9 April, the Commission reached the
conclusion that it must before long report to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations on the results of the efforts it had so far made
with all parties concerned to make the necessary arrangements to
enable it to undertake its work, and it was of the view that this report
1
F
1
1 U. N. doc. A/2122, pp. 36-37.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1807
Ibid., pp. 39–40.
necessary to enable it to undertake its work.
should, if possible, be submitted by the end of April. The Commission
further decided that it should make one more appeal to General
Chuikov, requesting him to facilitate it in the discharge of its duties.
58. In its fourth and last letter to the Chairman of the Soviet Control
Commission for Germany dated 9 April 1952, the Commission drew
General Chuikov's attention to its three earlier letters to him dated 22
February, 10 March and 26 March respectively, and pointed out that
it had not received a reply from him to those letters. Stating again
that the Commission's ability to undertake its work was entirely
dependent on the willingness of the responsible authorities in the
Soviet Zone of Germany and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin to con-
clude agreements with the Commission similar to the ones already
concluded with it by the authorities in Western Germany, the Com-
mission again requested General Chuikov to facilitate it in the dis-
charge of its duties. It further informed him that it felt obliged,
under its terms of reference, to report before long to the Secretary-
General on the results of its activities so far, and that it intended to
submit a report by the end of April 1952. In view of this conclusion,
it requested an answer before 27 April 1952. In concluding its letter,
the Commission stated that "in the event of the Commission not
receiving a reply from you by the time indicated, the Commission
would, to its regret, be obliged to conclude that at present there is
little prospect of its being able to pursue its task of investigation”.
This letter was sent both by telegram and by air mail and was later
released to the Press. Up to the date of the signing of this report,
the Commission has not received a reply from General Chuikov to
any one of its four letters to him.
59. The Commission met from 28 April to 30 April to consider the
present report. At its twenty-first meeting held on 30 April 1952, the
Commission unanimously approved and signed the report.
PART III
RECAPITULATION OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
60. The United Nations Commission to investigate conditions for
free elections in Germany, constituted by General Assembly resolution
510(VI), submits the following recapitulation of its work and its
61. The Commission, composed of the representatives of Brazil
,
Iceland, the Netherlands and Pakistan (Poland having declined to
participate in its work), was convened to its first meeting on 11 Feb-
ruary 1952 in Paris. Shortly thereafter it moved its headquarters to
Geneva from where it began its substantive work as from 21 February.
It decided that, under its terms of reference, its first task was to make
with all the parties concerned such arrangements as it deemed
conclusions.
1
1808
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
62. In its efforts to carry out its preliminary task, the Commission
addressed a letter on 22 February to the Chairman of the Allied High
Commission for Germany requesting his good offices to arrange meetings
between the Commission and the appropriate authorities in the Federal
Republic of Germany and in the Western Sectors of Berlin, suggesting
that the meetings take place on 17 and 21 March respectively. The
Commission addressed a similar letter on 22 February to the Chairman
of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany requesting his good
offices to arrange meetings between the Commission and the appro-
priate authorities in the Soviet Zone of Germany and in the Eastern
Sector of Berlin, suggesting that the meetings take place on 17 and 21
March respectively.
63. On 1 March 1952, the Commission received a reply from the Allied
High Commission to the effect that the meetings requested had been
arranged. No reply having been received from the Soviet Control
Commission of Germany by 10 March, the Commission wrote 8
second letter on 10 March 1952 to the Chairman of the Soviet Control
Commission reiterating the request it had made in its first letter. The
Commission did not receive a reply to its second letter.
64. After having prepared a set of identic memoranda concerning the
arrangements deemed necessary by the Commission to enable it to
undertake its work and which the Commission decided to submit to
the authorities in Germany that expressed their willingness to meet
with it, the Commission left Geneva on 15 March 1952 for Germany.
The Commission stayed in Germany from 16 to 23 March. During this
period, it was able to conclude satisfactory agreements concerning the
arrangements it required to do its work with the following authorities:
(a) the Allied High Commission for Germany; (b) the Government of
the Federal Republic of Germany; (c) the Inter-Allied Kommandatura
in Berlin (in so far as the authority of this body extended over those
areas of Berlin over which the French, United Kingdom and United
States Commanders in Berlin exercised authority); and (d) the
Government of the Western Sectors of Berlin.
65. Following its return to Geneva, the Commission addressed
third letter on 26 March 1952 to the Chairman of the Soviet Control
Commission for Germany and a fourth on 9 April. In its last letter,
the Commission stated that it would appreciate receiving a reply as
early as possible and in any event before 27 April.
66. The Commission, bearing in mind the direction given to it by
paragraph 4 (a) of General Assembly resolution 510 (VI), decided on
9 April 1952 that it should report before long to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations on the results of its efforts to make with all the
parties concerned the arrangements deemed necessary by it to enable
it to undertake its work. It was of the view that its report should
, if
possible, be submitted by the end of April. Not having received a
reply to any of its four letters to the Soviet Control Commission
before 27 April, the Commission decided on 28 April to proceed with
the preparation and submission of the present report.
(
:*:*:
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1809
government. It remains the policy of the United States Government
67. While the Commission has been successful in carrying out its
preliminary task in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the
Western Sectors of Berlin, it has not thus far been able to establish
reciprocal contact with the authorities in the Soviet Zone of Germany
and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin even by correspondence. The
Commission consequently has not thus far been able to make with
the authorities concerned in the Soviet Zone of Germany and in the
Eastern Sector of Berlin the arrangements deemed necessary by it to
enable it to undertake its work in accordance with its terins of ref-
erence. Bearing in mind the infructuous efforts it has made on four
separate occasions to appeal to the Soviet Control Commission for
Germany to facilitate it in the discharge of its duties, the Commis-
sion, to its regret, is obliged to conclude that at present there is little
prospect of its being able to pursue its task.
68. However, in view of the fact that sub-paragraph 4 (C) of General
Assembly resolution 510 (VI) "directs the Commission, if it is unable
forthwith to make these arrangements, to make a further attempt to
carry out its task at such time as it is satisfied that the German
authorities in the Federal Republic, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone
will admit the Commission, as it is desirable to leave the door open
for the Commission to carry out its task”, the Commission will remain
at the disposal of the United Nations and the parties concerned, and
will make a further attempt to implement its mandate at such time
as it seems likely to the Commission that new steps may lead to
positive results.
69. The following four representatives on the Commission, whose
signatures are appended below, unanimously adopted the report at
the twenty-first meeting of the Commission held on 30 April 1952 in
the Palais des Nations, Geneva.
(Signed) Brazil
A. MENDES VIANNA
Iceland
K. ALBERTSON
Netherlands M. KOHNSTAMM
Pakistan
A. H. ABBASI
68. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, MAY 13, 1952 1
1. In reply to the Soviet Government's note of the 9th of April,?
the United States
Government wishes to make the following observa-
tions in regard to the unity of Germany, the election of a free all-
German government and the conclusion of a peace treaty with that
French
Embassies at Moscow delivered similar notes on the same day.
Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1952, pp. 817-819. The British and
2 Ibid., pp. 819-820.
415900_-57-Vol. 2----11
1810
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
to achieve these objectives on terms that will insure unity with freedom
and peace with security.
2. It is ready to begin negotiations with the Soviet Government on
these issues; and it desires to do so just as soon as it is clearly apparent
that it is also the intention of the Soviet Government to avoid the
fruitless negotiations of the past. The United States Government
and the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet
Union must therefore first reach a clear understanding upon the scope
of the negotiations and upon the fundamental problems to be exam-
ined. Proper preparation is essential to success and to avoid long
delays. The Soviet Government's note of the 9th of April throws
little new light on what it considers should be the means of insuring
the success of any such negotiations.
3. In its latest note the Soviet Government now stipulates that
Germany must not be included "into one or another grouping of
powers directed against any peace-loving state”. Germany's pro-
posed membership in the United Nations should surely make
such provision unnecessary. In any case the United States Govern-
ment could not accept any provisions forbidding Germany to enter
into association with other states which one of the signatories of the
peace treaty might arbitrarily choose to regard as "directed against
any peace-loving state". It cannot admit that Germany should be
denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itsel
with other nations for peaceful purposes. It must assume that the
Soviet Government likewise cannot object to Germany's right to
enter into defensive agreements.
4. In its note of March 25,' the United States Government pointed
out that it is giving full support to the efforts which the free states of
Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic, are mak-
ing to bring into being a peaceful European community and thus to
begin a new era in which international relations will be based on
cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. The United States
Government welcomes the development of such a European com
munity in which Germany will participate. Germany is divided
because Europe is divided. This policy of European unity cannot
threaten the interests of the Soviet Union or of any country whose
policy is devoted to the maintenance of peace. Tảe United States
Government will
, therefore, not be deflected
from its support of the
policy. It is more than ever convinced that it represents the tru
path of peace.
5. The United States Government has no responsibility for the
failure to extend this cooperation beyond its present limits,
remains ready to examine with sincerity and good will any practica
and precise suggestions designed to reduce tension and to heal exist
ing divisions.
6. A German peace treaty can be worked out only if there is
all-German government formed as a result of free elections and ab
to participate in full freedom in the discussion of such a treaty,
is, therefore, not possible to hold discussions now about the provision
I
I Supra, doc. 66.
.1.2:
ĜERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1811
of a German peace treaty. The U.S. Government has already made
known its views on some of the Soviet Government's proposals espe-
cially its erroneous interpretation of the territorial provisions of the
Potsdam protocol and its intention to confine Germany in a position
of permanent isolation from Western Europe while obliging her to
seek to provide for her defense solely through her own national
armed forces. The Soviet proposals would mean permanent shackles
upon Germany's rights of international association and a permanent
state of tension and insecurity in the center of Europe.
7. The all-German government resulting from free election must
itself be free. Such freedom is essential both before and after a
peace treaty has been negotiated. It must be able to maintain its
genuinely representative character; to assume its responsibilities as
the government of a reunited Germany and to play its full part in
the discussion of the peace-treaty. This question of freedom is,
therefore, inseparable from the problem of elections. The Soviet
Government has still failed to give any indication of its views on this
subject. The United States Government must ask specifically
whether the Soviet Government considers that an all-German gov-
ernment, resulting from free elections, would be under four-power
control until after the conclusion of a peace treaty or whether they
agree that it should have the necessary freedom of action and powers
of government.
8. The United States Government is happy to note that the Soviet
Government now agrees in principle that there should be free elec-
tions throughout Germany. Such free elections can, however, only
be held if the necessary conditions exist in all parts of Germany and
will be maintained not only on the day of voting, and prior to it, but
also thereafter. An essential first step is, therefore, to insure such
conditions. Otherwise, no progress can be made. In recent years
the eastern part of Germany has evolved in a direction increasingly
divergent from the main path of German progress. This is a prin-
cipal reason why an impartial inquiry is needed before elections can
take place
9. The Soviet Government does not agree, however, that the
international commission set up by the General Assembly of the
United Nations should carry out such an inquiry throughout Ger-
many. It bases this refusal on its interpretation of Article 107 of
the United Nations Charter. But this reads as follows: "Nothing in
the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation
to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy
of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a
result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such
action.” These words clearly do not preclude the United Nations
from considering these aspects of German affairs. This interpreta-
tion was upheld by the United Nations General Assembly by an
overwhelming majority. However, even under the Soviet Govern-
ment's erroneous interpretation of the Charter there
is nothing to
prevent the Four Powers from availing themselves of the United
See supra, doc. 65.
1812
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Nations Commission in order to determine the conditions in which
genuinely free elections could be held throughout Germany.
10. The Soviet Government suggests instead that responsibility
for the inquiry could be entrusted to a commission formed by the
four occupying powers. Before the United States Government could
feel assured that this suggestion would result in an impartial inquiry
it would need to know what would be the composition and functions
of such a body. A commission composed solely of members with
direct responsibilities in Germany would be both judge and party
.
Experience during the period of four-power control of Germany sug-
gests that it would not be able to reach useful decisions. Thus the
elections would be greatly delayed. Nor can the United States
Government overlook the fact thắt the appointment of a four-power
commission might be interpreted as a step towards the re-establish-
ment of four-power control in Germany. This would be a retrograde
move, out of keeping with constitutional developments in the Fed-
eral Republic.
11. For these reasons the United States Government maintains its
preference for the United Nations Commission: It is already in being,
its functions have been laid down and it can take action without
delay. Nevertheless, the United States Government is ready to
examine every possibility of determining whether conditions of free-
dom exist throughout Germany for the holding of genuinely free elec-
tions. The United States Government in agreement with the United
Kingdom and French Governments and after consultation with the
German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin,
accordingly makes the following proposals:
(i) An impartial commission should immediately determine whether
there exist in the Soviet Zone of Germany, as well as in the German
Federal Republic and in all sectors of Berlin, the conditions necessary
for the holding of free elections and, if not, should recommend for
consideration by the Four Powers exercising responsibilities in Ger-
many what step should be taken to create such conditions. The
Four Powers should give the necessary facilities for the investigation
of such a commission in the German Federal Republic, in the Soviet
Zone, and in all sectors of Berlin. The three Western Powers and
the German Federal Government have already stated their willing
ness to do so.
(ii) The Four Powers should utilize for this purpose the United
Nations Commission which is already available. This seems the
quickest and most practical course.
(ii) Despite its strong preference for the procedure under @
above, the United States Government is ready to consider any other
practical and precise proposals for an impartial commission of inves-
tigation which the Soviet Government may wish to put forward, on
the one condition that they are likely to promote the early holding of
free elections throughout Germany.
(iv) As soon 'as the report of such an impartial commission
available, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom,
1813
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Government nevertheless offered to consider any other practical
Government might advance.
French Embassies delivered similar notes.
Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1952, pp. 92–93. The British and
3 Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1952, pp. 93–96.
French and Soviet Governments would meet to consider it, with a
view to reaching agreement on:
(A) The early holding of free elections throughout Germany,
including the creation where necessary of the appropriate conditions;
and
(B) The assurances to be given by the Four Powers that the
all-German government, formed
as the result of these free elections,
will have the necessary freedom of action during the period before
the
peace treaty comes into effect.
69. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, JULY 10, 19521
In its note of May 13 2 the United States Government made
various proposals in the hope of facilitating four power conversa-
tions which could lead to the unification of Germany and to the nego-
tiation with an all-German Government of a German peace treaty.
It observes with regret that the Soviet Government in its note of
May 24 3 does not answer these proposals. The United States
Government fully maintains the views and proposals in its note of
May 13. On this basis it wishes in its present note primarily to con-
centrate attention upon the immediate practical problem of the pro-
cedure for setting up, through free elections, an all-German Govern-
ment with which a peace treaty can be negotiated.
In its note the Soviet Government once more proposes simul-
taneous discussions on a peace treaty, the unification of Germany,
and the formation of an all-German Government. For its part,
the United States Government maintains its position on this question,
namely, that an all-German Government must participate in the
negotiation of a peace treaty, and that, therefore, before under-
taking such negotiations Germany must be'unified and an all-German
Government established. Unification of Germany can be achieved
only through free elections. The essential first step is obviously
the determination that conditions necessary for such free elections
exist. The second step would be the holding of those elections.
In regard to the first step, the United States Government proposed
in its note of May 13 that an impartial Commission
should determine
whether there exist throughout Germany the conditions necessary
for the holding of free elections. While pointing out the great ad-
vantages of using the United Nations Commission, the United States
The Soviet Government advances
no such proposals and limits itself to maintaining its position on the
1
1
2
Supra.
1814
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
appointment of a Commission to carry out this verification by agree-
ment among the four Powers. It is not clear to the United States
Government whether the Soviet Government considers that the
Commission should be composed of representatives of the four Powers
or merely that the four Powers should agree on its composition,
and the United States Government would be pleased to receive
clarification on this point. The United States Government remains
convinced that a Commission composed solely of nationals of the
four Powers would be unable to reach useful decisions since it could
only reflect present differences of opinion among the four Powers
as to conditions existing in the Federal Republic, in the Soviet Zone
and in Berlin. The United States Government considers that if the
Commission is to carry out its work effectively, it should be composed
of impartial members, should not be subject to veto or control by
the four Powers and should be empowered to go freely into all parts
of Germany and investigate conditions bearing on the possibility
of holding free elections.
In regard to the second step, the United States Government
similarly proposed that as soon as the Commission's report was
ready there should be a meeting of representatives of the United
States, French, Soviet and United Kingdom Governments to discuss
the early holding of free elections throughout Germany, including
the creation where necessary of appropriate conditions. The United
States Government maintains this proposal to which the Soviet
Government has not yet replied.
70. SECOND REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMIS-
SION TO INVESTIGATE CONDITIONS FOR FREE ELEC-
TIONS IN GERMANY, AUGUST 5, 1952 1
1. The United Nations Commission to investigate Conditions for
Free Elections in Germany submits to the Secretary-General the
present report covering its work during the period from May to
August 1952 in pursuance of the direction given to it by the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
2. In compliance with the direction given to it under the terms of
paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly
on 20 December 1951 (resolution 510 (VI)) 2 on the agenda item
entitled “Appointment of an impartial international commission
under United Nations supervision to carry out a simultaneous in-
vestigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in
the Soviet Zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing
conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely free elections
throughout these areas', the Commission submitted on 1 May
1952 (30 April] its reports on the results of its efforts to make the
1 U.N. doc. A/2122/Add. 2, Aug. 11, 1952.
2 Supra, doc. 65.
3 Supra, doc. 67.
1815
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1
then existing position in paragraphs 67 and 68, which for the sake of
preliminary task in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the
Western Sectors of Berlin, it has not thus far been able to estab-
lish reciprocal contact with the authorities in the Soviet Zone of
Germany and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin even by correspond-
necessary arrangements with all the parties concerned to enable it to
undertake its work according to the terms of the said resolution.
3. This first report of the Commission contained an account of its
activities from 11 February 1952, the date when the Commission
first met and organized itself, to 30 April 1952, the date by which
the Commission considered it was obliged to submit its first report,
after having made in that preliminary period every reasonable effort
to make the necessary arrangements with all the parties concerned
to enable it to undertake its work.
4. The present report, which supplements the first and is in a sense
& postscript to it, contains a brief account of the work of the Com-
mission in the three-month period subsequent to the submission of
the first report, including a brief summation of the views of the
Commission as regards developments in the German situation in so far
as they may be regarded as having had a bearing on the specific
task the Commission was required to carry out.
The report is being submitted in accordance with the direction
to the Commission contained in paragraph 4 (d) of General Assembly
resolution 510 (VI), which "directs the Commission in any event
to report, not later than 1 September 1952, on the results of its ac-
tivities to the Secretary-General, for the consideration of the four
Powers and for the information of the other Members of the United
Nations".
6. At its 24th meeting held on 31 July 1952 in Geneva, the Com-
mission decided
that the final report it was required to submit ac-
cording to the terms of paragraph 4 (d) of the resolution quoted
above should not be delayed any longer, as, in its view, there ap-
peared at the time hardly any further possibility of its being able to
carry out its task of simultaneous investigation throughout the
whole of Germany of conditions for free elections in that country.
Throughout the period of three months during which the
Commission
has had to remain in Geneva at no little sacrifice to the Member
Governments concerned, in constant session and ready to go into
action at any time it could do so or it appeared feasible to make an
attempt to do so, it had become increasingly evident that the un-
willingness to co-operate with and assist the Commission to discharge
its task displayed at the sixth session of the General Assembly by the
representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the
German authorities in the Soviet Zone of Germany, remained un-
7. It will be recalled that the Commission in its first report stated the
ready reference are reproduced below:
"While the Commission has been successful in carrying out its
diminished.
1816
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ence. The Commission consequently has not thus far beer
able to make with the authorities concerned in the Soviet Zone of
Germany and in the Eastern Sector of Berlin the arrangements
deemed necessary by it to enable it to undertake its work in accord
ance with its terms of reference. Bearing in mind the infructuos
efforts it has made on four separate occasions to appeal to the
Soviet Control Commission for Germany to facilitate it in the
discharge of its duties, the Commission, to its regret, is obliged
conclude that at present there is little prospect of its being able to
pursue its task.
"However, in view of the fact that sub-paragraph 4 (c) of General
Assembly resolution 510 (VI) directs the Commission, if it is u
able forthwith to make these arrangements, to make a further
attempt to carry out its task at such time as it is satisfied that the
German authorities in the Federal Republic, in Berlin, and in the
Soviet Zone will admit the Commission, as it is desirable to lear
the door open for the Commission to carry out its task’, the Com
mission will remain at the disposal of the United Nations and the
parties concerned, and will make a further attempt to implement
its mandate at such time as it seems likely to the Commission
that new steps may lead to positive results".
8. In all the period that the Commission has had to remain in session
in Geneva since the submission of its first report in order to make an
effort to implement, if feasible, the directions given to it by par:
graphs 4 (c) and 4 (b) of General Assembly resolution 510 (VI), the
Commission had hoped that the authorities of the USSR as well as
the German authorities in the Soviet Zone of Germany would ult-
mately see their way clear to co-operate with the Commission, an
impartial, international body set up by the United Nations with the
positive support of forty-five out of its sixty Members, and one
had already received every assurance of co-operation from the author-
ities representing by far the greater portion of the German people
This hope was entertained by the Commission because of its under
standing that the authorities of the USSR as well as the Germau
authorites in the
Soviet Zone of Germany, were
as anxious
as the thre
Western Power's and the authorities in the Federal Republic of Ge
many and the Western Sectors of Berlin to bring about a peaceful
solution to the German question by
way of the formation of a free
elected all-German government with which the four occupyic
Powers could proceed to negotiate a peace treaty. It seemed cler
to the Commission that the four occupying Powers were agreed that
an essential preliminary to the formation of an all-German govert
ment was that it should be formed on the basis of free elections, an
further that, prior to the formation of such a government, an investi
:
gation by an impartial body was necessary to determine whether
existing conditions throughout Germany admitted of the possibilit
of genuinely free elections. It was the Commission's hope that the
Government of the USSR, anxious as it was for a quick and just
solution to the German question, would ultimately be persuaded in
that
1817
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 7, 1952, pp. 531-532.
(supra, doc. 68). The Soviet Union sent its third note to the three Western
Powers on May 24, 1952 (Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1952, pp.
Quoted from the text of the Note of the three Western Powers dated 13 May
repose faith in a body that had been set up by an overwhelming
majority of its colleagues in the United Nations.
9. In the period between the submission of its first report and before
it could make a further attempt to carry out its task, the Commis-
sion considered that it would have to be reasonably certain that, at
whatever time it did make the further attempt, it would be attended
with some prospect of success. The Commission, therefore, was per-
force concerned to consider closely developments in the German
situation arising out of the exchange of Notes between the USSR on
the one hand, and France, the United Kingdom and the United
States of America on the other, as well as significant developments
inside Germany itself.
10. The series of Notes on the German question exchanged between
the USSR and the three Western Powers, it will be recalled, com-
menced with one from the USSR dated 10 March 1952, by which
date the Commission had been in existence and at work for a month.
By the time the Commission submitted its first report on 1 May
1952, the USSR had addressed two Notes to the three Western
Powers (on 10 March and 9 April 2 respectively), and the three
Western Powers had replied on 25 March to the first Soviet Note.
Between 1 May and 5 August 1952, the date on which the present
report was adopted by the Commission, three further Notes 4 were
exchanged between the four occupying Powers. In none of the six
Notes could the Commission discern any agreement whatsoever
between the USSR and the three Western Powers as to utilization of
the Commission in carrying out an investigation in all of Germany
to determine whether existing conditions there made it possible to
hold genuinely free elections in that country. Indeed, what became
more obvious as a result of the exchange of the series of Notes was the
following: (1) that the three Western Powers, while they continued
to maintain more or less strongly their preference for the present
United Nations Commission, were nevertheless prepared at the
same time “to consider any other practical and precise proposals for
an impartial commission of investigation which the Soviet Govern-
ment may wish to put forward, on the one condition that they are
likely to promote the early holding of free elections throughout
Germany's and (2) that the USSR, continuing to maintain its
objection to the competence of the United Nations to concern itself
with the German question, rejected investigation by the present
Commission, while it was agreeable to an investigation by another
impartial commission formed
by the four Powers occupying Germany.
3 Ibid., May 26, 1952, pp. 819-820.
3 Supra, doc. 66.
The three Western Powers replied to the second Soviet note on May 13, 1952
1952' addressed to the USSR. [Footnote in original.]
1
1952 (supra).
5
1818
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
sine die, desiring, however, to maintain its headquarters and secre.
11. The Commission, at this point, would like to make certain obser-
vations. While on the one hand, the Commission derives its mandate
solely from the General Assembly of the United Nations, it is, on the
other hand, entirely dependent on the willingness of all the parties
concerned to co-operate unreservedly with it for the execution of its
mandate. It has so far been unable to secure this co-operation from
the authorities in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and it could see at the
time of the adoption of the present report little prospect of its being
able to do so in the near future. The Commission, as a United
Nations body, is anxious above all for an early, just and peaceful
solution of the German question, regardless of whether the steps
contributing to such a solution are to be worked out under the aus-
pices of the United Nations or not. The United Nations, the Com-
mission is confident, would at all times be prepared to heed any
appeal for its assistance in the finding of a peaceful solution to this
question. This being its view, the Commission would not desire to
suggest that it alone affords the only impartial means of investigating
existing conditions in all of Germany. The Commission would
consider its existence and its work hitherto justified, and its mission
in substance fulfilled, if, by agreement among the four occupying
Powers, another equally impartial body were to be set up whic
could and would carry out the essentials of the mandate entrusted to
the present United Nations Commission.
12. Apart from its consideration of the situation arising out of the
exchange of the series of Notes between the USSR and the three
Western Powers, the Commission, during the last three-month period
has also been watching with concern reports of internal developments
in Germany. These have been such as to afford no hope to the Com-
mission that the German authorities in the Soviet Zone of Germany
will co-operate with it in the execution of its task.
13. At its 23rd meeting held on 11 July, the Commission felt that
might perhaps be well for it to wait to consider the USSR reply to
the Note of the three Western Powers dated 10 July before deciding
to submit the present report and adjourn its session sine die. How
ever, after further prolonged deliberation, it decided that, if past
events provided any indication of the nature of things to come,
was little prospect of its being able to carry out its task any further
beyond what it had been able to do in the preliminary period of it
activity. At its 24th meeting held on 31 July, the Commission
decided, therefore, to submit its final report and adjourn its session
tariat in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, until the expiry of its man
date. While with the adjournment sine die of its session the Com
mission has left its representatives free to resume duty with their
respective Governments, the Commission as a body wishes,
again to lay stress on the fact that, in compliance with
the resolutio
of the General Assembly, it will continue to remain at the disposal of
the United Nations and all the
parties concerned to carry
out its task
during such time as the mandate entrusted to it remains in force,
there
however
.
and
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1819
1
2 Ibid., pp. 518-521.
at such time as it seems likely to the Commission that it can do so
with a prospect of positive results.
14. The following four representatives on the Commission, whose
signatures are appended below, unanimously adopted the report at
the 25th meeting of the Commission held on 5 August 1952 in the
Palais des Nations, Geneva.
Signed: Brazil
A. MENDES VIANNA
Iceland
KRISTJÁN ALBERTSON
Netherlands M. KOHNSTAMM
Pakistan
A. H. ABBASI
71. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1952
The United States Government has carefully considered the Soviet
Government's note of August 23 about Germany. It had hoped
that the note would have marked some progress towards agreement
on the essential question of free all-German elections. This is the
first question which must be settled among the four powers so that
Germany can be unified, an all-German Government formed and a
peace treaty concluded.
Possibly in order to divert attention from this issue, the greater
part of the Soviet note of August 23 is, however, devoted to wholly
unfounded attacks upon the Atlantic Pact, the European Defense
Community 3 and the conventions signed at Bonn on May 26.4 As
the United States Government has often emphasized, these agree-
ments are purely defensive and threaten no one.
The Bonn conven-
tions and the #pc treaty, far from being imposed on the German
People, are a matter for free decision by freely elected Parliaments,
including of course that of the German Federal Republic. Insofar
as the Bonn conventions reserve certain strictly limited rights to the
three Western powers, a fundamental consideration has been specific-
cally to safeguard the principle of German unity and to keep the
door open for agreement with the Soviet Union on the unification of
The United States Government must insist on the necessity of
starting four-power discussions at the only point where they can in
fact start, which is the organization of free elections. In its note of
July 10, the United States Government drew attention to the obvious
fact that this is the first point which must be settled if any progress
is to be made towards uniting the Soviet zone with the Federal
French Embassies sent similar notes on the same date. The Soviet Government
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 6, 1952, pp. 517–518. The British and
did not reply to the notes of the three powers.
. See the treaty of May 27, 1952; supra, pp. 1107–1150.
19. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9-22, 25-165.
Germany
5 Supra, doc. 69.
1820
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Republic, which constitutes the greater part of Germany. In its
first note, as in its last, the Soviet Government has evaded this clear
issue. Instead of putting first things first, it now relegates to the
background the problem of elections and proposes that the four-
power conference should discuss in the first place such important
issues âs a peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an all-
German Government". But until elections are held, no all-German
Government can be formed, nor can Germany be unified. Until an
all-German Government is formed which will be in a position to nego-
tiate freely, it is impossible to discuss the terms of à German peace
treaty.
In complete accord with the views of the United States, French and
United Kingdom Governments, the Soviet Government originally said
that "the preparation of the peace treaty should be effected with the
participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government”.
The Soviet Government has now shifted its ground. It now sub-
stitutes for this, the participation of representatives of the Soviet
zone and the Federal Republic in the four-power meetings "during the
discussion of relevant questions". The United States Government
cannot accept this proposal. A peace treaty for the whole of Germany
cannot be negotiated with, and accepted by, any German representa-
tives other than the all-German Government which would have to
carry it out. Such a government can only proceed from free elections.
It is moreover well known that the East German administration is
not representative of the German population of the Soviet zone,
This fact is not controverted by the assertion in the Soviet note of
August 23 that this administration acted “at the request" of that
population in enforcing recent measures further dividing East and
West Germans in defiance of their clear desire for unity in freedom.
The United States Government is compelled to remind the Soviet
Government that conditions have altered radically since the Potsdam
Agreement of 1945, 2 which laid down certain political and economic
principles to govern the initial control period. The Soviet conception
of a peace treaty drafted by the four powers and imposed upon
Germany is entirely unsuitable in 1952. The United States Govern-
ment could never agree to a peace treaty being drafted or
without the participation of an all-German Government. Any other
procedure would mean a dictated treaty. That indeed would be
an insult to the German nation”.
The United States Government again insists that genuinely free
elections with a view to the formation of an all-German Government
must come first. It has however learned by hard experience in recent
years that terms such as "free elections” have one meaning in common
parlance and another in the official Soviet vocabulary. The contrast
between the concept of free elections which obtains in West Germany
and that which prevails in the Soviet Zone is clear. It is for the
1 For a translation of the Soviet note of Mar. 10, 1952, in which the translation
of this passage is slightly different, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 7,
1952, pp. 531-532.
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 34-48.
negotiated
AU
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1821
all-German elections and an appeal to the Bundestag at Bonn; Documents on
· 1951, by President Grotwohl to the People's Chamber; ibid., pp. 198-201.
German Unity vol. I (Frankfurt, 1951), pp. 196, 197. Cf. statement of Sept. 15.
German people to choose between these alternative ways of life.
But they must be able to make their choice in genuine freedom and
full responsibility. Only genuinely free elections can reflect the will
of the German people and permit the formation of an all-German
Government with the necessary freedom of action to discuss and
accept a peace settlement.
In order to create the conditions necessary for free elections, there
has been four-power agreement that there should be a commission of
investigation. The Soviet Government has now proposed that this
commission should be composed of representatives of the People's
Assembly of the "German Democratic Republic" and of the Bundestag
of the German Federal Republic. A commission of investigation
must, however, be genuinely impartial. A German commission
would be no more able than a four-power commission to meet this
requirement. The underlying principle of the present Soviet proposal
was contained in one which emanated from the Soviet zone on
September 15, 1951. This was rejected by the Bundestag, which
then suggested investigation by a United Nations Commission. It
was thus the freely elected representatives of fifty millions of the
German people who themselves proposed the creation of a neutral
investigation commission under United Nations supervision. Never-
theless, the United States Government repeats its readiness to discuss
any practical and precise proposals, as stated in its note of the tenth
The United States Government continues to seek a way to end the
division of Germany. This will not be accomplished by premature
discussions about a peace treaty with a Germany not yet united and
lacking an all-German Government. The United States Government
therefore renews the proposal made in its note of July 10 for an early
four-power meeting which could take place in October—to discuss
the composition, functions and authority of an impartial commission
of investigation with a view to creating the conditions necessary for
free elections. The next step would be to discuss the arrangements
for the holding of these elections and for the formation of an all-
German Government, as proposed in paragraph 11 (IV) of the United
States Government's note of May 13. When free elections have been
held and an all-German Government formed, the peace settlement
can be negotiated. The United States Government, in concert with
the French Government and the United Kingdom Government and
after consultation with the German Federal Government and the
German authorities in Berlin, most earnestly urges the Soviet Govern-
ment to reconsider its refusal to join the other powers in a single-
minded effort thus to come to grips with the problem of free elections
See resolutions of this date by the Soviet Zone People's Chamber concerning
of July.
in Germany.
.هالمشهد
1822
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
United States at their meeting in London on May 18 reaffirmed
E. AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY NEGOTIATION, 1950-
1953
72. DECLARATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE,
MAY 19, 1950 1
The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and
France reaffirm that their policy with respect to Austria requires
the earliest possible completion of an Austrian treaty which will
lead to the restoration of a free and independent Austria in accordance
with the pledge given in the Moscow Declaration of November 1,
1943, and to the withdrawal of the forces of occupation.
To this end the three Governments are ready at any time to settle
without delay all outstanding issues of the treaty, provided that this
will definitely bring about agreement on the treaty as a whole. I
however, the unwillingness of the Soviet Government to settle all
outstanding issues continues to prevent the conclusion of the treaty,
the occupation will have to be maintained for the present. But the
three Governments are themselves prepared to carry out such meas-
ures as may properly be taken to strengthen within the framework
of existing quadripartite agreements the authority of the Austrian
Government and to lighten the burden of the occupation on Austria
In accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the control agree
ment of June 28, 1946,3 the three Governments have decided to
proceed at any early date to the appointment of civilian High Com-
missioners.
73. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOS.
COW4 TO THE SOVIET MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JUNE 12, 1950
I have the honor to refer to the situation in which the deputies
for the Austrian treaty negotiations have been unable to reach agree
ment on the terms of an Austrian state treaty. It will be recalled
that Austrian independence was pledged in the Moscow Declaration
of 1943,’ and my Government regrets exceedingly the failure to reach
an agreement which would result in the fulfillment of this pledge
The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the
that their policy with respect to Austria requires the earliest possible
completion of an Austrian treaty which will lead to the restoration
6
1 Department of State Bulletin, May 29, 1950, p. 828.
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.
3 Ibid., p. 618.
4 Adm. Alan G. Kirk.
5 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
8 Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, p. 74.
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1823
}
}
1
|
Notes of Mar. 7, 1950; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Apr. 15–22, 1950, p.
Department of State Bulletin, July 24, 1950, pp. 131-132.
5 Documents on International Affairs, 1950 (London, 1953), pp. 519-521.
Ibid., pp. 515-519.
7 Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1950, p. 1054.
of a free and independent Austria in accordance with the pledge
given in the Moscow Declaration and to the withdrawal of the forces
of occupation. The three governments further agreed that they are
ready at any time to settle without delay all outstanding issues of the
treaty, provided that this will definitely bring about agreement on
the treaty as a whole.
In the absence of a treaty, the three governments agreed that they
are prepared to carry out such measures as may properly be taken
to strengthen, within the framework of existing quadripartite agree-
ments, the authority of the Austrian Government and to lighten the
burden of the occupation on Austria to the greatest extent possible as
requested by the Austrian Government in recent notes to the occupy-
ing powers. The three Foreign Ministers further agreed to proceed
at an early date to appoint civilian high commissioners in Austria
in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the Control Agree-
ment of June 28, 1946.3
My Government would be pleased if the Government of the Soviet
Union, pending final decision on the treaty, would associate itself
with the program determined upon by the three Foreign Ministers.
In the meantime, my Government will
, on its part, as a first step
in such a program, proceed at an early date to designate a civilian
high commissioner to replace its present military commander in
Austria and hopes that the Soviet Government will take similar
action.
74. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE, JULY 12, 1950 4
The deputies for the Austrian treaty negotiations met in London
on July 10 for their 256th meeting. In obvious preparation for this
meeting, the Soviet Government on July 8 sent to the American
Embassy in Moscow a second note 5 regarding the Allied position in
Trieste. This second note merely repeats the unfounded allegations
in the Soviet note of April 20.
This Government's reply of June 16 ? adequately answered those
allegations. There is, of course, no valid reason for linking the two
questions, but, true to the Soviet propaganda pattern, the Soviet
deputy for the Austrian treaty negotiations, at the July 10 meeting,
instead of discussing the remaining unagreed articles of the Austrian
treaty
, utilized the meeting to read a prepared statement on Trieste.
This Soviet action once again emphasizes that the Soviet Govern-
See the tripartite declaration of May 19, 1950; supra.
: A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 618.
6
10660.
& Not printed.
ܐܒܬܟܬܚܟܪܟ
1824
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
4 Agreement of June 28, 1946; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 614-620
ment does not wish to conclude an Austrian treaty at this time
despite the pledge which it made in the Moscow Declaration in 1943)
to reestablish Austria as a free and independent nation. The efforts
of the Western deputies to negotiate and conclude the treaty were
unsuccessful and, in view of the impasse, the deputies adjourned,
with the Western deputies agreeing to meet again on September 7
The Soviet deputy stated that it would be necessary for him to refer
to his Government for consideration the Western proposal to meet
again on September 7.
The British, French, and United States Foreign Ministers agreed
at their meeting in London last Mayề that their respective Govern-
ments are ready at any time to settle without delay all outstanding
issues of the treaty provided that this will definitely bring about
agreement on the treaty as a whole. The principles agreed upon by
the three Foreign Ministers were communicated to the Soviet Gor-
ernment on June 123 in the hope that the Soviet Government
would agree to associate itself with the program and that more
definite progress in the solution of the Austrian problem might thus
be achieved. No reply has been received from the Soviet Govern-
ment to this approach.
The only true basis on which Austria can exercise full sovereignty
is by four-power agreement and the withdrawal from Austrian soil of
all forces of occupation. It is fundamental that the Government of
the United States desires the achievement of this objective.
Soviet actions designed to prevent conclusion of the Austrian
treaty must necessarily result in a delay in the fulfillment of Austria's
desire, with which this Government is in full sympathy, to enjor
complete independence. Under these circumstances, the thre
Western Governments are endeavoring, within the framework
existing four-power agreements, to carry out such measures as mer
properly be taken to strengthen the authority of the Austrian Gora
ernment and to lighten Austria's occupation burdens.
It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that any steps
heretofore taken or to be taken by this Government to reduce Au-
tria's occupation burdens are not regarded as a substitute for the
treaty. Our actions, in this respect, are endeavors on our
take such constructive measures
as may properly be taken, pending
conclusion of the treaty, to fulfill our obligations under the Control
Agreement of 1946+ which provides that the Allied Commission fu
Austria shall assist the freely elected Government of Austria
recreate a sound and democratic national life and to assume as
as possible full control of its own affairs of state.
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.
2 See the tripartite declaration of May 19 1950; supra, doc. 72.
3 Supra.
part to
quickly
!
1825
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
3 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 12, 1951, p. 768.
75. STATEMENT RELEASED TO THE PRESS BY THE DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, DECEMBER 15, 1950 1
Once again, the deputies for the Austrian treaty have failed to
make any progress because the Soviet representative persists in
introducing irrelevant issues in order to avoid discussing the few
and relatively minor articles of the treaty which remain unagreed.
For over a year, the Soviets, by a series of stalling devices, have re-
fused to discuss concrete issues. Again, they have used the Aus-
trian discussions to talk about Trieste, an entirely unrelated matter.
This development was hardly a surprise, in view of past Soviet
tactics. The report, spread earlier this week, that the Soviets had
requested the meeting, was incorrect—they merely agreed to a meet-
ing proposed weeks ago by the Western deputies.
The United States remains determined to do all in its power to
conclude an Austrian treaty but such a treaty is impossible until the
Soviets agree and withdraw their occupation forces. Until they do
So, the United States will be forced to keep its troops in Austria and
will continue to live up to its obligations there. Unfortunately, the
Austrians are still denied the freedom and independence which were
long ago promised to them.
76. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE UNITED STATES
HIGH COMMISSIONER, OCTOBER 31, 19513
The suggestion of the Austrian Government that the Deputy
Foreign Ministers of the four occupying powers meet as early as pos-
sible to reach a definite agreement on the state treaty is particularly
gratifying to me. It is consistent with the unswerving policy of the
United States Government to terminate the occupation of Austria
by means of a state treaty and is also in keeping with the statement of
the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the
United States in Washington on September 14.,
The United States Government remains firm in its conviction that
the four occupying powers
should sign and implement the state treaty
without further delay and restore Austria to its rightful position as
a sovereign nation. The people of Austria can continue to count
upon the unqualified support of the United States Government in
fulfilling the pledge undertaken at Moscow on November
1, 1943,
for the restoration of a free and independent Austria.
I personally feel that the Soviets again have the opportunity to
demonstrate their good faith in carrying out this agreement
and in
carrying it out without introducing any issues extraneous to the
Austrian problem. It is a clear-cut issue: Either Austria is to be
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1008.
2 Walter J. Donnelly:
See the Austrian note of Oct. 31, 1951; ibid., pp. 768–769.
* Supra, pp. 1721-1723.
415900—-57--Vol. 2-12
1826
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
restored to its full independence and occupation is to be terminated
or this unfair occupation will continue.
There can be no doubt in the minds of the Austrian people that the
United States Government has and will continue to press for the con-
clusion of the state treaty and withdrawal of troops from Austria
.
But, as I have said before, the United States will not withdraw until
all of the occupying powers are prepared to do likewise.
77. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE AUS
TRIAN TREATY DEPUTIES TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY AT
LONDON, JANUARY 24, 1952!
3
I have the honor to state that I have been requested by the Deputies
for the Austrian Treaty of France, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America to inform you as follows:
The three Deputies have taken note that the Soviet Government
wish to give further study to their communication of January 19th,
and that in the meanwhile a Soviet representative is unable to attend
a meeting of the Deputies for the Austrian Treaty.
The three Deputies recall that a representative of the Soviet Gore
ernment was invited on December 28, 1951 to attend such a meeting
on January 21, 1952. On the eve of the proposed meeting the
Soviet Government sent a reply 4 making the attendance of the
Soviet Deputy dependent on an assurance by the Western Deputies
that they would agree to discuss certain issues having no relation to
the conclusion of the Treaty. For nearly two years the Soviet Deputy
has delayed agreement on the Treaty by his insistence upon prior
consideration of these issues. The situation has now been further
aggravated by the Soviet Government making acceptance of its
conditions a prerequisite to a meeting.
The three Deputies regret that the failure of the Soviet Deputy to
take part in the proposed meeting is continuing to delay the conclu-
sion of the Austrian Treaty. Persistence of the Soviet Government
in its present attitude would inevitably lead to the conclusion that
the Soviet Government is deliberately seeking to obstruct the com-
pletion of the Austrian Treaty and the restoration of independence to
the Austrian people.
The three Deputies still hope that a Soviet representative will be
able
to attend a meeting at an early date for the purpose of complex
ing the Treaty. The chairman remains ready to call a meeting of
the Deputies as soon as this can be mutually agreed.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 4, 1952, p. 160.
2 Ibid., Mar. 3, 1952, p. 327.
3 See the Soviet note of Jan. 21, 1952; ibid.
4 See the Soviet note of Jan. 18, 1952; ibid., pp. 326–327.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1827
78. STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, FEBRU-
ARY 28, 1952
1
The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States of America are seriously concerned that arrangements which
had been made for discussion by the deputies for the Austrian treaty
to take place on the 21st of January for the purpose of concluding the
treaty, were frustrated owing to the failure of the Soviet deputy to
attend.2
The three Governments recall that Austria, the first country to be
occupied by Hitler, was promised her freedom and independence in a
declaration made in Moscow in the name of the Governments of the
United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics in 1943.3 France associated herself with
this declaration on the 16th of November 1943.4 The Governments
then announced their determination that Austria should be liberated
from German domination and reestablished as a free and independent
country. Yet 8 years afterwards and despite 258 meetings of the
deputies to conclude the treaty, Austria has not yet regained her full
independence. Her laws are submitted to a foreign body before being
passed, her communications are controlled and censored, and, above
all, her territory is divided into zones occupied by foreign troops with
all the economic and moral hardship on the Austrian people that this
implies.
The Austrians ardently desire to see terminated a state of affairs
which should rightly have ended long ago. The three Governments
fully share this aspiration and consider that renewed efforts should be
made to solve
a problem with which the world ought no longer to be
confronted. They are, therefore, urgently examining new proposals
so that the Four Powers may be enabled to fulfill their pledge made
in the Moscow Declaration to restore to Austria her full freedom and
independence.
1
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 10, 1952, pp. 379–380. In releasing the
above statement at Washington, the Department of State emphasized that no
consideration is being given to the conclusion of a separate treaty for Austria
without Soviet participation. [Footnote in Bulletin.]
2 See note of Jan. 24, 1952, from the Secretary-General of the Austrian Treaty
Deputies to the Soviet Embassy at London; supra.
Declaration on Austria, Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy,
* Recueil de textes à l'usage des conférences de la paix (Paris, 1946), p. 123.
p. 11.
1828
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
79. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, MARCH 13, 1952 1
1
On February 28 the Governments of the United Kingdom, the
United States of America, and France publicly expressed their serious
concern that the discussions of the Austrian Treaty by the Deputies
planned for January 21, for the purpose of concluding the Treaty
,
were frustrated owing to the failure of the Soviet Deputy to attend
They recalled that Austria, the first country to be occupied by Hitler,
was promised full independence in the Moscow Declaration of 1943
but that nearly 9 years afterwards this promise has not yet been
fulfilled.
Responsibility for this state of affairs lies squarely on the Soviet
Government. The Four Foreign Ministers reached agreement in
Paris on June 20, 1949 on the basic issues involved in the Austrian
settlement and instructed their Deputies to complete negotiations on
the draft Treaty no later than September 1, 1949. Since that time,
the Soviet Government has studiously evaded its obligation towards
Austria undertaken in the Moscow Declaration. The Soviet Govern-
ment has refused to engage in constructive negotiations on the remain-
ing unagreed issues in the draft Treaty, has introduced extraneous
issues, and did not send its representative to attend the last scheduled
meeting of the Deputies.
The Government of the United States considers that failure to
reach an Austrian settlement has placed a heavy and unnecessary
burden on the Austrian people and has contributed materially to the
maintenance of the dangerous tensions which unhappily exist in
international relations. It is the most earnest desire of the Govern-
ment of the United States to do everything within its power to remove
these tensions. The conclusion of an Austrian Treaty would consti-
tute an important step toward the consolidation of peace.
This Government, in concert with the Governments of the United
Kingdom and France, has now examined the Austrian problem aner.
The three Governments are in agreement that the paramount obliga
.
tion of the powers occupying Austria is to restore Austria's freedom
and full independence in accordance with the Moscow Declaration.
The three Governments
are also agreed that this fundamental obliga-
tion to the Austrian people is vastly more important than the minor
and extraneous considerations which have since June 1949 prevented
agreement on the Treaty. Accordingly, the Government of the
United States desires to propose to the Soviet Government a simple
instrument which will give Austria full independence. This new pro-
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 24, 1952, pp. 448-449; identical notes
were sent by the British and French Embassies. For the text of the draft treaty
transmitted with this note, see infra.
2 Supra.
3 Declaration on Austria, Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Polich
+ See the communiqué of the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers
ibid., pp. 110-112.
1
p. 11.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1829
themselves have made and will have to continue to make for the
admission to the United Nations Organization;
1 , , .
* Recueil de textes à l'usage des conférences de la paix (Paris, 1946), p. 123.
posal should be examined in the light of the impasse in negotiations
on the draft Treaty and the progress of Austria toward democratic
self-government during the prolonged occupation. The Soviet Gov-
ernment will note that it conforms to the Moscow Declaration and
contains the essentials which are required to reestablish Austrian
independence.
The Government of the United States earnestly recommends that
the Soviet Government give this proposal most careful and serious
consideration and inquires if the Soviet Government is prepared to
instruct its Deputy to renew negotiations.
80. THE ABBREVIATED DRAFT TREATY WITH AUSTRIA,
MARCH 13, 1952 1
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America,
and France, hereinafter referred to as "the Allied and Associated
Powers,” of the one part, and Austria, of the other part;
WHEREAS on March 13, 1938, Hitlerite Germany annexed Austria
by force and incorporated its territory in the German Reich;
WHEREAS in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, the
Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America declared that they re-
garded the annexation of Austria by Germany on March 13, 1938,
as null and void and affirmed their wish
to see Austria reestablished
as a free and independent State and the French Committee of Na-
tional Liberation made a similar declaration on November 16, 1943;3
WHEREAS as a result of the Allied victory Austria was liberated
from the domination of Hitlerite Germany;
WHEREAS the Allied and Associated Powers, and Austria, taking
into account the importance of the efforts which the Austrian people
restoration and democratic reconstruction of their country, desire to
conclude a treaty reestablishing Austria as a free, independent and
democratic State, thus contributing to the restoration of peace in
WHEREAS the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria are desir-
ous for these purposes of concluding the present Treaty to serve as
the basis
of friendly relations between them, thereby enabling the
Allied and Associated Powers to support Austria's candidature for
of .
Europe; and
le
eign Ministry, see supra.
2
1830
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Have therefore appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries who
,
after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form,
have agreed to the following provisions:
ARTICLE 1
Reestablishment of Austria as a Free and Independent State
The Allied and Associated Powers recognize that Austria is re-
established as a sovereign, independent and democratic State.
ARTICLE 2
Preservation of Austria's Independence
The Allied and Associated Powers declare that they will respect
the independence and territorial integrity of Austria as established
under the present Treaty.
The Allied and Associated Powers declare that political or economic
union (Anschluss) between Austria and Germany is prohibited
.
Austria fully recognizes its responsibilities in this matter.
ARTICLE 3
Frontiers of Austria
The frontiers of Austria shall be those existing on January 1, 1938.
ARTICLE 4
of
Withdrawal of Allied Forces
1. The Agreement on the Machinery of Control in Austria of
June 28, 1946,1 shall terminate on the coming into force of the present
Treaty.
2. On the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Inter-
Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura [Kommandatura]) estal
lished under paragraph 4 of the Agreement on Zones of Occupation u
Austria
and the Administration of the City of Vienna of July 9, 1945
shall cease to exercise any functions with respect to the administration
of the City of Vienna. The Agreement on Zones of Occupation
Austria shall terminate upon completion of the withdrawal from Austria
of the forces of the Allied and Associated Powers and in any case af
the expiration of ninety days from the coming into force of the
present Treaty.
3. The forces of the Allied and Associated Powers and members
of the
Allied Commission for Austria shall be withdrawn
from Austria
as soon as possible and in any case within ninety days from the coming
into force of the present Treaty.
4. The Government of Austria shall accord to the forces of the
Allied and Associated Powers and the members of the Allied Coll-
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 614-620.
2 Ibid., pp. 610-612.
1831
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
I
1
ratification shall, in the shortest time possible, be deposited with the
mission for Austria pending their withdrawal from Austria the same
rights, immunities and facilities as they enjoyed immediately before
the coming into force of the present Treaty.
5. The Allied and Associated Powers undertake to return to the
Government of Austria within the specified period of 90 days:
(a) All currency which was made available free of cost to the
Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of the occupation and
which remains unexpended at the time of completion of withdrawal
of the Allied forces;
(b) All Austrian property requisitioned by Allied forces or the
Allied Commission, and which is still in their possession,
ARTICLE 5
Reparation
No reparation shall be exacted from Austria arising out of the
existence of a state of war in Europe after September 1, 1939.
ARTICLE 6
War Booty-German Assets
Each of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, within the ninety-
day period specified in Article 4, relinquish to Austria all property,
real and personal, of whatever description held or claimed by them
as German Assets or as war booty in Austria.
ARTICLE 7
Accession Clause
1. Any member of the United Nations at war with Germany
which had the status of a United Nation on May 8, 1945, and is
not a signatory to the present Treaty, may accede to the Treaty and
upon accession shall be deemed to be an Associated Power for the
purposes of the Treaty.
2. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and shall take effect
upon deposit.
ARTICLE 8
Ratification
The present Treaty, of which the Russian, English, and French
texts are authentic, shall be ratified. It shall come into force immedi-
ately upon deposit of instruments of ratification by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, by the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, by the United States
of America, and by France
of the one part and by Austria of the other part. The instruments of
1832
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
With respect to each Allied and Associated Power which accedes
to the Treaty in accordance with Article 7, and whose instrument of
ratification is thereafter deposited, the Treaty shall come into force
upon the date of deposit. The present Treaty shall be deposited in
the archives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, which shall furnish certified copies to each of the signatory
States.
In faith whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the
present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in the city of
in the Russian, English, French and
German languages this
day of
195_.
81. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MAY 9,
1952 1
The Government of the United States refers to its note of March
132 in which it proposed that the four powers immediately conclude a
settlement which would fulfill the pledge made to the Austrian people
in 1943 that their independence would be restored.
A draft abbreviated treaty 3 was proposed as a basis for the resump,
tion of the negotiations which have been in progress since 1947 and
which, despite several hundred meetings of the representatives of the
four powers, have not succeeded in reaching final agreement.
This Government considers that its proposal provides a basis for an
immediate and equitable settlement in Austria which would relieve &
source of constant tension in Europe and render justice to the Austrian
people.
The Government of the United States requests, therefore, that the
views of the Soviet Government on the proposal for an Austrian settle-
ment, as contained in its note of March 13, be made known at the
first opportunity.
82. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1952'
The Government of the United States is pleased to receive the
reply of the Soviet Government to its note of March 13, 1952 proposing
to the Soviet Government a simple instrument which will give Austris
full independence.
The Soviet Government's recent reply 5 suggests the withdrawal
1 Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1952, p. 778. The British and French
Embassies at Moscow transmitted identical notes.
2 Supra, doc. 79.
3 Supra.
* Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 15, 1952, pp. 404–405. The British and
French Embassies sent similar notes to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
5 Note of Aug. 14, 1952; ibid., Sept. 1, 1952, pp. 322-323.
1833
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
:
draft treaty, see ibid., Sept. 15, 1952, p. 405.
of the proposal made on March 13, 1952. This suggestion is based
on four objections, namely, that it fails to provide for free elections as
specified in Article 8 of the long draft of the State Treaty, that it fails
to guarantee human rights and basic freedoms as specified in Article
7 of the long draft, that it fails to eliminate Nazism as specified in
Article 9 of the long draft, and that it fails to provide for Austrian
Armed Forces 1
With reference to the first three of these points, it is the view of the
Government of the United States that none of these provisions specified
in the note of the Soviet Government are required in a simple instru-
ment designed to terminate the prolonged occupation and to re-
establish the independence of Austria. These points are all covered
in the Austrian Constitution or in Austrian legislation now in force.
Nonetheless, appreciating the careful consideration given by the
U.S.S.R. during these past five months to the proposal of March
13, 1952, and anxious, as it has been since the Moscow Declaration
of 1943, to restore to Austria full independence, the Government of
the United States therefore proposes that there be added to its proposal
of March 13, 1952 articles 7, 8, and 9 of the long draft as previously
agreed upon by the four powers.
With reference to the Soviet Government's objections to the proposal
of March 13, 1952 in that it passes over the right of Austria to have
its own national armed forces necessary for the defense of the country,
the Government of the United States considers that the right to main-
tain armed forces belongs inherently to a free and independent nation
and should not have to be specifically granted to a nation never
considered to have been an enemy. The Soviet Government, however,
implies by its
reference to the long draft of the State Treaty that it
wishes to place limitations upon Austria's right to have national
armed forces for its self-defense. While seeing no necessity thus to
limit Austrian sovereign rights, the United States Government, in
order to reach early agreement and to terminate the occupation,
would accept, although reluctantly, the
addition of Article 17 of the
long draft to its proposal of March 13, 1952.
The Government of the United States therefore believes that the
way is now clear for the conclusion of an Austrian settlement as it is
prepared to accept the Soviet suggestions regarding the points
of objection to the proposal of March 13, 1952. The Government of
the United States is accordingly prepared for a meeting of the
Deputies with the object of initialling the proposal of March 13, 1952,
amended as above in accordance with the suggestions outlined in the
Soviet Government's note. Since the United States Deputy will be
in the chair at the forthcoming meeting, he has requested the Secretary
General to issue invitations for a meeting of the four Deputies in
by The “long” draft treaty was the draft treaty of 59 articles which had been the
om hject of the negotiations prior to the intreduction byrthe three Western Powers
of the "short” draft treaty of Mar. 13, 1952. For the texts of the articles from
the “long” draft treaty which the Western Powers were willing to add to the short
London on September 29, 1952.
1834
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
83. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 613 (VII),
DECEMBER 20, 1952 1
The General Assembly,
Recalling the terms of resolution 190 (III) of 3 November 1948,
whereby an appeal was made to the great Powers to renew their efforts
to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace,
Recalling the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943,
whereby the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America recognized that Austria should be re-
established as a free and independent State,
Recalling further that the Government of France joined the three
above-mentioned Governments in the said declaration as of 16
November 1943,4
Considering that, in the spirit of the said declaration, the four
Powers accepted the responsibility of re-establishing a free and inde-
pendent Austria, and, to that end, have entered into negotiations
towards the conclusion of an Austrian treaty,
Noting with concern that those negotiations, which have been under
way intermittently since 1947, have hitherto failed to bring about the
proposed objective,
Taking into account that such a state of affairs, still prevailing after
a lapse of seven years since the liberation of Austria at the end of the
Second World War, and arising from the inconclusive stage of the
aforementioned negotiations, does constitute a source of deep dis-
appointment for the Austrian people, who have by themselves made
successful efforts towards the restoration and democratic reconstruc-
tion of their country,
Recognizing that only through the unhampered exercise by the
Austrian people of their freedom and independence can these efforts
attain full realization,
Taking further into account that such a state of affairs hinders the
full participation by Austria in the normal and peaceful relations of
the community of nations and the full exercise of the powers inherent
in its sovereignty,
Having in mind that the solution of this problem would constitute
an important step towards the elimination of other areas of disagree-
ment and therefore towards the creation of conditions favourable to
the accomplishment of world peace,
Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of international peace
and security and the developing of friendly relations among nations
in conformity with the purposes and Principles of the Charter,
Addresses an earnest appeal to the Governments concerned to make
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 39
(A/2361), pp. 5–6. See also tripartite report to the U.N. Secretary-General
PU.N. General Assembly, oficiai Records, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions
(A/810), pp. 15-16.
3 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.
(See Recueil de textes à l'usage des conférences de la paix, (Paris, 1946) p. 123.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1835
5 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 260. The British and French
• Ibid., pp. 260-261.
& renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an
Austrian treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation
of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in
its sovereignty.
NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCO TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, JANUARY 12, 1953 1
The United Nations General Assembly on December 20, 1952,
adopted a resolution addressing an earnest appeal to the Governments
of the Four Powers which occupy Austria to make a renewed and
urgent effort to reach an agreement on the terms of an Austrian Treaty
with a view to an early termination of the occupation.”
The United Nations General Assembly resolution emphasizes the
world-wide support for Austria's plea for the restoration of her full
freedom and sovereignty. The United States Government which has
the past urged and continues to urge full Austrian independence
and
sovereignty not only welcomes this resolution but also considers
that it imposes an additional and immediate obligation on each of the
Four Powers to give renewed and urgent consideration to the fulfill-
ment of their pledge made in the Moscow Declaration of 1943.
The United States Government for its part urges that every effort
be made now to conclude a Four Power Treaty. It is proposed,
therefore, rather than to continue the sterile exchange of notes, the
most recent of which is the Soviet Government's note of September
27, 1952, that a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies be held at
an early date for the purpose of concluding an Austrian Treaty.
Since the United States Deputy 4 will be in the chair at this meeting,
he will request the Secretary General of the Austrian Treaty Deputies
to issue invitations for an early meeting of the Four Deputies in
London.
85. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, JANUARY 29, 1953 6
The United States Government acknowledges the receipt of the
Soviet note of January 27 6 and wishes to reaffirm its desire to comply
with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December
20, 1952?
which called upon the Four Powers to make a renewed and
urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian treaty
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135. Similar notes were sent
by the British and French Embassies.
See Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1952 (New York, 1953), pp.
2
Supra.
271-273.
4 Samuel Reber, Jr.
Embassies sent similar notes.
7
Supra, doc. 83.
1836
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and
the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in her sovereignty
,
With this purpose in mind, the United States Government called
meeting of the treaty deputies for January 30 in London in order to
conclude an Austrian treaty. The United States Government notes
that the Soviet Government declares its readiness. subject, however
,
to certain conditions, to take part in a meeting to discuss the Austrira
problem. The United States Government for its part does not con-
sider it appropriate to impose prior conditions, as proposed by the
Soviet Government, as to the scope of these discussions. It reiterata
its readiness to discuss, without prior conditions, any and all matters
relevant to the speedy conclusion of a treaty. To that end, it repeats
the invitation to the Soviet deputy to attend a meeting on January 30,
but is prepared if the Soviet Government should prefer, to postpone
the meeting until February 6.
86. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, FEBRUARY 10, 1953 1
(In answer to questions concerning the meetings of the Austrian
treaty deputies at London on February 6 and February 9, Michael J.
McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, made the following
statement:]
Andrei Gromyko furnished further proof that the Soviet Union
has no intention of concluding an Austrian treaty and desires thal
Austria continue as an occupied country. During yesterday's meet
ing, the Western deputies had repeated the simple fact that they had
met to agree on an Austrian treaty. The French chairman (Etienne
de Crouy-Chanel] suggested that anything could be discussed that
would lead to a treaty. He proposed that the long draft treaty be
discussed inasmuch as he assumed that the Soviet Government
had expressed its readiness to conclude a treaty on the basis of this
draft only.
Mr. Gromyko, however, again insisted that no discussion cook
take place until the so-called abbreviated treaty? was withdrawl
He refused to be budged even after the Western deputies declarat
that they might withdraw the abbreviated treaty if a just and equ
table treaty could be concluded on any other basis, including the low
draft, without further delay. The Western deputies in fact formals
draft. When the Soviet representative saw no way out, he simpi
proposed
that discussion
begin by going through that draft, the low
said: "I have nothing to add to my previous position.
The Western deputies then agreed that no further purpose
be served in continuing discussions
made futile by Mr. Gromykos
position and agreed to suspend further meetings pending submission
of reports to their governments.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 23, 1953, p. 305.
2 Supra, doc. 80.
would
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1837
Étienne de Crouy-Chanel (France).
Department of State Bulletin, June 8, 1953, pp. 814–815.
French Embassies sent similar notes.
* Department of State Bulletin, June 22, 1953, pp. 873–874. The British and
87. JOINT NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND
FRENCH DEPUTIES FOR THE AUSTRIAN TREATY TO THE
SOVIET DEPUTY,2 MAY 26, 19533
In his letter of the 25 May 4 to the Secretary General of the Depu-
ties for the Austrian Treaty, the Soviet Deputy alleged that a meeting
of the Treaty Deputies could be called only at the request of the
Council of Foreign Ministers, and asserted that there were no grounds
for believing that the meeting called for the 27 May would be success-
ful
. The Deputies of France, the United Kingdom and the United
States fail to understand the Soviet Deputy's position. It is the
assigned task of the Deputies to draft an Austrian Treaty. All but
& few of their 260 previous meetings were called without specific
instructions from the Council of Foreign Ministers. Moreover, at the
last meeting of the Deputies on February 9, 1953, the Soviet Deputy
agreed to an adjournment with the understanding that the next
meeting would be called by the United Kingdom Chairman at an
The three Deputies consider unwarranted the assumption by the
Soviet Deputy that the meeting proposed would not lead to the con-
clusion of an Austrian Treaty. “At the last meeting they made it
perfectly clear they were prepared to accept any treaty in terms which
would ensure Austria's political and economic independence. They
are convinced that, given goodwill on the Soviet side, it would still
be possible to conclude such a treaty.
The three Deputies deeply regret the refusal of the Soviet Deputy
to meet and are reporting the position to their respective governments.
early date.
88. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOS-
COW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, JUNE 11,
19537
The Ambassador of the United States presents his compliments
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and, under instructions from his Government, has the
honor to communicate the following:
The United States Government has learned with regret of the
refusal of the Soviet Deputy to attend the meeting of Deputies for
the Austrian Treaty called for the 27th of May by the United King-
Walter Dowling (United States), Geoffrey Harrison (United Kingdom), and
2 Andrei A. Gromyko.
8
.
5 Charles E. Bohlen.
Vyacheslav M. Molotov.
1838
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
dom Chairman, The United States Government is seriously con
cerned that it is now nearly ten years since the Austrian people were
promised the restoration of their freedom and independence in the
Moscow Declaration. It is more than eight years since the end of
hostilities in Europe made possible the fulfillment of that pledge
.
The United States Government cannot accept as justification for
this further delay in the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty the pretert
on which the Soviet Deputy has based his refusal to attend the
meeting.
In 1949 the United States Government, together with the French
and United Kingdom Governments, agreed to meet the Soviet posi-
tion on major outstanding issues of the treaty provided early agree-
ment could be reached on it as a whole.3
Since that time, the Soviet Government has persisted in raising
obstacles which have prevented substantive negotiations, although
the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and
France have repeatedly made it clear that they were prepared to
accept any treaty which would ensure Austria's political and eco-
nomic independence.
It was in that spirit that the representatives of the United King-
dom, the United States and France were ready in London on the
27th of May to attend the meeting called in the customary manner
as agreed at the previous meeting. The Soviet Deputy, however
,
did not attend and proposed instead that consideration of the Austriku
Treaty be continued through diplomatic channels.
The conclusion of an Austrian Treaty is not a question of proce-
dure but rather of good will. To avoid further unnecessary delays
and to enable the Deputies to complete the work already done, the
United States Government requests the Soviet Government to in-
form it of the exact text of the treaty which the Soviet Government
is prepared to conclude in order to ensure the political and economie
independence of Austria.
1 See the Soviet note of May 25, 1953 (Department of State Bulletin, June 8,
1953, p. 815) and the tripartite note of May 26, 1953 (supra).
2 Declaration on Austria, Nov. 1, 1943; À Decade of American Foreign Policy,
3 See communiqué of June 21, 1949; ibid., p. 112.
p. 11.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1839
3 Documents on German Unity, vol. IV (Bad-Godesberg, 1953), p. 15.
States, and the Soviet Union. This meeting of limited duration
Governments sent similar notes to the Soviet Government on the same date.
· Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1953, p. 107. The British and French
F. NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING GERMANY,
AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1953–1954
89. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, JULY 15, 1953 1
The development of the international situation and the recent
events in Eastern Germany and in Berlin have intensified the univer-
sal desire to see peace more firmly established and to ease existing
tensions in a way consistent with the fundamental right to freedom.
While recognizing the fact that enduring peace can only be ulti-
mately assured when certain basic problems, such as controlled dis-
armament, can be dealt with, the United States Government desires
to dispose now of those problems which are capable of early solution.
The conclusion of the German and Austrian treaties which are long
overdue clearly constitutes an essential element of the European settle-
ment which the United States Government regards as a major con-
A German peace treaty can only be negotiated with the participa-
tion of a free and representative all-German Government in a posi-
tion freely to discuss such a treaty. Such a government can only
result from free elections.
The conditions under which such a Government should be formed
and enjoy full liberty of action, constitute a problem which is capable
of early solution if there is good will on all sides. It is equally clear
that no real progress
can be made toward a general relaxation of ten-
sion in Europe so long as this problem remains unsolved.
In its notes to the Soviet Government,
the last of which is that of
September 23, 1952,2 to which no answer has yet been received, the
United States Government made constructive proposals
, which
were fully reflected in the resolution of the German Bundestag of
June 10th of this year. These proposals are designed to satisfy
the unanimous desire of the German people for unity in freedom.
Mindful of the even greater
urgency which the recent events have
given to German unification, the United States Government is deter-
mined to make a new effort so as to bring to an end the abnormal
situation to which the German people is subjected. It has therefore
decided, after consulting the German Federal Government and the
German authorities in Berlin, to propose to the Soviet
Government a
meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, United
tribution to peace.
i
2 Supra, pp. 1819–1821.
1840
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
might begin about the end of September at a place to be mutually
agreed. The subjects for discussion should be the following:
(1) The organization of free elections in the Federal Republic
,
the Eastern Zone of Germany, and in Berlin. This would involve
discussion inter alia of the necessary guarantees for freedom of
movement, freedom of action for political parties, freedom of the
press, and the enjoyment of the basic freedoms by all Germans
before, during and after elections.
(2) Conditions for the establishment of a free all-German Govern-
ment, with freedom of action in internal and external affairs.
These are essential steps which must precede the opening of dis-
cussions with the Soviet Government for a German peace treaty,
itself a major element of a general settlement.
The United States Government also considers that at this first
meeting agreement should finally be reached on the Austrian Treaty.
90. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, AUGUST 17, 1953
1
The United States Government has examined with care the note
of July 302 in which the Soviet Government indicated that it was
prepared to resume discussion of a treaty for Austria if the "abbre-
viated treaty” were withdrawn from consideration.
In their notes of June 11 4 the Governments of the United King-
dom, the United States and France stated clearly, as they had al-
ready done on a number of previous occasions, that they were pre-
pared to accept any treaty which would insure Austria's political and
economic independence and requested the Soviet Government to
inform them of the exact text of the treaty which the Soviet Govern-
ment was prepared to conclude. The Soviet Government has not
responded to this request. Furthermore the Soviet Government
declined to attend the meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies
called for May 27, in London.
The United States Government suggested in its note of July 15
that the Austrian treaty should be discussed at the meeting of the
four Foreign Ministers. But in view of the Soviet Government's
note of July 30, and so as to conclude an Austrian treaty as soon as
possible, the United States Government proposes that the Treaty
Deputies be convened in London on August 31, 1953, in order to
discharge their obligation to report on this matter to the Foreign
Ministers. On the understanding that there will be no extraneous
issues raised and that the Soviet Government is prepared to conclude
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 31, 1953, p. 282; the British and French
Governments sent similar notes.
2 Ibid., pp. 283–284.
3 Draft treaty of Mar. 13, 1952; supra, doc. 80.
4 Supra, doc. 88.
Supra.
5
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1841
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 352–353.
2 Ibid., pp. 351-352. The British and French Governments sent similar notes
a treaty for Austria which will insure Austria's political and eco-
nomic independence, the United States Government undertakes not
to introduce for consideration the abbreviated treaty. In making
this proposal the United States Government assumes that the Soviet
Government will be prepared in fact promptly to conclude an Aus-
trian treaty and accordingly that the reference to a relationship be-
tween a German peace settlement and an Austrian treaty in the final
paragraph of the Soviet Government's note of August 41 should
not be construed as deferring any hope of an Austrian treaty until
other unrelated conditions are met.
91. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, SEPTEMBER 2, 1953 ?
1. The United States Government, in its customary close consulta-
tion with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has
carefully studied the Soviet Government's notes of August 4 and 15,
1953, which were in reply to proposals presented on July 154 by the
three Western powers. The Government of the German Federal,
Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been con-
sulted.
2. The United States Government has no intention once again to
refute the Soviet Government's criticisms of policy followed by the
three powers, nor of thus prolonging a sterile discussion which can
only be harmful to the cause of peace.
3. The United States Government therefore fully reserves its posi-
tion in regard to the various allegations in the Soviet notes of August
4 and 15, and will confine its comments to the problems of an urgent
nature which arise in connection with the meeting of the Foreign
Ministers proposed in its note of July 15.
4. Real progress toward peace and toward a lessening of inter-
national tension would be achieved were it possible to find an early
solution of some of the existing problems concerning Germany and to
conclude the Austrian state treaty. It therefore appears desirable
that the meeting of the Foreign Ministers should devote itself
to these
problems; whereas to inject into the discussion a series of other com-
plex questions, as proposed by the Soviet Government, could only
delay and prejudice the success of the talks. A solution of the
German and Austrian problems could
be expected
to pave the way
for fruitful discussion of other major questions. The United States
Government also wishes to point out that the study of some of these
other questions has already been entrusted to such international
organizations as the United Nations or to international bodies such
as the political conference on Korea where the Chinese People's
wwvwww.WWW.AJ... www.
on the same date.
3 Ibid., pp. 352-356.
* Supra, doc. 89.
415900_57-Vol. 2-13
1842
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Republic will be represented. The latter's participation in the pro-
posed meeting of Foreign Ministers of the four powers could not
therefore be justified.
5. The Soviet Government has suggested a procedure for dealing
with the German problem which appears complicated, and work on
such a basis could, at best, only be long drawn out. The Soviet
Government's note of August 15 envisages, in effect, a series of devices
which could result in postponing to some indeterminate date the hold-
ing of free elections in the Federal Republic, in the East Zone of
Germany, and in Berlin. An All-German Government which is not
based on the will of the people as expressed in free elections would
not be qualified to take vital decisions affecting the future of the
United Germany. The problem of free elections is thus the key to
any all-German settlement. The United States Government there-
fore considers that the meeting of the Foreign Ministers should devote
itself to the German problem, the solution of which is an essential
part of a world settlement, and concentrate in the first instance on
the question of free elections and the status of the future German
Government.
6. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that when the United
States Government proposed, in its note of July 15, that the problem
of free elections be considered first, it did not make any prior condition
that an investigating commission be established. It seems, therefore
,
that on this point the Soviet Government has misinterpreted the
terms of this note.
7. The United States Government has never considered that the
re-establishment of freedom and independence of Austria, which by
terms of the Moscow declaration of November 1943 ? must be con-
sidered as a liberated country, should be dependent upon progress
toward a solution of the German problem. It considers that these
two problems are quite distinct. In its view nothing should now
prevent the conclusion of an Austrian treaty. It therefore regrets
the failure of the Soviet Government to accept its proposals that the
Austrian treaty deputies should meet on August 31. It nevertheless
remains the hope of the United States Government that the Foreign
Ministers will be able to agree on the Austrian state treaty when they
themselves meet.
8. The United States Government is convinced that progress is
more likely to be made by discussion of these problems than by &
further exchange of notes. Consequently, it renews its invitation
to the Soviet Government to participate in a meeting of the four
Foreign Ministers which could take place on October 15 at Lugano
.
It understands that this would be agreeable
to the Swiss Government
.
See infrn, pp. 2685-2693 and 2695--2701.
3 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.
3 See the American note of Aug. 17, 1953, to the Soviet Government; supra.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1843
Nov. 14, 1944, and July 26, 1945; TIAS 3071 (5 UST 2078.)
92. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1953 1
The continued partition of Germany is a scandal. It is more than
that. It is a crime. Originally, there were four zones of occupation,
one each for Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet
Union. This was designed as a convenient way for the Allies to
administer the first phases of the surrender terms. It was never
intended that Germany should be indefinitely partitioned. Britain,
France, and the United States over 4 years ago put their zones together. 4
The Soviet Union has stubbornly held on to the part of Germany it
occupies.
This is not only wrong to the Germans; it is a menace to the peace.
The Germans in the Soviet zone, now cut off from their fellows for
over 8 years and subjected to the despotic rule of Soviet puppets, are
becoming increasingly restless. Their pathetic economic plight is
shown by the eagerness with which they seek the food packages
made
available to them in West Berlin. They have sought these by the
millions, even at great personal risk. Their growing resentment at
their rulers is shown by the riots and strikes which led even unarmed
Germans with stones to seek to resist the Red Army tanks which
were sent to subdue them.
Now, in an effort to curry favor with the Germans, particularly
having in mind the coming elections, the Soviet leaders have made
another of a long series of propaganda gestures in giving lip service
to the idea of German unity. However, they have surrounded this
with conditions which would effectively nullify any practical result.
For example, in their note of August 4,6 the Soviet Union proposed
that Communist China should be brought into Foreign Minister
consultations dealing with such proposals as that of German unity,
It is hard to conceive of any
proposition better calculated to prevent
any constructive result. Surely the solution of Germany should not
be subordinated to a solution of China nor should the fate of Germans
be left to Chinese Communists.
The Soviet Union has also said that before there could be German
unity, there must be a German peace treaty and that its own puppet
regime in East Germany must participate in the making of that
A peace treaty with the Allies, including the Soviet Union, when
German sentiment was purportedly represented by the Soviet puppet
regime in East Germany, would hardly be a peace treaty which gave
genuine expression to the wishes of the Germans. Such a treaty
could not be expected to be indefinitely accepted
by the Germans.
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 353.
* See protocol between U.S., 4.K., and U.S.S.R., Sept. 12, 1944, as amended
See trizonal fusion agreement of Apr. 18, 1949; ibid., pp. 588-590.
• The elections held throughout the German Federal Republic, Sept. 6, 1953.
• Department of State Bulletin. Sept. 14, 1953. pp. 352-353.
peace treaty.
1
505-506.
1844
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
It is the view of Great Britain, France, and the United States that
the first step for the solution of the problem of Germany is to have
all-German free elections to bring about unification. When that has
happened, then there will be a truly representative German govern-
ment and then the Allies can make a peace treaty which, if accepted
by the all-German Government, will have a true endorsement on the
part of the German people which they can be expected to honor.
In the hope of bringing this matter to a prompt solution, the three
Western allies have proposed a meeting with the Soviet Union on
October 15 to discuss in the first instance the establishment, by all-
German free elections, of a government which would unify Germany.
We also hope at that meeting to conclude an Austrian peace treaty.
In the interest of speed the three Western allies have eliminated
from their note 1 all controversial matter and have not attempted to
rebut the vast series of arguments and implications contained in the
two preceding Soviet notes of August 4 and August 15.2 Our proposal
is simple---a meeting on October 15 which would concentrate in the
first instance on the question of free elections and the status of the
future German government. This is what the Germans themselves
want, as shown by the Bundestag resolution of June 10, adopted with
the support of all political parties, except the Communists.
The response of the Soviet Union to this proposal will be another
test of whether the Soviet Union desires in good faith to solve out-
standing problems which threaten international peace and which
create grave international tension. We hope for a favorable response.
i
93. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOS.
COW 4 TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, OCTOBER
18, 19536
1. The United States Government in its customary close consulta-
tion with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, bas
carefully studied the Soviet Government's reply of September 28
to the proposals of the three Western powers for a four-power meeting
at Lugano on October 15. The Government of the German Federal
Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been
consulted.
2. A satisfactory settlement of the problems relating to Germany
and Austria
is clearly essential for any real and lasting relaxation of
international tension and is vital to the future of the people of those
countries. The United States Government, recalling its earlier notes
i Note of Sept. 2, 1953; supra.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 354-356.
3 Documents on German Unity, vol. IV (Bad-Godesberg, 1953), p. 15.
4 Charles E. Bohlen.
5 Vyacheslav M. Molotov.
6 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 547–548. The British-and
French Ambassadors delivered similar notes.
; Ibid., pp. 548-550.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1845
:
1
of July 151 and September 2,2 is firmly of the opinion that real progress
towards a solution of major international questions, including the
problem of European security, can be made by frank discussions on
Germany and Austria at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the
U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and France and not by embarking upon a
further exchange of notes. The U.S. Government trusts that the
Soviet note reflects a willingness promptly to discuss these subjects.
3. Such a meeting will enable the Soviet Government to state its
views on any aspect of the German and Austrian questions which it
may wish to present. For its part, the U.S. Government welcomes
the opportunity to put forward its 'views concerning questions dealt
with in its previous notes.
4. As regards the Soviet proposal that the Austrian question be
discussed in the ordinary diplomatic way, it is the view of the U.S.
Government that diplomatic channels are always available and this
government will continue to give its most careful consideration to
any Soviet proposal regarding the treaty which may be thus sub-
mitted. However, as no progress has been made through such chan-
nels during the past few years, the United States Government is of
the opinion that discussion by the four Foreign Ministers themselves
represents the most practicable way to end the present stalemate and
reach agreement on a treaty.
5. A solution of the German and Austrian questions is long overdue.
The Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and
France, conscious of the special responsibilities which their govern-
ments together with the Soviet Government share in regard to
Germany and Austria, therefore, desire to consider these questions
together with the Soviet Foreign Minister as soon as possible. Since
the date of October 15 originally suggested has now passed, the
United States Government proposes that the Foreign Ministers should
meet at Lugano on November 9. They sincerely hope that the
Soviet Government will agree to participate
6. The Soviet note also proposes an additional five power conference
to consider measures to lessen tension in international relations. The
United States Government is always ready and willing to discuss the
underlying causes of such tension with a view to their removal. But
it wishes to do so under conditions which offer reasonable prospects
for positive results and assure that the views of the directly interested
governments are properly represented. Accordingly, the United
States Government has already agreed to the political conference on
Korea in the form proposed by the Communist side in the Korean
armistice negotiations and recommended in the armistice agreements
and by the United Nations General Assembly. It has been proposed
that discussions shall take place at Panmunjom on arrangements for
the conference. All the five governments mentioned in the Soviet
note could be represented at this conference which it is hoped will
meet at an early
date. Its object is precisely to remove one of the
1 Supra, doc. 89.
? Supra, doc. 91.
Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724–750.
3
1846
.
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
major sources of tension in the Far East, thus opening the way for an
early peaceful settlement of other international problems now existing
in this part of the world. Other matters mentioned in the Soviet
note, such as the disarmament question, are under either current or
projected discussion in the United Nations General Assembly. Indeed,
several of the subjects mentioned in the Soviet note were recently
inscribed on the agenda of the current General Assembly at the request
of the Soviet Union. In addition, the United States Government
remains ready to discuss through ordinary diplomatic channels any
points which any government may wish to raise.
7. Thus, on these various questions, the way is open for progress.
If in addition a fruitful discussion can now take place at Lugano, the
way would be paved for discussion of other major questions and for
restoring the necessary conditions for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations.
94. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT
MOSCOW 2 TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, NOVEM-
BER 16, 1953
4
In close consultation with the Governments of France and the
United Kingdom, the United States Government has carefully studied
the Soviet Government's note of November 3 5 in reply to the note of
October 18 in which the U.S. Government proposed that the four
Ministers of Foreign Affairs should meet at Lugano on November 9.
The Government of the German Federal Republic and the German
authorities in Berlin have also been consulted.
The U.S. Government notes with regret that the Soviet Govern-
ment has for the third time within the past four months ignored its
invitation to discuss the most urgent international problems. The
U.S. Government is still of the opinion that the best way of reduc-
ing international tension is to persevere in constructive efforts for
the progressive solution of outstanding problems, starting with those
which most urgently require an early settlement. With this in
mind, the United States Government proposed a meeting of the
four Foreign Ministers in order to reach agreement on Germany
,
especially on its reunification in freedom, and on the Austrian State
Treaty. In the same spirit, it is continuing its efforts to enable
the political conference on Korea to take place.?
To judge from its note of November 3, the Soviet Government
contemplates a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, with the partici-
pation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's
1
1 i. e., the Eighth Session of the General Assembly.
2 Elim O'Shaughnessy.
3 Vyacheslav M. Molotov.
4 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 30, 1953, p. 745. The British and
French representatives delivered similar notes on the same day.
5 Ibid., pp. 745-748.
6 Supra.
? See infra, pp. 2685-2693 and 2695–2701.
1847
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
)
2 Ibid., Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 745–748.
6 General Assembly Res. 613 (VII); supra, doc 83.
Republic,” of such a different character that it would not only be-
come involved in futile and endless debate, but would also prevent
all progress in the settlement of questions which are both urgent and
concrete.
The United States Government laid down no conditions in its
invitation and made every possible effort to take into account the
views of the Soviet Government. But the latter has made a meeting
of the Foreign Ministers conditional upon the acceptance of a num-
ber of demands. Some of these have no relation to Europe, but must
in the Soviet view be met before even the study of European problems
could be initiated. Others would entail the abandonment by the
U.S., U.K. and France of all their plans to safeguard their own security.
A defenseless Western Europe appears to be the price demanded by
the Soviet Government for participation in a conference. The Soviet
Government must be well aware that such demands are totally
unacceptable.
The United States Government can only conclude from the latest
Soviet note that the Soviet Government does not wish at the pres-
ent time to enter into any negotiations which might have positive
results. The U.S. Government nevertheless remains determined to
seek by all appropriate means agreement on the most urgent question
the solution of which is essential to the lessening of international
tension. Therefore it leaves open the invitation addressed to the
Soviet Government on October 18. The U.S. Government is con-
vinced that negotiations on these vital problems would open the
way to broader agreement and would thus improve the chances of
re-establishing real peace in the world.
95. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, NOVEMBER 25, 1953 1
In its note of November 3, the Soviet Government ignored the
U.S. Government's invitation to discuss the Austrian State Treaty
at a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers
at Lugano. It said that
it awaited a reply to its note of August 283 on this subject and con-
fined itself to recalling the suggestion contained
in its earlier
notes
for pursuing this question through diplomatic channels, without
however putting forward by this means any proposal on the Austrian
problem.
Ten years after the Moscow Declaration* the Austrian people have
still not obtained their complete political and economic
independence
.
Wishing to fulfill the promise made in that Declaration and to com-
ply with the U.N. resolution of December 20, 1952,5 the U.S. Gov-
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 7, 1953, pp. 785–786.
Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.
1953, p. 19.
1848
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ernment has not relaxed its effort for the conclusion of a treaty.
During the present year it has three times proposed that the treaty
be discussed by the Deputies, and since August 28 it has twice sug.
gested that this question be taken up at the proposed conference at
Lugano.
It is all the more surprising that the Soviet Government has not
been willing to resume discussions on Austria in that the three Western
Governments, in order to meet Soviet wishes, had in their note of
August 17 withdrawn the short draft treaty, the sole object of which
was to achieve the earliest possible restoration of Austrian freedom
and independence. In order to remove any possible misunderstand-
ing, the U.S. Government wishes once more formally to state that
this draft is withdrawn.
The U.S. Government believes that nothing stands in the way
of
the résumption of discussion on the Austrian State Treaty except the
attitude of the Soviet Government. The U.S. Government is pre-
pared to study any Soviet proposal which would promote an Austrian
settlement and which does not raise extraneous issues. If the Soviet
Government does not feel able to participate in the very near future
in a conference of the Foreign Ministers, the U.S. Government hopes
that it will see no objection to the resumption of the work of the
Deputies at a date which the Soviet Government finds convenient
.
If, however, the Soviet Government would prefer to make proposals
through diplomatic channels and, in particular, would give an indi-
cation of the basis on which it would be prepared to conclude the
treaty, the U.S. Government would give any such proposal prompt
and careful consideration.
96. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, JANUARY 12, 1954
With reference to the Austrian Government's note of January
5,5 the Government of the United States has shared for many years
the deep desire of the Austrian nation for an early conclusion of a
State Treaty. To this end the Government of the United States on
July 15, 1953,6 in proposing a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the
United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R. and the United States
,
declared that an Austrian Treaty clearly constitutes an essential
element of European settlement
which the United States Government
regards as a major contribution to peace, and that agreement on
such a treaty should be reached finally whenever the four Foreign
Ministers might meet. Again in its notes to the Government of
the U.S.S.R. on September 2, October 18, November 16, November
1 See American notaz of Jan. 12, 1953, Jan. 29, 1953, and Aug. 17, 1953; supra,
docs. 84, 85, and 90.
2 See American notes of Sept. 2, 1953, and Oct. 18, 1953; supra, docs. 91 and
93.
3 Draft treaty of Mar. 13, 1952; supra, doc. 80.
4 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1954, p. 111.
5 Ibid.
6 Supra, doc. 89.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1849
1 Supra, docs. 91, 93, 94, and 95.
French Ambassadors delivered similar notes to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 852-853. The British and
25,' and December 8,2 the Government of the United States ex-
pressed the earnest belief that an Austrian Treaty should be con-
cluded at the earliest meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
The Government of Austria may be assured that there has been
no change in the intention of the Government of the United States
to seek and take every opportunity of restoring to Austria its well
deserved political and economic independence by agreement among
the occupying powers on the terms of an Austrian Treaty. The
meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Berlin will be such an oppor-
tunity and the Government of Austria may be confident that its
aspirations will there be given every support by the Government
of the United States.
G. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF GERMANY,
AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AT THE
BERLIN MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS,
JANUARY 25-FEBRUARY 18, 1954
97. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR 3 AT MOS-
COW TO THE SOVIET MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
DECEMBER 8, 19535
The United States Government is glad to learn from the Soviet
Government's note of November 266 that it is now prepared to take
part in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom,
United States, France and the Soviet Union. It is its hope that this
meeting will lead towards the reunification of Germany in freedom
and to the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty.
The United States Government is confident that real progress
towards the settlement of the German and Austrian questions, which
are especially urgent, will contribute to the solution of other major
international problems, including that of European security. In this
connection, the United States Government reaffirms that the voluntary
association of the free countries of the Atlantic alliance and the actions
of certain European
states for developing
their prosperity and ensuring
their joint security are exclusively defensive and a collective contribu-
The Soviet Government has stated its desire to discuss the possibility
of a five-power conference. The forthcoming meeting of the four
tion to peace.
? Infra, doc. 97.
3 Charles E. Bohlen.
4 Vyacheslav M. Molotov.
* Ibid., pp. 853-854.
1850
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
Foreign Ministers will enable any participating government to state
its views on this question.
The United States Government, having consulted with the German
Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, proposes
that the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers should begin on
January 4, 1954, in the building which was used by the Allied Control
Council in Berlin.
98. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
JANUARY 30, 1954 (Excerpt) ?
This second item of our agenda deals with the German question and
also the problem of insuring European security. History compels us
to treat these two matters together.
From this very city where we are, still largely in ruins, have been
launched two world wars. Two of our four countries, France and the
Soviet Union, have suffered land invasion both in World War I and
World War IÍ. The United Kingdom was invaded by air. All four
of us have twice had to marshal to the full our human and material
resources in order to withstand and finally to throw back the tides
of German aggression.
Surely we have a vital interest to do all that is in our power to
make sure that such aggressions should never occur again. Indeed
,
that concern is shared by the German people themselves who have
suffered cruelly from militarism and tyranny from some of their ow
people.
The sacrifices which have been made during these two World Wars
have now placed in our hands a large measure of power to influence
the future, for better or for worse, and to determine whether the
coming years will preface a durable peace or another disastrous war.
Nine years have now elapsed since the German Armistice 2 and peace
is still unmade. In many ways, that delay is a reproach to us. But
there is another side to the matter. The immediate aftermath of &
bitter and exhausting war usually finds that reason is submerged by
sentiments of hatred and revenge. The instinctive reaction at that
time is to turn to repression as a means to future safety. But the
lapse of time restores reason to its proper place and now,
9 years
ing passed, we should be able to invoke wisdom and statesmanship
to be our guides.
The problem that we face here has two major aspects. First, there
is the task of uniting Germany; and secondly, there is the task of
insuring that united Germany shall be a peaceful Germany. I shall
first speak of the problem of German unification.
The partition of Germany creates a basic source of instability, and
there is little merit in our talking about peace if at the
same time we
are perpetuating conditions which endanger the peace.
1 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions
, January 25-February 18, 1954
(Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 64-67.
2 Act of surrender, May 8, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, PP.
har-
505
506.
1851
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
for peace.
national assembly. Who decides when powers shall be transferred
all-German government, and what international rights and obligations
1 Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 223-225.
2 See Mr. Molotov's statement of Jan. 30, 1954; ibid., pp. 61-64.
I am firmly convinced that a free and united Germany is essential
to stable peace in Europe and that it is in the interest of all four na-
tions which are represented here around this table.
How did it come to pass that there is this disunity, this disunity of
Germany which is, as I say, a danger to peace? We here are not free
from responsibility in that respect, because it is the disagreement of
our four nations which has created the present division of Germany.
It is the disagreement of our four nations which perpetuates the pres-
ent division of Germany, and it is only we who can end this division of
Germany
As I pointed out in some earlier remarks that I made, that fact--the
fact that we four have a unique responsibility in Germany-should
make this German problem a central theme of our work here. It can
be the test as to whether or not we are really qualified to work together
There exists this partition of Germany which is a threat to the peace.
It is in our power to end it. All that is needed to end it is that we
should have the will to end it. If we do not have that will, then I say
we may be peace-loving nations, but we are not peace-seeking nations.
Mr. Eden yesterday submitted a precise and a detailed plan to
achieve the unification and freedom of Germany by an orderly series
of actions that would start with free elections. It seems to us that this
British proposal is clear, is reasonable, and is well designed to achieve
at the earliest practical moment a full German settlement, including a
German peace treaty.
I have no doubt that our discussions here around the table, as we de-
bate this intricate matter, may suggest the desirability of some modifi-
cations in detail of the plan which Mr. Eden has submitted and per-
haps some clarifications. Certainly, I think we must all have an open
mind on that, and I certainly have an open mind. But I do say that in
general I endorse the proposal that has been submitted on behalf of
the United Kingdom and associate myself with it.
There are one or two observations which I would make, particularly
suggested by some remarks that have been made by Mr. Molotov.
Mr. Molotov has, for example, suggested that the proposal of the
United Kingdom would be in essence an attempt on the part of the four
Occupying Powers to impose unification
upon Germany rather than to
let the Germans work out their own affairs.2 As I read Mr. Eden's
project
, it would be just the contrary.
Under his proposal, the essentiaľ steps in the entire unification
process, including their timing, are left up to the freely elected
repre,
sentatives of the German people. Who is it under this plan who will
draft the new constitution? It will be the freely elected German
national assembly. Who will set up a provisional all-German au-
thority and later on the all-German
government? The all-German
1852
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
it shall assume? Again, the national assembly and the all-German
government.
As I read the plan, the entire emphasis seems to be on enabling
freely elected German authorities to make the crucial decisions al
along the road to a final German settlement.
That observation brings me to comment on another point upon
which Mr. Molotov has commented, namely, this problem of free
elections,
Any proper plan for German unification must provide adequate
safeguards of election freedom. This, it seems, is covered by the
proposal that we are considering. Conditions of genuine freedom
must exist not only on election day itself, but for a reasonable period
of time before the votes are cast, and also after the elections, in order
to insure that there shall be no reprisals and that everyone may safely
vote his convictions.
To take care of this latter point, the United Kingdom plan would
maintain the supervisory machinery in operation until the all-German
government assumes full control and is able to assure democratic free-
doms throughout Germany in accordance with its constitution.
We can be sure that the 50 million inhabitants of Western Germany
are willing and anxious to cooperate to insure such free elections.
The same can be said for my Government and also, I believe, for the
French and British Governments. The 18 million inhabitants of the
Soviet Zone deserve the same kind of assurances, and I trust that my
Soviet colleague will agree to the importance of providing those
assurances.
Mr. Molotov has made some observations about the pending pro-
posal which seem to me to imply a lack of full understanding of that
proposal, or possibly, I might suggest, the need of further clarification
of the proposal. I will not attempt to go into those matters myself
because I am confident that Mr. Éden, who submitted the plan, wil
himself deal with these matters. But as I read the plan, it is not
subject to the type of objections which Mr. Molotov has indicated, and
I hope that, on the basis of further clarifications, he would find that
the plan itself, at least in its broad outlines, is reasonable and one that
we could proceed to adopt as providing a way of bringing an end to
this dangerous condition of the continued partition of Germany.
:
99. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 5, 1954 1
Since our meeting yesterday, I have read the transcript of Mr.
Molotov's remarks 2 and have studied his proposal. I can still find
no encouraging interpretation of what we heard yesterday afternoon.
1 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954
(Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 102–105.
2 Ibid., pp. 90-100.
3 Ibid., pp. 228-229.
1853
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Soviet Zone. The election must be so conducted as to assure its so-
privilege any organizations which by Soviet standards are of a Fascist
The basic impression which strikes me is this: Mr. Molotov is
afraid of genuinely free elections in the East Zone. He is afraid
that the 18 million Germans in the East Zone, if given a chance
to speak, would overwhelmingly reject the present imposed regime.
Mr. Molotov has good reason to be afraid.
Consequently, the Soviet Foreign Minister has categorically re-
jected the proposals for genuinely free elections which have been
put forward by the Western Powers. In its place he proposes his
own blueprint. In the name of peace, he proposes a method for
extending the solid Soviet bloc to the Rhine. In the name of what
he calls democracy, he has set forth the classic Communist pattern
for extinguishing democracy as that word has been understood for
2,000 years.
The cornerstone of the Soviet proposal is the so-called government
of the German Democratic Republic. That government was put in
office by Soviet power. It was confirmed in office by Soviet power.
If it had not been for elements of 22 Soviet divisions, including
tanks and armored cars, it would have been forcibly ejected from
power by the workers who in their desperation rose up against it
last June.
It is that regime which under the Soviet plan would negotiate
on a basis of equality with the government of the German Federal
Republic
. However, the scales are to be still further weighted in
favor of the Soviet puppet regime, because it is provided by the
Soviet plan these initial negotiations shall also involve "wide par-
ticipation of democratic organizations."
In the Soviet dictionary the words "democratic organizations"
have a clear, precise meaning. They mean those front organiza-
tions-captive trade unions, youth organizations, women's organi-
zations--which promote the Communist purposes without openly
presenting themselves to the people in their true guise.
It is under these auspices that there would be prepared the "all-
German electoral law," and the establishment of election conditions.
We can visualize in advance the type of elections upon which the
East German regime would insist, because we already know those
conditions from its past. I have already told of the election
conditions
which were established in East Germany where the voters were com-
pelled by armed force
and penalties to go to the polls and, when there,
were compelled to put in the ballot box a list of names which had
previously prepared for them and which was made public only
Indeed, the Soviet plan expressly stipulates in Communist language
that the election conditions would in fact be what they were in the
tion of all democratic organizations." It must preclude "pressure
upon voters by big monopolies," and it must exclude from voting
?
on election day
or militaristic nature.
If we take the tragic pattern which has spread all over Eastern
1854
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
}
Europe in the wake of the Red armies, it does not require much wit
to see what that means. It means that anyone who dares to express
the slightest doubt concerning communism is automatically deemed a
Fascist or a militarist or a monopolist.
If this system were to be applied to Western Germany, no organiza-
tion opposing the Communists or the policies of the Soviet Commu-
nists, which are the same thing, would be permitted to take part in
the elections.
It would only be the Communist Party and the Communist front
organizations which under Mr. Molotov's plan would participate in
the elections.
I have no doubt that the Soviet Foreign Minister would protest that
his plan does not really involve the sovietization of Western Germany.
I recall that, in the October 1939 speech to which I have already
referred, the Soviet Foreign Minister explained that the mutual-
assistance pacts which he had recently negotiated with Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania 4 "no way implies any interference on the part
of the Soviet Union. as some foreign newspapers are trying
to make out. We declare that all the nonsensical talk about
the sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our
common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs."
The memory of what happened within a few months to Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, and of having seen that same pattern extend
to the countries of Eastern Europe by the use of the methods which
the Soviet proposal prescribes for Germany, will, I hope, explain
some skepticism at the Soviet proposals for restoring freedom to
Germany
Mr. Molotov is too intelligent to believe that the people or govern-
ment of West Germany would accept his proposals or that the three
Western Powers would suggest that they do so.
The Western Ger-
man Bundestag, representing 70 percent of the entire German people
,
has unanimously refused to accept the East German regime as having
any legitimate status or right to speak for the people of East Germany,
One can only conclude that the Soviet Foreign Minister does not
submit his proposal with any expectation that it might be acceptable
.
His purpose is quite different. He is actually attempting to hold on
to the Soviet position in East Germany by preventing free
elections
.
We can well understand the dread with which Soviet leaders view
any prospect of really free elections in East Germany, elections of
the kind set out in the proposals which have been presented and sup-
ported by the three Western Powers. Those proposals call for “free-
dom of movement throughout Germany"; "freedom of presentation
of candidates”; “immunity of candidates''; "freedom from arbitrary
arrests or victimization"; "freedom of association and political meet-
ings"; "freedom of expression for all"; "freedom of the press, radio
Speech of Oct. 31, 1939; Soviet Peace Policy: Four Speeches by V. Molotov
(London, 1941), pp. 27–46.
2 Pact of Sept. 28, 1939; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 198, pp. 223-229.
3 Pact of Oct. 5, 1939; ibid., pp. 381-387.
4 Pact of Oct.' 10, 1939; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1939, pp.
705–707.
1855
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
7
3 Proposal of Feb. 10, 1954; ibid., pp. 230-231.
and television and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc.”
"secrecy of the vote”; “security of polling stations and ballot boxes."
Thus, could anyone doubt the effect of elections of that kind on the
future of the East German regime? Clearly the Soviet proposal is
a maneuver designed to protect this puppet regime in Eastern Ger-
many from being subjected to the test of what the 18 million people
who live there would say if they were ever given the right to say it.
The four of us came together 2 weeks ago for the first time in 5
years.' We met before the whole world, a world to whom a certain
promise was implicit in our meeting. That promise was that world
tensions should somehow be eased by the good will and common sense
of the participants. The three of us accepted the Soviet proposal
that we should meet in Berlin, a city which symbolizes the division
of Germany. We hoped that solutions could be found here for the
problem of German unity.
So far at this Conference, Mr. Molotov has adopted a different ap-
proach. First, he devoted his efforts to delaying, for as long as
possible, our discussion of German unity.
Now, his proposal shows that he has no intention of seriously seek-
ing German unity with freedom.
I would say to Mr. Molotov that it is late, but not too late to redeem
the promise of Berlin.
100. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 10, 1954 (Excerpts)
Since Mr. Molotov has been kind enough to say that the United
States can be an "observer," I thought it would be in order to make
some observations on his plan.
The proposals submitted are in two parts, one of which deals pri-
marily with Germany and the other of which represents the draft
of a proposed European treaty on collective security.
The paper with reference to Germany contains the statement: “that
we shall continue our efforts to seek a settlement of the German prob-
lem," and that, of course, the United States is disposed to do.
Then the paper in its paragraph 2 goes on to repeat the proposal
which has heretofore been made a number of times by the Soviet Union
with reference to the withdrawal of so-called occupation forces from
[Discussion concerning translation.]
May 23-June 21, 1949; See A Decade of American Foreign Policy,
pp: 110–112.
The last previous meeting of the four Foreign Ministers was held in Paris,
Foreign Ministers ' Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18,
1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 162–164.
* Proposal of Feb. 10, 1954, ibid., pp. 231-232.
2
East and West Germany.
!
3
1856
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
It makes it relevant, therefore, only for me to repeat what has been
said before by me and others around this table: that the proposal
would leave West Germany and consequently much of Western Europe
exposed to any threat of external aggression.
The second paper is the text of a proposed general European treaty
on collective security in Europe. Since the United States would pre-
sumably not be a part of that treaty, my observations are not directed
primarily to the actual text of the treaty, although there are certain
implications in it which do affect the United States. It is perhaps
implicit in the draft, although not entirely clear, that it is designed
to replace the North Atlantic Treaty. I assume that from the pro-
visions of article 7 and perhaps 10 and the fact that the Soviet
Foreign Minister, in introducing his text, made a serious attack upon
the North Atlantic Pact as resembling in many ways "the Anti-
Comintern Pact which led to the unleashing of the Second World
War." He went on to say that "there are no reasons to doubt that
the fate of the North Atlantic Pact shall be any better than that of
the Anti-Comintern Pact."2
So I presume, although the Soviet Foreign Minister can correct me
if I am wrong, that his proposed treaty for European collective security
would be in reality a replacement of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The United States certainly cannot take offense at the suggestion
of the Soviet Foreign Minister that the European countries should
get together for their own collective security without the participa-
tion of the United States. The United States, I think, has never
intruded itself as an unwanted participant in European affairs, and
we do not have any intentions of doing so in the future.
The American people have a very deep and legitimate interest in
Europe. Most of us derive from Western Europe. We share the
culture and traditions and religion of Western Europe, and there are
many bonds which tie us very closely together. But we do not feel
that on that account we have any right to demand participation in
European affairs.
The United States sent its armed forces to Europe in the First World
War when the West was threatened by German militarism under the
Kaiser. We delayed somewhat in doing so. But at the urgent appeal
and desire of the threatened peoples of Western Europe, and because
our own interests became involved, we did participate and certainly
contributed to the final defeat of the German militarists
represented
by the Kaiser.
When that war was over, we took our troops home at once.
then the same story was repeated under Hitler in the Second World
War, and again, after some delay and when the danger, not only
to Western Europe but also to the Soviet Union, was immense and
when we ourselves seemed threatened, we made a gigantic effort of
putting troops and supplies in Europe to help to save Europe from
the renewed militarism of Germany.
And
1 Protocol of Nov. 6, 1937; Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan,
1931-1941, vol. II, pp. 159–160.
2 Statement of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 159–161.
1857
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Soviet Peace Policy: Four Speeches by V. Molotov (London, 1941), p. 36.
; See treaty of May 27, 1952; supra, pp. 1107–1150.
? Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949; see supra, pp. 812-815.
4 Pact of Sept. 28, 1939; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 198, pp. 223-229.
8 Pact of Oct. 10, 1939; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1939,
And after the Second World War we withdrew all our forces from
Europe, except a relatively small number who were required for
occupation purposes in Germany.
Now, for the third time in this century we have sent forces back
to Europe and again the reason was that there were many in Europe
ho were afraid and who asked us to do so.
That fear is, I imagine, a fear which cannot be allayed by new
words and new promises, because the fear was inspired by a country
which was already bound by the United Nations Charter not to use
force against the territorial integrity or independence of any state.
Whether that fear will be allayed by any repetition of that pledge
is not for me to decide.
It has been suggested that our participation in the present defense
of West Europe to which I now refer caused the division of Europe.
That is one of these strange reversals of history--the upside-down
talk-to which unfortunately we have had to accommodate ourselves.
Everyone knows that the division of Europe was created before the
action to which I refer and that our action was taken only because
of the division of Europe.
It cannot, I think, be forgotten that, when the United States pro-
posed the Marshall plan,' which involved the
contributions of many
billions of dollars to the rehabilitation of Europe, that plan was
initially made available to all of the European states. It was at that
juncture that the Soviet satellites, under the direction of the Soviet
Union, were not permitted to share in that plan. Perhaps if that plan
had been carried out in its original scope, it would have prevented the
division of Europe-or at least mitigated the division of Europe
which unfortunately was intensified by the Soviet action.
The division of Europe, I am afraid, comes from causes which
considerably antedate the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty?
and the proposed
European Defense Community. It goes back to the
date when the Soviet control, initially confined to the Soviet Union
itself
, was extended to a vast area which now includes
one-third of
I recall the pacts of mutual assistance which the Soviet Union made
in 1939 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which the Soviet
For-
eign Minister
at the time described in language which is almost exactly
the
same as the second preamble of the proposed new European treaty
The pacts with
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Mr. Molotov said
on October 31, 1939, "strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sover-
eignty of signatory' states and the principle of non-interference in
The second preamble to which I refer speaks of the “respect for
See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1268–1328.
the human race.
each others affairs.?
, pp. 705–707.
415900-57-Vol.2
14
1858
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
remain partially unagreed, and I am confident that with good ml
However, the Soviet Union has now introduced new proposal
which would totally alter the situation. They would cut the heart out
3 See the Declaration on Austria of Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreigo
the independence and sovereignty of States and noninterference i
their internal affairs."
What quickly happened to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has gone
on and on and has, I suggest, created the division to which the Soviel
Foreign Minister refers.
It is a division between those who have been absorbed and the
others who do not want to be absorbed.
Whether or not the Soviet proposal of today will obliterate the
division in Europe is, as I say, something which is primarily to by
considered by other states than the United States.
So far as the United States is concerned, we are determined the
we will not be absorbed.
101. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 13, 1954 1
Yesterday afternoon the Soviet Foreign Minister presented us with
a rather peculiar sandwich. The top and the bottom of his remars
stressed the necessity for the early conclusion of an Austrian State
Treaty, which would reestablish a free and independent Austria. Bu
in between the top and bottom he inserted some poisonous proposek
They meant that the treaty, instead of reestablishing a free and inde
pendent Austria, should establish an Austria without freedom aut
without independence.
I earnestly hope that these new proposals will be withdrawn, so that
we may in fact conclude an Austrian State Treaty at this
very meeting
as promised in 1943.3
The Soviet Foreign Minister's statement completely confirms the
view I expressed yesterday 4 that, if we adhere to the present draft
the Austrian State Treaty, there remain only minor differences be
tween us. As the Soviet proposals state, that draft treaty "was i
the main agreed among the Four Powers in 1949." Only five article
Soviet Union suggests, 3 months to reach that agreement. It op
be reached in 3 days or even less, so that we can in fact conclude ta
treaty at this Conference in accordance with the proposal made yesta
day by the three Western Powers.5
of the proposed treaty and turn the clock back, not to 1949,
1947, not even to 1943, but to the darker earlier period when by
1 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 19
(Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 188-191.
2 Ibid., pp. 180–183; see also the Soviet proposal of Feb. 12, 1954 (ibid., p.
233-234).
not ti
Policy, p. 11.
4 Statement of Feb, 12, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting
See ibid., p. 233.
pp. 184-187
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1859
11
Austria but a treaty for the subjection of Austria.
1 Proposal of Feb. 4, 1954; ibid., pp. 228-229.
Hitler's action Austria seemed hopelessly doomed to be forever the
victim of alien occupation.
The Soviet Union proposes to continue military occupation of
Austria “pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany."
Since the Soviet Union has rejected all proposals for the unifica-
tion of Germany on the basis of free elections, and by its own latest
German proposal treats the division of Germany as a semipermanent
condition, the Soviet Austrian proposal would mean an indefinite
occupation of Austria. By requiring the withdrawal of all allied
troops from Vienna, while retaining Soviet forces in the Soviet Zone,
the capital of Austria would thus be left as a defenseless island, sur-
rounded by a sea of Russian soldiers.
That occupation of Austria could never be terminated by any action
of her own. It would be wholly within the power of the Soviet Union
to prolong the occupation forever merely by perpetuating the division
of Germany and blocking an all-German peace treaty.
If the Soviet proposal were adopted, it would pervert the Austrian
State Treaty and require its being rewritten from the preamble to the
end.
How could we any longer in the preamble describe the treaty as
being one designed to liberate Austria and to make it a free and
independent state?
How could we any longer stipulate by article 1 that Austria shall
be “reestablished as a sovereign, independent and democratic State”?
How could we any longer declare as in article 2 that we "will
respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria”?
Article 33 entitled "Withdrawal of Allied Forces” would be ob-
literated and have to be replaced by an article entitled "The Indefinite
Military Occupation of Austria."
The treaty would thus become not a treaty for the liberation of
A second major and related change in the treaty is proposed by the
Soviet Union in terms of subjecting Austria to "neutralization.
A neutral
status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen
by & nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral
she has achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under
the Austrian State Treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be
free to choose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Cer-
tainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect,
as it fully respects
the comparable choice of the Swiss Nation.
However, it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral. It
is another thing to have neutrality forcibly imposed on it by other
! nations as a perpetual servitude.
A state subjected to such imposed neutralization is not in fact a
of the language which the Soviet proposal retains that "Austria shall
be reestablished as a sovereign, independent, and democratic state.”
It is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union, at this moment
when an Austrian State Treaty seemed to be on the point of realiza-
If
1
11
1
10
M
.........
1860
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
t
tion, should now propose provisions which would basically alter the
entire character of the treaty and which would violate the Moscow
Declaration on Austria of November 1, 1943, whereby the Three
Powers with the subsequent adhesion of France undertook "to see
reestablished a free and independent Austria." If the Soviet proposal
were accepted, there would be not a free Austria, but an enslaved
Austria; not an independent Austria, but a subject Austria.
If this Four Power meeting accepted the Soviet proposal, we would
expose ourselves before the world as being morally and politically
bankrupt. We would have forfeited all right to the confidence of
others in our willingness to fulfill our solemn pledges.
We do not know, we can only suspect, the reasons which prompt
the Soviet to make its present proposal. The reasons given are gro-
tesquely inadequate.
It is given as a reason that there is lacking a treaty with Germany
whereby Germany undertakes to respect the independence of Austria
.
It is said that, until that undertaking is given, Austria must remain
occupied.
The Soviet Foreign Minister would have us believe that, during the
period when Germany is occupied and totally disarmed—at least in
the Western Zones, the danger to Austria from Germany is so great
that Austria must be occupied to protect it against that German
danger; but that, once Germany is restored to a unified and inde- S
pendent status with a national army of its own, then it will be safe
to end the occupation of Austria. Such reasoning will not carry con se
viction anywhere.
A plausible explanation is the fact that article 22 of the Treaty of 30
Peace with Hungary and article 21 of the Treaty of Peace with
Rumania ? provide that the Soviet Union may maintain its armed en
forces on the territory of these countries so long as this is needed for vi
the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army as
with the Soviet Zone of occupation in Austria.
I can understand that the Soviet Union fears a withdrawal fron en
Austria which would also require it to withdraw its Red Armies from
Hungary and Rumania.
Is it, however, really decent that little Austria should have to vi
continue to be an occupied state so that the Soviet Union will here th
a pretext for continuing to occupy also Hungary and Rumania? So
ali
cynical an attitude will surely shock the conscience of the world.
We have heard from the Soviet Foreign Minister many words con una
demning militarism." But everything which he proposes, whether ist
relation to Hungary and Rumania, shows dependence on militar of
power. No considerations of humanity prevail as against naked
force.
The Soviet Minister has introduced in his Austrian proposal a por
posal for the four of us to consider the question of Trieste. That
UI
an
indirectly in
ра
1
1 Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1651 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 2065).
2 Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1649 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1757).
Foreign Ministers Meeting ..., p. 239.
1861
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
11
le
at
of these documents we have signed? Nothing is wrong in the wording.
? This statement by Mr. Molotov was not printed.
3 Declaration of Aug. 14, 1941 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp.
1-2); see also the United Nations declaration of Jan. 1, 1942 (ibid., p. 2). .
Protocol of Proceedings of Feb, 11, 1945; ibid., pp. 27–32.
proposal is unacceptable to the United States. In any event, it has
no proper relationship to the Austrian question. I hope that its
introduction does not mean that it is the intention of the Soviet For-
eign Minister to make a conclusion of a State Treaty with Austria
dependent upon the prior solution of all other European questions,
so that the first victim of Hitlerite aggression would automatically
be the last to be relieved of the consequences of that aggression.
I earnestly plead with the Soviet Foreign Minister to withdraw the
two Austrian proposals which he made yesterday, which, as I say,
would completely revolutionize not only the text but also the charac-
ter of the Austrian State Treaty. If he will make that withdrawal,
t then I have every confidence that the remaining differences, which
are very slight, can be composed. Then we could in fact conclude
the Austrian State Treaty at this meeting of the Foreign Ministers
and crown our efforts here with an honorable success.
102. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 15, 1954 (Excerpt) i
I would like first of all to answer the_last questions which the
Soviet Foreign Minister put. He said, "Do we want collective se-
le cuity in Europe?''The answer to that is, "We want collective
- security everywhere in the world.”
We have tried to get that security during the war and postwar
of years in many different ways.
h We tried to get it by the Atlantic Charter, 3 to which all of our gov-
odernments subscribed. I am afraid none of us can feel that the pro-
visions of the Atlantic Charter have been lived up to, provisions which
V assure the right of all peoples to choose the form of government
under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-gov-
10: ernment restored to those who have been deprived of them.
We tried to get it by the Declaration of Yalta, which provided,
among other things, a Declaration on Liberated Europe which pro-
vided for the establishment of free governments by free elections
And then we tried to get it by the U. N. Charter, which requires
all of us—and most of the nations of the world not to use force
against the political independence or territorial integrity of other
Why have we not gotten European security and world security out
What has been wrong is, at least in the opinion of some, that other
parties to the agreements
have not lived up to these agreements, and
-1)
-
I
DI
0
le throughout Europe.
10
1- ei
states.
III
!
Bu
at
* Ibid., pp. 171-174.
1862
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
t
t
g
SO
W
B
co
T
m
of
to
T
lo
sa
ba
th
tid
there has followed a great sense of insecurity in the world because
of lack of trust and confidence in men's and nations' will to live up
to their pledged word.
That is why there has grown up in the world, in addition to the
proposed universal system of the United Nations, other regional col-
lective security arrangements exercising what the charter calls "the
collective right of self-defense.
These special security arrangements do not have any words that
add anything not already in the United Nations Charter. The addi-
tion which they provide is that they are agreements between nations
which, over long periods of time, have come to trust and have con
fidence in each other. They provide the element of confidence which
unfortunately has not been present on a universal basis.
The Soviet Foreign Minister has asked why, if the 21 American
nations had made a Rio pact, is it not equally logical that the
mysterious "32" nations of Europe should not make a pact.
The Rio Pact, the pact of the Americas, is not just a regional pact.
It is a pact which, as the treaty itself provides, contains this declara-
tion:
"Peace is founded on justice and moral order and ... the pro-
tection of human rights and freedoms."
These are not mere words in the case of the pact of the Americas
.
That is an expression of reality which has been demonstrated by close
association for 150 years. And the ingredient which makes the Rio
Pact a dependable reality is the fact of confidence which is based
upon 150 years of peaceful association,
And so it is that groups of countries have sought to augment the
words of the United Nations Charter with the essential element of
confidence based upon long historic association.
That is true of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is true of
the nations which are bound together by the North Atlantic Treaty!
The North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the expressed determina
tion of their peoples to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and
civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy,
individual liberty, and the rule of law.
And those words, again, are not just ink on paper. Those words
are the expression of a reality which has been demonstrated over
many generations and which
are bound not by ink, but by blood which
has been shed in protecting that common heritage.
It is suggested that this North Atlantic Treaty is a cause of division,
It is clearly evident that history has revealed that the coming into
closer association of the Western nations is not a cause of disunity,
but is caused by the fear and apprehension which, to an increasing
degree, seized hold of these countries as the result of actions which
occurred elsewhere.
I recall that this postwar coming together had its first major be
ginning in the Brussels Pact of March 17, 1948.4 I recall, however
,
1 Statement of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 159–161.
2 Treaty of Sept, 2, 1947; supra, pp. 789-796.
3 Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949; supra, pp. 812–815.
4 Supra, pp. 968–971,
the
887
crt
of
ce)
pri
th
as
th
WO
br
is
AI
83
pu
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1863
balance of power.
83d Cong., 2d sess., Part 14).
3 See Germany, 1947–1949: The Story in Documents (Department of State
publication 3556; 1950), pp. 202–274.
* See infra, pp. 2536-2626.
that that was preceded by the Communists' armed efforts to overthrow
the lawful government of Greece and by the forceable coup d'état
whereby the Czech Government was overthrown and a Communist
government installed in its place.?
Then I recall that there was the blockade of Berlin, which brought
war very close to Europe.
And it was during that period that the idea of strengthening the
Brussels Pact by bringing in the United States, Canada, and other
countries first was conceived, and that treaty, the North Atlantic
Treaty, was then realized in 1949.
Even then, however, it was not thought to be necessary to imple-
ment that treaty with any large military organization.
I recall that I was in the U. S. Senate at the time of the ratification
of that treaty, and we did not think it would be necessary actually
to implement any large military organization under the Atlantic
Treaty
But then came the armed aggression in Korea, in June 1950, fol-
lowed by the Chinese Communist aggression of November 1950.4
And these events created fear to such a degree that it seemed neces-
sary to build a sufficient strength in Europe to create a respectable
General Eisenhower came over at the end of December 1950 to be
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and under his inspira-
tion there was developed military strength in Europe.
Now that there is at least a reasonable defensible posture in sight,
that expense is being leveled off.
I think it would be very difficult for any impartial observer to
say that the North Atlantic Treaty or the organizations under it have
created the division of Europe. It has been responsive to a division
of Europe which already existed and the danger of which was ac-
centuated by such events as I have outlined.
The Soviet Foreign Minister has asked us to study and analyze the
precise words and drafting of his project. I must say in all frankness
that I am not interested in the words.
I could heap this table high with past words that are just as fine
as the human hand and mind can pen. I have referred to some of
What I ask is, will these words bring with them confidence? The
words already exist; they exist in the United Nations Charter.
They have existed in many other documents,
The essence is not the words but whether in fact the proposal will
bring a confidence which will end the disunity of Europe.
I can say with, I hope, assurance that I will be believed, that there
is no international objective which is as dear to the hearts of the
American people as real peace and security in Europe. That ought
See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 753–782,
See Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czechoslovakia (H. Rept. No. 2684,
them this afternoon.
1
1864
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
C.
ai
es
W
m
0i
fo
Again it went down to the bottom of the hill. And the Deputies
to be our wish, because the lack of that has cost us very dearly and in
very heavily in the past.
I have, however, grown skeptical of the possibility of solving great
problems merely by repeating old words or inventing new words
.
I do not believe, myself, that the division of Europe, which so des.
perately needs to be cured, can be cured by a formula of words. I
believe there are some things which need to be done first.
it
One of the things that needs to be done is to end the division of it
Germany.
d
Here is a problem which is our own particular problem. It lies
here on this table; it is symbolized by the city in which we meet. And
yet we seem unable to even make that start in ending the division
of Europe.
T
PE
103. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 16, 1954 1
th
For about 2,000 years now there has been a figure in mythology
which symbolizes tragic futility. That was Sisyphus, who, according
to the Greek story, was given the task of rolling a great stone up to
the top of a hill. Each time when, after great struggle and sweating
the stone was just at the brow of the hill, some evil force manifested
itself and pushed the stone down. So poor Sisyphus had to start his su
task over again.
I suspect that for the next 2,000 years the story of Sisyphus wil
be forgotten, when generation after generation is told the story,
T
tragic story, of the Austrian State Treaty. Austria was promised
its independence 11 years ago. When our forces moved into Austrie
9 years ago they announced that they were there only to liberate
.
fa
Now, year after year has gone by, when we have repeatedly been
almost at the point of concluding an Austrian State Treaty, and
always some evil force manifests itself and pushes the treaty
again. So we have to start again from the bottom of the hill. That
is again the tragedy being repeated here today.
I recall that when we were in Moscow in 1947,2 7 years ago, an Aus
trian State Treaty was almost concluded as the result of the work
A
which the Deputies had been carrying on in London some 6 months
previously, and we thought then that an Austrian State Treaty was
in sight.
A
worked and worked for the succeeding 2 years, and finally again
if
th
seemed to be on the point of realization. And at our meeting in Paris
Ai
1 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1964
(of ;
2 The fourth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers; see Secretary Mar
shall's report (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 97-106).
be
tr
to ye
ar
SE
the
2
SO
S1
back
tr
VE
C&
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GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1865
9 Treaty of May 27, 1952; supra, pp. 1107–1150.
Anschluss. And presumably the Soviet troops are to be there to pre-
Soviet Foreign Minister as being found in certain Austrian periodi-
cals. Well, I wonder, is it to be the function of the Allied troops in
Austria to censor the publications of the Austrians, and to be sure
that nothing appears in any Austrian periodicals that relates to
1 The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers; see the quadripartite
communiqué of June 21, 1949 (ibid., pp. 110–112);
in 1949' it was so near to completion that it seemed that the Deputies
could conclude it within a few days.
Then began again the series of efforts, and first one excuse after
another one was brought forward-Yugoslavia, Trieste, the Soviet
claim for payment for the dried peas, and finally, when no more
excuses could be thought of, the Soviet Union suddenly realized that
it was wrong to work on the treaty at all through deputies and that
it all had been a great mistake that the task had been referred to
deputies for some 4 years, and, therefore, the whole task had to be
withdrawn from the deputies and had to be negotiated through diplo-
matic channels.
Now, when we came here with real hope that the Austrian State
Treaty could at last be concluded, we were completely taken by sur-
prise to find major new proposals put forward by the Soviet Union.
The most serious of those proposals, because it cuts the heart out
of the treaty, is that providing for an indefinite perpetuation of armed
forces of alien nations on the territory of the Austrian State.
It is suggested that the reason is, or one of the reasons is, the fact
that a European Defense Community is proposed.
As I recall
, the Edc treaty was signed in May 1952. I do not
believe that even the Soviet
Foreign Minister would claim that the
treaty signed in May 1952 explains the failure for the 3 preceding
years to conclude an Austrian State Treaty.
And if the European Defense Community Treaty of May 1952 was
an obstacle to the removal of Soviet troops from Austria, it is indeed
surprising and hardly explained why that was kept such a close
secret for 2 years, to be sprung on us here just a day or two ago.
It was indeed a rather cruel performance, if in fact that event of
years ago completely undermined the proposed Austrian State
Treaty, that no inkling of that should be given during this 2-year
period. Indeed, that is so incredible that, in the light of all that has
transpired during the past 9 years, we must conclude that all we are
faced by is another pretext, another excuse, for not carrying out the
solemn pledge which assured that Austria would, as quickly as pos-
sible
, be given its independence as a sovereign state.
It is not at all clear to me as to what the relationship is of Soviet
troops in Austria to the alleged reasons.
It is said that there is evidence of the development toward an
The evidence of movement toward an Anschluss is reported by the
We can only surmise as to the functions these troops are to perform.
2
vent that.
Anschluss?
1
1866
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Under the Austrian State Treaty as heretofor
drafted, Austria would be free to choose for herself to be a neutral
choose to be neutral, and it is another thing to have neutrality forcibly
The proposed treaty which the Soviet Union has been considering
1 Statement of Feb. 13, 1954; supra, doc. 101 (the text is slightly different
But on the basis of the reasons given, it would seem they would
have a great role indeed in controlling the thinking, the printing of
the news-perhaps the social order of the Austrians' supposedly
sovereign state.
What are these troops to do? The Soviet Foreign Minister says
they are not occupation troops. They certainly, as I said before
, ,
occupy part of Austria. They are there to stop Anschluss, which
,
it is said, is rearing its ugly head because it is referred to in publica-
tions which, presumably, then these troops would suppress.
And there is some evidence, it is said, that in some business circles
,
they are thinking of economic ties with Germany. Are these troops
to have the responsibility of controlling the economic, the commercial
life, of Austria? What are they to do there to stop the Anschluss?
All of that is very obscure to me.
Another reason given and to me that is the most curious of all-
is that the United States, it is said, has a hundred bases in Europe
.
Well, let me say first that none of those bases are under Edc, because
there is no Enc.
And furthermore, it strikes me as extremely curious to say that
,
because the United States has a hundred bases in Europe, therefore
it must be compelled to have one more in Austria.
I think that the Soviet Foreign Minister will understand that i
is at least excusable if we think, and if much of the world will think
that what is actually under way here is another illustration of the
unwillingness of the Soviet Union actually to restore genuine free
dom and independence in any area where it has once gotten its grup
through the use of its army or otherwise.
The interpretation is forced upon us by the otherwise inexplicable
amendments proposed and the lack of
any valid justification for the
That is really the tragic aspect of this affair. It throws a somber
light upon other problems as well.
The Soviet
Foreign Minister referred to the question of the so-called
neutralization of Austria and indicated that I had agreed with, or W
not strongly opposed to, the Soviet position in that respect. I think
that the Soviet Foreign Minister must have misunderstood me or per
M
haps I did not make my position sufficiently clear.
What I have said, as shown by my notes, is this:
G
"A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen PE
by a nation.
nation. Certainly, the United States would fully respell as
Austria's choice in this respect.'
fra
However, I went on to say that it is one thing for a nation
GO
th
imposed on it by other nations as a perpetual servitude.
with us here contains certain articles which the Soviet Union has
@
t
8
11
en,
2
from Mr. Dulles' notes).
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1867
CAM
181
ss?
ore
concerned; I doubt whether he can speak with the same authority
from the authorities of West Germany, or from the people of West
Germany, that they would like to see the withdrawal of troops of
the Western Powers which are in Germany.
1 See the Soviet draft texts of these two treaty articles submitted to the confer-
ence, Feb. 14, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting
? Ibid., pp. 124-127.
3 Statement of Feb, 17, 1954; ibid., pp. 123–124.
uld
objected to. Article 1 says that "the Allied and Associated Powers
of
recognize that Austria is reestablished as a sovereign, independent and
dy democratic State."
The essence of sovereignty is to be able to exclude
from your country the armed forces of other nations, if you do not
ay want them; and also the essence of sovereignty is to be able to make
dependable alliances with other nations, if you so wish. We believe
that Austria should have both of these rights, and it is precisely both
of these rights which would be denied by the amendments proposed
by the Soviet Union. They would, in effect, nullify the provisions
Les of article 1 which I have read, and would equally nullify the provi-
sions of article 2, which says that the "Allied and Associated Powers
... will respect the independence and the territorial integrity of
Austria."
As I have said here, the United States does not itself maintain any
1-
armed forces upon the territory of any other sovereign state except at
its expressed request and desire, and only as it so desires. We believe
Lise that that sound system should be applied to Austria.
We are not disposed to go along with a treaty which imposes upon
lat
Austria a fundamental, basic impairment of the sovereign rights
which ostensibly, in the first articles of the treaty, we give to Austria,
it
and then, in later articles, we entirely take away:
nk
Thus, the treaty would, in effect, become a fraud, offering sover-
the
eignty and territorial integrity by the first and second articles, and
taking them away by article 4-bis and article 33.
I beg that the Soviet Foreign Minister will permit this treaty to
be promptly signed, as he professes he would like to have it signed,
ble
by allowing the treaty to be a genuine treaty for the sovereignty and
independence of Austria.
Ted
104. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 17, 1954 2
I will comment on the observations made by the Soviet Foreign
supports his proposal for troop withdrawal in East and West
Germany on the
basis that this would give satisfaction to the German
I am sure he can speak with authority as far as the Eastern Zone is
as far as the Western Zone is concerned.
can say that there has been no intimation of any kind received
Pe
1
2013
ber
Fest
inly
em
Minister 3
He
Seul people.
Me
ell
I
Of
, pp. 239-240.
1868
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
siderable concern if these troops were withdrawn, given the situation
which exists in the East.
Therefore, I am afraid that, while the proposal might give satis-
faction in the Eastern Zone, it would not give satisfaction in the
Western Zone.
If the Soviet Union is eager to give people satisfaction by troop
withdrawals, I would suggest that a good place to begin would be in
Austria, where there is no question but what all the people eagerly
desire all the troops to be withdrawn. There we are assured of a
chance to give satisfaction. The Soviet delegation might give further
consideration to that matter and perhaps indicate their acceptance
of the Austrian State Treaty when we take that up tomorrow
afternoon.
There is, however, a reason more fundamental than any I have in-
dicated so far why the United States does not feel itself able to accept
the Soviet proposal which is entitled, “On insuring European se-
curity.”! That is the paper which calls for the final withdrawal
forces,
What the Soviet Union asks the Western Powers to do, presumably
in the name of European security, is what we did under very analogous
circumstances in Korea immediately preceding 1950. Our withdrawal
in that case did not produce security; it produced war.
Korea, like Germany, was divided. *Korea, like Germany, was
divided under conditions so that roughly two-thirds of Korea was
occupied by Western forces and the other third occupied by the non-
Western forces.
The analogy is closer because the indigenous forces in North Korea
,
like the forces in Eastern Germany, were highly organized and trained
,
whereas those in Southern Korea and in Western Germany were only
police forces.
Mr. Molotov has questioned Mr. Eden's (Mr. Bidaults] statements
with reference to the East German military personnel. The United
States has very reliable information to reveal that the East German
military personnel now total 140,200 men under arms. Of this num
ber 100,000 are in the ground forces with an additional 25,000 serving
in security formations. There are seven organized divisions of which
three are mechanized. Air forces constitute 60 jet fighters
and trained by 5,000 effectives. These forces are commanded by
ex-officers of the Nazi Wehrmacht and of the SS. They are additionai
to 100,000 East German police.
I can assure the Soviet Foreign Minister that there is nothing com-
parable in West Germany.
There are ample means of access to information so that anyone
can ascertain that fact readily for himself.
There is in West Germany a total of 150,000 police, none of whom
have any more than normal police armament.
thought of in terms of the population of the Western Zone, which is
of course, many times that of the Eastern Zone.
1
manned
+
]
1
i
1 Proposal of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting .
2 See Mr. Bidault's statement of Feb, 15, 1954; ibid., pp. 164-170.
: , pp. 230-231.
1869
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
I repeat, lies great danger.
1
unity.
| almost surely will follow the same course that was followed by the
| Germany which succeeded the Treaty of Versailles. There the re-
with the security of the rest of us. Since, in fact, Germany wishes
to associate herself with the Western countries of Europe, it is es-
sential to peace that she be allowed to do so.
have wanted to force her otherwise. The main point is that we should
associate herself with the powers of Eastern Europe, we would not
| feel that Germany is an independent sovereign state. In that way,
not attempt to apply such a coercion to Germans that they will not
The situation in Germany is thus comparable to the situation which
existed in Korea prior to 1947. Up to that time the United States
had its own armed forces in South Korea; and there was peace. The
United States took its troops out of South Korea in 1949, and in 1950
there was war.
It is not necessary at this point to indulge in argument as to just
where the responsibility for that war lay. No one can dispute the
two facts: First, that the United States troops were taken out; and,
immediately following that, there was war.
Therefore
, I am sure that Mr. Molotov will understand, even if
he does not agree with, our state of mind, when we say that we are
highly skeptical of a proposal put forward in the name of peace which
involves our following the same course of action which, under remark-
ably similar circumstances, in fact led to war.
It is to fly in the face of the teachings of history, and indeed of ele-
mental reasoning, to seek peace by continuing the disunity of a people
who are bound together by sentiments of patriotism and by ethnic
The way to get peace and promote peace in Europe is not simply to
think of various devices whereby we can mitigate the dangers of a
disunited Germany. We should seek a united Germany.
That is why I regret that in this
topic of item
2 the Soviet Union
has gotten lost in its great grandiose scheme, piling words upon words,
and it has left the central problem, which is the peaceful unification
It is not an accident that the three Western Ministers, under this
item 2, have concentrated their attention on the problem of Ger-
many and the creation of a united Germany through free elections. It
is because we believe that this goes to the heart of the problem of
We are also convinced that a united Germany should be allowed
to develop along peaceful lines of its own choosing. A Germany
which is coerced, which is told what it cannot do, is a Germany which
pursue her inclinations so long as these are peaceful and compatible
our second point is that Germany must be allowed to
If she had wished to
of Germany.
security for Europe.
extreme nationalists to come to power.
Therefore,
1870
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
achieve German reunification in freedom and by peaceful meali
In the meantime, they have suggested certain measures which coul
reduce the effect of the present division of Germany and its consel
1 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 191
It is a fact, which all of us who really want peace should eagerly
welcome, that certainly the greater part of the Germans want to
adopt a course which will end, for at least 50 years, and I believe
for all time, a distinctively national army, and equally end the Ger
man general staff. The fact that the Germans want to do this gives
us a unique opportunity to go to meet them, and to consolidate that
present will. That will may not always be with us.
If today went
ject that will of the German people which goes in the direction of
peace, if we try to substitute provisions which will be forcibly imposed
upon Germany, if we perpetuate the division of Germany, if we impos
limitation and controls of the nature of the Versailles treaty then
, I
say, we would be accepting a heavy responsibility before history.
105. CONCLUSION OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE: Commu-
niqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Unitel
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, February 18, 195
(Excerpt)
The four Ministers have had a full exchange of views on the Germa
question, on the problems of European security, and on the Austrian
question. They were unable to reach agreement upon these matter fr
106. CONCLUSION OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE: Comma
niqué by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Unite al
Kingdom, and France, February 19, 1954 2
The major problem facing the Berlin conference was that
Germany. The three Western delegations urged that the reunifis
tion of Germany should be achieved through free
elections, leadis
to the creation of an all-German Government with which a per
treaty could be concluded. They put forward a practical
plan to th
end. Their proposals were not accepted by the Soviet delegatik
that the Soviet Government is not now ready to permit free a
even as a basis for discussion, and they were forced to the conclusie
German elections, or to abandon its control over Eastern German
The three Western Governments will continue their efforts »
ta
CI
G
pl
T
p]
ef
B
1
22
(Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 217–218.
2 Ibid., pp. 218-219.
3 See ibid., pp. 223-225.
1871
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
8 See the two proposals made by the Soviet Union, Feb. 10, 1954; ibid., pp.
efforts to develop the system of defense on which their survival
Berlin Conference, see supra, pp. 85-90.)
See Dr. Figl's statement of Feb. 16, 1954; ibid., pp. 200- 202.
See ibid., pp. 239-240.
1 See M. Bidault's statement of Feb. 15, 1954; ibid., pp. 164-170.
See Dr. Figl's statement of Feb. 18, 1954; ibid., p. 207.
missioners should study these questions with the Soviet High Com-
missioner. As regards Berlin, the three Governments reaffirm their
abiding interest in the security of the city as expressed in the Tri-
partite Declaration of May 27, 1952. They will do all in their
power to improve conditions in Berlin and to promote the economic
welfare of the city.
The three Western Ministers did their utmost to secure agreement
upon the Austrian State Treaty. They accepted the Soviet version
of all the remaining disagreed articles. The Austrian Foreign Minister,
who was present at all the discussions on this question, declared
himself ready to sign the treaty in this form. The Soviet Foreign
Minister
, however, insisted upon adding new provisions to the treaty.s
The effect of these would have been to leave foreign troops in Austria
for an indefinite period after the entry into force of the treaty,
and
to impair Austria's right to play her full part in international life.
The treaty could therefore not be concluded in Berlin, despite an
Austrian offer accepted by the Western Ministers, that troops of the
Four Powers should remain in Austria until the 30th of June 1955.6
The three Governments are prepared to continue their efforts to
conclude the Austrian State Treaty, but progress depends on the
Soviet Union modifying its attitude. Meanwhile, they will continue
to seek every means of lightening the burden of occupation on Austria.
The three Governments remain ready to take advantage of any
further opportunity which may arise to promote, by renewal of the
contacts established at Berlin or by other means, å solution of the
The three Ministers explained and reaffirmed the purely defensive
character of Western security arrangements.
Offers were made to discuss how the undertakings which already
protect the Soviet Union against aggression could be reinforced??
The Soviet delegation made
no response to these offers. Their own
proposals would have involved the dissolution of the Western security
system, while the military power of the Soviet bloc
in Europe remained
intact. The Three Powers do not intend to be deflected from their
e for the text of Secretary Dulles' report of February 24, 1954, on the
pp. 234-235.
German and Austrian problems.
depends.
See Mr. Eden's statement of Feb. 18, 1954; ibid., pp. 128–130.
? Supra, pp. 1197–1198.
*
8
230-232.
can only prolong insecurity and division in Europe. These proposals,
6 Proposals of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussion
January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954,
1872 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
H. NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING GERMANY, AUS.
TRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1954-1955
107. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW
TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, MAY 7, 1954 1
The United States Government has consulted the British and
French Governments and the other interested governments, and in
particular those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on
those aspects of the problem of European security which were fully
discussed by the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin and to which the
Soviet Government again drew attention in its note of March 31.?
The United States Government has long been striving for the
universal reduction of armaments, to include the prohibition of
atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the control of
atomic energy. In the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments, and
subsequently in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the
United States Government has worked to secure international agree-
ment on disarmament and to put an end to the competition in arma-
ments which is imposing such a burden upon the peoples of the
world. Such agreement can only be reached by progressive and
balanced disarmament with effective safeguards which would re-
move the dangers of aggression from any quarter. The United States
Government is determined to do everything in its power
to bring to
a successful conclusion the conversations started as a result of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's initiatives as well as the disarmament negotia-
tions which will shortly begin again in the United Nations. It hopes
that the Soviet Government will make a constructive contribution
to the solution of these problems.
If these negotiations are to succeed, a sense of security and coni
dence must first be established. It is in this light that the United
States Government has again carefully studied the Soviet proposals
on European security first put forward in Berlin - and now repeated
in the Soviet Government's note. In these the Soviet Government
does not attempt to remove the actual causes of European tension
Instead it proposes a new collective security treaty which is a vowed
based on the neutralization and continued
division of Germany while
leaving unchanged the Soviet Government's close political, economie
and military control over the countries of Eastern Europe.
1 Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1954, pp. 756-757,
2 Ibid., pp, 757-759.
3 See President Eisenhower's address of Dec. 8, 1953, infra, pp. 2798-2805
.
4 See infra, pp. 2810–2823.
pp. .
This
1873
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Discussions, pp. 223-225.
solution of the German problem.
1 Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, as amended by protocol of Oct. 17, 1951; supra, pp.
? See the "Eden plan" of Jan. 29, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin
even when amended to permit United States participation, do not
provide any foundation for genuine security.
The addition to the United Nations of such an organization as that
proposed by the Soviet Government, embracing the Soviet Union, the
United States and all European countries would contribute nothing
to what is already a world-wide security organization. It would not
only be useless but also dangerous because it would inevitably tend
to destroy the authority of the United Nations. The United States
Government cannot therefore accept the Soviet proposal. Collective
security would best be safeguarded if the Soviet Government would
permit the United Nations to function as the Charter intended.
The Soviet Government has also suggested that its proposed
Collective Security Pact should be accompanied by an extension of
the Atlantic Pact through the adherence of the Soviet Union to the
North Atlantic Treaty. It is unnecessary to emphasize the com-
pletely unreal character of such a suggestion. It is contrary to the
very principles on which the defense system and the security of the
Western Nations depend. These nations have bound themselves by
close ties of mutual confidence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization, which is much more than a purely military arrangement, is
founded on the principle of individual liberty and the rule of law.
The means of defense of its members have been pooled to provide
collectively the security which they cannot attain individually, in the
face of the military preponderance
which the Soviet Union has attained
in Europe since 1945 and of the westward expansion of a political,
economic and military system subject to its sole control. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization is wholly defensive. There is free and
full exchange of information between at its members. All its decisions
are taken by unanimous consent. The Soviet Union as a member of
the organization would therefore be in a position to veto every
decision. None of the member states is prepared to allow their joint
defense system to be
disrupted in this way.
European and world security will not
be promoted by the disruption
of defensive associations of like-minded states and the substitution of
new illusory security organizations. The United States Government
remains convinced that the only way to remove the sense of insecurity
which weighs on the world is through step-by-step solutions
of indi-
pidual problems. It does not believe that a lasting settlement can
be achieved by erecting a new façade of security behind which the
fundamental difficulties and divisions remain unchanged.
With these thoughts in mind, the Western Powers at Berlin advo-
cated a plan which would have constituted a first step towards the
not even discuss this plan. The Western Powers also put forward
proposals designed to reinforce the security of
Europe on the basis of
2
812-815, 853–854.
415900_-57-Vol. 2-15
1.1.
1874
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
3 The
existing agreements. The Soviet Government refused also to con-
sider these proposals. The Western Powers offered to accept the
Soviet text of every unagreed article of the Austrian State Treaty.
But the Soviet Government, far from agreeing to sign on its own
terms, attached new and unacceptable conditions which would have
totally changed the treaty from one of freedom and independence to
one of indefinite occupation by foreign troops.
The Soviet Government has repeated the criticisms it made at
Berlin about plans for a European Defense Community.
United States Government has already stated its views on this subject
.
It is quite untrue to suggest that the present plans which are of
limited scope are responsible for the division of Europe or aggravate
the risk of war. The division of Europe was brought about by the
Soviet Government, and its refusal to contemplate the reunification
of Germany on the basis of free elections is one of the elements that
serves to perpetuate this division. In these circumstances the
Federal Republic of Germany cannot be allowed to remain without
any means of defense when the Eastern Zone of Germany, as its
leaders openly acknowledge, possesses substantial armed forces
. The
United States Government considers that the best and safest way
for
all concerned to solve the problem of a German contribution to defense
is within the framework of an association which by its very nature
would prevent Germany from taking any individual armed action.
The United States Government remains convinced of the urgent
need to improve relations between states and to ensure mutual
security. It suggests that progress could best be made toward the
elimination of the sources of international tension if the Soviet Govern-
ment would give concrete evidence of its good intentions by joining
with the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the
United States in (1) finding a speedy settlement of the Austrian
question that will restore to Austria its full sovereignty and inde-
pendence; (2) seeking a lasting and acceptable solution of the German
problem; (3) reaching early agreement on general, progressive, bal-
anced, and supervised disarmament: such agreement should specific
cally include the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass
destruction and the control of atomic energy under adequate safe-
guard; (4) working for solutions of the most pressing problems in the
Far East at the Geneva conference; (5) conforming their behavior in
the United Nations to the principles of the Charter and so enabling
the United Nations to fulfill its true role as an effective organization
for collective security.
1
1
1
f
(
1 See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, pp. 152, 168–169.
9 See the United States proposal of Feb. 14, 1954; ibid., pp. 234-235.
8 Mr. Molotov's statements of Feb. 1 and?, 1954; ibid., pp. 134-138, 142–148
1875
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
See supra, docs. 97–106.
European security, is intended to prevent any nation from having
by holding free elections throughout Germany under international
Powers at the Berlin Conference for the early holding of elections.
French Governments sent similar notes.
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 20, 1954, pp. 397-398. The British and
108. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW
TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, SEPTEMBER 10, 19541
The United States Government, in consultation with the British
and French Governments, with the other NATO Governments and also
with the Austrian and German Federal Governments, has studied
with close attention the Soviet Government's note of July 24 2 and
its oral communication of August 4.3
In these communications the Soviet Government has repeated its
proposals which were fully discussed at the Berlin Conference. The
United States Government attaches great importance to European
security but it cannot be usefully discussed unless the fundamental
interests of all the parties concerned are safeguarded. Security in
Europe cannot be brought about by the signature of a general treaty
of the kind proposed by the Sovieť Government. It will only result
from the solution of concrete problems, of which the most pressing
are those of Germany and Austria.
The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government
has again alleged that Nato constitutes an "aggressive military
grouping". The aims of Nato are purely defensive and are in entire
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. It was set up
to enable the western democracies to defend themselves against the
threat created by the establishment since 1945 of a heavily armed
Soviet grouping in Eastern Europe. It now forms a free association
of like-minded states, with other than purely military ties. There can
be no question either of modifying or abandoning this conception.
The association of the German Federal Republic
with other peace-
loving states of Western Europe in a defensive system, long after
the
rearming of Eastern Germany, far from constituting a threat to
independent recourse to the threat or use of force. This is the best
guarantee for the security of all Germany's neighbors, of Germany
herself and of Europe as a whole.
Neither in its note of July 24 nor in its oral communication of
August 4 has the Soviet Government made any new proposals for a
solution of the German problem. Under the proposed Soviet security
treaty the present division of Germany would be maintained contrary
to the profound desire of the German people. The U.S. Government,
on the other hand, believes that Germany
must be re-united in freedom
at the earliest possible moment and that this can only be achieved
supervision. The U.S. Government remains prepared to negotiate
pro the basis of the practical plan put forward by the three Western
? Ibid., pp. 398-401.
Ibid., p. 402.
4
3
1876
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
United States Government now renews; (B) agreeing to free election
If progress could be made in this way, the United States Government
the foreign ministers of the United States, France, the United
Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to complete
the action on these problems and then to consider the remaining
The simplest step towards the promotion of European security
remains, however, an early settlement of the Austrian question. In
this connection the U.S. Government must once again express the
view that conclusion of an Austrian treaty should not, as proposed by
the Soviet Government, be dependent upon an all-European settle-
ment, upon a German peace treaty, or upon any other matter extrane-
ous to the Austrian treaty. At Berlin the U.Š. Government offered,
contingent upon prompt Soviet acceptance, to accept the Soviet
text of all the previously unagreed articles in the Austrian state
treaty. The U.S. Government is prepared to renew that offer now.
If the Soviet Government will sign the treaty in these terms, agree-
ment could thus be reached at once to restore to Austria the freedom
and independence which have been promised to her since 1943.
Agreement on the question of disarmament would undoubtedly
help to create the necessary atmosphere in which the problem of
European security could usefully be discussed. The U.S. Govern-
ment seeks the abolition of the use, possession and manufacture of all
atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, within s
system which would include provisions for simultaneous and major
reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces to levels to
be agreed, the whole program to be carried out in accordance with an
agreed timetable and under effective supervision and control. During
the recent discussions in the U.N. subcommittee, the U.S. Govern
,
ment put forward proposals which could have led to progress
.
Although the Soviet Government was not then willing to consider
these proposals, the U.S. Government will continue to seek a
acceptable and effective agreement
and hope that the Soviet Govern-
ment will contribute to this end.
These are the problems to which practical agreed solutions must be
found if there is to be genuine security in Europe. Further inter
national discussion of them would only be useful if there is a better
prospect of finding solutions than was revealed in the exhaustive
discussions at the Berlin Conference or than is now revealed in the
latest Soviet communications. The U.S. Government remains deter
mined to do all in its power to make progress on these problems.
hopes that the Soviet Government will contribute to such progress
by: (A) signing the
Austrian state treaty with the Soviet text of the
previously unagreed articles, an offer made at the Berlin Conference
by the United States,
United Kingdom, France and Austria which
the
on the basis proposed by the United States Government at Beria
as the essential first step towards German reunification in freedom
would then be prepared to agree to the convocation of a
}
meeting
1 See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February
1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 234-235.
2 See infra, pp. 2810–2817.
1877
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1953, pp. 260-261.
They added that they were prepared to take part in a meeting of
* U.N. doc. A/2798, Nov. 22, 1954.
4 General Assembly Res. 613 (VII); supra, doc. 83.
8 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.
4 French adherence took place Nov. 16, 1943; Recueil de textes à l'usage des
Conférences de la paix (Paris, 1946), p. 123.
o See American note of Jan. 12, 1953; supra, doc. 84.
aspects of European security. The United States Government also
sincerely hopes that the disarmament discussions in the U.N. can
be brought to a successful conclusion,
109. SUMMARY OF AUSTRIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS, DE-
CEMBER 20, 1952-NOVEMBER 19, 1954: Report by the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, November 19, 1954 1
On 20 December 1952, the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions
, at its 409th plenary meeting, recalling the terms of the Moscow
Declaration of 1 November 1943, whereby the Governments of
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom
and the United States of America (joined later by France) recog-
nized that Austria should be re-established as a free and independent
State
, expressed its concern that negotiations towards the conclusion
of an Austrian Treaty which had been under way since 1947 had
failed to bring about the proposed objective. The Assembly, there-
fore, addressed an earnest appeal to the Governments concerned to
make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms
of an Austrian Treaty with a view to an early termination of the
occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers
inherent in its sovereignty. The General Assembly also expressed
its hope that the solution of this problem would "constitute an im-
portant step towards the elimination of other areas of disagreement
and therefore towards the creation of conditions favourable to the
accomplishment of world peace."
2. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom
and France have been working constantly since 1946 to obtain an
acceptable Austrian State Treaty. They consider that the time has
now come to report to the General Assembly on the results of the
efforts made since 1952 to implement the Assembly's resolution.
3. In January 1953 the three Governments, in notes addressed to the
Soviet Government,
welcomed the Assembly's resolution and pro-
posed that a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies be held at an
early date
, for the purpose of concluding an Austrian
Treaty. The
reply of the Soviet Government, dated 27 January 1953, stated that
the "Soviet Government considers it necessary to call 'attention to
the fact that both the raising of the Austrian question in the United
Nations as well as the resolution adopted on this question are illegal.
...
:
i
1878
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
independence. (Footnote in the original.] For the text of the short draft turla's
representatives of the four Powers on the Austrian question, provided
that the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom
and France were prepared to withdraw their proposal for an "ab-
breviated Treaty' 1 and to negotiate on the basis of the draft State
Treaty which had been the subject of the earlier abortive discussions.
The three Governments felt it inappropriate to impose prior conditions
,
as proposed by the Soviet Government, regarding the scope of the
new discussions.
Nevertheless the three Governments reiterated
their readiness to discuss any proposition which would lead to the
end of the occupation. The Soviet Government continued at meet-
ings of the Deputies on 6 and 9 February 1953, to insist on the pre-
conditions previously stipulated and declined to negotiate on sub-
stance. They declined an invitation to a meeting of the Treaty
Deputies on 27 May 1953 on the pretext that such a meeting (of
which over 260 had already been held) could be called only by the
Council of Foreign Ministers. The three Western Deputies denied
this and reiterated that they were prepared to accept any treaty
in terms which would ensure Austria's political and economic inde-
pendence. On 11 June 1953, the three Governments then asked
the USSR to state what kind of an Austrian settlement it was pre-
pared to conclude. The Soviet Government ignored this request and
again limited itself to a demand for withdrawal of the "abbreviated
Treaty". The Soviet Government also, in notes addressed to the
three Governments on 4 August,“ stated that “a possible successful
solution of the German problem could also facilitate the solution
of the Austrian question, thus apparently suggesting that hope of
an Austrian Treaty must be deferred until other unrelated conditions
had been met, a proposition which the three Governments were
bound to oppose. On 17 August they invited the USSR to attend &
meeting of the Treaty Deputies, scheduled for 31 August, and de-
clared their preparedness not to introduce the abbreviated Treaty
for consideration on the understanding that no extraneous issues
would be raised. The Soviet Government chose not to attend this
meeting. In late November 1953 the three Powers made yet another
attempt to persuade the Soviet Government to join a discussion of
the Austrian problem, offering to do so in a Foreign Ministers con-
ference, or in a Deputies meeting, or, if the Soviet Government
should prefer, to give prompt and careful consideration to any Soviet
1 It will be recalled that in 1952 the Governments of the United States, the
United Kingdom and France, finding the Soviet Government unwilling to como
plete the work carried out on the Austrian State Treaty since 1947, submitted &
very brief draft treaty which eliminated the unsettled questions of the longer
version, and yet included all the essential elements needed to restore Austria's
[treaty
of Mar. 13, 1952, see supra, doc. 80.
2 See the Soviet note of May 25, 1953; Department of State Bulletin, Jure
8, 1953, p. 815.
3 See the tripartite note of May 26, 1953; supra, doc. 87.
4 Supra, doc. 88.
5 See Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 352–353.
6 Supra, doc. 90.
1879
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1
Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication
5399; 1954), pp. 175–178.
proposals made through diplomatic channels. This invitation re-
mained unanswered.
4. It was not until the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in
Berlin, between 25 January and 18 February 1954, that negotiations
were resumed on the Austrian Treaty.? The Austrian Foreign
Minister participated in these discussions. He declared Austria's
readiness to pay, if necessary to achieve freedom, the price imposed
by the Treaty, including surrender to the Soviet Union of most of
Austria's petroleum resources in addition to other assets. He ap-
pealed, however, for alleviation of the burdens of the Treaty, espe-
cially of article 35, and particularly asked that Austria should be
allowed to pay the Soviet Union $150 million in goods instead of
cash.3
5. The Soviet Foreign Minister granted this latter request but at
once made fresh stipulations. The main ones were:
(I) That the withdrawal of occupation troops stationed on the
territory of the respective Zones of Austria should be post-
poned pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with
Germany. (At the same time, it was proposed that all
Allied troops should be withdrawn from Vienna).
(II) That Austria should undertake not to enter into any coalition
or military alliance directed against any Power which partic-
ipated with its armed forces in the war against Germany
and in the liberation of Austria.4
6. The Austrian Government and the three Governments objected
to the proposals of the Soviet Government, which would make the
conclusion of an Austrian Treaty dependent on the unconnected
problem of a settlement in Germany and impose the burden of con-
tinued foreign occupation on the Austrian people for an indefinite
future
. They also pointed out that the second proposal contained
conditions which had both military and non-military implications and
should not be imposed on any sovereign State. They considered that
Austria should be free to decide her own international relations in
accordance with the United Nations Charter. The Austrian Govern-
gave assurances during the Conference that Austria would not
enter into any military alliance but also emphasized that they could
not accept, as a condition of reaching agreement upon the State Treaty,
that occupation troops should
remain in Austria until the signing of
In an effort to obtain agreement, the Governments of the United
States of America, the United Kingdom and France expressed their
See the American note of Nov. 25, 1953; supra, doc. 95.
: See supra, docs. 97–106.
See Dr. Figl's statement of Feb. 12, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin
ment
& German Peace Treaty.
posal of the same date (ibid., pp. 233-234).
1880
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
willingness to conclude the Treaty by accepting the versions of the
unagreed articles supported by the USSR up to that time.
8. The Austrian Government, as a final concession, offered, if it were
agreed by the four Governments, to accept an extension of the period
for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Austria provided that
that extension was for a definite period and that such a concession
would enable the Treaty to be concluded. They suggested that the
date of withdrawal should be fixed at the latest at 30 June 1955.2
9. The Soviet Government proved unwilling to accept any of these
proposals. Accordingly, no Treaty could be concluded during the
Berlin Conference. The three Governments, however, made clear
their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the Soviet Govern-
ment were prepared to agree to the restoration of Austrian sovereignty
and independence, which would of necessity include the withdrawal
of all foreign troops.
10. Exchanges of correspondence since the Berlin Conference have
failed to indicate any change thus far in the Soviet attitude which
would permit the withdrawal of all occupation forces and conclusion
of a Treaty. In a note of 7 May 1954, to the Soviet Government the
Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France
again urged conclusion of an Austrian Treaty as a means of eliminating
sources of international tensions. The Soviet Government, in :
note of 12 August addressed to the Austrian Government, rejected
the latter's proposal for a five-Power committee to consider alleviating
Austria's occupation burdens. The Soviet Government instead sug-
gested convocation of a committee to examine the unresolved ques-
tions pertaining to the Austrian Treaty and other related questions,
but again referred to the Soviet proposals made at the Berlin Confer-
ence and failed to indicate a willingness to withdraw its troops from
Austria, a fundamental requirement for the restoration of Austria's
freedom and independence. On 10 September the three Western
Powers sent a further note to the USSR in which they renewed their
offer made at Berlin in February to conclude the Treaty by accepting
the versions of the unagreed articles supported by the USSR up to
that time. The Austrian Government, in replying
on 12 October
to the Soviet note of 12 August, said that it was prepared to participate
in new treaty discussion but pointed out that the withdrawal of all
occupation forces would be requisite to the conclusion of a Treaty.
11. The Soviet Government, in notes addressed to the Western
Powers on 23 October, ? ignored the offer contained in the Western
notes of 10 September to sign the Austrian Treaty but instead referred
to the same proposal made in its note of 12 August to the Austrian
Government for a conference of Ambassadors in Vienna for "ex-
1 See the American proposal of Feb. 14, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin
Discussions, pp. 234 ff.
2 See Dr. Figl's statement of Feb. 18, 1954; ibid., p. 207.
3 Supra, doc. 107.
See Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955), p. 239.
5 Supra, doc. 108.
The Austrian note of Oct. 12, 1954, has not been printed.
? Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 902-905.
1881
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
French Governments sent similar notes.
delaying or preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements. The
United States Government for its part is resolved to bring the Paris
destruction of defensive associations between states inspired by the
1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 901-902. The British and
North Atlantic Treaty (supra, pp. 871-873), and Western European Union
4 Agreements of Oct. 23, 1954, relating to Germany (supra, pp. 483-612), the
amination of questions connected with the conclusion of a State
Treaty". These new notes also contained no indication of the
Soviet Government's willingness to withdraw its occupation troops
from Austria which, as previously stressed by the Austrian Government
and the three Western Powers, is requisite to conclusion of an Austrian
Treaty.
12. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and
France deeply regret that their efforts to conclude a Treaty and to
grant Austria its freedom and independence in compliance with the
United Nations General Assembly resolution have been unavailing.
The three Governments will continue to seek means whereby Austrian
independence may be re-established and will continue to press for the
earliest possible conclusion of a just and acceptable State Treaty.
Further progress depends upon the attitude of the Soviet
Government.
110. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW
TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, NOVEMBER 29,
1954 1
The United States Government, in consultation with the French
and British Governments, with the other Nato Governments and with
the German Federal Government, has considered the note of October
23 in which the Soviet Government proposed a meeting of the Foreign
Ministers of the
four powers in November. They have at the same
time, in consultation with the interested governments, considered the
Soviet Government's note of November 13 proposing a conference
on the question of creating a system of collective security in
Europe." 3
The United States Government is disappointed to find that, except
for a suggestion for the hurried convocation of a European conference
on November 29, neither of the Soviet notes contains any new pro-
posal, whether on Germany, Austria or European security, which
has not already been considered by the Western powers at the Berlin
The Soviet note of November 13 is openly and explicitly aimed at
agreements * into force as soon as possible and they do not intend
to be deflected from this course. The United States Government does
not believe that the cause of European security can be served by the
Conference.
* Ibid., pp. 902-905.
>
3
(supra,
1882
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
to replace such associations by new organizations which would leave
fundamental divergencies unresolved and would thus constitute no
more than a deceptive facade. The United States is convinced that
the Paris agreements provide the basis for the solution of some of the
most difficult problems confronting Europe and that far from making
the question of European security more difficult to solve they wil
serve its promotion and contribute to the cause of peace.
The unity which is being built up in the west is far broader in its
scope and significance than a purely military alliance. The as.
sociation of the western nations is based on their common civiliza-
tion and traditions. The achievement of a close union in all fields is
a deeply rooted aspiration of their peoples. It is a development of
great importance in the history of Europe and is gaining in strength
and purpose. By settling old rivalries and forming new ties it wil
promote the cause of peace in a region which in the past has given birth
to so many wars.
Since the end of the war rearmament in the countries of the Soviet
Bloc, including the Soviet zone of Germany, has been centrally im-
posed, massive and unrestricted, thus compelling the western powers
to strengthen their common defense. Under the Paris agreements,
however, they have of their own free will accepted a system of con-
trols, limitations and prohibitions to be applied to their forces ard
armaments. This system is designed to prevent any member nation
from having independent recourse to the threat or use of force.
As regards Germany, the United States Government has noted that
the Soviet Government states that a settlement of the German problem
is of decisive importance for ensuring security in Europe. In pre-
vious notes, the United States Government has emphasized that free
all-German elections are the essential first step in the process of Ger
man reunification in freedom. In its note of October 23 the Soviet
Government has given no indication of its view on this point nor of
its attitude towards the practical plan for the holding of early elec-
tions, which was put forward by the Governments of France,
United States and the United Kingdom at the Berlin Conference
,
Nor has the Soviet Government advanced specific alternative pro-
posals.' The United States Government awaits a precise indication
of any concrete proposal which the Soviet Government may now here
to make concerning both the timing and nature of the free all-German
elections which are the essential first step for the re-establishment of
a united Germany.
As regards Austria, the United States Government can see Do
justification for the continued denial to that country of the freedom
and independence promised her by the four powers in the Moscow
Declaration of 1943. The governments of the United Kingdom
United States and France expressed themselves ready at the Berlin
Conference to sign the Austrian State Treaty with the Soviet tero
1 See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18
1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 223-225.
2 Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, P.
the
11.
1883
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
European and other interested powers to consider the remaining
of the previously unagreed articles. The Austrian Government
for its part made it plain that it concurred in this view, and this re-
mains its position. There should therefore be no further obstacle
in the way of the signature of the treaty and the termination of the
occupation and the withdrawal of all foreign forces as prescribed
therein. The United States Government notes with disappointment
that the Soviet Government nonetheless propose a meeting at Vienna
to "consider the remaining unsettled questions relating to the draft
state treaty and other questions connected with the conclusion of
this treaty.” The United States Government is at a loss as to the
nature of the questions referred to by the Soviet Government. If
the Soviet Government wishes to furnish the necessary clarifications,
the United States Government suggests that this could appropriately
be done in exchanges between the Ambassadors in Vienna. Mean-
while, the United States Government for its part reaffirms its desire
as expressed in the note of September 102 to proceed as soon as
possible to the signature of the Austrian State Treaty.
The United States Government has on many occasions given proof
of their desire to settle questions in dispute
by negotiations conducted
in a spirit of mutual respect for the essential interests of all the
participants. They remain convinced that this is the best way of
promoting the cause of peace. This cause would be ill-served by a
conference ending in failure. In order that negotiations may be
undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success, they consider
that a basis of agreement should have been carefully prepared and
established in advance. The essential basis for a useful conference
whether on Germany, Austria or the remaining aspects of European
security does not, in their view, at present exist.
In order to establish such a basis and to deal with the foregoing
questions in due order, the United States Government proposes the
(1) Agreement to sign the Austrian State Treaty;
(2) Clarification by the Soviet Government of its position on the
question of free elections in Germany which are the essential
first steps to German reunification;
(3) Exchanges through diplomatic channels on any other European
questions of common interest which might suitably be examined
at a later four-power meeting, in particular, questions relating to
(4) A meeting of the four-power Ministers as soon as it should
appear that there is a real prospect
of finding solutions and after
ratification of the Paris agreements by the countries concerned;
9) Should it thereafter appear useful, a wider conference of
following:
.
European security;
aspects of European security.
* See Foreign Ministers Meeting,
* Supra, doc. 108.
, pp. 234-235.
1884
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
111. DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, APRIL 5,
1955 1
For many years the Governments of the United Kingdom, the
United States and France have sought to conclude an Austrian state
treaty. They have made ceaseless efforts thus to bring about the
restoration of Austrian freedom and independence at the earliest
possible moment.
At the Berlin conference in 1954 the three governments expressed
their readiness to sign the draft state treaty with the Soviet texts
of the previously unagreed articles. This would have resulted in
the termination of the occupation and the withdrawal of all foreign
troops within three months of the entry into force of the treaty. But
the Soviet Government declined and insisted on putting forward
new and unacceptable conditions which would have infringed Aus-
trian sovereignty.?
The three governments have followed closely the recent exchanges
between the Austrian Government and the Soviet Government on
matters relating to the state treaty. From these exchanges it ap-
pears that the Soviet Government may now have certain clarifica-
tions to offer regarding their policy toward Austria, in particular
on the question of the independence and sovereignty of that country
already provided for in the first five articles of the draft treaty. The
three governments trust that the decision of the Austrian Govern-
ment to accept the Soviet invitation to Moscow will result in useful
clarifications.
Questions relating to the conclusion of the state treaty are of con-
cern to the governments of all four responsible powers, as well as to the
Austrian Government. The Governments of the United Kingdom,
United States and France accordingly consider that if the Soviet
Government should offer proposals which hold clear promise of the
restoration of freedom
and independence
to Austria, these could
appropriately be discussed by the four Ambassadors in Vienna with
the participation of the Austrian Government.
It remains the earnest desire of the Governments of the United
States, United Kingdom and France to conclude the state treaty as
soon as possible in conformity with principles which would insure
Austria's full freedom and independence.
l
1
1
1
1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 18, 1955, pp. 647–648.
2 See Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February
18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 175–208 and 232-241
;
and supra, doc. 106.
0
)
1885
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1 Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1955, p. 733; similar notes were delivered
* Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1955, p. 932.
the Treaty.
country with 7 million people. But I do not believe that anybody
realistically believes that the German people, 70-odd million of them,
112. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, APRIL 22, 1955 1
The Government of the United States, in consultation with the
British and French Governments, has considered the Soviet Govern-
ment's note of April 19 ? proposing a conference of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the U.K., the Soviet Union, the U.S. and France,
with Austrian representatives participating, in order to discuss the
question of concluding a State Treaty for the reestablishment of an
independent democratic Austria and in order to sign that Treaty.
The Government of the United States welcomes the Soviet Govern-
ment's view that the possibility now exists of concluding the Austrian
State Treaty. It would be pleased to participate at the earliest
possible moment in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four
powers together with the representatives of Austria in order to sign
From the information it has received regarding the exchanges
between the Austrian and Soviet Ministers in Moscow it is clear that
some preparatory work still remains to be done. Recalling the
tripartite declaration of April 5, it suggests that the Ambassadors
of the four powers in Vienna should meet at a very early date, with
the participation of Austrian representatives, in order to examine
the results of the exchanges in Moscow and to reach the necessary
agreements for the early signature of the State Treaty by the Foreign
Ministers
. It would therefore propose that the Ambassadors together
with Austrian representatives should meet in Vienna on May 2.
As soon as the necessary preparations have been completed, the
earliest practicable date should then be set for the Foreign Ministers
to meet and sign the treaty.
For the text of the Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955, see supra,
113. STATEMENT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE SECRE-
TARY OF STATE, MAY 24, 1955 4
At his news conference on May 24, Secretary Dulles was asked about
the policy of the United States with respect to neutrality,
particularly as
it would affect Germany. The Secretary replied:
It is the view of the United States that a policy of neutrality has
no application to a country of the character of Germany. It is all
Well to talk about neutrality for
a country such as Austria, a small
:
pp. 643-675.)
by the British and French Embassies.
Ibid., p. 734.
3
Supra.
:-**
1886
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
are destined to play the role of a neutral country. Furthermore
, a
President Eisenhower has pointed out, the kind of neutrality which
was discussed in terms of Austria is an armed neutrality, and there i
no limit in the Austrian State Treaty i upon the size of the Austrian
Army. I do not think that the German people or the Soviet people
or the Western European people want to see applied to Germany the
concept of it being an independent state with an unlimited army.
1. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF GERMANI
AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AT THE GENEV
CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT,
JULY 18-23, 1955
114. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES, BRITISH, AND
FRENCH GOVERNMENTS TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT,
MAY 10, 1955 2
The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States believe that the time has now come for a new effort to resolve
the great problems which confront us. We, therefore, invite the
Soviet Government to join with us in an effort to remove sources el
conflict between us.
We recognize that the solution of these problems will take time and
patience. They will not be solved at a single meeting nor in a hasty
manner. Indeed, any effort to do so could set back real progres
toward their settlement. Accordingly, we think it would be helpful
to try a new procedure for dealing with these problems.
In view
of their complexity
and importance, our suggestion is the
these problems be approached in two stages. We think it would be
fruitful to begin with a meeting of the Heads of Government, accom-
panied by their Foreign Ministers, for an exchange of views. In the
limited time for which the Heads of Government could meet, the
would not undertake to agree upon substantive answers to the maja
difficulties facing the world. Such a meeting could, however, provu
a new impetus by establishing the basis for the detailed work whis
will be required.
For this purpose the Heads of Government could devote themselve
to formulating
the issues to be worked on and to agreeing on metho
to be followed in exploring solutions. We further propose that th
Foreign Ministers, to assist the Heads of Government in their tas
should come together shortly in advance of the meeting of the Head
of Government and at the same place.
1 Treaty of May 15, 1955; supra, pp. 643–675.
2 Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1955, pp. 832-833; see also
June 20, 1955, pp. 989 ff.; June 27, 1955, pp. 1030–1031; and July 4, 1955,
20-21.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1887
3 Ibid., pp. 35–43.
1955; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, pp. 1011-1012,
This first stage would lay the foundation for the second stage in
which the problems would be examined in detail by such methods,
organs, and participants as it appears will be most fruitful according
to the nature of the issues. This work should be started as soon as
practicable after the meeting of the Heads of Government.
This procedure would facilitate the essential preparation and
orderly negotiation most likely to bring about agreements by pro-
gressive stages. The important thing is to begin the process promptly
and to pursue it with patience and determination.
We hope that this proposal will commend itself to the Soviet
Union as a useful basis for progress toward better relations between
us. If the Soviet Union agrees that an early meeting of Heads of
Government to explore such a program would be useful, we suggest
that our Foreign Ministers settle through diplomatic channels or
otherwise upon a time and place for such a meeting. The forthcom-
ing meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Vienna for the signing of the
Austrian State Treaty i might provide an opportunity for preliminary
discussion of this proposal.
[For text of President Eisenhower's address of July 15, 1955, see infra,
pp. 2005-2008.]
115. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
JULY 19, 1955 (Excerpts) 2
I would say with reference to the official text [of Premier
Bulganin's statement of July 18, 1955 3] that it was delivered to
the United States Delegation this morning. I had not received it
when I started to speak. I have just received a copy of it since, and
I am prepared in a very preliminary way to touch on the matters as
to which Mr. Molotov indicates he would like to have the views of
the United States Delegation.
With respect to the policy of neutrality, the views of the United
States have been made clear in connection with the proposed declara-
tion of neutrality by the Austrian Government. There we indicated
that we were prepared to respect the free action of that country in
adopting for themselves a policy of neutrality. However, we doubt
that a policy of so-called neutrality should be encouraged generally,
because we believe in the principle of the United Nations Charter,
which is that there is a duty, broadly speaking, upon nations--always
subject to minor exceptions-but there is a duty upon nations to be
prepared to take collective action for the preservation of peace and
· Treaty of May 15, 1955; supra, pp. 643–675.
The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 69–70.
This declaration was later made in the Austrian Government's note of Nov. 14,
1888
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1 Mr. Edgar Faure, French Premier; The Geneva Conference of Heads of Gore
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. We particularly
consider that neutrality is a quite unrealistic policy for, for example,
country of the large population and geographical location of Germany,
That was expressed very forcibly yesterday by M. Faure, and this
United States entirely agrees with that. I recall that the United
States tried neutrality in 1914 and in 1939 and we found that it wa
a dangerous policy, not only for ourselves but for our friends; and
recall that when the United Nations was originally founded the
were excluded from the founding countries all nations which hai
pursued a policy of neutrality in the Second World War.
116. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 19, 1955
(Excerpt) 2
Now I would address myself, then, as others, to this Germe
problem. I do not wish to go over the same ground that others have
but I would like to talk a little bit about NATO as it was conceived
as it has been organized, and as it has been administered, possibly
little bit from the political sense, but also from the military. I wou
particularly like my friend, Marshal Zhukov, to listen carefully i
what I have now to say. I have known him for a long time and
knows that, speaking as soldier to soldier, I have never uttered] I
single word that I did not believe to be the truth.
In December of 1950, or January 1951, I returned to Europe
(
the head of SHAPE, the forces that the NATO countries had broug
together into a single headquarters in Paris. I assure you that
accepted that job—because I had been retired-I accepted that
because I believed it to be a true agency for peace. Personally
have had enough of war and I would not have accepted that comme
had I conceived it to be an organization getting ready really to i
One of the great problems then facing the Western world was
many. Germany, if allowed to become a military vacuum, if allow
to become again a fertile ground for the propagation of a Hitler
,
t
be of the gravest danger. Now, admittedly, we were not at tu
moment thinking of danger to the Soviet Union: we were thinking
.
danger to Western Europe.
Let us not forget that our Allied friend within a matter of 85 yeni
has three times been locked in mortal combat with Germany,
T
always as a result of German aggression.
Let us draw Germany into such a position that she would not be a
prey to a Hitler, a dissatisfied, unhappy nation suffering from
inferiority complex, but one which could play a respectable part
own defense, but which could not gain the power to attack.
ment, pp. 22–31.
8 Ibid., pp. 45–47.
1
€
(
8
fort
€
a war.
8
coule
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II
1
Cinnan
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1889
a
1954; supra, pp. 812–815, 853-854, and 871-873.
Now, speaking politically for just a moment, all the world knows the
main activities of every Western nation. There is free access to our
great centers of activity by all the press of the world. There is news
published about every main army camp, every great facility that we
have, and this news goes all over the world. The scale of our military
operations in our country is well known to everybody.
Now, within our country it is impossible for the Government, the
Executive Government, to declare war. It can be done only by the
Congress of the United States by free debate and vote. The only
exception to this is when we ourselves are attacked with a full-scale
military attack, as at Pearl Harbor, and then the reaction is merely
that of self-defense.
Now, the treaties that bind the NATO nations together provide
against aggression by any one of these nations, either among them-
selves or against anyone else. The treaty is purely defensive, and if
any one of these nations attempts to act aggressively against any other,
it is immediately moved against by all the remaining nations of NATO.
Militarily Germany, like all other nations in Western Europe, has
certain limits set upon its forces, and, I must point out, these limits are
maximum limits as well as minimum limits. In no case are any parts
of the forces allowed to Germany complete or whole within them-
selves
. They are all intertwined with the forces of the other Western
nations, making it impossible for them to conduct any effective military
operation of any kind by themselves.
My French colleagues can speak far better than can I about the
preoccupations of the French Parliament concerning all of the meas-
ures and all of the agreements under the treaty that would prevent
Germany from ever getting into a position where it would be strong
enough again to attack France.
Now, besides all of these treaty provisions for making the breaking
of the peace by any nation impossible, I want to make one observation
about the United States. The United States is a fairly important
member of NATO, and I can assure you that under no circumstances
is the United States ever going to be a party to aggressive war-
against any nation. We believe in negotiation and friendly con-
ference
, and the only way that we will ever go to war is when we are
attacked, as in our vital interests, in such a way that war would be
the only alternative and then it would have to be an alternative so
desperate that only war could eventuate.
Perhaps I have talked overly long
about my point, but my point is
this
. If there is any tendency to delay urgent consideration of the
problem of German reunification because of the unhappiness or fear
of the united Germany in NATO, then so far
as it is possible for the
United States to give the assurance of its pledged word, I say here
and now: There is no need to fear that situation.
Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, as amended by protocols of Oct. 17, 1951, and Oct. 23,
415900_57-Vol. 216
:
1890
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
117. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
JULY 20,1955 1
Mr. Chairman, the United States Delegation is quite prepared to
deal with the topic of European security, although in our opinion the
topic of European security is inseparably connected with the problem
of the unification of Germany. There is perhaps a difference which
has been developed between the basic viewpoint of the Soviet Union
and that of the three Western nations in that, I think, the thre
Western Powers here feel that the prolonged division of German
is in itself a threat to European security, whereas, I gather, the
Soviet Delegation feels that the division of Germany can be almost
indefinitely prolonged without endangering European security
,
provided certain supplementary measures are taken of a kind which
they suggest.
I think, at least from the standpoint of the United States Dele
gation, that we would feel that any discussion of European security
would have to start out with an assertion that in our opinion Europa
will not be very secure so long as a great nation like Germany i
divided and, as far as we can judge, passionately seeks unification
I am quite prepared to accept the apparent sincerity of the Sovi
conviction that the unification of Germany would not bring it in
creased security but would bring it insecurity. I would like to her
the Soviet Delegation believe that we are equally sincere when we
assert that we would only want to see German unification occur unde
conditions which would in fact bring about increased security for al
I feel that there are two very sincere positions which now seem
keep us apart, which could be perhaps drawn together if we come
see somewhat more clearly the basis for the Soviet feeling that the
unification of Germany would endanger it. If, for example, the
Soviet Union feared that a unified Germany would mean advancin
toward the east bases and military positions which endangered
that is a specific fear which we could understand, even though we di
not agree with it. It is a specific fear with which we could try to des
in a practical way. If the Soviet Union felt that a unified Germany
would have a military potential which would lead it to enlarge
military establishment beyond what was reasonable or what would
the case otherwise, that again is a specific fear which, if it concert i
the Soviet Union, we could grapple with in a practical way.
Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by just saying this: We do in
that the prolonged division of a great nation like the German natin
must itself be a cause of insecurity. We believe that that cause i
insecurity can be eliminated without increasing the insecurity
others. We are very eager to see whether there cannot be found
common ground between us in that respect, because, I repeat,"
wish in every sincerity to make clear to the Soviet Union that we
not want, by eliminating one cause of insecurity, to create a 164
1 The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Departme
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 70–71.
1
1
C
8
8
0
it
1
D
S
0
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1891
2 Statement by Premier Bulganin, July 18, 1955; ibid., pp. 35–43.
cause of insecurity. We believe that the two possibilities of inse-
curity can be dealt with at the same time, if we could understand more
clearly what the basis is of the apprehension of the Soviet Union.
118. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
JULY 20, 1955 1
It would not, I think, be quite accurate to say, as I understood Mr.
Molotov to indicate, that there has not yet been any serious discussion
of the proposals put forward by the Head of his Delegation in his
important opening statement of Monday. Certainly I myself felt
that the observations which were made yesterday by President
Eisenhower 3 constituted a very eloquent and clear comment upon
one of the central proposals which had been made by Marshal Bul-
ganin in his exposition of European security. Marshal Bulganin's
statement indicated that it was the Soviet view that security would
be increased if we could bring about a withdrawal of foreign troops
from the territories of European states and re-establish in this respect
a situation which existed prior to the Second World War.
President Eisenhower, speaking with the authority which comes
not merely from being at present the Constitutional Commander in
Chief of the United States forces but with the added authority which
comes from his leadership of the Western portion of the coalition
which won the Second World War and the first Commander of NATO
in Europe, speaking in all three of those capacities, he expressed the
very solemn and considered conclusion that the security of all of us
very greatly enhanced as there is an integration of forces of different
nationalities into a single whole, which cannot effectively operate
offensively without a unanimous conjunction of the wills of inde-
pendent states,
which in fact would be unobtainable.
He indicated that the presence in the Federal Republic of Germany
of troops of the forces of the United Kingdom, of France, of Canada,
and of the United States integrated into any prospective future forces
of the Federal Republic of Germany would, in his opinion, constitute
a great security for us all, and that it would not advance the security
any of us to revert to the situation in that respect which existed
immediately prior to the Second World War.
Indeed, it seems to me that the four of us here, who suffered so
terribly from the Second World War and the three other Govern-
ments here suffered more greatly than did the United States--that
we ought to view with a good deal of hesitation trying to find future
security in reproducing the conditions which existed immediately
prior to the Second World
War and out of which the Second World
The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 71-73.
of
War
came.
!
8 Supra, doc. 116.
1892
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
other
We believe that the integration of forces which can be possibl
.
under NATO, if properly conducted, can indeed greatly inure to the
security of all of us, and that the liquidation of NATO as conten
plated by the statement of Marshal Bulganin would not in is
promote security.
And I would like to add a word about the Brussels Treaty,' whis
also would be liquidated under the Soviet proposal. The United
States, like the Soviet Union, is not a party to the Brussels Treaty
but we believe that the integration of many of the activities of the
member countries, which is one of the purposes of that treaty, is
result which is extremely valuable for the United States and also
the Soviet Union, although neither of us are parties to that treaty a
although, naturally, I would not set myself up in any way as a juda
of the security of the Soviet Union. But I do make the analogy of os
own feeling that it is a tremendous insurance against the type
division and separation of Western European countries, and notab
of Germany and France, out of which have grown the aggressions
which President Eisenhower referred yesterday, and which has bez
the cause of many wars, the last two of which have been world war
involving not only the immediate parties but all of us and many
besides.
I realize, of course, that organizations like the North Atlan:
Treaty Organization and the Brussels Treaty, like all good thing
could theoretically at least be perverted to evil ends, although I think
that the inherent nature of these arrangements is such as to me
that highly unlikely. I also recognize that no great power is hap
to have its security, or at least its peace, in part dependent upons
rangements with which it has no privity. These are all aspects of er
problem which can be, and I think should be, considered between us
t
the spirit which happily prevails here and which I hope will be carne
forward.
f
Furthermore, there are certain aspects of the proposals of the He
of the Soviet Delegation which, it seems to me, we could usefully stor
For example, it is suggested that certain of the European states shou
assume mutual commitments not to use armed force against one a
other. It is further suggested that they could assume an obligating
to hold mutual consultations in case any differences or disputes an
among them which might constitute a threat to the maintenance
peace in Europe. Certainly such suggestions, together with those to
have been put
forward in the last statement made by Mr. Macmillan
those are the kinds of things I think we could usefully study asi
try to evolve a system of European security which, on the one ha
will end the insecurity inherent in the continued division
of Germi
and, on the other hand, permit that insecurity to be removed within
creating new insecurities for any of us.
1 Treaty of Mar. 17, 1948, as amended by the protocols of Oct. 23, 1954; tip
pp. 968-989.
2 Not printed.
Я
7
1
D
C
V
0
0
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1893
119. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 20, 1955 1
D.
tel
SI
QUE
to
OH
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the Conference, as I listened to
my colleague, Premier Bulganin, it seemed to me that the principal
point of difference between the thinking of the Soviet Delegation and
the thinking of the United States Delegation is the urgency with which
we view the need for a reunified Germany.
The Soviet Delegation seems to believe that the organization of some
new and over-all pact, deferring for the moment any thought of re-
unifying Germany, would contribute to security. We believe that
the division of Germany of itself contributes to the insecurity of
Europe, and that seems to us to be the principal point of difference
between what he has just said to the Conference and what we believe.
Now I certainly would be the last to minimize the importance of the
over-all security of all Europe to the security of the world. Of course
we agree to that, and I apologize for seeming to return to a question,
the reunification of Germany, which we discussed at such length
yesterday. But in our view these two matters are inseparable, and,
therefore
, I cannot help bringing them back. So I feel—this is my
conviction--that to start this so-called security pact with this Con-
ference, making no move toward starting the machinery or means
for the reunifying of Germany, would appear to confirm instead of
deploring that division, and, consequently, as we attack the broader
question, which is of over-all security, it seems to me that we must,
from our viewpoint, attack the problem of how do we get Germany
Now, whether it will take one step or two steps or three steps, I
my Soviet colleagues have studied it in greater detail than I,
but I am sure that it would be a great mistake for us not to set up the
machinery that proves once and for all that we confirm the necessity
for so doing, and giving to some competent group or body the job of
working out what needs to be done in order to bring this about. And
I believe that until we do devise some such machinery we cannot by
mere words, or saying we believe in the eventual reunification of
Germany—I do not believe we can satisfy the situation that from our
viewpoint confronts us, this Conference, and the world.
I think that is all I want to say at the moment because, I repeat, no
one could applaud more than does the American Delegation the earnest
protestations of the Soviet Delegation that we seek peace through giv-
ing peace to all and not just to a part of this great world.
The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 51–52.
back together.
al
OR
admit
10
* Remarks not printed.
دلم تتمعنستصمد فيضانت
فمنهم محمد مصطنعمممملنمنمنمندها وعند
1894
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
t
e
husu
i The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
120. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 20, 1955
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have only a brief observation to
make (with respect to comments made, in turn, by Premier Faure
Prime Minister Eden, and Premier Bulganin concerning the Sovi
(
proposal on European security ?). These ideas, of course
, han
b
tremendous interest for all of us, and naturally each of us is going
to study carefully the draft that the Soviet Delegation has submitte.
But I should like to say, for my part, I have talked individually
, I
think, to each member of the Delegation of the Soviet Republic
,
F
which now we find differing from the other three of us on a particula
point in a suggestion. And I want to make clear I believe they are
earnestly desirous of finding peace, as are we.
The problem becomes how to find a bridge between these differing
viewpoints.
Now, we have taken up matters that manifestly we cannot hande
in detail in this Conference. It's impossible, because we are inviting ,
th
presumably, a number of other countries into a pact, and they wil
have to be dealt with.
I noted that in Premier Bulganin's speech of the 15th of July!
which I read with great interest, he pointed out that this Conferenc
could be only a beginning. But if we could here establish a real spirit
of conciliation and an effort to get along together, our Foreign Min-
isters and other agencies that could be
set up through them, or by
them or by us, might solve some of these problems and build the
kind of bridge of which I speak
I believe we have come to the point with this subject where we
should ask our Foreign Ministers, can they suggest the kind of m3
chinery that we would like to set up, or when they would like to under
take a more detailed conference on these subjects of the unification
of Germany and the community security of Europe the two subject
now so far on our agenda-how would they like to approach it? And
possibly they could present it to us in such a way that we, the Headlip
of Government, could give them a directive.
I am sure that all of us will agree to the importance of one thing
We must not leave this Conference without showing a determined a
honest effort of all of us to approach peace in some way.
Now, I submit again that we have gotten into details now that w U
couldn't possibly settle here. And therefore we must find some bodi,
some machinery, that can handle this in better fashion.
ti
P.
IE
1
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 52–53.
2 Proposal of July 20, 1955; ibid., pp. 48-51.
8 New York Times, July 16, 1955.
IS
Oj
نننننن
.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1895
? Ibid., pp. 35–43.
3 Ibid., pp. 74–75.
to
to
+
net
TA
IN
100
of State publication 6046; 1955), p. 74.
121. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
JULY 21, 1955 (Excerpt) 1
the Delegations of France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States have tried, in the spirit which happily animates this
Conference, to fairly reflect the points of view which have heretofore
been expressed by the four Delegations.
The concept that Germany should be reunified in conformity with
the national interests of the German people and the security of Europe
is
, I think, almost in the precise words which were used by Marshal
Bulganin in his opening statement.2
And the concept that security for Europe should be sought by
effective means which will further the legitimate interests of all, in-
cluding the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense-
that
, again, is an effort to reflect the point of view which Marshal
Bulganin expressed in this matter.
The particular suggestions made as to what the representatives of
the Four Powers should take into consideration, . . . also is de-
signed to include a reference to some of the major suggestions which
have been made here by the Heads of Government, notably by Marshal
Bulganin, Prime Minister Eden, and Premier Faure. We naturally,
however, indicate that there may be other possibilities, so as not to
mi
limit unduly the resourcefulness and inventiveness of the Foreign
Ministers for the future, and their advisers.
122. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
JULY 21, 1955 3
Mr. President, I think we all appreciate the approach which has been
reflected by the remarks which have been made around this table and
which, I think, indicate a genuine desire to reach an agreement on this
dis
proposed) directive [to the Foreign Ministers] 4 and, as Mr. Molotov
has said, not to make this topic a matter of propaganda discussion
among us. I will try to maintain that spirit in making merely one
or two further remarks.
There is undoubtedly a difference between us in that the Soviet
Union, as I understand, would make the primary task the establish-
ment of a new European security system and would
treat the unifica-
tion of Germany as a secondary problem which could be resolved
perhaps as a by-product of the first." I think I can say that the view
of the three Western Powers represented
here is that the primary
problem is a problem of the unification of Germany, and that there
is really no need for a new European security pact, having regard
The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
በ
br
rol
8
OD
DO
Sot
190
* For the final text of the directive (July 23, 1955), see infra.
1896
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
:
E
6 The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Departo
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 67-68. The portions of this Directive when
to the entirely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty, the
Brussels Treaty, all of which fall within the overriding framework
of the United Nations Charter. It already reflects a very genuine
effort at conciliation on the part of France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
We are willing to put these two problems in essence on a parily
.
I hope very much that the Soviet Union will feel able to meet us in
that respect and not insist upon a subordination of the problem of
German unification.
If I understood correctly the interpretation of an earlier remari
of Mr. Molotov,' he said in substance that he feared that if we ad
dressed ourselves to the task of German unification that would imply
an indefinite postponement of European security. It could equally
be said if we address ourselves to the task of European security that
would involve an indefinite postponement of the unification d
Germany
I do not think that any of us should strive to bring about eithe
result, that is, neither of us should try to bring about any indefinite
postponement, either of European security or of German unification
As President Eisenhower said yesterday, and I quote from our
f
transcript of his remarks: “in our view these two matters are in
separable”.? I hope, therefore, that we can find a directive which will
reflect the view that the two problems must be considered concur-
rently, that neither can be indefinitely postponed in favor of the other
I am encouraged by what Mr. Molotoy has said to hope that the
fa
Soviet Delegation would find acceptable that approach which we her
sought to embody in the draft directive which I have had the home pe
to present on behalf of the Delegations of France, the United King
dom, and the United States. I will just add this one further want
that I am very happy that as a matter of first impression, at least
Mr. Molotov indicates that important portions of this Three-Pora
proposed directives are acceptable,
J.
123. DIRECTIVE OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF TH
FOUR POWERS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS,
JULY 23, 1955 (Excerpt)5
12
The Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., guided by the desire to contribute to
relaxation of international tension and to the consolidation of cu
fidence between states, instruct their Foreign Ministers to contini
the consideration of the following questions with regard to which
exchange of views has taken place at the Geneva Conference, and
1 Not printed.
2 Supra, doc. 119.
3 Text not printed.
4 Ellipsis in original.
CE
4
bil
ра
Mi
East and West are printed infra, pp. 2015-2016
2
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1897
Minister submitted this proposal on Oct. 27 on behalf of the three delegations.
Discussion began on Oct. 28, when the proposal was read to the Conference by
won the British Foreign Secretary.
7
propose effective means for their solution, taking account of the close
link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of
European security, and the fact that the successful settlement of
each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating
peace.
1. European Security and Germany. For the purpose of establishing
d European security with due regard to the legitimate interests of all
nations and their inherent right to individual and collective self-
defense, the Ministers are instructed to consider various proposals to
this end, including the following: A security pact for Europe or for
a part of Europe, including provisions for the assumption by member
nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance
to an aggressor; limitation, control, and inspection in regard to armed
forces and armaments; establishment between East and West of a
zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual
me agreement; and also to consider other possible proposals pertaining
to the solution of this problem.
The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility
DW
for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of
Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question
and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be
carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German
me people and the interests of European security. The Foreign Min-
thek isters will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable
for the participation of, or for consultation with, other interested
01.
-87
parties.
2001
ing
Od
cast
19701
J. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF GERMANY
AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AT THE GENEVA
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, OCTOBER
27-NOVEMBER 16, 1955
14. PROPOSAL BY THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH
DELEGATIONS, OCTOBER 27, 1955 1
BE
Reunification of Germany and Security
64
all
At the Geneva Conference, the Heads of Government recognised,
their Directive to the Foreign Ministers, the common responsi-
bility of the Four Powers for the reunification of Germany by means of
The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (De-
partment of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 27-33. The French Foreign
%
Supra.
قغ عدت تتصدرخانمهننننننننننهل
1898
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
WILI
on individual action which the NATO system imposes on its members. Whention
They accordingly rould be
refrain from the use of force and to withhold aid from an aggressor; sme of de
1 Proposal of Jan. 29, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions,
free elections in conformity with the national interests of the German te ob]
nto foi
people and the interests of European security.
France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America mold
have striven unceasingly for the reunification of Germany in freedom the
in order to promote real stability in Europe. Last year they put for-sale. A
ward, in the Eden Plan, proposals which offer the German nation theater
means to recover its unity in accordance with the rights of peoples Trani
and liberty of the individual.' They renew these proposals in the cominc
both
paper attached hereto.
Free elections leading to the formation of a single Government for sacific
the whole of Germany are the right way of ensuring full participation use
of the German people in the solution of the German problem, which in
the Soviet Government says it also desires. If agreement in principle qocal
is reached during the present Conference, it should be possible to settle 4. S
without delay questions concerning the electoral law and the supervi- meld se
sion of the elections, which could take place as early as 1956.
Without German unity, any system of European security would
be an illusion. The division of Germany can only perpetuate friction
and insecurity as well as grave injustice. France, the United Kingdom
and the United States of America are not prepared to enter into & The te
system of European security which, as in the Soviet proposals put met on
forward at Geneva, does not end the division of Germany
At the Geneva Conference the Soviet Government expressed concern
about the policy and associations of a reunified German Government. 1-Rex
The Soviet Union appears to fear that a unified Germany, established
by free elections and free to choose its associates in collective defence
,
would constitute a threat to the security of the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. The fact is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation and the Western European Union are strictly defensive organ-
isations. Far from constituting a threat to peace, they contribute to
the security not only of their members but of all states. This is evident
from the various limitations and restrictions which the members of Rock po
the Western European Union have assumed and from the restraint bey &
If a reunified Germany elects to associate itself with these organisaj apary
tions, the inherent obligations of restraint and control would enhance
rather than detract from Soviet security.
Nevertheless, to remove any possible grounds for Soviet refusal to
reunify Germany promptly, France, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America are prepared to take further steps to meet
propose the conclusion of a treaty in the terms set forth below,
currently with the conclusion of an agreement to reunify Germany
under the Eden Plan. This treaty would comprise undertakings to
provisions for the limitation and control of forces and armaments, and
Fer the
Bach
internati
from the
d the U
COD-
Armamen
Semence o
dispositivo
-lay
pp. 223-225.
2 Proposal of July 20, 1955; The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July
18-23, 1955, pp. 48–51.
The
ON
pa
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1899
the obligation to react against aggression. The treaty would enter
into force only in conjunction with the reunification of Germany. It
would be carried out by stages. Its signature would be concurrent
with the signature of the agreement on the Eden Plan. The final
stage would become effective when a reunified Germany decides to
enter NATO and the Western European Union.
France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are
convinced that these proposals could lead to an agreement satisfactory
to both sides. If the Soviet Union's concern over immediate German
reunification is primarily security, these proposals should constitute
an acceptable basis for negotiation since they provide a system of con-
trols in which the Soviet Union would directly participate, and re-
ciprocal assurances from which the Soviet Union would directly ben-
efit. Such a settlement, by creating confidence in an area vital for
world security, would facilitate the solution of even wider problems.
OUTLINE OF TERMS OF TREATY OF ASSURANCE ON
THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY
The treaty, which would be concluded concurrently with an agree-
ment on the reunification of Germany under the Eden Plan, would
cover the following subjects:
1.-Renunciation of the Use of Force-
Each party would undertake to settle, by peaceful means, any
international dispute in which it might be involved, and to refrain
from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations.
2.-Withholding Support from aggressors
Each party would agree to withhold assistance, military or economic,
to any aggressor, and any party could bring the aggression to the
attention of the United Nations, and seek such measures as are
necessary to maintain or to restore international peace and security.
3.-Limitation of Forces and Armaments-
In a zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and
importance on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunified
Germany and the Eastern European countries, levels for armed forces
would be specified so as to establish a military balance which would
contribute to European security and help to relieve the burden of
armaments. There would be appropriate provisions for the main-
tenance of this balance. In parts of the zone which lie closest to the
line of demarcation, there might be special measures relating to the
disposition of military forces and installations.
4.-Inspection and Control
The parties would provide information on an agreed progressive
basis on their armed forces in the zone. There would be agreement on
:
1900
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
German reunification and the conclusion of a freely negotiated
progressive procedures of mutual inspection to verify such data and
to warn against any preparation for surprise attack.
5.-Special Warning System
In order to provide added depth to the surveillance system on both
sides and thus give further protection against surprise attack, provi-
sion could be made to establish:
a) in the western part of the zone mentioned in paragraph 3, &
radar warning system operated by the Soviet Union and the other
eastern members of the treaty, and
b) a like system in the eastern part of that zone operated by the
NATO members of the treaty.
6.-Consultation
-
There would be suitable provision for consultation among
the
parties to implement the treaty.
7.-Individual and Collective Self-Defence-
It would be provided that nothing in the treaty would impair or
conflict with the right of individual and collective self-defence recog.
nised by the United Nations Charter and Treaties under it. No
party would continue to station forces in the territory of any other
party without the latter's consent, and upon request of the party
concerned any party would withdraw its forces within a stated period
,
unless these forces are present in the territory concerned under col-
lective defence arrangements.
8.--Obligation to react against aggression-
Each party would agree that armed attack in Europe by any party,
which is also a NATO member, against any party which is not a
NATO member, or vice-versa, would endanger the peace and security
which is the object of this treaty, and that all the parties would then
take appropriate action to meet that common danger.
9.-Entry into force by stages
The provisions would come into effect progressively at stages to be
agreed.
THE EDEN PLAN
PLAN FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION IN FREEDOM
Method of Reunification
Peace Treaty with a united Germany should be achieved
following stages:
I-Free Elections throughout Germany
1901
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Freedom of expression for all
Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.
throughout the whole of Germany. There should be a central body
with subordinate bodies at Land and local levels. All votes should be
II-The convocation of a National Assembly resulting from these
elections
III-The drafting of a Constitution and the preparation of Peace
Treaty negotiations
IV-The adoption of the Constitution and the formation of an all-
German Government responsible for the negotiation and con-
clusion of the Peace Treaty
V-The signature and entry into force of the Peace Treaty
I-FREE ELECTIONS THROUGHOUT GERMANY
Free and secret elections should be held throughout Germany
including Berlin at the earliest possible date. These elections must
be held in conditions of genuine freedom. Safeguards must be agreed
to assure this freedom before, after and during the elections. The
elections must also be supervised in such a manner as to make sure
that these safeguards are observed and that the elections are properly
conducted.
(1) Preparation for the Elections
(a) The Electoral Law
The Electoral Law should be prepared by France, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America, in consultation
with German experts
, taking into consideration the electoral laws
already drafted for this purpose by the Bundestag of the Federal
Republic and the Soviet Zone Volkskammer. When approved by the
Four Powers, it should be published throughout Germany. Elections
should take place as soon as possible thereafter.
(b) Guarantees for Free Elections
The draft electoral law must contain provisions which will guar-
antee the genuine freedom of the elections. These include, amongst
Freedom of movement throughout Germany
Freedom of presentation of candidates
Immunity of candidates
Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimisation
Freedom of association and political meetings
Freedom of the press, radio and television and free circulation of
newspapers, periodicals, etc.
Secrecy of the Vote
(C) Supervision of the Elections
Supervision should be carried out by a Supervisory Commission
others:
1902
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
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counted and verified at local headquarters in the presence of the
Supervisory Commission.
(i) Cor position of Supervisory Commission--The Commissie
should be composed of representatives of the Four Power
with or without the participation of neutrals, assisted by
Germans in a consultative capacity.
(i) Organisation of the Commission --The Commission shore
work on a Committee basis. Its decisions should be taken by
A
majority vote.
th
(iii) Functions and Powers of the Commission-The principal task
of the Commission will be to ensure that the elections take
place in genuine freedom and in strict conformity with the
tr
provisions of the Electoral Law.
sh
(2) Method for completing the above Preparations
The Foreign Ministers must in the first place agree on the principles ar
contained in this Plan. They will then give instructions accordingly, ne
to a Working Group, consisting of the principal representatives i ar
Germany of the Four Powers, or members of their staffs, which wil U
work out the necessary details and submit a report.
This report should include, in particular: --
G
(1) the draft of the all-German Electoral Law;
of
2) detailed recommendations regarding the supervision of the
B
elections.
The Working Group should begin work not later than two weeks A
after the Foreign Ministers have agreed on the principles contained in w
this Plan. It should submit its report to the Four Governments not m
later than one month after beginning its work.
II. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
The all-German elections will establish an all-German National
Assembly.
During the period between the end of the elections and the full
assumption of control by the all-German Government, it will be de
sirable for part of the Supervisory machinery to remain in operation
,
in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair the
conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held,
as provided in Section I (1) (b) above. Recommendations on this
subject should be included in the report of the Working Group.
III. DRAFTING OF A CONSTITUTION AND PREPARATIONS OF PEACE
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
The National Assembly will begin drafting a Constitution as soon
as possible after its first meeting. Meanwhile, it may form a pro
visional all-German Authority charged with assisting the Assembly
in drafting the Constitution and with preparing the nucleus of the
future all-German executive organs. The Authority may also open
with the Four Powers preliminary negotiations for the Peace Treaty
.
SE
S.
1
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1903
SSION
TEN
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 48-52.
I the
IV. ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND FORMATION OF AN ALL-
GERMAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NEGOTIATION AND
CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TREATY
The draft of the Constitution will be submitted to the Assembly
as soon as possible. Immediately after it has been adopted an all-
German Government will be formed. This Government will then be
oul responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of the Peace Treaty.
ne bi
At the same time, such other institutions as may be provided for in
the Constitution shall be established.
As soon as the all-German Government has been formed, the
task
take
National Assembly will determine how the powers of the Federal
Government and the German authorities in the Soviet Zone shall be
transferred to the all-German Government, and how the two former
shall be brought to an end.
The all-German Government shall have authority to assume or
reject the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic
and the Soviet Zone of Germany and to conclude such other inter-
national agreements as it may wish. The Four Powers will support
any application of the all-German Government to accede to the
United Nations Organization.
Each of the Four Powers will exercise with respect to the National
Assembly, the Provisional All-German Authority and the all-German
Government, only those of its rights which relate to the stationing
the of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security,
Berlin, the reunification of Germany and a Peace Treaty.
Decisions of the National Assembly, the Provisional all-German
eks Authority and the all-German Government in carrying out this Plan
will not require the approval of the Four Powers. Such decisions
ot
may not be disapproved except by a majority vote of the Four Powers.
V. SIGNATURE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PEACE TREATY
The signatories to the Treaty should include all States, or the
successors thereof, which were at war with Germany. The Treaty
should enter into force when ratified by the Four Powers and by
125. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
OCTOBER 28, 1955 2
Mr. Chairman, I would like first of all to confirm the sponsorship
of the United States of the document and proposals
which were read by
you. These joint proposals—the proposal for assurances of security,
The provisions of this Plan are subject to any provisions of a security agree-
ment concluded in connection with the reunification of Germany. [Footnote in
De The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955
* The Rt. Hon. Harold Macinillan, British Foreign Secretary.
* Proposals of Oct. 27, 1955; supra.
Germany.
P
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18
18
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the original.]
1904
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
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1
me
Mr. Molotov has said, and said with some reason, that security | sid
I think he put the question: How do we get security? Well, I think
that the way to get security is to try to end some of the injustices which
coupled with the Eden Plan for the reunification of Germany—are pr
shared by the United States, together with the United Kingdom, and
France.
JUE
I merely wish, first of all, to confirm that fact, and to say that we
associate ourselves, Mr. Chairman, with what you have said in exposi' nis
tion of these joint proposals.
ati
I would like now to address myself to some of the observations to
that were made by Mr. Molotov,' and, in the first instance, to the of
condemnation of what Mr. Molotov called "military blocs" but which
are in reality collective security associations.
I realize that there is a difference of opinion between our govern-
ments with reference to these matters, and probably it will not be da
possible to resolve all those differences at this time, but I could not on
pass without comment the condemnation of these collective defens:
pe
organizations.
Why, indeed, should it be that nations should not join together to
pr
help each other against what they consider to be a common danger, or ing
in pursuance of what they consider to be a sense of common destiny
. Pi
Individuals do that. It is considered the appropriate way to get
security. And the Charter of the United Nations, to which we have fer
all subscribed, defines that as an inherent right of nations.
Wi
Why should it be that something which we have all agreed is an
inherent right of nations--that is, the right not only of an individual,
but the right of collective self-defense-why is it that that now comes ba
in for such bitter condemnation, when it is something which, I say, the
we have all agreed is an inherent right.
It is suggested that these collective defense associations are a cause rien
of increased military expenditures, and in support of that these figures per
are given showing that in the case of some of our countries our mili-
tary budgets went up very sharply between the year 1948 and the
year 1954. But it should not be forgotten that some things happened ou
during that period other than the formation of collective security ass0- the
ciations. There were the events which took place in Czechoslovakia
, all
there was the blockade of Berlin; there was the attack upon the Re
public of Korea. Anyone who examines history realistically must set
that it was such events as these that led to the increase of military res
budgets, and not the creation of collective security associations.
Indeed, I think
it is demonstrable that the military budgets of
each of the Western Powers would have gone up much more
than they did were it not for the fact that because of collective security
will
we thought that we could help each other out and, therefore, did not wen
need, in each individual nation, as large a military budget as would
have been felt necessary had we stood alone.
pacts of themselves do not necessarily provide adequate security and ges
tak
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We
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Ger
1 See Mr. Macmillan's statement of Oct. 28, 1955; The Geneva Meeting
Foreign Ministers, pp. 33–37.
2 Statement of Oct. 28, 1955; ibid., pp. 38-44.
2
1905
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
lime of a treaty which has been submitted by the three Western Powers.
were instructed to consider are realistically incorporated in the out-
sider the proposal contains under the paragraph numbered 8 a sug-
takings of the utmost gravity and which for the United States would
gested agreement to react against aggression which involves under-
constitute an extremely serious and far-reaching commitment having
The title of this portion of the directive reads, "European Security and
Germany''; see supra, doc. 123.
prevail in the world and which sometimes drive people into acts of
violence which otherwise they would not commit. One of those in-
justices, and one the responsibility for which we here are charged
with
, is the continued division of Germany. Because it was recog-
nized that that was a dangerous situation, a wrong situation, a situ-
ation which created insecurity, we were charged here to deal with the
two problems inseparably or closely linked; that is, the problem
of reunification of Germany and European Security. It is stated
in that order in the directive."
. And it is further said in the directive that the successful settle-
ment of each of these problems would serve the interests of consoli-
dating peace; in other words, that the reunification of Germany is
one of the problems, a settlement of which will serve to consolidate
peace. .
We have come here with proposals to deal with each of these two
problems, the solution of which would serve the interests of consolidat-
ing peace. We have put on the table yesterday, through President
Pinay
, the proposal for the unification of Germany, which reflects
in essence the Eden Plan which was put forward at our Berlin Con-
ference
, and the new proposals to give security assurance in connection
with the reunification of Germany.
The Eden Plan is, as I say, one with which we are all familiar; and
it is reintroduced now, substantially in its initial form, because it is
based upon principles' which are basic and sound and which reflect
the directive that we should seek a "settlement of the German ques-
tion and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections car-
ried out in conformity with the national interests of the German
people.
The suggested treaty of assurance on the reunification of Germany
13 new and it represents an honest, sincere, painstaking effort to carry
out the directive in that respect and to meet what we recognize to be
the legitimate preoccupations of the Soviet Union and, indeed, of
us, as against the possibility that Germany might again become
2 militaristic state. The proposals include all of the features which
we were instructed to consider; provisions for an obligation not to
resort to force, that is one; provision to deny assistance to an aggres-
sor
, that is another; limitation, control and inspection in regard to
armed forces and armaments, that is another; the establishment be-
tween East and West of a zone in which the disposition of forces
will be subject to mutual agreement. All of those aspects which we
And in addition to the features which we were instructed to con-
2
1
? See supra.
415900_-57-Vol. 2-amam 17
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
C
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t
9
t
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1. Treaty of Mar. 17, 1948, as amended by the protocols of Oct. 23, 1954; supra
regard to our traditional attitude toward these matters and to our
geographical separation from the European continent. It is, how-
ever, something that I believe the United States would be prepared
to do as a part of a contribution to bring about the increased security
for all which would come with the reunification of Germany.
I was very glad to hear Mr. Molotov say that he would study these
proposals more carefully, because it is quite obvious that his initial
reaction is based upon an inadequate understanding of the document.
As I understood Mr. Molotov, his basic objections to the proposal
, as
he understood the proposal, were in essence two: One to the effect
that the proposal required Germany to become a party to NATO and
the other was that the sanctions of the treaty were mere "consulta-
tions."
Dealing with the first point, let me say that there is nothing what-
soever in the treaty proposal which conflicts with the provision of the
Eden Plan that the all-German Government shall have authority to
assume or reject the international rights and obligations of the Fed-
eral Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany. Let me make it per-
fectly clear and emphatic: There is nothing whatsoever in the treaty
proposal which requires Germany to become a member of NATO.
It is recognized that a reunified Germany will be free to accept or to
reject existing obligations with reference either to NATO, to Brussels,
or to Warsaw.? That is a complete freedom, and nothing in our pro-
posals is in any way contrary to that.
With respect to the sanctions in the treaty, these are more far-reach-
ing than any which have ever been known before in the course of inter-
national relations, covering practically every aspect which is subject
to control, not only in terms of engagements
, pledges, which are most
serious, but also including physical arrangements in the way of in-
spection, controls, assurances regarding the level of forces, and the like
.
As I say, they go far beyond anything that history has ever before
known, and surely it is not to be said that there is nothing is this
proposal except mere "consultations".
So I very much hope that this proposal, which tries so seriously
and conscientiously to give real substance to our directive, will receive
the careful consideration which I know it deserves. And I am con
fident that with that consideration the provisional and superficial
views that have
been expressed here will be revised. Of course, all of
this proposal is subject to the reunification of Germany, and at leas
one of the provisions of the treaty operates, as far as the United States
and the other powers here are concerned, only if the reunified German
joins NATO; that is, Article 8, because Article 8 deals in effect with
a guarantee by the NATO members that no one of their own mem.
bership will commit aggression. We can give such assurance as he
gards our own group, but if a reunified Germany joins the Warsaw
Treaty, then it would not be for us to give assurances that Germany
will not commit aggression.
pp. 968–971, 972–989.
2 Treaty of May 14, 1955; supra, pp. 1239-1242.
0
a
a
8
m
si
SE
0
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GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
task. And, in that spirit, I would like to say this: I think that
the three Western Powers in their proposals have gone very far
in presenting the position which their governments hold, on both
the subject of the reunification of Germany and on the subject of
security, and, while I do not suggest that those proposals are by any
means complete, they do, I think, constitute & very full exposition
of the point of view of our three governments.
I think that most of the questions which Mr. Molotov has put,
Proposal of Oct. 28, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 45–48.
Statement of Oct. 29, 1955; ibid., pp. 66-72.
We shall
, of course, examine carefully the proposal which the Soviet
Delegation has submitted. In looking at it in the few minutes that
have been available, I think it will be found that some at least of the
provisions of our proposal coincide with the proposals of the Soviet
Delegation. There is, however, one basic difference of approach,
which is that we have submitted together proposals dealing with
what our directive says are the two closely-linked problems; namely
the problem of the reunification of Germany, and the problem of
European security.
The proposal of the Soviet Delegation, so far as I can see, is in no
way. connected with the reunification of Germany, and, therefore, it
would be difficult for us to consider it until we see the proposal which
the Soviet Delegation says it intends to submit for the reunification
of Germany. When we see the two together then we shall be able
to appreciate thern better than by only seeing the first proposal with-
out the other half; namely, the reunification of Germany.
In conclusion, let me beg the Soviet Delegation to believe that
the treaty proposal that has been made here represents a serious
and, I would say, indeed, a momentous and historic proposal designed
to meet, as fully as human ingenuity can meet it, the problem of
permitting the reunification of Germany to occur under conditions
which will assure that whichever election Germany makes, in terms
of its future associations or lack of associations, there will be assur-
ance to us all against something which we are all entitled to dread
and fear; that is, the possibility that Germany might again become
126. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
OCTOBER 29, 1955 2
Mr. Chairman, I feel that we have made considerable progress
during the two days of conference
which we have so far had-two
days of discussion of our proposals--and that the last statement
made by Mr. Molotov poses the question, a very proper one at this
stage
, as to how do we really make progress from now on.
We are not here to engage in polemics, and to show how smart we
tre either as lawyers or as diplomats. We are here on a very serious
& militaristic State.
4
1
* Ibid., pp. 73-74.
Supra, doc. 124.
4
1908
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
4
89
85
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2
either yesterday or today, have been answered as adequately as is
appropriate to answer them at the present stage of our debate. When
we get down to discussing the detailed elaboration of a security
treaty, a treaty of assurance, along the lines we have proposed, then
it will naturally be appropriate to have further more detailed ex-
changes of views as to just how certain articles should be drafted.
It seems to me that the important thing at this stage is to know
the position of the Soviet Union with reference to the reunification
of Germany. It is quite true that our proposals start from the prem-
ise that Germany will be reunified and the assurances which we have
suggested are assurances which depend basically, not upon Germany's
entry into N.A.T.O., but they do depend basically upon the reunifica-
tion of Germany.
We do not yet know the position of the Soviet Union on the ques-
tion of the reunification of Germany, and while we know that the
head of the Soviet Government agreed in the directive that Germany
should be reunified through free elections, we do not know just what
proposals the Soviet Union will now make to give effect to that pro-
vision of the directive.
Mr. Molotov says that he has a proposal to make in that respect
and it seems to me that from the standpoint of making progress i
would be very useful if Mr. Molotov could let us see what that
proposal is.
There is, I know, a difference of opinion between us as to the
relative order of importance of European security and the reunifica-
tion of Germany but there can be no difference between us on the prop-
osition that there is a close link between the two, because that has
already been decided for us by our superiors.
There are, one might say, two sides of a single coin, one side of which
is European security and the other side of which is German reunifi-
cation. We have tried to present our view as to the pattern of both
sides of the coin, the pattern of European security, the
German reunification. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned only
one side of the coin is as yet visible; that is, the one that has the pattern
of European security. I think, in order that we can really proceed in
a businesslike way, which I know we all want, that it would be ex-
tremely useful if the Soviet Union would show us the other side of its
coin, the one that has the pattern of German reunification. Then we
can see whether there is a basis of agreement there. Because in our
case, it has been made clear, German reunification is the premise of
our proposed security treaty.
If we cannot reach agreement about the reunification of Germany,
then obviously our security proposals are irrelevant because they are
predicated upon the reunification of Germany, and in that case it is
academic to attempt to elaborate proposals because the foundation
may not exist. But if, as I hope, a foundation exists in our being
able to find agreement about the reunification of Germany, then the
hypothetical questions which have been put can be developed because
we will know on what premise it is perinissible to proceed.
fou
pattern of
the
De
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11
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3
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1909
127. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
OCTOBER 29, 1955 1
Mr. Chairman, we can all ask questions. I have asked several. One
question I have asked is as to whether we can proceed in our discussion
of security on the assumption that the Soviet Union will promptly
agree to the reunification of Germany. That is, from my standpoint,
as important a question to ask and to have answered as any that I can
think of.
I would say that certainly the purpose which we all have here is
to find security for all. As far as the United States is concerned-
and I can not in this respect speak for my colleagues or anybody but
myself—I can only refer to what President Eisenhower said when he
was here in July when he said and he said it on two separate days
to make it perfectly clear: "European security and the reunification
of Germany are inseparable".2 Those were his words. And it is the
view of the United States that it is not possible to achieve security in
Europe upon the premise of a divided Germany. Now, that may not
be the view of others, but that is certainly the point of view which we
bring to this conference, and until we know whether or not we are to
proceed on the premise that Germany will be unified or on the premise
that Germany is to be divided it is extremely difficult for us to answer
hypothetical questions about a security treaty because a security tresty
which is predicated upon a unified Germany is one thing. If Germany
is not to be unified, then the problems are of a totally different order,
and it is not possible to answer questions until we knoir what the basic
foundation is as far as Germany is concerned.
That is all.
128. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 2, 1955
3
Mr. Chairman, I am glad to have the opportunity to comment on
the presentation which has just been made by the head of the Soviet
Delegation. I shall, of course, look forward to the opportunity to
study closely his remarks when I have the exact transcript, but I can
make some preliminary observations at this time.
As I recall, Mr. Molotov first commented on our security proposals
and made objections on two grounds, principally, the first being, as I
recall, that, and I quote now my notes of the English translation,
The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (De-
partment of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 74–75.
* Statements of July 20, 1955 (supra, doc. 119) and July 21, 1955 (The Geneva
Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955; Department of State publica-
tion ; 1955, p. 53, n. 7
: The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 99-101.
,
* Ibid., pp. 89-99.
5 Supra, doc. 124.
:
S
S
S
1 Statement of Nov. 2, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 85-87
1910 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
“that the treaty enters into force only simultaneously with the entry
of Germany into NATO”.
The second point, as I understand it, was that the security proposals
which we had submitted did not operate for the benefit of the neigh-
bors of Germany who had in the past been the victims of German
aggression.
I was very glad that his objections are of a kind which can readily
be met.
The proposal as submitted by the three Western Powers provides
that "the treaty would enter into force only in conjunction with the
reunification of Germany." So it is not accurate to say that it only
comes into force when Germany enters into NATO. That provision
must be read in connection with the provision in the Eden Plan,
which
is annexed, which provides that the all-German government may
either accept or reject membership in NATO. It is quite true that our
proposal says that "the provisions would come into effect progres-
sively at stages to be agreed. That agreement we will seek from the
Soviet Government at an appropriate time.
With respect to the second point, it is certainly the intent—and I
think certainly the effect of the proposals that we submitted, that
they should benefit all of the countries here in Europe which have
been subject to German aggression. For example, Article 8 says "an
armed attack against any party which is not a NATO member," and
obviously the limitation of forces and the special measures within &
treaty area which would embrace parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia
would give a very great measure of security to those countries.
I think it can be confidently said, as I said before Mr. Moloto
spoke this last time, that the progress that we have made makes it
apparent that we can reach agreement on security provided we can
reach agreement on the reunification of Germany. Having listened
here to all the observations
which Mr. Molotoy has made and having
seen his own proposals, I am confident that it is possible to find agree-
ment upon a security treaty which will meet all the legitimate security
preoccupations of the Soviet Union and of the other countries who
have in the past suffered from German aggression. That is, I know
,
an optimistic statement,
but I hope it is not a crime to be optimistic
.
So, after having made this good progress in the area of security, we
turn to the problem of reunification of Germany. Mr. Molotov dis
cussed the question of who is responsible for the present division of
Germany, and, as I understood it, he put the responsibility on
who had created first Bizonia and then Trizonia.2 Well
, Germany was
originally divided into four parts
, and I am not sure that it is fair to
put the responsibility for the continued division of Germany upon
those who first reduced the four parts to three, and then reduced the
three parts to two. If the Soviet Union will join with us to bring
occupation in Germany, Jan. 1, 1947 (see A Decade of American Foreign Policy
pp. 528–541), and the merger of all three Westerne zones under the Allied High
Commission, Apr. 8, 1949 (ibid., pp. 588-590).
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GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1911
won't take it. But the point I want to make is it is not whether Mr.
Molotov likes it, or I like it, that isn't what counts-the essence of free
elections is that the Germans themselves will decide if they want it or
about now the reduction of the two to one, then we will no longer have
to argue about who is responsible for division.
But really the important thing is not who is responsible for the
division of Germany, but who is responsible to put Germany together
again, and as to that, the decision has been made: “The Heads of
Government recognizing their common responsibility for the reunifica-
tion of Germany—that is our Directive; and, whoever was respon-
sible for the past
, we now have a common responsibility for the future.
I confess that I was at first discouraged by the Soviet proposals
about Germany because they seemed to me not only to be impractical
but they seemed to me to be a very clear departure from our Directive
but I did not remain discouraged long because I thought to myself
that the first proposals which the Soviet Union had made about
security were very discouraging, and their second proposals came
much closer and showed a real approach to those of the Western
Powers
. So I hope that the Soviet Delegation, after we have had
a discussion on this question of the reunification of Germany, may
see its way to coming forward with proposals which meet more clearly
the Directive, and which by so doing also meet more responsively
the submission which we have made in this respect.
Our Directive calls for the reunification of Germany by means of
free elections. Now Mr. Molotov has pointed out that, if you have
free elections, somebody is going to win and somebody is going to
lose. That is, however, inherent, as I see it, in the nature of free
elections. Presumably that fact was taken into account by the Heads
of Government when they nevertheless directed us to bring about the
reunification of Germany by free elections. I do not wish to go into
a debate about the merits or demerits of the social structure which
has been created in East Germany. It is not really important what
I think about it. The important thing is: What do the Germans
think about it
, because they are the ones who are going to have to
Free elections, under the conditions that are foreseen by the proposal
of the Western Powers, will permit the Germans who live in East
Germany, if they wish, to go all about Germany
explaining the merits,
if these are merits, of the social system that exists in East Germany,
and they will have a full opportunity to explain it to the Germans
It will also give the people in West Germany an opportunity to find
out, by personal investigation, by talking with the East Germans,
what they think about
it. And then, after that period of election-
eering has taken place, the people will go to the polls and
decide
what they want. If they want this system, which to Mr. Molotov
seems so good, they will vote to take it; if they don't like it
, then they
live by their choice.
pot
. If they do like it, they will take it; if they don't like it, they will
And that is the essence of free elections which we are
get rid of it.
required to bring about.
Supra, doc. 123.
:
1912
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
affirm what I said yesterday—that there is before us a realizable
1 Proposal of Nov. 2, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 98-99,
I am really surprised that Mr. Molotov should assume, as he ap
parently does, that under conditions of free elections, where the people
have the right to see and examine what is going on, they will reject
the East German system. If the social and economic conditions which
Mr. Molotov would preserve are good then they will survive the test
of free elections. I believe that the free system of the West is good
enough to survive free elections. Apparently, Mr. Molotov does not
believe that the system of the East is good enough to survive free elec
tions. But, however that may be, our Directive says that the Heads
of Government have agreed on the reunification of Germany by means
of free elections, and I hope very much that the Soviet delegation, in
loyal performance of the Directive given us, will again examine the
matter and put forward either its own proposal for free elections, or,
which would be much better, accept the proposal which the Western
Powers have made.
The four-point Soviet proposal, which has been circulated, makes
no provision whatever for free elections in Germany, and I would hope
that the Soviet Union, I repeat, would submit a proposal for free
elections in Germany, which is what we are directed to do.
129. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 3, 1955 2
Mr. Chairman, I have, as I promised Mr. Molotov yesterday, read
very carefully his speech and the proposals which accompanied that
speech. About half of the remarks of Mr. Molotov concern themselves
with the problem of European security, which we have been discussing
now for some days. As I read that portion of Mr. Molotov's remarks
,
and then read the further speeches that were made around the table by
President Pinay, Mr. Macmillan, and myself, it seemed to me
the statements made gave a very full reply to the questions which
Mr. Molotov put in relation to the matter of European security.
I would like
to associate myself
with the eloquent statement
which
was made by President Pinay. It was I felt an answer of a states-
manlike character, to the
points that had been raised by Mr. Molotov
.
I feel, after having read the speech on behalf of the Soviet Delega-
tion and the other
speeches that were made, that I can confidently ra
.
vision of security in Europe by means of a treaty which would conform
to our directive; provided-and, of course, this proviso is of the utmost
importance we can make similar progress with respect to the re-
unification of Germany.
2 Ibid., pp. 105–112.
3 Supra.
4 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 89-99.
5 Ibid., pp. 102–105.
8 Ibid., pp. 82-85.
that
1913
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1
}
1
}
templates not the reunification of Germany, but the cooperation of
two German states. This apparently, is the Soviet view of the most
Therefore, as I see it, the urgent present task of our conference
is to concentrate, as closely as we may, as intensely as we may, as
constructively as we may, on dealing with the other half of the whole
of our first directive; namely, the problem of Germany, and the re-
unification of Germany.
The Western powers recognized what our directive calls the "close
link between the reunification of Germany and the problem of Euro-
pean security.” So, in their proposals of last week, six days ago, we
submitted not only a proposal in relation to the European security
treaty, but, also, as part of our proposal, the amended Eden Plan
dealing with the reunification of Germany by means of free elections.?
That proposal
, as I say, was submitted six days ago. Yesterday, the
Soviet Union submitted a proposal of its own with reference to the
German problem, and asked us to comment upon it.
Perhaps it would not be unfair if we felt that it would be useful
if the Soviet Union would comment upon our proposal which was sub-
mitted six days ago. That proposal was designed to conform care
fully to our directive, and I think deserves comment and consideration
which, so far, has been lacking.
In the extensive remarks which Mr. Molotov made yesterday on
this subject of Germany, he did not comment upon, either by way
of criticism or by way of approval, on the plan which we had sub-
mitted
. We have a saying that “Silence means consent". I recall
I suggested that once in the past, but Mr. Molotov said that was not
I am, however
, willing to oblige by commenting upon the four-
point proposal which Mr. Molotov submitted yesterday. My first
reaction was, and my considered conclusion is, that that proposal is
| principally noteworthy in its complete failure to comply at all with
the directive under which we are operating.
The directive of last July on this subject contains four elements.
The first is that Germany shall be reunified; the second is that it shall
be reunified by means of free elections; the third is that this shall be
done in conformity
with the national interests of the German people,
and fourthly, in the interests of European security.
I deal first with the fact that it was agreed there shall be a reuni-
fication of Germany. I would observe that whereas the proposal of
the Western powers contemplated an actual reunification of Germany,
e plate at all the reunification of Germany,
and this we hope by next year, the Soviet proposals do not contem-
The various proposals so far submitted by the Soviet Union, which
touch on this topic, seem to presuppose not that Germany will be
pemified but that Germany will continue to be divided. The four-
point proposal of the Soviet Delegation, submitted yesterday, con
& Russian proverb.
I do not think that it is improper for us to ask that the Soviet
1
Supra, doc, 123.
2 Supra, doc. 124.
1914
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Union should submit a plan for the reunification of Germany. After
all, that is the agreement of the Heads of our Governments; that is
the directive they gave us. The Western powers have submitted a
plan for the reunification of Germany and it would seem to me that
we are entitled to expect from the Soviet Delegation a plan for the
reunification of Germany.
Now, I turn to the second element in our directive on the German
problem. It says Germany should be reunified "by means of free
elections." The proposal submitted by the Western powers meets
this requirement of the directive. It contemplates that "free and
secret elections should be held throughout Germany, including Berlin,
at the earliest possible date." It contemplates an electoral law which
would be worked out in consultation with German experts taking
into account the electoral laws already drafted for this purpose by
the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany and in the Soviet
zone by the Volkskammer.
Our proposal goes on to contemplate guarantees to assure that the
elections will be really free and so that those in any part of Germany
who have social programs or economic projects, which they wish to
present to the German people, will have a full opportunity to do so.
It contemplates that these free elections will be so supervised that
there will be an all-German national assembly which will draft!
German constitution and prepare for peace treaty negotiations
.
In this way we try to comply with the directive that Germany shall
be reunified by means of free elections.
The proposal submitted by the Soviet Union makes no provision
whatsoever for the free elections for which our directive calls and
indeed, the remarks which accompany the proposal indicate that it is
the view of the Soviet Delegation, that free elections are rather danger
ous things because it is pointed out no one can be sure in advance what
the results will be.
Now, I have here the ballot which was used in the elections in the
East-German zone. One could know in advance what would come out
of that election because there was only
one set of names on the ballat
There was no opportunity to vote for anyone else, and the only
freedom that was had was the freedom to put this particular ballot in
the ballot box. Then, indeed, one could be sure in advance whet
would come out, because it was decided in advance what went in
I admit that with free elections one cannot be sure what the result
will be before the elections take place and I realize that that is some
times inconvenient. It is particularly inconvenient if you turn up.com
the losing side, as I sometimes have. But that risk is inherent in free
elections which are designed to ascertain the popular will
, for no ole
can be sure
in advance what the popular will may turn out to be
That, as I say, is a risk inherent in free elections. Surely the Head
of our Governments, who agreed that there should be free election
must have taken that risk into account and nevertheless agreed the
there should be free elections in Germany.
Therefore, it seems to me, that it is not in order for us here in
question free elections, to doubt whether free elections are good
or bei
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1915
(Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 228–229.
because the results are unpredictable. We are under a directive
which requires us to bring about the reunification of Germany "by
means of free elections". That is the order of our Heads of Govern-
ment which the three Western powers have complied with by sub-
mitting a plan for free elections in Germany, and I very much hope
that the Soviet Delegation will also either accept our plan or submit a
plan of its own.
The third element of our directive is that this reunification through
free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national
interests of the German people. I underline the words "national
interests." The emphasis, you will see, is upon a national Germany,
not upon a sectional or divided Germany.
The Soviet Delegation has called attention to what it believes to
be social gains which have been achieved in a certain portion of
Germany and also it feels that there is grave doubt whether these
so-called "social gains" will be preserved if the whole people were
given an opportunity freely to express their will. Therefore, it
seems to be argued by the Soviet Delegation that a national view
shall not prevail
, but that some form of sectionalism and the main-
tenance of a divided Germany must be maintained as against a na-
tional viewpoint in order to preserve these sectional so-called "gains”.
In this respect there seems to be a retrogression not merely from
the directive under which we operate, but even from the condition
which existed at the time of the Berlin Conference, when the pro-
posals made by the Soviet Delegation seemed to accept the view that
the German people would decide on a national basis what were the
social conditions which they wanted to have.
On the 4th of February 1954 the Soviet Delegation submitted a
proposal which called for all-German elections--I am quoting now,
as a result of which the German people would take their decisions,
without any interference on the part of foreign countries, concerning
the social and state organization of a democratic Germany." In
other words, by that Soviet proposal it was conceded that the German
people acting as a whole would take their decisions as to the kind of
a social system which they wanted and
that they would do so without
any interference on the part of foreign governments who might pre-
fer to see the Germans maintain one or another social system.
As Mr. Macmillan said yesterday, the language and the spirit of
the directive are that Germany should again become a nation which
would determine its own foreign policy and its own domestic policy
and decide on a national basis what
kind of a social system it wanted.
That feature of the directive, it seems, is now abandoned by the
Soviet Delegation even though that seems to involve also an aban-
donment of the prior position which it took in Berlin last year.
With respect to the right of Germans to determine their own foreign
policy and foreign
relations, I must observe the denunciation by the
Soviet Union of the exercise by 50 million Germans in the Federal
Poreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954
? The Geneva Meeling of Foreign Ministers, pp. 82-85.
1 ܙܐ
1916
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
and its neighbors to the East, "or other international agreements as
Republic of their right through a free government, chosen by free
elections, to associate themselves with the North Atlantic Treaty and
with the Brussels Treaty for Western European Union.”
I am not quite clear, nor has it been pointed out, what are the
specific features, for example, of the Brussels Treaty which the Soviet
Union finds objectionable.
Is it objectionable that by joining that treaty the Federal Republic
agrees closely to limit its military forces—to limit them to a degree far
more modest than that which is the case with respect to the so-called
GDR? 3 Is it objectionable that the Federal Republic of Germany
foregoes the right to have atomic weapons, bacteriological weapons
and chemical weapons?_Is that objectionable? Is it objectionable
that under the Brussels Treaty the military establishments and arma-
ments of the Federal Republic are subject to investigation and control
through the Brussels Treaty Council representing predominantly
states which in the past have suffered from German aggression? Is
it objectionable that by that Treaty and by the North Atlantic Treaty
the Federal Republic of Germany solemnly is committed to a purely
defensive posture for the future?
The Federal Republic of Germany in the exercise of its sovereign
rights has followed a foreign policy which carries it into such a course
designed to assure that Germany will not be again & militaristic
country and that it will live peacefully in association with its neigh-
bors. That is a right which we believe should be preserved for the
unified Germany--not that we know or demand that it should exercise
its right in any particular way. We provide that it should be entirely
free. We do recognize that Germany operating as our directive says
upon a "national basis shall have the right to determine its own
foreign policy as well as its own domestic policy.
In this connection I recall a provision of the Eden Plan which
formas a part of the proposal submitted here last week, which reeds
"The all-German Government shall have authority to assume or reject
the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and
the Soviet Zone of Germany and to conclude
such other international
agreements as it may wish
In consonance with the directive, our plan affirmatively provides
and contemplates that in terms of domestic policy, for example
, the
kind of social system they want, and also in terms of foreign policy,
that the German nation as established
through free elections will be
in charge of its own destiny and decide what it wants: whether it
wants to accept or to reject the kind of relations which now exist
between either the Federal Republic of Germany and its neighbors
to the West or the relations which exist between the so-called GDR
it may wish.”
We believe that it is inadmissible and contrary to our directive to
1 See the Protocol of Oct. 23, 1954, to the North Atlantic Treaty; supra, PP"
871-873.
2 See supra, pp. 968–989.
3 German Democratic Republic.
4 See supra, doc. 124.
1917
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
because the last two considerations coincide.
1 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 102-105.
close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of
European security", and why they said that Germany must be re-
unified by means of free elections in accordance with the national
interests of the German people and the interests of European security,
try to decide for the Germans what will be their future policy either
internally or externally.
That leads me to the fourth element in the directive to which I
have referred, namely, that German reunification shall be carried out
in "the interests of Xuropean security”.
Mr. Molotov suggested yesterday that perhaps nations which "were
not very close to the confiagration” were not very good judges as to
how to prevent a recurrence of such conflagrations for the future. I
assume that that had reference to the United States, which is the only
one of the four of us whose land was not directly attacked by the
Nazi forces. I would say that, while the losses of the United States
in the first and second world wars were not as great as some others,
nevertheless we did pour out a sufficient volume of blood and of
treasure in both of those world wars so that I would think that it
could be assumed that we would be anxious not to have to do so again.
But if that assumption is not entertained by the Soviet Union,
I
would think at least that the Soviet Union would recognize that
France is a country which is qualified to speak on that subject; and
I was deeply moved, as I think all of us must have been, at the words
of President Pinay yesterday on this subject. He pointed out a
fact which is so clear that none of us who is interested in the peaceful
future can be blind to it: namely, that the greatest danger of re-
creating German militarism is by perpetuating the division of
I was particularly struck by that because I was at the Versailles
Peace Conference – I think I am perhaps the only one here who can
claim that honor, if it be such-and I recall the well-intentioned plans
which were there evolved and embodied in that peace treaty to pre-
vent a second world war by means of repressions, the division of
Germany, and a series of measures, which as it turned out, merely pro-
voked after a period of pacificism a rebirth of fanatical nationalism
Mr. Molotov has suggested that that rebirth of militarism occurred
because they had free elections
in Germany. Well, in the first place,
Mr. Hitler did not come to power through free elections. The last
free election held in Germany showed a decline in Hitler's vote. But
the fact that he had any large vote at all was due to the pre-existence
measures which aroused fanatical German nationalism. As Pres-
ident Pinay said, any of us who study history
must see clearly the
lesson which it teaches as we face again the problem of Germany. If
We are capable at all of learning from the lesson of history, we must
realize that to continue indefinitely the division of Germany is the
most dangerous thing that we can do. That is surely the reason why
our Heads of Government, in their wisdom, saw and affirmed “the
Germany
>
1
1918
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
German people have learned something too. We have all, in vary-
ing degrees, suffered greatly from past German aggressions, but I do
not think that any nation in history ever suffered as severely as did
the German nation as it faced defeat during the closing period of
World War II. And if today we see, at least in the Federal Republic
of Germany, fifty million Germans who are eager to promote Euro-
pean security by associating themselves with others in a way which
will assure a limitation of their armaments, an exclusion of their use
of the most dangerous kinds of weapons, and the acceptance of con-
trols, that is because the German people, certainly the German people
of this generation, want to make sure that the lesson which they have
learned will be accepted and so riveted into the very warp and woof
of German life that there will never again be the opportunity for :
future generation to commit the follies which have been committed
by Germans of the past over a good many generations.
So as we consider this fourth element in our directive, "the in-
terests of European security,” let us never forget what is said in the
opening of our directive, “the close link between the reunification of
Germany and the problems of European security," and let us make
sure that we do not perpetuate what, in my opinion, could bring about
a rebirth of excessive nationalism in Germany; that is, the continued
division of a great people.
So, Mr. Chairman, for the reasons I have given, the explicit man.
date we have from our Heads of Government, the reasons for that
mandate-reasons which are indelibly marked on the pages of his
.
tory-let us in truth try to bring about this reunification of Germany.
I ask the Soviet Delegation, which has every reason to be moved by
the same considerations as I think move us, to submit to us &
for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections to be
carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German
people, and in the interests of European security.
proposal
130. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 4, 1955
)
1
Mr. Chairman, we have now completed a week of discussion, and
we are about to proceed into three days of recess, and it did occur
to me that it might be useful to try to sum up the position that we
are now in.
We are working still on the first item of the Directive, European
security and Germany. In that matter, I recall that we were in:
structed to take account of the close link between the reunification
of Germany and the problems of European security, and I further
more recalſ that the Directive instructs us to consider various spe;
cific proposals with reference to security, such as the renunciation of
· The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1958
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 127-130.
Supra, doc. 123.
1
1919
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
2 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 45–48.
that our security proposal presupposed a united Germany, while the
Soviet Delegation complies, as we still assume it will, with the Direc-
force; the denial of assistance to an aggressor; the limitation, con-
trol
, and inspection of armed forces and armaments; and the estab-
lishment of a zone between the East and the West in which the
disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement.
T'he Directive then goes on to say that "The Heads of Government,
recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the
German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that
the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Ger-
many by means of free elections, shall be carried out in conformity
with the national interests of the German people and the interests of
European security".
The three Western powers, in an effort faithfully to carry out the
Directive, submitted on October 28 [27] a proposal' which did take
account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and
the problems of European security. Our proposal ties the two
together and comprises, on the one hand, a proposal with reference
to security on the assumption that Germany will be reunified as our
Heads of Government agreed; and, on the other hand, a concrete
proposal for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections,
as our Directive specifies.
The Soviet Union on October 28 submitted a proposal for European
security," which almost wholly ignored the specifications of our Direc-
tive as to security features which we were instructed to consider.
Furthermore, it ignored the instruction to take account of the close
link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of Euro-
pean security. This Soviet security proposal did not recognize any
link at all between security and the reunification of Germany; on the
contrary, it assumed the division, and, apparently, the indefinite
division of Germany. Subsequently, on the 31st of October, the
Soviet Union made new security proposals, which, although they still
disregard the link with German reunification, did more fully meet
the specifications of the Directive as to the scope and nature of se-
curity
. Because of that, these new proposals approached those which
had been made on October 28 [27] by the Western powers in con-
formity with the Directive.
In a statement which I made at our fifth session on November 2,
41
made a comparative analysis of the Western security proposals and
the new proposals of the Soviet
Union, and pointed out, item by item,
the extent to which, by conforming to the Directive, they coincided
Of course, there remains the fundamental and critical difference
proposals did indicate a possibility of significant progress once the
with each other.
* Supra, doc. 124.
• Ibid., pp. 76-82.
* Ibid., pp. 85-87.
1920
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
int
&d
me
to
foui
OX
1
ass
But the four Heads of Government
as to the close link between the reunification of Germany and European sh
security.
I do not minimize the serious problems which will, no doubt, arise sh
as we undertake the task of converting our security proposals, now WI
presented in general terms, into concrete treaty clauses. Nevertheless wb
it is encouraging that, subject to the fundamental and critical di
ference which I have referred to, there is a very considerable measura
of agreement in principle as to how to get security in Europe. do
Mr. Molotov has asked a good many questions about our security
proposals, questions which we have answered even though Mr. the
Molotov does go on asking them again. Perhaps his confusion comes
from the fact that it is indeed difficult to have a complete meeting of an
minds until we know we are both proceeding from the same premise
namely, the reunification of Germany.
So, that is where we stand on European security.
Th
With respect to the reunification of Germany, the Soviet Delegation be
still continues to be totally unresponsive to the specific directions Fo
under which we are operating. The only proposal of the Soviet clu
Union is a proposal which says that, and I quote from it: "The German the
people are deprived of the possibility of living in a united state”, and thg
which, accordingly, calls for a consultative council to be formed by
ful
representatives of the so-called German Democratic Republic and the
German Federal Republic.
The Soviet Union has not submitted any proposal for the reunifica-
joi
tion of Germany by means of free elections and so far declines to con-
sider the proposal wbich the Western powers have made in this respect
.
lin
So that is where we stand with respect to German reunification.
I find it hard to believe that this rigid and unresponsive position of by
the Soviet Union is final.
tha
The Soviet Delegation may now believe, as it so ardently argues
that there is no close link between the reunification of Germany and
European security. But the four Heads of Government agreed, last
July, that there is a close link between European security and the red out
unification of Germany, and they instructed us to take that into
account.
The Soviet Delegation may now believe that, as its proposal says
the Germans do not now have "the possibility of living in a united
131
state. But the four Heads of Government determined, last July, that
Germany had that possibility and that Germany should be reunified
.
The Soviet Delegation may now believe, as it so ardently argues
agreed, last July, that Germany should be
reunified "by means of free
elections."
The Soviet Delegation may now believe, as it contends, that Ger the
many should not be made a national state because this would jeopard-
ize alleged social gains in that part of Germany which has been com
munized by the Soviet Communist
party. But the four Heads &
Government agreed, last July, that the reunification of Germany
1 See the Soviet delegation's proposal of Nov. 2, 1955; Geneva Meeting of Foreign
Ministers, pp. 98–99.
ref
Wh
any
see
(
Ki
1
2
(De
dele
1921
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
>>
Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the U.S.
1 Address of July 25, 1955; supra, pp. 111-114.
3 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 136-137. The American
delegation submitted this proposal on behalf of the three delegations.
should take place, and take place in conformity with the "national”
interests of the German people. There was no precondition that there
should be preserved a sectional system which has been imposed from
without and which the German people, once they become again a
whole nation, may, if they wish, either accept or repudiate.
It may be tiresome that I repeat, again and again, the refrain of
adhering to our Directive. I cannot, however, in good conscience
do otherwise. The four Heads of our Governments reached an agree-
ment last July at Geneva which gave rise to new hopes throughout
the world.
President Eisenhower, on returning from Geneva, made a radio
and television broadcast to the American people 1 in which he referred
to these agreements that had been made and he said, “We are pro-
foundly hopeful that these assurances will be faithfully carried out."
Then he went on to say, "The acid test should begin next October,
because then the next meeting occurs.
It will be a meeting of the
Foreign Ministers. Its principal purpose will be to take the con-
clusions of this conference as the subjects to be discussed there and
the general proceedings to be observed in translating those generalities
that we talked about into actual, specific agreements."
We believe, Mr. Chairman, that our task here is to carry out faith-
fully the assurances that were given last July and to translate those
assurances into actual, specific agreements. That is why we have
joined with Britain and France in making specific proposals with
reference to European security, which took into account the close
link between that security and the reunification of Germany. That is
why we submitted concrete proposals for the reunification of Germany
by means of free elections.
We are, as President Eisenhower said, facing the acid test. I hope
that we shall pass it. Certainly if we fail it will not be because of
any unwillingness on the part of the three Western delegations to
see that the assurances of last July will, in fact, be faithfully carried
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
131. PROPOSAL BY THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH
DELEGATIONS, NOVEMBER 4, 1955
Reunification of Germany by Free Elections
On the joint initiative of the Governments of France, the United
submit the following proposal as the first step in order to carry out
out.
415900,-57-Vol. 2-18
1922
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
C
S
ti
e.
at least until Germany can be unified under conditions which wolk
Sovietize the whole of Germany. Mr. Molotov extolled the govern
mental regime which the Soviet has established in the German zon
the so-called “German Democratic Republic”, and said it has a great
the reunification of Germany in freedom in accordance with the Ples
presented by the Three Powers on October 28 [27]: 1
Draft Decision of the Conference
In conformity with the common responsibility of their government
for the settlement of the German question and the reunification !
Germany and in compliance with the Directive of their Heads
ds
Government that the settlement of the German question and the reun
fication of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in t
conformity with the national interests of the German people and the p
interests of European security, the Foreign Ministers of France
, the
U.K., the USSR, and the U.S. have agreed as follows:
1. Free and secret elections shall be held throughout Germany du
ing September 1956, for the selection of representatives for an al
li
German National Assembly to draft a constitution and to form a gos-
ernment thereunder for a reunified Germany.
I
2. Each of the Four Powers will designate a representative to s
Commission to prepare, in consultation with German experts
, th:
the th
electoral law for such 'elections, including effective provisions in
safeguards and supervision to insure the freedom of such elections
.
th
3. The Commission shall undertake its functions promptly are
fo
shall submit its report to the Four Powers by January 1956.
ti
t
E
132. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 9, 1955 2
of
le
Yesterday, Mr. Molotov, just returned from Moscow, made a state
ment on behalf of the Soviet Union. It had such grave
implication G
th
that I asked that we should suspend our meeting until today so as
be able to give his statement deliberate thought. I am now in a pea
tion to express the views of my Government.
My first observation is that the Soviet position if persisted in 1 ag
perpetuate conditions which put in jeopardy the peace of Europe si
My second observation is that it strikes a crippling blow at the post
bility of developing relations of confidence with the Soviet Union
I ask your permission, Mr. Chairman, to deal with these two pointse C
order.
I.
The Soviet Union says in the most categorical manner that
security of Europe is best assured by a continued division of Germain
1 Supra, doc. 124.
2 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16,
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 154–159.
W:
W.
to
ar
m
er
&
th
to
70
ni
1923
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
7 Statement of July 18, 1955; infra. pp. 2009-2012.
future ahead of it because it is moving along the main road of prog-
ress and because it has strong and loyal friends." It is, he said, "im-
possible to accept” a reunification of Germany which might jeopardize
that "great future” for this Sovietized segment of Germany.
But, Mr. Chairman, the Directive which brought us here, and which
ought to guide us here, did not ask us to judge of the relative merits of
social systems as between that of the Federal Republic of Germany
and that of the so-called “German Democratic Republic". It told us
to reunite Germany in the "national interest”. Thus, the German
people themselves will determine under what system they want to live.
The problem which our Heads of Government did direct us to
study was how to assure European security and German reunification,
two problems which the four Heads of Government agreed were closely
linked.
It is, I think, a fair interpretation of our Directive that the four
Heads of Government recognized that European security would be
endangered if there was not a reunification of Germany. Certainly
that is the view of the United States Government.
As President Eisenhower pointed out in his address, which opened
the Geneva Conference last July, the division of Germany prolonged
for over ten years "does a grievous wrong to a people which is en-
titled, like any other, to pursue together a common destiny. While
that division continues, it creates a basic source of instability in
Europe. Our talk of peace has little meaning if[,) at the same time,
we perpetuate conditions which endanger the peace.” 2
And because our Directive specifically requires us to take account
of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the prob-
lems of European security, the Western powers[,] loyally complying
with the Directive, proposed a security system based upon a reunified
Germany. The proposals which we made embody greater assurances
than have ever before been contrived to preserve the peace. There
would be not only solemn undertakings to abstain from aggression, to
withhold help to an aggressor, and, in effect, to guarantee against
aggression, but there would be physical and material safeguards, con-
sisting of a level of forces to be agreed upon and actual inspections
to ensure that these levels were maintained. There would be ample
and dependable safeguards, in which the Soviet Union, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia would take part, against re-creation of a menacing
military force. There would be novel and effective provisions to
ensure against any possibility of surprise attack.
These provisions, based on a reunified Germany, would give Europe
& security which it has not known for hundreds of years. Indeed,
the merit of the proposals we made was so obvious that the Soviet
Union itself
, after studying them, introduced supplementary security
proposals of its own which were closely modeled on ours. However,
Supra, doc. 123.
1
3 See supra, doc. 124.
See the Soviet delegation's “Draft Treaty on Security in Europe?«submitted
to the conference, Oct. 31, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp.
79-80.
1924
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
11
+
I turn now to the effect of the Soviet action upon international relis
took place in Geneva “has its positive significance for the relaxation
Western European bourgeois States have been determined primarily by Germani
efforts to break the fetters of the Versailles Treaty whose authors were Grey
2 Statement of July 18, 1955; The Geneva Conference of Heads of Governants
pp. 35–43 (where the English translation of this portion of Mr. Bulganin's rement
the Soviet proposals in this respect, as indeed every proposal that the
Soviet Union has made, are predicated upon the continued divisje
of Germany.
As President Eisenhower said again and again last July, “Fun
pean security and the reunification of Germany are inseparable." I
is not possible to have European security without the reunificatis
,
of Germany
I recall that Mr. Molotov, speaking on October 31, 1939, after the
outbreak of the Second World War, referred to the relations beter!
Germany and the other Western European States during the preced
ing two decades, and to what he called the “German efforts to brex
the fetters of the Versailles Treaty.”_"This it is”, he said, “that i
the long run led to the present war in Europe."
The Versailles Treaty did impose certain fetters upon German
But nothing that the Versailles Treaty did compares with the cruelt
and injustice of dividing the German people by the separation ine
Germany of the Soviet Zone comprising 17,000,000 Germans. 'n
anguish of this is demonstrated by the fact that 2,704,680 Germans i
the cost of great sacrifice and risks, fled from the Soviet Zone ink
West Germany. During the last month of October there were 32,84
refugees.
The situation, thus dramatized, cannot be indefinitely perpetuala
without grave risk.
Yet, it is to perpetuate this very risk that the Soviet Union fin
itself compelled to reject the far-reaching and solid security propose
which I referred to. Surely, better statesmanship than that can be
found.
We urge upon the Soviet Government that it should not perpetuak
the injustice of a divided Germany with the menace which it came
to European security. Can we not learn from the lesson of Versaille
We make that plea, and we shall go on making it, in the hope
, ai
indeed, in the expectation that before it is too late wisdom will preps
tions generally. I recall that Chairman Bulganin, in his opema
statement at the July conference, said that the purpose was
achieve a relaxation of international tension and bring about a
of confidence between nations.'
In his
final speech he said
1 Soviet Peace Policy: Four Speeches by V. Molotov (London, 1941), L-
According to this version, Mr. Molotov said: “Relations between Germany
Britain and France with the active participation of the U. S. A.
in the long run led to the present war in Europe."
differs slightly from that cited by Mr. Dulles).
1
II.
11
]
1
1
feel
2
1
1
This it was when
V
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1925
1 Statement of July 23, 1955; ibid., pp. 77–80.
KWA
of tension in the relation[s] between states[,] for the re-establishment
of the necessary confidence between them.'1
The Heads of Government had to reconcile many differences before
they reached the final agreement which is embodied in the Directive
which they gave us. But it was, after much debate, finally agreed
that there was a "close link between the reunification of Germany and
the problems of European security.” Furthermore, the Heads of
Government reaffirmed their common responsibility "for the reunifica-
tion of Germany." They "agreed" upon "the reunification of Ger-
many by means of free elections, to be carried out in conformity with
the national interests of the German people and the interests of
European security
The United States Government believed that at the very least this
solemn agreement meant that when the Foreign Ministers met there
would be a serious discussion both of European security and of the
reunification of Germany.
There has been such a discussion with reference to European secu-
rity; indeed, it produced a considerable measure of agreement on the
component elements needed for security. That fact has been noted
with satisfaction by both the Western powers and by the Soviet
Delegation.
It was, I think, demonstrated that there could be put around a
united Germany a dependable framework of European security.
But when we turned to consider the reunification of Germany, the
Soviet Delegation refused to consider it at all despite the explicit
words in the Directive under which we are operating. The Soviet
Delegation refused to consider the proposals of the Western powers
their serious and detailed proposals for German reunification. The
Soviet Delegation refused to make any proposals of its own on the
subject of German reunification. The Soviet proposal for an "all-
German Council" did not even purport to charge that Council with
any responsibility to reunify Germany; indeed, it was calculated to
perpetuate the division of Germany.
The Government of the United States believes that the refusal of
the Government of the Soviet Union even to discuss seriously the
reunification of Germany involves a grave breach of the agreement of
the Heads of Government. The effect of this is bound to affect ad-
Versely the overall relations of the Soviet Union with other countries,
including the United States.
I would be less than frank if I did not say that so far as the United
States is concerned, what has happened here has largely shattered
such confidence as was born at the Summit Conference at Geneva.
There can, of course, be peace and a limited degree of working
relations as between nations which have no confidence that agreements
between them-even though made at the highest level—will be honored.
However, relations under those conditions are bound to be difficult
Let me illustrate what I say by referring to what remains to be
discussed at this Conference. We are directed to go on to discuss
and restricted.
1926
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
9
(
At Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 305-306. This declaration
2 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1953
was transmitted to the Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic and /
here the problem of disarmament and the development of contack
between the East and the West. But I am bound to say that I fear
that these discussions will profit us little when we feel that we cannot
make agreements between us which are dependable.
III.
Mr. Chairman, the peoples of all the world were heartened by the
agreement of the Heads of Government reached here last July. But
as President Eisenhower said in his closing statement at that Con
ference, . only history will tell the true worth and real values of
our session together. The follow-through from this beginning by ou
respective Governments will be decisive in the measure of this Com
ference." And he went on to say, "The work of our Foreign Minister
,
as they strive to implement our Directive, will be of great importance,
perhaps, even more important (perhaps of even more than what w
have done here.[''] ?
I greatly fear that what has been done here, or, more accurately
,
what has not been done here despite the explicit terms of our Direc-
tive, will be viewed with grave discouragement and concern througs.
out the world.
It is not the desire or the intention of the United States, so far as
we can control it, to revert to the conditions which existed prior to
the meeting of the Heads of Government last July. It is our purpose
to continue to strive by all the means in our power for a just and
durable peace. But I do deplore the set-back to European security
and the damage to the spirit of Geneva which has been inflicted by the
Soviet Union.
When the issues are as great as those here at stake, we shall not
easily be discouraged. It is still our hope that the Soviet
Union
,
if not now, then soon, may give loyal substance to the agreement or
the Heads of Government that Germany shall be reunified by free
elections.
When that day comes, European security can be assured, and the
spirit of Geneva will have borne a major part of the good fruit which
it seemed to offer to the world.
133. DECLARATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE
NOVEMBER 16, 1955
Tripartite Declaration on Germany and European Security
1 Statement of July 23, 1955; infra, pp. 2013-2014.
t
&
2
the of Berlin.
GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
1927
Soviet Foreign Minister on what the Four Heads of Government in
July agreed were the closely linked problems of German Reunification
and European Security. To this end they made a proposal for the
Reunification of Germany by free elections in 1956 and for a Treaty
of Assurance giving the Soviet Union far-reaching safeguards against
aggression when Germany was reunified.
Marshal Bulganin in July had agreed that the Reunification of
Germany was the common responsibility of the Four Powers and
should be carried out by means of Free Elections. The Soviet Foreign
Minister, however, despite the Directive of the Heads of Government,
made it plain that the Soviet Government refused to agree to the
Reunification of Germany since that would lead to the liquidation of
the East German regime. He made counterproposals which would
have involved the continued division of Germany as well as the even-
tual dissolution of the Western security system. It is for this reason
that the negotiations have failed.
The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America are aware that this result must bring a sense
of cruel disappointment to the German people, East and West of the
zonal border which now unjustly divides them. However, the three
Foreign Ministers believe that the Soviet Government will come to
recognize that its own self-interest will be served by ending the injus-
tice of a divided Germany. They believe that the Soviet Government
will realize that so long as it persists in withholding unity from the
German people, thus perpetuating the division of Europe, there can
be
no solid security in Europe, nor indeed in the world.
The three Western Powers will themselves not cease their efforts
to end the injustice and wrong now being done by dividing the German
people and will continue to stand ready to contribute to the security
which can be enjoyed by all only when Germany is reunified.
[For the texts of Secretary Dulles' statement of November 16, 1955, and
the quadripartite communiqué of the same date, see infra, pp. 2035-2039.
The text of Secretary Dulles' address of November 18, 1955, is printed
supra, pp. 115-122.]
5
]
C
I
تتم معهم
1
t
t
C
S
C
1
C
t
f
8
C
speak on your behalf. That claim was based not on any constitutions
procedure, or on any expression of the will of those whose represent-
1 Delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif.; Department of
Part XI
THE SOVIET UNION
A. GENERAL
1. TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TH
SOVIET UNION: Address by the Secretary of State, March &
1950 1
The right and obligation of the Secretary of State to speak to li
fellow citizens, or to the representatives of other nations, about op
foreign relations is not derived from any claim on his part to speck
knowledge or wisdom which makes him right and other people wrong
It is derived from the fact that our forefathers by free choice worked
out and approved a Constitution. This Constitution, with the amen
.
ments and interpretations which have made
it a living
and growie
thing, has survived to this day as an expression of the will of the entir
people. A President is duly elected under this Constitution with a
heavy and solemn responsibility to direct the foreign relations of the
American people. The President bas, in accordance with law and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed a man to serie
as Secretary of State to assist him in the conduct of our foreign affairs
This right to speak on your behalf results directly from the constita
tional processes by which the American people provide a government
for themselves in an orderly, clear, and democratic manner.
SOVIET PHILOSOPHY OF IMPERIALISM
A little over 30 years ago, there came into power in one of the great
countries of the world a group of people
who also claim the right
men made to a monopoly of the knowledge of what was
what was wrong for human beings. They further
profess that the
claim is based on a body of thought taken over in large part from te
State Bulletin, Mar. 27, 1950, pp. 473–478.
8
&
right
1928
THE SOVIET UNION
1929
writings of a mid-nineteenth century German economist and theorist,
Karl Marx.
I have no desire to debate here the errors of one version or another
of what is today called "Marxism." But I think it must be recognized,
in the light of the experience of the last 100 years, that many of the
premises on which Marx based his thought have been belied by the
known facts of what has actually happened in the decades since
Marx made his studies. Marx's law of capitalist accumulation, his
law as to the rate of profit, his prediction of the numerical decline of
the middle classes and of the increase of the class struggle: none of
these calculations has been borne out by the experience of the societies
of the West. Marx did not foresee the possibility of democratic
solutions.
Furthermore, the body of doctrine now professed by the Moscow-
controlled Communists is only tenuously identified with Marx's
writings and is largely overlaid with Russian imperialism. We
certainly cannot accept the thesis that such a doctrine can serve as
the justification for the right of a small group of individuals to speak
for the great masses of human beings who have never selected them
as their spokesmen and whose own opinions they have never consulted.
Now, for three decades this group of people, or their successors, has
carried on as the rulers of that same great country. They have
always, at the same time, maintained the pretense that they are the
interpreters of the aspirations of peoples far beyond their borders.
In the light of that professed philosophy, they have conducted, as
masters of the Russian state, a foreign policy which now is the center
of the most difficult and troublesome problems of international affairs,
problems designed to keep the peoples of the world in a state of deepest
apprehension and doubt. In addition to this, they have operated
within the limits of the Soviet state on the basis of a domestic policy
founded, they say, on the same philosophy,
There are many points in this philosophy, and particularly in the
way in which it has already been applied in practice in the Soviet
Union and elsewhere, which are not only deeply repugnant to us, but
raise questions involving
the most basic conceptions of good and
evil-
questions involving the ultimate moral nature of man.
There is no
use in attempting to ignore or gloss
over the profundity of this conflict
of view.
PHILOSOPHY OF A FREE SOCIETY
The free society values the individual as an end in himself. It
requires of him only that self-discipline and
self-restraint which make
the rights
of each individual compatible with the rights of every other
individual. Individual freedom, therefore, implies individual re-
sponsibility not to exercise freedom in ways inconsistent with the
freedom of other individuals and responsibility positively to make
constructive use of freedom in the building of a just society.
In relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society
is on the strength and appeal of its principles, and it feels no compul
sion sooner or later to bring all societies
into conformity with it.
1930
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
It does not fear, rather it welcomes, diversity and derives its
strength from freedom of inquiry and tolerance even of antipatheti
ideas.
CA
THESES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
We can see no moral compromise with the contrary theses d
international communism: that the end justifies the means, that an
and all methods are therefore permissible, and that the dignity d
the human individual is of no importance as against the interest d
the state.
To our minds, these principles mean, in their practical application
,
the arrogation to individual human leaders, with all their inevitab
frailties and limitations, of powers and pretenses which most of w
would be willing to concede only to the infinite wisdom and compassin
of a Divine Being. They mean the police state, with all that the
implies; a regimentation of the worker which is hardly distinguishable
from slave labor; a loss to society of those things which appear to u
to make life worth living; a denial of the fundamental truths en
bodied in all the great religions of the world.
Here is a moral issue of the clearest nature. It cannot be evade
Let us make no mistake about it.
Yet, it does not follow from this that the two systems, theirs and
ours, cannot exist concurrently in this world. Good and evil can and
do exist concurrently in the whole great realm of human life. The
exist within every individual, within every nation, and within every
human group. The struggle between good and evil cannot be con
fined to governments. That struggle will go on, as it always has, ir
the wider theater of the human spirit itself.
But it also does not follow from this coexistence of good and en
that the two systems, theirs and ours, will necessarily be able # ir
exist concurrently. That will depend largely on them, for we ou
selves do not find impossibility in the prospect of coexistence with the
Soviet system.
However much we may sympathize with the Soviet citizens w P:
for reasons bedded deep in history are obliged to live under it, we a
not attempting to change the governmental or social structure of te
Soviet Union. The Soviet regime, however, has devoted a mer ti
portion of its energies and resources to the attempt to impose la
system on other peoples. In this attempt, it has shown itself pigd
pared to resort to any method or stratagem including subversul te
threats, and even military force.
Therefore, if the two systems are to coexist, some acceptable meus tt
must be found to free the world from the destructive tensions of
anxieties of which it has been the victim in these past years
and 4 fr
continuance of which can hardly be in the interests of any people to
POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FREE SOCIETY AND COMMUNALE
I wish, therefore, to speak to you about those points of gresit
difference which must be identified and sooner or later reconcile di
the two systems are to live together, if not with mutual respech,
a
a
W
W
a
THE SOVIET UNION
1931
1 Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 23.
DEFINITION OF TERMS OF PEACE
leaders could, if they chose, relax tensions. They could, for example,
duties by allowing the Commission's entry into North Korea and by
permit the United Nations Commission in Korea to carry out its
least in reasonable security. What is it which the leaders of inter-
national communism could do to make such coexistence more tolerable
to everyone?
There are a number of things they could do, which, while leaving
much yet to do, would give the world new confidence in the possibility
of peaceful change, in the principle and processes of peaceful settle-
ment as an effective means of finding workable solutions in areas of
disagreement.
Let us look, first, at the points where we and they are perhaps most
closely in contact and where the establishment of peace in its narrow-
est, most limited sense is dangerously impeded by the absence of
common ground.
It is now nearly 5 years since the end of hostilities, and the victorious
Allies have been unable to define the terms of peace with the defeated
countries. This is a grave, a deeply disturbing fact. For our part,
we do not intend nor wish, in fact we do not know how, to create
satellites. Nor can we accept a settlement which would make
Germany, Japan, or liberated Austria satellites of the Soviet Union.
The experience in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria
has been one of
bitter disappointment and shocking betrayal of the solemn pledges
by the wartime Allies. The Soviet leaders joined in the pledge at
Tehran that they looked forward "with confidence to the day when
al peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and
according to their varying desires and their own consciences.” i We
can accept treaties of peace which would give reality to this pledge
and to the interests of all in security.
With regard to Germany, unification under a government chosen
in free elections under international observation is a basic element in
an acceptable settlement. With that need recognized and with a
will to define the terms of peace, a German treaty could be
formulated
which
, while not pretending to solve all of the complex and bitter
problems of the German situation, would, nevertheless, go far toward
a relaxation of a set of major tensions.
With regard to Austria, that unhappy country is still under occupa-
tion because the Soviet leaders do not want a treaty. The political
and economic independence of Austria is being sabotaged by the
determination of the Soviets, camouflaged in technicalities, to main-
tain their forces and special interests in eastern Austria.
With regard to Japan, we feel that the Soviet leaders could
recognize
the interest
which nations other than the members of the Council of
Foreign Ministers have in a Japanese peace treaty and could refrain
from taking
positions and
insisting on procedures which
block progress
In the Far East, generally, there are many points where the Soviet
toward a treaty.
1932
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
pointed to practical steps which Members should take to support
A respect for the expressed will of the majority is as fundaments
a majority of the General Assembly has generally not agreed with the
*2 General Assembly Res. 290 (IV), Dec. 1, 1949; General Assembly, Official
accepting its report as the basis for a peaceful settlement of that
liberated country's problems. They could repatriate Japanese
prisoners of war from Siberian camps. They could refrain from
subverting the efforts of the newly independent states of Asia and
their native leaders to solve their problems in their own way.
USE OF FORCE
With regard to the whole group of countries which we are accus-
tomed to think of as the satellite area, the Soviet leaders could with-
draw their military and police force and refrain from using the shadow
of that force to keep in power persons or regimes which do not com-
mand the confidence of the respective peoples, freely expressed through
orderly representative processes. In other words, they could elect to
observe, in practice, the declaration to which they set their signatures
at Yalta concerning liberated Europe.
In this connection, we do not insist that these governments have
any particular political or social complexion. What concerns us is
that they should be truly independent national regimes, with a wil
of their own and with a decent foundation in popular feeling. We
would like to feel, when we deal with these governments, that we
are dealing with something representative of the national identity
of the peoples in question. We cannot believe that such a situation
would be really incompatible with the security of the Soviet Union
.
This is a question of elementary good faith, and it is vital to a
spirit of confidence that other treaties and other agreements will be
honored. Nothing would so alter the international climate as the
holding of elections in the satellite states in which the true will of
the people could be expressed.
The Soviet leaders could drop their policy of obstruction in the
United Nations and could instead act as if they believe
the United
Nations is, as Stalin himself has recently called it, a serious instru
:
mentality for the maintenance of international peace and security
.
They are simply not acting that way now.
Their policy of walk-out and boycott is a policy that undermine
the concept of majority decision. Indeed, they seem deliberate
to entrench themselves in a minority position in the United
Nations
This was illustrated last fall when they voted against the Essential
of Peace Resolution 2 which solemnly restated and reaffirmed the
principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter
and which
Soviet Union, whereas we ourselves have generally been on
1 Protocol of Proceedings of Feb. 11, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Polish
8
1
OBSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
{
1
(
]
f
1
the peace.
:)
the
(
pp. 27-32.
Records, Fourth Session, Resolutions (Ả/1251), p. 13.
THE SOVIET UNION
1933
.
F
9
S
S
1
e
Government stands in an outward state of friendship and respect.
The Soviet leaders could cooperate with us to the end that the
official representatives of all countries are treated everywhere with
decency, and respect and that an atmosphere is created in which these
Tepresentatives could function in a normal and helpful manner, con-
forming to the accepted codes of diplomacy.
majority side. There is nothing artificial about this situation. It
has not been the result of any sleight of hand or pressures on our
The
part. We do not have any satellites whose votes we control.
significant fact is that proposals which have commended themselves
to a majority of the members of the United Nations have also com-
mended themselves to us.
Let the Soviet Union put forward in the United Nations genuine
proposals conducive to the work of peace, respectful of the real
independence of other governments, and appreciative of the role
which the United Nations could and should play in the preservation
of world stability and the cooperation of nations. They will, then,
o doubtless have a majority with them. We will rejoice to see them in
such a majority. We will be pleased to be a member of it ourselves.
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
The Soviet leaders could join us in seeking realistic and effective
arrangements for the control of atomic weapons and the limitation
of armaments in general. We know that it is not easy for them,
under their system, to contemplate the functioning on their territory
of an authority in which people would participate who are not of
I their political persuasion.
If we have not hesitated to urge that they as well as we accept
this requirement it is because we believe that a spirit of genuine
responsibility to mankind is widely present in this world. Many
able administrators and scientists could be found to operate such an
authority who would be only too happy, regardless of political
complexion, to take an elevated and enlightened view of the immense
responsibility which would rest upon them. There are men who
would scorn to use their powers for the negative purpose of intrigue
and destruction. We believe that an authority could be established
which would not be controlled or subject to control by either ourselves
d
or the Soviet Union.
ATTEMPTS AT UNDERMINING ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS
The Kremlin could refrain from using the Communist apparatus
controlled by it throughout the world to attempt to overthrow, by
subversive means, established governments with which the Soviet
prevent
, indirect aggression across national frontiers--a mode of
conduct which is inconsistent
with the spirit and the letter of the
PROPER TREATMENT OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES
1.
q
le
t
of
l-
1
Il
United Nations Charter.
Il
12
1934
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
DISTORTION OF MOTIVES OF OTHERS
achieve binding, peaceful settlements would be required of all partie
Nor have they been formulated as a one-sided bargain. A wil to!
good faith. All would have to accept agreements in the observant
The standards of conduct of our own representatives are know
from more than a century and a half of American diplomatic expe
.
rience. These standards are such that all countries which have
accepted our representatives in a spirit of respect and confidence
over periods of many decades have certainly remained none the worse
for it. The independence of those countries has not been under-
mined; their peoples have not been corrupted; their economies here
not been scathed by sabotage.
When we now find our representatives treated as criminals, wher
we see great official propaganda machines reiterating that they are
sinister people and that contact with them is pregnant with danger-
we cannot believe that such insinuations are advanced in good faith
,
and we cannot be blind to the obvious implications of such an attitude
In general, the Soviet leaders could refrain, I think, from system-
atically distorting to their own peoples the picture of the world
outside their borders, and of our country, in particular.
We are not suggesting that they become propagandists for any
country or system other than their own. But the Soviet leaders
know and the world knows with what genuine disappointment and
concern the people of this country were brought to the realization
that the wartime collaboration between the major Allies was not to
be the beginning of [a] happier and freer era in the association between
the peoples of the Soviet Union and other peoples.
What are we now to conclude from the morbid fancies which their
propaganda exudes of a capitalist encirclement, of a United States
craftily and systematically plotting another world war? They know
,
and the world knows, how foreign
is the concept of aggressive war to
our philosophy and our political system. They know that we are not
asking to be the objects of any insincere and effusive demonstration
of sentimental friendship. But we feel that the Soviet leaders cock
at least permit access to the
Soviet Union of persons and ideas from
other countries so that other views might be presented to the Russian
people.
These are some of the things which we feel that the Soviet leader
could do, which would permit the rational and
peaceful developmen
of the coexistence of their system and ours. They are not things to
go to the depths of the moral conflict. They are not things that promo
ise the Kingdom of Heaven. They have been formulated by us
, no
as moralists but as servants of government, anxious to get on with di
manner consistent
with mankind's deep longing for
a respite
from fall
and uncertainty.
]
S
t
of which all riations could have real confidence.
THE SOVIET UNION
1935
GREATER SECURITY THROUGH COOPERATION
The United States is ready, as it has been and always will be, to
cooperate in genuine efforts to find peaceful settlements. Our attitude
is not inflexible, our opinions are not frozen, our positions are not and
will not be obstacles to peace. But it takes more than one to co-
operate. If the Soviet Union could join in doing these things I have
outlined, we could all face the future with greater security. We could
look forward to more than the eventual reduction of some of the
present tensions. We could anticipate a return to a more normal
and relaxed diplomatic atmosphere and to progress in the transaction
of some of the international business which needs so urgently to be
done.
I fear, however, that I must warn you not to raise your hopes.
No one who has lived through these postwar years can be sanguine
about reaching agreements in which reliance can be placed and which
will be observed by the Soviet leaders in good faith. We must not,
in our yearning for peace, allow ourselves to be betrayed by vague
generalities or beguiling proffers of peace which are unsubstantiated
by good faith solidly demonstrated in daily behavior. We are always
ready to discuss, to negotiate, to agree, but we are understandably
loath to play the role of international sucker. We will take the inizia-
tive in the future as we have in the past in seeking agreement whenever
there is any indication that this course would be a fruitful one. What
is required is genuine evidence in conduct, not just in words, of an
intention to solve the immediate problems and remove the tensions.
which divide us. I see no evidence that the Soviet leaders will change
their conduct until the progress of the free world convinces them that
they cannot profit from a continuation of these tensions.
So our course of action in the world of hard reality which faces us
is not one that is easily charted. It is not one which this nation can
adopt without consideration of the needs and views of other free
nations. It is one which requires all the devotion and resolve and
wisdom that can be summoned up. We have had, and continue to
have, the assistance and advice of distinguished leaders in all walks
of life
. We have the
benefit of the great public discussion which has
been proceeding in the democratic way, by free inquiry and free expres-
It is my purpose in talking with you to point a direction and to define
the choices which confront us.
We need to stand before the world
with our own purpose and position clear.
We want peace, but not at any price. We are ready to negotiate,
but not at the expense of rousing false hopes which would be dashed
by new failures. We are equally determined to support all real efforts.
for peaceful settlements and to resist aggression.
sion.
TASK FOR TOTAL DIPLOMACY
The times call for a total diplomacy equal to the task of defense
against Soviet expansion
and to the
task of building the kind of world
in which our way of life can flourish. We must continue to press
.
1936
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ahead with the building of a free world which is strong in its faith and
in its material progress. The alternative is to allow the free nations
to succumb, one by one, to the erosive and encroaching processes of
Soviet expansion.
We must not slacken, rather we must reinvigorate, the kind of
democratic efforts which are represented by the European Recovery
Program, the North Atlantic ? and Rio Pacts, the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program, 4 the Point 4 Program 5 for developing the world's
new workshops and assistance in creating the conditions necessary to
a growing, many-sided exchange of the world's products.
We must champion an international order based on the United
Nations and on the abiding principles of freedom and justice, or accept
an international society increasingly torn by destructive rivalries.
We must recognize that our ability to achieve our purposes cannot
rest alone on a desire for peace but that it must be supported by the
strength to meet whatever tasks Providence may have in store for us.
We must not make the mistake, in other words, of using Soviet
conduct as a standard for our own. Our efforts cannot be merely
reactions to the latest moves by the Kremlin. The bipartisan line
of American foreign policy has been and must continue to be the con-
structive task of building, in cooperation with others, the kind of
world in which freedom and justice can flourish. We must not be
turned aside from this task by the diversionary thrusts of the Soviet
Union. And if it is necessary, as it sometimes is, to deal with such
a thrust or the threat of one, the effort should be understood as one
which, though essential, is outside the main stream of our policy.
Progress is to be gained in the doing of the constructive tasks which
give practical affirmation to the principles by which we live.
The success of our efforts rests, finally, on our faith in ourselves and
in the values for which this Republic stands. We will need courage
and steadfastness and the cool heads and steady nerves of a citizenry
which has always faced the future "with malice toward none, with
charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the
right,
t
13 6
1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1268–1327.
2 Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949; súpra, pp. 812-815.
3 Treaty of Sept. 2, 1947; suprá, pp. 789–796.
4 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364.
5 See ibid., pp. 1366–1372.
President Lincoln's second inaugural address, Mar. 4, 1865; James
Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897
(Washington, 1897), vol. VI, pp. 277-278.
P
THE SOVIET UNION
1937
due to Soviet intransigence and the unreliability of its word.
brought up to date the document submitted by the Department of State to the
- Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, pp. 8–12.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 2, 1948; A Decade of American
Foreign Policy, pp. 920-933.
? See Protocol of Proceedings, ibid., pp. 27–34.
3 Ibid., pp. 34-50.
" Treaties of Feb. 10, 1947, with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; 61 Stat.,
5 Armistice agreements of Sept. 12, 1944, with Rumania (A Decade of American
Jan, 20, 1945, with Hungary (ibid., pp. 494 ff.).
2. SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS:
Department of State Memorandum, June 1950 1
The instability of peace the world over is due, in large measure, to
deliberate Soviet policy and actions and to the wholesale Soviet
violation of basic agreements. Because of the U.S.S.R.'s record in
ignoring its international pledges, the faith of the world in Soviet
signatures had been badly shattered. Whether it be the Yalta
Agreement or a treaty of friendship, the U.S.S.R. has chosen to
ignore its sworn commitments whenever it has found such action
advantageous for its own purposes.
As it ruthlessly pursues its expansionist objectives in the postwar
world, the Soviet Union is building up a reputation as an irresponsible
international marauder. Before the court of world opinion, it stands
indicted for disregarding its international treaties and agreements,
openly fiouting protocols and promises, and encouraging violations of
basic human rights by other treaty signatories. Because of its policy
of refusal to work in concert with other nations, its preference for
abrupt and unauthorized unilateral action, and its apparent deter-
mination to impose its will upon the world, the value of agreements
with the Soviet Union has been nullified. From Yalta to the present,
tae broken pledges of the U.S.S.R. have marked international
relations. A review of this record is worthwhile.
The uncertain peace of postwar Europe is primarily due to the fact
that the Russians have deliberately
undermined the
foundations upon
which peace was to be built. The Soviet Union has violated the
agreement of February 1945,2 the Potsdam Declaration of July
1945 (Protocol of Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference of August 1,
1945), and the peace treaties so far concluded with the ex-German
satellites. Soviet violation of Allied armistice agreements, refusal
to act in concert with the other Allies on control commissions, and
even the ignoring of the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers
can be added to those. The fact that the framework of peace has
hever been completed, that Austria still pleads for a treaty, and that
the settlement of the German question still plagues Europe is also
This memorandum
487 ff.); Oct. 28, 1944, with Bulgaria (ibid., pp. 482 ff.); and
EUROPE
Yalta
pt. 2, pp. 1757-2229.
Foreign Policy, pp.
415900m-57----Vol. 2.19
1938
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
THE YALTA AGREEMENT
GI
de
ing
tre
an
When the Big Three met at Yalta in February 1945, the three
Governments, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
U.S.S.R., agreed to assist liberated people to form ''interim govern-
ment authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in
the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment
through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the
According to James F. Byrnes, former Secretary of State
,
Stalin accepted the Yalta agreement without serious discussion and
in an atmosphere of genial camaraderie. Yet, Soviet action has
consistently undermined and made meaningless this fundamental
declaration.
ha.
W
people."
VI
9.
aul
thi
reg
COL
HUS
THE POTSDAM DECISIONS AND THE CONTROL COUNCIL
The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 (Protocol of Proceedings of u.
the Potsdam Conference of August 1, 1945] aimed at the ultimate
creation of a unified, democratic Germany. To achieve this aim,
the powers represented at the conference committed themselves to
bu
the destruction of German militarism, the wiping out of nazism, the All
punishment of war criminals, the decentralization of the political | infi
structure of Germany, and the dissolution of concentrations of 1 for
economic power. A new democratic German government was to
be developed under the supervision of an Allied Control Council
(Acc), and the four Allied zone commanders were to enjoy absolute
sovereignty in their respective zones unless their powers were pre- Go
empted by Acc legislation. Besides dealing with Germany, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed at
of
Potsdam, among other things, to consult with each other with a view
to revising the procedures of Allied Control Commissions for Rumania
,
the:
Bulgaria, and Hungary.
The lack of success of the program formulated at Potsdam can
laid at the door of the Soviet Union. From the inception of the
Potsdam protocols, the U.S. S. R. has a record of wholesale violation
of the agreement, refusal to abide by decisions of the Control Councils,
and
flagrant usurpation of power on the Control Councils in the
of
satellite area.
C
ana
3
be
Fre
in
tim
pro
Fre
mer
GERMANY
thre
1
110
Moreover, in dealing with Germany, the Soviet Union has readily of
disregarded promises, made at meetings of the Council of Foreign indi
Ministers (CFM). By a CFM decision reached at Moscow, March 19-
April 24, 1947, all German prisoners of war were to be repatriated by
December 1 [31], 1948.4 The U.S.S.R. not only did not return
· See Speaking Frankly, by James F. Byrnes (New York and London, 1947)
, ratie
2 See Protocol of Proceedings, Aug. 1, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign July
Policy, pp. 36–42.
3 See ibid., p. 45.
* Agreement of Apr. 23, 1947; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 16, 1949,
p. 78. For other documents on 'this question, see infra, pp. 2059–2066.
were
p. 32..
35
Fore
THE SOVIET UNION
1939
a
n
t
e
Freedom of expression and of press and publication no longer exist
Freedom of political opinion is also violated by the forceful elimination
three Governments with having violated the human-rights obligations
indicated their unwillingness to adopt the requested remedial meas-
Communiqué of June 21, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp.
.? The treaties entered into force on Sept. 15, 1947, when instruments of
ratification by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union
were deposited at Moscow. The United States had ratified the treaties on'.
3 See the American notes to the three governments; A Decade of American
Foreign Policy, pp. 1159–1165.
German prisoners by that date, but she unilaterally announced a new
deadline of January 1, 1950.
Under the Paris CFM communiqué of June 20, 1949, each occupy.
ing power in Germany agreed to insure the "normal functioning of
transport between Berlin and the zones as well as between the Soviet
and Western zones. Since January 13, 1950, the Soviet authorities
have intermittently interfered with traffic between Berlin and
Western Germany.
VIOLATIONS OF THE PEACE TREATIES
] Upon ratification of the treaties of peace with Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Rumania, on September 15, 1947, the armistice period and the
authority of the Allied Control Commissions came to an end. On
this date
, the treaties entered into force, and the three Governments
regained a type of nominal sovereignty. In fact, however, the
U.S.S. R. continued to exercise tutelary powers over them. In
consequence, the implementation of the treaties is characterized by
subservient fulfillment with regard to obligations toward the U.S.S.R.
but by evasion, delay, and violations with reference to the Western
Allies. The Soviet Union condones and in many cases abets these
1
infringements and, as the tutelary power, must bear responsibility
1
Under the peace treaties, the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian
Governments undertook 'to guarantee the enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression,
of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion,
and of public meeting. The U.S.S.R. directly aided and abetted
these Governments in failing to fulfill these human rights clauses.
In any of these countries. Freedom of worship is interfered with
time and again, either through subtle methods or through drastic
procedures such as the trials and imprisonments of church leaders.
On April 2, 1949, the United States and Great Britain charged the
All three Governments
f for them.
HUMAN RIGHTS
1
**
3
}
ments of these countries.
{
1
1
110-112.
1
July 14, 1947.
1940
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
8
United States called upon the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. to hold
pp. 1167–1169); the Rumanian note of Apr. 18, 1949 (ibid., pp. 1169-1170; and
1949 (Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1949, p. 755) and Acting Secretari/
4 See Acting Secretary of State Webb's statement of June 15, 1949 (ibid,
ures. 1
The United States and the United Kingdom thereupon
informed them ? that in the British and American view a dispute
had arisen concerning the interpretation and execution of the peace
treaties. Under the treaties, any dispute concerning the execution
of the treaties, which is not settled by diplomatic negotiations, should
be referred to the heads of the United States, United Kingdom, and
U.S.S.R. missions in the three countries. On May 31, 1949, the
a meeting of the three heads of mission in each country to settle the
disputes which had arisen over noncompliance with the human-
rights clauses. The Soviet Union, in a note of June 11, 1949,
refused to participate in the meetings, contending that no such disputes
had arisen and that there was, therefore, no reason for such a meeting
,
A second United States note, delivered June 30, 1949,5 expressed
regret for the Soviet Union's disregard of the provisions of the treaties
and again asserted that disputes did exist between the United States
and the three satellite Governments. In a memorandum dated
July 19, 1949,8 the Soviet Union reaffirmed its previous contention
and, since that time, has consistently refused to participate in 8
meeting on the matter.
By its stand, the Soviet Union violates the disputes clause of the
peace treaties and the offending countries are encouraged to continue
systematically and willfully to violate their treaties.
Besides the flagrant violations of the human-rights clauses, there
have been other treaty violations. In each instance, the attitude
of the Soviet Government is to condone the violation.
Under article 10 of her treaty, Hungary undertook to honor ber
prewar bilateral treaties with the Allied and Associated Powers
provided that the other contracting party notified the Hungarian
Government, within a period of 6 months of the coming into force of
the peace treaty, that she desired to keep in force or revive the bilateral
treaty, in question. Among the prewar treaties coming under the
provisions of this article was the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation of 1925 between the United States and Hungary.
Although the United States Government duly notified Hungary
,
within the prescribed 6-month period, that she desired to keep
bilateral treaty in force, the Hungarian Government has evaded and
1 See the Hungarian note of Apr. 8, 1949 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy
the Bulgarian note of Apr. 21, 1949 (ibid., pp. 1165–1167).
2 See the American notes of May 31, 1949, to the three governments; ibid.
pp. 1171-1173.
3 See the statement released to the press by the Department of State on June -
of State Webb's statement of the same daté (ibid., p. 759).
8
I
As a
fi
C
HUNGARY
B
mi
si
this
HI
Or
Cf.
June 26, 1949, pp. 824-825).
5 Ibid., July 11, 1949, pp. 29-30.
6 Not printed.
y Treaty of June 24, 1925; Treaty Series (TS) 748 (44 Stat. 2441).
THE SOVIET UNION
1941
| Kingdom their rights, under the terms of the treaty, to information
? Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948 (London, 1952), pp. 389-397;
treaty. In addition, the U. S. S. R., by negative and extremely
dilatory acts, is tolerating Bulgarian failure to reduce these forces to
the limits prescribed in article 10 [9]. The U. S. S. R., by negative
and obstructionist tactics, aided and abetted the Bulgarian Govern-
organizations, i. e., the militia and the use of this organization by the
Bulgarians to violate both the spirit and letter of article 2, the human-
rights clause of the treaty. The U.S.S. R. encourages the Bulgarian
Government to deny the Governments of the United States and United
1 See infra, pp. 2117-2119 and 2120-2121.
cf. the Yugoslav reply of June 29, 1948 (ibid., pp. 397-404).
refused to fulfill its obligations under article 10 in at least two notable
instances: first, in the seizure of United States property; and second
in the arrest and trial of two American citizens, Robert Vogeler and
Israel Jacobson, who were held incommunicado without access to
United States consular officers.
Under article 23 of the peace treaty, Hungary undertook to pay the
sum of 100 million dollars as reparations to Czechoslovakia and Yugo-
slavia. On February 27, 1949 (after the Moscow-inspired Comin-
form declaration of June 28, 1948, against Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav
Minister to Hungary delivered a note to the United States Legation at
Budapest stating that the Hungarian Government had failed to abide
by article 23 of the treaty and that, as a result of the ill will of the
Hungarian Government, the enforcement of article 23 could not be
carried out by direct negotiations between the two Governments.
The Hungarian Government has, to this day, refused to comply with
article 23 of the treaty, and the Soviet Government has refused to par-
ticipate in a meeting of the three heads of mission at Budapest, pro-
vided for in article 40 of the treaty for the settlement of disputes
which cannot be solved by direct negotiation.
Under article 28 [26] of the treaty, Hungary undertook to restore
all legal rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals,
as they existed on September 1, 1939, as well as to compensate such
persons for property loss and war damage. The Hungarian Govern-
ment has given no indication that she intends to compensate American
citizens
. On November 8, 1949, the United States Legation at
Budapest transmitted to the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs
four new claims and additional evidence with regard to 116
previous
claims." Although Hungary has acknowledged receipt of the note,
she has taken no action
to fulfill these claims.
The U. S. S. R. has openly aided and abetted the Bulgarian Govern-
ment in failing to fulfill completely or in totally ignoring treaty provi,
sions limiting the armed
forces. The Soviet Union accomplished
this fact by supplying Bulgaria with arms, ammunition, and equipment
in excess of those needed for the armed force stipulated by the peace
:
BULGARIA
}
3 Not printed.
1942
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
RUMANIA
va
signer of the United Nations Charter, the U. S. S. R. subscribed to
State, or in any other] manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
pertaining to the Bulgarian armed forces or the right to gather such
information by investigation. The Soviet Government declined the
United States United Kingdom invitation to name a Soviet repre
sentative to participate in a proposed survey of the Greco-Bulgarian
border.1 It, thereby, encouraged the Bulgarian
the Bulgarian Government's
reply 2 that, under the terms of the peace treaty, the matter should be
referred to the United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.
diplomatic missions. (The Soviet Government had already refused
to participate in any such conventions under article 36 of the peace
treaty to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or execution of
the Bulgarian peace treaty.)
As in Bulgaria, the Soviet Government has consistently refused to
cooperate with American and British chiefs of mission to consider the
principles involved in the implementation of the military clauses of
the peace treaty with Rumania. Both the Soviet and British chieis
of mission agreed to a meeting on this matter, scheduling it for Mar
18, 1948. However, the Soviet Ambassador cancelled the scheduled
meeting, saying that he was "indisposed," and, on May 26, 1948, be
addressed a notes to the American Minister stating that there was
no necessity for the proposed meeting and no reason for putting the
proposal into effect. ' Thus, the Rumanian Government has felt fre:
to violate the military provisions of the peace treaty.
VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENT WITH IRAN
Soviet-Iranian relations are based formally on the treaty of friend
ship of February 26, 1921,- which was reaffirmed in 1928 [1921)
Article IV of this treaty states:
In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine free
its political destiny, each of the two contracting parties formally expresses il
desire to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other.
In 1942, the U. S. S. R., United Kingdom, and Iran signed a treaty.
alliances in which the two large powers agreed
to respect the territores
Tehranº declaration, the U. S. S. R., United Kingdom, and the
integrity,, sovereignty, and independence of Iran. In the 1998
United States expressed their desire for the maintenance of the
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. Asal
.:)
article II (par. 4), which states:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of an
Nations.
1 Not printed.
2 Not printed.
3 Not printed.
4 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 114, pp. 901 ff.
5 Treaty of Oct. 1, 1927; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 112, p.
6 Treaty of Jan. 29, 1942; British and Foreign State Papers, pp. 1017 f.
? Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp.
1
1
276 fr.
THE SOVIET UNION
1943
1
5
11
0
18
of
18
persons, motor, rail transport, and coastwise shipping between the
Korea refused to discuss or implement this agreement and resisted
barter basis. No regularized movement of persons or transport was
1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 9, 1945, pp. 934-935.
· U.N. press release 52, Jan. 19, 1946.
4 Agreement of Dec. 27, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 63.
New York Times, Dec. 7, 1946, p. 8.
The U.S.S.R., in her relations with Iran, has violated all of these
solemn commitments.
The Soviet Government, in a note to the United States on November
29, 1945, admitted that Soviet forces in Iran had prevented Iranian
troops from taking action after the outbreak against the Iranian
Government in northern Iran. This Soviet action at least indirectly
aided the Azerbaijan separatists and, thus, constituted interference
in the internal affairs of Iran, in violation of its 1921 pledge of friend-
ship. Furthermore, violations of the tripartite treaty occurred both
during and after World War II. By supporting the Azerbaijan
separatists while occupying Iran and by its refusal to evacuate its
troops except under United Nations pressures, the U. S. S. R. violated
the Tehran declaration. The Iranian appeal to the Security Council
in January 1946 ? and its notification to the Council on December 5,
1946, that the U. S. S. R. had warned Iran to refrain from moving
troops into Azerbaijan were both based upon charges of Soviet
interference in the internal affairs of Iran in violation of the United
Nations Charter. Moreover, the Soviet radio has repeatedly attacked
the Iranian Government on false grounds, has incited the Iranian
people to violent action against the government, and has given sup-
port to the illegal Tudeh Party.
VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS INVOLVING THE FAR EAST
The Soviet Government openly violated the joint United States-
U.S. S. R. Moscow agreement for the reestablishment of Korean
independence and the economic recovery of the country. The
two powers were to consult in the preparation of proposals for the
formation of a provisional Korean government. The U. S. S. R,
representative on the Joint Control Commission consistently refused
to allow such consultation except under unilateral interpretations of
the phrase "democratic parties and social organizations” which, in
each case, would have excluded all but pro-Soviet political groups.
Moreover
, the Soviet delegation
refused to consult with Korean
groups whose representatives had at any time expressed opposition
to the provision for placing Korea under trusteeship, as envisaged in
The Joint Commission agreed to reestablish the movement of
country. Concessions to economic coordination were made only on a
ES
ne
P8
KOREA
13
lll
jel the Moscow agreement.
Of
219
1944
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
JAPAN
rather than destroy, international relationships based on the principles
2 See Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Victim
3 Delivered before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C.; Departe
established beyond that allowed the United States to supply her
outposts that were accessible only by roads through Soviet-occupied
territory.
In the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, defining the conditions
for the Japanese surrender, Japanese military forces, after being
completely disarmed, were to be permitted to return to their homes
"with [the] opportunity to lead peaceful [and] productive lives:
On December 8, 1949, the U. S. S. R. signed the Geneva Prisoners of
War Convention, setting forth the rights and obligations of countries
holding prisoners of war.?
TASS, the official Soviet news agency, on May 20, 1949, declared
that
there were 95,000 Japanese prisoners of war in Soviet-held
territory still awaiting repatriation. According to Japanese figures
an additional 376,929 Japanese were then still under Soviet control
The discrepancy is explicable either by continued detention of Japanese
prisoners or an abnormally high death rate. The U.S. S. R. refuses
to give any information on the matter and has walked out of Control
Council meetings in which the problem was broached.
3. DEFENDING THE PEACE FROM SOVIET THRUSTS: Address
by the Secretary of State, April 30, 1951 3
The common interest around which your organization is built i
one which goes right to the heart of what we are trying to achieve in
the world through our foreign policy.
Your organization is one of the major expressions of America's
great productive power, and, though there may be differences et
opinion about many things, I think all of us will agree that this great
productive power of ours is one of the key factors, and perhaps the
most important single factor, on which the peace of the world today 1
depends.
Although we are blessed with the greatest productive capacity in 1
all the world, we dare not forget that there are other important com
centrations of industrial production in the world. Fortunately
, most
of the other important concentrations are in the hands of those who
share our basic purposes. This means that a preponderance of i
dustrial power is in the hands of nations who are trying
to bui
of the United Nations.
Now, your Government is asking you to devote a substantial share
and an increasing share, of this great productive capacity to turning
1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 49–50.
1
(Department of State publication 3938; 1950), pp. 84–161.
ment of State Bulletin, May 14, 1951, pp. 766–770.
}
1
t.
t
f
f
THE SOVIET UNION
1945
Now, even if we were to leave aside all the considerations of our
friendship and concern for the people who would be enslaved in this
expansion of Soviet power and were to take the narrowest view of our
own national security, we would still be faced with that fact that these
two thrusts by the Soviet power system would not be compatible
from adding the resources and the productive concentrations in West-
defense program in the present period to prevent the Soviet system
ern Europe and in Asia to its own war-making machine. This is not
1
out items that contribute to the defensive strength of this and other
free nations.
All of us wish that it were not necessary to do this. We would all
much rather be turning out things that are creative and constructive,
things that make life better for people, rather than weapons of war.
And, we all wish that we could devote a larger portion of our energies
to our great constructive programs to assist other free peoples to move
toward better standards of living. This is the kind of thing we
Americans traditionally prefer to do.
But instead, we are called upon to devote some 15 to 20 percent of
our national output to the urgent necessities of military defense.
What I would like to discuss with you today is why this has become
necessary and what it is this nation is seeking to do with this strength
you are helping to build.
ol
US
shevik conspiracy
defensive strength.
15
II
MENACE OF SOVIET THRUSTS
In the 54 years that have passed since the end of the war, the men
who control the destinies of the Soviet Union have continued to press
forward not only with the traditional territorial aspirations of Old
Russia but also with the revolutionary aims for world rule of the Bol-
This is the threat which requires the rest of the world to build
By a combination of a ruthless control system over their own people
and false promises to the discontented in many other lands, the men
who run this vast conspiracy have been reaching out for more power.
And, what is most important for us to understand is that they are
reaching out for those critical centers of power which will give them
leverage over all the rest.
The
object of the Soviet reach for power in this period is to bring
within the Soviet sphere of control two critical areas.
One of these
contains the great industrial capacity of Europe. The other is Asia
with its resources, including the present
and more important, the
potential industrial capacity of Japan.
With these areas under their control, the Soviet rulers believe that
they could dominate the world. They would not only be in a strong
position in the
event of war but what also is just as important, they
would be in a strong position to impose their
will on the other parts of
o the world without having to fire a shot.
It is immediately clear that this would be a very dangerous condi-
at
le
11
1
D-
ļ, tion for us and for all free people.
BS
1946
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1 See joint declaration of June 21, 1951, by the American, British, and French
all that our defense program has to do, but it is, in broad strategie
terms, the major task now required of it.
Let us now take a closer look at what we are doing, with the strength
which you are helping to build, to meet these two major Soviet thrusta
in Europe and in Asia.
MEETING THE THRUST IN EUROPE
One arm of our security effort is seeking to meet the Soviet thrust
against Europe.
I am not going to review with you here all the details of the progress
we are making under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the
setting up of General Eisenhower's headquarters and staff
, and the
operation of our military and economic aid program, and the steps
which show the growing cohesion and strength of the European
nations. I know that these are familiar to you and that your organiza-
tion has been following these programs closely.
What I do want to do is to step back and look at these efforts in
the large, to see this European effort in great block poster colors, so
that we can come away with a feeling for the whole pattern of what it
is we are trying to do there.
In the large, the people of Europe, with our help, are trying to
harness their growing economic strength to the urgent need for an
effective defense system, so that they and their resources and their
skills and their industrial plants will not, either through attack or
through subversion, fall into the hands of the Soviet rulers.
Germany, as I indicated a moment ago, occupies a place of particular
significance in this effort, because Soviet control over the Ruhr would
put the Soviet rulers in a strong position to reach out for the rest of
Europe.
The Soviet rulers have long understood this simple strategic feet"
The whole point of the Soviet tactics in the talks among the deputy
Foreign Ministers at Paris' has been to retard, and if possible to pre
S
vent, the strengthening of the Western European defense system
To do this, they have been trying to drive a wedge between the Allies
by portraying themselves as the put-upon lovers of peace and by
h
characterizing our defense measures as aggressive. În
they have been seeking to prevent the participation of Westem P
Germany in the Western European defense system.
The increased shrillness of the Soviet representative in the Paris
talks, Mr. Gromyko,
is in a sense the measure of the progress of ou
defensive effort.
If we weren't getting anywhere with the European defense program
the Soviet representatives wouldn't be making a great noise about i.
t]
But as we make progress, as we eliminate the possibilities for easy
conquest, we must be prepared for these propaganda blasts, for a w
of nerves, for fake peace offensives.
It is one of the inescapable features of this situation that, as he
Deputies; supra, p. 1793.
ti
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particular
a:
IT
ai
D
d
THE SOVIET UNION
1947
at
e
e
S
11
appetite for aggression altogether.
this European defense system to a level which approaches these
allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in answer to sugges-
I would like to say a word here on the cost of our assistance to our
tions I have heard that this aid is an extravagance which should be
Purely, in terms of the hard-headed question: How much security
o eliminate the weaknesses which invite aggression, the tensions and
the dangers of the immediate period may increase.
h
Since the only alternative to this course would be to remain at a
disadvantage and ultimately lose all, we have no choice but to plug
ahead, building our combined strength as steadily and as rapidly as
we can. That is the only way to work our way through this period
of danger.
We have repeatedly said--and our record in these Paris discussions
and on many previous occasions makes it clear that we mean what we
say—that we are ready to negotiate in good faith now or at any time.
But until we are met with equal good faith, and so long as this threat
hangs over us, we cannot relax our efforts to build our common
strength.
One advantage that the people of Europe start with in building this
defensive strength is the remarkable rate of economic recovery they
have achieved from the destruction of the war. Great credit is due
the people of Europe for this achievement. It does not in any way
diminish from the luster of their accomplishment for us to acknowledge
t the part our aid program has played in that recovery.
Our economic aid program, which was carried forward, appropriately
under the name of the Marshall Plan, has been a tremendous success.
Make no mistake about that. The evidence of Europe's mounting
productive output is not only a testimony to our enlightened and
unprecedented effort to assist the people of Europe in rebuilding their
war-shattered economy but it is also, even from à narrow interpreta-
tion of our own self-interest, a good return on our investment in
our national security.
of The urgent problem that remains is to translate an adequate part
of this economic potential into the tanks and the planes and the guns
A good start has been made in this direction. But the Soviet
military preparations have been going
on steadily since the
war, and
Soviet satellite forces are being built up rapidly, to add to the Soviet
capability for intimidation and attack.
The best military minds of this country and of our European allies
have been working to devise defense plans and create a defense
program which will be adequate to the threat
It is our goal to build a defense system which will inspire confidence
irom being overrun. It is also our goal to attain a level of defense
which will
, together with our power, be sufficient to discourage the
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11
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necessary goals
l
1948
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
United Nations, and they sought, in so doing, to weaken the political
Another purpose of this attack, which has made itself apparent, il
will a dollar buy? It is evident that the aid we are furnishing our
allies so multiplies our common security that it is in fact an economical
use of resources.
Our aid is not only an addition to the billions of dollars now in the
military budgets of the European countries—but it is often a multi-
plying factor. To take one example, 55 thousand dollars worth of
copper and zinc supplied by us made possible the manufacture of 3.5
million dollars worth of antitank mines in Britain,
Or, in another case, 300 thousand dollars worth of machine tools
made it possible for France to produce almost 14 million dollars worth
of air frames.
Reduced to its simplest terms, our aid to Western Europe produces
more security per dollar, faster, than we could possibly achieve our-
selves. And, it is security which is vital both to us and to our European
allies.
We are well aware that the rapid fulfillment of our common defense
program is certain to affect the civilian life, not only of our own
people but of all the people with whom we are allied.
Wherever careful planning and cooperation can moderate or equalize i :
these burdens, we are endeavoring to bring this about.
This is all part of the complex but essential process by which the
combined defense system is now taking shape.
Our progress up to this point has been sufficient, I believe, to justify b
our confidence that, with time and with effort, we can build the
strength of this European defense system sufficiently to prevent the
Soviet thrust in this direction from achieving its aim. To do so is p
b
necessary to peace and to our security.
THE PATTERN IN ASIA
Now, let us look at the other major Soviet thrust and at what we
W
are doing about it.
The purpose of this thrust is to put the Soviet empire in a position
be
to dominate all Asia, including control over Japan, with its alread
large production and its larger potentialities, with its skilled poput
fu
tion and its strategic position. By linking the production of Japan to
the manpower of China and the resources of Asia, the Soviet rulers
would be in a strong position to redouble
their pressure on the rest o
the world.
he
To understand this purpose helps to make clear the meaning of the
pr
attack on Korea.
This attack, carried forward by satellite troops, was designed in the
So
first instance to extend Communist control over the entire Koreai
peninsula.
To achieve this, they were willing to flout the authority of the
are standing in the way of the Soviet ambitions.
possible in Asia before our strength-in-being has been further buili u
Cd
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tra
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1
2
A
THE SOVIET UNION
1949
See Treaty of Sept. 1, 1951; supra, pp. 878–880.
BE
further strengthen the structure of peace in the Pacific.
helping them to achieve and protect their freedom and to make
tragedy of life behind the iron curtain, has not diminished. The
Our friendship for the people of China, who are now suffering the
structure of peace which we and our allies are building will never be
1 See Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 425-440.
? See Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 885-886.
Statement of Apr. 18, 1951; Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 30, 1951,
See Treaty of Aug. 30, 1951; supra, pp. 873–875.
How are we dealing with this Soviet strategy for Asia ? Again here,
as in our discussion of the thrust against Europe, I will not go into
great detail about the steps we are taking. These details are familiar
to you, and what I want to try to bring out is the pattern of our efforts.
The objuctive of these efforts is to thwart the Soviet attempt to
dominate Asia. It is our purpose to help the people of Asia protect
their freedom and independence.
One of the major lines of effort in this program is the writing of a
peace treaty for Japan. The careful and able work of Ambassador
John Foster Dulles has laid the basis for a Japanese peace treaty
which will enable Japan to become an equal, peaceful, and self-
sustaining member of the world community. It will also put the
people of Japan in the best position to contribute to the independence
of their country, which, as we have seen, is important to our security
as well as to theirs.
The people of Japan have earned our confidence by their steady
and responsible course during these difficult months since the attack
was launched against Korea, and we look forward to the establish-
ment of permanent bonds of friendship between Japan and all other
ne! In order that a power vacuum will not be created by a peace settle-
ment with Japan, we are making cooperative arrangements, on the
besis of mutual agreement, to insure the independence and the
continued security of Japan.
agreement is to be one of a series recently announced by the
is President, which are intended as initial steps toward building the
basis for security in the Pacific.
Conditions in the Pacific area are substantially different from those
which prevail in Europe, and the establishment of security arrange-
ments similar to those in the North Atlantic area are not now feasible.
We wish to help the peoples of the Pacific area in their efforts in any
way we can, and the present and proposed security arrangements
between ourselves and Japan and with the Philippines, Australia
and New Zealand, to which the President referred, will, we hope,
Our economic and military aid programs are another essential part
of this total effort to maintain peace in the Far East.
By demonstrating our friendship for the peoples of Asia and by
bi
progress against the poverty and misery which oppresses them, we
he
Soviet imperialist design, and we thereby strengthen our own security.
free nations.
2
he! This
We
01
to
N
3
p. 699.
1950
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
program of building strength, and we need to build that strength t
These are factors which cannot be ignored in thinking about whe
complete until all the peoples who are now under the domination of
the Kremlin are able to participate freely and independently.
The Soviets are constantly probing for points throughout Asia at
which penetration may be possible. Efforts to penetrate by economic
and political means of subversion have now been supplemented by
the use of armed invasion and war.
Our military and economic aid programs have been adapted to
meet the further threat posed by this Communist use of force
.
Supplementing the important aid programs which we had been
developing in the Far East, additional military aid has been directed
to those areas especially threatened by this military development.
This includes additional aid to Formosa, the Philippines, and Indo-
china. As the President declared following the Communist attack on
Korea, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces in these
circumstances would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific
area and to United States forces in that area.1 The Seventh Fleet
was ordered then to prevent any attack on Formosa. To supplement
the defense of Formosa and insure that Formosa will not fall into
hostile hands, we are providing increased military aid.
The aid programs in the Far East meet not only such immediate
security requirements as these but also give powerful support to our
national security interest by helping the people of Asia lay the basi
for stable and developing societies. It is important for us to ap-
preciate that our humanitarian instincts and our own national security
interests are both served by these programs.
THE TEST OF STRENGTH IN KOREA
Now, we come to the most direct military aspect of our efforts to
deal with the Soviet thrust in Asia. This relates to what we and the
other members of the United Nations are doing to stop the aggression
in Korea.
What I have already said should make it clear why it is important
to our security that this attack in Korea be stopped in its tracks
We have seen that this attack is part of a design to gain control ore
all Asia. This attack is also intended to weaken the position of the
United Nations, the United States, and others who stand in the war
of Soviet ambitions.
There are several other points which have emerged from our survey
and which bear on this conflict
in Korea. One is that this is not the
only Soviet thrust we must bear in mind. The Soviets are using
satellite troops for this aggression, keeping their own forces in reseri
It would further their strategy if we were to expend our major streng
against the forces and the territory of their satellites or if we were i
neglect other vital interests in meeting this thrust.
We have also seen that we need time to push ahead with
together with our allies.
]
it is we are doing in Korea.
1 Statement of June 27, 1950; infra, pp. 2539–2540.
i
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I
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THE SOVIET UNION
1951
The best way to do this is for us to continue firm in our determination
of bringing this action to a successful conclusion.
t
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IC
ht
happens, the responsibility for it will rest squarely on the Kremlin
Korea, if we don't flinch or get rattled, we shall have the best chance
li we remain firm and steady on the course we are following in
of Our objectives in Korea are very clear, and there should be no
misunderstanding about them.
In the simplest terms, we are trying to accomplish three things in
Korea:
1. We are trying to stop this act of aggression.
2. We are trying to keep this conflict from spreading, to the extent
that it is in our power to do so.
3. We are trying to restore peace and security to the area.
d
These have been our purposes from the beginning, and these have
been the agreed purposes of the United Nations. The United Nations
has never contemplated the use of force to accomplish its political
objective in Korea, which is the establishment of a unified, inde-
se pendent, and democratic country.
A great deal has already been accomplished by the steadiness with
which we have held to these purposes, and above all by the heroic
devotion of our men in Korea and their fellow soldiers from other
countries. We should not, in the course of the present debate, lose
sight of these accomplishments:
First, this act of aggression has not succeeded according to the
! Soviet plan, and whatever other actions were planned have been
interfered with;
Second, the defense against this aggression has served to arouse
free men all over the world and has stimulated them to speed up
their efforts to build a strong defense system;
Third, new vitality has pulsed through the whole idea of collective
security against aggression;
And fourth, this device of satellite aggression has been thoroughly
exposed, and its usefulness in other situations has been reduced.
We knew last June, and we know today, that it was right and
necessary to stand firm against this attack. If we had not, the whole
spirit of resistance against the Soviet grab for power would have been
weakened, perhaps fatally.
Now, people are saying: this may be true, but how can the conflict
in Korea be brought to an end ?
There are two ways in which this situation in Korea may develop
that the fighting may spread despite our efforts to limit it.
Further acts of the aggressors could touch off world war. If this
50
be
-15
to 0
22
S
ar
Il
IN
One
il
and its agents in Peiping.
l
The other is that the fighting may be brought to an end in Korea.
to meet and repel the enemy until it becomes
clear to him that his
aggression cannot pay. There
must be an end to the fighting, there
must be concrete measures against the renewal of the attack, and
there must
be an abandonment by the enemy of his attempt to conquer
the Republic of Korea.
1952
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The other day at Paris, Mr. Gromyko was playing back to us some
of the arguments he has been overhearing from this side of the Atlantic
about Korea. He raised the question whether or not we are going
to hold to our course in Korea with firm determination.
Well, we are. But his intervention serves to remind us that, in
thinking about this action in Korea, we have to keep always in mind
the total world picture, and the whole threat we face.
The ingredients of peace in the world must include: the resoluteness
with which we hold to our course in Korea; the speed with which we
build up our strength elsewhere in the world; the closeness of our
common defense arrangements with our allies.
As I said at the outset, the strength and the power you are helping
to build are essential to our security and to world peace. But equally
important is the strength of character and the steadiness of the
American people.
To win through to a period of peace in the world will require wisdom
and courage and common sense from all of us.
4. AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE:
Message From the President of the United States to the President
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Transmitting a Con-
gressional Resolution, July 7, 1951 2
I have the honor of transmitting to you a resolution adopted by
the Congress of the United States with a request that its contents
be made known by your government to the people of the Soviet
Union.
This resolution expresses the friendship and good will of the
American people for all the peoples of the earth and it also reempha-
sizes the profound desire of the American Government to do every-
thing in its power to bring about a just and lasting peace.
As Chief Executive of the United States, I give this resolution my
sincere approval. I add to it a message of my own to the Soviet
people in the earnest hope that these expressions may help form &
better understanding of the aims and purposes of the United States
The unhappy results of the last few years demonstrate that formal
diplomatic negotiations among
nations will be largely barren wbile
barriers exist to the friendly exchange of ideas and information among
peoples. The best hope for a peaceful world lies in the yearning for
peace and brotherhood which lies deep in the heart of every human
being. But peoples who are denied the normal means of communica-
tion will not be able to attain that mutual understanding which must
IN. M. Shvernik.
2 Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1951, p. 87. For the texts of the letter
from the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S. R., dated
Aug. 6, 1951, transmitting the Presidium's friendship resolution of this date,
and
of President Truman's message
of Aug. 20, 1951, transmitting to the U.S. Com
gress the Soviet communication, see ibid., 'Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 294–297, and Sept.
3, 1951, pp. 379-381.
THE SOVIET UNION
1953
That the Congress of the United States reaffirms the historic and
Whereas, in proof of this, the United States has offered to share all
Whereas terrible danger to all free peoples compels the United States
Whereas we rearm only with reluctance and would prefer to devote
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
? See the section entitled “Findings and Declaration of Policy” of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356
form the basis for trust and friendship. We shall never be able to
remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war until commu-
nication is permitted to flow, free and open, across international
boundaries.
The peoples of both our countries know from personal experience
the horror and misery of war. They abhor the thought of future
conflict which they know would be waged by means of the most
hideous weapons in the history of mankind. As leaders of their
respective governments, it is our sacred duty to pursue every honorable
means which will bring to fruition their common longing for peace.
Peace is safest in the hands of the people and we can best achieve
the goal by doing all we can to place it there.
I believe that if we can acquaint the Soviet people with the peace
aims of the American people and government, there will be no war.
I feel sure that you will wish to have carried to the Soviet people
the text of this resolution adopted by the American Congress.
(Enclosure)
Senate Concurrent Resolution 11 (82d Congress, 1st session),
June 26, 1951 1
Whereas the goal of the American people is now, and ever has been,
& just and lasting peace; and
Whereas the deepest wish of our Nation is to join with all other
nations in preserving the dignity of man, and in observing those
moral principles which alone lend meaning to his existence; and
that is good in atomic energy asking in return only safeguards
against the evil in the atom; and
Whereas the Congress reaffirms its policy as expressed in law "to
continue to exert maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide
the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the
Charter and agreements to achieve universal control of weapons of
mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of arma-
ments
, including armed forces, under adequate safeguards to pro-
tect complying nations against violation and evasion”, and
Whereas this Nation has likewise given of its substance and resources
to help those peoples ravaged by war and poverty; and
to undertake a vast prograin of armaments expenditures; and
our energies to peaceful pursuits: Now, therefore, be it
:
165 Stat. 369-370.
1357.
415900-57Vol. 2-20
1954
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
war; and
benec. 24, 1951, pp. 1010-1011); Dec. 13, 1951
Cf, the Czechoslovak notes to the United
abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, and
declares-
That the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which
separate them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of the desire
of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples
,
and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood;
and
That the American people believe the Soviet Government could
advance the cause of peace immeasurably by removing those artifical
barriers, thus permitting the free exchange of information between
our peoples; and
That the American people and their Government desire neither
war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a
That, although they are firmly determined to defend their freedom
and security, the American people welcome all honorable efforts to
resolve the differences standing between the United States Govern-
ment and the Soviet Government and invite the peoples of the Soviet
Union to cooperate in a spirit of friendship in this endeavor; and
That the Congress request the President of the United States to
call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to acquaint the peoples of the Soviet Union with the contents of this
resolution.
5. REPLY TO SOVIET CHARGES REGARDING THE MUTUAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1951: Note From the American Embassy at
Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, December 19, 1951 1
The United States Government categorically rejects the Soviet
Government's allegations 2 that the Act 3 constitutes interference
in the internal affairs of the U.S.S. R. or a violation of the undertakings
in the Roosevelt-Litvinov correspondence of November 16, 1933.
The Mutual Security Act, by its very title and by all its provisions,
is clearly designed to strengthen the defense of the Free World and,
as regards Europe, to support European freedom through assistance
1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1056.
2 See Soviet note of Nov. 21, 1951 (ibid., Dec. 3, 1951, pp. 910-911)_and state-
ment of the same date by the Department of State (ibid., p. 910). For the de
velopment of this campaign by the Soviet Union against the Mutual Security
Program, see also statements by U. S. Representatives to the U.N. General
(ibid., Jan. 28, 1952, pp. 128-129).
Mar. 16, 1953, pp. 410-411); the American Notes to Czechoslovakia of Nov. 18,
1952 (ibid., Dec. 1, 1952, pp. 850-851) and Mar. 4, 1953 (ibid., Mar. 16
, 1958
pp. 409-410); and discussion of the question in the Political and Security Com:
mittee of the General Assembly, Mar. 23-25, 1953 (ibid., Apr. 6, 1953, PP.
516).
3 Act of Oct. 10, 1951; 65 Stat. 373–387. See also infra, pp. 3059-3086.
4 Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp.
1-62
THE SOVIET UNION
1955
January 15, 1952, note No. 1130/PR of September 30, 1948,4 and
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency
the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has
the honor to invite the Ambassador's attention to note No. 46/PR of
Mar. 10, 1952, by the Department of State regarding travel restrictions in the
? Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 451. See also statement of
Soviet Union (ibid., p. 452).
4Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 24, 1948, p. 525.
to the defense of the Nato countries. The provision of the Act to
which the Soviet Government referred is intended to provide assistance
for victims of oppression, when such assistance has been determined
to contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area. Assistance
of this nature is in keeping with the traditional United States policy
of helping victims of oppression, in this instance those Eastern
Europeans who have escaped or may escape to the Free World.
The United States Government denies the implication of the reference
note that rendering assistance to refugees from oppression and refusal
to return them to the oppressor governments constitutes subversion
or interference in the internal affairs of those governments.
As has been repeatedly made clear previously, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization was, in conformity with the Charter of the
United Nations, established for defensive purposes only and has no
aggressive aims. The Organization would not have been necessary
if, since the end of World War II, the U.S. S. R. had not adopted an
aggressive and threatening attitude toward the individual countries
of the Free World, who have now joined in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization for their common defense. It is therefore obvious that
any North Atlantic Treaty Organization assistance authorized by the
Mutual Security Act is not, as alleged by the Soviet Government,
designed for aggressive purposes against the U. S. S. R. or any other
The Soviet note under reference clearly represents another of many
attempts to disrupt particular aspects of the defense effort of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization by falsely charging for propa-
ganda purposes that a specific facet of United States support for the
objects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is aimed with
aggressive intent against the U. S. S. R.
The United States Government states in conclusion that false
charges of interference in Soviet internal affairs come with singular
il-grace from a regime which has for many years consistently supported
subversive activities directed against the United States and other
nations of the Free World.
6. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET OFFICIALS IN THE
UNITED STATES: Note From the Secretary of State to the
Soviet Ambassador at Washington, March 10, 1952 ?
country,
1
3
1 S.
3 Not printed
1956
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the note verbale dated May 16, 1941, addressed to the United States
Embassy at Moscow by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the effect of
which has been to restrict the travel in the Soviet Union of American
diplomatic and consular officers, as well as of the other members of
the staff of the American Embassy at Moscow.
In view of the restrictions which have been placed upon the travel
of American diplomatic and consular representatives and employees
in the Soviet Union, the Government of the United States is con-
strained to regulate the travel of Soviet personnel assigned to the
Embassy in Washington, Soviet representatives of the official Soviet
news agency, Tass, and Soviet representatives of other publicity
media who are assigned for duty in Washington and Soviet official
personnel assigned to Amtorg2 in New York. Effective immediately
Soviet official personnel of the Embassy in Washington, Tass repre-
sentatives and others who are Soviet citizens assigned for newspaper
work in Washington are required not to travel to any point more than
25 miles distant from the center of Washington without previous
official notification at least 48 hours in advance. Soviet official
personnel assigned to Amtorg shall not travel to any point more than
25 miles distant from the center of New York City without previous
official notification at least 48 hours in advance.
In the case of Soviet civilian officials, the notification should be
addressed to the Department of State; and in the case of Soviet mili-
tary personnel to the appropriate Army, Navy or Air Force foreign
liaison office. Notification should contain the name of each traveler
,
complete and detailed information concerning his projected travel,
including itinerary, points of stopover, and duration of journey.
The United States Government observes that by reason of the action
of the Soviet Government in restricting the travel of United States
official personnel in the USSR, it is compelled similarly to regulate
Soviet Official personnel. At the same time the United States Gov.
ernment states it is prepared to reexamine the question of travel
regulations in the light of the treatment accorded United States official
representatives in the Soviet Union.
7. RECALL OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR: Note From
the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
October 8, 1952 3
The receipt is acknowledged of the note of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of October 34 informing the United States Government that
the Soviet Government considers Ambassador George F. Kennan as
persona non grata and requesting Mr. Kennan's immediate recall
.
The Soviet Government in its note bases its attitude on statements
made on September 19 by Ambassador Kennan in Berlin to repre-
1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 24, 1948, p. 525.
2 Amtorg Trading Corporation,
3 Department of State Bulletin, Oct, 20, 1952, p. 603.
4 Ibid.
THE SOVIET UNION
1957
1 See the statement by the Secretary of State at a press conference on Oct. 3,
on Americans in Moscow (ibid., Oct. 13, 1952, p. 557).
? Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 2, 1953, pp. 353-354.
sentatives of the press 1 wbich the Soviet Government characterizes
as “slanderous attacks hostile to the Soviet Union in gross violation
of generally recognized norms of international law.”
Ambassador Kennan's statement accurately and in moderate lan-
guage described the position of foreign diplomats accredited to the
Soviet Government. It is this treatment of diplomatic representa-
tives
, systematically applied over a period of years by the Soviet
Government, which grossly violates the traditions and customs in
international intercourse developed over generations.
In the light of the above, the United States Government cannot
accept the charges made by the Soviet Government as constituting
valid reasons for acceding to the request for the recall of Ambassador
Kennan.
8. SUBJUGATION OF FREE PEOPLES BY THE SOVIET
UNION: Letter From the President to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting a
Draft Resolution, February 20, 1953 2
Dear Mr. President:
Mr. Speaker:
In my message to Congress of February 2, 1953, I stated that
I would ask the Congress at a later date to join in an appropriate
resolution, making clear that we would never acquiesce in the enslave-
ment of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves,
and that we would not feel that any past agreements committed us to
any such enslavement.
In pursuance of that portion of the message to Congress, I now have
the honor to inform you that I am concurrently informing the Presi-
dent of the Senate (the Speaker of the House) that I invite the con-
currence of the two branches of the Congress in a declaration, in which
I would join as President which would:
(1) Refer to World War II international agreements or understand-
ings concerning other peoples;
(2) Point out that the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party who
now control Russia, in violation of the clear intent of these agreements
ou understandings, subjected whole nations concerned
to the domina-
tion of a totalitarian imperialism;
(3) Point out
that such forceful absorption of free peoples into an
aggressive despotism increases the threat against the security of all
remaining free peoples, including our own;
4. State that the people of the United States, true to their tradition
and heritage of freedom, have never acquiesced in such enslavement
of any peoples;
2
.
3
Supra, pp. 61-65.
1958
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
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as H. J. Res, 200, 83d Cong., 1st sess., and, together with other draft resolutions
(5) Point out that it is appropriate that the Congress should join
with the President to give expression to the desires and hopes of the
American people;
(6) Conclude a declaration that the Senate and the House join with
the President in declaring that the United States rejects any interpre-
tations or applications of any international agreements or understand-
ings, made during the course of World War II, which have been
perverted to bring about the subjugation of free peoples and further
join in proclaiming the hope that the peoples, who have been subjected
to the captivity of Soviet despotism, shall again enjoy the right of
self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace;
that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government
under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of self-government
shall be restored to them all in accordance with the pledge of the
Atlantic Charter. I
I am enclosing a form of draft resolution, which, in my opinion,
carries out the purposes outlined above, and in which I am prepared
to concur.
(Enclosure)
Draft Resolution 2
Whereas, During World War II, representatives of the United
States, during the course of secret conferences, entered into various
international agreements or understandings concerning other peoples
;
and
Whereas, The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, who now
control Russia, have, in violation of the clear intent of these agree-
ments or understandings, subjected the peoples concerned including
whole nations, to the domination of a totalitarian imperialism; and
Whereas, Such forcible absorption of free peoples into an aggressive
despotism increases the threat against the security of all remaining
free peoples including our own; and
Whereas, The people of the United States, true to their tradition
and heritage of freedom, are never acquiescent in such enslavement of
any peoples; and
Whereas, It is appropriate that the Congress join with the President
in giving expression to the desires and hopes of the people of the
United States: Therefore be it
Resolved, That the Senate and House concurring,
Join with the President in declaring that the United States rejects
any interpretations or applications of any international agreements or
understandings, made during the course of World War II, which have
been perverted to bring about the subjugation of free peoples, and
further
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1-2.
2 This draft resolution was later introduced in the House of Representatives
was referred to the House Committee on. Foreign Affairs... Following hearing,
none of these measures was reported out of committee.
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THE SOVIET UNION
1959
northern Habomai and Shikotan islands.
slovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania,
Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva, China, Korea (in part), and Japan's
Kremlin has found it necessary to purge more than one-third of their
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 9, 1953, pp. 372–373,
Join in proclaiming the hope that the peoples who have been sub-
jected to the captivity of Soviet despotism shall again enjoy the right
of self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace;
that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government
under which they will live; and that sovereign rights of self-government
shall be restored to them all in accordance with the pledge of the
Atlantic Charter.
9. DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SUBJUGATION OF FREE
PEOPLES BY THE SOVIET UNION: Statement by the Secre-
tary of State Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Febru-
ary 26, 1953 1
The resolution proposed to the Congress by the President ? has one
crucial, compelling aim. That aim is to make totally clear the in-
tegrity of this Nation's purpose in relation to the millions of enslaved
peoples in Europe and Asia. The resolution speaks to those who yearn
for national and personal freedom and who fear that we may forget
them. The resolution also speaks to the Soviet despots who have
contrived this enslavement and who hope that we may come to
accept it.
To those enduring enslavement, and to those inflicting it, we would
make our position clear and firm. We, as a people, never have ac-
quiesced and never will acquiesce in the enslavement of other peoples.
Our Nation, from its beginning, was and is inspired by the spirit of
liberty. We do not accept or tolerate captivity as an irrevocable fact
which can be finalized by force or by the lapse of time. We do not
accommodate ourselves to political settlements which are based upon
contempt for the free will of peoples and which are imposed by the
brutal occupation of alien armies or by revolutionary factions who
serve alien masters.
The facts we must face can be simply summarized. Some dozen
people in the Kremlin are seeking to consolidate their imperial rule
over some 800 million people, representing what were nearly a score of
independent nations. The methods of the despots can be judged by
the fact that there are some 15 million in forced labor
camps in Soviet
Russia. Their number amounts to double the total membership of
the Soviet Communist Party itself.
This tyranny has been extended far beyond the frontiers of Russia
by the cold, calculated subjugation of free nation after free nation.
The list is a tragic one: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czecho-
it easy to rule these nations and peoples. Since World War II, the
2
Supra.
حنينغ معين
1960
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
original puppet leaders within the satellite countries of Europe. In
Asia, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, have been slaughtered in
a publicized exhibition of terrorism.
We must face these facts. It is a moral obligation to do so--for all
peoples have a right to know whether the United States acquiesces in
this assault on freedom. It is a practical matter--for the ultimate fate
of these peoples can gravely affect the future of freedom in Europe
,
in Asia, and through all the world, including our own United States
.
In the glaring light of these facts, the nature of this resolution
defines itself. It is a straight-forward statement of American principle
and American peaceful but firm purpose.
Some of you may think that American purpose is already clear, so
clear that this resolution is superfluous. Let me assure you that that
is not the fact. The captive peoples are oppressed by a great fear that
at some future time the United States may agree to a partition of the
world whereby we would accept and support Soviet dictatorship of
alien peoples in the hope of gaining greater security for ourselves.
This is not difficult to understand. Soviet propaganda vigorously
spreads this fear and there are within the free world
some who would
countenance such a bargain. The resultant fear is not something to
which we can be indifferent. It generates a sense of hopelessness and
futility among the captives, which paralyzes the strivings which could
operate peacefully to dissolve the unnatural unity of Soviet despotism
and return it to its natural and historic parts.
So long as there is doubt as to the attitude of the United States, and
I repeat that today there is such doubt, the captive peoples feel that
they have no choice but to be passive victims allowing themselves to
be made into tools of further aggression. If we want to maintain and
stimulate the spirit of freedom which eventually will peacefully frus-
trate the oppressive design of Soviet despotism and disintegrate that
overextended despotism, the first and indispensable step is to make
clear, on the highest authority of the President and Congress,
One, the United States does not countenance the violations by which
Soviet leadership has perverted past agreements and understanding
into chains of bondage. That is a result which the American people
never intended and which they will never accept.
Two, the United States will never be a party to any international
"deal" or "trade” confirming the rule of Soviet despotism over the
alien peoples it dominates in Europe and Asia.
Three, the United States seeks, as one of its peaceful goals, that these
enslaved national groups of Europe and Asia shall recover genuine
independence.
That is the purpose of the resolution now before you.
President Eisenhower proposes that our nation should reaffirm its
awareness that the struggle in the world today is, above all, a mora
conflict. We propose to attest our fidelity, without compromise.com
vacillation, to the principles of honor and political freedom
upon which
the nation was founded and which have made us always the dread of
the oppressor and the hope of the oppressed. We propose, in the
that:
1
THE SOVIET UNION
1961
Government and its puppet governments in satellite states in Europe
Orthodox congregations,
of Moslem communities, the persecution and scattering of ethnic
increasing persecution of the people of the Jewish faith, deserve the
strongest condemnation by all peoples who believe that spiritual values
are the bases of human progress and freedom.
Cong. Rec., vol. 99, Part 2, p. 1475.
spirit of the early days of the Republic, to do what we peacefully can
do, in order to revive the hopes of those now enslaved.
This resolution is no call to bloody and senseless revolution. On the
other hand, it is no idle gesture. It is an act of great historical im-
portance and many consequences will stem from it. As its purpose
becomes more and more widely understood, it will, over the coming
years, revive the inherent longing for freedom which persists within
the captive peoples so that that longing becomes a mounting spiritual
power which will eventually overcome the material power of Soviet
dictatorship to rule what it has, or to subjugate more.
This resolution looks to the future, rather than to the past. The
past is controversial. Should past administrations have made the
agreements which they made? Were they foolishly beguiled by Soviet
promises? Were they too much moved by considerations of short-
term expediency, so that they sacrificed basic principles? Did they
exceed their power in what they attempted; for these wartime agree-
ments were never subjected to the constitutional processes of our
Government? All of these questions have been, and long will be,
debated.
The resolution which President Eisenhower has proposed would
avoid this realm of controversy. It validates nothing that is invalid.
It gives up no rights, if we choose to assert them. It also leaves us
free to pursue other courses and take other steps in the future, as
circumstances may indicate their desirability.
What the President seeks is a solemn act of dedication for the
future
. It is an act which needs, and deserves, the support of both
great parties. It will provide the indispensable foundation upon which
future foreign policies can again build a structure of peace, justice,
and freedom. Therefore, I beg, let us not on this occasion divisively
debate the past. Let us unitedly move on to mold the future.
10. CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET PERSECUTION OF RE-
LIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES: Senate Resolution 84
(83d Congress, 1st Session), February 27, 1953
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate of the United States
that the vicious and inhuman campaigns conducted by the Soviet
in many other areas under Soviet domination, and most recently the
1
1962
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
1
2
C
P
t
The point I want to make is that so long as these three conditions
Representative to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (Department of
18, 1953 (ibid., Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 607–608) and Under Secretary Smith's ad-
Resolved further, That the President of the United States is hereby
urged to take appropriate action to protest, particularly in the
General Assembly of the United Nations, against these outrages
, in
order that the United Nations shall take such action in opposition to
them as may be suitable under its charter.
11. PRECONDITIONS FOR ACCOMMODATION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION: Remarks by the Secretary of State at a News
Conference, April 3, 1953 2
Nothing that has happened, or which seems to me likely to happen,
has changed the basic situation of danger in which we stand. There
are three basic facts which, I think, we should always have in mind
as long as they are the facts.
The first is this: The Soviet Union is a heavily armed totalitarian
state, subject to the dictates of a small group, whose total control
extends to one-third of the people, and the natural resources of the
world.
The second fact is that the leaders of the Soviet Union are basically
and deeply hostile to any other state which does not accept Soviet
Communist control. That is part of their fanatically held creed.
The third fact is that the Soviet Communist leaders do not recognize
any moral inhibitions against the use of violence. In fact, they do
not admit the existence of such a thing as the moral law.
Now those facts combine to create a grave danger, and as I said
,
nothing that has happened or seems likely to happen in the near
future ends that danger, or our need, or the need of the free world
generally, to take precautions against it. That, however, does not
prevent accommodations from time to time which may be useful.-
useful if, but only if, they do not blind us to the persistence of the
danger.
At the moment I see nothing which ends that danger or would
justify us in changing any of our basic defensive policies, either alone
or in conjunction with our allies. Now, there are, as I have said
,
possibilities of useful accommodation that could relate to such matters
as the exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war in Korea, and
if good faith is shown in relation to that, then there may be the
possibility of an armistice in Korea.
There is a question of an Austrian treaty which could also be a
matter of accommodation.
There are a whole series of outstanding questions which can be a
matter of accommodation.
1 This resolution was transmitted with a letter of Mar. 13, 1953, from the U:
State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 506).
2. Ibid., Apr. 13, 1953, p. 524. See also Secretary Dulles' address of Ap.
dress of Apr. 25, 1953 (ibid., May 11, 1953, p. 677).
ho C
8
0
8
THE SOVIET UNION
1963
requirement. At the discretion of the Department, they may also be
Notifications will be addressed to the Department of State, the
Mission to the United Nations in New York, New York, as appro-
more than twenty-five miles distance from the centers of Washington,
D. C., or New York, New York.
of July 11, 1955, from the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy granting
? Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, pp. 193-197. See also the note
a Pravda correspondent access to a restricted area (ibid., July 25, 1955, pp. 134-
persist, to which I referred, we must not, in my opinion, assume that
the danger is over and that we are living in a peaceful world which
requires neither armament nor our allies.
Ỉ see nothing which should delay or hamper the European Defense
Community and the other basic policy measures that we are trying
to take.
12. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET CITIZENS IN THE
UNITED STATES: Note From the Secretary of State to the
Soviet Ambassador at Washington, January 3, 1955 2
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency
the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has
the honor to state that the following regulations have been instituted
and will apply until further notice to travel in the United States by
Soviet citizens in possession of valid passports issued by the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics other than Soviet
citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations
while their conduct is a responsibility of the Secretary General of the
United Nations.
Travel will be permitted throughout the United States except in
the border zones described in enclosure No. 1, the states and counties
listed in enclosure No. 2. those cities which are listed in enclosure
No. 3 as closed cities in otherwise open areas, or as otherwise indicated
below. Enclosure No. 4 lists open cities in otherwise closed areas.
The prior notification of travel procedure set forth in the Depart-
ment's note of March 10, 1952,3 is extended to include all resident
Soviet citizens who are in possession of valid passports
issued by the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics other than
Soviet Officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United
Nations
while their conduct is a responsibility of the Secretary General of the
United Nations. Soviet citizens who are temporarily admitted to the
United States for some specific purpose which does not involve
temporary residence
in Washington, District of Columbia, or New
York
, New York, will not be subject to the prior notification of travel
germane to the purpose of the visit for which admitted.
or Air Force foreign liaison offices, or the United States
priate at least forty-eight hours in advance of anticipated travel of
Each
Army, Navy
1 Georgi N. Zaroubin.
135).
* Supra, doc 6.
1964
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1 See the Soviet notes of May 16, 1941, Sept. 30, 1948 (Department of State
Bulletin, Oct. 24, 1948, p. 525), and June 22, 1953 (ibid., Jan 31, 1955, p. 197).
2.
i
U
N
SE
M
the name of the traveler or travelers and detailed information con-
cerning the projected travel including itinerary, mode or modes of
travel, points and duration of stopovers, and specific routes and
carriers if transiting closed areas. Other than for large cities, place
names should be identified by county and state.
Transit travel by railroad or commercial airlines through closed
areas will be permitted when such travel is necessary to reach open
areas or open cities in otherwise closed areas. Soviet citizens en-
gaging in such transit travel are not to leave the immediate vicinity
of any air or rail terminal located in a closed area or city except where
necessary to effect air or rail connection for continuing the travel.
The transit of closed areas by automobile or bus will not normally be
permitted except by specified routes without intermediate stops be-
tween Washington, D. C., and New York, New York; Washington
,
D. C., and Baltimore, Maryland; New York, New York, and the
Oyster Bay, New York area; Washington, D. C., and the open areas
C
to the south and west. These routes are specified in enclosure No. 5.
Applications for exceptional access to recreation and resort areas
which fall in a closed area will be considered on the merits of each
such application.
The foregoing regulations are comparable to those which the Soviet
$
Union has imposed, presumably for reasons of security, on the move-
ment of United States citizens in the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Je
Union should hereafter conclude that the international situation were
such that security requirements enabled it to liberalize its regulations
restricting the travel of United States citizens in the Soviet Union, this
Government would in turn be disposed to reconsider in the same spint
spirit Pi
its own security requirements.
Enclosures:
1. Border Zones Closed to Travel by Soviet Citizens in Possession of Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics Passports.
2. States and Counties Closed to Travel by Soviet Citizens in Possession of
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Passports.
3. Cities in Otherwise Open Areas which are closed to Travel by Soviet
Citizens in Possession of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Passports.
4. Cities in Otherwise Closed Areas which are open to Travel by Soviet
Citizens in Possession of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Passports.
H
5. Specified Routes of Automotive Transit Through Areas Closed to Travel by
Soviet Citizens in Possession of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Passports.
BORDER ZONES CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET CITIZENS IN POSSESSION OF
U. S. S. R. PASSPORTS
1. U. S. A.-Canadian Border
Sc
In addition to the shores of the Great Lakes included within closed areas,
following
lake shores are closed by a band fifteen miles wide in the states and
counties listed:
a. Lake Superior: Minnesota-Cook, Lake, St. Louis; Wisconsin-- Douglas,
Bayfield,
Ashland, Iron; Michigan-Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton,
Keweenam
Baraga, Marquette, Alger, Luce, Chippewa, Mackinac and
Drummond Island.
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THE SOVIET UNION
1965
Cowley, Dickinson, Doniphan, Douglas, Elk, Franklin, Geary,
Harvey, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Leavenworth, Linn, Lyon, McPherson,
Sedgwick, Shawnee, Sumner, Wabaunsee, Wyandotte.
Kentucky: Ballard, Boone, Caldwell, Campbell, Christian, Crittenden, Hender-
son, Hopkins, Kenton, Livingston, Logan, Lyon, McCracken, Muhlenberg, Todd,
Soto, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Jefferson
Davis, Lafayette, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, Point Coupee,
St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin,
St. Mary, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, West Baton Rouge,
Maine: Androscoggin, Aroostook, Cumberland, Hancock, Kennebec, Knox,
Dorchester, Frederick, Harford, Howard, Kent, Queen Annes, St. Marys, Somer-
Maryland. Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Calvert, Caroline, Carroll, Cecil, Charles,
set, Talbot, Washington, Wicomico, Worcester.
b. Lake Michigan: Michigan-Emmet.
C. Lake Huron: Michigan-Cheboygan, Presque Isle, Alpena, Alcona, Iosco,
Arenac.
d. Lake Erie: Ohio-Lake, Ashtabula.
2. U. S. A.-Mexican Border
In addition to San Diego County, California, the Mexican border is closed by a
band fifteen miles wide except for that portion of the border which falls in Webb
County, Texas.
STATES AND COUNTIES CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET CITIZENS IN POSSESSION OF
U. S. S. R. PASSPORTS
Alabama: Colbert, Lauderdale, Limestone, Madison.
Arizona: Maricopa, Mohave, Yavapai.
California: Alameda, Contra Costa, Los Angeles, Marin, Monterey, Merced,
Napa, Orange, Sacramento, San Benito, San Diego, San Francisco, San Joaquin,
San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Bárbara, Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, Solano,
Sonoma, Ventura, Yolo.
Colorado: Adams, Alamosa, Arapahoe, Archuleta, Boulder, Chaffee, Clear
Creek, Conejos, Costilla, Custer, Delta, Denver, Douglas, Elbert, El Paso,
Fremont, Gilpin, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Huerfano, Jefferson, Lake, Mesa, Mineral,
Montrose, Ouray, Park, Pitkin, Pueblo, Rio Grande, Saguache, Teller.
Connecticut.
Delaware.
Georgia: Bryan, Bullock, Burke, Chatham, Effingham, Jenkins, Richmond,
Screven.
Idaho: Benewah, Bingham, Bonneville, Butte, Clark, Custer, Fremont, Idaho,
Jefferson, Latah, Lemhi, Lewis, Madison, Nez Perce, Teton, Valley.
Illinois
: Adams, Alexander, Brown, Calhoun, Clinton, Cook,
Du Page, Edgar,
Edwards, Franklin, Gallatin, Greene, Grundy, Hamilton, Hancock, Hardin,
Henderson, Iroquois
, Jackson, Jefferson, Jersey, Johnson, Kane, Kankakee,
Kendall, Lake, McHenry, Madison, Marion, Massac, Mercer, Monroe, Perry,
Pike, Pope, Pulaski, Randolph, Rock Island,
St. Clair, Saline, Union, Vermilion,
Wabash, Washington, Wayne, 'White, Will, Williamson.
Indiana: Adams, Allen, Benton, Blackford, Boone, Carroll, Cass, Clay, Clinton,
Dearborn, Decatur, De Kalb, Delaware, Elkhart, Fayette, Fountain, Franklin,
Fulton, Gibson, Grant, Hamilton, Hancock, Hendricks, Henry, Howard, Hunting-
ton, Jasper, Jay, Johnson, Kosciusko, Lagrange, Lake, La Porte, Madison, Marion,
Porter, Posey, Pulaski, Putnam, Randolph, Rush, St. Joseph, Shelby, Starke
Steuben, Tippecanoe, Tipton, Union, Vanderburgh, Vermillion, Vigo, 'Wabash,
Warren, Warrick, Wayne, Wells, White, Whitley.
Lowa: Des Moines, Henry, Lee, Louisa, Muscatine, Scott.
Kansas: Anderson, Atchison, Brown, Butler, Chase, Chautauqua, Coffey
Greenwood,
Louisiana: Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Caddo, Calcasieu, Cameron, De
:
Trigg, Union, Webster.
:
1966
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
son, Hyde, Jackson, Jerauld, Jones, Lawrence, Lincoln, Lyman, McCook, MC-
Pickett, Polk, Putnam, Rhea, Roane, Robertson, Rutherford, Scott, Sequatchie,
Sevier, Smith, Stewart, Sumner, Trousdale, Union, Van Buren, Warren, Wayne,
miles from the center of New York, New York. [Footnote in original document.)
2 Closed except for Oyster Bay area north of Route 25A. ' [Footnote în original
Massachusetts.
Michigan: Bay, Genesee, Hillsdale, Huron, Ingham, Jackson, Lapeer, Lenawee,
Livingston, Macomb, Midland, Monroe, Oakland, Saginaw, St. Clair, Sanilac
,
Shiawassee, Tuscola, Washtenaw, Wayne.
Missouri: Bollinger, Cape Girardeau, Clark, Jefferson, Lewis, Lincoln, Madi.
son, Marion, Perry, Pike, Ralls, St. Charles, St. Francois, Ste. Genevieve
, St.
Louis, St. Louis City.
Montana: Beaverhead, Deer Lodge, Silver Bow.
Nebraska: Cass, Douglas, Gage, Johnson, Lancaster, Nemaha, Otoe, Pawnee
,
Richardson, Sarpy.
Nevada: Clark, Lincoln, Nye.
New Hampshire: Cheshire, Hillsboro, Rockingham, Strafford.
New Jersey: Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Essex
,
Gloucester, Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex,1 Monmouth, Morris, ' Ocean,
Passaic, Salem, Somerset, Union, Warren.
New Mexico: Bernalillo, Los Alamos, Rio Arriba, Sandoval, Santa Fe, Tacs
,
Torrance.
New York: Albany, Broome, Cayuga, Chautauqua, Chenango, Cortland, Dela-
ware, Erie, Greene, Jefferson, Kings (Brooklyn), Madison, Monroe, Nassau,
Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Orleans, Oswego, Otsego, Schenectady, Schoharie
,
Suffolk, Wayne.
North_Dakota: Adams, Billings, Bottineau, Bowman, Burke, Burleigh, Divide,
Dunn, Emmons, Golden Valley, Grant, Hettinger, Kidder, Logan, McHenry,
McIntosh, McKenzie, McLean, Mercer, Morton, Mountrail, Oliver, Renville,
Sheridan, Sioux, Slope, Stark, Ward, Williams.
Ohio: Allen, Ashland, Auglaize, Butler, Champaign, Clark, Crawford, Cuya-
hoga, Darke, Defiance, Delaware, Erie, Franklin, °Fulton, Greene, Hamilton,
Hancock, Hardin, Henry, Huron, Jackson, Logan, Lorain, Lucas, Madison
,
Marion, Medina, Mercer, Miami, Montgomery, Morrow, Ottawa, Paulding
,
Pickaway, Pike, Preble, Putnam, Richland, Ross, Sandusky, Scioto, Seneca
,
Shelby, Štark, Summit, Union, Van Wert, Wayne, Williams, Wood, Wyandot
.
Oklahoma: Creek, Kay, Lincoln, Logan, Noble, Oklahoma, Osage, Pawnee,
Payne, Tulsa, Washington.
Pennsylvania: Adams, Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Bedford, Berks, Bucks
Butler, Carbon, Chester, Columbia, Cumberland, Dauphin, Delaware, Erie
Fayette, Franklin, Fulton, Greene, Huntingdon, Juniata, Lancaster, Lawrence
Lebanon, Lehigh, Luzerne, Miffin, Montgomery, Montour, Northampton
,
Northumberland, Perry, Philadelphia, Schuylkill, Somerset, Union, Washington,
Westmoreland, York.
Rhode Island,
South Carolina: Aiken, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Beaufort, Berkeley,
Charleston, Colleton, Dorchester, Hampton, Jasper, Orangeburg.
South Dakota: Armstrong, Aurora, Bennett, Bon Homme, Brule, Bufalo
,
Butte, Campbell, Charles Mix, Clay, 'Corson, Custer, Davison, 'Dewey, Douglas
Edmunds, Faulk, Gregory, Haakon,' Hand, Hanson, Harding, 'Hughes, Hutchin
Sully, Todd, Tripp, Turner, Union, Walworth, Washabaugh, Yankton, Ziebach
Tennessee: Anderson, Bedford, Bledsoe, Blount, Bradley, Campbell
, Cannon
Cheatham, Clay, Coffee, Cumberland, Davidson, De Kalb, Dickson, Fentress
Franklin, Giles, 'Grundy, Hamilton, Nickman, Houston, Humphreys, Jack.com
Knox, Lake, Lawrence, Lewis, Lincoln, Loudon, McMinn, Macon, Marion, Mar
shall, Maury, Meigs, Monroe,
Montgomery, Moore, Morgan, Overton, Penya
White, Williamson, Wilson.
Texas: Anderson, Aransas, Armstrong, Austin, Bastrop, Bell, Bexar, Bowie
Brazoria, Brazos, Burleson, Caldwell, Cálhoun, Camp, Carson, Cass, Chambers
,
1 Closed except for those portions of these counties which lie less than 25 air
document.]
THE SOVIET UNION
1967
2 Open except for Borough of Brooklyn (Kings County, N. Y.). [Footnote
Cherokee, Collingsworth, Colorado, Comal, Dallam, Dallas, Deaf Smith, Delta,
De Witt, Donley, Ellis, Falls, Fayette, Fort Bend, Franklin, Freestone, Galveston,
Goliad, Gonzales, Gray, Gregg, Grimes, Guadalupe, Hansford, Hardin, Harris,
Harrison, Hartley, Hays, Hemphill, Henderson, Hill, Hopkins, Hutchinson,
Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Karnes, Kaufman, Lamar, Lavaca, Lee, Leon,
Liberty, Limestone, Lipscomb, Madison, Marion, Matagorda, Milam, Mont-
gomery, Moore, Morris, Navarro, Ochiltree, Oldham, Orange, Panola, Parker,
Potter, Rains, Randall, Red River, Refugio, Roberts, Robertson, Rockwall,
Rusk, San Jacinto, Shelby, Sherman, Smith, Tarrant, Titus, Travis, Upshur,
Van Zandt, Victoria, Walker, Waller, Washington, Wharton, Wheeler, William-
son, Wilson, Wood.
Virginia: Accomac, Albemarle, Alleghany, Augusta, Bath, Charles City,
Clarke, Culpeper, Elizabeth City, Essex, Fauquier, Frederick, Gloucester, Greene,
Highland, Isle of Wight, James City, King and Queen, King George, King William,
Lancaster, Loudoun, Madison, Matthews, Middlesex, Nansemond, Nelson, New
Kent, Norfolk, Northampton, Northumberland, Orange, Page, Princess Anne,
Prince William, Rappahannock, Richmond, Rockbridge, Rockingham, Shenan-
doah, Stafford, Surry, Warren, Warwick, Westmoreland, York.
Washington: Adams, Asotin, Benton, Clark, Columbia, Cowlitz, Douglas,
Franklin, Garfield, Grant, King, Kittitas, Klickitat, Lewis, Lincoln, Pierce,
Skamania, Snohomish, Spokane, Thurston, Walla Walla, Whitman, Yakima.
West Virginia: Brooke, Hancock, Marshall, Ohio.
Wisconsin: Kenosha, Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Racine, Walworth, Washington,
Waukesha.
CITIES IN OTHERWISE OPEN AREAS WHICH ARE CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET
CITIZENS IN POSSESSION OF U.S.S.R. PASSPORTS
Ashland, Kentucky
Kansas City, Missouri
Atlanta, Georgia
Louisville, Kentucky
Birmingham, Alabama
Memphis, Tennessee
Charleston, West Virginia
Portland, Oregon
Gadsden, Alabama
St. Paul, Minnesota
Huntington, West Virginia
Johnstown, Pennsylvania
San Bernardino, California
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Steubenville, Ohio
Youngstown, Ohio
CITIES IN OTHERWISE CLOSED AREAS WHICH ARE OPEN TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET
CITIZENS IN POSSESSION OF U.S.S.R. PASSPORTS
Atlantic City, New Jersey
Austin, Texas
Hammond, Indiana
Baltimore, Maryland
Houston, Texas
Berkeley, California
Kansas City, Kansas
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Knoxville, Tennessee
Lansing, Michigan
Lincoln, Nebraska
Chattanooga, Tennessee
Long Beach, California
Chicago, Illinois
Los Angeles, California 1
Lowell, Massachusetts
Lynn, Massachusetts
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Nashville, Tennessee
New Bedford, Massachusetts
New Haven, Connecticut
New Orleans, Louisiana i
New York, New York 2
Niagara Falls, New York
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Omaha, Nebraska
Pasadena, California
Open except for port areas of these cities. (Footnote in original document.]
Camden, New Jersey
Canton, Ohio
Cincinnati, Ohio
Cleveland, Ohio
Dearborn, Michigan
Elizabeth, New Jersey
El Paso, Texas
Evansville, Indiana
Fall River, Massachusetts
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Fort Worth, Texas
Gary, Indiana
Glendale, California
1
in original document.]
1968
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
In industrial enterprises engaged in the manufacture of civilian
mercial airports, river or lake port installations and governmental
1 Open except for port areas of these cities. [Footnote in original document)
Phoenix, Arizona
Shreveport, Louisiana
Quincy, Massachusetts
Somerville, Massachusetts
Reading, Pennsylvania
South Bend, Indiana
Richmond, California
Spokane, Washington
Sacramento, California
Tacoma, Washington
Saginaw, Michigan
Trenton, New Jersey
St. Louis, Missouri
Tulsa, Oklahoma
San Antonio, Texas
Utica, New York
San Francisco, California 1
Washington, District of Columbia
San Jose, California
Waterbury, Connecticut
Savannah, Georgia 1
Wichita, Kansas
Seattle, Washington 1
Worcester, Massachusetts
SPECIFIED ROUTES OF AUTOMOTIVE TRANSIT THROUGH AREAS CLOSED TO TRAVEL
BY SOVIET CITIZENS IN POSSESSION OF U.S.S.R. PASSPORTS
1. From Washington, D. C., and return:
(a) To Baltimore via U. S. Route No. 1 or Washington-Baltimore Expresswa,
(b) To West Virginia via Virginia Route No. 7 and Route No. 9.
(c) To Spotsylvania County, Virginia, via U. S. Route No. 1.
2. From Baltimore, Maryland, to New York, New York, and return through
Farnhurst, Delaware, via U. S. Route No. 40 and New Jersey Turnpike.
3. From New York, New York, and return:
(a) To Baltimore, Maryland, and Washington, D. C. (see 1 and 2 above)
.
(b) To Oyster Bay, New York area via New York Route 25 A.
13. RESTRICTIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHY AND SKETCHING
BY SOVIET CITIZENS IN THE UNITED STATES: Note From
the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington
January 19, 19553
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellenes
the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and bus
the honor to state that the following regulations have been instituted
and will apply until further notice to photography and sketching i
the United States by Soviet citizens in possession of valid passport
issued by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
other than Soviet citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat d
the United Nations while their conduct is a responsibility of
Secretary General of the United Nations.
Soviet citizens in the United States are permitted to sketch or take
photographs of historical and architectural monuments; the building
of cultural, educational and medical institutions; theaters, museum
city, State or national parks; stadiums; and also urban and run
scenes
in the background
of which there are none of the objects listed
below in points a. through g.
products, agricultural experimental stations, railroad stations, com
2 Georgi N. Zaroubin.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, pp. 198–199.
THE SOVIET UNION
1969
regulating the photographing and sketching activities of American citizens and
2 Ibid., June 6, 1955, pp. 913–914.
institutions, Soviet citizens may, in individual cases, make sketches
or take photographs provided that they have first obtained the
permission of the administration of these institutions and organiza-
tions.
Citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United
States may not sketch or take photographs:
a. Of military objects, installations, technology and armaments.
b. Of fuel storage depots.
c. Of seaports, hydroelectric, thermoelectric or nuclear power
installations, bridges, railroad junctions, terminals, and tunnels.
d. Of industrial establishments except those engaged solely in
civilian production.
e. Of scientific research institutions, offices and laboratories.
f. Of radio, television, telephone and telegraph stations or facilities.
g. From airplanes on flights over territory of the United States.
Citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United
States may not purchase or otherwise procure the following except
where they appear in or are appendices to newspapers, periodicals,
technical journals, atlases and books commercially available to the
general public:
a. Aerial photographs, mosaics and photomaps.
b. Maps and charts of scale of or larger than 1:250,000.
c. Navigational and hydrographic maps and charts.
d. Panoramic photographs or detailed development plans of
industrial cities.
The foregoing regulations are comparable to present Soviet regula-
tions restricting photography and sketching by United States citizens
in the Soviet Union which presumably have been instituted for
reasons of security. If the Soviet Union should hereafter conclude
that the international situation were such that security requirements
enabled it to liberalize its regulations restricting photography and
sketching by United States citizens in the Soviet Union and to make
available to them materials of the types noted above, this Government
would in turn be disposed to reconsider its own security requirements
14. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY: Statement
by the Secretary of State Before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, May 25, 1955 (Excerpt)?
This program of mutual security continues to be an essential part
of our overall policy of seeking to bring those rulers who now follow
For the text of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's circular of Feb. 11, 1954,
other foreigners, see ibid., p. 199.
in the same spirit.
.
----------
415900_-57Vol. 2-21
ܚܝܝܚܝ. ܚ ،
1970
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The object of such
strategy is to gain time, to scatter the forces of the enemy while consolidating
the line of international communism to see the futility of the policy
of attempting world conquest. Also we hope that there may come
policies designed better to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the
subject peoples. The recent events in Europe to which I first alluded
suggest that the time may be nearing when those who have been
seeking the conquest of freedom will in fact adopt more tolerable
policies.
I do not want to imply that I think we have achieved our goals
.
There are still bad spots as well as good spots. Also, it
Also, it may be that
the international Communists consider that any new policies which
they now adopt are part of the classic design which Lenin said means
that "we might have to go in zigzags, sometimes retracing our steps,
sometimes giving up the course once selected and trying various
others," 1 and which Stalin said involves "maneuvering the reserves
with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong."*
Nevertheless, I do feel à certain sense of encouragement because
today the tactics of the international Communists suggest that
they realize that the free world is in fact "strong" and that they do
have to give up some of the courses they once selected.
FOUR SOVIET REVERSALS
I have referred to the events of recent days. These have been
marked by a striking reversal of many of the policies of the Soviet
rulers. They reversed their position with reference to the Austrian
State Treaty. The consequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from
this advanced position in the heart of Europe will be the first time in
Europe that the Red forces will have gone homeward since they took
their forward positions 10 years ago.
Then there is the pilgrimage of the Soviet leaders to Belgrade
.
For 7 years, since the Yugoslav Government seceded from the Soviet
bloc, it has been consistently reviled and threatened. Its party was
excommunicated by the Soviet Communist Party as guilty of flagrant
heresy. Now the heads of the Soviet state, who have never yet in
time of peace left their home country, go to Belgrade to make their
peace. 4 Independence is rewarded, and heresy is condoned. This is
bound to have a profound effect throughout the Soviet zone.
On the subject of disarmament, the Soviet Union has recently
altered its position. Its present position contains much which is
1 “Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder,” in The Strategy and Tactics
of World Communism (H. Doc. No. 619, 80th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 51.
2 “The reserves must be handled in such a way as to safeguard
retreat should the enemy be very powerful, should a withdrawal be inevitable
should it be obviously undesirable to accept the enemy's offer of battle
, should
retreat be the only way whereby (in the circumstances) the vanguard
destruction and keep the reserves at its disposal .
our own for a future advance" ("The Foundations of Leninism”; ibid., p. 106).
3 Treaty of May 15, 1955; supra, pp. 643–675.
5 See Soviet proposal of May 16, 1955, Department of State Bulletin, May 30
1955, pp. 900-905.
u
an orderly
can escape
:
1971
THE SOVIET UNION
1 See supra, pp. 1885-1886.
2
not clear or not acceptable to the United States, but at least the
Soviet Union now recognizes as valid certain basic propositions which
ир until now it has consistently rejected. For example, the Soviet
Union now no longer insists that any reduction of land armaments
should be on a percentage basis which would perpetuate, and indeed
accentuate, its present superiority in that particular field.
Finally, the Soviet leaders, after having said that consummation of
the Paris accords would be a serious impediment to further talks, now
seem ready for such talks-Pravda's complaint being that we do not
seem to be willing to talk long enough.
No one can be confident as to the meaning of these four reversals,
which have been accumulated within the span of a few weeks. Cer-
tainly
, one interpretation is that they hope by this show of sweet
reasonableness to bring the free nations to a sense of security so that
they will abandon measures which have so far enabled them to help
each other preserve their freedom. There are, within the free nations,
some who are tempted by this prospect. For the most part, they
look to the United States to see how we interpret the recent Soviet
gestures. If we seem to regard them as demonstrating a basic change
of Soviet attitude and as indicating that the danger is over, they will
hastily follow in that way. In that event much of the solidarity and
strength which has been built over past years would quickly dis-
The United States eagerly welcomes, and will fully and in good
faith explore, all new possibilities of insuring a just and durable peace.
That is the goal to which our Nation is dedicated, and we shall not
let pass any opportunities to advance toward it. We welcome recent
Soviet deeds which suggest a greater degree of tolerance and a greater
acceptance of freedom and independence. However, it would be a
great mistake to judge that the danger was now past or to act in
such a manner that others might think we judged it past. There
could be no worse moment to depart from the policies which the
program represents and which have brought us where we are.
We can hope that a new day is coming; but too often men have
been lured to their doom by mistaking a faſse
dawn for the real dawn.
We must not make that mistake.
integrate.
.
1972
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
that the facts set forth above may be confirmed to its satisfaction
3
The Ambassador of the United States has been instructed to protest
and of the most elementary rules of peaceful conduct between nations,
The United States Government demands that the Soviet Government
B. AIRPLANE INCIDENTS
April 8, 1950 Incident (Baltic Area)
15. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOS.
COW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, APRIL 18,
1950
The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his
compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and, with reference to the note of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 11, 1950,4 has the honor to state
that the only American military aircraft which was in the air in the
Baltic area on April 8, 1950, was a United States Navy Privateer
airplane which disappeared on that date and no trace of its crew hes
since been found.
The United States Navy airplane carried ten persons. It was
wholly unarmed. It left Wiesbaden at 10:31 a. m. Greenwich time
for a flight over the Baltic Sea and two and one-half hours later
reported by radio crossing the coast line of the British Zone of Ger-
many. All American military aircraft operate under strict instructions
to avoid flying over any foreign territory in the absence of express
permission for such a flight from the appropriate foreign government
The investigation conducted by the United States Government has
convinced it that the United States Navy airplane in question corn
plied strictly with these instructions and did not fly over any Soviet
or Soviet-occupied territory or territorial waters adjacent thereto
In the Ministry's communication under reference the Soviet Gor-
ernment acknowledges that one of its fighter aircraft fired upon 42
American
plane on April 8, 1950, at 5:30 p. m. Moscow time. In
view of the fact that the only American military airplane which was
in the air in the Baltic area on that date was the unarmed United
States Navy airplane mentioned above and that this airplane
no time after it crossed the coast line of Germany over any foreign
territory or territorial waters, it must be concluded that Soviet mill-
tary aircraft fired upon an unarmed American plane over the opet
sea, following which the American airplane was lost.
in the most solemn manner against this violation of international lor
was at
]
1
]
t
1 Adm. Alan G, Kirk.
2 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
3 Department of State Bulletin, May 1, 1950, pp. 667–668.
4 Ibid., p. 668.
THE SOVIET UNION
1973
1 Department of State Bulletin, May 15, 1950, pp. 753-754.
Government of the United States which would enable it to correct
American airplane violated Soviet or Soviet-occupied territory and
no alternative but to conclude that the Government of the Union of
The United States Government further demands that the most strict
and categorical instructions be issued to the Soviet Air Force that there
be no repetition, under whatever pretext, of incidents of this kind
which are so clearly calculated to magnify the difficulties of maintain-
ing peaceful and correct international relationships.
The United States Government confidently expects that, when its
investigation is completed, the Soviet Government will express its
regret for the unlawful and provocative behavior of its aviators, will
see to it that those responsible for this action are promptly and se-
verely punished, and will, in accordance with established custom among
peace-loving nations, pay appropriate indemnity for the unprovoked
destruction of American lives and property.
16. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOS-
COW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, MAY 5, 19501
The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his
compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and, with reference to the Ministry's note of
April 212 regarding the lost American airplane has the honor to
communicate the following:
The Government of the United States of America notes that the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics continues to
refer to an American airplane of the B-29 type, which allegedly
penetrated Soviet territory on April 8, despite the fact that it has
been made clear that the only American military airplane in the Baltic
area on April 8 was a United States Navy airplane of the Privateer
type. The United States Government reiterates that this United
States Navy airplane was unarmed and was at no time over Soviet
or Soviet-occupied territory or territorial waters. It is thus apparent
that the Soviet Government's account of this incident is not factual.
The reply of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United States Government's communication of April 18 3
makes it obvious that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics continues to base its position on the erroneous account
which it put forward shortly after the incident occurred and that
it
has failed to carry out the careful investigation suggested by the
The United States Government categorically denies that the
last paragraph of the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 21.
In these
circumstances, the Government of the United States has
these errors.
2 Ibid., p. 754.
3
Supra.
1974
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
to the Court, the Soviet Government refused to accept the Court's jurisdiction.
Soviet Socialist Republics has not only failed to meet but has no
intention of meeting the obligations which international law and
practice impose on members of the family of nations. It is clear that
this disregard for law, custom, and the opinion of mankind constitutes
a further obstacle to the establishment of harmonious relations among
nations and cannot be reconciled with the Soviet Government's
continued protestations of its devotion to the cause of peace.
It is clearly impossible to resolve this issue so long as the Soviet
Government refuses to base its position upon the facts of the case.
The Soviet Government must, however, bear the responsibility both
for the action of its Air Force and for the manner with which it has
dealt with this incident. The Government of the United States must
warn the Government of the [Union of) Soviet Socialist Republics of
the seriousness with which it regards the attitude of the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in matters of such grave
consequence.
October 7, 1952 Incident (Habomai Islands)
17. APPLICATION BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, MAY 26, 1955 1
SIR:
1. This is a written application, in accordance with the Statute?
and Rules of the Court, submitted by the Government of the United
States of America instituting proceedings against the Government o
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account of certain willful
acts committed by fighter aircraft of the Soviet Government against
a United States Åir Force B-29 aircraft and its crew off Hokkaido,
Japan, on October 7, 1952.
The subject of the dispute and a succinct statement of the facts
and grounds upon which the claim of the Government of the United
States of America is based are adequately set forth in a note
delivered
to the Soviet Government on September 25, 1954.
note is attached to this application as an annex.* The Soviet Govern
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 11, 1955, pp. 65–67. See also the State
Department's announcement of June 7, 1955 (ibid., p. 65); U.S. notes of Oct. 1
1952 (ibid., Oct. 27, 1952, p. 650) and Dec. 16, 1952 (ibid., Jan. 5, 1953, p.
and Soviet notes of'oct. 12, 1952 (ibid., Oct. 27, 1952, pp. 649-650) and Nov. 34
1952 (ibid., Jan. 5, 1953, pp. 11-12). In a communication of Aug. 26, 1958
,
removed from its docket. See statement of Mar. 16, 1956, by the Department of
State (ibid., Mar. 26, 1956, pp. 513-514).
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 140–155.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 18, 1954, pp. 579–586.
4 Not reprinted here.
r
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A copy of the
PE TO
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THE SOVIET UNION
1975
return; and that the Soviet Government has concealed from the
Supra, pp. 425-440.
1
is briefly that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
Soviet aircraft doing so unbeknown to the crew of the United States
Air Force B-29, and without any provocation to attack and destroy
the United States Air Force B-29, causing it to crash into the sea at a
point between Yuri Island and Akiyuri Island in territory rightfully
States Air Force and nationals of the United States, have failed to
belonging to Japan; that the crew of eight, all members of the United
ment has asserted its contentions of fact and law with reference to
the United States Government's claim in other diplomatic corre-
spondence on this subject, most recently in a note dated December 30
1954, a copy of which is also attached to this application as an annex.
2. The United States Government notes that the present dispute
concerns matters of the character specified in Article 36 (2) of the
Statute of the Court, including subdivisions (a) through (d). As
will be seen from the annexes, the legal dispute of the United States
Government with the Soviet Government involves serious questions
of international law. Among them are the validity of the Soviet
Government's claim to sovereignty over the Habomai Islands situated
off Hokkaido, Japan, and in that connection the interpretation of the
Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco on September 8,
1951. In addition there are involved the scope and application of
international obligations relating to the overflight of intruding and
intercepting military aircraft, together with numerous issues of fact
which if resolved in favor of the United States Government would
constitute breaches of international obligation by the Soviet Govern-
ment; and the nature and extent of reparations to be made by the
Soviet Government to the United States Government for all these
The United States Government, in filing this application with the
Court, submits to the Court's
jurisdiction for the purposes of this case.
The Soviet Government
appears not to have filed any declaration with
the Court thus far, although it was invited to do so by the United
States Government in the note annexed hereto. The Soviet Govern-
ment is, however, qualified to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court
in this matter and may upon notification of this application by the
Registrar, in accordance with the Rules of the Court, take the neces-
sary steps to enable the Court's jurisdiction over both parties to the
dispute to be confirmed.
The United States Government thus founds the jurisdiction of this
Court on the foregoing considerations and on Article 36 (1) of the
3. The claim of the Government of the United States of America
direcraft to overfly the territory of Japan, to hover over and pace a
United States Air Force B-29 aircraft lawfully flying over Japan, the
breaches.
2
}
Statute.
:
:
}
· Not reprinted here.
* Not reprinted here.
1976
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
United States Government information as to the fate of the crew and
has not made provision for the prompt return of any crew members
whom it may still be holding or of whose whereabouts it is informed.
The damages suffered by the United States Government and for
which the Soviet Government is liable to it are specified in the an-
nexed note. The United States Government claims that in the
circumstances described in the annex the actions chargeable to the
Soviet Government constituted serious violations of international
obligation for which the United States Government has demanded and
demands monetary and other reparation.
In diplomatic correspondence with reference to this matter, in-
cluding the Soviet Government's note a copy of which is attached
hereto as an annex, constituting negotiations which must now be
determined to have been exhausted, the Soviet Government has
asserted a version of the facts and of the law contrary to that asserted
by the United States Government.
A dispute is therefore presented appropriate for hearing and
decision by this Court in accordance with the Statute and Rules
.
The United States Government, in further pleadings herein, will
more fully set forth the issues of fact and the issues of law in this
dispute. It will request that the Court find that the Soviet Govern-
ment is liable to the United States Government for the damages
caused; that the Court award damages in favor of the United States
Government against the Soviet Government in the sum of $1,620,-
295.01 with interest and such other reparation and redress as the
Court may deem to be fit and proper; and that the Court make all
other necessary orders and awards, including an award of costs, to
effectuate its determinations.
4. The undersigned has been appointed by the Government of the
United States of America as its agent for the purpose of this applica-
tion and all proceedings thereon.
Very truly yours,
HERMAN PHLEGER
The Legal Adviser
of the
Department of State
THE REGISTRAR OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
The Hague, Netherlands.
THE SOVIET UNION
1977
1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 577. See also Soviet note of
1
following an intensive investigation and study of the incident, the
information with respect to the incident and with respect to the various
1953,4 August 4, 19535 and August 26, 1953.8 The Soviet Govern-
Mar. 22, 1953; ibid., pp. 577-578.
2 Ibid., Dec. 6, 1954, pp. 858-862.
8 Ibid., Mar. 15, 1954, pp. 409-410.
4 Ibid., Aug. 17, 1953, p. 207.
March 15, 1953 Incident (Kamchatka Peninsula)
18. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW
TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, MARCH 18, 1953
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and has the honor to bring the following matter
to the attention of the Ministry.
On March 15, 1953, a United States Air Force plane of the RB-50
type was attacked by Soviet fighter aircraft over the open seas at
Latitude 54:02 North and Longitude 161:04 East. After one of the
Soviet planes of the Mig type opened fire on the RB-50 the latter
was forced to return the fire.
It is reported that no damage occurred to the American plane, and
none was observed with regard to the Soviet plane.
The Embassy has been instructed to protest vigorously this action
on the part of the Soviet aircraft. The United States Government
expects to be informed at an early date concerning the disciplinary
action taken with regard to the Soviet personnel responsible and also
concerning the measures adopted to prevent a recurrence of incidents
July 29, 1953 Incident (Cape Povorotny)
19. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, OCTOBER 9, 1954 ?
The Government of the United States of America refers again to
the destruction on July 29, 1953 by Soviet military aircraft of a
United States Air Force B-50 type aircraft off Cape Povorotny in the
International air space over the
Sea of Japan. On January 26, 1954,
of Soviet Socialist Republics a note requesting certain detailed
of this kind
>
b Ibid.
• Not printed.
1978
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
ment having failed to reply to the United States Government's note
of January 26, 1954, the United States Government, through its
Embassy at Moscow, transmitted another note on May 25, 1954
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiring when a reply
might be expected to the note of January 26, 1954. The Soviet
Government has made no reply or acknowledgement whatever to
either note, although far more than sufficient time has elapsed to
enable the Soviet Government to make a reply or to state its inten-
tions with respect to such reply. The United States Government
must conclude, therefore, that the Soviet Government is fully aware
that it is not in a position to make a responsive or adequate reply
to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954.
This circumstance, the United States Government concludes
,
reinforces and confirms the essential accuracy of the findings of fact
resulting from the United States Government's own investigation and
study, as well as of the statements made in the various communica-
tions of the United States Government to the Soviet Government on
this subject, particularly the United States Government's note of
August 4, 1953.2
The United States Government therefore takes this opportunity to
place solemnly upon the record the facts relevant to the Soviet
Government's liability and to prefer against the Soviet Government
formal international diplomatic claim for damages as set forth below,
|
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The United States Government is prepared to prove by evidence
in an appropriate forum, and it charges, the following:
1. Early in the morning of July 29, 1953 a four-engine aircraft of
the United States Air Force, of the B-50 type, was duly dispatched
from its base in Japan by United States Air Force authorities to
perform a routine navigational mission in the air space over the
international waters of the Sea of Japan, returning to base in Japan
upon completion of the mission. The officers and crew were instructed
prior to departure that under no circumstances was the aircraft to
fy closer to the Soviet-held land mass than twelve nautical miles
.
Upon its departure the B-50 type aircraft had on board a crew of
seventeen persons, all members of the United States Air Force and all
nationals of the United States. They were, as the Soviet Government
was informed in the United States Government's note of August 4,
1953, the following:
Stanley Keith O'Kelley-Captain--Serial No. AO 776002
John Ernst Roche-Captain-Serial No. AO 2029268
Edmund Joseph Czyz-1st Lieutenant-
Serial No. AO 2072656
Lloyd Clayton Wiggins-1st
Lieutenant-Serial No. AO 695999
James Gordon Keith—1st Lieutenant-Serial No. AO 2092926
Warren John Sanderson 1st Lieutenant-Serial No. AO 2066184
1 Not printed.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 206–207.
THE SOVIET UNION
1979
attack until the component parts of the aircraft hit the water was
actions of the MIG-15 aircraft against it, the members of the crew of
the B-50 were directed by the aircraft commander, Captain Stanley
K. O'Kelley, to abandon the aircraft and to seek safety by bailing
out of the aircraft. The United States Government is informed and
believes that, apart from First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, all
members of the crew above named bailed out of the aircraft, or para-
Robert Elbon Stalnaker-1st Lieutenant-Serial No. A0 761337
John Cyrus Ward-Captain-Serial No. A0 865270
Francisco Joseph Tejeda—Major- Serial No. AO 726704
Frank Ernest Beyer-1st Lieutenant-Serial No. A0 2093286
Francis Luther Brown-Master Sergeant-Serial No. AF 19
053497
Donald Wayne Gabree--S. Sergeant Serial No. AF 19 333787
Roland Edgar Goulet-A/1C—Serial No. AF 12 323933
James Edwin Woods---A/2C-Serial No. AF 24413122
Charles Joseph Russall-A/2C_Serial No. AF 13 351658
Donald George Hill—S. Sergeant-Serial No. AF 19 353976
Earl Wilbur Radelin, Jr.—Ă/2C—Serial No. AF 14 370732
The B-50 aircraft proceeded on a course of approximately 315
degrees from the Japanese Island of Honshu. When it arrived in the
air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan at a point
approximately 50 miles from the coastline, the aircraft turned to the
right and proceeded on an easterly heading, flying at an altitude of
approximately 20,000 feet, the crew carrying out the instructions given
them as above stated.
The aircraft had reached a point in the air space over the inter-
national waters of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of
Cape Povorotny, flying on a heading of approximately 95 degrees at
an altitude of 20,000 feet when suddenly, at approximately 6:15 in
the morning local time and without any prior warning whatever,
Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft intercepted and fired upon the United
States aircraft. One MIG-15 type aircraft commenced the inter-
ception and firing by coming up from below and to the left of the B-50
and shooting the No. 1 engine, rendering it inoperative. One or
more additional MIG-15 type aircraft thereupon appeared behind
the B-50, directed fire on the No. 4 engine and upon the right wing
and other portions of the aircraft, and set the No. 4 engine on fire.
When the Soviet
MIG-15 aircraft appeared from behind, shooting
at the B-50, one or more of the personnel
on board the B-50 aircraft
opened fire in self-defense against the oncoming attacking MIG-15
Immediately upon being hit, the B-50 aircraft dived sharply, losing
altitude rapidiy. The shots from the rear attack tore off the right
wing and the tail section and caused the aircraft to disintegrate.
component parts of the B-50 then hit the water, at approximately
same position at which the interception and attack took place.
The total time which elapsed between the commencement of the
Upon the B-50's first becoming disabled, in consequence of the
aircraft, but to no avail.
The
the
approximately two minutes.
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
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chuted, into the Sea of Japan, all coming down at points within the
area of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Povo-
rotny.
The United States Government finds, and charges, that all the
actions of the MIG-15 type aircraft above described were taken upon
the deliberate and willful orders of competent Soviet authorities.
When the B-50 failed to return to its base at the time required for
its return, and could not be otherwise accounted for, the competent
United States authorities commenced and conducted a meticulous
and thorough search of the area by aircraft and by surface vessels of
the United States Government and with the assistance of a naval
vessel of the Australian Government in the area. The search of the
Sea of Japan off Cape Povorotny succeeded in the sighting in the inter-
national waters of several survivors and disclosed the active presence
in the same area of Soviet PT-type boats, trawlers and aircraft. One
of the search aircraft dropped a lifeboat to a group of survivors but
only Captain John E. Roche, the co-pilot, was able to reach the life-
boat and get into it. Intermittent fog hampered the rescue efforts
and no other personnel could be rescued by the United States and
Australian surface vessels. When the weather in the area cleared up,
by dawn of July 30, 1953, no evidence of survivors, other than Captain
Roche, could be seen in the international waters of the Sea of Japan
by the air or surface rescue craft.
2. The United States Government finds, and charges, that in direct
consequence of the Soviet Government's actions above described, the
following took place:
a. The B-50 aircraft was totally destroyed.
b. First
Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, navigator situated in the
nose of the aircraft, was thrown from his position and mortally
wounded, so that he was unable to bail out from the aircraft, and died
c. Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, the aircraft commander, although
he succeeded in bailing
out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea
of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the
shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these
physical injuries and shock and of his exposure for approximately
twenty hours in the Sea of Japan.
d. Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, flight engineer, although
he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea
of Japan, was badly injured and
shocked as a direct result of the
shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical
injuries
and of shock and of long exposure in the Sea of Japan.
e. Captain John Ernst Roche,
the co-pilot,
was thrown headlong
into the body of the aircraft, suffering numerous bodily injuries and
shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft but
he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft. He suffered further
shock and exposure in the Sea of Japan from approximately 6:17.00
the morning
local time, July 29, 1953, to approximately 4:20 in the
morning local time July 30, 1953. He was rescued from the waters
of the Sea of Japan by a search vessel of the United States Navy
f. The remaining thirteen members of the crew have not so far
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THE SOVIET UNION
1981
known to the Soviet Government, move toward the coast, in a north-
knots. Even if the Soviet Government did not have these crew
3. The B-50 aircraft at the time of the attack upon it and its
destruction, and the navigational and flying equipment thereon, were
in efficient and good working order. Each member of the crew was
efficient and experienced in the performance of his task. In particular,
Captain O'Kelley, the aircraft commander, was an efficient and
experienced pilot; Captain Roche was an efficient and experienced
been accounted for. The United States Government finds, however,
that al of them suffered bodily injury and shock as a direct result of
the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft. It finds further that a number,
if not all
, of them successfully parachuted to the surface of the Sea of
Japan in the area above described in which the attack and destruction
of the B-50 took place. It must conclude that these persons were
either picked up alive by surface vessels of the Soviet Government in
the area in which they hit the water, or that in due course, dead or
alive, they were carried by the prevailing currents to Soviet-held
territory and into the Soviet Government's custody. Those dead,
the United States Government finds and charges, were brought to
their death by the injuries caused in the course of the attack on the
B-50 aircraft, by shock and by exposure in the waters of the Sea of
Japan. Those that were alive when they came into the custody of
the Soviet Government, the United States Government finds and
charges
, suffered in addition injuries and anguish caused by their long
detention by the Soviet Government, by the failure of the Soviet
Government to inform the United States Government with respect
to their whereabouts and their condition or to permit them to com-
municate with United States Government authorities.
These conclusions are based on the following considerations:
(1
) As the United States Government has previously indicated,
personnel on board search craft of the United States Government
observed at least twelve Soviet PT-type boats, at least one armed
trawler-type Soviet naval vessel, and Soviet aircraft, proceeding at
high speed to and from the area of the scene of the incident. Other
surface vessels of Soviet nationality were in the vicinity. These
observations were made as late as 3 o'clock in the afternoon local time
July 29, 1953. In view of the failure of the Soviet Government
to
make responsive reply to questions of the United States Government
in its note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States
Government is confirmed in its conclusion, and it charges, that these
Soviet craft picked up survivors and portions of the disabled B-50
1) The prevailing currents of the Sea of Japan at the positions
above mentioned and at the date of the incident, which are well
of their arrival in Soviet territorial waters or on Soviet soil by August
aircraft.
1, 1953.
1982
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
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statement is false. As the United States Government has stated
co-pilot; First Lieutenant Czyz, First Lieutenant Wiggins and First
Lieutenant Keith were efficient and experienced navigators.
The United States Government finds as a result of its investigation
bat in its notes above mentioned the Soviet Government willfully
and knowingly made material misstatements of fact for the purpose
of creating an untrue record and of misleading the United States
Government. These misstatements of fact are most explicitly made
in the Soviet Government's note of August 26, 1953 on this subject,
which substantially reiterates the misstatements contained in the
Soviet Government's earlier notes on the same subject:
1. The Soviet Government states that the B-50 aircraft at about
6 a. m. local time "violated the state boundary of the USSR, at first
in the region of Cape Gamov, and continued the flight over the
territory of the USSR at Askold Island not far from Vladivostok".
But the Soviet Government has refused, although duly requested, to
state where the boundary, which it claims, runs in this region. The
United States Government must therefore conclude, as it has found
,
that the B-50 aircraft at no time crossed into territory of the Soviet
Union in this area but, on the contrary, flew entirely in the air space
over the international waters of the Sea of Japan.
2. The Soviet Government states that two Soviet fighter aircraft
approached the B-50 with the intention of showing the B-50 that it
was within the boundaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and with the intention of suggesting that the B--50 leave the air
space of the Soviet Union. This statement must be characterized as
false, as well as misleading, since the first intimation which the crew
of the B-50 had of the approach of any aircraft was the destruction
of the No. 1 engine on the B-50 by fire directed from one of the
Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft, which had appeared without any
warning whatever to the left and from
below the B-50 aircraft. This
fact and the shooting which immediately followed directed by MIG-15
type aircraft coming up without warning from behind the B-50
aircraft conclusively demonstrates that it was the intention of the
MIG-15 interceptors, and of the competent Soviet authorities who
dispatched them and controlled
their actions, to give the crew of the
B-50 aircraft no warning whatever but, on the contrary, to effect
the B-50's destruction without any warning or opportunity to the
crew to disengage or to defend themselves.
3. The Soviet Government's statement permits the implication
that the interception of the B-50 by Soviet aircraft took place within
the air space over Soviet territory. This statement is false also
.
As has been stated above, the interception as well as the attack took
place approximately forty miles south of Cape Povorotny and in
the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan.
4. The Soviet Government states
that fire was
first opened by the
B-50, being directed against the intercepting Soviet aircraft. This
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THE SOVIET UNION
1983
contained in the United States Government's 'notes, there were no
the B-50.
returning to base, if not earlier, reported what they had done and what
presumably including reports of ground observers as well as the
data “refute the statement that the American airplane B-50 did not
testimony of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft involved, and that these
violate the boundary of the USSR and was attacked by Soviet
fighters over the Sea of Japan”. The Soviet Government, although
July requested in the United States Government's note of January 26,
1954, has failed and refused to produce these supporting data. The
United States Government is compelled to conclude that such data
as exist do not support the Soviet Government's conclusion and that
these statements are therefore false.
.9. The Soviet Government states that, contrary to the allegations
above, the B-50 aircraft did not open fire until after two firing passes
had been made by the Soviet intercepting aircraft.
The first MIG-15
type aircraft, which as stated above without warning destroyed the
No. 1 engine, flew away unscathed. When immediately thereafter
one or more MIG-15 type aircraft appeared from behind, the MIG
aircraft were firing and the gunners on board the B-5C were compelled
in self-defense to open fire against the MIG aircraft so firing upon
5. The Soviet Government states that the attack took place at
6:12 in the morning local time. The United States Government
charges that this statement is untrue and is known by the Soviet
Government to be untrue. The United States Government has found
that the interception and attack took place not earlier than 6:15 in
the morning local time, if not later. By this time the B-50 aircraft,
as the Soviet authorities well knew, had reached a point approximately
forty miles off the Soviet land mass at its closest proximity.
6. The Soviet Government states that one of the Soviet aircraft
was seriously damaged by fire from the B-50 in consequence of which
the Soviet aircraft was compelled to fire upon the B-50. This state-
ment is misleading as well as false. Even if, contrary to fact, the
gunners had opened fire on the MIG aircraft appearing from
rear, the destruction of the No. 1 engine by the MIG aircraft
which appeared first and the hostile attitude of the MIG aircraft
appearing in the rear would have justified the B-50 gunners in opening
fire on the MIG aircraft.
7. The Soviet Government states that after the Soviet aircraft
fired on the B-50 the B-50 “departed in the direction of the sea”
and that the Soviet authorities have no further information regarding
the American military aircraft. This statement must be character-
ized as false as well as misleading. As stated above, within seconds
after the Soviet aircraft hit the right wing and fuselage the B-50
disintegrated and fell into the sea. The pilots of the Soviet aircraft
could not but have seen the
consequence of their actions and reported
it to the competent
Soviet authorities. The United States Govern-
ment notes that the Soviet Government admits that the pilots upon
8. The Soviet Government indicates that it has "verified data”,
B-50
the
had happened
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
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to authorities of the United States Government rescued personnel,
Soviet surface ships on July 29, 1953 in the area of the Sea of Japan
in which the shooting incident took place, and it further implies that
the weather conditions of fog and darkness were such that the observa-
tions of the crews of search craft reported in the United States Gov-
ernment's notes were not in fact made. These statements, as above
indicated, are false and misleading. The weather, during the hours
of daylight, was in fact foggy but at the low altitudes at which the
search aircraft flew, and on the surface of the sea at which the naval
craft proceeded, there was as the Soviet Government well knows
intermittent visibility permitting the observations which were made
and which were reported by the United States Government.
10. The Soviet Government states that as a result of investigation,
it has been confirmed that the Soviet authorities have no information
concerning the crew of the American bomber B-50”. For the reasons
above stated this statement must be characterized as false and mis-
leading
The United States Government finds and it charges that the fore-
going actions of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft and of the competent
Soviet authorities made the Soviet Government guilty of deliberate
and willful violations of international law, on account of which it has
become liable to the United States Government for damages and
other amends:
1. Since the Soviet Government has evaded the questions in the
United States Government's note of January 26, 1954 on this subject
,
the United States Government declares that the limit of the territory
of the Soviet Government in the area of the incident extends no
further than three nautical miles from the mean low water mark of
the shore line of the Soviet-held land mass in this area, following the
sinuosities of the coast and the sinuosities of each of the Soviet-held
islands. While the United States Government in instructions to its
personnel has prohibited any overflying aircraft or seagoing craft
from coming closer than twelve miles to Soviet-held territory in tra -
ersing the international waters of the Sea of Japan or the air space
above, the United States Government takes this opportunity again to
inform the Soviet Government that it does not recognize the claim
of the Soviet Government to territorial waters in excess of three miles
from its coast. In the opinion of the United States Government
there is no obligation under international law to recognize claims to
territorial waters in excess of three miles from the coast.
2. In the circumstances of the case it was the duty of the Soviet
Government to make every effort, following the wrongful destruction
of the B-50 aircraft, to search for and pick up members of the crew,
dead or alive, to cooperate with all other searching aircraft and surface
craft in such' search and rescue operations and promptly to turn over
the bodies of any dead personnel picked up and any portions of the
aircraft salvaged, or to make arrangements
for their prompt delivery
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1985
The United States Government declares that its demand for com-
not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the
withholding of those crew members from return to the United States,
or the suppression by the Soviet Government of information regarding
their whereabouts or welfare, or the making of false statements by
the Soviet Government with respect thereto. The United States
in the United States Government. The failure of the Soviet Govern-
ment to do so constitutes violation of international obligations.
3. It was the duty of the Soviet Government to make truthful
statements to the United States Government in the notes above men-
tioned which the Soviet Government delivered to the United States
Government in connection with this incident. The willful making of
false or misleading statements in these circumstances constitutes a
violation of international obligation.
4. The continued detention of survivors by the Soviet Government,
and the failure of the Soviet Government immediately upon receipt
of information at any time from its own sources of the observation of
bodies of any of the crew members, constitute violations on the part
of the Soviet Government of international obligation
5. Any shooting by the crew of the B-50 at the MIG aircraft, in
the circumstances of the case, was lawful as an exercise of the right of
self-defense. The B-50 having been fired upon and hit without prior
warning, the crew of the B-50 were justified in the exercise of self-
defense in shooting at the approaching MIG aircraft.
The United States has suffered the following items of damage in
consequence of the foregoing illegal acts and violations of duty
and international legal obligations, for which the Soviet Government
is liable
, and the United States Government demands that the Soviet
Government pay the following sums on account thereof:
1. United States Air Force airplane B-50 type No. 47–145A and
equipment thereon, amounting in total to $1,468,908.56.
2. Damages to the United States by the willful and unlawful
conduct of the Soviet Government $491,584.38.
3. Damages to Captain John Ernst Roche, a national of the
United States, for injuries to him, $25,000.00.
4. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States,
for the deaths of Captain
Stanley Keith O'Kelley, Master Sergeant
Francis Luther Brown, First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith,
5. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States,
of the remaining thirteen crew members for all injuries resulting
from the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government,
including the wrongful deaths of such crew members or the wrongful
and unlawful detention by the Soviet Government of such members
of the crew as survived, $650,000.00.
IV
direct
$150,000.00
415900m-57--Pol. 2
--22
1986
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
to
ht
G
re
21
M
ti
81
takes this opportunity again to demand that the Soviet Government
forthwith provide the information in this regard which the United
States Government has already requested, and make provision for
the prompt return of any crew members whom it may still be holding
or of whose whereabouts it is informed, and in the interim to provide
such crew members with the maximum degree of care and comfort
and facilitate access to them by appropriate representatives of the
United States Government. The United States Government further
declares that such demand for compensation with respect to members
of the crew whose bodies came into the custody of Soviet authorities
but who were no longer alive does not imply the acquiescence of the
United States Government in the failure of the Soviet Government to
inform the United States Government of such facts or to turn over
such bodies to the United States Government. The United States
Government further reserves the right to make additional demand
upon the Soviet Government for amends or other actions on account
of its conduct on or since July 29, 1953, with respect to such survivors
or such dead crew members.
Furthermore, the United States Government has not included in
its demand for damages, specified above, any sum on account of
items of intangible injury deliberately and intentionally caused to the
United States Government and to the American people by the wrong-
ful actions of the Soviet Government. In this regard the United
States Government had determined to defer to a future date the
formulation of the kind and measure of redress or other action which
the Soviet Government should take which would be appropriate in
international law and practice to confirm the illegality of the actions
directed by the Soviet Government against the United States Govern-
ment and against the American people.
The Government of the United States calls upon the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics promptly to make its detailed answer to
the allegations and demands made in this communication.
Should the Soviet Government in its answer acknowledge its
indebtedness to the United States on account of the foregoing and
agree to pay the damages suffered and to comply with the demands
as above set forth, the United States Government is prepared, if
requested, to present detailed evidence in support of its calculations
of damages suffered and alleged. If, however, the Soviet Government
contests liability, it is requested so to state in its answer. In the
latter event, the Soviet Government is hereby notified that the
United States Government deems an international dispute to exist
falling within the competence of the International Court of Justice
and that the United States Government proposes that that dispute be
presented for hearing and decision in the International Court of
Justice. Since it appears that the Soviet Government has thus far
not filed with that Court any declaration of acceptance of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the United States Government
invites the Soviet Government to file an appropriate declaration
with the Court, or to enter into a Special Agreement, by which the
Court may be empowered in accordance with its Statute and Rules
ta
fo
li
THE SOVIET UNION
1987
}
I
1
foundation in fact the allegations contained in the Soviet Govern-
ment's note number 340 dated September 5, 1954.4 As was stated
in the Embassy's note number 160 dated September 5, 1954,5 the
V.S. Navy aircraft was on a peaceful patrol mission over the high
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 13, 1954, p. 364.
120 to 125 miles southeast of Vladivostok. (Footnote in original.]
? The U.S. Navy stated on Sept. 6, 1954, that the incident occurred about
3 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 13, 1954, p. 365.
to determine the issues of fact and law which have been set forth
herein.
The Soviet Government is requested to inform the United States
Government in its reply to the present note of its intentions with
respect to such a declaration or Special Agreement.
September 4, 1954 Incident (Sea of Japan)
20. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1954 1
[First Note]
A U. S. Navy P2V aircraft was attacked without warning by two
MIG-type aircraft with Soviet markings at 1818 September 4 (local
time). This attack took place over the international high seas
approximately one hundred miles east of Vladivostok and forty-four
miles from the Siberian coast.2 Each Soviet aircraft made one
run on the U. S. Navy aircraft and disappeared towards the
Siberian coast. As a result of this unwarranted and hostile attack,
the U. S. Navy aircraft was destroyed. To this hour all survivors
bave not been recovered.
The U. S. Government protests this wanton and unprovoked attack
12. & U. S. Navy aircraft engaged on a peaceful mission over the
high seas. The U. S. Government requests that measures be taken
to subject those responsible to immediate and appropriate punish-
manent. The U. S. Government reserves all rights to claim damages
for loss of property and lives and for other circumstances resulting
from this illegal attack by Soviet aircraft.
21. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW TO
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1954 3
[Second Note]
The United States Government rejects as completely without
5,
firing
Ibid.
5 Supra.
.
1988
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
G
OE
seas some forty miles from the Siberian coast when it was attacked
without warning and destroyed by two Soviet aircraft. At no time
did the U. S. Navy aircraft open fire on the Soviet aircraft.
The United States Government declares once more that it reserves
rights to present claims for damages and expects that measures will
be taken not only to subject those responsible to immediate and
appropriate punishment but also to prevent recurrence of such
wanton and unprovoked attacks.?
1
W
June 23, 1955 Incident (St. Lawrence Island)
fu
IS
22. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, JULY 7, 19553
pu
101
th
mi
rel
pa
The United States Government acknowledges receipt of the memo-
randum of the Soviet Government transmitted by the Soviet Foreign
Minister, Mr. Molotov, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, on
June 25,4 regarding the shooting down of a United States naval
aircraft by Soviet military jet-propelled aircraft on June 23.
The facts in possession of the United States Government do not
accord with the statements set forth in the Soviet memorandum under
acknowledgment. The United States plane, of propeller type, was
on a routine daylight shipping surveillance flight, of a regular and well-
known character. Such flights have been made at more or less
regular intervals for some time past. The plane was on its reg;
ular route, which involved, at one point, flying over international
waters in the channel between the United States (St. Lawrence
Island) and the Soviet Union.
Carefully verified information discloses: that the United States plane
was at no time nearer the Soviet Union than the approximate middle
of the above-mentioned channel and was always well over interna-
tional waters; that it did not at any time fire on the attacking Soviet
aircraft; that no warning of any sort was given by the Soviet fighters
before they opened fire on the United States plane.
1 Subsequent information obtained by the U.S. Navy disclosed that, after
the second pass by the MIGs, one of the gunners on the U.S. plane was able to
get off about 1009 rounds of:50 cal. ammunition. - [Footnote in Bulletin text.
2 Ambassador Lodge discussed the Sept. 4, 1954, incident and related incidents
in the U. N. Security
Council on Sept. 10, 1954 Department of State Bulletin
Sept. 20, 1954, pp. 417-420). See also "Report of the Security Council to the
General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/2936)
,
3 Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1955, pp. 100-101. The note was
transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Ministry by the American Embassy at Moscow
See also Secretary Dulles remarks of June 28, 1955; ibid., July 11, 1955, pp. 50.
4 Ibid., July 18, 1955, pp. 101-102.
99
TA
ONE
S
0
pp. 15–18.
52-53.
THE SOVIET UNION
1989
* Act of June 16, 1951; infra, pp. 2888-2892.
as is necessary to suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of any
"Sec. 5. As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action
excise treatment, or other concession contained in any trade agree-
reduction in any rate of duty, or binding of any existing customs or
ment entered into under authority of section 350 of the Tariff Act of
1938, as amended and extended, to imports from the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and to imports from any nation or area dominated
or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization
controlling the world Communist movement."
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 291; and 65 Stat. c25-c26.
The United States Government notes the statement of the Soviet
Government that due to weather conditions, the possibility of error
on the part of the Soviet planes existed in regard to this incident. It
is presumed that this possibility of error refers to the geographic
position and not the identity of the United States aircraft since it was
flying in a clear area above broken lower cloud strata at the time it
was attacked.
Taking into account the regret expressed by the Soviet Government;
its offer of compensation for damages to the plane and crew by the
payment of 50 percent thereof; and, in particular, the statement in
the Soviet memorandum that strict orders have been issued by the
Soviet Government to its military authorities to refrain from any
future action of this character, the Government of the United States
is prepared, for the reasons herein mentioned, to regard the Soviet
memorandum as providing an acceptable basis for the disposal of this
particular incident; noting at the same time, however, that the United
States plane acted throughout in a correct and blameless manner in
pursuance of its peaceful mission and was in fact attacked over
international waters.
In conclusion, the United States Government expresses the hope
that the Soviet Ġovernment will indeed in the future take all necessary
measures to avoid repetition of this and like incidents, a repetition
which
, if it occurred, would inevitably have
a harmful effect upon the
relations of our two nations, relations which the United States, for its
part, desires to see improved.
C. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS
23. IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COM-
MUNIST COUNTRIES: Proclamation by the President, August 1,
1951 1
WHEREAS sections 5 and 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension
det of 1951 (Public Law 50, 82d
Congress)? provide as follows:
1990
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
81
of
of
th
“Sec. 11. The President shall, as soon as practicable, take such
measures as may be necessary to prevent the importation of ermine
,
fox, kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furs and skins,
dressed or undressed, which are the product of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics or of Communist China."
WHEREAS an important element in determining when it may be
practicable to apply these provisions to particular articles is the ability
to do so consistently with the international obligations of the United
States;
WHEREAS, in giving effect to the procedures available to free the 24
United States from international obligations existing with respect to
some of the nations and areas covered by the above provisions, it will
not be practicable to apply such provisions to all such nations and
areas at the same time;
Now, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United
States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested
in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the said sections So
5 and 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, do proclaim: st
mi
PART I
That the application of reduced rates of duty (including rates of the
import tax) established pursuant to trade agreements heretofore or in
hereafter entered into under the authority of section 350 of them
Tariff Act of 1930, as originally enacted or as amended and extended
(ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943; ch. 22, 50 Stat. 24;ch. 96, 54 Stat. 107; ch. 118
,
57 Stat. 125; ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410; ch. 678, 62 Stat, 1053; ch. 585, 63
Stat. 697; Public Law 50, 82d Congress), shall be suspended with it
respect to imports from such nations and areas referred to in section
5 as may be specified in any notification pursuant to this part of this te
proclamation given by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury
,
and published in the Federal Register, which are entered, or withdrawn su
from warehouse, for consumption on such date as may be specified s
for each such nation or area in the notification, or are so entered or
withdrawn thereafter until such date as may be so specified in a later
notification and so published for the termination of such suspension, ac
For the purposes of this part the term “imports from such nations and
areas" shall mean articles imported directly or indirectly into the
United States from nations or areas specified in an effective notifica
tion, but shall not in any case include articles the growth, produce, or
manufacture of any other nation or area.
In
St
to
PART II
13
That the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of
ermine, fox, kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furs and
skins, dressed or undressed, shall be prohibited 'as to products of such
nations and areas as may be specified in any notification pursuant to
this part of this proclamation given by the President to the Secretary
of the Treasury,
and published in the Federal Register, on such date as
may be specified for each such nation or area in the notification, and
2
THE SOVIET UNION
1991
1952 1
The distribution in the United States by the Soviet Embassy in
1. Government or its organs should also be suspended.
Washington of pamphlets published at the expense of the Soviet
the publication of “Amerika' at such time as the Soviet Government
ir distribution and sales which has been accorded Soviet publications
in the United States and to grant to representatives of the United
| to verify the extent of distribution actually made.
States Government facilities which would make it possible for them
| 132; ibid., June 18, 1951, pp. 985–986; and ibid., Aug. 18, 1952, pp. 263-264.
· Department of State Bulletin, July 28, 1952, p. 127, See also ibid., pp. 127-
thereafter until such date as may be so specified in a later notification
and so published for the termination of such prohibition,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 1st day of August in the year
of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-one, and of the Independence
of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.
24. SUSPENSION OF PUBLICATION OF AMERIKA AND THE
0 U.S.S.R. INFORMATION BULLETIN: Note From the American
| Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 14,
d
d
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
d
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
2. Socialist Republics and has the honor to state that it has been in-
structed to inform the Soviet Government that publication of the
magazine "Amerika" is being suspended immediately.
Since the beginning of 1949 it has become increasingly apparent
of that the Soviet Government, through its agencies, has been engaged
oru progressive restriction of the full distribution and free sale of the
ne magazine
. As a result of this obstruction the number of copies which
can be presumed to reach the Soviet public has become so small as
8, not to justify a continuation of this effort of the Government of the
13 United States to supply Soviet readers with a true picture of American
ile and thus to promote understanding between the two peoples.
In view of the evident unwillingness of the Soviet
Government to
is reciprocate the privileges granted by the Government of the United
States to Soviet publications, the Soviet Government is requested to
suspend immediately the publication and
distribution in the United
ed States of the U.S.S. R. Information Bulletin and supplements thereto.
of
d
d can
D
12
DI
I
ar
le
h
;0
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IS
d
1992
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
25. EAST-WEST TRADE CONTROLS: Statement by the Director
of Mutual Security, March 3, 1953 2
26.
1
wit
Cro
ana
COI
mo
and
Communist-made weapons and munitions are now being used in
the Korean war to commit aggression against the United Nations and
to kill and wound men of the United Nations forces including soldiers
of the Republic of Korea, [the] United States, Belgium, Canada
, we
Colombia, Ethiopia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Australia, Greece
, in
France, the Netherlands, [the] Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and an
the United Kingdom.
Communist-made weapons and munitions are being used in the the
Indochinese war against the Vietnamese and French forces in a violent fie
illegal action seeking to overthrow the established Government.
Under these circumstances every possible effort should be made to Ft
prevent strategic supplies from reaching the Soviet bloc. Much has
been done by the free and sovereign nations, including the United pa
States. Much more needs to be done. Much more will be done understa
President Eisenhower's new Administration.
Our increased efforts will include these measures:
(1) Special moves against what I call the "Triple C Men." These
are the "Capitalist-Communist-Collaborators" who operate beyond
the law and, in a greedy drive for profits, carry on an underground
trade sending strategic materials into the Communist area. De
(2) Peaceable but effective measures to stop the sly movement of tio:
ships carrying strategic materials on a transshipment basis from the
West to the Communist area. Special attention will be given to
ships originally built and owned by the United States and later sold
to foreign nationals or registered under foreign flags.
(3) Cooperation with the appropriate investigating committees of 27
the Congress to develop the facts and devise any remedies necessary.
(4) Study and consultation with the Foreign Řelations and Foreign
Affairs Committees of any further legislative measures needed to
carry out more effectively the intent of the Battle Act.
bas
(5) Appropriate participation in the negotiations conducted by the
Department of State with other free nations for the more effective w
des
control of strategic materials and of shipping:
(6) Coordination with the Departments of State, Treasury, De An
fense, Commerce, and other Departments and Agencies in a combined
program of pertinent administrative action.
(7) Appointment of Gen. William J. Donovan as special consultant
in East-West trade control.
foi
In-
1 Harold E. Stassen.
tiv
2 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 23, 1953, pp. 435–436.
3 Act of Oct. 26, 1951; infra, pp. 3101-3105.
IM
3
TOT
an
stu
TAJ
the
19E
THE SOVIET UNION
1993
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 21, 1955, p. 487; see also ibid., Apr. 25,
Y
5
bassy at Moscow to issue visas to 11 editors of Soviet student and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated that these student editors
The Department has asked the Institute of International Education,
en organization with wide experience in the field of international
student exchange, to undertake to make the necessary arrangements
for the reception and itinerary of the 11 Soviet student editors.
Institute of International Education has agreed to respond affirma-
tively to the Department's request and will make all necessary ar-
rangements for the trip directly with the Soviet student editors and
? Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, p. 563.
Aet of Oct. 26, 1951; infra, pp. 3101-3105.
2. ALLIED DISCUSSIONS REGARDING EAST-WEST TRADE:
Statement by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administra-
tion,' March 31, 1954 2
d Our conferences in London with representatives of the governments
of the United Kingdom and France on the subject of East-West trade
were successful and satisfactory. We reached an agreement. That
in itself is important for in standing together there is great strength
and essential security.
We agreed on the principles and on the procedure through which
these principles would be applied in detail, in cooperation with other
t friendly countries, in the months ahead. Our agreement is in harmony
with the Battle Act 3 passed by the U.S. Congress and it is in accord
o with the security policies of President Eisenhower's administration.
$ We do anticipate, compatible with security requirements, an ex-
dpanded trade with the Soviet Union and with the Eastern European
1 states in the export to them of peaceful goods in exchange for items
and materials which the free world can use. The existing tight
controls on trade with Communist China and North Korea will be
I will report the results of our conferences to President Eisenhower
and to the Secretary of State.
á number of the technical staff including representatives of the
Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and the Foreign Opera-
tiens Administration have remained in Europe to follow through the
implementation of our agreement.
d
127. VISIT OF SOVIET STUDENT EDITORS: Statement by the
Department of State, March 10, 1955 4
The State Department on March 10 authorized the American Em-
desire to visit the United
States in order
to acquaint themselves with
maintained.
d
d
of
ce
.
11
a
American student life.
the Soviet Government.
1 Harold E. Stassen.
1953, p. 695.
1994
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
28. DISCUSSIONS REGARDING EXCHANGE OF MEDICAL
FILMS: Note From the Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet
Ambassador at Washington, March 17, 1955 3
m
OX
Sa
81
The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His
Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and has the honor to refer to discussions that have taken place con- 24
cerning the possibility of arranging for exchanges of medical films
between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such discussions
were held by Professor B. V. Petrovsky, member of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics Academy of Medical Sciences, and Major
Paul W. Schafer, Medical Corps, Walter Reed Hospital, Washington
,
District of Columbia, during the Second World Congress of Cardiology
held in Washington, D. C., in September 1954, and subsequently
between officers of the Soviet Embassy and Major Schafer.
It is understood from the discussions referred to above that the
U
Soviet Union desires to exchange medical films with the United States.
On the basis of such an understanding the United States is prepared
to participate in such an exchange with the Soviet Union.
As a first step in effecting such an exchange there is enclosed a list
of films which can be made available to the Soviet Union in the near
future. The Soviet Government is requested to indicate which of the
de
films on the attached list it desires: following the receipt of such indi-
cation the requested films will be transmitted to the Soviet Govern-
ment.
It is believed that the most feasible method of effecting a reciprocal
exchange of films would be for the Soviet Government in presenting
the list of films which it desires from the United States to submit
list of Soviet films which it is prepared to make available to the United
ti
States. The United States Government would then indicate which
of the Soviet films it desires, and such films would subsequently be
transmitted to the United States.
The proposal for an exchange of medical films is made by the United
States Government on the understanding that the films made
available
$
by both Governments will be on a six-month loan basis and that the
films made
available by each of the Governments during the six-month
1
period will be comparable.
m
ca
87
(
.
Enclosure :
List of United States Films.
1
List of United States Films
1. Combined Abdominal and Right Thoracic Approach to Carcinoma of the
Mid Esophagus
2. Congenital Malformations of the Heart
3. Patent Ductus Arteriousus
4. Intravenous Anesthesia with Barbiturates
5. Ether Analgesia for Cardiac Surgery
1 Herbert Hoover, Jr.
2 Georgi N. Zaroubin.
Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 785; see also Soviet note of
Sept. 5, 1955 (ibid., p. 786).
3
THE SOVIET UNION
1995
point may be arranged within the general framework of the proposed
IS
S
IS
I
3.
in the itinerary and other visits to areas and installations outside of
Soviet delegation. The University of Minnesota will also be included
lowa of interest to the Soviet delegation from an agricultural stand-
note of May 20, 1955 (ibid., June 13, 1955, p. 970) and statement of June 2, 1955,
Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1955, pp. 932–933. See also Soviet
by the Departments of State and Agriculture (infra).
? The Soviet note of Mar. 10 (not printed) expressed the view that an exchange
of agricultural delegations could be advantageous and requested the U. S.
Government's opinion concerning such an exchange. (Footnote in Bulletin.]
L
6. Cancer: Problem of Early Diagnosis (Series)
7. Anemia
et
8. Diseases of the Ear, Nose, and Throat
9. Nephrosis in Children
10. Surgical Repair of Direct Inguinal Hernia
29. EXCHANGE OF AGRICULTURAL DELEGATIONS: Note From
the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
Is !
May 17, 1955 1
1
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
by
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U. Š. S. R. and has the
honor to refer to the Ministry's note of March 10, 1955 concerning
the proposal by the Des Moines Register of Des Moines, Iowa, that an
exchange of agricultural delegations be arranged between the Soviet
e Union and the United States.2 Reference is also made to conver-
d
sations in connection with such an exchange held between representa-
tives of the Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 4
and May 6, 1955.
As the Ministry was advised on May 4, the United States Govern-
ment takes a favorable view of the proposed exchange of agricultural
delegations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In
view of the decision by the Soviet Government to designate an official
delegation to participate in an exchange, the United States
Govern-
) ment is prepared to grant official visas to the members of a Soviet
delegation of approximately ten agricultural specialists upon notifi-
cation by the Ministry of their names and official status.
2 The United States Government believes that the most advantageous
time for the Soviet delegation to visit the United States from the
standpoint of agricultural conditions
would be during midsummer.
It is, therefore, proposed that the Soviet delegation
plan to be in the
United States from approximately July 10 to August 10, 1955.
In view of the official status of the Soviet delegation, the United
States Department of Agriculture will assist in making general
urangements for the tour of the Soviet group in the United States.
contemplated that the central part of the
tour would be con-
centrated in the State of Iowa, where Iowa State College, at the
request of the United States Government, is willing to undertake to
Bake appropriate arrangements for the reception and itinerary of the
it
tour,
1996
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
CC
i Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1955, p. 970. See also statements of
The composition of the American farm delegation to visit the Soviet
Union, which will have unofficial status, will be determined in con
sultation with the Department of Agriculture, Iowa State College
and other nonofficial institutions and organizations concerned with
agricultural matters. The United States Government would be
th
pleased to have an indication from the Soviet Government as to the
approximate size of the American delegation it would be prepared to
P
receive and the most appropriate time for the American delegation
to observe Soviet agricultural methods.
Although, as indicated above, the U. S. Department of Agriculture u
will have general advisory responsibility for arrangements regarding
the tour of the official Soviet delegation, it is the desire of the U. S.
Government that the members of the Soviet group have the widest
possible opportunity to observe at first hand the functioning of U.S.
farms and installations servicing agricultural needs. With this
object in view, and keeping in mind the technical interests of the
Soviet agricultural experts, a program will be developed for the visit 31
of the Soviet delegation which will permit the members of the dele-
gation to familiarize themselves with U. S. farming methods in the
total environment in which they operate. In the State of Iowa,
which possesses a great diversity of agricultural conditions, the Soviet
delegation will be shown the methods and procedures used in connec-
tion with the production of corn and raising of pigs and other livestock, Se
as well as the central role played in agricultural production by family by
owned and operated farms. In the U. S. the most efficient level of G
agricultural production has been developed on the basis of such units,
operating on their own initiative, and utilizing as they see fit the var-
ious agricultural services provided by local, state, cooperative and
Federal Government entities.
The U. S. Government welcomes the opportunity which will be
provided by the visit of the Soviet agricultural delegation to present pe
to the Soviet experts these and other aspects of American farm
practices.
30. EXCHANGE OF AGRICULTURAL DELEGATIONS: Statement
by the Departments of State and Agriculture, June 2, 1955
The U.S. Departments 'of Agriculture and State on June 2 an-
nounced that 12 representatives
of American agriculture will comprise
a delegation scheduled to visit the U.S.S.R.between July 15 and
August 15.
Since the visit to the Soviet Union will be unofficial, no provision
will be made for payment of travel expenses from U.S. Government
funds. The delegation will be broadly representative of American
agriculture, and its members will be persons well recognized in farming
July 25, 1955, pp. 151–152) and Secretary Dulles comments of Oct. 18, 1955 (ibid.,
Oct. 31, 1955, p. 689).
SE
1
C
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THE SOVIET UNION
1997
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8
0
)
3
distribution within the USSR of an illustrated Russian language
Accordingly, the Government of the United States proposes the
in character, devoted to an objective presentation of various aspects
of American life. The Government of the United States further
50,000 copies of each issue to be distributed through Soviet distribu-
proposes that distribution of this magazine be effected as follows:
tion channels, with an option to increase this number, with the
Government of the United States reserving the right to distribute
2,000 copies of each issue through the Embassy on a complimentary
basis, with an option to increase the number.
Dulles statement of Oct. 31, 1955 (infra, doc 44); Soviet note of Dec. 16, 1955
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 2, 1956, pp. 18-19. See also Secretary
(Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 2, 1956, p. 19); and statement of Dec. 23, 1955,
by the Department of State (ibid., p. 18).
and in agricultural research and extension. It is understood that the
itinerary will include various rural areas of the Soviet Union and
e Sgricultural research and educational institutions.
1 To date, several hundred persons have expressed interest in making
the trip. The national farm organizations, Iowa State College,
Ames, Iowa, and other land-grant colleges are being invited to make
preliminary nominations. Final selections will be made by a non-
| official public group to be designated.
The visit to the U.S.S.R. is of a reciprocal nature. The Soviet
? Union is sending to the United States an agricultural delegation of
similar size during the approximate period July 10 to August 10. A
considerable amount of time will be spent in Iowa, in accordance
with the expressed Soviet interest in corn-hog production.
31. PROPOSED RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE MAGAZINE: Note From
the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
September 9, 1955 1
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the
views expressed
by the President of the United States in addressing the Heads of
Government of the USSR, France and the United Kingdom at Ge-
meva
, on July 22,
on the topic of normalizing and increasing East-
West contacts. President Eisenhower said in part:
To help achieve the goal of peace based on justice and right and mutual under-
standing, there are certain concrete steps that could be taken: (1) to lower the
eners which now impede the interchange of information and ideas between
The Government of the United States believes that publication,
byit, of a Russian language magazine for distribution within the Soviet
Union
, would constitute a concrete step furthering a fuller inter-
change of information and ideas.
negazine
, issued monthly, which would be cultural and nonpolitical
1
}
peoples
*
1
2
* Infra, doc. 39.
1998
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
D.
In view of the cultural and non-political character of the magazine
proposed by the United States, it is assumed that the Soviet Govern-
ment would not request pre-publication review or any other type of
censorship, such as that previously imposed on foreign publications
as a war-time emergency measure.
The Embassy awaits the favorable reply of the Ministry regarding
this proposal and is prepared to discuss the details of its implementa-
tion with the appropriate Soviet authorities at an early date.
T
Mir
1"
aut!
NO
know
limit
T.
beta
miss
32. EAST-WEST TRADE: Statement by the Secretary of Commerce
,
November 3, 1955 (Summary) 1
Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks announced on November 3
a plan to ease controls on private commercial trade in peaceful goods
with the European Soviet bloc. In making the announcement
Secretary Weeks said:
This plan is designed to carry out further the objective urged by President
Eisenhower at Geneva in July "to create conditions which will encourage nations
to increase the exchange of peaceful goods throughout the world.” At the
Foreign
Ministers Conference in Geneva on October 31, Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles indicated the intention of the U.S. Government to simplify export
control procedures on shipments of peaceful goods to the Soviet bloc.3
Secretary Weeks said that the Bureau of Foreign Commerce is
setting up an initial roster of certain peaceful goods which will be
exportable to the European Soviet bloc under general license, with-
out prior application to the Bureau. Establishment of the new
roster thus will relieve U.S. exporters of the burden involved in
applying for individual licenses for commodities included on the
roster.
Strategic goods, which under present policy are not licensed to the
Soviet bloc, will be excluded from the new roster. Only peaceful
goods will be included, such as are now being approved for export to
the Soviet bloc under individual licenses. Examples of commodities
recently licensed for shipment to the bloc include tallow, hides and
skins, wool rags, cigarettes and tobacco, phosphate rock, pencil slats,
and rosin.
Secretary Weeks indicated that the new arrangements are expected
to be in effect by the end of the year.
The new procedure will not affect U.S. export controls to Com-
munist China and other Far East Communist points.
relati
Unie
nati
The
its
Fale
QUST
astie
| Biss
| but
met
T
thai
this
Sov
be
Per
Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 784.
2 Statement of July 22, 1955; infra, doc. 39.
3 Infra, doc. 44.
1
1
1
THE SOVIET UNION
1999
American Embassy.
auspices of the Order of Assumptionists, a Roman Catholic ecclesi-
astical organization with headquarters at Worcester, Mass. Father
Bissonnette has no official connection with the American Embassy
went to administer to the spiritual needs of American Roman Catholics
| The Department has been informed by the Order of Assumptionists
that plans had already been made, before the recent Soviet action
gainst Father Bissonnette, to send Father Louis F. Dion to Moscow
symptionists intends to make application in the near future to the
wiet Embassy for a Soviet entry visa for Father Dion in order that
te may proceed to Moscow to continue the work which was being
performed by Father Bissonnette.
wander the terms of the Litvinov Agreement and was in no way related
As stated above, Father Bissonnette's presence in Moscow was
' Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 14, 1955, p. 424.
Poreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 27-37.
D. ENTRY AND RESIDENCE PRIVILEGES OF
AMERICAN AND SOVIET CLERGYMEN
33. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
MARCH 2, 1955 1
The American Embassy at Moscow has been advised by the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Soviet Government is expelling
the Rev. Georges Bissonnette, an American Roman Catholic priest
resident in Moscow. Father Bissonnette has been told by the Soviet
uthorities that he must depart from the Soviet Union by March 5.
so reason for Father Bissonnette's expulsion has to date been made
known by the Soviet Government to Father Bissonnette or to the
The U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union on March 1 protested
ngorously to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Soviet action
gainst Father Bissonnette as a violation of those portions of the
utvinov Agreement ? (the exchange of notes of November 16, 1933,
between President Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov, People's Com-
miser for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, whereby diplomatic
mations were established between the United States and the Soviet
Union
) pertaining to freedom of conscience and religious worship of
Istionals of the United States on the territory of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Government, however, thus far has refused to reconsider
is position regarding Father Bissonnette's ouster.
Pertinent portions of the Litvinov Agreement are attached hereto.
Father Bissonnette, who was born on July 22, 1921, at Central
fall, R. I., has been in Moscow since January 25, 1953, under the
as a replacement for Father Bissonnette. The Order of
that city
this spring
Not reprinted here.
:
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2000
m
ecclesiastical functionaries will be protected from all disability or persecution |
Americans desiring to enter the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on personal
to cases of temporary visits to the United States and Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics by ecclesiastical figures of the respective countries
which have occurred from time to time in the past.
00
So
th
th
34. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW th
TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, JUNE 27, 1955
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet pr
Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note of
No. 20/OSA of March 8, 1955 ? in connection with the expulsion from
the Soviet Union of Father Bissonnette, an American priest residing i
in Moscow under the terms of the exchange of notes of November 16
,
1933 between President Roosevelt and Mr. Litvinov relating to free-
dom of religion for American nationals residing in the Soviet Union
. th
The Ministry's note under reference, which makes clear that the res
action taken against Father Bissonnette was in retaliation for the
refusal of the United States Government to extend the visa issued to at
Archbishop Boris of the Russian Orthodox Church, contends that in de
the agreement of November 16, 1933 both countries bound themselves to
to "extend on the territory of their countries to citizens of the other en
Li
party the right to satisfaction of their spiritual needs by priests,
pastors, rabbis, or other ecclesiastical functionaries who are citizens
of the other party'.
It will be recalled that the exchange of notes in 1933 was initiated
by a note from President Roosevelt, the final paragraph of which is
St
reads as follows:
ad
We will expect that religious groups or congregations composed of nationals of
the United States of America in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics will be given the right to have their spiritual needs ministered to by
clergymen, priests, rabbis or other ecclesiastical functionaries who are nationals ac
of the United States of America, and that such clergymen, priests, rabbis or offer
all
th
their ecclesiastical status.3
Bip
This is the only paragraph of the note which deals with the question
of the right of clergymen to enter the Soviet
Union to minister to the
religious needs of American nationals. The
final paragraph of the
Soviet reply of the same date reads as follows:
BE
th
Finally, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, while
reserving to itself the right of refusing visas ta
WE
grounds, does not intend to base such refusals on the fact of such persons having In
an ecclesiastical status. 4
cit
the
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1955, pp. 102–103.
3 President Roosevelt to the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 18
th
1933; Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, p.
* The Soviet
Commissar of Foreign Affairs to President Roosevelt, Nov. 16 B:
1933; ibid., p. 33.
me
DE
8
rei
sto
sto
h
be
THE SOVIET UNION
2001
es
clergymen abroad. Furthermore, the fact that the notes contained
Jl the more clear in that the expulsion of Father Bissonnette from
the Soviet Union was undertaken, not because of objection to Father
Bissonnette on personal grounds, but solely in retaliation for the
refusal of the United States Government to permit the extension of
26 status in the United States was not comparable to that of Father
stay in the United States of the Soviet Archbishop Boris, whose
Bissonnette in the Soviet Union. Archbishop Boris was admitted into
to that faction of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States
which is administratively subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate.
In this capacity, Archbishop Boris was in contact with American
the possibility of holding religious services in many different churches
citizens who are members of the Russian Orthodox Church and had
18 number of American cities which he visited during his stay in
the United States. In contrast to Archbishop Boris' status, Father
5 Bissonnette resided in Moscow under the terms of a formal agreement
| between the United States and the Soviet Union. He served the
et
It is apparent that, when considered together, these two notes can
enly mean that American clergymen will be permitted to enter the
Soviet Union to minister to the needs of American nationals resident
there
, although it is recognized that the Soviet Government reserved
the right to refuse a visa on "personal grounds”. The meaning of
this reservation would appear to be that a visa would be refused if an
individual applicant were objectionable on some ground other than
tis being a clergyman.
it! The reservation made by the Soviet Union is not applicable in the
et present instance, since Father Bissonnette was not expelled because
te d objection to him personally but simply in retaliation for action
m taken by the United States Ğovernment in connection with Arch-
ng bishop Boris.
6. There is no condition of reciprocity contained in the Soviet note of
November 16, 1933, and the proposal in the United States note of
1. that date was confined to rights for American clergymen. That no
he reciprocity was provided for in these particular notes appears to have
he arisen from the fact that the Soviet Government gave no indication
to at that time of being concerned with the problem of sending Soviet
es no provision for reciprocity cannot be regarded as accidental, since
er another exchange of notes between President Roosevelt and Mr.
S Librinov on the same date relating to noninterference in political
is i matters contains a provision for reciprocal adherence to the engage-
ments undertaken.
ed. It is therefore the view of the United States Government that there
i no basis for the claim of the Soviet Government that the United
States is bound by the terms of the November 16, 1933 agreement to
admit clergymen from the Soviet Union to minister to the religious
needs of Soviet nationals in the United States.
On the other hand, the United States Government regards the
dhe action of the Soviet Government in expelling Father Bissonnette as
se a violation of the terms of the 1933
agreement. This violation is
of
st
by
of
1.
of
al
18
41590057-Vol. 2----23
2002
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ISS
ad
08
ar
ap
Louis Dion, who has been designated by the Assumptionist Order to
note delivered June 27, 1955, by the American Embassy at Moscow
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs protesting the expulsion
from the U.S. S. R. of the Reverend Georges Bissonnette, a member
of the Assumptionist Order.2 This note refuted the Soviet Govern-
spiritual needs of Americans in Moscow and had no contact with
Soviet citizens of the Roman Catholic faith. Due to action of the
Soviet Government, Father Bissonnette was unable to hold services es
in the Roman Catholic church in Moscow and was forced to use his
PI
small apartment for this purpose.
to
The United States Government considers as irrelevant to the les
matter at issue the question raised in the Ministry's note of March &
1955 with respect to the practice of the Moscow Patriarchate in
designating heads of the Russian Orthodox Church in America. I
may be noted, however, that no interference by the United States to
Government has ever been interposed to the appointment by the
Moscow Patriarchate of officials of that segment of the Russian
of
Orthodox Church in America which recognizes the right of the Moscow
Patriarchate to make appointments of this kind. When such officials tr
are not United States citizens, the conditions of their entry into the Ar
United States are necessarily determined in the context of pertinent
United States immigration laws and regulations. As is evident from st
the action of the United States Government in permitting visits to Re
the United States of Soviet clergymen, including most recently the late
Archbishop Germogen and Archbishop Boris, the United States
Government has not objected in principle to temporary visits to the Ju
United States of Soviet ecclesiastics for the purpose of conducting cl
legitimate church affairs.
Ui
În reiterating its protest against the expulsion of Father Bisson Af
nette the United States Government requests that favorable action be
be taken with regard to issuance of a Soviet entry visa to Father Er
succeed Father Bissonnette and who made application for a Sovisi form
visa at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. on March 23, 1956. a
If the Soviet Government now considers it desirable that Sopii mi
clergymen be admitted to the United States in order to minister to
the religious needs of Soviet nationals, the United States Government
is prepared in the interest of reciprocity to extend to a Soviet cleres" cep
man the same possibilities of entry and religious activity as those
accorded to American clergymen in the Soviet Union under the terms
of the November 16, 1933 agreement.
35. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 15, 1955 1
The Department of State on June 28, 1955, released the text of a
vis
DO
em
un
WC
aci
арт
ad
Ca
the
org
001
Wa
.
1
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 28, 1955, p. 888.
* Supra.
THE SOVIET UNION
2003
· Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 14, 1955, pp. 784-785.
I
20
1
11
| action was undertaken November 4, 1955.
Catholics in Moscow requires the admission of Archbishop Boris into
the United States for an indefinite period to head an American church
note of November 10 that Archbishop Boris would fulfill this broad
ganization. Inasmuch as the Soviet Government indicated in its
and unacceptable function, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
was requested by the American Embassy at Moscow on November 12,
1955, to return the passports of the Archbishop and his secretary.
issued to Soviet Archbishop Boris constituted a violation of the terms
of the November 16, 1933, Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement, which
established diplomatic relations between the two countries and which
provides for the presence of American clergymen in the Soviet Union
to minister to the spiritual needs of American nationals. Neverthe-
less
, the United States Government in this note stated:
BE
If the Soviet Government now considers it desirable that Soviet clergymen be
admitted to the United States in order to minister to the religious peers
of Soviet
nationals
, the United States Government is prepared in the interest of reciprocity
si to extend to a Soviet clergyman the same possibilities of entry and religious activity
as those accorded to American clergymen in the Soviet Union under the terms
of the November 16, 1933 agreement.
The Embassy's note of June 27, 1955, pointed out the sharp con-
trast between the functions of an American priest ministering to
American Catholics in the U. S. S. R. and the functions of a Soviet
archbishop
, heading an American church organization in the United
States
, and requested that Father Bissonnette's appointed successor,
Father Louis Dion, be granted the Soviet visa for which he had
te applied on March 23, 1955.
No direct reply was made by the Soviet Government to our note of
June 27, 1955, and its voluntary offer of reciprocity permitting a Soviet
| clergyman to attend to the religious needs of Soviet nationals in the
United States. On September 8, 1955, the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs requested our Embassy to issue unlimited visas to Archbishop
23 Boris and his secretary, and Father Dion was advised by the Soviet
Embassy in Washington that it was prepared to issue him a Soviet
yasa
. A request by our Embassy on September 14, 1955, to be in-
e formed if by its action of September 8 the Soviet Government was
5. accepting tħe basis set forth in our June 27 note relative to the per-
missible activity of a Soviet clergyman in the United States elicited
In the absence of such response and following Father Dion's ac-
leptance of a Soviet visa, the American Embassy in Moscow was
instructed to issue U. S. visas to the Archbishop and his secretary,
emphasizing at that time that these visas were being issued on the
understanding that the Archbishop's functions in the United States
would not exceed those permitted Father Dion in Moscow. This
apparent that the Soviet Government continues to insist that the
admission of Father Dion to tend the spiritual needs of a few American
to visa
to
10 Soviet response.
DS
2
11
88
Not printed.
2004
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
8S
1
VE
CO
ece
As the Ministry is aware, a representative of the Assumptions the
so that their U. S. visas could be canceled. At the same time, the On
willingness of the U. S. Government to admit a Soviet clergyman to the
fulfill functions comparable to those permitted the American priest su
in Moscow was reaffirmed.
U
th
36. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT MOSCOW
TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, DECEMBER 10, 1955
Bo
VC
Go
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-D
Di
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet du
Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's
Note No. 118 of December 2, 1955.2 Essentially, the Ministry's
note again supports the view of the Soviet Government that Soviet
Archbishop Boris should be granted the privilege of unlimited entry
to the United States to function as resident Exarch of the Russian
Orthodox Church in America before the American Catholic priest
,
Father Dion, will be permitted to enter the Soviet Union to assume the
pu
modest functions which his predecessors fulfilled under the terms of
pen
the November 16, 1933 agreement which established diplomatic
relations between the USA and the USSR. It
is regrettable that the fee
Soviet Government has seen fit since its expulsion of Father Bisson-
nette in March 1955 4 to link these dissimilar cases.
Properly considering each of these matters in its own context
, the of
United States Government holds to the position presented in the
Embassy's note of June 27, 1955 5 that the right of American clergy of
men to tend the spiritual needs of American nationals in the Soviet
Union rests on the terms of the November 16, 1933 agreement
.
Consequently, the Soviet Government's expulsion 'of Father Bisson
nette and its present negative attitude toward the admission of
Father Dion constitute a clear violation of that agreement.
Although the Ministry's Note of March 8. 1955 6 erroneous
claimed that the November 16, 1933 agreement provided for real
procity with regard to Soviet Clergymen in the United States
, the
United States Government perceived no objection to the extension
of reciprocity. Consequently, the Embassy advised the Ministry on
June 27, 1955 and has subsequently reiterated that the United States
Government is prepared to grant a Soviet clergyman the same porno
bilities of tending to the religious needs of Soviet nationals in the
United States as those
accorded to American clergymen to tend tut 37.
the religious needs of American nationals in the Soviet Union. De
spite the absence of a positive Soviet response to this voluntary ofa
of reciprocity, it remains in effect.
Wе.
at
cell
by
mis
&
COD
1
27-32.
2
1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 2, 1956, pp. 19–20.
2 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
3 Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, PP.
2, . 3
5 Supra, doc. 34.
& Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1955, pp. 103–104.
Con
ica:
THE SOVIET UNION
2005
et
70 37. ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE EVE OF HIS
DEPARTURE FOR THE CONFERENCE, JULY 15, 1955
the United States on a trip that in some respects is unprecedented for
Good evening, friends. Within a matter of minutes I shall leave
| & President of the United States. Other Presidents have left the
continental limits of our country for the purpose of discharging their
1 See statement of Nov. 15, 1955, by the Department of State; supra.
? Delivered over radio and television networks from Washington; The Geneva
lication 6046; 1955), pp. 13-16.
Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–29, 1955 (Department of State pub-
he Order has been advised orally by the Soviet Embassy in Washington
to that Father Dion should not attempt to utilize his Soviet visa until
st
) such time as the question of the entry of Archbishop Boris into the
United States is resolved. The United States Government requests
that this counsel be revoked and that no further obstacles be placed
in the way of Father Dion's early departure for the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Government's
action in linking the entry of Archbishop
Boris with that of Father Dion has tended to confuse the issues in-
volved and to complicate a clear understanding of the United States
Government's position with regard to the entry of Archbishop Boris.
Divorced from the irrelevant and extraneous considerations intro-
duced by the Soviet Government in dealing with these two distinctly
E's
different problems simultaneously, this position may be summarized
's
as follows:
The United States Government has not objected to temporary
visits to the United States by Soviet ecclesiastics for the purpose of
conducting legitimate church'affairs. Archbishop Boris and his pred-
esessor, Archbishop Germogen, were admitted temporarily for this
of
purpose
, and in both cases their visas were extended subsequently to
permit a longer stay in the United States than that for which they
were originally admitted. However, the Department continues to
feel that it is neither appropriate nor desirable for Archbishop Boris,
& Soviet national who is a high-ranking official of the Orthodox
Church
in the Soviet Union, to reside indefinitely in the United States as head
of one of the Russian Orthodox Church groups in the United States.
The Embassy's request of November 12, 1955 1 that the passports
of Archbishop Boris and his secretary
be made available
for the can-
cellation of their visas is reaffirmed. This cancellation can be effected
by United States consular officials at any United States diplomatic
mission or consular office abroad.
L. DISCUSSION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF
GOVERNMENT, JULY 18–23, 1955
bo
IC
1.
he
he
t.
I
18
D.
13
enes
ll
2
2006
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
ex
we
duties as Commander-in-Chief in time of war or to participate in
conferences at the end of the war, and to provide for the measures
of
that would bring about a peace.
But now, for the first time, a President goes to engage in a con- by
ference with heads of other governments in order to prevent war; pm
in order to see whether in this time of stress and strain, we cannot WE
devise measures that will keep from us this terrible scourge that
that off
afflicts mankind.
Now, manifestly, there are many difficulties in the way of a Presi- ' bo
dent going abroad for a period, particularly while Congress is in
th
session. He has many constitutional duties. He must be here to
perform them. I am able to go on this trip only because of the
generous cooperation of the political leaders in Congress of both to
parties who have arranged their work so that my absence for a period
will not interfere with the business of the Government.
W
On my part I have promised them that by a week from Sunday
,
on July twenty-fourth, I shall be back here ready to carry on my De
accustomed duties.
Now, it is manifest that in a period such as this, the time I am able fro
to spend abroad, we cannot settle the details of the many problems sta
that afflict the world. But, of course, I go for a very serious purpose,
This purpose is to attempt, with my colleagues
, to change the spirit
that has characterized the intergovernmental relationships of the ste
world during the past ten years.
ho:
Now, let us think for a moment about this purpose. Let us just
enumerate a few of the problems that plague the world, the problem
of armaments and the burdens that people
are forced to carry
of the necessity for these armaments. The problem of the captive
:states, once proud people, that are not allowed their own form of wa
TI
government freely chosen by themselves and under individuals freely
elected by themselves.
QUE
The problem of divided countries, people who are related to each
other by blood kinship and divided by force of arms into two camps
that are indeed expected to be hostile to each other. Then we have
the problem of international interference in the internal affairs of
free governments, bringing about a situation that leads to subversion
,
Pro
difficulties and recriminations within a country, sometimes even
revolution.
These problems are made all the more serious by complications
th
between governments. These problems of which I speak have often
th
arisen as the aftermath of wars and conflicts. But governments are
divided also by differing ambitions, by differing ideologies, but it
mutual distrust and the alarms that these create, and because of the
be
alarms, they build up armaments and place their trust for peace
protection in those armaments, and these armaments create greater
alarm, and so we have
a spiral of growing uneasiness, suspicion and
distrust.
That is the kind of thing that the world faces today.
Now for these things there is no easy settlement.
time that this conference can exist, it is impossible to pursue all of the
because per
net
&
lin
an
em
and
pr
W
In the briel
THE SOVIET UNION
2007
New York Times, July 16, 1955, p. 3.
)
)
Premier Bulganin in Moscow ? 1
line that I am now speaking. He talked of conciliation and tolerance
and understanding. I say to you—I say to all the world—if the words
and minds of all the people in Russia, as in the hearts and minds
between the Russian delegation and our own at this coming conference.
Now I want to mention another item that is important in this
We are not held together by force, but we are held together by this
great factor, and it is this: The free world believes, under one religion
long and tedious negotiations that must take place before the details
s of these problems can be settled.
Our many post-war conferences have been characterized too much
by attention to details; by an effort apparently to work on specific
problems rather than to establish the spirit, and the attitude in which
we shall approach them. Success, therefore, has been meager. Too
often indeed these conferences have been mere opportunities for
exploitation of nationalistic ambitions, or indeed only for sounding
boards for the propaganda that the participants want to spread to
the world.
If we look at this record we would say, "Why another conference ?
What hope is there for success? Well now the first question I ask
you
, “Do we want to do nothing? Do we want to sit and drift along
to the inevitable end in such a contest of war or increased tensions ?"
We want peace. We cannot look at this whole situation without
realizing first that pessimism never won any battle, whether it was in
peace or it was in war.
Next we will understand that one ingredient has been missing
from all these conferences. An honest intent to conciliate, to under-
stand
, to be tolerant, to try to see the other fellow's viewpoint as
well as we see our own. I say to you if we can change the spirit in
which these conferences are conducted we will have taken the greatest
step toward peace, toward future prosperity and tranquillity that
has ever been taken in all the history of mankind.
I want to give you a few reasons for hope in this project.
First, the people of all the world desire peace. This is peace for
people everywhere. I distinguish between people and governments
here for the
moment when we know that the great hordes of men and
women who make up the world do not want to go to the battlefield.
They want to live in peace. Not a peace that is a mere
stilling of the
guns but a peace in which they can live happily, tranquilly, and in
confidence that they can raise their children in a world of which they
will be proud. That common desire for peace is something that is
a terrific force in this world and to which I believe all political leaders
in the world are beginning to respond. They must
recognize it.
Another item; did you note this morning the speech made by
Every word he said was along the
the men in the Kremlin as we are sure they are reflective
of the hearts
9. iron curtain. The
free world has one great factor in common.
2008
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
for
for
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ter
net
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COI
of
or another, in a divine power. It believes in a Supreme Being. Now
this, my friends, is a very great factor for conciliation and peace at
this time because each of those religions, each one of them, has as
one of its basic commandments the words, terminology that is similar
to our Golden Rule. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you.” This means that the thinking of those people is based upon
ideas of right and justice and mutual self-respect, consideration for
the other man. And this means peace, because only in peace can such
conceptions as these prevail.
This means that the free people of the world hate war, and they
want peace and are fully dedicated to it. Now this country, as other
free countries, maintains arms. We maintain formations of war and
all the modern weapons. Why? Because we must. As long as this
spirit that has prevailed up to now is going to prevail in the world
we cannot expose our rights, our privileges, our homes, our wives, our
children, to the risk that would come to an unarmed country.
But we want to make it perfectly clear these armaments do not
reflect the way we want to live; they merely reflect the way under
present conditions we have to live.
Now it is natural for a people, steeped in a religious civilization
,
when they come to moments of great importance, maybe even crisis,
such as now we face, to turn to the Divine Power that each has in
his own heart, believes in his own heart, for guidance, for wisdom,
for some help in doing the thing that is' honorable and is right
.
I
have no doubt that tonight, throughout this country, and indeed,
throughout the free world, such prayers are ascending. This is a
mighty force. And this brings to me the thought that through prayer
we could also achieve a very definite and practical result at this very
moment. Suppose, on the next Sabbath Day observed by each
our religions, America, 165 million people of us, went to our accus-
tomed places of worship and, crowding those places, asked for help
,
and by so doing demonstrated to all the world the sincerity and depth
of our aspirations for peace.
This would be a mighty force.
None could then say that we preserve armaments because we want
to—we preserve them because we must.
My friend, Secretary Dulles, and I go to this conference in the
earnest hope that we may accurately represent your convictions, pour
beliefs, your aspirations. We shall be conciliatory because our
country seeks no conquest, no property of others.
We shall be tolerant, because this nation does not seek to impose
our way of life upon others. We shall be firm in the consciousness
of your spiritual and material strength and your defense of the right
But we shall extend the hand of friendship to all who will grasp
it honestly and concede to us the
same rights, the same understanding
,
the same freedom, that we accord to them.
Wethe Secretary and I shall do our best with others there to
start the world on the beginning of a new road, a road that may
long and difficult, but which, if faithfully followed, will lead us
into a better and fuller life.
Thank you. Good night.
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found merely by talking in terms of abstractions and generalities.
It is necessary that we talk frankly about the concrete problems
which create tension between us and about the way to begin in solving
As a preface, may I indicate some of the issues I think we should
First is the problem of unifying Germany and forming an all-
German Government based on free elections. Ten years have passed
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 18-22.
The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
? New York Times, July 16, 1955, p. 3.
38. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 18, 1955 1
We meet here for a simple purpose. We have come to find a basis
for accommodation which will make life safer and happier not only
for the nations we represent but for people elsewhere.
We are here in response to a universal urge, recognized by Premier
Bulganin in his speech of July 15,2 that the political leaders of our
great countries find a path to peace. We cannot expect here, in the
few hours of a few days, to solve all the problems of all the world that
need to be solved. Indeed, the four of us meeting here have no
authority from others that could justify us even in attempting that.
The roots of many of these problems are buried deep in war, conflicts
and history. They are made even more difficult by the differences in
governmental ideologies and ambitions. Manifestly it is out of the
question in the short time available to the Heads of Government
meeting here to trace out the causes and origins of these problems
and to devise agreements that could with complete fairness to all
eliminate them.
Nevertheless, we can, perhaps, create a new spirit that will make
possible future solutions of problems which are within our respon-
sibilities. And, equally important, we can try to take here and now
at Geneva the first steps on a new road to a just and durable peace.
The problems that concern us are not inherently insoluble. Of
course
, they are difficult; but their solution is not beyond the wisdom
of man. They seem insoluble under conditions of fear, distrust, and
even hostility, where every move is weighed in terms of whether it
wil help or weaken a potential enemy. If those
conditions can be
changed, then much can be done. Under such circumstances I am
confident that at a later stage our Foreign Ministers will be able to
carry on from where we leave off to find, either by themselves or with
others
, solutions to our problems.
No doubt there are among our nations philosophical convictions
which are in many respects irreconcilable! Nothing that we can
say or do here will change that fact. However, it is not always neces-
sary that people should think alike and believe alike before they can
work together. The essential thing is that none should attempt by
force
or trickery to make his beliefs prevail and thus to impose his
The new approach e of this conference should seek cannot be
system on the unwilling
them.
discuss.
2010
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
CODS
1 Agreements of Oct. 23, 1954; for the texts of the agreements regarding
Germany, see supra, pp. 483-612. The North Atlantic Treaty protocol of this
The agreements relating to Western Euro
since the German armistice and Germany is still divided. That F
division does a grievous wrong to a people which is entitled, like any once
other, to pursue together a common destiny. While that division to &
continues, it creates a basic source of instability in Europe. Our talk dive
of peace has little meaning if at the same time we perpetuate condi- Te
tions endangering the peace. Towards Germany, the four of us bear beca
special responsibilities. While any conclusions we reach would be $
invalid unless supported by majority opinion in Germany this prob-
whic
lem should be a topic for our meeting here. Must we not considershor
ways to solve it promptly and justly?
În the interest of enduring peace, our solution should take account best
of the legitimate security interests of all concerned. That is why sup
we insist a united Germany is entitled at its choice, to exercise its of
inherent right of collective self-defense. By the same token, we are
of
ready to take account of legitimate security interests of the Soviet that
Union. The Paris agreements contain many provisions which serveure
this purpose. But we are quite ready to consider further reciprocal dia
safeguards which are reasonable and practical and compatible with A
the security of all concerned.
that
On a broader plane, there is the problem of respecting the right of peo
peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live
; und
and of restoring sovereign rights and self-government to those who The
have been deprived of them. The American people feel strongly that pati
certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many with a long and proud the
record of national existence
, have not
yet been given the benefit of Non
this pledge of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by relea
other wartime agreements.
thaf
There is the problem of communication and human contacts as de
among our peoples. We frankly fear the consequences of a situation uve
where whole peoples are isolated from the outside world. The Ameri-sz
of ti
can people want to be friends with the Soviet peoples. There are no
I
natural differences between our peoples or our nations. There are
no territorial conflicts or commercial rivalries. Historically, our two
countries have always been at peace. But friendly understanding 18
between peoples does not readily develop when there are artificia
barriers such as now interfere with communication. It is time that
all curtains whether of guns or laws or regulations should begin to do
come down. But this can only be done in an atmosphere of mutual
respect and confidence.
There is the problem of international communism. For 38 years
now, its activities have disturbed relations between other nations and
bric
the Soviet Union. Its activities are not confined to efforts to per-
suade. It seeks throughout the world to subvert lawful governments
and to subject nations
to an alien domination. We cannot ignore the
distrust created by the support of such activities. In my nation and
elsewhere it adds to distrust and therefore to international tension.
date is printed supra, pp. 871-873.
pean Union are printed supra, pp. 972–989.
» Declaration of Jan. 1, 1942; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 2.
ene
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In
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destruction. We still believe that if the Soviet Union would accord-
| briefly
that all of us will have suggestions as to how we might promote the
search for the solution of these problems.
Perhaps it would be well if each of us would in turn give a similar
indication of his country's views. Then we can quickly see the scope
See the President's address of Dec. 8 1953; infra, pp. 2798-2805.
Finally, there is the overriding problem of armament. This is at
once a result and a cause of existing tension and distrust. Contrary
to a basic purpose of the United Nations Charter, armaments now
divert much of men's effort from creative to non-productive uses.
We would all like to end that. But apparently none dares to do so
because of fear of attack.
Surprise attack has a capacity for destruction far beyond anything
which man has yet known. So each of us deems it vital that there
should be means to deter such attack. Perhaps, therefore, we should
consider whether the problem of limitation of armament may not
best be approached by seeking--as a first step-dependable ways to
supervise and inspect military establishments, so that there can be
no frightful surprises, whether by sudden attack or by secret violation
of agreed restrictions. In this field nothing is more important than
that we explore together the challenging and central problem of effec-
live mutual inspection. Such a system is the foundation for real
disarmament.
As we think of this problem of armament, we need to remember
that the present burden of costly armaments not only deprives our own
people of higher living standards, but it also denies the peoples of
mderdeveloped areas of resources which would improve their lot.
These areas contain much of the world's population and many
nations now emerging for the first time into political independence.
They are grappling with the urgent problem of economic growth.
Normally they would receive assistance particularly for capital de-
relopment from the more developed nations of the world. However,
that normal process is gravely retarded by the fact that the more
developed industrial countries are dedicating so much of their produc-
live effort to armament. Armament reduction would and should in-
sure that part of the savings would flow into the less developed areas
of the world to assist their economic development.
In addition, we must press forward in developing the use of atomic
energy for constructive purposes. We regret that the Soviet Union
has never accepted our proposal of December 1953 1 that nations pos-
sessing stockpiles of fissionable material should join to contribute to
"World bank” so as, in steadily increasing measure, to substitute
coperation in human welfare for competition in means of human
ng to its ability contribute to this great project, that act would im-
people of the United States and where solution is largely within the
As our work here progresses I hope
prove the international climate.
competence of the four of us.
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(2) To lower the barriers which now impede the opportunities of
all our citizens and elsewhere in the world. By helping eliminate
poverty and ignorance, we can take another step in progress toward
In America, the fervent belief in freedom od 801
thought, of expression, and of movement is a vital part of our heritage
Yet during these past ten years even we have felt compelled, in two
i The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
of the matters which it might be useful to discuss here and arrange
our time accordingly.
Let me repeat, I trust that we are not here merely to catalogue or
differences. We are not here to repeat the same dreary exercises that
fi
have characterized most of our negotiations of the past ten years. We
are here in response to the peaceful aspirations of mankind to start
the kind of discussions which will inject a new spirit into our diph
macy; and to launch fresh negotiations under conditions of good
augury.
In that way, and perhaps only in that way, can our meeting, neces
sarily brief, serve to generate and put in motion the new forces needed
bi
to set us truly on the path to peace. For this I am sure all humanity
will devoutly pray.
8
39. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 22, 1955
According to the adopted agenda, today we meet to discuss method
of normalizing and increasing the contacts between our nations in
ST
many fields. I am heartened by the deep interest in this question,
which interest implies a common purpose to understand each other
better. Unfortunately there exist unnecessary restrictions on the flow
between us of ideas, of things and of people.
Like other questions we have considered during the past four days de
this one cannot be considered independently or in isolation. All ar tu
related by their direct importance to the general objective of lessening
world fears and tensions.
To help achieve the goal of peace based on justice and right and et
mutual understanding, there are certain concrete steps that could be
taken:
(1) To lower the barriers which now impede the interchange of ir
be
formation and ideas between our peoples.
do
people to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful, friendly purposes
so that all will have a chance to know each other face-to-face.
(3) To create conditions which will encourage nations to incres
the exchange of peaceful goods throughout the world.
An
Success in these endeavors should improve the conditions of life in
peace.
Restrictions on communications of all kinds, including radio an
travel, existing in extreme form in some places, have operated as cauri
CEC
ea
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ind
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See
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of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 63-64.
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ded
100,
America devoutly desires-as I know all of us do.
101 good intent that have characterized the statements of the two prem
Rogeceding speakers.? But I do hope that my silence respecting certain
of the statements made by the immediately preceding speaker will
The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 80–81.
? Prime Minister Eden and Premier Bulganin; see ibid., pp. 76-80.
protection of our own interests, to place some restrictions upon the
movement of persons and communications across our national
OW
frontiers.
chat
This conference has the opportunity, I believe, to initiate concrete
114
steps to permit the breaking down of both mild and severe barriers
tart
to mutual understanding and trust.
plo-
ood
Now I should like to turn to the question of trade. I assume that
each of us here is dedicated to the improvement of the conditions of
life of our own citizens. Trade in peaceful goods is an important
factor in achieving this goal. If trade is to reach its maximum capa-
bility in this regard, it must be both voluminous and world-wide.
The United Nations has properly been concerned in making avail-
able to the people of the under-developed areas modern technology
and managerial abilities, as well as capital and credit. My country
not only supports these efforts, but has undertaken parallel projects
outside the United Nations.
od
In this connection the new atomic science possesses a tremendous
potential for helping raise the standards of living and providing
310
greater opportunity for all the world. World-wide interest in over-
ther
coming poverty and ignorance is growing by leaps and bounds, and
How
each of the great nations should do its utmost to assist in this develop-
ment. As a result new desires, new requirements, new aspirations are
emerging almost everywhere as man climbs the upward path of his
destiny. Most encouraging of all is the evidence that after cen-
au turiès of fatalism and resignation, the hopeless of the world are
But regardless of the results achieved through the United Nations
1. elfort or the individual efforts of helpful nations, trade remains the
*) indispensable arterial system of a flourishing world prosperity
we could create conditions in which unnecessary restrictions on
trade would be progressively eliminated and under which there would
be free and friendly exchange of ideas and of people, we should have
done much to chart the paths toward the objectives we commonly
By working together toward all these goals, we can do much to
transform this century of recurring conflict into a century of enduring
and invigorating peace. This, I assure you, the United States of
for
40. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JULY 23, 1955 1
I welcome and warmly reciprocate the spirit of friendliness and
nie beginning to hope.
If
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
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have broadened our knowledge of each other, further agreement be-
of justice. May it result in improved well-being, greater freedom.
I came here because of my lasting faith
in the decent instincts and good sense of the people who populate
not by any means be interpreted as acquiescence on my part-Par
from it.
But it has seemed to me that in the closing minutes of this con-
ference there is no necessity for me to announce to this conference
and to the world the United States position on the important questious
we have discussed. These I hope and believe have already been made
clear. Therefore, it has not seemed particularly fitting once more
to recite them in detail. Rather I content myself with some refler
tions on our work of the past week and an expression of some hopes
for the future,
This has been an historic meeting. It has been on the whole : &
good week. But only history will tell the true worth and real values
of our session together. The follow-through from this beginning by
our respective Governments will be decisive in the measure of this
Conference.
We have talked over plainly a number of the most difficult and
perplexing questions affecting our several peoples and indeed the
peoples of the entire world.
We did not come bere to reach final solutions. We came to see if
we might together find the path that would lead to solutions and would
brighten the prospects of world peace.
In this final hour of our assembly, it is my judgment that the pros-
pects of a lasting peace with justice, well-being, and broader freedom
,
are brighter. The dangers of the overwhelming tragedy of modern
war are less.
The work of our Foreign Ministers as they strive to implement our
directives will be of great importance, perhaps of even more than
what we have done here. Theirs is the task, reflecting the substantive
policies of their Governments, to reach agreement on courses of action
which we here could discuss only in broad terms. I know we all wish
them well.
I trust we will all support the necessary adjustments which ther
may find our Governments must make if we are to resolve our
ferences in these matters.
If our peoples, in the months and years ahead, broaden their know
edge and their understanding of each other, as we, during this week
.
tween our Governments may be facilitated. May this occur in a
marked by more of good will among men.
deed be ever remembered.
I came to Geneva because I believe mankind longs for freedom
from war and rumors of war.
unshaken, and with the prayer that the hope of mankind will one deſ
be realized.
dił
.
spirit
These days will then in
THE SOVIET UNION
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1955 1
1
terial resources to be devoted to the peaceful economic development of
Recognizing that achievements in this field would release vast ma-
ment of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 67-68.
For the texts of documents regarding discussion of these questions at the
Geneva Conferences, see supra, pp. 1886-1896.
* See infra, pp. 2841-2843.
41. DIRECTIVE OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
FOUR POWERS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, JULY 23,
The Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the
U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A., guided by the desire to contribute to the
relaxation of international tension and to the consolidation of confi-
dence between states, instruct their Foreign Ministers to continue
the consideration of the following questions with regard to which an
exchange of views has taken place at the Geneva Conference, and to
propose effective means for their solution, taking account of the close
link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of Euro-
pean security, and the fact that the successful settlement of each of
these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace.
1. European Security and Germany. For the purpose of establish-
ing European security with due regard to the legitimate interests of all
nations and their inherent right to individual and collective self-
defence, the Ministers are instructed to consider various proposals
to this end, including the following: A security pact for Europe or
for a part of Europe, including provisions for the assumption by
member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny
assistance to an aggressor; limitation, control, and inspection in
regard to armed forces and armaments; establishment between East
and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be
subject to mutual agreement; and also to consider other possible pro-
posals pertaining to the solution of this problem.
The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsi-
bility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification
of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question
and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be
carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German
people and the interests of European security. The Foreign Min-
isters will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable
for the participation of, or for consultation with other interested
Desirous of removing the threat of war and lessening the burden
Convinced of the necessity, for secure peace and for the welfare of
mankind, of achieving a system for the control and reduction of all
armaments and
armed forces under effective safeguards,
en The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Depart-
parties.
2. Disarmament 3
The Four Heads of Government,
of armaments,
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fulness and initiative of the Western Powers. That was particularly o
1 The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department
nations, for raising their well-being, as well as for assistance to under-
developed countries,
Agree:
(1) for these purposes to work together to develop an acceptable
system for disarmament through the Sub-Committee of the United
Nations Disarmament Commission;
(2) to instruct their representatives in the Sub-Committee in the
discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to take account in
their work of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of
Government at this Conference;
(3) to propose that the next meeting of the Sub-Committee be held
on August 29, 1955, at New York;
(4) to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings
in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views and
proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference
and to consider whether the four Governments can take any
further
useful initiative in the field of disarmament.
3. Development of Contacts between East and West
The Foreign Ministers should by means of experts study measures,
including those possible in organs and agencies of the United Nations
,
which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers
which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade be-
tween people and (b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as
are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned.
4. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers will meet at Geneva
during October to initiate their consideration of these questions and
to determine the organisation of their work.
42. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT A NEWS
CONFERENCE, JULY 26, 1955
The Geneva "Summit” Conference produced good results.
First of all, I would put the fact that it registered a certain trans-
formation in the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western
Powers. They became less brittle. That should mean that
, for the
predictable future, we can subject our differences to the patient proc-
esses of diplomacy with less fear that war will come out of them.
That, of course, does not mean that early and easy solutions are in
sight. It does mean that the war danger has further receded.
Another development at the Geneva Conference was the resource-
United States and the Soviet Union should
agree that peaceful planes
would fly over each other's territory to take photographs
of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 87-88.
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There are certainly opportunities for the free world in the present
* Proposal of July 21, 1955; infra, pp. 2841–2843.
attack.
United States can themselves take pride in the contribution of each
our determination to make peace both just and durable.
In looking to the future we must not forget the sequence of events
and unified. It must remain so for the long arduous months ahead
could be sure that the other was not planning a massive surprise
This is the most dramatic, and at the same time most serious and
sober, peace proposal that history records. The Soviets made no im-
mediate reply, but that is not surprising for the proposal is one which
no doubt they wish to take time to study. If, however, they have the
genuine desire of peace which they indicated at Geneva, then I feel
confident that positive results will come from President Eisenhower's
proposal.
The Western powers also brought to the fore the problem of German
reunification. This now is very much a matter of practical inter-
national statesmanship. German reunification is in the air and I
am convinced that it will come about, not immediately, but surely.
Of
course, we recognized that it will come about more easily within
a framework of European security. So the Western powers accepted
the Soviet request that European security be studied. In that con-
nection we put forward a series of practical suggestions which will
come before the October Foreign Ministers Conference. These can
give the Soviet Union assurance that German reunification, far from
endangering the Soviet Union, can take place under conditions which
will provide safety to all.
We had occasion to bring home to the Soviet rulers the importance
which the United States Government and people attach to the right
of the satellite nations to have governments of their own choosing.
Also we made clear our grave objection to the revolutionary and sub-
Fersive activities of international Communism. We obtained no as-
surance
, but we hope that developments will in fact tend to eliminate
these causes of tension.
The Conference in no way weakened the close ties and unity of pur-
pose which exist between the three Western powers which were present
at Geneva. On the contrary, their unity
emerges stronger than ever
from this new testing to which it was subjected.
The Conference did not press national viewpoints to a point where
there would have been a breakdown, which would have dimmed the
hopes of future peace. On the other hand, the Conference avoided
the equal danger of creating an illusion
that all was now so well that
We could safely relax our efforts to build individual and collective
President Eisenhower played a great role at this Conference, one
of which our nation can always be proud. Also the people of the
to an unprecedented peacetime demonstration of spiritual unity behind
self-defense.
415900_-57----Vol. 2-24
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
For their own part the three
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 245-248. The proposal was
situation, but there are also possible hazards. The task of statesman-
like diplomacy is to realize to the full the opportunities while avoiding
the hazards.
F. DISCUSSION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
AT THE GENEVA MEETING OF FOREIGN MIN.
ISTERS, OCTOBER 27-NOVEMBER 16, 1955
43. PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND
FRANCE, OCTOBER 31, 1955 1
Development of East-West Contacts
The Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and the United
States, mindful of the Directive issued at Geneva by the Heads of
Government, express their desire to explore, together with the
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, measures designed to bring
about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free
communications and with peaceful trade between peoples and to bring
about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual ad-
vantage of the countries and peoples concerned.
The three Ministers wish to point out that their Governments have
consistently favored free communication of information and ideas
,
free exchange of persons, and the development of peaceful trade, as
constructive means of promoting an atmosphere of confidence among
states and a better understanding among peoples. Their Govern-
ments have always sought to foster free expression of thought
, to
promote the free development of individual conscience, and to en:
courage, through a free competition of ideas, the development of
objective opinion. The three Western Governments are confident
that a constructive development of contacts with the Soviet Union
together with the progressive resolution of those substantive issues
which constitute the true causes of international tension, can como
tribute to the establishment of the durable peace
desired by all
mankind.
It is the view of the Western Powers that the four Governments
must contribute actively to the establishment of a better understand-
ing between the peoples of the West
and the peoples of Eastern Europe
.
It is hoped that future contacts will expand in such a way as to comme
spond to the natural desire of men to understand each other and to
1 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1966
the French
2 Directive of July 23, 1955; supra, doc. 41.
THE SOVIET UNION
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Union and the three Western countries.
is a practice to be deplored. It is incompatible with the Directive
from the Four Heads of Government and should be discontinued.
Foreign Ministers are convinced that this work of mutual under-
standing, which must eventually lead to peaceful changes enlarging
the area of those freedoms which mankind holds dear, will receive
the moral approbation of the peoples of Eastern Europe as well as
the peoples of the West.
Accordingly the Western Powers consider that it is essential, in
agreement with the Soviet Union, to determine torthwith the areas
in which it appears most appropriate to proceed with exchanges that
are to the mutual advantage of the peoples of Eastern Europe and
the West.
It is with this intention that the three Western Governments sub-
mit a program of action. Cognizant of the fact that the evolution of
free societies has produced individual traditions and processes, it is
understood that arrangements made by the Three Western countries
aimed at the implementation of this program would be in accord with
their national traditions and procedures. The program of the Western
Governments comprehends the following concrete propositions.
1. Freer exchange of information and ideas should be facilitated.
All censorship should be progressively eliminated. The obstacles
which hamper the flow of full factual information and varied comment
between the peoples of the West and those of the Soviet Union, should
be removed.
2. Arrangements should be made for the four Powers to open in-
formation centers, on a basis of reciprocity, in each other's capitals
where these do not already exist. Everyone
should be allowed full
use of these centers without hindrance or discouragement from their
own government.
3. The four Powers, where they do not already do so should permit
the publication and facilitate the distribution to public institutions
and private individuals in each other's countries of official periodicals
printed in English, French or Russian.
4. Exchanges of books, periodicals and newspapers between the
principal libraries, universities and professional and scientific bodies
in the Soviet Union
and the three Western countries should be en-
couraged. Such books, periodicals and newspapers should also be
available for general and unimpeded public sale in the Soviet Union
on the one hand and the three Western countries on the other.
5. There should be a substantial increase in the exchange of govern-
ment publications and full lists, catalogs and indexes of such publica-
tions should be made available by Governments where they do not
6. The film producers of the three Western countries are ready to
make films available to the Soviet Union at normal commercial prices
and on normal commercial terms. Soviet films are already accepted
7. There should be exchanges of exhibitions between the Soviet
already do so.
in the West on these terms.
2020
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
9. The Soviet Union and the Western Powers should consider the
desirability of exchanging monthly uncensored broadcasts on world
developments. This could take the form of half hours for the Soviet
Union on the Western broadcasting systems with reciprocal arrange-
ments for the Western Powers on the Soviet system.
10. The censorship of outgoing press despatches and the denial to
journalists of access to normal sources of information are serious
barriers to the free circulation of ideas. The four Governments, where
appropriate should take immediate steps to remove such barriers
.
11. Private tourism should be increased. This will require more
liberal procedures as regards travel restrictions and other administra-
tive practices. Above all it will require reasonable rates of currency
exchange.
12. There should be further exchanges of persons in the profes-
sional, cultural, scientific and technical fields. Exchanges should
be arranged on the basis of principles approved by the governments
concerned.
13. Meetings of outstanding scientists and scholars of the four
countries at reputable international congresses should be facilitated.
14. There should be cultural and sporting exchanges on a reciprocal
basis, drawing on the best each has to offer under the auspices of the
principal cultural institutions and sporting organizations on both
sides.
15. A beginning should be made with exchanges of students[,
particularly those engaged in language and other area studies. It
should be possible for the students to share fully and freely the
student life of the country they visit.
16. Restrictions on the ability of the members of the diplomatic
missions of the four governments to travel in each other's countries
should be removed on a basis of reciprocity.
17. Agreement should be reached in principle for reciprocal ex-
changes of direct air transport services between cities of the Soviet
Union and cities of the three Western countries.
So far as trade is concerned, the Western Powers sincerely desire
to see an improvement in commercial relations between the countries
of Eastern Europe and themselves, leading to an increase in mutual
trade in peaceful goods. To this end they have made freely available
to the countries of Eastern Europe a wide area of trade with respect
both to exports and imports. That only small advantage has so far
been taken of these opportunities is, in their view, basically a reflection
of policies and conditions within the countries of Eastern Europe.
While they feel, therefore, that the major initiative in securing an
increase in East-West trade must be taken by the countries of Eastern
Europe, they are, for their part, prepared to consider sympathetically
any proposals which seem likely to lend [lead?) to a mutually bene-
ficial development of peaceful trade.
In particular the Western Powers would urge the Soviet Govern-
ment to make it less difficult for Western private traders to engage in
and to develop opportunities for East-West trade to the advantage
of both sides.
THE SOVIET UNION
2021
were brought here last July by the President of the United States.
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 240-245.
2 See tripartite communiqué of Sept. 28, 1955; Department of State Bulletin,
Oct. 10, 1955, p. 559.
3 The Committee of Experts subsequently held 18 meetings from Nov. 2 to
If the Four Powers can agree on the above propositions & great
step forward will have been made towards better understanding
between nations. This might in due course serve as the foundation
for a further expansion of contacts on a broader international basis.
44. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
OCTOBER 31, 1955 1
The Heads of Government meeting here last July directed us to
study measures, including those possible in the United Nations, for
the progressive elimination of barriers interfering with free com-
munication and peaceful trade and for the establishment of freer con-
tacts and exchanges which are of advantage to both East and West.
The reductions of barriers and greater human contacts that we
seek are not merely ends in themselves. They are designed to help
to assure that the peace we seek is not passive, but a curative and
creative force which enables men and nations better to realize those
individual and national aspirations which conform to moral law.
The United States approaches hopefully, even though guardedly,
å study of measures to eliminate barriers to free communications and
peaceful trade. We know that, in an atmosphere of tension, commu-
nications are not readily made free, nor trade made normal. But we
must break at some point a vicious circle in which lack of freedom in
communications and the absence of normal trade relations and per-
sonal contacts lead to further misunderstanding between peoples and
We have already begun discussion of one of the fundamental causes
of international tension, the division of Germany, and we shall go on
to discuss the world's vast armaments. However, as agreed between
the Four Ministers at New York, we are willing, simultaneously with
our own consideration of European Security and Germany, and Dis-
armament, to proceed through a committee of experts with a study of
the elimination of barriers to free communications and trade and the
establishment of freer contacts.
Upon conclusion of their study, these experts should, I assume,
report back to the Four Ministers, so that we may consider the results
of their study, both upon individual topics and in the aggregate, and
so that we may be in a position likewise
to coordinate
our observations,
proposals and conclusions under item III of our agenda with the re-
sults of our work on the other items.
In this matter of contacts” the United States Delegation will ask
that specific measures be considered with the faith and optimism that
increased tension.
Dephe Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955
Nov. 10, 1955.
2022
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
When I saw President Eisenhower in Denver, just before leaving for
Geneva, he re-affirmed his high hopes for progress at this conference,
not only with respect to the reunification of Germany within the frame-
work of European security and disarmament, but also in the develop-
ment of contacts between our peoples.
Contacts between peoples is not a new thing for the United States.
It is part of our heritage. Our nation itself is composed of people
from every land who have brought with them new ideas and have made
valuable contributions enriching our society.
We are naturally a friendly people who like to know and be known.
We have long wanted to learn more about the Soviet Union and its
peoples and we have hoped that they would come to know us, and what
we say and think and do. There is a solid basis for good will between
It is a fact of history which should be remembered now that our
peoples have never fought each other.
So we did not understand it when the rulers of the Soviet Union
sought to seal off their people from outside contacts. But when this
happened and strains developed, the United States, in its turn, placed
restrictions on exchanges with the USSR. But these restrictions were
solely in response to the actions initiated by the Soviet Government
in this period.
Recently, we have noted that the attitude of the Soviet Government
may be changing. We welcome this development. It provides a
basis of hope for accomplishment in this item of our agenda.
us.
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as
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ica
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The subject of contacts can be divided into three parts: (1) freedom
for exchanges of information and ideas; (2) freedom for exchanges
of persons and travel; (3) development of trade between East and
West.
Information
In the field of exchanges of information, we immediately encounter
basic obstacles.
There is an all-embracing Soviet censorship of press and radio
.
There is systematic jamming of radio broadcasts from other coun-
tries. We hope that steps will be initiated at this conference looking
to the removal of these obstacles.
In addition to the removal of obstacles, the United States will
encourage specific projects in this field, such as an exchange of radio
broadcasts between the United States and the Soviet Union. For
example, there might, as a beginning, be a monthly exchange of com-
mentaries on world developments as seen from Soviet and Western
points of view. In the United States, radio broadcasting is not con-
trolled by the government and our government cannot
bind American
broadcasting companies to any particular course
of action. However
,
our major radio companies tell us that they are prepared to provide
regular radio time in the United States for Soviet broadcasts if this
is compatible with our national policy. The United States Govern-
ment would welcome this, provided that reciprocal privileges are
IC
tr
SE sad
th
THE SOVIET UNION
2023
* See supra, docs, 29 and 30.
and contribute to and reflect a spirit of real cooperation.
in the future. Americans are fond of travel and many people from
other countries visit us each year. In 1954 almost one million Amer-
icans went abroad. Four hundred and fifty thousand foreign
posals to advance. Among them is a proposal for an agreement in
principle on reciprocal civil aviation rights, which Great Britain and
France as well as the United States desire to support. If accepted,
this would mean insofar as the United States is concerned that Soviet.
national airport near New York, and United States airplanes might
commercial airplanes, for example, might land at Idlewild, the inter-
similarly land at the airport serving Moscow. We also hope that the
1 See supra, doc. 31.
granted to the United States on the Soviet radio. Through such an
exchange, the peoples of both our countries would have the benefit of
free discussion, criticism and debate on outstanding issues of the day.
A concrete step promoting a mutually useful exchange of informa-
tion and ideas was taken by the United States on September 9th of
this year. The United States proposed to the Soviet Government
that it permit the renewed circulation in the Soviet Union of an
oficial Russian-language magazine entitled Amerika. We are pre-
pared to permit the comparable circulation of an official Soviet maga-
zine in the United States.
We wish also to advance proposals for the distribution of American
films in the Soviet Union and for the establishment, on a reciprocal
basis
, of information centers in the respective capitals.
Travel
In the field of exchanges of persons and travel, another basic ob-
stacle is immediately encountered. The arbitrary rate of exchange of
the ruble makes all travel in the Soviet Union excessively expensive
for foreigners. The ruble rate also has an adverse effect on many
aspects of the exchange of information and the development of trade.
It is important
that steps should be taken to eliminate this obstacle.
The United States has played an active role in recent months in
eflecting exchanges of persons with the Soviet Union. A group of
Soviet agriculturalists toured the United States and a group of Amer-
ean farmers visited the Soviet Union. Groups of Soviet construction
experts and newspapermen are now travelling widely throughout our
country. Two outstanding Soviet musical artists have been invited to
make concert tours in the United States, one of which has already
begun
. These visitors will bear witness to the wide range of facilities
and opportunities
which they enjoy in the United States in line
with
the purposes of their visits.
We shall continue to consider such proposals favorably to the ex-
tent to which they accrue to the mutual advantage of both countries.
and the Soviet Union will gradually become more normal occurrences
travelers entered the United States.
In the general area of travel, the United States has specific pro-
$
2024
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
multilateral base of their trade and to increase the extent to which
each of them shares in the international division of labor. Trade in
2 See statement of Oct. 31, 1955, by the Department of State; infra, p. 2085.
1 See statement of May 1, 1952, by the Department of State; infra, p. 2084.
controls which now are imposed on the movements of foreigners in the
Soviet Union will be reduced. The United States is prepared to
reduce, on a basis of reciprocity, the controls which we imposed on
Soviet citizens as a result of the restrictions in the USSR.
Due to the lack of adequate protection afforded to American citizens
in the Soviet bloc countries, the United States Government imposed
passport restrictions in 1952 on the travel of Americans to the coue-
tries of Eastern Europe. These are being removed today. Here-
after, American passports will be valid for the Soviet Union and all
the countries of Eastern Europe with which the United States main-
tains relations.
Trade
The third aspect of contacts relates to peaceful trade. So far as
strategic trade is concerned, I support fully the observations which
Mr. Macmillan and M. Pinay have already made. Strategic trade is
a matter of security concern and is clearly outside the purview of Item
III of the Directive, which speaks of "peaceful trade". The restrie-
tions which govern strategic trade are a consequence, not a cause, of
tensions, and involve only a very narrow portion of the wide area of
potential trade.
To a trading nation such as the United States, peaceful foreign
trade is most important. However, it is conducted by the United
States primarily as a matter of individual enterprise in response to
commercial motivation,
United States exporters and importers buy and sell a tremendous
range of diverse things. Judging from our limited knowledge of the
present conditions of life within the Soviet bloc, there would seem to
be a great number of United States materials and products, as well as
those of other Western countries, which could fill immediate needs
The state of trade, however, stands in marked contrast to this ap-
praisal. Although the Western countries continue to offer Eastern
Europe ready access to an enormous area of potential trade, the level
of trade between
them is still low as compared with pre-war years and
is only a very small proportion of total world trade and of the trade
of most Western countries.
Plainly the reason for the continued low level of East-West trade
has been an unwillingness or lack of interest on the part of the Soviet
Union. While talking generalities about trade, the Soviet Govern
ment has continued to confine its international trade even in the case
of peaceful goods, within strict controls and the rigidities of bilater
barter trade arrangements. It has pursued a policy of economie
nationalism and regionalism which ignores the benefits of free el
changes. In contrast, the Western nations have sought to widen the
risen to an unprecedented level. The same opportunities have been
3 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 228-233.
THE SOVIET UNION
2025
ze
to
IS
PA
all
11-
OS
IS
M
ic-
of
m
je between the peoples of the world.
12 designed the natural order, a family. Its members differ in many re-
1 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 256–262.
and are now offered by the Western nations to the Soviet bloc
countries.
The general question of Soviet interest in peaceful international
trade can only be answered in specific terms. Is the Soviet Union
now prepared to expand its exports sufficiently to make possible a
ed much higher level of trade with the West? If so, what goods will be
available? If the USSR believes that serious obstacles to peaceful
trade exist on the Western side, we want to know what they are.
Before coming here to Geneva, I consulted with the heads of the
appropriate departments of my Government and arranged for pro-
gressively simplifying certain of our operating procedures concerning
exports to the Soviet bloc countries, so that the pathway to commercial
enterprise might become smoother.
These measures can facilitate trade, but they cannot produce trade
where commercial incentive is lacking or where Western interest in
trade is not reciprocated in Eastern Europe. The discussions here, it
is hoped, will disclose the specific steps which can be taken to increase
the peaceful trade between the West and Eastern Europe. We shall
await with sympathetic interest the suggestions which the representa-
of | tives of the Soviet Union may make upon this subject.
We agreed at New York that detailed discussion at Geneva of East-
West contacts would be left to our experts. As the United States.
expert, I have appointed Mr. William H. Jackson. He is serving not
to merely at my request but at the personal request of President
I hope that the experts may begin their important task without
he delay. I would
suggest that
they make a careful study of specific
projects in the field of improved contacts and prepare recommenda-
tions concerning their implementation, including procedures which
s / could be developed through the organs and agencies of the United
P
We shall eagerly await the results of the experts' work, which con-
ad
tains so much of hope and promise for a better and more peaceful
world,
de
de
45. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 14, 1955 1
This item of East-West contacts, although last on our Agenda, is
We believe that the human race is, by the Supreme Will which
be
spects
; but they are alike in their inherent capacity to judge right and
trong and they are akin through sympathy with each other's
The great danger of war comes from the possibility that the human
ed
Eisenhower.
JUS
Nations.
ID
iel
de
et
1.
S8
le
$
:D
aspirations.
2026
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
:
Soviet system of censorship, of which jamming is a part, is a basi
This censorship is exercised in such a way as to prevent the Soviet
family may be artificially divided into hostile camps and that certain
peoples may be brought to regard others as alien and hostile, when in
fact that is not the case. Sometimes those in power find it profitable
to promote this alienation of peoples. But that is a danger against
which we should erect such bulwarks as are to be found in the free
exchange of information and in the free movement of people.
We realize that free information is not always correct information
and that those who travel do not always give or receive correct impres-
sions. Nevertheless, the risks from such infirmities are infinitely less
than the risk of allowing the thinking of one people about another to
be determined by government controls.
The United States hoped that one of the good results to come from
the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Governments would be freer
exchanges of ideas, of persons and of goods.
This has happened to some degree. The United States has tried
to help in that direction.
With respect to the exchange of ideas there was nothing that the
United States could do unilaterally. Already our free press reports
fully on developments within the Soviet bloc that are known to it.
Important statements by Soviet rulers are widely reported by our
press, radio and television newscasts. The only limitation is caused by
Soviet censorship of news from the Soviet Union and the difficulty
which reporters experience in getting access to the facts within the
Soviet bloc. On our side there is no censorship or
restrictions,
With respect to the exchange of persons, the United States, as an
earnest of its intentions, changed its passport regulations so that pass-
ports may be obtained valid for the Soviet Union and Eastern Euro-
pean countries with which we have diplomatic relations, just as our b
passports are valid for Western European countries.
In the area of trade with the Soviet Union we have only a few pro-
hibitions. In anticipation of this Conference, and in order to facilitate b
trade further, we took steps to simplify export procedures,
However, the developments at this Conference have been disap d
pointing.
The exchange of information and ideas is blocked on the Soviet
fe
side by an all-embracing Soviet censorship of press and radio and the
systematic Soviet jamming of radio broadcasts from other countries.
In the Committee of Experts, the Soviet representative maintained
that these two obstacles-censorship and jamming-could not be ad
mitted to the agenda for substantive
consideration since they con-
G
cerned internal affairs of the Soviet Union.
It can be argued that these matters, are, indeed, internal ones
, and
it is true that only Soviet action can remove them. Nevertheless, the
to
and grave impediment to the free flow of information and ideas.
comparable
11
AS
81
1
a
ti
1 See statement of Nov. 3, 1955, by the Secretary of Commerce; supra
doc. 32.
•The Committee met from Nov. 2 to Nov. 10, 1955.
THE SOVIET UNION
2027
of exchanges of persons and of delegations, but even here many dif-
ferences exist regarding the procedures and principles under which
such exchanges should be conducted.
Exchanges of persons with the Soviet Union of necessity assume
a different character than with countries of the Free World.
travel abroad by Soviet citizens is carefully controlled by the Soviet
Government and is undertaken only by carefully selected groups.
We would call ordinary travel by persons on business or pleasure.
Travel abroad therefore on the part of Soviet citizens is not what
Visits to foreign countries are an instrument of Soviet policy designed
to bring certain specific advantages to the Soviet state, especially for
the acquisition of technical know-how. These special features must
be and are taken into consideration by the United States in its
approach to this problem. It is for this reason that we seek to
people from learning objective facts about the rest of the world.
Knowledge of the true way of life of the non-communist countries,
including their eagerness to live in peace and friendship with the
Soviet peoples, has been suppressed. At the same time, it is impossible
for the rest of the world to receive adequate reports about develop-
ments in the Soviet Union.
The failure of the Soviet Delegation to indicate any willingness to
take steps looking toward the progressive elimination of censorship
is, consequently, extremely discouraging.
The Soviet Delegation refused to consider Western suggestions for
improvement in the treatment accorded to foreign journalists in the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Delegation also evaded a precise answer
to the proposal of the Western Powers for a regular exchange of un-
censored broadcasts, responding only with vague pronouncements re-
garding the desirability of a general agreement for greater coopera-
tion in the radio field.
We would welcome cooperation in radio communications. However,
there is massive and systematic jamming of news broadcasts. Once
this is eliminated, I am confident that we could reach general agree-
ment on cooperation with regard to radio communications. This
position was made clear in a note from the United States Government
to the Soviet Union of December, 1953.
On other items to which the Western Delegations attach impor-
tance--items containing concrete proposals-such as the establish-
ment of reading rooms in the respective capitals, the publication and
distribution in each other's countries of official periodicals, and the
public sale of books and
magazines, the Soviet
Delegation also
refused
to express agreement
even in principle. These matters were consigned
by the Soviet Delegation to possible bilateral discussions at a later
With respect to movement of people, significant progress is blocked
by the Soviet failure to respond to the Western proposals for less
travel restrictions on foreigners and more normal treatment of
The Committee of Experts agreed in general on the desirability
1
date
diplomatic missions.
All
: Not printed
2028
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
tive to expect from the Soviet Union, the Soviet representatives in the
Experts' Committee confined their approach to an openly political
attack upon the Western system of security controls over the exporta
and to direct attention to the vast problems of economic relationships
precisely to avoid disputes and recriminations over these controls,
between East and West, that the Directive from the Heads of Govern-/
the substance of our assigninent that President Pinay, Mr. Macmillas
establish visits of this type on a basis of reciprocal advantage. They
cannot be made haphazardly or on short notice but require a certain
degree of planning and arrangement.
The Experts' studies in the field of transport and trade have sim-
larly been frustrated by the negative attitude of the Soviet Delegation
.
In the course of the Working Group meetings the Western Powers
advanced four positive proposals:
(1) That the Soviet Union agree that bilateral negotiations look-
ing toward the early establishment of direct air links between the
Soviet Union and the Western nations, under normal bilateral air
transport agreements, should be undertaken as soon as possible;
(2) That the Soviet Union take measures to alleviate the difi
culties now encountered by Western businessmen in establishing ade-
quate representation and in performing usual business and mainte-
nance services within the Soviet Union;
(3) That the Soviet Union accord 'more adequate protection to
Western industrial property rights and copyrights, recognizing the
generally accepted right of priority to new patents and agreeing to
make data available concerning Soviet patents;
(4) That the Soviet Union make available production, marketing
price and trade data, comparable to such information now available
to the Soviet Union from the Western countries.
Each of these modest proposals was designed to eliminate discernible
obstacles now thwarting the exercise of Western initiative for the
mutually beneficial development of peaceful East-West trade. Each
of these proposals was ignored or summarily dismissed by the Soviet
representatives.
France, the United Kingdom and the United States made repeated
requests that the Soviet Union indicate that it was now
itself to make the effort necessary to attain a substantially higher leve
of peaceful East-West trade. But the Soviet representatives made me
positive response. Yet unless goods are made available from the
Soviet Union and unless the Soviet Union takes concrete steps
to open
its market, unilateral willingness to trade on the part of the Western
countries cannot convert itself into two-way trade.
In place of the positive response concerning peaceful trade which
the United States had reason under the Heads of Government Dire
tion of a relatively small range of strategic commodities
. It was
ment speaks of "peaceful” trade.
It was precisely to avoid wasting time over such distractions fra
prepared
1 Supra, doc. 41.
THE SOVIET UNION
2029
Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 228-233.
and I, in our opening remarks on Item III, before constituting the
Experts' Committee, took the pains to point out that the strategic
trade controls are a matter of security—are a consequence, not a cause,
of tensions and are outside the purview of Item III.
Soviet officials conduct a strong propaganda outside their own
country about their desire for trade and the alleged denial to them
of trade opportunity. Yet the only restrictions which exist are those
on strategic goods related to war purposes touching only a very small
percentage of normal international commerce. Actually, the Soviet
Officials speak differently at home. There they explain to their own
people that the countries of the Soviet bloc must pursue an autarchic
policy of self-sufficiency. Earlier this year Mr. Molotov, speaking
before the Supreme Soviet, called attention to the existence of two
parallel world markets, which he said were opposed to each other.
We had hoped for a change in policy but thus far we have hoped in
vain. The discussions of the Experts concerning measures to expand
peaceful trade have produced no basis of agreement for the simple,
now unmistakably evident reason that the Soviet Union remains
basically opposed to developing a high level of trade between East
and West.
The fact is that the economic policies pursued by the Soviet Union
and directed toward insuring the greatest degree of self-sufficiency
leave for export no important stocks of consumer and other goods
which normally enter into international trade. This consequence of
Soviet economic policy, and not the small percentage of goods covered
by strategic controls, has been and remains the chief limitation on
any important development of trade with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union apparently at the present time does, however,
have large stockpiles of discarded arms resulting from the production
of new models for the Soviets' own use. It would be a matter of
utmost concern to the other nations of the world if the Soviet bloc
should try to meet its large import needs and serve its other aims, by
exporting these surplus arms throughout the world. This is indeed
something very different from the peaceful trade between peoples"
which the Heads of Governments said we should seek to develop.
As a result of my review of the work of the Experts, it seems clear
that the Soviet Union is not at present disposed to take those impor-
tant steps which lie within its power to promote the free circulation of
information and ideas and to facilitate trade in peaceful goods.
The lack of progress on Item III should not, I suppose, come as a
surprise. It is confirmation of the fact that the Soviet bloc system
is based upon artificial conditions
which cannot withstand free contact
with the outer world. The Soviet rulers seem to fear lest their system
would be endangered if the Soviet people had the kind of information
which is available elsewhere; if they were free to join the many mil-
lions who constantly travel back and forth to get acquainted with
each other, and if trade in consumer goods should bring to the
Mr. Dulles' statement of Oct. 31, 1955, is printed supra.
For the text of
the remarks of the same date by Mr. Pinay and Mr. Macmillan, see Geneva
2030
,
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ac
ofi
Russian people knowledge of the immense quantity and superb quality
of goods which are produced by societies where labor is free.
We do not believe that peace will have a solid foundation until there
comes about free communications and peaceful trade between the
Soviet bloc and the free Western peoples.
We cannot expect this to happen all at once. Indeed, our Directivet
calls for a "progressive elimination of barriers."
It does not require is
that barriers should be pulled down all at once. We had felt that ne
our proposals were modest and we greatly regret that virtually none
of them has been accepted.
be
It would, of course, be possible for us to say that we here had in :
general way reaffirmed the desirability of increased contacts. But in
merely to reaffirm is not our task. It is our task to formulate the
measures which could realize the principles which our Heads of Gor-
ernment set forth. Therefore for us merely to reaffirm in generalities of
would only gloss over our lack of common accord on the important ar
questions we have been asked to consider.
Therefore, it appears far preferable to state frankly that little has
PC
been achieved here to eliminate barriers and that basic impedimenkt
to freer contacts between East and West still exist and that we are ti
far from achieving in practice the objectives set forth in the Directive
from the Heads of Government.
I
This is a disappointing conclusion, but the future is apt to be better th
if we face up now to what are the indisputable facts.
of
Nevertheless, we need not be disheartened. Since the Summit meet-
ing last July some progress has been made. Some barriers have in
tid
fact been lowered. We believe that the process thus begun cannot
easily be reversed. Perhaps it will proceed more surely through
living process than by dependence upon negotiation. The United
States does not intend to slacken its efforts to make communication
more free and thus to end a situation that is dangerous to peace because
tic
it sets off one great part of the world as against another.
I have often expressed the friendship of the American people for
the Russian people. Our countries have never been at war
. Our
th
people have never fought each other. And we do not believe that we
could ever be brought to fight each other if only we know each other
,
The great danger
comes from the carrying on year after year of an
persistent campaign which distorts the mind of the Russian people
.
That is the danger which the Heads of our Governments directed u
to avert. I believe that the talks which have occurred here, even
though they have not
resulted in any substantial agreements
, at les
tic
may help us in the future to find the way to make our peace more
alle
be
re
re
2
an
th
solid.
(D
1
1
THE SOVIET UNION
2031
18
TO
re
B!
18
Ho
ES
>4
70
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 270-272.
* Ibid., pp. 266-267."
Ibid., pp. 269–270.
46. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 15, 1955 1
Yesterday, the French Delegation submitted a proposal? which, after
study, the United States was ready to accept had it been accepted by
the Soviet Delegation. Apparently, however, that French proposal
is now rejected by the Soviet Delegation. The Soviet Delegation has
now submitted a proposed draft statement by the Four Powers,
which I have studied during the brief recess we have had. I regret to
be forced to the conclusion that this present Soviet proposal does not
adequately meet the Directive under which we are acting, primarily
in that it contains nothing, or practically nothing, designed to permit
e of an exchange of ideas and of information.
It will be recalled that President Eisenhower in his statement here
on July 22 on this topic put first of all the importance, as he put it,
and I quote: "First to lower the barriers which now impede the inter-
change of information and ideas between peoples. The Soviet
proposal does not seem to make any effort at all to meet the views of
the Western powers with respect to the importance of free communica-
retion in the realm of information and ideas.
In view of the rejection by the Soviet Union of the French proposal,
I have compared the present Soviet proposal with that which the
three Western powers introduced on October 31st through the medium
of the French Delegation: 5
at
Item 1 of that proposal contemplated a freer exchange of informa-
DI tion and ideas and a progressive elimination of censorship. That is
rejected.
Item 2 proposed to have information centers on a basis of reciprocity
which the people could freely use. That is rejected.
Item 3 proposed to permit the publication and facilitate the distribu-
tion of official periodicals. That is rejected.
Item 4 dealt with exchange of books. It is accepted insofar as it
relates to the exchange. But the vital part, which dealt with making
these books available for public sale, is rejected.
Item 5, with reference to the exchange of government publications
and full lists, catalogues, and indices, also seems to be rejected.
Item 6, dealing with exchange of films at normal commercial prices
and on normal terms, seems to be rejected subject to the possibility
that there might hereafter be an agreement on this topic.
Item 8, dealing with the reduction of jamming of news and informa-
d.
Item 9, with reference to exchanging uncensored broadcasts, appears
also to be rejected, although it is suggested
that there might
hereafter
be an agreement covering broadcast exchanges.
De The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955
er
10
ed
1
S&
DI
[II
Il
I.
9
e
INS
3
st
tion broadcasts, is rejected.
3
8
Supra, doc. 39.
Supra, doc. 43.
2032
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
2
ba
WE
W!
i The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16,
Item 10, dealing with the elimination of the censorship of outgoing
press dispatches and access by journalists to normal sources of i
31
formation, is rejected.
th
Item 11 relates to tourism. There is a reference in the Soviet pape
to tourism, but the Soviet Union rejects any suggestion that ther
should, to facilitate this, be reasonable rates of currency exchange 3.
Item 16, dealing with the restriction on the travel by members al
ga
the diplomatic missions on a basis of reciprocity, also is rejected.
Item 17, dealing with reciprocal exchanges of direct air transport
4.
services[,] is rejected.
In other words, of our 17 concrete proposals only five seem to in
partially accepted. I emphasize that all of those which relate to Ch
freer exchange of ideas, news, uncensored information have been ex
rejected. The Soviet Union seems to have picked out of our propost go
only four or five suggestions which it deems to its interest, and to co
have rejected all the others, without any spirit of give and take in
and with a complete omission of anything of substance in the realme W
exchange of ideas.
I pointed out in my remarks yesterday that we consider that peace
de
is not solidly based unless the peoples of the different countries en
W
have access to what other peoples believe and, I think, that to be res
peace upon the power of government to dictate what peoples she the
think about each other is, in our opinion, a very dangerous conditio 5.
And because the Soviet paper would perpetuate what we deem to k
a very great danger to peace and good understanding between people wis
and because it does not seem to us to comply with the Directive while the
guides us, we do not find it acceptable.
47. BACKGROUND PAPER RELEASED TO THE PRESS BY
THE DELEGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, TH
UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, NOVEMBER 15, 1960 6.
pre
1. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers instructed their do
perts to "study measures, including those possible in organs
dis
agencies of the United Nations, which could:
tin
(a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which inte aci
fere with free communications and peaceful trade between the
peoples,
and
(b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to ti
mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned."
2. The Experts formed two Working Groups, one dealing withe 7.
changes of ideas, information and persons and the other dealis
with questions of peaceful trade. Between them, the Committee
Experts and the two working Groups
held 18 meetings from Novembet :
mi
an
Cat
po
3
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 279–281.
THE SOVIET UNION
2033
* The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 239-240
3 General Assembly Res. 500 (V); infra, pp.2614-2615..
1
2
N
EN
JM
3
00
24
10
TAI
AX
2 to November 10. They examined the proposals tabled by the French
Foreign Minister on behalf of the Three Western Powers on October
31,' and the draft resolution tabled by the Soviet Foreign Minister on
the same day.
Elimination of Barriers
3. Unfortunately no significant progress was made. The Soviet dele-
gation were unwilling to consider the progressive elimination of the
barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade.
4. The only barriers the Soviet delegation were prepared to discuss
were the Western controls on the export of strategic goods and alleged
interference with the freedom of navigation of Soviet vessels in the
China Seas. The Western delegations reiterated that the controls
exercised by the Western countries on exports of certain strategic
si goods are maintained for their own security. The fact that these
controls are not negotiable was clearly and deliberately recognized
in Item III of the Directive which covers only "peaceful" trade. The
Western delegations showed that the situation in the China Seas
was irrelevant since the specific matters complained of by the Soviet
an delegation either were outside the responsibility of any of the three
Western Powers or, as in the case of the refusal to provide fuel to
vessels carrying strategic goods to Communist China, followed from
all the United Nations Resolution of May 18, 1951.3
L 5. The barriers to the free movement of persons and to the free com-
munication of ideas and information, which the Western delegations
wished to see removed, were listed among the 17 points contained in
the Western proposals of October 31. The chief barriers are:
censorship,
jamming,
the artificial rate of exchange of the rouble,
BT
restrictions on foreign journalists,
restrictions on diplomatic missions.
3
6. The Soviet Delegation showed no readiness to consider the Western
proposals on these matters, which they declared to be of purely
domestic concern to the Soviet Union, or matters which should be
discussed bilaterally but not at the Four Power Conference. Some-
times they argued, in spite of evidence to the contrary, that Soviet
were justified by Western actions; for example, that jamming
was justified by the content of Western broadcasts. The Western
Powers replied that systematic jamming had no relation to content
and that no progress could be made towards cooperation in broad-
thel
casting until systematic jamming ceased.
Positive Western Proposals
7. The Western Delegations put forward a number of positive pro-
line
posals to bring about freer contacts and exchanges to the mutual
01.
be
LICO
HES
801
actions
1 PDA
elle
el
nbey
* Supra, doc. 43.
41590057_--Vol. 2-25
2034
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
t
8
W
cluding patents, parallel to those available in the West, should be
advantage of their countries and peoples. To none of these proposal
did they receive a satisfactory reply. This was particularly the com
with ali proposals which would result in more individual contack
The Soviet Delegation suggested that certain of the Western proposak
should be the subject of bilateral negotiations; but they refused to
express approval, even in principle, of the most important measure
proposed.
8. In putting forward their proposals, the Western Delegations took
into account the contribution which could be made by the orgas
and agencies of the United Nations in putting into effect the measure
envisaged.
9. To the Western proposal for agreement in principle to the eart
establishment of direct air links between the Soviet Union and
Western nations, the Soviet delegation returned a negative answer 1
10. The Soviet Delegation suggested that the text of Mr. Molotor
draft resolution' might serve as a basis for general agreement on Item
III. The Western delegations pointed out that those parts of i
which could be considered to fall within the terms of the Directir
f
consisted of generalised statements of good intention which woul
require the four Governments to extend only the group exchange
I
which are already a characteristic feature of existing contacts between
the Soviet and Western peoples. The Western Delegations naturals
welcome such exchanges, but cannot regard them as an adequak
fulfillment of the instruction in the Directive.
Development of Peaceful Trade
11. The Western delegations demonstrated that the strategic export
controls cover only a small part of the trade field, and that there i
freely available to the Soviet Union a wide area of peaceful trade
which, however, her monopoly buying and selling organisations tak
only meagre advantage. The wide opportunities for trade med se
available by the West compare very favourably with the rigid contra
over all aspects of foreign trade which is still exercised by the Sovie of
Union. The prime requirement for any worthwhile expansion i ag
peaceful East/West trade must be the discarding of the policy is
self-sufficiency which the Soviet Union has applied since the 1938
12. Nevertheless, the Western Powers offered to consider sympathe
G
ically any proposals which the Soviet delegation might put sh
as being likely to lead to a mutually beneficial development of peace
ful trade. This offer elicited no positive response.
Powers themselves put forward a number of specific proposals of
modest nature, the acceptance of which would do something to help
trade expand.' Among these were that it should be made less dificul
and less expensive for Western traders to visit and reside in the Sovie
Union; chat facilities for the protection of industrial property, it
1 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 239-240.
fe
m
W
m
Sa
forward
B
The Western
3
190
pp.
THE SOVIET UNION
2035
t0
LI
1
0
AN
FEE
Ei
CITO
ull
RES
Pon
ally
| Brussels Treaty - Organizations:
1 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, : October 27-November 16, 1955
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 284-288.
+ Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, as amended by protocols of Oct. 23, 1954; supra, pp.
statistics and trade data as is the case in Western countries. None
of these specific proposals elicited any positive response from the
cite Soviet delegation.
48. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 16, 1955
We must all feel the seriousness of this moment as our Conference
draws to an end.
We came here carrying a heavy responsibility. Last July, the
Heads of our Governments met and agreed to make a new effort to
solve some of the stubborn problems which have long defied solution-
the problem of Germany, the problem of disarmament and the prob-
lem of breaking down the barriers which separate the Soviet bloc from
the free world. They gave to us, the Foreign Ministers, the task of
attempting to translate their purposes into concrete realities.
The United States undertook, with the utmost seriousness, its share
of the common task. We dedicated immense effort to preparation
for this Conference. I know that the Governments of France, and
the United Kingdom, and so far as it was concerned, the Federal
Republic of Germany also made similar efforts. All this involved
work of unprecedented intensity between the close of the July Con-
férence of Heads of Government and the opening in October of this
Conference of Foreign Ministers.
We brought here the results, of that preparatory work and we have
presented them, not as rigid positions but as bases for negotiation.
There is, however, little agreement to record, as our communiqué ?
The first item of our Agenda involved the problem of European
security and Germany. The three Western Powers came forward
with proposals both for European security and for the reunification
i of Germany two problems which the four Heads of Government
agreed were closely linked. Our proposals for European security in-
a great effort to give the Soviet Union assurance that its secu-
rity would not be impaired if Germany should be reunified. Special
et-
safeguards were proposed to reassure the Soviet Union if reunified
Germany, in the exercise of its inherent right of collective self-deferise,
should elect to associate itself
with the North Atlantic Treaty and the
The merit of our security proposals is demonstrated by the fact that
See the tripartite proposals of Oct. 27, 1955, and Nov. 4, 1955; supra, pp. 1897–
si
on makes plain.
30
เof
I. ;
11
volved
CA
II
? Infra.
1903 and 1921-1922.
be
812-815, 871-873.,
:
Treaty of Mar. 17, 1948, as amended by the protocols of Oct. 23, 1954; supra,
pp. 968-971, 972-989.
2036
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ఉం డే
own.
ar
mi
y
M
m
80
of
ne
The attitude of the Soviet Government here will almost certain
impair the development of confidence which the Summit meetu buz
The second item of our Directive was Disarmament. In this mattel
ference. The Heads of Government agreed, last July, to work w
the Soviet Union seemed to find in them much with which to agree
It has been made apparent that security is not the primary reason
why the Soviet Union does not agree to the reunification of Germans
.
That is an important demonstration, and it may be helpful for the
future.
However, the indispensable premise of our security proposal w
b
the reunification of Germany, without which we feel there can be u
th
solid peace in Europe. And the Soviet Union made no effort what-
soever to meet this point or to comply with that portion of our Dire
tive which called for the reunification of Germany by free elections
P
The Soviet Delegation refused to discuss the provisions of our reun
fication proposal and it never submitted a reunification proposal of it
It pointed to alleged obstacles to German reunification such as
the existence of NATO and Western European Union. But it neve
said that it would permit the reunification of Germany even if these
alleged obstacles were done away with. Rather, it took the position
that it would not permit the so-called German Democratic Republic
the regime which the Soviet Government has installed in East Ger
many, to be subjected to the test of free elections.
The Soviet refusal even to contemplate free elections in East Ger
many has a significance which goes far beyond the confines of Ger
many. It highlights, as no words could, the situation throughout
Eastern Europe. If the so-called German Democratic Republic cam
not stand the test of the people's choice, no more can the regimes in
posed on the other peoples of Eastern Europe. This topic was not on
our Agenda because the Soviet Government had refused to accepti be
there. But we were all conscious of the fact that Soviet preoccupatico
Ca
with its problems in Eastern Europe
weighed heavily upon it at this Co
Conference.
Last July, Chairman Bulganin agreed that there was a close link
between German reunification and European security; that the for
Powers had a responsibility for the reunification of Germany and the
Germany should be reunified by free elections. The Government and
people of the United States will find it hard to understand why, in the
light of this, Chairman Bulganin sent to this Foreign Ministers Corne
ference a Delegation which
was apparently under orders not to discus has
ho
seriously the matter of German reunification.
Conditions in Eastern Europe may be such that the Soviet Unn wie
feels that it cannot now agree to free elections in any area it control
because that would have a contagious effect. But
we think it unforte wit
nate that this was not foreseen by the Soviet Government before i
agreed at the highest level and under the most solemn circumstanek dor
that Germany should be reunified by free elections.
891
sought to foster.
primary responsibility was not given to this Foreign Ministers Car
tak
DO
00
WO
WO
WTO
are
Den
II.
blo
1
Port
THE SOVIET UNION
2037
28
00
he
00
al
188
This
FH
23
00
H
human dignity are best served by allowing ideas, knowledge, and
"Proposal of July 21, 1955; infra, pp. 2841-2843.
Foreign Ministers, pp. 184-186.
gether through the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission to develop an acceptable system for disarmament. The
Foreign Ministers here were given what might be called a watching
and supporting role.
Nevertbeless, I believe that our discussions on disarmament have
been useful. I hope they have led the Soviet Delegation to realize
the sincerity of United States purpose. We have made it clear that
we are determined to seek reduction of armament, but we want reduc-
tion that can be checked and controlled, so that it will not be one-sided.
President Eisenhower's proposal for exchange of blueprints and aerial
inspection was presented as a start toward that goal.
The Soviet Union has suggested the giving of pledges not to wage
an atomic war.? We pointed out that the four of us here, and indeed
most of the nations of the world, are already pledged not to wage any
war in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
The great weight of world opinion and the potency of moral judge
ment should be directed against the initiation of any war, and not
merely wars with particular weapons. Any war is horrible. And any
government which defied world opinion by going to war in violation
of its previous solemn pledges could not be relied upon to keep its
new pledge not to use atomic weapons.
Therefore, in the case of atomic as of other weapons, the primary
task is to find means of supervision and control. Pledges alone are
OB
it
We believe that the Western point of view in these respects is now
better understood and that the representatives of the four of us, with
on the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission will accordingly now be able more effectively to carry
on their work. The agreement of the four Heads of Government to
work through that Subcommittee is, of course, unchanged by anything
we have done here.
Item III of our Agenda dealt with the Development of Contacts.
e here again, there is no agreement to record. It is apparent that there
has been little change in the sensitiveness of the Soviet Government
to the introduction into the Soviet Union of any ideas which conflict
The free democracies believe that human beings were given minds
with which to think, and consciences with
which to judge right and
wrong, and that
human dignity requires freedom of thought and free-
* dom of conscience. We also believe that the peoples of the world
are essentially a single family, the members of which are naturally
sympathetic with each other. Therefore, we believe
that peace and
news to be freely exchanged.
We do not expect this to happen all at once so far as the Soviet
bloc is concerned. Indeed our Directive contemplates that the bar-
T-
not enough.
OD
his
Canada,
ni
UI
III.
on with the official ideology,
2038
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
OS
er
West is far greater than the local and passing advantages which it
riers which interfere with free communications shall be eliminated
only gradually and not abruptly. Recognizing this, we made only
modest proposals which we believed the Soviet Government couk
accept. However, no concrete proposal made by the Western Power!
for the elimination of barriers to the free exchange of ideas and in-
formation between our peoples was acceptable to the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union was primarily interested in contacts which might
enable it to obtain valuable technological information or to enable i
to obtain strategic goods rather than the commodities of peaceful
trade which our Directive specifies.
The talks here of our experts have for the first time brought man se
new vistas into the realm of practical discussion. No agreements PE
have been reached, but I think that the efforts made will not die.
I expect that each of our Governments will act in these matters in
terms of particular items, and in terms of its judgment as to whether
to reduce barriers is in its national interest. But one element in that
decision is bound to be the eagerness of people to know more about
each other and to learn of new ideas.
Since the July Summit Conference certain barriers to communic-
of
tion have, in fact, been eliminated. The process now started is al-
So
most sure to go on. It may proceed only slowly and unevenly, but the
fro
process now started is, we believe, not easily reversed.
pr
GIF
Conclusion
International conferences rarely produce as much as people hope
from them. We should not complain that hopes are high because the
existence of those hopes inspires us to do our best. Having mysell the
lived through more conferences than are the lot of most human beings be
I have learned not to be readily discouraged.
I recall that the three Western Powers took the initiative which
led to the Heads of Government Conference. They pointed out in
their note to the Soviet Union of May 10, 1955, "We recognize that
the solution of these problems will take time and patience. They G.
will not be solved at a single meeting nor in a hasty manner.
And I recall that President Eisenhower on his return from the
Summit Conference said that he was "profoundly impressed with the
need for all of us to avoid discouragement merely because our ow
?
proposals, our own approaches; and our own beliefs are not always
immediately accepted by the other side".2
This Conference has had its merits. We have talked plainly. We
have in the main discussed seriously and without vituperation. Our 1
talks have not been wholly barren.
The Government and the people of the United States want to die
velop better relations with the Soviet
nation. Our hope for the future this
derives from our belief that the Soviet. Government will, sooner.com
later, come to see that the advantage to it in better relations with me
an
$10
11
|
len
193
on]
1
(De
2
3
I Supra, pp. 1886-1887.
2 Address of July 25, 1955; supra, pp. 111-114.
THE SOVIET UNION
2039
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 15, 1951, pp. 93–94.
ENS
1,
d
at
ut
U.S.-U.S.S. R. negotiations for a settlement of the Soviet wartime
this purpose. These discussions will deal with lend-lease matters
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955), p. 305.
could gain at the price of forfeiting the good relationship which, at
the Summit Conference, the Soviet rulers seemed to want.
On my return to the United States, I shall report to President
Eisenhower. He has closely followed this Conference on a day-to-
day basis, and will evaluate its result against the background of his
vast knowledge and abhorrence of war, and his dedication to the cause
of a just and durable peace.
it I am confident that our national policy will continue to find the way
to serve the cause of human dignity, as represented by the freedom
of individuals to exchange ideas; the cause of humanity, as (re)pre-
3
sented by control of disarmament; and the cause of justice, as
represented by the unification of Germany.
in
49. QUADRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUÉ, NOVEMBER 16, 1955 1
In compliance with the Directive issued by the four Heads of Gov-
ernment after their meeting in Geneva in July, the Foreign Ministers
of the French Republic, the United Kingdoin, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of America met in Geneva
from October 27 to November 16, 1955. They had a frank and com-
prehensive discussion of the three items entrusted to them in the Direc-
tive, namely: 1. European Security and Germany, 2. Disarmament,
and 3. Development of Contacts between East and West.
The Foreign Ministers agreed to report the result of their discus-
sions to their respective Heads of Government and to recommend that
the future course of the discussions of the Foreign Ministers should
A be settled through diplomatic channels.
1 G. NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING A LEND-LEASE
be
SETTLEMENT
he
50. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
To
JANUARY 5, 1951 3
1961, with representatives of the Soviet Government nominated for
The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955
8
P
I
lo
II
Of
%
Supra, doc. 41.
2040
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ri
b
0
น1
4 An agreement of Sept. 27, 1949, provided for the return of three icebreaker
U.S.-U. S. S. R. Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942," he
d
been a subject of discussion between the two Governments since 1945
,
Formal settlement negotiations were first undertaken in April 1941.
The forthcoming talks result from a United States note of June 13
,
1950, to the Soviet Government 2 suggesting the resumption d
negotiations in a further effort to reach a long-overdue settlement d'
b.
this lend-lease account.
The main problems to be dealt with are:
A
(1) The amount, and terms of payment, for the reimbursable portion
T
of wartime lend-lease aid from the United States to the Soviet Union
This reimbursable portion does not include articles lost, destroyed, a
S
consumed in the common war effort. It thus comprises only a small
S
part of the total of approximately 11 billion dollars worth of lend-lease
aid from the United States to the Soviet Union.
V
(2) The disposition of naval and merchant vessels loaned to the
S
U.S.S.R. which are subject to return to the United States on reques
.
After the Soviet authorities failed for 2 years to comply with requesk
for return of certain vessels, the United States, on October 7, 1948
JI
formally demanded the return of 3 icebreakers, 28 frigates, and 18
G
units of other types, mainly small craft.3 To date, the U.S.S. R. he
returned the frigates and one icebreaker but has failed to comply with to
the request for the other vessels.4
(3) Compensation to United States firms for the use of their
patented oil refinery processes supplied to the U.S.S.R. under lend-
lease. To date, the U.S.S.R. has reached agreement with only one of
the seven interested United States firms.
d
A
51. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 7,
56
I have the honor to refer to Article V of the Master Lend-Lease
Agreement of June 11, 1942, between the Governments of the United
States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics’ which provides that
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will return to the 1?
United States of America at the end of the emergency, as determined by
t.
President of the United States of America, such defense articles transferred under
this agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed
and as shell
determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States «
America or of the Western Hemisphere, or
to be otherwise of use to the Unital
States of America.
b
1 Executive Agreement Series 253; 56 Stat. 1500.
2 Not printed.
8 In a note not printed.
6
1951
t
and various frigates; TIAS 2060 (63 Stat., pt. 3, p. 2810).
6 Alexander S. Panyushkin.
6 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 19, 1951, pp. 302–303.
7 EAS 253; 56 Stat. 1500.
THE SOVIET UNION
2041
0
201.
, O!
283
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 23, 1951, pp. 646–647.
On July 7, 1948, the President of the United States of America
has
determined that the emergency relative to the lend-lease program
943
referred to in the provisions of the Master Lend-Lease Agreements
941
between the United States and various lend-lease countries had ter-
.
minated.
I have the honor to confirm herewith the statement made by Am-
to
bassador John C. Wiley during the Lend-Lease Settlement discussions
on January 27, 1951, that the President of the United States of
America has determined that certain defense articles are of use to the
in United States, namely all the naval and merchant vessels and military
watercraft which were transferred to the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics under the Lend-Lease Agreement of June
11, 1942, and which have not been heretofore returned to the United
States. This will also confirm the request made by Ambassador
Wiley on January 27, 1951, as directed bỳ the President of the United
States
, that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
es immediately return to the United States these defense articles in
ests
&ccordance with Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of
June 11, 1942. A list of these vessels by category is attached hereto.?
186 It is further requested that representatives of the United States
be Government be permitted to examine all unserviceable vessels in order
ith
to determine the ultimate disposition of these vessels.
The Government of the United States expects that the Soviet naval
meir experts now in the United States will promptly make arrangements
with American naval experts for the immediate return of the vessels
of
referred to above.
The Government of the United States reserves its rights under
Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, to
demand the return to the United States, under the provision of this
Article
, of such other lend-lease articles as may be determined to be
M
of use to the United States.
52. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON, APRIL 6, 1951 4
at:
EXCELLENCY:I have the honor to refer to your note No. 22 of March
| 21,19516 concerning this Government's request of February 7, 1951 €
that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
promptly return to the United States all vessels loaned to the Soviet
Union under the terms of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June
between our two Governments for the sale to the Soviet Union of all
your note you declare that agreement had already been reached
the merchant ships and part of the naval ships
received under Lend-
Not printed. See table of Apr. 24, 1952; infra, doc. 55.
8 Alexander S. Panyushkin.
ndo
28
be
11, 1942.
In
1 Not printed.
AN
• Ibid., pp. 647-648.
o Supra.
2042
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
'
1
I
S
V of the Agreement of June 11, 1942, to require the return to the United States of
in accordance with the surplus property procedures outlined to representatives
of
which referred to the conditional nature of the agreement concerning
the position of the Government of the United States is that, if a compra
hensive lend-lease settlement is not concluded promptly, the Government of the
United States under Article V of the Agreement of June 11, 1942, will require the
return to the United States of the lend-lease merchant vessels now remaining i
Lease and that this Government's note of February 7, 1951 "violates"
this agreement.
By "agreement” it is presumed that you have reference to this
Government's notes of February 27, 1948, September 3, 1948 ali
August 8, 1949 which dealt with the disposition of lend-lease vessel
With respect to the thirty-six war-built merchant vessels thi
Government's note of February 27, 1948 stated:
The agreement of your Government concerning these vessels resolves tenka
tively one of the several points necessary to a satisfactory comprehensive settle
ment of the obligations under the agreement between our two Governments «
June 11, 1942.
Your attention is invited to the fact that at the first meeting of the
Working Groups on May 3, 1947, United States Representatives stated that sine
the object of the negotiations was to achieve a satisfactory comprehensive settle
ment, agreement reached on any particular subject was tentative and subject to
agreement on all issues necessary to a general settlement. The Soviet repre t
sentatives indicated their concurrence. Accordingly, the first paragraph of the
Outline of Main Points of Settlement Proposed by the United States Side in keeping
with the above-mentioned understandings reached by the representatives of ou
two Governments on May 3, 1947 reads in part as follows: "As both sides bave
understood from the outset, the reaching of agreement upon any one isur t
is tentative and subject to the conclusion of a satisfactory comprehensive
settlement."
With respect to pre-war-built merchant vessels and tugs, this
Government's note of August 8, 1949 stated in part:
The Government of the United States considers this amount ($13,000,00
)
satisfactory as the cash price for the sale of the vessels, effective as of September
2, 1945, it being understood that the sale will be consummated only upon con
clusion of the over-all Lend-Lease settlement. Agreement on this point resolve
satisfactorily another of the
several points of a comprehensive settlement, but the
Government of the United States will continue to reserve its rights under Artik
the pré-war-built merchant vessels and the tugs as well as other Lend-Lex
articles until such time as a mutually satisfactory over-all settlement agreementi
reached.
With respect to naval vessels, this Government's note of September
3, 1948 stated in part:
Provided a mutually satisfactory Lend-Lease settlement is promptly agreed
upon by our two Governments, the Government of the United States is willing
at agreed prices, to sell to the Soviet Government as a part of such settlement and
your Government on June 25, 1947, the following naval craft
Moreover, on other occasions this Government has made perfectif
clear to the Soviet Government its position concerning the disposition
of lend-lease vessels. In this Government's note of May 7, 19
war-built merchant ships as set forth in this Government's note o
February 27, 1948, it was stated:
the possession of your government.
9
THE SOVIET UNION
2043
INC
Laya
determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of
* President of the United States that 3 icebreakers, 28 frigates and 186
tes"
In this Government's note of September 3, 1948 in connection with
the need for a prompt and satisfactory settlement, it was stated:
this
Therefore, notwithstanding certain offers which this Government has made
and in connection with its settlement proposals, unless a mutually satisfactory settle-
sels ment is promptly agreed upon by our two Governments, this Government will
they have no alternative but to withdraw its offers to transfer full title to certain lend-
lease articles to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
will be obliged to exercise its rights under Article V of the Agreement of June 11,
inte-
1942 by requiring the return of such articles to the United States. This is partic-
ttle
ularly applicable to all merchant and naval vessels. It applies also to military
sd
vessels and to certain other lend-lease articles which would be of use to the United
States.
the
From the above it is clear that the agreement referred to in your
note of March 21, 1951 consists of a series of tentative offers by the
to Government of the United States which have been explicitly condi-
tioned upon the conclusion of a prompt and satisfactory lend-lease
the
settlement. In the current conversations on the subject of a lend-
ping
lease settlement, Ambassador John C. Wiley has repeatedly called
to
your attention the fact that the Soviet Government by avoiding
the reaching of a prompt and satisfactory over-all settlement clearly
has failed to meet the conditions for the sale of any of these vessels.
Therefore, this Government is free to withdraw its conditional offer
bi to sell such vessels and this was done in this Government's note of
February 7, 1951.1
10)
Your note of March 21, 1951 advances as a second reason for not
to returning lend-lease vessels the argument that the vessels are not
needed by the United States. Article V of the Master Lend-Lease
Agreement of June 11, 1942 is clear and specific on this point, reading
the
as follows:
so
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will return to the
United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the
President of the United States of America, such defense articles transferred under
this agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed
and as shall be
This article places upon the President of the United States alone
the responsibility
for the determination of the
usefulness of lend-lease
articles to the United States. The point raised in your note of March
21, 1951 that certain vessels of the United States may have been dis-
posed of to third countries bears no relationship to the obligations of
your Government under Article V and is not subject to discussion
between our two Governments.
On July 7, 1948 the President of the United States of America
determined that the emergency relative to the lend-lease program
had been terminated and the
Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist
Republics was so notified on October 7. 1948. On this date
the Soviet Government was also notified of the determination by the
IYA
de
FAX
ON
States of America.
380
301
01
Supra
$
1
1
t
8
8
0
b
t
h
$
ܘܒܝ ܒܓ ܒܛ ܒܫܢ
fo
W
0]
CI
in
CC
ec
The Government of the United States has requested no payment
war, exclusive of ships) which may have remained in Soviet custod
at the war's end. The position of the Government of the United
2044 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
demanded. The Soviet Government has returned only the frigates
and one icebreaker. On February 7, 1951 the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was informed that the President
of the United States of America had determined that all merchant
military and naval lend-lease vessels remaining in Soviet custody are di
use to the United States and the prompt return of these vessels was
duly demanded. Therefore, the obligation of the Soviet Government
to return the vessels listed in this Government's note of February 1,
1951 is clear and unequivocal.
With reference to the statement in your note of March 21, 1951
that United States naval vessels in Soviet custody are "badly wozi
out and for the most part unfit for navigation in the open sea,"
I wish to emphasize that title to these vessels remains in the Govern
ment of the United States regardless of their condition. I therefore
repeat the request made in this Government's note of February 2
1951 that representatives of the Government of the United States
be permitted to examine all unserviceable vessels in order to determine
their ultimate disposition.
The demand presented in this Government's note of February 1,
1951, that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
immediately return to the Government of the United States all the
naval and merchant vessels as well as military watercraft which were
transferred to it under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11
,
1942 is hereby reiterated.
A prompt reply is requested in order that the necessary arrangements
for return may be promptly agreed upon with the Soviet naval expert
now in Washington.
53. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON, APRIL 27, 1951 ?
EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the negotiations between
our two Governments for a settlement of the obligations of the Govern
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Master
Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, and specifically to the
questions of compensation for lend-lease articles not lost, destroyed or
consumed during the war and the terms and conditions under which
such articles may be retained by the Soviet Government. The
Government of the United States has upon
several occasions already
demanded the return under Article V of the Master Lend-Lees
Agreement of all lend-lease ships and watercraft, particularly in ik
notes of February 7 and April 6, 1951.3 The question of ships therë
fore is not considered herein.
for “military-type" articles (arms, ammunition and implements.
1 Alexander S. Panyushkin.
2 Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1951, pp. 744–746.
3 Supra, docs. 51 and 52.
OI
tie
les
GO
19
en
its
pr
tir
lib
TH
mu
to
bil
aft
Jui
fur
bil
int
has
pro
pre
to
1
THE SOVIET UNION
2045
The Soviet: Government has taken the position that a lend-lease
}
TI
}
1
H
*
conclusion, the Government of the United States expressed its willing-
| billion and later the amount of $800 million. Furthermore, in the
provided that the Soviet Government on its part would increase its
to the Soviet peacetime economy.:
States, however, has been that the terms of any settlement would
reserve the right of the Government of the United States, as set forth
in Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, to the return to
the United States by the Soviet Government of such “military-type"
articles and would maintain the obligation of the Soviet Government
as stipulated in Article III of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, to
obtain the prior consent of the Government of the United States
before retransfer of such articles to third parties. The position of
the Government of the United States in this matter is in keeping with
the settlements already concluded with other Lend-Lease countries
having Master Lend-Lease agreements similar to that with the
Soviet Government.
The Government of the United States also has requested no payment
for "civilian-type" articles lost, destroyed, or consumed during the
war. The Government of the United States has requested payment
only for those "civilian-type" articles which remained in Soviet
custody at the war's end and has offered to transfer title to such articles
in consideration of payment of a mutually satisfactory sum on terms
agreed by our two Governments. These "civilian-type" articles
consist of lend-lease supplies having a peacetime value to the Soviet
economy and remaining under the control of the Soviet Government
on September 2, 1945, or subsequently received by it with the excep-
tion of ships, "military-type" articles as stated above, and certain
lend-lease articles title to which had been transferred to the Soviet
Government under the Agreements of May 30, 1945 and October 15,
1945:
In order to provide a basis for determination of the fair value of
"civilian-type” articles remaining in Soviet custody at the war's
end, the Government of the United States carefully compiled from
its own records a detailed estimated inventory of such articles. In
preparing this inventory most liberal allowances were made for war-
time losses. The value of this inventory at landed cost less most
liberal allowances for depreciation amounted to a total of $2.6 billion.
The Government of the United States, in an effort to arrive
at a
mutually satisfactory sum representing the fair value of these articles
to the Soviet peacetime economy, initially proposed the sum of $1.3
repayable in thirty annual installments beginning five years
after July 1, 1946, with interest at 2 percent per annum accruing from
July 1, 1946 and payable annually thereafter. Subsequently, in a
further effort to speed the negotiations to a mutually satisfactory
more to accept still lesser sums, first by proposing the amount of $1
il has repeatedly indicated its readiness to reduce further this sum
78
18
Tts
ort
T
10
2-
billion
10
$
;
a
:
Not printed.
in
ini
2046
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
(
C
S
&
0
8
ei
ai
settlement, in the first place, must take into account the Soviet com-
tribution to the victory against the common enemy, and secondo
,
must conform with other existing lend-lease settlements. The Sovie
Government, however, has cited only the settlement with the British
Government.
With regard to the first principle put forward by the Soviet Gover:
ment, the Government of the United States believes that it has given
full recognition to the Soviet contribution to the defeat of the common
enemy by writing off completely the entire lend-lease contribution d
the United States to the Soviet war effort and asking payment only
for those "civilian-type" articles remaining in the Soviet Unions
the war's end. It is to be noted that total lend-lease assistance
provided by the United States to the Soviet Union during the war
amounted to approximately $10.8 billion and represented a vas
contribution of the skills, labor and resources of the United State
to assist the peoples of the Soviet Union in the defeat of the aggressor
nations. It is also to be noted that the amount of compensation nor
proposed by the Government of the United States is $800 million p
From these facts it may be clearly seen that the Government of the
T
United States has asked no payment for war-time lend-lease ait
G
totaling approximately $10 billion. This represents, on the part d
the Government of the United States, great recognition of the com-
munity of interest of our two Governments in the achievement of the
So
common victory and takes full cognizance of the part played by the
de
Soviet Government in this effort.
be
With regard to the Soviet contention that a lend-lease settlement
G
must conform to "precedents”, specifically the settlement with the
British Government, the Government of the United States has ir
vited the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that the
Government of the United States has never agreed to give most Go
favored-nation treatment in connection with any lend-lease selle
tri
ment. Nevertheless, the Government of the United States basi
ur
fact sought to reach'a lend-lease settlement with the Soviet Goven:
ment on the basis of the same principles which were observed in
settlement with the British Governinent. In accordance with these
principles the British Government was noi asked to pay for lend-es
articles lost, destroyed or consumed in the war; nor was payment asko 54
for "military-type articles remaining in the United Kingdom at u
end of the war. Payment was requested only for the fair value
"civilian-type" articles remaining in the United Kingdom at the war
A
gorically refused
to reach a settlement on the basis of these principles Go
It will be recalled in this connection that, unlike the British Court to
ernment, the Soviet
Government while refusing
to furnish an inventory to
of lend-lease articles remaining in existence at the end of the war,
declined also to consider the estimated inventory provided by De
Government of the United States as a basis for settlement.
Soviet Government has instead sought to make settlement on
basis of the total lend-lease furnished and has had recourse to estoy
neous analogies not germane to the British settlement.
sh
W
mi
he
1
th
rer
the
1
THE SOVIET UNION
2047
OD:
6
城
​eri-
EVER
TON
200
Wa
vasi
S90
TION
10n
.
Government of the United States that the Soviet Government return
1 Not having received replies to the notes of Feb. 7, Apr. 6, and Apr. 27, the
Department of State asked the Soviet Embassy on July 2, 1951, to expedite
The reply; Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1951, p. 145.
2 Alexander S. Panyushkin.
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 21, 1952, pp. 86–87.
Thidiš pp. 87-88.
i Act of Mar. 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31-33.
The Soviet Government has thus refused to accept the very princi-
dly
ples on which it insists and upon which the settlement with the British
Government was based. The Government of the United States must,
Tied
therefore, reject the contention of the Soviet Government that its
offer fully conforms to the British settlement.
The Soviet Government, on the basis of its own principles, has
offered to pay to the Government of the United States a "global"
sum first in the amount of $170 million, later increased to $200 million
and more recently has made an offer of $240 million stated by Soviet
no
only
representatives to be "final”. The Soviet Government proposes that
payment of this sum should be made over a period of 50 years with
10
interest at 2 percent per annum, but with payment of interest and
principal beginning five years after the conclusion of the agreement.
The Government of the United States considers the amount and terms
of the offer of the Soviet Government to be inadequate and unreason-
ates
able.
In these circumstances the Government of the United States must
point out that four years of direct negotiations between our two Gov-
ernments have yielded little progress toward a settlement of this issue.
Therefore, in order to achieve a solution satisfactory to both sides, the
t of
Government of the United States proposes that there be submitted to
an arbitral panel consisting of three members, one each to be appointed
by the Government of the United States and of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and a third member to be appointed by the Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice, the question of what would
be fair and reasonable terms of financial settlement by the Soviet
tbe
Government for the lend-lease articles having civilian utility, except
ships, which were not lost, destroyed or consumed during the war and
are not returned to the United States.
The Government of the United States expresses its hope that the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will agree to
treat the decision of such an arbitral panel on this question as binding
upon both Governments and will accept this proposal as a practical
means of reaching final agreement on this issue.'
skel 54. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON, JANUARY 7, 1952 3
EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your Government's
Note No. 71 of August 21, 1951 + concerning the request of the
Hory to the United States naval, military and merchant vessels loaned to
tort your Government under the Lend-Lease Act 5 and the Master Lend-
the
dent
which
I II
- the
JOSE-
ttle
em
the
he
the
le
Paris
ted
th
3
sta
2048
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
lend-lease procedures and remain the property of the Government of
Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942. I also have the honor to rele
to your Government's note No. 73 of August 28, 1951 ? concerning
the proposal of the Government of the United States that the questio) cu
of the determination of a fair and reasonable lend-lease financial a
settlement be submitted to arbitration.
b
In the latter note your Government rejects the proposal of them
Government of the United States that the question of a satisfactor
financial settlement be submitted to arbitration. In addition il o
verbal proposal of $300 million was made by the Soviet representative o
on August 24, 1951. It was indicated at that time that the Gover m
ment of the United States considers this amount as far from fair and ti
reasonable compensation for lend-lease articles of the United States
which remained in Soviet custody at the end of the year. Furthe to
more, in your note of August 21, 1951, your Government again ind th
cates that it does not intend to meet its obligation to return the lend
lease vessels as requested by the President of the United States. G
Instead your Government continues to evade this obligation, which m
is clearly and specifically stated in Article V of the Lend-Leas
Agreement of June 11, 1942, to return lend-lease articles as requested to
by the President of the United States. In attempting to justify
evasion of this obligation your Government refers to “understandings" u
relating to the sale of some of the vessels.
d
These so-called “understandings,” however, were offers made long
LE
ago by the Government of the United States which were explicit
conditioned upon the prompt conclusion of a mutually satisfactory T
over-all lend-lease settlement. This condition was not met by you S
Government. Therefore, the Government of the United States, fa
acting within its legal rights and in full accord with the terms of the su
Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, informed representatives
en
the Soviet Government on January 27, 1951,3 that all of the lead
.
lease vessels which were loaned to the Soviet Government under
the United States, are of use to the Government of the United States
:
and, at the same time, the return of these vessels to the United Statá
was requested in accordance with Article V of the Lend-Lease Agrek
ment of June 11, 1942. Moreover, on the same date
representative
of the Soviet
Government were informed
that the previous conditional
offers by the Government of the United States to sell some of the
vessels had long since lapsed and that none of the vessels were a val
able for sale
to the Soviet Government. On February 7, 1951
, the
Government of the United States confirmed in a note its request
for the return of all the lend-lease vessels.
re
CC
· Executive Agreement Series 253; 56 Stat. 1500.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 21, 1952, pp. 88–89.
8 See supra, doc. 51.
THE SOVIET UNION
2049
atas
refer It is to be noted that on October 12, 1948, the Government of the
United States demanded the return to the United States of 186 naval
tio craft in addition to 3 icebreakers and 28 frigates. These 186 vessels
iciall at no time had been offered for sale to the Soviet Government on any
basis. Even in this instance the Soviet Government has refused to
the meet its obligation.
tory It is the view of the Government of the United States that the return
ni of all lend-lease vessels is essential to the conclusion of a satisfactory
tim over-all lend-lease settlement. It is also the view of this Govern-
ein- ment that the Soviet Government is clearly in default on its obliga-
and tions by not returning these vessels to the United States.
If the Soviet Government remains unwilling to return these vessels
her to the United States, the Government of the United States suggests
nd that the question be resolved by submission of the matter to the Inter-
end national Court of Justice for adjudication. For that purpose, the
ute Government of the United States proposes that the Soviet Govern-
hich ment join with it in submitting the following question to the Court
pe with the understanding that both Governments will be governed by
sted the Court's decision.
its
Does the failure of the Soviet Government to return lend-lease vessels to the
United States, as requested by the Government of the United States, constitute a
default by the Soviet Government in its obligation under Article V of the Master
long Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, to return lend-lease articles when so
citus
requested ?
107 The Government of the United States therefore requests that the
Soviet Government immediately make the necessary arrangements
ute for the return of the lend-lease vessels as requested or agree to the
the submission of the question of the vessels as stated above to the Inter-
sd national Court of Justice for adjudication.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest
orang
2nd
ider consideration.
tol
tes
:
ates
Tet
1 In a note not printed.
IPAS
ona!
the
781
the
USSIT
415900_-57-Vol. 2-28
;
55. TABULAR DATA RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, APRIL 24, 1952
1
TABLE I.-- Information on merchant vessels transferred to the U.S.S.R. under lend-lease
Type
Re-
turned
prior
to VJ-
day
Trans- Value 1
ferred
Value 1
In
Lost
Soviet
prior Value 1 custody Value 1
to VJ-
on VJ
day
day
Re-
Pres-
turned
ently
subse- / Value 1 in Value 1
quent
Soviet
to VJ-
custody
day
38
3
1, 729
1, 729
36
3
62, 229
War-built Liberty ships, dry
cargo
Liberty tankers.
T-2 tankers
War-built tugs
Prewar-built ships, dry cargo
Prewar-built tankers
Prewar-built tug
65, 686
5, 186
16,000
1, 235
28, 728
8, 946
140
2
60
12
1
1
0
0
0
10
10
0
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
3 5, 186
2 5 16,000
0
3 1 500
62, 229
5, 186
16,000
1, 235
21, 983
863
140
36
0
0
2
47
1
1
2
48
5, 329
7, 295
1, 915
788
1, 235
21, 483
863
140
1
0
Total
121 125, 921
21 (14, 353
4 | 4, 432
96 107, 636
9 21, 686
87
85, 940
1 Cost to the U.S. Government at time of acquisition ($000).
1 broken in half; both halves salvaged and returned to the United States.
s Returned to the United States and transferred to Italy from which country originally seized by the United States in World War II.
1 Department of State Bulletin, June 2, 1952, pp. 880-881. These tables were sent to Sen. William F. Knowland of California
with a letter of Apr. 24, 1952, from the Department of State in reply to the Senator's letter of Apr. 10, 1952, in which he had asked
for information concerning vessels loaned by the United States to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Aét. The Department's
letter concluded, “It is the intention of the Department to continue to press vigorously for the return from the U.S.S.R. of all lend-
lease vessels." For the texts of the letters of Apr. 10 and 24, 1952, see ibid., pp. 879-880. The footnotes to the two tables appear in
the Bulletin.
2050
THE SOVIET UNION
2051
TABLE II.-Information on Naval and Army watercraft transferred to the U.S.S.R.
under lend-lease
;
Trans-
ferred
Value 1
Returned
Value 1
NAVAL VESSELS
3
2 27
19, 203
11, 113
.
0
3
28
34
43
78
62
205
19, 203
11, 115
72, 511
34, 152
35, 088
7, 418
53, 807
0
0
•
Icebreakers.
Frigates
Large minesweepers
Minesweepers.
Large sub chasers
Small sub chasers
Torpedo boats
Landing craft:
Infantry
Tank
Vehicle.
Support
Mechanized
Floating repair ships.
River tugs.
Pontoon barges
Motor launch.
Plane personnel boat.
12, 360
2, 765
21
0
0
0
34
.
30
17
2
2
54
4
15
6
1
1
1, 700
2, 504
19, 000
719
11
3
0
0
0
0
0
Total
585
272, 411
30
30, 316
Value 3
Trans-
ferred
Returned
Value 3
ARMY WATERCRAFT
Tankers
Freight vessel
Machine shop barges
Crane barges
5, 520
767
9
1
2
17
0
0
0
412
3, 057
Total
29
9, 756
0
1 Lend-lease invoice value ($000),
11 certified as lost.
* Cost to the U. 8. Government at point of transfer ($000).
2052
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
t
IF
TE
VE
56. NOTE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE TO
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON, NOVEM.
BER 5, 1952 3
ft
EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Mr. Karavaev's note
No. 44 of June 16, 1952 4 concerning the negotiations for & settle-
ment of the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet S
Socialist Republics under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June S
11, 1942.
In his note of June 16, 1952, Mr. Karavaev expressed the readiness
pr
of the Soviet Government to return to the United States 186 naval ja
craft, the return of which the Government of the United States initially
requested in its note of September 3, 1948, and has repeatedly ne-
quested since that time. On June 18, 1952, United States lend-lease Go
representatives in a meeting with the Soviet lend-lease delegation of
proposed the immediate establishment of a working group to arrange A
the details of the return of these vessels. The Soviet delegation
however, was unwilling to agree to the establishment of such a working me
group or otherwise to arrange for the return of the vessels. Thus, Sta
the Soviet Government, although formally professing its readiness fai
to return these vessels, has not been prepared to take concrete action ty
for this purpose. If it is in fact the intention of the Soviet Govern ho
ment to return these vessels, the Government of the United States pro
desires that it be informed, without further delay, of the dates and re
ports of return, or alternatively of the date when Soviet representatives sid
will be available to work out with representatives of the Government 19
of the United States the details for the return of the vessels
.
Go
Mr. Karavaev's note also reiterates the desire of the Soviet Gor-
ernment to purchase lend-lease merchant vessels and certain of the
lend-lease naval craft now in its custody. The Government of the by
United States had made its position with respect to lend-lease vessels So
clear in its notes of April 6, 1951 6 and January 7, 1952 ? and
meetings of the lend-lease delegations of our two Governments sin
since January 1951. The offers of the Government of the United Sta
States early in the settlement negotiations
to sell lend-lease merchant ran
vessels and a number of lend-lease naval vessels were expressly cor-
ditioned upon the prompt conclusion of a satisfactory over-all lead in
lease settlement. When it became unmistakably clear that the pro
Soviet Government did not intend to conclude a settlement promptly 1
the Government of the United States in January 1951 withdrew these the
offers and requested the return of all lend-lease vessels.
That the Soviet Government has consistently avoided the com
clusion of a prompt settlement is fully documented in the history a
1 David Bruce.
2 Georgi N. Zaroubin.
Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 24, 1952, pp. 819–820.
4 Ibid., pp. 820-821.
5 Text quoted in part in the U.S. note of Apr. 6, 1951; supra, doc. 52.
8 Supra, doc. 52,
? Supra, doc. 54.
can
1
1
3
THE SOVIET UNION
2053
the negotiations. A particular example of the attitude of the Soviet
Government toward the prompt conclusion of a settlement is its
failure to return the 186 vessels which were requested by the Govern-
ment of the United States over four years ago and were never offered
for sale. This attitude is further exemplified by the refusal of the
Soviet Government to resolve the question of a financial settlement
through arbitration as proposed by the Government of the United
States in its note of April 27, 1951 1 and also by the refusal of the
Soviet Government to submit the question of the return of lend-lease
vessels to the International Court of Justice for adjudication, as
proposed by the Government of the United States in its note of
January 7, 1952.
Since the Soviet Government has not only failed to return the
Vessels but also has refused to submit the matter to adjudication, the
Government of the United States must conclude that it is the intention
of the Soviet Government to remain in default of Article V of the
Agreement of June 11, 1942.
As regards the question of a financial settlement which is also
mentioned in Mr. Karavaev's note, the Government of the United
States has offered to accept the sum of $800 million which it considers
fair and reasonable compensation for the vast quantities of civilian-
type lend-lease articles remaining in Soviet custody at the end of
hostilities. However, in the interests of achieving a settlement
promptly, this Government offered to reduce further the amount
requested provided a truly constructive offer was made by the Soviet
side. The Government of the United States, in its note of January 7,
1952, has already stated that it considers the latest offer of the Soviet
Government of $300 million as far from fair and reasonable compen-
sation for the residual lend-lease articles. Furthermore, the Ĝov-
ernment of the United States must take into account the fact that
by not returning the 186 naval craft and other vessels requested, the
Soviet Government is in clear default of the very agreement under
which negotiations of a lend-lease settlement have been carried on
since April 1947. It is the position of the Government of the United
States, therefore, that when the Soviet Government has made ar-
rangements to fulfill its obligations under Article V of the Lend-Lease
Agreement of June 11, 1942, the Government of the United States
the interest of a settlement will be prepared to make further
proposals concerning a financial settlement.
If it is the serious intention of the Soviet Government to advance
the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory settlement agreement, it
can do so by returning the lend-lease vessels promptly.
:
:
· Supra, doc. 53.
2054
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1953 1
t
but that in the interest of achieving a settlement, the Government de
the United States was willing to reduce further this amount provide proj
57. AIDE-MÉMOIRE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO
THE SOVIET EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 11
On November 5, 1952 the Acting Secretary of State addressed
a note to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Government of the a
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the negotiations fors 1
settlement of the obligations of the Soviet Government under the th
Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942. In this note it we w
pointed out that although the Soviet Government had expressed is of
readiness to return to the United States 186 naval craft, the returnd19
which the Government of the United States initially requested in itam
note of September 3, 1948 3 and repeatedly requested thereafter
, the se
Soviet Government had not been prepared to take any concrete action
for this purpose. It was suggested that if it was in fact the intentie U
of the Soviet Government to return those vessels, the Government d of
the United States should be informed without further delay of the no
dates and ports of return, or alternatively of the date when Sori
representatives would be available to work out with representative the
of the Government of the United States the details for the return d of
the vessels.
Ag
The Acting Secretary's note also reiterated the position of the Go. Um
ernment of the United States with respect to the other lend-les le ter
vessels remaining in the custody of the Soviet Government. Sta
had been made clear in the United States notes of April 6, 19516 e 4g
January 7, 19526 and in meetings of the lend-lease delegations of the
two Governments since January 1951, the offers of the Government a
the United States early in the settlement negotiations to sell lend-les
58
merchant vessels and a number of lend-lease naval craft were expresi
conditioned upon the prompt conclusion of a satisfactory lend-less
I
settlement. When in January 1951 the Soviet Government had mat
arrived at a settlement of its lend-lease obligations the Government a
H
the United
States withdrew these offers and requested the return of
lend-lease vessels. Furthermore, it had become unmistakably el
from the history of the negotiations that the Soviet Government bol obli
pub
consistently avoided the conclusion of a prompt settlement.
With respect to the question of a financial settlement the note of tiny na
Acting Secretary recalled that the Government of the United Stall not
had offered to accept the sum of $800 million which it considered fix
and reasonable compensation for the vast quantities of civilian-17
lend-lease articles
remaining in Soviet custody at the end of hostilik
that a truly constructive offer were made by the Soviet side. It
again emphasized that the United States considered the Soviet of
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, pp. 44-45.
was handed to Ambassador Zaroubin by Under Secretary Smith.
2 Supra.
3 Quoted in part in the U.S. note of Apr. 6, 1951; supra, doc. 52.
4 Supra, doc. 52.
Supra, doc. 54.
Oct
init
Gor
mer
the
for
1
The aide-mémoins
11
21
31
! ]
0 1
8
5
THE SOVIET UNION
2055
C100
1
December 15, 1953 at the Department of State to work out the details
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, pp. 45–46.
Text quoted in part in U.S. note of Apr. 6, 1951; supra, doc. 52.
of $300 million to be far from fair and reasonable compensation for
the residual lend-lease articles and it was pointed out furthermore,
that the Government of the United States had to take into account
the fact that by not returning the 186 naval craft and other vessels
requested, the Soviet Government was in clear default of the very
agreement under which negotiations have been carried on since April
1947. The note of the Acting Secretary of State affirmed that it is
he therefore the position of the Government of the United States that
when the Soviet Government has made arrangements to fulfill its
i obligations under Article V of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11,
1942, the Government of the United States in the interest of a settle-
itement, will be prepared to make further proposals concerning a financial
the settlement.
On March 20, 1953 a further note was sent to the Embassy of the
Ein Union of Soviet Socialist Republics inquiring when a reply to the note
td of November 5, 1952 might be expected. No replies to either of these
the notes have been received by the Government of the United States.
viel
As His Excellency is aware, more than six years have elapsed since
is the beginning on April 30, 1947 of the negotiations for a settlement
nd of the obligations of the Soviet Government under the Lend-Lease
Agreement of June 11, 1942. Accordingly, the Government of the
40. United States requests that it be advised at an early date of the in-
Patentions of the Soviet Government with respect to the return of United
States-owned lend-lease vessels as required under Article V of the
21 Agreement of June 11, 1942.
the
58. NOTE FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 2 TO
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON,3 NOVEM-
BER 24, 19534
EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note No. 13 of
October 20, 1953 6 concerning the negotiations for a settlement of the
obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.
The Government
of the United States notes that the Soviet Govern-
ment has again stated that
it is prepared to return the 186 naval craft
initially requested by this Government on September 3, 1948.6 The
Government of the United States also notes that the Soviet Govern-
ment states it is now willing
to discuss the technical arrangements for
the transfer of these vessels to the United States. Accordingly, it is
proposed that representatives of our two Governments meet on
for the return of these vessels to the United States.
260!
PASA
2561
cast
DO!
ito
ifal
clear
f the
bas
ni
idley
ofé
1 Not printed.
2014
2 Walter Bedell Smith.
: Georgi N. Zaroubin.
6
., p
2056 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
eri
ca
1953 1
nel
retary replied that the Government of the United States favored
Embasy
The Government of the United States would appreciate being &
vised at the earliest possible date whether the above date is acceptable
to the Soviet Government.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highes
consideration.
po
qu
thi
59. AIDE-MÉMOIRE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO ad
THE SOVIET EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 19.
of
In its note of November 5, 1952, the Government of the United
of
States pointed out that the Soviet Government, by its failure to retin
five
the 186 naval craft and other lend-lease vessels requested by the
to
United States, was in default of the very agreement under which lent
Les
lease negotiations have been carried on since April 1947. The Sovie
Sot
Government was advised that it is therefore the position of the Goven
Sta
ment of the United States that when the Soviet Government has made
Aca
arrangements to fulfill its obligations under Article V of the Lent
of t
Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, the Government of the United
der
States in the interest of a settlement, will be prepared to make furtu
neg
proposals concerning a financial settlement.
The Soviet Government in its note of October 20, 1953 agus
sho
stated that it has agreed to return the 186 naval craft and also statal
oft
that it is willing to discuss the technical arrangements for the transer
of these vesseis to the United States. Accordingly, the United
States proposed in its note of November 24, 1953 4 that represents
Foll
tives of the two Governments meet on December 15, 1953 at de
Department of State to work out the details for the return of the 18
naval craft to the United States. His Excellency, the Ambassadi
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, replied by note on
cember 3, stating that the Soviet Government was in agreemen
with the proposal of the Government of the United States to
representatives of the two Governments meet on December 15.
From these exchanges of correspondence it was the expectation A
the Government of the United States that working groups of the te Soy
Governments would meet on December 15 to work out the detai
for the return of the 186 naval craft to the United
States. Howere
on December 14, His Excellency advised the Acting Secretary
State that the Soviet Government desired to deal simultaneous
at t]
with all of the issues in the lend-lease negotiations including T
return of the 186 naval craft to the United States. The Acting
step-by-step approach but nevertheless undertook to consider
informed the Department that it was the position of the Soviet Com
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, pp. 46–47.
2 Supra, doc. 56.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 45.
4 Supra.
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 46.
mer
Len
De
con
Wou
mot
*
whi
Sovi
1951
men
craf
D
fort
11
2 I
31
5
THE SOVIET UNION
2057
cabil
.
Vam
went
for the return of the other 148 naval craft.
Discussions are continuing on the ports, dates, and procedures
2 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, p. 563.
3 TIAS 2990; 5 UST 1067.
ernment that the meeting scheduled for December 15 should be
cancelled.
The Government of the United States has carefully considered the
ches
position of the Soviet Government and has concluded that the various
questions should be dealt with on a step-by-step basis. In reaching
this conclusion, this Government has been guided by its belief that
I adherence to the terms of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11,
1 1942 can best contribute to the creation of the mutual understanding
necessary to the negotiation of a final lend-lease settlement agreement.
With respect to the question of the 186 naval craft, the Government
of the United States has taken into account the fact that the return
mital
of these craft was requested initially on September 3, 1948,' more than
etun
five
the
years ago, and that at no time were these vessels offered for sale
to
lend
the Soviet Government. Furthermore, Article V of the Lend-
opie
Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942 provides unconditionally that the
Soviet Government shall return lend-lease articles to the United
mad
States when requested to do so by the President of the United States.
Accordingly the return of lend-lease vessels requested by the President
nited
of the United States is not an issue for negotiation nor can it be made
arthen
dependent upon the resolving of other questions in the lend-lease
negotiations.
It is the position of this Government, therefore, that the first step
agar
should be the working out of detailed arrangements for the return
of the 186 naval craft. In this connection, the United States working
group previously designated for this purpose will be prepared to
meet at the earliest convenience of the Soviet representatives.
Following the working out of such arrangements the two Govern-
ments should be prepared to take up the remaining matters under the
DA
60. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
MARCH 26, 1954 2
Agreement was reached on March 26 with representatives of the
Soviet Government on the dates and procedures for return to U. S.
control of 38 small naval craft loaned to the Soviet Union under the
Seal World War II lend-lease program. The
38 craft, consisting of 12
motor torpedo boats and 26 submarine chasers, are to be returned
at the port of Istanbul during the months of May and June 1954.
Ses
These craft are part of a group of 186 naval craft, the return of
which the United States first
requested on September 3, 1948. The
Soviet Government agreed to return the 186 craft on October 20,
1953, and on December 28, 1953, representatives of the two Govern-
ments began to work out the necessary details for the return of the
I In a note quoted in part in the U.S. note of Apr. 6, 1951; supra, doc. 52.
tata
nsf!
mited
ents -
t the
e 101
sada
Lend-Lease Agreement.
ment
thelt
2nd
try
etalii
}
Dust
tehen
red
th
asil
Gor
crait.
2058
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Pru
Discussions are continuing on the ports, dates, and procedures for
61. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
H
DECEMBER 23, 1954 1
The Soviet Government has agreed on the dates and procedures
for the return to U. S. control of 27 small naval craft loaned to the
Soviet Union under lend-lease during World War II. The 27 craft
consisting of 4 submarine chasers, 8 motor torpedo boats, and 1
landing craft (infantry), are to be turned over to U. S. Navy repre
sentatives at the port of Maizuru, Japan, during the months of June
and July 1955.
have
These craft are part of a group of 186 naval craft, the return d me
which the United States first requested on September 3, 1948. The of
Soviet Government agreed to return the 186 craft on October 20, 198, was
and on December 28, 1953, representatives of the two Governmeni, gen
began to work out the necessary details for the return of the craft 1
In May and June 38 naval craft, consisting of 12 motor torpedo boal, yea
and 26 submarine chasers, were returned to U. S. Navy control de tria
the port of Istanbul, Turkey.
Discussions are continuing on the ports, dates, and procedures in fail
the return of the other 121 naval craft.
Jap
rep
info
sen
62. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
tha
MAY 27, 1955 2
hur
of
On May 26 representatives of the U. S. and Soviet Governments rece
signed an agreement on the dates and procedures for the return T
U. S. control of 62 small naval craft loaned to the Soviet Union
under lend-lease during World War II.3 The 62 craft, consisting of de
6 submarine chasers and 56 motor torpedo boats, are to be turned ore und
to U. S. Navy representatives at the port of Kiel, Germany,
during Cor
the months of July and August 1955.
These craft are part of a group of 186 naval craft, the return das ?
which the United States first
requested on September 3, 1948. 9 tot
Soviet Government agreed to return the 186 craft on October 2010
1953. On December 28, 1953, representatives of the two gover by
ments began to work out the necessary details for the return of thel,
craft.
In May and June 1954, 38 naval craft, consisting of 12 motor in a
torpedo boats and 26 submarine chasers, were returned to U. S. Nor men
control at the port of Istanbul, Turkey. Twenty-seven other crud did
consisting of 4 submarine chasers, 8 motor torpedo boats
, and deliz
landing craft (infantry),
are to be returned at the port of Maizun the
Japan, during the months of June and July.
hav
2
18
the return of the remaining 59 naval craft.
Peber
pp.
41
1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 52.
Ibid., June 13, 1955, pp. 969-970.
3 TIAS 3384; 6UST 3825.
tran
THE SOVIET UNION
2059
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 13, 1950, p. 244.
February 26, 1946–July 10, 1947 (Department of State publication 2888; 1947),
transmitted to the Soviet Embassy Jan. 3, 1950.
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 16, 1950, pp. 102-103. The note was
H. REPATRIATION OF GERMAN AND JAPANESE
PRISONERS OF WAR
durs
o the
craft, 63. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
dl
FEBRUARY 3, 1950 1
epro
jue On the afternoon of February 1, 1950, the Soviet Ambassador
handed a note? to the Secretary of State proposing the early appoint-
moment, in accordance with a Far Eastern Commission policy decision
The of. April 3, 1946,3 of a special International Military Court to try as
1948 war criminals the Emperor of Japan and several former Japanese
nes generals on charges of crimes against humanity.
craft The timing and content of the Soviet note-coming as it did 47%
Doel years after the surrender and many months after the war crimes
ols trials in Japan had been terminated-strongly suggest that the
principal motivation of the note is to divert attention from Soviet
s fier failure to repatriate or otherwise explain the fate of over 370,000
Japanese prisoners detained in Soviet-held territory. Following
repeated efforts. by General MacArthur's headquarters to obtain
information on the fate of these prisoners, the Secretary of State
sent a note on December 30, 1949, to the Soviet Ambassador urging
that his Government agree to the designation of an international
humanitarian organization charged with making a complete survey:
of the situation. No reply, not even an acknowledgment, has been
nents received to this note.
1. The minutes of the seventh meeting of the Far Eastern Commission
man on April 3, 1946, show that the Commission approved the policy
gol decision referred to by the Soviet Ambassador with the express
over understanding that the directive to be forwarded to the Supreme
rief Commander embodying the Far Eastern Commission decision should
be so worded as to exempt the Japanese Emperor from indictment
mod as & war criminal without direct authorization. Since the directive
to the Supreme Commander was so worded, he can accordingly take
2 no action against
the Japanese Emperor without a new policy decision
er by the Far Eastern Commission.
These facts are known to the Soviet Government, which could
have introduced a policy proposal in the Far Eastern Commission,
otrok in accordance with normal procedure, along
the lines of the recom-
fa71 mendations contained in its note. That the Soviet Government
med did not elect to do so but made these belated
charges in a sensation-
alized manner raises obvious questions about the real motive behind
Activities of the Far Eastern Commission: Report by the Secretary General,
uru the Soviet note.
for
1
2 Not printed.
pp. 97-100.
2060
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ml
ÅS
me
int
au
82
dec
national Cooperation, 1945 to 1952 (Department of State publication 5138; 195)
7 Trial of Japanese War Criminals (Department of State publication 2018
th
64. STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE
to
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE
E
MAY 13, 1950 1
to
The three Foreign Ministers have noted with surprise and dee
ju
concern the Soviet statement of May 4 which declared that then Go
patriation of German prisoners of war from the Soviet Union to Ge
many has now been completed. They recall the repeated effort
made by the three Western Occupation Powers to secure the Sovid
Government's compliance with the quadripartite agreement to wa
patriate all German prisoners of war by December 31, 1948.3
The Soviet statement stands in sharp contradiction with the fus St
that a very large number of German families are still awaiting the
return of their relatives taken prisoner of whom they have had
direct news during their captivity in the Soviet Union. The Minis
ters note furthermore the inconsistencies among the scant daa bil
furnished at different times by the Soviet Government concerning
ap
the numbers, whereabouts and fate of German prisoners of war and the
deported civilians. This situation reveals a grave disregard for human
rights.
It is moreover apparent that this is not an isolated incident since
the Soviet Government has also failed to repatriate numerous national Th
of German occupied countries taken prisoner during the war as we Po
as more than 300,000 Japanese nationals who still remain unaccountal the
for in Soviet territory.
of
The Ministers have agreed that they will take all possible step
to obtain information bearing on the fate of prisoners of war an
alte
civilians not yet repatriated from the
Soviet Union and to bring about
by
repatriation in the largest possible number of cases.
to
que
Go
65. NOTE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO THE PRO
to
SOVIET EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON, JUNE 8, 1950 €
har
The Department of State
acknowledges the receipt of note No. 1
pla
of May 11, 1950 6 from
the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialis Ple
Republics. The note calls attention to Circular No. 5 "Clemeo
par
for War Criminals" issued by command of General MacArthur a
the
March 7, 1950. It is alleged that the circular runs counter to be
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Pau
Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1950, p. 1018.
2 Cf. TASS statement of May 5, 1950; ibid., Sept. 11, 1950, pp. 433-434.
3 Agreement of Apr. 23, 1947; ibid., Jan. 16, 1949, p. 78.
4 Ibid., July 10, 1950, p. 60.
5 Ibid., pp. 60–61.
6 FEC Loc. 314/18. See also The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in love
1946), pp. 39–104.
cor
im
18
sen
Vic
1
cer
for
1
Feb
pp.
p.
THE SOVIET UNION
2061
Tiel
It
tos
February 26, 1946-July 10, 1947 (Department of State publication 2888; 1947),
the decision of the Far Eastern Commission of April 3, 1946,' relating
TH
to the apprehension, trial and punishment of war criminals in the Far
CE
East. The Government of the United States is urged to take measures
to have Circular No. 5 revoked.
Inasmuch as the matters referred to in the note are within the
le jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Commission, the request of the Soviet
en Government should have been addressed to the Commission. In this
Ga connection the attention of the Soviet Government is called to the
coll minutes of the 193d meeting of the Fec, May 18, 1950 2 which contain
a statement of the views of the United States on the parole of Japanese
war criminals. Nevertheless, as the position of the Soviet Govern-
ment is at variance with the views of the Government of the United
States, those views are set forth for the Soviet Government's
the information.
hed
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is the sole executive
m authority for the Allied Powers in Japan, and as such, has the responsi-
data
bility for carrying out the judgments of any international courts
ning
appointed by him. This is specifically recognized by Article 17 of
and the Charter of the International Military_Tribunal for the Far East
many and by paragraph 5 (b) (1) of the Far Eastern Commission policy
decision of April 3, 1946.
Since
Under Article 17 of the Charter of the International Military
a Tribunal for the Far East the Supreme Commander for the Allied
prel
Powers may "at any time” reduce or otherwise alter a sentence of
mtell the Tribunal except to increase its severity and paragraph 5 (b) (2)
of the Far Eastern Commission policy decision of April 3, 1946,
en confirms that he has the power to approve, reduce or otherwise
any sentences,” imposed by any international courts appointed
Dolly by him. Whether the Supreme Commander can exercise his power
to reduce or otherwise alter a sentence "only while considering the
question of the approval of this sentence" as contended in the Soviet
Government's note or whether this may be done “at any time” as
PET provided by Article 17 of the Charter quoted above is unnecessary
to consider at this time as no reductions or alterations in the sentences
imposed by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
have been made by the Supreme Commander and none are contem-
The Soviet Government is apparently under the impression that
paroles such as are provided for by Circular No. 5 are alterations of
the sentences imposed by the International Military Tribunal. This
A parole is in no sense an alteration of a
sentence but permission by the appropriate authority for the con-
victed
criminal to serve part of his sentence outside of prison under
certain conditions and controls and subject to being returned to prison
for serving the remainder of the sentence if the conditions of the parole
Activities of the Far Eastern Commission: Report by the Secretary General,
and alter
1.74
e list
plated by him.
2010
L 01
the
is fundamental error.
8171
nano
153
pp. 97-100.
ここ
​* The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International Cooperation, p. 198.
2062
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
!
+
1
COI
at
1
are violated. This method of dealing with convicted criminals is il 67
accordance with the practice in enlightened and democratic countriel
For the reasons indicated the Government of the United States
declines the request of the Soviet Government that it take measure
looking to the revocation by the Supreme Commander of his Circus
No. 5.
Soi
ho
66. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIE
sta
CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON, JUNE 9, 1950
So
9,7
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chair
alle
d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
det
refers to the Secretary's note of December 30, 1949, requesting
cooperation of the Soviet Union in the matter of repatriating or other of 1
wise accounting for over 370,000 Japanese nationals who, according
to
to figures considered reliable, are in areas under Soviet control, deel Gei
or alive.
The note under reference alluded to the repatriation obligations of
the Soviet Union under the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1944 of
and pointed out that the prolonged detention of prisoners after the
reti
cessation of hostilities is in patent conflict with accepted internation: ។
concepts of fundamental human rights and freedoms and with human the
tarian principles as set forth in the
Geneva Convention of 1949 relatin
in
to the treatment of prisoners of war 4 which was signed by, some sit Ger
Powers including the Soviet Union. In the interests of resolving the
problem of long-standing concern to the Allied Powers and Japan, pat
note specifically requested that the Soviet Government agree to ta
agr
designation of an international humanitarian body or organization
pro
charged with making a complete first-hand survey of the situation A
194
a view to obtaining exact information on Japanese held in Soviet T
since the cessation of hostilities.
The Embassy is reminded that the note under reference has ne
agre
been answered or acknowledged, directly or indirectly, since its di of I
livery over five months ago and that an early indication of the reaction ado
of the Soviet Government to the United States Government's propesi still
would be appreciated."
spo
con
mer
rem
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 14, 1950, p. 257.
2 Ibid., Jan. 16, 1950, pp. 102-103.
3 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 49–50: The Soviet Union; ip mer
declaration of war against Japan, Aug. 8,1945, **"joined in the declaration of le
Allied Powers of July 26.”!
4 Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Vilipe
See Soviet repiye Fujuiya ti6, 1950; Department of State Bulletin
, Sept. i serem
1950, p. 435.
3
Ann
5
8
t
Ann
.
78
publ
8
THE SOVIET UNION
2063
publication 3556; 1950), pp. 119 ff.
gw
others
ording
agreement of April 1947.7 On January 24, 1949, the Soviet Minister
Department of State Bulletin, July 24, 1950, pp. 132-133.
French Embassies also sent notes to the Soviet Government.
* Reprinted in Annex V, U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session
Annetes, Agenda Item 67 (A/1339).
5 See Bundestag resolution of May 5, 1950; ibid., Sept. 11, 1950, p. 434.
Anneces, Agenda Item 6Y (A/1339). .
? See Germany, 1947-1949 The Story in Documents (Department of State
$ 151 67. NOTE FROM
THE
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT
nkriege MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER,” JULY 14,
Statel 19503
asu
roule
The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his
compliments to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and on instructions from his Government has the
VTC
honor to refer to the Soviet press announcement of May 5, 1950,4
30!
stating that the repatriation of German prisoners of war from the
Soviet Union to Germany has been completed with the exception of
9,717 persons convicted of grave war crimes, 3,815 persons whose
hare
alleged war crimes are in the process of investigation, and 14 persons
5.4 detained owing to illness.
The Government of the United States shares the shock and concern
of the German people • over this public announcement, and is unable
to give credence to the Soviet statement that there are only 13,546
den
German prisoners of war in its custody. These figures are completely
at variance with the information in the possession of the Government
onsd
of the United States, showing that large numbers of German prisoners
1946
of war known to have been in the Soviet custody have not yet been
returned to their homes.
The Soviet Government is again informed that, in accordance with
the agreement reached by the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow
atitit
in April 1947 for the repatriation before December 31, 1948, of all
sin German prisoners of war in the custody of the four occupying powers,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France did in fact re-
patriate all Germán prisoners of war in their custody prior to the
agreed date. The United States, on its part, actually completed its
program of repatriation of German prisoners of war as early as June 30,
The Government of the Soviet Union has repeatedly failed to re-
spond to requests for pertinent information of its actions under the
3 de
of Foreign Affairs, in acknowledging receipt of one of these inquiries,
admitted that an unspecified number of German prisoners of war were
still held in Soviet
custody, failing however to furnish any information
concerning them, but stating unequivocally that the Soviet Govern
ment would complete the repatriation of German prisoners of war
remaining in its custody during 1949. It is clear from the announce-
ment of May 5, 1950, that the Soviet Government has failed to honor
The British and
1
CIONS
6
3, the
o the
ಇta09
with.
area
1947.
10.
tion
11
1 Adm. Alan G. Kirk.
? Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
6
& Ibid., pp. 122–123.
2064
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ap
}
1
1
In concerning itself at this time with the question of Germai ove
and broken specific commitments, the Government of the Unite pro
States does not overlook the equally disturbing parallel situatia
this commitment just as it has failed to honor its earlier commitmed tal
of April 1947. In this connection, the Government of the Unite as
States desires to make it plain that the arbitrary reclassification in
the Soviet Government of prisoners of war as civilians would not,
pre
course, have the effect of relieving the Soviet Government of its oblig me
tion to return these persons to their homes and families.
By its delay in repatriating these German prisoners of war, and by
its repeated refusal to furnish information concerning them, the Sori
Government has caused suffering and anxiety for large numbers d 68
prisoners of war in the Soviet custody and their relatives and friend
and has demonstrated a complete disregard for the fundamenta
human rights of the unfortunate persons concerned. The Soria
Government alone has the power to mitigate this suffering, and i
could do so by taking the following steps:
(1) Furnish full information on the identification of the 9,7 (A
persons alleged to have been convicted of grave war crimes, the 3,8%
Re
persons whose alleged war crimes are in the process of investigation, det
and the 14 persons said to be under treatment for illness, who are still the
retained by the Soviet Union as stated in the Soviet announcemento
tio
May 5. This information would include the present location at
treatment of these persons, data on the sentences imposed on thos
said to have been convicted of war crimes, and the status of the
the
investigations pending, as well as information with respect to measura
taken by the Soviet Government to ensure the right of these prisones pri
les
of war to correspond with their families in Germany.
(2) In accordance with the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929
to which the Soviet Union is a party, to provide information on the
number, identity, date of death and place of burial of prisoners of we pas
and civilian internees who have died in captivity in the Soviet Uniol Mi
bet
or in transit.
Po
(3) Permit investigation in the Soviet Union by an impartial inter
1,
national body in order that the actual fate of the prisoners of me
known to have been in Soviet custody may be ascertained. For this
M
purpose, the Government of the United States suggests the appon
ment of an ad hoc commission designated by the United Nations, de
tio
group composed of representatives of the four powers now occupy
fac
Germany, or representatives of neutral powers, or any other componen
mutually acceptable. It is noted in this connection that the Unite 103
ati
States, the United Kingdom, and France, at the time when they
had German prisoners of war in their custody, furnished full informi
tion concerning them to the interested parties, and permitted full of
impartial access to the prisoners of war by international agencies
.
prisoners of war, a question on which the
Soviet Government has ma
concerning the Soviet failure to repatriate, or to account for
numerous nationals of the German-occupied countries who mam
lar
ret
stil
exe
1
the
P.
2
Iter
this
1 Treaty Series 846; 47 Stat. 2021.
THE SOVIET UNION
2065
on by
1
sti
and
those
sura
onen
mele taken prisoners during the war, or who were brought to the U.S.S.R.
nital as civilian internees.
Information concerning the action which the Soviet Government is
ot
, prepared to take on this matter would be welcomed by the Govern-
blig) ment of the United States, which would be willing to cooperate in any
appropriate way.
adhi
OVIH
Ts ( 68. LETTER FROM THE DELEGATIONS OF THE UNITED
end STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND AUSTRALIA TO
senta THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
BOTH AUGUST 25, 1950 2
ndi
We have the honour to refer to our telegram of 20 August 1950
9,7 (A/1327), submitting the item "Failure of the Union of Soviet Socialist
38 Republics to repatriate or otherwise account for prisoners of war
tion detained in Soviet territory” to be placed on the provisional agenda of
the fifth session of the General Assembly.
The explanatory memorandum, referred to in the above-men-
tioned telegram, follows:
At the end of hostilities in Europe and in the Far East in 1945,
the large numbers of military personnel of various nationalities were in
the hands of the Allied Powers. The prompt repatriation of these
prisoners was demanded by accepted international practice and no
less by the elementary principles of humanity.
9. The Allied Powers clearly recognized at the outset this responsibility
at and entered into agreements to repatriate prisoners of war (see
me paragraph 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945; the Foreign
Ministers Agreement in Moscow of 23 April 1947; the Agreement
between the U.S.S.R. and the Supreme Commander for the Allied
nter i
Powers in Japan of 19 December 1946, which are reproduced in annexes
thi The Soviet Union has not complied fully with these agreements.
Moreover, the other governments concerned
have on various occasions
requested the U.S.S.R. to furnish information concerning its repatria-
tion programmes and have even in certain cases offered transportation
facilities for repatriation. However, on 22 April 1950 and 5 May
1950, TASS announced that the U.S.'S. R. had completed the repatri-
ation of all Japanese and German prisoners of war from its territories
mobexcept for
detained in connexion with war crimes or on account
of illness (see annexes IV and V):
Evidence exists to show that these statements are not true. More-
over
, the Japanese Diet on 2 May 1950 and the Bundestag of the
Federal German Government on 5 May 1950 adopted resolutions
protesting these announcements and appealing for every possible
See Soviet note of Sept. 30, 1950; Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 20, 1950,
UN General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Annexes, Agenda
Hem 67 (A/1339), p. 2. The annexes to the tripartite letter are not included in
this compilation; for texts, see ibid., pp. 3-9.
t
nion
I, II and III).
972!
Oink
VYLE
TOU
stil
persons
and/
mau
Nach
tion
the
p. 817.
per
415900_-57---Pol. 2
-27
2066
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
assistance to bring about an early settlement of the problem
annexes VI and VII).
On the basis of the evidence of Soviet non-compliance, government
having control responsibility in Germany and Japan have on varios
occasions stated to the Soviet Government their inability to gia
credence to the TASS announcements, and have requested it to a
to the designation of an international humanitarian body or organiz
tion which should make a thorough examination of the repatriatu
programme at first hand (see annexes VIII, IX, and X)
Since all these efforts have been without avail, the Governments
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States now consi
it essential to place the matter before the General Assembly unde
Articles 10, 14, and 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter. The ture
Governments hope that the General Assembly will consider meas
whereby full information on all these persons may be obtained and te
repatriation of all those now living may be secured.
Further documents will be supplied later.
E
A
1
1.
1 See also U.N. General Assembly Res. 427 (V), Dec. 14, 1950;
General Asser
bly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1755), p. 45, establishin
the Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War; the report of Sept. 12, 1952, byť
Commission (supra, pp. 269-271);
and General Assembly Res. 741 (VIII), Dec.
1953 (supra, pp. 271-272).
COI
wh
tis
ser
im
pa
go
mu
do
TI
WO
for
of
an
Wh
ng
OW
of
асс
for
1
2
8
on
ment
rarion
gia
ag
aniz
riata
Part XII
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES AND
THE BALTIC STATES
ents
inside
unde
thom
men
nder
A. GENERAL
Basic United States Policy
Asser
olishia
był
Dec.
1. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT A NEWS
CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 24, 1950 1
Their
I should like to say a few words about our relations with certain
countries of Eastern Europe, particularly Bulgaria and Hungary,
which have been highlighted by the events of the past week.
The conduct of the Bulgarian Government has given us no alterna-
tive but to suspend diplomatic relations with that country. The
sentencing by a Hungarian
court of an American citizen to 15 years'
imprisonment on false charges without a fair trial 3 is part of a general
pattern common to all those countries which now have Communist
governments and are closely tied to the Soviet Union. This pattern
must now be absolutely clear to even the most casual observer.
The principal purpose behind what these governments have been
doing is plainly to make the so-called iron curtain impenetrable.
purpose is to cut off the people of Eastern Europe from the free
world, to deprive them of all hope of any other fate than that reserved
for them by their present rulers, and to liquidate all signs and symbols
of Western influence to the accompaniment of a flood of propaganda
and denunciation of "spies," "warmongers," and the other familiar
In pursuit of their aims, the present Communist rulers of these
nations have ruthlessly used the power of the state to frighten their
own populations and to take action against the diplomats and citizens
of other countries wholly contrary to the rules
and standards long
accepted in relations between nations.
The Communist leaders do not seem to comprehend our concern
for the rights of individuals. They regard our attempts to defend
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 6, 1950, pp. 377–378.
See the U. S. note of Feb. 20, 1950; infra, pp. 2091–2093.
* See the U. S. note of Feb. 1, '1950; 'infra, pp. 2117-2119.
whipping boys.
2067
2068
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1 Treaties of Feb. 1C, 1947 (TIAS 1649–1651 (61 Stat., pt. 2, pp. 1757-2229)
SUI
1
to
1
to take in order to meet the situation created by the unprinciple
This country will maintain u
such rights and to give to persecuted individuals what protection 2.
appropriately can give them as evidence of hostility and of interver
tion in their internal affairs. But here we are dealing with funds
mentals of human and political behavior. It is the purpose of te Ra
Government and of the American people to promote respect is in
human rights. That is why we have vigorously supported the prora
sions of the United Nations Charter and of the peace treaties a
spi
this subject and attempted to make them as effective as possible
It is notable that the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary
, a
Rumania, besides making it increasingly difficult for the United States fre
to maintain diplomatic missions and virtually impossible to give a s
protection to American citizens and American interests, have al
gro
systematically denied human rights and fundamental freedoms
their own peoples in flagrant violation of the provisions of the peace trit
treaties.
The countries of Eastern Europe claim to be sovereign nations i
equal members of the international community. The United State we
has treated them as such, for these nations have had independene mu
in the past and have a right to it. We have wished and still wish tour
maintain normal relations with them regardless of differences i
political philosophies and institutions. We have wished especial heli
to maintain our ties of friendship with the peoples of Eastern Europe Iroj
with whose welfare and freedom the American people are naturally 80
very deeply concerned.
On the other hand, states which claim to be sovereign member to
of the international community must act the part. Their govem
ments must observe accepted standards in their relations with to
rest of the world, and they must maintain the attributes of indie
pendence.
T
With regard to Bulgaria and Hungary, whose recent flagrant ai tha
have brought their relations with the United States to the lower I
point since the war, it is well to remember that a few short years I di
these states were allies of Nazi Germany. It was the intention
peo
the Allied Powers, in proceeding rapidly to the conclusion of per effe
treaties with them, to give them a full opportunity to take the I
place again in the family of nations. Their present rulers, in a
regard of the wishes of their peoples, seem bent on rejecting to crit
opportunity.
I should like to repeat that we do not regard the people of Easter
by
Europe as responsible for the deterioration of our relations with tax
governments, and the measures which the United States is compelle
actions of those governments are in no sense directed against
people, who after their experience with Nazi rule had every right
diminished its concern for their rights and their welfare.
forg
cou
star
can
vict.
1
mad
in su
Four
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2069
91
1
e alle
ms
is all
ces
ciali
On 2. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, FEBRUARY 8, 1955
erven
und I am happy to be with you tonight for I strongly believe that
ft Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom are vital to success
ct l, in the battle for men's minds.
PION Many of us learned during the war that the most potent force is
es ut spiritual; that the appeal to men's minds produces a dedication which
ssib!
surmounts every trial and test until victory is won.
To toughen, strengthen, fortify such dedication to the cause of
Stel freedom is the mission of Radio Free Europe.
Substantial progress has already been made. The free world is
2.21 growing stronger because its peoples are growing in their determination
to stand together and in their faith that freedom and justice will
pear triumph.
Radio Free Europe, each day of the year, nourishes this growth.
Here at home, we Americans face the future with confidence. But
Statel
we must also face up to the dangers that still lurk about us. We
da must ever work
to strengthen our posture of defense and to reinforce
ish
our alliances and friendships in the free world.
While we maintain ourº vigilance at home and abroad, we must
help intensify the will for freedom in the satellite countries behind the
Uncat Iron Curtain. These countries are in the Soviet backyard, and only
und so long as their people are reminded that the outside world has not
forgotten them--only that long do they remain as potential deterrents
The great majority of the 70 million captives in these satellite
countries have known liberty in the past. They now need our con-
stant friendship and help if they are to believe in their future.
Therefore, the mission of Radio Free Europe merits greater support
tant than before. It serves our national security and the cause of peace.
op. I have long given the Crusade for Freedom my strong
endorsement.
15 aly I did that because I am familiar with its purposes, its operations, the
people who run it, and, perhaps, most important, its hard-hitting
effectiveness as an independent American enterprise.
I know that our country and our friends behind the Iron Curtain
can count on you for active participation and leadership in this most
critical of all battles-the winning of men's minds. Without this
victory, we can have no other victories. By your efforts, backed up
by America, we can achieve our great goal that of enabling us and
all the peoples of the world to enjoy in peace the blessings of freedom.
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 295. The statement was
made by closed-circuit television to meetings held throughout the United States
bele ho support of Radio Free Europe, under the auspices of the American Heritage
mbay to Soviet aggression.
OTOMI
h the
inde
ON O
pear
thes
I di
thull
Pelik!
29
1950 1
Whereas the General Assembly, at the second part of its Third
1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 16, 1950, p. 97. The American Legations
Ministries. The United States sent copies of all notes to the U.N. Secretari:
Oct. 22, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1173–1175. Cand
and the United Kingdom sent similar notes to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumani,
2070 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Interpretation of the Human Rights Clauses of the
Peace Treaties With Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania
3. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN LEGATION AT BUCHAREST
TO THE RUMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, JANUARY
The Legation of the United States of America presents its compi-
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Rumania and has the
honor to refer to the Legation's note of August 1, 1949 2 asking the
Rumanian Government to join the United States Government i
naming a Commission, in accordance with Article 38 of the Treaty dl
Peace, to settle the dispute which has arisen over the interpretation
and execution of Article 3 of the Treaty. Reference is also made to
the Ministry's note of September 2, 1949 4 and to the Legation's not
of September 19, 1949 5 on the same subject.
The Legation has the honor to inform the Ministry that the United
States Government has designated Mr. Edwin D. Dickinson as it
representative on the proposed Commission. It is requested the
the Rumanian Government designate its representative forthwith and
enter into consultation immediately with the United States Govern-
ment through the American Minister in Bucharest, with a view to the
appointment of the third member of the
Commission as stipulated is
Article 38 of the Peace Treaty.
4. ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, MARCH 30 1950 (Excerpts) 6
On October 22nd, 1949, the General Assembly of the United
Nations adopted the following Resolution:
"Whereas the United Nations, pursuant to Article 55 of the
Charter, shall promote universal' respect
for, and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language or religion,
Regular Session, considered the question of the observance !
2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 15, 1949, p. 238.
8 Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1649 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1757).
4 Summarized in Department of State Bulletin, Sept.'26, 1949, p. 456.
5 Ibid., Oct. 3, 1949, pp. 514-515.
* International Court of Justice Reports, 1950, pp. 66–78.
? Resolution 294
(IV); A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1173–1175.
7
1
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2071
le to
? Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1650 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1915).
3 Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1651 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 2065).
the Bulgaria and Hungary of human rights and fundamental free-
unig
doms,
Whereas the General Assembly, on 30 April 1949, adopted
Resolution 272 (III) concerning this question in which it ex-
pressed its deep concern at the grave accusations made against
EST the Governments of Bulgaria and
Hungary regarding the suppres-
sion of human rights and fundamental freedoms in those coun-
tries; noted with satisfaction that steps had been taken by several
States signatories to the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria 2 and
apli Hungary : regarding these accusations; expressed the hope that
the
measures would be diligently applied, in accordance with the
the Treaties, in order to ensure respect for human rights and funda-
ti mental freedoms; and most urgently drew the attention of the
yo
! Governments of Bulgaria and Hungary to their obligations under
ution the Peace Treaties, including the obligation to co-operate in the
settlement of the question,
mote Whereas the General Assembly has resolved to consider also
at the Fourth Regular Session the question of the observance
nited
in Romania of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
s its
Whereas certain of the Allied and Associated Powers signatories
that
to the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
and
have charged the Governments of those countries with violations
of the Treaties of Peace and have called upon those Governments
o the
to take remedial measures,
din
Whereas the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
have rejected the charges of Treaty violations,
Whereas the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers
concerned have sought unsuccessfully to refer the question of
Treaty violations to the Heads of Mission in Sofia, Budapest and
OF
Bucharest, in pursuance of certain provisions in the Treaties
Whereas the Governments of these Allied and Associated Powers
have called upon the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania to join in appointing Commissions pursuant to the
provisions of the respective Treaties of Peace for the settlement
of disputes concerning the interpretation or execution of these
Whereas the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
have refused to appoint their representatives to the Treaty Com-
missions, maintaining that they were under no legal obligation
Whereas the Secretary-General of the United Nations is author-
ized by the Treaties of Peace, upon request by either party to
a dispute, to appoint the third member of a Treaty Commission
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1170–1171.
4
of Peace,
ited
the
301
tion
Treaties,
6
hird
II
to do so,
JOL
reig
IV.
jadi
• Ibid., pp. 1165-1170.
* See the U.S. note of Jan. 5, 1950; supra, doc. 3.
2072
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
party is obligated to appoint a representative to
provisions for the appointment of their represents
the Secretary-General has so advised the International
III. If one party fails to appoint a representative to
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania where that
if the parties fail to agree upon the appointment of the thir
member,
Whereas it is important for the Secretary-General to be advise
authoritatively concerning the scope of his authority under the
Treaties of Peace,
The General Assembly
1. Expresses its continuing interest in and its increased concr
at the grave accusations made against Bulgaria, Hungary a
Romania;
2. Records its opinion that the refusal of the Governments d
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to co-operate in its efforts to
examine the grave charges with regard to the observance
human rights and fundamental freedoms justifies this concern d
the General Assembly about the state of affairs prevailing i
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in this respect;
3. Decides to submit the following questions to the Inter-
national Court of Justice for an advisory opinion:
'I. Do the diplomatic exchanges between Bulgari
Hungary and Romania, on the one hand, and certas
Allied and Associated Powers signatories to the
Treaties of Peace, on the other, concerning the in
plementation of Article 2 of the Treaties will
Bulgaria and Hungary and Article 3 of the Treaty
with Romania, disclose disputes subject to the pra
visions for the settlement of disputes containe
in Article 36 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgazi of
Article 40 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary
and Article 38 of the Treaty of Peace wild
Romania?'
In the event of an affirmative reply to question I:
H
'II. Are the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary any
Romania obligated to carry out the provisions &
the articles referred to in question I, including to
WA
tives to the Treaty Commissions?'
In the event of an affirmative reply to question II and i tern
within thirty days from the date when the Court de
Cc
livers its opinion, the Governments concerned have a
notified the Secretary-General that they have appointe una
their representatives to the Treaty Commissions, fro
19
Court of Justice:
thi
Treaty Commission under the Treaties of Peace
an
pr
in
WI
me
WE
wi
an
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2073
cer
And
tso
ts to
TD
nter
anni
rtain
the
im
aith
eat!
Pro
Hungary and Romania of having violated the provisions of the
thin
the Treaty Commission, is the Secretary-General
of the United Nations authorized to appoint the
third member of the Commission upon the request
vised
I the
of the other party to a dispute according to the
provisions of the respective Treaties?'
In the event of an affirmative reply to question III:
'IV. Would a Treaty Commission composed of a repre-
sentative of one party and a third member ap-
pointed by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations constitute a Commission, within the
meaning of the relevant Treaty articles, competent
to make a definitive and binding decision in
settlement of a dispute?'
go
4. Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the
International Court of Justice the relevant exchanges of diplo-
matic correspondence communicated to the Secretary-General for
circulation to the Members of the United Nations and the
records of the General Assembly proceedings on this question;
5. Decides to retain on the agenda of the Fifth Regular Session
of the General Assembly the question of the observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, with a view to ensuring that the charges are appro-
priately examined and dealt with.”
In conformity with the Resolution of the General Assembly
of October 22nd, 1949, the Court is at present called upon to give
an Opinion only on Questions I and II set forth in that Resolution.
The power of the Court to exercise its advisory function in the
present case has been contested by the Governments of Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, and also by several other Governments,
in the communications which they have addressed to the Court.
This objection is founded mainly on two arguments.
the
It is contended that the Request for an Opinion was an action
ultra vires on the part of the General Assembly because, in dealing
with the question of the observance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in the three States mentioned above, it was "inter-
fering” or “intervening” in matters essentially within the domestic
de jurisdiction of States. This contention against the exercise by the
Hill Court of its advisory function seems thus
to be based
on the alleged
to incompetence of the General Assembly itself, an incompetence deduced
from Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.
The terms of the General Assembly's Resolution of October 22nd,
1949, considered as a whole
and in its separate parts, show that
this argument is based on a misunderstanding. When the vote
was taken on this Resolution, the General Assembly was faced
with a situation arising out of the charges made by certain Allied
and Associated Powers, against the Governments of Bulgaria,
ined
TIX
HIT
801
so
QTS
and!
for
hall
to
2074
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
en
art
This objection reveals a confusion between the principles governing
contentious procedure and those which are applicable to Advisory die
The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Courti
Peace Treaties concerning the observance of human rights alto
fundamental freedoms. For the purposes of the present Opiniere
it suffices to note that the General Assembly justified the adoptie. Ce
of its Resolution by stating that "the United Nations, pursuar bi
to Article 55 of the Charter, shall promote universal respect to Ui
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms fowl
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion".
The Court is not called upon to deal with the charges brough. Op
before the General Assembly since the Questions put to the Cow to
relate neither to the alleged violations of the provisions of the Treatie N
concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms nor to the tio
interpretation of the articles relating to these matters. The objes
of the Request is much more limited. It is directed solely to obtai:
ing from the Court certain clarifications of a legal nature regardiz
the applicability of the procedure for the settlement of disputes bi
the Commissions provided for in the express terms of Article 3
of the Treaty with Bulgaria, Article 40 of the Treaty with Hungar
and Article 38 of the Treaty with Romania. The interpretation
thi
the terms of a treaty for this purpose could not be considered 2
Bu
question essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State
th
It is a question of international law which, by its very nature, lix
within the competence of the Court.
jec
These considerations also suffice to dispose of the objection based
do
on the principle of domestic jurisdiction and directed specifically
against the competence of the Court, namely, that the Court
, as a
organ of the United Nations, is bound to observe the provisions d
of
the Charter, including Article 2, paragraph 7.
The same considerations furnish an answer to the objection that the
hu
advisory procedure before the Court would take the place of the
procedure instituted by the Peace Treaties for the settlement el
disputes. So far from placing an obstacle in the way of the latte
procedure, the object of this Request is to facilitate it by seeking
information for the General Assembly as to its applicability to the
ing
circumstances of the present case.
tre
It thus appears that these objections to the Court's competene
to give the Advisory Opinion which has been requested are ill-foundal
and cannot be upheld.
Another argument that has been invoked against the power of the
Court to answer the Questions put to it in this case is based on
opposition of the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romani
to the advisory procedure. The Court cannot, it is said, give
1a
Advisory Opinion requested without violating the well-established
principle of international law according to which no judicial pri sp
ceedings relating to a legal question pending between States can
place without their consent.
TE
Opinions.
ac
jurisdiction in contentious cases.
The situation is different in regia w
sui
vid
ca
Cat
me
mi
to
tai
ex
or
wi
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2075
ODO
981
I
ase।
cally
188
accused of violations of the Peace Treaties make use of arguments
all to advisory proceedings even where the Request for an Opinion
inio relates to a legal question actually pending between States. The
optie Court's reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no
SUA binding force. It follows that no State, whether a Member of the
th United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion
s tad which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain
enlightenment as to the course of action it should take. The Court's
Dugihl Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled
Court to request it; the reply of the Court, itself an "organ of the United
zatieNations”, represents its participation in the activities of the Organiza-
the tion, and, in principle, should not be refused.
objedi
otain
rding
Question I involves two main points. First, do the diplomatic
exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on the one hand
de 3
and certain Allied and Associated Powers signatories to the Peace
Treaties on the other, disclose any disputes? Second, if they do,
ngày
are such disputes among those which are subject to the provisions for
the settlement of disputes contained in Article 36 of the Treaty with
tata
Bulgaria, Article_40 of the Treaty with Hungary, and Article 38 of
liels
the Treaty with Romania ?
Whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for ob-
jective determination. The mere denial of the existence of a dispute
does not prove its non-existence. In the diplomatic correspondence
submitted to the Court, the United Kingdom, acting in association
with Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and the United States
of America charged Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania with having
t the
violated, in various ways, the provisions of the articles dealing with
the
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Peace Treaties and
upon the three Governments to take remedial measures to
carry out their obligations under the Treaties. The three Govern-
king
ments
, on the other hand, denied the charges. There has thus arisen
a situation in which the two sides hold clearly opposite views concern-
ing the question of the performance or non-performance of certain
treaty obligations. Confronted with such a situation, the Court
must conclude that international disputes have arisen.
The next point to be dealt with is whether the disputes are subject
to the provisions of the articles for the settlement of disputes con-
tained in the Peace Treaties. The disputes must be considered to
fall within those provisions if they relate to the interpretation or
execution of the Treaties, and if no other procedure of settlement is
prin specifically provided elsewhere in the Treaties.
Inasmuch as the disputes relate to the question of the performance
or non-performance of the obligations provided in the articles dealing
disputes concerning the interpretation or execution of the Peace
Treaties. In particular, certain answers from the Governments
which clearly involve an interpretation of those Treaties.
च
called
atter
the
PUDICES
del
the
the
eni
heid
2076
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
SI:
W
The Court finds that all the conditions required for the commencer
its representative. Otherwise the method of settlement by Commit
Since no other procedure is specifically provided in any othe
article of the Treaties, the disputes must be subject to the method
of settlement contained in the articles providing for the settlemen
of all disputes.
0
The Court thus concludes that Question I must be answeredi
the affirmative.
In these circumstances, it becomes necessary to take up Questan R
II, which is as follows:
"Are the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romani po
obligated to carry out the provisions of the articles referred to an
Question I, including the provisions for the appointment of their to
of
representatives to the Treaty Commissions ?":
The articles for the settlement of disputes provide that any dispa
о a
which is not settled by direct diplomatic negotiations shall be refer
to the Three Heads of Mission. If not resolved by them within
period of two months, the dispute shall, unless the parties to the di ob
pute agree upon another means of settlement, be referred at the reques Qu
of either party to the dispute to a Commission composed of one rept pr
sentative of each party and a third member, to be selected in accord Ce
ance with the relevant articles of the Treaties.
The diplomatic documents presented to the Court show that the
United Kingdom and the United States of America on the one hand at
and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on the other, have not succeede
in settling their disputes
by direct negotiations. They further shople
Se
that these disputes were not resolved by the Heads of Mission withi
the prescribed period of two months. It is a fact that the parties #
the disputes have not agreed upon any other means of settlement
It is also a fact that the United Kingdom and the United States
America, after the expiry of the prescribed period, requested that th
disputes should be settled by the Commissions mentioned in the
Treaties.
This situation led the General Assembly to put Question II Sos
to obtain guidance for its future action.
have been fulfilled.
In view of the fact that the Treaties provide that any dispute ste
be referred to a Commission “at the request of either party", it follor Sta
that either party is obligated, at the request of the other party
,
co-operate in constituting the Commission, in particular by appoint
sions provided for in the Treaties would completely fail in its purpose
The reply to Question II, as interpreted above, must therefore con
in the affirmative.
1 Heads of the diplomatic missions of the United States, the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom at the capital of Bulgaria, Hungary, or Rumania.
t
Avg
Sta
e
Co
ave
орі
1
2
thes
the
3
2077
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
Dans
2 International Court of Justice Reports, 1950, pp. 79-88. Judge Azevedo
the questions-he concurred in the Court's answers.
3 Ibid., pp. 89–113.
othe: For these reasons,
Chod
THE COURT IS OF OPINION,
men
On Question 1:
by eleven votes to three,
that the diplomatic exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary and
stin Romania
on the one hand and certain Allied and Associated Powers
signatories to the Treaties of Peace on the other, concerning the im-
plementation of Article 2 of the Treaties with Bulgaria and Hungary
to i and Article 3 of the Treaty with Romania, disclose disputes subject
thel to the provisions for the settlement of disputes contained in Article 36
of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Article 40 of the Treaty of Peace
with Hungary, and Article 38 of the Treaty of Peace with Romania;
spuki
On Question II:
ered by eleven votes to three,
hind that the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are
e de obligated to carry out
the provisions of those articles referred to in
que Question I, which relate to the settlement of disputes, including the
cept provisions for the appointment of their representatives to the Treaty
Ecord Commissions.
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
hand at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this thirtieth day of March, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty, in two copies, one of which will be
placed in the archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
BASDEVANT
President.
E. HAMBRO,
Registrar.
Judge AZEVEDO, while concurring in the Opinion of the Court, has
availed himself of the right conferred on him by Article 57 of the
Statute and appended to the Opinion a statement of his separate
opinion,
Judges WINIARSKI, ZORIČIĆ and KRYLOV, considering that the
Court should have declined to give an Opinion in this case, have
availed themselves of the right conferred on them by Article
57 of the
Statute and appended
to the Opinion statements of their dissenting
opinions.
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 150.
were substantive and not abstract, but the Court having decided to answer
at the
eeded
shor
rithir
ies ti
menti
tes de
ut the
thi
SO 81
enca
SION
llon
FI
nting
im
paris
re
halli
re
IS
W
to
Nations that none of those Governments had notified him, with
thirty days from the date of the delivery of the Court's Advisor
5 Resolution 294 (IV); A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1173-1175
2078 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
5. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN LEGATION AT BUDAPEST
TO THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, APRIL %
:
1950 1
th
The Legation of the United States of America presents its compe
ments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary and has the
honor to direct the Minister's attention to the advisory opinion on the
interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Rumania which was given by the International Court of Justice el
March 30, 1950.2
In the light of this opinion, it is assumed that the Hungarian Gor
ernment will now nominate its representative on the Peace Treaty
Commission and will inform the Secretary-General of the United N
tions of the nomination in accordance with the United Nations Generi
Assembly Resolution of October 22, 1949. It is further assumal
that the Hungarian Government will also be willing to enter inte
C
consultation with the United States Government with
view to the
ar
appointment of a third member in accordance with Article 40 of the
at.
Treaty of Peace.
NE
As the United States Legation informed the Minister for Foreign
Affairs in its note of January 5, 1950,3 the United States Government
has appointed Mr. Edwin D. Dickinson as its representative on the
proposed Commission.
at
th
be
6. ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, JULY 18, 1950 (Excerpts)
THE COURT,
gives the following Advisory Opinion:
[The opinion quotes the resolution adopted by the United Nation
General Assembly on October 22, 1949; 5 it then quotes the Court's answer
to questions I and II which were asked in that resolution; and it continue
with an account of certain subsequent developments.]
in
sib
Having stated, in its Opinion of March 30th, 1950,6 that the Gover
for
ments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania are obligated to car
out the provisions of those articles of the Peace Treaties which relik
to the settlement of disputes, including the provisions for the appor
ment of their representatives to the Treaty Commissions, and here
received information from the Secretary-General of the Unite
· Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1950, p. 738.
sent similar notes to Bulgaria and Rumania.
2 Supra.
3 Supra, doc. 3.
* International Court of Justice Reports, 1950, pp. 222, 226, and 230,
See
t
ant
U
COI
rig
1
2
The United State
Supra, doc. 4.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2079
Tor
a International Court of Justice Reports, 1950, pp. 231-254.
RSS Opinion, of the appointment of its representative to the Treaty Com-
26
missions, the Court is now called upon to answer Question III in
the Resolution of the General Assembly of October 22nd, 1949, which
reads as follows:
mpli
the
(Here follows the Court's reasoning by which it reached its conclusion.)
the
and
Consequently, Question III must be answered in the negative. It
is therefore not necessary for the Court to consider Question IV,
which requires an answer only in the event of an affirmative answer
to the preceding Question.
Feath
For these reasons,
NE
THE COURT IS OF OPINION,
her
by eleven votes to two,
med
into
that, if one party fails to appoint a representative to a Treaty
the
Commission under the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary
the
and Romania where that party is obligated to appoint a represent-
ative to the Treaty Commission, the Secretary-General of the United
cel
Nations is not authorized to appoint the third member of the Com-
mission upon the request of the other party to a dispute.
1 the
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighteenth day of July, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty, in two copies, one of which will
be placed in the archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
BASDEVANT,
President.
E. HAMBRO,
Registrar.
Judge Krylov, while joining in the conclusions of the opinion
and the general line of argument, declares that he is unable to concur
in the reasons dealing with the problem of international respon-
sibility which, in his opinion, goes beyond the scope of the request
Judges Read and AZEVEDO, declaring that they are unable to
concur in the Opinion of the Court, have availed themselves of the
right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute ? and appended
to the Opinion statements of their dissenting opinion.?
J. B
E. H.
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 150.
ment
Biome
ren
for opinion.
2017
elati
gin.
they
sar?
15
.
2080
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
na
$
ga
Tr
ME
ani
CO1
the U.S, note of Apr. 26, 1950, to Hungary (similar notes were sent to Bulgaris
7. RESOLUTION 385 (V) OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL is
ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 3, 1950 1
up
The General Assembly,
HI
Considering that one of the purposes of the United Nations is
of
achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging Co
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,
Having regard to General Assembly resolutions 272 (III) and 294
(IV)?
concerning the question of the observance in Bulgaria, Hungary this
and Romania of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to is
decision in the latter resolution to submit certain questions to the
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion,
1. Takes note of the advisory opinions delivered by the Inte:
national Court of Justice on 30 March 1950 3 and 18 July 1950 4 to the
effect that:
the
(a) The diplomatic exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary and
RO
Romania on the one hand, and certain Allied and Associated Power ref
signatories to the Treaties of Peace on the other, concerning the
wh
implementation of article 2 of the Treaties with Bulgaria and Hungary
and article 3 of the Treaty with Romania, disclose disputes to the ani
provisions for the settlement of disputes contained in article 36 of the the
thi
Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, article 40 of the Treaty of Peace with
Hungary, and article 38 of the Treaty of Peace with Romania;
the
(b) The Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are
obligated to carry out the provisions of those articles of the Treaties wit
of Peace which relate to the settlement of disputes, including the
provisions for the appointment of their representatives to the Treaty
Commissions;
(C) If one party fails to appoint a representative to a Treaty Com
mission under the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania
where that
party is obligated to appoint a representative to
the Treaty Commission, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
1 General Assembly, Oficial Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 64 w
1775), p. 16. See also statement
of Oct. 2, 1950, by Ambassador Cohen; Depart of
ment of State Bulletin, Oct. 23, 1950, p. 666.
Vid
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1170–1171 and 1173–1175. Ru
3 Supra, doc. 4.
Go
4 Supra.
5 See the U.S. notes of Mar. 29, 1949, to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumanis
(A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1159–1165); the Hungarian note .
Apr. 8, 1949, to the United States (ibid., pp. 1167–1169); the Rumanian note of of
Apr. 18, 1949, to the United States (ibid., pp. 1169-1170); the Bulgarian note
Apr. 21, 1949, to the United States (ibid., pp. 1165-1167); the U.S. notes
May 31, 1949, to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania (ibid., pp. 1171-1173);
and Rumania; Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 15, 1949, p. 238); the Los
note of Sept. 19, 1949, to Rumania (similar notes were sent to Bulgaria, am
Hungary; ibid., Oct. 3, 1949, pp. 514-515); the o.s. note of Jan. 5, 1950,
Rumania similar notes were sent to Bulgaria tand Hungary; supra, doc. 3.jar
8.
fai
sug
196
COT
ext
1
2
3
aft
$
8
and Rumania; supra, doc. 5).
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2081
INS
cary
2 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 31, 1952, pp. 496–497.
4 Resolution 385 (V); supra.
Department of State publication 4376A.
RAIis not authorized to appoint the third member of the Commission
upon the request of the other party to a dispute;
2. Condemns the wilful refusal of the Governments of Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania to fulfil their obligation under the provisions.
S
of the Treaties of Peace to appoint representatives to the Treaty
Commissions, which obligation has been confirmed by the Inter-
101 national Court of Justice;
3. Is of the opinion that the conduct of the Governments of Bul-
291
garia, Hungary and Romania in this matter is such as to indicate that
27 they are aware of breaches being committed of those articles of the
Treaties of Peace under which they are obligated to secure the enjoy-
the
ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in their countries;
and that they are callously indifferent to the sentiments of the world
ater
community;
the
4. Notes with anxiety the continuance of serious accusations on
these matters against the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and
and Romania, and that the three Governments have made no satisfactory
vers
refutation of these accusations;
the
5. Invites Members of the United Nations, and in particular those
which are parties to the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary
the and Romania, to submit to the Secretary-General all evidence which
the they now hold or which may become available in future in relation to
with
6. Likewise invites the Secretary-General to notify the Members of
the United Nations of any information he may receive in connexion
with this question.
the
sty
8. NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE RU-
MANIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON, MARCH
nd
18, 19522
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Af-
faires ad interim of the Rumanian People's
Republic and transmits here-
(al with, for the information of the Rumanian Government, three copies
it of Department of State publication No. 4376 entitled "Evidence of
Violations of Human Rights Provisions of the Treaties of Peace by
Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, submitted by the United States
Government 3 to the Secretary General of the United Nations pur-
suant to the resolution of the General Assembly of November 3,
1950,* Volume I, Violations by the
Rumanian Government, Freedoms
of Expression and of Press and Publication," together with three
copies of a supplement containing facsimile reproductions of original
exhibits included in English translation in Volume I. Volume I was
..
i8
this question;
80
ties
to
DDS
of
은
​1 Corneliu Bogdan.
20
to
ed after "United States."
415900----57-rol. 2-28
2082
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
.
evi
ev
ar
er
W
If, on the other hand, the Rumanian Government does not contend
submitted by the United States Government to the Secretary Generd
T!
of the United Nations on November 16, 1951, and the supplementi di
being submitted presently.
to
The Secretary of State takes this occasion to note that the Ro
RI
manian Government has referred
to the contents of Volume I, following Up
its submission to the Secretary General of the United Nations, as "
collection of lies and falsifications.” Such references were made be
the Rumanian Government in a declaration in its controlled press or
December 6, 1951.
This declaration the Rumanian Government repeated in a volum.
distributed by it during the meeting of the last General Assembly die
the United Nations in Paris, entitled “The Aggressive Policy 20 ha
Machinations of American Imperialism Against the Rumaniai se
People's Republic."
The attention of the Rumanian Government is called to the fsdw
that of the eighty-nine exhibits, with sub-exhibits, constituting the pa
evidence offered by the United States Government to support is of
charges that the Rumanian Government has violated the provisions el
the Treaty of Peace by which the Rumanian Government undertouren
to secure the enjoyment of freedom of expression and freedom of pres
and publication in Rumania, sixty-five, including sub-exhibits
, ar
reproduced in the supplement in facsimile of the original form th
These sixty-five include articles or statements by Soviet Communist of
authorities (four exhibits), quotations from the Rumanian Constituan
tion (three exhibits), quotations from the official Rumanian Goverb
ment press or Rumanian newspapers appearing during the period to
when the press has been under the Rumanian Government's contra
(six exhibits), and official legislation and decrees of the Rumania G
Government as published in the official gazette, "Monitorul Oficial
or "Buletinul Oficial,” and similar government publications (forty-sit
b
exbibits). Since these sixty-five exhibits, including sub-exbibita
have been in documents believed to be official, the Rumanian Govers
ment is invited to specify which, if any, of these exhibits it charges
fall in the category of "lies and falsifications” and to specify furtheir
the respects in which the "lie” or “falsification” is comprised.
The remaining exhibits offered by the United States Governmentes
evidence in Volume I consist, for the most part, of certain affidavits or
declarations sworn to before persons authorized to administer oats
in various countries. These include forty documents, including
sub-exhibits. If the remarks of the Rumanian Government we
intended to apply to these latter exhibits, the Rumanian Government
is invited to specify which of them it believes fall into the category
of “lies and falsifications," giving again the respects in which the
or "falsification” is comprised.
that the excerpts from its official publications, or from the writings i
Communist leaders, or from the Rumanian Press, contained
exhibits, have in fact been forged or otherwise falsified by the Unite
States or by others, but means only that the Rumanian Government
differs in the interpretation thereof, or if the Rumanian Government
M
.8
ti
t
i
C
1
t
C
o
.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2083
as
te be
SS OR
and
ania
ons of
to which this first installment of evidence relates have not been proved and that
o permit. The refusal of the accused governments to respect their treaty obliga-
mera while not charging that the signatures of affiants have been forged or
falsified or that the affiants have wilfully lied, differs with respect
to the facts to which the affiants have testified, the attention of the
Ru Rumanian Government is called to the introductory statement of the
Win United States Government in Volume I as follows (page vi):
The Rumanian Government is invited to offer in any appropriate way such
evidence-in the legal sense--as it may have in rebuttal and to submit that
evidence to further objective verification.
olum The United States Government has looked in vain in the publica-
old tions of the Rumanian Government on this subject to which reference
has been made above for the submission of any evidence in any legal
sense; it has instead found unsupported conclusions, unresponsive
and irrelevant assertions, always without factual proof, and statements
3 fad which, insofar as they might be relevant, the United States would be
g the prepared to demonstrate, in any appropriate forum governed by rules
rt it of legal procedure, to be false.
It is clear to the United States, as it must be to objective persons
stock examining these documents, that the failure of the Rumanian Gov-
presernment to meet the issues of fact and of law in this matter, coupled
are with that Government's evasion of its established legal duty to submit
form these issues for trial by the Commission provided in the Treaty
of Peace, or by any other judicial body, constitute an unquestionable
stitu- admission by the Rumanian Government that the charges made
yen: by the United States against that Government were correct, that
erind the evidence submitted by the United States amply sustains its charges
entre against the Rumanian Government and that, therefore, the Rumanian
aniel Government stands convicted in accordance with the normal legal
icial" rules obtaining in civilized countries of violating the Treaty of Peace
by wilfully and systematically denying to its citizens and other
persons in its jurisdiction the enjoyment of elemental human rights
and fundamental freedoms which the Rumanian Government pledged.
The Secretary of State takes this occasion to repeat what he said
other in submitting Volume I to the Secretary-General of the United
From its past performance one may expect the Rumanian Government-and
the
other accused governments--to say, always in general terms, that the charges
its persecutions have been directed solely to the suppression of Nazism and Fas-
cism and to make other self-serving statements of sweeping generality. This
will not do. Verifiable facts are called for from the accused, not mere conclusions
nor name calling. The truth is that, since the charges and the evidence in support
thereof relate to facts localized in the territory
of Rumania, their truth or falsity
in the event of dispute may best be determined by inquiries on the spot in
Rumania—and in Hungary and Bulgaria. Were the accused governments sin-
Cerely concerned with establishing the truth, they would welcome an arbitral
commission of the kind stipulated by the Treaty of Peace. In this case, the
commission would receive the testimony of officials of the Rumanian Government
concerned with press, radio, books, theater, book publishing and similar matters;
it would
question other persons
within Rumania
having testimonial
qualifications
and otherwise make the dispassionate, careful inquiry which civilized nations
expect of judicial tribunals, attended by effective assurances to witnesses against
intimidations or reprisals. This the accused governments have thus far refused
Nations:
nt as
its or
aths
ding
wen
ment
20
lie"
tend
sol
the
lita
nent
ent
2084
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
tions by joining in the establishment of commissions must be taken as born in
substantial part out of the suspicion that such a tribunal would seek and find
a way to obtain evidence which these governments prefer to conceal.
In submitting its material, the United States Government is guided by the legal
meaning of the word "evidence" used in the General Assembly resolution; that
is, as denoting testimony which is logically probative of issues of fact raised by St
charges made and the replies thereto, and which is acceptable for consideration
tr
under standards for the conduct of judicial proceedings generally prevailing in
civilized countries. 1
SC
in
th
OS
Travel of American Citizens in Iron Curtain Countries
9. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
MAY 1, 1952 2
m
ar
as
The Department of State announced today that it was taking
B
additional steps to warn American citizens of the risks of travel in
Iron Curtain countries by stamping all passports not valid for travel
in those countries unless specifically endorsed by the Department
of State for such travel.
In making this announcement, the Department emphasized that
this procedure in no way forbids American travel to those areas.
It contemplates that American citizens will consult the Department
or the Consulates abroad to ascertain the dangers of traveling in
countries where acceptable standards of protection do not preval A
and that, if no objection is perceived, the travel may be authorized
All new passports will be stamped as follows:
A
THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID FOR TRAVEL TO ALBANIA, BULGARIA,
CHINA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, POLAND, RUMANIA OR THE
SPECIFICALLY
ENDORSED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AS
A
All outstanding passports, which are equally subject to the restric-
tion, will be so endorsed as occasion permits.
ti
1 The word "Government” in the second paragraph of this quotation does not
appear in the original document.
Department of State press release 341; the text in Department of State
Bulletin, May 12, 1952, p. 736, reads on May'1 instead of today in the first sentence
.
See also statements of Feb. 27, 1950, regarding travel in Bulgaria and Hungary
(ibid., Mar. 13, 1950, p. 399); "May 1, 1951, regarding travel in Hungary (ibid,
May 14, 1951, p. 770); and 'June 2,'1951,' regarding travel in Czechoslovakia
(ibid., June 11, 1951, p. 932).
PI
fo
UNION
OF
SOVIET
SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS
UNLESS
W
BEING VALID FOR SUCH TRAVEL
CO
0
m
e
SE
to
C
py to be
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2085
.
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 6, 1954, p. 862. See also letter of Aug. 27,
statement of Nov. 28, 1953, by the Department of State (ibid., Dec. 14, 1953,
ora in
10. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
find
OCTOBER 31, 1955 1
e legal
thai The Secretary of State announced today in Geneva that United
ed by States passports will henceforth not require special validation for
ration travel to the following countries in the European Soviet bloc: Czech-
ng is
oslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. Instead of the previous endorsement necessitat-
ing special validation for travel in those areas passports will now carry
the following stamp:
ries
"This passport is not valid for travel to the following areas
under control of authorities with which the United States does not
have diplomatic relations: Albania, Bulgaria, and those portions
of China, Korea and Viet-Nam under Communist control."
king B. ALBANIA
11
ave!
nent
11. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
that
NOVEMBER 27, 1954
eas.
dent
November 28. marks the anniversary of the two historic events
g in most cherished by the Albanian people: the first proclamation of
vai
!
Albanian independence in 1443 and the reemergence of Albania as
zed.
an independent nation in 1912.
The traditional friendship of the United States for the people of
Albania has sprung from a natural American sympathy with Albanian
aspirations for liberty. Since World War I, this sympathy has ex-
pressed itself in important actions of support by the United
States
for the sovereign independence of the Albanian nation and for the
welfare of its people. Whenever contacts between Americans and
Albanians occur, we are reminded that the Albanian people retain
ric a keen appreciation of past evidences of U. S. interest and that, in
consequence, a special bond of understanding between the peoples of
the two countries has been firmly established.
present sufferings of the Albanian people under Communist
oppression and their strong desire to be rid of this alien yoke are
matters of deep concern to the United States. The American Gov-
ernment and people recognize the right of the Albanian people to a
sovereign national status, to genuinely democratic institutions, and
to a government of their free choice. During the past few years,
Department of State press release 630.
of the National Committee for a Free Albania (ibid., Oct. 19, 1953, p. 530) and
2
RIA,
THE
LLI
AS
The
not
cate
ace.
ATT
kia
%
pp. 819-820).
2086
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
the United States has noted with satisfaction declarations by official 18
spokesmen of the neighboring countries in support of a free and indo
pendent Albania. Americans look forward to the ultimate resum-
tion by Albania of its rightful place in the community of nation
,
and the U. S. Government will not cease its advocacy of this goal
C. BALTIC STATES
he
ES
PI
12. AIDE-MÉMOIRE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO
19
THE MINISTER OF LITHUANIA, THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES
th
OF LATVIA, AND THE ACTING CONSUL GENERAL OF ES pe
TONIA IN CHARGE OF LEGATION,3 AUGUST 9, 1950 4
tr
OY
tic
tre
as
TI
ect
an
ni
pe
fre
With reference to the aide-mémoire of July 27, 1950, which w
presented to the Department of State by the Honorable the Minister
of Lithuania, the Chargé d'Affaires of Latvia, and the Acting Consu
General of Estonia in charge of legation and in confirmation of the
conversation of that date, the Secretary of State informs the above
named representatives of the Baltic States as follows:
The Department of State is pleased to receive the expression
ol
appreciation tendered by the representatives of Estonia, Latvia
, ar
Lithuania on behalf of their respective countries for the policy
followed by the United States Government toward the Baltic Stata
The Department is also pleased to note the approval expressed
be
the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania of the polie
followed by the United States and the United Nations with respek
to the recent developments in Korea. As is well known, these policis
conform with the traditional views of the United States Governmen
concerning the rights of all peoples to self-determination and freedom
from aggression.
The request of the representatives of the Baltic States that the
United States support consideration by the United Nations "of the
genocidal mass deportations and of the appalling situation in
in the Baltic States” will be brought to the attention of the Depar
.
ment's representatives who are directly concerned with Unitat
Nations affairs,
na
cu
no
lis
ex
mi
dis
genen
ev
fry
1
1 Povilas Zadeikis.
2 Jules Feldmans.
3 Johannes Kaiv.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 28, 1950, p. 334.
5 Not printed.
X]
tre
pp
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2087
tions
wa
* Treaty of Feb. 2, 1920, with Estonia (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol.
treaty of July 12, 1920, with Lithuania (ibid., pp. 105–147).
3 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, vol. II,
official 13. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE
inde THE HOUSE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE AND STUDY
Bump THE SEIZURE AND FORCED INCORPORATION OF LITHU-
ANIA, LATVIA, AND ESTONIA BY THE UNION OF SOVIET
gol
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE TREATMENT OF SAID
BALTIC PEOPLES, NOVEMBER 30, 1953 1
Chairman Kersten and Members of the Committee, I appreciate
having this opportunity to talk to you of the Baltic republics of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I shall speak of their past, their
present, and their future. Each of these phases is full of meaning
The Baltic peoples proclaimed their independence of Russia in
E TO
1918. In 1920, Soviet Russia made peace treaties with them. By
TRES these treaties Soviet Russia recognized, without reservation, the inde-
pendence and sovereignty of the Baltic States. It declared in these
treaties that it voluntarily and forever renounced all sovereign rights
over the Baltic peoples and the territories of the Baltic States.
On July 28, 1922, the United States extended diplomatic recogni-
tion to the Baltic governments. We did so in application of our
niste
traditional concepts.
Consu
of the
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had shown, by four years of existence
bove
es independent states, that their independence had a solid reality.
They had successfully maintained internal stability, both political and
economic. They had conducted themselves internationally in accord-
on of
ance with good practice. Therefore, they were entitled to our recog-
en nition. Indeed, their independence fulfilled the kind of hope for all
peoples which our Nation had entertained since its own beginning.
tates
For two decades the Baltic republics showed the good fruits of
ad freedom. Their creative accomplishments were impressive. Their
polisi natural resources were meager. But the peoples were skilled in agri-
culture and by their hard work they achieved a good measure of eco-
nomic well-being. National arts and crafts flourished. They estab-
content lished a high standard of social justice and won worldwide respect as
exemplary members of the family of nations. Their spiritual and
the
moral strength, their love of liberty, their energy, and their self-
discipline showed that they possessed those qualities which, more than
mere numbers, area, or wealth, make for national worth.
The Baltic republics, during this period, gave the whole world an
ever-needed demonstration of the creative power of self-disciplined
The present dark period began in 1939. It was begun by the
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 14, 1953, pp. 818-819.
policy
licies
edom
t
of the
neral
part
nited
freedom.
pp. 873-874.
2088
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
V
The special
W
ON
ostensibly friendly embrace of the Soviet Union, which pressed “pack
of mutual assistance" i upon these Baltic countries.
The Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs carefully explained the indis
cent and protective nature of these pacts in a major address of Octobe th
31, 1939.2 I quote his words:
PO
The Soviet Union has concluded pacts of mutual assistance with Esthonis,
Latvia, and Lithuania which are of major political importance.
character of these mutual assistance pacts in no way implies any interference on
the part of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Esthonia, Latvia, or Lithuania
, as to
some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. On the contrary, all the
Ba
pacts of mutual assistance strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty
of the signatory states and the principle of non-interference in each other's
asti
fairs. , We declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the
Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all antith
Soviet provocateurs.
th
Scarcely had these passionate and authoritative words been uttered en
when the “Sovietization” began. The concluding acts occurred aboul of
eight months later when the Soviet Union marched its Red Armisha
into the Baltic territories, set up puppet governments, and caused them
to apply for admission into the Soviet Union, an admission that we te
graciously granted. The "nonsensical talk" of the "foreign newspa-
do
pers” had come true.
The free nations of the world were shocked by this aggression. That
United States promptly made its position known. On July 23, 194 CE
our Government described and denounced the "devious processes go
whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the ar
three small Baltic republics-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-wath
to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful
C
neighbors." 3
The "devious processes” still went on until today over 15 ome to
independent nations, representing much of the human race, have beeth
"Sovietized."
go
Today the Soviet leaders still ask the free peoples to accept alth
rely on Soviet mutual security pacts. We should know by now that
when the Soviet rulers use the word "security" they mean an oppade
tunity for the Soviet Union to secure new victims.
What of the future? First of all, let us never lose hope that there a
is a future.
I recall some of the earliest history recorded in the books of the 8 m
Testament. The nations there mentioned are such as Israel, Arabi,
ta
Egypt, and Lebanon. How many times have these nations of many
fo
thousands of years ago been submerged, to rise again?
1 Pact of Sept. 28, 1939, with Estonia (League of Nations Treaty Series
198, pp. 223-229); pact of Oct. 5, 1939, with Latvia (ibid., pp. 381-387) *
pact of Oct. 10, 1939, with Lithừania Department of State Bulletin, Dec. Il
1939, pp. 705-707).
2 Soviet Peace Policy: Four Speeches by V. Molotov (London, 1941), p. 36.
Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1940, p. 48.
8
W
PE
Pc
3
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2089
nce 01
r's
estates.
pacts The Baltic peoples, in the face of every imposition, retain their
will to be free and maintain their steadfast opposition to Soviet despot-
inne ism. Terrorism has been prolonged now for thirteen years. Many of
tobe their courageous and noble representatives have been executed, de-
ported, or driven into exile. But their martyrdom keeps patriotism
alive.
honis
special
The United States, for its part, maintains the diplomatic recognition
which it extended in 1922 to the three Baltic nations. We continue
aia
, &
to deal with those diplomatic and consular representatives of the
thes
Baltic countries who served the last independent governments of these
eignty
states
of the Some may say that it is unrealistic and impractical not to recognize
at the enforced "incorporation" of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into
the Soviet Union. We believe, however, that a despotism of the pres-
tered ent Soviet type cannot indefinitely perpetuate its rule over hundreds
abot' of millions of people who love God, who love their country, and who
rmie have a sense of personal dignity.
them The Soviet system, which seeks to expunge the distinctive charac-
t weteristics of nation, creed, and individuality must itself change or be
SPS- doomed ultimately to collapse. The time of collapse depends largely
on whether the peoples who remain free produce spiritual, intellectual,
The and material richness and a faith which can penetrate any iron
1941| curtain. The captive peoples should know that they are not for-
cesses gotten, that we are not reconciled to their fate, and, above all, that we
of the are not prepared to seek illusory safety for ourselves by a bargain with
-Wertheir masters which would confirm their captivity.
These are our purposes. We have not forgotten the Atlantic
Charter and its proclamation of "the right of all peoples to choose
the form of government under which they will live. We still share
bes the wish expressed in that Charter, "to see sovereign rights and self-
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of
and them."
This is an hour when it is particularly important that our Nation's
dedication to these principles should be made manifest. We approach
& possible meeting with the representatives of the Soviet Union. I
ther can assure you that we welcome opportunities to settle specific disputes
between us; to end the race in armament, particularly atomic arma-
e Olment; and to reduce the risks of war.
But let me also assure you of this. We do not look on the conference
as a place where we surrender our principles, but rather as a place
which I am confident is backed by the Congress and by the American
our principles prevail. That is our resolve, a resolve
poll .
Ferful
Once
tihet
ppor
abis
.
man
table
for making
and
c. 11
Anglo-American Declaration of Aug. 14, 1941; A Decade of American Foreign
Policy, pp. 1-2.
2090
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
18
WO
m
destroy their patriotic and religious allegiances. By the non-violent
captive peoples are showing their rulers the hopelessness of continued by
Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1954, p. 882. For the text of Dr. Spekkes
14. REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE
LATVIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON, MATI of
24, 1954 2
of
I have received from your hands the letters of April 21, 1954, i w
which Mr. Charles Zarine, Minister of Latvia in London and beare Of
of the special emergency power of the last independent Government sti
of the Republic of Latvia, presents you to me as Chargé d'Affaires d all
Latvia in the United States. You come in succession to the late Mr.
Jules Feldmans whose distinguished and devoted services in repre
senting his country to the United States were cut short by his untimely
death last year.
D
In accepting you as Chief of the Latvian Mission in Washington in
the capacity of Chargé d'Affaires, this Government reaffirms its whole
hearted support for the Republic of Latvia and for the realization
of the principle, expressed in the Atlantic Charter, that sovereign rights / 16
and self-government shall be restored to those who have been forcibly
deprived of them.
I am confident that in carrying on the work to which your predeces
sors gave themselves unsparingly in defense of the cause of a free
Latvia, you will enjoy, as they did, the dedicated support of Latvians
everywhere. I am happy to welcome you to this country and to wish
of
you every success in undertaking your duties here. You may be
Ja
assured that my associates in the Department and I will always be
LE
ready to help you in every way we can.
19
I would ask you to thank Minister Zarine for his expression of good M
wishes, which are warmly reciprocated, on behalf of the Latvian nation
and himself for the welfare and prosperity of the United States. Ja
W
15. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
FEBRUARY 15, 1955 3
of
ta
The peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will commemoraš
this year the 37th anniversary of the declaration of their national Co
independence. On this occasion I would like to express to them the
deepest sympathy and warmest friendship of the American people
Despite the efforts of Soviet rulers to hide the nature of their ad
G
ministration in the Baltic States, the plight of the Baltic Peoples is
much in our thoughts.
There are many signs that the Baltic peoples have successful
resisted the devices of Soviet terror and propaganda intended *
but stubbornly insistent expression of their human aspirations
,
disregard of basic human rights.
1 Dr. Arnold Spekke.
to
to
an
Su
an
&C
CO
28
the
M
Bi
th
2
remarks, see ibid.
3 Ibid., Feb, 28, 1955, p. 337.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2091
on 11
ights
eces.
Bulgaria would be represented by Switzerland and that Bulgarian interests in
the United States would be represented by Poland (ibid., Apr. 3, 1950, p. 524).
Ibid., Jan. 30, 1950, p. 159.
* Ibid., Dec. 26, 1949, p. 981.
THE Through our contributions to the material and spiritual strength
MAI of the free world, we seek to create conditions under which the right
of the Baltic peoples to resume their place in the community of free
nations will be universally respected. We are convinced that a
4. i world community in which the Baltic peoples are free to choose their
2AT4 own form of government and their own political and economic in-
ment stitutions is likely to be one which will assure peace, with justice, for
es of all nations, large and small.
Mr.
spre
mely
D. BULGARIA
hole
ation
16. SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: Note From the
cibly
American Legation at Sofia to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry,
February 20, 1950 1
free
vians
The Legation of the United States of America presents its compli-
wish
ments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic
y be
of Bulgaria and has the honor to refer to the Legation's note of
is be
January 20, 1950, in reply to the note delivered by the Bulgarian
Legation in Washington to the Department of State on January 19,
1950, requesting the recall from Bulgaria of the American Minister,
Mr. Donald R. Heath, as persona non grata.
As indicated in the statements of the Under Secretary of State
James E. Webb to the Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires ad 'interim in
Washington on December 12, 1949,4 the United States Government
took a most serious view of the Bulgarian Government's conduct
toward Minister Heath in connection with the trial of Traicho Kostov
and others, in particular the charges against Mr. Heath, the falsity
of which the Bulgarian Government itself was in a position to ascer-
tain. The Under Secretary made it quite clear that these accusations,
coming as they did on top of a long series of intolerable restrictions
and indignities to which the American Legation in Bulgaria had been
subjected, inevitably affected relations between the two countries
and compelled the United States Government to warn the Bulgarian
Government that it could not ignore such deliberate
and unwarranted
actions which were in complete disregard of normal practice in the
fuly
conduct of international relations.
80 The Bulgarian Government, however, persisted in its course of
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 6, 1950, pp. 356, 381. See also state-
ment by the Department of State, Feb. 21, 1950' (ibid., pp. 353-355)
and address
Mar. 22, 1950, the Department of State announced that American
interests in
good
ation
prate
onal
the
ople
ad
ess
lent
the
qued
ke's
%
a Ibid.
2092
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
W
t
11
01
s1
0
ಟೆ ,ನ
.
So here's
conduct. On January 19, 1950, it requested the immediate recal
of Minister Heath from Bulgaria on the grounds that, by alleged
"contacts" with Kostov and others, he had "allowed himself to take
action not in line with his diplomatic functions" and thus had "show it
abrupt interference in the interior affairs of the People's Republic of
ir
Bulgaria concerning its sovereignty as well as its national security.
G
This action on the part of the Bulgarian Government, in putting to
forward wholly unfounded charges against the principal diplomatie
representative of the United States as the basis of a demand for his
recall, could be taken by the United States Government only as
le
confirmation of the mounting evidence that the Bulgarian Govern-
ment was unwilling, in its relations with the United States, to observe
accepted standards of international comity.
The United States Government, in its note of January 20, 1959
,
stated that unless the Bulgarian Government withdrew its note of 1
January 19 and demonstrated its willingness to observe established
international standards of conduct, the United States Government
must conclude that the Bulgarian Government did not desire to
maintain normal relations. Over a period of 4 weeks the Bulgarian
Government did not have the courtesy to reply. On February
16, 1950, it was advised by the Department of State that the
long delay had created a situation which could not continue
indefinitely and was requested to reply immediately. No reply
has been received. The conclusion is inescapable that the Bulgarian
Government is unwilling to modify the position it has taken
t.
that it is unwilling to treat American official representatives in Bul
garia in accordance with the standards of established international
practice; and, consequently, that it is unwilling to maintain normal
diplomatic relations with the United States.
Diplomatic relations between the United States and the postwar
Government of Bulgaria, since their establishment in September
1947, have not been on a basis which could be called friendly or
cordial. Cordiality was scarcely to be expected when Bulgarian
officials and the controlled press were constantly denouncing and in
sulting the United States, and when the Bulgarian Government was
violating its peace treaty a obligations, ignoring resolutions of the
United Nations, and supporting armed action against Greece. It was f
the hope of the United States Government, however, that relations
if not cordial, at least might be correct. But
the treatment accorded
to the American Legation in Sofia, including crippling restrictions on
the entry and movement of American
officials assigned to the Legatio
and an unprincipled campaign of persecution against the Legation's
Bulgarian employees, left no doubt that the Bulgarian
Government
did
not accept even the minimum standards of international practice
Despite all these difficulties the United States Government wished
to maintain diplomatic contact with Bulgaria because of the sincere
desire of the American people to work toward better understanding
1 See statement of Oct. 1, 1947, by Acting Secretary Lovett; A Decade.
American Foreign Policy, pp. 486-487.
2 Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1650 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1915).
C
0
مسلسل سلس ته
T
C
a
r
o
8
I
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2093
eged
latia
Fern-
serye
950,
inue
of the Ministry of Interior, is able to put everyone where he belongs,
ecall
with the Bulgarian people, with whom ties of friendship have linked
them in the past.
take
The Government of the United States will continue to maintain
its feeling of friendship for the people of Bulgaria and to manifest
LOWL
ic of in every appropriate way its deep interest in their welfare. The
ity.
Government of the United States, however, is reluctantly compelled
tting
to conclude that it is no longer possible, in view of the present attitude
of the Bulgarian Government, for the American Minister and his
r his staff to remain in Bulgaria. They have received instructions to
leave Bulgaria as soon as possible. At the same time, the Government
of the United States requests the recall of the Bulgarian diplomatic
mission from the United States.
ce di
17. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN BULGARIA: Statement by
shed
the Department of State, October 20, 19521
ment
e to
The Bulgarian Government has just staged (Sept. 29-Oct. 3)
rian
another of its elaborate "trials” of religious leaders, designed, in this
14PT
the
instance, to destroy the last remnants of the Catholic Church in Bul-
garia. As in the infamous trials of Bulgarian Protestant leaders in
eply
the spring of 1949, the 40 Catholic leaders accused in this latest "trial"
were charged with various vaguely defined anti-State activities, in-
1191
ken;
cluding, in the course of the proceedings, allegations that certain of
Bul
the defendants had engaged in espionage as employees of the Ameri-
cans” and had for this purpose been in touch with a U.S. Government
official on duty with the former American Legation in Sofia.
These charges are groundless and absurd. The same crude attempt
to accuse the U.S. Government and its official representatives in
Bulgaria of being involved in clandestine efforts to overthrow the
Bulgarian Government has recurred in each of the many "trials” in
which the Soviet satellite dictatorship in Bulgaria has sought to eradi-
cate every form of opposition to its regime.
Cynical disregard for the truth characterized the whole “trial.”
the
At the end, the court dutifully meted out the sentences-four defend-
ants
, including one bishop to be shot, all but five of the rest sentenced
for periods ranging from 10 to 20 years.
In å speech just prior to the trial, Bulgarian Minister of Interior
Georgi Tsankov revealed with crude brutality the atmosphere in
which the trial was to be staged. "Let all (who oppose the Communist
regime] know," he said, "that the People's Rule, through the organs
nor their imperialist másters can help them.”
In accordance with this avowed policy, under the flimsiest pretense
of legality, a last vestige of free religion in Bulgaria
has now been
stamped out. The Government of Bulgaria, which already stands
accused before the tribunal of world opinion of the most blatant viola-
of
Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 10, 1952, pp. 728–729.
onal
ma!
WSP
aber
01
T180
| in-
was
Was
ONS,
ded
5 on
tion
on's
nent
cice.
hed
cere
ding
W
1
W
C
C
of Aug. 2, 1955, by the Department of State; ibid. The Swiss Government
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 15, 1955, p. 264. See also the statement
has caused the death of completely innocent people," promised to punish "there
Bulgarian Government expressed "profound regret for this great disaster wbie
guilty of causing the catastrophe," pledged to take preventive measures against
recurrences of such incidents, and indicated readiness to compensate the familie
of the victims as well as to give partial compensation for the material damage
2094 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
tions of its solemn obligation to guarantee human rights and funde 2
mental freedoms to its citizens, has by this new act proved again hor
justly its vicious tyranny deserves the condemnation of free ma
everywhere.
18. BULGARIAN SUGGESTION FOR RENEWAL OF DIPLO
ju
MATIC RELATIONS: Statement by the Department of State
September 10, 1953
d
The Department has noted with interest the recent statement
db
the Bulgarian Prime Minister regarding the present lack of diplomatic
relations between his government and the United States. It would
not serve any useful purpose to review at this time the actions which as
led to the suspension of relations in 1950. The Department woulo!
like to take this opportunity, however, to reaffirm the sentiments de
deep and abiding friendship which the American people and Gover sp
ment have toward the people of Bulgaria.
lo
19. DESTRUCTION OF ISRAELI AIRCRAFT: Note From the
United States Government to the Bulgarian Government (Traps
mitted by the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires at Sofia), August 2, 1955
E
The United States Government protests emphatically against the
brutal action of Bulgarian military personnel on July 27, 1955 i
firing upon a commercial aircraft of the El Al Israel Airlines which
was lawfully engaged as an international carrier. This attack, which
resulted in the destruction of the aircraft and the death of all per
sonnel aboard, including several United States citizens, constitutes
grave violation of accepted principles of international law. Th
Bulgarian Government has acknowledged responsibility for this action
The United States Government demands that the Bulgarian Govern
ment (1) take all appropriate measures to prevent a recurrenced
incidents of this nature and inform the United States Government
concerning these measures; (2) punish all persons responsible for this
incident; and (3) provide prompt and adequate compensation to the
United States Government for the families of the United States
citizens killed in this attack.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 21, 1953, p. 375.
d
2 See the U.S. note of Feb. 20, 1950, to the Bulgarian Government; supra
doc. 16.
ibid., Aug. 29, 1955, pp. 354-355.
2
AGB DD
0
8
1
a
8
e
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2095
mu
nts of
&
SUPA demonstrably untrue charges. These offices of the Embassy and
* Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 529. See also Under Secretary
Department of State Bulletin, May 1, 1950, pp. 684-685.
undel 20. EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE EXECUTION OF NIKOLA
na hor PETKOV: Statement by the Under Secretary of State, September
22, 1955 2
Eight years ago tomorrow Nikola Petkov, a great Bulgarian patroit,
was hanged in Bulgaria. After a trial which made a mockery of
PLO
justice, he was judicially murdered on September 23, 1947, in order
State that communism in his country might triumph.3
Nikola Petkov was a courageous liberal and a valiant defender of
democracy in his country. His countrymen will never forget the
entdboldness and selflessness with which he and his colleagues fought
mali Communist injustice even after their cause seemed lost. That the
Woul Communist press in Bulgaria should finally have described his death
which as an "imperative state necessity” is striking evidence of the vigor
would of his struggle.
Although Nikola Petkov's voice and pen have been silenced, his
iven spirit still lives. His devotion to the cause of justice and democracy
will ever serve as inspiration to his countrymen and to all liberty-
loving people who look forward to the day when the captive peoples
can once again live in freedom under governments of their own
choosing
the
frans
1955
E. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
21. CLOSING OF UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE
LIBRARIES AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK CONSULATE GEN-
ERAL AT CHICAGO: Note From the American Embassy at
Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, April 21, 1950
The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czecho-
d Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to its
note dated April 19, 1950 $ demanding that the United States In-
r the formation Service libraries of the Embassy in Praha and the Consulate
co to General in Bratislava be closed immediately and that the United
State States press attaché, Joseph C. Kolarek, be recalled.
The United States Government considers the demand for the closing
of the United States Information Service libraries and the recall of the
United States press attaché as utterly unwarranted and based on
Consulate General have confined their
cultural and information
execution (ibid., Oct. 4, 1954, p. 490).
See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1178–1182.
st the
155 in
which
which
) per
ates :
They
4
ctior.
over
ce
ument
1 Herbert Hoover, Jr.
cement
nment
15, the
whid
"these
8
gain
milies
magt?
$ Not printed.
2096
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
}
Str
na
we
C01
CW
tor
}
an
COI
rer
nai
evi
mi
these statements is demonstrated by the facts set forth in the affidami
the Department of State Apr. 14, 1950 (ibid., pp. 632–633) regarding the Czecho
P. 632) regarding Elbl's statement, and (2) the statement issued to the press o
slovak propaganda attack against the U. S. information Service in Czechoslovakia wit
2 Note and enclosed affidavit, regarding the efforts of Czechoslovak security Ge=
agents to persuade Miss Kosmak, on the basis of her marriage plans, to renounk)
activities to efforts to promote mutual understanding and friendshin
between the people of Czechoslovakia and the people of the Unita
States. Such activities have departed in no way from the legitimela
Se
functions of diplomatic and consular establishments in the cultural si
information fields.
of
The United States Government, therefore, strongly rejects the al
legations of the Czechoslovak Government made directly or is
directly that Mr. Kolarek, other American official representatives,
Czechoslovak employees were engaged in any improper activities i
the pursuit of their duties. Mr. Kolarek concerned himself only mi
ag?
his official functions relating to press, information, and cultural affair
and never acted in any way which might be regarded as abuse di
his diplomatic office. În view of the allegations of the Czechoslovak
authorities, the United States Government can only conclude that the
Czechoslovak Government does not adhere to the diplomatic practice
the
normally observed by the community of nations.
inf
The methods employed by the Czechoslovak authorities to obtain
a pretext for this provocative action will themselves refute the charge
before the judgment of world opinion. Thus, the statements of the
Czechoslovak citizens, Ivan Elbl and Ruzena Soumarova, agairall be
the United States Information Service library in Praha were produced
and cited by the Czechoslovak authorities only after these two forme
of
local employees of the library were arrested on April 6 and subjectel his
to police pressure for 36 hours prior to their resignation. The
Go
Czechoslovak authorities also cited the declarations of Lubomir
effc
Elsner and Dagmar Kacerovska, two other Czechoslovak citizens
formerly employed by the library, who were convicted of espionag
tim
and plotting against the Czechoslovak Republic in a so-called trial
and sentenced to 18 and 15 years of imprisonment respectivel,
prc
Such "confessions" as were obtained from these unfortunate victims
bet
of police action resulted only after they had been arrested and pro,
sys
essed for approximately one month prior to the trial.1
oth
The complete worthlessness of such charges as are contained in obl
of the director of the United States Information Service library of
Praha, Miss Katherine Kosmak, a copy of which was enclosed i
the Embassy's note of April 17.2 This affidavit makes abundandr Mi
clear how the Czechoslovak police tried to intimidate an America
citizen in the official employ of the Embassy and exploit a person
Go
relationship in the effort to build a propaganda case, by any means
whatsoever, against the United States Information Service and the
Embassy. This affidavit reveals the hollowness of these charges
and the improper conduct of the Czechoslovak police.
of
1 See (?) the note of Apr. 12, 1950, from the American Embassy at Prague em Cz
the Czechoslovak Foreign Office Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 24, 1
pp. 685-686.
an
car
va
ser
con
me.
Sta
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2097
Or 1
used
at the
of the
Ministry's demand that it close its information libraries in Czechoslo-
Sue Czechoslovak Government has unjustifiably insisted on the curtail-
vabis with, as an immediate result of that review, that it close its Consulate
acuri General in Chicago, Illinois, not later than May 1, 1950.
adship
The note of the Ministry asserts that the United States Information
United
Service libraries have functioned without legal title. The United
timate
States Government does not accept this unusual conception of inter-
national relations. The United States Information Service libraries
of the Embassy in Praha and the Consulate General in Bratislava
hes!
were established in Czechoslovakia as in other countries as an integral
component of the official representation of the United States. Such
mes
, cultural and information functions are carried on without special
ties i
agreement as a universal element in the diplomatic life of nations
today.
affair
The Czechoslovak Government never contested this principle
sloval
until it felt obliged to seek excuses for its attempt, in accordance with
an emerging pattern of procedure among the Communist-dominated
countries of Eastern Europe, to isolate the Czechoslovak people from
ictica
the outer world. The United States and other countries can only
obtai
infer that the present government by its demand to close the libraries
harges
reveals its fear of the free exchange of information and the mainte-
nance of free cultural contacts with other peoples. It is only too
evident that the present government is moved by fear to impose
gainst
barriers to the entry of truth from abroad and to the free inquiry of
ducl minds at home. This obvious fear of truth is not in the tradition
of the Czechoslovak people, who have shown throughout their
The
history a stubborn aversion to attempts at thought control. The
Government and people of the United States are convinced that such
efforts of the Czechosìovak Government to repress freedom of thought
tizen
and the desire for impartial information will never stand the test of
conog time in the modern world.
cively
.
It is, likewise, obvious that the Czechoslovak Government's
professions in behalf of world peace and mutual understanding
between nations lack any meaning and constitute, on the contrary, a
systematic campaign to mislead the public of Czechoslovakia and
other countries. The United States Government is reluctantly
ed i
obliged to conclude that the Czechoslovak Government no longer
cares whether it observes diplomatic principles and the convention
courtesy in international life.
The United States Government is obliged to comply with the
pri rakia and recall the press attaché, Mr. Kolarek. The Czechoslovak
Government must, however, expect that its action cannot escape
and serious consequences affecting various aspects of the relations between
the two governments. The attitude of the Czechoslovak authorities
large compels the United States Government to review the scope of activities
of Czechoslovak establishments in the United States. Since 'the
ment of the normal diplomatic and consular functions of the United
States in Czechoslovakia it will understand the request made here-
Orma
jected
homi
I tried
ictim
prot
dami
ry
of
ed in
antis
Sona
ess bis
zech
OUNT
415900_57-Vol. 229
2098
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
3 Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1950, pp. 974-975. A Czechoslovak
22. REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN 23
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CLOSING OF CZECHOSLOVAK
CONSULATE GENERAL AT NEW YORK: Note From the
American Ambassador at Prague ? to the Czechoslovak Foreign
Minister, May 27, 1950 3
I am directed by my Government to state that it cannot admit
aslo
conforming to the generally accepted principles and practices of ist
international comity that a receiving state shall attempt arbitraril vid
and unilaterally to determine the composition of the diplomatic rel
missions of a state with which it maintains relations. Moreover, my St
Government has previously rejected, and rejects once more,
the
allegations the Czechoslovak Government has put forward as
C
pretext for the reduction of United States representation in Czecho-
SEE
slovakia. The United States Government, furthermore, has continu-
at
ing confidence in the good will and traditional feeling of friend
slo
ship of the people of Czechoslovakia toward the United States despite
fro
the efforts of the Czechoslovak Government to sever friendly contacts
tic
between the American and Czechoslovak people.
In view, however, of the repeated provocations and groundles
attacks against the United States and United States representatives
in Czechoslovakia during the past few weeks, it is clear that the
Czechoslovak Government has belied its stated intention of promoting
ha
peaceful relations among nations and has made clear that it is no
longer interested in maintaining normal diplomatic relations with the
United States. The United States Government therefore
, while
ter
reserving its rights and customary privileges, intends to reduce its
qu
official representation to conform with conditions arbitrarily imposet
95
by the Ministry's note under reference.
In view of the forced reduction of its personnel in Czechoslovakia
M.
and in recognition of the curtailed relations between the two countries
ph
imposed by the Czechoslovak Government, the United States Govern
ment hereby announces its intention to close its Consulate General in
Bratislava and requests the Czechoslovak Government to close within
two weeks its Consulate General, including the office of the commercial
counselor, in New York.
1 Ellis 0. Briggs.
2 Viliam Siroky.
boi
note of May 23, 1950 (not printed) had requested the United States
to reduce in un
official personnel in Czechoslovakia to 12 persons.
See also statement of May 1 of
1950, by the Department of State; ibid., p. 974.
lat
me
me
cro
at
Į
noi
1
fro
lea
Car
no
lea
offi
pal
1
not
10,
195
2
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2099
reign
as 8
tives
ce lik unpainted border stones in line with the first barrier. No member
* ,
? Ibid., pp. 421-422.
VIN 23. CZECHOSLOVAK CHARGES REGARDING BORDER VIO-
VAK LATIONS AND RADIO BROADCASTS: Note From the American
the Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, June
19, 1951 1
The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czecho-
it a slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with reference to the Min-
s distry's note of May 21, 1951,2 concerning the question of border
marily violations, certain broadcasts in Czech and Slovak languages, and
naté related matters, has the honor, pursuant to instructions of the United
;
mStates Government, to make the following reply:
tha
With respect to the charges of violations of the border between
Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany by United
echo
tinu
States military personnel, the Ministry's note states that on May 4,
iend
at 6 or 7 a. m., military personnel in two autos crossed the Czecho-
:spite
slovak frontier between frontier markers 22 and 23, drove around
tacts
frontier barriers on both sides of the frontier, studied frontier installa-
tions
, used field glasses and photographed certain objects.
dless
The Embassy informs the Ministry that the United States Govern-
ment does not condone any violation of the Czechoslovak frontier by
members of its armed forces whether on the ground or in the air.
oting
An investigation of the incident referred to in the Ministry's note
is no
has been made. The results of this investigation indicate that the
crossing of the Czechoslovak frontier by American military personnel
at the place indicated did in fact take place and that it was unin-
tentional and inadvertent. The American military personnel in
question entered Czechoslovak territory to the maximum depth of
95 yards and remained there approximately 5 minutes.
The report received by the Ministry is inaccurate in two respects:
Members of the American patrol, which numbered six men, took no
photographs; furthermore, they drove around one road barrier but
not two, as they stopped before reaching the second barrier.
The explanation of this unwitting crossing of the Czechoslovak
appears to be that all members of the patrol, including the
leader, were unfamiliar with this segment of the frontier and were
carrying out their first patrol in this area.
Furthermore, there was
no sign indicating the presence of the border which led the patrol
leader to assume that the second barrier marked the international
boundary
. He, as well as members of his patrol, failed to see the
y of this patrol realized he had been in Czechoslovakia until so informed
later by the investigating officer.
Although the border crossing was unintentional, the investigating
officer has recommended
that disciplinary action be taken against the
patrol leader on the grounds that his failure to make reconnaissance
10 1951, pp. 417-418), and @zechoslovak note of July 21, 1951 (ibid., Sept 10,
the
h the
while
ce its
Dosed
atries
vern.
al in
cithin
ercial
frontier
lovat
1951, pp. 418-421).
2100
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
à
U
m
SI
ti
From the circumstances in which this frontier violation occurred.
directing this operation took care to remain inside of Czechoslovakia,
intentional violation of the territory of the United States Zone o
before passing the first barrier constituted a failure to exercise goed
judgment.
The Embassy assures the Ministry that all possible steps are being
taken by the appropriate United States authorities to prevent the
recurrence of such an incident.
As stated, the United States Government does not tolerate an
violation of the Czechoslovak frontier by members of its armed fores
and by the same token will not tolerate the violation of the United
States Zone of Germany by Czechoslovak personnel. In this connes
tion the United States Government calls the attention of the Czecho
slovak Government to two recent violations in which armed members
of the Czechoslovak armed forces crossed the border. On May 24
from approximately 0930 to 1000 hours six Czechoslovak soldiers were
illegally within the United States Zone of Germany at the Regnita
River east of Hof in the American area. Furthermore one of these
soldiers threatened a German national, Margarete Rausch, with
machine-pistol while within the United States Zone of Germany. Ti
At approximately 0930 May 24 two Czechoslovak soldiers dis-
mounted from vehicles in Czechoslovakia, crossed the border and the
Regnitz River and penetrated into the territory of the United States
Zone of Germany to the depth of approximately 35 yards. The it
soldiers told Mrs. Rausch that she had been cutting grass in Czecho-
slovakia and must return with them. Despite her insistence that if A
no time had she been in Czechoslovakia, one of the soldiers pushed ti
machine-pistol into her back and forced her to return across a stream
P
to a place, likewise in Germany, where she had been working. Fou
more Czechoslovak soldiers joined the group and laughed when she
told them they were all standing in Germany. Her husband, Mar
Rausch, came up and also told the soldiers they were in Germans
,
During the course of this conversation a seventh Czechoslovak soldier
,
I
presumably the one in command, remained in Czechoslovak territory E
near one of the border markers and finally signalled to the six soldiers
who thereupon left the United States Zone.
T
The American military authorities were immediately notified
this violation of the United States Zone of Germany and on the same
morning (May 24) undertook an investigation. The investigating G
officer and a sergeant while standing at the spot in Germany
the Czechoslovak soldiers first intercepted Mrs. Rausch noticed two
Czechoslovak soldiers
partially concealed in the brush on the Czecho
slovak side of the border with their weapons aimed at them. As the
American soldiers started towards the Rausch house, the Czechy G
slovak soldiers fired two shots, apparently not aimed at the Americas I
soldiers.
particularly the fact that the Czechoslovak soldier who was
the Embassy is justified in drawing the conclusion that this was
DE
je
01
11
0!
where
II
u
olemasol S 2
CA
apparent
Ppt
A
C
le
0
Germany.
Between 11:00 and noon on June 6 a tractor dragging logs and car
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2101
Onet
by 2
were
Czechoslovak authorities. The Czechoslovak Government will doubt-
ing three unarmed civilians and a member of the uniformed Czecho,
good slovak Security Police armed with a machine pistol, was observed
crossing the border twice and penetrating the United States Zone
being each time to a depth of 10 or 15 yards near Wies. The improvised
& the
road used by the Czechoslovak personnel was clearly in the United
States Zone. After the second unauthorized entry of the armed
a member of the Security Police, he was apprehended by a patrol of
orce the United States constabulary. He was returned to Czechoslovak
nited
authorities at approximately 2330 on June 7.
The United States Government considers these actions as entirely
echo-
uncalled for and regards the first incident as particularly flagrant.
abers
The Ministry is requested to undertake a careful investigation to
determine who was responsible for these border violations and to
insure that the guilty person or persons be appropriately disciplined.
The Embassy expects the Ministry to show the same diligence in
these
informing it of the results of the investigation and in assuring it that
ith a
measures to prevent recurrence have been taken, as was shown by
United States authorities in connection with the incident which is the
dis subject of the first part of this note.
d the
As to radio broadcasts, the Czechoslovak Government asserts that
itats the United States Government utilizes broadcasting stations for activ-
The
ities hostile to Czechoslovakia and in so doing broadcasts false news
echo-
and propaganda of incitement against Czechoslovakia and its people.
at at
Although the Ministry may by this reference intend to make accusa-
hed i
tions against the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe as well as
purely commercial broadcasting stations, its statements on the sub-
Fou
ject appear to relate chiefly to Radio Free Europe. It should be made
clear at once that the Voice of America represents a radio broadcasting
Mes
organization of the United States Government while Radio Free
har Europe was organized
and is operated by a group of private citizens.
itory
It is a division of a corporate body, the National Committee for a Free
Europe, which is incorporated in the State of New York. More than
16 million American citizens are supporting Radio Free Europe.
Thus while the American
people have a direct interest in the activities
of Radio Free Europe, the United States Government does noč.
Since Radio Free Europe has established broadcasting stations in
Germany the interest
of the United States Government as an occupy-
ing power is involved but it is limited to matters concerning frequency
usage and observance by Radio Free Europe of any laws and regula-
tions of the Allied High Commission that may be applicable. Radio
censorship does not exist in the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany and freedom
of speech prevails there as in the United States,
It is believed that this policy is fully in accordance with the obligations
The United States Government cannot accept the view that a
responsibility exists to require the Radio Free Europe or any private
American radio organization to transmit only what will please the
less appreciate that freedom of expression, whether of the press, radio,
or individual utterance, constitutes a fundamental principle of Ameri-
l'eau
n she
Idier
Idiers
ed of
Same
ating
There
two
echo
s the
echo-
rican
of international law.
rred
entli
akia,
ser
ne of
2775"
با ما متعجبم
2102
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1 See Annex to European Broadcasting Convention, signed at Copenhagen!
Sept. 15, 1948, printed by the General Secretary of the International Telecom
&
ti
T
0
C
can democracy, indeed of the Western democracies generally. Faith-
fully observing the principle of freedom of information the United
States Government does not attempt to censor the American press
or nonofficial radio transmissions either from the United States of
the United States Zone of Germany. It is not, therefore, possible or
desirable to exercise control over these organizations in violation of
the principle of freedom of information.
Nothing in this policy violates any international agreement con-
cerning Germany, or any other international agreement to which the
United States Government is a party, or is contrary to any principle
of international law in connection with broadcasting activities. The
United States Government, therefore, fails to find any foundation
for the charges of the Czechoslovak Government in this connection
On the contrary in observing the principle of freedom of information to
the United States Government considers that it is faithfully adhering
to principles generally recognized among nations. If the Czechoti
slovak Government refers in this accusation to the use of wavelengths i
by Radio Free Europe allocated in accordance with the "Copenhagen
Plan" 1 it should be noted that neither the United States Government
nor the United States authorities in Germany were signatories to the ti
Copenhagen agreement and that it is in no way binding upon
them
It should also be noted that even some of the countries which signed in
this agreement have deviated from its frequency assignments.
t
Objection is found by the Czechoslovak Government to the employ-
ment by Radio Free Ěurope of those persons described in the Mis
istry's note as "traitors of the Czechoslovak people from the ranks d
of the mercenary Czechoslovak emigration.” These men are generalit
recognized by the world as political refugees simply desiring a free ant
democratic government. Moreover whom the Radio Free Europe
employs seems an irrelevant matter clearly not appropriate for comh
sideration by the Czechoslovak Government, as it is not by the United
States Government.
The Ministry's note finally refers to a regulation of the Minister of
Finance of the Federal Republic of Germany dated February 10
, 1931
,
allegedly on the treatment of persons claiming to be agents of the
Western occupation powers upon entering the territory of the Federa
Republic of Germany. The United States Government is not a manip
that any such notice had been officially promulgated by the Federal
Republic of Germany on a matter presumably directed exclusively for
to its own administrative
officials and, before considering the questio
further, would be greatly interested in receiving a copy of the dog
ment in the possession of the Czechoslovak authorities together with
an explanation of how it was acquired and what means the Czechos
slovak Government has established in Western Germany for the
gathering of such matter.
C
B
C
S
D
B
munication Union, Bern, Switzerland, 1948.
0
VIWATAWAV
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES 2103
SO
4
le or
1
Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1951, pp. 93-94.
aith.) 24. AIRPLANE INCIDENT OF JUNE 8, 1951: Note From the
nited
American Ambassador at Praguel to the Czechoslovak Foreign
Minister, June 24, 1951 3
ress
I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's Note No. 651 of June 17
and Your Excellency's reply of June 21 * concerning the unintentional
landing near Prague on June 8 of two United States jet planes, the
Con- pilots of which are still being detained by the Czechoslovak Govern-
the ment.
ciple Your Excellency's reply takes the position that notwithstanding
T the unequivocal statements made by me during my conversation with
you on June 15 and confirmed by the Embassy's note of June 17, the
tion
. Czechoslovak authorities must examine whether this really was a
ation training mission and whether the Czechoslovak aerial border has truly
ering been violated unintentionally.” Your communication indicates that
cho the investigation is still in progress, apparently seeking thereby to
igths justify the continued detention of the two pilots.
lagen
My Government directs me strongly to reiterate the request made
mentorally on June 15 and repeated in the Embassy's note of June 17 that
o the the pilots in question be released without further delay. Your Ex-
hem cellency is reminded that these two young men have already been
gned in the hands of the Czechoslovak authorities for 16 days, although all
the information the pilots could possibly possess concerning their
plos. having become lost on a training flight and their landing in Czecho-
Min slovakia must have been communicated by them to the authorities
calls during the first few hours, if not during tắe first few minutes after
erally their
their emergency landing in this country on June 8.
Your Excellency is further reminded that although during our con-
Trope versation on June 15 you declared the pilots are not prisoners, they
con- have been and are still being held incommunicado, and efforts on the
mited part of the Embassy to visit them and ascertain their personal welfare
With respect to the statement in Your Excellency's note that the
193. United States planes intentionally and systematically cross the Czecho-
f the Slovak border, my Government declares that such charges are false
der and furthermore an unintentional crossing of the border by, lost
wer planes
, as occurred on June 8, does not constitute, and would not be so
dend considered by nations generally, "flagrant violation of the most
ivel fundamental principles of international law prohibiting any flights of
stio military planes over the territory of another state without its express
docu- consent.'
Furthermore, with reference to 116 alleged violations of Czecho-
echoslovak territory referred to in the enclosure to Your Excellency's
the note of June 21, it is remarked that no identification numbers and
no description of any kind concerning the planes are given, and
See also statement
and
have been unavailing.
cer
o
2&gen
1 Ellis 0. Briggs.
2 Viliam Siroky,
econ
8
Not printed.
2104
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ul
W.
al
ET
P]
rC
tr
or
fo
in
It
st
of
ar
ha
a
tł
sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, subject to reduction to 5 years for good be
(XIII), Sept. 1, 1951; Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Thirteenth
The Czechoslovak Government
therefore it is difficult for a proper investigation to be made by the
appropriate authorities. I may mention that the Embassy alread
brought to the Ministry's attention the importance of specific data to
support alleged violations.
In view of the fact that it was not the intent of the flight to enter
Czechoslovakia, the presence of guns and ammunition therein wa
unintentional vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia as was the presence of the
aircraft themselves. Loaded guns are frequently carried on United
States military aircraft on operational training flights within the
United States Zone as is common of air forces of all nations when plane
are over territory within their jurisdiction. The key point in the
matter after all is that the planes were lost and did not cross the
Czechoslovak frontier by intention.
I must again remind the Ministry, as the Embassy did in Note Na
558, February 7, that no reply was received to the Embassy's
Note No. 422, August 28, 1950, requesting that investigation be
made of a number of violations of the United States Zone of Germany
by Czechoslovak aircraft. The aircraft guilty of these violations were
described in detail. Also, the requested assurances that suitable
instructions be issued to Czechoslovak aviators to prevent such
violations have not been received. Furthermore, the Embassy
has
been informed that such violations are continuing:
The United States Government does not admit the right of Czecho-
slovakia to continue to detain the two pilots of the jet planes landing
here unintentionally on June 8, the immediate release of whom
again requested.
25. OATIS CASE: Statement by the Department of State,
July 4, 1951 :
The mock trial of the Associated Press representative at Prague
William N. Oatis, has now been brought to a conclusion. The
sentencing is but an epilogue to this ludicrous travesty of justin
in which the victim was required to speak his prefabricated "COL-
fession” as a part of a public spectacle exhibiting all the usual Com
1 Not printed.
2 Not printed.
Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1951, pp. 92–93.
arrested Apr. 23, 1951. On July 4, 1951, he was found guilty of espionage and
to
rials relating to the Oatis trial, see ibid., Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 283–288, and Sept. 2
1951, pp. 489-490. See also H. Con. Res. 140, Aug: 23, 1951; infra. For the
text of remarks regarding the Oatis case by Walter Kotschnig, 'U.s. Represents
:
Bulletin, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 289; see also Economic and Social Council Res.
,
informed the American Embassy on May 15, 1953, that Mr. Oatis had been part
doned; Department of State Bulletin, June 1, 1953, p. 785.
exchange of letters between Secretary Duiles and Mr. Oatis, see ibid., Oct. 12
1953, p. 491.
le
A
da
CO
to
ar
3
pl
th
a
ali
in
DIE
3
Mr, Oatis Fas
in
th
ar
For the texts of mate
m
TE
ju
For the subsequent / SE
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2105
read
enter
I
Were
State Bulletin, June 11, 1951, p. 932.
y the
munist trial techniques. This was prepared and rehearsed in advance
under police auspices and by customary Communist police procedures
ata
when Oatis was held incommunicado for 70 days between his arrest
and presentation in court.
The proceedings revealed the flimsiest kind of alleged "evidence,”
even more insubstantial than the Communists are accustomed to
of the
produce in trumped-up trials of this type. For example, the normal
nited
routine requests of the Associated Press for news reports, openly
n the
planes
transmitted by wire, were distorted into "espionage missions on
orders from centers in New York and London."
in the
Such an attempted hoax on the intelligence of world opinion will
s the
fool While it had all the trappings of legal procedure, it was
e M
in fact a kangaroo court staged before the klieg lights of propaganda.
Its
purpose was purely intimidation and propaganda designed to
USSF strike at the United States press services and against the free press
in be
of the world.
man
The "confession" of "espionage” was in truth but the admission of
an American reporter that, in the high traditions of his profession,
table he was attempting under the most unfavorable conditions to report
such
a true picture of conditions and events in Czechoslovakia as he saw
has
7
them.
echo-
The Czechoslovak regime has clearly demonstrated that it considers
"
As the prosecutor publicly stated, Oatis was held to be a particularly
dangerous “espionage” agent because he insisted on obtaining accurate,
correct, and verified information. To do this is "a crime,” according
to the concepts of the present Czechoslovak authorities, who find
any press activity except the transmission of official propaganda to be
"espionage." The Czechoslovak Government thus rejects com-
pletely the principle of freedom of information. It is presumed that
press of the free world will so view this turning back of the clock.
The proceedings of this especially arranged spectacle also included
a number of groundless accusations against the American Ambassador
COM
and other members of the United States Embassy staff. These were
invented as a part of the entire propaganda performance in attacking
This action comes as a climax in the treatment of American citizens
in Czechoslovakia. It has accordingly been necessary to recognize
that it is no longer safe for American citizens to go to that country
a be and to prohibit private travel there until further notice.
If further evidence were needed, the arrest, the detention for
months without access to friend, Embassy representative, or trusted
the legal counsel, the forced confession" to fabricated charges, the
est- shabby "conviction" of William N. Oatis shows that the present
regime in Czechoslovakia fears truth, hates liberty, and knows no
See statement of June 2, 1951, by the Department of State; Department of
om is
-
the
ague,
The
stice
Conia
the United States.
and
"ague
nate
1
1.24
State
justice.
389
eenth
ment
par
went
12
2106
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
26. OATIS CASE: House Concurrent Resolution 140 (82d
Congress, 1st Session), August 23, 1951 1
SC
al
ai
01
WHEREAS the arrest and conviction of William N. Oatis, corr- th
spondent for the Associated Press in Prague, Czechoslovakia
, is i b]
shocking violation of the fundamental human freedoms guaranteed
in the United Nations Charter; and
WHEREAS the treatment of William N. Oatis demonstrates that the th
Czechoslovak Government has willfully repudiated the principle din
free information which is so essential to peaceful cooperation and se
friendly relations among the people of the world; and
al
WHEREAS the persecution by the Government of Czechoslovakia
of other American citizens is condemned and deplored by the people
th
of the United States, and throughout the free world: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That the Congress of the United States expresses its profound is
G
dignation at the arrest, sham trial and unjust conviction of William
N. Oatis; that the executive agencies of the Government be requested
do
to take all possible action to bring about his release; and that the I
sense of this resolution be conveyed by the proper officials of ou
Government to the United Nations and to the officials of the Czechoth
slovakian Government.
Be it further resolved, That it is the sense of the Congress that al
F
commercial relations with Czechoslovakia should be terminated 19
immediately, and should be resumed only if and when the Govern
ment of Czechoslovakia restores to William N. Oatis his freedom.
al
no
ot
es
0
01
27. CZECHOSLOVAK CHARGES REGARDING AMERICAN
POLICY IN GERMANY: Note From the American Embassy
Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, September 24
,
1951 2
hi
M
D
ad
se
01
er
fr
The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czecho
slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to reply, on
instructions from its Government, to the Ministry's note of Augusto
1951, setting forth various charges about U.S. policy in Germany
and the activities of the Sudeten population transferred to German
The Embassy emphatically rejects the allegation that the US
Government is fostering militarism and irredentism in German
Such charges have no basis whatever in fact and
the Embassy can only
conclude that such completely unfounded charges are made for the
165 Stat. B 81. See also summary of remarks of Aug. 29, 1951, by Secretary
Acheson to Vladimir Prochazka, the newly appointed Czechoslovak Ambassador
;
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 10, 1951, pp. 416,417.
2* Ibid., Oct, 15, 1951, pp. 629-630.
3 Ibid., pp. 628–629.
b
g
ti
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2107
3 Germany, 1947–1949: The Story in Documents (Department of State publica-
tion 3556; 1950), pp. 283-305.
1
CONTE
vakis
2d sole purpose of endeavoring to mislead the peoples of Czechoslovakia
and other countries.
As indicated in the Embassy's statement of November 8, 1947,
the objective of the U.S. authorities in Germany has been, and is, to
is el bring about as soon as possible the assimilation of Germans trans-
ated ferred from Czechoslovakia to the U.S. zone into the German economy
and social structure as well as the identification of their interests with
at tel those of Germany. This purpose is, of course, being accomplished
led in a democratic manner, permitting organizations among such persons
and seeking to protect or improve the welfare of members, and permitting
also peaceful and orderly expression of views.
The basic democratic principle of free expression of views including
eople those not concurred in by others is apparently not understood by the
efore present Government of Czechoslovakia. Strict controls over freedom
of speech such as are imposed on the people of Czechoslovakia do not
ring)
accord with democratic traditions on which the Federal Republic of
de Germany, as well as the Western occupying powers, is based.
llien In pursuance of the policy of fostering the development of free and
este democratic institutions in Germany, the Occupation Statute of April
t the 10, 1949,2 was enacted. Under this statute the U. S. authorities
f
or no longer exercise control over the establishment of organizations in
echo- the U.S. zone which engaged in political activity. The activities
of such organizations are within the scope of the Constitution of the
Federal
Republic of Germany, which became effective on May 22,
nated 1949. This constitution does not provide for controls by a single
totalitarian party, such as once existed in Nazi Germany and now
exist in certain other countries.
The Ministry has protested because Franz Bluecher, Vice Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany, attended a meeting at Frankfort
on July 1, sponsored by the Union of East German Compatriots, and
CAN made a statement described by the Ministry as "provocative.
The U.S. Government has found no evidence that Dr. Bluecher in
his statement manifested "aggressive designs” as alleged by the
Ministry and regrets that his
remarks were distorted in this fashion.
Dr. Bluecher spoke of the Charter of East German Compatriots
adopted August 5, 1950, and took as his principal thesis the following
sentence from the charter: "We, the expellees, renounce all thoughts
of revenge and retaliation and shall support with all our strength every
endeavor directed towards the establishment of a United Europe in
which nations may live in freedom from
fear and force.”
The U.S. Government fails to understand how a speech based on
concept of "a united Europe in which nations may live in freedom
from fear and force” which appears to accord with the interests and
hopes of all European peoples, is considered “provocative" and "ag-
gressive" by the Czechoslovak Government.
at all
Ver-
m.
sy at
29
.
echo
On
ist 6
nang
tant
U.S.
the
only
- the
etary
ador
? Ibid., p. 629.
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 586-588.
2
2108
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
in
to
0
in
Steps are now being taken toward the ideal of such a united Europe
by various democratic Governments in Europe, including the Federal
Republic of Germany. This development is encouraged by the
U.S. Government as an important contribution to the stability, peace
,
and progress of Europe so that smaller nations can live in security
and freedom, without fear of attacks and impositions by powerfd
neighbors such as took place in Central Europe prior to and during t
the last war, and again in Eastern Europe since 1945.
t
The U.S. support of peaceful international cooperation in Europe S
provides a striking contrast to the apparent intent of the Czechoslovak
Government as evidenced by the note under reference and other acts
.
By consistent distortion of facts, by attacking freedom of expression
and information both at home and abroad, by seeking to prevenir
contact between the people of Czechoslovakia and other peoples
db
Europe whereby free international cooperation may be achieved, the
Czechoslovak Government is contributing not to peace but to inte
creased international tension. Such actions, in the view of the fa
Government, are not in the interest of the people of Czechoslovakis
or of Europe as a whole.
Despite the accusations of the Czechoslovak Government that the M
policy of the United States and its allies is aggressive because con-
sideration is being given to including German armed units in European ir
defense forces, the reasons for the present strengthening of West in
European defenses is clear to all who objectively examine postwar on
developments. At the close of the war the United States and other
Western countries, looking forward to a peaceful future after years po
of bloodshed, effectively demobilized their forces.
tu
In contrast the Soviet Union alone maintained vast numbers of
men under arms. At the same time that country embarked on a
policy of breaking agreements designed to serve as the basis of th
future peace, initiated a policy of conquest and threatened Europeat co
peace further by arming satellite regimes, including that established w
in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.
H
The free countries of Europe,
in cooperation with the United States en
had no recourse therefore but to take measures for common defenses
While undertaking such a program, however, the concept of a unite si
Europe is not lost sight of but strengthened. The Czechoslovak se
Government in abetting Soviet propaganda and tactics appears
stand firmly opposed to efforts of free countries to ensure their
freedom and working peacefully together.
th
ce
VE
to
ge
er
In
i
:
tr
he
al
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2109
authorities regarding the train; ibid., pp. 627–629.
acts
.
treatment of four Czechoslovak officials who, according to the Czechoslovaks,
had been sent to the U.S. Zone in Germany to negotiate with United States
rope 28. TRAIN INCIDENT OF SEPTEMBER 11, 1951: Note From the
deral American Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign
the Ministry, October 1, 1951 1
Buce
urity The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czecho-
erful slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge
iring the Ministry's note of September 20 with an enclosure concerning
the unscheduled departure from Czechoslovakia for Germany on
trop: September 11 last of a train carrying approximately 100 persons, a
Oval number of whom have since freely indicated their desire not to return
to Czechoslovakia. In this connection the Ministry makes a number
ssion of assertions, accusations, and complaints, as well as several requests,
vent in regard to all of which the Embassy has been directed to reply on
es of behalf of the American Government as follows:
, the
The contents of the Ministry's note, and of publicity simultaneously
Dilemanating from official sources in Prague on the same subject, seem
founded on the notion that the train in question was seized by Czecho-
rakia Slovak “terrorists” and that this seizure was part of a conspiracy
involving these so-called terrorists and certain foreign agents. The
t the Ministry implies that these conjoined forces are sinister, and their
COD- purposes hostile and furthermore, that their behavior has been
pean irritating to the Czechoslovak Government. The Ministry further
West implies that the Czechoslovak Government would like to get its hand
on the persons who ran off with their train.
other
The Ministry's note employs this fiction apparently with the
Tean purpose to conceal, if possible, the fact that the direction and depar-
ture of the train from Czechoslovakia was an unaided undertaking of
ns of certain citizens of that country who adopted this somewhat uncon-
on & ventional method of leaving the country and simultaneously indicated
is of their attitude. It is noted, moreover, that this explanation does not
peer conform with the original attempt to intimate that defective brakes
were responsible for the entry of the train into Western Germany.
However much the Czechoslovak Government has chosen thus to
cates explain the occurrence or attempt thereby to keep from the Czecho-
ense slovak people the actual circumstances of this departure, the United
nited States cannot understand how the Czechoslovak authorities can
novel seriously attempt to use this fiction in a diplomatic note to a foreign
government.
To declare that a foreign agency aided in the execution of this
enterprise is not only contrary to the facts but underestimates the
ingenuity of the Czechoslovak citizens concerned, in which connection
the Embassy has been authorized to make clear that the
part played
by the American Government in the episode in question has been
limited to action by the United States authorities in Germany in
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 15, 1951, pp. 626-627. See also Czecho-
slovak note of Sept. 20, 1951. and the U.S. reply" of Oct. 1, 1951, regarding the
strar
ished
as to
their
2
Ibid., pp. 624-625.
2110
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
n
à
8
(
(
C С.
that is, as soon as their wishes had been ascertained and necessary
arrangements for their return had been completed. The remaining
granting political asylum to all those asserting that they did not
desire to return to Czechoslovakia.
According to such information as has come to the knowledge of the
United States Government, recent departures from Czechoslovakia
have been effected among other means by such vehicles as bicycles
,
automobiles, and trucks, as well as considerable assortment of a
planes and even a glider, whereof the train is merely the latest and
largest conveyance to be employed. In addition there has been
rather substantial exodus of Czechoslovak citizens proceeding on fock
World opinion has not been accustomed to hold, as the Ministry ap-
parently attempts to do, that such persons who have sought to leave
their country in order to obtain political asylum abroad are "terrorists
and "criminals." Based on records of the United States authorities
in Germany, one quality which these Czechoslovak citizens coming
to Western Germany have in common is the desire for human freedom
.
The American Government accordingly rejects the assertion that
"grave crimes" were committed in an action involving the departure
from Czechoslovakia for political reasons, or that the activities could
be considered to come within the purview of the extradition treatī
mentioned in the Ministry's note. In this connection reference is
made to the United States position when the Czechoslovak Goveri-
ment asked for the extradition as "criminals” and “terrorists” persons
leaving Czechoslovakia for political reasons by three Czechoslovak
transport planes which landed at Erding Field near Munich on March
24, 1950. It was explained at that time that no basis in law exists
for making or complying with such an extradition request. Neither
the Extradition Treaty of 19252 nor any other treaties presently
in force between the United States and Czechoslovak Governments d
fi
can be considered applicable to the question of returning from the
United States Zone in Germany any of those now accused by the
Czechoslovak Government. It may be noted that Article III of the
Extradition Treaty specifically excludes its application to any crime
C
or offense of a political character and recognizes the right of the
state
receiving an extradition request to decide whether a case is of a polit
cal character. The United States has never recognized, as is also the
case with many other countries, any obligation to extradite in the 2
absence of a treaty. No basis therefore exists for the charge of the
Czechoslovak Government that the United States has contravenet
any principles of international law or the stipulations of the Extra
dition Treaty.
The train in question had aboard approximately 100 persons why t
it reached Germany. Those who of their own free volition expressedo t
desire to return numbered 79 individuals, all of whom, except two, we
permitted to depart from Germany within two days of their arrive
Unite
1 See the U. S. notes of Apr. 6, 1950 (Department of State Bulletin, Apt
1950, pp. 595–597), in reply to Czechoslovak notes of Mar. 30, 1950 (ibid, pa
597-599).
Treaty of July 2, 1925; Treaty Series 734 (44 Stat. pt. 3, p. 2367).
ti
0
a
من مع ع
Ա
C
a
F
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2111
not
eare
ming
ce is
Pern-
ISONS
2 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 22, 1952, p. 985.
States custody all appropriate facilities were provided for their
comfort and welfare. The Czechoslovak Government may care to
I the note how the United States authorities carried out this obligation of
shi comity in comparison with the retention by Czechoslovak authorities
cles
for 26 days of two Western jet pilots in the United States jet planes
who, on becoming lost and running out of fuel, were obliged to land
and near Praha on June 8.1
beer The train itself, which has been in the custody of appropriate
foot authorities, will be released at the frontier near Asch. It will not be
necessary for Czechoslovakia to send a delegation to Germany for this
7 Allo
purpose. It may be pointed out in this connection that the Ministry
ists" did not proceed properly in attempting at the outset to obtain a
cities release of the train by sending four representatives to the United
States Zone without official notification to the United States Govern-
domi.
ment.
that Finally, note is taken of the statement in the communication under
rtune acknowledgment to the effect that Czechoslovakia seeks to reserve the
jould
assertion of a claim for "full compensation for damage caused to the
eaty
Czechoslovak state," in reply to which the Embassy is directed to
observe that whenever Czechoslovakia may feel impelled further to
promote this project, that the Government may expect to receive a
counter-claim including various expense incurred by the American
Government in connection with the train in Germany.
As of probable interest to the appropriate Czechoslovak authorities,
the Embassy encloses the original signed statement of seven passengers
on the train, six of whom were listed in Annex A of the Ministry's note
ently as being "forcibly abducted against their will and unlawfully
nents detained.” As the Ministry will observe, no assertion could be farther
from the truth.
Since the Czechoslovak Government has already published its
f the communications of September 20 to the American Government, it is
crime requested that comparable publicity be given by the Czechoslovak
Government to this communication.
polis
the 29. THE SLANSKY TRIAL: Statement by the Secretary of State,
December 10, 19522
tened
The recent trial of Slansky 3 and others which concluded with the
imposing of drastic sentences of death or life imprisonment for all of
the accused is another in the series of staged spectacles patterned on
purge trials at Moscow during the 30's. There is nothing new or
unexpected about it.
This show trial in which Stalinist communism devours its own
children, and some of its most faithful votaries, has been repeated time
and again to sound a macabre warning to those Communist leaders
See the U.S. note of June 24, 1951; supra, doc. 24.
..
, ??
[arch
exists
either
1
n the
the
state
o the
1
xtra-
24
ssed
the
Ivar
ripa!
Ssar
ining
nital
pr. 14
Party.
2112
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
W
The note charged that two.U.S. mili
who survive. We may expect it to recur in the Soviet empire wherever fe
it is deemed necessary to teach the lessons of utter unquestioning G
dependence upon the Kremlin and unswerving and successful comb
pliance with its purposes.
W
It is an elaborate pretense with innumerable false charges, forced 19
testimony, and induced confessions but its essence is a technique of
totalitarian control. It is designed to terrorize satellite regimes
, to vi
punish them for shortcomings, to compel greater exertions, to produm
scapegoats, and to provide a propaganda demonstration of the cc
Kremlin's favorite hates whether states, organizations, or individual
of the free world.
ta
As to the anti-Israel, anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish aspects of the an
trial, occasion was taken to introduce numerous hostile allegations at
against the Zionist movement and the State of Israel. It is not yet
clear what consequences this development may have for Jews generali
in Czechoslovakia and in other satellite areas of Eastern Europe,
The record of the proceedings presents an interesting review of el
the deficiencies of the regime in Czechoslovakia since the February
3
coup as adjudged by Moscow. That it was necessary to have this
trial is evidence of Moscow's dissatisfaction with what the Communists
have done or failed to do in Czechoslovakia, especially with (the) per-
formance of that country in the economic sphere.
30. AIRPLANE INCIDENT OF MARCH 12, 1954: Note From the ti
American Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Mir M
istry, March 24, 1954 1
C
The competent American military authorities have made a detailed vo
investigation of the incident alleged in the Ministry's note ? and here po
found that two American aircraft on a routine training flight did it
fact through error in navigation cross the Czechoslovak border el T
approximately the hour stated in the Ministry's note and thus peze
in
trated inadvertently into Czechoslovakia. Unaware of their errol
,
these aircraft were peacefully returning to their base when set upor
without warning by Czechoslovak fighter aircraft who crossed into ne
the territory of the German Federal Republic.
The investigation established without any question that no warning
was given by the Czechoslovak aircraft before opening fire and despit
this hostile act neither of the American aircraft ever fired upon of
attempted to fire upon the Czechoslovak aircraft. Reports from th
reliable witnesses and empty shell cases found within the territory &
the German Federal Republic confirm that the attack was carried
t]
at 1402 hours central European time at an estimated altitude of 6,00
b
1 12, . .
a Čzechoslovak airplane, and attempted to attack the latter. The note also
stated that the Czechoslovak airplane had fired in self-defense. The note pro
tested against "this repeated serious violation of Czechoslovak airspace."
CI
W
to
11
CU
01
5
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2113
1 Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1954, p. 881.
reve feet when the American aircraft were flying over the territory of the
oning German Federal Republic. This penetration of the German border
com by the Czechoslovak MIG 15 fighter took place near the town of
Waldmuenchen, longitude 49 degrees 23 minutes north and latitude
orced 12 degrees 43 minutes east.
ue of The Embassy wishes to express its regrets for the unintentional
es
, i violation of the Czechoslovak territory by American aircraft but
oduce must at the same time protest against the unjustifiable hostile acts
f the committed by Czechoslovak fighters against American aircraft.
duak The Embassy wishes also to request that investigation be under-
taken regarding both the unwarranted attack on American aircraft
of the and the violation of the territory of the German Federal Republic by
utions at least one Czechoslovak MIG 15 fighter plane. The Embassy
it ye would appreciate being informed of the results of the investigation as
erally well as disciplinary action taken against the guilty persons involved.
of al
ruar
this
31. CZECHOSLOVAK PROTEST REGARDING ARRIVAL OF
AMERICAN BALLOONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Note From
inists
per
the American Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign
Ministry, May 24, 19541
The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czecho-
slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor, upon instruc-
m the tions of the U. S. Government, to refer to the Ministry's note of
Mr May 5, 1954, concerning the arrival of balloons in Czechoslovakia.
The U. S. Government is informed that the Crusade for Freedom
Committee has sent messages to the people of Czechoslovakia by the
tailed vehicle of balloons. The Crusade for Freedom, an organization of
here private citizens, is supported by millions of Americans and expresses
id in the aspirations of the American people for the freedom of all peoples.
The
messages, it has been learned, transmitted news items and dis-
pene cussed concrete goals in which the Czechoslovak people would be
The operation was undertaken by this private organization and
into neither the U. S. Government nor the U. S. authorities in Germany
were involved. The U. S. Government rejects the protest of the
rning Czechoslovak Government which is without foundation.
As has been previously suggested, the United States holds firmly
to the view that there must exist unobstructed communication be-
from
tween peoples if nations are to live in peace and freedom with one
another. When a government violates this principle by trying to
insulate its people from the world of ideas without, it is only natural
that efforts will be made, both
inside and outside that country, to
break through the insulation. The choice of balloons as a means of
communication in the present instance indicates that the Czecho-
er at
Sprut interested .
Upob
espite
on 0
ed or
6,00
mili
Follo
ខ also
pro
July 20, 1953 (ibid., p. 211).
? Not printed.
415900_57--Vol. 2
-30
2114
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
zo
slovak Government continues to deprive the Czechoslovak people d 3
the possibilities of free contact with other peoples, the free exchang
of ideas and the free reception of uncensored news.
It is understandable that the American people would seek by such
means as are available to maintain contact with the people of Czechos
slovakia with whom they had formerly enjoyed free association and
with whom they share many common traditions and beliefs. THE
American people take a profound interest in the welfare and futurs
of the people of Czechoslovakia. The leaflets borne to Czechosle
vakia express the interest of the American public in seeing the welfar
of the people there improved through the attainment of a series al
goals. Notwithstanding, the Czechoslovak Government claims that
these leaflets were subversive and inciting. It consequently appear
that in the eyes of the present regime in Czechoslovakia discussion
of concrete steps to better the lot of the common man in that country to
is subversive in nature.
th
If the Czechoslovak Government desires that this form of cons
munication between peoples not be utilized, it lies within its power to
remove the need for such media by opening the barrier to free acom
to the people of Czechoslovakia. The United States is convinced th
that free contact between peoples everywhere will contribute great
to support world peace in which the Government of Czechoslovakit
professes continuing interest. The U. S. Government would have no
basis for interfering with attempts by private American organization
to establish communication with the people of Czechoslovakia and
convey to them the interest of the American people in their fate
. S
$1
U
8.
CO
G
32. BORDER INCIDENT OF JULY 4, 1954: Note From the Amer.
can Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry
July 7, 19541
81
A
CI
CI
t
G
: . [names and rank
21
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compu
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to stale
that United States authorities in Germany have reported that the
following members of United States armed forces are now in the
custody of Czechoslovak border authorities.
of personnel]. These soldiers were proceeding innocently, withow
arms along the border in the vicinity of Barnau on July 4 when the
were seized by a Czechoslovak patrol at approximately 1830-190
The Czechoslovak border patrol in this area has already acknowledge
that these American soldiers are in Czechoslovak custody. The
Government protests in the strongest terms this
abduction of America
soldiers and demands their immediate return to U.S. authorities i
Germany.
| Department of State Bulletin, July 19, 1954, p. 91.
were returned to U.S. custody on July 15; ibid.
2 The men later were identified as Capt. Jack M. Davis, Corp. John F. Glasses
and Privates Leonard Tennis, J. W. Griffith, John F. Switzer, Richard J. Jumper
and Ross F. McGinnis. [Footnote in Bulletin)
0
to
a!
0
11
S
The abducted personnel
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2115
TIAS 1591; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1180.
zecha Sir:
tiesa
LS
erica and Czechoslovak note of Mar. 11, 1953, to the United States (ibid., p. 474).
State; ibid., Mar. 26, 1956, pp. 513-514.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 30, 1954, pp. 302–305, 308–309. Not re-
pled 33. AIRPLANE INCIDENT OF MARCH 10, 1953: Application by
chang
the United States to the International Court of Justice, March 22,
1955 1
y such
en and
1. This is a written application, in accordance with the Statute and
TT Rules of the Court, submitted by the Government of the United
futur States of America instituting proceedings against the Government of
hoch Czechoslovakia on account of certain wrongful acts committed by
Telia MIG-type aircraft from Czechoslovakia within the United States
zone of occupation in Germany on March 10, 1953.
The subject of the dispute and a succinct statement of the facts and
ppear grounds upon which the claim of the Government of the United
ussic States of America is based are adequately set forth in a note delivered
punts to the Czechoslovak Government on August 18, 1954._A copy of
the note is attached to this application as an annex.3 The Czecho-
com slovak Government has failed, although the time therefor has long
werd since elapsed and although the United States Government bas duly
acca urged the Czechoslovak Government to make reply, to respond to
Finch the United States Government's note, but the Czechoslovak Govern-
creatment asserted its contentions in prior diplomatic correspondence on
pvaki this subject, and the nature of those contentions is adverted to in the
2. The United States Government notes that the present dispute
concerns matters of the character specified in Article 36 (2) of the
• fate Statute of the Court, including subdivisions (a) through (d). As
will be seen from the annex, the legal dispute of the United States
Government with the Czechoslovak Government involves, among
Imeri.
other questions of international law, the scope and application of
nistry
international obligations relating to the overflight of intruding military
aircraft, embodied in part in the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, adopted December 7, 1944; 4 the duties of the ground
controllers and pilots of intruding military aircraft with respect to
interception and identification by patrolling domestic aircraft in the
country of intrusion; the content and application in case of such over-
flight of obligations to signal between patrolling and intruding aircraft;
om the nature of the rights,
prerogatives and powers of the United States
Government and the United States Air Force in the United States
zone of occupation in Germany with respect to the control of air
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 18, 1955, pp. 649–650. See also statement
Apr. 5, 1955, by the Department of State (ibid., pp. 648–649);
American notes
to Czechoslovakia of Mar. 10, and 13, 1953 (ibid., Mar. 30, 1953, pp. 474-475);
jurisdiction. The Court announced on Mar. 15, 1956, that the case had been
removed from its docket. See statement of Mar.'16, 1956, by the Department of
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 140-155.
annex.
ave no
ation
and to
ompli:
state
at the
ithout
2 ther
-1900.
ledged
U.S.
ies i
rsonnel
2
3
lassot
printed here.
umper
2116
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ai
case.
deem to be fit and proper; and that the Court make all other necessary
traffic in general and the overflight of foreign military aircraft; to
gether with numerous issues of fact which if resolved in favor of the
U
United States Government would constitute breaches of international
obligation by the Czechoslovak Government; and the nature and
extent of the reparations to be made by the Czechoslovak Government
to the United States Government for all these breaches.
The United States Government, in filing this application with the
Court, submits to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of this
The Czechoslovak Government appears not to have filed al
declaration with the Court thus far, although it was invited to do so
T
by the United States Government in the note annexed hereto. The
Czechoslovak Government, however, is qualified to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Court in this matter and may upon notification d
this application by the Registrar, in accordance with the Rules of the
Court, take the necessary steps to enable the Court's jurisdiction ore
both parties to the dispute to be confirmed.
The United States Government thus founds the jurisdiction of this
Court on the foregoing considerations and on Article 36 (1) of the
Statute.
3. The claim of the Government of the United States of America
3
is briefly that the Government of Czechoslovakia on March 10, 1953
willfully and unlawfully caused MIG-type military aircraft to overfor
the Czechoslovak-German border, and without any provocation,
pursue and attack United States Air Force F-84-type aircraft which
Ja
were engaged in peaceable routine patrol of the air space within the
df
United States zone of Germany, destroying one F-84-type aircraft
and causing physical injury to the pilot thereof, an American national
as well as other damage specified in the annexed note. The Unitet
States Government claims that in the circumstances described in the
annex these actions constituted serious violations of international
th
obligation on the part of the Czechoslovak Government. For these
breaches of international obligation the United States Government
has demanded and demands monetary and other reparation from the
Czechoslovak Government.
A
At earlier stages of the diplomatic negotiations, which must por
be determined to have been exhausted, the Czechoslovak Government
asserted an entirely contrary version of the facts, which
in the annexed note. The United States Government, in further
pleadings herein, will more fully set forth such issues of fact and the
issues of law in this dispute, for the purpose of hearing and decision
by the Court in accordance with the Statute and Rules. It 11
request that the Court find that the Czechoslovak Government is
liable to the United
States Government for the damage caused; the
the Court award damages in favor of the United States Government
against the Czechoslovak Government in the sum of $271,384. I
with interest, and such other reparation and redress as the Court may
orders and awards, including an award of costs, to effectuate ili
determinations.
ವಜ ಹೊಸ
0]
ei
ZE
described
Epis
ſe com
ai
mi
re
d
.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2117
aiment
iono
1 over
3 , , .
released by the Hungarian authorities on Apr. 28, 1951 (see statement of that
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 16, 1950, pp. 95-96.
4. The undersigned has been appointed by the Government of the
the
United States of America as its agent for the purpose of this application
tion and all proceedings thereon.
e and
Very truly yours,
HERMAN PHLEGER
The Legal Adviser
th the
of the
of this
Department of State
d ang
do se
THE REGISTRAR OF THE
The
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
to the
The Hague, Netherlands.
of the
of this F. Hungary
of the
nerid 34. VOGELER CASE: Note From the American Minister at Buda-
1953
verify
pest? to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, February 1, 1950 3
on,
I have the honor to refer to the Hungarian Government's reply of
January 7, 1950,4 to the note which I communicated to you under
rcraft
date of January 3 ó concerning the case of Mr. Robert A. Vogeler.
I am instructed by my Government to state that it regards the
Inited
above-mentioned reply of the Hungarian Government as wholly un-
satisfactory. The Hungarian Government cannot, in the view of my
government, avoid its international responsibilities and obligations in
these
the Vogeler case by asserting this matter is entirely
an internal affair
Hungary. The United States Government considers that it has
every right to concern itself with the treatment of this American citi-
zen, who has been detained for over two months without access to
American Consular representatives or, so far as I am aware, to legal
counsel. The United States Government will continue to concern
itself with Mr. Vogeler's situation and until his release will hold the
Hungarian Government responsible in every particular as regards
In an interview on January 19 the Deputy Prime Minister of Hun-
gary informed me that, in spite of the repeated representations of the
United States Government, Mr. Vogeler would shortly be brought to
The United States Government cannot accept such action as
ment on charges of espionage and sabotage; ibid., Mar. 6, 1950, p. 378. He was
date by the Department of State, infra, doc. 36).
to
which
the
ional
n the
tional
of
ment
m.the
DOW
ment
ribed
rther
his well being
d the
CISIOI
: 11
ut is
trial.
men
4.16
mit
1 Nathaniel P. Davis.
? Gyula Kállai.
SSATT
e.it
* Not printed.
2118
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ex
note
otherwise, will be allowed to attend the trial and that American
During my interview on January 19, the Deputy Prime Minister
1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 2, 1950, pp. 21-22. See also Hungarian O
justified, especially since the Hungarian Government has refused as a
give me any explanation of the charges against Mr. Vogeler and he
refused all of my requests concerning an opportunity for America th
Consular Officers to see him.
The Deputy Prime Minister further informed me that the trield to
Mr. Vogeler would be public in order that the world might judge the ob
correctness of Hungarian justice and assured me that Mr. Vogeler
would have full opportunity to defend himself and might have sin
many Hungarian lawyers as he desired. In the light of these assu, un
ances, I am directed by my government to invite your attention up
the following:
Without prejudice in any way to its continuing demand for ME
Vogeler's prompt release and liberty to depart from Hungary or to the
reservation of rights respecting possible claims contained in my
of December 20, 1949, the United States Government asserts the
right of Mr. Vogeler to the services of legal counsel retained on his
behalf irrespective of the membership of such counsel in the Hun-
garian bar. In this connection, the United States Government
requests that the Hungarian Government agree to the immediate
th
entry of a private American lawyer and such assistants as he may
to
require, whose purpose will be to consult at once with Mr. Vogeler and
the Hungarian legal counsel retained on Mr. Vogeler's behalf and to
associate himself, together with his assistants, in the preparation d si
Mr. Vogeler's defense. Arrangements are now being made for the
retention of such an American lawyer, whose name will be communion
cated promptly to the Hungarian Government.
TI
The United States Government insists that American Consoler
Officers and the legal counsel
retained on Mr. Vogeler's behalf be
afforded immediate and thereafter continuous access to Mr. Vogelere
with assurance of adequate opportunity to converse freely with him
, St
prepare his case, and inquire fully into all matters which the Consular
Officers, his legal counsel, or Mr. Vogeler may consider pertinent for 1 T
discussion. The United States Government requests also that the th
Hungarian Government give unqualified assurances that the legal
counsel serving Mr. Vogeler will be wholly free to represent thér
client in a forthright manner and to conduct the latter's defense in s ga
manner best calculated to serve his interests. Further,
States Government requests that Mr. Vogeler's legal counsel and the
American Consular representatives observing the trials shall hare
free access day by day to the verbatim record of the proceedings of
the court in this case. The United States Government also desires
assurance that representatives of the American Legation, Consular e bem
same purpose will be permitted to do so and will be admitted to the
sessions of the court.
note of Dec. 24, 1949; ibid., Jan. 16, 1950, p. 96.
as
mi
91
of
the United
&C
re
CO
th
G
pp
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES 2119
o the Government did not regard the Hungarian reply as satisfactory; ibid.,
sed also informed me that the trial of Mr. Vogeler would disclose the
nd her "involvement" of members of the Legation in this case. I must insist
erice that any such allegations, if they are to be made at the trial, and an
explanation of the grounds on which they are based, be communicated
riel d to me at once as a matter of right and courtesy, since such charges
ge the obviously affect the relations between our two countries.
ogele The Hungarian Government is requested to make a prompt reply
ve & in the above matters in order that its intentions may be clearly
ASSIT understood and full opportunity given to Mr. Vogeler's counsel to
ion to prepare adequately for his defense and in order that the conduct of
the trial may correspond with the Deputy Prime Minister's assurances.
Accept [etc.]
IM
to the
note
35. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OF HUNGARIAN DIPLOMATS
Is the
IN THE UNITED STATES: Note From the Secretary of State to
on his
the Hungarian Minister at Washington, ? January 29, 1951 3
Hur
ament
ediate
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable
the Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic and has the honor
to inform him as follows:
end to
Effective immediately, members of the Hungarian diplomatic mis-
ion dsion in the United States and Hungarian employees of that mission,
or the as well as the dependents of these persons, are prohibited from staying
mut or traveling beyond a specified area except by express permission.
The perimeter of the designated area is fixed at a distance of eighteen
sular miles from the White House, Washington, D. C.
alf be
Permission to stay or travel outside the specified_area shall be
gele requested in advance through the Chief of Protocol, Department of
1 him State
, according to a prescribed form, of which a facsimile is enclosed
sular and copies may be obtained from the Department upon request.
nt for Travel beyond the designated area should
not be
undertaken prior to
to the receipt by applicants of signed
authorization from the
Department
their
The Secretary of State further informs the Minister of the Hun-
garian People's Republic that the Department of State will take into
account in its application of the foregoing restrictions, with particular
ed the reference
to the issuance of travel
permits, the consideration accorded
hare
gs of
The Hungarian Government replied, on Feb. 6, 1950, that the Hungarian
esires court would
proceed with the trial, that inasmuch as the hearing would
be public
both Hungarian and foreign correspondents
would have the opportunity to attend,
viously expressed; ibid., Feb. 27, 1950, p. 325. See also the statement issued to
press by the Department of State,'Feb. 15, 1950,
to the effect that the U. S.
e man
er and
4
legs of State.
in
mited
laro
rica!
I
the
nister
3
pp. 323-324.
Imre Horváth.
Department
Oct. 13, 1953; infra, doc. 40.
* Not reprinted here.
of State Bulletin, Feb. 12, 1951, p. 262. See also U.S. note of
gariei
2120
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
1 The Hungarian order prohibited travel by Legation personnel . beyond 21
statement of Jan. 29, 1951, by the Department of State (Department of State
to members of the American Legation in Budapest who may wish to
travel beyond the limits of the restrictive zone established by the
Hungarian Government on January 22, 1951.
36. VOGELER CASE: Statement by the Department of State
,
April 28, 1951 2
Robert A. Vogeler, an American citizen who has been held i
Hungary for over 17 months, was today released by the Hungarian
authorities and has arrived at the American Legation in Vienna
.
Mr. Vogeler was delivered by Hungarian officials into the custody d
a representative of the American Legation in Vienna at Nickelscent
on the Austrian frontier at 11 a.m. today (5 a.m. e.s. t.) and wa
escorted directly to Vienna.
The Department is gratified that this American citizen bas regained
the freedom of which he was unjustly deprived and that he is not
safely reunited with his family. The release of Mr. Vogeler follows
upon continuous efforts by the United States Government in his
behalf since the beginning of his detention and brings to a successful
close negotiations which the American Minister in Budapest
, Nathanie
P. Davis, has carried on personally with the Hungarian Government
over a long period of time, with skill and determination, under mos!
trying conditions.
In connection with the understanding reached with the Hungarian
Government for freeing Mr. Vogeler, assurances on the following
points have been communicated by Mr. Davis to the Hungarian
Government, and, in consequence of the latter's action in releasing
Mr. Vogeler and of his safe arrival at the American Legation i
Vienna, these assurances now enter into effect:
(1) The United States Government will approve the reopening &
Hungarian consular establishments in New York City and Cleveland
,
Ohio.
(2) It will also, through its appropriate agencies, again validate
the passports of private American citizens who may wish to travel
to Hungary.
(3) Finally, the United States Government will facilitate the
delivery of all Hungarian goods in the United States zone of Germany
which, in the light of the provisions of article 30 of the treaty o
peace with Hungary, have been found available for restitution
including Hungarian cultural property, and will permit two Hungarian
representatives to enter the United States zone of Germany for the
purpose of receiving such property and arranging for its transportation
12p. .
a Ibid., May 7, 1951, P. 723. See also ibid., pp. 723–725, and supra, doc. 34
Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947 (TIAS 1651; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 2065).
(
(
t
]
I
t
co o un
S
]
E
a
0
0
:
3
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2121
:
eld in
ar 140
lenna.
gained
AS NOT
Eollow
in his
cessful
1
of State officials of the American Legation.at Budapest, see statement of June 23, 1951,
by the Department of State (ibid., July 9, 1951; p. 73).
United States civil and military officials in Germany will facilitate
wish to the entry of the Hungarian representatives for the purpose stated,
by to render them all proper assistance as regards the collection and ship-
ment of the property in question, and regard them as official repre-
sentatives of the Hungarian Government.
With regard to the matters dealt with under points (1) and (2)
tate,
above, it is, of course, the expectation of this Government that the
Hungarian Government's observance of consular rights and the
rights of American citizens will be in accord with international law
and practice and with the provisions of existing treaties between the
United States and Hungary. Moreover, private American citizens
who may wish to travel to Hungary will undoubtedly wish to inform
wody d themselves through the Department or American missions abroad
elsdori
concerning conditions in that country.
37. HUNGARIAN CHARGES REGARDING ACTIVITIES OF
AMERICAN OFFICIALS: Note From the American Legation at
Budapest to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, July 7, 1951 (Ex-
cerpt) 1
Ghaniel
The Government of the United States categorically rejects the
r mot allegations directed against the Legation of the United States and
members of its staff by the Hungarian Government in its note of
garian July 22 and regards the demands put forward by the Hungarian
lowing Government on the basis of these charges as arbitrary and unwar-
garian ranted. The activities of the United States Legation in Hungary
easing have been legitimate in every respect and in full conformity with
ion in international diplomatic practice. The United States Government
concludes, therefore, that the conduct of United States Legation
officials has been called into question only to serve the propaganda
aims of the Hungarian Government.
In the view of the United States Government, the proceedings in the
trial of Archbishop Grösz
establish nothing except the fact that the
authorities are continuing by ruthless and unconscionable
measures to terrorize the Hungarian people into mute submission to
the existing regime and its totalitarian program. In this instance,
as on many past occasions, the Hungarian Government has contrived
a tissue of falsehoods in a brazen though futile attempt to justify
element before the world its continuing campaign to crush all dissent and to
suppress the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens.
It is also evident that the Hungarian note of July 2 reflects the
extreme annoyance of the Hungarian Government that the Hungar-
and eight other Hungarian citizens were charged with conspiracy and violation
of currency regulations. The prosecution at the trial attempted to implicate
mment
lingo
eland
alidate
Hungarian
travel
ie the
rman
garian
or the
tation.
ond 21
est; set
0.34:
Not printed.
2122
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
visions, which obligate that Government to secure to all persons under
ian people, despite unending Communist propaganda and repression
continue to maintain their feelings of deep friendship for the United
States as well as their firm confidence that the United States Gov.
ernment will not cease to concern itself with their tragic plight.
Without accepting or crediting in any way the preposterous charges
which the Hungarian Government has advanced, the United States
Government has taken the decision to discontinue certain cultural
and informational activities mentioned in the Hungarian Gover-
ment's note, since it is clear that the Hungarian Government ba
rendered impossible the maintenance of open and normal contacts
and the free exchange of ideas and information between the two
peoples. The United States Government believes, however, that the
attitude of the Hungarian Government in this regard will be viewed
with deep resentment and regret by the Hungarian people, who have
shown a great interest in cultural contacts with the people of the
United States and who are fully aware that this policy of the Hungar-
ian Government is aimed at further isolating them from the free
world. By its behavior in this matter, the Hungarian Government
has effectively demonstrated before the entire world that it dare not
tolerate, even to a limited degree the exercise of freedom of opinia
38. MASS DEPORTATIONS FROM HUNGARY: Statement by
the President, July 27, 1951 1
Many Americans have expressed concern about the mass deporta
tions from Hungary which are being carried out by the Communist
Government of that country. Their condemnation of these brul
acts against the people of Hungary is in the best American tradition of
concern for liberty and justice. I am deeply moved by the tragi
plight of the Hungarian people, who bear a heavy burden of oppression
,
and I share the abhorrence which has been expressed with regard to
these measures which the Hungarian Government has instituted i
wanton disregard of every principle of right and decency.
The Government of the United States is giving the closest attention
to the deportations in Hungary with a view to taking such steps as ma
appropriately expose this situation to public view and judgment en
render the Âungarian Government accountable before the world for
its infamous conduct. The forced removal of thousands of persons
from their homes by the Hungarian Government under the condition
which have been reported must be regarded as a flagrant violatio
of the human rights provisions of the treaty of peace. The
Unite
States Government has already formally charged the Government &
Hungary with wilfully and systematically contravening these pt
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 6, 1951, p. 208. See also statement of du
1, 1951, by Secretary Acheson; ibid., Aug. 13, 1951, p. 251–252.
I
.
1
1
1
{
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2123
SSION,
'nited
ivern
two
free
inion
1 Resolution 385 (V); supra, pp. 2080–2081.
exposed these violations before the United Nations. In accordance
with the terms of a resolution passed by the General Assembly on
Gor: November 3, 1950, this Government will submit to the Secretary-
light General of the United Nations, and through him to all member Gov-
larges ernments of the United Nations, detailed evidence which the Depart-
States
ment of State has in its possession regarding many such violations.
Itural
In view of the significant bearing which the present deportations have
on the general question of the Hungarian Government's suppression of
t has
human rights and freedoms, the United States Government will also
Itacts
submit to the Secretary-General all evidence which may be available
3
from reliable sources regarding the conditions under which such
at ta expulsions are being conducted.
iewed
hare
f the
ingar
39. AIRPLANE INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 19, 1951: Statement
by the Secretary of State, December 28, 1951 2
ment
e not
Every American will be relieved that the four American flyers
are now safely in our hands. But underlying relief is a deep current
of indignation over the treatment they have received.
The American people are rightfully indignant. Because we value
the welfare of the individual above all else, we have paid the so-called
not be "fines.” But we have not paid willingly, and we state clearly, in
order that there may be no misunderstanding of our attitude in the
future, that our patience is not inexhaustible.
port: In this whole performance, the Budapest regime has ignored the
basic rules of long-established international conduct.
Repeated requests were made to the Hungarian authorities to
permit American officials to visit the airmen. No such access was
tragis allowed either before trial or subsequently when the request was
ession renewed. In the circumstances, in view of the refusal of the Hun-
ard to garian authorities to permit American officials to exercise this normal
sed in right, which is basic to the extension of customary consular protec-
tion to American citizens abroad, the U.S. Government will no longer
antich falidate the passports of American citizens for travel in Hungary.
s mer Furthermore, since the reciprocal basis of the exchange of consular
privileges has been nullified by Hungary, this Government is also
ld fet notifying the Hungarian Legation
in Washington that the Hungarian
Orsolo consulates in this country, which are located in Cleveland and New
lition York, should be closed immediately.3
Any further statement on this matter must await the opportunity
to talk with the released airmen.
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 7, 1952, p. 7. See also statement of Dec.
26-1951, by the Department of State (ibid.) and U. S. application of Feb. 16, 1954,
to the International Court of Justice (infra, doc. 42).
*Note of Dec. 28, 1951; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 7, 1952, p.
unist
bruta
!
ion of
it and
for
la tios
Tnited
ent of
pro
under
d has
of Aug.
7.
2124
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the Hungarian Legation staff and their dependents will be permitted
ment of State, on a prescribed form, a copy of which is enclosed.
40. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OF HUNGARIAN DIPLOMATS
IN THE UNITED STATES: Note From the Secretary of State to
the Hungarian Minister at Washington, October 13, 1953 2
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable
the Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic and has the honor to
refer to the regulation of travel of United States diplomatic personne
in Hungary and of Hungarian diplomatic personnel in the United
States.
The restrictions on the travel of Hungarian Legation personnel
in the United States which were notified to the Minister of the Hun-
garian People's Republic on January 29, 1951 3 were instituted only
after the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Ameri
can Legation in Budapest on January 19, 1951 that restrictions were
being imposed on the travel of United States diplomatic personnel in
Hungary. The Department of State affirmed clearly at that time
that in applying restrictions on the travel of Hungarian Legation
staff members in the United States it would take into account the
consideration accorded to members of the American Legation in
Budapest who might wish to travel beyond the limits of the restrictive
zone established by the Hungarian Government.
The Secretary of State welcomes the decision of the Hungarian
Government, made known in a circular note of August 4, 1953
,
to cancel the regulations communicated in its note of January 19
1951 and to establish new procedures and regulations allowing free
and more extensive movement by foreign diplomatic personnel within
Hungary
In view of the Hungarian Government's modification of travel
restrictions hitherto in force, the competent United States authorities
have decided upon appropriate changes in the regulations which have
previously governed the travel of Hungarian Legation personnel in
the United States. The Minister of the Hungarian People's
Republi
is accordingly informed that the restrictions notified to the Hungarian
Legation on January 29, 1951 are superseded by the following regular
tions:
1. Members of the Hungarian diplomatic mission in the United
States and their dependents may travel freely within a radius of 4
miles from the Zero Milestone located on the north side of the Ellipse
in Washington, D. C.
2. Elsewhere throughout the United States, travel by members of
upon written notification 24 hours in advance of such travel. The
required notification shall be made to the Chief of Protocol, Depart
The Government of the United States continues to support the
principle of freedom of travel for diplomatic personnel
. The Secretary
i Károly Szarka.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 2, 1953, pp. 601-602.
Supra, doc. 35.
Department of State Bulletin, Nov, 2, 1953, p. 602.
{
1
1
3
4
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2125
:DD
U-
UIT
en:
me
1
2 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 22, 1954, p. 273. See also message of
Mindszenty, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1193—1194.
INS
of State requests the Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic to
to
inform his Government in this regard and expresses the hope that the
Hungarian Government, upon further consideration of the question
of travel restrictions, will find it desirable at an early date to enlarge
uble
the areas in Hungary where travel may be freely undertaken or to
e to
remove all travel restrictions.
ine!
ted Enclosure:
Copy of Department of State form
"Notification of Travel."
[The Notification of Travel requests the last, first, and middle name of the
traveler, the full title of the traveler, the name and relationship of the accompany-
ing members of the family, the dates of travel including time of departure from
and return to Washington, the destination, the routes of travel to the destination
ent
and return travel, the means of travel, whether by automobile, train, or plane on
Lin the outward and return journey, the automobile license number, a space for the
signature of the Chief of Mission to be undersigned by the signature of the principal
traveler and the date of notification.]
100
the
it
Lite 41. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE
CHAIRMAN OF
OF THE
THE UNITED CATHOLIC ORGANIZA-
an
TIONS FOR THE FREEING OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY,
53, FEBRUARY 1, 19542
19,
Feel
DEAR MR. VORBECK: I have your telegram of January twenty-
hin
third on behalf of the United Catholic Organizations for the Freeing
of Cardinal Mindszenty. We in the free world have not forgotten
vel
that this is the fifth anniversary of Cardinal Mindszenty's trial and
he imprisonment by the Communist authorities in Hungary.
The unjust nature of the proceedings against Cardinal Mindszenty
is, of course, well known to the American people. They regarded the
blic
attack upon him as a blow against religious freedom in Hungary and
an unprincipled attempt to destroy spiritual and moral influences in
hla
The Communist assault upon religious liberty and leadership in
Hungary has failed, however, to turn the Hungarian people from their
faith in God. The plight 'of Cardinal Mindszenty and of other
churchmen who have suffered at the hands of the Communists has
not been forgotten. Their situation continues deeply to concern the
of people of Hungary and to evoke the sympathy of the free world.
Despite the constraints of person and silence imposed on Cardinal
ht Mindszenty and other church leaders by their persecutors, the spirit
of these men has defied confinement by the totalitarian State. It
has become, indeed, a symbol of faith and freedom for our times.
the
ar
1.7, 1949, by Selden Chapin (ibid., June 26, 1949, pp. 820 ff.). For earlier expres-
sions of the United States Government's views regarding the case of Cardinal
are
11
191
that country.
ted
40
p.se
ted
It-
ed
1 Frederic L. Vorbeck.
2126
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1952 (ibid., Jan. 12, 1953, pp. 51-52); Hungarian note to the United States of
See International Court of Justice Reports, 1954, pp. 99-105.
3 See statement of Mar. 17, 1953, by the Department of State; Department of
42. AIRPLANE INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 19, 1951: Application
by the United States to the Registrar of the International Court
of Justice, February 16, 1954 1
SIR:
1. This is a written application, in accordance with the Statute?
and Rules of the Court, submitted by the Government of the United
States of America instituting proceedings against the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account of certain actions
of the latter Government, in concert with the Government of the
Hungarian People's Republic. A separate written application is
being submitted by the Government of the United States of America
simultaneously herewith instituting proceedings against the Govern-
ment of the Hungarian People's Republic on account of the same
matter. The Government of the United States of America requests
that so far as it may be convenient and proper to do so the two applica-
tions and the proceedings thereon be considered and dealt with
together
The subject of the dispute and a succinct statement of the facts
and grounds on which the claim of the Government of the United
States of America is based are set forth in two notes, one delivered to
the Soviet Government on March 17, 1953 and one delivered to the
Hungarian Government on the same day; 3 the note to the Hungarian
Government was incorporated by reference in the note to the Soviet
Government, the note to the Soviet Government was incorporated by
reference in the note to the Hungarian Government, and each of the
two Governments received from the United States Government !
copy of the note addressed by the United States Government to the
other Government. Copies of both notes are attached to this appli
cation as an annex.4
2. The United States Government notes that the present dispute
concerns matters of the character specified in Article 36 (2) of the
Statute of the Court, including subdivisions (a) through (d). As
will be seen from the annex, the legal dispute of the United States
Government with the Soviet Government involves the interpretation
of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Paris February 10, 1947,5 to which the
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 22, 1954, pp. 450–451. See also state
.
ment of Dec. 26, 1951, by the Department of State (ibid., Jan. 7, 1952, p. 2
the U.S. notes
to Hungary of Dec. 10, 1952 (ibid., Dec. 22, 1952, pp. 982-984)
and Jan. 30, 1953 (ibid., Feb. 16, 1953, pp. 258-259); the U.S.' notes to the
Soviet Union of Dec. 10, 1952 (ibid., Dec. 22, 1952, pp. 981–982) and Dec. 17
of Dec. 11, 1952 (ibid., Jan. 12, 1953, p. 51) and Dec. 20, 1952 (ibid., P: 52.
The Soviet and Hungarian Governments refused to accept the Court's jurisdio
States application had been removed from the docket of the Court; ibid., July 25
,
1954, pp. 130-131.
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 140–155.
State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1953, pp. 496_498.
4 Not reprinted here.
5 TIAS 1651; 61 Stat. 2065.
1
]
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t
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1
(
(
I
1
(
1
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2127
1 TS 748; 44 Stat., pt. 3, p. 2441.
us
.69
'n
me
Bts
8.
cts
On United States Government, the Soviet Government and the Hun-
ar garian Government are parties; the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Consular Rights, signed at Washington June 24, 1925, which
was in effect during the period relevant to this dispute and to which the
United States Government and the Hungarian Government are
el parties; numerous questions of international law, as set forth in Part
ed II of each of the annexed notes; numerous issues of fact which if
of established would constitute breaches of international obligations by
the Hungarian Government; and questions of the nature and extent
he of reparation to be made to the United States Government by the
is Hungarian Government for these breaches.
The United States Government, in filing this application with the
Court, submits to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of this case.
The Hungarian Government appears not to have filed any declaration
with the Court thus far, and although it was invited to do so by the
nited States Government in the Note annexed hereto it has not made
ta any responsive reply to the invitation. The Hungarian Government,
however, is qualified to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in
this matter and may upon notification of this application by the
ed Registrar, in accordance with the Rules of the Court, take the neces-
to sary steps to enable the Court's jurisdiction over both parties to the
be dispute to be confirmed.
Thus the United States Government founds the jurisdiction of this
let Court on the foregoing considerations and on Article 36 (1) of the
by Statute.
he 3. The claim of the Government of the United States of America
is briefly that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic in
be
concert with and aided and abetted by the Government of the Union
li
of Soviet Socialist Republics on November 19, 1951, wilfully and un-
lawfully caused to be seized a United States Air Force C-47 type
aircraft together with its crew of four American nationals and its
he contents, driven over Hungary by winds unknown to the crew;
that thereafter both Governments engaged in unlawful actions against
the crew and against the United States with respect to the incident,
constituting both serious violations of existing treaties as well as mani-
he fest denials of justice and other international wrongs. For these
breaches of international obligation
the United
States has demanded
and demands monetary and other reparation from the Hungarian
2);
Government. The Soviet Government has sought to justify some of
its conduct by Article 22 of the Treaty of Peace to which reference
has been made, a contention which the United States Government
2.1
Q
ate
As
ces
on
te-
34
che
17
,
of
TES
2)
.
denies
ic-
ed
26.
As the United States Government, in further pleadings herein,
will more fully set forth, the United States Government proposes
that the issues of law and fact in this dispute be heard and decided
by the Court in accordance with its
Statute and Rules; that the Court
decide that the accused Governments are jointly and severally liable
to the United States for the damage caused; that the Court award
of
2128
,
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
damages in favor of the United States Government against the Soviet
Government in the sum of $637,894.11, with interest, as demanded
in the annexed notes; that the Court determine the nature and extent
of other reparation and redress, which the Court may deem fit and
proper; and that the Court make the necessary orders and awards
,
including an award of costs, to effectuate its determinations.
4. The undersigned has been appointed by the Government of the
United States of America as its agent for the purpose of this application
and all proceedings thereon.
Very truly yours,
HERMAN PHLEGER
The Legal Adviser
of the
Department of State
43. HUNGARIAN PROTEST REGARDING ARRIVAL OF BAL-
LOONS: Note From the American Legation at Budapest to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, December 17, 1954 1
8
a
8
C
a
0
be
The Legation of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's
Republic and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note of October
15, 1954, concerning leaflets carried by balloons into Hungary.
The Legation is instructed by the United States Government to
state that the activity in question was undertaken by the Crusade
for Freedom and Radio Free Europe on their own initiative and re-
sponsibility. These are private organizations established and sup-
ported by private American citizens. It is only natural that they
should take an interest in the welfare of the Hungarian people and
seek some means of communication with them. If unusual methods
have been adopted, this is due solely to the actions of the Hungarian
Government and to those in and outside of Hungary who may
responsible for the policy of erecting barriers against normal inter-
course among peoples. This policy has been pursued to such a degree
that even the airwaves in Hungary are artificially jammed to prevent
as far as possible communication by radio.
Since this matter was called to its attention, the Government of the
United States has obtained copies of the balloon leaflets and careful
examined their content. These leaflets suggest only that the people
of Hungary employ legal means to achieve realization of rights theo
retically assured them by their Constitution and, in many instances
explicitly guaranteed under the Treaty of Peace. The Government
of the United States is at a loss,
therefore, to understand the basis of the
Hungarian Government's concern and more specifically on what
grounds it apparently finds repugnant the points made in the leafleks
CO
d
q
S
r
e
a
&
t
t
1
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 3, 1955, pp. 14–16.
2 Not printed.
3 TIAS 1651; 61 Stat. 2065.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2129
at
ed
at
14
1
DI
Montevideo Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
titled "Measures to Promote the Use of Means of Mass Communica-
that the Hungarian Government could improve the condition of the
Hungarian people by:
a. In practice, vesting real authority in popularly chosen Local
Councils, constitutionally responsible and accountable to the local
s population;
b. Enforcing in practice the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and assembly;
c. Assuring in practice the constitutional guarantee of equality
before the law;
d. Guaranteeing in practice the right of the working peasant to a
just share of the fruits of his labor;
e. Respecting in practice responsibility of the working people
freely to organize for the protection of their interests against all
exploitation;
f. Observance in practice of the constitutional right of the workers
to proper rest and recreation, as well as other benefits necessary for a
L
decent livelihood;
che
g. Affirmation in practice that, to protect the wealth of the Hun-
garian community, the economic welfare of the Hungarian people
must transcend the demands resulting from foreign economic levies;
Oli- h. Recognition in practice that the forced nationalization of
e's
consumer goods outlets and services has deprived the Hungarian
her people not only of an important element of their guaranteed per-
sonal liberty, but also of their legitimate material needs;
to 1. Realizing in practice the requirement for adequate housing to
assist in protecting the institutions of marriage and family;
į. Establishing in practice the principle of free education and schol-
arly inquiry, and the constitutional right of freedom of worship and
The United States Government does not believe that any of the
above suggestions can be considered either "inciting," "slanderous,"
or "seditious.” Certain of the highest officials of the Hungarian
be
Government apparently share this belief as in recent months they
publicly criticized present conditions in Hungary including references
to flagrant abuses of police power and judicial processes as well as
deep-seated economic ills and political tensions. The leaflets in
question
merely make suggestions
concerning practical means whereby
some admitted shortcomings may be corrected.
The United States Government desires to take this occasion to
Pk reiterate its belief in international freedom of communication and to
express its conviction that steps in achieving peaceful relations
ce between peoples will be frustrated so long as governments attempt to
Selle isolate and silence their own people. In this connection it is noted
Hungarian Government representatives attended the recent
All other delegations in adopting by acclamation the resolution en-
tion to Increase Mutual Confidence and Understanding
Among the
NE-
UD-
der
conscience.
1110
ods
101
jer-
Tee
CBI
the
ill
ople
1e0-
that
hat
415900_-57---Vol. 2
-31
2130
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
un-
UNESCO Program for 1955-56. For the text of this part of the program, sa
Peoples of the World." This resolution among other things invites
all members of UNESCO to take the necessary measures to assure
freedom of expression and to remove barriers to the free flow of
distorted information between member states.
The United States Government hopes that the day will come when
balloons will no longer be necessary as a means by which the people of
one country may freely communicate with peoples in other lands
Presumably it is within the power of the Hungarian Government to
take the necessary remedial action. Should the Hungarian Govero-
ment, in conformity with the obligations it assumed toward the
United States and other signatories of Article Two of the Treaty of
Peace, establish freedom of discussion, opinion, and assembly within
the country and, in accordance with the spirit of that Article and
the above-cited UNESCO resolution, remove existing barriers to free
interchange with the outside world, the need for friends of the Hun-
garian people to resort to unconventional means of communications
will no longer exist.
44. MESSAGE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL
COUNCIL, FEBRUARY 23, 1955 4
The efforts and sacrifices made by the people of Hungary in the
War of Independence of 1848-49 were viewed, as you know, with warm
sympathy by the American people. This was a period in our own
history when we were coming of age as a nation and, in keeping with
the principles underlying the founding of our Government and society
,
the American people felt a deep interest in all peoples who aspired to
freedom and independence. In the years that followed, the bonds of
sympathy between the two peoples were further strengthened by tens
of thousands of Hungarian immigrants who, seeking new opportunities
in this land of freedom, came to the United States and contributed
importantly to our national growth and development and to the
enrichment of our culture.
Now, more than a century after the stirring events of 1848-4%
I believe we may regard as inspiring and
reassuring the fact that
despite all vicissitudes, the people of Hungary and the people of the
United States remain stanch friends and continue to find in the
common devotion to those high ideals the basis of mutual respect
and understanding. From these lasting foundations, across
1 This was the title of draft resolution 8C/DR/123, approved by the Prophet
General Conference, Eighth Session, Montevideo, 1954: Proceedings
, p. 497 eur
by the 17th plenary meeting on Dec. 10, 1954 (ibid., p. 219), as Part 5 of the
A
ibid., Resolutions, pp. 37–40.
2 Herbert Hoover, Jr.
3 The Rt. Rev. Béla Varga.
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 4, 1955, p. 558.
E
€
I
r
}
C
It
t
d
D
W
e
the
M
ke
0
&
a
0
0
4
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2131
?
difficult days which lie ahead, the goals of liberty and justice in the
struggle against tyranny come within clear prospect, and we can
view the future with quiet resolution and confidence.
1
f
B.
45. HARASSMENT OF LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF THE AMERI-
CAN LEGATION AT BUDAPEST: Note and Memorandum From
the American Legation to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, July
1, 1955 1
1-
PS
Il
IS
he
THI
HI
ith
to discredit upon it.
; of
The Legation of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's
Republic and has the honor to refer to the arrest of Mr. Cornelius
Balas
, a Hungarian employee of the Legation, by Hungarian police
authorities on June 23, 1955. The Legation has not been adequately
informed of the reasons for this action, which is the latest in a long
series of such harassments directed against its local employees.
The Hungarian Government has persistently failed to respond satis-
factorily to repeated inquiries by the Legation in each of these cases.
!
The Legation is instructed to inform the Ministry for Foreign
AL
Affairs that the United States Government protests most emphati-
cally the arbitrary and secretive actions which the Hungarian Gov-
ernment has taken against not only Mr. Balas but also other local
employees of the Legation. These steps by the Hungarian Govern-
ment, accompanied as they have been by acts of intimidation and
| reprisal against visitors at the Legation, indicate clearly that the
Hungarian Government has adopted once again the provocative
policies in disregard of human rights that have previously brought
The Government of the United States has also taken note in this
en connection of the MTI [Magyar Tavirati Irodi, Hungarian Telegraph
Agency] release
of June 25 concerning the detention of alleged Amer-
ican spies and saboteurs by State Defense organs of the Ministry of
the the Interior. It categorically rejects this announcement as slan-
derous and unfounded. These actions of the Hungarian Govern-
* ment, especially at the present juncture in international affairs, are
a wholly inconsistent with the professed desire
of the Hungarian Ġov-
the ernment for normal relations.
In these circumstances the United States Government cannot but
e regard the arrest of Mr. Balas and the continued detention of other
the local employees of the American Legation as developments detri-
mental to United States-Hungarian relations. It is the earnest hope
of the United States Government that the responsible Hungarian
Sen authorities will accordingly give careful thought to their further
actions in this matter. The arrest of Mr. Balas and the detention of
other local employees of the Legation have
impaired functions of the
American Legation in Budapest that are normal and legitimate phases
of the operation of diplomatic missions in all countries.
Department of State Bulletin, Sept 19, 1955, pp. 460–462.
ties
ted
del
the
$
2132
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
1
)
1
1
1
5. Jozsef Batta-Disappeared on April 6, 1952. An Aide Memoire, dated
April 11, 1952, was left at the Ministry requesting the Hungarian Government to
A
The Government of the United States calls upon the Hungarian
Government to provide a satisfactory explanation of charges brought
against the local employees of the American Legation who are now
under detention by Hungarian authorities or to permit them to return
without delay to their employment with assurance to the Legation
that they will not be subjected to further molestation without due
cause. Failing a satisfactory response or remedial action by the
Hungarian Government within a reasonable period of time, the
United States Government will find it necessary to make public the
facts regarding the conduct of the Hungarian Government in these
and related matters and to reconsider the situation under which the
Hungarian Legation in Washington has been free to carry on infor-
mation activities in the United States.
The Legation of the United States requests a prompt reply from the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
(Enclosure]
MEMORANDUM OF HISTORY OF ARRESTS AND HARASSMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGATION AT BUDAPEST 2
Since 1951 twelve local employees of the American Legation in
Budapest have been arrested or deported, or have disappeared without
trace as a result of action instituted by authorities of the Hungarian
Government. The history of these cases is as follows:
1. Stephen Szecsi-Arrested January 19, 1951. An Aide Memoire requesting
the Hungarian Government to state the reason for the arrest, was delivered on
January 19, 1951. The Hungarian Government has to this date failed to provide
the Legation with a specification of the charges preferred against
Mr. Szecsi or
with other particulars concerning the case. The Legation learned last May that
Mr. Szecsi died in prison on April 28, 1955.
2. Aloysius Pongracz-Arrested March 24, 1951. An Aide Memoire requesting
the Hungarian Government to inform the Legation of the reasons for Mr. Pon-
gracz' arrest was left at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 27, 1951. No
reply has to this date been received. Mr. Pongracz is presumed still to be in
prison.
3. Otto Fernbach-Arrested April 17, 1951, following a minor automobile
accident in which he was involved while acting as official Legation chauffeur
.
The Legation subsequently learned that Mr. Fernbach had been sentenced to
fifteen days imprisonment. In its Aide Memoire dated April 18, 1951
, in
Legation requested information regarding the sentence reportedly given
Fernbach. No reply was ever received to this inquiry. Mr. Fernbach thereafter
disappeared for a period of two years. He reappeared unexpectedly on April 9.
1953, stating only that he had been in prison. He has been re-employed with the
Legation since the date of his release.
4. Frederick B. Karg-Deported from Budapest on twenty-four hours' notiek
on July 3, 1951 to a small village in northern Hungary. The Legation intercedes
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but without avail.
permitted to leave his place of deportation on August 6, 1953.
not permitted to reside in Budapest,
he resumed his employment with the legatia
and commutes to work each day.
—
1
(
Mr. Karg was finally
Although stil
institute a search and advise the Legation of the results.
A further note was
1 No reply was received; see the U.S. note of Sept: 1, 1955 (infra).
2 The notes referred to in this memorandum were not printed.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2133
21
OY
LID
On
ue
che
Or
DE
Hajdu, Director of Political Section No. 2 of the Ministry, in connection with the
addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on June 23, 1952, repeating the
Legation's request for information. In its reply, dated September 1, 1952, the
ht
Ministry stated that Mr. Batta had been taken into custody for anti-democratic
activity. No specification of the charges or announcement of sentence has ever
been communicated to the Legation. It is assumed that Mr. Batta is still in
prison.
6. Hannah Vegh-Disappeared on July 10, 1952. In its Note No. 22 of
September 9, 1952, the Legation requested the assistance of the Ministry in
che
locating Miss Vegh. On September 25, the Ministry offered the explanation that
Miss Vegh had attempted to leave Hungary illegally and that she had been
che
arrested. Although no subsequent information regarding Miss Vegh has been
communicated to the Legation, it is presumed that she is still under detention.
7. Aimee Karolyi-She was last seen on March 13, 1953. On March 20 the
he
Legation sent Note No. 119, requesting the Ministry to determine the where-
abouts of Mrs. Karolyi. A further inquiry was directed to the Ministry in the
Legation's Note No. 151 of May 20, 1953. The Ministry replied on June 27 that
Mrs. Karolyi had committed action in violation of Hungarian criminal law and
the
had been ordered detained. No further information concerning this case has been
forthcoming and Mrs. Karolyi is presumed still to be under detention.
8. Jeno Kvassay, who was employed as a personal chauffeur by the Assistant
Military Attaché of the Legation, disappeared on April 17, 1953. On April 20
the Legation, in its Note No. 137, requested the Ministry to inform the Legation
concerning the whereabouts of Mr. Kvassay. No reply has ever been received to
this inquiry and Mr. Kvassay's whereabouts and fate continue to be unknown to
the Legation.
10
9. Laszlo Gal-Disappeared on June 3, 1953. The Legation on June 8, 1953
bent Note No. 161 to the Ministry asking for information regarding the where-
Dut
abouts of Dr. Gal. The Ministry's reply, dated June 27, stated only that Dr.
Gal had committed "action in violation of Hungarian criminal law" and was being
detained. The specific charges on which Dr. Gal was detained have never been
made known, nor has the result of any proceedings against him ever been commu-
Link
nicated to the Legation.
10. George Karman-Disappeared without explanation on September 24, 1954.
On September 28 the Minister of the United States made an oral protest to Mr.
or
unexplained disappearance of Mr. Karman. On October 4, the Minister addressed
a personal letter to Mr. Hajdu requesting information as to whether the Ministry
ting had any information as yet on Mr. Karman. Mr. Hajdu on October 12, addressed
a note to the Minister stating that in view of Mr. Karman's Hungarian citizenship,
No
his case was not
a proper subject for discussion between the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs and the Legation. When in its Note No. 16 of October 25, the Legation
took issue with this contention, the Ministry in its Note No. 001415/1 of November
17, closed the
case by stating that it did not wish to react to the Legation's Note.
No further information concerning the case of Mr. Karman has been communi-
1 60
cated to the Legation since this date.
the
11. Bela Kapotsy—-Arrested on February 24, 1955. In its Note No. 36 of
March 7, the Legation requested
the Ministry to clarify the reasons
for the arrest.
fter
In a subsequent conversation, Mr. Hajdu, Director of Political Department No. 2
20
, of the Ministry, advised a representative of the Legation that he understood the
arrest was due to some "illegal activities” and that he would attempt to ascertain
the facts and inform the Legation. No additional information regarding Mr.
Kapotsy's case has to this date been forthcoming from the Ministry.
12. Cornelius Balas - Arrested on June 23, 1955.
all
The Legation was informed
mally on June 27 by a representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that
Mr. Balas had been
arrested for contravening Hungarian law".
Efforts to elicit
tion
more specific information regarding the charges on which Mr. 'Balas was being
181
OL
vide
Chat
00-
2 ID
bile
eur
Mr.
the
tice
ded
stil
held proved unavailing.
ited
t to
Thus, within the past eight months alone, three local employees of
the Legation staff have been arrested without
proper explanation or
justification
being offered, with two of these arrests occurring within
the past four months.
2134
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
In addition to these arrests, a pattern of harassment of Legation
staff members has been increasingly evident, particularly over the
past two months. American members of the staff of the Legation
,
including the American Minister, have from time to time been placed
under close surveillance with their every move being catalogued. As
many as five of what have been clearly established to be agents al
Hungarian security organs have been observed loitering in the new
vicinity of the Chancery building at one time and on various occasions
over the past month. That these persons represent security organs
of the Hungarian Government has been confirmed beyond doubt by
American Legation staff members. The persons in question here
been seen to follow individuals leaving the Legation, to detain them
and, in several instances, to conduct them to waiting automobile
,
trucks, and taxis, in which they were transported away.
This molestation of visitors calling at the Legation has been particu-
larly severe since the middle of May. Again, observation by America
staff members indicates that the persons who have been thus molested
and/or carried off exceeds one hundred at the least, with good grounds
for believing that a very high percentage of all visitors to the Legation
have been so treated during the past month.
46. HUNGARIAN INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES: Note From the Secretary of State to the Hungarian
Minister at Washington, September 1, 1955 2
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable
the Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic and has the honor to
refer to the dissemination of the publication "New Hungary" and is
other information activities in the United States of the Legation of
the Hungarian People's Republic.
The Minister is doubtless aware that the American Legation i
Budapest has found it increasingly difficult to carry on information
activities comparable to those carried on freely in the United States
by the Legation of the Hungarian People's Republic. This situation
has arisen because the Hungarian Government has adopted a repres
sive attitude toward the American Legation's information work
Hungary, already limited in scope, and has permitted the Hungarian
police authorities to arrest arbitrarily and otherwise to harass local
employees of the American Legation and to molest and intimidate
local visitors calling at the Legation.
The Government of the United States considers these actions of the
Hungarian Government as particularly regrettable at this time
view of the emphasis placed at the recent Geneva Conference on the
development of contacts between East and West.3 The conduct
the Hungarian Government militates against the lowering of exista
oli
2
1 Károly Szarka.
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 19, 1955, pp. 459–460.
3 See supra, pp. 2005–2016.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2135
2 Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, pp. 172-174.
3101
the
ion,
CAL
ts
301
TONS
ans
by
ave
barriers to cultural intercourse and the interchange of information
and ideas between peoples for the establishment of a new and healthy
atmosphere for the pursuit of peace. The Government of the United
States has exercised the utmost patience in awaiting the Hungarian
Government's response to its note of July 1' requesting a satisfactory
explanation or remedial action with respect to the matters in question.
The Hungarian Government has made no reply, however, nor has it
taken any steps to correct the situation which was the subject of this
Government's just complaint. In these circumstances, the Govern-
ment of the United States has reluctantly concluded that it has no
alternative other than to invoke appropriate countermeasures and
maintain them in force until such time as the Hungarian Government
may be disposed to reconsider its actions and reestablish conditions
permitting normal information activities by the Legations of the two
countries.
The Secretary of State accordingly informs the Minister that the
Legation of the Hungarian People's Republic is required to cease all
information activities in which it is directly or indirectly engaged,
including the dissemination of "New Hungary” and other publica-
tions, film showings, and photographic exhibits, in so far as these
activities are conducted wholly or in part outside of the Legation
premises.
This requirement is effective immediately.
lemi
iles
ACU
ICAN
sted
inds
tion
TED
ria
G. POLAND
cabile
or to
d to
in of
47. POLISH REPATRIATION ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY: Note
From the American Embassy at Warsaw to the Polish Foreign
Ministry, July 19, 1951 2
ID
tion
cates
tion
DIAS
k in
riad
Och
zone of Germany.
dele
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on instructions from the
Government of the United States has the honor to reply as follows to
the Ministry's note of June 13, 1951, concerning the termination of
accreditation of the Polish repatriation mission in the United States
As the Polish Government is aware, repatriation mission personnel
are accredited to the United States High Commissioner for Germany
Ethe
who has the responsibility of determining the size of the mission on the
basis of the number of displaced persons with which the mission
is
properly concerned. From July 1, 1947, to December 31, 1950, the
Polish voluntary repatriates from the United States zone totaled
stre 12,504. Of this number, only 410 volunteered for repatriation in 1950.
1
e in
the
tad
Supra.
3
Ibid., pp. 172-173.
2136
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Moreover, during the first 5 months of 1951 there were only 27 volun-
tary repatriations of Polish citizens from the United States zone.
There is no Polish displaced persons camp in the United States zone
and only one International Refugee Organization repatriation camp at
Griesheim near Frankfort. Thus, since the period of mass repatria
.
tion had clearly come to an end, the continued presence in the United
States zone of eight Polish repatriation officials could no longer be
considered necessary.
A procedure exists, in the absence of a Polish repatriation mission,
for returning those few persons who might from time to time voluntee
for repatriation to Poland. Arrangements in each case can readily be
made by the Polish Military Mission at Berlin with the United States
High Commissioner's office. This was pointed out to the chief of the
Polish Repatriation Mission in the United States zone in a letter d
May 16, 1951, from the United States High Commissioner's office
requesting the withdrawal of the mission. The United States Ambas
.
sador at Warsaw also stressed in a conversation with the Secretary
General of the Foreign Office on June 12, 1951, that facilities for Polish
repatriation have not been terminated as arrangements for this purpose
can readily be effected by the Polish Military Mission at Berlin
, in
agreement with the office of the United States High Commissioner
.
Under these circumstances the United States Government cate-
gorically rejects the charge made by the Polish Government in its note
of June 13, 1951, that American authorities in terminating the accredi-
tation of the Polish mission in the United States zone of Germany are
rendering impossible the repatriation of Polish displaced persons
who
wish to return to Poland.
Moreover, since the Polish Government continues to have the
possibility of making arrangements for voluntary repatriates, there
has been no violation of Polish rights under the United Nations
General Assembly resolutions of February 12, 1946,2 and November
17, 1947, or under resolutions contained in the report of April 23
1947,4 to the Council of Foreign Ministers.
The actual facts concerning the unwarranted charge of the Polish
Government that American officials have hindered the repatriation of
Poles are as follows:
1) United States officials have provided extensive logistical support
to the Polish Repatriation Mission, including authorization for free
train travel throughout the United States zone of Germany, facilities
for vehicle registration and purchase of gasoline from United States
Army supplies, United States post-exchange privileges and com-
missary privileges for the Chief of Mission.
2) No protest has ever been received from the Polish Mission that
its activities in the repatriation of dependent persons resident in the
1 Not printed.
2 Resolution 8_(I); Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During the
First Part of Its First Session (A/64), p. 12.
* Resolution 136 (IT); General Assembly, Oficial Records, Second Session
Resolutions; (A/519), p. 44.
4 Not printed.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2137
un-
One
118.
Leer
DAS
&ry
Ost
11
legion under Napoleon in Italy (1798-1801).
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 298.
United States zone of Germany were obstructed by United States
zonal authorities.
3) The record shows that Polish representatives were free to visit
at
International Refugee Organization camps as frequently as they
wished, and that these visits often averaged three a week.
ted 4) The Polish Repatriation Mission did not publish a periodical
bi in Germany, but rather imported quantities of magazines and news-
papers from Poland. The question of paper allocation and licensing
101,
therefore did not arise.
The Polish Government has included in its note various misstate-
th
ments concerning United States statutes governing military service.
ates
The reference to the "law approved on April 13, 1951," was apparently
the
intended to relate to Public Law 51, enacted June 19, 1951.1' Public
rol
Law 51 is essentially a continuation of the Selective Service Act of
fice
1940 ? under which many thousands of legally admitted aliens fought
for the freedom and survival of the allied nations, including Poland.
The Polish Government's statement concerning “displaced persons
lish
as reserve manpower” is presumably directed at plans an-
nounced by the United States Secretary of the Army for the imple-
mentation of the Act of June 30, 1950,3 providing for voluntary enlist-
ment of a limited number of aliens in the Regular Army of the United
ate
States. It would seem singularly inappropriate that exception to this
note
law should be taken by the Government of Poland, many of whose
edi
present leaders have frequently and recently called attention to the
brilliant feats of arms by Generals Kosciuszko,4 Pulawski, E. Bem,
who
and Walter, and whose own national anthem is still the song of
Dabroski's 8 soldiers in Italy.
ber
48. POLISH AND UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICES:
23 Statement by the Department of State, August 9, 1951 º
Tish
The Polish Foreign Minister called in the American Ambassador
nd
Joseph Flack on August 8 and asked that the activities of the United
States Information Service, including distribution of the English
and Polish language wireless bulletins, film showings, and library
functions, should be terminated as of 'that date. Since the Polish
Act of Sept. 16, 1940; 54 Stat. 885.
Tadeusz Kosciuszko (1746–1817) served in the United States as engineering
officer (1776-1783), later resided in the United States as private citizen (1797-
Count Kazimierz Pulawski (1748-1779) served in the United States as a
cavalry officer (1777-1779).
• E. (Josef?] Bem (1795-1850), Polish General.
Walter (pseud. for Karol Swierczewski (1889–1947)], served in the Spanish
Civil War and World War II, later an officer
in the Polish Government.
.. Probably Jan Henryk Dabrowski (1755-1818), who commanded the Polish
are
6
the
ere
ODS
)
ort
ree
les
tes
165 Stat. 75.
2
ml-
3 64 Stat. 318.
nat
1798).
the
im
9
2138
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
I
a
I
b
(
I
t
t
t
t
of the Polish Government, can, therefore, hardly be unconnected in
Government insisted that this was final there was no alternative but
to comply with this request.
The United States Government regards this action of the Polish
Government as an entirely unwarranted interference with the free
exchange of information between nations, an exchange which this
Government is always ready to foster on a fair and reciprocal basis.
It is recalled, moreover, how much the Polish people appreciated
,
ever since the United States Information Service was established at
Warsaw, the services it performed. There is every reason to believe
that these activities in the interest of a better understanding between
peoples will be missed by the Polish nation.
The Polish Ambassador here has been summoned today and in-
formed that the Polish Research and Information Service at New York
must be closed within 24 hours.
49. POLISH AND UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICES:
Note From the Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador at
Washington, September 20, 1951 2
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency,
the Ambassador of Poland and has the honor to refer to the note
which was delivered to the United States Embassy at Warsaw by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 14, 1951.3 This note protested
the closing of the Polish Research and Information Service at New
York, and also made certain charges against the United States
Information Service at Warsaw.
The Government of the United States finds it difficult to believe
that the Polish Government can seriously contend that the action
of the United States in requesting the closing of the Polish Research
and Information Service was a baseless and illegal reprisal.
The Polish Government will recall that on August 8, 1951 the Polish
Foreign Minister received the United States Ambassador at Warsaw
and delivered a note 4 protesting the proposal by the United States
Government that the 1931 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Consular Rights be amended by the elimination of Article VI of
that treaty. It was at the conclusion of this interview that the
Foreign Minister demanded the closing of the United States Informa-
tion Service office at Warsaw.
It is of interest that the Polish Embassy at Washington in a pres
release issued on August 10, 1951, also clearly linked the two subjects
of the proposal to terminate Article VI of the 1931 Treaty and the
closing of the United States Information Service office at Warsaw
These two subjects, so closely connected in time and in the actions
Я
F
1
I
t
S
I
C
I
t
t
2
1 Jozef Winiewicz.
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 22, 1951, pp. 652-653.
3 Ibid., pp. 651-652.
+ See statement of Aug. 9, 1951, by the Department of State; supra.
5 Treaty of June 15, 1931; 48 Stat. 1507.
19.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2139
SIS
91
eve
af
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the publications of the United
but
the minds and in the intentions of the responsible officers of that
Government.
lish The United States Government is always prepared to encourage,
Free
on a fair and reciprocal basis, the free exchange of information between
his
nations. It can, however, only regard as hypocritical or naive the
attitude of a Government which, having practiced reprisals in the
ced
name of legality, then proceeds to denounce as "reprisals” the
practice, by another Government, of the principle of reciprocity.
The Polish Government also alleged in its note of August 14, 1951,
een which, it may be noted, was issued as a press release three days later
by the Polish Embassy'at Washington, that the closing of the Polish
in-
Research and Information Service proves that the United States
ork
Government wishes to separate the American people behind an
Iron Curtain from all news of the peaceful attitude and activities of
the Polish nation.
The facts which are relevant to this allegation must be known to
ES: the Polish Government. It is a matter of common knowledge where
the Iron Curtain was created and where it is maintained by govern-
ments exercising a monopoly of police and political power and claiming
to exercise a monopoly over all sources of public information. It is
also a matter of common knowledge, reported almost daily in the free
CT,
press
ote
of the world, from which direction and from which countries,
the
men, women, and children escape, at desperate risk, to join the com-
munity of freedom in the Western World
ted
The extent to which the contents of this note are made known to
the people of Poland by the Polish press and radio will provide a
significant commentary on the location of the Iron Curtain.
The Government of the United States rejects the contention of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the activities of the United States
Information Service in Poland went beyond the accepted scope of
normal activity of a diplomatic mission or were against the interests
The United States carries on these activities as part of its diplo-
matic functions in sixty-four nations, where, far from being subject
tes
end
to police harassment and official impediments, the activities are
of
welcomed by the governments concerned, which in many cases
the
cooperate heartily with the United States Information Service in
its work among their people. Only in Communist China, Hungary,
Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and now Poland has the United
States Information Service been compelled by governmental action
cts
che
The many governments that welcome and cooperate with the
United States Information Service are surely not incompetent judges
of what constitutes normal diplomatic activity. Nor can they be
considered to be insensitive as to what constitutes diplomatic privilege.
The United States Government also rejects the assertion of the
States Information Service in Poland spread war propaganda and
propaganda hostile to Poland. The publications at the United
States Information Service in Poland, notably the Daily Wireless
ei
tes
ve
101
of peace.
ish
81
18.
ENS
to suspend operations.
INT,
DS
in
2140
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
peace,
unfounded charges in the Ministry's note of January 16, 1953,4
graph of the Ministry's note of January 16, the United States Govern-
1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 23, 1953, pp. 304-305. See also the US!
Bulletin, undertook, among other things, to provide those citizens
of Poland who desired to be informed, with accurate accounts of the
views expressed and the positions taken by the responsible gover-
mental officials of the United States, in the United Nations and
elsewhere. Not less importantly, the Bulletin continually reported
the views of the duly elected representatives of the people of the
United States, and of the responsible journals of fact and opinion
in the United States.
To allege, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs endeavors to do, that
the publication of such material is to engage in war mongering is to
deny the validity of the open and democratic processes by which fire
public opinion is formed. It is only in this way that free legislative
assemblies can function, that the executive authority of a free gor.
ernment can exercise leadership, and that sound and just internationi
judgments as expressed in the United Nations, of which Poland i
a member, can be formulated.
The fact that these democratic processes involve the expression
of views repugnant to those held by the present Government of Poland,
does not conjure them out of existence or render them propagandi
for war.
On the contrary, these views are held by governmerk
and individuals keenly desirous of maintaining international
concerned by developments threatening it, and determined to forestall
the betrayal of peace by all possible means.
A government which undertakes to deny its people access to such
information, the right freely to judge the validity of the views ex. i
pressed, accordingly assumes the most serious responsibility. '16
attempt to keep people in ignorance of the facts of the world in which
they live, of the forces at work in it, and the reactions which thes
forces can create, is not to work for peace but for those miscalculations t
and errors that in the past have often led to misunderstandings between
nations. History abundantly proves that governments which adopt
the policy of denying their peoples access to all the avenues to truth
have done so at their own loss,
t
]
50. POLISH CHARGES REGARDING ALLEGED SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES: Note From
the American Embassy at Warsaw to
f
the Polish Foreign Ministry, February 9, 1953
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its complir
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and on instructions of the
United States Government has the
honor to reject categorically ti
leging aggressive attempts by the Government of the United States
on the security of Poland. With specific reference to the last par
note of Mar. 28, 1953; ibid., Apr. 20, 1953, p. 578.
2 Not printed.
C
O
S
0
V
t
1
C
a
i
1
C
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2141
zament rejects the allegations of the Polish Government that an aircraft
the
belonging to the Armed forces of the United States violated Polish
en territory on November 4, 1952, and that the United States has organ-
and ized aggressive “intelligence and subversion” on Polish territory.
rted
The charges are very clearly a part of a larger pattern of accusations
the made with increasing vehemence during the past few months by a
mion number of governments dominated by a single totalitarian political
party. As the Polish Government is well aware, these recent charges
that have been leveled against Christians and Jews, Communists and former
# Communists, workers, peasants and intellectuals, and even against
fre
many once prominent and trusted officials occupying positions of
Etire
great power in the very governments which are now making the
gor-charges.
onal
stal
The free world, and no doubt many in that part of the world which
di is not free, has viewed these accusations with profound skepticism and
deep disgust, seeing in them the characteristic excesses of men hys-
ssion terically fearful that they will lose the absolute power which has cor-
and, rupted them. To the
extent, however, that this macabre process of
and almost daily accusation actually reflects a genuine struggle of men to be
ente free and masters of their own thoughts and souls, the Government and
cace people of the United States cannot be disinterested.
Sympathy and concern for the welfare and aspirations to freedom
of peoples of other lands has been a continuing and important feature
such of American history from the beginning of the United States as an
es independent country. The names of Pulaski 1 and Kosciuszko, of
Kossuth ® and Krzyzanowski,4 of Paderewski - and the elder Masaryk,
lied all of whom
found haven and support in the United States during their
he struggles for the freedom of their homelands bear eloquent testimony
dions to the continuing American interest in the liberty and independence
BD of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The Polish Government in its note of January 16 alleges that while
rull the American nation desires peaceful relations with the Polish nation,
the policy of the Government of the United States is anti-Polish
The absurdity of this contention is apparent to anyone acquainted
with the democratic and representative nature of the political insti-
FTVE
tutions of the United States which ensure, contrary to the situation
which prevails in totalitarian regimes, the faithful reflection of the
popular will in the policies followed by the Government of the United
dort
w to
pl
the
the
cates
* Count Kazimierz Pulawski (1748–1779) served in the United States as a
cavalry officer (1777-1779).
Tadeusz Kosciuszko (1746-1817) served in the United States as an engineering
officer (1776-1783) before returning to Poland and again resided in the United
States as a private citizen (1797–1798),
Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894) spent the years 1851-1852 in the United States
after the collapse of the insurrection he had headed
in Hungary.
Vladimir Bonaventure Krzyzanowski (1824-1877) came to the United States
in 1846, served in the American Civil War, buried in Arlington Cemetery.
Ignace Jan Paderewski (1860–1941) spent most of the latter part of his life
Tomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937) spent some time in the United States
the World War I period in connection with the establishment of the new state
818-
ern
in the United States.
US
of Czechoslovakia.
2142
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
States. In any event, the question of whether the policy of the United
States Government is anti-Polish is one which the United States is
happy to leave to the judgment of history, confident that the recon
clearly shows that from its earliest beginnings as an independent com-
try, the United States has always been, and remains, a firm friend of
Poland.
It is also impossible to understand the grounds on which the Mi
istry bases the fantastic allegation that the United States Government
desires to transform Poland into a colony of the United States. Its
understandable that under the conditions which prevail in Polands
the present time many citizens of Poland might entertain legitimate
fears regarding the possible reduction of Poland to the status of a
colony, but it is certainly not on the Government of the Unital
States that responsibility for these unfortunate conditions rests.
A very few years ago both Poland and the United States fought
side by side in defense of their national existence against an evil and
powerful enemy. For several years after that war, the United States
through official and unofficial channels, undertook a massive and
varied program of economic assistance to the people of Poland. As a
part of that assistance, UNRRA,' which was financed largely by the
United States, delivered to Poland food, clothing, medical, industrial
and agricultural supplies in the amount of $477,927,000. This was
more than was supplied to any other European country, and was on:
sixth of the total assistance granted to all war-devastated countris
throughout the world.
Moreover, it was the Polish Government itself which announced i
July 1947 a decision not to participate in the European economi
recovery program which offered additional great possibilities for p
building war damage in Poland and for raising the standard of living
of the hard-pressed Polish people.
In its note of January 16, 1953 the Ministry of Foreign Afair
saw fit to return to the subject of Section 101 of the United States
Mutual Security Act of 1951, and to repeat the baseless charges
contained in its note(s) of December 19, 19513 and January 12, 1982
As the Polish Government was informed more than a year ago
Section 101 of the Mutual Security
Act is intended to provide assas
ance to victims of oppression, where such assistance has been deter
mined to contribute to the defense
of the North Atlantic Area. The
purely humanitarian program for extending care and assistance !
resettlement to refugees which is now being actively carried out under
this legislation is completely consistent
with the policy of the United
Nations of rendering assistance to people who have been forced to
flee from their homelands.
With regard to the allegations in the Polish note under referemus
attempting to establish a connection between the Embassy at Warser
1 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
2 Act of Oct. 10, 1951; 65 Stat. 373.
3 Not printed.
4 Not printed.
5 In a note not printed.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2143
ited
S IS
con
dd
Min
pent
It is
det
nate
of a
lited
and the murder of a Polish radio announcer, the Government of the
United States states categorically that these allegations are groundless,
and that the Government of Poland must be aware of that fact.
Concerning the further allegation that United States Government
information activities have sown hatred toward Poland, it is to be
noted that the aim of these activities with respect to Poland is to
provide accurate news and commentaries on important developments
to the Polish people who, cut off from such information by their own
authorities, are naturally eager to be informed by other means. As
the Government of the United States observed to the Polish Embassy
at Washington in a note of September 20, 1951, history abundantly
proves that governments which adopt the policy of denying their
peoples access to all the avenues to truth have done so at their own
loss.
During the past century and three quarters Poland has several
times been partitioned by powerful neighboring states, and at times
has been occupied by one of them. During these tragic years of
Polish history, no people and no government has had a warmer ad-
miration for the unquenchable Polish love of liberty than the people
and Government of the United States, and none has had a firmer
faith in the final outcome of the Polish struggle for liberty and national
independence.
Ueri
ates
and
As &
the
tria
)
1786
One
min
ed in
51. KATYN MASSACRE: Note From the United States Represent-
ative to the United Nations 2 to the Secretary-General, February
10, 19534
omk
VIDE
daus
cates,
urges
5
952.'
200
sist
eter-
The
e In
nder
nited
EXCELLENCY: On September 18, 1951, the House of Representatives
of the United States Congress provided for the establishment of a
Committee to conduct an investigation and study the facts, evidence,
and circumstances of the Katyn massacre, committed against thou-
sands of Polish Army officers and civilians during World War II.
The Committee held hearings in the United States, United Kingdom,
Germany, and Italy. In the course of its inquiry into the responsi-
bility for the massacre the Committee heard testimony from 81
witnesses
, studied 183 exhibits, and studied and received 100 deposi-
tions taken from witnesses who could not appear at the hearings.
In addition, the Committee staff has questioned more than 200 other
individuals who offered to appear as witnesses but whose information
was mostly of a corroborative nature. The account of the Com-
mittee's inquiry is set forth in the seven volumes entitled "Hearings
Before the Select Committee to conduct an Investigation of the Facts,
Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", two
to
enna
ESATA
1 Supra.
2 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
3 Trygve Lie.
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 23, 1953, pp. 322-323.
$ H. Res. 390, 82d Cong., 1st sess.
4
2144
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
8 The short-lived constitution of May 3, 1792, whose institution was opposed
sets of which I have the honor to transmit with this communication
,
The findings and conclusions on this phase of the Committee's in
quiry are contained in the Interim Report.
I am enclosing 70 copies of the Interim Report with the request
that you transmit a copy of the Interim Report together with a copy
of this communication to the Representative of each Member of the
United Nations as a matter pertaining to United Nations objectives
in the field of Human Rights.
It will be noted that the Interim Report contains references to the
"Hearings” referred to above and enclosed herewith. May I ask
you to make these volumes available to any Representative who may
wish to refer to them.
52. 162d ANNIVERSARY OF THE POLISH CONSTITUTION:
Statement by the Secretary of State, May 3, 1953 ?
Today [May 3] is the 162d anniversary of the adoption of the
Polish Third of May Constitution, a step of worldwide significance on
the road toward modern, Western democracy. In the days of its
independence the Polish Nation celebrated this anniversary freely
and with patriotic devotion as the national holiday. In their present
unhappy bondage the Polish people commemorate the occasion no
less solemnly, although those in Poland, as we all know, may do so
only in their hearts and thoughts.
The Polish Nation is rightly proud of its splendid history which
illustrates, as does all history, that no tyranny can suppress perme-
nently the freedom of a nation which truly desires freedom. Free-
dom—the freedom of nations as well as freedom of the individual—is
at the heart of American policy. It is the same principle which the
Poles inscribed on their banners—"for our freedom and for yours.
On this occasion I send to the Polish people an expression of the
warm, friendly sympathy of the American people and of their Govera-
ment. We salute true Poles wherever they may be. We join with
them in the hope and faith that the Polish desire for freedom and
independence will find the fullest realization.
1 Report of July 2, 1952; H. Rept. No. 2430, 82d Cong., 2d sess.
H. Rept. No. 2502, 82d Cong., 2d sess.
2 Department of State Bulletin, May 18, 1953, p. 721. The statement was
released to the press May 2, 1953, 7:00 p.m.
partitions of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and Austria.
See also
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2145
OD,
.
IN-
VOS
Eisenhower's remarks of Sept. 30, 1953 (ibid.), and the statement of Sept. 22,
53. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN POLAND: Statement by the
Department of State, September 30, 1953 1
lest In denouncing the arrest and forced retirement of the Primate of
OPS
Poland, Cardinal Wyszynski, the President expressed the condemna-
the tion by the American people of this new act of Communist terrorism
against religion.
It is clear to everyone that the outright war on religion conducted
the by the Polish regime is also an attack on the national traditions of
ask which religion has always been a vital part. The Polish Communists
791 have committed a crime against a true leader of the Polish nation, and
the memory of it will never be erased.
The American people are profoundly convinced that the religious
persecution now being carried on in Poland will not achieve the purpose
Nintended. We are confident that the religious spirit of man will not
be subdued or extinguished and will remain a sustaining force in
Poland during the present tragic suffering of the Polish nation.
the
01
iis
els 54. CLOSING OF POLISH CONSULATES GENERAL IN THE
ent
UNITED STATES: Note From the Secretary of State to the Polish
DO Ambassador at Washington, 2 February 25, 1954 3
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency
ich
the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic and has the honor to
inform the Ambassador that the Department of State has reviewed
the activities of the Polish Consulates General in the United States.
After careful consideration the Department has reached the conclusion
the
that these Consular establishments serve no useful purpose in the
conduct of relations between the United States and Poland at the
the
present time. The United States Government, consequently, requests
that the Polish Government close its Consulates General at New
York, Chicago and Detroit and withdraw the personnel of those
offices within a reasonable period for liquidating their affairs.
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 19, 1953, p. 529. See also President
also
Oct. 5, 1953, pp. 456–457).
2 Jozef Winiewicz.
* Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 8, 1954, p. 352.
SO
ma-
ee
}
r!
ith
und
WAS
osped
195)
415900~57-Vol. 232
2146
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
5 See the Yalta Declaration on Poland (Feb. 11, 1945); A Decade of American
55. ARREST OF POLISH UNDERGROUND LEADERS IN 1945:
Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet
Foreign Ministry, April 21, 1955 1
The Embassy refers to representations which were made in 1945 by
a United States official 2 with Premier Stalin at Moscow and by the
then Secretary of State 3 with Foreign Minister Molotov at the San
Francisco Conference on the United Nations Charter with respect to
the arrest of 16 leaders of the Polish Underground by Soviet authorities
on March 28, 1945.4
It is recalled that the Underground had waged a bitter struggle
the side of the Allies and in the defense of Poland against foreign
aggression and occupation in the Second World War. The arrest of
these men, members of various Polish political parties and groups
aroused great concern throughout the world. It may also be noted
that the 16 Polish leaders were arrested at a time when the Western
Allies were making an effort, in accordance with international dis-
cussions, to have a new Polish Government formed on a democratie
basis by the inclusion of Polish leaders from abroad and from the
Underground in Poland. In virtue of this interest the United States
made its inquiries to the Soviet Government in 1945 with a view to
obtaining information regarding the arrested men. The United
States Government now wishes to raise this matter again.
Certain developments subsequent to this arrest are well-known
The men were transported from Poland to the Soviet Union and were
tried by a Soviet court in June 1945. Most of them were
in the Soviet Union. Some were re-arrested in Poland and sentenced
to imprisonment in Polish jails. The longest Soviet sentence was that
of ten years, imposed on Major General Okulicki.
The United States Government notes that if General Okulicki's
sentence began on the date of his arrest he has now presumably com-
pleted his term of imprisonment. Since all of the other Soviet sen-
tences were of lesser length it is assumed that none of the sixteen men
originally arrested are now held in Soviet jails.
The United States Government also wishes to point out that despite
continued interest in the fate of these Polish leaders, nothing is known
of the whereabouts of several of them and there is even some doubt
as to how many are still alive.
So far as the United States Government is aware the following three
members of the group, in addition to General Okulicki, have not ye
returned to Poland: Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, Stanislaw
Jasiukowice
1 Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1955, pp. 737-738. A similar note *
the Polish Foreign Ministry contained the following additional paragraph: "It i
also understood that Stanislaw Michalowski and Kazimierz Kobylanski wele
re-arrested following their return to Poland from the Soviet Union. Their
ultimate fate, as well as that of Adam Bien, Alexander Zwierzynski and Jozef
Stemler-Dabski is unknown"; ibid., p. 738.
2 Ambassador W. Averell Harriman.
3 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
4 See Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1945, p. 850.
imprisoned
Foreign Policy, pp. 30–31.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2147
ki
101
3 Ibid., Mar. 20, 1950, pp. 443-444.
and Antoni Pajdak. Dating from the time of their original arrest,
iet Jankowski's sentence would have ended March 28, 1953, and that of
Jasiukowicz, and possibly of Pajdak, on March 28, 1950.
Under these circumstances the United States Government wishes
by to request that the Soviet Government provide information as to
the which of these sixteen men are still in the Soviet Union, and under
Dan what circumstances. Information is also requested regarding any of
sto the men who may have died in the U.S.S.R.
ties
01
ig
H. RUMANIA
aps
.
ted
cer
56. AMERICAN INFORMATION AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES
dis
.
IN RUMANIA: Note From the American Legation at Bucharest
atic
to the Rumanian Foreign Ministry, April 26, 1950 1
the
ates
Ito
The Legation of the United States of America presents its compli-
ited
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the
Ministry's note of April 14 2 concerning the information and cultural
activities of the American Legation at Bucharest, has the honor to
communicate the views of the United States Government as follows:
The nature and tone of the Rumanian Government's response to
the inquiries contained in the Legation's note of March 6 3 are such
Ehet
that the United States Government considers it unnecessary to refute
in detail the contentions of the Ministry's note under reference.
The accusations against the United States and its official repre-
sentatives, by which the Rumanian Government seeks to justify its
demand for the cessation of the activities of the United States In-
formation Services in Rumania, would be ludicrous if they were not
so serious in their implications for that understanding between peoples
Nevertheless, the United States Government takes occasion to
state categorically that the Rumanian Government's charges of im-
proper activities on the part of employees of the United States In-
formation Services in alleged conspiracy against
the Rumanian Gov-
ernment are completely baseless. Indeed, the United States Govern-
ment wishes to remind the Rumanian Government that no credence
can be placed in purported evidence which it adduces in support of
Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1950, p. 735. See also statement of
Apr. 26, 1950, by the Department of State; ibid., pp. 732–733.
2. Ibid., pp. 733-734. The Rumanian note charged that the U.S. Information
office had "served to organize activity hostile to the Rumanian people”; that the
trials of certain conspirators, spies and saboteurs", showed the role played by
employees of the Information Office in "espionage activities"; and that the United
States obstructed cultural exchange by refusing to admit Rumanian delegates to
"peace meetings” in the United States and hindering the cultural activities of
the Rumanian Legation at Washington.
WD.
Terg
ned
aced
ki's
om
sen-
nen
which is essential to peace.
pite
31
ubt
ured
Fet
FICZ
je to
I
It i
were
"heir
lozef
sical
2148
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
these charges as developed in "trials" which the Rumanian authorities
manipulated in such a way as to create a false impression of United
States Information policies and of the legitimate activities of official
United States representatives.
The United States Government is confident that the people of
Rumania, no less than the free peoples of the world, will regard the
Rumanian Government's allegations as a reflection of its fear of free-
dom of information. Such fear is reflected in the Rumanian Govern-
ment's comprehensively restrictive measures which have the effect
of cutting off the Rumanian people from contact with the United
States and other democratic nations.
The sole aim and practice of the American Legation's Information
Office, as with the United States Information Services everywhere
has been to furnish a channel of information and cultural exchange
between the peoples of Rumania and of the United States, affording
all elements of the Rumanian population an opportunity for news and
a balanced picture of America which are denied them by the Govern-
ment-controlled press and radio of Rumania and constantly misrepre-
sented to them by Rumanian Government spokesmen.
The United States Government reaffirms its view that informational
and cultural exchange constitutes a normal and proper function of
diplomatic mission which is able to contribute to understanding be-
tween peoples. The United States Government, in its international
relations as in domestic affairs, staunchly adheres to freedom of infor-
mation. It believes in the inherent right of individuals and nations
to a free flow of information which they may freely judge for them-
selves.
The Rumanian Government's persistently unfriendly behavior
toward the United States and its lack of cooperation in promoting
international amity give a hollow tone to its voice in the Communist
"peace offensive”. Issues of the American Legation's news bulletin,
to which the Ministry's note refers, contain expressions by the Presi-
dent and Secretary of State concerning United States efforts for world
peace and the constant United States willingness to share in promoting
peace. Any government genuinely disposed to foster peaceful rela-
tions and friendly intercourse among nations will find the United
States ready to cooperate in furthering these ends.
57. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OF RUMANIAN DIPLOMATS
IN THE UNITED STATES: Note From the Acting Secretary of
State 1 to the Rumanian Minister at Washington, 2 May 25,
1950 3
The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the
Honorable the Minister of
Rumania and, referring
to the inordinate
restrictions imposed by the Rumanian' Government upon official
1 James E. Webb.
2 Mihai Magheru.
3 Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 921.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2149
es
d
AL
of
:
he
American personnel in Rumania, has the honor to inform him as
follows:
Effective immediately, members of the Rumanian diplomatic rep-
resentation in the United States and the Rumanian employees of that
Mission, as well as their dependents, may not travel outside of a
designated area except by special permission. The limits of the area
under reference are fixed at a distance of thirty-five miles from the
boundaries of the District of Columbia.
Permission to go beyond the area so described shall be requested in
advance of the Department of State according to a prescribed form,
of which a facsimile is enclosed herewith. 1 Copies of this form may
be obtained from the Department upon request. Travel outside of
the designated area should not be undertaken prior to receipt by the
Legation of authorization from the Department of State.
n-
ct
ed
ge
ng
0-
de
58. REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN
RUMANIA: Statement by the Acting Secretary of State, May 26,
19503
al
&
tv
al
r
ៗទេ
1
31
28
st
1,
Id
The United States Minister to Rumania, Rudolf E. Schoenfeld,
delivered to the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mme. Ana
Pauker, on May 22 4 a note in reply to the Rumanian Government's
demand of May 13 5 that the staff of our Legation at Bucharest be
reduced to 10 persons.
The United States note refused to admit the propriety of a receiving
state (like Rumania) attempting to determine arbitrarily and uni-
laterally the composition of the diplomatic mission of a state with
which it maintains relations. Our reply flatly rejected the pretexts
on which the Rumanian Government based its demand. However,
taking into account the Rumanian Government's
evident lack of dis-
position to further the interests of the two countries in the mainte-
nance of normal diplomatic relations, we indicated our intention to
reduce the official personnel of our Légation to conform to the situa-
tion created by the arbitrary attitude of the Rumanian Government.
On the occasion of delivering our reply to the Rumanian demand
for the reduction of our Legation staff at Bucharest, the United States
Minister informed the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs that,
in view of the severe travel restrictions imposed by the Rumanian
authorities upon official American personnel in Rumania, the United
States Government has decided to apply similar restrictions
to official
Rumanian personnel in the United States. The Rumanian Foreign
Minister was told that, in the application of these restrictions, the
United States Government would take account of the current treat-
ment of American officials in Rumania.
ng
ed
5
of
3
ne
te
1 Not printed here.
? James E. Webb.
3
Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 921.
Not printed.
• Not printed.
2150
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2
3 Members of the Legation had openly disposed of a small quantity of outdated
A note has been delivered to the Rumanian Minister in Washington
informing him of the limitations on travel in the United States by
personnel of the Rumanian Legation and of the procedure for
obtaining authorization to travel.
59. RUMANIAN CHARGES REGARDING ALLEGED SUBVER
SIVE ACTIVITIES: Note From the American Legation at Bucha.
rest to the Rumanian Foreign Ministry, June 20, 1950
The Government of the United States has taken note of the manner
in which the Rumanian Government has misrepresented an action
on the part of certain members of the American Legation relating to
the disposal of some obsolete small arms ammunition. The United
States Government has also noted the Rumanian Government's de-
mand in this connection for the recall of Captain Herschel Hutsin-
piller, Assistant United States Army Attaché at Bucharest.
It is illustrative of the conduct of diplomatic relations by the
Rumanian Government that, through its organs of propaganda,
it
should have launched a new virulent attack against the American
Legation and the United States Government on the basis of an arti-
ficially exaggerated and distorted incident, without so much as first
seeking an explanation through the American diplomatic representa-
tives in Rumania.
It is also characteristic that, after stating on June 9 that the Ru-
manian Government "would leave it up to the United States Govern-
ment to decide what to do about Captain Hutsinpiller" and without
awaiting the transmission of a reply from the Government of the
United States, the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 14
should have peremptorily demanded the recall of Captain Hutsinpiller.
The quantity of the ammunition in question was negligible
. It
was disposed of in an open manner which belies assertions that this
action had a clandestine or secretive character. The false construc-
tion placed by the Rumanian Government-controlled press on the
intentions of the United States Government and its representatives
in connection with this insignificant incident is patent on its face
.
The United States Government is withdrawing Captain Hutsin-
piller. At the same time, it repudiates the alleged justification for
the Ministry's demand. The use which the Rumanian authorities
have made of this episode and the abuse, on this as on former occa-
sions, of the right to declare a foreign official unacceptable can only
lead to the conclusion that the Rumanian Government's action is
1 Supra.
2 Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, pp. 29-30.
ammunition left over from the supplies of the U.S. military representation
the Allied Control Commission, whereupon the Rumanian press interpreted the
incident as showing that the Legation was hiding arms to be supplied to Be
manian dissidents. See statement of June 21, 1950 by the Department of State;
ibid., p. 30.
C
!
1
1
1
?
+
1
1
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES 2151
3D
Or
er
)n
to
ad
.
n.
1.1
ti
st
International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America
3 Treaty of Feb, 10, 1947; TÍAS 1649 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1757).
not really based upon the incident or upon the conduct of Captain
Hutsinpiller but is part of a deliberate and centrally directed policy
being carried out throughout Eastern Europe, to interrupt the normal
conduct of diplomatic relations between the United States and the
states of that area.
3.
60. RUMANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: Statement by the Sec-
a.
retary of State, June 23, 1950 1
Over the past 3 years, the Rumanian Government has subjected
our diplomatic representation at Bucharest to progressively severe
restrictions, impediments, and discourtesies. These not only dras-
tically curtail the performance by our mission of its normal diplo-
matic and consular functions, but they also violate the existing
consular agreement with Rumania ? and effectively deprive our chief
of mission of rights and privileges to which he is entitled by his special
responsibilities under the Treaty of Peace with Rumania.
he
For a year now, there have been in effect in Rumania travel re-
it
strictions which, as administered by the Rumanian authorities vir-
tually confine our representatives to Bucharest and its immediate
environs. Theoretically, these restrictions are imposed on all diplo-
matic personnel. Theoretically also, our people may travel to a few
designated places by special pei mission. This is of little value since
the Rumanians as å rule delay unduly or fail to issue travel permits
At the time the travel restrictions were imposed, we were given
informal assurance that we had only to ask and we would be per-
mitted to travel to Constanza in connection with incoming shipments
for the Legation. This, like many other such assurances, has proved
The Rumanian Government has deprived our personnel of premises
for which they had rental contracts at destinations where they might
be permitted to go. When no other accommodations are available,
it is of little use for them to travel there.
Altogether the restrictions and harassments to which our mission
in Rumania has been subjected by the Rumanian Government are
more comprehensively severe than those of any other country. We
do not accept the thesis that we must conduct our relations toward
one state and its representatives, regardless of its behavior toward
us and our representatives, in the same way as we would toward
The institution on May 25 of the travel-procedure applicable to
personnel of the Rumanian Legation here involves reciprocity of diplo-
matic comity, a principle which
the Rumanians have emphasized to
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 30.
Convention of June 17, 1881; William M. Malloy, ed., Treaties, Conventions,
&-
U-
II
ut
he
14
Br.
It
hollow.
IS
C-
he
tes
Il
OL
es
8.
other states.
IS
ed
ne
Il-
ce;
>
2152
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ment, if taken at face value, would be that the Rumanian Government
an extreme degree. As the Rumanian Government was informed
our administration of the travel procedure will be carried out with i
view to the current treatment of our representatives in Rumania.
It is interesting to note that the Rumanian protest recognizes the
the imposition of travel restrictions by a receiving country upon the
official personnel of a sending country constitutes a limitation on the
normal activity of a diplomatic mission. When the Rumanian Gok
.
ernment is disposed to remove the restrictions which it has placed on
the travel of our representatives in Rumania, we will be ready to alta
appropriately the restrictions which are presently applicable to per
:
sonnel of the Rumanian Legation here.
61. RUMANIAN PROTEST AGAINST TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS
Note From the Secretary of State to the Rumanian Minister of
Washington, 2 July 3, 1950 3
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable
the Minister of Rumania and, with reference to his note No. 2421
June 19, 1950,4 has the honor to respond to the Rumanian Govert-
ment's protest against regulations which the United States Govern
ment has instituted in respect of travel by personnel of the Rumanian
Legation at Washington.
It is of interest to note the Rumanian Government's explicit acknow
.
edgment that the imposition of travel restrictions by a receiving
government upon the official personnel of a sending government com-
stitutes a limitation of the normal activity of a diplomatic Mission
With this view, the United States Government readily agrees.
Restrictions of movement, like restrictions upon the free flow of
information and cultural exchange as imposed by the Rumanian
Government, are basically distasteful to the American people and ils
Government. Travel regulations applicable to personnel of the
Rumanian Legation at Washington have been instituted merely as a
reciprocal limitation of diplomatic privilege in view of the nature ant
effect of travel restrictions as applied by Rumanian authorities to
members of the American Legation at Bucharest.
On the one hand, the Rumanian Government complains that
restrictions on the travel
of its Legation personnel tend to prevent |
diplomatic Mission from carrying on its normal activity. On the
other hand, the Government of Rumania alleges that its own
restrictions are applied without discrimination to all diplomatie
Missions in Rumania. The inescapable deduction from this area
.
1 See the U.S. note of May 25, 1950, and statement of May 26, 1950, by Acties
Secretary Webb; supra, docs. 57 and 58.
2 Mihai Magheru.
3 July ,
See statement of June 23, 1950, by the Secretary of State; supra. The June 4
1950, note is not printed.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2153
* Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 2, 1953, pp. 333–335.
bilo
med. is applying measures which tend to prevent the performance of normal
ith : activities by all diplomatic Missions in Rumania.
Without debating the artificial contention of the Rumanian Govern-
the ment that its travel restrictions are nondiscriminatory, it may be said
a thel that the United States Government rejects the thesis that, no matter
n the how obstructive and abnormal the behavior of a particular state
Gor toward American interests and official American representatives, the
do conduct of United States relations with that state must correspond
alte uniformly with the conduct of United States relations with other states.
At such time as the Rumanian Government may be disposed to
remove the restrictions which it has placed upon the travel within
Rumania of American Legation personnel, especially in performance
of the normal functions of a diplomatic Mission, the United States
DNS
Government will be prepared to alter accordingly the restrictions which
presently apply to travel by personnel of the Rumanian Legation
er at
within the United States. Meanwhile, as the Rumanian Government
has been informed, the travel procedure will be administered with a
view to the current treatment in this regard by Rumanian authorities
of the United States representatives in Rumania.
21 0
per
vern-
Pein-
10/10
62. PLOESTI TRIAL OF FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE
ROMANO-AMERICANA OIL COMPANY: Note From the Amer-
ican Legation at Bucharest to the Rumanian Foreign Ministry,
February 20, 1953
2017
iving
1
COD-
SION.
W
The Legation of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and under instruc-
tions from its Government has the honor to call the Ministry's atten-
niso tion to the "trial” at Ploesti from February 9 to 12, 1953, of various
dis Rumanian citizens, some of whom are former employees of the
the Romano-Americana Oil Company. Since, in the proceedings in the
as il courtroom during the trial and in the commentaries published in the
and Rumanian press and broadcast over the official radio, various un-
s to founded allegations and statements were made concerning the Amer-
ican oil companies and former American officials, the following facts
that are brought to the Rumanian Government's attention.
The Romano-Americana Oil Company was largely owned by citizens
the of the United States of America who had invested huge sums
great risk in the development of Rumanian petroleum resources.
alil This was one of the important factors
which enabled Rumania to
regulattain the substantial production of 8,600,000 metric tons of crude oil
nent
in 1936. During the state of active war which existed between
Rumania and
the United States (1941-44) this company was seques-
tered by the Rumanian Government and administered as enemy
property over which the United States owners had no control.
In these circumstances, it was axiomatic that as soon as Rumania
t its
a Fel
!
at
cting
ell
2154
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
during the fighting and bombing in 1944 sharply reduced possibilities
had concluded an armistice with the Union of Soviet Socialis
Republics, Great Britain and the United States of America, repre
sentatives of these powers who constituted the Allied Control Com-
mission for Rumania should have been restored to control of property
belonging to their citizens. This was a matter of concern both to the
Government of the United States and to American citizens directly
concerned with the ownership and management of the Romans
Americana Oil Company
The Rumanian Government can have no legitimate complaint
regarding any steps taken by American officials and American officer
of that company to keep informed about American property and
about operation of that company in the years 1945, 1946, and 1941
,
years in which a state of war still existed between Rumania and the
United States of America. American owners had every right to know
of the state of production of their company, its activities, personne
,
financial status, sales, etc. Moreover, there were at that time no such
laws concerning state secrets” as now exist in Rumania, as substan-
tially all of the information about which such slanderous statements
have been made in connection with the Ploesti trial, was openly
published in the Monitorul Petrolului Roman. If the Rumanian
Government is not already aware of the fact, the Government of the
United States takes this opportunity to inform it that all of the s-
called espionage information of the type involved in the Ploesti trial
insofar as the American petroleum industry is concerned, freely aval-
able in published form in the United States and can thus be open
obtained by the Rumanian Legation in Washington.
It is clear that no "sabotage" could or did take place under the
auspices of the managerial staff of the oil companies. The operatruus
of such companies in Rumania after the war were an open book in
which all details were known to the three elements (Soviet
, British
and American) of the Allied Control Commission and to the Rumanian
Government. It is true that crude oil production declined after the
war and reached its lowest point in 1947. There are two reasons for
this
, however, neither of which has
any connection with falsely alleged
"sabotage" by the management of the oil companies,
The first and main reason is military. In November and December
1944 alone, Soviet occupation authorities seized about 48,000 metni
tons of tubular goods such as casing, tubing, drill pipe and line
pipe
This amount represented sixty (60) percent of the stocks on head
Stocks left in the country amounted to less than that needed for op
year's amount of normal drilling. Furthermore, destruction o
railway and tank car equipment as well as other petroleum equipment
From the petroleum output that continued, 1,080,000 metric tons o
petroleum products were taken by the Union of Soviet Socialis
Republics as reparations between September 1944 and March 194
alone. During 1945 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics took
1 Armistice agreement of Sept. 12, 1944; A Decade of American Foreign Polish
pp. 487-491.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2155
alist
pre
om
ant
1
ICEN
and
947
.
NOT
such
lents
11191
À SO
adequate and effective compensation.
sixty-eight (68) percent of the total petroleum output and seized
exclusively for its own use the majority of available tank cars.
Faced with such a situation, the only way to rebuild the industry
) the
out of damages resulting from over-exploitation by the Germans dur-
ing the war, from military operations, and from Soviet seizures, was
eeth
investment of large amounts of new capital for repairing existing
plant, for replacing lost equipment, and for exploring for new fields.
ain
This capital did not exist within Rumania in sufficient quantities, a
fact which the present government admits when it claims that large
quantities of equipment have been imported since 1948 from the Soviet
Union at the price of giving that nation a major share in the ownership
the
and management of the industry through so-called "Sovrom Petrol
and "Sovrom Utilaj-Petrolifer' corporations. However, in 1945,
anel
1946, and 1947, the only practicable sources of foreign capital were
the United States and Great Britain who already had invested so
stan
much to give Rumania as large a petroleum industry as it then had.
Instead of encouraging American-owned companies to invest new
funds in Rumania where risk was high, the Rumanian Government
enli
in connivance with the Soviet authorities in Rumania, after formation
f the
of Sovrom Petrol in May 1945, instituted a deliberate policy of
harassing the operations of all privately owned enterprises. "The
alis
Rumanian Government took no steps to assist such enterprises in the
mai importation of desperately needed equipment, it failed to grant realis-
venly
tic prices, it barred, for purely political purposes, financial advances
from the National Bank, it levied arbitrary taxes, forced qualified
the
workers to resign, interfered needlessly in the day-to-day conduct of
business, and allowed the General Confederation of Labor and the
Communist Party to foment pointless strikes. In addition to such
harmful practices it soon became painfully obvious that the ultimate
intention of the Rumanian Government was to expropriate and
nationalize all industrial enterprises except those that were Soviet-
owned. When on June 11, 1948 the Rumanian Government did in
fact pass legislation for the nationalization of industrial, banking,
insurance, mining, transportation and other enterprises, with the
aber exception of those having a Soviet interest, the United States Govern-
ment pointed out that the legislation, being seriously discriminatory,
was expressly prohibited by Article 31 (C) of the Treaty of Peace
between Allied and Associated Powers and Rumania signed at Paris on
February 10, 1947. It was further pointed out
that the nationaliza-
tion legislation failed to provide for equitable valuation and prompt,
of the Rumanian Government after March 1945 and its
obvious inten-
tions it is not surprising that the production of American companies
declined. To place the blame for such a decline on sabotage is, how-
ever, a patently obvious falsification of history.
The Rumanian Government may seek to delude its people into be-
lieving that the
shortages of petroleum products in Rumania
in the
olicy
years 1945, 1946, and 1947 were caused by the actions of the manage-
tions
k in
Itish
mig
the
s for
eged
etric
Dipe
and
One
of
ment
ties
sof
alist
941
ook
* TIAS 1649; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1757.
2156
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
ment of the oil companies. In fact, as has been shown above, the
were due to seizures of equipment and forced exports of such produci
to the Soviet Union. The government will have a more difficult time
explaining why in 1953, when production, according to official claims
is at the highest level in history, gasoline, oil, and lighting and heating
fuels are still rationed in the country, farmers must often wait for
hours in line to purchase two liters of kerosene for lighting purpose
at an exorbitant price, and city residents receive only two liters of
kerosene per month.
The Government of the United States can arrive at no other con-
clusion except that the Government of the Rumanian People's Ré
public has deliberately attempted by the so-called Ploesti "trial" and
the propaganda connected with it to add to its general campaign
misrepresentations against the Government and people of the United
States. The American people, including in their midst many thou-
sands of Rumanian descent, have always had and continue to have
friendliest feelings for the people of Rumania and the desire to col-
tribute to their welfare. They deeply regret that the Government of
Rumania does not share that desire and persists in taking actions
and promoting calumnies and slanders which only aim at destroying
the historical friendship between the two peoples.
1
{
1
63. CESSATION OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE ROMANIAN
NEWS AND NEWS FROM AMERICA: Note From the Secre
tary of State to the Rumanian Minister at Washington, ' Decem-
ber 31, 1953
2
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable
the Minister of Rumania and has the honor to refer to the dissemina-
tion of publications within the United States at the instance of the
Rumanian Legation. Special reference is made to the periodiel
bulletin entitled, The Romanian News.
As the Legation is doubtless aware, the Rumanian Government
has requested the American Legation at Bucharest to cease further
distribution in Rumania
of a periodical issued by that Legation
entitled News From America.
Accordingly, the Department of State requests the Rumania
Legation to cease forthwith the publication and distribution in the
United States of The Romanian News. The distribution in the
United States by the Rumanian Legation of other similar pamphlets
published at the expense of the Rumanian Government or its orgabe
should also be terminated.
1 Marin F. Ionescu.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 48.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES 2157
CON
B
lave
201
. 2 Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1954, p. 914.
64. ANTI-SEMITISM IN RUMANIA: Statement by the Deputy
ucts
Under Secretary of State 1 to a Delegation From the American
time Jewish Committee, June 3, 1954 2
ime,
ting In recent months the Rumanian Communist regime has brought
foi to trial and sentenced to long prison terms scores of Rumanian Jews.
058 Many of these recently sentenced have been held in prison without
trial for several years, their only crime being that the regime considers
them undesirable. The fate of the victims of this widespread perse-
cution is cause for deep concern on the part of the Department of
Re State as well as the American Jewish Committee.
and The conduct of the Rumanian Government in this instance is but
one more example of its callous disregard for human rights and
ited fundamental freedoms. In order to instill fear in the hearts of the
how 250,000 Jews in Rumania that Government has found it necessary to
sentence leaders of the Jewish community so that they might be
held as hostages. Such conduct is not only in violation of the pro-
ut el visions of the Treaty of Peace with Rumania but also ignores the
ions dictates of justice and humanity.
ying I am deeply moved by the tragic plight of these unfortunate
Jewish leaders and sympathize with the feelings expressed by members
of the delegation from the American Jewish Committee.
TAN
65. TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMMUNIST SEIZURE
OF POWER: Statement by the Secretary of State, August 23,
1954 3
able
Ten years ago today the Rumanian people, under the leadership of
ink
their King and of the heads of the country's democratic parties, freed
the themselves from Nazi domination and joined the Allies in the final
lical decisive struggle for liberty. In the Royal Proclamation of August
23, 1944, King Mihai I stated that "the new government marks the
Le beginning of an era in which the rights and liberties of all citizens will
cher be respected.
These promising beginnings were halted on March 6, 1945, when
the Soviet Government, in violation of its solemn undertakings,
intervened in Rumanian affairs and installed the first of a series of
puppet governments which have existed in that captive country
the
lets
The Communist rulers of Rumania have persistently sought to
take over this national holiday and make it their own. The grim
irony of this attempt is evident when it is recalled that not only did
the Communists contribute
nothing to the courageous action of
August 23, 1944, but also that they have exiled or imprisoned all the
1954 (ibid., May’17, 1954, pp. 755-756) and May 10, 1955 (ibid., May 23, 1955,
cre:
EVOL
the
如​她
​until today.
1 Robert Murphy
3
P. 842).
2158
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
e
a
political leaders who organized and carried out that historic step
and have systematically suppressed all human rights and freedom
The travesty which the Communist regime seeks to perpetrate
cannot deceive the people of Rumania. Likewise, it should not blind
the free world to the true significance of this date, or prevent our
paying tribute to the fortitude and deep love of liberty of the Ruman-
ian people.
@
e
F
66. RESTRICTIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHY AND SKETCHING
Note From the Secretary of State to the Rumanian Minister at
Washington, 1 June 9, 19552
1
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable
the Minister of the Rumanian People's Republic and has the honor
to state that the following regulations have been instituted and wil
apply until further notice to photography, sketching, and the execution
of works of plastic art in the United States by Rumanian officiel
personnel and their dependents.
1. Rumanian official personnel and their dependents in the United
States may execute works of plastic art, take photographs, or make
sketches of historical and architectural monuments; the buildings of
cultural, educational, and medical institutions; theaters, museums,
city, state or national parks; stadiums; and urban and rural scenes
in the background of which there are none of the objects listed below
in points 3a through 3g.
2. Within the premises of economic enterprises and organizations
engaged in the manufacture of civilian goods, as well as in cultural
institutions, Rumanian official personnel and their dependents in
the United States may, in individual cases, execute works of plastie
art, make sketches, or take photographs provided that they have first
obtained the permission of the administration of these institutions
and organizations.
3. Rumanian official personnel and their dependents in the United
States may not execute works of plastic art, make sketches, or take
photographs of the objects listed below. This provision is also appli-
cable in cases where the specified objects are under construction:
a. Areas where Rumanian official personnel and their dependents
do not bave free access.
b. Industrial enterprises of any kind.
c. Fuel storage depots.
d. Military objects, installations, technology and armaments,
e. All water ports; airfields and airports; hydro-electric, thermo-
electric or nuclear power installations; bridges; railroad junction
and terminals; tunnels; reservoirs and dams; silos; and water towers
f. Scientific research institutions, offices and laboratories
g. Radio, television, telephone and telegraph stations or facilities
1 Anton Moisescu.
2 Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1955, pp. 105–106.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2159
1 For the text of the Rumanian note of Oct. 13, 1954, describing these regula-
Ibid., Nov. 14, 1955, pp. 786–787.
3 Ibid., Nov. 23, 1947, p. 995.
step
ms.
181-
al
4. Rumanian official personnel and their dependents may not
execute works of plastic art, make sketches, or take photographs from
rate
airplanes on flights over territory of the United States.
lind
5. Rumanian official personnel and their dependents in the United
Ou States may not purchase or otherwise procure the following items
except where such items appear in or are appendices to newspapers,
periodicals, technical journals, atlases and books commercially avail-
able to the general public:
NG:
2. Aerial photographs, mosaics and photomaps.
b. Maps and charts of scale of or larger than 1:250,000.
c. Navigational and hydrographic maps and charts.
d. Panoramic photographs or detailed development plans of
the industrial cities.
will
The foregoing regulations are comparable to present Rumanian
regulations restricting the execution of plastic works of art, photogra-
cial phy and filming, by United States citizens in Rumania which pre-
sumably have been instituted for reasons of security. If the Govern-
ment of the Rumanian People's Republic should hereafter conclude
ted that the international situation were such that security requirements
ake enabled it to reexamine its regulations restricting the execution of
s of plastic works of art, photography and filming by United States citizens
in Rumania and to make available to them materials of the types
noted above, the Government of the United States would, in turn, be
How disposed to reconsider its own security requirements on the same basis.
Dor
100
ms
Des
ODS
oral
67. DEATH OF JULIU MANIU: Statement by the Department of
State, October 25, 1955 2
stic
Trst
ONS
ted
Government.
ats
The circumstances surrounding the press interview last week in
which Gheorghe Tatarescu, a former Premier and postwar Foreign
Minister of Rumania, told of [Juliu] Maniu's death in prison is
ako strong evidence that Maniu's death, frequently reported throughout
Di Europe
, is a fact despite lack of official confirmation by the Rumanian
You will recall that in November 1947 Maniu and several other
members of the Rumanian National Peasant Party were placed on trial
in Bucharest. As Secretary of State Marshall said at that time,
this trial, like that of Nikola Petkov in Bulgaria a few months earlier,
was a travesty of justice of which the evident purpose was to eliminate
democratic opposition
to the Communist-dominated regime.
Juliu Maniu fought courageously against the forces of reaction and
tyranny in his country throughout his long political career. A
defender of individual liberty and champion of the Rumanian peasants
10-
nos
PS.
tions, see ibid., p. 106.
2
2160
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
W
08
SE
1
0
U
sh
શક
1 TIAS 2349; 2 UST 2254. See also relief agreements of Jan. 6, 1951 (TIAS
whom he represented for many years, Juliu Maniu won the devotion of
til
his followers and admiration and respect everywhere.
ti
His loss is felt not only by the peoples of Eastern Europe but by
08
friends of democracy throughout the world.
1. YUGOSLAVIA
F
68. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND YUGOSLAVIA, NOVEMBER 14, 1951
The Governments of the United States of America and the Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia;
Desiring to foster international peace and security within the
framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures t
which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes
and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arranget
ments for individual and collective self-defense in support of those
purposes and principles;
Reaffirming their determination to give their full cooperation to
the efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as com
templated by the Charter and to obtain agreement on universal
regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate guaranty
against violations;
Taking into consideration the support that the Government of
the United States of America has brought to these principles by
enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,2 as amended
,
and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which provide for the fir-
nishing of military assistance to certain nations;
Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the, fu-
nishing of such assistance;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. The Government of the United States of America will make
or continue to make available to the Government of the Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia equipment, materials, services
or other assistance in accordance with such terms and conditions
as may be agreed. The furnishing of such assistance shall be con
sistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance wil
be furnished under the provisions, and subject to all of the terms
conditions and termination provisions, of the Mutual Defense As
sistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acis
amendatory and supplementary thereto and appropriation 2ck
m
S
-
a
2174; 2 UST 13) and Apr. 17, 1951 (TIAS 2245; 2 UST 914).
2 Act of Oct. 6, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364
.
3 Act of Oct. 10, 1951; 65 Stat. 373. See also infra, pp. 3059–3086.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2161
United States of America dinars for the use of the latter Govern-
ond thereunder. The two Governments will, from time to time, nego-
tiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions
it be of this paragraph.
2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
will use the assistance exclusively in furtherance of the purposes
of the Charter of the United Nations for the promotion of inter-
national peace and security and for strengthening the defenses of the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia against aggression.
3. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia undertakes not to transfer to any person not an officer or
TL agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or pos-
session of any equipment, materials, information, or services, received
on a grant basis, without the prior consent of the Government of the
United States of America.
deral
4. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia will provide the United States of America with reciprocal
assistance by continuing to facilitate the production and transfer to
zure the United States of America in such quantities and upon such terms
Dose and conditions as may be agreed on, of raw and semi-processed ma-
up terials required by the United States of America as a result of de-
howeficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which
may be available in Yugoslavia. Arrangements for such transfers
shall give due regard to requirements of Yugoslavia for domestic
COM use and commercial export.
ersal
anty
Article II
1. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent
at with security to keep the public informed of operations under this
ded
.
2. Each Government will take such security measures as may be
fur-
agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to pre-
vent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles,
furs services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.
Article III
The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, nego-
tiate appropriate arrangements between them respecting responsi-
for patent or similar claims based on the use of devices, proc-
aces
esses, technological information or other forms of property protected
by law in connection
with equipment, materials or services furnished
pursuant to this Agreement. In such negotiations consideration
shall be given to the inclusion of an undertaking whereby each
Government will assume the responsibility for all such claims of
As
its nationals and such claims arising in its jurisdiction of nationals
any country not a party to this Agreement.
Article IV
1. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia undertakes to make available to the Government of the
by Agreement.
nake
leaf ,
bility
ions
COD-
21
rms
,
of
acts
acts
TAS
415900-57--Vol. 233
consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribu
2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslari
undertakes to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon
3. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslari
agrees to take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization 4
the economic and military assistance provided by the Government
2162 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ment for its administrative and operating expenditures in connectin
with carrying out this Agreement. The two Governments »
forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amour
of such dinars and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishi,
of such dinars.
2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslari
will, except as otherwise agreed to, grant duty free treatment at
exemption from taxation upon importation or exportation to produk
property, materials or equipment imported into or exported from i
territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar Agreemer
between the Government of the United States of America and to
government of any other country receiving military assistance
Article V
The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslani
agrees to receive personnel of the Government of the United State
of America who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities :
the Government of the United States of America under this Agreemen
and who will be accorded facilities to observe the progress of the assist
ance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. It is understood betwe
the two Governments that the number of such personnel will be kept
as low as possible. Such personnel who are United States national
including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations wil
the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavi
operate as a part of the Embassy of the United States of Ameris
under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mix
sion, and will have the same status as that of other personnel wit
corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States of America
who are United States nationals. "Upon appropriate notification )
the Government of the United States of America full diplomati
status will be granted to an agreed number of the personnel assigue
thereto.
Article VI
1. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugosla
reaffirms that it will continue to join in promoting international unce
standing and goodwill
, and in maintaining world peace; to mak
tion permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general en
nomic condition to the development and maintenance of its om
defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop
defense capacities.
eliminate causes of international tension.
P
6
:
ti
8
&
Y
ti
8)
n
81
the United States of America,
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2163
ection
e.
ional
s mit
slavi
sentative; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 14, 1952, pp. 62-63.
a General Assembly, Official Records, Annexes, agenda item 68 (A/1946).
Article VII
$5 1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature;
mou and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either
ishing
Party of written notice of the intention of the other Party to ter-
minate it, provided that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2 and
Islari
3, and arrangements entered into under Article II, paragraph 2, and
1 an under Article III, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by
dust the two Governments.
omit
2. The Government of the United States of America reserves the
eme right at any time to suspend its assistance to Yugoslavia made avail-
ad te
able pursuant to this Agreement, including deliveries of all supplies
scheduled but not yet transferred.
3. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them,
consult regarding any matter relating to the application of this Agree-
aslan ment or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to this
State Agreement.
ties. 4. The terms of this Agreement may at any time be reviewed at
semed the request of either Government or amended by agreement between
assist the two Governments.
twee 5. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary General
e kept of the United Nations.
Done at Belgrade, in duplicate in the English and Serbo-Croat
languages, this fourteenth day of November, 1951.
mern 69. HOSTILE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS
ALLIES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA: Resolution 509 (VI) of the
United Nations General Assembly, December 14, 1951
Signe
The General Assembly,
Having considered the complaint 2 submitted to it by the delegation
of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the ac-
tivities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania,
as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against
with serious concern the tension between Yugoslavia on
side, and the other above-mentioned countries on the other
hop
Mindful of the purpose of the United Nations "to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples
, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace”,
General Assembly, Oficial Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/2119),
Bente i See also remarks of Dec. 14, 1552, by John Sherman Cooper, U.S. Repre-
merich
CM
l with
ion by
I
osleri
unde
make
atribu
OITA
Yugoslavia,
Viewing
the
side.
and!
slate
oslari
tione
zenta
2164
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
S
cont
cord
vari
The talks have led to an increased understanding on the part of the
is anticipated that further consideration of these matters will be carried
71.
Mindful of the authority of the General Assembly to "recommend
S
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless e
G
origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friends
relations among nations”,
1. Takes note of the declaration of the Yugoslav delegation the T
the Government of Yugoslavia for its part is ready to do all that i slav
necessary for the carrying out of the recommendations of the present bass
resolution;
the
2. Recommends that the Governments concerned:
T
(a) Conduct their relations and settle their disputes in accordane
vidi
with the spirit of the United Nations Charter;
Gov
(6) Conform in their diplomatic intercourse with the rules and
T
practices which are customary in international relations;
(c) Settle frontier disputes by means of mixed frontier commission
agre
or other peaceful means of their choice.
T
favo
70. JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ REGARDING ECONOMIC DISCUS Gor
SIONS, NOVEMBER 22, 1954?
shou
full
Mutually beneficial informal discussions on economic matters which
the
have been under way since November 12 between representatives
the Yugoslav and United States Governments, were concluded todas such
T
The Yugoslav delegation was under the leadership of Genere
Svetozar Vukmanović, Vice President of the Federal Executive exis
Council of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, assisted human
Mr. Stanislav Kopcok, Counsellor in the Yugoslav State Secretaris trib
for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Kiro Gligorov, Deputy Director of the Coo
Yugoslav Federal Planning Institute. The Yugoslav Ambassador i
the United States, Mr. Leo Mates, also was present.
For the American side, the talks were conducted by Mr. Haril pro
Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration; Unde Tom
Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr.; Deputy Under Secretary
State Robert Murphy; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thorsten
rela
Kalijarvi; and Dr. D. A. Fitzgerald, Foreign Operations
will
tion Deputy Director.
During the talks, a broad informal exchange of views took pl
on many aspects of Yugoslavia's economic situation. Particule
attention was directed to Yugoslavia's balance of
72.
its supply of wheat and raw materials, and its foreign debt burden
1
representatives of the two countries of their mutual problems, and
T
forward in Belgrade.
ence
Wor
also
situ
Administri
payments position
has
1
1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 6, 1954, p. 869.
3
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
2165
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 11, 1955, pp. 49–50.
2 Treaties of Feb. 28, 1953, and Aug. 9, 1954; supra, pp. 1233-1239.
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 10, 1955, p. 566.
meni
2SS
71. COMMUNIQUÉ BY THE AMBASSADORS OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE AT BEL-
GRADE AND THE YUGOSLAV UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JUNE 27, 1955 1
endir
they Talks were held in Belgrade from June 24 to 27 between the Yugo-
hati slav Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Prica, the Am-
mesel bassadors of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on
the general international situation and questions of direct mutual
concern.
SSION
es al
dang
These talks were a further step in a series of consultations, indi-
vidual
, or collective, between representatives of the three Western
Governments and the Yugoslav Government.
This exchange of views, which took place in an atmosphere of
cordiality and mutual confidence, confirmed the wide measure of
agreement among the four Governments in their approach to the
various international questions under review.
This meeting had special significance in view of the recent more
favorable developments in the international situation. The four
CUS Governments were agreed that solutions to outstanding problems
should be sought by peaceful means and by negotiations based upon
full respect for and recognition of the right of all nations to independ-
which ence, equality, self-defense and collective security in conformity with
the Charter of the United Nations. They will continue to promote
oder such solutions.
The four Governments express their firm conviction that the
existence of a strong and independent Yugoslavia and continued co-
ed la operation between them under conditions of full equality are a con-
tari tribution to peace and stability. They consider that the fruitful
of the cooperation being developed in all fields in the Balkan alliance” is also
or the an important contribution to peace and stability in this part of the
world.
They believe that this method of exchange of views can help to
Unde promote an even closer understanding between themselves and can
also contribute to a further improvement in the general international
situation and to world peace. They are confident that the good
relations developed between them in recent years in so many fields
will be maintained and further expanded.
eneral
cutive
!
LITO
orster
istri
placi
icule
ition
orden.
72. JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ REGARDING VISIT OF THE DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 3 TO BELGRADE, OCTOBER
1, 1955 4
of the
andi
ITA)
The visit of Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy to Belgrade
has provided opportunity for frank and fruitful discussion of a wide
3 Robert Murphy
4
.
2166
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The meeting proved once again the usefulness of such person
the promoting of the cause of peace and international cooperation
2 Mr. Dulles said in part: "The final subject of our talk was the problem of the
States of Eastern Europe. We reached common accord on recognizing their
portance of independence for these States, noninterference from the outside i
their internal affairs, and their right to develop their own social and economi
range of problems of mutual interest to Yugoslavia and the Unite
States. As a result, differences of opinion have been ironed out an
a clearer understanding of objectives reached. This has been achiera
in a very cordial atmosphere and should establish a solid basis for ty
further cooperation of the two countries. These meetings gave furthe
evidence of the confidence and mutual respect which has been esta
lished between the two countries in recent years.
During his visit Mr. Murphy, accompanied by Ambassador (Jan NI
W.] Riddleberger, had luncheon and two conversations with Preside
Tito and several meetings with Under Secretary of State for Forg
Affairs Prica, Vice President Vukmanović-Tempo, and Defense Min
ister Gosnjak. Mr. Murphy concluded his conversations with
luncheon on October 1 tendered at the American Embassy in hous
of Vice President Kardelj and other high-ranking Yugoslav and Amer A.
can officials.
73. STATEMENT REGARDING VISIT BY THE SECRETARY O 1.
E
STATE TO YUGOSLAVIA, NOVEMBER 7, 1955 1
On November 6, 1955, the United States Secretary of State, Jak
1
Foster Dulles, met with the President of the Federal People's Republi
of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz-Tito, at Brioni. The President of ty vel
Republic entertained the Secretary of State and his party at lunchen of
Participating in the subsequent talks, held in the spirit of friendski regi
and mutual understanding, were the Ambassador
to Yugoslavia, Jam Eur
Riddleberger, and the Counselor of the State Department, Dougle lie
N
MacArthur II, on the American side, and the Vice President of the
The
Federal Executive Council, Edward Kardelj, the State Secretary
Foreign Affairs, Koča Popovič, and the Secretary General of this
pre
President of the Republic, Joza Vilfan, on the Yugoslav side.
the
Views were exchanged on the international situation and question
Art
of mutual interest. The subjects that had been discussed were sio
outlined by the Secretary of State at his press conference.
]
Agreement
was noted on a series of issues, particularly as to in
the
possibility
and necessity of covtinued efforts to improve internation
relations and with regard to the further broadening of the friend
cooperation between the two countries.
under the charter of the United Nations.
State , .
released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the
Geneva Meeting of Foreign
Ministers. See also Secretary Dulles statement of Nov. 6, 1955; ibid.
order in ways of their own choice." (Ibid., p. 833).
late
ass
an
Gri
It
ano
me
liv
thi
The statement i
}
aid
1
Ist
€
nuta
tani
leve!
or the
urthe
Part XIII
asta!
Tamil NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
sider
recht
ith
hone
men A. BASIC UNITED STATES POLICY
publi
pugky
of the
for
stion
yd 1. INCREASING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: Message by the President to the Congress, May 24, 1951
(Excerpt)
Joel
The countries of the Middle East are, for the most part, less de-
ft veloped industrially than those of Europe. They are, nevertheless,
hea of great importance to the security of the entire free world. This
adski region is a vital link of land, sea, and air communications between
James Europe, Asia, and Africa. In the free nations of the Middle East,
lie half of the oil reserves of the world.
No part of the world is more directly exposed to Soviet pressure.
The Kremlin has lost no opportunity to stir these troubled waters,
# as the postwar record amply demonstrates. Civil war in Greece;
pressure for Turkish concessions on the Dardanelles; sponsorship of
the rebellious Tudeh party
in Iran; furthering of factional strife in the
later Arab States and Israel all reflect a concerted design for the exten-
sion of Soviet domination to this vital area.
There is no simple formula for increasing stability and security in
the Middle East. With the help of American military and economic
assistance, Soviet pressure has already been firmly resisted in Turkey
and the Soviet-inspired guerrilla war has been decisively defeated in
Greece. But the pressure against the Middle East is unremitting.
It can be overcome only by a continued build-up of armed defenses
and the fostering of economic development. Only through such
measures can these peoples advance toward stability and improved
living conditions, and be assured that their aims can best be achieved
through strengthening their associations in the free world.
To these ends, I am recommending 415 million dollars in military
aid, for Greece, Turkey, and Iran; a portion of this aid will be avail-
Department of State Bulletin, June 4, 1951, p. 887; H. Doc. 147, 82d Cong.,
Ist sess. See also statement by the Secretary of Staté, June 26, 1951; Depart
ent of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 51.
to the
tioma
end
SOM
d to
alicu
th
Dreier
1
of the
ne in
de it
hom
2167
2168
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ag
fr
W
w
ar
ai
ai
W
W
al
W
States policies have, in recent years, been harmful and even antagoni
1 Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, pp. 831-835 (printed also s
Department of State publicatioň 5088; 1953). Secretary Dulles' report mai
delivered to the Nation over radio and television networks from Washington
able for other Middle Eastern nations if necessary. I am also recom
mending 125 million dollars in economic aid for Middle Easter
countries, exclusive of Greece and Turkey for whom economic aid
provided as part of the program for Europe. This amount ak
includes programs of technical assistance to Libya, Liberia,
Ethiopia, three independent states of Africa whose economic
SC
proble
lems are similar to those of the Middle Eastern countries.
Continuing military aid for Greece and Turkey will make possil
the further strengthening of these countries' large and well-traine
U
armed forces, which have already displayed their valiant resoluta
in the fight for freedom in Korea. In Iran, continuing military ai
is required to help build internal security and defense, together wit
economic aid to help sustain the Iranian economy and give impers
to the much needed longer-term process of economic development le
T
the benefit of the Iranian people.
In the Arab States and Israel, the fundamental requirement is:
regional approach to the basic problems of economic development
P
This is urgently needed to reduce existing tensions, especially throw
the orderly settlement of homeless refugees. The program for te
Arab States will expand needed food production through the develop b
ment of land and water resources. The program for Israel will
K
that country to maintain her economy during an especially tryi
po
period of her national development. At the same time, the prograut
of assistance to the Arab refugees from Palestine, which will necessar
d
extend beyond the coming fiscal year, has the threefold purpose
assisting the settlement of refugees, of strengthening those state
wherein they settle, and assisting both Israel and the Arab Stats
th
by removing this threat to the peace of the area.
The program I am now proposing is a balanced program for strength
ening the security of the Middle East. It will make a solid contribu
fc
tion to our hopes for peace.
S
2. SIX MAJOR POLICY ISSUES: Address by the Secretary
State Upon His
Return From a Tour of the Region, June 1, 195)
About 3 weeks ago, the Director for Mutual Security, Mr. Hara
Stassen, and I and our associates set out, at President Eisenhowe
request, on a trip to 12 countries which lie in between the Medite
ranean in Europe and China in Asia. I shall give you our
country impressions and then our general conclusions.
F
First, let me say that everywhere we were well received. Tu
h
was encouraging, for several of the countries feel that the Unite
They staged some hostile
demonstrations. But these were income
quential. The governments received us with warm hospitality
, em
m
TE
CI
0
3.V
a
country-by
a
S
To
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2169
econ
Isteri
80
1
aine
meni
roue
I
thi
sador in Moscow, regarding his conversation of that date with V. M. Molotov,
Soviet Foreign Commissar, and the draft agreements from the files of the German
Embassy in Moscow; Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Department of State
publication 3023; 1948), pp. 258–259 and 255–258.
as we drove through the streets, the people usually greeted us with
friendly smiles and applause. The political leaders talked intimately
with us, and we gained new friendships and new understanding which
will stand us in good stead for the future. Also in each capital I
spoke to all of the United States Foreign Service personnel. They
prob
are a fine body of men and women of whom we can be proud.
It is high time that the United States Government paid more
issil
attention to the Near East and South Asia, which, until our trip, no
United States Secretary of State has ever visited. Our postwar
lubic
attention has been primarily given to Western Europe. That area
yu
was and is very important, but not all-important.
: wit
It came as a surprising shock when the 450 million Chinese people,
ipete
whom we had counted as friends, fell under Communist domination.
at her
There could be equally dangerous developments in the Near East
and South Asia. The situation calls for urgent concern.
t is it
The area we visited contains about one-fourth of the world's
population. It represents about one-half of the people of the world
who are still free of Communist domination.
The Near East possesses great strategic importance as the bridge
velop
1 helt
between Europe, Asia, and Africa. The present masters of the
Kremlin, following the lead of past military conquerors, covet this
bryan
position. In 1940 Soviet leaders specified, in secret negotiations with
ONE
the Nazis, that Soviet “territorial aspirations center . in the
sanii direction of the Indian Ocean and . . the Persian Gulf.” 1
state
This area contains important resources vital to our welfare-oil,
State
manganese, chrome, mica, and other minerals. About 60 percent of
the proven oil reserves of the world are in the Near East.
Most important of all, the Near East is the source of three great
religions--the Jewish, the Christian, and the Moslem--which have
for centuries exerted' an immense influence throughout the world.
Surely we cannot ignore the fate of the peoples who have first per-
ceived and then passed on to us the great spiritual truths from which
our own society derives its inner strength.
193
EGYPT AND THE SUEZ BASE
Our first stop was in Egypt. There we had 3 days in which to get
acquainted with General Naguib, who heads the Government. He
23 a popular hero, and I could readily see why. He and
his associates
are determined to provide Egypt with a vigorous government which
y-high will truly serve the people. Also, they seek to end the stationing of
British troops and exercise of British authority at the Suez base.
Before we arrived in Egypt, a very tense situation had developed
between the British and the Egyptian GovernmentsConversations
looking to an orderly withdrawal of British troops had been suspended,
and there was danger that hostilities would break out.
See the telegram of Nov. 25, 1940, from Count Schulenburg, German Ambas-
OSS O
ength
:
tribi
ary
Tarol
wer :
diteri
Thi
Tnita
gon
eling
Onsel
1
also si
rt i
ton
2170
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
9.7
WE
l'u
no
mn
an
i See, inter alia, General Assembly Res. 303 (IV), Dec. 9, 1949; General As
We discussed the situation with General Naguib. The heart of
the trouble is not so much the presence of British troops, for both
sides agreed that they should be withdrawn, but the subsequent
authority over and management of this gigantic base, its airstrips
,
JC
and its depots of supplies. Experienced administrative and technical
personnel is needed to keep the base in operating efficiency and the
provision of this personnel causes difficulty. The matter has a to
importance which goes beyond Egypt, for the base serves all Near Se
Eastern and indeed Western security.
of
I am convinced that there is nothing irreconcilable between this las
international concern and Egyptian sovereignty. We asked, with
some success, that there be further time to find a peaceful solution pe
The United States is prepared to assist in any desired way.
Egypt stands at the threshold of what can be a great new future.
If this Suez problem can be satisfactorily solved, I am confident that
Egypt can find the means to develop its land and lift up its people re
and add a new bright chapter to a glorious past.
ali
gl
ISRAEL, JERUSALEM, AND REFUGEES
SY
Next we went to Israel. We were impressed by the vision and sup-
porting energy with which the people are building their new nation
,
Inspired by a great faith, they are now doing an impressive work of Ge
creation. They face hard internal problems, which I believe they can w
solve. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, and other
Israeli officials asserted convincingly their desire to live at peace
their Arab neighbors.
Jerusalem is divided into armed camps split between Israel and the
Arab nation of Jordan. The atmosphere is heavy with hate. As I rel
gazed on the Mount of Olives, I felt anew that Jerusalem is, above all
the holy place of the Christian, Moslem, and Jewish faiths. This wi
CI
has been repeatedly emphasized' by the United Nations. This does
not necessarily exclude some political status in Jerusalem for Israel
of
and Jordan. But the world religious community has claims in Jeruse
lem which take precedence over the political
claims of any particule
Vs
nation.
Closely huddled around Israel are most of the over 800,000 Arab
refugees, who fled from Palestine as the Israelis took over. The G
mostly exist in makeshift camps, with few facilities either for health
be
work, or recreation. Within these camps the inmates rot away ,
spiritually and physically. Even the Grim Reaper
offers no solution ca
for as the older die, infants are born to inherit their parents' bitter fate
Some of these refugees could be settled in the area presently com
trolled by Israel. Most, however, could
more readily be integrated
into the lives of the neighboring Arab countries. This, however
awaits on irrigation
projects, which will permit more soil to be culti-
vated.
Throughout the area the cry is for water for irrigation. United
Nations contributions and other funds are available to help refugees
CO
rei
with
ca
an
ru
WA
Evolve o sol
as
fr
D
sembly, Official Records, Fourth Session, Resolutions (A/1254), p. 25.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2171
an
ure.
100.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 18, 1952, pp. 265–266.
and Mr. Stassen and I came back with the impression that they can
Ü
i of
well be spent in large part on a coordinated use of the rivers which
oth
run through the Arab countries and Israel.
lent
ips
JORDAN
iCal
the Irrigation needs became most vivid as we motored from Jerusalem
to Amman, the capital of Jordan. The road goes through the Dead
lear Sea area, a scene of desolation with no sign of life other than the tens
of thousands of refugees who survive precariously on the parched
this land largely by aid of United Nations doles. Later on, as we flew
vita north, we observed the waters of the Yarmak River, which could
ion perhaps be diverted so as to return some of this vast desert valley
into fertile land.
At Amman we dined with the charming and able new King Hus[s]ein
ihat and his Government. They are preoccupied with the problem of
ople refugees and of relations with Israel. The inflow of refugees has
almost doubled the population, and the long armistice line with Israel
gives rise to frequent and dangerous shooting episodes.
SYRIA, LEBANON, IRAQ, AND SAUDI ARABIA
BUD
From Jordan we went to Syria. There we were impressed by
kot General Shishakli. He is eager to develop the resources of his country,
which are substantial. Thus, the living standards of the Syrian people
ther could be raised. This would, in turn, enable them to receive more
with refugees into a land which relatively is sparsely populated.
From Damascus, the capital of Syria, we motored to Beirut, the
the capital of Lebanon. The road took us over a mountain range, with
As I refreshing snow in sharp contrast to the heat of the desert plains.
all You will recall that Beirut is the home of the American University,
This which has educated many of the Arab leaders of today. President
loes Chamoun of Lebanon talked to us of his high hopes for his country
Trael and pointed to the role it might play, representing uniquely a meeting
of East and West.
Leaving Lebanon for Iraq, we flew over the Tigris and Euphrates
Valleys. This was the site of the Garden of Eden. Under its new
Tab ruler, King Faisal-who visited the United States last summer1_the
Government of Iraq is beginning to develop these valleys and restore
Alth
, their former productivity. The revenues from the oil production are
By being largely directed to this and other construction purposes. Iraq
10 can be, and desires to be, the granary for much of this part of the
In Saudi Arabia we were received by King Ibn Saud, one of the
great Near Eastern figures of this century, conspicuous in his dignity
and singleness of purpose. He
is a good friend of the United States,
as he has shown by deeds. Our policy will be to reciprocate this
friendship. In Saudi Arabia Americans and Arabs are working to-
ted gether in good fellowship in the vast
oil fields of the country. It is a
King Faisal visited the United States from Aug. 10 to Sept. 17, 1952; see the
CAD
1919-
War
her
ate
.
te world.
.
011-
ted
yer
,
ulti
Des
good relationship.
AS
2172
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ar:
sti
OC
to
mi
st
to make clear that the United States, as a friend of both countries, i
hopes for an accord which would make more fruitful such economic
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
IR
We left the Arab area to go first to India and then to Pakistan.
These two nations, although independent for less than 6 year,
already play an influential part in world affairs.
Ir
In India I met again with Mr. Nehru, one of the great leaders
th
our time. We had long conversations together in the intimacy of his
home. His calm demeanor and lofty idealism impressed me. 7
reviewed together the international problems which concern both our
dit
countries, including the problem of a Korean armistice and the threst
to Southeast Asia. We did not always agree, but we did clear up som
misunderstandings and, I felt, gained respect for the integrity of our
pr
respective purposes. India is now supporting the armistice positie pr
of the United Nations Command in Korea.
T
Mr. Stassen and I also obtained a clearer view of the Government
of India's 5-year program to improve the welfare of the Indian people
.
ha
India is the world's largest self-governing nation. It has about
Cc
2,000 miles of common boundary with Communist China. There is
occurring between these two countries a competition as to whether
U
ways of freedom or police-state methods can achieve better social
progress. This competition affects directly 800 million people in these
2 countries. In the long run, the outcome will affect all of humanity
,
EL
including ourselves. Our interest fully justifies continuing, on
I
modest scale, some technical assistance and external resources to
permit India to go on with its 5-year plan.
Pakistan is the largest of the Moslem nations and occupies a high
position in the Moslem world. The strong spiritual faith and martial
spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against com-
munism.
N
The new Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, whom we recently knew
Ki
as Ambassador to Washington, energetically leads the new Gover-
tei
ment. We met with a feeling of
warm friendship on the part of the
people of Pakistan toward the United States.
А grave and immediate problem is the shortage of wheat. Without As
large imports, widespread famine conditions will ensue. Last year
we helped India in a similar emergency. I believe that prompti
United States wheat assistance to Pakistan is essential.
It is not possible to think about United States aid without also
ole
thinking that these countries cannot afford to waste their efforts in
quarreling with each other and diverting their strength for possible
use against each other.
That thought applies to the dispute between India and Pakistan th
about Kashmir. It is my impression from my conversations with the
Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan that this controversy can be
settled. Surely it needs to be settled. We tried, tactfully but firmly
aid as we render.
1 Mohammed Ali was the Ambassador of Pakistan at Washington from February
1952 to April 1953.
2 See infra, pp. 2227-2229.
CO
ne
ke
re:
sel
an
ret
lib
fri
1
2
DE
231
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2173
stan
ein
74
treat
some
EOL
nits.
ON 8
os to
IRAN
It was not practical to include Iran in our schedule. However, we
arranged that our Ambassador to Iran should meet us in Pakistan,
Iran is now preoccupied with its oil dispute with Great Britain. But
still the people and the Government do not want this quarrel to expose
f his
them to Communist subversion. They have not forgotten the Soviet.
occupation of 1941-1946.
The United States will avoid any unwanted interference in the oil
dispute. But we can usefully continue technical aid and assistance
to this agricultural nation of Iran and in that way perhaps help
prevent an economic collapse which would play into the hands of
ation
predatory forces.
TURKEY, GREECE, AND LIBYA
ment
ople
After Pakistan, we went to Turkey and Greece. These two countries
have clearly demonstrated their intent to stand steadfast against
bout
Communist aggression and subversion. Despite their heavy commit-
re
the
ments to NATO, both countries have contributed valiantly to the
United Nations efforts in Korea.
ocial
chese
We, in turn, plan to continue to help Greece and Turkey to grow
stronger. They are valiant in spirit and hold a strategic position in
Europe and Asia which enables them to help us. While in Greece
I dined with the King and Queen and passed on to this charming
couple President Eisenhower's invitation that they visit us this fall.
high
Our last stop before returning to the United States was Libya, the
newest member of the family of nations. This country is located at a
key spot on the North African coast on the Mediterranean. It has
recently become an independent nation by action of the United
Nations. Libya is cooperating with the United
States and the United
Kingdom in strengthening its own defenses and those of the Medi-
the
Let me turn now to conclusions.
1. Colonialism. Most of the peoples of the Near East and South
Asia
are deeply concerned about political independence for them-
selves and others
. They are suspicious of the colonial powers. The
imply United States too is suspect because, it is reasoned, our Nato alliance
a.lso
with France and Britain requires us to try to preserve or restore the
old colonial interests of our allies.
I am convinced that United States policy has become unnecessarily
ambiguous in this matter. The leaders of the countries I visited fully
recognize that it would be a disaster if there were any break between
the United States and Great Britain and France. They don't want
this to happen. However, without breaking from the framework of
mly
.
Western unity, we can pursue our traditional dedication to political
ries
liberty. In reality, the Western powers can gain, rather than lose,
from an orderly development of self-government.
1 Loy W. Henderson.
2 The King and Queen of Greece visited the United States from Oct. 28 to
Libya's independence entered into force Jan. 2, 1952. See also infra, pp.
rtia]
2011-
8
iner
rern.
terranean area.
hout
year
mpt
ts i
sible
.stao
I the
n be
Omic
ruary
Dec. 3, 1953.
2302-2303.
2174
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
I
t
S
n
a
d
regard of the Israeli but also of the Arab peoples. We shall see
croachments. The area is enfeebled by fear and by wasteful measure
I emphasize, however, the word "orderly." Let none forget that
the Kremlin uses extreme nationalism to bait the trap by which i
seeks to capture the dependent peoples.
2. Living Standards. The peoples of the Near East and Asia de
mand better standards of living, and the day is past when their aspin-
tions can be ignored. The task is one primarily for the government
and the peoples themselves. In some cases they can use their aval
able resources, such as oil revenues, to better advantage. There are
however, ways in which the United States can usefully help, not with
masses of money but by contributing advanced technical knowleda
about transport, communication, fertilization, and use of water in
irrigation. Mr. Stassen and I feel that money wisely spent for this
area under the mutual security program will give the American
people a good return in terms of better understanding and cooperation
.
3. Arab Good Will. The United States should seek to allay the deep
resentment against it that has resulted from the creation of Israel. I
the past we had good relations with the Arab peoples. American
educational institutions had built up a feeling of good will, and als
American businessmen had won a good reputation in this area. There
was mutual confidence to mutual advantage.
Today the Arab peoples are afraid that the United States will be
the new State of Israel in aggressive expansion. They are more feari ti
of Zionism than of communism, and they fear lest the United States
become the backer of expansionist Zionism.
On the other hand, the Israelis fear that ultimately the Arabs mit
try to push them into the sea.
In an effort to calm these contradictory fears the United States
joined with Britain and France in a Declaration of May 25, 195
which stated that "the three Governments, should they find that earth
of these states (of the Near East) was preparing to violate frontir
to
or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as men
bers
of the United Nations, immediately take action,
both within
an
outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation." The b
Declaration when made did not reassure the Arabs. It must be mad
clear that the present U.S. administration stands fully behind thai
Declaration. We cannot afford to be distrusted by millions wi
b
could be sturdy friends of freedom. They must not further swell fh A
ranks of Communist dictators.
h
The leaders in Israel themselves agreed with us that United States
policies should be impartial so as to win not only the respect an
policies.
4. Peace Between Israel and the Arab Nations. There is need in
peace in the
Near East. Today there is an uneasy military armisur
between Israel and the Arab States, while economic warfare is bei
conducted by the Arab States, in retaliation for alleged Israeli &
p
UF
a
SI
W
a.
у
0
V
(
which are inspired by fear and hate.
2
1 See infra, p. 2237.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2175
Dent:
AN
I
rica
lhes danger.
Israel should become part of the Near East community and cease
thet to look upon itself, or be looked upon by others, as alien to this
ch il community. This is possible. To achieve it will require concessions
on the part of both sides. But the gains to both will far outweigh
ad the concessions required to win those gains.
pirs The parties concerned have the primary responsibility of bringing
peace to the area. But the United States will not hesitate by every
1val appropriate means to use its influence to promote a step-by-step
reduction of tension in the area and the conclusion of ultimate
peace.
wil 5. Middle East Defense Organization. A Middle East Defense Or-
lechganization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of
r fa
the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with
r the Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the
rican
menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where
ition
.
the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations
de shows awareness of the danger.
There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But
no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed
| als and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common
While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the
bet
United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of
art those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the
State West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.
6. Friendly Understanding. In conclusion, let me recall that the
primary purpose of our trip was to show friendliness and to develop
understanding. These peoples we visited are proud peoples who have
a great tradition and, I believe, a great future. We in the United
States are better off if we respect and honor them, and learn the
ter thoughts and aspirations which move them. It profits nothing merely
to be critical of others.
President Eisenhower's administration plans to make friendship-
not faultfinding--the basis of its foreign policy. President Eisenhower
1 brought with him from Europe an unprecedented measure of under-
mai standing and personal friendships. Before he was inaugurated, he
the
went to Korea. Twice since inauguration, Mr. Stassen and I have
been to Europe. Now we have been to the Near East and South
14 Asia
. Later this month, the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisen-
hower
, and Assistant Secretary of State Cabot will go to South
State
Thus your Government is establishing the worldwide relationships
and gathering the information which will enable us better to serve
you, the American people.
map
States
1950
ntieri
menie
7 and
thi
3
Tall
seed
d for
Estir
DEITE
i els
The President-elect visited Korea, Dec. 2-4, 1952.
The Secretary and Mr. Stassen toured the capitals of the prospective members
of the proposed European Defense Community, Jan. 30-Feb. 9, 1953, and again
visited Europe, Apr. 21–27, 1953, in connection with the meeting of the NATO
Dr. Eisenhower and Assistant Secretary Cabot toured Latin America, June
sumi
23-July 29, 1953.
2176
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–19.5,5,
1
spe
COI
me
WI
It was clear
an
pr
SO
3. PROGRESS IN RESOLVING MAJOR POLICY ISSUES: TH
Address by the Secretary of State, August 26, 1955
wh
One of the first things I did as Secretary of State was to go to the figh
Middle East. I wanted to see for myself that area so rich in culture
and religious tradition, yet now so torn by strife and bitterness. &
in the spring of 1953, I visited Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon
, De
Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Upon my return I spoke of the impressions
gathered on that trip and of the hopes which I held as a result of
talks with leaders and people there.?
liv
Some of those hopes have become realities. At that time the Suez
Base was a center of controversy and of potential strife. Now, as s
pe
result of patient effort, in a spirit of conciliation, the problem of the
Suez Base has been successfully resolved.3
Another problem which was then concerning many of the leaders the
in the Middle East was that of the security of the area.
the
that effective defense depended upon collective measures and that
such measures, to be dependable, needed to be a natural drawing
together of those who felt a sense of common destiny in the face of
what could be a common danger. Here, too, there has been some
encouraging progress.
A third problem which called for attention was the need for water
to irrigate land. I mentioned in my report the possibility that the
rivers flowing through the Jordan Valley might be used to make this
valley a source of livelihood rather than dispute. Since then Am-
bassador Eric Johnston has held talks with the governments of
countries through which the River Jordan runs. They have shown fer
an encouraging willingness to accept the principle of coordinated
arrangements for the use of the waters. Plans for the development pr
of the valley are well advanced.4 Ambassador Johnston is now on his
fourth visit to the countries concerned in an effort to eliminate the he
small margins of difference which still exist.
A beginning has been made, as you see, in doing away with the
im
obstacles that stand in the way of the aspirations of the Midde ef
Eastern peoples. It is my hope and that is the hope of which I be
would now speak—that the time has come when it is useful to think be
in terms of further steps toward stability, tranquillity, and progress
in the Middle East.
B
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 5, 1955, pp. 378–380. Secretary Delife
City. See also ibid., Sept. 12, 1955, p. 421, Oct. 3, 1955, pp. 525–526, and Dee
. its
19, 1955, p. 1009.
bi
Ź See report by the Secretary of State, June 1, 1953, supra.
3 See the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of Oct. 19, 1954; infra, pp. 2223-2226
.
See summary of statement of July 6, 1954, by Ambassador Johnston; infra
,
pp. 2235-2236.
ne
an
re
ar
at
an
со
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2177
AS 8
lear them.
ES: THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM
What are the principal remaining problems? They are those
which were unresolved by the armistice[s] of 1949 which ended the
the
fighting between Israelis and Arabs. Before taking up these problems
ture
specifically, I would first pay high tribute to what the United Nations,
So has done to preserve tranquillity and to serve humanity in the area.
201, Despite these indispensable efforts, three problems remain that
ions
conspicuously require to be solved.
t of
The first is the tragic plight of the 900,000 refugees who formerly
lived in the territory that is now occupied by Israel.
juez
The second is the pall of fear that hangs over the Arab and Israel
people alike. The Arab countries fear that Israel will seek by violent
the
means to expand at their expense. The Israelis fear that the Arabs. .
will gradually marshal superior forces to be used to drive them into
ders
the
sea,
and they suffer from the economic measures now taken against
that
The third is the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel
ving and its Arab neighbors.
e of
There are other important problems. But if these three principal
Oine problems could be dealt with, then the way would be paved for the
solution of others.
ater
These three problems seem capable of solution, and surely there is.
the need.
this
Border clashes take an almost weekly toll of human lives and inflame
Am-
an already dangerous mood of hatred. The sufferings of the Arab
3 S of refugees are drawn out almost beyond the point of endurance. The
fears which are at work, on each side, lead to a heavy burden of
armament, which constitutes a serious drag on economic and social
I his
progress. Responsible leaders are finding it hard to turn their full
attention and energies to the positive task of creating conditions of
Serious as the present situation is, there is a danger that, unless it
the improves, it will get worse. One ill leads to another, and cause and
ddle effect
are hard to sort out. The atmosphere, if it worsens, could
1 becloud clear judgments, making appear attractive what would in fact.
Both sides suffer greatly from the present situation, and both are
anxious for what they would regard as a just and equitable solution.
But neither has been able to find that way.
This may be a situation where mutual friends could serve the .
Dec. common good. This is particularly true since the area may not,
itself, possess all of the ingredients needed for the full and early
building of a condition
of security and well-being.
efra
,
The United States, as a friend of both Israelis and Arabs, has given
OWO
ated
nent
the healthy growth.
link be reckless. .
ress
lles'
Fort
- Supra, pp. 698-724.
415900_57_-10l, 2-
-34
2178
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ti
I
S.
t.
o
я
C
n
F
1
H
to join in such a security guaranty, and that it would be sponsored by/
By such collective security measures the area could be relieved ol
near the boundaries could relax from the strain of feeling that violent
standards of living are already too low would no longer have to cart
the situation deep and anxious thought and has come to certain co
clusions, the expression of which may help men of good will with
the area to fresh constructive efforts. I speak in this matter with the
authority of President Eisenhower.
PROPOSED LOAN TO ISRAEL
To end the plight of the 900,000 refugees requires that thes
uprooted people should, through resettlement and
to such an exteni
as may be feasible---repatriation, be enabled to resume a life
dignity and self-respect. To this end, there is need to create mix
arable land where refugees can find permanent homes and gain the
own livelihood through their own work. Fortunately, there are pre
tical projects for water development which can make this possible
.
All this requires money.
Compensation is due from Israel to the refugees. However
,
may be that Israel cannot, unaided, now make adequate compensation
If so, there might be an international loan to enable Israel to pay the
compensation which is due and which would enable many of the
refugees to find for themselves a better way of life.
President Eisenhower would recommend substantial participatie
by the United States in such a loan for such a purpose. Also be
would recommend that the United States contribute to the realization
of water development and irrigation projects which would, direct
or indirectly, facilitate the resettlement of the refugees.
These projects would, of course, do much more than aid in the
resettlement of refugees. They would enable the people throughout
the area to enjoy a better life. Furthermore, a solution to the
refugee problem would help in eliminating the problem of recurrent
incidents which have plagued and embittered the settlements on
both sides of the borders.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES
The second principal problem which I mentioned is that of fear
The nature of this fear is such that it is hardly within the capacity d
the countries of the area, acting alone, to replace the fear with a seux
of security. There, as in many other areas, security can be assure
only by collective measures which commit decisive power to
deterring of aggression.
President Eisenhower has authorized me to say that, given a solution
of the other related problems, he would recommend that the Unite
States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart en
effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel
and its Arab neighbors. I hope that other countries
would be willin
the United Nations.
death may suddenly strike them; the peoples of the area wh
1
17
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2179
COM
pithi
th the
the burden of what threatens to become an armaments race if indeed
it does not become a war; the political leadership of the area could
devote itself to constructive tasks.
PROBLEM OF BOUNDARIES
V
the
lation
ration
rectly
a the
ghout
Errent
ts 01
thN
If there is to be a guaranty of borders, it would be normal that there
should be prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is the
Exten
ife di
third major problem. The existing lines separating Israel and the
Arab States were fixed by the armistice agreements of 1949. They
MON
thai
were not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect; in part,
at least, they reflected the status of the fighting at the moment.
prat
The task of drawing permanent boundaries is admittedly one of
ple.
difficulty. There is no single and sure guide, for each of two con-
flicting claims may seem to have merit. The difficulty is increased
er,
ation
by the fact that even territory which is barren has acquired a senti-
mental significance. Surely the overall advantages of the measures
here outlined would outweigh vastly any net disadvantages of the
adjustments needed to convert armistice lines of danger into boundary
lines of safety. In spite of conflicting claims and sentiments, I
so he
believe it is possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests
of all the parties. The United States would be willing to help in the
search for a solution if the parties to the dispute should desire.
If agreement can be reached on these basic problems of refugees,
fear, and boundaries, it should prove possible to find solutions for
other questions, largely economic, which presently fan the flames of
5 the hostility and resentment.
It should also be possible to reach agreement on the status of
Jerusalem. The United States would give its support to a United
Nations review of this problem.
I have not attempted to enumerate all the issues on which it would
be desirable to have a settlement; nor have I tried to outline in detail
the form which a settlement of any of the elements might take
fear
I have tried to show that possibilities exist for an immeasurable
improvement and that the possibilities do not require any nation
taking action which would be against its interests, whether those
interests be measured in terms of material strength or in terms of
the
national prestige and honor. I have also, I trust, made clear that
the Government of the United States is disposed to enlarge those
possibilities by contributions of its own, if this be desired by those
concerned.
Both sides in this strife have a noble past, a heritage of rich con,
tributions to civilization; both have fostered progress in science and
the arts. Each side is predominantly representative of one of the
ib
world's great religions. Both sides desire to achieve a good life for
their people and to share, and contribute to, the advancements of
At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the tension
which has long prevailed between the Soviet and Western worlds,
can we not hope that a similar spirit should prevail in the Middle
East? That is our plea. The spirit of conciliation and of the good
ty of
sens:
ured
ation
nited
an
ling
al d
this century.
ted)
ent
IT)
2180
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
neighbor brings rich rewards to the people and to the nations,
doing that involves some burdens, they are burdens which the United
States would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which
would result to all peoples if happiness, contentment, and good will
could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in
high respect and honor.
ES
foi
B. DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS AND FACILITIES
Or
H
to
to
AL
G
in
Middle East Command Negotiations
4. PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
EGYPT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND TURKEY, OCTOBER
13, 1951 1
M
ne
CO
.CO
DOCUMENT A
POINT I
in
Egypt belongs to the free world and in consequence her defense and
th
that of the Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratie fo
nations.
POINT II
The defense of Egypt and of other countries in the Middle East
against aggression from without can only be secured by the coopera-
tion of all interested powers.
th
to
POINT III
za
The defense of Egypt can only be assured through the effective
defense of the Middle East area and the coordination of this defense
with that of adjacent areas.
W
th
M
POINT IV
DI
C
It therefore seems desirable to establish an Allied Middle East de
Command in which the countries able and willing to contribute to
the defense of the area should participate. France, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States are prepared to participate
with other interested countries in establishing such a Command
.
Invitations to participate in the Command have been addressed to
Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, who have indir
cated their interest in the defense of the
area and who have
agreed in
principle.
C
1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 22, 1951, pp. 647-648.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2181
POINT V
TE
lited
hich
wil
di
Egypt is invited to participate as a founder member of the Middle
East Command on a basis of equality and partnership with other
founder members.
POINT VI
3
If Egypt is prepared to cooperate fully in the Allied Command
Organization in accordance with the provisions of the attached annex,
His Majesty's Government for their part would be willing to agree
to supersession of the 1936 Treaty land would also be willing to agree
to withdraw from Egypt such British forces as are not allocated to the
Allied Middle East Command by agreement between the Egyptian
Government and the Governments of other countries also participat-
ing as founder members.
POINT VII
OP
TES,
As regards armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Allied
Middle East Command and the provision to that Command of the
necessary strategic defense facilities, such as military and air bases,
communications, ports, etc., Egypt will be expected to make her
contribution on the same footing as other participating powers.
BER
POINT VIII
In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements Egypt would be
invited to accept a position of high authority and responsibility with
the Allied Middle East Command and to designate Egyptian officers
for integration in the Allied Middle East Command Headquarters staff.
:
POINT IX
Eest
Facilities to train and equip her forces will be given to Egypt by
those participating members of the Allied Command in a position
era-
to do so.
POINT X
ense
The detailed organization of the Allied Middle East Defense Organi-
tirezation and its exact relationship with the N.A.T.O. have yet to be
worked out in consultation between all the powers concerned. For
this purpose it is proposed that all founding members of the Allied
Middle East Command should send military representatives to a
meeting to be held in the near future with the object of preparing
est detailed proposals for
submission to the governments concerned.
DOCUMENT B
e to
the
pate
nd.
to
ndi
1
in
TECHNICAL ANNEX
[1]
In common with other participating powers who are making similar
contributions to the defense of the area.
(a) Egypt will agree to furnish to proposed Allied Middle East
" Treaty of Aug. 26, 1936; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 140, pp. 179 ff.
2182
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
础​班​视
​no
OW
WO
da
Command Organization such strategic defense and other facilities
th
her soil as are indispensable for the organization in peacetime of the lot
defense of the Middle East
(b) that she will undertake to grant forces of the Allied Middle
East Command all necessary facilities and assistance in the event of
war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emer of
gency including the use of Egyptian ports, airfields and means d red
communication.
[2]
of
of
We should also hope that Egypt would agree to the Allied Supreme
Commander's Headquarters being located in her territory.
[3]
In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements, it would be under-
stood
the
(a) that the present British base in Egypt would be formally of
handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding that it would
simultaneously become an Allied base within the Allied Middle East the
Command with full Egyptian participation in the running of this bas
in peace and war
(b) that the strength of the Allied force of participating nations to she
be stationed in Egypt in peacetime would be determined between the top
participating nations including Egypt from time to time as progress
is made in building up the force of the Allied Middle East Command
6.
[4]
It also would be understood that an air defense organization includ
:
ing both the Egyptian and Allied forces would be set up under the
command of an officer with joint responsibility to the Egyptian Gop-
ernment and to the Allied Middle East Command for the protection
of Egypt and Allied bases.
acd
me
Mi
ki
lov
5. REJECTION BY EGYPT OF THE JOINT PROPOSALS: State
ment by the Secretary of State, October 17, 1951
1
pei
imi
its
It is with genuine regret that the U. S. Government received notifica
tion on October 15 2 of the rejection by the Egyptian Government
the proposals presented to it on October 13 by the United States
France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. This Government he
noted with surprise
that the Egyptian Government rejected proposes
of such importance without having given them the careful and copy op
sidered deliberation which they merited. These proposals were for
mulated by the nations interested in the welfare and security of the Co
Middle East after the most intensive and thorough consideration of
1
1 Department of State Bulletin, Qct. 29, 1951, pp. 702–703.
2 Not printed.
3 Supra.
1
{
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2183
reme
Isal its defense against outside aggression can be secured only by the co-
COD operation of all interested states.
Doment of peace and security in the area through the Middle East
Command will bring with it social and economic advancement.
1 Treaty of Aug. 26, 1936; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 140, pp. 179 ff.
2 Agreements of Jan. 19, 1899, and July 10, 1899; ibid., vol. 91, pp. 19–22.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 19, 1951, pp. 817-818.
s on the special problems of the area. The invitation to join with the
the other sovereign nations of the free world in a joint and cooperative
effort to make the world safe from aggression was wholly consistent
dide with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt.
at of
Vigilance in protecting the liberties we enjoy is the responsibility
ma of every nation of the free world. The spirit of responsibility to others
is d requires that no nation carelessly precipitate events which can have
no constructive end but which by their nature create those elements
of confusion and weakness which tempt aggression. It is the hope
of the U. S. Government that Egypt will carefully reconsider the
course of action on which it has embarked and will recognize that its
own interest will be served by joining the other nations of the free
world in assuring the defense of the Middle East against the common
danger.
ade
The U. S. Government must reaffirm its belief that the action of
the Egyptian Government with respect to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
Day of 1936 1 and the agreements of 1899 2 regarding the Sudan is not in
ould accord with proper respect for international obligations. For its part,
East the U. S. Government considers the action of the Egyptian Govern-
base ment to be without validity.
It is the sincere hope of the United States that great restraint will be
ins to shown in the present situation and that the obligation of all nations
o the towards the preservation of world law and order will be respected.
6. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE
THE PROPOSED
PROPOSED MIDDLE
EAST COMMAND: Statement by the Governments of the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, November 10,
the
1951 3
In proceeding with their announced intention to establish the
Middle East Command, the Governments of the United States, United
Kingdom, France, and Turkey state that they are guided by the fol-
tate lowing principles:
1. The United Nations is a world response to the principle that
peace is indivisible and that the security of all states is jeopardized
Zifics by breaches of the peace anywhere; at the same time it is incumbent
nt or upon the states of any area to be willing and able to undertake the
2. The defense of the Middle East is vital to the free world and
for
3. The Middle East Command is intended to be the center of
the cooperative efforts for the defense of the area as a whole; the achieve-
gres
tand
.
clud
Gor
ction
initial defense of their area.
stes
has
2184
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
C
ri
11
P
re
0
m
W
7
t
?
(
4. A function of the Middle East Command will be to assist an
support the states willing to join in the defense of the Middle Ea
and to develop the capacity of each to play its proper role in the
defense of the area as a whole against outside aggression. It will .
interfere in problems and disputes arising within the area. 11
establishment of the Middle East Command in no way affects existin
arrangements relating to such matters, notably the 'armistice agree
ments
1 and the United States-United Kingdom-French Triparts
Declaration of May 1950.2
5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset will
primarily one of planning and providing the Middle East States
their request with assistance in the form of advice and training
Requests for arms and equipment made by states in the area wilis
to join in its defense to sponsoring states in a position to assist in thi
connection will be filled by them to the extent possible following thi
coordination of such requests through the Middle East Command.
6. The Supreme Allied Commander Middle East will command
forces placed at his disposal and will develop plans for the operation
of all forces within the area (or to be introduced into the area
) i
time of war or international emergency. However, the placing &
forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Midk
East in peacetime is not a prerequisite for joining in the commo
effort for the defense of the Middle East. Movement of those troop
placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Middh
East to or within the territories of states joining in the defense of the
Middle East will be made only with the agreement of the state «
states concerned and in full accord with their national independence
and sovereignty.
7. While details have yet to be formulated, the sponsoring state
intend that the Middle East Command should be an integrated alisi
command, not a national command. The responsibility of the Su
preme Allied Commander Middle East will be to insure the effectire
ness of the corporate defense enterprise represented by the command
All states joining in this enterprise will be individually associata
with the command on the basis of equality through a Middle East
Defense Liaison Organization which will be located at Middle East
Command Headquarters and will be the link between the comman
and the countries ready to join in the defense of this area.
8. Any facilities granted to the Middle East Command by state
joining in the defense of the Middle East will be the subject of
agreements.
9. The broad mission of the Middle East Command and its com
operative character make it necessary that all States, whether teru
torially or not part of the area, act in the best
interests of the coopera
tive defense of the area; the Middle East Command naturally w
not further the national interest of any particular state.
10. A continuing objective of the Middle East Command is
reduce such deficiencies as exist at present in the organization
C
18
I
a
C
t
8
{
f
(
specă
(
1 Supra, pp. 698-724.
2 Infra, p. 2237.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2185
it and
型 ​训
​ea) i
ſiddh
nmon
troops
Tiddi
of the
ate a
idence
Union's aggressive actions.
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 31, 1951, pp. 1055-1056.
Ibid., pp. 1054-1055.
capacity for defense in a vitally important area so that the peacetime
EXY
role of the states of the area in Middle East defense will progressively
thi
increase, thus permitting the peacetime role of states not territorially
ill me
part of the Middle East
to be decreased proportionately.
11. The sponsoring states of the Middle East Command do not
isting
regard the initial form in which the Middle East Command will be
organized as unchangeable; they believe that the Middle East Com-
agree
Partit:
mand through mutual understanding should evolve in the manner
which will enable it most effectively to provide for the defense of the
Middle East area as a whole.
tes de
lining
villig
7. REPLY TO SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THE ESTABLISH-
in thi
MENT OF A MIDDLE EAST COMMAND: Note From the
ng to
American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
ind.
Affairs, December 18, 1951 1
mand
ation
The Government of the United States has given careful considera-
ingo
tion to the note of the Government of the U.S.S.R. of November
242 concerning the proposed establishment of the Middle East
Command.
It is apparent that the Soviet Union has placed a completely
erroneous interpretation upon the Middle East Command and has
chosen to ignore the clearly-stated purposes and principles upon
which the Middle East Command will be founded.
The allegation of the Soviet Union that the Middle East Command
is
aggressive in intent is utterly without foundation. On the con-
state
trary, the statement of principles published by the United Kingdom,
France, Turkey, and the United States on November 103 make it
abundantly clear that the Middle East Command is designed (1) to
create a voluntary cooperative defense organization to provide for
mand the security of the Middle East area as a whole in the event that that
area should become a target of outside aggression, and (2) to assist
the states in the area to preserve and strengthen their independence
and freedom so that their economic well-being and social institutions
can develop in an atmosphere unclouded by fear for their security.
The Middle East Command proposals and principles are based
upon the inherent right of self-defense set forth in article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations. Such self-defense is facilitated by
cooperative measures like the Middle East Command. The need for
these cooperative measures arises from the concern over present
tensions in the world situation which have been created by the Soviet
at subversion against the states of the Middle East do not contribute
to lessening these tensions.
The United States notes with surprise the assertion by the U.S.S. R.
allied
le
St
ctite
ciated
Eas!
East
mani
states
recife
IS CO
term
pera:
71
is
is to
1 and
2
* Supra.
2186
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
{
C
1
(
.
concept that those states choosing to participate in the Command will
that the idea that any threat exists to the Middle East states is
"absolutely groundless." The United States Government reminds
the Soviet Government that on November 25, 1940, a proposal of
U. S. S. R. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov to
German Ambassador Schulenburg to reach agreement with the Nazi
Government of Germany on the delimitation of the spheres of influence
between the Axis Powers and the U. S. S. R. provided, among other
things, that the U. S. S. R. be enabled to establish "a base for land
and naval forces" within range of the Turkish Straits and that "the
area south of Batum and of Baku in the general direction of the
Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the
Soviet Union." 1 In light of the Soviet attitude toward the Middle
East area since the end of World War II, the United States Govern-
ment can only assume that the aims set forth by Mr. Molotov in
1940 remain the policy of the Soviet Government.
With respect to the Soviet allegation that the sponsors of the Middle
East Command intend to convert the Middle East into a place d'arma,
with a view to occupying the states in the area and interfering with
their internal affairs, the principles submitted to the Middle East
states on November 10 make it clear that (a) the Middle East Com-
mand will not interfere in matters arising within the area; (b) that
movement of Middle East Command forces to or within the territories
of the Middle East states will be made only with the agreement of
the state or states concerned in full accord with their national inde
pendence and sovereignty; and (c) that facilities granted to the
Middle East Command will likewise be the subject of specific agree-
ments.
The United States and other members of the Nato have frequently
been exposed to the purely propagandistic charge from the U.S.S. R.
that the Nato is aggressive. That this charge is a complete distortion
of the facts is made clear by the terms of the Treaty, by the steps
taken under it, and by the foreign policies of the members. Being
devoted to the cause of peace, the members believe that they can
best serve this cause by their just determination to defend themselve
against aggression. The United States wishes to make quite clear
to the Soviet Union that neither the Nato nor the Middle East
Command is aggressive in intent. As is well known to the Soviet
Union and to the Governments satellite to it, there has been no
aggression whatsoever originating from the countries who are members
of these organizations. Furthermore, there will not be any. There
fore, the Soviet reference to "the aggressive Atlantic Bloc" is once
again rejected as being without any foundation whatsoever.
The Middle East Command proposals and principles, based on the
1 See Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1989–1941 (Department of State publication 30%
1948), p. 258.
2 Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, as amended by protocol of Oct. 17, 1951, supra, pp
812-815 and 853–854.
i
1
1
}
.
?
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2187
note of Oct. 2, 1950 (ibid.), and the Greek note of Oct. 4, 1950
eri-
y in
In connection with the examination of security problems confront-
s is
inds
governments of the sovereign and independent Middle East states
for their study and evaluation in the light of their own national
lol
interests. The decision as to whether they will elect to participate
to
in the Command and freely accept the benefits and responsibilities
Vazi
of such participation belongs to these states alone and not to the
Дce
ther
Soviet Government. The recent Soviet threats to these states warning
land
against their participation in the Middle East Command constitute
"the
interference in the affairs of these countries. The United States
Government believes, as the Soviet Government professes to do, that
the
the peoples of the Middle East have the right to conduct their national
Idie
policies "free from any kind of external pressure.” The Government
of the U.S.S.R. bears the responsibility for the present situation,
not those states which, either individually or collectively under the
Charter of the United Nations, take legitimate measures of self-defense
ddle
in the interest of their own security and of international peace.
mes
,
with
East
om
that
NATO's Eastern Arm---Greece and Turkey
Dries
it of
nde
8. PRELIMINARY ASSOCIATION WITH NATO: Note Verbale
the
From the Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador at Wash-
Teba ington, September 19, 1950 1
ntly
.R.
ing the Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council, it was recognized
tion
that, in the case of the Mediterranean area, it would be desirable, if
teps
the Turkish Government so wished, to make arrangements which
eing
would permit Turkey to be associated with such appropriate phases of
can
the military planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Ives
as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean.
lear
The Council is keenly aware of the active support which Turkey,
East
as a member of the United Nations, has accorded the principles of
viet
the United Nations and of the important role which Turkey is play-
ing in the maintenance of the stability of the eastern Mediterranean
It is the view of the Council that association of the Turkish Govern-
ment with the appropriate phase of the planning work of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization with regard to the defense of the
Mediterranean would contribute significantly to the defense of that
1
DO
pers
area.
DIA
nce
the
will
area.
the
202
JO
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 632. A note verbale identic
With this one, mutatis mutandis, was sent by the Secretary of State to the Greek
Ambassador at Washington, Oct. 3, 1950, ibid., p. 633. See also the Turkish
(ibid.).
* See Council's communiqué of Sept. 18, 1950; supra, pp. 1606-1607.
PP
2188
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
[PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE
ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY, OCTOBER 17, 1951
9. UNITED STATES USE OF DEFENSE FACILITIES: Agreement
Between the United States and the Kingdom of Greece, October
12, 1953 2
of
th
in
F
fr
01
ಡ 5 OD
0]
ri
A
d
t
C
d
A
0
f
f
t
The United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece being
parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed at Washington
on April 4, 1949 3 and having regard to their respective responsibilities
under the aforesaid
Treaty to provide for the security and defense of
the North Atlantic Treaty Area, and under Article 3 thereof to develop
their collective capacity to resist armed attack, have entered into the
following Agreement:
Article I
1. The Government of Greece hereby authorizes the Government
of the United States of America, subject to the terms and conditions
set forth in this Agreement and to technical arrangements between
appropriate authorities of the two Governments, to utilize such roads
railways and areas, and to construct, develop, use and operate such
military and supporting facilities in Greece as appropriate authorities
of the two Governments shall from time to time agree to be necessary
for the implementation of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO
plans. The construction, 'development, use and operation of such
facilities shall be consistent with recommendations, standards and
directives from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
where applicable.
2. For the purpose of this Agreement and in accordance wit
technical arrangements to be agreed between the appropriate author
ities of the two Governments, the Government of the United States
of America may bring in, station and house in Greece United States
personnel. United States Armed Forces and equipment under their
control may enter, exit, circulate within and overfly Greece and is
territorial waters subject to any technical arrangements that may be
agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments
These operations shall be free from all charges, duties and taxes.
3. The priorities, rates of consumption and charges established for
the United States Armed Forces for such services as electric power
sewerage, water supply, communication systems, and freight and
personnel transportation by rail, will be no less favorable than those
established for the Greek Armed Forces.
&
1 Supra, pp. 853–854.
2 TIAS 2868; 4 UST 2189. Entered into force on date of signature. A similar
agreement with Turkey (TIAS 3243; 6 UST 1031) was signed on Apr. 25, 1966
,
and entered into force on date of signature.
Supra, pp. 812–815.
3
܀ ܚܕܚܝܫܝܕܢܓ
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2189
Se of
Veen
THI
Article II
951
1. Equipment, materials and supplies imported by or on behalf
of the Government of the United States of America in connection with
the construction, development, operation or maintenance of agreed
installations and facilities and the official support of the United States
ment
tober
Forces, civilian components, and their dependents shall be exempt
from all duties, taxes, custom restrictions and inspections.
2. All removable facilities erected or constructed by or on behalf
of the Government of the United States of America at its sole expense
being
and all equipment, materials and supplies brought into Greece or
gton
purchased in Greece by or on behalf of the Government of the United
Litur States of America in connection with the construction, development,
operation and maintenance of agreed installations and facilities wilí
relay remain the property of the Government of the United States of
o the
America and may be removed from Greece. No such removal or
disposition will be undertaken which will prejudice the mission of
the NATO.
ment
3. The United States of America will be compensated by the Greek
tions
Government for the residual value, if any, of the facilities acquired,
developed and constructed at United States expense under the present
bads
Agreement and not removed or otherwise disposed of in accordance
such with paragraph 2 of this Article, including those facilities developed
rities or constructed jointly by United States and Greek funds, when such
facilities or any part thereof are no longer needed by the military
ATO
forces of the United States. The amount and manner of compensa-
such
tion shall be in accordance with agreements to be made between the
appropriate authorities of the contracting parties. Negotiations as
TO) to the method for treating the residual value of these facilities will be
without prejudice to agreements within the NATO.
with
shor
Article III
cates
For the implementation of this Agreement the provisions of Article
cates
I, paragraphs 3a and 3b of Legislative Decree 694 of May 7, 1948,
Eheir
and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of
its the United States and the Government of Greece dated February 4,
y be
1953, shall be applied in accordance with terms mutually agreed.
2. The United States Armed Forces in Greece under this Agree-
may
also establish and continue to use or operate United States
i for
military post offices.
wer
Article IV
The present Agreement will come into force from the date on which
it is signed, and will remain in effect during the period of the validity
of the North Atlantic Treaty.
DONE at Athens in duplicate, in the English and Greek languages,
the two texts having equal authenticity, this 12th day of October, 1953
SAIT
and
ents
.
ment
and
Jose
milar
1955,
1 TIAS 2775; 4 UST 166.
2190
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
10. DEFENSE SUPPORT AID: Communiqué by the Government
of the United States and Turkey, June 5, 1954 1
re
0
8
m
0
0
1
0
The Governments of the United States and Turkey wish to expres
their mutual satisfaction as a result of the visit of Prime Minister
Adnan Menderes to Washington. It has provided a valuable oppor-
tunity for the Turkish Prime Minister to discuss thoroughly with h
President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense
Wilson, FOA Director Stassen, and other high ranking United Statesh
officials matters of common interest to the two countries.
During his visit the Prime Minister also met with members of
Congress who are active in committees concerned with foreign affairs.
In such meetings Mr. Menderes engaged in a frank exchange of views
and opinions relative to the common goals and interests of our tiro
countries.
Further, the visit afforded an occasion for the Prime Minister to
place before the United States Government a clear and forceful state
ment of Turkish policy to act as a convinced and determined member
of Nato, to develop closer political and military ties with other
friendly nations in the free world, in and out of Nato, and to support
the mutual efforts of the United States and other free nations to
organize for world security.
The official visit has also provided another opportunity for the
United States Government to reaffirm its recognition of the fact that
Turkey has assumed a defense posture which includes a modernized
armed force and which places a heavy strain upon the resources
of its
country and people and that substantial assistance from the United
States and from other free nations who are in a position to render such
assistance is necessary in order to permit the attainment of our com;
ti
mon objectives for a collective defense. In this direction, the United
States Government intends to continue to base.its program of military
assistance to the Republic of Turkey toward meeting the requirements
S
of the Nato-approved Turkish force goals. In order to enable Turkey
to meet the requirements of her armed forces under the above programi
during the coming year, the United States Government, subject to
the action of Congress and a review of commitments and priorities,
is disposed to increase its presently approved military assistance
program. The United States Government is further prepared
accelerate deliveries of items in the present pipeline of roughly one-he.
billion dollars of military equipment presently appropriated and
programmed for Turkey
În recognition of the fact that the support and maintenance of a
large defense force will place a strain upon the Turkish econom
which it cannot presently bear without
external assistance and in
further recognition of the fact that it is in our common interest that
Turkey be placed in a position where it can support the needs of its
military establishment and its economy through its own resources in
o
0
0
S
a
t
0
I
C
S
C
(
1
Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1954, pp. 912-913.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2191
Bress
ister
t
air
hems
31 to
other
port
2 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 1, 1954, pp. 327-328.
lents the shortest possible time, the United States Executive Branch has
requested the Congress for funds which would permit the furnishing
of economic assistance to Turkey during the coming fiscal year.i
Although it is impossible for the United States Government to make
any commitments as to its intentions with respect to the furnishing of
por military or economic support assistance beyond Fiscal Year 1955, it
will has been agreed with the Republic of Turkey to continue the appraisal
ense of Turkey's possible future needs and of the measures which may
tates have to be taken by the Government of Turkey and the Government
of the United States in the attainment of their common objectives.
is of
OTTO
Mutual Defense Assistance Arrangements
With Pakistan
tate
.
mber
11. COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: Statement
by the Department of State, February 19, 1954 2
· the
The U. S. Government warmly welcomes the announced intention
that of the Governments of Turkey and Pakistan "to study methods of
achieving closer friendly collaboration in the political, economic, and
of its cultural spheres as well as of strengthening peace and security in their
nited own interest as also in that of all peace-loving nations." 3 This for-
such ward-looking step should provide increased assurances that these and
other countries in the area will be able to maintain the independence
they so highly prize. No nation standing alone can obtain adequate
security at bearable cost. This principle has already been accepted and
ents applied throughout most of the free nations of Europe, North and
rker South America, and the Western Pacific.
The Secretary of State reported last spring on his return from a trip
through the Near East and South Asia that he found certain countries
of the area concerned at the dangers which threatened them and others
in the free world. He also reported that he found some desire for a
collective security system in the area, but emphasized that such a
-hal system should be designed and grow. from within out of a sense of
common destiny and common danger. It is evident that the proposal
of these two Governments is of this character and constitutes a con-
of a
structive step toward broadening
the base of the collective strength
See par. (C), (2), Sec. 105, of the Mutual Security Act of 1954; infra, p. 3109.
This announcement by Turkey and Pakistan was made, Feb. 19, 1954.
is to
COM-
Tam
et to
ties
,
anch
i to
and
of the free world.
om
din
that
f its
S ID
* See supra, doc. 2.
تحت کنند
la
th
15
to
in
T
st
M.
U
OP
be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetie
2192 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
12. DEFENSIVE PURPOSE OF UNITED STATES MILITARI
AID: Message From the President of the United States to the
Prime Minister of India, February 24, 1954 1
DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I send you this personal message
because I want you to know about my decision to extend military
aid to Pakistan before it is public knowledge and also because I wari
you to know directly from me that this step does not in any wa
affect the friendship we feel for India. Quite the contrary. We wi
continually strive to strengthen the warm and enduring friendship
between our two countries.
Our two Governments have agreed that our desires for peace or
in accord. It has also been understood that if our interpretation of
existing circumstances and our belief in how to achieve our goalk
differ, it is the right and duty of sovereign nations to make their own
decisions. Having studied long and carefully the problem of
posing possible aggression in the Middle East, I believe that consulte
tion between Pakistan and Turkey about security problems wil
serve the interests not only of Pakistan and Turkey but also of the
whole free world. Improvement in Pakistan's defensive capability
will also serve these interests and it is for this reason that our aid w
be given. This Government's views on this subject are elaborated
in a public statement I will release, a copy of which Ambassador
Allen will give you.
What we are proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to is
not directed in any way against India. And I am confirming publici
that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and
directed against another in aggression I will undertake immediately,
in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action
both within and without the UN to thwart such aggression. I be
lieve that the Pakistan-Turkey collaboration agreement which
is
being discussed is sound evidence of the defensive purposes
both countries have in mind.
I know that you and your Government are keenly aware of the
need for economic progress as a prime requisite for stability and
strength. This Government has extended assistance to India i
recognition of this fact, and I am recommending to Congress & com
tinuation of economic and technical aid for this reason. We also
believe it in the interest of the free world that India have a strong
military defense capability and have admired the effective way you
Government has administered your military establishment. If you
Government should conclude that circumstances require military
aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, pless
ag
V
to
ef
1,
to
3
re
de
he
in
W
fr
which
CA
8]
S]
V
St
.
II
a
a
a
ī
t
i
1
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 15, 1954, pp. 400-401.
2 See statement of Feb. 19, 1954, by the Department of State; supra.
3 Infra.
See the agreement of Apr. 2, 1954; supra, pp. 1253–1256.
1
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2193
litary
1987
e an
on of
goals
sulta
wil
d wil
rated
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 15, 1954, p. 401.
I regret that there has been such widespread and unfounded specu-
o the lation on this subject. Now that the facts are known, I hope that
the real import of our decision will be understood.
Ssage
13. INCREASING THE DEFENSE POTENTIAL OF PAKISTAN:
Statement by the President, February 25, 1954 1
e vi
dship
On February 19th, Turkey and Pakistan announced their intention
to study methods of achieving closer collaboration on various matters
including means designed towards strengthening peace and security.
This Government welcomed this move and called it a constructive
step towards better ensuring the security of the whole area of the
LOT Middle East. The Government of Pakistan has now asked the
f OP
United States to grant military assistance.
I have said repeatedly that regional groupings to ensure security
of the
against aggression constitute the most effective means to assure sur-
bilita
vival and progress. No nation can stand alone today. My report
to the Congress on June 30, 1953 stated that we should strengthen
efforts towards regional political, military and economic integration.
I, therefore, under the authority granted by the Congress, am glad
sador
to comply with Pakistan's request, subject to the negotiation of the
required MDAP agreement.
to, is
This Government has been gravely concerned over the weakness of
blier defensive capabilities in the Middle East. It was for the purpose of
.
helping to increase the defense potential in this area that Congress in
its last session appropriated funds to be used to assist those nations
in the area which desired such assistance, which would pledge their
willingness to promote international peace and security within the
framework of the United Nations, and which would take effective
which
measures to prevent and remove threats to peace.
Let me make it clear that we shall be guided by the stated purposes
of the
and requirements of the mutual security legislation. Those include
specifically the provision that equipment, materials or services pro-
vided will be used solely to maintain the recipient country's internal
security and for its legitimate self defense, or to permit it to participate
in the defense of the area of which it is a part. Any recipient country
also must undertake that it will not engage in any act of aggression
against any other nation. These undertakings afford adequate
Litar whatever their international policies may be, that the arms the
assurance to all nations, regardless of their political orientation and
United States provides for the defense of the free world will in no way
threaten their own security. I can say that if our aid to any country,
See Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months
See the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1954 (PL 218, 83d Cong.,
Ist sess., approved Aug. 7, 1953, 67 Stat. 478).
* See Sec. 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 as amended; infra, p. 3063.
415900_57-Vol. 235
and
ately
,
uction
I be.
Ich is
collective
- and
ja in
ܐ
· CON-
also
trong
Fou
your
please
hetic
Ended June 30, 1953, p. 5.
2194
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
9
al
including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggreso
sion I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitz-
tional authority, appropriate action both within and without the UN
A
to thwart such aggression. I would also consult with the Congress te
on further steps.
A
The United States earnestly desires that there be increased stabilit
and strength in the Middle East, as it has desired this same thing i
other parts of the free world. It believes that the aspirations of the
peoples in this area for maintaining and developing their way of lif
and for realizing the social advances close to their hearts will be best
served by strength to deter aggression and to reduce the fear d to
aggression. The United States is prepared to help in this endeaviem
if its help is wanted.
0
W
CE
CO
W
G
14. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN, MAY 19, 1954"
G
ot
m
at
ar
or
as
to
The Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Pakistan,
ան
Desiring to foster international peace and security within the frame-
work of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which st
will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and pri-
ciples of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for
individual and collective self-defence in support of those purposes and to
principles;
Reaffirming their determination to give their full co-operation to
the
of
efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contem-
plated by the Charter and to participate in United Nations collective
defence arrangements and measures, and to obtain agreement on
universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate se
guarantee against violation or evasion;
Taking into consideration the support which the Government of
United States has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutuel A
Defence Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Security
Act of 1951, as amended: 3
G
Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing | al
of such assistance;
Have agreed:
fu
ARTICLE I
Jei
pe
1. The Government of the United States will make available to the
Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other
assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize .
accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The
furnishing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with the in
W
ur
ра
su
m
1 TIAS 2976; 5 UST 852.
2 63 Stat. 714; 22 U. S. C. $ 1571 note.
3 Infra, pp. 3059–3086.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2195
gree Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made
stitu available by the Government of the United States pursuant to this
UN
Agreement will be furnished under the provisions and subject to all the
gtes terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defence
Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts
bility
amendatory or supplementary thereto, appropriation acts thereunder,
ug 1 or any other applicable legislative provisions. The two Governments
f the
will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to
of
carry out the provisions of this paragraph.
best
2. The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively
ar dd to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to per-
970, mit it to participate in the defence of the area, or in United Nations
collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not
undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. The
Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the
EEN
Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes
14
other than those for which it was furnished.
3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and
Verta materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and no longer re-
quired or used exclusively for the purposes for which originally made
came available will be offered for return to the Government of the United
1
which States.
prin-
cs
for
and
ective
at 01
utal Agreement.
4. The Government of Pakistan will not transfer to any person not
an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title
to
or possession of any equipment, materials, property, information,
or services received under this Agreement, without the prior consent
to the of the Government of the United States,
item-
5. The Government of Pakistan will take such security measures
as may be
be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order
to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles,
quatre services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.
6. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent
of the with security to keep the public informed of operations under this
eurity
7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the
Government of Pakistan will so deposit, segregate or assure title to
shing all funds allocated to or derived from any programme of assistance
undertaken by the Government of the United States so that such
funds shall not, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, be sub-
ject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any
person, firm, agency, corporation, organization or government.
ARTICLE II
The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate
in the appropriate arrangements between them relating to the exchange of
patent rights and technical information for defence which will expedite
such exchanges and at the same time protect private interests and
maintain necessary security safeguards.
other
ize 1
The
نعنعنه
2196 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
m
and export duties on personal property imported for the personal us
of such personnel or of their families and will take reasonable admini:
ARTICLE III
1. The Government of Pakistan will make available to the Goven
ment of the United States rupees for the use of the latter Government
for its administrative and operating expenditures in connection wil
carrying out the purposes of this Agreement. The two Government
will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the
amount of such rupees and to agreeing upon arrangements for the
furnishing of such funds.
2. The Government of Pakistan will, except as may otherwise be
mutually agreed, grant duty-free treatment on importation or exporte
tion and exemption from internal taxation upon products, property
materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection wil
this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government
of the United States and the Government of any other country recer.
ing military assistance.
3. Tax relief will be accorded to all expenditures in Pakistan by,
or on behalf of, the Government of the United States for the commoC
defence effort, including expenditures for any foreign aid programme
. U
of the United States. The Government of Pakistan will establish
procedures satisfactory to both Governments so that such expenditure et
will be net of taxes.
ARTICLE IV
th
1. The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the
Government of the United States who will discharge in its territor
the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this
Agreement and who will be accorded facilities and authority to od
serve the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agre
ment. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including
personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the
Government of Pakistan, operate as part of the Embassy of the
United States of America under the direction and control of the Chie
!
of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same privileges an
immunities as are accorded other personnel with corresponding rahi
of the Embassy of the United States who are United States national
Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the Unite
States the Government of Pakistan will grant full diplomatic stars
to the senior military member assigned under this Article and the
senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers and their respective in
mediate deputies.
2. The Government of Pakistan will grant exemption from import
trative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation,
exportation of the
personal property of such personnel and the
families.
ca
ti
al
농​AM5
0
mi
g?
U:
T
V
0
e
9
8
t
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2197
ARTICLE V
) Ver:
iment
I mit
ments
hం -
port:
I will
iment
receit
mmoi
ablish
1. The Government of Pakistan will:
(a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill,
and maintaining world peace;
(b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to elimi-
g the
nate causes of international tension;
or the
(c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the
full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facili-
isel ties and general economic condition to the development and
maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive
perty strength of the free world;
(d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop
its defence capacities; and
(e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilisation of the
economic and military assistance provided by the United States.
in br.
2. (a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the
United States, or to such other governments as the Parties hereto
may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services or
litur other assistance as may be agreed upon in order to increase their
capacity for individual and collective self-defense and to facilitate
their effective participation in the United Nations system for collec-
tive security.
b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government
Titor of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Govern-
ment of the United States, for such period of time, in such quantities
to alle and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw
agent and semi-processed
materials required by the United States as a result
quam of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which
h the
may be available in Pakistan. Arrangements for such transfers shall
give due regard to reasonable requirements of Pakistan for domestic
use and commercial export.
ARTICLE VI
In the interest of their mutual security the Government of Pakistan
will co-operate with the Government of the United States in taking
ed the measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the
er this
of the
Chiel
S and
rant,
onak
United
status
maintenance of world peace.
Te im
mport
al is
minis
1 and
thei'
ARTICLE VII
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and
will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party
of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it,
except that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 4, and
arrangements entered into under Article I, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7,
and under Article II, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by
the two Governments.
:
2198
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
technical assistance, flood relief as previously agreed upon consequent
ister of Pakistan arrived in Washington on Oct. 14 as an official guest of the
2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, to
consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amend me
ment of this Agreement.
go
3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the su
United Nations.
Done in two copies at Karachi the 19th day of May one thousand fo
nine hundred and fifty four.
St
th
m
H
15. DEFENSE SUPPORT AID TO PAKISTAN: Communiqué bl of
the Governments of the United States and Pakistan, October 21 ye
1954 1
As the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali
Pakistan draws to a close, the Government of the United States and
the Government of Pakistan consider it fitting to reaffirm their com-
mon purpose in striving to assure peace and economic security
their peoples. They are convinced that those objectives can be
attained through measures of collective security, self-help and ex
nomic cooperation. At the same time, they share a common conti
tion that their goals can be attained only where fundamental spiritual
values are permitted to flourish.
The Prime Minister and cabinet members accompanying him hare
had discussions of problems of mutual interest with a number of
high-ranking officials of the United States, including President
Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson
and Foreign Operations Administration Director Stassen.
The discussions were preceded and have been accompanied by
earnest efforts within the United States Government to determine
measures which the United States might take to strengthen Pakistan
bearing in mind Pakistan's special position in the Middle East and
South Asia, its unreserved friendship and cooperation with the
b
United States in its efforts for the security of the free world, and the
economic problems with which Pakistan is at present faced.
With the report of the special FOA mission sent to Pakistan last
summer under the leadership of Mr. H. J. Heinz II, it became clear
that, despite its own tremendous efforts, Pakistan was in urgent need
of increased economic assistance to ameliorate shortages of consumers
goods and industrial raw materials, and that economic development
programs must be increased if economic stability were to be attained
Accordingly, it has been agreed that the United States Government
will make available to Pakistan in the current fiscal year about $105
million in economic aid, part of which will be in the form of loans
.
This figure, which is five times last year's aid, includes funds for
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 1, 1954, pp. 639-640. The Prime Min
U.S. Government; ibid., Oct. 25, 1954, p. 606.
0
t
€
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2199
them to the disaster of last August in East Pakistan, and funds for develop-
nend mental purposes. To meet Pakistan's urgent needs for consumer
goods and industrial raw materials, the total figure also includes a
of the substantial amount in the form of agricultural commodities.
Recognizing Pakistan's position in the common defense effort and
isand following the military assistance agreement signed with the United
States this spring, the United States will endeavor to accelerate the
substantial military aid programs for Pakistan, which are beginning
this
year. In this connection, the United States cannot make com-
mitments beyond the limits of existing and current appropriations.
However, the Government of the United States and the Government
lé by of Pakistan intend to continue to study together in this and future
r 21, years the best means of achieving their mutual objective: the strength-
ening of the economy and the defense capabilities of Pakistan.
1
Wid
s and
COM
ty to
n be
Aircraft Transit Facilities in Saudi Arabia
ECO-
ntica
itual
16. USE OF FACILITIES AND SERVICES AT DHAHRAN AIR-
FIELD BY TRANSIENT AND SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT OF
THE UNITED STATES: Note From the American Ambassador at
Jidda? to the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs,: June
18, 19514
have
er of
ident
mine
and
ilson
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Highness' note
of this date reading as follows:
ber
"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that as of this date
stan
the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Government of the United States of America concern-
ing Dhahran Airfield, concluded on June 23, 1949, as extended, will
the be terminated. In view of the desire of the Government of Saudi
Arabia to offer to the Government of the United States of America
certain facilities after that date, I have the honor to transmit to Your
desi Excellency herein below the provisions upon which agreement was
Reed reached for the continuation of the use of facilities and services at
Dhahran Airfield by the transient and supporting aircraft of the
Government of the United States, in accordance with the conditions
mentioned in this letter. It is my hope that you will inform me in
your reply of the approval thereof by the Government of the United
States in order
to consider this note and Your Excellency's reply an
agreement committing the two parties.
last
ned.
ent
105
for
ent
2
fin-
· Supra, doc. 14.
Raymond A. Hare.
3 Prince Feisal.
* TIAS 2290; 2 UST 1466.
5 Not printed.
the
2200
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
rey
and
4
fiel
pre
ret
Ag
ter
to
Ar
to
fre
ag
an
W1
ste
W
m
1. The term Dhahran Airfield as used in this Agreement mean
the area of land located in the so-called Dammam tracts measuring
five statute miles on each side of a square with the center located ai
the terminal building of the existing airdrome.
2. (a). In accordance with the request of the Saudi Arabia
Government, the Government of the United States agrees to send, al
its expense, to Dhahran Airfield a Mission to be employed for training
Saudi nationals and for organizing the operations of the Dhahru
Airport technical administration.
(b). The number of the members of the Mission will be de
termined by request of the head of the Mission and approval thered
by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense. Such specification in
numbers of personnel will be reviewed from time to time in the light
of developing circumstances and requirements.
(c). "The Mission referred to in paragraph (a) above is per
mitted to employ an additional number of civilians on the Airfield on
condition that such civilians shall be the subjects of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia or the subjects of the United States or the subjects el fo
a third state friendly to both, and that the number of non-Saud de
personnel will be determined by request of the Mission and approved th
of the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense. Such specification in ol
numbers of personnel will be reviewed from time to time in the light M
of developing circumstances and requirements.
(d). It is provided that there must not be among members of
the Mission or among the other employees any individual who is
objectionable to the Saudi Arabian Government, and that the Govern-
at
ment of the United States will submit a detailed list of the names and
P&
identity of these personnel and employees.
(©). If the Saudi Arabian Government requests the Mission T
to send out or replace any of its personnel or employees whom the
Saudi Arabian Government does not desire to remain in the country
,
the Mission will carry out such request promptly.
3. (a). United States aircraft are permitted to use the Saudi
Arabian Government Airport at Dhahran to land and take off for
refueling and other technical services such as maintenance and repair.
(b). United States aircraft are permitted to fly over those
routes of Saudi Arabia of which the Saudi Arabian Government pels
mits the use.
(c). United States aircraft are permitted to perform air rescue
operations for aircraft which are in need of aid, upon notice to the
Saudi Arabian Government. In performing such air rescue,
and crash boats may be used to the extent necessary for air rescue
operations.
(d). The number of aircraft which will be permitted to
based at Dhahran Airfield and which will be used for air rescue and
other authorized operations will be determined by request
United States
Mission and approval of the Saudi Arabian Minister
of Defense. Such specification in the number of aircraft will be
or
e
8
ti
1
vehicles
of the
views
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2201
means
Bining
ahra
On 11
om of
reviewed from time to time in the light of developing circumstances
suring and requirements.
jede
4. In accordance with paragraph 23 of the existing Dhahran Air-
field Agreement which states that all fixed installations and other
"Abian
property used in operation and maintenance of the Airfield will be
nd
, at
returned to the Saudi Arabian Government upon termination of the
Agreement, and in view of the fact that the said Agreement is being
terminated and that such installations and properties thereby revert
to the Saudi Arabian Government, and, due to the desire of the Saudi
de
Arabian Government to facilitate the errand of the Mission, it agrees
hereo
to place at the disposition of the Mission at Dhahran Airfield, rent
light
free, certain existing buildings and installations as specified in the list
agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments
and approved by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense. This list
pe will be reviewed from time to time in the light of developing circum-
old on
stances and requirements.
5. (a). The United States Mission at Dhahran Airfield will per-
eta o form the necessary technical operations, and such operations will be
Saudi
determined and agreed upon between the members of the Mission and
proval
the appropriate officials of the Saudi Arabian Government, and, after
09. obtaining the approval of the Saudi Arabian
Minister of Defense, the
light| Mission will perform its duties on the
Base, provided that such duties
will be reviewed from time to time subject to the technical develop-
irs of
ments and circumstances.
who is
(b). The United States Mission is permitted to administer,
at Dhahran Airfield only, and in addition to what is mentioned in
paragraph (a), matters connected with United States military air-
craft, the military personnel and the civilian employees of the Mission.
The Mission at Dhahran Airfield will not act in any other matters
except when specifically authorized by the Saudi Arabian Government.
inter
(c). Civil aviation operations and all other aviation operations
at Dhahran Airfield, with the exception of those mentioned in para-
graphs 5 (a) and (b) will be administered by the Saudi Arabian-
off for
Government under its responsibility. The Saudi Arabian Government
pou will take the necessary action to prevent interference with the opera-
tions of United States aircraft as authorized under this Agreement.
s per All regulations and instructions of the Saudi Arabian Government
will be applied to civilian aircraft which are permitted by the Saudi
esc Arabian Government to use Dhahran Airfield, including compliance
by such aircraft with the international provisions which are accepted
nicles
by the Saudi Arabian Government. The Saudi Arabian Government
will also perform customs procedures, collection of fees, inspections,
passport control and similar matters.
6, (a). To assure efficient operation and the furnishing of tech-
nical services at Dhahran Airfield to the best possible extent the
United States Mission will be permitted to improve, alter, modify
nister
and replace buildings and facilities for improvement purposes or,
l be
after notifying the Saudi Arabian Government, and obtaining its
approval, to construct such buildings and facilities
at Dhahran Air-
field (including runways, taxiways, parking aprons, weather services,
Verl-
ES and
SSION
n the
Saudi
de 81
o the
escue
0
be
and
the
2202
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ng
CO
Government charges for themselves or their personal effects which
provided that quantities of such effects will be within reasonable
limits and that no such articles will be sold unless the appropriate
authorities of the Saudi Arabian Government are informed in order
radio communications and navigational aids) as may be deemed necelth
sary for the purpose of this Agreement. The Saudi Arabian Goven na
ment will issue instructions to the appropriate authorities to probiti ox
the construction of buildings or obstacles for a distance of five kilom th
ters in the plain west of the present Airfield, and it will also is th
instructions to prevent the construction of obstacles in the approaches
to the runways.
th
(b). Such installations and constructions will become, as som
as they are established, the property of the Saudi Arabian Govers
ment. All fixed properties will also be considered as belonging to the to
Saudi Arabian Government as soon as they are established. Th
Saudi Arabian Government will permit such new installations al
fixed items to remain at the disposition of the United States Mission
during the period of this Agreement.
(c). It is agreed that the United States Mission will not re
move any of the property and installations which have been installed
and have become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government. I b
case the Mission replaces any installations or property which be
become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government, then such
replacements will become the property of the Saudi Arabian Gover
ment and the items which were removed will become the property
do
the United States Government.
I
(d). Neither the Mission nor the United States Government
has the right to sell, lease, donate or pledge to a third party anythings
granted
to it in this Agreement or which has been put at its dispos:
tion at Dhahran Airfield under this Agreement.
7. The Mission is permitted to employ radio codes.
8. The Mission may construct at the expense of the United States
Government a railway spur to connect Dhahran Airfield with the
railway which passes through the city of Dhahran. This spur
be considered as soon as constructed the property of the Saudi Arabian
Government. The use of such spur during the period of this Agree
ment will be subject to a special agreement.
9. (a). The Saudi Arabian Government will accord exemption
from customs duties, taxes and all Government charges on materias
equipment and supplies necessary for the construction, maintenance
supply and operation of the Airfield, provided that the Mission wil
submit to the appropriate authorities of the Saudi Arabian Gover
ment the official bills of lading and manifests on the material, equit
ment and supplies imported for the operation and maintenance a
Dhahran Airfield.
(b). The Saudi Arabian Government accords the militar
personnel of the Mission personal exemption from customs duties a?
may be brought in for their personal use provided that such effect
will be subject to submission of official bills of lading and manifest and
Smo
1
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2203
neces
SOON
OVOM
that the applicable taxes may be collected. Civilians of United States
oven nationality who are attached to the Mission will also be accorded
rohibi exemption from customs duties, taxes and Government charges for
ilom themselves or on their personal effects which may be brought in for
) ise their personal use provided that such effects will also be subject to
Dache submission of official bills of lading and manifest and provided that
the quantities of such effects will be within reasonable limits and that
no such articles will be sold unless the appropriate authorities of the
Saudi Arabian Government are informed in order that the applicable
to the taxes may be collected.
The (c). It is understood that the Mission will inform the appro-
is 80 priate authorities of the Saudi Arabian Government of anything the
Tissia Mission may intend to sell in order that the applicable taxes may be
collected.
not re-
(d). Subject to the provisions of paragraph 6 (b) the Mission
stall may withdraw from Saudi Arabia any of those items which have been
t.. brought in after notifying the Saudi Arabian Government; if the
ch he United States has no special interest in using such items in some other
1 sue place outside Saudi Arabia, these items will be offered for sale to the
oven Saudi Arabian Government at a fair price. In case the Saudi Arabian
ertyd Government does not wish to buy these items they may then be ex-
ported free of any export charges.
nment
10. The Mission is permitted to receive its military mail and to
ything send it to and from Dhahran Airfield exempt from customs duties
isposto provided that parcel post will be in accordance with the terms of
paragraph 9 (a).
11. The members of the Mission, its personnel and employees may
State carry on any social activities on condition that they will take into
h the account the local customs and laws in effect in Saudi Arabia.
1
12. (a). The complete authority and sovereignty inside and outside
Tabiat of Dhahran Airfield is the absolute right of the Saudi Arabian Gov-
Agreernment and it will make arrangements for guarding and maintaining
the safety of the Airport.
(b). The United States Mission will assign special guards for
eriak the installations which are used by the Mission and such guards will
be responsible for
such installations under their guard inside the
12 11 Airfield.
(©). The Mission shall comply with the request of the Director
equr of the Dhahran Airport in appointing certain responsible persons
from the Mission to accompany the Saudi patrol guards to identify
members of the Mission and to cooperate during patrol duty,
litary
13: (a). All United States military personnel, members of the
sol Mission, and all civilian employees of the Mission who are United
States nationals or the nationals of other friendly states and their
fet dependents at Dhahran Airfield shall obey all applicable laws and
ton regulations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
(b). Any offense committed by any of the individuals referred
to in (a) with the exception of American military personnel will be
subject to the local jurisdiction
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
ar
aption
dance.
Verd-
ice of
which
nable
oriete
order
2204
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ua
WI
m
re
G
m
el
st
ei
Si
schools in the United States advanced technical training in airfield
to the maximum degree possible, be given consideration and priority
(c). Depending on international authority, the Saudi Arabiu) ta
Government agrees that:
ор
(i) If any member of the armed forces of the United States
commits an offense inside Dhahran Airfield he will be subject to United
States military jurisdiction,
A:
(ii) In the case of any offense committed by a member of the
armed forces of the United States outside Dhahran Airfield at !
pe
st
Khobar, Dammam, Dhahran, Ras Tanura, the beaches south of Il
Khobar to Half Moon Bay, and the roads leading to these places, the S
Saudi Arabian authorities will arrest the offender and after prompth
completing the preliminary investigation will turn such person ove it
to the Mission at Dhahran Airfield for trial and punishment under
American military jurisdiction.
th
(iii) Any offense committed by a member of the armed forca
of the United States outside the places mentioned in (i) and (ii) wil
be subject to the local jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabi, 8?
(d). Claims for compensation for damages arising out of acid
of members of the armed forces of the United States will be settled
by agreement between the appropriate Saudi Arabian authorities and
the Head of the Mission. In case no agreement is reached, settlement
will be made through diplomatic channels.
th
14. Members, personnel and employees of the Mission who are
United States nationals will be in possession of valid passports or
identification papers to be presented to the appropriate authorities
ti
upon arrival at Dhahran Airfield. All of them must obtain Saudi
it
visas from the point of departure, and if, for unavoidable reasons,
is impossible to obtain such visas, the Saudi Arabian Government will
honor competent United States Government travel orders on cond-
tion that such persons are not undesirable. If anyone arrives withou
having followed the said arrangements, he will be subject to the laws
I
and regulations of the Saudi Arabian Government.
15. The United States Government agrees to provide the Saudi
Arabian Government the following services:
(a). A military training program, the details of which will be
agreed upon in a separate agreement and whereby an American mili
tary mission will be sent to Saudi Arabia.
(b). Training in the maintenance and operation of airfields to
maximum at one time of one hundred Saudi Arabian
students selected
by the Saudi Arabian Government. The Saudi Arabian Government
will select from these students, in consultation with the Mission
twenty Saudi Arabian students to pursue at United States Air Forum
operation and maintenance, under conditions embodied in the attached
annex. Saudi Arab students of the Training Mission who have com
pleted a course of technical training in United States schools an
who have been found fully qualified in their technical specialty
, wł
.
1 See the agreement of June 27, 1953 (TIAS 2812; 4 UST 1482).
ರ
V
U
I
1
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2205
i Oy
i) w
10 Are
abia taken to increase the training and experience of these advanced grad-
uates to the degree where they will be capable of administering and
operating the international airports of Saudi Arabia. Rates of pay
States
will be on the same scale as others of equal qualifications.
Jnited
(C). In cases of emergency the United States will provide Saudi
Arabia for its state-owned aircraft at delivery cost price, aircraft
of the
parts, including engines, when such parts can be made available from
at ! stock at Dhahran Airfield. In the event that such parts cannot be
oid made available at Dhahran Airfield, the United States will assist
s, the Saudi Arabia in procuring them from commercial sources.
mpth (d). The Mission will make available, within the capabilities of
its facilities in operation at Dhahran Airfield, its weather services,
radio communications, air rescue and aircraft operation services for
the use of civilian aircraft which are authorized by the Saudi Arabian
force Government to use Dhahran Airfield.
(e). The United States Mission will provide to the best of its
rabi ability and within its capabilities at Dhahran Airfield medical treat-
facit ment and dispensary services for Saudi Arabian nationals who are
ettled employees of the United States Mission and for Saudi members and
es and
students of the United States Training Mission. In the event of
ement epidemic or infectious diseases the United States Mission will assist
the Saudi Arabian Government to the extent possible to combat the
situation.
rts or
16. Upon the termination of this Agreement, the Mission will re-
turn to the Saudi Arabian Government in sound operating condition
all fixed installations, properties and equipment of which it makes use
in the operation and maintenance of Dhahran Airfield.
17. (). The Mission is permitted to construct wells, water reser-
condi
voirs or dams to insure an ample supply of water for Dhahran Airfield.
ithout
(b). The Mission will undertake, in cooperation with the appro-
elev priate Saudi authorities, to take such steps as may be mutually agreed
upon to improve health and sanitation in areas contiguous to Ďhahran
Airfield.
18. The Mission is permitted to contract for any construction work
at Dhahran Airfield authorized by this Agreement without restriction
as to choice of contractor provided that the contracting firm or the
people working with it will not be unacceptable to the Saudi Arabian
Government. So far as may be practicable, Saudi nationals will be
given preference in employment and contracts.
19. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted or construed to
or detract in any way from the complete and absolute sov
ereignty of the Saudi Arabian Government over Dhahran Airfield,
nor does it include any authorization whatsoever which would for
any reason permit flying over, landing or conducting any aviation
operations over or near the Holy Places or over any prohibited areas.
20. This Agreement shall come into force as of this date, shall con-
tinue in force for a period of five years, and shall remain in force for
an additional period of five years thereafter unless, six months prior
to the termination of the first five year period, either party to the
brities
Saudi
ons, it
at will
Saudi
till be
1 mill-
s tos
lected
ament
infringe
SSION
,
Force
irfield
ached
Com-
s and
iority
ill be
2206
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Agreement gives to the other notice of intention to modify or term.
nate the Agreement.
17
ANNEX
ma
ea .
The following are the conditions covering the training of Saudi
Arabian students in the United States as specified in paragraph
15 (b).:
1. Transportation from Dhahran to the United States and return
will be furnished by the United States Air Force via military aircrat
at no cost to the Saudi Arabian Government. Travel within the
United States will be at the expense of the Saudi Arabian Govern-
fir
ment although the United States Air Force will render all advice and
fir
assistance to trainees.
2. Saudi students will mess at their own expense on a cost basis at
th
Officers' Messes at the established local rates.
CH
tic
3. Where quarters are available, they will be furnished on a scale
tir
equivalent to that authorized officers of the United States Air Force
.
No reimbursement will be made to the United States for this service
Where quarters are not available, the officer trainee or the Saudi
Arabian Government will make their own arrangements at no cost to
the United States Government.
4. All training will be without cost to the Saudi Arabian Govern-
ment except as herein provided. Special clothing and equipment mi
required for the prescribed training courses will be furnished for use
during the training course upon a temporary loan basis at no cost to
the Saudi Arabian Government.
5. Commissary, post exchange and similar privileges which are U
ordinarily available to officers of the United States Air Force will be
be extended to these trainees.
6. Medical care will be furnished when available on the same of
as furnished United States Air Force personnel, at no cost to the to
Saudi Arabian Government other than for subsistence."
I have been authorized to inform Your Royal Highness of my
Government's agreement to your proposal that your note and this
reply should constitute an Agreement between our two Governments lo
effective as of this date.
Please accept, your Highness, the assurances of my highest
consideration.
wwwmSwaqG
besis
W.
no
ai
t]
a
para sa
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2207
Defense Facilities in Libya
ermi
1
Veri
)
orce.
17. USE OF DEFENSE FACILITIES IN AGREED AREAS IN
LIBYA: Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding Between
Saudi
the United States and Libya, September 9, 1954
Tapi
PREAMBLE
ptum
'crat
The Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
1
ment of the United Kingdom of Libya, desiring to strengthen the
the
firm friendship and understanding now existing between them; con-
and firming their determination to cooperate amicably and to support
each other mutually in the international field, and to contribute to
sis at the maintenance of peace and security within the framework of the
Charter of the United Nations; and being of the opinion that coopera-
scale tion within the territory of Libya will assist in achieving these objec-
tives; have entered into the present Agreement.
VICE
.
Saudi
ARTICLE I
ist to
AGREED AREAS
(1) The Government of the United Kingdom of Libya grants per-
ment
mission to the Government of the United States of America to occupy
and use for military purposes, for the duration of the present Agree-
est to
ment and in accordance with its terms and conditions, those areas
which are presently used and occupied by the Government of the
United States of Åmerica as well as such additional areas as may
he agreed upon in writing
from time to time by the two Governments.
All areas used and occupied by the Government of the United States
bes of America pursuant to this paragraph shall hereinafter be referred
the to as "agreed areas".
(2) A particular agreed area shall cease to be considered as such
whenever the Government of the United States of America shall
this
notify the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya that it no
longer requires such area.
Vern-
I use
ant
wil
ents
chest
ARTICLE II
DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY OF AGREED AREAS
The Government of the United States of America may make
arrangements for and carry out directly or through its contractors
the installation, construction and removal of facilities within the
agreed areas to improve and adapt such areas for military purposes
and to provide for the internal security of such areas.
The authorities
TIAS 3107; 5 UST 2449. See also the memorandum of understanding of
Feb, 24, 1955, relating to jurisdictions over United States Armed Forces under
the Sept. 9, 1954 agreement (TIAS 3607; 7 UST 2051).
9
or
ot!
au
са:
are
Government of the United States of America except as otherwise
2208 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
of the Government of the United States of America will not, however
demolish any buildings existing on public lands at the time of fori
entry of the United States forces on such lands or cut or remove trestur
in any substantial number growing on such lands without the consen! TH
of the appropriate authorities of the Government of the United the
Kingdom of Libya.
ARTICLE III
ch:
CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT, VESSELS AND VEHICLES th
of
(1) The Government of the United States of America may exerce
full control over aircraft, ships and water-borne craft, and vehics
pe
pe
entering, leaving and while within the agreed areas.
(2) The Government of the United Kingdom of Libya shall arrang) Li
for such controls over aircraft, vessels and vehicles entering, leavik
and while within areas near the agreed areas as are agreed by the two of
Governments to be necessary to carry out the purposes of the prese
Agreement and ensure the security of United States forces and properts
in Libya.
ARTICLE IV
COMMUNICATION AND PIPELINE FACILITIES
The Government of the United States of America may construed K
and maintain such wire communication and pipeline facilities outsid
:
of the agreed areas as the two Governments agree are necessary to
carry out the purposes of the present Agreement.
ARTICLE V
PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES
Upon the request of the Government of the United States of
America and provided that the Government of the United Kingdom
of Libya is assured that the public and private interests in Libya wi
be duly safeguarded, the public services and facilities in Libya shal
fo
be made available as far as practicable for the use of the Government
of the United States of America and members of the United States
forces. The charges therefor shall be the same as those paid by other
users, unless otherwise agreed.
ARTICLE VI
USE OF AGREED AREAS
(1) The agreed areas shall be used and occupied exclusively by the
ernment of the United States of America will be maintained at its
expense.
(2) The two Governments, as an element in collective military
measures to maintain or restore international security, may agree !
m
in
m
sa
18
th
01
U
81
er
ht
G
el
ir
8
9
A
р
to
0
0
3
1]
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2209
wever,
3aying
at its interest in land is made available.
a joint use and occupancy of an agreed area by the two Governments,
of fire or by the United States of America and any nation with which the
e tres United Kingdom of Libya has a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.1
onsen The cost of maintenance of an agreed area which is used jointly by
Jnite the two Governments, or by the United States of America and any
other nation, shall be apportioned on the basis of usage, at rates and
charges which are mutually satisfactory to the users.
(3) The Government of the United States of America may request
the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya to permit the use
of the agreed areas for training purposes by small groups of military
kereis
personnel of countries other than the United States of America, such
ehicle
personnel to be at all times while in Libya under the United States
auspices and control. The Government of the United Kingdom of
rrang Libya is prepared to examine all such requests expeditiously on a
case by case basis and inform the Government of the United States
le te of American of its decision.
resent
operty
ARTICLE VII
ACQUISITION OF LAND
(1) Except as otherwise agreed by the two Governments in accord-
ance with paragraph (2) of this Article, the Government of the United
Struc Kingdom of Libya will make all acquisitions of land and other arrange-
ments required to permit occupation and use of lands and interests
ary | in lands for the purposes of the present Agreement. The Govern-
ment of the United States of America shall not be obliged to compen-
şate any Libyan national or other person for the occupation or use of
lands in which he has an interest and which are made available to
the Government of the United States of America under the provisions
of this paragraph, but it agrees to pay to the Government of the
Kingdom of Libya on behalf of such national or person annu-
ally an equitable rental for such occupation or use. The two Gov-
ernments agree that once the equitable annual rental for such lands
has been determined, the amount of that rental shall not be changed
for the duration of the present Agreement without the consent of both
(2) Subject to agreement between the two Governments, the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America may rent lands or any interest
in or relating to lands directly from private owners or make other
arrangements with private owners as required to permit occupation
and use of agreed areas in accordance with the provisions of the present
Agreement. If satisfied that there is unreasonable refusal by a
private owner, after he has received an offer of equitable compensation,
to make available land or an interest in land necessary for the purpose
rest of the present Agreement, the Government of the United
Kingdom
God of Libya will take the necessary steps to ensure that such land or
utside
United
tes
of
gdon
& W
wil
ament
Governments.
States
other
litary
Libya has Treaties of Friendship and Alliance with the United Kingdom
signed
at Benghazi, July
29, 1953), France (signed at Tripoli, Aug. 10, 1955), and
Italy (signed at Tripoli, Jan. 23, 1956).
ee to
415900~57---Pol. 236
2210
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
reaso
wear
entral
(3) Subject to such conditions (including conditions governing
ment of the United Kingdom of Libya to foreign aircraft in general,
agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments domn *
United States public aircraft may use airports and other aviation dition
(4) In the exercise of the privileges described in this Article al
(3) The rentals paid by the Government of the United States of
America on the date of the entry into force of this Agreement for the State
occupation and use of lands and interests in lands within the agreri
(5)
areas shall be deemed to be the equitable rentals payable for such
princ
occupation or use.
(4) Lands or interests in lands occupied or used by the Government status
of the United States of America under the provisions of this Artide
shall be regarded as agreed areas for the purposes of the present
Agreement.
(5) Compensation to private owners for damage arising out of the
occupation and use of property, if not otherwise paid, shall be paid by The
the Government of the United States of America under the provisions, expen
of Article XIX.
Kingo
that
ARTICLE VIII
roads
MOVEMENT OF FORCES, AIRCRAFT, VESSELS AND VEHICLES
(1) The Government of the United Kingdom of Libya grants to the
United States forces and United States public vessels, aircraft,
and
vehicles, including armor, the right of free access and egress to an
from the agreed areas and movement within and between the agreed
Wh
areas, by land, air and sea, for the purposes of the present Agreemen.
The right shall include freedom from compulsory pilotage and all the fact
charges anywhere within Libya, including territorial waters. With Derek
shal]
a view to facilitating control of harbor traffic within Libyan port ares
open to commerce, reasonable notice will be given to the appropriate
instal
port authorities of the arrival of a United States public vessel i
any such port area. The provisions of this paragraph shall not app
shall
to courtesy visits of United States Government vessels unrelate
to the present Agreement. Such visits shall be governed by customary
international practice.
(2) By agreement between the two Governments, United Stati Unite
forces and United States public vessels, aircraft and vehicles
, including prester
armor, shall have freedom of movement in other districts of Libya' prope
including the territorial waters, in order to carry out the purposes
the present Agreement.
of
. Am
ities of the two Governments, United States public aircraft mey
over any of the territory of Libya, including territorial waters
. Unite
States public aircraft
shall not fly over areas prohibited by the Govern
except as may be agreed. In an emergency United States pabai
aircraft may land on and take off from any of the territory of Libro The
including territorial waters, and, under such conditions as may
facilities outside the agreed areas.
Excep
presei
any r
Unite
the p
cease
Amer
to tur
Gove
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2211
ment status.
of America for such property.
cion dition in which they were at the time of their occupation by the
Government of the United States of America.
es el reasonable precautions will be taken by the Government of the United
r the States of America to avoid damage to public facilities.
reed (5) The Government of the United States of America accepts the
sud principle that military members of the United States forces should
wear civilian clothes when in Benghazi and Tripoli in an off-duty
sticle
ARTICLE IX
?sen
ACCESS FACILITIES
f the
d by The Government of the United States of America may, at its own
310 expense, and in agreement with the Government of the United
Kingdom of Libya, and without the right to claim compensation from
that Government at any time, construct and maintain necessary
roads and bridges, and improve and deepen harbors, channels,
entrances and anchorages, affording access to the agreed areas.
) the
ARTICLE X
and
Sud
VACATING AGREED AREAS
Teed
When the Government of the United States of America permanently
jent
pacates an agreed area, permanent constructions thereon shall not
With
be removed and the Government of the United States of America
ress
shall not be entitled to any compensation for such constructions.
riata
Except as provided in the preceding sentence, all property constructed,
el in installed, brought into or procured in Libya under or prior to the
pply
present Agreement by the Government of the United States of America
ated shall remain its property and may be removed from Libya, free of
nary
any restrictions, or disposed of in Libya by the Government of the
United States of America as agreed with the Government of the
atas
United Kingdom of Libya, at any time before the termination of the
ding present Agreement or within a reasonable time thereafter. Any such
bral property not so removed or so disposed of before the termination of
the present Agreement or within a reasonable time thereafter will
cease to be the property of the Government of the United States of
ning
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya shall
not be obligated to compensate the Government of the United States
ARTICLE XI
CONDITION OF AGREED AREAS UPON RELEASE
The Government of the United States of America is not obligated
to turn over the agreed areas to the Government of the United King-
dom of Libya at the expiration of the present Agreement in the con-
รูป
es of
hot
for
ited
EIN
ral
blir
oyd
2212
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
of me
ment:
I
of Libya when any survey is to be made. outside the agreed areas,
maintain and operate United States post offices in the agreed areas
for domestic use between United States post offices in the agreed
1 Libya was admitted to membership in the United Nations, Dec. 14, 1955
ARTICLE XII
Such
agenc
OTHER OBLIGATIONS
the
State
The present Agreement is made in accordance with the principles
Gove
laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and nothing in the
Agreement shall be construed to conflict with the obligations assumed
by the United States of America under that Charter, which obligation
the United Kingdom of Libya also accepts pending its admission to
the United Nations. Further, the two Governments declare that
nothing in the present Agreement conflicts with or prejudices or is (1)
intended to conflict with or prejudice international obligation into
assumed by either Government under any other existing internatione carry
agreements, conventions or treaties, including, in the case of the (3)
United Kingdom of Libya, the Covenant of the League of Arab shall
States.?
ARTICLE XIII
forces
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
cards
filed
The Government of the United Kingdom of Libya authorizes the
and
Government of the United States of America to employ and supervise the
military and civilian personnel as required in connection with opar
(3)
ations under the present Agreement.
regist
ARTICLE XIV
beha
SURVEYS
such
The Government of the United States of America may make | Liby
engineering, topographic, hydrographic, coast and geodetic, and other be fu
technical surveys (including aerial photographs) in any part of Libyal State
and the waters adjacent thereto. The Government of the United
States of America shall notify the Government of the United Kingdom
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya may,
desired, designate an official representative to be present when app
survey is made outside the agreed areas. A sufficient number of copia men
with title and triangulation and other control data of any
survey shall be furnished to the Government of the United Kingdom
of Libya.
ARTICLE XV
the i
Post OFFICES
The Government of the United States of America may
areas and between such post offices and other United States post offices
ager
2 Supra, pp. 1243–1249.
mem
State
into
alter
if so
Gove
ment
such
bim
him
of Li
(5
cond
of the
establist
soon
T
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2213
Such post offices shall be for the exclusive use of the authorities,
agencies and offices of the Government of the United States of America
the members of the United States forces and nationals of the United
States of America holding an official position in Libya with the
Government of the United States of America.
iples
ARTICLE XVI
med
IONS
n to
that
IB
per
ENTRY AND DEPARTURE OF UNITED STATES FORCES
(1) The Government of the United States of America may bring
ion into Libya members of the United States forces in connection with
o carrying out the purposes of the present Agreement. .
the (2) The laws of the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya
shall not apply to prevent admission or departure into or from Libya
of members of the United States forces. Passport and visa require-
ments shall not be applicable to military members of United States
forces
, but they shall be furnished with appropriate identification
cards or tags and samples of such identification cards or tags shall be
filed with the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya. Passport
the
and visa requirements shall be applicable to non-military members of
VIe the United States forces.
(3) The Government of the United Kingdom of Libya shall exempt
members of the United States forces from any laws providing for the
registration and control of aliens. The Government of the United
States of America shall take every step open to it to ensure the correct
behavior of all members of the United States forces and will provide
such information as the Government of the United Kingdom of
akel Libya may require about the civilian members, as may appropriately
her be furnished, bearing in mind
their status as members of the United
(4) If the status of any member of the United States forces brought
into Libya by the Government of the United States of America is
so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the
Government of the United States of
America shall notify the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Libya and shall, unless the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Libya permits him to remain, remove
him from Libya as soon as possible, and shall in the meantime prevent
him from becoming a public responsibility of the United Kingdom
(5) If the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya requests
the removal of any member of the United States forces whose mis-
conduct renders
his presence in Libya undesirable, the Government
of the United States of America shall remove him from Libya as
States forces.
ted
중 ​2
altered
rav
SO
3105
ch
OD
of Libya.
sh
,
soon as possible.
8S
ed
ARTICLE XVII
2015
AGENCIES OF UNITED STATES FORCES
The Government of the United States of America may establish
Agencies in the agreed areas, including concessions such as sales
2214
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
exert
United States armed services, including those who are nationals d'
or ordinarily resident in Libya, in connection with operations under
commissaries, military service exchanges, messes and social club (4
for the exclusive use of members of the United States forces and force
nationals of the United States having comparable privileges; and such
agencies shall be free of all licenses, fees, excise, sales or other tare
or imposts. The merchandise or services sold or dispensed by sum
Government agencies shall be free of all taxes, duties, imposts and
inspection by the Government of the United Kingdom of Libra
(1
Administrative measures shall be taken by United States military
authorities to prevent the resale of goods which are sold under the
cipli
provisions of this Article to persons not entitled to buy goods at such
Stat
agencies, and generally to prevent abuse of the privileges granted
follo
under this Article. There shall be cooperation between such autho-
ities and the appropriate authorities of the Government of the Unitel
Kingdom of Libya to this end.
ARTICLE XVIII
HEALTH AND SANITATION
The appropriate authorities of the two Governments will cooperate
in making arrangements in the interest of sanitation and health
Any measures in the interests of sanitation or health which are
required to be taken in the agreed areas to meet acceptable inter and
national standards will be the responsibility of the Government of dicti
imm
the United States of America.
(2
the
ARTICLE XIX
exer
Liby
CLAIMS AND JURISDICTION IN CIVIL MATTERS
Unit
(1) The Government of the United States of America
Unit
pay just and reasonable compensation for valid claims of the Govern- imp
ment of the United Kingdom of Libya for damage, loss or destruction cipli
of its property caused by military members of the United States (2
forces who are in Libya under the terms of the present Agreement," in ti
by civilian employees of the
United States armed services, including bers
those who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in Libya, in conne!
tion with operations under the present Agreement.
(2) The Government of the United States of America agrees
Stat
pay just and reasonable compensation for valid claims of person auth
who are nationals of Libya, or inhabitants of that country, for damage the
loss or destruction of property, or for injury or death, caused der
military members of United States forces who are in Libya unde for i
the terms of the present Agreement or by civilian employees of the
(4
in t
in th
of
the present Agreement.
hen
(3) All such claims will be processed and paid in accordance with
the applicable provisions of United States law, and the courts
Libya will not entertain any such claims against members of the
United States forces.
agrees
to
ProF
Uni
to
Stat
of
Over
wit!
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2215
Ganes
crate
are
of witnesses at the trial and the seizure and, in proper cases, the
club (4) In all other civil cases involving members of the United States
ad forces the Libyan courts will have jurisdiction.
such
ARTICLE XX
such
and
JURISDICTION—CRIMINAL MATTERS
ibra
.
(1) The United States military authorities shall have the right to
itary
the
exercise within the United Kingdom of Libya all criminal and dis-
such
ciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the laws of the United
States of America over members of the United States forces in the
nted
chor
following cases, namely:
nited
(a) Offenses solely against the property of the Government of
the United States of America, or against the person or prop-
erty of another member of the United States forces,
(b) Offenses committed solely within the agreed areas,
(c) Offenses solely against the security of the United States of
America, including treason, sabotage, espionage or violation
of any law relating to official secrets, or secrets relating
to the national defense of the United States of America,
alth
.
(d) Offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the
performance of official duty,
ater and in every such case where such criminal and disciplinary juris-
td diction exists, the members of the United States forces shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the Libyan courts.
(2) In other cases the Libyan courts shall exercise jurisdiction unless
the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya waives its right to
exercise jurisdiction. The Government of the United Kingdom of
Libya will give sympathetic consideration to any request from the
United States authorities for a waiver of its right in cases where the
United States authorities consider such waiver to be of particular
e importance, or where suitable punishment can be applied by dis-
tion
ciplinary action without recourse to a court.
(3) The United States and Libyan authorities will assist each other
in the arrest and handing over to the appropriate authority of mem-
bers of the United States forces for trial in accordance with the above
De provisions, and the Libyan authorities will immediately notify the
United States authorities if they arrest any member of the United
2016 authorities request the release on remand of 'an arrested member of
The Libyan authorities will, if the United States
the United States forces, release him from their
custody on the United
| States authorities undertaking to present him to the Libyan courts
for investigatory proceedings and trial when required.
the
(4) The United States and Libyan authorities will assist
each other
in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses, and
in the collection and production of evidence, including the attendance
over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return
them within the time specified by the authority delivering them.
ates
sto States forces.
700.
-611
•
der
ith
2216
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
autho
are n
to me
of the United States forces may be serving shall have paramount
1 cases, the Libyan police with whom members
(5) Whenever a member of the United States forces is prosecuted in
a Libyan court he shall be entitled:
(a) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law in a trial in which he has had the guarantees necessary
for his defense,
(b) to a prompt and speedy public trial,
(c) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge x Th
charges made against him,
honoi
(d) to refuse to testify against himself,
Gove
e) to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
(f) to be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses, mits
(g) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
perm
favor, if they are within the jurisdiction of the Libyan courts, drivi
(h) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defers Amer
or to have free or assisted legal representation under the what
conditions prevailing for the time being in Libya,
perm
(i) to have his legal representatives present during all stages o
proceedings against him,
(j) to have, if he considers it necessary, the services of a com-
petent interpreter,
(k) to communicate with the United States authorities and to Mi
have a representative of those authorities present at his and
trial, and
(1) to such other rights as are guaranteed under the constitution
and laws of the United Kingdom of Libya to persons on trial
in those courts.
(6) The Libyan authorities will notify the United States authorities
(1)
of the result of any trial in a Libyan court of a member of the United
States forces.
075 Witnesses who are alleged to have committed perjury or cop unde
tempt of court in proceedings before the United States service beni
locali
bunals or authorities and who are not subject to the law administered
by those tribunals and authorities will be turned over to the Libyan
authorities. Provision will be made by the laws of Libya for the trial
the
and punishment of such offenders.
avoi
(8) The Government of the United States of America will have the
right to police the agreed areas and to maintain order therein and
Kin
may arrest therein any alleged offenders and, when they are
by the Libyan courts, will forthwith turn them over to the Libyan purs
authorities for trial.
the
(9) Outside the agreed areas, members of the United States forces
may be employed on police duties by arrangement with the appro
priate Libyan authorities. The Libyan authorities shall be primarily
pref
responsible for the protection of cables carrying light, power or com
munications to any of the agreed areas, whether such cables are
the ene
property of the Government of the Ủnited States of America of
otherwise, but they may make arrangements with the United States
authorities for the employment of members of the United States forces
(
neces
and
Ame
econ
triable
Stat
Gov
part
and
laid
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2217
SATT
e or
S 01
omi-
Government of the United States of America and its contractors to
edi authority with respect to the persons and property of persons who
are nationals of or ordinarily resident in Libya.
g to
ARTICLE XXI
DRIVING PERMITS
The Government of the United Kingdom of Libya either shall
honor, without driving test or fee, driving permits issued by the
Government of the United States of America or a subdivision thereof
to members of the United States forces; or issue its own driving per-
.mits without test or fee to such persons who hold such United States
his permits. Members of the United States forces who do not hold
arts
, driving permits issued by the Government of the United States of
ex America or a subdivision thereof shall be required to comply with
the
whatever regulations Libya may establish with regard to driving
permits.
ARTICLE XXII
PossESSION AND CARRIAGE OF ARMS
I to Military members of the United States forces in Libya may possess
hs and carry arms as required in the performance of official duties.
tion
ARTICLE XXIII
-ria
]
LOCAL PURCHASES AND EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL LABOR
ties
ted (1) Members of the United States forces may purchase locally goods
necessary for their own consumption and such services as they need
under the same conditions as Libyan nationals.
tri
(2) The Government of the United States of America may purchase
med locally goods required for the subsistence of the United States forces
and it shall be the policy of the Government of the United States of
America to purchase such goods locally if they are available and of
the standard required by United States authorities. In order to
the avoid any such purchases having an adverse effect on the Libyan
nd economy, the appropriate authorities of the Government of the United
ble
Kingdom of Libya will indicate, when necessary, any articles the
purchase of which should be restricted or forbidden.
(3) The Government of the United Kingdom of Libya consents to
the employment of Libyan civilians by the Government of the United
States of America, or its contractors, and it shall be the policy of the
ily
and qualified to do the work involved. The conditions of employ-
ment for Libyan nationals and persons normally resident in Libya,
particularly in respect to wages, supplementary payments, insurance,
and conditions for the protection of workers, shall be generally those
01-
r18
]
90
ves
TO
illa
he
OL
nes
CAS
laid down by Libyan law.
IS
ni
2218
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
United States forces from the payment of any license fees impose
the laws of the United Kingdom of Libya in respect of private motar
(4) Upon the request of the appropriate authorities of the Govem
ment of the United Kingdom of Libya, the United States militar
authorities will withhold and pay over to the Government of the
United Kingdom of Libya all income tax or other deductions from the
wages of persons other than members of the United States forces em
(1)
ployed by the Government of the United States of America, who may ties o
by Libyan law be subject to such tax or deductions in the same manne right
and to the same extent as any other employer.
ARTICLE XXIV
Taxes, DUTIES, ETC.
(1) The temporary presence in Libya of a member of the United
States forces shall constitute neither residence nor domicile therein and
shall not of itself subject him to taxation in Libya, either on his income
or on his property the presence of which in Libya is due to his tem-
porary presence there, nor, in the event of his death, shall it subject bis
estate to a levy of death duties. Land and permanent structures there
on located in Libya which are purchased by a member of the United
States forces shall be subject to the laws of the United Kingdom of
Libya as to taxation.
(2) No national of the United States of America or corporation
organized under the laws of the United States of America, resident i
(2)
the United States of America, shall be liable to pay the Government of
Artic
the United Kingdom of Libya any tax in respect of any income derived
laws
under a contract with the Government of the United States of America
(3)
in connection with operations under the present Agreement. The
(1)
provisions of this paragraph shall not, however, apply to any such
national or corporation engaged in business in Libya otherwise then
under such a contract with the Government of the United States all perso
America.
(3) No tax, duty or other charge of any nature shall be levied or
assessed on material
, equipment, supplies
or goods brought into Libre of A
or procured in Libya by United States authorities for the use of the
of ar
Government of the United States of America or its agents or for the
the
use of persons present in Libya only in connection with
under the present Agreement.
(4) Members of the United States forces may at the time of the forc
first arrival in Libya or at the time of the first arrival of any of their
dependents to join them, import into Libya free of customs duty
their personal effects and household goods
and their private moter
vehicles for personal use.
pria
.
(5) The provisions of this Article shall not exempt members of the
side the agreed areas and any registration or license fee imposed under
purp
in ac
impc
Unit
operations
gOVE
area
meni
into
mer
are
sale
а.
cars.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2219
vern
itari
1 and
Ome
lere
no
ARTICLE XXV
f the
CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS
in the
300 (1) The laws and regulations administered by the customs authori-
merties of the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya, including the
immer right to inspect and seize, shall have no application to:
(a) Service and construction material, equipment, supplies, pro-
visions and other goods, brought into Libya by the Govern-
ment of the United States of America or its contractors in con-
nection with operations under the present Agreement for the
exclusive use of the United States forces.
nited (b) Personal effects, household goods, including privately owned
automobiles and furniture, and other goods brought into
Libya by the authorities of the Government of the United
tem
States of America directly or through the customary civil
this channels of Libya for the personal use of members of the
United States forces at the time of their first arrival in Libya
Lited or at the time of the first arrival of any of their dependents to
join them.
(c) Official documents under seal.
tion (d) Mail sent to and from the United States post offices estab-
lished pursuant to Article XV.
(2) Property falling within the provisions of Paragraph (1) of this
ired
be exported from Libya, without regard to the customs
rich
laws and regulations of the United Kingdom of Libya.
The
(3) Property brought into Libya under the provisions of Paragraph
(1) of this Article may not be disposed of in Libya except for the
hal purposes of operations under the present Agreement, or, to any
so person or corporation having the right to bring property into Libya
In accordance with Paragraph (1) of this Article, or, under conditions
lor imposed by the appropriate authorities of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Libya. The Government of the United States
of America may, however, dispose of such property to the government
any nation entitled to make use of agreed areas in accordance with
the provisions of the present Agreement or to the personnel of such
government engaged in activities connected with such use of an agreed
area
. The United States military authorities will prescribe and en-
force regulations designed to prevent the sale or supply to individual
members of the United States forces of quantities of goods imported
into Libya free of charge
which would be in excess of personal require-
ments of such personnel and which in consultation with the appro-
priate authorities of the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya,
are determined to be most likely to become items of gift, barter or
at
Article
may be
such
the
Ons
Tel
ell
at
101
ed
sale in the free market in Libya.
der
0
2220
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
OCCU
ma 11
recr
services of the United States of America and accompanying civilian
are not nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in Libya; and who are i
ARTICLE XXVI
thet
Agre
USE OF CURRENCY
"
(1) The United States authorities will take the necessary measures
(incl
tion
in cooperation with the appropriate Libyan authorities to safeguard
Libyan foreign exchange legislation or regulations.
and
(2) With respect to the acquisition of Libyan currency, the Unite cove
States forces will have the authority to purchase local currency with
United States dollars at the most favorable rate from authorized
undo
"]
banking facilities and institutions, provided that Libyan currens
now available or which may become available to the Government des p
the United States of America may be used by the Government of the
United States of America for such purposes as it desires.
incli
(3) The United States authorities may import, export, possess and
forc
use United States currency, the currency of any third state, and in
Ame
struments or scrip expressed in United States currency.
und
(4) The United States authorities may pay the United States forces
Gov
in instruments expressed in United States currency, or scrip denomi-
aut)
nated in units of United States currency, or in Libyan currency, ori
with
United States currency, provided that payment in United States cu-
rency shall take place after consultation between the appropriste
med
authorities of the two Governments. The United States authorities
belo
will take appropriate measures to assure that the use of scrip denom
ореї
nated in units of United States currency is restricted to internal trans-
Uni
actions within installations and areas in use by the United States
forces.
ARTICLE XXVII
COMPLIANCE
The Government of the United States of America shall take the to
necessary measures to prevent abuse of the privileges granted by the
Government of the United Kingdom of Libya under the present the
Agreement.
the
the
ARTICLE XXVIII
DEFINITIONS
In the present Agreement the following expressions have the mear
ings hereby respectively assigned to them:
The two Governments" means the Government of the United
Kingdom of Libya and the Government of the United States of reco
America.
"The Government of the United Kingdom of Libya” means
federal Government of the United Kingdom of Libya.
"United States forces” includes personnel belonging to the armes
TL
19
cluding the dependents of such military and civilian personnel),
Com
the
no
of.
reti
tW
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2221
SUNA
'encr
nt of
the territory of Libya in connection with operations under the present
Agreement.
"Agreed areas” means those areas and their component parts
(including land, buildings, structures, water, stone and other construc-
tion materials, and things other than minerals, including petroleum,
wand
and archeological remains which are on, in, or over land and land
covered by water) which the two Governments shall agree may be
nited
with occupied and used by the Government of the United States of America
under the terms and conditions of the present Agreement.
rized
"Military purposes" means, within the agreed areas and elsewhere
as provided in the present Agreement, the installation, construction,
f the maintenance, use and operation of military equipment and facilities,
including facilities for the training, accommodation, hospitalization,
god recreation, education, and welfare of members of the United States
di forces; and the operations of the Government of the United States of
America and its contractors and of authorized service organizations
under the present Agreement; and the storage of the property of the
Government of the United States of America and its contractors and of
authorized service organizations which are in Libya in connection
with the operations under the present Agreement.
"United States public vessel” and “United States public aircraft”
ities
mean yessels (including waterborne craft of all kinds) and aircraft
belonging to the Government of the United States of America or
operating under charter, contract or otherwise for the purposes of the
United States armed services.
DICA
ODU
Or 11
cur
riate
omi.
ans
cates
ARTICLE XXIX
the
DISPUTES
Matters relating to the interpretation of the present Agreement and
to the settlement of disputes arising therefrom shall be examined in
common by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. In
the event it is not possible for such authorities to reach agreement,
the two Governments will consider the practicability of submitting
the dispute to an independent third person or body.
sent
ARTICLE XXX
2011
ited
1
the
RATIFICATION AND DURATION
The present Agreement shall come into force upon the date of
receipt by the Government of the United States of America of a
notification from the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya
of its ratification of the present Agreement and without having any
retroactive effect shall replace the existing arrangements between the
two Governments on the matters covered in the present Agreement.
The present Agreement shall continue in force until December 24,
1970 and after that date shall continue in force until either of the two
nel
181
1.
zho
- A
Oct. 30, 1954.
2222
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Government of the United Kingdom of Libya should prohibit
are 1
Paragraph (1). In the event that the customs regulations of the Dec.
Governments gives to the other notice of termination, in which event, refur
the Agreement shall cease to be effective one year after the dated the
receipt of such notice.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned duly authorized representa dutie
tives of the Government of the United States of America and the State
Government of the United Kingdom of Libya have signed the present supp
Agreement.
Unit
Done in duplicate at Benghazi in the English and Arabic language
Artic
both texts being equally authentic, the ninth day of September 1964
TI
Gove
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING puls
term
With respect to the "Agreement between the Government of the of th
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdon that
of Libya" signed at Benghazi on September 9, 1954, hereinsite take
referred to as "the Agreement”, the Government of the Unital cords
States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom da de
Libya have reached the following understandings concerning certai purs
provisions of the Agreement.
Do
both
Article IV
The two Governments agree that the facilities referred to in Artich
IV of the Agreement will be constructed and maintained solely at the
expense of the Government of the United States of America when such
facilities are to be constructed for the sole use of the United States of
America.
Article VII
The two Governments agree that nothing in Article VII of the
18.
Agreement shall be construed to authorize the Government of the
TE
United States of America to purchase land in Libya.
В!
Article XIV
The two Governments agree that copies of surveys will be furnished
the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya without cost. To Nort
D
two Governments further agree that areas formally established by
the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya as prohibitel mit
areas will not be surveyed without the specific consent of the Gover H:
ment of the United Kingdom of Libya.
H
Article XVIII
terri
The two Governments agree that the agreement of the Government
of the United Kingdom of Libya to the text of Article XVIII of the
Agreement does not of itself obligate that Government to the er
penditure of funds in connection with the implementation thered. Den
Article XXV
TH
muti
IT
2
the c
F
4
ment
Cmd
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2223
t
territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth in Part A of
1 TIAS 1598; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1218.
? Libya became a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
reot. Dec. 14, 1955.
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
4 British Treaty Series No. 67 (1955); Cmd. 9586.
the ment, see Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, State Papers, Egypt No. 1 (1955);
even refund of customs duty already paid on goods acquired in Libya by
ated the Government of the United States of America or by persons who
are themselves exempt from the obligation to payment of customs
sent duties on goods they import into Libya, the Government of the United
d the States of America will not request such refunds on its own behalf or
resen support such requests made by its contractors or by members of the
United States forces in Libya.
Taga Article XXIX
1961
The representatives of the two Governments understand that the
Government of the United States of America has accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under the
terms set forth in a declaration deposited with the Secretary General
of th of the United Nations on August 26, 1946. They also understand
gdea that the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya may wish to
nafte take steps to become a party to the Statute of the Court 2 in ac-
Enited cordance with Article 93 of the United Nations Charter and to file
mo a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 3
rtain pursuant to Article 36 of the Statute.
Done in duplicate at Benghazi in the English and Arabic languages,
both texts being equally authentic, the ninth day of September, 1954 .
rticle 1
at the
Operation of the Suez Canal Base
f the
th 18. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
THE REPUBLIC OF EGYPT REGARDING THE SUEZ CANAL
BASE, OCTOBER 19, 1954 4
shell The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
The Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Egypt,
the Desiring to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of
bited mutual understanding and firm friendship,
Have agreed as follows:-
Article 1
Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from Egyptian
such
tes of
verns
ment,
the
* As of the end of calendar year 1955 Libya had not filed a declaration accepting
. .
2224
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-
flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft
aircraft, the Government of the Republic of Egypt shall accord
Annex I 1 within a period of twenty months from the date of signatur treatz
of the present Agreement.
other
Article 2
of Jo
servic
The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the Treaty dl Airfie
Alliance signed in London on the 26th of August, 1936, with the
Agreed Minute, Exchanged Notes, Convention concerning the in
munities and privileges enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt and
Thi
all other subsidiary agreements, is terminated.
time
Article 3
ically
expre
Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in Appendi) the fr
A to Annex II, shall be kept in efficient working order and capabled the 29
immediate use in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the
present Agreement. To this end they shall be organised in accordance
with the provisions of Annex II.
(a)
equip]
Article 4
6)
In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country upon
of the
which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party do
the Treaty of Joint Defence between
Arab League States, signed's
Cairo on the 13th of April, 1950,4 or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford
The
to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to
place the base
on a war footing and to operate it effectively. The as affe
facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits d the CI
what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.
Article 5
The
consid
In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez Canal Base
area in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, these forces shall
withdraw immediately upon the cessation of the hostilities referred to
in that Article.
a)
Article 6
In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside Power on tracti
any country
which at the date of signature of the present Agreements
a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League
or on Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between Egyptensio
and the United Kingdom.
Article 7
Seven
(6)
States
ments
©
di sig
sway
The
into f
be ex
1 Not reprinted here.
2 British Treaty Series No. 6 (1937); Cmd. 5360.
3 "Initialed," rather than "signed."
4 Supra, pp. 1249-1253.
1 Br-
INC
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2225
1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. LXXIX, pp. 18-22.
atur treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the aircraft of any
other foreign country with the exception of States parties to the Treaty
of Joint Defence between Arab League States. The landing and
servicing facilities mentioned above shall be afforded at Egyptian
ty Airfields in the Suez Canal Base area.
that
im
Article 8
The two Contracting Governments recognise that the Suez Mari-
time Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway econom-
ically, commercially and strategically of international importance; and
express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing
ends the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on
oled the 29th of October, 1888.1
f the
Article 9
(a) The United Kingdom is accorded the right to move any British
equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion.
(6) There shall be no increase above the level of supplies as agreed
untry
upon in Part C of Annex II 2 without the consent of the Government
ty to
of the Republic of Egypt.
Article 10
fford
The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be interpreted
They as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties
under
the Charter of the United Nations.
Lance
då
10
er to
ts of
shal
ed to
nts
Article 11
The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement? shall be
Bag considered as an integral part of it.
Article 12
(a) The present Agreement shall remain in force for the period of
seven years from the date of its signature.
(6) During the last twelve months of that period the two Con-
I tracting Governments shall consult together to decide on such arrange-
ments as may be necessary upon the termination of the Agreement.
C) Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any ex-
tension of the
Agreement it shall terminate seven years after the date
of signature and the Government of the United Kingdom shall take
away or dispose of their property then remaining in the Base.
Article 13
present Agreement shall have effect as though it had come
jato force
on the date of signature. Instruments of ratification shall
be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible.
ates
TIPI
ver
malt
such
The
cord
* Not reprinted here.
415900_-57---Vol. 2-37
2226
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Suez Canal Base, Initialled at Cairo, July 21, 1954 (Cmd. 9230; London, HNS
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereu C.
have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their set
Done at Cairo, this nineteenth day of October, 1954, in duplicet
,
in the English and Arabic languages, both texts being equal 20.
authentic.
19. CONCLUSION OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUEZ BAS Sta
AGREEMENT: Statement by the Secretary of State, October
14s
1954 1
isti
The signing of the final agreement between Egypt and the Unitel parc
pro
Kingdom on the Suez Base is an event of far-reaching importance in
194
an occasion for renewed congratulations to both countries.
Sta
This action, following the initialing of the agreement in principu
bet
last July, marks the successful resolution of a problem which i
existed in some form for many years. Its solution has been faciliteter med
pot
by the development of a spirit of mutual confidence between the two
countries which augurs well for their future relations.
sha
I believe that the removal of this deterrent to closer cooperatie
the
will open a new approach to peaceful relations between the Net
of
Eastern states and other nations of the free world. It is my hop
S
that this cooperation may now develop fully to the mutual advantar
util
of all concerned and will strengthen the stability and security of tt
Egypt now assumes new and fuller responsibilities as the militar
base in the Suez Canal Zone passes from British to Egyptian contre
pro
I am pleased to note that in accepting these responsibilities FAT
has reiterated in the agreement its adherence to the principle
freedom of transit through the Canal in conformity with the
convention.3
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 734.
2 See Heads of Agreement: Anglo-Egyptian Defence Negotiations regarding
1954).
3 See article 8 of the Suez Base agreement, supra.
ins
area.
195
abl
759
and
una
SUC.
ami
not
tior
SUC
pur
Tre
and
the
Loa
rese
Pu!
by
it
21
3
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2227
3 Act of Sept. 6, 1950; 64 Stat. 595-769.
ce an
ncipl
Treasury is hereby authorized and directed to purchase such notes
Brehl C. ECONOMIC AID AND DEVELOPMENT
seals
licate
quali
qual 20. AN ACT TO FURNISH EMERGENCY FOOD AID TO INDIA:
Public Law 48 (82d Congress, 2d Session), June 15, 1951 1
AN ACT To furnish emergency food aid to India
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
BAC States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited
er I as the "India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951".
Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Admin-
istrator for Economic Cooperation is authorized and directed to
United
provide emergency food relief assistance to India on credit terms as
provided in section 111 (c) (2) of the Economic Cooperation Act of
1948 2 as amended, including payment by transfer to the United
States (under such terms and in such quantities as may be agreed to
ch between the Administrator and the Government of India) of materials
itate
required by the United States as a result of deficiencies, actual or
potential, in its own resources. The Administrator is directed and
instructed that in his negotiations with the Government of India he
shall
, so far as practicable and possible, obtain for the United States
N2
the immediate and continuing transfer of substantial quantities
-hop
of such materials particularly those found to be strategic and critical.
Sec. 3. For purposes of this Act the President is authorized to
utilize not in excess of $190,000,000 during the period ending June 30,
1952, of which sum (1) not less than $100,000,000 shall be made avail-
able immediately from funds heretofore appropriated by Public Law
759, Eighty-first Congress, for expenses necessary to carry out the
EST
provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended;
and (2) $90,000,000 shall be available from any balance of such funds
unallotted and unobligated as of June 30, 1951: Provided, That if
such amount unallotted and unobligated is less than $90,000,000 an
amount equal to the difference shall be obtained from the issuance of
notes in such amount by the Administrator for the Economic Coopera-
tion Administration, who is hereby authorized and directed to issue
such notes from time to time during fiscal years 1951 and 1952 for
purchase by the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the
and, in making such purchases to use, as a public debt transaction,
the proceeds of any public debt issue pursuant
to the Second Liberty
Loan Act * as amended: And provided further, That $50,000,000
reserved by the Bureau of the Budget pursuant to section 1214 of
Public Law 759 of the Eighty-first Congress from funds appropriated
by that
Act for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the
ne ti
ratio:
antag
ilitar
entral
ple di
IN
ling A
AMS
165 Stat. 69.
Act of Apr. 3, 1948; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1299–1321.
2228
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
9S
not
act
are
cies
and
tion Act of 1948, as amended, may be used to carry out the purposes
SEC. 7. (a) Any sums payable by the Government of India, under/
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, shall not be available the
for purposes of this section.
Sta
Sec. 4. (a) Funds made available for purposes of this Act shall
be used only for the purchase of food grains or equivalents in the
United States.
spe
(b) No procurement of any agricultural product within the United
sta
States for the purpose of this Act shall be made unless the Secretary
exp
of Agriculture shall find and certify that such procurement will not Sta
impair the fulfillment of the vital needs of the United States.
(c) The assistance provided under this Act shall be for the sole
purpose of providing food grains, or equivalents, to meet the emer- for
gency need arising from the extraordinary sequence of flood, drought
,
and other conditions existing in India in 1950.
(d) The assistance provided under this Act shall be provided oth
under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, a Un
amended, applicable to and consistent with the purposes of this Act in 1
SEC. 5. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, to the
extent that the President, after consultation with appropriate Govera-
ment officials and representatives of private shipping, finds and Gift
proclaims that private shipping is not available on reasonable terms for
and conditions for transportation of supplies made available under leb
this Act, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and in
directed to make advances not to exceed in the aggregate $20,000,000 from
to the Department of Commerce, in such manner, at such times
, and
in such amounts as the President shall determine, for activation and abc
operation of vessels for such transportation, and these advances may aut
be placed in any funds or accounts available for such purposes, and
no interest shall be charged on advances made by the Treasury
by
Reconstruction Finance Corporation for these purposes: Provided
That pursuant to agreements made between the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and the Department of Commerce, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall be repaid without
interest not later than June 30, 1952, for such advances either from
funds hereafter made available to the Department of Commerce for
21.
the activation and operation of vessels or, notwithstanding the pro
visions of any other Act, from receipts from vessel operations
: Pro
vided further, That pending such repayment receipts from vesel
operations may be placed in such funds or accounts and used for
activating and operating vessels.
Sec. 6. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Adminis
12,
trator for Economic Cooperation is authorized to pay ocean freight
in
charges
from United States ports to designated
ports of entry in Indo
of relief packages and supplies under the provisions of section 117 of
of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, including the
relief packages and supplies of the American Red Cross. Funds no
or hereafter available during the period ending June 30, 1952, for
furnishing assistance under the
provisions of the Economic Coopers
of this section
to the
VO1
cer
20
Mu
COLE
Pre
and
in
1
2
8
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2229
1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, p. 566.
not
mer
ern-
commodities produced in the United States. It further authorizes the
President to enter into agreements with friendly countries for the sale
able the interest terms agreed to between the Government of the United
States and the Government of India, on or before January 1, 1957,
shall as interest on the principal of any debt incurred under this Act, and
the not to exceed a total of $5,000,000, shall, when paid, be placed in a
special deposit account in the Treasury of the United States, notwith-
ited
standing any other provisions of law, to remain available until
tary expended. This account shall be available to the Department of
State for the following uses:
(1) Studies, instruction, technical training, and other educational
sole activities in the United States and in its Territories or possessions (A)
for students, professors, other academic persons, and technicians who
ght
, are citizens of India, and (B) with the approval of appropriate agen-
cies, institutions, or organizations in India, for students, professors,
ided
other academic persons, and technicians who are citizens of the
E, as
United States to participate in similar activities in India, including
Act
.
in both cases travel expenses, tuition, subsistence and other allowances
the
and expenses incident to such activities; and
(2) The selection, purchase, and shipment of (A) American scien-
and
tific, technical, and scholarly books and books of American literature
for higher educational and research institutions of India, (B) American
nde laboratory and technical equipment for higher education and research
and
in India, and (C) the interchange of similar materials and equipment
from India for higher education and research in the United States.
(b) Funds made available in accordance with the provisions stated
above may be used to defray costs of administering the program
may | authorized herein.
the by the Division of Disbursement of the Treasury Department, upon
(©) Disbursements from the special deposit account shall be made
had
vouchers duly certified by the Secretary of State or by authorized
tion certifying officers of the Department of State.
the
Approved June 15, 1951.
for
PN-
21. EMERGENCY FOOD AID TO AFGHANISTAN: Statement by
Pro-
essel
the Department of State, March 23, 1954 1
fo
The Governments of the United States and Afghanistan on March
20 signed an agreement under which the United States will provide
12,000 tons of wheat or wheat flour to meet a threatened food shortage
in Afghanistan. The aid will be sent under section 550 of the
Mutuel Security Act of 1951, as amended, which authorizes the use
of mutual security
funds to finance the purchase of surplus agricultural
erims
and
and
and
2011
rom
inis.
ght
adis
the
NOW
far
es
arge
OSOS
in payment.
nder
* TIAS 2934; 5 UST 420.
• Infra, pp. 3085-3086.
2230
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
program.
acros
Tears
not !
have
This agreement was entered into at the request of the Government
Re
of Afghanistan, which found that the food requirements of its people
195
could not be met during the coming months without outside assistance
.
The Afghan funds received in payment for the wheat or wheat flour
will be used, as authorized by the mutual security legislation, for Fre
helping in the economic development of Afghanistan.
tumb
The Foreign Operations Administration will administer the pause
selves
Th
miles
of the
22. HIGH ASWAN DAM PROJECT: Statement by the Department
It
of State, December 17, 1955 2
very
Mr. Abdel Moneim El Kaissouni, Egyptian Minister of Finance
Fr
met yesterday with Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, J.
,
British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins and World Bank President
Eugene Black for final talks before his departure for Cairo.
wind
During their stay in Washington, Mr. Raissouni and his colleagues
YE
have been carrying on discussions with the management of the World
Bank and representatives of the United States and United Kingdom
held
Governments concerning possible assistance in the execution of the
High Aswan Dam project.
Ar
The United States and British Governments assured the Egyptian
need
Government through Mr. Kaissouni of their support in this project, histo
which would be of inestimable importance in the development of the
Egyptian economy and in the improvement of the welfare of the
ultim
Egyptian people. Such assistance would take the form of grants
from the United States and the United Kingdom toward defraying
W
foreign exchange costs of the first stages of the work. This phase
,
sugg
involving the Coffer Dam, foundations for the main dam, and auxiliary
work will take from four to five years. Further, assurance has been
given to Mr. Kaissouni that the Governments of the United States
and the United Kingdom would, subject to legislative authority
,
be
prepared to consider sympathetically in the light of then existing cut-
cumstances further support toward financing the later stages
Mr. Kaissouni plans to leave Washington for Egypt today, and it's M
understood that he will report to his Government on his talks here
Ihac
Final understandings with the British and American Governments
and the World Bank will await Mr. Kaissouni's consultation with the
Egyptian Government.
It
On Jan. 8, 1953, the Department of State and the Export-Import Bank
Washington announced an emergency loan of $1.5 million to Afghanistan for
procurement of wheat and flour from the U.S.; Department of State Buleta
.
Jan. 19, 1953, p. 103.
2 Ibid., Dec. 26, 1955, pp. 1050-1051.
come
neve
acqu
man
for
I
and
and
discu
to
little
just
incr
urge
the
11
was
with
of ar
majc
on &
750.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2231
1953 1
1
was appointed by the President in October 1953 as his personal representative
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 28, 1953, pp. 891-893.
of an improvement in the general situation of that region, having in view as a
on a regional basis. See ibid., Oct. 26, 1953, p. 553, and Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 749.-
750. Mr. Johnston's address was made over CBS radio.
23. JORDAN RIVER DEVELOPMENT: Address by the Personal
nent
uople
Representative of the President (Eric Johnston), December 1,
ince.
fiour
for
From time immemorial, the Biblical waters of the Jordan have
tumbled down the towering slopes of Mount Hermon in the Lebanon,
the paused in the Sea of Galilee, and rolled swiftly south to waste them-
selves in the salt depths of the Dead Sea.
The Jordan is a short silt-laden stream, plunging for most of its 200
miles through earth's deepest valley, a thousand feet below the level
ment of the sea.
It is one of mankind's most beloved streams. It flows through the
very heartlands of three great religions as consistently as it moves
across the barren geography that confines its downward course.
inice,
Jr.
From the banks of the Jordan, the ancient Israelites, wearied by
dent
years of wandering in the desert, first glimpsed the Promised Land.
its turgid waters, Jesus Christ was baptized by John. Along its
winding course, the Prophet Mohammed preached the word of Allah.
gues
orld
Yes, the River Jordan has enriched history and song but, unhappily,
dom not the arid lands through which it flows. These noble waters have
the
held spiritual significance for man down through the ages, but they
have given him relatively little material benefit.
tian
And because the life-giving blessings of these waters are so sorely
ject
needed by the suffering peoples who today inhabit this hallowed and
the
historic region, the President of the United States, only this October,
the
commissioned me to go there bearing a proposal-a proposal intended
ultimately to make the valley of the Jordan blossom and bloom as it
never has before.
ging
When the President first asked me to undertake this mission, I
lary
suggested in my stead other Americans who, I felt, were better
acquainted with the area and the situation there. But finally, with
many misgivings, I followed the wishes of the President and set out
for Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel.
I got no farther than Paris when word was received of new incidents
and charges which inflamed the tensions between Arabs and Israelis
soon became the subject of United Nations Security Council
My first reaction-and I must say I did not have a second one until
Thad spoken with some of the leaders in the Near East-was that what
the
little chance the mission had of succeeding in the first place was now
It was not long, however, before I realized that though such incidents
increased the difficulties of the assignment
they also made it more
Mr. Johnston
the
ants
ase.
een
ates
cir-
to
and
discussions.
tis
ere.
nts
just about gone.
of
urgent and necessary.
the
Billig
2232
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
an ex
tweer
Iti
1
I am happy to say that, in my capacity as personal representatire
of the President of the United States, I was received with the warm
quies
must
hospitality traditional to the region, and I was granted a courteous
To
and attentive hearing wherever I went.
furth
I would like to correct a general impression that developed at the
very outset. I did not go to the Near East with a plan. What I had
plans
which
in my brief case was a proposal.
To
This proposal was to urge the careful consideration of a concept, i
concept which envisioned the coordinated development of the Jordan
River watershed. I am pleased to report that, without exception, fed t
the statesmen of the affected countries are now studying that proposel
.
Now it is true that I took with me charts and tables based on studies
well-
made by a distinguished American engineering firm working under the
ment
direction of the Tennessee Valley Authority at the behest of the United
it
, bu
United Nations agency responsible for the Arab refugees from Pals lsrael
Th
tine.
pleo
The report also contained suggestions for the construction of dama
affect
and power stations without regard to national frontiers or political
a clai
boundaries.
mattt
But I did not ask or expect a "yes" or "no" answer from anyone
No
in connection with these suggestions. On the contrary, I did not
state
feel that any definite reply made before careful consideration had
devel
been given to the proposal would be in order.
It
These studies, which themselves drew on previous research, do i-
lustrate what can be done and how many material benefits can
think
showered on war victim and pioneer alike through the modern utili- effect
zation of the water resources of the Jordan basin.
It
Thanks to 20th century engineering practices and administrativo
them
coordination, it is estimated that nearly 240,000 acres of land now
its
idle and unproductive can be put into tħe richest kind of production
,
Most of this land, of little use or value to anyone now,
would yield
could
three crops a year, so that by American standards we may figure that TH
in effect the equivalent of some 720,000 acres would be put to fertile
work giving sustenance to hungry people, work to the idling, and new
wealth and revenue to the nations involved.
Ot
What is more, in the course of parallel development pron
65,000 additional kilowatts of power would be made available to furt
the wheels of societies already on the move.
The proposal holds out real promise to all parties concerned. 10
the Arab leaders of the area, it offers a way to meet their peoples
growing demands for progress and a better life.
Mass lethargy in the Arab world is fast disappearing before the
surge of new aspirations. It is a world in transition, straining at the
fetters of economic feudalism, seeking opportunities which our times
offer.
Arab leadership is conscious of this vast stirring of peoples long
IN
1 The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Regina
by Chas. T. Main, Inc. (Boston, 1953).
done
be
ne
take
Syria
their
more than
alone
wate
the
TH
mak
even
and
cont
who
SC
oftes
VO
Colo
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2233
ative
Varm
teons
TOAD
Jams
not
contested waters of the Jordan.
Colorado River even when Arizonians and Californians have not.
quiescent. It knows that social revolution has begun and that it
must lead that revolution or be swallowed up by it.
To Israel, on the other hand, the Jordan Valley development
furthers the possibilities to forge ahead with ambitious and urgent
to the
[ had
plans to wrest every possible benefit from the meager resources on
which Israel must depend.
To both the Arabs and Israelis it suggests a practical way of easing
pt, &
an explosive issue largely responsible for so much of the tension be-
tween them, the alleviation of the plight of the Arab refugees who
tion
.
fed their homes in Palestine.
osa!
I truly believe that the United Nations report will contribute to the
idies
r the
well-being of all the peoples in the Near East. I hope the develop-
nited
ment will take the form this report recommends, or something like
it
, but in my conversations with the leaders of the Arab states and
y the
Israel I made it clear that modifications would be welcomed.
ales
The main thing right now, however, is general support of the princi-
ple of development of the Jordan watershed in which each of the
itical affected states would acknowledge a responsibility as well as advance
a claim. The precise nature of the plan finally adopted is a secondary
matter so long as it is equitable, economic, and efficient.
yone
Now one might ask, is it realistic to hope that nations still in a
had state of war could be expected to participate in any coordinated
development?
01.
I think it is practical and realistic so long as the coordinating is
na be
done by some agent above reproach and beyond prejudice. I should
think that the United Nations could be trusted to do a fair and
ative It is not a prerequisite that any of the states involved commit
themselves directly or indirectly to signing an agreement with any of
its neighbors or of working with them. Each country could under-
ield
take unilateral commitments to the coordinating agency, which
that
serve as a clearing house and a catalytic agent.
This, I might add, is part of the proposal I presented to Jordan,
Syria
, Lebanon, and Israel, and it is being given consideration by
han
Other questions which could readily be raised but which can be
promptly answered are: “Why can't individual states go forward
alone with independent irrigation and power projects involving the
waters of the Jordan and its tributaries? Couldn't the benefits of
oles
'
the Jordan watershed be achieved piecemeal?”
The sad facts and frightening possibilities that stare us in the face
the make rhetorical questions out of such queries. In the first place,
even if the Arabs and the Israelis were living in neighborly harmony
and sweet bliss today, there would be sure to be a rumpus over the
Squabbles over riparian rights and water use are as common, and
often as violent, as romantic quarrels between suitors.
In our own country, Kansans and Coloradans have tiffed over the
utili-
effective job.
DOW
tion.
could
Ttile
new their leaders.
turi
TO
the
mes
who is entitled to how much.
ong
2011
men
on t
&CCE
(
plar
As things now stand, I do think that the chances for coordinated
East a few weeks ago. I don't know whether one more journey wil
settle everything, but if we continue to make progress there will be
If, as I hope, the historic waters of the Jordan bring new and green
will bless him that gives and him that takes. And they will also bless
2234 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Being a Westerner myself, I am not unmindful of the disputes in the
Snake River country.
The quarrels over water rights extend from the Rio Grande to the us 8.
Helmand in Afghanistan and Iran—and back again, and they er
usually settled only when there is some impartial authority on the
ground
24.
It would not take much imagination to envision what would happe P
in the way of sabotage and even bloodshed if the waters of the Jordan
were to remain unregulated indefinitely.
There is of course room for national water resource development
A
plans by the affected states in the Jordan basin. But to get maximum
Seci
benefit and equity while avoiding violence, these, it seems to me
should be integrated within the framework of the general Jordan
of t
watershed development program.
Gov
Having spoken of the interests and the potential advantages of the
for
Arab states and Israel in the development of the Jordan basin
, m
C
friends in the Middle East will, I know, understand if I now discus
Ara
for a moment the stake that the West has in such a program. of ti
Of course, as religious people, Americans have something more than
a passing interest in any dispute raging around the Holy Land, and
cult
.
we have some economic and political interests in the area, too.
Pro
For one thing, the American Government is spending $150 million
him
a year in this area for general economic development, and in the last :
years we have contributed $154 million in support of the Arab refuges
alone.
No one has to be on the inside in Washington these days to predict 1
that, much as we sympathize with unfortunate people, the United equ
States is not going to keep on spending that kind of money indefinitel
: prio
Certainly, we have a right to expect progress and improvement by
Surely, it is not out of order for us to urge undertakings which brigh
enable people to help themselves, just as, I am sure, they want to do affit
Americans do not want to see communism spread and we know that Joh
human misery helps it do so.
2
We want to combat misery, and we are
on the side of anyone who feels the same way and is willing to
something about it. We are not the only freedom-loving people
o div
earth, and we should not have the monopoly of combating Communist
3
imperialism.
So we do have material as well as spiritual interest in the valley al tine
the Jordan. It is a continuing interest, and for that reason I do not Jora
4
consider my mission ended. The President has asked me to return
to the lands of the Jordan as soon as their leaders have had the opp rear
portunity to study our proposal.
real reason optimism.
life to suffering people, then I think they will be thrice blessed.
IST
acce
suc!
refu
ares
5
1
2
Thes
Jord
This
the
first
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2235
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 26, 1954, p. 132.
Jordan, Egypt, and Israel regarding the development of the Jordan River Valley.
This visit followed the submission of comments by the Arab States and Israel on
first visit in November 1953 (ibid., June 14, 1954, p. 913).
in the
men of good will everywhere who would dearly love to see misery
on the run in the land that first gave life to the treasured credos of
us all-Christian, Jew, and Muslim.
to the
Fare
in the
appel
ordan
24. PRINCIPLES OF THE JORDAN RIVER DEVELOPMENT
PLAN: Statement by the Personal Representative of the President,
July 6, 1954 1
iment
imum
) me
ordan
1, mp
1
ISCUS
then
and
>
last
uges
Ambassador Eric Johnston has informed the President and the
Secretary of State that Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel have
accepted the principle of international sharing of the contested waters
of the Jordan River and are prepared to cooperate with the U.S.
Government in working out details of a mutually acceptable program
for developing the irrigation and power potentials of the river system.?
On his return from a 4-week visit to the area for discussion with
Arab and Israeli representatives, Mr. Johnston said that the attitudes
of the interested states clearly indicated a desire to evolve a workable
plan for economic development of the Jordan Valley despite the diffi-
cult political issues outstanding between Israel and the Arab countries.
million
Progress made during the negotiations just concluded has encouraged
:
him to believe that an early understanding on all aspects of such a plan
is now a possibility. Mr. Johnston stated that the plan involved
acceptance by the Arab countries and Israel of the following principles:
redict
)
1. The limited waters of the Jordan River system should be shared
Enited equitably by the four states in which they rise and flow. This
nitelt
: principle was implicit in the valley plans put forward respectively
ment by the Arab states and Israel, both of which clearly recognized the
w right of the other states to a share of the available waters. It was
code affirmed by both sides during the recent conversations with Mr.
that Johnston.
2. A neutral impartial authority should be created to supervise
to do withdrawals of water from the river system in accordance with the
de a division ultimately accepted by all parties. The precise nature of
Lunis such an authority remains to be determined.
3. Amelioration of the condition of the Arab refugees from Pales-
ey de tine should be a principal objective of the irrigation program for the
4. Broad lines of understanding as to the total program should be
e op reached at the earliest possible time, not
only in the interest of the
refugees but in the interests of economic progress and stability in the
5. Storage of irrigation waters for the valley in Lake-Tiberias (Sea
we are
o
08 Jordan Valley
etur
nated
area,
NE
771
Il be
re
This
bless
2236
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
fon
$800,000,000 $3,047, 000, OH
East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955," Part III, Department of State
partment of State International Educational Exchange Service in this area.
of Galilee) will be considered open-mindedly by all parties, when
D.
progress in developing the valley indicates the necessity of using the
lake as a principal reservoir.
R
Mr. Johnston made it clear that while the foregoing principles form
à solid basis for further negotiations, there remain a number of
specific points on which differences must be reconciled before the valla
Tri
project can be realized. All of the states concerned have requested
that the Government of the United States continue to exercise its
good offices in reconciling these outstanding differences.
26.
Ambassador Johnston's mission in the Near East began les S.
October when the President asked him to lay before the Governmenik 19
of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel a report on unified development
of the Jordan Valley prepared by an American engineering firm ! T
the request of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Stat
Refugees. On his first visit to the area, the states concerned agreed mee
to consider the suggestions contained in the UNRWA report
and
Arab countries later submitted a plan for the valley's development of tl
and Israel also put forward a plan to Mr. Johnston. These thres
plans formed the basis of the recent discussions.
1.
Isra
pose
25. TABULAR SUMMARY OF NET UNITED STATES GRANTS
defe
AND
CREDITS TO THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND
area
AFRICA, 1945-1955 1
coni
tern
Net Grants Net Credits
Cou
the
Greece
$1, 208, 000, 000 $81,000,000 $1, 289, 000, 080
2
Turkey
226, 000, 000
94, 000, 000
Iran.
147, 000, 000
54, 000, 000
Egypt
26, 000, 000
4,000,000
Israel
233, 000, 000
not
137, 000, 000
Jordan.
25, 000, 000
Liberia.
6,000,000
19,000,000
to
Unspecified (Near East and
3
Africa)
189, 000, 000 -7,000,000
Afghanistan
3,000,000 26,000,000
India
116, 000, 000 228,000,000
mai
Pakistan
142, 000, 000
15, 000, 000
Unspecified (South Asia)
19, 000, 000
Totals by Area:
Near East and Africa. $1, 967, 000, 000
$532, 000, 000 $2, 499, 000, 000
South Asia.
280,000,000
268,000,000
Near East, South Asia and
the
Africa
$2, 247, 000, 000
1 Harry N. Howard, “The Development of United States Policy in the piece
by the United States Government, September quarter, 1955.
coul
Net Total
rece
320, 000, CHE
201, 000, OH
30,000,00 to
370,000,000
25, 000, an
25, 000, 000
Sim
dee
182,000,000
29,000,00
344,000,000
157,000,000
19,000,000
орр
stat
any
line
Uni
548, 000, OH
11
stat
(sur
2
3
Auc
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2237
August 1949, pp. 20–21, 23-27, and 33–37.
2,000/ opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the
the United Nations, to prevent such violation.
statement of May 25, 1950 (ibid.) and the Secretary's address of May 31, 1950
Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 886. See also the President's
when
D. OPERATION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMISTICE
REGIME
form
er of
valley
alle Tripartite Declaration Regarding the Armistice Borders
ested
se its
26. STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED
lest
STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, MAY 25,
pents 1950 1
ment
ma
The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United
stion States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers
zreel meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace
Tus and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that
men of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved
three
to make the following statements:
1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and
Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the pur-
poses of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-
defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the
area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these
countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this
connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the
terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security
Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their
opposition to
the development of an arms race between the Arab states
and Israel.
2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been
received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms
to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does
2.0 not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state.
Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the area
to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.
3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their
deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and
maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable
states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that
any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice
United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside
NTS
AND
tal
D, ON
9, 00
0, 000
000
, 00
OW
ON
7,000
OM
,00
OM
1
Near
State
De
(supra, pp. 1432-1441).
ares,
edis
See the tripartite communiqué of May 13, 1950; supra, pp. 1458–1459.
See U.N. Security Council, oficial Records, 433rd "and 434th Meetings, 4
2238
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
27. REAFFIRMATION OF THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION:
Statement by the President, November 9, 1955 1
ence
All Americans have been following with deep concern the latest 28.
developments in the Near East. The recent outbreak of hostilities
has led to a sharp increase in tensions. These events inevitablı
retard our search for world peace. Insecurity in one region is bound
to affect the world as a whole.
II
While we continue willing to consider requests for arms needed for
legitimate self-defense, we do not intend to contribute to an arm goal
competition in the Near East because we do not think such & met we
would be in the true interest of any of the participants. The polis peop
which we believed would best promote the interests and the security Nea
of the peoples of the area was expressed in the Tripartite Declaration to t
of May 25, 1950. This still remains our policy.
for
I stated last year that our goal in the Near East as elsewhere is in e
just peace. Nothing has taken place since which invalidates our assu
fundamental policies, policies based on friendship for all of the people
of the area.
We believe that true security must be based upon a just and
reasonable settlement. The Secretary of State outlined on August
26th 4 the economic and security contributions which this country 29.
was prepared to make toward such a solution. On that occasion 1
authorized Mr. Dulles to state that, given a solution of the other
related problems, I would recommend that the United States join T
formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either disa
side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Ars the
neighbors.
'T
Řecent developments have made it all the more imperative that a haw
settlement be found. The United States will continue to play it as
full part and will support firmly the United Nations, which has has
already contributed so markedly to minimize violence in the area the
I hope that other nations of the world will cooperate in this endeavor I
har
thereby contributing significantly to world peace.
0
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 845. This statement 78
issued from the temporary White House in Denver, Colo.
2 Supra.
3 See the President's address of Oct. 20, 1954; infra.
4 Supra, pp. 2176–2180.
anc
WOT
tin
the
1
was
2
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2239
| ran
2 Ibid., Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560.
Arms Supply Policy
ION:
latert 28. PREVENTION OF LOCAL ARMS IMBALANCE: Address by
ilities
the President, October 20, 1954 (Excerpt) 1
itabli
sound
In the Near East, we are all regretfully aware that the major differ-
ed in ences between Israel and the Arab States remain unresolved. Our
arme goal there, as elsewhere, is a just peace. By friendship toward both,
we shall continue to contribute to peaceful relations among these
polis peoples. And in helping to strengthen the security of the entire
curit Near East, we shall make sure that any arms we provide are devoted
Patin to that purpose, not to creating local imbalances which could be used
for intimidation of or aggression against any neighboring nations,
e 188 In every such arrangement we make with any nation, there is ample
$ ou assurance that this distortion of purpose cannot occur.
antri 29. AVOIDANCE OF AN ARMS RACE: Statement by the Secretary
of State and the British Foreign Secretary, September 27, 1955 2
other
The United States Secretary of State and British Foreign Secretary
aithe discussed together reports relating to their arms supply policies in
They wish to state that the United States and British Governments
that have for some time been in close consultation with each other as well
as with other governments in relation to this matter and that there
his has been, and continues to be, complete harmony of views between
their two governments.
Both governments base their policies on the desire, on the one
hand, to enable the various countries to provide for internal security
and for their defense, and on the other, to avoid an arms race which
it we would inevitably increase the tensions in the area. They will con-
tinue, and hope other governments will continue, to be guided by
Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 8, 1954, p. 678. The President's address
was delivered at the American Jewish Tercentenary Dinner in New York City.
oples
and
ugust
ion)
in in
Arab the Middle East.
Jy its
area.
ayor
TO
these principles
2240
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
an
wł
2 George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian
30. SHIPMENT OF SOVIET ARMS TO ARAB COUNTRIES
Remarks by the Secretary of State at News Conference, October
4, 1955 (Excerpts) 1
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us any information you might han
As
about Mr. Allen's ? progress in talks with Nasser 3 in Cairo?
of
wł
A. He has had a very good talk, indeed two rather full talks, fruth
which I think he has gained an insight as to the Egyptian motives in as
this matter, and I think that Colonel Nasser has gained an insight
aret
to our attitude toward the matter. There is better understanding in
than there was before. I think in substance that is the result of his
ро
trip and that was the purpose of his trip.
Q. Mr. Secretary, further in that connection, could you tell us whether
our attitude toward the proposed contract arrangement has changed any
since Mr. Allen completed his talks with Colonei Nasser?
A. I had prepared a little statement which perhaps I will read to
you, because I anticipated questions on this topic.
At my press conference the last of August (August 30) * I was 31
asked about possible Soviet-bloc shipments of arms to Arab countries
,
I made two observations. The first was that the Arab countries were
independent governments and free to do whatever they wished in the
matter. My second observation was that, from the standpoint of
U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, such delivery of arms would
not contribute to relaxing tensions.
Those two observations stand today. I might add this:
NO
It is difficult to be critical of countries which, feeling themselves Ag
endangered, seek the arms which they sincerely believe they need for th
defense. On the other hand, I doubt very much that, under the col- th
ditions which prevail in the area, it is possible for any country to get
security through an arms race. Also it is not easy or pleasant to Ag
speculate on the probable motives of the Soviet-bloc leaders
.
In my talk about this matter of August 26," I spoke of the fear
which dominated the area and said that I felt that it could be dis
sipated only by collective measures designed to deter aggression by of
anyone. I proposed a security guaranty sponsored by the United
Nations. That, I said, would relieve the acute fears which both sides
now profess.
It is still my hope that such a solution may be found.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may ask one other question, there have been
reports that the United States might provide arms to Israel to balas
1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 17, 1955, p. 604.
1
CO
sta
re
>
(8
Tu
ma
91
As
&
the
Pr
and African Affairs.
3 Gamel Abdel Nasser, Prime Minister of Egypt.
4 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 12, 1955, p. 421.
5 Supra, pp. 2176-2180.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2241
• Ibid., S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, p. 10.
Tes 11
TAS
tries
.
were
the
at of
could
Ibid., S/INF/3, Feb. 1, 1950, pp. 14-15.
5 Ibid., S/INF/4, Feb. 1, 1951, pp. 14–16.
RIES:
any arms shipments from the Soviet bloc to Egypt. Can you tell us
ctober
whether this is a likely prospect or not?
A. No, I could not say whether it would be a likely prospect or not.
thay As I say, in the first place we do not know what amount or character
of arms may be involved in the Egyptian-Soviet bloc deal and to
what extent, if any, it may seriously upset the balance of power in
from the area. It has in the main been the policy of the United States,
as was set out in the joint statement which the British Foreign Sec-
ght as retary and I issued in New York last week, to avoid participating
nding in what might become an arms race, and we still hope it will be
of this possible to avoid getting into that situation.
Bether
any
Jurisdictional Disputes and Border Incidents
31. AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPER-
VISION ORGANIZATION AND OF THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI
MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION: United Nations Security
Council Resolution, May 18, 1951 2
The Security Council
Recalling its past resolutions of 15 July 1948,3 11 August 1949,4 17
November 1950 6 and 8 May 1951 6 relating to the General Armistice
elves
Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States? and to
I for the provisions contained therein concerning methods for maintaining
the armistice and resolving disputes through the mixed armistice
commissions participated in by the parties to the General Armistice
Noting the complaints of Syria and Israel to the Security Council,
fear
statements in the Council of the representatives of Syria and Israel, the
br
reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Chief
of Staff and the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce
ides
2.U.N. document S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, pp. 10–13. The draft resolution
(S/2151/Rev. 1) was introduced by the United States and cosponsored by France,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. For Ambassador Warren R. Austin's state-
ment on May 16, 1951, see Department of State Bulletin, June 4, 1951, pp. 914-
916. For background information see Report of the Security Council to the General
Assembly Covering the Period
from 16 July
1950 to 15 July 1951 (A/1873), pp. 61–67,
and United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to
the Congress for the Year 1951 (Department of State publication 4583; 1952),
pp. 114-116.
SU. N. doc. S/INF/2, July 18, 1949, pp. 50–51.
COD-
t to Agreements,
dis-
ited
Supra.
Been
tinct
sian
3
4
7
Supra, pp. 698-724.
415900-57-Vol. 2-38
2242
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
+
1
up
th
m
obligations under article V and calls upon the parties to be represented
“The question of civil administration in villages and settlements
Such civil administration, including policing,
will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of
Supervision Organization for Palestine, and statements before the
Council by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization for Palestine,
Noting that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organiza-
tion in a memorandum of 7 March 1951, and the Chairman of the
Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on a number of occasions
have requested the Israel delegation to the Mixed Armistice Com-
mission to ensure that the Palestine Land Development Company,
Limited, is instructed to cease all operations in the demilitarized Zone
until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman di
the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this project,
Noting further that article V of the General Armistice Agreement
between Israel and Syria 1 gives to the Chairman the responsibility
for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone,
Endorses the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the
Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and calls upon the Gor-
ernment of Israel to comply with them;
Declares that in order to promote the return of permanent peace in
Palestine, it is essential that the Governments of Israel and Syria
observe faithfully the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949;
Notes that under article VII, paragraph 8, of the Armistice Agree-
ment, where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of
the agreement, other than the preamble and articles I and II, is at
issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission's interpretation shall preval;
Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to bring before the
Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman, whichever has the
pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their com-
plaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom;
Considers that it is inconsistent with the objectives and intent of
the Armistice
Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the
Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of the
Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his
at all meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to
respect such requests;
Calls upon the parties to give effect to the following excerpt cited
the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization at the
542nd meeting of the Security Council on 25 April 1951, as
the summary record of the Syria-Israel Armistice Conference of 3 Jus
1949, which
was agreed to by the parties as an authoritative commer
on article V of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and
Syria:
in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework
of an Armistice Agreement, in sub-paragraphs 5, (h) and
of the draft article.
CO
ri
te
th
d
being from
0
Ic
fo
r
administration, jurisdiction, citizenship and sovereignty.
N
1 Supra, pp. 719–724.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2243
ISION
niza:
the
cons
Tom-
any,
zone
nility
e in
Mixed Armistice Commission for this purpose;
Reminds the parties of their obligations under the Charter of the
: the
"Where Israel civilians return to or remain in an Israel village
or settlement, the civil administration and policing of the village
or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians
return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab administration
and police unit will be authorized.
“As civilian life is gradually restored, administration will take
shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman
of the Mixed Armistice Commission.
"The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consulta-
in of
tion and co-operation with the local communities will be in a position
to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and
nent
protection of civilian life. He will not assume responsibility for
direct administration of the zone."
the Recalls to the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations
joy.
under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and
their commitments under the Armistice Agreement not to resort to
military force and finds that:
yra
949;
(a) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel
on 5 April 1951 and
TEC-
n of
(b) Any aggressive military action by either of the parties in or
around the demilitarized zone, which further investigation by the
rail
Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization into the reports
the and complaints recently submitted to the Council may establish,
the
constitutes a violation of the cease-fire provision provided in the Secu-
rity Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the
tal
terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under
the
the
Noting the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab resi-
dents from the demilitarized zone;
ted (a) Decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from the
demilitarized zone by the Government of Israel should be permitted
to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice
Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a
manner to be determined by the Commission; and
(b) Holds that no action involving the transfer of persons across
uls
international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarized
zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of
the Mixed Armistice Commission.
Noting with concern the refusal on a number of occasions to permit
observers and officials of the Truce Supervision Organization to enter
ork localities and areas which were subjects of complaints in order to per-
0
Dorm their legitimate
functions, considers that the parties should
permit such eutry
at all times whenever
this is required, to enable the
Truce Supervision Organization to fulfil its functions, and should
render every facility which may be requested by the Chairman of the
S at
om-
the Charter;
his
to
ted
the
om
ent
end
ats
18
2244
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
United Nations to settle their international disputes by peaceful to
means in such manner that international peace and security are not qu
endangered, and expresses its concern at the failure of the Gover
ments of Israel and Syria to acbieve progress pursuant to their commit pro
ments under the Armistice Agreement to promote the return to perme- to
nent peace in Palestine;
Directs the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to fac
take the necessary steps to give effect to this resolution for the purpose
of restoring peace in the area, and authorizes him to take such measures
to restore peace in the area and to make such representations to the
33
Governments of Israel and Syria as he may deem necessary;
Calls upon the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization
to report to the Security Council on compliance given to the present
resolution;
Requests the Secretary-General to furnish such additional personnel
and assistance as the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organiza-
Su
tion may request in carrying out the present resolution and the Coun-
ho
cil's resolutions of 8 May 1951 and 17 November 1950.
t
COI
tai
ur
32. RESPECT FOR THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE: United Na.
tions General Assembly Resolution 512 (VI), January 26, 1952'
tiy
Go
tio
int
1
C01
the
tar
E
Su
dei
The General Assembly,
Recalling all the resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the
General Assembly on the Palestine problem,
Having examined the progress report of the United Nations Con-
ciliation Commission for Palestine, 2
1. Expresses its appreciation to the Conciliation Commission for
Palestine for its efforts to assist the parties to reach agreement on their
outstanding differences;
2. Notes with regret that, as stated in paragraph 87 of the report
, the
Commission has been unable to fulfil its mandate under the resolutions
of the General Assembly;
3. Considers that the governments concerned have the primary
responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences
in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on
Palestine;
4. Urges the governments concerned to seek agreement with a vier
to an early settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity
with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine; and for this
purpose to make full use of United Nations facilities;
5. Considers that the Conciliation Commission for Palestine should
continue its efforts to secure the implementation of the resolutions of
the General Assembly on Palestine and accordingly should
be available
1 U.N. General Assembly, Oficial Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No.
(A/2119), pp. 11–12.
2 U.N. doc. A/1985.
th
am
sto
ch
in
57
on
See
29
N
tid
:
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2245
NDIQ
ures
the
1
1
2
character of the zone, and authorized him to explore conciliation possibilities.
see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, pp. 58–59, and Feb. 22, 1954, pp,
Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1958 (Department of
Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July 1953 to 15 July 1954 (A/2712), pp. 15–29.
ceful to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement on outstanding
not questions;
em- 6. Requests the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to render
mit-
progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission
to the Members of the United Nations;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and
in to facilities for carrying out the terms of the present resolution.
pose
33. ISRAELI-SYRIAN WATER DIVERSION DISPUTE: United
Nations Security Council Resolution, October 27, 1953
tion
sent
The Security Council,
anel Having taken note of the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce
1124- Supervision Organization dated 23 October 1953 (S/3122),
Desirous of facilitating the consideration of the question, without
Jun-
however prejudicing the rights, claims or position of the parties
concerned,
Deems it desirable to that end that the works started in the Demili-
tarized Zone on 2 September 1953 should be suspended during the
ONS
urgent examination of the question by the Security Council,
Na
Notes with satisfaction the statement made by the Israel representa-
tive at the 631st meeting regarding the undertaking given by his
Government to suspend the works in question during that examina-
tion,
the Requests the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to
inform it regarding the fulfilment of that undertaking. *
1 U.N. doc. S/3128, Oct. 27, 1953. The resolution was adopted following a
fo: complaint by Syria concerning Israeli activity on a hydroelectric project involving
neir
the diversion of the Jordan River at Banat Yaacov in the Syrian-İsraeli demili-
the
The report stated, among other things, that the Chief of Staff of the Truce
Supervision Organization had informed Israel on Sept. 23, that the work in the
demilitarized zone should cease "so long as an agreement is not arranged."
• U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 631st Meeting, Oct. 27, 1953, p. 5.
IT
* The Security Council continued to consider this question. In December 1953,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France sponsored
a resolution which,
among other things, supported the Chief of Staff in his decision with regard to
stopping the diversion project, called upon him to maintain the demilitarized
not the decision of the Chief of Staff was the basis for permitting any undertaking
ity in the
demilitarized zone, and vetoed the resolution on Jan. 22, 1984. It was its
57th veto. For statemerts by the U.S. Representatives
in the Security Council
on Dec. 16 and 21, 1953, and Jan. 21, 1954, in connection with the draft resolution,
old
of
ble
tion 5769; 1955), pp. 73-74; and Report of the Security Council to the General
1
on-
tarized zone.
JUS
cas
on
ET
his
20
2246
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
34. THE QIBYA (ISRAEL-JORDAN) INCIDENT: United Nations
Security Council Resolution, November 24, 1953
1
to
0
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions on the Palestine question partie-
ularly those of 15 July 1948,2 11 August 1949,3 and 18 May 1951
concerning methods for maintaining the armistice and resolving
disputes through the Mixed Armistice Commissions,
Noting the reports of 27 October 1953 and 9 November 1953 to the
Security Council by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization and the statements to the Security Council
by the representatives of Jordan and Israel,
th
ar
of
PO
tc
re
a1
re
A
al
of
G
3!
Finds that the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by armed forces of
Israel on 14-15 October 1953 and all such actions constitute a violation
of the ceasefire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15 July
1948 and are inconsistent with the parties' obligations under the
General Armistice Agreements and the Charter;
Expresses the strongest censure of that action, which can only
prejudice the chances of that peaceful settlement which both parties,
in accordance with the Charter, are bound to seek, and calls upon
Israel to take effective measures to prevent all such actions in the
future;
T
N
B
V
8
0
Takes note of the fact that there is substantial evidence of crossing
of the demarcation line by unauthorized persons, often resulting in
acts of violence, and requests the Government of Jordan to continue
and strengthen the measures which it is already taking to prevent
such crossings;
Recalls to the Governments of Israel and Jordan their obligations
under Security Council resolutions and the General Armistice Agree-
ment to prevent all acts of violence on either side of the demarcation
line:
Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Jordan to ensure the
effective co-operation of local security forces;
az
S
a
C
a
ti
t
d
F
F
Reaffirms that it is essential, in order to achieve progress by peace
ful means towards a lasting settlement of the issues outstanding
between them, that the
parties abide by their obligations under the
General Armistice Agreement and the resolutions of the Security
Council;
N
b
1 U.N. doc. S/INF/8, Nov. 24, 1953, pp. 8–9.
• S/INF/2, July 18, 1949. pp. 50–51.
3 S/INF/3, Feb. 1, 1950, pp. 14-15.
4 See supra, doc. 31.
5 Agreement of Apr. 3, 1949; supra, pp. 712–718.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2247
1
only
Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the
Covering the Period from 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955 (A/2935), pp. 8-10.
4S/INF/3, Feb. 1, 1950, pp. 14–15.
5 S/INF/4, Feb. 1, 1951, pp. 14–16.
tions
Emphasizes the obligation of the Governments of Israel and Jordan
to co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision
Organization;
Requests the Secretary-General to consider, with the Chief of Staff,
irtie-
the best ways of strengthening the Truce Supervision Organization
9514
and to furnish such additional personnel and assistance as the Chief
ving of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization may require for the
performance of his duties;
i the
Requests the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization
ruce to report within three months to the Security Council with such
indi
recommendations as he may consider appropriate on compliance with
and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreements, with particular
reference to the provisions of this resolution and taking into account
any agreement reached in pursuance of the request by the Government
25 of
of Israel for the convocation of a conference under article XII of the
tion General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan.
July
the
35. ISRAELI ATTACKS IN THE GAZA STRIP: United Nations
Security Council Resolution, March 29, 19552
ties
,
POD
the
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions of 15 July 1948,8 11 August 1949, 17
November 1950,5 18 May 1951 6 and 25 (24) November 1953; 7
Having heard the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Super-
sing vision Organization and statements by the Representatives of Egypt
g in
and Israel;
Noting that the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission on 6
March 1955 determined that a "prearranged and planned attack
ordered by Israeli authorities” was "committed by Israeli regular
army forces against the Egyptian regular army force" in the Gaza
Strip on February 28th, 1955;
1 The Department of State issued a statement on Oct. 18, 1953, expressing its
"deepest sympathy for the families of those who lost their lives in the Qibya
attack as well as the conviction that those responsible "should be brought to
account and that effective measures should be taken to prevent such incidents in
the future” (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1953, p. 552). See also the
tripartite communiqué of Oct. 18, 1953; supra, pp. 1467-1468.
For background
ce- discussion see Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the
period from 16 July 1953 to 15 July 1954 (A/2712), pp. 6-15, and United States
IDE
che
Year 1958 (Department of State publication 5459; 1954), pp. 75-77
* U.N. doc. S/3378, Mar. 28, 1955; See also Ambassador Lodge's statements of
Mar. 29, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 18, 1955, pp. 659–661. For
background discussion, see Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly
: U.N. doc. S/INF/2, July 18, 1949, pp. 50-51.
4
nue
rent
ODS
-100
the
ity
• Supra, doc. 31.
? Supra.
2248
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
31
Condemns this attack as a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the
Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and as inconsistent with
the obligations of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement
between Egypt and Israel and under the Charter;
Calls again upon Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent
such actions;
Expresses its conviction that the maintenance of the General
Armistice Agreement is threatened by any deliberate violation of that
Agreement by one of the parties to it, and that no progress towards the
return of permanent peace in Palestine can be made unless the parties
comply strictly with their obligations under the General Armistice
Agreement and the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of July 15
,
1948.
in
C
de
ar
T)
01
W
ar
PC
36. ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN OBLIGATIONS TO COOPERATE WITH
THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZA
TION: United Nations Security Council Resolution, March 30,
1955 2
m
E
B В
it
pi
ti
of
C1
an
ti
4
The Security Council,
Taking note of those sections of the report by the Chief of Staff of
the TSỞ 3 which deal with the general conditions on the Armistice
Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel, and the causes of the
present tension;
Anxious that all possible steps shall be taken to preserve security in
this area, within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement
between Egypt and Israel;
Requests the Chief of Staff to continue his consultations with the
Governments of Egypt and Israel with a view to the introduction of
practical measures to that end;
Notes that the Chief of Staff has already made certain concrete
proposals to this effect;
Calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with
the Chief of Staff with regard to his proposals, bearing in mind that
in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, infiltration can be reduced to an
occasional nuisance if an agreement were effected between the parties
on the lines he has proposed;
Requests the Chief of Staff to keep the Council informed of the
progress of his discussions.
38
V
Bu say
1 Agreement of Feb. 24, 1949; supra, pp. 698-707.
2 U.N. doc. S/3379, Mar. 28, 1955.
The resolution was submitted by the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and was adopted unanimously,
For statement by Ambassador Lodge on Mar. 30, 1955, see Department of State
Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July 1964 19
15 July 1955 (A/2935), pp. 10–13.
3 Truce Supervision Organization. U.N. doc. S/3373.
4 Agreement of Feb, 24, 1949; supra, pp. 698-707.
be
1
F
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2249
neral
that
Covering the Period from 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955 (A/2935), pp. 14-15.
f the
37. CALL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY
with
COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF MARCH 30, 1955: Letter From
ment
the President of the Security Council to Each Member, June 7,
1955 1
vent
EXCELLENCY: As President of the Security Council this month it is
incumbent upon me to bring to the attention of the members of the
Council my concern over the situation created by the continued inci-
the dents along the Gaza Demarcation Line and the difficulties which
rties are being encountered by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations
stice Truce Supervision Organization [Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns) in carrying
15
, out the Council's unanimous resolution of March 30, 1955. You
will recall that this resolution called upon the Governments of Egypt
and Israel to cooperate with the Chief of Staff with regard to his pro-
posals directed toward preservation of security in that area.
ITH
It is to be hoped that the Security Council resolution will be imple-
ZA
mented promptly with the full cooperation of the Governments of
30, Egypt and Israel. If this hope is not realized, however, and General
Burns does not receive the full cooperation of the parties concerned,
may be necessary to call a meeting of the Council for the specific
purpose of considering the status of the implementation of the resolu-
f of tion of March 30 and such further assistance and support to the Chief
tice
of Staff as may be necessary.
the This letter is being addressed to each member of the Security Coun-
cil
. Copies are being sent to the representatives of Egypt and Israel
and the Secretary-General.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considera-
the
of
38. RENEWED APPEAL FOR ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN COOPERA-
ete
TION WITH THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION:
United Nations Security Council Resolution, September 8, 19553
ith
lat
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution of 30 March 1955, 4
Having received the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Super-
1 U.N. doc. S/3406, June 7, 1955.
Bulletin, June 20, 1955, pp. 1016-1017. The letter was sent by Ambassador
Text is also found in Department of State
Henry Cabot Lodge in his capacity as President of the Security Council for the
Security Council on Apr. 19 on this matter, see ibid., May 23, 1955, pp. 860–861.
Cor background discussion
see Report
of the Security Council to the Generai Assembly
y in
ent
tion,
an
cies
vision Organization,
the
the
sly.
ate
the
to
2 Supra.
3
U.N. doc. S/3432, Sept. 7, 1955. This resolution was unanimously adopted
by the Security Council Sept: 8, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 19,
1955
, p. 459. See also Ambassador Lodge's statement of Sept. 8, 1955; ibid.,
pp. 458-459.
* Supra, doc. 36.
* U.N. dọc. S/3430.
2250
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
and
Noting with grave concern the discontinuance of the talks initiated
Stat
by the Chief of Staff in accordance with the above-mentioned resolu-
hay
tion,
A
Deploring the recent outbreak of violence in the area along the
Egy
Armistice Demarcation Line established between Egypt and Israel
with
on 24 February 1949,
1. Notes with approval the acceptance by both parties of the ap-
peal of the Chief of Staff for an unconditional cease-fire;
2. Calls upon both parties forthwith to take all steps necessary
to bring about order and tranquility in the area, and in particular to
desist from further acts of violence and to continue the cease-fire in
full force and effect;
3. Endorses the view of the Chief of Staff that the armed forces of
both parties should be clearly and effectively separated by measures 40.
such as those which he has proposed;
T
4. Declares that freedom of movement must be afforded to United S
Nations Observers in the area to enable them to fulfill their functions;
5. Calls upon both parties to appoint representatives to meet with The
the Chief of Staff and to co-operate fully with him to these ends, and 1
6. Requests the Chief of Staff to report to the Security Council on rela
the action taken to carry out this Resolution.
in
the
2
39. UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS
(S/I
TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT: Statement by
stic
Department of State, November 5, 1955 2
oth
During recent weeks, especially during the last few days, the United
States has noted, with deep concern, the increasing tempo of hostilities
3
between Israel and Egypt. According to our information there have Org
been violations of the General Armistice Agreement by both Israel
and Egypt which have led to bloodshed and loss of life. The United Org
States deplores resort to force for the settlement of disputes. The
Secretary-General of the United Nations and General E. L. M.]
"in
Burns have put forward proposals to Israel and Egypt which are
designed to ease the present situation along their common border
.
The United States strongly supports the United Nations efforts to
achieve settlement by peaceful means, especially the current proposals
of General Burns, who is the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Сау
Truce Supervision Organization.
E
Recent reports have also been received that United Nations
observers who are under General Burns' direction have been pre
vented from carrying out their assigned functions. The United
leg
1 See Armistice Agreement of Feb. 24, 1949, supra, pp. 698-707.
gr&
issued after the Ambassadors of Israel (Abba Eban and Egypt (Ahmed Hussein
had called on Assistant Secretary George M. "Allen, at the request of the State
Department.
3 See U.N. doc. S/3430.
the
of
setti
4
in
des
met
to
pre
exis
nei
req
E
1'8S
1
2
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2251
Egypt
Tad
e in
legitimate purpose of self-defence,
ated States continues to believe that these United Nations observers should
olu-
have full liberty to perform their peaceful functions.
Assistant Secretary Allen informed the Ambassadors of Israel and
the
of the attitude of the United States and asked for information
with respect to their Governments' intentions regarding these matters.
ap-
sary
rto
Shipping Restrictions in the Suez Canal
s of
ures 40. EGYPTIAN RESTRICTIONS ON ISRAELI SHIPPING IN
THE SUEZ CANAL: United Nations Security Council Resolution,
ited September 1, 1951 1
ons;
with The Security Council
and
1. Recalling that in its resolution of 11 August 1949 (S/1376),
on relating to the conclusion of Armstice Agreements between Israel
and the neighbouring Arab States ? it drew attention to the pledges
in these Agreements "against any further acts of hostility between
the Parties"
2. Recalling further that in its resolution of 17 November 1950
the 9/1907 and Corr. 1), it reminded the States concerned that the Armi-
stice Agreements to which they are parties contemplate "the return
of permanent peace in Palestine", and therefore urged them and the
ted
other States in the area to take all such steps as will lead to the
settlement of the issues between them,
ties
3. Noting the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision
Organization to the Security Council of 12 June 1951 (S/2194),
4. Further noting that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision
Organization recalled the statement of the senior Egyptian delegate
M. In Rhodes on 13 January 1949, to the effect that his delegation was
"inspired with
every spirit of co-operation, conciliation and a sincere
her.
desire to restore peace in Palestine”, and that the Egyptian Govern-
ment has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff made
Is
to the Egyptian delegate on 12 June 1951, that it desist from the
present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez
Canal of goods destined for Israel
,
5. Considering that since the 'armistice regime, which has been in
existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character,
neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or
requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any
6. Finds that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in para-
graph 4 above is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settle-
LTS
ave
cael
ted
l'he
are
to
13
ons
ONS
Te-
ced
Fas
in
ate
U.N. doc. S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, pp. 13-15.
* For the texts of the armistice agreements, see supra, pp. 698-724.
2252
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
cisi
:
wel
SOU
ma
are
rep
vie
fab
2 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 569-570. For background
ment between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peau
in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement,
tion
7. Finds further that such practice is an abuse of the exercise o con
the right of visit, search and seizure,
8. Further finds that that practice cannot in the prevailing circum, sati
stances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence
,
to i
9. And further noting that the restrictions on the passage of good cisi
through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no cer
time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required rea
for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions together
Na
with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited
Ass
Israel ports represent unjustified interference with the rights of nation
des
If.
to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another, including
the Arab States and Israel,
bri
Thi
10. Calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage
of international commercial shipping and goods through the Sun
Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping
beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and
to the observance of the international conventions in force.
41. OBLIGATION OF EGYPT TO COMPLY WITH THE
pea
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 1951: Statement by
Un
the United States Representative at the United Nations. Before the
sid
Security Council, March 25, 1954 2
the
The issue before us is the compliance of a valued member of the def
United Nations with a decision taken 242 years ago by the highest
body of this organization charged with the maintenance of internal and
tional peace and security. After examining the facts and arguments of
presented by both sides, this Council adopted a resolution on Sep the
tember 1, 1951,
which continues to apply to the facts
as we have heart the
them relating to the complaint now under consideration. The rest Ar
lution of 1951 was adopted after the parties themselves had entered ful
into a general armistice agreement* which had as one of its principa ery
purposes the promotion of permanent peace in Palestine. The res
ſution stems from that agreement. The basic issues are the same
as those considered then, and in our opinion, nothing has happenal of
since 1949, when the Armistice Agreement was signed, or since 195, Ar
when the resolution was adopted,
to alter their validity or significance 59
to the peace of the area.
Co
1 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Period from 16 July 1953 to the July 1952%A2 the General-39, and United Son N
Participation in the United Nations? Report by the President to the Congress for in Go
Year 1954 (Department of State publication 5769; 1955), pp. 74–76.
For the text of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement of Feb. 24, 1949, s*
supra, pp. 698-707.
rea
me
CO
wil
in
3 Supra.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2253
peace
rcum
involved here the all-important question of peace and security in the
Throughout the history of the Palestine Question the United Na-
tions has sought a peaceful, just, and equitable settlement of the
many
ise et complicated problems arising out of the Palestine conflict. The de-
cisions of the various organs of the United Nations have not always
satisfied our own views 100 percent. But we have consistently sought
to respect and give effect to the combined judgment which those de-
ice,
good
cisions represent. We, for our part, feel that the parties directly con-
sto cerned in these questions have an equal duty to respect and make every
quired
reasonable effort to give effect to the combined judgment of the United
ether Nations, whether expressed in the Security Council or in the General
isited Assembly, or other competent organs. We must say frankly that the
utions desire of the interested parties to do so has not always been apparent.
uding) If, disregarding the collective efforts of the United Nations, the parties
bring the house down upon themselves, it is they who will suffer most.
This
Ssage may seem like a strong statement, but candor compels it.
Suez When the United Nations was established, such situations as these
pping were the reason why we combined together to pool some of our re-
fal sources and to subject some of our interests to the judgment of the
majority. It seems to us that the parties to the Palestine Question
are losing sight of the immense value to themselves that this process
represents. None of us can stand alone; disregard of the Council's
view in one instance encourages recalcitrance in another. The whole
fabric of international cooperation inevitably suffers. Thus, to re-
peat, the question before us is one of compliance with a decision of the
nt by United Nations. That decision was based on several important con-
ce the
siderations, one of which was that, and I quote, "neither party can
reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise
the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-
In our opinion, this principle is equally applicable to the Suez Canal
erna-and to any waters outside the Canal. This principle and the decision
ments of the Council in its resolution of 1951 should be applied by the parties
Sep themselves through the Mixed Armistice Commission which they
heard themselves set up. Differences arising between the parties under the
reso Armistice Agreement should always, in our opinion, be handled as
tered fully as possible in the first instance by the Mixed Armistice machin-
ery. An
exception to this rule could weaken the effectiveness of that
reso machinery. We believe that the Mixed Armistice Commission, in
same considering the specific complaint with respect to actions in the Gulf
genel of Agaba, must be bound not only by the provisions of the General
1951
, Armistice Agreement, but should acť also in the light of paragraph
came 5 of the resolution of September 1, 1951.
We therefore fully support the draft resolution presented to this
Council by New Zealand. We hope that the members of the Council
will likewise give
it their full support in the knowledge that there is
| Government's viewpoint presented to us at our meeting on March 12,
V. N. doc. S/3188/Corr. 1, Mar. 19, 1954.
• Mahmoud Azmi, permanent representative of Egypt to the United Nations.
THE
of the defense."
ghese
cipal
Found
no
the
Statet
2
For the
9, see
2254
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
U
t
st
b
n
LY
til
e
te
n
0
II
4
3
it was attempting to transit the Suez Canal. For a statement by Ambassador
has referred to the "complete good will of Egypt” and “its efforts to
prepare the ground for a reasonable solution." He also, quite prom
erly, called for similar efforts by the Government of Israel. To
could not fail to endorse such sentiments. We are convinced the
they can be given effect by acceptance and reaffirmation of the Cow-
cil's decision of September 1, 1951. We hold similar views with res
spect to the various other decisions of the United Nations on this dif
cult question of Palestine. We hope that these views will continu
to be the views of all responsible members, whether charged with the
peculiar responsibility of membership in this Council or otherwis
.
In this spirit we will vote for the draft resolution proposed by the
delegation of New Zealand.2
The Status of Jerusalem
(INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE JERUSALEM AREA
AND PROTECTION OF THE HOLY PLACES: GENERAL AS
SEMBLY RESOLUTION 303 (IV), DECEMBER 9, 1949!
42. REMOVAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN OFFICE FROM TEL
AVIV TO JERSUALEM: Statement by the Secretary of State
July 28, 1953 4
The United States regrets that the Israeli Government has seen fit
to move its Foreign Office from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
We have made known our feelings on that subject to the Govern
ment of Israel on two prior Occasions. It was done in July 1952
and again in March 1953, when our Ambassador, hearing rumors that
this was in contemplation, called upon the Israeli Government and
requested them not to transfer their Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem
2 The Soviet Union vetoed
the draft' resolution on Mar. 27. The Security
, .
Council took up again the question of Egyptian interference with shipping
had seized on Sept. 28, 1954, the Bat Galim, a ship Aying tắe Israeli flag, white
letin, Jan. 17, 1955, pp. 110–111. For background discussion see Report of the
Security Council to'the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July 1si?
to 15 July 1955 (A/2935), pp. 1-6.
3 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 859–860.
5 For the text of the aide-mémoire delivered by the Embassy at Tel Aviv to le
Israeli Government on July 9, 1952, see ibid., Aug. 4, 1952, pp. 181–182
.
1
0
n
1
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2255
orts tú
itbet
im
s aut
Foreign Policy, pp. 859–860.
We feel that way because we believe that it would embarrass the
}
prop
United Nations, which has a primary responsibility for determining
17 the future status of Jerusalem. You may recall that the presently
d the standing U.N. resolution about Jerusalem contemplates that it should
Coun be to a large extent at least an international city rather than a purely
national city. Also, we feel that this particular action by the Govern-
ment of Israel at this particular time is inopportune in relation to
ntinut
the tensions which exist in the Near East, tensions which are rather
th the
extreme, and that this will add to rather than relax any of these
?T1878. tensions.
by the The views that I express here are, we know, shared by a considerable
number of other governments who have concern with the development
of an atmosphere of peace and good will in that part of the world.
We have notified the Government of Israel that we do not intend to
move our own Embassy to Jerusalem.?
43. RETENTION OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT TEL AVIV:
Statement by the Department of State, November 3, 1954 3
AREA
L AS
The ranking diplomatic representatives of Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq,
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, and Egypt called on the Secretary
of State on November 3 to make known the views of their Govern-
ments with respect to the plans for presentation of credentials in
Jerusalem by the appointed American Ambassador to Israel, Edward
State
,
B. Lawson.
In the course of the conversation the Secretary recalled the policy of
the U.S. Government to look to the United Nations as primarily
en fit responsible for determining the future status of Jerusalem. Follow-
ing normal practice, the presentation of credentials would be effected
by Ambassador Lawson at the place where the Chief of State actually
is. The fact that this means that the presentation will take place in
Jerusalem implies no change in our attitude regarding Jerusalem nor
does it imply
any change in the location of the American Embassy in
Israel, which is at Tel Aviv.
lie., General Assembly Res. 303 (IV), Dec. 9, 1949; A Decade of American
curits
See Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1953, p. 82.
3 Ibid., Nov. 22, 1954, p. 776.
( TEL
Vel'l
952
that
1
and
-M.
pping
Egypt
while
sador
Bul
.
of the
o the
2256
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
crec
ļ
AID TO PALESTINE REFUGEES
app
cerr
pris
out interest, the advances made by it under authority contained
1950, “General Appropriation Act, 1951," appropriated $27,450,000 for contribu-
Palestine Refugees
S
Act
44. UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE REFUGEE AID ACT OF 1950: resp
Title III of Public Law 535 (81st Congress, 2d Session), June 5, 1950
spel
AN ACT
rein
To provide foreign economic assistance.
com
hert
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited audi
as the "Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950."
prot
Nat
Eas
TITLE III
all ,
mat
SEC. 301. This title may be cited as the "United Nations Palestine
Refugee Aid Act of 1950".
SEC. 302. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized to make con-
tributions from time to time before July 1, 1951, to the United Na-
tions for the “United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East", established under the resolution of the
45.
General Assembly of the United Nations of December 8, 1949, in
amounts not exceeding in the aggregate $27,450,000 for the purposes
set forth in this title.
1
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 303. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated, out Wo
of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to
exceed $27,450,000 to carry out the purposes of this title.
for
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Recon- 1
struction Finance Corporation is authorized and directed, until such
time as an appropriation shall be made pursuant to subsection (a) of
this section, to make advances to the Secretary of State, not to exceed
in the aggregate $8,000,000, to carry out the provisions of this title
.
From appropriations authorized under subsection (a) of this section
,
there shall be repaid to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with in
herein. No interest shall be charged on advances
made by the Treas
:
ury to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in implementation of
this section.
1 64 Stat. 198, 203.
2 General Assembly Res. 302 (IV); A Decade of American Foreign Policy,
pp. 856-859.
A
Chapter XI, “Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, 1951,” of the act of Sept, og
for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East; 64 Stat. 763.
rep
aut
ang
effic
of
t
ref
30
1
in
to
2
3
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2257
NATURE OF ASSISTANCE
to the assignment of American specialists for service with another government.
* Ibid., Fourth Session (A/1251), pp. 23-25.
4 U.N, docs. A/1451 and A/1451/Corr. 1, Oct. 19 and Oct. 30, 1950.
$ U.N. doc. A/1452, Oct. 24, 1950.
Sec. 304. (a) The provisions of sections 301, 302, and 303 of the
Act of January 27, 1948 (62 Stat. 6),' are hereby made applicable with
950: respect to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
9501 Refugees in the Near East to the same extent as they apply with re-
spect to the government of another country: Provided, That when
reimbursement is made by said Agency, such reimbursement shall be
credited to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized for paying the
compensation, travel expenses, and allowances of any person assigned
hereunder.
vited
(b) Departments and agencies of the United States Government are
ited authorized, with the approval of the
Secretary of State, to furnish or
procure and furnish supplies, materials, and services to the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East: Provided, That said Agency shall make payments in advance for
all costs incident to the furnishing or procurement of such supplies,
materials
, or services, which payments may be credited to the current
applicable appropriation or fund of the department or agency con-
tine
cerned and shall be available for the purposes for which such appro-
priations and funds are authorized to be used.
ON-
Na-
ine
the
45. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
: in
393 (V), DECEMBER 2, 1950 ?
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949,
Having examined the report * of the United Nations Relief and
Dut Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the
to report of the Secretary-General concerning United Nations Relief
1. Notes that contributions sufficient to carry out the programme
authorized in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (IV) have not been made,
of and urges governments which have not yet done so to make every
ed effort to make voluntary contributions in response to paragraph 13
.
n
2. Recognizes that direct relief cannot be terminated as provided
h-
in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (IV);
ed
3. Authorizes
the Agency to continue to furnish direct relief to
refugees in need, and considers that, for the period 1 July 1951 to
of 30 June 1952, the equivalent of approximately $20,000,000 will be
"United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948, also printed
In A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224–1234.
Sections 301-303 relate
FY
2
ses
3
for Palestine Refugees,
ON-
Ich
S-
6,
(A/1775), pp. 22-23.
FU-
OT
415900_-57-Vol. 2
-39
2258
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
p]
81
ac
ce
to
re
tained the extent to which Member States are willing to make contribu-
tions, all delegations be notified accordingly by the Secretary-General
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions
required for direct relief to refugees who are not yet reintegrated in
the economy of the Near East;
4. Considers that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph
11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948
the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Net
East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential in preparation til
for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and
for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area
;
5. Instructs the Agency to establish a reintegration fund which
vi
shall be utilized for projects requested by any government in the
Near East and approved by the Agency for the permanent re-establish
.
ment of refugees and their removal from relief;
ti
6. Considers that, for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, De
la
less than the equivalent of $30,000,000 should be contributed to the
Agency for the purposes set forth in paragraph 5 above;
7. Authorizes the Agency, as circumstances permit, to transfer
funds available for the current relief and works programmes, and is th
the relief programme provided in paragraph 3 above, to reintegration
projects provided for ir paragraph 5;
C
8. (a) Requests the President of the General Assembly to appoint
U:
In
a Negotiating Committee composed of seven or more members for
the purpose of consulting, as soon as possible during the current ga
session of the General Assembly, with Member and non-znembe w
States as to the amounts which governments may be willing to coz-
PC
tribute on a voluntary basis towards:
LE
(i) The current programme for relief and works for the period Co
ending 30 June 1951, bearing in mind the need for securing contribu- tid
tions from Member States which have not yet contributed;
(ii) The programme of relief and reintegration projects as provide
for in paragraphs 3 and 4 above for the year ending 30 June 1952;
hu
(6) Authorizes the Negotiating Committee to adopt procedures
th
best suited to the accomplishment of its task, bearing in mind:
th
(i) The need for securing the maximum contribution in cash;
(ii) The desirability of ensuring that any contribution in kind is of
oth
nature which meets the requirements of the contemplated proef
grammes;
(iii) The importance of enabling the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to plan if 46
programmes in advance and to carry them out with funds regularly
contributed;
(iv) The degree of assistance which can continue to be rendered
by specialized agencies, non-member States and other contributors;
(c) Requests that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has ascen
.
in order that they may consult with their governments;
ta
ne
of
(A
(A/810), pp21–25.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2259
2 Ibid. Third Session, Part I, Resolutions (A/810), pp. 21-25.
3 Ibid., Fourth Session, Resolutions (A/1251), pp. 23–25.
ration
dini
(2) Decides that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has com-
pleted its work, the Secretary-General shall at the Committee's
gran request arrange, during the current session of the General Assembly
1948
an appropriate meeting of Member and non-member States at which
New Members may commit themselves to their national contributions and
ration the contributions of non-members may be made known;
e
Tea;
9. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Ad-
Whih visory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to
n the advance funds, deemed to be available for this purpose and not ex-
blick ceeding $5,000,000, from the Working Capital Fund to finance opera-
tions pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not
2, mot later than 31 December 1951;
to the 10. Calls upon the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies
to utilize to the fullest extent the Agency's facilities as a point of
ansfer reference and co-ordination for technical assistance programmes in
nd for the countries in which the Agency is operating;
11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations International
Children's Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the
rs for
International Refugee Organization, the International Labour Or-
urrent ganisation and the Food and Agriculture Organization for the assistance
embe which they have rendered, and urges them to continue to furnish all
con possible assistance to the Agency;
12. Commends the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service
period Committee for their invaluable services and whole-hearted co-opera-
tribution in the distribution of relief supplies until those functions were
taken over by the Agency;
13. Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and
52;
humanitarian organizations whose programmes have brought much
needed supplementary assistance to the Palestine refugees, and urges
them to continue and expand, to the extent possible, the work which
:
they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees;
; 14. Extends its appreciation and thanks to the Director and staff of
s of the Agency and the members of the Advisory Committee for their
prv effective and devoted work.
opoint
vided
dures
1
and
in 46. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
laris
916 (X), DECEMBER 3, 1955 1
Jered
The General Assembly,
IS;
scer
ribu-
Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,2 302 (IV)
of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950,4 513' (VI) of 26
UN General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19
neral
(A/3116), pp. 7-8.
utions
A
Supra.
2260
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
1
f
1
C
F
T
t
E
47
January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of727
November 1953, and 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954,4
Noting the annual report and the special report of the Director
of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East and the special report ’of the Advisory Commission
of the Agency,
Having reviewed the budgets for relief and rehabilitation prepared
by the Director of the Agency,
Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided
for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that
no substantial progress has been made in the programme for reintegra-
tion of refugees endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) and
that the situation of the refugees therefore continues to be a matter of
grave concern,
1. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestin
Ref: es in the Near East to pursue its programmes for the relief and
rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitations imposed
upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;
2. Requests the Agency to continue its consultation with the United
Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of
their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of
resolution 194 (III);
3. Requests the Government of the area, without prejudice to
rnme
paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), to make a determined effort, in
co-operation with the Director of the Agency, to seek and carry out
projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;
4. Notes with gratification that the Government of the Hashimite
Kingdom of the Jordan and the Agency have made substantial progress
toward resolving the difficulties which impede the granting of rations
to all qualified refugee children in Jordan;
5. Notes the serious need of the other claimants for relief as described
in the special report prepared by the Director pursuant to paragraph
6 of resolution 818 (1x), namely, the frontier villagers in Jordan, the
non-refugee population of the Gaza strip, a number of the refugees in
Egypt, and certain of the Bedouin;
6. Appeals to private organizations to give them increased assistance
to the extent that local Governments cannot do so;
7. Urges all Governments and individuals to support these private
organizations with food, goods and services;
8. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds
,
after the receipt of the budgets from the Director of the Agency, to
seek such funds as may be required by the Agency;
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. A
(A/2119), pp. 12–13.
3 Ibid., Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/2361), pp. 7–8.
3 Ibid., Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/2630), p. 6.
4 Ibid, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21 (9/2890), pp. 8–9.
5 Ibid., Tenth Session, Supplement No. 15 (A/2978).
8 Ibid., Supplement No. 15 A (A/2978/Add. 1).
Ibid., Tenth Session, Agenda Item 22 (A/3017).
01
fa
to
CE
cho
WI
as
te
sp
h:
SO
th
ор
the
on
4,
7
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2261
127
stor
gees
Sion
9. Appeals to the Governments of Member and non-member States
to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry
through to fulfilment the Agency's programmes, and thanks the
numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations for
their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;
10. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency
for their continued faithful efforts to carry out their mandate, and
requests the Governments of the area to continue to facilitate the work
of the Agency and to ensure the protection of its personnel and
property;
11. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the
reports referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) as well as
the annual budgets.
ered
ded
Chat
2r8.
aand
Tof
tine
and
used
E. THE IRANIAN OIL CONTROVERSY
ited
t of
of
47. UNITED STATES POSITION IN TALKS WITH IRAN AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM: Statement by the Department of
State, May 18, 1951
to
in
out
nite
ress
LONS
bed
aph
the
sm
The United States is deeply concerned by the dispute between the
Iranian and British Governments over Iranian oil. We are firm friends
of both Iran and Great Britain and are sincerely interested in the wel-
fare of each country. The United States wants an amicable settlement
to this dispute, which is serious not only to the parties directly con-
cerned but also to the whole free world. We have followed the matter
closely and have told both countries where we stand. The views which
we have expressed have related to the broad aspects of the problem,
as it has not been appropriate for us to advise with respect to specific
terms of arrangements which might be worked out.
Since the United States attitude has been the subject of some
speculation, it is deemed advisable to describe the position which we
have taken in our talks with representatives of Iran and Great Britain.
We have stressed to the Governments of both countries the need to
solve the dispute in a friendly way through negotiation and have urged
them to avoid intimidation and threats of unilateral action.
In our talks with the British Government, we have expressed the
opinion that arrangements should be worked out with the Iranians
which give recognition to Iran's expressed desire for greater control
Department of State Bulletin, May 28, 1951, p. 851. See also statements by
the Department of State on Apr.'9
and 19, and remarks by the Secretary of State
On May 23, 1951; ibid., Apr. 23, 1951, p. 661, Apr. 30, 1951, p. 700, and June
nce
ate
ids,
,to
20
4, 1951, p. 891.
2262
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ma
as
WIS
int
SOT
ser
over and benefits from the development of its petroleum resources
, 48
While the United States has not approved or disapproved the terms
of any particular British proposal, it is pleased to note a sincere desire
on the part of the British to negotiate with the Iranians on all out
standing issues.
We fully recognize the sovereign rights of Iran and sympathias
with Iran's desire that increased benefits accrue to that country Af
from the development of its petroleum. In talks with the Irania:
TE
Government, we have pointed out the serious effects of any unilateral
of
cancellation of clear contractual relationships which the United States
strongly opposes. We have stressed the importance of the Iranians
achieving their legitimate objectives through friendly negotiation
with the other party, consistent with their international responsibili-
ties. This would have the advantage of maintaining confidence is
future commercial investments in Iran and, indeed, in the validity of
contractual arrangements all over the world.
Iran has been urged, before it takes final action, to analyze carefully
the practical aspects of this problem. In this connection, we have the
raised the question of whether or not the elimination of the established
A
British oil company from Iran would in fact secure for Iran the greatest
tro
possible benefits. We have pointed out that the efficient production
and refining of Iranian oil requires not only technical knowledge and by
capital but transport and marketing facilities such as those provided the
by the company. We have also pointed out that any uncertainty as of
to future availability of Iranian supplies would cause concern on
the
pu
part of customers which might lead to shifts in their source of supply of
with a consequent decreased revenue to Iran.
Those United States oil companies which would be best able to
kin
conduct operations such as the large-scale and complex industry in
Iran have indicated to this Government that they would not in the
the
face of unilateral action by Iran against the British company
willing to undertake operations in that country. Moreover, petro its
leum technicians of the number and
competence required to replace and
those presently in Iran are not, due to extreme shortages of manpower tha
in this specialized field, available in this country or in other countries.
The United States believes that Iran and Great Britain have such
a strong mutuality of interests that they must and will find some way, rup
through friendly negotiation, of reestablishing a relationship which
int
will permit each party to play its full role in the achievement of their
to t
common objectives. Through such negotiation it is felt that Iran's
basic desires and interests
can best be realized, the legitimate British
interests preserved, and the essential flow of Iranian oil into the mar-
kets of the free world maintained.
The United States has repeatedly expressed its great interest in the
continued independence and territorial integrity of Iran and has given
and will continue to give concrete evidence of this interest.
con
be
arra
the
will
free
int
ind
prin
1
2
3
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2263
rces,
ormis
esire
out-
48. UNITED STATES NONINTERVENTION IN IRANIAN DO-
MESTIC AFFAIRS: Aide-Mémoire From the American Ambas-
sador at Tehran to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, May 26,
1951 1
Dians
ty of
: and
ided
thize
The aide-mémoire of His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign
ntry Affairs of Iran, which was handed to the American Ambassador in
niar
Tehran on May 21, has been carefully considered by the Government
teral of the United States.
tates
It is unfortunate that the public statement made by this Govern-
ment on May 18 3 has been misconstrued by the Iranian Government
ation
as intervention in the internal affairs of Iran. The United States
ibili wishes to make it clear that it did not then intend, nor does it now
en intend, to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran, nor to oppose Iran's
sovereign rights or the expressed desires of the Iranian Government
in regard to control of Iranian resources.
fully
There is, however, legitimate basis for deep and proper interest on
have the part of this Government in a solution of the oil problem in Iran.
shed
A serious controversy exists between Iran and Great Britain, a con-
atest
troversy which could undermine the unity of the free world and
ction
seriously weaken it. The United States is bound to both countries
by strong ties of friendship and has attested its sincere concern for
the well-being of both. It has, therefore, in view of the importance
7.0 of the matter, discussed the issues with both parties and has stated
publicly the principles it considers important in reaching a solution
The United States continues in its firm belief that an issue of this
le to kind can be settled satisfactorily only by negotiation by the parties
7
concerned. While the United States has urged upon both parties
the the need for moderation, it has taken no position on details of any
5. be arrangement which might be worked out. It has, however, reaffirmed
etano its stand against unilateral cancellation of contractual relationships
place and actions of a confiscatory nature
. The United States is convinced
ower that through negotiation a settlement can be found which will satisfy
ries the desires of the Iranian people to control their own resources,
which
suca will protect
legitimate British interests and which will assure uninter-
was rupted flow of Iranian oil to its world markets. Such a settlement is,
in the opinion of this Government, of the utmost importance not only
to the welfare of the two powers concerned
but to that of the entire
2018 free world. The United States wishes to state again its deep interest
in the welfare of the Iranian people and in the maintenance of the
nell'independence and territorial integrity of Iran, which is a cardinal
principle of United States policy.
the
apply of this controversy.
1
Department of State Bulletin, June 4, 1951, pp. 891-892.
2 Not printed.
3 Supra.
2264
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ng
m
resources.
Persian Oil Company, and with the effect of the Iranian Government's oil national |
an order (U.N. doc. S/2239, July 11, 1951), which, inter alia, indicated "provisional
At British request, the Court on July 5, 1951, issued
measures," pending its final decision, designed to insure against any action which
United Kingdom accepted the Court's suggestion on July 6, but the Government
of Iran on July 9 rejected the interim measures and withdrew its acceptance of the
49. OFFER TO SEND A PRESIDENTIAL PERSONAL REPRE
.
th
SENTATIVE TO TEHRAN: Message From the President of the
G
United States to the Prime Minister of Iran, July 8, 1951 1 ya
fo
I am most grateful to Your Excellency for giving me in your recent
he
letter a full and frank account of the developments in the unhappy
A
dispute which has arisen between your Government and the British of
oil interests in Iran. This matter is so full of dangers to the welfare
of your own country, of Great Britain, and of all the free world, that
I have been giving the most earnest thought to the problems involved
of
I had hoped that the common interests of the two countries directly
de
involved and the common ground which has been developed in you
discussions would open the way to a solution of the troublesome and
complicated problems which have arisen. You know of our sympa
:
thetic interest in this country in Iran's desire to control its natur
th
From this point of view we were happy to see that the
British Government has on its part accepted the principle of nationali-
zation.
tid
Since British skill and operating knowledge can contribute so much
of
to the Iranian oil industry I had hoped—and still hope that was
0
could be found to recognize the principle of nationalization and
British interests to the benefit of both. For these reasons I have to
watched with concern the breakdown of your discussions and the drilgan
toward a collapse of oil operations with all the attendant losses to Iran
to
and the world. Surely this is a disaster which statesmanship cao
find a way to avoid.
Recently I have come to believe that the complexity of the problems ale
be
involved in a broad settlement and the shortness of the time available
before the refinery must shut down--if the present situation çok
tinues—require a simple and practicable modus vivendi under which
operations can continue and under which the interests of neither side
will be prejudiced. Various suggestions to this end have failed. The second
be
time available is running out.
In this situation a new and important development has occurred
The International Court of Justice, which your Government, thi
5C
British Government, and our own, all joined with other nations to
establish as the guardian of impartial justice and equity, has made
a suggestion for a modus vivendi.3
Technical considerations aside, I lay great stress on the action of
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1951, pp. 129–130.
3 On May 26, 1951, the United Kingdom instituted proceedings in the content
national Court of Justice against Iran in connection with the application of the
agreement of 1933, between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Anglo-
ization law of May 1, 1951.
hinder the carrying on of the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
5.2.3 Oo
m
at
as
ar
ca
1
the
the
19
See
of
The
Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2265
SPRE
recent
happy
1 you
ympa
atura!
WATS
1
2 Ibid., Oct. 1, 1951, pp. 548-550.
the Court. I know how sincerely your Government and the British
of the
Government believe in the positions which you both have taken in
your discussions. However, I am sure you believe even more pro-
foundly in the idea of a world controlled by law and justice which
has been the hope of the world since the San Francisco conference.
Apart from questions of jurisdiction, no one will doubt the impartiality
British
of the World Court, its eminence, and the respect due to it by all
Felfare nations who signed the United Nations treaty.
d. the Therefore, I earnestly commend to you a most careful consideration
olved
.
of its suggestion. I suggest that its utterance be thought of not as a
irecth
decision which is or is not binding depending on technical legal con-
siderations, but as a suggestion of an impartial body, dedicated to
Leand justice and equity and to a peaceful world based upon these great
conceptions. Å study of its suggestion by your Government and by
the British Government will, I am sure, develop methods of imple-
at the menting it which will carry out its wise and impartial purpose
onli maintaining the operation of the oil industry and preserving the posi-
tions of both Governments. Surely no government loses any element
muel
of its sovereignty or the support of its people by treating with all
possible consideration and respect the utterance of this great Court.
and
Our
own Government and people believe this profoundly. Should
here you take such a position I am sure that the stature of Iran would be
drill greatly enhanced in the eyes of the world.
I have a very sincere desire, Mr. Prime Minister, to be as helpful
to you as possible in this circumstance. I have discussed this matter
at length with W. Averell Harriman who, as you know, is one of my
blems
closest advisers and one of our most eminent citizens. Should you
be willing to receive him, I should be happy to have him go to Tehran
as my personal representative to talk over with you this immediate
and pressing situation.
May I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my highest
The consideration and to convey to you my confidence in the future well-
being and prosperity of Iran.
50. OBSERVATIONS ON IRANIAN PROPOSALS FOR SETTLE-
made
MENT OF THE CONTROVERSY: Note From the President's
Special Representative (W. Averell Harriman to the Prime
Minister of Iran, September 15, 1951 ?
Lour Excellency's message of September 123 has been communi-
cated to me by the Iranian Ambassador. I share your regret that the
discussions between the Iranian Government and the
British delegation
The Iranian Prime Minister's reply to the above message was released to
the press by the White House on July
11. The reply, among other things, accepted
the offer of Mr. Harriman's good offices (Department of State Bulletin, July 23,
1951, p. 130). For Mr. Harriman's remarks on his departure for Iran on July 13,
de ibid. See also
statement of July 13 by George C. McGhee, Assistant
Secretary
of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (ibid., p. 131).
Iran
D Cab
wilable
COM
which
r side
irred
.
is the
us to
012 of
Inter-
of the
Anglo-
tional-
issued
sional
which
ite, or
The
ment
of the
* Ibid., pp. 547–548.
2266
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the suspension of negotiations between the British and Iranians and commending
1 See President's statement of Aug. 23, 1951, expressing disappointment at
ca
sa
th
be
Ir
CC
C
PI
nc
A
de
th
m
ef
CC
PI
G
under Lord Privy Seal Stokes did not culminate in an agreement
upon a settlement of the oil controversy. I know that the continued
interruption to the production and shipment of Iranian oil imposs
a very considerable hardship upon the economy of Iran as it dos
upon the economy of Great Britain. The United States and the
entire free world looked anxiously upon these discussions in the bove
that some solution could be found which would satisfy the legitimate
interests of both parties.
I assure Your Excellency that I continue to stand ready to assis
in any way that I can in finding a just solution. In my efforts thus
far I have endeavored to be frank and objective in the advice that
I have given to the Iranian Government, as well as to the British
Government. It is in this objective and friendly spirit, and in a
effort to be helpful to you in arriving at a settlement, that I should
like to comment upon the substance of your communication.
With reference to the proposals in general, I should say at the outse!
that they appear to be the same as proposals made by the Iranian
Government during the course of the negotiations in Tehran, which
the British Mission did not accept since they did not conform to
practical and commercial aspects of the international oil industry
.
In some respects the proposals in fact represent a retrogression from
the positions taken during the discussions.
Your Excellency has suggested that the various departments of
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company be retained, insofar as this does not
conflict with the terms of the Nationalization Law, and that the
managers and other responsible personnel of the technical sections be
employed in the National Oil Company of Iran with the same authority
which they enjoyed previously. You have also stated that the
Iranian Government is prepared to create a mixed executive board
composed of Iranian and neutral foreign technicians who would
jointly manage the administrative and technical affairs of the Na
tional Oil Company of Iran.
In discussing this possibility during the negotiations in Tehran, I
endeavored to point out to the Iranian representatives the impractica-
þility of attempting to operate a large and complex industry on the
basis of a number of section heads reporting to a board of directors
with no single individual being given executive authority. I beliere
that no organization can operate effectively in this manner and
understood Mr. Stokes' position in Tehran to be that the Britisk
would not consider it workable. Moreover, I have pointed out that
effective operations, particularly of a refinery of the size and com
plexity of that in Abadan, require the employment of an integrated
organization rather than the employment of individual foreign
specialists. Competent technicians would not themselves consent to
employment except under conditions satisfactory to them. Such
conditions would include assurance that the industry was under
V
al
le
m
d
P
II
P
P
E
f
S
a
V
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2267
assist
s this
anian
'm to
consideration. It is also true that only those who have developed
markets for Iranian oil are in a position to commit themselves for its
purchase in the large quantities produced.
ement
capable management and operated in a manner which would assure
tinued
safety and efficiency.
n poses Your Excellency has expressed concern that the arrangements for
t does
the operation of the oil industry must take into account the require-
id the
ments of the Nationalization Law. I am convinced that arrange-
hove
ments are possible which would meet this objective and at the same
timate
time would assure that the oil industry is conducted on an efficient
basis. During our visit in Tehran Mr. Levy and I discussed with
Iranian officials arrangements under which a competent organization
could be employed to operate under the control of the National Oil
e that
Company of Iran. Such arrangements are a common business
British
practice throughout the world.
in a
Your Excellency has reiterated that the Iranian Government has
should
not intended and does not intend to confiscate the property of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and has suggested methods for the
putset
determination of the amount of compensation.
While I have no comments upon your suggestions for determining
which
the value of the assets, it is obvious that payment of compensation
must depend upon and will be affected by arrangements for the
Asti
ustry
.
efficient operation of the oil industry to assure that the products
from
continue to be made available for sale to world markets. As I have
its of
pointed out to Your Excellency, in the view of the United States
Government the seizure by any government of foreign-owned assets
s not
without either prompt, adequate and effective compensation or
ns be
alternative arrangements satisfactory to the former owners is,
less of the intent, confiscation rather than nationalization. There
hority
must be more than a willingness to pay; there must be the ability to
do so in an effective form. I believe, however, that if arrangements
board
for the sale of oil are made with the British interests the compensation
problem could be worked out satisfactorily and that the net oil
income accruing to Iran could be as large as that of any other oil-
producing country under comparable circumstances.
etica-
Your Excellency has stated that the Iranian Government is pre-
pared to sell to the British ten million tons of oil per year, this quan-
tity representing an estimate of Iranian oil previously used in Great
-tors
liere
Britain. It is specified that sales would be at prevailing
international
prices on the basis of the fo.b. value at Iranian ports. It is also
stated that this oil would be delivered to any company or transport
agency designated by the British.
As I pointed out to Your Excellency in Tehran, in order to be
assured of continuous sales of substantial quantities of its oil in
world markets Iran must make arrangements with customers
that
eign
it to
can make available large transportation and distribution facilities
for marketing it on a world-wide basis. Potential customers would
nder
not make such arrangements unless they could obtain Iranian oil on a
basis as favorable as that on which they could buy or develop oil in
other producing countries. This, of course, is a practical business
t the
regard-
the
vould
NA
an, I
2
the
nd I
itish
that
com-
ated
Such
et at
ding
2).
2268
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
na
me
rek
ret
att
The production of Iranian oil before the present controversy arose
51
amounted to some 30 million tons per year. The major portion of
this production was handled by British concerns and effiliates which
have developed markets for it throughout the world. Only the
have the great transportation facilities needed to carry the oil from A
Iran to its markets, where only they have the necessary distribution
facilities for it. Arrangements, including financial terms, for the sel
of only that portion of the oil which previously went to Great Britain
would leave the problem of shipping to and distribution in other parts
of the world unsolved, and would force the British interests to develop 52
other sources of supply.
During the negotiations in Tehran the Iranian Government indi-
cated its willingness to consider a long-term contract for the sale of
Iranian oil to an organization acting on behalf of former purchasers of
the products. Under this suggestion, that portion of the industry's
TO
output which was not covered by this contract could be sold directly
by the National Oil Company of Iran to its own customers. You
Excellency's present suggestion would indicate that there has been :
change in this position.
Your Excellency, in pointing out that the suspension of negotiations
Ai
with the British and the shutdown of the Iranian oil industry have
th:
created a serious situation in Iran, has stated that if a satisfactory
conclusion is not achieved within 15 days from the date on which you
proposal is submitted to the British Government the Iranian Govern-
ment intends to cancel the residence permits held by the British staf
pr
and experts now residing in the southern oilfields.
As I have pointed out to Your Excellency, the proposals which you
have set forth in your communication do not represent an advance
from the positions taken in the discussions in Tehran and in some
respects appear to be the opposite. I believe that the problem with
which Iran and Great Britain are confronted can be settled only by in
negotiations based upon recognition of the practical business and
technical aspects of the oil industry and based upon mutual good will
between the parties. Such a settlement, which would attain Iranian
Se
aspirations for control of the oil industry within Iran, is, I am con-
vinced, possible and feasible
in accordance with the discussions we have
had in Tehran and the comments I have made.
that my passing your communication to the British Government
would militate against a settlement, particularly in view of the posi-
tion taken regarding the expulsion of the British employees in southern
Iran, a position which I believe will only further aggravate an
serious situation.
As a sincere friend of Iran, I earnestly hope that Your Excellencs to
will reconsider the points set forth in your communication and that
basis can be developed under which negotiations
can soon be resumed
I want to tell Your Excellency how much I appreciate your commun
cating with
me on this matter. As stated earlier, I am anxious to be a
helpful as circumstances permit, but for the reasons I have set forte
I regret that it is not possible for me to meet your request in this
particular instance.
SIO
1
pro
Un
cor
cat
th
Oc
tio
However, I consider
SS
res
for
the
to
pos
ha
tai
already
Re
pu
50-
Co
16
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2269
? Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 8, 1952, p. 360.
they
e sale matter.
ers of
een &
publication 4583; 1952), pp. 92-94; ibid., 1952 (Department of State publication
5034; 1953), pp. 205–206; Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly
Covering the Period from 16 July 1951 to 15 July 1952 (A/2167), pp. 17–24; ibidos
16 July 1952 to 15 July 1958 (A/2437), p. 28.
arose 51. COMPETENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
Zon of JUSTICE IN THE CONTROVERSY: United Nations Security
which
Council Decision, October 19, 1951 1
from Adjournment of discussion on pending draft resolutions until the Inter-
ution national Court of Justice shall ħave ruled upon its own competence in the
ritain
parts
52. PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY:
Joint Message and Proposals From the President of the United
indi
.
States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the
ale of
Prime Minister of Iran, August 30, 1952 2
stry's
To His Excellency
cectly
Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh,
You
Prime Minister of Iran
We have reviewed the messages from our two Embassies in Iran 3
tions regarding recent talks with you, as well as your communication of
August 7, 1952, to the British Government. It seems clear to us,
tory
that to bring about a satisfactory solution to the oil problem will
you require prompt action by all three of our Governments.
We are
er attaching proposals for action which our two Governments are pre-
staf pared to take and which we sincerely hope will meet with your ap-
proval and result in a satisfactory solution. We are motivated by
sincere and traditional feelings of friendship for the Iranian nation
1 U.N. doc. S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, p. 3. The decision was taken on a verbal
with proposal by the representative of France.
Upon the breakdown of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Iran
in September 1951, and the failure of Mr. Harriman's efforts at mediation, the
United Kingdom requested the Security Council on Sept. 28, 1951, to take up its
will complaint that Iran had failed to comply with the provisional measures” indi-
cated by the International Court of Justice in its order of July 5, 1951. The
Security Council decided on Oct. 1 to admit the item to its agenda, and
considered
the question between Oct. 15 and 19, 1951. The U.S. representative supported on
oct 17 (Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 5, 1951, pp. 746–749) a draft resolu-
sider tion (8/2358/Rev. 2, Oct. 17, 1951) calling for the resumption of negotiations to
resolve the differences in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter, and
for the avoidance of any action which would have
the effect of further
aggravating
the situation. When it became clear, on Oct. 19, that the seven votes necessary
pass the resolution would not be secured, the Council adopted the French pro-
cady posal above. In its judgment of July 22, 1952, the Court decided that it did not
Ency
tained in its order of July 5, 1951, had Tapsed with the issuance of the judgment.
kor background information see ünited States Participation in the United Nations:
Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1951 (Department of State
have
: You
cance
sonie
V
by
and
nian
COD-
18үе
nent
HOSI
nern
to
at &
aed
.
uni-
e as
orth
this
3 Not printed
2270
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
rea
parture of the plenipotentiary representatives a sum of 20 million pounds (ibid.,
and people and it is our earnest desire to make possible an early and 53.
equitable solution of the present dispute.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
Proposals
DE
1
1. There shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice
pre
the question of compensation to be paid in respect of the nationaliza
Un
tion of the enterprise of the AIOC 1 in Iran, having regard to the legal
difti
position of the parties existing immediately prior to nationalization
hay
and to all claims and counterclaims of both parties.
LO
2. Suitable representatives shall be appointed to represent the
nes
Iranian Government and the AIOC in negotiations for making arrange-
ments for the flow of oil from Iran to world markets.
che
3. If the Iranian Government agrees to the proposals in the for-
Ira:
going two paragraphs, it is understood that (a) representatives of the
its
AIOČ will seek arrangements for the movement of oil already stored
in Iran, and as agreements are reached upon price, and as physical
free
conditions of loading permit, appropriate payments will be made for
I
such quantities of oil as can be moved; (6) Her Majesty's Government
emni
will relax restrictions on exports to Iran and on Iran's use of sterling;
elin
and (c) the United States Government will make an immediate grant
whi?
of $10 million to the Iranian Government to assist in their budgetary
ind
problem.
ing
con
1 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
adh
2 On Sept. 3, 1952, the Secretary of State pointed out at a press conference
,
that "the purpose of this grant would be to provide Iran with funds for a short
term to assist that nation financially until flow of Iranian oil to world markets
could be resumed” (Department of State Bulletin Sept. 15, 1952, p. 406). On the
Sept. 24, 1952, Prime Minister Mossadegh rejected the proposals of Aug. 30
, 1952 faci
and made counter-proposals (ibid., Oct. 6, 1952, pp. 532–535). On Oct. 5, 1952,
the American Ambassador at Tehran delivered to Prime Minister Mossadegh &
message from the Secretary of State pointing out that the rejection had appara
ently
been based on certain misunderstandings of the Anglo-American proposals of t
and correcting the misunderstandings concerning the management of the com
industry and the purchase of the oil produced (ibid., Oct. 13, 1952, p. 569).00 to
examined the explanations which were furnished with a view to removing the to
Oct. 7, 1952, Prime Minister Mossadegh replied saying that he had grateful
ambiguity of the joint message of Aug. 30, 1952, and that he had now proposed to exte
the British Foreign Secretary that plenipotentiary representatives of the former Iran
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company be sent to Tehran to discuss the terms of his counter
proposals of Sept. 24, 1952, if the British Government would pay prior to the de
p. 894). The Department of State observed on Dec., 1952, that'as regards the
Purchase of oil from Iran hy American nationals oor American firms, it was the
Kush individuals
or firmseas might be considering purchases?o The legal risks ir
position of the U.S. Government that the decision on this point must be left to
volved were matters to be resolved by them (ibid., Dec. 15, 1952, p. 946).
2
MDE
of t
mer
int
pro
COM
1
2
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2271
Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1953, pp. 74–75.
and 3. IMPOSSIBILITY OF INCREASING ECONOMIC AID TO IRAN
PENDING SETTLEMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY: Message
From the President of the United States to the Prime Minister
of Iran, June 29, 1953
IAN
1
ILL
ment
grant
DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
I have received your letter of May 28 ? in which you described the
istice
present difficult situation in Iran and expressed the hope that the
aliza-
legal
United States might be able to assist Iran in overcoming some of its
ation
difficulties. In writing my reply which has been delayed until I could
have an opportunity to consult with Mr. Dulles and Ambassador
Loy] Henderson, I am motivated by the same spirit of friendly frank-
the
ness as that which I find reflected in your letter.
.
ange
The Government and people of the United States historically have
cherished and still have deep feelings of friendliness for Iran and the
fore
f the
Iranian people. They sincerely hope that Iran will be able to maintain
tored
its independence and that the Iranian people will be successful in
sical
realizing their national aspirations and in developing a contented and
free nation which will contribute to world prosperity and peace.
e for
It was primarily because of that hope that the United States Gov-
Fling
ernment during the last two years has made earnest efforts to assist in
eliminating certain differences between Iran and the United Kingdom
which have arisen as a result of the nationalization of the Iranian oil
industry. It has been the belief of the United States that the reach-
ing of an agreement in the matter of compensation would strengthen
confidence throughout the world in the determination of Iran fully to
adhere to the principles which render possible a harmonious com-
munity of free nations; that it would contribute to the strengthening
of the international credit standing of Iran; and that it would lead to
On the solution of some of the financial and economic problems at present
1952,
The failure of Iran and of the United Kingdom to reach an agree-
ment with regard to compensation has handicapped the Government
osals of the United States in its efforts to help Iran. There is a strong feeling
in the United States, even among American citizens most sympathetic
to Iran and friendly to the Iranian people, that it would not be fair
to the American taxpayers for the United States Government to
sed to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as
pret Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil and oil
products if a reasonable agreement were reached with regard to
compensation whereby the large-scale marketing of Iranian oil would
etary
rence,
short
rkets
1952 facing Iran.
egh
ppar
ne
On
efully
g the
ne de
1952
,
Is the
s the
eft to
1
? Ibid., pp. 75–76.
$ in-
2272
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
re
se
es
m
Secretary of State stated on July 28, 1953, that the growing activities of the illegal
assistance (ibid., Aug. 10, 1953, p. 178). With the change of government in Iran
sponding to an appeal af Aug. 26, 1953, by the Prime Minister, General Fazlollah
be resumed. Similarly, many American citizens would be deeply 54
opposed to the purchase by the United States Government of Iranian
oil in the absence of an oil settlement.
There is also considerable sentiment in the United States to the
effect that a settlement based on the payment of compensation merely
for losses of the physical assets of a firm which has been nationalized th
would not be what might be called a reasonable settlement and that
an agreement to such a settlement might tend to weaken mutualth
trust between free nations engaged in friendly economic intercourse A
Furthermore, many of my countrymen who have kept themselves q!
informed regarding developments in this unfortunate dispute believe
that, in view of the emotions which have been aroused both in Iran
and the United Kingdom, efforts to determine by direct negotiation b
the amount of compensation due are more likely to increase friction by
than to promote understanding. They continue to adhere to the pa
opinion that the most practicable and the fairest means of settling
the question of compensation would be for that question to be referred
to some neutral international body which could consider on the basis lo
of merit all claims and counter-claims.
fo
I fully understand that the Government of Iran must determine for PE
itself which foreign and domestic policies are likely to be most advan-
tageous to Iran and to the Iranian people. In what I have written
,
I am not trying to advise the Iranian Government on its best interests. PO
I am merely trying to explain why, in the circumstances, the Govern-
ment of the United States is not presently in a position to extend more
aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil.
C
In case Iran should so desire, the United States Government hopes PI
to be able to continue to extend technical assistance and military aid C
on a basis comparable to that given during the past year.
pe
I note the concern reflected in your letter at the present dangerous
be
situation in Iran and sincerely hope that before it is too late, the
th
Government of Iran will take such steps as are in its power to prevent
fo
a further deterioration of that situation.
Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
1 A similar attitude was expressed in a statement by the Department of State
on Mar. 20, 1952 (Department of State Bulletin, Mår. 31, 1952, p. 494). The
Communist Party in Iran (the Tudeh Party) and the toleration of those activities
by the Iranian Government were causing much concern to the U.S. Government,
and that these developments made it more difficult for the U.S. to grant Tran
in August 1953, and a more hopeful approach to a settlement, the President, men
immediate assistance to Iran' on an emergency basis. The Foreign Operation,
400,000 for technical and economic aid during the 1954 fiscal year. The offer
was accepted (ibid., Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 349–350).
81
81
m
IS
te
T
n
9
Une
maisons
b
C
E
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2273
'anian
le lor
negotiating delegations in Tehran and by the British Embassy and Iranian
Government, Aug. 5, 1954; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954
(New York, 1955), pp. 387-388.
keeph 54. SETTLEMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY: Joint Statement by
the Government of Iran and the Oil Consortium, August 5,
1954 1
o the
nerely The Iranian Government, the National Iranian Oil Company and
alized the negotiators representing a consortium of 8 oil companies have
I that reached accord on necessary points of an agreement which will restore
lutual the flow of Iranian oil to world markets in substantial quantities.
An essential part of the consortium agreement was settlement of the
selves question of compensation to [the] Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. A
elieve separate announcement has been made in this respect.?
The agreement must now be put into proper legal form, approved
iation by the Boards of Directors of the participating companies, and signed
by the parties concerned. It will then be submitted for enactment as
o the part of the law of Iran and for formal approval of the Shah. It is
estimated that these requirements can be concluded in about two
erred months, after which large volumes of Iranian oil will once again be
basis loaded at Iran's great oil ports at Abadan and Bandar Mashur bound
for the consuming and refining centers of the world. In the interim
e for period, preparations for resumption of activities will commence.
lvan- Two operating companies will be formed to operate the oil fields
itten, and refinery. These companies will receive the necessary rights and
powers from the government and the National Iranian Oil Company
and exercise them on their behalf to the extent specified in the agree-
ment. The consortium companies will pay the National Iranian Oil
Company for all the oil required for export and sell the crude and
LOPES products exported. Provision is made for the National Iranian Oil
gaid Company to take crude oil in kind, in lieu of payments, up to 1272
percent of total exports. Products for consumption within Iran will
be available to the National Iranian Oil Company at substantially
their cost. The agreement covers a period of 25 years, with provisions
for three 5-year extensions.
my
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 16, 1954, pp. 232-233.
issued by Dr. Ali Amini
, representing Iran, and' Howard Page, chairman of the in-
ternational consortium. For a separate statement by Mr. Page, see ibid., p. 233.
The agreement became effective on Oct. 29, 1954. For a summary of the agree-
ments among the companies forming the consortium, see ibid., Dec. 27, 1954, pp.
Following the change of government in Iran (August 1953), the Secretary of
State, in October 1953, sent Herbert Hoover, Jr.
, his adviser on problems dealing
with worldwide petroleum affairs
, to explore the Iranian oil situation (ibid.,
Oct. 26, 1953, p. 553). The Secretary of State remarked on Apr. 10, 1954, that the
1. Government was taking satisfaction in the fact that negotiations would soon
begin between the Iranian Government and representatives of oil companies from
several countries having as their purpose the resumption of large-scale oil produc-
tion in Iran. He noted that the U.S. Government was not directly involved in the
commercial negotiations but would observe them with great interest (ibid., Apr. 19,
See the communiqué and joint statement issued by the British and Iranian
40
rests.
vern-
more
.
TOUS
the
vent
The statement was
State
The
Ilegal
wities
nent,
Iran
Iran
t, re.
ollah
n for
tions
323,
offer
1954, p. 583).
415900--57-Vol. 2
2274
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
m
se
.
SIĘ
8
of
Through payments to [the] National Iranian Oil Company and ap-
plication of Iranian tax laws it has been estimated that total direct se
income to Iran from increased scale of operations for the first 3 full Je
years, following a starting up period of 3 months, will be 150 million A
pounds on the basis of present prices and costs. The estimated figures R
begin at 31 million pounds for the first full year of operation, increasing
to 67 million pounds for the third.
The National Iranian Oil Company will continue to operate the 55
Naft-I-Shah oil field and Kermanshah refinery to produce a part of
Iran's own oil needs, and will continue to handle the distribution of ou
products in Iran.
The National Iranian Oil Company will also be responsible for all
facilities and services not directly a part of producing, refining and
transportation operations of the operating companies. These will
St
include such functions as industrial training, public transport, road
maintenance and facilities such as housing, medical care and social
welfare. The National Iranian Oil Company will be reimbursed for a
major part of the cost of such facilities and services by the operating
companies, with whom close cooperation will be maintained.
Production of crude oil from Iran, following a starting up period of
three months, will be increased progressively, bringing total exports of
crude and products to a minimum of eighty million cubic meters (78
million tons; 500 million barrels) for the first three year period. In
addition some five million cubic meters will be produced for internal he
consumption. Following the third year it would be the policy of the T
consortium companies to continue taking quantities of crude oil which
would reasonably reflect the supply and demand trend for Middle ti
East crude oil, assuming favorable operating and economic conditions
in Iran.
Large scale operations at the Abadan refinery will be resumed as
quickly as possible. It is expected that, again following the initial th
period of three months a total of nearly 35 million cubic meters (30 ht
million tons; 220 million barrels) of crude will be processed for export
during the first three years of operation. Of this, some 15 million U
cubic meters (13 million tons; 94 million barrels) will be processed dur-
ing the last three years, a rate which will once again establish Abadan's
output as the largest in the Eastern Hemisphere, despite sharp in-
creases in refinery capacity in that area during the last three years
.
The two operating companies will be organized by the consortium
and will carry on operations in Iran within a specified area. One of
the companies will deal primarily with exploration and production
the other with refining. The companies will be registered in Iran and
have their management and operating headquarters there. They
will be incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands. There will
be seven directors of each company, two of whom will be named by
Iran and five
by the consortium. Operating data and records of the
companies will be available to Iran and the National Iranian Oil
Company.
an
01
ti
ik
a
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2275
d ap-
The consortium is expected to consist of the Gulf Oil Corporation,
direct Socony Vacuum Oil Company Incorporated, Standard Oil (New
3 ful Jersey), Standard Oil Company California, the Texas Company, the
illion Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Compagnie Française de Petroles and
gures Royal Dutch/Shell.
asing
the
rt of
of di
55. UNITED STATES GRATIFICATION OVER THE SETTLE-
MENT: Message From the President of the United States to
the Shah of Iran, August 5, 1954 1
rall
and
will
road
ocial
Cor &
ting
d of
S of
(78
In
rnal
the
nich
Adle
Your IMPERIAL MAJESTY: The important news that your Govern-
ment, in negotiation with the British, French, Dutch and United
States oil companies, has reached, in principle, a fair and equitable
settlement to the difficult oil problem is indeed gratifying.
Your Majesty must take great satisfaction at the success of this
significant phase in the negotiations to which you personally have made
& valuable contribution. I am confident that implementation of this
agreement, under Your Majesty's leadership, will mark the beginning
of a new era of economic progress and stability for your country.
Like myself, all Americans have a deep concern for the well-being
of Iran. With them I have watched closely your courageous efforts,
your steadfastness over the past difficult years, and with them I too
have hoped that you might achieve the goals you so earnestly desire.
The attainment of an oil settlement along the lines which have been
announced should be a significant step in the direction of the realiza-
tion of your aspirations for your people.
There is concrete evidence of the friendship that exists between
our two countries and of our desire that Iran prosper independently
in the family of free nations. We have endeavored to be helpful in
the form of economic and technical assistance and we are happy to
have helped in finding a solution to the oil problem.
I can assure Your
Majesty of the continued friendly interest of the
United States in the welfare and progress of Iran, and of the admira-
tion of the American people for your enlightened leadership.
With sincere best wishes for the health and happiness of Your
Majesty and the people of Iran.
ODS
+
9S
tia)
(30
ort
ion
ul-
n's
in-
im
of
on,
nd
ey
ill
by
he
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 16, 1954, p. 230.
The letter was released
to the press on Aug. 5. For the Shah's reply, released
to the press on Aug. 9, see
ibid., Aug. 23, 1954, p. 266. For further statements and
exchanges relative to the
agreement, see ibid., Aug. 23, 1954, pp. 266-267, and Nov. 8, 1054, p. 683.
2276
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1855
2
F. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND CLAIMS
Cyprus
56. UNITED STATES HOPES FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE
CYPRUS ISSUE AS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY: Note
From the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of Greece,
Released September 18, 1955 1
I have followed with concern the dangerous deterioration of Greek-
Turkish relations caused by the Cyprus question. Regardless of the
causes of this disagreement, which are complex and numerous, I believe
that the unity of the North Atlantic community, which is the basis
of our common security, must be restored without delay.
Since the time, almost a decade ago, when Communist expansion
first posed a serious threat to the free world, the close and friendly
cooperation of Greece and Turkey has proved a powerful deterrent
to Communist ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean. In Korea,
Greek and Turkish troops fought valiantly, side by side, to repel the
Communist aggressors.
I cannot believe that in the face of this record of common achieve-
ment, any problem will long disrupt the course of Greek-Turkish
friendship. Nor can I believe that the unhappy events of the past
two weeks will reverse policies of cooperation which were initiated
twenty-five years ago under the far-sighted leadership of Eleftherios
Venizelos and Kemal Ataturk.
Since 1947 the United States has made very considerable efforts
to assist Greece and Turkey to maintain their freedom and to achieve
greater social and economic progress. We have extended this assist
ance and extend it now---because we believe that the partnership
of Greece and Turkey constitutes a strong bulwark of the free world in
a critical area.
If that bulwark should be materially weakened, the consequences
could be grave indeed. I urge you therefore to make every effort to
assure that the effectiveness of your
partnership is not impaired by
present disagreements.
I am confident that the spirit of close cooperation that Greece and
Turkey have so often demonstrated in the past as fellow members
of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and
the Balkan Alliance 2 will enable you to transcend immediate differ
ences in the interests of free world unity.
An identic note
,
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 26, 1955, p. 496.
mutatis mutandis,
was sent to the Prime Minister of Turkey (ibid., pp. 496–197)
2 Treaties of Feb. 28, 1953, and Aug. 9, 1954; supra, pp. 1233-1239.

U.
R.
S.
S.
A F G H Α Ν Ι S Τ Α Ν
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.
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Rawalpindi
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XX.COM
XARROS
415900 O - 57 ( Face p. 2276)
N
NARR
DOOR
International boundary, demarcated
International boundary, undemarcated
International boundary, indefinite
Jammu and Kashmir boundary
Provincial boundary
the testing by swasta**
eses ***
3 by
vetu
12456 10-52
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2277
3
Committee and in the Assembly. Ambassador Lodge stated in the General
Committee on Sept. 21, among other things, that "the primary purpose of the
of international disputes. We do not believe that the inscription of the Cyprus
Bulletin, Oct. 3, 1955, pp. 545-546). The General Committee decided at its
57. INAPPROPRIATENESS OF UNITED NATIONS CON-
SIDERATION OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION: United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 814 (IX), December 17, 1954 1
The General Assembly,
Considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate
to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus,
Decides not to consider further the item entitled “Application,
under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population
of the Island of Cyprus"?
Kashmir
58. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR
DISPUTE, 1947-1952 (Excerpt)
When India and Pakistan attained independence and dominion
status on August 15, 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir
was one of about 560 such states whose status was left undetermined,
Under the Indian Independence Act, these states could decide whether
to join India or Pakistan. For most of these states, geographical
proximity to one of the dominions, as well as preponderance of either
Hindu or Moslem population, made the decision relatively easy.
MU.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21
(A/2890), p. 5. In support of the draft resolution in Committee I on Dec. 14,
Ambassador Lodge stated that "prolonged consideration" of the Cyprus question
in the United Nations would only increase tensions and embitter national feelings
at a time when the larger interests of all concerned are best served by strengthening
existing solidarity among freedom-loving nations” (Department of State Bulletin,
Jan. 3, 1955, pp. 31-32). For background discussion of this issue, see United
States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress
for the Year 1954 (Department of State publication 5769; 1955), pp. 58–62.
* The United States opposed the inscription of the Cyprus matter (item 58)
on the agenda of the General Assembly in September 1955, both
in the General
”
agenda
, and the General Assembly upheld the recommendation at its 521st
Article by Frank D. Collins, Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 27, 1952, pp.
item
102d
2278
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
F
to
LAS
a
C
I
3 U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Supplement for November
1948 (S/1100); ibid., Fourth Year, Supplement for January 1949 (S/1196); ibid,
Since Kashmir lies between India and Pakistan and has a mixed
population, it became the scene of armed conflict soon after partition
În January 1948 the dispute was brought before the Security Council
and in this month the Council established the United Nations Com
mission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). A year later UNCIP
succeeded in obtaining the agreement of both India and Pakistan to
a cease-fire and to the general principles under which a truce (1.e., &
plan for the withdrawal of the armed forces from the area) and a
plebiscite under U.N. auspices might be carried out. This agreement
was formalized in the "UNCIP resolution" of January 5, 1949. On
March 21, 1949, the U.N. Secretary-General named Fleet Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz as administrator of the projected plebiscite to be
held under the terms of the January 5 resolution.
During 1949 and 1950 UNCIP, Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton
of Canada, acting under special temporary authorization of the
Security Council, and Sir Owen Dixon 5 of Australia, designated as
successor to UNCIP, tried unsuccessfully to bring about a settlement.
In January 1951 efforts of the London Conference of Commonwealth
Prime Ministers failed to break the impasse on demilitarization
,
When the Security Council met on February 21, 1951, the United
States joined the United Kingdom in submitting a joint draft resolu-
tion. The resolution provided for the appointment of another U.N.
representative to succeed Sir Owen Dixon and instructed him to effect
demilitarization on the basis of the proposals made by Sir Owen, with
appropriate modifications, and to present to India and Pakistan
detailed plans for carrying out a plebiscite. The representative was
directed to report to the Security Council 3 months after undertaking
negotiations with the governments on the subcontinent.
To accomplish this task the draft resolution authorized the new
representative to take into account such possibilities as (1) the prom
vision of U.N. Forces to facilitate demilitarization and the holding of
a plebiscite; (2) the assignment to the loser in the plebiscite of local
areas, contiguous to its frontier, in which the vote had been over
whelmingly in the loser's favor; (3) different degrees of supervision as
might be appropriate in different areas. Finally, the resolution called
upon both India and Pakistan to accept arbitration on all unresolved
points which remained after their discussions with the U.N. repre-
sentative and which the latter designated as points of difference.
Both parties objected to certain parts of the resolution. Pakistan
objected to the clause concerning boundary adjustments because i
could mean a partial partition and was, in Pakistan's view, a com
travention of the January 5, 1949, agreement. India took exception
1 U.N. Security Council Resolution of Jan. 20, 1948 (S/INF/2, July 18, 1949
pp. 21-23).
2 U.N. doc. S/1196, Jan. 10, 1949, pp. 4-6.
U mom
h
I
d
WI
8.
re
0
b
P
re
$
a
S.
th
U
PE
d
re
a
tr
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ti
ag
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no
No. S//
4 Ibid., Fifth Year, Supplement for January-May 1950 (S/1453),
See also
' U.N. Security Council Resolution, Mar. 14, 1950; S/INF/4, Feb.
1951, pp. 11-12.
5 Ibid., Supplement for September-December 1950 (S/1791).
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2279
ked
LOD.
neil
m.
CIP
to
8
ai
95
2 U.N. doc. S/2375, Oct. 15, 1951.
1 U.N. doc. S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, pp. 4-6.
3 Ibid., annex 2, pp. 41-43.
to a number of aspects of the resolution, particularly the provisions
for arbitration and for the possible entry of U.N. troops. As a result
of the objections by both sides, the United States and the United
Kingdom presented on March 21 a revised resolution which directed
the U.N. representative to effect demilitarization on the basis of the
January 5, 1949 resolution to which both parties had agreed. This
new draft, however, retained in its preamble the original reference to
0 the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and also included the arbitration
ent
provision. Pakistan accepted the resolution, but India rejected it.
On The Security Council approved the resolution (S/2017/Rev. 1) on
T! March 30, 1951,1 by a vote of 8 to 0 with three abstentions (India,
be
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia).
On April 30 the Council appointed Dr. [Frank P.] Graham, former
OD
U.S. Senator from North Carolina, as U.N. representative for India
the and Pakistan. Thus began the most recent phase of the Kashmir
negotiations. These negotiations fall into four periods, at the end
ent. of each of which Dr. Graham reported to the Security Council.
lth
FIRST REPORT, JULY-OCTOBER 1951
On October 15 Dr. Graham submitted his first report to the
Security Council.2 When he arrived on the subcontinent in July,
he reported, he found an atmosphere of hostility. The press in both
India and Pakistan had begun a barrage of charges and counter-
ith
charges which had given rise to considerable tension. Dr. Graham
decided to adopt the procedure of separate, informal conversations
with officials of the two governments. On September 7 he submitted
ing
a 12-point draft proposal on demilitarization to the governments and
requested their comments. He was able to obtain the agreement
of the parties to four of the 12 points. (It should be mentioned that
both parties had previously committed themselves to these four
points under the January 5, 1949 agreement.) In addition to
reaffirming their determination not to resort to force, to avoid warlike
statements, and to observe the cease-fire the parties reaffirmed their
led
acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the
red
state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided
through the democratic
method of a free and impartial plebiscite under
U.N. auspices. The points of difference under the remaining eight
proposals
, according to Dr. Graham, centered around the period of
.it
demilitarization, the withdrawal of troops, the size of the forces to
remain on each side of the cease-fire line, and the question of whether
a date should be set for the formal induction of the Plebiscite Adminis-
trator. Dr. Graham reported that because of the situation pre-
vailing on the subcontinent, he had not been able to effect
demilitariza-
tion within the prescribed time limit. He added, however, that
agreement was still possible, and suggested that the Security Council
consider instructing him to implement its decision by continuing the
negotiations with the two governments, such negotiations to be
OII.
ted
lu-
N.
ect
tan
VAS
el
10-
of
cal
er
AS
T'e
18]
11
01]
149
ber
ili
1
2280
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
]
1
1
{
The Indian Government had insisted
4 United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to
the Congress for the Year 1948 (Department of State publication 3437; 1949,
carried out at the seat of the Council. Dr. Graham suggested that
he be instructed to report to the Security Council again within 6
weeks from the time negotiations were resumed.
On October 18 Dr. Graham made a statement to the Security
Council ' explaining his report and paying high tribute to the late
Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who had been assassinated
2 days earlier at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Later in the month the
Security Council moved to Paris, where discussions were resumed co
November 10. At this meeting the United States joined the United
Kingdom in sponsoring a resolution which noted with approval the
basis for a program of demilitarization put forward by Dr. Graham,
and instructed him to continue his efforts to obtain agreement on a
demilitarization plan. In addition, the resolution instructed Dr
Graham to report to the Security Council within 6 weeks, giving his
views on the problems confided to him. The resolution was approved
by a vote of 9 to 0 with two abstentions (India and U.S. S. R.)?
SECOND REPORT, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1951
On December 18 Dr. Graham reported the results of his 6-week
negotiations at Paris. He stated that his procedure had been, first
to try to reach an agreement between the parties on his 12-point
proposals of September 7, 1951. Failing this, he hoped to obtain
each party's plans for demilitarization under the UNCIP resolutions of
August 13, 1948,4 and January 5, 1949, in order to establish the points
of difference in interpretation and execution of those resolutions that
must be resolved before such demilitarization could be carried out.
Under the first point of that procedure Dr. Graham had endeavored
to narrow the differences to two fundamental issues:
(1) the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the
cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization period;
(2) the date on which the Government of India would cause the
Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted into office.
On December 7 Dr. Graham presented to the parties a statement
and questionnaires relating to these issues. Informal conversations
were held separately with the two delegations by Gen. Jacob Deven
U.N. military adviser to Dr. Graham. Dr. Graham
reported that the
disparity between the number and character of the forces which each
party proposed should be left at the end of the demilitarization period
had been so wide that agreement on the whole plan could not be
reached at that stage. In addition, agreement on the important
question concerning the date of induction of the Plebiscite
Admin-
1 For excerpts from this statement, see Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 4
1951, pp. 740-745.
2 Ú.N. doc. S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, pp. 7-8.
3 U.N. doc. S/2448, Dec. 19, 1951, pp. 8-14.
$
t
O
pp. 250-252; see also pp. 78-79.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2281
reek
ment of the Kashmir question? It is not difficult to understand that the explana-
thet that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as
in 6 conditions in the state permitted of a start being made with the
arrangements for carrying out a plebiscite. The Pakistan Govern-
urity ment had attached much importance to the appointment of the
late Plebiscite Administrator to office "as much in advance of the final day
ated of demilitarization as possible.'
the Dr. Graham pointed out that agreement had been obtained on 4
I ch more of his 12 demilitarization proposals of September 7, 1951, and
ited suggested some revisions of the 4 remaining points, i. e., proposals 5,
the
6, 7, and 10. Of these the most significant was his revision of proposal
am, 7 on troop numbers; he suggested that ". there will reniain on
11 8 each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed
Dr.
forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on
his
each side of the cease-fire line on January 1, 1949."
ved The Security Council resumed its hearings on January 17, 1952.
On that date Dr. Graham formally submitted his report and after dis-
cussing his negotiations made a strong plea to India and Pakistan to
arrive at a settlement of this long standing dispute. He stated his
view that agreement on proposals 7 and 10 (troop numbers and date of
ist
,
appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator) would be the linchpin
vint
binding all 12 proposals together in an effectively integrated program
cain
and would prepare the way for the plebiscite. The plebiscite," Dr.
sof
Graham stated, "would keep the promise made to the people of
ents
Jammu and Kashmir, who are worthy of the right of their own self-
hat determination through a free, secure, and impartial plebiscite.” (U.N.
doc. S/PV 570.) He remarked further:
red
The people of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and impartial plebiscite would
signal through the darkness of these times a ray of hope that not by bullets but by
ballots, not through the conflict of armies but through cooperation of peoples, is
the the enduring way for people to determine their own destiny and way of life
On the subcontinent of India and Pakistan today, the place, the time, the oppor-
the
tunity and the leadership have met in one of the great junctures of human history,
for the possible weal or woe of the peoples of the world.
Immediately following the introductory statement by Dr. Graham,
Jacob Malik, the U.S.S.R. representative, indicated he would like to
speak briefly. His statement came after the Soviet Union had main-
IS
tained a virtual silence for 4 years in the Security Council on the Kash-
mir question. After noting that the United States and the United
Kingdom had been particularly active in the Council's consideration
od
of the Kashmir issue, Mr. Malik stated:
What is the reason why the Kashmir question is still unsettled and why the
plans put forward by the United States of America and the United Kingdom in
connection with Kashmir have proved fruitless from the point of view of a settle-
5. ture of an annexationist, imperialist nature,
because they are not based on the effort
United States of America and the United Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kash-
The purpose of these plans is interference by the
mir
; the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question
of Kashmir and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States
D) of America and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering it s'assistance
through the United Nations.". Finally, the purpose of these plans in connection
de
ent
DIS
che
ch
be
ent
11.
ed
to achieve a real settlement.
2282
1950–1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
hi
ol
T
gc
DI
bi
he
re
K
ti
of
fa
ni
pl
21 Savage
R
with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the
territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a
military and strategic base.
The United States of America and the United Kingdom are taking all steps to
exclude a settlement of the question of the status of Kashmir by means of a free
and unconstrained declaration by the people of Kashmir themselves. When in
October 1950 it became known that the General Council of the "All Jammu and
Kashmir National Conference” had adopted a resolution recommending the con-
vening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the future shape
and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United States of America
and the United Kingdom immediately interfered in the matter so as not to allow
the people of Kashmir to decide their own future and determine the affiliations of
their country independently. They hastened to foist upon the Security Council
a resolution in which it was stated that the convening of a Constituent Assembly in
Kashmir and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the
future shape and affiliation of Kashmir or any part thereof would not constitute a
disposition of Kashmir.
The U.S.S.R. representative concluded by proposing the following
solution:
The U.S.S.R. Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved
successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the
question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without outside inter-
ference. This can be achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent As-
sembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people.
Both the U.S. and U.K. representatives challenged the Soviet
charges. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the U.K. representative, stated:
I should merely like to say that the really extraordinary fantasies apparently
entertained by our Soviet friend and colleague in regard to the Kashmir dispute
are typical, as I think, of the whole Soviet approach to international problemas
.
Whatever the dispute' before us, the first thing to do is, it seems, to discover
how and why it is part of an anti-Soviet plot designed merely to advance the cause
of the ruling circles of the United States and of the United Kingdom with the
object of clamping down an Anglo-American domination or dictatorship on &
suffering world. Any attempt by the Security Council to deal with the dispute
by applying principles of reason must, unless, of course, it is concurred in by the
Soviet Government, be viewed in the light of those general principles; and it is
by such a process of reasoning, if it can indeed be so termed, that the Soviet
Government comes to the conclusion that, for instance, the Kashmir dispute
has been invented and subsequently carefully fostered by the diabolical Anglo
Americans for the one end of turning Kashmir into an Anglo-American armed
camp full of imperialistic troops destined for an eventual invasion of the Soviet
Union.
No doubt there are people who can be persuaded to believe this, just as there
are people who could believe that, for instance, a United Nations mission to
totalitarianism or on a Marxist society. It is possible to believe that; and people
indeed, can always be found who will believe anything. But when it comes to
accusing our friend, Mr. Graham, of being the secret agent of the Pentagon
well, that should, i think, cause 'even the most ingenuous to sit up and think
and think.
Surely the Kashmir dispute is capable of being considered with some degree of
objectivity, and surely the dictates of reason, if they are firmly and consistently
fostered by this Council, will, one day, succeed in enabling the two great nation
involved to agree on a settlement which will be satisfactory to both and which
will, or which may, relieve even
the Soviet Union of the nightmares which not
seem to surround its contemplation of this long-standing dispute.
Si
' ದ
SE
S
e
f
a
(
+
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2283
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 783–786.
the
nda
is to
free
nin
and
COD.
lape
rica
llow
s of
nci
yin
the
tea
ing
ved
the
er-
As-
.
iet
The U.S. representative, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, associated
himself with the remarks of the U.K. representative and further
observed:
The attacks on Mr. Graham do not merit a reply and do not require a denial.
The dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir is one which my
government earnestly hopes to see settled in accordance with United Nations
principles and in accordance with agreements already reached between the parties.
I think it would serve no useful purpose to continue the debate at this time. The
business before the Security Council, as the representative of the United Kingdom
has already said, is to give the most careful and respectful consideration to the
report which has just been given to us by the representative of the Council. My
Government will give it the attention which it deserves.
At the meeting of the Security Council on January 30 Sir Zafrullah
Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, spoke in part as follows:
At the meeting of the Security Council held on January 17, 1952, a representa-
tive of the U.S.S.R. referred to certain press reports relating to the granting
of military bases in Kashmir to the United States. I wish to state clearly and
with authority that these reports relied upon by him for his statement are utterly
false and without any foundation whatsoever. We have neither been asked for,
nor have we offered, any military or other bases to the U.S. or any other
power. .
Throughout this controversy, India, Pakistan, and the Security Council have
been agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan
or India should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial
plebiscite. This fundamental principle is embodied in the preamble to the
Security Council Resolution of April 21, 1948,1 and in clause I of the Commission's
Resolution of January 5, 1949. (U.N. doc. S/PV 571.)
Sir Gladwyn then stated his Government's view that Dr. Graham
pay a further visit to the subcontinent to attempt to bring
about a solution of the two outstanding points of difference. Ambas-
sador Gross supported this suggestion, as did the majority of the
Security Council members.
The following day, the Indian representative, Mr. Motilal Setalvad,
expressed India's willingness to continue the discussions under Dr.
Graham's direction and stated:
I have already declared that India is anxious to settle the Kashmir dispute
quickly and peacefully. This is so not only because India is anxious that the
delay
, to determine freely their own future
, but also because we most earnestly
desire to prepare the way for firm and lasting friendship with our neighbor,
Pakistan. It is no less to our interest than to the interest of Pakistan, and tó
the interest of the world, that these two countries which have so much in common
should live side by side in complete amity, each fully sovereign but both fully
and wholeheartedly in cooperation in the pursuit of the common task of peace
and progress. This is no language of convention but the free expression of a
deep and sincere sentiment. It seems to be the sense of the Council that the
negotiations should be continued under the auspices of the U.N. representative
to find a settlement of the differences that still divide India
and Pakistan over
certain parts of Mr. Graham's plan. India has no objection to this course and
would cooperate in finding a settlement in the spirit that I have just described.
tly
should
uite
ns.
ter
ise
Che
8
ate
he
s
het
te
a
ed
et
TC
to
3D
0
k
of
J
$
(U.N. doc. S/PV 572.)
The President of the Security Council, Jean Chauvel, speaking, as
the representative of France, stated that "it was the sense” of the
2284
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1
ant
roi
on
2
Security Council that the U.N. representative, acting under the res.
olutions of March 30, 1951,' and November 10, 1951, was authorized par
without any new decision by the Council to continue his efforts to the
fulfill his mission and submit his report, which the Council hoped
would be final within 2 months. The Soviet representative objected
to this decision and indicated that "if such a proposal or conclusion Fc
is submitted to a vote the delegation of the Soviet Union will abstain."
THIRD REPORT, DECEMBER 1951-APRIL 1952
de
of
Following this Security Council debate and some discussions in
Paris with the parties, Dr. Graham departed for New Delhi, where
he arrived on February 29 and remained until March 25. His third
ph
report was submitted to the Security Council on April 22, 1952.
At New Delhi Dr. Graham continued his previous procedure of
separate negotiations with the parties, having concluded that a meet- ati
ing with representatives of the two Governments was inadviseble
by
before sufficient preliminary agreement had been reached to insure ste
positive results from a joint conference. This round of negotiations loc
had two purposes: To assist the parties in removing the obstacles still
blocking agreement on the proposals submitted to them and to ob
tain, if possible, further withdrawals of troops from the state of No
Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line.
In
He reported that the Government of India maintained its position
concerning the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of
the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, i. e, D
21,000 regular Indian army forces plus 6,000 state militia, on ag
Indian side and, on the Pakistan side, a force of 4,000 men normally
resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of
of Azad Kashmir. The Indian Government, Dr. Graham stated
, pr
considered that the questions of a definite period for demilitarization
and of a date for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Adminis- de
trator could be settled without difficulty, provided agreement was th
reached on the scope of demilitarization and the number of forces to
remain at the end of the demilitarization period.
du
Pakistan, Dr. Graham stated, accepted the four remaining points to
of his 12-point demilitarization proposals, i. e., 5, 6, 7, and 10, with
certain qualifications regarding the character of the forces to be de-
pr
militarized. In his view the demilitarization of the state had reached
a stage at which further reductions of troops were directly related to oi
the preparation of a plebiscite. Accordingly, he deemed it necessary
that
the Plebiscite Administrator-designate should be associated with
him in his studies and the consideration of common problems. Dr
:
th
Graham recommended that both parties should undertake to reduce
the forces under their control in the state and that the U.N. repre-
G
sentative's negotiations with the two Governments should be colla
tinued with a view to
va
nu
DU
ISO
SI
st
re
t
SE
1 U.N. doc. S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, pp. 4-6.
2 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
3 U.N. doc. S/2611, Apr. 22, 1952.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2285
" U.N. doc. S/2783, Sept. 19, 1952.
& res
ected
sure
>
(a) resolving the remaining difficulties on the 12 proposals submitted to the
rized / parties
, with special reference to the number of forces to be left on each side of
ts to the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and
(1) the general implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948,
oped
and January 5, 1949.
Tsico FOURTH REPORT, MAY-SEPTEMBER 1952
ain."
Dr. Graham, in a letter dated May 29, 1952, informed the Presi-
dent of the Security Council that, in agreement with the Governments
of India and Pakistan, the negotiations on the question of the state
$ in of Jammu and Kashmir had been renewed and that at the appropri-
here
ate moment he would report to the Council on the outcome of that
hird
phase of negotiations.
His fourth report, submitted on September 16, detailed the recent
round of negotiations held at New York and Geneva. He had first
et attempted to bridge the remaining differences between the parties
able
by proposing bracketed figures of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on Paki-
stan's side and 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side to break the dead-
ion lock on the number of troops. As he was unable to obtain agreement
still
on this suggestion, he submitted another draft proposal on September
ob-
2 which fixed the figures at 6,000 and 18,000 excluding Gilgit and
Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side and the state militia on the
Indian side. Pakistan accepted this proposal, with certain reser-
convations, India did not.
e of
Concluding that he could not obtain agreement on fixed figures,
. Dr. Graham decided it might be possible for the two Governments to
the
alls
agree on certain principles which could serve as criteria for fixing the
number of forces in a conference of civil and military representatives
Ters of both sides. Instead of including a fixed troop quantum, his new
-ed
proposal, presented on September 4, provided that the minimum
number of forces to be maintained on each side of the cease-fire line be
defined as those "required for the maintenance of law and order and of
the cease-fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the pleb-
to | iscite.” In the case of India, the proposal added the phrase "with
e regard to the security of the state” and expanded the term “forces”
to include "Indian forces and state armed forces."
Dr. Graham reported the following reaction of the parties to this
le-
ed
proposal
: India, although it believed that the proposal contained
"the germs of a settlement," indicated it could not accept any equation
of its responsibilities with those of the local authorities on the Pakistan
th
side of the cease-fire line and insisted that the defense of the entire
OT
state is the concern of India. Pakistan objected to certain clauses in
proposals which it suggested should be eliminated to avoid the
recurrence of political controversies.
Dr. Graham stated that it was evident after 2 weeks of discussion at
Geneva that agreement could not be reached on any of the revised
drafts he presented. He attributed
the differences in the positions of
the parties to their differing concepts
of their status in the state and
stressed the importance of the induction into office of the Plebiscite
101
DIS-
Tas
due
ats
eth
to
the
ce
Il-
2286
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
or
- కొల్లా:
re
January 1949 4 resolutions; Part IV will summarize the negotiations
3 United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to
Administrator, a matter which he termed "the heart of the integrated P?
program for demilitarization and a plebiscite." He concluded by
expressing the view that to reach an agreement on a plan of demill-
tarization it is necessary either:
(a) to establish the character and number of forces to be left on each side of
the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization;
(b) to declare that the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at
end of the period of demilitarization should be determined in accordance with
the requirements of each area, and, accordingly, principles or criteria should be
established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives 34
of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the
Provisional Clause of the revised proposals.
P
59. FIFTH REPORT BY THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENT. 35
ATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN, MARCH 27, 1933K
(Excerpts)?
tie
1. In previous reports and statements to the Security Council the
United Nations Representative has reviewed the background, the
content and the steps in the acceptance of the twelve proposals for a
plan of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
, first
submitted to the Governments of India and Pakistan on 7 September
1951.
2. This report should be read in connexion with the first (S/2375, and
Corr. 1), second (S/2448), third (S/2611) and fourth (S/2783) reports
of the United Nations Representative.
3. We shall in this report not review again the twelve proposals as a
whole but shall concentrate on proposal seven. Differences over
proposal seven continue on two issues (1) the number and (2) the
character of the forces to be left on the two sides of the cease-fire line
at the end of the period of demilitarization. In his efforts to assist
the two Governments to reach an agreement the United Nations
Representative has made six suggestions for the negotiation of the
parties, including the latest exploratory suggestions made in Geneva
,
În reviewing these suggestions and the present situation the report
will be in five parts.
4. Part I will review the suggestions regarding proposal seven
Part II will point out the values of the induction of the Plebiscite
Administrator into office at an early fixed time; Part III refers to
assurances and elucidations regarding the 13 August 19488 and
since the meeting of the Security Council on 23 December 1952; and
TE
1 Dr. Frank P. Graham.
2 U.N. doc. S/2967, Mar. 27, 1953.
pp. 250-252.
.4 U.N. doc. S/1196, Jan. 10, 1949, pp. 4-6.
38
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2287
the
with
be
Council informed of any progress.”
ated Part V will emphasize the importance to the people of the State, the
bor two nations, and the world of an agreement on the Kashmir dispute.
led
IV
A. CONVERSATIONS IN NEW YORK PRELIMINARY TO THE
CONFERENCE IN GENEVA
ive 34. These conversations were participated in, on the part of India,
the by Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, Minister, Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, and Mr. B. Rajan, Adviser; and, on the part of
Pakistan, by Mr. Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. A. A. Khan, Adviser.
7. 35. On 23 December 1952, following the presentation by the United
953 Kingdom and the United States of America of the joint draft resolu-
tion (S/2839), the Security Council at the 611th meeting adopted a
resolution (S/2883] which provided, inter alia, that:
the
"The Security Council
the
“Endorses the general principles on which the United Nations
irst
Representative has sought to bring about agreement between the
Governments of India and Pakistan;
"Urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into
immediate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations
Representative for India and Pakistan in order to reach agreement
on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-
fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, this number
the
to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the
Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000
armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, as
suggested by the United Nations Representative in his proposals
of 16 July 1952 (annex III of S/2783) such specific numbers to be
arrived at bearing in mind the principles
of criteria contained in
paragraph 7 of the United Nations Representative's proposal of 4
September 1952 (annex VIII of S/2783).
en;
"Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to report to
the Security Council not later than thirty days from the date of
the adoption of this resolution; and further requests the United
16
Nations Representative
for India and Pakistan to keep the Security
or &
ber
and
orts
S &
Ver
ine
sist
JIS
the
Vå.
ort
ite
to
DIIS
und
36. It will be recalled that:
India, stated inter alia:
Ito
() At the meeting of the Security Council of 23 December 1952
flith meeting] referred to above, Mr. Menon, the representative of
"The Government of India has already stated that it is unable
to accept the draft resolution now before the Security Council.
:9)
,
,
1950-1955
40
1
1
sta
by the UNCIP. This basis for the resumption of the negotiations
Nations Representative to the President of the Security Council,
2288
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, The Government of India is not prepared to be a party to any
talks on the basis suggested in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution
.
With these explicit reservations, however, the Government of
39
India would, in line with its readiness to explore all avenues leading
towards a peaceful settlement, be prepared to join and continue
In
in any talks in connexion with this dispute. If the Council
, in its
wisdom, still considers it useful or necessary to proceed with the
draft resolution we can only profoundly regret its decision."
(6) At another meeting of the Security Council held on 23 Decem
ber 1952 [610th meeting), Mr. Zafrulla Khan, the representative of Pa
Pakistan, stated inter alia:
"I should like to state, once again, that we are prepared to go
forward on the basis of the draft resolution now before the Security
Council, subject to the suggestions which I made when I last spoke
and which might improve the situation, as well as the possibilities
of reaching an agreement between the two sides.'
41.
37. The United Nations Representative invited the representatives
(1
of India and Pakistan to meet on 12 January 1953 in the United
Nations Headquarters in New York, in order to ascertain their att
:
tudes towards a renewal of the negotiations. At that meeting and 42
in those that followed it was evident that whereas the Government 19
Th
of Pakistan was prepared to comply with the resolution of the Security
Council of 23 December 1952 and to enter into immediate negotia-
tions on that basis, the Government of India remained unable to
accept the resolution as the basis for the resumption of negotiations
.
However, the representative of India confirmed that India was pre-
pared “to consider avenues of peaceful negotiations which did not
violate the basic principles and standards of the two resolutions of
the UNCIP”.
38. Following upon these conversations, the Governments of Indis
and Pakistan, on 23 January 1953, agreed that a meeting of repre,
sentatives of the two Governments at ministerial level should be held
43
under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India
and Pakistan in the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva
UI
beginning 4 February 1953, for the purpose of continuing
negotiations,
on the basis of the UNCIP's resolutions of 13 August 1948
gra
and 5 January 1949, bearing in mind the assurances, clarifications
and elucidations given to the Governments of India and Pakistan
44
will be without prejudice to a further consideration, should this
become necessary, of the twelve proposals of the United Nations (C
Representative)."
tiF
It was agreed also that a communication be sent by the United
ple
informing the Council of the agreement.
1 See document S/2910.
COL
the
on
B
im
CU
1
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2289
an
50
B, sub-paragraph 3, would take place.
cussion would be confined at least in the initial stages to the im-
B. CONFERENCE IN GENEVA FROM 4 TO 19 FEBRUARY 1953
any
101.
39. The Conference took place in Geneva from 4 to 19 February 1953.
of
40. The delegations of India and Pakistan were composed as follows:
ling
India:
nue
Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Ambassador, Governor of Bombay,
its
Leader
the
Mr. D. P. Dhar, Adviser
Mr. V. Shankar, Adviser
Mr. J. Kidwai, Adviser
of Pakistan:
Mr. Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Leader
Mr. Aftab A. Khan, Adviser
rity
Major-General K. H. Shakh, Senior Military Adviser
oke
Lieut. Colonel Mohammed Iqbal Khan, Junior Military Adviser
ties
41. The Conference in Geneva may be divided into two different
stages as follows:
Ives
(1) Consideration of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and
ited
etti
.
5 January 1949
5
and 42. The first meeting of the Conference took place on 4 February
Lent 1953 and was confined to discussion of the procedure to be followed.
rity The United Nations Representative made a statement (see annex III
tis to this report] ' in which he stated, inter alia:
to
"I should like to propose that we start with the examination of
the resolution of 13 August 1948, part by part. In this way we
may determine to what extent the resolution has already been
implemented, and define, as completely as possible, the obstacles
sof
which have until now impeded the implementation of those parts
which have not yet been carried into effect. I hope that with
dis
regard to each of such obstacles it will be possible for the Govern-
ments concerned to indicate the conditions under which the ob-
eld
stacles might be removed."
dia 13. It was agreed that (a) the discussion would start with the
consideration of part I (Cease-fire order) of the resolution of the
the UNCIP of 13 August 1948, followed by part II (Truce agreement)
of that resolution, and (b) the discussion of part II would be initiated
with consideration of paragraph A, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and para-
graph B, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and then, if agreement
were reached
on those points, examination of paragraph A, sub-paragraph 3, and
24. The representatives of India and Pakistan, assuming that part I
125 Cease-fire order) of the UNCIP's 13 August 1948 resolution had been
implemented, began discussion of part II. After the two representa-
ied
tives had expressed their points of view, it was agreed that the dis-
cil
,
ns.
Ore-
not
re-
V&
348
DUIS
1,21
DS
Not reprinted here.
415900-57-01. 2-41
2290
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
P
and order. The Commission will have observers stationed
Azad Kashmir forces cannot be differentiated from the Pakistae
Army of which they are, for all practical purposes, an integra
of 13 August 1948. The discussion was confined to paragraph A,
sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and paragraph B, sub-paragraphs 1 and ?
which read as follows:
UNCIP's resolution of 13 August 1948
"PART II
“Truce agreement
"A
"1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory &
the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change
in the situation since it was represented by the Government of
Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of
Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
"2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeator
to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir
of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident
therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
“B
"1. When the Commission shall have notified the Governa
ment of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals Ye
ferred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby termi
.
nating the situation which was represented by the Government
of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the pre-
sence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir
, and
further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agret
to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in
stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for å fical
settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmi
the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing
at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its
forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered
necessary to assist the local authorities in the observance of Ley
where it deems necessary.'
45. The positions of India and Pakistan in regard to the implements
tion of this part of the resolution were summarized by the two repre-
sentatives as follows:
India
“As regards the implementation of B. 1 and 2 of Part II of the
Resolution of the 13th August, 1948, India's position is that the
, ,
46
tin
se
tii
SO
to
sti
en
47
th
of
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2291
h
nd 2
rydd
Lange
nt of
t of
hmi
dent
ng.
part, and that their numbers, equipment and efficiency constitute
a threat to the security of the State. The implementation, there-
fore, by Pakistan of A. 1 and 2 of Part II of the resolution will not
materially diminish this threat which is aggravated by the ease
with which, owing to the proximity of Pakistan's military canton-
ments, these forces could be quickly reinforced by the Pakistan
army. So long as agreement regarding the complete disbanding
and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces is not reached, a truce
agreement cannot create the conditions for a final settlement of the
situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir'. India is, therefore,
unable to accept any reduction of its present forces except as part
of an overall arrangement which includes not only the withdrawal
of Pakistan troops, tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally
resident in the State who have entered for the purpose of fighting
but also agreement on the measures to be adopted for the complete
disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces" (see annex
IV, appendix).
Pakistan
"It will be seen that under the resolution the withdrawal of
Pakistan troops is contingent upon the withdrawal of the "bulk”
of the Indian Army (clause B (1)). The UNCIP had explained
that 'synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the
two Governments will be arranged between the respective High
Commands and the Commission'. (See paragraph 10 of appendix
I to the Commission's letter dated 27th August 1948 to the Foreign
Minister of Pakistan).
"It was reaffirmed by the Pakistan Delegation on 5 February
1953 that once a satisfactory truce agreement based on the above
principles was arrived at, the Government of Pakistan would
proceed to fulfill all the obligations that devolved on it.
"The problem thus resolved itself into one of securing India's
agreement to withdraw the bulk' of its forces from the State of
Jammu and Kashmir as provided for in Part II of the 13 August
1948 resolution” (see annex V, memorandum, paras. 4 and 5)...
46. The results of the meetings and conversations with the representa-
tives separately on this approach led the United Nations Repre-
sentative to the conclusion that agreement was not possible at that
time between the two Governments on a truce agreement based
solely on part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and it appeared
to him that the same difficulties that existed as early as 1949 were
still the main obstacles
in the way of carrying out the commitments
Teri
Sre
ermi
ment
pre-
and
1 the
grees
te in
final
imi,
sting
of its
ered
lar
oned
inta-
pre-
embodied in part II.
the
47 The United Nations Representative did not feel he could continue
this approach as the figures of troops proposed by the Government
of India for the withdrawal of the bulk of their Army were not such
the
stay
? Not reprinted here.
GTA!
2292
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
TE
at tă
PI
SI
ni
over four years for the fulfilment of the promise of a plebiscite under
be fulfilled for and by the people of this most ancient, beautiful and
as he could sponsor with Pakistan; nor were the figures suggested h
by Pakistan negotiable with India.
48. It was clear to the United Nations Representative, that this
5
approach would not lead to any fruitful result and, in accordance
with the terms of reference agreed upon between the two Gover-
ments for the Conference, further consideration of the twelve proposal
ensued.
(2) Further consideration of the twelve proposals
49. As the United Nations Representative has pointed out and as it
was borne out in the last discussions in the Security Council, the main 5
problem under the programme of demilitarization was the question
dealt with under paragraph 7 of his twelve proposals, that is to say,
the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the
cease-fire line at the end of a period of demilitarization.
50. The United Nations Representative, having met separately with
the representatives of India and Pakistan to discuss with each their
positions on this important matter, presented on 14 February 1953
to the two representatives for discussion, proposals (see annex II
to this report] 1 which contained, inter alia, in paragraph 7 specifice
figures for the forces on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the
period of demilitarization. The revised text of paragraph 7 appears
in annex II.
51. The positions of the representatives of India and Pakistan on these
proposals were set forth in their communications of 17 February 1953
(annexes IV and V to this report].
[For the position of India, see annex IV, memorandum.]
For the position of Pakistan, see annex V, memorandum, para. S.
52. After thorough consideration of these communications and
further conversations with the representatives of India and Pakistan
the United Nations Representative felt that there was no ground let
at that stage on which to continue the conference and therefore
, in
agreeement with the two representatives, he decided to conclude it
V. IN VIEW_OF THE CONTINUING DISAGREEMENT, IT IS TIMELT
AGAIN TO RECALL THE VALUE OF AN AGREEMENT TO THE PEOPLE
OF (A) THE STATE, (B) THE Two NATIONS AND (C) THE WORLD
A. Values to the People of the State
53. The people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir have waited
the West look for an example from the top of the subcontinent.in
Jammu and Kashmir, that an agreement for a plebiscite will soom
1
i Not reprinted here.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2293
this
Terl.
osals
as it
ears
ested historic state. Renewed physical and spiritual energies would be
released by an agreed settlement of this dispute.
54. The meaning of this new freedom would shine across the earth
lance from the top-most roof of the world, brightening the lives of the
people in the hills and valleys, fields and forests, the homes and
schools, mosques and temples, the shops and workplaces, beckoning
near and far to all people struggling to be free.
B. Values to the People of the Two Nations
nain
55. An agreement would have many positive values to India and
stion Pakistan:
sap,
the
(1) The two Governments, without prejudice to their concep-
tions and claims, would by the reconciliation of their long main-
tained differences over Kashmir, take a decisive and co-operative
with
step forward, rather than continuing to the point of possible
their
catastrophe, a disagreement over the ways for the carrying out
1953
of these four-year-old agreements which provide for the de-
11
termination by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of their
cific
relation to India and Pakistan.
the
(2) The dispute over Kashmir would be settled by a constructive
peace and not by force of arms or the attrition of years, with
their attendant international bitterness and their running sores
nese
drawing off the higher interests and energies of two peoples.
953
(3) Settlement of the Kashmir dispute might contribute to the
settlement of the disputes over evacuee property and water-
ways, with all the meaning of these steps to the morale, and the
9.
productive programmes of these historic peoples, most ancient
and
on the earth, yet youngest in the hopes and dreams of their
new liberation, and most resolute in the faith and courage of
Lan,
their dedicated leadership.
C. Values to the People of the World
56. The universal yearning of the people for peace is today con-
fronted with the high potentials of the world for war. The peoples
of the sub-continent have an unprecedented opportunity for pro-
viding the leadership, setting the example and mayhap turning the
direction of human affairs, away from the tendencies to self-destruc-
tion, to the ways of self-determination, peace and co-operation.
The settlement of the Kashmir dispute, with its implications for the
der
400,000,000 people of the sub-continent, might set in motion the
beginnings of a counter chain reaction of peace, production and hope.
The warmth of human brotherhood may yet melt away the hard
divisions between the peoples in their hopes for freedom and peace
left
it.
SLI
PLE
RLD
ted
nd
iD
OU
med
in the world.
57. Instead of the United Nations Representative continuing to
report differences to the Security Council, may the leadership of
over 400,000,000 people, with the good will and assistance of the
United Nations, join in negotiating and reporting an agreement on
2294
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
}
I
they
I
1
Я
S b
t
e
A. As far as I know, all the world regards it as a Portuguese prot-
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263. See also communiqué
Kashmir and thereby light a torch along the difficult path of the
people's pilgrimage toward peace.
58. Out of the East, the cradle of civilizations and the home of gresi
spiritual faiths, would come again the example to the nations and
the call to all peoples for demilitarization, self-determination, and
co-operation in great programmes for education, health, production
and peace on all the earth.
(Negotiations concerning the disposition of Kashmir were subse
quently conducted bilaterally between Pakistan and India without the
benefit of the presence of a United Nations Representative.]
Goa
60. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE GOA CONTROVERSI:
Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, August
2, 1955 1
At his news conference on August 2 Secretary Dulles was asked if he
would comment on the tension over the Portuguese colony of God on the
west coast of India since India and Portugal have broken off relations over
the dispute and some members of the Indian Parliament have demanded
limited war. In reply, the Secretary made the following statement:
The United States is concerned with tension in that area as it is
with tension in any area. It has always been our
policy to favor the
settlement of disputes by peaceful means.
That is, of course,
principle which is expressed in the charter of the United Nations
That applies to Goa as well as to any other place in the world. W
are pleased to note that, as I recall, Prime Minister Nehru affirmed
that principle for his own Government, and I am confident that that
is also the view that will be taken by the Government of Portugal
.
61. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GOA CONTROVERSY: Transcript
of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, December 6, 195
(Excerpts) 2
Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Government regard Goa as a Portugues
province?
ince. It has been Portuguese, I think, for about 400 years.
supra, p. 1689.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, pp. 1007-1008.
W
1
8
E
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2295
1 Communiqué of Dec. 2, 1955; supra, p. 1689.
ubse
it the
is he
of the
Q. Mr. Secretary, did you say "province" or "colony''?
A. Province.
great
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with Goa, is there any question that
s and
the NATO commitment could possibly cover Goa or any of the other
and
ction
,
Portuguese possessions in Asia or in that part of the world?
A. That part of the world is definitely outside of the North Atlantic
Treaty area.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your statement in connection with the visit of the
Portuguese Foreign Minister and your reference to the Portuguese prov-
inces I were you attempting to give support of the United States to the
Portuguese position in the controversy with India, or just what was your
purpose in making that reference?
A. Well
, you will recall that in an earlier statement, which I made
I think the early part of August 2 I indicated the interest of the
United States in a peaceful solution of the problem. The statement
RSY:
which was issued here the other day was primarily a statement directed
against the introduction of hate and prejudice into a situation which
igust
needs to be dealt with in a spirit of calm. We did not take, or attempt
to take, any position on the merits of the matter. We did jointly
express our concern at the atmosphere of hatred and prejudice which
Was sought to be created out of it.
P. Mr. Secretary, you said that all the world regards it as a Portuguese
unde province
. India does not, apparently, and I wondered whether or not
there had been any exchanges since this statement was made between your
it is
Government and the Indian Government.
the
A. I do not think that the Indian Government questions the status
of these various portions of territory that are governed by Portugal
as being under Portuguese law "provinces." I believe that they are
W such under the Constitution of Portugal and that the residents of
these areas, which include not merely Goa but several others, such as
bat Macao, have the full rights of Portuguese citizens. They can be
I.
elected to office and serve in Portugal and also elsewhere. "I do not
think there is any particular controversy about the status of those
areas under the Constitution of Portugal.
Q. And you include Goa in that?
A. Goa, and there are two other points I think in India and there
is the province of Macao off the China coast. I think their status is
all the same under the Portuguese Constitution.
f. Mr. Secretary, did you have any idea that this reference to Portu-
quese provinces would stir up the tempest that it did in India when you
n the
over
8
,
Ons
ript
955
est
T.
included it in the statement?
: Statement of Aug. 2, 1955; supra.
2296
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
C
11
0
W
On March 1, 1951, the French
A. Well, we did give it very careful consideration. The commi-
niqué was not lightly issued. But we did feel that it was appropriate
and right to indicate our attitude toward the emotionalism which
was sought to be created by the Soviet rulers when they were in
India. They were not in India at that time but had just left forb
Burma. But the creation and fomenting of that atmosphere
db
hatred was something we felt we should express ourselves against,
f
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying, in effect, that the United States i
against the settlement of this incident between Portugal and India on any
other than peaceful grounds but that the United States is not taking side
on how it should be settled?
P
A. As you know, we have been strongly advocating the principles
that these situations should not be settled by force. That generali
approach has, I think, been sympathetically shared by Prime Minister til
Nehru. We have taken that position in relation to all these situations
where there are national claims that conflict. We did not think they
should be settled by force. And we had the feeling that the state
ti
ments which were made by the Russians in relation to this matter
V
were designed to create an atmosphere which might generate efforts
to invoke force. That was our objection,
b
to
G. DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA
th
Morocco
62. RIGHTS OF AMERICAN NATIONALS IN MOROCCO
: :
Statement by the Department of State, June 29, 1951
In October 1950 the Government of the French Republic instituted
proceedings against the United States in the International Court of
Justice concerning the rights of American nationals in Morocco
!
The Court subsequently set time limits for the filing by the two
Government filed its Memorial with the Court. The United States
Counter-Memorial was due on July 1, 1951.
The case before the International Court involves the interests of
both France and Morocco as well as of the United States.
of Fez of 1912 4 established a protectorate by France over Moroceo
,
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, p. 179.
2 Petition of Oct. 28, 1950; ibid., Dec. 11, 1950, pp. 951-953.
3 See ibid., Jan. 8, 1951, p. 79.
* Treaty of Mar. 30, 1912; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 106, PP.
1023-1024.
CF
n
t
3
The Treaty
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2297
Orders, 1952, pp. 178–213.
Morocco, to the American Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, setting forth the action
being taken to implement the Court's opinion, see ibid., p. 623.
mame pursuant to which Morocco is represented in foreign affairs by France.
priate The French Memorial, and the French application instituting pro-
whici ceedings
, had not specified whether the French Government brought
ere in this case on behalf of France, on behalf of Morocco, or on behalf of
it for both countries. The United States Government is concerned that
red both France and Morocco, as well as the United States, should be
ainst. parties to the case before the International Court and should be
bound by the Court's judgment. Since the French written pleadings
Etes i
had not made clear whether the moving party or parties were France,
Morocco, or both, the United States Government sought in discussions
sides
with the French Government, beginning April 23, 1951, to have this
point clarified prior to the filing of this Government's Counter-Memo-
ciples rial. However, representatives of the French Government informed
neral representatives of the United States Government on June 9, 1951,
nister that the French Government was not prepared to make any formal
tion statement concerning the identity of the parties in whose name and
ther on whose behalf the present case has been brought. The representa-
tate tives of the French Government stated that the application and the
atter Memorial did not require clarification. Accordingly, last week the
forts United States Government filed with the Court, pursuant to its
rules
, a preliminary objection asking the Court to rule on the identity
of the party or parties which had instituted the proceedings and which
would therefore be bound by the judgment of the Court in the case.
The United States wishes to secure an authoritative determination
by the Court on the rights of American nationals in Morocco pursuant
to treaties governing the obligations between France, Morocco, and
the United States. This Government is naturally anxious that the
case proceed without unnecessary delays, and indeed regretted the
necessity of filing a preliminary objection. It is hoped, nevertheless,
that the issue raised in the preliminary objection may be disposed of
promptly and that it will then be possible to proceed without delay
to subsequent phases of the Moroccan case.?
CO:
1. For the text of the preliminary objection (June 15, 1951; filed June 21), see
the Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, pp. 179-181.
The French Government presented to the International Court of Justice on
ited
July 28
, 1951, observations and submissions on the U.S. Government's preliminary
objection of June 15, 1951 (ibid., Dec. 17, 1951, pp. 978-982). As a result of
clarification which followed from an exchange of correspondence between the
co.
U.S. and French Governments and between the two Governments and the Court
wo Registrar, the U.S. withdrew its preliminary objection in October 1951, upon the
nch
French Government's declaration that it was acting both
on its own behalf and
is the protecting power of Morocco. The proceedings on the merits were then
resumed upon filing by the U.S. of a counter-memorial on Dec. 20, 1951 (not
printed). Following the filing of a French reply on Feb. 15, 1952, a U.S. re-
of joinder on Apr. 18, 1952, and public hearings held at The
Hague, July 15-26,
aty 1952, the Court rendered its decision on Aug. 27, 1952. For the Court's decision,
COM
of International Court of Justice, Reports of judgments
, Advisory Opinions and
For an article Joseph
620-623. For the note of Oct. 2, 1952, from the French Resident at Rabat,
t of
tes
op
2298
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Dec. 15,
CO
au
m-
the resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, pp. 1040-1041.
63. FREE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR MOROCCO: United 6
Nations General Assembly Resolution 612 (VII), December 19
1952 1
The General Assembly,
Having debated the “Question of Morocco”, as proposed by thirteen
M
Member States in document A/2175,
to
Mindful of the necessity of developing friendly relations
M
among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self
determination of peoples,
Considering that the United Nations, as a centre for harmonizing
the actions of nations in the attainment of their common ends under
the Charter, should strive towards removing any causes or factors of
misunderstanding among Member States, thus reasserting the general
principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace
pe
and security,
1. Expresses the confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed poli.
cies, the Government of France will endeavour to further the funda-
mental liberties of the people of Morocco, in conformity with the
Purposes and Principles of the Charter;
2. Expresses the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on
an urgent basis towards developing the free political institutions of the
people of Morocco, with due regard to legitimate rights and interests 65
under the established norms and practices of the law of nations;
3. Appeals to the parties to conduct their relations in an atmosphere
of goodwill, mutual confidence and respect and to settle their disputes
in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, thus refraining from any
acts or measures likely to aggravate the present tension.
do
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 9
(A/2361), p. 5. For a statement by the U... representative in Committee Ion
de
Jan. 5, 1953, pp. 33-34. He said, among other things: "We have faith in the
peoples and Governments of France and Morocco who must and will work out
their destinies together." The General Assembly adopted a further resolution
on the Morocco question on Dec. 17, 1954 (Res. 812 (IX)), which in substance C
expressed confidence that a satisfactory solution would be achieved by the two
peoples concerned, and decided to postpone for the time being further considera
tion of this item; 'U. N. General
Assembly, Oficial Records, Ninth
Session, Sur
plement No. 21 (A/2890), p. 5. For statements by Ambassador Lodge on
resolution on Dec. 13, 1954, in the General Assembly, favoring
its adoption, wie
Department of State 'Bulletin, Jan. 3, 1955, pp. 28-30. The General Assembly
adopted an identical resolution (911 (x)) on Dec. 3, 1955; U. N. General Assem
bly, oficial Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19 A/3116), pp. 3-4. Fa B
a statement by Ambassador Lodge on Nov. 28, 1955, in Committee I favoring
ne
ac
m
this
80
ret
0
(A
an
pp
Per
mt
1
lie
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2299
teen
5 on
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894. Sultan Mohammed
Item 60, pp. 1-4.
ited
64. RETURN OF SULTAN MOHAMMED BEN YOUSEF (MO-
19
.
HAMMED V) TO MOROCCO: Statement by the Department of
State, November 18, 1955 1
The U.S. Government welcomes the return of Mohammed V to
Morocco and on this anniversary of his accession to the throne wishes
to extend warm and friendly greetings to him and the people of
Morocco.
Long
self-
His Majesty's return marks a significant step in the development of
cooperation between Morocco and France. While there are many
zing
problems yet to be worked out, the degree of concession and the
der friendly spirit which are demonstrated by both French and Moroccans
sot augur well for success in working out mutually satisfactory arrange-
eral ments. It is earnestly hoped that such arrangements will lead to the
cace peace and prosperity of the Moroccan community.
poli-
da-
the
Tunisia
the
ests 65. FREE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR TUNISIA: United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 611 (VII), December 17,
19522
uites
any
The General Assembly,
Having debated the question proposed by thirteen Member States in
document A/2152,
Mindful of the necessity of developing friendly relations among
e the nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples,
Considering that the United Nations, as a centre for harmonizing the
ation actions of nations in the attainment of their common ends under the
Charter
, should strive towards removing any causes and factors of
misunderstanding among Member States, thus reasserting the general
Su principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace
ring returned from exile in October 1955 and was recognized by France again as Sultan
on Nov. 5, 1955. He returned to Rabat on Nov. 18 as Sultan Mohammed V.
a. General Assembly, Oficial Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20
and the United States
position, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 28, 1952,
United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1962 (Depart-
ment of State publication 5034; 1953), pp. 69-73.
here
2. 20
the
out
ance
UFO
lers-
this and security,
Sea
ably
sem.
For
041
.
(A/2361
2300
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
French Government and the Tunisian leaders reached an agreement whereby
rele
enti
by the President to the Congress for the Year 1953 (Department of State publication the
2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 22, 1955, p. 301, On June 3, 1955, the
1. Expresses its confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed
policies, the Government of France will endeavour to further the effec
tive development of the free institutions of the Tunisian people, in
conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter;
2. Expresses the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on 67
an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government for
Tunisians in the light of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations;
3. Appeals to the parties concerned to conduct their relations and
settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and to
1
refrain from any acts or measures likely to aggravate the present
tension."
pre
66. INTERNAL AUTONOMY FOR TUNISIA: Statement by the
We
Secretary of State at a News Conference, August 10, 1955? follo
It is a source of much satisfaction to the United States that France
Alg
and Tunisia have agreed upon conventions which provide a new frame-
work for close cooperation between the French and Tunisian com-
W
munities. It is significant that agreement on these conventions was
whi
reached through negotiations on a basis of equality between the
parties directly concerned. France and Tunisia may take real satis-
faction and pride in the achievement of this agreement.
The manner in which the agreement was reached, the impressive
of t.
majorities by which both Houses of the French Parliament approved
the conventions, and the extensive support they have received in
Tunisia indicate a common realization of the need for continued ante
Algo
cooperation.
The Franco-Tunisian negotiations demonstrate that mutually satis
. com
to w
factory progress can be made on such difficult problems if they are deals
Nov
with in time by the parties concerned with determination, realism,
and good will.
1 The General Assembly adopted a resolution on Dec. 17, 1954 (813 (IX)), which
noted with satisfaction the negotiations then in progress between the parties com
cerned, expressed confidence that the negotiations would bring about a satisfa
T
tory solution, and decided to postpone
for the time being further consideration
of this item; ibid., Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), p. 5. For the cont
falls
resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 3, 1955, pp. 30–31. For the
Tunisian question, see United States Participation in the United
NationsReport Le
, .
Free
item
Deco
true
& SC
sou
Asse
char
men
does
conf
p. 730.
thin
cour
. Tunis,
Mohammed Amin, Tatified and
sealed the convention restoring
internal sites
omy to Tunisia, and the documents were exchanged and deposited in Paris et
Aug. 31
1H
D
Gene
inseri
3
8
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2301
inscription of the Algerian question.
Ter
ܕ
10
nice
me-
Let me say this final word.
conflict with the provisions of article 2, paragraph 7.
think that this danger is inherent in the pending question. Now,
General Assembly rejected the General Committee's recommendation against
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 10, 1955, p. 582. On Sept. 30, 1955, the
med
Algeria
301 67. COMPETENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN RELATION
for TO THE ALGERIAN QUESTION: Statement by the United
the
States Representative at the United Nations. Before the General
Assembly, September 30, 19552
and
ito
Mr. President, we believe the Assembly should bear in mind certain
centrelerant factors as it decides whether to inscribe in its agenda the item
entitled "The Question of Algeria.”
Remembering that a vote on the inscription of an item is without
prejudice to the ultimate question of the Assembly's competence,
the
we must nevertheless in this particular case take into account the
following:
Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, which are French protectorates,
Algeria under French law is administratively an integral part of the
French Republic.
We have noted in the explanatory memorandum (Document A/2924)
the which has been submitted by the members that have proposed the
Item respecting Algeria that it is stated that "there is an imperative
Deed for negotiations between the Government of France and the
SITE true representatives of the Algerian people" and that consideration
ved
the Algerian question by the General Assembly would facilitate
8 solution by making the need for negotiation evident. We have
noted further that reference is made to the right of the people of
Algeria to independence as well as to the concern of the international
tis community in a prompt solution of the Algerian problem, a concern
to which the French Government is claimed to have failed to respond.
Now
, Mr. President, this memorandum indicates clearly that what is
sought by the sponsors of the item is the sanction of the General
assembly to a course of action intended to bring about fundamental
changes in the composition of one of the General Assembly's own
members
, that is, the French Republic. If it doesn't mean that, it
The United States believes that the proposed item, viewed in the
antext of this action proposed to be sought in the
General Assembly,
els within the provisions of article 2, paragraph 7, of the United
of
course
, this Assembly can vote as it wishes, but we should be com-
was
tis-
II
ved
aich
200
fat
tion
doesn't mean anything.
ate
the
the
Nations Charter.
the
port
101
53
aby
id
00
OD
3
Supra, p. 136.
2302
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
8
it
8:
fi
P
0
L
ti
94
L
National Assembly as contemplated by the United Nations. On this momentous
occasion I wish to express to Your Majesty my congratulations for a notabile
For statement of Ambassador Lodge in support of the drait
3 Res. 289 (IV); U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Session,
pletely clear in our own minds as to just exactly what it is that we
are doing
For these reasons, the United States will vote to support the recom-
mendation of the General Committee that this item not be included
in the agenda.
68. INAPPROPRIATENESS OF UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERA
TION OF THE ALGERIAN QUESTION: United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 909 (X), November 25, 1955 1
The General Assembly
Decides not to consider further the item entitled "The question of
Algeria” and is therefore no longer seized of this item on the agenda
of its tenth session.
Libya
7
69. RECOGNITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF LIBYA:
Statement by the Department of State, December 24, 1951
The United Kingdom of Libya on December 24 proclaimed its
independence pursuant to a United Nations General Assembly resolu-
tion of November 21, 1949, 3 and the Government of the United States
is extending full recognition to the new Government.
The American Consul General at Tripoli, Andrew G. Lynch
,
S
informed the Libyan Foreign Minister of the recognition of his
Government by the United States and of the elevation of the American
Consulate General to the status of legation. Mr. Lynch will serve
chargé d'affaires ad interim until a Minister arrives.
fo
Following is the text of a message from President Truman to King
Idris I of Libya
on the declaration of the independence of Libya:
The announcement today that all powers have been transferred to the Gover!
ment of Libya and that Your Majesty, as King, has proclaimed the independen
of Libya is a significant fact of historical importance not only to the people
Libya but to the entire
community of free nations. The United States of Ameris h
strongly supported the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations
that Libya should become an independent state. Therefore, it is gratifying
stitution determined by the representatives of the people of Libya meeting to
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement. Nou
(A/3116), p. 3.
resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 992.
2 Ibid., Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1057.
a
a.
0
t
n
Based on 1
Resolutions (A/1251), pp. 10–13.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2303
COM
? Treaty of Aug. 26, 1936; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 140, pp. 179.ff.
3 Agreements of Jan. 19, 1899, and July 10, 1899; ibid., vol. 91, pp. 19-22.
achievement and to extend to Your Majesty and to the Libyan people the hand of
at we
friendship of the people of the United States of America.
Message from Secretary Acheson to the Foreign Minister of Libya:
luded It was with great satisfaction and pleasure that I received your telegram today
announcing the proclamation of Libyan independence. My Government deems
it a great privilege to have been associated with United Nations action which
assisted the Libyan people in determining a constitution and establishing an
BRA
independent government. The Government of the United States of America
looks forward with pleasure to the establishment of mutually beneficial and
neral friendly relations with the Libyan Government, which it welcomes to its rightful
place among the sovereign states of the world. I shall take the first opportunity,
on behalf of my government, to urge that immediate action be taken to admit
Libya to membership in the United Nations. I send my heartiest congratula-
tions to Your Excellency and to members of the Libyan Government and may I
onol ask that
ask that you convey to His Majesty, King Idris I, and through him to the people of
enda Libya, an expression of the friendship of the people of the United States of America.
Sudan
70. EGYPTIAN ABROGATION OF CONDOMINIUM IN THE
BYA:
1?
SUDAN: Statement by the Secretary of State, October 10, 1951 1
dits
The American Embassy in Cairo has confirmed that the Egyptian
Prime Minister on October 8 introduced in the Egyptian Chamber of
solu
Deputies draft legislation which would abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian
tates
treaty of 1936 ? and the Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreements of
nich
,
1899, which provide for joint Anglo-Egyptian administration of the
The parties directly involved are the United Kingdom and Egypt
and, in the case of the 1899 agreements, the Sudanese people as well
.
However
, these matters are also of general concern to the free world
King
for they affect the security and defense of the important Middle East
:
None of the agreements in question provides for abrogation. The
U.S. Government believes that proper respect for international
de obligations requires that they be altered by mutual agreement rather
than by unilateral action of one of the parties. Furthermore, it should
be noted that procedures wholly in accord with such
respect for inter-
ng national commitments have already been set in motion.
During past months, new proposals
to be offered to Egypt have been
under consideration and the Egyptian Government had been informed
that proposals
were to be presented to it within the next few days.
It is the belief of the United States that a solution to the Anglo-
Egyptian question can be found through these proposals. The United
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 22, 1951, p. 647.
Sudan.
TICHI
ve
area.
vern
nerica
tion
COD
ins
utous
table
0.
dralt
55401
2304
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
如​假
​CO
K
March 19, 1953, and has been accorded by the President the personal
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 23, 1953, p. 306. A similar note was sent
3 Department of State press release 154, Mar. 23, 1953 (see also Department of
States considers that the new proposals shortly to be presented to the
Egyptian Government should serve as a sound basis for an agreement
which will not only satisfy the interests of all parties concerned but
also contribute to the defense of the free world in which the Middle
East plays such an important role.
71. ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT ON THE SUDAN: Note
From the Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister of Egypt
,
February 14, 1953 1
The United States is gratified that an agreement on the Sudan has
been arrived at by Egypt and the United Kingdom. This is a truly 73
important occasion. It affords an opportunity for me to express my
Government's pleasure at the spirit in which these difficult negotiations
were carried out.
My Government trusts that the same spirit of good will and cooper&-
tion will characterize the transitional period preceding the decision by
th
the Sudanese people of their future status. The amicable resolution
ор
of this long outstanding question goes far toward creating an atmos-
phere of mutual understanding and trust in the Near East which can
tic
only result in great benefits for all the nations of the free world.
My Government continues to follow with interest and sympathy
the progressive attitude and energetic efforts of the Government of
lu
General Naguib to meet and overcome the internal problems which
11
face the Egyptian people. The United States wishes the Egyptian
Government every success in its efforts.
in
AL
72. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE MIXED ELEC
TORAL COMMISSION FOR THE SUDAN: Statement by the Co
Department of State, March 23, 1953 (Excerpt) 3
pr
th
In reply to requests received from the Governments of Egypt and
tei
the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States has agreed
to participate on the Mixed Electoral Commission for the Anglo-
D
Egyptian Sudan. Mr. Warwick Perkins, a Foreign Service Career
Officer of Class One, has been nominated as United States representer
th
tive on the Commission. Mr. Perkins departed for Khartoum of
Su
rank of Minister for the duration of his service on this Commission
.
The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 12, 1953
Sudan provided for the election of a Sudanese Parliament as a step
on the same day to the British Foreign Secretary.
2 Agreement of Feb. 12, 1953; British Treaty Series 47 (Cmd. 8904).
CO
ind
4
on
the
UI
in
1
WE
D
State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 493).
4 British Treaty Series 47 (Cmd. 8904)
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2305
1
Ons
Ta-
101
0S-
Call
plebiscite provided in the agreement of Feb. 12, 1953.
independent state. Three days later, the Senate concurred.
United Kingdom and Egypt recognized Sudanese independence.
(A?2361), p. 9. The U.S. representative introduced the above draft resolution
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 22, 1952, pp. 999-1000.
the towards self-government and self-determination in that country.
zent The election is to be supervised by a Mixed Electoral Commission
but
consisting of representatives of the Sudan, Egypt, India, the United
ide Kingdom and the United States.
Fote
Upl
Ethiopia and Eritrea
has
uly 73. FEDERATION OF ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: United Nations
my General Assembly Resolution 617 (VII), December 17, 1952 2
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 390 A (V) of 2 December 1950,3 providing
by that Eritrea be constituted an autonomous unit federated with Ethi-
opia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown,
Having noted the adoption and ratification of the Eritrean Constitu-
tion and the ratification of the Federal Act embodying the provisions
thy
contained in paragraphs 1-7 inclusive of that resolution,
of
Having noted that the conditions laid down in paragraph 13 of reso-
lution 390 A (V) of 2 December 1950 bave been fulfilled, and that on
ich
11 September 1952 the Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia was pro-
Noting further the final report of the United Nations Commissioner
in Eritrea of 17 October 1952 4 and the report of the Administering
Authority of 27 October 1952,
C Noting with appreciation the part played by the United Nations
the
Commissioner and the former Administering Authority in Eritrea in
preparing Eritrea to take its place in the Federation,
Noting also with satisfaction the contribution made by Ethiopia to
ind
the establishment of the Federation and Ethiopia's expression of de-
termination scrupulously to execute the provisions of the Federal Act,
-10- 1. Welcomes the establishment of the Federation of Eritrea with
Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown;
The Parliamentary elections were held in November 1953. On Dec. 3, 1955,
the United Kingdom and Egypt agreed to the holding of the "self-determination
he
On Jan. 1, 1956, the
iep
approved on Dec. 12. For the statement of the U.S. representative, see
* U.N. doc. A/2233, Nov. 8, 1952.
181
claimed,
5
ed
eer
ta-
OD
281
).I.
ent
was
jor
* U.N. dọc. A/2188.
415900_57---Vol. 2-42
2306
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
168 Stat. 865. See also Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 10, 1955, pp. 67-68
2. Congratulates the people and governmental authorities of the
Federation for their effective and loyal fulfilment of resolution 390 ,
(V) of the General Assembly of 2 December 1950.
Gold Coast (Ghana) and Nigeria
74. SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE GOLD COAST (GHANA) AND
NIGERIA: Senate Joint Resolution 183 (83d Congress, 2d Session)
,
August 27, 1954 1
f
F
Whereas it is the policy of the United States to encourage efforts
toward independence and self-government truly expressive of the
desires of the people and as they show their capability to establish
and protect free institutions; and
Whereas the continent of Africa is a vital part of the free world arek;
and
Whereas a revised constitution of the Gold Coast was approved on
April 29, 1954, and the first formal meeting of the legislature of that
territory under this constitution will take place on July 29, 1954;
and
Whereas a revised constitution of Nigeria is expected to be approved
during August 1954, and the first meeting of the federal legislature
of
that territory under this constitution is expected to take place
shortly thereafter; and
Whereas these occasions mark important milestones in their progres
toward self-government and independence: Now, therefore, be i
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Unite
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress of the
United States extend its most cordial greetings to the representative
bodies of the Gold Coast and Nigeria on the occasion of the first meest
ing of their legislatures under the revised constitutions, in recognition
of the democratic ideals shared
by the United States and those term
tories, and in reaffirmation of the friendship of the United States for
the peoples of Africa; and be it further
Resolved, That the Secretary of State is hereby requested to appoint
a United States delegation at the appropriate time to represent the
United States at ceremonies marking the achievement of complete
self-government for these territories.
S
(
to
l
P
P
p
F
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 2307
Foreign Policy, pp. 1156-1159.
tbA
Union of South Africa
04
75. TREATMENT OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN THE
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 615 (VII), December 5, 1952 1
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 44 (I), 265 (III),3_395 (V) 4 and 511
IND (VI) : relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the
on)
Union of South Africa,
Noting that the Government of the Union of South Africa has ex-
pressed its inability to accept General Assembly resolution 511 (VI)
in respect of the resumption of negotiations with the Governments of
Eorts
India and Pakistan,
the
Olish
Noting further that the Government of the Union of South Africa
has continued to enforce the Group Areas Act in contravention of
the terms of General Assembly resolutions 511 (VI) and 395 (V),
rea
1. Establishes a United Nations Good Offices Commission consisting
of three members to be nominated by the President of the General
that
Assembly, with a view to arranging and assisting in negotiations
954
between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the
Governments of India and Pakistan in order that a satisfactory solu-
oved
tion of the question in accordance with the Purposes and Principles
ture
of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 6
may be achieved;
lace
2. Reguests the Good Offices Commission to report to the General
Assembly at its eighth session;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the members of the
Commission with the necessary staff and facilities;
4. Calls upon the Government of the Union of South Africa to
suspend the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of the
Group Areas Act, pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred
to in paragraph 1 above;
for
1.U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20
Resolution of Dec. 8, 1946; ibid., First Session, Second Part, Resolutions
Resolution of May 14, 1949; ibid., Third Session, Part II, Resolutions (A/900),
p. 6.
Resolution of Dec. 2, 1950; ibid., Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775),
• Resolution of Jan. 12, 1952; ibid., Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/2119),
General Assembly Res. 217 (III) of Dec. 10, 1948; A Decade of American
1 01
TES
ve it
the
tite
eet
tion
ITI
(A/2361), p. 8.
(A/64! Add. 1), p. 69.
oint
the
lete
P. 24.
-62
p. 11.
8
2308
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
I
1
C
P
9
t
ti
ti
A
ti
U
No. 17 (A/2630), pp. 6-7); Res. 820 (IX), Dec. 14, 1954 (ibid., Ninth Session,
Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), p. 9). For the U.S. position in the Ad Hoc Political
Committee and in the General Assembly opposing the draft resolution adopted
5. Decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of the
eighth session of the General Assembly.
76. POLICIES OF APARTHEID IN THE UNION OF SOUTH
AFRICA: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 917 (1)
December 6, 1955 2
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous resolutions on the question of race conflict
in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Govern-
ment of the Union of South Africa,
Recalling section E of resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950,
in which it expressed its conviction that a genuine and lasting peace
depends also upon the observance of all the principles and purposes
established in the Charter of the United Nations, upon the imple-
mentation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and other
principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the main-
tenance of international peace and security and especially upon
1 The General Assembly adopted further resolutions concerning this question:
(a) Res. 719 (VIII), Nov. 11, 1953; ibid., Eighth Session, Supplement No. !?
(A/2630), pp. 5–6. In connection with the consideration of the draft resolution
in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, the U.S. representative stated, in part, the
following: "My delegation believes the basic task of the Assembly here is to
bring about direct discussion between the parties.
My delegation believes
that, before the governments concerned have made further efforts to resume
direct discussions, the General Assembly should not recommend particular meas-
ures or solutions-solutions of the problem which the parties, first of all, must
face" (Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 23, 1953, pp. 729-730),
(b) Res. 816 (IX), Nov. 4, 1954; U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth
Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), pp. 7-8. For the U.S. position on the
draft resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 22, 1954, pp. 783-786
The U.S. representative stated in part: "The United States will vote in favor
of the resolution as a whole, since we are in full agreement with its conciliatory
nature and in particular the objective of direct negotiations between the parties
which it seeks to bring about. Our belief is that progress can only come to the
extent that the parties are willing to confer and to negotiate” (ibid., p. 786).
(c) Res. 919 (X), Dec. 14, 1955; U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Tenda
Session, Supplement No. 19' (A/3116), p. 8. The resolution noted that the nego
tiations envisaged in Res. 816 (IX) had not been pursued; urged the parties
concerned to pursue negotiations with a view to bringing about a settlemen
of the question; and invited the parties to report at the next session of the General
Assembly.
2 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19
(A/3116), p. 8.
Res. 616° (VII), Dec. 5, 1952 (ibid., Seventh Session, Supplement No.
(A/2361), pp. 8-9); Res. 721 (VIII), Dec. 8, 1953 (ibid., Eighth Session, Supplement
each case the U.S. abstained.
* U.N. General Assembly, official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. ”
(A/1775), p. 10.
A
CI
M
h fr
fa
th
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
2309
2
TI-
the respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all,
Reiterating its resolutions 103 (1) of 19 November 1946 1 and 616 B
(VII) of 5 December 1952 in which the General Assembly has de-
clared, inter alia, that it is in the higher interests of humanity to
TH put an immediate end to religious and so-called racial persecution
I), and discrimination, and that governmental policies which are designed
to perpetuate or increase discrimination are inconsistent with the
pledges of the Members under Article 56 of the Charter,
Noting that the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situa-
tion in the Union of South Africa has now submitted its third report,
ict
1. Commends the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situa-
tion in the Union of South Africa for its constructive work;
50,
2. Notes with regret that the Government of the Union of South
Africa again refused to co-operate with the Commission;
3. Recommends the Government of the Union of South Africa to
take note of the Commission's report;
ple
4. Expresses its concern at the fact that the Government of the
her
Union of South Africa continues to give effect to the policies of
in-
apartheid, notwithstanding the request made to it by the General
Assembly to reconsider its position in the light of the high principles
contained in the Charter and taking into account the pledge of all
Member States to promote respect for human rights and fundamental
;
5. Reminds the Government of the Union of South Africa of the
faith it had reaffirmed, in signing the Charter, in fundamental human
rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person;
6. Calls on the Government of the Union of South Africa to observe
the obligations contained in Article 56 of the Charter.
ace
ses
POLI
on;
E101
the
: to
eves
ime
AS-
lust
nath
the
186.
vor
ory
ties
the
1 U.N. doc. A/64/Add.1, Jan, 31, 1947, p. 200.
U.N. doc. A/2953 (1955). The Commission was established by Res. 616
(VII), cited above.
nih
bies
ent
Ta!
19
ent
cal
ted
In
如​伽​印
​20
to
IS
he
me
Part XIV
as!
to
ha
di
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
an
PO.
are
per
di
A. THE BASIC POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
mu
TE
1
of
neg
1. REVIEW OF THE POSITION AS OF 1950: Address by the
Secretary of State, January 12, 1950
FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY
tio
of
This afternoon I should like to discuss with you the relations Et
between the peoples of the United States and the peoples of Asia, la
and I used the words "relations of the peoples of the United States tin
and the peoples of Asia" advisedly. I am not talking about govern
.
ments or nations because it seems to me what I want to discuss with of
you is this feeling of mine that the relations depend upon the attitudes ha
of the people; that there are fundamental attitudes, fundamental tio
interests, fundamental purposes of the people of the United States
, isla
150 million of them, and of the peoples of Asia, unnumbered millions
, fin
which determine and out of which grow the relations of our countries
and the policies of our governments. Out of these attitudes and the
interests and purposes grow what we do from day to day.
Wh
Now, let's dispose of one idea right at the start and not bother with de
it any more. That is that the policies of the United States are deter
mined out of abstract principles in the Department of State or in the En
White House or in the Congress. That is not the case
. If these
policies are going to be good, they must grow out of the fundamental
attitudes of our people on both
sides. If they are to be effective
, they
must become articulate through all the institutions of our national
life, of which this is one of the greatest-through the press, through
the
the radio, through the churches, through the labor unions,
business organizations,
through all the groupings of our national life
,
there must become articulate the attitudes of our people and the
policies which we propose to follow. It seems to me that understand-
ing is the beginning of wisdom and therefore, we shall begin by trying
1 Made_before the National Press Club, Washington; Department of Stat
Bulletin, Jan, 23, 1950, pp. 111-118.
L
18
nes
fac
through
the
0001
Tai
ano
aga
t
the
20
2310
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2311
against foreign domination. Whether that foreign domination takes
to understand before we announce what we are going to do, and that
is a proposition so heretical in this town that I advance it with some
hesitation.
Now, let's consider some of the basic factors which go into the
making of the attitudes of the peoples on both sides. I am frequently
asked: Has the State Department got an Asian policy? And it seems
to me that that discloses such a depth of ignorance that it is very
hard to begin to deal with it. The peoples of Asia are so incredibly
diverse and their problems are so incredibly diverse that how could
anyone, even the most utter charlatan believe that he had a uniform
policy which would deal with all of them. On the other hand, there
are very important similarities in ideas and in problems among the
peoples of Asia and so what we come to, after we understand these
diversities and these common attitudes of mind, is the fact that there
must be certain similarities of approach, and there must be very
great dissimilarities in action.
she To illustrate this only a moment: If you will consider as an example
of the differences in Asia the subcontinent of India and Pakistan, you
will find there an area which is roughly comparable in size and popula-
tion to Europe. You will find that the different states and provinces
of that subcontinent are roughly comparable in size to the nations of
ons Europe and yet you will find such differences in race, in ideas, in
12
, languages
, and religion, and culture, that compared to that subcon-
testinent, Europe is almost one homogeneous people.
Or take the difference, for instance, between the people and problems
ith of Japan and Indonesia, both in the same Asian area. In Japan, you
des have a people far advanced in the complexities of industrial civiliza-
a people whose problems grow out of overpopulation on small
es islands and the necessity of finding raw materials to bring in and
Os, finding markets for the finished goods which they produce. In Indo-
10 mesia, you find something wholly different--a people on the very
nd threshold of their experience with these complexities and a people
who live in an area which possesses vast resources which are awaiting
ith development. Now, those are illustrations of complexities.
che
81 Let's come now to the matters which Asia has in common. There
is in this vast area what we might call a developing Asian conscious-
ness
, and a developing pattern, and this, I think, is based upon two
factors which are pretty nearly common to the entire experience of all
One of these factors is a revulsion against the acceptance of misery
and poverty as the normal condition of life. Throughout all of this
Fast area, you have that fundamental revolutionary aspect in mind
and belief. The other common aspect that they have is the revulsion
they are through with it. They have had enough of it,
and they want
These two basic ideas which are held so broadly and commonly
D-
tal
tion,
ese
181
these Asian people.
he
de
ng
ate
no more.
2312
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
CC
re
TE
ar
re.
Te
un
to
to the soil, the problem of how much can be exacted from them by
dominion status in the British Commonwealth, Feb. 4, 1948; Burma became
in Asia tend to fuse in the minds of many Asian peoples and R
many of them tend to believe that if you could get rid of
foreign domination, if you could gain independence, then the
relief from poverty and misery would follow almost in course.
he
It is easy to point out that that is not true, and of course,
they are discovering that it is not true. But underneath that beliel,
G
there was a very profound understanding of a basic truth and it is the
basic truth which underlies all our democratic belief and all our dem
cratic concept. That truth is that just as no man and no government
bu
is wise enough or disinterested enough to direct the thinking and the
action of another individual, so no nation and no people are wise
ti
enough and disinterested enough very long to assume the responsibility
for another people or to control another people's opportunities.
That great truth they have sensed, and on that great truth they are
to
acting. They say and they believe that from now on they are on their
a
own. They will make their own decisions. They will attempt to
better their own lot, and on occasion they will make their own mistakes.
But it will be their mistakes, and they are not going to have their
mistakes dictated to them by anybody else.
1
The symbol of these concepts has become nationalism. National
independence has become the symbol both of freedom from foreign
domination and freedom from the tyranny of poverty and misery
.
its
Since the end of the war in Asia, we have seen over 500 million
people gain their independence and over seven new nations come into
existence in this area.
th
We have the Philippines with 20 million citizens. We have Pak-
istan, India, Ceylon, and Burma with 400 million citizens, southern
Korea with 20 million, and within the last few weeks, the United
ha
States of Indonesia with 75 million.
This is the outward and visible sign of the internal ferment of Asia
,
H
But this
ferment and
change is not restricted to these countries which
are just gaining their independence. It is the common idea and the
common pattern of Asia, and as I tried to suggest a moment ago, do
not based on purely political conceptions. It is not based purely go in
ideological conceptions. It is based on a fundamental and an earthy
and a deeply individual realization of the problems of their own daily
lives. This new sense of nationalism means that they are going to
deal with those daily problems--the problems of the relation of his de
those ideas they are going forward. Resignation is no longer the th
typical emotion of Asia. It has given way to hope, to a sense of effort
and in many cases, to a real sense of anger.
1 The Philippine Republic achieved full independence, July 4, 1946; Pakista
1947, India becoming a sovereign republic, Jan. 26, 1950; Ceylon was acorde
and Indonesia achieved its independence, Dec. 28, 1949.
AS
MT
OY
DO
OT
to
it is
C01
COM
thi
int
bri
mi
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2313
Ise.
10-
TIS!
are
misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government.
There was really nothing to overthrow. They simply ignored it
throughout the country. They took the solution of their immediate
village problems into their own hands. If there was any trouble or
interference with the representatives of the government, they simply
brushed them aside. They completely withdrew their support from
military establishment disintegrated. Added to the grossest incompe-
government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole
and / RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA
of
the
Now, may I suggest to you that much of the bewilderment which
has seized the minds of many of us about recent developments in China
comes from a failure to understand this basic revolutionary force
rse
,
liet
,
which is loose in Asia. The reasons for the fall of the Nationalist
the
Government in China are preoccupying many people. All sorts of
reasons have been attributed to it. Most commonly, it is said in
ent
various speeches and publications that it is the result of American
the
bungling, that we are incompetent, that we did not understand, that
American aid was too little, that we did the wrong things at the wrong
lity
time. Other people go on and say: "No, it is not quite that, but that
an American general did not like Chiang Kai-shek and out of all that
relationship grows the real trouble.” And they say: "Well you have
heir
to add to that there are a lot of women fooling around in politics in
China."
to
kes
Nobody, I think, says that the Nationalist Government fell because
heir it was confronted by overwhelming military force which it could not
resist
. Certainly no one in his right mind suggests that. Now, what
onal you to do is to stop looking for a moment under the bed and
under the chair and under the rug to find out these reasons, but rather
eiga
to look at the broad picture and see whether something doesn't suggest
7.
lion
into
The broad picture is that after the war, Chiang Kai-shek emerged
as the undisputed leader of the Chinese people. Only one faction,
Pok the Communists, up in the hills, ill-equipped, ragged, a very small
military force, was determinedly opposed to his position. He had
ited
overwhelming military power, greater military power than any ruler
bad ever had in the entire history of China. He had tremendous eco-
nomic and military support and backing from the United States.
He had the acceptance of all other foreign countries, whether sincerely
the or insincerely in the case of the Soviet Union is not really material
to this matter. Here he was in this position, and 4 years later what
do we find? We find that his armies have melted away. His support
in the country has melted away. His support largely outside the
aily
country has melted away, and he is a refugee on a small island off the
coast of China with the remnants of his forces.
As I said, no one says that vast armies moved out of the hills and
by defeated him. To attribute this to the inadequacy of American aid
is only to point out the depth and power of the forces
which were
miscalculated or ignored. What has happened in my judgment is
ort
that the almost inexhaustible patience of the
Chinese people in their
I ask
itself.
zern
.
zich
础​咖​础​础​伽姆​叫​崛​阿​仙​础​叫
​i to
the
stan
15
ded
Ame
948;
this
2314
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ī
L
IS
&
N
C
their profound belief that the control of China by a foreign power was
contrary to American interests. The interesting part about that i
tence ever experienced by any military command was this total lack
of support both in the armies and in the country, and so the whole
matter just simply disintegrated.
The Communists did not create this. The Communists did not
create this condition. They did not create this revolutionary spirit,
They did not create a great force which moved out from under Chiang
Kai-shek. But they were shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride
this thing into victory and into power.
That, I suggest to you, is an explanation which has certain roots
in realism and which does not require all this examination of intricate
and perhaps irrelevant details. So much for the attitudes of the
peoples of Asia.
U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD ASIA
Let's consider for a moment another important factor in this
relationship. That is the attitude of our own people to Asia. What
is that fundamental attitude out of which our policy has grown!
What is the history of it? Because history is very important, and
history furnishes the belief on the one side in the reality and truth N
of the attitude.
What has our attitude been toward the peoples of Asia? It has
been, I submit to you, that we are interested that Americans as
individuals are interested in the peoples of Asia. We are not interested
in them as pawns or as subjects for exploitation but just as people
.
T
For 100 years some Americans have gone to Asia to bring in What th
they thought was the most valuable thing they had their faith di
They wanted to tell them what they thought about the nature and
relationship of man to God. Others went to them to bring to them
what they knew of learning. Others went to them to bring them
healing for their bodies. Others and perhaps fewer went to them to
learn the depth and beauty of their own cultures, and some went to tr
them to trade and they traded with them. But this trade was a very
small part of American interest in the Far East, and it was a very
small part of American interest in trade. It was a valid interest
; }
was a good interest. There was nothing wrong about it
, but out of
the total sum of the interests of the American people
in Asia, it was a
comparatively small part.
be
Through all this period of time also, we had, and still have, great B
interests in Asia. But let me point out to you one very importan
factor about our interests in Asia. That is that our interests have hui
been parallel to the interests of the people of Asia. For 50 years
it has been the fundamental belief
of the American people--and I
th
not talking about announcements of government but I mean a
b!
of people in little towns and villages and churches and missionary
forces and labor unions throughout the United States--it has been do
was not conflict but parallelism in that
interest. And so from the time
OF
8
W
1
m
a1
m
Sa
of
te
belie!
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2315
lang
through ignorance, or because they believe these false promises, or
because there is real distress in their areas.
beeb development, if we can go forward with it, then we have brought
1 See Secretary Hay's instructions of Sept. 6, 1899, and Mar. 20, 1900; United
States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949
(Department of State publication 3573; 1949), pp. 414-416.
a Treaty of Feb. 6, 1922; ibid., pp. 438-442.
lack of the announcement of the open door policy through the power
thole treaty to the very latest resolution of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, we have stated that principle and we believe it.
not And similarly in all the rest of Asia-in the Philippines, in India,
mirit in Pakistan and Indonesia, and in Korea-for years and years and
years, the interests of Americans throughout this country have been
ride
in favor of their independence. This is where their independence,
societies, and their patriotic groups have come for funds and sympathy.
Toots The whole policy of our government insofar as we have responsibility
icate in the Philippines was to bring about the accomplishment of this
the independence and our sympathy and help. The very real help which
we have given other nations in Asia has been in that direction, and it
is still in that direction.
this
THE FACTOR OF COMMUNISM
That
Now, I stress this, which you may think is a platitude, because of
own?
& very important fact: I hear almost every day someone say that the
and
real interest of the United States is to stop the spread of communism.
ruth Nothing seems to me to put the cart before the horse more completely
than that. Of course we are interested in stopping the spread of
hes
communism. But we are interested for a far deeper reason than
any conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. We
are interested in stopping the spread of communism because com-
ople munism is a doctrine that we don't happen to like. Communism is
what
the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has ever been
devised, and it is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism which
and would, if it could, take from these people what they have won, what
then
we want them to keep and develop, which is their own national
them independence, their own individual independence, their own develop-
mt
ment of their own resources for their own good and not as mere
nt to
tributary states to this great Soviet Union.
TETT
Now, it is fortunate that this point that I made does not represent
For any real conflict. It is an important point because people will do
more damage and create more misrepresentation in the Far East by
saying our interest is merely to stop the spread of communism than
any other way. Our real interest is in those people as people. It is
because communism is hostile
to that interest that we want to stop it.
But it happens that the best way of doing both things is to do just
have
exactly what the
peoples of Asia want to do and what we want to
help them to do, which is to develop a soundness of administration
of these new governments and to develop their resources and their
technical skills so that they are not subject to penetration either
If we can help that
IS
ested
saith,
st;it
ut of
Vas!
great
rtant
ears
I 2012
held
nary
(179
lat
There
time
2316
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
say must be allowed to obscure the reality of this fact. All the effort
China, see Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 6, 1950, pp. 218-219. See also
1 For background material regarding Soviet penetration of northern areas a' /
Secretary Acheson's statement of Mar. 31, 1950, regarding Sinkiang; ibid., Apr. 11,
0
28
8
about the best way that anyone knows of stopping this spread of
communism.
It is important to take this attitude not as a mere negative reaction
to communism but as the most positive affirmation of the most
affirmative truth that we hold, which is in the dignity and right of
p
every nation, of every people, and of every individual to develop inn
their own way, making their own mistakes, reaching their own
triumphs but acting under their own responsibility. That is what
we are pressing for in the Far East, and that is what we must affirm
and not get mixed up with purely negative and inconsequential
statements.
11
V
CO
SOVIET ATTITUDE
15
A
k
8
ic
Q
8
U
th
0
S1
Now, let me come to another underlying and important factor which
determines our relations and, in turn, our policy with the peoples of
Asia. That is the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Asia, and
particularly towards those parts of Asia which are contiguous to the
Soviet Union, and with great particularity this afternoon, to north
China.
The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in
these other areas as well, long antedates communism. This is not
something that has come out of communism at all. It long antedates
it. But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills
and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This (These
Communistic concept[s] and techniques have armed Russian imper
ialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration. Armed
with these new powers, what is happening in China is that the Soviet
Union is detaching the northern provinces [areas) of China from
China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is
complete in Outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in Manchurik
,
and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are very
happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. This is what
is going on. It is the detachment of these whole areas, vast areas,
populated by Chinese-the detachment of these areas from China
and their attachment to the Soviet Union.
I wish to state this and perhaps sin against my doctrine of our
dogmatism,
but I should like to suggest at any rate that this fact that
the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China
the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of
any foreign power with Asia.1
al
it
K
8)
P
d
0
a
Two RULES OF U.S. POLICY
What does that mean for us? It means something very, Point
significant. It means that nothing that we do and nothing that is
0
P
1950, 568
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2317
hich
es of
and
Permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be
dol of propaganda will not be able to obscure it. The only thing that can
obscure it is the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part which
etion easily could do so, and I urge all who are thinking about these foolish
most adventures to remember that we must not seize the unenviable
it de position which the Russians have carved out for themselves. We
ip in must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the
om righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people
what which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.
form. We must take the position we have always taken—that anyone who
ntial violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting
contrary to our own interest. That, I suggest to you this afternoon,
is the first and the greatest rule in regard to the formulation of
American policy toward Asia.
I suggest that the second rule is very like the first. That is to
keep our own purposes perfectly straight, perfectly pure, and perfectly
aboveboard and do not get them mixed-up with legal quibbles or the
the attempt to do one thing and really achieve another.
north
The consequences of this Russian attitude and this Russian action
in China are perfectly enormous. They are saddling all those in
id in
China who are proclaiming their loyalty to Moscow, and who are
not
allowing themselves to be used as puppets of Moscow, with the most
lates
awful responsibility which they must pay for. Furthermore, these
kills
,
actions of the Russians are making plainer than any speech, or any
hese
utterance, or any legislation can make throughout all of Asia, what
the true purposes of the Soviet Union are and what the true function
of communism as an agent of Russian imperialism is. These I
opiet
suggest to you are the fundamental factors, fundamental realities of
from
attitude out of which our relations and policies must grow.
MILITARY SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
uria
Now, let's in the light of that consider some of these policies. First
of all
, let's deal with the question of military security. I deal with
it first because it is important and because, having stated our policy
Chine in that regard, we must clearly understand that the military menace
is not the most immediate.
What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific
area, and what is our policy in regard to it?
In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has
placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military
defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of
our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific
area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security.
We have
American--and there are Australian troops in Japan. 'I am not in
a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there
is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses
of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through
aper
rmed
ess is
Terr
28s
DOD.
that
na is
of
VEIT
it we
forts
pasa
maintained.
e also
1.
This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and
then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in
2318
1950–1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1 See treaty of July 4, 1946. (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 861-864);
agreement of Mar. 14, 1947 (TIAS 1775; 61 Stat., pt. 4, p. 4019); agreement of
CE
W
DE
S1
VO
OL
OL
the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the
interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appro-
priate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United
Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of
the Pacific, and they must and will be held.
The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine
Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippiness
are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are
being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both
peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between
our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that
, so
and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines si
could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I
hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such si
attack,
to
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is con-
cerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against ca
military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee isp
hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship
. si
Should such an attack occur-one hesitates to say where such an
armed attack could come from the initial reliance must be on the th
people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the th
entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which
so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are
determined to protect their independence against outside aggression
,
But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern
problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important
as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other
problems are not capable of solution through military means. These
other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, de
countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That lo
cannot be stopped by military means.
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO PENETRATION
&
The susceptibility to penetration arises because in many arcas there
are new governments which have little experience in governments
.
administration and have not become firmly established or perhaps
firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in part, from very
serious economic problems, some of them growing out directly from
the last war, others growing indirectly out of the last war because of it
the disruptions of trade with other parts of the world, with the disrup.fr
to In
tion of arrangements which furnished credit and management to
these areas for many years. That has resulted in dislocation of eco-
be
nomic effort and in a good deal of suffering among the peoples con-
SIE
and
many
II
41
ar
VE
PI
; .. p)
and Apr. 1, 1948 (TIAS 2406; 3 UST 457); and agreement of Feb. 24 and Mar. 18
1950 (TIAS 2080; 1 UST 448).
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2319
ne
les
ore
cen
OR-
an
are
OI.
210
he cerned. In part this susceptibility to penetration comes from the
10- great social upheaval about which I have been speaking, an upheaval
ed which was carried on and confused a great deal by the Japanese occu-
of pation and by the propaganda which has gone on from Soviet sources
since the war.
Here, then, are the problems in these other areas which require
some policy on our part, and I should like to point out two facts to
YOU
and then discuss in more detail some of these areas.
th The first fact is the great difference between our responsibility and
our opportunities in the northern part of the Pacific area and in the
at, southern part of the Pacific area. In the north, we have direct respon-
Dessibility in Japan and we have direct opportunity to act. The same
I thing to a lesser degree is true in Korea. There we had direct respon-
achsibility, and there we did act, and there we have a greater opportunity
to be effective than we have in the more southerly part.
In the southerly part of the area, we are one of many nations who
st can do no more than help. The direct responsibility lies with the
is peoples concerned. They are proud of their new national respon-
ip.sibility. You can not sit around in Washington, or London, or Paris,
or The Hague, and determine what the policies are going to be in
the those areas. You can be willing to help, and you can help only when
the the conditions are right for help to be effective.
Ich
LIMITATIONS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE
That leads me to the other thing that I wanted to point out, and
that is the limitation of effective American assistance. American as-
ant
sistance can be effective when it is the missing component in a situa-
tion which might otherwise be solved. The United States cannot
se furnish all these components to solve the question. It can not furnish
INT
st
determination, it can not furnish the will, and it can not furnish the
byality of a people to its government. But if the will and if the deter-
mination exists and if the people are behind their government, then,
and not always then, is there a very good chance. In that situation,
American help can be effective and it can lead to an accomplishment
ere which could not otherwise be achieved.
tal
Japan.--Now, with that statement, let's deal very briefly--because
2PS the time is going on and I am almost equaling my performance in the
Senate and House--let's deal very briefly with some of the problems.
om
Let's take the situation in Japan for a moment. There are three great
de factors to be faced. The security matter I have dealt with. Aside
from that, there are the economic
questions and the political questions.
to In the political field, General MacArthur has been very successful
and the Japanese are hammering out with some effort, and with some
backsliding, and regaining and backsliding again of progress, a political
system which is based on nonmilitaristic institutions.
In the economic field, we have not been so successful
. That is in
very large part due to the inherent difficulty of the problem. The
problem
arises with the necessity of Japan being able to buy raw mate-
ials and sell goods. The former connections of Japan with the main-
land and with some of the islands have been disrupted. That
has
Ener
IP-
CO-
DI
sof
147,
13
,
2320
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
produced difficulties. The willingness of other countries to receive
Japanese goods has very much contracted since the war.
Difficulties of currency have added to those problems. But those
matters have got to be faced and have got to be solved. Whether
they are solved under a treaty or if the procedural difficulties of that
are too great under some other mechanism, they must be solved
along lines which permit the Japanese greater freedom-completa
freedom if possible—to buy what they need in the world and to
sell what they have to offer on the mainland of Asia, in southeast
Asia, and in other parts of the world. That is the nature of the
problem and it is a very tough one. It is one on which the occupation
authorities, the Japanese government, ourselves, and others are
working. There can be no magic solution to it.
Korea.--In Korea, we have taken great steps which have ended
our military occupation, and in cooperation with the United Nations,
have established an independent and sovereign country recognized
by nearly all the rest of the world. We have given that nation great
help in getting itself established. We are asking the Congress to
continue that help until it is firmly established, and that legislation is
now pending before the Congress. The idea that we should scrap
all of that, that we should stop half way through the achievement
of the establishment of this country, seems to me to be the most
utter defeatism and utter madness in our interests in Asia. But
there our responsibilities are more direct and our opportunities more
clear. When
you move to the south,
you find that our opportunity is
much slighter and that our responsibilities, except in the Philippines
and there indirectly, are very small. Those problems are very
confusing.
Philippines. In the Philippines, we acted with vigor and speed to
set up an independent sovereign nation which we have done. We
have given the Philippines a billion dollars of direct economic aid
since the war. We have spent another billion dollars in such matters
as veterans' benefits and other payments in the Philippines
. Much
of that money has not been used as wisely as we wish it had been used
,
but here again, we come up against the matter of responsibility
.
It is the Philippine Government which is responsible." It is the
Philippine Government which must make its own mistakes. What
we can do is advise and urge, and if help continues to be misused
, to
stop giving the help. We cannot direct, we should not direct, we
have not the slightest desire to direct. I believe that there are in
dications that the Philippines may be facing serious economic difl
.
culties. With energetic, determined action, they can perhaps
avoided or certainly minimized. Whether that will be true or not, ,
be
see Res
1 The independence of Korea was proclaimed Aug. 15, 1948. For the reselu
tion of the U.N. General Assembly relating to Korean independence,
112 (II), Nov. 14, 1947; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677–878
.
3 The independence of the Philippine Republic was proclaimed July 4 punten
by the President of the United States; see Du Decade of American Foreign Police,
pp. 860-861.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2321
zive
her
hat
lete
to
ast
the
are
led
Ds,
zed
est
to
1 is
ap
ent
ost
But
I can not say, but it does not rest within the power of the American
Government to determine that. We are always ready to help and
to advise. That is all we can and all we should do.
Asia.-Elsewhere in southeast Asia, the limits of what we can do
are to help where we are wanted. We are organizing the machinery
through which we can make effective help possible. The western
powers are all interested. We all know the techniques. We have
all had experiences which can be useful to those governments which
are newly starting out if they want it. It cannot be useful if they
don't want it. We know techniques of administration. We know
techniques of organizing school districts, and road districts, and
taxation districts. We know agricultural and industrial techniques,
all of which can be helpful, and those we are preparing to make
available if they are wanted, where they are wanted, and under
circumstances where they have a fighting chance to be successful.
We will not do these things for the mere purpose of being active.
They will not be done for the mere purpose of running around and
doing good, but for the purpose of moving in where we are wanted
to a situation where we have the missing component which, if put into
the rest of the picture, will spell success.
The situation in the different countries of southeast Asia is difficult.
It is highly confused in Burma where five different factions have
utterly disrupted the immediate government of the country. Progress
is being made in Indochina where the French, although moving
slowly, are moving. There are noticeable signs of progress in trans-
ferring responsibility to a local administration and getting the adher-
ence of the population to this local administration. We hope that
the situation will be such that the French can make further progress
and make it quickly, but I know full well the difficulties which are
faced by the Foreign Minister of France and my admiration and
respect for him are so great that I would not want one word I say to
add a feather to the burden that he carries.
In Malaya, the British have and are discharging their responsibility
harmoniously with the people of Malaya and are making progress.
Indonesia.--In Indonesia, a great success has been achieved within
the last few weeks and over a period of months. The round table
conferences at The Hague in which great statesmanship and restraint
were displayed, both on the Dutch and the Indonesian side, have
resulted in this new government being formed.' Relations of
this
government with the Dutch will be very good, and the Dutch can
furnish them great help and advice, and we will be willing to stand by
to give whatever help we can rightly and profitably give. That
situation is one which is full of encouragement although it is full of
India and Pakistan. As one goes to the end of this semicircle and
comes to India and Pakistan, we find really grave troubles facing the
world and facing these two countries there, both with respect to
ore
1 18
nes
ery
th
To
aid
315
chi
ed.
by.
he
at
to
ve
1-
Tim
be
at
difficulty also.
LU
23.
ใน
802-804.
The independence of Indonesia was effected Dec. 28, 1949; see ibid., pp.
415900_-57-vol. 2
43
2322
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
P
D
S
t
Kashmir, and to the utter difficulties—economic difficulties growing
out of the differences in devaluation, settlement of monetary plans
back and forth, et cetera. We know that they have assured one
another, and they have assured the world, that as stubborn as these
difficulties may be and difficult as they may be of solution, they are
not going to resort to war to solve them. We are glad to hear those
assurances and the whole world is glad to hear it, but we know also
that the problems are in such a situation and in such an area that they
are most inflammable, and we believe that in addition to these most
desirable assurances there should be some accommodation of wills to
bring about a result as soon as possible.
In India and in Pakistan we are willing to be of such help as we can
be. Again, the responsibility is not ours. Again we can only be
helpful friends. Again the responsibility lies with people who have
won their freedom and who are very proud of it.
11
PI
D
11
D
ho
THE NEW DAY FOR ASIA
81
!
own.
fo
址
​CO
SO
So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is
a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian
peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their
It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west
are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitation, and
which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and
the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of
mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends
.
Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but be
we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions
of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that
this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a
glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that
decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power
of the
the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an
to
enemy from the outside can decide for them.
ti
er
W
112
2. REVIEW OF THE POSITION AS OF 1955: Address by the
Secretary of State, February 16, 1955 (Excerpts)'
W
fe
M
th
FAR EAST SECURITY TREATIES
In the Far East the United States has responded to the desire of
others that we join with them to assure their security. During the
last 4 years, the United States has become party to security treaties
with Korea, Japan, the Republic of China on Formosa, the Philip-
19
p
1 Made before the Foreign Policy Association, New York; Department of State
Bulletin, Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 328–331.
an
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2323
For Congressional action on the Manila Pact, the security treaty with China,
pines
,
OS
le
se
ce
be
50
ET
st
0
D
be
he
4
.
ferred--the China treaty and the Manila Pact.
1951 (supra, pp. 885-886), Dec. 2, 1954 (supra, 945-947), Aug. 30, 1951 (supra,
pp. 873–875), and Sept. 1, 1951 (supra, pp. 878-880).
**? Treaty and protocol of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 912-916.
3 See infra, pp. 2483-2486.
and the Formosa (Taiwan) resolution, see supra, pp. 929-945 and 957–965, and
Australia and New Zealand. Also we hare joined the eight-
power Manila Pact for the security of Southeast Asia.?
The total of these treaties is a mutual security system which, start-
ing from the Aleutian Islands in the North, runs in a great arc to the
South Pacific. This constitutes a defensive bulwark for freedom in
that part of the world.
What has thus been done by many nations is important. Also
important is the manner in which the United States has played its
part, particularly during recent days.
When the Congress convened last January, it was organized by the
Democratic Party. So when the Manila Pact and the China treaty
were submitted, they were submitted by a Republican President to a
Democrat-controlled body. The same was true of President Eisen-
hower's request for Congressional authority to use the armed forces
Nevertheless, the two treaties were ratified and the Congressional
authority was granted. This was done promptly and with virtual
is unanimity.
These events demonstrate a national unity and capacity of action
11
which is needed in the world today. Too often representative processes
lead to such partisanship and such consequent delays that hostile
d
forces are encouraged to believe that democracies are inherently
ad ineffective. The Government of the United States has shown the
of contrary. Partisanship was wholly subordinated to the
national good,
so that action of great importance could be taken with deliberation,
For this the nation can be grateful to the leadership and to the gen-
eral membership of both parties in the Congress. I know that they
would expect me to pay special tribute to Walter F. George, who, as
at Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, carried the
of heaviest aggregate burden of responsibility in relation to the three acts
We can all take pride, as Americans, in this demonstration of na-
tional unity and capacity. Because of it, free men throughout the
world can face the future with better hope and new confidence.
Mutual DEFENSE TREATY WITH CHINA
Let me turn now to deal with some of the substantive problems
which arise out of the two Far Eastern treaties to which I have re-
the Pescadores. These islands became part of the Japanese Empire
See, respectively, the treaties of Oct. 1, 1953 (supra, pp. 897–898), Sept. 8,
st
S.
it but with decisiveness.
IS
it
8
n
to which I refer.
le
e
1
S
e
infra, pp. 2486-2487.
2324
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
T
S
ni
IT
8.
1 Treaty of Apr. 17, 1895; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 87, pp. 795-805
4 See President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950; infra, pp. 2539-2540.
in 1895.' They continued as such for half a century, until they were
relinquished by Japan as a result of her defeat in war?a defeat prin-
cipally wrought by the efforts and sacrifices of the United States.
These islands form an important part of the Western Pacific defense
system which I have described. The people of the islands eagerly
seek our help.
Thus Formosa and the Pescadores have been properly a matter of
concern to the United States.
In 1945 our long-time ally, the Republic of China, was entrusted
with authority over these islands.3 In 1950, when the aggression
against Korea occurred, President Truman ordered our Pacific fleet toi
defend Formosa against possible Chinese Communist attack. Now,
that determination has been converted into our Mutual Defense
Treaty with the Republic of China.
It is important to note that the treaty, except as it relates to United
States territories, covers only the islands of Formosa and the Pesca-
N
dores, and an armed attack directed against those islands. The Cor-
gressional authority is to secure and protect Formosa and the Pescah
dores against armed attack, and to make secure and to protect “related
positions and territories" as the President judges "this would be re-
quired or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the h
Pescadores.”
The President did not use our armed forces to help the Chinese Na-
tionalists to hold the Tachen Islands and Yushan and Pishan, lying
some 200 miles north of Formosa. These islands were virtually un- th
related to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. We helped the
Chinese Nationalists to evacuate these islands and regroup in
forces, so as to avoid a bloody and wasteful battle which would have
inflamed public emotions. Thus, Nationalist China and the United
States have made an important contribution to the cause of peace.
It has been suggested that Nationalist China should go further and U
surrender to the Chinese Communists the
coastal positions which the 01
Communists need to stage their announced attack on Formosa
. Its th
doubtful that this would serve either the cause of peace or the cause
of freedom.
The Chinese Communists have been the initiators of violence in this
area. They have already formally declared their intention to take
Formosa by force. If the Chinese Nationalists now oblige by making di
it easier for the Chinese
Communists to conquer Formosa, will they be
less apt to do so? I doubt it.
The United States has no commitment and no purpose to defend the
coastal positions as such. The basic purpose is to assure that Formel
and the Pescadores will not be forcibly taken over by the Chinese
Policy, pp. 625-626.
3 See General Order No. 1, Sept. 2, 1945; The Political Reorientation of Japanese pi
September 1945 to September 1948: Report of Government Section, Supreme
mander for the Allied Powers, vol. II, p. 442.
their
DI
SE
2.
D.
.
dia
th
C
t]
2490-2491.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2325
ise
It
President of the Security Council; Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955,
the Congress for the Year 1950 (Department of State publication 4178; 1951),
Chinese Communist Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (infra, p. 2490) and
the Chinese reply of Feb. 3, 1955 (Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955,
Communists. However, Foreign Minister Chou says they will use
all their force to take Formosa and they treat the coastal islands
as means to that end. When the Nationalists voluntarily evacuated
the Tachen islands, the Chinese Communists' comment was: “The
158 liberation of these islands has created favorable conditions for our
ry People's Liberation Army in the liberation of Formosa."
Thus the Chinese Communists have linked the coastal positions to
of the defense of Formosa. That is the fact which, as President Eisen-
hower said in his message to Congress about Formosa, "compels
ied
us to take into account closely related localities.” Accordingly, we
302 shall be alert to subsequent Chinese Communist actions, rejecting
to for ourselves any initiative of warlike deeds.
WW, It is hardly to be expected that the Chinese Communists will re-
nounce their ambitions. However, might they not renounce their
efforts to realize their goals by force?
ted
Such renunciation of force is one of the basic principles of the United
(31 Nations, and the United States had hoped, and still hopes, that the
- United Nations may be able to effect a cessation of the present
** | hostilities. President Eisenhower, in his message to Congress dealing
sed with this matter, made clear that the United States
would welcome
action by the United Nations which might bring an end to the active
the hostilities in the area. The Government of New Zealand has brought
this situation before the Security Council, and the United States,
Va
in the interest of peace, went to the length of voting to invite thé
10. Chinese Communists to come to the Security Council to discuss
10- the matter.3
the
In 1950, the Chinese Communists had accepted a Security Council
el invitation in relation to Korea. However, this time the Chinese
Communists contemptuously rejected the invitation.
We sincerely hope that this decision of the Chinese Communists is
end
not irrevocable and that they will abide by the principles of the
2. United Nations rather than challenge by force the defensive obligations
of this country. In any event, we believe that their attitude toward
the United Nations Security Council has not ended the responsibility
us of that body which, by the Charter, has the "primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
his
ske
It should not, moreover, be carelessly assumed that peace and
security will be promoted merely by the non-Communist nations
in-
definitely granting one-sided concessions to the Communist nations.
President Eisenhower's message to Congress of Jan. 24, 1955; infra, pp.
the
See letter of Jan. 28, 1955, from the Representative of New Zealand to the
ese P. 253.
3
See Ambassador Lodge's statement in the Security Council on Jan. 31, 1955;
1 fra, pp. 2487–2489.
United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to
See the cablegram of Jan. 31, 1955, from the U.N. Secretary-General to the
Ave
5
ted
the
be
2483-2486.
788
2016
pp. 40-41.
PPT pp. 254-255).
2326
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
1
1
3
A great danger in Asia is the fear of many non-Communist peoples
that the United States has no real intention of standing firmly behind
them. Already that fear has mounted to the danger point. W
accepted in Korea an armistice which the Chinese Communists boister
ously misrepresent as a "victory" for them. We acquiesced in an
Indochina armistice 1 which reflected the defeat of the French Union
forces at Dien Bien Phu. We aided the Tachen evacuation. The
reasons were compelling; nevertheless the result added a few squam
miles to the Communist domain.
If the non-Communist Asians ever come to feel that their Western
Allies are disposed to retreat whenever communism threatens the
peace, then the entire area could quickly become indefensible.
As the situation now exists, neither the cause of freedom, nor United
States security, nor world peace and security would be promoted by
undermining the faith of the free Asian peoples in our strength and
in our willingness to use that strength to restrain those who violently
menace liberty. The American people have, through the Congress
,
made their own resolution clear. That is a verdict which the Govern-
ment accepts as sound and which it will soberly execute.
SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Let me turn now to Southeast Asia. In a few hours I shall be going
to Bangkok to attend the first meeting of the Council created under
the Manila Pact for the security of Southeast Asia.
We shall at Bangkok deal with the problem of organizing the Treaty
Council. Also we shall begin to deal with the three substantive prob-
lems assigned to the Council, namely, military security, security
against subversion directed from without, and economic welfare
.
cannot anticipate what the decisions will be, but I am confident that
our gathering will show the advantages of cooperation between the
East and the West.
Some Asians retain a fear, derived from past colonial relationships,
that close ties with the Western powers will lead to their being domi-
nated by the Western powers. It is essential that that fear should be
dispelled.
Ån important step in that direction was taken at Manila when, at the
inspiration of President Magsaysay, the eight powers there signed the
Pacific Charter. Thereby we dedicated ourselves
to promoting seli
government and to securing independence for all countries whose
peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. Also
,
we agreed to cooperate in the economic, social, and cultural fields in
order to promote higher living standards, economic progress,
and social
well-being.
However
, words alone are not enough. It is necessary to infuse these
words with the breath of life. That, I hope, will be done
at Bangkok
Those who gather there will meet as equals. We shall, I think, find
1 Armistice agreements of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 750-788.
3 The Council met from Feb. 23 to Feb. 25, 1955. For the text of the con
muniqué, see infra, doc. 7.
3 See declaration of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 916-917.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2327
er-
en
100
he
2118
ern
nd
HT
ESS
TI-
continent. If the other nations of Europe and Asia stand alone, they
1 President Lincoln's speech of Feb. 22, 1861, delivered in Independence Hall,
. Philadelphia; Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. IV,
ples
ways to diminish the risk of armed attack against the treaty area and
ind
the danger of subversion from without. Also we shall begin to study
We
economic problems. These are not capable of any dramatic and
spectacular solution, but they do respond to steady, painstaking, and
sympathetic efforts.
The first task is to deal with fundamentals. That we are already
doing, particularly in the basic realm of education. United States
universities and colleges are cooperating with Asian institutions in
Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan. Many United States techni-
cians are serving in Asia in economic, educational, and health tasks,
Ehe
and the number is being increased. Our cooperation is already
beginning to show results in better food and better health, and we are
ced
together taking the first steps to expand trade, to increase private
investment, and to raise standards of living.
In such ways, we can justify man's faith in freedom.
There should indeed be no cleavage between the Western and Asian
nations. Our concept of the nature of man had its beginning in Asia,
where East and West met. We believe that all men are the creation
and concern of a universal God and that He has endowed every person
with a right to develop in accordance with the dictates of his indi-
vidual reason and conscience.
ng That religious faith, politically translated into the Magna Charta,
der the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and our own Declara-
tion of Independence, was, as Lincoln said of our Declaration, nothing
aty
exclusive but designed to provide "liberty, not alone to the people of
b- this country, but hope for the world for all future time.”
ty We also realize that, if human liberty is to be a reality, there must
1 be an economic as well as a political foundation. The impoverished
nat
and the destitute cannot be truly free. So we recognize that economic
he values are essential to give reality to the moral and political values
that we cherish.
Such a philosophy is indeed very different from that of Soviet com-
be Soviet communism denies the principle of human equality and
instead substitutes the principle of class rule.
he
It denies that men are capable of self-government and substitutes
he
the principle of dictatorship, the so-called dictatorship of the
f
proletariat.
It denies nationalism, except as it can be used as a slogan to drive
& wedge between East and West and prepare the way for an absorp-
in
tion of the peoples by international communism.
s!
It preaches a new doctrine of segregation. The peoples of Asia, it
is said, must be segregated from the peoples of the West. The new
nations of Asia must be segregated from association with others.
The guile behind this is obvious. The Soviet and Chinese Com-
d
munists know that their combined power can dominate the Eurasian
35,
11-
munism.
Se
10,
se
k.
(New Brunswick, N. J., 1963), p. 240.
2328
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
11
0
will be unable to resist the iron embrace of international communism
At the Berlin Conference last year, Mr. Molotov denounced NATO
and proposed a European security system which would exclude the
United States. Now, the Soviet and Chinese Communists denounce s
the Manila Pact, because it may bring to Southeast Asia the strength
needed to resist Communist aggression.
T
The Bangkok Conference will enable the free nations of the West
and of the East to begin a vital demonstration. They can show that, I
through association as sovereign equals, they can each help the other E
to independence, security, and well-being.
C
That result accords with the high ideals with which our nation was
founded. It is in keeping with what our people have sought through i
out their history. So our delegation goes to Bangkok with conf
.
dence, because we know that our mission is sustained by national
faith and national purpose.
d
ಪ = ರ
-5ة
S
8
B. THE PACIFIC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
8
D
t
The ANZUS Pact
W
0
m
li
[For the text of the Security Treaty of Sept. 1, 1951, between the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand (the ANZUS Treaty), see supra,
pp. 878-880.]
r
3. ESTABLISHING THE MACHINERY OF THE ANZUS COUNCIL:
Communiqué of the First Meeting of the ANZUS Council, Kaneohe
,
Hawaii, August 7, 1952 2
t
C
C
C
The Anzus Council established by the security treaty between
Australia, New Zealand and the United States 3 concluded its first
meeting at Kaneohe today. The Right Honorable Richard G. Casey
Minister for External Affairs, represented Australia; The Honorable
T. Clifton Webb, Minister for External Affairs, represented New
Zealand; and The Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
represented the United States of America.
Advisers of the Australian Minister for External Affairs included
:
The Honorable Sir Percy Spender, Ambassador to the United States
Mr. Alan Watt, Secretary, Department of External Affairs; Sir Fred-
erick Shedden, Secretary, Department of Defense and Air; Vics
Marshal F. R. W. Schergerhead, Australian Joint Service Staff
.
1 See Soviet proposal of Feb. 10, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Bebas
Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954.4 Department of State publication 539
1954), pp. 231-232.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 18, 1952, pp. 244–245.
3 Treaty of Sept. 1, 1951; supra, pp. 878-880.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2329
er
cas
machinery the general nature of which was agreed to:
The Advisers of the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs
m. included: The Honorable Leslie K. Munro, Ambassador to the
10 United States; Mr. Foss Shanahan, Deputy Secretary, Department
he of External Affairs; and Major General W. G. Gentry, Chief of General
ce Staff .
th
The Advisers of the United States Secretary of State included:
The Honorable Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large; The Honorable
2St George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs;
at The Honorable John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs; and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in
Chief, Pacific and U. S. Pacific Fleet.
At the end of the meeting the three Foreign Ministers issued the
to following announcement:
fic
(The] Anzus treaty recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
Lal area on any of the parties would be dangerous to the peace and security
of all signatories and declares that each would act to meet the common
danger in accordance with constitutional processes. The treaty also
establishes the Council as the means for a closer consultative relation-
ship among the three governments. We believe that the Council will
afford each of us the opportunity to achieve more effective cooperation
as members of the free world. We take this occasion to reaffirm the
principles of the treaty.
At this first meeting we have established the necessary organization
to implement the treaty. In following the provisions of the treaty
which states that the Council is to consist of the three foreign ministers
or their deputies we have agreed that the Council of Ministers should
meet annually, one year in the United States and the alternate year
ed
in Australia or New Zealand. The Council also agreed that special
meetings normally attended by the Deputies will be held in Wash-
ington to provide for continuing consultation and to provide a focus
L:
where existing channels and agencies may be utilized in the imple-
mentation of the treaty.
The deputy members of the Council will be: For Australia, The
Honorable Sir Percy C. Spender, Ambassador to the United States;
for New Zealand, The Honorable Leslie K. Munro, Ambassador to
the United States; and for the United States, The Honorable David
st
K. Bruce, Under Secretary of State.
1
To ensure that effective measures are taken to implement Article III
of the treaty the Council will have the advice of appropriate military
officers of the three governments. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN,
has been designated as the United States military representative ac-
credited to the Council. The Australian and New Zealand military
.:
representatives will soon be designated. An early meeting of these
B;
officers will be held at Honolulu to work out details of the military
light of Article VIII of the treaty which authorizes it to maintain a
consultative relationship with other states and regional organizations.
The Council discussed the ways and means by which it might con-
tribute to the
growth of the
system of regional
security referred to in
8,
31
le
-1
2330
1950–1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1
1
]
this article and reaffirmed on behalf of the three governments the need
for collective defense in the Pacific area. The Council examined the
possibility of providing arrangements for the association of other gor
ernments in its work. Recognizing that the Council is just beginning
to evolve its own tripartite organization and program it came to the
conclusion that it would be premature at this early stage in its own
development to attempt to establish relationships with other states
or regional organizations. The Council agreed, however, that in the
meantime the members of the Council would continue to keep in close
touch through existing channels with other states concerned to pre-
serve peace in the Pacific area.
We reaffirm that our governments are dedicated to the strengthening
and furtherance of friendly and peaceful relationships among nations
in the Pacific area. In so doing we emphasize that the purpose of
the Anzus treaty is solely the defense of its members against aggres
sion. As is clear from the treaty itself this is fully consistent with the
principles of the United Nations Charter and with the obligations of
the members under the charter. The ANZUS Council is dedicated to
help support and implement the principles and responsibilities of the
United Nations. The principle of collective security is the common
objective of both and the security system of the United Nations which
we are seeking to build will be made stronger by the steps which we
have taken here. Furthermore, in our discussion of how best to con-
tribute by constructive measures to the security of the Pacific ares
we have taken into account the membership of Australia and New
Zealand in the British Commonwealth and United States participation
in the North Atlantic Treaty organization and its association by treaty
with the other American republics and with Japan and the
Philippines.
We have taken the opportunity to review situations of mutual con-
We exchanged views on the operations of the United Nations
in Korea and the problem of assisting the free nations of Asia to resist
Communist imperialism.
We emphasize, however, that we neither reached any decisions nor
undertook any commitments regarding matters of direct concern to
our friends in the Pacific area or elsewhere.
1
1
1
1
1
Cern
4. THE ANNUAL REVIEW: Communiqué of the Second Meeting
of the ANZUS Council, Washington, September 10, 1953"
The Anzus Council, established by the Security Treaty between
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, concluded its 2-day
meeting in Washington' today. The Right Honorable Richard G.
orable T. Clifton Webb, Minister of External Affairs, represented New
Casey, Minister for External Affairs, represented Australia; the Hon
Zealand; and the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
,
represented the United States of America.
1
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 28, 1953, pp. 414-415.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2331
WI
tes
Se
uns
28-
he
OD
ch
Te
11
Representatives in the carrying out of their responsibilities. It
eed
In addition to the Ministers the delegations included, for Australia:
the
His Excellency the Honorable Sir Percy C. Spender, Ambassador to
the United States, and Lt. General Sir Sydney F. Rowell, Chief of the
img
General Staff; for New Zealand: His Excellency Leslie K. Munro,
Ehe
Ambassador to the United States; Alisteir D. McIntosh, Secretary of
External Affairs; and Maj. Gen. W. G. Gentry, Chief of the General
Staff; and for the United States: The Honorable Livingston T. Mer-
che
chant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; the Honorable Walter
S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; the Honor-
able Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; and
Admiral Felix Stump, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and U.S. Pacific
ng
Fleet. By invitation of the Council Admiral Arthur W. Radford,
Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and formerly
of
U.S. Military Representative accredited to the Council, attended the
meeting in a consultative capacity.
At the conclusion of the meeting the Council issued the following
of
statement:
to
The Council affords the Foreign Ministers of the three Governments
he
the opportunity to consult together periodically in regard to the im-
plementation of the Anzus Security Treaty and to discuss various
matters of interest and concern to their countries. It is the over-all
objective of the Anzus partners, building on the foundation of the
Treaty, to strengthen the relationships between their Governments
at both the political and military levels and to seek the most effective
means of providing for their common defense.
At this meeting the Ministers again affirmed the defensive nature
ST
of the Treaty. They expressed the determination of their Govern-
ments that Anzus shall play its full part in the maintenance of peace
and security in the Pacific. They took, however, no decisions and
reached no agreements directly affecting the interests of the other
nations of the free world, but discussed in considerable detail the
general world situation with specific reference to areas under threat
from Communist imperialism.
In its deliberations the Council surveyed situations in the Pacific
specifically affecting the security of the three countries. It took
special note of those areas in which Communist aggression has led
to outright hostilities. In particular the Council considered the
situation in Korea and in Indo-China. Each Minister expressed the
view of his Government that under present circumstances no question
of the recognition of Communist China or of the admission of its
representatives to the United Nations would be entertained.
The Council examined reports from the Military Representatives,
who were appointed at its first meeting last year to advise the Council
concerning the military aspects
of the implementation of the Treaty.
The Military Representatives held their first meeting in September
1952 and concluded another meeting at Pearl Harbor last week.
The Council noted with satisfaction the progress made by the Military
found that their reports demonstrated clearly the importance of con-
88
ET
OD
ne
ju
ាទ
st
OT
0
1
1
}
be pressed forward. They also shared the conviction expressed
2 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951 (supra, pp. 885-886), and statements by President
1 Treaties of Aug. 30, 1951, and Oct. 1, 1953; supra, pp. 873-875 and 897-898.
2332 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
tinuing the close cooperation established by the Representatives
during the past year.
The Council considered its responsibilities in the light of Article
VIII of the Treaty, which authorizes it to establish consultative
relationships with other states and regional organizations
. It
reviewed its own position vis-a-vis other existing defense arrange
ments in the Pacific and considered the place of Anzus in the devel-
opment of a broader collective security system for the area. The
Council affirmed its readiness to consider any measure which would
strengthen the defense of the area. It unanimously concluded
,
however, that to attempt to enlarge its membership would not con-
tribute directly and materially to this end.
The Council noted the fact that each of the three Governments
already has other relationships and responsibilities. It recognized
the important interests of other countries in the Pacific. The
ANZUS Treaty is one of a number of arrangements for the furtherance
of security among the nations of the area. The United States is &
partner in a mutual security pact with the Philippines and has
initialed such a pact with Korea. It has a Security Treaty with
Japan and has defense understandings with the National Govern-
ment of China in Formosa. Then again, Australia and New Zea-
land as members of the British Commonwealth, have the closest ties
with Great Britain and the other Commonwealth nations. All
these arrangements and relationships constitute together a solemn
warning to any potential aggressor and represent the growing founda-
tion for lasting peace in the Pacific.
5. COLLECTIVE DEFENSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Statement by
Representatives of the ANZUS Governments at Their Informal
Consultative Meeting, Washington, June 30, 1954 3
Today's Anzus meeting was one in the continuing series of such
meetings providing close consultation among Australia, New Zea-
land, and the United States, the three signatories to the Anzos
treaty.
The situation in Southeast Asia was discussed in the light of cur-
rent developments, including the talks just concluded in Washington
.
The Australian and New Zealand representatives expressed satis-
faction with the statement by President
Eisenhower and Sir Winston
Churchill that plans for collective defense in Southeast Asia should
Truman, June 27, 1950 (infrà, p. 2486), and by President Eisenhower,
1953 (infra, p. 2475).
3 Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, p. 50.
4 Statement of June 28, 1954; supra, pp. 1705-1706.
Feb. 2,
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2333
zes
cle
ve
It
ge
el
he
old
d.
that, if at Geneva the French Government is confronted with demands
which prevent an acceptable agreement regarding Indochina, the
international situation will be seriously aggravated.
All three representatives at the ANZUS meeting agreed on the need
for immediate action to bring about the early establishment of col-
lective defense in Southeast Asia--an area in which the three par-
ticipating countries are all vitally concerned.
11-
6. THE ANNUAL REVIEW: Communiqué of the Fourth Meeting
of the ANZUS Council, Washington, September 24, 1955
1
its
ed
he
ce
8
22s
th
ት- 1-
es
1
II
H-
The Anzus Council affords the Foreign Ministers of the three
Governments the opportunity of regular, periodic consultation in
regard to international and defense matters of mutual interest and
concern. The over-riding objective of the Anzus partners is to
strengthen the relationships between their Governments and to seek
effective means of providing for their mutual security.
At this meeting the representatives of the three Governments were
glad to note that since their last meeting in 1954, at which they had
agreed on the need for the early establishment of collective defense in
Southeast Asia, the Manila Pact has been concluded. They unani-
mously agreed that the Manila Pact, which is history's first multi-
lateral collective defense organization with East Asian participation,
represents a further highly significant development toward sustaining
and strengthening peace and security in an area of vital concern to
the free world. In addition to mutual membership in Anzus and the
Manila Pact, the Ministers noted that their countries have other
relationships which contribute to the development of strength and
stability in the area.
The Ministers discussed at some length the developments in the
world situation occurring
since the last meeting of the Anzus Council
.
They noted with satisfaction the efforts made at the Geneva meeting
of heads of government 4 toward reducing the causes of world tension.
They expressed the hope that these preliminary steps would be fol-
lowed by positive action. They were in firm agreement that world
developments do not so far justify any relaxation of the efforts of the
free world to maintain a posture of defensive strength.
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 534.
* See statement of June 30, 1954; supra.
Treaty and protocol of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 912-916.
See The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Depart-
ment of State publication 6046; 1955) and supra, pp. 111-114.
h
"
S
0
8
2334
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO
(
(For the text of the SEATO Treaty, September 8, 1954, see supra,
pp. 912-916.)
1
7. ESTABLISHING THE MACHINERY OF SEATO: Communiqué
of the First Meeting of the SEATO Council, Bangkok, February
25, 1955 1
{
CD
S
Treaty
S
f
1
I
8
I
The Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States
and the Representative of France have completed the First Meeting
of the Council established by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
The Treaty entered into force on February 19, 1955
,
following the deposit of the instruments of ratification with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Council has
held six sessions in Bangkok from February 23 to February 25 under
the Chairmanship of H. R. H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, Foreign
Minister of the Government of Thailand.
The Council met in circumstances which give increasing urgency
to the objectives of the Treaty. The Members of the Council declared
the dedication of their Governments to the purposes and principles
set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular
, they
asserted their hatred of war and their determination to take all possible
measures to preserve and strengthen peace. They reiterated that
such military arrangements as they may make will be purely defensive,
in accordance with their international obligations, and will never be
used for purposes of aggression.
The Council reaffirmed the aim of their Governments, as set forth
in the Pacific Charter: 3 to uphold the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples; to promote self-government and to
secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and
are able to undertake its responsibilities; to continue to cooperate in
the economic, social, and welfare fields' in order to promote higher
living standards, economic progress, and social well-being in this
region; and to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt
in the Treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sov-
ereignty or territorial integrity.
Upholding the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of other states, the Council stressed the paramount need for the main
tenance in peace of the integrity and authority of freely constitute
governments in the area and of the right of peoples to determine
their own destiny without external interference. They, therefore
,
condemned not
only warlike
action but also those subtle forms of
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1955, pp. 371-373; see also ibi.
pp. 373-375.
2 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 912–916.
3 Agreement of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 916-917.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2335
"
he
ES
8
se
5.
ne
25
aggression by which freedom and self-government are undermined
and men's minds subverted.
This Meeting has provided the Members of the Council with an
opportunity for bringing about closer ties among their own govern-
ments in achieving their common objectives and purposes under the
Treaty. They believe that the Manila Treaty is already exerting a
positive influence for the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia and
the Southwest Pacific, and that the solidarity of the member nations,
shown at the present meeting, will serve as an increasingly powerful
deterrent against aggression. The Council recognized the continuing
dangers to peace and security in the Treaty area and agreed that
these threats make it imperative that the member governments take
steps to strengthen the common defense.
It was recognized that subversion and infiltration constitute a serious
threat to the peace and security of the area and that this demands
special efforts in all aspects of the national life. The Council dis-
cussed specific attempts by elements directed from outside to subvert
free institutions and governments in the Treaty area. The Council
viewed these subversive activities with grave concern and was deter-
mined to help the peoples of the area to resist them. There was
agreement on the need for cooperation among the member govern-
ments to assist one another in combatting the subversive activities of
international Communism. The Council decided to arrange for con-
tinuing consultation and mutual assistance and to make it possible
for each member government to draw upon the experience of the
others in dealing with this danger. In this connection the Council
received a valuable report on the Philippine experience in combatting
internal dissidence, and noted the statement of the United Kingdom
Delegation on the improved situation in Malaya.
The Council agreed upon the importance of implementing Article
III of the Treaty which provides:
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate
with one another in the further development of economic measures, including
technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-
being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward
7
es
V
ut
24
h
d
0
d
1
1
these ends.
S
it
ber
S
d
e
Arrangements were made for economic experts designated by mem-
governments to meet periodically wherever appropriate and con-
venient on matters within the scope of this Article.
The members of the Council recognized that while certain economic
matters such as trade, the international payments, development, in-
vestment, and sound economic progress involved a wider geographic
area and desirably included cooperation with many friendly states as
well as with the member states, nevertheless special economic ques-
tions arise out of the Treaty commitments of the member govern-
ments and may involve individual and cooperative_steps which
member states could take to resolve these questions. The economic
experts designated will advise Council representatives on these meas-
eures
. The first meeting of the economic experts will take place at à
!!
early date.
2336
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
They will also make arrangements for a Secretariat to assist them,
i
r
The Council representatives may request the member governments
may from time to time be working on projects under the Treaty.
The Council noted with interest the statement by the United States
Delegation about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Council
is deeply conscious of the potential contributions of atomic energy to
the health and standards of living of the peoples of the member
nations and welcomed the proposed discussions relating to further
cooperation and assistance in the atomic energy programs directed
toward achieving these benefits.
Realizing the importance to the security of Southeast Asia and the
Southwest Pacific of the States of Cambodia, Laos, and of the free
territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Viet Nam, the Count
cil reaffirmed the determination of the member governments to sup
port these three States in maintaining their freedom and independ-
ence as set forth in the Protocol to the Treaty! The Council was
informed of assistance which had been extended to the three States
and expressed the hope that member governments would offer further
assistance,
Having thus exchanged views, the members of the Council made
the following arrangements to help carry out the provisions of the
Treaty:
Operation of the Council
The governments will be represented on the Council by their For ?
eign Ministers or their designated representatives. The Council will
meet at least once each year and more often when deemed necessary
.
It will usually meet in the Treaty area.
Decisions of the Council
will be taken by unanimous agreement.
Designation of Council Representatives
In order to assure close and continuing cooperation when the Colum
cil is not in session, the Council has
agreed to designate Council repre-
sentatives who will have their seat in Bangkok. The Council repre!
sentatives will maintain continuing consultation on matters relating
to the Treaty and will perform such special tasks as the Council maj
from time to time, direct. They may make agreed recommendation ?
to the Council or, when the Council is not in session, to the member
governments with respect to implementation of the Treaty. Through
the Council representatives the member governments may raise ma
ters relating to the Treaty and agree on the steps to be taken 1
carrying out its provisions.
tasks. Working groups composed of such personnel may me 1
wherever appropriate and convenient.
The Council representatives will ensure appropriate exchange of
information and close coordination of planning among such groups
0
a
M
CI
61
II
S1
1 Protocol of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, p. 916.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2337
ree
nd-
TAS
tes
tes the personnel of the Secretariat being made available by the
cil representatives on a contributed basis.
to
The Council directed that the Council representatives begin opera-
bertions as soon as possible and that one of their first tasks should be to
her arrange meetings of specially qualified personnel designated by mem-
ted ber governments to assist the Council representatives in considering
means of strengthening cooperation in combatting subversion and
the infiltration.
The Council also requested the Council representatives to explore
the opportunities for increasing cultural and technical cooperation
up- among the member governments and to submit recommendations to
the next meeting of the Council.
Military Advisers to the Council
her
Each of the governments agreed to designate a Military Adviser to
its member of the Council.
nde
The Military Advisers will make recommendations to the Council
the
on military cooperation under the Treaty.
They will meet periodically as required, will formulate their own
rules of procedure and any necessary organizational arrangements.
The Military Advisers at this Council meeting met on February
Or 24 and 25. They exchanged views concerning the military aspects of
il the Defense Treaty and as a result of these discussions their staff
TY. planners will meet in Manila in April 1955 to initiate plans for the
nel implementation of certain military aspects of the Treaty. Shortly
thereafter the Military Advisers will again convene in Bangkok.
Peace and Security of the Area
Although they represent diverse nations and peoples, the members
ore of the Council were unanimous in the belief that this meeting has
are enabled them to understand and appreciate the problems facing the
ing governments of the countries covered by the Treaty in the common
BY effort to ensure peace and security under the Treaty. The progress
pris achieved at this first Council meeting provides solid hope for closer
bet cooperation among the member governments for the good of the
ugh region as a whole. The members of the Council are united in their
195 conviction that the common efforts of their governments are con-
tributing positively to the peace and security of the area, both for
the
member governments and for other free nations in the region. The
Council expressed the hope that these free nations will associate them-
it selves in the near future with the work to be undertaken under the
Win-
ats
eet Treaty.
of
388
aty.
emi,
415900_-57-Vol. 2_444
2338
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
I
Te
It
CO
10
CO
re
pe
OD
The peoples in these countries,
fact, I suggested I might talk to you about the Colombo Plan-
the first place, because I have just returned from Ottawa where I
Colombo Plan countries; 3 and in the second place, because I think
2 Delivered before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry,
The Colombo Plan
th
8. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE COLOMBO
of
PLAN: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economie
Affairs,1 October 14, 1954 ?
The theme of your conference is "Strengthening Economic Ties
Between the United States and Asia.” There is no need to tell this
audience the importance of that objective. Indeed, your Council
exists largely for that purpose--to enlarge American understanding A
of the nature and content of our economic relations with Asia and to
strengthen the economic ties between our country and Asian countries
. O
Neither do I need to tell the members of this audience how impor-B
tant it is for our own interests and for the sake of peace and stability
in the world that the aspirations of the countries of Asia for economie ha
progress should be fulfilled. In those countries it is literally true be
that the future of the democratic way of life and the democratic form
of government depends to a very considerable extent on whether or be
not it will prove possible to achieve some measurable economic pro- As
gress, some visible economic development, by democratic methods do
All of the free countries of Asia stand challenged by the totalitarian an
governments of Russia and Red China. They are constantly being al
told that enormous progress has been made and is being made
those Communist countries. They are not in a position to say
that
this is not so. They know, however, that if it is so this progress
is
being accomplished at a great price in human freedom and dignity.
Nevertheless, whatever progress is being made in the slave states
is a challenge to the free countries. The peoples of those free coun:
tries—many of them newly independent and newly possessed of the
freedom to manage their own affairs-have chosen a system of govern
however, are not academic political scientists; they are farmers in the
WE
fields and workers in the factories. To them the worth of a political
system is measured by what it can do what it can produce in the
way of economic well-being and increasing general welfare.
iti
To us the outcome of this challenge and this effort is of the greatest
importance. I need not belabor with you the reasons why this is so
You know them full well.
I have been asked to talk today about one important set of eco
nomic ties between the free countries of Asia and the United States th
and certain other free countries of the West--the Colombo Plan. In
1 Samuel C. Waugh.
New York; Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 1, 1954, pp. 640-644. Sc
3 See ibid., Sept. 27, 1954, pp. 464-465.
an
an
ac
så
in
OC
SU
m
PI
eco
Wh
of
ent
19
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2339
1
MIC
vi definite and identifiable things to be done. In order to lend con-
1957, and to set down as specifically as possible what, during this
1 See The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and
Southeast Asia (Cmd. 8080; London, 1950).
that not enough of our people understand what the Colombo Plan is
and what our relationship to the Plan involves.
The Colombo Plan was conceived initially in 1950 as an organization
of Commonwealth countries to focus attention on the economic de-
ТВО
velopment problems of the countries of South and Southeast Asia.
It is designed to provide a framework within which international
cooperative efforts can be made to promote sound and enduring eco-
nomic progress in that area.
Ties As I said, in its origins the Colombo Plan was a Commonwealth
this concept. It initially included on the one side the economically de-
and reloped countries of the Commonwealth such as Great Britain, Canada,
In Australia, and New Zealand; and on the other side the newly inde-
Ho pendent or not yet fully independent Asian countries members of the
ries. Commonwealth such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, British
por-Borneo, plus Burma.
In the interim, however, the geographic scope of the membership
Taic has been so radically enlarged that it can no longer be thought of as
true being, in any way except historically, a Commonwealth project. Not
orm only has the United States since 1951 associated itself as a full mem-
at ber
, but other non-Commonwealth countries of South and Southeast
210- | Asia have also joined, such as Cambodia, Laos, Viet-Nam, and In-
ods.donesia. Last week at Ottawa, Japan was admitted to membership,
101 and Thailand and the Philippines, which had heretofore been observers,
sing also became full members. In alí, there are now 17 member countries,
and the area stretches from Pakistan to the Philippines. In this
hat area live 720 million people, about 29 percent of the world's population.
A COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ates
What is the Colombo Plan? The easiest and most enlightening
the aiswer to that question is to explain it is not a plan in the commonly
accepted use of the word "plan" but that it is exactly what its title
ies
,
says it is--the Consultative Committee for Economic Development
the
in South and Southeast Asia. It is a committee of nations all of
which
are, for one reason or another, constructively interested in the
the
economic development of the free countries of this area. It is a con-
sultative committee, not a continuing organization. There were in-
tial formative meetings of the group in 1950 and 1951 at Colombo,
at Canberra, and at London. Starting in 1952 there have
been annual
meetings to review progress in economic development and to assess
prospects for the future.
In the course of the formative meetings the member countries of
In the South and Southeast Asia area were encouraged to formulate
efonomic development programs and thereby
to translate
their some-
vague aspirations for economic progress into concrete schedules
eeteness and definiteness to the undertaking, the countries agreed to
å 6-year period extending from July 1, 1951, to June 30,
SIS
..
un-
en-
ical
est
SO.
CO-
tes
what
el
the
ink
envisage
try,
2340
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
agreed by the Colombo Plan countries that they would no longer
plans. The plans were sufficiently definite that it would be possible
and Southeast Asia: Fourth Meeting at Karachi, Pakistan, March, 1952 (Depart
1 See Report of the Consultative Committee on Economic Development in South
period, they hoped to be able to accomplish, how they expected to be
finance their programs, what policies and legislative measures they an
expected to have to pursue, and what goals of investment and produ
tion they hoped to be able to reach.
C
These economic development programs-each of which is an indre
vidual country development program—when taken collectively andis
known as the Colombo Plan.
be
The subsequent meetings, which took place after the formatin be
meetings, were held in 1952 and 1953 at Karachi and New Delhi
, rec
and this year (1954) in Ottawa. At these annual meetings the coun
les
tries of the area review the results of the year just passed. They lag te
out on the table for frank and friendly discussion what they have a to
complished, what they have failed to accomplish, what difficulties
they have encountered, what changes they have felt constrained to cor
make in their development plans, and what policies they have pursued on
Similarly, they evaluate their prospects for the future; they try to
assess what is likely to happen in the way of changes in
trade, increases or decreases in public revenues, shortfalls or overage
do
in the achievement of specific development targets. They appras
what has been available to them heretofore and what is likely to be sien
available in the future in the way of external assistance. They er en
amine what has been and what is likely to be the role of private foreiga
, o
investment in their economic development, what they have done pa
and left undone to attract foreign investment and mobilize domestila
capital
The Colombo Plan period from 1951 to 1957 is, you will notice 4
just a little bit more than half over. After the formative meeting
the significance of the 6-year framework has, I think, become progress
sively less. The usefulness of the 6-year concept was that it helpt b.
and enabled the countries of the area to view their development are
problems more concretely. It forced them to examine their problem tu
and their aspirations in terms of what definite, concrete things could to
be done within a finite and agreed period of time. This searching me
examination by the Colombo Plan countries was very healthy. )
made for realism and for a very valuable, if painful
, translation of te
general plans into precise projects.
ANNUAL REVIEW OF PROGRESS
Now, however, the benefits of this rigid time period have been
realized. It is no longer necessary or even very useful to contigu
refining and modifying the 6-year targets. Indeed, at the
annual review meeting that held at Karachi in 1952 4-it
tic
keep making technical and statistical adjustments in the 6-pere Cr
ment of State publication 4650; 1952).
ase
na
82
800
very firs
an
WAS
nic
1
195
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2341
- are
1 See supra, pp. 992-1000.
an
sued one of this group.
ragas
Taise
go Colombo Plan intellectual framework emphasizes to a very large
ed H been accomplished in the preceding year and to evaluate the tasks
ther and the problems for the foreseeable period lying ahead.
odu) It has been customary in the deliberations of the Consultative
Committee to draw a loose line of distinction between the so-called
indi recipient countries and the so-called contributing countries. The
distinction is, however, becoming more and more à tenuous one
because—and this is one of the great virtues of the Plan--there has
satie been engendered a process of cooperation and mutual aid among the
Dell, recipient countries such that almost all of them are to greater or
com lesser extent contributing countries to one another. They borrow
y la technical skills and technical assistance from each other according
rew to their respective needs and their respective capacities to assist.
ed or almost altogether contributing countries. The United States is
ry to I have said that we are a full member of the Colombo Plan. I have
ms d also said that we are a contributing-country member. Now what
does this mean?
The
point that must be emphasized is that the Colombo Plan is
to be simply an intergovernmental committee. We do not contribute
yer anything to any central pool. There is nothing analogous to the
reign Organization for European Economic Cooperation. There is no
done process by which the contributions of the contributing countries are
mestic parceled out or allocated by any international organization. Our
assistance to the countries of the area-like that provided by Canada,
tie Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom-is bilaterally
ting given and bilaterally received. Our contribution, in other words,
agres is the sum total we do in the various countries of the area to promote
ped the economic development of those countries. Our aid programs
ment are our governmental contribution. We are not under any contrac-
olen tual obligation either to provide any definite amount of assistance
zouk to any one country or to all of them taken together; nor, for that
matter, are we under any contractual obligation to provide aid at all
to any particular country. In Burma, for example, our aid program
en dterminated at the request of the Burmese Government.?
Neither are we under any obligation to provide assistance in any
uniform way or according to any uniform pattern. Our aid programs
n Viet-Nam, Laos, andCambodia have been very different in their
nature and orientation from our programs, for example, in India
and Indonesia. Nevertheless, whatever we do to help to promote
economic development in any of the countries
of the
area is accepted
and regarded as our contribution in relation to that particular country.
I have been emphasizing our aid programs and our public contribu-
tions toward economic development in this area. Indeed, the whole
extent public programs of economic development and public tech-
ziques of intergovernmental cooperation. This is understandable.
been
cique
first
1788
nge
le-
had
ould
Dierl
1953, p. 530.
2342
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
W
21
W
ca
th
and which has not yet been published—they have noted that govern" | PIE
ments can help to mobilize private capital by seeking to minimize
In the annual meetings the countries of the area are prepared to
have manifested themselves. These meetings are by no means &
The governments of the area naturally are in a better position to a
measure what has been accomplished by public action and to assess
what needs to be done through public development projects. Like-
wise the aid that is given by governments and received by governments
is easier to measure than the less tangible benefits of private foreiga a
investment.
di
Nevertheless, this natural tendency to concentrate upon what is
done in what these countries call “the public sector" does not reflect of
any unhealthy bias in favor of public projects. Indeed, the countries
of this area are fully aware of the benefits of and their need for private
foreign capital. They have, for example, included prominently in
their calculations of sources and possibilities of external assistances
an assessment of what can be borrowed on the private international
capital markets and of what steps need to be taken by them to im-
prove their credit-worthiness. Many of the countries in the arek sp
have taken specific measures to improve the climate for foreign
investment. They have issued official declarations welcoming 50
foreign enterprise either in general or at least in specific fields. They
have publicly recognized also that government measures are not the
th
only factors governing the import of capital, and, for that matter,
that the mere absence of discriminatory government measures is not a
in all cases sufficient to overcome the shyness of foreign capital.
Hence they recognize further that if they desire foreign participation
in specific fields they will probably have to take positive steps to
attract it.
JU
Therefore, in the various annual reviews the Colombo Plan coun-
tries have recognized and welcomed any evidence that may
Cc
have
developed during the preceding year of willingness on the part of .
foreign investors to undertake enterprises in the countries of the
area, especially if these enterprises happen to be undertaken jointly
with local capital—as was the case, for example, with the Sui ga
project in Pakistan and the oil refinery investments in India and as
promises to be the case in the investment finance corporations being
established in India and Ceylon.
pu
Po
PRIVATE CAPITAL MOBILIZED
The countries of the area have not only, therefore, recognized the
need and the scope for private foreign participation in the develop
ment process; they have also recognized the overwhelmingly urged
problem of mobilizing private domestic capital. In the most recent
annual report, for example—that which was just prepared at Ottawa
of
governmental
regulations and irksome methods of tax administration
.
the
face frankly the difficulties that exist and the shortcomings
th
IT
&
ta
cap
C0
on
CA
mi
fig
ye
ME
150
to
COI
which
mo
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2343
Sess
im-
not
their problems and difficulties and shortcomings is in its aggregate a
her Deshmulh (who was the chairman) that the Colombo Plan was "a
toare rather a frank and friendly review of what has been done and
what still needs to be done.
ike The prevailing tone, for example, of the annual report just drafted
ents
at Ottawa is one of optimism combined with stark realism. The
aign
ein countries, when they reviewed the pace and the content of economic
development during the year just passed, were able to conclude that
i significant and encouraging progress had been made in a number
Hect of important respects but that there was no room for relaxation of
tries
effort. They recognized that in some countries the progress realized
rate was relatively small; that throughout the region as a whole the
i population has been growing rapidly indeed, at an annual rate of
nce slightly over 9 million) and that, therefore, food production
per capita
(despite very creditable increases in total food output) was still
below prewar levels; that underemployment in rural areas was wide-
red spread and that unemployment in urban areas, particularly of edu-
eign cated persons, presented a serious social problem; that trained per-
ning sonnel in many fields was not yet available in sufficient numbers;
"her that in some of the countries of the area the process of formulating
the balanced development programs was still not far enough along;
Eter
,
that there was only a narrow margin of production over consumption
and that, therefore, the level of savings and the level of tax revenues
Ital provided on the whole only a precarious base for development
in inancing
sto
This is indeed a formidable enumeration of problems to be faced
and difficulties to be overcome. It is, of course, not the whole story.
Just as I did not want you to think that the annual meetings of the
Colombo Plan group of countries were limited to an uncritical eulogy
of results achieved, neither did I want you to think that they represent
the session of breastbeating and complaining over the hardness of the
athy task. Indeed, at this same Ottawa meeting which produced the
catalogue of problems which I summarized a few minutes ago, the
countries of the area were able also to record that their own outlays
zing on development had increased considerably over those for the pre-
ceding year. In India, for example, development expenditures by
public authorities for the year 1951-52 were roughly $550 million.
For the year 1953–54, they had increased to $705 million and are
epicted for the year ending June 30 next to approximate $1,170
milion if financing is available. For Pakistan the comparable
fgures are for the fiscal year 1951–52, $125 million; for the fiscal
year 1953–54, $275 million.
These, indeed, are very creditable results and expectations. I
pention them merely lest you think that the sessions of the Colombo
Pan meetings are devoted
entirely to lamenting over the difficulties
is the economic development problems of the area. But to return
to the summation of the problems, the frankness with which the
countries of the area have discussed among themselves and with us
e 1953 Colombo
Plan meeting by Indian Finance Minister C. D.
un-
are
t of
gas
1 83
the
lop-
fent
cent
2178
10B.
zich
S
8
2344
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
D
ar
tu
mo
1 Report on Indonesia (published periodically by the Embassy of Indonesia &
The Afro-Asian conference had
been suggested at a meeting at Colombo, Ceylon, of the Prime Ministers of Burms,
Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan held from Apr. 28 to May 2, 1954, for the
Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 272-276. Detailed plans for the conference
were worked out at a subsequent meeting of the Prime Ministers at Bogor, Indo Ni
nesia, Dec. 28–29, 1954; the Dec. 29, 1954, communiqué of this meeting is printed
great experiment in human relations.” It is very rarely that govern
ments are able to come together and with so much freedom and 1
honesty and openness to say what they have done, what they have 1
failed to do, what they still need to do, what they intend to do, and
what are the political and cultural limitations upon what they can del
If there is any conclusion to be drawn as concerns what the mem-
15
bers of this Far East-America Council might learn from the experi
ence, at governmental level, in the Colombo Plan, it is, I should think
, 17
that there are almost limitless possibilities of fruitful cooperation 18
between the United States and the countries of Asia if there is evi-
denced the same frankness, the same patience, and the same under-
tai
standing We in government know that there are difficulties in the
way of establishing business connections in the countries of Asia. We
know that there are frictions, there are uncertainties,
there are
difti
culties of mutual understanding. However, from our experience at A.
the governmental level we are quite certain there is a great fund of
common interest and of common viewpoint. We conclude, therefore
,
that there is much which should be done and can be done to accom-
plish the objective stated as the theme of this conference: "Strength-
tri
ening Economic Ties Between the United States and Asia."
er
th
th
the
The Afro-Asian Conference
9. COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE CONFERENCE OF AFRO-ASIAN
COUNTRIES, ISSUED AT BANDUNG, INDONESIA, APRIL
24, 1955 1
pu
The Asian-African Conference, convened upon the invitation of the w
Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan
, ter
met in Bandung from the 18th to the 24th April, 1955. In addition to sa
the sponsoring countries the following 24 countries participated in the
conference:
th
1. Afghanistan
6. Gold Coast
2. Cambodia
7. Iran
the
3. People's Republic of China 8. Iraq
Wh
4. Egypt
9. Japan
5. Ethiopia
10. Jordan
Washington), vol. 6, No. 9, June 1955, pp. 28–31.
(V
ibid., pp. .
t
SIC
ve
1
}
an
Of:
mit
ve
MI
As
1
1
Do
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2345
ern
and / 11. Laos
187 12. Lebanon
and / 13. Liberia
do 14. Libya
lem | 15. Nepal
Der 16. Philippines
int 17. Saudi Arabia
tion 18. Sudan
(VIII) of Dec. 7, 1953, and 822 (IX) of Dec. 11, 1954; U. N. General Assembly,
Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), pp. 11-12.
Oficial Records, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/2630), pp. 10–11, and ibid.,
19. Syria
20. Thailand
21. Turkey
22. Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam
23. State of Viet-Nam
24. Yemen
em The Asian-African Conference considered problems of common in-
der-
terest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa and discussed ways
the
and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cul-
We
tural and political cooperation.
lifi
est A. Economic Cooperation
dof
ore 1. The Asian-African Conference recognized the urgency of pro-
om-moting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was
gta general desire for economic cooperation among the participating coun-
tries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sov-
ereignty. The proposals with regard to economic cooperation within
the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or
the need for cooperation with countries outside the region, including
the investment of foreign capital. It was further recognized that the
assistance being received by certain participating countries from out-
side the region, through international or under bilateral arrangements,
had made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their de-
TAN
2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical assist-
anice to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the form
of: experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration
purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and
to where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting
an, technical knowledge and skills in cooperation with the existing inter-
the 3. The Åsian-African Conference recommended: the early establish-
ment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development;
the allocation by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and De-
velopment of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries;
the early establishment of the International Finance Corporation
which should include in its activities the undertaking of equity invest-
ment, and encouragement to the promotion of joint ventures among
asian-African countries in so far as this will promote their common
4. The Asian-African Conference recognized the vital need for
. See United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 724 A (VIII) and 724"B
velopment programmes.
RIL
nt national agencies.
.
2
interest.
& at
had
ma,
2201
ndo
ated
P.
2346
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
available information regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceti
purposes; urged the speedy establishment of the Internation:
sentation of the Asian-African countries on the executive authority
ments to take full advantage of the training and other facilities in the
i See United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolutions 512 A (XVI)
of Apr. 30, 1954, and 557 F (XVIII) of Aug. 5, 1954; U. N. Economic and Social
2 See the report of progress in international use of atomic energy made i
Ambassador Lodge before Committee I of the U. N. General Assembly, Nov. 1
stabilizing commodity trade in the region. The principle of enlarging
the scope of multilateral trade and payments was accepted. How
ever, it was recognized that some countries would have to take re
course to bilateral trade arrangements in view of their prevailing eco-
nomic conditions.
5. The Asian-African Conference recommended that collectie
action be taken by participating countries for stabilizing the inter-
national prices of and demand for primary commodities through bi
lateral and multilateral arrangements, and that as far as practicable
and desirable, they should adopt a unified approach on the subject i
the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on Intern-
tional Commodity Trade 1 and other international forums.
6. The Asian-African Conference further recommended that: Asisa-
African countries should diversify their export trade by processing
their raw material, wherever economically feasible, before export
intraregional trade fairs should be promoted and encouragement given
to the exchange of trade delegations and groups of businessmen; er
change of information and of samples should be encouraged with
view to promoting intraregional trade and normal facilities should be
provided for transit trade of landlocked countries.
7. The Asian-African Conference attached considerable important
to Shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed from
time to time their freight rates, often to the detriment of participating
countries. It recommended a study of this problem, and collective
action thereafter, to induce the shipping lines to adopt a more reason
able attitude. It was suggested that a study of railway freight of
transit trade may be made.
8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement should
be given to the establishment of national and regional banks and in
surance companies.
9. The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of information
on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of profits and taxations i
might eventually lead to the formulation of common policies
.
10. The Asian-African Conference emphasized the particula
significance of the development of nuclear
energy for peaceful po
poses, for the Asian-African countries. The Conference welcome .P
the initiative of the Powers principally concerned in offering to mak
Atomic Energy Agency 3 which should provide for adequate reports
of the Agency; and recommended to the Asian and African Govet
and ibid., Fighteenth Session, Supplement No. 1 (E2654), pp. 25-27.
t
C
e
8
t
CI
o
1954; Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1954, pp. 742–750.
3 See U. N. General Assembly Res. 810 (IX) of Dec. 4, 1954; infra, pp.
2824.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2347
and African countries. True to the age-old tradition of tolerance
rging
e re
en.
ernes
JFell these policies amount to a denial of the fundamental rights in the
groups of nations and other civilisations and cultures that the Con-
ference viewed the development of cultural cooperation among Asian
peaceful uses of atomic energy offered by the countries sponsoring
How such programmes.
11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment of
Liaison Officers in participating countries, to be nominated by their
respective national Governments, for the exchange of information and
ctive ideas on matters of mutual interest. It recommended that fuller use
Enter-
should be made of the existing international organizations, and par-
bi ticipating countries who were not members of such international
cable organizations, but were eligible, should secure membership.
ect in
12. The Asian-African Conference recommended that there should
be prior consultation of participating countries in international
forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual
sian economic interest. It is, however, not intended to form a regional
bloc.
SSING
port;
B. Cultural Cooperation
CITED
; es 1. The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among the
ith most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is
ld be the development of cultural cooperation. Asia and Africa have been
the cradle of great religions and civilizations which have enriched other
tane cultures and civilizations while themselves being enriched in the
from process. Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual
nating and universal foundations. Unfortunately contacts among Asian
acting and African countries were interrupted during the past centuries.
as The peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere
cht of desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in
the context of the modern world. All participating Governments
houl at the Conference reiterated their determination to work for closer
ad
2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the
stuck existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa
in whatever
a tal form it may be not only prevents cultural cooperation but also sup-
presses the national cultures of the people. Some colonial powers
icul have denied to their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of
pued education and culture which hampers the development of their
home personality and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian
man and African peoples. This is particularly true in the case
of Tunisia,
Reel Algeria, and Morocco, where the basic right of the people to study
tical their own language and culture has been suppressed. Similar dis-
repre crimination has been practised against African and coloured people
10 some parts of the Continent of Africa. The Conference felt that
this and other forms of cultural suppression,
In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means of
suppression.
3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other
Socie
6 p.
cultural
adell
Vor
, i
2348
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
I
parts of the world. Such conduct is not only a gross violation of
4 See United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 637 (VII) of Dec. 16, 1952
(U. N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement Now
(A/2361), pp. 26-27), 648 (VII) -of Dec, 10, 1952 (ibid., pp. 33–35), 738 (VIII)
Nov. 28, 1953 (ibid., Eighth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A/2630), p. 18), and 837
and universality, the Conference believed that Asian and African
cultural cooperation should be developed in the larger context of
world cooperation.
Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural coopers-
tion the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop cultural contacta
with others. This would enrich their own culture and would also
help in the promotion of world peace and understanding.
4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa which have not
yet been able to develop their educational, scientific and technical
institutions. The Conference recommended that countries in Asia
and Africa which are more fortunately placed in this respect should
give facilities for the admission of students and trainees from such
countries to their institutions. Such facilities should also be made
available to the Asian and African people in Africa to whom opportu-
nities for acquiring higher education are at present denied.
5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of cultural
cooperation among countries of Asia and Africa should be directed
towards:
(I) the acquisition of knowledge of each other's country;
(II) mutual cultural exchange, and
(III) exchange of information.
6. The Asian-African Conference was of opinion that at this stage
the best results in cultural cooperation would be achieved by pursuing
bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations and by
each country taking action on its own, wherever possible and feasible
C. Human Rights and Self-determination
1. The Asian-African Conference declared its full support of the
fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations and took note of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ? as a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations.
The Conference declared its full support of the principles of sels
determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations and took note of the United Nations resolutions a
the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a pri
requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights
2. The Asian-African Conference deplored
the policies
and practice
of racial segregation and discrimination which form the basis of gor
ernment and human relations in large regions of Africa and in oibd
1 Set forth in Article 55 of the Charter; supra, p. 148.
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1156–1159.
3 See, especially, Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter; supra, pp. 135 and 148
.
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2349
tural
zcted
(A/2119), pp. 12–13); 614 (VII), Nov. 6, 1952 (ibid., Seventh Session, Supplement
Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), pp. 8-9).
Ticu human rights, but also a denial of the fundamental values of civiliza-
tion and the dignity of man.
The Conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the
pera curageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, espe-
tacka cially by the peoples of African and Indian and Pakistani origin in
South Africa; applauded all those who sustain their cause, re-affirmed
the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of
3 mot racialism that might exist in their own countries; and pledged to use
inicdl its full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims to
Asia
the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.
hould
such! D. Problems of Dependent Peoples
made
1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of depend-
ortu-
ent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from the subjection
of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.
The Conference is agreed:
(a) in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an
evil which should speedily be brought to an end;
(b) in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental
human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and
is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation;
stage
© in declaring its support of the cause of freedom and inde-
suing
pendence for all such people, and
(d) in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and
independence to such peoples.
2. In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the
persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-
E the determination, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of
arter the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-deter-
ond, mination and independence and urged the French Government to
oples bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.
selfE. Other Problems
the
1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the
situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace,
the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the
Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the
United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the
peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.
2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed
See United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 194 (III), Dec. 11, 1948
pp
. 21-25);
302 (IV), Dec. 8, 1949 (ibid., Fourth Session, Resolutions (A/1251),
12
: 23-25); 393 (V), Dec. 2, 1'950 (supra, pp. 2257-2259); 513 (VI), Jan. 26, 1952
4.N. General Assembly, Oficial Records
; Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20
1)
. ene
, No. 17 (A/2630), p. 6); and 8 18 (1x), Dec. 4, 1954 (ibid., Ninth Session,
db
sible.
SOL
pre
S.
Cices
20P
ther
7 of
1951
.
7
897
2350
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
of 1
NUE
USA
0 1
SUC
me!
Dec
3 By its Res. 995 (X) of Dec. 14, 1955, the General Assembly admitted Cam.
bodia, Ceylon, Jordan, Libya, and Nepal to membership in the United Nations;
attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of
the
Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the relevant agreements
ill
between Indonesia and the Netherlands.
The Asian-African Conference urged the Netherlands Government
1
to reopen negotiations as soon as possible, to implement their obliga-
tions under the above-mentioned agreements and expressed the earnest
tior
hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in
side
finding a peaceful solution to the dispute.?
3. The Asian-African Conference supported the position of Yemen
dut
in the case of Aden and the Southern parts of Yemen known as the
Protectorates and urged the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful
settlement of the dispute.
]
F. Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation
sho
1. The Asian-African Conference, taking note of the fact that be
several States have still not been admitted to the United Nations,
considered that for effective cooperation for world peace, member the
ship in the United Nations should be universal, called on the Security con
Council to support the admission of all those States which are qualitet
fied for membership in terms of the Charter. In the opinion of the
Asian-African Conference, the following among participating coun-
tries, viz: Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal
, a unified Na
Vietnam were so qualified.
The Conference considered that the representation of the countries
of the Asian-African region on the Security Council, in relation to the
principle of equitable geographical distribution, was inadequate. It
expressed the view that as regards the distribution of the non-perma-
nent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the arrangement
arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from being elected
should be enabled to serve on the Security
Council, so that they might tio
make a more effective contribution to the maintenance of international
peace and security.
2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous
situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting
the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the
destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and
1 The dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the status of West for
Irian (West New Guinea) arose from their differing interpretations of the first two of
articles of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty (from the Netherlands to
Indonesia), signed at The Hague, Dec. 27, 1949; 69 United Nations Treaty Series
2° The question of West Irian (West New Guinea) was placed on the agenda of by
the Ninth Session
of the U.N. General Assembly. The draft resolution on this site th
drawn up by the First Committee (see U.N. doc. A/2831) failed of adoption by the
. , bar
Assembly's Tenth Session, Res. 915 (X) was adopted, Dec. 16, 1955; see in:
General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A/3116)
,
NE
see supra, p. 337
3
to
4.7
ano
the
TOE
int
Tec
peg
an
dre
P. 3.
DO
for
P. 6.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2351
ents
lent
nen
Indeed, all nations should have the right freely to choose their own
formity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
thermonuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of
of
all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a
war were to break out.
The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition
d the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-
iga-
nuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisa-
zest
in
tion from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It con-
sidered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a
duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim their support for
the
disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal
eful
to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about
such disarmament and prohibition.
The Conference considered that effective international control
should be established and maintained to implement such disarma-
ment and prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should
hat be made to this end.
s Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and
er thermo-nuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers
is concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such
the The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an absolute
na necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United
ied Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily
to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all
des armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the pro-
the duction
, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction,
It and to establish effective international control to this end.
G. Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation
d.
ht
The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the ques-
hal
toe of world peace and cooperation. It viewed with deep concern
the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic
world war. The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of
international security. In this connection, all States should coop-
ng
he
mate
, especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the
nd
reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons
under effective international control. In this way, international
peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively
wo peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs particularly
« Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom. Freedom and peace
e interdependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed
all peoples, and freedom and independence must be granted, with
ali- weapons.
18-
ent
JUS
est
90
10
es
2.1
he
he
N
6),
Nations
Das
2352
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
Free from mistrust and fear, and with confidence and goodwill
towards each other, nations should practise tolerance and live together
in peace with one another as good neighbours and develop friends
cooperation on the basis of the following principles:
1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
nations
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of
all nations large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal
affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or
collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the Unitel to
Nations,
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective de
fence to serve the particular interests of any of the big power
id
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on othe
countries.
p
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of forme
against the territorial integrity or political independence of an
U
country.
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, sua
as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlements
well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in eam
formity with the Charter of the United Nations.
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.
10. Respect for justice and international obligations.
The Asian-African Conference declared its conviction that friend
cooperation in accordance with these principles would effectively courts
tribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and
security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fels
would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of al
The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five spade
soring countries consider the convening of the next meeting of wil
Conference, in consultation with the participating countries.
81
th
8
1
&
SI
1 i.e., Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
I
P
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2353
spor the territory of the Union of Burma or to continue their hostile acts
odwill
Burma
cether
endir
10. PRESENCE OF CHINESE TROOPS IN BURMA: Resolution
s and
815 (IX) of the United Nations General Assembly, October 29,
of all
1954 1
ityd The General Assembly,
Having considered the report 2 dated 27 September 1954 of the
ernes Government of the Union of Burma on the situation relating to the
presence of foreign forces in its territory,
ly ( Having taken note of the report 3 of the Joint Military Committee
nited for the Evacuation of Foreign Forces from Burma the efforts of which
were directed to securing the removal of these foreign forces,
re del 1. Notes with satisfaction that nearly 7,000 persons, both foreign
er forces and their dependants, have been evacuated from Burma and
other that this constitutes a substantial contribution to the solution of the
problem pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly;
fore 2. Expresses its appreciation of the efforts of the Governments of the
of an United States of America and of Thailand in helping to bring about
sued 3. Deplores the fact that considerable foreign forces with a significant
ents quantity of arms still remain in the territory of the Union of Burma
com- and have failed to respond to the declarations of the General Assembly
that they should either leave the territory of the Union of Burma or
submit to internment;
4. Declares once more that these forces should submit to disarma-
5. Assures the Government of the Union of Burma of its continuing
sympathy with and support of the efforts of that Government to
ve and bring about a complete solution of this serious problem;
6. Urges all States to take all necessary steps to prevent the fur-
nishing of any assistance which may enable foreign forces to remain in
OWEN
this evacuation;
4
ment and internment;
iends
y cor-
fields
of all
of the against that country;
7. Invites the Government of the Union of Burma to report on the
situation to the General Assembly as appropriate.
VU.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21
Ibid., Annexes, agenda item 63 (A/2739).
"See General Assembly Resolutions 707 (VII), Apr. 23, 1953, and 717 (VIII),
Dec. 8, 1953; ibid., Seventh Session, Supplement
No. 20A (A/2361/Add. 1),
Pp. 4-5, and ibid., Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/2630), p. 4.
(A/2890), p. 7.
' Ibid. (A/2740)
415900_-57-Vol. 245
2354
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
tion to uphold the principles of the United Nations in its unceasing
11. EXCHANGE OF VIEWS: Joint Statement by the President
of the United States and the Prime Minister of Burma, July 2,
1955 1
The Prime Minister of Burma, His Excellency U Nu, has visited
Washington for three days at the invitation of President Eisenhower
The President and the Prime Minister discussed many matters of
common concern and exchanged views on current international
problems.
The Prime Minister, the President and the Secretary of State
reviewed problems of peace and security in Asia. They had a frank
discussion of the complex economic problems arising from the existence
of substantial surpluses of exportable rice both in Burma-one of the
1
world's leading rice exporting countries—and in the United States,
Note was taken of the salutary influence of religion as exemplified by
the Sixth Buddhist Synod presently being held in Rangoon and
attended by leading Buddhist scholars from many nations.
The problem of imprisoned American fliers in Communist China
was reviewed.?
These talks have been of special value in increasing mutual under-
standing between Burma and the United States. There is a wide ares
of agreement and a traditional friendship between Burma and the
United States resting firmly upon certain noble concepts to which both
countries subscribe. Our two peoples, those of the United States
and the Union of Burma, share two fundamental goals, &
world and a democratic way of life.
They reaffirmed their dedication to the ideal of peace and friendly
cooperation amongst nations founded on international justice and
morality. Both countries are deeply concerned with a subject that is
predominant in the minds of all responsible world leaders today—the
problem of achieving peace with justice, a peace based upon the
liberty of human beings and the security of nations.
Such a peace can best be achieved by loyal steadfast support for
the Charter of the United Nations. That is the surest and mos
practical avenue along which to seek peace with justice in this world
A patient striving to uphold the fundamental moral and religious
beliefs underlying the Charter provides the best hope for the fulfil-
ment of mankind's aspirations.
The Prime Minister, the President and the Secretary of State
deplored the conditions which force the peoples of the world to divert
their energies and talents from a single-minded effort to improve and
expand those cultural and economic opportunities by which men cam
raise the levels
of their existence. They renewed their own determine
peaceful
1
)
effort to save mankind from the scourge of future war.
i
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1955, pp. 96-97.
3 See infra, pp. 2709-2714.
į
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2355
shall; Deputy Chief; Edward M. Bernstein, Chief Economist; August L. Strand,
12
1
ence
the
S.
db
and
nder-
area
the
both
tates
ceful
1 Report lo the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to
the Philippines (Department of State publication 4010; 1950), pp. 1, 3-4.
members of the Mission were D. W. Bell, Chief of the Mission; Richard J. Mar-
dent
Republic of the Philippines
12. ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE PHILIPPINES: Summary and
ited
Recommendations From the Report of the Bell Mission, October
ver.
9, 1950 (Excerpts)
sol
onal
At the request of the President of the Philippine Republic, President
Truman appointed a United States Economic Survey Mission to
State
consider the economic and financial problems of that country and to
Tank
recommend measures that will enable the Philippines to become and
to remain self-supporting. The Mission was instructed to survey all
aspects of the Philippine economy, including agriculture, industry,
internal and external finances, domestic and foreign trade, and public
administration. The Mission was asked to give special consideration
to immediate measures to help raise production and living standards
thing
in the Philippines. The Mission has had the full cooperation of the
Philippine Government and of many individuals and organizations
outside the Government. Their help has been invaluable in pro-
viding the Mission with the data necessary for its work.
Economic conditions in the Philippines are unsatisfactory. The
economic situation has been deteriorating in the past 2 years and the
factors that have brought this about cannot be expected to remedy
themselves. Unless positive measures are taken to deal with the
fundamental causes of these difficulties, it must be expected that the
ndly
economic situation will deteriorate further and political disorder will
inevitably result. Whatever is to be done to improve economic
conditions in the Philippines must be done promptly, for if the situa-
tion is allowed to drift there is no certainty that moderate remedies
The mission recommends that the following measures be taken:
1. That the finances of the Government be placed on a sound basis
gious in order to avoid further inflation; that additional tax revenues be
raised immediately in as equitable 'a manner as possible to meet the
expenditures of the Government; that the tax structure be revised to
State ncrease the proportion of taxes collected from high incomes and large
iren property holdings; that the tax collecting machinery be overhauled
; and to secure greater efficiency in tax collection; that a credit policy be
adopted which will encourage investment in productive enterprises;
ning end that fiscal
, credit and investment policy be better coordinated
to prevent inflation.
2. That agricultural production be improved by applying known
The
and
lat is
- the
will suffice.
I
the
0
et for
most
orld
.
alf
I CAN
asing
survey of industry and power.
2356
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1 Agreements of July 4 and Oct. 22, 1946 (TIAS 1588; 61 Stat. 2611-2636).
that the right of workers to organize free trade unions to protect
mandatory direct payment of wages and retroactive monetary awards
to insure honesty and efficiency in Government; that the civil service
methods of increasing the yield from all basic crops; that the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and Natural Resources be adequately supplied
with funds and the agricultural extension service expanded; that the
agricultural college at Los Baños be rehabilitated and the central
experiment station located there, with other stations at appropriate
places throughout the country; that rural banks be established to
provide production credit for small farmers; that the opening of new
lands for settlement in homesteads be expedited and the clearance of
land titles promptly assured; that a program of land redistribution
be undertaken through the purchase of large estates for resale to
small farmers; and that measures be undertaken to provide tenants
with reasonable security on their land and an equitable share of the
crops they produce.
3. That steps be taken to diversify the economy of the country by
encouraging new industries; that adequate power and transportation
facilities be provided as needed for further economic development;
that a Philippine Development Corporation be established to co-
ordinate all government corporations and enterprises and liquidate
those that are ineffective; that financial assistance be made available
to productive enterprises by the Corporation acting in cooperation
with private banks, that the natural resources of the country be
systematically explored to determine their potentialities for economic
development; and that the present laws and practices with respect to
the use of the public domain be re-examined.
4. That to avoid a further deterioration in the international pay-
ments position and to reduce the excessive demand for imports,
special emergency tax of 25 percent be levied for a period not to exceed
two years on imports of all goods other than rice, corn, flour, canned
fish, canned milk and fertilizer; that if such an emergency import
levy is not possible under the Trade Agreement with the United
States,' either very heavy excise taxes should be imposed or a tax of
25 percent should be levied on all sales of exchange; that, as a safety
measure, the present exchange and import controls be retained but
their administration be simplified and liberalized and the full remit-
tance of current earnings be permitted; that a Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation be concluded between the Philippines and
the United States and the present Trade Agreement re-examined in
the light of the new conditions.
5. That an adequate program of public health and improved educa-
tion be undertaken, and better facilities for
urban housing
be provided
tion; that abuses in present employment practices depriving the
workers of their just earnings be eliminated
by legislation making
to workers; that a minimum wage for agricultural and other workers
be established to provide subsistence standards of living.
6. That public administration be improved and reorganized so.es
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2357
President of the Philippines a copy of the Bell Mission report and a letter from
3 Department of State Bulletin, June 25, 1951, pp. 1017-1018.
date; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 860–864.
art-
lied
the
tral
Tate
I to
Dev
e of
ion
to
unts
the
be placed on a merit basis and civil service salaries raised to provide
a decent standard of living; that the Philippine Government remove
barriers to the employment of foreign technicians and take steps to
improve training facilities for technicians in the Philippines; and that
in accordance with the request of the Philippine Government, the
United States send a Technical Mission to assist the Philippine
Government in carrying out its agricultural and industrial develop-
ment, fiscal controls, public administration, and labor and social
welfare program.
7. That the United States Government provide financial assistance
of 250 million dollars through loans and grants, to help in carrying
out a 5-year program of economic development and technical assist-
ance; that this aid be strictly conditioned on steps being taken by the
Philippine Government to carry out the recommendations outlined
above, including the immediate enactment of tax legislation and other
urgent reforms; that expenditure of United States funds under this
recommendation, including pesos derived from United States loans
and grants, be subject to continued supervision and control of the
Technical Mission; that the use of funds provided by the Philippine
Government for economic and social development be co-ordinated
with the expenditure of the United States funds made available for
this purpose; and that an agreement be made for final settlement of
outstanding financial claims between the United States and the
Philippines, including funding of the Reconstruction Finance Co po-
ration loan of 60 million dollars.
by
Lion
ent
;
CO-
late
able
tion
be
mic
t to
ay-
5,8
ceed
ned
port
ited
x of
fety
but
mit-
nip,
As a
and
in
13. PROGRESS REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHIL-
IPPINES: Statement to the Press by the American Ambassador
to the Republic of the Philippines, June 15, 1951 3
I should like to give you a progress report on developments in the
Philippines and our relations with that gallant ally of ours.
result of 50 years of American tutelage and out of loyalty to and
affection for the United States, the Philippines unfalteringly stood by
us when Japan embarked on its program to conquer Asia. The sur-
render of Japan found the Philippines destroyed and laid waste to an
extent which has happened to few countries in modern history, and of
which few Americans can even begin to conceive.
Against this background of death and destruction, the United
States
, in compliance with its undertakings transferred sovereignty to
the Philippines on July 4, 1946,* and agreed to assist in its rehabilita-
On Oct. 28, 1950, the American Ambassador at Manila delivered to the
by the United States Government; Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 6, 1950,
ICA-
led:
tect
sls-
the
zing
ards
cers
AS
· Myron M. Cowan.
VICE
:)
.
2358
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The only direct financial aid |
tion. It was to be expected that the first 5 years of Philippine inde-
pendence would encounter the most serious difficulties, particularly
in view of the growing menace of the international Communist
conspiracy.
Altogether too much is heard in this country of what is wrong in the
Philippines, and I would be less than fair to our Filipino friends if I
denied that there is much wrong. Far more important, however, is
that there is much that is right and, in all honesty, I can tell you that
I am supremely confident the Philippines is well on the way to justify.
ing the confidence we have placed in it.
Because of misleading publicity, I suspect that the first and auto-
matic reaction of the average American when he thinks of the Philip-
pines is, “What happened to the 2 billion dollars the United States
gave the Philippines?"
I believe this is as good a time as any to dispel once and for all the
misconceptions about this 2 billion dollars worth of American aid
The best way to do it is to show what the United States has done and
what this 2 billion dollars really consists of.
In the first place, the United States paid out 400 million dollars for
private war damage claims, of which the majority were in amounts of
less than 500 dollars each, and for the reconstruction of public build-
ings. At the same time, the United States spent roughly 118 million
dollars in the reconstruction of such essential public services as roads
and bridges, ports and harbors, public health, fisheries, weather serv-
ices, coast surveys, interisland shipping, and civil air facilities.
Another category of American payments during the first 5 years of
independence fell into a more strictly military category. An amount
of 822 million dollars was paid out by the American armed forces as
back pay for Philippine armed forces, civilian claims against the mili
tary, civil relief, redemption of the guerrilla currency, missing persons
benefits, and other items for military pay and construction materials
and services.
The Veterans Administration paid out 181 million dollars ás com-
pensation to Filipino veterans.
An arrangement was also made to transfer surplus property esti-
mated at a fair value of 100 million dollars. Other kinds
of equipment
and material and technical assistance to the amount of 200 million
dollars were also made available.
The foregoing adds up to a dollar value of less than 1.9 billion but it
should be noted that it was all in the form of goods and services and
payments to individuals. Not a single centavo of this total was paid
has been an RFC budgetary loan of 60 million dollars and 89.
million dollars of processing and excise taxes
which the United States
had collected on behalf of the Philippine Commonwealth.
Two billion dollars can be made to sound like a lot of aid if you
interpret it to suit your own purposes. Honest analysis makes it looks
like something else. It is true that what the United States has done
1 See Act of Apr. 30, 1946; 60 Stat. 128.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2359
IS
to the Philippines (Department of State publication 4010; 1950). Summary and
Recommendations printed supra.
de for the Philippines did make available to it substantial amounts of
Lely
United States dollar exchange, much of which could undoubtedly have
list been spent more wisely than it was. We should remember, however,
that the end of hostilities found the Philippines stripped of all con-
the sumer goods. It will still take many long years to replace what was
if I | destroyed.
;
The Philippine Government itself realized the danger of its position
hat when its dollar reserves, during 1949, decreased from 400 million
ify dollars to 248 million dollars. To remedy this situation the Philippine
Government imposed the most stringent import regulations with the
ito-
result that its reserves are now back to the 400 million dollars level.
lip-
In addition, improved collection of taxes and the imposition of new
ates taxes in the face of serious political opposition give us confidence that
the Philippine budget will be balanced this year.
the And lastly, Philippine production, particularly of such strategic
aid and important commodities as copra, abaca, sugar, lumber, and min-
and erals is now encouragingly close to the prewar level. I maintain that
in view of the obstacles which had to be overcome and those which
for still remain, the record of Philippine self-help and American assistance
s of is a good one. The purpose of the United States now is to extend the
ild assistance necessary to preserve and extend the gains which have
lion been made.
Last year the Bell Mission made a most excellent survey and made
er recommendations for the improvement of the Philippine economy.
Pursuant to the Quirino-Foster agreement, recommendations of the
s of Bell Mission ? are now in process of implementation, both by the
unt Philippines and by the United States.
With American military assistance, the rejuvenated Philippine
mili armed forces are now making significant inroads on the strength
and capabilities of the Communist-dominated Huk movement. The
cials presence of the Seventh Fleet in Philippine waters has contributed
significantly to Philippine morale. American naval and air bases are
being expanded. These specific measures are giving the Philippine
people confidence that President Truman and the Secretary of State
esti- have meant exactly what they said when they categorically stated
nent publicly that the United States would never tolerate aggression against
lion
Philippine efforts at self-improvement and of cooperation with the
free world (for example, the splendid showing of Filipino troops in
Korea) persuade me that
the Philippines is convinced the United
paid States
as in the past, will keep its pledged faith. In return we can
know that in Asia we have no more devoted or staunch friend and ally.
Agreement of Nov. 14, 1950, between the President of the Philippine Republic,
Elpidio Quirino, and the Administrator of the
Economic Cooperation Administra-
ton, William d. Foster; see the preamble to the Economic and Technical Co-
See Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission
S as
SONS
om-
the Philippines.
it it
and
aid
89.5
ates
Jou
ook
Jone
2360
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
!
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 19, 1955, pp. 463–464. The text of the
negotiations. See also statements of Sept. 6, 1955, by Mr. Langley and General
press release does not contain the last paragraph preceding the summary of
14. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL UNDER THE UNITED
STATES-PHILIPPINE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY: Note
From the Secretary of State to the Philippine Chargé d'Affaires at
Washington, June 23, 1954 2
SIR: I refer to my conversation with General Carlos P. Romulo
Personal and Special Representative of the President of the Philip
pines, on June 15, 1954, in regard to implementation of the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Re
public of the Philippines, and to an aide-memoire handed to the
Acting Secretary of State by the Personal and Special Representative
of the President of the Philippines on June 3, 1954.
During the discussions on June 15, between the Personal and
Special Representative of the President of the Philippines and me,
we were in agreement that, pursuant to the provisions of the United
States-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, and in the light of inter-
national developments, it would be useful to establish a Council
consisting of the Secretary of State, or his Deputy, and the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, or his Deputy
;
that each member of the Council would designate a military repre-
sentative; that consultations will be held upon the request of either
party; and that the time and place of such meetings will be deter-
mined by mutual agreement.*
I should be glad to know whether the foregoing is acceptable to
the Government of the Philippines. If so, we shall promptly proceed
accordingly.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.
15. REVISED UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINE TRADE AGREE-
MENT: Statement by the Department of State, September 6,
1955 6
The Department of State announced on September 6 (press release
529) that a revised agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States regarding trade arrangements and related
matters was signed on that date at the Department. The agree
1 Dr. Melquiades J. Gamboa.
2 Department of State Bulletin, July 5, 1954, p. 14.
* The first meeting of the Councii kocok place in Manila, Sept. 4, 1954, just prior
to of
6 The
Ambassador of the Philippine Republic
, by a note of this date (Depare
ment of State Bulletin, July 5, 1954, p. 14), indicated
his Government's acceptance
first To
., pp. 464-466
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2361
* Act of Aug. 1, 1955; 69 Stat. 413.
• Agreement of July 4, 1946, amended Oct. 22, 1946 (TIAS 1588; 61 Stat., pt.
Agreement of Sept. 6, 1955; TIAS 3349, 6 UST 3030.
me.
TED ment was signed on behalf of the Philippines by Gen. Carlos P.
Note Romulo, Special and Personal Envoy of the President of the Philip-
pines, James M. Langley, Special Representative of the President of
the United States of America, signed on behalf of the United States.
It will enter into force on January 1, 1956.
ulo
. The title of the agreement is "Agreement between the United
ilip States of America and the Republic of the Philippines concerning
tual Trade and Related Matters during a Transitional Period following
Rethe Institution of Philippine Independence, signed at Manila on
the July 4, 1946, as revised." The authorizing legislation of the U.S.
tive Congress is Public Law 196, 84th Congress, the Philippine Trade
Agreement Revision Act of 1955,2
and The 1946 trade agreement 3 was entered into at the time the Philip-
pines gained its independence. At that time there were no precedents
ited to indicate exactly how the problems of the new relationship which
ater- was to exist between the Philippines and the United States might
incil best be met. During the 9 years of operation of this agreement,
tery problems arose on both sides suggesting the need for revisions. These
uty
, revisions, affecting every article of the agreement, provide for adjust-
pre ments which better accommodate the current and future economic
ther interests of both nations and effect changes in their relationships which
were mutually felt desirable as a result of the experiences of the
Philippines in handling its political and economic problems since the
e to Philippines became independent in 1946. The modification of transi-
ceed tional tariff schedules coupled with the elimination of an exchange
tax in the Philippines is an important element of the revised agreement.
The further economic development of the Philippines is one of the
objectives of the new agreement. Such development, in addition
to enhancing the importance of the Philippines as a trading partner
EE
of the United States, serves to strengthen a staunch friend and close
ally
er 6 ,
At the same time an additional agreement, relating to the status
of U.S. and Philippine traders and investors entering the territories
of the parties, was effected by an exchange of notes. This agreement
lease entered into force immediately.
SUMMARY OF MODIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN THE REVISED TRADE
AGREEMENT
eter-
1
ines
ated
gree-
(effective January 1, 1956)
Article I: The revised agreement replaces the schedules for the
gradual disappearance of tariff preferences for Philippine articles
imported into the United States and for U.S. articles imported into
prior
part
anca
of the
* TIAS 3348; 6 UST 2981.
The
Ty of
neral
3, p. 2611).
2362
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ti
PERCENTAGES OF CUSTOMS DUTIES TO BE APPLIED
如​拉​m,弘化
​By the United States to imports from the Philippines
By the Philippines to im.
ports from the
United States
Calendar year
1946 agree-
ment as
extended
Revised
agreement
1946 agree
ment as
extended
Revised
agreement
te
ci
ar
PT
Percent
25
25
25
50
50
.
ac
Percent
5
5
5
10
10
10
20
20
20
40
nc
re
1956.
1957.
1958.
1959.
1960.
1961.
1962.
1963.
1964.
1965.
1966.
1967.
1968.
1969.
1970.
1971.
1972.
1973.
1974.
Percent
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
100
d) Removing criteria for allocation of U.S. quotas among producers
for the protection of domestic at
the Philippines by new schedules which are more liberal to the
Philippines, as set forth below:
de
in
This article also provides for the elimination by the Philippines of
C
the present 17 percent exchange tax and its replacement by a tem-
porary special import levy which will be reduced at the rate of 10
percent per year beginning in 1957. The latter will not apply to
invisibles as did the exchange tax.
U
Article II: The revised agreement modifies U.S. quotas on Philip-
pine products by:
a) Eliminating quotas on rice.
6) Removing absolute quotas on cigars, scrap tobacco, coconut oil
and buttons and providing a new and slower schedule for the
progressive decrease in duty-free quotas on these commodities
c) Removing any impediment to possible future increases in the
absolute quotas on sugar.
Article III: Reciprocal provisions are made for quantitative import to
imposition of such restrictions include advance consultations.
Article IV: The prohibition on the imposition of export taxes by
either country is eliminated in the revised agreement.
Percent
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
100
75
75
75
90
90
90
90
40
ta
40
60
60
60
80
80
80
100
90
90
90
100
16
1
1
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2363
* Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 13, 1950, p. 244.
olm-
sed
ent
eni
the Article V: The revised agreement eliminates the old article relating
to limitations on changes in the Philippine exchange rate and on restric-
tions on transferability of funds. The new language substituted
provides for Philippine implementation of U.S. proposals for reciprocal
arrangements to facilitate the entry and stay in either country of
persons
classifiable as traders and investors.
Article VI: The obsolete terms of the old agreement relating to
immigration are replaced in the revised agreement by the modified
terms of former article VII. These terms mutualize as between
citizens of both countries the right to use and exploit natural resources
and operate public utilities on the basis of national treatment.
Article VII: The revised agreement contains here a new article
% providing for reciprocal nondiscrimination by either party against the
citizens or enterprises of the other with respect to engaging in business
activities.
Article VIII: The revised agreement inserts here security exceptions
not previously contained.
Article IX: With deletion of obsolete terms, former article VIII
regarding implementing legislation in both countries is repeated here.
Article X: Old article IX providing for consultations on interpre-
tation or application is amended to provide for consultations 3 years
prior to termination.
Article XI: Obsolete portions of former terminating article X are
deleted
, leaving those portions applying to termination with the
insertion of the effective date of the revisions.
Protocol: Some revised definitions are substituted.
25
25
50
75
90
90
90
90
90
100
s of
C. INDOCHINA
em-
f 10
y to
ilip-
United States Policy Regarding the Communist Threat
in Indochina, 1950-1953
oil
,
the
ties
.
the
2
16. UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF INCREASED SOVER-
EIGNTY IN THE STATE OF VIET-NAM: Note From the United
States Ambassador-at-Large 1 to the Chief of State of Viet-Nam,
January 27, 19503
The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, has instructed me to express
to Your Majesty the gratification
of the United States Government
at the assumption
by Your Majesty of the powers transferred by
Cers.
port
estic
the
1 Philip C. Jessup.
2 Bao Dai.
3 by
2364
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
V
ti
mi
ar
1 Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950 (London, 1953), pp. 596-608.
4 See Franco-Vietnamese agreement of Mar. 8, 1949; Documents on Interna
the French Republic at the beginning of this year, and its confident
best wishes for the future of the State of Viet Nam with which it
looks forward to establishing a closer relationship. My Government
believes that both the people of Viet Nam and the people of France
are to be congratulated on this development.
The Secretary of State also asked me to express his personal hopes
that Your Majesty will succeed in his present endeavors to establish
stability and prosperity in Viet Nam, which, Your Majesty may be
assured, my Government is following with close attention.
17. UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF VIET-NAM, LAOS,
AND CAMBODIA: Statement by the Department of State, Feb.
ruary 7, 1950 2
The Government of the United States has accorded diplomatic
recognition to the Governments of the State of Viet Nam, the King- ti
dom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia.
I
The President, therefore, has instructed the American consul I
general at Saigon to inform the heads of Government of the State of
Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia S
that we extend diplomatic recognition to their Governments and look
forward to an exchange of diplomatic representatives between the
United States and these countries.
Our diplomatic recognition of these Governments is based on the it
formal establishment of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom ST
Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia as independent states within st
the French Union; this recognition is consistent with our fundamental d
policy of giving support to the peaceful and democratic evolution of
dependent peoples toward self-government and independence.
In June of last year, this Government expressed its gratification
at the signing of the France-Viet Namese agreements of March 8
which provided the basis for the evolution of Viet Namese independ-
ence within the French Union. These agreements, together with
similar accords between France and the Kingdoms of Laos and Cam
bodia, have now been ratified by the French National Assembly and
of
signed by the President of the French Republic. This ratification
has established the independence of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia de
as associated states within the French Union.
It is anticipated that the full implementation of these basic agree
ments and of supplementary accords which have been negotiated and
U
are awaiting ratification will promote political stability and the
L
growth of effective democratic institutions in Indochina. This
Government is considering what steps it may take at this time to
further these objectives and to assure, in collaboration with other
2 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 20, 1950, pp. 291–292.
3 Ibid., July 18, 1949, p. 75.
tional Affairs, 1949-50 (London, 1953), pp. 596-608.
in
11
$1
st
es
M
th
to
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2365
to the President of the French Union.
108
1
l'his Laos, and Vietnam. This mission will have the responsibility of
Ministers meeting; Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1950, p. 821.
the American Ambassador at Paris, simultaneously delivered an identical note
Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1950, pp. 977-978.
ent like-minded nations, that this development shall not be hindered by
it internal dissension fostered from abroad.
ent The status of the American consulate general in Saigon will be
raised to that of a legation, and the Minister who will be accredited
to all three states will be appointed by the President.
pes
ish
be
18. EXTENSION OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID: State-
ment by the Secretary of State, May 8, 1950
The (French) Foreign Minister and I have just had an exchange of
OS
views on the situation in Indochina and are in general agreement both
eb-
as to the urgency of the situation in that area and as to the necessity
for remedial action. We have noted the fact that the problem of
meeting the threat to the security of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos
atic which now enjoy independence within the French Union is primarily
ng the responsibility of France and the Governments and peoples of
Indochina. The United States recognizes that the solution of the
usul
Indochina problem depends both upon the restoration of security
e of
and upon the development of genuine nationalism and that United
dia
States assistance can and should contribute to these major objectives.
pok
The United States Government, convinced that neither national
the independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated
by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant
its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated
of
States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring
stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and
democratic development.
of
on
19. ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM: Note From the American Chargé
8.1 d'Affaires at Saïgon 3 to the Chiefs of State of Viet-Nam, Laos, and
nd-
Cambodia, May 24, 1950 4
with
anti-
I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United
States has decided to initiate a program of economic aid to the States
of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. My Government has reached this
dis
decision in order to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to restore
stability and pursue their peaceful and democratic development.
With these purposes in mind, the United States Government is
establishing, with headquarters in Saïgon and associated with the
the United States Legation, a special economic mission to Cambodia,
Issued at Paris, where the Secretary of State was attending a Western Foreign
the
hin
tal
3
and
tion
ree-
and
z to
ther
-608
? Robert Schuman.
3 Edmund Gullion.
David Bruce,
mnd
2366
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
ti
i
t
r
Q
2.
S
2
S
The participants were in complete agreement that the successful
working with the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and
with the French High Commissioner in developing and carrying out
a coordinated program of economic aid designed to assist the three
countries in restoring their normal economic life. The members of
the American economic mission will, at all times, be subject to the
authority of the Government of the United States and will not
become a part of the administrations of the Associated States.
The Government of the United States recognizes that this American
assistance will be complementary to the effort made by the three
Associated States and France, without any intention of substitution
,
American aid is designed to reinforce the joint effort of France and
the Governments and peoples of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, on
whom rests the primary responsibility for the restoration of security
and stability.
United States economic aid will be granted in accordance with
separate bilateral agreements between each of the Associated States
and the United States of America. The approval of these agreements
will be subject to legal conventions existing between the Associated
States and France. Initial economic aid operations, however, may
begin prior to the conclusion of these agreements.
The United States
Government is of the opinion that it would be
desirable for the three governments and the French High Commis
.
sioner to reach agreement among themselves for the coordination of
those matters relating to the aid program that are of common interest
.
The American economic mission will maintain contact with the three
Associated States, with the French High Commissioner in Indochina
and, if desired, with any body which may be set up by the Associated
States and France in connection with the aid program.
Mr. Robert Blum has been appointed Chief of the United States
special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
Identical letters are being addressed today to the governments of
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the President of the French Union.
[Military Aid to France and Indochina: Statement by the Department
of State regarding Franco-American Conversations, October 17, 1950;
supra, pp. 1668-1669.]
20. THE MILITARY AID PROGRAM: Statement by the Depart.
ments of State and Defense, September 23, 1951
Discussions which have been going on for the past week between
General of the Army, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Com
missioner in Indochina and Commander in Chief of the French Union
Forces in Indochina, and officials
of the Departments of Defense and
State were concluded September 22 in an atmosphere of cordiality
and unity of purpose.
th
V
II
el
Q
C
0
e
fo
4
A
f
1
CI
STA
F
M
ti
D
i Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 570.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2367
08
Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1952, p. 1010.
and
Southeast Asia. United States officials stated that General de Lat-
out
tre's presentation of the situation in that area had been invaluable to
hree
them and had demonstrated that United States and French policies
s of
in the Associated States were not at variance.
the
In the course of the discussions with the Department of Defense,
not
the military-aid program for Indochina was reexamined, with the
result that considerable improvement will be made in the rate of
ican
deliveries of many items of equipment. General de Lattre has been
hree
advised that the question of additional aid for the French and Viet-
ion.
namese forces in Indochina in the fiscal year 1952 program is under
and study by the United States Government.
urity
21. THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA: Communiqué Regarding
with
Discussions Between Representatives of the United States, France,
ates
Viet-Nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952 1
ents
ated
Mr. Jean Letourneau, Minister in the French Cabinet for the
may Associated States in Indochina, has just concluded a series of conver-
be
sations with U.S. Government officials from the Department of State,
mis-
Department of Defense, the Office of Director for Mutual Security,
the Mutual Security Agency, and Department of the Treasury. The
n of
Ambassadors of Cambodia and Viet-Nam have also participated in
these talks.
hree
hing
The principle which governed this frank and detailed exchange of
ated
views and information was the common recognition that the struggle
in which the forces of the French Union and the Associated States are
engaged against the forces of Communist aggression in Indochina is
an integral part of the world-wide resistance by the Free Nations to
Es of
Communist attempts at conquest and subversion. There was unani-
mous satisfaction over the vigorous and successful course of military
operations, in spite of the continuous comfort and aid received by the
Communist forces of the Viet-Minh from Communist China. The
nient
excellent performance of the Associated States' forces in battle was
1950;
found to be a source of particular encouragement. Special tribute
was paid to the 52,000 officers and men of the French Union and
Associated States' armies who have been lost in this six years' struggle
for freedom in Southeast Asia and to the 75,000 other casualties.
In this common struggle, however, history, strategic factors, as
well as local and general resources require that the free countries
concerned each assume primary responsibility for resistance in the
com-
specific areas where Communism has resorted to force of arms. Thus
the United States assumes a large share of the
burden in Korea while
France has the primary role in Indochina. The partners, however,
ality recognize the obligation to help each other in their areas of primary
responsibility to the extent of their capabilities and within the limita-
tions imposed by their global obligations as well as by the require-
fall ments in their own areas of special responsibility. Řt was agreed
rest.
cates
1.
part
veen
nion
and
ssful
2368
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
r
1 Agreements of Mar. 8, 1949 (Viet-Nam), July 19, 1949 (Laos), and Nov. 8;
that success in this continuing struggle would entail an increase in
the common effort and that the United States for its part will, there bet
fore, within the limitations set by Congress, take steps to expand its
aid to the French Union. It was further agreed that this increased
assistance over and above present U.S. aid for Indochina, which now
tin
approximates one third of the total cost of Indochina operations Sta
would be especially devoted to assisting France in the building of the
national armies of the Associated States.
As
Mr. Letourneau reviewed the facts which amply demonstrate the At
determination of the Associated States to pursue with increased energy
the strengthening of their authority and integrity both against internal for
subversion and against external aggression.
gor
In this connection Mr. Letourneau reminded the participants that
the accords of 1949, which established the independence within the
French Union of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, have been liberally see
interpreted and supplemented by other agreements, thus consolidating
this independence. Mr. Letourneau pointed out that the governments
of the Associated States now exercise full authority except that &
23.
strictly limited number of services related to the necessities of the
war now in progress remain temporarily in French hands. In the
course of the examination of the Far Eastern economic and trade
situation, it was noted that the Governments of the Associated States
are free to negotiate trade treaties and agreements of all kinds with all
their neighbors subject only to whatever special arrangements may M
be agreed between members of the French Union,
It was noted that these states have been recognized by thirty-three
foreign governments.
The conversations reaffirmed the common determination of the
of
participants to prosecute the defense of Indochina and their confidence
in a free, peaceful and prosperous future for Cambodia, Laos, and to
Viet-Nam.
Mr. Letourneau was received by the President, Mr. Acheson, and
to
Mr. Foster, as Acting Secretary of Defense. Mr. John Allison
,
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, acted as Chair-
th
man of the U.S. Delegation participating in the conversations.
24
22. SUPPORT BY NATO OF THE FRENCH UNION DEFENSE
EFFORTS IN INDOCHINA: Resolution Adopted by the North
Atlantic Council, December 17, 1952
The North Atlantic Council
be
Recognizes that resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any
part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security
R
of the free world;
agreement with Viet-Nam is also-printed in Documents on International Affairs
,
1949–50 (London, 1953), pp. 596-608.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.
art
les
r
res
an
2
001
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2369
e in
NOT
it a
1
Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1953, p. 641.
, Department of State Bulletin, May 18, 1953, p. 708.
Having BEEN INFORMED at its meeting in Paris on the 16th Decem-
ere ber of the latest developments in the military and political situation
lits in Indo-China;
used Expresses its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long con-
tinued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated
ons
, States against Communist aggression; and
the
Acknowledges that the resistance of the free nations in South-East
Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the
the Atlantic Community;
rgy
And therefore agrees that the campaign waged by the French Union
rnal forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the NATO
governments.
shat
the
(For the text of the Franco-American communiqué of March 28, 1953,
aly see supra, pp. 1672–1675.)
ting
ents
23. UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF LAOS AGAINST THE VIET
the
MINH INVASION: Statement by the Department of State,
the April 17, 1953
ade
ates The Royal Government of Laos has issued a statement drawing
attention to the attack upon the territory of the Kingdom by Viet
may Minh troops and stating the determination of the Government, the
army, and the people of Laos with the aid of French Union troops to
resist this aggression.
The Government of the United States is following developments
the with the closest attention. It expresses its sympathy with the people
of Laos in their present emergency and its fervent wishes to them,
and
to their troops, and to those of the French Union in their efforts to
resist and turn back the invaders. The United States will continue
and to provide and will study ways and means of making more effective
500, its assistance to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in
the struggle to destroy Communist aggression in Laos, Cambodia,
24. UNITED STATES EMERGENCY AID TO LAOS AND THAI-
LAND IN THE FACE OF VIET MINH AGGRESSION: Statement
by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, May 9, 1953 3
In view of the recent, rapid sequence of events in the Far East, I
believe it would be appropriate to summarize for you our actions
concerning developments in Laos and Thailand.
city
Communist Viet Minh forces began their movement toward the
Royal Capital City of Luang Prabang in Laos on April 12.
an appeal from the Government of Laos on April 13 to
hree
ence
all-
and Vietnam.
SE
erth
Following
8
the
71r's,
1
3
415900---57-Vol. 2
46
2370
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
OL
er
sa
m
W.
IS
W
2 See the NATO Council communiqué of Apr. 25, 1953; supra, pp. 1631-1633.
3 See Secretary Dulles' statement of that date; Department of State Bulletin
6 Made before the American Legion, St. Louis; ibid., Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 341-342
the free world to condemn the aggression, the United States issued
so
statement of support and sympathy.
th
The urgent need for cargo aircraft to aid French and Lao forces in
meeting this aggression was discussed by me with French officials
during our stay in Paris for the recent Nato meeting.?
Within 24 hours it was agreed at the highest level that such aircraft
if available, should be dispatched to Indochina. Within another 2
hours the aircraft were located with the Far East Command. Within
another 24 hours civilian operators were located to fly the planes,
because the French did not have crews accustomed to handle these co
planes and we did not desire that our military personnel should fy al
into the combat zone. The plan was actually put into operation et
within a few hours after our return from Paris, and the aircraft
arrived at Hanoï on May 5 and were made operational immediately ef
Three days prior to the arrival of the aircraft in Hanoi, we ar
nounced on May 23 that we were maintaining close contact with the
Governments of Laos and of France regarding the special require
ments of the situation and that the Mutual Security Administration U
Mission in Laos had made arrangements to help ease the refuge
problem by making available certain funds and supplies.
The Ambassador from Thailand, Pote Sarasin, came to my office su
at 3:30 p.m. on Tuesday of this week, May 5, to discuss the problems to
confronting his country as a result of the Viet Minh invasion of Leos.ch
The Ambassador expressed his country's urgent need for smal
arms ammunition and for various military items urgently required
by the Thai Navy, Army, and Air Force, which requests had simu.
taneously been made through the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory
Group and our Embassy at Bangkok. Within 24 hours of the
Ambassador's request certain amounts of such ammunition were in B
the air on their way to Bangkok from the Pacific area, and action it
was taken to expedite delivery of the other military items.
U
These two instances illustrate a capacity for decision and perform-
ance and of cooperative teamwork between the Departments of State
and Defense, which should, I believe, be gratifying to the American
people. Also, they should be impressive to others, whether they be 1 2
friends or aggressors.
25. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECT CHINESE COMMUNIST
INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA: Address by the Secretary to
of State, September 2, 1953 (Excerpt) 5
th
We do not make the mistake of treating Korea as an isolate
affair. The Korean war forms one part of the worldwide effort
de
1 Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1953, p. 641.
May 11, 1953, p. 678.
See ibid., May 18, 1953, p.709.
m
01
CO
0
my
0
8
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2371
? Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 486–487.
ces in
icials
Vietnam has earned the admiration and support of the free world.
ued communism to conquer freedom. More immediately it is part of
that effort in Asia.
A single Chinese-Communist aggressive front extends from Korea
on the north to Indochina in the south. The armistice in Korea,
even if it leads to a political settlement in Korea, does not end United
craft States concern in the western Pacific area. As President Eisenhower
er said in his April 16 speech,' a Korean armistice would be a fraud if it
Titkin merely released Communist forces for attack elsewhere.
lanes, In Indochina a desperate struggle is in its eighth year. The out-
these come affects our own vital interests in the western Pacific, and we are
Id fy already contributing largely in material and money to the combined
ration efforts of the French and of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.
rcraft We Americans have too little appreciated the magnitude of the
ately effort and sacrifices which France has made in defense of an area
e 82 which is no longer a French colony but where complete independence
h the is now in the making. This independence program is along lines
quire which the United States has encouraged and justifies increased
ation United States aid, provided that will assure an effort there that is
fugee vigorous and decisive.
Communist China has been and now is training, equipping, and
ofice supplying the Communist forces in Indochina. There is the risk
blems that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own army into Indo-
china. The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a
smal second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which
uired might not be confined to Indochina. I say this soberly in the interest
imul- of peace and in the hope of preventing another aggressor miscalculation.
We want peace in Indochina, as well as in Korea. The political
f the conference about to be held relates in the first instance to Korea.
ere in But growing out of that conference could
come, if Red China wants
uction it
, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The
United States would welcome such a development.
ey be 26. ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES AID FOR FRANCE AND
INDOCHINA: Joint Franco-American Communiqué, September
30, 1953 2
NIST
The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have
-etart for 8 years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment
of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The
heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring
the liberty of the new and independent states of Cambodia, Laos
and
ment has in the past furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments
of France
and the Associated States
to assist in bringing the long
struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.
Fisory
form
State
rican
plated
ort
--1633.
ulletin
1
Supra, pp. 65–71.
1-342
2372 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
mi
The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its
declaration of July 3, 1953,1 by which is announced its intention of an
perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indo-
china, through negotiations with the Associated States.
The Governments of France and the United States have now Fr
agreed that, in support of plans of the French Government for the pu
intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh, the United Pe
States will make available to the French Government prior to Dear
cember 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed $385 wł
million. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the po
United States for aid to France and the Associated States.
The French Government is determined to make every effort to
break up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochină. Toward St
this end the government intends to carry through, in close cooperation Re
with the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the wi
plans for increasing the Associated States forces while increasing
temporarily French forces to levels considered necessary to assure
the success of existing military plans. The additional United States rem
aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives
with maximum speed and effectiveness.
The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail
basic
or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and pro- the
grams for its Nato forces.
any
SH
aid
The Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference, 1954
CEE
th
h
27. PLANS FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA AND 1
INDOCHINA: Quadripartite Communiqué of the Berlin Confer A
ence, February 18, 1954 2
my
28
A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States,
France
,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union
--Mr. John Foster Dulles
,
M. Georges Bidault, Mr. Anthony Eden, and M. Vyacheslav Molo-
tov-took place in Berlin between January 25 and February 18, 1954
They reached the following agreements:
(A)
The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United
Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in
Berlin,
TI
th
ME
D
PP.
347-
BA
348.
1 Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953 (New York, 1954),
1954 Department of State publication 5399;11969), pp. 219-218. See also see
* Foreign Ministers "Meeting: -Berlin Discussions, January 25-February se
retary Dulles' address of Feb. 24, 1954; supra, pp. 85-90.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2373
1
thinking about two related matters—Indochina and the Chinese Com-
(Department of State publication 5609; 1954) and infra, pp. 2695-2701.
2 General Assembly Res. 715 (VIII); infra, pp. 2796–2798.
Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539-542.
ill its Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united
on of and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing
(ndo international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,
Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States,
NOT France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
r the publics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the
nited People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and the other countries the
De 1 armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and
$388 which desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on April 26 for the pur-
7 the pose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question;
AGREE that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also
rt to be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United
ward States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist
ation Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, and other interested states
the will be invited.
It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of,
ssure the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic
tates recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.
(B)
The Governments of the United States of America, of France, of
pro the United Kingdom, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Convinced that the solution of international controversies neces-
sary for the establishment of a lasting peace would be considerably
aided by an agreement on disarmament, or at least on a substantial
reduction of armaments,
1954
WILL SUBSEQUENTLY HOLD an exchange of views to promote a suc-
cessful solution of this problem as provided for in paragraph 6 of
the United Nations resolution of November 28, 1953.2
The four Ministers have had a full exchange of views on the Ger-
AND man question, on the problems of European security, and on the
afer Austrian question. They were unable to reach agreement upon these
alles, 28. VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE EVE OF THE
Colo-
GENEVA CONFERENCE: Address by the Secretary of State,
954.
March 29, 1954 3
This provides a timely occasion for outlining the Administration's
ited
See The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954
18,
matters.
nice,
munist regime.
11
3
347-
Seco
2374
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
I
ac
M
V
ar
an
tas
pe
PE
under way
un
ot:
trained and equipped in Communist China. They are supplied
3 Declaration of July 3, 1953; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958
4 Mikhail Markovich Borodin, political adviser to the Kuomintang (1923–1927 Ya
bo
Indochina
Indochina is important for many reasons. First—and always first-
are the human values. About 30 million people are seeking for
themselves the dignity of self-government. Until a few years ago
С C
M
they formed merely a French dependency. Now, their three political
th
units---Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—are exercising a considerable
measure of independent political authority within the French Union,
Each of the three is now recognized by the United States and by
more than 30 other nations. They signed the Japanese Peace Treaty
with us. Their independence is not yet complete. But the French
Government last July 3 declared its intention to complete that is
dependence, and negotiations to consummate that pledge are actively
The United States is watching this development with close attention
and great sympathy. We do not forget that we were a colony that
won its freedom. We have sponsored in the Philippines a conspicu- tb
ously successful development of political independence. We feel &
sense of kinship with those everywhere who yearn for freedom.
the
Communist Imperialism
The Communists are attempting to prevent the orderly develop de
ment of independence and to confuse the issue before the world. The mic
Communists have, in these matters, a regular line which Stalin laid off
down in 1924.
The scheme is to whip up the spirit of nationalism so that it becomes
violent. That is done by professional agitators. Then the violencem
is enlarged by Communist military and technical leadership and the ar
provision of military supplies. In these ways, international Com.co
munism gets a strangle-hold on the people and it uses that power to | A
Samalgamate” the peoples into the Soviet orbit.
"Amalgamation" is Lenin's and Stalin's word to describe their "o
process.
‘Amalgamation” is now being attempted in Indochina under the be
ostensible leadership of Ho Chi Minh. He was indoctrinated in
Moscow. He became an associate of the Russian, Borodin," when
the latter was organizing the Chinese Communist Party which we
to bring China into the Soviet orbit. Then Ho transferred bis
activities to Indochina.
Those fighting under the banner of Ho Chi Minh have largely been
with artillery and ammunition through the Soviet-Chinese Com
ag
munist bloc. Captured material shows that much of it was fabricated
1 See statement of Feb. 7, 1950, by the Department of State; supra, doc. 17.
2 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 425-440.
(New York, 1954), pp. 347–348.
and head of Communist government at Hankow (1924–1927).
of
as
ಜೊತೆ 5
OL
}
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2375
* Supra, pp. 65–71.
aty?
our diplomacy has sought to deter Communist China from open
3 Statement made at the President's news conference of Mar. 24, 1954; New
York Times, Mar. 25, 1954.
by the Skoda Munition Works in Czechoslovakia and transported
across Russia and Siberia and then sent through China into Vietnam.
Military supplies for the Communist armies have been pouring into
Vietnam at a steadily increasing rate.
st
; for
Military and technical guidance is supplied by an estimated 2,000
Communist Chinese. They function with the forces of Ho Chi
ago,
Minh in key positions—in staff sections of the High Command, at
tical
the division level and in specialized units such as signal, engineer,
able
lion.
artillery and transportation.
i by
In the present stage, the Communists in Indochina use nationalistic
anti-French slogans to win local support. But if they achieved mili-
tary or political success, it is certain that they would subject the
ench
t in.
people to a cruel Communist dictatorship taking its orders from
ively
Peiping and Moscow.
The Scope of the Danger
ation
The tragedy would not stop there. If the Communist forces won
that
uncontested control over Indochina or any substantial part thereof,
DICU: they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against
eel
& other free peoples in the area.
The propagandists of Red China and Russia make it apparent that
the purpose is to dominate all of Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia is the so-called "rice bowl” which helps to feed the
elop-densely populated region that extends from India to Japan. It is
The rich in many raw materials,
such as tin, oil, rubber and iron
ore. It
laid offers industrial Japan potentially important markets and sources
The area has great strategic value. Southeast Asia is astride the
lence most direct and best developed sea and air routes between the Pacific
the and South Asia. It has major naval and air bases. Communist
Com control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines,
rer to Australia and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual
assistance. The entire Western Pacific area, including the so-called
their offshore island chain", would be strategically endangered.
President Eisenhower appraised the situation last Wednesday when
the be said that the area is of transcendent importance".?
ed il
The United States Position
The United States has shown in many ways its sympathy for the
gallant struggle being waged in Indochina by French forces and
those of the Associated States. Congress has enabled us to provide
material aid to the established governments and their peoples. Also,
of raw materials.
omes
I
wher
was
d his
been
plied
Com-
aggression in that area.
cated
17.
President Eisenhower, in his address of April 16, 1953, explained
See the treaties of Aug. 30, 1951, and Sept. 1, 1951; supra, pp. 873-875 and
, 1958
878-880.
-1927
2376
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
.
a.
e
ti
9
$
2 e. g., Secretary Dulles' address of Jan. 12, 1954: “The way to deter aggression
that a Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released aggres-
sive armies for attack elsewhere. I said last September that itt
Red China sent its own army into Indochina, that would result in
grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.
Recent statements have been designed to impress upon potential
aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places and by
means of free world choosing, so that aggression would cost more
than it could gain.?
The Chinese Communists have, in fact, avoided the direct use of
their own Red armies in open aggression against Indochina. They
have, however, largely stepped up their support of the aggression
in that area. Indeed, they promote that aggression by all means
short of open invasion.
Under all the circumstances it seems desirable to clarify further the
United States position.
Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of
the litical system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist
ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free!
community. The United States feels that that possibility should not
be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This
might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those
that will face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today
. t
The free nations want peace. However, peace is not had merely by
wanting it. Peace has to be worked for and planned for. Sometimes
it is necessary to take risks to win peace just as it is necessary in wa
to take risks to win victory. The chances for peace are usually
bettered by letting a potential aggressor know in advance where bis
aggression could lead him.
ị hope that these statements which I make here tonight will serve
the cause of peace.
N
Communist China
Let me now discuss our political relations with Red China, taking
first the matter of recognition.
he United States does not recognize the Chinese Communist
regime. That is well known. But the reasons seem not so wel
known. Some think that there are no reasons and that we are
actuated purely by emotion. Your Government believes that its B
position is soberly rational.
Non-Recognition
Let me first recall that diplomatic recognition is a voluntary ack
One country has no right to demand recognition by another. Gen-
1 Address of Sept. 2, 1953; supra, doc. 25.
and means of its own choosing" (supra, p. 80).
SE
a
II
1
TI
0
CI
8
It
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2377
2 General Assembly Res. 498 (V); infra., pp. 2608-2609.
at if
77 1
SSIOD
government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those
relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just
claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none.'
the Monroe Doctrine (Department of State publication 37; 1930], p. 103.)
gres.erally, it is useful that there should be diplomatic intercourse between
those who exercise de facto governmental authority and it is well
It in established that recognition does not imply moral approval.
President Monroe, in his famous message to Congress, denounced
ential the expansionist and despotic system of Czarist Russia and its allies.
by But he said that it would nevertheless be our policy "to consider the
more government de facto as the legitimate government for us”. That has
indeed been the general United States policy, and I believe that it is
se of a sound general policy. However, where it does not serve our inter-
They ests, we are free to vary from it.
In relation to Communist China, we are forced to take account of
beans the fact that the Chinese Communist regime has been consistently
and viciously hostile to the United States.
er the A typical Chinese Communist pamphlet reads: "We Must Hate
America, because She is the Chinese People's Implacable Enemy”;
sia of "We Must Despise America because it is a Corrupt Imperialist
unist Nation, the World Center of Reaction and Decadency"; "We Must
free Look down upon America because she is a Paper Tiger and Entirely
d not Vulnerable to Defeat".
This
By print, by radio, by drama, by pictures, with all the propaganda
those skills which Communism has devised, such themes are propagated by
oday the Red rulers. They vent their hatred by barbarous acts, such as
ly by seizures and imprisonments of Americans.
times Those responsible for United States policy must ask and answer:
"Will it help our country if, by recognition, we give increased prestige
ually and influence to a regime that actively attacks our vital interests?"
e his I can find only the answer "No".
Admission to the United Nations
Let us turn now to the matter of seating Red China in the United
Nations
. By the Charter, membership is supposed to be limited to
"peace-loving” states. Therefore, it is relevant to recall that the
Chinese Communist regime became an aggressor in the latter part of
aking
1950. Its armies invaded Korea and waged war against the United
Nations Command. They contributed largely to the killing, wound-
unit ng or losing in action of about 500,000 soldiers of the United Nations
Command, including over 100,000 Americans.
The United Nations General Assembly on February 1, 1951 voted,
44 to 7, that the Chinese People's Republic was guilty of aggression in
Korea. It called upon it to withdraw its forces from Korea. But
Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1823: "Our policy in regard to Europe which
hans adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter
of the globe, nevertheless
remains the
same, which is, not to interfere in the internal
concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate
W&T
serve
well
e are
at its
they still remain.
7 act.
Gen-
ression
places
2378
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
f
C
M
2 See Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939,
It is true that the Chinese Communist Command concluded
Korean Armistice. But that was not a Chinese Communist good-wil
offering. It was something that the United Nations Command won.
The Communists signed only after desperate and bloody final efforts
had failed to break the allied line, and only after the United Nations
Command had made it apparent that the conflict, if continued, would
bring into jeopardy valuable Communist military and industrial
assets in nearby Manchuria.
The Chinese Communists' continuing lack of genuine will for peace
is being demonstrated in Indochina.
As one of the United Nations members who must pass on representa-
tion, we must ask "Will it serve the interests of world order to bringt
into the United Nations a regime which is a convicted aggressor,
which has not purged itself from that aggression, and which continues
to promote the use of force in violation of the principles of the United
Nations?” I can find only the answer “No”.
Free China on Formosa
There is still another aspect of this China matter. We must not
forget that the National Government of China continues to function
in Formosa and millions of free Chinese are gathered
there under its
jurisdiction. It has the allegiance of many more. They have been
our loyal friends and allies when, during World War II, we needed
each other.
Should the free nations facilitate and encourage the bloody liquida-
fo
tion by the Chinese Communists of these free Chinese on Formosa?
S
To me again, the only answer is "No".
Experience with Communist Promises
Some say that the United States should recognize the Chinese Com.
munist regime and welcome it to the United Nations, in reliance of
promises in relation to Korea and Indochina.
The United States must judge that proposal on the basis of past
experience.
The United States agreed to recognize the Soviet regime in 1931
relying on its promise, in the so-called
Litvinov agreement, to avoid
and prevent political action from Russia against our political
order. We performed and granted recognition. But the promises
we received were vain.
At Yalta, in February 1945, Britain and the United States gare
sanction to the fact of dominant
Soviet influence in Central Europe
,
They did so on the basis of a Soviet agreement that the peoples et
liberated
Europe would have the right "to choose the form of Govern
:
ment under which they will live”, and that in Poland there would be
1 Armistice agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724-750,
S
SI
1
th
0]
ai
8
or social
11
!!
pi
T
pp. 27-37.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2379
WON.
cons
leace
nues
ī not
Enises Conference. There, by standing firm, I finally obtained the reluctant
1945; ibid., pp. 33–34.
3 Treaty of Aug. 14, 1945, and related agreements; United States Relations
publication 3573; 1949), pp. 585-596.
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; ibid., pp. 587-588.
o See infra, pp. 2715–2728.
d & "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible".1 But those
-will promises we received were vain.
There was also a Yalta Agreement with reference to the Far East.?
forts The United States agreed to obtain for the Soviet Union control of
Port Arthur, Dairen and the Manchurian Railroad. In exchange,
ould the Soviet Union promised to support the National Government of
strial China. This arrangement was consummated at Moscow in August
1945. Then the Soviet Government acquired from China the
Manchurian assets that had been promised it. In return it gave a
30-year engagement "to render to China moral support and aid in
inta- military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid
to be entirely given to the National Government as the central
ssor,
government of China." 4
Having gained what it wanted the Soviet Government then moved
lited
promptly to assist the Chinese Communist regime in its efforts to
overthrow the National Government. It gave to the Chinese Com-
munist forces vast stocks of military supplies and other material
resources which it had promised to give entirely to the National
Government.
ction
In this matter again we gave performance. But the corresponding
or its | Communist promises proved vain.
been Our experience with Chinese Communist promises is limited because
we have with them only one agreement. That is the Korean Armi-
stice
. The United Nations Command has reported that the Com-
munists have violated it 40 times. That only tells part of the story,
noss
! for the basic violation is that the Swedish and Swiss members of the
Supervisory Commission are denied an adequate opportunity to
supervise the North and to detect Communist violations.5
The United States recognizes that few nations have a record which is
not marred by some violations of agreements. Also, we recognize
Com that nothing human is immutable. Surely, there is nothing vindictive
or implacable about the American people. Indeed, few people are
as ready as we to forgive and forget. But it would be reckless for
us to ignore the events of recent years which have filled our archives
We are not in the market for more.
It is now the policy of the United States not to exchange United
void States performance for Communist promises.
That United States position was made clear at the recent Berlin
See Section II, “Declaration on Liberated Europe," and Section VII,
of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, Feb. 11,
1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 29 and 30–31.
See the agreement regarding Japan, signed at the Crimea Conference, Feb. 11,
eded
lide
ce of
past
with vain promises.
1933
social
gare
"Poland,"
rope.
es of
vern-
Id be
-1939
2380
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
discuss ha
CO
01
3 Statement of Jan. 26, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions,
agreement by Mr. Molotov that the Geneva Conference would not
be a "Big Five Conference” and that the invitation to Geneva would to
itself specify that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, that
conference should be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition where it 80
had not already been accorded.2
The Chinese Communist regime has been invited only to discos
Korea and Indochina, where it is in fact a force of aggression which we If
cannot ignore. It gets no diplomatic recognition from us by the fact
of its presence at Geneva. I said at Berlin: "It . . . is one thing to
recognize evil as a fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's breast
and call it good.” 3 That we shall not do.
24
The Dangers Ahead
The United States Delegation will go to Geneva in an effort to bring
about & united and independent Korea, from which Communist
China will have withdrawn its army of invasion. Also, we hope that
St
M
any Indochina discussion will serve to bring the Chinese Communists
to see the danger of their apparent design for the conquest of South-
east Asia, so that they will cease and desist. We shall not, however
,
be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us, merely
to buy its promises of future good behavior.
Some, perhaps, would have it otherwise. But we dare not forget
that during the period when we accepted Communist promises at their
face value, and took for granted their peaceful intentions, the danger
U
steadily grew.
We can, I think, take a lesson from Dien Bien Phu.4 For some days
there has seemed to be a lull. But in fact the danger has steadily
mounted. The enemy sappers have never ceased their work. They
have burrowed and tunneled to gain forward positions so that the
D
C
inner citadels can be subjected to mass assault from close positions
.
Today the free world also feels a sense of lull. The danger of general
U
war seems to have receded. I hope that that is so. If it is so,
bg
because the free nations saw the danger and moved unitedly,
courage and decision, to meet it.
There is, however, no reason for assuming that the danger
has pel
th
manently passed. There is nothing to prove that the Soviet Com
In
munist rulers accepted peace as permanent, if permanent peace
block their ambitions. They continue unceasingly to burrow and
C
tunnel to advance their positions against the citadels of freedom
In Europe, Soviet Russia holds its grip on Eastern Germany and º
Austria and maneuvers recklessly to prevent reconciliation between
be
1 i. e., the Geneva conference on the problems of Korea and Indochina
.
2 See the quadripartite communiqué of Feb. 18, 1954, supra, doc. 27: t1
January 25-February 18, 1954' (Department of State publication 5399;
The French-held bastion in Indochina under siege by the forces of the Vis
Minh.
m!
it is
with
er
would
SE
A
1954,
p. 28.
i
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2381
Issued at Paris; Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 622-623.
t their
Id not France and Germany. In Asia, the whole area from Japan and Korea
would to Southeast Asia is troubled by Communist efforts at penetration.
; that As against such efforts, there is only one defense-eternal vigilance,
here it sound policies and high courage.
The United States is a member of a goodly company who in the past
liscus have stood together in the face of great peril and have overcome it.
ich we If we are true to that past, we can face the future with hope and
le fact confidence.
ing to
breast
29. VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE ON THE
EVE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE: Joint Statement by the
Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister, April 14, 19541
bring
a unist Following their conversations in Paris on April 14th, the United
e that States Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, and the French
unists
Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Bidault, issued the following statement:
south- For nearly two centuries it has been the practice for representatives
rever,
of our two nations to meet together to discuss the grave issues which
nerely
from time to time have confronted us.
In pursuance of this custom, which we hope to continue to the benefit
forget of ourselves and others, we have had an exchange of views on Indo-
china and Southeast Asia.
Mr. Dulles expressed admiration for the gallant fight of the French
Union forces, who continue with unshakeable courage and deter-
days
mination to repel Communist aggression.
Padily We deplore the fact that on the eve of the Geneva Conference this
They aggression has reached a new climax in Viet-Nam particularly at
at the
Dien-Bien-Phu and has been renewed in Laos and extended to
The independence of the three Associated States within the French
Union, which new agreements are to complete, is at stake in these
We recognize that the prolongation of the war in Indochina, which
endangers the security of the countries immediately affected, also
threatens the entire area of Southeast
Asia and of the Western Pacific.
In close association with other interested nations, we will examine the
and possibility of establishing, within the framework of the United Nations
Charter, a collective
defense to assure the peace, security and freedom
We recognize that our basic objective at the Geneva Conference will
be to seek the re-establishment of a peace in Indochina which will
safeguard the freedom of its people and the independence of the
Associated States. We are convinced that the possibility of obtaining
this objective depends upon our solidarity.
anger
Cambodia.
ONS.
eneral
it is
battles.
with
s pero
Com-
would
edom.
of this area.
y and
tween
na.
ssions,
1954),
1
e Viet
.
2382
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
0
&
T
te
9
S
th
d
a
al
SE
5 Treaties of Aug. 30, 1951, with the Philippines, Sept. 1, 1951, with Australis
Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954 (Department of State publication
ment of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 228–229.' See also Secretary Dulles"
30. PREPARATIONS FOR THE INDOCHINA PHASE OF THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE: Statement by the President, May 5,
1954 1
With the return of the Secretary of State from Geneva, there will
of course be a series of conferences on foreign affairs both within the
Executive Department and between the Secretary of State and bipar-
tisan groups of the Congress. Because of these forthcoming con-
ferences and the probability that the Secretary of State will himself
have something to say, and because, also, of the delicate nature of
the issues now pending before the Geneva Conference, I shall limit
my comments on the Indochina situation to a brief written statement
.
United States foreign policy has consistently supported the princi-
ples on which was founded the United Nations. A basic expression
of this policy was the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948.2 The United PE
States believes in assuring the peace and integrity of nations through
collective action and, in pursuance of the United Nations principle
,
has entered into regional security agreements with other nations
.
Examples are the Inter-American Agreement, the Nato Agree-
ment, and a whole series of pacts in the Pacific. These arrange-
ments are invariably to assure the peaceful security of the contracting
nations and to prevent likelihood of attack; they are not arrange-
ments designed primarily for waging war.
The Geneva Conference, now 9 days old, has produced no surprises
.
The expressed fears of some have proved unfounded.
It has not been a "five-power" conference as the Soviet Union
tried to make it,
lu
It has not involved establishing express or implied diplomatic
recognition by the United States of the Chinese Communist aggressors
.
The Korean phase of the Conference has been organized. Here
the Communists came up with
a scheme for Korean unification which 31
was a Chinese copy of the Soviet scheme for the unification of Ger-
many. Under their proposal no election measures could be taken
without Communist consent, and there could be no impartial super-
vision of the election conditions or of the voting.
This scheme was rejected for Germany.? Secretary Dulles tell
me that it is equally unacceptable to the Republic of Korea and
of
1 Made at a news conference; Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1954
, th
2 S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d sess., June 11, 1948; A Decade of American
Foreign Policy, p. 197.
3 Treaty of Sept. 2, 1947; supra, pp. 789–796.
4 Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, supra, pp. 812–815.
U
supra, pp. 873–875, 878-880, 885–886, and 897-898.
See North Korean proposal of "A pr. 27, 1954; The Korean Problem at the
5609; 1954), pp. 39–40.
? Cf. Soviet proposal of Feb. 4, 1954, for the unification of Germany; Foreign
Ministers Meeting: Berlin DiscussionsJanuary 25-February 18, 1954 Depark
Oi
G
W
re
DO
p. 740.
DC
as
OI
to
of
Vi
address of Feb. 24, 1954; supra, pp. 85-90.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2383
je
I
1-
DI
of State Bulletin, May 17, 1954, pp. 739–744.
IEUnited Nations members which took part in the Korean War under
5.
the United Nations Command now represented at Geneva.
The Indochina phase of the Conference is in process of being
organized and the issues have not yet been clarified. In this matter
ill a large measure of initiative rests with the Governments of France,
Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, which are the countries most
directly concerned.
Meanwhile plans are proceeding for the realization of a Southeast
Asia security arrangement. This was publicly suggested by Secre-
of | tary Dulles in his address of March 29. Of course, our principal
uit
allies were advised in advance. This proposal of the Secretary of
it. State was not a new one; it was merely reaffirmation of the principles
that have consistently guided our postwar foreign policy and a
reminder to interested Asian friends that the United States was pre-
dpared to join with others in the application of these principles to the
threatened area. Most of the free nations of the area and others
directly concerned have shown affirmative interest, and conversations
8: are actively proceeding.
Obviously, it was never expected that this collective security
the arrangement would spring into existence overnight. There are too
ng many important problems to be resolved. But there is a general
sense of urgency. The fact that such an organization is in process
of formation could have an important bearing upon what happens at
Geneva during the Indochina phase of the Conference.
The countries of the area are now thinking in constructive terms,
which include the indispensable concept of collective security. Prog-
ress in this matter has been considerable and I am convinced that
tic
further
progress will continue to be made.
ch
31. MIDWAY IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE: Address by the
er-
Secretary of State, May 7, 1954 2
I welcome this opportunity to talk with you about the Conference
71 now going on in Geneva: and the related aspects of our foreign policy.
nd
First of all, I join with you in paying tribute to the gallant defenders
of Dien-Bien-Phu. May it be given us to play a worthy part to defend
54 the values for which they gave
their lives.
This week I returned from the Geneva Conference. My return was
not connected with any developments at the Conference. As long ago
as last February when the Conference was called, I said I would attend
only the opening sessions, and then have my place taken by the
Under Secretary of State, General Bedell Smith. He is highly
qualified
to head our delegation at Geneva. .
Delivered over radio and television networks from Washington; Department
the Geneva conference on the problems of Korea and Indochina.
The French-held fortress at Dien-Bien-Phu fell to the besieging forces of the
30
rs.
re
en
er-
lia
the
00
Supra, doc. 28.
gr
It-
3i.
e.,
es"
Viet Minh, May 7, 1954.
2384 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
th
0
CO
CE
F
li
9
U
CC
d
4 See communiqués of Dec. 16, 1953, and Apr. 23, 1954; supra, pp. 1633-1637.
6 See North Korean proposal of Apr. 27, 1954; The Korean Problem at the
cussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399;
Since the Conference may last for some weeks, I did not feel able
to stay with it that long. I have been out of the United States during
much of the last 6 months to attend the Bermuda Conference, the
Berlin Conference, the Caracas Conference, and two Nato Council
meetings in Paris. These meetings strengthen the links with our
allies and enable us to present the position of the United States to
others. But the Secretary of State must also keep in close touch with
our own people and with the Congress. In order to exercise our full
influence in foreign affairs, the Government must have the under-
standing and support of the American people for its policies.
The Geneva Conference has two tasks. The first is to try to find &
way to unify Korea. The second task is to discuss the possibility of
restoring peace in Indochina.
The Soviet delegation, however, has sought to use the Conference
for other purposes. By various devices, it has tried to create the false
impression that this meeting accepted Red China as one of "five great
powers" or conferred on it a new international status.
Both of these issues had been fought out in connection with calling
the Conference and the Soviets had then conceded that the Conference
would not be a five-power affair nor involve any recognition for Red
China. We and our allies stood firmly and solidly on that position
and the Soviets ended by accepting it.
By the time I left Geneva, the Korean phase of the Conference had
been organized and was well under way. I will speak first of that
,
and then of Indochina where the fighting is still active and where the
question of possible United States participation has to be considered
.
For many years Korea has been the pawn of great powers,
Japan, and China have abused and exploited Korea and kept its
peoples in servitude. The Koreans now want only to be united and
free and left alone. Yet, in fact, Korea is divided, and North Korea
lives under the Chinese Communist voke. In all decency it would
seem that the Communists should allow the Korean people at long
last to live their own lives and to satisfy their aspirations for freedom.
When the Geneva Conference was organized,
the Communists put
up their program for uniting Korea. Unhappily it was not a pro-
gram to satisfy the desires of the Korean people for unity and freedom
It was, as President Eisenhower said, “ “a Chinese copy' of the Soviet
scheme for the unification of Germany.” Their idea is to have elections
so set up that the Communists can dictate the outcome and thus im-
pose their rule upon the whole country.
In the case of Germany, the Communists control Eastern Ger
1 See communiqué of Dec. 7, 1953; supra, pp. 1468-1470.
2 See supra, doc. 27.
3 See supra, pp. 1299-1302.
1954), pp. 39–40.
, supra,
7 See Soviet proposal of Feb.*491954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin, De
1954), pp. 228-239.
r
b
li
Russia,
8
I
0
C.
a
t
(
1
I
]
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2385
ur
to
er-
Ice
Ise
at
Ice
01
tralia and New Zealand; supra, pp. 873-875 and 878-880.
ble
many, with about one-fourth of the total German population. In
the case of Korea, they control about one-sixth of the total Korean
he
population. They insist, however, in both cases, that this gives them
the right to equal participation in determining the election conditions.
Also, they stipulate that there must be no impartial supervision or
observation of the elections to be sure that they are fair and free of
coercion.
ull
The Communists feel confident that under these conditions they
can make their candidates seem to win.
This scheme, when offered for Germany, was turned down by the
la
Federal Republic of Germany and by the three Western Powers at
of
Berlin. The same scheme is equally objectionable for Korea.
I can assure you that the United States delegation will do all that
lies within its power to promote, by peaceful means, the independence
and freedom and unity of Korea,
More than 140,000 Americans were killed or wounded under the
United Nations Command to keep Korea from being overrun by
armed invasion. I promise you that we shall not surrender at the
ng
council table at Geneva the freedom for which so many fought and
died.
ed
We are pressing the Communists to accept honest elections which
will be supervised by responsible outside observers, who will assure a
ad really free election. Whether the Communists accept that remains to
at,
be seen. If they would, then I think that Korea could be unified.
he Let me turn now to the problem of Southeast Asia. In that great
ed
peninsula and the islands to the south live nearly 200 million people
in 7 states--Burma; the three states of Indochina-Laos, Cambodia,
18,
its
and Viet-Nam; Thailand; Malaya; and Indonesia. Communist con-
nd quest of this area would seriously imperil the free world position in
the Western Pacific. It would, among other things, endanger the
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, with all of which the
ng
United States has mutual-security treaties. It would deprive Japan
of important foreign markets and sources of food and raw materials.
In Viet-Nam, one of the three Indochinese states, war has been
going on since 1946. When it began, Indochina was a French colony
just liberated from Japanese occupation. The war started primarily
et as a war for independence. What started as a civil war has now been
taken over by international communism for its own purposes. Ho
Chi-Minh, the Communist leader in Viet-Nam, was trained in Moscow
and got his first revolutionary experience in China.
In the name of nationalism, the Communists aim to deprive the
people of Viet-Nam of their independence by subjecting them to the
new imperialism of the Soviet bloc.
What is going on in Indochina is a perfect example of the Soviet
Communist strategy for colonial and dependent areas which was laid
down by Lerin and Stalin many years ago and
which the Communists
have practiced to take over much of Asia.
See Secretary Dulles' statement of Feb. 5, 1954, at the Berlin conference;
Treaties of Aug. 30, 1951, with the Philippines, and Sept. 1, 1951, with Aus-
rea
Id
m.
ut
0-
1).
IS
1
21
37
Ehe
19;
1
supra, pp. 1852–1855.
78
19;
415900—57-vol. 2-47
2386
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
0
li
d
h
11
On the military side, a 2-year plan was worked out by General
The cost of this operation would be considerable. The United
3 Gen. Henri Eugène Navarre, French military commander in Indochina
The Indochina area was vulnerable. The Governments of Vieta
Nam, Laos, and Cambodia had not yet received full political in-
dependence. Their peoples were not adequately organized to fight
against the Communist-led rebels, and they did not feel that they
had a stake in the struggle which justified great sacrifice.
President Eisenhower became familiar with the problem when
he was the Supreme Commander of Nato in Europe. He had seen
the strain and the drain which the Indochina war put upon France. .
He was aware of the growing discontent in France resulting from
the long war where the French were assuming the principal burden
of the fight and where human and material costs were mounting.
I recall in December 1952 when General Eisenhower, as President-
elect, was returning from his Korean trip on the cruiser. Helena, we
discussed gravely the problem of Indochina.
We realized that if Viet-Nam fell into hostile hands, and if the
neighboring countries remained weak and divided, then the Com.
munists could move on into all of Southeast Asia. For these reasons
the Eisenhower administration from the outset gave particular at-
tention to the problem of Southeast Asia.
Our efforts took two complementary lines. We sought to strengthen
the resistance to communism in Indochina. We sought also to build
in Southeast Asia a broader community of defense.
INDOCHINA MEASURES
In Indochina itself, the following steps seemed to us important
:
1. The French should give greater reality to their intention to
grant full independence to Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. This
would take away from the Communists their false claim to be leading
the fight for independence.
2. There should be greater reliance upon the national armies whe
would be fighting in their own homeland. This, we believed
, could
be done if the peoples felt that they
had a good cause for which to
fight and if better facilities for training and equipment were pro-
vided for them.
3. There should be greater free-world assistance. France was
carrying on a struggle which was overburdening her economic re-
Much progress was made in each of these respects. The French
declaration of July 3, 1953, pledged full independence to Viet-Nam
,
Laos, and Cambodia?: Already, a treaty of independence has been
concluded with Laos, and Emperor Bao Dai told me, in Paris, 2
weeks ago, that he felt that Viet-Nam was assured of its independence
1 For the text of the French declaration, see Documents on American Foreign
Relations, 1953 (New York, 1954), pp. 347-348.
2 See the French-Lao agreement of Oct. 22, 1953; ibid., pp. 348–350
fe
lc
lo
CE
아
​bi
th
st
b
SI
DI
c
sources.
st
CI
a
P
d
d
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2387
F
len
迦
​Ce.
OMI
We
m
len
Throughout this period the United States has also followed the
importance to the United States.
See Secretary Dulles' address of Sept. 2, 1953; supra, doc. 25.
eta
States, which was already paying part of the cost of the war, agreed
to bear the greater part of the total cost. We are now paying at
ght the rate of about $800 million a year, plus a very large provision of
ley military equipment.
Despite the gains on these fronts, there has been a growing belief
by the French people that France was overextended, in view of its
responsibilities in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe. As a result, when
I met in Berlin last January and February with the Foreign Ministers
of France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, the French Govern-
len
ment asked that the projected conference on Korea be expanded to
discuss also the problem of peace in Indochina.?
nt
Shortly after the Berlin Conference adjourned, the Communists,
as was to be expected from them, began to expend their military assets,
human and material, in a desperate effort to win some victory which
the
they would exploit for political purposes. They concentrated on a
mass assault against one of the French outposts——that of Dien-Bien-
15 Phu. That assault was pushed with a callous disregard of human
at-life
.
Now, Dien-Bien-Phu has fallen. Its defense, of 57 days and nights,
ild
will go down in history as one of the most heroic of all time. The de-
fenders, composed of French and native forces, inflicted staggering
losses on the enemy. The French soldiers showed that they have not
lost either the will or the skill to fight even under the most adverse
conditions. It shows that Viet-Nam produces soldiers who have the
qualities to enable them to defend their country.
An epic battle has ended. But great causes have, before now,
to been won out of lost
battles.
This
The Chinese Communists have been supplying the forces of Viet
ing Minh rebels with munitions, trucks, anti-aircraft guns, radar, and
ho
technical equipment and technical advisers. They have, however,
wild
stopped short of open intervention. In this respect, they may have
been deterred by the warnings which the United States has given that
to
such intervention would lead to grave consequences which might
10- not be confined to Indochina.3
second course of trying to develop strength in Southeast Asia through
Back in 1951, I negotiated treaties with the Philippines, Australia,
and New Zealand. These recognized that this area was one of vital
, 2
aprehensive system of collective security in the area.
ted
See the French-United States communiqué issued Sept. 30, 1953; supra,
See the quadripartite Berlin conference communiqué of Feb. 18, 1954; supra,
::
135 COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
re-
nch collective measures.
2.1,
Den
}
ce
ces
doc. 26.
eigt
doc
3
mo
2388
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
E
t
8
0
8
ir
m
This we have constantly sought. However, it has proved difficult
to achieve this result. There were differences of race and culture and
differences in the development of national self-government. The
countries which had won or were winning their independence from
Western colonialism and Japanese imperialism were often more con-
cerned with past dangers from which they were extricating themselves
than with the threat of new peril. The memories of the past blinded
them to the present perils of Communist imperialism. They were not
disposed to make the sacrifices inherent in any collective security
system.
However, this situation began to change and by the spring of this
year it seemed that there could be a broader program of collective
defense.
On March 29, 1954, after consultations with Congressional leaders of
both parties, and after having advised our principal allies, I stated
:
1,"The imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Comi
munist Russia and its Chinese Communist álly, by whatever means
would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United
States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted but
should be met by united action.”'i
This declaration was nothing new, although the circumstances of
the moment gave the words a new significance.
President Ểisenhower speaking almost a year earlier, in his address
of April 16, 1953, had said that "aggression in Korea and in Southeast
Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united
action." 2
C
After having explained our purposes to the American people
, wo
promptly conferred with the representatives of nine free nations having
hu
immediate interest in the area, namely, Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodi,
Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, France, and
to
the United Kingdom. We informed others whose interests could be
affected.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and of France asked me
to visit their capitals to develop further our concept. After com
ferences at London on April 12 and 13 with Sir Winston Churchill and
N
Mr. Eden, we issued a joint U.S.-U.K. communiqué 3 which, after
reciting the danger to the entire area of Southeast Asia and the West-
ern Pacific caused by Communist warfare in Indochina, concluded
:
U
"Accordingly we are ready to take part, with the other countries
principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establish:) **
ing a collective defense, within the framework of the Charter of the
ti
United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom
of Southeast
Asia and the Western Pacific."
A similar agreement was reached in Paris with Prime Minister
C
Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault.
h
The progress thus made was that which the United States had
t.
8
01
TV
P
4
0
S
0
1 Supra, doc. 28.
2 Supra, pp. 65–71.
3 Communiqué of Apr. 13, 1954; supra, pp. 1704–1705.
4 Statement of Apr. 14, 1954; supra, doc. 29.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2389
participate with its armed forces.
Conference. The French have stated their desire for an armistice on
of Viet-Nam, this would be a real contribution to the cause of peace in
Southeast Asia. But we would be gravely concerned if an armistice
Communist takeover and further aggression. If this occurs, or if
sought. We had never sought any sudden spectacular act such as an
ind ultimatum to Red China. Our goal was to develop a basic unity of
The constructive purpose. We advanced toward that goal. I feel con-
omfident that unity of purpose persists, and that such a tragic event as
on the fall of Dien-Bien-Phu will harden, not weaken, our purpose to stay
Fes united.
led
The United States and other countries immediately concerned are
not giving careful consideration to the establishment of a collective de-
ity fense. Conversations are taking place among them. We must agree
as to who will take part in the united defense effort, and what their
this commitments will be.
ive
It must be recognized that difficulties have been encountered, but
this was expected. The complexity of the problem is great. As I
of have pointed out, the complications were such that it was
not possible
ed even to get started until recent months. Under all the circumstances,
- I believe that good progress is being made. I feel confident that the
uns outcome will be such that Communist aggression will not be able to
ted
gain in Southeast Asia the results it seeks.
but
This may involve serious commitments by us all. But free peoples
will never remain free unless they are willing to fight for their vital
1 of interests. Furthermore, vital interests can no longer be protected
merely by local defense. The key to successful defense and to the
18 deterring of attack is association for mutual defense. That is what
488t the United States seeks in Southeast Asia.
ted
CURRENT HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM
The question remains as to what we should do about the current
dia,
hostilities in Viet-Nam.
and
In Korea we showed that we were prepared under proper conditions
to resort to military action, if necessary, to protect our vital interests
and the principles upon which stable peace must rest.
In Korea, we, along with others, joined in the defense of an inde-
pendent government, which was already resisting an armed assault.
and We did so at the request of the Republic of Korea and under
a United
Eter Nations mandate. The Korean people were inspired by a deep sense
of patriotism
and eager to develop a power of their own. The issues
were clarified before the world by decisions of the United Nations.
Under these circumstances, we and our allies fought until the enemy
the In Indochina, the situation is far more complex. The present condi-
tions there do not provide a suitable basis for the United States to
The situation may perhaps be clarified as a result of the Genova
a settlement on terms which do not endanger the freedom of the peoples
of cease-fire were reached at Geneva which would provide a road to a
wa
ring
be
me
0D
est-
ed:
ries
ish-
sized for an armistice.
past
ster
nad
2390
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
?
S
hostilities continue, then the need will be even more urgent to create the
conditions for united action in defense of the area.
In making commitments which might involve the use of armed force
.
the Congress is a full partner. Only the Congress can declare war.
President Eisenhower has repeatedly emphasized that he would not
take military action in Indochina without the support of Congress
Furthermore, he has made clear that he would not seek that unless, in
his opinion, there would be an adequate collective effort based on gen-
uine mutuality of purpose in defending vital interests.
A great effort is being made by Communist propaganda to portra
it as something evil if Asia joins with the nations of the Americas and
Europe to get assistance which will help the peoples of Asia to secure
their liberty. These Communist nations have, in this connection
,
adopted the slogan "Asia for the Asians.”
The Japanese
war lords adopted a similar slogan when they sought to
subject Asia to their despotic rule. The similar theme of "Europe for
the Europeans” was adopted by Mr. Molotov at the Berlin Conference
when he proposed that the Europeans should seek security by arrange-
ments which would send the United States back home.
Great despotic powers have always known that they could impose
their will and gain their conquests if the free nations stand apart and
none helps the other.
It should be observed that the Soviet Communist aggression in
Europe took place only against countries which had no collective
security arrangements. Since the organization of the North Atlantic
Treaty, there has been no successful aggression in Europe.
Of course, it is of the utmost importance that the United States
participation in creating collective security in Asia should be on a
basis which recognizes fully the aspirations and cultures of the Asian
peoples. We have a material and industrial strength which they lack
and which is an essential ingredient of security. Also they have
cultural and spiritual values of their own which make them our
by every moral standard.
The United States, as the first colony of modern history to win inde
pendence for itself, instinctively shares the aspirations for liberty of al
dependent and colonial peoples. We want to help, not hinder, the
spread of liberty.
We do not seek to perpetuate Western colonialism and we find even
more intolerable the new imperialist colonialism of communism.
That is the spirit that animates us.
If we remain true to that spirit
,
we can face the future with confidence that we shall be in harmont
with those moral forces which ultimately prevail.
(
8.
8
equals
Я
}
t
1
1 At his press conference on Mar. 10, 1954, President Eisenhower said: “There
is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result of the com
stitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it" (New York
Times, Mar. 11, 1954).
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2391
1
ar.
lot
# = $
1rd
200
OS
Resolution of June 1948,4 which laid down basic conditions under which
1 Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1954, pp. 862-864.
Supra, pp. 65–71.
the 32. CONDITIONS FOR UNITED STATES DIRECT INTERVEN-
TION IN INDOCHINA: Transcript of a News Conference of the
Ce Secretary of State, May 25, 1954 (Excerpt)
At his news conference on May 25, a correspondent recalled to Secretary
Dulles his report to the Nation following his return from Geneva 2 in
in which he set forth the conditions under which the United States inter-
uned in Korea. Mr. Dulles was asked to relate those conditions to the
Indochina situation. Mr. Dulles made the following reply:
27
nd I pointed out, I think, the existence of certain conditions in the case
of Korea, and I went on to say that the situation in Indochina was
different and more complex.
0D
I think that broadly speaking the attitude of the United States
ito toward this situation has been made clear by statements which the
for
President has made and which I have made. I think it is fair to say
that the United States attitude in this matter has been one of the few
stable aspects in an otherwise changing and fluid situation.
ge
The position of the United States toward collective security in
Southeast Asia has been known basically for quite a long while. In
und fact
, it really goes back to the time when I went out to the Far East
in, I think, January of 1951 on a mission to try to create a collective
in security pact in that area. That effort failed at that time in the sense
ive that we were not able to put together a collective security arrangement
tic of any large proportions, and we ended with a series of separate pacts
one with Japan, one with Australia and New Zealand, and another
tes with the Philippines. But there was not a regional security pact
created at that time.
Then I think I pointed out that, in his great address of April 16
ack
of last year, President Eisenhower 'made a statement which did not
attract at the time the attention it deserved perhaps because of other
als aspects of his speech where he referred to Korea and Southeast Asia
and said there should be united action for the defense of Southeast
.
all
I repeated that statement in my March 29 speech after having
the previously discussed it with congressional leaders and with our
principal allies.
The general conditions under which the United States is prepared to
participate in collective defense there or elsewhere, for that matter,
mit are quite well known. We are willing to participate in collective de-
fense basically upon the terms that are laid down by the Vandenberg
the United States would be prepared to participate on the basis of
mutuality and in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.
We are not prepared to go in for a defense of colonialism. We are
See Secretary Dulles' address of May 7, 1954; supra.
18
1ab
are
Jan
Only
era
300-
ork
Policy, p. 197.
2392
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2 See the agreement initialed at Paris, June 4, 1954; Documents on American
only going to go in for defense of liberty and independence and
freedom.
We don't go in alone; we go in where the other nations which have
an important stake in the area recognize the peril as we do.
We go in where the United Nations gives moral sanction to our
action,
All of those conditions are known. They have been known. They
are a basic part of American foreign policy, and they are, as the
President said in one of his press conferences, a "stable” element in the
situation.
Mr. Dulles was then asked what was initiated by this Government in
the period between March or April of 1953 and May of this year to bring
about a Southeast Asian pact. He replied:
We did have conversations, particularly with the French and the
representatives of the Associated States who under conditions then
existing were apt to form the core of any defensive action in that
area."
A correspondent recalled that one of the conditions laid down by
Mr. Dulles in his speech of May n was to give independence to the
Associated States. The correspondent said that France and Viet-Name
had initialed proposed treaties of independence and association. H
asked Mr. Dulles how far those treaties go toward meeting this point
.
Mr. Dulles made the following reply:
I think what France is doing will, from what you might call a
juridical standpoint, be a very large step in fulfillment of their pledge
of July 3 of last year of complete independence to the Associated States
.
The main difficulty, I would say, at the present moment is not so much
juridical as it is the translation of legal documents into a sense on the
part of the peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia that they really
have an independence for which it is worthwhile for them to fight
and, if need be, to die.
It takes time to translate papers that are signed in Paris into the
living spirit; and it also takes time to overcome a certain
feeling on the
part of many of the Asian nations that France is not really sincere in
its promises. I believe the French are going a long way
path—perhaps from a legal standpoint as far as it is either wise or
necessary to go at the present time. But it is one thing to have the
letter and another thing to have the spirit, and I would say at the
moment the principal
deficiency is a translation of the spirit of liberty
into the area and in the conduct of the French people in relation to the
native peoples. There is quite a bit to be done, I think, in that prac-
tical respect.
A reporter cited as one of the general conditions for participation
place where the United Nations gives moral sanction. He asked if the
1 See supra, docs. 26 and 29.
Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 270-272.
1
down that
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2393
3 Address of Apr. 16, 1953; supra, pp. 65–71.
ave
Our
姆
​the support it.
However, on July 3, 1953, the French Government made a public
June 28, 1954, p. 974.
2 Delivered before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles; ibid.,
and United States had any plans for seeking that kind of sanction from the
United Nations. Mr. Dulles answered:
There have been discussions off and on, I am sorry to say more off
than on, over the past year or more with reference to bringing the
United Nations into this situation. At the moment the prospects look
somewhat better than they have recently, but in the past we have been
close to the United Nations action without its being actually
the
very
takon. So I don't want to forecast at the present time.
the
Asked if we would support any appeal to the United Nations for a peace
129
mission or observation mission to be sent into the Southeast Asian area,
he replied:
" ang
I believe if such an appeal were made, the United States would
hen
Mr. Dulles was asked if the United States had before it any request from
the French Government for intervention in Indochina. He replied:
No, the French Government has made no such request of the
United States. They have had some conversations to explore the
conditions under which that might be possible, and in that respect the
French have been told much the same thing that has been publicly said
by the President and me as to the conditions, which as I say have been
stable and unchanging over a considerable period of time, under which
such intervention would be considered possible. Of course, let me
I & make clear that one of the conditions which we have always stood on is
edge that there must be congressional sanction to any such action.
tes
33. THE THREAT OF DIRECT CHINESE COMMUNIST
INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA: Address by the Secretary
of State, June 11, 1954 (Excerpt)
At the moment, Indochina is the area where international com-
het munism most vigorously seeks expansion under the leadership of Ho
Chi-Minh. Last year President Eisenhower,
in his great "Chance for
the Peace” address," said that “aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia
the
are threats to the whole free community to be met
by united action.”
But the French
were then opposed to what they called "international-
the izing”
the war. They
preferred to treat it as a civil war of rebellion.
Cf. Secretary Dulles' statement of June 18, 1954, regarding the Soviet veto
城​伽​孤城
​山姆​奶娘​叫​她​她​,
ght
the
A II
m
erty
no
pp. 971-973.
icon
2394
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
m
S11
W.
CC
8
W
SI
6 See the Anglo-American statement of Apr. 13, 1954 (supra, pp. 1704–1705);
declaration of independence for the three Associated States,' and in
September it adopted the so-called Navarre plan, which contemplated
a rapid buildup of national native forces. The United States then
agreed to underwrite the costs of this plan.3
But last winter the fighting was intensified and the long strain co
began to tell in terms of the attitude of the French people toward a
war then in its eighth year. Last March, after the siege of Dien-
Bien-Phu had begun, I renewed President Eisenhower's proposal that
we seek conditions which would permit a united defense for the area. C
I went to Europe on this mission, and it seemed that there was agree St
ment on our proposal.5 But when we moved to translate that pro-
posal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had
concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the th
results of the Geneva Conference.
Meanwhile, the burdens of a collective defense in Indoching have a
mounted. The Communists have practiced dilatory negotiating at el
Geneva, while intensifying their fighting in Indochina. The French
and national forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their
front and of political uncertainty at their rear. I told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee last week that the situation is grave but
by no means hopeless. The future depends largely on decisions
awaited at Paris, London, and Geneva.
6
The situation in Indochina is not that of open military aggression by
the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem is
one of restoring tranquillity in an area where disturbances are fomented P
from Communist
China, but where there is no open invasion by Com-
munist China. This task of pacification, in our opinion, cannot be
successfully met merely by unilateral armed intervention. Some
other conditions need to be established. Throughout these Indo-s
china developments, the United States has held to a stable and con-
sistent course and has made clear the conditions which, in its opinion
,
might justify intervention. These conditions were and are (1) an
of
invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance
complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3)
evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collec
tive effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance
that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.
Only if these conditions were realized could the President and the
Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the
sacrifices incident
to committing our Nation, with others, to using
force to help to restore peace in the area.
For the text of the French declaration, see Documents on American Foreign
Relations, 1959 (New York, 1954), pp. 347–348.
2 So named for Gen. Henri Eugène Navarre, French military commander in
Indochina.
3 See Franco-American communiqué of Sept. 30, 1953; supra, doc. 26.
4 See Secretary Dulles' address of Mar. 29, 1954; supra, doc. 28.
and the Franco-American statement of Apr. 14, 1954 (supra, doc. 29).
• Statement of June 4, 1954; Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1934
pp. 924-925.
T
C
8
8
D
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2395
2 Armistice of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724-750.
3 Statement of Apr. 28, 1954; infra, pp. 2685-2692.
len-
ONS
10 Another problem might, however, arise. If the Chinese Com-
ited munist regime were to show in Indochina or elsewhere that it is
hen determined to pursue the path of overt military aggression, then the
situation would be different and another issue would emerge. That
pain contingency has already been referred to publicly by the President and
do myself
. The President, in his April 16, 1953, address, and I myself,
in an address of September 2, 1953,1 made clear that the United
hat States would take a grave view of any future overt military Chinese
est Communist aggression in relation to the Pacific or Southeast Asia area.
Peso Such an aggression would threaten island and peninsular positions
010 which secure the United States and its allies.
hed
If such overt military aggression occurred, that would be a deliberate
the threat to the United States itself. The United States would of
course invoke the processes of the United Nations and consult with its
are allies. But we could not escape ultimate responsibility for decisions
* closely touching our own security and self-defense.
nch
There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume that the
leir attitude of the United States flows from a desire for a general war
ate with Communist China. That is clearly false. If we had wanted
but such a war, it could easily have been based on the presence of Chinese
aggressors in Korea. But last July, in spite of difficulties which at
times seemed insuperable, we concluded a Korean armistice with
by Communist China. How could it be more surely demonstrated that
we have both the will to make peace and the competence to make
Your Government wants peace, and the American people want
be
peace. But should there ever be openly launched an attack that the
American people would clearly recognize as a threat to our own
do-security, then the right of self-preservation would demand that we
on- regardless of any other country-meet the issue squarely.
It is the task of statesmanship to seek peace and deter war, while
at the same time preserving vital national interests. Under present
of conditions that dual result is not easy to achieve, and it cannot be
3 achieved at all unless your Government is backed by a people who are
Co willing, if need be, to sacrifice to preserve their vital interests.
At the Geneva Conference I said: "Peace is always easy to achieve-
by surrender.": Your Government does not propose to buy peace
che
at that price. We do not believe that the American people want peace
best that price. So long as that is our national
will, and so long as that
ng will is backed by a capacity
for effective action, our Nation can face
the future with that calm confidence which is the due of those
who, in
a troubled world, hold fast that which is good.
Egn
IS
ted peace?
om-
me
on,
ace
in
1
Supra, doc. 25.
5):
54
2396
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
WI
CAS
could help France, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia find acceptable
the United States must adhere if it is to be true to itself, and if the
2 Ibid., p. 123; see also statement of July 12, 1954, by Secretary Dulles (ibid.),
34. INCREASED MILITARY AID TO THAILAND: Statement
Released by the Department of Defense, July 13, 1954 Vi
The Department of Defense on July 13 announced a new progran po
of increased military aid and technical assistance to the Government be
of Thailand.
As a result of staff talks recently concluded between Department
of Defense officials and a Thai military mission headed by Gen. Sridi
Dhanarajata, Deputy Defense Minister and Commander in Chief di
the Royal Thai Army, a new and additional military-assistance pro-
Br
gram has been approved for the Thais so as to increase the capability
UL
of the Thai armed forces to resist aggression.
th
Additional emphasis will also be placed on the accelerated develop-
ment of junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and technical per:
sonnel, the announcement stated. The program calls for additional ca
support for Thai training activities, including the provision of weapon,
equipment, and technical and training assistance in their use.
In addition to the military-aid grant, the Department of Defense
36
also announced that approximately $3 million was being made avai
able to the Thai Government for the construction of a highway from
Saraburi, in Central Thailand, through Korat to Ban Phai, a distance
of 297 miles.
While this highway will be of strategic value in case of military to
operations in Thailand, its value to the economy of the country will be
considerable, the announcement stated.
The program will be administered in Thailand by a Joint U.S
b
Military Aid Group headed by Maj. Gen. W. N. Gillmore, U. S. Army.
35. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH PREMIER AND THE
bi
BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY: Statement by the Secretary d
th
State, July 15, 1954 %
CO
ha
I return from consultations at Paris with the new French Prims
Minister and Foreign Minister, M. Pierre Mendès-France
. These
th
talks were also participated in by Anthony Eden, the British Foreign lo
Secretary.
These talks have brought about an understanding concerning Indo N
china much more complete than has heretofore existed. It enabled us
to demonstrate anew the solidarity of the Western powers in the face
of Communist hostility and intrigue.
The United States has been concerned to find a way whereby i th
of ,
mi
ng
81
SE
PE
Se
W
MI
ei
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2397
1 General Smith left for Geneva on July 16. (Note in Bulletin]
* Cease-fire agreements of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 750-785.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 163.
Statement of July 21, 1954, by Under Secretary Smith; supra, pp. 787-789.
nent
1
ment captive and endangered peoples of the world are to feel that the
United States really believes in liberty.
I had the opportunity in Paris fully to explain the United States
gram position in this respect to M. Mendès-France, whom I had known
nent before but whom I had not met since he assumed his new offices.
The conclusion was that we would ask the Under Secretary of State,
Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, to return to Geneva at an early date to
rikli renew his participation in the Indochina phase of the Conference.
ed But this is on the understanding, to which both the French and
p10-
British Ministers expressly agreed, that renewed participation by the
lit United States at the ministerial level will be without departing from
the U.S. principles which I had described.
I believe that we have found a formula for constructive allied unity
per-
which will have a beneficial effect on the Geneva Conference. And it
onal carries no danger that the United States will abandon its principles.
1018
,
ense
pail
.
irom
ance
36. THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS IN INDOCHINA: Statement
by the President, July 21, 1954 2
y of
I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reached at Geneva
tary
to stop the bloodshed in Indochina.3
II be The United States has not been a belligerent in the war. The pri-
mary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those
1.8. nations which participated in the fighting. Our role at Geneva has
my. been at all times to try to be helpful where desired and to aid France
and Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to obtain a just and honorable
settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested
people. Accordingly, the United States has not itself been party to
"HE or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our
hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with
the rights and the needs of the countries concerned. The agreement
contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on
The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect
that it is not prepared to join in the Conference declaration, but, as
** loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance
ada
with the obligations and principles contained in article 2 of the United
dus
Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the
settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist
aggression
would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.
As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play
part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful com-
munity of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the Gov-
ernments of Cambodia 'and Laos to our appointment of an Ambassador
how they work in practice.
ime
Beso
face
their
git
able
nich
the
d.).
2398
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 16, 1954, p. 241; see also statement of
or Minister to be resident at their respective capitals (Phnom Penh
and Vientiane). We already have a Chief of Mission at Saïgon, the
capital of Viet-Nam, and this Embassy will, of course, be maintained
.
The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free
nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in
Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Com-
munist aggression in that general area.
Aid for Indochina Following the Geneva Conference,
1954-1955
37. ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES FROM NORTH VIET-NAM:
Note From the American Embassy at Saïgon to the Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry, August 8, 1954 1
On August 6 the U.S. Government received from the Government of
Viet-Nam a request that the United States provide assistance in moning
over 100,000 refugees from North Viet-Nam, the area which is being
turned over to the Viet Minh, to South Viet-Nam areas under control of
the anti-Communist government of Viet-Nam. The United States on
August 8 replied as follows [Note in Department of State Bulletin):
The United States Government desires to extend to the Government
of Viet-Nam all reasonable assistance to evacuate from areas defined in
the cease-fire agreement its nationals who understandably are unwil
ing to face the grim certainties of life under the Communists
. The
United States is well aware that mere removal does not solve the
problem for such people or for the Government of Viet-Nam. The
United States is also prepared to provide as far as possible materia
help needed to enable refugees from Viet Minh domination to resume
existence under their chosen government with maximum opportuniti
to add to the strength of that government through their own efforts
The American Embassy will continue close cooperation with the
Government of Viet-Nam to ensure that United States assistance is
made effective in meeting the needs of the Government of Viet-Nam
and its people. The United States will expect the maximum coopera
tion of the Government of Viet-Nam
in working to this mutual eod.
23, 1954, pp. 265–266) and White House
statement of Aug. 22, 1954 (infra)
.
f
.
1
1
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2399
她
​OM
lese
end / Sabin and are already loading refugees at Haiphong. Several thou-
Mekong River Delta and the high lands of South Viet-Nam there is
steads and work out new lives in freedom.
? See American note of Aug. 8, 1954; supra.
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 6, 1954, pp. 336–337.
enh 38. EVACUATION OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH VIET-NAM:
the Statement Released by the White House, August 22, 1954 1
ded.
free
The cease-fire agreement which terminated hostilities in Viet-Nam
te in provided that persons on either side of the dividing line, which is
roughly at the 17th parallel of latitude, would be free to move to
places of their own choice. Very soon all of North Viet-Nam, which
includes the Delta of the Red River otherwise known as Tonkin, will
be handed over provisionally to the Viet Minh Government of Ho
Chi Minh.
Thousands of refugees of Tonkin, fearful of being placed under the
Ice
, Communist yoke, are moving outward to Free Viet-Nam. The
French Government has offered transport to these evacuees, and both
the French Navy and Air Force are doing what they can to carry
out this movement.
IM:
The French Air Force is presently lifting approximately 3,400
evacuees a day from airfields at Hanoï and Haiphong to the Saigon
area. Likewise the French Navy is carrying refugees and at the same
time transporting French expeditionary forces to Saïgon.
it of
However, the number of refugees has so increased that both the
French authorities and Vietnamese Government have asked additional
ving
eing
assistance of the United States in transporting these Vietnamese
ol of
citizens who prefer to give up their homes in order to remain free.
The United States promptly agreed to their request.? The French
1
and Vietnamese authorities retain complete responsibility for the
care of Vietnamese citizens who choose to leave the Delta area.
The
nent United States is providing ships to help transport refugees and, in
din addition, is furnishing some tentage and other supplies to better
will enable the French and Vietnamese officials ashore to take care of the
The refugees.
the It is estimated that at least 200,000 civilian refugees must be moved
The from Hanoï or Haiphong before September 10.
The Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Felix Stump, has in-
rum structed the Fifth Amphibious Group of the Western Pacific Fleet
nity to assist in the transportation from Haiphong to points in South and
orts Central Viet-Nam a total of between 80,000 and 100,000 refugees.
the
The majority of refugees will probably be moved by LST's. In
ei order to help expedite this movement, however, transport vessels
Nam and commercial freighters of the Military Sea 'Transport Service
here were dispatched earlier under the command of Rear Admiral Lorenzo
t bi Fortunately, Free Viet-Nam is a country with ample land resources
for the resettlement of almost any number of Vietnamese who desire
to flee from Communist domination. In the rich rice lands of the
$ 01
erial
.
Aug.
1
2400
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
11
1
1t
1
1
The United States was represented by Acting Secretary Smith and France br
1 Issued at Washington; Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 534.
Guy LaChambre, Minister of State for Relations with the Three Associated
The United States will continue to assist the Vietnamese Govern-
ment, headed by Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, in their
humanitarian endeavor to bring the Vietnamese to Free Viet-Nam,
It is noteworthy that, although Vietnamese from Tonkin are clamor-
ing to leave the area, soon to be under Communist rule, no Viet
Minh adherents from Free Viet-Nam have clamored to be transported
north to settle in that area under the Government of Ho Chi Minh,
39. DIRECT AID TO THE ASSOCIATED STATES: Communiqué
Regarding Franco-American Conversations, September 29, 1954
Representatives of the two Governments have had very frank and
useful talks which have shown the community of their views, and are
in full agreement on the objectives to be attained.
The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in
Manila on September 8, 1954, has provided a firmer basis than here-
tofore to assist the free nations of Asia in developing and maintaining
their independence and security. The representatives of France end
the United States wish to reaffirm the support of their Governments
for the principles of self-government, independence, justice and liberty
proclaimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 1954
The representatives of France and the United States reaffirm the
intention of their governments to support the complete independence
of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Both France and the United
States will continue to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in their
efforts to safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance
the welfare of their peoples. In this spirit France and the United
States are assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the resettlement
of the Vietnamese who have of their own free will moved to free
Viet-Nam and who already number some 300,000.
In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the further
development of national forces for this purpose, the representatives
of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of is
Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned
,
within the limits permitted under the Geneva agreements and to an
extent to be determined. The United States will consider the question
of financial assistance for the Expeditionary Corps in these
circum
stances in addition to support for the forces of each of the three
Associated States. These questions vitally affect each of the thre
Associated States and are being fully discussed with them.
The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary
support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be
direct to that state. The United States representatives will begin
States, and Edgar Faure, Finance Minister.
2 Supra, pp. 912–916.
3 Supra, pp. 916-917.
1
1
:
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2401
10r-
1
are
y in
ere-
ents
2 Ibid., Nov. 15, 1954, pp. 735-736. ..
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 25, 1954, p. 615.
rn- discussions soon with the respective governments of the Associated
leir States regarding direct aid. The methods for efficient coordination
im.
of French and United States aid programs to each of the three Associ-
eted States are under consideration and will be developed in discussions
liet with each of these states.
ted After the bilateral talks, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Wash-
inhington of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam were invited to a final
meeting to have an exchange of views and information on these mat-
ters. The representatives of all five countries are in complete
qué
agreement on the objectives of peace and freedom to be achieved in
Indochina.
and 40. AID TO CAMBODIA: Message From the President of the
United States to the King of Cambodia, October 2, 1954 1
YouR MAJESTY: The people of the United States have watched
with concern and admiration the struggle of Cambodia against un-
Ang warranted Communist aggression. The United States is happy that
and Cambodia has reaffirmed its independence and that your Kingdom is
in a position now to undertake a course which will secure that sovereign
erty freedom for which your people fought.
154.
At this time when Cambodia has so convincingly demonstrated its
the
independence and its stern determination to maintain that inde-
ne pendence, I desire Your Majesty to know that my Government will
ited be pleased to consider ways in which our two countries can more
effectively cooperate in the joint task of stemming the tbreats facing
your territories and maintaining peace and prosperity in your
With assurances of my personal esteem and high regard,
free
41. AID TO THE STATE OF VIET-NAM: Message From the
President of the United States to the President of the Council of
Ministers of Viet-Nam, October 23, 1954 2
Dear Mr. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest
the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the con-
clusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agree-
ment concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the
future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military group-
ng weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies
Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of
the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens
away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political
48
ance
cited Kingdom.
nent
ther
Cites
f its
ned
7 AD
tion
CUDI-
hree
hree
tart
77 be
egin
534
br
iated
415900_-57-Vol. 248
2402
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
.
{
ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the
United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.
We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to
Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to
the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am,
accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to
examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an
intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Govern-
ment can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial
, pro-
vided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the
standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event
such aid were supplied.
The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam
in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resist-
ing attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The
Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by
performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in under-
taking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your
own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independ-
ent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a govern-
ment would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of
its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance,
that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage ang
who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people
,
42. MISSION OF THE SPECIAL UNITED STATES REPRE-
SENTATIVE IN VIET-NAM:1 Statement Issued by the White
House, November 3, 1954 2
The President on November 3 designated Gen. J. Lawton Collins
as Special United States Representative in Viet-Nam with the per-
sonal rank of Ambassador, to undertake a diplomatic mission of
limited duration. He will coordinate the operations of all U.S.
agencies in that country.
General Collins will proceed immediately to Saïgon, where he wil
confer with Ambassador Donald R. Heath prior to the latter's already
scheduled return to the United States for reassignment following !
years of distinguished service in Indochina. For the duration of this
assignment General Collins will relinquish his other duties, including
that of U.S. representative on the Military Committee of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Since the conclusion of hostilities in Indochina, the U. S. Govern
ment has been particularly concerned over developments in Viet-Nam
,
zones, and confronted by dangerous forces threatening its
independ-
a country ravaged by 8 years of war, artificially divided into armistice
ence and security.
i Gen, J. Lawton Collins.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 22, 1954, pp. 777–778.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2403
. 2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 10, 1955, pp. 51-52.
Letter of Oct. 23, 1954; supra, doc. 41.
le
0
0
1,
0
D
lo
The U. S. Government is fully aware of the immense tasks facing
the Government of Viet-Nam in its effort to achieve solidarity, internal
security, and economic rehabilitation. The United States has already
played an important role in the evacuation of hundreds of thousands
of refugees from Communist rule in North Viet-Nam.
Moreover, as the President told Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem
in his letter of October 23d, U.S. representatives in Viet-Nam have
been instructed to consider with the Vietnamese authorities how a
program of American aid given directly to Viet-Nam can best assist
that country. General Collins will explore this matter with Prime
Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and his Government in order to help them
resolve their present critical problems and to supplement measures
adopted by the Vietnamese themselves.
In executing his temporary mission, General Collins will maintain
close liaison with the French Commissioner General, Gen. Paul Ely,
for the purpose of exchanging views on how best, under existing cir-
cumstances, the freedom and welfare of Viet-Nam can be safeguarded.
).
le
it
ta
le
}
r
Ir
f
43. DIRECT AID TO VIET-NAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS:
Statement by the Department of State, December 31, 1954 ?
"
}
Arrangements have been completed so that on January 1, 1955,
the United States can begin supplying financial aid directly to the
Governments of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos for the purpose of
strengthening their defense against the threat of Communist sub-
version and aggression. This direct aid reaffirms the independent
status these Governments now possess, and is in addition to the eco-
nomic aid that has been given directly to these three states by the
United States since 1950. The aid will be given pursuant to section
121
' of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which provides for "the
as far as possible, of direct assistance to the Associated
States of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.
The provision
of U.S. aid directly to these Governments was confirmed by the
communiqué issued at Washington on September 29 of this year,
following talks between representatives of the United States, France,
the Chiefs of Mission of the three Associated States and by
letters from President Eisenhower to the King of Cambodia 5 and to
President Diem of Viet-Nam.°
furnishing,
>) 3
1 Supra.
3 Infra, p. 3111.
* Supra doc. 39.
* Letter of Oct. 2, 1954, supra, doc. 40,
2404
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
44. UNIFICATION OF VIET-NAM THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS:
Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, June 28
,
1955 1
At his news conference on June 28, Secretary Dulles was asked the
position of the United States with respect to elections in Viet-Nam. The
Secretary replied:
Neither the United States Government nor the Government of
Viet-Nam is, of course, a party to the Geneva armistice agreements.?
We did not sign them, and the Government of Viet-Nam did not sign
them and, indeed, protested against them. On the other hand, the
United States believes, broadly speaking, in the unification of countries
which have a historic unity, where the people are akin. We also
believe that, if there are conditions of really free elections, there is no
serious risk that the Communists would win.
The Communists have never yet won any free election. I don't
think they ever will. Therefore, we are not afraid at all of elections
,
provided they are held under conditions of genuine freedom which the
Geneva armistice agreement calls for. If those conditions can be
provided we would be in favor of elections, because we believe that
they would bring about the unification of the country under free
government auspices.
45. RECOGNITION OF THE NEW CHIEF OF STATE OF VIET-
NAM: Statement by the Department of State, October 26, 1955 8
1
1
On October 26, the Government of Viet-Nam sent the following
communication to the American Embassy at Saïgon:
"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the United
States Embassy that by referendum October 23 the Vietnamese
people have pronounced themselves in favor of the deposition of Bao
Dai and have recognized President Diem as Chief of State. It is
hoped that the Government of the United States will continue as in
the past to entertain diplomatic relations with the new Government
of the State of Viet-Nam."
U.S. Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt, under instructions, bas
replied as follows:
"The Government of the United States looks forward to main-
taining with the new Government of Viet-Nam the same cordial and
friendly relations which have in the past so happily existed between
the two governments."
The United States affirms its intention to maintain friendly rela
tions with the Government of Viet-Nam. We are glad to see the
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 11, 1955, p. 50.
2 Agreements of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 750–788.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 760.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2405
United States of Sept, 8, 1951, see supra, pp. 425-440 and 885–886. By an
:
f
}
1
1
}
}
)
)
1
statement of Feb. 25, 1950, by the Department of State.
Foreign Policy, pp. 60-62.
evolution of orderly and effective democratic processes in an area of
Southeast Asia which has been and continues to be threatened by
Communist efforts to impose totalitarian control.
D. JAPAN
Transition From Allied Occupation to Mutual Security
Arrangements, 1950-1952
46. PARTICIPATION OF JAPAN IN TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS
AND CONFERENCES: Interim Directive to the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers, Japan, February 21, 1950 2
The following interim directive, serial 110, regarding Japanese
participation in technical agreements and conferences, prepared by
the Department of State, received from the Department of the Army,
is transmitted for your guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 3,
of the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission:
"1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, subject to his
discretion and continued control, should permit Japan to participate
with other nations or groups of nations in such international agree-
ments
, conventions, and conferences of a technical character as Japan
may be invited to enter into, accede to, or attend and as the Supreme
Commander shall consider to be in the interest of the occupation.
"2. Before leaving Japan, Japanese representatives appointed in
accordance with the provisions of this policy decision, should be
instructed to refrain from engaging in propaganda or subversive
.
"3. The Supreme Commander should direct the Japanese Govern-
ment to fulfill any obligations which it assumes in accordance with
the provisions of this policy.
“4. The Supreme Commander should inform the Far Eastern
Commission of any action taken in accordance with the provisions of
or texts of the Japanese peace treaty and the security treaty with the
that "if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United
Nations are engaged in anyces
nited Nations action in the Far East after
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 13, 1950, p. 414; printed as a part of a
activities of any kind
1
T
this policy."
.
under article XVIII (TIAS 2783; 4 UST 355); agreements of Apr. 6, 1954 (TIAS
2963; 5 UST 742) and Aug. 19, 1955 (TIAS 3494; 7 UST 193) regarding the
2406 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the
support in or about Japan, by the Member or Members of the forces en
gaged in such United Nations action, the expenses involved in the use of
Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at present or as otherwise
mutually agreed between Japan and the United Nations Member con-
cerned (TIAS 2490; 3 UST, pt. 3, pp. 3326-3328). See also the agreement
signed at Tokyo, Feb. 19, 1954, regularizing the status of United Nations
forces in Japan (TIAS 2995; 5 UST, pt. 2, pp. 1123-1257).]
47. ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE SECURITY
TREATY, FEBRUARY 28, 19521
PREAMBLE
Whereas the United States of America and Japan on September 8,
1951, signed a Security Treaty ? which contains provisions for the
disposition of United States land, air and sea forces in and about
Japan;
And whereas Article III of that Treaty states that the conditions
which shall govern the disposition of the armed forces of the United
States in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative
agreements between the two Governments;
And whereas the United States of America and Japan are desirous
of concluding practical administrative arrangements which will give
effect to their respective obligations under the Security Treaty and
will strengthen the close bonds of mutual interest and regard between
their two peoples;
Therefore, the Governments of the United States of America and
of Japan have entered into this Agreement in terms as set forth below:
ARTICLE I
In this Agreement the expression-
(a) "members of the United States armed forces” means the
personnel on active duty belonging to the land, sea or air armed
services of the United States of America when in the territory of
Japan.
(b) “civilian component” means the civilian persons of United
States nationality who are in the employ of, serving with, or de
companying the United States armed forces in Japan, but excludes
persons
who are ordinarily resident in Japan or who are mentioned
in paragraph 1 of Article XIV. For the purposes of this Agree-
1 TIAS 2492; 3 UST, pt. 3, p. 3341. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1952. Se
also agreement of Sept. 29, 1953, amending article XVII (TIAS 2848; 4 UST
pt. 2, p. 1846); agreement of Mar. 23, 1953, regarding the settlement of claims
1953, regarding criminal jurisdiction over U. N. forces' TIAS 2887; 4 UST, pt. 2
p. 2766).
2 Supra, pp. 885–886.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2407
e
€
$
3
t
S
e
territorial waters and airspace adjacent to, or in the vicinities of
facilities and areas for their support, defense and control. In the
thority granted in this Article, there should be, as the occasion re-
ment only, dual nationals, United States and Japanese, who are
brought to Japan by the United States shall be considered as United
States nationals.
(c) "dependents” means
(1) Spouse, and children under 21;
(2) Parents, and children over 21, if dependent for over half
their support upon a member of the United States armed
forces or civilian component.
)
ARTICLE II
I
1. Japan agrees to grant to the United States the use of the facili-
ties and areas necessary to carry out the purposes stated in Article I
of the Security Treaty. Agreements as to specific facilities and areas,
not already reached by the two Governments by the effective date
of this Agreement, shall be concluded by the two Governments through
the Joint Committee provided for in Article XXVI of this Agree-
ment. "Facilities and areas” include existing furnishings, equipment
and fixtures necessary to the operation of such facilities and areas.
2. At the request of either party, the United States and Japan shall
1 review such arrangements and may agree that such facilities and areas
shall be returned to Japan or that additional facilities and areas may
be provided.
3. The facilities and areas used by the United States armed forces
shall be returned to Japan whenever they are no longer needed for
purposes of this Agreement, and the United States agrees to keep the
needs for facilities and areas under continual observation with a view
toward such return.
4. (a) When facilities and areas such as target ranges and maneuver
grounds are temporarily not being used by the United States armed
forces, interim use may be made by Japanese authorities and nationals
provided that it is agreed that such use would not be harmful to the
purposes for which the facilities and areas are normally used by the
United States armed forces.
(b) With respect to such facilities and areas as target ranges
and maneuver grounds which are to be used by United States armed
forces for limited periods
of time, the Joint Committee shall specify
in the agreements covering such facilities and areas the extent to
which the provisions of this Agreement shall apply.
ARTICLE III
1. The United States shall have the rights, power and authority
within the facilities and areas which are necessary or appropriate for
their establishment, use, operation, defense or control. The United
States shall also have such rights, power and authority over land,
exercise outside the facilities and areas of the rights, power and au-
S
e
1
1
2408
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
3. When the vessels mentioned in paragraph 1 enter Japanese ports
the proper Japanese authorities. Such vessels shall have freedom
quires, consultation between the two Governments through the Joint
Committee.
2. The United States agrees that the above-mentioned rights, power
and authority will not be exercised in such a manner as to interfere
unnecessarily with navigation, aviation, communication, or land
travel to or from or within the territories of Japan. All questions
relating to frequencies, power and like matters used by apparatus
employed by the United States designed to emit electric radiation
shall be settled by mutual arrangement. As a temporary measure the
United States armed forces shall be entitled to use, without radiation
interference from Japanese sources, electronic devices of such power,
design, type of emission, and frequencies as are reserved for such
forces at the time this Agreement becomes effective.
3. Operations in the facilities and areas in use by the United States
armed forces shall be carried on with due regard for the public safety.
ARTICLE IV
1. The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and
areas to Japan on the expiration of this Agreement or at an earlier
date, to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they
were at the time they became available to the United States armed
forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration,
2. Japan is not obliged to make any compensation to the United
States for any improvements made in the facilities and areas or for
the buildings or structures left thereon on the expiration of this
Agreement or the earlier return of the facilities and areas.
3. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to any construction
which the United States may undertake under special arrangements
with Japan.
ARTICLE V
1. United States and foreign vessels and aircraft operated by, for,
or under the control of the United States for official purposes shall be
accorded access to any port or airport of Japan free from toll or
landing charges. When cargo or passengers not accorded the exemp-
tions of this Agreement are carried on such vessels and aircraft
notification shall be given to the appropriate Japanese authorities
,
and such cargo or passengers shall be entered according to the laws
and regulations of Japan.
2. The vessels and aircraft mentioned in paragraph 1, United States
Government-owned vehicles including armor, and members of the
United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their de
pendents shall be accorded access to and movement
between facilities
and areas in use by the United
States armed forces and between such
facilities and areas and the ports of Japan.
appropriate notification shall, under normal conditions, be made to
paid for at appropriate rates.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2409
United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their de-
at
er
DS
US
38
LI
PS
er
States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.
Japanese passport and visa laws and regulations. Members of the
ARTICLE VI
1. All civil and military air traffic control and communications sys-
tems sball be developed in close coordination and shall be integrated
Te
id
to the extent necessary for fulfillment of collective security interests,
Procedures, and any subsequent changes thereto, necessary to effect
this coordination and integration will be established by mutual
arrangement.
2. Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed
or established in the facilities and areas in use by United States armed
forces and in territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity
II
be
thereof shall conform to the system in use in Japan. The United
States and Japanese authorities which have established such naviga-
tion aids shall notify each other of their positions and characteristics
and shall give advance notification before making any changes in them
V.
or establishing additional navigation aids.
ARTICLE VII
The United States armed forces shall have the right to use all public
utilities and services belonging to, or controlled or regulated by the
Government of Japan, and to enjoy priorities in such use, under con-
ditions no less favorable than those that may be applicable from time
od
to time to the ministries and agencies of the Government of Japan.
ARTICLE VIII
The Japanese Government undertakes to furnish the United
States armed forces with the following meteorological services under
tes
present procedures, subject to such modifications as may from time to
time be agreed between the two Governments or as
may result from
Japan's becoming a member of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization or the World Meteorological Organization:
(2) Meteorological observations from land and ocean areas in-
cluding observations from weather ships assigned to positions known
as "Xand "T”.
(b) Climatological information including periodic summaries
and the historical data of the Central Meteorological Observatory,
(C) Telecommunications service to disseminate meteorological
information required for the safe and regular operation of air-
(d) Seismographic data including forecasts of the estimated
size of tidal waves resulting from earthquakes and areas that might
ARTICLE IX
1. The United States shall have the right to bring into Japan for
purposes of this Agreement persons who are members of the
United
2. Members of the United States armed forces shall be exempt from
Or
115
OD
I,
De
OM
Jo
US
craft.
LO
$
be affected thereby
5
e
2410
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
!
States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents
2. All materials, supplies and equipment imported by the United
United States armed forces, or by the organizations provided for in /
pendents shall be exempt from Japanese laws and regulations on the
registration and control of aliens, but shall not be considered as acquir
ing any right to permanent residence or domicile in the territories
of Japan.
3. Upon entry into or departure from Japan members of the United
States armed forces shall be in possession of the following documents
:
(a) personal identity card showing name, date of birth, rank and
number, service, and photograph; and
(b) individual or collective travel order certifying to the status
of the individual or group as a member or members of the United
States armed forces and to the travel ordered.
For purposes of their identification while in Japan, members of the
United States armed forces shall be in possession of the foregoing
personal identity card.
4. Members of the civilian component, their dependents, and the
dependents of members of the United States armed forces shall be in
possession of appropriate documentation issued by the United States
authorities so that their status may be verified by Japanese authorities
upon their entry into or departure from Japan, or while in Japan.
5. If the status of any person brought into Japan under paragraph
1 of this Article is altered so that he would no longer be entitled to
such admission, the United States authorities shall notify the Jap-
anese authorities and shall, if such person be required by the Japanese
authorities to leave Japan, assure that transportation from Japan
will be provided within a reasonable time at no cost to the Japanese
Government.
ARTICLE X
1. Japan shall accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, the
driving permit or license or military driving permit issued by the
United States to a member of the United States armed forces
, the
civilian component, and their dependents.
2. Official vehicles of the United States armed forces and the civilian
component shall carry distinctive numbered plates or individual marks
ings which will readily identify them.
3. Privately owned vehicles of members of the United States armed
forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall carry Jap
anese number plates to be acquired under the same conditions as those
applicable to Japanese nationals.
ARTICLE XI
1. Save as provided in this Agreement, members of the United
customs authorities of Japan.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
>
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2411
US
tions, goods imported into Japan free of duty shall not be disposed of
be for the use of the members of the United States armed forces, the
civilian component, and their dependents, and materials, supplies and
iesequipment which are to be used exclusively by the United States armed
forces or are ultimately to be incorporated into articles or facilities
ed used by such forces, shall be permitted entry into Japan; such entry
its shall be free from customs duties and other such charges. Appropri-
ate certification shall be made that such materials, supplies and equip-
ad
ment are being imported by the United States armed forces, the au-
thorized procurement agencies of the United States armed forces, or
by the organizations provided for in Article XV, or, in the case of
materials, supplies and equipment to be used exclusively by the
United States armed forces or ultimately to be incorporated into
he articles or facilities used by such forces, that delivery thereof is to be
ng
taken by the United States armed forces for the purposes specified
above.
he 3. Property consigned to and for the personal use of members of
the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their
ies dependents, shall be subject to customs duties and other such charges,
les except that no duties or charges shall be paid with respect to:
ph
(a) Furniture and household goods for their private use imported
by the members of the United States armed forces or civilian com-
to
ponent when they first arrive to serve in Japan or by their de-
1
pendents when they first arrive for reunion with members of such
use
forces or civilian component, and personal effects for private use
brought by the said persons upon entrance.
(b) Vehicles and parts imported by members of the United States
armed forces or civilian component for the private use of themselves
or their dependents.
(C) Reasonable quantities of clothing and household goods of a
type which would ordinarily be purchased
in the United States for
everyday use for the private use of members of the United States
armed forces, civilian component, and their dependents, which are
mailed into Japan through United States military post offices.
4. The exemptions granted in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply only
90 cases of importation of goods and shall not be interpreted as re-
funding customs duties and domestic excises collected by the customs
authorities at the time of entry in cases of purchases of goods on
which such duties and excises bave already been collected.
5. Customs examination shall not be made in the following cases:
(a) Units and members of the United States armed forces under
orders entering or leaving Japan;
(b) Official documents under official seal;
(C) Mail in United States military postal channels and military
cargo shipped on a United States Government bill of lading.
6. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese and
United States authorities in accordance with mutually agreed condi-
BI
ese
he
he
he
2.0
ed
St
ed
18
ad
10
ED
OI
2412
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
by the United States armed forces shall be exempt from commodity
7. Goods imported into Japan free from customs duties and other
such charges pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3, may be re-exported free
from customs duties and other such charges.
8. The United States armed forces, in cooperation with Japanese
authorities, shall take such steps as are necessary to prevent abuse
of privileges granted to the United States armed forces, members of
such forces, the civilian component, and their dependents in accord-
ance with this Article.
9. (a) In order to prevent offenses against_laws and regulations
administered by the customs authorities of the Japanese Government
the Japanese authorities and the United States armed forces shell
assist each other in the conduct of inquiries and the collection di
evidence.
(b) The United States armed forces shall render all assistance
within their power to ensure that articles liable to seizure by, or on
bebalf of, the customs authorities of the Japanese Government are
handed to those authorities.
(c) The United States armed forces shall render all assistance
within their power to ensure the payment of duties, taxes, and penal
ties payable by members of such forces or of the civilian component
,
or their dependents.
(d) Vehicles and articles belonging to the United States armed
forces seized by the customs authorities of the Japanese Government
in connection with an offense against its customs or fiscal laws or regu-
lations shall be handed over to the appropriate authorities of the force
concerned.
ARTICLE XII
1. The United States shall have the right to contract for any sup-
plies or construction work to be furnished or undertaken in Japan
for purposes of, or authorized by this Agreement, without restriction
as to choice of supplier or person who does the construction work.
2. Materials, supplies, equipment and services which are required
from local sources for the maintenance of the United States armed
forces and the procurement of which may have an adverse effect of
the economy of Japan shall be procured in coordination with, and
,
when desirable, through or with the assistance of, the competent
authorities of Japan,
3. Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for official
purposes in Japan by the United States armed forces, or by authorized
procurement agencies of the United States armed forces upon appro-
priate certification shall be exempt from the following Japanese taxes:
a) Commodity tax
(b) Travelling tax
(c) Gasoline tax
d) Electricity and gas tax.
Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for ultimate uge
and gasoline taxes upon appropriate certification by the United States
.
1
$
1
:
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2413
res
IDS
re
100
ponent, and their dependents shall be exempt from taxation in Japan
her armed forces. With respect to any present or future Japanese taxes
not specifically referred to in this Article which might be found to
constitute a significant and readily identifiable part of the gross pur-
de chase price of materials, supplies, equipment and services procured
IS | by the United States armed forces, or for ultimate use by such forces,
of the two Governments will agree upon a procedure for granting such
exemption or relief therefrom as is consistent with the purposes of
this Article.
4. Local labor requirements of the United States armed forces or
at civilian component shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Japa-
all nese authorities,
d 5. The obligations for the withholding and payment of income tax
and of social security contributions, and, except as may otherwise be
Ich mutually agreed, the conditions of employment and work, such as
op those relating to wages and supplementary payments, the conditions
for the protection of workers, and the rights of workers concerning
labor relations sball be those laid down by the legislation of Japan.
6. Members of the civilian component shall not be subject to
Japanese laws or regulations with respect to terms and conditions of
the employment.
7. Neither members of the United States armed forces, civilian com-
od ponent, nor their dependents, shall by reason of this Article enjoy any
nt exemption from taxes or similar charges relating to personal purchases
of goods and services in Japan chargeable under Japanese legislation.
8. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese and
United States authorities in accordance with mutually agreed condi-
tions, goods purchased in Japan exempt from the taxes referred to in
paragraph 3, shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not entitled
-D- to purchase such goods exempt from such tax.
ARTICLE XIII
1. The United States armed forces shall not be subject to taxes or
similar charges on property held, used or transferred
by such forces in
Japan
d
2. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian compo-
nent, and their dependents shall not be liable to pay any Japanese
taxes to the Japanese Government or to any other taxing agency in
Japan on income received as a result of their service with
or employ-
ment by the United States armed forces, or by the organizations
provided for in Article XV. The provisions of this Article do not
kempt such persons from payment of Japanese taxes on income
derived from Japanese sources, nor do they exempt United States
citizens who for United States'income tax purposes claim Japanese
residence from payment of Japanese taxes on income. Periods during
which such persons are in Japan solely by reason of being members
of the United States armed
forces, the civilian component, or their
dependents shall not be considered as periods of residence or domicile
in Japan for the purpose of Japanese taxation.
3. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian com-
U-
C8
BD
OD
ed
ed
1
ut
ed
Do
S:
58
28
2414
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
on the holding, use, transfer inter se, or transfer by death of movable of
property, tangible or intangible, the presence of which in Japan is due
solely to the temporary presence of these persons in Japan, provided Ja
that such exemption shall not apply to property held for the purpose
fo:
of investment or the conduct of business in Japan or to any intangible
Ja
property registered in Japan. There is no obligation under this
Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use
ab
of roads by private vehicles.
no
Or
me
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ex
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U
ARTICLE XIV
Go
de
1. Persons, including corporations organized under the laws of the
St
United States, and their employees who are ordinarily resident in the
United States and whose presence in Japan is solely for the purpose
of executing contracts with the United States for the benefit of the
United States armed forces shall, except as provided in this Article
,
Jai
be subject to the laws and regulations of Japan.
pla
2. Upon certification by appropriate United States authorities as
res
to their identity, such persons and their employees shall be accorded
the following benefits of this Agreement:
(a) Rights of accession and movement, as provided for in Article
be
V, paragraph 2;
(b) Entry into Japan in accordance with the provisions of
Article IX;
(c) The exemption from customs duties, and other such charges 18
provided for in Article XI, paragraph 3, for members of the United
Ja
States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents
(d) If authorized by the United States Government, the right
to use the services of the organizations provided for in Article XV
sh
(e) Those provided for in Article XIX, paragraph 2, for mem-
ter
bers of the armed forces of the United States, the civilian compo-
nent, and their dependents;
(f) If authorized by the United States Government, the right
to use military payment certificates, as provided for in Article XI
(g) The use of postal facilities provided for in Article XXI;
(h) Exemption from the laws and regulations of Japan with th
respect to terms and conditions of employment.
3. Such persons and their employees shall be so described in their
passports and their arrival, departure and their residence while in Ag
Japan shall from time to time be notified by the United States armed
forces to the Japanese authorities.
4. Upon certification by an authorized officer of the United States
St
armed forces depreciable assets except houses, held, used, or trans-
ferred, by such persons and their employees exclusively for the execu
tion of contracts referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be subject to
taxes or similar charges of Japan.
5. Upon certification by an authorized officer of the United States bu
armed forces, such persons and their employees shall be exempt from
taxation in Japan on the holding, use, transfer by death, or transfer
to persons
or agencies entitled to tax exemption under
this Agreement
,
ata
be
am
PO
lat
su
SO
se
or
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2415
e
e
e
.
e
e
e
IS
d
lations, license, fees, taxes or similar controls.
but purchases within Japan of merchandise and supplies by such
of movable property, tangible or intangible, the presence of which in
Japan is due solely to the temporary presence of these persons in
Japan, provided that such exemption shall not apply to property held
for the purpose of investment or the conduct of other business in
Japan or to any intangible property registered in Japan. There is
no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from taxes pay-
able in respect of the use of roads by private vehicles.
6. The persons and their employees referred to in paragraph 1
shall not be liable to pay income or corporation taxes to the Japanese
Government or to any other taxing agency in Japan on any income
derived under a contract made in the United States with the United
States Government in connection with the construction, maintenance
or operation of any of the facilities or areas covered by this Agree-
ment. The provisions of this paragraph do not exempt such persons
from payment of income or corporation taxes on income derived from
Japanese sources, nor do they exempt such persons and their em-
ployees who, for United States income tax purposes, claim Japanese
residence, from payment of Japanese taxes on income. Periods dur-
ing which such persons are in Japan solely in connection with the
execution of a contract with the United States Government shall not
de be considered periods of residence or domicile in Japan for the pur-
poses of such taxation.
of 7. Japanese authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over the persons and their employees referred to in para-
graph 1 of this Article in relation to offenses committed in Japan
and punishable by the law of Japan. In those cases in which the
Japanese authorities decide not to exercise such jurisdiction they shall
notify the military authorities of the United States as soon as possible.
Upon such notification the military authorities of the United States
shall have the right to exercise such jurisdiction over the persons re-
ferred to as is conferred on them by the law of the United States.
ARTICLE XV
1. (a) Navy exchanges, post exchanges, messes, social clubs, the-
aters
, newspapers and other non-appropriated fund organizations au-
thorized
and regulated by the United States military authorities may
be established in the facilities and areas in use by the United States
armed forces for the use of members of such forces, the civilian com-
ponent, and their dependents. Except as otherwise provided in this
.
Agreement, such organizations shall not be subject to Japanese regu-
(b) When a newspaper authorized and regulated by the United
States military authorities is sold to the general public, it shall be
subject to Japanese regulations, license, fees, taxes or similar controls
so far as such circulation is concerned.
2. No Japanese tax shall be imposed on sales of merchandise and
services by such organizations, except as provided in paragraph 1 (b),
organizations shall be subject to Japanese taxes.
ES
d
l.
D-
ht
ch
ir
OS
1.
0
ES
11
21
2416
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
person fleeing from the jurisdiction of the United States armed
1 Supra, pp. 1529–1544. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement entered into
3. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the United States
and Japanese authorities in accordance with mutually agreed condi-
tions, goods which are sold by such organizations shall not be disposed
of in Japan to persons not authorized to make purchases from such
organizations.
4. The obligations for the withholding and payment of income tar
and of social security contributions, and, except as may otherwise be
mutually agreed, the conditions of employment and work, such as
those relating to wages and supplementary payments, the conditions
for the protection of workers, and the rights of workers concerning
labor relations shall be those laid down by the legislation of Japan
.
5. The organizations referred to in this Article shall provide such
information to the Japanese authorities as is required by Japanese
tax legislation.
ARTICLE XVI
It is the duty of members of the United States armed forces, the
civilian component, and their dependents to respect the law of Japan
and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this
Agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in Japan.
ARTICLE XVII
1. Upon the coming into force with respect to the United States of
the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
regarding the Status of their Forces”, signed at London on June 19
1951, the United States will immediately conclude with Japan, at
the option of Japan, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction 2 similar
to the corresponding provisions of that Agreement.
2. Pending the coming into force with respect to the United States
of the North Atlantic Treaty Agreement referred to in paragraph 1.
the United States service courts and authorities shall have the right
to exercise within Japan exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses which
may be committed in Japan by members of the United States armes
forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, excluding their
dependents who have only Japanese nationality. Such jurisdiction
may in any case be waived by the United States.
3. While the jurisdiction provided in paragraph 2 is effective, the
following provisions shall apply:
(a) Japanese authorities may arrest members of the United
States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents
outside facilities and areas in use by United States armed forces
for the commission or attempted commission of an offense, but i
the event of such an arrest, the individual or individuals shall be
immediately turned over to the United States armed forces. An
force with respect to the United States, Aug. 23, 1953.
2 See agreement of Sept. 29, 1953 (TÍAS 2848; 4 UST, pt. 2, p. 1846).
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2417
tes
d- di-
led
ch
be
&S
IDS
ng
ch
he
81
his
.
of
HTT
19
forces and found in any place outside the facilities and areas may
on request be arrested by the Japanese authorities and turned over
to the United States authorities.
(b) The United States authorities shall have the exclusive right
to arrest within facilities and areas in use by United States armed
forces. Any person subject to the jurisdiction of Japan and found
in
any such facility or area will, on request, be turned over to the
Japanese authorities.
(c) The United States authorities may, under due process of law,
arrest, in the vicinity of such a facility or area, any person in the
commission or attempted commission of an offense against the
security of that facility or area. Any such person not subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States armed forces shall be im-
mediately turned over to Japanese authorities.
(d) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 (c), the activities
outside the facilities and areas of military police of the United States
armed forces shall be limited to the extent necessary for maintaining
order and discipline of and arresting members of the United States
armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.
(e) The authorities of the United States and Japan shall co-
operate in making available witnesses and evidence for criminal
investigations and other criminal proceedings in their respective
tribunals and shall assist each other in the making of investigations.
In the event of a criminal contempt, perjury, or an obstruction of
justice before a tribunal which does not have criminal jurisdiction
over the individual committing the offense, he shall be tried by a
tribunal which has jurisdiction over him as if he had committed the
offense before it.
(1) The United States armed forces shall have the exclusive right
of removing from Japan members of the United States
armed forces,
the civilian component, and their dependents. The United States
will give sympathetic consideration to a request by the Govern-
ment of Japan for the removal of any such person for good cause.
(8) Japanese authorities shall have no right of search or seizure,
respect to any persons or property, within facilities and areas
in
use by the United States armed forces, or with respect to prop-
erty of the United States armed forces wherever situated. At the
request of the Japanese authorities, the United States authorities
undertake, within the limits of their authority, to make such search
and seizure and inform the Japanese authorities as to the results
thereof. In the event of a judgment concerning such property,
except property owned or utilized by the United States Government,
the United States will turn over such property to the Japanese au-
thorities for disposition in accordance with the judgment. Japanese
authorities shal have no right of search or seizure outside facilities
and areas in use by the United
States armed forces with respect to
persons or property of members of the United States armed
forces, the civilian component, or their dependents, except as to
such persons as may be arrested in accordance with paragraph 3 (a)
of this article, and except as to cases where such search is required
at
101
tes
1
ht
ch
ed
21
with
OD
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ed
ts
S
PS
be
OT
the
to
41590057--Vol. 2
49
2418
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
OT
Ja
1
1
1
1
រ
1
caused by a member of the armed forces or a civilian governmental
currence for which the United States armed forces is legally responsible,
for the purpose of arresting offenders under the jurisdiction of
Japan.
(h) A death sentence shall not be carried out in Japan by the
United States armed forces if the legislation of Japan does not
provide for such punishment in a similar case.
4. The United States undertakes that the United States service
courts and authorities shall be willing and able to try and, on convic
.
tion, to punish all offenses against the laws of Japan which members
of the United States armed forces, civilian component, and their de-
pendents may be alleged on sufficient evidence to have committed in
Japan, and to investigate and deal appropriately with any alleged
offense committed by members of the United States armed forces,
the civilian component, and their dependents, which may be brought to
their notice by Japanese authorities or which they may find to have
taken place. The United States further undertakes to notify the
Japanese authorities of the disposition made by United States
service courts of all cases arising under this paragraph. The United
States shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from Japanese
authorities for a waiver of its jurisdiction in cases arising under this
paragraph where the Japanese Government considers such waiver to
be of particular importance. Upon such waiver, Japan may exercise
its own jurisdiction.
5. In the event the option referred to in paragraph 1 is not exercised
by Japan, the jurisdiction provided for in paragraph 2 and the fol-
lowing paragraphs shall continue in effect. In the event the said
North Atlantic Treaty Agreement has not come into effect within for
one year from the effective date of this Agreement, the United States ago
will, at the request of the Japanese Government, reconsider the sub-
ject of jurisdiction over offenses committed in Japan by members
W
of the United States armed forces, the civilian
component, and their th
dependents.
ARTICLE XVIII
1. Each party waives all its claims against the other party for injury do
or death suffered in Japan by a member of its armed forces, or a citt tol
ian governmental employee, while such member or employee
engaged in the performance of his official duties in cases where such
injury or death was caused by a member of the armed forces, or a
civilian employee of the other party acting in the performance of his
official duties.
2. Each party waives all its claims against the other party
damage to any property in Japan owned by it, if such damage was
employee of the other
party in the performance of his official duties
of members of
, or employees of the United States armed forces in the
performance of official duty or out of any other act, omission or
SUL
ar
Was
for
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2419
has been payment in full satisfaction of the claim.
of
ale
ot
le
EINS
C
in yen.
t0
ve
he
ces
ed
So
Tuis
to
ISE
claimant in full satisfaction of his claim, the United States au-
a) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the jurisdiction of the
Japanese courts to entertain an action against a member or
employee of the United States armed forces, unless and until there
or property damage in Japan to third parties shall be dealt with by
Japan in accordance with the following provisions:
(a) Claims shall be filed within one year from the date on which
they arise and shall be considered and settled or adjudicated in
accordance with the laws and regulations of Japan with respect to
claims arising from the activities of its own employees.
(b) Japan may settle any such claims, and payment of the amount
agreed upon or determined by adjudication shall be made by Japan
ed
(C) Such payment, whether made pursuant to a settlement or to
adjudication of the case by a competent tribunal of Japan, or the
final adjudication by such a tribunal denying payment, shall be
binding and conclusive.
(d) The cost incurred in satisfying claims pursuant to the pre-
ceding subparagraphs shall be shared on terms to be agreed by the
two Governments.
(e) In accordance with procedures to be established, a statement
of all claims approved or disapproved by Japan pursuant to this
paragraph, together with the findings in each case, and a statement
of the sums paid by Japan, shall be sent to the United States pe-
riodically, with a request for reimbursement of the share to be paid
ed
by the United States. Such reimbursement shall be made within
pl
the shortest possible time in yen.
id
4. Each party shall have the primary right, in the execution of the
in foregoing paragraphs, to determine whether its personnel were en-
gaged in the performance of official duty. Such determination shall
B-
be made as soon as possible after the arising of the claim concerned.
When the other party disagrees with the results of such determination,
er that party may bring the matter before the Joint Committee for con-
sultation under the provisions of Article XXVI of this Agreement.
5. Claims against members of or employees of the United States
armed forces arising out of tortious acts or omissions in Japan not
done in the performance of official duty shall be dealt with in the
ch
(a) The Japanese authorities shall consider the claim and assess
compensation to the claimant in a fair and just manner, taking into
account all the circumstances of the case, including the conduct
of the injured person, and shall prepare a report on the matter.
(b) The report shall be delivered to the United States author-
ities, who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer
an ex gratia payment, and if so, of what amount.
c) If an offer of ex gratia payment is made, and accepted by the
thorities shall make the payment themselves and inform the Jap-
anese authorities of their decision and of the sum paid.
les
bi
ces
IN
following manner:
AS
:
US
1
Or
as
al
28.
IS
he
10
2420
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
(
S
t
hibited from engaging in transactions involving military payment
6. (a) Members of and civilian employees of the United States
armed forces, excluding those employees who have only Japanese
nationality, shall not be subject to suit in Japan with respect to claims
specified in paragraph 3, but shall be subject to the civil jurisdiction
of Japanese courts with respect to all other types of cases.
(b) In case any private movable property, excluding that in use
by the United States armed forces, which is subject to compulsory
execution under Japanese law, is within the facilities and areas in use
by the United States armed forces, the United States authorities shall
upon the request of Japanese courts, possess and turn over such prop-
erty to the Japanese authorities.
(c) The United States authorities shall cooperate with the Jap-
anese authorities in making available witnesses and evidence for civil
proceedings in Japanese tribunals.
7. Disputes arising out of contracts concerning the procurement
of materials, supplies, equipment, services, and labor by or for the
United States armed forces, which are not resolved by the parties to
the contract concerned, may be submitted to the Joint Committee for
conciliation, provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not
prejudice any right which the parties to the contract may have to file
a civil suit.
ARTICLE XIX
1. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian com-
ponent, and their dependents, shall be subject to the foreign exchange
controls of the Japanese Government.
2. The preceding paragraph shall not be construed to preclude the
transmission into or outside of Japan of United States dollars or dol-
lar instruments representing the official funds of the United States
or realized as a result of service or employment in connection with
this Agreement by members of the United States armed forces and
the civilian
component, or realized by such persons and their depend-
ents from sources outside of Japan.
3. The United States authorities shall take suitable measures to
preclude the abuse of the privileges stipulated in the preceding para
:
graph or circumvention of the Japanese foreign exchange controls
.
ARTICLE XX
1. (a) United States military payment certificates denominated in
dollars may be used by persons authorized by the United States for
internal transactions within the facilities and areas in use by the
United States armed forces. The United States Government wil
take appropriate action to insure that authorized personnel are pro
Japanese Government will take necessary action to prohibit una
thorized persons from engaging in transactions involving military
payment certificates and with the aid of United States authorities En
undertake to apprehend and punish any person or persons under its
1
t
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t
0
1
0
0
e
a
1
]
.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2421
se
us
ON
se
se
1
OT
information of the United States, and for the punishment of offenders
jurisdiction involved in the counterfeiting or uttering of counterfeit
8 military payment certificates.
(b) It is agreed that the United States authorities will apprehend
and punish members of the United States armed forces, the civilian
component, or their dependents, who tender military payment certif-
icates to unauthorized persons and that no obligation will be due to
such unauthorized persons or to the Japanese Government or its agen-
ry cies from the United States or any of its agencies as a result of any
unauthorized use of military payment certificates within Japan.
1
2. In order to exercise control of military payment certificates the
P
United States shall have the right to designate certain American finan-
cial institutions to maintain and operate, under United States super-
D-
vision, facilities for the use of persons authorized by the United
Til
States to use military payment certificates. Institutions authorized
to maintain military banking facilities will establish and maintain
such facilities physically separated from their Japanese commercial
be
banking business, with personnel whose sole duty is to maintain and
to
operate such facilities. Such facilities shall be permitted to maintain
United States currency bank accounts and to perform all financial
ot
transactions in connection therewith including receipt and remission
ile
of funds to the extent provided by Article XIX, paragraph 2, of
this Agreement.
ARTICLE XXI
The United States shall have the right to establish and operate,
within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed
forces
, United States military post offices for the use of members of
Ehe
the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their
-
dependents, for the transmission of mail between United States mili-
tary post offices in Japan and between such military post offices and
other United States post offices.
nd
ARTICLE XXII
The United States shall have the right to enroll and train all eligible
United States citizens, residing in Japan, in the reserve organizations
of the armed forces of the United States, except that the prior consent
of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in the case of persons
employed by the Japanese Government.
in
ARTICLE XXIII
The United States and Japan will cooperate in taking such steps
1
is may from time to time be necessary to ensure the security of the
United States armed forces, the members thereof, the civilian com-
ponent
, their dependents, and their property. The Japanese Govern-
ment agrees to seek such' legislation and to take such other action as
may be necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within
its territory of installations
, equipment, property, records and official
11-
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at
18
1
ts
under the applicable laws of Japan.
2422
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
PI
SC
17
re
IC
at
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1
PI
0
11
2. The Joint Committee shall be composed of a representative of
ARTICLE XXIV
In the event of hostilities, or imminently threatened hostilities
, in
the Japan area, the Governments of the United States and Japan
shall immediately consult together with a view to taking necessary
joint measures for the defense of that area and to carrying out the
purposes of Article I of the Security Treaty.
ARTICLE XXV
1. It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of
this Agreement without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the
maintenance of the United States armed forces in Japan except those
to be borne by Japan as provided in paragraph 2.
2. It is agreed that Japan will:
(a) Furnish for the duration of this Agreement without cost to
the United States and make compensation where appropriate to
the owners and suppliers thereof all facilities, areas and rights of
way, including facilities and areas jointly used such as those e
airfields and ports, as provided in Articles II and III.
(b) Make available without cost to the United States, until the
effective date of any new arrangement reached as a result of periodic
reexamination, an amount of Japanese currency equivalent to $155
million per annum for the purpose of procurement by the United
States of transportation and of the requisite services and supplies
in Japan. The rate of exchange at which yen payments will be
credited shall be the official par value, or that rate considered most
favorable by the United States which on the day of payment is
available to any party, authorized by the Japanese Government or
used in any transaction with any party by the Japanese Government
or its agencies or by Japanese banks authorized to deal in foreign
exchange, and which, if both countries have agreed par values with
the International Monetary Fund, is not prohibited by the Articles
of Agreement of the Fund.
3. It is agreed that arrangements will be effected between the Gor-
ernments of the United States and Japan for
accounting applicable to
financial transactions arising out of this Agreement.
ARTICLE XXVI
1. A Joint Committee shall be established as the means for consu-
tation between the United States and Japan on all matters requiring
mutual consultation regarding the implementation of this Agreement
In particular, the Joint Committee shall serve as the means for com
sultation in determining the facilities and areas in Japan which are
required for the use of the United States
in carrying out the purposes
stated in Article I of the Security Treaty.
the United States and of Japan, each of whom shall have one or more
deputies and a staff. The Joint Committee shall determine its own
ST
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2423
4 TIAS 2492; 3 UST, pt. 3, p. 3413.
11
18
Se
1
SS S
at
10
IC
35
ed
es
28
st
is
OT
26
9
Administrative Agreement signed today, in which Your Excellency
procedures, and arrange for such auxiliary organs and administrative
in services as may be required. The Joint Committee shall be so organ-
ized that it may meet immediately at any time at the request of the
17
representative of either the United States or Japan.
he 3. If the Joint Committee is unable to resolve any matter, it shall
refer that matter to the respective Governments for further consider-
ation through appropriate channels.
ARTICLE XXVII
of
1. This Agreement shall come into force on the date on which the
Security Treaty between the United States and Japan enters into
force.
2. Each party to this Agreement undertakes to seek from its legis-
lature necessary budgetary and legislative action with respect to
provisions of this Agreement which require such action for their
execution.
of
ARTICLE XXVIII
Either party may at any time request the revision of any Article
of this Agreement, in which case the two Governments shall enter
into negotiation through appropriate channels.
ARTICLE XXIX
This Agreement, and agreed revisions thereof, shall remain in force
while the Security Treaty remains in force unless earlier terminated
by agreement between the parties.
in witness whereof the representatives of the two Governments,
duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Agreement.
Done at Tokyo, in duplicate, in the English and Japanese lan-
guages, both texts authentic, this twenty-eighth day of February,
1952.
48. INTERIM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UPON TERMINA-
TION OF ALLIED OCCUPATION: Exchange of Notes Between
the Special Representative of the President of the United States
and the Japanese Foreign Minister, February 28, 1952 4
United States Note
I have the honor to refer to our discussion on the terms of the
f
stated as the opinion of the Japanese Government that, as the occu-
PS
7.
50
EXCELLENCY:
e
$
1
8
Apr. 28, 1952.
2 Dean Rusk.
3 Katsuo Okazaki.
I
2424
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
f
r
1 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 425–440. The Treaty of Peace entered
pation of Japan by the Allied Powers comes to an end on the coming
into force for the Treaty of Peace with Japan,' the use of facilities
and areas by United States forces on the basis of occupation requisi-
tion also comes to an end on the same date; thereafter, the use of
facilities and areas by United States forces must be based upon agree-
ment between the two Governments, subject to the rights which each
might have under the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Security
Treaty, and the Administrative Agreement. I hereby confirm that
such is also the opinion of the United States Government.
In Article II, paragraph 1, of the Administrative Agreement it is
stipulated that, "Agreements as to specific facilities and areas, not
already reached by the two Governments by the effective date of
this Agreement, shall be concluded by the two Governments through
the Joint Committee provided for in Article XXVI of this Agreement."
The United States Government is confident that our two Governments
are agreed that consultation shall be on an urgent basis in order to
complete such arrangements at the earliest possible date. With this
in mind, the United States Government is prepared to join with the
Japanese Government in constituting a Preliminary Working Group
,
consisting of a representative and the necessary staff from each
Government, to begin such consultations immediately, with the under-
standing that the arrangements made by the Preliminary Working
Group shall be put into effect as agreed and that the task of the
Preliminary Working Group would be taken over by the Joint Com-
mittee upon the effective date of the Administrative Agreement.
However, unavoidable delays may arise in the determination and
preparation of facilities and areas necessary to carry out the purposes
stated in Article I of the Security Treaty. It would be much appre-
ciated, therefore, if Japan would grant the continued use of those
particular facilities and areas, with respect to which agreements and
arrangements have not been completed by the expiration of ninety
days after the effective date of the Treaty of Peace with Japan,
pending the completion of such agreements and arrangements.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
His Excellency
KATSUO OKAZAKI,
Minister of State,
Tokyo.
into force Apr. 28, 1952.
2 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 885–886.
3 Agreement of Feb. 28, 1952; supra.
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0
8
}
DEAN RUSK
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2425
254 Stat., pt. 2, p. 2643.
Japanese Note
So ..
Translation
18
S
i-
f
ho
h
THE GAIMUSHO
FEBRUARY 28, 1952.
EXCELLENCY:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's
Note of today's date in which Your Excellency has informed me as
follows:
it
(There follows the text of the note of the President's Special Representa-
is
it
of
th
tive.]
11
En
Es
10
IS
le
1-
g
18
The Japanese Government fully shares the desire of the United
States Government to initiate consultations on an urgent basis in
order to complete arrangements for the use of facilities and areas at
the earliest possible date. The Japanese Government agrees, there-
fore
, to the immediate constitution of the Preliminary Working Group
referred to in Your Excellency's Note, with the understanding that
the arrangements made by the Preliminary Working Group shall be
put into effect as agreed and that the task of the Preliminary Working
Group would be taken over by the Joint Committee upon the effective
date of the Administrative Agreement.
With full appreciation of the contents of Your Excellency's Note,
I have the honor, on behalf of the Japanese Government, to confirm
that the Japanese Government will grant to the United States the
continued use of those particular facilities and areas, with respect
to which agreements and arrangements have not been completed by
the expiration of ninety days after the effective date of the Treaty
of Peace with Japan, pending the completion of such agreements
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
KATSUO OKAZAKI
1-
d
28
3
se
d
and arrangements.
J
His Excellency
DEAN RUSK,
Office of the Special Representative
of the President of the United States
Tokyo.
d
49. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WITH JAPAN:
Presidental Proclamation No. 2974, April 28, 1952 1
Whereas by Proclamation No. 2352 of September 8, 1939, the
President proclaimed the existence of a national emergency in con-
nection with and to the extent necessary
for the proper observance.
166 Stat. C31.
2426
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
safeguarding, and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States of
America and the strengthening of our national defense within the
limits of peace-time authorizations; and
WHEREAS by Proclamation No. 2487 of May 27, 1941, the President
proclaimed the existence of an unlimited national emergency, requir-
ing that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country
be put on the basis of readiness to repel any and all acts or threats of
aggression directed toward any part of the Western Hemisphere; and
WHEREAS acts of aggression against the United States of America
by Axis Powers subsequently led to declarations by the Congress of
the existence of states of war between the United States of America
and Japan, Germany,3 Italy, 4 Hungary,5 Rumania 6 and Bulgaria;"
and
WHEREAS the state of war between the United States of America
and Japan, which was the last of the aforesaid states of war stil
existing, was terminated by the coming into force this day of the
Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco on September 8,
1951:8
Now, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United
States of America, do proclaim that the national emergencies declared
to exist by the proclamations of September 8, 1939, and May 27,
1941, terminated this day upon the entry into force of the Treaty of
Peace with Japan.
Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to affect Proclame-
tion No. 2914, issued by the President on December 16, 1950,
declaring that world conquest by communist imperialism is the goal
of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world
, and
proclaiming the existence of a national emergency requiring that the
military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strength,
ened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repal
any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our
responsibilities in the efforts being made through the United Nations
and otherwise to bring about lasting peace; and nothing herein shall
be construed to affect the continuation of the said emergency
September 8, 1939, as specified in the Emergency Powers Interim
Continuation Act, approved April 14, 1952 Public Law 313—82
Congress),10 for the purpose of continuing the use of property held
under the 'Act of October 14, 1940, ch. 862, 54 Stat. 1125, as amended.
U
of
026.
1 55 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1647.
2 Joint resolution of Dec. 8, 1941; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, P.
3 Joint resolution or Dec. 11, 1941; ibid., p. 502.
4 Ibid., p. 455.
5 Joint resolution of June 5, 1942; ibid., p. 482.
6 Ibid.
a Ibid.
Supra, pp. 425–440.
9 15 Fed. Reg. 9029.
10 66 Stat. 54.
8
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2427
她
​· Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 26, 1953, pp. 134-135.
2 Note of Jan. 13, 1953; ibid., p. 134.
* Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 208.
3 of
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the
the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-eighth day of April
ent
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
uur-
(SEAL] fifty-two, and of the Independence of the United
try
States of America the one hundred and seventy-
sof
sixth.
end
ica
i of
ica
,
| The Defense Capacity and Economic Viability of
Sovereign Japan, 1953-1955
ic:
till
the
50. REPELLING VIOLATIONS OF JAPANESE TERRITORIAL
18,
AIR BY FOREIGN MILITARY AIRCRAFT: Note From the Amer-
ican Embassy at Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Ministry,
Eed
January 16, 1953 1
ed
27.
of
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its com-
pliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to
acknowledge receipt of the Ministry's Note 2 concerning violations
-0,9
of Japan's territorial air over Hokkaido by foreign military planes.
02]
The United States Government has noted that the Japanese Gov-
nd
ernment considers such trespasses to constitute a grave menace to
che the security
of Japan. It has further
noted the
request of the Japanese
ch- Government that the United States authorities take effective and
bel
appropriate measures to repel similar violations of Japan's territorial
air should they occur in the future.
In accordance with the request of the Japanese Government the
United States Government has instructed the Commander-in-Chief,
of Far East Command, with all practicable assistance from the Japanese
Government, to take all possible measures necessary and proper under
terms of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan
dated September 8, 1951, to repel all such violations of Japan's ter-
51. AMERICAN RIGHTS IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS: Note From
the Secretary of State to the Japanese Prime Minister, 3 August 8,
The Government of the United States desires to relinquish its
rights under article 3 of the
peace treaty s over the Amami Oshima
group in favor of the resumption by Japan of authority over these
18-
!1
IS
11
eld
1
ritorial air.
d.
5.
19534
8 Shigeru Yoshida.
* Supra, pp. 425–440.
2428
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
fu
re
SU
12
islands as soon as necessary arrangements can be concluded with the
Government of Japan.
With respect to the other islands included under article 3 of the
Japanese peace treaty, it will be necessary during the present inter-
national tensions in the Far East for the United States to maintain
the degree of control and authority now exercised. The United
States will thus be able to carry out more effectively its responsibilities
under the security treaty between the United States and Japan to
contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the area.
Meanwhile, the United States will make increased efforts to promote
the welfare of the inhabitants of these islands.
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52. THE MILITARY SECURITY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY
OF JAPAN: Joint Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs and the Personal Representative of the
Japanese Prime Minister, October 30, 1953 3
fo
CO
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fa
Mr. Hayato Ikeda, the personal representative of the Prime Minister
of Japan, and his party had a series of conferences with Mr. Walter S.
Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and
other officials of the United States Government during the past four
weeks.
The talks covered various interrelated problems of mutual interest
such as Japan's defense buildup, United States assistance, settlement
for United States postwar economic aid (GARIOA), foreign investment
,
and trade with Communist China. The informal exchange of views
on these subjects was most profitable and lays the ground work for
further cooperation between the two countries. The discussions were
exploratory and no agreements were entered into. Certain genera
understandings are set forth below.
The conferees agreed on the necessity of increasing Japan's self-
defense forces in order to protect her from possible aggression, and to
reduce the United States burden related to the defense of Japan. It
was, however, noted that under present circumstances there are
constitutional, economic, budgetary and other limitations which wil
not allow the immediate building of Japan's self-defense forces to 8
point sufficient for Japan's defense. With due regard to these limita-
tions, continued effort on the part of Japan will be made to expedite
the build-up. Subject to necessary Congressional
authorization
, the
United States conferees offered to assist Japan in developing the
Japanese forces by supplying major items of military equipment for
the land, sea and air forces which Japan raises.
Questions relating to Japanese defense forces and United States
military assistance will be discussed further in Tokyo in the near
0
$1
S
CI
II
en
ti
b
1 Walter S. Robertson.
2 Hayato Ikeda.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1953, pp. 637–638.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2429
3 Department of State Bulletin, June 22, 1953, p. 878.
3 Ibid., May 11, 1953, pp. 681-682.
he
r
10
es
8.
je
er
future by representatives of the two governments with a view to
reaching a definite understanding.
be The conferees agreed that a reduction in Japan's contribution to the
support of United States forces should be considered from time to time
in the light of the development of Japan's own forces. It was also
# agreed that the withdrawal of the United States forces from Japan
would be effected as the Japanese forces develop the capability to
to
defend their country.
The conferees considered that $50 million is a reasonable target
te amount for commodities to be supplied to Japan under Section 550 of
the Mutual Security Act. It is contemplated that the local currency
proceeds of the sale of such agricultural products will be used to help
develop the defense production and the industrial potential of Japan
through offshore procurement and investment. Necessary arrange-
Y
ments will be executed to cover the requirements of Section 550 and
te
the related defense support activities,
The conferees recognized that pending a political settlement in
Korea it is important to maintain a high level of controls over trade
with Communist China. However, the implications of these controls
for Japanese trade are such that the United States and Japan will
S. continue current consultations on the items to be controlled.
d The United States conferees attached great importance to an early
settlement for GARIOA aid. It was agreed to hold a meeting in Tokyo
in the near future between representatives of the United States and
st Japan with a view to reaching an agreement on the settlement.
at As to foreign investment in Japan, the investment guaranty program
-14 under the Mutual Security Act and the Contact Clearing House
Service, as well as the services of the United States Department of
or Commerce, were suggested as helpful measures to be taken on the side
of the United States, while willingness on the part of Japan to liberalize
al Japanese laws and regulations pertaining
to foreign investments was
expressed by the Japanese conferees in order to create a better climate
for foreign investment.
The Japanese conferees expressed their belief that vigorous efforts
Et
on the part of Japan to resist
inflation are most important in order to
strengthen Japan's economic position and to promote further economic
1
cooperation between the United States and Japan.
It was gratifying for all the conferees to learn that while they were
in conference the
$40 million loans for Japanese thermal electric proj-
ects were signed by the International Bank and Japanese representa-
tives, and that the $60 million cotton credit to Japan was announced
by the Export-Import Bank of Washington.3
SE2
IT
TS
re
20
"O
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e
A
1
Infra, pp. 3085–3086.
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3 For the text of article III of the Japanese peace treaty, see supra, pp. 426-427.
2430 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
53. RESTORATION OF JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE
AMAMI OSHIMA ISLANDS (RYUKYU GROUP): Statement by
the Secretary of State, December 24, 1953
1. By arrangements concluded today in Tokyo, the Government
of the United States has relinquished in favor of Japan its rights under
article III of the Japanese peace treaty over the Amami Oshima group
of the Ryukyu Islands.
2. Questions have been raised regarding the intentions of the United
States with respect to the remaining islands specified in article III of
the peace treaty.3
3. The United States Government believes that it is essential to the
success of the cooperative effort of the free nations of Asia and of the
world in the direction of peace and security, that the United States
continue to exercise its present powers and rights in the remaining
Ryukyu Islands and in the other islands specified in article III of the
peace treaty so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the
Far East.
4. The United States earnestly hopes that progress can be made in
reducing tensions, and we will spare no effort toward that end. But
,
until conditions of genuine stability and confidence are created
, the
need of the free nations to preserve an armed vigilance will remain
imperative. It would be an abdication of responsibility to the com-
mon effort of these free nations, including Japan, for the United States
to adopt any other course than here set out, since the remaining
Ryukyuan and other islands specified in article III of the peace
treaty constitute an essential link in the strategic defense of the whole
Pacific area. Accordingly, the United States intends to remain as
custodian of these islands for the foreseeable future. However, in
exercising its treaty rights, the United States will not only do all in its
power to improve the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of
the Ryukyus, but it will continue to safeguard economic and cultura
intercourse throughout the Archipelago.
54. THE NEED FOR A STRONG JAPAN: Address by the As-
sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 4 February 6, 1954
(Excerpt)
We gave strong encouragement during the Occupation to Japan's
recovery from the war, advancing about $2 billion to that end. He
moved to break up 'those overconcentrations, or monopolies,
power-economic, political, and military--that had deprived the
1 Department of State, Bulletin, Jan, 4, 1954, p. 17.
2 TIAS 2895; 4 UST, pt. 2, p. 2912.
4 Walter S. Robertson.
5 Made before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, Cleveland, Ohio
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 15, 1954, pp. 229–233.
e
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THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2431
nt
le
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es
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II
le
es
E Japanese people of their rights and opportunities in the years before
by the war and had led Japan to disaster. It is a conviction of the
American people that a stable and progressive society is one in which
economic and political power is widely dispersed. This is, of course,
one of our outstanding points of difference with the Marxists, whose
er practice—whatever their theory--is to concentrate ever more power
Lp
ever fewer hands for the benefit of an ever smaller number of
people.
d If I may further condense the statement of our objective in the
of Occupation, I should say that it was to promote the creation of a
strong Japan, in the true and best sense of the word. Unfortunately,
a cardinal element of strength was left out of our concept. We and
our allies, including those who had been occupied by the Japanese
Army, did that which had come to be normal after total war: We
go totally disarmed the enemy. In addition, Japan with our encourage-
ment renounced military forces in its Constitution. It was not
hat we wished to leave Japan helpless in the face of deadly danger.
On the contrary. We failed to recognize that there was such a dan-
ger or to realize what kind of world we were living in and were to
ti live in. We put our faith in the partnership of the United Nations,
which had been forged in a war against aggression. We did not dis-
in
criminate against Japanese safety; we impartially rushed to disarm
ourselves as well.
The Japanese are now entirely in command of their country. Our
ng relations with them are those of collaboration between friends and
equals. The American troops in Japan are there for the same reason
le
and on the same basis as those in Western Europe---in recognition
that the problem of defense against aggression today transcends
nationality and does not permit any of us the luxury of living unto
himself. As far as we are concerned, nothing in our relations with
of Japan today reflects the relationship of winner or loser, occupier or
occupied. I trust that the great majority of Japanese feel this state-
Today, our hopes for Japan are the same as those of the Occupation.
Te should like to see a strong Japan, and a Japan whose strength
includes adequate defense forces. This is, of course, our policy with
A
respect to all free peoples. I think we have proved that we should
like to see all the free peoples grow in strength. But our hopes for
Japan
have a special
meaning and
urgency. For in all the expanse of
Asia, from the Urals and the Persian Gulf on the west to the Pacific
on the east, Japan is alone in being an exporter of the industrial
revolution, of its science, its technology, its skills, its machines, its
manufactured goods. The other Asian countries are, without excep-
of
tion, net importers of those things.
Whenever we speak in this vein we can count on hearing the cry,
"the United States wants to use Japan in its fight with the Com-
munists." I think we should hit this facile slander on two sides.
we should take every opportunity to make clear that the conflict
T'he Constitution of Japan, Efective May 3, 1947 (Department of State
s
ment is true.
€
1
First,
publication 2836; 1947).
2432
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Chinese "People's Republic."
C
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Some Japanese, as well as some others in the Far East, are opposed
of 1941 when we disarmed Japan, so those fearful of Japanese mili-
tarism today are, I believe, thinking in terms of May 1932 and
with communism is not primarily an American affair. It is not, as
the neutrals dearly love to picture it, a conflict between two giant
powers. The Communist danger concerns most immediately those
countries on the borders of the Communist empire that are most
exposed to its rapacity. The United States has drawn upon itself the
ire of the Communists because those countries have looked to us to
support them and have not looked in vain. While the Soviet Union
has, of course, the power to attack the United States directly, it is
where we have been assisting those directly threatened-Greece
Turkey, the countries of Western Europe, Berlin and the German
Federal Republic, Southeast Asia and, of course, Korea above all-b
that we have come into conflict with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Rus-
sians are quite aware of this, much as they would like to have the
world believe that it is only capitalist America that stands in the way
of universal peace and brotherhood. We could put an end overnight
to the anti-American propaganda pouring out of Moscow and Peiping
,
We could present the world with a spectacle of the most fraternal
association between Americans and Soviet Russians and Chinese
Communists. We could eliminate with a single gesture all those
bothersome tensions we hear so much about. All we should have to j
do is wash our hands of the countries on the borders of the Communist
empire and leave them to the mercies of what Chou En-lai' calls "The
camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union." But
that would be, of course, the last way in which to serve our Own
interests. It would lead to the progressive overpowering of the rest
of the free world and ultimately to our own destruction.
The second point to be emphasized is that our reason for wishing
to see the Japanese build adequate defense forces is emphatically not
because we wish to see the Japanese fighting the Communists
. The
primary purpose of an army is not to fight. It is quite the opposite
. i
The primary purpose of an army is to secure the national objectives
without fighting. To the Soviet Union, the Red Army is primarily a
I
weapon of intimidation to be used in causing other countries to care
f
in without the firing of a shot. To us in the free world, our own
armed forces are the means of preventing that from happening and of
maintaining our safety in peace. We know only too well that military
establishments are expensive. We look forward to the day when the
Soviet Union will agree to a fair system of disarmament. And we
believe that the sooner all sectors of the free world are
strong, the sooner that day will come.
OPPONENTS TO JAPANESE REARMAMENT
f
f
60 Japanese rearmament because they fear it would mean a recra
descence of the military caste in Japan. I believe they are too muco
influenced by the past. Just as we were thinking too much in terms 1
0
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adequately
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THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2433
388
ost
18
US-
ese
Ost
healthy society would be mere harmless cranks and misfits have been
ibid., 1936, vol. IV, pp. 706–782.
2 Supra, pp. 895-886.
February 1936, when vicious attacks were launched on the Japanese
int civil government by groups of army officers. It seems to us that the
conditions of 1954 are distinctly different. The Japanese people are
now possessed of the means required to prevent the accumulation of
che power in the hands of a military caste. They have free elections;
to they have a representative Diet; they have a free press; they have a
Constitution in which human rights are firmly embedded; and above
all, they have the experience of the past ever before them.
CE,
To assume that, because Japan embarked on imperialist adventures
in the past, she is likely to do so again is to take a hopeless view of
human affairs. However much we may lament it, the fact is that
many of the most respected members of the family of nations have
the Fielded to imperialist urges in the past. Militarism, expansionism,
ay aggressiveness are—we must conclude_not endemic with certain
ght nationalities but epidemic under certain economic, social, and political
ng conditions. We should be watchful not of particular reces but of
nal particular circumstances that cause nations to act in certain ways.
Japan has, of course, made a beginning in the development of the
means to protect herself. In the future increase in the size of the
to Japanese Defense Forces, which the Japanese Government hºs recog.
ist nized is necessary, we have agreed to help by providing major items
be of land, sea, and air equipment. We may hope the time is not too
But remote when Japan in the words of the Security Treaty of 1951
will be ready 'to assume responsibility for its own defense" and we
est
can bring our troops home.
I have talked as if our expectations of Japan lie altogether in the
realm of resistance to Communist military aggression. That is not
net my meaning. The role that awaits Japan is in our view far broader
The than that. ”For I think we must recognize that Communist imperial-
te. ism is only a current symptom, and only one symptom, of ancient and
T'es deep-seated evils. The real enemy is the condition that produces
78
communism. The real problem is the problem of human desperation.
It is a pitiable aspect of human beings that the more desperate and
frightened they are, the readier they are to grasp at panaceas and
of promises of the millennium, the more susceptible they are to counsels
TF of violence and extremism,'the quicker they are to follow the fanatic.
be The world in our lifetime has presented vast opportunities for imposing
upon the credulities of suffering, bewildered humanity. There has
been the damage done to men's nerves by the ferocity of our wars, the
devastation left by those wars, the upsetting impact of half-understood
scientific discoveries upon religious faiths, the bewilderment and con-
fusion of youths and intellectuals looking for something
to believe, the
frustrations of submerged nationalities seeking a place in the sun, and
the vast discontent of the millions who have learned that poverty
ch and disease are no longer the inevitable lot of all but a small privileged
class
. There the fanatics have found their chance. Those who in a
2
WI
ng
ero
we
ed
1-
ms
It
ad
See Poreign Relations of the United States, 1932, vol. IV, pp. 672–728, and
415900-57-Vol. 2-50
2434
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
19
mi
Cr
m
SE
es
able to exploit the vast physical, spiritual, and intellectual unhappiness ha
of our era to build brutal, terroristic totalitarianisms characteristically ir
combining immense military forces and dreams of world domination se
with fantastic dogmas of self-justification.
It is in the disillusionment and despair of so many human beings
that the fundamental danger lies, that the real challenge exists for we
those with the means of alleviating to some degree the conditions that com
make for such disillusionment and despair. It is in this endeavor we go
believe that Japan can in time find its most important mission. The th
Japanese, with their productive capacities and their technical and F
scientific skills, have the potential of contributing importantly, as we
have tried to contribute, to relieving the largely voiceless despair of
the hundreds of millions of Asia and of helping them to build a toler på
able and rewarding future. To make headway in this task will strain
the resources of the free peoples. Japanese resources of mind and skildr
cannot be dispensed with.
In speaking of Japan's role as a great industrial nation-or our role
for that matter—I do not mean to suggest that for all ills there are
materialistic solutions. What I do contend is that when we bring B
peace to those who have lived amid the terrors of war and riot, when
we bring medicines to those who are sick and food to those who are
hungry, there is never any question in our hearts that we are engaged no
in a great work with a meaning and consequences transcending the
material.
f
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION
What Japan can contribute in the future must obviously depend
on her state of health. The facts about Japan's economic situation
stand out in bold relief and are doubtless already well known to you.
The recovery of Japanese production has been one of the outstanding
phenomena of the postwar years. It is now 50 percent more than i
was in 1940. On the other hand, there is the alarming situation of
Japanese trade. Japan must import 20 percent of its food. Last
year there was a failure of the rice crop in Japan. Very little more
1
rice was produced in 1953 than in 1934, when there was also a crop
failure. But when in 1934 the population of Japan was 60 million
now it is 87 million. Last year the greater part of what Japan earmen
by selling her products abroad went to buy food from abroad. With
the continuing increase in Japan's population, the abnormal conditions
of 1953 may become normal.
It is, of course, not in food alone that Japan is unable to supply her
own needs. Japan is lacking in most of the natural resources required
by an industrial nation, particularly coal and iron. These must be
also bought from abroad. Japan must sell abroad in increasing
amounts,
but Japan's
exports have been shrinking. Last year Japanis
exports and its earnings from its shipping amounted to about $1
billion while its imports stood at over $2 billion. Almost nine-tentas
of the difference was made up by U.S. expenditures in Japan incident
to the Korean war and the stationing of American troops in Japan.
Such expenditures by the United States will not go on indefinitely
SU
02
1)
SO
W
at
07
P
Q
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2435
100
WO
are
barriers to international trade will also in itself tend to increase the
productivity and hence the purchasing power of the trading nations
will lead to further international trade.
les however. The plain fact is that Japan is living beyond her earnings
ally from normal sources by about a billion dollars a year. Japan must
sell much more abroad. If she is unable to do so we shall be back in
1930—with differences that are apparent to us all.
ngs Trade with Communist China is not the answer. If all restrictions
for were removed, we believe such trade would only slightly affect Japan's
bat commercial deficit; and to the extent that Japan supplied strategic
We goods to augment Communist China's war potential —which is what
The the Chinese Communists want-Japan would be sowing the whirlwind.
und For above anything else, the Chinese Communists would like to under-
mine or overpower Japan.
of It is also not enough to say that Japan can find a natural trading
ler partner in Southeast Asia. Certainly Southeast Asia needs Japanese
ain manufactured goods. It is buying them at the rate of several hun-
kill dred million dollars a year. This amount could, of course, be in-
creased by devices to tie Southeast Asia's economy to Japan. But
ole these are out of the question. Japan's products must compete for
are markets on their merits. And other countries-notably Great
ing Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States--are also
en seeking to expand their trade with Southeast Asia.
What then is the answer? Here is what the Japanese tell us. After
ged noting that there are difficult and stubborn internal problems they
the themselves must solve, they say “The Japanese nation . . . can
exert very little control over the elements which are shackling her
foreign trade. These problems-undeveloped or unavailable nearby
supply sources, unstable export markets, inconvertibility of foreign
end currencies, tariff and export-import quota limitations--are primarily
in the field of international relations and their solution is dependent
upon the development of goodwill and cooperation between the
sovereign nations of the free world . .
ing
The United States is the
greatest economic power in the world today. Actions taken by the
of U.S. Government, which appear to the average American situated in
his powerful economy to be minor
and unimportant, may have a
tremendous effect upon the economies of other, less stable countries.
OP
Therefore, the foreign economic policy of the United States is of
worldwide significance.”
NEED FOR INCREASED PURCHASING POWER
th
I think we must admit the force of what the Japanese say. I might
add one thing. I would say that what is most required, if the econ-
enemies of Japan and other nations dependent on a large volume of
ed foreign trade are to be viable, is a continuing rise in the purchasing
be
power of the free world—and particularly, so far as Japan is con-
cerned, in Southeast Asia. This can be accomplished by increasing
i capital investment and continued technological progress. Removing
11
most efficiently. At the same time, this increased purchasing power
}
100
2u.
ast
ore
ON
ed
DS
hs
I.
2436
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
SUB
WI
*
IS
m
W
minority could take in their stride and that the consuming public
The report of the Randall Commission on United States Foreign
Economic Policy released last week makes important recommendations th
on the subjects we are discussing. Among these are that our tech-
nical cooperation program be pressed forward vigorously, that our
u
Government contribute all it can to the creation abroad of a climate
conducive to private foreign investment, and that our Government in
extend loans to countries where substantial economic aid is necessary
in our interests and cannot be provided by private or international
sources. I might add that it is by applying such policies as these to th
Southeast Asia that we could do most to bring about an increasingly
fruitful economic relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan
.
But the recommendations of the Randall Commission with the closest
bearing on our policy toward Japan are that our customs procedure
should be simplified and that the President should be authorized to
reduce our tariffs by 5 percent per year for 3 years and to effect larger
reductions in the case of goods on which the tariff is manifestly dis
proportionately high. We have lowered our tariffs but we must
lower them further, not out of charity for foreign producers but in
appreciation of our self-interest. The economic gains of trade be-
tween two countries accrue to both. Every dollar Japan makes selling m
to us she will spend buying from us.
PO
Moreover—and this might be even more significant—the enactment
of trade agreement legislation enabling the United States to take the
P!
lead in reducing world trade barriers generally would be of tremendous
assistance to Japan. The Japanese Government has taken the view
that its accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ?
inelegantly known as Gattby which the participating nations guar ca
antee one another most-favored-nation treatment, would be the most u
beneficial single step Japan could take toward obtaining guarantes
of nondiscriminatory treatment for its exports. We agree
. Also of $
great significance in Japan's foreign trade prospects would be the op
portunity for Japan to enter into trade agreement negotiations with
the individual contracting parties to Gatt for the purpose of reducing a
tariffs on a reciprocal basis. It is essential that the United States
continue to lead other countries in such multilateral efforts.
fo
Quite apart, however, from the matter of profit in international
trade, we must consider the paramount interest we have in the eco
nomic health of the free nations. The economic collapse of Japan
, p
with all the consequences that must follow from it, could mean some
thing like disaster for the free world. There is no excuse for us no
1954 will be more crucial than those we make with respect to our treat-
ment of imports. The issue at stake is the same issue that was a
stake on the battlefields of Korea: the defense and strengthening i
the free world. We shall see it demonstrated whether it is easier il !
our society to send 30,000 of our youths to their death or to expose
ou
domestic producers to an increased competition that all but a smal
IN
SI
9.9
8
8
0
S
C
1 Report of Jan. 23, 1954; H. Doc. 290, 83d Cong., 2d sess.
2 See statement of July 22, 1955, by the Department of State; infra, doc. 58
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2437
also infra, pp. 3039-3042.
SAIT
Jan.
sest
Taking into consideration the support that the Government of the
[ the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the
* TIAS 2957; 5 UST 661. Entered into force May 1, 1954.
sign would benefit from. This is putting the question in harsh terms, but
ions the realities we face are themselves of an unrelenting harshness.
och- I have set forth in general terms what our policy is toward Japan
our up to the present and I have suggested what many well-informed
Date persons believe is required in the future. Both the Japanese and we
lent in the United States are facing crucial decisions. What we must hope
is that these decisions will be made in the two countries on the basis
mal of the actual alternatives that offer and with full regard for the realities
e to that mean so much to us both.
Lght
ires 55. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT,
I to
MARCH 8, 1954 1
ger
dis-
The Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
lust ment of Japan,
te in
Desiring to foster international peace and security, within the frame-
be work of the Charter of the United Nations, through voluntary arrange-
ling ments which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter to develop effective measures for
eat Individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and
Reaffirming their belief as stated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan
signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 2 that Japan
as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or
Dar collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the
Recalling the preamble of the Security Treaty between the United
of States of America and Japan, signed at the city of San Francisco on
September 8, 1951,3 to the effect that the United States of America,
in the interest of peace and security, would maintain certain of its
og armed forces in and about
Japan as a provisional arrangement in the
tes expectation that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility
zna
for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always
avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve
other than to promote peace and security in accordance
with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
Recognizing that, in the planning of a defense assistance program
in for Japan, economic stability will be an essential element for
con-
sideration in the development of its defense capacities, and that Japan
at
can contribute only to the extent permitted by its general economic
al
186
the principles;
OUS
ler
2
Lost United Nations;
ceas
21
ne
le condition and capacities;
4
%
Supra, pp. 425-440.
• Supra, pp. 885–886.
.
Act of Oct. 6, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356-1364. See
2438
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
SU
ARTICLE I
TE
13
P
mn
0
fo
D
In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of
Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, which provide for the
furnishing of defense assistance by the United States of America ir
furtherance of the objectives referred to above; and
Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing
of such assistance;
J
Have agreed as follows:
1. Each Government, consistently with the principle that economi:
di
stability is essential to international peace and security, will make
fu
available to the other and to such other governments as the two
Governments signatory to the present Agreement may in each can
agree upon, such equipment, materials, services, or other assistance
as the Government furnishing such assistance may authorize, in
accordance with such detailed arrangements as may be made between
them. The furnishing and use of any such assistance as may
be
authorized by either Government shall be consistent with the Charter
of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available
by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to the
present Agreement will be furnished under those provisions, and
subject to all of those terms, conditions and termination provisions
of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the Mutual Security
Act of 1951, acts amendatory and supplementary thereto, and appr-
priation acts thereunder which may affect the furnishing of such
assistance.
2. Each Government will make effective use of assistance received
pursuant to the present Agreement for the purposes of promoting
peace and security in a manner that is satisfactory to both Govera-
ments, and neither Government, without the prior consent of the
other, will devote such assistance to any other purpose.
3. Each Government will offer for return to the other, in accordano
with terms, conditions and procedures mutually agreed upon, equip
ment or materials furnished under the present Agreement, except
equipment and materials furnished on terms requiring reimbursement
and no longer required for the purposes for which it was originally
made available.
4. In the interest of common security, each Government undertakes
not to transfer to any person not an officer or agent of such Govern
ment, or to any other government, title to or possession of any equip
ment, materials, or services received pursuant to the present
Agres
ment, without the prior consent of the Government which furnished
such assistance.
Japan agrees to facilitate the production and transfer to the Goveri
ment of the United
States of America for such
period of time, in such
quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upor
of raw and semiprocessed materials required by the United States kr
Svona
in
8
m
A
r
ARTICLE II
1 Act of Oct. 10, 1951; infra, pp. 3059-3086.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2439
a in
the America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own
sin resources, and which may be available in Japan. Arrangements for
such transfers shall give due regard to requirements for domestic
hing
use and commercial export as determined by the Government of
Japan.
ARTICLE III
1. Each Government will take such security measures as may be
agreed upon between the two Governments in order to prevent the
me disclosure or compromise of classified articles, services or information
lake
furnished by the other Government pursuant to the present Agree-
2. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent
with security to keep the public informed of operations under the
present Agreement.
TIFO
ment.
Case
2006
; 11
Teen
o be
erter
ARTICLE IV
ARTICLE V
two Governments will, upon the request of either of them,
able make appropriate arrangements providing for the methods and terms
the of the exchange of industrial property rights and technical information
and for defense which will expedite such exchange and at the same time
100 protect private interests and maintain security safeguards.
arity
pro-
such
The two Governments will consult for the purpose of establishing
procedures whereby the Government of Japan will so deposit, segre-
ting
gate
, or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any
programs of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United
the
States of America so that such funds shall not be subject to garnish-
ment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm,
ne agency, corporation, organization or government, when the Govern-
zip-
ment of Japan is advised by the Government of the United States of
America that any such legal process would interfere with the attain-
ent
;
ment of the objectives of the program of assistance.
ally
ived
ern-
ARTICLE VI
akes
ern
wp-
Tet
lied
1. The Government of Japan will grant
a. Exemption from duties and internal taxation upon importation
or exportation to materials, supplies or equipment imported
into or exported from its territory under the present Agree-
ment or any similar agreement between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of any
other country receiving assistance, except as otherwise agreed
to; and
b. Exemption from and refund of Japanese taxes, as enumerated
in the attached
Annex E, so far as they may affect expendi-
tures of or financed by the Government of the United States
of America effected in Japan for procurement of materials,
tol
uch
POI
sol
* Not printed here.
2440
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
of the free world, take all reasonable measures which may be needed
to
th
of
un
m
CO
CO
maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength
facilities and general economic condition to the development and
supplies, equipment and services under the present Agreement
or any similar agreement between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of any other
country receiving assistance.
2. Exemption from duties and exemption from and refund d
Japanese taxes as enumerated in the attached Annex E will apply,
in addition, to any other expenditures of or financed by the Gover to
ment of the United States of America for materials, supplies
, equip st
ment and services for mutual defense, including expenditures made
in conformity with the Security Treaty between the United States
of America and Japan or any foreign aid program of the Government
of the United States of America under the Mutual Security Act of
1951, as amended, or any acts supplementary, amendatory or sue-
cessory thereto.
ARTICLE VII
1. The Government of Japan agrees to receive personnel of the
Government of the United States of America who will discharge in
the territory of Japan the responsibilities of the latter Government
regarding equipment, materials, and services furnished under the
present Agreement, and who will be accorded facilities to observe the be
progress of the assistance furnished by the Government of the United
States of America under the present Ågreement. Such personnel who
are nationals of the United States of America, including personnel
temporarily assigned, will, in their relationships with the Government
of Japan, operate as part of the Embassy of the United States of
America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplo A
matic Mission, and will have the same privileges and immunities as
are accorded to other personnel with corresponding rank in the
Embassy of the United States of America.
2. The Government of Japan will make available, from time to
time, to the Government of the United States of America funds in
yen for the administrative and
related expenses of the latter Govern-
ment in connection with carrying out the present Agreement.
P
The Government of Japan, reaffirming its determination to jamº
in promoting international understanding and good will, and man
taining world peace, to take such action as may be mutually agreed d
upon to eliminate causes of international tension, and to fulfil the
military obligations which the Government
of Japan has assume
under the Security Treaty
between the United States of America and
Japan, will make, consistent with the political and economic stability
of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its
manpower
, resources
TE
IC
W
01
2 A
el
TE
ARTICLE VIII
en
Di
,
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2441
I
nent
to develop its defense capacities, and take appropriate steps to ensure
the
the effective utilization of any assistance provided by the Government
other of the United States of America.
ARTICLE IX
of
oply 1. Nothing contained in the present Agreement shall be construed
reni to alter or otherwise modify the Security Treaty between the United
(up States of America and Japan or any arrangements concluded there-
nade under.
Ates
2. The present Agreement will be implemented by each Govern-
nentment in accordance with the constitutional provisions of the respective
ut of countries.
SUC-
ARTICLE X
dent
ARTICLE XI
plo-
1
SAS
1. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them
consult regarding any matter relating to the application of the present
Agreement or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to
e in the present Agreement.
2. The terms of the present Agreement may be reviewed at the
the
request of either of the two Governments or amended by agreement
the between them at any time.
ited
who
nnel
1. The present Agreement shall come into force on the date of
sent
$ of
receipt by the Government of the United States of America of a
written notice from the Government of Japan of ratification of the
Agreement by Japan.
the
2. The present Agreement will thereafter continue in force until
one year after the date of receipt by either Government of a written
notice of the intention of the other to terminate it, provided that the
to
provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and arrangements
entered into under Article III, paragraph 1 and Article IV shall
remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.
3. The Annexes ? to the present Agreement shall form an integral
part thereof.
4. The present Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat
cin of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the representatives of the two Governments,
the
duly authorized for the purpose, have
signed the present Agreement
Done in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both
equally authentic, at Tokyo, this eighth
day of March, one thousand
ity
5
2011-
ዝD-
ged
ned
nd
nine hundred fifty-four.
es
nd
eth
1 May 1, 1954.
* Not reprinted here.
2442
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
0
ec
go
gi
W
AL
u
Japan makes so well and which also produce food and raw material
our surplus food crops and to do so on terms which would be liberal
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, pp. 264–265. See also addres
of Jan. 14, 1954, by Frank A. Waring, Counselor for Economic Affairs at the
56. ECONOMIC POSITION OF JAPAN: Statements by the
Secretary of State at a News Conference, August 10, 1954
B
The United States recognizes that one of the major postwar prob-
lems is the problem of finding opportunities whereby Japan, with it
large and industrious population, can find a way to earn a useful and
profitable living in the world.
Japan itself possesses very few natural resources, and it does not
produce enough food for its people. It produces normally about 8i
percent of the foodstuffs that the people require. This year it pro-
duced somewhat less because there was a bad failure of the rice crop
.
That means the Japanese have to be importing goods and raw ma-
h!
terials and manufacturing raw materials into articles which the rest
th
of the world needs. Goods which are distinctly of Japanese origa
generally pay rather high tariff duties throughout the world because
Japan has not been heretofore brought into the Gatt organization
,
nor does it benefit from the reductions which have been made in tarif 5
rates in favor of the distinctive products of many other countries
.
It is the hope of the United States that steps may be taken to im.
prove the opportunities for Japanese trade, not just in the United
States, I will emphasize, but in other countries of the world where
there are actually more natural markets for much of what Japan pro
duces. There is no necessity actually to increase largely Japanes
imports to the United States. What is needed, rather, is to try to find
other areas of the world where the type of goods which Japan produces
will be able to find markets.
The problem is a many-sided one. The negotiation of a trade agreb-
ment on a multilateral basis is one angle to the problem. Another
angle to the problem is the need for an austerity program in Japan,
which has been lacking somewhat over recent years but which seems
to be taking shape at the present time. Also there is the importane
of developing markets in Asia, particularly in the Southeast Asia area
where there are large populations which need the kind of things which
which Japan needs.
All of these aspects of the problem need to be explored and I hope
will be explored.
Asked whether, in view of the fact that the administration asked for an
economic assistance for Japan this year, it may be necessary for
United States to reconsider the possibility of some direct assistance
AS
Japan this year, Mr. Dulles replied:
It is possible, but we do not think that that will be necessary.
may be desirable to make available some foodstuffs to Japan out of
American at , ,
- See statement of Jan. 29, 1954
, by the Department of State; ibid., Feb.
1954, pp. 154–155.
to
0
0
C
t
t
I.
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2443
situation in detail. It was agreed that the economic well-being of the
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 22, 1954, pp. 765–766.
!
s not
mia-
rest
ause
GLOR,
3.
Representatives of both governments discussed Japan's economic
the from the standpoint of payment possibly in terms of local currency.
But we do not anticipate the necessity for any economic aid to Japan,
on the assumption that the Japanese handle their own fiscal and com-
proh
mercial affairs with prudence and firmness.
h its
It seems to us the situation can be dealt with without any direct
I and
economic aid. There is, of course, a certain amount of assistance that
goes to Japan through our contribution to their enlarged security pro-
gram. There are still a substantial number of U.S. troops in Japan
it 80
who are spending money there. In that way there is a considerable
amount of what you might call invisible exports to Japan which runs
pro-
up into terms of several hundred million dollars. This is not nearly
crop
.
big as it was at the height of the Korean War, when there were
heavy purchases in Japan for use in Korea. There is a certain decline
there, but the figure is still quite a substantial one.
rigu
tarif 57. REVIEW OF AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS: Joint
Statement by the President of the United States and the Prime
i im-
Minister of Japan, November 10, 1954 1
nited
there
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Yoshida met on Novem-
paper ber 9 and reaffirmed the spirit of friendly cooperation characterizing
ne the relations between the United States and Japan. The Prime Min-
find
ister also met with Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Treasury
Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Wilson, and Director Stassen of the
Foreign Operations Administration. The Prime Minister and Secre-
entary Dulles at their meetings this week, after a full and frank exchange
of views on matters of mutual interest, reviewed the conversations
held during
the past 3 weeks by representatives of the two governments.
I
The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the solidarity
and determination of the free nations had greatly advanced the cause
of world peace. They declared that their governments would, in
nop cooperation with the free nations of Asia, continue their united efforts
to maintain and promote the peace and prosperity of Asia. The Prime
Minister reaffirmed his Government's determination to make a full
of the contribution to those efforts and in particular stressed Japan's desire
ce to
cooperate, wherever possible, in the development of economic
strength by the free nations of Asia.
The President and the Prime Minister declared that the goals of
their governments
are peaceful and
that their peoples desire peace and
liberty for themselves and their neighbors.
II
duces
ther
ems
ance
ares
hich
rials
to
It
tot
eral
dresi
the
.
2444
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
m
beca
term
tions of free governments in Asia, the request of Japan for expedited ules)
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands in the light of the present international
State Bulletin, Mar. 29, 1954, p. 466); statement by the American Ambassador
1 See statement by the Department of State, Mar. 17, 1954 (Department of
at Tokyo, Apr. 9, 1954 (ibid., Apr. 19, 1954, pp. 598–599); and note from the
American Ambassador to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Jan. 4, 1955 (ibid,
Japanese people is a matter of importance to the entire free world
58.
The achievement of improved economic conditions in Japan depends G
partly upon the ability of the Japanese people themselves to pursue
sound and constructive internal monetary and other economic policies
and partly upon Japan's ability to expand its trade with other coun
T
tries. By various means since the end of the war the United States
effed
has been able to contribute substantially to the economic progres Jepe
which Japan has achieved. The United States is aware of the efforts
Prot
which Japan is making to solve its difficult economic problems and wil
Stat
continue to examine sympathetically means whereby it can assist the
the
Japanese people to advance their well-being.
A number of specific measures were discussed in the recent talks.
thir
General agreement was reached that the United States would 0-
favo
operate with Japan in its efforts to expand its foreign trade and
achieve a better balance in its foreign economic relations. It was
entr
further agreed that the United States would sell to Japan agricultural
8h81
commodities and that a substantial portion of the proceeds of these
pub
sales will be used for Japan's domestic economic improvement and
Deg
defense support and for regional economic development. Other steps
A
were discussed, such as the establishment of a productivity program bety
in Japan and the mutual benefits which might arise from Japan's
participation with the other free nations of South and Southeast Asia
in the economic development of that area. Both sides agreed that
these measures would be of marked benefit to Japan by improving 230
its economic position and facilitating its efforts to attain a higher
standard of living.
Apr
III
T
United States representatives expressed regret over the incidentes
on March 1 in which 23 Japanese fishermen were injured–que
in t
fatally by the fall-out of radioactive materials following
test in the Pacific. They emphasized their belief that peaceful uses
The
of atomic energy would be steadily developed and would eventual
become of great value to Japan and other friendly nations throughout
the world.
IV
There was also discussion of the disposition of Japanese
vested by the United States, and representatives of the United
States hang
stated that this matter is under consideration. Among other subjects
reviewed were Communist efforts to weaken and discredit the opera
Islands of former inhabitants.
cert
of J
men
whi
nuclear
bot]
thes
the
11
assets
Aug
4
sion
1
17, 1955, pp. 90–91).
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2445
ITSU
OU:
Tas
4
sions (Department of State publication 5881; 1955).
world. 38. BENEFICENT EFFECT OF JAPAN'S ACCESSION TO THE
tends GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: State-
ment by the Department of State, July 22, 1955 1
licies
The President on July 22, 1955, signed a proclamation ? to give
tates
effect to the results of the recent negotiations for the accession of
gress
Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Under the
forts
Protocol for the Accession of Japan, which was signed for the United
1
States on June 8, 1955, Japan will become a Contracting Party and
t the
the concessions negotiated between the United States and Japan will
become effective on September 10, 1955, if by August 11, 1955, two-
alks
1 com
thirds of the Contracting Parties to the general agreement have cast
and
favorable votes on a decision for the accession of Japan under the
terms of the protocol. The proclamation provides that the date of
tural
entry into force of the concessions negotiated by the United States
shall be notified by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury and
and
published in the Federal Register. An analysis of the results of these
negotiations was issued by the Department of State on June 9, 1955.
steps
As a result of the provisions of the exclusive trade agreement
TAM
between the United States and Cuba, concluded on October 30, 1947,
Asis
certain reductions in rates negotiated in connection with the accession
that
of Japan will result in the elimination of the preferential tariff treat-
Ting
ment now enjoyed by like Cuban products. There follows on page
230 a list of these Cuban products indicating the changes in duty
which will result from the entry into force of the Protocol for the
The proclamation also provides that effect shall be given to con-
dent
cessions negotiated with Canada and the Benelux countries (Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg) as compensation for statutory increases
in the duty on fish sticks and on certain rubber-soled footwear, on
both of which concessions had been granted in the general agreement.
The proclamation provides that the date of the entry into force of
these compensatory concessions shall be notified by the President to
the Secretary of the Treasury and published in the Federal Register.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 8, 1955, p. 226;
See also statement of
Sell Aug, 22, 1955, by the Department of State and President Eisenhower's memo-
randum of that date to the Secretary of the Treasury; ibid., Sept. 5, 1955, p. 397.
120 Fed. Reg
. 5379; Department of State Bulletin, 'Aug. 8, 1955, pp. 226–231.
* TIAS 3438; 6 UST 5833.
lited nules
) for Accession of Japan - Analysis of Renegotiations of Certain Tarif Conces-
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--Analysis of Protocol (including sched-
*TIAS 1703; 61 Stat., pt. 4, p. 3699.
pan's
Accession of Japan.
One
clear
USES
lally
hout
cates
jects
vera-
the
ona!
onir
ut of
adar
the
ibid,
2446
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
defei
the Foreign Minister, recognizing the desirability of closer cooperation
their Governments should continue on various problems of mutual rel
2 See The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–29, 1955 (Depart-
ment of State publication 6046; 1955); and supra, pp. 111-114, 1887-1897 and
3 See The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955
(Department of State publication 6156; 1955); and supra, pp. 115–122, 1897-
59. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE CAPACITY OF JAPAN:
Th
Forei
Joint Statement by the Secretary of State and the Japanese
Foreign Minister, August 31, 1955 1
reach
that
Mamoru Shigemitsu, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
limit
of Japan, has concluded three days of discussions with Secretary of Japa
State John Foster Dulles and other high United States officials
.
The Foreign Minister was accompanied among others by Ichin in th
State
Kono, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Nobusuke Kishi
, Secre-
tary-General of the Japan Democratic Party; Ambassador to the time
United States Sadao Iguchi; Ambassador Toshikazu Kase, Japan's
It
Permanent Observer to the United Nations; and Takizo Matsumoto
, coop
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary.
тарі
American officials in addition to the Secretary of State who met hom
with the Foreign Minister and members of his party included: Unde peae
Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr.; Deputy Secretary of Defense when
Reuben "B. Robertson, Jr.; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf repla
W
Admiral Arthur W. Radford; Mr. John Hollister, Director of the
International Cooperation Administration; Deputy Under Secretary angre
of State Robert Murphy; Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon and
Gray; Ambassador to Japan John M. Allison; and Acting Assistent such
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William J. Sebald.
forc
A free and frank exchange of views from the global viewpoint was
held concerning more recent international developments, notably the act
0
implications of the "Summit” meeting at Geneva, the
present United
Uni
Nations discussions on disarmament, and the impending Conference
of
of Foreign Ministers at Geneva.3 The Far Eastern situation was
also discussed. Secretary Dulles explained the policy of the United men
T
States to support freedom firmly while exploring patiently, every
wit
avenue which
may lead to the
enhancement of general peace. Foreign
for
Minister Shigemitsu drew on his experience in the Soviet Union and
China in interpreting his nation's policies. The Secretary of State
S
and the Foreign Minister concurred in the view that while the imme-
the
diate danger of major war had perhaps receded there still remain
Un
elements of uncertainty in the situation, particularly in the Far Est,
and that the continued solidarity
of the free world is needed to main pla
pos
tain improved prospects of peace.
the
The Foreign Minister expressed Japan's resolve to maintain co-
operation with the United States and the free world as the cornerstone
of its foreign policy. In this connection the Secretary of State and
the
enduring peace in the Far East, agreed that consultations between
concern.
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 12, 1955, pp. 419-420.
2005–2016, and 2841-2843.
2018–2039.
me!
for
are
ex
1
ecc
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2447
AN:
nese
CTA-
an's
met
ense
economic assistance rendered to Japan during the occupation and
The basic problems of Japanese security were discussed. The
Foreign Minister indicated that Japan's defense strength has now
reached a considerable level and expressed the firm determination
that the policy of progressive increase will be continued within the
ister
limit of Japan's capacity. He explained the plans for increasing
Japan's defense capabilities recently formulated by the Japanese
defense authorities. It was agreed that these plans should be studied
hir
in the course of the continuing consultations in Tokyo on United
States-Japanese defense relationships and should be reviewed from
the time to time in the light of strategic requirements.
It was agreed that efforts should be made, whenever practicable on a
oto
, cooperative basis, to establish conditions such that Japan could, as
rapidly as possible, assume primary responsibility for the defense of its
homeland and be able to contribute to the preservation of international
oder peace and security in the Western Pacific. It was also agreed that
when such conditions are brought about it would be appropriate to
starf replace the present Security Treatyl with one of greater mutuality,
the With the conclusion of such a treaty as an objective, it was further
larg agreed that consultations would take place in Tokyo between Japanese
don and United States representatives on defense problems and that in
Ant
such consultations consideration will be given to the establishment of
schedules for the progressive withdrawal of United States ground
forces as Japan's own defense capacity increases and taking into
the account the related situation in Asia.
ited On the problem of Japan's financial contribution to the support of
United States forces in Japan, there was agreement on the desirability
of establishing a general formula for progressive reduction over the
Fery
The Foreign Minister emphasized Japan's need to expand its trade
eigu with other countries particularly in Asia and expressed appreciation
for the help of the United States in assisting Japan to become a full
member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.
Secretary Dulles expressed current thinking about assistance for
the economic development of the free nations of Asia pursuant to
ist
, United States legislation. It was recognized that the measures
planned would facilitate Japan's efforts to improve its economic
position and attain a higher standard of living. The Secretary stressed
the contribution to economic development which could be made by
foreign private investment both in Japan and in other countries of the
Tid
The Foreign Minister requested the early release of war criminals
nd under United States jurisdiction. The Secretary of State described
the complexity of the problem and indicated that the question of the
release of the war criminals will be kept under
continuous and urgent
It was agreed that no major obstacles remain to settlement for
WAS
enca
WAS
Eted next several years:
and
cate
2
me
ain
11-
CO-
une
area.
OD
en
examination.
at
and
Supra, pp. 885–886.
* See statement of July 22, 1955, by the Department of State; supra.
2448
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
att
spec
2 See Secretary Hay's instruction of Sept. 6, 1899, to the American Ambassador
in Great Britain and his circular instructions of Mar. 20, 1900, and July 3, 1900;
that utmost efforts will be made to bring the negotiations in Tokyo their
on this subject between the two Governments to an early conclusion
Forg
Throughout these talks the representatives of the United States
Stat
and Japan recognized that Japan, as a major power in Asia, should whic
play an active role in friendly cooperation with other Asian nations in
ried
contributing to stability and peace in Asia. They agreed that in vier
of Japan's efforts to establish internal stability, reconstruct the ne-
Ford
tional economy and strengthen its defense capacity, there is a forma
for
basis for continuing cooperation between the United States and Japan
have
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Secretary of State Dulles confirmed
T
anew the determination of their Governments to expand this relation-
othe
ship further so that they together and with others may pursue their
work for the consolidation of world peace and freedom.
at t
forc
erni
civi
S
E. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON FORMOSA
aid
(TAIWAN) AND COMMUNIST CHINA
Stat
ther
defe
Immediate Results of Communist Seizure of Mainland con
China, 1950
61
60. UNITED STATES POLICY RESPECTING THE STATUS 01
FORMOSA (TAIWAN): Statement by the President, January
1950 1
I
The United States Government has always stood for good faith in
international relations. Traditional United States policy toward of
China, as exemplified in the open-door policy, called for internatione For
respect for the territorial integrity of China. This principle I
recently reaffirmed in the United Nations General Assembly resolution
oft
of December 8, 1949, which, in part, calls on all states-
To refrain from (a) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign
que
.controlled regimes within the territory of China; (b) seeking to obtain special
tha
rights or privileges within the territory of China.3
A specific application of the foregoing principles is seen in the
present situation
with respect to Formosa. In the joint declaration di De
Cairo on December 1, 1943, the President of the United States, the
British Prime Minister, and the President of China stated that it was
1. A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 727-728.
of e
a
dire
WAS
SUCI
tho
1
2
3
194
II
,
(Department of State publication 3573; 1949), pp. 414-417.
3 Res. 291 (IV); A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 726–727.
4 Ibid., p. 22.
3
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2449
Department of State Bulletin, Jan, 16, 1950, pp. 79-81.
ISION,
1
Vien
ena-
1
rnier
thoughts, and speech of the American people. For the past week or
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 49–50.
* Instrument of surrender, Sept. 2, 1945; ibid., pp. 625-626.
1945; The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol.
okre their purpose that territories Japan had stolen from China, such as
Formosa, should be restored to the Republic of China. The United
tates
Stetes was a signatory to the Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945,
hould
which declared that the terms of the Cairo declaration should be car-
ons in ned out. The provisions of this declaration were accepted by Japan
at the time of its surrender. In keeping with these declarations, ,
Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,; and
for the past 4 years, the United States and the other Allied Powers
pa beve accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the Island.
rmed
The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any
tion
other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain
thei
special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa
at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed
forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Gov-
ernment will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the
civil conflict in China.
OSA Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military
aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United
States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable
them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the
defense of the Island. The United States Government proposes to
and continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program
of economic assistance.
61. ELABORATION OF POLICY RESPECTING THE STATUS OF
FORMOSA (TAIWAN): Remarks by the Secretary of State at
TTS
a Special News Conference, January 5, 1950 4
I am having this conference this afternoon at the request and at the
direction of the President for the purpose of going into the background
man of the statement which he made this morning on the subject of
I should like to make a few remarks on this subject for the purpose
of trying to put it in its setting
for you, and then we will get
down into
such details as you want to get into.
was the statement made at this particular time? That is a
question that arises in all of your
minds and I want to recall to you
that I have said very often in these meetings that the foreign policy
tbe of the United States is determined not merely by what the State
18 Department
says, or not even
by what the President says, and not even
the by what the Congress says, but reflects the sum total of the activities,
08
ch in
!
WA
stion
Formosa.
reigo
Why
recia
was
ador
900;
1940
II, pp. 442-445.
5 Supra.
415900--57--Vol. 2-_-51
2450
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
1
ar
su
On
DC
and you
AS
CE
10 days, this subject of Formosa has become one of the foremost
subjects of discussion throughout the country.
be
The ordinary processes of life in this town of Washington have
made their contribution. We have had leak and counterleak, gossip thi
and countergossip. We have had the contributions of distinguished Br
statesmen in the debate. We have had a great deal of talk in the pres
and on the radio. Much of that is good and much of that is desirable, go
and all of it has to go on to make the United States the democracy
that it is. But we slide very easily from discussion to the statement in
of fact. I have here a distinguished foreign newspaper dated Friday Pc
last (December 30) which announces as a fact that President Truman
has decided, et cetera, and et cetera, giving something which President
Truman had not decided and had not intended to decide. Therefore
,
what has occurred is that we have gotten a great deal of confusion C
in the minds of our own people. We have gotten a great deal of com- di
fusion in the minds of foreign people. We have stirred up a good
deal of speculation, all of which, if allowed to continue, would be highly | U
prejudicial to the interests of the United States of America. And
th
therefore, it was the President's desire to clarify the situation. He
was not primarily concerned in stating anything new,
will
find
very
little which is new in the statement. What he was interested
in doing was bringing clarity out of confusion.
ba
That, I think, gives you the background as to why it was necessary fc
to make the statement at the present time. It would have been
desirable from our point of view if the whole question of the Far
East, and all of the parts of the Far East and of Formosa, which alter K
all is a small part of the great question of the Far East, could have
been discussed very fully with members of both parties on the Hill
before any statement was made. But one has to choose in this life M
and it was more important to clarify thinking than it was to go
and have the most desirable of all possible things which is consultation
.
Now, getting down to this statement, let's be clear about one or
two things. There has been a great deal of amateur military strategy
indulged in in regard to this matter of Formosa. The underlying
factors in the decision are not in that area. They have to do with
the fundamental integrity of the United States and with maintaining b
in the world the belief that when the United States takes a position
it sticks to that position and does not change it by reason of transitory d
expediency or advantage on its part. If we are going to maintain
the free nations of the world as a great unit opposed to the encroach
ment of communism and other sorts of totalitarian aggression, the
world must believe that we stand for principle and that we are honor
able and decent people and that we do not put forward words, es
propagandists do in other countries, to serve their advantage only
to throw them overboard when some change in events makes the
position difficult for us.
We believe in integrity in our foreign relations. We believe also
in respect of the integrity of other countries. That
held by some other countries. That is a view not held by some
other countries with respect to China.
W
W
CO
to
m
re
p
su
TE
CH
F
t
& view not
8
J.
C
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2451
country had failed because of Soviet obstruction, free elections were held in South
lished, Aug. 15, 1948, as a result of these elections, was subsequently recognized by
the United States and the United Nations.
3 General Order No. 1 provided that Soviet forces should receive the Japanese
Japanese surrender in the Mandated Islands (now known as the Trust Territory
most
Dress
It is important that our position in regard to China should never
be subject to the slightest doubt or the slightest question.
have Now, what has that position been? In the middle of the war,
the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great
shed Britain, and the President of China agreed at Cairo that among the
areas stolen from China by Japan was Formosa and Formosa should
go
back to China.
As the President pointed out this morning, that statement was
nent incorporated in the declaration at Potsdam and that declaration at
Potsdam was conveyed to the Japanese as one of the terms of their
surrender and was accepted by them, and the surrender was made
dent
on that basis.
fore Shortly after that, the Island of Formosa was turned over to the
Chinese in accordance with the declarations made and with the con-
ditions of the surrender.
The Chinese have administered Formosa for 4 years. Neither the
United States nor any other ally ever questioned that authority and
And
that occupation. When Formosa was made a province of China
H: nobody raised any lawyers' doubts about that. That was regarded
will
as in accordance with the commitments.
sted
Now, in the opinion of some, the situation is changed. They
believe that the forces now in control of the mainland of China, the
forces which undoubtedly will soon be recognized by some other
countries, are not friendly to us, and therefore they want to say,
Fax "Well
, we have to wait for a treaty." We did not wait for a treaty on
after
Korea.? We did not wait for a treaty on the Kuriles. We did not
wait for a treaty on the islands over which we have trusteeship.
Hill
Whatever may be the legal situation, the United States of America,
life
,
Mr. Truman said this morning, is not going to quibble on any lawyers'
words about the integrity of its position. That is where we stand.
ion.
Therefore, the President says, we are not going to use our forces in
connection with the present situation in Formosa. We are not going
to attempt to seize the Island. We are not going to get involved
militarily in any way on the Island of Formosa. So far as I know, no
vith
responsible person in the Government, no military man has ever
ning
believed that we should involve our forces
in the island.
tion
I do not believe that is new policy. It would be new policy if we
decided to do that. The President
is affirming what so far as † know
Instrument of surrender, Sept. 2, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy,
General Order No. 1 provided that Soviet forces should receive the Japanese
surrender north of the thirty-eighth parallel and that American forces
should
the
sary
Deen
1878
3 00
e or
TEST
tain
the
pp. 625-626.
2
2150
not
me
surrender in the Kuriles.
General Order No. 1 provided that American forces should receive the
of the Pacific Islands).
2452
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
OV
VO.
an
in the unlikely and unhappy event that our forces might be attacked
has been the view of his Administration, and the unquestioned view | 62.
ever since I have known about it.
The President goes on to say that we do not intend to give military
assistance or advice, that is matériel and military people, to the forces
on Formosa, and he says why. He says that there are resources on
that Island which are adequate to enable those on the island to obtain
whatever necessary military supplies they believe they have to have. tod
That is against a background of very considerable gifts on our part at St.
a time when the Government on Formosa was recognized by everybody tre
as the Government of China and was in control of a very large part of th
China. We gave vast amounts of military equipment to that gov-
ernment after the war up until 1948. In 1948 another act of Con-
gress ? was passed, and 125 million dollars of military equipment was thi
turned over.
rig
That is not where the difficulty lies in maintaining the Island by the
forces on it. It is not that they lack rifles or ammunition or that, ii
they do have any deficiencies in any of those, they cannot purchase in
what they need. That is not the trouble. The trouble lies elsewhere
,
CH
and it is not the function of the United States nor will it or can it PRE
attempt to furnish a will to resist and a purpose for resistance to those
who must provide for themselves.
Ar
That is the background of this statement. The President goes on for
to say that in regard to economic assistance which we have been tica
furnishing, we will furnish it for as long as the legislation that
Congress has passed permits us to. Whether that legislation will be
extended or not, I don't wish to prejudice this afternoon. That is a
matter for discussion with the leaders, and for action by the Congress
.
We have been, through the ECA, conducting programs one of which
has resulted in all the fertilizer necessary for the spring crop on the
St
Island of Formosa. Others have been
the purchase of necessary oil is
for refining on the Island and for running the power plants and other th
things on the Island. Other programs have had to do with keeping de
their power plants and other factories in repair and in operation
.
Those are going forward.
Now those are the main statements of background which I wish
to make. I am informed by Mr. McDermott that some of you
me to say what if any significance is to be attached to the sentence in
the next-to-last paragraph of the statement which says, "The United
Pe
States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish
military bases on Formosa at this time." The question is, what does
that phrase "at this time” mean.
That phrase does not qualify or
modify or weaken the fundamental policies stated
in this declaration
by the President in any respect. It is a recognition of the fact that
whatever action in whatever area is necessary for its own security.
with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1974-1949 (Department of State
1 See summary of U.S. aid for the period 1937–1949; United States Relatione
publication 3573; 1949), pp. 1042–1053.
2 Act of Apr. 3, 1948; ibid., pp. 991–993.
3 See economic cooperation agreement of July 3, 1948; ibid., pp. 994–1001
.
WI
9.r
ICE
SO)
wish
m
of
an
re
fu
Re
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2453
1
WAS
lase
ere,
Dit
LOSA
recovering "this type of real property right.”
Relations of the United States, 1901, Appendix, pp. 316, 330-331.
3 Treaty of Jan. 11, 1943 (TS 984; 57 Stat., pt. 2, p. 767).
4 See Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 26, 1949, pp. 955–957.
See ibid., Dec. 12, 1949, p. 908.
62. RECALL OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL FROM
1e1
COMMUNIST CHINA: Statement by the Department of State,
ary
January 14, 1950 (Excerpts)
rces
son Chinese Communist authorities in Peiping have ordered the taking
tain over of United States Government consular property in Peiping and
ive today have seized that property in defiance of protests by the United
tæt States Government. This seizure is in violation of long standing
ody treaty rights granted the United States in 1901 ? and reaffirmed in
tof the Sino-United States treaty of 1943 by which the United States
Ov-voluntarily relinquished its extraterritorial rights in China.
on-
The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of
this situation, which constitutes a flagrant violation of our treaty
rights and of the most elementary standards of international usage
the and conduct.
t, if
The seizure was carried out despite our protests and our announced
intention to withdraw all American official personnel from Communist
China if the Chinese Communists attempted to seize our office and
properties,
The Department is now preparing instructions for the recall of all
American official personnel from Communist China. Arrangements
for the withdrawal of our official personnel will be made as expedi-
tiously as possible and when completed our official
establishments
hat
will be closed. Any
facilities for evacuation from China which are
be arranged for our official personnel will be made available for all Amer-
ican citizens who desire to depart.
This violation of American consular property has arisen in almost
hich
immediate sequence to the harsh and unjustified treatment of United
the
States Consul General
Angus Ward
and his staff at Mukden. It also
oil
is one in the long series of mistreatment of Americans, which included
cher
the beating of Vice Consul Olive in Shanghai and the continued
ning detention of Messrs. Smith and Bender, United States Navy per-
sonnel.
The background of this unprecedented act by the Chinese Com-
ein
munists is as follows:
On January 6, the Chinese Communist military authorities at
issued a proclamation which stated that certain foreign
countries in the past, utilizing the so-called 'right of stationing troops'
unequal treaties, ' have occupied land in the Peking municipality
and constructed military barracks” and expressing their intention of
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1950, pp. 119-121,
e protocol of Sept. -4, 1901, especially article and annex 14; Foreign
OD
een
US &
ess.
101.
-
ish
rish
Peiping
ited
lish
loes
OL
cion
pat
ake
7.
Cions
state
2454
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
111
seri
mer
end
con
are
194
ext
COE
to
ent
returned to Mr. Clubb with indications that they had been opened
3 Bracketed insertion by the editors of the Department of State Bulletin,
see ibid., p. 122. (For a correction of the date of the note as printed, see ibid.,
6 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1950, pp. 121-122. (For a correction
tary barracks and other installations will first be requisitioned."
I
On January 7, the Chinese Communist military authorities addressed
a communication to the American Consul General at Peiping repre-
sented as an order for the requisitioning of United States Govern-
Em
ment official property at No. 22 Legation Street in Peiping and a
directed the Consul General to send a messenger with authority to
turn over this property, which was being used by the American Con-
sulate General for official purposes.?
Ger
The Department of State instructed the American Consul General
Co
effc
at Peiping on January 7 to transmit to Gen. Chou En-lai a communi-
cation pointing out that the United States Government acquired the
right to use for official purposes the land in question under the protocol reg
signed at Peking (Peiping) : on September 7, 1901, by China and
Mr
eleven other powers and that this right was reaffirmed in the Sino-
United States treaty of 1943, under which this Government relinwit
quished its extraterritorial rights in China. The Consul General was
further instructed to state that this land and the buildings thereon
har
were now being used for official purposes and that the so-called mili-
Gle
tary barracks mentioned in the communication from the Chinese
Communist military authorities had long since been converted into
an office building and used as the office of the American Consulate
the
General. In conclusion, he was directed to express the United States
Government's expectation that no action would be taken consti-
tuting any violation of the rights of the United States Government as
set forth above. 4
Mr. Clubb 5 reported that he had sent the above-mentioned
communication to General Chou on January 9 and that the communi-
cation had been returned to him without answer or acknowledgment
list
but with indications that it had been opened and read. Mr. Clubb
pel
later informed the Department that he had delivered a second com-
munication on this subject to General Chou on January 10,
str
was designed to clarify to the local authorities that the property in
lim
question was in fact the office of the American Consulate General."
This communication was also returned to Mr. Clubb with indications
Sta
that it had been opened and read. On January 8 Mr. Clubb had
tal
made a simple acknowledgment of the communication of January
from the Chinese Communist military authorities
and on January 11
in accordance with instructions from the Department, he forwarded
a second communication to these authorities, enclosing a copy
each of his letters to General Chou. All these communications were
and read.
Department of State Bulletin, Jan, 23, 1950, p. 121.
2 Ibid.
Mar. 27, 1950, p. 487.)
5 Oliver E. Clubb, American Consul General at Peiping,
in the date of the note as printed, see ibid., Mar.
27, 1950, p. 487.)
aui
Sta
me
COL
}
which
nis
au
ins
1
pw
ad]
ent
qu
2
2
Sei
tra
1
Br
pel
Fo
mi
19.
A
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2455
re-
rn-
On-
1
10-
Was
e01
lese
quishment of extraterritorial rights. [Footnote in the original press statement.]
transportation could be arranged for official personnel and arrangements made for
British representatives in those cities to take charge of American interests. The
Consulate General at Tsingtao was closed on Jan. 23, 1950, when American
For additional information regarding the closing of American consulates in Com-
personnel left the city (Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 20, 1950, p. 302).
munist China, see Secretary Acheson's statements of Mar. 1, 1950 (ibid., Mar. 13,
In recognition of the limitations of time and in view of the extremely
sed
serious concern of the United States Government over the develop-
ments at Peiping, the Department, having informed the British
Embassy in Washington on January 7 of this development, on Janu-
and ary 10 requested the good offices of the British Foreign Office to the
to
end that the British officer-in-charge at Peiping be instructed to
convey personally on behalf of the United States Government to
General Chou En-lai or, in his absence, to the highest ranking Chinese
258
Communist official available to him a statement to the following
ini-
effect:
the
"General Chou will have by now received the communication
ical regarding the question of requisition of the former military barracks
and area of the United States Government at Peiping forwarded to him by
Mr. Clubb on instructions from this Government. In accordance
lin- with the provisions of Article II of the Sino-United States treaty of
1943, under which the United States Government relinquished its
extraterritorial rights in China, the United States Government would
hili- have no objection to turning over to the authorities at Peiping the
Glacis property to the west of the United States Government consular
nto compounds. The United States Government would also be prepared
ate
to turn over to the authorities at Peiping for immediate occupancy
ites
the United States Government-owned building on this property and
enter into discussions regarding indemnification for the building:
t as
"Should the requisition order of the Chinese Communist military
authorities be made applicable, however, to any part of the United
ned States Government's consular compounds, the United States Govern-
ment would consider such action a violation of its rights and would
conclude that it had no alternative to closing all of its official estab-
lishments in Communist China and to withdrawing all of its official
om- personnel from Communist China." 2
The British Government was good enough to send appropriate in-
structions to its officer-in-charge at Peiping. In view of the time
ral"
limitations involved and in order to ensure that the Chinese Commu-
nist authorities be aware of the views and intentions
of the United
had States Government and not act without
full realization of the inevi-
table results of a violation of United States rights, Mr. Clubb was
11,
authorized as a last resort, in the event that the British Government's
-ded instructions to its officer-in-charge did not arrive prior to the expira-
The boundary area on three sides of the diplomatic quarter, which for defense
purposes had originally been cleared of buildings. This area was under the joint
administration of the diplomatic quarter and its return to Chinese control was
envisaged in the various treaties between China and foreign powers for the relin-
fernice posts at Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, and Tientsin to close as soon as
sti-
uni-
lent
ubb
nich
y
in
TODS
J7
of
vere
ned
1950
,
ibid.,
ction
Apr. 24, 1950, pp. 630-631).
2456
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-19.55
to
COE
of
mi
ар
loc
en
el
MacArthur presented to the National Security Council in iis deliberations preceding
tion of the time limit, to bring directly or indirectly to the attention
of General Chou En-lai or some other Chinese Communist official
the views and intentions of the United States Government. This the
Mr. Clubb did in a communication to General Chou on January 12,
which was received and subsequently returned. At 3:30 p. m. Bu
January 13, Mr. Clubb received an oral communication from i
representative of the Military Control Commission that the requisi
Fo
tion order would be put into effect from 9:00 a. m. the following day
Fo
Immediately upon receipt of this notice, Mr. Clubb orally informed
FO
this representative that if the order was carried out it would be the
pu
full responsibility of those concerned and against United States
Government official protests. Mr. Clubb later in the same day
confirmed this message by formal letter.?
At 9:50 a. m. on January 14 the premises of the Consulate General
Du
were invaded by the police and four civilian officials.
fo-
63. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN RELATION TO
CHINA (REPLIES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO A
SERIES OF QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN HOUSE RESO-
LUTION 452 (81st CONGRESS, 21 SESSION): Report of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 9, 1950 3
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the
resolution (H. Res. 452) requesting the State Department to furnish
full and complete answers to certain questions relating to the foreign
policy of the United States in the Far East, having considered the
same, report adversely thereon and recommend that the resolution
The recommendation of the committee is based on the fact that
answers to the questions contained in the resolution have been fur-
nished the committee by the Department of State. With the exceps
tion of portions of two answers, the publication of which portions
felt by the Department of State would
be incompatible with the public
interest, the answers are included in this report for the information
of the Members of the House, and are as follows:
Question 1
With respect to the President's statement of January 5, 1950,4 on policy regarding
Formosa
(a) Were the views of the Secretary of Defense solicited in the formulation of the
policy enunciated therein?
Comment.--Yes.
Question 1 (6)
Were the above views and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Gen. Douglas
the said statement?
CC
S
81
m
OP
n
do not pass.
SI
f
1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1950, pp. 122–123.
2 Ibid., p. 123.
3 H. Rept. No. 1618, 81st Cong., 2d sess.
4 Supra, doc. 60.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2457
1. OD
om &
1
f the
the integrity of China and must remain free to take the position that anyone who
There are, of course, additional practical difficulties.
Government is now on Formosa and that island, with Hainan, is the only remain-
ntion
Comment.— The views of the National Military Establishment were presented
fficial
to the National Security Council in its deliberations preceding the issuance of
This the President's statement. These views presumably included those of the
y 12
, component parts of the National Military Establishment.
Question 1 (c)
Is Hainan included in the policy enunciated in said statement?
qui-
Comment.-Certain portions of the President's statement refer specifically to
day
.
Formosa. Other portions apply clearly to all areas of China including Hainan.
For example, the statements "The United States has no predatory designs on
rmed
Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. the United States will not
e the pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China" are
States of general application. The statement "Similarly, the United States Govern-
day
ment will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa"
applies to all forces under the Chinese Government high command which is
located on Formosa regardless of the present deployment of those forces.
neral
Question 1 (d)
Have the following been considered by the Executive as alternatives to the policy
enunciated in said statement?
(1) Insistence on the execution of the terms of the Cairo Declaration, which provided
for the return of Formosa to the Republic of China.
TTO
Comment.-- This cannot properly be considered an alternative to the policy
10 enunciated by the President. The President's statement of January 5, 1950
ESO contained a reaffirmation of the Cairo Declaration on the part of the United
States in respect to the disposition of Formosa. Formosa has been administered
since 1945 by China, the surrender of Japanese forces on Formosa having been
made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
(2) Consideration of Formosa as a possession of Japan to be administered by the
victor powers until eventual disposition under a peace settlement with Japan.
(3) A plebiscite in Formosa, under the auspices of the Far Eastern Commission
rnish
of a special commission of the UN, to determine whether the inhabitants desire
a) to continue as a province of and the seat of government of the Republic of China;
(6) to be placed under a United Nations trusteeship; or (c) to become an independent
ention
Comment.—These alternatives were considered. As has been noted under (1)
above, Formosa has been administered by China since 1945, when Japanese
that forces on the island surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It was incor-
fur
The Allied Powers associated in the war against Japan have not questioned these
scep
steps. The United States Government has not questioned these steps because
they were clearly in line with its commitments made at Cairo and reaffirmed
at
Potsdam. In other words, the Allied Powers including the United States have
for the past 4 years treated' Formosa as a part of China.
For the United States Government, at this date, to seek to establish a non-
Chinese administration on Formosa, either through SCAP or a United Nations
or FEC-sponsored plebiscite, would be almost universally interpreted in mainland
arding
China and widely interpreted throughout Asia as an attempt by this Government
to separate Formosa from China in violation of its pledges and contrary to its
the
long-standing policy of respecting the territorial integrity of China. The im-
portant point from the standpoint of our interests in Asia, including mainland
China, is not the technical justifications which we might urge for taking such
steps but rather the way such action on our part would be viewed by the people
of Asia. In this connection we do not wish Por create a Formosa ipredenta issue
about which the Chinese Communists could rally support within China and with
ding
not place ourselves in the unenviable position of the U.S.S.R. with regard to
These are compelling reasons for rejecting the alternatives stated above.
The seat
reign
a the
nation.
DS IS
ublic
ation
uglas
1
2458
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Que
age
fro
rel
th
PT
etti
Q2
ur
900
th
$1
the
19
са
of
saray
3
I
8
0
Such arrangements would raise the total
of commodities for import into Japan would adversely affect Japan's balance of
priced above the world-market price. It is probable that sugar can be procured
i See Part II of the Moscow Communiqué of Dec. 27, 1945; A Decade of American
ing substantial territory now under its control. There is no evidence that the
Chinese Government would willingly accomplish its own demise by acquiescing
in either of the proposed alternatives. There is likewise the question of military
force to carry out the course of action proposed if the Chinese Government refuses
its consent, and to defend the island if either proposal were effected. The
United Nations, of course, has no forces and it seems clear that any defense of
the island would finally rest upon the United States.
In any case the conduct of a plebiscite for the purpose of determining the
wishes of the inhabitants on the future disposition of Formosa is beyond the com-
petence of the Far Eastern Commission. The Far Eastern Commission by its
terms of reference is "to formulate the policies, principles, and standards in con-
formity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of
surrender may be accomplished. The terms of reference also provide that "the
Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of
military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments."
Question 1 (e) (1)
Does the Executive have information as to alternate sources of essential commodities
such as rice and iron ore to replace Formosa and Hainan as sources of these com-
modities for Japan in the event of the capture of these islands by the Chinese
Communists?
Comment.-In recent years Japan has procured only iron ore from Hainan, in
the amount of between 200,000 and 300,000 tons in 1948 and 1949 together.
This amount was obtained largely from wartime stocks mined by the Japanese
and Hainan's potential rate of current production is not large enough to present
a problem of alternative sources. Formosa has exported no rice and no iron ore
to Japan in recent years. It was formerly a source of rice for Japan, but recent
increases in population and declines in production have been obstacles to export
of rice to Japan since the war. The major commodity exported since the war
from Formosa to Japan is sugar, and this has represented from one-sixth to
one-fifth of total Japanese sugar imports. The Philippines and Indonesia would
be adequate alternative sources of supply. It is probable that Japan could
procure from these sources under balanced-trade arrangements, as much or more
as it has imported from Formosa.
level of Japan's trade with these countries. Formosa is also a source of small
quantities of salt for Japan; alternative sources are available, particularly in the
Red Sea area.
The capture of these islands by the Communists would not necessarily eliminate
them as sources of supply of commodities for Japan. Whether the Communists
would be willing to engage in such trade upon acceptable terms cannot be
predicted.
Question 1 (e) (2)
Does the Executive have information as to the factor of additional cost of the occur
pation of Japan to the United States in the event of capture of Formosa and Hainan
by the Chinese Communists?
Comment. The extent to which elimination of Hainan and Formosa as sources
international payments and thus create additional United States occupation
costs cannot be predicted with accuracy. Formosan sugar has generally been
balance of payments. For example, Philippine sugar is available to Japan :
the world-market price. Procurement of iron ore and salt from
alternative sources
would not present a problem of major importance. Accordingly, the capture
Formosa and Hainan
by the Communists
would not greatly increase the cost to
the United States, if at all, of defraying the deficit in Japan's payments
.
Foreign Policy, pp. 60-62.
8
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2459
cing
tary
uses
The
le of
the
om-
7
its
COI-
is of
'the
t of
"
nese
, i
in
her.
nese
sent
Ore
cent
port
war
2 to
ould
puld
nore
otal
mal!
the
allocated, however, have been used thus far to initiate actual procurement of
June 27, 1949 (TIAS 1975; 63 Stat., pt. 3, p. 2702).
the
Question 1 (6)
Has any recent survey of the defense resources of Formosa been made by any
agency of this Government?
Coinment.-Information on Formosa's defense resources is received constantly
from the United States reporting officers in the field and is subject to continual
review and assessment by the intelligence agencies. In general, it is considered
that the available material resources are adequate for the defense of Formosa,
provided that they can be mobilized by the Chinese Government and put to
effective use by its military forces.
Question 1 (9)
For what purposes and in what amounts has assistance been rendered to Formosa
under the present Economic Cooperation Administration program, which, in the
words of the statement, "the United States Government proposes to continue"? In
this connection, what steps have been taken and what sums have been spent in (1) the
$17,000,000 capital improvement program which was contemplated for Formosa at
the time of the consideration of legislation to extend the China Aid Act 2 in March
ities 1949; and (2) the land-tenure reforms and similar welfare-improvement measures
carried out by the Provincial government of Formosa with the advice and assistance
of the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction? 3
Comment.- United States aid from appropriated funds to Formosa under the
ECA program had amounted to approximately 18.5 million dollars by December
31, 1949. This figure includes the value of all commodities delivered, en route
and scheduled for shipment to Formosa as well as actual payments for services.
It does not include appropriated funds used for ECA administrative expenses
and for the JCRR program relating to Formosa. An accounting break-down
of these expenses as between the Chinese mainland and Formosa is not available
at this time. Nor does the total aid figure include expenditures from counterpart
funds for local currency costs of ECA administration or the JCRR program.
(The latter is discussed under (g) (2) below.)
There follows a list of the commodities and services for which the 18.5 million
dollars has been obligated.
(Millions of
United States
dollars)
Wheat and flour
0.1
Cotton
1. 6
Petroleum
5. 4
Fertilizer
9. O
Miscellaneous freight
1. 7
Technical services
0.7
18. 5
The $17,000,000 capital improvement program.
The item for technical assistance indicated in the above table includes the
cost of preliminary engineering surveys on a variety of industrial and trans-
portation projects of the type for which the
$17,000,000 capital improvement
program was contemplated in March 1949. None of the funds thus tentatively
equipment for such projects.
This suspension of the capital improvement aspect of the ECA program for
Formosa was based on two developments which had their immediate origin in
the rapid Chinese Communist
advance to the Yangtze River in the spring of 1949
and the equally rapid
flight of the Chinese
National Government and its armies.
this influx continued until the Chinese Government abandoned the mainland in
See agreements of July 3, 1948 (TIAS 1837; 62 Stat., pt. 3, p. 2945), Mar. 26–
$4,1949 (TIAS 1923; 63 Stat., pt. 3, p. 2425); and Jan. 21-31, 1950 (TIAS 3077;
I Act of Apr. 3, 1948; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 713-715.
. See agreements of Aug. 5, 1948 TIAS 1848;462 Stat., pt. 3, p. 3139) and
nate
hists
be
0
Question 1 (g) (1)
ccule
ces
e of
jon
zea
red
n's
at
ces
of
to
an
2460
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
fil
are
the
CH
CH
the
fo
PE
DI
DE
PO
PC
AN
AN
LS
LS
LS
LS
LS
LS
AN
Al
AN
AN
Al
AL
AL
of Agriculture and forestry, for production of hog-cholera vaccine, multiplication
control research and training of antimalaria workers, and disease-control demon
Rural health: Projects for rehabilitation of rural water supply plants, malaria-
stration in cooperation with the public works and health bureau of the Provincial
Land-tenure reform: Projects for farmers' rent reduction and land reclassifics-
the late fall of 1949. The consequences of this unplanned mass migration were
considerable confusion in the administration of the island and the creation of
strong inflationary pressures through increased demands levied on Formosan
resources by the new nonproductive population.
It would have been highly impractical, to say the least, to have launched
large-scale capital-investment projects in the face of such unstable administrative
and economic circumstances. Even if the administrative difficulties could have
been overcome, the immediate inflationary impact of local currency expenditures
necessary for installation of imported capital equipment might well have seriously
impaired the Formosan economy. This continues to be an important considera
tion governing the rate and magnitude of United States assistance for capital
improvement projects on Formosa.
Moreover, it was considered that, in the light of all circumstances, political
and military as well as economic, the danger that Formosa might go the way of
the mainland was such as not to warrant United States Government assistance
for the creation of substantial new industrial and transportation facilities on the
island. On the other hand, United States aid to help meet the current economie
needs of the island was continued; technical advice was extended to assist in the
more effective operation of the island's capital plant; ECA supported the program
of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction designed to improve agricul
.
tural productivity and bring about greater social stability among the rural popu:
lation. The United States Government took the position, however, that United
States grants for permanent additions to the island's wealth should be contingent
on a clear showing that the Chinese Government was able to employ its resources
in such a manner as to ensure (a) progress toward economic and political stability
and (6) the effective defense of Formosa should it be attacked. This criterion
applies with equal validity to present implementation of the ECA program,
Question 1 (g) (2)
Status of JCRR program in Formosa, Dec. 31, 1949
[Thousands of United States dollar equivalents of local currency
Obligated projects
Category
Program category
allocation
Number of Amount
projects
Agricultural improvement
Farmers organizations .
Irrigation
Health
Land-tenure reform
Audio-visual education
2, 291
Examples of project in each category
Agricultural improvement: Projects in cooperation with the Provincial bureau
construction of compost houses, and multiplication and extension of stock catre
Farmers' organizations: Project for training staff members of farmers' associa:
Irrigation Projects for irrigation and reclamation of several areas of the island
in cooperation with the local authorities.
government and with local research institutes.
tion in cooperation with
the land bureau of the Provincial government.
PC
PO
PO
PO
PO
PC
PC
Payments
made
211
2
A
AC
AC
567
83
900
601
90
50
+
48
3
8
11
4
1
557
74
166
551
78
50
.
49
A]
DI
LO
LO
615
Total
75
1,476
•
LA
LC
Y]
Y}
Y)
SC
11
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2461
1 TIAS 1691; 61 Stat., pt. 4, p. 3618.
1944-1949 (Department of State publication 3573; 1949).
were
-n of
osan
ched
ative
have
cure
pusly
ders
pital
Audio-visual education: Projects for dissemination of posters and showing of
film strips on subjects connected with the other program categories.
Question 2
With respect to the current situation in China and the Far East
(a) What are the numbers and types of vessels and craft transferred to China under
the agreement of December 8, 1947? 1 What balance remains to be transferred?
Comment. The December 8, 1947 agreement between the United States and
China contained a proposed list of 138 naval vessels to be transferred to the
Chinese Government. A total of 131 such vessels have been transferred under
this agreement. A list of these vessels, as given in the White Paper, page 942,
follows:
tical
sy of
ance
the
omic
the
gran
icul
Opu-
nited
ngent
irces
bility
erion
PR 4
DE 6
DE 47
PCE 867
POE 869
AM 257
AM 258
AM 259
LST 537
LSM 155
LSM 157
LSM 285
LSM 457
LSM 431
AM 260
AM 266
AM 273
AM 276
AM 246
AM 274
AM 286
PC 1247
PC 1549
PGM 20
PGM 28
PGM 12
PGM 13
PGM 14
PGM 15
SC 648
SO 698
LSM 433
LSM 442
LSM 456
LOI (L) 233
LOI (L) 631
LCI (L) 417
LOI (L) 418
LOI (L) 630
LOI (L) 632
LST 557
LST 755
LST 1030
LST 993
LST 716
LST 717
LST 1017
LST 1050
LST 1075
LCI (L) 514
LCI (L) 517
AG 124
LOT 512
LOT 515
LCT 849
LOT 892
LOT 1143
LOT 1145
LOT 1171
LOT 1213
AOG 42
AFDL 34
25 LOM
25 LOVP
AM 297
AM 216
YMS 339
PC 490
PC 492
PO 593
PC 595
SO 704
SO 708
SO 722
SC 723
SC 735
AOG 22
AFDL (C) 36
ARL 41
DE 102
DE 103
DE 104
DE 112
A break-down by type of the above transfers is as follows:
nents
ide
Code
Type of vessel
Number
Code
Type of vessel
Number
AFDL.
AG.....
4
2
1
LSM.
LST.
PC.
8
10
6
AOG.
AM..
Mine sweeper
ARL
Auxiliary floating dock..--
Miscellaneous auxiliary
tanker,
Tanker, small.
.
Landing craft, repair ship-
Destroyer escort
Landing craft, infantry-
Landing craft, mecha-
nized.
Landing craft, tank.
Landing craft, vehicle-
personnel.
DE..
LCI (L).
LCM.
2
12
1
6
8
25
Landing ship, medium..
Landing ship, tank..
Patrol craft, subchaser
(steel hull).
Patrol craft, escort.
Motor gunboat--
River gunboat.
Subchaser (wooden hull).
Mine sweeper (yard)--
PCE.
PGM
PR.--
SC..
YMS.
2
6
1
7
1
615
LCT.
LOVP.
Total..
131
lreau
ition
The seven vessels not transferred were
етр, ;
attle
.
Code
ocia.
Type of vessel
[Vessel]
Number
Code
Type of vessel
(Vessel]
Number
YMS
sland
637
YMS.
YMS.
SC.....
Mine sweeper
...do..
..do...
Subchaser
346
367
2017
518
SO..
SC.
AGS.
Subchaser.
do.---
Surveying ship-
703
9
aris-
mon.
ncia]
li.
e.,
ifica-
2462
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
E
and each government must make its own decision in the light of the situation
UN to vote against motions which would have the effect of depriving National
A motion to unseat a National Government representative or to seat a Chinese
internal organization of a UN organ. Under article 27 of the Charter, decisions of
Council. In other UN organs procedural matters are determined by a simple
If a UN organ should vote in accordance with its rules of procedure to seats
continue active participation in such organs fulfilling in good faith our duties as 8 |
Chinese Communist representative we would accept the will of the majority and
Since the capacity of the Chinese Government to maintain and operate naval
vessels had been taxed to the full by early transfers under the agreement
, the
Chinese Government requested an extension of the agreed-upon date—July 1,
1948—by which time transfers of vessels in the Philippines were to have been ef
.
fected. (Under terms of the agreement the Chinese had 120 days after the
transfer of a vessel to effect its movement.) This Government agreed to an
extension of the transfer date until September 1, 1948, for 10 of the ships in
Philippines. Two of the seven vessels not transferred, the YMS 2017 and the
SC 518, were either forced aground or sunk during the typhoon season. The
other five were found to need reconditioning. The Chinese Navy did not avail
itself of transfer rights on these vessels.
No further transfers of vessels pursuant to the December 8, 1947, agreement
are contemplated.
Question 2 (6)
Have the Chinese Communist forces obtained, and are they obtaining, amphibious
assault equipment from the Soviet Union or elsewhere?
Comment.—There have been many reports of varying degrees of reliability on
this subject, many of which have appeared in the press. The Communist author-
ities have publicly announced that the capture of Formosa is now a major military
objective and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the Communists are making
all possible efforts to prepare the necessary amphibious assault equipment.
Question 2 (c)
Has the United States Government made any statement with respect to the recogni-
tion of the Communist regime by the United Kingdom?
Comment.-In response to a question by a correspondent, the State Depart-
ment spokesman on January 6, 1950, replied as follows:
"The American position on recognition has been previously stated.
"As has been previously announced, we have been in consultation with the
British and other governments regarding this subject and each government has
made its views known. The decision by a government whether to withhold on
grant recognition to a new government is an exercise of a basic sovereign right
as it sees it and of its own circumstances. It is the United States position that
recognition of a government in no way constitutes or implies approval of that
government. This
have been
in consultation all seem to have the same ultimate objective of a stable
,
a widely held principle. The governments with whom we
independent China free of foreign domination.”
Question 2 (d)
Has the United States Government formulated its attitude with respect to admission
of the Communist regime in China to the UN?
Comment.-The United States Government has formulated its attitude on this
question and that attitude may be summarized as follows:
The United States Government recognizes the National Government as the
Government of China and has instructed United States representatives at the
any seven members and there is no right of veto. If this were not the case and
permanent member could by its single vote decide in effect that one of two claim
ants should representual memberin gecente berimanent member of the Securit
majority vote.
}
in
the
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2463
American Foreign Policy, pp. 1253–1257.
2 Address of Jan. 12, 1950; supra, pp. 2310–2322.
UN member. Such action on our part would, of course, not constitute recognition
of the Chinese Communist regime.
Laval
the
ly 1,
I el-
the
an
the
I the
The
aval
ment
vious
Question ? (e)
What areas in Asia come within the scope of the Truman doctrine? 1
Comment.-The interrelated concepts of supporting those peoples who are
resisting subjugation, of assisting free peoples to work out their own destinies,
and of aiding, primarily through economic and financial means, in the establish-
ment of economic and political stability, are basic to the policies of this Govern-
ment with respect to Asia no less than to other parts of the world.
This has been evidenced by such actions as the Point IV proposals, aid to the
recognized Government of China, economic aid to Korea, the steps taken in
Japan to restore economic stability and to foster democratic institutions and
ideas, and the encouragement of peaceful settlements in such areas as Indonesia,
India, and Pakistan.
It is axiomatic that the application of these fundamental concepts must be
adapted in the light of particular circumstances in various areas. Obviously
certain programs which are effective in Europe, for example, may not necessarily
be equally effective in Asia. Similarly, to consider Asia as a homogeneous entity
would dangerously oversimplify a complex situation. In the formulation of its
policies, this Government must take into consideration the diversities in peoples,
problems, and opportunities existing not only between other areas of the world
and Asia, but also within Asia itself. For example, as Secretary Acheson stated
in his recent address to the Press Club, there is a great difference between our
responsibility and our opportunity in the northern part of the Pacific area and
in the southern part of the Pacific area." 2
The Department is constantly studying those problems related to the foreign
policy of this Government in order to determine how these basic concepts may
best be applied to specific areas throughout both Asia and the rest of the world.
uy on
thor-
itary
Aking
1
cogni
parte
h the
It has
ld of
right
1&tion
I that
that
m me
table,
64. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, ALLIANCE, AND MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE
BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND
COMMUNIST CHINA, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, FEBRU-
ARY 14, 1950 3
ission
Republic of China;
this
us the
at the
tional
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's
Filled with determination jointly to prevent, by the consolidation
of friendship and cooperation
between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and
the People's Republic of China, the rebirth of Japanese
imperialism and a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or
any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of
Imbued with the desire to consolidate lasting peace and universal
security in the Far East and throughout the world in conformity with
the aims and principles of the United Nations organization;
See President Truman's message to Congress, Mar. 12, 1947; A Decade of
in the
aggression;
hinese
to the
ions of
1
ote of
se af
claim
curity
simple
seats
ty and
es as
2464
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
el
SC
Profoundly convinced that the consolidation of good neighborly
relations and friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics and the People's Republic of China meets the fundamentel
interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and China;
fr
Resolved for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and
appointed as their plenipotentiary representatives:
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Social
ist Republics-Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of to
China-Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of the State Administrative
Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China;
Who, after exchange of their credentials, found in due form and
good order, agreed upon the following:
fic
SO
10
Article I
H
fo
thi
R
65
Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the
necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing &
repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan
or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly
in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting
Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus
being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party
will immediately render military and other assistance with all the
means at its disposal.
The High Contracting Parties also declare their readiness in the
spirit of sincere cooperation to participate in all international actions
aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world, and wil
do all in their power to achieve the speediest implementation of these
tasks.
Article II
Both the High Contracting Parties undertake by means of mutual
agreement to strive for the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with
Japan, jointly with the other Powers which were allies during the
Second World War.
Article III
Both High Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude any
alliance directed against the other High Contracting Party, and not
to take part in any
coalition or in actions or measures directed against
the other High Contracting Party.
Article IV
Both High Contracting Parties will consult each other in regard to
all important international problems affecting the common interests
of the Soviet Union and China, being guided by the interests of the
consolidation of peace and universal security.
&L
it
A
ag
be
ni
1
in
CE
D
C
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2465
1
this rule.
into force, Apr. 11, 1950, when the Soviet Union completed its ratification pro-
1 Communist China ratified the treaty, Apr. 10, 1950.
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 27, 1950, pp. 468–469.
3 See supra, pp. 2310–2322.
Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalny; and (b) on the granting of credits to Communist
China, both signed at Moscow, Feb. 14, 1950, see The American Journal of
International Law, vol. 44, no. 3, July, 1950, pp. 86-90.
orly
Article V
jub-
ntal
Both the High Contracting Parties undertake, in the spirit of
friendship and cooperation and in conformity with the principles of
and equality, mutual interests, and also mutual respect for the state
sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal
cial-
affairs of the other High Contracting Partyto develop and con-
eiga
solidate economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and
China, to render each other every possible economic assistance, and
3 of to carry out the necessary economic cooperation.
tive
Article VI
and
The present Treaty comes into force immediately upon its rati-
fication; the exchange of instruments of ratification will take place
in Peking.
The present Treaty will be valid for 30 years. If neither of the
the High Contracting Parties gives notice one year before the expiration
ig &
of this term of its desire to denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in
force for another five years and will be extended in compliance with
pad
itly
ting
Done in Moscow on February 14, 1950, in two copies, each in the
hus Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.
arty
the
65. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND
the
RELATED AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION
ions
AND COMMUNIST CHINA: Address by the Secretary of State,
will
March 15, 1950 (Excerpt) ?
Since I spoke in January on the Far East 3 there has been one new
and clear indication of Soviet Russia's intentions in China. We see
it in the published terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950, and the other
agreements concluded and announced at the same time.
The Soviet Union and its most ardent supporters in China may
bave temporary success in persuading the people of China that these
DY agreements refute the contention of the non-Communist world that
700
alliance with Soviet Russia holds an evil omen of imperialistic domi-
nation. These agreements promise help in the rehabilitation of
The treaty entered
Delivered before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco;
-52
nese
cual
rith
the
ust
cedure.
to
sts
he
415900--57-Vol. 2
2466
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
In
TV
h
SC
Sc
te
IL
8.
fr
1
year 1948.1
can provide foodstuffs and raw materials for the new industrial
The more fanatical of the Communist leaders may be content
gressive Chinese who have supported the Communists against
the Kuomintang in the belief that the new revolution would clear
away obstacles to China's economic development. The new rulers
of China have deliberately cut off their country from the possibility!
1 See section, “Assistance to China,” of title I of the Foreign Aid Appropriation
China's war-torn and impoverished economy. They promise, in
particular, assistance in the repair and development of China's
railroads and industry. The Chinese people may welcome the
promises and assurances. But they will not fail, in time, to see where
they fall short of China's real needs and desires. And they will
wonder about the points upon which the agreements remain silent
Now, let us examine these assurances and promises of economie
aid. First, Soviet Russia has promised to return certain Manchurian
property but not the industrial equipment robbed by the Red Army
in 1945. Is this aid? Is it even a belated admission of a theit
which deprived not only China but all of Asia of some 2 billion dollas
worth of productive capacity?
Second, Soviet Russia extends to China a 300 million dollars 5-yees
credit at an interest rate of 1 percent yearly. This works out al
60 million dollars each year. This announcement was made only to
be followed by the news that the ruble was to be revalued, thus
cutting down the effective aid by one-fourth if the new dollar-ruble
rate should be applied to this credit. Thus, the Chinese people
may find Soviet Russia's credit to be no more than 45 million dollars
per year. They can compare this with a grant-not a loan—of 40
million dollars voted by the American Congress to China in the single
China's needs are great and pressing. China today faces a prosper
of 40 million people suffering from hunger between now and the next
crops. Millions may die. And yet, food moves from China to the
Soviet Union.
China's need for development capital runs into billions of dollars
In its issue of February 25, the London Economist makes the following
penetrating analysis of Chinese needs and hopes and the extent to
which they have been dashed by the agreements with Moscow
it has not been the purpose of modern-minded Chinese
to stagnate in the backwardness of a pre-industrial era; for many
years they have been possessed by the dream of a rapid industrial
sation whereby China would break out from its old weakness and
poverty and take a place among the nations more in keeping with
its vast population and considerable natural resources. There is
indeed, no sign at all of a great programme of industrialisation :
be carried through with Russian aid; the idea seems rather to
make China's economy more "colonial” than before,
areas of Siberia.
with this, but it must bring a bitter disillusionment to many pro
Act of 1949 (PL 793, 80th Cong., 2d sess., June 28, 1948; 62 Stat. 1054).
IU
1
r
a
f
so that it
{
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2467
nomic
101190
Army
theft
people
2 next
se, i
of American economic assistance which would have been forth-
hins?
coming for a United China on a far larger scale and with fewer
these
strings attached than the loan now received with so much official
where
gratitude from Moscow. If any Chinese really thought that
Peking would obtain an unconditional and unstinted bounty by
silent
.
turning from Washington to Moscow, the experience of Jugoslavia
might have warned him that there are more kicks than halfpence
in dependent association with the Soviet empire.
And, now, as to the political and territorial assurances contained
in the agreements. Can the Chinese people fail to observe that,
lollars
whatever may be the promises for the future under the terms of
the treaty and agreements recently concluded at Moscow, the U.S.S.R.
spel has special rights in China which represent an infringement of China's
jut at
sovereignty and which are held by no other foreign power. It is
nly to
thus
Soviet Russia which, despite all the tawdry pretense of the treaty
-Tuble
terms, occupies the role of empire builder at China's expense.
These are the realities that must be faced by the Chinese people.
lollars
In facing them, they can well consider what it means to brush aside
of 40
an established friendship for new-found and voracious friends. Our
single
friendship has been founded on the belief that anyone who violates
the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is hostile to the
interests of the United States. We have 50 years of history and a
uspect
world war to prove that this belief is not a mere matter of words.
o the
This belief has been proved by deeds. We can and shall stand on the
record.
ollars
We now face the prospect that the Communists may attempt to
owing
apply another familiar tactic and use China as a base for probing for
other weak spots which they can move into and exploit.
ent to
As old friends, we say to the Chinese people that we fully understand
that their present unhappy status within the orbit of the Soviet
Union is not the result of any choice on their own part, but has been
forced upon them. We understand that the Communist basis for
their Government is similarly not the result of any free choice of
their own. We do not intend to tell them what ideologies or form of
government they should have. We do not intend to engage in any
aggressive adventures against them. The American people will
remain in the future, as we have been in the past, the friends of the
But they should understand that, whatever happens within their
own country, they can only bring grave trouble on themselves and
their friends, both in Asia and beyond, if they are led by their new
rulers into aggressive or subversive adventures beyond their borders.
Such adventures would violate not only every tradition and interest
of the Chinese people, they would violate
the traditions and interests
of their
Asian neighbors, of the American people, and indeed—of all
free peoples. They would violate
the United Nations Charter. They
would violate the peace
which the Charter was designed to preserve.
I say this so that there may be no mistake about the attitude of
the United States; no opportunity to distort or twist it; and so that
hinese
maur
triali
and
with
re is
,
on to
er to
Chinese people.
at it
stria
atent
Pro-
ainst
clear
ulers
bility
ation
2468
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
all in China may know who would be responsible for all that such
adventures might bring to pass.
67.
f
wer
[The Treaty of Alliance and the related agreements were subsequently
reaffirmed and modified by a series of joint declarations and communiqué
published Oct. 12, 1954, as the outcome of a visit in Peiping by Soviet inte
leaders, Sept. 29-Oct. 12, 1954. For the texts of these joint declarations
all-
and communiqués, see Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954
On
(New York, 1955), pp. 323–332.]
GOL
ind
I
NO
United States Policy in the Formosa (Taiwan) Area and
During the Korean Hostilities, 1950–1953
shi
Ser
to
66. MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTH FLEET IN
THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Statement by the President,
June 27, 1950 (Excerpt) 1
Th
PO
act
be
1
ne
pe
be
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that to
communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer
independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It
has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations
issued to preserve international peace and security. In these cir
cumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would to
be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United Po
States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that an
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any As
attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon
in
the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations
against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done
.
The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the
restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan,
It
or consideration by the United Nations.
It
area.
mi
at
CO
tet
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 5. For complete text of the
President's statement, see infra, pp. 2539-2540.
2 See the U.N. Security Council Resolution of June 25, 1950; infra, pp. 2538
cle
be
ME
2539.
ME
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2469
ution
1954
community are seriously divided among themselves in terms of
recognizing one or the other Chinese claimant or recognizing the
claims of either to the Island of Formosa. It is complicated further
because there has been no clear, no real consultation with the For-
ment of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1950, pp. 891-892.
* See President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950; supra.
such 67. NEUTRALIZATION OF FORMOSA (TAIWAN) DURING THE
KOREAN ACTION: Remarks by the Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs,' November 15, 1950 (Excerpt)2
tently
I should like to discuss briefly the question of Formosa. On the
riqués weekend of June 25–27, we were confronted with the fact that
Soviet international communism had apparently decided to resort to formal
all-out armed aggression posing some extremely difficult questions.
One of them was what else do these people have in mind? Are we
going to be involved in a general crisis throughout the Far East, or
indeed on a world basis, or is this Korean action itself a limited action?
In order to insure that United Nations forces operating in Korea
would not be heavily threatened from an important flank position
frea and in order that in that period of crisis there would not be a sudden
shift in the military position of Formosa, the President ordered the
Seventh Fleet to insure the military neutralization of that island and
to protect the flank of United States forces in Korea.3
Now, the question is what do we do about the future of Formosa ?
I IN There are two elementary points in the American position at this
dent,
point with respect to Formosa.
One is that it should be militarily neutralized while the Korean
action is in progress. We do not believe that it will be tolerable to
have Formosa seized and exploited militarily by those acting contrary
that to the policies and programs of the United Nations. Thus, military
quer neutralization is an important element in the present situation.
It
The second is that whatever people think about Formosa, and
Lions people think & great many different things about Formosa, it must
be settled by peaceful means.
We should not allow Formosa itself
could to become a point around which a general war could start or that
uited Formosa should threaten the general peace and security of the Pacific
that
Therefore, we asked that Formosa be considered by the General
an Assembly.* 'We think it important that the United Nations move
in to insure that Formosa be settled by peaceful means.
It would be normal for the United Nations to arrange for a Com-
mission to take a look at it and to report back to the United Nations
the at a later date
. Formosa is complicated in its history. It is com-
plicated in the international commitments made with respect to it.
It is complicated by the fact that there are two Chinese claimants.
It is complicated by the fact that the members of the international
mosans themselves either during or since this past war.
cir-
area.
pon
ions
ne,
pan,
the
538
1 Dean Rusk.
2
Made before the National Conference on Foreign Policy, Washington; Depart-
See infra, doc. 73.
2470
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ACC
an
me
No. 13
1 TIAS 2293; 2 UST, pt. 2, p. 1499. No Senate action was required. The agree. |
Jan. 2, 1952 (TIAS 2604; 3 UST, pt. 4, p. 4543) and Oct. 23-Nov. 1, 1952 (TIAS
2 Act of Oct. 6, 1949 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364), as
Thus, we hope very much that the United Nations will take this
matter up and put it into the category of those questions which are fur
being dealt with by peaceful means. We hope also that the other
pu
side will see fit to accept that procedure and not press it on a basis
tio
of military action.
of
68. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN Ch
THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
FEBRUARY 9, 1951 1
dis
The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to the Chinese Minister of sot
Foreign Affairs
ing
AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Or
Taipei, January 30, 1951. the
EXCELLENCY:
Pursuant to instructions from my Government, I have the honor to
an
deliver the following statement:
tat
"The Government of the United States is prepared to make avail-
able to the Republic of China under the terms of P. L. 329, 81st Con-
gress, as amended, certain military material for the defense of
Taiwan against possible attack.
HE
“This material, and any other furnished under the authority of the
law referred to, is transferred on the understanding that it will be
used and disposed of pursuant to the following undertakings and that
failure to do so by the Chinese
Government will be contrary to the
understanding of the United States Government, and may be con-
sidered by the United States to be cause for the cessation of further
deliveries (it being understood that the undertakings contained in
the first three paragraphs below apply as well to the material trans-
ferred to the Chinese Government under that law
since June 27, 1950);
"1. The Chinese Government will use the material to maintain its
M
internal security or its legitimate self-defense.
"2. The Chinese Government will take such security measures as
may be agreed in each case between the United States Government a
and the Chinese Government in order to prevent the disclosure and
compromise of classified military articles, services or information
furnished by the United States Government.
3. The Chinese Government agrees to receive personnel of the
United States Government who will discharge in the territory under
the control of the Chinese Government the responsibilities of the
United States Government under this agreement and who will be hi
9,
2712; 3 UST, pt. 4, p. 5166).
amended by act of July 26, 1950 (infra, pp. 3039–3042).
em
un
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2471
1
ment January 30, 1951, which reads as follows:
this
accorded adequate facilities to observe the progress of the assistance
h are furnished, to confirm that the material furnished is being used for the
other
purposes for which it is provided, and to carry out such other opera-
basis
tions or arrangements as shall be mutually agreed pursuant to this
agreement. Such personnel, including personnel temporarily assigned,
will
, in their relations with the Chinese Government, operate as a part
of the United States Embassy, under the direction and control of the
EEN Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.
INA
“4. The Chinese Government will not transfer, sell, or otherwise
dispose of the material provided pursuant to the above undertakings, or
any other equipment susceptible of military use, without regard to its
ter of source
, or the time or manner of its acquisition, without first obtain-
ing the assurance of the United States Government that such equip-
ment or material is not required by the United States for its own use
or required to support programs of military assistance undertaken by
51.
the United States.
"The United States Government would appreciate a written assur-
lor to ance from the Chinese Government of its acceptance of the under-
takings in this note."
aval Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Con-
of
K. L. RANKIN
His Excellency
Dr. GEORGE K. C. YEH,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Taipei.
.
Translation
950); /
TAIPEH, TAIWAN
February 9, 1951
MONSIEUR LE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES:
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note No. 13, dated
se
ill be
that
o the
CON
rther
1ans-
in its
es as
and
ation
[There follows the text of the U.S. note.]
onder under reference.
In reply, I have the honor to signify on behalf of the Chinese Gov-
E the emment the acceptance of the undertakings set forth in your note
Please accept, Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires, the assurances of my
I the
il be high consideration.
agree
1951)
TILS
4), 85
2472
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
y1
WI
PE
to
qu
IS
th
Dr
im
Bi
res
fri
m
2 Made before the China Institute, New York; Department of State Bulletin,
June 1, 1951 (Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings Before the Committee on
Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area, part 3, pp. 1737-1739)
3 Resolution of June 26, 1951 (65 Stat. B69-B70; supra, pp. 1952–1954).
69. AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP FOR THE PEOPLES OF CHINA:
CE
Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,
May 18, 1951 2
of
lo
ha
I should like, first of all, to congratulate the China Institute on its
quarter century of splendid public service and to compliment you
who are responsible for this timely chance to recall the warm friend-
ship which has marked the relations between the Chinese and Ameri
can people throughout the last two centuries.
Something of what we have in mind this evening is contained in a
concurrent resolution which passed the Senate on May 4 and which
is now before the House of Representatives, which reads in part:*
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the
Congress of the United States reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the
American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union,
and declares-
That the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate
them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep
the Soviet peoples from learning of the desire of the American people to live in
friendship with all other peoples and to work with them in advancing the ideal of
human brotherhood; and
That the American people and their Government desire neither war with the
H
Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war .
de
Despite the artificial barriers which now separate us from most of
the peoples of China, we meet to reaffirm the historic and abiding | Pe
friendship of the American people for the people of China. th
Most of you here this evening are better qualified than I to explore K
the origins and elements of Chinese-American friendship. Over the
centuries, this friendship has come to be taken for granted; cordia
.
sentiments between a free China and a free America became strong Si
and durable because they were constantly nourished by common of
purposes and common practical interests.
We and the Chinese, for example, have had a vital interest in the
PI
peace of the Pacific. Each of us wants security on our Pacific fan
and wants
to be able to look across those vast waters to find strength
,
independence, and good will in its great neighbor on the other side
It was inevitable that the driving force of Japanese militarism would
sooner or later bring China and America together to oppose it
, just
as we had moved 40 years earlier to support China's independence ti
and integrity against threats from Europe. The same issues are now
posed again-and are made more difficult to deal with because foreign
g?
encroachment is now being arranged by Chinese who seem to love
China less than they do their foreign masters.
1 Dean Rusk.
ment of State (ibid., May 28, 1951) and remarks by the Secretary of State of
t)
Eighty-second Congress, First "Session, to orgonaulte lani ornquiry into the Milien
Situation in the
forma mest and the practions arounding the relies of General of the larg
P
m
m
ar
m
er
se
CO
Di
ma Sorisce
ů
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2473
n its
YOU
end
neri-
in 8
..3
of the
larate
keep
ive in
h the
distinct from China? Are our friends in China impressed by trade
perience of the miserable satellites of Eastern Europe?
We meet here this evening to reaffirm our friendship with the
NA:
Chinese people--but not merely as a routine and elegant expression
tirs,"
of good will
. For the friendship we have taken for granted for so
long is now being attacked with every available weapon by those who
have come to power on the mainland of China. Their sustained and
violent effort to erase all evidence of this friendship bears powerful
witness to the validity and strength of the bonds between our two
peoples. American influence among the Chinese people is intolerable
to those in power in Peiping and Moscow because they know, and
quite rightly, that the idea of national and individual freedom which
is at the heart of American political thought is the greatest threat to
thich
their own evil purposes.
Is the message of this meeting this evening to our friends in China
it the prompted solely by narrowly conceived American interests? That
important American interests are involved, there can be no doubt.
Inion, But our historical relations with China have always reflected a high
regard on our part for Chinese interests, and it is these we ask our
friends in China now to consider.
The independence of China is gravely threatened. In the Com-
eal of
munist world, there is room for only one master-a jealous and
implacable master, whose price of friendship is complete submission.
How
many Chinese, in one community after another, are now being
destroyed because they love China more than the Soviet Union? How
ist of
many Chinese will remember in time the fates of Rajk, Kostov,
iding Petkov, Clementis
, and all those in other satellites who discovered
that being Communist is not enough for the conspirators of the
The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing, Trial by
mob
, mass slaughter, banishment as forced labor to Manchuria,
Siberia or Sinkiang, the arbitrary seizure of property, the destruction
of loyalties within the family, the suppression of free speech-these
are the facts behind the parades and celebrations and the empty
promises.
The territorial integrity of China is now an ironic phrase. The
movement of Soviet forces into Sinkiang, the realities of “joint
exploitation" of that great province by Moscow and Peiping, the
separation of Inner Mongolia from the body politic of China, and the
continued inroads of Soviet power into Manchuria under the cloak of
Teigh greedy hands for
them for at least a century.
northern areas to the European empire which has stretched out its
Are our Chinese friends reflecting upon the maps of China now
being published on the mainland wřich show Sinkiang, Inner Mon-
golia
, Manchuria, and areas in the
west and southwest as something
show Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia
on the map of China? Have the
authorities in Peiping themselves fully considered what it means for
them to have Soviet troops one Chinese soil, in the light of the ex-
plore Kremlin?
r the
Od
trong
o the
flen
ngth
side
poul
just
lence
non
love
Metin,
part
te On
tee of
enate
ilitary
Army
1739
2474
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
rece
#mc
It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations.
The peace and security of China are being sacrificed to the ambitions beli
of the Communist conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign of t
masters into an adventure of foreign aggression
which cuts across the
most fundamental national interests of the Chinese people. This
pen
action stands condemned by the great world community in which the the
Cl inese people have always aspired to play a worthy role.
the
Hundreds of thousands of Chinese youths are being sacrificed in a
peo
fiery furnace, pitting their waves of human flesh against the fire power
I
of modern weapons and without heavy equipment, adequate supply,
or the most elementary medical attention. . Apart from Korea, the The
Chinese are being pressed to aggressive action in other areas—al Chi
calculated to divert the attention and energies of China away from
exp
the encroachments of Soviet imperialism upon China itself.
I find it hard to believe that the Chinese people will acquiesce in the
kind of future which their masters are now preparing for them. I find
it impossible to believe that our friends in China have given up their 70.
desire to live at peace with their neighbors, to play a major role as a
F
peaceful member of the international community of nations, to trade
t
freely with all the world, to improve their own conditions in accordance
with their own needs, aspirations and traditions, to maintain their I
independence as a nation, to preserve their territorial integrity, and Ko
to live out their lives in dignity and with the respect of their fellow pre
Events in China must surely challenge the concern of Chinese
everywhere—in Formosa, on the mainland, and in overseas commu-
nities. There is a job to be done for China which only the Chinese to
can do—a job which will require sustained energy, continued sacrifice, situ
and an abundance of the high courage with which so many Chinese ha
have fought for so long during the struggles of the past decades. The Th
rest of us cannot tell them exactly what is to be done
or how. We
Co
cannot provide a formula to engage the unity of effort among
in 1
Chinese who love their country. But one thing we can saya
the
Chinese people move to assert their freedom and to work out their Un
destiny in accordance with their own historical purposes--they can
of
thi
count upon tremendous support from free peoples in other parts
the world
Co
It is not my purpose, in these few moments this evening, to go into
specific elements of our own national policy in the present situation
.
But we can tell our friends in China that the United States will not
lor
acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon them. We
thi
do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to
Bi
be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government-
Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of
China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.
aggression upon which it is now willfully, openly, and senselesly
embarked.
We recognize the National Government of the Republic of Ching
even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We
men.
not
ma
all
the
bil
OU
1...
0
mic
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2475
3 See Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 12, 1953, pp. 74–78.
wer
rom
Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of
message, see supra, pp. 61-65.
2 Statement by the President, June 27, 1950; supra, doc. 66.
ions believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body
aign of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for inde-
the
pendence from foreign control. That Government will continue to
l'his
receive important aid and assistance from the United States. Under
the
the circumstances, however, such aid in itself cannot be decisive to
the future of China. The decision and the effort are for the Chinese
in 8
people
, pooling their efforts, wherever they are, in behalf of China.
If the Chinese people decide for freedom, they shall find friends
ply
,
among all the peoples of the earth who have known and love freedom.
the
They shall find added strength from those who refuse to believe that
-All
China is fated to become a land of tyranny and aggression and who
expect China to fulfill the promise of its great past.
the
find
heir 70. REVISED MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTH
FLEET IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Message by
sade the President to the Congress, February 2, 1953 (Excerpt) !
ince
heir
In June 1950, following the aggressive attack on the Republic of
and Korea, the United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to
low
prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should
not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist
mainland.
This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required
to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China. Regardless of the
fice, situation of 1950, since the date of that order the Chinese Communists
have invaded Korea to attack the United Nations forces there.
The
They have consistently rejected the proposals of the United Nations
We
Command for an armistice. They recently joined with Soviet Russia
all in rejecting the
armistice proposal sponsored in the United Nations by
the
the Government of India. This proposal had been accepted by the
heir United States and 53 other nations..
Consequently there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition
s of
that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsi-
bilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists. This permitted those
as &
nese
mu
nese
nese
can
nto
100.
not
WC
I to
our United Nations allies in Korea.
I
am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no
longer be employed to shieſa Communist China. Permit me to make
this crystal clear: This order implies no aggressive intent on our part.
But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us
of l in Korea.
DS.
of
sly
1H. Doc. 75, 83d Cong., 1st sess.
For more complete text of the President's
nan
Ve
2476
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1.
Qor
2.
S
6 Message of Aug. 24, 1950, from Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist Premier and solu
Communist Charges of United States Aggression in S1
the Formosa (Taiwan) Area
follo
(T
print
71. UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION OF THE COMMU.
NIST CHARGES: Statement by the Department of State, August
TE
fect)
24, 1950 1
will
The United States would welcome United Nations consideration
of the Formosa problem. By direction of the President, Ambassador
Austin notified the Security Council at once of the action taken by
the United States on June 27.2 In the President's statement of that at a
same date, it was indicated that the problem is one which might be Mor
considered by the United Nations.3
Chir
Of course, the Security Council should not be diverted from the the
urgent business already on its agenda, the aggression against the the
Republic of Korea.
Rept
the
3.
72. REFUTATION OF THE COMMUNIST CHARGES: Letter From actic
the United States Representative at the United Nations 4 to the mair
Secretary-General, August 25, 1950 (Excerpts) 5
NatF
There has been circulated to members of the Security Council & desig
paper which charges the United States with aggression against acqu
4.
Formosa. The paper asks the Security Council to consider the
question of Formosa.
The United States Government does not intend to discuss at this
time this paper or the ridiculous falsehoods which it contains. It by t
does wish to take this occasion to make a further statement about terri
the Formosan question,
On June 27 the United States representative read at the Security bay di
Tha
Council the following statement of the President of the United
5.
States:
the
of C
[There follows the text of the President's statement as printed, infra
,
pp. 2539-2540.]
on to
Rep
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 4, 1950, p. 395.
6.
2 Supra, doc. 66.
3 See Ambassador Austin's statement of June 27, 1950; Department of State of t
Bulletin, July 3, 1950, pp. 6–8.
4 Warren R. Austin.
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 11, 1950, pp. 411–412.
Oct. 16, 1950, p. 607.
ther
prej
The
actio
Unit
inye
cons
5
7.
dive
1S
2539
?(
Polic
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2477
the Pacific area.
Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.
investigation here or on the spot. We believe that United Nations
consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable
diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic
See Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950; infra, pp. 2538–
? General Assembly Res. 291 (IV), Dec. 8, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign
in Since then, the President of the United States on July 19 made the
following declaration in a message to the Congress:
(There follows a portion of the text of the President's message as
printed, infra, pp. 2552–2560.]
MU
gust
These statements and the facts to which they related make per-
fectly clear certain fundamental points which the people of the world
will have clearly in mind:
ition 1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China,
ador nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.
be 2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken
that at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland.
It be More
serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration
of the
Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened
thes the security of the United Nations Forces operating in Korea under
the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression on the
Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through
3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing
"rom action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the
the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was,
therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United
Nations. As President Truman has solemnly declared, we have no
cil designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to
ainst acquire a special position for the United States.
the 4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without
prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island.
this The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan
by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such
bout | territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international
action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked
by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island.
Lited
That is the reason the Chinese are there now.
5. The United States
has a record through history of friendship for
the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions
of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last
United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution
on the integrity of China. Only the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Bill the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations
7. We do not believe that the Security Council need be or will be
arity
nfra,
- and solution of that problem.
ibid,
2539 and 2540-2541.
Policy
, pp. 726-727.
,
1950-1955
It
rest
COUL
In accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure of the General
Assembly, the Delegation of the United States offers the following
2 See the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly (U. N, doc. A/520; Dec.
2478
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor " qu
attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United of
Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression. Formosa is now at
peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force. If the
Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall oft
support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the President of the Security Chi
Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item
on the agenda which is the Complaint of Aggression Against the Republic
of Korea, and, specifically, the recognition of the right of the Korean min
Ambassador to take his seat and the vote on the United States resolucou
tion for the localization of the Korean conflict.
J
I request that this letter be circulated to members of the Security
Jap
Council.
the
Pro
[The United Nations considered three items relating to Formosa:
Ger
(1) The Chinese Communist complaint regarding “armed invasion of pur
Formosa”, submitted August 24, 1950. On November 30, 1950, the Jap
Şecurity Council rejected by a 9-1-1 vote a Soviet resolution which would Ger
have condemned the United States.
(2) The Soviet complaint of “aggression against China by the United was
States of America”, submitted September 20, 1950. The First Com. apr
mittee of the General Assembly rejected a Soviet resolution on this has
subject by a vote of 49–5–3 (February 1, 1951). The General Assembly (
itself rejected the same resolution on February 1, 1951, by a similar
in
margin.
(3) The question of Formosa, submitted by the United States Septem: i the
ber 20, 1950 (supra, pp. 174–175). After hearing Mr. Dulles' statement firs
of November 15, 1950 (infra, doc. 74), the First Committee decided to post- of
pone consideration of the question. On February 7, 1951, the First
Committee adopted a British proposal to adjourn discussion sine die.
For information regarding the discussion of these items, see United
of
States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the
Congress for the Year 1950 (Department of State publication 4178; 1951)
ibid., 1951 (Department of State publication 4583; 1952); Annual Report
of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 1 July 1950–30 June
1951 (General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 1
U. N. doc. A/1844); and Report of the Security Council to the General Assen.
Sev
bly, Covering the period from 16 July 1950 to 15 July 1951 (ibid., Supplement No of 1
2; U. N. doc. A/1783). See also statement of Nov. 28, 1950 by Ambassador
Austin regarding the Chinese Communist
charges; 'Department of State
Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1950, pp. 929–936.]
tha
73. UNITED STATES REQUEST THAT THE "QUESTION OF
FORMOSA” BE PLACED ON THE AGENDA OF THE GENER-
AL ASSEMBLY: Letter
From the Secretary of State to the Secre fur
tary-General of the United Nations, September 21, 1950 ?
wit
of G
1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1950, pp. 607-608.
pres
Pac
fund
A
For
mer
mer
pre
Un
or
inh
1
2
2
3
5
12, 1947).
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2479
s See supra, doc. 66.
orean
El
embly
milar
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on
Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.
inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 22.
? Ibid., pp. 49-50.
of Government Section, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, vol. II, p. 442.
esot question of Formosa" be placed on the agenda of the Fifth Session
nited of the General Assembly as an additional item of an important and
DW8t urgent character within the meaning of Rule 15.
f the În the joint Declaration at Cairo of 1 December 1943, the President
shall of the United States, the British Prime Minister, and the President of
curity China stated-
item
ublic
It is their purpose that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores shall be
restored to the Republic of China. The aforesaid three Great Powers,
mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due
esolu- course Korea shall become free and independent.
In the Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945, defining the terms for
curity
Japanese surrender the three Allied leaders declared that the terms of
the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. The provisions of this
Proclamation were accepted by Japan at the time of its surrender.
General Order No. 1 of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters 3 issued
on ot! pursuant to the terms of surrender provided for the surrender of the
Japanese Forces in China (excluding Manchuria) and Formosa to
Doruk Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek. Formal transfer of Formosa to China
nited
was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other
Com appropriate formal act. For the past five years, Chinese authority
this has been exercised over the island.
On 25 June 1950, a breach of the peace occurred in the Pacific area
in the form of an armed attack against the Republic of Korea. In
otem the resolution adopted on that day, the Security Council took the
ment first step toward restoring the peace. On 27 June, the President
of the United States stated that
the North Korean forces had-
die.
defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to
preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, the occupation
of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the
1951);
Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary
Report
ment on Formosa to cease all air and sea
operation against the mainland. The
of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settle-
ment with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.
The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear
that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without
TOP United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position
prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and that the
en privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes
eten further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly 8 million people
The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948: Report
post-
Jnited
to the
functions in that area.
) June
No. 1;
Ssem.
nt No.
sador
State
5
)
VER
ners!
swing
it the
; Dec.
Infra, pp. 2538-2539.
2480
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
to!
situs
[Later in the debate, Mr. Dulles made the following remarks responding to a
pretation of what I said, I had not said that this question should be
The limited question, that of charges of the Peiping Regime against post
the United States, as set forth in document S/1715, remains before oft
the Security Council. The United States considers that the General
I
Assembly could make an important contribution towards carrying
into
out the purpose and principles of the United Nations in the Pacific says
Area if it should study the general situation with respect to Formosa
the
with a view to formulating appropriate recommendations.
I
my
adic
74. POSTPONEMENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDER inte
ATION OF THE “QUESTION OF FORMOSA" (TAIWAN: the
Statements by the United States Representative? Before the Wi
General Assembly, November 15, 1950 3
gov
nort
I
I am going to suggest that we should defer and put to a later place in
on our agenda this item of the question of Formosa.
We put the item of the question of Formosa on the agenda because, may
If
as our Secretary of State said in his opening statement to the Assembly
in general debate,
T
It is the belief of my Government that the problem of Formosa and the nearly
8 million people who inhabit it should not be settled by force or by unilateral
the
action. We believe that the international community has a legitimate interest
of ti
and concern in having this matter settled by peaceful means.4
deba
That is basically the reason, Mr. Chairman, why we asked that this
whid
item be placed on the agenda, and we still believe that the item should oft
stay on the agenda.
We do, however, suggest that it should not be considered at the
present time.
When the Secretary of State spoke, as I indicated, in September
, it
seemed at that time that there was a reasonable prospect that peace
and security would be reestablished in Korea speedily and satis-
factorily by the action of the United Nations and its forces there
I am sorry to say that that prospect has now been, in recent days
considerably changed by the rapid and substantial increase of Chinese
Communist intervention in Korea. The situation that results creates
a very serious problem both for the United Nations and for my own
Government.
A resolution dealing with the intervention in Korea is now pending
before the Security Council and is being considered.
75.
0
th
Soviet statement.]8
If the delegate of the Soviet Union understood correctly the inter
POSS
Att
IF
the
Dec.
5
Nat
1 See Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 607.
2 John Foster Dulles.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1950, p. 911.
4 Statement of Sept. 20, 1950; supra, pp. 169–179.
5 Draft resolution of Nov. 10, 1950; infra, pp. 2583–2584.
6 Note in Department of State Bulletin.
1]
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2481
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, pp. 191-192.
nose
Dec. 2 and 10, 1954, see supra, pp. 945–949.]
of the Chinese Communists to take one of the offshore islands from the
Nationalists. Secretary Dulles made the following reply:
ainst postponed until there could be an arrival here of the representatives
for of the Chinese so-called government.
neral
I am quite sure, Mr. Chairman, that the interpreters could not fall
ying
into such a grievous error. I am quite sure that what Mr. Malik
cife says he thinks I said is a case of the wish perhaps being followed by
the thought. It is not a case of error by the interpreters.
I never suggested in any degree whatsoever that the motivation for
my proposal for adjournment was to allow the Chinese Communists
to get here. Quite the contrary, the one reason I hesitated to urge the
adjournment was that it might be interpreted, as it has been mis-
ER interpreted—I am afraid-deliberately by the honorable delegate of
AN: the Soviet Union.
the What I did say was that, in the light of the conduct of this so-called
government, things we can't shut our eyes to—the intervention in
north Korea, the invasion of Tibet, the great aid to Ho Chi-minh
lace in Indochina, and the threats of invasion of Formosa--we face the
situation, Mr. Chairman, of the risk, at least, that that whole area
nuse, may be engulfed in aggressive war.
mbly If that is going to happen, then a discussion here of the long-range
future of Formosa would be somewhat academic.
The primary task of the Security Council is to do everything it
possibly can to be sure that that great disaster does not occur, and
cerest the only reason, Mr. Chairman, why I suggested the postponement
of the discussion here was lest by misventure, in the course of our
this
debate here, we might say something about this delicate problem
which might make more difficult the already difficult enough task
ould
of the Security Council.
the
Attempts To Effect a Cease-Fire in the Formosa
(Taiwan) Area, 1954-1955
[Por texts of the Mutual Defense Treaty and exchange of notes between
the United States and the Republic of China on Formosa (Taiwan),
ding
75. RELATION OF THE TACHEN ISLANDS TO THE DEFENSE
OF FORMOSA (TAIWAN): Transcript of a News Conference of
the Secretary of State, January 18, 1955 (Excerpt)
be
Secretary Dulles was asked if he had any reports on the attempt
early
ateral
eace
atis-
nere.
lays
nese
cates
OWO
to &
1
ater-
I have had some reports about the fighting, which is rather severe
415900_57-Vol. 2-53
2482
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
safe
sery.
mos
V
I put it that that was a matter of
can usefully pick up a possible air attack against Formosa and relay
knowledge of that to Formosa before that air attack could be detected infra
apparently around the island of I-chiang, an island which lies, I eny
believe, about 8 miles to the north of the Tachen Islands. of F
Asked how important the Tachen Islands are to us, the Secretary
replied:
76.
I would not say that the Tachen Islands are in any sense essential D
to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, which we do regard &
th
vital to us.
Asked whether they are useful in the defense of those places, Mr. Dulles | Tot
replied:
T
Well, that would call for a military judgment rather than one I
would want to try to express as a civilian. There is, I believe, on the
tion
island a radar point which is perhaps of some utility in picking up
peac
possible air attack against Formosa. It lies about 200 miles north of
Si
Formosa. But whether the Tachen radar could pick it up and get dore
word to Formosa in advance of the detection of it by radar actually of
on Formosa I wouldn't know.
islai
Asked whether it had any value to the United States position on
if
Okinawa, the Secretary replied:
whic
No.
the
Asked whether he was talking about the island that is currently under
attack and whether it is considered one of the Tachen group or not
,
Secretary Dulles replied:
of t
No, it is not one of the Tachen group. It is part of a group
islands most of which actually passed from Nationalist to Communist
T
hands last May. There is a little group of four or five islands there, Chin
and most of them were taken over by the Communists about last Form
May. The loss didn't attract any particular attention at that time sive
11
Since then, public opinion has been focused more on these little off-
shore islands than was the case last May. But the island itself whe
(I-chiang) is without any particular importance. It is subject to 1950
artillery fire from some of these islands that were taken over
T
May, and it was not held by any regular forces of the Republic of
China.
Asked whether it was correct to say that the Tachen Islands were
essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, the Secretary feas
replied:
military judgment. My own information is that the only relation
Tre
that it has to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores
is that there
is a radar station on the island, and whether or not that radar station
Stat
secu
rup
to
U.
und
We
not
Nat-
and
11
61-6
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2483
1
g up
112 07
| Treaty between this Government and the Republic of China, covering
? See President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950; supra, doc. 66.
See President Eisenhower's message to Congress, Feb. 2, 1953; supra, pp.
es
, I any precise knowledge of. I would say the relationship to the defense
of Formosa was at the best marginal.
etary
76. EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN
ential
DEFENSE OF THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Message by
rd as
the President to the Congress, January 24, 1955
Dulles To the Congress of the United States:
The most important objective of our Nation's foreign policy is to
safeguard the security of the United States by establishing and pre-
one I
on the serving a just and honorable peace. In the Western Pacific a situa-
tion is developing in the Formosa Straits that seriously imperils the
peace and our security.
th of
get
Since the end of Japanese hostilities in 1945, Formosa and the Pesca-
dores have been in the friendly hands of our loyal ally, the Republic
ualis
of China. We have recognized that it was important that these
islands should remain in friendly hands. In unfriendly hands, For-
on mosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate the existing, even
if unstable, balance of moral, economic, and military forces upon
which the peace of the Pacific depends. It would create a breach in
the island chain of the Western Pacific that constitutes, for the United
under States and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their
security structure in that ocean. In addition, this breach would inter-
rupt north-south communications between other important elements
of that barrier, and damage the economic life of countries friendly
ip ol to us.
The United States and the friendly Government of the Republic of
here, China, and indeed all the free nations, have a common interest that
last Formosa and the Pescadores should not fall into the control of aggres-
time. sive Communist forces.
of Influenced by such considerations, our Government was prompt,
itself when the Communists committed armed aggression in Korea in June
it to 1950, to direct our Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa from possible
last invasion from the Communist mainland.2
ic of These considerations are still valid. The Seventh Fleet continues
under Presidential directive to carry out that defensive mission.3
We also provide military and economic support to the Chinese
e mol Nationalist Government and we cooperate in every proper and
etary feasible way with that Government in order to promote its security
and stability. All of these military and related activities will be
In addition, there was signed last December a. Mutual Defense
- not
,
unist
continued.
er of
ation
there
ation
relay.H. Doc. No. 76, 84th Cong., 1st sess.
infra.
cted
See also resolution of Jan. 29, 1955;
have
61-65.
2484
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
-
in
VOI
Moreover, we must be alert to any concentration or employment
of Chinese Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate
I do not suggest that the United States enlarge its defensive obliga pro
Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores. It is a treaty of purely no
defensive character. That treaty is now before the Senate of the att
United States.
cla
Meanwhile Communist China has pursued a series of provocative mi
political and military actions, establishing a pattern of aggressive su
purpose. That purpose, they proclaim, is the conquest of Formose in
In September 1954 the Chinese Communists opened up heery to,
artillery fire upon Quemoy Island, one of the natural approaches to
Formosa, which had for several years been under the uncontested
control of the Republic of China. Then came air attacks of mounting Cat
intensity against other free China islands, notably those in the vicinity to
of the Tachen group to the north of Formosa. One small island to
(Ichiang) was seized last week by air and amphibious operations
after a gallant few fought bravely for days against overwhelming odds lick
There have been recent heavy air attacks and artillery fire against to
the main Tachen Islands themselves.
for
The Chinese Communists themselves assert that these attacks are
a prelude to the conquest of Formosa. For example, after the fall o meu
Ichiang, the Peiping radio said that it showed a
tha
nat.
determined will to fight for the liberation of Taiwan (Formosa]. Our people wil
Uni
use all their strength to fulfill that task.
Clearly, this existing and developing situation poses a serious danger I
to the security of our country and of the entire Pacific area and
any
indeed to the peace of the world. We believe that the situation is one the
for appropriate action of the United Nations under its charter, for the whe
purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area. We would T
welcome assumption of such jurisdiction by that body.
Meanwhile, the situation has become sufficiently critical to impe
me, without awaiting action by the United Nations, to ask the Cor the
gress to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed late
1
to improve the prospects for peace. These measures would contem-
plate the use of the Armed Forces of the United States if necessary to resc
assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores
The actions that the United States must be ready to undertake are to I
of various kinds. For example, we must be ready to assist the reas
Republic of China to redeploy and consolidate
its forces if it should so
desire. Some of these forces are scattered throughout the smalle
A
offshore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons whi
directly related to defending Formosa. Because of the
air situation
in the area, withdrawals for the purpose of redeployment of Chinese Chi
Nationalist forces would be impractical without assistance of the bee
Armed Forces of the United States.
attack upon Formosa, and be prepared to take appropriate military Com
action.
nei
COD
TECI
are:
the
and
Ari
em
Coi
1 Treaty of Dec. 2, 1954; supra, pp. 945–947.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2485
les to
_f the been flaunted to the whole world by words and by deeds. Just as
Armed Forces of the United States or any acceleration in military
Creati emergency arises requiring any change, I will communicate with the
urely now awaiting ratification. But, unhappily, the danger of armed
f the attack directed against that area compels us to take into account
closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions,
cative might determine the failure or the success of such an attack. The
BSite authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only
nosa
. in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries
neayy to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.
Authority for some of the actions which might be required would be
ested inherent in the authority of the Commander in Chief. Until Congress
nting can act I would not hesitate, so far as my constitutional powers extend,
cinity to take whatever emergency action might be forced upon us in order
sland to protect the rights and security of the United States.
utions However, a suitable congressional resolution would clearly and pub-
odds licly establish the authority of the President as Commander in Chief
ainst to employ the Armed Forces of this Nation promptly and effectively
for the purposes indicated if in his judgment it became necessary. It
ts are would make clear the unified and serious intentions of our Govern-
all of ment, our Congress, and our people. Thus it will reduce the possibility
that the Chinese Communists, misjudging our firm purpose and
national unity, might be disposed to challenge the position of the
ole wil United States, and precipitate a major crisis which even they would
neither anticipate nor desire.
8nger
In the interest of peace, therefore, the United States must remove
and any doubt regarding our readiness to fight, if necessary, to preserve
is one the vital stake of the free world in a free Formosa, and to engage in
or the whatever operations may be required to carry out that purpose.
To make this plain requires not only Presidential action but also
congressional action. In a situation such as now confronts us, and
impel under modern conditions of warfare, it would not be prudent to await
Com the emergency before coming to the Congress. Then it might be too
igned | late. Already the warning signals are flying.
I believe that the threatening aspects of the present situation, if
ary to resolutely faced, may be temporary in character. Consequently, I
recommend that the resolution expire as soon as the President is able
se are to report to the Congress that the peace and security of the area are
to the reasonably assured by international conditions, resulting from United
Again I say that we would welcome action by the United Nations
as which might, in fact, bring an end to the active hostilities in the
area. This critical situation has been created by the choice of the
Their offensive military intent has
they created the situation, so they can end it if they so choose.
What we are now seeking is primarily to clarify present policy
life and to unite in its application. We are not establishing a new policy.
liter consequently, my recommendations de not call for an increase in the
3
would
ntem-
ald so Nations action or otherwise.
maller
hinese Chinese Communists, not by us.
ment
2486
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly oi
Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the
vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in
169 Stat. 7. See also White House statement of Jan, 27, 1955 (Department
of State Bulletin, Feb. 7, 1955, pp. 213-214) and President Eisenhower's statement
gressional resolution will be to calm the situation rather than to
create further conflict.
One final point: The action I request is, of course, no substitute
for the treaty with the Republic of China which we have signed and
which I have transmitted to the Senate. Indeed, present circum
stances make it more than ever important that this basic agreement
should be promptly brought into force, as a solemn evidence of ou
determination to stand fast in the agreed treaty area and to thwart
all attacks directed against it. If delay should make us appear in Std
decisive in this basic respect, the pressures and dangers would surely | Ur
mount.
FO
Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served if, with FOW
pu
help, we demonstrate our unity and our determination. In all that we
age
do we shall remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the ted
United Nations to be ready to settle our international disputes by fri
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, be
ind justice, are not endangered.
the
For the reasons outlined in this message, I respectfully request that
the Congress take appropriate action to carry out the recommende the
tions contained herein.
77. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PRESI
DENT TO EMPLOY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES TO PROTECT FORMOSA. THE PESCADORES, AND
RELATED POSITIONS AND TERRITORIES OF THAT AREA:
House Joint Resolution 159 (84th Congress, 1st Session), January
29, 1955 1
Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations
with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring
peace for all; and
Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction
of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats
munists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for
and declarations have been
and are being made by the Chinese
Cor
armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,
Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the
Formosa and the Pescadores; and
Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western
na
W19
78
1
Pr
So
Ze:
off
ME
thi
mi
ini
ish
SI
1
1
or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and
of Jan. 29, 1955 (ibid., p. 214).
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2487
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 252-253.
an to
rcum-
ement
of our
of the
Com threatening situation results directly from intensified Chinese Com-
Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, sub-
mitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a
titute
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and
d and
the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in
the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described,
in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous
to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it
hwart
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
ar in
States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the
surel United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed
Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific
FOU
purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores
hat we
against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and pro-
tection of such related positions and territories of that area now in
ces by friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to
urity
, be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and
the Pescadores.
t that
This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine
hence that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by inter-
national conditions created by action of the United Nations or other-
wise, and shall so report to the Congress.
RESI78. SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE QUES-
TION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA:
AND
Remarks by the United States Representative 3 Before the Se-
REA:
curity Council, January 31, 1955 4
In the few remarks which I shall make I shall first refer to the item
proposed by New Zealand 5 and then to the item proposed by the
The United States favors inscribing the item proposed by New
We agree that the hostilities in the area of the Chinese
iction ofshore islands have produced a situation which endangers the
hreats maintenance of international peace and security. The present
munist military pressures against the offshore islands which began on
September 3, 1954, when the Chinese Communists without warning
mitiated a heavy and long continued artillery barrage against Quemoy.
nly o The Chinese
Communist Iand, sea, and air
assaults against the
offshore
islands from the Tachens to Quemoy have continued intermittently
since that date. Only recently, the Chinese Communists attacked
ITED
nuary
ations
Juring
Soviet Union.
Zealand.
on for
er the
ester
to the
ons in
S. Exec. A, 84th Cong., 1st sess.
? Supra, pp. 945–947.
3 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
4
rtment
tement
" See letter of Jan. 30, 1955, from the Soviet representative;ibid., pp. 253–254.
2488
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
OU
6
WE
דנו
mt
syllable in it. It is purely defensive. It reflects the true views
communism. There is the real aggressor. The Soviet representative
What is aggressive in the modern world, Mr. President, is
and overran the island of I-chiang, which up to then was under con- ki
tinuous control of the Government of the Republic of China. WE
The forces of the Government of the Republic of China have limited th
their response to these attacks to operations of a purely defensive its
character in the immediate vicinity designed to reduce the capacity ob
of the Chinese Communists to continue the attacks.
The danger to the peace which exists as a result of this situation
can only be removed through the cessation of hostilities.
les
The United States Government believes that recourse to the ta
Security Council is desirable and therefore endorses the initiative it
commendably taken by the New Zealand representative in this
matter.
Now, Mr. President, let me say a word about the Soviet item
. it
The Soviet Union tells us not to interfere, if you please, in the internal
affairs of another country. That is the phrase. Here it is—you
can read it for yourself—from the letter signed by the Soviet repre-
sentative, "the intervention of the United States of America in the
internal affairs of China," etc.
K
Now, Mr. President, when I hear the Soviet Union telling others A
not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, I really by
feel that I can honestly say that I have heard everything!
Here is this Soviet regime wbich always interferes to the maximum I
extent possible in the internal affairs of all countries, which bas inter- it
fered and is interfering with deadly effect and to the fullest extent
of its power in the internal affairs of China-here is this regime in a
tone of unction, if you please, making a charge of interference against ho
the United States.
Now, Mr. President, it is not necessary for me to say that the
United States has never interfered in the internal affairs of Chinelo
and that the entire letter of the Soviet representative and the Soviet
T
Union item is a preposterous cold war fraud.
As a matter of fact, the Soviet statement this morning committed
a whole series of flagrant inaccuracies, a few of which I shall briefly
correct as follows:
The message of President Eisenhower to Congress' does not threaten CH
the Chinese Communists with war. There is not one aggressive
th
of Dwight Eisenhower, our President, who is known to his country-
men and is known all over the world as a man of peace, as a man
who knows the horrors of war and who is deeply dedicated to peace
Then the resolution passed by Congress, and passed by almost
unanimous vote, is also purely defensive. It is aimed entirely at pre-
venting aggression,
The Mutual Security Treaty; to which reference was made is en
tirely defensive. It has no aggressive or offensive potentialities what
SC
St.
bc
in
m
T
fe
01
m
SU
al
soever.
1 Message of Jan. 24, 1955; supra, doc. 76.
? Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; supra.
I Supra, pp. 945–947.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2489
3 See infra, pp. 2676-2684.
COD
ference. It is also the case here and now.
? Cease-fire agreement of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 750–767.
1 Armistice agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724–750.
knows full well that the international Communistic organization
which his Government controls continues its attempts to dominate
mited the world. He must know that if the Soviet Union were to give up
insite its support of the international Communist movement, the greatest
acity obstacles to organizing peace would disappear.
The Soviet representative's utterances this morning let the cat
ation out of the bag. I say this because the Soviet Union's actions today
leave no room for doubt that international communism would cer-
) the tainly like to take over Formosa or any other place on this earth if
jative it could.
this
Now, Mr. President, in accordance with our custom, we will not
oppose putting the Soviet complaint on the agenda, specious though
item.
it is. We are not afraid of a discussion. In fact, we welcome it. And
ernal
we are satisfied that after we have told our story all but the hard-core
-you professional Communists will applaud what we have done.
epre- Our whole effort-the whole effort of the United States Govern-
n the
ment–is for peace. The world knows that we agreed to a truce in
Korea,' to a settlement in Viet-Nam; 2 the world also knows, as Sir
then Anthony Eden once pointed out, that no one has ever been enslaved
cally by the United States.
What the Soviet Union proposes is the standard Communist line.
I doubt if many persons really believe it, least of all those who utter
nter-
it and write it. I hope I will be proved wrong, but I very much fear
xtent that this latest Communist move is merely a rather obvious smoke-
in a
screen to conceal the Communist refusal to agree to a cessation of
cainst hostilities.
If the Communists really are opposed to war and violence, as their
statement affirms, they can easily demonstrate it by joining the peace-
China loving nations of the world in supporting a cessation of hostilities.
oviet
That is why we of the free world are here
today.
(Following discussion of the question by the Security Council, Am-
ciefly
bassador Lodge continued:]
The United States agrees that the Security Council should invite the
Chinese Communist regime to send a representative to be present at
the Council's discussion
of the New Zealand item. We believe that
in any effort to end an armed conflict to which the Chinese Com-
munist regime is a party, it is useful for this regime to be present.
This was our attitude
in 1953 concerning the Korean Political Con-
Our support for this motion has no bearing whatever on the question
of our opposition to the
representation of China by the Chinese Com-
munists in the United Nations or in any body thereof. Nor does our
support for this motion imply any change in our established attitude
against recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.
mum
the
itted
caten
ssive
views
atry-
man
eace.
most
pre-
en-
hat-
t, is
tive
2490
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
4
Far
mer
5 Ibid., p. 255. See also statement of Feb. 11, 1955, by the Department of
79. INVITATION TO THE "PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA" giti
TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
this
DISCUSSION OF THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) QUESTION:
1
Cablegram From the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the
the Chinese Communist Premier, January 31, 1955 2
son
the
in
I HAVE THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT TO YOU THE FOLLOWING IN-
as
FORMATION:
und
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 690TH MEETING ON 31 JANUARY 1955
1
DECIDED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS IN ITS AGENDA:
mu
"1. LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NEW ZEALAND DATED We
28 JANUARY 1955 TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CON-
CERNING THE QUESTION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA OF CERTAIN
ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF THE MAINLAND OF CHINA (S/3354).3. 81.
"2. LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1955 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF ACIS
OF AGGRESSION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST THE
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE AREA OF TAIWAN AND OTHER
ISLANDS OF CHINA (s/3355).
IN APPROVING ITS AGENDA THE COUNCIL DECIDED THAT IT WOULD
001
COMPLETE CONSIDERATION OF THE FIRST ITEM BEFORE PROCEEDING
TO DISCUSS THE SECOND,
IT FURTHER DECIDED TO EXTEND AN INVITATION TO THE CENTRAL
PEOPLES GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO SEND
A REPRESENTATIVE TO BE PRESENT IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE
DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST ITEM AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBATE
tha
IN ORDER TO PRESENT THE VIEWS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT.
po
the
fra
80. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KO
ot!
CHINA IN THE EVACUATION OF THE TACHEN ISLANDS:
Imre
Statement by the Department of State, February 5, 1955
The Government of the Republic of China has informed the U.S.
Government that it will redeploy its military forces from the Tachens
,
a group of small islands 200 miles north of Formosa, to other positions. Da
It has requested the aid of U.S. forces in protecting and assisting the
redeployment of these military forces and the evacuation of such
civilians as desire to leave those islands. The U.S. Government has
be
1 Chou En-lai.
2 U.N. doc. S/3358, Feb. 4, 1955. See also Chou's reply, dated Feb. 3, 1956;
Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 254-255.
3 Ibid., p. 253.
• Ibid., pp. 253-254.
pp.
House (ibid., Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 332-333).
ma
an
5
mi
WE
the
COI
USE
1
E
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2491
1 Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; supra, doc, 77.
Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 28, 1955, pp. 526-527.
Statement of Feb. 25, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1955,
NA" given orders to the Seventh Fleet and other U.S. forces to assist in
NCIL this operation.
ION:
The U.S. Government has further advised the Chinese Government
ns 60 that with the object of securing and protecting Formosa, in con-
sonance with the congressional resolution approved January 29, 1955,
the U.S. Government will extend assistance to the Republic of China
in defending such related positions and territories now in its hands
as the United States deems to be essential to the defense of Formosa
and the Pescadores.
It is hoped that these steps will contribute to a cessation of Com-
munist attacks and to the restoration of peace and security in the
West Pacific.
I IN
1955
ATED
CON
TAIN
E OP
81. CONDITIONS FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE OF QUE-
MOY AND THE MATSU ISLANDS: Transcript of a News Con-
ference of the Secretary of State, March 15, 1955 (Excerpt)
RESI-
2
ACTS
THE
THER
DULD
DING
TRAL
SEND
THE
BATE
At his news conference on March 15, Secretary Dulles was asked a
series of questions relating to United States defense commitments in the
Far East and Southeast Asia and its plans for implementing these arrange,
ments. He was asked at the outset whether the United States would
commit American forces to specific points in the area. Secretary Dulles
made the following reply:
No, there has been no change in the basic U.S. policy which I
announced first at Manila 3 and repeated at Bangkok. That is that
we believe that our most effective contribution to the defense of
the entire area is by a strategic force with a high degree of striking
power by sea and by air. That power is available to be used wherever
the occasion arises. U.S. policy is not to split that power up into
fragments of which one part is irrevocably committed, let us say, to
Of Korea
, and another part irrevocably committed to Japan, and an-
DS:
part irrevocably committed to the Ryukyus, and another part
rrevocably committed to Formosa, and another part irrevocably com-
mitted to the Philippines
, and another part irrevocably committed to
U.S.
various parts of Southeast Asia.
If you are going to divide our strength up, and irrevocably commit
parts of it to each one of the areas which are in danger and which
We are committed to help to defend, you may not have enough at
the area which is attacked. We don't know where the attack is
coming, and a commitment which would deprive us of the right to
use our full power wherever the need arose would not, in my opinion,
be in the interests of anybody involved.
355;
other
ens,
ons.
the
uch
has
t of
hite
pp. 374-375.
2492 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
agree
reca
HUSE
NO E
A
2 The Secretary visited Taipei, Mar. 3, 1955, for the purpose of exchanging of 81
Asked how this related to the possible defense of the Islands of Quemay
and Matsu, the Secretary replied:
both
The situation there is inherently speculative because it depends Secre
upon the intentions and purpose of the Chinese Communists. The
I
treaty that we have with the Republic of China excludes Quemog
and Matsu from the treaty area. That was done with much thought
that
and deliberation. Therefore, the treaty does not commit the United
be wa
States to defend anything except Formosa and the Pescadores, and
Fou
the
to deal with attacks against that treaty area.
that
Public Law 4, which authorizes the President to use the armed
forces of the United States in relation to the defense of Formosa and
Secu
the Pescadores, also allows the President to use those armed forces in
relation to related areas if in the opinion of the President that is A
necessary or appropriate for the defense of Formosa and the
Pescadores.
Therefore, the issue is, would an attack on Quemoy, Matsu, perhaps
W
elsewhere, be part of an attack against Formosa and the Pescadores
?
If so, then both under the treaty and under the law the President meet
would presumably react with U.S. force. If the President judges no
Chic
that the attack is not related to an attack on Formosa and the Pesca-
call
dores, then neither the treaty nor the law gives him authority to act
.
Up to the present time the Chinese Communists have indicated
that their operations in the Formosa Straits are designed against and
Formosa and the Pescadores. When islands such as the Tachens
were taken over, they did not. say, “We have now regained some
islands”; they said, “We have now gained a better position from
WE
which to attack Formosa." So that as the situation now stands, on renu
the basis of the record made by the Chinese Communists, it would ot &
seem that their operations are designed against Formosa and the agai
Pescadores.
Because of that fact, when I was in Taipei for our consultations of t
there, and there were also military consultations, account was taken that
of the fact that it might in the future be judged by the President at få
that the defense of Quemoy and the Matsu Islands was called for
because of the intention of the Chinese Communists to make their
operations an attack against Formosa. On the other hand, I don't 82
know whether an attack will come; I don't know when it will come, i.
(I
may be next week, it may be next year, it may be never. I cannot
foresee or attempt to judge for myself, much less on behalf of the
President, what the circumstances
may be. Therefore, it is inevitable
that the situation should be in some ambiguity,
because, as I say,
areas are outside of the treaty area and the question of the U.S. 1789
of force for their defense depends upon the circumstances under
which an attack upon them occurs.
Secretary Dulles was asked about the statement of the British Foreign in
Secretary that the British were seeking to get a renunciation of force by
1 Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; supra, doc. 77.
instruments of ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty with China.
Porn
Whe
of
A
the
these
mad
T
peo
18
Choi
2
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2493
emoy
res in
| made the following reply:
Ereigt in Peiping. We have made perfectly clear our desire that there
Chou En-lai (supra, doc. 79) and Chou's reply, dated Feb. 3, 1955 (Department
1 See cablegram of Jan. 31, 1955, from Secretary-General Hammarskjold to
zigin of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 254-255).
? Ibid., Apr, 18, 1955, pp. 643–644,
lemon
both the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. Is that in
agreement with our position and did you discuss that with Mr. Eden, the
pends Secretary was asked. He replied:
The
I made clear, as I think the President has repeatedly made clear,
bught
that we do not believe in or desire the solution to these problems to
nited
be worked out through the use of force, and that a cease-fire, which
and
would end the actual hostilities in this area, would be welcomed by
,
the United States. So far, there has been no evidence whatever
rmed
that the Chinese Communists would accept a cease-fire, and, as you
t and
recall, they rejected an invitation to come to the United Nations
Security Council to discuss that matter.1
lat is Asked whether the renunciation of the use of force without a renunciation
the
of a a claim, as Mr. Eden suggests, would be considered the equivalent of a
conse-fire by this Government, the Secretary replied:
rhaps
Well
, if there were a renunciation of the use of force, that would
ident
meet the immediate requirements of the situation and there would be
idges no necessity that I can see for anybody, either on the Republic of
China's side or the Communists' side, to renounce what they might
esc&-
call their legal pretentions, their legal claims.
Asked what the United States position would be if an attack on Quemoy
and Matsu were accompanied by renunciution of the use of force against
chens Formosa, Secretary Dulles replied:
from Well
, it would depend a good bit on whether we accepted that
$, on renunciation at face value, or whether we judged it as merely a trick
vould or a device. If in fact the President judged that there was no attack
I the against Formosa and the Pescadores, then it would be questionable
whether the treaty and the law gave authority to use the armed forces
tions
of the United States. But, as I say, we have learned before now
aken that the Communists' protestations are not necessarily to be taken
ident | at face value.
for
their
don't 2. DEFENSE OF THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Transcript
of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, April 5, 1955
ndot (Excerpt) 2
At his news conference on April 5, Secretary Dulles was asked about
these the prospects of war or peace
in the Formosa area. Secretary Dulles
To answer that question would require me to read the minds of
people to whom I have no access; that is, the Communist leaders
ce by
) act
.
cated
ainst
some
ze, it
f the
table
use
nder
2494
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
0.
1
班级​,m%Ew仙儿
​ext
There is a very active exchange of advice steadily going
possible the dangerous elements there. Whether we shall succeed
Chinese Communists are willing to have an abandonment of force
shall be no war, our desire that there shall be a cease-fire. So
,
if there is any war, it will be entirely due to the provocation and
the
initiative of those who unfortunately may not be subject to the
pacific purpose which they proclaim. If, in fact, the Chinese Com-
munists are faithful to what they talk about-peace—then there will
be no fighting in the area.
Asked whether the release of the Chinese students on April 21 was
intended as an indication of our preference for peace rather than wu,
the Secretary replied:
In a broad sense you can say that it was indicative of our desire th
to keep our relations with the Chinese Communists on, you might th
call, a civilized, peaceful basis. We did not desire to be in a position
of holding any persons as hostages, and in fact they have never been
so held. We have pushed ahead to complete the process of clearances
,
including the necessary legal steps which have to be taken, I believe
if
by the Department of Justice. As soon as those were completed
. ,
we announced these people were free to go.
In the same way, we recently turned back at Hong Kong seven
ago
Communist fishermen that had been picked up in a storm and rescued. m
In some quarters the suggestion had been made that we should
hold them as a barter. We do not believe in bartering human being
and we hope that our conduct and example in that regard might th
possibly have some influence in Communist China.
of
Asked whether this was done at the suggestion or request of of
Hammarskjold, Mr. Dulles replied:
th
No. Mr. Hammarskjold is dealing only with the prisoners of War
th
who were in the United Nations Command, and he has not concerned
himself particularly about the civilian situation. As far as I am
aware, Mr. Hammarskjold was not informed about the steps to
shi
were taking to release these civilians. He was informed of the steps
which we took to release the seven fishermen that I referred to
That took place some weeks ago.
do
Asked whether any new steps had been taken or if any were in prosto
pect to find a common allied position with regard to Formosa
through diplomatic channels or through the United Nations, Secretary
Dulles replied:
We are in close contact with the nations having an interest in the und
part of the world, and we have frequent discussions with their repre
sentatives
thi
gerous situation, and we want to eliminate to the maximum degree
an
Mr.
th:
an
to
to
either
de
81
BI
thi
81
dar
in
1
1 See statement of Apr. 2, 1955, by the Department of State; infra, doc. 9l
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2495
" Treaty of Dec. 2, 1954; supra, pp. 945--947.
2 Joint resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; supra, doc. 77.
8
_and
o the
Com-
1
was
1 UUT
ances
,
scued.
eings
,
Asked to comment on the fact that the Canadians have stated publicly
that they would not back us if war comes out of Quemoy and Matsu and
whether that represented a divided allied position, the Secretary replied:
No. On the contrary, as a result of my trip up there there is a
e w much closer understanding between our two Governments than had
existed before. We have never expected that if there were a war
in the Formosa area the Canadian Government would be a partici-
pant in that war. They have no treaty arrangements of any kind
which relate to that part of the world, and that kind of support has
never been anticipated. I think there is now an understanding of
desire the problem and that our relations in that respect are much better
than they have been before.
sition
been
Asked whether he believed that the overall world position of the United
States would necessarily be weakened or might in fact be strengthened
elieve
,
if the United States were to base its commitments in the Formosa area
oleted
exclusively upon Formosa and the Pescadores, the Secretary replied:
I have said many times, and I am glad to have a chance to say
seven again, something which I can repeat by heart: The only commit-
ment of the United States in that area is based exclusively on Formosa
should and the Pescadores.
We have a treaty which confines the treaty area to Formosa and
might the Pescadores. We have a law which says that the armed forces
of the United States can be used in that part of the area for the
defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. We have no commitment
any kind, sort, or description, expressed or implied, which binds
the United States to anything except the defense of 'Formosa and
of war
Now
w you get to the question if there seems to be an attack
I am against Formosa and the Pescadores, how do you defend against
that attack? That is the only question. Some people say that we
steps should announce in advance precisely how we are going to defend
ed to and carry out our commitment on Formosa and the Pescadores and
to say we will carry out that commitment by doing this or by not
doing that. Once you extend your commitment to defend Formosa
to a commitment as to particular means which you may use for
you are getting into very difficult ground. We have
A commitment, certainly, to defend the United States of America.
But nobody yet has required us to state publicly precisely what the
thel
means would be of defense in the event of certain types of attack
which cannot be predicted. I repeat again and again and again-
that our only commitment is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores
and if there were no challenge
to Formosa and the Pescadores, then
there wouldn't be any question as far as we are concerned of fighting
Mr.
of
the Pescadores.
cerned
PS WE
pros-
either
defense, then
cretary
1
repre-
going
y dar
degree
in that area.
ucceed
er the
force
.
91
2496
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
me
1
us
CUS
negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of re-
Asked if he were saying in that connection that we would not aid the
Chinese Nationalists to defend Quemoy and Matsu for the sake of Chinese Com
Nationalist morale, Mr. Dulles replied:
Unless that were vital for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores
It all comes back to that.
the
SOM
sho
83. RELAXING TENSION IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Ta
Statement by the Department of State, April 23, 1955 ta!!
the
The Department of State has received press reports concerning the
the statement of Chou En-lai at the Bandung conference. The
United States always welcomes any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace
to the world. In the Formosa region we have an ally in the free
the
Republic of China, and of course the United States would insist on
free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning
the area.
If Communist China is sincere, there are a number of obvious Ir
steps it could take to clear the air considerably and give evidence
before the world of its good intentions. One of these would be to Th:
place in effect in the area an immediate cease-fire. It could also oft
1
immediately release the American airmen and others whom it unjustly
holds. Another could be the acceptance of the outstanding invita-
tion by the Security Council of the United Nations to participate in
Com
discussions to end hostilities in the Formosa region.3
the
of
84. POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING A CEASE-FIRE ARRANGE-
Au
MENT: Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of
by
State, April 26, 1955 -
tha
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with Senator George that the United
States should sit down and talk with Red China even though Nationalist
China might not be present?
A. That depends on what we talk about and whether there is evi-
dence that such talks would be held in good faith on both sides. We
are not
going to talk about the interests of the Republic of China
behind its back.
1 of Bulletin, ,
2 Statement of Apr. 23, 1965.". The Chinese people are friendly to the America
can people. The Chinese people do not want to have war with the United States
of America, The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter inte
Times, Apr. 24, 1955, p. 1).
3 See Secretary-General' Hammarskjold's cablegram to Chou En-lai, Jan. 31
1955; supra, doc. 79.
4 Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1955, pp. 755–759.
WOD
as
sta
are
wit
me
befi
Tec
on
m2
1
2
܀
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2497
1 Statement of Apr. 23, 1955; supra.
2 Address of Apr, 16, 1953; supra, pp. 65–71.
ores.
eace
ton
ence
I the
Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe you said you would try to find out if the
Communists are sincere. What steps do you have in mind to do that?
A. There are inquiries that we can make through friendly govern-
ments to find out what the Communists have in mind. For example,
the statement as made by Chou En-lai the last day at Bandung is
somewhat cryptic in that he said in substance that no conference
should deny the sovereign right of the People's Republic to "liberate"
EA: Taiwan. if that means that the Communists are not prepared to
talk about a cease-fire in the area, if they are not willing to give up
the achievement of their ambitions through force, then obviously
ning
there would be no reason that I can see to talk with them.
The
9. Mr. Secretary, in the light of what you said this morning, are we
right in assuming that the conditions, or what seem to be conditions, in
free
the Saturday statement of the State Department are not regarded by you
a conditions prior to discussion with the Chinese Communists?
ning
À. There are two paragraphs in the State Department release, as
ious Trecall
. The first paragraph said in substance that we would not dis-
cuss a disposal of the area in the absence of the Chinese Nationalists.
e to
That stands as a precondition. We are not going to deal with the rights
also of the Chinese Nationalists, and their claims, in their absence.
istly Now, the other paragraph mentions certain things which it said
vita- would clear the air and be evidence of sincerity. Those are not stated
ce in as conditions precedent. It said that it would be helpful if the Chinese
Communists would release our flyers, etc. Those things were not
stated as conditions and were never intended to be conditions. They
are very much like what the President and I often said in relation to
the rulers of the Soviet Union—that it would be very helpful evidence
of their sincerity if they would do certain things such as signing the
of
Austrian treaty. That was one of the things mentioned 2 years ago .
by the President in his "Chance for Peace" address. Nevertheless,
that was never regarded as an indispensable prerequisite to talking
ited with the Soviet Union. Actually, before any Austrian treaty, I did
alist
meet with the Soviet Union at Berlin.3
9. Mr. Secretary, did you see the statement or approve the statement
before it was issued on Saturday?
We
A. No, I was away. When I get away I am really away, up there
9. Mr. Secretary, there is a report that the statement was very badly
received by our friends and elsewhere in the free world. Will you comment
GE-
1
evi-
ning
on that?
neri
ates
into
re
ork
A. No, except I am not aware of the fact.
9. Mr. Secretary, would official talks, as proposed by the Chinese Com-
munists
, be tantamount to a semirecognition of the Red Government?
31,
41590057-TOL. 2-
-54
2498
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
RE
MC
10
OD
OE
fat
CO
VE
Y
to
m
th
U
f
A. No, we have made that perfectly clear when we talked to them
before. Remember that it would be nothing new for us to talk with
the Chinese Communists. We negotiated the armistice in Korea
with the Chinese Communists. We had some discussions with the
Chinese Communists at Geneva.? We made it perfectly clear on
both occasions, in fact, it was said explicitly in the Berlin resolution
which convoked the Geneva conference, that the fact that we met to-
gether would not involve diplomatic recognition. Of course that
would also be explicit in any further talks we had.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to undertake direct negotiations
with the Chinese Communists providing they agreed to participation of
Nationalist China, or would you prefer that they be held under the
auspices of the United Nations?
A. We believe it to be preferable that negotiations should be held
under the auspices of the United Nations, and I do not give up hope
that they might be held under those auspices. I read last night, the
first time I had a chance to do so, the final communiqué of the Bandung
conference.4 What impressed me, as I read through it, was the extent
to which that communiqué talks about the United Nations. Almost
every paragraph brings in the United Nations and the various activi-
ties of the United Nations. Since that communiqué was acceptable
to the Chinese Communists, perhaps they do not have such a repug-
nance to the United Nations as seemed to be the case when last
January they were invited by the United Nations to have discussions
Q. Mr. Secretari', are you planning to take any steps to revive the
United Nations effort in this matter?
A. I doubt whether it is useful to revive the United Nations effort
at this particular juncture without preliminaries to find out if it would
be apt to succeed.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do we definitely plan to make these inquiries through
friendly governments? I think you said we might.
A. I said we might because these matters all require a certain
amount of deliberation. What was said at Bandung is coming in
gradually-some I only got this morning, in fact, from some of the
friendly governments. Therefore, we have not had an opportunity
yet to formulate anything so definite that I could speak in the past
tense, as of something already decided.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you attach any significance to the fact that the
Chinese Communists proposed bilateral
negotiations with us and that the
, pp.
2 See The Korean Problem
at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 16, 1860
(Department of State publication 5609; 1954).
3 Infra, p. 2685.
5 See Secretary-Generai Hammarskjold's cablegiam of Jan. 31, 1955, to Choy
Én-lai
, the Chinese Communist Premier" (supraz "doc. 79) and
Chou's reply of
Feb. 3, 1955 (Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 254–255).
0
to
ta
8
8
Y
}
(
{
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2499
c with
ores!
that
07
held
1 last
haps bilaterally, or at the United Nations, or possibly under other
then
Russians not long ago proposed a 10-power conference to discuss the same
matter, or the Formosa issue?
ob the A. I noticed that fact, and I thought it had a certain significance.
ar on
lution
Q. Which would you prefer?
let to
A. Well, I found quite unacceptable the Soviet proposal for a
10-power conference with the composition suggested and with the
omission of the Chinese Nationalists from that group. Much depends
ations
on what it is you are going to discuss—the subject matter of the con-
ion of
ference. The agenda, so to speak, itself operates to determine to a
considerable extent who it is that ought to be there. So far we are
very much in the dark as to what might be discussed.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does that mean you would not rule out bilateral talks?
hope
You would not rule it out?
t, the
A. No.
dung
xtent
Q. Mr. Secretary, you started to say you would attach some significance
Imost to this, and then you did not say what significance you would attach-
ctivi-
table
A. It tends to confirm the fact that in this area the Chinese Com-
munists exercise, I think, a measure of independence. I think that
epus-
their basic policies are undoubtedly coordinated with the Soviet
ions
Union and that the Party discipline is exerted in both countries
along
fundamental lines. But certainly as respects details, the application
se the
of agreed principles, there is a far greater measure of independence
exercised by the Chinese Communists than is the case with reference
to the satellite countries of Europe, for example.
effort
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the Chou En-lai proposal he spoke not only of the
specific Formosa problem but of the general Far East problem. Is it
your view that our position is that we should settle the Formosan problem
ong
me we get into a larger discussion with Communist China, or is it
possible to have a larger discussion in which Formosa can be a part of it?
A. The first thing, it seems to me, that requires to be determined
is whether we must prepare for war in that area or whether there is
apt to be a cease-fire in the area.
nity
One cannot very well settle
matters under the threat of a gun. So far there has been nothing
There has been and there is still continu-
i very large buildup, particularly of Chinese Communist air
the capabilities, in the Formosa
Straits area. There has been until
quite recently a very violent propaganda campaign to the effect
that they were going to take Formosa by force and that the islands,
such as rachen,
were useful to carry out their program of force. As
say, you do not negotiate—at least, the United States does not
negotiate--with a pistol aimed at its head.
The first thing is to find out whether there is a possibility of a
cease-fire in the area. That is a matter which can be discussed per-
circumstances.But I regard a cease-fire 'as the indispensable pre-
3
rould
before
taid
the
Dast
but war threats in the area.
ing
950
hou
of
if
th
且​m
th
OD
mi
ins
sta
W
the
Se
the
1 See statement of Apr. 20, 1955, by the Department of State; Department of
2500 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
requisite to anything further. When you get into further matters
,
then the interests of the Chinese Nationalists would naturally come
to play a very large part.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have the Nationalist Chinese accepted the concept
of a cease-fire? Are they prepared to accept a cease-fire in that area!
A. They have indicated opposition to a cease-fire in the area, and
in that respect our views do not wholly coincide. At the time when
New Zealand put this matter on the agenda of the Security Counci,
there was, as I recall, a statement issued by the Chinese Nationalists
indicating they did not favor a cease-fire in the area.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that, after discussing the cease-fire, in other
matters the interests of the Chinese Nationalists would play a part
Do I understand correctly from what you said that the presence of the
Chinese Nationalists would not be indispensable for the discussion of a
cease-fire?
A. Not as far as concerns a cease-fire which involved the possible
interests of the United States, which has undertaken to react to an
attack against Formosa. If we could get assurances there was to
be no attack against Formosa, we would accept those.
Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been suggested that the move by the Chinese
Communists--by Chou En-lai at Bandung--did not come as a complete
surprise but in fact you had some information, or at least expectations
of it--that it figured in your discussions with the President in Augusta
and it may perhaps have played some part in the mission of Assistant
Secretary of State Robertson and Admiral Radford at Formosa.
A. I would say this: It is no secret that we have hoped that the
Bandung conference ? would result in a more peaceful attitude on the
part of the Chinese Communists. I have sometimes said that I
felt that a great deal would depend, as far as the future is concerned,
on whether the Chinese Communists came away from Bandu 18
feeling that they had a green light to go ahead and take Formosa by
force or whether they felt that to do so would antagonize the good
will of the free Asian countries which they were seeking.
It is that thought which influenced us as far back as the Bangkok
conference. There, you may recall, was introduced a resolution of
greeting to the Bandung conference and an expression at that
time of the hope that the Bandung conference would set in motion
forces for peace. After I was at Augusta with the President, you may
recall that I said then that the President hailed the Bandung con-
ference and called on it to "exert a practical influence for peace where
peace is now in grave jeopardy." 4 We have all along believed that
State Bulletin, May 2, 1955, p. 732.
* See the communiqué of Apr. 24, 1955, of the Bandung conference; supra
,
pp. 2344-2352.
3 See statement of Feb. 26, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1956,
See Secretary Dulles statement of Apr. 17, 1955; ibid., May 2, 1955, pp.
727-728,
he
fo
I
C
of
15
oti
m
0i
re
to
ho
ta
0
T
ti
p. 373.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2501
1 Statement of Apr. 26, 1955; ibid., May 9, 1955, p. 754.
tters,
come
) an
Robertson and Admiral Radford did not go out there with the idea
if the Chinese Communists would get in contact with the opinion of
the free peoples, the free nations of Asia, they would realize much more
fully than they have so far that their policy of relying upon force,
the policy to which I alluded in the opening statement,' was a policy
ncept which it was not in their best interests to follow.
11
I don't think that there occurred any moral or spiritual conversion
and
on the part of the Chinese Communists. But I do think that there
phen
may have been a realization of the fact that a real peacefulness,
incil
,
instead of just talk about peace while carrying on war, was from their
lists
standpoint the best policy. If that has happened, it is something
which we can be very glad about.
otha 9. Mr. Secretary, do you attribute these encouraging developments to
part
.
Mr. Hammarskjold's negotiations?
f the
A. I doubt if there is any discernible relationship between the two.
of a
Q. I just wanted further clarification of my question as to whether
sible these considerations played a part in the mission of Admiral Radford and
Secretary Robertson in Formosa.
s to
A. They played a part, although I would not say a decisive part.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how much are you able to tell us this morning about
the mission of Admiral Radford and Secretary Robertson?
olde
ions
A. Very little, other than to say that the situation in that area
usta has been precarious. We did not know whether it would take a turn
tant for the better or the worse as a result of the Bandung conference.
I have referred already to the buildup that is proceeding on the
the
China mainland, which has very distinct military implications, some
the of which in turn have political implications. In view of that it seemed
t 1 useful to have another high-level talk and to have Assistant Secretary
ned
of State Robertson and Admiral Radford canvass the political and
military aspects of the situation in the Formosa Straits in the light
V:g
by
of new developments which had occurred. It was a general
, overall
pod
review of the factors, political and military, and it seemed useful
carry that on in a personal, direct way at a high level, such as
kok has been done
, rather than depend upon
cable communication, which
in these matters is not always satisfactory.
hat
2. Mr. Secretary, could you persuade them to be a little more friendly
A. I can't add to what I have said except to say this–Secretary
They went over to sit down together as allies, as partners, to discuss
the situation that is developing. I must say frankly that I do not
Þet know fully today what the outcome of their discussions has been.
nese
to
of
1
to the idea of a cease-fire?
100
nay
On-
ero
hat
t of
OTA,
pp.
55,
2502
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
OU
BU
the
mu
oug
if we should get a further clarification which would come spontane-
Q. You would like to have the Nationalists be more receptive to the
idea of a cease-fire?
A. There has been no secret of the fact that the United States
has hoped for a cease-fire in the area. The President made that
perfectly clear in his message to the Congress. That was last Jant
ary when he spoke of what we then thought was the most hopefu
No
thi
route of action before the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire
and the acceptance of a principle of the United Nations that nations
do
should renounce force to accomplish their objectives. There hes
been some difference of viewpoint between the Chinese Nationalist or
ret
and ourselves with respect to that matter, but I am not in a position
the
to say to what extent that was discussed at Taipei or what the result
CL
was, because I haven't heard.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do I understand you correctly that it would be thi
possible for us to accept a declaration from the Chinese Communist
as to their willingness to agree to a cease-fire without participation o
fin
the Chinese Nationalists in any such declaration?
Mc
A. I think the United States would welcome an assurance of the com
abandonment of force by the Chinese Communists in whatever way stil
it came.
Q. Should it be made a public statement?
A. I think it should be public, for unless it was made public we
Geox
would not have the adequate sanction of the weight of public opinion
Th
behind it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you get it down to this: Do we consider it our
turn now to get in touch with the Chinese Communists, or do we consider we
that we must hear more from the Chinese Communists about this peace
conference that Chou En-lai originally proposed?
A. I don't know about this question of whose “turn” it is. How:rel
ever, I would say this: When the issues are as grave as those that
to
confront us in the Formosa area, we are not disposed to stand upon
protocol.
sho
A proposal has been made which may or may not be sincere,
thri
may or may not have any substance to it. We believe that the
circumstances under which it was made are apt to give it a greater
degree of credibility than perhaps if it had been made under other
circumstances. It was made to and in the presence of a very large
group of other countries, made to them first privately and then
was made publicly. Therefore, a statement made under those com
ditions carries greater weight than if, for example, it had been a pure
propaganda statement issued by Peiping radio sometime.
Now, since a statement was made under those circumstances, ne
are disposed to try to probe it further. As to the order of events
820
En
sett
ask
reg
On
EM
which
res
POS
in
thi
Na
Sec
qui
1 Message of Jan. 24, 1955; supra, doc. 76.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2503
Nationalists, and it is quite incredible to me that there should be a
to the cusly from the Chinese Communists, that would be well and good.
But we shall not merely sit around and wait on that. We may probe
States
the thing ourselves to find out if it has any substance.
that
As I say, there was an ambiguous phrase about their sovereign
Janu night to “liberate” Formosa which could not be any way impaired.
opeful
Now, I have said previously that we would not expect the parties to
se-fire
this struggle, whether the Chinese Nationalists or the Chinese Com-
ations
munists, to renounce their ambitions. We don't expect that to be
done
e has
any more than we expect that to happen in the case of Germany
halists
or Korea or Viet-Nam. But even though they retain their ambitions
sition
retain their claims--they might renounce the use of force to satisfy
result
their claims and their ambitions. Now I don't know whether what
Chou En-lai said was intended to be responsive to what I had previ-
ously said on that phase of the matter, or not. That is one of the
uld be things which I think deserves further exploration.
unists
jon of
Q. Can you tell us what are the mechanics, what you are doing to
find out, what is happening as far as our Government is concerned?
Mohammed Ali, the Pakistan Premier, this morning reported he had a
of the conversation with Chou and that Chou En-lai told him the door was
r Way still open a crack. Also, Chou En-lai told him he felt there was a pos-
sibility of successful negotiation, or implied that. He also said Chou
En-lai made to him what he regarded as a reasonable proposition for the
Betlement of the present crisis. He didn't give the details. Have you
ic we asked Mohammed Ali to tell you what the details are or asked him to
Dinion give the reaction of the U. S. to this conversation? What are we doing?
That is what I want to know.
it our 4. I thought I had made clear, in answer to a prior question, that
msider we have not yet done anything--that the information hich is pre-
requisite to sober, intelligent action is only beginning to come in.
Only a few minutes ago did we receive word through the Pakistan
Embassy of what you refer to, and we have not yet collected all the
How relevant data. Until we have all the relevant data we are not going
9. Mr. Secretary, why should you insist that this evidence of sincerity
which should be made public? Would you be satisfied with assurance given
to the through diplomatic channels, shall we say, by private diplomacy?
A. Well, that is a hypothetical question and I wouldn't want to
respond categorically to it. But it does not seem to me that it is
possible to make plans on the assumption that there will be a cease-fire
in the area unless we can let it be known. It affects all of our own
secret agreement to have a cease-fire. I would think it would be
quite a problem as to how to keep it secret.
peace
that to go off doing things.
upon
reater
other
large
en it
-COD-
pure
S, we
ents
tane
2504
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
United States in Communist China. There was prompt acceptance
85. NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA FOR A CEASE wb
FIRE ARRANGEMENT IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA:
Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, July 28 ou
1955 1
AB
GE
Last April at the Bandung conference Mr. Chou En-lai suggested
be
that there should be bilateral talks with the United States. He said hii
"The Chinese people do not want to have war with the United States
.
We are willing to settle international disputes by peaceful means."
Immediately (on April 23, 1955) the Department of State responded an
by stating that “the United States always welcomes any efforts
, il of
sincere, to bring peace to the world." 2" Then at my subsequent to
press conference (April 26, 1955) I referred to Mr. Chou En-lars for
statement and said, “Whether or not that was a sincere proposed
remains to be seen. Perhaps the Chinese Communists are merely
ba
playing a propaganda game. But we intend to try to find out. b) in
doing so we shall not, of course, depart from the path of fidelity and
Cd
honor to our ally, the Republic of China." 3
Developments since then indicate the possibility of obtaining St
beneficial results from a continuance of the talks which have been of
going on at Geneva for the past year and their restoration to the W
original ambassadorial level.
Four out of the 15 United Nations prisoners of war have been 90
released. 4
th
A few more United States civilians have been released
.
These results, though meager, are something. Chinese Commune
warlike activities, such as had been displayed in relation to I-chiang w
and Tachen," have not been resumed and there has been something me
TE
approximating a de facto cease-fire in the Taiwan (Formosa) ares
,
The former belligerent Communist propaganda about Taiwan and
th
against the United States has recently been somewhat subdued.
bu
In addition, various governments which have diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China have indicated their own beli ha
in the desire of the Chinese Communists to pursue a peaceful path
. I en
Under these circumstances the United States proposed on July 11
to Mr. Chou En-lai that the talks that
had been going on at Geneva
recently at the consular level, should be somewhat raised in level the
and enlarged in scope. This proposal was made through the inter
th
mediary of the United Kingdom, which represents the interests of the
th
communiqué with reference to it was arrived at and simultaneously ag
issued in Peiping and in Washington yesterday morning;
It was made clear that the offer of the ternited States did not imply ele
any diplomatic recognition whatsoever. It was also made clear that tio
we were not prepared in any way in these talks to make arrangemenlå
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 8, 1955, pp. 220–221.
2 Supra, doc. 83.
3 of 9,
* See statement of June 1,-1955, by the Department of State; infra, doc. 92.
5 See remarks of Jan. 18, '1955, by Secretary Dulles; supra, doc. 75.
8 See infra, doc. 93.
m
WI
Ac
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2505
o Declaration of July 21, 1954; supra, pp. 787–788.
It was
t98."
taining
20usly aggression to bring about the unification of Viet-Nam. 6
Act of the London Conference, Oct. 3, 1954; supra, p. 1481.
* Treaty of Oct. 1, 1953; supra, pp. 897-898.
EASE which would prejudice the rights of our ally, the Republic of China.
AREA:
The United States will be represented at Geneva on August 1 by
July 2, our Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, U. Alexis Johnson.
Ambassador Johnson who represented the United States in the
Geneva talks with the Chinese Communists when these talks first
rrested began a year ago." Prior to that, as a Departmental officer, he devoted
Le said, himself largely to the Korean Armistice negotiations.
States The United States is concerned with getting back the American
civilians still detained in Communist China. In this connection we
ponded are prepared to discuss with the Chinese Communists the status
orts, 1 of the few Chinese students in the United States who desire to return
sequent to Communist China and who the Chinese Communists claim, without
in-lai's foundation, are prevented.
roposal We also want to reinforce the efforts of the United Nations to get
meret back tbe Americans who as members of the United Nations Command
it. in Korea became prisoners of war and are still held by the Chinese
ty and Communists.
As to other practical matters which might be considered, the United
States would like to be sure of precautions taken against a repetition
e been of such incidents as involved the shooting down of the Cathay airliner
to the with loss of American lives and injury to American civilians.
Of course, the basic thing is that which I pointed out in my press
e been conference of April 26, namely, “whether we must prepare for war in
leased that area or whether there is apt to be a cease-fire in the area." 3
The United States believes that whatever may be the differences
chiang
which now divide countries, these differences should not be settled by
ething recourse to force where this would be apt to provoke international war.
The United States has itself consistently acted on that belief. Wher-
n and ever we give any military assistance, it is under the explicit condition
ed.
that it will not be used for aggressive purposes. There is no doubt
but what East Germany is part of Germany, but Chancellor Adenauer
has given solemn assurance
that he will not use force to unite his
path. country. There is no doubt that North Korea is a part of Korea,
uly 11 but the security treaty which we made with the Republic of Korea ?
makes clear that the United States will not extend its protection other
than to areas which we recognize as having been lawfully brought
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea,
and we do not believe
aggressive force is such a lawful means. There is no doubt but
that North Viet-Nam is part of Viet-Nam, but we stated in connection
with the Indochina armistice that
we were opposed to any renewal of
Both the Republic of China and the Chinese People's Republic
claim that the area held by the other is part of China. But in connec-
r that tion with the mutual security treaty which the United States made
Sea the Mar. 1, 1955, statement by the Department of State; infra, doc. 90.
munist
area.
lations
belie!
eneva,
level
inter-
of the
tance
that
greed
imply
ments
? See infra, docs. 97 and 98.
Supra, p. 2499.
$
See the declaration by the German Federal Republic in Part V of the Final
2.
2506
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
CO
WE
W
Cl
N
IC
q
Dec. 10, 1954 (supra, pp. 947–949) and report of Feb. 8, 1955, by the Senate
ments of Aug. 1, 1955, by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles regarding
the release of American military prisoners by the Chinese Communists (ibid.,
p. 262) and Secretary Dulles' remarks of Aug. 16, 1955, concerning the Genera
with the Republic of China, it was agreed that the Republic o di
China would not use force except as a matter of joint agreement, di
subject to action of an emergency character which was clearly an T
exercise of the inherent right of self-defense.?
ta
We believe that the principle of nonrecourse to force is valid not
merely for the United States and its allies but that it is valid for all
We shall hope to find out in the forthcoming talks whether the
Chinese Communists accept the concept of a cease-fire in accordance
with the United Nations principle of avoiding any use or threat of
force which could disturb the peace of nations.
No doubt the Chinese Communists will have matters of their om
to bring up. We shall listen to hear what they are, and if they directly
involve the United States and Communist China we will be disposedur
to discuss them with a view to arriving at a peaceful settlement.
As President Eisenhower said last night,
the
the United States will go to any length consistent with our concepts of
decency and justice and right to attain peace. For this purpose we will work
cooperatively with the Soviets and any other people as long as there is sincerity
of purpose and a genuine desire to go ahead.3
That is the principle which will govern the continuation of our talks
with the Chinese Communists at Geneva.
86. NEGOTIATION OF A BROAD CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENT
IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Transcript of a News
Conference of the Secretary of State, August 2, 1955 (Excerpt
) ·
At his news conference on August 2, Secretary Dulles was asked
series of questions regarding the ambassadorial talks at Geneva
between the United States and the People's Republic of Chine
.
b.
Following is a transcript of that portion of the news conference. go
Q. Mr. Secretary, are there any obstacles presently on the return of
Chinese in this country to the mainland, and do you know of any case of
any Chinese here who have been prevented from returning?
A. No, there are no restrictions whatsoever on the return to China
bi
of any of these Chinese here, particularly students, who have expressed
a desire to return, and we have tried to ascertain who of them does
desire to return. Now Mr. Chou En-lai in his speech the day before
yesterday, I think it was, or 3 days ago, said something about
Řnancial
1 Treaty of Dec. 2, 1954; supra, pp. 945–947.
2 See notes exchanged between Secretary Dullas and Foreign Minister Yeh ora
Committee on Foreign Relations (supra, pp. 957-965).
3 Supra, pp. 111-114.
* Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 15, 1955, pp. 260–262. See also stane
talks with Chinese Communist representatives. (ibid., Aug. 29, 1955, pp.
SI
88
m
I
8
W
IC
Q
01
d
p
1
U
341-342
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2507
rly an
epts of
5
broader, in terms of perhaps a U.N. Charter declaration, between the
would not engage in force?
1 Address of July 30, 1955; New York Times, July 31, 1955.
2 Statement of July 26, 1955; supra.
blic of difficulties. I can't answer whether any of them are in such financial
ement, difficulties that they haven't got the money to pay their fare home.
That is a question which will no doubt be looked into as a result of the
talks taking place at Geneva. But as far as any legal impediments are
id not concerned, I can say categorically that there are none.
for all
.
er the
Q. Mr. Secretary, about how many of these students are there who
rdance
want to return to China? You said last week that there were a few.
'eat of
A. It is in the general order of under 50. I am sorry I don't have
the precise number in my mind.
T OWN
irectly Q. Mr. Secretary, in that statement of Chou En-lai's, he reiterated an
sposed argument that he made before, namely, that there was no point in discuss-
t. ing a cease-fire with the United States, since there is no shooting between
the two countries. You have taken the point of view, I believe, that the
cease-fire is a matter of discussion. How do you reconcile those differing
views?
ll work
ncerity
A. I would gather that Mr. Chou En-lai is using that word in a
rather technical sense, whereas I have used it in a broad sense. It is
: talks quite true that there is no fighting going on at the moment between
the Chinese Communists and the United States military forces in the
area. On the other hand, there has been very considerable danger of
such fighting. And what I have wanted to bring about was an
assurance that the Chinese Communists were not planning to use
News
military force in order to achieve their ambitions in that area.
I made that quite clear, I think, in several statements which I have
made, and particularly in the statement which I made last week 2
ked &
was very glad to note that Mr. Chou En-lai quoted with apparent
approval one statement which I had made to the general effect that
whatever were the differences which divided countries it should not
Ching
.
be sought to resolve that difference by use of force, and I thought in
general the tone of the speech indicated his going further in the
renunciation of force than anything he had said before.
ase of
9. In other words, if I might follow that, what you are seeking is not
a cease-fire in the terms that perhaps most Americans have been thinking
about between the Nationalists and the Chinese but something much
Chinese Communists and the United States?
A. That is correct. And also you must bear in mind that a display
of military activity there by the Chinese Communists which was
designed to possess themselves by force of Formosa would bring into
play our treaty of defense
with the Republic of China.
9. Mr. Secretary, could the United States give the Chinese Com-
manists assurances in any such discussions that the Chinese Nationalists
LENT
:)!
I
eners
emin of
China
essed
does
refore
encial
eh 01
Senate
state
arding
(26id.
eners
-342).
2508
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
SO
si
no
W
PE
SI
said. I hope that what is taking place either at Geneva or outside
of Geneva, and the whole trend of world events, will create a situation
1 See the treaty of Dec. 2, 1954, and notes exchanged Dec. 10, 1954, between
A. I think that the treaty arrangements which we have with the
Republic of China make it quite clear that it is in our mutual con-
templation that force shall not be used. The whole character of that y
treaty is defensive. That is underlined throughout the treaty itsel w
and in the concurrent understandings that were arrived at in that th
connection; so while the United States would not feel that it was in a fe
position to act as in any sense an agent for the Republic of China
nevertheless I do think that the whole pattern that has been woven
there by the United States is in itself evidence that we accept for
ourselves, and in our alliances seek to make it a principle of those it
alliances, that force shall not be used to achieve national ambitions.be
That is the same principle which we invoke and which we hope wil
guide the Chinese Communists, and we naturally accept it for our-
selves. As you probably know, all of the agreements under which
we give military assistance to various countries are very explicit in
the
their provisions that the equipment shall not be used for any aggressive
A
purpose.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does this also apply to the South Korean declaration
of today, I believe it is, that they wish to recover areas below the skik
S
parallel, including Kaesong and the Ongjin Peninsula? 2
pi
A. It would apply equally to that, yes.
I
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said that you don't espect the idea of
broader no-shooting arrangement to come about out of these current
Geneva talks. Do you envisage a high-level talk or how do you expect to
R
bo
bring this about?
A. I would expect this to come about primarily as a declaration of
policy which leaders or the rulers of a country would make rather
than as the subject of a bilateral agreement.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will you elaborate a little more on this broader
agreement relating to a cease-fire? Just how do you expect it to evolme t.
Does it have a U.N. connection, for example?
hi
A. No. What we hope to arrive at by progressive steps is a
situation where the Chinese Communists will have renounced the
use of force to achieve their ambitions. That is the thing I have been
emphasizing and driving at for months because, if they are not willing
to do that, if they want to use force to achieve their ambitions, that
will almost surely start up a war the limits of which could not be
defined in advance. How that is brought about I don't know
bi
That is a matter of policy for the Chinese Communists. I don't
know how
they will choose to make that clear, if indeed they do make
Friday went further
in that direction than anything that he has yet
it clear. I already have said that the speech of Chou En-lai of las
0
SU
V
oi
is
PO
ge
aut
st
01
ch
the United States and the Republic of China; supra, pp. 945–949.
2 See the New York Times, Aug. 2, 1955.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2509
3 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 912–916.
I con-
I that
povei
essive
ration
2 381
Organization isn't anything directed against the Soviet Union. If
Agreements of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 750-785.
+ See Secretary Dulles' statement of July 20, 1955; supra, pp. 1891-1892.
th the so that we can feel that we are not under the threat of war from the
situation in that area. I said in my press conference of April 26,
f that you may remember, that the United States was not willing to negotiate
itself with a pistol at its head; that the first thing to do is to find out whether
there was a threat of war there because, if that was the case, then as
us in a far as the United States is concerned it would be quite impossible to
China, negotiate these practical matters.
I pointed out last week that a number of things had happened
pt for which indicated that the pistol had been laid down and that it made
those it possible to try to clear up now some of these practical matters
itions between us. But the important thing is that the pistol should be
e will permanently discarded, and we hope that the trend of events will
r our bring reassurance on that point.
which
cit in
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the Communists laying down
their pistol, is there any relation between that and SEATO, the Southeast
Asia defense alliance?
A. Obviously the laying down of the pistol is applicable to the
situation in Indochina as well as to the situation in the Formosa
Straits. We have there a series of armistice agreements ? which
purport to bring the fighting there to an end. Obviously any re-
sumption of that fighting would be violating the principle to which
I have alluded.
9. We would not be willing, for instance, to trade a declaration by the
Reds abandoning the use of force for our abandoning SEATO, or dis-
banding SEATO:
con of
1. Absolutely not, any more than we would be prepared to abandon
cather the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We are absolutely con-
vinced that these collective security organizations are in the interest
oader
of peace. We know that they are defensive in purpose and in spirit,
and we believe that they are in harmony with the general trend of
the times which brings every community to organize itself on a
collective security basis. The old days when each had to defend
his own home with his own gun have passed. We have a central
d the police force; we have a central fire department. The whole idea of
been getting security through collective action rather than individual
Filling
action is in our opinion a tremendous advance. Now the Soviets
and Communists seem to take the view that each country should
stand alone on its own feet, that there shouldn't be any collective
organizations for security. We believe that is turning the clock
back to go in that direction, and we are not disposed to turn the
clock back by dismantling either Nato or the so-called SEATO, the
I explained that at Geneva. I said this North Atlantic Treaty
of a
urrent
pect to
volvei
IS &
that
ot be
KNOW
don't
make
f last
s yet
atside
ation
Manila Pact.3
* Supra, doc. 84.
%
tween
.
mei
IS
On April 30, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peiping, acting on
2510 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
there weren't any Soviet Union in the world today it would be almost sib
as important because it ties together, it integrates, these nations Am
who make up its membership in a way which makes it most unlikely Au
and impractical that any one of them shall assume an offensive to
nationalistic action of its own. That is its essential value. As I to
say, even if so-called tensions between the East and West were totally spe
resolved, I believe that this type of organization should persist and equ
that that marks the enlightened future which we should seek.
Go
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that parallel with an easier relationship ove
with the Soviet Union there is now developing an easier relationship per
with Red China? Is that the import of much that you have said?
Ch
A. The release of the fliers, the release of the civilians, if it comes
about, such statements as are made by Chou En-lai, if I interpret
law
them right and if they are sincere and permanent parts of policy
,
might mark the beginning of a new phase in Chinese Communist
relations with the rest of the world. I pointed out some time ago 88
.
that the Chinese Communists seem to be much more violent and
fanatical, more addicted to the use of force than the Russians are or
have become. Whether or not there is going to be a change in that
respect I don't know. There are some auguries, but we always have
of
to remember the adage that one swallow does not make a summer.
Wh
Co
Wh
The Problem of United States Nationals Detained in
det
Communist China
dec
to
87. IMPRISONMENT OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS BY spe
CHINESE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES: Statement by the has
Department of State, May 21, 1951 1
The Department of State has been extremely concerned for an
Co
extended period of time over the imprisonment by Chinese
Communist
authorities of a number of American nationals, now believed to number the
of
more than 30. At least some are definitely known to have been allowed
.
, local
Chinese Communist authorities have given no explanation of the
arrests or any information concerning the welfare or whereabouts of
the persons arrested. Access has been denied to legal counsel and to
British officials, who have been representing American interests in
Communist China since the closure of our consulates. This Govern-
ment has been in constant communicatie.com is subject with the
British Government.
1 Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1951, p. 947.
D&D
rale
Ch
inc
Co
Dei
ser
COU
1
sen
2
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2511
? See statement of May 21, 1951, by the Department of State; supra.
omes
are or
that
Communists and which have established diplomatic relations in
1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1014. The statement repre-
sents the substance of an oral announcement to the press on Dec. 8, 1951.
Imost sible Chinese Communist authorities at Peiping on behalf of all
ations Americans arrested, as well as the United Kingdom, Canadian, and
likely Australian nationals under arrest. He appealed to these authorities
znsive
to take appropriate steps to permit those imprisoned to have access
As I to legal counsel and to friends outside. It was hoped that their
otally speedy release would be effected, on humanitarian no less than on
t and equitable grounds. No reply has yet been received by the British
Government from the Chinese Communist authorities.
The Department of State has also been concerned for some time
mashing over the continued denial by Chinese Communist authorities of exit
naship permits to certain Americans, including a number of Shanghai business-
?
men, some of whom have been endeavoring for over a year to leave
Ching. Arbitrary refusal to permit aliens to depart from a country
rpret
is of course a violation of the elementary principles of international
law and practice.
olicy
lunist
e ago 88. DETENTION OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS: Statement
; and
by the Department of State, December 12, 1951 1
have
The Department has for some time been concerned about detention
of Americans by officials of the Chinese Communist regime. Mean-
imer.
while information on the general situation in which Americans in
Communist China find themselves has been made available to any
The Department, however, has refrained from making individual
names public. It has advised the relatives or associates of persons
detained that publicity in individual cases was a matter for their
decision and it has not discouraged those who wished to give publicity
The Department has refrained from publicizing the names and
BY specific situations of those persons or all of the action the Department
the has taken in their behalf for two major reasons: (1) requests of
ralatives or associates of the person concerned that no publicity be
given for fear of jeopardizing the person's welfare; and (2) warnings
by countries assisting in making representations to the Chinese
Communists that in their opinion official publicity, particularly during
mber
the period of their activity on our behalf, might jeopardize the success
Americans are not the only ones under detention in Communist
China
. There are numerous other foreigners also under arrest,
including nationals of countries which have recognized the Chinese
Peiping: All foreigners face these same difficulties.
In this cɔnnection it will be recalled that the Department issued a
series of warnings to American citizens in China to evacuate that
country before the Communists took over unless they were prepared
who inquire.
d in
to the arrests.
r an
unist
of their efforts.
owed
local
the
ts of
ad to
ts in
Tern-
the
g on
pon-
2512
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
wewe
mu
the British representatives in Peiping have presented on our behall. rel
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 8, 1949, p. 197. The quoted passage
areas under their control, demonstrated in many cases an inability or unwilling
to remain under hazardous conditions. The American Embassy in ap
China on July 26, 1949, publicly warned all Americans in China thet 28
the Chinese Communists "had demonstrated an inability or unwilling-
ness to afford adequate protection to foreigners or to safeguard their Th
individual liberties, particularly in connection with arrest, detention, 19
trial and mob action."
del
Many Americans left in the face of these warnings, and where no co
adequate means of transportation were available this Government Da
assisted them in departing by providing military air and sea transport als
There are still about 300 Americans in Communist China. Most are res
engaged in business or missionary activities, and are not in prison
,
although some 30 had been reported to be under house arrest. Seven rel
of these are now reported to have been released. However, as in
some instances final confirmation has not yet been received, the
Department cannot make their names public. The situation is
complicated by the difficulty in obtaining accurate and up-to-date
90.
information in many cases.
Two of the 32 persons formerly listed as in prison have now been
released and have left China. În addition, Philip Cline, who bad
been under arrest, was released from prison, but died in a Chinese
hospital. The Department has also received further information
reporting that one person formerly believed to be under house arrest
Na
is now in prison and that two additional Americans were arrested in
eff
August and September, leaving this total at 32.
The Department continues to make every effort to free those held
Co
in prison or detained against their will. The Department, however,
does not consider it advisable at this time to make public all the ato
fra
details regarding the steps it is taking and has taken to accomplis
.
ho
the release of detained Americans.
bei
Ju
89. CONTINUED DETENTION OF UNITED STATES NA
:
TIONALS: Statement by the Department of State, October 9, 1953'
The Department of State is very seriously concerned over
continued imprisonment, detention and maltreatment of American Li
tw
citizens in Communist” China. There are now 33 Americans in
Chinese Communist jails, some of whom have been imprisoned for?
years. The Chinese Communist regime has not published the changes
21, the Chinese Communists have released no information, despite the Ar
reads as follows: the Chinese Communist authorities have thus far, is
be
ing
rel
1
nu
ber
th
pe
те
1
2
ness.
27
2 Ibid , Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 551-552.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2513
2.
ate
BAD
Americans who need medical attention or hospital care would receive it.
receive medical care and attention. He promised to reply later to
The Communist representative stated that those who were ill would
1 See Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1953, p. 546.
? Ibid., Mar. 14, 1955, pp. 429–430.
3 See Secretary-General Hammarskjold's report of Sept. 9, 1955; infra, pp.
in appeal made by the British representative at Peiping on March
Dat 28, 1953.
We have also asked the Soviet Union to assist on several occasions.
The first request was made by our Embassy at Moscow in September
OD
1 1951. On March 25 of this year Ambassador Lodge asked the Soviet
delegate during debate at the United Nations if the Soviet Union
no could furnish any information about the Americans, including
1 Donald Dixon and Richard Applegate. Our Embassy in Moscow
It also has made several approaches to the Soviet Foreign Office this
Are year.
The Department will not overlook any possibility of obtaining the
release of all the Americans unjustly imprisoned by the Chinese Com-
munists or denied the right to leave Communist China.
che
90. NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CONSULAR LEVEL FOR THE
RELEASE OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS: Statement by the
Department of State, March 1, 1955 2
While U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold continues his efforts
secure the release of American military personnel of the United
Nations Command imprisoned in Communist China, a continuing
effort is also being made by the U.S. Government to secure the release
eld
of other detained and imprisoned Americans. Yesterday the U.S.
er,
Consul General at Geneva met with a Chinese Communist represent-
he ative to renew U.S. demands for release of these American citizens
from their unwarranted detention. The Communist representative, ,
however, reiterated the Communist position that no Americans are
being unjustly detained.
This was the 11th in a series of meetings held at Geneva since last
June on this subject. During this period 18 Americans who had
i been imprisoned or otherwise detained bave left Communist China,
13" including Dr. Malcolm Bersohn and Mrs. W. A. Rickett, who were
released on the Hong Kong border on February 27.
Twenty-six American civilians, including John T. Downey and
Richard G. Fecteau, remain in jail; three are under house arrest; and
in twelve others are still denied exit permits.
: 2
The Consul General also inquired specifically as to the welfare of a
18 number of the detained Americans from whom no correspondence has
been received although the Communists gave assurances in June 1954
that all detained Americans would be permitted to correspond with
requested that the Chinese Communist Red Cross ex-
de pedite mail deliveries. He also sought assurances that imprisoned
S
FOD
est
to
ish
he
80
ch
relatives. He
Ige
i
18
2713-2714.
415900-57-Vol. 2-55
2514
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
me
2 This emergency aid program was established by an agreement between the
4 See statement of May 29, 1954, by the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Con
the Consul General's requests for information on the welfare d
Americans who had not been heard from and stated that Red Cros92
channels were available for transmission of letters and small parcela
including food and medicines, from the families.
91. RESCINDING OF RESTRAINING ORDERS ON CHINESE
G
STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: Statement by the De
F
partment of State, April 2, 1955 1
Ch
CH
The program of emergency aid to Chinese students and scholars
the
is expected to terminate on June 30, 1955.2 This, of course, does not co
affect the regular exchange program which is in effect between the M
United States and the Republic of China. No grants for tuition or
maintenance under this emergency. program can be continued a th
renewed after June 30, no requests for thesis or dissertation costs Co
received after this date can be honored, and no requests for emergenerrel
medical expenses can be given consideration. Chinese students and
scholars who desire to return to the Far East and who are eligible in
for travel grants to cover minimum expenses for transportation must An
be in actual travel status on or before June 30 in order to qualify ba
for the grants. However, grantees wishing financial assistance for de
return travel prior to June 30 must present through their university An
representative substantial evidence to the Department of their need av
of financial aid for this purpose and of their definite arrangements
for departure. All applicants for travel grants must present written
permission from the Immigration and Naturalization Service to ho
leave the country.
It has been brought to the attention of the Department of State 11
that some Chinese students may refrain from applying to the Imm-
SDE
gration and Naturalization Service for permission to depart from
the United States for fear of being refused. This fear apparently the
based on the fact that a number of technically trained Chines an
students have in the past been refused permission to depart from the
the United States under section 215 (a) of the Immigration
Nationality Act of 1952.3 In this connection the Department
wishes to point out that the cases of such students have been in proces ar
of reexamination. As a consequence, restraining orders were rescinde bir
cases of 76 of these students, who are now free to depart, and it i No
anticipated that action will shortly be completed by the Immigration aw
and Naturalization Service on the few remaining cases.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 11, 1955, p. 627.
1949, with funds allocated under the China Aid Act of 1948.
3 Act of June 27, 1952; 66 Stat. 163.
ference; Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1954, pp. 949-950.
as
ad
SOL
1
1
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2515
· Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1955, pp. 953-954.
See statement of Apr. 2, 1955, by the Department of State; supra.
of
FOSS
els
92. CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CONSULAR LEVEL
FOR THE RELEASE OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS
DETAINED BY CHINESE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES:
Statement by the Department of State, June 1, 1955 1
101
bile
SI
As part of a series of talks that have been in progress ever since the
Geneva Conference last summer, our Consul General at Geneva, Mr.
De
Franklin C. Gowen, has just had another conversation with the
Chinese Communists. On May 16 he requested a meeting with the
Chinese Communist representative to take up again the question of
on the continuing detention and the welfare of American citizens in
mot Communist China. The Chinese Communists agreed to meet with
the Mr. Gowen on May 30.
The meeting was held at the Hotel Beau Rivage at Geneva where
the other meetings have also been held. At that time the Chinese
Dok Communist representative informed Mr. Gowen of the prospective
Der release of the four Air Force men, who have been released, and a state-
ment was volunteered that the purpose of their release was to relieve
international tensions. Mr. Gowen reviewed the plight of the other
Americans still held and he renewed his request for information that
I had been promised on all cases of Americans imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the Chinese Communists. He presented revised lists of
site
Americans, both military and civilians, held in Communist China,
eed and he renewed demands for their release.
ents
In the lists which Mr. Gowen presented, there were 53 names,
tell as follows: 42 civilians, of whom 25 are imprisoned, four are under
fo | house arrest, and 13 have been refused exit visas; and 11 military
admittedly being held
by the Chinese Communists, as well as the
kate 11 Navy and Coast Guard personnel whom the Red Chinese have
mi specifically denied they hold.
With reference to cases of Chinese students in the United States,
fill the Consul General pointed out that restrictions have been removed
Les and that those students who have expressed a desire to return to
their home in China are free to do so.
That has been known for
some time. Nevertheless, the Consul General stressed it again.
The Chinese Communist representative stated that he would send
report of the meeting to his government, together with the revised
lists of Americans held in China, and he said that the questions
to Mr. Gowen had raised would be examined and he would reply later.
No date has been set for another meeting. Presumably that will
200 | await word now from the representative of Red China.
Com
.com
2
and
ent
gesi
ded
iba
10B
2516
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
BE
for
AT
80
th
in
80
2
A. If any Chinese in the United States believes that contrary to
the declared policy of the United States he is encountering obstru
tion in departure, he may so inform the Embassy of the Republic of
India in the United States and request it to make representation
1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 8, 1955, p. 219. See also statement en
2 Ibid., Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456; see also statement by Ambassador Johnso. /
Sept. 10, 1955, and list of Americans released by the Communist authoritle" } &E
93. NEGOTIATIONS AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL FOR
P
THE RELEASE OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS: Joint Com
1
muniqué by Representatives of the United States and Communist
China, July 25, 1955 1
th
As a result of communication between the United States and the
People's Republic of China through the diplomatic channels of the
United Kingdom, it has been agreed that the talks held in the last fo
year between consular representatives of both sides at Geneva should th
be conducted on ambassadorial level in order to aid in settling the
matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their r
spective countries and to facilitate further discussions and settlement
be
of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides
ha
The first meeting of ambassadorial representatives of both sides wi
take place on August 1, 1955 at Geneva.
P
94. AGREED MEASURES FOR THE RETURN OF UNITED
STATES AND CHINESE CIVILIANS: Joint Statement by Repres
sentatives of the United States and Communist China, September
10, 1955
The Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People: ca
Republic of China have agreed to announce measures which the
respective governments have adopted concerning the return
civilians to their respective countries.
With respect to Chinese in the United States, Ambassador U. Alexis
G
Johnson, on behalf of the United States, has informed Ambassador
Wang Ping-nan that:
1. The United States recognizes that Chinese in the United State
to
who desire to return to the People's Republic of China are entitet
to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adop
appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise thel
right to return.
2. The Government of the Republic of India will be invited to
assist in the return to the People's Republic
of China of those me
C
C
desire to do so as follows:
91
, 1955, by the Department of
ibid., pp. 456-457.
of
eL
th
01
in
di
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2517
* It
Dent
des
pre
defending their continued detention of U.S. civilians in China. At the
1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 26, 1955, pp. 1049–1050.
FOR
People's Republic of China, the Government of the Republic of
India may also investigate the facts in any such case.
om
B. If any Chinese in the United States who desires to return to
imis
!
the People's Republic of China has difficulty in paying his return
expenses
, the Government of the Republic of India may render him
financial assistance needed to permit his return.
the
the 3. The United States Government will give wide publicity to the
foregoing arrangements and the Embassy of the Republic of India in
ould the United States may also do so.
With respect to Americans in the People's Republic of China, Am-
bassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the People's Republic of China,
has informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that:
will
1. The People's Republic of China recognizes that Americans in the
People's Republic of China who desire to return to the United States
are entitled to do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further
adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise
their right to return.
2. The Government of the United Kingdom will be invited to assist
iher
in the return to the United States of those Americans who desire to do
so as follows:
A. If any American in the People's Republic of China believes that
contrary to the declared policy of the People's Republic of China he is
cher encountering obstruction in departure, he may so inform the Office of
o the Chargé d'Affaires of the United Kingdom in the People's Republic
of China and request it to make representations on his behalf to the
Le Government of the People's Republic of China. If desired by the
United States, the Government of the United Kingdom may also
investigate the facts in any such case.
B. If any American in the People's Republic of China who desires
to return to the United States has difficulty in paying his return ex-
penses, the Government of the United Kingdom may render him
financial assistance needed to permit his return.
3. The Government of the People's Republic of China will give
10 wide publicity to the foregoing arrangements and the Office of the
mate Chargé d'Affaires of the United Kingdom in the People's
Republic of
1
35. FAILURE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES
TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 10,
1955: Statement by the Department of State, December 16,
The Chinese Communists on December 15 issued a statement
same time they accused the United States of not complying with the
ata
itiled
dopt
her
China may also do so.
TUM
a oll
the
1955 1
*.-
50 C
je
LLIURE
foundation. This cannot conceal the fact that U.S. citizens continue
to
an
cii
ret
La
or the Indian Embassy at Washington, D. C., which the United Isl_
make a public announcement containing charges which are without
2518 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
agreed announcement of September 10 1 regarding the repatriation
of civilians to Communist China.
Because the Communist statement contains many errors, this state-
ment is being made. The facts show that the United States has
scrupulously complied with its agreement and that Chinese in the
United States are now and have at all times since the announcement
been free to leave.
Unfortunately the same is not true with respect to the Chinese
Communist performance of its agreement to permit U.S. civilians to
"expeditiously" return to the United States. Of the 19 U.S. citizens
in Communist China who were being prevented from returning on
September 10, the date of the Chinese Communist agreement, only
5 have been released.
96
U.S. Ambassador Johnson has repeatedly protested to Communist
Ambassador Wang, in the Genevā talks, the failure of the Com-
munists to permit U.S. citizens to leave China. He has also protested
the cruel and inhuman treatment of those concerning whom facts are
available.
19
The answer to these protests has been the public statement by the Jew
Communists charging that the United States has not permitted to
Chinese to leave the United States.
In the agreed announcement of September 10, the Chinese Come tu
munist Ambassador declared:
The People's Republic of China recognizes that Americans in the People's
Republic of China who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do fu
so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures
so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.
Ca
This declaration is simple, clear, and positive. It says that any
U.S. citizen has the right to leave China and that the Communists Ar
have taken or will take the necessary steps so that those who wish
HO
may leave “expeditiously.” No distinction is made as between these
in prison and those out of prison. All U.S. citizens who wish to Au
The continued holding of these U.S. citizens by the Communists is
a violation of their agreed announcement, for which the United States A
Co
must continue to protest.
As for the Communist charge that the United States is preventing
Chinese from leaving the United States, it is sufficient to point out
that not a single Chinese has been refused exit. If anyone knows
of any Chinese who wishes to leave and who claims he is being pre: A
vented, he should communicate at once with the Department of State
States has agreed may render assistance. The ľndian Embassy, ban Se
Co
made no representation that any Chinese is being prevented from
leaving
It is unfortunate that the Chinese Communists have seen fit to Cc
Co
AC
DO
wa
HC
AT
knows by
Se
1 Supra.
19
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2519
to Communist shore batteries in the Lama Island group.
200
ENS
01
20
Zted batteries in the vicinity of Lafsami, the ship's location possibly within 2 miles of
Communist shore batteries in the Lama Islands.
178 by Chinese Communist machine guns from an island near Macao.
ate Communist batteries on the Lama Islands, then by batteries on the Ling Ting
ied Islands. One enlisted man was wounded.
September 16, 1950: The British ship S.S. Sing Hing was fired on by Chinese
Communist shore batteries from the Lama Island group.
September 17, 1950: The British ship S.S. Mahadevi was fired on by Chinese
released to the press by the U.S. representative to the United Nations on Sept.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 505-507. The list was
to be held in prison by the Communists in violation of their public
announcement of September 10. It is to be hoped that these U.S.
Ete
citizens will be permitted promptly to leave Communist prisons and
bas
return to their homes.
the
ent
ese
to
Ship and Plane Incidents in the China Area
nly
96. COMMUNIST CHINESE ATTACKS ON FOREIGN SHIPS
ist AND PLANES IN THE CHINA AREA: List (July 1950-June
Ill-
1954) Released by the United States Mission at the United Nations,
ted September 19, 1954 1
1950
the July 20, 1950: British S.S. Tak Shing was fired on by Chinese Communist shore
Lafsami.
om. July 24, 1950: The Panamanian ship S.S. Flying Dragon was fired on by Chinese
Communist shore batteries on Lafsami. The ship was hit.
le's August 2, 1950: An Air France plane was fired on by Chinese Communist A/A
de guns, Ladrone Island.
August 3, 1960: The 300-ton British freighter Nambee was fired on by Chinese
Communist shore batteries on the Nam Shan Islands. There were no hits and
ny
$tis August 6, 1950: The American ship S.S. Steel Rover was fired on by Chinese
Communist shore batteries in the Lama Island group; the ship was just entering
August 7, 1950: The British ship S.S. Hand Sang was fired on by Chinese com-
15. munist shore batteries
in the Lama Islands; the ship was just outside Hong Kong
s is waters; two British officers were slightly wounded.
tes ) August 8, 1950: The Norwegian ship S.s. Pleasantville was fired on by Chinese
The ship was just outside
ing
out | August 15, 1950: A Pacific Overseas Airways plane, under U.S. flag, was fired on
august 17, 1950: The British destroyer Concord was repeatedly shelled by Chinese
Tres
no casualties.
ish
Hong Kong.
Ose
Hong Kong.
re
jas
an
jut
Iue
19, 1954.
2520
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
COD
T&
we
S.S. Tak Shing was fired on and detained by an armed Chinese Communist napal
The Tak Shing was taken to Lafsari Island where two passengers were
October 7, 1950: The Danish S.S. Emilie Maersk was fired on by Chinese Com Se
munist shore batteries on the Lama Island group.
Bri
November 7, 1950: Portuguese sloop Goncalo Velho was fired on by Chinese Com ter
munist shore batteries on the Lafsami Islands. The ship was just outside Hong bat
Kong waters on the regular Hong Kong-Macao route.
Oct-
December 8, 1950: A Panamanian flagship was shelled by Chinese Communist rev
shore batteries off Wu Yu Island, near Amoy. No damage, no casualties.
Co
December 9, 1950: The British tug Allegiance was fired on by shore batteries at No
Putao (Pak Leak) Island, in the Wan Shan Island group. The tug was returning Br
from the rescue of the Philippine S.S. Joseph S. The master and two Cret
members were slightly injured.
Ca:
198
1951
19.
February 13, 1951: The British-registered Caltex II, a motor vessel, was shelled
by Chinese Communist shore batteries on Ling Ting Island. The ship wa ja
outside Hong Kong waters. The British master and British chief officer were Ne
injured.
fire
ele
April 10, 1951: The British ship Jade Leaf on its way from Hong Kong to Chuen
Chow was forced by weather conditions to anchor near Namao Island, of Swatow
. M
The master did not know that the area was prohibited. The ship was fired on
by Chinese Communist shore-battery machineguns. The ship was hit once tal
and there were no casualties. Later, while
entering Swatow, the ship was buzzed Be
by unidentified planes.
Ar
April 16, 1951: Chinese Communist shore batteries on outer Ling Ting Islands AE
fired on the British S. S. Victoria Peak causing some of the cargo to ignite.
May 3, 1951: The British tug, Caroline Moller, while towing barge, was fired on Co
by Chinese Communist shore batteries on the Ling Ting islands.
June 8, 1951: The British S.S. Edith Moller was shelled by Chinese Communist
armed junk and shore batteries near Hong Kong.
M
June 8, 1951: The Danish ship Marieskou, while going up the Pearl River estua?
was shelled by Chinese Communist island batteries.
12
S.
August 12, 1951: Enroute Hong Kong to Chuanchow, the British S.$. Jade Les
Se
took shelter in Tang Sang harbor. The ship, being mistaken for Nationalist
, was
attacked by the Chinese Communists. The attack resulted in the killing of the
boatswain.
September 2, 1961: Between Hong Kong and Macao, the British flag Yu Man No
on the regular Hong Kong-Macao run, was fired on by a Chinese small craft.
N
November 26, 1951: A vessel off Swatow fired on a U.S. Navy plane.
ag
1952
January 1952: The Asiatic Petroleum Company's oil lighter BPM 88, soline 19
under British flag, was intercepted and detained by the Chinese Communists
, on
Ji
the fringe of Hong Kong territorial waters.
September 25, 1952: On the regular Hong Kong-Macao route the British in
vessel.
removed.
$
mo
80F
an
ses
81
,
in
Da
un
or
er
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2521
com September 25, 1952: In answer to the distress call, the H.M.S. Mounts Bay and
consort arrived to give escort to the Tak Shing to Hong Kong. While still in
British territorial waters, 4 miles from Lafsami, Chinese Communist shore bat-
Som teries fired on the Mounts Bay. The Mounts Bay returned fire and silenced the
long batteries.
October 13, 1952: While pursuing a suspected smuggling junk, a Hong Kong
inist revenue launch in the vicinity of Ling Ting Island was fired on by a Chinese
Communist shore battery.
3 st November 2, 1952: A Chinese Communist armed junk took into custody two
ning British seamen in a whale boat sailing around Hong Kong Island-about half
way between Lama Island and the Ling Ting Islands. The men were taken to
Canton, questioned intensively, and were returned to Hong Kong on March 19,
1953, having been detained for more than 4 months.
CHET
1953
elled
12 January 18, 1953: Chinese Communist A/A fire off Swatow shot down U.S.N.
Tere Neptune plane. U.S.C.G. Mariner crashed taking off after rescue. U.S. destroyer
fired on by shore batteries, later chased by hostile craft. Total casualties were
eleven missing.
duen
Once
tow. March 21, 1953: Chinese Communist gunboat seized U.S. yacht Kert about 5 miles
doa west of Lantau Island, 6-7 miles north of Lafsami. The following Americans were
taken into custody and not released until September 1954: Richard Applegate,
zzed Benjamin Krasner, and Donald Dixon. Three Chinese, who were with the
Americans, have not been released.
and April 30, 1959: A Chinese Communist gunboat attacked a British-registered
motor junk in international waters near Soko Island and Sang Lau Point off the
doo
southwest tip of Lantau Island. After taking refuge in British waters, a Chinese
Communist gunboat and four Communists in naval uniform pursued the junk
and after some shooting took it. The Hong Kong Marine Department later
rescued the crew.
unist
817
WS
May 25, 1953: As it was leaving Amoy, the British S.S. Nigelock received small
arms fire from Communist-held Hu Hsu Island.
June 30, 1953: At Scrag Point Chinese Communist shore batteries fired on the
Leo
S.S. Hydralock of British registry.
September 9, 1953: A Chinese Communist gunboat fired on Hong Kong ML 1323
in disputed waters in the Pearl River estuary. Resulting casualties: 6 British
navy crew members and one captain of the Royal Hong Kong defense force killed.
tan November 11, 1953: Chinese Communist shore batteries fired on S.S. Inchulva,
under British flag, while entering Wenchow.
November 12, 1963: The S.S. Inchulva again attempted to enter Wenchow. It was
the
again shelled with no damage.
OD
ing 1954
June 4, 1954: Chinese Communists took British forces yacht Elinor which, while
on a pleasure cruise, entered Chinese Communist waters through navigational
error. Two officers and 7 men
aboard were detained till July 10.
Dag
ya
AN
2522
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ment of the United States protests most strongly against these attecks
and demands that those responsible be adequately punished, that
2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 9, 1954, pp. 196–197. Mr. Trevelyan had
previously made an oral protest. The Communist authorities later returned the
3 Ibid., p. 197. The Communist authorities later returned the note to the
97. PROTEST AGAINST ATTACK ON BRITISH CATHAY
PACIFIC AIRLINER: Note From the United States Government
to the Chinese Communist Authorities at Peiping, Transmitted
by the British Chargé d'Affaires, July 27, 1954 2
(First Note]
The Government of the United States protests vigorously against
the barbarous and lawless attack on July 23, 1954 at approximately
8:45 a.m. local time, against a British Cathay Pacific unarmed and
defenceless commercial airliner and its passengers. This unwarranted
unprovoked attack occurred over international waters about 30 miles
south of Hainan Island. It resulted in the killing of three United
States citizens, including two children of tender age, two and four
years, and the wounding of three other United States citizens, includ-
ing a child aged six. The Government of the United States demands
appropriate punishment of all the persons having responsibility for
this criminal attack as well as compensation for the victims and
families of the deceased. The Government of the United States
demands that measures be taken to guard against a repetition of such
action and the British Government be informed of the nature of such
measures.
98. PROTEST AGAINST ATTACK ON UNITED STATES AIR-
CRAFT IN RESCUE WORK ON THE BRITISH CATHAY
PACIFIC AIRLINER: Note From the United States Government
to the Chinese Communist Authorities at Peiping, Transmitted bp
the British Chargé d'Affaires, July 27, 19543
[Second Note]
The United States Defence authorities have received an official
report from the United States Naval authorities in the Pacific that
on July 26 at approximately 10:05 a.m. local time two United States
carrier-based aircraft while searching the area of attack on the Cathay
Pacific Aircraft were attacked and fired on by two Chinese LA-9 sur
craft. This incident occurred well over the international waters
approximately 13 miles from Hainan. The United States pilots in:
volved report that during this wanton and unprovoked attacks
Chinese gunboat also opened fire on the United States aircraft which
as stated above, were engaged on a mission of mercy search in the
vicinity for possible survivors of the incident of July
23. The Gorente
1 Humphrey Trevelyan.
note to the British Embassy.
I
I
C
I
1
1
t
British Embassy.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2523
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, p. 51.
3 Ibid., July 26, 1954, p. 131.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 22, 1955, p. 302.
State, August 8, 1955 6
Under Secretary this afternoon concerning the case of the Soviet
tanker Tuapse. The aide memoire expressed the satisfaction of the
AT
immediate effective steps be taken to ensure that there be no repetition
ent
ted
of this deplorable attack and that the British Government be informed
as to the nature of such measures. The Government of the United
States reserves its right to present a claim for possible damage and
injury after thorough investigation has been completed.
ust
els
99. REJECTION OF SOVIET CHARGES OF UNITED STATES
und
INTERFERENCE WITH THE SOVIET TANKER TUAPSE:
ted
iles
Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign
ted
Ministry, June 26, 1954 1
Our
- The United States Government refers to the Soviet Government's
nd note of June 24 regarding interception of the Soviet tanker Tuapse
far by a war vessel of the destroyer type in Far Eastern waters. 2
ind The United States Government rejects as completely without foun-
stes dation the allegations made by the Soviet Government that Naval
ich
Forces of the United States have seized or otherwise interfered with
Ich the movement of the Soviet tanker in question.
IR
100. RENEWED REJECTION OF SOVIET CHARGES: Note From
AY
the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
July 4, 19543
ent
bi
The United States Government refers to the Soviet Government's
note of July 24 with further reference to the Soviet tanker Trapse.
The Soviet Government is well aware that the vessel in question
was not seized by the naval forces of the United States and that it
has not been detained by United States authorities. The United
States Government therefore has nothing further to add to its note
tes
of June 265 rejecting the unfounded charges of the Soviet Govern-
185
101. DENIAL OF ANY RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CASE OF THE
TUAPSE AND ITS CREW: Statement by the Department of
ch
the
The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires presented an aide memoire ? to the
hat
ment in this matter.
2.11
AN
in-
18
TU-
oks
786
had
the
2 Ibid.
the
Ibid.
Supra.
6
? Not printed.
2524
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Soviet Union that 29 members of the Tuapse crew have returned to
the Soviet Union but stated that the Soviet Government was disturbed
by the fact that 20 members of the crew were still being held and that
the tanker itself had not been returned. The aide memoire said that
the Soviet Government expects the United States Government to take
the necessary measures for the return of the remaining members of
the crew of the Trapse. The aide memoire concluded by saying that
the Soviet Government expects the Government of the United States
of America will take appropriate steps toward the return to the Soviet
Union of the tanker.
In commenting on the contents of the Soviet aide memoire, the
Under Secretary stated to the Soviet Chargé that he wished to make
very clear that the case of the Tuapse and its crew was one entirely
within the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of Chine
and that the United States Government had nothing whatever to do
with it. So far as the cases of the men who have chosen not to return
to the Soviet Union are concerned, the Under Secretary said he was
not personally acquainted with he details in this regard. However,
he noted to the Soviet Chargé that if the United States Government
had any control over the matter, which it did not, the attitude of the
United States Government would be that the men were perfectly free
to make up their own mind as to where they wished to reside.
102. DENIAL OF POLISH CHARGES OF UNITED STATES
INTERFERENCE WITH THE POLISH TANKER PRACA:
Note From the American Embassy at Warsaw to the Polish Foreign
Ministry, October 20, 1953
1
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli
.
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on instructions of the
United States Government has the honor to reply to the Ministry
note of October 12 2 with respect to the interception of the Polish
flag tanker Praca by naval forces of the Chinese Government. The
United States Government rejects categorically the false charges
contained in the Ministry's note and wishes to make clear to the
Polish Government that the United States Government had no connec-
tion with the detention of the Praca.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1953, p. 640.
2 Ibid.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
2525
3
es
et
as
,
at
he
ee
Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1954, pp. 824–825.
4 , , ,
sion of the Polish charges in the United Nations; ibid., pp. 996–1003.
103. DENIAL OF POLISH CHARGES OF UNITED STATES
zd
INTÉRFERENCE WITH THE POLISH FREIGHTER GOTT-
WALD: Statement by the Department of State, May 21, 1954 1
at
at
ke In a note of May 15 2 delivered to the American Embassy in Warsaw
of the Polish Government referred to a report that the Polish merchant
at ship Gottwald had been intercepted by naval forces of the Government
of the Republic of China. As in the case of the Polish tanker Praca
which was similarly intercepted in October 1953, the Polish Govern-
ment sought to impose upon the U.S. Government responsibility for
he the action against the Gottwald. On May 20 this Government replied
ke to the Polish note through our Embassy in Warsaw. The substantive
ly portion of our note is as follows:
18
do
"The U.S. Government rejects as completely without foundation
the allegations made by the Polish Government. The United States
Government has had no connection whatever with this incident.
"Furthermore, as has been clearly stated before, and as the Polish
Government must be well aware, propaganda charges involving the
United States Government in the Praca case are also completely false.”'
104. DENIAL OF ANY RESPONSIBILITY IN CONNECTION
WITH THE PRACA AND THE GOTTWALD AND THEIR
US
CREWS: Note From the American Embassy at Warsaw to the
4:
Polish Foreign Ministry, December 8, 1954 +
The Embassy of the United States presents [its) compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and refers to its note of November 20,
Li
1954. The United States Government again rejects as without
basis in fact the version contained in that note of the interception of
the Polish-flag vessels Praca and Gottwald. The United States had
no connection with this action or with the decision of so many crew
members from these ships to seek asylum.
These vessels were intercepted by the naval forces of the Republic
of China. If the Polish Government is genuinely interested in pur-
suing this matter in a practical way rather than in dispatching a series
of notes purely for propaganda purposes, it could seek a solution of
this issue with the Government of the Republic of China through
diplomatic channels.
The note of the Polish Government refers to the presence in the
area of the Island of Formosa of aircraft of the United States Navy.
These United States aircraft operate in conjunction with the Seventh
Fleet of the United States Navy, which has been ordered by the
See American note of Oct. 20, 1953; supra.
.
de
's
sh
ne
2
le
1
? Not printed.
5
Ibid., pp. 983–984.
2526
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
On December 17, 1954, by a vote of 44 to 5, the General Assembly
The United States Govern-
3 Res. 821 (IX); General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supple.
ment No. 21 (A/2890), pp. 9-10. See also Annucl Report of the Secretary-(eneral
on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1957-15 June 1955 (A/2911), pp. 15–16.
President of the United States to patrol the waters around Formosa
in order to prevent an attack on that island. The mission of the
Seventh Fleet has been and will continue to be to contribute to the
security of the Far East. The United States reaffirms its intention
to devote its efforts to the maintenance of peace and stability in that
area and hopes that other governments will contribute their efforts to
the same end.
In discussing the decision of the officers and crew of the two vessels
to seek asylum in the free world, the Polish Government's note
reveals its concern that large numbers of Poles have fled from their
homeland. Many of these people who have escaped from political
and religious persecution in Poland, or have refused to return there,
have sought asylum in the United States. The United States Gor-
ernment, true to its traditional policies of granting asylum to those
suffering from oppression, has welcomed and will continue to welcome
persons such as the Polish officers and seamen from the Praca and
Gottwald who sought refuge in this country.
105. FINAL REJECTION OF POLISH ALLEGATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CASES OF THE PRACA AND
THE GOTTWALD: Note From the American Embassy at War
saw to the Polish Foreign Ministry, February 21, 1955 1
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in accordance with in-
structions received from the United States Government has the honor
to reply to the Ministry's note of February 12, 1955, concerning the
detention of two merchant vessels, the Praca and the Gottwald, by
the navy of the Government of the Republic of China.
The United States Government has repeatedly and categorically
rejected the Polish Government's false charges alleging United States
responsibility in this matter The United States Government once
again rejects these charges and wishes it clearly understood that the
United States considers inadmissible the Polish Government's attempt
to determine the applicability of United States legislation to alleged
United States conduct.
of the United Nations rejected similar charges made against
world opinion in recognizing the true nature and purposes of such
accusations as are contained in the present note of the Polish
Government.
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 14, 1955, p. 430.
2 Ibid., pp. 430–432.
I
a
o
the
3
Os8
iels
ote
el
cal
re
).
Se
me
nd
1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 6, 1950, p. 212. For the texts of docu-
Policy, pp. 669–684; Korea's Independence (Department of State publication
2933; 1947); and Korea 1945-1948 (Department of State publication 3305; 1948).
States and the Korean Problem (S. Doc. No. 74, 83d Cong., 1st sess.).
the
ion
hat
.to
Part XV
KOREA
A. UNITED STATES MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE
KOREAN CONFLICT
1. REJECTION OF THE KOREAN AID BILL BY THE HOUSE OF
OF
REPRESENTATIVES: Statement by the President, January 21,
VD
1950 1
r •
I am releasing herewith a letter which I have received from the
Oli-
Secretary of State about the action of the House of Representatives
in rejecting the Korean Aid Bill on Thursday 2 by a vote of 193–191.
I entirely concur in the Secretary's views as to the seriousness of this
action and the necessity for its speedy rectification. I shall take up
che
this matter with Congressional leaders and urge upon them the need
for immediate action, in order that important foreign-policy interests
of this country may be properly safeguarded.
DT
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE [January 20, 1950)
Dear Mr. PRESIDENT: The Department of State received with
concern and dismay the report that the House of Representatives had
rejected the Korea Aid Bill of 1949 by a vote of 193 to 191. This
action
, if not quickly repaired, will have the most
far-reaching adverse
effects upon our foreign policy, not only in Korea but in many other
areas of the world. It has been fundamental to our policy that in
tnose areas where a reasonable amount of American aid can make the
of difference between the maintenance of national independence and its
collapse under totalitarian pressure, we should extend such aid within
ah
points dealing with Korea from 1945 to 1950, sce" A Decade of American Foreign
Ill-
101
by
TCS
ce
he
pt
ed
11.
ch
ܒܨܟ ܝ ܝܝ
2 Jan. 19, 1950.
2527
2528
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
81st Congress, 1st Session, on H. R. 5330, June 8-23, 1949. Hearings before the
a prudent assessment of our capabilities. The American people
2
understand this policy and have supported our extending aid in such
circumstances; the success of such aid is a matter of public record
The Republic of Korea owes its existence in large measure to the
United States, which freed the country from Japanese control
. The
peoples of the Republic of Korea, the other peoples of Asia, and the
members of the United Nations under whose observation a govern-
ment of the Republic was freely elected, alike look to our conduct in I
Korea as a measure of the seriousness of our concern with the freedom
and welfare of peoples maintaining their independence in the face
di
great obstacles. We have not only given the Republic of Korea
independence; since then we have provided the economic, military,
technical, and other assistance necessary to its continued existence
.
Of the current program of economic assistance we are extending to
Korea, half was provided by the Congress during the previous session.
The withholding of the remainder would bring our efforts to an end
in mid-course. It is our considered judgment that if our limited
assistance is continued the Republic will have a good chance of sur-
vival as a free nation. Should such further aid be denied, that chance
may well be lost and all our previous efforts perhaps prove to have
been vain.
We are concerned not only about the consequences of this abrupt
about-face in Korea, whose government and people have made
valiant efforts to win their independence and establish free institutions
under the most difficult circumstances, but we are also deeply con-
cerned by the effect which would be created in other parts of the
world where our encouragement is a major element in the struggle for
freedom.
It is difficult for us to believe that the members of the House of
Representatives who voted against this measure took sufficiently into
account the serious implications of this action upon the position e
the United States in the Far East. These implications were set forth
in considerable detail in hearings before the committees of Congres
by the Department of State Department of Defense, and the
Economic Cooperation Administration,
In our judgment it would be disastrous for the foreign policy of the
United States for
us to consider this action by the House of Representa
tives as its last word on the matter.
1 63 Stat. 404–405, 485, and 739.
2 Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representative
in executives ession, June 28-July 12, 1949. SeesRept. No. 748, 81st Cong.
$
1
2
1
1st sess.
KOREA
2529
et in Korea:
Oreg
DCC
Ople
) 2. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
cord
. JANUARY 26, 1950 1
the
The
Preamble
I the
The Governments of the United States and of the Republic of
:
dom Desiring to foster international peace and security, within the
2 of framework of the Charter of the United Nations, through measures
which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes
art
,
and principles of the Charter to develop effective measures for self-
defense in support of those purposes and principles; and without
g te prejudice to continue[d] exertion of maximum efforts to obtain
in agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as
end provided by its Charter, and to obtain agreement among member
ited nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under
scr adequate and dependable guarantee against violation;
Recognizing that measures to eliminate insecurity caused by fear
of aggression will enhance the progress of economic development;
Considering that, in furtherance of these principles, the Govern-
"upi ment of the United States has enacted the Mutual Defense Assistance
lade Act of 1949 2 providing for the furnishing of military assistance by
the United States of America to the Republic of Korea; and
Desiring to set forth the understandings which govern the furnish-
the ing of assistance by the Government of the United States under the
for Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, and the receipt of such
assistance by the Republic of Korea;
of
Have agreed as follows:
ince
la Te
IONS
2011-
into
ad
ARTICLE I
orth
T'ess
the
the
1. Each Goveroment, consistently with the principle that economic
recovery is essential to international peace and security and must
be given clear priority, will make or continue to make available to
the other, and to other Governments, such equipment, materials,
services, or other military assistance as the Government furnishing
such assistance may authorize and in accordance with such terms and
conditions as it may agree. The furnishing of any such assistance
as
may be authorized by either party hereto shall be consistent with
the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made
available by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement
will be furnished under the provisions, and subject to all of the terms,
conditions and termination provisions,
of the Mutual Defense As-
sistance Act of 1949,
and such other applicable United States laws
hereafter come into effect. The two Governments will, from
time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry
out the provisions of this paragraph.
res
the
ted
ngon
as
may
* TIAS 2019; 1 UST 137.
* Act of Oct. 6, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364.
415900_57-vol. 2
-56
2530
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ta
mor
CO
Ág
th
ARTICLE II
The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate
connection with equipment, materials or services furnished pursuant
arising in its jurisdiction of nationals of any country not a party to this
2. The Government of the Republic of Korea undertakes to make
effective use of assistance received pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
Article for the purposes for which such assistance was furnished, and
that Government will not, without the prior consent of the Govern-
ment of the Urited States, devote assistance so furnished to purposes
other than those for which it was furnished.
3. The Government of the Republic of Korea undertakes not to
th
transfer to any person not an officer or agent of such Government
,
or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment
, me-
terials, or services, pursuant to paragraph 1, without the prior con-
sent of the Government of the United States.
In the event that Article VIII of the Economic Cooperation Agreat
ment between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the ot
Government of the United States, signed on December 10, 1948.' ! A
Seoul, Korea, shall cease to be in force prior to the termination of
this Agreement, the Government of the Republic of Korea will
, for $9
long as this Agreement remains in force, facilitate the production and
transfer to the Government of the United States, for such period of w
time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as mayor
be agreed upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the as
United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential
deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Kores
Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable
requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Korea.
ARTICLE III
1. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent
with security to keep the public informed of operations under this
Agreement.
2. Each Government will take such security measures as may be
agreed between the two Governments in order to prevent the dis
closure or compromise of classified military articles, services or in
formation furnished by the other Government pursuant to this
Agreement.
ARTICLE IV
appropriate
arrangements between them respecting responsibility for
patent or similar claims based on the use of devices, processes
, teca
nological information
or other forms of property protected by law a
to this Agreement. In such negotiations, consideration shall be given
to including an undertaking whereby each Government will assume
the
responsibility for all such claims of its nationals and such claims
V
CO
0
î
fo
0
0
R.
ta
to
8
.
1 TIAS 1908; 62 Stat., pt. 3, p. 3780.
KOREA
2531
ARTICLE V
IT-
JSES
ARTICLE VI
ake
this
The Government of the Republic of Korea will, except as otherwise
and
agreed to, grant duty-free treatment and exemption from internal
taxation upon importation or exportation of products, property,
materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with
this Agreement.
} to
ent
,
ma-
1. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them,
consult regarding any matter relating to the application of this
Agreement or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to
this Agreement.
2. The Government of the Republic of Korea will accord, to duly
ree authorized United States representatives, facilities freely and fully to
the observe the utilization of assistance furnished pursuant to this
bat Agreement.
1 of
OD-
ARTICLE VII
I SO
and
The two Governments recognize their mutual interest, consistent
I did with mutual security and recovery objectives, in effective controls
mer over the export of war-potential materials, equipment, and, in so far
the | as practicable, technical data; and the two Governments will consult
till with a view to taking measures for the accomplishment of these ends.
able
rea
ARTICLE VIII
sent
This
be
dis
ill-
this
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and will
continue in force until three months after the receipt by either party
of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it.
This Agreement shall be submitted to the Korean National Assembly
for ratification.
2. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary General
of the United Nations in compliance with the provisions of Article 102
of the Charter of the United Nations.
Done in duplicate, in the English and Korean languages, at Seoul,
Korea, on this 26th day of January 1950. The English and Korean
texts shall have equal force, but in case of divergence, the English
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective representatives, duly
authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.
text shall prevail.
ate
for
ch-
in
BDI
Fel
me
NIS
his
2532
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
SUI
1
Je
TE
an
an
as
Or
1 PL 447, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (64 Stat. 5-6; Department of State Bulletin, Mar.
3. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
:
The Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950, February 14
1950
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United of
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act be cited as the
"Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950”.
$3
SEC. 2. To enable the President until June 30, 1950, to obligate at
funds heretofore appropriated for assistance in certain areas of
China, section 12 of Public Law 47, Eighty-first Congress," is amended to
by striking out "February 15, 1950” and inserting in lieu thered Re
“June 30, 1950”.
for
SEC. 3. (a) The Administrator for Economic Cooperation is hereby the
authorized to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea in conformity
with-
to
(1) the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948
, sau
amended, wherever such provisions are applicable and not incor-
sistent with the intent and purposes of this section 3; and
(2) the agreement on aid between the United States of America
and the Republic of Korea signed December 10, 1948," or an
supplementary or succeeding agreement which shall not substantiall 4.
alter the basic obligations of either party.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Admi.
istrator shall immediately terminate aid under this section in the
event of the formation in the Republic of Korea of a coalition goveri
ment which includes one or more members of the Communist Party
or of the party now in control of the government of northern Korea of
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Admin
istrator is authorized to make available to the Republic of Kores in
merchant vessels of tonnage not in excess of two thousand five hundred pf
gross tons each, in a number not to exceed ten at any one time, with
å stipulation that such vessels shall be operated only in east Asia to
waters and
must be returned forthwith upon demand of the Admin
istrator and in any event not later than June 30, 1951. Any agene
of the United States Government owning or operating any such res
is authorized to make such vessel available to the Administrator for
the purposes of this section upon his application, notwithstanding
the provisions of any other law and without reimbursement by the th
Administrator, and title to any such vessel so supplied shall remai
in the United States Government.
(d) In order to carry out the provisions of this section 3, there it
K
hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President, in addition to
13, 1950, p. 405).
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1322–1327.
3 Ibid., pp. 1299-1321. For other amendments prior to Feb. 14, 1950, 3*
and 63 Stat., passim.
TIAS 1908; 62 Stat., pł. 3, p. 3780.
In
ts
01
B
E
ram
KOREA
2533
mits
erics
ADE
our fundamental declaration made at Cairo in 1943 with the United
Kingdom and China (and later joined by the U. S. S. R.) "that in
Bulletin, Mar. 20, 1950, pp. 454-455.
Economic Cooperation Administration, Paul G. Hoffman, testified in executive
S. Rept. No. 748, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 1.
LEA:
sums already appropriated, not to exceed $60,000,000 for the fiscal
11
Fear ending June 30, 1950.
() Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, until such
time as an appropriation shall be made pursuant to subsection (d)
millel of this section, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized
3 the and directed to make advances not to exceed in the aggregate
$30,000,000 to carry out the provisions of this section, in such manner,
igalke at such times, and in such amounts as the Administrator shall request,
3 dl and no interest shall be charged on advances made by the Treasury
nded
to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for this purpose. The
278 Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall be repaid without interest
for advances made by it hereunder, from funds made available for
reby the purposes of this section 3.
Sec. 4. The authorization for appropriations in this Act is limited
to the period ending June 30, 1950, in order that any subsequent
8,8 authorizations may be separately passed on, and is not to be construed
108"as an express or implied commitment to provide furtber authorizations
or appropriations.
jalt 4. EXTENSION OF THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: Statement by the Secretary
min
of State, March 7, 1950 1
the
I appreciate the invitation to appear before your Committee with
Parte Mr. Hoffman to explain to you briefly why I feel the continuation
of the Korean economic recovery program for a second year is of
real importance to the success of American foreign policy. I shall
comes indeed be brief because I know that, although I myself was not
dred present, this matter was fully discussed with you by Mr. Webb and
Mr. Hoffman? only a few
months ago. In addition, I have referred
to the importance of our Korean program in discussions we have
had during the present session.
I believe the main questions we have to consider are: (1) the
Bog importance of the proposed continuation of the economic recovery
for program to the success of our over-all policy toward Korea and (2)
in the part
which our Korean policy plays in United States policy for
the
first as to Korea: You will recall that the United States has
taken the leadership among the nations to attain the realization of
Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Department of State
et
Fero
Tel.
mul
sian
min
enCT
the Far East.
al
el
a to
late
2534
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
SE
e como
W
a
Uj
81
al
American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678); 195 (III) of Dec. 12, 1948 (U. N. General to
and 293 (IV) of Oct. 21, 1949 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 682–684).
General Assembly Res. 112 (II) of Nov. 14, 1947 (A Decade of American Foreign
6 Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Oct. 6, 1949, and Second Supple-
due course Korea should become free and independent." When our
own efforts to persuade the U.S.S. R. to join in holding free elections
to establish a united country were unsuccessful, we referred the
matter to the United Nations. The General Assembly has used and
is using its best efforts to bring about the accomplishment of this
S
end, desired by all the Korean people. The success of its efforts
I
S
has, thus far, been limited to assisting in the establishment of a fre
government, the Republic of Korea, in what was formerly the area
of United States occupation. 4
Upon the establishment of the Republic, the United States under p
took to assist it to survive and develop as a democratic, representative
government. To do this, the United States is providing the Republic
with political support. Through our information and educational
b
programs, we are seeking to help the Republic develop a sound edu-
b"
cational system founded on principles of representative democracy
.
At the request of the Republic, we are maintaining there & Military
Advisory Group to assist in training Korean security forces and to
insure the efficient employment of United States military assistance
E
by those forces. Supplementing the prior transfer of military equir
:
ment under the Surplus Property Act, the Congress has authorized
under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act the extension of military
aid to Korea. And the Congress has recently authorized the Economie
K
Cooperation Administration to undertake a program intended to
bring the economy of the Republic as nearly as possible to a self-
supporting basis. In doing so the Congress authorized the expend
.
iture in the fiscal year 1950 of the total sum of 120 million dollars.
?
P
By means of these and related measures, the United States hopes
to achieve the objective of strengthening the Republic of Kores to
the point where it can (1) successfully withstand the threat of expand-
ing Communist influence and control arising out of the existence in
north Korea of an aggressive Soviet-dominated Communist regime
and (2) serve as a nucleus for the eventual peaceful unification of the
entire country on a democratic basis.
The testimony presented to your Committee by Mr. Hoffman
, Mr.
Webb, and other witnesses at the time of hearings on the bill authoriz
:
ing the program for fiscal year 1950 indicated very plainly that the
1 Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 22.1.2018
Declaration of July 26, 1945, in its declaration of war against Japan, Aug. 8, 194
see Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945-1946 (Princeton, 1945
,
pp. 848–849.
2 See Korea's Independence (Department of State publication 2933; 1947) ht
3 See General Assembly Resolutions en12°C Intate NOV. 14, 1947 (A Decade e
fo
Policy, pp. 677-678) and was proclaimed, Aug. 15, 1948.
5 Act of Oct. 3, 1944; 58 Stat. 765.
mentary Appropriation Act, 1950; 63 Stat. 716, 975.
7 Third Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1949, '
Oct. 10, 1949; 63 Stat. 739.
in
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1 Message of June 7, 1949; H, Doc. No. 212, 81st Cong., 1st sess.
OU
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ACT
nce
7); has increased agricultural production and the well-being of the large
farming population of Korea. It has given food to the families of
the industrial workers and, by increasing production, has brought
about mounting employment.
authority requested was to carry out the first year of a planned 3-year
10 program intended to help Korea make substantial progress toward a
the
self-supporting economy. The program for which authority is now
and
requested for fiscal year 1951 is the second year of this 3-year program.
this
Since Mr. Hoffman will go into the economics of the program with you,
orts
I will not attempt to do so beyond saying that the Department of
free
State has participated in the preparation of the program which he
will outline and supports it fully.
Second, as to the place of this proposal in our over-all Far Eastern
der policy, I have said that the United States is taking the leadership
tire among the nations in helping the people of Korea attain the goal of a
blic united independent nation, free from foreign domination. As a
onal
result of this initiative, the United States today is looked to not only
du-
by the people of Korea but by the peoples of the Far East and, in fact,
by the people of democratic nations everywhere as the leader in the
ACT
struggle for the survival of a Korean Republic, both for itself and as a
I to
possible nucleus for the eventual peaceful unification of that country.
Broadly speaking, the United States foreign policy in the Far
11g-
East is directed toward encouraging and assisting the efforts of the
ed peoples of that area to improve their welfare and security, to stabilize
ary
and develop their economies, to strengthen free institutions, and to
advance the cause of self-government free from outside domination.
Korea is one place in which the United States can continue to take
well-defined positive steps to help a free democratic country to survive
mnd
in the face of efforts of communism to engulf it. Hundreds of millions
si? of people of Southern and Southeastern Asia and the islands of the
Pacific are now in a period where they must choose between the roads
toward democracy or totalitarianism. As the President said in his
ad-
message to the Congress on Korean aid in June of last year:
Korea has become a testing ground in which the validity and practical value
of the ideals and principles of democracy which the Republic is putting into
the practice are being matched against the practices of communism which have been
imposed
upon the people of north Korea. The survival and progress of the
11. far-reaching influence on the people of Asia.
Republic toward a self-supporting, stable economy will have an immense and
17-
Hill encourage the people of southern and southeastern Asia and the islands of
Such progress by the young Republic
he the Pacific to resist and reject the Communist propaganda with which they are
besieged. Moreover, the Korean Republic
, by demonstrating the success and
people of northern Asia in resisting the control of the Communist forces which
The people of Asia, as well as the people of Korea, have been able
to see the way in which economic assistance from the
United States
has contributed already to the ability of the Korean people to move
toward economic independence. The Economic Assistance Program
mic
to
s
pes
to
: 11
me
Che
ani
have overrun them.1
45;
8),
gn
for
It has made possible a small surplus
حت
2536
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
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11
1.
th
21
8.1
area, and Chunchon area, and an amphibious landing was reported
2 United States Policy in the Korean Crisis (Department of State publication
On May 2, 1951, the United Nations Command released two captured docu
Republic of Korea; Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for 1 April
be imported. This progress, together with the rehabilitation of
factories, mines, and fishing facilities important to the Korean
economy, has helped to give them faith in their form of government
,
strength to resist the constant pressures of communism, and con-
fidence in their future.
There is one further and fundamental question which must be
considered: That is the probability of ultimate success of the effort of
the Korean Republic to survive. In recent debates, a number of
Members of the Congress have indicated their feeling that the possi-
bility of failure makes them doubt the wisdom of the United States
giving a helping hand in this effort. It is my belief that American
policy should be based on determination to succeed rather than on
fear of the possibility of failure. Despite the problems with which
6.
the Republic of Korea is beset, both internally and externally, and
despite its necessarily limited experience in self-government and
paucity of technical and administrative know-how, conditions of
stability and public order have continued to improve and the threst
of Communist overthrow appears at least temporarily to have been
he
contained.
There is good reason to hope from progress made thus far that with
our assistance, the Republic of Korea can survive and thrive. This
cannot, of course, be guaranteed. However, it continues to be true
that without our assistance there can be no such hope.
te
B. INITIAL PHASE OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT,
JUNE-OCTOBER 1950
K
5. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN ATTACK
Telegram From the American Ambassador at Seoul' to the
Secretary of State, June 25, 1950 2
According to Korean Army reports which are partly confirmed by in
Korean Military Advisory Group field adviser reports, North Korean
forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this
morning. Action was initiated about 4 a.m. Ongjin
by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 a.m. North Korean infants
commenced
crossing the [38th] parallel in the Ongjin area, Kaesore
made south of Kangnung on the east coast. Kaesong was
2
1 John J. Muccio.
3922; 1950), p. 11. The telegram was received in the Department of State on
3
June 24, marking the difference between Korean and
Washington time.
through 30 June, 1951 (S/2112), pp. 88–94.
1
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reportedly
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39
KOREA
2537
5 United States Policy in the Korean Crisis (Department of State publication
>
be
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en
Government of Republic of Korea states that about 04:00 hrs.
of
captured at 9 a.m., with some ten North Korean tanks participating
in the operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, are
nt, reportedly closing in on Chunchon. Details of the fighting in the
01 | Kangnung area are unclear, although it seems that North Korean
forces have cut the highway. I am conferring with Korean Military
Advisory Group advisers and Korean officials this morning concern-
of
ing the situation,
of
It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in
which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against
tes the Republic of Korea.
01
ich
6. REQUEST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF
nd
THE NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION: Letter From the
nd Deputy Representative of the United States at the United
of
Nations to the U.N. Secretary-General, June 25, 1950 2
sat
DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have the honour to transmit
herewith the text of the message which I read to you on the telephone
the
at three o'clock this morning, June 25, 1950.
Will
his you be good enough to bring the message to the immediate
attention of the President of the United Nations Security Council.
[Enclosure)
The American Ambassador to the Republic of Korea ' has informed
the Department of State that North Korean forces invaded the
territory of the Republic of Korea at several points in the early morn-
1, ing hours of June 25 (Korean time).
Pyongyang Radio under the control of the North Korean regime, it
is reported, has broadcast a declaration of war against the Republic of
Korea effective 9 p.m. e.d.t. June 24.
he
An attack of the forces of the North Korean regime under the cir-
cumstances referred to above constitutes a breach of the peace and an
Upon the urgent request of my Government, I ask you to call an
Oy
immediate meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations.
od 7. CONFIRMATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION:
Telegram From the
United Nations Commission at Seoul to the
U.N. Secretary-General, June 25, 1950 5
all along the 38th parallel. Major points of attack have included
ue
Faithfully yours,
:
act of aggression.
211
US
1
1 Ernest A. Gross.
D
United States Policy in the Korean Crisis (Department of State publication
3922; 1950), pp. 11-12.
3 John J. Muccio.
1
ng
See supra.
ܐܶ
3922; 1950), p. 12.
2538
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
If
01
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the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Govern-
will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed
Ongjin Peninsula, Kaesong area and Chunchon and east coast where
b
seaborne landings have been reported north and south of Kangnung
Another seaborne landing reported imminent under air cover in
Pohang area on southeast coast. The latest attacks have occurred
along the parallel directly north of Seoul along shortest avenue of
approach. Pyongyang radio allegation at 13:35 hrs. of South Korean
invasion across parallel during night declared entirely false by Presi.
dent and Foreign Minister in course of conference with Commission
members and principal secretary. Allegations also stated Peoples
Army instructed repulse invading forces by decisive counterattack
and placed responsibility for consequences on South Korea. Briefing
on situation by President included statement thirty-six tanks and
armoured cars used in northern attacks at four points. Following
K
emergency Cabinet meeting Foreign Minister issuing broadcast to
I.
people of South Korea encouraging resistance against dastardly
attack. President expressed complete willingness for Commission
th
broadcast urging cease-fire and for communication to United Nations
II
to inform of gravity of situation. Although North Korean declara-
tion of war rumoured at 11:00 hrs. over Pyongyang radio, no confirma-
tion available from any source. President not treating broadcast as
official notice. United States Ambassador, appearing before Com-
mission, stated his expectation Republican Army would give good pi
account of itself.
At 17:15 hrs, four yak-type aircraft strafed civilian and military re
air fields outside Seouſ destroying planes, firing gas tanks and attack-
ing jeeps. Yongdungpo railroad station on outskirts also strafed
.
Commission wishes to draw attention of Secretary-General to
N
serious situation developing which is assuming character of full-scale
war and may endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security. It suggests that he consider possibility of bringing matter
to notice of Security Council. Commission will communicate more 9.
fully considered recommendation later.
8. CALL FOR NORTH KOREAN WITHDRAWAL: Resolution of
ba
the United Nations Security Council, June 25, 1950 1
in
U
The Security Council
Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21
October 1949 2 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a
lawfully established government having effective control and juris
diction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary
Commission on Korea was
able to observe and consult and in which
SI
as
819
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1 U.N. doc. S/INF/4, Feb. 1, 1951, pp. 5–6.
2 Res. 293 (IV); A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 682–684.
KOREA
2539
3 Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 5.
lere
in
247
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3101
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nd
to
ally
201
DIS
ra-
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assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.
In these circumstances, I have ordered United States air and sea
Resolutions (A/810), pp. 25–27. .
by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such govern-
ment in Korea;
ing,
Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its
resolutions of 12 December 1948 1 and 21 October 1949 of the conse-
Ted
i quences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts
derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations
in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea;
and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United
Oles
Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and
well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and
might lead to open military conflict there;
Noting with grave concern the armed' attack on the Republic of
Korea by forces from North Korea,
ing
Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,
I. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and
Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith
their armed forces to the 38th parallel;
II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea
(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the
85 situation with the least possible delay,
(b) To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th
© To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this
ATT resolution;
k
III. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United
Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving
le assistance to the North Korean authorities.
nd
ter
9. INITIAL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES IN
THE KOREAN CRISIS: Statement by the President, June 27,
1950
d
In Korea, the Government forces, which were armed to prevent
border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by
invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the
United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease bostilities
21 and to withdraw to the 38th Parallel. This they have not done but,
on the contrary, have pressed the attack. The Security Council
called upon all members of the United Nations to render every
forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.
Res: 195 (III); U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, Part I,
mod parallel, and
to
re
3
8
D-
Blo
? Supra.
* Resolution of June 25, 1950; supra.
2540
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
COM
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91
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DO
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Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw !
Korea 3 that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hos
1 For subsequent modification of this order, see President Eisenhower's message
3 Report of June 26, 1950; United States Policy in the Korean Crisis (Department
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that
munism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independ an
ent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied
the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to
N
preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, et
the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct
threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States fores 28
performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any at
:
tack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the
Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operation
11
against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done!
The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the
restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan
,
or consideration by the United Nations.
I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be
strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Govern-
S
ment be accelerated.
di
I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military
assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-
china and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working
relations with those forces.
I know that all members of the United Nations will consider care-
fully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance
h
of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of foros
in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United
States will continue to uphold the rule of law.
I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the
United States to the Security Council,'to report these steps to the
Council.
1
10. CALL FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO THE RE
PUBLIC OF KOREA: Resolution of the United Nations Security
Council, June 27, 1950 2
The Security Council
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of
Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities; and li
forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel; and
Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for
to Congress, Feb. 2, 1953; supra, p. 2475.
2 U.N. doc. S/INF/4, Feb. 1, 1951, p. 6.
of State publication 3922; 1950), p. 21.
V.
02
I
CO
KOREA
2541
3 be
do-
Government of the United States have given consideration to the
? Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, p. 46.
& Ibid. The Chinese aide-mémoire of June 30, 1950, offered 33,000 men.
5 Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, p. 47.
com urgent military measures are required to restore international peace
end and security; and
ofel Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United
Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and se-
curity,
rect
Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.
isto
the
1018 11. ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES MEASURES IN SUPPORT
ne'
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: Statement Released by the
the
White House, June 30, 1950 ?
181,
At a meeting with Congressional leaders at the White House this
morning, the President, together with the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
, reviewed the latest
developments of the situation in Korea.
ATT
The Congrešsional leaders were given a full review of the intensified
military activities.
ing
In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for
support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean in-
vaders and restoring peace in Korea, the President announced that
he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions
ICE
on specific military targets in Northern Korea, wherever militarily
necessary, and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean
coast.
the
the
General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting
ground units.
12. OFFER OF GROUND FORCES BY THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ity
FOR SERVICE IN KOREA: Note From the Secretary of State to
the Chinese Ambassador at Washington, July 1, 1950 6
In response to the request contained in the Chinese Embassy's
of Aide-Mémoire of June 29, 1950, the appropriate authorities of the
CE
expression of willingness on the part of the Government of the Repub-
lic of China to furnish ground forces for service in Korea in support
For The Secretary of State desires to inform His Excellency the Ambas-
sador of the Republic of China of the deep appreciation of the United
States Government for this prompt and substantial demonstration of
Message of June 26, 1950, from the Korean National Assembly; ibid., p. 17.
are
nice
ted
31
of the United Nations.
7S
8t
ge
* Resolution of June 27, 1950; supra.
Dr. Wellington Koo.
2542
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Of
8
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IS
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1
i
About
of State Bulletin print of the memorandum, and which summarized pertinent
support for the United Nations on the part of the Government of
the Republic of China. In light, however, of the threat of invasion
PI
of Taiwan by Communist forces from the mainland, a threat repeated
in the last day or so by spokesmen for tbe Chinese Communist regime
in Peiping, it is the view of the Government of the United States of
th
America that it would be desirable for representatives of General
MacArthur's Headquarters to hold discussions with the Chinese mil-
itary authorities on Taiwan concerning the plans for the defense of
the island against invasion prior to any final decision on the wisdom
UA
of reducing the defense forces on Taiwan by transfer of troops to
Korea. It is understood that General MacArthur's Headquarters of
will be in communication with the appropriate Chinese_military
authorities on Taiwan with a view to the dispatch from Tokyo o
representatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters for this purpose
.
13. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR USE OF UNITED pe
STATES FORCES IN KOREA: Memorandum by the Department
of State, July 3, 1950 (Excerpts)
Co
This memorandum is directed to the authority of the President to
order the Armed Forces of the United States to repel the aggressive Ar
attack on the Republic of Korea,
As explained by Secretary Acheson to the press on June 28, as
tha
soon as word of the attack on Korea was received in Washington
, it
was the view of the President and of all bis advisers that the first
by
responsibility of the Government of the United States was to report
the attack to the United Nations 2
Accordingly, in the middle of the night of Saturday, June 24, 1950
,
Ambassador Gross, the United States deputy representative at the
Security Council of the United Nations, notified Mr. Trygve Lie
, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, that armed forces from
North Korea had commenced an unprovoked assault against the
territory of the Republic of Korea,
The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of
the United States, has full control over the use thereof. He also has
authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States
Since the beginning of United States history, he has, upon numerous
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950, pp. 173-177. Ellipses indicated
ther discussion of this subject, "see Background Information on the Use
of Unile
in quotations herein were so indicated in the original memorandum. For fur
States Armed Forces in Foreign countries (H. Rept. No. 127, 82d Cóng, ist
sess.)
2 See the Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 6.
3 For the five paragraphs
which were omitted at this point in the Department
No. 2495, 81st Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 61-62.
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2543
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war.
113
to
this discretionary right constitutionally vested in him, and, therefore, not subjecte
reasonable to predict that, should the question be presented to it, the Supreme
appeared in the original memorandum in the main text, however, rather than
State Bulletin print of the memorandum.]
Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 1916, pp. 128–129.
occasions, utilized these powers in sending armed forces abroad. The
of
preservation of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace is
à cardinal interest of the United States. Both traditional inter-
national law and article 39 of the United Nations Charter i and the
m18
resolution pursuant thereto ? authorize the United States to repel
of
the armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.
!
The President's control over the Armed Forces of the United States
il
.
is based on article 2, section 2 of the Constitution which provides that
of
he "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
- United States."
to
In United States v. Sweeny, the Supreme Court said that the object
of this provision was "evidently to vest in the President the supreme
command over all the military forces—such supreme and undivided
of
command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful
That the President's power to send the Armed Forces outside the
country is not dependent on Congressional authority has been re-
peatedly emphasized by numerous writers.
mt For example, ex-President William Howard Taft wrote:
The President is made Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy by the
Constitution evidently for the purpose of enabling him to defend the country
against invasion, to suppress insurrection and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. If Congress were to attempt to prevent his use of the
Army for any of these purposes, the action would be void. Again, in the
carrying on of war as Commander in Chief, it is he who is to determine the move-
ments of the Army and of the Navy. Congress could not take away from him
it that discretion and place it beyond his control in any of his subordinates, nor
could they themselves, as the people of Athens attempted to carry on campaigns
st
by votes in the market-place.
rt
Professor Willoughby writes:
9
As to his constitutional power to send United States forces outside the country
in time of peace when this is deemed by him necessary or expedient as a means of
preserving or advancing the foreign interests or relations of the United States,
there would seem to be equally little doubt, although it has been contended by
some that the exercise of this discretion can be limited by congressional statute.
That Congress has this right to limit cr to forbid the sending of United States
forces outside of the country in time of peace has been asserted by so eminent
the authority as ex-Secretary Root. It would seem to (the) author, however,
Navy
, and his general control of the foreign relations of the United States
, has
1o. congressional control. Especially, since the argument of the court in Myers v,
United States with reference to the general character of the executive power vested
in the President, and, apparently, the authority impliedly vested in him by
reason of his obligation to take care that the laws be faitħfully executed, it is
U.N. Security Council Resolution of June 27, 1950; supra, doc. 10.
Dh57 S. (1895) 281, 284. This citation, and most of those which follow,
[Citation in the
ze
AS
16
le
11
S.
1.
1
1
Supra, p. 144.
original memorandum.]
2544
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
sec
th
uni
use
1 The Constitutional Law of the United States, 1929, vol. III, p. 1567. [Citation
4 58 Cong. Rec., pt. 8, p. 8195, Nov. 10, 1919, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (Citation
Court will so hold. Of course, if this sending is in pursuance of express provisions
1
of a treaty, or for the execution of treaty provisions, the sending could not reason
ably be subject to constitutional objection.
Na
rele
In an address delivered before the American Bar Association in
POT
1917 on the war powers under the Constitution, Mr. Hughes stated
that "There is no limitation upon the authority of Congress to create
881
an army and it is for the President as Commander-in-Chief to direct
of 1
the campaigns of that Army wherever he may think they should be
1
carried on. He referred to a statement by Chief Justice Taney in
Fleming v. Page (9 How. 615) in which the Chief Justice said that es
of 1
Commander in Chief the President “is authorized to direct the
STE
movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his
command." 2
the
At the time the approval of the Treaty of Versailles was under
consideration in the Senate, there was under discussion a reservation
oft
to article 10, presented by Senator Lodge, to the effect that "Con- inci
gress. under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war I
or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the Coi
United States." Senator Walsh of Montana stated in debate on abr
November 10, 1919 that the statement was a recital of "What is
asserted to be a principle of constitutional law.” He said that if- hop
Am
any declaration of that character should ever be made by the Senate of
the United States, it would be singularly unfortunate. It is not true. It is not par
sound. It is fraught with the most momentous consequences, and may involve
disasters the extent of which it is hardly possible to conceive.
the
The whole course of our history has been a refutation of such a declaration
,
namely, that the President of the United States, the Chief Executive of the
United States, the Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States
, has bist
no power to employ the land or naval forces without any express authorization to
upon the part of Congress. Since the beginning of our Government, our Navybes
been sent over the seven seas and to every port in the world. Was there ever the
any congressional act authorizing the President to do anything of that kind?
fore
He stated that our Navy travels the sea "in order to safeguard and WAS
protect the rights of American citizens in foreign lands. Who can the
doubt that the President has no [sic] authority thus to utilize the It
he
naval and land forces of the United States?''
Mr. Borah stated:
I agree fully with the legal or constitutional proposition which the Senator
I
states, and I hope this (reservation] will be stricken out. It is an act of super
erogation to put it in. It does not amount to anything. It is a recital which is
sph
not true.
would simply be vain and futile and, if I may say so, with due respect to those who
It can not change the Constitution, and it ought not to be there.
drew it, the doing of an inconsequential thing.'
Cit
.
in the original memorandum.]
2 Ş. Doc. 105, 65th Cong., 1st sess., p. 7. [Citation in the original
randum.]
3 Bracketed insertion in the original memorandum.
in the original memorandum.]
Cit
,
deb
108
dor
тер.
It ques
1
?
the
cite
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cite
Blitz
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KOREA
2545
101
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the
Citation in the original memorandum.]
1 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et al. (299 U.S. (1936) 304, 319).
the Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950, pp. 177-178, and in the above
cited H. Rept. No. 2495, pp. 67–68. At this point in the memorandum appeared
cited a pamphlet by James Grafton Rogers entitled World Policing and the Con-
a sentence (omitted in the Bulletin but printed in H. Rept. No. 2495, p. 64) which
Citation in the original memorandum.]
Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, pt. 8, Nov. 26, 1945, p. 10967.
ion:
Not only is the President Commander in Chief of the Army and
SON
Navy, but he is also charged with the duty of conducting the foreign
relations of the United States and in this field he "alone has the
in
power to speak or listen as a representative of the Nation." I
ted
Obviously, there are situations in which the powers of the President
zate
as Commander in Chief and his power to conduct the foreign relations
rect
of this country complement each other.
be
The basic interest of the United States is international peace and
in
security. The United States has, throughout its history, upon orders
cas
of the Commander in Cbief to the Armed Forces and without con-
the
gressional authorization, acted to prevent violent and unlawful acts
bis
in other states from depriving the United States and its nationals of
the benefits of such peace and security. It has taken such action both
der
unilaterally and in concert with others. A tabulation of 85 instances
the use of American Armed Forces without a declaration of war was
incorporated in the Congressional Record for July 10, 1941.2
It is important to analyze the purposes for which the President as
Commander in Chief has authorized the despatch of American troops
abroad. In many instances, of course, the Armed Forces have been
used to protect specific American lives and property. In other cases,
however, United States forces have been used in the broad interests of
e of
de American foreign policy, and their use could be characterized as
mot participation in international police action.
The traditional power of the President to use the Armed Forces of
the United States without consulting Congress was referred to in
debates in the Senate in 1945. Senator Connally remarked: “The
bistorical instances in which the President has directed armed forces
in to go to other countries have not been confined to domestic or internal
instances at all.” Senator Millikin pointed out that "in many cases
the President bas sent troops into a foreign country to protect
our
nd
loreign policy . . . notably in Central and South America." "That
was done,” he continued, "in order to keep foreign countries out of
fine there was not aimed at protecting any particular American citizen.
het was aimed at
protecting our foreign policy." To his remark that
he presumed that by the Charter of the United Nations we had laid
per pin a foreign policy which we could protect, Senator Connally
replied that that was "absolutely correct." He added:
I was trying to indicate that fact by reading the list of instances of intervention
oh our part in order to keep another government out of territory in this hemi-
estion involving the protection of some American citizen or American property
of the tabulation was annexed to the memorandum. It is printed in
Ive
On,
the
has
Ver
201
er
is
11
ho
at the moment3
3D
g
А
copy
11
stitution.
415902-57-Vol. 257
2546
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
88
the
811
an
NA
ADI
Taft, op. cit. pp. 114-115; Rogers, op. cit. pp. 58–62. [Citations in the original | MT
2 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. v, pp. 747-748
3 Ibid., p. 750; S. Ex. Doc. 58, 41 Cong. 2d sess. [Citations in the original
4 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1868, p. xi. [Citation in the original |
During the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900-1901, the President
sent about 5,000 troops to join with British, Russian, German, French,
ch
and Japanese troops to relieve the siege of the foreign quarters i
Peking and reestablish the treaty status. This was done without
express congressional authority. In defining United States policy
at the time Secretary of State Hay said:
The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act com-
currently with the other powers; first, in opening up communication with Peking
and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in
St
danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to rig
American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate la
American interests; and, fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorder
to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is, of
course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy
of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about
permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administre the
tive entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and inter- ba
national law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial
trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.i
After the opening up of Japan to foreigners in the 1850's through
to
the conclusion of commercial treaties between Japan and certam
Western powers, antiforeign disturbances occurred. In 1863, the
American Legation
was burned following previous attacks on
the
Br
British Legation. The commander of the U. S. S. Wyoming was in
:
structed to use all necessary force for the safety of the legation or of
Americans residing in Japan. Secretary of State Seward said that the
pen
prime objects of the United States were:
First, to deserve and win the confidence of the Japanese Government and
people, 'if possible, with a view to the common interest of all the treaty power tal
secondly, to sustain and cooperate with the legations of these powers, in good faith, Ice
so as to render their efforts to the same end effective.2
Ur
In 1864, the Mikado, pot recognizing the treaties with the Western tro
powers, closed the straits of Shimonoseki. At the request of the Un
Tycoon's government (opposed to the Mikado), American, Britist
. Kot
French, and Netherlands forces, in a joint operation, opened the for
straits by force. The object of the Western powers was the enforcer le
ment of treaty rights, with the approval of the government that is
granted them.
Again, in 1868, a detachment of Japanese troops assaulted foreign
residents in the streets of Hiogo. One of the crew of the Oneida vas
threatened, naval forces of the treaty powers made a joint landies com
and adopted measures to protect the foreign settlement.
Ch
1 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. V, p. 482. Se ako
[Citation in the original memorandum.]
CE
ori
an
G1
ford
1
tion
2
Cit
3
memorandum.]
KOREA
2547
COI
nter
nigol by Germany against the Western Hemisphere. 3
ling consulting the Congress for the purpose of protecting the foreign
Charter was, of course, a landmark in the development of American
1 World Policing and the Constitution, published by the World Peace Founda-
tion, 1945, pp. 66, 67. [Citation in the original memorandum.]
Citation in the original memorandum.]
2 John Bassett Moore, A. Digest of International Law, vol. I, pp. 545-546.
Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 87, pt. 6, July 7, 1941, p. 5868.
dent
Former Assistant Secretary of State James Grafton Rogers has
characterized these uses of force as "international police action",
saying:
hout
olies. They amounted to executive use of the Armed Forces to establish our own and
the world's scheme of international order. Two American Presidents used men,
ships and guns on a large and expensive scale.1
eking
In 1888 and 1889, civil war took place in Samoa where the United
ein States, Great Britain, and Germany had certain respective treaty
na to rights for the maintenance of naval depots. German forces were
landed, and the German Government invited the United States to
rders
is, of
join in an effort to restore calm and quiet in the islands in the interest
policy of all the treaty powers. The commander of the United States naval
about forces in the Pacific was instructed by the Secretary of the Navy that
to the United States was willing to cooperate in restoring order on the
artial
basis of the full preservation of American treaty rights and Samoan
authority, as recognized and agreed to by Germany, Great Britain,
and the United States.” He was to extend full protection and defense
ough
to American citizens and property, to protest the displacement of the
tain
native government by Germany as violating the positive agreement
and understanding between the treaty powers, but to inform the
the British and German Governments of his readiness to cooperate in
T of
causing all treaty rights to be respected and in restoring peace and
order on the basis of the recognition of the Samoan right to inde-
pendence.
On July 7, 1941, the President sent to the Congress & message
sod announcing that as Commander in Chief he had ordered the Navy to
en take all necessary steps to insure the safety of communications between
ait Iceland and the United States as well as on the seas between the
United States and all other strategic outposts
and that American
ten troops had been sent to Iceland in defense of that country. The
the United States, he said, could not permit "the occupation by Germany
strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases
the for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere.” For the same
me reason, he said, substantial forces of the United States had been sent
but to the bases acquired from Great Britain in Trinidad and British
Guiana in the South to forestall any pincers movement undertaken
ing the President had used
the Armed Forces of the United
States without
i Milikin agreed that the President was entitled to use armed forces in
As noted above, Senator Connally and Senator
5 11-
the
ish,
FAS
also
foreign policy:
748
ina!
ind!
in the original memorandum.]
(Citation
2548
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
9
In
81
01
11
W
0
United States, because it will be on a par with the Constitution, which provides
So I have no doubt of the authority of the President in the past, and his author
1 Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, July 27, 1945, p. 8127-8128. {Cita.
7.2 Ibid., July 26, 1945, p. 8064-8065. [Citation in the original memorandum.)
protection of the foreign policy represented by the Charter. This
view was also expressed in the Senate debates in connection with the
ratification of the Charter. For example, Senator Wiley made the
u
following pertinent statement:
d
It is my understanding, according to the testimony given before the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Senate, that the terms "agreement or agreements
"
as used in article 43 are synonymous with the word "treaty." On the other
hand, I recognize that Congress might well interpret them as agreements brought
about by the action of the Executive and ratified by a joint resolution of both
Houses. These agreements would provide for a police force and the specific
responsibility of each nation. But outside of these agreements, there is the
power in our Executive to preserve the peace, to see that the "supreme laws" are
faithfully executed. When we become a party to this charter, and define ou
responsibilities by the agreement or agreements, there can be no question of the
power of the Executive to carry out our commitments in relation to international
policing. His constitutional power, however, is in no manner impaired.
PE
An even fuller exposition of the point was made by Senator Austin
,
who stated:
Mr. President, I am one of those lawyers in the United States who believe that
the general powers of the President-not merely the war powers of the President N
but the general authority of the President-are commensurate with the obligation
which is imposed upon him as President, that he take care that the laws are
faithfully executed. That means that he shall take all the care that is required
to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
Of course, there are other specific references in the Constitution which show N
that he has authority to employ armed forces when necessary to carry out specific
things nam.ed in the Constitution; but the great over-all and general authority arises
from his obligation that he take care that the laws are faithfully executed. That has
been true throughout our history, and the Chief Executive has taken care, and has
sent the armed forces of the United States, without any act of Congress preceding
their sending, on a great many occasions. I have three different compilations of
those occasions. One of them runs as high as 150 times; another of them 12
times, and so forth. It makes a difference whether we consider the maneuvers
which were merely shows of force as combined (comprised?] in the exercise of this
authority-as I door whether we limit the count to those cases in which the
armed forces have actually entered upon the territory of a peaceful neighbor
.
But there is no doubt in my mind of his obligation and authority to employ all
the force that is necessary to enforce the laws.
It may be asked, How does a threat to international security and peace violate
the laws of the United States? Perhaps, Mr. President, it would not have violated
the laws of the United States previous to the obligations set forth in this treaty
. bu
Perhaps we have never before recognized as being true the fundamental doctrine
with which I opened my remarks. But we are doing so now. We recognize the
ri
a breach of the peace anywhere on earth which threatens the security and peace
of the world is an attack upon us; and after
this treaty is accepted by 29 nations
th
that will be the express law of the world. It will be the law of nations, because
according to its express terms it will bind those who are nonmembers, as well as
members, and it will be the law of the United States, because we shall have
A
adopted it in a treaty. Indeed, it will be above the ordinary statutes of the
dent is the officer under our constitution in whom there is exclusively vested the
responsibility for maintenance of peace.?
tion in the original memorandum.]
n
8
th
IE
8
CA
88
1
h
01
LI
de
V
01
KOREA
2549
ther
ara
OW
the
910
This
Action contrary to the Charter of the United Nations is action
the against the interests of the United States. Preservation of peace
the under the Charter is a cornerstone of American foreign policy. Presi-
dent Truman said in his inaugural address in 1949:
eigi
In the coming years, our program for peace and freedom will emphasize four
major courses of action.
First
, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and
ight related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their
voth authority and increase their effectiveness.1
cific
the In the Korean situation, the resolution of the Security Council of
June 25 determined, under article 39 of the Charter, that the action
of the North Koreans constituted a breach of the peace and called
upon "the authorities in North Korea (a) to cease hostilities forth-
inal
with; and (b) to withdraw their armed forces to the thirty-eighth
parallel.” It also called upon "all Members to render every assistance
to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution." This is
an application of the principles set forth in article 2, paragraph 5
hat of the Charter, which states: "All Members shall give the United
eat Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with
the present Charter The Security Council resolution of June
27, passed after the North Korean authorities had disregarded the
June 25 resolution, recommended "that Members of the United
Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace
and security in the area." This recommendation was also made under
the authority of article 39 of the Charter.
ing
The President's action seeks to accomplish the objectives of both
The continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean
authorities would have meant that the United Nations would have
ceased to exist as a serious instrumentality for the maintenance of
international peace. The continued existence of the United Nations
as an effective international organization is a paramount United States
interest
. The defiance of the United Nations is in clear violation
ed
of the Charter of the United Nations and of the resolutions adopted
EN
by the Security Council of the
United Nations to bring about a settle-
ment of the problem. It is a threat to international peace and secu-
operity, a threat to the peace and security of the United States and to
the security of United States
forces in the Pacific.
These interests of the United States are interests which the Presi-
dent as Commander in Chief can protect
by the
employment of the
Armed Forces of the United States without a declaration of war. It
Was they which the President's order of June 27 did protect. This
order was within his authority as Commander in Chief.
OT
ific
ses
188
has
of
22
resolutions.
en
This
che
Dr.
all
ate
ne
at
&
Se
916
ye
he
28
72
'Address of Jan. 20, 1949; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 30, 1949, p. 124.
2550
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
14. DESIGNATION OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND: Resolution of
the United Nations Security Council, July 7, 1950
an
1
t
in
N
in the area,
The Security Council,
po
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of in
Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish Co
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to op
repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security is
1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governmenta
and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 16
25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending
itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace
and security in the area;
2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted
to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea
;
3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and E:
other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions th
make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command
under the United States;
4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such
forces;
5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the
United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean U.
forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating
: m
6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with N
reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified
command.
th
STI
15. DESIGNATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMANDER:
Statement by the President, July 8, 1950 %
the
SU
re
ar
ca
an
an
N
VO.
The Security Council of the United Nations, in its resolution of
July 7, 1950,4 has recommended that all members providing military
forces and other assistance pursuant to the Security Council resoli-
tions of June 25 and 27, make such forces and other assistance avai-
able to a unified command under the United States.
The Security Council resolution also requests that the United
States designate the commander of such forces, and authorizes the
unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations fleg in
the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrenti
with the flags of the various nations participating.
I am responding to the recommendation of the Security Council
1
De
2
loc
of
So
COD
Soo
lov
per
3
198
2
1 U.N. doc. S/INF/4, Feb. 1, 1951, pp. 6–7.
Supra, docs. 8 and 10.
3 Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1950, p. 83.
4 Supra.
5 Supra, docs. 8 and 10.
KOREA
2551
permanent solution of the Korean problem" (ibid., p. 170).
ace
Delhi; Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950, pp. 170–171.
Soviet Socialist Republics can return to it, and, whether within or through informal
contacts outside the Council, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet
loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the [Korea] conflict and for a
Socialist Republics, and China, with the help and cooperation of other peace-
ind and have designated General Douglas MacArthur as the Command-
ing General of the military forces which the members of the United
Nations place under the unified command of the United States
pursuant to the United Nations' assistance to the Republic of Korea
cd in repelling the unprovoked armed attack against it.
ace
, I am directing General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security
nish Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag in the course of
I to operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the
rity flags of the various nations participating.
ents
s of 16. UNITED STATES VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
ling NATIONS IN REPELLING THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA:
Message From the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of
India, July 18, 1950 1
ted
rea
I am deeply appreciative of the high purpose which prompted Your
and Excellency in sending the message which I received on July 13, 1950,
Os through your distinguished Ambassador in Washington 2 and your
and
subsequent message of the 17th transmitting Prime Minister Stalin's
reply to your similar letter to him of July 13. Both the President
uch
and I have given the most thoughtful consideration to these communi-
cations.
the
One of the most fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the
Pan United States is to assist in maintaining world peace, and the Govern-
ment of the United States is firmly of the opinion that the United
i Nations is the most effective instrument yet devised for maintaining
hed
and restoring international peace and security. The United States is
therefore, eager to do all that is proper and possible to preserve and
strengthen the United Nations.
The purpose of the United States Government and of the American
people with respect to Korea is to support by all means at our disposal
the determination of the United Nations to repel the armed attack
upon Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area.
il We desire both to prevent the spread of aggression beyond
Korea
and to end it there-as required by the Security Council of the United
ail
We are deeply conscious of the fact that law-abiding governments
and peoples
throughout the world have a vital stake in the issues in-
ed
volved in this aggression and in the success of the United Nations in
Transmitted telegraphically through the American Ambassador at New
for
di ef the People's Government of china than Taher ist seat in the Council, the Union of
bek over Chinese representation) in the security Council so that representatives
D.
JI
lu-
che
? The
1953
2552
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
of
of
OC
SIO
re
CO
VE
2 Prime Minister Nehru, in a reply of July 19, 1950, referred to the American
and Indian Governments' policy of maintaining peace and supporting the United
Nations, and added that his suggestion of July 13 had been "designed to fulfill
dealing with it. It is painful to realize that there could have long
since been a restoration of peace and the saving of the lives of those fo
fighting on behalf of the United States [Nations) 1 had not a small
minority of the United Nations failed to meet their obligations under
the Charter and refused to use their authority and influence to prevent in
or stop the hostilities. The acceptance of their obligations and the
exercise of their authority and influence in accordance with those al
obligations would restore peace tomorrow.
A breach of the peace or an act of aggression is the most serious
matter with which the United Nations can be confronted. We do not el
believe that the termination of the aggression from northern Korea
can be contingent in any way upon the determination of other ques. U
tions which are currently before the United Nations.
There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation
by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the
decision of the Soviet Government itself. The Security Council has dr
shown that it is both competent and willing to act vigorously for the
maintenance of peace.
In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant govern th
ments for China's seat in the United Nations is one which must be
reached by the United Nations on its merits. It is a question on which
there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of
the United Nations. I know you will agree that the decision should at
not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct
which would subject the United Nations to coercion and duress. PL
I know that Your Excellency shares our earnest desire to see an
early restoration of peace in Korea in accordance with the resolutions the
of tħe Security Council
, and I asure you of our eagerness to work with tor
you and your great country to establish in the United Nations a means K
by which the fear of aggression can be permanently lifted from the
peoples of the earth.2
gu
po
17. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS ON
THE SITUATION IN KOREA, JULY 19, 1950 (Excerpts)
pre
To the Congress of the United States:
I am reporting to the Congress on the situation which has been inco
created in Korea, and on the actions which this Nation has take, the
as a member of the United Nations, to meet this situation. I am
of these events for this Nation and the world,
and certain recom shop
also laying before the Congress my views concerning the significane este
mendations for legislative action which I believe should be taken si
Ch
this time.
1 Correct version as found in Department of State press release 759, July
1950.
8
se
18
OTO
3
an
ab-
nal
for
age
to
1
P.
bili
: H. Doc. No. 646, 81st Cong., 2d sess.
KOREA
2553
bility for the aggression, see infra, doc. 21.
1
Dres
tion reto.
On June 25, within a few hours after the invasion was launched
Charter, created a real and present danger to the security of every
1 for the United Nations, since it was an attempt to settle, by military
nation. This attack was, in addition, a demonstration of contempt
long
At 4 o'clock in the morning, Sunday, June 25, Korean time, armed
108 forces from north of the thirty-eighth parallel invaded the Republic
mal of Korea.
nder The Republic of Korea was established as an independent nation
rent in August 1948, after a free election held under the auspices of the
the United Nations. This election, which was originally intended to cover
20 all of Korea, was held only in the part of the Korean peninsula south
of the thirty-eighth parallel, because the Soviet Government, which
LOWS occupied the peninsula north of that parallel, refused to allow the
not election to be held in the area under its control.
The United States, and a majority of the other members of the
ples United Nations, have recognized the Republic of Korea. The admis-
sion of Korea to the United Nations has been blocked by the Soviet
the
In December 1948 the Soviet Government stated that it had with-
has drawn its occupation troops from northern Korea, and that a local
regime had been established there. The authorities in northern Korea
continued to refuse to permit United Nations observers to pass the
er: thirty-eighth parallel to supervise or observe a free election, or to
be verify the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
ich Nevertheless, the United Nations continued its efforts to obtain
pd a freely elected government for all of Korea and, at the time of the
bild attack, a United Nations Commission, made up of representatives of
Auct
seven nations-Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the
Philippines and Turkey-was
in the Republic of Korea.
Just 1 day before the attack of June 25, field observers attached to
in the United Nations Commission on Korea had completed a routine
tour, lasting 2 weeks, of the military positions of the Republic of
2015 Korea south of the thirty-eighth
parailel
. The report of these inter-
the national observers stated that the Army of the Republic of Korea was
organized entirely for defense. The observers found the parallel
guarded on the south side by small bodies of troops in scattered out-
ON
posts, with roving patrols. They found no concentration of troops
and no preparation to attack. The observers
concluded that the
absence of armor, air support, heavy artillery, and military supplies
precluded any offensive action by the forces of the Republic of Korea,
from the north, the Commission reported to the United Nations that
the attack had come without warning and without provocation.
The reports from the Commission make it unmistakably clear that
the attack
was naked, deliberate, unprovoked aggression, without a
This outright breach of the peace, in violation of the United Nations
vith
leen
kel
nce
shadow of justification.
1
186
iCAD
uited
ileil
to settle by peaceful means.
71)
hi or the analysis and conclusions of the U.N. Commission concerning responsi-
2554
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
hostilities nor withdrawn to the thirty-eighth parallel, the United
9
02
TV
United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government
On Tuesday, June 27, when the United Nations Commission in
Korea had reported that the northern troops had neither ceased
Nations Security Council met again and passed a second resolution,
The attack on the Republic of Korea, therefore, was a clear challenge
to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and to the specið
actions taken by the United Nations in Korea. If this challenge head
not been met squarely, the effectiveness of the United Nations would
have been all but ended, and the hope of mankind that the United
Nations would develop into an institution of world order would havet
been shattered,
Prompt action was imperative. The Security Council of the United
Nations met, at the request of the United States, in New York at
2 o'clock in the afternoon, Sunday, June 25, eastern daylight time b
Since there is a 14-hour difference in time between Korea and New
York, this meant that the Council convened just 24 hours after the
attack began.
At this meeting the Security Council passed a resolution' which
called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal de
of the invading troops to the thirty-eighth parallel, and which re-
quested the members of the United Nations to refrain from giving
aid to the northern aggressors and to assist in the execution of this
resolution. The representative of the Soviet Union to the Security
Council stayed away from the meeting, and the Soviet Government
has refused to support the Council's resolution.
The attack launched on June 25 moved ahead rapidly. The tactical
surprise gained by the aggressors, and their superiority in planes, so
tanks, and artillery, forced the lightly armed defenders to retreat
The speed, the scale, and the coordination of the attack left no doubt
that it had been plotted long in advance.
NE
When the attack came, our Ambassador to Korea, John J. Muccio, ha
began the immediate evacuation of American women and children
from the danger zone. To protect this evacuation, air cover and sex
cover were provided by the commander in chief of United States
forces in the Far East, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. I
AD
response to urgent appeals from the Government of Korea, Genera la
MacArthur was immediately authorized to send supplies of ammun
.
tion to the Korean defenders. These supplies were sent by air trans
be
port, with fighter protection. The United States Seventh Fleet w
NA
ordered north from the Philippines, so that it might be available
in the area in case of need.
Throughout Monday, June 26, the invaders continued their attack
with no heed to the
resolution of the Security Council of the United
Nations. Accordingly, in order to support the resolution, and on the ba
unanimous advice tour civil and military authorities
, I ordered
troops cover and support.2
ot
82
m
נו
ave
al
aci
age
res
f
3
me
1
2
3
1 Supra, doc. 8.
2 Statement of June 27, 1950; supra, doc. 9.
Report of June 26, 1950; United States Policy in the Korean Crisis
, p. 21.
3
KOREA
2555
3 See the President's statement of July 8, 1950; supra, doc. 15.
our memory:
2015 | MacArthur's command. The other offers of assistance that have
meetings of the Security Council which took action regarding Korea,
Om the United States brought the matter directly to the attention of the
nge recommending that members of the United Nations furnish to the
cific Republic of Korea such aid as might be necessary to repel the attack
had and to restore international peace and security in the area. The
vuld representative of the Soviet Union to the Security Council stayed
ited away from this meeting also, and the Soviet Government has refused
HAVE to support the Council's resolution.
The vigorous and unhesitating actions of the United Nations and
ited the United States in the face of this aggression met with an immediate
<t and overwhelming response throughout the free world. The first
meblow of aggression had brought dismay and anxiety to the hearts of
Ver men the world over. The fateful events of the 1930's when aggression
the unopposed bred more aggression and eventually war, were fresh in
nich
But the free nations had learned the lesson of history. Their
wel determined and united actions uplifted the spirit of freemen every-
where
. As a result, where there had been dismay there is hope;
ting where there had been anxiety there is firm determination.
this Fifty-two of the 59 member nations have supported the United
Tily Nations action to restore peace in Korea.
nent
A number of member nations have offered military support or
other types of assistance for the United Nations action to repel the
ice
!
aggressors in Korea. In a third resolution, passed on July 7, the
mes Security Council requested the United States to designate a com-
eat mander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the
aubt Korean operation, and authorized these forces to fly the United
Nations flag.? In response to this resolution, General MacArthur
cie) has been designated as commander of these forces. These are
La important steps forward in the development of a United Nations
ses system of collective security. Already, aircraft of two nations-
ates Australia and Great Britain-and naval vessels of five nations-
Australia
, Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zea-
erd land—have
been made available for operations in the Korean area,
um along with forces of Korea and the United States, under General
e I been, and will continue to be made, will be coordinated by the United
able Nations and by the unified command, in order to support
the effort
All the members of the United Nations who have endorsed the
the bas been taken. This united and resolute action
to put down lawless
ction of the Security Council realize the significance of the step that
aggression is a milestone toward the establishment of a rule of law
in a few countries have failed to support the common action to
restore the peace. The most important of these is the Soviet Union.
Since the Soviet representative had refused to participate in the
In
in Korea to maximum advantage.
ack
ted
础​测
​ent
among nations.
Only
sed
ted
1
Supra, doc. 10.
2556
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
t
8
8
d
t
1
8
0
G
1
th
t]
t
b
military action in Korea be understood. It should be made perfectly
lished and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked
Soviet Government in Moscow. On June 27, we requested the
Soviet Government, in view of its known close relations with the
North Korean regime, to use its influence to have the invaders with-
draw at once."
The Soviet Government, in its reply on June 29 2 and in subsequent
statements, has taken the position that the attack launched by the
North Korean forces was provoked by the Republic of Korea, and
that the actions of the United Nations Security Council were illegal
,
These Soviet claims are flatly disproved by the facts.
The attitude of the Soviet Government toward the aggression
against the Republic of Korea is in direct contradiction to its often
expressed intention to work with other nations to achieve peace in
the world.
For our part, we shall continue to support the United Nations
action to restore peace in the Korean area.
As the situation has developed, I have authorized a number of
measures to be taken. Within the first week of the fighting, General
MacArthur reported, after a visit to the front, that the forces from
North Korea were continuing to drive south, and further support to
the Republic of Korea was needed. Accordingly, General Mac
Arthur was authorized to use United States Army troops in Korea,
and to use United States aircraft of the Air Force and the Navy to
conduct missions against specific military targets in Korea north of
the thirty-eighth parallel
, where necessary to carry out the United
Nations resolution. General MacArthur was also directed to block-
ade the Korean coast.3
The attacking forces from the north have continued to move
forward, although their advance has been slowed down. The troops
of the Republic of Korea, though initially overwhelmed by the tanks
and artillery of the surprise attack by the invaders, have been reor-
ganized and are fighting bravely.
United States forces, as they have arrived in the area, have fought
with great valor. The Army troops have been conducting a very
difficult delaying operation with skill and determination, outnum-
bered many times over by attacking troops, spearheaded by tanks
.
Despite the bad weather of the rainy season, our troops have been
valiantly supported by the air and naval forces of both the United
States and other members of the United Nations.
In this connection, I think it is important that the nature of our
clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral
principle. The United States was going to the aid of a nation estaba
by an aggressor force. Consequently, we were not deterred by
relative immediate superiority of the attacking forces, by the fact
that our base of supplies was 5,000 miles away, or by the further fast
ME
in
as
A
81
Se
a1
DO
in
ba
the
TI
to
m
th
1 United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, pp. 63-64.
2 Ibid., p. 64.
3 See White House statement of June 30, 1950; supra, doc. 11.
1,
KOREA
2557
I, Resolution (A/810), pp. 25-27.
3 See the President's statement of June 27, 1950; supra, doc. 9.
the
the
rith-
that we would have to supply our forces through port facilities that
are far from satisfactory.
We are moving as rapidly as possible to bring to bear on the fighting
front larger forces and heavier equipment, and to increase our naval
and air superiority. But it will take time, men, and material to slow
down the forces of aggression, bring those forces to a halt, and throw
lent
the
and them back.
gal
!
FION
ften
ܐ 8
Tons
of
eral
180-
may
in
oks
Nevertheless, our assistance to the Republic of Korea has prevented
the invaders from crushing that nation in a few days as they had
evidently expected to do. We are determined to support the United
Nations in its effort to restore peace and security to Korea, and its
effort to assure the people of Korea an opportunity to choose their
own form of government free from coercion, as expressed in the
General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, and December
12, 1948.2
In addition to the direct military effort we and other members of
the United Nations are making in Korea, the outbreak of aggression
rom there requires us to consider its implications for peace throughout
to
the world. The attack upon the Republic of Korea makes it plain
beyond all doubt that the international Communist movement is
res
, prepared to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations.
| We must therefore recognize the possibility that armed aggression
of
take place in other areas.
ted
In view of this, I have already directed that United States forces
ch
support of the Philippines be strengthened, and that military
gosistance be speeded up to the Philippine Government and to the
Ore Associated States of Indochina and to the forces of France in Indo-
78 china. I have also ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent
any attack upon Formosa, and I have requested the Chinese Govern-
ment on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the
mainland. These steps were at once reported to the United Nations
ery
Our action in regard to Formosa was a matter of elementary secu-
mi nity
. The peace and stability of the Pacific area had been violently
si disturbed by the attack on Korea. Attacks elsewhere in the Pacific
ied
area would have enlarged the Korean crisis, thereby rendering much
more difficult the carrying out of our obligations to the United
Nations
In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our
intentions regarding Formosa, I wish to state that
the United States
bas no territorial ambitions
whatever concerning that island, nor do
ed
We seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa.
present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice
to
mosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of
the Pacific and that ano questions affecting Formosa be settled by
Res. 112 (II); A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678.
01
ght Security Council.
yen
in Korea.
UI
b-
he
het
2558
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
0:
I
8
The increased strength which is needed falls into three categories | th
Of the three categories I have just enumerated, the first two in polvere
peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations
With peace reestablished, even the most complex political questions
are susceptible of solution. In the presence of brutal and unprovoked
aggression, however, some of these questions may have to be held
in abeyance in the interest of the essential security of all.
The outbreak of aggression in the Far East does not, of course
,
lessen but, instead, increases the importance of the common strength
of the free nations in other parts of the world. The attack on the
Republic of Korea gives added urgency to the efforts of the free D-
tions to increase and to unify their common strength, in order to
deter a potential aggressor.
C
To be able to accomplish this objective, the free nations must
maintain a sufficient defensive military strength in being and, even
more important, a solid basis of economic strength, capable of rapid
mobilization in the event of emergency.
The strong cooperative efforts that have been made by the United to
States and other free nations, since the end of World War II, to
restore economic vitality to Europe and other parts of the world,
and the cooperative efforts we have begun in order to increase the
productive capacity of underdeveloped areas, are extremely important
contributions to the growing economic strength of all the free nations
,
and will be of even greater importance in the future.
We have been increasing our common defensive strength unders
the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and the North Atlantic Treaty, which
are collective security arrangements within the framework of the
United Nations Charter. We have also taken action to bolster the
military defenses of individual free nations, such as Greece,
and Iran.
The defenses of the North Atlantic Treaty area were considered as
matter of great urgency by the North Atlantic Council in London
in
this spring. Recent events make it even more urgent than it was
at that time to build and maintain these defenses.
Under all the circumstances it is apparent that the United States
is required to increase its military strength and preparedness not in
only to deal with the aggression in Korea but also to increase our com- It
mon defense, with other free nations, against further aggression.
In the first place, to meet the situation in Korea, we shall need to
send additional men, equipment, and supplies to General MacArthus
command as rapidly as possible.
In the second place, the world situation requires that we increase
substantially the size and matériel support of our Armed Forces, over
and above the increases which are needed in Korea.
In the third place, we must assist the free nations associated with vi
us in common defense to augment their military strength.
increases in our own military manpower, and in the matériel support
that our men must have.
Cl
a
Turkey
,
01
V.
m
OC
to
1 For texts of treaties, see supra, pp. 789–796 and 812–815.
2 See communiqué of May 19, 1950; supra, pp. 1604-1606.
4
2559
- KOREA
1 See infra, pp. 3039-3042.
Ons.
114-
ven
Ith vital to our own.
determine what each nation will need to do, I shall lay before the
Congress a request for such funds as are shown to be necessary to the
To meet the increased requirements for military manpower, I have
cons authorized the Secretary of Defense to exceed the budgeted strength
ked of military personnel for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and to use
held the Selective Service System to such extent as may be required in
order to obtain the increased strength which we must have. I have
ise,
also authorized the Secretary of Defense to meet the need for military
ngth manpower by calling into active Federal service as many National
the Guard units and as many units and individuals of the Reserve forces
of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces as may be required.
: to I have directed the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to keep our military manpower needs under constant study, in
lust order that further increases may be made as required. There are
now statutory limits on the sizes of the armed forces and, since we
ipid may need to exceed these limits, I recommend that they be removed.
To increase the level of our military strength will also require addi-
ited tional supplies and equipment. Procurement of many items has
to already been accelerated, in some cases for use in Korea, in others to
rld, replace reserve stocks which are now being sent to Korea, and in
the still others to add to our general level of preparedness. Further
ant increases in procurement, resulting in a higher rate of production of
Ds, military equipment and supplies, will be necessary.
The increases in the size of the armed forces, and the additional
der supplies and equipment which will be needed, will require additional
lich appropriations. Within the next few days, I will transmit to the
the Congress specific requests for appropriations in the amount of approx-
the imately 10 billion dollars.
cey, These requests for appropriations will be addressed to the needs of
our own military forces. Earlier, I referred to the fact that we must
de also assist other free nations in the strengthening of our common
Jon defenses. The action we must take to accomplish this is just as
pas important as the measures required to strengthen our own forces.
The authorization bill for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ates for 1951, now before the House of Representatives, is an important
immediate step toward the strengthening of our collective security.
It should be enacted without delay.
But it is now clear that the
free nations of the world must step up
their common security program. The other nations associated
with us in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, like ourselves,
will need to divert additional economic resources to defense purposes
In order to enable the nations associated with us to make their
ese maximum contribution to our common defense, further assistance on
our part will be required. Additional assistance may also be needed
to increase the strength of certain other free nations whose security is
In the case of the North Atlantic area these requirements will
reflect the
consultations now going on with the other nations associ-
ort ated with us in the North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as it is possible to
mot
D1-
1
les:
to
ar's
vel
re
2560
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
8
world peace.
S
t
C
0
North Korean infantry crossed the 38th parallel, led by Soviet-made
1 U.N. doc. S/1626, July 25, 1950, pp. 2–8 (Department of State publication
attainment and maintenance of our common strength at an adequate
level.
The free world has made it clear, through the United Nations, that
lawless aggression will be met with force. This is the significance of
Korea-and it is a significance whose importance cannot be over-
estimated.
I shall not attempt to predict the course of events. But I am sure
that those who have it in their power to unleash or withhold acts di
armed aggression must realize that new recourse to aggression in the
world today might well strain to the breaking point the fabric di
The United States can be proud of the part it has played in the
United Nations action in this crisis. We can be proud of the unhesi-
tating support of the American people for the resolute actions taken
to halt the aggression in Korea and to support the cause of word
peace.
The Congress of the United States, by its strong, bipartisan support
of the steps we are taking and by repeated actions in support of
fe
international cooperation, has contributed most vitally to the cause
of peace. The expressions of support which have been forthcoming
from the leaders of both political parties for the actions of our Govern-
ment and of the United Nations in dealing with the present crisis
have buttressed the firm morale of the entire free world in the face of
this challenge.
The American people, together with other free peoples, seek a new
era in world affairs. We seek a world where all men may live in peace
and freedom, with steadily improving living conditions, under gor-
ernments of their own free choice.
in
For ourselves, we seek no territory or domination over others. Te
are determined to maintain our democratic institutions so that Ameri-
cans now and in the future can enjoy personal liberty, economic op-
portunity, and political equality. We are concerned with advancing :
our prosperity and our well-being as a nation, but we know that our fa
future is inseparably joined with the future of other free peoples.
We will follow the course we have chosen with courage and with
faith, because we carry in our hearts the flame of freedom. We are
fighting for liberty and for peace and with God's blessing we shall
succeed.
18. FIRST REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE P
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, JULY 24, 1950 ? N
th
At 0400 Korean time on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean
Army launched a completely unprovoked invasion
of South Korea
8
T
SO
gle
th
mi
in
W
8
8
to
3935).
KOREA
2561
cesi
port
use
primarily for preserving internal security.
South Korea was a carefully-planned, full-scale invasion in force.
(A/1360), pp. 40-42. The quotation cited in the U.N. Command report appears
late tanks in an estimated number of 100. The main attack was down
the Pochon-Uijongbu-Seoul corridor. Simultaneously, attacks were
launched in the Ongjin Peninsula to the West, against Chunchon in
the eastern mountains, and down the east coast road. The North
chat Korean Air Force covered the amphibious landings, and attacked
ed
Kimpo Airfield, near Seoul. The size of the attack, the fact that it
covered the principal areas along the 38th parallel, and the amount
and character of material involved, and the use of amphibious land-
sureings, indicated clearly that the invasion had been carefully planned
sol for long in advance.
the
The character and disposition of the Republic of Korea Army
of
indicated that it did not expect this sudden attack. This fact is
supported by a report of an observation team of the United Nations
the
Commission on Korea, made along the 38th parallel and dated 24
June 1950. This report stated that its team of observers "had, in
ken
the course of a two-week inspection, been left with the impression
rld
that the Republican Army was organized entirely for defense and
(was) in no condition to carry out a large-scale attack against the
forces in the North. The observers found that the Republic of Korea
of
forces were disposed in depth all along the 38th parallel with no
concentration of troops at any point, that a large number of Republic
ing
Korea troops were actively engaged in rounding up guerrillas and
were, in any case, entirely lacking in the armor, heavy artillery, and
air support necessary to carry off an invasion of North Korea.”
0 These facts controverted
completely the North Korea broadcast from
Pyongyang, late in the morning of 25 June, that the Republic of
Korea had initiated an attack across the border and that the North
Korean Forces had been ordered to repel the attack.
The North Korean invaders were reported to have committed
We
initially 6 divisions of Infantry, 3 Border Constabulary Brigades,
supported by approximately 100 Soviet-made T34 and T70 tanks
and ample heavy artillery. Their Air Force held complete control of
the air, and was at the time estimated to be
composed of 100-150
he Soviet-made combat planes. The total strength
of the North Korean
forces was placed at between 90,000 and 100,000, organized in approxi-
mately 7 divisions and 5 brigades, well trained and equipped chiefly
with excellent Soviet material.
opposed to this mobile army, Republic of Korea troops were
initially deployed along the 38th parallel
with elements of 4 divisions,
with the remainder in the interior, without tanks or heavy artillery
and with only 16 trainers as an air force; an organization assigned
E
North and South Korea, the actual date of the assault is immaterial;
the potential for it was present for months.
In the light of the above facts, it is apparent that the attack upon
SIS
act
DY-
31-
P-
ith
Ire
all
:1)
.
de
See U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16
OL
to be a paraphrase.
415900_-57--Vol. 2-58
2562
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
5 a
recommendation of the Security Council, the Unified Command
From the attack to the fall of Seoul on 28 June, North Korean forces
struck southward across the 38th parallel on 25 June, in four major
drives:
A. To the west, a Border Constabulary Brigade attacked in the
Ongjin Peninsula against approximately one Republic of Korea
regiment and was reported on 26 June in control of the area. How-
ever, a considerable number of Republic of Korea men escaped by sea,
B. One North Korean division, plus 42-50 tanks captured Kaesong
on the afternoon of 25 June, and later pushed south through Husan
toward Seoul. Another North Korean force of from 8,000-10,00
men, plus more than 50 tanks, drove down the Pochon-Uijongbu
Corridor toward Seoul.
C. A division of North Korean troops, supported by heavy artillery
and tanks, struck south toward Chunchon.
D. Along the east coast, a Border Constabulary Brigade reinforced
to approximately 10,000, attacked Kangnung and carried out two
amphibious landings further south.
The North Korean attack was initially opposed by five Republic
of Korea divisions located in or north of Seoul. They were armed
with rifles, machine guns, and other light infantry weapons. Taken
completely by surprise, and facing greatly superior equipment
, they
fought desperately, but were forced to withdraw gradually. Another
Republic of Korea division, hastily brought up from the south, was
badly mauled in the fighting of 26
June. An official report on 30 June
indicated that the Republic of Korea forces had suffered a high per-
centage of casualties and had lost much equipment in the hurried
withdrawal.
On 28 June, aircraft of the United States Air Force, operating pur
;
suant to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations
began air operations against the North Korean invaders in support of
Republic of Korea forces and later struck at military targets north
to the 38th parallel with a view to disrupting the lines of communica-
tions and supply of the invading forces.
The badly decimated Republic of Korea forces reformed south of
the Nan (Han) River, and with U.S.A.F. assistance, sought to dela
the North Korean advance. By sheer weight of numbers and materia
they were forced back step by step until, on 2 July (Korean time) tha
town of Suwon, 20 miles south of Seoul, was reported in Norts
Korean hands.
United
States ground forces were committed to the area for stabilis:
Meanwhile, in pursuance of United Nations recommendations
contact with the invaders, south of Suwon. On 7 July, upon
8
e
U
&
0
B
0
C
D
P
2
a
b
1 Resolution of June 27, 1950; supra, doc. 10.
2 Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950; supra, doc. 14.
KOREA
2563
rces
1
re&
OW-
Sell
SAD
IVO
sen
the naval forces of the U.lified Command.
by transport continues with escort.
the President of the United States as the Commanding General of the
ajor forces of the members of the United Nations.
The first United States troops were small in number and were com-
mitted as a holding force only. They were followed by additional
the
supporting forces as rapidly as these could be transported to the battle
line. Facing odds at times as high as 20 to one, "Our Army troops,
ably supported by tactical aircraft of the United States Air Force and
Navy and our Australian friends, flying under most adverse conditions
one of weather ... distinguished themselves in the most difficult of
military operations--a delaying action."
000
Under the protection of this delaying action Unified Command
gbu
forces have steadily been strengthened. Under the combined impact
of ground, air and naval forces, the progress of the invasion has been
erT
slowed, while the enemy has suffered severe losses on sea and land
ced
which are curtailing his supply and transportation capabilities.
At the outset of the North Korean invasion, naval forces available
to oppose the aggression consisted of a small Republic of Korea Coast
Guard. United States and other forces proceeded to the operational
blic
areas and by virtue of overwhelming superiority established a patrol
led of both coasts of Korea. These forces took the necessary action to
prevent movement by sea of forces and supplies for use in operations
against the Republic of Korea, including ingress and egress to and
her from Korean ports of merchant vessels furnishing or likely to furnish
assistance to the North Korean authorities. United Nations Naval
une Porces covered some of the initial necessary evacuations, rendered
logistic support
, and by operating against North Korean waterborne
forces denied the Communist invaders the logistic support of its forces
Naval units proceeded to accomplish the waterlift of troops and
& supplies to Korea, patrol by naval aircraft of water and coastal areas,
of escort duties and coastal patrol functions. Harassing fire from naval
th units on both coasts shelled targets susceptible to naval gunfire,
breached roads, and generally interfered with enemy communications.
Naval units have attacked North Korean water traffic where found,
di and have already destroyed approximately one-third of the vessels
Lay originally available to North Korean naval forces.
A new phase of naval operations commenced on 3 July with the
Ehe first aircraft carrier air strike. They struck on the west coast of North
th Korea. Subsequent
carrier strikes on the east coast of Korea have
been made by the British and United States units. The first amphibi-
bus landing by United Nations Forces was accomplished on the east
coast of Korea on 18 July 1950.
The present naval situation finds both coasts of Korea covered by
port missions are being carried out
by these forces. Patrols and recon-
by
naissances are being conducted by naval patrol planes over coastal
and water areas. Logistic support of men, equipment, and supplies
See the President's statement of July 8, 1950; supra, doc. 15.
vas
ber
ied
by sea.
ur-
Cå.
218)
ms
za
de
]
€
I
a
f
81
ܒܝ
I
8
11
b
in weapons and manpower. The task is not a small one when viewed
2564 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Member States have contributed to the naval forces assisting in the
restoration of peace in Korea. The United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands have dispatched vessels to
support the United Nations' effort to cut off supplies for the invading
hordes from north of the 38th parallel. In carrying out this work
,
shore bombardments have been conducted where and as necessary to
interdict the supply of Communist troops which have moved
into that portion of Korea governed by the Republic of Korea under
the aegis of the United Nations. Valuable service has also been
rendered by a British naval unit in the rescue from the water of air-
men who had been compelled to abandon their airplane. The Coast
Guard of the Republic of Korea has been rendering invaluable service
in providing for the security of the shorelines. Naval air (sic) provided
by the United Kingdom has contributed in a major way in the sup-
port of landing operations at Pohang-dong.
Upon the request by the Security Council of the United Nations
for assistance to defend the Republic of Korea against the North
Korean aggressors, the only forces in the area immediately available
were those United States and British Commonwealth occupation
forces under the command of General MacArthur in the occupation
of the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these forces were
sufficient only to perform the occupation duties in Japan.
Before committing the forces, in response to the Security Council
resolutions, they had to be regrouped and re-equipped from standards
for peacetime occupation of Japan to standards suitable for combat
in Korea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equip-
ment and supplies, from their various occupation stations in Japan
,
by combinations of motor, rail, water and air transportation, to Korek
.
Even so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately
available to General MacArthur and therefore had to be rushed to
Korea from the United States--a distance of one-third of the way
around the globe. Future assistance for the defense of the Republic
of Korea, both men and materials, must be transported over comer
sponding distances from the Member nations of the United Nations
rendering such assistance. The well-planned attack by the North
Korean regime, the size of their force, their logistical support
their ability to continue to press the attack, account for the degree
of initiative enjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the Republic
of Korea have been forced to submit to the time and place selected
by the aggressor, and now must depend
upon assistance from nations
peacefully disposed and lying not merely hundreds, but thousands of
From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers
of enemy personnel and equipment, it is now apparent that the Norto
Korean aggressors have available to them resources far in excess
their internal capabilities. This, with the initial advantage of the
aggressor, combines to give the enemy a strength that cannot be over
come until the United Nations forces achieve the effect of superiority
e
I
Cl
LE
SU
TE
d
de
st
fii
TE
a
and
d
U
miles away.
KOREA
2565
* U.N. doc. S/INF/4, Feb. 1, 1951, pp. 7-8.
Deen
Vice
mere
_Recognizing the hardships and privations to which the people
Korea are being subjected as a result of the continued prosecution by
the North Korean forces of their unlawful attack,
Appreciating the spontaneous offers of assistance to the Korean
the
Until forces of the Unified Command are increased further in strength,
the rapidity with which success will be achieved cannot be predicted.
sto However, with the combined efforts of the United Nations, the full
ding
effect of the contribution from each member nation will be felt in the
Fork
,
ultimate defeat of the aggressors from north of the 38 degree parallel.
y to
In conclusion, it is believed appropriate to quote the Unified Com-
ved mander's latest estimate of the Korean operations.
ader
"With the deployment in Korea of major elements of the Eighth Army now
accomplished the first phase of the campaign has ended and with it the chance
for victory by the North Korean Forces. The enemy's plan and great oppor-
O&st
tunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun South Korea once
he had breached the Han River line and with overwhelming numbers and superior
weapons temporarily shattered South Korean resistance. This chance he has now
ded lost through the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth Army has been
sup- deployed from Japan to stem his rush. When he crashed the Han Line the way
seemed entirely open and victory was within his grasp. The desperate decision
TODS
to throw in piecemeal American elements as they arrived by every available
means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save the situation. The skill
orth and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces
able in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete co-ordination
cion by air and naval elements, forced the enemy into continued deployments, costly
CION
frontal attacks and confused logistics which so slowed his advance and blunted
his drive that we have bought the precious time necessary to build a secure base.
"I do not repeat not believe that history records a comparable operation which
excelled the speed and precision with which the Eighth Army, the Far East Air
nci Force and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land for immediate
commitment to major operations. It merits highest commendation for the com-
manders, staffs and units concerned and attests to their superior training and
bat high state of readiness to meet any eventuality. This finds added emphasis in the
Lip- fact that the Far East Command, until the President's great pronouncement to
an,
support the epochal action of the United Nations, had no repeat no slightest
responsibility for the defense of the Free Republic of Korea. With the President's
decision it assumed a completely new and added mission.
ely
"It is
, of course, impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy future inci-
to
dents of a military campaign. Over a broad front involving continuous local
Fay
struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. Our
olic
final stabilization line will unquestionably be rectified and tactical
improvement
will involve planned withdrawals as well as local advances. But the issue of battle
now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not
repeat not
be without choice. Our hold
upon the southern part of Korea represents
pereure base. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively
nd
light. Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively
decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance but failed to
exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay
lic
until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored. Mac Arthur.
ed
of
19. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNIFIED COMMAND: Resolu-
tion of the United Nations Security Council, July 31, 1950 1
th
of
and
rds
288.
TE
is
3DS
th
ee
OS
I'S
The Security Council,
be
of
T
Do
2566
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
De
act
is
of
under a single banner to uphold the rule of law in the world. This is frec
Two months ago, Communist imperialism turned from the familier
tactics of infiltration and subversion to a brutal attack on the small
people which have been made by governments, specialized agencies, Re
and non-governmental organizations,
Requests the Unified Command to exercise responsibility for de-
termining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian pr
population of Korea, and for establishing in the field the procedures up
for providing such relief and support;
If
Requests the Secretary-General to transmit all offers of assistance of
for relief and support to the Unified Command;
to
Requests the Unified Command to provide the Security Council with a
reports, as appropriate, on its relief activities;
Requests the Secretary-General, the Economic and Social Council in U
accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, other appropriate United wi
Nations principal and subsidiary organs, the specialized agencies in I
accordance with the terms of their respective agreements with the ho
United Nations, and appropriate non-governmental organizations, to
provide such assistance as the Unified Command may request for the
the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and as ex
appropriate in connexion with the responsibilities being carried out
th
by the Unified Command on behalf of the Security Council
. rig
20. REPORT TO THE NATION ON THE SITUATION IN KOREA:
Address by the President, September 1, 1950 1
Tonight, I want to talk to you about Korea, about why we are
there, and what our objectives are.
lib
As I talk with you, thousands of families in this land of ours have ha
à son, or a brother, or a husband fighting in Korea. I know that it
your thoughts and hopes are constantly with them and so are mine pea
These men of ours are engaged once more in the age-old struggle
for human liberty. Our men, and the men of other free nations, are
defending with their lives the cause of freedom in the world. They It
are fighting for the proposition that peace shall be the law of this has
earth.
def
We must and shall support them with every ounce of our strength
and with all our hearts. We shall put aside all else for this supreme
tak
duty.
of
No cause has ever been more just or more important.
For the first time in all history, men of many nations are fighting
an inspiring fact.
If the rule of law is not upheld, we can look forward only to the
horror of another world war and ultimate chaos. For our part, we
do not intend to let that happen.
Two COURSES FACED BY FREE WORLD
pre
1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 11, 1950, pp. 407-410.
.
det
]
has
RE
stre
KOREA
2567
nca
es
determination to work together for peace and freedom.
RECORD TO CREATE UNITY AMONG FREE NATIONS
strength among the free nations.
pressive. Let me recall some of them to you.
diese Republic of Korea. When that happened, the free and peace-loving
nations of the world faced two possible courses.
de- One course would have been to limit our action to diplomatic
lian protests, while the Communist aggressors went ahead and swallowed
red up their victim. That would have been the course of appeasement.
If the history of the 1930's teaches us anything, it is that appeasement
of dictators is the sure road to world war. If aggression were allowed
to succeed in Korea, it would be an open invitation to new acts of
rith aggression elsewhere.
The other course is the one which the free world chose. The
lit United Nations made its historic decision to meet military aggression
ted with armed force. The effects of that decision will be felt far beyond
s in Korea. The firm action taken by the United Nations is our best
the hope of achieving world peace.
It is your liberty and mine which is involved. What is at stake is
for the free
the free way of life--the right to worship as we please, the right to
express our opinions, the right to raise our children in our own way,
out the right to choose our jobs, the right to plan our own future, and the
right to live without fear. All these are bound up in the present
action of the United Nations to put down aggression in Korea.
We cannot hope to maintain our own freedom if freedom elsewhere
is wiped out. That is why the American people are united in support
A: of our part in this task.
During the last 5 years, we have worked day in and day out to
achieve a just and lasting peace. We have given every possible proof
of our desire to live at peace with all nations. We have worked for
iberty and self-government for people the world over. Most nations
Te bave joined with us in this effort, but the Soviet Union and the nations
23 it controls have unceasingly hampered all efforts to achieve a just
peace.
The Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its pledges of international
cooperation. It has destroyed the independence of its neighbors.
ey It has sought to disrupt those countries it could not dominate. It
has built up tremendous armed forces far beyond the needs of its own
th
Communist imperialism preaches peace but practices aggression.
nie
In these circumstances, the free nations have been compelled to
take measures to protect themselves against the aggressive designs
18
The United Nations was able to act as it did in Korea because the
is free nations in the years since World War II have created a common
Every American can be justly proud of the role that our country
has played in bringing this about.
We have taken the lead in step after step to create unity and
2.18
18.
gle
Te
18
defense.
of the Communists.
28
Fe
SI
1
2568
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
00
PE
87
at
COE
ME
Our men have fought with grim gallantry. All of us, especially those
In 1945, we helped to bring the United Nations into existence at lo
San Francisco.
In 1946, the United States gave its full support to the successful
action taken by the United Nations to protect Iran against Com for
munist invasion.
In 1947, we began our military and economic aid to Greece and
Turkey, which has helped those countries to keep their independence lir
against Communist attacks and threats.
Also in 1947, by the treaty of Rio de Janeiro, we joined with the
other American nations to guarantee the safety of the Western
Hemisphere.
3,6
In 1948, the Marshall Plan checked the danger of Communist sub-
version in Europe; and, since that time, it has brought the free nations
more closely together in a strong economic framework.
The Berlin airlift, in 1948 and 1949, defeated the Soviet effort to W
drive the free nations out of the democratic outpost of western Berlin
. to
The North Atlantic Treaty, in 1949, served notice that the nations
of the North Atlantic community would stand together to preserve ga
their freedom.
Today, in 1950, we are going ahead with an enlarged program for tw
military aid to strengthen the common defense of free nations. str
Step by step, these achievements in the struggle between freedom
and Communist imperialism have brought the free nations closer
str
together.
When the Communist movement turned to open, armed aggression
in Korea, the response of the free nations was immediate
Fifty-three of the fifty-nine members of the United Nations joined
in meeting the challenge. Thirty have already pledged concrete aid of
ing
to the United Nations to put down this aggression.
Thus far, the brunt of the fighting has fallen upon the armed forces
of the Republic of Korea and the United States. In addition, ngyal
forces from Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, the Nether-
lands, and New Zealand have been and are now in action under the
301
United Nations command. Fighting planes from Australia, Canada, dep
and Great Britain have joined the operation.
U.
Ground forces have been offered by Thailand, the Philippines
,
Turkey, Australia, France, and other countries. Some British troops
have landed in Korea
and more are on their way. All
of these wil
serve under the flag of the United Nations and under the United
Nations Commander, General MacArthur.
to
Our own men, with their gallant Korean comrades, have held the
breach. In less than 8 weeks, five divisions of United States troops
have moved into combat, some of them from bases more than 6,00
I
miles away. More men are on the way. Fighting in difficult country,
under every kind of hardship, American troops have held back over
forces have been carrying the attack to the military bases and supply
lines of the aggressors.
of us who are old soldiers, know how worthy they are of a place
WE
COD
to
str
nor
our
thi
up
eqe
m&
BUT
1:
on that
8188
KOREA
2569
mo
ace
ODS
12.
Om
ser
81st Cong., 2d sess.), Sept. 6, 1950; 64 Stat. 595.
at long and honored roll of those who created and preserved liberty for
our country.
ful The soldiers of the Republic of Korea have been fighting fiercely
for their own freedom.
The determination of the South Koreans to maintain their inde-
nd/ pendence is shown not only by the valor of their soldiers in the battle
line but also by countless supporting activities of the whole population.
They are giving every possible assistance to the United Nations forces.
che These United Nations troops are still outnumbered. But their hard
D and valiant fight is bringing results. We hold a firm base of about
3,500 square miles. For weeks, the enemy has been hammering, now
b. at one spot, now at another, sometimes at many points at once. He
has been beaten back each time with heavy loss.
The enemy is spending his strength recklessly in desperate attacks.
to | We believe the invasion has reached its peak. The task remaining is
to crush it. Our men are confident, the United Nations command is
DES confident, that it will be crushed.' The power to do this is being
Te gathered in Korea.
Right now, the battle in Korea is the front line in the struggle be-
for tween freedom and tyranny. But the fighting there is part of a larger
struggle to build a world in which a just and lasting peace can be
maintained.
That is why we in the United States must increase our own defensive
strength over and above the forces we need in Korea. That is why
we must continue to work with other free nations to increase our
ed
The Congress is now acting on my request to increase our program
id of arms aid to other free countries. These nations are greatly increas-
ing their own efforts. Our aid is not a substitute but is an addition to
what they themselves do.
78]
In Western Europe alone, there are over 200 million people. Next
ours, their industry is the world's greatest workshop. They are
be joining with us to develop collective forces for mutual "defense-our
lai
, as well as their own.
U.S.-KEY ELEMENT IN STRENGTH
“ll
The armed forces of the United States are a key element in the
strength of the free world. In view of the threats of aggression which
now face us, we shall have to increase these forces, and we shall have
to maintain larger forces for a long time to come.
he
We have had about 1%, million men and women on active duty in
our Army, Navy, and Air Force. Our present plans call for increasing
this number to close
to 3 million, and further increases may be required.
In addition to increasing the size of our armed forces, we must step
up sharply the production of guns, tanks, planes, and other military
equipment. We shall also have to increase our stockpile of essential
materials, and expand our industrial capacity to produce military
See Title I of Chapter XI of the General Appropriation Act, 1951 (PL 759,
con
combined strength.
jes
er-
to
defense
es,
ed
ps
00
sondern
T-
supplies.
Se
at
2570
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
8€
ot
ag
1
IN
pe:
mo
ind
support of the United Nations in Korea 2 months ago. We shall the
pendent, and united-as they want to be. Under the direction and
Third: We do not want the fighting in Korea to expand into 8
We have the ability and the resources to meet the demands which
confront us. Our industry and agriculture have never been stronger
or more productive. We will use as much of this economic strength as
is needed to defend ourselves and establish peace.
Hitler and the Japanese generals miscalculated badly, 10 years ago, be
when they thought we would not be able to use our economic power
effectively for the defeat of aggression.
Let would-be aggressors make no such mistake today
st.
We now have over 62 million men and women employed-more than
we have ever had before. Our farmers are producing over 20 percent
more than they were in 1940. The productive capacity of our manu-
facturing industry is 60 percent greater than it was 10 years ago, when
toi
the Axis dictators threatened the world.
it
We must now divert a large share of this productive power to defense
purposes. To do this will require hard work and sacrifice by all of us.
Se
I know all of us are prepared to do whatever is necessary in the cause
of peace and freedom. We have never yet failed to give all that is
needed in that cause, and we never will.
Th
In order to increase our defense effort rapidly enough to meet the N.
danger that we face, we shall have to make many changes in our way
of living and working here at home. We shall have to give up many
things we enjoy. We shall all have to work harder and longer
. To
919
prevent inflation and runaway prices, we shall have to impose certain
restrictions upon ourselves.
WE
The Congress has today completed action on legislation to enable to
us to channel the necessary effort to defense production, to increase clo
our productive capacity, and to hold down inflation.
Th
After this legislation is signed, I intend to talk to you again, to
for
explain what your Government proposes to do, and how each citizen
can play his part in this national effort.
As we move forward to arm ourselves more quickly in the days like
ahead and as we strive with the United Nations for victory in Korea
,
we must keep clearly in mind what we believe in and what we are
trying to do. We also want the rest of the
world to understand clearly
our aims and our hopes.
STATEMENT OF U.S. AIMS AND POLICY
First: We believe in the United Nations. When we ratified its Ow
Charter, we pledged ourselves to seek peace and security through are
this world organization. We kept our word when we went to the
never go back on that pledge.
Second: We believe the Koreans have a right to be free, inde ska
T
to help them enjoy that right. The United States has no other sit wit
1
in Korea.
g1V
Suc
free
I
figh
sta)
:
the.
tru
of s
con
dici
1 The Defense Production Act of 1950 (PL 774, 81st Cong., 2d sess.), Sept.
1950; 64 Stat. 798.
KOREA
2571
nich
145
wer
in war.
Eise
US.
Use
conflict fall as heavily on those who act as tools for the Communist
dictatorship as they do on its victims. There will be no profit for
general war. It will not spread unless Communist imperialism draws
ger other armies and governments into the fight of the aggressors against
the United Nations.
Fourth: We hope in particular that the people of China will not
130
, be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations and
against the American people, who have always been and still are
tħeir friends. Only the Communist imperialism, which has already
started to dismember China, could gain from China's involvement
han
cent
Fifth: We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves.
4 We believe that the future of Formosa, like that of any other terri-
hen
tory in dispute, should be settled peacefully. We believe that
it should be settled by international action and not by the decision
of the United States or of any other state alone. The mission of the
Seventh Fleet is to keep Formosa out of the conflict. Our purpose is
peace, not conquest.
tis
Sixth: We believe in freedom for all the nations of the Far East.
That is one of the reasons why we are fighting under the United
the
Nations for the freedom of Korea. We helped the Philippines become
independent, and we have supported the national aspirations to
ang
independence of other Asian countries. Russia has never voluntarily
10
given up any territory it has acquired in the Far East; it has never
given independence to any people who have fallen under its control.
ble
We not only want freedom for the peoples of Asia but we also want
to help them secure for themselves better health, more food, better
ese clothes and homes, and the chance to live their own lives in peace.
The things we want for the people of Asia are the same things we want
for the people of the rest of the world.
Seventh: We do not believe in aggressive or preventive war.
Such war
is the weapon of dictators
, not of free democratic countries
rea,
We are arming only for defense against
aggression. Even though Communist imperialism does not believe
In peace, it can be discouraged from new aggression if we and other
free peoples are strong, determined, and united.
Eighth: We want peace and we shall achieve it. Our men are
fighting for peace today in Korea. We are working for peace con-
stently in the United Nations and in all the capitals of the world.
Our workers, our farmers, our businessmen, all our vast resources,
are
helping now to create the strength which will make peace secure
We want peace not only for its own sake but because we want all
all the peoples of the world, including ourselves, to be free to devote
their full energies to making their lives richer and happier. We
de-
shall give what help we can to make this universal human wish come
und true.
We invite all the nations of the world, without exception, to join
The events in Korea have shown us again all the misery and horrors
of war. The North Koreans have learned that the penalties of armed
-811
to
zen
Bys like the United States.
are
art
im
with
us in this great work.
8
8
2572
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ped
ang
the methods used for undermining the Republic from within proved tien
204. The origin of the conflict is to be found in the artificial division Ref
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16
4, 1950, was transmitted by the Chairman of the Commission to the Secretary
(A/1350), pp. 32–33. This report, covering the period Dec. 15, 1949, to Sept.
General of the United Nations on Sept. 4, 1950, for transmission to the Geners
3 See Korea's Independence (Department of State publication 2933; 1947
any people who follow the Communist dictatorship down its dark Th
and bloody path.
Against the futile and tragic course of dictatorship, we uphold, mo
for all people, the way of freedom-the way of mutual cooperation bec
and international peace. We assert that mankind can find progress
and advancement along the path of peace. At this critical hour in No
the history of the world, our country has been called upon to give ol hec
its leadership, its efforts, and its resources, to maintain peace and ple
justice among nations. We have responded to that call. We will not sta
fail.
The task which has fallen upon our beloved country is a great one pla
In carrying it out, we ask God to purge us of all selfishness and mean the
ness and to give us strength and courage for the days ahead.
21. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA: des
Report of the United Nations Commission in Korea, September 4
1950 (Excerpt) 1
Со
Part Four
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AGGRESSION
202. The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the Non
armed forces of the North Korean authorities, which began on 2 ve
June 1950, was an act of aggression initiated without warning and
without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan,
203. This plan of aggression, it is now clear, was an essential para accu
of the policy of the North Korean authorities, the object of which are
was to secure control over the whole of Korea. If control could not pre
be gained by peaceful means, it would be achieved by overthrowing bay
the Republic of Korea, either by undermining it from within a
should that prove ineffective, by resorting to direct aggression. spen
unsuccessful, the North Korean authorities launched an invasion o
the territory of the Republic of Korea.
B. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
agreement on the method to be used for giving independence to Korsals
Assembly.
meg
the
bas
Ko
2
dor
ties
2
800
mis
2
co
neer
toc
C
10
of A
eral
682-
pp. 2-11.
KOREA
2573
25-27); and 293 (IV) of Oct. 21, 1949 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp.
arisen.
thor Republic of Korea from the threat from the North gradually became
1 See U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 112 (II) of Nov. 14, 1947 (A Decade
of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678); 195 (III) of Dec. 12, 1948 (U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions (A/810), pp.
dark This failure was not due to anything inherent in the attitude of the
people of Korea themselves, but was a reflection of those wider and
nold,
more fundamental differences of outlook and policy which have
tion become so marked a feature of the international scene.
Tess
205. This artificial division was consolidated by the exclusion from
rin North Korea of the United Nations Temporary Commission, which
80 had been charged by the General Assembly to observe the holding of
and elections on a democratic basis in the whole of Korea. In the circum-
not
stances, it was decided to hold such elections in South Korea alone.
206. Had internationally-supervised elections been allowed to take
one place in the whole of Korea, and had a unified and independent Korea
care thereby come into existence, the present conflict could never have
C. PROSPECTS OF UNIFICATION
207. The Korean people, one in race, language and culture, fervently
EA: desire to live in a unified and independent Korea. Unification can
er 4 be the only aim regarding Korea. It did, however, appear to the
Commission, before the aggression took place, that unification through
negotiation was unlikely to be achieved if such negotiation involved
the holding of internationally-supervised elections on a democratic
basis in the whole of Korea. Experience suggested that the North
Korean authorities would never agree to such elections.
208. It was hoped that, at some stage, it might be possible to break
down the economic and social barriers between the two political enti-
ties as a step toward unification. That too proved illusory, as the
the North Korean authorities persisted in their policy of aiming at the
2 % overthrow of the Republic of Korea.
and
209. After the consolidation of the division of Korea, propaganda
and hostile activities on the part of the North Korean authorities
part accentuated tension which, in turn, stiffened the attitude of the Gov-
ich erment and people of the Republic of Korea, and even further
not prejudiced such possibility of unification by negotiation as might
rings have remained. Notwithstanding the continued efforts of the Com-
a mission, it appeared on the eve of the aggression that the Korean
As peninsula would remain divided indefinitely, or at least until interna-
Vedtional tension had slackened.
D. DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
210. The necessity to safeguard the stability and security of the
a controlling factor in all the major activities of the administration
of the Republic, and absorbed energies and resources which were
18
needed to develop the new form of representative government and
to carry out the economic and social reconstruction programme.
lof
ach
ed
ept
.
UIF
email
47
.
).
2574
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
conditions under which they arose disappear, it will be possible for
the Korean people of both North and South to come again together;
to live in peace and to build the strong foundations of a free, demo-
211. The first two years of the new National Assembly reflected
clearly the difficulties which it would be normal to expect in a body
dealing with a new and unfamiliar political structure. It had become
clear, long before the act of aggression occurred, that the Legislature
was making good progress in its efforts to exert parliamentary control
over all departments of government, and would not rest content until
its relations with the Executive had been satisfactorily adjusted
.
The growing civic responsibility shown by the Legislature augured
well for the future of representative government in Korea.
212. At the elections of 30 May 1950, the people showed very con-
siderable enthusiasm, and the electoral machinery functioned well
.
Among the cases of interference with candidates which occurred,
some were explainable in the light of the stringent precautions which
the Government found it necessary to take in order to safeguard the
stability and security of the State against the threat from the North
,
Although there appeared to be little justification for interference in
some other cases, the results of the elections, in which many candi-
dates critical of the Administration were returned, showed that the
voters were in fact able to exercise their democratic freedom of choice
among candidates, and had cast their votes accordingly. The results
also showed popular support of the Republic, and a determination to
improve the Administration by constitutional means.
for
213. The division of Korea added to the economic difficulties that
de
had arisen at the end of the Japanese domination, and made it most
of
difficult for the Republic of Korea to become self-supporting. Funda
No
which might have been expended for the execution of the social and
economic programme of the Republic were consumed by heavy du
fence expenditures. Nevertheless, when the aggression occurred
, ,
substantial progress was being made with that programme.
E. KOREAN NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS
214. Serious problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation, par Ko
ticularly the grave refugee problem, already confront the country
To these problems will be added problems of yet greater magnitud civ
when the military conflict comes to an end. It will be quite beyond
the capacity of the country to provide from its own resources means thi
for rehabilitation. A healthy and viable democracy in Korea cannot des
come into being unless very considerable aid and assistance are pro-
vided from outside Korea.
215. Finally, as the division of the country and the resulting
antagonisms were artificial, the Commission believes that, when the
do
as
Na
an
ant
as
1
Suz
:
KOREA
2575
201
pell
11
the Supplement for September through December, 1950, p. 70.
cted
Done in a single copy in the English language at House No. 328
at Camp Hialeah, Pusan, Korea, this fourth day of September in the
ome year nineteen hundred and fifty.
ture
trol
Anup SINGH (Chairman) (India)
until
A. B. JAMIESON (Rapporteur) (Australia)
ted.
Liu Yu-Wan (China
ored
Angel Gochez MARIN (El Salvador)
Henri BRIONVAL (France)
Bernabe AFRICA (The Philippines)
Kamil IDIL (Turkey)
red
Bertil A. RENBORG (Principal Secretary)
zich
the
rth
.
22. CALL FOR THE SURRENDER OF THE NORTH KOREAN
adi
FORCES: Message From the Commander-in-Chief, United Na-
the
tions Command, to the Commander-in-Chief, North Korean
Oice
Forces, October 1, 1950 1
ults
a to
The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed
hat forces and war making potential is now inevitable. In order that the
Lost
decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum
nd
of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United
end
Nations Commander in Chief, call upon you and the forces under
de your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay
ved your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision
38. I may direct, and I call upon you
at once to liberate all United
Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control
and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenance
and immediate transportation to such places as I indicate. North
* Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United
Nations Command, will continue to be given the care dictated by
une civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes
1. soon as practicable. I shall anticipate your early decision upon
habe | this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and
Douglas MACARTHUR
ing
Doc. S 1829, printed in U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year,
for
lery
down
end
pot destruction of property.
10
2576
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
u
S
0
e
0
t
11
I
P
U
R
b
th
IT
SI
K
th
3 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions
23. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMIS.
SION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF
KOREA (UNCURK): Resolution 376 (V) of the United Nations
General Assembly, October 7, 1950 *
The General Assembly,
Having regard to its resolutions of 14 November 1947 (112 (II)), of
12 December 1948 (195 (III)); and of 21 October 1949 (293 (IV)),
Having received and considered the reports of the United Nations
Commission on Korea,
Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions
referred to above have not been fully accomplished and, in particular,
that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an
attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Kored to
extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea,
Recalling the General Assembly declaration of 12 December 1948
that there has been established a lawful government (the Government
of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction
over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Com-
mission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the
great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is
based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the
electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the
Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government
in Korea,
Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present
operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the
Security Council of 27 June 1950,6 subsequent to its resolution of
25 June 1950,7 that Members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the
area,
Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the
General Assembly referred to above was the
establishment of a unified,
independent and democratic Government of Korea,
1. Recommends that
(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability
throughout Korea;
(6) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections
,
under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No.
(A/1775), pp. 9–10.
2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678.
(A/810), pp. 25–27.
3 O.N. General Assembly one
facial licencompas, Pirith Session, Supplement No. 1
(A/1350). "For Part Four %f the report, canded Sept. 1411950
, see supra, doc. 21.
Supra, doc. 10.
> Supra, doc. 8.
K
8g
fc
tile
c
C
of
of
be
1
fo
to
N.
ple
lib
50
RE
6
of
KOREA
2577
TS.
OP
ons
ODS
Ons
gn
to
ent
00
mi
318
Secretary-General for transmission to Members;
Supplement No. 13 (A/2441); (4) Aug. 14, 1953, to Aug. 17, 1954 (ibid., Ninth
Session, Supplement No. 15 (A/2711)]; and (5) Aug. 17, 1954, to Sept. 7, 1955
libid., Tenth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/2947)).
work was adopted at the eighth session of the General Assembly; Res. 811 (IX)
of Dec. 11, 1954, infra, doc. 93; and Res. 910 (X) of Nov. 29, 1955, infra, doc. 94.
unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign
State of Korea;
(c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of
Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs
of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of
elections and in the establishment of a unified government;
: of
(d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea
otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified
in sub-paragraphs (a) and (6) above;
(0) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic
rehabilitation of Korea;
Lar, 2. Resolves that
(a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands,
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, to be known as the
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
848
Korea, be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised
by the present United Nations Commission on Korea; (ii) represent
the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified,
Che
independent and democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise
such responsibilities in connexion with relief and rehabilitation in
che
Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving
the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions
ent
as soon as possible;
he
(6) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the governments of
the States represented on the Commission should form an Interim
he
Committee composed of representatives meeting at the seat of the
United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified
Command in the light of the above recommendations; the Interim
Committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval
of the present resolution by the General Assembly;
9 The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session
of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might
be called to consider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and
ty shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the
"Concerning the activities of UNCURK, see Reports of the U.N. Commission
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea for the periods (1) Oct. 7, 1950,
to Sept. 1951 [U.N. General Assembly, Oficial Records, Sixth Session, Supplement
plement No. 14 (A/218791; (3)
Aug. 27, 1952, to Aug. 14, 1953 (ibid., Eighth Session,
ReCLŐ (VIT) of Dec. 3, 1952, en real, hoe som repolation concerning UNCURK'S
Hey CVDof Feb. 5, 1952, "ibid., Sixth Session, a supplement No. 20, A/2119), p. 7;
che
ent
of
ch
be
he
is,
8
20
16
!
415900---57-Vol. 2-59
2578
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
រ
not
The General Assembly furthermore,
25
Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task
of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude,
3. Requests the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with
the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation
on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly
within three weeks of the adoption of the present resolution by the
pul
General Assembly;
lon
4. Also recommends the Economic and Social Council to expedite
Ou
the study of long-term measures to promote the economic develop-
D
ment and social progress of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the atten-
to
tion of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance
des
to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to
tha
Korea;
5. Expresses its appreciation of the services rendered by the mem-
faci
bers of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance
of their important and difficult task;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations to go
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea with
C
adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers as required
H:
and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and per diem
of a representative and alternate from each of the States members of
Chi
the Commission.
of
an0
tech
Pro
24. SECOND CALL FOR THE SURRENDER OF THE NORTH
KOREAN FORCES: Message From the Commander-in-Chief
, ,
United Nations Command, to the Commander-in-Chief, North
Korean Forces, and to All North Koreans, October 9, 1950 1
Am
Р
Ma
tion
I
the
step
POSE
out
W
In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried
out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, Nat
I, as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, for the last time call
of
upon you and the forces under your command in whatever part
Korea situated, to lay down your arms and cease hostilities. And I
call upon all north Koreans to cooperate fully with the United Nations
in establishing a unified, independent and democratic government of
Korea, assured that
they will be treated justly and that the United
Nations
will act to relieve and rehabilitate all parts
of a unified Korea
,
Unless immediate response is made by you in the name of the norta
Korean government, I shall at once proceed to take such military
T
actions as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United
Nations,
TECO
solu
Uni
T
achi
Ing.
bes
esser
fort
This message was
1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 13, 1950, p. 763.
transmitted by radio broadcast and by leaflets dropped from planes.
11
?R
:
2579
1. KOREA
i
7
e
2
e
!
S
reconstruction of Korea which the United Nations is facing and to the
be supplemented by both spiritual and material rehabilitation.
) for themselves better than anyone else can do it for them.
? Res. 376 (V) of Oct. 7, 1950; supra, doc. 23.
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 23, 1950, pp. 643-844.
25. COORDINATION OF POLICY AND STRATEGY FOLLOWING
THE INCHON LANDING: Statement by the President on Wake
Island, October 15, 19501
I have met with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur for the
purpose of getting first-hand information and ideas from him. I did
not wish to take him away from the scene of action in Korea any
longer than necessary, and, therefore, I came to meet him at Wake.
Our conference has been higbly satisfactory,
The very complete unanimity of view which prevailed enabled us
to finish our discussions rapidly in order to meet General MacArthur's
desire to return at the earliest possible moment. It was apparent
that the excellent coordination which has existed between Washington
and the field, to which General MacArthur paid tribute, greatly
facilitated the discussion.
After I had talked with General MacArthur privately, we met
together with our advisers. These joint talks were then followed by
technical consultations in which the following participated:
General MacArthur and Ambassador John Muccio; Mr. Averell
1
Harriman, Special Assistant to the President; Secretary of the Army
of
Frank Pace; General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief
of the Pacific Fleet; Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk; and
Ambassador-at-large Philip C. Jessup
Primarily, we talked about the problems in Korea which are General
MacArthur's most pressing responsibilities. I asked him for informa-
tion on the military aspects.
got from him a clear picture of the heroism and high capacity of
the United Nations forces under his command. We also discussed the
steps necessary to bring peace and security to the area as rapidly as
possible in accordance with the intent of the resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly ? and in order to get our armed forces
out of Korea as soon as their United Nations mission is completed.
I
We devoted a good deal of time to the major problem of peaceful
solution
of which we intend to make the best contribution of which the
This is a challenging task which must be done properly if we are to
schieve the peaceful goals for
which the United Nations
has been fight-
The success which has attended the combined military effort must
It is
HI
f,
h
I
S
f
United States is capable.
LO
it
1
ing.
$
2580
1950–1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
en
IN
MA
The United Nations can, however, render essential help with sup-
plies and technical advice as well as with the vital problem of rebuild
.
ing their educational system.
Meanwhile, I can say I was greatly impressed with what General
MacArthur and Ambassador Muccio told me about what has already
26
been done and is now being done to bring order out of chaos and to
restore to the Korean people the chance for a good life in peace.
For example, the main rail line from Inchon to Suwon was opened
to rail traffic in less than 10 days after the Inchon landing. The rail
line from Pusan to the west bank of the Han River opposite Seoul was
open to one-way rail traffic about October 8. Bridge and highway
reconstruction is progressing rapidly. Power and the water supply in
Seoul were reestablished within a week after the reentry into the
capital.
the
General MacArthur paid a particularly fine tribute to the service
being rendered in Korea by Ambassador Muccio.
I asked General MacArthur also to explain at first hand his views o
the future of Japan with which I was already generally familia
through his written reports. As already announced, we are moving
forward with preliminary negotiations for a peace treaty to which
de
Japan is entitled.
General MacArthur and I look forward with confidence to a ner
Japan which will be both peaceful and prosperous.
I also asked General MacArthur to tell me his ideas on the ways 11
which the United States can most effectively promote its policies
assisting the United Nations to promote and maintain international
peace and security throughout the Pacific area.
fro
On all these matters, I have found our talks most helpful and I am fee
very glad to have had this chance to talk them over with one
America's great soldier-statesmen, who is also now serving in the unique 1
position of the first Commander in Chief of United Nations pexe fro
forces.
We are fully aware of the dangers which lie ahead, but we are com
fident that we can surmount these dangers with three assets which w?
have:
Ya
ent
on the worki
SU:
QUE
ol
tin
fee
we
On
14
first, unqualified devotion to peace;
second, unity with our fellow peace-loving members of the United
Nations;
third,'our determination and growing strength.
Ch
tre
an
KO
40
fro
fee
we
KOREA
2581
1 U.N, doc. S/1884, Nov. 6, 1950.
1. Tas
rvice
Korea where they came in contact with UN forces approximately
from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 10,000
weather, 8 miles visibility, low clouds 2,300 feet.
C. CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION AND ITS
sup
suild CONSEQUENCES, NOVEMBER 1950-JUNE 1951
neral
eady
26. PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN NORTH
od to
KOREA: Special Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command, November 5, 1950 1
tened
e rail
I herewith submit a special report of the United Nations Command
1987
operations in Korea which I believe should be brought to the attention
of the United Nations.
ly
) the
Introduction:
The United Nations Forces in Korea are continuing their drive to
the north and their efforts to destroy further the effectiveness of the
enemy as a fighting force are proving successful. However, presently
in certain areas of Korea, the United Nations Forces are meeting a
niliw new foe
. It is apparent to our fighting forces, and our intelligence
agencies have confirmed the fact, that the United Nations are pres-
hich ently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units
deployed for action against the forces of the United Command.
The fact of intervention:
Hereafter, in summary form, are confirmed intelligence reports
substantiating the fact that forces other than Korean are resisting
es of our efforts to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations:
A. 22 August: Approximately 50 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire
from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 7000
I
over Korea in the vicinity of the Sui-Ho reservoir; damage, none;
time 1600 K; weather, 10 miles visibility, high broken clouds.
B. 24 August: Approximately 40 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire
from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 10,000
feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none, time 1500K;
C. 15 October: Anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of
Yalu River against a flight of 4 F-51's flying near the Sinuiju airfield
on the Korean side of the river; damage, 1 aircraft total loss; time,
14451; weather, overcast at 8000 feet; 8 to 10 miles visibility.
D. 16 October: The 370th Regiment of the 124th Division of the
Chinese Communist 42nd Army, consisting of approximately 2,500
troops, crossed the Yalu River' (Korean border) at Wan Po Jin,
and proceeded to the area of Chosen and Fusen Dams in North
E. 17 October: Approximately 15 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire
ner
JS II
lone
féet
ne of
peace
COM weather, 20 miles
visibility.
h 12
nited
40 miles north of Hambung.
2582
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
+
}
!
east coastal area, resulting in raising the number of enemy prisoners of
F. 20 October: A Chinese Communist Task Force known as the
"56th" unit consisting of approximately 5,000 troops crossed the Yala
River (Korean border) at Antung and deployed to positions in Korea
south of the Sui-Ho Dam. A captured Chinese Communist soldier
of this Task Force states that his group was organized out of the
regular Chinese Communist 40th Army stationed at Antung, Man-
churia.
G. 1 November: A flight of F-51's was attacked early in the after-
noon by 6 to 9 Jet aircraft which flew across the Yalu River into
Manchuria. No damage was done to US aircraft. A red star was
observed on the top of the right wing on one of the Jet aircraft.
H. 1 November: Anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of
the Yalu River directed against a flight of 13 F-80 aircraft was ob-
served in the vicinity of Sinuiju at 1345 hours. This resulted in the
total loss of 1 UN aircraft.
I. 30 October: Interrogation of 19 Chinese prisoners of war identi
fied two additional regiments of 124 CCF 1 Division, the 371 and
the 372 in the vicinity of Changjin.
J. 2 November: Interrogation of prisoners of war indicates the
54 CCF unit in Korea. This unit is reported to have same organi-
zation as 55 and 56 units, but to be drawn from the 112, 113 and 114
Divisions of the 38 CCF Army.
K. 3 November: Further interrogation of Chinese prisoners of
war indicates 56 CCF unit organized from elements of 118, 119 and
120 CCF Divisions of the 40 CCF Army.
L. 4 November: As of this date, a total of 35 CCF prisoners bed
been taken in Korea.
The continued employment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea
and the hostile attitude assumed by such forces, either inside or
outside Korea, are matters which it is incumbent upon me to bring
at once to the attention of the UN.
27. CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA: Com.
muniqué by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,
November 6, 1950 2
The military position of the United Nations forces in the western
sector of North Korea is now sufficiently stabilized and information of
enemy unit identifications adequately evaluated to permit me to put
the situation growing out of the last few days' operations in proper
perspective.
The Korean war was brought to a practical end with the closing di
the trap on enemy elements north of Pyongyang and seizure of the
war in our
hands to well over 135,000, which, with other losses amount
C
1 Chinese Communist Foroes.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 13, 1950, p. 763.
KOREA
2583
3 Res. 376 (V); supra, doc. 23.
th
elu
Drea
lier
the
ter-
nto
YAS
of
ob-
the
border area.
nti
and
ing to over 200,000, brought casualties to 335,000, representing a fair
estimate of North Korean total military strength.
The defeat of the North Koreans and destruction of their armies
was thereby decisive. In the face of this victory of United Nations
arms, the Communists committed one of the most offensive acts of
international lawlessness of historic record by moving without any
notice of belligerency elements of alien Communist forces across the
Yalu River into North Korea and massing a great concentration of
possible reinforcing divisions with adequate supply behind the privi-
leged sanctuary of the adjacent Manchurian border.
A possible trap was thereby surreptitiously laid, calculated to encom-
pass the destruction of the United Nations forces engaged in restoring
order and the processes of civil government in the North Korean
This potential danger was avoided with minimum losses only by
the timely detection and skillful maneuvering of the United Nations
commander responsible for that sector who, with great perspicacity
and skill, completely revised the movement of his forces in order to
achieve the greater integration of tactical power necessitated by the
new situation, and avert any possibility of a great military reverse.
The present situation, therefore, is this:
While the North Korean forces with which we were initially engaged
have been destroyed or rendered impotent for military action, a new
and fresh army now faces us, backed up by a possibility of large alien
reserves, and adequate supply within easy reach to the enemy but
beyond the limits of our present sphere of military action.
Whether and to what extent these reserves will be moved forward to
reinforce units now committed remains to be seen and is a matter of
the gravest international significance.
Our present mission is limited to the destruction of those forces now
arrayed against us in North Korea, with a view to achieving the
United Nations objective to bring unity and peace to the Korean
the
114
of
and
18d
res
OT
ing
nation and people.
10,
28. RETENTION OF THE KOREAN-CHINESE FRONTIER:
Draft Resolution of the United Nations Security Council, Novem-
ber 10, 1950
1
I
lut
jer
he
of
ito
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution of 25 June 1950,2 determining that the
North Korean forces had committed a breach of the peace and
calling upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from
of giving assistance to the North Korean authorities,
Recalling the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7
October 1950, which sets forth the policies of the United Nations in
Nov. 30, 1950, the draft resolution
failed of adoption.
v 1. doc. S/PV 72, Nov. 30, 1950, pp. 22–23. As a result of a Soviet veto on
respect to Korea,
Supra, doc. 8.
:
2584
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Sat
fc
W
ar
CC
sa
IT
DE
m
9
COI
2 Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed
Having noted from the special report of the United Nations Com-
mand in Korea dated 5 November 1950 1 that Chinese communist fc
military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United
Nations in Korea,
Affirming that United Nations forces should not remain in any
part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the
th
objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a
unified independent and democratic government in the sovereign PU
State of Korea, as set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly be
dated 7 October 1950,
Insistent that no action be taken which might lead to the spread
les
of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger
international peace and security,
Calls upon all States and authorities, and in particular those
responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from assisting or
lin
encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals
or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to
North Korean forces and to cause the immediate
withdrawal of any
such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea
;
die
Affirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the
Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate
Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;
Calls attention to the grave danger which continued intervention
by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a
policy;
Requests the Interim Committee on Korea and the United Nations
firm
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to ch
consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems
relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or
authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and 30
suggests that the United Nations Commission for the
Unification and
Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon as possible
, and
pending its arrival that it utilize the assistance of such States members
of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this
purpose.
29. EXTENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION Of
IN KOREA: Special Communiqué by the Commander-in-Chie.
So
United Nations Command, November 28, 1950 2
Enemy reactions developed in the course of our assault operations
of the past four days disclose that a major segment of the Chinese
K
continental armed forces in army, corps and divisional organization
of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against
the United Nations forces in North Korea.
(A
1 Supra, doc. 26.
1st Session, p. 3495. Reprinted from the New York Times, Nov. 29, 1950
.
au
WU
ar
1
į
KOREA
2585
3 Res. 376 (V), supra, doc. 23.
如
​01
Ose
Or
to
28;
Korean people cannot themselves repair,
There exists the obvious intent and preparation for support of these
ist
forces by heavy reinforcements now concentrated within the privileged
ted sanctuary north of the international boundary and constantly moving
forward.
ny
Consequently, we face an entirely new war. This has shattered
jhe the high hopes we entertained that the intervention of the Chinese
fe was only of a token nature on a volunteer and individual basis as
publicly announced, and that therefore the war in Korea could be
brought to a rapid close by our movement to the international bound-
ary and the prompt withdrawal thereafter of United Nations forces,
sd leaving Korean problems for settlement by the Koreans themselves.
Ser
It now appears to have been the enemy's intent, in breaking off
contact with our forces some two weeks ago, to secure the time neces-
sary surreptitiously to build up for a later surprise assault upon our
lines in overwhelming force, taking advantage of the freezing of all
als rivers and roadbeds which would have materially reduced the effective-
ness of our air interdiction and permitted a greatly accelerated forward
DT
movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. This plan has been
disrupted by our own offensive action, which forced upon the enemy
thea premature engagement.
ate
General MacArthur later issued this additional paragraph to the
communiqué:
This situation, repugnant as it may be, poses issues beyond the
authority of the United Nations military council—issues which must
find their solution within the councils of the United Nations and
chancelleries of the world.
nd
30. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS KOREAN
nd
RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY (UNKRA): Resolution 410 (V)
ad
of the United Nations General Assembly, December 1, 1950 ?
A
Having regard to its resolution of 7 October 1950 on the problem
ON of the independence of Korea,
ef,
Having received and considered a report of the Economic and
Social Council submitted in accordance with that resolution,
Mindful that the aggression by North Korean forces and their
warfare against the United Nations seeking to restore peace in the
area has resulted in great devastation and destruction which the
st
U.N. General Assembly, Oficial Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20
01
18
DS
to
ms
OL
ers
his
The General Assembly,
DS
est
OD
red
(A/1775), pp. 31-35.
* See U.N. doc. Al1493
ess
2586
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
8
It
establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government
(c) To designate authorities in Korea with which the Agent General
(d) To take such steps as may be needed to support the Agent
are desperately in need of relief supplies and materials and help in
reconstructing their economy,
t
Deeply moved by the sufferings of the Korean people and determined
to assist in their alleviation,
Convinced that the creation of a United Nations programme of reliel
and rehabilitation for Korea is necessary both to the maintenance of
lasting peace in the area and to the establishment of the economie
A
foundations for the building of a unified and independent nation
,
Considering that, under the said resolution of 7 October 1950, the
P
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea is the principal representative of the United Nations in Kores
and hence must share in the responsibility for the work undertaken t.
by the United Nations in furtherance of the objects and purposes $
mentioned in the said resolution,
P
Considering that it is nevertheless desirable to set up a special g
authority with broad powers to plan and supervise rehabilitation and
relief and to assume such functions and responsibilities related to
planning and supervision, to technical and administrative matters, and
to questions affecting organization and implementation as are to be
exercised under the plans for relief and rehabilitation approved by the
U
General Assembly, such authority to carry out its responsibilities in
B
close cooperation with the Commission,
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS KOREAN RECONSTRUC-
fi
TION AGENCY FOR THE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
ti
1. Establishes the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency th
(UNKRA) under the direction of a United Nations Agent General
who shall be assisted by one or more deputies. The Agent General
shall be responsible to the General Assembly for the conduct (in
accordance with the policies established by the General Assembly
and having regard to such general policy recommendations as the
g
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
of Korea may make) of the programme of relief and rehabilitation in
Korea, as that programme may be determined from time to time by
the General Assembly;
2. Authorizes the United Nations Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea:
(a) To recommend to the Agent General such policies concerning the
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency's programme
activities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective
discharge of the Commission's responsibilities in relation to the
in Korea;
(6) To determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the
geographical areas within which the Agency shall operate at any time
nature of such relationships;
0
So
fi
in
re
IE
and
SE
on
t
KOREA
2587
mic
Tea
zen
ses
be
Korean economy and the effective distribution and utilization within
Korea of supplies and services furnished;
tary-General, transmitting copies simultaneously to the United
in
General in fulfilling his task in accordance with the policies established
by the General Assembly for relief and rehabilitation;
bed
(0) To consider the reports of the Agent General' to the General
Assembly and to transmit any comments thereon to the Economic
liet
and Social Council and the General Assembly;
of
a) To call for information on those aspects of the work of the
Agent General which the Commission may consider necessary for the
-on,
the
proper performance of its work;
of 3. Authorizes the Commission to consult from time to time with
the Agent General in regard to the provisional programme adopted by
the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Economic and
Social Council and especially with regard to the adequacy of that
programme to meet the needs of Korea as defined in the statement of
in]
general policy, and to make recommendations thereon to the Economic
nd
and Social Council;
to
4. Directs the Agent General:
end
(a) To co-ordinate his programme with measures taken by the
the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
in Korea to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly
relating to the establishment of a unified, independent and demo-
cratic government in Korea, and to support the Commission in ful-
IC-filling this task;
(b) To commence the operation of the programme in Korea at such
be agreed upon by the United Nations Unified Command,
the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
of Korea and the Agent General;
© To consult with and generally be guided by the advice of the
in
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
hly
of Korea on the matters set forth under paragraph 2 (a) and be
he
governed by its advice on the matters covered in paragraphs 2 (6)
in
by 5. Further directs the Agent General, in the carrying out of his
(2) To ascertain, after consultation with the designated authorities
in Korea, the requirements for supplies and services for relief and
he rehabilitation made necessary by the consequences of armed conflict
ad
(6) To provide for the procurement and shipment of supplies and
services and for their effective distribution and utilization within
. To consult with and assist the appropriate authorities in Korea
respect to measures necessary for the rehabilitation of the
time as may
деу
ra!
OD
and 2 (C);
functions:
00
in Korea;
Ve
he
nt
Korea;
with
ne
ey
18
at
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1950-1955
I
P
0
N
8
th
SS
ܒܝܒܝ
P
W
T
81
of Dec. 14, 1954, ibid., Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), pp. 14-15
2 At the 326th plenary meeting on 15 December 1950, the General Assembly,
on the nomination of the President, elected the following States Members to serve
on the Advisory Committee established under the terms of paragraph 6 of section
A of the above resolution; Canada, India, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
2588
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
and to the Economic and Social Council;
(e) To be guided in matters of administration, to the extent con-
sistent with the special requirements of the programme, by the rules
and regulations established for the operation of the Secretariat of the
United Nations;
Specifically he shall:
(1) Select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrange-
ments made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including
such of the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations as the
Agent General and the Secretary-General shall agree are appli-
cable;
(2) Utilize, wherever appropriate, and within budgetary limitations
the existing facilities of the United Nations;
(3) Establish, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
and in agreement with the Advisory Committee established under
paragraph 6 below, financial regulations for the United Nations
Korean Reconstruction Agency;
(4) Arrange, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Ad
ministrative and Budgetary Questions, for the rendering and
audit of the accounts of the Agency under procedures similar to
those applicable to the rendering and audit of the accounts of
the United Nations;
6. Establishes an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives
of five Member States to advise the Agent General with regard to
major financial, procurement, distribution and other economic prob-
lems pertaining to his planning and operations. The Committee
shall meet on the call of the Agent General but not less than fou
1 Concerning the operations of UNKRA, see Reports of the Agent General of
the U.N. Korean
Reconstruction Agency for the periods (1) Dec. 1, 1950, to
Jan. 16, 1952 [U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Annexes
Agenda' Items i7 and 27 (A/1935 and A/1935/Add. 131; (2) February 1951 to Sept
,
15, 1952 (ibid., Seventh Session, Supplement No. 15 A/2222), and Supplement
No. 19A (A/2222, Addenda 1 and 251; (3) Sept. 15, 1952, to Sept. 30, 1953 (ibid
,
(ibid., Ninth Session, Supplement No. %(A/2450)); and (5) Sept. 1, 1954, to June
30, 1955 [ibid., Tenth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/2936)].
For the General Assembly resolutions dealing with the above reports of the
Agent General, see (1) Res. 507 (VI) of Feb. 5, 1952, ibid., Sixth Session, Supple
.
ment No. 20 (A/2119), p. 7; (2) Res. 201 (VII
) of Mar. 11, 1953, ibid., Seventh Sen
1953, ibid., Eighth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A)2630), p. 12; (4) Res. 828 LIX
(A/3116), p. 9.
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and Uruguay.
t.
g
8
SO
N
t
0
P
P
8
t
a
;
r
r
I
r
KOREA
2589
Drea,
IONS
Ons
rehabilitation contained in section B of the present resolution;
izations to make available to the maximum extent possible, and sub-
times a year. The meetings of the Committee shall be held at the
Headquarters of the United Nations except in special circumstances,
CON- when the Committee, after consultation with the Agent General,
cules
may meet elsewhere if it deems that this would be essential to the
the
proper performance of its work. The Committee shall determine its
own methods of work and rules of procedure;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting the United
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
nge-
and the Advisory Committee, to appoint the United Nations Agent
ding General for Korean Reconstruction, and authorizes the Agent General
the to appoint one or more Deputy Agents General in consultation with
opli the Secretary-General;
8. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a special account
Ons to which should be credited all contributions in cash, kind or services,
the resources credited to the account to be used exclusively for the
the programme of relief and rehabilitation and administrative expenses
connected therewith; and directs the Secretary-General to make cash
der withdrawals from the account upon request of the Agent General.
The Agent General is authorized to use contributions in kind or
services at his discretion;
Ad
9. Recommends that the Agent General in carrying out his functions:
and
ato
(a) Make use at his discretion of facilities, services and personnel
of that may be available to him through existing national and inter-
national agencies and organizations both governmental and non-
governmental;
() Consult with the Secretary-General and the heads of the
specialized agencies before appointing his principal subordinate per-
sonnel in their respective fields of competence;
ter
Make use of the advice and technical assistance of the United
Nations and the specialized agencies and, where appropriate, request
them to undertake specific projects and special tasks either at their
l of own expense or with funds made available by the Agent General;
(d) Maintain close contact with the Secretary-General for the
purpose of ensuring fullest co-ordination of efforts of the organs of
the United Nations and the specialized agencies in support of the
10. Authorizes the Agent General to enter into agreements with
such authorities in Korea as the United Nations Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may designate, containing
terms and conditions governing measures affecting the distribution
and utilization in Korea of the supplies and services furnished, in
accordance with the statement of general policy on Korean relief and
oly mum extent possible, and subject to appropriate financial arrange-
ments, such facilities, advice
and services as the Agent General may
12. Requests the specialized agencies and non-governmental organ-
S
ves
to
ob-
Our
to
was
ept.
tent
nd,
954
programme;
une
the
ple
Ges
:
7
X
15;
19
rve
LOO
gin
request;
5. Whilst the programme should be consistent with the pattern
2590 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ject to appropriate financial arrangements, such facilities, advice and
services as the Agent General may request;
13. Requests the Economic and Social Council to review the reports
of the Agent General and any comments which the United Nations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Koreg map
submit thereon, and such other data as may be available on the
progress of relief and rehabilitation in Korea and to make appropriate
reports and recommendations thereon to the General Assembly;
14. Calls upon all governments, specialized agencies and non-
governmental organizations, pending the beginning of operations by
the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, to continue to
furnish through the Secretary-General such assistance for the Korean
people as may be requested by the Unified Command;
15. Invites countries not Members of the United Nations to par-
ticipate in financing the programme of relief and rehabilitation in
Korea;
B. STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY ON RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
IN KOREA
16. Approves the following statement of general policy:
1. The United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation
in Korea is necessary to the restoration of peace and the establish-
ment of a unified, independent and democratic government in
Korea,
2. To this end, it is the objective of the United Nations to pro-
vide, subject to the limit of the resources placed at its disposal for
this purpose, relief and rehabilitation supplies, transport and
services, to assist the Korean people to relieve the sufferings and
to repair the devastation caused by aggression, and to lay the
necessary economic foundations for the political unification and
independence of the country.
3. The United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation
for Korea shall be carried out in practice in such a way as to com
tribute to the rapid restoration of the country's economy in com
formity with the national interests of the Korean people, having in
view the strengthening of the economic and political independence
of Korea and having in view that, in accordance with the general
principles of the United Nations, such assistance must not serve as
a means for foreign economic and political interference in the
internal affairs of Korea and must not be accompanied by any
conditions of a political nature.
4. The United Nations programme is to be a supplement to the
general recovery effort that will be undertaken
by the Korean
Pffective utilization of their own resources as well as of the aid
people on their own initiative and responsibility, through the most
which is rendered under the programme.
limited to relief and rehabilitation, and contributions and supplies
KOREA
2591
orts
ons
ate
ON-
to
29n
3r-
in
ON
100
foundations of the country. Among these, special attention should
end
furnished under this programme shall be used exclusively for that
purpose.
6. First priority shall be given to the provision of the basic
necessities of food, clothing and shelter for the population of Korea
DAT
and measures to prevent epidemics. Second highest priority shall
the
be given to projects which will yield early results in the indigenous
production of basic necessities; this will include the reconstruction
of transport and power facilities. As the programme develops,
emphasis should be shifted to the provision of other materials,
by
supplies and equipment for the reconstruction or replacement of
war-damaged facilities necessary to the economic life of the country.
7. The necessary measures shall be taken to ensure that dis-
tribution shall be so conducted that all classes of the population
sball receive their equitable shares of essential commodities without
discrimination as to race, creed or political belief.
8. Subject to adequate control, the distribution of supplies shall
be carried out, as appropriate, through public and co-operative
organizations, through nonprofit-making voluntary organizations
such as the Red Cross, and through normal channels of private
trade
. At the same time, measures shall be taken to ensure that
the cost of distribution and the profit from the sale of supplies
sh
are kept to the minimum. Measures shall be taken to ensure that
the special needs of refugees and other distressed groups of the
population are met through appropriate public welfare programmes,
and accordingly the sale of relief supplies will take place only in
justifiable cases and under conditions agreed upon with the United
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
nd
Korea.
nd
ho 9. The local currency proceeds derived from the sale of relief
nd
and rehabilitation supplies or, at the discretion of the Agent General,
an amount commensurate with the value of goods and services
supplied, shall be paid into an account under the control of the
Agent General. The Agent General, after consultation with the
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
of Korea, and in agreement with the
Advisory Committee referred
to in paragraph 6 of section A of the present resolution, shall use
bese funds for appropriate additional relief and rehabilitation
activities
within Korea, for the
local currency expenses of the relief
he and rehabilitation operations of the United Nations, or for measures
to combat inflation. The proceeds shall not be used for any other
10. The necessary economic and financial measures shall be
taken by the authorities in Korea to ensure that the resources
provided under the United Nations programme, as well as Korean
id resources, are effectively employed to aid in laying the economic
V
monetary policies, to the
requisite pricing, rationing
and allocation
controls (including the pricing of goods imported under the
pro-
gramme), to the prudent use of Korean foreign exchange resources
in
for
t
in
HS
19
purpose.
he
10
st
PS
2592
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
...
TE
21
se
(c) The degree of assistance which can be rendered by specialized
1 In accordance with the terms of the above resolution, the President of the
General Assembly, at the 318th plenary meeting on 4 December 1950, announced
that he had appointed a Negotiating Committee, composed of the following
States Members: Canada, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom of Great
together with promotion of exports, and to the efficient management
of government enterprise.
11. Import taxes shall not be imposed on relief and rehabilitation
supplies received under the United Nations programme.
12. The authorities in Korea should maintain such records and
make such reports on the receipt, distribution and use of relief and #
rehabilitation supplies as may be determined by the Agent General
after consultation with them.
13. All authorities in Korea shall freely permit the personnel of
the United Nations to supervise the distribution of relief and 31
rehabilitation supplies, including the examination of all storage and
distribution facilities as well as records.
14. The personnel of the United Nations shall be accorded
within Korea the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary
for the fulfilment of their function.
15. All authorities in Korea and the Secretary-General shal
... use their best efforts to inform the people of Korea of the sources
and purposes of the contributions of funds, supplies and services K
16. In determining Korea's needs for relief and rehabilitation
,
in drawing up programmes and plans, and in implementing such
programmes and plans, the Agency created to administer the reliel do
and rehabilitation programme should consult with and utilize
, to G
the greatest extent feasible, the services of Korean authorities.
9
DO
B
The General Assembly
1. Requests the President to appoint a Negotiating Committee
composed of seven or more members for the purpose of consulting,
as soon as possible during the current session
of the General Assembly
with Member and non-member States as to the amounts which i
governments may be willing to contribute towards the financing of
the programme for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea;-
PE
2. Authorizes the Negotiating Committee to adopt procedures best
C
suited to the accomplishment of its task, bearing in mind:
(a) The need for securing the maximum contribution in cash;
(6) The desirability of ensuring that any contribution in kind is of b
a nature which meets the requirements of the contemplated pro
P
grammes; and
agencies, non-member States and other contributors;
jo
3. Requests that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has ascer
tained the extent to which Member States are willing to make como F
tributions, all delegations be notified accordingly by the Secretary-
General in order that they may consult with their governments;
S2
ar
SE
it
SI
m
KOREA
2593
sary
urces
tion, Committee.
I to
? Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 18, 1950, pp. 989–990.
4 U.N. doc. S/1894, Nov. 10, 1950; supra, doc. 28.
ment 4. Decides that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has com-
pleted its work, the Secretary-General shall, at the Committee's
ation request, arrange, during the current session of the General Assembly,
an appropriate meeting of Member and non-member States at which
and Members may commit themselves to their national contributions and
{ and the contributions of non-members may be made known.
Deral
ield
31. LABELING AS AGGRESSION THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
and
INTERVENTION IN KOREA: Statement by the United States
Representative at the United Nations Before the United Nations
rded
General Assembly, December 6, 1950 2
The General Committee has recommended that the General As-
shall
sembly might include on its agenda an item entitled: Intervention of
the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in
100s | Korea. I speak in support of the recommendation of the General
such
My Government has joined with the Governments of Cuba, Ecua-
eliel
dor, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom in requesting that the
General Assembly consider this item as an important and urgent
question. No delegate here can have any doubt as to just how im-
portant and how urgent this question is.
The United Nations forces who are carrying out in Korea the task
assigned to them by the Security Council are under attack by the
tter
armed forces of the Peiping regime. Little more than a month ago,
it
cing seemed that the United Nations forces would soon complete their
bly assigned task. Then came the intervention of the Chinese Commu-
hich | nist forces.
go
of
The Security Council immediately took up this new threat to the
peace. On November 10 the same Governments which are now asking
the Assembly to consider this item introduced into the Security
Council a resolution designed to hasten the end of the conflict, to keep
it localized in Korea, and to assure states and authorities on the other
sof
side of Korea's northern frontier that their legitimate interests would
The Security Council also invited a representative of the Central
zed
People's Government of the People's Republic of China to attend its
meetings on this question. The Council deferred its vote on the
joint draft resolution until this representative arrived. Members of
the Council then saw for themselves that the representative declined
answer questions relating to his government's actions in Korea.
He said that the Chinese soldiers fighting there were volunteers.
He also said that the Chinese People's Republic considered there
· For subsequent Res. 498 (V), Feb. 1, 1951, see infra, doc. 42.
best
be protected.
4
010-
are
DI
11
the
1 Warren R. Austin.
ced
108
415900-57--Vol. 2
-60
2594
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Tec
1
un
ju
101
Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent
i For the text of the remarks by the Chinese Communist representative, see
2 U. N. General Assembly Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20
were no grounds for hindering the dispatch to Korea of volunteers
The Security Council voted on the joint draft resolution on Novem.gr
ber 30. The resolution was not adopted, because of the negative wł
vote of one of the permanent members, the Soviet Union.
It seems clear to the six sponsors of the joint draft resolution that
no fruitful action can be expected, at this time, from the Security
Council in view of this attitude of one of the permanent members.
33
Under these circumstances, the Governments which sponsored that
resolution believe that the question of Communist intervention in
Korea should be considered by the General Assembly as an important
and urgent matter.
The proposed agenda item puts before this Assembly one of the
greatest questions faced by the United Nations. It may involve the
whole future of the United Nations. It may involve the peace of
the world. All the processes of the United Nations should be invoked
Sts
in an effort to put an end to the threat to world peace.
My Government believes that world opinion should be brought to
bear on this question and that the full weight of that opinion should ecc
Ch
be made clear to the authorities of Peiping. Full and frank discus-
sions by the General Assembly can best bring light upon the real thing
nature of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, its portent for
the future of peace, the gravity with which it is viewed by the nations
Co
of the world, and how the processes of the United Nations can bring
of
about a solution.
Asking the General Assembly to consider this question, at this
Un
time, is the symbol of our belief in the United Nations and in its
ability to maintain international. peace.
My Government, therefore, urges the General Assembly to include obi
this item on its agenda, to proceed quickly and soberly to consider
the situation, and to make the necessary recommendations.
the
for
32. ESTABLISHMENT OF A GROUP FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN che
KOREA: Resolution 384 (V) of the United Nations General wit
Assembly, December 14, 19502
pro
Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,
fighting in Korea itself, and that further steps should then be taken
for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,
U.N. doc. S/PV. 527, Nov. 28, 1950.
1
ONE
es
Ver
tra
at
the
ess
1
ASE
to
Ira
2
3
(A/1775), p. 15.
KOREA
2595
? Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1004.
BUS-
to himself, he had appointed Sir Benegal Rau of India and Nasrollah Entezam of
Assembly's President (Lester B. Pearson of Canada) announced that, in addition
cers Requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute a
dem group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on
tive which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make
recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible.
that
rity
5.
33. CONTROL OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
that
UNITED STATES AND COMMUNIST CHINA AND NORTH
1 in
KOREA: Statement by the Department of State, December 16,
tant
1950 2
the
the
The United States Government is taking measures today to place
e of under control all Chinese Communist assets within United States
ked jurisdiction and is issuing regulations to prohibit ships of United
States
registry from calling at Chinese Communist ports until further
t to
notice
as steps necessary to accomplish the effective control of the
ould economic relationships between the United States and Communist
China envisaged by the institution, on December 3, 1950, of the
meal requirement that no exports would be permitted
to Communist China
for from the United States without validated export licenses.3
This action has been forced upon us by the intervention of Chinese
ring
Communist military forces in Korea. In view of the commitment
of Chinese resources in this unprovoked aggressive activity, this Gov-
this emment cannot permit the Chinese Communists to have access to
its United States supplies or assets in the United States, the use of which
present circumstances clearly runs counter to the interests and
ude
objectives of the United Nations in the Far Eastern crisis.
der It is not our desire that this be a permanent restriction. As long
18 & willful group of Chinese Communist leaders are willing to sub-
vert their national interests and the welfare of the Chinese people to
the designs of international Communist imperialism, it is impossible
for this Government
to act otherwise. If the Chinese Communists
IN choose to withdraw their forces of aggression and act in conformity
aral with United Nations principles, this Government will be prepared
promptly to consider removing restrictions and restoring normal
The same controls also are being applied to North Korean assets
# this time. This is purely an administrative measure since North
The Departments of Commerce and Treasury are issuing the nec-
esary regulations. Copies of these will be available from them.
be
at the 325th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, Dec. 14, 1950, the
LODS
under
trade relations.
the Korean assets are negligible.
the
len
Iran to the cease-fire group.
20
315 Fed. Reg. 9040 ff.
2596
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
C
W
CU
AC
4.U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item
34. DESIGNATION OF KOREA AS A COMBAT ZONE AS OP
JUNE 27, 1950: Executive Order 10195, December 20, 1950
N
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 22 (b) (13) of
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by section 202 (a) of the
Revenue Act of 1950, approved September 23, 1950 (Public Law 814,
81st Congress), there is hereby designated, for the purposes of part-
graph (13) of section 22 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, as an are
G
in which armed forces of the United States have engaged in combat:
Korea, including the waters adjacent thereto within the followings!
described limits: From a point at Lat. 39°30' N, Long. 122°45' ECE
southward to Lat. 33° N, Long. 122°45' E; thence eastward to Lat
.
33° N, Long. 127°55' E; thence northeastward to Lat. 37°05' N
Long. 133º E; thence northward to Lat. 40°40' N, Long. 133º E
tr.
thence northwestward to a point on the east coast of Korea at the
N
juncture of Korea with the U.S.S.R.
The date of the commencing of combatant activities in such an
K
is hereby designated as June 27, 1950.
of
fo
35. REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS GROUP ON A CEASE
FIRE IN KOREA TO THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE
th
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, JANUARY 2, 19514
de
1. On 14 December 1950 the General Assembly adopted the folor-
ing resolution (384 (V)] which had been sponsored by thirteen Asian
Powers:
"The General Assembly,
“Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East
,
"Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the
conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to
the fighting in Korea itself, and that further steps should then be
taken for å peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance
da
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,
"Requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute 601
group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis
on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and
to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as
possible.” 5
2. In pursuance of the resolution, the President forthwith com-
pei
stituted a group consisting of Mr. L. B. Pearson of Canada, Su
Benegal N. Rau of India and himself, and announced this fact to
1 15 Fed. Reg. 9177; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 22, 1951, p. 149.
2 56 Stat. 814,
DO
3 64 Stat. 927-928.
76, pp. 6-8. The bracketed insertion in the first paragraph appears
Official Records.
5 Ibid., Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), p. 15.
ar
COD
to
C01
ful
an
INC
mi
ME
mi
ler
in the
am
fu
KOREA
2597
further steps approved by the United Nations.
ra-
trea
lems arising out of the cease-fire, including civil government and
police power in the demilitarized zone.
arrangements, which should continue in effect until superseded by
Of the General Assembly. The Group met almost immediately after-
wards and decided to associate the Secretary-General of the United
Nations with its work.
lo 3. A copy of the resolution was sent on 15 December to General
the Wu, the representative of the Central People's Government of the
314
, People's Republic of China, who was then in New York,
4. On 15 December, as a first step in carrying out its task, the
res Group consulted the representatives of the Unified Command as to
bat
: what they considered to be a satisfactory basis for a cease-fire. The
ing suggestions which emerged from this consultation, and which in the
circumstances the Group felt constituted a reasonable basis for dis-
cat cussion, are summarized below:
N.
(@) All governments and authorities concerned, including the Cen-
E:
the
tral People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the
North Korean authorities, shall order and enforce a cessation of all
acts of armed force in Korea. This cease-fire shall apply to all of
Korea.
(6) There shall be established a demilitarized area across Korea
of approximately twenty miles in depth with the southern limit
following generally the line of the 38th parallel.
SE (0) All ground forces shall remain in position or be withdrawn to
HE
lear; forces, including guerrillas, within or in advance of the
demilitarized area, must be moved to the rear of the demilitarized
area; opposing air forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the
areas beyond the zone; opposing naval forces shall respect the waters
contiguous to the land areas occupied by the opposing armed forces
to the limit of three miles from shore.
(d) Supervision of the cease-fire shall be by a United Nations
commission whose members and designated observers shall ensure
full compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. They shall have
the free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea. All governments
to and authorities shall co-operate with the cease-fire commission and
be | its designated observers in the performance of their duties.
(0) All governments and authorities shall cease promptly the intro-
duction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement units or per-
sonnel, including volunteers, and the introduction of additional war
335 equipment and material. Such equipment and material will not
and include supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare
and such other supplies as may be authorized by the cease-fire com-
C) Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis
Si
pending final settlement of the Korean question.
9) Appropriate provision shall be made in the cease-fire arrange-
ments in regard to steps to ensure (*) the security of the forces; (ii) the
movement of refugees, and (iii) the handling of other specific prob-
the
09.
3182
OCH
ce &
8S
ON-
to
ten
the
2598
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
?
hai
tra
Ce
sta
ANI
Pre
1
t
8
1
I
e
I
a
6. On 18 December, Mr. Pearson, on behalf of the Group, submitted
5. The Group then attempted to consult the Central People's
Government of the People's Republic of China and, for this
purpose
,
sent a message by hand to General Wu and repeated it by cable to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs in Peking. The text of this message is
reproduced below:
“16 December 1950
"As you have already been informed by resolution 384 (V) a copy
of which was sent to you yesterday, a Committee was set up by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on the previous day, 14
December, consisting of myself and my two colleagues, Sir Benegal
Rau of India and Mr. L. B. Pearson of Canada, charged with the
duty of determining whether it is possible to arrange appropriate and
satisfactory conditions for a cease-fire in Korea. The purpose of
this cease-fire in Korea will be to prevent the conflict from spreading
to other areas, to put an end to the fighting in Korea, and to provide
an opportunity for considering what further steps should be taken
for a peaceful settlement of existing issues, in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
"The above Committee has now met representatives of the
Unified Command in Korea, and has discussed with them, in an
exploratory manner, possible conditions upon which a cease-fire
might be established. Since the Government of the Communist
People's Republic of China has expressed strong views on the future
of Korea and about the present state of warfare in that country, and
since Chinese are participating in that warfare, the Committee
wishes also to discuss with your Government or its representatives,
and with the military authorities in command of the forces operating
in North Korea, possible conditions upon which a cease-fire might
be established. For this purpose, we desire to see you at your earliest
convenience, and we should be grateful to know when a meeting
can be arranged.
“We realize
that your Government which sent you here with other
objects in mind, may prefer other arrangements by which a cease-
fire can be discussed with them. We wish your Government to
know that, in the interest of stopping the fighting in Korea and of
facilitating a just settlement of the issues there in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter, we are prepared to
discuss cease-fire arrangements with your Government or its repres
sentatives either here or elsewhere, as would
be mutually convenient
.
We urge only that arrangements for these discussions should be
made with the least possible delay. With this in mind, we are send
ing the text of this communication directly
to your Government by
telegram.
a brief preliminary account of its activities to the First Committe,
hoping that a fuller report would be made in the near future.
S
n
A
a
b
be
r
S
t
r
&
C
of
"Nasrollah ENTEZAM"
No.
Pre-
195
KOREA
2599
? Ibid., pp. 56-58.
go in
de
szen
Government is of the opinion that the United Nations should
?d No. 72. See also United States Participation in the United Nations; Report by the
1 Action of Nov. 30, 1950; U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year,
President to the Congress for the Year 1950 (Department of State publication 4178;-
1951), pp. 51-56.
ple's
7. On 16 December, the President, acting on behalf of the Group,
had availed himself of the good offices of the Swedish delegation to
ose,
the transmit, through the Swedish Embassy in Peking, a request to the
Central People's Government that General Wu should be instructed to
stay on in New York and discuss with the Group the possibility of
50
arranging a cease-fire. The reply to the request, communicated to the
President on 21 December through the same channel, was as follows:
ору
"The Central People's Government acknowledges receipt of a
message dated 18 December 1950 from Mr. Entezam, President of
14
egal
the General Assembly, transmitted via the Swedish Government and
asks the Swedish Government to transmit the following reply to
and
Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly:
of
"The representative of the People's Republic of China neither
ling
participated in nor agreed to the adoption of the resolution concern-
ing the so-called three-man Committee for Cease-Fire in Korea by
United Nations General Assembly. The Central People's Govern-
the
ment has repeatedly declared that the Central People's Government
would regard as illegal and null and void all major resolutions,
the
especially those concerning Asia, which might be adopted by the
United Nations without the participation and approval of the duly
appointed representatives of the People's Republic of China. There-
fore, the Central People's Government cannot instruct its repre-
sentative General Wu to continue to remain in Lake Success for
und
negotiations with the above-mentioned three-man illegal Committee.
tee
After the Security Council unreasonably voted against
the complaint
against the United States armed aggression against Taiwan raised
by the People's Republic of China, General Wu was instructed
ing
Eht
by the Central People's Government to continue to stay at Lake
Success for participation in the discussion of the complaint of
United States aggression against China submitted by the U.S. S. R.
ng
representative; although he has waited for a long time and until the
United Nations General Assembly was declared adjourned, he was-
still not given the
opportunity to speak. Under such circumstances
,
the Central People's Government deems that there is no more
of
necessity for General Wu and his staff to remain at Lake Success
th
and has therefore instructed him to start their homeward journey
"As to the question of how the United Nations may get in touch
with the Korean Democratic People's Republic, the Central People's
be
de address direct inquiry to the Government of the Korean Democratic
V
3. On 19 December, acting on a recommendation from the sponsors
of the twelve-Power" draft fesolution (A/C.1/642) introduced in the
an
fire
hist
ura
es
est
ler
se-
to
on 19 December
to
"@a
it.
People's Republic.
8
2600
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
TE
8
SO
TE
at
OU
an
“President of the General Assembly | Ko
9. On 23 December, the President of the General Assembly, in Up
text of a statement issued by the latter in Peking on 22 December
peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This document is
First Committee on 12 December, the Group sent another message
to the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government. This
was intended to remove any possible misunderstandings which may
have arisen out of the separation of the twelve-Power resolution from
G
the thirteen-Power resolution (384 (V)] adopted by the General
Assembly on 14 December. The text of the message is given below:
"Mr. Chou En-lai,
"Minister for Foreign Affairs,
"Central People's Government of the People's Republic of Chine 34
"Peking, China
"In the consideration which you are giving to our earlier message
,
we are anxious that there should be no misunderstanding as to the
relationship between the United Nations resolution establishing
a cease-fire group and the resolution proposed by twelve Asian
pr
governments recommending appointment of a committee to meet
as soon as possible and make recommendations for
peaceful
settlement of existing issues in Far East. It is our clear under-
standing and also that of the twelve Asian sponsors, that once &
sh
cease-fire arrangement had been achieved, the negotiations visual ad
ized in the second resolution should be proceeded with at once
fo
Indeed, the preamble to the cease-fire resolution states specifically
that steps should be taken for a peaceful settlement when fighting for
in Korea is ended. It is also our view, as well as that of the twelve
Asian governments sponsoring the second resolution, that the pu
Government of the People's Republic of China should be included pe
in the negotiating committee referred to in that resolution. We
feel that this committee could become an effective channel for (v
seeking peaceful solution of existing issues in the Far East between sou
the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and pro
China. For that purpose, in our opinion, it should be set up
with ap
a minimum of delay, but to make that possible a "cease-fire
" eine
arrangement must
be put into effect. This point of view has been c
communicated to your delegation which left New York today, and son
we express the hope that you will give full weight to it.
"Nasrollah ENTEZAN
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of Chine the
explaining the attitude of the Central People's Government on
resolution constituting the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea and on
Dal
Un
Į
"Sir Benegal RAU
"Lester B PEARSON"
era
rer
ant
1
the
the
Ses
:
KOREA
2601
Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 76, pp. 8–10.
in United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Not printed here. See U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth
reproduced as an Annex.1 It appears to be in the nature of an
This
answer to the Group's message of 16 December.
may 10. In these circumstances, and in spite of its best efforts, the
com Group regrets that it has been unable to pursue discussion of a
eral
satisfactory cease-fire arrangement. It therefore feels that no
OF: recommendation in regard to a cease-fire can usefully be made by it
at this time
line 36. PRINCIPLES ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
GROUP ON A CEASE-FIRE IN KOREA, JANUARY 11, 1951 ?
age, The objective shall be the achievement, by stages, of the programme
the
outlined below for a cease-fire in Korea, for the establishment of a
ning free and united Korea, and for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern
5141
problems.
neet
eful
1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property,
dler- and while other steps are being taken to restore peace, a cease-fire
ed should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement should contain
anal adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen
for mounting a new offensive.
ally 2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a
ting arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities
elve pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to
the pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of
ded peace.
We
3. To permit the carrying out of General Assembly resolution [376
for (V) that Korea should be a unified, independent, democratic,
Teen sovereign State with a constitution and a government based on free
and popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by
with appropriate stages, from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in
ire" accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the
Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future
and government.
4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding
en graph, appropriate interim arrangements,
in accordance with
United Nations principles, will be made for the administration of
Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.
3. As soon as agreement has been reached on à cease-fire, the Gen-
mal Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall
include
representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the
the of a settlement, in conformity with existing international obligations
ace.
formal
een
1
Y
U
娘娘​烟​娘娘​这
​* Ibid., p. 13.
Supra, doc. 23.
:
2602
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
possible
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, First Commitee of
i.e., the principles adopted by the General Assembly's Group on a Cease-Fire
3 See the reply of Jan. 17, 1951, by Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist
Foreign Minister, declining to accept the principles (Department of State
Bulletin, Jan. 29, 1951, pp. 165–166) and Secretary Acheson's comments of the
and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Easter
problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and
of the representation of China in the United Nations.
37. TRANSMITTAL OF THE PRINCIPLES ADOPTED BY THE
UNITED NATIONS GROUP ON A CEASE-FIRE IN KOREA
TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME: Resolution of the
First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, January
13, 1951 1
The First Committee
Invites the Chairman of the First Committee, through the Secretary:
General, to transmit the principles approved by it on 13 January 1958
to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of
China and invite that Government to inform him as soon as
whether it accepts those principles as a basis for the peaceful settlement
of the Korean problem and other Far Eastern problems. Upan
the receipt of the reply from the Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China, the Chairman of the First Committe
will convene the Committee to consider that reply.
f
38. LABELING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS AGGRES
t
SORS IN KOREA: Resolution of the House of Representatives
January 19, 1951 4
t
t
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that d
the United Nations should immediately act and declare the Chines $1
Communist authorities an aggressor in Korea.
N
th
39. LABELING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS AGGRES:
SORS IN KOREA: Resolution of the United States Senate
,
January 23, 1951 5
It
N
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United Nations th
should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea th
dd
Meetings, p. 500.
in Korea on Jan. 11, 1951; supra.
8
N
t
.
CO
a
sta
de
date ibid., p).
4 H. Res. 77, 82d Cong., 1st sess.
5 S. Resolution 35, 82d Cong., 1st sess.
KOREA
2603
See supra, pp. 538-2539 and 2540-2541.
Nations. It has affronted the United Nations by the pretense that
ce of the Peiping regime? Does anyone believe that this intervention
2 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 5, 1951, pp. 203–205, 220. For a similar
statement by the U.S. Representative on Nov. 28, 1950, in the United Nations
Security Council, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1950, pp. 929–936.
s See supra, pp. 2537–2538.
-40. CONDEMNATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRES-
astem
SION IN KOREA: Statement by the United States Representa-
) and
tive at the United Nations Before Committee I of the U.N. General
Assembly, January 24, 1951 2
Mr. Chairman: The present stage of debate in this Committee
THE reveals a situation which is confused and uncertain. We must not
DREA let our minds be taken away from essential facts and basic principles.
of the The facts are not in dispute. The principles are the principles of the
mur Charter. This Committee should stop a moment and consider calmly
and objectively the essential elements of the situation which confronts
Us. What are these elements?
First, an organized armed aggression was committed by the forces
etary of North Korea against the Republic of Korea across the 38th parallel
195 on June 25, 1950. The facts of this aggression are unchallengeable.
lied They were established by the United Nations Commission in Korea 3
osible
. Let us at the very beginning be absolutely clear about these events.
ement There would have been no fighting in Korea except for that aggression.
Up Further, that aggression was committed with the encouragement,
of the participation, and support of the authorities in both Peiping and
mittel Moscow who furnished manpower and supplies to enable the aggres,
sion to occur. Interrogation of prisoners of war taken by the United
Nations forces reveals that long before June 25, Communist China
provided to North Korean authorities large numbers of military
RES the forces of Communist China.
personnel of Korean ancestry, estimated at 50,000 troops, drawn from
atives
,
Most of the military supplies came from the Soviet Union. At
very beginning of this aggression, the Security Council passed
two resolutions on June 25 and June 27.4 I should like to urge that
the delegates reread these resolutions. They still apply to the present
hinese situation. Those resolutions and the action taken by the United
Nations thereafter illustrated a principle of the Charter in operation;
the United Nations was in fact
and in deed fulfilling its purpose to
maintain international peace and security and to that end taking
collective measures for the suppression of an act of aggression.
Another essential element is that the Peiping regime has put its
own organized armed forces into Korea to assist the North Koreans.
It has committed a special offense
in waging war against the United
One that the intervention in Korea of the Chinese Communists' troops is
spontaneous act by the Chinese people and not an official decision
the
RES
nale,
itions
eu
ie-fire
in the Charter?
1 Warren R. Austin.
nuns
State
of the
4
2604
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The final effort was made on January 13 with the transmission to
Peiping of the five principles representing the minimum basis on which
These are the facts from which we must start. What is the United
Nations called upon to do in this present situation? We must oppose
and not reward the aggression. The first article of the Charter states
that it is the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international
peace and to that end to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression
of acts of aggression and to bring about by peaceful means and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law ad-
justment or settlement of situations. What does this mean? It
means the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea
where they have no right to be. Fundamental to the present situation
is the fact that the United Nations forces are in Korea to repel ag.
gression and to restore peace. United Nations forces should leeve
Korea when these missions are accomplished. United Nations forces
should not leave Korea under such conditions as would invite an
early resumption of North Korean or Chinese Communist aggression
.
A second step is to settle the Korean problem. On what basis
?
The United Nations gave long consideration to this last October
before the General Assembly adopted its resolution of October 7
1950.1 That resolution is as valid today as it was then because it is
in accordance with the principles of the Charter. We might all pause
and reread that resolution and refresh our recollection of what are
the United Nations objectives in Korea and how they should be
achieved. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly also
sets forth conditions for the withdrawal of United Nations forces,
A third step to bring about a general easing of the tension in the
Far East is to turn to the peaceful settlement of other Far Eastern
questions. As far as the United States is concerned, we are ready at
all times to take part in appropriate processes of peaceful settlement
for these and other questions. The United States Government takes
seriously its solemn obligations under article 33 of the Charter
. I
discussions are held, the United States will enter them in good faith
.
We will not commit ourselves in advance nor will we insist in advance
,
as the Chinese Communists do, that the discussions must lead to a
predetermined result in our favor.
Where are we
now in terms of carrying out the purposes of this great
organization? What has been happening since the Chinese Commis
nist intervention began and this Committee
started dealing with the
problem?
It has been 7 weeks since the General Assembly put this item on dit
agenda as an important and urgent matter. In the weeks which inter
vened, the Committee and its members have made unceasing effort
to bring
about in Korea
peace with justice, in accordance with prio
ciples of international law and the Charter. All these efforts were
rebuffed by Peiping.
an honorable settlement could be achieved.2
the
1
1
1
1
On January 17,
1 See supra, pp. 2576-2578.
2 See supra, doc. 37.
KOREA
2605
jose
ites
ina!
the
3101
I in
ad-
It
ret
tion
ago
:9 Te
rces
bise
ale
: U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, First Committee,
ted
Peiping regime flatly rejected the five principles. Its response, in-
cluding its so-called counterproposal," was utterly unacceptable. This
final effort at peaceful settlement having been rebuffed, the United
States introduced its resolution setting forth the undisputed facts and
providing for further steps which, we believe, the United Nations is
called upon to take under the Charter.?
This is where things stood when Sir Benegal Rau reported a further
communication from
Peiping to the Indian Ambassador.3 The United
States has great respect for India and for Sir Benegal's sincerity. We
admire his efforts, but, as the Philippine delegate said, we cannot
agree that this new communication changes very much.
In the first place, what is the status and character of this communi-
cation and to whom is it addressed? Does it purport to supersede the
response from Chou En-lai dated January 17, or is it merely an amplifi-
an
10n.
cation of the earlier response? If it is in answer to some questions put
sis?
to the Peiping government, what were those questions? Has the
ber
Peiping government reconsidered its earlier reply, and does it wish
17,
now to make a further communication to the United Nations? If
it is
that is so, there are simple ways for making such official and responsible
communications and the Chinese Communists know how to do it.
The United States does not wish ever in any case to close the door to
the possibility of negotiation and settlement by peaceful means in an
also
honorable way. Nor do we wish to be lacking in decent respect for
the opinion of others. But this latest communication from Peiping
the
appears to have all the aspects of a dusty answer. It appears to be
designed to confuse the United Nations, to divide its members, and to
becloud the issues that are before us.
If we read the proposal as a new offer to the United Nations and give
kes
it the benefit of every doubt as to its purport and its purposes, one
It thing remains clear: it is not an acceptance of the United Nations'
ith. proposal of January 13. Nowhere does it recognize the United Na-
tions or the resolutions of this Assembly.
The latest communication talks of a cease-fire for a limited time.
Does that mean that the negotiations might be interrupted at any
moment by a new attack from the Chinese Communists because the
talks were not going in exactly the way they wish? Are they seri-
the ously asking the United Nations to enter discussions in such circum-
stances? The five principles contemplated the immediate arrange-
its ment of a cease-fire to continue in effect until superseded by further
steps approved by the United Nations.
The Chinese Communist response does not accept the principle that
all non-Korean troops shall be withdrawn by appropriate stages from
Korea
. Instead, it says only that the Central
People's Government
will “advise” Chinese volunteers to return to China if the principle
that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea has been ac-
cepted and is being put into practice. In other words, the United
See United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, July 1950-February 1951
(Department of State publication 4263), pp. 35–36.
be
S.
ter?
y at
nent
nce,
to a
reat
mu-
ter
orts
rin-
Tere
to
nich
the
1
2 See infra, doc. 42
Meetings, p. 525.
2606
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
are
and
On
United Nations, that the Peiping reply is another rejection. It is
Nations forces are to be treated as having less right in Korea than the easy
forces of the aggressor, and only after the withdrawal of United Nathis
tions forces has begun will the Central People's Government "advise" T
its troops to go home.
hea!
Further, the cease-fire is not to be arranged in advance, but it is to shou
be negotiated by a 7-nation group while hostilities are still in L
progress.
Later negotiations, after the limited cease-fire, are agreed to by the
Nat
Central People's Government only in terms which prejudge the out- gres
come according to that Government's desires. Is this negotiation or
peal
discussion in the accepted meaning of the word? Is this what this do
committee had in mind when it transmitted the basis for a cease-fire amb
to Peiping?
Finally, the response demands, and I am now quoting the language
If
read to us by Sir Benegal on Monday, “The definite affirmation of they
the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China in the United 20
.
Nations must be insured.” This presumably means that the United
the
of
Nations is given an ultimatum that it must agree to accept a govern-
ber
ment currently an aggressor as the representative of China. The
decision as to which government should represent China in the
that
United Nations is a decision to be made by the United Nations
.
Peit
We have every confidence that it will be made soberly and justly
,
taking into account all the relevant circumstances. Surely, one of
lth
these relevant circumstances is the behavior of the Peiping regime
sett
and the fact that its armies are now on foreign soil as an invader
,
presently in battle with the forces of the United Nations and shedding
the blood of soldiers of many of the Governments sitting at this
flict
table. It is a matter of common sense as well as of principle that no
I
government can gain entry to the United Nations by force of bay-
onets and bullets. You can't shoot your way into the United Nations
.
of t
The question of Formosa, the Chinese representation, and of other
Far Eastern problems have been or can be put on the agenda of the
United Nations and dealt with by orderly United Nations processes
.
Various members of the United Nations may take differing
views on
the
question of Chinese representation and perhaps also on the future
of Formosa. But they cannot possibly disagree with my Govern-
ment's view that these problems must be solved in the United Nations
in accordance
with the Charter and the procedures provided for there
in and not by blackmail.
When we compare the five principles and the latest Peiping com-
munication, what do we find? The five principles meant in effect
that if the Chinese Communists ceased their attacks on United
Nations, forces, there could be an end to hostilities in Korea,
then there could be bona fide discussions with a view to achieving
United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means and to settling
other outstanding questions in the Far East. The Peiping communi-
cation does not in fact agree to a cessation of hostilities; it does not
in fact agree to discussions in good faith.
It is clear to us, as I am sure it is to most other members of the
In t
resti
SOCIE
thro
rific
mad
collo
ther
off
are
Inyc
late
OW
relo
Tor.
and
tack
Nat
OW
to
gtes
KOREA
2607
'ess.
1 01
II-
ens
Nations be so committed in Korea as not to be available for their
involvement. Some are concerned lest the strength of the United
Felopments in the Far East and what these mean to the rest of the
Nations to provide the unified support of every other Government
the easy enough to say yes if you mean yes. Peiping has said no, but
No this time it has said it less forthrightly.
ise" The present reply gives no inkling that there has been a change of
heart and that its intentions are honorable. The United Nations
3 to
should not be fooled.
Let us ask ourselves with honesty and candor whether the United
the Nations should put itself in the position of a suppliant to a trans-
jut
. Jgressor and make further appeals to Peiping. Would a further ap-
peal contribute to the authority of the United Nations and the system
this
of collective security? Would it not rather inflate the appetites and
fire ambitions of Peiping, confusing the world as to what the issues really
are and complicating a situation which is in fact a very simple one?
age
If particular members wish to address further appeals to Peiping,
l of they are at entire liberty to do so. My Government would raise
ted no objections. If these members receive any replies which reflect
ted the possibility of a reasonable settlement or the adoption by Peiping
of an acceptable course of conduct, of course my Government will
The be ready to consider them. But I would point out to my colleagues
the that this is not merely a problem of finding a formula acceptable to
Peiping. The result must also be acceptable to the United Nations
ly
,
and in conformity with the Charter. The United Nations has called
on its members for great sacrifices on behalf of collective security.
It has gone to great lengths to leave the way open for a peaceful
cer,
settlement of a situation brought about by flagrant aggression.
ng
In the conduct of military operations, its forces have used the greatest
his
restraint under_extreme provocation in order to localize the con-
Biet in Korea. But the United Nations must not be taken for granted.
By my colleagues to give some thought to the issue of collective
security
. "Collective security is not merely a phrase. The views
of the people of the United States on this matter were developed
he through a generation of vigorous debate and are linked with the sac-
rifices of the peoples of the world in World War II which had to be
made because the world had not been able to establish a system of
collective security to meet Nazi aggression. We do recognize that
there are honest differences on the question before us on the points
of view of the Governments represented around this table. Some
pre remote from the scene of conflict and hope somehow to avoid
own defense. Others take differing views about the nature of de-
ed
nd
acked
, each of us would in that situation desperately ask the United
our own countries? Only by a determination to take united action
to support each other faithfully and vigorously. when an act of ag-
me
S
I ask
ns.
er*
25.
OD.
Ere
I-
ms
P
1.
ct.
o o
1o
at
gression occurs.
le
is
2608
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ar
91
u
hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in
3 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 A
in Korea, Jan. 2, 1951, and Principles Adopted by the General Assembly's Group | tt
See Report to the U.N. General Assembly from its Group on & Ceass-Fire
41. CONDEMNATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRES
SION IN KOREA: Statement by the President, January 25, 1951
Ambassador Austin has fully and forcefully presented the views d
this Government on our attitude toward aggression by the Chines
Communists. These views have the solid support of the Executire, as
the Congress, and the people of the United States.
Each member of the United Nations must make its own decision on M
this issue. For my part, I believe in calling an aggressor an aggressor
. m
The question of what can and should be done about the aggression is te
Korea of course must be discussed with all other friendly nations.
Obviously, this is no time for rash or unwise action. This is a time to
for clear thinking and firmness.
Let me stress again that the American resolution contains--as ad
our proposals have contained a method for bringing about a cease of
fire and opening the way for peaceful settlement of outstanding issues q
tr
42. CONDEMNATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRES
SION IN KOREA: Resolution 498 (V) of the United Nations
General Assembly, February 1, 1951 3
4
The General Assembly,
Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of
the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibi. K
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security in regant
to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea,
Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's R-
public of China has not accepted United Nations proposals * to bring A
about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful setlet
ment, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and
K
their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there,
1. Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who
were already committing aggression in Korea and by, engaging in
T
aggression in Korea;
2. Calls upon the Central People's Government of the Peoples
Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease
hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from
Korea;
1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 5, 1951, p. 205.
(A/1775/Add. 1), p. 1.
/
tr
II
M
SI
R
08
P
2 See supra.
&
on a Cease-Fire in Korea, Jan. 11, 1951; supra, docs. 35 and 36.
I
KOREA
2609
1
IS.
Philippine Republic, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela,
the members of the General Assembly (A/1779) that Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo
(Mexico) and Mr. Sven Grafstrom (Sweden) had accepted his invitation to form
3 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 16, 1951, pp. 603-605 (also available as
Department of State publication 4195; 1951).
GRES 3. Afirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its
, 1951" action in Korea to meet the aggression;
4. Calls upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every
ew ed assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;
hinese
hip 5. Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving any
cutire assistance to the aggressors in Korea;
6. Requests a Committee composed of the members of the Collective
sion en Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional
Tesser
: measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon
sion in to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is
authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee referred
a time to in the following paragraph reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;
7. Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations
-as al to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement
ceast of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and re-
issues. quests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith
two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to
use their good offices to this end.?
RES
:
ations
43. UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT:
Address by the President, April 11, 1951 3
I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in
nsibi- Korea and about our policy in the Far East.
regard in the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are
trying to prevent a third world war.
s Re-
I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June.
bring and they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help
setle the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now ,
a apo many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend
Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.
It is right for us to be in Korea. It was right last June. It is
e who right today.
I want to remind you why this is true.
The COMMUNIST THREAT TO FREEDOM
The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous con-
spiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to
The Collective Measures Committee, set up by the General Assembly's
of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, the
ity of
ople's
ng in
江​田
​ed in
ople's
cease
from
2014
and Yugoslavi
- Fire
Group
The President of the General Assembly, on 19 February 1951, informed
415900_-57-Vol. 2
-61
2610
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
8
t
I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report which si
came to us after the attack. It is a report of a speech a Communist to
army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs
shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a carefully pre-
trained in Moscow, told his men: "Our forces," he said, "are scheduled It
coming attack on South Korea marks the first step toward the libera
succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal
victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot
and will not-sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only
question is: When is the best time to meet the threat and how?
The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier
to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has
become a roaring blaze.
And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-
loving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are
likely to be picked off, one by one.
If they had followed the right policies in the 1930's—if the free
countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the dictators,
and if they had acted in the beginning, when the aggression was
small—there probably would have been no World War II.
If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in
the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world. When that
aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful
nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present
danger to the security and independence of every free nation.
This is a lesson that most people in this country have learned
thoroughly. This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the
United Nations. And since the end of World War II we have been
putting that lesson into practice—we have been working with other
free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before
they can result in a third world war.
That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by
S
the aggression of international communism.
The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this
country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported
Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of
the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.
b
Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade
That too could have led to war.
But again it was settled because
free men would not back down in an emergency.
THE COMMUNIST PLAN FOR CONQUEST
The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous
move the Communists have yet made.
8
The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of
Asia.
th
last May, one month before South Korea was invaded. The report
pared plot. Here is part of what the Communist officer
, who had been
to attack South Korean forces about the middle of June. .
10
(
CI
m
NE
01
/
Dit
The
,"
KOREA
2611
}
fighting in Indochina and other countries in that part of the world.
muled It has already slowed down the timetable of conquest.
been large increases in the enemy's available air forces.
icipal
Notice that he used the word "liberation." That is Communist
not-double-talk meaning "conquest."
onlr I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what
another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months
zasier before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: "In order to
t has successfully undertake the long awaited world revolution, we must
first unify Asia. . . . Java, Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thai-
eace land, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets. . .. The United
y are States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all countries
in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia
free and crush the United States.'
ktors, That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people, and
was that is what they have been trying to do.
They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin.
This plan of conquest is in flat contradiction to what we believe.
that We believe that Korea belongs to the Koreans, that India belongs to
rerful the Indians--that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out
esent their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far
East and everywhere else.
The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in
the the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped the
bean North Koreans for aggression. The Chinese Communists massed 44
other well-trained and well-equipped divisions on the Korean frontier.
efore These were the troops they threw into battle when the North Korean
Communists were beaten.
d by
STOPPING SHORT OF GENERAL WAR
this
The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of
conquest can be stopped without general war.
Our Govern-
ment and other countries associated with us in the United Nations
believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to
meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.
That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task.
But so far it has been successful.
So far, we have prevented World War III.
So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggres-
sion from succeeding
and bringing on a general war." And the ability
of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been
We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found out that aggres-
hich sion is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who
want
gnist to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know
now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight and that
Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now
The
ground forces for a new mass offensive. We also know that there have
orted
ts of
rade.
cause
TOUS
110 greatly improved.
eurs
port they will stand up and fight.
pre-
een
era-
2612
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
m
WW:
ac
IT
It is the course consistent with our obligation /
experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective to
First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of
the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United
Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and here
If a new attack comes, I feel confident it will be turned back. Their
United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well equipped
. In
They are fighting for a just cause. They are proving to all the world
that the principle of collective security will work. We are proud of all
these forces for the magnificent job they have done against heavy oddsen
We pray that their efforts may succeed, for upon their success may
th
hinge the peace of the world.
11
The Communist side must now choose its course of action. The co
Communist rulers may press the attack against us. They may take a
further action which will spread the conflict. They have that choice
,
and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow. The Com
munists also have the choice of a peaceful settlement which could lead by
to a general relaxation of tensions in the Far East. The decision is a
theirs, because the forces of the United Nations will strive to limit the
conflict if possible.
We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying
to prevent a world war--not to start one. The best way to do that is
to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to
resist the attack.
THE BEST COURSE TO FOLLOW
But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the
aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why
don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland als
China?
If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk
of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have
brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.
di
If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast ti
conflict on the continent of Asi i and our task would become immeasura co
ably more difficult all over the world.
What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our PE
military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China?
It may well be that, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists th
may spread the war. But it would be wrong—tragically wrong
us to take the initiative in extending the war.
North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand
The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the K
Sp
additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese
stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers
, and the
scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.
Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict.
The course we have been following is the one best calculated on the
avoid an all-out war.
course of action we can follow.
re
ni
II
9
De
KOREA
2613
2.
t the always open.
181 is
d the demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership
ration interested in real peace.
The inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger
oped
. now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may
world discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.
of all Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength
odds every day. In the United States, in Western Europe, and throughout
may the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building
their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from
The continuing the war in Korea—and from undertaking new acts of
take aggression elsewhere.
Oice
, If the Commurist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in
Com Korca, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities
lesd beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their
on is aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is
Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compro-
rying mise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.
I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the
Tue to war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military
advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course
we are following is the best course.
I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital
h the
reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are
not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world
nd of
is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.
AVOIDING CONFUSION OVER U.S. POLICY
hare
A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur
did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essen-
u vast tial to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or
Asu- confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.
It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself com-
ir ou pelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest
na? military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important
inists than any individual.
.foThe change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever
in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in
d the Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a
stand speedy and successful conclusion,
inee The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already
We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in
ed the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only
Our
Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the
Thr
e risk
needed for this task.
ectire
will of
Inited
following factors:
One
: the fighting must stop.
not break out again.
Two:
concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will
hare
2614
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950--1955
0
83
1
11
8
Three: there must be an end to the aggression.
t
A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for
the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective
We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are
trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas
.
But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as
to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to
continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to
destroy the Republic of Korea.
That is our military objective—to repel attack and to restore peace
.
In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action
among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of
resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the
turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving
peace and security.
The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace
The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent d
a third world war.
That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come.
But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming
,
We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to
prevent that disaster. And in so doing we know that we are following
the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.
0
th
a
44. UNITED NATIONS STRATEGIC EMBARGO AGAINST COM
MUNIST CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: Resolution 500 (V) of 5
the United Nations General Assembly, May 18, 1951
TE
1
t
0
2
3
4
The General Assembly,
Noting the report of the Additional Measures Committee deted
14 May 1951,
Recalling its resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951,
Nothing [Noting] that:
(a) The Additional Measures Committee established by that
resolution has considered additional measures to be employed to
meet the aggression in Korea,
(6) The Additional Measures Committee has reported that a
number of States have
already taken measures designed to deny
contributions to the military strength of the forces opposing the
United Nations in Korea,
(c) The Additional Measures Committee has also reported that
certain economic measures designed further to deny such contribu
1 U.N. General Assembly, Oficial Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 A
(A/1775/Add. 1), p. 2.
· See U.N. doc. A/1799.
3 Supra, doc, 42.
SE
P
4
KOREA
2615
1
SO AS
is of
this embargo;
eace,
ome.
Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1951, pp. 923–926.
tions would support and supplement the military action of the United
Nations in Korea and would assist in putting an end to the aggression,
1. Recommends that every State:
.
ctive
.
(a) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control
Te are of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China
areas and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and imple-
ments of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation
ure to materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of
pt to
arms, ammunition and implements of war;
6) Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall
react within the embargo, and apply controls to give effect to the embargo;
ction
(c) Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention
of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the
} the
present resolution;
eving
(d) Co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of
(0) Report to the Additional Measures Committee, within thirty
zvent
days and thereafter at the request of the Committee, on the measures
taken in accordance with the present resolution;
ning. 2. Requests the Additional Measures Committee:
irt to
wing
(a) To report to the General Assembly, with recommendations as
appropriate, on the general effectiveness of the embargo and the
desirability of continuing, extending or relaxing it;
(6) To continue its consideration of additional measures to be
employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon
further to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Com-
1) of mittee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee
reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;
3. Reaffirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations
to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea,
and the achievement
of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests
the Good Offices Committee to continue its good offices.
that
I to 45. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN
CONFLICT: Statement by the Secretary of State, June 1, 1951 ?
eny
The real issues in the discussion before us are peace or war, and the
the survival of human freedom.
It is not just a difference as to method which is now under examina-
het tion. What is challenged is the bedrock purpose of our foreign
bu policy
, and of what we have been trying to do. That is the place I
rould like to start, in this brief statement.
See U.N. General Assembly, Oficial Records, Fifth Session, First Committee,
* Made before the Senate Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committees;
OM
ated
t &
OA
1
448d Meeting.
2616
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The attack on Korea was a blow at the foundation of this whole
program. It was a challenge to the whole system of collective
was
was
anc
on
T
act
The foreign policy of the United States has a central and dominant was
objective-to protect the nation and to safeguard the future of its
people. We stand ready to defend our future by force of arms if that
up
necessity is forced upon us. But we seek to deter war if we can. *]
Another world war would be destructive beyond experience; it
sys
would not solve problems, but multiply them. Therefore, it is part oth
of our fundamental purpose to prevent, by all honorable means, the 1
outbreak of another general war.
Even before the last world war was over, while our young men Pre
were storming the beaches at Normandy and Saipan and dozens of full
other places now engraved in our memories, the resolution was forming pri
among our people that future wars must be prevented.
Their conviction grew that the best way to protect the security of pea
our nation and of our people was to prevent war, and that the way to
go about it was through an international system of collective security
.
The Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations-
these were not cynical slogans. They represented the idea which our
people felt in their hearts was worth fighting for.
Wh
It has been the purpose of our foreign policy to keep faith with that this
idea.
I
The attempt to build a collective security system on the basis of
the cooperation of all the great powers broke down because of the Un
policies of the Soviet Union. But Soviet ambitions have not been ber
able to obstruct our determined efforts.
Within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, we
have been building a collective security system based on the coopera- the
tion of those nations who are dedicated to peace.
ger
The united and determined effort of our people to build effective
instruments for keeping the peace is recorded in a series of vigorous pec
and far-sighted actions: the United Nations Charter itself
, the Rio de
Treaty, the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, the day
North Atlantic Treaty, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program tha
We have been building our
strength, together with our allies. We
must be strong enough to keep the peace.
Side by side with these programs there is another basic element in
our foreign policy: to assist the hundreds of millions of people who
in
were acquiring their independence after the war, so that they might
be free to develop in their own way, and to join in an international the
system for preserving the peace.
Our hopes for peace required us to understand the changes which ро
were in motion among vast populations
of the Middle East and Asis
and to help peoples who had just gained their independence from
KO
losing it again to the new imperialism of the Soviet Union.
Those are the big, central ideas that express what we have bet
trying to do in the world.
T!
THE CHALLENGE OF KOREA
n
red
toti
to
to
po
;
th
KOREA
2617
S-
Our
i
the plans for carrying it to a conclusion, need to be considered.
tant was & threat to all nations newly arrived at independence. This
its dagger thrust pinned a warning notice to the wall which said: "Give
hat
up or be conquered.
This was a test which would decide whether our collective security
; it system would survive or would crumble. It would determine whether
part other nations would be intimidated by this show of force.
the The decision to meet force with force in Korea was essential. It
was the unanimous view of the political and military advisers of the
nen President that this was the right thing to do. This decision had the
s of full support of the American people because it accorded with the
ing principles by which Americans live.
As a people we condemn aggression of any kind. We reject ap-
Idd peasement of any kind.
kind. If we stood with our arms folded while Korea
1 to was swallowed up, it would have meant abandoning our principles,
ity
, and it would have meant the defeat of the collective security system
on which our own safety ultimately depends.
What I want to stress here is that it was not only a crucial decision
whether or not to meet this aggression; it was no less important how
bet this aggression was to be dealt with.
In the first place, the attack on Korea has been met by collective
action. The United States brought the aggression in Korea before the
the United Nations, not only because the Charter requires it, but also
200 because the authority and even the survival of that organization
was directly involved.
response of some members of the United Nations, in terms of
their capacities and their other security responsibilities, has been
generous and wholehearted.
ave
The total action is admittedly an imperfect one, as might be ex-
Das pected of beginning steps in a collective security system. But the
Rhe development of this system requires us to take into consideration the
che dangers and interests of those associated with us, just as we want
them to take into consideration our dangers and interests.
Te
In the second place, our response to the aggression against Korea
required a careful estimate of the risks involved in the light of the
ho
There was the risk that the conflict might spread into a general war
bin Asia, a risk that the Chinese Communists might intervene, a risk
that the Soviet Union might declare itself in.
We take it for granted that risk of some sort is implicit in any
positive policy, and that there is also a risk in doing nothing.
The elements of risk and the means of reducing that risk to us and
to the rest of the free world quite properly influenced our policy in
It has been our purpose to turn back this Communist thrust, and
This is in accord with one of the most fundamental tenets of our
policy-to prevent, in so far as we can do so, another world war.
It is aguinst this basic purpose that the operation in Korea, and
16
The
18-
mi.
in total world situation.
23
mi
Korea.
-D
e
2618
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
I
Cal
C&
mt
Both are willing-indeed desire—to end the fighting by an honorable
settlement which will end the aggression, provide against its renewal
Neither will purchase a settlement by allowing the aggressors t
profit by their wrong. Neither believes that the destruction or un
conditional surrender of the aggressor is necessary to attain the goal
WHAT THE DEFENSE OF KOREA HAS ACCOMPLISHED
ha
The operation in Korea has been a success. Both the North C
Koreans and the Chinese Communists declared it to be their purposeth
to drive the United Nations forces out of Korea and impose Com-
munist rule throughout the entire peninsula. They have been pre is
vented from accomplishing their objective.
It has been charged that the American and allied forces fighting in ha
Korea are engaged in a pointless and inconclusive struggle. bu
Nothing could be farther from the fact. They have been magrif-wi
cent. Their gallant, determined and successful fight has checked the
Communist advance and turned it into a retreat. They have admin-
istered terrible defeats to the Communist forces. In so doing, the C
have scored a powerful victory.
Their victory has dealt Communist imperialist aims in Asia a severe trs
setback.
The alluring prospect for the Communist conspiracy in June, 1950–
the prospect of a quick and easy success which would not only win of
Korea for the Kremlin but shake the free nations of Asia and paralya be
the defense of Europe all this has evaporated.
Instead of weakening the rest of the world, they have solidified it
.
They have given a powerful impetus to the military preparations of ple
this country and its associates in and out of the North Atlantic Treaty pe
Organization.
We have doubled the number of our men under arms, and the pro-
duction of matériel has been boosted to a point where it can begin to
have a profound effect on the maintenance of the peace.
be
The idea of collective security has been put to the test, and has been
sustained. The nations who believe in collective security have shown be
that they can stick together and fight together.
New urgency has been given to the negotiation of a peace treaty with
Japan, and of initial security arrangements to build strength in the
Pacific area.
bl
These are some of the results of the attack on Korea, unexpected
by--and I am sure most unwelcome to the Kremlin.
How THE FIGHTING CAN BE BROUGHT TO AN END
The objective of our military operation in Korea is to end the aggres
sion, to safeguard against its renewal, and to restore
fie
wide agreement on this objective in the domestic discussions of this
bi
issue.
Both the Administration and its critics have said that the object of be
the courses they propose is to end the aggression and restore peace th
ha
and restore peace.
80
SIC
WE
te:
m
ce
There is
peace.
A
82
KOREA
2619
82d Congress, 1st Session, etc., pp. 322–1662.
1
yere
I think it is fair to say that all of the President's advisers believe
hostilities and ending the aggression in Korea.
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
General Marshall, General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have given you, in detail, the reasons why they believe that the
orth Chinese Communists will be defeated in Korea and must abandon
pose their purpose.
om- They report that our forces are in excellent shape, that their morale
pre is high and that they are in a good supply position.
They report not only that the mass attacks launched by the enemy
gi have failed to break through the firepower of United Nations forces,
but that the offensives of the enemy have been broken and thrown back
nifi with enormous enemy casualties.
the These defeats in Korea, together with other consequences of this
min campaign, present grave problems for the Communist authorities in
her China.
While the manpower resources of China are vast, its supply of
trained men is limited. They cannot cover up their casualties. They
cannot gloss over the draft of more and more men for military service.
The Chinese Red leaders have betrayed their long-standing pledge
win of demobilization and the military demand for manpower has, instead,
yze been increased.
Peiping has also broken its promises of social and economic improve-
fit
ment. In the great cities, dependent on imported materials, unem-
3 ]
ployment
increases. The régime has not lightened the burdens of the
ats people
. It has made them heavier.
All of this is reflected in a sharp increase in repressive measures,
and in propaganda to whip up the flagging zeal of their own people.
i to
In the light of all these factors, I believe that the aggression can best
be brought to an end with a minimum risk and a minimum loss, by
continuing the punishing defeat of the Chinese in Korea. This is
10 being done.
No one can predict when the fighting will stop and when the aggres-
ith
sion will end. It is also true that no one could have foretold exactly
the
what would happen when we undertook action to end the Berlin
blockade, but we did what we thought was right and the blockade
ced
Was ended.
No one could have foretold how the aggression in Greece would be
terminated, but again we took those measures which our best judg-
ment and sense indicated were the right ones and the aggression
While the outcome of every course of action in the foreign policy
field cannot be predicted with
certainty in advance
, it is our responsi-
bility in taking action to apply our best judgment on the basis of the
of
Be
ale
el
Se Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings Before the Committee on
DIO-
Pen
ceased.
PS.
18
best information at hand.
1-
2620
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Or
ነከ
in
WC
SU
sti
This view is certainly not well enough grounded to justify a gamble
THE PROPOSAL TO ENLARGE THE WAR
I should like briefly to address myself to the alternative course
which was placed before this Committee. This course would seek to
bring the conflict in Korea to an end by enlarging the sphere of bil
hostilities.
I will not try to review the military considerations involved in this to
proposed course, since these have been thoroughly discussed by the th
previous witnesses before your Committees.
It is enough to say that it is the judgment of the President's military
advisers that the proposed enlargement of our military action would
not exercise a prompt and decisive effect in bringing the hostilities
to an end. To this judgment there must be added a recognition of the thu
grave risks and other disadvantages of this alternative course.
Against the dubious advantages of spreading the war in an initially ris
limited manner to the mainland of China, there must be measured
sti
the risk of a general war with China, the risk of Soviet intervention
,
and of World War III, as well as the probable effects upon the soli
darity of the free world coalition.
th
The advocates of this program make two assumptions which
ab
require careful examination. They assume that the Soviet Unionda
will not necessarily respond to any action on our part. They also
assume that in the build-up of strength relative to the Soviet Union
and the Communist sphere, time is not necessarily on our side.
As to Soviet reactions, no one can be sure he is forecasting accurately
th
what they would be, but there are certain facts at hand that bear on
this question.
No
We know of Soviet influence in North Korea, of Soviet assistance
WH
to the North Koreans and to Communist China, and we know that
understandings must have accompanied this assistance. We also
th
know that there is a treaty between the Soviets and the Chinese
Communists.?
But, even if the treaty did not exist, China is the Soviet Union's
to
largest and most important satellite."' Russian self-interest in the
Far East and the necessity of maintaining prestige in the Communist
sphere make it difficult to see how the Soviet Union could ignore a
PT
direct attack upon the Chinese mainland.
I cannot accept the assumption that the Soviet Union will go its
way regardless of what we do. I do not think that Russian policy is
if
formed that way any more than our own policy is formed that way
.
fo
with the essential security of our nation.
In response to the proposed course of action, there are a number
of courses of counteraction open to the Soviets.
fo
They could turn over to the Chinese large numbers of planes
with
sh
"volunteer” crews for retaliatory action in Korea and outside. They
might participate with the Soviet air force and the submarine fleet
,
The Kremlin could elect to parallel the action taken by Peiping
th
1 See the testimony of General MacArthur; Military Situation in the Far Ball
pp. 3–320.
ap
2 Supra, pp. 2463–2465.
mi
to
ser
QU
ma
m
8.7
or
&
KOREA
2621
war
urse
ito
ON
동
​security system-all this in return for what?
force-in-being, both in the United States and among our allies, to
onslaught, and to ensure that our allies will not suffer occupation
that would enable us to win a war.
and intervene with a half million or more ground force "volunteers";
or it could go the whole way and launch an all-out war.
Singly, or in combination, these reactions contain explosive possi-
of bilities, not only for the Far East, but for the rest of the world as well.
We should also analyze the effect on our allies of our taking steps
chis to initiate the spread of war beyond Korea. It would severely weaken
the their ties with us and in some instances it might sever them.
They are understandably reluctant to be drawn into a general war
UT in the Far East-one which holds the possibilities of becoming a
uld
with the progress of the effort to repel aggression, an effort which in
he their belief offers an honorable and far less catastrophic solution.
If we followed the course proposed, we would be increasing our
Hy risks and commitments at the same time that we diminished our
ved strength by reducing the strength and determination of our coalition.
), We cannot expect that our collective security system will long
oli survive if we take steps which unnecessarily and dangerously expose
the people who are in the system with us. They would understand-
ch ably hesitate to be tied to a partner who leads them to a highly
dangerous short cut across a difficult crevasse.
Iso
In relation to the total world threat, our safety requires that we
strengthen, not weaken, the bonds of our collective security system.
The power of our coalition to deter an attack depends in part upon
ely the will and the mutual confidence of our partners. If we, by the
measures proposed, were to weaken that effect, particularly in the
North Atlantic area, we would be jeopardizing the security of an area
which is vital to our own national security.
at What this adds up to, it seems to me, is that we are being asked
to undertake a large risk of general war with China, risk of war with
the Soviet Union, and a demonstrable weakening of our collective
is
In return for measures whose effectiveness in bringing the conflict
to an early conclusion are judged doubtful by our responsible military
Before concluding, I should like to deal briefly with the related
proposition that we may need to take extreme risks now because time
AS
may not be on our side. I believe this is wrong.
The basic premise of our foreign
policy is that time is on our side
if we make good use of it. This does not necessarily mean that time
must bring us to a point where we can match the Soviet Union man-
What it does mean is that we need to use the time we have to build
an effective deterrent force. This requires us to create sufficient
h
I
and destruction. And back of this shield we need to have the potential
3
approach our objective of preventing war.
OD
ce
SO
se
he
st
authorities.
a
is
7.
e
er
2622
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
mi
De
Wh
OT
cor
Re
SCO
Un
1
ASS
1951; infra, pp. 3101-3105) also included embargo provisions which became
5 Positive List of Commodities. See Department of Commerce, Office of
International Trade, Comprehensive Export Schedule, Appendix A, Sec. 399.1.
Can we do this? I believe we can. We and our allies have the
capacity to out-produce the Soviet bloc by a staggering margin
There is no doubt about that. Our capacity to produce has been set
in motion and is rapidly getting to the point where its output will be
vast and its effect significant.
tou
There is also the critical factor of our will. The future belongs to
des
freedom if free men have the will to make time work on their side.
has
Ste
I believe the American people and their allies do have the will
, the
will to work together when their freedom is threatened
No
sud
This is the ultimate source of our faith and our confidence. A free
society can call upon profound resources among its people in behalf
of a righteous cause.
46. UNITED STATES EMBARGO ACTION AGAINST COM-
MUNIST CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: Report Submitted by bas
the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations
to the Additional Measures Committee of the United Nations of
General Assembly, June 15, 1951 (Excerpt)
bas
tra
PART I
the
The controls applied by the United States on shipments to the
Chinese Communists and the North Korean authorities are more
comprehensive than those called for by Resolution 500(V) and were
placed in effect before that Resolution was passed. Exports from the
the United States of arms, ammunition and implements of war
(Annex I); and atomic energy materials (Annex II) to North Kores Ad
and to Communist China have not been authorized at any time, and
exports of a number of other strategic articles were severely restricted
and in some instances embargoed for some time prior to June 1950.
Since the end of June 1950, the United States Government has per-
mitted no shipments to North Korea and applied an embargo on
shipments to Communist China not only
of arms and munitions but
also of atomic energy materials, petroleum products, and other items by
of strategic value included in the United States Positive List. by
(Annex III.) 5
The scope of the economic measures applied against the Chinese by
Communists by the United States was greatly
extended when it
became unmistakably clear that they were engaged
in large-scale
shi
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, pp. 54-60 (U.N. doc. A[184
July 12, 1951, pp. 48–52). For introductory comments on the report by Ernest
g01
A. Gross, Deputy U.S. Representative to the General Assembly,
1951, p. 54. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Act of Oct. 26,
,
2 U.N. General Assembly Res. 500 (V), May 18, 1951; supra, doc. 44.
3 Annexes not printed here,
July 9, 1951, pp. 56-58.
12' Fed. Reg. 1855 and Amendment 14 Fed. Reg. 1156 for List A. See 1?
Fed. Reg. 7651 for List B.
to
CON
und
em
Ste
ma
me
101
mo
the
Co
For annex I, see Department of State Bulletin
,
1
2
KOREA
2623
1 Act of Aug. 1, 1946; 60 Stat, 755,
ree
IDS
governments have been licensed since that time.
Commodities which appear on the Positive List are placed there after
the military operations against United Nations forces in Korea. Since
Fin.
December 1950, the United States has not exported any materials
whatever to Communist China. Vessels and aircraft documented
set
be
or registered under United States laws have not been permitted to
touch at any Chinese Communist port or area or to carry any cargo
destined directly or indirectly for Communist China. Strict control
.to
de
has been exercised over commodities in transit through the United
the
States destined for Communist China. All Communist China and
North Korea assets within the United States have been blocked and
subjected to stringent controls.
The United States believes that the United States Positive List
contains items which would meet the intent of the General Assembly
Resolution of May 18. Not all these items are included within the
scope of paragraph 1 (A) of the Resolution. Nevertheless, the
M: United States believes that the control of such items furthers the
by basic purpose of the Resolution.
The scope and detail of the United States Munitions List, the list
of atomic energy materials, and the United States Positive List may
assist cooperating States in effecting the embargo by providing a
basis for that efficient customs administration, control of transit
trade
, and control over transport of prohibited cargoes which it is
purpose of the Resolution to accomplish. It may also contribute
he
to the working out of such further measures in the field of economic
controls as may become appropriate or necessary,
The United States will prevent by all means within its jurisdiction
the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States
under the Resolution and cooperate fully with other States and the
Additional Measures Committee in carrying out the purposes of this
ed
50.
PART II
er-
The following is a summary of the measures taken by the United
on States to control its trade with the aggressors.
ut
The export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined
is by Presidential Proclamation 2776, of April 13, 1948, is controlled
st by the Secretary of State (Annex 1). The export of atomic energy
materials as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946' is controlled
$e by the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Annex II). Ship-
it
ments of such materials to Communist China and North Korea have
De not been authorized at any time. In November 1949, this policy
was extended to include Hong Kong and Macao, as possible trans-
shipment points
, and only very limited materials for the use of these
-6
,
export from the United States to foreign destinations of com-
modities in short supply and of strategic
materials is controlled through
the Positive List administered by the Department of Commerce
under the authority of the Export Control
Act of 19492 (Annex III).
the
re
Pra
om
781
es
mnd embargo.
31,
The
le
12
ol
1.
2
Act of Feb. 26, 1949; 63 Stat. 7.
2624
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
all
Or
or
cal
&C
eco
10
í
101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, issued Transportation po-
1 15 Fed. Reg. 4744, 8562-8563, 9140; for excerpts, see Department of State
determination by the United States Government that they possess
sufficient strategic value or are in such critical supply as to justify at
careful screening of destination and end-use. Such commodities
cannot be exported to foreign destinations without validated export 19
licenses.
shi
From June 1950, shortly after the North Korean aggression against at
the Republic of Korea, until December 1950, the United States tio
Government was applying an embargo over shipments to Communist be
China of arms and munitions, petroleum products, atomic energy tio
materials, and all other items on the United States Positive List.
Since June 1950, no shipments of any kind have been permitted to
go to North Korea, and the subsequent measures outlined below have the
been applied to North Korea as well as Communist China. CH
As a precaution, in the light of the Chinese Communist intervention iss-
in the Korean struggle, the Department of Commerce issued an
order, effective December 3, 1950, subjecting all proposed exports
from the United States to the mainland of China or to Hong Kong
and Macao (as possible transshipment points) to a screening procedure Cb
in order to prevent Communist China from obtaining materials, the
receipt of which by Communist China would be contrary to the Sta
objectives of the United Nations in Korea. The order revoked :]
General Licenses for the exportation of any commodity, whether or
by
not included on the Positive List, to Communist China and to Hong
Kong and Macao.
OG
On December 7, 1950, an additional Department of Commerce
order was issued providing authorization for United States officials for
to stop shipments loaded under General Licenses if the ships carne
into United States ports en route. Since that date, accordingly, the
validated export licenses are required for all commodities intended | bla
for the destinations noted above if a vessel, whatever its registry, bes inc
not obtained clearance from the final port of departure in the United wh
States for a foreign port or if, after receiving final clearance, the vessel ch
transits the Panama Canal Zone. The order directed that shipments
which were not licensed were required to be off-loaded prior to final by
clearance or proceeding through the Canal Zone. Under Department Se
of Commerce orders effective December 4, and 6, 1950, shipments of all
do
commodities, whether or not on the Positive List
, originating in ga
foreign country moving in transit through the United States or using
the facilities of a foreign trade zone or manifested to the United States
may not be exported to China, Manchuria, Hong Kong or Macao
without a validated export license. The foregoing actions were taken
under the authority of the Export Control Act of 1949 (See Annet she
IV).
Ön December 8, 1950, the Department of Commerce, Under com
Secretary for Transportation, under the authority granted by Section shi
Order T-1 This order directed that no person should transport in
any ship documented under the laws of the United States or in any
Bulletin, July 9, 1951, pp. 58-59.
res
pro
in
or
1
1
Те:
195
?
3
KOREA
2625
3 Foreign Assets Control Regulations; 15 Fed. Reg. 9040.
Sess
ties
or
ave
-101
ure
individual Chinese and Koreans in the United States and abroad,
United States, cargo of any kind to Communist ports or to any other
Text of Transportation Order T-1 also in Department of State Bulletin, July 9,
1 Transportation Order T-1; 15 Fed. Reg. 8777. Interpretation, ibid., 9145.
? See Department of State statement of Dec. 16, 1950; supra, doc. 33.
aircraft registered under the laws of the United States any commodities
at the time on the Positive List, or any article on the Munitions List,
any article controlled for export under the Atomic Energy Act of
port 1946, to China, Manchuria, Hong Kong or Macao; and no person
should discharge from any such ship or aircraft any such commodity
nast at these ports or areas, or at any other ports in transit to such destina-
tions, without a validated export license, or unless authorization had
been obtained from the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transporta-
TET tion. The prohibition applied to the ship or aircraft owner, master
or any other officer or employee of the owner (Annex V).1
be On December 16, 1950, the Department of State announced that
the United States was taking measures to place under control all
Chinese Communist assets within United States jurisdiction and was
issuing regulations to prohibit ships of United States registry from
an calling at Chinese Communist ports until further notice. These
orts actions were necessary to accomplish the effective control of the
ng economic relationships between the United States and Communist
China-North Korea envisaged by the December 3 requirement that
the
no exports would be permitted to these destinations from the United
the States without validated export licenses (Annex VI).
The Department of the Treasury accomplished this financial control
by action under the Foreign Assets Regulations (pursuant to the first
ng War Powers Act of 1941 and the Trading With the Enemy Act of
October 6, 1917, as amended) blocking the United States assets of
residents of China and North Korea. The blocking regulations
als forbade all transactions involving bank accounts and United States
assets of the Communist Chinese and the North Korean regimes and
ly
, their nationals unless Treasury approval was obtained. A series of
blanket authorizations were included in the regulations, protecting
bed where these persons were not acting on behalf of the North Korean or
se Chinese Communist regimes (Annex VII)?
nts The Department of Commerce accomplished its shipping controls
Lal by the issuance of Transportation Order T-2, under the authority of
ent Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. This order
all provided, in substance, that no person
should take any ship or aircraft
documented or registered under the laws of the United States to any
Chinese
Communist port or area; that no person should transport
,
m any ship or aircraft documented or registered under the laws of the
places under the control of the Chinese Communists; that no person
should take on board any such ship or aircraft any cargo if he knows
or has reason to believe that it is destined, directỉy or indirectly, for
let Communist China; and
that no person shouảd discharge from any such
on | skip or aircraft any such cargo so destined at any place other than the
port where the cargo was loaded, or within territory under United
OT
rce
The
las
ng
tes
80
en
er
OD
in
DY
1951, p. 59.
ate
415900-57_Vol. 2-62
2626
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
States jurisdiction, or in Japan. This order was made applicable to D.
the owner, master, or any other officer, employee or agent of the
owner of the ship or aircraft. (Annex VIII).
48
47. APPEAL FOR ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES IN KOREA:
Communication From the Unified Command to the Secretary.
General of the United Nations, June 21, 1951 2
ence
mu
COL
ISSI
an
reg
The acting representative of the United States to the United
Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the of
United Nations and has the honor to address a communication on
KO
behalf of the United States, acting in its capacity as the Unified UI
Command, concerning the need for additional ground troops from
Member Governments of the United Nations for the collective
for
effort in Korea.
ob
The Unified Command has conducted and is now conducting
extensive bilateral conversations in connection with this problem m
with various Member States and, in particular, is conducting coll- ho
versations with States which have already contributed armed forces
.
In order to further efforts of the Unified Command in this respect, illo
the Secretary-General is requested to send communications on behal
of the Unified Command to Member Governments which previously
gave a favorable reply either to the Security Council's resolution the
of June 25, 1950,3 or to its resolution of June 27, 1950,4 but which
have not yet contributed armed forces for the collective effort in
Korea, advising the aforementioned Members of the need for further
AG
ground assistance in Korea. There is a real need for additional of
forces from Member States in the light of massive Chinese Com-
munist concentrations in the area and of their continuing aggression
.
in
The Unified Command therefore requests the Secretary-General in foli
his communication to appeal to Member Governments which have
given their support to the Security Council resolutions but have not
made contributions of armed forces that they give immediate con
;
sideration to making an initial contribution of ground forces of
substantial character, consonant with their respective capabilities
and other responsibilities.
Further, it is requested that Member Governments be asked to
notify the Secretary-General of offers in general terms, detailed
arrangements to be made by the respective Member
Governments
and the Unified Command.
SIO
Text also in Department of
1
1 Transportation Order T-2; 15 Fed. Reg. 9063.
State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 60.
2 Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 53.
3 Supra, pp. 2538-2539.
4 Supra, pp. 2540–2541.
2
Ne
to
3
(DE
Ger
KOREA
2627
(Department of State publication 3938; 1950), pp. 84-161. Cited hereafter as
A
1
Om
em
1 U.N. doc. S/3079, Aug. 7, 1953, pp. 8-18.
Negotiations for a Korean Armistice, June 28, 1951, and Proposed Initial Meeting
3 See Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Victims
to D. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE AGREE-
the
MENT, JUNE 1951-JULY 1953
48. SUMMARY OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE
BA:
1951-JULY 1953: Special Report of the United Nations Command
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, August 7, 1953
A. In general
ted
The history of the continuing efforts of the Unified Command and
the of the United Nations at all times to bring an end to the fighting in
Korea on an honourable basis is set forth in various documents of
the
fed United Nations. The Unified Command took numerous steps to this
end on its own initiative and co-operated fully with proposals of others
1P for bringing about peace on a basis consistent with United Nations
objectives in Korea.
ing
In July [June] 1951, it appeared from statements made by Com-
munist spokesmen ? that the aggressor forces were willing to cease
01 hostilities. However, the hopes of the Unified Command for quickly
Ses concluding an agreement that would stop the fighting soon proved
illusory. Time after time the Communists stalled, injected extraneous
half
issues, endeavoured to use the negotiations for propaganda purposes,
sky and otherwise indicated a lack of good faith. Despite these obstacles
the United Nations negotiators consistently evinced a willingness to
The United Nations Command was determined that the Armistice
her
Agreement must contribute to the achievement of the basic purposes
nal
of the United Nations military action in Korea-to repel the aggres-
m-
slon against the Republic of Korea and to restore peace and security
in the area. The United Nations Command therefore insisted on the
following requirements:
(1) A line of demarcation based upon military realities and affording
defensible positions for the opposing forces, consistent with the
United Nations objective of repelling aggression;
(2) Other provisions offering maximum reasonable assurance against
a renewal of the aggression;
to
(3) Appropriate arrangements for an exchange of prisoners of war
on a basis that would ensure the return of United Nations Com-
mand prisoners of war and the disposition of prisoners safe-
guarding the right of asylum, consistent with international law,
the Geneva Convention and humanitarian principles.
ICTA
200
Ich reach agreement.
in
OD.
11
ve
lot
ll-
of
les
के 8
its
of
Geneva Conventions.
2628
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
nu
hil
an
8
in
for
ph
CUS
ret
hoi
ned
rer
ani
lan
See statement by the Secretary of State, July 19, 1951; Department of State
So long as the Communists refused to agree to an armistice on this
basis, the United Nations Command was compelled to insist on the
continuation of the fighting in accordance with the resolutions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly, so as to compel the
enemy to accept an honourable end to the fighting.
B. Early obstacles to agreement
(1) The agenda and the conference site
At the very beginning of negotiations the Communists raised issues
calculated to delay them. They sought adoption of an agenda that
would prejudice in their favour the substance of the items to be dis-
cussed. The Communists sought, for example, to obtain agreement
on language in the agenda recognizing the 38th parallel as the line of
demarcation for the cease-fire. The Communists also proposed an
thi
agenda item on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. The
United Nations Command insisted on an objective agenda, and one
"pp
was finally adopted. The question of the withdrawal of foreign
troops was rejected as beyond the scope of military negotiations?
fiel
Delay was also occasioned by Communist violations of the neutrality
of the conference area and failure to provide equal treatment to both
Co
delegations as originally promised. fabricated charges by the Com-
munists that the United Nations Command had violated the neutrality
Un
of the conference area led to suspension of the talks for two months
from August to October 1951.3
be
(2) Arrangements for implementing the armistice
The armistice, of course, had to contain provisions for putting an
pri
end to the fighting. The United Nations Command delegation also
del
sought arrangements which would make renewal of the hostilities less
Th
likely. The negotiations on these matters were extended and pains-
taking. The United Nations Command delegation wanted the broad-
est possible access to all parts of Korea for a supervisory body to
fift
ensure against violations of the armistice. It was quite willing to
have such inspection behind its own lines. The Communists, however,
for some time resisted all proposals for inspection and finally agreed
to it only on a limited scale. At one point, the United Nations Compell
mand proposed inspection of the implementation of the armistice by
joint teams to operate throughout Korea. Following Communist
rejection of this proposal, agreement was reached on arrangements
for inspection by observers drawn from countries not participating
in the Korean action and acceptable to both sides. But the Com
munists further delayed the negotiations by nominating the Soviet
Union as a “neutral", this was of course unacceptable to the United
7,1
Nations Command.4
The United Nations Command proposed a ban, applicable to bolo
sides, on the construction
of new military airfields and a ceiling on the
Ger
1 See Agreed Agenda for Armistice Negotiations, July 26, 1951; infra, doe ale
Bulletin, July 30, 1951, p. 188.
* See statement by the commander-in-Chief
, U.N. Command, of August 2
1951; ibid., Sept. 3, 1951, pp. 390–391.
4 See Progress of Armistice Negotiations, June 13, 1951; infra, doc. 58.
acc
to
eve
Ass
ant
On
Wh
CODE
hur
reso
1
2
3
Con
pp.
5
2
Con
of $
KOREA
2629
of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608.
es
at
1
15.
nt
290
ne
2
humanitarian principles and the principles of the General Assembly
Command to the Security Council (Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 18, 1952,
General Ridgway (ibid., May 19, 1952, pp. 786–788).
+ Res. 610 (VII); infra, doc, 62.
See letter of Apr. 17, 1953, from Lt. Gen. W. K. Harrison, senior U.N.
Command delegate, to General Nam Il, senior Communist delegate; Department
number of civilian airfields that could be rehabilitated. Such a pro-
Dis
he
hibition would have made resumption of the aggression more difficult
and less likely. The Communists adamantly refused to agree to such
he
he
a limitation.
(3) Prisoners of war
The issue that, in appearance at least, contributed most to the delay
in achieving an armistice involved the repatriation of prisoners of war.
From the outset the United Nations Command made it clear that,
while it was prepared to repatriate all the prisoners of war in its
custody, it would not agree to use force against prisoners resisting
return to the Communists. The Communists stubbornly insisted,
however, that all prisoners of war must be returned, by force if
of necessary
.
In an extraordinary effort to break the long continuing deadlock on
he
this issue the United Nations Command, on 28 April 1952, offered a
“package proposal” ? providing that (a) there shall not be forced
repatriation of prisoners of war; (b) that the United Nations Command
will not insist on prohibiting reconstruction and rehabilitation of air-
felds; and (c) the United Nations Command agrees to accept Poland
and Czechoslovakia as members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission if the Communists agree to accept Sweden and Switzer-
IT
land (thus withdrawing their demand for the inclusion of the Soviet
chs
The United Nations Command made it clear that this proposal must
be accepted as a unit. The Communists, however, purported to
accept the second and third points only, remaining adamant on
As a result of their rejection, the armistice was
delayed and the fighting continued for fifteen 'additional months.
They persisted in this inhumane attitude for many months, contrary
de to international law and in the face of preponderant world opinion,
to even after the principle of non-forcible repatriation was approved by
fifty-four Members of the United Nations who supported the General
Assembly resolution of 3 December 1952.4 Communist intransigence,
ed and Communist failure to bargain in good faith on this issue, com-
pelled the United Nations Command to recess the plenary negotiations
on 8 October 1952. They were not resumed until 26 April 1953,
when the Communists finally indicated that they were prepared to
consider a solution for the prisoner of war question consistent with
See Exchanges of Prisoners of War, Jan. 2, 1952; infra, doc. 55.
See Support for U.N. Three-Point Proposal in Armistice Negotiations, May
mi
Union).
al
ISO
prisoners of war.
SS
IS-
to
I,
1-
OF
5
ist
its
ng
resolution.
11-
et
ed
7, 1952; infra, doc. 57.
th
be
il.
fe
13
2630 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2. Both sides will withdraw their forces from the Demilitarized
C. The agreements finally reached
All the agreements between the United Nations Command Delega-
tion and the Communist Delegation are set forth in the attached
Armistice Agreement and the Prisoner of War Agreement with
the Supplementary Agreement of 27 July attached to it. In some
cases, as the record of the negotiations indicates, the United Nations
Command recorded its understanding as to the meaning of phrases
in the Armistice Agreement that might otherwise be ambiguous
.
(1) The Military Demarcation Line
The Communists delayed negotiations for some time by insisting
that the demarcation line between both sides should be the 38th
parallel. Finally, however, they recognized the merit of the United
Nations Command position that the line should be determined strictly
on military grounds and should correspond to the actual line of
contact between the opposing forces. The objective of the United
Nations Command in insisting on such a line was to provide maximum
defensive safeguards against a possible renewal of the aggression.
The line of demarcation was first marked out on 27 November
1951, on the basis of the line of contact as of that time. It was
then agreed that this should be the final demarcation line, provided
an armistice was achieved within thirty days; otherwise the line
should be redrawn on the basis of the line of contact at the time
of the armistice. In fact, tentative agreement was reached on 8
new line in June 1953, when it seemed that an armistice could be
signed within a very few days, but the Communists insisted that
it be redrawn again to take account of the results of the offensive
they launched on 13-14 July 1953. The Demarcation Line 78
finally agreed on the basis indicated in the map attached to the
Armistice Agreement. The Demilitarized Zone was established in
accordance with the agreement, each side withdrawing its forces
two kilometres north and south of the Demarcation Line respectively.
(2) Arrangements for implementing the armistice
With the exception of the continuing disagreement on the rehabil-
tation of airfields, the arrangements for implementing the armistice
were virtually completed by March 1952. The United Nations Com-
mand finally gave up its insistence on the limitation of airfields when
it signed the armistice. The agreements on this subject may
summarized as follows:
1. There will be a cease-fire within twelve hours of the signing
of an armistice.
Zone within seventy-two hours
after the signing of an'armistice
3. All military forces will be withdrawn from rear areas and the
coastal islands and waters of Korea within five days after the
signing of an armistice.
1 Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724–750. Not attached here.
: See Agreement on Military Demarcation Line, Nov. 23, 1951; infra, doc
. a
* See Principles for Carrying Out Armistice, Nov.
27, 1951; infra, doc. 54.
5 Supra, p. 725.
be
1
poli
pre
the
1
Nati
1958
KOREA
2631
Nations Repatriation Commission, see Department of State Bulletin, June 22,
842
ons
Ses
um
V&S
ded
me
Concerning subsequent appointment of the representatives to the Neutral
4. Both sides shall cease the introduction into Korea of reinforc-
ing military personnel. However, the rotation of 35,000 mili-
hed tary personnel a month shall be permitted. Rotated personnel
with shall enter Korea only through designated ports of entry,
ume under the supervision and inspection of the teams of the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
5. Both sides shall cease the introduction into Korea of rein-
forcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and
ammunition. However, the replacement of destroyed, dam-
cing
aged, worn-out or used up equipment on the basis of piece-
Sth
for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type is per-
ted
mitted. Such replacement shall take place only through
atly
designated ports of entry, under the supervision and inspection
of teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
ted
6. A Military Armistice Commission, with headquarters at
Panmunjom composed of military officers of the United
Nations Command and the Communist forces and aided by
ber
Joint Observer Teams will:
(a) Supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement;
(b) Deal with alleged armistice violations and settle through
negotiations any such violations;
(c) Report all violations of the Armistice Agreement to the
Commanders of the opposing sides.
7. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, with headquar-
ters in proximity to those of the Military Armistice Commis-
sion, composed of four senior officers, two of whom shall be
appointed by neutral nations nominated by the United Nations
Command and two of whom shall be appointed by neutral
nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the
Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers 1 will supervise, observe, inspect, and
investigate adherence to the terms of the armistice agreement
relative to the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military
personnel and equipment. At the request of the Military
Armistice Commission or senior member of either side, it can
conduct special observation and inspection at places outside
the demilitarized zone where violations have been reported.
ing Twenty inspection teams, ten of which will be located at the
designated ports of entry, five in North Korea and five in
South Korea, with ten mobile teams in reserve, will assist the
(3) The political conference following an armistice
In order to counter the constant efforts of the Communists to inject
political questions into the Korean armistice negotiations, and to
prevent such extraneous issues from delaying armistice negotiations,
the United
Nations Command agreed to dispose of political questions
me
be
247
Fas
the
in
ces
Ir
.
ili
ice
m.
ell
be
ed
Commission.
Ce.
he
he
53
.
1953, p. 868.
2632
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
8nO
to
tar
WO
posed by India and discussed in the hope of gaining Communist
2 See Suspension of the Korean Armistice Negotiations, Oct. 8, 1952; infra,
by recommending their consideration at a political conference follor far
ing an armistice. The United Nations Command Delegation accepted ad
a revised Communist proposal now contained in article 60 of the sho
Armistice Agreement, which provides:
bel
“In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean ques the
tion, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend
for
to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that
1
within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed
pos
and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of off
both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to le
settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean
question, etc."
(4) Prisoners of war
Na
Co
The background of this question, and the position of the United
Nations Command was outlined in the Special Unified Command sti
of
report of 18 October 1952 (A/2228). As indicated at that time, the
only issue preventing agreement was Communist insistence that all to
the
prisoners of war must be repatriated, even if the use of force should
be necessary to effect their return, and United Nations Command pro
diu
refusal to use force against such' unwilling prisoners. When the
It
Communists insisted that there were in fact no prisoners who refused
to be repatriated, but that the United Nations Command was de-
taining them against their will, the United Nations Command made the
numerous proposals for impartial determination of the true attitudes ste
of the prisoners of war. The Communists refused to submit this wh
question to the test and thus further delaved achievement of an
th
armistice.
s
On 8 October 1952, the United Nations Command Delegation to
qu
cessed the negotiations. In doing so, it made clear that the numerous
proposals which it had made for an honourable solution of the prisoner
question remained open. Whenever the Communists were prepared
to negotiate in good faith, to accept any one of the United Nations
Go
Command proposals
, or to make a constructive proposal of their own
do
on the prisoner issue, the United Nations Command Delegation
would be prepared to meet again.
At this juncture the Korean question came before the General
Assembly, and the United States Government, as the Unified Com
mand, reported on the state of the negotiations. It urged the As
sembly to approve the principle of nonforcible repatriation and to
call upon the Communists to accept an armistice on this basis. .
definite plan for the solution of the prisoner-of-war question was prie
approval
, and on 3 December 1952, by a majority of 54 votes 1
1 Released also as U.S. delegation press release No. 1554, Oct. 18, 1962
,
exc
pro
We
r
me
40
rea
20
Ap
1
2
3
Qu
inft
195
doc. 61.
KOREA
2633
Par, Feb. 22, 1953; infra, doc. 63.
Question of Repatriating Prisoners of War, Apr. 5, 1953; infra, doc. 64.
infra, doc. 65. See also the 67th Report of the U.N. Command (S/3084), Aug. 21,
1953; also found in Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 28, 1953, pp. 423-425.
ues-
to
021
Por favour, with only the Soviet bloc in opposition, the General Assembly
oted adopted resolution 610 (VIT). This resolution specified that force
the should not be used against prisoners to prevent or effect their return,
and it set forth a detailed series of proposals which the Assembly
believed would form a just and reasonable basis for an agreement on
the prisoner issue. The Communists rejected this plan, and hopes
end for an armistice in the foreseeable future appeared dim.
hat,
Nevertheless, the Unified Command continued to examine every
ned
possibility for solving the prisoner question. Seizing the opportunity
I of
offered by a resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the
League of Red Cross Societies on 13 December 1952, which appealed
to the parties, as a gesture of good will, to implement the humani-
tarian principles of the Geneva Convention by repatriating sick and
wounded prisoners of war, the Commander-in-Chief of the United
Nations Command, on 22 February 1953, addressed a letter to the
ited
Communist commanders stating that the United Nations Command
and
still remained ready to implement, immediately, the repatriation
the of the sick and wounded, and asking if the Communists were prepared
all to proceed with the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners in
-uld their custody. The United Nations Command had made this same
end proposal to the Communists on a number of previous occasions
the during the armistice negotiations, but they had failed to respond.
sed
It
was hoped that the Communists would at last agree to such an
de exchange
, that it would bring about the return of at least some of
ade the United Nations Command prisoners of war, and that this first
des step might pave the way for the solution of the prisoner issue as a
Chis trhole
. The hopes of the United Nations Command in this regard
proved not unwarranted. On 28 March the Communists agreed to
the principle of the exchange of sick and wounded, which they stated
"should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire
Des question of prisoners of war", and arrangements for the exchange
were initiated through the respective liaison officers on 6 April.
The Communist acceptance was followed on 30 March by a state-
ment by Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Communist People's
Government of the People's Republic of China, subsequently en-
101
dorsed by the Prime Minister of the North Korean regime, indicating
a desire to resume negotiations on the entire prisoner question and a
al readiness to take a more constructive and humane attitude on the
question of forcible repatriation.
ds Sick and wounded prisoners of war were in fact exchanged between
20 April and 3 May 1953 pursuant to an agreement reached on 11
April 1953.5
Te-
3
ner
red
ONS
152
11-
to
TO
ist
1 Infra doc. 62.
See U.N. Proposal for the Exchange of Sick and Wounded Prisoners of
10
3
4 Ibid.
ta
ese Repatriation of Sick and Injured Captured Personnel, Apr. 11, 1953;
2634
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
m
lo
rem
ma
im
ab
Pri
ret
wa
3
On
On 8 June, the Senior Delegates for the United Nations Command
Negotiations by the plenary armistice delegations on the prisoner-
of-war question as a whole resumed on 26 April. At the outset
, the
Communists submitted a proposal for sending all prisoners not di
rectly repatriated to an agreed neutral State where for six months th
after their arrival representatives of the States to which they be W
longed would "explain" to them matters related to their return; i
Cc
after this period any non-repatriates remained, their disposition
would be referred to the political conference. Discussion subsequently R
centered upon the questions of what neutral State should be nomi-
nated, of whether non-repatriates should be removed from Korea
,
and how long the non-repatriates would remain in neutral custody.
On 7 May, the Communists put forward a new proposal pro-
viding for establishment of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-
mission to be composed of the four States already nominated for
membership on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
, ,
namely, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, and Indie
as agreed upon by both sides. This Commission was to take custody w
of the prisoners in Korea. The United Nations Command on 13
the
May presented a counter-proposal shortening the period of time
in which the non-repatriates would remain in neutral custody, pro- It
viding for release of Korean non-repatriates immediately after the the
armistice, and proposing that only Indian forces take actual custody
po
of the non-repatriates. The Communists rejected this proposal
On 25 May, the United Nations Command, in another effort to
obtain Communist agreement on an equitable solution of the prisoner Ko
issue, submitted a new proposal 4 providing for the transfer of both
lor
Korean and Chinese non-repatriates to neutral custody and for
consideration of the disposition of any remaining non-repatriates Ag
by the political conference for a limited period, after which they
might either be released to civilian status or the question of their
disposition referred to the General Assembly. On 4 June, the Com
munists offered a counter-proposal in effect based upon the mechanics sti
of General Assembly resolution 610 (VII), also closely parallelling abi
the
the United Nations Command 25 May proposal
, but vague.com
Th
basic principle of non-forcible repatriation. The United Nations the
Command succeeded in reaching agreement with the Communists
on elaboration of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission's
terms of reference to insure that there could be no abuse and that
the principle approved by the General Assembly that force should
not be used to compel or to prevent repatriation of any prisoner of
war would be fully observed.
is[attached to and incorporated by reference in the Armistice Agreso
081
WO
sti
ant
ani
1
2
8
infi
of
to 1
195
$
8
of )
p. I
Rhe
1 See Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1953, pp. 687-688.
2 Ibid., May 18, 1953, p. 727.
3 Ibid., May 25, 1953, pp. 755-757.
* See 70th Report of the U.N. Command, Sept. 14, 1953 (S/3096).
Obi
Coi
Jun
KOREA
2635
June 19, 1953; Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 906-907.
mi-
TO-
m-
me
TO-
1 Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724–750.
* See Escape of North Korean Non-Repatriate Prisoners of War, June 18, 1953;
s See Escape of Prisoners of War, June 29, 1953; infra, doc. 68.
Rhee-Robertson discussions (ibid., July 13, 1953, pp. 45-46). See also Common
Objectives with Respect to Korea, July 11, 1953; infra, doc. 82.
Communist Forces in Korea to the Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command,
ler-
ment. The delegations then proceeded to the final arrangements
the
looking toward an early signature of the armistice.
di
As a result of discussions with the Republic of Korea, described in
ths
the succeeding section, a Supplementary Agreement on Prisoners of
be-
War was signed on 27 July 1953, which permits the United Nations
if
Command (and the Communists if applicable), to transport the non-
on repatriates to the Demilitarized Zone where the Neutral Nations
thy Repatriation Commission will take custody of them.
D. The attitude of the Republic of Korea
', On 18 June an incident occurred which further delayed the achieve-
08 ment of an armistice at a time when the conclusion of hostilities seemed
imminent. On that date, officials of the Republic of Korea brought
about a break-out from prisoner-of-war camps of some 27,000 Korean
for prisoners of war who had previously indicated they would resist
repatriation to North Korea. This action by the Republic of Korea
dia
was inconsistent with the 8 June Agreement on Prisoners of War
ody which the United Nations Command had entered into on behalf of all
13
the forces under its command. The United Nations Command at
once protested the action of the Republic of Korea Government.
It immediately informed the Communists of the event and told them
the
that, while efforts would be made to recover as many of the escapees as
possible, there was not much hope that many of these could be re-
captured since they had melted into the South Korean population.
This incident led to immediate discussions with the Republic of
Korea by representatives of the Unified Command.
oth
longed conversations, the Republic of Korea gave assurances that it
for would not obstruct the implementation of the terms of the Armistice
ley
The incident, however, gave the Communists an excuse for delaying
still further the conclusion of the armistice. They demanded assur-
ances that the United Nations Command would live up to the Armi-
ies
stice Agreement, that the Republic of Korea and its forces would also
habide by it, and that the released prisoners would be recaptured.?
The United Nations Command reply to the Communists stressed that
the armistice was a military agreement between military commanders
and that it was being entered into by the United Nations Command,
n's
ld
of
nd
See Escape of Prisoners of War, June 20, 1953; infra, doc. 67. See also message
to the President of the Republic of Korea; Department of State Bulletin, July 6,
of June
22
, on his departure for Korea (Department
of State Bulletin, July 6, 1953,
Bir 4) and statement by the Secretary of State of June 30 on the status of the
to
101
6
After pro-
tes Agreement.
ell
mi.
che
-HIS
sts
1986
? .
infra, doc. 66.
ch
el
1953, pp. 14-15.
1
2636
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950–1955
te
no
ot
]
gu
tives would discuss questions of assurances against the resumption
as Commander of all the forces under its command, including those of it
the Republic of Korea. The United Nations Command Delegation
also told the Communists that so far as recovering the released pris-
oners of war, as they had already been informed, this would be im-
possible; they were assured, however, that the remaining non- M
repatriate prisoners would be turned over to the Neutral Ñations
Repatriation Commission, as provided by the agreement on prisoners T
of war.
The Communists were assured that the United Nations
Command forces (including those of the Republic of Korea) would c
observe the armistice. The United Nations Command informed the
Communists, however, that it would not undertake to use force against
the Republic of Korea forces to ensure compliance with the armistice
51
by the Republic of Korea,
Despite these comprehensive assurances by the United Nations
Command, the Communists continued to delay negotiations and in
the meanwhile launched the biggest offensive in more than two years
,
an offensive which obviously took much planning and preparation
and caused heavy casualties. Finally, however, on 19 July, the Com-
be
munists stated their readiness to proceed with the final work on the
Armistice Agreement leading to its signature.
for
The armistice was finally signed on 27 July 1953, at 10 a. m. Korean
time.
49. INITIAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN SOVIET AND UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVES AT THE UNITED NATIONS
CONCERNING NEGOTIATION OF AN ARMISTICE: Statement
by the Department of State, June 28, 1951 2
51
The United States has sought in New York and in Moscow ?
clarification on certain aspects of the statement made by Jacob A:
Malik, the
Soviet representative at the United Nations, on June 23
Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko received the United States
Ambassador in Moscow on June 27. In discussing Mr. Malik's
statement, Mr. Gromyko indicated that it would be for the military
representatives of the Unified Command and of the Korean Republic
Command, on the one hand, and the military representatives of the
North Korean Command and of the "Chinese volunteer units
,
on the other, to negotiate the armistice envisaged in Mr. Maliks
statement. The armistice, Mr. Gromyko pointed out, would include
a cease-fire and would be limited to strictly military questions without
involving any political or territorial matters; the military representa-
.
Beyond the conclusion of an armistice, the Soviet Government had
no specific steps in mind looking toward the peaceful settlement is
which Mr. Málik referred. Mr. Gromyko indicated, however,
See Escape of Prisoners of War, June 29, 1953; infra, doc. 68.
2 Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 45.
3 Text in New York Times, June 24, 1951.
pre
at
COL
IM
the
est
ho
1
ari
tio
CEE
1
2
3
leti
KOREA
2637
4 Ibid., Aug. 26, 1951, pp. 231-232.
ON
S-
1-
I.
18
I'S
OS
Id
he
st
ce
NS
AL
IS
21
11-
he
I
4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.
? Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai.
3 Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 43. Brackets inserted in Bul-
of it would be up to the parties in Korea to decide what subsequent
special arrangements would have to be made for a political and
territorial settlement. He said that the Soviet Government was
not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on Mr.
Malik's statement.
The implications of Mr. Gromyko's observations are being studied.
The Department of State is consulting with the representatives of
other countries having armed forces in Korea under the Unified
Command.
50. PROPOSED INITIAL MEETING TO DISCUSS AN AR-
MISTICE: Message From the Commander-in-Chief, United Na-
tions Command, to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Chinese Com-
munist and North Korean Forces, June 30, 1951 3
As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command I have
been instructed to communicate to you the following:
am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing
for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate
guarantees for the inaintenance of such armistice.
Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be
prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date
at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting
ED
could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship (Jutlandia) in Wonsan harbor.
S
int
51. AGREED AGENDA FOR ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS:
8
Announcement by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Com-
A
mand, July 26, 1951 4
3.
This afternoon the delegations representing the belligerent forces
I'S
in Korea in the conference at Kaesong agreed upon an agenda for
TY
the regulation of the military armistice conference.
lic
This agenda is as follows:
he
1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to
establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of
3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and an
tions of a supervising organization
for carrying out the terms of a
ad
to
21.01
-
de
ut
hostilities in Korea.
&
OD
Cease-fire and armistice.
at
1 Gen. M. B. Ridgway.
letin account.
2638
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
M9
9.
vei
an-
va
WE
4 See Initial Exchanges Between Soviet and U.S. Representatives Concerning
5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned sti
on both sides.
te:
Having agreed upon an agenda, the way now is clear for the dele-
gations to enter the area of really substantive discussion of the terms
of a military armistice. Major problems remain to be solved in these
lin
discussions. It is much too early to predict either the success or the
rate of progress to be obtained. Preliminary discussion began in-
th
mediately after the agreement on the agenda in order that the poten-
tial for halting bloodshed in Korea may be realized as soon as possible
.
It must be fully realized that mutual acceptance of an agenda is
merely the initial step for the final goal of a military armistice and
fly
resultant cease-fire, which must be achieved under conditions giving
every reasonable assurance against the resumption of hostilities.
There are numerous basic points within the framework of the
the
agenda on which agreement must be reached and on which there is
to
presently wide diversion of views.
the
po
per
52. REQUEST FOR COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET UNION
IN NEGOTIATING A KOREAN ARMISTICE: Statement Read
by the American Ambassador at Moscow 1 to the Soviet Minister
the
for Foreign Affairs, October 5, 1951 3
by
I have been instructed before leaving Moscow for an extended
period to take advantage of the opportunity to discuss certain met-
of
ters now causing international tension and standing in the way
of
improved relations between our two countries.
At the present time the most explosive outstanding issue is Korea
and the armistice talks are the most immediate aspect
of that prob-
lem. The cessation of fighting in Korea on a mutually acceptable
of 1
basis would serve to reduce tensions and contribute to an atmosphere
be
in which further constructive steps might be taken toward the solution
of other pressing international problems.
The developments between the United Nations Command and the
North Korean and Chinese Communist negotiators are incompre
hensible to the United States Government. The North Korean and
Chinese Communist proposals in regard to an armistice line are in
aff
consistent with the current military situation and with statements
which Acting Foreign Minister Gromyko made to me upon the
oc
casion of my call on him on June 27 of this year to clarify the earlier
public statement by Mr. Malik in New York on June 25. In this ento
interview Mr. Gromyko explained that the Soviet Government en
visaged a meeting of the opposing commands to conclude a militar
armistice which would include a cease fire and which would be
limited
In
1 Alan G. Kirk,
2 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 29, 1951, pp. 687-688.
Negotiations for an Armistice, June 28, 1951; supra, doc. 49.
dre
fac
of
dis
reci
arn
Thi
its
the
con
site
enc
not
hay
SUIT
pur
tior
acci
KOREA
2639
access and to obviate the possibility of charges and countercharges
cms
Lese
en-
SIS
os
IS
have free access should eliminate the possibility of incidents and in-
proposing to discuss the change of site from Kaesong, the sole
purpose of the United Nations Command has been to obtain a resump-
tion of the talks in a truly neutral area with equality of rights and
ned strictly to military questions and would not involve any political or
territorial matters.
The United Nations Command was surprised and disappointed to
ele
discover that the opposing negotiators kept insisting upon an armistice
line not strictly military in character which introduced complicated
political and territorial issues contrary to the understanding on which
the
the United Nations Command had entered the negotiations and which
im-
does not conform to the military requirements for a satisfactory
armistice line. To take important political steps in military con-
ole
.
versations between the United Nations Commander on the one side
nd
and commanders on the other, who profess to represent Chinese
"volunteers” and a North Korean regime which enjoys no interna-
ing
tional status, cannot be accepted. The United Nations Commander
the
was authorized to participate in such military talks with the thought
that this would provide the Soviet Government with an opportunity
to assist in bringing about an armistice. This does not mean that
the United States Government is prepared to dispose of important
political matters in talks with such irregular Communist military
personnel. Political issues of a Korean settlement must be dealt
ON with subsequent to an armistice by the United Nations and by the
ead governments concerned on a responsible basis.
ster In the opinion of the United States Government the attitude of
the Communist bloc toward the restoration of peace will be tested
by whether the North Korean and Chinese Communist negotiators
ded are prepared to reach an armistice settlement based on purely military
et- factors ; upon a reasonable line affording safety to the armed forces
of both sides; and upon adequate arrangements for the inspection
of compliance with the armistice terms; and for the satisfactory
disposition of prisoners of war.
ed,
The Soviet Government must surely
recognize that, as a simple statement of fact, the breakdown of
ble armistice talks in Korea would add greatly to the explosive character
of the situation and might stimulate a course of events which would
be undesirable from the point of view of both our governments.
The United States Government for its part has clearly shown by
its declarations and by its actions that it desires an end to the conflict
in Korea and to prevent its spreading to other areas, purposes which
ud
the Soviet Government has publicly stated it shares.
With regard to the current status of the armistice talks, I wish to
Its affirm that the United Nations Command is sincerely desirous of
concluding an armistice. However, past experience
with the Kaesong
site fully illustrates the fact that this place does not afford adequate
protection guaranteeing the security of the negotiations. The insist-
face of the United Nations Command upon another site which will
IT not be under the control of either side and to which both sides will
sure that the talks can be resumed with good prospect of success.
of
ere
OD
be
re-
11-
DC
jel
181
}{lº
ng
2640
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1 For the text of the reply of Oct. 15, 1951, by the Soviet Minister for Foreign
Affairs counter-charging obstruction of an armistice by the Commander-in-Chief
U.N. Command, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 29, 1951, pp. 688–691
W
WI
SEE
eV
concerning incidents which have plagued the talks to this date. I 5
the eyes of the United Nations Command there is no reason why
agreement on another site truly neutral cannot be quickly agreed
upon by both sides and the talks resumed.
Of all the problems and causes of tensions in the postwar world the
Korean problem presents the clearest immediate issue. The invasion
of South Korea on June 25, 1950 was an act of naked aggression-bo
a fact understood throughout the world. The very fact that the
al
North Korean Army almost succeeded in reaching Pusan in the early th
stages of the war demonstrates clearly upon whose responsibility the
aggression lay. However, I have no desire now to enter into a fruit- m
less discussion concerning what has been done; what I do wish to
impress upon you is the seriousness of the present impasse in the tic
Korean armistice talks. It is hoped that the Soviet Government wi
act to the end that the North Korean and Chinese Communist nego de
tiators will conclude a realistic armistice agreement which would
afford safety for both sides and which does not become involved with
political and territorial issues with which the governments of the de
United Nations must deal.
lir
I assume that the Soviet Government is receiving full and objective
reports concerning developments outside the Soviet Union and the sic
attitude of the United States and other states confronted by Soviet
policies which have proved uncompromising and not contributory to
the solution of mutual problems. The Soviet Government does not sig
need to be told that other nations are determined to defend their own
way of life and independence. The measures now being taken by to
the United States and other governments to increase their security sig
are for defense and defense alone. On specific instructions of my de
government I wish to assure the Soviet Government that the United ch
States has no aggressive designs on the U.S.S.R. or on anyone
and bo
it is our hope that there may soon be restored to the nations of the
world a sense of confidence
and security which should be conducive wto
the settlement of outstanding issues embittering international relax th
tions. Nothing could contribute more to this as an immediate firs
step than the successful outcome of the Korean armistice talks.
Without the achievement of an armistice in Korea, there is lite
54
if any prospect for any real solution of other problems besetting us
throughout the world. An armistice in Korea might open up pele
spectives for the useful discussion of other measures which may
taken to alleviate existing tensions. In conclusion I should like
express
the hope of the United
States Go comment that an armistice de
can be achieved and that
the Soviet Government will act to that end) A
ses
ex
be
1
ಳ ಸ್ಥ
to
KOREA
2641
reaching of agreement between U.N. Command and Communist staff officers as
1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1036. Concerning the
SION
in 53. BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING A MILITARY DEMARCATION
why
LINE: Agreement Reached Between Representatives of the United
reed
Nations Command and the Chinese Communist and North Korean
Commands, November 23, 1951 1
the
1. The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between
both sides (as determined under either paragraph two or three, as
the appropriate) will be made the military demarcation line and that at
the time specified in the signed armistice agreement both sides will
the withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish the de-
uit militarized zone for the duration of the military armistice.
to
2. In accordance with the above-stated principle, the subdelega-
the tions will determine immediately the present line of contact so as to
will fix it as the military demarcation line and as the median line of the
ego-
demilitarized zone.
If the military armistice agreement is signed
within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary
with session this agreement and the specific location of the above military
the demarcation line and demilitarized zone, the military demarcation
line and demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of what-
táre ever changes may occur in the actual line of contact between both
the sides
Tiet 3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing
of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice agreement is not
not signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary
session this line and the demilitarized zone as determined in paragraph
by two above, the subdelegations shall revise, immediately prior to the
rity signing of the military armistice agreement, the above-mentioned
demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the
ited changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between
and both sides so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide
the exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior
to the signing of the military armistice agreement and will constitute
melis | the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice
first
012
my
e to
title
125
2
Der
be
e to
tice
54. PRINCIPLES FOR CARRYING OUT AN ARMISTICE: Proposal
by the United Nations Command, November 27, 1951
On November 27 the joint subcommittee accepted the staff officers'
the location of the battle line. Later the same day the Military
Armistice Conference began its first plenary session since October 25 by
ratifying the joint subcommittee's recommendation as to the establishment
The full conference then proceeded to a discussion of procedures to be
decision
on
ndi
!
of a line of demarcation.
eign
ve
691
.
p. 1037. See also infra.
* Ibid., p. 1037.
415900-57--Vol. 2-63
2642
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan, 21, 1952, pp. 105-106. For the text of a
Soviet counter-proposal introduced in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly
VE
SIC
un
followed after the signing of an armistice agreement. The U.N. delega-
tion presented the following principles:
1. There shall be a cease-fire, effective within 24 hours of the signing
of the armistice agreement, and adhered to by all forces of any type
under the control of either side.
2. There shall be established a supervisory organization, equally
pe
and jointly manned by both sides, for carrying out the terms of the
bo:
armistice agreement.
3. There shall be no increase of military forces, supplies, equipment,
and facilities by either side after the signing of the armistice. PC
4. The Military Armistice Commission, in carrying out its super-
visory functions, shall have free access to all parts of Korea, for itself
and for the joint observation teams responsible to the Armistice be
Commission.
the
5. There shall be general withdrawal of forces of each side, Air,
Ground, and Naval, Regular and Irregular, from the territory con-
trolled by the other side.
6. There shall be no armed forces in the Demilitarized Zone except for
as specifically and mutually agreed by both sides.
toi
7. The Military Commanders shall administer their portion of the
Demilitarized Zone in accord with the terms of the military armistice I
agreement.
of
COI
SISI
noi
CIV.
SUC
fajn
the
ans
55. EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR: Proposal by the United
Nations Command, January 2, 1952 1
be
des
tion
CIVI
Arn
V
pro
The UNC (United Nations Command) proposal is as follows:
1. POWs [Prisoners of War) who elect repatriation shall be ex.
changed on a one-for-one basis until one side has exchanged all such
POWs held by it.
2.
The side which thereafter holds POWs shall repatriate all those
POWs who elect to be repatriated in a one-for-one exchange for foreign
civilians interned by the other side, and for civilians and other persons 56
,
of the one side who are
at the time of the signing of the armistice in the N
territory under control
of the other side, and who elect to be repatri-
ated. POWs thus exchanged shall be paroled to the opposing force
such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual shal
not again bear arms against the side releasing him.
7
3. All POWs not electing repatriation shai be released from POW
D
status and shall be paroled, such parole to carry
with it the condition
in P
that
the individual will not again bear arms in the Korean conflict
4. All remaining civilians of either side who are at the time of the
signing of the armistice, in territory under control of the other side
,
shall be repatriated if they so elect.
A
U
И
lager
11
$
relief
14, 1952, pp. 46–47.
KOREA
2643
Desiring to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the negotiations
in Panmunjom and the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, and
agenda of the present session,5
' International Committee of the Red Cross.
3 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).
U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sirth Session, Supplement No. 20
relief and rehabilitation of Korea.
Item 17 concerned the problem of the independence of Korea; item 27, the
Wishing to avoid premature consideration of items 17 and 27 of the
er-
5. In order to insure that the choice regarding repatriation is made
without duress, delegates of the ICRC · shall be permitted to inter-
view all POWs at the points of exchange, and all civilians of either
side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in territory
pe
under the control of the other side.
ly
6. For the purposes of paragraphs 2, 4 and 5, civilians and other
persons of either side are defined as those who on 25 June 1950 were
he
bona-fide residents of either ROK ? or the DPRK.3
at
In summary, the UNC proposal provides for the release of all
POWs, including soldiers of the other side who may have been in-
corporated into the army of the detaining power. Thus, it is con-
el sistent with the first principle advanced by your side that all POWS
ce be released. As regards repatriation, it permits freedom of choice on
the part of the individual, thus insuring that there will be no forced
ir, repatriation against the will of an individual. It provides repatriation
not for POWs alone but for those other victims of war, the displaced
civilians. All those who desire it are permitted to return to their
cpt former homes. Finally the proposal provides for a supervisory organ
to interview the persons involved to insure that, whatever their choice,
dhe such choice will be made freely and without duress.
In advocating your proposal of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners
of war your side has many times asked the question, "What could be
fairer than the release and repatriation of all prisoners of war following
the armistice?" Today, in the proposal, the UNC gives you the
ced
answer to that question. The release of all persons who are or should
be classified as prisoners of war, and the repatriation of those who
desire to be repatriated, is fairer than the release and forced repatria-
Moreover, it is fairer to permit displaced
civilians who so desire to return to their former homes, under the
ch Armistice Agreement, than to neglect their interests in that agreement.
We ask your earnest consideration and early acceptance of this
1-
Ice
tion of all prisoners of war.
X-
proposal.
}se
go
INS
he
Ti-
ce
7856. CONVENING OF A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPON CONCLUSION OF
AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT: Resolution 507 (VI) of the
United Nations General Assembly, February 5, 1952 4
al
!
The General Assembly,
W
OD
he
16,
f&
oly
ale (A/2119), p. 7.
3n.
2644 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
On
+
ISS
DIO
ISSE
18
tio
mo
in
been dealt with individually, tentative agreement has been reached
2 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No.
Command Delegation on Apr. 28, 1952, in an executive session. Following the
4 The proposal was made to the Communists at Panmunjom by the UI/
Communist rejection of the proposal, the executive sessions were terminated
and General Ridgway released the substance of the proposal to the press (5
I
Decides that:
(a) Upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security
Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, the Secretary
General shall convene a special session of the General Assembly åt
the Headquarters of the United Nations to consider the above-
mentioned items; or
(6) When other developments in Korea make desirable considers
tion of the above-mentioned items, the Secretary-General, acting in in
accordance with Article 20 of the Charter and with the rules of pro-wo
cedure of the General Assembly, shall convene a special session or Un
an emergency special session of the General Assembly at the Head-
quarters of the United Nations;
sla
II
Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds et
established by General Assembly resolution 571 B (VI) of 7 December m
ho
1951 2 to undertake negotiations regarding voluntary contributions
to the programme of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction
for
Agency for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.
tio
57. THREE-POINT PROPOSAL FOR AN ARMISTICE SUB-ing
MITTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND: Statement
by the President, May 7, 1952 3
ch
U1
The United States fully approves and supports without qualifica-
tion the proposal for reaching an armistice which General Ridgway
has offered to the Communist aggressors in Korea.
Last July the United Nations forces had repulsed Communis
aggression in Korea, had proved to the Communists that aggression
cannot pay, and had brought new hope for peace to free men
the world. The Soviet Union then indicated that Korean hostilities
could be terminated by a military armistice. The United Nation
Command in good faith and in a sincere desire to find a basis for
peaceful settlement began armistice talks with the Communists in
Korea.
th
In
After many trying months of negotiation, in which each issue bus
Pr
1 U.N. doc. A/520/Rev. 2, June 5, 1951.
ar
(A/,
3 Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1952, pp. 787–788.
COL
4
around
9
mi
WU
CO
ar
W
ibid., pp. 786–787
KOREA
2645
ions
on all but three issues. It is now apparent that the three remaining
issues cannot be resolved separately. The United Nations Command
proposal offers a just and a real opportunity to resolve these three
rity
issues together and simultaneously. The three-point proposal is:
art-
y at
1. That there shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners of
OTO war-as the Communists have insisted. To agree to forced repatria-
tion would be unthinkable. It would be repugnant to the funda-
er&- mental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our action
g in in Korea. To return these prisoners of war in our hands by force
pro-would result in misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the
D or United States and of the United Nations.
ead-
We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for
slaughter or slavery.
The United Nations Command has observed the most extreme care
in separating those prisoners who have said they would forcibly oppose
inds
return to Communist control. We have offered to submit to an
aber impartial re-screening--after an armistice-of those persons we would
hold in our custody.
tion Nothing could be fairer. For the Communists to insist upon the
forcible return to them of persons who wish to remain out of their
control is an amazing disclosure before the whole world of the opera-
2. That the United Nations Command will not insist on prohibit-
UB
: | ing reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields.
3. That the neutral nations supervisory commission should com-
prise representatives of four countries; Poland and Czechoslovakia
chosen by the Communists, Sweden and Switzerland chosen by the
ሰ fica-
United Nations Command.
The three parts of General Ridgway's proposal are all parts of a
whole
. They must be considered as an entity-not piecemeal. Our
agreement is contingent upon acceptance of the whole proposal.
This is our position. The Communists thus far have indicated only
& willingness to withdraw their proposal that the U.S.S.R. be a
member of the neutral inspection commission. This spurious issue
was raised by them late in negotiations and its withdrawal is no real
The patience and understanding shown by General Ridgway and
hai
the United Nations Command negotiators merit the highest praise.
In spite of almost overwhelming provocation, they have made real
progress in reaching agreement on many substantial terms for an
armistice. General Ridgway's proposal offers a sound and sensible
way to settle the remaining issues all at once.
appeal to those sincerely desiring peace.
It will have compelling
tion of their system.
není
WAT
mist
3100
und
ities
ions
Dr &
concession on their part.
hed
2:52
ul
the
sted
Septe
2646
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
D
Te
au
Те
pa
WU
B. Agreement on the composition of the neutral nation inspection
2 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 14, 1952, pp. 597-599; ibid., May 5, 1952,
58. PROGRESS OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS: Forty- 59
Second Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Com
mand, to the United Nations Security Council, June 13, 1952
(Excerpt) 1
Substantive progress was made on agenda item 3, concrete arrange-
ments, through the persistent efforts of United Nations Commard
staff officers.
N
The subject of ports of entry was finally resolved when the United sti
Nations Command reduced its requirement for these complexes from
to
six to five and the Communists agreed to the following United Nations th
Command provisions:
pr
A. A port of entry shall include the railheads, airheads and seaport
facilities associated with and supporting a city, and
B. Rotation and replenishment shall be conducted only in the
mutually agreed ports of entry.
Detailed maps of the ports of entry were prepared by each side
N
and were exchanged. The following specific ports of entry have been c
prepared:
(A
A. By the Communists: Sinuiju, Chongjin, Manpojin, Hungnam pa
and Sinanju.
B. By the United Nations Command: Pusan, Inchon, Kangnung,
Kunsan and Taegu.
th
Slight progress was made on the subject of the neutral nations
inspection teams when the Communists agreed, on the staff officers
level, that these teams will not be authorized to inspect or examine
secret designs or characteristics of combat aircraft, armored vehicles
,
weapons or ammunition.
The United Nations Command Representatives have brought up
C
repeatedly the problem of neutral nations and the previously agreed
to principle which stated that the neutral nations would be selected
on the basis of being mutually acceptable to both sides
, reiterating
their stand that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not accept.
able to the United Nations Command as a neutral nation. In each
instance the Communist side answered with vague generalities.
There are only two important issues remaining to be settled under
agenda item 3. United Nations Command reports numbers thirty-
seven, thirty-eight and forty, have explained the United Nations
Command position on these issues, which are:
A. Agreement to limit airfield construction and rehabilitation
teams
1 U.N. doc. S/2662, June 13, 1952, pp. 2-3.
pp. 715–718; ibid., June 23, 1952, pp. 998–1001.
ta.
VE
of
er
W
60
6
D
Ta
KOREA
2647
3 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 4, 1952, pp. 171-172.
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War Victims
ratified by the United States on July 14, 1955.
(Department of State publication 3938; 1950), pp. 84–161. The convention was
• Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 6, 1952, pp. 549–550.
2
3
4
rom
port
orty
. 59. REQUEST FOR SOVIET GOOD OFFICES IN OBTAINING
om. NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE COMMUNIST COMPLI-
1952 ANCE WITH THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION ON TREAT-
MENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: Note Delivered by the Amer-
ican Ambassador at Moscowl to the Soviet Foreign Minister,
July 23, 1952
nge
and Early in the course of the Korean hostilities, on July 13, 1950, the
North Korean authorities issued a declaration stating that they would
ited strictly abide by the principles of the Geneva Convention in respect
to prisoners of war. On July 16, 1952, the Chinese Communist au-
Lons thorities issued a declaration of intention to adhere, with certain
reservations, to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, for the
protection of prisoners of war.
Up to the present time, the Chinese Communist and North Korean
the
authorities have failed to observe the provisions of the Geneva Con-
vention. More specifically, the following provisions which are of
particular importance to the welfare of the personnel of the United
side Nations Command who are prisoners in North Korean and Chinese
Communist hands have not been observed: inspection of prisoner of
war camps by an impartial international body has not been permitted
(Article 126); relief parcels have not been delivered (Article 72); and
prisoner of war camps have been placed in areas in proximity to mili-
tary objectives, exposing the prisoners to danger of attack (Article 23).
ng The United Nations Command has consistently abided by the pro-
visions of the Geneva Convention and has in good faith carried out
the responsibilities laid upon belligerents by this convention.
It is, therefore, requested that in the interest of the accomplishment
of the humanitarian objectives of the Geneva Convention, the Gov-
ies
,
ernment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics use its good offices
with the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities, for the
purpose of requesting them to observe the provisions of the Geneva
eel
ONS
cers
ine
UP
Convention.
ped
ted
ing
pte
ch
der
60. PROPOSAL FOR A SOLUTION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR
PROBLEM: Statement by the Chief United Nations Command
Negotiator 5 at Panmunjom, September 28, 1952 6
I have an important statement to make. For many weeks the
prisoner of war issue
has blocked the achievement of an armistice in
Korea
. On July 1 we suggested to you that a solution to the problem
F-
DS
1 George F. Kennan.
2 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.
DI
4
• Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr.
52
2648
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
and
be
I
des
rep
& D
1
wh
wa
in
tar
qua
80
and
or
of
Committee of the Red Cross, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams.
demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such individual, of
must be one that to a reasonable degree meets the requirements of
both sides. You have admitted the soundness of that proposition
.
It must now be clear to you that one of the requirements of our side
which cannot be compromised is that of no forced repatriation,
Within this humanitarian principle the United Nations Command
has made honest efforts to achieve an armistice. So that there can be sidi
no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the United whe
Nations Command delegation has attempted to find a solution to the fire
prisoner of war question, I will restate the proposals which we have from
previously offered and which you have summarily rejected.
We have previously proposed that joint teams or Red Cross teams
,
with or without military observers of both sides, be admitted to the
prisoner of war camps of both sides to verify the fact that non-re-
patriates would forcibly resist return to the side from which they came
As an alternative we proposed that all prisoners of war of both sides be
delivered in groups of appropriate size to the demilitarized zone and
log
given the opportunity to express their preference on repatriation, the
interview to be done by one or a combination of the following:
A. International Committee of the Red Cross
B. Teams from impartial nations
C. Joint teams of military observers
D. Red Cross representatives from each side
Either one of these proposals, if accepted by your side, would have
No
allayed any legitimate fear you might have had that the prisoners of
war were being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your side and
pr
would have produced an armistice.
I now present to you three additional alternate proposals any one of
which will lead to an armistice if you truly desire one.
ago
I ask that you give careful consideration to them because they
represent the only remaining avenues of approach on which our side
can agree to an armistice. All of these proposals are based on the prior
formal acceptance of an armistice by both sides, with the disposition
of prisoners of war to be determined thereafter according to one of the
following procedures.
A. Proposal Number One:
As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war in the
custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release
and repatriation of prisoners of war shall begin in accordance with the provisios
of article three of the armistice agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation
to exchange and repatriate prisoners of war shall be fulfilled by having them of
brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The prisoner
of war shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of prisoner
of war in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination of the International
purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any prisoner for
war who at time of identification states that there wishes to return to the side by
which he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to do so.
which he wishes to go, which side shall provide him with transportation from a
Such former prisoner of war shall thereupon go into the custody of the side he
course, shall not be detained as a prisoner of war but shall assume civilian status,
Or
ne
m
m
m
ne
Or
PI
D
KOREA
2649
1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 20, 1952, p. 600.
Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command; see ibid.,
1.
ave
Te-
me.
and, in accordance with paragraph 52 of the armistice agreement, shall not again
s of be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.
B. Proposal Number Two:
side As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war who
desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. All prisoners objecting to
repatriation will be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups where, at
and
& mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from military control of both
sides and interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries
ited whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities, such persons being
the
free to go to the side of their choice as indicated by such interview. The foregoing
procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or without military representation
from each side and under the observation of one or a combination of the following:
1. International Committee of the Red Cross
mus
2. Joint Red Cross teams
the
3. Joint military teams
C. Proposal Number Three:
; be
As soon as the armistice is signed and becomes effective, all prisoners of war
who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. Concurrently, if
und logistical capability permits, or as soon as possible thereafter
, those prisoners of
the war who have previously expressed their objections to repatriation will be delivered
in groups of appropriate size to a mutually agreed upon location in the demili-
tarized zone and there freed from the military control of both sides. Without
questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released will be free to
go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this movement
and disposition of non-repatriates accomplished under the observation of one
or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint teams
of military observers, or Red Cross representatives from both sides.
We have now offered you the widest selection of choices the United
of Nations Command can offer. Each of them will produce an armistice.
nd
I
urge that
you give mature and careful consideration to our
proposals.
of For that purpose I propose a recess for 10 days, and that we meet
again here at 1100 hours on 8 October.
ey Our staff officers will be available at any time to answer questions
on any of our proposals.
ve
OT
ON
he
he
os
61. SUSPENSION OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS:
Statement by the Secretary of State, October 8, 1952 1
As was made clear by General Clark's statement, the armistice
negotiations at Panmunjom are not terminated. After the Com-
munists rejected all of the latest proposals made by the U.N. Com-
mand delegation, General Harrison 3 called a recess. The duration
of the recess is entirely up to the Communists. General Harrison
made it clear that the U.N. Command delegation continues ready to
negotiate and will again meet with the Communist delegation when-
ever they are ready to accept any one of our numerous proposals or
make a constructive proposal of their own for an honest settlement
1)
er
1
pp. 600-601, for his statement.
Delegation.
elitGen. William K. Harrison, Jr.
, U.S. Army, senior delegate, U.N. Command
2650
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
.
mi
en
ing
00
su
of the prisoner-of-war question. However, the U.N. Command 62
delegation will not continue to go to Panmunjom merely to be sub-
jected to Communist abuse and propaganda harangues.
For many months we have been attempting to negotiate an honor-
able armistice with patience and sincerity. The three alternative
proposals which General Harrison presented on September 281
represented a further earnest effort by the United Nations to find
of
an acceptable solution to the prisoner-of-war question. All three of
thi
those proposals preserve the humanitarian principles of nonforcible
lat
repatriation. Any one of these proposals could lead to an armistice
The Communists have claimed that the U.N. Command has forced
prisoners to say they would resist repatriation, although, in fact, the
opposite was the case. The U.N. Command pointed out to each
qu
prisoner the possibilities that his family might be persecuted if he
refused repatriation and that the U.N. Command could make no
promise whatever as to the ultimate fate of those who refused to go
home. General Harrison's proposals even included the device that w!
the prisoners should be taken in small groups to a neutral area and
there be released to walk north or south. Certainly, nothing could
be more fair or reasonable. If the Communists want to settle this fig
issue, our latest proposals point the way.
We have submitted numerous proposals throughout the negotiations of
and have thoroughly explored every possible solution, while the
Communist negotiators have utilized the negotiating table as
sounding board for false and vicious propaganda. We have tried
everything we can think of to meet the considerations raised by the
Communists.
We have said and will continue to say that we shall not compromise be
on the
principle that a prisoner should not be forced
to return against Tr
his will. For us to weaken in our resolve would constitute an aban-
lis
donment of the principles fundamental to this country and the pr
United Nations. We shall not trade in the lives of men. We shall
not forcibly deliver human beings into Communist hands.
pl
General Harrison's action last night
does not represent a loss of
hope in an armistice; we believe that it is an affirmative step toward
obtaining an armistice. The Communists must now recognize that
the position of the U.N. Command is firm as well as right. The
Communists must now recognize that they cannot continue to
toy with the hopes of the world for a Korean peace. We continue to
believe that a humanitarian solution to the prisoner-of-war question
th
can be found, and that this can be done at Panmunjom.
th
As General Clark said this morning, we remain ready at any
to conclude an armistice acceptable to the conscience of free peoples
.
It is up to the Communists to show whether they too want such an
armistice.
.
CO
హం
at
SICO
C
CO
M
&U
time
(A
1 Supra.
tes
M
KOREA
2651
DO
fighting
U.N. doc. A/2228, Oct. 18, 1952.
telegram to the President of the U.N. General Assembly acknowledging receipt
Mar. 16, 1953, pp. 422-423.
and 62. PROPOSALS FOR A SOLUTION OF THE PRISONER OF
sub- WAR PROBLEM: Resolution 610 (VII) of the United Nations
General Assembly, December 3, 1952 1
10r-
tive
The General Assembly,
281
Having received the special report of the United Nations Command
And
of 18 October 1952 on "the present status of the military action and
3 of
the armistice negotiations in Korea" ? and other relevant reports re-
ible
lating to Korea,
ice.
Noting with approval the considerable progress towards an armistice
ced
made by negotiation at Panmunjom and the tentative agreements to
the
end the fighting in Korea and to reach a settlement of the Korean
3ch
question,
Noting further that disagreement between the parties on one remain-
ing issue, alone, prevents the conclusion of an armistice and that a
go
considerable measure of agreement already exists on the principles on
hat
which this remaining issue can be resolved,
ind
Mindful of the continuing and vast loss of life, devastation and
uld
his
suffering resulting from and accompanying the continuance of the
Deeply conscious of the need to bring hostilities to a speedy end and
of the need for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question,
che
Anxious to expedite and facilitate the convening of the political
ed
conference as provided in article [paragraph) 60 of the draft armistice
agreement,
che
1. Afirms that the release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall
be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, the well-estab-
lished principles and practice of international law and the relevant
he
provisions of the draft armistice agreement;
all
2. Afirms that force shall not be used against prisoners of war to
prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall
of
at all time be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provi-
d
sions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of the
3. Accordingly requests the President of the General Assembly to
communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean
authorities as forming a just and reasonable
basis for an agreement so
that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected; to invite
their acceptance of these proposals - and to make a report to the
UN General Assembly, Oficial Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20
On Dec. 17, 1952, the North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a
ZS
&
ase
st
El-
Convention;
at
ne
20
to
01
28
S.
1.
(A/2361), pp. 3-4.
3 Ibid., annex A.
2652
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
9)
PROPOSALS
re
ai
STU
CO
pi
re
m
to
0]
in
matter relating to their return to their homelands and particularly
VIII. Red Cross teams of both sides shall assist the Repatriation
General Assembly during its present session and as soon as appra-
priate:
I. In order to facilitate the return to their homelands of all prison-
ers of war, there shall be established a Repatriation Commission
consisting of representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and
Switzerland, that is, the four States agreed to for the constitution of
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and referred to in para-
graph 37 of the draft armistice agreement, or constituted, alternatively, in
of representatives of four States not participating in hostilities, two
th
nominated by each side, but excluding representatives of States that
are permanent members of the Security Council.
fo
II. The release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be effected
in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, the well-established prin-
ciples and practice of International Law and the relevant provisions
of the draft armistice agreement.
III. Force shall not be used against the prisoners of war to prevent
or effect their return to their homelands and no violence to their
th
persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in
any manner or for any purpose whatsoever. This duty is enjoined by
on and entrusted to the Repatriation Commission and each of its
members. Prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in
accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and
with the general spirit of that Convention.
C
IV. All prisoners of war shall be released to the Repatriation Com-
mission from military control and from the custody of the detaining
side in agreed numbers and at agreed exchange points in agreed de-
militarized zones.
V. Classification of prisoners of war according to nationality and
domicile as proposed in the letter of 16 October 1952 from General
Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
,
th
and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's
Volunteers, to General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command, shall then be carried out immediately.
VI. After classification, prisoners of war shall be free to retur
?
to their homelands forthwith, and their speedy return shall be facili
tated by all parties concerned.
lo
VII. In accordance with arrangements prescribed for the purpose
by the Repatriation Commission, each party to the conflict shall have
freedom and facilities to explain to the prisoners of war “depending
upon them” their rights and to inform the prisoners of war on any
be
their full freedom to return.
ti
terms of the draft armistice agreement, to prisoners of war while they
re
M
m
W
PI
W
us
P
W
0
ಜಿ ಪಿ e
SO
P:
P:
8
u.
mi
ha
1 U.N. doc. A/2230, Oct. 16, 1952, enclosure 3.
KOREA
2653
pro-
son-
ara-
ODS
ped
1 ID
are under the temporary jurisdiction of the Repatriation Commission.
IX. Prisoners of war shall have freedom and facilities to make
representations and communications to the Repatriation Commission
and to bodies and agencies working under the Repatriation Commis-
sion sion, and to inform any or all such bodies of their desires on any matter
and concerning themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the
n of purpose by the Commission.
X. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph III above, nothing
elv
, in this Repatriation Agreement shall be construed as derogating from
two the authority of the Repatriation Commission (or its authorized
that representatives) to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities
for the control of the prisoners under its temporary jurisdiction.
ited XI. The terms of this Repatriation Agreement and the arrange-
lent
ments arising therefrom shall be made known to all prisoners of war.
rin- XII. The Repatriation Commission is entitled to call upon parties
to the conflict, its own member governments, or the Member States
of the United Nations for such legitimate assistance as it may require
ent in the carrying out of its duties and tasks and in accordance with
zeir
the decisions of the Commission in this respect.
in XIII. When the two sides have made an agreement for repatriation
based on these proposals, the interpretation of that agreement shall
its rest with the Repatriation Commission. In the event of disagree-
ment in the Commission, majority decisions shall prevail. When no
and majority decision is possible, an umpire agreed upon in accordance
with the succeeding paragraph and with article 132 of the Geneva
Convention of 1949 shall have the deciding vote.
ing XIV. The Repatriation Commission shall at its first meeting and
de prior to an armistice proceed to agree upon and appoint the umpire
who shall at all times be available to the Commission and shall act
end
as its Chairman unless otherwise agreed. If agreement on the ap-
pointment of the umpire
cannot be reached by the Commission
ly, within the period of three weeks after the date of the first meeting
le's
this matter should be referred to the General Assembly.
ted IV. The Repatriation Commission shall also arrange after the
armistice for officials to function as umpires with inspecting teams
or other bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the
ili
Commission
or under the provisions of the draft armistice agreement,
so that the completion of the return of prisoners of war to their home-
XVI. When the Repatriation Agreement is acceded to by the
ng parties concerned and when an umpire has been appointed under
paragraph 14 above, the draft armistice agreement, unless otherwise
rhy altered by agreement between the parties, shall be deemed to have
been accepted by them. The provisions of the draft armistice agree-
ment shall apply except in so far as they are modified by the Repatria-
he
tion Agreement. Arrangements
for repatriation under this agree-
ment will begin when the armistice agreement is thus concluded.
XVII. At the end of ninety days, after the Armistice Agreement
has been signed, the disposition of anya prisoners
of war whose
return
ON1-
eral
112
lands shall be expedited.
Ose
ve
ny
00
2654
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
M
9.
ar
re
in
will be prepared to meet your liaison officers to make necessary
to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with
the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall
be referred with recommendations for their disposition, including a
target date for the termination of their detention to the political con-
ference to be called as provided under article (paragraph) 60 of the
draft armistice agreement. If at the end of a further thirty days 64
there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has
not been effected under the above procedures or whose future has not
been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for
their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shal
be transferred to the United Nations, which in all matters relating to
them shall act strictly in accordance with international law.
th
63. PROPOSAL FOR THE EXCHANGE OF SICK AND WOUNDED M
PRISONERS OF WAR: Letter From the Commander-in-Chief
,
United Nations Command, to the Commanders-in-Chief of the re
North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces, February 22, 1953'
To Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's
Army, and Peng Teh-Ħuai, Commander of the Chinese People's
Volunteers:
The Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies
,
in a resolution adopted in Geneva, Switzerland, on 13 December 1952
called on both sides in the Korean conflict as a gesture of good wil
to take immediate action in implementing the humanitarian provi
.
sions of the Geneva Convention by repatriating sick and wounded
prisoners of war in accordance with appropriate
articles of the Geneva
Convention.
G
As has been repeatedly stated to you in the course of negotiations
at Panmunjom the United Nations Command has from the very
,
beginning adhered scrupulously to the humanitarian provisions of
the Geneva Convention and in particular has been prepared to carry
out the provisions of the Geneva Convention in regard to the sick
and wounded prisoners in its custody. The United Nations Com-
mand remains ready immediately to repatriate those seriously sick
and seriously wounded captured personnel who are fit to travel in
accordance with provisions of Article 109
of the Geneva Convention.
"
I wish to be informed whether you are prepared for your part to
proceed immediately with the repatriation of seriously sick and
wounded captured personnel of the United Nations Command who
are in your hands. The United
Nations Command liaison officers
arrangements for impartial verification of the conditions and for the
AC
CH
rej
RE
1
of
PP
(ib
Na
2
doi
1 Gen. Mark W. Clark.
2 Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 494.
4 Geneva Conventions, p. 126.
KOREA
2655
Geneva Conventions, p. 126."
s to
3
che (ibid., pp. 575-576), and General Harrison's letter of Apr. 17, 1953, to General
2 Ibid., Apr. 20, 1953, p. 574; see also General Nam Il's reply of Apr. 9, 1953
Nam II (ibid., Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608).
3 Statement of Mar. 30, 1953.
Sixty-seventh report of the U.N. Command to the Security Council; U.N.
doc. S/3084 (Aug. 21, 1953), pp. 4–7.
rith mutual exchange of such seriously sick and wounded in accordance
ball with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.
g &
On-
the
64. REQUEST FOR COMMUNIST COMMAND STATEMENT ON
ays
has REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR: Letter From the
not
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the Com-
for manders-in-Chief of the North Korean and Chinese Communist
hall Forces, April 5, 1953 (Excerpt) 2
At as early a date as possible, I request that your liaison group
furnish our liaison group with a detailed statement of suggestions on
the implementation of the proposal for settling the entire question of
repatriating prisoners of war as set forth in the statement of Foreign
ED Minister Chou En-lai,3 and endorsed by Marshal Kim Ki [II] Sung,
iel, in order that it may be studied while reasonable settlement of the
the repatriation of sick and wounded is being effected.
3
le's
le's 65. REPATRIATION OF SICK AND INJURED CAPTURED PER-
SONNEL: Agreement Between the United Nations Command and
ies
, the North Korean and Chinese Communist Commands, April 11,
252
will
VI-
AGREEMENT FOR THE REPATRIATION OF SICK AND INJURED CAPTURED
ded
PERSONNEL
The Senior Member of the United Nations Command Liaison
ODS
Group and the Senior Member of the Korean People's Army and the
ery Chinese People's Volunteers Liaison Group, in order to effect the
of repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel in accordance
Try
with the provisions of Article 109 of the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, agree
to the following:
Eck
1. Repatriation shall be accomplished at Panmunjom.
2: Repatriation shall commence at Panmunjom not later than ten
(10) days after the signing of this agreement.
nd
For further communications and discussions on this subject, in the course
ho
which agreement in principle was reached, see Department of State Bulletin,
apie 1953, pp. 494-485; ibid., Apr. 13, 1953, pp. 526-529; ibid., Apr. 20, 1953,
Ty
Not
19534
278
ock
m-
in
-1.
to
PIS
pp. .
4
5
2656
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
shall consist of not less than five (5) vehicles in close formation;
except that north of Panmunjom, because of actual conditions,
b. Each car in rail movements and each vehicle in motor convoys
3. a. The Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese People's Volun-
teers shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel at the rate
of approximately one hundred (100) per day until delivery of all
sick and injured captured personnel to be repatriated by the Korean
People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers is completed
.
The number of persons actually delivered each day shall be con-
tingent upon the ability of the United Nations Command to
receive them, but delivery shall in any case be completed prior to
the termination date of this agreement.
3. b. The United Nations Command shall deliver sick and injured
captured personnel at the rate of approximately five hundred (500
)
per day until delivery of all sick and injured captured personnel to
be repatriated by the United Nations Command is completed
.
The number of persons actually delivered each day shall be contin-
gent upon the ability of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese
People's Volunteers to receive them, but delivery shall in any case
be completed prior to the termination date of this agreement.
4. The United Nations Command shall deliver sick and injured
captured personnel in groups of approximately twenty-five (25)
the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers sbal
deliver sick and injured captured personnel in groups
of
mately twenty-five (25). Each group shall be accompanied bg
rosters, prepared by nationality, to include:
a. Name.
b. Rank.
c. Internment or military serial number.
5. After each group of sick and injured captured personnel i
delivered and received, a representative of the receiving side shal
sign the roster of the captured personnel delivered as a receipt and
shall return this to the delivering side.
6. In order to insure that the sick and injured captured personnel of
both sides are given maximum protection during the full period of
repatriation, both sides agree to guarantee immunity from el
attacks to all rail and motor movements carrying sick and injured
captured personnel to Kaesong and Munsan-ni, respectively, and
thence through presently established immunity routes to Panmun-
jom, subject to the following conditions:
a. Movement of motor convoys to Kaesong and Munsan-ni
.
respectively shall be restricted to daylight hours, and each contos
the latter provision shall apply only to the route from Pyongyang
to Kaesong.
approx
S
shall display clearly visible identification markings.
KOREA
2657
lun-
Team
sted.
COU
I to
ir to
Case
S/2469, Jan. 5, 1952), in Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1952, pp. 270-272.
c. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the
rate
Liaison Group of the other side with a detailed description of the
of all markings utilized to identify motor convoys and rail movements.
This shall include color, size and manner in which the markings
will be displayed.
d. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the
Liaison Group of the other side with the sites and markings of the
bivouac areas and night stop-over locations for motor convoys.
e. Each side shall inform the Liaison Group of the other side,
uired
twenty-four (24) hours in advance of each movement, of the
500
selected route, number of cars in rail movement or number of
olto
vehicles in motor movement, and the estimated time of arrival
ted.
at Kaesong or Munsan-ni.
atin-
Dese
f. Each side shall notify the Liaison Group of the other side, by
the most expeditious means of communications available, of the
location of emergency stop-overs.
zred 7. During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are
25) being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area,
hal
the October 22, 1951 Agreement Between Liaison Officers, with
OX1- the exception of the part therein provided for in Paragraph 8 of this
bi Agreement, shall continue in effect. Liaison Groups of both sides
and their parties shall have free access to, and free movement
within, the Panmunjom conference site area. The composicion of
each Liaison Group and its party shall be as determined by the
Senior Member thereof; however, in order to avoid congestion in the
conference site area, the number of personnel of each side in the
area, including captured personnel under its control, shall not
exceed three hundred (300) persons at any one time.' Each side
shall transfer repatriated personnel out of the Panmunjom con-
ference site area as expeditiously as possible.
lof . During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are
of being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area,
the armed military police of each side, who undertake to maintain
order within the conference site area, shall be increased from the
nd
maximum number of fifteen (15), as provided for in the October 22,
1951 Agreement Between Liaison Officers, to thirty (30).
9. Other administrative details shall be mutually arranged by
ni. officers designated by the Senior Member of the Liaison Group of
11
10. This agreement is effective when signed and will terminate
twenty (20) days after the commencement of repatriation of sick
and injured captured personnel at Panmunjom.
ys
2. for the full text of the agreement, see U.N. Command Rept. 32 (U.N. doc.
IS
Al
and
ed
]]]-
each side.
OP
15.
ng
415900-57---Vol. 264
2658
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
as
1
m.
sion upon completion of extant agenda items, subject to reconvening to consider
other developments in Korea, see U.N. General Assembly, Official Records,
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, this 11th day of April 1953, in the
English, Korean and Chinese languages, all texts being equally re
authentic.
LEE SANG CHO
J. C. DANIEL
Major General
Rear Admiral
Korean People's Army
United States Navy
Senior Member
Senior Member
Korean People's Army and Chinese United Nations Command
67
People's Volunteers Liaison Group Liaison Group
66. ESCAPE OF NORTH KOREAN NON-REPATRIATE PRIS
D
ONERS OF WAR: Letter From the Senior Delegate of the United
St
Nations Command at the Armistice Discussions to the Senior
N.
Delegate of the Communist Command, June 18, 19532
fo
Gen. NAM IL,
of
Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army, and the
Chinese People's Volunteers:
Between midnight and dawn today, approximately 25,000 North
Korean prisoners of war, who have refused to be repatriated following
an armistice, broke out of United Nations Command prisoner of war
camps Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 9.
Statements attributed to high officials of the Republic of Korea
indicate that the action had been secretly planned and carefully
coordinated at top levels in the Korean Government and that outside
assistance was furnished the prisoners of war in their mass breakout
Republic of Korea Army security units assigned as guards at the
PE
prisoner of war camps did little to prevent the breakout, and there is
of
every evidence of actual collusion between the Republic of Kores
Army guards and the prisoners.
The Republic of Korea Army security guard units used at the
camps containing anti-Communist prisoners of war had been con
sidered especially suitable in view of the previous cooperative attitude
of these prisoners while in custody.
These Republic of Korea Army security guard units which have
left their posts at nonrepatriate camps are being replaced by United
PE
States troops.
Efforts are being made to recover the prisoners now at liberty and
1 Concerning approval by the U.N. General Assembly on Apr. 18, 1953, of the
above agreement, and the General Assembly's decision to recess its Seventh se
on
Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20 A (A/2361/Add. 1), pp. 3-4.
2 Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 905-906.
CO
ar
CC
in
ca
ce
m
of
tid
re
in
W.
CO
ch
ar
Case
pr
18
LE
CO
19
KOREA
2659
3 For the text of President Rhee's letter of July 15, 1950, see ibid., Aug. l,
charging the U.N, Command with the responsibility for release of the prisoners,
Ibid., June 29, 1953, p. 907. For other documents on the release of the
prisoners by officers and men of the ROK Army, including a statement of June
Lester B. Pearson, President of the U.N. General Assembly, to President Rhee
concerning the release of the prisoners, see ibid., July 6, 1953, pp. 14–15.
the as of 1 o'clock this afternoon, 971 escaped prisoners of war had been
ially recovered.
WILLIAM K. HARRISON, Jr.,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Senior Delegate
United Nations Command Delegation.
1
67. ESCAPE OF NORTH KOREAN NON-REPATRIATE PRISON-
ERS OF WAR: Letter From the Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command, to the President of the Republic of Korea,
June 20, 1953 2
RIS
ited
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the summer of 1950, when the United
nior
States and other nations responded to your appeal to the United
Nations to repel the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by
forces from North Korea, the United Nations received from you a
message assigning command authority over all land, sea and air forces
of the Republic of Korea to the commander, United Nations Com-
the
mand, for the duration of hostilities.
The United Nations Command did not seek, and indeed, did not
orth
consider
necessary any further or more formal commitments from
ing your Government regarding the participation of Republic of Korea
armed forces in the United Nations Command. I therefore have
considered and do now consider that I have full command authority
over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea. Nothing
mily in our long association during our mutual prosecution of our common
side cause has prepared me to believe that I should consider otherwise.
ut. This notwithstanding, and in clear violation of my authority,
the certain officers and men of the Republic of Korea Ármy willfully
permitted the escape of many thousands of lawfully detained prisoners
of war from various prisoner of war installations during the early
morning hours of 18 June 1953, such officers and men having been
the oficially enjoined with responsibility for the security of said installa-
tions and for the detention of said prisoners. Further, I have
de received information through the public press that this action was
mitiated on your orders and issued through an official who is not
within the forces under my command.
ed I must inform you with all the sincerity which I possess that I am
profoundly shocked by this unilateral abrogation of your personal
nd commitment,
which was so freely
and voluntarily given at the time.
For the texts of the reply of the Communist commanders of June 19, 1953,
3
Teg
is
rea
ON
ve
be
PS
ter
2
of
As
1950, p. 206.
June 19, 1953, see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 906-907.
int
un
AS
CO
mi
mt
AS
mi
breakout, and the Republic of Korea Army security guards made
5 For the text of the Communist commanders' letter to General Clark of
2660 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
As a matter of fact on several occasions in recent weeks
you
hare
personally assured both Ambassador Briggs 1 and me that you would the
not take unilateral action with reference to R. O. K. forces under my am
control until after full and frank discussion with me.
NE
Your actions today have clearly abrogated these assurances.
I cannot at this time estimate the ultimate consequences of this Re
precipitous and shocking action on your part, nor can its effect on the
90
common cause for which we have sacrificed so much during these past of
several years be forecast at this time.
Sincerely,
eff
MARK W. CLARK, Il
General, U.S. Army
68. ESCAPE OF NORTH KOREAN NON-REPATRIATE PRISON
ERS OF WAR: Letter From the Commander-in-Chief, United Na AL
tions Command, to the Commanders-in-Chief of the North Korean
and Chinese Communist Forces,2 June 29, 1953 3
of
tio
The United Nations Command agrees, of course, that the escape
of about 25,000 captured personnel of the Korean People's Army is a
serious incident and unfortunately has not been conducive to the the
early armistice for which both sides have been earnestly striving mo
The United Nations Command, by means of General Harrison
letter of 18 June 1953, immediately informed you of the facts regard-
ing the loss of these prisoners.4
We felt that you deserved to have this information at the earliest
Y
possible time. However, in your letter of 19 June 5 I note that for
one reason or another you fail to accept the realities of the situation lic
which we accurately reported to you, and you have made several in
inaccurate statements of fact. In an earnest endeavor to achieve
an early armistice, I shall further clarify these facts.
Despite our voluntary and accurate presentation of these facts
you still seem to consider that the "escape” of the prisoners and their
"release" by order of the Republic of Korea Government are con
tid
tradictory terms. The fact is, as you are well aware by this time, that
the prisoners “escaped” by breaking through the prison fences and
barricades and, except for those who were captured, disappeared into
the civil population. They were 'released" in that the Republic of
tt
Korea Government, without the knowledge of
, and contrary to the
intent of, the United Nations Command, planned and arranged the
th
little real effort to prevent the escape.
| Ellis 0. Briggs, American Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.
Department of State Bulletin, suly 13,1953, pp. 46-47. For the text of the
fc
Communist commanders reply to the June 29 letter
, see ibid., July 20, 1953
, pp
73–74.
4 Supra, doc. 66.
mi
.
red
mi
CU
re
ac
C
CC
m
es
th
to
0i
Bi
S
es
KOREA
2661
rean
IS &
have
In replying to the questions which you asked in your letter, I believe
would that you realize the armistice which both of us seek is a military
er my armistice between the military commanders of both sides. The United
Nations Command is a military command and, contrary to the opinion
indicated in your letter of 19 June, does not exercise authority over the
this Republic of Korea, which is an independent sovereign state whose
government is the product of the self-determination of its millions
past of people. The Republic of Korea Army was placed by its Government
under the control of the United Nations Command in order to more
effectively repel the armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.
I believe it should be clear to you that the United Nations Command,
ny as the result of a commitment made by the Republic of Korea, does not
command the Republic of Korea Army. In this incident that Govern-
ment violated its commitment, issuing orders which were unknown to
ON me, through other than recognized military channels to certain Korean
Na army units, which permitted the prisoners of war to escape.
You also asked whether the armistice in Korea included the Republic
of Korea as represented by President Syngman Rhee; another ques-
tion, which is closely related, expressed your interest in knowing what
cap: assurances there may be for the implementation of the armistice agree-
ment on the part of South Korea. It is necessary here to reiterate that
the the armistice which we seek is a military armistice between the com-
ring manders of both sides and involving the forces available to the com-
on's manders of both sides.
ard-
It is recognized that certain provisions of the armistice agreement
require the cooperation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea.
Kiest You are assured that the United Nations Command and the interested
for governments concerned will make every effort to obtain the coopera-
101 tion of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Where necessary
eral | the United Nations Command will, to the limits of its ability, establish
epe military safeguards to insure that the armistice terms are observed.
Our willingness to do this should be apparent to you by the con-
currence which we have given to those portions of the terms of
Deir reference which require the United Nations Command to take certain
action to insure the safety and security of the neutral nations repara-
hat tion commission and its personnel.
regrettable that you choose to allege that the United Nations
nto
Command connived in the escape of the prisoners. Besides being
of contrary to the obvious facts, such accusation tends to obstruct rather
che than to facilitate an armistice agreement. The United Nations Com-
che mand is continuing its efforts
to recover the prisoners
of war who have
de escaped. It would be unrealistic, however, and misleading to imply
that an appreciable number of these prisoners could be recovered now
that they have disappeared among the population, which is disposed
to shelter and protect them. You undoubtedly realize that the recov-
for your side to recover the 50,000 South Korean prisoners “released”
by your side during the course of hostilities. You, of course, under-
stand that the cessation of hostilities will facilitate the return of the
escaped Korean prisoners of war to your side if they are not opposed
ete
acts
ON
und
It is
Ehe
OP.
of
11
1
to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would
2662 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
to such return. Under the provisions of Paragraph 59 of the draft 70
armistice agreement, the escaped prisoners of war can proceed to your
side if they so desire after the armistice becomes effective.
Following the signing of an armistice, the exchange of those prison-
ers of war who desire repatriation will involve the 12,000 of our per-
sonnel reported by you in April 1952, plus the additional ones captured
since that date and now in your hands, as compared with about 74,000
of your personnel, including approximately 69,000 Koreans, now in
71
our hands, whom we are prepared to return to you.
3]
This letter is an earnest effort by the United Nations Command to
acquaint you with the facts. It is suggested that the delegations meet
19
immediately to exchange information as to the time at which respective
components of the neutral nations supervisory commission can be KO
prepared to function in order that an effective date for the armistice
may be established and, on receipt of that information, the armistice
agreement as has been developed by our respective delegations be
signed.
[KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, JULY 27, 1953] "
69. SIXTEEN-NATION DECLARATION ON KOREA ISSUED AT
WASHINGTON, JULY 27, 1953 2
"We the United Nations Members whose military forces are par-
ticipating in the Korean action support the decision of the Commander-
in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice
agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully E.
to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other
parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terme
.
"The task
ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts
of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea
based on the principles which have long been established by the United
Nations, and which call for a united, independent and democratie 71
Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the
people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.
"We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the
United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities
in Korea, and our determination
in good faith to seek a settlement off
the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace,
if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again
Jur
ciples of the United Nations, we should
again be united and prompt
hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.
in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any
"Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result
other part of Asia.'
1 Supra, pp. 724–750.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247.
that
mi
the prin-
1
20
b
2
KOREA
2663
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 454
SOL-
ed to
be
3
be
by bearing a Red Star passed over a screening.ship and continued
* Supra, docs. 8, 10, 14, 23, 42, 44, and 62.
Iraft 70. TRIBUTE TO UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA:
Four
Resolution 712 (VII) of the United Nations General Assembly,
August 28, 1953 1
per- The General Assembly
ured
Recalling the resolutions of the Security Council of 25 June, 27
,000 June and 1 July 1950 and the resolutions of the General Assembly of
7 October 1950, 1 December 1950, 1 February 1951, 18 May 1951 and
3 December 1952,2
Having received the report of the Unified Command dated 7 August
dieet
19533
tive
Noting with profound satisfaction that fighting has now ceased in
.
Korea.
on the basis of an honourable armistice,
stice
tice 1. Salutes the heroic soldiers of the Republic of Korea and of all
those countries which sent armed forces to its assistance;
2. Pays tribute to all those who died in resisting aggression and thus
in upholding the cause of freedom and peace;
3. Expresses its satisfaction that the first efforts pursuant to the call
of the United Nations to repel armed aggression by collective
military measures have been successful, and expresses its firm
AT
conviction that this proof of the effectiveness of collective secu-
rity under the United Nations Charter will contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security.
der-
tice
illi E. INCIDENTS INVOLVING UNITED NATIONS
cher
COMMAND AND SOVIET AIRCRAFT IN THE
KOREAN CONFLICT, 1950-1953
atic 71. SHOOTING DOWN OF SOVIET BOMBER: Message De-
the
livered by the Deputy United States Representative at the United
Nations 4 to the U.N. Secretary-General, September 5, 1950 $
the
On September 4, 1950, United Nations naval forces were operating
of the west coast of Korea at approximately the 38th parallel on
missions in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of
At 13:29 o'clock, Korean time, a twin-engine bomber identified only
ine
ult
ori General Assembly, Oficial Records, Seventh Session. Supplement No.
Dar-
ms.
orts
red
ted
ties
of
hat
in June 27, 1950.
6
apt
uld
20 B (A/2361/Add. 2), p. 2.
UT
3
Supra, doc. 48.
'Ernest A. Gross.
8
* Supra, doc. 10.
2664
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
OV
SW
on
So
be
mi
bri
an
to
att
fui
The United States representative to the United Nations presents his
A United Nations plane, a two-motored P2V bomber operating
operations in Korea failed to return from a weather reconnaissance
toward the center of the United Nations formation in a hostile manner.
The bomber opened fire upon a United Nations fighter patrol which
returned its fire and shot it down.
A United Nations destroyer succeeded in picking up the body of one
member of the bomber crew. Identification papers indicated that the
body was that of Lt. Mishin Tennadii Vasilebiu, of the armed forces of
the U.S.S.R., Serial No. 25054.
72. UNITED STATES REFUSAL TO ACCEPT SOVIET NOTE
CONCERNING BOMBER: Statement by the American Am
bassador at Moscow, September 6, 1950 1
The American Ambassador at Moscow, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, was
called today to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Foreign
Minister Vyshinsky, who read to him a note on the subject of the
airplane incident which took place off Korea on September 4 and which
was reported to the Security Council by the deputy representative of 74
the United States, Ernest A. Gross, the following day.?
Admiral Kirk
made the following statement in reply to Mr. Vysbin-
sky:
The information at my disposal indicates that the question to which
refer
pertains to defensive action by United Nations Forces operating in the Korean
area in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council shu
and that it has, in fact, been brought to the attention of the Security Council for
appropriate consideration. I am therefore not in a position to accept on behalf
of the United States Government the communication of the Soviet Government
th
on this subject. It would appear to be appropriate for any representations on this
question to be presented to the United Nations Security Council.
TH
Admiral Kirk did not accept the note for delivery to this Govern
fra
ment. .
73. SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST UNITED NATIONS AIRCRAFT:
Communication Delivered by the United States Representative at
the United Nations 3 to the U.N. Secretary-General, November
cle
24, 1951 4
ter
ha
for
the honor to report the following from the Unified Command under the
United States for submission to the Security Council:
th
1
you
mi
COL
ter
mi
1
IS
M
In
1
p. 454.
M
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 18, 1950,
2 Supra.
3 Warren R. Austin.
4 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 909.
15
KOREA
2665
aircraft through Korean territory.
3 Ibid., Aug. 10, 1953, p. 179.
aner.
zhich
vas
territory prior to the termination of hostilities there, the Embassy
incurred in this incident. In view of the fact, however, that the
incident occurred in the Korean Zone of hostilities, the responsibility
therefore must rest with those Soviet authoritieswho flew the Soviet
? Ibid., Aug. 10, 1953, p. 179. For a reply to this note by the Soviet Foreign
Ministry handed to Ambassador Bohlen on August 11, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1953,
over the Sea of Japan on November 6, 1951. An intensive search for
survivors proved fruitless.
From the last reported position of this plane at 0850 (-9 time zone)
fone
on November 6, it is undoubtedly this plane that was the subject of a
t the
Soviet statement to the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow on Novem-
es of
ber 71 admitting that two Soviet fighter planes fired on a two-engine
bomber at 1010 November 6 in the vicinity of Cape Ostrovnaya.
The route this plane was following did not approach closer than 40
miles to U.S.S.R. territory, and the plane crew had been thoroughly
OTE briefed not to approach closer than 20 miles to U.S.S.R. territory under
Am. any circumstances.
It can only be concluded that an intentional or unplanned approach
to the Russian coast was not made, and the plane was intercepted and
attacked without warning while over international waters, and
furthermore, while well outside of 20 miles from the Russian coastline.
eign
the
hich
e of 74. SHOOTING DOWN OF SOVIET IL-12 BY UNITED NATIONS
AIRCRAFT: Statement by the Department of State, August 1,
hin
1953
According to confirmed information received from United States
read military authorities, an aircraft of the IL-12 type was attacked and
men shot down by a United States Army Air Force fighter plane on a
combat mission for the United Nations Command over Korean
ment territory at 12:25 p. m., local time, on July 27, 1953. The location of
this the United States plane at the time of the attack was 41 degrees 38
minutes north latitude and 126 degrees 55 minutes east longitude.
This position is inside Korean territory approximately eight miles
The United States Government assumes that the foregoing incident
is the one which is the subject of the Ministry's Note of July 31 ' in
FT: which the Soviet Government falsely alleges that the attack took
at place over Chinese territory. Since facts available to United States
ber military authorities and to the United Nations' Command have
clearly established that the attack was carried out over Korean
has been instructed to reject the Ministry's Note as being without
The United States Government can only deplore the loss of life
2
refer
for
ehalf
from the Yalu River.
his
foundation in fact.
nas
the
nig
N.
Ice
1 See ibid.
15, 1954, pp. 410-413.
2666
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
--
I
1
II
T
AF
11
7
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and by authorities ☺
knowing their charges would not stand up under the scrutiny o
International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct an impartial
rejected an offer of the U. N.'s World Health Organization to provide
technical assistance in Communist-held areas where we were accused
F. THE COMMUNIST “GERM WARFARE” CAM.
PAIGN, 1951-1953
75. REFUTATION OF COMMUNIST CHARGES OF GERM
WARFARE: Statement by the Secretary of State, May 7, 1951
I have just been reading the alleged “confessions” of two American
fliers who were shot down in Communist-held North Korea in January
.
I should like to talk about these so-called “confessions” for a minute
because they are so revealing, though not in the sense that Communist
propagandists intended.
A reading of these statements makes one fact crystal clear: while
they may have been signed under duress by the American fliers, they
were dictated by Communist propagandists. They contain all the
Communist clichés so alien to American youths. We have no way of
knowing, of course, whether the fliers signed the statements at all.
Both statements have picked up the standard Communist picture
of the world as divided into two hostile "camps"---the so-called
"peace-loving camp" of Communists and the "imperialistic” and
"warmongering" camp of Wall Street.
th
For example, Lt. Kenneth Enoch is alleged to have stated: “I have bi
seen the truth as printed by the democratic Chinese press,
and all these ef
truths and kind treatment show all the more clearly the lies and
untruthful war propaganda of the Wall Street radio and press ...!
am beginning to see very clearly just who is the peace-lover and who
is the warmonger responsible for this inhuman war, and I am de-
del in
termined to struggle for peace against Wall Street capitalism, to clear :
my conscience of past errors. I am filled with determination to join a
the peace-loving camp."
I submit that there are no two men in the whole U. S, Air Force who
would of their own volition express themselves in such terms.
These statements are, of course, merely additional trumped-up
“evidence" to support the utterly false Communist charges that we
have waged bacteriological warfare in Korea. They are another an
example of the incredible lengths to which they will go to propagate ep
the "big lie.”
These charges have been flatly denied by American authorities in
of other nations having forces in Korea. Moreover, the Communisten
investigation on both sides of the battleline
in Korea. They have
of having caused epidemics.
ye
an
TO
pr
1
1
to
th
1 Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1952, p. 777.
KOREA
2667
the ICRC proposals by the United States on Mar. 13, 1952, see ibid., p. 453.
1
acan
information behind United Nations lines bearing upon the investi-
2 Department of State Bulletin, Mar, 24, 1952, pp. 452–453.
3 Concurning the willingness of the International Committee of the Red Cross
M. Although not permitted to make an on-the-spot investigation,
competent scientists in many parts of the world have examined the
"evidence" submitted by the Communists and, as a result, have
pronounced the charges an obvious and clumsy hoax.
All of this is generally understood, at least in parts of the world
RM where people have access to facts. These Communist propaganda
themes are part of the "hate America” line which is now being supple-
mented with a "hate Americans' line.
Sowing the seeds of hate among people may in the Communist
ary. Fiew produce some short-range benefits, but I am convinced that
zute as their cynicism is increasingly revealed, they will find that they
mist were in fact sowing the wind.
Chile
they
the 76. REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF GERM WARFARE
y of
CHARGES BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
all. RED CROSS (ICRC): Telegram From the Secretary of State to
ture
the President of the ICRC, March 11, 1952 2
alled
Despite categorical denials by the United States Government and
the United Nations Command, Communists continue to charge that
nave biological warfare by the United Nations Command has caused an
bese epidemic in Communist-held areas of Korea.
and
I repeat that the United Nations Command has not engaged in
..1 any form of biological warfare.
who
In the interest of having the facts clearly established by a dis-
de interested international body, the United States Government as the
clear Unified Command would like to suggest that the International
join Committee of the Red Cross make arrangements to conduct an in-
vestigation to determine (1) the nature and extent of this epidemic
who and (2) the real cause of the epidemic.
To establish the facts beyond all doubt, such an investigation
J-up would have to be conducted on both sides of the battle line in Korea.
t we Investigation in the Communist-held areas would reveal the nature
ther and extent of this epidemic plus evidence of the real cause of the
gate epidemic. Investigation behind the United Nations lines would
provide additional evidence with regard to the falsity of the biological
the warfare charge. For example, International Committee of the Red
ities
investigators would be given free access to all sources of possible
lists
,
I
the
and
olgation.
rtial
1 Paul Ruegger.
la ve
vide
used
2668
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
re
11
ta
SL
2
41
3 U.N. doc. S/2671, June 20, 1952. Concerning the discussion of the draft
resolution in the Security Council and its defeat on July 3, 1952, as a result of
77. COMMUNIST REFUSAL TO PERMIT INVESTIGATION
OF GERM WARFARE CHARGES BY THE ICRC: Statement
by the Secretary of State, March 26, 1952 1
At his news conference on March 26, Secretary Acheson was asked
2
for comment on the statement, highly publicized by the Communists, of a
ti
group of jurists who claim to have "substantiated the waging by United
Nations forces in Korea of germ warfare.
Secretary Acheson made the following extemporaneous reply:
As I understand it, this group of very eminent jurists to which you 3
refer are a group of Communists and former Nazis who have turned
Communist, who have gone from East Germany into this area. That
would not seem to imply any special impartiality or disinterest in
their approach to it.
We have stated often, I have stated, General Ridgway has stated
that there is not the slightest truth whatever in these statements
.
We have asked the International Red Cross to make an investiga-
tion. We have offered all facilities to the Red Cross. The World
Health Organization has proposed that it be used to make an inves-
tigation, also to attempt to deal with any epidemic if such an epidemic
exists. We have supported that request. The Communists have
never replied to either request.
N
It seems perfectly clear that the Communists are determined not
to have any fair or impartial investigation made. They continue on
the one hand to say there is no epidemic. On the other hand they
say that we are engaged in these nefarious practices.
There is no truth in the statements. The fact that there is no
truth is shown by the refusal of the Communists to permit ang
investigation by an impartial international body.
by
78. CALL FOR INVESTIGATION OF GERM WARFARE
CHARGES BY THE ICRC: Draft Resolution of the United Nations
of
Security Council, June 20, 1952 3
The Security Council,
Noting the concerted dissemination by certain governments and
authorities of grave accusations charging the use of bacteriological
warfare by United Nations forces,
Noting that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- S
publics has repeated these charges in organs of the United Nations,
mand for Korea immediately denied the charges and requested that th
an impartial investigation be made of them,
S
d
1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 529.
2 Supra.
a Soviet veto, see Department of State Bulletin, July 7, 1952, pp.
SLE
m
PI
tc
CE
In
R
TE
CE
re
a1
2
38-39.
KOREA
2669
.
1
ves-
South Korea, the Chinese mainland and Japan as the Commission may
deem necessary in the performance of its task and to allow the Com-
ION
1. Requests the International Committee of the Red Cross, with
nent
the aid of such scientists of international reputation and such other
experts as it may select, to investigate the charges and to report the
results to the Security Council as soon as possible;
skeid
2. Calls upon all governments and authorities concerned to accord
of a
to the International Committee of the Red Cross full co-operation,
uited
including the right of entry to, and free movement in, such areas
as the Committee may deem necessary in the performance of its
task;
you 3. Reguests the Secretary-General to furnish the Committee with
ned such assistance and facilities as it may require.
That
t in
ated 79. INVESTIGATION OF GERM WARFARE CHARGES BY A
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION: Resolution 706 (VII) of the
ga-
United Nations General Assembly, April 23, 1953
orld
The General Assembly,
mic Noting that accusations have been made by certain governments
have and authorities charging the use of bacteriological warfare by United
Nations Forces, and that the Unified Command has repeatedly denied
Recalling that when the charges were first made the Unified Com-
hey mand had requested that an impartial investigation be made of them,
Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Re-
public of China and the North Korean authorities have so far refused
any to accept an offer by the International Committee of the Red Cross to
carry out an investigation,
Noting that the draft resolution 2 submitted in the Security Council
by the Government of the United States of America proposing an
RE mvestigation of these charges by the International Committee of the
Red Cross failed to carry because of the negative vote of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Desiring to serve the interests of truth,
1. Resolves that, after the President of the General Assembly has
received an indication from all the governments and authorities con-
cerned of their acceptance of the investigation
proposed in the present
& Commission, composed of Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan,
Sweden and Uruguay, shall be set up and shall carry
out immediately
an investigation of the charges that
have been made;
2. Calls upon the governments and authorities concerned to enable
the Commission to travel freely throughout such areas of North and
not such charges,
ON
no
Ons
and
cal
resolution,
Re-
DIS,
111-
786
aft
of
20A (A/2361/Add.1), p. 4
UiN. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No.
* Supra.
2670
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
COI
1
(
ceptance of the investigation by all the governments and authorities
mission freedom of access to such persons, places and relevant docu-
ments as it considers necessary for the fulfilment of its task and to rep
allow it to examine any witness, including prisoners of war, under
such safeguards and conditions as the Commission shall determine
:
Na
all prisoners of war who are alleged to have made confessions regarding
the use of bacteriological warfare shall, prior to examination by the
Commission, be taken to a neutral area and remain under the responsi-
bility and custody of the Commission until the end of the Korean
hostilities;
3. Requests the President of the General Assembly to transmit the
present resolution immediately to the governments and authorities
concerned, requesting them to indicate their acceptance of the investi-
gation proposed in the present resolution;
4. Requests the President of the General Assembly to report to the
General Assembly at the earliest practicable date on the results of his
efforts;
5. Directs the Commission, when set up, to enlist the aid of such
scientists of international reputation, especially epidemiologists
, and
such other experts as it may select;
6. Directs the Commission, after acceptance of the investigation
proposed in the present resolution by all the governments and authori-
ties concerned, to report to the Members of the General Assembly
through the Secretary-General as soon [as] possible and no later than
1 September 1953;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish the Commission with
the necessary staff and facilities.
80. COMMUNIST FAILURE TO REPLY TO OFFER OF UNITED
NATIONS INVESTIGATION OF GERM WARFARE CHARGES:
Report by the President of the United Nations General Assembly,"
July 28, 1953 2
18
In accordance with its terms, resolution 706 (VII) of 23 April 1953
on the “Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by United
Nations forces of bacterial warfare” was duly communicated to the
Governments of the United States of America, of the People's Demo-
cratic Republic of Korea, of the People's Republic of China, of the
Republic of Korea, and of Japan, with the request that they indicate
their acceptance of the investigation proposed in the resolution
.
The commission of investigation which was to be set up upon, ac
E
t
I
2 U.N. General Assembly, a Official Records, Eighth Session, Agenda Item 24
Annexes (A/2426), July 28, 1953, pp. 1-2.
3 Supra.
.
1
KOREA
2671
ean
101
Government is prepared to render every practicable assistance to
cu concerned has not been established as, to date, only the following three
I to replies have been received:
der
1. The representative of the United States of America to the United
ine:
Nations, in a note dated 1 May 1953, replied as follows:
ing
"The representative of the United States of America to the United
the
Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the
usi-
United Nations and, with reference to note SCA/459/6/01 dated 24
April 1953, has the honor to inform the Secretary-General that the
United States of America accepts the investigation proposed in the
the
resolution adopted by the General Assembly under item 73 of its
ties
agenda, entitled 'Question of impartial investigation of charges of
sti-
use by United Nations forces of bacterial warfare'.
"In accordance with paragraph 2 of the resolution, the United
the
his
States of America, in its capacity as the Unified Command, after
the Commission is set up will issue instructions to the United
Nations Command to accord to the Commission for the performance
Ich
of its task the various appropriate facilities within the competence
und
of the United Nations Command. The United States of America
will issue similar instructions to the Commander in Chief, United
States Forces in the Far East".
ori-
2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, in a
bly
cablegram dated 13 May 1953, replied as follows:
“I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your radiogram
th
dated 27 April regarding a resolution entitled Question of impartial
investigation of charges of use by United Nations forces of bacterial
warfare”, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
at its 428th plenary meeting on 23 April 1953.
“I also have the ħonour to inform you that the Government of the
ED Republic of Korea willingly accepts the investigation proposed in the
S: resolution and will co-operate in regard to the provisions of para-
1,
graph 2 of the resolution"
3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in a cablegram dated
18 May 1953, replied as follows:
"Have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's
telegram transmitting the text of the resolution entitled Question
che of impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations forces
of bacterial warfare', with the request that the Japanese Govern-
he ment indicate its acceptance of the investigation proposed in the
resolution. To co-operate with the United Nations, the Japanese
BC-
throughout such areas of Japan as it may deem necessary in the
performance of its task, its free access to such persons, places and
relevant documents as it considers necessary for the fulfilment of
24
its task and its examination of any witness”
an
1
33
ed
10- 10-
ite
)n.
les
2672
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
2
SE
W
8
u
8
01
also letter from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative at
the United Nations, to the Secretary-General, dated Oct. 26, 1953 (Department
1953, containing statements from U.S. fliers repudiating germ warfare confessions
8 See statement of Oct. 26, 1953, by Charles W. Mayo, U.S. Representative in
the General Assembly, in Department of State Bulletin, Nov.9, 1953, pp. 641-647
81. DISCUSSION OF GERM WARFARE CHARGES IN THE
EIGHTH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: State
.
F
ment by the United States Representative,' November 3, 1953
C
The objective of the United States in the discussion of this item was
I
to bring the truth before the world so that these dreadful things would
never happen again. Two main events have taken place since the
General Assembly last April passed its resolution calling for an im-
partial investigation of the charges of use by the United Nations forces
th
of bacteriological warfare. The first event was that the Republic of
Korea and Japan indicated their acceptance of the investigation. The
Chinese and North Korean Communists did not reply to the communi-
cation of the President of the Seventh General Assembly on this
subject. The second event related to certain materials introduced
by the Soviet Union in connection with the debate on this item in the
Seventh General Assembly. I am referring to the so-called "confes-
sions” of six American Aiers that they had waged bacteriological
warfare over North Korea and China.5
These fliers had been repatriated and had indicated their so-called
"confessions" were obtained under coercion and torture. My Govern-
ment brought this to the attention of the Committee and also indicated
to the Committee the significance of the entire bacteriological warfare
campaign in relation to the general political tactics of worldwide
Communist imperialism.
Since the resolution of the Seventh General Assembly is still opera-
tive, my Government saw no occasion for any further resolution on
the subject. An impartial investigation can be conducted pursuant !
to that resolution, any time that the Chinese or North Korean Com-
munists indicate their willingness to cooperate.
The Soviet Union, however, introduced into the Committee dis
cussion a resolution calling upon all states which have not accede
to or ratified the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,8 for the “prohibi-
tion of use of bacteriological weapons to accede to the Protocol or
ratify it." This Soviet resolution was properly described in the
Committee as a 'red herring,” totally irrelevant to the question which h
the Committee was discussing. It was pointed out that the sole
motive of the action of the Soviet Union was to cast an aspersion on
my Government and thus divert attention from a debate which it
could not win.
1 Henry Ford II.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 758-759.
3 Res. 706 (VII), supra, doc. 79.
4 .
6 U.N. docs. S/2802 (Oct. 1, 1952) and A/C.1/L.28 (Mar. 12, 1953)
th
to
7 U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.67, Oct. 26, 1953.
8 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 94, p. 65.
6
ex
୩
8]
C
81
CE
ap
M
KOREA
2673
2
orces
uced
Jern-
ated
to Communist jurisdiction shall be set free in South Korea, or, in the
3 Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1953, pp. 72–73.
The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Colombia,
THE
tate:
France, and New Zealand introduced into the Committee, and the
Committee accepted, a proposal' to refer to the Disarmament Com-
mission the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. My Government
supported this resolution in the Committee and will vote for it today.
1 18 The entire question of the elimination of bacteriological warfare as
jould
well as of other major weapons of mass destruction properly belongs
2 the
in the Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union has reintroduced
im
into the General Assembly the same resolution which it presented to
the Committee. The adoption by this Assembly of the resolution
lic of
approved in the Committee in the view of my Government will make
The
unnecessary a vote on the Soviet resolution.
juni
I sincerely hope that the debate on this matter has established to
this
the satisfaction of all members of the General Assembly that these
frightful charges of the use of bacteriological warfare by U.N. forces
the
nfes-
Korea are totally unfounded and are false. I further hope that
all states will consider thoroughly the significance of such a campaign
gical
of falsehood in relation to the broader subject of the political tensions
alled
now engulfing the world,
rfare
G. EFFORTS TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLE-
MENT IN KOREA, 1953-1955
uant 82. COMMON OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO KOREA: Joint
Com
Statement Issued at Seoul by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs 2 and the President of the Republic of Korea,
dis-
July 11, 1953.3
nibi-
During the past 2 weeks we have had many frank and cordial
de exchanges of views which have emphasized the deep friendship
hich
existing between the Republic of Korea and the United States and
sale
have gone far toward achieving mutual understanding of the troubled
questions which have arisen in connection with arrangements for an
| armistice
, the exchange of prisoners, and the forthcoming political
These discussions have cemented our determination to continue
and extend in the postarmistice period the close collaboration for our
common objectives, marking our relations since the Communist
aggression commenced 3 years ago.
mination
that no prisoners shall be subject to coercion and that, at
respect to the prisoners of war, we have reaffirmed our deter-
the
end of the specified period, all prisoners desiring to avoid returning
Win. doc. A/C.1/L.68, adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1953.
For further infor-
wide
Derg-
n OD
eded
the
00
shit
conference.
See
e at
ment
26,
ONS
647.
? Walter S. Robertson.
415900_57_-Vol. 2
-65
2674
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
tre
001
tor
case of the non-Communist Chinese, to proceed to a destination
chosen by them.
Our two Governments are in agreement in respect to entering into
a mutual-defense pact, negotiations for which are under way.
We have likewise discussed collaboration along political, economic
,
and defense lines, and our conversations have disclosed a wide ares
of agreement concerning these matters.
In particular, we wish to emphasize our determination to work
together for the realization within the shortest practical time of our
common objective; namely, a free, independent, and unified Korea.
We are confident that the spirit of accord in which our talks have
progressed, and the large areas of agreement which have resulted,
will be followed by continuing mutual consideration and by the
spirit of mutual accommodation which will lead most certainly to
our broad objective of a secure and lasting peace in the Far East
,
qu
SIE
ke
8C
ex
be
ter
ati
83. UNDERSTANDING RESPECTING A POLITICAL CONFER.
ENCE ON KOREA: Statement by the Secretary of State at a News
Conference, July 28, 1953 1
fo
at
to
an
Asked about reports that the United States had agreed with President
Syngman Rhee to withdraw from the Korean political conference after th
90 days of the convening of that conference, Secretary Dulles said:
I think that what there is to say has already been said, but I will
be glad to try to make it clearer. 'We have agreed through Assistant
KE
Secretary Robertson that if after 90 days it seems that the conference
is a sham and unproductive and is being availed of by the Communists
as a cover for carrying on subversive activities in Korea, we would for
join with President Rhee in walking out of the political conference
.
We will make our own decision on this as the conference progresses
.
fac
We have made it clear to President Rhee, however, that we would
not automatically resume war at that time. It was made clear to
him that the question of what, if anything, we would do would be 8
matter for discussion and agreement at that time in the light of the
surrounding circumstances.
pu
sta
t
VAI
COI
tio,
peg
181
İ
bec
ach
84. POST-ARMISTICE UNITED STATES-KOREAN POLICY: eko
Joint Statement Issued at Seoul by the Secretary of State and they
the President of the Republic of Korea, August 8, 1953 ?
Our friendly and understanding consultations demonstrate clearly
the determination of the United States and the Republic of Korea to
stand together in cordial cooperation to achieve our common
oben
8h8
jectives, including the reunification of Korea.
| Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 10, 1953, pp. 176-177.
2 Ibid., Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203–204.
con
of {
the
CO
KOREA
2675
rea
to
ews
CY: exchange of views which we hope and trust will establish a prepara-
becomes clear to each of our Governments that all attempts to
is being exploited by the Communist delegates mainly to infiltrate,
achieve these objectives have been fruitless and that the conference
shall then be prepared to make a concurrent withdrawal from the
propagan dize, or otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, we
of a unified, free, and independent Korea which is the postwar goal
conference. We will then consult further regarding the attainment
the United States set itself during World War II, which has been ac-
1on We have today initialed a draft of a mutual defense treaty. That
treaty is designed to unite our nations in common action to meet
ato
common danger and it will cement the ties which have brought us
together to combat in Korea the menace of Communist aggression.
nic
, Our two Governments will actively proceed with the constitutional
processes necessary to bring this treaty into full force and effect,
These constitutional processes, in the case of the United States, re-
ork quire that the U.S. Senate consent to the ratification. The U.S.
our Senate
, having adjourned this week, will not again be in regular ses-
sion until next January. However, U.S. Senate leaders have been
ave kept fully informed of the exchange of views which have led to the
action we have taken today and it is our sincere hope that this will
the lead to prompt and favorable U.S. Senate action.
Between now and the date when the mutual defense treaty can be
este expected to come into force and effect, our armed forces in Korea will
be subject to the U.N. Command which will comply with the armistice
terms. If, during this period, there should occur unprovoked armed
CR
attack by the Communist forces against the Republic of Korea in
violation of the armistice, the Unc, including the Republic of Korea
forces, would at once and automatically react, as such an unprovoked
attack would be an attack upon and a threat to the Unc itself and
to the forces under its command. Such reaction to an unprovoked
cent
armed attack would not be a new war but rather a resumption by
ter
the Communist forces of the active belligerency which the armistice
has halted. The UNC will be constantly alert against such an attack.
vill Our Governments will promptly negotiate agreements to cover the
status of such forces as the United States may elect to maintain in
Korea after the mutual defense treaty comes into force and effect,
and the availability to them of Korean facilities and services needed
for the discharge of our common task. In the meantime, the Re-
public of Korea will continue to cooperate with the Unc and the
status of Unc forces in Korea and the availability to them of Korean
uld
facilities and services will continue as at present.
to The armistice contemplates that a political conference will be con-
Tened within 3 months, that is, prior to October 27, 1953. At that
the
conference the U.S. delegation, in cooperation with the Rok delega-
tion and other delegations from the
Unc side, will seek to achieve the
peaceful unification of historic Korea as a free and independent
bation. We and our advisers have already had a full and satisfactory
and | lry foundation for coordinated effort at the political conference.
I, after the political conference has been in session for 90 days, it
ob
ant
ce
sts
ald
.ce.
ses.
e i
Ily
to
2676
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
C.
4
I
{
1
step has thus been taken towards the full restoration of international
2. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the
cratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full
1 U. N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No
cepted by the United Nations as its goal and which will continue to
be an object of concern of U.S. foreign policy
We recognize that the Republic of Korea possesses the inherent
tha
right of sovereignty to deal with its problems, but it has agreed to
tio
,
take no unilateral action to unite Korea by military means for the the
agreed duration of the political conference.
thr
We contemplate that the projected 3 to 4 year program for the re
habilitation of the war-ruined Korean economy shall be coordinated by
through the combined economic board, under the joint chairmanship
of the Korean and American representatives. This program con-
the
templates the expenditure of approximately one billion dollars of
funds, subject to appropriations thereof by the U.S. Congress. The
hundred million dollars has already been authorized, out of pro-
spective defense savings.
We have exchanged preliminary views with respect to various
problems involving the maintenance and development of Rok land
,
air, and sea forces.
We feel confident that the relationship thus established between
our two Governments marks an important contribution to the de
veloping of independence and freedom in the Far East. With un-
shaking faith in the principle of collective security, and with loy!
adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, we intend to move
forward together toward the achievement of our common objective-
the restoration of a unified, democratic, and independent Korean
nation.
There are no other agreements or understandings stated or in-
plied resulting from these consultations other than those herein
contained.
85. CONVENING OF A POLITICAL CONFERENCE ON KOREA:
Resolution 711 (VII) of the United Nations General Assembly
,
August 28, 1953
ret
A
Sts
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 60 OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT
The General Assembly
1. Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea
gre
on 27 July 1953, the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major
peace and security in the area;
the
restoration of international peace and security in the area;
2
P&
it.
for
Re
20 B (A/2361/Add. 2
3 Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724–750.
(V
KOREA
2677
Records, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 14) and General Assembly Res. 725
(VIII), Dec. 7, 1953 (ibid., Supplement No. 1 (A/2630), p. 12).
ue to
erent
1 le le-
CON-
Veen
3. Notes the recommendation contained in the Armistice Agreement
that “In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean ques-
ed to tion
, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to
r the the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within
three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes
effective
, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held
nated by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotia-
nshiption the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea,
the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.";
rs of 4. Welcomes the holding of such a conference;
TWO
5. Recommends that:
pro-
(a) The side contributing armed forces under the Unified Com-
mand in Korea shall have as participants in the conference those
rious
land,
among the Member States contributing armed forces pursuant to
the call of the United Nations which desire to be represented, to-
gether with the Republic of Korea. The participating govern-
de-
ments shall act independently at the conference with full freedom
of action and shall be bound only by decisions or agreements to
which they adhere;
Loga
(b) The United States Government, after consultation with the
other participating countries referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above,
shall arrange with the other side for the political conference to be
held as soon as possible, but not later than 28 October 1953, at a
place and on a date satisfactory to both sides;
(c) The Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall, if this is
agreeable to both sides, provide the political conference with such
services and facilities as may be feasible;
(d) The Member States participating pursuant to sub-paragraph
(2) above shall inform the United Nations when agreement is
ables reached at the conference and keep the United Nations informed at
other appropriate times;
6. Reafirms its intention to carry out its programme for relief and
rehabilitation in Korea, and appeals to the governments of all Member
States to contribute to this task.
B
un-
nove
VO
rean
im-
erem
The General Assembly,
ajor
ong]
Having adopted the resolution entitled "Implementation of para-
Dragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement”
Recommends that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics partici
:-
pate in the Korean political conference provided the other side desires
IV.
the
mo
full
The General Assembly
C
No.
Bequests the Secretary-General to communicate the proposals on
the Korean question submitted to the resumed meetings of the sev-
e dhe period Sept. 15, se sept. 190.91953 (U.. General Assembly, Oficial
i Se Report of the Agent-General of the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency
2678
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
(
Korea and are currently familiar with its problems, shall be invited
1 See General Assembly Res. 705 (VII) of Apr. 18, 1953; U.N. General As-
sembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20A (A/2361/Add. 1),
8 In presenting this proposal Ambassador Dean said: “Some of the govern-
ments on our side may not actually attend the political conference. I understand
from unofficial information that it is the present intention of the Government of
the Union of South Africa not to attend. There may be one or two others who
do not join in this offer or who will not care to attend the Conference for one reason
enth session and recommended by the Assembly, together with the
records of the relevant proceedings of the General Assembly, to the
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and
to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea
and to report as appropriate.
86. COMPOSITION OF AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR A POLITI
.
ÇAL CONFERENCE ON KOREA: Proposals Submitted by the
Deputy to the Secretary of State at the Conference Preparatory
Talks at Panmunjom, December 8, 1953 ?
I. Composition and place of the political conference.
1. The political conference shall take the form of a conference on an
equal footing between the two sides referred to in paragraph 60 of the
armistice agreement. The two sides participating in the political
conference shall have plenary authority as to its proceedings.
2. The political conference shall have as voting participants: Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Ethiopia, France, Greece,' Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Republic of Korea,
Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom, and United States of America.
3. All decisions of the political conference shall be deemed to have
been reached by agreement among the
voting participants
on the two
sides referred to in the
armistice agreement and the USSR, only if
decision has received the
affirmative vote of both sides and the USSR
at the political conference. All decisions shall be binding upon each
signatory government. Each side shall determine its own procedure
as to the manner in which it will signify concurrence or non-concut-
rence in decisions.
Each voting participant shall be bound only by the specific agree
.
ments to which it adheres.
4. In consideration of their responsibilities in connection with the
stabilization of the armistice and consequent concern in a
settlement in Korea, and to promote the smooth progress of the
political conference, some or all of the governments whose nations
are now actually working there or who have current experience in
2
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 877–878.
1
0
peaceful
ܪܚܒܝ
)
r
8
8
pp. 3-4.
S
I
or another."
[Footnote in Bulletin.]
KOREA
2679
orea
1 an
Korean, and Chinese. The English, Korean, and Chinese texts of all
resolutions and documents of the political conference shall be equally
authentic. Representatives of the governments invited by the two
the
by both sides to attend and take part in the political conference with-
I the
out vote on either of the two sides.
and
The governments so invited shall be entitled to express their views
in plenary sessions or committee meetings on any item on the agenda
agreed upon by both sides when that item is under discussion by
agreement between the two sides, and in accordance with the schedul-
ing of debate and speeches acceptable to both sides.
On this basis the invited governments may participate in the dis-
ITI. cussion in the political conference. In view of the responsibilities of
the the two sides for reaching agreement, the invited governments shall
tory
not introduce formal motions or proposals.
5. The political conference shall be convened at Geneva, Switzer-
land.
II. Time of the political conference.
6. The political conference shall be convened not less than 28 nor
the
more than 42 days after the termination of these preliminary talks.
tical
III. Procedural matters of the political conference.
fus.
c of
7. The agenda of the political conference shall be determined on
the basis of the armistice agreement by unanimous agreement between
Jew
both sides at the political
conference as its first order of business after
its opening and initial organization.
8. Each government represented at the political conference shall be
limited to one representative at the conference table with the right
to speak. Each representative as designated in the official list of the
political conference shall be entitled to appoint a deputy to sit in his
absence, due notification being given to the other side.
9. The rules of procedure shall be decided by unanimous agreement
between the two sides and shall include regulations for the conduct of
meetings, order of speaking, order of items, and scheduling of the
opening and closing of debate.
10. The order and timing of debate, and the schedule of speeches
and items for discussion shall be determined by unanimous agreement
between the two sides. No representative shall be permitted to speak
the
on any topic not on the agenda and then only in the order on the
the
11. The political conference shall establish such committees or subor-
dinate bodies as are agreed between the two sides.
in
12. The official languages of the political conference shall be English,
rea,
alist
18үе
two
SSR
-ach
lure
sur
ree
eful
agenda.
ted
AS.
1),
sides
may bring their own interpreters to participate in the conference.
13. Sessions of the political conference shall be held daily, except
14. Except as determined by unanimous agreement
between both
sides,
sessions of the political conference shall normally be closed to the
Sundays
and
t of
who
public.
SODI
2680
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ACC
sese
10
Each side shall be entitled to issue communications to the press
cold
following the sessions of the conference.
The conference may meet in executive sessions if both sides agree
,
each side being free to propose the end of such sessions at any time
.
Neither side shall issue any communication to the press following
executive sessions, except as agreed to by both sides.
me
IV. Administrative arrangements for the political conference.
tre
RE
15. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be invited to
Ge
furnish the joint secretariat for the political conference proceedings Ju
and facilities for simultaneous interpretation. This shall not restrict
each side, or each government represented, from having such separate
secretariat, at its own expense, as it may deem necessary.
16. Before
each side shall designate representa-
tives to meet at Geneva, Switzerland, together with a representative
whom the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be invited to
designate, to prepare recommendations for the consideration of the
th
political conference with regard to:
(a) Rules of procedure,
(b) Manner of determining the expenses to be shared equally by
the two sides, and
FO
(c) Related administrative and procedural matters.
Their recommendations shall be subject to ratification at the P-
political conference by the unanimous agreement of both sides,
V. Expenditures of the political conference.
bi
17. Expenditures of each delegation to the political conference shall
be borne by each government itself. All joint expenses, such as cost
of the conference buildings, joint secretariat, and other joint adminis
trative expenses shall be charged on an equal basis to the governments
of the two sides.
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at hours on the
December 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being
equally authentic.
sem
01
$0
to
W
0
0
day of
li
87. BREAKDOWN OF THE KOREAN POLITICAL CONFER-
ENCE PREPARATORY TALKS: Address by the Deputy to the
Secretary of State, December 21, 19532
As the Special Envoy appointed by President Eisenhower and
Secretary of State Dulles
, I am reporting to the American people
tonight on my 7 weeks' attempted negotiations at Panmunjom
Korea, with the delegates from Red China and Communist North
Korea'in an effort to bring about an early convening of the Korean
peace conference.
m
1
2 Made" over radio and television networks; Department of State Bulletin
Jan. 4, 1954, pp. 15–17.
KOREA
2681
1 See supra, docs. 66-68.
a Annexed to the Korean Armistice Agreement, supra, pp. 743–748.
)
'
Bio
The Communists usually introduce false premises, exaggerations,
* morations of fact, distortions of the truth, and completely false
accusations for propaganda purposes to mislead and to divert. These
talks were no exception.
At the meeting on December 10, 1953, in an uninterrupted 534-hour
& session, the Chinese delegate, Huang Hua, after several warnings from
me accused the United States of America of perfidy or deliberate
treachery in connection with the release of prisoners by President
Rhee of the Republic of Korea on June 17-18 1 after Lieutenant
General Harrison had signed the terms of reference for prisoners on
$ June 8, 1953.
it
My Government has never been guilty of perfidy and pray God
je it never shall.
I told him that his statement was false--that my Government was
not guilty of perfidy and unless he withdrew the charge I would treat
the meetings as in indefinite recess. He repeated the charge. And
0
withdrew in protest. To my mind it is quite sufficient. If I had not,
le the Communists would have broadcast far and wide that a repre-
sentative of the United States Government had admitted the charge
of perfidy.
President Rhee said to me, "We salute you, Mr. Dean, for the stand
you took to teach the Soviets that they cannot all the time throw in-
sults at the United States of America and get away with them.”
Tonight I shall explain to you what we were talking about at
10 | Panmunjom and why, and where we go from here.
In our preliminary talks with the Communists we were endeavoring
to bring about the political or peace conference for Korea called for
by paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement.
11
purpose of the political conference originally scheduled for
October 28 is "to settle through negotiation the questions of the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement
* of the Korean question, etc.” The Korean question is the unification
of a free, independent, and democratic Korea.
The nations I represented at these preliminary talks consisted of
the 17 nations contributing troops to the United Nations Command,
including the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.
The other side consisted of Red China and Communist North Korea.
Not present, but really there, was the U.S.S.R.,
which, as everyone
knows, actually instigated the aggression in Korea in June 1950.
you know, through the noble and persistent efforts of President
Eisenħower, the Armistice Agreement was signed by both sides on
July 27, 1953, and was designed to bring about "a complete cessation
of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final
peaceful settlement is achieved."
The fighting and the bloodshed and the destruction have been
If the political conference is not held, does that mean bostilities will
The
f
1
I
As
stopped.
2682
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
V
TE
t?
ma
to
a1
1
W
CE
SE
We have said the U.S.S.R. can attend provided the
be resumed? No-it does not. The armistice agreement provides al
that it shall remain in effect until expressly superseded.
Will the Communists resume hostilities? I do not think so. The
destruction in North Korea is indescribable. Whole villages have
been wiped out, power stations have been destroyed, and factories
roads, farmhouses, and public facilities are in ruins. The Com-
munists took a terrific beating. We stopped the tide and timetable
of Red aggression.
it
Posters all over North Korea depict peace, and children releasing
white doves. The emphasis is on civilian building. The construction
of huge concrete bunkers and tunnels in the north leads us to believe
they have no wish to resume hostilities but are preparing to hold T
the north.
C
Will President Rhee unilaterally resume hostilities? In my judg-
ment the answer is "no."
aj
President Rhee is an indomitable fighter for a free, united, and
democratic independent Korea. Those are our objectives and of the it
United Nations. We admire his patriotism and courage and his fight
against communism tremendously.
We have signed the armistice and are determined to keep it. On
August 7, 1953, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles signed a joint ti
communiqué 1 in which President Rhee agreed to leave his troops under
the United Nations Command and
to take no unilateral action until 11
the mutual defense pact might be expected to come into operation
next spring if approved by the Senate. In view of his talks with
Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, and Vice
President Nixon and my many talks with him on this subject, I b
believe President Rhee will take no unilateral action.
What is the argument all about? Why can't we and the Com-
munists agree on the time, place, and composition of the conference
?
Time and place are relatively easy. As to time, we are
to any date so long as there is adequate time to prepare
the necessary
facilities, transport the delegations, etc. As to place, we say Geneva, ,
the Communists say New Delhi, and we could probably agree on
b
Beirut, or Colombo or Kandy or Nuwara Eliya in Ceylon.
The meat of the coconut is the composition. Who will attend the
conference—who will be bound by agreements reached? Can w
bring about unification of Korea and the withdrawal of foreign forces
?
With regard to composition, although the armistice does not so
provide, the other side proposed we should invite five neutrals
,
including the U.S.S.R. as one of them, with the same rights to partic
pate in the discussions and to vote as the nations on the two sides
.
They include the U.S.S.R. among these truly neutral nations pre
sumably
to hide her aggression in Korea. The U.S.S. R. cannot be
classified with such truly fine neutrals as Burma, India, Indonesia
,
other side wants her.
it would be desirable to have her at the conference and to know her
It is readily apparent why the U.S.S.R. is not a neutral and why
mi
9
W
agreeable
e
U
n
8
1 See supra, doc. 84.
KOREA
2683
2 See supra, doc. 85.
lave
leve
ance with resolution 5 (b) adopted by the United Nations General
does not elect to be bound by her vote on that particular item. This
ides attitude on each agenda item at the conference—whether she agreed
with the other side and whether she will be bound by any agreements
The reached.
Why do the Communists want neutrals? The Communists think
ries
, they can stir up trouble for us with India by nominating her as a
om- neutral at the conference. They want well-intentioned people to
able believe that the Government of the United States does not like India,
its great leader, or its freedom-loving people, which is fantastic.
sing Let me here pay tribute to a great military man, a great humani-
tion tarian, and a man combining superb common sense with patience
and a warm friendly feeling for the helpless prisoners of war-General
nold Thimayya of India, Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission. I believe that General Thimayya is in full sympathy
idge with our desire to observe the unalterable clockwork timetable of the
agreement for the release of the prisoners of war.
end
If the political conference is in session December 22 to January 22,
the
it can discuss until that date but no longer the disposition of prisoners
ght
who have not elected repatriation to the country of their origin. It
cannot discuss that question longer than January 22. If it is not in
On
session that does not affect by one jot the automatic operation of the
vint
time schedule for the release of prisoners.
der
On midnight, January 22, unless both sides ask them to remain,
atil
the Indian forces will withdraw and the prisoners will be assisted to a
ion
neutral country. We have assured General Thimayya our side will
ith
not so request.
I think there is reason to hope that there will be no action either
by the Communists or the Republic of Korea to cause bloodshed
and that the prisoners will revert to civilian status on January 22
without difficulty or trouble.
ce?
To stop the other side's byplay as to neutrals and to further the
ble early convening of the conference, our side
has put forward an overall
ry constructive proposal for the participation at the conference of
Ta,
neutrals as nonvoting observers on the items on the agenda as agreed
between the two voting sides and in the order of discussion as agreed
upon.'. This would permit India and the others to participate as
he
nonvoting observers and
to discuss
items on the agreed agenda and
in the agreed order. If an item is not on the agenda
it cannot be
S?
discussed. Nor can items be brought up out of their agreed order.
Except for the other side's insistence on the U.S.S.R. participating
is,
of a neutral, and ironing out the particular neutrals to participate
which really constitutes no fundamental difficulty,
we have fully met
the other side on this question as to the participation of nonvoting
observers and their rights at the conference
and voting procedures.
As to voting, each side votes as a unit. But any nation, in accord-
Assembly on August 28, 1953, can announce before the voting she
ly
ice
I
011
we
SO
S.
be
be
live
de
should facilitate agreement.
or
1 See supra.
2684
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
81
11
TE
-slavery or freedom-is fundamental. There is no easy formula
The other side insists that talk continue and that there should be
no voting until all nations on each side are bound. If any one nation's
vote, as a practical matter, is really needed-for example, unification
of Korea or withdrawal of foreign forces--this would, as a practical
matter, have to be worked out before voting took place; so really we
are not too far apart.
Thus we may have to have some agreement as to the territorial
integrity of Korea and agreement to insure that the troops withdrawn
across the northern border will not return or that other troops K
will not cross the border when we withdraw pursuant to some agree-B
ment to be worked out for phased withdrawal of troops at the peace
conference.
Do I feel there still is a good chance for a true Korean peace, or has
Panmunjom demonstrated the futility of a Korean political confer-
ence? I do believe the Chinese Communists are determined to keep
North Korea politically and economically integrated into their own
economy. The outlook is discouraging but by no means hopeless D
There is no easy, pat solution. It will take all the brains, energy to
resolution, and patience at our command.
d
Communists are in no hurry. They have no timetable. They
think time is on their side and that Americans, being optimistic,
friendly, truthful, constructive, and inclined to believe and to hopeb
for the best, will become discouraged.
S
They believe that at a long, drawn-out conference the American R
negotiators will be forced by American public opinion to give in,
order to have a "successful" conference. Impatience mounts as no
progress is reported. People ask, “What progress did you make
th
today?"
The Communists know this and burn bonfires under the America
negotiators and utter rude, insulting, arrogant demands that the
American negotiators stop their unconstructive, stalling tactics.
The Communist press is completely government-controlled. Our
is free and pray God it ever shall be. The Communists can plar
and talk and vote as a unit. We must marshal facts, argue
, and
convince the individual nations on our side. I wouldn't have it
otherwise. But sometimes it's tough to see your best play spilled
before it gets off the ground because someone has unintentionally
revealed the signals.
As against that, consider how much better off we would be today
if the secret agreements with respect
to China, Manchuria, and the
U.S.S.R. had never been entered into at Yalta without notice to
Nationalist China or to the American public.
The issue between us and the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Commu-
nists
which can either hide it or solve it.
We are fighting to free the minds and souls of men from communism
and we in the free world must stand together in this great fight
.
It is not a fight of left against right. It is a fight for the human
dignity of man as a creature of God against the Communist doctrine
that he has no value except as the state desires to use him.
W
TE
8
r
KOREA
2685
(Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 221--222. The substance of
this resolution was incorporated in the quadripartite communiqué of the Berlin
Conference, Feb. 18, 1954; supra, pp. 2372–2373.
* The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954, pp. 45–53.
100
we
11
ace
! be
n's 88. RESOLUTION ON THE HOLDING OF A FAR EASTERN
CONFERENCE AGREED TO BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
ical OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE,
AND THE SOVIET UNIONI AT THE BERLIN FOREIGN
MINISTERS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 18, 19542
rial
The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United
Op Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in
Met Berlin,
Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united
and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing
189 international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,
er-
Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States,
Lep France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's
sk
. Democratic Republic of Korea, and the other countries the armed
forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which
desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on April 26 for the purpose of
preaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question;
IC
Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also
pe be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United
States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, and other interested states
.
It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of,
ke the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic
recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.
wn
20
in will be invited.
20
2.1
ne
T'S
89. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED AND INDEPENDENT
KOREA: Statement by the Secretary of State at the Geneva
Conference on Korea and Indochina, April 28, 1954 3
d
it
ed
J
e
0
We are here to establish a united and independent Korea. It may
be given us to write a new page in what has been a tragic history,
The people of Korea for centuries
lived together as one nation, and
together they have
long endured foreign subjugation and aggression.
They have sought to be united
in freedom and independence. This is
4 right which no nation or group of nations can legitimately deny
The United States has come here with the Republic of Korea and
with the other governments whose armed forces came to Korea's
John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden, Georges Bidault, and Vyacheslav M.
* Poreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954
them.
ៗ
Molotov.
1
B
2686
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
W
1
th
el
to
091
2 See General MacArthur's Order No. 1 of Sept. 2, 1945; The Political Reoriento-
3 Statements of Apr. 27, 1954; The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference,
assistance, in a renewed and determined effort to aid the Korean people
d
to realize their reasonable and rightful aspirations.
Why does Korea remain divided? The 1943 Declaration of Cairo
promised that victory over Japan would be used to make Korea "free
and independent." But that has not happened.
The present phase of Korea's martyrdom goes back to August
Then the United States, which had for four years borne the
burden of the Japanese War, agreed that the Soviet Union might
T
move into Manchuria and Korea north of the 38th parallel, in order
Nati
to accept there the surrender of the Japanese. But the Soviets
,
having gotten into North Korea for one purpose, stayed on for another
only
purpose. Their goal has been, directly or through puppets, to turn
tras
North Korea into a satellite state and, if possible, to extend their rule
min
throughout all Korea. In so doing, they have consistently defied thes
agreements with their former allies, and also the collective will
Rus
represented by the United Nations.
T
It is important that we should constantly have in mind that what
on
is here at stake is not merely Korea, important as that is; it is the
and
authority of the United Nations. The United Nations assumed pri-
port
mary responsibility for establishing Korea as a free and independent
tury
nation. It helped to create the Republic of Korea and nurtured it.
fied
When aggressors threatened the Republic of Korea with extinction
, Net
it was the United Nations which called on its members to go to Korea's
with
defence.
Korea provides the first example in history of a collective security
organization in actual operation. If this Conference is disloyal to
the United Nations and its decisions, then each of us will bear a share
of responsibility for destroying what protects us all.
Yesterday, the Delegates of the Republic of Korea and of Colom-
bia told eloquently of the mission which the United Nations had
assumed in relation to Korea. It is a story that bears repetition,
The United Nations first took jurisdiction of the Korean problem
in the year 1947. It then created a Temporary Commission for
Korea to help organize a government of Korea and to observe the
initial elections. The Soviet Union refused to permit the United
Nations Commission to have access to North Korea. Elsewhere the
Commission functioned as the United Nations had intended.
In December 1948 the United Nations General Assembly received
the report of its Temporary Commission and it adopted, by a vote of
48 to 6 with one abstention, a resolution which I shall read. The
resolution declared:
"That there has been established a lawful government (the Governado
ment of the Republic of Korea) having effective
control and juris- rote
1 Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 22;
tion of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. II, pp. 442-445.
pp. 34-39 and 41-45.
General Assembly Res. 112 (II), Nov. 14, 1947; A Decade of American Foreign
Policy, pp. 677-678.
mili
initi
But
bers
ing
head
actid
飢​T畝​伽​毗​姻​吧​删​娜​氏​咖​娜​如​肌​wBw帆​咖​咖​Fi仰​上下​正
​for
1950
08
KOREA
2687
Res. 498 (V), Feb. 1, 1951; supra, pp. 2608–2609.
Korea." I
ī
1
1
Session, Part I, Resolutions, pp. 25–27.
? Reports of June 25 and 26, 1950; United States Policy in the Korean Crisis
| Department of State publication 3922; 1950), pp. 12 and 21.
"Res. 376 (V); supra, pp. 2576–2578.
Resolution of June 25, 1950; supra, pp. 2538-2539.
diction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission
was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of
the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on
elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the elec-
torate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Tem-
porary Commission; and that this is the only such Government of
The United States, trusting to the moral authority of the United
Nations and the Charter undertakings of its members, withdrew its
own armed forces from South Korea. That left South Korea with
only local forces suitable for maintenance of internal order. In con-
trast, the Soviet Union rapidly built up the war power of the Com-
munist regime it had installed in North Korea, and on June 25, 1950,
these forces launched a full-scale attack, implemented with many
Russian-made tanks and planes.
The United Nations Temporary Commission, which was present
on the spot, and the membership of which included India, instantly
and unanimously found that this was armed aggression, and so re-
ported to the United Nations Security Council. That Council in
tun, by a vote of 9 to 0, with one absence and one abstention, certi-
fied to the fact of aggression, and called on the members of the United
Nations to help to resist the aggression. Sixteen nations responded
with military contributions, and over forty responded with either
military or material aid.
The small and lightly armed forces of the Republic of Korea were
mitially overpowered by the assault. The Communist aggressors
quickly occupied all of Korea except a small
beachhead at Pusan.
But the forces of ROK quickly rallied and the United Nations mem-
des gave increasing support. A brilliant military operation, involv-
ng a bold landing at Inchon, caught the aggressors off balance, and
enabled the United Nations Command to break out
of the Pusan beach-
bed. The aggressors were routed and destroyed as an effective force.
It seemed that the United Nations could now complete its earlier
action to unify Korea. Accordingly, on 7 October 1950, the General
assembly set up a new body, known as the United Nations Commission
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea-initials UNCURK
sad usually used to complete the
task of the previous Commissioas.
The new Commission proceeded to Korea.
But the long-sought unification and freedom of Korea was not yet
bhe. Another Communist aggression intervened. In November
1950 the
Chinese Communist regime sent masses of its armed forces
into Northern Korea. The United Nations General Assembly by a
bote of 44 to 7, with 9 abstentions, adjudged this intervention to be
degression 6
Res. 195 (III), Dec. 12, 1948; U.N. General Assembly, Oficial Records, Third
1
2688
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
and
ter
cor
quiesced in and the area of suppression must be constantly expanded
The United Nations Command was forced to withdraw again to the
south of Korea. But again they fought their way back to a point
where the aggressors held less territory than when they had committed
the initial aggression from the 38th parallel.
On 27 July 1953, an Armistice was concluded with the United
Nations Command. This was no free-will gift of peace by the Com-But
munists. It came only after final fanatical efforts to break the line nist
of the United Nations Command had failed with ghastly losses to the thre
attackers. It came only after the Communists realized that, unless A
there was a quick armistice, the battle area would be enlarged so as to tim
endanger the sources of aggression in Manchuria. Then and only then thi
did the Communist rulers judge that it would be expedient to sign the
Armistice.
The Armistice contemplated that there should be a political con-
ference with reference to Korea within three months. But the Com-
munists found it inexpedient to live up to that agreed recommenda-
tion. They desired first to consolidate their position in North Korea has
Only now does the Korean Political Conference meet, after long die
haggling over its composition and place of meeting.
ing
The composition and the place of the Conference are precisely those her
which the United Nations side proposed six months ago.
the
This fact enables one to judge where lies the responsibility for the
delay.
The seven-year story I have summarized is a story of persistent
attack against the forces of international law and order represented
by the United Nations. Whether this attack will still prevail may
be determined by this Conference.
During the seven-year period of 1947 to the present time, which I
have briefly reviewed in relation to Korea, the Governments of France
,
Great Britain and the United States have been working with the
fre
Soviet Union to bring about the unification of Germany and libera-
tion of Austria. There have been hundreds of meetings of the For-
eign Ministers or their aides on these subjects. Nothing has been
accomplished. But something has been learned. This Conference w
can usefully have that in mind as we judge the proposals which come
before us here.
th
It seems to us that Soviet Communist conduct has been largely in-
K
fluenced by fear of freedom.
It seems that the Communist ruling class believe that a society is
most peaceful and most productive if its members conform to a pat-
tern which is prescribed by rulers possessed of absolute power,
inherently involves a suppression of freedom, for freedom implies
diversity, not conformity, but it is not enough that freedom be sup
pressed within what is now the Soviet orbit, because freedom is con-
V
tagious. Accordingly, freedom outside that orbit cannot be ac-
in order to preserve the existing area of suppression.
Thus, the Soviet Communist rulers seem to have been driven by
their own doctrine, by their own fears, to seek constantly, in one way or
* Supra, pp. 724–750.
mo
I
lite
ini
SUC
&
STE
of
ac
This
N
ar
SC
p
KOREA
2689
Vations or its resolutions. These, it seems, are to be treated as
a
S
0
e
11
2
something different. It did not so much as mention the United
another, to extend their control until there is finally achieved the goal
t which Lenin referred to as “the amalgamation of all nations" and
which Stalin referred to as "the amalgamation of the masses into a
single state Union.'
i It may be said that Lenin and Stalin are dead-and so they are.
But their doctrine is not dead. It continues to be taught to Commu-
nists throughout the world, and Communists continue to practice it
e throughout the world.
As the record stands to this date, the Communist rulers have at no
time, at no place, voluntarily relaxed their grasp on what they had.
i This is so even though, as in the case of Eastern Germany, Austria
and North Korea, they had promised that the grasp was to be only
temporary. Also, in every non-Communist nation of the world the
agents of international communism work to achieve the amalgamation
of the nation and its people into the system of Communist dictatorship.
The problem which we face here at Geneva is the same problem that
has been faced elsewhere. It is the problem of achieving "peace" and
"democracy”-in the historic meaning of those words. They are allur-
ing words, rich in their traditional meaning. Communist propaganda
bas adopted them as lures, to trap the unwary. It must be remembered
that when the Communists speak of "peace," they mean a society of
conformity, under a single directing will. When they speak of de-
mocracy," they mean a dictatorship of the proletariat.
The sum of the matter is this:
1
When we negotiate with the Soviet Communists and their satel-
lites, we are confronted with something far more formidable than
individual or national lust for glory. We are confronted with a vast
monolithic system which, despite its power, believes that it cannot
survive except as it succeeds in progressively destroying human
I do not present this analysis in a mood of pessimism, but rather in
a mood of realism. Communist
doctrine authorizes accommodation
when the opposition is strong. It is our task here to show such
strength-strength of honourable and non-aggressive purpose that
the Communists will find it acceptable to grant unity and freedom to
Yesterday, we heard three proposals for the solution of the problem
of Korea. The Republic of Korea and the Republic of Colombia
advocated a solution giving vitality to the resolutions of the United
Nations-those resolutions which
refer to the
establishment of a united
The proposal of the North Korean-Communist regime was, however,
0
1
j
freedom.
1
Korea.
and free Korea.
pullities.
June 1950,
The Communist proposal is in essence the same as that made in
as a prelude to the armed attack upon the Republic of
Proposal of Apr. 27, 1954; The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference
,
pp.
415900-57Vol. 2--
-66
2690
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
mi
Allt
I
I
DIV
este
mo
IPOD
and
1 Proposal of Feb. 4, 1954; Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions,
Korea. Also, it is strikingly similar to the scheme which the Soviet som
Union presented at Berlin last February 1 for the unification of Ger-
many. Conformity, you see, is the Communist rule.
The present Communist proposal on Korea provides that the freely Cer
elected government of the Republic of Korea, representing at least
three-quarters of the Korean people, would be forced into combina-
tion, on a basis of equality, with the Communist regime ruling & tio.
small minority of the people in the North.
free
General elections are proposed by the Communists under a law, the
terms of which would be subject to veto by the Communist regime
.
The proposal stipulates that the election conditions should exclude Up
all "foreign interference.” Presumably, this is intended to exclude ist
United Nations supervision.
The scheme is designed to destroy the authority of the existing gor-obs
ernment and to replace it by a Communist puppet regime.
had
The North Korean Communist proposal likewise requires that all
foreign forces should be withdrawn from Korean territory within six
months. The United Nations forces would have a long way to go.
The Chinese Communist forces would have only a few miles to go-
and they could quickly return.
The Ünited States does not desire its troops to remain indefinitely tio
in Korea. But we remember that once before we had our troops in 198
Korea and withdrew them prematurely as it turned out. We do not
195
want that history to repeat itself,
This then is the North Korean proposal. The United States must
reject that proposal because it does not meet the requirements of a for-
free, unified and independent Korea, for which so much blood has been in
expended and suffering endured.
Peace is always easy to achieve-by surrender. Unity is also easy of
to achieve-by surrender. The hard task, the task that confronts us, pen
is to combine peace and unity with freedom.
The people of the Republic of Korea know freedom, and they have
fought and suffered as have few others to preserve their freedom,
I have myself seen the freedom of the Republic of Korea.
the
I have been to the University of Seoul and seen the young men and
women of Korea eagerly acquiring knowledge in a free, liberal educa- pro
tional institution.
Ke
I have attended sessions of the Korean Assembly and seen the func- U
tioning of this body, whose members had been chosen by freely con-
tested elections observed by a United Nations Commission.
I have met in a vast auditorium with thousands of Christian
refugees who had recently fled from North Korea into the Republic
of Korea to escape the religious persecution of the Communist North
and to gain the freedom of religion which prevailed in the Republicita
of Korea.
tic
The Republic of Korea, which fought so valiantly for freedom, wil
never accept unity at the price of thinly disguised
annexation by the
N
sub
ces
me
Te
OT
po
pp. 228-229.
KOREA
2691
* Treaty of Oct. 1, 1953; supra, pp. 897-898.
.
@
X
).
tions which would be served by control of Korea? If so, it will be
Nations has been seeking for Korea, and which the Koreans want for
it Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc. The United States sent over one
million of their youth to fight in Korea to save Korea from violent
annexation by aggressors. Of them, over 140,000 became casualties.
Certainly we are not disposed, here at the Council table, to give away
what our sons battled so bravely to preserve.
It is basic that whatever programme is adopted here for the unifica-
& tion of Korea must in fact also be a programme which will assure the
freedom of Korea.
e À workable programme for unifying Korea does not have to be
invented by us. It is already at hand. It was laid down by the
e United Nations General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950. That
is the resolution to which I have already referred, the resolution which
established a Commission to complete the unification of Korea by
observing elections in that part of Korea where observed elections
had not yet been held
l]
That United Nations Commission (UNCURK) is at this very
moment waiting in Korea ready to fulfil its clear and precise mandate
from the United Nations.
Accomplishment of that mandate would complete the unification
and freedom of Korea which was interrupted first by Soviet obstruc-
I tion in 1948, then by North Korean Communist aggression in June
1950, and then by the Chinese Communist aggression of November
t 1950. Now that aggression has been thwarted, the interrupted work
of the Commission should proceed.
That is our proposal.
t
It would require the Chinese Communist regime to withdraw their
forces of aggression and occupation from North Korea so that the
United Nations can complete its task in an atmosphere free of menace.
It is important to think of freedom not only in terms of the freedom
J of individuals but also in terms of national freedom. Korea is a
peninsula of such strategic value that it has for many years been the
subject of big-power politics. Russia, Japan and China have suc-
e cessively sought to use Korea to serve their own policies of aggrandize-
ment. For a long time the Koreans have not been the masters of
dheir own destiny. That state of affairs should be ended.
The United States seeks no advantages in Korea. We are in the
process of concluding a Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of
Korea.' But that treaty implies no aggressive purpose and the
United States does not seek thereby to gain a forward position which
Japan is no longer an aggressive force and has loyally undertaken to
žefrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or the political independence of any other country,
The Republic of Korea has itself no ambitions which extend beyond
Are Soviet Russia and Communist China willing to renounce ambi-
1
a
could menace anyone.
its natural borders.
themselves.
如​仙​!侧​毗​?如​如​如下​汕​w
Whi
AT
Casey of Australia, P. H. Spaak of Belgium, C. A. Ronning of Canada, Francisco
Kindynis of Greece, J. Sturm of Luxembourg, A. Bentinck of the Netherlands,
Turkey, Anthony Eden of Great Britain, and Walter Bedell Smith of the United
2692 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Such a Korea should of course be a member of the United Nations
Koi
and enjoy the added dignity and protection which membership may
P
give. It may be recalled that the Republic of Korea applied for mem-
bership in the United Nations in 1949. It was prevented only by a inde
Soviet Union veto in the Security Council. That is another of the
foll
.
wrongs which we should agree here to remedy. .
1
There are those who feel that past experience and cold reason
em]
combine to show the futility of the task which we here undertake.
I do not underestimate the difficulty of that task. But I still feel that
sett
we need not be discouraged, and that it is not a waste of our time to
2
seek resourcefully to achieve our allotted goal.
Koi
We properly recall the failures of the past, so that we may profit for
by experience. But we can also remember that the future is never &
mere repetition of the past.
We need not let cold logic chill our hopes. We know that those who
live by faith prevail in the end over those who live by calculation.
It is right that Korea should be united and should be a free and
1
independent nation able to realize a destiny which conforms to the
peaceful aspirations of its people.
Fin
It is right that the United Nations should be sustained as an au- The
thority to which all peoples, for all time, may turn to save them from dit
the scourge of war and to assure the dignity and worth and equal itse
rights of nations large and small.
Our duty is to pursue these goals with dedication, and with a purity
of purpose which admits of no self-aggrandizemènt. Then we
shall
have done our part in serving principles of moral order, which impose
ger
themselves on men and nations.
Pla
90. SIXTEEN-NATION DECLARATION ON KOREA ISSUED AT
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA AND INDOCHINA,
JUNE 15, 1954 3
TE
Pursuant to the resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Nations
General Assembly, and the Berlin communique of February 18
,
rej
1954, we, as nations who contributed military forces to the United
Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva
for
! See United Nations Bulletin, Mar. 1, 1949, pp. 209–210.
2 The Soviet Union exercised its veto at the security Council meeting of Apr.
Ui
8, 1949; ibid., May 1, 1949, pp. 457-458.
Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, pp. 973-974. Signed by RG de
of the Republic of Korea, Wan Waithayakanclof Thailand, M. C. Acikalisted
States.
4 Supra, doc. 85.
5 Supra, pp. 2372-2373.
elea
姻​w舰​舰​职​伽​秘​明
​con
who
194
SU
3
2011
N
KOREA
2693
S
T
e
.
t
| United Nations of August 28, 1953, the member states parties to this
declaration will inform the United Nations concerning the proceedings
Nov. 11, 1954; infra, doc. 92.
Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent
Korea by peaceful means.
We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord with
the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unification,
independence, and freedom of Korea; and within the framework of the
following two principles which we believe to be fundamental.
1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully
empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore
peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful
t
settlement in Korea.
2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic
Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under UN supervision,
for representatives in the national assembly, in which representation
shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.
We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement
which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accord-
soce with these fundamental principles.
The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain
3
agreement. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear.
Firstly
, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations.
The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence
of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations
1
as the tool of aggression. Were we to accept this position of
the Communists, it would mean the death of the principle of collective
security and of the UN itself. Secondly, we desire genuinely free
elections. The Communists insist upon procedures which would make
genuinely free elections impossible. It is clear that the Communists
will not accept
impartial and effective supervision of free elections.
Plainly
, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist
control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes
which have frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since
We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disa-
greement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the
world into believing that there is agreement where there is none.
In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and
regretfully to conclude that so long as the Communist delegations
reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable,
further consideration and
examination of the Korean question by the
conference would serve no useful purpose. We reaffirm our continued
support for the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.
In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the
See Results of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva: Letter, Report
ed Annex From Certain
Members of the United Nations to the Secretary-General,
itself
I
1947.
+
at this conference.
2694
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
92
.
A
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 15
2 For the full text of the resolution of Oct. 12, 1950, see ibid., Sicth Session
91. TRANSFER TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE REGION BETWEEN THE tica
ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND THE 38th PARALLEL: al
Resolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification on
and Rehabilitation of Korea, August 9, 1954 1
“The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabili-
:
tation of Korea,
“Recalling the resolution of the Interim Committee on Korea of 12
October 1950, subsequently endorsed by UNCURK, which advised
the Unified Command to assume provisionally all responsibilities for
government and civil administration of areas north of the 38th parallel
which might come under occupation by United Nations forces and
over which the United Nations had not recognized any Government
as having legal and effective control, pending consideration by UN.
CURK in the light of its responsibility for establishing a unified,
independent and democratic Government of all Korea,
I
"Noting that the Unified Command has, through the United Nations
27.
Command, administered in accordance with that resolution the smal
area north of the 38th parallel which has been under United Nations
"po
control since 1951,
Ger
“Considering that the cessation of hostilities consequent upon the
the
conclusion of the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953 has enabled
the United Nations Command to develop civilian resettlement of
that area, so far as possible with original inhabitants who have been
living as refugees in South Korea, under a programme viewed favour-
ably by the Commission as a means of relieving the refugee problem
and assisting the economy,
"Recognizing that the civilian population has now grown to some
130,000 in this area of approximately 2,300 square miles and has
created an increasingly large and complex administrative task which
needs the facilities of civilian administration,
“Bearing in mind that the United Nations Command has in conse-
quence indicated to the Commission that it now wishes to be relieved
of responsibility for an administration which it considers it is not
organized to carry out,
"Believing that in any event it is undesirable to keep & civil
population under military administration for a prolonged period after
hostilities have ceased.
"Considering that this problem can be appropriately resolved by het
transferring administrative control to the Government of the Republic
of Korea, and
“Further considering that such transfer of administrative control
will be without prejudice to the final disposition of the territory and
will not adversely affect any future negotiations for a settlement of
the Korean question,
(A/2711), .
Supplement No. 12 (A/1881), p. 13.
3 See map of Korea, supra, p. 725.
trib.
sha
Star
Nai
Koi
Re
desi
the
pan
par
sho
CON
tim
F
MC
Ho
Un
Sta
Rey
the
the
1
Cor
Del
17
3
KOREA
2695
17 (A/2786), Nov. 11, 1954.
However, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the
BT February 1954 that "a conference of representatives of the United
United States, and the USSR, meeting in Berlin, proposed on 18
Tx States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea,
1 The President of the Republic of Korea was informed by the United Nations
Command, Aug. 12, 1954, of the latter's intent to effect this transfer; see the
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 6, 1954, p. 337.
? U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item
IS. "Recommends that the Unified Command transfer, as soon as prac-
HE ticable
, administrative control over the areas north of the 38th par-
L: alle and south of the Demilitarized Zone now under United Nations
ion ontrol to the Government of the Republic of Korea." 1
2
92. RESULTS OF THE KOREAN PHASE OF THE GENEVA
12
CONFERENCE ON KOREA AND INDOCHINA: Letter, Report,
sed
and Annex From Certain Members of the United Nations to the
for
U.N. Secretary-General, November 11, 1954 2
el?
nd LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1954 FROM THE MEMBERS OF THE
ent UNITED NATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE UNITED NATIONS
N. ACTION IN KOREA AND ATTENDED THE KOREAN POLITICAL CON-
ed, FERENCE, AT GENEVA, ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
In paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement signed on
ell
27 July 1953 the military commanders of both sides recommended that,
in order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, a
political conference of a higher level of both sides” be held. The
Che
General Assembly, in its resolution of 28 August 1953, welcomed
led
the holding of such a conference and recommended that "the side con-
of
ributing armed forces under the United Nations Command in Korea
shall have as participants in the conference
those among the Member
States contributing armed forces pursuant to the call of the United
Nations which desire to be represented, together with the Republic of
Korea". It also recommended that the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics participate in the conference, "provided the other side
desires it”. The United States Government was requested to make
the arrangements for the political conference with the other partici-
pants. Finally, the Assembly recommended that Member States
participating in the political conference on the United Nations side
ed
should inform the United Nations when agreement was reached at the
conference and keep the United Nations informed at other appropriate
Til
Efforts by the United States to make arrangements for the confer-
ence in accordance with these resolutions were for long frustrated.
DS
DS
ur-
em
me
nas
ich
Se-
106
times.
rol
nd
d
ike armed forces of which
participated in the hostilities in Korea, and
ว้
DIA
* Supra, doc. 85.
2696
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
SU
Coll
S
m
peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peacefu
which desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on 26 April for the purpose
of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question”.
The Conference convened as scheduled on 26 April in accordance
K
with the Berlin communiqué of 18 February 1954 with all eligible
countries attending except the Union of South Africa. In our view
this Conference was in effect the conference referred to in paragraph
60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the General Assembly's
resolution of 28 August 1953. The Korean problem was discussed in tha
fifteen plenary sessions and one special meeting over a period of seven
weeks, from 26 April to 15 June.
Pursuant to the Assembly's resolution of 28 August 1953, the Mem- Co
bers of the United Nations who participated in the United Nations
action in Korea and attended the Geneva Conference believe it appro-
priate to inform the United Nations of their efforts to bring about, by
negotiation, a peaceful solution of the Korean problem. It is requested
that their report on the Conference, and this letter, be circulated to
the Members of the United Nations. Copies of the records of the
Conference have been transmitted to the United Nations Secretariat,
Th
th
For Australia: Percy SFENDER
For Belgium: F. VAN LANGENHOVE
b
For Canada: Paul MARTIN
For Colombia: Francisco URRUTIA
For Ethiopia: Z. G. Heywor ME,
For France: H. HOPPENOT
For Greece: Alexis KYROU
he
For Luxembourg: J.-P. KREMER
For the Netherlands: D. J. von BALLUSECK
For New Zealand: L. K. MUNRO
3.
For the Philippines: Felixberto M. SERRANO
acti
For Thailand: Wan WAITHAYA KON
For Turkey: Selim SARPER Meli
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain colla
and Northern Ireland: Anthony NUTTING Con
For the United States of America: Henry Cabot LODGE, Jr. ( Thi
1. Our Governments, which participated in the United Nations
action in Korea, made every effort at the Korean Political Conference
in Geneva to obtain agreement that would lead to the establishment
of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. To this end, our
delegations made a number of proposals and suggestions, consistentes
with the authority and principles
of the United Nations, to achieve our
the unification of Korea by peaceful means on a practical and honor
able
basis. Agreement was sought on the basis of the following tw
fundamental principles:
(1) The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and right
' Islam
empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore
settlement in Korea; and
84
10
reso
effo
!
tent
Solu
1
part
};
1 Supra, doc. 88.
KOREA
2697
The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954 (De-
partment of State publication 5609; 1954), p. 97.
-8
28
LA
7
n
S
:)
1
28
ER
VE
IN
IA
OT
2) In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic
Korea genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations
supervision for representatives in a National Assembly, in which
epresentation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous popula-
ñ con in all parts of Korea.
PS
2. The three Communist delegations rejected these principles. In
the first place, they argued that the United Nations, through the
collective action taken in Korea, had lost its moral and legal authority
to deal with the Korean problem. For example, in a speech to the
2. Conference on 11 May 1954, Mr. Molotov said:
"In the situation which has arisen the United Nations has
y deprived itself of the possibility of acting as an impartial interna-
dtional organ [n] and it can no longer play an objective part in the
to settlement of the Korean question.
The same viewpoint was expressed on 22 May by Mr. Chou En-lai,
ut.
who asserted that:
the United Nations has been placed in the position of a
belligerent in the Korean War and has lost its competence and
moral authority to deal impartially with the Korean question”.
OT Mr. Nam Il told the Conference on 22 May that:
"We fail to understand the statement(s) of some delegates who
have called upon the Korean people to respect the United Nations'
actions and resolutions on the Korean question.” 2
3. The Governments which participated in the United Nations
action in Korea believed that it was essential to declare and adhere
to the first of the principles mentioned above in order to uphold the
validity of the Charter of the United Nations and the legality of the
in collective action undertaken by the United Nations to repel the
No Communist aggression and to restore peace
and security in Korea.
This principle was reaffirmed by the General Assembly which, in a
solution of 28 August 1953, expressed satisfaction that "the first
pursuant to the call of the United Nations to repel armed
ent sgression by collective military measures have been successful"
and expressed its firm conviction that".
this proof of the effective-
1988 of collective
security under the United Nations Charter will
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security”.
Cur delegations at the Geneva Conference therefore rejected the con-
tention that the United Nations, in taking
collective action against
begression, had lost its authority 'under the Charter to find a peaceful
kolution of the Korean question. We believe that, had we taken any
the other position in this matter at Geneva and accepted the repudiation
o e o the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea,
DU
ER
CK
RO
NO
ON
ER
Jr.
DIS
ice
JU
ent
380
or
WO
1
* Ibid., p. 117.
2698
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
pa
PI
Or
was pointed out at Geneva, this form of international supervision
would have been identical with that of the neutral nations supervisory
this would have gravely undermined the principle of collective in
security which is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations
4. Our Governments also strongly believed that the second printe
ciple--genuinely free elections—was essential to the achievement of m
the objectives of the United Nations in Korea. Free elections are the pr
only means by which the Korean people can express their will without
fear of coercion; they are, therefore, the essential first step towards
the unification of Korea. To ensure that the elections are held under
conditions of genuine freedom in Korea, we maintained that they
must be conducted under appropriate supervision. In our view, such !
supervision must be impartial and effective and should be under the
authority and auspices of the United Nations.
5. The proposals put forward by the three Communist delegations
on the subject of elections were, briefly, that:
(1) Elections in Korea must be prepared and conducted by an
"all-Korean commission” in which North and South Korea would
have equal representation and which would function only by agree-
ment between the two.
(2) International supervision of the elections must be limited to ?
“neutral nations supervisory commission”, composed of an equal o
number of Communist and non-Communist nations to be designated
by the Conference, and operating only by unanimous agreement.
6. In our view, these proposals were unacceptable. They repudi-
ated the competence of the United Nations and were inherently
unworkable. They failed entirely to provide any guarantee that
elections would be carried out in genuine freedom. "They rejected
the principle of proportional representation by insisting tħat in the
fo
so-called "all-Korean commission” the minority of the population
who inhabit North Korea should have the same number of repre-
sentatives as the overwhelming majority of the population who live
in South Korea. Even if the all-Korean commission" could success-
fully have been constituted, it could only have functioned to the
extent that its North Korean and South Korean members were in
complete agreement. There was no provision for resolving points
de
disagreement. In practice, the Communist members would have re-
tained an absolute veto over the conduct of the elections, which
ba
would have
meant that they could never have
taken place in freedom,
if at all.
7. As for the proposed "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission"
it could only
have functioned in the unlikely event that the “all-Korean
commission” was able to agree on a plan for the elections
. Even then
he
the equal representation of Communist and non-Communist nations
,
and the provisions under which decisions could only be taken by
unanimous agreement, would have enabled the Communist members
fe
of the supervisory commission to frustrate the commission's opera-
tions and to prevent any effective observation of the elections. As
C
T
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of
&
oi
ai
a
CO
DO
KOREA
2699
ee-
) 8
conclusion, therefore, that further discussions at the Geneva Con-
Communist delegations presented a number of further proposals.
ise inherent vice in the proposal becomes the more patent in the light of
past experiences when we consider that Communist representatives
in bave freely used the veto to frustrate any contemplated action no
of matter how reasonable. There was no basis for believing that the
the proposed Commission would have been any more effective in practice
but than the neutral nations supervisory commission established by the
rds Armistice Agreement which, because of Communist obstruction, has
der been unable to ensure compliance with the Agreement in North Korea.
ley 8. The proposals of the three Communist_delegations indicated
ich plainly a refusal to submit the solution of the Korean problem to the
he will of the Korean people expressed in honest and free elections, ade-
quately and impartially supervised. They sought to obliterate the
is distinction between the Government of the Republic of Korea, and
the North Korean régime whose forces were declared by the United
Nations to have committed aggression in Korea. The Communist
in proposals would have served to extend their control over all of Korea
id
or, at the very least, to perpetuate its division.
9. The three Communist delegations also called for the withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Korea before the holding of elections. This
proposal would have involved the withdrawal of the United Nations
forces before the mission of the United Nations to establish peace and
ed
security in Korea had been completed, leaving behind them a country
still divided, still without a single government, and with no early hope
dj- of obtaining one. Furthermore, the proposal amounted to a demand
dly aggressor forces in Korea should be placed on a plane of
equality with the United Nations forces which are in Korea in accord-
ed ance with United Nations resolutions to repel aggression.
he 10. Our Governments were all agreed that all United Nations
forces should be withdrawn as soon as this could be done without
po prejudice to the objectives of the United Nations to restore peace
and security in the area. We believed, therefore, that the withdrawal
of the United Nations forces from Korea should be completed as soon
as these objectives had been achieved and after the establishment
of 11. For more than seven weeks every effort was made by our
delegations to secure agreement on a basis consistent with the prin-
chciples set out in paragraph 1 above. These efforts were in vain. It
became clear that serious negotiation was impossible and that the
Conference was being exploited by the Communist spokesmen to
attack the very basis of the United Nations action in Korea and to
attempt to confuse world
opinion on the fundamental issues in the
Korean question. To the very end, the
Communist proposals would
S,
have made the unification of Korea impossible, except on the basis
} of extending Communist control over all of Korea. We came to the
ference could hold out no prospect of success.
12. At the final session of the Conference on 15 June, the three
1
designed essentially to blur the issues at stake and to
make it appear that the Conference was in complete agreement on
that the
at
on
ve
S-
he
in
of a unified Korea.
8-
1,
}
11
I'S
2
IS
1
These were
le
10
re
1
the United Nations, which is acting the part
2700 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the objectives it sought in Korea. Nevertheless, it quickly became
evident that the Communist Delegations maintained their previous lic
position on the points of principle discussed above. They still insisted
K
on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea before the beginning
of the elections, and that these elections should be arranged by an
“all Korean Commission" and supervised by a "Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission” in each of which the Communist members
would retain a power of veto. They continued to assert (in the words
of the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union on 15 June) that the
GE
United Nations Organization "has acted in Korea as a belligerent
and ... in consequence has no moral right to function as an impartial
organization for the solution of the Korean problem”. 1
13. They also claimed that the adoption of their proposals was
necessary in order to bind all parties in Korea to maintain peace
there. It was pointed out to them that the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment already contained formal and exact provisions for the mainte- U
nance of the cease-fire in paragraph 62 which lays down that:
“The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in
effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments
and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful
A
settlement at a political level between both sides”.
14. In our view the proposals submitted by the three Communist
delegations at the final session could have served only to conceal the
serious issues of principle which remained unresolved. We considered
that it was better to face the facts of our disagreement and that it
would be wrong to raise falşe hopes and mislead the peoples of the
world into believing there was agreement when in truth there was
none. Accordingly, at the final plenary session of 15 June, our Dele
f
gates and the Delegate of the Republic of Korea made the Declaration
by the Sixteen (of which the text is attached), in which we informed
the Communist Delegations that we had been compelled, reluctantly
and regretfully, to conclude that, so long as they rejected the two
fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further
consideration and examination of the Korean question by the Con-
ference would serve no useful purpose.
15. The Governments which participated in the United Nations
action in Korea deeply regret that the Communist delegations per
sisted at Geneva in the same refusal
to accept elections
impartially
supervised which has frustrated the efforts of the United Nations
since 1947 to bring about the unification of Korea.
Our delegations made it clear that the failure of the Geneva Con-
ference to solve the Korean question does not prejudice the armistice
1 The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference .
differs somewhat, reading: “
role of an impartial body with regard to the Korean question.
* Not printed as attachment here; see Sixteen-Nation Declaration on Korea
Issued at Geneva, June 15, 1954; supra, doc. 90.
-
M
C
1
Я
$
6
p. 179. The translation
KOREA
2701
· Ibid., Supplement No. 15.
e
S
in Korea, which remains in effect. We expressed our intent to continue
to support the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, in par-
ticular that of achieving a unified, independent, and democratic
d Korea by peaceful means. It is our hope that, through the acceptance
of the fundamental principles set forth in the first paragraph of this
report, it may yet prove possible to achieve this objective.
D
.S
$
e
t
93. APPROVAL OF REPORT ON THE KOREAN PHASE OF THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA AND INDOCHINÅ: Reso-
lution 811 (IX) of the United Nations General Assembly, December
11, 1954
1
S
e
-
S
11
it
e
d
t
S
The General Assembly,
Having noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea signed at Seoul, Korea, on
17 August 1954,
Having received the report on the Korean Political Conference held
in Geneva from 26 April to 15 June 1954, in pursuance of General
Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953,
Noting that the negotiations in Geneva have not resulted in
agreement on a final settlement of the Korean question in accordance
with the United Nations objectives in Korea,
Recognizing that these objectives should be achieved by peaceful
methods and by constructive efforts on the part of the Governments
concerned,
Noting that paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July
1953 provides that the Agreement "shall remain in effect until ex-
pressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and
additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful
settlement at a political level between both sides”,
1. Approves the report on the Korean Political Conference;
2. Reafirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the
achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and demo-
cratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full
restoration of international peace and security in the area;
3. Expresses the hope that it will soon prove possible to make prog-
ress towards these objectives;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to place the item on the provi-
sional agenda of its tenth session.
LU.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21
9
(A/2890), p. 5.
Supra.
2702
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
94. CONTINUING CONSIDERATION OF A POLITICAL SETTLE-
MENT IN KOREA: Resolution 910 A (X) of the United Nations
General Assembly, November 29, 1955 1
1
7
On a
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION 5. ]
AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
P1
19
The General Assembly,
Having noted the report of the United Nations Commission for
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea signed at Seoul, Koree,
1)
Com
on 7 September 1955,2
custa
Recalling that, in resolution 811 (IX) of 11 December 1954, in
Unic
approving the report 4 of the fifteen Governments participating in the
diffe
Geneva Conference on behalf of the United Nations, the General
Assembly expressed the hope that it would soon prove possible to
persi
make progress towards the achievement by peaceful means of a
be
unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative
Com
form of government and of full restoration of international peace
to the
and security in the area,
"341
Noting that paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July
W
1953 provides that the Agreement "shall remain in effect until ex-
of ou
pressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and
over
additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful
take
settlement at a political level between both sides",
1. Reaffirms its intention to continue to seek an early solution of
the Korean question in accordance with the objectives of the United
Nations;
2. Urges that continuing efforts be made to achieve these objec. 0
tives;
11
3. Requests the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on
the provisional agenda of the eleventh session of the General Assembly.
T
1
1 U.N. doc. A/RES/326, Nov. 30, 1955. See also Department of State Bulletin, Com
Dec. 26, 1955, pp. 1074-1086.
2 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 18:
(A/2947).
3 Supra.
Supra, doc. 92.
tho
hes
free
in
3
$
US
teps
test
deg
10
1
3
tem
3
KOREA
2703
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 205-206.
$
1
}
freedom after 120 days. This period ends January 22, 1954. Even
resolution of December 3, 1952,4 was under discussion. It was made
dear to the Communists when armistice negotiations were resumed
* Ibid., Nov. 30, 1953, p. 749.
3 Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724–750.
See U.N. Proposals for Solution of Prisoner of War Problem: General As-
sembly Res. 610 (VII), Dec. 3, 1952; supra, doc. 62.
1. THE PRISONER OF WAR PROBLEM FOLLOWING
THE ARMISTICE, 1953-1955
S. POSSIBLE COMMUNIST DETENTION OF KOREAN WAR
PRISONERS: Statement by the Department of State, August 8,
1953 1
r
The State Department is gravely concerned by reports that the
Communists may not intend to return all of our prisoners now in their
eustody. It has long been believed on good authority that the Soviet
Union still holds an unknown number of World War II prisoners of
ifferent nationalities, and it was with this in mind that we insisted
on a clause in the armistice agreement which provided that any U.N.
personnel who are said not to desire repatriation must nevertheless
be transferred to the custody of the [Neutral Nations) Repatriation
Commission where United Nations and U.S. officials will have access
to them. This would include any prisoners alleged to have been given
" fail sentences." None is exempt. .
We must avoid action which might jeopardize the safety or liberty
of our prisoners now in Communist hands. The progress of the pris-
oner exchange is being watched closely and appropriate action will be
taken just as soon as definite facts are established.
X. AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF NON-REPATRIATE PRIS
ONERS OF WAR: Statement by the Secretary of State, November
17, 19532
There has been some inquiry as to the status of prisoners of war
* Korea 120 days after they were turned over to the Repatriation
Commission. The armistice provisions are clear. All prisoners
ho have not chosen
repatriation, and as to whom
no other disposition
as been agreed to by the Political Conference, shall be given their
I no Political Conference has been held by that time the prisoners
on that date should receive their freedom.
Since the beginning of the POW (Prisoner of War] discussion, the
S. position has been consistently that POW's must not be forcibly
was made clear and accepted by the United Nations when its
1
1
mpatriated or held indefinitely.
This
in
a the spring of 1953. This position was finally accepted by the
2704
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950--1955
re
ALL
M.
1
in
mi
80
四​、如​饥​似
​19
IS
tional Government of the Republic of China. Representatives of
Communists in June 1953, although the Communists attempted to
insert a provision which would have held the prisoners until final
agreement by the Political Conference. The U.N. negotiators mein
tained their position that POW's should not be indefinitely held and
the Communists finally accepted the U.N. position. The agreement to
thus confirms the consistent and firm position of the United States.
The relevant portion of paragraph 11 of the Terms of Reference
for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission,' annexed to the Ar-
mistice Agreement, reads:
The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the
prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not to
exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has an
been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120
)
days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their
custody.
97. AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF NON-REPATRIATE PRIS
ONERS OF WAR: Statement by the Commander-in-Chief, United 1
Nations Command, December 23, 1953 2
the
The terms of reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-
mission, signed at Panmunjom on June 8 of this year as an annex to
the armistice agreement which later halted armed conflict in Korea
,
resolved an issue which alone had protracted the cease-fire discussions
for more than a year.
98.
The issue was the right of a Pow (Prisoner of War) who resists 16
patriation to seek asylum and of a detaining power to grant it
. This
right is based on respect under the law for individual freedom and
human dignity. To uphold it the UNC (United Nations Command
fought throughout the long and at times frustrating negotiations
.
Paragraph 11 of the terms of reference provide that at the expiration
of 90 days after the transfer of custody of Pow to the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission, access to captured personnel by representar
tives of their original sides shall terminate. That 90-day period of
thi
explanations comes to an end on December 23.
Paragraph 11 provides that as of the end of the day of 22 January Un
these men
will become entitled to their freedom as civilians. There
will no longer be authority for their custody by the Indian troops
.
let
As civilians they are to be enabled to go to any available country
of their choice. Public statements made by representatives of the
ROK [Republic of Korea] and the National Government of the
Republic of China contain open invitations to the nearly 3,000
Korean and more
than 14,000 Chinese anti-Communists
, respectively
its
in the south Cri (Custodian Force, India)
camp to make their heart
Co
i Annex to Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 743–748.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan 18, 1954, p. 90.
Supra, pp. 743-748.
1
1
.
rec
QUI
wa
anos
ant
ma
for
1
1
1
Fel
$
KOREA
2705
a Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 115-116; see also ibid.,
So
the
not
heir
inalienable right of freedom of choice.
Peb. 1, 1954, pp. 152 ff.
"Ibid., Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 113-115.
1.to srailable facilities to expedite the movement of the individuals who
inal desire to go to those countries. Under paragraph 11 of the terms of
ain-Nerence to the NNRC (Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission]
and and the Indian Red Cross are to assist any individual who may wish
tento apply to go to neutral countries elsewhere in the world.
It is regrettable that Communist obstructions have caused disagree-
nce ments and disrupted the explanations to nonrepatriate Pow (Prisoners
Ar- of War). Despite the fact that agreement was once reached concern-
ing the fundamental rights of these thousands of prisoners, the Com-
munists have persisted in employing their habitual frustrating tactics
to the extent that the work of the NNRC has been interfered with
hs and the already difficult job of the Custodial Force, India, greatly
120 complicated.
With the expiration of this period of explanations, I desire to express
ny profound admiration and respect for the Indian troops. In their
unique and sensitive mission these officers and men have demonstrated
IS- an almost unprecedented capacity for military firmness and humane
ted restraint
. Their rigid adherence to mandate imposed upon them by
the terms of reference has earned them the plaudits of all fairminded
nations of the world and an unshakable confidence in their ability to
continue their duty in the same splendid manner until their mission
to is completed some 30 days hence.
ea,
98. AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF NON-REPATRIATE PRIS-
re
ONERS OF WAR: Letter From the Commander-in-Chief, United
his
and
Nations Command, to the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Re-
od
patriation Commission, January 16, 1954
I have read your letter of 14 January 4 in which you propose to
ons request the United Nations Command to accept the restoration of
custody, beginning at 0900 hours, 20 January, of those prisoners of
par given over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission by
Bry my communication to you of 6 January,5 the position of the
United Nations Command was stated clearly. That position has not
and will not be changed, since it is founded on both the spirit and the
try letter of the terms of reference which embody the factors
of humanity
the
and justice for the prisoners themselves and the recognition of their
the
100
It is recognized that Communist intransigence made it impossible
ly
, for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
fully to accomplish
te mission under its agreed terms of reference. The United Nations
Command in good faith turned over the prisoners of war in its custody
of
Bl
ONS
3
ion
ta-
of
this command.
In
ere
ps
.
av
8.
'Gen. John E. Hall.
5.Not printed.
415900_57-Vol. 267
2706
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
United Nations Command agreed to the Terms of Reference for the
status at 23 January all prisoners of war who have refused repatris
tion. Failure of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to
fulfill this obligation would be a deliberate avoidance of an important
element of the Terms of Reference and the United Nations Command
could not concur in an action constituting default by the Neutral
to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, with confidence
that each prisoner would be given full opportunity to hear explana-
tions and to make freely and without coercion his own choice as to
his future. The United Nations Command made an earnest effort
to explain their rights to repatriation to the prisoners it turned over
to custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The di
United Nations Command also sought to assist the Neutral Nations u
Repatriation Commission in conducting explanations to prisoners of
war formerly detained by the United Nations Command. Failure to pr
complete explanations to more than a minority of prisoners of war
the
formerly detained by the United Nations Command can only be Co
attributed to the stubborn refusal of the Korean People's Army and
Chinese People's Volunteers to continue explanations except under do
conditions of their own choosing, which conditions required the use pak
of physical force against the prisoners of war. Such use of force is Co
contrary to the terms of reference, the Geneva Convention and the
universally accepted concepts of human decency and rights. The Ne
United Nations Command supports and commends the Neutral du
Nations Repatriation Commission and the Custodian Force, Indian, the
in their refusal to use force illegally against prisoners of war.
les
The United Nations side has made every effort to convene the
political conference recommended in Paragraph 60, Armistice Agree to
ment, and referenced in Paragraph 11, Terms of Reference
, Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission, which was to consider within the man
specified period of thirty days the disposition of prisoners of war.
These efforts have been thwarted by the other side. However, as
I made clear in my letter of 6 January, the plain intent of Paragraph
99.
11 of the Terms of Reference is to prevent either party to the agree
ment from frustrating the basic purpose of avoiding indefinite captivity
for the prisoners.
For the United Nations Command now to agree to further and
indefinitely prolonged captivity of these prisoners of war would negate
the very principle of human rights for which so many men of this
command have fought and died. Such unjust and unworthy action
Re
is intolerable to any free people, and is obviously unthinkable. The
the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission only because they, in
cluded a prohibition against enforced repatriation, and made clear
provisions for the final
release of prisoners of war to civilian status
120 days after being placed in the custody of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission,
I reiterate the unalterable conviction of the United Nations Com-
mand that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has a
solemn obligation to fulfill its responsibilities and
release to civilisan
Nations Repatriation Commission.
me
|
SUT
see
Sol
Un
801
1
ma
3
Sor
KOREA
2707
Soviet denial of May 12, see ibid.
nice
Par
Lighth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/2641). For the report of the U.N. Com-
ibid., Supplement No. 19 (A/2642).
Department of State Bulletin, May 24, 1954, p. 785. For the text of the
The United Nations Command cannot accept custody of these
na- prisoners of war in accordance with the terms of your proposal.
to However, in view of your stated intention to release unilaterally the
ort prisoners of war starting 20 January, the United Nations Command
ver must necessarily be prepared to arrange for their accommodation and
the disposition. In processing these personnel, after they leave the de-
ons militarized zone, it must be clearly understood that we do so out of
of regard for humanitarian consideration and in order to insure the
to prisoners the fullest possible continued enjoyment of the benefits
the agreement was designed to assure to them. The United Nations
be Command, in accordance with the agreement on prisoners of war,
and wil honor its obligation to treat them as fully entitled to their free-
derdom as civilians on 23 January. You are already aware of the detailed
use plans for processing which have been made by the United Nations
is Command. The return to the United Nations Command of personnel
the prior to 2300 1 January can only be regarded as a failure by the
The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission fully to discharge its
ral duties, but this failure will in no way, it must be emphasized, affect
an, the right of prisoners of war to become civilians at that time regard-
less of their physical location.
the Accordingly, I have instructed the Commanding General, Eighth
ee. United States Army, to adjust his present plans to permit handling
ral and processing of personnel beginning 20 January. He will, as å
the matter of priority, make the necessary arrangements with you.?
ph
99. REPORTS OF UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR
ee-
ity
HELD IN SOVIET CUSTODY: Note From the American Em-
bassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May
nd
5, 1954 3
ate
his
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
onents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
the Republics and has the honor to request the Ministry's assistance in
be the following matter:
in
The United States Government has recently received reports which
support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had
teen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet
focialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The
United States Government desires to receive urgently all information
available to the Soviet Government concerning these American per-
sonnel and to arrange their repatriation at the earliest possible time.
18
to
er or the reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for the
DO
Genied Sept. 9, 1953-Feb. 21, 1954, see U.N. General Assembly, Official Records,
al
ar.
as
2811
US
IS
ni-
9
21
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.
nd
3
2708
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
ID:
pre
the reason for detention and the time and place of their expected release
100. ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING UNITED NATIONS PERSON.
NEL: Statement by the Senior United Nations Representative on
the Military Armistice Commission, August 17, 1954 2
On the ninth of September, 1953, we presented to your side a list
of the names of United Nations Command personnel who, according Co
to our best available information, were prisoners of war held by your des
side in the months immediately preceding the end of active hostilities pro
in Korea and who were not returned to our side in the programs of to
prisoner exchange. As subsequently amended, the list currently in
your hands totals 3,405 individuals. The reason that we gave you
It
these amendments from time to time was because of our sincere desire
to provide your side with the most accurate information possible so y
that a satisfactory accounting could be made by your side for these e
prisoners of war.
to
Because of the fact that additional information has recently become
available which warrants the deletion of a considerable number of
names from the list currently in your possession and since further
amendments to the original list might create confusion, we have
prepared a completely new list for your use. This new list supersedes 10
and replaces all previous information we have presented you on this
subject. I now hand you a list containing the names of 2,840 United
Nations Command personnel who we are convinced were in your
hands and whom we consider as not having been accounted for in a
satisfactory manner. The names of persons of Korean nationality
are listed in the Korean language, all others are listed in English
,
The difference between this new list and previous lists
furnished
amounts to 418 United States personnel, 1 British soldier
, and 146 be
Republic of Korea personnel. These deletions are largely persons
determined to be deceased or, particularly in the case of some of the te
Korean persons, found to have been repatriated.
ti
The United Nations Command is desirous of securing a complete re
report as to the current status of each of these persons. If they are
currently held in North Korea, Manchuria, China, or elsewhere, the
location of the place of custody and the reason
therefor is requested
.
If they are deceased, that information should also be furnished together
with any additional details available regarding cause of death and
place of burial, including an indication that the remains will be th
returned in the exchange program beginning on 1 September 1954
.
During the recent negotiations at
Geneva it was developed that
certain
of the prisoners are being held in China. We are particularly
interested in obtaining information regarding these individuals. !
Since their captive status resulted from the conflict in Korea, it i
appropriate that the necessary exchange of information concerning
both the place of detention and reason therefor be conducted here in
this commission. It is requested that for each name in this category
80
td
C
C
be furnished to our side.
1 Rear Adm, T. B. Brittain.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 13, 1954, p. 379.
KOREA
2709
York, 1955), pp. 348–352.
On
ou
388
jer
Ve
authorities to release these unjustly detained American nationals
of Nov. 23, 1954, by the Department of State; ibid., p. 856.
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 6, 1954, pp. 856-857. See also statement
N.
The families of the personnel in this unaccounted-for category are
anxious to reach an early and satisfactory settlement of this entire
problem. Accordingly, immediately upon receipt from your side of
list complete accounting by name for each of these 2,840 United Nations
ing Command personnel, in return and as evidence of our sincerity in
desiring to exchange the most complete information available on the
ies present status of former prisoners of war, we are prepared to present
of to your side an explanation by individual name for the 98,739 personnel
in of your side on the list you submitted to our side on 21 September 1953.
It is proposed that this exchange of information will be reciprocal
ire and simultaneous. Such an exchange of information will contribute
so greatly to the successful accomplishment of our mission of negotiations
sabere in the Military Armistice Commission. I await your reply as
to when you expect to be able to furnish the information we have
ne requested and thereby expedite the receipt of the information you
of desire regarding your list.
les 101. PROTEST OF IMPRISONMENT OF UNITED STATES
his PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS:
ed
Note From the United States Government to the Chinese Com-
munist Authorities (Transmitted by the British Embassy at
Peiping), November 26, 1954 1
ty
The United States Government vigorously protests the wrongful
ed action of the Chinese Communist authorities in sentencing on Novem-
46ber 23rd eleven members of the United States Armed Forces and two
ms American civilians employed by the Department of the Army to
he
terms of imprisonment on political charges which are without
founda-
tion. These Americans were in planes which were attacked over the
to recognized combat zone in Korea, or over international waters, in
18the course of the Chinese Communist aggression against Korea.
Their detention is in patent violation of the Korean Armistice Agree-
d.
The sentencing of the members of the United States Armed Forces
to penitentiary terms in these circumstances is grossly contrary to
| the substance and spirit of all recognized
international standards as
to the protection of prisoners of war.
The maltreatment of the two
civilian American citizens, whose names were willfully and deceit-
fully withheld by the Chinese Communist representatives
at Geneva
last June from the list of American civilians held in Chinese Communist
The United States Government calls upon the Chinese Communist
ur
8
18
ment.
er
nd
De
5.
jails
, is equally reprehensible.
11
1
8
1
munist authorities, see Documents non American Foreign Relations, 1964 (New
2710
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
AUTO
810
ñ
ſ
forthwith, in accordance with the provisions of the Korean Armistice
Agreement and in conformity with the elementary precepts of justice
and humanity.
The Chinese Communist authorities are under an obligation to
redress in so far as possible the wrong they have inflicted on these
American nationals and their families. The United States Gover-
ment reserves the right to claim compensation as may be determined
appropriate, and to demand the punishment of the Chinese Commu-
nist officials responsible for the denial of the rights of these persons
,
The Chinese Communist authorities should bear in mind that the
long list of Chinese Communist outrages against American nationals
,
which the American people have borne with restraint thus far
, is
significantly extended by the Chinese Communist announcement of
November 23rd.
Chi
Mai
Ste
DU
Kit
dre
the
OU
ser
211
an
more
fee
102. COMMUNIST DETENTION OF UNITED NATIONS PER Go
SONNEL: Letter and Explanatory Memorandum From the United me
States Representative at the United Nations to the U.N. Secre-
tary-General, December 4, 1954 2
TE
The Government of the United States of America, as the Unified
Command of United Nations forces in Korea, proposes herewith the
th
inclusion of the following additional item in the agenda of the ninth
ab
regular session of the General Assembly:
“Complaint of detention and imprisonment of United Nations
military personnel in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement".
Pursuant to rule 20 of the rules of procedure, an explanatory
memorandum is attached.
In view of the urgency and importance of this item, I request that
a meeting of the
General Committee be convened at the earliest
possible moment.
CA
U
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
COMPLAINT OF DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT OF UNITED NATIONS
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN VIOLATION OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE
CE
1!
AGREEMENT
A
A United States Air Force B-29 type aircraft, on a mission of the
United
Nations Command in Korea, was attacked fifteen miles south
of the Yalu River
near the North Korean town of Sonchon and shot
down on 12 January 1953. The officers and men of the United
States Air Force on the plane were captured. More than a year and
a half later, and long after the conclusion
of the Korean Årmistice
Agreement providing for the release of all captured personnel desir-
to
P
8
1 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
2 U.N. doc. A/2830, Dec. 4, 1954; see also Department of State Bulletin, Dec.
20, 1954, pp. 931 ff.
KOREA
2711
ese
m-
au-
ns
+ Agreement regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war,
Recalling the provisions of article III of the Korean Armistice
American airmen, members of the United Nations Command, referred
& violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement;
og repatriation, eleven officers and men from the above-mentioned
ice
sitraft were brought before a Chinese Communist military tribunal
and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.
This is a clear-cut violation of the Armistice Agreement.
to
The United States Government first learned of this action by the
Chinese Communist authorities through a broadcast of the Peking
led
ndio on 24 November 1954. Immediately thereafter, the United
States Government sought to communicate with the Chinese Com-
munist authorities, both directly in Geneva and through the United
the Kingdom Government, to protest this serious violation of the Korean
als,
Armistice Agreement. The Chinese Communist authorities rejected
these representations.
of
The Government and people of the United States are shocked and
outraged by the treatment thus accorded to its airmen who were
serving the cause of peace under the Charter, and hold these same
feelings for the men of other nations who are held prisoner. The
B: Governments of other nations having troops in Korea share this feel-
leding of indignation at this violation of the Årmistice Agreement.
The United States believes this conduct of the Chinese Communist
authorities has created a serious situation for the United Nations,
which called for the action in Korea to repel Communist aggression,
ed
and which requested the United States to provide a Unified Com-
be
mand of United Nations forces in Korea. The United States believes
ith
the United Nations must now act promptly and decisively to bring
about the release of these eleven officers and men and all other
captured personnel of the United Nations Command still detained.
TT 103. COMMUNIST DETENTION OF UNITED NATIONS PER-
SONNEL: Resolution 906 (IX) of the United Nations General
at
Assembly, December 10, 1954
st
Having considered the item proposed by the United States of
America
as the Unified Command regarding eleven members of the
United States armed forces under the United Nations Command
captured by Chinese forces when undertaking a mission on 12 January
1953
, at the direction of the United Nations Command.
1. Declares that the detention and imprisonment of the eleven
to in document A/2830.2 and the detention of all other captured
personnel of the United Nations Command desiring repatriation is
2. Condemns, as contrary to the Korean
Armistice Agreement, the
General Assembly, Oficial Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21
DS
1}
1
The General Assembly,
S
3
(A/2890), p. 56.
ο Supra.
2712
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
b:
P
UI
t
t
i On Dec. 30, 1954, the Secretary-General reported that following an exchange
trial and conviction of prisoners of war illegally detained after 25
fr
September 1953;
3. Requests the Secretary-General, in the name of the United
pl
Nations, to seek the release, in accordance with the Korean Armistice ?
Agreement, of these eleven United Nations Command personnel, and
all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command still
detained;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to make, by the means most
appropriate in his judgment, continuing and unremitting efforts to 11
this end and to report progress to all Members on or before 31
December 1954.1
104. COMMUNIST DETENTION OF UNITED NATIONS PER
SONNEL: Statement by the Department of State, January 19
,
1955 2
Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and
Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson met with the U.N. Secretary-
General, Dag Hammarskjold, and U.N. Under Secretary Ahmed S.
Bokhari on January 19. They conferred for about an hour and a half.
Mr. Hammarskjold gave Secretary Dulles a detailed report of the
conversations that he had had in Peiping in pursuance of his mandate
from the United Nations : to make continuing and unremitting
efforts to effect the release of captured personnel of the U.N. Command
detained by the Chinese Communist regime in violation of the terms
of the Korean Armistice.
The Secretary-General gave a full account of the information and
views that had been exchanged at Peiping on the question of the U.N.
Command prisoners and expressed the hope that, given restraint on
all sides, it would be possible to effect their release. In the meantime
he had made inquiries and received assurances regarding the well-being
of the prisoners, and he has transmitted this information to the
Secretary of State. This will be transmitted in turn to the families
by the U.S. Defense Department.
Secretary Dulles expressed, on behalf of the President and himself
their appreciation of the painstaking efforts which had been made
and their hope that the United Nations would persist effectively in
the course upon which it had embarked pursuant to the U.N. General
Assembly resolution of last December. Secretary Dulles pointed out
that there was in the United
States a strong sentiment in favor o
direct action but that it was the policy of the President for the time
being to leave the
handling of this matter, insofar as it was covered
by the U.N. resolution, to the United Nations itself and to abstain
A
of cablegrams and conversations with the Chinese Communist Ambassador at
See U.N. General Assembly, official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No.
(A/2911), p. 14.
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, pp. 189–190.
8 Supra.
2
KOREA
2713
ice
ind
till
ost
Command personnel and all other captured personnel of the United
[Footnote in the original document.]
from direct intervention which might embarrass the activities and
25
efforts of the United Nations itself. The Secretary did, however,
point out that the U.S. Government and indeed the entire American
ted
people were strongly aroused by the unlawful imprisonment of U.S.
citizens and that they awaited with eagerness and anxiety the further
developments in this matter.
to 105, COMMUNIST DETENTION OF UNITED NATIONS PER-
31
SONNEL: Statement by the Department of State, January 21,
1955 1
R. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was informed during
19.
bis Peiping discussions that Chinese Communist authorities might
permit relatives to visit those United States personnel who had been
convicted and those whose cases were under investigation and that
nd
they would provide them the necessary entry visas. This morning
the Chinese Communists made this announcement.
y
S.
The United States Government canoot, of course, in good conscience
lf
.
encourage those who may wish to go into an area where the normal
he
protections of an American passport cannot be offered. World public
opinion will judge the motives of those who, having it in their power
ite
and being under an obligation to end promptly the tragic grief they
have caused, now visit upon the families of these imprisoned Americans
& harrowing dilemma. It is by releasing those they hold that the
Chinese Communists can convincingly show concern for the human
d
sufferings they have caused.
N.
106. NEGOTIATIONS FOR RELEASE OF UNITED NATIONS
PERSONNEL DETAINED BY THE COMMUNISTS: Report of
the U.N. Secretary-General, September 9, 1955
1. The General Assembly, by resolution 906 (IX) of 10 December
f 1954, requested the Secretary-General to seek the release, in accord-
ence with the Korean Armistice
Agreement, of eleven
United Nations
Nations Command 4 still detained. It further requested the Secre-
t
tary-General to make, by the means most appropriate in his judg-
f
ment
, continuing and unremitting efforts to this end and to report
progress to all Members on or before 31 December 1954.
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 192. For the text of a letter
from the Secretary of State to the next of kin of each of the imprisoned personnel
,
dated Jan. 27, 1955, advising that the Department of State would
not issue pass-
ports valid for travel to the Chinese mainland, see ibid., Feb. 7, 1955, p. 214.
Y.N. doc. A/2954, Sept. 9, 1955.
In the debate on this resolution attention was drawn to four jet pilots, serving
peoler the United Nations Command, who were known to be detained in China.
ms
01
ne
ng
je
2
ES
€
11
e
• Supra, doc. 103.
2714
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
l
SI
0]
8
11
2. On 31 December 1954,' I submitted a report informing Members 11.
that, following an exchange of communications with the Prime
Minister of the State Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China and a meeting in Stockholm with General
Keng Piao, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China, arrange.
10
ments were made for the Secretary-General to visit Peking.
3. As stated in my annual report to the General Assembly on the
work of the Organization, my visit to Peking was made necessary
because of the need to establish a direct contact with the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China, since this
Government was not represented in any organs of the United Nations.
The visit, aimed primarily at clarifying the substantive and legal
aspects of the matter, established this direct contact on a personal
basis. It thus provided possibilities to pursue the discussion con-
cerning the problem raised by the detention of the United Nations
personnel referred to in the General Assembly resolution.
le
4. After my return from Peking I continued, within the framework
U
of the contact thus established, an exchange of views with Mr. Chou
En-lai, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's
Republic of China. The contact was maintained mainly through
series of communications transmitted by the Swedish Embassy in
Peking. I received valuable assistance also from representatives of
the Governments of other Member States.
5. A renewed personal contact with a representative of the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Ambassador
Keng Piao, was made by me in Stockholm on 23 April 1955.
6. By a letter to me, given to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking in
the early afternoon of 29 May 1955 (New York time), Mr. Chou
En-lai announced that an investigation of the cases of four detained
fliers had been completed and that it had been decided that they should
be deported
immediately from the territory of the People's Republic
of China. The four men arrived in Hong Kong on 31 May 1955.
7. By an oral message to me, given to the Swedish Ambassador in
Peking at 1 o'clock in the morning, 1 August 1955 (New York time),
and transmitted by him, Mr. Chou En-lai announced that the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China had decided
to release as soon as feasible the eleven American fliers who had been
detained and imprisoned, and that an announcement to that effect
would be made in Peking at 10 a. m. on 1 August 1955 (New York
time). The eleven men årrived in Hong Kong on 4 August 1955.
8. Mr. Chou En-lai has expressed his hope that the contact estab-
lished will be continued. In reply I have stated that this hope is
shared by me.
1 See U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Anneres, Agenda
item 72 (A/2891). [Footnote in the original document.]
2 Ibid., Tenth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A72911).:' [Footnote in the original
document.]
3 See Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1955, p. 953.
* See ibid., Aug. 15, 1955, p. 262.
1
I
KOREA
2715
rs
le
le
a]
D-
le
V
2
is
3.
11
3
l-
S
u
KPA/CPV military units. Their retention after 24 September 1953
Agreement by the KPA/CPV. For the second time, the NNSC
Member of a side as authorized in paragraphs 28 and 42F of the
Armistice Agreement. For the second time, the Czech and Polish
? Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1954, pp. 689-691.
3 All brackets inserted in original Bulletin presentation.
1. OPERATION OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE
MACHINERY, 1953–1955
107. COMMUNIST OBSTRUCTION OF INSPECTION ACTIVI-
TIES IN KOREA: Letter From the Senior United Nations Repre-
sentative on the Military Armistice Commission to the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission, April 15, 1954
1. For investigation of violations of the Armistice Agreement by
the KPA/CPV [Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers]
i side
, during the period 29 November 1953 to 9 February 1954, the
following facts are presented for your immediate consideration.
2. On 29 November 1953, after the KPA/CPV in a meeting of the
MAC [Military Armistice Commission) refused to submit a joint
k letter to the NNSC [Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission), the
UNC (United Nations Command) unilaterally requested the NNSC
to investigate the case of three soldiers apprehended by the UNC
on 19 November 1953 in the Joint Security Area.
These three soldiers
were identified beyond question to be former soldiers of the ROKA
f Republic of Korea Army!. The place and date of their capture
by the KPA/CPV was firmly established. Although ample evidence
1 was available to verify the fact that these persons were impressed
into the KPA/CPV military units, and were retained after 24 Sep-
tember 1953, a clear violation of paragraph 51 of the Armistice Agree-
ment by the KPA/CPV, the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC
refused to participate in any proceedings for the consideration of
this critical matter as a violation of the Armistice Agreement.
3. On 18 December 1953, after the KPA/CPV in another meeting
of the MAC again refused to submit a joint letter to the NNSC
the UNC unilaterally, and for the second time, requested the NNSC
to investigate the case of two individuals apprehended by the UNC
South of the Southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone on 10
December 1953. These individuals, as in the case of the three
ROKA persons previously cited,
were also identified beyond question
to be former soldiers of the ROKA who had been impressed into the
constituted a second clear violation of paragraph 51 of the Armistice
failed to take any action on a unilateral request from the Senior
S
0
r
members of the NNSC refused to participate in the performance of
their solemn obligation under the terms of the Armistice Agreement
4. On 18 January 1954, and again on 26 January 1954,
the UNO
submitted separate unilateral requests to the NNŠC to investigate
1
Maj. Gen. J. K. Lacey, USAF.
2716
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
01
m
9.]
82
pi
91
bu
b
K
b
T
CE
letter to the NNSC. The influence that this letter had on the proceed-
requests for investigation of violations by submitting unfounded
to the UNC requests of 9 February 1954. This letter was received
specific military units of the several ROKA persons, who had been
impressed into the military service of the KPA/CPV, in order to
ascertain whether these and other individuals had also been forcibly
detained in the territory under the military control of the KPA/CPV,
For the third and fourth time, respectively, the Czech and Polish
members of the NNSC again refused to cooperate in the investigation
of KPA/CPV violations of the Armistice Agreement. The arguments
presented by the members gave every indication of being mere excuses
to prevent the NNSC from confirming KPA/CPV violations of the
Armistice Agreement in the territory under the military control of
the KPA and the CPV. Particularly significant, however, was the
fact that the responses of the Polish and Czech members as évidenced
by an examination of the minutes of the 89th and 96th meetings of the
NNSC, conformed to and appeared to be unduly influenced by the
contents of two prior letters of 19 January and 27 January, issued
by the Senior Member of the KPÅ and CPV, MAC, as his reply
to the UNC unilateral requests submitted to the NNSC on 18 Jan-
uary and 26 January, respectively. Substantiation of such influence
is found in the following remark made by the Polish member and
confirmed by the Czech member, at the 96th meeting of the NNSC:
The Polish Delegation also deems it its duty to declare that for the above
stated reasons it will not agree-either now or in the future---to a request of
one of the sides to conduct any investigation in connection with the issue of
retention of the captured personnel of the other side--until settlement or under-
standing is reached on the matter by the two opposing sides or by the forth-
coming political conference.
Such a decision by the Czech and Polish members is considered by
the UNC to render the NNSC ineffective for future investigation
of any Armistice violations relating to captured ROKA personnel
impressed into KPA and CPV military units.
5. Finally, on 9 February, 1954, the UNC unilaterally requested
the NNSC to investigate the illegal introduction of combat material
into the territory under the military control of the KPA and the
CPV, in violation of the Armistice Agreement. Names of places
and exact locations were
included in this request of the UNC. Before
the NNSC had officially announced its decision regarding the UNC
request, the Senior Member of the KPA and CPV, MAC, addressed
a letter to the Senior Member of the UNC, MAC, denying all the
facts presented. Concurrently he forwarded an 'almost identical
ings of the NNSC cannot be discounted.
6. In attempting to veil these KPA and CPV violations, the Senior
Member of the KPA and CPV, MAC,
charged the UNC with viola-
tions of the Armistice Agreement, with no foundation in fact. In
addition to labeling the UNC charges slanderous fabrication, the
Senior Member of the KPA and CPV, MAC, attempted to offset the
UNC
charges against the UNC. In a letter dated 23 Feb. 1954, the NNSC
indicated its inability to carry out its pledged obligations with regard
W
8
2
b
ī
KOREA
2717
to
le
le
le
8
Te
of
f
(
-
19 March 1954. This was the fifth time that the Czech and Polish
members of the NNSC refused to participate in the performance of
their duties as members of the NNSC, in accordance with the pro-
sh visions of the Armistice Agreement.
7. Reliable information available to the UNC shows that the
ts KPA and CPV have introduced operating combat aircraft into the
es territory under the military control of the KPA and the CPV, and
are introducing combat equipment in such a manner as to by-pass-
of and evade the NNITs [Neutral Nations Inspection Teams) at the
ne ports of entry in the territory under the military control of the KPA
d and the CPV, all of which acts are deliberate violations of the Armi-
stice Agreement. Although the Senior Member of the UNC, MAC,
has requested that investigation of these violations be accomplished
d by the NNSC, the Senior Member of the KPA and CPV, MAC, has
y stated that no such inspection could ever be permitted since the
1 KPA and CPV have not violated the agreement. The Senior Mem-
ber of the KPÅ and CPV, MAC, as the representative of his com-
d manders, has clearly violated that portion of para 17 of the Armistice
3: Agreement which states:
The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective
commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance
with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall
actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission
and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of
both the letter and the spirit of all of the
provisions of this Armistice Agreement
T 8. The UNC has made every effort to facilitate the operations of the
NNSC in the territory under the military control of the UNC and has
el in good faith complied with the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agree-
ment. The NNİTs have been given maximum freedom to inspect
incoming and outgoing equipment according to the agreement. The
1 NNITs have been given access to documents listing combat materiel
and military personnel introduced into and evacuated from the terri-
3 tory under the military control of the UNC. With the aid of these
documents they have been able to accomplish their supervisory duties
quickly and efficiently. At airfields the teams received information on
all arrivals and departures of aircraft including approximate flight
e appointment times, type of aircraft, and
flight numbers. The teams
have been allowed to board cargo aircraft to accomplish their inspec-
tions and inspections have been carried out daily. The UNC has
always willingly and freely complied with requests of the NNITs for
additional
information. The UNC, in its desire to carry out both the
spirit and letter of the Armistice Agreement, has allowed the above
mentioned freedom to the NNITs in spite of the fact that it has been
obvious from the first that the Polish and Czech members
of the
WANITs have been utilizing this very freedom for the purpose of taking
advantage of administrative errors and technical discrepancies to
charge the UNC with deliberate efforts
to violate the Armistice Agree-
ment. If the UNC had intended to violate the Armistice Agreement it
would have followed the system used in the territory under the military
control of the KPA and CPV. In that territory the NNITs have been
1
1
2718
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
k!!
so restricted and handicapped by the established procedures that they
have been unable to report or investigate any possible violations of the
Armistice. Since the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC have
subscribed to and supported the views of the Senior Member, KPA
and CPV, MAC, before making proper investigations of violations to
the Armistice Agreement, as requested by the Senior Member of the
UNC, MAC, it appears clear that the NNSC has been paralyzed to
such a degree that it cannot carry out its pledged obligations as out-
lined under the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The acceptance of
the KPA and CPV views of the letters of 19 January, 27 January, and
12 February, respectively, by the members from Poland and Czecho-
slovakia, without consideration of the evidence submitted by the
UNC, serves to prevent other investigations for substantiated charges
of violations of the Armistice Agreement committed by the KPA
and CPV.
9. It is obvious that the exercise of the full responsibilities of the
NNSC is confined to the area of the UNC. In the territory under the
military control of the KPA and the CPV, the NNSC has been unable
to conduct investigations as provided for in the Armistice Agreement
.
The Czech and Polish members of the NNSC, and the Senior Member
of the KPA and the CPV, MAC, have obstructed the work of the
NNSC to date, and their recent statements appear to preclude the
NNSC from ever performing all of its pledged obligations in the future
.
In view of the outright repudiation by the KPA and CPV of this por-
tion of the Armistice Agreement, and the inability of the NNSC to
carry out the obligations charged to it by the same agreement, the
UNC considers that its rights as a signatory to the Armistice Agree-
ment have been denied it. There is to date no indication that the
NNSC either can or will fulfill in the area under the military control of
the KPA and CPV, the full obligations which its members undertook
by accepting office on the NNSC. Neither has the NNSC acknowl-
edged the fact that in prohibiting inspections lawfully requested by
the UNC the KPA and CPV have in effect unilaterally abrogated that
part of the Armistice Agreement applicable to the functions of the
NNSC in the territory under the military control of the KPA and
CPV.
108. REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF VIOLATIONS OF
THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT: Letter From the
Representative of the United Nations Command on the Military
Armistice Commission to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Com.
mission, February 21, 1955 1
1. The United Nations Command charges that the Korean Peoples
Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers have between the dates of 27
July 1953 and 5 February 1955 introduced into the territory under
the military control of their side combat aircraft of the MIG type
,
-1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 14, 1955, pp. 428-429; see also ibid,
pp. 426-428.
KOREA
2719
was also given to the Swiss Minister in Washington,
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 14, 1955, p. 429. An identical aide-mémoire
Ite
to
to
ut-
10-
res
srms, and ammunition therefor, in excess of combat aircraft of the
ter MIG type, arms, and ammunition therefor in the territory under the
the
military control of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples
Volunteers side on 27 July 1953, and have failed to report them in
PA
the prescribed manner and form to the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission, in violation of paragraph 13d and other provisions of
jhe
the Armistice Agreement. Furthermore, the United Nations Com-
mand reports and charges that the above indicated violations occurred
at the air installations at: 40° 09' North, 124° 30' East in the vicinity
of
of Uiju, 39° 57' North, 125° 13' East in the vicinity of Namsi, 39° 54'
nd
North, 125° 30' East in the vicinity of Taechon, 39°01' North, 125° 50'
East in the vicinity of Pyongyang East (Mirim-Ni), 39° 12' North,
he
125° 40' East in the vicinity of Sunan, 39° 24' North, 125° 55' East
PA
in the vicinity of Pyong-Ni, all in the territory under the military
control of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers
side.
he
2. Therefore in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 28 of
he
ple
the Armistice Agreement, I, as Senior Member of the United Nations
Command component of the Military Armistice Commission, request
that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission dispatch three
he
mobile Neutral Nations inspection teams to the places indicated
he
above, outside the demilitarized zone, to conduct special observations
and inspections under the provisions of paragraphs 41, 42c and 42f of
the Armistice Agreement of the illegal introduction of combat aircraft
to
of the MIG type, arms, and ammunition therefor by the Korean
Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers into the territory under
their military control, between the dates 27 July 1953 and 5 February
1955, in excess of those items which were in the territory under the
of
military control of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples
k
Volunteers on 27 July 1953 in violation of paragraph 13d of the
1
Armistice Agreement, and a failure to report the same to the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission in accordance with the requirements
у
of the Armistice Agreement.
3. The United Nations Command is prepared to present photo-
graphs and other evidence in support of the above indicated charges.
20.
jer
e.
I-
he
-
18
@
109. TERMINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEUTRAL
NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION: Aide-Mémoire From
the Department of State to the Swedish Embassy at Washington,
March 2, 1955 1
Reference is made to the Aide-Mémoire of the Embassy of Sweden
Legation of Switzerland) of January 27, 19552 concerning the desire
of the Swedish (Swiss) Government that consideration be given to
the termination of the activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
2 Not printed.
2720
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
es
on
18
ter
Tel
Commission, or, failing that, to agreement by the signatories to the
Korean Armistice Agreement to a solution comprising a sizeable re-
duction of the personnel of the four delegations to the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission. In replying to these proposals, this Gov-
ernment has consulted with its Allies whose forces fought under the
United Nations Command to repel the Communist aggression.
The Government of the United States appreciates the difficulties
Sweden (Switzerland) is encountering in carrying out a task which
the Swedish (Swiss) Government had undertaken on the understand-
ing that the Commission would last for only a limited time. Furtherm
more, it is aware that obstructionist activities on the part of the
Communist side have made it impossible for the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission to fulfill its responsibilities under the Armi-
stice Agreement. The Government of the United States, therefore
, te
agrees with the Government of Sweden (Switzerland) that the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission should be abolished.
for
It is understood, however, that the Chinese Communist reply to CH
the Swedish Aide-Mémoire rejects the liquidation of the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission which is the solution preferred by
the Government of Sweden (Switzerland), but accepts in concept the
less preferred alternative of a reduction in the Neutral Nations Super-yo
visory Commission personnel. Despite the current activities under-
taken by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at the request
of either the United Nations Command side or the Communist side
,
it is the view of the Government of the United States, primarily be-
cause of the consistent history of Communist obstruction, that it is
doubtful that any useful purpose would be served by a continuation
of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
to
The Government of the United States expresses the hope that the
Government of Sweden (Switzerland) will conduct its further consul-
tations on the problem on an urgent basis and awaits with interest
C
the results of such consultation.
K
m粗 ​阴 ​阴​址
​en
DA
SU
pe
00
110. COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT: Statement by the Senior United Nations Com-
mand Representative on the Military Armistice Commission,' July
5, 1955 2
an
TO
$1
C
1
A concept basic to the establishment and maintenance of the
Armistice in Korea was that the balance which existed between the
military forces of the opposing sides on July 27, 1953, would not be
altered
thereafter by the opposing commanders through the introdue
tion of reinforcing military personnel or combat materiel. Provisions
for implementing this basic concept were clearly spelled out in detail
in paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement.
Shortly after the signing of the Armistice it became apparent to
1 Maj. Gen. Harlan C. Parks, USAF.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 1, 1955, pp. 191–196.
KOREA
2721
es
IS
0
ie
-
| aircraft, 1,034 armored vehicles, 194,385 weapons, and 386,828,087
Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, es-
tablished no such system or procedures, failed to use your designated
be the United Nations Command that the Korean People's Army and
the Chinese People's Volunteers were resorting to every possible
subterfuge to avoid compliance with the provisions of paragraphs 13
F) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement. Whereas the United Nations
ne Command submitted its first combat materiel and personnel report
es prescribed in paragraphs 13 (c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement
on 28 July 1953, the day following the signing of the Armistice, it
h was not until 12 September 1953 that your side submitted its first
de
report of rotation personnel and not until 6 October 1953 that you
r submitted your first combat materiel report. Your first personnel
de report dated 12 September 1953 instead of reflecting actual arrivals
and departures merely listed 964 departures and no arrivals for the
- 24-hour period of 15-16 September 1953. Apparently you would
have the United Nations Command and Neutral Nations Supervisory
al
Commission believe that from 28 July to 15 September, with a military
force exceeding 1,200,000 men, the majority of whom came from Red
China, not one soldier arrived or left Korea during that 7-week period.
a
Your first combat materiel report of 6 October 1953 reflected an
outgoing shipment of four 57 mm. anti-tank guns with 20 rounds of
ammunition, and it was not until 9 February 1954 that you submitted
your first legitimate combat materiel report reflecting an incoming
slipment --covering one 37 mm. AA gun. Again, you would ap-
parently have us believe that you could logistically support your
buge military force in war-torn and ravaged North Korea for the
entire first 6 months of the Armistice without a single incoming ship-
That the United Nations Command has continued scrupulously
to comply with provisions of 13 (c) and (d) is reflected in the following
figures taken from the official records covering the first year of the
Armistice. From 27 July 1953, to 31 July 1954, the
United Nations
Command submitted 370 personnel reports covering 287,343 perma-
dent arrivals and 362,122 departures. During this same period the
Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side
submitted only 42 reports covering the ridiculous figures of 12,748
permanent arrivals and 31,201 departures.
The United Nations Command during this period submitted 1,057
combat materiel reports covering the movement of 9,717 combat
The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteer
on the other hand, submitted only 24 combat materiel reports
covering the movement' of zero combat aircraft, 14 armored vehicles,
1,848 weapons, and 746,500 rounds of ammunition.
The United Nations Command established a system and procedures
to insure that all incoming and outgoing
combat materiel and personnel
se shipped only through designated ports of entry and took neces-
sary measures to facilitate free and open
inspections of these shipments
by the Neutral Nations inspection teams. The Korean People's
it
V
-
S
ment.
1
e
t
1
rounds of ammunition.
side,
415900---57--Vol. 26-68
2722
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
&
1
1
|
ܝܚ ܕ܂
C
1
*
no Air Force and not one usable airfield. Our side bas presented these
official photographs to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
Within a few months after the Armistice Agreement was signed our
ports of entry, and resorted to every conceivable pretext to cir
cumvent the provisions of 13 (c) and (d). Attempts by the Swiss
and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commis
.
sion to carry out their functions of inspection and observation wer:
effectively blocked by the Czechs and Poles.
RELATIVE MERITS OF INSPECTION SYSTEMS
S
The relative merits of the inspection system established in the South
as compared with that established in the North was the subject of
considerable discussion and deliberation by the Neutral Nations
În the 107th plenary session of the Neutral Nations Supervisory i
Commission on 23 February 1954, General Wacker, the Senior Swiss
Member, made these observations:
In the South, rotation takes place every day and every hour in all ports of entry
with the exception of one, whereas in the North some spare parts are shipped out
once a month through one or two ports of entry and then introduced again a few
weeks after. I have never heard anything about rotation of aircraft, armored
vehicles, or even complete weapons and ammunition in the North. I think we
have the right to ask ourselves how it is possible that an army counting several
one hundred thousand soldiers can be logistically supported by the amount of
material as shown by the figures which are being submitted to us.
in the
South the teams control . . . all material being brought into Korea--control
which is being carried out, thanks to documents submitted by the local authorities
(load manifests, ship manifests) as well as by means of inspections on the spot
.
Ì emphasize the fact that in the South these documents and inspections concern
non-combat material as well as combat material. In contrast to this
, we find
that in the North not more than two to four inspections of spare parts of wa
material have been carried out every month only in the ports of entry of Sinuju
and Manpo.
General Mohn, the Senior Swedish Member of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, observed that,
Gradually the teams in the South secured an insight in the movements of all
cargo in their respective ports of entry. The Polish and Czechoslovakian men.
bers of the teams were only too eager to inspect all sorts of goods which did not
even remotely have any connection with combat material. They were not in
the slightest embarrassed by the restrictive interpretation of the armistice agree
ment apparently held by their principals in Panmunjom. . . . Well,
what happened
in the North? Ås we all know,
the teams in North Korea had
to wait an unusually
long time before they found anything to put their teeth in. They wandered about
aimlessly in their ports of entry, not knowing exactly what to do.
The airfield situation that existed in the territory under your control
at the time the Armistice Agreement was signed is well known by
your side as well as ours. All airfields under the control of the Korean
People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had been under
continuous attack and were inoperative. Photographs taken by the
United Nations Command on 27 July 1953 prove that on that dada
the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had
refuted.
OT
KOREA
2723
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 14, 1955, pp. 427–428.
SWISS
(mis-
were
lored
k we
veral
it of
ntrol
ities
combat aircraft. A letter was dispatched to the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission outlining our charges and requesting that
cordar surveillance detected continuously increasing jet aircraft
activity in the territory occupied by the Korean People's Army and
the Chinese People's Volunteers side. Such radar detection was
imefutable proof of your violation of paragraph 13 (d).
On 21 September 1953 this evidence was further confirmed when
Senior Lieutenant Ro Kum Suk, a Korean People's Army and the
Chinese People's Volunteers pilot officer who deserted from the
outh Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side,
et of landed at a Republic of Korea airport and surrendered a MIG-15
ions combat aircraft which had been illegally introduced into Korean
People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers territory in de-
sory fiance of paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement. This pilot
hiss offered irrefutable proof that from 27 July 1953 until 21 September
1953 he was engaged in the air movement of MIG-15 aircraft. These
:ntry
combat planes were introduced into the territory under the military
1 cul control of your side subsequent to the signing of the Armistice Agree-
a ferment and in direct and willful violation thereof. This pilot had
personally observed at least 80 combat aircraft that were brought
into the territory of your side contrary to paragraph 13 (d).
1 the SERIES OF OFFICIAL PROTESTS
Faced by this serious development and possessed with irrefutable
spot evidence, the United Nations Command, on 12 October 1953, lodged
en its first official protest against the Korean People's Army and the
Chinese People's Volunteers for violating the provisions of paragraph
nuiju 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement by the illegal introduction of air-
craft into the territory under your control. The United Nations
requested the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
to conduct an investigation on an airfield near Uiju, where such air-
craft were definitely known to be located. Despite the attempts of
fall
Four Czech and Pole members on the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission to forestall this investigation, the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission finally agreed to dispatch a mobile inspection
team, but due to collusion between the Czech and Pole members of
ally
the mobile inspection team with the Korean People's Army and the
Chinese People's Volunteers military representatives at the scene of
the investigation, you were successful in thwarting any realistic in-
ol
vestigation. Documents requested by the Swiss and Swede members
of the team were refused on grounds that they were secret, requests
by
by Swiss and Swede members to conduct inspections at the railroad
station and other shipping points around the Uiju airfield were denied,
ne
and visual observations of the Uiju airfield were carefully restricted
te
and controlled to insure that the team would observe no incriminating
Based upon new and additional evidence of your continued secret
Air Force build-up, on 9 February 1954, the United Nations Command
lodged its second" official protest against your illegal
introduction of
Vår
Command
Ons
eru.
not
in
ree
ned
out
211
er
evidence.
ed
30
-1
T
1
I
2724
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1如​如​的​姐姐​好似​叫
​ME
Ć
AT
91
mi
JI
M
ary 1955 introduced into the territory under the military control of their side
Volunteers side on 27 July 1953, and have failed to report them in the prescribed
Again the United Nations Command requested a mobile inspection
mobile inspection teams be dispatched to conduct special observations
,
inspections, and investigations at the following airfields: Pyong-Ni
Taechon, Pyongyang East, Uiju, Pyongyang Main, Sinuiju Northeast
,
90
Wonsan, Saamcham, and Sunan, as well as road and rail by-passes in
the vicinity of the ports of entry of Sinuiju, Chongjin and Manpo
.
Although the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission were in favor of dispatching the requested
mobile inspection teams, the action was blocked by the veto power of
your Polish and Czech comrades, and the investigation was thereby
prevented. Previously, General Bures, Czechoslovak, on 29 Janu-
ary 1954, had summed up the attitudes always taken by the Czech
and Polish members in regard to United Nations Command requests
for investigations when he said, "All accusations against the Korean
People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side are nothing
but groundless fabrications. . Later, 10 February 1954, Colo-
nel Bibrowski, Polish member, in speaking of a United Nations Com-
th
mand request for a mobile inspection team, states, “The Polish delega-
tion cannot agree to consider such a request and in no case is it ready
to comply with it."
From the actions of your side and the actions of your unneutral
Czech and Pole representation in the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission on this and the previous United Nations Command
protest it became obvious that any realistic neutral inspection of your
illegal activities was virtually impossible. Although the United
le
Nations Command was cognizant throughout the following year
of
your continued illegal Air Force build-up, it was not until you overtly
employed your illegally amassed air power on 5 February 1955 by
making an unprovoked attack against United Nations Command air-
craft on a routine training mission over international waters that the
United Nations Command lodged another protest against your side
.
In the Military Armistice Commission negotiations on this incident
you inadvertently admitted that your own MIG aircraft participated to
in this air battle. This admission constituted conclusive corroboration
of your illegal introduction of combat aircraft, of not making the proper
combat materiel reports and of by-passing the designated ports of
be
entry, all in violation of the Armistice Agreement.
The third official protest against your illegal introduction of combat
materiel was therefore made by the United Nations Command on 21
February 1955. Again the complaint was spelled out in detail.
The United Nations Command charges that the Korean People's Army and the
Chinese People's Volunteers have between the dates of 27 July
1953 and 5 Febru-
be
combat aircraft of the MIG type, arms, and ammunition therefor in the territory
under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's
paragraph 13 (d) and other provisions of the Armistice Agreement.
8.
0
3
I
1 Department of State Bulletin, pp. 426-427.
KOREA
2725
Ibid., May 30, 1955, p. 891.
DIS
tu-
an
10-
M-
sde has not yet submitted the report covering the movement of com-
EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY DEFECTORS
Un Yong, pilot, and Junior Lieutenant Lee In Son, navigator, both
members of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force, after de-
sircraft were known to be based. Again your Czech and Pole cohorts
nas, ca the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission ably represented
Ni,
pour side and successfully stalled the dispatch of the mobile inspection
st.
teams for one week, enabling you to fly your MIG's away from the
in
bases to be investigated and otherwise remove or hide incriminating
20. evidence. That most of your MIG's were flown out was irrefutably
established by our radar surveillance. When the mobile inspection
ced
teams reached your airfields, every effort of the Swiss and Swede
of
members to make full and impartial investigations was thwarted by the
by Cech and Polish members, just as they had thwarted the investigation
of Uiju in October 1953. Although the official reports submitted by
ch
these teams reveal that at least 88 MIG's were observed on those fields,
sts
the Czechs and Poles vetoed requests by the Swiss and Swedes for
available documents which could have established the dates when those
mi sincraft were brought into the territory under your control. It is sig-
nificant to note that these documents were the same type documents
that were freely offered by the United Nations Command side to
28-
mobile inspection teams operating in the South.
ly
On 10 May 1955 again your illegally introduced aircraft made an
al
uprovoked attack against United Nations Command aircraft on a
nutine training mission over international waters. On 13 May 1955
the United Nations Command lodged a strong letter of protest against
the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers for
of this hostile act and for the fourth time charged your side with il-
ed
of
egally introducing combat aircraft in violation of the Armistice
Agreement.
ly
An analysis of the official reports submitted by the United Nations
Command and the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's
e Yolunteers covering combat materiel shipments for the period 28
2
July 1953 to 31 May 1955, reflects the following:
The United Nations Command has submitted 1,969 combat ma-
ad teriel reports, covering movement of 16,141 combat aircraft, 2,492
mored vehicles, 447,803 weapons, and 608,386,231 rounds of am-
of
The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers
has submitted 162 combat materiel reports,
covering the movement
at
di zero combat aircraft, 245 armored vehicles, 144,808 weapons, and
10,674,619
rounds of ammunition. I repeat, in the first 22 months of
the Armistice, despite the fact that you have twice openly employed
pour illegally' acquired combat aircraft in large numbers in hostile
ed unwarranted attacks against
the United Nations Command, your
of bat aircraft in or out of Korea.
At approximately 1315 hours 21 June 1955. Senior Lieutenant Lee
Ir-
nt
D
er munition.
he
I-
le
IT
ed
of
1
ring
1
2726
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
TE
1
TTO
airfields in the territory under your command capable of supporting de
fecting from your side and leaving Pyongyang Main airfield, landed
at Seoul airbase and surrendered a YAK-18 aircraft to our side.
These men have also surrendered themselves and have asked for
asylum from the tyranny and abuse they suffered under your control
.
This has been granted. Moreover, they have offered to make their
full contribution toward the defeat of your iniquitous conspiracy.
do
Your side will recognize their names. They are men who have held
positions of high trust and responsibility in your forces. Senior
Lieutenant Lee, the pilot, had served 8 years and 6 months in your lis
armed forces. He graduated from the Air Academy in Chkalov,
U.S. S. R., and the Air Officers' School in Yenchi, Manchuria. Your
side has rewarded him with the 3d Class Order of the National Flag
Medal, 2d Class Order of the National Flag Medal, 2d Class Freedom
and Independence Medal, Air Merit Medal. Senior Lieutenant Lee
was a member of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force, 858th
Independent Night-Bomber Regiment.
Junior Lieutenant Lee In Son has served in your forces for 4 years
and 9 months. His services have been rewarded by the presentation
of the Merit Medal. He was a member of the Korean People's
Armed Forces Air Force, 858th Independent Night-Bomber Regiment.
Senior Lieutenant Lee, the pilot of the YAK-18 aircraft, was sta-
tioned at Pyongyang Main airfield from July 1953 until September
1954 and again from February 1955 until 21 June 1955, the date of his
defection. The navigator was at Pyongyang Main from July of 1953
until his defection with Senior Lieutenant Lee on 21 June 1955
.
Both men had made frequent and regular flights to other principal
bases used by your air forces. Consequently both men were well
informed on the airfield development in North Korea, and the strength
composition, deployment, and operations of your illegally established
bo
Air Force.
I now present you with the evidence provided freely and voluntarily
to our side by these two former members of your Air Force:
hr
1. The YAK-18 aircraft which Senior Lieutenant Lee and Junior
Lieutenant Lee flew from Pyongyang Main to Seoul on 21 June 1955
bears serial number 8715. The YÅK-18 is fitted with one under
wing bomb rack under each wing, and each rack is capable of carrying
a 100 kilogram bomb. Senior Lieutenant Lee stated that while
stationed
at Antung, Manchuria, he flew aircraft of this type in night
bombing combat operations from October 1951, to March 1952, and
that he has flown 600 hours in this type of aircraft, of which 200 hours
were in combat. The YAK-18 in which the defectors came to Seoul
is a combat aircraft as defined by the Military Armistice Commission
it was brought to Korea
in April, 1954, in direct
violation of paragraph
13 (d).
2. Although we know, and our photographs taken on 27 July 1953
prove that at the time of the Armistice Agreement there were no
stored to full operation and
are supporting combat aircraft. Ou
chon, Pyongyang East (Mirin-Ni) and Onkong-Ni, have been me
itt
Tes
any
WE
de
SIC
.
UL
CO
KOREA
2727
flectors merely served to confirm existing evidence and provide
The information provided our side by your two most recent de-
another link in the long chain the United Nations Command has
constructed to irrefutably prove your illegal Air Force build-up.
UT
m
ee
IS
OD
-
er
od nar tracks have verified the flying activity at these fields. The
le defectors also stated that more fields are being built to support the
or growing strength of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force.
ol
. This is further evidence of your expanding Air Force strength.
ir 3. The two defectors were stationed at Pyongyang in March, 1955
during the period mobile inspection teams 6, 7, and 8 were conducting
ld their investigations. Senior Lieutenant Lee and Junior Lieutenant
or Lee provided specific information on steps your side took to remove,
ur aiguise and conceal incriminating evidence during the mobile inspec-
V, hon team investigations. Among the ruses employed by your side
Fere the following:
ag
A. Your side flew many combat aircraft away from the inspected
irfields.
th B. Your side hid combat aircraft in ravines in the hills in the
vicinity of the airfields and camouflaged them.
C. Your side dismantled some of the aircraft and concealed them.
D. Your side stationed heavy guards about the hiding places and
t's revented inspection of these areas by the mobile inspection teams.
it.
E. Your side arbitrarily reduced the boundaries of the airfields,
thereby restricting the scope of the mobile inspection team inspection.
F. Your side prepared false testimony by long, detailed coaching
is probable witnesses and by substituting politically indoctrinated
53 higher ranking officers for lower ranking officers by switching insignias.
15. G. Your side delayed the assembly of newly arrived combat aircraft
Da!
* Techon
by leaving them in their crates until the mobile inspection
ell leam investigations were completed. Senior Lieutenant Lee, who
sh,
reads Russian, noticed the wording "Kiev Aircraft Factory" on tags
ed
attached to one of his unit's combat aircraft. This aircraft's log
book showed that the plane left the Russian factory in March 1955.
4. The defectors have also stated that since the signing of the
amnistice Agreement the illegal build-up of the Korean People's
Armed Forces Air Force has been taking place, so that at the present
35 line there are more than 300 combat aircraft, the majority of which
de jet fighters of the
MIG-15 type. This has also been confirmed
ng our radar and by the incidents where our aircraft have been
stacked over international waters by Korean People's Armed Forces
ht
nd 5. The two defectors confirmed the fact that the MIG-15 jet
ghters
, which attacked United Nations planes over international
paters on the 5th of February, 1955, and on the 10th of May, 1955,
w from bases in the territory under
the military control of your
aide, and that these MIG aircraft belonged to your air forces.
Jy
Or
er-
ale
Air Force fighters.
TS
u
Bli
53
LIST OF CHARGES
30
n-
2728
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
I have presented to you today the official record of your continuous
and numerous violations of paragraph 13 (d), paragraph 17, and
other fundamental provisions of the Armistice Agreement, through
out the Armistice period. It stands as monumental evidence to the
United Nations Command and the free world of your complete
insincerity, dishonesty, and utter lack of integrity. The combat
forces, and particularly the air forces, that you have built up illegally
and covertly since the signing of the Armistice, constitute a grave
situation which threatens seriously the very structure and stability
of the Armistice itself.
The United Nations Command, at this time, lodges the strongest
and most serious protest made against your side since the signing
of the Armistice and charges that, through your willful, deliberate
and illegal build-up of your combat forces, you have:
1. Flagrantly violated every basic provision of the Armistice
Agreement, including the spirit and intent of that document.
2. Clearly demonstrated your aggressive intent of acquiring &
favorable military position over the forces of the United Nations
Command.
The United Nations Command demands that:
1. You provide the United Nations Command, without delay, an
accurate accounting of all combat materiel and combat aircraft
introduced into the territory of your side since the signing of the
Armistice.
2. You immediately provide the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission with corrected combat materiel reports which reflect the
mass of combat materiel and hundreds of aircraft you have illegally
introduced into Korea.
3. You cease immediately the illegal introduction of additional
combat materiel and combat aircraft into the territory of
We have listened since last summer to the soothing music of your
united Korea, while at the same time contending with your continued
peaceful propaganda and your expressions for a free and independent
willful and flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement, your
hostile and aggressive actions, and your murderous and inhumane
atrocities. The time has come to demand that the powers who are
directing your iniquitous activities start trying to reconcile your
Dr. Jekyll with your Mr. Hyde.
your
side.
KOREA
2729
tice
38
ONS
donment of the fruits of aggression.
Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, pp. 835-836.
and J. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA RESPECTING
the POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY MAT.
TERS, 1953-1955
bat
ally
lity 111. UNITED STATES POLICY IN KOREA: Letter From the Presi-
dent of the United States to the President of the Republic of Korea,
June 6, 19531
cate DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I received on June 2 the cabled text of your communication dated
May 30.? I have given it the careful and sympathetic consideration
it deserves.
The Republic of Korea has engaged all of its resources, human and
material
, in a struggle which will go down in history as one of the epic
struggles of all time. You have dedicated your all without reservation
to the principle that human liberty and national liberty must survive
against Communist aggression, which tramples upon human dignity
and which replaces national sovereignty with a humiliating satellite
can status. The principles for which your nation has fought and for which
aft
the and free nations everywhere.
so many of your youth have died are principles which defend free men
The United States has stood with you, and with you we have fought
one for those principles, as part of the United Nations Command. The
your youth and our youth has been poured out on the altar of
aly common sacrifice. Thereby we have demonstrated not only our dedi-
mal
cation to the cause of human freedom and political liberty, but also
our dedication to an equally important principle which is that there
de cannot be independence without interdependence, and there cannot
be human liberty except as men recognize that they are bound together
by ties of common destiny.
The moment has now come when we must decide whether to carry
on by warfare a struggle for the unification of Korea or whether to
ne pursue this goal by political and other methods.
The enemy has proposed an armistice which involves a clear aban-
tory which the Republic administered prior to the aggression, indeed
this territory will be somewhat enlarged.
The proposed armistice, true to the principle of political asylum,
assures that the thousands of North Koreans and Communist Chinese
prisoners in our hands, who have seen liberty and who wish to share it,
into Communist areas. The principle of political asylum is one which
we could not honorably surrender even though we thereby put an
blood of
OUT
ent
ned
OUT
are
ur
? Not printed.
2730
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
SIOL
Rei
tat
lish
pec
pro
OV
net
to
CON
course.
any such treaty would be made only with the advice and consent
1 For text of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the
earlier end to our own human and material losses. We have suffered
together many thousands of casualties in support of this principle
.
It is my profound conviction that under these circumstances accept-
ance of the armistice is required of the United Nations and the Re-
public of Korea. We would not be justified in prolonging the war with
all the misery that it involves in the hope of achieving, by force, the
unification of Korea,
gog
The unification of Korea is an end to which the United States is
committed, not once but many times, through its World War II jus
declarations and through its acceptance of the principles enunciated in
reference to Korea by the United Nations. Korea is unhappily not M
the only country which remains divided after World War II. We
remain determined to play our part in achieving the political union of pro
all countries so divided. But we do not intend to employ war as an
instrument to accomplish the world-wide political settlements to
which we are dedicated and which we believe to be just. It was indeed
a crime that those who attacked from the North invoked violence to bel
unite Korea under their rule. Not only as your official friend but as 8 say
personal friend I urge that your country not embark upon a similar
.
fen.
There are three major points I would like to make to you:
Wh
1. The United States will not renounce its efforts by all peaceful adi
means to effect the unification of Korea. Also as a member of the
United Nations we shall seek to assure that the United Nations con- set
tinues steadfast in its determination in this respect. In the political the
conference which will follow an armistice that will be our central
objective. The United States intends to consult with your Govern-
ment both before and during such a conference and expects the full of
participation of your Government in that conference.
be
2. You speak of a mutual defense pact. I am prepared promptly
after the conclusion
and acceptance of an armistice to negotiate with
you a mutual defense treaty along the lines of the treaties heretofore
11:
made between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines,
and the United States and Australia and New Zealand. You may
recall that both of these treaties speak of "the development of a more
comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." A
security pact between the United States and the Republic of Kores
would be a further step in that direction. It would cover the territory Pan
now or hereafter brought peacefully under the administration
of the
ROK. Of course you realize that under our constitutional system,
th
of the Senate. However, the action which the United States has here-
tofore taken, and the
great investment of blood and treasure which has
thu
already
been made for the independence of Korea are certainly clear
indications of American temper and intentions not to tolerate e
repetition of unprovoked aggression.
3. The United States Government, subject to requisite Congres-
Republic of Korea of Oct. 1, 1953, see supra, pp. 897-898.
800
vor
1
SD
an
of
ASE
be
1
thi
2
KOREA
2731
an
to
38
the manner in which the United States and the United Nations can best
1 For the reply (June 19, 1953) of the President of the Republic of Korea to
this letter, see Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1953, pp. 13–14.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 7, 1953, p. 313.
See ibid., Apr. 20, 1953, p. 576.
edsional appropriations, will be prepared to continue economic aid to the
Republic of Korea which will permit in peace a restoration of its devas-
Pt- tated land. Homes must be rebuilt. Industries must be reestab-
le lished
. Agriculture must be made vigorously productive.
ith
he The preamble of the Constitution of the United States states the
goals of our people, which I believe are equally the goals of the brave
is people of Korea, namely "to form a more perfect union, establish
II justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty
10t Manifestly, not all of these conditions now prevail in Korea. More-
Ve over, in existing circumstances they cannot be achieved either by
of prolongation of the present conflict or by reckless adventure with a
new one. Only by peaceful means can these things be achieved.
With the conclusion of an armistice the United States is prepared
ed to join with the Republic of Korea to seek for Korea these ends. We
to believe that in Korea there should be a more perfect union and, as I
say, we shall seek to achieve that union by all peaceful methods,
lar We believe that there should be domestic tranquillity and that can
come from the end of fighting. There should be provision for the de-
fense of Korea. That will come from the mutual security treaty
which we are prepared to make. The general welfare should be
ful
advanced and that will come from your own peacetime efforts and from
he
economic assistance to your war-torn land. Finally, a peaceful
settlement will afford the best opportunity to bring to your people
al
the blessings of liberty.
ral
I assure you, Mr. President, that so far as the United States is
]
concerned, it is our desire to go forward in fellowship with the Republic
of Korea. Even the thought of a separation at this critical hour would
be a tragedy. We must remain united.
dly
th
112. SUMMARY OF A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE 2 FOR KOREAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS,
JUNE 15, 1953 (Excerpt)
Pursuant to a recommendation of the National Security Council,
President Eisenhower on April 9, 1953, appointed Henry J. Tasca as
de special representative of the President for Korean Economic Affairs
and requested that he head a mission to investigate ways and means
of strengthening the Korean economy. The President
directed that
the mission's recommendations include the amounts and types of U.S.
assistance desirable in support of the Korean economy; proposals as to
D-
1-
re
es,
ay
re
A
3
28
I'Y
1,
at
e-
25
21
a
· Henry J. Tasca.
he
2732
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Sub
DOY
bet
initi
10
10
ty
[MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
113
most efficient manner possible; and the formulation of measures to be
adopted to insure the coordination of all economic programs in Korea.
The results of the mission's investigation are embodied in this report
,
The mission arrived in Korea on April 17, 1953, and headquarters bee
were established in Pusan. A series of meetings was held with U.N. the
Command agencies in Korea, with the U.N. Korean Reconstruction of
Agency, with each of the Ministries of the Republic of Korea, with the
chairmen of National Assembly Committees, and with the Korean
Chamber of Commerce. Each of the above prepared extensive ma-
terial on the Korean economy for consideration by the mission. In
addition, the special representative visited most of the important l in
industrial plants and agricultural and mining areas in South Korea
including Seoul, the capital.
In developing its plan the mission has examined in detail the
economic support requirements of the Korean defense forces and the
consumption requirements of the Republic of Korea (ROK) as well as dor
production and investment possibilities and programs in all sectors
, sha
The report assumed, in this connection, that an armistice would be to
negotiated at the beginning of the reconstruction period.
The mission's major recommendations are:
1. The United States should institute a new program of defense
441
support, relief, and reconstruction in Korea, of 4 or 5 years' duration
,
the
which it is anticipated will require a substantial amount in external
wi
assistance.
2. The new program would not replace the U.N. Korean Recon-
struction Agency (UNKRA) program but would be coordinated with it
,
nor would it replace Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK), the emergency
relief program of the Department of the Army in Korea.
3. Funds for the new program should be sought through the
Mutual Security Agency (Msa) or its successor.
4. Consistent with the expanded economic aid program, the Rok
Government should initiate certain basic changes in its financial
th
structure, aimed at such goals as balancing the Government budget
,
establishing and maintaining a uniform exchange rate, strengthening
the currency, and making credit controls more effective.
5. Technical and professional skills of the Korean people should be 12
developed as rapidly as possible.
6. A new agreement governing aid from the United States should
be negotiated with the ROK Government.
th:
AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, OCTOBER 1, 1953) ·
al
at
COL
an
wi
GT
矿​,
1 Supra, pp. 897-898.
19:
1
KOREA
2733
28.1
as
I'S.
ES demonstration of our solidarity of purpose.
subject by the Secretary of State, see ibid., Jan. 11, 1954, pp. 42–43.
1953; supra, p. 2662.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 9, 1954, p. 197.
113. REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA:
be Statement by the President, December 26, 1953 1
ort. The fighting in Korea was ended by an armistice which has now
ers been in effect for 5 months. We do not need as much ground strength
.N. there now as when there was fighting. That is the more true because
ion of the capabilities of ROK [Republic of Korea] forces which were
the substantially built up during the war. Also our growing national air
power possesses greater mobility and greater striking force than ever
18. before.
ID
Accordingly I have directed that the United States ground forces
ant in Korea be progressively reduced as circumstances warrant. As an
res initial step, two Army divisions will soon be withdrawn and returned
to the United States. While the United States is acting in good faith
she
to preserve the armistice and accomplish its purposes, we remain alert
the to all possibilities. Therefore, I emphasize that the action being taken
does not impair our readiness and capacity to react in a way which
should deter aggression and, if aggression should nevertheless occur,
be
to oppose it with even greater effect than heretofore.
Recently the United Nations members which had forces in Korea
clearly stated that, together, we would be united and prompt to resist
any renewal of armed attack. The same statement pointed out that
the consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave
on,
nal
that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities
within the frontiers of Korea."
The United States military forces in the Far East will be maintained
it,
at appropriate levels to take account of the foregoing and to fulfill the
commitments which the United States has undertaken in that area,
су
and which are vital to the security of the
United States. These forces
the
will feature highly mobile naval, air, and amphibious units.
Thus, we move forward in pursuance of our broad policy to make
evident to all the world that we ourselves have no aggressive inten-
-191 tions and that we are resourceful and vigilant to find ways to reduce
et,
the burdens of armament and to promote a climate of peace.
ng
be 114. EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO KOREAN
DEVELOPMENTS: Joint Statement Issued at Washington by
ld
the President of the United States and the President of the
Republic of Korea, July 30, 1954%
We have had a fruitful and cordial exchange of views on a number
of matters of mutual concern. These conversations have strengthened
the friendship existing between our two countries and are a further
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 14. For a statement on this
198
OD-
OK
2734
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950--1955
COL
2
On August 8, 1953, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles agreed to
that the United States and the Republic of Korea would again con-
sult if the political conference envisaged in the Armistice of July 27,
1953 failed to produce a satisfactory settlement. This conference was
held at Geneva from April 26 to June 15, 1954, but at that meeting in
the Communists refused to accept any formula for the unification of
ap
Korea on the basis of genuinely free elections under U.N. supervision
and instead continued to press for arrangements which would have off
led directly and inevitably to extinguishing the liberties of the Korean
people.
We reaffirm our intention to move forward, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General
Assembly on Korea, to achieve a unified, democratic, and independent K
Korea. In view of the failure of the Conference at Geneva to reach
a settlement of the Korean question, we have discussed means for
continuing to seek this objective.
Our military and economic advisers will continue with more detailed
discussions of the questions of common interest which concern them. Of
In conclusion, we reiterate our determination to continue to work Re
together in close and reciprocal cooperation to attain our common UN
objectives regarding Korea.
ab
och
cee
COL
me
est.
me
115. UNITED STATES-KOREAN COOPERATION: Agreed Min.
ute Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, No-
vember 17, 1954 3
ser
ap
of
mi
1
to
KO
this
i
It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the Republic Re
of Korea to continue the close cooperation which has proved mutually
beneficial and has played such an important part in the Free World's
struggle against Communist aggression and its determination to KO
remain free.
Accordingly,
It is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea to:
1. Cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea
,
including possible efforts through the United Nations to secure
objective;
2. Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control
of the United Nations Command while that Command has responsi-
bilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless after consul-
tation
it is agreed that our mutual and individual interests would best
be served by a change;
3. Accept the force levels and principles set forth in Appendix B'
dr
1 See supra, doc. 84.
2 See supra, doc. 92.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 29, 1954, pp. 810-811; see also ibida
pp. 809-810. Initialed at Seoul by Korean Prime Minister Pyun Yang-tai and
American Ambassador Ellis 0. Briggs,
4 Not printed.
mi
of
mi
SIC
at
KOREA
2735
1 Brackets inserted in original document.
Tas
an
II,
drawings of United States forces by sale of dollars through the Bank
red which will permit the maintenance of an effective military program
11- consistent with economic stability and within available resources;
27, 4. Continue to encourage private ownership of investment projects;
5. Cooperate in procedures for administration of United States aid
ing funds consistent with United States legislation and the practices
applied generally in such programs;
ion
6. Take the necessary measures to make the economic program
ive effective, including those set forth in Appendix A.
Based upon the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it
the will create, it is the intention and policy of the United States to:
ral
1. Continue its program of helping to strengthen the Republic of
ent Korea politically, economically and militarily, with programmed
ich
economic aid and direct military assistance furnished during Fiscal
for Year 1955 to aggregate up to $700 million. This amount would ex-
ced by more than $100 million the amount of assistance previously
led
contemplated by the United States for Korea in Fiscal Year 1955.
Of this total, programmed economic aid, including the CRIK (Civil
ork Relief in Koreal 1 carryover and the United States contribution to
ON UNKRA (United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency],' avail-
able for obligation in Fiscal Year 1955 would amount to approxi-
mately $280 million (actual expenditures in Fiscal Year 1955 are
estimated at approximately $250 million);
in.
2. Support a strengthened Republic of Korea military establish-
ment as outlined in Appendix B, including the development of a re-
serve system, in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by
appropriate military representatives of the two Governments.
3. Consult fully with appropriate military representatives of the
Republic of Korea in the implementation of the program for support
hry of the Republic of Korea military establishment
a's
4. In the event of an unprovoked attack upon the Republic of
Korea to employ, in accordance with its constitutional processes, its
military power against the aggressor;
5. Subject to the necessary Congressional authorizations, continue
to press forward with the economic program for the rehabilitation of
Appendix A: Measures for an Effective Economic Program
mol
The Republic of Korea will undertake the necessary measures to
make the economic program effective, including:
1-
£ with respect to exchange rates, the official rate of the Republic
of Korea Government and the counterpart rate being 180 to 1, agree-
ment to procedures as proposed by the United States for the conver-
sion of dollars at a different and realistic exchange
rate to cover hwan
of Korea, and generally to price aid goods into the Korean economy
at a similar rate, thereby providing for the maximum
contribution tò
fo
to
Korea. .
can
1S
st
ad
2736
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
FAS
top
IMO
that
mer
government should take to speed up the reconstruction and rehabili-
the Korean economy and to the Korean budget from the use of these
SUPP
resources,
The operation of existing agreements with respect to
hwan drawings by the United States will be suspended so long as the
of the
foregoing arrangements work out in practice to the mutual satisfaction
As
of both Governments;
the
2. agreement that material for the aid program-not furnished
from the United States in kind- will be procured wherever in non-
hwa
Communist countries goods of the required quality can be obtained
exch
at the best price (it being the objective to perform the maximum
possible procurement in Korea at competitive world prices);
3. provision of adequate information to the appropriate United
Kor
States representatives concerning Korean plans for the use of their
the
own foreign exchange; and
and
4. a realistic effort to balance its budget and continue to resist
inflation (it will be the objective of both Governments to develop the
de
budget of the Republic of Korea in a manner that will resist inflation).
tok
T
116. TERMINATION OF COMBATANT ACTIVITIES IN THE
AREA OF KOREA AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 1955: Executive Order
jecti
10585, January 1, 1955 1
DESIGNATING THE DATE OF TERMINATION OF COMBATANT ACTIV-
118,
ITIES IN KOREA AND WATERS ADJACENT THERETO
A
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 112 (c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,9 January 31, 1955, as of mid-
night thereof, is hereby designated as the date of termination of com-
Ei
batant activities in the zone comprised of the area described in Execu. Min
tive Order No. 10195 of December 20, 1950 (15 F. R. 9177).
117. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DISCUSSIONS: Joint Com
muniqué Issued at Washington by the Governments of the United
States and the Republic of Korea, August 15, 1955 *
Economic and military discussions between the Government of the
Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States which
have taken place in Washington for the last several weeks have been
concluded.
The military discussions covered a wide range of aid and supply Di
matters. On the economic side the
talks focused on exchange rate
problems and related subjects, including discussion of the steps each
ar
and
as fc
TI
thic
1953
men
Unit
into
will
less
prich
rate.
and
prod
bine
enti
T
Stat
1 20 Fed. Reg. 17.
2 66 A Stat.
3 Supra, p. 2596.
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 29, 1955, p. 356.
II
IS
4
KOREA
2737
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 29, 1955, pp. 356–357.
to
exchange
een priced immediately at a rate not less than 50 percent of the official
producing projects will be priced at the official rate unless the Com-
bined Economic Board recommends a reduction either through differ-
ential exchange rates or subsidies.
| The official rate will apply to purchases of hwan by the United
ese supporting with a stabilized economy as rapidly as possible. There
was an extensive exchange of information and a fruitful joint appraisal
the (those aspects of the Korean economy which affect its future stability.
ion
As an outgrowth of these discussions between the two governments,
the Republic of Korea announced its intention to establish the rate
ned
d exchange between the Korean hwan and the U.S. dollar at 500
01. bwan to one U.S. dollar. This rate will be applicable to the foreign
led
transactions of the Government of the Republic of Korea,
to purchases of hwan by the U.S. Forces in Korea, and with certain
limited exceptions to U.S. aid furnished in the form of imports into
ted
Korea. The Government of the United States will cooperate with
teir the Government of Korea in its efforts to prevent further inflation
and to develop a stabilized economic situation within the limits of
sist
resources made available for this purpose.
the
As with other questions related to the United States aid program
n). 1 Korea, further consideration will be given in Seoul to those
matters
that have been discussed here which have continuing interest.
The two Governments have welcomed this opportunity to exchange
Eiews and reach understandings in a spirit of friendly cooperation on
ler
& wide
range
of topics important to the achievement of mutual ob-
118. MONETARY STABILIZATION: Amendment to Appendix A of
agreed Minute of November 14, 1954, Between the United States
of and the Republic of Korea, August 15, 1955
id-
m-
Effective August 15, 1955, paragraph 1 of Appendix A of the Agreed
Cu- Minute between the Governments of the United States of America
tad the Republic of Korea signed November 17, 1954,2 is amended
The official exchange rate of 500 hwan to 1 United States dollar
m-
which is to be established by the Republic of Korea on August 15,
ted 1985 as the rate for all foreign exchange transactions of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Korea and its agencies, will be applicable to
Enited States aid furnished for the importation of goods and services
the
sto Korea except the following: (a) coal of United States origin which
ich
pill be priced during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956 at a rate not
es than 40 percent of the official rate; (b) fertilizer which will be
rate, to be increased to the official rate not later than January 1, 1956;
ole e investment type commodities for non-revenue producing projects;
and (a) relief supplies. Investment type commodities for revenue
pectives.
IV-
1
us follows:
ch
ili-
Olf-
States Forces in Korea.
* Supra.
41890057-Vol. 269
2738
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The Government of the United States of America will cooperate
with the Government of the Republic of Korea in its efforts to develop
a stabilized economic situation in Korea within the limits of resources
made available for this purpose. In this regard both Governments
will pay particular attention to the objectives of expeditious action
leading to the speedy implementation of the aid program.
Arrangements existing prior to the effective date of this amendment
to Appendix A of the Agreed Minute of November 17, 1954 with re-
spect to acquisition of hwan by the United States including those ar-
rangements authorized by the original paragraph 1 of Appendix A
of the said Agreed Minute will be suspended as long as the foregoing
arrangements work out in practice to the mutual satisfaction of botá
Governments.
DI
A.
1
1.
P
C
A
I
Arn
safe
thre
Star
18
elah
of t
1
I.
1
1
Cou
men
Pore
2
3
Council resolution of Feb. 13, 1947. For text of this resolution and earlier docu-
ከ re
'U.N. doc. S/C:3/SC.3/23, May 13, 1950. The Commission for Conventional
Armaments, responsible to the Security Council, was established by Security
ments on the reduction of conventional armaments, see A Decade of Americani
Foreign Policy, pp. 1136–1143.
? U.N. doc. S/387/Annex A.
erate
celop
urces
ents
tion
Part XVI
ment
e ar DISARMAMENT AND THE CONTROL OF ATOMIC
ix A
ENERGY
oing
both
A. THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL ARMA-
MENTS, 1950
1. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS:
Paper Submitted by the United States Delegation to the Working
Committee of the United Nations Commission for Conventional
Armaments, May 13, 1950
Item 3 of the Plan of Work? of the Commission for Conventional
krmaments provides for: "Consideration of practical and effective
safeguards by means of an international system of control operating
through special organs. (and by other means) to protect complying
States against the hazards of violations and evasions." The following
$ a general outline of the views of the United States which will be
elaborated as the Working Committee proceeds with its consideration
1. The Objective of Safeguards
A. To ensure that nations fulfil their responsibilities and obli-
gations as prescribed in the treaty for the regulation and
reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, and
protect complying States against the hazards of viola-
tions and evasions;
A. The system of safeguards should be so devised that its
operations will be effective, technically feasible and prac-
ticable, and will:
(a) give warning of the likelihood of violations,
1
of this subject.
II. The Nature of Safeguards
2739
,
1950-1955
accompany the inspection group representing the inter-
E. The inspection and verification process as applied to each
State being inspected. However, the State being inspected
should be obliged to appoint a liaison officer to assist and
2740
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, (b) detect promptly the occurrence of violations,
(c) minimize interference with and impose minimum bur-
dens on the economic and industrial life of the signatory
States.
III. The Basic Elements Constituting Safeguards
A. Accurate and regular reports by all signatory States of such
information related to conventional armaments and armed
forces as may be required by the treaty,
B. Verification of the above-mentioned reports by thorough
international inspection procedures,
C. Remedial action in the case of violation of the treaty;
IV. The International Agency Responsible for Safeguards
VI.
A. An international agency should be established within the
framework of the United Nations, deriving its powers and
status from the treaty under which it is established, to super-
vise and administer the agreed system of safeguards in con-
nection with the regulation and reduction of conventional
armaments,
B. The international agency should consist of a governing board
,
an inspection corps and secretariat,
C. The governing board should be composed of representatives
from each of the States which are members of the Security
Council, the nonpermanent membership changing in con-
formity with elections to and retirement from the Security
Council,
D. The inspection corps should be composed of members drawn VII
from panels nominated by each participating State. The
size and composition of the inspecting teams drawn from
this corps and utilized in particular instances should be
determined by the governing board,
E. Such secretariat as may be needed should be selected by the
governing board,
F. The decisions made by the international agency should not
require unanimity;
V. Rights and Duties of the Agency
Å. Receiving from each signatory State the reports specified in
B. Verification of this information through direct inspections
C. Review and interpretation of data
derived from reports and
inspections,
D. Preparation and publication of periodic and special reports
to organs of the United Nations and to the signatory States
the treaty,
agency,
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2741
ber-
Pon-
F. Individual members and national composition of the inspec-
bur- tion teams should be varied periodically,
tory
G. The international agency and its representatives should have
no authority to issue directions to signatory States except as
may be provided in the treaty under which it is established,
H. Inspection and verification should be conducted on a regular
uch
basis with reasonable advance notice which should be set
ned
forth in the treaty. However, special inspections may take
place under such circumstances as may be specified in the
ugh
treaty,
1. Certification to the Security Council and to signatory States
of violations or evasions;
VI. Rights and Duties of Signatory States
the
A. Each signatory State should afford duly accredited repre-
and
sentatives of the agency unimpeded rights of ingress to and
egress from, and movement within its territories necessary to
inal
the performance of their duties; should aid and assist them in
the performance of their duties, should provide access to the
ard,
activities subject to inspection, and should arrange for the
full co-operation of national or local authorities or private
individuals,
rity
B. The treaty should set forth the nature and scope of the
inspection and verification processes to be followed by the
city
international agency in order that all participating States
may be aware of their rights and obligations;
aw VII. Action to be Taken upon the Determination of a Violation
The
A. The international agency should be responsible for the
j rompt referral with certification of facts to the Security
be
Council and to the signatory States of the agency's findings
in respect to violations or evasions of the treaty,
the
B. Such certification may be accompanied by such recommenda-
tions in respect of any violations or evasions cited as the
not
international agency may deem appropriate,
C. Action in respect of any violation or evasion should be
primarily the responsibility of the Security Council. The
in treaty should provide that, since the purpose of the system of
safeguards is to protect complying
States against
the hazards
of violations, failure by the Security Council to correct
violations or otherwise enforce the treaty should relieve
participating States from their obligations thereunder and
permit them such freedom of unilateral or collective action
as is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
Tes
on-
om
ns
nd
Tts
es,
ch
che
ed
nd
ar
2742
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
1091
med
by the Administration within its defined functions do not require
2. PROPOSED CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS ADMINISTRA.
TION: Paper Submitted by the United States Delegation to the shor
Working Committee of the United Nations Commission for Con
ventional Armaments, June 22, 1950 1
adm
I. Conventional Armaments Administration (CAA)
ber
Establishment. A United Nations Conventional Armaments Ad-
ministration should be created at the seat of the United Nations to
T
supervise and administer the general system for the regulation and
reduction of conventional armaments and
and armed forces. The
SUP
Administration should derive its powers and status from the treaty
or convention setting up the international system for the regulation I
and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. will
Composition. In order that the Conventional Armaments Adminis
.
acte
tration will be broadly representative of the States participating in the
system, but limited in size in the interest of efficient operations, it }
should be composed of a representative from each of the States which Cor
are members of the Security Council, the non-permanent membership
changing in conformity with elections to and retirement from the
Security Council.
(
To facilitate its operations, the Administration should be authorized,
in the treaty or convention which creates it, to establish regional
branches. Each participating State should be obliged by the
treaty or convention to designate a national agency to supervise the
execution of its obligations with respect to conventional armaments
and to assist the Conventional Armaments Administration in its work
,
The Administration
should be empowered
to employ the personnel
requisite to carrying out its functions. This personnel should be
recruited on the basis of character and technical competence, due
allowance being made for equitable geographical distribution.
Functions. The Conventional Armaments Administration should
AE
be responsible for:
II.
(1) Receiving from each participating State the reports specified in
the treaty or convention establishing the system;
(2) Verification of this information through investigation and direct
inspections;
(3) Review and interpretation of data derived from reports and
inspections;
(4) Preparation of periodic and special reports on conventional Se
armaments and armed forces to organs of the United Nations
and to the participating States;
(5) Immediate certification to the Security Council and to par-
ticipating States of violations or evasions.
Procedure. The treaty or convention which establishes the system
for the regulation of armaments should stipulate that decisions made
rec
ng
tic
WT
re
leg
1 U.N. doc. S/C.3/SC.3/24, June 22, 1950.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2743
s to
aty routine.
.
hip following:
Security Council. However, in order to provide the Security Council
I'm regulation and reduction of armaments:
relationships should be established in the treaty or convention for the
RA snimity. Except for this provision and others which may be
the slopted in the treaty or convention, the Administration should adopt
Con is own rules of procedure. It should also be authorized to issue
administrative regulations and to enter into ad hoc agreements neces-
sry to the discharge of its responsibilities.
İnspections. The Conventional Armaments Administration should
be required to conduct such inspections as are necessary to the fulfil-
Ad-
ment of its functions.
The treaty or convention setting up the system should stipulate the
and
objectives to be achieved by the inspections. There should then be
The
stipulated the types of inspections to be conducted as a matter of
tion
It is further considered most desirable that practically all inspections
will be scheduled in advance, and that they will be identical in char-
nis-
peter for Powers of similar strength.
the
Each individual inspection should be conducted by an inspection
it
team the size and composition of which should be determined by the
lich Conventional Armaments Administration with due regard to the
the
(1) Each member of the Administration should be entitled, but not
ed, required, to have a representative on each inspecting team,
nal
except where a member of the Administration is itself being
the
inspected. The State being inspected should be obliged to
the appoint a liaison officer to accompany the inspection team;
ats
(2) Each participating State should nominate as many inspectors
Tk.
as the Adminstration may require it to furnish, and these
nel
nominees should form a permanent roster from which inspection
be teams should be selected as needed;
due
Each inspection team should have at its disposal a staff composed
ild
of personnel of the international secretariat of the Conventional
Armaments Administration.
II. Relationships of the Conventional Armaments Administration to
Organs of the United Nations
ect
To the Security Council. Since every aspect of the regulation and
nd
reduction of armaments is associated with the maintenance of inter-
peace
tional Armaments Administration is to some extent related to the
and security, every aspect of the work of the Conven-
with a basis for taking appropriate action, the following specific
(2) Violations or evasions should be immediately certified to the
le
Security Council by the Conventional Armaments Administration;
(b) The Conventional Armaments Administration should submit
to the Security Council regular reports at stated intervals and special
in
national
21
IS
TM
re
reports as required.
2744
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The relation of the Conventional Armaments Administration to the I
Military Staff Committee should be defined by the Security Council inst
as circumstances require.
aut
To the General Assembly. Under the Charter (Articles 10-12) the tral
General Assembly has broad authority to consider and make recom-com
mendations concerning the principles governing disarmament and the men
regulation of armaments. In order to assist the Assembly in the 1
exercise of this function, the treaty or convention for the regulation
and reduction of armaments should require the Conventional Arma-
ments Administration to submit to the General Assembly annual
reports and such special reports as the Assembly may from time to
time request.
To the International Court of Justice. Under the Statute of the
Court, cases between States arising out of the treaty or convention
for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed
forces would fall within the jurisdiction of the Court when referred
to it by the parties or through the operation of a compulsory jurisdic-
tion declaration. In addition, the Conventional Armaments Ad-
ministration should be empowered, in accordance with the procedure
specified in Article 96 of the Charter, to request advisory opinions
on legal questions arising within the scope of the Administration's
activities. Proceedings before the Court should not delay the taking
of measures necessary to conserve international peace and security
: B.
To the Secretariat. The Conventional Armaments Administration
might have an independent secretariat separate from the United
Nations Secretariat. " It might, however, utilize the services of the
United Nations Secretariat to the extent mutually agreed upon.
Reports and other communications from the Administration to organ PE
of the United Nations should be transmitted through the Secretary-
General.
To the Economic and Social Council. Such relationships as may be
necessary should be established between the Conventional Armaments
Administration and the Economic and Social Council, its commissions
and sub-commissions, and related specialized agencies.
To the Trusteeship Council. Such relationships as may be necessary
should be established between the Conventional Armaments Admin-
istration and the Trusteeship Council.
With Individual States. The question of the relationship of the
Conventional Armaments Administration to each participating State In:
will require careful treaty definition, particularly as regards the extent
to which the privileges and immunities accorded to the Administration
will exempt it from the operation of national laws and the means by
de
which individual
rights and liberties will be protected against possible
infringement stemming from inspections. The grant of privileges
and immunities to the Ådministration should be based
on the principle
of minimum interference with the national laws of a State consistent
with adequate supervision of the regulation and reduction of arma
ments.
1 Article 36 of the Statute; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 147.
2 Supra, p. 157.
3.
U
GE
RE
an
mi
of
ar
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2745
of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated dis-
mg.
e to
long
on's
Committee of Twelve, May 17, 19512
| United Nations efforts should be directed towards the preparation of
General Assembly Res. 496(V), Dec. 13, 1950 (U.N. General Assembly, Official
and means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Com-
Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), p. 80), to report “on ways
mission for Conventional Armaments may be co-ordinated and on the advisability
the The Administration should have no authority to issue directions or
ancil instructions to any State. The Administration should, however, be
authorized to negotiate with each participating State such adminis-
thetrative agreements as may be necessary to carry out the treaty or
com-convention affecting such State's regulation and reduction of arma-
I the ments.
The privileges and immunities of the Administration should include:
tion
(1) The possession of legal personality similar to that enjoyed by the
nual
United Nations;
(2) The right of its accredited representatives to the privileges and
facilities of ingress, egress and access into and from the territory
the of participating States, including rights of transit for persons
tion
and equipment across or through such territory;
med
(3) The right to the use of communication facilities adequate to the
rred discharge of its responsibilities;
dic-
(4) Such exemption from customs and immigration regulations as
Ad- may be necessary to effective operations;
fure
(5) Inviolability of premises, property and archives.
cing
1:
B. CONSOLIDATION OF THE APPROACH TO DIS-
100
ted ARMAMENT, 1951-1952
the
ADS PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION OF THE TWO DISARMA-
ry-
MENT COMMISSIONS: Address by the President of the United
States Before the United Nations General Assembly, October
be
mts
3. PROPOSED COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF ALL
ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES: Working Paper Sub-
in-
mitted by the United States Delegation to the United Nations
the
ent
The United States believes that comprehensive plans to include the
by
international control of all armaments and armed forces should be
ole
developed by the United Nations, and, accordingly, that present
le
ent
U.N. doc. AAC.50/1. The Committee of Twelve was established under
01.
24, 1950] 1
ONS
ary
ate Introduction
OD
res
1 Supra, pp. 345-350.
18-
armament commission.”
2746
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
1107-1110) and Part II of the Commission's Second Report, Sept. 11, 1947
co-ordinated plans of control which would make possible with appro-
priate safeguards the regulations, limitation and balanced reduction
of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and
police forces. United Nations efforts in the field of armaments and
armed forces have to date been assigned to two separate bodies
,
namely the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Com-
mission for Conventional Armaments. Much useful work has been
accomplished by the two Commissions and, in the view of the United
States, the appropriate time has now arrived for bringing the respec-
tive efforts of the two Commissions into closer co-ordination through
the establishment of a single commission. In taking over the functions
of the two present Commissions, the new commission would build
upon the work already done by them. In particular, the United States
believes that the United Nations plan for international control of
atomic energy? must continue to serve as the basis for the work of the
new commission in the atomic energy phases of its work. Neverthe-
less, the commission should be empowered to consider any other pro-
posals that would be no less effective than the existing United Nations
plan
B.
A. Organization
The United States believes that a new commission whose primary com
all
task would be the development of plans for the international control
the
of all armaments and armed forces to be called the Commission for
the Control of Armaments and Armed Forces should be established
in place of the existing two Commissions in accordance with the fol-
lowing terms and provisions:
1. Status. The new commission should be established under and
report to the Security Council, which in turn should submit peri-
odic progress reports to the General Assembly.
2. Composition. Membership on the new commission should
correspond to the membership of the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and hence
would consist of the members of the Security Council, plus tio
Canada when Canada is not a member of the Security Council.
for
th
3. Sub-committees. The new commission should be expressly
authorized to establish such sub-committees as may be needed
DE
in order to carry out the tasks
assigned to it, recognizing that the
differences in the nature of atomic and non-atomic weapons, as
well as in the nature of biological and other instrumentalities of
th
warfare, require the development of varying, but
co-ordinated,
1 The "United Nations plan” here referred to consisted of the "General Find
ings and Recommendations" incorporated in the First Report of the U.N., Atomie
Energy Commission, Dec. 31, 1946 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Point
(ibid., pp. 1111-1118):
2011
ODE
ver
COL
COL
ent
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2747
ren
ted
EC-
1e-
ro-
ins
international control of all armaments and armed forces.
ro- systems of regulation and control, specially adapted to meet
ion the problems peculiar to the different types of weapons, or
ind instrumentalities.
ind
4. Technical advice. Technical advice should be provided as
les
necessary by experts appointed by the member States to assist
im-
their representatives.
5. The Secretariat. The Secretariat of the new commission should
be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
igh
6. Relationship to other organs of the United Nations. As a sub-
ins
ordinate organ of the Security Council, the new commission
ild
should have the normal relationship of such a body to other organs
tes
of the United Nations.
of
he 7. Rules of procedure. With appropriate modifications, the rules
of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission would appear to
be adequate to serve as the rules of procedure of the new
commission.
B. Functions
1. The primary task of the new commission should be to prepare
comprehensive and co-ordinated plans for the international control of
rol el armaments and armed forces, and accordingly, would provide for
For the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments
ed and armed forces, including internal security and police forces.
ol-
2. The new commission should build upon the work already devel-
oped by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Con-
Tentional Armaments. The United Nations plan for the international
nd
ri-
control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should
continue to serve as the basis for any plan for the control of atomic
energy unless and until a better and no less effective system can be
3. The new commission should take into account the inter-relation-
ship of control systems and safeguards necessary to assure the regula-
tion
, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed
forces
, including internal security and police
forces, in order to assure
ly that the respective systems of control complement each other.
4. The new commission should develop a comprehensive plan for
he phasing the implementation of the component systems of control
and regulation of all armaments and armed forces.
5. The new commission should formulate a plan for the regulation of
d, the international traffic in arms as part of the comprehensive plan for
ld devised
on
US
ed
as
of
d-
nic
2748
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMA-
MENT COMMISSION: Resolution 502 (VI) of the United Nations
General Assembly, January 11, 1952
1
fo
hi
of war,
ar
SD
CH
tic
tir
CO
00
en
att
se
im
The General Assembly,
Moved by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the
world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear
;
Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world this burden and this
fear, and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive pro-
grammes of reconstruction and development,
Reaffirming its desire that the United Nations develop an effective
collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed
forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accord-
ance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,
Believing that a necessary means to this end is the developinent by
the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under
international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced re-
duction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of
all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective
international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of
atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
only,
Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament must include all
kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations
whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would
endanger the system, and must include safeguards that will ensure
the compliance of all such nations;
Noting the recommendation ? of the Committee of Twelve estab-
lished by resolution 496 (V)that the General Assembly should es-
tablish a new commission to carry forward the tasks originally as-
signed to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for
Conventional Armaments,
1. Establishes under the Security Council a Disarmament Com-
mission. This Commission shall have the same mernbership as the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional
Armaments, and shall function under the rules of procedure of the
Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commis.
sion shall deem necessary;
2. Dissolves the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to
the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional
Armaments;
3. Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be
embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records
, Sixth Session, Supplement no lo
(A/2119), pp. 1-2. This resolution is substantially the same as the draft resolut
tion on the same subject proposed by the tanited States
, France, and the United
Kingdom on Nov. 19, 1951; ibid., Annexes, Agenda Items 66 and 16, p.
3 Resolution of Dec. 13, 1950; ibid., Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1275),
fo
sh
10
:
t
in
wi
CO
0
Or
pa
胡​丽
​th
lir
m
fo
5.
DIE
Ci
p. 80.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2749
JAS
ear
ro-
l'e-
ses
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all arma-
forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;
concerning the determination of the over-all limits and restrictions
(A balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the
elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and
for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the pro-
hibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes only. The Commission shall be guided by the following
the principles:
(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be pro-
his
gressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed
forces—including paramilitary, security and police forces-and all
armaments including atomic;
ive
(6) Such verification must be based on effective international in-
led spection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information dis-
rd-
closed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the de-
cisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established;
by
(c) The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or
ler
plans for control that may be put forward involving either conven-
tional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effec-
of tive system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international
ive
control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should
of
continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic
energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;
(2) There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure ob-
servance of the disarmament programme, so as to provide for the
old prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the min-
mum degree of interference in the internal life of each country;
(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all States
b-
for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties)
shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty
or treaties) shall enter into force;
or
4. Directs the Commission, when preparing the proposals referred to
in the preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for the establishment,
within the framework of the Security Council, of an international
he organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty
A! (or treaties). The functions and powers of the control organ (or
he organs) shall be defined in the treaty which establishes it;
5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in
paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans
for progressive
to
and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of
al which is recognized as a first and indispensable step
in carrying out
the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution
6. Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation,
(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed
5). negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission,
INS
are
es-
2S-
N-
control
IS-
be
nd
ments:
20
U
ed
2750
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
UN
1
1
+
referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their
respective national military establishments of the permitted national
armed forces and armaments;
7. Directs the Commission to commence its work not later than
thirty days from the adoption of the present resolution and to report
periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the
General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations when
the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall
submit its first report not later than 1 June 1952;
8. Declares that a conference of all States should be convened to she
consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the
Commission as soon as the work of the Commission shall have pro-
gressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part
of its programme is ready for submission to governments;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to convene such a conference
1
when so advised by the Commission;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff
and facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the
effective accomplishment of the purposes of the present resolution.
be
th
80
911
at
iš 3
ar
2
C. WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMA-
MENT COMMISSION, 1952-1953
PE
ai
3.
C
ali
4
5. DISCLOSURE, VERIFICATION, AND INSPECTION OF ARMA
MENTS: Proposal Submitted by the United States Delegation to
the United Nations Disarmament Commission, April 5, 1952 1
S
P
6
8
10
fo
f
C
INTRODUCTION
General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) 2 calling for regulation
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armamente
directs that the Disarmament Commission be guided by a number of
principles, including the following (paragraph 3):
"(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be
progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all
armed forces
including para-military, security and police forces
and all armaments including atomic;
"(6) Such verification must be based on effective international
disclosed; this
inspection to be carried out in accordance with the
decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be
established.”
1 U.N. Disarmament Commission, Oficial Records, Supplement for April
,
May and June 1952 (DC/C.2/1), pp. 9–18.
2 Supra, doc. 4.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2751
)ro-
armaments.
jart
nce
next stage, all States have the opportunity at periodic intervals of
heir Paragraph 5 of the resolution reads as follows:
nal “5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred
to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for
progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the imple-
han
mentation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step
jort
in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the
the
hen
present resolution".
hall It is therefore apparent that the General Assembly resolution
contemplates that the newly created Disarmament Commission
I to should as a matter of priority deal with the problem of progressive
the and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and
A. EXTENT OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION
1. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing
taf
basis
. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one time basis” and
the
subsequent verification of such disclosure would not meet the require-
ments of a continuing programme for regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction of all armed forces. Therefore it is contemplated
that the machinery which will be set up should be on a permanent or
at least a long-term basis, since the disclosure and verification of
armed forces and armaments will be on a continuing basis.
A-
2. The disclosure must cover all armed forces of every kind, including
para-military, security and police forces, and all armaments, including
atomic.
3. The verification of armed forces and armaments must likewise
cover all armed forces of every kind, including para-military, security
TA and police forces and all armaments, including atomic.
4. The permanent machinery to be established must provide adequate
safeguards under a competent international authority having ap-
propriate status, rights and powers.
B. STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION
5. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with
appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when, and only
when, previous steps have been satisfactorily completed. The reasons
for proceding by stages are two:
be
:11 (a) In the existing state of international tensions all States must be
protected in the event of a serious violation or collapse of the system
of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments. The
181 existence of stages gives all States the opportunity over a period of
time to test the good faith of all other States. The mere agreement
che
to enter into a system for disclosure and verification would give no
be assurance that the parties thereto would actually carry it out in full
or at all. With disclosure and verification in several stages and with
fach step of one stage completed prior to the commencement of the
trile
to
OD,
nts
of
on
2752
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
MU
1
Ini
PS
JUL
S
៖
periodic visits of inspection and through reference of statistical
checking the good faith of other States through review of the informarec
tion theretofore disclosed.
(6) It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification would for
proceed from the less secret areas, which would be disclosed and verition
fied in early stages, to the more secret areas. A phasing of this nature
,
in addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all States
,
would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of mil
each country, since the less sensitive information can in fact be more
readily verified, and would, in cases of differences or delays, prevent
premature disclosure of information which many States would like
reserved until substantial co-operation and good faith have been bal
demonstrated.
6. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the United States thi
had as its objective the full implementation of the programme of
disclosure and verification as rapidly as feasible in the light of the
existing state of international tensions. An excessive number of 10
stages, each of which must be completed prior to the commencement sta
of the next stage, would unduly delay not only the programme of
disclosure and verification but also the entire programme for regula-
tion, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and arma-
Sta
ments. With this in mind, the United States concluded and is
pro-
posing that the number of stages of disclosure and verification should
be five-—a figure which represents the minimum number consistent
with the considerations set forth in the previous paragraph. In each
stage, the disclosure and verification processes will go forward simul-
taneously on a wide variety of items in order to accelerate the success-
St
ful completion of the programme.
7. Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed forces and
armaments (excluding atomic) to be disclosed in the respective stages
8
and the manner of verification of the information required to be dis-
closed. Annex II sets forth the same information with respect to
atomic armaments. The proposals with respect to atomic weapons
are presented in a separate annex solely in the interest of clarity of
presentation. Both the problems involved and the appropriate
terminology with respect to atomic weapons differ so greatly from the 11
problems and terminology with respect to other weapons that a single
pa
annex comprehending both might be confusing. It is contemplated
that all stages of disclosure and verification cover both atomic and
non-atomic weapons. In other words, the first stage includes the
items set forth both in annex I and in annex II for disclosure and
verification in that stage, and the same is true as to all succeeding
stages.
8. Without commenting in detail at this point on the specific items
subject to disclosure and verification in the respective stages, it should the
be noted that the armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the
first stage have three general characteristics:
(a) They should prove to be the least secret items.
b) In the main, they are most susceptible of verification by
I
1
Sla
&
80
la
8
TE
P
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2753
in their production.
the system of safeguards which must be established to ensure observ-
reduction of armed forces and armaments, so as to provide for the
prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the
minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country.
It will not be adequate to provide merely for the verification of dis-
ma- records—with the result that verification can take place with the
minimum of interference in the internal life of the respective countries.
uld Some resort would nevertheless be required to "on-the-spot” inspec-
eri- tion, and aerial reconnaissance would be required in all stages to assist
ire, in checking the adequacy of the disclosure.
(c) At the same time, these items reveal so vast a segment of the
of military potential of all States that their disclosure and verification,
ore as provided in this stage, in and of itself would act as an indication of
ent good faith and would thus greatly facilitate progress towards the
ike ultimate goals of the entire programme of regulation, limitation and
een balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments.
& The armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the second,
tes third, fourth and fifth stages are progressively more secret and more
of diffcult to verify except through on-the-spot" investigations in con-
the junction with extensive aerial reconnaissance.
of 10. The character of the items to be disclosed and verified in the five
ent stages as outlined in annexes I and II can in general be summarized
of as follows:
18-
Stage I. A quantitative count in the nature of a report on existing
strength levels of all armed forces and of the location of installations
uld
and facilities concerned with armaments of all types, including:
atomic.
ent
ich Stage II. Detailed disclosure of organization of armed forces and of
ul-
installations and facilities concerned with the basic materials re-
quired for production of all armaments, including atomic.
Stage III. Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel arma-
nd
ments), fissionable material and installations and facilities utilized
ges
Stage IV. Detailed disclosure of installations and facilities utilized in
LIS-
to the production of novel armaments, including atomic (armaments
ONS not in general use by the end of the Second World War but in
of
volume production today).
ite Stage V. Detailed disclosure of novel armaments, including atomic.
he
11. The information to be disclosed and verified in all stages and
gle
ed
particularly in the early stages--is so vast that there appear to be
advantages in disclosing material only at the rate at which it can be
he
processed. Therefore, in general within each stage, disclosure should
nd
proceed progressively step by step in accordance with an agreed plan
from the less sensitive information to that which is more sensitive.
ng
C. INSPECTION
ms
ld 2. The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of
hé
18-
To-
SS-
nd
by
cal
415900_57-Vol. 2-
-70
2754
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
uit
inspectors and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably
19. The inspectors should report to the Commission any information
affirmative vote of any seven members, of such a major violation
closed information. In addition, provision must be made for deter- du
mining the adequacy of the disclosed information, through broad
general powers of "on-the-spot” inspection, through access to stash
tistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports to
and through aerial surveys.
20.
13. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the up
verification procedure in order completely to determine the adequacy of
of disclosed information. It will be obvious that aerial reconnaissance Ge
furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large su
undisclosed facilities and installations. Aerial survey will be essential
in all stages of the disclosure and verification procedure.
of
14. It is contemplated that "on-the-spot" inspection will take place th
in all stages as a part of the verification procedure. Its use, however
, 21
will be less extensive in the first than in the later stages because of st
the greater ease of verification, through other methods, of the items pr
disclosed in the first stage. It will of course be necessary at each
stage to regulate inspection in such a way as to prevent disclosure of
information which is to be withheld from disclosure and verification
during the particular stage. Certain principles governing limitations
tf
on the right of "on-the-spot" inspections in early stages are set forth
in annexes I and II.
15. Each State at the commencement of each stage should submit
to the Commission a general description of the nature and location of
facilities falling within the terms of reference for that stage. Access
to such locations, reasonably sufficient to verify the information dis-
be
closed, should be granted to inspectors. Inspection in each stage
should proceed in accordance with a previously accepted plan.
16. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the inter
national inspectors, in addition to examining declared installations
and facilities, be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire
national territory in order that the Commission may determine within
reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the information dis-
closed. Accordingly, each State should be required during each
stage of the process of disclosure and verification to permit the inter-
national inspectors such freedom of movement and to give them
reasonably be required, including the right to inspect
physical dimen-
sions of all facilities and installations wherever situated.
17. Each State should facilitate
the activities of the international fi
require.
18. Procedure should be set up in order to permit a determination by
the Commission of the necessity for inspection of any facilities on
installations, access to which is denied to the inspectors and where in
the judgment of the inspectors such inspection is required.
indicating a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or armen
ments respecting disclosure and verification. In the event of a Comme
mission determination confirmed by the Security Council
, by the
28
VO
le
21]
O!
26
2.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2755
e of
cess
eter during any stage and the failure of the State guilty of violation to
road repair the same within a reasonable specified period, other States
sta-should be free to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verifica-
bortstion system.
20. The first stage of disclosure and verification should commence
the upon (a) the entry into force of the treaties dealing with the programme
nacy of disclosure and verification and referred to in paragraph 3 of the
ance General Assembly resolution, and (b) the establishment, pursuant to
arge such treaties, of international machinery responsible for carrying out
ntial the programme of disclosure and verification, including the portion
of such machinery located within the territory of States adhering to
place the programme.
ver, 21. Disclosure and verification in all stages subsequent to the first
je of stage could commence upon a Commission determination that the
iems previous stage has been satisfactorily completed.
each
D. MISCELLANEOUS
tion
22. The United Nations should establish concurrently with and at the
cions
time of the adoption of the general principles governing this pro-
orth
gramme the necessary inspection machinery to ensure effective veri-
fication of the armed forces and armaments, including those involving
mit
n of
atomic energy, disclosed pursuant to the programme. In establishing
this machinery, consideration should be given to its subsequent utili-
dis-
zation to supervise the programme for the regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces. The ma-
chinery recommended in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan
would presumably be utilized in connexion with the disclosure and
ter-
verification of armaments involving atomic energy. The problem of
ntire
appropriate United Nations machinery both for purposes of the sys-
tem of disclosure and verification and for the regulation, limitation
thin
dis-
and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments is the subject
ter-
23. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes
lem respect to all adhering States should begin simultaneously and
forward at approximately the same tempo.
1. The draft treaties or agreements bringing into effect the dis-
closure and verification system should specifically provide for ad-
herence of States in accordance with the principles set forth in the
ably paragraph of the preamble and sub-paragraph 3 (e) of General
Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, the relevant por-
tions of which are as follows:
i by
“Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament must
be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that
their failure to accepi would endanger the system . .
"C) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all
the
States for signature and
ratification or adherence. The treaty (or
tage
ions
of a separate study
each
with
should go
may
hen-
onal
fifth
or
e in
..^3
tion
ree.
om
tion
" See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1107–1118.
2756
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
V
treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto
before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force.
ANNEX I
Proposed stages of disclosure and verification of Armed forces and
non-atomic armaments
le
STAGE I
Disclose
(a) Over-all manpower strength of regular and reserve military forces
and para-military organizations, including training establishments
and security and police forces, broken down into each category.
DE
(6) Location of all operational military installations.
Verify
(a) By examination and cross-checks of central records to include per 16
sonnel, disbursement, medical and procurement supplemented by
access to and spot checks of records at selected installations.
(6) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and
physical dimensions of installations.
La
(a) and (6): Inspectors will have access to entire national territory
to extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations (0)
have been declared. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same pur-
pose and to same extent.
STAGE II
Disclose
(a) Organization, composition and disposition of units making up
over-all strengths disclosed in stage İ.
Di
(6) Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to arma-
ments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.
V
Verify
(a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel
, move-
ment of units and administrative support supplemented by access
to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
(b) By cross checks of pertinent statistics and employment records
,
access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to ma-
terials used.
(a) and (6): By aerial survey as stated in stage I.
Di
STAGE III
2
Disclose
(a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up
over-all strengths disclosed in stages I and II except units equipped
with novel weapons).
(6) Production facilities for manufacture of weapons and heavy equip-
ment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in stages
I and II (excluding novel weapons), giving location, type and
capacity.
lai
@
PM
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2757
rces
ints
1.
: by
cluding weapon storage sites.)
reto Verify
(a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of organi-
zation and equipment, and repair and overhaul of equipment sup-
plemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and
installations.
d (6) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination
of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials,
available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot
checks of selected units and installations.
(a) and (b): By aerial survey as stated in stage I.
STAGE IV
Disclose
(6) Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons
to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological war-
fare and atomic weapons.
per ) Installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel
weapons.
and Verify
(a) By cross checks with stages I and II and quantitative inspection
ory of units disclosed.
ons) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of
records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials,
available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot
checks of selected units and installations.
(a) and (b): By aerial survey as set forth in stage I.
up
STAGE V
(a) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.
(a) By physical count of stockpiles of finished novel weapons cross
checked with information disclosed in stages I, II, III and IV.
ds,
ANNEX II
Proposed stages of disclosure and verification of Atomic armaments
STAGE I
(a) Location of all installations directly concerned with production
of atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in
the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed,
physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. Ex-
nd to a statement
giving the input material, the produce
material and
process used in each instance.
jur-
Diadose
218-
Verify
Te-
ess
18-
Disclose
UP
ed
FP
res
2758
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations
(6) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable
Verify
(a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and
physical dimensions of installation. (Inspectors will have access
to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine
through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and
railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations have
been declared.)
Dis
(6) Uses and functions in so far as revealed by external examination
(0
of all structures and unboused equipment. Detailed interior
inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular
stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of
the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial | Ve
verification of plant use or function.)
(6)
(a) and (6): By aerial survey in all stages for same purposes and to
same extent as permitted with armed forces and non-atomic arma-
ments. (See annex I.)
STAGE II
Di
Disclose
@
(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output
,
of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with
V.
preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such
auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from
mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants
,
and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable
or fusionable material.
6.
Verify
(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations
and appropriate records. Cross checks with stage I.
STAGE III
Disclose
pr
(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output
of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations
concerned with the conversion
of feed materials to fissionable
or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive
materials in large quantities.
(6) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand
or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or
process.
(c) General design and operational characteristics of research labora-
tories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW or
more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusion-
able materials produced.
Verify
and appropriate records. "Cross checks with stages I and II
,
WO
1,
re
WE
as
2.
20
P
t
3
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2759
entered into by which all States would reduce their armed forces to
cess
ave
llar
1
&•
tions long before an offending State could start a war.
material, or radioactive materials, installations for production
and
thereof, and appropriate records.
() By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by de-
tailed irspection of reactors themselves.
and
STAGE IV
Disclose
ion) Details of design and operation, including past and present output
rior of all those atomic energy establishments and installations con-
cerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from
of fissionable or other materials.
tial
Verify
I to
(m) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate
records. Cross checks with stages I, II and III.
STAGE V
Disclose
() Location, numbers and types of atomic and radioactive weapons
luty on hand. Weapon storage sites.
ith
om By direct inspection. Cross checks with stages I, II and III
its, and (a) above.
ble
6. ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF A DISARMAMENT PROGRAM:
Proposal Submitted by the United States Delegation to the United
Nations Disarmament Commission, April 24, 1952
The Disarmament Commission accepts as a guide for its future
work the following principles as the essentials of a disarmament
programme:
out
ns
1. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by
ble
relaxing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making
ive
war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible
8 a means of settling disputes between nations.
and 2. To achieve this goal, all States must co-operate to establish an open
and substantially disarmed world:
(a) In which armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a
point and in such a thorough fashion that no State will be in a condi-
tion of armed preparedness to start a war, and
0 In which no State will be in a position to undertake prepara-
tions for war without other States having knowledge of such prepara-
ich Verify
Ons
1
III
8-
Or
n-
ms
1.
1. To reach and keep this goal, international agreements must be
U.N. Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for April, May
le
and June 1962 (DC/C.1/1), pp. 8-9.
2760
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
8
The objective must be to reduce
the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid
levels, and restrict their armaments to types and quantities, necessary
for:
(a) The maintenance of internal security,
b) Fulfillment of obligations of States to maintain peace and
security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
4. Such international agreements must ensure by a comprehensive
and co-ordinated programme both:
(a) The progressive reduction of armed forces and permitted
armaments to fixed maximum levels, radically less than present levels
and balanced throughout the process of reduction, thereby eliminating
mass armies and preventing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to
peace, and
(6) The elimination of all instruments adaptable to mass destruc-
tion.
5. Such international agreements must provide effective safeguards to
ensure that all phases of the disarmament programme are carried out
.
In particular, the elimination of atomic weapons must be accomplished
by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to
ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only.
6. Such international agreements must provide an effective system of
progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed
forces and armaments, including atomic, to achieve the open world in
which alone there can be effective disarmament.
7. NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF ARMED FORCES: Working
Paper Submitted by the Delegations of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France to the United Nations Disarmament
Commission, May 28, 19521
The delegations of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which
sored the resolution of the General Assembly establishing the Dis
armament Commission,2 are today submitting the attached working
proposals for the determination of over-all numerical limitations on all
armed forces.
In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States a
number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic
the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be
taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can
inflexibly be applied in all cases.
1 U.N. Disarmament Commission, Oficial Records, Supplement for April, Maj
and June 1952 (DC/10) pp. 1-5.
2 Supra, doc. 4.
1.
1
spoD-
2
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2761
é VON
:
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all
The proposals suggest that there should be fixed numerical ceilings
for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. A ceiling between
Republics, the United States of America and China, while a ceiling
between 700,000 and 800,000 is suggested for the United Kingdom
and France.
The proposals call for agreed maximum ceilings for all other States
having substantial armed forces to be fixed in relation to the ceilings
agreed upon for the five powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with
a
view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international
peace and security in any area of the world, thus reducing the danger
of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the
population and should be less than current levels, except in very
special circumstances.
The proposals envisage substantial and balanced reductions in
armed forces. Agreement on such reductions should greatly lessen
the likelihood and the fear of successful aggression and should facilitate
agreement on other essential parts of a comprehensive disarmament
programme, including the elimination of all major weapons adaptable
to mass destruction and the effective international control of atomic
energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
PROPOSALS FOR FIXING NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS OF ALL ARMED
FORCES
A. Introduction
1. Paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January
1952:
"Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals
to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all
armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable
to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of
atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and
the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only”.
2. Paragraph 6 of the resolution:
"Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation,
)
6
1
1
armaments:
e
1
g
"(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all
armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;
"(6) To consider methods according to which States can agree
by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Com-
mission concerning the
determination of
the over-all limits
and
restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the alloca-
tion within their respective national military establishments of
the permitted national armed forces and
armaments”.
I
}
2762
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
0
St.
1
SI
01
0
m
to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace
3. The present working paper presents a plan for the determination
of over-all numerical limitations on the size of the armed forces of
States. Obviously some over-all limitations on the size of the armed
forces of States are an essential part of any comprehensive plan for
the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces
and armaments. The working paper is not intended to exclude,
6.
but to facilitate the development of other essential components which
must be included in what the preamble of the General Assembly
resolution refers to as "comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under
international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination
to
of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the
effective control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic fic
weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" includ-
рь
ing "safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all ...
nations
(whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would
ite
endanger the system)”. Proposals have already been submitted on
certain other essential components, i. e., the control of atomic energy
and disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments.
By submitting this working paper and focusing attention on another
component we hope to facilitate progress toward an agreed com-
prehensive programme.
D
B. Standards for determining numerical limitations of all armed forces
7.
4. In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States &
number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic
,
have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of States and
the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be
taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can
inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce
the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a g.
disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security.be
ta
5. The following working formula is suggested as a basis of discussion
(a) There should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France
,
10
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
United States of America which should be worked out with a view of
avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace
11
and security among themselves or with other States and thus rem
ducing the danger of war. It is tentatively suggested that the max-
mum ceilings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
States of America and China should be the same and fixed at, say
,
between 1 million and 1.5 million, and the maximum ceilings for the
1:
United Kingdom and France should be the same and fixed at, say,
between 700,000 and 800,000.
(6) For all other States having substantial armed forces there should
be agreed maximum
ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed it
upon for the five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view
and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger
al
in
re
as
re
ar
P1
co
OI
11
10
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2763
| armaments, such as the control of atomic energy and the system of
cordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control
forces would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved
of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the
population. Moreover, they should be less than current levels except
in very special circumstances.
C. Significance of over-all numerical limitations
6. While a nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed
strength, and other elements of armed strength will have to be con-
sidered in any comprehensive programme for the balanced reduction
of armed forces and armaments, nevertheless a numerical limitation
an armed forces is a major element in any such programme for the
following reasons:
(a) All armaments programmes depend upon manpower and there-
fore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on
permitted armed forces.
6) A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in
itself would tend to reduce the likelihood of successful aggression.
(0) Agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction of armed
forces
, minimizing the likelihood and fear of successful aggression,
should greatly facilitate agreement reducing and restricting the arma-
ments supporting these armed forces.
D. Implementation of proposals for numerical limitations of all armed
forces
1. In determining the numbers in the armed forces, all kinds of
armed forces, including para-military and security forces, must be
& Adequate provision must be made to ensure that the maximum
limitation on armed forces is not circumvented through building up
burge forces of trained reserves or militarily trained police.
9. This system must be accepted by all States, whether or not Mem-
bers of the United Nations, whose military resources are such that their
failure to accept would endanger the system.
10. There should be adequate safeguards throughout the process of
reduction to ensure that limitations are put into effect and observed
as agreed and that violations can be promptly detected.
11. The implementation of the reductions should be closely related
to progress in connexion with other phases of the programme for
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and
progressive and continuing disclosure and verification.
2. The reduction should be carried through in a manner and in ac-
organ and should be completed within the
shortest feasible time after
13. In the future, further numerical limitation of permitted armed
included.
:
its commencement.
2764
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
118
$1
16
ta
bi
U
0:
PI
CO
Oti
M
members of the Commission (DC/8). Committee 1 was authorized
"Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic
3 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 80
toward the easing of international tensions, and the agreed ceilings
would be subject to review at stated intervals.
14. The proposed limitations including their relationship to other
components of the programme for regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of
weapons adaptable to mass destruction--should be comprehended
within the treaty or treaties required under paragraph 3 of General
Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952.
8. FIRST REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT
COMMISSION, MAY 29, 1952 1
1. The General Assembly, by resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January
1952, established the Disarmament Commission. In addition, the
General Assembly, by resolution 504 (VI) of 19 January 1952, re-
ferred to the Commission certain proposals of the USSR, as contained
in paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive, of document A/C.1/698 (DC/2].
2. The Members of the Disarmament Commission for 1952 are:
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Greece, Netherlands, Pakistan
,
Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
3. The Commission has held twelve meetings to date, of which the
first was held in Paris on 4 February 1952, and the subsequent ones
have been held at United Nations Headquarters in New York,
4. At the 2nd meeting of the Commission on 14 March 1952, the
representative
of the United States submitted a "Proposal for a Plan
of work for the Disarmament Commission" (DC/3].
5. At the 3rd meeting of the Commission on 19 March 1952, the
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted
a "Proposal for a plan of work for the Disarmament Commission
[DC/4 and DC/4/Corr.1].
6. At the 7th meeting of the Commission on 26 March 1952, the
representative of France submitted a "Proposed program of work for
the Disarmament Commission” [DC/5). This proposed programme
was adopted by the Commission at its sth meeting on 28 March 1952
7. At the 9th meeting of the Commission on 2 April 1952, at the
suggestion of the Chairman, the representative of Chile, the Commis
sion established two working
committees, each consisting of all the
tion
of all armaments and armed forces". Committee 2 was author
ized to consider paragraph A of the programme of work
, to w
armaments, and of all armed forces".
1 U.N. doc. DC/11.
2 See supra, doc. 4.
07
9.
PE
97
1
g
81
Q1
(A/2119), p. 4.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2765
See supra, doc. 6.
3
obtaining early agreement on these matters among States with
and September 1952 (DC/12), pp. 1-3.
8. At the first meeting of Committee 2, on 5 April 1952, the repre-
sentative of the United States submitted a working paper entitled
"Proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification
of armed forces and armaments" (DC/C.2/1).1
9. At the 3rd meeting of Committee 1 on 24 April 1952, the repre-
gentative of the United States submitted a proposal entitled "Essen-
tial principles for a disarmament programme" (DC/C.1/1].2
10. At the 12th meeting of the Commission on 28 May 1952, the
representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
submitted a "Working paper setting forth proposals for fixing numer-
ical limitations of all armed forces' (DC/10).
11. The Commission decided at its 12th meeting on 28 May 1952
to submit this first report, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolu-
tion 502 (VI), to the Security Council and to the Members of the
United Nations, and to transmit with this report the two resolutions
of the General Assembly referred to above, and the records of the
proceedings of the Commission and its Committees to date.
12. The discussions in the Commission and its two Committees are
continuing and the Commission will, in accordance with paragraph 7
of resolution 502 (VI), submit further reports on its work.
13. The list of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and of the
records of the proceedings of the Commission and its Committees is
annexed hereto.
9. NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF ARMED FORCES: Supple-
mentary Working Paper Submitted by the Delegations of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the United
Nations Disarmament Commission, August 12, 19526
1. It is contemplated that any agreement for the numerical limita-
tion of armed forces would necessarily comprehend:
(a) Provisions to ensure that production of armaments and quan-
tities of armaments bear a direct relation to the amounts needed for
permitted armed forces;
(6) Provisions for composition of permitted armed forces and
urmaments in order to prevent undue concentration of total permitted
armed forces in a manner which might
prejudice a balanced reduction;
(0) Procedures in conformity with the directive contained in para-
taph 6 (b) of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January
1952, for the negotiation within over-all limitations of mutually
agreed
programmes of armed forces and armaments with a view to
UN. Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for July, August
substantial military resources.
See supra, doc. 5.
7
See supra, doc. 7.
Not reprinted here.
!
Supra, doc. 4.
2766
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
0
IF
an
CE
d
ti
ta
SE
Ci
ALE
Procedures should be worked out to facilitate the development
,
under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission, of mutually
agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments to be compre-
hended within the treaty or treaties referred to in General Assembly
resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952.
2. One possible procedure, advanced for the purpose of initiating
discussions, might be:
(a) Upon acceptance of the proposals set forth in Working Paper
DC/10 1 with respect to fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces,
arrangements might be made for a conference between China, France
,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and the United
States of America with a view to reaching tentative agreement among
themselves, by negotiation, on:
(1) The distribution by principal categories of the armed forces
that they would consider necessary and appropriate to main-
tain within the agreed numerical ceilings proposed for their
armed forces;
(2) The types and quantities of armaments which they would
consider necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed
forces within the proposed numerical ceilings;
(3) The elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than
those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision
will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable
to mass destruction, and for the effective international control
of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons
and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
The distribution of armed forces within stated categories and the
types and volumes of armaments would not necessarily be identic
,
even for States with substantially equal aggregate military strength
,
inasmuch as their needs and responsibilities may be different. The
objective of the agreements would be to reduce the possibility and
fear of aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous
to international peace and security. Such agreements would neces-
sarily be tentative, as they would have to be reviewed in the light of
further tentative agreements to be reached, as indicated in the follow-
ing paragraph.
(6) When tentative agreement is attained at the conference referred
to in paragraph 2 (a), regional conferences might be held, to be
attended by all governments and authorities having substantia
military forces in the respective regions, for the purpose of reaching
similar tentative agreement on:
(1) The over-all numerical ceilings for the armed forces of all such
governments and authorities, as proposed in paragraph 5 (b) of
(2) The distribution of the permitted armed forces within stated
categories,
!
ta
01
T
PI
P
ak
1
8
8
1 Supra, doc. 7.
0
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2767
and September 1952 (DC/15), pp. 3-4.
| balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments should provide
tion, including bacterial, and for the effective international control of
2. Bearing in mind that all Members of the United Nations have
LU.N. Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for July; August
(3) The type and volume of armaments necessary and appropriate
to support the permitted armed forces, and
(4) The elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than
those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision
will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable
to mass destruction, and for the effective international control
of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons
and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
(c) Thereafter a draft treaty might be worked out, as contemplated
in operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI)
of 11 January 1952, comprehending and bringing into a balanced
relationship all essential components of the programme.
3. The timing and co-ordination of the reductions, prohibitions
and eliminations should ensure the balanced reduction of over-all
armed strength and should avoid creating or continuing any dis-
equilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security
during the period that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations
are being put into effect. In particular, the initial limitations or reduc-
tions in armed forces and permitted armaments and the initial steps
toward elimination of prohibited armaments should commence at the
same time. Subsequent limitations and reductions should be syn-
chronized with subsequent progress in elimination of prohibited
amaments. An international control authority should be established
at the commencement of the programme and it should be in a position
to assume progressively its functions in order to ensure the carrying
out of such limitations, reductions, curtailments and prohibitions.
Thus, when the limitations and reductions in armed forces and per-
mitted armaments provided by the treaty or treaties are completed,
production of prohibited armaments will have ceased, existing stock-
piles of prohibited armaments and facilities for their production will
have been disposed of, atomic energy will be utilized for peaceful
purposes only, and the international control authority will have
assumed its full functions.
10. ELIMINATION OF BACTERIAL WEAPONS: Working Paper
Submitted by the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Disarmament Commission, September 4, 1952 1
1. A comprehensive programme for the regulation, limitation and
for peaceful
purposes only.
agreed to refrain not only from the use of germ warfare but from the
use of atomic
2768
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
of
01
19
;
a1
use of force of any kind contrary to the law of the Charter, the pro-
gramme envisaged in paragraph 1 must be approached from the point
of view of preventing war and not from the point of view of regulating
the armaments used in war or of codifying the laws of war. The
proof
gramme as a whole should ensure that armed forces and armaments are
reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that:
(a) No State will be in a position of armed preparedness to start
a war
(6) No State shall be in a position to undertake preparations for war
without other States having knowledge of such preparations long
before the offending State could start a war.
3. Safeguards must be devised to ensure the elimination of bacterial
weapons and facilities and appliances for their production and use
along with the elimination of all armed forces and armaments not
expressly permitted to States to maintain public order and to meet
their Charter responsibilities. The principal safeguards to ensure the
elimination of bacterial weapons are to be found in an effective and
continuous system of disclosure and verification of all armed forces
and armaments such as that suggested in the working paper sub-
mitted by the representative of the United States on 5 April 1952,
th
entitled "Proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and
verification of armed forces and armaments" (DC/C.2/1). It is
proposed that, at appropriate stages in an effective system of dis-
closure and verification," agreed measures should become effective
providing for the progressive curtailment of production, the progres-
1.
sive dismantling of plants and the progressive destruction of stockpiles
of bacterial weapons and related appliances. Under this programme
with co-operation in good faith by the principal States concerned, all
bacterial weapons and all facilities and appliances connected therewith
should be completely eliminated from national armaments and their
use prohibited.
PA
el
11. REGULATION, LIMITATION, AND BALANCED REDUC-
TION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS:
Resolution 704 (VII) of the United Nations General Assembly,
April 8, 1953
el
ti
)
81
2
bu
t
I E
The General Assembly,
Recognizing that:
Under the Charter of the United Nations all States are bound to
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international
peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered
,
and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
D
I
1 See .
2 U.N. General Assembly, Oficial Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20A
(A/2361/Add. 1), p. 3.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2769
of peace,
Energy Commission, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
Deputy V. S. Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission,
United States Efforts Toward Disarmament: Report to the President by the
January 12, 1953 (Department of State publication 4902; 1953). Letter of trang-
mittal not reprinted here.
See supra, docs. 5, 6, and 10.
of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
d the United Nations,
The aim of a system of world-wide disarmament is to prevent war
and release the world's human and economic resources for the purposes
1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission; 1
2. Reaffirms General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January
1952 ? and requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its
work for the development by the United Nations of comprehensive
end co-ordinated plans providing for:
(8) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed
forces and armaments;
(b) The elimination and prohibition of all major weapons, including
bacteriological, adaptable to mass destruction;
(c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure
the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes only;
The whole programme to be carried out under effective international
control in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that
its security was endangered;
3. Requests the Commission to report to the General Assembly
and the Security Council no later than 1 September 1953, and hopes
that all the members of the Commission will co-operate in efforts to
produce constructive proposals likely to facilitate its task.
12. UNITED STATES EFFORTS TOWARD DISARMAMENT:
Report to the President by the Depaty United States Representa-
tive on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, January 12,
In view of your deep and active interest in the development of an
effective and comprehensive disarmament program I have thought it
would be appropriate for me at this time to make a report to you on the
work of the U.N. Disarmament Commission and in particular on the
eforts of the United States in close
cooperation with other
members of
the Commission to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly in
accordance with the spirit and the principles of the Charter.
behalf of the United States in the Commissions are the product of the
joint efforts of the State and Defense Departments, the Atomic
The Second Report of the Disarmament Commission, Oct. 9, 1952 (U.N. doc.
71
1953 4
DC/20).
? Supra, doc. 4.
Benjamin V. Cohen.
415900_-57-Pol. 2
2770
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the
nat
nat
The tripartite proposals submitted on behalf of the United States
,
France, and the United Kingdom represent the joint efforts of all
three Governments. The cooperation achieved within our Govern-
ment and with friendly governments on the Commission has made it
possible for us to supply the ideas and materials with which an effective
and comprehensive disarmament program may in the future be
wrought.
OUR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE CHARTER
teg
inci
It may seem paradoxical to many that we should discuss disarmament I
in the United Nations in 1952, when the nations of the world are
increasing their armaments at an accelerated pace.
not
But the United States has made it clear in the discussions of dis-ider
armament in the United Nations that the burden of armaments has
been thrust upon us and is not of our choosing. We have learned
that in an armed world we cannot safely rely on unarmed goodwill."
But we have made it clear that we would infinitely prefer a world
order in which the energies and resources now diverted to armaments the
could be used to advance human dignity and well-being.
On November 7, 1951, in an address explaining the proposals of
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France for the establish-sat
ment of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, you, Mr. President, seti
stated:
“We are determined to win real peace-peace based on freedom
and justice. We will do it the hard
way if we must-by going forward
, of
as we are doing now, to make the free world so strong that no would-be
aggressor will dare to break the peace. But we will never give up of
trying for another way to peace—the way of reducing the armaments
that make aggression possible.” 2
Five months later, on April 2, 1952, General Eisenhower, then
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, in his first report to the
NATO countries declared:
“Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such
military, economic and moral strength as the Communist world
the
would never dare to challenge. When that point is reached, the Iron
Curtain rulers may finally
be willing to participate seriously in dis-
armament negotiations. Then we may see fulfilled
the universal
bu
hope expressed in the United Nations Charter to reduce the diversion
for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.
Our position is clear and unequivocal. Until all nations cooperate
in good faith in putting into effect a balanced reduction in armede
forces and armaments, we must build up and maintain the armed de
strength of the free world to guard and preserve the peace. But we
he
have shown that we are ready, willing, and eager to work out a com
prehensive disarmament program to reduce the danger of war and
pro
IN
not
1
SUC
cen
VAL
of
nie
8
C
do
De
1 See supra, docs. 7 and 9.
2 See Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 19, 1951, pp. 799–803.
3 See ibid., Apr. 14, 1952, pp. 572-579.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2771
j expressly permitted should be eliminated under effective international
t
or group
5
ance that such weapons will not be available for use.
therefore urged in the United Nations that efforts be directed toward
1 | comprehensive disarmament program which will insure that nations
ments in types or in volume beyond those required for self-defense
and to meet their Charter responsibilities. Forces and weapons not
the fear of aggression. That is the duty of all member states under
the Charter of the United Nations.
Under the Charter, all members have agreed to settle their inter-
national disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that inter-
sational peace and security and justice are not endangered. Under
the Charter all members have agreed to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
The maintenance of large armaments undermines confidence in
the fulfillment of the solemn Charter obligations of member states
not to use force or the threat of force as an instrument of national or
ideological policy.
But the use of force or the threat of force in international relations
annot be eliminated by unilateral disarmament by any one state
of states. All states must cooperate.
Åll members of the United Nations have a responsibility to see
that force is used only in self-defense and in the service of the Charter
and not as an instrument of national or ideological policy.
Disarmament must be viewed as a means of carrying out the obli-
gations under the Charter not to use force or the threat of force for
settling disputes among nations. The objective of a disarmament
rogram must be to prevent war, not to regulate the armaments used
in war. We have tried to make clear that the United States does
not accept war as inevitable; that the job is to reduce the likelihood
of war by insuring that no nation possesses the means to commit a
secessfui act of armed aggression. The aim is to reduce the likelihood
(war by reducing the possibility of war and armed aggression.
In its efforts towards disarmament, the United States has con-
centrated single-mindedly on the root problem, the prevention of
war itself. When men fight to kill it is hard to regulate the manner
killing. True humanitarianism as well as realism supports the
view that the only practical way to eliminate the horror of war is
That of course does not mean that we are uninterested in examining
the rules for the conduct of war or in finding better ways to protect
trilians and prisoners should war occur. But in developing a dis-
! imament program we must strive not to codify the rules of warfare
but to reduce the possibility of war.
Responsible statesmen cannot rely upon paper promises which
provide no assurances of their observance. We cannot make genuine
rogress toward disarmament by piecemeal attempts to forbid the
1 of individual weapons without safeguards designed to give assur-
We have
manot retain in their military establishment armed forces and arma-
1
-
S
to elimin:ate war itself.
2772
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
DO
ud
DIE
ME
me
FOR
in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and good will, agreement on the
1 See statement of June 14, 1946, by the U.S. Representative before the U.X
Atomic Energy Commission; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1079–1087
2 See U.N. General Assembly Res. 191 (III) of Nov. 4, 1948; ibid., pp. 1122-1123
safeguards sufficient to remove the possibility and fear of prohibited a
forces or armaments being available for use.
The most solemn promise in the history of international relation-
ships is that contained in the Charter against the threat or use of force Ng
of any kind in any way in international relations contrary to the pur
poses of the Charter. A disarmament program should provide the
safeguards necessary to assure that no state will be in a position to 1
break this solemn promise. No lesser promise can be relied upon il ne
that most solemn promise is broken. A state which would flout the
Charter to make war cannot be relied upon to honor any lesser promise pro
as to how it will wage war.
LUE
This is the framework within which we have undertaken in the
Disarmament Commission our Charter responsibility "for formulat-
ing . . . plans ... for the establishment of a system for the regula-
tion of armaments.'
EARLY EFFORTS TOWARD DISARMAMENT
At the time the Charter was adopted, Nazi and Japanese aggression
had been crushed. We looked forward to a peaceful world. We so
the
sought to cooperate to relieve the peoples of the world of the fear of
war and the burden of armaments.
of ti
Relying on the good faith of the Soviet Union and its promises to
fulfill its Charter and treaty obligations, we demobilized our
the
armed
forces.
lor
We did even more. Less than a year after the momentous dis pas
covery by the United States of the war potential of the atom, we pro-
of
posed that the United Nations undertake to develop an effective plan
for the international control of atomic energy which would insure it is
use for peaceful purposes only. Within the same year the United me
States presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commissionele
the basic principles of a constructive plan for the effective international
control of this new force which would make possible and encourage in
use by all nations for peaceful purposes. These principles with
minor modifications were accepted as a working basis by the Genera A
Assembiy of the United Nations in the fall of 1946, and a plan based on in
these principles received the overwhelming endorsement of the Assen
bly in 1948. The plan may not be perfect. Possibly it can be in
proved upon. But we can be very proud of the part we have played for
in working out the U.N. plan for the control of atomic energy
are confident this plan could do the job of controlling effectively to
atomic weapon and other related weapons as well, since its conter:
plated procedures actually encompass the entire field of atomic energet
In 1946, when we first suggested the basic principles of the plan
,
we had hoped that if general agreement could first be reached on
plan for the effective international control of this new force of atome F
energy, with its tremendous possibilities for good or for evil, the
GO
WRI
200
the
stre
al
901
181
1
1
1
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2773
Governments. The resolutions established a Disarmament Com-
Res. 502 (VI); supra, doc. 4.
lon
mission with a broad mandate to develop comprehensive and
Tel the way for fresh efforts to reach realistic agreements, the proposals
-be stressed the fact that a genuine system for disarmament must include
are compliance by all nations,
Assembly passed a resolution 3 based on the proposals of the three
See supra, docs. 1 and 2.
See supra, pp. 345-350.
ther essential parts of a comprehensive disarmament program would
Ht be difficult of accomplishment. That was the reason why we
AD - thought in the early days of the disarmament discussions in the United
ce | Nations it would be better not to merge the discussions of conventional
IT maments with the discussions of atomic-energy control.
he In the Commission for Conventional Armaments the United States,
to France, and the United Kingdom placed great stress on the develop-
if ment of a system for the disclosure and verification of armed forces
he ud armaments. We believed then, as we believe now, that such
ise procedures generate mutual confidence necessary for any program of
maranteed disarmament. If disarmament is to be considered seri-
he jusly and not merely as an instrument of propaganda, statesmen
Besponsible for the peace and security of their countries cannot rely
18-
m paper promises to disarm, but must have assured means of know-
ing that promises made are kept.
Unfortunately our hope that progress in the field of atomic energy
old stimulate progress in the field of conventional arms proved
ufounded. Progress was stalled at a dead center in both commis-
We sons. In the Atomic Energy Commission the Soviet Union rejected
of de control features of the plan which had been developed on the basis
the U.S. proposals and itself presented no acceptable alternative.
tou the Conventional Armaments Commission the Soviet Union rejected
red he proposals for a system for the disclosure and verification of armed
forces and armaments because it did not include atomic armaments.
lis
. In an effort to break this deadlock, at the fifth session of the General
possembly you, Mr. President, suggested a new approach to the task
Jan of disarmament by merging the work of the Atomic Energy Com-
its mission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.?
te mall
, our hope was that the valuable preliminary work done in both
elds could be preserved and that the new framework might be helpful
mall a meeting the objections of the Soviet Union.
its
ith DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 11, 1952
19
At the sixth session of the General Assembly, the United Kingdom,
france
, and the United States joined in proposals to set up a new
ed
wordinated plans for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduc-
on of all armed forces and armaments including atomic. To pave
stions whose military resources are such that their failure to accept
endanger the system, and must include safeguards which will
in overwhelming vote on January 11, 1952, the sixth General
100
-D1
70.
&
7 By
- * '
21)
---
2774
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the outset because of the insistence of the Soviet Union that we could !
ma
sig
Ito
imi
AN
Jec-
red
of the Soviet Union. It might be illuminating to review the principal
and agree on objectives and principles which we believed should
We were influenced to present these principles and objectives si
mission, composed of the members of the Security Council plus
Canada, and directed the Commission to prepare draft proposals to
80
be embodied in a treaty or treaties for submission to a conference of
all states, concerning
Regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces
and all armaments;
Elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;
Effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohi
bition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for
peace-
ful purposes only, with the present U.N. plan being used as the
basis for the Commission's considerations until a better or no less
effective plan is devised;
Progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed
forces and all armaments, including atomic, the implementation
of such a scheme being recognized as a first and indispensable step
in carrying out the disarmament program;
the
Methods for fixing over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces
and armaments, and for determining the allocation within their
respective military establishments of the permitted national armed
forces and armaments;
The establishment of an international control organ (or organs) to
insure the implementation of the treaty or treaties; and
An adequate system of safeguards to insure observance of the disa pre
armament program.
THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
pic
tec.
As a member of the Disarmament Commission, the United States
has put forward every effort to carry out the mandate of the General
Assembly. The United States, individually and in collaboration
with France and the United Kingdom, has placed before the Dis-
armament Commission working papers and proposals which w
believe provide a working basis and broad outline for a practical and
comprehensive disarmament program. In the development and
consideration of these proposals we had constructive assistance and
cooperation from all members of the Commission with the exception
suggestions we made in the Disarmament Commission.
Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program
On April 24, 1952, the United States introduced a paper setting
forth what we considered "Essential Principles for a Disarmament
Program”i (DC/20, pp. 83-84). It represented an attempt to clarify
comprehensive disarmament program.
QIS
gra
TAS
the
Un
Dis
the
1 See supra, doc. 6.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2775
IS
0
of
ES
e
ES
1)
es
Wted States submitted its paper on "Essential Principles for a
condition of armed preparedness to start a war, and
make no progress until we took certain decisions on principles. The
Soviet representatives had argued in the Commission, as they have
upued in past General Assemblies, that the United States was opposed
w any general reduction in armed forces and armaments because the
United States was unwilling to accept the Soviet proposals that
immediate decisions should be taken to reduce by one-third the
umed strength of the great powers and to prohibit the use of atomic
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
The record is clear that the United States is dedicated to the goal
significantly reducing armaments and effectively eliminating
stomic weapons from the world's arsenals. The United States re-
jected the Soviet proposals for the same reasons which caused the
d General Assembly repeatedly to reject them, because they are not
antrived to achieve a balanced reduction in armed strength or to
-P provide safeguards which would insure their observance. In fact,
they would clearly result in a dangerous imbalance of strength in
favor of the Soviet Union and other states having mass armed forces.
Te
were confident that our statement of principles would clearly
d demonstrate that the United States actively favors a truly balanced
reduction in over-all armed strength, which would include the elimi-
TO Istion of mass armed forces as well as all weapons of mass destruction.
What we are opposed to is paper agreements or paper decisions
which
s provide no tangible safeguards or assurances of their observance.
Responsible nations cannot morally or legally bind themselves to
disarm on the basis of a decision in principle on the basis of paper
promises and without adequate and unequivocal safeguards to pro-
tect them from the hazards of violations and evasions. But if there
could be agreement in advance on the objectives and principles which
govern a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament pro-
rap, such agreement should greatly simplify the main and primary
agreeing on specific and practical measures for arms reductions
ld
and eliminations, and concrete and workable safeguards to carry out
id
these principles and objectives.
d With this hope of facilitating the work of the Commission, the
For the most part these principles, summarized below, derive from
the Charter
and the resolutions of the General Assembly.
11. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate the armaments to
be used in war, but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions and
lears created by armaments and by making war inherently, as it is
constitutionally under the Charter,
impossible as a means of settling
2. To achieve this goal, all states must cooperate to establish an
open and substantially disarmed world
(a) in which armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such
e point and in such a thorough fashion that no state will be in a
es
al
should
un
S-
task of
Il
ID
al
Disarmament Program.”
1g
16
disputes between nations.
8
at
M
2776
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
6. The safeguards provided in these international agreements
must include an effective system of progressive and continuing ,
disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments
(b) in which no state will be in a position to undertake prepara-
tions for war without other states having knowledge of such
preparations long before an offending state could start a war.
This principle of an open and substantially disarmed world stems
from the fourth freedom, freedom from fear, which President Roose-
velt proclaimed in 1941. It was President Roosevelt himself who
translated freedom from fear in world terms to mean "a world-wide
reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion
that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical
aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world."
If we want a disarmed world, we must insist that all states refrain
from the use of force or the threat of force as an instrument of na-
tional or ideological policy. An effective disarmament program must
be conceived with a determination to strengthen the peace and reduce
the possibility of war, not as a haggling process to determine the
kinds of arms which may be used in the next war or to gain a strategic
advantage at the start of the next war or to reduce the costs of pre-
paring for war. If we want to make progress towards disarmament
,
states must come to rely for their strength, as for their welfare, not
on the number of battalions or weapons they have ready to unleash
on a moment's notice, but on the health, happiness, and economic
efficiency of their people in peacetime.
The other four principles which we enumerated in our paper refer
to the nature of the international agreements necessary to progress
toward the disarmament goals mentioned in our first two principles
.
3. These international agreements must bind all states to reduce
their armed forces to levels and restrict their armaments to types
and quantities no more or greater than may be necessary for the
maintenance of internal order and the fulfillment of their obliga-
tions to maintain peace and security in accordance with the Charter
.
4. These international agreements must provide a comprehensive
and coordinate disarmament program, balanced throughout the
process of reduction so as to avoid any disequilibrium of power
dangerous to the peace and envisaging the progressive and colla
current elimination of mass armed forces and all instruments
adaptable to mass destruction, including
atomic and
bacteriological
5. These international agreements must provide effective safe-
guards to insure that all phases of the disarmament program are
carried out. In particular, the elimination of atomic weapons
control of atomic energy to insure that atomic energy is used for
peaceful purposes only.
1
1
}
+
.
including atomic, to achieve the open world in which alone there
can be effective disarmament.
1 Message to Congress of Jan. 6, 1941; A Decade of American Foreign Policy
.
p. 1.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2777
1
0
e
D
,
e
C
I
to provide that the information disclosed in the atomic field at suc-
disclosed in the nonatomic field.
We not only outlined the principles and objectives of a compre-
hensive disarmament program. We submitted a number of working
papers making concrete suggestions as to how they could be carried
out in practice.
s System of Disclosure and Verification of All Armed Forces and
Armaments
The General Assembly resolution had directed the Disarmament
Commission to consider from the outset plans for progressive dis-
1 closure and verification, the implementation of which was recognized
as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament
program envisaged by the resolution. In order to assist the Com-
mission in complying with this directive, the United States sub-
mitted to the Commission on April 5, 1952, a working paper contain-
ing "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Veri-
fication of Armed Forces and Armaments'' (DC/20, pp. 30–42).
A system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification
is
, as the General Assembly has declared, an essential part of any
plan for "guaranteed disarmament.” Such a system is necessary to
t provide the basis for effective safeguards and realistic controls to
insure that agreed disarmament becomes actual disarmament.
C The system of disclosure and verification suggested in the U. S.
working paper is continuing, progressive, and complete, and would,
r under competent international control, provide advance warning
s against violations. The system covers all armed forces and all arma-
iments, including atomic from the very start.
We suggested that disclosure and verification should be carried out
s progressively, step by step. We suggested the system should proceed
py stages not because we wanted to proceed at a snail's pace but
because we know that in the present state of world tension no state
would tear the veil
of secrecy from its most carefully guarded security
arrangements unless it could be satisfied that all states are proceeding
with the same good faith and the same understanding and at the same
pace. The concept of stages is introduced not to delay and obstruct,
but to facilitate and expedite progress and to establish confidence.
Our paper suggested five stages in all
, each stage to follow when
the previous stage has been satisfactorily completed. This concept
of stages was intended to protect all states in the event of a serious
violation or collapse of the program by providing a check on the good
,
believe, should proceed from the less secret to the more secret infor-
mation, both to prevent premature disclosure of more secret informa-
tion until substantial cooperation and good faith had been demon-
strated through the working of the previous stage, and also because
the less secret information
can be more readily verified. We sought
cessive stages should be approximately parallel to the information
A
e
.-----...-------
See supra, doc. 5.
2778
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
We have tried to make the first step in both fields a meaningful
stride toward the goal of confidence. The first stage would disclose
in breadth, although not in depth, the general contours of the military
establishments of all nations. And the first stage includes so much
information of a quantitative nature that the disclosures in the atomic
field, for example, would give a clear indication of existing atomic
strength-our own and that of other countries. That first stage calls
for a verified report on the existing strength of all armed forces as
well as on the location of installations and facilities required for the
production of armaments of all types, including atomic. The success-
ful completion of this first stage would do more to inspire international
confidence and reduce tensions than any amount of words could ever
accomplish.
The second stage would provide detailed information on the organ-
ization of armed forces and on the installations and facilities supplying
the basic materials required to produce all armaments, including
atomic. The third stage would give detailed information on arma-
ments (except novel armaments which were not in general use by the
end of World War II but are in volume production today), as well
as detailed disclosure of kinds and amounts of fissionable material,
and full data on the operation of installations and facilities which
produce armaments and fissionable material. The fourth stage would
give information in detail concerning the installations and facilities
used to produce novel armaments, including atomic weapons. And
the fifth stage would provide detailed disclosure of the novel arma-
ments themselves and of atomic weapons.
The Soviet representative in the Disarmament Commission refused
to give serious attention to our working paper on disclosure and verif-
cation and at the same time failed to submit any alternative proposals
of his own to carry out the directions of the General Assembly that
plans for disclosure and verification be considered from the outset
The Soviet representative characterized our effort to develop a work-
able system of disclosure and verification as a gigantic intelligence
and espionage operation bearing no relation to disarmament. It is
true, of course, that states have become so accustomed to living in
the dark that they have become suspicious of the light. But it i
truly impossible to see how, in our imperfect world, we can make rea
progress toward disarmament so long as the Soviet Union is unwilling
even to consider means of moving toward agreement on a workable, com-
tinuing, progressive process of disclosure and verification. Respor-
sible governments cannot be expected to agree to cut down their ow
defenses unless through an effective disclosure and verification process
they are reliably informed
as to where such cuts will in fact leave them
in relation to the armed forces of other countries.
The Soviet representative on the Commission also criticized ou
proposals on the ground that the atomic disclosures were relegated to
à remote and indefinite stage. Actually there is a
amount of atomic disclosure in the very first stage. But the Sopriet
representative seemed more concerned to find reasons for rejectir
our proposals than to open up any avenues for possible agreement
.
considerable
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2779
1 See supra, doc. 7.
2
3
3
ET
g
1
le
Les
facilitate efforts to agree on reducing and restricting the quantities
w and types of permitted armaments.
piet United Kingdom, and France. As a basis for discussion, it proposed
We recognized that there might be differences as to the stages and
the speed with which the program passes from one stage to another.
We contemplated that as soon as one stage was finished the next
would begin. We believed that with genuine cooperation on the part
of all states, all the stages could be completed within 2 years. The
purpose of providing stages was to facilitate the process by creating
confidence. In order that there be mutual confidence, there must be
disclosure by degrees so that all nations are free of the fear that one
nation is getting more knowledge than another or that the process is
1
in any way inequitable.
We tried, in submitting the plan, to make clear that it was a working
paper, that we were open to suggestion, and that we wanted to find
out what sort of safeguards we could collectively devise. We tried
to make it clear that the proposed system of disclosure and verification
was not intended to exclude or delay reductions in armed forces and
armaments or eliminations of weapons adaptable to mass destruction,
but on the contrary was intended to provide the necessary ground
work for such reductions and eliminations.
21,
Ceilings on All Armed Forces
ch
id
On May 28, 1952, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France submitted to the Disarmament Commission proposals suggest-
ing the fixing of numerical limits on all armed forces of all states
8 (DC/20, pp. 125–130).
The tripartite working paper of May 28 made clear that we are pre-
edpared to grapple earnestly and sincerely not only with the problems of
if- safeguards but with substantive measures to secure drastic and
als balanced reductions in armed strength.
The tripartite working paper of May 28 dealt with one of the
et essential parts, in some ways the most important part, of a compre-
* hensive disarmament program: the manpower strength of the armed
108 forces
A nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed
in strength. Other elements must be dealt with in any comprehensive
i disarmament program. But aggressors are not likely to go to war
ed without the armed forces necessary to insure the successful accom-
10 plishment of their aggressive purposes. All armaments depend upon
om manpower, and their effectiveness in varying degrees is affected by
on the armed forces available to use them. A substantial and balanced
wa reduction of armed forces should greatly lessen the likelihood and fear
es of war. If even tentative agreement could be reached on the ceilings
em to the placed on permitted armed forces, we felt that would greatly
i to
be the armed forces of the United States, the U.S.S.R., China, the
in equal maximum ceilings of between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 for the
1
18-
lat
IS
1
2780
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950–1955
9
OF
re
00
D
an
ap
that they did not deal with the distribution of the permitted armed
United States, the U.S.S.R., and China, and equal maximum ceilings
of between 700,000 and 800,000 for the United Kingdom and France.
The reductions proposed were substantial and balanced. They
sought to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international
peace in the relations of the great powers among themselves or with th
other states, and thus to reduce the danger of war. The reductions
for the United States and, we assumed, for the U.S.S.R. and China
would be well over 50 percent. We felt if that could be secured there
would be less likelihood of any powerful country being in a position
where others would fear its readiness for war or its capability for a
surprise attack.
The tripartite working paper also suggested that there should
be agreed maximum ceilings for all other states having substantial
armed forces which should be fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed th
upon for the Five Powers. The ceilings would be fixed in these
PE
cases also with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous
to international peace and security in any area of the world, and thus of
reducing the danger of war. We contemplated that the ceiling to
would normally be less than 1 percent of the population and would
normally be less than the current levels. But we recognized that
pre
there would be special cases requiring different treatment and that
there is no one automatic formula which can be rigidly applied in all
cases. The basic objective must be the avoidance of any imbalance
of power dangerous to the peace.
lim
Many of the present difficulties both in Europe and in Asia springpall
from an imbalance of armed strength which causes some nations
to feel that they live only by leave or grace of their more powerful
and none too friendly neighbors. If a balanced reduction of arms is
to reduce both the fear and danger of aggression it must take into
account the balance of armed strength of the most powerful states
not only in relation to one another but also in relation to their The
neighbors.
The numerical limitations proposed were flexible and were not
intended to be final or exhaustive. They were offered not as fixed
limitations but as tentative standards to serve as a basis for discussion
and negotiation.
These proposals stressed one of our fundamental objectives in the
disarmament field. We would eliminate as far as possible the danger
of resort to war by reducing the practicability of successful aggression
.
Genuine enforcement of agreed levels of armaments would prevent
excessive concentrations of military power which endanger peace
and security.
We believed our proposals to be eminently fair and deserving
study. It was a great disappointment to us that the Soviet repre-
sentative in the Disarmament Commission gave them scant considera
tion and denounced them as cynical and hypocritical. The Soviet
representative also criticized
and misrepresented them on the ground
agr
000
neg
mig
per.
ten
8
Thi
Thi
e
a
8
11
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regi
and
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Gre
sim
1:
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2781
1 See supra, doc. 9.
}
1
r
1
1
|
]
regional conferences might be held attended by all governments
and authorities having substantial military forces in the respective
= Great Powers, the regional conference would endeavor to reach
regions. In light of the tentative agreement reached by the Five
similar tentative agreement on the above-mentioned subjects, in-
armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. He
ignored the fact that our working paper and our statements in the
Commission made clear that our paper was intended to deal with
only one aspect of a comprehensive disarmament program and that
the other essential components which he mentioned were to be dealt
with before we concluded our work, But unfortunately the Soviet
representative again showed more concern to find reasons for rejecting
our proposals than to find possible avenues toward agreement.
Distribution of Armed Forces and Limitations on Types and Quantities
of Armaments
On August 12, 1952, the United States again joined with France
and the United Kingdom in submitting a tripartite supplement to
the tripartite working paper on ceilings for the armed forces 1 (DC/20,
pp. 162-164).
In this supplement we proposed to prevent undue concentration
of the permitted armed forces in particular categories of service and
to limit armaments in types and quantities to those necessary and
appropriate to support permitted armed forces. We suggested
practical procedures to facilitate the development of mutually
agreed programs to accomplish these purposes and to bring all essential
1
components of these programs into balanced relationship.
Pe specifically suggested that if our proposals for fixing numerical
limitations on all armed forces were accepted and the powers princi-
pally concerned were prepared to undertake in good faith serious
negotiations looking towards their implementation, arrangements
1
might be made for a conference of the Five Great Powers which are
permanent members of the Security Council with a view to reaching
tentative agreement among themselves by negotiation on-
The distribution by principal categories of the armed forces that they
would consider necessary and appropriate to maintain within the
agreed ceilings proposed for their armed forces;
The types and quantities of armaments which they would consider
necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces
within the proposed numerical ceilings;
The eliinination of all armed forces and armaments other than those
expressly permitted, it being understood that all major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction should be eliminated and atomic
energy should be placed under effective international control to
insure its use for peaceful purposes only.
We further proposed that following a Five Power conference,
e
S
D
1
at
il
-
er
I.
11
2.8
of
2782
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Inte
Com
wit
Unfortunately, the Soviet representative on the Disarmament
cluding agreement on the over-all numerical ceilings for the armed
forces of all governments and authorities in the region.
We proposed that all these agreements should be incorporated in a T
draft treaty comprehending and bringing into balanced relationship effe
all essential components of the disarmament program.
In our paper we recognized that the needs and responsibilities of T
states are different. Considerable flexibility in negotiation would be for
necessary to obtain concrete and satisfactory results. The important ther
thing is to obtain the greatest practicable reduction in armed forces 8PPD
and armaments in order to reduce the danger and fear of war, bearing sbou
in mind the necessity of avoiding throughout the process of reduction
and
any serious imbalance or disequilibrium of power dangerous to inter!!
national peace and security in any part of the world.
and
In order to clarify the concept of balanced relationship between
thro
the essential components of a comprehensive disarmament program,
T
the tripartite supplement suggested that the timing and coordination Cone
delit
of the reductions, prohibitions, and eliminations should insure that
there would be balanced reductions of over-all armed strength at all
Gent
stages throughout the disarmament process until the agreed limits are prop
reached. In particular, the initial limitations or reductions in armed
T
forces and in permitted armaments should commence at the same time
as the first steps toward the elimination of prohibited armaments
,
with synchronization throughout the process. The elimination of
prohibited armaments would cover the elimination of all major
weapons adaptable to mass destruction, whatever their nature, in
cluding the elimination of atomic weapons as the result of an effective with
system of international control of atomic energy. In order to oversee
the job, the tripartite supplement proposed that an international
control authority should be established at the commencement of the prog
program, assuming progressively its functions to insure the carrying
out of these limitations, reductions, curtailments, and prohibitions
This concept of synchronization throughout the disarmament For?
process is necessarily stated in general terms, for the details depend our
upon working out the specific reduction process in each field. Of jede
course the United States, France, and the United Kingdom do not seeks for
to gain any advantage, imagined or real, which might give the pre-
ponderance of military power to the West at the expense of other inspi
1
powers.
The synchronization of the disarmament process must be designed prop
to further the concept of balanced reduction which avoids a disequi-
librium of power. It applies to atomic weapons, to artillery, to
bacteriological weapons, to mass armies.
In this context, as throughout the entire program, effective and as a
balanced disarmament must be viewed as a means of reducing the
danger and fear of war, not as a bargaining process to obtain strategic
advantages in event of war.
ener
the
The
prest
W
arm
The
EXTEI
the i
that
Dise
IF
(AL
missi
28
with the
1123
Commission refused to accept the tripartite working paper
supplement, even as a basis of discussion.
TA WA
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2783
Disarmament Commission the Soviet Union has refused to explain
(A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1107–1110) and Part II of the Com-
mission's Second Report (ibid., pp. 1111-1118).
See supra, doc. 4.
International Control of Atomic Energy
The United States has always considered that a system for the
effective international control of atomic energy is an indispensable
component of any disarmament program.
The United States took a leading part in developing the U.N. plan
for the control of atomic energy.
That plan was the product of
thorough study in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. It was
approved by an overwhelming vote in the General Assembly. It
should be reiterated that the U.N. plan would provide for elimination
and prohibition, through effective international control procedures of
all the various types of weapons based on the release of atomic energy,
and the plan's references to control of atomic energy should be read
throughout in that light.
The General Assembly at its last session directed the Disarmament
Commission to use the U.N. plan as the basis of the Commission's
deliberations until a better or no less effective plan is devised. The
General Assembly further directed the Commission to consider any
proposals regarding atomic-energy control which might be submitted
to it.3
The United States has continued to support the U.N. atomic-
energy plan as the best plan presently available. But we made it
dear in the Disarmament Commission that in no sense do we regard
the plan as immutable and incapable of change and improvement.
The United States reaffirmed its willingness to examine seriously and
with an open mind any proposals for atomic control which might
be
presented.
We did more. In our working paper proposing a continuing and
progressive system of disclosure and verification of armed forces and
armaments, the United States expressly included atomic armaments.
The system of disclosure and verification proposed lays the ground
work for continuing inspection. Other elemerts of control are of
course very important and necessary in the field, but any plan must
a
process of continuing inspection. Any international system
for the control of atomic energy, whatever its nature, must involve
extensive disclosure and verification as part of a process of continuing
The Soviet Union has rejected the U.N. atomic-energy plan, but has
proposed no
acceptable alternative. It has objected particularly to
the ownership and other control features of the U.N. plan, contending
)
that control should involve only continuing inspection. But in the
Parts II C and III of the First Report of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission
8
See supra, doc, 5.
include
inspection.
?
C
t
1123
2784
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
00
I
in
re
sta
sai
acceptable to it, and it was unwilling even to consider our suggestions
GE
for continuing disclosure and verification in the atomic field or any It
other field.
The concept of disclosure and verification which includes continuing to
inspection provides an indispensable first step in laying the ground me
work for any control plan in the atomic field. Until the Soviet Union TI
is willing to consider this concept little progress can be made toward
determining what other elements of control, those contained in the of
U.N. plan or others, may be necessary. We are interested in controls
not for the sake of controls nor as an end in itself. We are interested It
in controls as a necessary means for effectively eliminating atomic
AU
weapons from national arsenals.
Sta
Elimination of Weapons Adaptable to Mass Destruction, Including op
Bacteriological Weapons
The United States made clear in the Disarmament Commission that
in its view a comprehensive disarmament program should include not
sh
only the effective international control of atomic energy to insure the
str
elimination of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peace-ob
ful purposes only but the elimination of all major weapons adaptable
to mass destruction, including bacteriological weapons. This position
we reiterated in our proposal on essential principles and in both the
M
tripartite proposal and supplement.
Beginning with the very first meeting of the Disarmament Commis-
sion in New York the Soviet Union sought to poison the atmosphere the
of the Commission and obscure the clear and unequivocal position of
the United States on this subject by making false and sensational Co
charges that U.S. troops were conducting germ warfare in Korea and
bai
China. The Soviet Union sought to leave the false impression that
the United States was opposing any effort in the United Nations to
devise ways and means of eliminating bacteriological weapons as a
W.
part of a disarmament program.
The monstrously false charges regarding the use of germ warfare in ch:
Korea and China, which were completely irrelevant to the disarma
les
ment discussions, were categorically denied by the Unified Command
and by the highest U.S. officials. The United States invited the
International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate the charges
.
ab
But the North Korean authorities and the Chinese Communist author
ities ignored the offer of the International Committee of the Red Cross
to make an investigation. When the United States sought to have
the Security Council request the Red Cross to make such investigation, th
the Soviet Union vetoed the proposal.2
On August 15, 1952, I made in the Disarmament Commission &
statement 3 fully explaining the position of the United States.com
bacteriological disarmament and in particular on the adequacy of the
1
1
in
a
l
we
Gc
CO]
Vc
We
VO
:
Ot
NE
pri
}
be
PO
Co
1 See supra, docs. 6, 7, and 9.
2 See supra, pp. 2668–2669.
3 See Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 25, 1952, pp. 294–297.
per
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2785
1
$
1
1
1
a
ܢ
e
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925; League of
Nations Treaty Series, vol. 94, pp. 65–74. The United States did not ratify this
2 Article XIII of the Annex to the Hague Convention of July 29, 1899, forbade
belligerents to employ "poison or poisoned arms". This provision was also incor-
porated in article XXIII of the Hague Convention of Oct. 18, 1907; Treaties,
Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United
States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909, vol. II, William M. Malloy, ed.
(Washington, 1910), pp. 2052 and 2285.
Geneva protocol as a means of securing bacteriological disarmament.
I tried to make clear our conviction that the objectives of the protocol
could not be more worthy or laudable, but--and this cannot be repeated
too often--that the protocol does not provide security against the
manufacture, the stockpiling, and the use of bacteriological weapons.
The Soviet representative placed great stress on the Geneva protocol
in the Disarmament Commission and it was brought to the attention
of the Seventh General Assembly in the item introduced by the Polish
s representative which as of this writing has not yet been considered.
| It might be useful to repeat here certain portions of my statement of
c August 15 to the Disarmament Commission:
"It would be a grave mistake to assume that, because the United
States has not ratified the Geneva protocol, the United States is
opposed to the general objective of the treaty, the effective outlawing
of poisonous gas and biological weapons directed against human be-
ings.
"Our sympathy with the general objective of the Geneva protocol
should not blind us to the fact that intervening events have demon-
strated the protocol to be inadequate and ineffective to achieve its
objective. The hope entertained at the end of World War I that
states could rely upon treaty promises and treaty declarations without
safeguards to insure their observance has turned out to be illusory.
Mussolini was no more deterred from using poisonous gas in Ethiopia
in the 1930's by the Geneva protocol, which Italy had accepted, than
was Germany deterred from using poisonous gas in World War I by
of
the Hague conventions, which Germany had accepted
“It was shocking to hear the Soviet representative in the Security
1
Council suggest that Hitler was deterred from using poisonous gas and
t
bacteriological warfare in World War II by the Geneva protocol, when
we know that Hitler and his henchmen adhered to no treaty or law of
God or of man which they believed they could successfully ignore.
Would the Soviet representative have us believe that the men who
consigned defenseless women, old men, and little children to the gas
chambers would have respected the Geneva protocol, save for their
1
fears of reprisals? Winston Churchill did not think so. Marshal
Voroshilov did not think so when he stated on February 22, 1938:
Ten years ago or more the Soviet Union signed a convention
abolishing the use of poison gas and bacteriological
weapons. To that
We still adhere but if our enemies use such methods against us I tell
pou we are prepared and fully prepared to use them also and to use
them against aggressors on their own soil."
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or
n
.. -------
0
1
-----------
j
protocol.
415900_-57--Vol. 2-72
2786
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
tha
M
1
@
V
net
for
to
me
In
cal
reg
CL
bei
TH
GE
treaty obligations cannot be trusted to keep their paper promises
"We have pointed out that the Soviet Union and other states which
ratified the Geneva protocol reserved the right to employ poisonous
gas and germ warfare in reprisal. We have pointed out that the
Soviet Union and other states which have ratified the Geneva protocol
have conducted research work and made other preparations for the
use of poisonous gas and bacteriological warfare.In view of the
proved inadequacies of the Geneva protocol we do not criticize the
Soviet Union or other states parties to the protocol for these pre-
cautionary measures.
"But we do criticize the ... Soviet Union for attacking the
United States for taking the same precautionary measures. We do
criticize and condemn the . . . Soviet Union for making false charges
that the United States is using bacteriological warfare in Korea. We
do criticize and condemn the ... Soviet Union for conducting a
hate-mongering campaign against the United States, which is, as I
have previously stated, sadly reminiscent of Hitler's hate-mongering
campaign against the Czechs before Munich.
"We do not criticize the humane and worthy objective of the Geneva
protocol. But we do not trust the promises of those who foreswear on
paper the use of germ warfare save in reprisal and then make deliberate
and false charges that others are using germ warfare. We do not trust
the paper promises of those who bear false witnesses [sic] against
their neighbors. We do not trust the paper promises of those who
not hesitate to break their treaty promises when it serves their ideo-
logical ends. We have no reason to believe that those who have made
deliberately false charges against us would have been loath to make
the same false charges against us if we had ratified the Geneva pro-
tocol. And that is particularly true when their false charges provide
false excuses for breaking their own promises op alleged grounds of
reprisals.
"Our purpose is not to discredit the worthy objective of the Geneva
protocol but to find means adequate and effective to attain its objec-
tive. The United States has never used germ warfare. The United
States has never used gas warfare save in retaliation in the First
World War when it was first used by Germany. In the last World
War, President Roosevelt condemned the use of poisonous gas and
issued strict orders that it should not be used except in retaliation
.
The United States has not used gas or germ warfare in Korea. The
charges that it has are monstrous falsehoods and those that make
them are unwilling to have them investigated by an impartial body
The record of the United States is clear and clean,
and no state tha
keeps its Charter obligations has anything to fear from the United
States in this regard.
"It is not without significance that in both of the two wars in the
Twentieth Century in which poison gas was used, its use was in
augurated by states which had bound themselves on paper not to use
it. If the history of the last half century teaches us anything i
teaches us that aggressor states which
start wars in violation of their
ter
ot
TH
its
th
mi
de
th
OREB
S
81
P
d
(
W
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2787
)
?
}
2
)
3
9
}
a
States, I have insisted that we must approach the problem of dis-
disarmament as a means of preventing war. My Government does
not believe that we should interrupt this work to inform any would be
aggressor state, which may contemplate using force contrary to its
Charter commitments, what kind of force law-abiding states will or
will not use to suppress aggression.
1 Res. 377 (V) of the U.N. General Assembly, Nov. 3, 1950; supra, pp. 187-192.
those promises stands in the way of their accomplishing their ag-
s gressive designs.
"If men fight to kill, it is not easy to regulate how they shall kill.
Moreover, there is the danger that if we prohibit the use of some
weapons, even more hideous weapons may be discovered and used.
We want to eliminate, and we have submitted proposals for the
elimination of, all weapons which are not expressly permitted as
necessary and appropriate to support the limited number of arined
forces which may be permitted to states to maintain public order and
to meet their Charter obligations.
"In civilized communities the deliberate and unprovoked killing of
man by man is murder regardless of the kind of weapon used to kill.
In a civilized world, deliberate and unprovoked aggression which
causes the killing of masses of men should be regarded as mass murder
regardless of the kinds of weapons used. That is the theory of the
Charter of the United Nations and that is the rule of law which we
}
here in the Disarmament Commission should seek to implement.
That is the way we can best attain the unrealized objective of the
Geneva protocol.
"All members of the United Nations have agreed to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
The United States as a member of the United Nations has committed
itself, as have all other members, to refrain from not only the use of
poisonous gas and the use of germ warfare but the use of force of any
kind contrary to the law of the Charter. And by that commitment
the United States intends to abide and has a right to expect other
of
members to abide. The United States condemns not only the use of
germ and gas warfare but the use of force of any kind contrary to the
"Let it not be said that there is no way to determine when force is
d being used
contrary to the law of the Charter. If the Security Council
does not act, the
sentiments of the civilized world can be recorded in
|
the General Assembly as the Uniting for Peace resolution provides.
1
"We hope here in this Disarmament Commission to agree upon
measures of disarmament to reduce the possibility of aggression and
make war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter,
impossible as a means of settling disputes between
nations. That is
Shy throughout our discussions, as representative of the United
.
armament from the point
of view of preventing war and not from the
point of view of regulating the armaments to be used in war.
“My Government
hopes we are going to work out here measures of
e
it
it
0
|
le
ca
e
law of the Charter.
2
e
e
2
a
2788
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ano
lite
arm
Sart
mas
sous
arra
Veri
"I hope my remarks will not be misunderstood. We are issuing no Chi
ultimatums. We are making no threats. We will support effective
par
proposals to eliminate all weapons adaptable to mass destruction, in-
cluding atomic, chemical, and biological weapons from national arma-
ments. We believe, as the Soviet delegation maintained in 1932, that
paramount importance should be attached, 'not to the prohibition of
chemical weapons in war time, but to the prohibition of chemical war-
prc
fare in peace time' and that 'efforts should be directed not so much to
the framing of laws and usages of war as to the prohibition of as many for
lethal substances and appliances as possible.'
dise
“Certainly there is no assurance that aggressors, which break their fool
Charter obligations not to go to war, will keep their paper promises dies
.
not to fight with certain weapons if they have them and need them to WHE
achieve their evil designs.
insu
"The task of the Disarmament Commission is, as the United States
points out in its proposals setting forth the Essential Principles of a
olog
Disarmament Program, to devise measures to insure that ‘armed
ilan
forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a
The
thorough fashion that no state will be in a condition of armed prepared-
age
ness to start a war' and that 'no state will be in a position to undertake
preparations for war without other states having knowledge of such
effe
preparations long before the offending state could start a war. We
do not believe that it is the function of the Disarmament Commission
to attempt to codify the laws of war. But obviously if it attempted to
W
do so it would have to deal with the whole range of weapons and
methods of warfare to be prescribed, the machinery necessary to secure
the observance of the rules, and the matter of sanctions, reprisals
,
and retaliation in case of violation."
It should be emphasized that it was the Soviet Union which in 1928
proposed an additional protocol which would outlaw the methods and
appliances utilized to wage poison-gas and bacteriological warfare and
the industrial undertakings engaged in the production of the weapons
as well as the use of such weapons. It was the Soviet Union itself but
If
which observed, in the Disarmament Conferences in 1932, that mere
legal prohibitions are "inadequate and of merely secondary impor-
tance."
The Soviet delegate said, at that time, "Consequently
efforts should be directed not so much to the framing of laws and usages
of war as to the prohibition of as many lethal substances and appliances it th
as possible. This is the point of view which the Soviet Union wil
continue to represent..
In the U.S. statement of August 15 we outlined a proposal for the
elimination of bacteriological weapons and facilities for their produc- rein
tion which could be made effective as part of a comprehensive pro
gram, a plan which would not merely prohibit the use of bacteriologica
weapons but would provide assurance and safeguards that such weap-
ons would not be available for use.
On September 4, 1952, the
prer
ata
tion
prok
of I
riolo
with
bact
be e
and
use
trea
The
A
the
Dise
miti
acet
faile
SUPI
1 See supra, doc. 6.
T
i
18
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2789
See supra, doc. 10.
The "Phantom" Proposals of the Soviet Union
reintroduced the proposals which the Soviet delegation presented to
Disarmament Commission. These same proposals had been sub-
mitted by the Soviet Union to previous assemblies, which refused to
accept them, and in the Disarmament Commission the Soviet Union
failed to elaborate their proposals or to offer any new arguments in
The Soviet proposals may be described as “phantom" or "ghost”.
['nited States presented a summary of these proposals as a working
paper to the Commission (DC/20, pp. 191--192).
The plan we suggested for the elimination of bacteriological weapons
and facilities for their production is inseparably connected with an
effective and continuous system of disclosure and verification of all
armed forces and armaments such as we have proposed. Such a com-
prehensive system of disclosure and verification would lay the neces-
sary ground work for the elimination of germ weapons and facilities
for their use and production, within the framework of a comprehensive
disarmament program. It may be true that there are no theoretically
foolproof safeguards which would prevent the concoction of some
deadly germs in an apothecary's shop in the dark hours of night. But
when the United States proposed the establishment of safeguards to
insure the elimination of germ warfare along with the elimination of
mass armed forces and all weapons adaptable to mass destruction, we
sought what is possible and practical, not the impossible. Bacteri-
ological weapons to be effective in modern warfare would require more
ilan the dropping at random of a few infected spiders, flies, or fleas.
They would require industrial establis! irents, facilities for maintaining
agents, transport containers, and disseminating appliances Such
arrangements and facilities will not readily escape detection under an
effective, comprehensive, and continuous system of disclosure and
Ferification which the General Assembly las declared to be a necessary
prerequisite of any comprel'ensive disarmanent program.
We therefore proposed in our working paper of September 4 that
at appropriate stages in an effective system of disclosure and verifica-
tion agreed measures should become effective providing for the
progressive curtailment of production, the progressive dismantling
plants, and the progressive destruction of stockpiles of bacte-
nological weapons and related appliances. Under this program, ,
cooperation in good faith by the principal states concerned, all
bacteriological weapons and all facilities connected therewith could
be eliminated from national armaments and thus not only their use
but their very existence prohibited.
If we wish to achieve effective disarmament and to reduce the danger
and fear of war we must not be content with paper promises not to
use weapons of mass destruction. Such promises would only give to
treaty-breaking aggressors their choice of weapons. We must see to
it that prohibited weapons are not available for use.
At the seventh session of the General Assembly the Polish delegation
is
1
.:.:.:.
of
with
**********......*
..""...2: ---**immerdisündinum..............
support of them.
1
---
1
2790
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
sent
that
simy
men
tion
that
bruit
word
SO US
T
16
clear
and
obsc
the
and
T
expl
that
meal
to explain what the Soviet proposals for strict international control
proposals because like ghosts they constantly appear and
reappear, ,
but one can never catch hold of them. They are shadowy and elusive
,
and it is impossible to state precisely just what they are or are intended
to be. They call upon the Five Great Powers to reduce their armed
forces within 1 year by one-third and to submit full data on their
armaments. They call for immediate adoption of a decision on the
unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction and the establishment of strict international control
over the observance of that decision by all states, with the right of
the international control organ to conduct inspection on a continuing
basis but not to interfere in the domestic affairs of states.
Now inasmuch as no data whatsoever are forthcoming until these
decisions are taken, states cannot determine in advance how the reduc-
tions which are supposed to be made will leave them in relation to the
armed strength of other states. Nor has the Soviet Union ever
sought to explain how the simple one-third reduction would be applied
to all the complicated components which make up the armed strength
of a nation. On their face, the proposals would perpetuate and not
remove any imbalance of power which now exists and no machinery
is provided for the implementation of even the vague promises called
for in the proposals.
Since the proposals call for the prohibition of the atomic weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction and only a one-third reduction
in conventional armaments, the proposals would in fact enormously
increase the relative armed strength of states with large mass armies
.
.
The proposals run counter to the basic principles of a balanced reduc-
tion in armaments. Certainly the Soviet Union would object if we
reversed their proposals and called upon the Soviet Union and all
other states to abolish immediately all armed forces and nonatomic
armaments, and to reduce existing stocks of atomic weapons by one-
third.
While the proposals profess to recognize the necessity of an inter-
national control organ having some control over their observance
,
the Soviet Union has refused not only in the Assembly but in the Dis-
armament Commission to discuss any concrete measures of interna-
tional control. While insisting that a U.N. control organ must not
interfere in domestic affairs, the Soviet Union has refused to explain
what it means by interference in domestic affairs. It has branded
any effort on our part to work out a system of disclosure and verifica-
tion as an intelligence and espionage operation, despite the fact that
the General Assembly has declared that such a system is a prerequisite
to any program of guaranteed disarmament. It was impossible in the
Disarmament Commission to prevail upon the Soviet representative
PV.
At
aske
and
orga
right
stage
Regg
the
socie
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ment
disci
At
ques
sixth
Sovi
In
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"The
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ques
meant.
defin
A Few instances from the record of the proceedings in the Die
armament Commission will serve to illustrate the evasiveness of the
Soviet representative in giving any explanation of the "phantom"
Soviet proposals.
On April 4, the representative of France requested the Soviet repre-
tions
ANSW
Ar
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2791
|
definite discussion of the clear-cut U.S.S.R. proposals, artificial ques-
tions are being asked .
sentative to clarify two points. First, the meaning of the proposal
that prohibition and establishment of control should come into effect
simultaneously-did it mean that prohibition began the day agree-
ments were signed, or when the control organ was actually in a posi-
tion to operate? And, second, the precise implications of the proposal
that the international control organ undertake "continuous inspection"
bet "without interference in the domestic affairs of States”-in other
words, what constitutes continuous control, and how is it to be limited
so as not to interfere in domestic affairs?
The Soviet representative replied that the purpose of the questions
“is to obscure these concrete proposals, since they are abundantly
clear to any objective person who has long been acquainted with them
and since there is nothing obscure about them. They can only be
obscure to someone who does not wish to understand them, is opposing
the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons,
and for this purpose is still, as before, finding various pretexts.
The Soviet representative then stated that noninterference was self-
explanatory-he termed it"a very clear and precise formulation”—and
that simultaneous prohibition and control was also self-explanatory,
meaning that the two would be introduced simultaneously (DC/C.1/-
PT.1, pp. 4, 5, 24, 25, 26).
At the meeting on April 9, the representative of the United Kingdom
asked if the "decision to announce the prohibition of atomic weapons
and the establishment of controls” meant a broad agreement that an
organ would be set up, or that a detailed plan for operations, specifying
nights and duties of the organ and of states, will have been at that
stage accepted by the governments and written into the decision.
Regarding the question of interference in domestic affairs, he cited
the uniquely restrictive attitude of the U.S.S.R. toward what free
societies consider normal practices and asked for a precise under-
standing of the Soviet proviso. He asked for an unequivocal state-
ment of the Soviet Union's attitude on this point which we could then
discuss dispassionately and objectively,
At the same meeting the representative of Canada repeated the
questions his delegation had asked the Soviet representative at the
sixth General Assembly, in order to secure the clarification of the
Soviet proposals which had not been
furnished at that time.
In answering these questions, the Soviet representative repeated in
substance Mr. Vyshinsky's reply at the sixth Assembly to the same
questions. He said the questions showed "some conspiracy among
delegations not willing to discuss the question of the prohibition of
atomic weapons and the question of control.” He went on to say,
The raising
of these questions was in itself a device to avoid dis-
cussion of the substance of the U.S.S.R. proposals ... in order to
obscure the issue, they bombarded the Soviet Union delegation with
questions. That same device is being repeated now.
Instead of a
He called it playing at questions and
And at the same meeting, we ourselves asked the Soviet representa-
answers.
2792
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
DISSE
not
our
tive to state clearly his conception of international control. We asked
if the Soviet control proposal contemplated national or international
TH
ownership of fissionable material, and national or international owner-
ship, operation, and management of facilities producing dangerous
prop
quantities of fissionable material. Would the international control
organ have the right to station inspectors continuously at any par-
ticular installation? Could inspectors be sent wherever and whenever
De
the control organ considered it necessary? Could the control organ
Powe
"interfere” with the freedom of a state so far as might be necessary
TH
to insure that there was no possible evasion or violation?
In reply, the Soviet representative stated it was necessary to agree
whic
on principles before replying to our questions. As long as we did not
from
abandon the U.N. plan, there was no point in discussing a system
mitte
of inspection on a continuing basis. As he said, “This is the funda- signi
mental issue, and until we get beyond it there is no point in dis-
W
cussing details of the how, why, and wherefore. . . . Until we clear sente
up this basic question, until we reach agreement on it, there is no
exha
point in considering the details."
Similarly, he insisted there must be agreement on a "decision" to
for d
prohibit atomic weapons before “discussing details and particular unde
points.” (DC/C.1/PV.2, pp. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 30, 31, 35, 36.)
and
On May 8 the representative of France made one more attempt.
As
He asked for a yes or no answer to the question of whether by "con-
addr
tinuing inspection" the Soviet representative actually meant that
international inspectors could be stationed day and night in all
atomic-energy establishments, at all stages of production, so that we achie
are assured that at no stage of production can any quantity of fission-
only
able material, however small, be diverted for the clandestine manu- will
facture of bombs.
The Soviet representative replied, “When the United States and
France . . . are prepared to withdraw this obsolete, unacceptable
TI
and worthless proposal,” meaning the U.N. plan, “then I shall be
prepared to give a concrete explanation of how we think control and
continuing inspection should be carried out.
As long as our approach obta
to the question remains so utterly different, there is no need for me
to give any details" (DC/C.1/PV.4, pp. 28, 33).
li
At the meeting on May 14, the representative of the United King
dom tried again, asking the same questions, hoping,
convince the Soviet delegation that its position was genuinely obscure
.
The Soviet representative replied as before. "The details," he said,
"can and should only be discussed when we have reached agreement the
on the system to be adopted.” Until such time as the U.N. plan is
abandoned, he said, “it is futile to discuss the details of a system of whe
control on a permanent basis. It would be so much idle talk. That self.
is how the matter stands on this question" (DC/C.1/PV.6, pp. 6, 12)
There were other attempts by members of the Commission to
elicit some reasoned explanation of the Soviet proposals, They were
all met the same way. The vague and unexplained slogans
constitute the Soviet proposals must be accepted before
could be given.
evas
men
men
ence
way
as he said, to
the
effo:
men
the
Peo
new
pas:
imp
lem
stal
which
details
any
1
PD.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2793
d
The Soviet proposals remain, as they have always been, "phantom"
proposals, elusive shadows without substance.
S
1
CONCLUSION
r
n
ja
0
0
T
til
1.
1
1-
will
Despite the lack of progress toward agreement among the Great
Powers on disarmament, we must not be discouraged.
The United States and other members of the Disarmament Com-
mission worked hard to secure a better understanding of the problems
which must be met if we are to move toward a disarmed world free
i from the danger and fear of war. The constructive proposals sub-
mitted to the Disarmament Commission during the past year make a
significant contribution to the better understanding of these problems.
We do not contend that the constructive proposals thus far pre-
1
sented to the Commission would solve all the problems. They were
not intended to be final and definitive in terms or complete and
exhaustive in details. They were intended only to provide the basis
for discussion and to open up avenues by which we might approach
understanding and agreement. To keep the road to understanding
and agreement open to new approaches, we sought to avoid freezing
ow positions or taking inflexible stands.
As the Secretary of State of the United States stated in his opening
address in the general debate:
1
disarmament cannot be achieved unilaterally. It cannot be
achieved by denunciation in a battle of epithets. It can be achieved
only by international agreements under effective safeguards which
protect law-abiding states from the hazards of violations and
evasions." 1
1
The Disarmament Commission cannot force disarmament agree-
ments upon recalcitrant states. It cannot bridge deep and funda-
d
mental differences by linguistic sleight of hand. Excessive zeal to
h
obtain agreements which gloss over rather than resolve these differ-
ences may even increase the tensions and fears which stand in the
way of necessary understanding.
In the interest of world peace it is important to continue, through
the Disarmament Commission and in every other way open to us,
efforts to develop a better understanding of the problems of arma-
ments, and the significance of disarmament as a means of reducing
the danger and fears of war.
There is reason to believe that, with
the development of better understanding of these problems, the over-
whelming common interest of all peoples in peace and the instinct of
self-preservation will induce the statesmen of all nations to save their
peoples from the horrors of war in the twentieth century. For as
new instruments of warfare may be developed which would far sur-
pass previous weapons in terms of sheer destructiveness, it becomes
imperative that all nations reexamine their self-interest in these prob-
fms
. All nations have an equal stake in their solution. For at
stake is the survival of our common humanity.
Address of Oct. 16, 1952; Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 27, 1952.
e
e
e
1
j
pp. 639-645.
2794
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
When
13. NEW IMPETUS FOR DISARMAMENT: Address by the Presi-
dent of the United States, April 16, 1953 (Excerpt) 1
see
001
bre
Wher
thi
tio
NO
Re
State
and
Unit
of an
addr
Da
As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could
then proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction
of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world. To this
end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements.
These could properly include:
1. The limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed interna-
tional ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all
nations.
2. A commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that
proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be
devoted to military purposes.
3. International control of atomic energy to promote its use for
peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons,
4. A limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons
of
great destructiveness.
5. The enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions
by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection
under the United Nations.
The details of such disarmament programs are manifestly critical
and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can
properly claim to possess a perfect, immutable formula. But the
formula matters less than the faith-the good faith without which
no formula can work justly and effectively.
na
Pr
de
pe
WE
tid
in
to t
ity
man
R
14. ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S DISARMAMENT
PROPOSALS: Resolution of the United States Senate, July 29,
1953 2
Pres
Pres
Nat
requ
1
Gen
Whereas the peoples of the earth are plunged into vast armament
expenditures which divert much of their effort into the creation of
means of mass destruction; and
Whereas the American people and the Congress ardently desire peace
and the
achievement of a system under which armaments
, except
for the maintenance of domestic and international order
, will
become unnecessary while at the same time the national security
of our own and other nations will be protected; and
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 601-602. For the completa
text of this address, see supra, pp. 65–71.
7 S. Res. 150, 83d Cong., 1st sess. [Unanimously adopted.]
the
there
wer
abic
men
dur
1
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2795
President of the United States and the Secretary of State, and that the
* Transmitted by the U. S. Representative at the U. N. to the Secretary-
the Department of State sent the resolution to all U. S. diplomatic posts directing
abiding interest of the Congress and the Executive Branch of the U. S. Govern-
durable peace. See also Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 31, 1953, pp. 299-300.
Whereas it is the policy of the Government of the United States to
seek the honorable termination of present armed conflicts, and the
correction of oppression and injustice and other conditions which
breed war; and
Whereas progress in these respects would strengthen world trust so
that the nations could proceed with the next great work, the reduc-
tion of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it continues to be the declared purpose of the United
States to seek by all peaceful means the conditions for durable peace
and concurrently with progress in this respect to seek, within the
United Nations, agreements by all nations for enforceable limitation
of armament in accordance with the principles set out in the President's
address of April 16, 1953, namely--
(1) the limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed inter-
national ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all
nations;
(2) a commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that
proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be
devoted to military purposes;
(3) international control of atomic energy to promote its use for
peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic
weapons;
(4) a limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of
great destructiveness; and
(5) the enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibi-
tions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of
inspection under the United Nations;
to the end that a greater proportion of the world's productive capac-
ity may be used for peaceful purposes and for the well-being of
mankind; and be it further
Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the
President make known the sense of this resolution to the United
Nations and to the heads of state of the
nations of the world with the
request that their people be informed of its contents.
1
Supra.
here, accredited, and to explain that the resolution was demonstrative of the
2796
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
15. THIRD REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMA.
MENT COMMISSION, AUGUST 20, 1953 1
gran
prog
B.
in th
R
arm
cecu
1. By General Assembly resolution 704 (VII), the Disar mament
Commission was requested to report to the General Assembly and
Security Council not later than 1 September 1953.
2. The Disarmament Commission has held no meetings since the
adoption of the General Assembly resolution mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph, except for a meeting on 20 August 1953
3. It is hoped that recent international events will create a more
propitious atmosphere for the reconsideration of the disarmament
question, whose capital importance in conjunction with other queg-
tions affecting the maintenance of peace is recognized by all. The
Disarmament Commission therefore expects to continue its work and
suggests that it present a report to the ninth session of the General
Assembly and to the Security Council.
Uni
graf
@
buro
nom
H
of 2
Teso
E
will
lisa
wit!
by &
16. REGULATION, LIMITATION, AND BALANCED REDUCTION
OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS: Resolution
715 (VIII) of the United Nations General Assembly, November 28,
1953 3
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for consider-
ing the problem of disarmament and affirming the need for providing
for:
(a) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed
forces and all armaments,
(b) The elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other
types of weapons of mass destruction,
(c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure
the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes only,
the whole programme to be carried out under effective international
control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that
its security was endangered,
Believing that the continued development of weapons of mass de
struction such as atomic and hydrogen bombs has given additional
urgency to efforts to bring about effectively controlled disarmament
throughout the world, as the existence of civilization itself may be
at stake,
Mindful that progress in the settlement of existing international
disputes and the resulting re-establishment of confidence are vital tº
the attainment of peace and disarmament and that efforts to reach
agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated disarmament pro-
1 U.N. doc. DC/32.
.
3 U.N. General Assembly Oficial Records, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 1?
(A/2630), pp. 3–4.
1.
agre
plar
redu
and
othe
oft
2.
trar
wit!
Crin
3.
4
mer
side
sem
Sec
5
to i
tas!
to i
6
ity
1
3
Gen
the
Rece
4
infr
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2797
by all
,
General Assembly, see the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of
Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/2663)), pp. 1-4 and 5–7.
gramme with adequate safeguards should be made concurrently with
progress in the settlement of international disputes,
Believing that progress in either field would contribute to progress
in the other,
Realizing that competition in the development of armaments and
armed forces beyond what is necessary for the individual or collective
security of Member States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations is not only economically unsound but is in itself a
grave danger to peace,
Conscious of the continuing desire of all nations, by lightening the
hurden of armaments, to release more of the world's human and eco-
nomic resources for peace,
Having received the third report of the Disarmament Commission
of 20 August 1953,' submitted in accordance with General Assembly
resolution 704 (VII) of 8 April 1953,2
Endorsing the Commission's hope that recent international events
will create a more propitious atmosphere for reconsideration of the
disarmament question, the capital importance of which, in conjunction
with other questions affecting the maintenance of peace, is recognized
1. Recognizes the general wish and affirms its earnest desire to reach
agreement as early as possible on a comprehensive and coordinated
plan, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and
reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination
and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, bacterial, chemical and all such
other weapons of war and mass destruction, and for the attainment
of these ends through effective measures;
2. Recognizes that, whatever the weapons used, aggression is con-
trary to the conscience and honour of the peoples and incompatible
with membership in the United Nations and is the gravest of all
crimes against peace and security throughout the world;
3. Takes note of the third report of the Disarmament Commission;
4. Requests the Commission to continue its efforts to reach agree-
ment on the problems with which it is concerned, taking into con-
sideration proposals made at the eighth session of the General As-
sembly, and to report again to the General Assembly and to the
Security Council not later than 1 September 1954;
5. Calls on all Member States, and particularly the major Powers,
to intensify their efforts to assist the Disarmament Commission in its
tasks and to submit to the Commission any proposals which they have
to make in the field of disarmament;
6. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission study the desirabil-
ity of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of
*For a summary of the discussion of disarmament in the Eighth Session of the
4
Supra.
................--.-.
Supra, doc. 11.
infra, doc, 23.
2798
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
to thi
being
Clei
10 YOL
the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an ac-
ceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission as soon
as possible, in order that the Commission may study and report on
such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council
not later than 1 September 1954;
7. Further suggests to the Disarmament Commission, in order to
facilitate the progress of its work, to arrange for the sub-committee
,
when established, to hold its private meetings as appropriate in the
different countries most concerned with the problem,
issure
invoke
dignit
Nei
recite
,
ADA
appro
Assem
One W
Sion,
The
citizer
parati
It!
some
D. ATOMS FOR PEACE, 1953
legisla.
month
Ameri
Ik
17. ATOMS FOR PEACE: Address by the President of the United
dange:
States Before the United Nations General Assembly, Decem-
that if
ber 8, 1953 1
by all
Fin
MADAME PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
even b
When Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation to address this
General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning &
series of conferences with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers I fe
of Great Britain and of France. Our subject was some of the prob-
lems that beset our world. 2
During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly The
in mind that ahead of me lay a great honor. That honor is mine
today as I stand here, privileged to address the General Assembly of
the United Nations.
At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing signifi
.
you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly.
Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been
gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and
decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those
hopes.
But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. j subjec
And in the confident expectation
of those accomplishments, I would
use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the
Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support
On
of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide
explog
a great share of the wisdom, the courage, and the faith which can bring
1 Atomic Power for Peace (Department of State publication 5314; 1953).
For a detailed chronicle of developments under the President's proposed program,
see Atoms for Peace Manual: A Compilation of Oficial Materials on International
Doc. No.
55, 84th Cong., 1st sess.). See also Commonwealth of Australia, Depart-
ment of External Affairs
, Select Documents on International Affairs: Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy (Canberra, 1955).
2 See the communiqué of Dec. 7, 1953; supra, pp. 1468–1470.
to cor
the si
My
Unite
I kno
THE
Sing
12 tes
Ato
weapo
are in
Tod
wurse
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2799
course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent
---
American people.
1 weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons
Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of
to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well-
being for all men.
Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present
to you a unilateral American report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I
assure you that in our deliberations on that lovely island we sought to
invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human
dignity which are so cleanly etched in your Charter.
Neither would it be a measure of this great opportunity merely to
recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes.
A DANGER SHARED BY ALL
I therefore decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you
some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my
legislative and executive associates and on mine for a great many
months—thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the
I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a
danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all--and equally
that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared
by all
.
Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease
even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more
appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General
assembly of the United Nations?
I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new
me which Ì, who have spent so much of my life in the military profes-
sion, would have preferred never to use.
That new language is the language of atomic warfare.
The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every
etizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in com-
parative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost
significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are
to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with
the significant facts of today's existence.
My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in
United States terms, for these are
the only incontrovertible facts that
I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly,
however, that this
subject is global,
not merely national in character.
On July 16, 1945, the United States set off the world's first atomic
Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted
Atomic bombs today are more than 25 times as powerful as the
be in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.
The FEARFUL POTENTIALS
explosion
42 test explosions.
2800
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
他​他​加​血
​ind
ace
hil
in
str
qu
The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb
of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and
every gun in every theatre of war in all of the years of World War II.
A single air group, whether afloat or land-based, can now deliver to
any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the
bombs that fell on Britain in all of World War II.
th
In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no
less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons
th:
have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services
.
In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the
Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.
But the dread secret, and the fearful engines of atomic might, are
not ours alone.
In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies
,
Great Britain and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous
contribution to our original discoveries, and the designs of atomic
bombs.
The secret is also known by the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has
devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period,
the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, including at
U.
least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions.
be
No MONOPOLY OF ATOMIC POWER
If at one time the United States possessed what might have been of
called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exis
several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted Non
us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the
atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater of
significance.
the
First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will even-
tually be shared by others-possibly all others.
1
Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a con:
]
sequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself
be
against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would
]
be inflicted by surprise aggression.
bel
The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has natural
dir
embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems. That
]
program will be accelerated and expanded.
But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons
and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities
does not permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most
powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum
number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably places
sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause bideos
damage
Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United
States, our reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to
that the defense capabilities of the United States are such that they 1
am
der
ton
ste
i
OVE
say
Bri
of
to
to
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2801
Il no
DONS
7
ices.
the
.
are
mic
8
at
Britain, and France to negotiate with the Soviet Union the problems
and
would inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor—for me to say that the
rII.
retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such
ir to
an aggressor's land would be laid waste all this, while fact, is not
the
the true expression of the purpose and the hope of the United States.
To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief
that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other
indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to
accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed—the anni-
hilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us
generation from generation--and the condemnation of mankind to be-
gin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery toward
lies,
decency, and right, and justice.
dous
Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory
in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by
history with such human degradation and destruction.
Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the “Great De-
has
strogers" but the whole book of history reveals mankind's never-ending
iod
.
quest for peace, and mankind's God-given capacity to build.
It is with the book of history, and not with isolated pages, that the
United States will ever wish to be identified. My country wants to
be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars,
anong nations. It wants itself to live in freedom, and in the confi-
dence that the people of every other nation enjoy equally the right
been of choosing their own way of life.
tted | No IDLE WORDS OR SHALLOW VISIONS
So my country's purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber
of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men,
the hopes of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward
peace and happiness and well being.
In this quest, I know that we must not lack patience.
I know that in a world divided, such as ours today, salvation cannot
be attained by one dramatic act.
I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months
before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new
climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world.
But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these
steps- NOW
The United States and its allies, Great Britain and France, have
over the past months tried to take some of these steps. Let no one
say that we shun the conference table.
On the record has long stood the request of the United States, Great
exist
the
eater
Ten-
toward
CON-
cself
ould
rally
Chat
pons
cities
omb
nost
mum
ces
of a divided Germany
COUS
nited
On that record has long stood the request of the same three nations
to negotiate an Austrian State Treaty.
on the same record still stands the request of the United Nations
to negotiate the problems of Korea.
Most recently, we have received from the Soviet Union what is in
S&T
ther
415900-57-Vol. 273
asenta
il the
shadow
limina
but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a record, Propos
But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past pro- | The 1
sembly suggested-and I quote-"that the Disarmament Commission
2802 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
effect an expression of willingness to hold a Four Power Meeting!
Along with our allies, Great Britain and France, we were pleased to
sudy t
see that this note did not contain the unacceptable pre-conditions
burate
previously put forward.
he Ge
As you already know from our joint Bermuda communiqué, the
Septem
United States, Great Britain, and France have agreed promptly to
The
meet with the Soviet Union.
The Government of the United States approaches this conference
uch o
with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to the
icepta
single purpose of emerging from that conference with tangible results
toward peace-the only true way of lessening international tension,
We
We never have, we never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet
eption
Union surrender what is rightfully theirs.
The
We will never say that the peoples of Russia are an enemy with
whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful
It is
relationship.
On the contrary, we hope that this Conference may initiate a
relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about
a free intermingling of the peoples of the East and of the West—the
one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for
confident and peaceful relations.
Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Ger-
many, occupied Austria, and the countries of Eastern Europe, we
seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with
none a threat sentis
to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of Russia.
Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of Asia, we seek peaceful
opportunity for these peoples to develop their natural resources and
to elevate their lives.
These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies &
story of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of war
,
already written, of assistance gladly given by nations of the West to
needy peoples, and to those suffering the temporary effects of famine
,
drought, and natural disaster.
These are deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises sement
or protestations of peaceful intent.
FOR THE BENEFIT OF MANKIND
posals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the time is
such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible
,
should be explored.
There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not yet been
well explored-an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the
United Nations,
In its resolution of November 18th [28th], 1953, this General As
It must
military
The
buildup
develop
The
i no dr
DOW
with wh
mpidly
To h
from the
there al
|
I the
The
tributio
The
900d fa
lith w
associat
Undo
mall in
it can 1
1 See the Soviet note of Nov. 26, 1953; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 24,
1953, pp. 852-854.
2 Communiqué of Dec. 7, 1953; supra, pp. 1468-1470.
1 Supr
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2803
I
dumentary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint con-
werly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I have
a good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good
Undoubtedly initial and early contributions to this plan would be
It can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions
tudy the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of rep-
esentatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in
rivate an acceptable solution and report on such a solution to
he General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1
xptember 1954."1
The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly
I the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with
uch other countries as may be "principally involved”, to seek "an
seceptable solution” to the atomic armaments race which over-
kadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world.
We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new con-
eption.
The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or
imination of atomic materials for military purposes.
It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers.
I must be put into the bands of those who will know how to strip its
military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.
The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military
buildup can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be
developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind.
The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy
sno dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here-
re-today. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world's
sientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material
1
with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would
moidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage.
To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear
wom the minds of people, and the governments of the East and West,
here are certain steps that can be taken now.
PROPOSAL FOR JOINT ATOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS
I therefore make the following proposals:
The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by
materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. We would
pect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the
The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would
The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in
sith not
However, the proposal has the great virtue that
li
1
}
0
United Nations.
S
referred to earlier.
0
sayciate.
1 mall in quantity.
Supra.
2804
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
help solve the fearful atomic dilemma-to devote its entire heart and
1MY
be one.
before you and therefore before the world-its determination bid.,
To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledeal other
incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of
mind
world-wide inspection and control.
shall
The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the im-
1 &
pounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and
other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special
safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be
DISLY
made essentially immune to surprise seizure.
The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency
would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be
allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be IEM
mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine
A
and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide
abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world
.
AT
Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their
strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.
The United States would be more than willing-it would be proud 18. PI
to take up with others "principally involved” the development of Me
plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited
. dor
Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course,
OUT OF FEAR AND INTO PEACE
The
I tire vi
I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States,
and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would
:
First-encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective like
peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that
they had all the material needed for the conduct of all experiments
that were appropriate;
Second-begin to diminish the potential destructive power
world's atomic stockpiles;
Third-allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened bevil
age, the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, tives
are interested in human aspirations first, rather than in building up
A.
the armaments of war;
Fourthopen up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiates
at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be
solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to
shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progresi
Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United
States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the destra
and the hope for peace.
A
Assembly; in the capitals and military headquarters of the work
The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In the
in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governors or governed
, mis
they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into
peace.
1. The
Th
of the aegis
to re
B.
toward peace.
I. Thu
Depe
de
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2805
ledge other documents exchanged between the United States and the Soviet Union,
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 480-482.
ibid., pp. 478-489.
1 of mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man
shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.
im-
I again thank the delegates for the great honor they have done me,
and inviting me to appear before them, and in listening to me so courte-
cial
mily
. Thank you.
n be
ency
d be
d be L. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
cine,
A UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT AND
vide
orld.
ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, 1954
their
1
roud A PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:
at of Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassa-
ited dor at Washington, March 19, 1954
urse,
OUTLINE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
The United States Government wishes to submit additional tenta-
cates
tre views amplifying the proposals for an International Atomic
Bergy Agency as presented by the President of the United States
ective
w the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953: 2
that
1 The Objectives of the U.S. Proposals
The U.S. proposes that there should be established under the
of the regis of the United Nations an International Atomic Energy Agency
to receive supplies of nuclear materials from those member nations
tened beving stocks of such materials to be used for the following objec-
West, tives:
ould:
zients
ig up
itiate
ist be
is to
Ogress
nited
desire
A. to encourage world-wide research and development of peaceful
uses of atomic energy by assuring that engineers and scientists
of the world have sufficient materials to conduct such activi-
ties and by fostering the interchange of information.
B
to furnish nuclear materials to meet the needs of agriculture,
medicine, and other peaceful activities including the eventual
production of power.
1. The International Atomic Energy Agency
A. The Agency would be created by and derive its authority
under the terms of a treaty among the participating nations.
To the greatest extent practicable, the treaty should define
n this
world
map
}
d into
For the texts
ion
to
rt and
'Supra.
2806
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
G. Relationship to the United Nations and Other International
Bodies—The Agency should submit reports to the UA)
Security Council and General Assembly when requested by
either of these organs. The Agency should also consult and
cooperate with other UN bodies whose work may be related
1. Plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage,
standards and principles which would govern the Agency in
the discharge of its functions.
B. Membership--all signatory states would be members of the
Agency
C. Governing Body
1. The highest executive authority in the Agency should be
exercised by a Board of Governors, of limited membership
representing governments. In determining the com-
position of the Board of Governors, it might be desirable
II.
to take account of geographic distribution and member
ship by prospective beneficiaries. It is expected that the
principal contributors would be on the Board of Governors.
2. It is suggested that decisions of the Board of Governors
generally should be taken by some form of majority vote.
Arrangements could be worked out to give the principal
contributing countries special voting privileges on certain
matters, such as allocations of fissionable material.
D. Staff-The Staff of the Agency should be headed by an
administrative head or general manager, appointed for
fixed term by the Board of Governors and subject to its
control, and, of course, include highly qualified scientific and
technical personnel. Under the general supervision of the
Board, the administrative head should be responsible for the
appointment, organization and functioning of the Staff
.
E. Financing
1. Funds for the central facilities and fixed plant of the
Agency and its research projects should be provided
through appropriation by the participating states in a
cordance with a scale of contributions to be agreed upon,
It is suggested that it might be possible to utilize the genera
principles governing the scale of contributions by individuel
members to the UN.
2. Funds for specific projects submitted by member nations
to utilize the materials or services of the Agency should be
provided by the recipient country concerned through
specific arrangements in each case.
F. The administrative headquarters of the Agency could be
located at a place mutually agreed upon.
to that of the Agency.
H. The facilities of the Agency would include:
and issuance of nuclear materials.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2807
cy in
f the
"
ld be
rship
com.
rable
nber-
t the
nors.
IRON
vote.
ncipal
ertain
J 81
for å
Eo. its
C and
of the
or the
2. Physical safeguards.
3. Control laboratories for analysis and verification of receipts
and inventory control of nuclear materials.
4. Necessary housing for administrative and other activities
of the Agency not included in the preceding categories.
5. Those facilities, as might in time be necessary, for such
purposes as education and training, research and develop-
ment, fuel fabrication and chemical processing.
III
. Functions of the Agency
A. Receipt and Storage of Materials
1. All member nations possessing stocks of normal and en-
riched uranium, thorium metal, U-233, U-235, U-238,
plutonium and alloys of the foregoing would be expected to
make contributions of such material to the Agency.
2. The United States would be prepared to make as a dona-
tion, a substantial initial contribution of nuclear materials
towards the needs of the Agency. The USSR would make
an equivalent donation towards these needs.
3. The Agency would specify the place, method of delivery,
and, when appropriate, the form and composition of ma-
terials it will receive. The Agency would also verify stated
quantities of materials received and would report to the
members these amounts. The Agency would be responsible
for storing and protecting materials in a way to minimize
the likelihood of surprise seizure.
B. Allocation of Materials by the Agency
1. The Agency would review proposals submitted by participat-
ing members desiring to receive allocations of Agency stocks
in the light of uniform and equitable criteria, including:
a. The use to which material would be put, including
scientific and technical feasibility.
b. The adequacy of plans, funds, technical personnel, etc.,
to assure effective use of the material.
C. Adequacy of proposed health and safety measures for
handling and storing materials and for operating facilities.
d. Equitable distribution of available materials.
2. Title to nuclear materials would initially remain with the
Agency, which would determine fair payment to be made
for use of materials.
3. In order to insure that adequate health and safety standards
were being followed, and in order to assure that allocated
fissionable material is being
used for the purposes for which
it was allocated, the Agency would have the continuing
authority to prescribe certain design and operating condi-
tions, health and safety regulations, require accountability
and operating records, specify disposition of byproduct
f the
vided
1 8C
иров, .
nera)
ridus!
ations
ild be
rough
uld be
tional
UN
ed by
t and
elated
Frage
2808 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
....
OD
fissionable materials and wastes, retain the right of monitor-
19.
ing and require progress reports. The Agency would also
have authority to verify status of allocated material inven-
tories and to verify compliance with the terms of issuance.
4. Information about all transactions entered into by the
Agency would be available to all members.
tior
C. Information and Service Activities of the Agency
1. All member nations possessing information relevant to the 1..
activities of the Agency would be expected to make contribu- este
tions from that information to the Agency.
Fra
2. In addition to data developed as a result of its own activi- of
ties, the Agency would have available:
Am
a. Data developed by participating countries as a result of
2.
the utilization of the materials, information, services,
and other assistance of the Agency.
3.
b. Data already publicly available in some of the countries
. the
c. Data developed and previously held by principals or 15,
other members and voluntarily contributed to the
Agency
20.
3. The Agency would encourage the exchange of scientific
and technical information among nations, and be responsible
S
for making wide dissemination of the data in its possession.
4. The Agency would serve as an intermediary securing the
performance of services by one participating country for
another. Among the specific activities the Agency might
provide would be the following:
a. Training and education.
b. Services concerned with developing codes for public wo
the
health and safety in connection with the utilization of
fissionable materials.
c. Consultative technical services in connection with the
establishment and carrying on of programs.
d. Processing of nuclear materials (i. e., Chemical separation for
and purification, fabrication of fuel elements, etc.).
e. Supply of special materials, such as heavy water.
f. Design and supply of specialized equipment.
g. Special laboratory services such as conduct of experia wb
ments and tests.
h. Aid in making financial arrangements for the support
of appropriate projects.
.
C
1
27
sub
Th
W8
ME
pre
lim
ate
PO
na
len
1
2
3
5
6
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2809
en-
3
'les.
or
1 U.N. doc. DC/49, Apr. 19, 1954.
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 484-485.
19. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMA-
tor-
MENT COMMISSION SUBCOMMITTEE: Resolution of the
also
United Nations Disarmament Commission, April 19, 1954 1
e.
the
The Disarmament Commission,
Noting General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII) ? and the resolu-
tion on disarmament agreed by the Four Foreign Ministers at Berlin
on 18 February 1954,
the 1. Decides, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII), to
bu- establish a Sub-Committee consisting of representatives of Canada,
France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom
ivi- of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America;
t of 2. Recommends that the Sub-Committee should hold its first meeting
ces,
on 23 April, and should arrange its own meetings and method of work;
3. Recommends that the Sub-Committee should present a report on
the results of its work to the Disarmament Commission not later than
15 July.
the
2. PURPOSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
tific
AGENCY: Note Submitted by the Secretary of State to the
ible
Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Geneva Conference
the
on Korea and Indochina, May 1, 1954 *
for
ght
1. I have now read the aide-memoire of the Soviet Union of April
278 re the proposal for "an international atomic energy agency"
submitted to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on March 19.8
This aide-memoire criticizes the proposal on the grounds that it
blic
would not substantially reduce atomic material stockpiles, or control
of
the making or use of atomic weapons or remove the threat of atomic
the
2. These criticisms misconstrue the purpose of the US proposal of
March 19. By its terms this proposal was not intended as a measure
Gion
for the control of atomic weapons or for solving itself the various other
problems mentioned in the Soviet note. Its purpose was the more
limited one of initiating international cooperation in the field of
atomic energy on a basis which would avoid many of the obstacles
eri-
which have heretofore
blocked any agreement. In this way the pro-
posal could contribute to improving relations among the cooperating
pations and thereby to facilitating solution of the more difficult prob-
lem of effective control of atomic energy for military purposes.
3. Accordingly, the US cannot concur in the view of the Soviet
See communiqué of Feb. 18, 1954; supra, pp. 2372–2373.
ion.
war.
port
2
Supra, doc. 16.
3
4
• Ibid., pp. 482-484.
* Supra, doc. 18.
2810
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Union that creation of an international agency to foster the use of
atomic materials for peaceful purposes would not be useful in itself.
tion
,
On the contrary, it believes that such an agency could have valuable
patie
results both in encouraging closer cooperation among the participating
end
nations and in expediting more extensive use of atomic energy for
to po
disar
purposes beneficial to mankind. The US therefore regrets that the
Soviet Union is not willing to explore this matter further at this time.
4. In view of the lack of interest now of the Soviet Union in pursuing
this proposal, the US will feel free to examine the creation of such an
3.
agency with other nations which might be interested. If the Soviet Disa
Union should later decide that it wishes to take part in any such dis- to as
cussions, the US will, of course, welcome its participation.
4.
5. The US proposal of March 19 was, of course, not intended as a
substitute for an effective system of control of atomic energy for
military purposes. The US will continue, as heretofore, to seek means
and
of achieving such control under reliable and adequate safeguards. artic
It is prepared to continue exchanges of views with the Soviet Union 5.
for that purpose, and will shortly submit to the Soviet Union com-
ments' on its proposal referred to in its aide-memoire of April 27.
Carme
men
resp
6.
Dise
21. PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT AND
ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY: Working Paper Sub-
mitted by the United States Delegation to the United Nations inty
Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, May 25, 19542
prop
3
tion
7.
mat
cha
prog
bav
of a
cong
Dir
8
con
INTRODUCTION
1. The General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952
directs the Disarmament Commission to formulate plans for the estab-
lishment within the framework of the Security Council of an inter-
national control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the
treaty (or treaties). Such major aspects of the disarmament pro-
grammes as disclosure and verification, limitation and balanced reduc-
tion of armed forces and armaments, and the control of atomic energy
cannot be implemented until an international control organization
with appropriate rights, powers and functions has been established.
2. The broad objectives in establishing control organs are: (i) to
provide international control of atomic energy so as to enforce observ-
ance of prohibition and elimination of atomic and hydrogen weapons
and to ensure use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, (ii
) to
supervise programmes for limitation and balanced reduction of armed
forces and armaments, and prohibition and elimination of major mass
destruction weapons; (iii) to supervise the various safeguards necessary
for enforcement of the programme, including disclosure and verifica-
2 U.N. Disarmament Commission, oficial Records, Supplement for April, May
, infra,
and June 1954, pp. 9–14; see also Department of State
Bulletin, Aug. 2, 1954, PP.
3 See supra, doc. 4.
terr
9
Aut
the
of
Div
Auf
but
Dis
1
bis
177 ff.
par
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2811
partments of the Disarmament Division.
ne.
an
S &
ins
article 42.)
im-
Authority, he should be allowed sufficient discretion in carrying out
Division. The Director-General would be required to refer to the
but not routine day-to-day decisions concerning the operations of the
Authority charges of violations and other important developments
bis duties by assistant directors-general in charge of the principal de-
of
tion, and (iv) to help develop an open world by assuring each partici-
elf.
peting State that other States are observing the various agreements
ble
and by providing knowledge upon which States can take rapid action
ing
to provide for their security in the event of serious violations of the
for
disarmament agreement.
the
UNITED STATES SUGGESTIONS
ing
3. The United States suggests the establishment of a United Nations
iet Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority (hereafter referred
lis- to as the Authority).
4. Under the Authority there would be a Disarmament Division to
carry out the responsibilities of the Authority with respect to the
for safeguards to ensure enforcement of the programme and the reduction
and limitation of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments. (See
ds.
ion 5. Also under the Authority there would be an Atomic Develop-
ment Division to carry out the responsibilities of the Authority with
respect to the international development and control of atomic energy.
I. ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION
ND 6. The Authority should be composed in the same manner as the
ib- Disarmament Commission. While it is necessary to keep the Author-
ity to a reasonably small size for the sake of over-all efficiency, it may
prove desirable also to include as members a limited number of addi-
tional States.
7. Any State not a member of the Authority would have an auto-
matic right to participate, without vote, in Authority discussions of
23 charges of violations by that State of provisions of the disarmament
programme treaty. Any State not a member of the Authority would
have the right to participate, without vote, in Authority discussions
che of any question brought before the Authority whenever the latter
considers that the interests of that State are specially affected.
A. Disarmament Division
8. The Disarmament Division would be under the supervision and
to control of a Director-General, who might be appointed for a fixed
9. While the Director-General would be subject to control by the
o the Authority to ensure effective operation of the Disarmament
ay
10. The Director-General would be assisted in the performance of
ins
ab-
er-
ro-
gy
Director-General
OD
ry-
term, by the Authority.
ons
to
ass
TY
ea-
Disarmament Division.
P.
2812
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
carri
WOU
Ator
strud
Secretariat
out
11. The Secretariat of the Disarmament Division would be organions
ized into departments, each charged with responsibility for administer Deve
ing a principal function of the Division. The Secretariat would also
furnish the personnel to perform the necessary staff functions for the staff
Authority.
24
12. The Secretariat would furnish the staffs of the inspection groups
in each country.
Whic
13. The Secretariat should be staffed with international civil serv- Divi
ants appointed by the Director-General. The principles governing requ
appointment and the international obligation of the persons appointed tions
should be similar to those contained in the United Nations Charter. 25
boar
Corps of Inspectors
14. The Disarmament Division would include among its personnel
,
but separate from the Secretariat, a corps of inspectors. The corps
would be composed of persons technically qualified for various types
26
of inspections and nominated by the States that are signatories of the
and
disarmament programme treaty.
of ti
15. Individuals would be selected by the Director-General from the
corps of inspectors to form the necessary inspection groups, both
and
resident and transient. The inspection groups would be responsible
to the Director-General in their work, and would be given authority to
the
take specified emergency action upon discovery of violations or infrac-
natid
tions of the treaty, such action to be subject to review by the Authority.
oper
16. Each inspection group would include a national of each of the
its d
permanent members of the Authority except where the member itself
is being inspected, plus nationals of other signatory States. In gen-
eral the latter would be selected, subject to their possessing the
requisite technical qualifications, on a basis of rotation.
17. Each State being inspected should appoint a liaison officer to
accompany each inspection team.
18. În conducting individual inspections, each inspection group facil
would be permitted to divide into such sub-groups as might be neces-
sary and to assign responsibilities to members of its staff in order to
best complete the functions assigned to it.
B. Atomic Development Division
Board of Governors
19. The Atomic Development Division would be under the super-
vision and control of a board of governors.
20. Each permanent member of the Authority would appoint &
member of the board.
21. Not less than six nor more than eight additional members of
the board would be appointed by the Authority.
22. Appointees would be expected to possess outstanding technical
qualifications and would be appointed for a term of five years
23. While the board of governors would be subject to control by
the Authority, it should be allowed sufficient discretion in carrying
27
and
wve
ACCO
shar
28
not
arm
how
nece
Stat
22
and
3
31
disa
app!
ensi
UPO!
tion
3.
Pro{
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2813
-
an-
the Staf
however, the international control agency should interfere as little as
| State relationships in the several countries.
and submitted to the Authority for final approval.
s of disarmament programme treaty. The General Assembly would take
| appropriate action, in anticipation of the signing of this treaty, to
ensure the establishment and activation of the Authority immediately
i by tion of its functions as required.
progressive and continuous disclosure and verification of all armed
out the terms of the disarmament programme treaty and the instruc-
tions of the Authority to ensure effective operation of the Atomic
ter- Development Division.
also
24. Operations of the Atomic Development Division would be
ups carried out by an international staff, the international character of
which would be similar to that of the Secretariat of the Disarmament
IT- Division, except that, to the greatest extent consistent with the
ing requirements of efficiency, inspection, accounting and control, posi-
tions in any country would be filled by nationals of that country.
25. The staff would be headed by a manager, appointed by the
board subject to the approval of the Authority. The Authority
would have the power to remove the manager at any time.
nel
rps
C. Finance
pes
26. It would be desirable to consider the finances of the Authority
the
and its subordinate agencies under three subdivisions: (i) the budget
the
of the Disarmament Division, (ü) that part of the budget of the
oth
Atomic Development Division directly concerned with establishing
ible
and operating atomic facilities (cost of raw materials and plant con-
struction, operational costs, etc.), and (iii) that part of the budget of
rac-
the Atomic Development Division dealing with the necessary inter-
ity.
national co-ordination and with the administrative costs above the
the
operational level as well as with research necessary to the discharge of
self
is duties and ensuring security:
27. The cost of the budget of the Disarmament Division ((i) above)
en-
the
and that part of the budget of the Atomic Development Division
covered in (iii) above would be borne by the participating States in
sccordance with a scale of contributions based upon principles of cost-
r
oup facilities (26
(ii
) above) should be met
by the benefiting nations and
28. The cost of establishing and operating the various atomic
r to
hot by general assessments upon the States participating in the dis-
humament programme. In carrying out its prescribed functions,
necessary with the economic plans and the private, corporate, and
29. The budget of each division would be prepared by the division
it & II. RIGHTS, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AUTHORITY
30. The Authority would derive its rights and powers from the
upon the coming into effect of the treaty and the progressive assump-
ying
1. The Authority would be empowered to supervise and control
y to
to sharing to be agreed upon
ces-
per-
ical
2814
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ACCO
So as
uses
Council, to the General Assembly, and to all States in order to permit
forces, including para-military, security and police forces and all spr
armaments, including atomic.
32. Within the limits of the programmes and phasing as laid down (0)
in the disarmament treaty, the Authority would be empowered to requ
determine the details of the time and the manner of the reduction of the
armed forces and armaments and to supervise such reduction in so farbe re
as such details are not fixed by the treaty. The disposition of existing 0
stocks of nuclear fuel would be made by the Authority in accordance timir
with the treaty on international control.
and
33. The Authority would be empowered to function in accordance
38
with whatever plan may be agreed upon for the control of atomic
energy to the extent necessary to ensure effective prohibition of
tion,
verif
nuclear weapons and use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes
only.
(0
34. Except for the rule of procedure that decisions made by the
safeg
Authority within its defined functions would require a determined
16
majority, the Authority would have the right to adopt its own rules
respa
of procedure, including the method of selecting its president.
35. The Authority would be authorized to hold meetings at such
places other than the seat of the Authority as in its judgment would
best facilitate its work.
39
36. The Authority would be empowered to issue administrative Divis
disar
regulations within its field of competence.
37. The Authority would carry out an agreed programme of safe-1 at
40
guards to ensure the observance of the agreements for the regulation
,
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all arma-
sibili
ments. This programme of safeguards would include provision for conn
whatever programme of effective disclosure and verification of all ing t
armed forces and all armaments may be agreed
upon. This function
41
priat
would include, among others, the following tasks:
(a) Provide guidance and instructions, within the framework of
the treaty, for the disclosure programme;
(6) Control the receipt of and process the information from each
State and, within the framework of the disarmament programme
treaty, prescribe the particulars of the information desired from the
States;
06
(c) Organize and conduct field inspections and aerial surveys
verify information on reported installations and to determine
whether to th
all installations and facilities have been disclosed;
(d) Station personnel permanently in countries adhering to the
d
programme for the purpose of ensuring continuous verification;
(e) Prepare reports of disclosure and verification for the United to al
Nations and for the signatory States;
(f) In the event of a finding by the Authority of violations, obstrucs ance
tions, discrepancies, or pertinenť omissions by a State, call upon such
State to remedy forth with the violation or other infraction; in the
event of failure within a reasonable time of the offending State to
comply fully, report the violation or other infraction to the Security
of th
in CC
estal
woul
(a
time
to
(c)
Stati
priat
42
of sa
ince
respo
Disa
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2815
care
)
nce
mic
ses
ned
.
Disarmament Division, subject to appropriate arrangements for co-
all appropriate action by the United Nations or by individual States in
accordance with the treaty establishing the control organ;
(0) Submit such special reports to the Security Council as may be
I to requested by any seven members thereof;
1 of th) Submit such special reports to the General Assembly as may
far be requested by that body;
ing. Determine when each provision of the treaty relating to the
nce timing of disclosure and verification and of reductions of armed forces
and non-atomic armaments has been completed.
38. The powers of the Authority relating to disclosure and verifica-
of
tion, of course, would not be limited to the initial disclosure and
verification but would continue as permanent powers of the Authority.
(a) The Authority would carry out the agreed programme for
the
safeguards other than disclosure and verification;
(6) The Authority should have positive research and developmental
ules
responsibilities in order to remain in the forefront of atomic knowledge
uch
so as to render the Authority more effective in promoting the beneficial
uses of atomic energy and in eliminating its destructive ones.
ould
39. Authorized personnel of the Secretariat of the Disarmament
tive Division would have the right, in accordance with the terms of the
disarmament treaty, to conduct on-the-spot inspections preparatory
afe to and in aid of inspections by formal inspection teams.
ion, 40. The Atomic Development Division should have the respon-
sibility to determine and report to the Authority any violations in
for connexion with the execution of the provisions of the treaty establish-
alling the system for the control of atomic energy.
41. The Authority should be empowered to take action as appro-
priate short of the imposition of sanctions as provided in Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter, to remedy any violations or infractions
of
connexion with the enforcement of the provisions of the treaty
the C) Calling upon the offending State to remedy within a reasonable
time the violations or other infraction;
0) Bringing about the suspension of the supply of nuclear materials
0) Closing of plants utilizing nuclear materials in the offending
the State;
Eted to all States the violation or other infraction
in order to permit appro-
2) Reporting to the Security Council, to the General Assembly and
priate action by the United Nations or by individual States in accord-
ance with the international convention establishing the control organ.
the
42. In connexion with the inspection of items critical to the system
safeguards for both atomic development and non-atomic armaments,
rity es contrast to the items critical primarily to atomic development, the
pesponsibilities
of the Authority would in general be exercised by the
ma
tion
-ach
would include:
ume
5 to
cher to the offending State;
ruc-
uch
e to
mit
2816
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
to th
di Da
P
may
ordination. The responsibilities of the Authority for such control as
might be established over such items would, in general, also be exercised
52
by the Disarmament Division.
43. Any jurisdictional questions arising between the Disarmament
ipati
Division and the Atomic Development Division would be settled by
the Authority.
III. RELATIONS TO OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANS
of cit
stem
The relations of the Authority to the several organs of the United to th
Nations should be clearly established and defined by the treaty terem
creating the Authority.
and
activ
To the Security Council
58
44. The Authority would be required to submit such reports as inclu
might be requested by any seven members of the Security Council
45. The Authority's findings in respect to violations, evasions,
@
discrepancies or pertinent omissions should be referred, as appropriate and
with certification of facts, to the Security Council.
46. Findings would be accompanied by such recommendations as equi
the Authority might deem appropriate. In this regard, provision
10
would have to be made for specific steps to be taken by the Security
, to t
Council and/or the General Assembly to bring about rectification of
C
violations of the disarmament programme treaty.
ce
To the General Assembly
54
47. The Authority would transmit to the General Assembly periodic
I
reports and any findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrep-
ancies or pertinent omissions which are submitted to the Security
part
Council.
5.
48. The Authority would be required to submit such reports as
to t
might be requested by the General Assembly.
pro
To the International Court of Justice
49. The Authority would be authorized by the General Assembly reas
to request of the International Court of Justice advisory opinions und
on legal questions arising within the scope of the Authority's activities
.
Proceedings before the Court, however, would not be permitted to
delay the taking of measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.
To the United Nations Secretariat
50. The Authority would use the services of the United Nations abl
Secretariat to the extent mutually agreed upon.
51. Reports and other communications from the Authority to other
to 1
organs of the United Nations would be transmitted through the
Secretary-General.
OT
end
viol
tres
Art
be
1
or )
5
par
5
nat
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2817
as
100
1
IV. RELATIONSHIP TO INDIVIDUAL STATES
as
ised
52. The question of the relationship of the Authority to the partic-
ipating States will require careful treaty definition particularly
lent
by
regarding the extent to which the privileges and immunities accorded
w the Authority will exempt it and its personnel from the operation
of national laws and the means by which individual rights and liberties
el citizens of each State will be protected against possible infringement
stemming from inspections. The grant of privileges and immunities
ited to the Authority should be based on the principle of minimum inter-
aty ferences with the national laws of a State consistent with adequate
and expeditious carrying out of the Authority's responsibilities and
activities.
53. The privileges and immunities accorded the Authority should
include:
I.
ins, (a) The right of its accredited representatives to the privileges
late and facilities of ingress, egress and access into and from the territory
of participating States including rights of transit for persons and
as equipment over, across and through such territory;
6) The right to use communication facilities to the extent adequate
rity to the discharge of its responsibilities;
1 of (C) Such exemption from customs and immigration regulations as
may be necessary to effective operations;
(d) Inviolability of premises, property and archives.
odic 54. Any findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies
ep- or pertinent omissions which are submitted to the Security Council
ity and to the General Assembly would be transmitted also to the
participating States.
55. Provision must be made in a treaty to permit individual States
to take necessary steps to protect themselves in conformity with the
provisions of the United Nations Charter in the event of serious
violations determined by the Authority and not remedied within a
bly reasonable time. Such provision would include the right of any State
under such circumstances to terminate its obligations under the
ies.
treaty, to take steps for individual and collective
self-defence under
to Article 51 of the Charter, and to take such other action as might
mal be decided or recommended by the United Nations Security Council
or by the United Nations General Assembly.
56. The Authority would be empowered to negotiate with each
participating State such administrative agreements as may be desir-
able to facilitate the operation of the disarmament programme.
hational agency to supervise the execution of its obligations and
the
to assist the Authority in its work. -
as
Ons
ODS
zer
415900_57_-Vol. 2----74
2818
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
und
22. BASIS FOR AN EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT PLAN: Memo.the
randum From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy con-
at Washington, July 9, 1954 1
of
pur
The United States has further considered the draft declaration
5.
January 30 ? and Aide-Memoire of April 27 3 delivered by the Soviet to
Union to the United States. The United States wishes to make the Thi
following comments:
ato
teci
I.
for
1. The President's speech of December 8, 1953 4 to the United met
Nations General Assembly pointed out the dangers of the atomic pro
armaments race and stressed the desire of the United States to remove pro:
these dangers by any effective method which includes adequate sale pro
guards against violations and evasions. The United States would 6
welcome any system of disarmament which would serve to protect US
the peoples of the world from the threat of war and relieve them of the pov
heavy burden of military defense in a manner consistent with their of a
security.
2. The United States is also aware of the difficulties which have gra
been experienced since 1946 in trying to negotiate a disarmament plan.age
From that date until the present, the United States has persistently we
sought, alone and in concert with other nations, to find ways of easing de
the burden of armaments and of lessening the threat of war
. In the pro
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 through 1948
, pro
in the Commission for Conventional Armaments from 1947 through
1950, in the special meetings of the Six Permanent Members of the ful
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1949 and 1950, and ma
in the United Nations Disarmament Commission since 1951, the over-
whelming majority of nations was able to reach agreement—the Soviet pro
Union alone prevented progress.
Wh
3. Despite this discouraging record, the President, in his address on
December 8, stated that the United States, heeding the resolution of kn
November 28, 1953 5 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, obl
was "prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be mo
‘principally involved' to seek an acceptable solution to the atomie nu
armaments race which overshadows not only the peace but the very
life of the world."
II.
If
4. In his address, the President also stated that the United States
would carry into these talks a new proposal for an international
pa
atomic energy agency to expedite the use of atomic energy to serve
the peaceful pursuits of mankind. In its memorandum of March 19,
can
to
WI
ev
sud
na
of
1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 485–486.
2 Ibid., p. 479.
3 Ibid., pp. 482-484.
4 Supra, doc. 17.
5 Supra, dec. 16.
6 Supra, doc. 18.
TI
DO
Op
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENFÖRGY
2819
.
200-
the United States explained in more detail its views on the method for
assy converting this conception into a practical reality. The Aide-Memoire
of April 27 of the Soviet Union appears to misconstrue completely the
purpose of this specific proposal.
in of
5. This proposal was intended to make a beginning toward bringing
viet to the peoples of the world the peaceful benefits of atomic energy.
the This offer by the United States to join with other nations having
atomic facilities to furnish fissionable material and atomic energy
technology for the common benefit, would provide a new opportunity
for international cooperation. Successful cooperation in the imple-
nited mentation of the President's proposal would surely result in an im-
omic proved atmosphere, which, in turn, could significantly improve the
nove prospects for genuine, safeguarded international disarmament. The
safe- proposal itself was not put forward as a disarmament plan.
ould 6. The Soviet Aide-Memoire of April 27 states in effect that the
otect USSR will not cooperate in steps to achieve peaceful benefits of atomic
f the power for the world until the United States agrees to a ban on the use
their of atomic weapons. The primary reason given for this position is that
under the President's United Nations proposal, stockpiles of weapon
have grade material could continue to increase after the international
olan. agency had been established. Yet the Soviet proposal for a ban on
ently weapons' use would not in any way prevent such increases in stockpiles.
using Accordingly, the United States cannot agree that the Soviet position
the provides a valid objection to proceeding at this time with steps for
1948
, promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
7. The Soviet Union also appears to assume that any form of peace-
the ful utilization of atomic energy must necessarily increase stocks of
and materials available for military purposes. In reality, however, ways
can be devised to safeguard against diversion of materials from power
pviet producing reactors. And there are forms of peaceful utilization in
which no question of weapon grade material arises.
8. The United States believes that the nations most advanced in
on of knowledge regarding the constructive uses of atomic energy have an
ions, obligation to make it available, under appropriate conditions, for pro-
be moting the welfare of peoples generally. At the present stage of
nuclear technology, the United States believes that it is now possible
very
to make a beginning in this direction. Accordingly, the United States
will feel free to go ahead with its
proposal with other interested nations,
even though the Soviet Union does not wish to pursue it at this time.
If at a later time the Soviet Union should decide to take part in any
such discussions, the United States will continue to welcome such
ough
Over-
OS OD
у
onal
participation.
erre
6
19,
III.
9: The Soviet Union refers to its proposal of January 30 for an inter-
national agreement calling for unconditional renunciation of the use
of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction.
The United States has thoroughly and earnestly considered this pro-
posal in accordance with its oft-declared policy to examine with an
open mind all suggested approaches to the problem of disarmament.
2820
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1985
by
tha
all
the
solo
hisi
Bu
effe
nud
bal
red
the
1
grm
Sor
ACC
gua
eXC.
In
SUC.
10. In the opinion of the United States, any effective plan for dis-
armament must provide satisfactory answers to two fundamental
questions:
a. First, will the plan result in an actual reduction or elimination
of national armaments in a manner consistent with the security of
each nation? A paper promise not to use weapons will not enable
the nations safely to reduce their armaments. The very existence
of any weapon poses the possibility of its use, despite promises not
to do so, which can be broken without notice.
b. Second, will the plan materially reduce or eliminate the
danger of aggression and warfare? If any plan would, in fact,
tend to increase the danger of resort to war by a potential aggressor
,
it would not accomplish the basic purpose of disarmament.
11. The Soviet Union's proposal of January 30 fails to meet either
of these basic tests, or to offer any hope for beneficial results in the
disarmament field:
a. It would leave unimpaired existing armaments and continued
armament production. This is clear from the terms of the Soviet
proposal itself. There would be only an exchange of promises not
to make use of weapons which are still retained. There could be
no certainty that these assurances would be observed. The
maintenance of stocks of weapons and the continued manufacture
of weapons would bear ominous witness to the danger that the
assurances might be disregarded.
b. The danger of aggression and war would not be lessened if
the Soviet proposal were put in effect. Indeed, it could be increased,
since the deterrent effect upon a potential aggressor of the existence
of nuclear weapons would doubtless be lessened if his possible
victims had undertaken an obligation not to use them. Such an
aggressor might be tempted to initiate an attack in the hope that
the ban would prevent or delay the use of such weapons in the defense
of his victims. Yet, the aggressor with nuclear weapons would be
in a position to repudiate his past assurances and employ nuclear
weapons whenever it suited his
interests. Thus, such a plan might
merely serve to induce aggression and weaken its victims.
12. Not only does the Soviet proposal fail to meet the necessary
tests of any effective plan to prevent atomic warfare, but it would in
fact harm the chances of adoption of any such effective plan. For
surely the Soviet proposal, if it were accepted, would tend to create
the deceptive impression that the danger of atomic warfare had some-
how been limited and weaken the vigilance
of the people regarding i
threat which had, if anything, increased. This false sense of security
could discourage further efforts to achieve genuine disarmament under
effective safeguards, which would actually enhance the security of all,
reduce the danger of war, and lighten the heavy burden of armaments.
see
1
the
pro
any
Un
23.
the
anc
resi
tas
Test
2
pro
Co
10
mit
Uni
1
2
3
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2821
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the
1
ler
he
Commission should establish a Sub-Committee which should seek
in private an acceptable solution. He proposed that the Sub-Com-
mittee should consist of representatives of Canada, France, the
IV.
is-
tal
13. The United States reaffirms, as it did in the resolution adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly on November 17, 1950,
that, whatever the method used, aggression itself is the gravest of
OR
of
all dangers. Only if there is aggression will the world be exposed to
ole
the horrors of modern war.
ce
14. The signatories of the United Nations Charter have undertaken
not
solemn assurances not to commit aggression. In conformity with its
historic traditions, the United States will never violate that pledge.
he But
, as indicated, the United States is convinced that the only truly
ct,
effective way to ensure that aggression will not take place and that
nuclear weapons will not be used in war is to adopt a safeguarded,
or,
balanced system of disarmament. Such a system could materially
reduce the chance of successful aggression, and thereby minimize
the risk of any aggression at all.
15. The United States continues to believe that a solution of the
armaments problem is essential. Despite its inability to accept the
ed
Soviet proposal, the United States is ready at all times to discuss
iet
acceptable measures for effective disarmament under proper safe-
100
guards. It is prepared to do so either in the continuation of private
be
exchanges or in the United Nations Disarmament Commission.
the
In view of the urgency of disarmament, the United States will welcome
such a continuation if the Soviet Union considers it a useful means for
seeking a common approach to this problem.
16. The United States also hopes that, in the light of the foregoing,
if
the Soviet Union will wish to comment further on the concrete
ed,
proposal submitted by the United States on March 19, 1954. In
ce
any event the United States is prepared to renew with the Soviet
ble
Union at any time the talks on the President's proposal.
23. FOURTH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMA-
be
MENT COMMISSION, JULY 29, 1954 2
ht
1. Following requests to the Chairman dated 3 April 1954 from
the representatives of France (DC/41), the United Kingdom (DC/42)
ry and the United States (DC/43), the Disarmament Commission
ID resumed its meetings on 9 April 1954 for the consideration of the
or tasks of the Commission in accordance with General Assembly
ite
2. At the 32nd meeting the representative of the United Kingdom
& proposed that, as had been suggested in resolution 715 (VIII), the
ity
ler
re
he
an
at
ise
dr
resolution 715 (VIII).
3
le-
ts.
1
Supra, pp. 168–169.
? U. N. doc. DC/55.
Supra, doc. 16.
3
&nd
Col
of a
of disarmament, the capital importance of which, in conjunction app:
facilitate the continued and fruitful consideration of the question
with other questions affecting the maintenance of international
2822 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
United States. Following the meeting the representative of the
1
United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution (DC/47/Rev.1) em-
bodying his proposal.
3. At the 33rd meeting the representative of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics submitted an amendment (DC/48) which would
have added to the membership of the Sub-Committee the People's
Republic of China, Czechoslovakia and India.
4. At the 35th meeting the USSR amendment was rejected by 10 (T.
votes to one, with one abstention, and the United Kingdom draft
resolution was adopted by 9 votes to one, with 2 abstentions. The
adopted resolution (DC/49) read as follows:
"The Disarmament Commission,
"Noting General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII) and the resolu-
tion on disarmament agreed by the four Foreign Ministers at
2.
Berlin on 18 February 1954,
“1. Decides, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII),
F
to establish a Sub-Committee consisting of representatives of
U
Canada, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
I
United States of America:
В
"2. Recommends that the Sub-Committee should hold its first
meeting on 23 April, and should arrange its own meetings and
D
method of work;
"3. Recommends that the Sub-Committee should present &
report on the results of its work to the Disarmament Commission
not later than 15 July."
5. Pursuant to the above decision, the Sub-Committee held its
B
first meeting at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 23
April, considered administrative and procedural arrangements and diss
agreed to continue its discussions in London on or about 13 May.
6. The Sub-Committee continued its discussions in Lancaster
House in London at nineteen meetings between 13 May and 22 June
.
On the latter date the Sub-Committee approved its report to the
Commission (DC/53).
R
7. The Disarmament Commission considered the report of the
Sub-Committee at its 36th to 43rd meetings between 20 and 29 July
1954, the verbatim records of which are contained in DC/PV,36-
DC/PV.43.
8. By letter dated 22 July to the Chairman (DC/54), the repre;
sentative of India requested that the proposals of the Government of
India contained in document DC/44 and Corr. 1 be incorporated in
the Commission's report. At its 43rd meeting the
Commission decided
1.
to annex document DC/44 and Corr. 1 to this report.
will
9. The Commission expresses the hope that circumstances will
2.
peace, is recognized by all.
1 Not reprinted here.
end
ame
R
Opel
ener
peal
Ami
N
they
of a
the
cou
prac
1
=
(412
?
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2823
? U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21
em-
riet (VIII).
Recalling the initiative of the President of the United States of
America, embodied in his address of 8 December 1953,2
will will be established without delay;
stion 2. Suggests that, once the Agency is established, it negotiate an
appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations;
(4/2890), pp. 4-5; see also Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 14, 1955, pp. 444 ff.
the
10. This report was approved by the Commission on 29 July 1954
and is hereby submitted to the General Assemby and to the Security
Council in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 6 of resolution 715
uld
le's
F. EFFORTS TOWARD THE PEACEFUL APPLICA-
aft TION OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND TOWARD THE
The
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CON-
TROL AGENCY, 1954-1955
olu-
at
24. PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
II).
AND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PEACE-
FUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY: Resolution 810 (IX) of the
of
United Nations General Assembly, December 4, 1954 1
the
the
The General Assembly,
first Believing that the benefits arising from the momentous discovery
and of atomic energy should be placed at the service of mankind,
Desiring to promote energetically the use of atomic energy to the
t & end that it will serve only the peaceful pursuits of mankind and
sion
umeliorate their living conditions,
Recognizing the importance and the urgency of international co-
operation in developing and expanding the peaceful uses of atomic
its energy to assist in lifting the burdens of hunger, poverty and disease,
Believing also that all nations should co-operate in promoting the
and dissernination of knowledge in the realm of nuclear technology for
A
the
CONCERNING AN INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AGENCY
the
July
*.36-
they should continue, for the establishment as quickly as possible
of an International Atomic
Energy Agency to facilitate the use by
the entire world of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
, and to en-
wurage international co-operation in the further development and
practical application of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind,
1. Expresses the hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency
I
23
peaceful ends,
ster
une,
pre-
it of
d in
ided
ition
onal
? Supra, doc. 17.
CONCERNING
THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
18.
ME
Advisory Committee that, in making plans for the international
8. Requests that the Secretary-General circulate for information 8
2824 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
3. Transmits to the States participating in the creation of the
25
Agency, for their careful consideration, the record of the discussion
of this item at the present session of the General Assembly;
4. Suggests that Members of the United Nations be informed
progress is achieved in the establishment of the Agency and that
the views of Members which have manifested their interest be fully
considered;
B
In
G
1. Declares the interest and concern of the General Assembly in
helping in every feasible way to promote the peaceful applications tic
of atomic energy;
Cc
2. Decides that an international technical conference of Govern-
m.ents should be held, under the auspices of the United Nations, to for
explore means of developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy through | U.
international co-operation and, in particular, to study the develop G
ment of atomic power and to consider other technical areas—such
as biology, medicine, radiation protection, and fundamental science- Di
in which international co-operation might most effectively be accom-
plished;
3. Invites all States Members of the United Nations or of the speen
cialized agencies to participate in the conference and to include among U.
their representatives individual experts competent in the atomie un
energy field;
4. Suggests that the international conference should be held no
later than August 1955 at a place to be determined by the Secretary-
General and by the Advisory Committee provided for in paragraph lai
5 below;
Ei
5. Requests the Secretary-General, acting upon the advice of a be
small committee composed of representatives of Brazil
, Canada
pe
France, India, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States of America, to issue invitations to this conference, to prepare tid
and circulate to all invitees a detailed agenda, and to provide the th
necessary staff and services;
6. Suggests to the Secretary-General and the above-mentioned ed
conference, they consult with competent specialized agencies
, in pa
ticular the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health
Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization;
7. Invites the interested specialized agencies to designate person te
be
to represent them at the conference;
to other Governments and specialized agencies participating in the
conference.
mc
ME
cel
OD
te
PI
se
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2825
See supra, doc. 17.
EFUL
vern-
tributions to all segments of the topical agenda.
ference site at Geneva. More than 60 institutions and firms already
have signified interest in participating in this U.S. Government
1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 14, 1955, p. 444.
See Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1954, pp. 659–662.
f the
25. PLANS FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE
ISSION INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL USES
OF ATOMIC ENERGY: Joint Announcement by the Department
ed as
of State and the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
that
February 23, 1955 1
fully
Preliminary plans for participation by the United States in the
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at
Geneva, Switzerland, August 8–20, 1955, were announced today.
The U.S. Government has accepted the invitation to participate in
the Conference, which was extended by the United Nations to 84
bly in nations, including 9 from the Soviet bloc. Enclosed with the invita-
itions tions were several documents, including the Topical Agenda for the
Conference and the Conference Rules of Procedure.
Primary responsibility for the technical planning and preparation
ns, to for U.S. participation in the Conference has been assigned to the
rough U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The Commission has named Dr.
velop | George L. Weil, former Assistant Director of its Reactor Develop-
-such ment Division and now a consultant to the Commission, as Technical
nce Director for U.S. participation in the international Conference.
President Eisenhower's proposal for a worldwide conference to pro-
mote the dissemination of new information on peaceful uses of atomic
e sper energy was first announced by Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the
mong U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on April 19, 1954. It will be held
tomie under the auspices of the United Nations, which authorized the
meeting by formal resolution of the U.N. General Assembly on De-
etary
The Conference is an outgrowth of the atoms-for-peace proposals
graph laid before the United Nations on December 8, 1953, by President
Eisenhower 5 when he urged that the atomic resources of the world
of a be mobilized to apply the benefits of atomic energy to the cause of
Inited
The Conference will be devoted to the presentation of information
Inited
on reactor technology; atomic power; radiation protection; applica-
repare tons of atomic energy to biology, medicine, and agriculture; and
e the the industrial uses of radioisotopes.
The Atomic Energy Commission is assembling through key U.S.
home educational institutions, industrial
establishments, and research cen-
tion ters (government and private) technical information in the fields ap-
pe propriate to the Conference agenda. It is believed that papers pre-
sented by U.S. scientists and engineers will make substantial con-
ccom-
ld nocember 4, 1954.4
nada, peace.
ioned
ealth
and
ISONS
ion 8
exhibit.
and
2 the
}
* Res. 8110 (IX), supra.
2826
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
G
11
P-
S
CO
Si
CE
b
P
3
f
1
2 Made before the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Society
at Washington, D. C.; Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 10, 1955, pp. 555-559.
In addition to heading the Commission staff assigned to the plan-
ning and preparation of the meeting, Dr. Weil will undertake to
coordinate the technical participation in the meeting by other inter-
ested agencies.
Invitations are being issued requesting that abstracts of papers be
submitted prior to March 11 for consideration for the U.S. program,
which in turn will be submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General
Interested individuals should contact their organizations for copies
of the Conference topical agenda and rules of procedure.
26. REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY: Address by the
Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
September 28, 1955 2
The posture of a nation is a composite of the words of its leaders
and the deeds of its people. The Atomic Energy Conference had its
origin in President Eisenhower's unforgettable words to the United
Nations in December of 1953 when he told of the great promise in
store for peoples everywhere if the world's scientists and engineers
could be free to devote themselves fully to the benign uses of the atom.
Four months later we moved to translate the President's vision into
deeds. We proposed a world conference to compare notes on the
peaceful atom, for we were convinced that such a conference would
give to the peoples of the world a clearer understanding of the para-
mount problem of this age-a realization of the blessings denied to
all of us by reason of the fact that atomic armament must have first
call upon the resources, intellectual and material, of a world precari-
ously at peace.
The problem is not a new one. As children, we all grew up with
the Arabian Night's story of the fisherman who found a bottle in his
nets, uncorked it, and released a great cloud which rapidly trans-
formed itself into the monstrous and threatening Djinn. The story
ended happily, as you recall, by the fisherman's artifice in inducing
that unwelcome apparition to return to the bottle and become captive
This fable, even to the illustrations of the great mushroom cloud
from which the Djinn materialized. is like the situation we face
today-how to render atomic energy harmless, how to get it back into
its bottle, under control, so we may make it fulfill our wishes for good
purposes only
The Geneva conference 4 was a step toward that goal, but only a
step. The press of the world, which sent some 800 reporters to
1 Lewis L. Strauss.
3 See supra, doc. 17.
4 Held Aug. 8-20, 1955.
S
once more.
1
1
1
|
1
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2827
.
lan-
; to
ter-
; be
am,
ral.
pies
ON
the
on,
1
lers
lits
ited
e in
eers
im3
into
Geneva, was enthusiastic and generous in its appraisal of the proceed-
ings. They were described as a resounding triumph of "atoms for
peace." But this should not conceal for us the fact that the conference
was only a preliminary move in a right direction and that succeeding
steps will have to be taken if any permanent good is to result.
But it was a truly gratifying beginning. The enthusiasm and
cooperation which it inspired among the nations, great and small,
surpassed the expectations of those whose task it was to set up the
conference machinery. They had anticipated that the conference
might attract some 400 scientists and that perhaps 300 papers would
be submitted. Actually we found that 72 nations were eager to
participate and that, not 400 scientists and engineers, but 1,400
would attend. The number of reports and papers submitted was not
300, but nearly four times as many—so many in fact that only a
fraction could be presented orally. But most of them, brilliant works,
will be published.
The day is not yet here for a precise evaluation of these more than
1,100 papers and discussion sessions. However, enough time has
perhaps elapsed for a reminiscent look at the conference, to appraise
its more obvious and immediate effects and some of the initial benefits
gained from it. Within those limits I would like to give you my
impressions, admittedly from the viewpoint of a prejudiced observer.
First, I might say something about our own participation. Our
United States delegation was selected with great care and numbered
384 persons, of whom 239 were scientists and engineers, the remainder
being the necessary staff to operate the exhibits, the reactor, and other
services,
Of the 1,110 papers presented to the conference by all the partici-
pating countries, either orally or for inclusion in the published pro-
ceedings
, approximately one-half-to be precise, 48.2 percent—were
submitted by the United States. All our papers had been prepared
months in advance and carefully reviewed to make certain that no
matters of military significance were compromised.
The nations having atomic energy programs of any magnitude
had impressive technical exhibits at the conference, but incontestably
the star attraction was our operating research reactor, built at our
Oak Ridge Laboratory, flown to Geneva, and erected on the grounds
of the Palace of Nations. The attractive redwood structure we
Tennessee Chalet," and it was visited by more than 63,000 persons
put up to house the reactor quickly acquired the nickname of “The
during the 2 weeks of the conference. Incidentally, for most of the
delegates from other countries, including scientists and engineers
come to deliver learned papers on atomic energy, it was their first
opportunity to see an actual atomic reactor of any kind, much less to
operate
its controls as very many of them did. We also had in our
main exhibit an outstanding demonstration of what Americans are
doing in pure science, industry, medicine, and biology, and more
power development. Many of you here tonight contributed
Por a list of the U.S. delegation, see The Department of State Bulletin, Aug.
the
uld
ara-
to
first
-ari-
1
zith
his
IDS-
ory
ing
cive
oud
ace
nto
pod
ya
to
iety
559.
8, 1955, p. 243.
2828
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1985
0
OL
SU
8
m
ro
P
Я
1.
ti
C
t
e
S
1
to this exhibit and are familiar with it. Some of those exhibits
,
brought from Geneva, are included in the Trade Fair on exhibition
here.
At a trade exposition in another section of Geneva, industrial firms
of several countries——the Soviets excepted-showed their products
to good effect, but we made it clear that we had not come to Geneva
to boast of our scientific prowess or, in other words, that we had not
entered with the spirit of carrying off all the laurels in a sort of atomic
Olympic Games.
The Soviet had a large technical exhibit which was chiefly remark-
able, from my point of view, for the fact that it was there at all. We
have had “atoms for peace” exhibits circulating around the world
for more than a year. But, until this conference, we had seen nothing
of Russian progress in this field. Therefore, great interest and con-
jecture attached itself to anything they proposed to show. Because
the rest of the world knew so little of what the Russians were doing
with the peaceful atom, it was clear that whatever they exhibite
or even reported, would be in the nature of a revelation.
Let me at this point say that they did come up with a great deal
.
There was no evidence, however-photographic or otherwise-to
support the statement made by Soviet Official spokesmen a few
years back to the effect that, whereas the United States was engrossed
with atomic energy to make bombs, they, the Soviets, were using
atomic energy to change the courses of rivers and to remove moun-
tains. On the other hand, their exhibits in areas of biology, in certain
industrial applications, and in general instrumentation were not
unimpressive and occasionally not greatly dissimilar from our own.
However, it was electrical power generation from atomic energy
that attracted particular interest in the Soviet exhibit. They demon-
strated a scale model of their 5,000-kilowatt reactor and a motion
picture of the reactor itself, well photographed and accompanied by a
narration in English. They also indicated that larger power reactors
of a different design were planned. We, of course, have had units
substantially larger than the Soviet plant operating for a considerable
time, and far larger ones are building
Soviet written reports to the conference showed careful preparation
and a considerable amount of detail. But it became apparent early
in the proceedings that, in answering the questions of delegates
,
they were not prepared to engage in the same degree of frankness as
other delegations.
The Russian delegation, of whom some 79 were technicians, im-
pressed our people as generally competent and, in some instances, as
exceptional men. We have no way of knowing whether it was their
first team, but as one of our people said, "They were good enough to
be a first team."
It is the general impression among the members of our delegation
that, on the basis of Geneva, we are well ahead of other nations
all other nations in both the scope and the state of our technology
in using atomic energy for
peaceful purposes. This, however, was to be
expected since we appear to have a considerably larger program
(
1
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2829
ims
cts
V&
not
mic
use
ing
them to possess.
-to
ew
example, foresees the end of her increasingly expensive coal.
England, therefore, time is of the essence; she cannot afford to wait
for development of the ultimate reactor of maximum efficiency.
than any other country and we have been engaged upon it for a longer
its,
time.
ion
In this connection it is interesting to note, however, that at least
one of the Russian papers presented at the conference bore the date
of 1943, indicating that they had been seriously concerned with the
subject for a longer time than many of us realize.
While what the Russians revealed at Geneva did not contain
anything new or startling, it did give some insight into their working
methods and into the caliber of their research. On the basis of their
rk-
mole at Geneva, they appeared stronger in basic research than in its
We
practical applications.
rld
The fact that we appear to be ahead in the peaceful applications of
ing
atomic energy-perhaps by a scant few years-certainly offers no
justification for complacency. To the contrary, the situation must
On-
be regarded as a serious challenge. The Soviets have not outstripped
nor equaled us in any peaceful application, but at the same time--and
ed,
this is important--we did not show anything at Geneva which they
cannot have in a few years, given the talent and zeal which we believe
al
.
Too many of us have been thinking of the Russians, either by
education or temperament, as not quite equal to us in the technological
sed sense. Despite the many things wrong with their political system
ing
from our point of view, let us not fall into the easy attitude of assum-
ing that they cannot compete with us in mastering atomic energy.
ain
The early date at which they produced nuclear weapons should be a
constant reminder of the fallacy and danger of such an attitude on our
part
. We can never let down our research without letting down our
guard at the same moment.
Also, the belief that science cannot thrive under conditions designed
ion solely to protect the security of data already in hand and deemed
important to national defense would seem to be brought into question
y &
by the degree of Soviet progress. This progress was achieved under
tits security provisions which are part of a complete tyranny where com-
ble munication is rigidly controlled and the individual has no rights.
Since we proceed under the policy of removing information from
ion
classification as rapidly as possible, the Soviet results present some-
Tly
thing of a paradox.
With respect to power from atomic energy, the Geneva conference
made it evident that, while others are engaged in extensive under-
takings
, our program is presently substantially ahead in extent and
in the versatility of its approach. As you know, we are relatively
close in the United States to the production of economic, electrical
eir energy; Even today, the kilowatts we are producing in our reactors
would be economic in some parts of the world.
But different countries are taking different paths to power develop-
ment, depending upon varying economic factors. England, for
For
89
un-
not
rgᎩ
on-
Ors
ces,
as
m-
as
to
100
be
am
2830
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Imp
conference, it is bound to have a profound international political
peacetime uses of atomic energy and no spirit of competitive free
enterprise. In Russia the whole show is a government monopoly. sta
It will be interesting to see how this will affect the search for a more "M
economic and efficient power system than the one they exhibited. fer
We, in the United States, are fortunate in that we face no urgent pea
shortage of conventional fuels. We have time and the opportunity cou
to attack the problem from every side and to experiment simul- rol
taneously with a whole variety of atomic power systems. That is S
exactly what we are doing. Last week the Commission took another Wha
step forward and invited proposals from industry and other groups
line
for the design and construction of small atomic power plants. This and
marks the second round of a partnership program designed to speed
of t
the development of efficient, economic nuclear power. Our first I
power demonstration reactor program began, as you know, earlier PO11
of a
this year and produced proposals for large plants. American in-
dustry is dedicating risk capital in a conservative race to produce the
best and most efficient means of atomic power—knowing full well COM
that the first plants will not be economic.
first
bod
To sum up, we did not go to this conference in an effort to carry
hay
away all the honors. If there was some semblance of a contest, in
the technical exhibits and in the papers presented, no one lost in this
competition. All the nations gained, and the winner was mankind
POW
at
From the viewpoint of our national self-interest, however, the
F
conference was certainly a victory for fundamental American policy.
the
We achieved new understanding abroad of our earnest effort to promote
a decent and enduring peace.
As a people, knowing full well the sincerity of our own desire for
peace, we have not always appreciated how the rest of the world
regarded us. Sometimes even nations whose safety from aggression expl
reali
has depended upon our possession of nuclear weapons have shown &
judg
tendency to view us with suspicion. Too often, in the past
, Com-
F
munist propaganda has had some success in depicting us as war-
appe
mongers interested in the atom only to make bombs and ready to use
them to gain our supposed imperialist aims. This myth was effec-
tively demolished at Geneva and without our having to brand it as a
myth. Our scientists and engineers who went to Geneva and who
unfolded there a factual account of our purpose and efforts to use the
atom for man's benefit were ambassadors of peace, plenipotentiary
and extraordinary.
The conference was convened without any political objective.
Nor did it, in its 162 hours of sessions, encounter any political com
plications. Under its "ground rules' any discussion of political impe
topics or of atomic weapons was out of bounds by common consent
,
in advance. The fact that no violations of either the letter or the
spirit of the conference occurred is one of the principal explanations it in
for its success.
But notwithstanding the absence of politics from the
mm
We
thin
espe
We 8
Inte
Sovi
com
prog
that
half
this
upor
dem
Si
Coni
brig)
impact.
What were its chief results? It would appear that there were
several, both immediate and for the not-distant future:
for 11
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2831
for inillions of people all over the world Geneva cast off the mesmerism
e
..
e
LS
er
IS
IS
d
st
er
1-
le
1
I demands prompt consideration and more emphasis than I can give
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, I come to the
| brightest, most appealing of all its accomplishments. As our story
First, the free world—perhaps even the Soviet-has a new under-
standing of the absolute sincerity of our desire to strip the atom of its
"military casing." and "adapt it to the arts of peace." The con-
ference substantially advanced the President's program of "atoms for
at
peace.” Any suspicion of our motives, imported to the conference,
J
could not have survived the 2 weeks of Geneva, and many delegates
Folunteered that statement to me in similar words.
Second, communication was reestablished between men of science
tho for many years had experienced the isolation of finding those
lines down. As a result, much cross-fertilization of ideas will occur
and that, inevitably, will stimulate new inventions in many phases
of the atomic art during the next year or two.
Third, there can no longer be any talk of nations which, from the
point of view of possessing information for the peaceful applications
of atomic energy, are "have not” nations. The smaller nations were
impressed by the fact that the development of atomic power is a very
complex and expensive undertaking - an undertaking which requires,
first of all, a grounding in the basic technology and then a substantial
У body of trained scientists and engineers. The notion that all they
have to do is place an order for a reactor out of a catalog and be
immediately in business to provide electrical energy from atomic
power—if such a notion existed-was, or should have been, dispelled
Fourth, we gained much information of value to ourselves from
the conference. One byproduct, I believe, was a rebirth of humility.
We learned not to underrate the competence of others and to cease to
think of ourselves those of us, that is, who were so inclined as
especially and exclusively gifted with imagination and ability in
exploring the possibilities of the new worlds that lie ahead. This
realization could save us in the future from some grievous error of
Fifth, all of us were impressed by the disturbing fact that Russia
appears to be training scientists and engineers at a faster rate than
We are. Mr. Allen Dulles, the distinguished Director of our Central
Intelligence Agency, has publicly stated that, between 1950 and 1960,
Soviet Russia will have graduated 1,200,000 scientists and engineers
,
compared with about 900,000 in the United States in our present
y program. Those figures would not be so important did we not know
that our own colleges and universities are turning out only about
half the number of engineers we require today. Unless corrected,
à generation hence, will become a national calamity,
al imperiling our security and freedom in an age of expanding dependence
ity
pon science and technology. This is a most serious subject and
n
1s
he
at Geneva.
V.
te
OL
d
n
8
judgment.
* * * ೬ ಪ
10
le
e.
n-
this situation,
le
AS
it in this general report.
ne
Sixth and finally, in this listing of the results of the world's first
al
re
2832
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
man.
asny
genc
MIDIS
bearing
United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1954 % stated butio
of the bomb. No other event that has occurred has done so much
toward taking the horror—the terror-out of the atom.
De
The first decade of man's mastery of the atom, in its actual applica- thos
tion, began on an early morning in July of 1945 in a blinding flash zoril
over the sands of Alamogordo. The monstrous Djinn had been pret
released from the bottle. The second decade of the atom may be some
said to have begun in Geneva, 10 years later, but this time it emerged, Katie
not as a terrifying monster, but as the powerful, obedient servant of sol
Wider horizons of grander view were opened. To many, it le
must have seemed that, overnight, the atom had been transformed Th
from a thing of fear and terror to a promise of great blessing.
History may record that in Geneva, at the opening of this second time
decade of the atom, mankind's stake in peace was lifted out of the the
paralysis of fear to a vision so compelling as to render unthinkablerme
the very notion of another major war. If the conference produced upo
such a vision, it made a good and auspicious beginning. We must under
not allow that vision to fadereither for us or for other men.
prble
27. SUMMARY OF ATOMIC ENERGY NEGOTIATIONS: Report
to the President by the United States Representative for Inter-
national Atomic Energy Negotiations,' November 30, 1955 (Excerpt)
The following is a progress report of my activities for the year
during which I have served.
I. Discussions Abroad
In December 1954, at the suggestion of the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee of the Congress, I joined certain of its members in visiting
a number of European countries to determine the international re-
sponse to our "Atoms for Peace” program. In Turkey, Greece, Italy
,
Spain, Portugal, France, and Switzerland, I consulted the individuals
in government and in business chiefly concerned with atomic energy
programs. It was apparent that the prospective demand for power intern
in all these countries far exceeded their conventional fuel resources
and that all of them would seek as rapidly as possible to develop
atomic power programs. It was clear that they wished to cooperate
and exchange information immediately with the United States
They preferred not to wait for the creation of an International Agency. We
II. Negotiations for an International Atomic Energy Agency
The Secretary of State in his opening statement to the Ninth set i
and t.
carrie
mann
Am
ment
functi
Luv
| day-te
There
broad
cenc
the G
Gover
timp
a two
The
comp
S
possi
]
of Go
RE
1 Morehead Patterson.
2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 2, 1956, pp. 5–7.
3 For the full text of this statement, see supra, pp. 92–100.
FC
Det. 2
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2833
Oct. 24, 1955, pp. 666-672.
en
(international situation. It is clear that for a number of years the
lof Governors dependent upon the size of contributions.
? For the text of the draft Statute, see the Department of State Bulletinha
Res. 810 (IX) of Dec. 4, 1954; supra, doc. 24.
ch had the U.S. efforts "have been and will be directed primarily toward
he following ends: 1) The creation of an International Agency
those initial
membership will include nations from all regions of the
sh forld
. It is hoped that such an Agency will start its work as early as
ed year.” The view of the United States that the Agency should
ve into being as soon as possible became the view of the United
dations when the General Assembly by_a unanimous vote passed a
of solution expressing "the hope that the International Atomic Energy
it deney will be established without delay.” 1
ed This raised a basic issue-how it would be possible to solve the
2017 complicated problems and troublesome details and at the same
nd fine establish an Agency at an early date. It was my conclusion that
the file draft Statute of the Agency should be a broad constitutional
ble amework--a statement of general principles rather than a point-
ed w-point revelation of details--which would leave the Agency free
ust v develop primarily as an operating Agency after its creation. The
gency should be led and operated by experts in the field and ad-
ministrators qualified to meet and cope with the uncharted and evolving
roblems which will have to be solved. I proceeded on this basis,
earing constantly in mind the examples of the International Bank
sort and the International Monetary Fund as organizations which have
tried out great responsibilities in a businesslike and successful
Among the problems which could be dealt with after the establish-
ment of the Agency were the location of its headquarters and the
functions it would assume under its broad grant of authority.
It was clear that the membership as a whole could not deal with the
sy-to-day technical problems which would confront the Agency.
Therefore, we provided in the Statute for a Board of Governors with
road authority to make most of the necessary decisions for the
gency
. The
membership as a whole described in the Statute as
me General Conference maintains its control over the Board of
Governors through election of a number of its members and through
aly,
complete control over the purse. The budget must be approved by
a two-thirds vote of the General Conference.
The provisions of the Statute dealing with composition and selection
the Board of Governors were designed to reflect the realities of the
gency will secure its fissionable materials, its source materials and its
de la sbnical skill troms aisserya Soama
number of States. It would be
tes
urealisite to disregard this situation in developing a formula for
composition and selection of the Board of Governors of the Agency.
* Ne studied a number of methods of meeting this situation. One
esibility was to provide a system of weighted voting in the Board
This was
er-
manner,
pt)
Tear
ing
l'e-
nals
TET
wer
ces
ted wtions.
415900_-57-Vol. 275
2834
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ox
to
St
De
of
to
to
Will
Many comments have been received either through communications stu
lationship of the Agency to the United Nations; c) procedures for /
Another possible method of meeting this situation was to provide
that certain countries with the most advanced atomic energy pro-
grams should be permanent members of the Board of Governors
.
This did not seem desirable for two reasons: Over a period of years
quite a number of additional States are likely to develop important
atomic energy programs. Furthermore the possibility exists that a
State designated as a permanent member would fail to make a sub-
stantial contribution to the Agency
The formula which we developed, while it necessarily could not
fully satisfy everyone, seems to me a sound one.
It places appro-
priate emphasis upon contributions of fissionable materials
, of technical
M
skills, and of source materials. It contemplates extensive changes
in the composition of the Board as other States developed their
resources of uranium and thorium and their atomic energy programs
.
US
It provides substantial representation for countries which would be in
a position to contribute neither fissionable materials nor source
materials nor technical skills.
ber
I have gone into some detail in connection with this provision of the
for
Statute since it was far the most difficult problem which faced the
negotiating group.
Generally as the negotiating group clarified the problems and
visualized in detail how the Agency would operate, solutions of other
alo
problems suggested themselves.
Procedurally the negotiations developed somewhat as follows:
Te
The United States prepared a first draft of the Statute taking into
consideration suggestions received from other negotiating States
and also from the United Nations General Assembly debates. This
draft was then submitted to the negotiating States on March 29, 1955
.
During April and May the United States discussed this draft with
all the negotiating States and also received further comments from in
terested agencies of the United States Government which had not the
participated in the original drafting.
After a thorough discussion, it developed that there was sufficient sat
unanimity among all negotiating States so that substantially all of enge
the suggested changes could be reconciled and incorporated into me
new draft of the Statute. This new draft was transmitted to the
Soviet Union on a confidential basis on July 29, 1955, and its cominents we
were requested. It was distributed by the United States on behali
of the negotiating States also on a confidential basis to all eighty-fou bar
States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies per
on August 22, 1955. Comments on the Statute were requested from ext
all States.
to the State Department or through statements made in the recent
debate on this subject in the Tenth General Assembly. These com
ments indicate that differences in viewpoint as disclosed to date at
mainly concentrated on a few points such as: a) composition
manner of selection of the Board of Governors of the Agency; b) ne
see
USE
ma
III
195
im
and
the
1
2
3
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2835
d the
encies particularly through distribution of radio-isotopes, through furnishing
zations students in the United States. This cooperation involving exchange
the installation of research reactors abroad. These research reactors
1 See Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 798.
2 Res. 912 (X) of Dec. 3, 1955; infra.
ovide
approval of the budget and prorating among States of operating
pro-
expenses.
nors.
The United States and the other negotiating States have sought
years
give full consideration to the viewpoints expressed by all of the
rtant
States. It would not, however, be feasible to include within the
at &
negotiating group all States which have made comments. A group
sub-
of that size could not effectively work out the technical details of a
Statute. Also a detailed discussion of the Statute in the General
1 not
Assembly was undesirable at this stage.
ppro-
On October 21, the United States called for an Operating Level
inical
Meeting to consider further the draft Statute. The United States ,
anges
their
asked the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, India, and Brazil in addition
to the original negotiating group to participate in this Meeting. The
rams.
be in
USSR on October 1 had suggested such a meeting with the USSR
and Czechoslovakia added to the original eight negotiating States.
ource
Thus the phase of the negotiations which I have conducted has now
of the
been merged with the negotiations with the USSR, heretofore reserved
for the attention of the Secretary of State. The new group will seek
to reconcile differences of viewpoint and to produce a Statute which
will be acceptable to as many States as possible.
On
other many fundamental matters all States are thinking basically
along the same lines. The differences of viewpoint, while substantial,
lows:
seem capable of reconciliation. The unanimous approval by the
Tenth General Assembly of the resolution dealing with the peaceful
uses of the atom 2 highlights the great progress that has already been
made.
1956. III
. Bilateral Agreements for Cooperation
with
The informal discussions among the eight States participating in
not the drafting of a Statute for an International Agency had by December
1954 revealed that the drafting of a Statute of an International Agency
icient satisfactory even to the eight States initially participating in the
all of negotiations, would in itself be a considerable task. To secure the
nto 8 views of all other States would certainly take a year. Therefore
the immediate achievements in advancing the Atoms-for-Peace program
ments were more likely to result from bilateral agreements for cooperation.
The United States Atomic Energy Commission had already em-
-four barked upon extensive programs to share the benefits of the atom
from extensive libraries of unclassified information to countries in all areas
of the world and through extensive programs for training
foreign
without formal agreements for cooperation.
A further approach promising immediate results was a program for
and
into
States
This
min-
behalf
3
recent
Coni-
te are
n
and
b) re-
es for
* See infra, doc. 36.
2836
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
4
.
6.
10.
11,
12.
would furnish training in the type of problems that would be en-
countered on a larger scale in the operation of power reactors. In
addition, these research reactors would permit production abroad of a
number of useful isotopes.
In order for countries to receive from the United States the atomic
fuel necessary for the operation of the research reactors, it is necessary 2
for them to enter into Agreements for Cooperation as provided by 3.
Article 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The discussions
with several States which had already expressed an interest in such
reactors disclosed that conditions and requirements in most countries
7.
were sufficiently similar so that a standard form of agreement could be &
prepared. Accordingly, the Department of State and the Atomic
Energy Commission developed such an agreement which was first
made available on March 22, 1955.
It was necessary that the Agreements for Cooperation be negotiated
and initialed by approximately June 15 lest the adjournment of
13.
Congress in early August might make compliance with the thirty day
16
waiting provision of Article 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 %.
impossible until February of next year. The Missions in Washington
of thirty-four States were contacted and twenty-four such Bilateral
2.
Agreements were initialed. Nineteen of these Agreements were
21.
initialed in time to become effective prior to the adjournment of
Congress. (Annex I)
IV. Geneva Technical Conference
I attended the UN Technical Conference in Geneva from August 7 27
to August 20, accompanied by my Special Assistant. We discussed
informally problems relating to the International Atomic Energy
Agency with a large number of delegations.
28
ANNEX I
P
Missions Contacted
N
E
1. Argentina
18. Italy
G
2. Australia
19. Japan
3. Austria
20. Korea
4. Brazil
21. Lebanon
1
5. Burma
22. Mexico
6. Chile
23. Netherlands
7. China
24. New Zealand
8. Colombia
25. Pakistan
9. Denmark
26. Peru
10. Egypt
27. Philippines
11. Finland
28. Portugal
12. France
29. Spain
13. Greece
30. Switzerland
14. India
31. Thailand
15. Indonesia
32. Turkey
16. Ireland
33. Union of South Africa
17. Israel
34. Venezuela
$
ato!
I
end
amo
I'
enla
agre
prio
the
Uni
1 Act of Aug. 30, 1954; infra, doc. 37.
(AK
2
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2837
of a
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
1
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
1
- -
-
1954 | 17. Peru..
-
-
-
atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
ameliorate their living conditions,
| enlarged to include all bilateral agreements initialed or signed in 1955.
| agreements with Belgium, Canada, and the United Kingdom were not initialed
| prior to signature. All agreements entered into force on date of signature with
| United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium, July 21, 1955.
the following exceptions: Netherlands, Dec. 30, 1955; Japan, Dec. 27, 1955;
? U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION INITIALED OR SIGNED 1
en-
In
Country
Date Initialed Date Signed TIAS
mic
1. Argentina
June 7, 1955 July 29, 1955 3299
sary 2. Belgium
June 15, 1955 3301
by 1 3. Brazil.
May 31, 1955 Aug. 3, 1955 3303
ions
4. Canada.
June 15, 1955 3304
3. Chile.
such
June 20, 1955
3306
Aug. 8, 1955
6. China.
June 14, 1955 July 18, 1955 3307
ries
7. Colombia.
May 31, 1955 July 19, 1955 3308
d be 8. Denmark
June 10, 1955 July 25, 1955 3309
imic
9. Greece.
June 22, 1955 Aug. 4, 1955 3310
first
10. Israel.
June 3, 1955 July 12, 1955 3311
11. Italy
June 7, 1955 July 28, 1955 3312
12. Japan.
June 21, 1955 Nov. 14, 1955 3465
ated 13. Korea-
July 1, 1955 Feb. 3, 1956 3490
t of 14. Lebanon
June 2, 1955 July 18, 1955 3313
15. Netherlands.
day
June 14, 1955 | July 18, 1955 3461
16. Pakistan.
June 15, 1955 Aug. 11, 1955 3315
.
July 1, 1955 Jan. 25, 1956 3483
gton ( 18. Philippines
June 14, 1955 July 27, 1955 3316
teral 19. Portugal..--
June 14, 1955 July 21, 1955 3317
20. Spain.
were
June 7, 1955 July 19, 1955 3318
21, Sweden
July 1, 1955 Jan. 13, 1956 3477
22. Switzerland..
June 10, 1955 July 18, 1955 3319
July 11, 1955 Mar. 13, 1956 3522
May 3, 1955 June 10, 1955 3320
June 15, 1955 3321
June 24, 1955 Jan, 13, 1956 3476
June 14, 1955 July 21, 1955 3323
issed
ergy
28. ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON THE
PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND CONTINUED
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC EN-
ERGY AGENCY: Resolution 912 (X) of the United Nations
General Assembly, December 3, 1955 2
Desiring that mankind should be enabled to make the fullest use of
end that it will serve only the peaceful pursuits of mankind and
This table, based on a list in Mr. Patterson's report, has been revised and
The
it of
-
-
1
-
-
23. Thailand...
24, Turkey
25. United Kingdom.
26. Uruguay --
ist 7 27. Venezuela---
-
1
1
1
The General Assembly
(A/3116), pp. 4-5.
2838
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
gi
pa
Ass
pre
the
mer
the
present resolution and in consultation with the appropriate special
invitations to the conference in accordance with paragraphs 3 and
Recognizing the deep interest of all Members of the United Nations
in achieving these ends,
G
Recalling its resolution 810 (IX) of 4 December 1954 ' concerning
international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic
energy, and recognizing that, in accordance with that resolution, sig.
nificant progress is being made in promoting international co-operation
for this purpose,
Having considered the report (A/2967) of the Secretary-General
,
submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of section B of the above-men-
tioned resolution, on the International Conference on the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva from 8 to 20 August 1955,
Recognizing the necessity of ensuring that the facilities of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and such fissionable material as
may be placed at its disposal are not used for, or diverted to, other
than peaceful purposes,
GODE
Believing that continuing international co-operation is essential
Ato
for further developing and expanding the peaceful uses of atomic
Go-
energy,
2
A
CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON THE PEACEFUL USES
OF ATOMIC ENERGY
Age
1. Expresses its satisfaction with the proceedings of the International 3
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy convened in 1
accordance with General Assembly resolution 810 (IX), and com: Rep
mends the participants therein for the high scientific quality of the pom
papers and discussions, and for the spirit of co-operation which pre- lte
vailed at the Conference;
2. Notes the impressive results achieved by the Conference in the
facilitating the free flow of scientific knowledge relating to the produc Gen
tion and peaceful uses of atomic energy and in laying a foundation Com
for the fuller exchange of information on the development of atomic
energy for the aims of human welfare;
3. Expresses its appreciation of the work of the Secretary-General
and of the Advisory Committee established under paragraph 5 of
section B of resolution 810 (IX) in preparing and
Conference;
4. Recommends that a second international conference for the
ol
exchange of technical information regarding the peaceful uses
atomic energy should be held under the auspices of the United Nations
in two to three years time;
5. Requests the Secretary-General
, acting upon the advice of the
Advisory Committee referred to in paragraph 7 of section A of the
peri
of section B of resolution 810 (IX), to prepare and circulate an
and to provide the necessary staff and services;
4
pres
5.
reso
ganizing th
tion
cont
6.
Arse
7.
esta
agends
11
Pp.
and
1 Supra, doc, 24.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2839
|| periodical devoted to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
CONCERNING AN INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
1
Committee referred to in paragraph. 7 of Section A of the present
established, consider the desirability of arranging for an international
| pp. 666-672. The text was circulated by the U.S. to other members of the U.N.
and the specialized agencies on Aug. 22, 1955.
6. Invites the specialized agencies to consult with the Secretary-
General and the Advisory Committee with a view to ensuring proper
co-ordination between the conference referred to in paragraph 4
above and such technical conferences as they or their affiliated non-
governmental scientific organizations may convene on the more
specialized aspects of the peaceful uses of atomic energy;
7. Decides to continue the Advisory Committee established under
paragraph 5 of section B of resolution 810 (IX) in order that it may
assist the Secretary-General in carrying out the provisions of the
present resolution.
B
1. Notes with satisfaction that substantial progress has been made
toward negotiation of a draft statute establishing an International
Atomic Energy Agency and that this draft has been circulated to
Governments for their consideration and comment;
2. Welcomes the announced intention of Governments sponsoring
the Agency to invite all States Members of the United Nations or
members of the specialized agencies to participate in a conference on
the final text of the statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency:
3. Further welcomes the extension of invitations to the Governments
of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to participate, as Governments concerned, with the present
sponsoring Governments in negotiations on the draft statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency;
4. Recommends that the Governments concerned take into account
the views expressed on the Agency during the present session of the
General Assembly, as well as the comments transmitted directly by
Governments, and that they take all possible measures to establish
the Agency without delay, bearing
in mind the provisions of the
5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory
tional Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations, and
to transmit
conference referred to in paragraph 2 of section B above is convened;
1.8Requests the Governments concerned to report to the General
as appropriate;
7. Suggests that the International Atomic Energy Agency, when
present resolution:
1
S
Assembly
So
1
}
e. Per text of Draft Statute, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 24, 1955,
2840
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
par
regu
3.
19D07
data
CODICE
mber
Japa
(d) To review and collate national reports, referred to in sub-
or earlier if the assembled facts warrant, a summary of the reports
environment together with the evaluations provided for in sub-
29. EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION: Resolution 913 (8)
of the United Nations General Assembly, December 3, 1955
doc
The General Assembly,
for
Recognizing the importance of, and the widespread attention being
Nata
given to, problems relating to the effects of ionizing radiation upon
man and his environment,
3.
Believing that the widest distribution should be given to all available app
scientific data on the short-term and long-term effects upon man and prov
his environment of ionizing radiation, including radiation levels and 4
radio-active "fallout",
Noting that studies of this problem are being conducted in various dio
countries,
Believing that the peoples of the world should be more fully informed 5.
on this subject,
1. Establishes a scientific Committee consisting of Argentina
,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France
,
6.
India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, and requests the Governments of these
7.
countries each to designate one scientist, with alternates and con-
sultants as appropriate, to be its representative on this Committee;
2. Requests the Committee:
(a) To receive and assemble in an appropriate and useful form the
following radiological information furnished by States Members of
G. O
the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies:
(i) reports on observed levels of ionizing radiation and radio-
activity in the environment;
(ii) reports on scientific observations and experiments relevant
to the effects of ionizing radiation upon man and his environ). A
ment already under way or later undertaken by national Pro
scientific bodies or by authorities of national Governments
; Co.
(6) To recommend uniform standards with respect to procedures
for sample collection and instrumentation, and radiation counting
It is
procedures to be used in analyses of samples;
(C) To compile and assemble in an integrated manner the variou
reports, referred to in sub-paragraph (a) (1) above, on observed
radiological levels;
paragraph (a) (i) above, evaluating each report to determine is
usefulness for the purposes of the Committee;
(e) To make yearly progress reports and to develop by 1 July 1958
appr
ceedi
M
Dis
cover
tive (
tific
imit:
Afi
lisasi
Then
that
guari
Tarn
mutu
1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement Ne. A
ID
(A/3116), p. 5.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2841
Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 1, 1955, pp. 173-174.
i
ordination;
limitation and control and reduction of armament.
After our victory as allies in World War II, my country rapidly
disarmed. Within a few years our armament was at a very
that we had disarmed too much.
rearm and to associate with others in a partnership for peace and for
paragraph (d) above and indications of research projects which might
mquire further study;
iTo transmit from time to time, as it deems appropriate, the
documents and evaluations referred to above to the Secretary-General
for publication and dissemination to States Members of the United
Nations or members of the specialized agencies;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Committee with
appropriate assistance in organizing and carrying on its work, and to
provide a secretary of the Committee;
4. Calls upon all concerned to co-operate in making available
rports and studies relating to the short-term and long-term effects
ionizing radiation upon man and his environment and radiological
data collected by them;
3. Requests the specialized agencies to concert with the Committee
oncerning any work they may be doing or contemplating within the
sphere of the Committee's terms of reference to assure proper co-
1.6
. Requests the Secretary-General to invite the Government of
dapan to nominate a scientist, with alternatives and consultants as
spropriate, to be its representative on the Committee;
7. Decides to transmit to the Committee the records of the pro-
dedings of the General Assembly on the present item.
G. CONSIDERATION OF METHODS OF DISARMA-
MENT INSPECTION, 1955
M. AERIAL INSPECTION OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS:
Proposal by the President of the United States at the Geneva
Conference of Heads of Government, July 21, 1955 1
Disarmament is one of the most important subjects on our agenda.
is also extremely difficult. In recent years the scientists
have dis-
dovered methods of making weapons many, many times more
destruc-
ve of opposing armed forces
but also of homes and industries and
hresthan ever known or even imagined before. These same scien-
the discoveries have made much more complex the problems of
1
1
}
S
low .
peace we needed greater strength. Therefore we proceeded to
mutual security.
2842
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
819
1
pun
0 m
The American people are determined to maintain and, if necessary, bars
increase this armed strength for as long a period as is necessary to the
safeguard peace and to maintain our security.
of
But we know that a mutually dependable system for less armament both
on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace tries
and to maintain our security.
do g
It would ease the fears of war in the anxious hearts of people every- and
where. It would lighten the burdens upon the backs of the people
.
It would make it possible for every nation, great and small
, developed US
and less developed, to advance the standards of living of its people
,
I
to attain better food and clothing and shelter, more of education and
larger enjoyment of life.
Thes
Therefore the United States Government is prepared to enter into
a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of arma- TA
ment. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this lisho
subject be made within our own Government. From these studies, the
which are continuing, a very important principle is emerging to which each
I referred in my opening statement on Monday.
NO
phy
ADEQUATE INSPECTION AND REPORTING ESSENTIAL
maka
No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely
to st
covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support
every portion of the agreement. The lessons of history teach us that
disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection in-
crease the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace
,
Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study
effect
of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting
,
Questions suggest themselves.
How effective an inspection system can be designed which would No
be mutually and reciprocally acceptable within our countries and the
other nations of the world? How would such a system operate?
What could it accomplish? Is certainty against surprise aggression tions
attainable by inspection? Could violations be discovered promptly such
and effectively counteracted?
other
We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or
inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of
nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made
such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. We the s
have not as yet been able to discover
any accounting or other inspec
tion method of being certain of the true budgetary facts of total
expenditures for armament. Our study of this problem is continuing
.
We by no means exclude the possibility of finding useful checks in
these fields.
As you can see from these statements, it is our impression that
many past proposals of disarmament are more sweeping
than can be
insured by effective inspection.
Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to
present to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind
great
Liker
prop
tion.
on D
and
TI
relia]
PROV
of SU
whic
TE
nity
Prac
suit o
of th
only
teste
1 Statement of July 18, 1955; supra, pp. 2009–2012.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2843
Practical progress to lasting peace is his fondest hope.
being, and freedom for the people of the world can be achieved, but
for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of
the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem
disarmament. I should address myself for a moment principally
to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great coun-
tries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which
d give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears
and dangers of surprise attack.
U.S. PROPOSAL
I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin
an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves-immediately.
These steps would include:
To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military estab-
lishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to
the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to
ach other.
Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photogra-
ply to the other country--we to provide you the facilities within our
wuntry, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can
make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country
to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we
to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world
that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of
great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.
Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and
eflective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I
propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.
Now from my statements I believe you will anticipate my sugges-
tion. It is that we instruct our representatives
in the Subcommittee
on Disarmament in discharge of their mandate from the United Na-
taas to give priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting.
Such a study could well include a step-by-step testing of inspection
and reporting methods.
The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a
reliable system of inspections and reporting and, when that system is
proved, then to reduce armaments with aſ others to the extent that
system will provide assured results. The successful working out
of such a system would do much
to develop the mutual confidence
which will open wide the avenues of progress for all our peoples.
The quest for peace
is the
statesman's most exacting duty. Secu-
my of the nation entrusted to his care is his greatest responsibility.
Ỹet in pur-
the people's security. A sound peace-with security, justice, well-
tested road.
2844
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
3.
Театр
Nati
31. SYSTEM OF INSPECTION: Letter From the President of the
United States to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Soviet Union, October 11, 1955 1
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank you for your letter of
September 19, 1955 ? about my Geneva proposal of July 21 3 that
we exchange information about military establishments and permit
reciprocal aerial inspection over our two countries.
You raise a good many questions, and I shall not be able to reply
to them until the doctors let me do more than at present. In any
event, a full reply calls for preliminary work by my advisers and this
is actively under way.
Let me now say, however, that I am encouraged that you are giving
such full consideration to my Geneva proposal. I hope that we can
agree on it, not as a cure-all, but, as I said at Geneva, to show a spirit
of non-aggressiveness on both sides and so to create a fresh atmosphere
which would dispel much of the present fear and suspicion. This, of
itself, would be worthwhile. It would, I believe, make it more pos-
sible to make progress in terms of comprehensive plans for inspection,
controls and reductions of armament, which will satisfy the high hopes
of our peoples, and indeed of all the world.
I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing
inspection teams at key points in our countries," and if you feel this
would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that
too.
bo
and
C
0&010
deve
gre
d
S
the
conti
le
Datic
clan
thera
(f)
appr
migh
mak
ofnu
Iki
4.
32. FURTHER STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT: Drehe
Proposal Submitted by the Governments of the United States, PERC
the United Kingdom, and France at the Geneva Meeting of Foreignhuma
Ministers, November 10, 1955
5.
5
arma
fear
1
6.
state
2
to he
6
The four Ministers of Foreign Affairs
1. Note that their representatives on the subcommittee of the
pher
United Nations Disarmament Commission, in the pursuit of their
efforts to establish a satisfactory system of disarmament, have fol-
lowed the directive given by the four Heads
of Government at Geneva
on July 27, 1955;
2. Take note of the work the subcommittee has accomplished in sleg
the spirit of the conference of the Heads of Government during its Presi
meetings in New York from August 29 to October 7, 1955, and express stab
their appreciation to the subcommittee for its efforts;
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 24, 1955, pp. 643–644.
2 Ibid., pp. 644-647.
See the Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955; Department of State Bulletin
,
May 30, 1955, pp. 904–905.
October 27-November 16, 1955 (Department of State publication 6156; 1950
5*Ibid., Nov 21, 1955, pp. 831–832; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers
pp. 199–201. British Foreign Secretary Macmillan submitted the proposal oz
behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
6 Supra, pp. 2015–2016.
of th
July
1
b
Hon
3 Supra.
AS BU
on Ji
Se
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2845
| blueprints and aerial inspection on the basis of the proposal of the
| President of the United States of July 21, 1955,' and (ii) A plan for
establishing control posts at key points, as suggested in the proposals
suggested in the proposals made by the Prime Minister of France
n July 22, 1955,3 and (ii) To study how best to gain practical ex-
The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, pp. 55–56.
See the French memorandum of July 21, 1955; ibid., pp. 60–62.
3. Express their agreement on the following:
(a) The renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and all other
Teapons in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations,
(b) The need to arrive at limitations and reductions of armaments
und of armed forces,
(c) The need to devote to the peaceful economic development of
nations, for raising their well being, as well as for assistance to less
developed countries, the material resources that would be released by
greements in the disarmament field,
(d) The fact that an effective system of inspection and control
is the keystone of any disarmament program, and, consequently,
the need to establish an organ responsible for the inspection and
control of agreed measures of disarmament under effective safeguards,
6) The fact that there are possibilities beyond the reach of inter-
national control for evading this control and for organizing the
dandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons even
there is a formal agreement on international control,
(1) The need for continued scientific search by each state, with
appropriate consultation between governments, for methods which
might be derived from evolving scientific knowledge that would
neke possible a thoroughly effective inspection and control system
Anuclear weapons material as part of a disarmament program covering
4. Declare their intent to continue to seek agreements on a com-
prehensive program for disarmament which will promote international
peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's
buman and economic resources;
5. Recognize that inspection, control, limitation and reduction of
armaments can best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of
6. Propose accordingly that, as a contribution to such an atmos-
phere and as a prelude to a general disarmament programme, the
2) Should agree promptly to put into early operation, in order
o help prevent a surprise attack: (i) A plan for
exchange of military
of U. S.
(b) should also agree: (i) To arrange for the exchange and publica-
1 of information regarding military expenditures and budgets,
all kinds of armaments;
lear and suspicion;
states concerned:
.
July 21, 1955,
...............; i.....
.
2846
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2.
CIC
NYOL
bord
Sovie
world. The people everywhere felt instinctively that his proposal, betwe
*3 See Mr. Molotov's statement of Nov. 10, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreigi
perience regarding the problems of inspection and control
, as sug-
gested by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on July 21,
1955.1
Stat
or ti
7. Direct their representatives on the United Nations Disarma-
ment Commission to request that its subcommittee be reconvened
DATE
at an early date and continue to seek an acceptable solution to the
Cert
problem of disarmament.
mei
kuma
ant
33. RECIPROCAL INSPECTION AND SUPERVISION: Statement
mith
by the Secretary of State at the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Min- Th
isters, November 11, 1955 2
I shall speak first with reference to the statements of the Soviet begin
delegation 3 regarding President Eisenhower's 'proposal for an ex-sove
change of military blueprints and reciprocal aerial reconnaissance.no
The Soviet delegation says that "no doubt President Eisenhowerin
was guided by the best of intentions." 5 But the Soviet delegations
concludes that, whereas President Eisenhower thought and said that the
his proposal would lessen danger and relax tension, the Soviet Union State
has come to the conclusion that it would work in exactly the opposite tone
way and would increase danger and tension.
In essence, the Soviet Union says that, although President Eisenbasis
hower has good intentions, he has bad judgment regarding these overs
matters of war and peace. With this conclusion we cannot agree, Of
and we believe that most of the world will also not agree. It is here
not easy to disparage the judgment of one who won worldwide sid
,
renown as the military leader of the great coalition which won Bu
victory in the West for freedom.
When President Eisenhower made his proposal to Chairman rouk
Bulganin, it was greeted with a wave of acclaim throughout the whole sobie
if accepted, would, for all practical purposes, mean an ending of the com
danger of war between our two countries.
I believe that the instinct of the people of the world was right, the
I do not think that they will be convinced to the contrary by the 3.
arguments which Mr. Molotov yesterday put forward. I shall take
up these arguments one by one and comment on them.
1. It is said that the link between the Eisenhower proposal and
disarmament is not clear. But, in fact, the
proposal was made as a
prelude to a program for a mutually dependable system for less
armament.
1 The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, p. 59.
]
2 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 28, 1955, pp. 872–875; see also ibili post
pp. 875–876.
1955), pp. 177 ff.
4 Proposal of July 21, 1955; supra, doc. 30.
5 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, p. 181.
the
decisi
It
S
expei
It
plane
WU
parec
refus
diver
4.
junct
St
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2847
1 Statement of July 21, 1955; supra, doc. 30.
to-
1
rer
end war to purposes of peace. The United States, I may say, is pre-
meluse to embark on a great project for peace because it required a
diversion of resources from war.
srid., not provide for “the setting up of control posts at ports,
Junctions, and so forth. I am surprised to hear this argument
2. The Soviet delegation points out that the Eisenhower proposal
1,
alers solely to the territory of the Soviet Union and of the United
Mates and would not cover the forces of these two countries elsewhere,
or the forces of our Allies.
It is quite true that both the Soviet Union and the United States
ed we substantial military forces beyond their sovereign border.
he Certainly, the Government of the Soviet Union will not deny that it
maintains substantial forces in East Germany, Poland, Hungary,
Sumania, and other places and locations. However, the most impor-
mat forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States are located
nt rithin their sovereign borders.
The overwhelming portion of the forces that would be inevitably
arolved in an attack are located in both instances within the sovereign
orders. This, then, is the place to begin. It is the place where a
iet teginning can be made promptly because it would not require the
x= vereign decision of many nations or raise the problems involved in
e. egotiating agreements with some 40 to 50 other countries.
The Governments of France and the United Kingdom have already
on ssociated themselves with the Eisenhower proposal. Furthermore,
at ithe Eisenhower proposal is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United
on Sates would be prepared to proceed promptly, so far as it is concerned,
ite o negotiate both with other sovereign states involved and with the
Soviet Union for the appropriate extension on a reciprocal, equitable
20-asis of the Eisenhower proposal and the Bulganin control posts to
ese merseas bases, and to the forces of other countries.
een Of course, President Eisenhower realized that what he proposed
is dere last July was only a beginning. I recall his exact words. He
de said
, "What propose, I assure you would be but a beginning.” 1
The But it is the beginning, the initial breakthrough, that is often
decisive. As President Eisenhower emphasized, the spirit of peace
can rould more surely reign and further disarmament more surely be
ole selieved if mutual understanding and reciprocal openness existed as
sal
, between the two countries which have the greatest stockpiles of
It is that moral aspect of President Eisenhower's proposal which
ht
. the Soviet Union seems entirely to have missed.
the 2. In the third place, objection is made to what is called “enormous
ake mpenditures” which would be required to carry out aerial photography,
It is quite true that there would be considerable expense and that
planes and technical facilities might have to be diverted from purposes
, I ,
railway
the atomic weapons.
S &
less
"
gign
156;
2848
,
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
mai
weg
SOFT
01
made after Chairman Bulganin has received President Eisenhower's mai
letter of October 11, in which President Eisenhower said:
Ide
I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing inspection
teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this would help to create the
better spirit I refer to, we could accept that too.
prog
ato
5. Finally, it is argued that the Eisenhower plan would increase the
plec
risk of war because it would give countries information about the
I.
military installations of each other and thus enable an aggressor touc
make a more effective surprise attack.
prej
I know that the Soviet Union has ample information about the
United States and about our military and industrial dispositions
. T
And the United States is not totally ignorant of the Soviet Union
, the
Both of us, I surmise, know enough to attack. What is lacking is ator
the deterrent to attack which would come if preparations for attack the
can be detected so that the aggressor does not have the benefit of T
surprise.
plat
That is the way in which the Eisenhower proposal would work I
powerfully for peace.
be
SOVIET POSITION ON AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY
full
We do not ignore the fact that the Soviet Union, although rejecting
I
President Eisenhower's proposal, as he made it, indicates that it
would accept a concept of aerial photography as one of the forms of
control to be considered, as the Soviet Union puts it, "at the con-
cluding stage of the implementation of measures to reduce armaments
nati
and prohibit atomic weapons."
We accept this statement of the Soviet Union as a welcome advance Uni
over prior Soviet positions. We are, nevertheless, grievously dis-
appointed that the Soviet Union now rejects President Eisenhower's for
proposal as a beginning step to lessen tension between our countries the
and open the path to further steps for inspection and control
, and to
reduction of armament based thereon.
Perhaps, however, the Soviet delegation's statement of yesterday
Un
does not represent the last word of the Soviet Union.
I recall the initial negative reaction of the Soviet Union toward wa
President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace proposal made in December
1953 before the United Nations. I also remember that by July 1955
the Soviet Union had come to accept
in principle that proposal
I still hope that there will be a similar evolution of Soviet thinking
with reference to President Eisenhower's proposal for exchanges Un
blueprints and reciprocal aerial photography, although I hope that
the time lapse will be shorter because time presses.
SOVIETS' ATOMIC PROPOSALS
I turn now to the proposal introduced yesterday by the Soviet
delegation on this topic of disarmament, a proposal which in the
1 Supra, doc. 31.
2 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, p. 183.
3 Ibid., pp. 184-186.
* 2
Un
NE
ina
ass
rea
1
this
gen
SUC.
ven
1
Ma
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2849
gen weapons, even if there is a formal agieement on international control. In
such a situation the security of the states signatory to the international con-
vention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential
For the full text of the Soviet proposals, see Department of State Bulletin,
May 30, 1955, pp. 900-905.
ion
the weapons.
ns.
ick
ar's main is a duplication of prior proposals made on various occasions.
I deal with this proposal myself only in so far as it deals with atomic
matters. There are four items with reference to atomic matters.
One is that was one of the first measures for the execution of the
the
program for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of
stomic weapons, states processing atomic and hydrogen weapons
the pledge themselves to discontinue tests of these weapons.
the
Let me say that, if agreement can be reached to eliminate or limit
to nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, the United States would be
prepared to agree to corresponding restrictions on the testing of such
Then there are two rather similar items, one of which suggests that
on. the four powers would pledge themselves "not to be the first to use
Istomic and hydrogen weapons," and the other of which suggests that
they should "pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons.”
of
These suggestions are subject to the grave defect that they contem-
plate only promises.
ork
It is basic in the United States policy not to allow its security to
be dependent upon promises and agreements which may prove illu-
sory. We had this week a grave disillusionment when we sought
fulfillment of the Soviet agreement that Germany should be reunified
ing by free elections.
it It can hardly be expected that the United States would depend
of upon pledges which cannot be relied upon and for the performance
of which no dependable controls are provided.
We further point out that if a war begins it will be because some
nation has violated the solemn pledge contained in the charter of the
United Nations, and found in many other international agreements,
dis- to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
er's
any manner inconsistent with the charter. If a nation breaks
cies
that pledge, how can we assume that it will live up to its pledge not
end
use atomic weapons, or not to be the first to use them? The
United States has agreed not to use force against the Soviet Union
lay in violation of the charter of the United Nations. But if the Soviet
Union does not
believe that we shall live by that pledge, why does it
ard want more pledges? And vice versa?
ber
FOR "ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST"
ing
be
o imated, I call attention to the powerful statement made by the Soviet
of Union in its May 10 proposals, wed the effect that there can be no
assurance of the elimination of atomic weapons. I should like to
There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading
bis control and
for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydro
nts
ace
force in
to
NEED
955
With
read from that statement:
riet
the
415900--57-Vol. 2-76
2850
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
34.
0
t
1
gt
em
for
ford
veg
mit
pui
aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise
atomic attack on peace-loving states.
Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between states, any
agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the
vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality
there will be a danger of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and
hence the threat of surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all
its appalling consequences for the people.
It is the danger so graphically portrayed by the Soviet Union that
creates the problem with which we are all wrestling. It will, we
assume, come again before the United Nations disarmament sub-
committee. We here are obviously unable to solve that problem,
nor are we prepared to anticipate what will be the conclusions of the
scientific experts who are dealing with the matter,
It will be recalled that in the proposal which the three Western
powers submitted yesterday' we called for "continued scientific
search by each state, with appropriate consultation between govern-
ments, for methods which might be derived from evolving scientific
knowledge that would make possible a thoroughly effective inspection
and control system of nuclear weapons material as part of a dis-
armament program covering all kinds of armaments.”
It cannot reasonably be expected that we here shall agree to an
elimination of nuclear weapons in the face of the difficulties and
dangers to which the Soviet Union has itself directed our attention
and which create a situation such that in the words of the Soviet
Union--we cannot be assured "until an atmosphere of trust has been
created in relations between states." We can only regret that at this
conference the position of the Soviet Union has brought no progress,
but retrogression, as regards "an atmosphere of trust.” It is more
than ever inevitable that the United States should adhere closely to
the position which President Eisenhower set forth in his address of
July 25, 1955:
In the matter of disarmament, the American Government believes that an
effective disarmament system can be reached only if at its base there is an effective
reciprocal inspection and overall supervision system, one in which we can have
confidence and each side can know that the other side is carrying out its com-
mitments.
I have given the reasons why the United States cannot entertain
disarmament proposals from the Soviet Union which are predicated
upon mutual trust and confidence, which does not now exist. We
urge that the Soviet Union realistically accept that fact and that
through the United Nations disarmament subcommittee we develop as
rapidly and as fully as possible an effective reciprocal inspection and
overall supervision system. Then we would, indeed, have a basis for
the reduction of armaments which we all want and which would enable
the resources of the world more fully to be dedicated to the welfare of
mankind.
the
ani
of
ful
Th
fea
prc
SUC
fou
ant
at
2
the
ther
1
C01
ng
of
On
the
ро
1
1 Supra.
2 For the full text of this address, see supra, pp. 111-114.
(A
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2851
se
iy
he
ty
id
ill
ve
b-
nh,
le
S-
the Disarmament Commission,
Noting that agreement has not yet been reached on the rights,
powers and functions of a control system, which is the keystone of
(A/3116), pp. 5-6.
a Ibid., Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), pp. 3-4.
34. PROPOSAL FOR CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMA-
MENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: Resolu-
tion 914 (X) of the United Nations General Assembly, December
16, 1955 1
at
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954,2 which estab-
lished the conclusion that a further effort should be made to reach
agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be
embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing
for:
'
ic (a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed
1- forces and all conventional armaments,
ic (6) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear
1 weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together
with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful
purposes
in © The establishment of effective international control, through a
Id control
organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee
the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments
and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for
ful purposes only,
$ The whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to
re
fear that its security was endangered,
0
of Expressing the hope that efforts to relax international tensions, to
promote mutual confidence and to develop co-operation among States,
such as the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the
four Powers, the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries
and the United Nations tenth anniversary commemorative meeting
at San Francisco, will prove effective in promoting world peace,
Desirous of contributing to the lowering of international tensions,
the strengthening of confidence between States, the removal of the
A
threat of war and the reduction of the burden of armaments,
Convinced therefore of the need to continue to seek agreement on a
comprehensive programme for disarmament which will promote inter-
peace
and security with the least diversion for armaments
d.
of the world's human and economic resources,
Welcoming the progress which has been made towards agreement
en objectives during the meetings in 1955 of the Sub-Committee of
1
et
n
peace-
LIS
1
je
je
1-
e
national
S
e
1
2852
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Com
objec
6.
infor
whic
SIOR
MISS!
tion
1
1
H.
I
3.
2
Fi
any disarmament agreement, nor on other essential matters set out
in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX),
Noting also that special technical difficulties have arisen in regard
to the detection and control of nuclear weapons material,
Recognizing further that inspection and control of disarmament can
best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of fear and suspicion,
1. Urges that the States concerned and particularly those on the
Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission:
(a) Should continue their endeavours to reach agreement on a com-
prehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in
General Assembly resolution 808 (IX);
(6) Should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on and
implementation of:
(i) Such confidence-building measures as the plan of Mr. Eisen-
hower, President of the United States of America, for ex-
changing military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection,
and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts
at strategic centres;
(ü) All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament
as are now feasible;
2. Suggests that account should also be taken of the proposals of
the Prime Minister of France for exchanging and publishing informa-
tion regarding military expenditures and budgets, of the Prime Min-
ister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
for seeking practical experience in the problems of inspection and con-
trol, and of the Government of India regarding the suspension of
experimental explosions of nuclear weapons and an "armaments
truce";
3. Calls upon the States concerned, and especially those on the
Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, to study the pro-
posal of the Prime Minister of France for the allocation of funds
resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living
throughout the world and, in particular, in the less-developed coun-
tries;
4. Recommends further that scientific search should be continued by
each State, with appropriate consultation between Governments
, for
methods that would make possible thoroughly effective inspection and
control of nuclear weapons material, having as its aim to facilitate
the solution of the problem of comprehensive disarmament;
5. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission reconvene its Sub-
Unit
AppE
1946
prop
II
5
ON
trer
befo
eve
ove
this
spel
chil
Cru
ano
long
pp. 55–56.
, , doc.
2 See Soviet proposal of July 21, 1965; The Geneva Conference of Heads all
Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955),
Proposal of July 21, 1955; ibid., pp. 60–62.
4 Ibid., p. 59.
5 Ibid., pp. 60–62.
3
1
2.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2853
in
le
1-
X-
1
overshadowed its potential for good. In the minds of most people
crucial importance in international relations. The common defense
Moreover, this Nation's monopoly of atomic weapons was of
longed by the most stringent security safeguards.
H. Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d sess.
? Act of Aug. 1, 1946; 60 Stat. 755.
Committee and that both pursue their efforts to attain the above
sbjectives;
rd į. Decides to transmit to the Disarmament Commission, for its
information, the records of the meetings of the First Committee at
rhich the disarmament problem was discussed during the tenth ses-
n,
sion of the General Assembly, and requests the Disarmament Com-
mission and the Sub-Committee to give careful and early considera-
tion to the views expressed in those documents.
0-
in
id
I. SHARING OF UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY
INFORMATION, 1954–1955
35. REVISION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946: Message
From the President to the Congress, February 17, 1954 1
To the Congress of the United States:
it For the purpose of strengthening the defense and economy of the
United States and of the free world, I recommend that the Congress
spprove a number of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of
of
1946.? These amendments would accomplish this purpose, with
proper security safeguards, through the following means:
First, widened cooperation with our allies in certain atomic
energy matters;
of Second, improved procedures for the control and dissemina-
tion of atomic energy information; and,
Third, encouragement of broadened participation in the de-
velopment of peacetime uses of atomic energy in the United
&
In 1946, when the Atomic Energy Act was written, the world was
on the threshold of the atomic era. A new and elemental source of
tremendous energy had been unlocked by the United States the year
before. To harness its power in peaceful and productive service was
even then our hope and our goal, but its awesome destructiveness
spelled the erasure of cities and the mass death of men, women, and
in
ts
2-
d
OS
States.
-
S
NUCLEAR PROGRESS
I
e
children.
f
2854
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
In this atmosphere the Atomic Energy Act was written. Well
suited to conditions then existing, the act in the main is still adequate
to the Nation's needs.
Since 1946, however, there has been great progress in nuclear science
and technology. Generations of normal scientific development have
been compressed into less than a decade. Each successive year has
seen technological advances in atomic energy exceeding even pro-
gressive estimates. The anticipations of 1946, when Government
policy was established and the Atomic Energy Act was written, have
been far outdistanced.
One popular assumption of 1946—that the United States could
maintain its monopoly in atomic weapons for an appreciable time-
was quickly proved invalid. That monopoly disappeared in 1949
,
only 3 years after the Atomic Energy Act was enacted. But to
counterbalance that debit on the atomic ledger there have been mighty
increases in our assets.
A wide variety of atomic weapons—considered in 1946 to be mere
possibilities of a distant future-have today achieved conventional
status in the arsenals of our Armed Forces. The thermonuclear
weapon, nonexistent 8 years ago, today dwarfs in destructive power
all atomic weapons. The practicability of constructing a submarine
with atomic propulsion was questionable in 1946; 3 weeks ago the
launching of the U. S. S. Nautilus made it certain that the use of
atomic energy for ship propulsion will ultimately become widespread
.
In 1946, too, economic industrial power from atomic energy sources
seemed very remote; today, it is clearly in sight-largely a matter of
further research and development, and the establishment of conditions
in which the spirit of enterprise can flourish.
Obviously, such developments as these within so short a
should have had a profound influence on the Nation's atomic energy
policy. But in a number of respects our atomic energy law is still
designed to fit the conditions of 1946.
Many statutory restrictions, based on such actual facts of 1946 as
the American monopoly of atomic weapons and limited application of
atomic energy in civilian and military fields, are inconsistent with the
nuclear realities
of 1954. Furthermore, these restrictions impede the
proper exploitation of nuclear energy for the benefit of the American
people and of our friends throughout the free world.
An objective assessment
of these varied factors leads clearly to these
conclusions: In respect to defense considerations, our atomic effective
ness will be increased if certain limited information on the use of
atomic weapons can be imparted more readily to nations allied with
us in common
defense. In respect to peacefuì applications of atomi
energy, these can be developed more rapidly and their benefits more
widely realized through broadened cooperation with
friendly nations
and through greater participation by American industry. By enhanc
ing our military effectiveness, we strengthen our efforts to deter as
gression; by enlarging opportunities for peacetime development, we
acceleratè our own progress and strengthen the free world.
Section 1 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 wisely recognizes the
period
S
I
1
1
e
8
T
8
t
f
سه نهه ه
8
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2855
1 Act of Oct. 30, 1951; 65 Stat. 692.
ence
COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS
nave
has
pro-
ment
have
Ower
arine
the
velopment, production of fissionable materials, and related research
ditions, may be better used to our national advantage.
friendly nations. Such cooperation requires the exchange of certain
Ir "
Well need for future revisions of the law. In its spirit, and in consideration
uate of matters of the utmost importance to the Nation's defense and wel-
fare, I recommend that the Congress approve a number of amend-
ments to the Atomic Energy Act.
In this atomic era the growth of international cooperation for the
defense of the free world is the most heartening development on the
world political scene. The United States is allied with many friends
in measures to deter aggression and, where necessary, to defeat the
ould
aggressor. The agreements binding ourselves and our friends in com-
ne-
mon defense constitute a warning to any potential aggressor that his
949,
it to
punishment will be swift and his defeat inevitable. These powerful
ghty
influences for peace must be made as strong and convincing as possible.
Most of our friends among the nations have had little opportunity
to inform themselves on the employment of atomic weapons. Under
mere
ional
present law we cannot give them tactical information essential to their
clear
effective participation with us in combined military operations and
planning, and to their own defense against atomic attack.
Our own security will increase as our allies gain information con-
cerning the use of and the defense against atomic weapons. Some of
our allies, in fact, are now producing fissionable materials or weapons,
read. supporting effective atomic energy research and developing peacetime
uses for atomic power. But all of them should become better informed
er of
in the problems of atomic warfare and, therefore, better prepared to
tions
meet the contingency of such warfare. In order for the free world to
be an effective defense unit, it must be geared to the atomic facts of
urge, therefore, that authority be provided to exchange with
nations
participating in defensive arrangements with the United States
such tactical information as is essential to the development of defense
46 as
plans and to the training of personnel for
atomic warfare. Amend-
ments to the definition of restricted data" recommended later in this
will also contribute to needed administrative flexibility in the
exchange of information with such nations concerning the use of
To meet a specific defense need existing in 1951, the Congress
approved a carefully limited procedure for the communication of
information on the processing of atomic raw materials
, reactor de-
and development. These limitations should now
be modified so that
the authority to communicate information, adjusted to present con-
Amendments are required for effective United States cooperation with
and
energy
also the release
of fissionable materials in amounts adequate for indus-
Se of
urces
this era.
I
eriod
nergy
stil
on of
h the
message
e the
atomic weapons.
rican
these
ctive
se of
with
tomic
more
tions
hanc
t, we
s the
2856
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
S
SE
P
C
8
1
de
If
SO
В
d
SE
] la
PE
to
PE
ofi
SU
OD
W
SUE
trial and research use. I therefore recommend that the Atomic Energy
Act be amended to authorize such cooperation. Such amendments
should prescribe that before the conclusion of any arrangements for
the transfer of fissionable material to a foreign nation, assurances must
be provided against its use by the recipient nation for military purposes
.
Sharing certain information with other nations involves risks that
must be weighed, in each instance, against the net advantages to the
United States. In each case we must be guided by such considera-
tions as: The sensitivity and importance of the data, the specific
uses to which the information will be put, the security standards of
the cooperating nation, its role in the common defense of the free
world, and the contributions it has made and can make to the mutual
security effort. Such considerations apply to the exchange or com-
munication of information on general-defense planning and the em-
ployment of conventional weapons as well as to the information that
could be exchanged pursuant to these recommendations.
These recommendations are apart from my proposal to seek & new
basis for international cooperation in the field of atomic energy as
outlined in my address before the General Assembly of the United
Nations last December.1 Consideration of additional legislation
which may be needed to implement that proposal should await the
development of areas of agreement as a result of our discussions with
other nations.
In a related area, present law prevents United States citizens or
corporations from engaging directly or indirectly in the production of
fissionable material outside the United States, except upon determina-
tion by the President that the proposed activity will not adversely
affect the common defense and security. Matters that have arisen
under this provision have been ordinary business or commercial
activities which nevertheless fall within the broad statutory prohibition
because they might contribute in some degree, however minor, to
foreign atomic-energy programs. The President'should be enabled to
authorize the Atomic Energy Commission to make future determina-
tions of this nature. This amendment is related also to the above
amendment concerning the exchange of information with other
countries, as arrangements for authorized exchanges of information
with friendly foreign governments may involve participation
American citizens or firms in work in foreign countries. The propose
amendment would permit the Atomic Energy Commission also to
authorize such participation.
All of these proposed amendments should make it clear that the
authority granted must be
exercised only in accordance
with conditions
prescribed by the President to protect the common defense and
security.
PROTECTION OF ATOMIC-ENERGY INFORMATION
A special category of "restricted data,” so defined as to include
virtually all atomic-energy data of security significance, is now
established by law. "Restricted data' are protected in the law by
VO
m
th
ty
fr
by
m
al
by
&C
ar
or
of
SO
th
th
tr
en
i Supra, pp. 2798–2805.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2857
its
For
st
ES
at
be
9-
fic
of
ee
al
1-
71-
at
21
as
ed
ON
he
th
unnecessary expense in time and money. I, therefore, recommend
tractors and licensees to afford access to restricted data" to personnel
special espionage provisions, provisions relating to the control, dis-
semination, and declassification of such data, and by requirements for
personnel security clearances.
Personnel security.—The provisions of the act relating to security
clearances of personnel need improvement in several respects. The
act does not recognize degrees of sensitivity of "restricted data."
The same clearance requirements apply to any type of "restricted
data," whether it be access by the unskilled construction laborer to
"restricted data" of only marginal security significance, or access by a
scientist to the heart of atomic weapons information. The Atomic
Energy Commission lacks sufficient latitude under present law to
determine the extent of personnel investigation needed for adequate
security. Many costly background investigations required by present
law are unnecessary. The Atomic Energy Commission should be
permitted to relate the scope of investigation required under the act
to the significance of the access to "restricted data" which will be
permitted.
This amendment is especially pertinent to the proposed broadening
of private participation in the development of atomic power. While
such private participants will require access to "restricted data'
on reactor technology, full investigations of all their employees who
will have such access are not warranted because much of the data
involved will not have significant security importance. Moreover,
such investigations would impede and discourage the desired partic-
ipation and would be unnecessarily costly both to Government and to
industry. Where access to more sensitive "restricted data” is in-
volved, the Commission must, of course, require full investigations.
Another security clearance problem relates to personnel of Depart-
ment of Defense agencies and to the personnel of contractors with
those agencies. The Atomic Energy Commission may now disclose
"restricted data” to such of these personnel as have security clearances
from the Department of Defense. The “restricted data” so disclosed
by the Commission are thereafter protected in accordance with Depart-
ment of Defense security regulations. And yet, contractors of the
Commission are precluded by law from granting the same personnel
access to the same "restricted data” until they have had AEC clear-
ances
, based on investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
or the Civil Service Commission.
As applications of atomic energy become increasingly widespread
within the armed services, the necessity
increases for communication
he
of "restricted data” between AEC contractors and participants in
nd
related Department of Defense programs. The present fact that
personnel engaged in military programs who have military clearances
must be denied access to restricted data” by AEC contractor per-
sonnel impedes cooperation between the Department of Defense and
de
the Atomic Energy Commission in areas of mutual interest and causes
Or
of
18-
ly
41
al
On
to
to
14-
ve
ter
OD
ed
to
15
OTT
b5
2858
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Dee
to
wit
are
rea
Th.
can
In
to
nea
nai
tha
seli
their work and who possess the proper military security clearances.
The definition of "restricted data". -(1) A large body of "restricted
data" under present law relates primarily to military utilization of
atomic weapons. The responsibility for the control of much of this
weapons information logically should rest with the Department of
Defense rather than with the Commission. Many administrative
difficulties that are produced by a dual system of security would be
eliminated by the removal of this weapons information from the
"restricted data” category and its subsequent protection by the
Department of Defense in the same manner and under the same safe-
guards as other military secrets.
This method of handling weapons information is not possible under
present law. "Restricted data can be removed from the statutory
restricted data" category only by declassification, upon a determina-
tion by the Atomic Energy Commission that the publication of such
data would not adversely affect the common defense and security.
Declassification obviously is not the remedy. The remedy lies
in reliance upon the standard security measures of the user, the
Department of Defense. I recommend, therefore, that the statutory
definition of "restricted data" be amended to exclude information
concerning the utilization of atomic weapons, as distinguished from
information on their theory, design, and manufacture.
(2) In addition to information which falls wholly within the utiliza-
tion category, there is information which concerns primarily the utiliza-
tion of weapons but which
pertains also to their design and manufac-
ture. In order to avoid difficulties in this marginal zone, I recommend
legislation which also would authorize removal of such information
from the "restricted data” category. This would be done only when
the Commission and the Department of Defense jointly determine
that it relates primarily
to military utilization of atomic weapons and
that it can be adequately safeguarded as classified defense information
under the Espionage Act and other applicable law.
(3) Consistent with these changes, I recommend that the Depart-
ment of Defense join with the Atomic Energy Commission in any
classification
of "restricted data” which relate primarily to military
utilization of atomic weapons and which can be published without
endangering the national security. Thus, the Department of Defense
will have an appropriate voice in the protection and declassification
of such “restricted data" and the responsibilities of the Commission
will be clarified with respect to all other "restricted data."
ma
der
the
PO
pra
Th
the
me
nif
En
de-
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY
What was only a hope and a distant goal in 1946--the beneficent
use of atomic energy in human service--can soon be a reality. Before
our scientists and engineers lie rich possibilities in the harnessing of
atomic power. The Federal Government can pioneer in its develop
ment. But, in this undertaking, the enterprise, initiative, and com.
petitive spirit of individuals and groups within our free economy are
1 See acts of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 217-219); June 25, 1948 (62 Stat. 736–738);
and Oct. 31, 1951 (65 Stat. 719–720).
act
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2859
f
f
2
I
I
1
.
S
e
0
1
needed to assure the greatest efficiency and progress at the least cost
to the public.
Industry's interest in this field is already evident. In collaboration
with the Atomic Energy Commission a number of private corporations
are now conducting studies, largely at their own expense, of the various
reactor types which might be developed to produce economic power.
There are indications that they would increase their efforts signifi-
cantly if the way were open for private investment in such reactors.
In amending the law to permit such investment, care must be taken
to encourage the development of this new industry in a manner as
nearly normal as possible, with careful regulation to protect the
national security and the public health and safety. It is essential
that this program so proceed that this new industry will develop
self-reliance and self-sufficiency.
The creation of opportunities for broadened industrial participation
may permit the Government to reduce its own reactor research and
development after private industrial activity is well established. For
the present, in addition to contributing toward the advancement of
power-reactor technology, the Government will continue to speed
progress in the related technology of military propulsion reactors.
The present complementary efforts of industry and Government will
therefore continue, and industry should be encouraged by the enact-
ment of appropriate legislation to assume a substantially more sig-
nificant role. To this end, I recommend amendments to the Atomic
Energy Act which would-
1. Relax statutory restrictions against ownership or lease of
fissionable material and of facilities capable of producing fission-
able material.
2. Permit private manufacture, ownership, and operation of
atomic reactors and related activities, subject to necessary safe-
guards and under licensing systems administered by the Atomic
Energy Commission.
3. Authorize the Commission to establish minimum safety and
security regulations to govern the use and possession of fissionable
4. Permit the Commission to supply licensees special materials
and services needed in the initial stages of the new industry at
prices estimated to compensate the Government adequately for
the value of the materials and services and the expense to the
Government in making them available.
5. Liberalize the patent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act,
principally by expanding the area in which private patents can
be obtained to include the production as well as utilization of
fissionable material, while continuing for a limited period the
authority to require a patent owner to license others to use an
invention essential to the peacetime applications of atomic
d
11
n
ce
d
m
material.
y
it
se
m
D
It
8
of
7
energy
ce
2);
Until industrial participation in the utilization of atomic energy
acquires a broader base, considerations of fairness require some
2860
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Same
scien
resea
&
Feat
no lo
magi
Since the isotopes of an element are similar in chemical behavior, their separation
mechanism to assure that the limited number of companies which, as TE
Government contractors now have access to the program, cannot build
a patent monopoly which would exclude others desiring to enter the The
field. I hope that participation in the development of atomic power state
will have broadened sufficiently in the next 5 years to remove the resul
need for such provisions.
In order to encourage the greatest possible progress in domestic
application of atomic energy, flexibility is necessary in licensing and indus
regulatory provisions of the legislation. Until further experience St
with this new industry has been gained, it would be unwise to try to prod
anticipate by law all of the many problems that are certain to arise. Hill
Just as the basic Atomic Energy Act recognized by its own terms that for a
it was experimental in a number of respects, so these amendments A1
will be subject to continuing future change and refinement.
pre-
The destiny of all nations during the 20th century will turn in large of st
measure upon the nature and the pace of atomic energy development very
here and abroad. The revisions to the Atomic Energy Act herein
recommended will help make it possible for American atomic energy Wort
development, public and private, to play a full and effective part in
leading mankind into a new era of progress and peace.
36. STABLE ISOTOPES AVAILABLE FOR FOREIGN DISTRIBU-
TION: Statement Issued to the Press by the United States
St
Atomic Energy Commission, July 1, 1954 1
not !
fessi
Stable isotopes produced in facilities of the U. S. Atomic Energy used
Commission will be available for foreign distribution under a program Deus
announced today by the Commission.?
Radioisotopes have been sold to foreign users by the Commission
since 1947, but stable isotopes generally have been available only
to users within the United States. About 175 stable isotopes
nearly 50 elements are produced by the AEC. Stable isotopes
, 37,
like radioisotopes, are valuable tools for basic research in various
scientific fields.
A total of 48 foreign countries has been authorized to receive
radioisotopes produced in the United States, and approximately State
2,500 foreign shipments of radioisotopes have been made. Foreign of 1
requests for stable isotopes will be forwarded to the Commission
through the official representatives of foreign nations for radioisotope
procurement.
ses
| Atomic Energy Commission press release 547, July 1, 1954.
2 Most elements have several forms, similar in chemical behavior but differing
in atomic weight. These are the isotopes of the element. More than 1,000 to b
isotopes occur naturally or have been artifically produced. Some are radioactive,
These usually are called radioisotopes. Others are non-radioactive
, or stable.
from each other requires special processes. (Footnote in original.]
Energy Commission on July 16, 1951;
Department of State Bulletin, July 30,
1951, pp. 181–182.
has
in qu
isoto
biolo
temy
BA
"CE
tion
16
ment
2
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2861
2 Act of Aug. 1, 1946; 60 Stat. 755.
S
e
le
e
for a similar purpose,
S
It
ni
I
"CHAPTER 1. DECLARATION, FINDINGS, AND PURPOSE
to be the policy of the United States that,
ment of State Bulletin, Sept. 13, 1954, pp. 365-366.
The terms and conditions for obtaining stable isotopes will be the
d xme as those which now apply to foreign requests for radioisotopes.
The applicant must agree to use the isotope only for the purpose
r stated in the application, and also must agree to report research
results to the AEC. Foreign countries may obtain isotopes for
scientific research, medical research, industrial isotopes for scientific
c research, medical research, industrial research, medical therapy and
d industrial utilization.
Stable isotopes will be sold at prices which will recover full costs of
0 production. The quantity of a stable isotope approved for export
2. will be limited to the amount generally provided to a domestic user
Although some stable isotopes have been produced since the 1930's,
pre-World War II techniques for the concentration and separation
e of stable isotopes were impracticable for most elements, and only
Fery minute quantities of pure separated isotopes could be obtained.
Electromagnetic separation was one of the methods used during
World War II to separate the uranium-235 isotope, needed for atomic
weapons, from the more common uranium-238 isotope. This method
no longer is used for uranium separation. However, part of the electro-
magnetic separation plant at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
has been utilized for the production of stable isotopes for research,
in quantities much greater than were available before. Most stable
isotopes now are produced by electromagnetic separation.
Stable isotopes have various research uses. Some elements do
not have radioisotopes with half-lives long enough to make their use
feasible in experiments. Stable isotopes of these elements can be
used in tracer experiments. Boron–10 is useful as a neutron detector.
» Deuterium, the stable heavy isotope of hydrogen, has been utilized in
biological and chemical studies." Helium 3 is important in low-
teraperature studies.
of
5, 37. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954: Public Law 703 (83d Con-
gress, 2d Session), August 30, 1954 (Excerpts)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
That the Atomic
Energy Act
of 1946, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. DECLARATION.- Atomic energy is capable of applica-
as well as military purposes. It is therefore declared
"a. the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall
be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the
108 Stat. 919. For statement of the President on signing the act, see Depart-
1
-T
ES
he
71
1
8
So
tion for peaceful
2
2
D
C
2,
2862
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
1
S
"a. a program of conducting, assisting, and fostering research
general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective
of making the maximum contribution to the common defense and
security; and
“b. the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall
be directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general
welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free
competition in private enterprise.
"Sec. 2. FINDINGS.-- The Congress of the United States hereby
makes the following findings concerning the development, use, and
control of atomic energy:
"a. The development, utilization, and control of atomic energy for
military and for all other purposes are vital to the common defense
and security.
“b. In permitting the property of the United States to be used by
others, such use must be regulated in the national interest and in order
to provide for the common defense and security and to protect the
health and safety of the public.
"c. The processing and utilization of source, byproduct, and special
nuclear material affect interstate and foreign commerce and must be
regulated in the national interest.
"S
“d. The processing and utilization of source, byproduct, and special
nuclear material must be regulated in the national interest and in
order to provide for the common defense and security and to protect used
"a.
the health and safety of the public.
"e. Source and special nuclear material, production facilities, and brane
utilization facilities are affected with the public interest, and regulation lative
by the United States of the production and utilization of atomic missi
energy and of the facilities used in connection therewith is necessary judic
in the national interest to assure the common defense and security
"b
and to protect the health and safety of the public.
"f. The necessity for protection against possible interstate damage
occurring from the operation of facilities for the production or utiliza perm
tion of source or special nuclear material places the operation of those san
"C
facilities in interstate commerce for the purposes of this Act.
"g. Funds of the United States may be provided for the develop-
"d
ment and use of atomic energy under conditions which will provide for
the common defense and security
and promote the general welfare
“h. It is essential to the common defense and security that title to devic
all special nuclear material be in the United States while such special
nuclear material is within the United States.
"e
“Sec. 3. PURPOSE.—
It is the purpose of this Act to effectuate the
(exce
policies set forth above by providing for-
if
industrial progress;
"b. a program for the dissemination of unclassified scientific
and technical information and for the control, dissemination, and defen
declassification of Restricted Data, subject
to appropriate safe-
guards, so as to encourage scientific and industrial progress;
come
with
the
C
energ
devid
ment
expo:
utiliz
"
cater
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2863
1
3
1
2
device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the
d utilizing special nuclear material.
| defense and security of the United States.
category determined by any Government agency authorized to classify
"c. & program for Government control of the possession, use,
and production of atomic energy and special nuclear material so
directed as to make the maximum contribution to the common
defense and security and the national welfare;
"d. a program to encourage widespread participation in the de-
velopment and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and
security and with the health and safety of the public;
"e. å program of international cooperation to promote the
common defense and security and to make available to cooperating
nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as
widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common
defense and security will permit; and
"f. a program of administration which will be consistent with
the foregoing policies and programs, with international arrange-
ments, and with agreements for cooperation, which will enable the
Congress to be currently informed so as to take further legislative
action as may be appropriate.
"CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS
"Sec. 11. DEFINITIONS.—The intent of Congress in the definitions as
given in this section should be construed from the words or phrases
used in the definitions. As used in this Act:
". The term 'agency of the United States' means the executive
branch of the United States, or any Government agency, or the legis-
lative branch of the United States, or any agency, committee, com-
e mission, office, or other establishment in the legislative branch, or the
I judicial branch of the United States, or any office, agency, committee,
7 commission, or other establishment in the judicial branch.
“h. The term “agreement for cooperation means any agreement
with another nation or regional defense organization, authorized or
permitted by sections 54, 57, 64, 82, 103, 104, or 144, and made pur-
"e. The term 'atomic energy' means all forms of energy released in
the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.
"d. The term 'atomic weapon' means any device utilizing atomic
energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the
ment of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.
16. The term byproduct material means any radioactive material
lexcept special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by
exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or
1. The term "Commission means the Atomic Energy Commission.
3. The term 'common defense and security' means the common
1
e
e
suant to section 123.
r
0
1
8
C
d
2864
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
seci
oth
Pro
one
in
DUI
mat
SOWI
exce
man
sign, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the produc-
information, as being information respecting, relating to, or affecting alas
the national defense.
"i. The term 'design' means (1) specifications, plans, drawings
,
blueprints, and other items of like nature; (2) the information con-
tained therein; or (3) the research and development data pertinent
to the information contained therein.
"j. The term 'Government agency' means any executive depart-Con
ment, commission, independent establishment, corporation, wholly or
partly owned by the United States of America which is an instru-
mentality of the United States, or any board, bureau, division, service
,
office, officer, authority, administration, or other establishment in the
61,
executive branch of the Government.
“k. The term 'international arrangement' means any international the
agreement hereafter approved by the Congress or any treaty during
the time such agreement or treaty is in full force and effect, but does inch
not include any agreement for cooperation.
Can
"1. The term Joint Committee' means the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy.
sm. The term 'operator' means any individual who manipulates expe
the controls of a utilization or production facility.
to b.
"n. The term 'person' means (1) any individual, corporation, part-
nership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution
, adap
group, Government agency other than the Commission, any State or
any political subdivision of, or any political entity within a State, any
foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any such
government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor,
representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
"0. The term produce, when used in relation to special nuclear
material, means (i) to manufacture, make, produce, or refine special
nuclear material; (2) to separate special nuclear material from other
80 A
substances in which such material may be contained; or (3) to make
or to produce new special nuclear material.
"p. The term 'production facility' means (1). any equipment or
device determined by rule of the Commission to be capable of the pro-
duction of special nuclear material in such quantity as to be of signifi-
cance to the common defense and security, or in such manner as to
affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any important com
ponent part especially designed for such 'equipment or device as de
termined by the Commission.
"q. The term research and development means (1) theoretical anes
analysis, exploration, or experimentation; or (2) the extension of
investigative findings and theories of a scientific or technical nature
into practical application for experimental and demonstration pur
poses, including the experimental production and testing of models
,
devices, equipment, materials, and processes.
ar. "The term "Restricted Data' means all data concerning (1) de-
material in the production of energy, but shall not include data de
signi
to a
Com
deter
"S
bers
dent
ther
Choi
Com
Chaj
man
the i
auth
one
vote
the :
Com
pers
the
and
Com
1
while
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2865
r
'
e
S
n
S
| Commission as Acting Chairman to act in the place and stead of the
| authority in all decisions and actions of the Commission and shall have
Commission in its relations with the Congress, Government agencies,
the faithful execution of the policies and decisions of the Commission,
| and shall report thereon to the Commission from time to time or as the
Commission may direct. The Commission sholl have an official seal
which shall be judicially noticed.
I classified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to
section 142.
ly 13. The term 'source material' means (1) uranium, thorium, or any
üher material which is determined by the Commission pursuant to the
t
provisions of section 61 to be source material; or (2) ores containing
one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the
Commission may by regulation determine from time to time.
44. The term 'special nuclear material' means (1) plutonium, ura-
zium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other
material which the Commission pursuant to the provisions of section
s1, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include
source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of
11
the foregoing, but does not include source material.
"u. The term 'United States', when used in a geographical sense,
includes all Territories and possessions of the United States, and the
Canal Zone.
"y. The term 'utilization facility' means (1) any equipment or device,
except an atomic weapon, determined by rule of the Commission to be
capable of making use of special nuclear material in such quantity as
to be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such
.
manner as to affect the health and safety of the public, or peculiarly
1: adapted for making use of atomic energy in such quantity as to be of
significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner as
T
to affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any important
component part especially designed for such equipment or device as
E, determined by the Commission.
"CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION
"Sec. 21. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.-There is hereby established
an Atomic Energy Commission, which shall be composed of five mem-
bers
, each of whom shall be a citizen of the United States. The Presi-
dent shall designate one member of the Commission as Chairman
thereof to serve as such during the pleasure of the President. The
Chairman may from time to time designato any other member of the
Chairman during his absence. The Chairman (or the Acting Chair-
man in the absence of the Chairman) shall preside at all meetings of
the Cominission and a quorum for the transaction of business shall
consist of at least three members present. Each member of the Com-
of bission
, including the Chairman, shall have equal responsibility and
one vote. Action of the Commission shall be determined by a majority
$
mote of the members present. The Chairman (or Aeting Chairman in
the absence of the Chairman) shall be the official spokesman of the
persons
, or the public, and, on behalf of the Commission, shall see to
OI
LI
ol
er
ke
DI
10
2-
O"
re
T-
i
f
EI
e
415900-57--Vol. 2,77
2866
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
{
Sections 22-28 deal with Members, Office, General Manager, Divisions
and Offices, General Advisory Committee, Military Liaison Committee,
suth
and Appointment of Army, Navy, or Air Force Officers.]
siich
as it
"CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH
Com
discr
"SEC. 31. RESEARCH ASSISTANCE.-
studi
"a. The Commission is directed to exercise its powers in such man-
ner as to insure the continued conduct of research and development
activities in the fields specified below, by private or public institutions
or persons, and to assist in the acquisition of an ever-expanding fund
of theoretical and practical knowledge in such fields. To this end
the Commission is authorized and directed to make arrangementsBS-
(including contracts, agreements, and loans) for the conduct of
research and development activities relating to-
“(1) nuclear processes;
“(2) the theory and production of atomic energy, including
processes, materials, and devices related to such production;
"(3) utilization of special nuclear material and radioactive
material for medical, biological, agricultural, health, or military
purposes;
"(4) utilization of special nuclear material, atomic energy,
and
radioactive material and processes entailed in the utilization or
production of atomic energy or such material for all other purs:
poses, including industrial uses, the generation of usable energy, tion
and the demonstration of the practical value of utilization or pro-ind
duction facilities for industrial or commercial purposes; and
"(5) the protection of health and the promotion of safety
during research and production activities.
"S
b. The Commission may (1) make arrangements pursuant to this duet
section, without regard to the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised utiliz
Statutes, as amended, upon certification by the Commission that such the
action is necessary in the interest of the common defense and security,
or upon a showing by the Commission that advertising is not reasonas
ably practicable; (2) make partial and advance payments under such as ele
arrangements; and (3) make available for use in connection therewith priat
such of its equipment and facilities as it may deem desirable.
"C. The arrangements made pursuant to this section shall contain publ
such provisions (i) to protect health, (2) to minimize danger to life or
property, and (3) to require the reporting and to permit the inspection bodi
of work performed thereunder, as the Commission may determine
.
No such arrangement shall contain any provisions or conditions which eber
prevent the dissemination of scientific or technical information, except
to the extent such dissemination is prohibited by law.
"SEC. 32. RESEARCH BY THE COMMISSION.–The Commission is
authorized and directed to conduct, through it own facilities, activities
and studies of the types specified in section 31.
"Sec. 33. RESEARCH FOR OTHERS.-Where the Commission finds
private facilities or laboratories are inadequate to the purpose, if I
Facil
to P
of st
auth
the
men
Com
"S
dete
mat
nuc
1 41 U.S.C. $5.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2867
AS
TIES.
19
ve
is determine from time to time that other material is special nuclear
| material in addition to that specified in the definition as special
nuclear material. Before making any such determination, the Com-
28 authorized to conduct for other persons, through its own facilities,
y such of those activities and studies of the types specified in section 31
as it deems appropriate to the development of atomic energy. The
Commission is authorized to determine and make such charges as in its
discretion may be desirable for the conduct of such activities and
studies.
e-
at
"CHAPTER 5. PRODUCTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL
id
Id
"Sec. 41. OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF PRODUCTION FACILI-
ts
of "a. OWNERSHIP OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES.—The Commissioni,
as agent of and on behalf of the United States, shall be the exclu-
sive owner of all production facilities other than facilities which
(1) are useful in the conduct of research and development activi-
ties in the fields specified in section 31, and do not, in the opinion
of the Commission, have a potential production rate adequate to
LY
enable the user of such facilities to produce within a reasonable
period of time a sufficient quantity of special nuclear material
to produce an atomic weapon; or (2) are licensed by the Commis-
sion pursuant to section 103 or 104.
(Subsections b. and c. deal with operation of the commission's produc-
yution facilities and operation of other production facilities. Sections 42
05 and 43 deal with Irradiation of Materials and Acquisition of Production
ty
"Sec. 44. DISPOSITION OF ENERGY.—If energy is produced at pro-
is duction facilities of the Commission or is produced in experimental
ed utilization facilities of the Commission, such energy may be used by
ch the Commission, or transferred to other Government agencies, or sold
s, i publicly, cooperatively, or privately owned utilities or users at
I reasonable and nondiscriminatory prices. If the energy produced
ch
s electric energy, the price shall be subject to regulation by the appro-
the priate agency having jurisdiction. In contracting for the disposal
of such energy, the Commission shall give preference and priority to
in public bodies and cooperatives or to privately owned utilities provid-
oping electric utility services to high cost areas not being served by public
bodies or cooperatives. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
authorize the Commission to engage in the sale or distribution of
energy for commercial use except such energy as may be produced by
pt the Commission incident to the operation of research and develop-
ment facilities of the Commission, or of production facilities of the
"CHAPTER 6. SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
"Sec. 51. SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.-The Commission may
or
T-
Facilities.]
OB
Le.
Commission.
IS
25
2868
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
DIE
which such nation is a party and which is made in accordance with
“SEC. 55. ACQUISITION.- The Commission is authorized to purchase
or otherwise acquire any special nuclear material or any interest therein
outside the United States without regard to the provisions of section
mission must find that such material is capable of releasing substan
37
tial quantities of atomic energy and must find that the determination
that such material is special nuclear material is in the interest of the de
common defense and security, and the President must have expresslytis
assented in writing to the determination. The Commission's deter-
mination, together with the assent of the President, shall be submitted
to the Joint Committee and a period of thirty days shall elapse while
Congress is in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be
excluded the days on which either House is not in session because
of an adjournment for more than three days) before the determination
of the Commission may become effective: Provided, however, That the
Joint Committee, after having received such determination, may by
resolution in writing, waive the conditions of or all or any portion of
such thirty-day period.
"SEC. 52. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF ALL SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL.--All rights, title, and interest in or to any special nuclear
material within or under the jurisdiction of the United States, now or
hereafter produced, shall be the property of the United States and
shall be administered and controlled by the Commission as agent of
and on behalf of the United States by virtue of this Act. Any person
owning any interest in any special nuclear material at the time when
such material is hereafter determined to be a special nuclear material
shall be paid just compensation therefor. Any person who lawfully
produces any special nuclear material, except pursuant to a contract
with the Commission under the provisions of section 31 or 41, shall
be paid a fair price, determined pursuant to section 56, for producing
such material.
"SEC. 53. DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATE-
[Subsections a.-e. deal with licenses, charges, and license conditions.
)
"f. The Commission is directed to distribute within the United
States sufficient special nuclear material to permit the conduct of
widespread independent research and development activities to the
maximum extent practicable and within the limitations set by the
President pursuant to section 41. In the event that applications for
special nuclear material exceed the amount available for distribution,
preference shall be given to those activities which are most likely
,
in the opinion of the Commission, to contribute to basic research, to the
development of peacetime uses of atomic energy, or to the economie
and military strength of the Nation.
"SEC. 54. FOREIGN DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL:
The Commission is authorized to cooperate with any nation by die
tributing special nuclear material and to distribute such special nuclear
material, pursuant to the terms of an agreement for cooperation
. "
section 123.
mat
RIAL,
from
thos
such
essel
that
inter
have
miss
shall
shall
days
in se
the
howe
141
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2869
0
ce
e
e
1
ne
R
er
OI
d
DI
1
II
al
V
interest of the common defense and security, and the President must
I have expressly assented in writing to the determination. The Com-
shell elapse while Congress is in session in computing such thirty
days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not
the determination of the Commission may become effective: Provided,
however, that the Joint Committee, after having received such deter-
3709 of the Revised Statutes,' as amended, upon certification by the
Commission that such action is necessary in the interest of the common
defense and security, or upon a showing by the Commission that adver-
tising is not reasonably practicable. Partial and advance payments
may be made under contracts for such purposes.
d
Section 56 deals with Fair Price.]
SEC. 57. PROHIBITION.-
"2. It shall be unlawful for any person to-
"(1) possess or transfer any special nuclear material which is
the property of the United States except as authorized by the
у
Commission pursuant to subsection 53 a.;
"(2) transfer or receive any special nuclear material in inter-
state commerce except as authorized by the Commission pursuant
to subsection 53 a., or export from or import into the United
States any special nuclear material, and
"(3) directly or indirectly engage in the production of any
special nuclear material outside of the United States except (A)
under an agreement for cooperation made pursuant to section 123,
or (B) upon authorization by the Commission after a determina-
tion that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the
United States.
"b. The Commission shall not distribute any special nuclear
material
"(1) to any person for a use which is not under the jurisdiction
ng
of the United States except pursuant to the provisions of section
(2) to any person within the United States, if the Commission
finds that the distribution of such special nuclear material to such
8. person would be inimical to the common defense and security.
ed
“CHAPTER 7. SOURCE MATERIAL
of
"Sec
. 61. SOURCE MATERIAL.-The Commission may determine
from time to time that other material is source material in addition to
those specified in the definition of source material. Before making
such determination, the Commission must find that such material is
ly
, efsential to the production of special nuclear material and must find
he
that the determination that
such material is source material is in the
shall be submitted to the Joint Committee and a period of thirty days
th 1 session because
of an adjournment of more than three days) before
ct
54; or
E-
he
he
or
BIC
S
JS.
jar
to
25€
102
141 U.S.C. $5.
211
2870
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Wea
ever,
tic
mination, may by resolution in writing waive the conditions of or
all or any portion of such thirty-day period.
"SEC. 62. LICENSE FOR TRANSFERS REQUIRED.-Unless authorized
by a general or specific license issued by the Commission, which the
Commission is hereby authorized to issue, no person may transfer or
receive in interstate commerce, transfer, deliver, receive possession of
or title to, or import into or export from the United States any source
material after removal from its place of deposit in nature, except that
licenses shall not be required for quantities of source material which
,
in the opinion of the Commission, are unimportant.
[Section 63 deals with Domestic Distribution of Source Material.)
"SEC. 64. FOREIGN DISTRIBUTION OF SOURCE MATERIAL.- The
(1)
Commission is authorized to cooperate with any nation by distribut-
wea
ing source material and to distribute source material pursuant to the
sary
terms of an agreement for cooperation to which such nation is a party
part
and which is made in accordance with section 123. The Commission
is also authorized to distribute source material outside of the United
States upon a determination by the Commission that such activity
of SE
will not be inimical to the interests of the United States.
of su
[Sections 65-69 deal with Reporting, Acquisition, Operations on
Lands Belonging to the United States, Public Lands, and Prohibition.) dans
"CHAPTER 8. BYPRODUCT MATERIAL
Section 81 deals with Domestic Distribution.]
"Sec. 82. FOREIGN DISTRIBUTION OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL.-
"a. The Commission is authorized to cooperate with any nation
by distributing byproduct material, and to distribute byproducts
material, pursuant to the terms of an agreement for cooperation to Valu
which such nation is party and which is made in accordance with
section 123.
“b. The Commission is also authorized to distribute byproduct MEN
material to any person outside the United States upon application : "
therefor by such person and demand such charge for such material ng
as would be charged for the material if it were distributed within the issui
United States: Provided, however, That the Commission shall not smo
distribute any such material to any person
under this section if, in its speci
opinion, such distribution would be inimical to the common defense the
and security: And provided further, That the Commission may
require such reports regarding the use of material distributed pur prot
.
q
suant to the provisions of this section as it deems necessary
"c. The Commission is authorized to license others to distribute
byproduct material to any person outside the United States under the cond
same conditions, except as to charges, as would be applicable if the strat
material were distributed by the Commission,
trans
exce
Prov
mod
"S
unde
ing i
mert
miss
term
unde
prot
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2871
le
OT
le
t-
he
protect the health and safety of the public.
stration of the practical value of such facilities for industrial or com-
mercial purposes. In issuing licenses under this subsection, the Com-
mission shall impose the minimum amount of such regulations and
under this Act to promote the common defense and security and to
terms of license as will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations
protect the health and safety of the public and will be compatible with
DI "CHAPTER 9. MILITARY APPLICATION OF ATOMIC
ENERGY
d
"SEC. 91. AUTHORITY.
"a. The Commission is authorized to—
of "(1) conduct experiments and do research and development
ce
work in the military application of atomic energy; and
at "(2) engage in the production of atomic weapons, or atomic
0,
weapon parts, except that such activities shall be carried on only
to the extent that the express consent and direction of the Presi-
dent of the United States has been obtained, which consent and
direction shall be obtained at least once each year.
"b. The President from time to time may direct the Commission
1) to deliver such quantities of special nuclear material or atomic
Feapons to the Department of Defense for such use as he deems neces-
sary in the interest of national defense, or (2) to authorize the De-
wy
partment of Defense to manufacture, produce, or acquire any atomic
OI
ad
weapon or utilization facility for military purposes: Provided, how-
eter, That such authorization shall not extend to the production
ty
of special nuclear material other than that incidental to the operation
of such utilization facilities.
"SEC. 92. PROHIBITION.-It shall be unlawful for any person to
or transfer or receive in interstate commerce, manufacture, produce,
transfer
, acquire, possess, import, or export any atomic weapon,
except as may be authorized by the Commission pursuant to the
provisions of section 91. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
modify the provisions of subsection 31 a. or section 101.
"CHAPTER 10. ATOMIC ENERGY LICENSES
ICO
Sections 101-103 deal with License Required, Finding of Practical
to
Value, and Commercial Licenses.]
th
"Sec. 104. MEDICAL THERAPY AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-
act WENT,
". The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to persons apply-
ial ing therefor for utilization facilities for use in medical therapy. In
he assuing such licenses the Commission is directed to permit the widest
tot amount of effective medical therapy possible with the amount of
its special nuclear material available for such purposes and to impose
the minimum amount
of regulation consistent with its obligations
sy
under this Act to promote the common defense and security and to
16. The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to persons apply-
eta e therefor for utilization and production facilities involved in the
e nduct of research and development activities leading to the demon-
che
on
OH
on
se
Ir-
2872
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
VK
du
Da
sh
MI
m
m
thi
m
54
the regulations and terms of license which would apply in the event
that a commercial license were later to be issued pursuant to section
103 for that type of facility. In issuing such licenses, priority shall be
given to those activities which will, in the opinion of the Commission,
lead to major advances in the application of atomic energy for indus-
trial or commercial purposes.
"c. The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to persons apply-
ing therefor for utilization and production facilities useful in the
conduct of research and development activities of the types specified
in section 31 and which are not facilities of the type specified in sub-
section 104 b. The Commission is directed to impose only such mini-
mum amount of regulation of the licensee as the Commission finds
will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under this Act to
promote the common defense and security and to protect the health
and safety of the public and will permit the conduct of widespread
and diverse research and development.
"d. No license under this section may be given to any person for
activities which are not under or within the jurisdiction of the United
States, except for the export of production or utilization facilities
under terms of an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to
section 123 or except under the provisions of section 109. No license
may be issued to any corporation or other entity if the Commission
knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled, or dominated
by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government. In any
event, no license may be issued to any person within the United States
if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to such
person would be inimical to the common defense and security or to
the health and safety of the public.
[Sections 105-107 deal with Antitrust Provisions, Classes of Facilities,
and Operators' Licenses.]
"SEC. 108. WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY.-Whenever the Con-
gress declares that a state of war or national emergency exists, the
Commission is authorized to suspend any licenses granted under this
Act if in its judgment such action is necessary to the common defense
and security. The Commission is authorized during such period, if
the Commission finds it necessary to the common defense and security
,
to order the recapture of any special nuclear material distributed under
the provisions of subsection 53 a., or to order the operation of any
facility licensed under section 103
or 104, and is authorized to order the
entry into any plant or facility in order to recapture such material, of
to operate such facility. Just compensation shall be paid for an
damages caused by the recapture of any special nuclear material or
by the operation of any such facility.
[Sections 109–110 deal with Component Parts of Facilities and E-
clusions.
0
120
DU
14
SU
W
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2873
int
on
be
)n,
IS-
to
ase
ion
that group of nations pursuant to sections 54, 57, 64, 82, 103, 104, or
applications of atomic energy and he may thereafter cooperate with
suant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance
"CHAPTER 11. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
"SEC. 121. EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. —Any pro-
vision of this Act or any action of the Commission to the extent and
during the time that it conflicts with the provisions of any inter-
national arrangement made after the date of enactment of this Act
15-
shall be deemed to be of no force or effect.
"SEC. 122. POLICIES CONTAINED IN INTERNATIONAL ARRANGE-
he
led
MENTS.-- In the performance of its functions under this Act, the Com-
mission shall give maximum effect to the policies contained in any
1b-
international arrangement made after the date of enactment of
ni-
this Act.
ids
to
"SEC. 123. COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS.-No cooperation
with
1tb
any nation or regional defense organization pursuant to sections
ad
54, 57, 64, 82, 103, 104, or 144 shall be undertaken until-
"a the Commission or, in the case of those agreements for coop-
for
eration arranged pursuant to subsection 144 b., the Department of
sed
Defense has submitted to the President the proposed agreement
ies
for cooperation, together with its recommendation thereon, which
to
proposed agreement shall include (1) the terms, conditions, dura-
tion, nature, and scope of the cooperation; (2) a guaranty by the
cooperating party that security safeguards and standards as set
Bed forth in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained; (3) a
INT
guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to be trans-
tes
ferred pursuant to such agreement will not be used for atomic
ach weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or
for any other military purpose; and (4) a guaranty by the cooper-
ating party that any material or any Restricted Dată to be trans-
ferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will not be
des,
transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of
the cooperating party, except as specified in the agreement for
cooperation;
the
“b. the President has approved and authorized the execution of
his
the proposed agreement for cooperation, and has made a deter-
mination in writing that the performance of the proposed agree-
i
ment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk
ty
to the common defense and security; and
der "c. the proposed agreement for cooperation, together with the
approval and the determination of the President, has been sub-
mitted to the Joint Committee and a period of thirty days has
elapsed while Congress is in session in computing such thirty
days
, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is
not in session because
of an adjournment of more than three days)
“Sec. 124. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC Pool.-The President is author-
ized to enter into an international arrangement with a group of
nations providing for international cooperation in the nonmilitary
144.a.: Provided, however, That the cooperation is undertaken pur-
to
on-
Ase
шу
the
DT
OT*
Fs
with section 123.
2874
-AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
gory
othe
gent
secti
and
IS
lic
anot
On-
Pro-
MUI
ato
tak
ARCO
"CHAPTER 12. CONTROL OF INFORMATION
“Sec. 141. POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the Commission to
control the dissemination and declassification of Restricted Data in
such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. Con-
sistent with such policy, the Commission shall be guided by the fol-
lowing principles:
"a. Until effective and enforceable international safeguards against
the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been estab-
lished by an international arrangement, there shall be no exchange
of Restricted Data with other nations except as authorized by section
144; and
“b. The dissemination of scientific and technical information relat-
ing to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to
provide that free interchange of ideas and criticism which is essential
to scientific and industrial progress and public understanding and to
enlarge the fund of technical information.
“SEC. 142. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF RESTRICTED
DATA.
"a. The Commission shall from time to time determine the data,
within the definition of Restricted Data, which can be published with-
out undue risk to the common defense and security and shall there-
upon cause such data to be declassified and removed from the category
of Restricted Data.
“b. The Commission shall maintain a continuous review of Re-
stricted Data and of any Classification Guides issued for the guid-
ance of those in the atomic energy program with respect to the areas
of Restricted Data which have been declassified in order to determine
which information may be declassified and removed from the category
of Restricted Data
without undue risk to the common defense and
security.
"c. In the case of Restricted Data which the Commission and the
Department of Defense jointly determine to relate primarily to the
military utilization of atomic weapons, the determination that such
data may be published without constituting an unreasonable risk to
the common defense and security shall be made by the Commission
and the Department of Defense jointly, and if the Commission and
the Department of Defense do not agree, the determination shall be
made by the President.
"d. 'The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data cate-
gory such data as the Commission and the
Department of Defense
jointly determine relates primarily to the military utilization of
atomic weapons and which the Commission and Department of
Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as defense
information: Provided, however, That no such data so removed from
the Restricted Data category shall be transmitted or otherwise made
available to any nation or regional defense organization, while such
data remains defense information,
except pursuant to an agreement
for cooperation entered into in accordance with subsection 144 b.
"e. The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data cate-
exis
the
witi
par
Res
Whi
Un
tial
Pro
cat
ato
ing
in
g01
me
COI
ate
1
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2875
0
1
gury such information concerning the atomic energy programs of
other nations as the Commission and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence jointly determine to be necessary to carry out the provisions of
section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
and can be adequately safeguarded as defense information.
(Section 143 deals with Department of Defense Participation.]
"Sec. 144. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.-
"a. The President may authorize the Commission to cooperate with
another nation and to communicate to that nation Restricted Data
t
e
1
01_
)
1
)
D
11
1
S
P
.
"(1) refining, purification, and subsequent treatment of source
material;
"(2) reactor development;
"(3) production of special nuclear material;
"(4) health and safety;
"(5) industrial and other applications of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes; and
"(6) research and development relating to the foregoing:
Provided, however, That no such cooperation shall involve the com-
munication of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of
atomic weapons: And provided further, That the cooperation is under-
taken pursuant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accord-
ance with section 123, or is undertaken pursuant to an agreement
existing on the effective date of this Act.
“b. The President may authorize the Department of Defense, with
the assistance of the Commission, to cooperate with another nation or
with a regional defense organization to which the United States is a
party, and to communicate to that nation or organization such
Restricted Data as is necessary to -
"(1) the development of defense plans;
"(2) the training of personnel in the employment of and defense
against atomic weapons; and
"(3) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in
the employment of atomic weapons,
while such other nation or organization is participating with the
United States pursuant to an international arrangement by substan-
tial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security:
Provided,
however, That no such cooperation shall involve communi
cation of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of
weapons except with regard to external characteristics, includ-
ng size
, weight, and shape, yields and effects, and systems employed
or use thereof but not including any data in these cate-
gories unless in the joint judgment of the Commission and the Depart-
ment of Defense such data will not reveal important information
concerning the design or fabrication of the nuclear components of an
weapon: And provided further, That the cooperation is under-
e
in the delivery
atomic
1 61 Stat. 498; 50 U.S.C. $ 403 (d).
2876
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
or res
lills,
ment
ment.
Department of Defense shall keep the Joint Committee fully and cur-
taken pursuant to an agreement entered into in accordance with
section 123.
Defen
atomi
[Sections 145-146 deal with Restrictions and General Provisions.) tion 1
"CHAPTER 13. PATENTS AND INVENTIONS
[Sections 151-160 deal with Military Utilization; Inventions Con-
ceived During Commission Contracts; Nonmilitary Utilization; In-
Como
junctions; Prior Art; Commission Patent Licenses; Compensation,
of the
Awards, and Royalties; Monopolistic Use of Patents; Federally Financed
mem
Research; and Saving Clause.
Repr
“CHAPTER 14. GENERAL AUTHORITY
or ot
the j
[Sections 161-169 deal with General Provisions, Contracts, Advisory Point
Committees, Electric Utility Contracts, Contract Practices, Comptroller
Com
General Audit, Claim Settlements, Payments in Lieu of Taxes, and No
Subsidy.]
(SE
Class
"CHAPTER 15. COMPENSATION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY
ACQUIRED
ISE
[Sections 171-174 deal with Just_Compensation, Condemnation of
Real Property, Patent Application Disclosures, and Attorney General
Approval of Title.]
Dheel
"CHAPTER 16. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
[Sections 181-189 deal with General, License Applications, Terms of
Licenses, Inalienability of Licenses, Construction Permits, Revocation,
Modification of Licensé, Continued Operation of Facilities, and Hearings
and Judicial Review.]
“CHAPTER 17. JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
"SEC. 201. MEMBERSHIP.—There is hereby established a Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy to be composed of nine Members of the
Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and nine
Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance not more
than five Members shall be members of the same political party.
"SEC. 202. AUTHOPITY AND DUTY.—The Joint Committee shall
make continuing studies of the activities of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and of problems relating to the development, use, and control
of atomic energy. During the first sixty days of each session of the
Congress, the Joint Committee shall conduct hearings in either open
or executive session for the purpose of receiving information concern-
ing the development, growth, and state of the atomic energy industry
.
The Commission shall keep the Joint Committee fully and currently
informed with respect to all of the Commission's activities. The
Sectio
Data:
Injur
IS
Prop
Appl
depa
Af
38.
me
UI
TH
erum
Irela
RE
they
RE
the e
e
IT
with
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2877
Recognizing that their common interests will be advanced by
0
United Kingdom, June 15, 1955 1
they be prepared to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare,
Recognizing that their mutual security and defense requires that
- the exchange of information pertinent thereto,
1 TIAS 3322 (6 UST 2721); entered into force July 21, 1955. Similar agreement
with Canada on the same date, TIAS 3305 (6 UST 2607).
h
Defense relating to the development, utilization, or application of
stomic energy. Any Government agency shall furnish any informa-
tion requested by the Joint Committee with respect to the activities
or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy. All
bills
, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House
of Rep-
resentatives relating primarily to the Commission or to the develop-
ment, use, or control of atomic energy shall be referred to the Joint
Committee. The members of the Joint Committee who are Members
( the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the
members of the Joint Committee who are Members of the House of
Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill
er otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within
the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are referred to the
Joint Committee or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Joint
Committee.
(Sections 203–207 deal with Chairman, Powers, Staff and Assistance,
Classification of Information, and Records.]
“CHAPTER 18. ENFORCEMENT
Sections 221–231 deal with General Provisions, Violation of Specific
Sections, Violation of Sections Generally, Communication of Restricted
hata, Receipt of Restricted Data, Tampering with Restricted Data,
Disclosure of Restricted Data, Statute of Limitations, Other Laws,
3 Injunction Proceedings, and Contempt Proceedings.]
"CHAPTER 19. MISCELLANEOUS
ES (Sections 241, 251, 261, 271–273, 281, and 291 deal with Transfer of
Property, Report to Congress, Appropriations, Agency Jurisdiction,
Applicability of Federal Power Act, Licensing of Government Agencies,
Separability, and Short Title.]
Approved August 30, 1954, 9:44 a. m., E.D.T.
38. ATOMIC INFORMATION FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE: Agree-
ment Between the Governments of the United States and the
The Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
.
rament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
$
7
2
2
e
Ireland,
2878 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Sec
ford
2
mer
3
sem
acce
ont
pursuant to this Agreement lower than those set forth in the applicable
Believing that the exchange of such information can be under-
taken without threat to the security of either country, and
Taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, which was prepared with these purposes in mind,
Agree as follows:
&gr
ARTICLE I
two
3.
1. While the United States and the United Kingdom are par- Dot
ticipating in international arrangements for their mutual defense
pers
and security and making substantial and material contribution the
thereto, each Government will from time to time make available the
to the other Government atomic information which the Govern- to to
ment making such information available deems necessary to:
(a) the development of defense plans;
b) the training of personnel in the employment of and defense
against atomic weapons; and
(c) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the
employment of atomic weapons.
A.
(a
2. Atomic information which is transferred by either Govern-
ment pursuant to this Agreement shall be used by the other Gov-
ernment exclusively for the preparation and implementation of
defense plans in the mutual interests of the two countries.
ARTICLE II
1. All transfers of atomic information to the United Kingdom
by the United States pursuant to this Agreement will be made in
compliance with the provisions of the United States Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and any subsequent applicable United States legislation
,
All transfers of atomic information to the United States by the United
Kingdom pursuant to this Agreement will be made in compliance with
the United Kingdom Official Secrets Acts, 1911-1939, and the United
Kingdom Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
2. Under this Agreement there will be no transfers by the United
States or the United Kingdom of atomic weapons or special nuclear
material, as these terms are defined in Section 11 d. and Section 11 t.
of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
ARTICLE III
1. Atomic information made available pursuant to this Agree
ment shall be accorded full security protection under applicable infor
security arrangements between the United States and the United zatie
Kingdom and applicable national legislation and regulations of
the two countries. In no case shall either Government maintain
security standards for safeguarding atomic information made available
$
b
NO
to co
Wing
deler
infor
this.
lativ
tion
TI
Gov.
1 Act of Aug. 30, 1954; supra.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2879
Government shall receive from the other Government written notifica-
1
information made available by the other Government pursuant to
information has been made available to that nation or regional organ-
ization by the other Government in accordance with its own legis-
lative requirements and except to the extent that such communica-
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each
security arrangements in effect on the date this Agreement comes into
force.
2. Atomic information which is exchanged pursuant to this Agree-
ment will be made available through channels existing or hereafter
greed for the exchange of classified defense information between the
two Governments,
3. Atomic information received pursuant to this Agreement shall
not be transferred by the recipient Government to any unauthorized
person or, except as provided in Article V of this Agreement, beyond
the jurisdiction of that Government. Each Government may stipulate
the degree to which any of the categories of information made available
to the other Government pursuant to this Agreement may be dis-
seminated, may specify the categories of persons who may have
Bocess to such information, and may impose such other restrictions
on the dissemination of such information as it deems necessary,
ARTICLE IV
As used in this Agreement, "atomic information" means:
(a) so far as concerns the information provided by the United
States, Restricted Data, as defined in Section 11 r. of the
f
United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which is permitted
to be communicated pursuant to the provisions of Section 144
b. of that Act, and information relating primarily to the military
utilization of atomic weapons which has been removed from
the Restricted Data category in accordance with the provisions
of Section 142 d. of the United States Atomic Energy Act of
1
1954;
I (b) so far as concerns the information provided by the United
Kingdom, information exchanged under this Agreement which
1
is either classified atomic energy information or other United
h
Kingdom defense information which it is decided to transfer to
d
the United States in pursuance of Article I of this Agreement.
ARTICLE V
Nothing herein shall be interpreted or operate as a bar or restriction
to consultation and cooperation by the United States or the United
Kingdom with other nations or regional organizations in any fields of
defense. Neither Government, however, shall communicate atomic
this Agreement to any nation or regional organization unless the same
tion is expressly authorized by such other Government.
ARTICLE VI
1
I
be
ho
Le
d
1)
le
e
2880
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
Haton
1
w this
Treat
tion W
1 TI AS 3521 (7 UST 397); entered into force Mar. 29, 1956. The agreement
tion that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional require the I
ments for the entry into force of such an Agreement, and shall remain com t
in effect until terminated by mutual agreement of both Governments. Secti
DONE at Washington this Fifteenth day of June 1955 in two 3. A
original texts.
the
upplica
.
till be
39. ATOMIC INFORMATION FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE: Agree intes
ment Between the United States and the Other Parties to the North
Nates
Atlantic Treaty, June 22, 1955
PREAMBLE
The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington 1. A
on 4th April, 1949,
Recognising that their mutual security and defence requires that
they be prepared to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare, and
North
Recognising that their common interests will be advanced by
2.0
making available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization infor-
mation pertinent thereto, and
orgina
Taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy Act
author
of 1954, which was prepared with these purposes in mind,
Acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization,
Agree as follows:
1. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to
make substantial and material contributions to the common defence
efforts, the United States will from time to time make available to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its civil and mili-
tary agencies and commands, atomic information wbich the Govern.
ment of the United States of America deems necessary to:
(a) the development of defence plans;
(b) the training of personnel in the employment of and defence
against atomic weapons; and
(c) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the
employment of atomic weapons.
2. As used in this Agreement so far as concerns information provided in effe
by the United States, “atomic information" means Restricted Date,
as defined in Section 11 r of the United States Atomic Energy Act of
1954, which is permitted to be communicated pursuant to the pro-
1.
visions of Section 144 b of that Act, and information relating primarily
Organi
tion re
Inform
Organi
that o
may st
ARTICLE I
made
of pers
such 0
becess
1.
under
and
P
lations
the sa
the pe
the U
shall
di No
2.'
fense, Apr. 2, -1955 (Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 25, 1955, pp. 686-687);
the President approved
the agreement in his letter to the chairman of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Apr. 13, 1955 (ibid., p. 686).
2 Supra, doc. 37.
INo
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2881
pin
Not reprinted here.
1
ARTICLE II
the United States of America pursuant to Article I of this Agreement
North Atlantic Treaty Organization defence plans.
in the military utilisation of atomic weapons which has been removed
irm the Restricted Data category in accordance with the provisions
Section 142 d of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
3. All transfers by the Government of the United States of America
tatomic information will be made in compliance with the provisions
the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and subsequent
pplicable United States legislation. Under this Agreement there
fill be no transfers of atomic weapons or special nuclear material, as
these terms are defined in Section 11 d and Section 11 t of the United
iates Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (The Sections of the United
šates Atomic Energy Act of 1954 referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3
il this Article are attached).
1. Atomic information which is transferred to the North Atlantic
Theaty Organization will be made available through the channels
mw existing for providing classified military information to the
orth Atlantic Treaty Organization.
2. Only those persons within the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
im whose duties require access to atomic information may be the
wiginal recipients of such information. Atomic information will be
authorised for dissemination within the North Atlantic Treaty
srganization only to persons whose North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
ton responsibilities require them to have access to such information.
hformation will not be transferred by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to unauthorised persons or beyond the jurisdiction of
thet Organization. The Government of the United States of America
made available by it may be disseminated, may specify the categories
of persons who may have access to such information, and may impose
such other restrictions on the dissemination of information as it deems
1. Atomic information will be accorded full security protection
under applicable North Atlantic Treaty Organization regulations
and procedures, and where applicable, national legislation and regu-
akions
. In no case will recipients maintain security standards
for
be safeguarding of atomic information lower than those set forth in
the pertinent North Atlantic Treaty Organization security regulations
effect on the date this Agreement comes into force.
1. Atomic information which is transferred by the Government of
necessary
ARTICLE III
ARTICLE IV
1
41590057--Vol. 2-78
2882
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
render reports to the Government of the United States of America Sex
of the use which has been made of the information. These reports RE
will contain pertinent information requested by the Government of Am
the United States of America and will in particular contain a list of
the persons possessing certain categories of information, in accordance
Se
with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article II, and a list of the docu-
oft
ments which have been transferred.
ll.
(
1. The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, other than the United
States, will to the extent that they deem necessary, make available
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization information in the same
categories as may be made available by the United States under for
Article I of this Agreement. Any such information will be supplied
on the same or similar conditions as those which apply under this the
Agreement with respect to the United States.
ARTICLE V
and
ARTICLE VI
Va.
of
1
1. The Agreement shall enter into force upon notification to the ser
United States by all Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty that they dg
are bound by the terms of the Agreement.
2. If any other State becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty qui
no information made available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organizares
tion under this Agreement will be provided to any person who is :
national of, or who is employed by, the new Party to the North
Atlantic Treaty until the new Party has notified the Government of me
the United States
of America that it is bound by the terms of this
Agreement, and upon such notification, this Agreement will enter into
force for the new Party.
3. The Government of the United States of America will inform to
all Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the entry into force of
this Agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article and of each notifica-
tion received under paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. This Agreement shall be valid as long as the North Atlantic les
Treaty is in force.
In witness whereof the undersigned Representatives have signed
the present Agreement on behalf of their respective States, member
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and on bebalf of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Done at Paris this 22nd day of June 1955, in the English
French languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single
original which shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government
of the United States of America. The Government of the United
States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the
signatory and acceding states.
COU
IT
Ch
and
US
Ju
6
18
int
wi
JU
ag
a
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2883
Netherlands, July 18, 1955 (entered into force Dec. 30, 1955) (TIAS 3461; 6
UST 6097); Pakistan, Aug. 11, 1955 (TIAS 3315; 6 UST 2665); Philippines,
erica SECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
ports REFERRED TO IN THE AGREEMENT FOR CO-OPERATION REGARDING
nt of ATOMIC INFORMATION
ist of
lanco
(Sections 113, 11r, 117, 142d, and 1446; not reproduced here, see text
locus of the Act, supra.]
40. CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY: Agreement Between the
Governments of the United States and the Turkish Republic,
nited June 10, 1955 1
lable
затв Whereas the peaceful uses of atomic energy hold great promise
nder for all mankind; and
Whereas the Government of the United States of America and
this the Government of the Turkish Republic desire to cooperate with
each other in the development of such peaceful uses of atomic energy;
and
Whereas there is well advanced the design and development of
the several types of research reactors (as defined in Article Å of this
they Agreement); and
Whereas research reactors are useful in the production of research
eaty quantities of radioisotopes, in medical therapy and in numerous other
nize research activities and at the same time are a means of affording
is a valuable training and experience in nuclear science and engineering
orth useful in the development of other peaceful uses of atomic energy
at of including civilian nuclear power; and
this
Whereas the Government of the Turkish Republic desires to pursue
into a research and development program looking toward the realization
of the peaceful and humanitarian uses of atomic energy and desires
tomto obtain assistance from the Government of the United States of
TIAS 3320 (6 UST 2703); entered into force on date of signature. The
agreement with Turkey is usually considered the "Master" agreement, being the
first concluded under the "Atoms for Peace” program. As of the end of calendar
Pear 1955 the United States had signed similar agreements with the following
muntries on the dates indicated: Argentina, July 29, 1955 (TIAS 3299; 6 UST
1937); Belgium, July 21, 1955 (TIAS 3301; 6 UST 2551); Brazil, Aug.' 3, 1955
Chile, Aug. 8, 1955 (TIAS 3306; 6 UST
2611); China, July 18, 1955 (TIAS
3307
the i UST 2617); Colombia, July 19, 1955 (TÍÁS 3308; 6 UST 2623), Denmark,
UST 2635); Israel, July 12, 1955 (TIAS 3311; 6 UŚT 2641) Italy, July 28, 1955
(TTAS 3312; 6 UST 2647); Japan, Nov. 14, 1955 (entered into force Dec. 27, 1955)
TITAS 3465; 6 UST 6119); "Lebanon, July 18, 1955 (TIAS 3313; 6 UST 2653);
the
GUST 2677); Spain, July 19, 1955 TIAS 3318; & UST 2689); Switzerland, July
into force July 21
, 1955) TIAS 3321; 6 UST 2009); supplemental agreement
prilike the United Kingdom, Nov. 3, 1955 (TIAS 3359; 6'ÚST 3079); and Venezuela,
dely 21, 1955 (TIAS:3:23; 6' UST 27255. TExcept where otherwise indicated, these
agreements entered into force on the date of signature.
ce of
fica-
antic
gned
bers
and
ngle
hent
ited
2884
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Inr
ma-
res
be
me
America and United States industry with respect to this program;
and
the
Whereas the Government of the United States of America, repre-
sented by the United States Atomic Energy Commission (hereinafter
Ar
referred to as the "Commission"), desires to assist the Government
of the Turkish Republic in such a program;
The Parties therefore agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
tbe
Subject to the limitations of Article V, the parties bereto will ара
exchange information in the following fields:
per
spe
A. Design, construction and operation of research reactors and
their use as research, development, and engineering tools and in
medical therapy.
B. Health and safety problems related to the operation and use
of research reactors.
C. The use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological
research, medical therapy, agriculture, and industry.
TI
ARTICLE II
zat
A. The Commission will lease to the Government of the Turkish of
a
Republic uranium enriched in the isotope U-235, subject to the terms
and conditions provided herein, as may be required as initial and re-
tra:
placement fuel in the operation of research reactors which the Govern-
ment of the Turkish Republic, in consultation with the Commission,
decides to construct and as required in agreed experiments re-
lated thereto. Also, the Commission will lease to the Government
of the Turkish Republic uranium enriched in the isotope U-235
,
subject to the terms and conditions provided herein, as may be re-
quired as initial and replacement fuel in the operation of such research
reactors as the Government of the Turkish Republic may, in con.
sultation with the Commission, decide
to authorize private individuals
or private organizations under its jurisdiction to construct and operate
,
provided the Government of the Turkish Republic shall at all times
maintain sufficient control of the material and the operation of the }
reactor to enable the Government of the Turkish Republic to comply
with the provisions of this Agreement and the applicable provisions of
the lease arrangement.
B. The quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 trans-
ferred by the Commission into the custody of the Government of the
Turkish Republic shall not at any time be in excess of six (6) kilograms Da
of contained U-235 in uranium enriched up to a maximum of twenty
percent (20%) U-235, unless the Commission shall specify that
greater quantity of such material may be transferred under this Agree-
ment to the Government of the Turkish Republic or authorized per-
sons under its jurisdiction.
C. When any fuel elements containing U-235 leased by the Com-
mission require replacement, they shall be returned to the Commis
sion and, except as may be agreed, the form and content of the
&NC
and
ern
and
and
seri
the
trai
ing
A
SUCI
rich
user
mel
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 2885
re-
ter
ent
in
ise
riched in the isotope U-235 leased from the Commission shall be
used solely for the purposes agreed in accordance with this Agree-
irradiated fuel elements shall not be altered after their removal from
cm;
the reactor and prior to delivery to the Commission.
D. The lease of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 under this
Article shall be on such terms and conditions as may be mutually
agreed and under the conditions stated in Articles VI and VII.
ARTICLE III
Subject to the availability of supply and as may be mutually agreed,
the Commission will sell or lease through such means as it deems
rill appropriate, to the Government of the Turkish Republic or authorized
persons under its jurisdiction such reactor materials, other than
special nuclear materials, as are not obtainable on the commercial
nd market and which are required in the construction and operation of
research reactors in Turkey. The sale or lease of these materials shall
be on such terms as may be agreed.
ARTICLE IV
mal
It is contemplated that, as provided in this Article, private indi-
viduals and private organizations in either the United States or
Turkey may deal directly with private individuals and private organi-
zations in the other country. Accordingly, with respect to the subjects
ish of agreed exchange of information as provided in Article I, the Govern-
ment of the United States will permit persons under its jurisdiction to
transfer and export materials, including equipment and devices, to,
and perform services for, the Government of the Turkish Republic
on,
and such persons under its jurisdiction as are authorized by the Gov-
ernment of the Turkish Republic to receive and possess such materials
nt and utilize such services, subject to:
5,
A. Limitations in Article V.
ch
B. Applicable laws, regulations and license requirements of the
Government of the United States, and the Government of the
e,
ARTICLE V
le
Restricted Data shall not be communicated under this Agreement
IT
and no materials or equipment and devices shall be transferred and no
of services shall be furnished under this Agreement to the Government of
the Turkish Republic or authorized persons under its
jurisdiction if the
transfer of any such materials or equipment and devices or the furnish-
me of any such services involves the communication of Restricted
ARTICLE VI
1. The Government of the Turkish Republic agrees to maintain
she safeguards as are necessary to assure that the uranium en-
ment and
to assure the safekeeping of this material.
US
re-
-11-
-
11-
Is
Turkish Republic.
3.
S-
je
IS
Data.
V
ܝܨ ܒܘ
le
ga
le
2886
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
DIE
one
mig
I
At the expiration of this Agreement or any extension thered
mission at a site in the United States designated by the Commissie
B. The Government of the Turkish Republic agrees to maintain
such safeguards as are necessary to assure that all other reactor
materials, including equipment and devices, purchased in the United Le
States of America under this Agreement by the Government of the
Turkish Republic or authorized persons under its jurisdiction, shall
be used solely for the design, construction, and operation of research
reactors which the Government of the Turkish Republic decides to
construct and operate and for research in connection therewith, excepten
as may otherwise be agreed.
ing
C. În regard to research reactors constructed pursuant to this from
Agreement the Government of the Turkish Republic agrees to mai-
tain records relating to power levels of operation and burnup of reactor
fuels and to make annual reports to the Commission on these subjects
If the Commission requests, the Government of the Turkish Republic
will permit Commission representatives to observe from time to time
the condition and use of any leased material and to observe the per-
formance of the reactor in which the material is used.
ARTICLE VII
Guaranties Prescribed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954
The Government of the Turkish Republic guaranties that:
pro
A. Safeguards provided in Article VI shall be maintained dev
B. No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to
the Government of the Turkish Republic or authorized person
der:
under its jurisdiction, pursuant to this Agreement, by lease, seal tion
or otherwise will be used for atomic weapons or for research oz er
I
development of atomic weapons or for any other military purposes
and that no such material,
including equipment and devices
, will be
transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction
the Government of the Turkish Republic except as the Commission. I
may agree to such transfer to another nation and then only if in the me
opinion of the Commission such transfer falls within the scope o! | I
agreement for cooperation between the United States and the other
nation.
ARTICLE VIII
This Agreement shall enter into force on June 10, 1955 and te
main in force until June 9, 1965, inclusively, and shall be subjek
to renewal as may be mutually agreed.
States all fuel elements containing reactor fuels leased by the Cam
mission and any other fuel materiál leased by the Commission
. Sud
fuel elements and such fuel materials shall be delivered to the Chur
anc
par
ANO
BUC
Sta
.
1 Act of Aug. 30, 1954; supra, doc. 37.
DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
2887
o time
Lintain the expense of the Government of the Turkish Republic, and such
eactor delivery shall be made under appropriate safeguards against radiation
United hazards while in transit.
of the
shal
ARTICLE IX
,
search It is the hope and expectation of the parties that this initial Agree-
des te ment for Cooperation will lead to consideration of further cooperation
except extending to the design, construction, and operation of power produc-
ng reactors. Accordingly, the parties will consult with each other
from time to time concerning the feasibility of an additional agreement
main-
mall for cooperation with respect to the production of power from atomic
reactor
energy in Turkey
.
bjects
.
epublic
ARTICLE X
For purposes of this Agreement:
de per-
"Commission" means the United States Atomic Energy Com-
mission or its duly authorized representatives.
B. “Equipment and devices” means any instrument or apparatus,
and includes research reactors, as defined herein, and their component
parts.
C. “Research reactor” means a reactor which is designed for the
production of neutrons and other radiations for general research and
development purposes, medical therapy, or training in nuclear science
and engineering. The term does not cover power reactors, power
Derse demonstration reactors, or reactors designed primarily for the produc-
tion of special nuclear materials.
D. The terms "Restricted Data", "atomic weapon", and "special
por unclear material
” are used in this Agreement as defined in the United
will States Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
nisionIn WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agree-
in the ment to be executed pursuant to duly constituted authority.
3 of Al Done at Washington in duplicate this tenth day of June, 1955.
1
red to
On 07
cion
3 other
2nd me
subjek
thered
United
* Com
Such
e Com
missie
010
do
pea
as
mi
to
res
1
an
reo
Nov. 24, 1950, the President requested the Advisory Board on International
Development (Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, chairman) to "address itself specifically
You will wish to formulate your recommendations in light of the Gray Report's
The Advisory Board had been created under the “Act for International Develop
Four of the President's Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1949 (see A Decade of American
Foreign Policy, pp. 1366–1367). The "recommendations of the Board appear
Part XVII
pr
of
TE
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES—TRADE AND
TARIFFS
an
list
Pri
[REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT
art
ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES (GRAY REPORT), NO-
COC
VEMBER 10, 1950]
of
the
[REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL DE
VELOPMENT ADVISORY BOARD (ROCKEFELLER REPORT),
lik
MARCH 7, 1951] 2
bu
1. TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1951: Public Law
agt
50 (82d Congress, 1st Session), June 16, 1951 %
rep
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress
assembled, that this Act may be cited Co
the
as the "Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951”.
to
1 Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies, Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1950. On Mar. 31, 1950, the President requested of
Mr. Gordon Gray as his special assistant to study the whole complex of United
is
States foreign economic relations and to develop appropriate recommendations
designed to "assure ourselves that our policies are those which will serve best to an
reinforce our economic strength and that of the other free nations of the world
For "Summary and Recommendations," see ibid., pp. 1-18; for "Analysis of the
Gray Report,
operation of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (Sulk
committee Print).
· Partners in Progress: A Report to the President by the International Development of
Advisory Board, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1951.,
and effectiveness the broad objectives and policies of the Point Four programmer
comprehensive analysis of our entire foreign economic policy" (ibid., pp:
Or
sul
ma
IN
an
SOL
sec
int
mc
ad
or
Point
1
in italics under the appropriate topical headings of the Report.
3 65 Stat. 72.
2
2888
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2889
1 Act of June 17, 1930; 46 Stat. 590.
1
modification of duties or other import restrictions, the imposition of
additional import restrictions, or the continuance of existing customs
Sec. 2. The period during which the President is authorized to
enter into foreign-trade agreements under section 350 of the Tariff
Act of 1930,' as amended and extended is hereby extended for a further
period of two years from June 12, 1951.
Sec. 3. (a) Before entering into negotiations concerning any
proposed foreign trade agreement under section 350 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended, the President shall furnish the United States
Tariff Commission (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the “Com-
mission") with a list of all articles imported into the United States
to be considered for possible modification of duties and other import
restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or continu-
ance of existing customs or excise treatment. Upon receipt of such
list the Commission shall make an investigation and report to the
President the findings of the Commission with respect to each such
ANT article as to (1) the limit to which such modification, imposition, or
NO-
continuance may be extended in order to carry out the purpose
of such section 350 without causing or threatening serious injury to
the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive articles;
DE
and (2) if increases in duties or additional import restrictions are
RT),
required to avoid serious injury to the domestic industry producing
like
or directly competitive articles the minimum increases in duties
or additional import restrictions required. Such report shall be made
by the Commission to the President not later than 120 days after
Law receipt of such list by the Commission. No such foreign trade
Agreement shall be entered into until the Commission has made its
report to the President or until the expiration of the 120-day period.
nited (b) In the course of any investigation pursuant to this section the
Commission shall hold hearings and give reasonable public notice
thereof, and shall afford reasonable opportunity for parties interested
to be present, to produce evidence, and to be heard at such hearings.
(C) Section 4 of the Act entitled “An Act to amend the Tariff Act
, approved June 12, 1934, as amended (19 U.S. C., sec. 1354),
is hereby amended by striking out the matter following the semicolon
est to and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "and before concluding
por such agreement the President shall request the Tariff Commission to
make the investigation and report provided for by section 3 of the
Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951, and shall seek information
and advice with respect to such agreement from the Departments
of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Defense, and from such other
sources as he may deem appropriate.
SEC. 4. (a) Within thirty days after any trade agreement under
section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has been entered
mto which, when effective, will (1) require or make
appropriate any
cited
ex
D.C.
iested
Tnited
of 1930"
ations
ic Co
Sub
pment
On
tional
fically
patch
port's
7-90).
velor
Point
prior will exceed the limit to which such modification, imposition, or con-
tinuance may be extended without causing or threatening serious
ppear
? 48 Stat. 943,
2890
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
we
mer
either House of Congress, upon resolution of either the Committee on
injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive
articles as found and reported by the Tariff Commission under section
3, or (2) fail to require or make appropriate the minimum increase in
duty or additional import restrictions required to avoid such injury
, pro
the President shall transmit to Congress a copy of such agreement
together with a message accurately identifying the article with respecte
to which such limits or minimum requirements are not complied with
, the
and stating his reasons for the action taken with respect to such
article. If either the Senate or the House of Representatives, or both, due
are not in session at the time of such transmission, such agreement and
I
message shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk
of the House of Representatives, or both, as the case may be
.
by
(b) Promptly after the President has transmitted such foreign the
trade agreement to Congress the Commission shall deposit with the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
, and noti
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, a copy of the portions of its part
report to the President dealing with the articles with respect to which
heat
such limits or minimum requirements are not complied with.
S
Sec. 5. As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action and
as is necessary to suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of any,
reduction in any rate of duty, or binding of any existing customs or
excise treatment, or other concession contained in any trade agreement qua
entered into under authority of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as I
amended and extended, to imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist pro
Republics and to imports from any nation or area dominated or con-
olled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
the world Communist movement.
Sec. 6. (a) No reduction in any rate of duty, or binding of any
existing customs or excise treatment, or other concession Hereafter set
proclaimed under section 350 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, in
shall be permitted to continue in effect when the product on which the ho
concession has been granted is, as a result, in whole or in part, of the tior
duty or other customs treatment reflecting such concession, being
imported into the United States in such increased quantities, either
actual or relative, as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic com
industry producing like or directly competitive products.
pro
(b) The President, as soon as practicable, shall take such action sale
as may be necessary to bring trade agreements heretofore entered into pro
under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, into con-
formity with the policy established in subsection (a) of this section
On or before January 10, 1952, and every six months thereafter, the gat
President shall report to the Congress on the action taken by him the
tio
under this subsection.
SEC. 7. (a) Upon the request of the President, upon resolution of to
House of Representatives, upon its own motion, or upon application
42 and 54 (83d Cong., 1st sess.), and Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1958
,
For reports of July 10, 1952, Jan. 10, 1953, and July 9, 1953, see H. Door
mod
Deco
800)
(
Tai
tio
1
dus
da
sei
or
p. 92.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2891
dustry. If the President does not take such action within sixty
days he shall immediately submit a report to the Committee on Ways
Senate stating why he has not made such adjustments or modifications,
ive Jol any interested party, the United States Tariff Commission shall
ion promptly make an investigation and make a report thereon not later
than one year after the application is made to determine whether any
ry, product upon which a concession has been granted under a trade
ent agreement is, as a result, in whole or in part, of the duty or other
ect customs treatment reflecting such concession, being imported into
th
, the United States in such increased quantities, either actual or relative,
ach a to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry pro-
th, ducing like or directly competitive products.
ind In the course of any such investigation, whenever it finds evidence
erk of serious injury or threat of serious injury or whenever so directed
by resolution of either the Committee on Finance of the Senate or
ign the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives,
the the Tariff Commission shall hold hearings giving reasonable public
and notice thereof and shall afford reasonable opportunity for interested
its parties to be present, to produce evidence, and to be heard at such
ich hearings.
Should the Tariff Commission find, as the result of its investigation
ion and hearings, that a product on which a concession has been granted
ny 1, as a result, in whole or in part, of the duty or other customs treat-
or ment reflecting such concession, being imported in such increased
ent quantities, either actual or relative, as to cause or threaten serious
as wjury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive
list products, it shall recommend to the President the withdrawal or
on modification of the concession, its suspension in whole or in part, or
ing the establishment of import quotas, to the extent and for the time
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury. Within sixty days, or
Dy sooner if the President has taken action under subsection (c) of this
ter section, the Tariff Commission shall transmit to the Committee on
ed di finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and
Means of the
the house of Representatives an exact copy of its report and recommenda-
che tions to the President.
ng b) In arriving at a determination in the foregoing procedure the
mer Tariff Commission, without excluding other factors, shall take into
tie consideration a downward trend of production, employment, prices,
profits
, or wages
in the domestic industry concerned, or a decline in
on sales
, an increase in imports, either actual or relative to domestic
to production, a higher or growing inventory, or a decline in the propor-
on- tion of the domestic market supplied by domestic producers.
C) Upon receipt of the Tariff Commission's report of its investi-
he sation and hearings, the President may make such adjustments in
the rates of duty, impose such quotas, or make such other modifica-
tions as are found and reported by the
Commission to be necessary
prevent or remedy serious injury to the respective domestic in-
and Means of the House and to the Committee on Finance of the
D.
im
of to
011
he
ON
os
33
or imposed such quotas.
2892
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
CO
SEC
(d) When in the judgment of the Tariff Commission no sufficient REI
reason exists for a recommendation to the President that a concession
should be withdrawn or modified or a quota established, it shall make
and publish a report stating its findings and conclusions.
SEC. 8. (a) In any case where the Secretary of Agriculture deter-
mines and reports to the President and to the Tariff Commission with
RED
BE
regard to any agricultural commodity that due to the perishability
of the commodity a condition exists requiring emergency treatment
,
24
the Tariff Commission shall make an immediate investigation under
the provisions of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as 2T
amended,' or under the provisions of section 7 of this Act to determine
the facts and make recommendations to the President for such relief
under those provisions as may be appropriate. The President may
B.
take immediate action however, without awaiting the recommenda- State
tions of the Tariff Commission if in his judgment the emergency as th
requires such action. In any case the report and findings of the
Tariff Commission and the decision of the President shall be made
at the earliest possible date and in any event not more than 25 cal-
endar days after the submission of the case to the Tariff Commission.
(b) Subsection (f) of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
T
Act, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"(f) No trade agreement or other international agreement hereto- &
lor
fore or hereafter entered into by the United States shall be applied
in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of this section.
SEC. 9. (a) The second sentence of section 2 (a) of the Act entitled T
“An Act to amend the Tariff Act of 1930”, approved June 12, 1934, Agr
as amended, is amended by striking out the word "sections" and insert-
ing in lieu' thereof the word "section" and by striking out "and
516 (b)”.
(b) Subsection (c) of section 17 of the Customs Administrative
Act of 1938, as amended, is hereby repealed.
SEC. 10. The enactment of this Act shall not be construed to deter-mad
mine or indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the
Executive Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tarifs
and Trade 3
Sec. 11. The President shall, as soon as practicable, take such meas-
ures as may be necessary to prevent the importation of ermine
, fox
,
kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furs and skins, dressed upon
or undressed, which are the product of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics or of Communist China.
fore
SEC
ame
mor
the
1
dom
Come
Tech
men
Com
2
1 Act of July 3, 1948; 62 Stat. 1247.
2 Act of June 25, 1938; 52 Stat. 1077.
3 Agreement of Oct. 30, 1947; 61 Stat., pts. 5 and 6.
the
Prin
viso
take
larte
amc
spec
1956
ager
104
436-
j
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2893
+ Act of June 17, 1930; 46 Stat. 590.
1
Commodities; vol. III, The Outlook for Energy Sources; vol. IV, The Promise of
ment Printing Office, 1952). Mr. William S. Paley served as chairman of this
| letin, July 14, 1952, pp. 55-60.
Commission. "Digest of Volume I” may be found in Department of State Bul-
| Printing Office, 1953. The President requested the members of the Public Ad-
take an investigation of the foreign trade policies of the United States, particu-
visory Board for Mutual Security (Mr. Daniel Bell, acting chairman) to "under-
special reference to the expiration of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in
| agencies in the trade field” (Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1952, pp.
104–105). A summary of the Bell report appears ibid., Mar. 23, 1953, pp.
ent REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MATERIALS POLICY
sion | COMMISSION (PALEY REPORT), JUNE 1952]
ake
ter-
rith
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE PUBLIC ADVISORY
lity
BOARD FOR MUTUAL SECURITY (BELL REPORT), FEBRUARY
ent,
24, 1953] ?
der
as 2 TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1953: Public Law
line
215 (83d Congress, 1st Session), August 7, 1953 3
liel
18y
da-
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
kates of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited
ncy
the
as the "Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953”.
ade
TITLE -FOREIGN-TRADE AGREEMENTS
cal-
ion.
SEC. 101. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY.
ent The period during which the President is authorized to enter into
foreign-trade agreements under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
eto s amended and extended 4 (19 U.S. C., sec. 1351), is hereby extended
lied for a further period of one year from June 12, 1953.
SEC
. 102. TIME FOR CERTAIN REPORTS BY TARIFF COMMISSION.
cled
The first paragraph of subsection (a) of section 7 of the Trade
134, Agreements Extension Act of 1951 5 (19'U.S. C., sec. 1364) is hereby
erto amended by striking out one year and inserting in lieu thereof "nine
and months”. In the case of any application made under such first para-
graph before the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States
Live Tariff Commission shall make its report not later than whichever of
the following is the earlier: (1) one year after the application was
fer- made, or (2) nine months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
the
iffs
' Report of the President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Free
dom: vol. I, Foundations for Growth and Security; vol. II, The Outlook for Key
OX
list
the Public Advisory Board for "Mutual Security, Washington, D. c., Government
larly as they affect our efforts .
to achieve economic strength and solvency
I think you should examine our tariff policy, with
I would also like to have your views on the role of international
cas-
sed
among the free nations. .
1953.
436-438.
367 Stat. 472.
* Supra, doc. 1.
2894
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
as
10 as
no
I SU
SEC. 103. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE NOT
AFFECTED.
The enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine or
indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive
Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
SEC. 104. EMERGENCY ACTION UNDER SECTION 22 OF THE AGRI.
CULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT.
Section 8 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (Public
Law 50, Eighty-second Congress, first session) is hereby amended by
SEC.
adding a new subsection (c) at the end thereof, reading as follows:
"(c) Subsection (b) of section 22 of the Agriculture Adjustment Act,
TI
as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
:
" 'In any case where the Secretary of Agriculture determines and
reports to the President with regard to any article or articles that & C.
condition exists requiring emergency treatment, the President may
take immediate action under this section without awaiting the recom- pse
mendations of the Tariff Commission, such action to continue in
effect pending the report and recommendations of the Tariff Com-
mission and action thereon by the President.'"
TITLE II-UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION
SEC. 201. EFFECT OF DIVIDED VOTE IN CERTAIN CASES.
Section 330 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, is hereby amended
polit
.
by adding a new subsection (d) reading as follows:
"(d) EFFECT OF DIVIDED VOTE IN CERTAIN CASES.-
“(1) Whenever, in any case calling for findings of the Com-
mission in connection with any authority conferred upon the sec.
President by law to make changes in import restrictions, a major- |, T
ity of the commissioners voting are unable to agree upon findings shall
or recommendations, the findings (and recommendations, if any) man
unanimously agreed upon by one-half of the number of commis-
sioners voting may be considered by the President as the findings
and recommendations of the Commission: Provided, That if the Men
commissioners voting are divided into two equal groups each of
which is unanimously agreed upon findings (and recommenda;
tions, if any) the findings (and recommendations, if any) of la
either group may be considered by the President as the findings bers
(and recommendations, if any) of the Commission. In any case .
of a divided vote referred to in this paragraph the Commission stal
shall transmit to the President the findings and recommendapens
tions, if any) of each group within the Commission with respect
to the matter in question.
A
"(2) Whenever, in any case in which the Commission is author
ized to make an investigation upon its own motion, upon.com
plaint, or upon application of any interested party, one-half of Bot
the number of commissioners voting agree that the investigation in
should be made, such investigation shall thereupon be carried the
le
out in accordance with the statutory authority covering the matter
1 Agreement of Oct. 30, 1947; 61 Stat., pts. 5 and 6.
2 Act of July 3, 1948; 62 Stat. 1247.
II SU
be fr
SEC.
N
SEC.
the
the
shal
I!
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2895
The Commission made its report in January 1954; see infra, doc. 3.
Or
ive
1
RI-
11)
-
travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in
the performance of the duties vested in the Commission.
ОТ in question. Whenever the Commission is authorized to hold
hearings in the course of any investigation and one-half of the
number of commissioners voting agree that hearings should be
held, such hearings shall thereupon be held in accordance with
the statutory authority covering the matter in question."
TITLE III-ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION ON
ylic
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 1
by
SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION.
.ct,
There is hereby established a bipartisan commission to be known
w the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy in this title referred
ng:
ind
to as the "Commission”).
t & SEC. 302. MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION.
tøy (a) NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT.—The Commission shall be com-
m- posed of seventeen members as follows:
(1) Seven appointed by the President of the United States;
(2) Five appointed from the Senate by the Vice President of
the United States; and
(3) Five appointed from the House of Representatives by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(b) POLITICAL AFFILIATION.- Of the first class of members specified
led in subsection (a), no more than four members shall be from the same
political party. Of the second and third classes of members specified
in subsection (a), no more than three members from each class shall
be from the same political party.
the SEC. 303. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION.
The President shall designate the member of the Commission who
og skall be the Chairman, and the member who shall be the Vice Chair-
25]
ngs
the
Nine members of the Commission (including at least five who are
of
Members of Congress) shall constitute a quorum.
ga-
SEC. 305. COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:
of (8) MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.-Members of Congress who are mem-
bers of the Commission shall serve without compensation in addition
to that received for their services as Members of Congress; but they
shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary ex-
de penses incurred by them in the performance of the duties vested in
(b) MEMBERS FROM THE EXECUTIVE Branch. The members of
the Commission who are in the executive
branch of the Government
m- shell each receive
the compensation which he would receive if he were
pot a member of the Commission, but they shall be reimbursed for
m-
01-
man
BIS-
SEC. 304. QUORUM.
nigs
ase
100
ect
the Commission
01-
ied
ter
2896
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
MISS
3 Act of Oct. 6, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356-1364.
shall receive not to exceed $75 per diem when engaged in the per- eign
formance of duties vested in the Commission, plus reimbursement for use
travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in to
the performance of such duties.
Ox-
SEC. 306. STAFF OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) APPOINTMENT OF PERSONNEL.—The Commission may appoint
land
such personnel as it deems advisable, without regard to the civil-
service laws, and shall fix the compensation of such personnel in
accordance with the Classification Act of 1949, as amended. The
Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services in ac-
cordance with section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 ? (5 U. S.C.,
sec. 55a), but at rates not to exceed $75 per diem for individuals.
The Commission may reimburse employees, experts, and consultants
for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them
in the performance of their official duties and make reasonable advances
to such persons for such purposes.
(b) CERTAIN Laws Not To APPLY.-Except for members of the
Commission appointed by the Vice President or the Speaker of the
House, and except for any member of the Commission who may be
appointed by the President from the executive branch of the Govern-
ment, service of an individual as a member of the Commission, employ-
ment of an individual pursuant to the first sentence of subsection (8),
and service by a person pursuant to the second sentence of subsec-
tion (a), shall not be considered as service or employment bringing
such person within the provisions of section 281, 283, or 284, or 1914
of title 18 of the United States Code, or section 412 of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U.S.C., sec. 1584),
or section 190 of the Revised Statutes (5 U. S. C., sec. 99).
SEC. 307. EXPENSES OF THE COMMISSION.
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in
the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, so much as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions of this title.
SEC. 308. REPORT-EXPIRATION OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) REPORT.-Within sixty days after the second regular session of
the Eighty-third Congress is convened, the Commission shall make &
report of its findings and recommendations to the President and to
the Congress.
(b) EXPIRATION OF THE COMMISSION.—Ninety days after the sub-
mission to the Congress of the report provided for in subsection (9
)
of this section, the Commission shall cease to exist.
SEC. 309. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) IN GENERAL.- The Commission is directed to examine, study
and report on the subjects of international trade and its enlargement
consistent with a sound domestic economy, our foreign economie
policy, and the trade aspects of our national security and total for-
1 Act of Oct. 28, 1949; 63 Stat. 954.
2 60 Stat. 806-812.
I
*
1
FOREIGN. ECONOMIC POLICIES
2897
nt
es
1.
inflationary policies, currency devaluations, exchange controls and
regulation of exports and imports, preferential tariff systems,
r- sign policy; and to recommend appropriate policies, measures, and
or ractices.
in 'b) CERTAIN OF THE MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED AND REPORTED
0x — Without limiting the general scope of the direction to the Com-
mission contained in subsection (a), the Commission shall consider,
and shall report on, the following matters:
il-
(1) (A) Applicable provisions of the Constitution of the United
in
States;
he (B) Laws, regulations, and practices of the United States
relating to international trade, including such matters as tariffs,
customs, customs administration, trade agreements, peril point
ls. and escape procedures, opinions and decisions thereon of the
its
United States Tariff Commission and the President, import and
export quotas, monetary licenses, countervailing duties, and
pro-
curement preferences;
(C) Departments, agencies, boards, commissions, bureaus, and
he other instrumentalities of the United States having jurisdiction
he over, or dealing with, these matters;
be (D) Laws, regulations, and practices and official instrumen-
talities of other nations concerned with similar subject matters;
V.
(E) Pertinent statistics on international trade; and
(F) Balance of payments, nation by nation; and the causes and
effects of, and proposed remedies for, excessive imbalances.
ng
(2) Relationship of our foreign economic policies to, and their
14 influences on, our total foreign policy; and the proper relation-
jal ship of each to the other.
4). (3) Effect of our foreign aid and military defense programs on
international trade and international balance of payments.
(4) Foreign markets of trading nations---extent and nature;
in
and the effect thereon of wars, other emergencies, technological
advances, international relations, and other pertinent factors.
TY
(5) International instrumentalities, organizations, and agree-
ments and practices affecting trade, such as the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Customs Unions, Organization for
of
European Economic Cooperation, International Wheat Agree-
ment, cartels, European Payments Union, European Coal and
Steel Community, and International Monetary Fund.
(6) Foreign investment capital and the flow of investment
b- capital between nations need thereof---restrictions thereon-in-
(8)
ducements necessary to encourage role of the Export-Import
Bank and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
(7) Effects on international trade of factors such as costs of pro-
duction and pricing, labor practices and standards, general living
standards, currency'manipulation, inconvertible currencies, official
tiple currencies, bilateral trade agreements, barter arrangements,
customs procedures, marking and transit problems, concealed
2C-
..
28
to
Development.
ly
,
ent
IC
OT
1.
415900_57---Vol. 2
-79
2898
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
IN
00
OCE
een
See
to
cres
tha
Whe
Richard M. Simpson, John M. Vorys, Jere Cooper, and Laurie C. Battle, and
David J. McDonald, Cola G. Parker, Jesse W. Tapp, John Hay Whitney, and
most-favored nation treatment, government monopolies, state de
controlled economies, state trading, and state-subsidized trading
(8) Effect of existing and proposed trade policies on the pro-
motion of peace and security and the betterment of political
, i
social, and economic life, domestic and foreign.
SEC. 310. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.
of
(a) HEARINGS AND SESSIONS.—The Commission or, on the authoriza-
tion of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, shall
have power to hold hearings and to sit and act at such times and
places, within the United States or elsewhere, to take such testimony,
and to make such lawful expenditures, as the Commission or such
citii
subcommittee or member may deem advisable.
(b) OBTAINING OFFICIAL DATA.—The Commission is authorized to
request from any department, agency, or independent instrumentality
of the Government any information it deems necessary to carry out
its functions under this title; and each such department, agency,
and
instrumentality is authorized to furnish such information to the Com-
of
mission, upon request made by the Chairman or by the Vice Chairman
when acting as Chairman.
[CUSTOMS SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1953: Public Law 243 (83d
Congress, 1st Session), August 8, 1953)
T
fun
1
3. REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICY (RANDALL REPORT), JANUARY 23, 1954 (Excerpts) köre
2
3
INTRODUCTION
As directed by the Act of Congress under which our work has been
stał
undertaken, and guided by a sense
of heavy responsibility, the memo
faithfully to re-examine the international relationships of the Uniteddon
States in the economic field, as they bear upon the soundness of our
domestic economy and the security of our citizens.
Dominating our thinking throughout, has been the sobering reali e
zation that the policies pursued and the actions taken by the United nudi
States in respect to foreign economic policy profoundly influence the pain
1 67 Stat. 507.
2 H. Doc, 290, 83d Cong., 2d sess.
Individual statements, as well as
minority report 'of Representatives Daniel A. Reed and Richard M. Simpsons
following members: Clarence Be kandall (Chairman), Lamar Fleming, Jr. (Vire
Bush, Walter F. George, and Harry F. Byrd, Representatives Daniel A. Rees
T
8 The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953; supra.
1
cicio
free
=
OUT
of n
duc
the
mus
inte
inst
B
tice
ard
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2899
The larger interests of all our people must at all times be our stand-
va-
om-
stabilizing influence of free markets.
uited ndustry, and agriculture, must all be respected. Where changes are
duction, and distress to individual citizens.
I the intelligently toward those known objectives. We must avoid the
instability of the improvised.
Boldness will be required. We have outgrown some former prac-
ute destinies of all of the peoples of the world. Our Nation bears an
ngwesome responsibility of world leadership. Though not of our seek-
rong
, it is one that we may be fated to bear for a long time to come.
call we bear it with understanding, courage, and honor, we can make
incalculable contributions to the cause of peace and the advancement
of human welfare.
In our discharge of this responsibility, we shall find at times that
al our views will differ from those held by other free peoples. On such
and occasions we must display forebearance, but never falter in the high
quality of our leadership.
ny,
uch Nor can we forget that the security and well-being of our own
citizens ace constantly at stake as we take significant steps in foreign
i to economic policy, though the effects of such decisions may at times
lity
seem remote to the individual, or difficult of evaluation.
out The responsibility which rests upon the President and the Congress
and to make wise decisions, and to take them promptly, is grave indeed.
How then shall our Government determine what is wise in the field
mand foreign economic policy?
Ours is clearly one of the most dynamic, the most resilient, the most
creative economies in the world. Never has it seemed more powerful
doan it is today. What, therefore, could be wiser than to determine
83d
what are the sources of that strength, and then to build upon these
as we play our part in the international economy?
The strength of our domestic economy requires adherence to three
1. The freest possible opportunity for the development of individ-
NIC
ual talents and initiative in the utilization of private resources and
ts) trough the free association of workers.
2. The maintenance of vigorous, but fair, competition,
3. The maintenance of a broad free market for goods and services.
Our primary reliance should therefore be upon the incentives of the
the enterprise system, the stimulating effects of competition, and the
In moving toward a fresh release of these expapsive forces, here and
ited abroad
abroad, we must not expect to repeal history. The present fabric of
our laws, the obligations which we have assumed under the necessities
of national defense, the customs and traditions of our people, the basic
eali protective standards of our laws that safeguard wages, commerce,
the required they must be embarked upon gradually, with every precau-
tion possible taken to avoid dislocations in our present systems of pro-
Changes when made must take us toward recognizable goals. We
aust know what we are seeking to achieve and advance steadily and
fundamental principles:
Deen
len-
ored
3
the
pson,
(
Scott
Reed
tices.
800
8.00
Į
ard of conduct.
2900
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
hos
meleg
wont
Onga
FLY
of m
with
TH
in its
11
Ishii
be me
throu
But
plish
can be
Owins
cial situation in most of the countries has much improved and inflation pilin
Responsible behavior on our part, moreover, requires that we recog-
nize our own limitations and restrict our commitments to our capa-
bilities. Our first obligation to the world, as well as to ourselves, is to
keep the United States strong. Only from that firm base shall we
be able intelligently and worthily to measure up to our great responsi-
bility in world leadership.
That from our own resources we have already poured out vast sums
to help reconstruct a war-torn world, and to further our own security,
is common knowledge. But the extent to which there still exists a
serious distortion in our economic relationships with the rest of the
world is not so clearly understood.
Basic, therefore, to any survey of our foreign economic problems
is an analysis of the so-called dollar gap.
THE POSTWAR DOLLAR PROBLEM
In
10 & I
During the period 1946 through 1953, the United States transferred
to the rest of the world through gifts and loans $33 billion of goods
for
and services, exclusive of military items. This total was equal to eat
relati
more than one-fourth of all American exports. The fact that after meer
so large a program of assistance, carried out over so long a period, Suro
the rest of the world still finds it necessary to maintain drastic restric-
tions on trade and payment, directed particularly against this country,
indicates strikingly the gravity of the world's dollar problem.
The average world dollar deficit of $4 billion a year covers up large
and significant fluctuations as well as a declining trend. In 1947,
need
before the Marshall plan began, the deficit reached a peak of $11
billion, which was reduced by almost one-half in the first 2 years
of
the Marshall plan. The first impact of the Korean war was greatly prob
)
to reduce the deficit, to somewhat more than $1 billion in 1950, owing
largely to our heavy buying of raw materials and other goods and prob
services from abroad. But in 1951 the pendulum swung the other way,
Ot
as the European countries felt the impact of the previous great rise
of raw material prices as compared with the pre-Korean level, while rester
the raw materials exporting countries, once the buying rush had sub- svod
sided, felt the effects of the shrinkage in the volume and value of their sale
exports. In the past two years there has again been a marked improve-
ment. For the first time since
the war our foreign trade, exclusive
of military exports, has come into balance; and foreign gold and dollar os
reserves have increased at a rate that is currently running at well over
$2 billion per year.
Of major importance for this report is the interpretation of this
current improvement. There is a disposition in some quarters
conclude that the world's dollar problem has at length been solved. puce
This conclusion gains plausibility from the fact that, with some in a high
portant exceptions, the
Western European countries have been making
much above
prewar; foreign trade, both within Western Europe and was
substantial economic progress. Their industrial production is not
with the outside world, is also much above prewar; the internal finance
prew
mals
tries
futur
this
1
to
CO
shoul
the
ative
{
dre
tract
this
{
to
TI
t
thesi
FOREIGN: ECONOMIC POLICIES
2901
ఉం
9-
to
ve
si-
IS
&
le
as
to
er
od traordinary expenditures consist of disbursements by our military
OB Piling. If economic aid is also included, the total of extraordinary
has been checked; direct internal controls have been removed or
mlaxed and, again with some exceptions, general monetary and fiscal
ontrols have been more effectively applied. Finally, through the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation, significant head-
may has been made toward liberalizing trade and widening the area
of multilateral trade and payment, both within Western Europe and
with its overseas trading areas.
This is an impressive record, and this Commission feels confidence
you its conclusion that genuine progress has been made toward estab-
ishing the conditions in which multilateral trade and payment may
be made worldwide, and the dollar deficit removed, not primarily
trough trade and payment restrictions but in a relatively free market.
But it is the Commission's view that much yet remains to be accom-
plished before a dependable and durable solution of the dollar problem
an be achieved.
In interpreting the current improvement, account must be taken
ed Ha
number of facts. It has been accompanied by a favorable change
ds bor Western Europe in the terms of trade"-a decline of import prices
relative to export prices---due largely to the decline of raw materials
rices from the high level created by the outbreak of the Korean war.
d.
Burope's terms of trade have worsened since before World War II
owing, basically, to the large growth of world industrial output since
V,
prewar and to the relatively small growth of production of raw mate-
nals and food, due in part to the urge of the primary producing coun-
tries to industrialize and diversify their economies. Looking to the
7, future
, there will be a major problem of developing the raw materials
11 the continuing industrial expansion; and though in the end
of
may prove one of the main ways of achieving a solution of the
is problem of world trade imbalance, it suggests also that for a long time
ng to come the terms of trade may continue to be one of the chief
problems. Here, clearly, is an area of international policy which
sy
should command' our most serious attention.
Other uncertainties arise from the fact that, owing to the direct
ile restriction abroad of dollar imports, the potential demand for dollar
ub- goods and services, in a free market and with convertible currencies,
ir could substantially exceed the present restricted demand. There is
the further fact that the recent high level of American imports, rel-
ative to earlier years, has been closely linked with the high level of
our gross national product. Experience has shown that our imports
are very sensitive to our level of national income, and that any con-
traction here has a multiplied effect in reducing foreign exports to
his
There is, furthermore, an element of illusion in the present ap-
ed
. parent balanced position of our trade (apart from military exports),
A that large "extraordinary" dollar expenditures are still being made
ng y the United States in Other countries. As of the end of 1953
Were running at an annual rate of about $3 billion. These ex-
sad civilian establishments
abroad, offshore procurement, and stock-
ge
needed by
this
nd
ise
ve
ar
er
this country.
to
Hi-
ONE
1.-
2902
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ser
an
00
De
From the end of the war through June 1953, United States expendia
tures in the form of grants and loans to other countries amounted
expenditures, as of the end of 1953, was running at about the rate of
$5 billion per year. Against this total should be credited the cur-
rent increase of foreign gold and dollar reserves which is running
at a rate of over $2 billion per year. There is thus a concealed dollar
gap of some $2 billion to $3 billion annually, which would be increased no
if there were a change in the economic situation, such as a recession
here or a deterioration in Western Europe's terms of trade. On the ?
other hand, it should be recognized that major parts of our "extraor-
dinary” expenditures abroad are connected with our defense effort, 27
and that the Western European countries' own defense programs
affect adversely their trade position, by increasing their essential im-
ports and by absorbing resources that would otherwise be available su
for expanding their exports.
8b
Surveying the postwar experience as a whole, the Commission be
lieves, as already stated, that much remains to be done to achieve a of
dependable international balance. It believes that the problem must op
be attacked on many fronts and that too much dependence should
not be placed on any one line of attack. There is no single or simple 19.
solution. The final solution will probably depend even more upon
the efforts of other countries than upon our own.
It will involve po
their continuing internal efforts to achieve sound and strong econ-
omies and their external efforts to correct their international im-
balance.
pr
ho
This report, however, is primarily concerned with the steps that
this country can take toward solving the world's, dollar problem,
steps that will be consistent with our own political, economic, and
fu
security interests. Or, to employ the language of the statute under me
which this Commission was organized, this report must deal with the
enlargement of international trade in a manner consistent with a
sound domestic economy.
Shule
FOREIGN AID AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The dollar problem has its source in basic maladjustments within be
the international economy that were caused by World War II and
the following political disturbances. Our large foreign aid pro po
grams, which were directed toward the rapid restoration of economie
and political stability within the free world, and the rebuilding of
the military strength of our allies, dealt with these maladjustments
on an emergency basis only.
That period has passed. The fundamental causes of the worlds
economic problems must now be analyzed, and solutions sought in ei
the fields of investment, trade, and foreign exchange policies,
Before these other fields can be surveyed intelligently, however
our foreign aid must be reviewed, and
its future role determined.
th
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID
an
un
Set
eri
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2903
appears on page 7 of the report is not reprinted here.
aor-
1
ams
e of returns. Of this, $33 billion was economic aid and $8.7 billion mili-
cur- tary aid. In addition, on June 30, 1953, $7.9 billion of mutual
ning security funds had been obligated but not spent, and $0.9 billion of
ollar Export-Import Bank funds were committed to various countries but
used not disbursed. Since fiscal 1949 economic aid has been declining,
sion and since fiscal 1951 military aid has been increasing. A further
the 87.3 billion has been made available for all purposes for fiscal 1954,
of which $5.3 billion or 73 percent is military aid, and $2 billion or
ort
,
27 percent is economic aid. (See table.)
Had such aid not been given, friendly countries would have been
im- forced to restrict their purchases of American goods and services to
able such a degree that economic and political chaos might well have ensued
abroad. With the additional resources which American aid placed
be at their disposal, they were able to maintain politically tolerable levels
of consumption; to carry out programs of reconstruction and devel-
nustopment needed to restore their overall levels of production, and grad-
ould ually to reduce their dependence on our assistance; and after June
nple 1950, to speed up their rearmament programs in the interests of the
upon common defense of the free world. In many countries the most im-
olve portant economic objectives for which American economic aid has
been extended in the past have been achieved, or nearly so.
im- The Commission is reluctant to make suggestions that would affect
programs now in operation, or commitments already made. We note,
that however, that the $7.3 billion available now for present programs
lem, and commitments will be spent over a period of years. In planning
and
future
programs based on future appropriations the following com-
underments and recommendations are offered.
the
pe &
con-
th &
.
The Commission recommends that economic aid on a grant basis
should be terminated as soon as possible. No further aid is justified
unless it contributes to the security of the United States. Our
security involves defense against communist aggression or infiltration
this here and all over the free world. The greatest expenditures are now
and for military defense, but our security must take into account many
pro political and economic considerations. The security of the United
States is bound up with that of the free world.
omic
g
of
ents
Ver
The United States is now giving economic aid to several countries
ods which do not have the economic capacity to maintain the military
ti | effort that is deemed essential by the NATO Council and by our Gov-
emment to deter aggression. Among these countries are Greece,
Turkey
, Spain, and Yugoslavia in Europe, and Indochina and For-
mosa in the Far East. It is also
extending very large scale economic
aid to France to enable France to increase its military effort to bring
the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion, and small amounts
to the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany (Berlin) for special
op the table entitled “Foreign Aid Made Available for Fiscal Year 1954” which
ndi
ated
ther
2904
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
0
CE
ni
b.
8
li
A
maintain military forces or to conduct military operations connected
purposes. This aid has been given the new name of "defense sup-
port” or “mutual defense financing.” The distinction between mili-
tary and economic aid is blurred by the use of such terms in a way
which the Commission believes is undesirable. Though "defense
support” is defended first and foremost as a means of preventing an
undesirable reduction in the defense effort, it also serves all the eco-
nomic ends which have been advanced in justification of economic aid
in the past. It is a form of economic aid and should be so denominated.
General support is also being given to the economies of our Euro-
pean allies, including the United Kingdom, through offshore procure-
ment--that is, the purchase of military items in a foreign country for
transfer to the same country or to other foreign countries as military
aid. The Commission recognizes that, from an economic point of
view, offshore procurement has certain advantages as compared to
grant aid such as was given under the European Recovery Program.
If so administered as to encourage an increase of productive capacity
on a competitive basis, it may be a step toward a solution of Europe's
remaining dollar problem. The primary purpose of offshore procure-
ment, however, is military. For the military purpose of offshore
procurement to be served effectively, the Commission recommends that
contracts for the production of military equipment be placed abroad on
the basis of the considerations of cost, availability, and quality of the
items purchased that govern effective procurement policy at home, or on
broad strategic judgments concerning the character and location of the
military production base on which the success of the joint defense effort st
depends. The offshore procurement program should not be used as a
form of general economic aid.
Our foreign aid programs up to the present have been carried on by
a combination of grants, loans, and guaranties, with overwhelming 20
emphasis on grants which have been decreasing for economic purposes the
and increasing for military purposes. At present, as the need for te
economic aid for postwar recovery disappears, demands are increas-
ing for general economic aid unconnected with recovery from waren
or preparation for defense. Underdeveloped areas are claiming &
right to economic aid from the United States, in proposals in the it
United Nations and the Interparliamentary Union. We recognize no
such right.
In Europe, with the exceptions previously mentioned, there now ap-
pears to be no need for further economic aid in the form of grants.az
This is a source of satisfaction to our European allies who are es
anxious as we are to terminate the
giver and receiver relationship,
In other sections of this report the Commission recommends steps br
that should be taken to assist underdeveloped countries in obtaining of
an adequate flow of capital from the United States without resort tº
grants-in-aid. In cases where our security is importantly involved
the
Commission believes that moderate grants-in-aid may serve the
national interest of the United States.
The Commission recommends further that where support is needed to
NO
th
81
21
tr
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2905
trade and investment dealt with elsewhere in this report.
ense
an
1ro-
ure-
am
ure-
Program and the small program of the Organization of American States,
unts approached than through bilaterial programs.
however, that no country should contribute as much as 60 percent
that some expansion of this program would be desirable, but that the
United States percentage share in the cost should be reduced.
ected acting communist influence, and in helping to solve the problems of
sup with our own security beyond the economic capacity of a country to
nili
sustain, grants should be made, not loans.
way In other cases where substantial economic aid is necessary in the interest
of the United States but cannot be obtained from private or international
sources, loans should be made, not granis.
eco-
aid
ted.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The Commission does not include within economic aid what is often
· for called "technical assistance.
tary The United States is now engaged in bilateral programs of tech-
t of nical cooperation in 38 countries for which about $120 million has
I to been made available this year. These programs are undertaken only
at the request of the host government. They are operated on a share-
city the-cost basis and they are intended eventually to be taken over com-
pe's pletely by the host governments. The United States also participates
in the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance,
home operating on a budget of about $21 million to which it contributes
that about 60 percent, and in the smaller program of the Organization of
lom American States.
-
the
All these are essentially programs of education and training in
the knowledge and techniques required for economic development,
the including the administrative skills needed to create and manage in-
fort stitutions which are indispensable for such development.
a by
The Commission recommends that within the limits imposed by
ning congressional appropriations, the need for selecting only sound projects,
the availability of trained technicians, and good administration, the
for technical cooperation program be pressed forward vigorously. It need
not and should not become a "big money" program and should not involve
wa capital investments.
The Commission also recommends that the United States continue
the its support of the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance
through which the technical skills of many countries can be better mobilized
ap-
and some dependent area and regional problems can be more effectively
The Commission attaches special importance to the strengthening
of the technical assistance work of the United Nations. It believes,
ning
The Commission wishes to stress the
great potential importance of
the technical assistance programs in contributing to improved
stand-
dards of living in countries with
half the world population, in counter-
mon
18 @
oses
eas-
ga
e no
e as
1.
teps
US
ved,
the
2906
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
an
ACH
| p82
All American military, economic, and technical aid to other coun-
tries is rooted in the national interest of the United States. Such
aid is acceptable to other countries only if it also serves their national
interests. The fundamental basis on which all foreign aid operations
should rest, therefore, is mutual interest. Mutual interest cannot
be created by pressure and can be destroyed by coercion. Foreign aid ,
therefore, should not become an instrument of coercion, and the fix-
ing of conditions on which it is extended should be limited by this
principle.
TH
the
800
"
Men
UNITED STATES FOREIGN INVESTMENT
CAF
ent
.
181
CAT
har
800
wit
.
ear
mer
acc
reg
Sta
pol
pos
of
NY
Vat
In considering the enlargement of international trade in a manner
consistent with a sound domestic economy, and our foreign economic
policy, no subject could be more urgent than an examination of the
problems having to do with the flow of investment capital to those
areas in the free world where it is most needed.
Fortunately, the economic welfare of the United States would itself
be directly promoted by an increased movement abroad of sound in-
vestment by United States nationals and corporations. Such a flow,
if well conceived and directed, would not only contribute to an increase
in international trade, but would assist in the maintenance of high
levels of economic activity and employment within our own country.
It can increase our national income by taking advantage of opportuni-
ties for more profitable investment. It can aid in the development
abroad of primary resources to meet the ever-increasing civilian and
defense needs of the United States and the free world. And, since
private United States investment usually carries with it management
and technical skills, it can contribute strongly to the economic devel-
opment of foreign countries.
Such an increased flow of private investment abroad can also assist
in attaining United States foreign policy objectives through strength-
ening the economy of the free world, and can reduce the burden of
military aid by increasing productivity abroad.
During the period 1948-52, United States private long-term invest
ment abroad increased at an average annual rate of $1.5 billion. Of
this total, additions to holdings of foreign securities by private indi-
viduals and financial institutions accounted for only $200 million per
year, mostly in investments in Canada or in securities of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The remaining
$1.3 billion
per year was about equally divided between net new direct
investments abroad of American corporations and reinvestment of
earnings from their foreign operations.
foreign Yoans outstanding increased at an average annual rate of
During the same period, the value of United States Government
$500 million. Repayments on old loans now nearly equal new lending.
Disbursements by the International Bank
averaged $139 million
per year during the period.
United States investment abroad has not increased as rapidly
inta
mu
of 1
Use
ti
its
mi
shu
rig
Soi
ne
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2907
ns
.X-
JIS
ler
ise
like-minded countries, and gradually be extended as additional coun-
tries become convinced of the desirability of a friendly attitude toward
trust laws to operations abroad. United States antitrust policies
One uncertainty relates to the application of United States anti-
right of each country to regulate trade within its own borders. At the
same time it should be made clear that foreign laws or established busi-
n- anticipated at the end of the war, and the United States has not
ch achieved all of the benefits which might have resulted from an ex-
lazł panded volume of wise foreign investment.
ot Tue CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD
de
The small flow of private investment abroad may be attributed to
the concern of potential investors over the general political, economic,
ad military uncertainties abroad, as well as over other aspects of the
"climate” for investment in particular countries. Many of the deter-
rents can be overcome only gradually. Countries desiring to attract
capital must provide a secure legal status for private capital and
enterprise, domestic as well as foreign. United States investors can
bardly be expected to venture into countries and fields which local
capital and enterprise consider unattractive or insecure. On the other
he
land, United States investors will venture into areas of political and
economic stability which provide fair and equitable treatment and
with it an opportunity for reasonable profit and assurance of remitting
elf
earnings.
There are various types of action which the United States Govern-
m-
W,
ment can take to encourage the flow of private investment abroad.
The Government can and should give full diplomatic support to the
se
gh
cceptance and understanding abroad of the principles underlying the
creation of a climate conducive to private foreign investment.
:
This
requires better coordination
of policy and action by the various United
01-
ent States agencies and representatives in the field of foreign economic
nd policy, and, in particular, a clear formulation of the Government's
ice
position with respect to private investment abroad, stressing support
ent
of the private enterprise system and the interests of United States
el-
some extent the general climate and legal environment for pri-
ist pate investment may also be improved through the negotiation of
ch- international treaties relating to foreign investment. Although it
of must be recognized that such treaties more often record the existence
of a favorable climate than create it, the discussions which take place
st-
in the attempt of two governments to reach agreement may in them-
Of selves be beneficial. The United States Government shoulo
di- me the treaty approach to establish common rules on the fair treatment
Der of foreign investment. Negotiations should be undertaken first with
er-
ng
of The United States Government also can remove uncertainties in
own policies which affect foreign investment.
investors.
TO
private enterprise.
eet
of
og
on
&S
con
or
eri
ISE
INC
for
rate tax rate by at least 14 percentage points on income from investment
the taxes of a corporation previously paying taxes at a 52 percent inte
2908 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
arrangements will limit the willingness of United States businessmen to 70t
invest abroad and will reduce the benefits of investment from abroad to
the economies of the host countries.
of
Another source of uncertainty which affects the willingness of for-
eign countries to accept private capital from abroad relates to United'in
States policy in the field of public financing. The United States
Government should make clear that primary reliance must be placed on
private investment to undertake the job of assisting in economic devel-
opment abroad. It should point out that United States resources for
public loans are limited and inadequate in relation to total investment
needs, and that public lending or other forms of public financing will
not be a substitute for private investment.
abi
In addition to these general activities in the field of diplomatic me
and foreign policy, there are two specific areas in which the Govern of
ment can take action to encourage the flow of private investment it i
abroad. It can provide an inducement to foreign investment by for
removing certain United States tax burdens and inequities
. It
mitigate, or remove, certain risks peculiar to foreign investment by
providing Government guaranties or insurance not available from ti
commercial sources.
less
UNITED STATES TAXATION AND INVESTMENT ABROAD
The nature of United States taxation of income earned outside the pain
country is an important determinant of the flow of United States
(2)
private investment abroad. At present, income from foreign invest-
1
ments is taxed at the same rates as income from investments within
the United States. An attempt is made to avoid double taxation by them
full
allowing the taxpayer to credit certain of his foreign taxes against his
domestic tax bill. However, the existing restrictions on the use of the
foreign tax credit may prevent the taxpayer from offsetting in ful
the appropriate foreign taxes which he has paid.
As a result of this system of taxation the United States investor
abroad is placed at a disadvantage in competition with international
investors from other nations which levy little or no tax on income
earned abroad. Furthermore, United States tax policy serves to offset
any tax reductions by which foreign governments might seek to
attract investment from the United States. United States tax laws
may even result in pressure on foreign governments to adopt income
taxes or to increase their income tax rates.
A study of these considerations leads the Commission to recommend
three revisions in the Revenue Code.
(1) RATE REDUCTION
The Commission recommends that there be a reduction in the
foreign country are not in excess of the reduced United States rates
,
abr
tax
mer
lp
cory
Thi
if &
fore
The
dial
Thi
thre
hold
time
cour
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2909
I'
1
2
if satisfactory administrative standards can be devised for dealing with
I holder the credit for foreign taxes available to individual investors.
rivent trusts, not only to receive, but to pass on to the individual share-
taces in lieu of a tax on income.
country have a general income tax to which the investor would be subject
in the absence of a special provision applicable to him has clearly been
rate would be reduced to 38 percent on income from investment in
that country. The existing reduction in the taxation of the income
of & Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation amounts to 14 per-
centage points, but this reduction is now too limited in some respects
!! and too broad in others. The Commission recommends that the lower
corporate tax rate be made to apply to investment income from all
vreas abroad; but the reduced rate should not apply to income from
exports which do not involve the risks of investment abroad.
The Commission believes that in many instances investments
abroad by United States citizens and investment trusts also deserve
encouragement. Such investors now pay the full United States rates
of tax on income from investments in those same countries in which
it is recommended that investment be encouraged by a tax reduction
for United States corporations. The Commission recognizes that it
is a far more difficult task of tax legislation to draft equitable tax
incentives to apply to individuals, with their varying tax rates, than
it is to provide fair tax incentives to corporate investors. Nonethe-
less the Commission recommends that the Congress seek to provide to
individuals who invest abroad-by means of a rate reduction, a foreign
tur credit, or some other device-preferential tax treatment . . . com-
parable to that already recommended for corporate investors.
(2) REMOVAL OF CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN TAX CREDITS.
The Commission recommends that the Congress remove several restric-
tions which now prevent a person who invests abroad from offsetting in
fall against his domestic tax the appropriate foreign taxes. Investment
abroad is discouraged since these restrictions impose a higher total
tax on income from foreign investments than on income from invest-
ment at home.
(2) Under present law a United States corporation owning 10 percent
more of the voting stock of a foreign corporation may credit against
ida United States tax on the dividends received from the foreign corporation
4 proportionate share of the foreign income taxes paid by the foreign
corporation on the earnings from which the dividend was distributed.
This 10 percent ownership requirement should be reduced or eliminated
foreign taxes which are imposed directly on his income from abroad.
The individual investor can, for example, credit the 15 percent Cana-
dian withholding tax on dividends paid to a United States investor.
This credit is lost
, however, when the United States citizen
invests
an investment trust. Provision should be made for the invest-
through
2910
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
of exchange. be given a further period of trial and that during this period
概
​w
re
de
Sta
len
pa
pos
are
2
:
tec
COU
COU
The Commission considers that the present experimental program
vestors have suggested that the program would be more conducive
to additional investment abroad if it were extended in some areas
all for Government insurance. The Commission therefore recommend
that the program of guaranties against expropriation or inconvertibili
too restrictive. The interpretation of what taxes are in lieu of income taxes
should be liberalized in this and other respects.
(c) The Commission recommends further that the "over-all" limitation
on foreign tax credits be eliminated. This limitation requires losses in
one foreign country to be set off against income from another in
determining the total of foreign income which can justify & tar
credit. This limitation, by reducing the foreign tax credit, deprives
the taxpayer of the full tax benefit of foreign losses so long as he has
offsetting foreign income. The limitation is a serious deterrent to
the commencement of operations in a new foreign country by å tax-
payer having profitable operations in other foreign countries.
(3) THE CHOICE OF FORM OF INVESTMENT ABROAD.
In the view of the Commission, United States tax law should not
penalize investors for adopting the form of organization dictated by local Ste
laws or business conditions abroad. In order to reduce the possibility tha
of such penalties the Commission recommends that a United States has
corporation be allowed the option of treating any direct foreign investment
either as a branch or a subsidiary for United States tax purposes
, regard of
less of which of the two forms of organization is actually chosen for
operations abroad. The choice of treatment for tax purposes should be
binding, however, until for good cause the United States Treasury allows lese
a change.
fing
the
GOVERNMENT GUARANTY OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD
pri
tri]
For the last few years the United States Government has offered
to guarantee approved United States private investments in certain
countries, mainly in Europe, against loss from exchange inconver-
tibility or expropriation. This guaranty, or insurance, program was
introduced in the hope that it would reduce the need for foreign aid
expenditures. To date the program has not greatly stimulated pri
vate investment abroad. Coverage has been given to only $41 million
per
of new investment. Thus far the Government has not been required
to pay out on any policy and nearly $1 million has been earned in
the form of fees.
has not proved itself. On the other hand, a number of potential in
vestors continue to show interest in the guaranty device. Many I
to cover the risks of war, revolution, and insurrection. To the Comu
mission, such risks actually seem to be the most appropriate risks
and
SUG
ves
ent
the
em
pri
TOT
RO
1
Sta
2
ani
Ur
Th
Or
in
Co
na
thi
Ba
be
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2911
between the two banks.
SO
11
U
0
X
S
S
0
it
Y
IS
it
Bank. This machinery should be employed to resolve any issues
guaranty coverage on a discretionary basis be authorized for the risks of
war
, revolution, and insurrection on new investments abroad.
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC LENDING
Although the United States Government should place primary
reliance on private enterprise and investment to assist in economic
development abroad, there are special circumstances in which United
States economic and foreign policy objectives can be served by public
lending. Loans by the Export-Import Bank have been made to ex-
pand the foreign production of raw materials needed for defense pur-
poses. In order to achieve vital foreign policy objectives in certain
areas, the Export-Import Bank has made loans for such purposes as
reconstruction of earthquake damage in Ecuador, and for helping
countries to adjust to political developments favorable to United
States interests, as exemplified by the loan to Yugoslavia following
that country's break with the U.S. S. R. The Export-Import Bank
has also made loans for the general economic development of foreign
countries where such loans supported the special national interests
of the United States.
The expansion of basic facilities, such as transportation, harbors,
and irrigation, is frequently essential for a balanced growth of the
less developed countries, most
of which lack the capital required to
finance projects of this type. Loans by the Export-Import Bank and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to finance
such basic facilities are often a necessary condition for increased
private foreign investment in raw materials, manufacturing, and dis-
ed
tribution--fields which are more attractive to private foreign in-
vestors. Wherever possible, such loans should be made to private
enterprise abroad, and foreign public lending should not encourage
the displacement of private by public operations. It should also be
emphasized that public lending should not compete with, or displace,
private foreign investment, including private loans to foreign bor-
rowers, and this principle should be made abundantly clear to pros-
pective borrowers.
ROLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK AND THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
The Export-Import Bank is essentially an instrument of United
States foreign policy. The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, on the other hand, promotes the interests of the
United States broadly in the field of foreign economic development.
The record does not indicate that there has been harmful competition
or duplication in the operations of the two banks. The Congress,
in the Bretton Woods Act
of 1945, established the
National Advisory
Council on International
Monetary and Financial
Problems to coordi-
late the policies of the Export-Import Bank with the activities of
the United States representatives on the
board of the International
I
US
ES
id
1
11
ed
11
1
1
FC
IS
1
of
2912
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
into
past few years. Any sharp decline in the total flow of investment
The International Bank has demonstrated its capacity to apply pert
banking principles in the field of public lending, and plays a useful lil the
role in the achievement of the vital objectives of increasing trade and saves
raising living standards in the free world. On the other hand, the write
national interests of the United States may require the making of kun
certain loans by the Export-Import Bank, which the International strict
Bank will not make because of its charter limitations or for other
reasons. For example, the Export-Import Bank can make loans to
private United States or foreign investors operating abroad without
PF
a foreign government guaranty; the International Bank can make
loans only to member governments or to residents of member countries
with the guaranty of the member government.
While it is believed that the Export-Import Bank should continue to
make loans which are in the special interest of the United States, the Bank For
should not use its own funds for loans which do not meet reasonable incon
standards of bankability: In general, loans which do not meet reason impo
able financial standards are likely to create serious administrative prod
difficulties by setting up dual standards for the treatment of inter-rel
national obligations. Nevertheless, in cases where there is an urgent keen
political need for foreign financial assistance to a country whose mimi
Capacity to service additional loans is doubtful, and where such as-
sistance is deemed by the Congress to be more appropriate on a loan Es
rather than a grant basis, special funds should be authorized for such produ
purposes.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY
United States investment abroad, public and private, provides
ad
additional markets for United States exports. The financing of ex-
ports by public loans has been, and can be, helpful, not only in main-
taining domestic production and employment when domestic demand hete
falls off, but also in assisting foreign countries in procuring the United
States goods necessary to their growth. The financing of exports by
short-term loans from the Export-Import Bank may provide a stimu-
lus to exports. Long-term loans for carefully selected development
projects not only will increase United States exports, but are also
likely to create a better international balance by assisting foreign
countries in expanding their capacity to export to the United States
and to third countries.
International balance may also be affected by the pattern of total
United States (apital outflow. Because of the large United States
Government loans made immediately following World War II, repay,
ments on old loans from this source are now running at a rate of about
$400 million annually, plus another $230 million in interest payments
.
United States Government lending is now little more than sufficient
to offset the repayment of principal on old loans. Direct private
investment, on the other hand, has been reasonably stable over
abroad would create severe problems of adjustment in American er
TEATS
one-f
expor
fruits
tesen
It
uct e
TOI
limit
aide
the
ture
to ta
Unite
woul
CONCE
of re
of ou
evide
Wise
that
and
the
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2913
and cotton during 1952–53.
r
)
t
3
United States farm products into world markets.
would adversely affect not only those segments of agriculture directly
1 of our farm economy. The prospect of such repercussions is already
evident in the shift of wheat and cotton acreages to other farm enter-
that has been ordered, partly in view of the decline in exports of wheat
port industries and in the development programs of the other nations
1 lil the free world. Moreover, a rapid fall in United States foreign
1 nvestment, such as occurred during the period 1928–33, would in-
e ritably put a strain on the balance of payments position of other
entries and might lead to a tightening of trade and exchange re-
I strictions or defaults on foreign obligations.
PROBLEMS OF AGRICULTURE AND RAW MATERIALS
IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO AGRICULTURE
Foreign handicaps to the free flow of international trade such as
nonvertible currencies, exchange controls, import quotas, and special
import licenses exert a depressing influence upon the exports of farm
products from the United States, especially when such products are
srailable from nondollar areas. American farmers therefore have a
t keen interest in measures which will reduce or eliminate such dis-
amination against the free movement of United States farm products
into world markets.
1
Export markets are of vital importance for our great staple farm
inducts such as cotton, wheat, tobacco, rice, and soybeans. In recent
rekrs one-third of our wheat, 40 percent of our cotton and rice, and
one-fourth of our tobacco and soybeans have been exported. Such
sport markets are also important to the producers of fresh and dried
buits
, dry beans and peas, condensed, evaporated, and dried milk,
and a considerable list of other products. In all, farm products rep-
resenting about 30 percent of the value of farm marketings in 1952
were dependent to a highly important degree upon export markets.
It would be unrealistic to expect the total volume of our farm prod-
let exports to continue at the level attained during the period of post-
ar reconstruction, when foreign supplies of such products were
as a result of the war and when large United States foreign
were financing a large fraction of such exports from
the United States. In order to minimize the repercussions on agricul-
ture of any inevitable decline in farm exports, however, it is important
to take such steps as can be taken to maximize a continuing flow of
resources from these to other farm enterprises, other segments
3
t
limited
aid expenditures
3
of
,
415900__57_-vol. 2-80
2914
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
à
C
at prices above world levels, can and do lead to retaliatory measures
pose of protecting domestic price-fixing programs on such products
1 For the full text of the International Wheat Agreement, open for signature
CONFLICT BETWEEN FARM POLICIES AND ENLARGEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
In the opinion of the Commission, it is necessary to harmonize ov
agricultural and foreign economic policies without sacrificing the sound
objectives of either.
The inherent conflict is not between foreign trade policy and farm
policy as such, but rather between foreign trade policy and the means
by which an important phase of our farm policy is being implemented
To put the matter boldly, it is necessary to emphasize that inflexible
price-support programs which hold domestic prices above world prices
become price-fixing programs and result in accumulations of surpluses
that would otherwise have moved into consumption here or abroad
To maintain such price-fixing programs it may become necessary for
the United States to apply trade restrictions of various kinds, includ
.
ing import quotas, to keep down foreign importations. To more
high-priced surpluses into export markets it may seem necessary to
use export subsidies or dumping procedures that, if practiced with
respect to imports into this country, would involve the application
of our antidumping and countervailing-duty laws. Price-fixing
, per
ticularly with reference to commodities moving in international trade
,
is inherently incompatible with a pattern of private trade, free enter
prise, and nondiscriminatory commerce among nations.
The International Wheat Agreement has contributed little to the
solution of wheat problems of the United States and the world st
large. Its chief significance has been to accord official sanction, en
the part of the participating nations, to United States export
dization of the United States quota when nonquota export prices went
at or above the agreed maximum. At heavy expense to the Unite
States Treasury, this has contributed to the persistence of excessita
domestic support prices, which have given undue
stimulus to whes
production here and abroad, and has tended to obstruct, rather than
to facilitate, normal readjustments in United States agriculture, and
to lead to abnormal accumulation of stocks of wheat. In the current b
season, when export prices are below the agreed maximum, the im
porting countries are relieved of their obligation to purchase when
unless the prices drop below the agreed minimum level. Furthermore
,
the most important importing country is no longer a party to the
agreement. Under these circumstances the significance of the agrea
"
ment in relation to our wheat export problem is relatively slight
.
Restrictions on our imports of certain farm products
, for the pure
Apr. 13–27, 1953, see TIAS 2799 (4 UST 944).
I
C
1
subsi-
Het 0
i
S
C
V
n
u
d
17
S
n
S
1)
V
а
t
ti
2
to
FORÉIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2915
found
leans
nted.
xible
rices
I for
clud.
termination in 1956. be given consideration.
which hurt other segments of agriculture which are dependent upon
export outlets and a favorable climate for foreign trade.
If to a scheme of fixed prices in agriculture are added the inevitable
implementing devices of production quotas, import controls, and ex-
farm
port subsidies, the ability of agriculture to play a continuing dynamic
role in expanding international trade will be largely lost. This would
be a serious loss, not only to agriculture, but to our entire economy
and to the productivity of the free world. Furthermore, the reper-
cussions from the standpoint of the trading policies of our friends
and allies of the free world would be to the detriment of all concerned.
luses
road.
STEPS TOWARD RECONCILIATION OF FARM AND TRADE POLICIES
The first step toward policy reconciliation in the fields of foreign
more economic and domestic agricultural policies must of necessity be a
ng to delineation by the Congress and the administrative agencies con-
with cerned of a consistent pattern of policies and procedures which will
ation permit the achievement of the objectives of both our agricultural and
por our foreign economic policies. The transition to this new pattern
rade will require time, particularly in view
of the existing accumulations
nter in actual or potential government ownership) of substantial quan-
tities of several farm products for which foreign markets are urgently
o the needed in the not too distant future. The potential international
ad al complications which keep arising over import quotas or embargoes,
2, o import fees additional to tariff rates, and export subsidies on a small
ubsi-
or large scale, undertaken in consequence of domestic agricultural
were programs, bid fair to reach an unprecedented peak in the fiscal year
nited 1954, as large stocks of farm products are being acquired. The tran-
Esive sitional problems are difficult
but not insoluble.
heat
During the transitional period it will be necessary to take every pre-
thai caution to avoid steps which may lead toward an increase in actual or
virtual state trading, lest a pattern of such conduct, seemingly forced
ment by the circumstances of the moment, becomes established as per-
manent policy. Also, if we are to succeed in moving toward a lessened
use of such devices as export subsidies and import quotas, it would be
desirable to continue the policy
and extend the practice of consulting
the with interested and affected countries, for the purpose of seeing that
such actions of this character as may be required by present law be
modified to the extent necessary to ensure that we do not provoke a
self-defeating chain of offsetting actions by other countries
The International Wheat Council may constitute a useful body for
international consultations on current wheat problems, although this
value is limited by the absence of certain nations that are important
as importing or exporting countries.
The Commission recommends
that during the life of the 1953 International Wheat Agreement its opera-
tion be kept under critical review, that efforts be made to make the organi-
zation contribute its maximum to solving pressing problems, and that its
ini-
hest
ore
Tel.
icts
TAS
2916
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
desired too in the industrialized countries which import raw materials
and such variations are affected by changes in the general economy
Prices inevitably fluctuate with variations in supply and demand;
In particular, the demand for primary products in international trade
is affected by business conditions in the industrialized countries which
import them. Because of its sheer economic weight, the American
economy exercises a particularly great influence on raw material
Proposals have been made to solve the problem of price instability
by intergovernmental commodity agreements, involving experi di
quotas, import quotas, price limits, reserve stocks, price stabilizata
bination of such devices. The Commission does not believe that are
purchases and sales (buffer stocks), production controls, or some con
In the application of import restrictions on farm products
, the level of
those restrictions should be set with full regard for the effects on oversas
buying power and the possibility that such restrictions may lead to retali.
tion and may be self-defeating.
The temptation to resort to short-run expedients as easy remedies is
great, and, in fact, a number of interim measures must be used. But
it is important to agriculture, and to the national interest, that these
interim measures be consistent with the long-term objective, and that
they hasten rather than hinder the achievement of this goal.
The Commission believes that a dynamic foreign economic policy as it
relates to agriculture cannot be built out of a maze of restrictive den
such as inflexible price-support programs which result in fixed prices
,
open or concealed export subsidies, import quotas at home and abroad
,
excessive use of tariffs here and abroad, exchange restrictions, and stak
trading. If we are to have a foreign economic policy which will make
best contribution to the strengthening of our long-term development e
foreign markets for farmers, we must move as rapidly as feasible tourant
the elimination of such devices as a part of, or supplement to, ou on
agricultural policy.
INSTABILITY OF RAW MATERIALS PRICES
Fluctuations in prices have particularly serious effects upon com
tries whose economies depend predominantly upon production and
export of primary products. Extreme fluctuations not only indur
distortions in the economic development of these countries; they some
times shock their economies to an extent that throws great strain upon ?
their social and political fabrics. Moreover, memories of collapses i
primary products prices and fears of a recurrence tend to stimulake
overrapid industrialization, designed to reduce their dependence upa
the sale of primary products.
For these reasons, greater stability of prices is one of the price
desires in the raw materials exporting countries; and of course
and foodstuffs.
prices.
a
d
6
6
S
2
it
8
u
à
1]
......)
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2917
talia
+
vel of sive resort to commodity agreements will solve the problem of price
instability; and it believes that such agreements introduce rigidities and
restraints that impair the elasticity of economic adjustment and the
freedom of individual initiative, which are fundamental to economic
progress. Moreover, the types of intergovernmental commodity
agreements thus far tried or proposed for the purpose of stabilizing
prices involve commitments which could lead, if extensively employed,
to very great outlays of United States Government funds in certain
thes contingencies
, of indeterminable amounts.
The Commission finds the same objections to the proposals for unilateral
buffer stock action by the United States to stabilize world prices of raw
2 x materials and foodstuffs. Experience with the costs of efforts to
menica stabilize certain commodity prices within the United States are an
price indication of the indeterminability of the costs of similar programs
on a worldwide scale.
Aside from other causes, price instabilities are caused or aggravated
in some instances by actions of governments. These include restric-
tions upon imports, exports, and foreign exchange; national com-
nuen modity controls; accumulations and liquidations of commodities by
governments; and finally wars.
The Commission believes that the constructive contributions that the
United States Government can make toward greater stability of world
(1) measures tending to relax or remove impediments to United States
foreign trade and to encourage other countries to move in the same
Coun- direction;
(2) a policy of encouragement of diversification of the economies of the
duce countries now excessively dependent upon a small number of products,
and of encouragement of the governments of those countries to pursue
upon policies likely to attract foreign investors to participate in the works of
as in
(3) avoidance of actions incidental to our own commodity control and
21p0n stockpile programs that would have avoidably disruptive effects upon
(4) continued consultation and cooperation with other. nations to
itd improve knowledge of world supply and demand for materials and food-
prisk stuffs
, and to explore possible means of lessening instability; and
5) policies which will temper the fluctuations of our domestic economy,
and which ecert great influence upon the course of world prices.
own
prices are:
diversification;
world prices;
om.
rade
hich
7081
rak
nilit
UNITED STATES DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED
MATERIALS
Since the beginning of World War II, the United States has become
a consumer of more raw materials than it produces. This makes us
dependent on materials imported from foreign sources and upon the
availability, accessibility, and reasonable cost of the materials pro-
duced. This dependence' will increase with growth in population, with
increase in per capita consumption of end products, and with inven-
port
tion
on
ten
2918
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
vit
by unpredictable or capricious levies on exports or production by the Star
countries of origin. Also our tariff policy toward the needed materials with
should be such as to offer them reasonably easy access to the United rela
not only a compelling necessity for the United States and free nations 5 ye
Intensified development of foreign sources of deficit materials is inc
ductivity in the countries where the development takes place, and of
improving their opportunities of employment, standards of living
tion of new useful products to open new avenues of demand. The
population factor alone will add 25 percent to our needs if it con-
pounds at the rate of 1.5 percent annually for 15 years. Forecast T
of the further additions through expansion of per capita consumption
and through new invention would be guesswork; but those who review in
the experience of the last half century cannot weigh them lightly
.
lore
We depend on foreign sources today for over 30 percent of our
Sta
requirements of copper, lead, and zinc; over 50 percent of our require sou
ments of tungsten, bauxite, and antimony; over 75 percent of our
vol
requirements of chrome and manganese; practically all of our nickel the
requirements; and all our requirements of tin, natural rubber, and exta
jute.
ard
The Western European countries and Japan depend more heavily war
than we do on imported materials, and the needs for raw materials in
T
other countries are growing steadily with the progress of industriali dict
zation which is in evidence in most parts of the world. In all these ma
countries, growth of population and the demands for ever higher
of 1
standards of living indicate progressively expanding requirements for case
raw materials, although at rates of expansion varying with the corne
cumstances of each country. Their dependence on the development ple
of new foreign sources of raw materials will increase with ours
, from dist
year to year and from generation to generation.
To some extent, this need for development of foreign sources
materials
may be mitigated by discoveries of new sources in the United move
States. To some extent, it can be lessened by intensified exploitation pero
of high-cost United States sources.
The latter course, however, would Ite
ada
involve quickened depletion of some of them and high costs of mate-
rials to our industry and of the products to our consumers
. For many
materials, the only practical sources are outside our borders
. In most on
a fir
of the countries where these sources are situated, local capital is not
adequate to finance their development.
The Commission believes that the most effective contribution which mean
the United States Government can make to the development of the foreign
sources of raw materials in which we and the free nations generally ang
deficient, is to follow policies
favorable toward private investment abroad
(as recommended earlier in this report), and to advocate among nations
adherence to principles and praciices hospitable to foreign investors an
I
conducive to thrift and investment by their own nationals. One principle
in particular must be stressed: Investors in the development of sources
of needed materials must be assured against frustration of their ventures be
States market.
generally; it also is a promising means of enlarging wealth and parent
to t
cost
The
to
in r
wer
to
0
disr
Wai
1
1
and capacities to buy from abroad.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2919
he
1-
to
On
se
er
71
States, has had no experience for any considerable period of time
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The purely economic considerations, however, must be reconciled
with considerations of military preparedness, where the two are not
in harmony. A prime military consideration in the selection of
foreign sources of materials is availability of the materials for United
States and allied use under conditions of war. The preference among
sources is governed by the degree of friendliness of the nations in-
volved, their exposure to enemy action, and the length and safety of
the transportation routes. In the case of critical materials which are
d extremely scarce, or whose sources in event of war would be in jeop-
ardy or at the other end of a long or dangerous ocean route, assured
J
wartime availability depends upon stockpiling.
The argument is often made that military considerations should
in dictate a preference for higher cost domestic sources of materials that
may be needed in time of war, and that the maintenance of these lines
of production here should be assured by effective tariffs. In some
cases, such protection may enlarge our available supplies by expand-
ing our production base, whereas in others it may exhaust the sup-
nt plies that remain. Acceptance of this principle could lead to extreme
distortions of the costs to our industry and consumers, with detriment
to the international competitive situation of industry and the living
costs of consumers incommensurate with the military considerations
d involved. It could lead also to burdens upon the entire American
people incommensurate with the benefits to small numbers of them.
d It could bring about uneconomical substitutions of other things less
adapted to the same use for the things whose costs it would inflate.
The Commission recommends that tariffs or other import restrictions
on raw materials should be determined on economic grounds. Upon
a finding by the Executive that it is necessary on solely military grounds
to assure a strictly domestic source of supply, the Commission recom-
mends that the purpose should be accomplished by other means, the
cost of which should be borne in the defense budget.
1
TARIFFS AND TRADE POLICY
In our consideration of the broad subject of tariffs and trade policies
in relation to international trade, our starting point of course must
our present tariff structure. The world, including the United
relatively normal. The
Trade Agreements Act I was enacted while we
were in the middle of a depression. Many bilateral trade agreements
involving many reductions in our duties. were made during the first
5 years the act was in effect, but there had been limited opportunity
to observe their effect before our trade, already distorted, was further
disrupted by the outbreak of war.
Since the termination of World
War II the patterns of both our exports and our imports have been
'Act of June 12, 1934; 48 Stat. 943–945.
2920
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
of payment imbalances than the rigidities maintained by other R$
ON
re:
as
reserves.
CO
g୦
the evidence examined by this Commission, that although many United
and cumbersome, many other United States tariffs are low and more
clear by any test that can be devised that the United States is no
We fully recognize the dangers of using averages, yet it seems per
longer among the higher tariff countries of the world. Taken by i e
abnormal. There was an unusually large demand for our exports tic
both for consumption and for rebuilding a war-torn world, and und
interruption in the growth of our imports, arising out of the same ri
causes. The Korean War resulted in a further distortion. Resulting ti
imbalances were financed largely through our foreign loan and' grautica
programs. During this period we continued to make further agre-
ments involving still greater reductions in our tariffs.
Now, we find ourselves facing demands for further opening of ou
markets at a time when our commercial exports are in approximate in
balance with the highest level of imports ever reached, while the world m
as a whole has considerably rebuilt its holdings of gold and dolleres
We are fully aware of the arguments for free trade. It is sufficient co
to say that, in our opinion, free trade is not possible under the condi-
tions facing the United States today. Even in moving toward greater by
freedom of trade we must consider all of the rigidities, both here
and elsewhere, which negate some of the premises upon which tra
arguments for free trade rest. We must take into account that while de
the United States employs impediments to trade, primarily through
tariffs and in only limited fields through quotas, other countries also
employ these devices. Beyond this, they employ the quota procedere que
the
far beyond our use, and against other countries as well as against us
and also employ exchange controls and many other devices not used
here.
The record clearly indicates that, from a psychological and econo
nomic point of view, United States policies in fields connected with step
the tariff have come to be regarded as of key importance by boti
the American and the foreign public. We believe this is an orer
emphasis, for it must not be assumed that any measures which the can
United States might take in the fields of customs administration are
tariff policy, taken by themselves, could provide the full answer i
the problem of imbalance described earlier in this report.
Any adequate program requires appropriate policies on a
front, in foreign countries as well as here, including but not limited 40
to policies with respect to convertibility and investment. Nor shoui en
tariffs and customs procedures, relative to the many impediments ng
which exist in the world to the international movement of goods and
to the most effective application
of capital and labor. It is cleaning
than half our imports enter free of duty.
C01
WY
EE
mo
are
S01
ma
broad
all
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eli
are
pos
ani
wit
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in
1
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2921
81
reto
Our
LUS
,
sed
orks tions. Restrictions on import and export trade, in turn, are probably
no more important than, and in a measure are bound up with, the
Sme rigidities maintained inside foreign economies through cartel restric-
tingtions, the immobility of labor, and ingrained resistance to technolog-
Butical change; and the rigidities maintained inside the American econ-
omy through farm price-support programs, minimum wage legislation,
resale price maintenance laws, and the like.
The fact is that we have moved far from a world in which complete
ste international specialization of labor is possible. Some of the rigidities
vild mentioned above are here to stay. Other rigidities, such as those nec-
Dar essary for the defense of the free world, cannot be eliminated as long
as the threat of communist aggression continues. This means that
completely free trade is not feasible.
Yet the nations of the free world would be stronger and more
ent cohesive if many of the existing barriers to the exchange of their
di goods were reduced, if unnecessary uncertainties and delays created
ater by such barriers were eliminated, and if adequate international ar-
mere rangements for discussing and finding solutions to their common
the trade problems were developed and maintained. The measures
bile described below are aimed at contributing to these broad objectives.
ugh
The Buy American Act 1 and legislative provisions of other acts
containing the Buy American principle should be amended to give
more authority to the President to exempt from the provisions of such legislation
the bidders from other nations that treat our bidders on an equal basis
with their own nationals. Pending such amendment, the President by
Executive Order should direct procurement agencies in the public interest
to consider foreign bids which satisfy all other considerations on sub-
instantially the same price basis as domestic bids.
The Buy American Act was enacted in 1933 as an antidepression
care measure. It requires Government procurement agencies in effect to
be give a preference to domestic suppliers, except where such suppliers
and are quoting prices substantially higher than those quoted from foreign
to
sources. It embodies a philosophy and a practice which exists in
many industrial nations of the free world and which is costly to them
our Government procurement alone is of an order some
40 times its dollar volume in 1933. We are fully aware of sentiment
ed everywhere that governments should buy from those who pay their
$ expenses. While we do not believe that foreign producers have any
inherent right to supply our Government, we believe that in the total
di national interest the United States could well lead the way toward the
elimination of such preferences on a reciprocal basis.
Congress should direct the President to have the Tariff Commission
undertake a study of the tariff schedules immediately, with the stated pur-
pose of framing proposals for the simplification of commodity definitions
and rate structures: this study should be completed within a definite time
period and the Tariff Commission
should be provided during this period
with an appropriately enlarged staff. Congress should empower the
on the basis of such recommendations, to proclaim such changes
in commodity definitions and changes in rates as he determines to be
" Title III of the act of Mar. 3, 1933; 47 Stat. 1520-1521.
CO•
oth
all. Today
s
DB
ed
IT
Ta
C
S
DO
President,
2922
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
pending investigation of suspected dumping; and at the same ti
2
f
n
Secretary of the Treasury to insure the greatest possible speed of
6. The first report should also set forth progress made through read
administrative action in simplifying customs procedures, inamis
measures taken in accordance with the Customs Simplification.
of determining, in accordance with the provisions of existing law, "
In connection with the application of antidumping duties, the tot
an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured.
by foreign dumping, should be transferred from the Department of
Treasury to the Tariff Commission. The Department of the Treasure
should be directed to study and report to the Congress on any statuto
amendments which may be needed to permit the continuance of skipanes
appropriate, provided that such changes do not materially alter the total
of duties collected pursuant to any group of rates affected by such sựmai.
fying changes when calculated on imports in a specified base period
.
The Department of the Treasury should formulate proposals desigual
to simplify the problem of classifying articles not enumerated in any
tariff schedules. To that end, consideration should be given to d'ini
nating the multiple and conflicting standards which now apply in the
classification of such articles, such as "similitude" and "componenty
chief value," and developing a single standard of classifications for
widest practicable application.
The Senate should promptly consider H. R. 6584 now before i
which would amend and improve the customs valuation provision
our law by eliminating so-called “foreign value” as a basis of valways
and by other simplifying changes. In addition, the Department of the
Treasury should be directed to make a study and report to the Congres
on the feasibility and effect of making greater use of the actual inse
price of imported goods for valuation purposes in transactions between
buyer and a seller who are independent of each other. In that connectin
it should also consider and report upon the feasibility of making met
efficient use of the "antidumping” law.
The Department of the Treasury should be directed to make a cui
tinuing study of difficulties and delays in customs administration or
to report the results of its studies each year to the Congress, together wat
Oj
any proposals for legislative action.
le
cate those detailed administrative provisions of the tariff laws and
a. The first of the regular reports herein recommended should tad
should be modified so that adequate discretion can be granted his
efficiency of administration in the operation of customs.
A
of 1953.2
th
ti
-
8
I
t
f
0
TI
WA
01
mi
tr
au
TE
T
be
1 This measure did not reach the Senate floor.
2 Act of Aug. 8, 1953; 67 Stat. 507-521.
:
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2923
-1 W
re it
ons
quatiuni
-POST
3 years, with such safeguards as experience then indicates to be necessary.
told should report on any measures needed to effect speedier and more efficient
imph operation of antidumping provisions in proper cases.
The President should study appropriate methods to assure that
siyah American industry is not injured by embargoes upon or other impedi-
ments to exports of raw materials to the United States for use in processing
dan here. In this connection, he should direct the Department of the Treasury
in the
to review the effectiveness of existing countervailing-duty provisions of
ents the law, should consider any alternative measures which may be available
for the
for achieving this purpose, and if necessary should make appropriate
recommendations to the Congress.
Our policy of nondiscrimination in trade matters, as reflected in our
unconditional most-favored-nation policy, should not be changed.
The United States should continue its traditional policy of nondis-
of crimination in its trade relations with other free nations. Only the
sunconditional most-favored-nation doctrine is consistent with this
policy. If the United States were to give preferential trade treat-
en ment to certain countries, such action would itself constitute discrimi-
nation and be inconsistent with the position of the United States in
Then the free world. Our present unconditional policy has been in effect
Its reversal now would probably defeat our efforts to
induce other countries to eliminate preferential arrangements that
discriminate against us.
The organizational provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade should be renegotiated with a view to confining the functions
of the contracting parties to sponsoring multilateral trade negotiations,
recommending broad trade policies for individual consideration by the
legislative or other appropriate authorities in the various countries,
and providing a forum for consultation regarding trade disputes. The
organizational provisions renegotiated in accordance with this recom-
mendation should be submitted to the Congress for approval either as a
treaty or by joint resolution.
The President's power to negotiate trade agreements under the Trade
Agreements Act and to place them in force should be extended for not less
than 3 years, with appropriate safeguards. Such a period should give
time for considering the effects of the recommendations for action here
and of the actions taken abroad to restore multilateral trade and payments
es in the past, and for Congress to give adequate consideration to the
renegotiated organizational provisions of the
General Agreement on
Tarifs and Trade, as recommended above. Consideration should then
given to extending the Trade Agreements Act for a longer period than
lection
for 30 years.
700X
and
n
prith
Catalin
whid
teced
ild
2 lat
lighed
oft
asun
hutan
NE
DET
See infra, docs. 7 and 8.
2
See the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955; infra, doc. 9.1
2924
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
negotiations undertaken, changes made in tarif rates, and reciprocal
The escape clause and the peril point provisions should be retained.
However, the statute should be amended expressly to spell out the fast
powers to negotiate trade agreements have created an aura of instabil-
ity in our trade policy which it would be desirable to avoid for the
future. However, any permanent or long-term delegation of tariff-
changing power by the Congress, while including limitations on maxi-
mum permissible changes, must also be accompanied by adequate
standards, more specific than those which have accompanied the earlier
delegations of such power for limited periods of time.
The President should be delegated broad powers under the Trade Agret-
ments Act to enter into multilateral negotiations looking toward a redue-
tion of tarif rates on a gradual basis. The President's power to increase
rates should not thereby be curtailed. The President should be authorized
for the 3 years following the renewal of the act to reduce tariff rates to the
following extent:
a. Pursuant to multilateral trade agreement negotiation, the Presi-
dent should be authorized to reduce existing tarif rates by not more
than 5 percent of present rates in each of the first 3 years of the new act
.
b. On the basis of information provided by the Tariff Commission,
the President should be authorized, with or without receiving reciprocal
concessions, to reduce tariffs by not more than one-half of rates in effect
January 1, 1945, on products which are not being imported or which
are being imported in negligible volume. Any such reductions should
be made in steps spread over a period of 3 years,
c. The President should be authorized to reduce to 50 percent ad
valorem, or its equivalent, any rate in excess of that ceiling, except that
any such reduction should take place by stages over a period of 3 years
.
d. Reductions in rates pursuant to the foregoing should not be cumu-
lative as to any commodity.
ę. In the exercise of these powers, the existing prenegotiation pro-
cedures, including public notice and hearings before the Tariff Com;
mission and before an interdepartmental committee, should be followed
and peril point determinations should be made. Moreover,
visions of the escape clause should apply to tariff reductions made under
this authority.
In "extending the tariff-negotiating authority of the President, the Con-
gress should direct that in future negotiations subdivisions of classifica
tion categories which would give rise to new confusion or controversy over
classification be avoided to the maximum extent possible.
The President should make an annual report to the Congress on the
operation of the trade agreements program including information on new
سر
$
11
the pro-
b
9
8
C
S
O
C
f
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2925
2 See supra, pp. 1989-1993 and infra, pp. 3101-3105.
1 See supra, pp. 26142615 and 2622-2626.
1
visions whenever he finds that the national interest of the United States
le requires it.
il-
er
1.
To date, the escape clause has been applied by the President with
respect to only 3 products, despite the fact that there have been over
te 50 applications for the use of that clause in the past 5 years. There
is no similar body of experience
as yet with respect to the application
of the peril point provisions. The application of these provisions on
the basis of the national interest should provide adequate reassurance
as to the stability of United States trade policy.
The same standards of sanitation and health should be applied to im-
ported as to domestic goods. Plant and animal quarantine provisions
& should be maintained. The desirability of consulting with other coun-
tries, with a view
to creating greater understanding abroad
of the standards
We being enforced by the United States, should be studied.
C.
%
Il
RELATED PROBLEMS OF TRADE ADJUSTMENT
1,
1 21
While the major solutions to trade and payments imbalance must
be found in the fields of foreign investment, currency convertibility,
and trade policy discussed elsewhere in this report, important con-
tributions can be made in other fields. Contributions can be made in
Eest-West trade, in shipping, and by tourism, each of which will now
ch
be discussed.
at
S.
1.
)-
7-
d
)-
ET
1
EAST-WEST TRADE
On the problem of what the United States should do toward the
growing desire of some Western European nations who are our allies
to trade with the countries involved in the Communist bloc, two points
seem entirely clear.
First, the present ban on exports by the United States to Communist
China and North Korea and our efforts to secure similar action by others
must continue until the present threats to our security and that of other
free nations in those areas have been removed.
Secondly
, our present efforts to prevent exports to the European-Soviet
bloc that might contribute to its military strength must continue until
genuine peace is assured.?
But over and above these two categories of shipments there lies
a possible area of trade between the
East and the West in Europe in
commodities which do not strengthen the forces of military aggres-
sion
, & trade from which net advantage might accrue to the West.
It is this area of commerce that presents the dilemma to the United
For many generations there has existed a broad historic pattern
of trade in Central Europe that served to support the economies of
countries that are now our allies. These nations traditionally drew
from the Soviet
Union, Poland, East Germany, and the lower Danube
l
States.
2926
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
foreign maritime nations of their dollar earnings from shipping services.
-
allocated to special reserves for ship building by companies receiving
ices of the merchant ships of our allies were available to us through
carriage of United States foreign commerce is an important source of
The Commission recommends that the determination of the active
merchant. fleet requirements of the United States for the purposes of the
Merchant Marine Shipping Act of 1936 take account of the availability
of foreign vessels and of the importance to the balance of payments of
valley, foodstuffs, feeds, fuels, and raw materials. They sold in return
the products of their factories.
Since the unmasking of the Soviet designs against western civi-
lization, in conjunction with other free nations we have sought to
restrict that trade. This weakened the economies of friendly coun-
tries and incre?:sed their need for our aid.
When we terminate that aid there is grave question as to whether
we should attempt longer to prevent such friendly nations from avail-
ing themselves of their normal and historic trade pattern.
It may well be, moreover, that more trade in goods for peaceful
purposes would in itself serve to penetrate the Iron Curtain and
advance the day when normal relationships with the peoples of East-
ern Europe may be resumed.
The Commission therefore recommends that, so far as it can be done
without jeopardizing military security, and subject to the embargo on
Communist China and North Korea, the United States acquiesce in more
trade in peaceful goods between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc.
MERCHANT MARINE POLICY
The Merchant Marine Shipping Act of 1936 ? declared it to be
necessary "for the national defense and development of its foreign and
domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant
marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic waterborne commerce and
a substantial portion of the waterborne export and import foreign
commerce of the United States and to provide shipping services on all
routes essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign
waterborne commerce at all times, (6) capable of serving as a naval and
military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ...
The act provided for construction-differential subsidies to compensate
American owners for the excess of the cost of building ships in the
United States over the cost of building them abroad, for operating
subsidies for ships employed in regular liner routes between the
United States and other countries, upon approval of the Maritime
Administration, and for exemption from income tax of earning
the operating subsidies.
A large part of the foreign commerce of the United States always
has becn carried in foreign vessels. During World War II, the serr
dollar earnings to the foreign maritime nations.
C
1
8
a
t
t
8
@
8
C
t
g
t
D
C
1 Act of June 29, 1936; 49 Stat. 1985–2017.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2927
D-
er
2x
ne
On
De
disarrangement of the triangular pattern of world trademas between
and
productivity and real income. Because of these structural develop
rn It recommends that such requirements be determined by a high-level
interdepartmental committee within the United States Government, based
Ti- upon these considerations as well as those enumerated in the act.
to
The Commission recommends that the statutory provisions requiring
Use of United States vessels for shipments financed by loans or grants
1 of the United States Government and its agencies be repealed and that
support sufficient to maintain a merchant marine adequate to our national
ul requirements be provided by direct means, such as those provided for
od under the Merchant Marine Shipping Act of 1936.
it-
TOURISM
The Commission recommends consideration of means of facilitating
the issuance of passports and visas to tourists, and close cooperation with
foreign governments through our missions abroad to insure ease of entry
and adequacy of accommodation for travelers abroad. The duty-free
allowance for tourists which, in effect, now amounts to $500 exercisable
once every 6 months, should be increased to $1,000. The President
nd should direct the appropriate departments of the Government to encourage
rt the promotion of tourism.
nd
CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY
There have been two schools of thought concerning the restoration
currency convertibility. One school regards the restoration of
onvertibility as mainly a matter of curbing inflation abroad. It
te regards the war-induced disturbances in production and trade as
de temporary phenomena which have now been surmounted. By this
ng reasoning, all that remains for the introduction of convertibility is
De appropriate monetary-fiscal and exchange rate policies.
Another school of thought
regards the problem as much more com-
ES plicated
. While agreeing that the curbing of inflation and the fixing
of appropriate exchange rates are essential for convertibility, it
orgues that such measures may not be enough. It lays emphasis upon
the structural, longer run nature of many of the
war-induced dis-
tortions in production and trade, and upon even deeper seated changes
ch
apparent before the war. Without repeating what was said
earlier in this report about the dollar problem, other factors that
of should be mentioned are the loss of Europe's overseas investments, the
the world economy, which has intensified the
effects abroad of short-
nian economic fluctuations here, and the longer run disparities in
ments, this school of thought takes a more cautious attitude toward
gn
a11
gn
nd
of
de
eg
7S
already
de
S.
?
convertibility.
2928 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
One further important question is the effect of sterling (and otherb
by the European Payments Union Managing Board, the Board has
been requested by the OEEC Council to report again in March 1954 en
on the question of compatibility of currency convertibility (partico-
larly sterling) and the continued functioning of the European Par
The Commission adheres to this latter view. It recognizes, how-
ever, that there is an important difference between establishing out-
right convertibility of currencies and taking gradual and prudent
steps in that direction; and it recognizes also that the general eco-
nomic conditions prerequisite to currency convertibility are more
nearly in prospect today than at any previous time since the war
,
The Commission believes that the decisions, the methods, the time table,
and the responsibility for introducing currency convertibility should rest
on the countries concerned. It recognizes, however, that currency con-
vertibility must be examined in the light of the policies pursued by other
countries, particularly the United States, and it believes that the recom-
mendations in the preceding sections of this report, if carried out, would
encourage and assist foreign countries in removing restrictions on trade
and payments as rapidly as prudence permits.
In the light of these considerations, the Commission wishes to make
some general observations regarding currency convertibility. The
Commission believes that convertible currencies constitute an indispensa-
ble condition for the attainment of world-wide multilateral trade and
the maintenance of balanced trade in a relatively free market. It would
deplore a merely formal convertibility maintained through trade restric
tións. It believes that the removal of restrictions upon payment and upon
trade should go hand in hand. It favors gradual but positive progress
toward currency convertibility. ..
The Commission does not favor a “dash” for convertibility, or
letting the currency "find its own level,” since such a method presents
the danger of a vicious circle of inflation, and would require larger
reserves than may be available to prevent currency depreciation from
getting out of hand. It is, however, sympathetic to the concept of a
“floating rate," which provides alternative methods of meeting trade b
and speculative pressures. Whether a country is strong enough
,
externally and internally, to administer such a system effectively
involves a judgment which only the country in question could itself
b
responsibly make.
The Commission does, however, wish to emphasize its view that
strong internal economy, willing and able
to control its money suppie
and its budget as safeguards against inflation, sufficiently mobile to
make the best use of its resources, and able and willing to save in order
to increase its productivity and improve its competitive positior in
world markets, is a prerequisite to convertibility; and that the attau
ment over time of these conditions should be the guide as to how
d.
rapidly full convertibility could safely be approached.
Union. As the matter now stands after more than a year
s
t
a
U
81
f
of study
CI
C
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2929
7
28
H
1
6.
ON
SS
Reserve System explore with foreign central banks the possibilities of
believes that this method is superior to any other which might be
it effectively, than a formal grant of credit by our Treasury.
See supra, pp. 1012-1037.
ments Union. The Commission's view is that the European Pay-
ments Union, by its own testimony, has always been regarded as a
temporary mechanism with limited objectives—an intra-European
multilateral system of trade and payments (including overseas areas).
But the Union has achieved an impressive measure of success-above
all
, it has shown that freeing trade and freeing payment go hand in
hand and the Commission feels it should not sponsor any measures
that might wreck the Union before there is something better to put
in its place. This is a problem for the OEEC countries to work out
among themselves, provided their solution does not impede the
attainment of a global multilateral system of trade and payments.
d Last and most important is the question of adequacy of reserves.
l
It must always be borne in mind that sterling is a key currency, i. e.,
& currency used to finance the trade of third countries. Even now
sterling finances about 40 percent of the total trade of the world, and
if made convertible it would be exposed to trade, financial, and
speculative pressures to a far greater extent than any other European
ed currency. This is indeed why, in proper circumstances, we want
sterling to become convertible, in the interests of freer trade and
payment in a worldwide multilateral system. To the extent that some
other of the major trading countries might be able to make their
currencies convertible simultaneously with sterling, the pressure upon
sterling might be eased. The Commission believes, however, that to
restore full confidence in sterling, Britain's reserves must be strength-
ened.
After serious consideration, and after study of the testimony of
ts highly qualified and closely interested witnesses both here and abroad,
er the Commission's view is that for the purposes of a gradual and con-
m trolled approach to full convertibility (except for special safeguards
against capital transfers and the control of previously accumulated
te balances) adequate reserves could be found through a much more active
be utilization than heretofore of the International Monetary Fund's hold-
4ings of gold and convertible currencies which now amount to $3.3 billion.
1 To this end, the Commission favors also any reasonable relaxations
by the Fund that might be required, such as a relaxation of the time
schedule for utilization of quotas and the provision for maintaining
to
As a second means of strengthening foreign reserves and of providing
foreign exchange support operations to assist in the gradual attainment
of general convertibility, the Commission recommends that the Federal
standby credits or line of credit arrangements. There is ample prece-
dent for such arrangements in the interwar period; and the
Commission
cause it would avoid an increase in the public debt and because it
could be handled more flexibly and informally, and therefore more
-81
OT
A
8
Is
fixed parities.
OT
11
1
s
S
lo
1
415900_-57--Vol. 2481
2930
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
9
IE
IE
SI
m
tr
ad
ai
and profitable and equitable for all, the highest possible level of trade
and the most efficient use of capital and resources. That this would
also strengthen our military allies adds urgency. Their strength is of pie
Great mutual advantages to buyer and seller, to producer and con
sumer, to investor and to the community where investment is made
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 19, 1954, pp. 602-607; H. Doc. No. 364
% The Commission was established under the provisions of Title III of the
4 Statement by the President before the organization meeting of the commission,
CONCLUSION
In closing this report and in submitting the foregoing conclusions
and recommendations to the President and the Congress, the Commis-
sion wishes to stress the importance of consistency and continuity with
respect to our foreign economic policy. Our position of leadership
th
in the world requires that we make clear to other countries the prin-
01
ciples upon which our policy is based, and that thereafter we seek to
maintain stability in our policy in order that the mutual confidence
ta
so urgently required in the field of international trade may be ad
vanced. This stability requires high level coordination of policy
within the executive branch of the Government, and consistency of
action within the legislative branch.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING UNITED STATES O
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY: Message by the President to
T
the Congress, March 30, 1954 1
d
be
I submit herewith for the consideration of the Congress recom-
mendations concerning the foreign economic policy of the United
States.
Due to the urgency and significance of our problems in this area,
fu
I'previously recommended, and the Congress
approved, the establisb-
ment of the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy. Its member-
ship, consisting of seventeen elected officials and private citizens, was
drawn from all parts of the country and represented diverse points of
th
view. The Commission's report, prepared in the American tradition
of full debate and vigorous dissent, has been carefully reviewed
by the
various Executive Departments of the Government and forms the
basis for the program I submit in this message.
Before the Commission
began its deliberations I said to its members
“I commend to you an attitude both realistic and bold. Above all
,
I urge you to follow one guiding principle: What is best in the 13
The national interest in the field of foreign economic policy is clear fo
It is to obtain, in a manner that is consistent with our national security di
fr
critical importance to the security of our country.
yi
83d sess.
th
hi
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953; supra, doc. 2.
3 Supra.
it
Sept. 22, 1953;
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 5, 1953, p. 450.
W
th
0i
18
th
01
ai
1
it
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2931
ms
16
ith
all
to
208
ed
ICT
TES
to
mi-
ted
€8,
sh
full
er-
accrue from high levels of trade and investment. They accrue no less
in trade from nation to nation than in trade from community to com-
munity within a single country. The internal strength of the Amer-
ican economy has evolved from such a system of mutual advantage.
In the press of other problems and in the haste to meet emergencies,
this Nation—and many other nations of the free world—have all too
often lost sight of this central fact. Worldwide depression and wars,
inflation and resultant economic dislocations, have left a sorry heri-
tage: a patchwork of temporary expedients and a host of restrictions,
rigidities, interferences, and barriers which seriously inhibit the expan-
sion of international trade. Thus are impeded the very forces which
make for increased production, employment, and incomes.
The tasks of repairing the physical damage caused by the catas-
trophe of war have been substantially achieved. The creation of an
adequate system of defense for the free world is well advanced. Most
of the countries which suffered the ravages of war have made remark-
able headway toward financial stability and increased production.
Their own efforts have been greatly aided by our assistance, and yet,
despite this recovery, we and other
free nations are still severely limited
by the persistence of uneconomic, manmade barriers to mutual
trade
and the flow of funds among us.
Together we and our friends abroad must work at the task of lower-
ing the unjustifiable barriers-not all at once but gradually and with
regard for our own interests. In this effort, the United States
must take the initiative and, in doing so, make clear to the rest of the
world that we expect them to follow our lead.
Many foreign restrictions have been
imposed as a consequence of
the so-called "dollar gap.” This phrase has become the symbol of
the failure of the free world to find a lasting solution to the imbalance
of international payments. We should no longer fill it by major
grants to enable other nations to secure what they need but cannot
buy. Our aim must not be to fill the dollar gap, but rather to help
close it. Our best interest dictates that the dollar gap be closed by
raising the level of trade and investment.
The United States
stands ready and able to produce and sell more
than the rest of the world can buy from us.
The inability of many
foreign countries to buy our goods in the volume we would like to seil
does not arise from any lack of desire for these goods. Such is far
from the case. Instead it arises out of an inability of these nations to
pay-in dollars for the volume we have to sell.
Dollar grants are no lasting solution to this impasse.
The solution is a higher level of two-way trade. Thus we can sell
and receive payment for our exports and have an increasing volume
of investment abroad to assist economic development overseas and
Greater freedom from restrictions and controls
and the increased efficiencies which arise from expanding markets and
the freer play of economic forces are essential to the attainment of this
Failure so to move will directly threaten our domestic economy, for
it will doom our efforts
to find ways by which others, through their own
TAS
8 of
100
the
the
DS,
all,
A1
ity
vo
de
ild
jo
ON-
den
yield returns to us.
360
the
higher trade level.
101,
2932
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
IM
90
COU
b. Reduction, by not more than one-half over a 3-year period, ol
!
tariffs in effect on January 1, 1945, on products which are not
being imported or which are being imported only in negligible
c. Reduction, over a 3-year period, pursuant to trade agreeme
negotiation, to 50 percent ad valorem, or its equivalent of a
I have approved these recommendations of the Commission and
urge their adoption by the Congress. I may also recommend specs
provisions for negotiation with Japan in view of the economic pret
2 See the announcement by the Department of State concerning special trade
negotiations with Japan, Nov. 12, 1954; Department of State Bulletin, Nor. A/
efforts, can buy our goods. The only practicable alternative is to
reduce exports. Our farms would have to sell less, since the product
of 40 million acres, amounting to 10 to 12 percent of our agriculture
would have to find their market outside our own country. Moreover, re
if their export markets were curtailed, American factories now selling
their products throughout the world' would have to reduce employ" be
ment. It is a very important fact that over 4 million American P
workers depend on international trade for their employment.
Beyond our economic interest, the solidarity of the free world and sh
the capacity of the free world to deal with those who would destroy it in
are threatened by continued unbalanced trade relationships—the
inability of nations to sell as much as they desire to buy. By moving
boldly to correct the present imbalance, we shall support and increase te
the level of our exports of both manufactured and agricultural prod.
ucts. We shall, at the same time, increase the economic strength d Ta
our allies. Thus shall we enhance our own military security of Tec
strengthening our friends abroad. Thus shall we assure those source gic
of imports that supplement our domestic production and are vitel i 1
our defense. Thus shall we raise our standard of living and aid in the
Un
development of a better world for all of us and our children.
TARIFFS
the
I am convinced that the gradual and selective revision of our tarifs
sta
through the tested method of negotiation with other nations, is an
nat
essential ingredient of the continuing growth of our domestic economy
LA!
An expression of our willingness to negotiate
further will offer neede
leadership toward the reduction of trade and payments barriers the
Ag
?
limit markets for our goods throughout the world.
abr
The Commission on Foreign Economic Policy recommended a thre
TH
year extension of the Trade Agreements Act with amendments i
authorize:
a. Reduction, pursuant to trade agreement negotiation, of existia
tariff rates on commodities selected for such negotiations by mal
more than 5 percent of present rates in each of the 3 years of di
new act;
1
;
and
got
rate in excess of 50 percent
ad valorem, or its equivalent
:
I
lems of that country.?
Extension 1955,
co
ind
me.
IT:
out
tha
VOI
đ ,
side
yar
trai
Ist
pro
mel
1954, pp. 767–771.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2933
See Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation; infra, doc. 8.
rer
ing
sideration by the legislative or other appropriate authorities in the
various countries, and providing a forum for consultation regarding
I shall act promptly upon this recommendation. At the same time,
I shall suggest to other contracting parties revisions of the substantive
provisions of the agreement to provide a simpler, stronger instru-
went contributing more effectively to the development of a workable
to The foregoing authority does not contemplate across-the-board
cits tariff reductions. The peril point and escape clause procedures
ing would, of course, be preserved, and the three proposed types of rate
e reduction would not be cumulative. Tariff reductions would be
ing
made selectively on specific commodities, and only after notice and
07. hearings in accordance with past practice. This would represent our
a part in the gradual and careful approach to the whole problem of
improved trade which the world so urgently needs. No sudden,
and sharp
, or widespread adjustments within our economy would be
pit involved.
These escape clause and peril point provisions of our tariff legis-
lation
are designed to mitigate injury to our domestic producers from
se tariff reductions. Whenever recourse is had to these provisions,
ed I shall carefully consider the findings and recommendations of the
na Tariff Commission. My responsibilities for the welfare of the Nation
by require that I continue to base my decisions at times on broader
e grounds than the Tariff Commission is empowered to consider.
to The Commission on Foreign Economic Policy supports this position.
the I have approved the Commission's recommendations that the
United States withhold reductions in tariffs on products made by
workers receiving wages which are substandard in the exporting
country. This policy shall be placed in effect. I have also approved
the Commission's recommendations concerning raising of labor
stendards through consultative procedures and cooperation in inter-
national conferences such as those sponsored by the International
Labor Organization.
that
These recommendations for renewal and amendment of the Trade
Agreements Act are based on the plain truth
that if we wish to sell
sbroad we must buy abroad.
M THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
Since 1948, virtually all the major trading nations of the world,
including the United States, have become
parties to a General Agree-
the ment on Tariffs and Trade. This agreement has been the principal
arrangement by which we in the United States have sought to carry
out the provisions and purposes of the Trade Agreements Act.
The Commission on Foreign Economic Policy has recommended
that the United States renegotiate the organizational provisions of
agreement, so that the contracting parties acting collectively
would confine 'their functions to sponsoring multilateral trade ne-
kotiations, recommending broad trade policies for individual con-
81
my
ret
DO
BOL
Will
zen!
80
and
trade disputes.
cial
robo
no
2934
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
It also could help maintain a high level of economic activity and
To provide an improved basis for customs valuations I urge adoption
An increased flow of United States investment abroad could cor-
tribute significantly to the needed expansion of international trade
1 See the President's letter to the chairman of the United States delegation so j me
the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties to GATT; Department of State
system of world trade. When the organizational provisions of the
agreement have been renegotiated, they will be submitted to the
Congress for its approval.?
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE
The problems of tariff classification, of proper valuation of imported
articles and of procedures for administering the customs are complex
and perplexing. Over the years these problems have grown to the
point where they now constitute an unwarranted and unintended
burden on trade.
The United States may be no worse in this regard than many other
nations, but good business practice alone is sufficient to require:
a. Simplification of commodity definitions, classifications, and
rate structure;
b. Improvement in the methods of valuation of imports; and
Establishment of more efficient procedures for customs
administration.
To this end I shall propose legislation providing for the simplif-
cation of the commodity definitions and rate structures in the Tarif
Act, after a study by the Tariff Commission, and subject to appro
priate standards to be established by the Congress. Such legislation
should also provide for a better method of classification of articles not
enumerated in the tariff schedules, and for sucb improvement in the
statutes governing the administration of customs procedures as can
be made at this time. In this connection I am directing the Depart-
tro
ment of the Treasury to keep customs procedures under continuous
review and to report to the Congress annually on the difficulties ad
delays in processing goods
through Customs, together with recommer-
dations for action to eliminate such obstructions. I further recom
mend that the antidumping law and procedures under it be change
so far as necessary to permit speedier and more efficient disposal din
cases and to prevent undue interference with trade during i Ivestiga
tion of suspected dumping.
fir
of the Treasury's valuation proposals. These are embodied
H. R. 6584, which has already been passed by the House
Representatives.3
C.
91
tr
fo
PI
DI
in
of
@3:57
UNITED STATES INVESTMENT ABROAD
tic
ar:
to
eci
1
9
2 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties, "Mar. 10, 1955; infra, doc. 7.
inj
3 Measure did not reach Senate floor.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2935
Recommendation not incorporated in the Mutual Security Act of 1954; see
EX
21
778
arrangements will limit the willingness of United States businessmen
to invest abroad and will reduce the benefits of such investment to the
economies of the host countries.
o employment in the United States. Further, such investment con-
tributes to the development abroad of primary resources needed to
meet our own ever-increasing needs even while it helps to strengthen
the economies of foreign countries. In view of the great importance
of private investment to our foreign economic policy, I emphasize the
d
necessity for passage of the administration tax bill' already recom-
mended to you and already advanced in your considerations which
provides for:
d
. Taxation of business income from foreign subsidiaries or from
segregated foreign branches which operate and elect to be taxed
as subsidiaries at a rate 14 percentage points lower than the
regular corporate rate;
d b. Broadening the definition of foreign taxes which may be credited
against the United States income tax to include any tax, which
is the principal form of taxation on business in a country, except
turnover, general sales taxes or excise, and social security taxes;
c. Removing of the overall limitation on foreign tax credits; and
d. Permitting regulated investment companies concentrating on
f
foreign investment to pass on to their stockholders the credit for
TA
foreign taxes which would be available on direct investment.
Further to encourage the flow of private investment abroad, we
shall give full diplomatic support, through our activities here and
through our missions and representatives in the field, to the acceptance
and understanding by other nations of the prerequisites for the at-
traction of private foreign investment. We shall continue to use the
treaty approach to establish common rules for the fair treatment of
In connection with legislation authorizing the mutual security
program, I suggest that the Congress consider the desirability of
broadening the existing authority to guarantee against losses on new
investment abroad, so as to cover losses caused by war, revolution,
The Commission has pointed out that uncertainty as to the appli-
catioa of United States antitrust laws to the operations of American
firms abroad is a deterrent to foreign investment. It recommended
that our antitrust laws be restated in a manner which would clearly
acknowledge the right of each country to regulate trade within its
own borders. At the same time, the Commission insisted that it
should be made
clear that foreign laws or established business prac-
tices which encourage
restrictive price, production, or marketing
21
ot
he
21
at
118
foreign investment.
11.
D
ed
and insurrection.
go
2
31
D
lo
id
si mendation in connection with its current study of the antitrust laws.
See Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (PL 591, 83d Cong., 2d sess.); 68A Stat.
8
infra, pp. 3105-3140.
2936
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
seas production by our citizens and the nationals of other countries.
materials required for military purposes should be assured by direct
BUY AMERICAN LEGISLATION
At present certain of our laws require that, in specified Federal or
federally financed procurement, preference be given to domestic firms
over foreign bidders. Except where considerations of national se-
curity, persistent and substantial unemployment, or encouragement
of small business require otherwise, I agree with the Commission that
it is improper policy, unbusinesslike procedure, and unfair to the
taxpayer for the Government to pay a premium on its purchases.
I request, therefore, that legislative authority be provided to
exempt from the provisions of this legislation the bidders from nations
that treat our bidders on an equal basis with their own nationals.?
Meanwhile, the executive branch is clarifying the application of these
preference principles to Government procurement. It will limit the
price differential favoring domestic producers over foreign bidders to
a reasonable percent, dependent upon the circumstances over and
above whatever tariffs may apply. Discretionary authority, how-
ever, must be continued to permit special consideration in Government
procurement for the requirements of national security, for the problems
of small business, and of areas where persistent and substantial un-
employment exists.
RAW MATERIALS
This country is blessed with abundant mineral resources, but we
must make the most of them if we are to satisfy the ever-increasing
appetite of an expanding economy and at the same time maintain an
adequate defense posture. We must recognize, however, that it is
not possible for this Nation, or any other
nation, to produce enough of
every metal and mineral needed by modern industry. These materials
are not evenly distributed throughout the world. We have to depend
on one another. Our foreign economic policies, therefore, must en
courage the relatively easy flow of these materials
in international
trade.
The Commission has made two sets of recommendations which |
believe will materially assist in achieving an orderly expansion of
mineral production both here and abroad.
The first is that the United States Government should make a con
structive contribution toward greater stability of world prices of raw
materials by moderating or relaxing impediments to international
trade, by encouraging diversification of foreign economies, by avoiding
procurement practices which disturb world prices, by consultation
with other nations, and by tempering the fluctuations in our 04
economy.
The second calls for increased encouragement of investment in over
I heartily endorse these recommendations.
The Commission also recommended that domestic sources for rear
t
t
1
I
1 No legislation submitted.
2 See Ex. Or. 10582, Dec. 17, 1954.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2937
3
1
j
Its membership consisted of the Secretary of the Interior (Chairman), the Secre-
Defense Mobilization. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the
Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 27, 1954, pp. 988–990.
PL 781, 83d Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 26 and Sept. 3, 1954; 68 Stat. 832 and 1267).
means and not by tariffs and import quotas. I believe that normally
this is sound.
However, I have appointed a special Cabinet committee which is
now surveying the whole field of our minerals policy and have drawn
their attention to these recommendations,
AGRICULTURE
Perhaps no sector of our economy has a greater stake in foreign trade
than American agriculture. In recent years, for example, one-third
of our wheat, forty percent of our cotton and rice, and one-fourth of
our tobacco and soybeans have been exported. It is highly important
to maintain foreign markets for our agricultural products.
Any program designed to serve the interests of American agriculture
must take due account of the necessity for export markets. Put in the
words of the Commission, "It is necessary to harmonize our agricul-
tural and foreign economic policies without sacrificing the sound objec-
tives of either." I am convinced such reconciliation is possible. Ac-
ceptance of the recommendations in my agricultural message of Jan-
uary 11 will, I feel certain, help accomplish this objective.?
MERCHANT MARINE
With respect to our ocean shipping, we must have a merchant ma-
rine adequate to our defense requirements. I subscribe to the prin-
ciple that such support of our merchant fleet as is required for that
purpose should be provided by direct means to the greatest possible
extent. Such a policy, however, requires a careful analysis of the
means available for providing direct support, its possible effects on
foreign flag vessel carryings, and its total costs before a specific pro-
gram can be recommended.
The Department of Commerce has already studied this problem at
length
. Its findings will be further reviewed within the Executive
Branch in order to develop specific recommendations to transmit to the
next session of the Congress, in addition to the proposals submitted
by the Executive Branch that are now before the Congress.3
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
International travel has cultural and social importance in the free
world. It also has economic significance. Foreign travel by Amer-
icans is a substantial source of dollars for many countries, enabling
them to pay for what we sell them.
The Cabinet Committee on Mineral Policy was appointed, Oct. 26, 1953.
report to the President, Dec. 11
, 1954. For a summary of its findings, see the
H. Doc. 292, 83d Cong., 2d sess.
See the two'amendments to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (PL 664 and
2938
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
CO
PI
ra
re
ga
WO
nomically sound, are within the capacity of the prospective borrowe
I approve the recommendations of the Commission on Foreign
Economic Policy that the United States participation in technical
While the promotion of tourism is primarily a responsibility of the
countries which welcome visitors, and is a function for private enter-
prise, there are some specific governmental actions which can be help-
ful. For example, there is H.R. 8352 ' which increases the duty-free de
allowance for tourists from $500 to $1,000, exercisable every 6 months in
I recommend its passage. From time to time I may have other recom- of
mendations for legislative action to stimulate travel.
to
Meanwhile, in the executive branch, I shall instruct the appropriate
agencies and departments, at home and abroad, to consider how they he
can facilitate international travel. They will be asked to take action
to simplify governmental procedures relating to customs, visas, pas le
ports, exchange or monetary restrictions and other regulations that
gr
sometimes barass the traveler.
ECONOMIC AID AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Assistance extended in the past by the United States to other free for
nations has played an effective part in strengthening the national se
curity, developing important resources, and opening up significant be
opportunities, for ourselves and for others. It has also carried with
it, in many instances, particularly in technical cooperation and famine re
relief, a deep humanitarian response by our people. However
, eco be
nomic aid cannot be continued indefinitely." We must distinguish 4
between an emergency and a chronic malady, between a special case
and a general rule.
I subscribe, therefore, to the principle that economic aid on a grant ca
basis should be terminated as soon as possible consistent with our of
national interest. In cases where support is needed to establish and
C
equip military forces of other governments in the interest of our
mutual defense, and where this is beyond the economic capacity of
another country, our aid should be in the form of grants. As recog
nized by the Commission,
there may be some cases in which modest
amounts of grant aid to underdeveloped countries will importantly
serve
the interest of security. I further agree that in other
situations
where the interest of the United States requires that dollars
not
otherwise available to a country should be provided, such
support to
the maximum extent appropriate should be in the form of loans
rather than grants.
In extending such loans, we must be careful not to interfere with
the normal lending activities and standards of the Export-Import
Bank. The International Bank is the primary institution for the
public financing of economic
development. The Export-Import Bank
th
will consider on their merits applications for the financing of developm
ment projects, which are not being made by the International
Bank
,
and which are in the special interest of the United States
, are ecer
to repay and within the prudent loaning capacity of the bank
OL
CO
in
re
en
re
th
be
of
ar
ar
Jar
1 Did not become law.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2939
3 See supra, pp. 2622-2626.
r-
ie
$. investment but should be so administered as to fit into the programs
1 See the Mutual Security Act of 1954; infra, pp. 3105-3140.
? Act of Oct. 26, 1951; infra, pp. 3101-3105.
ne cooperation programs should be pressed forward vigorously. Such
programs should concentrate on providing experts and know-how
De rather than large funds or shipments of goods except for necessary
* demonstration equipment. They should not provide capital for
of development of the assisted countries and they should be related
to any private or public investment likely to be forthcoming
Review of the requirements for the Mutual Security Program
has been conducted with these principles in mind and substantial
I reductions in grant aid have been made by this administration. The
legislation which I shall later propose for the Mutual Security Pro-
gram
will reflect these principles.
EAST WEST TRADE
In viewing the problems of other nations of the free world, we are
forced to recognize that the economies of some of them have been
weakened by the disruption of the broad historic pattern of trade
t between East and West.
h Curtailment of our aid programs will increase the pressures for
e resumption of such trade. A greater exchange of peaceful goods
between East and West—that is, goods not covered by the Battle
Act? nor otherwise considered strategic so far as it can be achieved
without jeopardizing national security, and subject to our embargo
on Communist China and North Korea, should not cause us undue
concern. I shall, of course, take appropriate action to ensure that
our security is fully safeguarded.
it
1
B8
1
d
CONVERTIBILITY
of
18
encouragement.
t
0
$
The Commission rightly regards positive progress toward currency
convertibility as an indispensable condition for a freer and healthier
international trade. Steps
toward enabling holders of foreign cur-
rencies to convert them freely into other currencies deserve our
The Commission has correctly observed that the initiative and
responsibility for introducing currency convertibility must rest with
the countries concerned. I am happy to say that
such initiative is
being taken. The British and other members of the Commonwealth
of Nations have met twice, in London and in Sydney, to consider
plans for convertibility of the pound sterling." The United
Kingdom
and other important nations of Europe have discussed their aims
with us. Individually they are taking constructive steps affecting
dlheir own currencies. In addition, discussions among them which
are now under way in connection with the renewal of the European
h
-
Jan. 8-14, 1954.
2940
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
m
0
LE
di
ing world markets; for our security we require that our allies become
economically strong. Expanding trade is the only adequate solutia
1 The May 5–6, 1954, session of the Ministerial Council of the OEEC extended
Payments Union 1 are being largely influenced by their desire to pre
pare the way for convertibility .
I have approved the Commission's recommendations for coopers.
tion in strengthening the gold and dollar reserves of countries which
have prepared themselves for convertibility by sound internal and
external policies. These recommendations do not call for new action
by the Congress. Authority and procedures for this purpose already
exist. The United States will support the use of the resources of the
International Monetary Fund as a bulwark to strengthen the cur
rencies of countries which undertake convertibility. In addition,
a study is now being made, as suggested by the Commission, of the
possibility of standby credits from the Federal Reserve System.
CONCLUSION
fa
What I have outlined to you is a minimum program which should
b
be judged as a whole. Its various parts are interrelated; each require
the other.
Conceived as a whole, this program consists of four major partes
Aid--which we wish to curtail;
Investment-which we wish to encourage;
Convertibility which we wish to facilitate; and
Trade-which we wish to expand.
I consider it essential that we achieve each of these objectives, which
we must clearly understand are closely interlocked: As we curtail ou
aid, we must help to close the dollar gap
by expanding our foreign iz
vestment and trade. This expansion will be facilitated by a return fo
to convertibility of foreign currencies. The return by our friends
abroad to convertibility will be encouraged if our trade policy lesdi
them to expect expansion of our foreign trade and investment
.
Unless we are prepared to adopt the policies I have recommende
to expand export and import trade and increase the flow of our capital
into foreign investment, our friends abroad may be discouraged in
their effort to reestablish a free market for their currencies. If we film
in our trade policy, we may fail in all. Our domestic employment, ou
standard of living, our security, and the solidarity of the free world
all are involved.
For our own economic growth we must have continuously expand
for these two pressing problems confronting our country.
the life of the EPU to June 30, 1955.
ag
ca
CU
MI
to
Z!
mi
1
2
the
1
4
of 1
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2941
218.
ur
Mutual Security Legislation and Related Documents, compilation prepared by
tion, Dec. 29, 1955, pp. 113-118.
of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (infra, p. 3129).
pre- 5. AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE
ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED IN 1955: Public Law 480 (83d
Congress, 2d Session), July 10, 1954; Amended by Public Laws 25
lich and 387 (84th Congress, 1st Session), April 25 and August 12, 19553
and
JOn AN ACT To increase the consumption of United States agricultural commodities
ady in foreign countries, to improve the foreign relations of the United States, and
the
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
cm, States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as
the the “Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.”
Sec. 2. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to expand
international trade among the United States and friendly nations, to
ould
facilitate the convertibility of currency, to promote the economic sta-
bility of American agriculture and the national welfare, to make maxi-
ires
mum efficient use of surplus agricultural commodities in furtherance
rts
:
of the foreign policy of the United States, and to stimulate and facili-
tate the expansion of foreign trade in agricultural commodities pro-
duced in the United States by providing a means whereby surplus
agricultural commodities in excess of the usual marketings of such
commodities may be sold through private trade channels, and foreign
currencies accepted in payment therefor. It is further the policy to
use foreign currencies which accrue to the United States under this
2.cAct to expand international trade, to encourage economic develop-
om ment
, to purchase strategic materials, to pay United States obligations
abroad, to promote collective strength, and to foster in other
ways the
un foreign policy of the United States.
TITLE I-SALES FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY
SEC. 101. In furtherance of this policy, the President is authorized
to negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly nations or organi-
zations of friendly nations to provide for
the sale of surplus agricul-
tural commodities for foreign currencies. In negotiating such agree-
ments the President shall-
(a) take reasonable precautions to safeguard usual marketings
of the United
States and to assure that sales under this Act will
not unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities;
(b) take appropriate steps to assure that private trade channels
are used to the maximum extent practicable both with respect to
sales from
privately owned stocks and from stocks owned by the
Commodity Crediť Corporation;
(c) give special consideration to utilizing the authority and
funds provided by this Act,
in order to develop and expand con-
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201
ded
168 Stat. 454.
: 69 Stat. 44 and 721.
3
2942
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2
(
hereunder, the Commodity Credit Corporation, in accordance with regulations
make available for sale hereunder at such points in the United States as the
issued by the President pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, (1) shall
President may direct surplus agricultural commodities heretofore or hereafter
acquired by the Corporation in the administration of its price support opera-
tions, and (2) shall make funds available to finance the sale and exportation
of surplus agricultural commodities from stocks owned by the Corporation or
pledged or mortgaged as security for price support loans or from stocks
privately owned if the Corporation is not in a position to supply the com
modity from its owned stocks: Provided, That to facilitate the use of private
commodity, may finance the sale and exportation of privately owned stocks
if the Corporation's stocks are reduced through arrangements whereby the
private exporter acquires the same commodity of comparable value of
modities to private exporters under such arrangements Commodity Credit
quantity from the Commodity Credit Corporation. In supplying car
Corporation shall not be subject to the sales price restriction in section 407
tinuous market demand abroad for agricultural commodities
with appropriate emphasis on underdeveloped and new market
areas;
(d) seek and secure commitments from participating countries
that will prevent resale or transshipment to other countries
, or
use for other than domestic purposes, of surplus agricultural com-
modities purchased under this Act, without specific approval of
the President; and
(e) afford any friendly nation the maximum opportunity to
purchase surplus agricultural commodities from the United
States, taking into consideration the opportunities to achieve the
declared policy of this Act and to make effective use of the foreign
currencies received to carry out the purposes of this Act.
SEC. 102. (a) For the purpose of carrying out agreements concluded
by the President hereunder, the Commodity Credit Corporation
, in
accordance with regulations issued by the President pursuant to sub-
section (b) of this section, (1) shall make available for sale hereunder to
domestic exporters surplus agricultural commodities heretofore or
hereafter acquired by the Corporation in the administration of its
price-support operations, and (2) shall make funds available to finance
the sale
and exportation of surplus agricultural commodities, whether
from private stocks or from stocks of the Commodity Credit Corpore
tion." In supplying such commodities to exporters under this sub-
section the Commodity Credit Corporation shall not be subject to the
sales price restrictions in section 407 of the Agricultural Act of 1949,'s
amended. The commodity set-aside established for any commoditi
under section 101 of the Agricultural Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 897) shal
be reduced by a quantity equal to the quantity of such commodity
financed hereunder which is exported from private stocks.
(b) In order to facilitate and maximize the use of private channel
of trade in carrying out agreements entered into pursuant to this day
1 Act of Oct. 31, 1949; 63 Stat. 1051.
2 This subsection was revised by PL 25, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (69 Stat. 4
approved Apr. 25, 1955. It formerly read as follows:
"For the purpose of carrying out agreements concluded by the President
Corporationeven though
of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended."
(
t
I
t
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2943
OT
90
OT
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ТЯ.
84th Cong., 1st sess. (69 Stat. 721), approved Aug. 12, 1955.
* Act of July 23, 1946; 60 Stat. 596.
es, the President may, under such regulations and subject to such safe-
ket guards as he deems appropriate, provide for the issuance of letters of
commitment against funds or guarantees of funds supplied by the
ies Commodity Credit Corporation and for this purpose accounts may be
of established on the books of any department, agency, or establishment
m of the Government, or on terms and conditions approved by the
of Secretary of the Treasury in banking institutions in the United States.
Such letters of commitment, when issued, shall constitute obligations
to of the United States and moneys due or to become due thereunder shall
ed be assignable under the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940. Expend-
heitures of funds which have been made available through accounts so
established shall be accounted for on standard documentation
required for expenditures of Government funds.
led
SEC. 103. (a) For the purpose of making payment to the Com-
i modity Credit Corporation to the extent the Commodity Credit
bal Corporation is not reimbursed under section 105 for commodities
to disposed of and costs incurred under titles I and II of this Act, there
are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as are equal to (1)
the Corporation's investment in commodities made available for
export under this title and title II of this Act, including processing,
Det packaging, transportation, and handling costs, and (2) all costs
incurred by the Corporation in making funds available to finance the
ob
exportation of surplus agricultural commodities pursuant to this title.
be Any funds or other assets available to the Commodity Credit Corpora-
Castion may be used in advance of such appropriation or payments, for
1 carrying out the purposes of this Act.
(b) Transactions shall not be carried out under this title which will
it call for appropriations to reimburse the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, in amounts in excess of
els $1,500,000,000. This limitation shall not be apportioned by year or
by country, but shall be considered as an objective as well as a limita-
tion, to be reached as rapidly as possible so long as the purposes of this
Act can be achieved within the safeguards established.?
Sec
. 104. Notwithstanding section 1415 of the Supplemental
Appropriation Act, 1953, or any other provision of law, the President
il may use or enter into agreements with friendly nations or organiza-
tions of nations to use the foreign currencies which accrue under this
title for one
or more of the following purposes:
(a) To help develop new markets for United States agricultural
commodities on a mutually benefiting basis;
(b) To purchase or contract to purchase strategic and critical
materials, within the
applicable terms of the Strategic and Critical
Materials Stockpile Act, for a supplemental
United States stock-
pile of such materials as the President may determine from time
to time under contracts, including advance payment contracts, for
supply extending over periods up to ten years. All strategic and
Act of Oct. 9, 1940; 54 Stat. 1029.
The figure “$1,500,000,000", and the second sentence were added by PL 387,
The figure
all
the
ter
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701
oks
ate
Die
dit
2944
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
is
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Agriculture. The Secretary of Agriculture is also authorized to deter-
critical materials acquired under authority of this title shall be
placed in the above named supplemental stockpile and may be
additional to the amounts acquired under authority of the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile Act. Materials so
acquired shall be released from the supplemental stockpile only
under the provisions of section 3 of the Strategic and Critical
Materials Stockpile Act;
(c) To procure military equipment, materials, facilities, and
services for the common defense;
(d) For financing the purchase of goods or services for other
friendly countries;
(e) For promoting balanced economic development and trade
among nations;
(f) To pay United States obligations abroad;
(g) For loans to promote multilateral trade and economic de
velopment, made through established banking facilities of the
friendly nation from which the foreign currency was obtained or
in any other manner which the President may deem to be appro-
priate. Strategic materials, services, or foreign currencies may be
accepted in payment of such loans;
(h) For the financing of international educational exchange
activities under the programs authorized by section 32 (b) (2)
of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, as amended (50 U.S.C.
App. 1641 (b)).
Provided, however, That section 1415 of the Supplemental Appropria-
tion Act, 1953, shall apply to all foreign currencies used for grants
under subsections (d) and (e) and
for payment of United States obliga-
tions involving grants under subsection (f) and to not less than 10 per
centum of the foreign currencies which accrue under this title:
Provided, however, That the President is authorized to waive such
applicability of section 1415 in any case where he determines that it
would be inappropriate or inconsistent with the purposes of this title
.
Sec. 105. Foreign currencies received pursuant to this title shall be
deposited in a special account to the credit of the United States and
shall be used only pursuant to section 104 of this title, and any de-
partment or agency of the government using any of such currencies
for a purpose for which funds have been appropriated shall reimburse
the Commodity Credit Corporation in an amount equivalent to the
dollar value of the currencies used.
Sec. 106. As used in this Act, *"surplus agricultural commodity
"
shall mean any agricultural commodity or product thereof,
class
, kind
type, or other specification thereof, produced in the United States
,
either privately or publicly owned, which is or may be reasonably
expected to be in excess of domestic requirements, adequate carryovery
and anticipated
exports for dollars, as determined by the Secretary of
mine the nations with whom agreements shall be negotiated,
and to
determine the commodities and quantities thereof which may
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1 Act of Oct. 3, 1944; 58 Stat. 765.
2 Act of July 15, 1952; 66 Stat. 637.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2945
authority of this title after June 30, 1957.
adding at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding the fore..
included in the negotiations with each country after advising with
other agencies of Government affected and within broad policies laid
down by the President for implementing this Act.
Sec. 107. As used in this Act, "friendly nation" means any country
other than (1) the U. S. S. R., or (2) any nation or area dominated or
controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization con-
trolling the world Communist movement.
Sec. 108. The President shall make a report to Congress with respect
to the activities carried on under this Act at least once each six months
and at such other times as may be appropriate and such reports shall
include the dollar value, at the exchange rates in effect at the time of
the sale, of the foreign currency for which commodities exported
pursuant to section 102 (a) hereof are sold.
Sec. 109. No transactions shall be undertaken under authority of
this title after June 30, 1957, except as required pursuant to agreements
theretofore entered into pursuant to this title.
TITLE II—FAMINE RELIEF AND OTHER ASSISTANCE
Sec. 201. In order to enable the President to furnish emergency
assistance on behalf of the people of the United States to friendly
peoples in meeting famine or other urgent relief requirements, the
Commodity
Credit Corporation
shall make available
to the President
out of its stocks such surplus agricultural commodities (as defined in
section 106 of title I) f. o. b. vessels in United States ports, as he may
request, for transfer (1) to any nation friendly to the United States in
order to meet famine or other urgent relief requirements of such
nation, and (2) to friendly but needy populations without regard to
the friendliness of their government.
Sec. 202. The President may authorize the transfer on a grant
basis of surplus agricultural commodities from Commodity Credit
Corporation stocks
to assist programs undertaken
with friendly gov-
emments or through voluntary relief agencies: Provided, That the
President shall take reasonable precaution that such transfers will
not displace or interfere with sales which might otherwise be made.
Sec
. 203. Not
more than $300,000,000
(including the Corporation's
investment in the commodities shall be expended for all transfers,
including delivery on board vessels
in United States ports, under this
title. The President may make such transfers through such
agencies
including
intergovernmental organizations, in such manner, and upon
such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate; he shal make use
of the facilities of voluntary relief agencies to the extent practicable.
Sec. 204. No programs of assistance shall be undertaken under the
TITLE III GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec
. 301. Section 407 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 is amended by
This sentence was added by PL 387, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (69 Stat. 721),
approved Aug. 12, 1955.
415900--07--Vol. 2
-82
2946
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
the case of (3) and (4) above the Secretary shall obtain such assurance
Secretary may from time to time estimate and announce the quantity
order to facilitate the appropriate disposal of such commodities, the
going, the Corporation, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary
may deem in the public interest, shall make available any farm
commodity or product thereof owned or controlled by it for use in
relieving distress (1) in any area in the United States declared by the
President to be an acute distress area because of unemployment or
other economic cause if the President finds that such use will not
displace or interfere with normal marketing of agricultural commodi-
ties and (2) in connection with any major disaster determined by the
President to warrant assistance by the Federal Government under
Public Law 875, Eighty-first Congress, as amended (42 U.S. C. 1855).
Except on a reimbursable basis, the Corporation shall not bear any
costs in connection with making such commodity available beyond
the cost of the commodities to the Corporation in store and the
handling and transportation costs in making delivery of the com-
modity to designated agencies at one or more central locations in
each State."
SEC. 302. Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 is amended
to read as follows:
“SEC. 416. In order to prevent the waste of commodities acquired
through price-support operations by the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion before they can be disposed of in normal domestic channels with-
out impairment of the price-support program or sold abroad at com-
petitive world prices, the Commodity Credit Corporation is author-
ized, on such terms and under such regulations as the Secretary maj
deem in the public interest: (1) upon application, to make such com-
modities available to any Federal agency for use in making payment
for commodities not produced in the United States; (2) to barter or
exchange such commodities for strategic
or other materials as author-
ized by law; (3) in the case of food commodities to donate such
commodities to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and to such State
,
Federal, or private agency or agencies
as may be designated by the
proper State or Federal authority and approved by the Secretary, for
use
in the United States in nonprofit school-lunch programs, in the
assistance of needy persons, and in charitable institutions, including
hospitals, to the extent that needy persons are served; and (9.to
donate any such food commodities in excess of anticipated disposition
under (1), (2), and (3) above to nonprofit voluntary agencies regis
tered with the Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the Foreign
Operations Administration or other appropriate department or agence
of the Federal Government and intergovernmental organizations for
use in the assistance of needy persons outside the United States. To
as he deems necessary that the recipients
thereof will not diminish
their normal expenditures for food by reason of such donation. In
1
11
distribution under (3) and (4) above. The Commodity Credit Com
poration may pay, with respect to commodities
disposed of under this
1 Act of Sept. 30, 1950; 64 Stat. 1109.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2947
section, reprocessing, packaging, transporting, handling, and other
charges accruing up to the time of their delivery to a Federal agency
or to the designated State or private agency, in the case of commodi-
ties made available for use within the United States, or their delivery
free alongside ship or free on board export carrier at point of export,
in the case of commodities made available for use outside the United
States. For the purpose of this section the terms 'State' and 'United
States' include the District of Columbia and any Territory or posses-
sion of the United States."
Sec. 303. Whenever the Secretary has reason to believe that, in
addition to other authorized methods and means of disposing of
agricultural commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration, there may be opportunity to protect the funds and assets of
the Commodity Credit Corporation by barter or exchange of such
agricultural commodities for (a) strategic materials entailing less risk
of loss through deterioration or substantially less storage charges, or
(b) materials, goods or equipment required in connection with foreign
economic and military aid and assistance programs, or (c) materials
or equipment required in substantial quantities for offshore construc-
tion programs, he is hereby directed to use every practicable means,
in cooperation with other Government agencies, to arrange and make,
through private trade channels, such barters or exchanges or to utilize
the authority conferred on him by section 4 (h) of the Commodity
Credit Corporation Charter Act, as amended, to make such barters
or exchanges. Agencies of the United States Government procuring
materials, goods or equipment are hereby directed to cooperate
with the Secretary in the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities
by means of barter or exchange. Strategic materials so acquired by
the Commodity Credit Corporation shall be considered as assets of
the Corporation and other agencies of the Government, in purchasing
strategic materials, shall purchase such materials from Commodity
Credit Corporation inventories to the extent available in fulfillment
of their requirements. The Secretary is also directed to assist, through
such means as are available to him, farmers' cooperatives in effecting
exchange of agricultural commodities in their possession for strategic
Sec. 304. The President shall exercise the authority contained herein
(1) to assist friendly nations to be independent of trade with the
V. S. S. R. or nations dominated or controlled by the U. S. S. R. for
food, raw materials and markets, and (2) to assure that agricultural
commodities sold
or transferred hereunder do not result in increased
availability of those or like
commodities to unfriendly nations.
SEC. 305.
All Commodity Credit Corporation stocks disposed of
under title II of this Act and section
416 of the Agricultural Act of
1949
, as amended, shall be clearly identified by, as far as practical,
appropriate marking on each package or container as being furnished
by the people of the United States of America.
Act of June 29, 1948: 62 Stat. 1070.
* See sec. 302 of this act.
such
materials.
:
2948
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
.
1
1
the free world. This free-world alliance will be most firmly cemented
6. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY: Message by the President to
the Congress, January 10, 1955 1
The Nation's enlightened self-interest and sense of responsibility as
a leader among the free nations require a foreign economic program
that will stimulate economic growth in the free world through enlarging
opportunities for the fuller operation of the forces of free enterprise
and competitive markets. Our own self-interest requires such a pro-
gram because (1) economic strength among our allies is essential to
our security; (2) economic growth in underdeveloped areas is necessary
to lessen international instability growing out of the vulnerability of
such areas to Communist penetration and subversion; and (3) an
increasing volume of world production and trade will help assure our
own economic growth and a rising standard of living among our own
people.
In the worldwide struggle between the forces of freedom and those
of communism, we have wisely recognized that the security of each
nation in the free world is dependent upon the security of all other
nations in the free world. The measure of that security in turn is
dependent upon the economic strength of all free nations, for without
economic strength they cannot support the military establishments
that are necessary to deter Communist armed aggression. Economic
strength is indispensable, as well, in securing themselves against
internal Communist subversion.
For
every country in the free world, economic strength is dependent
upon high levels of economic activity internally and high levels of
international trade. No nation can be economically self-sufficient
Nations must buy from other nations, and in order to pay for what
they buy they must sell. It is essential for the security of the United
States and the rest of the free world that the United States take the
leadership in promoting the achievement of those high levels of trade
that will bring to all the economic strength upon which the freedom
and security of all depends. Those high levels of trade can be pro-
moted by the specific measures with respect to trade barriers recom-
mended in this message, by the greater flow of capital among nations
of the free world, by convertibility of currencies, by an expanded
interchange of technical counsel, and by an increase in international
travel.
From the military standpoint, our national strength has been
augmented by the overall military'alliance of the nations constituting
when its association is based on flourishing mutual trade as well as
common ideals, interests, and aspirations. Mutually advantageous
trade relationships are not only profitable, but they are also more
binding and more enduring than costly grants and other forms of aid
.
advantageous trade and the flow of investment
are preventing the
1
Department of State publication 5733; 1955.
1
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2949
barriers. The instrument of cooperation is the General Agreement on
nations of the free world from achieving their full economic potential.
International trade and investment are not making their full contribu-
tion to production, employment, and income. Over a large area of the
world currencies are not yet convertible.
We and our friends abroad must together undertake the lowering
of the unjustifiable barriers to trade and investment, and we must do
it on a mutual basis so that the benefits may be shared by all.
Such action will add strength to our own domestic economy and
help assure a rising standard of living among our people by opening
new markets for our farms and factories and mines.
The
program that I am here recommending is moderate, gradual,
and reciprocal. Radical or sudden tariff reductions would not be to
the interest of the United States and would not accomplish the goal
we seek. A moderate program, however, can add immeasurably to
the security and well-being of the United States and the rest of the
free world.
TRADE AGREEMENT AUTHORITY
I request a 3-year extension of Presidential authority to negotiate
tariff reductions with other nations on a gradual, selective, and recipro-
cal basis. This authority would permit negotiations for reductions
in those barriers that
now limit the markets for our goods throughout
the world. I shall ask
all nations with whom we trade to take similar
steps in their relations with each other.
The 3-year extension of the Trade
Agreements Act should authorize,
subject to the present peril and escape clause provisions:
1. Reduction, through multilateral and reciprocal negotiations, of
tariff rates on selected commodities by not more than 5 percent per
2. Reduction, through multilateral and reciprocal negotiations, of
any tariff rates in excess of 50 percent to that level over a 3-year
3. Reduction, by not more than one-half over a 3-year period, of
tariff rates in effect on January 1, 1945, on articles which are not now
being imported or which are being imported only in negligible quan-
For approximately 7 years the United States has cooperated with all
the major trading nations of the free world in an effort to reduce trade
sought to carry out the provisions and purpose of the Trade Agree-
The United States and 33 other trading countries are now reviewing
the provisions of the agreement for the purpose of making it a simpler
and more effective instrument for the development of a sound system
of world trade. When the current negotiations on the
revision of the
See the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955; infra, doc. 9.
year for 3 years;
period; and
tities.
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
ments Act.
2950
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
organizational provisions of the General Agreement are satisfactorily
completed, the results will be submitted to the Congress for its
approval.1
11
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE
Considerable progress has been made in freeing imports from un-
necessary customs administrative burdens. Still more, however,
needs to be done in the three areas I mentioned in my message last
year: (1) the simplification of commodity definitions, classification
;
and rate structures; (2) improvement in standards for the valuation of
imports; and (3) further improvement of procedures for customs
administration.
An important step toward simplification of the tariff structure was
taken by the Congress last year with the passage of the Customs
Simplification Act, which directs the Tariff Commission to study the
difficulties of commodity classification of imports. The interim
report of the Tariff Commission to be made by next March 15 should
help enable the Congress to determine whether further legislative
steps should then be taken or should await submission of the final
report.
The uncertainties and confusion arising from the complex system
of valuation on imported articles cause unwarranted delays in the
determination of customs duties. I urge the Congress to give favor-
able consideration to legislation 2 for remedying this situation.
The improvement of customs administration requires continuous
effort, as the Congress recognized by enacting the Customs Simplifi-
cation Acts of 1953 and 1954. The Treasury Department in its
annual report to the Congress will review the remaining reasons for
delay or difficulty in processing imported articles through customs
and will propose still further technical amendments to simplify cus-
toms procedures.
1
UNITED STATES INVESTMENT ABROAD
B
ko
t
The whole free world needs capital; America is its largest source,
In that light, the flow of capital abroad from our country must
stimulated and in such a manner that it results in investment largely
by individuals or private enterprises rather than by government
,
An increased flow of United States private investment funds abroad
especially to the underdeveloped areas, could contribute much to the
expansion of two-way international trade. The underdeveloped
countries would thus be enabled more easily to acquire the capital
equipment so badly needed by them to achieve sound economie
growth and higher living standards. This would do much to offset
the false but alluring promises of the Communists.
To facilitate the investment of capital abroad, I recommend enact-
ment of legislation providing for taxation of business
income from
foreign subsidiaries or branches at a rate 14 percentage points lower
than the corporate rate on domestic income, and a deferral of tax op
1 See infra.
* H. Res. 6040 passed the House of Representatives during the 84th Cong.
1st sess. Not enacted.
A
d
ag
Is
8.
8
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2951
84th Cong., 1st sess. An analysis of the articles is printed in H. Rept. No. 505,
deposited with the International Bank on Dec. 5, 1955. For “Articles of Agree-
as Approved for Submission to Governments, by the Executive Directors of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,” see H. Doc. No. 152,
income of foreign branches until it is removed from the country where
it is earned.1
I propose also to explore the further use of tax treaties with the pos-
sible recognition of tax concessions made to foreign capital by other
countries. Under proper safeguards, credit could be given for foreign
income taxes which are waived for an initial limited period, as we now
grant credit for taxes which are imposed. This would give maximum
effectiveness to foreign tax laws designed to encourage new enterprises.
As a further step to stimulate investment abroad, I recommend
approval by the Congress at the appropriate time of membership in
the proposed International Finance Corporation, which will be
affiliated with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment. This corporation will be designed to increase private invest-
ment in less developed countries by making loans without Govern-
ment guaranties. Although the corporation will not purchase stock,
it will provide venture capital through investing in debentures and
similar obligations. Its operation will cover a field not dealt with by
an existing institution.
The executive branch will continue through our diplomatic repre-
sentatives abroad to encourage a climate favorable to the private
enterprise concept in investment.
We shall continue to seek other new ways to enlarge the outward
It must be recognized, however, that when American private
capital moves abroad, it properly expects to bring home its fair reward.
This can only be accomplished in the last analysis by our willingness
to purchase more goods and services from abroad in order to provide
the dollars for these growing remittances. This fact is a further
compelling reason for a fair and forward-looking trade policy on our
part.
TECHNICAL COOPERATION
The United States has a vast store of practical and scientific know-
how that is needed in the under-developed areas of the world. The
United States has a responsibility to make it available. Its flow
for
peaceful purposes must remain unfettered.
United States participation
in technical cooperation programs should
be carried forward. These programs should be concerned with
know-how rather than large funds. In my budget message
next week
I shall recommend that the Congress make
available the funds required
to support the multilateral technical cooperation programs of the
H. Res. 7725, not acted upon, 84th Cong., 1st sess.
See International Finance Corporation Act (PL 350, 84th Cong., 1st sess.,
dug. 11, 1955; 69 Stat. 669). The United States instrument of acceptance was
flow of capital.
84th Cong., 1st sess.
2952
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2
TRADE FAIRS
&
The first fair in which the United States presented a central
exhibit is that at Bangkok, which opened December 7, 1954. Adil
our exhibit was awarded first prize. Over 100 American companies
I shall ask the Congress for funds to continue this program.:
Convertibility of currencies is required for the development of 8!
steadily rising volume of world trade and investment. The achiere
1 See sec. 30b of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended; infra, p. 3118.
3 No specific legislation was requested in 1955. The program was financat
United Nations. The bilateral programs of the United States
should be pressed vigorously.
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
The United States remains committed to the objective of freedom
of travel throughout the world. Encouragement given to travel
abroad is extremely important, both for its cultural and social impor-
tance in the free world and for its economic benefits. Travel abroad
by Americans provides an important source of dollars for many
countries. The executive branch shall continue to look for ways of
facilitating international travel and shall continue to cooperate with
private travel agencies.
One legislative action that would be beneficial in this field is the
increase of the present duty-free allowances for tourists from $500 to
$1,000 exercisable every 6 months. I recommend the passage of such
legislation.
International trade fairs have been of major importance to foreign
countries for many years, and most of the trading nations have
strengthened the promotional aspects of their industrial displays in
many fairs with a central exhibit designed to emphasize the industrial
progress and achievement of the nation.
Soviet and satellite exhibits, for example, have been costly, wel
planned, and housed in expensive structures designed to convey the
impression that the U.S.S.R. is producing on a large scale for peace
and is creating a paradise for workers.
The United States, which has a larger volume of international trade
than any other nation, until recently has been conspicuous by is
absence at these trade fairs. American visitors and participants here
pointed out
the failure of their Government to tell adequately the ?
story of our free enterprise system and to provide effective inter
national trade promotion cooperation.
As a result, I have undertaken an international trade fair program
under the direction of the Department of Commerce. Since the
inauguration of this program in August,
participation has been author
ized in 11 fairs to be held before June 30. Sixteen additional fais
are being considered for exhibition purposes in the latter part
of the
year.
f
supplied items for inclusion in it.
CONVERTIBILITY
2 Res. 1795, 84th Cong., 1st
Not enacted.
from the President's emergency funds.
R
C
8
V
ប
f
1
in
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2953
the Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation (Geneva, The Contracting
Documents, vol. I (Revised), Texts of the General Agreement, as Amended, and of
GATT was negotiated by 23 nations, signed at Geneva on Oct. 30, 1947, and,
Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 1955), pp. 7-74.
increased to 35 by the end of calendar year 1955. Rounds of multilateral tariff
1948 (see TIAS 1700; 61 Stat., pts. 5 and 6). Adherents to the agreement had
esment of convertibility has not been possible in the postwar period due
to dislocations caused by the war, inflation, and other domestic
economic difficulties in many countries, which have contributed to an
imbalance in international trade and payments. However, steady
progress, particularly by Western European countries, is being made
ed toward our mutual objective of restoring currency convertibility.
The foreign economic program proposed here will make an important
o contribution to the achievement of convertibility.
AGRICULTURE
of
th
No single group within America has a greater stake in a healthy and
expanding foreign trade than the farmers. One-fourth to one-third of
some major crops, such as wheat, cotton, and tobacco, must find
to markets abroad in order to maintain farm income at high levels.
If they are to be successful, programs designed to promote the
prosperity of agriculture should be consistent with our foreign eco-
nomic program. We must take due account of the effect of any
agricultural
191
program on our foreign economic relations to assure that
it contributes to the development of healthy, expanding foreign
eve
markets over the years.
0
Fjal
CONCLUSION
The series of recommendations I have just made are all components
of an integrated program, pointing in a single direction. Each con-
the tributes to the whole. Each advances our national security by
2. bringing added strength and self-sufficiency to our allies.
Each
contributes to our economic growth and a rising standard of living
ade
among our people.
its
cv
ITO
jer
the | 7. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT):
Text of October
30, 1947, as Amended at
the Ninth Session of the
Contracting Parties, March 10, 1955 1
the
PART I
OP-
Article I
the
!
Objectives
1. The contracting parties recognize that their relations in the
field of trade and economie endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Basic Instruments and Selected
re
ned
ore for the United States and seven pother important
trading nations
on Jan. 1,
2954
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding
the production and exchange of goods, and promoting the progressive
development of the economies of all the contracting parties.
2. The contracting parties desire to contribute to these objectives
through this Agreement by entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of dis-
criminatory treatment in international commerce.
d
8
ADA
P
Article II
1
General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed
on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the
international transfer of payments for imports or exports
, and with
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges
, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, and with respect to the application of internal
taxes to exported goods, and with respect to all matters referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article IV, any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not require
the elimination of any preferences in respect of import duties on
charges which do not exceed the levels provided for in paragraph 4
of this Article and which fall within the following descriptions
(a) preferences in force exclusively between two or more of the
territories listed in Annex A, subject to the conditions set forth
therein;
(6) preferences in force exclusively between two or more territories
which on 1 July 1939, were connected by common sovereignty
or relations of protection or suzerainty and which are listed in
Annexes B, C and D, subject to the conditions set forth therein
;
(c) preferences in force exclusively between the United States of
America and the Republic of Cuba;
negotiations took place at Annecy, France, in 1949, and at Torquay, England, in
1950-1951. Still another negotiating session opened at Geneva on Jan. 18, 1966
By 1953, it became apparent that the General Agreement, particularly its
organizational provisions, needed revision. The Ninth Session of the Contracting
Parties at Geneva, Oct. 28, 1954-Mar. 7, 1955, reviewed the document and
proposed certain changes
, which are incorporated in the text cited above and
prepared an Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation (infra
GATT. The amendments to GATT were accepted by the United States.com
Mar. 21, 1955. The Agreement on OTC
is still before Congress (June 15, 1956
)
Meanwhile, GATT continues to operate under provisionai-arrangements. (See
H. Rept. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d sess.).
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2955
sanne; 23 League of Nations Treaty Series 115.
d.
ng
TO
ly
of
(d) preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring countries
listed in Annex E.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to preferences
between the countries formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and
detached from it on 24 July 1923; Provided that such preferences are
approved under paragraph 5 of Article XXV.
4. The margin of preference on any product in respect of which a
preference is permitted under paragraph 2 of this Article but is not
špecifically set forth as a maximum margin of preference in the appro-
priate Schedule 2 annexed to this Agreement shall not exceed:
(a) in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such
Schedule, the difference between the most-favoured-nation and
preferential rates provided for therein; if no preferential rate is
provided for, the preferential rate shall for the purposes of this
paragraph be taken to be that in force on 10 April 1947, and, if
no most-favoured-nation rate is provided for, the margin shall
not exceed the difference between the most-favoured-nation and
preferential rates existing on 10 April 1947;
(b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in
the appropriate Schedule, the difference between the most-
favoured-nation and preferential rates existing on 10 April 1947.
In the case of the contracting parties named in Annex F, the date of
10 April 1947, referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this para-
graph shall be replaced by the respective dates set forth in that Annex.
ed
18
ch
ch
al
1
DI
g
Y
OT
DI
4
Article III
LO
h
-S
I
Schedules of Concessions
1. (a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the
other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that
provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule
annexed to this Agreement.
(6) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to
ang contracting party, which are the products of territories of other
contracting parties, shall,
on their importation into the territory to
which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or
qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary
customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for therein.
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges
of any kind
imposed on or in connection with importation, including
charges of any kind imposed on the international transfer of pay-
ments for imports, in excess of those
imposed on the date of this
Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed
thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that
1
The treaty of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, signed at Lau-
* Schedules not reprinted.
2956
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
oth
Car
SO
tw
SU
W1
rel
HT
tap
cu
by
1S
by
an
red
(b
ad
in
&C
Or
concession provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to
(c) The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any
contracting party which are the products of territories entitled under
Article II to receive preferential treatment upon importation into the
territory to which the Schedule relates shall, on their importation into
such territory, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications
set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in
excess of those set forth and provided for in Part II of that Schedule
.
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges
of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation, including
charges of any kind imposed on the international transfer of payments
for imports, in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement
or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter
by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date. Nothing
in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from maintaining
its requirements existing on the date of this Agreement as to the
eligibility of goods for entry at preferential rates of duty.
2. Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from
imposing at any time on the importation of any product:
(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with
the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article IV in respect of the
like domestic product or in respect of an article from which the
imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole
or in part;
(6) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently
with the provisions of Article VI;
(c) fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services
rendered,
3. No contracting party shall alter its method of determining
dutiable value or of converting currencies so as to impair the value
of any of the concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule
annexed to this Agreement.
4. If any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes,
formally or in effect, a monopoly of the importation of any product
described in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement
,
such monopoly shall not, except as provided for in that Schedule
or as otherwise agreed between the parties which initially negotiated
the concession, operate so as to afford protection on the average in
excess of the amount of protection provided for in that Schedule
.
The provisions of this paragraph shall not limit the use by contracting
parties of any form of assistance to domestic producers permitted by
other provisions of this Agreement.
5. If any contracting party considers that a product is not re-
ceiving from another contracting party the treatment which the
first contracting party believes to have been contemplated by
other contracting party. If the latter agrees that the treatment
contemplated was that claimed by the first contracting party, but
declares that such treatment cannot be accorded because à court or
m
pa
ang
ani
ot
th
此​比​拉比​初 ​w
SC
t
11
di
Q
this
SE
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2957
See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 273–304.
3 Schedules not reprinted here.
other proper authority has ruled to the effect that the product involved
cannot be classified under the tariff laws of such contracting party
so as to permit the treatment contemplated in this Agreement, the
two contracting parties, together with any other contracting parties
substantially interested, shall enter promptly into further negotiations
with a view to a compensatory adjustment of the matter.
6. (a) The specific duties and charges included in the Schedules
relating to contracting parties members of the International Monetary
Fund,'
and margins of preference in specific duties and charges main-
tained by such contracting parties, are expressed in the appropriate
currency at the par value accepted or at the rate of exchange recognized
by the Fund at the date of this Agreement. Accordingly, in case the
par value accepted or the rate of exchange recognized by the Fund
is reduced consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund
by more than twenty per centum, such specific duties and charges
and margins of preference may be adjusted to take account of such
reduction; Provided that the Organization for Trade Cooperation
(hereinafter referred to as "the Organization") concurs that such
adjustments will not impair the value of the concessions provided for
in the appropriate Schedule or elsewhere in this Agreement, due
account being taken of all factors which may influence the need for,
or urgency of, such adjustments.
(6) Similar provisions shall apply to any contracting party not a
member of the Fund, as from the date on which such contracting
party becomes a member of the Fund or enters into a special exchange
agreement in pursuance of Article XV.
7. The Schedules 3 annexed to this Agreement are hereby made
an integral part of Part I of this Agreement.
2
PART II
Article IV
National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and
other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring
the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or
proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products
so as to afford protection to domestic production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject,
or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any
kind in excess of those
applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
For Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944,
directly
2958
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
$
PAT
1
par
par
men
subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to
products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply in-
ternal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products pro
in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
3. With respect to any existing internal tax which is inconsistent
with the provisions of paragraph 2, but which is specifically authorized this
under a trade agreement, in force on 10 April 1947, in which the par
import duty on the taxed product is bound against increase, the con-
tracting party imposing the tax shall be free to postpone the applica-
tion of the provisions of paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as pre
it can obtain release from the obligations of such trade agreement in
order to permit the increase of such duty to the extent necessary to
compensate for the elimination of the protective element of the tax.
tion
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported a
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
for
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering foi sale, purchase, transportation
,
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not
prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of
transport and not on the nationality of the product.
5. No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal
quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use
of products in specified amounts or proportions which requires
,
directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any
product which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from
domestic sources. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise
apply internal quantitative regulations in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.
6. The provisions
of paragraph 5 shall not apply to any internal
quantitative regulation in force in the territory of any contracting
party on 1 July 1939, 10 April 1947, or 24 March 1948, at the option of
that contracting party; Provided that any such regulation which is
contrary to the provisions of paragraph 5 shall not be modified to the
detriment of imports and shall be treated as a customs duty for the
purpose of negotiation.
7. No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture,
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions shall
be applied in such a manner as to allocate any such amount or pro-
portion among external sources of supply.
8. (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regu
lations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental
agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes
with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the produc-
tion of goods for commercial sale.
(6) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of
domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes of
charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and
t
and not
CO]
Wi
thi
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2959
3 products.
)
1
)
}
whose territory the traffic passes. Traffic of this nature is termed in
this Article "traffic in transit”.
subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic
9. The contracting parties recognize that internal maximum price
t control measures, even though conforming to the other provisions of
1 this Article, can have effects prejudicial to the interests of contracting
parties supplying imported products. Accordingly, contracting
parties applying such measures shall take account of the interests of
exporting contracting parties with a view to avoiding to the fullest
z practicable extent such prejudicial effects.
10. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any contracting
perty from establishing or maintaining internal quantitative regula-
tions relating to exposed cinematograph films. If any contracting
party establishes or maintains such regulations they shall take the
i form of screen quotas which shall conform to the following require-
ments:
(6) screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematograph
films of national origin during a specified minimum proportion
of the total screen time actually utilized, over a specified period
of not less than one year, in the commercial exhibition of all
films of whatever origin, and shall be computed on the basis of
screen time per theatre per year or the equivalent thereof;
6) with the exception of screen time reserved for films of national
e
origin under a screen quota, screen time including that released
by administrative action from screen time reserved for films of
national origin, shall not be allocated formally or in effect
e
among sources of supply;
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (6) of this
paragraph, any contracting party may maintain screen quotas
1 conforming to the requirements of sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph which reserve a minimum proportion of screen time
for films of a specified origin other than that of the contracting
party imposing such screen quotas; Provided that no such mini
mum proportion of screen time shall be increased above the level
in effect on 10 April 1947;
(2) screen quotas shall be subject to negotiation for their limitation,
liberalization or elimination.
Article V
Freedom of Transit
1. Goods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means
of transport, shall be deemed to be in transit across the territory of a
contracting party when the passage across such territory, with or
without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the
F
mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning
and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across
2. There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each
1
2
e
-
2960
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
the
diff
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which
industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retaras
Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the
contracting party, via the routes most convenient for international com
transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contract-
ing parties. No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of
G
vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on
any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of
other means of transport.
3. Any contracting party may require that traffic in transit
through its territory be entered at the proper custom house, but,
except in cases of failure to comply with applicable customs laws
and regulations, such traffic coming from or going to the territory
of other contracting parties shall not be subject to any unnecessary
delays or restrictions and shall be exempt from customs duties and
from all transit duties or other charges imposed in respect of transit
,
I
except charges for transportation or those commensurate with admin tion
istrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of services | if
rendered.
2
4. All charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties ma
on traffic in transit to or from the territories of other contracting in
parties shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the For
traffic.
3
5. With respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in
connection with transit, each contracting party shall accord to traffic team
in transit to or from the territory of any other contracting party no
treatment no less favourable than the treatment accorded to traffic ma
in transit to or from any third country.
6. Each contracting party shall accord to products which have pro
been in transit through the territory of any other contracting party sub
treatment no less favourable than that which would have been "co
accorded to such products had they been transported from their sevi
place of origin to their destination without going through the territory din
of such other contracting party. Any contracting party shal, of
however, be free to maintain its requirements of direct consignment
existing on the date of this Agreement, in respect of any goods into
regard to which such direct consignment is a requisite condition of sat
eligibility for entry of the goods at preferential rates of duty or has of
relation to the contracting party's prescribed method of valuation des
by
for duty purposes.
7. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to the operation
of aircraft'in transit, but shall apply
to air transit of goods (including
baggage).
Article VI
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties
of
duz
th)
as
country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be como
demned if it causes or threatens material injury to an
Pa
to
the establishment of a domestic industry. For the
Or
int
bo
sar
001
wa
of this
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2961
it
he
11
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to
countervailing duty on the importation of any product of the territory
of another contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the
I threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such
to levy an anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation
paragraph (a) of this paragraph so as to permit a contracting party
al
commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if
the price of the product exported from one country to another
ito
of
() is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
Di trade, for the like product when destined for consumption
of
in the exporting country, or,
() in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
it
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for
it
,
export to any third country in the ordinary course of
trade, or
гу (ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of
origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.
id
it, Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in condi-
Btions and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other
es differences affecting price comparability.
2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party
es may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater
ng in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product.
For the purposes of this Article, the margin of dumping is the price
difference determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.
3. No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the
lc territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
ty another contracting party in excess of an amount equal to the esti-
fic mated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted, directly
er indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of such
we product in the country of origin or exportation, including any special
ty subsidy to the transportation of a particular product. The term
encountervailing duty shall be understood to mean a special duty
levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed,
directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export
of any merchandise.
4. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to
of sati-dumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption
as of such product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when
op destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or
by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes.
3. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported
both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the
same situation of dumping or export subsidization.
6. (a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or
ch
or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or
() The Organization may waive the requirement of sub-
el
at
En
OD
dumping
1.
.
As
28
415900_-57-Vol. 2
-83
2962
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
17
Or
SU
COE
to
1
un
10
0
SUC
1. The contracting parties recognize the validity of the general
importation and exportation based upon or regulated in any manner
Moreover, they shall, upon a request by another con-
tracting party, review the operation of any of their laws or regulations
relating to value for customs purposes in the light of these principles
The Organization may request from contracting parties reports o
steps taken by them in pursuance of the provisions of this Article
2. (a) The value for customs purposes of imported merchandise
should be based on the actual value of the imported merchandise on
of any product for the purpose of offsetting dumping or subsidization
which causes or threatens material injury to an industry in the
ba
territory of another contracting party exporting the product concerned
to the territory of the importing contracting party. The Organization
shall waive the requirements of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph
,
ple
so as to permit the levying of a countervailing duty, in cases in which
they find that a subsidy is causing or threatening material injury to an
industry in the territory of another contracting party exporting the
product concerned to the territory of the importing contracting party
.
qu
(c) In exceptional circumstances, however, where delay might
cause damage which would be difficult to repair, a contracting party sit
may levy a countervailing duty for the purpose referred to in sub-
paragraph (6) of this paragraph without the prior approval of the
Organization; Provided that such action shall be reported immediately
to the Organization and that the countervailing duty shall be with-
wit
drawn promptly if the Organization disapproves.
PW
7. A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the
return to domestic producers of a primary commodity, independently
of the movements of export prices, whicħ results at times in the sale
sha
of the commodity for export at a price lower than the comparable
price charged for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic
bee
market, shall be presumed not to result in material injury within the
meaning of paragraph 6 if it is determined by consultation among wh
the contracting parties substantially interested in the commodity for
concerned that:
(a) the system has also resulted in the sale of the commodity forf
for export at a price higher than the comparable price charged
for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, and i
(6) the system is so operated, either because of the effective rega
:
lation of production, or otherwise, as not to stimulate exports et
unduly or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of other
contracting parties.
Article VII
Valuation for Customs Purposes
Article, and they undertake to give effect to such principles, in respect
of all products subject to duties or other charges or restrictions of
by
the
exp
on
reco
rate
the
be
Tary
trac
rate
Agri
part
the
juse I
any
CUIT
Arti
forel
le
cont
custe
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2963
0 ani
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
currency, rules of conversion for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this
Article which are designed to reflect effectively the value of such
poreign currency in commercial transactions.
(1) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require any
contracting party to alter the method of converting currencies for
Jcustoms purposes which is applicable in its territory on the date of
tion
which duty is assessed, or of like merchandise, and should not be
the
based on the value of merchandise of national origin or on arbitrary
rned
or fictitious values.
tion
(6) "Actual value” should be the price at which, at a time and
aph,
place determined by the legislation of the country of importation,
hich
such or like merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the ordinary
course of trade under fully competitive conditions. To the extent
the
to which the price of such or like merchandise is governed by the
Ity
, quantity in a particular transaction, the price to be considered should
ngat uniformly be related to either (i) comparable quantities, or (ii) quan-
any sities
not less favourable to importers than those in which the greater
sub
volume of the merchandise is sold in the trade between the countries
the
of exportation and importation.
tely
(2) When the actual value is not ascertainable in accordance
ith-
with
sub-paragraph (6) of this paragraph, the value for customs
purposes should be based on the nearest ascertainable equivalent of
such value.
ntly
sale
3. The value for customs purposes of any imported product
she should not include the amount of any internal tax, applicable within
able
stic
the country of origin or export, from which the imported product has
been exempted or has been or will be relieved by means of refund.
the
4. (a) Except as otherwise provided for in this paragraph,
one shere it is necessary for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article
dity for a contracting party to convert into its own currency a price
expressed in the currency of another country, the conversion rate
City of exchange to be used shall be based, for each currency involved,
ged
on the par value as established pursuant to the Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund or on the rate of exchange
recognized by the Fund, or on the par value
established in accordance
& special exchange agreement entered into pursuant to Article
her
) Where no such established par value and no such recognized
rate of exchange exist, the conversion rate shall reflect effectively
the current value of such currency in commercial transactions.
(aThe Organization, in agreement with the International Mone-
Mary Fund, shall formulate rules governing the conversion by con-
tracting parties of any foreign
currency in respect of which multiple
pates of exchange are maintained consistently with the Articles of
perty may apply such rules in respect of such foreign currencies for
paragraph 2 of this Article as an alternative to the
par values. Until such rules are adopted by the Organization,
y contracting party may employ, in respect of any such foreign
and
gu-
orts
XV of this Agreement.
ral
his
ect
OD
the purposes of
041
luse
DD"
INS
les
184
01
18
IN
reg
minor breaches of customs regulations or procedural requirements
customs documentation which is easily rectifiable and obviously req
made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence shall be greates par
formalities and requirements imposed by governmental authorities
in connection with importation and exportation, including those
(a) consular transactions, such as consular invoices and certificate
2964 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
this Agreement, if such alteration would have the effect of increasing
generally the amounts of duty payable.
5. The bases and methods for determining the value of produek
subject to duties or other charges or restrictions based upon or regu
.
lated in any manner by value should be stable and should be given to
sufficient publicity to enable traders to estimate, with a reasonable re
degree of certainty, the value for customs purposes.
pr
Article VIII
Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation in
1. (a) All fees and charges of whatever character (other the
fra
import and export duties and other than taxes within the purview of
Article IV) imposed by contracting parties on or in connection wit
importation or exportation shall be limited in amount to the approa: pa
tin
mate cost of services rendered and shall not represent an indirect
protection to domestic products or a taxation of imports or exports
for fiscal purposes.
(6) The contracting parties recognize the need for reducing the w
number and diversity of fees and charges referred to in subparagrapi
(a).
by
(c) The contracting parties also recognize the need for minimizi
the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and find me
decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation requin
has
ments.
2. A contracting party shall, upon request by another contracting wit
vie
party or by the Organization, review the operation of its laws an
regulations in the light of the provisions of this article.
3. No contracting party shall impose substantial penalties
of {
pre
than necessary to serve merely as a warning.
4. The provisions of this article shall extend to fees, charges cat.
relating to:
ma
VA.
rep
ting
trai
VAL
1
of
{
tair
pur
(6) quantitative restrictions;
(c) licensing;
(d) exchange control;
le) statistical services;
(f) documents, documentation and certification;
(9) analysis and inspection; and
quarantine, sanitation and fumigation.
mei
trai
trai
essi
per
thei
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2965
ducts
porti
Tape
Izing
Article IX
asing
Marks of Origin
Tegu 1. Each contracting party shall accord to the products of the terri-
giva tories of other contracting parties treatment with regard to marking
meble requirements no less favourable than the treatment accorded to like
products of any third country.
2. The contracting parties recognize that, in adopting and enforcing
laws and regulations relating to marks of origin, the difficulties and
inconveniences which such measures may cause to the commerce and
Din industry of exporting countries should be reduced to a minimum, due
than regard being had to the necessity of protecting consumers against
end
fraudulent or misleading indications.
3. Whenever it is administratively practicable to do so, contracting
pronti parties should permit required marks of origin to be affixed at the
Tired time of importation.
4. The laws and regulations of contracting parties relating to the
marking of imported products shall be such as to permit compliance
the without seriously damaging the products, or materially reducing their
value, or unreasonably increasing their cost.
5. As a general rule, no special duty or penalty should be imposed
by any contracting party for failure to comply with
marking require-
di ments prior to importation unless corrective marking is unreasonably
delayed or deceptive marks have been affixed or the required marking
has been intentionally omitted.
cting 6. The contracting parties shall co-operate with each other with a
view to preventing the use of trade names in such manner as to mis-
represent the true origin of a product, to the detriment of such dis-
8
liq tinctive regional or geographical names of products of the territory
of a contracting party as are protected by its legislation. Each con-
tracting party shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to such
pusly requests or representations as may be made by any other contracting
stej party regarding the application of the undertaking set forth in the
preceding sentence to names of products which have been communi-
cated to it by the other contracting party.
Article X
Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings
of general application, made effective by any contracting party, per-
faining to the classification or the valuation of products for customs
purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to require-
ments, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the
transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale, distribution,
transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspection, exhibition, proc-
sing
, mixing or other vse, shall be published promptly in such a man-
her as to enable governments and
traders to become acquainted with
them. Agreements affecting international trade policy which are in
an
ents
a
TOOS
Citzen
hosen
2966
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
!
Any contracting party employing such procedures shall, upon request
, che
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export/
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for expor
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
force between the government or a governmental agency of any cou o
tracting party and the government or governmental agency of app
other contracting party shall also be published. The provisions
this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to disclose to
confidential information which would impede law enforcement or
otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the
legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public a
private.
2. No measure of general application taken by any contracting
party effecting an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports
under an established and uniform practice, or imposing a new or more
burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports
, er
on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such
measure has been officially published.
3. (a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, in
partial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and
rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article
.
(6) Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as
practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures
for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of a
ministrative action relating to customs matters. Such tribunals
procedures shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with all
ministrative enforcement and their decisions shall be implemented by
and shall govern the practice of, such agencies unless an appeal.
lodged with a court or tribunal' of superior jurisdiction within the
time prescribed for appeals to be lodged by importers; Provided that
the central administration of such agency may take steps to obtain
review of the matter in another proceeding if there is good cause in
believe that the decision is inconsistent with established principles of
law or the actual facts.
(c) The provisions of sub-paragraph (6) of this paragraph shall ni
require the elimination or substitution of procedures in force in the
territory of a contracting party on the date
of this Agreement which
in fact provide for an objective and impartial review of administrative
action even though such procedures are not fully or formally inde
pendent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement
they may determine whether such procedures conform to the require
ments of this sub-paragraph.
Article XI
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
an
gTV
pro
tw
the
du
Wh
1
any
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2967
S a
201
ore
OM
uch
and
] AS
lies
8d
301
the contracting party shall pay due regard to the proportion prevailing
during a previous representative period and to any special factors
which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI,
COD of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
any party.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend
20 to the following:
OT
the
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to
prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other
products essential to the exporting contracting party;
ting (6) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to
orts the application of standards or regulations for the classifica-
tion, grading or marketing of commodities in international
trade;
(C) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product,
imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of
im- governmental measures which operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product
permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there is no
substantial domestic production of the like product, of
a domestic product for which the imported product can
be directly substituted; or
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic prod-
al
uct, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of
the like product, of a domestic product for which the
imported product can be directly substituted, by making
the
the surplus available to certain groups of domestic con-
sumers free of charge or at prices below the current market
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of
any animal product the production of which is directly
dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported commodity,
if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively
negligible.
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of
any product pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph shall
give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product per-
mitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any
change in such quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions applied
bis under (i) above shall not be such as will reduce the total of imports
te relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the
proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the
two in the absence of restrictions. In determining this proportion,
Article XII
ma
Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments
that
8
e to
level; or
sall
not
the
UCI
ITE
de
concerned.
je
ort
IT
011
any contracting party, in order to safeguard its external financial
2968
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950--1955
r
11
S
in
m
CI
SO
P:
а
0
re
B
(ii) not to apply restrictions so as to prevent unreasonably the
importation of any description of goods in minimum commer
cial quantities the exclusion of which would impair regular
(iii) not to apply restrictions which would prevent the importa- / W.
tion of commercial samples or prevent compliance with
(d) The contracting parties recognize that, as a result of domestic
and productive employment or towards the development of economie
policies directed towards the achievement and maintenance of fiul
resources, a contracting party may experience a high level of demand
for imports involving a threat to its monetary reserves of the sort
position and its balance of payments, may restrict the quantity or
value of merchandise permitted to be imported, subject to the pro-
visions of the following paragraphs of this Article.
2. (a) Import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified
by a contracting party under this Article shall not exceed those
necessary:
(i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline
in its monetary reserves, or
(ii) in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary
reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves
.
Due regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors which
may be affecting the reserves of such contracting party or its need
for reserves, including, where special external credits or other resources
are available to it, the need to provide for the appropriate use of such
credits or resources.
(6) Contracting parties applying restrictions under sub-paragraph re
(a) of this paragraph shall progressively relax them as such conditions
improve, maintaining them only to the extent that the conditions 0
specified in that sub-paragraph still justify their application. They
shall eliminate the restrictions when conditions would no longer justily un
their institution or maintenance under that sub-paragraph,
3. (a) Contracting parties undertake, in carrying out their domestic
policies, *to pay due regard to the need for maintaining or restoring
equilibrium in their balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis th
and to the desirability
of avoiding an uneconomic employment a
productive resources. They recognize that in order to achieve these de
ends, it is desirable so far as possible to adopt measures which expanding
rather than contract international trade.
(6) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article of
may determine the incidence of the restrictions on imports of different is
products or classes of products in such a way as to give priority to the
de
importation of those products which are more essential.
(c) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article
undertake:
by
(i) to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or eco-
nomic interests of any other contracting party;
channels of trade; and
patent, trade mark, copyright, or similar procedures.
th
0
re
W
PE
PE
re
те
W:
to
is
vi
CO
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2969
contracting parties concerned have not been successful.
-
se
or
ne
ry
S.
AS
Organization has ascertained that direct discussions between the
referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of this Article. Accordingly, a con-
or tracting party otherwise complying with the provisions of this Article
no shall not be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground
that a change in those policies would render unnecessary restrictions
ed, which it is applying under this Article.
4. (a) Any
contracting party applying new restrictions
raising the general level of its existing restrictions by a substantial
intensification of the measures applied under this Article shall im-
mediately after instituting or intensifying such restrictions (or, in
circumstances in which prior consultation is practicable, before doing
so) consult with the Organization as to the nature of its balance of
payments difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may be
ch available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies
ed of other contracting parties.
b) On a date to be determined by it, the Organization shall
ch review all restrictions still applied under this Article on that date.
Beginning one year after that date contracting parties applying import
ob restrictions under this Article shall enter into consultations of the
ns type provided for in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph with the
ns Organization annually.
BV (C) (i) If, in the course of consultations, with a contracting party
under sub-paragraph (a) or (6) above, the Organization finds that the
restrictions are not consistent with the provisions of this Article or
de with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV),
it shall indicate the nature of the inconsistency and may advise that
is the restrictions be suitably modified.
of
(ü) If, however, as a result of the consultations, the Organization
se determines that the restrictions are being applied in a manner in-
and volving an inconsistency of a serious nature with the provisions of
this Article or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions
le of Article XIV) and that damage to the trade of any contracting party
nt is caused or threatened thereby, it shall so inform the contracting
de party applying the restrictions and shall make appropriate recommen-
dations for securing conformity with such provisions within a specified
e period of time. If such contracting party
does not comply with these
recommendations within the specified period, the Organization may
release any contracting party the trade of which is adversely affected
by the restrictions from such obligations under this Agreement to-
wards the contracting party applying the restrictions as it determines
to be appropriate in the circumstances.
(d) The Organization shall invite any contracting party which
is applying restrictions under this Article to enter into consultations
with it at the request of any contracting party which can establish a
prima facie case that the restrictions are inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this Article or with those of Article XIII (subject to the
provisions of Article XIV) and that its trade is adversely affected
1
thereby. However, no such invitation shall be issued unless the
ng
D-
T.
1
C
1
If, as a
2970
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
importation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation
parties shall aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching
2. In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting
as closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties
(a) Wherever practicable, quotas representing the total amount
of permitted imports (whether allocated among supplying COL
countries or not) shall be fixed, and notice given of their ent
(6) In cases in which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions suc
amount in accordance with paragraph 3 (6) of this Article;
may be applied by means of import licences or permits without gre
result of the consultations with the Organization, no agreement
reached and it determines that the restrictions are being apolied
inconsistently with such provisions, and that damage to the trade of
the contracting party initiating the procedure is caused or threatened
thereby, it shall recommend the withdrawal or modification of the
restrictions. If the restrictions are not withdrawn or modified within
such time as the Organization may proscribe, it may release the con-
tracting party initiating the procedure from such obligations under
this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restric
.
tions as it determines to be appropriate in the circumstances.
(e) In proceeding under this paragraph, the Organization shall have
due regard to any special external factors adversely affecting the ex-
port trade of the contracting party applying restrictions.
(f) Determinations under this paragraph shall be rendered ex-
peditiously and, if possible, within sixty days of the initiation of the
consultations.
5. If there is a persistent and widespread application of import
restrictions under this Article, indicating the existence of a general
disequilibrium which is restricting international trade, the Organiza-
tion shall initiate discussions to consider whether other measures
might be taken, either by those contracting parties the balances of
payments of which are under pressure or by those the balances of
payments of which are tending to be exceptionally favourable, or by
any appropriate intergovernmental organization, to remove the
underlying causes of the disequilibrium. On the invitation of the
Organization, contracting parties shall participate in such discussions.
Article XIII
Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any com;
tracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
destined for the territory
of any other contracting party, unless to
any other contracting party or on the exportation of any produk
of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited at
restricted.
to this end shall observe the following provisions:
a quota;
WI
tic
an
tic
lic
lic
ob
SU
the
10
wh.
an
pri
no
the
pel
net
ne
tio
the
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2971
-
1-
ter
1
10
-70
21
he
ort
ral
18
ces
of
of
DF
he
the
18.
relate
permitted to be imported in the period in question, and also,
necessary, against the quantities permitted to be imported in the
next following period or periods; and Provided further that if any
is (c) Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating
hed
quotas allocated in accordance with sub-paragraph (d) of
of
this paragraph, require that import licences or permits be
ed
utilized for the importation of the product concerned from
che
a particular country or source;
nio (d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying
countries, the contracting party applying the restrictions may
seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the
quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial
interest in supplying the product concerned. In cases in
which this method is not reasonably practicable, the contract-
ing party concerned shall allot to contracting parties having
a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based
upon the proportions, supplied by such contracting parties
during a previous representative period, of the total quantity
or value of imports of the product, due account being taken of
any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting
the trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall
be imposed which would prevent any contracting party from
utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or value
which has been allotted to it, subject to importation being
made within any prescribed period to which the quota may
3. (a) In cases in which import licences are issued in connection
with import restrictions, the contracting party applying the restric-
tions shall provide, upon the request of any contracting party having
an interest in the trade in the product concerned, all relevant informa-
tion concerning the administration of the restrictions, the import
licences granted over a recent period and the distribution of such
licences among supplying countries; Provided
that there shall be no
of
obligation to supply information as to the names of importing or
(b) In the case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas,
the contracting party applying the restrictions shall give public
which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future period
and of any change in such quantity or value. Any supplies of the
product in question which were en route at the time at which public
| notice was given shall not be excluded from entry; Provided that
they may be counted so far as practicable, against the quantity
where
entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consump-
a period of thirty days after the day of such public notice,
practice shall be considered full compliance with this subpara-
() In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries,
the contracting party applying the restrictions
shall promptly inform
11"
supplying enterprises.
ECH
he
211
ng
at
Soda
tion during
IS
such
graph.
2972
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
XII or under Section B of Article XVIII shall not be precluded
1
m
W
re
transfers for current international transactions which that contract-
the benefits to the contracting party or contracting parties concerned
substantially outweigh any injury which may result to the trade of
3. The provisions of Article XIII shall not preclude & group
territories having a common quota in the International Monetary
Fund from applying against imports from other countries, but not
among themselves, restrictions in accordance with the provisions of
Article XII or of Section B of Article XVIII on condition that such
restrictions are in all other respects consistent with the provisions
4. A contracting party applying import restrictions under Article
all other contracting parties having an interest in supplying the
product concerned of the shares in the quota currently allocated, by
quantity or value, to the various supplying countries and shall give
public notice thereof.
4. With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with para-
graph 2 (d) of this Article or under paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the
selection of a representative period for any product and the appraisel
of any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made
initially by the contracting party applying the restriction; Provided
that such contracting party shall, upon the request of any other
contracting party having a substantial interest in supplying that
product or upon the request of the Organization, consult promptly
with the other contracting party or the Organization regarding the
need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base
period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved
,
or for the elimination of conditions, formalities or any other provisions
established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate
quota or its unrestricted utilization.
5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quotati
instituted or maintained by any contracting party, and, in so far as
applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend to export
restrictions.
0
Article XIV
Exceptions to the Rule of Non-discrimination
pg
1. A contracting party which applies restrictions under Article
XII or under Section B of Article XVIII may, in the application of 0
such restrictions, deviate from the provisions of Article XIII in a
P]
manner having 'equivalent effect to restrictions on payments and
ing party may at that time apply under Article VIII or XIV of the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or under M
analogous provisions of a special exchange agreement entered int
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XV.
2. A contracting party which is applying import restrictions under
Article XII or under Section B of Article XVIII may, with the con
sent of the Organization, temporarily deviate from the provisio
of Article
XIII in respect of a small part of its external trade where
other contracting parties.
PI
th
th
of Article XIII.
01
W:
81
F
IS
be
Z8
se
tu
a
in
m
of
DE
re
ar
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2973
ler
at
IT
ISO
DS
te
S
national Monetary Fund.
he Articles XI to XV or Section B of Article XVIII of this Agreement
by from applying measures to direct its exports in such a manner as to
ve increase its earnings of currencies which it can use without deviation
from the provisions of Article XIII.
18- 5. A contracting party shall not be precluded by Articles XI to
he XV, inclusive, or by Section B of Article XVIII, of this Agreement
al from applying quantitative restrictions:
de
led
(a) having equivalent effect to exchange restrictions authorized
under Section 3(6) of Article VII of the Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund, or
(6) under the preferential arrangements provided for in Annex A
of this Agreement, pending the outcome of the negotiations
referred to therein.
Article XV
Exchange Arrangements
1. The Organization shall seek co-operation with the Interna-
tational Monetary Fund to the end that the Organization and the Fund
may pursue a co-ordinated policy with regard to exchange questions
ut within the jurisdiction of the Fund and questions of quantitative
restrictions and other trade measures within the jurisdiction of the
2. In all cases in which the Organization is called upon to consider
or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of
payments or foreign exchange arrangements, it shall consult fully
of
with the International Monetary Fund. In such consultations, the
Organization shall accept all findings of statistical and other facts
nd
presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves
and balances of payments, and shall accept the determination of the
as to whether action by a contracting party in exchange matters
is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, or with the terms of a special exchange agreement
between that contracting party and the Organization. "The Organi-
zation, in reaching its final decision in cases involving the criteria
set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of
Article XII or in paragraph 9 of Article
XVIII
, shall accept the determination of the Fund as to what consti
tutes a serious decline in the contracting party's monetary reserves,
low level of its monetary reserves or a reasonable rate of increase
m its monetary reserves, and as to the financial aspects of other
matters covered in consultation in such cases.
3. The Organization shall seek agreement with the Fund regarding
procedures for consultation
under paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate
the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action,
the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the
Inter-
5. If the Organization considers, at any time, that exchange
restrictions on payments and transfers in connection with imports
are being applied
by a contracting party in a manner inconsistent
Organization
cle
Fund
ct
he
der
IS
to
01
-1
zs
ere
ed
a very
Top
ch
18
le
2974
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
al
ex
.1, If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidru
including any form of income or price support, which operates directly
or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce or
imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the Organ-
ization in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization,
the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the
affected product or products imported into or exported from its
territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary
In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to t
with the exceptions provided for in this Agreement for quantitative in
restrictions, it shall report thereon to the Fund.
6. Any contracting party which is not a member of the Fund shall,
within a time to be determined by the Organization after consultation a
with the Fund, become a member of the Fund, or, failing that, ente su
into a special exchange agreement with the Organization. A com-
tracting party which ceases to be a member of the Fund shall forth-
with enter into a special exchange agreement with the Organization,
Any special exchange agreement entered into by a contracting party
tr
under this paragraph shall thereupon become part of its obligations
under this Agreement.
7. (a) A special exchange agreement between a contracting party
and the Organization under paragraph 6 of this Article shall provide
to the satisfaction of the Organization that the objectives of this
Agreement will not be frustrated as a result of action in exchange
of
matters by the contracting party in question,
tr
(b) The terms of any such agreement shall not impose obligations
of
on the contracting party in exchange matters generally more restrictive
te
than those imposed by the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund on members of the Fund.
8. A contracting party which is not a member of the Fund shall
of
furnish such information within the general scope of section 5 of
Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone- af
tary Fund as the Organization may require in order to carry
functions under this Agreement.
9. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude:
th
(a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange
restrictions in accordance
with the Articles of Agreement of po
the International Monetary Fund or with that contracting
be
party's special exchange agreement with the Organization, an
(b) the use by a contracting party of restrictions or controls
imports or exports, the sole effect of which, additional to the tic
effects permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII and XIV, IS LO
make effective such exchange controls or exchange restrictions of
th
Article XVI
th
Subsidies
Section A-Subsidies in General
in
WI
B
out its
Or
10
su
:
en
.
of
en
ex
no
m
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2975
IVT
de
this
DIS
tive interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by
any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy
all shall
, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties
ion concerned, or with the Organization, the possibility of limiting the
nter subsidization.
OD-
th Section B-Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies
100.
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a con-
arty
tracting party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have
harmful effects for other contracting parties, both importing and
exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial
interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this
Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use
nge of subsidies on the export of primary products. If, however, a con-
tracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which
LITE
operates to increase the export of any primary product from its
territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results
2018
in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of
world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares
of
of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during a
previous representative period, and any special factors which may have
affected or may be affecting such trade in the product.
its
4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date
thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly
or indirectly any form of subsidy on the export of any product other
than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower
than the comparable price charged
ing for the like product to buyers in a domestic
market. Until 31 Decem-
ber 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any such
subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955
by the introduc-
tion of new, or the extension of existing, subsidies.
5. The Organization shall review the operation of the provisions
of this Article from time to time with a view to examining its effective-
ness, in the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives of
this Agreement and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to
the trade or interests of contracting parties.
hall
ne-
oge
r
the
to
ITIS.
Article XVII
ICE
31"
State-trading Enterprises
1. (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes
or maintains a State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any
enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges, such
enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or
be exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of
non-discriminatory
treatment prescribed in this Agreement
for govern-
mental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.
(b) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall
its
2976
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
objectives of this Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive
kind described in paragraph 1 (a), request the contracting party /
(d) The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contract
ing party to disclose confidential information which would impece
law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest a
would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular i
1. The contracting parties recognize that the attainment of the
be understood to require that such enterprises shall, having due re
gard to the other provisions of this Agreement, make any such
purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations
,
including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation
and other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall afford the enter-
prises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in
accordance with customary business practice, to compete for partic-
ipation in such purchases or sales.
(c) No contracting party shall prevent any enterprise (whether or
not an enterprise described in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph
)
under its jurisdiction from acting in accordance with the principles
of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply
to imports of products for immediate or ultimate consumption in
governmental use and not otherwise for re-sale or use in the production
of goods for sale. With respect to such imports, each contracting
party shall accord to the trade of the other contracting parties fair
and equitable treatment.
3. The contracting parties recognize that enterprises of the kind
described in paragraph 1 (a) of this Article might be operated so as
to create serious obstacles to trade; thus negotiations on a reciproca
and mutually advantageous basis designed to limit or reduce such
obstacles are of importance to the expansion of international trade
.
4. (a) Contracting parties shall notify the Organization of the
products which are imported into or exported from their territories
by enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 1 (a) of this Article
.
(b) A contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing
an import monopoly of a product, which is not the subject of a com-
cession under Article III, shall, on the request of another contracting
party having a substantial trade in the product concerned, inform tla
Organization of the import mark-up on the product during a recen
representative period, or, when it is not possible to do so,
price charged on the re-sale of the product.
(C) The Organization may, at the request of a contracting party
which has reason to believe that its interests under this Agreement
are being adversely affected by the operations of an enterprise of the
information about its operations related to the carrying out of the
provisions of this Agreement.
enterprises.
Article XVIII
Governmental Assistance to Economic Development
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2977
re-
ich
100
ini
tic-
10
100
al
9S
cal
development of their economies, particularly of those contracting
parties the economies of which can only support low standards of
living and are in the early stages of development.
2. The contracting parties recognize further that it may be neces-
sary for those contracting parties, in order to implement programmes
and policies of economic development designed to raise the general
standard of living of their people, to take protective or other meas-
ures affecting imports, and that such measures are justified in so far
ON as they facilitate the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement.
3h They agree, therefore, that those contracting parties should enjoy
iles additional facilities to enable them (a) to maintain sufficient flexi-
bility in their tariff structure to be able to grant the tariff protection
ply required for the establishment of a particular industry and (b) to
apply quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes in
a manner which takes full account of the continued high level of
ing demand for imports likely to be generated by their programmes of
economic development.
3. The contracting parties recognize finally that with those addi-
nd
tional facilities which are provided for in Sections A and B of this
Article, the provisions of this Agreement would normally be sufficient
to enable contracting parties to meet the requirements of their
Ich
economic development. They agree, however, that there may be
de.
circumstances where no measure consistent with those provisions is
che
practicable to permit a contracting party in the process of economic
development to grant the governmental assistance required to promote
the establishment of particular industries with a view to raising the
EDS general standard of living of its people. Special procedures are laid
down in Sections C and D of this Article to deal with those cases.
ng 4. (a) Consequently, a contracting party the economy of which
can only support low standards of living and is in the early stages of
development shall be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions
of the other Articles of this Agreement, as provided in Sections A,
B and C of this Article
t (6) A contracting party the economy of which is in the process
of development but which does not come within the scope of sub-
paragraph (a) above, may submit applications to the Organization
t
under Section D of this Article.
5. The contracting parties recognize that the export earnings of
contracting parties the
economies of which
are of the type described
paragraph 4 (a) and (6) above, and which depend on exports of a
small number of primary commodities may be seriously reduced by
a decline in the sale of such commodities. Accordingly, when the
exports of primary commodities by such a contracting party are
seriously affected by measures taken by another contracting party
it may have resort
to the consultation provisions of Article XXII of
6. The organization shall review annually all measures applied
pursuant to the provisions of Sections C and D of this Article.
nes
cle.
1-
che
ant
be
nh
De
Ir
€
in
OI
this Agreement
e
41590057-Vol. 2
-84
2978
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
the provisions of paragraphs 10 to 12, control the general level of
its imports by restricting the quantity or value of merchandise per-
mitted to be imported; Provided that the import restrictions instituted,
(a) to forestall the threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its
Section A
7. (a) If a contracting party coming within the scope of para-
graph 4 (a) of this Article considers it desirable, in order to promote
the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising the
general standard of living of its people, to modify or withdraw &
concession included in the appropriate schedule annexed to this
Agreement, it shall notify the Organization to this effect and enter
into negotiations with any contracting party with which such con-
cession was initially negotiated, and with any other contracting party
determined by the Organization to have a substantial interest therein
.
If agreement is reached between such contracting parties concerned
,
they shall be free to modify or withdraw concessions under the
appropriate Schedules to this Agreement in order to give effect to
such agreement, including any compensatory adjustments involved
.
(b) If agreement is not reached within sixty days after the notifica-
tion provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above, the contracting party
which proposes to modify or withdraw the concession may refer the
matter to the Organization, which shall promptly examine it. If it
finds that the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw
the concession has made every effort to reach an agreement and that
the compensatory adjustment offered by it is adequate
, that con-
tracting party shall be free to modify or withdraw the concession iſ
at the same time, it gives effect to the compensatory adjustment
.
If the Organization does not find that the compensation offered by :
contracting party proposing to modify or withdraw the concession is
adequate, but finds that it has made every reasonable effort to offer
adequate compensation, that contracting party shall be free to pro-
ceed with such modification or withdrawal. If such action is taken
,
any other contracting party referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above
shall be free to modify or withdraw substantially equivalent conces-
sions initially negotiated with the
contracting party which has taken
the action.
Section B
8. The contracting parties recognize that contracting parties
coming within the scope
of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article tend, when
they are in rapid process of development, to experience balance of
payments
difficulties arising mainly from efforts to expand their
internal markets as well as from the instability in their terms of trade
9. In order to safeguard its external financial position and to
ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of ik
programme of economic development, a contracting party coming
within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article may, subject to
maintained or intensified shall not exceed those necessary:
monetary reserves, or
M
:
.-.-.-.-.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2979
-8-
te
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CD
8
us
er
II-
ty
II,
ale
18
to
d.
23-
EV
18
it
at
1.
ta
2
.
(6) in the case of a contracting party with inadequate monetary
reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.
Due regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors
which may be affecting the reserves of the contracting party or
its need for reserves, including, where special external credits
or other resources are available to it, the need to provide for
the appropriate use of such credits or resources.
10. In applying these restrictions, the contracting party may
determine their incidence on imports of different products or classes
of products in such a way as to give priority to the importation of
those products which are more essential in the light of its policy of
economic development; Provided that the restrictions are so applied
as to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic
interests of any other contracting party and not to prevent un-
reasonably the importation of any description of goods in minimum
commercial quantities the exclusion of which would impair regular
channels of trade; and Provided further that the restrictions are not so
applied as to prevent the importation of commercial samples or to
prevent compliance with patent, trade-mark, copyright or similar
procedures
11. In carrying out its domestic policies, the contracting party
concerned shall pay due regard to the need for restoring equilibrium
in its balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the
desirability of assuring an economic employment of productive
resources. It shall progressively relax any restrictions applied under
this Section as conditions improve, maintaining them only to the
extent necessary under the terms of paragraph 9 of this Article, and
shall eliminate them when conditions no longer justify such mainte-
nance; Provided that no contracting party shall be required to with-
draw or modify restrictions on the ground that a change in its develop-
ment policy would render unnecessary the restrictions which it is
applying under this Section.
12. (a) Any contracting party applying new restrictions or raising
general level of its existing restrictions by a substantial intensifica-
tion of the measures applied under this Section, shall immediately
after instituting or intensifying such restrictions (or, in circumstances
in which prior consultation is practicable, before doing so (consult
with the Organization as to the nature of its balance of payments
difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may be available,
and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies of other
contracting parties.
6) On å date to be determined by it, the Organization shall
review all restrictions still applied under this Section on that date.
Beginning two years after that date, contracting parties applying
restrictions under this Section shall enter into consultations of the
type provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above with the Organization
at intervals of approximately, but not less than, two yeårs according
programme to be drawn up each year by the Organization;
Provided that no consultation under this sub-paragraph shåll také
IS
te
5-
11
the
1S
D
of
LI
}
0
'S
0
to a
S
2980
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Director
the contracting party initiating the procedure is caused or threatened
tracting party initiating the procedure from such obligations under
this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restrictions
(e) If a contracting party against which action has been taken in
accordance with the last sentence of sub-paragraph (c) (c) ord of
this paragraph, finds that the release of obligations authorized by the
Organization adversely affects the operation of its programme and
policy of economic development, it shall be free, not later than sixty
place within two years after the conclusion of a consultation of a
general nature under any other provision of this paragraph.
(c) (i) If, in the course of consultations with a contracting party
under sub-paragraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph, the Organiza-
tion finds that the restrictions are not consistent with the pro-
visions of this Section or with those of Article XIII (subject to
the provisions of Article XIV), they shall indicate the nature of
the inconsistency and may advise that the restrictions be suit-
ably modified.
(ii) If, however, as a result of the consultations, the Organi-
zation determines that the restrictions are being applied in a
manner involving an inconsistency of a serious nature with the
provisions of this Section or with those of Article XIII (subject
to the provisions of Article XIV) and that damage to the trade
of any contracting party is caused or threatened thereby, they
shall so inform the contracting party applying the restrictions
and shall make appropriate recommendations for securing con-
formity with such provisions within a specified period. If such
contracting party does not comply with these recommendations
within the specified period, the Organization may release any
contracting party the trade of which is adversely affected by the
restrictions from such obligations under this Agreement
towards the contracting party applying the restrictions as they
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.
(d) The Organization shall invite any contracting party which is
applying restrictions under this Section to enter into consultations
with them at the request
of any contracting party which can establish
a prima facie case that the restrictions are inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this Section or with those of Article XIII (subject to the
provisions of Article XIV) and that its trade is adversely affected
thereby. However, no such invitation shall be issued unless the
Organization has ascertained that direct discussions between the
contracting parties concerned have not been successful. If, as !
result of the consultations with the Organization, no agreement i
reached and it determines that the restrictions are being applied
inconsistently with such provisions, and that damage to the trade of
restrictions. If the restrictions are
not withdrawn or modified
withi
such time as the Organization may prescribe, it may release the com
as it determines to be appropriate in the circumstances
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2981
2
ty
8-
to
of
it-
li
Я
he
CO
de
ey
us
D-
ch
DS
he
nt
ey
IS
General of the Organization of its intention to withdraw from this
Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect on the sixtieth day
following the day on which the notice is received by him.
() In proceeding under this paragraph, the Organization shall have
due regard to the factors referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article.
Determinations under this paragraph shall be rendered expeditiously
and, if possible, within sixty days of the initiation of the consultations.
Section C
13. If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph
4 (a) of this Article finds that governmental assistance is required
to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to
raising the general standard of living of its people, but that no measure
consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement is practicable
to achieve that objective, it may have recourse to the provisions and
procedures set out in this section.
14. The contracting party concerned shall notify the Organization
of the special difficulties which it meets in the achievement of the
objective outlined in paragraph 13 of this Article and shall indicate the
specific measure affecting imports which it proposes to introduce in
order to remedy these difficulties. It shall not introduce that measure
before the expiration of the time-limit laid down in paragraph 15 or
17, as the case may be, or if the measure affects imports of a product
which is the subject 'of a concession included in the appropriate
Schedule annexed to this Agreement, unless it has secured the con-
currence of the Organization in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 18; Provided that, if the industry receiving assistance has
already started production, the contracting party may, after informing
the Organization, take such measures as may be necessary to prevent,
during that period, imports of the product or products concerned from
increasing substantially above a normal level.
15. If, within thirty days of the notification of the measure, the
Organization does not request the contracting party concerned to
consult with it, that contracting party shall be free to deviate from
the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the
extent necessary to apply the proposed measure,
16. If it is requested by the Organization to do so, the contracting
party concerned shall consult with it as to the purpose of the proposed
measure, as to alternative measures which may be available under
this Agreement, and as to the possible effect of the measure proposed
on the commercial and economic interests of other contracting parties.
If, as a result of such consultation, the
Organization agrees that there
is no measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement
which is practicable in order to achieve the objective outlined in
paragraph 13 of this Article, and concurs in the proposed measure,
the contracting party concerned shall be
released from its obligations
under the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement
to the extent necessary to apply that measure.
17. If, within ninety days after the date of the notification of the
proposed measure under paragraph 14 of this Article, the Organization
TIS
sh
D-
de
ed
je
de
ed
ol
ed
18
2T
78
1
of
le
d
2982
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
cessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension
than six months after the measure has been introduced or changed
such contracting party shall afford adequate opportunity for consulta
substantially to the detriment of the contracting party affected. Any
has not concurred in such measure, the contracting party concerned
may introduce the measure proposed after informing the Organization,
18. If the proposed measure affects a product which is the subject
of a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this
Agreement, the contracting party concerned shall enter into consulta-
tions with any other contracting party with which the concession
was initially negotiated, and with any other contracting party deter-
mined by the Organization to have a substantial interest therein. The
Organization shall concur in the measure if it agrees that there is no
measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement which
is practicable in order to achieve the objective set forth in paragraph
13 of this Article, and if it is satisfied:
(a) that agreement has been reached with such other contracting
parties as a result of the consultations referred to above, or
(b) if no such agreement has been reached within sixty days after
the notification provided for in paragraph 14 has been received
by the Organization, that the contracting party having recourse
to this Section has made all re sonable efforts to reach an
agreement and that the interests of other contracting parties
are adequately safeguarded.
The contracting party having recourse to this Section shall there
.
upon be released from its obligations under the relevant provision
of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to
permit it to apply the measure.
19. If a proposed measure of the type described in paragraph 13
of this Article concerns an industry the establishment of which has
in the initial period been facilitated by incidental protection afforded
by restrictions imposed
by the contracting party concerned for balance
of payments purposes under the relevant provisions of this Agreement
,
that contracting party may resort to the provisions and procedures
of this Section; Provided that it shall not apply the proposed measure
without the concurrence of the Organization.
20. Nothing in the preceding paragraphs of this Section shal
authorize any deviation
from the provisions of Articles II, III and
XIII of this Agreement. The provisos to paragraph 10 of this Article
shall also be applicable to any restriction under this Section
21. At any time while a measure is being applied under paragraph
17 of this Article, any contracting party substantially affected by
it may suspend the application to the trade of the contracting party
having recourse to this Section of such substantially equivalent con
days' notice of such suspension is given to the Organization not later
.
ment.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2983
Section D
ed
N.
ect
his
OD
he
BO
ch
oh
22. A contracting party coming within the scope of sub-paragraph
4 (6) of this Article desiring, in the interest of the development of
its economy, to introduce a measure of the type described in para-
graph 13 of this Article in respect of the establishment of a partic-
ular industry may apply to the Organization for approval of such
measure. The Organization shall promptly consult with such con-
tracting party and shall, in making its decision, be guided by the
considerations set out in paragraph 16. If the Organization concurs
in the proposed measure the contracting party concerned shall be
released from its obligations under the relevant provisions of the other
Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to permit it to
apply the measure. If the proposed measure affects a product which
is the subject of a concession included in the appropriate Schedule
annexed to this Agreement, the provisions of paragraph 18 shall apply.
23. Any measure applied under this Section shall comply with the
provisions of paragraph 20 of this Article.
ng
ser
el
se
2.1
les
Article XIX
e
ELS
to
13
13
as
ed
Ce
It
es
re
id
le
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect
of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agree-
ment, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported
into the territory of that
contracting party in such increased quantities
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive
products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such
product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary
to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole
or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
(6) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect
to a preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting
party in the circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of
a contracting party which receives or received such preference, the
importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting
party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in
part or to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the product,
to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to
the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in
writing to the Organization as far in advance as may be practicable
and shall afford the Organization
and those contracting parties having
a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an
opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action.
When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect
b
I
T
1
D
remedy such injury.
T
d
1
in
2984
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
----
discrimination between countries where the same conditions preval
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
ment of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article III
including those relating to customs enforcement, the enfores-
and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and
to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which
has requested the action. In critical circumstances, , where delay
would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair
, action
under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without
prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected
immediately after taking such action.
3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with
respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which
proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free
to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected con-
tracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after
such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days
from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received
by the Organization, the application to the trade of the contracting
party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (1
)
of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such
action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other obliga-
tions under this Agreement the suspension of which the Organization
does not disapprove.
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article
without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in
the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of
products affected by the action, that contracting party shall, where
delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend
upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of consulta-
tion, such concessions or other obligations as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy the injury.
Article XX
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
by any contracting party of measures:
a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
;
(c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver
:
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2985
ch
ay
On
ut
ed
th
ch
ee
ID-
ter
us
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic,
historic or archaeological value;
(9) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption;
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovern-
mental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria sub-
mitted to the Organisation and not disapproved by it or which
is itself so submitted and not so disapproved;
(1) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials neces-
sary to assure essential quantities of such materials to a domes-
tic processing industry during periods when the domestic price
of such materials is held below the world price as part of a
governmental stabilization plan; Provided that such restrictions
shall not operate to increase the exports of or the protection
afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart from
the provisions of this Agreement relating to nondiscrimination;
() essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general
or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be
consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are
entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of
such products, and that any such measures which are incon-
sistent with the other provisions of this Agreement shall be
discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have
ceased to exist. The Organization shall review the need for
this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960.
b
14.
OL
115
in
of
re
id
,
19-
to
Article XXI
in
le
1
IS
Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information
the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential
security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from
which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and imple-
ments of war and to such traffic in other goods and mate-
rials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose
of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security.
2986
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan
territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under
Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant
to the Protocol of Provisional Application. Each such customs
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (in four volumes): Volume 1 (Department
1 Protocol of Provisional Application, Oct. 30, 1947, not reprinted here. See
of State publication 3107; 1948) pp. 81-82, and The General Agreement on Tarifs
and Trade (amended text) and Texts of Related Documents (Department of State
Article XXII
Consultation
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration
to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding
,
such representations as may be made by another contracting party
with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement
.
2. The Organization may, at the request of a contracting party,
consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter
for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution
through consultation under paragraph 1.
Article XXIII
Nullification or Impairment
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nul-
lified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
Agreement is being impeded as the result of (a) the failure of another
contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure
,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (
with
the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may,
à view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties
which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus
approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations
or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting
parties concerned within
a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the
type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may
referred to the Organization.
PART III
Article XXIV
Territorial Application Frontier Traffic-Customs Unions
and Free-trade Areas
publication 3758; 1950), pp. 88–89.
.
be
....
1
Į
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES :
2987
1
-101
ng
rty
ent.
"ty.
ter
100
fit
ul
.
che
ner
ON
re,
(0
)
ith
cen
ies
territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the territorial application
of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting party;
Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed
to create any rights or obligations as between two or more customs
territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under
Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant
to the Protocol of Provisional Application by a single contracting
party.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be
understood to mean any territory with respect to which separate
tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substan-
tial part of the trade of such territory with other territories.
3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to
prevent:
(a) advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent
countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic;
(6) advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of
Trieste by countries contiguous to that territory, provided
that such advantages are not in conflict with the Treaties of
Peace arising out of the Second World War.
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements,
of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties
to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a cus-
toms union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between
the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of
other contracting parties with such territories.
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent,
as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-
trade area; Provided that:
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement
leading to the formation of a customs union, the duties and
other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of
any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with
contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall
pot on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general
incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable
in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union
or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case may
be;
(6) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement
leading to the formation of a free-trade area, the duties and
other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the con-
stituent territories and applicable at the formation of such
free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement to the
trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not
LUS
DIS
ng
he
he
011
15
er
at
75
PP
at
78
le
2988
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with
(except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles
respect to substantially all the trade between the constit-
uent territories of the union or at least with respect to
parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive
than the corresponding duties and other regulations of com-
merce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the
formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement, as the
case may be; and
(c) any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and
(6) shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such
à customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable
length of time.
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5 (a), a con-
tracting party proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently
with the provisions of Article III, the procedure set forth in Article
XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory adjustment
,
due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by
the reductions brought about in the corresponding duty of the other
constituents of the union.
7: (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union
or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation
of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the Organization and
shall make available to it such information regarding the proposed
union or area as will enable it to make such reports and recommenda-
tions to contracting parties as it may deem appropriate.
(6) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an
interim agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the
parties to that agreement and taking
due account of the information
made available in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph
(a), the Organization finds that such agreement is not likely to result
in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area within the
period contemplated by the parties to the agreement or that such
period is not a reasonable one, the Organization shall make recom-
mendations to the parties to the agreement. The
parties shall not
maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement
they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recom-
mendations.
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in
paragraph 5 (e) shall be communicated to the Organization, which
may request the contracting parties concerned to consult with it if
the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation
of the customs union or of the free-trade area.
8. For the purposes of this Agreement:
of a single customs territory for two or more customs terri-
tories, so that
if
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2989
}
1
?
}
}
I
1
Agreement bearing the date of 10 March 1955,' shall give effect to
substantially all the trade in products originating in such
territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially
the same duties and other regulations of commerce are
applied by each of the members of the union to the trade
1
of territories not included in the union;
(6) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two
or more customs territories in which the duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary,
those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIIJ, XIV, XV and
XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories in products originating in such territories.
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article II shall
not be affected by the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade
area but may be eliminated or adjusted by means of negotiations
with contracting parties affected. This procedure of negotiations
with affected contracting parties shall, in particular, apply to the
elimination of preferences required to conform with the provisions of
paragraph 8 (a) (i) and paragraph 8 (6).
10. The Organization may by a two-thirds majority approve
proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements of para-
graphs 5 to 9 inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to the
formation of a customs union or a free-trade area in the sense of this
Article.
11. Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out of
the establishment of India and Pakistan as independant (independent)
States and recognizing the fact that they have long constituted an
economic unit, the contracting parties agree that the provisions of
this Agreement shall not prevent the two countries from entering
into special arrangements with respect to the trade between them,
pending the establishment of their mutual trade relations on a definitive
12. Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures
as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of
this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities
Article XXV
The Organization for Trade Cooperation
1. The Organization for Trade Cooperation, established by the
those provisions of this Agreement, which provide
for action by the
Organization and such other provisions as involve joint action, and
may carry on any other activities with respect to the General Agree-
ment which are provided for by the Agreement establishing the
2. All contracting parties shall, as soon as possible, become Mem-
basis.
within its territory.
Organization.
bers of the Organization.
i Infra.
2990
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
.
shall, upon sponsorship through a declaration by the responsible
6. This Agreement shall enter into force, as among the govern-
Director-General of the Organization on behalf of governments
named in Annex G, the territories of which account for 85 per centum
of the total external trade of the territories of such governments,
computed in accordance with the applicable column of percentages
set forth therein. The instrument of acceptance of each other
3. Those contracting parties which have accepted the Agreement
on the Organization for Trade Cooperation may decide at any time
after the entry into force of that Agreement that any contracting
party which has not accepted it shall cease to be a contracting party
.
Article XXVI
Acceptance, Entry into Force and Registration
1. The date of this Agreement shall be 30 October 1947.
2. This Agreement shall be open for acceptance by any contracting
party which, on 1 March 1955, was a contracting party or was ne-
gotiating with a view to accession to this Agreement.
3. This Agreement, done in a single English original and in a single
French original, both texts authentic, shall be deposited with the
Director-General of the Organization, who shall furnish certified
copies thereof to all interested governments.
4. Each government accepting this Agreement shall deposit an
instrument of acceptance with the Director-General of the Organiza-
tion, who will inform all interested governments of the date of deposit
of each instrument of acceptance and of the day on which this Agree-
ment enters into force under paragraph 6 of this Article.
5. (a) Each government accepting this Agreement does so in
respect of its metropolitan territory and of the other territories for
which it has international responsibility, except such separate customs
territories as it shall notify to the Director-General of the Organiza-
tion at the time of its own acceptance.
(6) Any government, which has so notified the Director-General
under the exceptions in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, may at
any time give notice to the Director-General that its acceptance
shall be effective in respect of any separate customs territory
, or
territories so excepted and such notice shall take effect on the thirtieth
day following the day on which it is received by the Director-General
(C) If any of the customs territories, in respect of which a con-
tracting party has accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires
full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations
and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement, such territory
contracting party establishing the above-mentioned fact, be deemed
to be a contracting party and shall also be deemed to be a Member
of the Organization.
ments which have accepted it, on the thirtieth day following the day
on which
instruments of acceptance have been deposited
with the
:
and even ....
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2991
mt
ne
ng
-
ng
e-
le
ne
ed
IN
.
it
-
1
expiration of a period envisaged in paragraph 1 of this Article,
government shall take effect on the thirtieth day following the day
on which such instrument has been deposited.
7. The United Nations is authorized to effect registration of this
Agreement as soon as it enters into force.
Article XXVII
Withholding or Withdrawal of Concessions
Any contracting party shall at any time be free to withhold or to
withdraw in whole or in part any concession, provided for in the
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, in respect of which
such contracting party determines that it was initially negotiated
with a government which has not become, or has ceased to be, a
contracting party. A contracting party taking such action shall
notify the Organization and, upon request, consult with contracting
parties which have a substantial interest in the product concerned.
Article XXVIII
Modification of Schedules
1. On the first day of each three-year period, the first period
beginning on 1 January 1958 (or on the first day of any other period
that may be specified by the Organization by two-thirds of the votes
cast) a contracting party (hereafter in this Article referred to as the
"applicant contracting party') may, by negotiation and agreement
with any contracting party
with which such concession was initially
negotiated and with any other contracting party determined by the
Organization to have a principal supplying interest (which two pre-
ceding categories of contracting parties, together with the applicant
contracting party, are in this Article hereinafter referred to as the
"contracting parties primarily concerned"), and subject to consulta-
tion with any other contracting party determined by the Organization
to have a substantial interest in such concession, modify or withdraw
a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this
2. In such negotiations and agreement, which may include pro-
vision for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products,
the contracting parties concerned shall endeavour to maintain a
general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not
less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement
prior to such negotiations.
3. (a) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily
concerned cannot be reached before 1 January 1958 or before the
the
contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the con-
cession shall, nevertheless, be free to do so and if such action is taken
any contracting party with which such concession was initially
:
negotiated, any contracting party determined under paragraph 1 to
or
OS
-
1
1
h
l.
S
S
Agreement.
@
1
r
1
3
1
1
2992
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
cerned is not reached within a period of sixty days after negotia-
the Organization may have prescribed, the applicant contracting
the matter and submit their views to the contracting parties /
shall apply as if agreement between the contracting parties
If a settlement is reached, the provisions of paragraph 30)
primarily concerned had been reached. If no settlements
reached between the contracting parties primarily concerned,
withdraw the concession, unless the Organization determines
that the applicant contracting party has unreasonably failed
to offer adequate compensation. If such action is taken, any |
contracting party with which the concession was initial;
negotiated, any contracting party determined under pers-
graph 4 (a) to have a principal supplying interest and an
contracting party determined under paragraph 4 (a) to here
after such action is taken, to modify or withdraw, upon the
a substantial interest, shall be free, not later than six months
have a principal supplying interest and any contracting party deter-
mined under paragraph 1 to have a substantial interest shåll the
be free not later than six months after such action is taken, to with-
draw, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which
written notice of such withdrawal is received by the Organization
,
substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the
applicant contracting party.
(6) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily cor-
cerned is reached but any other contracting party determined under
paragraph 1 of this Article to have a substantial interest is not satis-
fied, such other contracting party shall be free, not later than six
months after action under such agreement is taken, to withdrew
,
upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written
notice of such withdrawal is received by the Organization, substan-
tially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the applicant
contracting party.
4. The Organization may, at any time, in special circumstances,
authorize a contracting party to enter into negotiations for modifica-
tion or withdrawal of a concession included in the appropriate Schedule
annexed to this Agreement subject to the following procedures and
conditions:
(a) Such negotiations and any related consultations shall be con-
ducted in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and
2 of this Article.
(b) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily com-
cerned is reached in the negotiations, the provisions of paragraph
3 (6) of this Article shall apply.
(c) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily cou.
tions have been authorized, or within such longer period, as
party may refer the matter to the Organization.
(d) Upon such reference, the Organization shall promptly examine
primarily concerned with the aim of achieving a settlement
the applicant contracting party shall be free to modify
E
I
(
(
1
r
C
C.
8
t
a
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2993
ser-
el
th-
ich
LOD,
the
expiration of thirty days from the day on which written
notice of such withdrawal is received by the Organization,
substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with
the applicant contracting party.
5. Before 1 January 1958 and before the end of any period en-
visaged in paragraph 1 a contracting party may elect by notifying
the Organization to reserve the right, for the duration of the next
period, to modify the appropriate Schedule in accordance with the
procedures of paragraphs 1 to 3. If a contracting party so elects,
other contracting parties shall have the right, during the same period,
to modify or withdraw, in accordance with the same procedures,
concessions initially negotiated with that contracting party.
der
tis-
SIX
BW,
ten
Article XXIX
ant
70
CA-
011-
und
0 OD-
ph
01-
ia-
S
Tariff Negotiations
1. The contracting parties recognize that customs duties often
constitute serious obstacles to trade; thus negotiations on a reciprocal
and mutually advantageous basis, directed to the substantial reduction
of the general level of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports
and in particular to the reduction of such high tariffs as discourage
the importation even of minimum quantities, and conducted with
due regard to the objectives of this Agreement and the varying needs
of individual contracting parties, are of great importance to the
expansion of international trade.' The Organization may therefore
sponsor such negotiations from time to time.
2. (a) Negotiations under this Article may be carried out on a
selective product-by-product basis or by the application of such
multilateral procedures as may be accepted by the contracting parties
concerned. Such negotiations may be directed towards the reduction
ing of duties, the binding of duties at then existing levels or undertakings
that individual duties or the average duties on specified categories of
inte products shall not exceed specified levels. The binding against
increase of low duties or of duty-free treatment shall, in principle, be
recognized as a concession equivalent in value to the reduction of high
(6) The contracting parties recognize that in general the success
of multilateral negotiations would depend on the participation of
ed,
all contracting parties which conduct a substantial proportion of
their external trade with one another.
3. Negotiations shall be conducted on a basis which affords
ed
adequate opportunity to take into account:
of
(a) the needs of individual contracting parties and individual
industries;
15
(b) the needs of less-developed countries for a more flexible use
of tariff protection to assist their economic development and
the special needs of these countries to maintain tariffs for
revenue purposes; and
ies
nt.
(0) ! duties.
jas
IS
OD
jes
9
TO
hs
he
415900—57T0l. 285
2994
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
tion, all contracting parties have been notified of the proposed amend
8
m
m
n
3. Any amendment to the schedules annexed to this Agreement
which records rectifications of a purely formal character or modifica
Article XVIII, Article XXIV, Article XXVII or Article XXVIII.
shall become effective on the thirtieth day following certification to
this effect by the Organization; Provided that prior to such certifies
(c) all other relevant circumstances, including the fiscal
, de
velopmental, strategic and other needs of the contracting
parties concerned.
Article XXX
Amendments
1. (a) Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article
amendments to the provisions of this Agreement shall be made in
accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.
(6) Amendments to the provisions of this Agreement shall be
submitted to the contracting parties for acceptance in accordance
with sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) below; Provided that such amend-
ments have been approved by the Organization by a majority of
two-thirds of the votes cast.
(c) Amendments to the provisions of Part I of this Agreement
or of this Article shall become effective on the thirtieth day following
the day on which they have been accepted by all the contracting
parties.
C
(d) Other amendments to this Agreement shall become effective
in respect of those contracting parties which have accepted them
on the thirtieth day following the day on which they have been
accepted by two-thirds of the contracting parties, and thereafter for
each other contracting party on the thirtieth day following the day
to
on which they have been accepted by it.
A
2. (a) The Organization may decide that any amendment made
P
effective under paragraph 1 (d) of this Article is of such a nature that
any contracting party which has not accepted it within a period
specified by the Organization shall be free to withdraw from this
Agreement or to remain a contracting party with the consent of the
A
Organization.
6) A withdrawal from this Agreement under sub-paragraph, (a)
of this påragraph shall take effect upon the expiration of the sixtieth
day following the day on which written notice of withdrawal is
received by the Director-General of the Organization. A contracting
party which, in the circumstances described in sub-paragraph ()
fails to accept the amendment or to give notice of withdrawal
, sha
.
cease to be a contracting party upon the expiration of the period alle
referred to in that sub-paragraph or on the sixtieth day following the th
day on which the Organization shall have decided to withhold their 4
consent to the contracting party remaining a contracting party, of
whichever date is the later.
SU
W.
SO
CO
of
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2995
de-
ing ment and no objection has been raised, within thirty days of such
notification by any contracting party, on the ground that the proposed
amendments are not within the terms of this paragraph.
Article XXXI
cle
,
Withdrawal
10
Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article
be XVIII or of paragraph 2 of Article XXX, any contracting party
Ice may withdraw from this Agreement, or may separately withdraw on
od behalf of any of the separate customs territories for which it has inter-
of national responsibility and which at the time possesses full autonomy
in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other
ent matters provided for in this Agreement. The withdrawal shall take
effect
ng
upon the expiration of six months from the day on which written
ung
notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-General of the
Organization
Article XXXII
Ive
21
en
for
LAT
to
de
nat
Contracting Parties
1. The contracting parties to this Agreement shall be understood
mean those governments which are applying the provisions of this
Agreement under Articles XXVI or XXXIII or pursuant to the
Protocol of Provisional Application.
2. At any time after the entry into force of this Agreement pur-
suant to paragraph 6 of Article XXVI, those contracting parties
which have accepted this Agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of
Article XXVI may decide that any contracting party which has not
80 accepted it shall cease to be a contracting party.
od
his
che
th
Article XXXIII
ng
all
A
Accession
government not a contracting party to this Agreement may
od accede thereto on terms to be agreed between such government and
be the Organization; Provided that such government has accepted the
* Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Decisions
of the Organization under
this paragraph
shall be taken by a majority
comprising two-thirds of the contracting parties.
nat
Article XXXIV
1
1
Annexes
tie
of this Agreement.
The annexes to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part
1
2996
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
S
Certain of the territories listed above have two or more preferential
ment with the other contracting parties which are principal supplier
be less favourable to suppliers at the most favoured-nation rate the
The imposition of an equivalent margin of tariff preference to replace
clusively between two or more of the territories listed in this Annex or /
following paragraph, shall not be deemed to constitute an increase in i
The preferential arrangements referred to in paragraph 564/
Article XIV are those existing in the United Kingdom on 10 April 14
Article XXXV
Non-application of the Agreement between particular Contracting
Parties
1." This Agreement, or alternatively Article III of this Agree
.
ment shall not apply as between any contracting party and any other
contracting party if:
(a) the two contracting parties have not entered into tariff nego
tiations with each other, and
(6) either of the contracting parties, at the time either becomes
a contracting party, does not consent to such application.
2. The Organization may review the operation of this Article in
particular cases at the request of any contracting party and make
appropriate recommendations.
1
ANNEX A
LIST OF TERRITORIES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 (a) OF ARTICLE II
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Dependent territories of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
Canada
Commonwealth of Australia
Dependent territories of the Commonwealth of Australia
New Zealand
II
Dependent territories of New Zealand
M
Union of South Africa including South West Africa
M
Ireland
N
India
Pakistan
Southern Rhodesia
Burma
Ceylon
rates in force for certain products. Any such territory may, by expert
T
B
preferential
rates a single preferential rate which shall not on the whole
R
the preferences in force prior to such substitution.
,
R
margin of tariff preference.
KUEEZEA
EpäoZzcz pat
es
the
C
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2997
Netherlands, Kingdom of the
mes
Madagascar and Dependencies
under contractual agreements with the Governments of Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, in respect of chilled and frozen beef and
ng
veal
, frozen mutton and lamb, chilled and frozen pork, and bacon. It
is the intention, without prejudice to any action taken under subpara-
pret graph (h) of Article XX, that these arrangements shall be eliminated
ther or replaced by tariff preferences, and that negotiations to this end
shall take place as soon as practicable among the countries substan-
tially concerned or involved
ego.
The film hire tax in force in New Zealand on 10 April 1947, shall, for
the
purposes of this Agreement, be treated as a customs duty under
Article II. The renters' film quota in force in New Zealand on 10
April 1947, shall, for the purposes of this Agreement, be treated as a
screen quota under Article IV.
18 ke
ANNEX B
LIST OF TERRITORIES OF THE FRENCH UNION REFERRED TO IN
PARAGRAPH 2 (6) OF ARTICLE II
French Equatorial Africa (Treaty Basin of the Congo' and other
territories)
French West Africa
Cameroons under French Trusteeship 1
French Somali Coast and Dependencies
French Establishments in Oceania
French Establishments in the Condominium of the New Hebrides 1
Indo-China
Ell France
and
Morocco (French zone)
New Caledonia and Dependencies
Saint-Pierre and Miquelon
Togo under French Trusteeship 1
Tunisia
ret
ANNEXO
til LIST OF TERRITORIES OF THE CUSTOMS UNION OF BELGIUM, LUXEM-
BURG AND THE NETHERLANDS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 (6)
OF ARTICLE II
The Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union
len
ich
tole
180
Belgian Congo
Ruanda Urundi
306
esot
New Guinea
Surinam
Netherlands Antilles
Republic of Indonesia
the
11
Customs Union.
For imports into the metropolitan territories constituting the
For imports into Metropolitan France and Territories of the French Union.
2998
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
1
THE PURPOSE OF MAKING THE DETERMINATION REFERRED TO IN
If, prior to the accession of the Government of Japan to the General
Agreement, the present Agreement has been accepted by contracting
parties the external trade of which under column I accounts for the
column I shall be applicable for the purposes of that paragraphy
percentage of such trade specified in paragraph 6.of Article XXII.
ANNEX D
LIST OF TERRITORIES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 (6) OF ARTICLE ||
AS RESPECTS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
United States of America (customs territory)
Dependent territories of the United States of America
Republic of the Philippines
The imposition of an equivalent margin of tariff preference to replace
a margin of preference in an internal tax existing on 10 April 1847
exclusively between two or more of the territories listed in this Annex
shall not be deemed to constitute an increase in a margin of tarif
preference.
ANNEX E
LIST OF TERRITORIES COVERED BY PREFERENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH
2 (d) OF ARTICLE II
(i) Chile on the one hand, and
1. Argentina
2. Bolivia
3. Peru, on the other.
(ii) Uruguay and Paraguay
ANNEX F
DATES ESTABLISHING MAXIMUM MARGINS OF PREFERENCE REFERRED
TO IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE II
Australia
Canada
France
Union of South Africa
Southern Rhodesia
ANNEX G
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF TOTAL EXTERNAL TRADE TO BE USED FOR
ARTICLE XXVI
(based on the average of 1949–1953)
15 October 1946
1 July 1939
1 January 1939
1 July 1938
1 May 1941
.
(
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
2999
the present Agreement has not been so accepted prior to the accession
of the Government of Japan, column II shall be applicable for the
purposes of that paragraph.
LEI
Column I
Column II
(Contracting parties (Contracting parties
on 1 March 1955) on 1 March 1955
and Japan)
olace
1947
nnes
Farif
3. 1
0.9
4. 3
2. 5
0.3
6. 7
0,5
0.6
1.1
1.4
1.4
0.1
1.0
8.7
3.0
0.8
4. 2
2. 4
0.3
6. 5
0.5
0.6
1.1
1.4
1.4
0.1
1.0
8.5
ENTS
ВАРН
Australia.
Austria
Belgium-Luxemburg
Brazil
Burma
Canada
Ceylon
Chile
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Finland
France.
Germany, Federal Republic
of
Greece
Haiti
India
Indonesia
Italy
Netherlands, Kingdom of the
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Peru .
Rhodesia and Nyasaland :
Sweden
Turkey
Union of South Africa
United Kingdom
United States of America
Uruguay
Japan
RED
5. 3
0.4
0.1
2.4
1.3
2. 9
4. 7
1.0
0.1
1.1
0.9
0.4
0.6
2. 5
0.6
1.8
20.3
20.6
0.4
5. 2
0.4
0.1
2. 4
1.3
2. 8
4. 6
1. 0
0.1
1.1
0.8
0.4
0.6
2. 4
0.6
1. 8
19.8
20. 1
0.4
2. 3
FOR
IN
ma
100.0
100.0
ang
the
1
1
Note: These percentages have been computed taking into account
the trade of all territories in respect of which the General
Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade is applied.
3000
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
P
fc
other than that under which importations of that product were
ANNEX H
NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS
Ad Article II
Paragraph 1.
The obligations incorporated in paragraph 1 of Article II by refer-
ence to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article IV and those incorporated in
paragraph 2 (6) of Article III by reference to Article VI shall be
considered as falling within Part IỈ for the purposes of the Protocollo
Provisional Application.
Paragraph 4.
The term "margin of preference" means the absolute difference
between the most-favoured-nation rate of duty and the preferential
rate of duty for the like product, and not the proportionate relations
between those rates. As examples:
(1) If the most-favoured-nation rate were 36 per cent ad valorem
and the preferential rate were 24 per cent ad valorem, the margin
of preference would be 12 per cent ad valorem, and not one-third
of the most-favoured-nation rate;
(2) If the most-favoured-nation rate were 36 per cent ad valorem
and the preferential rate were expressed as two-thirds of the
most-favoured-nation rate, the margin of preference would be
12 per cent ad valorem;
(3) If the most favoured-nation rate were 2 francs per kilogramme
and
the preferential rate were 1.50 francs per kilogramme, the
margin of preference would be 0.50 francs per kilogramme.
The following kinds of customs action, taken in accordance with
established uniform procedures, would not be contrary to a
binding of margins of preference:
(i) The re-application to an imported product of a tariff classifies
tion or rate of duty, properly applicable to such product
, in
cases in which the application of such classification or rate to
such product was temporarily suspended or inoperative on
April 10, 1947; and
(ii) The classification of a particular product under a tarif item
classified on April 10, 1947, in cases in which the tarif her
clearly
contemplates that such product may be classified under
more than one tariff item.
Ad Article III
Paragraph 2 (b).
See the note relating to paragraph 1 of Article II.
genera
re
in
er
ir
IE
to
A
is
vo. A estos.
la
in
SE
CO
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3001
I
er-
-
be
Ce
18
ns
Paragraph 4.
The provisions of this paragraph will be applied in the light of the
following:
1. The protection afforded through the operation of an import monop-
oly in respect of products described in the appropriate schedule
shall be limited by means of:
(a) a maximum import duty that may be applied in respect of the
product concerned; or
(b) any other mutually satisfactory arrangement consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement; any contracting party entering
into negotiations with a view to concluding such arrangement
shall afford to other interested contracting parties an oppor-
tunity for consultation.
2. The import duty mentioned in 1 (a) above shall represent the
margin by which the price charged by the import monopoly for the
imported product (exclusive of internal taxes conforming to the
provisions of Article IV, transportation, distribution, and other
expenses incident to the purchase, sale or further processing, and a
reasonable margin of profit) exceeds the landed cost; Provided that
regard may be had to average landed costs and selling prices over
recent periods; and Provided further that, where the product
concerned is a primary commodity which is the subject of a domestic
price stabilization arrangement, provisions may be made for adjust-
ment to take account of wide fluctuations or variations in world
prices, subject to agreement between the countries parties to the
negotiations.
Ad Article IV
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or
requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an
imported product and to the like domestic product and is collected or
enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other
internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred
to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of
07
rd
em
he
be
ne
be
th
I
1
50
I
Article IV.
Paragraph 1.
11
8
T
1
The application of paragraph 1 to internal taxes imposed by local
governments and authorities within the territory of a contracting party
is subject to the provisions of the final paragraph of Article XXIV.
The term "reasonable measures" in the last-mentioned paragraph
would not require, for example, the repeal of existing national legis-
lation authorizing local governments to impose internal taxes which,
although technically inconsistent with the
letter of Article IV, are
not
in fact inconsistent with its spirit, if such repeal would result in a
serious financial hardship for the local governments or authorities
concerned. With regard to taxation by local governments or au-
party may require reasonable security (bond or cash deposit) for the
st.
li
m
on
80
in
2. It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which
may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes on
paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties mer!
find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict
comparison with doinestic prices in such a country may not always bt!
1. As in many other cases in customs administration, & contracting
3002 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
thorities which is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of Article
IV, the term "reasonable measures” would permit a contracting parte de
pa
to eliminate the inconsistent taxation gradually over a transition so
period, if abrupt action would create serious administrative and
financial difficulties.
Paragraph 2.
PE
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of pare-
graph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of
the second sentence only in cases where competition was involved
between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand,
P
a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not sim.
larly taxed.
Paragraph 5.
Regulations consistent with the provisions of the first sentence of
paragraph 5 shall not be considered to be contrary to the provisions of
P
the second sentence in any case in which all of the products subject to
the regulations are produced domestically in substantial quantities
.
A regulation cannot be justified as being consistent with the provisions
of the second sentence on the ground that the proportion or amoun
allocated to each of the products which are the subject of the regulation P.
constitutes an equitable relationship between imported and domestie
products.
"
Ad Article V
Paragraph 5.
With regard to transportation charges, the principle laid down it fra
paragraph 5 refers to like products being transported on the same route
under like conditions.
Ad Article VI
Paragraph 1.
1. Hidden dumping by associated houses (that is, the sale by a
importer at a price below that corresponding to the price invoiced by
an exporter with whom the
importer is associated, and also below the di
price in the exporting country) constitutes a form of price dumping
with respect to which the margin of dumping may be calculated on a
the basis of the price at which
the goods are resold by the importer
where all domestic prices are fixed by the
State, special dificulties
ta
if
fe
appropriate.
Paragraphs 2 and 3.
X
no
a
tr
tr
0
m
m
DO
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3003
and
tion Paragraph 2.
estic
XV fully safeguard its position.
national Monetary Fund, the provisions of paragraph 9 (a) of Article
rtide payment of anti-dumping or countervailing duty pending final
party determination of the facts in any case of suspected dumping or
zition subsidization.
2. Multiple currency practices can in certain circumstances con-
stitute a subsidy to exports which may be met by countervailing duties
under paragraph 3 or can constitute a form of dumping by means of a
partial depreciation of a country's currency which may be met by
para: action under paragraph 2. By "multiple currency practices” is
asd meant practices by governments or sanctioned by governments.
olved
and Paragraph 6 (6).
şimi
. Waivers under the provisions of this sub-paragraph shall be granted
only on application by the contracting party proposing to levy an
anti-dumping or countervailing duty, as the case may be.
Ad Article VII
180
Paragraph 1.
it to
ties
.
The expression “or other charges” is not to be regarded as including
Lions
internal taxes or equivalent charges imposed on or in connection with
bunt imported products.
1. It would be in conformity with Article VII to presume that
"actual value” may be represented by the invoice price, plus any
non-included charges for legitimate costs which are proper elements of
"actual value” and plus any abnormal discount or other reduction
in from the ordinary competitive price.
2. It would be in conformity with Article VII, paragraph 2 (6), for
& contracting party to construe the phrase "in the ordinary course of
trade ... under fully competitive conditions”, as excluding any
transaction wherein the buyer and seller are not independent of each
other and price is not the sole consideration.
3. The standard of "fully competitive conditions” permits a con-
byl tracting party to exclude from consideration prices involving special
the
discounts limited to exclusive agents.
ing 4. The wording of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) permits a contracting
no party to determine the value for customs purposes uniformly either
1) on the basis of a particular exporter's prices of the imported
merchandise, or (2) on the basis of the general price level of like
Ad Article VIII
1. While Article VIII does not cover the use of multiple rates of
as such, paragraphs 1 and 4 condemn the use of exchange
taxes or fees as a device for implementing multiple currency practices;
f', however, a contracting party is using multiple currency exchange
fees for balance of payments
reasons with
the approval of the Inter-
2. It would be consistent with paragraph 1 if, on the importation of
oute
81
ich
nd merchandise.
A
of
exchange
be
78
3004
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
alloi
Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of this Agreement. Hof-Progre
for the application of the provisions of this sub-paragraph at the time alring
VIII, Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Articles of Agreement of the Intel- Article
national Monetary Fund become applicable to contracting parties sontrol
members of the Fund, the combined foreign trade of which const
tutes at least fifty per centum of the aggregate foreign trade of sus expe
It is agreed that paragraph 4 (e) does not add any new criteria for
products from the territory of a contracting party into the territory dl
another contracting party, the production of certificates of origin eternal
should only be required to the extent that is strictly indispensable. skicti
the b
Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII and XIV
g resti
Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII and XIV the terms import
restrictions" or "export restrictions" include restrictions made effective
through state-trading operations.
fragra
Nom
Ad Article XI
Paragraph 2 (c).
T gove
The term "in any form” in this paragraph covers the same products fer, in
when in an early stage of processing and still perishable, which compete ate.co
fith the
directly with the fresh product and if freely imported would tend to
make the restriction on the fresh product ineffective.
Paragra
Paragraph 2, last sub-paragraph.
See 1
The term "special factors” include changes in relative productive aspar
efficiency as between domestic and foreign producers, or as between
different foreign producers, but not changes artificially brought about
by means not permitted under the Agreement.
Ad Article XII
The Organization shall make provision for the utmost secrecy in the movide
conduct of any consultation under the provisions of this Article Article
Paragraph 3 (c) (i).
Contracting parties applying restrictions shall endeavour to avoid paragra
causing serious prejudice to exports of a commodity on which the One
economy of a contracting party is largely dependent.
Paragraph 4 (6).
It is agreed that the date shall be within ninety days after the entry
into force of the amendments of this Article effected by the Protond
ever, should the Organization find that conditions were not suitable The
envisaged, it may determine a later date; Provided that such data
not more than thirty days after such time as the obligations of Artigia
contracting parties.
Paragraph 4 (e).
ance of payments reasons. It is solely intended to ensure
Paragra
The
reclud
he field
Paragra
tacting
utions
termina
hange
prac
Interns
LAS OL
to COD
be than
the co
mport
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3005
190
la practice, there is no appreciable departure from the intent of the
is change action shall not be regarded as a violation of that Article if,
teaternational Monetary Fund, requires payment to be received for
Ulis exports in its own currency or in the currency of one or more mem-
lio contravene Article XI or Article XIII. Another example would
that of a contracting party which specifies on an import licence
not of introducing any additional element of discrimination in its
te country from which the goods may be imported, for the purpose
psport licensing system but of enforcing permissible exchange controls.
of
a sternal factors such as changes in the terms of trade, quantitative
strictions, excessive tariffs and subsidies, which may be contributing
bthe balance of payments difficulties of the contracting party apply-
ky restrictions will be fully taken into account.
ort
Ad Article XIII
Pirograph 2 (d).
No mention was made of "commercial considerations" as a rule for
Hellocation of quotas because it was considered that its application
governmental authorities might not always be practicable. More-
to pret
, in cases where it is practicable, a contracting party could apply
ete
ese considerations in the process of seeking agreement, consistently
to
fill the general rule laid down in the opening sentence of paragraph 2.
Laragraph 4.
See note relating to "special factors” in connection with the last
ne al-paragraph of paragraph 2 of Article XI.
Ad Article XIV
The provisions of this paragraph shall not be so construed as to
zelude full consideration by the Organization, in the consultations
che povided for in paragraph 4 of Article XII and in paragraph 12 of
sticle XVIII, of the nature, effects and reasons for discrimination in
he field of import restrictions.
One of the situations contemplated in paragraph 2 is that of a con-
acting party holding balances acquired
as a result of current trans-
stions whică it finds itself unable to use without a measure of dis-
Ad Article XV
The word "frustrate” is intended to indicate, for example, that
stingements of the letter of any Article of this Agreement by ex-
ontrol operated
in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the
a contracting party which, as part of its exchange
en
put
Paragraph 1.
i Paragraph
mination,
II
20
* wograph 4
1. lkticle. Thus,
l
I
3006
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 19.50-1955
8
me
under such a system shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 |
The intention of paragraph 4 is that the contracting parties should
seek before the end of 1957 to reach agreement to abolish all remaining
subsidies as from 1 January 1958; or, failing this, to reach agreement to
extend the application of the standstill until the earliest date thereafter of
Ad Article XVI
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne Pa
by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the
remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those co
which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
jec
Section B.
tra
1. Nothing in Section B shall preclude the use by a contracting
reg
party of multiple rates of exchange in accordance with the Articles of
Ar
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
2. For the purposes of Section B, a "primary product" is understood
to be any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its thi
natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily
required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in interme
national trade.
Pa
Paragraph 3.
1. The fact that a contracting party has not exported the product elf
in question during the previous representative period would not in the
itself preclude that contracting party from establishing its right to
obtain a share of the trade in the product concerned.
of
2. A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the re-
pre
turn to domestic producers of a primary product independently o
the
movements of export prices, which results at times in the sale of Pe
the product for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market, shall
be considered not to involve a subsidy on exports within the meaning me
of paragraph 3 if the Organization determines that:
Po
(a) the system has also resulted, or is so designed as to result, in the
sale of the product for export at a price higher than the com.
parable price charged for the like product to buyers in the of
domestic market; and
(b) the system is so 'operated, or is designed so to operate, either Po
because of the effective regulation of production or otherwise
, as
not to stimulate exports unduly or otherwise seriously to
ch
prejudice the interests of other contracting parties.
Notwithstanding such determination by the Organization, th:
addition to the funds collected from producers in respect of the produce Pc
concerned.
Paragraph 4.
AI
po
aco
mt
pa
mi
operations
pa
mi
im
to
by which they can expect to reach such agreement.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3007
er markets.
ICT
in
to
imported product (exclusive of internal taxes within the purview of
Ad Article XVII
ne | Paragraph 1.
The operations of Marketing Boards, which are established by
se contracting parties and are engaged in purchasing or selling, are sub-
ject to the provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).
The activities of Marketing Boards which are established by con-
tracting parties and which do not purchase or sell but lay down
regulations covering private trade are governed by the relevant
of Articles of this Agreement.
The charging by a state enterprise of different prices for its sales of
od
& product in different markets is not precluded by the provisions of
it this Article, provided that such different prices are charged for com-
ily
mercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply and demand in export
Paragraph 1 (a).
Governmental measures imposed to ensure standards of quality and
efficiency in the operation of external trade, or privileges granted for
the exploitation of national natural resources but which do not em-
power the government to exercise control over the trading activities
of the enterprise in question, do not constitute "exclusive or special
privileges”.
of
of | Paragraph 1 (6).
A country receiving a "tied loan” is free to take this loan into
account as a "commercial consideration” when purchasing require-
ng ments abroad.
Paragraph 2.
The term "goods” is limited to products as understood in com-
mercial practice, and is not intended to include the purchase or sale
Negotiations which contracting parties agree to conduct under this
paragraph may be directed towards the reduction of duties and other
charges on imports and exports or towards the conclusion of any other
mutually satisfactory arrangement consistent with the provisions of
3
this Agreement. (See paragraph 4 of Article III and the note to that
The term "import mark-up” in this paragraph shall represent the
margin by which the price charged by the import
monopoly for the
Article IV, transportation, distribution, and other expenses incident
to the purchase, sale or further processing, and a reasonable margin
of profit) exceeds the landed cost.
0-
ce
al
1-
je of services.
e Paragraph 8.
S
50
paragraph.)
Paragraph 4 (b).
3008
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The date referred to in paragraph 12 (6) shall be the date determined
by the Organization in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
Ad Article XVIII
The Organization and the contracting parties concerned shall
preserve the utmost secrecy in respect of matters arising under this
Article.
Paragraphs 1 and 4.
1. When they consider whether the economy of a contracting party
"can only support low standards of living”, the Organization shall
take into consideration the normal position of that economy and shall
not base their determination on exceptional circumstances such as
those which may result from the temporary existence of exceptionally
favourable conditions for the staple export product or products of
such contracting party.
2. The phrase "in the early stages of development” is not meant to
apply only to contracting parties which have just started their eco-
nomic development, but also to contracting parties the economies of
which are undergoing a process of industrialization to correct an
excessive dependence on primary production.
Paragraphs 2, 3, 7, 13 and 22.
The reference to the establishment of particular industries shal
apply not only to the establishment of a new industry, but also to
the establishment of a new branch of production in an existing in-
dustry and to the substantial transformation of an existing industry
,
and to the substantial expansion of an existing industry supplying a
relatively small proportion of the domestic demand. It shall also
cover the reconstruction of an industry destroyed or substantially
damaged as a result of hostilities or natural disasters.
Paragraph 7 (6).
A modification or withdrawal, pursuant to paragraph 7 (6), by a con-
tracting party, other than the applicant contracting party, referred to
in paragraph 7 (a), shall be made within six months of the day on which
the action is taken by the applicant contracting party, and shall be
come effective on the thirtieth day following the day on which such
modification or withdrawal has been notified to the Organization.
Paragraph 11.
The second sentence in paragraph 11 shall not be interpreted to
mean that a contracting party is required to relax or remove restarie
tions if such relaxation or removal would thereupon produce cond-
tions justifying the intensification or institution, respectively, of re-
strictions under paragraph 9 of Article XVIII.
Paragraph 12 (6).
4 (6) of Article XII of this Agreement.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3009
etv
US
Hy
to
CO-
2011
Organization has determined that the extent of the compensatory
Paragraphs 13 and 14.
all
It is recognized that, before deciding on the introduction of a meas-
is
ure and notifying the Organization in accordance with paragraph 14,
a contracting party may need a reasonable period of time to assess the
competitive position of the industry concerned.
Paragraphs 15 and 16.
It is understood that the Organization shall invite a contracting
all party proposing to apply a measure under Section C to consult with it
pursuant to paragraph 16 if it is requested to do so by a contracting
party the trade of which would be appreciably affected by the measure
of
in question.
Paragraphs 16, 18, 19 and 22.
1. It is understood that the Organization may concur in a proposed
of measure subject to specific conditions or limitations. If the measure
as applied does not conform to the terms of the concurrence it will to
that extent be deemed a measure in which the Organization has not
concurred. In cases in which the Organization has concurred in a
measure for a specified period, the contracting party concerned, if it
al finds that the maintenance of the measure for a further period of time
is required to achieve the objective for which the measure was orig-
inally taken, may apply to the Organization for an extension of that
J. period in accordance with the provisions and procedures of Section
Cor D, as the case may be.
2. It is expected that the Organization will, as a rule, refrain from
concurring in a measure which is likely to cause serious prejudice to
exports of a commodity on which the economy of a contracting party
is largely dependent.
BE
Paragraphs 18 and 22.
to The phrase "that the interests of other contracting parties are ade-
ch
quately safeguarded” is meant to provide latitude sufficient to permit
consideration in each case of the most appropriate method of safe-
guarding those interests. The appropriate method may, for instance,
take the form of an additional concession to be applied by the contract-
ing party having recourse to Section C or D during such time as the
deviation from the other Articles of the Agreement would remain in
force or of the temporary suspension by any other contracting party
referred to in paragraph 18 of a concession substantially equivalent to
the impairment due to the introduction of the measure in question.
Such contracting party would have the right to safeguard its interests
through such a temporary suspension of a concession; Provided that
this right will not be exercised
when, in the case of a measure imposed
d
by a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a), the
b
concession proposed was adequate.
to
1-
8
SO
e-
b
0
t
-
415900--57-yol, 2-486
3010
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
The Organization and each contracting party concerned should
arrange to conduct the negotiations and consultations with the greatest
possible secrecy in order to avoid premature disclosure of details of
1 Resolutions Adopted by the Economic and Social Council During Its Fourth
Paragraph 19.
The provisions of paragraph 19 are intended to cover the cases where
an industry has been in existence beyond the "reasonable period of
time" referred to in the note to paragraphs 13 and 14, and should not
be so construed as to deprive a contracting party coming within the
scope of paragraph 4 (a) of Article XVIII, of its right to resort to the
other provisions of Section C, including paragraph 17, with regard to
a newly established industry even though it has benefited from inci-
dental protection afforded by balance of payments import restrictions.
Paragraph 21.
Any measure taken pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 21 shall
be withdrawn forthwith if the action taken in accordance with para-
graph 17 is withdrawn or if the Organization concurs in the measure
proposed after the expiration of the ninety-day time limit specified in
paragraph 17.
Ad Article XX
Sub-paragraph (h).
The exception provided for in this sub-paragraph extends to any
commodity agreement which conforms to the principles approved by
the Economic and Social Council in its Resolution 30 (IV) of 28 March
1947.1
Ad Article XXIV
Paragraph 9.
It is understood that the provisions of Article II would require that
,
when a product which has been imported into the territory of a mem-
ber of a customs union or free-trade area at a preferential rate of duty
is reexported to the territory of another member of such union or area,
the latter member should collect
a duty equal to the difference between
the duty already paid and any higher duty that would be payable if
the product were being imported directly into its territory.
Paragraph 11.
Measures adopted by India and Pakistan in order to carry out defin
itive trade arrangements between them, once they have been agreed
upon, might depart from particular
provisions of this Agreement, but
these measures would in general be consistent with the objectives
the Agreement.
Ad Article XXVIII
Session From 28 February to 29 March 1947 (E/437), pp. 3-4.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3011
f
t
2
2
o
1
2
1
1
1
prospective tariff changes. The Organization shall be informed im-
mediately of all changes in national tariffs resulting from recourse to
this Article.
Paragraph 1
1. If the Organization specifies a period other than a three-year
period, a contracting party may act pursuant to paragraph 1 or para-
graph 3 of Article XXVIII on the first day following the expiration of
such other period and, unless the Organization has again specified
another period, subsequent periods will be three-year periods following
the expiration of such specified period.
2. The provision that on 1 January 1958, and on other days deter-
mined pursuant to paragraph 1, à contracting party "may
modify or withdraw a concession" means that on such day, and on the
first day after the end of each period, the legal obligation of such con-
tracting party under Article III is altered; it does not mean that the
changes in its customs tariff should necessarily be made effective on
that day. If a tariff change resulting from negotiations undertaken
pursuant to this Article is delayed, the entry into force of any com-
pensatory concessions may be similarly delayed.
3. Not earlier than six months, nor later than three months, prior to
1 January 1958, or to the termination date of any subsequent period,
& contracting party wishing to modify or withdraw any concession
embodied in the appropriate Schedule, should notify the Organization
to this effect. The Organization shall then determine the contracting
party or contracting parties with which the negotiations or consulta-
tions referred to in paragraph 1 shall take place. Any contracting
party so determined shall participate in such negotiations or consulta-
tions with the applicant contracting party with the aim of reaching
agreement before the end of the period. Any extension of the assured
life of the Schedules shall relate to the Schedules as modified after
such negotiations, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article
XXVIII. If the Organization is arranging for multilateral tariff
negotiations to take place within the period of six months before 1
January 1958, or before any other day determined pursuant to para-
graph i, it shall include in the arrangements for such negotiations
suitable procedures for carrying out the negotiations referred to in
4. The object of providing for the participation in the negotiations
any contracting party with a principal supplying interest, in addi-
tion to any contracting party with which the concession was initially
negotiated, is to ensure that a contracting party with a larger share in
the trade affected by the concession than a contracting party with
which the concession was initially negotiated shall have an effective
opportunity to protect the contractual right which it enjoys under
this Agreement. On the other hand, it is not intended that the scope
of the negotiations should be such
as to make negotiations and agree-
ment under Article XXVIII unduly difficult nor to create complica-
tions in the application of this Article in the future to concessions which
}
f
this paragraph.
of
3012
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
result from negotiations thereunder. Accordingly, the Organization
should only determine that a contracting party has a principal supply-
ing interest if that contracting party has had, over a reasonable period
of time prior to the negotiations, a larger share in the market of the
applicant contracting party than a contracting party with which the
concession was initially negotiated or would, in the judgment of the
Organization, have had such a share in the absence of discriminatory
quantitative restrictions maintained by the applicant contracting
party. It would therefore not be appropriate for the Organization to
determine that more than one contracting party, or in those exceptional
cases where there is near equality more than two contracting parties,
had a principal supplying interest.
5. Notwithstanding the definition of a principal supplying interest
in note 4 to paragraph 1, the Organization may exceptionally deter-
mine that a contracting party has a principal supplying interest if the
concession in question affects trade which constitutes a major part of
the total exports of such contracting party.
6. It is not intended that provision for participation in the negotia-
tions of any contracting party with a principal supplying interest, and
for consultation with any contracting party having a substantial in-
terest in the concession which the applicant contracting party is seek-
ing to modify or withdraw, should have the effect that it should have
to pay compensation or suffer retaliation greater than the withdrawal
or modification sought, judged in the light of the conditions of trade
at the time of the proposed withdrawal or modification, making allow-
ance for any discriminatory quantitative restrictions maintained by
the applicant contracting-party.
7. The expression “substantial interest" is not capable of a precise
definition and accordingly may present difficulties for the Organization.
It is, however, intended to be construed to cover only those coll-
tracting parties which have, or in the absence of discriminatory
quantitative restrictions affecting their exports could reasonably be
expected to have, a significant share in the market of the contracting
party seeking to modify or withdraw the concession.
Paragraph 4.
1. Any request for authorization to enter into negotiations shall be
accompanied by all relevant statistical and other data. A decision
on such request shall be made within thirty days of its submission.
2. It is recognized that to permit certain contracting parties, de-
pending in large measure on a relatively small number of primary
commodities and relying on the tariff as an important aid for furthering
diversification of their economies or as an important source of revenue,
normally to negotiate for the modification or withdrawal of concessions
only under paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII, might cause them at such
a time to make modifications or withdrawals
which in the long run
would prove unnecessary. To avoid such a situation the Organiza-
tion shall authorize any such contracting party, under paragraph 4
to enter into negotiations unless they consider this would result in, on
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3013
contribute substantially towards, such an increase in tariff levels as
to threaten the stability of the Schedules to this Agreement or lead to
undue disturbance of international trade.
3. It is expected that negotiations authorized under paragraph 4 for
modification or withdrawal of a single item, or a very small group of
items, could normally be brought to a conclusion in sixty days. It is
recognized, however, that such a period will be inadequate for cases
involving negotiations for the modification or withdrawal of a larger
number of items and in such cases, therefore, it would be appropriate
for the Organization to prescribe a longer period.
4. The determination referred to in paragraph 4 (d) shall be made by
the Organization within thirty days of the submission of the matter to
it, unless the applicant contracting party agrees to a longer period.
5. In determining under paragraph 4 (d) whether an applicant con-
tracting party has unreasonably failed to offer adequate compensation,
it is understood that the Organization will take due account of the
special position of a contracting party which has bound a high propor-
tion of its tariffs at very low rates of duty and to this extent has less
scope than other contracting parties to make compensatory adjustment.
Ad Article XXIX
Paragraph 3.
It is understood that the reference to fiscal needs would include the
revenue aspect of duties and particularly duties imposed primarily for
revenue purposes or duties imposed on products which can be substi-
tuted for products subject to revenue duties to prevent the avoidance
of such duties,
Ad Article XXX
The acceptance of amendments pursuant to this paragraph shall
be in such form as may be determined by the Organization.
Ad Article XXXIII
Similarly, a government, acting on behalf of a separate customs
territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external com-
mercial relations and of other matters provided for in this Agreement,
may accede to this Agreement on behalf of that territory on terms
applicable thereto.
3014
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
GENERAL
Cong., 2d sess., pp. 93-107. On the basis of the Randall Report (see supra, doc.
called for the renegotiation of the organizational and operational provisions of
GATT. His message of Jan. 10, 1955 (supra, doc. 6) was in the same vein. On
Apr. 14, 1955, the President requested legislation authorizing U.S. membership
in the Organization for Trade Cooperation; Department of State Bulletin, Apr.
of Jan. 24, 1956, transmitting to Congress the Economic Report of the President;
The agreement, however, has not entered
8. ORGANIZATION FOR TRADE COOPERATION (OTC): Agree.
ment Between the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, March 10, 1955 1
PART I
Article 1-Establishment.
The Organization for Trade Cooperation (hereinafter referred to
as "the Organization'') is hereby established to further, as provided
for in the General Agreement and herein, the achievement of the
purposes and objectives set forth in the General Agreement on Tarifis
and Trade ? (herein referred to as "the General Agreement").
Article 2—Membership.
The Members of the Organization shall be the contracting parties
to the General Agreement. Governments which become or cease
to be contracting parties to the General Agreement shall become or
cease to be Members of the Organization. The Organization may, by
a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, invite governments which
are not or which cease to be contracting parties to the General Agree-
ment to participate in such activities of the Organization and on such
terms as it shall decide; Provided that in no case shall such participa-
tion involve the right to vote or to be counted in determining the
fulfilment of the relevant voting requirements when the Organization
is exercising any function relating directly to the General Agreement
.
Article 3-Functions.
(a) The Organization shall administer the General Agreement and
generally facilitate the operation of that Agreement.
(b) In addition, the Organization shall have the following func-
tions:
(i) to facilitate intergovernmental consultations on
relating to international trade;
(ii) to sponsor international trade negotiations;
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Basic Instruments and Selected Doc
uments, vol
. I" (Revised), Texts of the General Agreement as Amended, and of the
Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation (Geneva, the Contracting
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 4, 1955, pp. 579-582; 'H. Rept. No. 2007, 84th
State of the Union Message of Jan. 5, 1956 (supra, pp. 129–133), and in a les
H. Doc. 280, 84th Cong., 2d sess.
into force (as of June 15, 1956).
Agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, as amended Mar. 10, 1955; supra.
questions
2
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3015
1
(iii) to study questions of international trade and commercial
policy and, where appropriate, make recommendations thereon;
(iv) to collect, analyze and publish information and statistical
data relating to international trade and commercial policy,
due regard being paid to the activities in this field of other
international bodies. .
(c) The Organization shall, in carrying out these functions, en-
deavour to give full effect to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agree-
ment.
(d) The Organization shall have no authority to amend the pro-
visions of the General Agreement; no decision or other action of the
Assembly or any subsidiary body of the Organization shall have the
effect of imposing on a Member any new obligation which the Member
has not specifically agreed to undertake.
}
PART II
1
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE ORGANIZATION
7
1
1
Article 4-Structure in General.
The Organization shall have an Assembly, an Executive Committee
and a Secretariat.
Article 5-The Assembly.
(a) The Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the Organ-
ization
(6) It shall be the responsibility of the Assembly to carry out the
functions of the Organization.
(C) The Assembly shall determine the seat of the Organization.
(d) The Assembly shall meet in regular annual session and in such
special sessions as may be convened in accordance with the rules of
procedure.
(@) The Assembly shall establish its own rules of procedure and
shall approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Committee and
of any other subsidiary body.
Article 6—The Executive Committee.
(a) The Executive Committee shall consist of seventeen Members
of the Organization elected periodically by the Assembly. Each
election shall be for a single term and each Member shall be eligible
for re-election. In such elections, the Assembly shall be guided by
the following criteria:
(i) the Executive Committee shall include the five Members of
chief economic importance, in the determination of which
particular regard shall be paid to their shares in international
trade:
(ii) the Executive Committee shall be representative of the broad
geographical areas to which the Members belong;
3016
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
procedure may require that parties to a dispute shall abstain from
(a) At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the Organization
shall be entitled to have one vote and, except as otherwise provided
sidiary bodies shall have one vote therein; Provided that the rules of
(iii) the Executive Committee shall be representative of different
degrees of economic development, different types of economies
and different economic interests.
(6) The Executive Committee shall exercise the powers and per-
form the duties assigned to it by the Assembly by a majority of
two-thirds of the votes cast. Decisions or recommendations of the
Executive Committee shall be subject to a right of appeal to the
Assembly by any Member in accordance with rules to be prescribed
by the Assembly
(c) Any Member of the Organization which is not a member of the
Executive Committee shall be entitled to participate, without the
right to vote, in the discussion by the Executive Committee of any
matter of concern to it.
Article 7-The Secretariat.
(a) The Assembly shall appoint a Director-General as chief admin-
istrative officer of the Organization. The powers, duties, conditions
of service and term of office of the Director-General shall conform to
regulations approved by the Assembly.
(6) The Director-General or his representative shall be entitled
to participate, without the right to vote, in all meetings of the Assem-
bly and subsidiary bodies of the Organization.
(c) The Director-General shall appoint the members of the staf
and shall fix their duties and conditions of service in accordance with
regulations approved by the Assembly.
(d) The selection of the members of the staff shall as far as possible
be made on a wide geographical basis and with due regard to the
various types of economy represented by Member countries. The
paramount consideration in the selection of candidates and in deter-
mining the conditions of service of the staff shall be the necessity of
securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, impartiality
and integrity.
(e) The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the members
of the staff shall be exclusively international in character. In the
discharge of their duties, they shall not seek or receive instructions
from any government or from any other authority external to the
Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect
on their position as international officials. The Members shall re-
spect the international character of the responsibilities of these persons
and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties
Article 8—Voting.
Assembly shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast.
(6) Each member of the Executive Committee and of other sub
1
1
i
1
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3017
ons
EM-
ent
lies Article 9-Budget and Contributions.
(a) The Director-General shall present to the Assembly, through
the Executive Committee, the annual budget estimates and financial
Oer-
of statement of the Organization. The Assembly shall approve the ac-
the counts and the budget.
the (b) The Assembly shall apportion the expenditures of the Organi-
bedzation among the Members, in accordance with a scale of contribu-
tions to be fixed by the Assembly, and each Member shall contribute
the promptly to the Organization its share of these expenditures.
the (c) If a Member is in arrears in the payment of its contributions by
any
an amount which equals or exceeds the amount of contributions due
from it in respect of the preceding two completed financial years, the
Member shall have no vote, and shall not be counted in the determining
of the fulfilment of the relevant voting requirements, in the organs
nin-
of the Organization. If the Assembly is satisfied that the failure to
pay is due to circumstances beyond the control of the Member, it may,
to nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote, and then such Member
shall be counted accordingly.
cled | Article 10—Status.
(a) The Organization shall have legal personality.
aft
. (6) The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of the
rith Members such legal capacity, privileges and immunities as may be
necessary for the exercise of its functions.
Eble (c
) The representatives of the Members, and the officials of the
the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as
The may be necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in
ter-
connection with the Organization.
(d) The privileges and immunities to be accorded by a Member to
lity the Organization, to its officials and to the representatives of its
Members shall be similar to those accorded by that Member to spe-
cialized agencies of the United Nations, to their officials and to the
the representatives of their members, under the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, or under
similar arrangements.
Fect Article 11-Relations with other Organizations.
(a) The Organization shall make arrangements with intergovern-
mental bodies and agencies which have related responsibilities to
provide for effective cooperation and the avoidance of unnecessary
duplication of activities.
(6) In pursuance of the provisions of the preceding paragraph,
ded the Organization may, by an agreement approved by the Assembly
be brought into relationship with the United Nations, as one of the
specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter of the
() The Organization may make suitable arrangements for con-
sultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations con-
cerned with matters within the scope of the Organization.
of
pers
ONS
the
re-
Ons
es.
ior
the
ub-
United Nations.
S of
Com
3018
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT
and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting /
mental organization in cases where it considers such consultation
(6) If the Organization considers that the circumstances are serious
or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party
Agreement as it determines to be appropriate in the circumstances
If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other
obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be
free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give
written notice to the Director-General of the Organization of its
intention to withdraw from the General Agreement and such wit/
PART III
Article 12--Administration in General.
The Organization shall give effect to those provisions of the General
Agreement which provide for action by the Organization, and shall
carry out such other activities in relation to the General Agreement
which involve joint action. This shall include the taking of decisions
the sponsorship of negotiations and consultations, the conduct of
studies, the circulation of proposals and the receipt of reports, in any
case in which such action is required or appropriate to carry out the
purposes of the General Agreement.
Article 13-Waivers in Exceptional Circumstances.
In exceptional circumstances, not elsewhere provided for in this
Agreement, nor provided for in the General Agreement, the Assembly
may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by the
General Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved
by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority
shall comprise more than half of the Members. The Assembly map
also by such a vote (i) define certain categories of exceptional cs
cumstances to which other voting requirements shall apply for the
waiver of obligations imposed by the General Agreement upon &
contracting party thereto, and (i) prescribe such criteria as may be
necessary for the application of this Article.
Article 14—Nullification and Impairment.
(a) If a claim that a benefit accruing directly or indirectly under
the General Agreement is being nullified or impaired,
attainment of any objective of that Agreement is being impeded,
referred to the Organization in accordance with the provisions of the
Agreement, the Organization shall promptly investigate the mater
parties to the General Agreement which it considers to be concerned
or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The Organization me
consult with contracting parties, with the Economic and
Socia
Council of the United Nations, and with any appropriate intergovern
necessary.
enough to justify such action, it may authorize a contracting para
or that the
។
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3019
BE
ons,
OTHER PROVISIONS
mar
cir-
r the
ON &
y be
provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
drawal shall take effect on the sixtieth day following the day on which
such notice is received by him.
Article 15—Continued Application of Provisions of this Part.
The Members shall not, acting as contracting parties to the General
Agreement, amend the General Agreement so as to provide therein
neral
shall
for procedures, other than consultation, negotiation or recommenda-
tion, applicable to the general situations to which Articles 13 and
ment
14 relate.
ct of
PART IV
ADT
t the
Article 16-Amendments.
Amendments to this Agreement shall become effective, in respect
this of those Members which accept them, upon acceptance by two-thirds
mbly
of the Members of the Organization and thereafter in respect of each
- the other Member upon acceptance by it.
oved
Article 17–Entry into Force.
ority
(a) This Agreement shall be deposited, subject to the provisions
of Article 21, with the Director-General of the Organization.
(6) This Agreement shall be opened at Geneva on 10 March 1955
for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by contracting parties to
the General Agreement and by any other government which has, in
accordance with such rules of procedure as may be established by the
Organization, notified the Director-General of its intention to accede.
C) Without prejudice to the principle laid down in Article 2, this
under Agreement shall enter into force, as among those governments which
are then contracting parties to the General Agreement and which
di
have accepted this Agreement, on the thirtieth day following the day
on which it has
been accepted by governments named in the Annex
to this Agreement the territories of which account for 85 per centum
of the total external trade of the territories of such governments,
med computed in accordance with the appropriate column of percentage
set forth therein. This Agreement shall enter into force for each
other government which is a contracting party to the General Agree-
ment on the thirtieth day following the day on which it has been
accepted thereby. It shall enter into force for each other government
which has accepted it when such government accedes to the General
Agreement.
parts Article 18-Notification and Registration.
(a) The Director-General of the Organization shall promptly fur-
nish a certified copy of this Agreement and a notification of its entry
into force, and of each acceptance thereof, to each contracting party
to the General Agreement.
(6) This Agreement shall be registered in accordance with the
i the
that
atter
ctin!
тал
Ocial
Tert-
rious
part
neri/
ACAS
Other
in be
SITE
of its
with
3020
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
If, prior to the accession of the Government of Japan to the General
Agreement, the present Agreement has been accepted by contracting
column I shall be applicable for the purposes of that paragraph. I
1 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Final Act and Instruments Adopted
at the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties (Geneva, the Contracting Parties
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Mar. 10, 1955), pp. 163–169.
PART V
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 19—Relation to Amendments to the General Agreement.
If this agreement enters into force before the entry into force of
amendments to the General Agreement contained in the Protocol of
Organizational Amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade dated 10 March 1955, this Agreement shall, until the entry
into force of such amendments, be applied as if all references in the
General Agreement to "the CONTRACTING PARTIES” were references
to the Organization.
Article 20-Provisional Application.
Without prejudice to the principle laid down in Article 2, if by
15 November 1955 this Agreement shall not have entered into force
pu nt to paragraph (c) of Article 17, those governments, being
contracting parties to the General Agreement, which are prepared to
do so may nevertheless decide to apply it; Provided that the territories
of such governments account for the percentage of trade required for
the entry into force of this Agreement under paragraph (c) of Article 17.
Article 21— Temporary Exercise of Depository Functions:
Pending the entry into force of this Agreement, the title “Director-
General of the Organization” in paragraph (6) of Article 14, para-
graphs (a) and (6) of Article 17 and paragraph (a) of Article 18, shall
read "Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING PARTies to the
General Agreement”.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective representatives, duly author-
ized to that effect, have signed the present Agreement.
Done at Geneva, in a single copy, in the English and French
languages, both texts authentic, this tenth day of March, one thousand
nine hundred and fifty-five.
ANNEX
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF TOTAL EXTERNAL TRADE TO BE USED FOR TEE
DETERMINATION REFERRED TO IN
(based on the average of 1949–1953)
percentage of such trade specified in paragraph (C) of Article 17
MAKING
THE
PURPOSE OF
ARTICLE 17
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3021
of
of
IS
y
28
DY
ce
ng
to
es
or
7.
the present Agreement has not been so accepted prior to the accession
of the Government of Japan, column II shall be applicable for the
purposes of that paragraph.
Column I
Column II
(Contracting parties (Contracting parties
on 1 March 1955) on 1 March 1955 and
Japan)
Australia
3. 1
3. O
Austria
0.9
0.8
Belgium-Luxemburg
4. 3
4. 2
Brazil
2. 5
2. 4
Burma.
0.3
0.3
Canada
6. 7
6. 5
Ceylon
0.5
0.5
Chile.
0.6
0.6
Cuba.
1.1
1.1
Czechoslovakia
1.4
1.4
Denmark.
1.4
1.4
Dominican Republic
0.1
0.1
Finland
1.0
1. 0
France,
8. 7
8.5
Germany, Federal Republic
5. 3
5. 2
Greece
0.4
0.4
Haiti
0.1
0.1
India
2.4
2.4
Indonesia
1.3
Italy
2. 9
2.8
Netherlands, Kingdom of
the
4. 7
4.6
New Zealand :
1.0
1.0
0.1
0.1
1.1
1.1
0.9
0.8
0.4
0.4
Rhodesia and Nyasaland :
0.6
0.6
2. 5
2.4
0.6
0.6
Union of South Africa
1.8
1.8
20.3
19.8
United States of America
20.6
20. 1
0.4
0.4
2. 3
of .
-
8-
all
he
1.3
I
ch
ld
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Peru .
IE
Sweden.
Turkey.
United Kingdom.
81
Uruguay
Japan
18
18
7.
[
100.0
100.0
el
Note: These percentages have been computed taking into account
the trade of all territories in respect of which the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade is applied.
3022
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
9. TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1955: Public Law
86 (84th Congress, 1st Session), June 21, 1955 1
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may
be cited as the "Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955".
SEC. 2. The period during which the President is authorized to enter
into foreign trade agreements under section 350 of the Tariff Act of
1930,as amended (19 U. S. C., sec. 1351), is hereby extended from
June 12, 1955, until the close of June 30, 1958.
SEC. 3. (a) Subsection (a) of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended (19 U.S. C., sec. 1351 (a)), is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“(a) (1) For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the
products of the United States (as a means of assisting in establishing
and maintaining a better relationship among various branches of
American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce) by regų.
lating the admission of foreign goods into the United States in accord-
ance with the characteristics and needs of various branches of Ameri-
can production so that foreign markets will be made available to
those branches of American production which require and are capable
of developing such outlets by affording corresponding market oppor-
tunities for foreign products in the United States, the President, when-
ever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or other import restric-
tions of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burden-
ing and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that
the purpose above declared will be promoted by the means hereinafter
specified, is authorized from time to time-
“(A) To enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign
governments or instrumentalities thereof: Provided, that the
enactment of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 shal
not be construed to determine or indicate the approval or dis-
approval by the Congress of the executive agreement known as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
"(B) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and
other import restrictions, or such additional import restrictions
,
or such continuance, and for such minimum periods, of existing
customs or excise treatment of any article covered by foreign
trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to carry out any
foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into
hereunder.
“(2) No proclamation pursuant to paragraph (1) (B) of this sub
section shall be made-
" (A) Increasing by more than 50 per centum any rate of
duty existing on January 1, 1945.
“(B) Transferring any article between the dutiable and free
lists.
of
pai
prc
sh2
3
prc
11
D
ī
1
1 69 Stat. 162.
2 Act of June 17, 1930; 46 Stat. 590.
3 Agreement of Oct. 36, 1947, as amended Mar. 10, 1955; supra., doc. 7.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3023
119 Fed. Reg. 7379-7386.
been in effect for a period or periods aggregating not less than
"(C) In order to carry out a foreign trade agreement entered
into by the President before June 12, 1955, or with respect to
which notice of intention to negotiate was published in the
Federal Register on November 16, 1954, decreasing by more than
50 per centum any rate of duty existing on January 1, 1945.
" (D) In order to carry out a foreign trade agreement entered
into by the President on or after June 12, 1955, decreasing (except
as provided in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph) any rate of
duty below the lowest of the following rates:
“(i) The rate 15 per centum below the rate existing on
January 1, 1955.
(ii) In the case of any article subject to an ad valorem
rate of duty above 50 per centum (or a combination of ad val-
orem rates aggregating more than 50 per centum), the rate 50
per centum ad valorem (or a combination of ad valorem rates
aggregating 50 per centum). In the case of any article
subject to a specific rate of duty (or a combination of rates
including a specific rate) the ad valorem equivalent of
which has been determined by the President to have been
above 50 per centum during a period determined by the
President to be a representative period, the rate 50 per
centum ad valorem or the rate (or a combination of rates),
however stated, the ad valorem equivalent of which the Presi-
dent determines would have been 50 per centum during such
period. The standards of valuation contained in section 402
of this Act (as in effect during the representative period)
shall be utilized by the President, to the maximum extent
he finds such utilization practicable, in making the determina-
tions under the preceding sentence,
“(3) (A) Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (B) and (C)
of this paragraph, the provisions of any proclamation made under
paragraph (i) (B) of this subsection, and the provisions of any
proclamation of suspension under paragraph (4) of this subsection,
shall be in effect from and after such time as is specified in the
"(B) In the case of any decrease in duty to which paragraph (2)
"(i) if the total amount of the decrease under the foreign trade
agreement does not exceed 15 per centum of the rate existing on
January 1, 1955, the amount of decrease becoming initially effec-
tive at one time shall not exceed 5 per centum of the rate existing
"(ü) except as provided in clause (i), not more than one-third
of the total amount of the decrease under the
foreign trade agree-
ment shall become initially effective at one time; and
(iii) no part of the decrease after the first part shall become
initially effective until the immediately previous part shall have
proclamation.
(D) of this subsection applies--
on January 1, 1955;
one year.
3024
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
O
1
"(1) In order to carry out a foreign trade agreement entered
“(2) In order to carry out a foreign trade agreement entered
into by the President on or after June 12, 1955, below the appli-
cable alternative specified in subsection (a) (2) (C) or (D) (sub-
'(C) No part of any decrease in duty to which the alternative speci-
fied in paragraph (2) (D) (i) of this subsection applies shall become
initially effective after the expiration of the three-year period which
begins on July 1, 1955. If any part of such decrease has become effec-
tive, then for purposes of this subparagraph any time thereafter dur-
ing which such part of the decrease is not in effect by reason of legis-
lation of the United States or action thereunder shall be excluded in
determining when the three-year period expires.
“(D) If (in order to carry out a foreign trade agreement entered
into by the President on or after June 12, 1955) the President deter-
mines that such action will simplify the computation of the amount
of duty imposed with respect to an article, he may exceed any limitation
specified in paragraph (2) (C) or (D) of this subsection or subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph by not more than whichever of the
following is lesser:
"(i) The difference between the limitation and the next lower
whole number, or
“(ii) One-half of 1 per centum ad valorem.
In the case of a specific rate (or of a combination of rates which in-
cludes a specific rate), the one-half of 1 per centum specified in clause
(ii) of the preceding sentence shall be determined in the same manner
as the ad valorem equivalent of rates not stated wholly in ad valorem
terms is determined for the purposes of paragraph (2) (D) (ii) of this
subsection.
“(4) Subject to the provisions of section 5 of the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951 (19 U.S.C., sec. 1362), duties and other im se
lot
port restrictions proclaimed pursuant to this section shall apply to
articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign countries,
whether imported directly or indirectly: Provided, That the Presidente
shall, as soon as practicable, suspend the application to articles the un
growth, produce, or manufacture of any country because of its dis on
Ob
criminatory treatment of American commerce or because of other
tus
acts (including the operations of international cartels) or policies
which in his opinion tend to defeat the purpose of this section
foi
"(5) The President may at any time terminate, in whole or in
int
part, any proclamation made pursuant to this section.”
(b) The last sentence of section 350 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930
,
as amended (19 U. S. C., sec. 1351 (b)), is hereby amended to read as ce
follows: "No rate of duty on products of Cuba shall be decreased- och
into by the President
before June 12, 1955, by more than 50 per
centum of the rate of duty existing on January 1, 1945, with re
ор
spect to products of Cuba.
ch
ag
un
OR
1
ter
an
}
each such alternative to be read for the purposes of this parts
(a)
im
Pri
1 Act of June 16, 1951 (65 Stat. 72); supra, doc. 1.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3025
le
ch
EC-
IT
IS-
in
OD
4-
Fer
ise
ter
m
nis
President, including any dissenting or separate findings and recom-
ci-
graph as relating to the rate of duty applicable to products of
Cuba. With respect to products of Cuba, the limitation of sub-
section (a) (2) (D) (ii) may be exceeded to such extent as may
be required to maintain an absolute margin of preference to which
such products are entitled."
(C) Subsection (c) of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended (19 U. S. C., sec. 1351 (c)), is hereby amended by inserting
ed "(1)" after "(c)”, by striking out "(1)” and inserting in lieu thereof
er "A)", by striking out “(2)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(B)”, and
nt by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(2) For purposes of this section---
"(A) Except as provided in subsection (d), the terms 'exist-
he ing on January 1, 1945' and 'existing on January 1, 1955' refer
to rates of duty (however established, and even though tempo-
rarily suspended by Act of Congress or otherwise) existing on
the date specified, except rates in effect by reason of action
taken pursuant to section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951 (19 U. S. C., sec. 1362).
"(B) The term 'existing' without the specification of any date,
when used with respect to any matter relating to the conclusion
of, or proclamation to carry out, a foreign trade agreement,
means existing on the day on which that trade agreement is
entered into."
(d) Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U. S. C.,
o sec. 1351), is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof the fol-
to lowing new subsection:
es
"le) (1) The President shall submit to the Congress an annual
ent report on the operation of the trade agreements program, including
he information regarding new negotiations, modifications made in duties
is and import restrictions of the United States, reciprocal concessions
obtained, modifications of existing trade
agreements in order to effec-
jes
tuate more fully the purposes of the trade agreements legislation (in-
cluding the incorporation therein of escape clauses), and other in-
11 formation relating to that program and to the agreements entered
30, "(2) The Tariff Commission shall at all times keep informed con-
15 cerning the operation and effect of provisions relating to duties or
other import restrictions of the United States contained in trade
pod agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into by the President
under the authority of this section. The Tariff Commission, at least
re- once a year, shall submit to the Congress a factual report on the
operation of the trade-agreements program.”
ed SEC. 4. Subsection (b) of section 6 of the Trade Agreements Ex-
tension Act of 1951, as amended (19 U.S.C., sec. 1363 (b)), is hereby
be amended by striking out the second sentence thereof.
Sec. 5. The last sentence of subsection (a) of section 7 of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended (19 U. S. C., sec. 1364
is amended to read as follows: "The Tariff Commission shall
immediately make public its findings and recommendations to the
ats
jer
+
into thereunder.
jer
y
)
.8
415900_57_Vol. 2
-87
3026
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
9S
O
the article is being imported into the United States in such quantities
as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall take such action
mendations, and shall cause a summary thereof to be published in
the Federal Register.”
SEC. 6. (a) Subsection (b) of section 7 of the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951, as amended (19 U. S. C., sec. 1364 (b)), is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Increased
imports, either actual or relative, shall be considered as the cause or
threat of serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or
directly competitive products when the Commission finds that such
increased imports have contributed substantially towards causing or
threatening serious injury to such industry.”
(b) Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,
amended (19 U. S. C., sec. 1364), is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new subsection:
“(e) As used in this Act, the terms 'domestic industry producing
like or directly competitive products' and 'domestic industry producing
like or directly competitive articles' mean that portion or subdivision
of the producing organizations manufacturing, assembling, processing
,
extracting, growing, or otherwise producing like or directly competi-
tive products or articles in commercial quantities. In applying the
preceding sentence, the Commission shall (so far as practicable) dis-
tinguish or separate the operations of the producing organizations
involving the like or directly competitive products or articles referred
to in such sentence from the operations of such organizations involving
other products or articles."
SEC. 7. Section 2 of the Act entitled "An Act to extend the authority
of the President to enter into trade agreements under section 350
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended”, approved July 1, 1954" (2
A
U. S. C., sec. 1352a), is hereby amended by inserting “(a)" after
"SEC. 2." and by adding at the end thereof a new subsection as follows:
B
“(b) In order to further the policy and purpose of this section
,
0]
whenever the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization has
reason to believe that any article is being imported into the United
States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security
he shall so advise the President, and if the President agrees
is reason for such belief, the President shall cause an immediate
investigation to be made to determine the facts. If, on the basis o
such investigation, and the report to him of the findings and recom
mendations made in connection therewith, the President finds that
as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article to a
that will not threaten to impair the national security."
C
b
SE
00
th
이명
​re
m
that there
at
SU
m
tr
be
th
level
VE
be
fu
1 68 Stat. 360.
by
Pr
U
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3027
1 Report of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report to the Congress of the
United States (S. Rept. No. 1312, 84th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 30–32.
2 See supra, doc. 8.
II
10. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY: Recommendations of the Joint
Congressional Committee on the Economic Report, January 5,
1956 1
ats
is
ed
Or
or
ch
OT
9.S
nd
ng
ng
OD
1
IS-
ODS
1. The President must continue to coordinate the diverse interests
represented in the executive branch, and bear responsibility for for-
eign economic policy within that arm of Government. In the nature
of our constitutional practices, there is not the same opportunity in
the Congress for centralized coordination of all foreign economic
policy, viewed in the broad sense. This puts a special responsibility
upon individual members, the party leadership, and the standing com-
mittees of the Congress to consider the impact of their legislative pro
posals and their speeches on both home opinion and foreign behavior.
2. We should keep in mind in greater degree the psychological im-
pact, as well as the purely economic, of domestic decisions which affect
our foreign economic relations. We should keep in mind that our
The day-to-day actions often speak much louder than do pronouncements
of overall good intentions, with consequent effect on the attitudes and
che
behavior of friendly nations with whom we must cooperate in our own
interest.
ced
3. The United States should continue to champion multilateral
trade on a most-favored-nation basis, insisting on reciprocal reductions
106 | in tariffs as well as the removal of other trade controls even without
special concessions. Our reductions of trade barriers should be the
-50
occasion for hard bargaining with other countries to ease trade
throughout the free world. The instrumentalities of the General
119
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Organization for Trade Co-
operation, the International Monetary Fund, and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development offer the
best immediate
opportunities for multilateral negotiation to make the greatest prog-
ress possible.
4. The United States should approve the agreement calling for its
membership
and participation in the Organization for Trade Cooper-
5. The United States should continue to press for the earliest re-
sumption of currency convertibility consistent with
finding stable and
maintainable
rates. Our interest in such convertibility is to minimize
trade discrimination and to spur international investment. It would
our hope that in particular the countries of Western Europe and
on the sterling area could meet
the necessary conditions for de jure con-
be forced prematurely, neither should it be consigned to the indefinite
6: Tariff and trade policy of the United States should be dictated
by the national interest, rather than in terms of specific industries or
products. Where individual industries cannot meet foreign competi-
tion, other solutions than new trade barriers should be sought.
ter
NS:
OD,
19
ted
ere ation.
ate
of
lat
les
future.
3028
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
12. Further study is required of the whole concept of defense essen-
tiality if it is not to dominate over other necessary factors in trade
policy. Not only should impartial criteria be discovered, but the
7. Further cuts in United States tariffs are in the national interest
,
The disruptive effect of such reductions can be minimized by making
these cuts gradual, selective, reciprocal, and timed to fit the condition
of business. Resort to quotas should be allowed only under extreme
emergency conditions when other solutions are not available. Further
simplification of the customs laws and related administrative matters
should be carried out at the earliest possible date to streamline their
operation and minimize arbitrary elements.
8. If aid is to be given to distressed areas or industries to meet the
problems caused by new imports, such policies should be part of a
broader program to meet similar problems of any source, not those of
foreign trade alone. Such aid should not be aimed at blanket coverage,
but to meet the specific hardships of people actually in distress. Aid
should be viewed as temporary, and should be designed to contribute
to the permanent correction of the distress so that aid can be termi-
nated. " It should not delay the solution of uneconomic arrangements
which would continue to drag down the rest of the economy
indefinitely
9. No basic change in our controls on trade with the Communist
countries is required at the present time. Trade in strategic goods
would not be in the interest of the free world. But peaceful trade is
not excluded from the realm of possibility any time that it is in the
interest of the free world. Because East-West trade policy requires the
cooperation of all countries of the free world, our policies must be
coordinated with theirs. If we would limit trade important to our
allies with the Communist countries, this policy carries a responsibility
to provide alternate markets for their trade.
10. International investment and technical aid, both public and
private, need further encouragement. Each case requires individual
study and the solutions
should be tailored to fit the circumstances. It
should be kept in mind that this aid and investment is more
purely economic in character, and this will influence the choices made
.
Although broader considerations are involved, such aid, whether
loans or grants, represents the positive and long-term equivalent of the
negative
and short-term restrictions
on trade
with the Communist bloc
This is a time when the Communists are using our own aid devices to
further their ends,
and we
must be prepared to meet this challenge with
a coordinated program which combines all the aspects of countering
the problems created by the Communists. Only thus will the free
world hold its margin of strength over the Sino-Soviet bloc.
11. Further study of domestic agricultural policy should take into
account in greater degree the foreign economic policy aspects of thes
domestic measures.
than
strategy should be reviewed.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES
3029
it.
ig
)
le
阻​让
​er
rs
le
8
of
13. New criteria should be developed to restrict application of the
escape clause and peril points to industries where failure to apply
these provisions would result in real hardship to individuals, whether
workers or businessmen.
14. The problem of interpretation of antidumping penalties is a
complicated one which deserves careful study rather than precipitate
action; the need for change is recognized as its interpretation threatens
to negate our foreign economic policy goals, but the remedies must be
sought only with thorough investigation. At the very least, the Presi-
dent should be given authority to override Tariff Commission de-
cisions when the national interest requires this.
15. We should give added encouragement to the preparation of
international statistics, with attention both to the breadth of coverage
and the quality of the information; data on national income and its
distribution are particularly needed.
16. We need more study of what makes for economic growth both
at home and abroad, if we are to choose policies which promote this
development in the interests of attaining our national goals.
17. The work of this subcommittee should be continued for at least
another year to explore more thoroughly some of the problems raised
this
year which were only partially answered. This study should
include more specific analyses of individual situations than was pos-
sible within the general frame of reference of the current study.
te
1-
ts
V
st
Is
1S
le
le
le
1
Y
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al
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YUE
1 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Thirty-Seventh
Part XVIII
FOREIGN AID_ECONOMIC, MILITARY,
TECHNOLOGICAL
A. THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM, 1941–1955
1. STATUS OF SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE LEND-LEASE
PROGRAM: Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for
the Year Ending December 31, 1955 (Excerpts) ?
Preamble
At the close of business on December 31, 1955, settlement under-
takings which had been signed by most of the lend-lease governments
reflected an aggregate original creditor position of the United States
of $1,577,458,847.50 in principal account, exclusive of “cash reimburse-
ment" lend-lease, silver, and miscellaneous other obligations.
Principal payments and credits already made total $409,730,250.58
or approximately 26 percent of these repayment obligations. In
addition, $164,552,611.70 has been paid to the Government of the
United States 'as interest on these debts. The combined principal
and interest credits of $574,282,862.28 represent more
than 36 percent
of the principal amount of these settlement obligations.
As yet, settlement
agreements covering lend-lease furnished prior
to V-j Day have not been reached with the U.S.S.R., China, Greece
,
and Saudi Arabia. A settlement with Poland is nearly completed.
appearing throughout this document and its accompanying
tables are from the
(Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1956), pp. 1, 5, 16-21. (The footnotes
original source.)
1
3
3
i
3030
FOREIGN AID
3031
Lend-Lease Settlement Accounts Showing Total Principal Amount Owed to the
United States, Aggregate Payments Made Through December 31, 1955, and
Principal Amount Outstanding *
Paid through December 31, 1955
Country
Settlement
obligation
Principal
balance to be
paid
Principal
Interest
$2,288, 619.83
$46,988, 637.41
61, 384,530. 13
77, 668. 44
305, 838, 802.61
711, 753. 36
19, 272, 682.39
Australia..
Belgium and Belgian Congo...
China 1
Czechoslovakia.
Ethiopia.
France
Iran...
Liberia ?
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway.
Turkey
Union of South Africa..
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics i..
United Kingdom and Colonies..
Yugoslavia...
American Republics...
$20, 500,000.00 $20, 500,000.00
55,004, 573. 93 55, 004, 573. 93
50, 344, 968. 65 3, 356, 331. 24
172, 961. 45 172, 961. 45
200,000.00 122, 331. 56
353, 300,000.00 47, 461, 197.39
8,541, 040.75 7, 829, 287.39
19, 422, 682. 39 150,000.00
120.00
120.00
67, 500,000.00 27, 992, 543. 23
5,900,000.00 549, 910.00
4, 500,000.00 4,500,000.00
92, 500,000.00 92,500,000.00
222, 492, 666. 01
562, 446, 911.00 45, 118, 705, 87
900, 000.00 639, 365. 20
113, 732, 923.32 103,832, 923.32
8, 256, 002. 79
39, 507, 456, 77
5, 350, 090.00
38, 739, 794. 96
53, 811, 232. 19
222, 492, 666.01
517, 328, 205. 13
260, 634.80
9, 900,000.00
72, 431. 80
8
r
Totals..
Grand total credits...
1, 577, 458, 847.50 409, 730, 250.58 164, 552, 611, 70 3 1,167,728,596.92
$574, 282, 862, 28
*This table is printed as "Statement (b)" on page 5 of the report. [Editor's note.]
Refers only to postwar "pipeline agreement."
Port construction at Monrovia.
Exclusive of cash reimbursement and silver accounts.
S
Status of Nations (Tabulation)
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
L-L Rpt.-Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations.
TIAS—Treaties and Other International Acts Series (published by Department of State).
EAS-Executive Agreement Series (published by Department of State)
UST—United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (published by Department of State).
Stat.-United States Statutes at Large.
Lend-lease and related agreements
(As of Dec. 31, 1955)
Lend-lease master agreement 1
Lend-lease settlement
Other related agreements 2
Declared
eligible for
lend-lease
aid
Country
Date
Date
Date
Where published;
remarks
Where published;
remarks
Where published;
remarks
Australia
June 7, 1946
23d L-L Rpt., p. 50; TIAS
1528; 60 Stat. 1707.
Mar. 8, 1945
Nov. 11, 1941 Sept. 3, 1942 | Accepted United King-
dom agreement; 6th
L-L Rpt., p. 24; EAS
271; 56 Stat. 1608.
June 13, 1941 June 16, 1942 EAS 254; 56 Stat. 1504.-
Marine Transportation and
Litigation, EAS 467; 59 Stat.
1499.
Belgium
Sept. 24, 1946
Apr. 20, 1950
23d L-L Rpt., p. 61; TIAS Jan. 30, 1943
2064; 62 Stat. (3) 3984.
Joint undertaking under Aug. 4, 1943
Agreement of Sept. 24, 1946;
TIAS 2074; 1 UST 437.
Apr. 19, 1945
Exchange of notes amending May 19, 1945
par. 2.A (1) of Agreement of
Sept. 24, 1946; TIAS 2953.
Arrangement for full settle-
ment within basic terms of
Lend-Lease Agreement of
Dec. 6, 1941,
(Final payment made and
reported in 32d L-L Rpt.,
p. 2.)
Reciprocal Aid, EAS 313; 57
Stat. 920.
Acts of United States Armed
Forces in Belgian Congo
EAS 395; 58 Stat. 1215.
Reciprocal Aid, EAS 481; 59
Stat. 1642.
Section 3 (c) Agreement,3 19th
L-L Rpt., p. 66; EAS 481; 59
Stat. 1642.
Apr. 2, 1954
Bolivia.
May 6, 1941
Dec. 6, 1941
Nov. 22, 1947
Brazil
Oct.
1, 1941
Mar. 3, 1942
(Revised)
Apr. 15, 1948
June 28, 1946
Arrangement for full settle-
ment within basic terms of
Lend-Lease Agreement of
Mar. 3, 1942.
(Final payment made and re-
ported in 36th II. Rpt.,
p. 3.)
Pipeline Agreement, 23d L-L
Rpt., p. 73; TIAS 1537; 60,
Stat. 1797. (Incorporated in
Settlement Arrangement of
Apr. 15, 1948.)
--do-
-do-
Apr.
10, 1960
Supplement No. 1 to Arrange-
1
3032
.
5.J
Apr.
19, 1950
Supplomont No. 1 to Arranse-
ment of Apr. 15, 1948, settlod
certain accounts contingent
to Lend-Lease Agreement
of Mar. 3, 1942.
(Final payment made and re-
ported in 35th L-L Rpt.,
p. 2.)
Burma.
Mar. 4, 1947
Assumption of claims by note
to United States consul
general, Rangoon, sent to
Department with despatch
No. 217, Mar. 7, 1947,
Claims for Collisions Between
War Vessels, EAS 330; 57
Stat. 1021.
Canada.
Nov. 11, 1941
Nov. 30, 1942
Mar. 14, 1949
May 26, 1943
By exchange of notes,
accepted principles of
art. VII of
VII of United
Kingdom Lend-Lease
Agreement.
Exchange of notes_(for cash
purchases); 28th L-L Rpt.,
P, 13; TIAS 1925; 63 Stat.
(3) 2432.
Nov. 11, 1943
Nov. 15, 1946
Claims for Collisions Between
War Vessels, EAS 366; 57
Stat. 1301.
Marine Transportation;
Waiver of Certain Claims
Involving Government Ves-
sels, TIAS 1582; 61 Stat. (3)
2520.
Chile
May 6, 1941
Mar. 2, 1943
Feb. 28, 1950
Arrangement for full settle-
ment within basic terms of
Lend-Lease Agreement of
Mar. 2, 1943.
(Final payment made and re-
ported in 32d L-L Rpt.,
P. 2.)
China.
June 2, 1942
May 21, 1943
5th L-L Rpt., p. 306;
EAS 251; 56 Stat.
1494.
Acts of Armed Forces, EAS
360; 57 Stat. 1428.
June 14, 1946
Pipeline Agreement, 230 L-L
Rpt., p. 69; TIAS 1533; 60
Stat. 1760.
Military Aid Agreement, 23d
L-L Rpt., p. 75; TIAS 1746;
61 Stat. (4) 3895.
June 28, 1946
Colombia.
Mar. 17, 1942
Apr. 13, 1950
13, 1950 Arrangement for full settle-
ment within basic terms of
Lend-Lease Agreement of
Mar. 17, 1942.
(Final payment made_and
reported in 33d L-L Rpt.,
p. 3.)
See footnotes at end of table.
* This table appears as “Appendix II" on pages 16-21 of the report. [Editor's note:]
3033
Lend-Lease and related agreements-Continued
(As of Dec. 31, 1955)
Lend-lease master agreement 1
Lend-lease settlement
Other related agreements 2
Declared
eligible for
lend-lease
aid
Country
Date
Where published;
remarks
Date
Where published;
remarks
Date
Where published;
remarks
Costa Rica
May 6, 1941
Jan. 16, 1942
Oct. 18, 1950
Cuba.
May 6, 1941
Nov. 7, 1941
Apr. 26, 1951
Czechoslovakia
Jan.
5, 1942 July 11, 1942
EAS 261; 56 Stat. 1562-
July 25, 1947
Sept. 16, 1948
Dominican Republic. May 6, 1941
Aug. 2, 1941
Aug. 6, 1941
Apr. 26, 1949
Arrangement for full settle-
ment within basic terms of
Lend-Lease Agreement of
Jan. 16, 1942.
(Final payment made and re-
ported in 35th L-L Rpt.,
p. 2.)
Final payment under Lend-
Lease Agreement of Nov. 7,
1941; reported in 33d L-L
Rpt., p. 3.
TIAS 1675; 61 Stat. (4) 3410.
28th LrL Rpt., p. 3; TIAS
1818; 62 Stat. (3) 2850.
Final payment under Lend-
Lease Agreement of Aug. 2,
1941; reported in 29th L-L
Rpt., p. 1.
Final payment under Lend-
Lease Agreement of Apr. 6,
1942; reported in 32d L-L
Rpt., p. 3.
Cash purchases only.
Final payment under Lend-
Lease Agreement of Feb, 2,
1942; reported in 32d LL
Rpt., p. 3.
29th L-L Rpt., p. 29; TIAS
1931; 63 Stat. (3) 2446.
(Supplement).
Ecuador.
Apr. 6, 1942
Feb. 12, 1951
Egypt
El Salvador
Nov. 11, 1941
May 6, 1941
Feb. 2, 1942
May 26, 1950
Ethiopia.
Dec. 7, 1942
Aug. 9, 1943
EAS 334; 57 Stat. 1043...
May 20, 1949
France
Nov. 11, 1941 Feb. 28, 1945
EAS 455, 59 Stat. 1304...
May 28, 1946
May 22, 1953 (Agreement) providing for Uti-
lization of Defense Instal-
lations (within the Empire of
Ethiopia); TIAS 2964.
Sept. 3, 1942 Reciprocal Aid, 6th L-L Rpt.,
p. 29; EAS 273; 56 Stat. 1614.
Sept. 25, 1943 Reciprocal Aid in French
North and West Africa, 13th
L-L Rpt., p. 66; EAS 483;
59 Stat. 1666.
23d LL Rpt., p. 41; TIAS
1928; 61 Stat. (4) 4175.
Financial Settlement, 28th
LL Rpt., p. 4; TIAS 1936;
63 Stat. (3) 2607.
Mar. 14, 1949
303
Maritime Claims 28th
Fab
28. 1945 1
Santion.
0251
do
Feb. 28, 1945
Maritimo Olaims & 28th LL
Rpt., p. 10; TLAS 1935; 63
Stat. (3) 2499.
Feb. 27, 1948
Section 3 (c) Agreement, LAS
455; 59 Stat. 1304.
Expenditures of U.S. Armed
Forces, TIAS 1930; 03 Stat.
(3) 3826.
EAS 260; 56 Stat. 1659.
Greece
Guatemala.
Mar. 11, 1941
May 6, 1941
July 10, 1942
Nov. 16, 1942
Sept. 30, 1946
Haiti.
do.
Sept. 16, 1941
Mar. 3, 1948
Honduras
-do.
Feb. 28, 1942
Feb. 10, 1949
Settlement under Lend-Lease
Agreement of Nov. 16, 1942.
Final payment under Lend-
Lease Agreement of Sept. 16,
1941; reported in 26th L-L
Rpt., p. vi.
Final payment under Lend-
Lease Agreement of Feb. 28,
1942; reported in 28th L-L
Rpt., p. 1.
Oash purchases only.
23d LL Rpt., p. 44; TIAS
1532; 60 Stat. 1753.
Iceland.
India.
July 1, 1941
Nov. 11, 1941
Nov. 21, 1941
EAS 429; 58 Stat. 1455.
May 16, 1946
Oct. 10, 1942 Acts of United States Armed
Forces, EAS 392; 58 Stat.
1199.
Dec. 21, 1945 Transfer of Credit; unpub-
lished correspondence.
Iran..
Mar. 10, 1942
Iraq-
Liberia
Cash purchases only.
May 1, 1942 July 31, 1945
Mar. 10, 1942 Mar. 31, 1942
June 8, 1943
EAS 470; 59 Stat. 1535_
EAS 275; 56 Stat. 1621..
EAS 324; 57 Stat. 978.
Other cash transactions only-- Dec. 31, 1943
Port Project Agreement, EAS
411; 58 Stat. 1357.
Mexico.
May 6, 1941
6, 1941 Mar. 27, 1942
Mar. 18, 1943
(Revised).
Feb. 24, 1951
Netherlands
Aug. 21, 1941 July 8, 1942
EAS 259; 56 Stat. 1584.
May 28, 1947
Arrangement for full settle-
ment within basic terms of
Lend-Lease Agreement of
Mar. 18, 1943.
24th L-L Rpt., p. 22; TIAS June 14, 1943 Reciprocal Aid, EAS 326; 57
1750; 61 Stat. (4) 3924.
Stat. 991.
A pr. 30, 1945 Section 3 (c) Agreement, Re-
ciprocal Aid, EAS 480; 59
Stat. 1627.
June 8, 1950 Maritime Claims, TIAS 2119;
1 UST 638.
23d L-L Rpt., p. 56; TIAS Sept. 3, 1942 Reciprocal Aid, 6th L-L Rpt.,
1536; 60 Stat. 1791.
P. 27, EAS 272; 56 Stat. 1611.
New Zealand.
Nov. 11, 1941 Sept. 3, 1942
Accepted United King. July 10, 1946
dom agreement, EAS
272; 56 Stat. 1611.
Sept. 26, 1951
Nicaragua.
May 6, 1941
Oct. 16, 1941
Arrangement for full settle-
ment within basic terms of
Lend-Lease Agreement of
Oct. 16, 1941,
(Final payment made and re-
ported in 36th L-L Rpt.,
p. 4.)
26th L-L Rpt., p. 61; TIAS May 29, 1945
1716; 62 Stat. (2) 1848).
Norway-
June 4, 1941 | July 11, 1942
EAS 262; 56 Stat. 1565.
Feb. 24, 1948
Marine Transportation and
Litigation, EAS 471;
471; 59
Stat. 1541.
See footnotes at end of table.
3035
Lend-Lease and related agreements Continued
(As of Dec. 31, 1955]
Lend-lease master agreement i
Lend-lease settlement
Other related agreements ?
Declared
eligible for
lend-lease
aid
Country
Date
Where published;
remarks
Date
Where published;
remarks
Date
Where published;
remarks
Paraguay-
May 6, 1941
Sept. 20, 1941
A pr. 3, 1952
Peru.
do
Mar. 11, 1942
Nov. 25, 1954
Final payment under Lend-
Lease Agreement of Sept.
20, 1941; reported in 34th
L-L Rpt., p. 2.
Arrangement for full settle-
ment within basic terms of
Lend-Lease Agreement of
Mar. 11, 1942.
Poland.
Saudi Arabia
Aug. 28, 1941 July 1, 1942
EAS 257; 56 Stat. 1542.
Feb. 18, 1943 Aug. 7, 1943
7, 1943 Exchange of unpub-
lished notes.
Nov. 11, 1941 A pr. 17, 1945 TIAS 1511; 60 Stat. 1576-Mar. 21, 1947
South Africa
Turkey
Nov. 7, 1941
Feb. 23, 1945
EAS 465; 59 Stat. 1476.
May 7, 1946
24th L-L Rpt., p. 38; TIAS
1593; 61 Stat. (3) 2640.
23d L-L Rpt., p. 66; TIAS
1541; 60 Stat. 1809.
U.S. S. R.
do.
June 11, 1942
8th L-L Rpt., p. 50;
EAS 253; 56 Stat. 1500.
Oct. 15, 1945
1
Sept. 27, 1949
Mar. 26, 1954
Dec. 22, 1954
May 26, 1955
July 27, 1942
Pipeline Agreement, 21st L-L
Rpt., p. 48.
Return of Ice Breakers and
Frigates, TIAS 2060; 63 Stat.
(3) 2810.
Return of Vessels; TIAS 2990.
Return of Vessels; TIAS 3168.
Return of Vessels; TIAS 3384.
Acts of Armed Forces, EAS
355; 57 Stat. 1193.
United Kingdom..
Mar. 11, 1941
Feb. 23, 1942
Dec. 6, 1945
4th L-L Rpt., p. 50, and
21st L-L Rpt., p. 62;
EAS 241; 56 Stat. 1433.
22d L-L Rpt., p. 45; TIAS
1509; 60 Stat. 1525.
Mar. 27, 1946
Aug. 24, 1942
Feb. 28, 1947
Sept. 3, 1942
Jan.
7, 1948
Dec.
4, 1942
22d L-L Rpt., p. 48; TIAS
1509; 60 Stat 1525.
Espoused Claims, TIAS 1635;
61 Stat. (3) 3012.
Surplus in Middle East,
TIAS 1698; 62 Stat. (2) 1836.
Unpublished Settlement of
U. S. Army claims subse-
quent to period covered by
agreements of Mar. 27, 1946.
Patent Interchange, EAS 268;
56 Stat. 1594.
Reciprocal Aid, 6th L-L Rpt.,
p. 22; EAS 270; 56 Stat. 1605.
Marine Transportation and
Litigation, EAS 282; 56 Stat.
1780.
Acts of Armed Forces, TIAS
1602; 61 Stat. (3) 2728.
June 18, 1948
Mar. 28, 1944
3026
June 29, 1948
July 12, 1948
do.
Unpublished acknowledg- Mar. 27, 1946 Amended Patent Interchango
ment of discharge of obliga-
Agreement, TIAS 1510; 60
tions under agreament relat-
Stat. 1566.
ing to petroleum (VI) of
Mar, 27, 1946.
Joint Installations in Middle May 7, 1946 Marine Transportation and
East, TIAS 1769; 62 Stat.
Litigation, TIAS 1558; 60
(2) 2027.
Stat. 1958.
Accounts and claims (wind- Jan. 23, 1947 Acts of Civilians, TIAS 1622;
up of residual accounts and
61 Stat. (3) 2876.
claims), 27th L-I Rpt., p.
59; TIAS 1770; 62 Stat. (2)
2034.
Extension of Amendment of June 27, 1947
June 27, 1947 | Marine Transportation and
Settlement of Dec. 6, 1945;
Litigation, TIAS 1636; 61
TIAS 2562.
Stat. (3) 3014.
Prepaid in dollars.
Final payment under Lend.
Lease Agreement of Mar. 18,
1942; reported in 29th L-L
Rpt., p. 2.
27th L-L Rpt., p. 64; TIAS
1779; 62 Stat. (2) 2133.
Apr. 28, 1952
Uruguay
Venezuela
May 6, 1941
do
Jan. 13, 1942
Mar. 18, 1942
Apr. 27, 1949
Yugoslavia
Nov. 11, 1941 July 24, 1942 | EAS 263; 56 Stat. 1570..
July 19, 1948
1 The lend-lease agreements signed by the United States with 18 of the other American Republics differed from the conventional “master” agreements in that a specific repay
ment responsibility, for defense aid furnished, was accepted by each beneficiary nation. The aggregate amount due has been paid in full in cash and/or through specially negotiated
settlement arrangements,
2 The historic document entitled The Declaration by United Nations for a cooperative war effort (not to be confused with the Charter of the United Nations signed in San Fran-
cisco in 1945] originally was signed on Jan. 1, 1942, by representatives of 26 nations and,
on later dates, by 19 others. (See Twenty-first Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations,
pp. 44-45.). It confirmed and accepted the principles of the Atlantic Charter, a Joint Declaration (Aug. 14, 1941) by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom (EAS 236; 55 Stat. 1603).
: A Section 3 (c) Agreement was an executive agreement concluded pursuant to sec. 3 (c) of the Lend-Lease Act of Mar. 11, 1941, which, as amended, prescribed a period up to
July 1, 1949, to carry out an agreement of the nited States with another government to furnish supplies and services, provided that the agreement was signed before July 1, 1946.
Territory under the jurisdiction of the French National Committee was declared eligible to receive lend-lease aid on Nov. 11, 1941, and all French territory not under the con-
trol of the Axis was declared eligible on Nov. 13, 1942.
* Wind-up of residual accounts and claims.
ADDENDUM
Aid was furnished, under special circumstances and specific conditions, to certain countries which never had formally been declared
eligible for formal lend-lease treatment. These are Burma (see above table), Denmark, Finland, Greenland, Italy, Panama, Sweden,
and Thailand.
Transfers to Denmark were made pursuant to arrangements described in the Twenty-first Report to Congress on Lend-Lease
Operations, and those made to Italy were pursuant to arrangements described in the Twenty-third Report to Congress on Lend-Lease
Operations. In respect to the others named, a modus operandi, very similar to that used for lend-lease cash-reimbursement transactions
but not under the Lend-Lease Act, was used to help these governments to acquire approved essential goods and services.
3037
3038
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ec
CO
fer
Or
ac
19
of
advise and consult with the Secretary of Defense and the Administra-
see the four semiannual reports to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance
81st Cong., 2d sess., Nos. 119 and 179 of the 82d Cong., 1st sess., and No. 352
B. THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 1tb
1949-1951
do
be
[The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st D
Congress, 1st Session; 63 Stat. 714) and the subsequent appropriation
on October 28, 1949, of $1,314,010,000 in cash and contract authority for
fiscal 1950 brought the Mutual Defense Assistance Program into being.
tra
Due to the turn of world events, and especially to the attack on the
Republic of Korea, Congress amended the basic law to increase its cover.
age and effectiveness and to authorize its extension (Public Law 621, 81st
Congress, 2d Session, September 26, 1950; infra, doc. 3), and made avail
.
able an additional $5,222,500,000 through regular and supplemental
pa
appropriation legislation for fiscal 1951 (Public Laws 759 and 843, 81st A
Congress, 2d Session; 64 Stat. 595 and 1044). The Mutual Security Act
of 1951 (Public Law 165, 82d Congress, 1st Session, approved October 10
,
1951; 65 Stat. 373) marked the end of a 2 year period during which the
emphasis of United States assistance shifted gradually from economic
rehabilitation to military assistance, began the effort toward integration
of economic recovery and military assistance programs, and symbolized
the reorientation of United States foreign policy with regard to the
foreign aid programs.] 1
ра
d de
2. ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY UNDER THE MUTUAL
to
DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1949: Executive Order No.
tid
10099, January 27, 1950 2
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 404 of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, approved October 6, 1949 (Public
Law 329, 81st Congress), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and as
3.
President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. (a) The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to perform
the functions and exercise the powers and authority vested in the
President by the Act, except
by section 303, section 405, subsection
(e) of section 406, clause 2 of subsection (b) of section 407, and sub-
$
section (b) of section 411 thereof.
M
(b) Within the scope of the authority delegated to him by this
order, the Secretary of State shall (1) have responsibility and authority
for
the direction of the programs authorized by the Act
, (2) make full
and effective use of agencies, departments, establishments, and wholly
D
owned corporations of the Government, with the consent of the respec-
do
tive heads thereof, in the conduct of operations under
such programs
ta
and coordinate the operations of such programs among them, and (3
)
tor for Economic Cooperation in order to assure the coordination of
American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364. For detailed information
on this period
1 For the text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, see A Decade of
of the 82d Cong., 2d sess.
2 15 Fed. Reg. 499.
3 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364.
W.
au
.
aus
T
*
IN
Of
į
lis
CO
SU
+
3039
FOREIGN AID
communiqué of the First Session of the North Atlantic Council, Sept. 17, 1.949;
it
lo
e
it
t
et
@
C
d
e
Treaty and the establishment thereunder of the Council and the
5 The North Atlantic Treaty entered into force Aug. 24, 1949.
lishment of the North Atlantic Council and its Defense Committee, see the
the mutual-defense-assistance activities with the national defense and
economic-recovery programs.
2. All assistance provided to recipient countries under the authority
delegated by this order shall be in conformity with programs approved
by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Secretary of
Defense and the Administrator for Economic Cooperation. As pro-
vided in section 401 of the Act, no equipment or material may be
transferred out of military stocks if the Secretary of Defense, after
consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines that such trans-
fer would be detrimental to the national security of the United States
or that such equipment or material is needed by the reserve com-
ponents of the armed forces to meet their training requirements. The
Administrator for Economic Cooperation shall advise the Secretary
of State concerning the effect of programs approved by the Secretary
of State under the authority delegated to him by this order upon the
achievement of the purposes of the Economic Cooperation Act of
1948," as amended, and of the purposes of the United States program
of economic assistance in Korea.?
3. Funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the pur-
poses of carrying out the portions of the Act pertinent to the authority
delegated by this order may be allocated by the Secretary of State
L
to any agency, department, establishment, or wholly owned corpora-
tion of the Government for obligation and expenditure in accordance
with programs approved by the Secretary of State under such
I
HARRY S. TRUMAN
C
3. ACT TO AMEND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE
ACT OF 1949: Public Law 621 (81st Congress, 2d Session) July
26, 1950 (Excerpts) 3
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That section 101 of the
Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949 * 'is hereby amended to read
Sec. 101. In view of the coming into force of the North Atlantic
Defense Committee which
will recommend measures for the common
defense of the North Atlantic area, and in view of the fact that the
task of the Council and the Defense Committee can be facilitated by
immediate steps to increase the integrated defensive armed strength
of the parties
to the treaty, the President
is hereby
authorized to
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1299–1321.
See supra, pp. 2532-2533.
8 64 Stat. 373; 22 U.S.C. 1591 et seq.
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364.
For the estab-
authority.
S
19
2
as follows:
1
1
1
supra, pp. 1594-1600.
3040
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
of war, or other military supplies, or (d) for the compensation of any
other manufacturing establishment, other than personal services of a
technical nature rendered by officers and employees of the United
States for the purpose of establishing or maintaining production by
such factories or other manufacturing establishments to effectuate the
purposes of this Act and in conformity with desired standards and
1 The Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947; A Decade of American Foreign Policy,
furnish military assistance in the form of equipment, materials, and
services to such nations as are parties to the treaty and request such
assistance. Any such assistance furnished under this title shall be
subject to agreements, further referred to in section 402, designed to
assure that the assistance will be used to promote an integrated de-
fense of the North Atlantic area and to facilitate the development of
defense plans by the Council and the Defense Committee under article
9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and to realize unified direction and
effort; and after the agreement by the Government of the United
States with defense plans as recommended by the Council and the
Defense Committee, military assistance hereunder shall be furnished
only in accordance therewith.
SEC. 2. Section 102 of such Act is hereby amended by designating
such section as subsection (a) and by adding thereto subsection (6)
to read as follows:
(b) In addition to the amounts heretofore authorized to be appro-
priated, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Presi
dent for the year ending June 30, 1951, out of any money in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for carrying out the provisions
and accomplishing the policies and purposes of this title, not to er-
ceed $1,000,000,000.
SEC. 3. Section 104 of such Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 104. None of the funds made available for carrying out the
provisions of this Act or the Act of May 22, 1947, as amended, shall
be utilized (a) to construct or aid in the construction of any factory
or other manufacturing establishment outside of the United States or
to provide equipment (other than production equipment, including
machine tools)
for any such factory or other manufacturing establish
.
ment, (b) to defray the cost of maintaining any such factory or other
manufacturing establishment, (c) directly or indirectly to compensate
any nation or any governmental agency or person therein for any
diminution in the export trade of such nation resulting from the
carrying out of any program of increased military production er bo
make any payment, in the form of a bonus, subsidy, indemnity
,
guaranty, or otherwise, to any owner of any such factory or other
manufacturing establishment as an inducement to such owner to
undertake or increase production of arms,
ammunition, implements
person for personal services rendered in or for any such factory of
.
pp. 1257-1261.
FOREIGN AID
3041
and
zuch
I he
d to
de-
It of
ticle
and
ited
the
shed
ting
(6)
pro-
'EST-
the
lons
the
ory
SOI
Eing
ish-
her
ate
LOT
the
Sec. 11. Section 404 of such Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 404. The President may exercise any power or authority con-
ferred on him by this Act through such agency or officer of the United
States as he shall direct, except such powers or authority conferred
on him in section 405, in clause (2) of subsection (b) of section 407,
and in subsection (c) of section 408.
SEC. 12. (a) Section 408 (c) of such Act is hereby amended to read
as follows:
(c) Whenever he determines that such action is essential for the
effective carrying out of the purposes of this Act, the President may
from time to time utilize not to exceed in the aggregate 10 per centum
of the funds and contract authority made available for the purposes
of any title of this Act for the purposes of any other title, or in the
event of a development seriously affecting the security of the North
Atlantic area for the purpose of providing military assistance to any
other European nation whose strategic location makes it of direct
importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area and whose
immediately increased ability to defend itself, the President, after
consultation with the governments of the other nations which are
members of the North Atlantic Treaty, finds contributes to the
preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and
is vital to the security of the United States. Whenever the President
makes any such determination he shall forthwith notify the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Section 408 (d) of such Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
d) Upon approval by the President, any currency of any nation
received by the United States for its own use in connection with the
furnishing of assistance under this Act may be used for expenditures
for essential administrative and operating expenses of the United
States incident to operation under this Act and the amount, if any,
remaining after the payment of such expenses shall be used only for
purposes specified by Act of Congress.
(C) Section 408 (e) of such Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
() (1) The President may, from time to time, in the interest of
achieving standardization of military equipment and in order to
provide procurement assistance without cost to the United States,
transfer, or enter into contracts for the procurement for transfer of,
equipment, materials or services to: (A) nations eligible for assistance
under title I, II, or III of this Act, (B) a nation which has joined with
the United States in a collective defense and regional arrangem.ent,
or (C) any other nation not eligible to join a collective defense and
regional arrangement referred to in clause (B) above, but whose
ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of
which it is a part, is important to the security of the United States:
Provided, That, prior to the transfer of any equipment, materials, or
services to a nation under
this clause (C), it shall provide the United
States with assurance that such equipment, materials, or services are
to
this
ner
to
ts
Or
ed
OT
de
id
415900-574-Vol. 2__88
3042
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
C
.
E
required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security
,
its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense
of the area of which it is a part, and that it will not undertake
any
act of aggression against any other state: Provided further, That, in
the case of any such transfer, the President shall forthwith notify the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
,
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
(2) Whenever equipment or material is transferred from the stocks
of, or services are rendered by, any agency, to any nation as provided
in paragraph (1) above, such nation shall first make available the fair
value, as determined by the President, of such equipment, materials
,
or services. The fair value shall not be less for the various categories
of equipment or materials than the "value" as defined in subsection
(c) of section 403: Provided, That with respect to excess equipment
or materials the fair value may not be determined to be less than the
value specified in paragraph 1 of that subsection plus (a) 10 per centum
of the original gross cost of such equipment or materials; (b) the scrap
value; or (c) the market value, if ascertainable, whichever is the
greater. Before a contract is entered into, such nation shall (A)
provide the United States with a dependable undertaking to pay
the
full amount of such contract which will assure the United States
against any loss on the contract, and (B) shall make funds available
in such amounts and at such times as may be necessary to meet the
payments required by the contract in advance of the time such pay-
ments are due, in addition to the estimated amount of any damages
and costs that may accrue from the cancellation of such contract
:
Provided, That the total amount of outstanding contracts under this
subsection, less the amounts which have been paid the United States
by such nations, shall at no time exceed $100,000,000.
Sec. 13. The present section 405 (d) of such Act is renumbered as
section 405 (e) and a new subsection 405 (d) is added to read as
follows:
(d) if, in the case of any nation, which is a party to the North
Atlantic Treaty, the President determines after consultation with the
North Atlantic Treaty Council that such nation is not making its full
contribution through self-help and mutual assistance in all practicable
forms to the common defense of the North Atlantic area; and in the
case of any other nation, if the President determines that such nation
is not making its full contribution to its own defense or to the defense
of the area of which it is a part.
S
I
t
1
r
a
f
I
1
0
1
i
FOREIGN AID
3043
158
On
es
es.
ks
ed
air
ls
les
OD
int
he
he
be
ias
October 6, 1950 to March 31, 1951 (H. Doc. 179, 82d Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 49–50.
ty, 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE (INTERDEPARTMENTAL) IN-
TERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (ISAC):
ny Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of
State, Treasury, Defense, and the Economic Cooperation Adminis-
he
tration, Approved by the President, December 19, 1950 1
1. The tremendous step-up in our foreign and domestic programs
for increasing our own national security and that of the other free
nations makes it imperative that we carefully examine the organiza-
tional arrangements within the United States Government for carrying
out these programs. Certain aspects of these arrangements require
urgent consideration and immediate decision.
2. The most urgent organizational problem which we now face
involves the proper framework in which the questions relating to the
North Atlantic Treaty and economic and military assistance programs
can properly be coordinated. With respect to the organization in
Washington, two basic decisions need to be made: (a) The proper re-
plationship among State, Defense, the Economic Cooperation Admin-
istration, and the Treasury, on an interdepartmental basis; and (b)
4)
the adjustments which must be made within each of these agencies
as a basis for an effective and coordinated Government-wide effort.
The following arrangements are agreed to as a first step in resolving
ole
3. (a) A Director for International Security and Assistance Affairs 2
y-
will be appointed in the Department of State. He shall occupy the
senior position authorized by section 406 (e) of the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949 as amended.
(b) The Director for International Security and Assistance Affairs,
on behalf of the Secretary of State, shall represent and speak for the
Department of State on matters of policy and program relating to
the North Atlantic Treaty, other similar international programs, and
military and economic assistance for mutual defense. He shall be
responsible for coordinating all activities within the department re-
ch
lated thereto. He shall have the authority, responsibility, and staff
1
necessary to assure that he can speak positively and expeditiously on
behalf of the Department of State.
le
(C) In addition, the Director for International Security and Assist-
ance Affairs, on behalf of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible
for providing continuing leadership in the interdepartmental coordi-
nation of policy and program with respect to the North Atlantic
Third Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program,
United States Government for Policy Formulation and Implementation With
Respect to International Security Arrangements and Military and Economic
Assistance for Mutual Defense."
in a covering memorandum transmitting this approved paper to the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget on this same date, the President suggested
the de-
letion of the words and Assistance from the title of the Director. (Footnote
these questions.
je
es
et:
4
US
es
og
ES
S
10
ne
1
se
in H. Doc. 179.)
3 See infra.
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364, and supra.
3044
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
+
grams for military production abroad; and the Economic Cooperation
adequate defense effort abroad, and for implementing approved pro- !
with due regard for the established responsibilities of the National
Treaty, other similar international programs, and military and eco-
nomic assistance for mutual defense. In performing this function
on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Director for International
Security and Assistance Affairs will be exercising responsibility for
the Government as a whole.
4. (a) There shall be appointed an Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs. He should occupy one
of the three positions, other than the senior position, authorized by
section 406 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 8
amended.
(b) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs shall have the same responsibility and authority
within the Department of Defense as is provided in paragraph 3 (b)
for the Director for International Security and Assistance Affairs
with respect to the Department of State.
5. The Economic Cooperation Administrator and the Secretary of
the Treasury shall each designate an official who shall have the same
authority and responsibility with respect to his agency as is provided
in paragraph 3 (b) for the Director for International Security and
Assistance Affairs with respect to the Department of State.
6. (a) The review and coordination of policy and program as be-
tween the several departments and agencies shall be carried on by ſe
senior staff committee to be known as the Committee on International
Security Affairs. The State Department Director for International
Security and Assistance Affairs shall be the Chairman. In addition
,
the membership shall consist of the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for International (Security Affairs, a representative of the
Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Harriman, and the ECA and
Treasury officials provided for in paragraph 5. Representatives of
other departments and agencies may be asked to sit with the Cozu-
mittee as appropriate.
(b) The Committee on International Security Affairs shall estab-
lish such permanent or temporary working groups as it finds necessary
and shall develop such arrangements as are necessary for guiding inter-
agency coordination outside of the Committee.
7. It is essential that operating responsibility be delegated to the
greatest possible extent to those agencies which are equipped to
handle it. This means that with respect to mutual defense and
within the framework of established policies, the Department of De
fense has primary responsibility for determining the military character
item and military training programs, and for developing United States
determinations as to military requirements in the formulation of pre-
implementing plans for economic assistance required to support au
grams for additional military production abroad.
8. The foregoing administrative arrangements shall be carried of
1
FOREIGN AID
3045
ol
F
9
to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, October 6, 1949 to April 6,
eco-
Security Council and other officials and agencies of the Executive
ition
Office of the President, and of the National Advisory Council on
onal
for
authorities and responsibilities of these officials and agencies are in
no wise modified by this agreement. This means that the National
y of
Security Council shall continue to be the agency "to advise the
one
I be
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and
military policies relating to the national security.”
9 as
9. Arrangements should likewise be made as quickly as feasible for
improved coordination between United States Government officials
onal
and
srity
representatives at both the regional and country levels.
(6)
fairs
5. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
amie
Departmental Announcement 248, December 27, 1950 1
ided
and
Effective January 8, 1951, there will be established in the Depart-
ment of State the position of Director, International Security Affairs.
be The Office of the Director, Mutual Defense Assistance established
October 25, 1949,2 is abolished and its personnel, records, and func-
stions, including the functions vested in the Secretary of State by
Inal
| Executive
Order 10099, as amended, have been transferred to the
ion
, Director, International Security Affairs.
of
The Director, Thomas Dudley Cabot, will occupy the senior
the
position authorized by section 406 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assist-
ance Act of 1949,4 as amended. The Director shall perform his
functions under the direction of the Secretary of State. He shall
have authority over, and be responsible for, the general direction
and coordination of all activities within the Department of State
relating to:
BIT
a. The North Atlantic Treaty and other similar regional and
bilateral arrangements concerned primarily with collective defense
the or mutual defense assistance;
b. the military security phases of other regional or bilateral arrange-
ndments, such as the Organization of American States;
De
c. military assistance programs;
ter
d. programs of economic assistance which are designed to support
programs of military assistance;
e. the export or foreign sale of military materiel or the release to
other nations of classified military information. In addition, the
commitment of United States military resources for United Nations
purposes shall be coordinated with the Director. As to all such
Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 22, 1951, pp. 155–156.
2 See Departmental Announcement 194, 'Oct. 25, 1949; First Semiannual Report
1950 (H. Doe. 613, 81st Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 64–65.
* A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 1362.
and
5 of
2m-
ab-
ter-
to
nd
tes
-0-
OD
nd
21
0
1
01
Supra, doc. 2.
3046
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
>
i. Assure the development, through existing organizational arrange
The Director shall be the Department of State representative on
and chairman of the Committee on International Security Affairs
The Director shall determine, in consultation with the Deputy Under
Secretary for Administration, State Department representation 01,
and shall be responsible for and generally supervise State Department
matters, he shall represent and speak for the Department of State
.
In performing these several functions, he shall be responsible for
appropriately relating, his performance to the development and
execution of other foreign policies and programs.
The Director shall have such staff as may be necessary for the
effective execution of his responsibilities but shall, to the extent
consistent with the effective discharge of his responsibilities
, utiliza
the resources of the regional and functional bureaus and offices,
The regional and functional bureaus and offices of the Department shall
give to the Director all appropriate assistance and shall be responsible
to the Director for all activities within the field of his responsibility.
The Director within the area of his responsibility set forth shall:
a. Coordinate and direct the development of objectives, policies,
and programs for international security and assistance affairs
.
b. Approve programs for military and economic assistance for
mutual defense, and review, coordinate, and expedite the implements-
tion of approved programs.
c. Assure the establishment and maintenance of effective working
relationships concerning international security and assistance matters
with all Government agencies having policy, advisory, or operational
responsibilities within this area.
d. Evaluate the effectiveness and progress of policies and program
in the field of international security and assistance and prepare or
direct the preparation of all necessary reports with respect thereto
.
e. See that appropriate instructions to United States representatives
abroad concerned with international security and assistance matters
are developed and issued.
f. Assure development, coordination, and implementation of
policies to control, under appropriate provisions of law, the export
and import of arms, ammunition, and implements of war.
g. Assure formulation of Department of State policy on all questions
relating to disclosure to foreign powers of classified information in the
field of international security and assistance affairs.
h. Have primary responsibility, subject to the budget and fiscal
policies and procedures of the Department of State
, for the control
,
allocation, and utilization of funds made available for aid
and asist-
ance programs and related activities, including responsibility for budge
formulation, for budget justification before the Bureau of the Budget
and Congress, and for budget execution.
respect to international security and assistance affairs.
1
1 See supra.
FOREIGN AID
3047
for
ers
Security Act of 1953 (PL 118, 83d Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 1953; 67 Stat. 152).
Ite participation in, the activities of such additional interdepartmental
for committees and working groups as exist or may be created in the
field of international security and assistance.
On international security and assistance matters, the Director shall
be responsible within the Department of State for all relationships of
the Department of State with the Department of Defense, with the
Economic Cooperation Administration, and with other Departments
and agencies.
jall
ble
.
C. ESTABLISHING THE MACHINERY OF THE POINT
FOUR PROGRAM, 1950
ta-
6. ACT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (TITLE IV,
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950): Public
ing
Law 535 (81st Congress, 2d Session), June 5, 1950 1
nal Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be
cited as the "Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950".
Or
eto.
TITLE IV
Sec. 401. This title may be cited as the "Act for International
Development”.
of
Sec. 402. The Congress hereby finds as follows:
(a) The peoples of the United
States and other nations have a
common interest in the freedom and in the economic and social
progress of all peoples. Such progress can further the secure
growth of democratic ways of life, the expansion of mutually
beneficial commerce, the development of international under-
standing and good will, and the maintenance of world peace.
(b) The efforts of the peoples living in economically under-
developed areas of the world to realize their full capabilities and
to develop the resources of the lands in which they live can be
furthered through the cooperative endeavor of all nations to
exchange technical knowledge and skills and to encourage the
flow of investment capital.
Title IV of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 198).
Title IV was subsequently amended by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (PL 165,
32dCong.,
1st sess., Oct. 10, 1951; 65 Stat. 373), by the Mutual
Security Act of
1952 (PL 400, 82d Cong., 2d 'sess., June 20, 1952; 66 Štat. 141), and by the Mutual
2d sess., Aug. 26, 1954;"68 Stat. 832), which act effected
a recodification of all
ms
ves
ters
ort
Ons
he
olm
Fall
et
1
T
at
foreign assistance programs.
3048
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
cooperation programs carried on by the United Nations, the Organi-
wise economically sound; and (3) with respect to projects for which
country or elsewhere upon reasonable terms and in sufficient amounts
United States is authorized to participate in multilateral technical
Sec. 404. (a) In order to accomplish the purposes of this title, the
(c) Technical assistance and capital investment can make maxi-
mum contribution to economic development only where there is
understanding of the mutual advantages of such assistance and
investment and where there is confidence of fair and reasonable
treatment and due respect for the legitimate interests of the
peoples of the countries to which the assistance is given and in
which the investment is made and of the countries from which the
assistance and investments are derived. In the case of investment
this involves confidence on the part of the people of the under-
developed areas that investors will conserve as well as develop
local resources, will bear a fair share of local taxes and observe
local laws, and will provide adequate wages and working condi-
tions for local labor. It involves confidence on the part of
investors, through intergovernmental agreements or otherwise
,
that they will not be deprived of their property without prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation, that they will be given
reasonable opportunity to remit their earnings and withdraw
their capital; that they will have reasonable freedom to manage
,
operate, and control their enterprises; that they will enjoy security
in the protection of their persons and property, including indus-
trial and intellectual property, and nondiscriminatory treatment
in taxation and in the conduct of their business affairs.
SEC. 403. (a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States
to aid the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas
to develop their resources and improve their working and living con-
ditions by encouraging the exchange of technical knowledge and skills
and the flow of investment capital to countries which provide condi-
tions under which such technical assistance and capital can effectively
and constructively contribute to raising standards of living, creating
new sources of wealth, increasing productivity and expanding pur-
chasing power.
(b) It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that
in order to achieve the most effective utilization of the resources of
the United States, private and
public, which are or may be available
for aid in the development of economically underdeveloped areas
,
agencies of the United States Government, in reviewing requests of
foreign governments for aid for such purposes, shall take into com
sideration (1) whether the assistance applied for is an appropriate
part of a program reasonably
designed to contribute to the balanced
and integrated development of the country or area concerned
; ?
whether any works or facilities which may be projected are actually
needed in view of similar facilities
existing in the area and are other
to finance such projects.
WA
FOREIGN AID
3049
0-
IS
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OP
li
of
ALWHW此​叫​吧​让​创​时​比如​叫好​品​山
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as
zation of American States, and their related organizations, and by
other international organizations, wherever practicable.
(b) Within the limits of appropriations made available to carry out
the purposes of this title, the President is authorized to make contribu-
tions to the United Nations for technical cooperation programs carried
on by it and its related organizations which will contribute to accom-
plishing the purposes of this title as effectively as would participation
in comparable programs on a bilateral basis. The President is further
authorized to make contributions for technical cooperation programs
carried on by the Organization of American States, its related organi-
zations, and by other international organizations.
(c) Agencies of the United States Government on request of interna-
tional organizations are authorized, upon approval by the President,
to furnish services and such facilities as may be necessary in connection
therewith, on an advance of funds or reimbursement basis, for such
organizations in connection with their technical cooperation programs.
Amounts received as reimbursements from such organizations shall be
credited, at the option of the appropriate agency, either to the appro-
priation, fund, or account utilized in incurring the obligation, or to an
appropriate appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the
purposes for which expenditures were made.
SEC. 405. The President is authorized to plan, undertake, administer,
and execute bilateral technical cooperation programs carried on by any
United States Government agency and, in so doing
(a) To coordinate and direct existing and new technical coop-
(b) To assist other interested governments in the formulation
of
programs for the balanced and integrated development of the
economic resources and productive capacities of economically
underdeveloped areas.
(c) To receive, consider, and review reports of joint commis-
sions set up as provided in section 410 of this title.
(d) To make, within appropriations made available for the
purpose, advances and grants in aid of technical cooperation pro-
grams to any person, corporation, or other body of persons, or to
any foreign government or foreign government agency.
(e) To make and perform contracts or agreements in respect of
technical cooperation programs on behalf of the United States
Government with any person, corporation, or other body of per-
sons however designated, whether within or without the United
or with any foreign government or foreign government
agency: Provided, That with respect to contracts or agreements
which entail commitments for the expenditure of funds appro-
priated pursuant to the authority of this title, such contracts or
agreements, within the limits of appropriations or contract author-
izations hereafter made available may, subject to any future action
of the Congress, run for not to exceed three years in any one case.
(f) To provide for printing and binding outside the conti-
1-
eration programs.
lls
di-
ly
of
T-
at
of
le
S,
1.
te
2)
States,
h
e
$
3050
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1
C
I
.RU
SEC. 408. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and
Sec. 409. The President shall create an advisory board, hereinafter
President or such other officer as he may designate to administer the
1 Under the provisions of the section referred to, it is necessary to obtain the
approval of the Congressional Joint Committee on Printing before arranging to
have official printing of the Executive Departments done anywhere other than
(1) at the Government Printing Office or (2) at a field printing plant approved by
nental limits of the United States, without regard to section 11
of the Act of March 1, 1919 (44 U.S.C. 111).
(g) To provide for the publication of information made avail-
able by the joint commissions referred to in section 410, and from
other sources, regarding resources, opportunities for private in-
vestment capital, and the need for technical knowledge and skill
in each participating country.
SEC. 406. Agreements made by the United States under the author-
ity of this title with other governments and with international organi-
zations shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations
in accordance with the provisions of article 102 of the United Nations
Charter
SEC. 407. In carrying out the programs authorized in section 405
of this title-
(a) The participation of private agencies and persons shall be
sought to the greatest extent practicable.
(b) Due regard shall be given, in reviewing requests for assista
ance, to the possibilities of achieving satisfactory results from
such assistance as evidenced by the desire of the country request-
ing it (1) to take steps necessary to make effective use of the
assistance made available, including the encouragement of the
flow of productive local and foreign investment capital where
needed for development; and (2) to endeavor to facilitate the
development of the colonies, possessions, dependencies, and non-
self-governing territories administered by such requesting country
so that such areas may make adequate contribution to the effec-
tiveness of the assistance requested.
(c) Assistance shall be made available only where the President
determines that the country being assisted-
(1) Pays a fair share of the cost of the program.
(2) Provides all necessary information concerning such
program and gives the program full publicity.
(3) Seeks to the maximum extent possible full coordination
and integration of technical cooperation programs being
carried on in that country.
(4) Endeavors to make effective use of the results of
(5) Cooperates with other countries participating in the
program in the mutual exchange of technical knowledge
and skills.
regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the provisions
of this title.
a
S
a
C
er
P
a
t
S.
the program.
the State
a
It
committee
FOREIGN AID
3051
ID-
ins
INS
)
he
re
sions may include recommendations as to any specific projects which
11 program herein authorized, with respect to general or basic policy
matters arising in connection with operation of the program. The
il board shall consist of not more (than] thirteen members to be appointed
by the President, one of whom, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, shall be appointed by him as chairman. The members
il of the board shall be broadly representative of voluntary agencies and
other groups interested in the program, including business, labor,
or agriculture, public health, and education. All members of the board
ni- shall be citizens of the United States; none except the chairman shall
be an officer or an employee of the United States (including any agency
or instrumentality of the United States) who as such regularly receives
compensation for current services. Members of the board, other than
05 | the chairman if he is an officer of the United States Government, shall
receive out of funds made available for the purposes of this title a per
be diem allowance of $50 for each day spent away from their homes or
regular places of business for the purpose of attendance at meetings
sto of the board or at conferences held upon the call of the chairman, and
in necessary travel, and while so engaged they may be paid actual
st
travel expenses and not to exceed $10 per diem in lieu of subsistence
and other expenses. The President may appoint such committees in
he special fields of activity as he may determine to be necessary or desir-
able to effectuate the purposes of this title. The members of such
be committees shall receive the same compensation as that provided for
members of the board.
NT Sec
. 410. (a) At the request of a foreign country, there may be
cestablished a joint commission for economic development to be com-
posed of persons named by the President and persons to be named by
ent
requesting country, and
may include representatives of interna-
tional organizations mutually agreed upon.
(b) The duties of each such joint commission shall be mutually
che agreed upon, and may include, among other things, examination of
(1) The requesting country's requirements with respect to
ng
technical assistance.
(2) The requesting country's resources and potentialities,
including mutually advantageous opportunities for utilization of
foreign technical knowledge and skills and investment.
he (3) Policies which will remove deterrents to and otherwise
encourage the introduction, local development, and application
of technical skills and the creation and effective utilization of
capital, both domestic and foreign; and the implementation of
such policies by appropriate measures on the part of the requesting
country and the United States, and of other countries, when ap-
propriate, and
after consultation with them.
he (C) Such joint commissions shall prepare studies and reports which
be they shall transmit to the appropriate authorities of the United States
and of the requesting countries in such reports the joint commis-
they conclude would contribute to the economic development of the
by requesting countries.
11-
the
the following:
01
of
ge
nd
DIS
er
to
3052
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
agency or with any international organization: Provided, That
n
excess of those established thereunder, and may be appointed to
any class in the Foreign Service Reserve or Staff in accordance
performing functions under this title shall be employed in accord
(d) Alien clerks and employees employed for the purpose of ! i
(e) Officers and employees of the United States Government
may be detailed to offices or positions to which no compensation
is attached with any foreign government or foreign government
(d) The costs of each joint commission shall be borne by the United
States and the requesting country in the proportion that may be agreed
upon between the President and that country.
SEC. 411. All or part of United States support for and participation
in any technical cooperation program carried on under this title shell
be terminated by the President-
(a) If he determines that such support and participation no
longer contribute effectively to the purposes of this title, are con-
trary to a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations that the continuance of such technical cooperatie
programs is unnecessary or undesirable, or are not consistent with
the foreign policy of the United States.
(b) If a concurrent resolution of both Houses of the Congress
finds such termination is desirable.
SEC. 412. The President may exercise any power or authority con-
ferred on him by this title through the Secretary of State or through
any other officer or employee of the United States Government.
SEC. 413. In order to carry out the purposes of this title-
(a) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, a person who, under the direction of the
President or such other officer as he may designate pursuant to
section 412 hereof to exercise the powers conferred upon him by
this title, shall be responsible for planning, implementing, and
managing the programs authorized in this title. He shall be
compensated at a rate fixed by the President without regard to
the Classification Act of 1949 i but not in excess of $15,000 par
(b) Officers, employees, agents, and attorneys may be em-
ployed for duty within the continental
limits of the United States
in accordance with the provisions of the civil-service laws and the
Classification Act of 1949.
(c) Persons employed for duty outside the continental limi
of the United States and officers and employees of the United
States Government assigned for such duty, may receive corte
Reserve and Staff by the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (60 Skal
pensation at any of the rates provided for the Foreign Serpient
999), as amended, may receive allowances and benefits not in
with the provisions of such Act.
ance with the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, &
amended.
i
t
e
annum,
а
r
S
a
2
C
8
S
t
1
15 U.S.C. § 1071 et seq.
FOREIGN AID
3053
and educational activities for the fiscal year 1951.
I DO
900-
the
press
COD-
nugh
ited
ceed
while so detailed any such person shall be considered, for the pur-
pose of preserving his privileges, rights, seniority, or other benefits,
tion
an officer or employee of the United States Government and of the
hal
United States Government agency from which detailed and shall
receive therefrom his regular compensation, which shall be reim-
bursed to such agency from funds available under this title: Pro-
vided further, That such acceptance of office shall in no case involve
the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government.
tion
(f) Experts and consultants or organizations thereof may be
with employed as authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946
(5Ů. Š. C. 55a), and individuals so employed may be compensated
at a rate not in excess of $75 per diem.
(g) Such additional civilian personnel may be employed with-
out regard to subsection (a) of section 14 of the Federal Employees
Pay Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 219), as amended,' as may be necessary
to carry out the policies and purposes of this title.
Sec. 414. No citizen or resident of the United States, whether or not
and
now in the employ of the Government, may be employed or assigned to
the duties by the Government under this Act until such individual has been
t to investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a report
i by
thereon has been made to the Secretary of State: Provided, however,
That any present employee of the Government, pending the report as
1 be to such employee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may be
d te employed or assigned to duties under this Act for the period of three
per
months from the date of its enactment. This section shall not apply
in the case of any officer appointed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Sec. 415. The President shall transmit to the Congress an annual
the report of operations under this title.
Sec. 416. (a) In order to carry out the provisions of this title, there
shall be made available such funds as are hereafter authorized and
ited appropriated from time to time for the purposes of this title: Pro-
vided, however, That for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of this title through June 30, 1951, there is hereby authorized to be
that appropriated a sum not to exceed '$35,000,000, including any sums
di appropriated to carry on the activities of the Institute of Inter-
i to
Affairs, and technical cooperation programs as defined in
section 418 herein under the United States Information and Educa-
tional Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 6). Activities provided for
under this title may be prosecuted under such appropriations or under
od authority granted in appropriation
Acts to enter into contracts pend-
Ing enactment of such appropriations. Unobligated balances of such
and
em
ates
mits
om
Vict
American
DICE
of
.
AS
ent
101
206
Concerning maximum totals of certain categories of employees.
Chapter XI, "Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, 1951,"
of the act of Sept. 6,
1950, "General Appropriation Act, 1951,"contained an appropriation of $26.9
million for international development, and authorized the transfer to this activity
of not more than $2.6 million from
the appropriation for international information
18t
1224-1234.
3054
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950--1955
1.
an
COT
.
1a
appropriations for any fiscal year may, when so specified in the appro-
priation Act concerned, be carried over to any succeeding fiscal year
or years. The President may allocate to any United States Govern-
ment agency any part of any appropriation available for carrying
out the purposes of this title. Such funds shall be available for obliga
tion and expenditure for the purposes of this title in accordance with De
authority granted hereunder or under authority governing the activi- 818
ties of the Government agencies to which such funds are allocated the
(b) Nothing in this title is intended nor shall it be construed as an
expressed or implied commitment to provide any specific assistance, the
whether of funds, commodities, or services, to any country or coun-
Pre
tries, or to any international organization.
SEC. 417. If any provision of this title or the application of any bel
provision to any circumstances or persons shall be held invalid, the de
validity of the remainder of the title and the applicability of such Go
provision to other circumstances or persons shall not be affected
thereby.
the
SEC. 418. As used in this title-
of
(a) The term "technical cooperation programs” means programs
for the international interchange of technical knowledge and skills
designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development
of the economic resources and productive capacities of economically
underdeveloped areas. Such activities may include, but need not sha
be limited to, economic, engineering, medical, educational, agricultura
fishery, mineral, and fiscal surveys, demonstration, training, and sim,
ilar projects that serve the purpose of promoting the development of
economic resources and productive capacities of underdeveloped areas
,
The term "technical cooperation programs" does not include such de
activities authorized by the United States Information and Educawi
tional Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 6) as are not primarily related
to economic development nor activities undertaken now or hereafter Ad
pursuant to the International Aviation Facilities Act (62 Stat. 450)
, he
tiy
nor pursuant to the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 (60 Stat
128), as amended, nor pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948
(62 Stat. 137), as amended, nor activities undertaken now or hereafter
in the administration of areas occupied by the United States armed
8.
forces or in Korea by the Economic Cooperation
Administration
.
(b) The term “United States Government agency" means any
department, agency, board, wholly or partly owned corporation of
instrumentality, commission, or independent establishment of the
United States Government.
(c) The term "international organization” means any intergovert ef
mental organization of which the United States is a member.
qu
ge:
an
as
}
ор
FE
tic
AO
1
1
FOREIGN AID
3055
3 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 13, 1950, pp. 793-795.
r
.
Bo
C2
S
February 21, 1950,4 is hereby abolished and its personnel and func-
1. ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY UNDER THE ACT FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: Executive Order No. 10159,
September 8, 1950 1
8
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act for International
b Development, approved June 5, 1950 (Title IV of Public Law 535,
8lst Congress),- hereinafter referred to as the act, and as President of
the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. The Secretary of State is authorized and directed (a) to perform
4
the functions and exercise the powers and authority vested in the
President by the act, except those so vested by section 413 (a) thereof,
and except those so vested by section 409 thereof except as provided
below, and (b), in cooperation with the heads of other appropriate
& departments and agencies and wholly-owned corporations of the
Government, to plan and execute the programs authorized by the act.
1
2. For the purpose of promoting the effective implementation of
the act, the heads of all departments and agencies the participation
of which is requested by the Secretary of State are hereby authorized
and directed to provide for such participation to the maximum extent
consistent with law.
3. There is established pursuant to section 409 of the act the Inter-
national Development Advisory Board. The members of the Board
shall serve for terms of two years. The Board shall meet at the re-
quest of the Secretary of State to advise and consult with him on
general policy matters. The Secretary of State is authorized to create
and appoint such additional committees in special fields of activity
as he may find, after consultation with the heads of other appropriate
departments
and agencies, to be necessary and desirable, in accordance
with the provisions of section 409 of the act.
4. The Secretary of State shall establish an Interdepartmental
Advisory Council on Technical Cooperation, to be composed of the
| heads of participating departments and agencies or their representa-
tives. The Council shall be advisory to the Secretary of State.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
8. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION
ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
Departmental Announcement 212, October 27, 1950 3
1. The Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) is established
effective October 27, 1950. The Interim Office for Technical Co-
operation (TCD), established by Departmental Announcement 41,
S
S
t
Administration.
1 15 Fed. Reg. 6103.
2 Supra.
* Ibid., Mar. 13, 1950, p. 422.
3056
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
91
MIC
SP
INC
ar
or
and, through the regional bureaus, direct their program activities;
... Establish general standards for the creation and operation of
h. Determine the amount to be allotted for United States contri-
international organizations and approve payment of such contribu-
nishing of services and facilities by Federal agencies for their execution;
2. The Technical Cooperation Administrator will, under the general
direction of the Secretary of State, plan, implement, and manage the
technical cooperation (Point 4) programs authorized by the Act for th
International Development (Title IV of the Foreign Economic Assist
ance Act of 1950, Public Law 535, 81st Cong.).1 The Administrator ti
shall perform the functions and exercise the powers and authority se
vested in the Secretary of State by the act and those vested in the
President by the act and delegated to the Secretary by Executive
Order 10159.2
3. The Technical Cooperation Administration shall operate as an
integral component of the Department, utilizing the Department's F
staff services and facilities and shall conduct its activities pursuant
to its own terms of reference and those of other components of the
Department as prescribed below and in the Manual of Regulations
and Procedures, Volume II, Organization. At each country mission
,
the chief of mission shall be responsible for the administration of the
bilateral program in his country.
4. The Technical Cooperation Administration shall:
a. Formulate general policies and plans for the conduct of existing
and new technical cooperation programs;
b. Review and coordinate country and area program plans sub-
mitted by the regional bureaus, make necessary adjustments, and
direct preparation of specific implementing projects;
c. Approve projects, determine action agencies, allocate funds for
United States bilateral programs within an approved financial plan
.
and approve assignment of United States Government personnel
abroad to such programs;
d. Coordinate bilateral technical cooperation programs with other
programs for economic development affecting the same areas and
coordinate negotiations and consultations with intergovernments
.
and private agencies carrying on technical cooperation programs
bi
affecting such areas;
e. Maintain liaison with and supervise and coordinate the technical fu
cooperation activities of other Federal agencies authorized by the act
f. Assure the effective operation of programs and projects are
select or approve technical cooperation officers for field assignments
joint commissions, select United States members and coordinate
their activities with other phases of the program;
th
Nations Affairs,'the United States position on the character and
af
scope of and priorities within such activities
; and approve the fu:
Or
&T
ON
a1
in
SU
er
ar
ac
SU
PI
ai
tr
Ir
1 Supra, doc. 6.
2 Supra.
FOREIGN AID
3057
NS
in,
ng
bilateral
character, scope and priorities of technical cooperation programs for
programs under the provisions of section 411 of the act.
tration, and between intergovernmental and other United States
Inter-American Affairs and the Bureau of United Nations Affairs
ra! i. Determine whether technical assistance may be given to a
be requesting country under the act and terminate, in consultation with
for the appropriate regional bureau insofar as country political affairs
st are involved, all or part of United States support for and participa-
ortion in any technical cooperation program under the provisions of
by section 411 of the Act for International Development;
j. Consult with the International Development Advisory Board
we (IDAB) provided by the act and Executive Order 10159 and recom-
mend the appointment by the Secretary of advisory committees in
a special fields of activity in consultation with interested offices and
t's Federal agencies.
nt
he
5. The regional bureaus shall:
a. Develop coordinated program plans for individual countries or
groups of countries; assist in the development of detailed plans for
he individual projects; and review program proposals affecting their
areas which originate in other sources;
b. Communicate and negotiate with foreign governments; review
or advise with respect to the assignment of and generally supervise
program personnel in the field; evaluate programs and
be projects within their regions; propose program changes; and review
ad
or advise with respect to the selection of, and give policy guidance
and general support to, United States members of joint commissions.
6. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs shall:
a. Develop the United States position concerning the international
organizational machinery to be used for technical cooperation activi-
ties and the relative contributions to be pledged by the United States
nd and other countries to the special technical assistance accounts of
al international organizations; coordinate and conduct negotiations on
such matters; and make recommendations for the payment of contri-
butions to the special accounts of international organizations from
3 funds allotted by the Technical Cooperation Administration;
b. Assure the development of the United States positions on the
S economic development to be undertaken by international organiza-
tions
, on the amount to be allotted for United States contributions,
and on program allocations among international organizations; and
advise the Technical Cooperation Administration on the substance of
such positions and
on the termination of participation in multilateral
C. Arrange for direct contact on operating program matters between
the United Nations (including the participating specialized agencies
and regional commissions) and the Technical Cooperation Adminis-
7. The existing division of responsibility between the Bureau of
or
ng
er
ns
ce
1
415900_-57---90l, 2-89
3058
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
is established the Interdepartmental Advisory Council on Technical
Administrator shall serve as Chairman of the Interdepartmental
and Cultural Cooperation and the Advisory Committee on Technical
Advisory Council. The Interdepartmental Committee on Scientife
Assistance will be abolished effective on the date of the first meeting /
12. Pending publication of appropriate revisions to the Organist
with regard to intergovernmental organizations of the other American
Republics shall apply to matters arising under this announcement
.
8. Subject to the responsibilities assigned to the Technical Coopera-
tion Administration in paragraph 4, the following units of the Depart-
ment shall have such responsibilities in dealing with the indicated
international organizations in connection with technical cooperation
matters as accord with their general responsibilities set forth in the
Organization Manual:
a. The Office of Financial and Development Policy with respect to
the International Bank and Monetary Fund;
b. The Office of Transport and Communications Policy with
respect to the International Telecommunication Union, the Inter
national Civil Aviation Organization, and other international organi-
zations concerned with transport and communications;
c. The UNESCO Relations Staff with respect to the United Natious
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
9. The offices in the economic area shall be responsible for the
development of over-all economic policy in their respective specialized
fields. These offices, and in particular the Investment and Economie
Development Staff in the Office of Financial and Development Policy
,
shall advise on and coordinate with the Administrator on economic
policy matters relating to underdeveloped areas and on the relation-
ship of United States Government financial programs to technica
cooperation programs, and shall maintain liaison with United States
and international agencies to facilitate the coordination of financial
programs with the planning and operation of technical cooperation
programs.
10. The Office of Educational Exchange shall:
a. Develop plans and procedures for, and facilitate the screening
selection, reception, placement, and orientation of foreign trainees
b. Coordinate Point 4 training with other United States Govern
ment training programs and activities;
c. Assure the adequate review and evaluation of training project
develop means for maintaining contact with trainees following com
pletion of their program, and perform other related functions as
requested by the Administrator.
11. In accordance with the terms of Executive Order 10159, there
Cooperation (TEC) effective on the date of its first meeting. Ta
of the Interdepartmental Advisory Council.
tion Manual, section 041 of the Manual shall be considered
hereto.
S
C
}
C
ܒܥ ܨܢܚܙ
8
an anner
a
FOREIGN AID
3059
020
ent.
10
101
the
cerpts) 1
201-
ODS
1CY
ting Security Act of 1952, and sec. 710 (b) of the act of 1953 (repealing sec. 115 (k) of
D. THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM, 1951-1953
art
ted
9. MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1951, AS AMENDED BY THE
MUTUAL SECURITY ACTS OF 1952 AND 1953: Public Law 165
(82d Congress, 1st Session), October 10, 1951; Amended by
Public Law 400 (82d Congress, 2d Session), June 20, 1952, and
Public Law 118 (83d Congress, 1st Session), July 16, 1953 (Ex-
t to
rith
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
ter
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited
as the "Mutual Security Act of 1951",
Sec. 2. (a) The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act
to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the
United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical
the assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security
ized
and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop
mic their resources in the interest of their security and independence and
the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective
umie participation of those countries in the United Nations system for
collective security. The purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1571-1604), the Economic
stes Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1501-1522), and
the Act for International Development (22 U. S. C. 1557) shall
hereafter be deemed to include this purpose.
(b) · The Congress welcomes the recent progress in political federa-
tion, military integration, and economic unification in Europe and
reaffirms its belief in the necessity of further vigorous efforts toward
ling
these ends as a means of building strength, establishing security, and
preserving peace in the North Atlantic area. In order to provide
further encouragement to such efforts, the Congress believes it essential
that this Act should be so administered as to support concrete measures
for political federation, military integration, and economic unification
in Europe. Appropriations made pursuant to paragraphs 101 (a)
(1), relating to military assistance, and 101 (a) (2), relating to defense
support and economic assistance, of this Act may be used, pursuant
165 Stat. 373, 66 Stat. 141, and 67 Stat. 152 respectively; Mutual Security
Legislation and Related Documents, Committee Print of the House Committee
in Foreign Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st sess., December 1953, pp. 1–42. For the sake of
brevity, certain footnotes in the Committee print text which do not relate spe-
the basic purposes of the acts are here deleted. The footnotes through-
tifle out this document are from the Committee print. Except for sections 11 (amend-
ing the Surplus Property Act of 1944, as amended) and 12 (authorizing appro-
priations for the U. N. International Children's Emergency Fund) of the Mutual
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948), the acts of 1952 and 1953 consist of
amendments to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949, as amended, the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended,
and the Act for International Development.
? This subsection was added by sec. 2 of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
100-
acial
tion
lees
Al'N-
:cts
3
here
nice!
The
ntal
cifically to
dical
iner
3060
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
determined by the President that such assistance will contribute
1 The words "for Spain” were added by sec. 3 (a) of the Mutual Security Act
2 The words "or any Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied areas of
to the applicable terms and conditions of the Mutual Defense Assist-
ance Act of 1949, as amended, and of section 503 of this Act, respec-
tively, to furnish assistance (including, in the case of amounts available
pursuant to paragraph 101 (a) (2), transfers of funds) to any of the
following organizations: (1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, (B) the European Coal and Steel Community, (C) the organiza-
tion which may evolve from current international discussions con-
cerning a European defense community.
TITLE I-EUROPE
SEC. 101 (a) In order to support the freedom of Europe through
assistance which will further the carrying out of the plans for defense
of the North Atlantic area, while at the same time maintaining the
economic stability of the countries of the area so that they may
meet their responsibilities for defense, and to further encourage
the
economic unification and the political federation of Europe, there
are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the
fiscal year 1952 for carrying out the provisions and accomplishing
the policies and purpose of this Act-
(1) not to exceed $5,028,000,000 for assistance pursuant to the
provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as
amended (22 U. S. C. 1571-1604), for countries which are parties
to the North Atlantic Treaty, for Spain, and for any country of
Europe (other than a country covered by another title of this Act)
,
which the President determines to be of direct importance to the
defense of the North Atlantic area and whose increased ability to
defend itself the President determines is important to the pres-
ervation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and
to the security of the United States (any such determination to be
reported forthwith to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives), and not to exceed $100;
000,000 of such appropriation for any selected persons who are
residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia, or the Communist-dominated or Communist
occupied areas of Germany and Austria, or any Communist-
dominated or Communist-occupied areas of Asia ? and
countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such per
Atlantic Treaty Organization 107 or other purposes
, when it's
sons into elements of the military forces supporting the North
of 1952.
Asia” were added by sec. 703 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
mi
It
su
U.
tio
for
Ac
hei
of
Ju
pa
pu
any
other
Sec
i
TŁ
tot
tio
pu
of
fer
tio
W!
Co
FOREIGN AID
3061
Senate and of the House of Representatives."
e
0
e
e
e
6
e
S
paragraph: Provided, That not to exceed $10,000,000 of the funds made available
whenever the President makes any such determination, he shall forthwith notify the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States. In addition, unexpended balances of appropria-
tions heretofore made for carrying out the purposes of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, through assistance
to any of the countries covered by this paragraph are hereby
authorized to be continued available through June 30, 1952, and
to be consolidated with the appropriation authorized by this
paragraph. Section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act
of 1949, as amended (22 Ù. S. C. 1579), is hereby repealed. There
is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the
fiscal year 1953 not to exceed $3,415,614,750, for assistance pur-
suant to the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of
1949, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1571-1604) to countries eligible for
assistance under this paragraph; and in addition unexpended
balances of any appropriations heretofore made pursuant to this
5
paragraph are authorized to be continued available for their
original purposes through June 30, 1953, and to be consolidated
with the appropriation hereby authorized.
(2) 2 There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President for the fiscal year 1953 not to exceed $1,282,433,000 to
provide assistance to any country covered by paragraph (1) of
this subsection and to any other country covered by section 503
of this Act in accordance with the provisions of such section; and
in addition unexpended balances of appropriations heretofore
made pursuant to this paragraph are authorized to be continued
available for their original purposes through June 30, 1953, and
to be consolidated with the appropriation hereby authorized
(b) . Not to exceed 10 per centum of the total of the appropriations
made available under this section may be transferred, when deter-
This last sentence was added by sec. 3 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
This subsection was revised by sec. 3 C) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
It formerly read as follows: "(2) not to exceed $1,022,000,000 for assistance pur-
suant to the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22
U.S. C. $§ 1501-1522) (including assistance to further European military
produe-
tion), for any country of Europe covered by paragraph (1) of this subsection and
for any other country covered by section 103 (a) of the said Economic Cooperation
Act of 1948, as amended. In addition, unexpended balances of appropriations
heretofore made for carrying out the purposes of the Economic Cooperation Act
June 30, 1952, and to be consolidated with the appropriation authorized by this
pursuant to this paragraph may be utilized to effectuate the principles set forth in
section 115 (e) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended.'
h
* This subsection was revised by sec. 701 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
total of the appropriations (granted pursuant toj made available under this sec-
may be transferred, when determined by the President to be necessary for the
purpose of this Act, between appropriations granted pursuant to either paragraph
ferred shall be determined without reference to any balances of prior appropria-
tions continued available pursuant to this section: Provided further], That,
ce
0
3-
e
.
ce
0
ET
S
et
f
3062
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
fiscal year 1953 not to exceed $560,316,500, to carry out the purposes
any appropriations heretofore made pursuant to this section are
authorized to be continued available for their original purposes through
1 This subsection was added by sec. 3 (d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952
PL 249, 82d Cong., the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1952, appro
mined by the President to be necessary for the purpose of this Act, J
between appropriations made available under either paragraph of sub-
section (a): Provided, That whenever the President makes any such
determination, he shall forthwith notify the Committee on Foreign is
Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the p
House of Representatives, and the Committees on Armed Services of i
the Senate and of the House of Representatives.
th
(c) 1 Not less than $25,000,000 of the funds made available under
authority of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be used for p
economic, technical, and military assistance to Spain in accordance de
with the provisions of this Act. Unexpended balances of appropri- re
ations made available for assistance to Spain pursuant to this section
by the Act of October 31, 1951 (Public Law 249, Eighty-second Conde
gress), are authorized to be continued available until June 30, 1953
SEC. 102. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the ti
President for the fiscal year 1954, to be made available on such terms Up
and tions, including transfer of funds, as he may specify, (1) not
to exceed $100,000,000 for manufacture in France of artillery, am-
munition, and semiautomatic weapons required by French forces for w
the defense of the North Atlantic area, and (2) not to exceed $100, py
000,000 for manufacture in the United Kingdom of military aircraft vi
required by United Kingdom forces for the defense of the North At th
lantic area.
in
TITLE II-NEAR EAST AND AFRICA
Sec. 201. In order to further the purpose of this Act þy contin- de
uing to provide military assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Iran, there ar
are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal St
year 1952, not to exceed $396,250,000 for furnishing assistance to mi
Greece and Turkey pursuant to the provisions of the Ắct of May 2 Af
1947, as amended (22 U.S. C. 1401–1410), and for furnishing assistance Ar
to Iran pursuant to the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance | Ni
Act of 1949, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1571-1604). In addition, un-ren
expended balances of appropriations heretofore made for assistance to ser
Greece and Turkey, available for the fiscal year 1951, pursuant to the site
Act of May 22, 1947, as amended, and for assistance to Iran pursuant of
to the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, are hereby
authorized to be continued available through June 30, 1952, and to be
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the
mis
2
ar
W
an
ag
ay
20
$Spain.
2 This section was added by sec. 201 point the Mutual Security Act of 1954
FOREIGN AID
3063
m-
? Sec. 701 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953 deleted from this location the
=of following expression: “(excluding balances of prior appropriations continued
available) pursuant to section 201" and substituted the phrase "under section
et, June 30, 1953, and to be consolidated with the appropriation hereby
bauthorized.)
ch Sec. 202. (a) Whenever the President determines that such action
gm is essential for the purpose of this Act, he may provide assistance,
pursuant to the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of
of 1949, as amended, to any country of the Near East area (other than
those covered by section 201) and may utilize not to exceed 10 per
ler centum of the amount made available 2 under section 201 of this Act:
or Provided, That any such assistance may be furnished only upon
ce determination by the President that (1) the strategic location of the
Ti recipient country makes it of direct importance to the defense of the
Ot Near East area, (2) such assistance is of critical importance to the
defense of the free nations, and (3) the immediately increased ability
3. of the recipient country to defend itself is important to the preserva-
hetion of the peace and security of the area and to the security of the
as United States
lot (b) · There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $50,000,000 to be available,
for whenever the President determines that such action is essential for the
0; purpose of this Act, in order to provide assistance, pursuant to the pro-
aft visions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, in
Ito the area of the Near East and Africa. Such assistance may be fur-
nished to any organization created pursuant to a regional defense
arrangement in the area, to any nation in the general area participating
in such an arrangement, or to any other nation in the general area
which the President determines to be of direct importance to the
in defense of the area and whose increased ability to defend itself the
ere President determines to be important to the security of the United
cal States (any such determination to be reported forthwith to the Com-
to mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign
23
, Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on
nco Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives).
ce No assistance shall be furnished under this subsection unless the
In recipient nation has agreed (1) that the equipment, materials, or
to services provided will be used solely to maintain its internal security,
the its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense
an of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements
and measures, and (2) that it will not undertake
any act
of aggression
against any other nation.
* This sentence was added by sec. 4 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
* This subsection was added by sec. 704 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
be
OD.
the
SAS
201”.
aro
ngh
152
pro-
+
3064
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
UCS
cas
ar:
vis
ass
ex
to carry out the purposes and provisions of this section, and in addition unexpendel
of section 503 of this Act and the Act for International Development (22 U.S.C!
SEC. 203. In order to further the purpose of this Act in Africa
and the Near East there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to Es
the President for the fiscal year 1953 not to exceed $50,822,750 to th
carry out the purposes and provisions of this section; and in addition be
unexpended balances of any appropriations heretofore made purso SD
ant to this section are authorized to be continued available for their
op
original purposes through June 30, 1953, and to be consolidated with
the appropriation hereby authorized. Funds appropriated pursuant in
to this section shall be available under the applicable provisions of
section 503 of this Act and the Act for International Development U.
(22 U. S. C. 1557).
Sec. 204. Not to exceed $50,000,000 of the funds authorized under
ap
section 203 hereof may be contributed to the United Nations during
the fiscal year 1952, for the purposes, and under the provisions, of
the United Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950 (22 U.S.C.
1556): Provided, That, whenever the President shall determine that
it would more effectively contribute to the purposes of the said
United Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950, he may allocate
ment to be utilized in furtherance of the purposes of said Act and As
any amount so allocated shall be a part of the United States com- her
tribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales
: yes
tine Refugees in the Near East and shall be so credited by said ba
Agency
VIE
Sec. 205. In order to assist in the relief of refugees coming into as
Israel, not to exceed $50,000,000 of the funds authorized under ser com
tion 203 hereof may be utilized during the fiscal year 1952, unde wit
such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, for specific
ba
refugee relief and resettlement projects in Israel.
1 This section was revised by sec. 4 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1982
The changes made are shown as follows: "Sec. 203. In order to further the pur-
pose of this Act in Africa and the Near East (, there are) there is hereby author of
ized to be appropriated to the President l for the fiscal year [1952, 195
pri
not to exceed ($160,000,000 for economic and technical assistance in Africa am
the Near East in areas other than those covered by section 103 (a) of the Eco
nomic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U.S. C. 1502) Funds appre
priated
pursuant to this section shall be available under the applicable provision du
of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1501-15
and of the Act for International Development 122.U.S.C. 1557).J $60,82,
ized to be continued arailable for their original purposes through June 30
,
and to be consolidated with the appropriation hereby authorized. Funds company
as
au
no
ize
Ju
th
author
1
19
fol!
aut
pu:
du
1557)."
dui
thi
ou
ant
2
Of
3
FOREIGN AID
3065
108
authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $60,063,250 for carrying out the
purposes and provisions of section 205 of this Act, relating to refugees in Israel,
Sec. 206.' In order to further the purpose of this Act in the Near
to East and Africa, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to
to the President for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $194,000,000 to
101 be used, on such terms and conditions as he may specify, to furnish
s special economic assistance designed to promote the economic devel-
opment of the area, for relief and rehabilitation of refugees in the
ith
area, and for other types of economic assistance to assist in maintain-
int
ing economic and political stability in the area. The applicable pro-
of visions of the Act for International Development (64 Stat. 204, 22
24 | U.S. C. 1557), except the provisions relating to the purpose for which
assistance may be given, or of section 503 (b) (3) of this Act, shall
apply to the expenditure of funds pursuant to this section to the
og extent that they are not inconsistent with the purposes of this section.
C.
TITLE III-ASIA AND PACIFIC
hat
aid Sec. 301. In order to carry out in the general area of China (includ-
ateing the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Korea) the
T: provisions of subsection (a) of section 303 of the Mutual Defense
And Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1604 (a)), there are
on hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal
les year 1952, not to exceed $535,250,000. In addition, unexpended
aid balances of appropriations heretofore made for carrying out the pro-
visions of title III of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,
nto as amended (22 U. S. C. 1602-1604), are hereby authorized to be
el continued available through June 30, 1952, and to be consolidated
de with the appropriation authorized by this section. Not to exceed
ci | $50,000,000 of funds appropriated pursuant to this section (excluding
balances of appropriations continued available) may be accounted for
as provided in subsection (a) of said section 303. There is hereby
952.
authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1953
not to exceed $564,807,500, to carry out the purposes and provisions
of this section; and in addition unexpended balances of any appro-
priations heretofore made pursuant to this section are hereby author-
ized to be continued available for their original purposes through
June 30, 1953, and to be consolidated with the appropriation hereby
Sec. 302. (a) In order to further the purpose of this Act through
the strengthening of the area covered in section 301 of this Act,
This sec. 206 was substituted by sec. 501 of the Mutual Security Act of
1953 for a prior sec. 206 on the subject of refugees. The old sec. 206 read as
follows: "In addition to the amounts authorized by section 203, there is hereby
purposes and provisions of section 204 of this Act, 'relating to Palestine refugees,
during the fiscal year 1953; and not to exceed $10,228,000 for carrying out the
this section which the President finds cannot be effectively expended to carry
out the purposes and provisions of sections 204 and 205 may be transferred to
and merged with the appropriations authorized by section 203.”
This sentence was added by sec. 5 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
Prom
this location
there was deleted, by sec. 705 of the Mutual Security Act
of 1953, the parenthetical
expression"(but not including the Republic of Korea).”
hor
1953
80ರ
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306 authorized.
2
166
ded
hor
958
C
3066
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
8.
ta
m.
17
CO
AC
au
sti
va
th
of China" the first time it appears therein. Unexpended balances of
1 The changes made in this sentence by sec. 5 (b) of the Mutual Security Act
of 1952 are shown as follows: "Funds appropriated pursuant to the authority di
this section shall be available under the applicable provisions of the Economie
Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U.S. C. 1501-1522), and the applicant the
provisions of section 503 of this Act and the applicable provisions of the Act for
2 This sentence was added by sec. 5 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
3 This subsection was added by sec. 502 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951
there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President, for
the fiscal year 1952, not to exceed $237,500,000 for economic and p
technical assistance in those portions of such area which the President
deems to be not under Communist control. Funds appropriated pur-
suant to authority of this section shall be available under the applicable
th
provisions of Section 503 of this Act and the applicable provisions of
D
the Act for International Development (22 U. S. C. 1557). In
th
Id
addition, unexpended balances of funds heretofore made available for
carrying out the purposes of the China Area Aid Act of 1950 (23
K
U.S. C. 1547), are hereby authorized to be continued available through
June 30, 1952, and to be consolidated with the appropriation author
ized by this section. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated
to the President for the fiscal year 1953 not to exceed $202,778,250
,
carry out the purposes and provisions of this subsection in accordanc
with the applicable provisions of section 503 of this Act and not to
exceed $118,634,250 to carry out the purposes and provisions of this
bi
subsection in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Ac
for International Development (Public Law 535, Eighty-first Com
gress); and in addition unexpended balances of any appropriations
th
heretofore made pursuant to this subsection are hereby authorized to
to
be continued available for their original purposes through June 30
,
1953, and to be consolidated with the appropriation hereby author
ized.2
(b) 3 In order to further the purpose of this Act in India and Pak
th
istan, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Presiden
for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $94,400,000 to be used, on such
terms and conditions as he may specify, to furnish special economy
th
assistance designed to promote the economic development of such
countries, to assist in maintaining economic and political stability
therein, and to enable the countries designated
in this subsection to any
make greater progress toward solving their mutual problems in com
operation with each other. The applicable provisions of the Act for
rel
International Development, except the provisions relating to the
purpose for which assistance may be given, or of section 503 (b
) !
of this Act, shall apply to the expenditure of funds pursuant to tas
section to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the purposes
of this section.
Wł
(c) The third proviso of section 202 of the China Area Aid Actor
1950 is amended by inserting and of Korea" after "selected citizer
U. S. C. 1557)
re
sed
CO]
ary
the
1
2
See
3
19:
4
5
Ser
8
:
FOREIGN AID
3067
OT
1
D
f
d
0
32
80
15
et
1
15
1
the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
allocations heretofore made to the Secretary of State pursuant to that
proviso shall be continued available until expended.
at
Sec. 303. (a) In order to provide for a United States contribution
to the United Nations
Korean Reconstruction Agency, established by
the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of
December 1, 1950, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to
the President for the fiscal year 1953 ? not to exceed $45,000,000.
In addition, unobligated balances of the appropriations heretofore
I
12
made, and available during the fiscal year 1951, for assistance to
ih Korea under authority of the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act
of 1950, as amended (22 U.S. C. 1543, 1551, 1552), are hereby author-
ized to be continued available through June 30, 1953,3 and to be
consolidated with the appropriation authorized by this section. In
addition, the United States Department of the Army is hereby
authorized to make available to the United Nations Korean Recon-
struction Agency, at the time when that agency assumes full responsi-
bility for relief and rehabilitation in Korea, goods and services of a
value not to exceed $40,750,000 - which the Department of the Army
then has on hand or on order for civilian relief in Korea and which
the President determines should be contributed by the United States
to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for use in its
relief and rehabilitation operations in Korea. The value of goods and
services made available pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be
credited toward the contribution to be made by the United States to
the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Not to exceed
per centum of the total of the appropriations authorized by this
section may, when determined by the President to be necessary for
purpose of this Act, be transferred to and consolidated with the
appropriation authorized by paragraph 302 (a). There is hereby
authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1954
not to exceed $71,000,000 for making contributions to the United
Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, or such other agency for
relief and rehabilitation in Korea as the President may direct.
(b) The sums made available pursuant to subsection (a) may be
contributed from time to time on behalf of the United States in such
amounts as the President determines to be appropriate to support
those functions of the United
Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
which the military situation in Korea permits the Agency to undertake
* This sentence was added by sec. 5 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
2 The words "for the fiscal year 1953) were added by sec. 5 (d) of the Mutual
Security Act of 1952.
. Changed from "1952” to “1953" by sec. 5 (e) of the Mutual Security Act of
*This figure was changed from $67,500,000 to $40,750,000 by sec. 605 (b) of
* This and the preceding sentence were added by sec. 5 (f) of the Mutual
Security Act of 1952.
* This sentence was added by sec. 605 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
50
the
to
0-
a
6
37
US
es
de
1952.
51
Of
3068
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950--1955
1
1
1
ass
Pre
ass
me
Ac
Oui
tar
found by the President to require the recipient country to participate
Mutual Security Act of 1952; "The aggregate amount which may by contributed
by the value of goods and services made available to Korea by any department
on behalf of the United States pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be reduced
or agency of the United States for relief and economic assistance after the assump
3 This section was added by sec. 201 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952
4 The words "and non-self-governing territories of the Western Hemisphere"
pursuant to arrangements between the Agency and the United Nations
Unified Command.
in
Ar
(c) The provisions of subsections 304 (a) and (b) of the United
hes
Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950 (22 U. S. C. 1556 (b)) are
an
hereby made applicable with respect to Korean assistance furnished
tha
under this section.
HE
(d) Unencumbered balances of sums heretofore or hereafter de
Sta
posited in the special account established pursuant to paragraph (2)
mi
of article V of the agreement of December 10, 1948, between the
wi
United States of America and the Republic of Korea (62 Stat., per
3, 3788)2 shall be used in Korea for such purposes as the President
pe
determines to be consistent with United Nations programs for assist
.
of
ance to Korea and as may be agreed to between the Government of
the United States and the Republic of Korea.
(e) The functions of the Administrator for Economic Cooperation
under the provisions of section 3 of the Far Eastern Economic Assist-
ance Act of 1950, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1551), shall hereafter be
performed by such departments or agencies of the Government a
the President shall direct.
ap
Sec. 304. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to
to the
Pro
President for the fiscal year 1954, to be made available on such terms
and conditions, including transfer of funds, as he may specify
, not to
exceed $400,000,000 for the procurement of equipment, material
and services (as defined in section 411 of the Mutual Defense Assist
.
ance Act of 1949, as amended) which are required by and are to be
made available to, or are necessary
for the support
of the forces el
the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and the
PUI
forces of France located in such Associated States.
api
TITLE IV-AMERICAN REPUBLICS AND NON-SELF-GOV
.
ERNING TERRITORIES OF
THE WESTERN HEM.
SPHERE
Sec. 401. In order to further the purpose of this Act through the
furnishing of military assistance to the other American Republis
there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President gre
the
the fiscal year 1952, not to exceed $38,150,000 for carrying out is
poi
Assistance Act of 1949, as amended:
Provided, That
such assistane
purposes of this section under the provisions of the Mutual Defesa
may be furnished only in accordance with defense plans which a
1 The following sentence was deleted from this subsection by sec. 5 (8aprile
United Nations Korean Reconstruction agency.'
2 TIAS 1908.
. c)
were added by sec. 6 of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
car
tec
bal
sec
TI
4
S.
and
as
Sec
bis
1
wer
3
195:
Seci
Mu
of t
FOREIGN AID
3069
OS
ed
at
at
01
at
TIS
to
1953, effective Aug. 1, 1953 [infra, doc. 12]. The functions vested by the Mutual
al Security Act of 1951, as amended, and any other statutes, in the Director for
Mutual Security were transferred by sec. 2 (a) of the same plan to the Director
of the Foreign Operations Administration,
in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.
Any such assistance shall be subject to agreements, as provided
ed
herein and as required by section 402 of the Mutual Defense Assist-
ance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U.S. C. 1573), designed to assure
that the assistance will be used to promote the defense of the Western
Hemisphere; and after agreement by the Government of the United
States and the country concerned with respect to such missions,
military assistance hereunder shall be furnished only in accordance
with such agreement.
Sec. 402. In order to further the purpose of this Act among the
peoples of the American Republics and non-self-governing territories
of the Western Hemisphere 1 through the furnishing of technical
assistance, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President, for the fiscal year 1952, not to exceed $21,250,000 for
assistance under the provisions of the Act for International Develop-
ment (22 U.S. C. 1557) and of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs
Act, as amended (22 U. S. C. 281).
Sec. 403. In addition to the amounts heretofore authorized and
he
appropriated, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President for the fiscal year 1953 not to exceed $57,685,750 to carry
out the purposes and provisions of section 401, which relates to mili
tary assistance for Latin America, and not to exceed $20,329,000 to
carry out the purposes and provisions of section 402, which relates to
technical assistance for Latin America. In addition, unexpended
be
of
balances of the appropriation heretofore made pursuant to each such
section are authorized to be continued available for their original
he
purposes through June 30, 1953, and to be consolidated with the
applicable appropriation authorized by this section.
V.
TITLE V--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
1
UNIFIED DIRECTION OF PROGRAM
Sec
. 501. (a) In order that the programs of military, economic,
and technical assistance authorized by this Act may be administered
as parts of a unified program in accordance with the intent of Con-
ho
gress and to fix responsibility for the coordination and supervision of
programs in a single person, the President is authorized to ap-
point in the Executive Office of the President a Director for Mutual
Security. The Director, on behalf of the President and subject to
his direction, shall have primary responsibility for-
(1) continuous supervision and general direction of the assist-
ance programs under this Act to the end that such programs
shall be (A) effectively integrated
both at home and abroad, and
The words “and non-self-governing territories of the Western Hemisphere"
were added by sec. 6 of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
This section was added by sec. 6 of the Mutual
Security Act of 1952.
*This office was abolished by sec. 8 (a) (1) of Reorganization Plan No. 7 of
he
pa
these
te
he
జ జా జనా
ܝܫܝܢ
3070
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
S.
ກ.
0
0
W
2
1 The part of this sentence which begins with the words and the supervision
"[6] (7) The Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments |
and of the military departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his
Chairman of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the
3 The Administration and the offices abolished by this section were established /
(B) administered so as to assure that the defensive strength of
the free nations of the world shall be built as quickly as possible
on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid
(2) preparation and presentation to the Congress of such pro-
grams of foreign military, economic, and technical assistance as
may be required in the interest of the security of the United
States;
(3) preparation for the President of the report to the Congress
required by section 518 of this Act and the supervision, coordin-
tion, and evaluation of all reports prepared by agencies of the
United States Government in the course of their operations under
f
this Act, in order to prevent duplication of effort and to insure
a reduction of reporting requirements to the minimum essential
for effective operation.
(e) (1) The fourth paragraph of section 101 (a) of the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S. C. 402 (a)), is amended by b
t
inserting after clause (4) the following:
ti
"(5) the Director for Mutual Security;
and by renumbering clauses (5) and (6) thereof as clauses (6) and (7)
respectively.
MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY
Sec. 502. (a) The Economic Cooperation Administration and the S
offices of Administrator
for Economic Cooperation, Deputy Admini-
trator, United States Special Representative in Europe, and Deputy
Special Representative are hereby abolished.3
(b) To assist in carrying out the purpose of this Act--
(1) there is hereby established, with its principal office at the
seat of the government, a Mutual Security Agency, hereinafter
was added by sec. 7 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
2 As amended, sec. 101 (a) provides that the National Security Council shall be
composed of
"(1) The President;
"(2) The Vice President;
(3) The Secretary of State;
"(4) The Secretary of Defense;
“(5) The Director for Mutual Security;
"*15(6) The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and
pleasure.'
repealed by
by sec. 104 of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which was
sec. 7 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
1
A
SI
CE
FOREIGN AID
3071
of
ble
ad
;
FO-
as
ed
28
14
ler
re
18!
referred to as the Agency, which shall be headed by the Director
for Mutual Security; and
(2) there shall be transferred to the Director the powers, func-
tions, and responsibilities conferred upon the Administrator for
Economic Cooperation by the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948,
as amended, and by any other law, but no such powers, functions,
and responsibilities shall be exercised after June 30, 1952, except
as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
(C) Not later than April 1, 1952, the President shall inform the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives which of the powers,
functions, and responsibilities transferred to the Director by subsection
(b) (2) are found by the President to be necessary to enable the Direc-
tor after June 30, 1952, to carry out the duties conferred upon him by
section 503. The termination provisions of section 122 of the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended,' shall come into effect
on June 30, 1952, and none of the powers, functions, and responsi-
bilities conferred by that Act shall be exercised after that date, except
those powers, functions, and responsibilities found necessary to enable
the Director to carry out the duties conferred on him by section 503
of this Act, which powers, functions, and responsibilities unless other-
wise provided by law shall continue in effect until June 30, 1954.
nal
7),
ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF DIRECTOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY
che
us.
t
che
ter
Sec. 503. (a) After June 30, 1952, the Director, on behalf of the
President and subject to his direction, shall, in consultation with the
Secretaries of State and Defense, continue to have primary respon-
sibility for-
(1) the development and administration of programs of assist-
ance designed to sustain and increase military effort, including
production, construction, equipment and matériel in each country
or in groups of countries which receive United States military
(2) the provision of such equipment, materials, commodities,
services, financial, or other assistance as he finds to be necessary
for carrying out mutual defense programs; and
(3) the provision of limited economic assistance to foreign
nations for which the United States has responsibility as a result
of participation in joint control arrangements when the President
finds that the provision of such economic assistance is in the
interest of the security of the United States.
assistance;
101
[(b) repeals the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, ex-
cept for certain portions.)
che
is
pl
Sec. 122 was repealed by sec. 7 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
be
3072
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
APPOINTMENT AND TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL
m
VO
CO
SO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
RI
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
or
le. For the purposes of this subsection
1 The offices established by this section were all abolished by sec. 8 of Reorgan:
zation Plan No. 7 of 1953 [infra, doc. 12). The office of Deputy Director of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
is Memorandum with Reference to the Reorganization of the Special Representa
tive in Europe (SRE)” (text in Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1953, p. 487
2 Sec. 7 (g) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952 substituted the phrase, “begir-
3 Sec. 7 (g) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952 substituted "403 (0)" for
SEC. 504." (a) To carry out the functions conferred by sections 502
and 503 of this Act, there shall be in the Agency a Deputy Director, a
Special Representative in Europe, and a Deputy Special Representa-
tive in Europe, who shall be appointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
to
G
Sec. 505. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to U
infringe upon the powers or functions of the Secretary of State.
SEC. 506. (a) In the case of aid under this Act for military end items
and related technical assistance and advice, the Secretary of Defense
pr
shall have primary responsibility and authority for-
(1) the determination of military end-item requirements;
(2) the procurement of military equipment in a manner which
permits its integration with service programs;
(3) the supervision of end-item use by the recipient countries;
(4) the supervision of the training of foreign military per-
sonnel; and
(5) the movement and delivery of military end items.
(b) The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery,
and allocation of military equipment shall be determined by the Secre-
tary of Defense. The apportionment of funds between countries
shall be determined by the President.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning with
July 1, 1952, the Secretary of Defense may furnish (subject to reim-
bursement from funds appropriated pursuant to this Act) military of
assistance out of the materials of war whose production in the United
States shall have been authorized for, and appropriated to, the Depart-
ment of Defense: Provided, however, That nothing in this Act shall
authorize the furnishing of military items under this subsection in
)
(
of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and (?
the
term "materials of war” means those goods, commonly known as
DE
au
ur
as
W]
re
3
nic
tio
3
ning with July 1, 1952” for the phrase, during the fiscal year 1952.".
fer
isti
in
ise
"402 (c)”.
FOREIGN AID
3073
military end items, which are required for the performance of their
missions by armed forces of a nation, including weapons, military
vehicles, ships of war under fifteen hundred tons, aircraft, military
communications equipment, ammunition, maintenance parts and
spares, and military hardware.
OVERSEAS COORDINATION
SEC. 507. The President shall prescribe appropriate procedures
to assure coordination among representatives of the United States
Government in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the
United States Diplomatic Mission.
COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Sec. 508. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to modify the
provisions of section 412 of the Act for International Development 2
or the provisions of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs Act.3
RELATIONSHIP
TO
TECHNICAL
AND
DETAIL OF PERSONNEL TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 509...
SECURITY CLEARANCE
Sec. 510...
}
S
or
ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE
Sec. 511. (a) No military, economic,
technical assistance
authorized pursuant to this Act (other than assistance provided
under section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,
as amended) shall be supplied to any nation in order to further military
effort unless the President finds that the supplying of such assistance
will strengthen the security of the United States and unless the
recipient country has agreed to---
(1) join in promoting international understanding and good
will, and maintaining world peace;
(2) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to elimi-
nate causes of international tension;
(3) fulfill the military obligations which it has assumed under
multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to which the United
1
9
0
S
States is a party;
3
}
(4) makė, consistent with its political and economic stability,
the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources,
| The word "end" was added by sec. 7 (g) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
* Sec. 1 (b) of Ex. Or. 10458, June 1, 1953' [infra, doc. 13), transferred the Tech-
nical Cooperation
Administration from the Department of State to the jurisdic-
tion of the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.
* Sec. 3 of Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953 (effective Aug. 1, 1953),
ferred the Institute of Inter-American Affairs to the Foreign Operations Admin-
istration and transferred the functions vested by the Inter-American Affairs Act
in the Secretary of State to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration
trans-
(see infra, doc. 12).
41690057-TOL. 2
3074
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
assisten/
1 This subsection was added by sec, 7 (h) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952
degree and at a rate commensurate with the rate of progress made
Sec. 512. In order to carry out the purpose of this Act, with respect
to those countries eligible to receive assistance as provided herein,
funds shall be available as authorized and appropriated to the Pres
facilities, and general economic condition to the development
and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive
strength of the free world;
(5) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to
develop its defense capacities; and
(6) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization
of the economic and military assistance provided by the United
States.
(b) No economic or technical assistance shall be supplied to any
other nation unless the President finds that the supplying of such
assistance will strengthen the security of the United States and pro-
mote world peace, and unless the recipient country has agreed to
join in promoting international understanding and good will, and i
maintaining world peace, and to take such action as may be mutually
agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension.
(c)? (1) The Congress of the United States finds that mutual
security can be realized only to the extent that the countries who
receive our aid do their utmost to help themselves and cooperate
among themselves and with the United States to the fullest extent
under this Act, the Congress of the United States affirms the desire
of the United States to continue to use its leadership and resources
for the purpose of uniting the efforts of recipient countries to the end
that positive accomplishments toward mutual security may be realized
with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of delay and cost.
(2) In addition to the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this
section, the Director, in administering this Act, shall insure that
, where
necessary to the mutual security effort, no country shall receive any
assistance hereunder unless it take decisive action to marshal is
resources collectively, or individually where more suitable, w
integration and unification plans in the appropriate area, and par
ticipate in programs which promote collective security in that are
The Director shall insure that, where suitable or necessary to the
success of the mutual security effort, countries take adequate steps
to mobilize their industries for mutual defense and gear their fisca
budgetary, capital, political, and military resources to the objective
of this Act and take appropriate other steps toward self-help al
mutual cooperation.
(3)
Assistance shall be given on a country-by-country basis to
in the attainment of the objectives of this Act.
FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS
:
dent each fiscal year.
FOREIGN AID
3075
ent
EVE
SPECIAL USE OF FUNDS 1
Sec 513...
STRATEGIC MATERIALS
to
S
100
Sec. 514.2 In order to reduce the drain on United States resources
and to assure the production of adequate supplies of essential raw
materials for the collective defense of The free world, the Director for
Mutual Security is authorized to initiate projects for, and assist in
procuring and stimulating increased production of, materials in which
deficiencies or potential deficiencies in supply exist among nations
receiving United States assistance. There is hereby authorized to be
appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed
$7,500,000 to carry out the provisions of this section.
ach
TO
to
PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACHMENT
SEC. 515. ...
ula
!
ho
ENCOURAGEMENT OF FREE ENTERPRISE
ate
ent
nce
SITE
"Ces
end
zed
Sec. 516. (a) The Congress recognizes the vital role of free
enterprise in achieving rising levels of production and standards of
living essential to the economic progress and defensive strength of the
free world. Accordingly, it is declared to be the policy of the United
States, in furtherance of the objectives of this Act, to encourage the
efforts of other free countries in fostering private initiative and com-
petition, in discouraging monopolistic practices, in improving the
technical efficiency of their industry, agriculture, and commerce, and
in the strengthening of free labor unions; and to encourage American
enterprise in contributing to the economic strength of other free
countries through private investment abroad and the exchange of
ideas and technical information on the matters covered by this
subsection.
chis
care
its
mith
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1. This heading was substituted for "Transferability Between Titles” by sec.
7 (i) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
? This section was revised by sec. 7 (j) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
It formerly read: "In order to promote the increased production, in areas covered
by this Act, of materials in which the United States is deficient, not to exceed
$55,000,000 of the funds authorized to be
appropriated pursuant to section 101 (a)
(2) of this Act may be used pursuant to the authority contained in the Economic
Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1501-1522).
The last sentence was added by sec. 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
3 Subsec. (a) was revised by sec. 710 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
It formerly read as follows:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress that this Act shall be
administered in such a way as (1) to eliminate the barriers to, and provide the
incentives for, a steadily increased participation of free private enterprise in
developing the resources of foreign countries consistent with the policies of this
Act, (2) to the extent that it is feasible and does not interfere with the achieve-
ment of the purposes set forth in this Act, to discourage the cartel and monopolistic
business practices prevailing in certain countries receiving aid under this Act
which result in restricting production and increasing prices, and to encourage
where suitable competition and productivity, and (3) to encourage where suitable
the development and strengthening of the free labor union movements as the
collective bargaining agencies of labor within such countries."
lect
Pill
:
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22
3076
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
made available pursuant to section 203 of this Act and not to exceed
of 1952. Sec. 710 (a) (2) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953 deleted the words
"To accomplish the purpose of clause (1) of subsection (a) of this section, under"
at the beginning of subsection (b) and substituted in lieu thereof the word "Under",
2 The Technical Cooperation Administration was transferred to the jurisdiction
of the Director for Mutual Security by sec. 1 (b) of Ex. Or. 10458 [infra, doc. 13.
Mutual Security became the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.
Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953 [infra, doc. 12), the Director for
U
1
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p.
p
SE
S
C
fi
p
as
(b) 1 Under the coordination of the Director for Mutual Security
,
the Mutual Security Agency, cooperating with private business groups
and governmental agencies to the fullest extent possible, shall encour-
age a greater participation by private capital in the guaranty program
and shall develop broad criteria to facilitate such participation,
including programs consistent with the purposes of the Act for
International Development.
(c) The Department of Commerce shall, in cooperation with such
groups and agencies (including the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development), conduct a thorough study of the legal
and other impediments, foreign and local, to private investment
abroad, and the methods and means whereby those impediments can
be removed or decreased and shall make recommendations thereon to
the Director for Mutual Security.
(d) The Department of State, in cooperation with other agencies
of the Government concerned with private investment abroad, and
taking into account the study and recommendations described in
subsection () of this section, shall accelerate a program of negotiating
treaties of commerce and trade, or other temporary arrangements
where more suitable or expeditious, which shall include provisions to
encourage and facilitate the flow of private investment to countries
participating in programs under this Act.
(e) The Technical Cooperation Administration, taking into a
count the study and recommendations described in subsection (C) of
this section, shall encourage and facilitate a greater participation by
private industrial groups or agencies in private contracts awarded by
the Administration, and shall, in cooperation with the Department of
Commerce and the Mutual Security Agency, find and draw the
attention of private enterprise to opportunities for investment and
development in underdeveloped areas.
(f) The reports required by section 518 of this Act shall include
detailed information on the implementation of this section.
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PATENTS AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION
SEC. 517...
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SEC. 518...
LOCAL CURRENCY
Sec. 519. (a) Upon a determination by the Director that it wil
further the purpose of this Act, not to exceed $10,000,000 of the
funds
Subsecs. (b) through (f) were added by sec. 7 (k) of the Mutual Security and
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ca
FOREIGN AID
3077
Act may be advanced out of funds made available for assistance
under section 503 of this Act to countries covered by said sections
in return for equivalent amounts of the currency of such countries
being made available to meet local currency needs of the aid programs
in such countries pursuant to agreements made in advance with the
United States: Provided, That except when otherwise prescribed by
the Director as necessary to the effective accomplishment of the aid
programs in such countries, all funds so advanced shall be held under
procedures set out in such agreements until used to pay for goods and
services approved by the United States or until repaid to the United
States for reimbursement to the appropriation from which drawn.
(b) In order to assist in carrying out the provisions of the Economic
Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, not to exceed $50,000,000 of
funds made available under the authority of this Act for assistance
pursuant to the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948,
as amended (22 U. S. C. 1501-1522), may be used to acquire local
currency for the purpose of increasing the production of materials
in which the United States is deficient.
GUARANTIES
1
1
Sec. 520. Funds realized from the sales of notes pursuant to section
111 (c) (2) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended,
shall be available for making guaranties of investments in accordance
with the applicable provisions of sections 111 (b) (3) and 111 (c) (2)
of the Economic Cooperation Act, as amended, in any country with
which the United States has agreed to institute the guaranty program,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 511 of this Act.?
2
1
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
Sec. 521. Funds made available for carrying out the provisions of
title I of this Act shall be available for United States participation in
the acquisition or construction of facilities in foreign countries for
collective defense: Provided, That no part of such funds shall be
expended for rental or purchase of land or for payment of taxes.
Such funds shall also be available for the administrative expenses of
carrying out the purposes of all of the titles of this Act, including
expenses incident to United States participation in international
security organizations and expenses in the United States in connection
with programs authorized under the Act for International Develop-
ment. Funds made available for carrying out the purpose of this
Act in the
Federal Republic of Germany may, as authorized in sub-
? The words "out of funds made available for assistance under section 503 of
this Act” were added by sec. 7 (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
* The words beginning "in any country" and continuing through the end of
the sentence were substituted by sec. 706 c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953
for the words "in any area in which assistance is authorized by this Act.”
There was deleted from this location by sec. 706 (f) (1) of the Mutual Security
Act of 1953 the following sentence: "Any currency of any nation received by the
United States for its own use in connection with assistance furnished by the
United States may be used by any agency of the Government without reimburse-
ment from any appropriation for the administrative and operating expenses of
carrying out the purpose of this Act.”
1
3078
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
8
USE OF COUNTERPART
C
REIMBURSABLE AID
labor standards of wages and working conditions and management-
1 This section was repealed by sec. 7 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
It formerly read as follows: “Section 111 (c) of the Economic Cooperation Act
of 1948, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1501-1522), is hereby amended by adding &
2 Sec. 414 of the Act for International Development related to personnel investi.
gations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It was replaced by sec. 510,
section 114 (h) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended
(22 U.S. C. 1512 (h)), be transferred by the President to any depart-
ment or agency for the expenses necessary to meet the responsibilities
and obligations of the United States in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Sec. 522,1 ..
SEC. 523.
RETURN OF EQUIPMENT
SEC. 524. The President shall make appropriate arrangements with
each nation receiving equipment or matériel under the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (other than equipment
or material furnished under terms requiring the nation to reimburse
the United States in full therefor), for the return to the United States
(1) for salvage or scrap, or (2) for such other disposition as the Presi-
dent shall deem to be in the interest of mutual security, of any of such
equipment or material as is no longer required for the purposes for
which originally made available.
SEC. 525..
EXCESS EQUIPMENT
SEC. 526.
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE EXPENSES
Sec. 527. ..
UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
SEC. 528. The Act for International Development is amended,
(a) By adding before the period at the end of section 404 (b) the
following: “: Provided, That for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952
such contributions from funds made available under authority of
sections 101 (a) (2), 203, 302, and 402 of the Mutual Security Act of
1951 shall not exceed in the aggregate $13,000,000, and the use
of
such contributions shall not be limited to the area covered by the
section of the Act from which the funds are drawn”.
(b) By adding at the end of section 407 a new paragraph:
"(d) Participating countries shall be encouraged to establish fair
labor relations."
(c) By repealing section 414.2
provisions of this Act with funds mea desiavailable under the authority of the
Mutual Security Act of 1951, as great an amount (in no event less than 10 per
centum) as possible shall be provided on credit terms.'"
Security Clearance, in the Mutual Security Act of 1951.
O
1
FOREIGN AID
3079
TERMINATION OF ASSISTANCE BY PRESIDENT
ed
t-
es
of
Sec. 529. If the President determines that the furnishing of
assistance to any nation-
(a) is no longer consistent with the national interest or security
of the United States or the policies and purpose of this Act; or
(b) would contravene a decision of the Security Council of
the United Nations; or
(C) would be inconsistent with the principle that members of
the United Nations should refrain from giving assistance to any
nation against which the Security Council or the General Assem-
bly has recommended measures in case of a threat to, or breach
of, the peace, or act of aggression,
he shall terminate all or part of any assistance furnished pursuant to
this Act. The function conferred herein shall be in addition to all
other functions heretofore conferred with respect to the termination
of military, economic, or technical assistance.
th
al
nt
se
es
51-
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or
EXPIRATION OF PROGRAM
he
52
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of
of
he
Sec. 530. (a) After June 30, 1954, or after the date of the passage
of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses of Congress before such
date
, none of the authority conferred by this Act or by the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U. S. Č. 1571-1604)
may be exercised; except that during the twenty-four months follow-
ing such date equipment, materials, commodities, and services with
respect to which procurement for, shipment to, or delivery in a
recipient country had been authorized prior to such date, may be
transferred to such country, and funds appropriated under authority
of this Act may be obligated during such twenty-four month period
for the necessary expenses of procurement, shipment, delivery, and
other activities essential to such transfer and
shall remain available
during such period for the necessary expenses of liquidating operations
under this Act: Provided, That such part of the equipment, materials
and services referred to above as is to be transferred to recipient
countries under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as
amended, or the Act of May 22, 1947, as amended, may be so trans-
ferred until June 30, 1957, and that part of the funds referred to
above which is appropriated to carry out such Acts may be obligated
for the purposes set forth above, and for liquidating operations under
this proviso, until June 30, 1957: Provided. That guaranties author-
ized under section 111 (b) (3) of the Economic Cooperation Act of
1948, as amended, may be issued until June 30, 1957, out of any funds
remaining
available for that purpose.
(b) At such time as the President shall find appropriate after such
date
, and prior to the expiration
of the twenty-four months
following
such date, the powers, duties, and authority conferred by this Act
and by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, may
Sec
. 706 (d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953 added the provisos to sec.
530 (a) and substituted "twenty-four months” and twenty-four month” for
twelve months” and twelve month” respectively wherever they appeared
air
ita
52.
Act
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ble
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formerly in sec. 530.
3080
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
.
1
ance under this Act; And provided further, That not to exceed
i This section was added by sec. 7 (m) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
The final sentence of the section was added by sec. 601 of the Mutual Security
Act of 1953. A related provision, sec. 115 (e) of the Economic Cooperation :
of 1948, as amended, was repealed by sec. 7 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of
1952. In Ex. Or. 10458, sec. 2, this function was delegated by the President to
2 This section was added by sec. 7 (m) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
The final sentence of the section was added by sec. 604 of the Mutual Security
Act of 1953. In Ex. Or. 10458, sec. 3, this function was delegated by the Presi.
dent to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (see infra, doc. 13)
be transferred for the purpose of liquidation to such other depart-
ments, agencies, or establishments of the Government as the President
shall specify, and the relevant funds, records, property and personnel
may be transferred to the departments, agencies, or establishments
to which the related functions are transferred.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 531. Sections 502 (a), (b), (2), and section 504 (b) of this
Act shall take effect on such date or dates as the President shall
specify, but in no event later than sixty days after the date the
Director first appointed takes office. Section 511 shall take effect
ninety days after enactment of this Act. All other provisions of this
Act shall take effect upon the date of its enactment.
EXEMPTION FROM CONTRACT, ACCOUNTING, AND CERTAIN OTHER LATS
SEC. 532.
SEC. 533.
MOVEMENT OF MIGRANTS
SEC. 534.' In order to encourage further the movement of mi-
grants from European countries having surplus population, there is
hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President $9,240,500 for
use in making contributions for the calendar year 1953 to the Provi.
sional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants
from Europe established at Brussels, Belgium, on December 5,
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not
to exceed $10,000,000 for contributions during the calendar yeau
1954 to the Intergovernmental Committee for Ểuropean Migration.
OCEAN FREIGHT CHARGES ON RELIEF PACKAGES
Sec. 535.2 The authority to pay ocean freight charges on ship
ments of relief supplies and packages under section 117 cc) of the
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U.S. C. 1515 (0)
shall be continued and may be exercised after June 30, 1952, by au
department or agency of the Government that the President may
designate:
Provided, That this authority shall hereafter also be api-
cable to relief shipments by voluntary nonprofit relief agencies regis
tered with and approved by the Advisory Committee on Voluntar
Foreign Aid to any country eligible for economic or technical assisk
$2,587,500 are authorized to be appropriated to the President for
the fiscal year 1953 for use in paying ocean freight charges
1951,
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3081
FOREIGN AID
}
INFORMATIONAL MEDIA GUARANTIES
LIMITATION ON FUNDS FOR PROPAGANDA
OI
Business to carry out the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this
section 117 (c) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended.
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for
the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $1,825,000 for use in paying ocean
freight charges under section 117 (c) of the Economic Cooperation
Act of 1948, as amended.
Sec. 536. The authority to make informational media guaranties
under section 111 (b) (3) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948,
as amended, shall be fully continued and may be exercised after
June 30, 1952, by any department or agency of the Government that
the President may designate.
Sec. 537.None of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated
nor any counterpart funds shall be used to pay for personal services
or printing, or for other expenses of the dissemination within the
United States of general propaganda in support of the mutual security
program, or to pay the travel or other expenses outside the United
States of any citizen or group of citizens of the United States for the
purpose of publicizing such program within the United States.
Sec. 538.? (a) Insofar as practicable and to the maximum extent
ot
consistent with the accomplishment of the purposes of this Act, the
Director for Mutual Security shall assist American small business to
participate equitably in the furnishing of commodities and services
financed with funds authorized under this Act (other than funds
authorized to carry out the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assist-
ance Act of 1949, as amended) by making available or causing to be
made available to suppliers in the United States and particularly to
small independent enterprises, information, as far in advance as
y possible, with respect to purchases proposed to be financed with
funds authorized under this Act (other than funds authorized to
carry out the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of
1949, as amended), by making available or causing to be made avail-
T
able to prospective purchasers in the countries receiving assistance
under this Act information as to commodities and services produced
by small independent enterprises in the United States, and by offer-
ing additional services to give small business better opportunities to
participate in the furnishing of commodities and services financed
with such funds.
(b) There shall be continued in the Mutual Security Agency the
Office of Small Business headed by the Special Assistant for Small
section. Each report transmitted to the Congress under section 518
This section was added by sec. 7 (m) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
In Ex. Or. 10476, sec. 201, the United States Information Agency was designated
to carry out the function authorized in sec. 536 (see infra, doc. 14].
? This section was added by sec. 7 (m) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
ts
1.
SMALL BUSINESS
9T
D.
D-
S-
ed
OL
BT
2
Gus
ct
2
3 This section was added by sec. 201 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
out the provisions of section 101 (a) (2) (relating to defense support
and economic assistance for Europe), and not to exceed $84,000,000
to carry out the provisions of section 302 (a) (relating to defense
support, economic and technical assistance), including the exploration
and development of mineral and petroleum resources, for the National
Government of the Republic of China and the Associated States of
3082 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
shall include a report of all activities under this section. The Tech-
nical Cooperation Administration shall adopt the procedure of notify
.
ing American business, particularly small independent enterprises, of
procurement and other information as far in advance as possible
through the facilities of the Office of Small Business of the Mutual
Security Agency. The Secretary of Defense shall assure that there is
made available to suppliers in the United States, and particularly.to
small independent enterprises, information with respect to purchases
made by the Department of Defense pursuant to the provisions of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, such information
to be furnished as far in advance as possible.
(c) Section 112 (i) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as
amended, is hereby repealed.
LIMITATION ON USE OF COUNTERPART FUNDS
SEC. 539. Except as otherwise specifically authorized by law, al
counterpart funds of local currencies created by section 115 (b) (6) of
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and by Acts
supplementary or amendatory thereto shall be expended only on
programs to carry out the purposes for which new funds authorized by
this Act would themselves be available.
SEC. 540.2 There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $2,129,689,870 to be
available under section 101 (a) (1) (relating to military assistance for
Europe): Provided, That of the equipment
and materials made avail
able under section 101 (a) (1) with funds appropriated pursuant to the
authorization contained in this section, 50 per centum shall be trans
ferred to the organization referred to in clause (C) of section 2 (b) or
to the countries which become members thereof, unless the Congress
,
upon the recommendation of the President, shall hereafter otherwise
provide; $305,212,637 to be available under section 201 (relating to
military assistance for the Near East and Africa); $1,081,620,493 to
be available under section 301 (relating to military and other assist
ance for Asia and the Pacific); and $15,000,000 to be available under
section 401 (relating to military assistance for Latin America)
,
SEC. 541. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $250,000,000 to cart
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
1
(
1
tege
a
* This section was added by see. 7 (m) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952
2 This section was added by sec: 10.1% of the Mutual Security Act of 1953
p
FOREIGN AID
3083
1
IS
to
PS
28
OD
235
ON
Sec. 542. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
F- President for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $100,000,000 for the
of
purpose of furnishing special weapons to nations eligible to receive
military assistance under this Act or to the international organizations
s referred to in section 2 (b) (A) and 2 (b) (C) of this Act: Provided,
That, prior to the obligation of funds for this purpose, the President
shall determine that such obligation is of direct importance to the
security interest of the United States and is in furtherance of the
policies and purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,
as amended: And provided further, That, prior to the transfer of such
weapons, the President shall determine (i) that the recipient is ade-
quately prepared to safeguard the security of such weapons; (2) that
the transfer of such weapons will be of direct importance to the secu-
rity interest of the United States; and (3) that such transfer will further
the purposes and policies of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,
as amended. Nothing contained in this section shall alter, amend,
of revoke, repeal, or otherwise affect the provisions of any law restricting,
limiting, or prohibiting the transfer of any such weapons. Notwith-
standing any other provisions of this Act, funds made available pur-
by suant to this section may be used only for the purpose of this section.
SEC. 543.2 There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $43,792,500 to carry
out the provisions of section 203 (relating to economic and technical
he
assistance for the Near East and Africa); $72,100,000 to carry out the
be provisions of section 302 (a) (relating to defense support, economic
for and technical assistance) other than for the National Government of
il-
the Republic of China and the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos,
he and Vietnam; and $24,342,000 to carry out the provisions of section
402 (relating to technical assistance for Latin America).
Sec. 544. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
SS.
President for the fiscal year 1954 not to exceed $13,750,000 for multi-
lateral technical cooperation under section 404 (b) of the Act for
International Development.
to
Sec. 545. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President not to exceed $9,000,000 for contributions during the calen-
ler
year 1954 for the support of international children's welfare work
in such manner and on such terms and conditions as he may deem to
he
be in the interests of the United States.
AS-
Or
IS
to
st-
dar
art
UNEXPENDED BALANCES
00
ISE
01
101
SEC. 546.5 The unexpended balance under each paragraph of title
III, Mutual Security, of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1953,
is hereby authorized to be continued available for its original purposes
through June 30, 1954, and may be consolidated
with the appropriate
This section was added by sec. 301 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
This section was added by sec. 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
* This section was added by sec, 602 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
* This section was added by sec. 603 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953. See
also sec. 12 of the Mutual Security Act of 1952, text on p. 44 (of the Committee
• This section was added by sec. 702 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
print).
1
3084
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
8 This section was added by sec. 706 (g) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
8
S
UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS
S
t
CO
a
n
after the Mutual Security Act of 1953 is enacted, together with
(b) In carrying out his duties under this section, the Director for
Mutual Security shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Rela-
House of Representatives, and shall keep these committees constantly
2 This section was added by sec. 706 (f) (2) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952
1 This section was added by sec. 706 (e) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953
fiscal year 1954 appropriation made for the same general purpose under
the authority of this Act.
SEC. 547.1 Whenever funds are made available under this Act for
assistance, other than military assistance, to any economically under $
developed area, such funds may be used under the applicable provi-
sions of section 503 (b) (3) or the applicable provisions of the Act for
International Development. Where administrative arrangements
,
including provisions relating to compensation and allowances of
personnel, authorized under section 503 (b) (3), differ from those ft
authorized by the Act for International Development, the Director
may make use of arrangements authorized under either statute, in
carrying out such programs, except that before extending the provi.
U
sions of section 109 (a) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as
amended, to countries in which programs authorized under the Act
for International Development are being carried out, the Director wil
secure the approval of the Secretary of State.
Sec. 548.2 (a) The several amounts otherwise authorized by this
Act to be appropriated are authorized to be increased by amounts
which shall not, in the aggregate, exceed $98,396,000.
in this Act are authorized to be made available for purchase of foreign
(b) Amounts appropriated pursuant to any authorization contained
currencies (including foreign currencies or credits owed to or owned by
the United States). Provided, That such currencies or credits are
authorized to be made available for use, without reimbursement to
the Treasury, for liquidation of obligations legally incurred against
such currencies prior to July 1, 1953.
ti
th
Sec. 549.3 (a) In order to contribute to the peace and stability of
the Near East in particular and of the world in general, the Director
for Mutual Security shall, in consultation
with the Secretary of State
make a survey
of the refugee situation in the Near East and report the
results of the survey to the Congress within one hundred fifty day
recommendations for seeking a solution. In the making of such report
and recommendations, especial consideration shall be given to 8
program which would utilize the services and talents of these refugees
to develop and expand the resources of the area, including its water
resources,
UNITED STATES USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY
NEAR EAST REFUGEES
re
FOREIGN AID
3085
1
S
et
1
and fully informed of the action which he takes to carry out the provi-
sions of this section.
USE OF SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
Sec. 550.1 (a) Not less than $100,000,000 and not more than
$250,000,000 of the funds authorized to be appropriated under this
Act, shall be used, directly or indirectly, to finance the purchase of
surplus agricultural commodities, or products thereof, produced in
the United States.
(b) The President is authorized to enter into agreements with
e friendly countries for the sale and export of such surplus agricultural
r
commodities under conditions negotiated by him with such countries
and to accept in payment therefor local currency for the account of the
United States. In negotiating agreements for the sale of such com-
modities, the President shall-
(1) take special precaution to safeguard against the substitu-
11 tion or displacement of usual marketings of the United States or
friendly countries, and to assure to the maximum extent practi-
cable that sales prices of such commodities are consistent with
maximum world market prices of like commodities of similar
quality, and to obtain the recommendations of the Secretary of
Agriculture in carrying out the provisions of this subsection;
(2) use private trade channels to the maximum extent prac-
ed
ticable;
(3) give appropriate emphasis to underdeveloped and new
2
(4) obtain assurance that the purchasing countries will not
resell or transship to other countries or use for other than domestic
consumption commodities purchased under this program without
specific approval by the President.
(c) Notwithstanding section 1415 of the Supplemental Appropria-
tion Act, 1953, or any other provision of law, the President shall use
the proceeds of such sales for the purpose of this Act, giving particular
regard to the following purposes-
(1) for providing military assistance to countries or mutual
defense organizations eligible to receive assistance under this
Act:
h
(2) for purchase of goods or services in friendly countries;
(3) for loans, under applicable provisions of this Act, to in-
crease production of goods or services, including strategic ma-
terials, needed in any country with which an agreement was
negotiated, or in other friendly countries, with the authority
to use currencies received in repayment for the purposes stated
in this section or for deposit to the general account of the Treasury
(4) for developing new markets on a mutually beneficial basis;
(5) for grants-in-aid to increase production for domestic needs
(6) for purchasing materials for United States stockpiles.
* This section was added by sec. 706 (h) of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.
market areas;
re
to
st
I
le
15
et
8
$
1
of the United States;
in friendly countries;
3086
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
to
40
S
0
u
JE
si
D
1
ai
and regulations providing for coordination among representatives of
the United States Government in each foreign country concerned.
Administration of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and Related Statutes".
The Executive order is entitled "Providing for the
(d) In carrying out the provisions of this section, the President
shall take special precaution to safeguard against the displacement to
of foreign exchange earnings which would otherwise accrue to the
United States or any friendly nations.
fu
(e) The President is authorized to enter into such agreements with b
third countries receiving goods accruing from the proceeds of sales
made pursuant to this section as he deems necessary to effectuate the
purpose of this Act.
10. ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY UNDER THE MUTUAL b
SECURITY ACT OF 1951: Executive Order No. 10300, November th
1, 1951 1
Sec. 1. Delegation of functions of the President.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 1 (b) of this order, the
functions conferred upon the President by the following-designated
laws are hereby delegated to the Director for Mutual Security: the
Mutual Security Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 373 (Public Law 165, 82d Cou-
gress, approved October 10, 1951), the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 714, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1571-1604), and
the act of May 22, 1947, 61 Stat. 103, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1401-
1408).
(b) There are hereby excluded from the functions delegated by
section 1 (a) of this order:
th
(1) The functions conferred upon the President by the laws referred C
to in section 1 (a) of this Executive order with respect to the appoint-
ment of officers required to be appointed by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, the transmittal of annual
, semi-annual, or
other periodic statutory reports to the Congress, and the termination
or withdrawal of assistance.
S
(2) The functions conferred upon the President with
ti
findings, determinations, certification, agreements, or regulations, 51
the case may be, by sections 101, 202, 302 (a), or 511, or by the propis tl
of section 401, of the said Mutual Security Act of 1951 or by section
303, 402, and' 411 (b) of the said Mutual Defense Assistance Act & fi
1949, as amended; functions so conferred with respect to the transier
of funds under sections 101 (b), 303 (a), and 513 of the Mutual Se
curity Act of 1951; and so much of the functions so conferred by
tion 5 of the said act of May 22, 1947, as amended, as relates to rules
d
503, 507, and 530 of the said Mutual Security Act of 1951 and
sections 407 (b) (2) and 408
(f) of the said Mutual
Defense Assistant
Act of 1949, as amended.
1 16 Fed. Reg. 11203.
a.
V
ti
to
respect
sec-
asi
E
ri
SI
.
0)
I
2 Also supra.
3 Also A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356–1364.
FOREIGN AID
3087
1
le
d
le
1
ce
I (c) Funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the President
I to carry out the laws referred to in section 1 (a) hereof shall be deemed
to be allocated to the Director for Mutual Security without any
further action by the President, and the said funds may be allocated
by the Director for Mutual Security to any agency, department,
establishment, or wholly-owned corporation of the Government for
obligation or expenditure thereby, consistent with applicable law,
subject
, however, to the reservation of functions respecting transfer
of funds set forth in section 1 (b) (2) hereof.
(d) The functions delegated to the Director for Mutual Security
| by this section 1 shall be deemed to include the authority to redelegate
the functions so delegated.
Sec. 2. International development. The administration of programs
under the Act for International Development (Title IV of the act of
June 5, 1950, 64 Stat. 204, as amended (22 U.S. C. 1557 et seq.)) in
accordance with Executive Order No. 10159 of September 8, 1950,2
shall be subject to coordination, direction, and supervision by the
Director for Mutual Security in accordance with section 501 (a) of
the Mutual Security Act of 1951; and the said Executive Order No.
10159 is amended accordingly.
Sec. 3. Coordination with foreign policy. The Secretary of State
and the Director for Mutual Security shall establish and maintain
arrangements which will insure that the programs included in the
Mutual Security Act of 1951 shall be carried out in conformity with
the established foreign policy of the United States.
Sec. 4. Interrelationship of Director and Secretary of Defense. (a)
ed
Consonant with section 501 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the
Secretary of Defense shall exercise the responsibility and authority
vested in him by section 506 (a) of the said Act subject to coordina-
tion, direction, and supervision by the Director for Mutual Security.
(b) The Secretary of Defense shall keep the Director for Mutual
Security fully and currently informed of all matters, including prospec-
tive action, relating to the establishment of priorities under section
506 (b) and the furnishing of military items under section 506 (c) of
the said Act.
Sec
. 5. Economic cooperation. (a) December 30, 1951, is hereby
fixed as the date on which sections 502 (a), 502 (b) (2) and 504 (b) of
the Mutual Security Act of 1951 shall take effect.
(b) The Mutual Security Agency is hereby designated as the
agency responsible for liquidating any outstanding affairs of the
Economic Cooperation Administration which are now or hereafter
required to be discontinued by law; and the said Agency shall be
deemed to be the successor of the said Administration in all respects,
subject to the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951.
Sec
. 6. Transfer of personnel, property, records, and funds. So
much of the personnel, records, property, and unexpended balances
of appropriations, allocations, and other funds of the Department of
State
as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget determines to relate
t-
id
01
31
10
IS
0
1$
of
31
D.
ته
N
1
2
Also supra, doc. 6.
? Supra, doc. 7.
3088
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ur
ve
Da.
Яс
an
rec
are
approved October 10, 1951), and as President of the United States and
Section 1. Functions of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic
Mission. (a) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in
behalf, shall coordinate the activities of the United States represents she
to functions under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as tic
amended, and the said act of May 22, 1947, and to be required by
the Director for Mutual Security for the performance of his functions St
hereunder shall be transferred to the Director for Mutual Security
,
Sec. 7. Prior orders. (a) Effective as of the date fixed in section Ad
5 (a) hereof, with respect to provisions then in force, and except as
may be inappropriate, references in prior Executive orders to the
Economic Cooperation Administration, the Administrator for Eco-M
nomic Cooperation, and the United States Special Representative ce
for (or in Europe, are amended to refer to the Mutual Security
Agency, the Director for Mutual Security, and the Special Representa-
tive in Europe (provided for in section 504 (a) of the Mutual Security
Act of 1951), respectively.
(b) To the extent that any provision of any prior Executive order the
is inconsistent with the provisions of this order, the latter shall control
and such prior provision is amended accordingly
(c) All orders, regulations, rulings, certificates, directives, agree-
ments, contracts, delegations, and other actions of any department
,
agency, or other establishment or officer of the Government relating un
to any function or under any authority continued in effect by the eff
Mutual Security Act of 1951 shall remain in effect except as they are
ha.
inconsistent herewith or are hereafter amended or revoked under
proper authority.
(d) Executive Order No. 10099 of January 27, 1950,' is hereby
revoked. The International Security Affairs Committee (approved the
by the President December 19, 1950) is hereby terminated. The
provisions of the identical letters of the President transmitted to the
Secretary of State and the Administrator for Economic Cooperation
on April 5, 1951, are hereby revoked.
Sec. 8. Definitions. As used in this order the term "functions" Di
embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, and discretion
,
hip
th
11. COORDINATION OF FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS AT THE
DIPLOMATIC MISSION LEVEL: Executive Order No. 10338
,
April 4, 19522
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 507 of the Mutual
Security Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 373 (Public Law 165, 82nd Congress
of
ordered as follows:
ta!
each country, as the representative of the President, and acting on
cu
sel
act
ste
t
his
HARRY S. TRUMAN.
fm
dir
St
cil
to
act
Sta
U
sht
1 Supra, doc. 2.
2.17 Fed. Reg. 3009.
FOREIGN AID
3089
3
1
S
e
T
United States representatives in each country shall be subject to the
tives (including the chiefs of economic missions, military assistance
advisory groups, and other representatives of agencies of the United
States Government) in such country engaged in carrying out programs
under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act), and he shall assume responsibility for assuring the unified de-
velopment and execution of the said programs in such country. More
e particularly, the functions of each Chief of United States Diplomatic
Mission shall include, with respect to the programs and country con-
P
cerned:
1 (1) Exercising general direction and leadership of the entire effort.
(2) Assuring that recommendations and prospective plans and
1 actions of the United States representatives are effectively coordinated
and are consistent with and in furtherance of the established policy of
the United States.
1 (3) Assuring that the interpretation and application of instructions
received by the United States representatives from higher authority
are in accord with the established policy of the United States.
(4) Guiding the United States representatives in working out meas-
ures to prevent duplication in their efforts and to promote the most
effective and efficient use of all United States officers and employees
e having mutual security responsibilities.
(6) Keeping the United States representatives fully informed as to
current and prospective United States policies.
(6) Prescribing procedures governing the coordination of the activi-
ties of the United States representatives, and assuring that these repre-
sentatives shall have access to all available information essential to the
accomplishment of their prescribed duties.
(7) Preparing and submitting such reports on the operation and
status of the programs under the Act as may be directed by the
Director for Mutual Security
(b) Each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall perform
his functions under this order in accordance with instructions from
higher authority and subject to established policies and programs of
B (C) No Chief of United States Diptomatic Mission shall delegate any
function conferred upon him by the provisions of this order which
directly involves the exercise of direction, coordination, or authority
Section 2. Referral of unresolved matters. The Chief of the United
States Diplomatic Mission in each country shall initiate steps to recon-
cle any divergent views arising in the country concerned with respect
to programs under the Act. If agreement cannot be reached the Chief
of the United States Diplomatic Mission shall recommend a course of
action, and such course of action shall be followed unless a United
States representative requests that the issue be referred to higher
authority
for decision. If such a request
is made, the parties concerned
promptly refer the issue to higher authority for resolution prior to
taking action at the country level. The Director for Mutual Security
shall assure expeditious decisions on matters so submitted:
Section 3. Effect of order on United States Representatives. (a) AU
ce
le
0
the United States.
1
S
)
shall
Ś
415900_-57-Vol. 2
91
3090
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ņ
1
0
VE
8
the Foreign Operations Administration, hereinafter referred to
(b) There shall be at the head of the Administration a Director su
of the Foreign Operations Administration, hereinafter referred #
2 12 Fed. Reg. 3331, 3558, 3559, 8867; 13. Fed. Reg. 1975 and 2707; and 16.P.
responsibilities imposed upon the Chief of the United States Diplo-
matic Mission in such country by section 507 of the Mutual Security
Act of 1951 and by this order.
(b) Subject to compliance with the provisions of this order and with
the prescribed procedures of their respective agencies, all United
States representatives affected by this order (1) shall have direct
communication with their respective agencies and with such other
parties and in such manner as may be authorized by their respectie
agencies, (2) shall keep the respective Chiefs of United States Diploma
matic Missions and each other fully and currently informed on all
matters, including prospective plans, recommendations, and actions,
relating to programs under the Act, and (3) shall furnish to the re
spective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions, upon their i
request, documents and information concerning the said programs.
Section 4. Further coordination procedures. The Director for Mutual
Security shall be responsible for assuring the carrying out of the pro
visions of this order. He is authorized to prescribe, after consultation
with the interested Government agencies, any additional procedures
he may find necessary to carry out the provisions of this order
.
Section 5. Prior orders. (á) To the extent that provisions of any
ti
prior order are inconsistent with the provisions of this order, the latter o
shall control, and any such prior provisions are amended accordingly
.
All orders, regulations, rulings, certificates, directives, and other to
actions relating to any function affected by this order shall remain in a
effect except as they are inconsistent herewith or are hereafter amended
or revoked under proper authority.
(b) Nothing in this order shall affect Executive Orders Nos. 10062 to
10063 and 10144 of June 6, 1949, June 13, 1949, and July 21, 1950,
respectively.
(c) Executive Orders Nos. 9857, 9862, 9864, 9914, 9944, 9960, 1020
and 10259 of May 22, 1947, May 31, 1947, May 31, 1947, December 25,
1947, April 9, 1948, May 19, 1948, January 25, 1951, and June 27,
respectively, are hereby revoked.?
A
12. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADR
MINISTRATION: Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953, June 1
IT
1953 3
fe
(a) There is hereby established a new, agency which
shall be kupne
SECTION 1. Establishment of Foregin Operations Administration of
th
as the "Administration".
1 . , 14: Fed. Reg: 3221, and : Fed. .
Reg. 709 and
by
* 67 Stat: 639. The plan entered into effect Aug. 1, 1953.
I
ಹ ಹ ದ
1951,
ñ
HARRY S. TRUMAN
er
asi
!
FOREIGN AID
3091
5.
010-
ole as the "Director". The Director shall be appointed by the President
Fitr by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall receive
compensation at the rate of $22,500 a year. The Secretary of State
ith shall advise with the President concerning the appointment and tenure
ted of the Director.
Cect
(c) There shall be in the Administration a Deputy Director of
her the Foreign Operations Administration, who shall be appointed by
live the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
Do and who shall receive compensation at the rate of $17,500 a year.
all The Deputy Director shall perform such functions as the Director
ons shall from time to time designate, and shall act as Director during
the absence or disability of the Director or in the event of a vacancy
Dar in the office of Director.
(d) There are hereby established in the Administration six new
jual offices with such title or titles as the Director shall from time to time
To determine. Appointment thereto shall be by the President, by and
Lion with the advice and consent of the Senate. The compensation for
ares each of two of the said offices shall be at the rate of $16,000 a year
and the compensation for each of the other four offices shall be at
any the rate of $15,000 a year. The persons appointed to the said new
tter offices shall perform such functions as the Director shall from time
gly
. to time designate, and are authorized to act as Director, as the Direc-
bet tor may designate, during the absence or disability of the Director
in and the Deputy Director or in the event of vacancies in the offices
ned of Director and Deputy Director.
Sec. 2. Transfer of functions to the Director.-- There are hereby
262, transferred to the Director:
150
, (a) All functions vested by the Mutual Security Act of 1951,
as amended, or by any other statute in the Director for Mutual
108, Security provided for in section 501 of that Act, or in the Mutual
28
, Security Agency created by that Act, or in any official or office of
151, that Agency, including the functions of the Director for Mutual
Security as a member of the National Security Council.
(b) All functions vested by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act of 1951 in the Administrator created by that Act.
The function vested by section 6 of the Yugoslav Emergency
D. Relief Assistance Act of 1950 in the Secretary of State.?
1,
SEC. 3. Institute of Inter-American Affairs.-The Institute of
Inter-American Affairs, together with its functions, is hereby trans-
ferred to the Administration. All functions vested by the Institute
of Inter-American Affairs Act in he Secretary of State are hereby
transferred to the Director. Functions with respect to serving as
to employees of the said Institute or as members
of the board of directors
thereof, including eligibility, as the case may be, to be detailed as
that such employees or to serve as such members, are hereby transferred
from the officials and employees of the Department of State to the
$
1
TO
to
Pod
1 See infra, doc. 15.
PL 897, 81st Cong., 2d sess., Dec. 29, 1950; 64 Stat. 1122.
* See PL 369, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 5, 1947 (61 Stat. 780), as amended
by PL 283, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 3, 1949 (63 Stat. 685).
3092
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
58
@
8
SE
re
SC
PI
sa
DO
of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended (including the organ
zation in the Executive Office of the President known as the Office of
(3) The title of Administrator provided for in the Mutual Defense
(4) The four positions provided for in section 406 (e) of the Mutual
officials and employees of the Administration. The Institute shall
be administered subject to the direction and control of the Director
,
SEC. 4. National Advisory Council.—The Director shall be a
member of the National Advisory Council on International Mone- 1
tary and Financial Problems (22 U. S. C. 286b).
SEC. 5. Performance of functions transferred to the Director:- The
Director may from time to time make such provisions as he shall $
deem appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer
, to
or by any employee or organizational entity, of the Administration
of any function of the Director, except the function of being a member
of the National Security Council and the function of being a member PI
of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Problems.
SEC. 6. Transfer of functions to the President.---- All functions vested
in the Secretary of State by the United Nations Palestine Refuges
Aid Act of 1950 1 are hereby transferred to the President.
SEC. 7. Incidental transfers.-(a) Personnel
, property, records, and
unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds
,
employed, used, held, available, or to be made available in connection
with functions transferred or vested by this reorganization plan shall | la
be transferred, at such time or times as the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget shall direct, as follows:
(1) So much of those relating to functions transferred to or vested edi
in the Director or the Administration as the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget shall determine shall be transferred to the Administra- D
tion.
tic
(2) Those of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs shall be trans-
ferred along with the Institute.
(3) So much of those relating to the functions transferred by section M
6 hereof as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine tw
shall be transferred to the agency or agencies of the Government
to which the President delegates the said functions.
of
(b) Such further measures and dispositions as the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget shall deem to be necessary in order to effect in
tuate the transfers provided for in subsection (a) of this section de
shall be carried out in such manner as he shall direct and by such
agencies as he shall designate.
SEC. 8. Abolitions.--(a) There are hereby abolished:
13
(1) The
offices of Director for Mutual Security and Deputy Director
for Mutual Security, provided for
in sections 501 and 504, respectively
the Director for Mutual Security).
(2) The Mutual Security Agency.
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.
OC
pe
AC
an
1
2
8
Ad
I Supra, pp. 2256-2257,
3093
FOREIGN AID
-
as
8
TI
U
Administration of Certain Foreign Aid Programs and Related Activities. ",
(5) The offices of Administrator and Deputy Administrator for
Technical Cooperation, provided for in section 413 (a) of the Act for
International Development, as amended, together with the functions
vested in the Administrator by the said section 413 (a), as amended.
(6) The offices of the Special Representative in Europe and Deputy
Special Representative in Europe, provided for in section 504 (a) of
: the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. The abolition of the
said offices of Representative and Deputy Representative shall become
effective on September 1, 1953 (unless å later date is required by the
provisions of section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act of 1949,2
1 amended).
(b) The Director shall wind up any outstanding affairs of the afore-
said abolished agencies and offices not otherwise provided for in this
reorganization plan.
SEC. 9. Interim provisions.—The President may authorize the per-
d
sons who, immediately prior to the effective date of this reorganization
plan, hold offices or occupy positions abolished by section 8 hereof to
hold offices and occupy positions under section 1 hereof until the
1 latter offices and positions are filled pursuant to the provisions of the
said section 1 or by recess appointment, as the case may be, but in
no event for any period extending more than 60 days after the said
d effective date, as follows:
(a) The Director and Deputy Director for Mutual Security as the
- Director and Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Administra-
tion, respectively.
(b) The Administrator for Technical Cooperation and the person
occupying the senior position provided for in section 406 (e) of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, to serve in the
two senior positions created by section i (d) hereof.
at
(C) The Deputy Administrator for Technical Cooperation and the
persons occupying the three positions provided for in section 406 (e)
le of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, to serve
in the four positions created by section 1 (d) hereof which have com-
pensation at the rate of $15,000 a year.
13. ADMINISTRATION OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE
MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM: Executive Order No. 10458,
June 1, 1953 %
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security
Act of 1951, as amended, the Act for International Development, as
amended, and sections 301 to 303, inclusive, of title 3 of the United
Supra, doc. 6.
PL 109, 81st Cong., 1st sess., June 20, 1949; 63 Stat. 203.
18 Fed. Reg. 3159." The title of the executive order reads "Providing for the
* Supra, doc. 6.
U
S-
1
18
I
1
!
3
1.
to
to
U
si
HE
W
TE
0
81
19
ho
fo
oi
re
00
in
to
b
conformity with the established foreign policy of the United States.
(c) The Secretary of State shall be responsible for making the
404 of the Act for International Development, to the United Nations
for technical cooperation programs carried on by it and its related
organizations, and to the Organization of American States, its related
organizations, and other international organizations for technical
cooperation programs carried on by them, and for making United
section 2 hereof. The Secretary of State shall also be responsible
States contributions to the international organizations referred to St
for formulating and presenting, with the assistance of the Director
for Mutual Security, the policy of the United States with respect
3094 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered
as follows:
SECTION 1. International development. (a) The functions conferred
upon the Secretary of State by Executive Order No. 10159 of Septem-
ber 8, 1950, 15 F. R. 6103, are hereby transferred to the Director for
Mutual Security; and, accordingly, the said Executive order is
amended by striking therefrom, wherever they appear, the words
"Secretary of State” and inserting in lieu thereof, in each instance
,
the words "Director for Mutual Security".
(b) The Technical Cooperation Administration is hereby trans-
ferred from the Department of State to the jurisdiction of the Director
for Mutual Security and shall be administered under his direction
and supervision.
SEC. 2. Participation in certain international organizations. There
are hereby delegated to the Director for Mutual Security the func-
tions conferred upon the President by section 534 of the Mutual
Security Act of 1951, as amended, section 12 of the Mutual Security
Act of 1952, and section 303 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as
amended, with respect to the Intergovernmental Committee for
European Migration (as the successor of the Provisional Intergovern-
mental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe)
the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, and
the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, respectively.
Sec. 3. Ocean freight charges on relief supplies, etc. The Mutual
Security Agency is hereby designated as the agency of the Government
which shall hereafter exercise the authority to pay ocean freight
charges on shipments of relief supplies and packages under section
117 (c) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948,
as amended,' are
section 535 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended.
Sec. 4. Functions of Secretary of State and Department of State
(a) Nothing in this order shall be deemed to modify the functions a
the Secretary of State with respect to conducting negotiations with
other governments.
(b) The Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security
shall establish and maintain arrangements which will insure that the
functions of the said Director under this order shall be carried out in
United States contributions, under subsections (a) and (b) of section
1 Supra, doc. 7.
: A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1299–1327.
ef
OP
de
1
t
Is
an
m
81
af
SIS
au
14
1
of
!
FOREIGN AID
3095
M-
OI
of
re
C
as
Or
D-
of Foreign Aid and Foreign Information Functions."
ed
to the assistance programs of the international organizations referred
to in this subsection and in section 2 hereof and for representing the
United States in those organizations. Sections 1 (a) and 2 hereof
ed
shall be subject to this subsection.
(d) The Director for Mutual Security shall allocate to the Depart-
ment of State funds which have been or may be appropriated or other-
Hy
wise made available for contributions of the United States to the
international organizations referred to in section 2 hereof or to those
58
receiving contributions under subsections (a) and (b) of section 404
of the Act for International Development.
Sec. 5. Miscellaneous provisions. (a) Subsection (a) of section 2
and sections 3 and 4 of Executive Order No. 10300 of November 1,
1951, as amended by Executive Order No. 10368 of June 30, 1952, are
hereby revoked.
(b) There shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Director
al for Mutual Security, consonant with law, so much as the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine of the personnel, property,
ty
records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and
other funds, employed, held, used, available, or to be made available
in connection with the functions transferred, delegated, or assigned
to the Director for Mutual Security or the Mutual Security Agency
by this order. Such further measures and dispositions as the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget shall deem to be necessary in order to
effectuate the transfers provided for in this section shall be carried
nt
out in such manner as he shall direct and by such agencies as he shall
(C) To the extent that any provision of any prior Executive order
is inconsistent with the provisions of this order, the latter shall control
and such prior provision is amended accordingly.
thu
(d) All orders, regulations, rulings, certificates, directives, agree-
diments, contracts, delegations, determinations, and other actions of
th any officer or agency of the Government relating to any function
affected by this order shall remain in effect except as they are incon-
sistent herewith or are hereafter amended or revoked under proper
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
14. REVISED ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY UNDER THE
MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1951, AS AMENDED: Executive
Order No. 10476, August 1, 1953 ?
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the statutes referred to
id in section 101 of this order, and by section 301 of title 3 of the United
States Code and Reorganization Plans Nos. 74 and 8.5 of 1953, and as
Supra, doc. 10.
17 Fed. Reg. 5929.
at
18 Fed. Reg. 4537. The title of the executive order reads "Administration
18
designate.
ht
01
ad
he
authority.
:
5.
be
IIS
冷冷​冷冷​宫
​II
le
1
JI
2
5
* Supra, doc. 12.
Infra, pp. 3184-3186.
3096
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
g
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I
T
memek
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a
obligation or expenditure thereby, consistent with applicable lsx
subject, however, to the reservation of functions relating to transfer
SEC. 102. Interrelationship of Director and Secretary of Defense
(a) Consonant with section 501 (a) of the Mutual Security Act d
1951, as amended, the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the responsi
President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed
forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
PART I. FOREIGN AID
SECTION 101. Delegation of certain functions of the President
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this order, the functions con-
ferred upon the President by the following-designated laws are
hereby delegated to the Director of the Foreign Operations Adminis-
tration: the Mutual Security Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 373, as amended;
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 714, as amended
(22 U. S. C. 1571-1604); the act of May 22, 1947, 61 Stat. 103, as
amended (22 U. S. C. 1401-1408); the Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 644 (22 U. S. C. 1611-1613c); and those
provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 137, as
amended (22 U. S. C. 1501 et seq.) which are continued in effect
by section 503 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended
.
(b) There are hereby excluded from the functions delegated by
section 101 (a) of this order:
(1) The functions conferred upon the President by the laws referred
to in section 101 (a) of this order with respect to the appointment
of officers required to be appointed by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, the transmittal of periodic or special reports
to the Congress, and the termination or withdrawal of assistance.
(2) The functions conferred upon the President with respect to
findings, determinations, certification, agreements, transfers of funds
or directives, as the case may be, by sections 101 (a) (1), 101 (b),
202, 302 (a), 303 (a) (last two sentences), 401, 503 (a) (3), 507 (except
as provided in Part III hereof), 511, 513, 536, 532, 540, 542, 550 (b)
and 550 (e) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended; sections
303, 402, 407 (b) (2), 408 (f), and 411 (b) of the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949, as amended; sections 105 (c), 111 (b) (2
(first clause), and 119 of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, a
amended; and sections 103 b), 104, 203, and 301 of the Mutua
Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951.
(C) Funds which have been or may be appropriated or otherwise
made available to the President to carry out the laws referred to in
section 101 (a) hereof, and section 12 of the Mutual Security Act et
1952 (66 Stat. 151), shall be deemed to be allocated to the Director
of the Foreign Operations Administration without any further action
by the President, and the said funds may be allocated by the Director
establishment, or wholly-owned
corporation of the Government for
of funds set forth in section 101 (b) (2) bereof.
t
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FOREIGN AID
3097
1 Supra, pp. 2256-2257.
2 I.e., Aug. 1, 1953.
1
ce
25
22
30
ES
ed
as amended, subject to coordination, direction, and supervision by
the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.
(b) The Secretary of Defense shall keep the Director of the Foreign
Operations Administration fully and currently informed of all matters,
#including prospective action, relating to the establishment of priorities
under section 506 (b) and the furnishing of military items under
section 506 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended.
Sec. 103. Aid to Palestine refugees. (a) Subject to subsection (b)
of this section, the functions transferred to the President by section 6
of the Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953 are hereby delegated to the
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.
(b) The Secretary of State shall be responsible for making the
United States contribution to the United Nations under the United
Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950. The Secretary of State
et shall also be responsible for formulating and presenting, with the
assistance of the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration,
OY the policy of the United States with respect to aid to Palestine refugees
and for representing the United States in the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
mt
Sec. 104. Šuccessor agencies. (a) Except as may be otherwise
and provided in this order, the Foreign Operations Administration and
ts the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration are hereby
made the successors, respectively, of the Mutual Security Agency
and the Director for Mutual Security.
(b) Except in instances wherein the provisions concerned are for
any reason inapplicable as of the effective date of Reorganization
pt Plan No. 7 of 1953,2 each reference in any prior Executive order to
.) the Mutual Security Agency or the Director for Mutual Security is
28 | hereby amended to refer to the Foreign Operations Administration
and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, respec-
(C) Without limiting the application of section 104 (b) of this order,
18
the amendments made thereby shall apply, subject to the provisions
of the said section 104 (b), to prior references to the Director for
Mutual Security and the Mutual Security Agency in (1) Executive
in
Order No. 10159 of September 8, 1950 (15 F. R. 6103), as amended,
(2) sections 7 and 9 of Executive Order No. 10300 of November 9
or 1951 (16 F. R. 11203), as amended, (3) Executive Order No. 10380
of August 2, 1952 (17 F. R. 7107), and (4) Executive Order No.
10458 of June 1, 1953 (18 F. R. 3159)
it
Sec. 105. Redelegation. The functions delegated to the Director
of the Foreign Operations Administration by the provisions of this
Part shall be deemed to include
the authority to redelegate the func-
to
ds
,
IS8
2) tively.
1
&S
Sa
3D
5
OL
II
er
tions so delegated.
Ei
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* Supra, doc. 7.
* Supra, doc. 10.
Supra.
5
3098
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
9
I
I
ti
e
$
behalf, shall coordinate the activities of the representatives of United
States agencies including the chiefs of economic and technical assist
ance missions, military assistance advisory groups, foreign information
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, and the programs
and execution of the said programs in such country. More particu
larly, the functions of each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission
shall include, with respect to the programs and country concerned
(1) Exercising general direction and leadership of the entire effort
1 For the establishment of the United States Information Agency, see infra,
PART II. FOREIGN INFORMATION
SEC. 201. Informational media guaranties. The United States
Information Agency is bereby designated as the agency of the
Government which shall on and after the effective date of this order
exercise the authority to make informational media guaranties under
section 111 (b) (3) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as
amended (22 Ú. S. C. 1509 (b) (3), and section 536 of the Mutual
Security Act of 1951, as amended, and to administer such guaranties
made prior to the effective date of this order. The Director of the i
Foreign Operations Administration, after consultation with the
Director of the United States Information Agency, shall fix (and may
from time to time revise) an amount representing that portion of the
limitation prescribed by section 111 (b) (3) of the Economic Cooperai
tion Act of 1948, as amended, which may be utilized by the Director
of the United States Information Agency for informational media
guaranties, including the liquidation of obligations outstanding under
such guaranties as of the effective date of this order.
SEC. 202. Information regarding technical cooperation. The United
States Information Agency shåll publicize abroad the activities
carried on under the Act for International Development.? Executive
Order
No. 10159 of September 8, 1950 (15 F. R. 6103), as amended
,
is bereby further amended accordingly.
PART III. PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION ABROAD
SEC. 301. Functions of the Chief of the United States Diplomate
Mission. (a) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mision
h
in each country, as the representative of the President, shall serve
I
as the channel of authority on foreign policy and shall provide foreign
policy direction to all representatives of United States agencies in
such country
(b) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in excel
country, as the representative of the President and acting on his
Government)
in such country engaged in carrying out programas ander
staffs, and other representatives of agencies of the United States
the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, programs under time
1
he shall assume responsibility for assuring the unified development
,
pp. 3184-3186.
2 Supra, doc. 6.
3 Infra, pp. 3184-3185.
ܒܢ
TO A
8
a
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FOREIGN AID
3099
(2) Assuring that recommendations and prospective plans and
actions of representatives of United States agencies are effectively
ates coordinated and are consistent with and in furtherance of the estab-
the lished policy of the United States.
der
(3) Assuring that the interpretation and application of instructions
der received by representatives of United States agencies from higher
$authority are in accord with the established policy of the United
u States
ctor
ive
101
IT
ties
(4) Guiding the representatives of United States agencies in work-
the
ing out measures to prevent duplication in their efforts and to pro-
the
mote the most effective and efficient use of all United States officers
na and employees engaged on the aforesaid programs.
the
(5) Keeping the representatives of United States agencies fully
TA informed as to current and prospective United States policies.
(6) Prescribing procedures governing the coordination of the activ-
disities of representatives of United States agencies, and assuring that
der these representatives shall have access to all available information
essential to the accomplishment of their prescribed duties.
ted
(7) Preparing and submitting such reports on the operation and
ties
status of the programs referred to in the preamble of this section 301
b) as may be requested of the Secretary of State by the Director of
Led
, the Foreign Operations Administration and the Director of the United
States Information Agency, respectively,
(8) Recommending the withdrawal from the country of United
States personnel whenever in his opinion the interests of the United
whic
States warrant such action.
(c) Each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall perform
his functions under this part in accordance with instructions from
191
higher authority and subject to established policies and programs of
the United States. Only the President and the Secretary of State
shall communicate instructions directly to the Chief of the United
States Diplomatic Mission.
his (d) No Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall delegate
ted any function conferred upon him by the provisions of this Part
which directly involves the exercise of direction, coordination, or
Sec. 302. Referral of unresolved matters. The Chief of the United
der
States Diplomatic Mission in each country shall initiate steps to
reconcile any divergent views arising between representatives of
United States agencies in the country concerned with respect to
and programs referred to in the preamble of section 301 (b) hereof. If
PL
agreement cannot be reached the Chief of the United States Diplo-
matic Mission shall recommend a course of action, and such course
of action shall be followed unless a representative of a United States
ed agency requests that the issue be referred to the Secretary of State
and the United States agencies concerned for decision. If such a
request is made, the parties concerned shall promptly refer the issue
for resolution prior to taking action at the country level.
Sec. 303. Effect of order on representatives of United States agencies.
(a) All representatives of United States agencies in each country
ach
ist
authority.
101
tes
the
MOS
CH
TOD
ort
from
3100
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
m
en
Bu
SIS
au
en
10300 of November 9, 1951. (16 F. R. 11203), as amended, exclusive
(b) Nothing in this order shall affect Executive Order No. 10062d
(c) To the extent that any provision of any prior Executive order the
is inconsistent with the provisions of this order, the latter shell
(d) All orders, regulations, rulings, certificates, directives, agree
shall be subject to the responsibilities imposed upon the Chief of the
United States Diplomatic Mission in such country by section 501
of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and by this Part
(b) Subject to compliance with the provisions of this Pårt and with
the prescribed procedures of their respective agencies, all represents-
tives of United States agencies affected by this Part (1) shall have
direct communication with their respective agencies and with such
other parties and in such manner as may be authorized by their
respective agencies, (2) shall keep the respective Chiefs of United
Au
States Diplomatic Missions and each other fully and currently in-
formed on all matters, including prospective plans, recommendation
,
and actions, relating to the programs referred to in the preamble of
section 301 (b) hereof, and (3) shall furnish to the respective Chiefs of
United States Diplomatic Missions, upon their request, documents
and information concerning the said programs.
E.
PART IV. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 401. Coordination of foreign policy. The Secretary of State,
the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Direc-
15
tor of the United States Information Agency shall establish and
maintain arrangements which will insure that the programs under
the supervision of the latter two officials are carried out in conformity
with the established foreign policy of the United States.
Sec. 402. Transfer of personnel, property, records, and funds. So
Ur
much of the personnel, records, property, and unexpended balance
of appropriations, allocations, and other funds, available to any office
or agency whereto there is delegated or assigned immediately prior
to the taking effect of this Executive order any function which by
this order is otherwise delegated or assigned, as the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget determines to relate to the said functions and
to be required by the officer or agency whereto the functions concerned an
are delegated or assigned by this order, for the performance theredt ut
shall be transferred, consonant with law, to such latter officer o ben
agency. Such further measures and dispositions
of the Bureau of the Budget shall deem to be necessary in order i
effectuate the transfers provided for in this section shåll be carriet
out
in such manner as he shall direct and by such agencies as he skal
designate.
Sec. 403. Prior orders and actions. (a) Executive Order. Na
4, 1952 (17 F. R. 3009), are hereby superseded.
June 6, 1949, as heretofore amended.
control and such prior provision
is amended accordingly.
officer be
WC
em
as the Director
Wa
str
pre
Or
Stie
tri
1
gar
to
i
by
Sec
tar
Au
12,
Ad
Hali
1 14 Fed. Reg. 2965.
FOREIGN AID
3101
len
ted
111
ats
the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 in the Administrator created
Secretary of State by sec. 101 of Ex. Or. No. 10610 (infra, doc. 19). The Secre-
Authority No. 85, June 30, 1955, 20 Fed. Reg. 4825, as amended by No. 85-1, Oat.
Administration but provided that the Director shall carry out the functions
ments, contracts, delegations, determinations, and other actions of
50
any officer or agency of the Government relating to any function
urt.
sffected by this order shall remain in effect except as they are incon-
Lith
sistent herewith or are hereafter amended or revoked under proper
tel.
authority
ve
Sec. 404. Definition. As used in this order, the word "functions"
ach
embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, and discretion.
Sec. 405. Effective date. This order shall become effective on
August 1, 1953.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
ONS,
of
ad
E. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL PRO-
GRAM, 1951-1955
at
rec-
and
15. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 1951
der
(BATTLE ACT): Public Law 213 (82d Congress, 1st Session),
nity
October 26, 1951 1
So Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may
ict be cited as the "Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951",
be
TITLE I-WAR MATERIALS
Sec. 101. The Congress of the United States, recognizing that in a
Rod world threatened by aggression the United States can best preserve
and maintain peace by developing
maximum national
strength and by
ed utilizing all of its resources in cooperation with other free nations,
hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to apply an
Hi embargo on the shipment of arms, ammunition, and implements of
war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of
He strategic value, and items of primary strategic significance used in the
production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to any nation
or combination of nations threatening the security of the United
States, including the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all coun-
untries under its domination, in order to (1) increase the national
PL 213, 82d Cong. (65 Stat. 644); 22 U. S. C. 1611. Section 2 (b) of Reor-
ganization Plan No. 7 of 1953 (effective Aug. 1, 1953; supra, doc. 12) transferred
to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration all functions vested by
der
tary of State then redelegated his authority (Department of State Delegation of
“under the direction and control of the Secretary of State”.
cas
Mor
ned
OI
• to
hall
ori
lol
18]
4D
3102
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
mined under section 103 (a) after a full and complete investigation
basis of investigation and consultation, and that all nations receiving
(b) All military, economic, or financial assistance to any nation
shall, upon the recommendation of the Administrator, be terminated
United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
all countries under its domination, of any item which he has deta
strength of the United States and of the cooperating nations; (2)
impede the ability of nations threatening the security of the United
States to conduct military operations; and (3) to assist the people
of the nations under the domination of foreign aggressors to reestab
lish their freedom.
It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that no
military, economic, or financial assistance shall be supplied to any
nation unless it applies an embargo on such shipments to any nation
or combination of nations threatening the security of the United
States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and al
countries under its domination.
This Act shall be administered in such a way as to bring about the
fullest support for any resolution of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, supported by the United States, to prevent the ship-
ment of certain commodities to areas under the control of govern-
ments engaged in hostilities in defiance of the United Nations.
Sec. 102. Responsibility for giving effect to the purposes of this
Act shall be vested in the person occupying the senior position author-
ized by subsection (e) of section 406 of the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949, as amended,' or in any person who may hereafter be
charged with principal responsibility for the administration of the
provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Such per-
son is hereinafter referred to as the “Administrator."
SEC. 103. (a) The Administrator is hereby authorized and directed
to determine within thirty days after enactment of this Act after fal
and complete consideration of the views of the
Departments of State
,
Defense, and Commerce; the Economic Cooperation Administration
and any other appropriate agencies, and notwithstanding the pro
visions of any other law, which items are, for the purpose of this
Act, arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy me
terials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and
those items of primary strategic significance used in the production
of arms, ammunition, and implements of war which should be embar
goed to effectuate
the purposes of this Act: Provided, That such deter
minations shall be continuously adjusted to current conditions on the
informed of such determinations.
mination under section 103 (a) knowingly permits the shipment !
any nation or combination of nations
threatening the security of the
(
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V
Y
}
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to
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t
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy; p. 1362.
FOREIGN AID
3103
sed
no
th
the
1p-
Th
1
Or-
er
States and the peace of the world.
to be included in any of the following categories: Arms, ammunition,
(2)
and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transpor-
tation materials of strategic value, and items of primary strategic
ple
significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and imple-
ab
ments of war: Provided, That the President after receiving the advice
of the Administrator and after taking into account the contribution
of such country to the mutual security of the free world, the impor-
ny
tance of such assistance to the security of the United States, the
100
strategic importance of imports received from countries of the Soviet
ed
bloc, and the adequacy of such country's controls over the export to
all
the Soviet bloc of items of strategic importance, may direct the con-
tinuance of such assistance to a country which permits shipments of
items other than arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic
energy materials when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessa-
tion of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United
States: Provided further, That the President shall immediately report
This
any determination made pursuant to the first proviso of this section
with reasons therefor to the Appropriations and Armed Services
Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee
be
th:
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the President
shall at least once each quarter review all determinations made previ-
ously and shall report his conclusions to the foregoing committees of
ted
the House and Senate, which reports shall contain an analysis of the
trade with the Soviet bloc of countries for which determinations have
been made.
ate,
Sec. 104. Whenever military, economic, or financial assistance has
on;
been terminated as provided in this Act, such assistance can be re-
sumed only upon determination by the President that adequate meas-
ures have been taken by the nation concerned to assure full compliance
with the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 105. For the purposes of this Act the term “assistance” does
not include activities carried on for the purpose of facilitating the
procurement of materials in which the United States is deficient.
TITLE II-OTHER MATERIALS
Sec. 201. The Congress of the United States further declares it to
be the policy of the United States to regulate the export of commodi-
ties other than those specified in Title I of this Act to any nation or
combination of nations threatening the security of the United States,
including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries
under its domination, in order to strengthen the United States and
other cooperating nations of the free world and to oppose and offset
by nonmilitary action acts which threaten the security of the United
SEC. 202. The United States shall negotiate with any country re-
ceiving military, economic, or financial assistance arrangements for
the recipient country to undertake a program for controlling exports
TO
his
ng-
und
JOD
81
er
the
ing
ent
on
end
er
tô
he
nd
er
01
Act of 1948 (Public Law 472, Eightieth Congress), as amended, and
S
as
ministration of this Act shall be charged to such local currency funds
currency administrative and operating expenses incurred in the st!
SEC. 305. Subsection (d) of section 117 of the Foreign Assistance
3104 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
of items not subject to embargo under Title I of this Act, but which
in the judgment of the Administrator should be controlled to any
nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United
States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all
countries under its domination.
Sec. 203. All military, economic, and financial assistance shall be
terminated when the President determines that the recipient country
(1) is not effectively cooperating with the United States pursuant
to this title, or (2) is failing to furnish to the United States infor-
mation sufficient for the President to determine that the recipient
country is effectively cooperating with the United States.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. All other nations (those not receiving United States
military, economic, or financial assistance) shall be invited by the
President to cooperate jointly in a group or groups or on an individual st
basis in controlling the export of the commodities referred to in Title
I and Title II of this Act to any nation or combination of nations
threatening the security of the United States, including the Union
SA
of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination,
SEC. 302. The Administrator with regard to all titles of this Act
shall-
(a) coordinate those activities of the various United States
departments and agencies which are concerned with security con-
trols over exports from other countries;
(b) make a continuing study of the administration of exports
control measures undertaken by foreign governments in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Act, and shall report to the
Congress from time to time but not less than once every si he
months recommending action where appropriate; and
(c) make available technical advice and assistance on export
ba
control procedures to any nation desiring
such cooperation.
in
SEC. 303. The provisions of subsection (a) of section 403, of section
to
404, and of subsection (c) and (d) of section 406 of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, Eighty-first Com
St.
gress), as amended, insofar as they are consistent with this Act, she
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, shall be available for
carrying out this Act in such amounts as the President shall direct
SEC. 304. In every recipient country where local currency
available for local currency expenses of the United
States in com
nection with assistance furnished by the United States, the book
PI
to the extent available.
PE
sh
pr
m
mi
KE
the
Co
nis
is made
pel
inc
tio
Ser
2
lata
19:
wh
Th
1
exc
* A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 1318.
FOREIGN AID
3105
int
or
ent
tes
JOS
1
10.
permitting exportation of items of military value to the U.S.S.R. or its satellites,
ch subsection (a) of section 1302 of the Third Supplemental Appropria-
otion Act, 1951 (Public Law 45, Eighty-second Congress),' are repealed.
all
be
F. MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM, 1954–1955
16. MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED BY THE
MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1955: Public Law 665 (83d Con-
gress, 2d Session), August 26, 1954; Amended by Public Law 138
(84th Congress, 1st Session), July 8, 1955 (Excerpts)?
the AN ACT To promote the security and foreign policy of the United
Lal States by furnishing assistance to friendly nations, and for other
itle purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
101
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited
act
as the "Mutual Security Act of 1954”.
TITLE I-MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE
CHAPTER 1. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Sec. 101. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER. The Congress of the United
port States reaffirms the policy of the United States to achieve international
peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force
the shall not be used except in the common defense. The Congress
SL hereby finds that the efforts of the United States and other nations to
promote peace and security require additional measures of support
101 based upon the principle of continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid. It is the purpose of this chapter to authorize measures
in the common defense,
including the furnishing of military assistance
to friendly nations and international organizations in order to pro-
01 mote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United
States and to facilitate the effective participation of such nations in
Act of June 2, 1951; 65 Stat. 63. Section 1302 (a), popularly known as the
for
Kem Amendment, provided that, during the period in which Armed Forces of
the U.S. are engaged in hostilities' while carrying out any decision of the Security
Council of the United Nations, no economic or financial assistance should be fur-
nished under the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, to any country
including Communist China and Communist North Korea,
unless such exporta-
tion should be certified
to be in the security interest of the U.S. by the National
1. PL 665, 83d Cong. (68 Stat. 832), approved Aug. 26, 1954, as amended by
PL 138, 84th Cong. (69 Stat. 283), approved July 8, 1955; Mutual Security Legis-
lation and Related Documents, International Cooperation Administration, Dec. 29,
which do not relate specifically to the basic purposes of the acts have been deleted.
The footnotes remaining throughout this document are from the ICA print,
except as otherwise indicated.
ates
-OD-
ord
sion
jus!
hal
18
to
ade
300
ad
nds
Security Council.
and
415900_57_yol. 292
to be appropriated to the President, in addition to appropriations
Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1954 (including the appropriate
continued available for the purpose of this chapter and to be come
which is hereby authorized to be continued available through du
dated with the appropriation authorized by this subsection, all
1 Section 12 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 290, provides
is hereby declared to be the continuing sense of the Congress that the Commus
regime in China has not demonstrated its willingness to fulfill the obligatie
contained in the Charter of the United Nations and should not be recogmid
2 See also the Act of May 19, 1926, as amended, 44 Stat. 565, 10 U.S.C.
3 Paragraph designation “(1)” was added by sec. 2 (a) of the Mutual Sarung
3106 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
arrangements for individual and collective self-defense. In furnish
ing such military assistance, it remains the policy of the United States
to continue to exert maximum efforts to achieve universal control
of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reductis
of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate safe-guari
to protect complying nations against violation and evasion.
The Congress reaffirms its previous expressions favoring the creation
by the free peoples of the Far East and the Pacific of & joint organ
:
zation, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to estable
a program of self-help and mutual cooperation designed to develop
their economic and social well-being, to safeguard basic rights sal
liberties and to protect their security and independence
.
The Congress hereby reiterates its opposition to the seating in the
United Nations of the Communist China regime as the representsin
of China. In the event of the seating of representatives of the
Chinese Communist regime in the Security Council or General de
sembly of the United Nations, the President is requested to infor
the Congress insofar as is compatible with the requirements of De
tional security, of the implications of this action upon the foreign
policy of the United States and our foreign relationships, including
that created by membership in the United Nations, together wil
any recommendations which he may have with respect to the matte
.
ŠEC. 102. GENERAL AUTHORITY.Military assistance may
furnished under this chapter on a grant or loan basis and upon su
other appropriate terms as may be
agreed upon, by the procurement
from any source and the transfer to eligible nations and internation
organizations of equipment, materials, and services or by the proper
of any service, including the assignment or detail of members of d
Armed Forces and other personnel of the Department of Defes
solely to assist in an advisory capacity or to perform other duties di
non-combatant nature, including military training or advice.
Sec. 103. AUTHORIZATIONS.—a) (1)• There is hereby authoriek
authorized by section 104, not to exceed $1,270,000,000 to carry it
the purpose of this chapter; and, in addition, unexpended balance
appropriations for military assistance under each paragraph of it
for mutual special weapons planning), are hereby authorized to
30, 1955.
to represent China in the United Nations."
34 U.S.C. $ 541a.
be
.
Act of 1955.
.
FOREIGN AID
3107
atatir
of out
oreiga
irish
(2)' In addition, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to
State the President to carry out the purposes of this chapter not to exceed
contri
$1,133,000,000, to remain available until expended.
luction
(b) Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a) of this section
guard shall be available for the administrative and operating expenses of
carrying out the purpose of this chapter and of section 124 including
reation
expenses incident to United States participation in international
or security organizations.
tablish
(c) 3 When appropriations made pursuant to subsection (a) of
evely this section are used to furnish military assistance on terms of repay-
#ment within ten years or earlier such assistance may be furnished,
notwithstanding sections 105, 141, and 142, to nations eligible to
in the
purchase military equipment, materials, and services under section
106.
SEC. 104. INFRASTRUCTURE.---(a) The President is authorized to
all
make contributions to infrastructure programs of the North Atlantic
infore
Treaty Organization, in accordance with agreements already made
between the member nations, out of funds made available pursuant
to this section, or section 103, or chapter IX of the Supplemental
lude Appropriation Act, 1953, of amounts totaling not more than $780,000,-
000, less amounts already contributed for such purpose. There is
RM hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for such pur-
bi
pose, in installments prior to June 30, 1958, not to exceed $321,000,000,
to remain available until expended. Such contributions by the
Temel United States shall not exceed its proportionate share, as heretofore
agreed upon, of the expenses of such programs.
(b) When the President determines that it is in the interest of the
security of the United States to participate in programs for the
acquisition or construction of facilities in foreign nations for collective
defense other than programs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, he may use for such purpose funds made available under section
103 or local currencies made available under section 402 in amounts
totaling not more than $50,000,000.
(C) Notwithstanding section 501 of this Act, no funds other than
t" arith
natter
.
By
u such
ational
OVISION
of the
Defense
es ofte
COTLZH
Tatios.
17 00
ICH I
1
of the
miatt
tot
page
Act of 1955.
210
1 June
This paragraph was added by sec. 2 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
2 Words "and of section 124” were added by sec. 2 (b) of the Mutual Security
This subsection was substituted, by sec. 2 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of
1955, for repealed sec. 103 (c) which read as follows:
"(c) Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a) of this section may be
used for the procurement of equipment or materials outside the United States
unless the President determines that such procurement will result in one or
more of the following conditions:
(1) Adverse effects upon the economy of the United States, with special
reference to any areas of labor surplus, or upon the industrial mobilization
base, which outweigh the strategic and logistic advantages to the United
States of procurement abroad;
(2) Production of such equipment or materials outside the United States
under inadequate safeguards against sabotage or the release to potential
enemies of information detrimental to the security of the United States;
(3). Unjustifiable cost in comparison with procurement in the United
States, taking into account transportation costs for delivery overseas; and
(4) Delays in delivery incompatible with United States defense objectives."
5.48
auri
3108
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
t
areas:
those referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section may be
expended for the purposes of this section. No funds shall be expended
under this section for rental or purchase of land or for payment of
taxes.
SEÇ. 105. CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE.--(a)
Military assistance may be furnished under this chapter to any nation
whose increased ability to defend itself the President shall have
determined to be important to the security of the United States and
which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance. Equipment
and materials furnished under this chapter shall be made available
solely to maintain the internal security and legitimate self-defense of
the recipient nation, or to permit it to participate in the defense of its
area or in collective security arrangements and measures consistent
with the Charter of the United Nations. The President shall be
satisfied that such equipment and materials will not be used to under-
take any act of aggression against any nation.
(b) In addition to the authority and limitations contained in the
preceding subsection, the following provisions shall apply to particular
(1): The Congress welcomes the recent progress in European
cooperation and reaffirms its belief in the necessity of further
efforts toward political federation, military integration, and
economic unification as a means of building strength, establishing
security, and preserving peace in the North Atlantic area. In
order to provide further encouragement to such efforts, the
Congress believes it essential that this Act should be so adminis-
tered as to support concrete measures to promote greater political
federation, military integration, and economic unification in
Europe.
(2) Military assistance furnished to any nation in the Near
East and Africa ? to permit it to participate in the defense of its
area shall be furnished only in accordance with plans and arrange-
ments which shall have been found by the President to require
the recipient nation to take an important part therein.
(3) In furnishing military assistance in Asia 3 and in carrying
out the provisions of section 121 of this Act, the President shall
1 This paragraph was amended by sec. 2(d) of the Mutual Security Act of
1955; it formerly read as follows:
"(1) In order to promote an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area
and to support concrete measures for political federation, military integration,
and economic unification in Europe, equipment and materials of the value
programed
for fiscal years 1954 and 1955 for nations signing the treaty consti-
tuting the European Defense Community shall
, pending the coming into force
of the treaty, be delivered only to such of these nations as have ratified the
treaty, and have joined together in or are developing collective defense, prima
grams in a manner satisfactory to the United States as determined by the
President."
2. Sec. 2 (e) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 amended this paragraph by
striking out the former "Near East, Africa, and South Asia” and inserting, in
lieu thereof, "Near East and Africa."
striking out the former the Far East and the Pacific and inserting, in lieu
3 Sec. 2 (é) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 amended this paragraph by
thereof, "Asia."
FOREIGN AID
3109
?
i
}
area:
striking out the former "Africa, and South Asia" and inserting, in lieu thereof,
striking out the former "the Far East and the Pacific" and inserting, in lieu
give the fullest assistance, as far as possible directly, to the free
1 peoples in that area, including the Associated States of Cambodia,
f
Laos, and Vietnam, in their creation of a joint organization, con-
sistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to establish a
program of self-help and mutual cooperation designed to develop
their economic and social well-being, to safeguard basic rights
and liberties, and to protect their security and independence.
(4) Military assistance may be furnished to the other American
Republics only in accordance with defense plans which shall have
been found by the President to require the recipient nation to
participate in missions important to the defense of the Western
Hemisphere.
(c) The Secretary of Defense shall insure that the value (as de-
termined pursuant to section 545) of equipment, materials, and serv-
ices heretofore furnished under military assistance programs author-
ized by Acts repealed by this Act or hereafter furnished pursuant to
section 103 (a) to nations or organizations in each of the four areas
named in this subsection shall not exceed the total of the funds here-
tofore made available for military assistance in that area pursuant to
Acts repealed by this Act plus the amount herein specified for that
(1) In the European area (excluding Greece and Turkey),
$617,500,000.
(2) In the Near East (including Greece and Turkey) and
Africa,' $181,200,000.
(3) In Asia, 2 $583,600,000.
(4) In the Western Hemisphere, $13,000,000.
(d) Whenever the President determines it to be necessary for the
purpose of this title, equipment, materials, and services of a value not
to exceed 15 per centum of the sum of (1) that portion of the unex-
pended balances referred to in section 103 (a) which was available on
June 30, 1954, to furnish assistance in any of the areas named in
subsection (c) of this section, and (2) the amount specified in the
applicable paragraph of subsection () of this section for additional
assistance in such area, may be furnished in any other such area or
areas, notwithstanding the limitations set forth in subsection (c) of this
section, Funds heretofore obligated or programed or hereafter made
available solely for the purpose of section 104 (pertaining to infra-
structure) shall not be included in the total fixed for each such area.
Funds heretofore appropriated for military assistance in a particular
geographic area but transferred from such use under section 513 of the
Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, or under section 408 (c)
of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, shall be included in the total
for the area for
the benefit of which such transfer was made, and not
in the total for the area from which the transfer was made.
Sec. 2 (f) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 amended this paragraph by
Sec. 2 (f) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 amended this paragraph by
.
"and Africa."
thereof, “Asia".
3110
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
amounts and at such times as may be necessary to meet the payments
tion to any program of military assistance for which funds may be
SEC. 108. TRANSFER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO JAPAN.-In add-
appropriated pursuant to this Act, the President is hereby authorized
to transfer to the Government of Japan, until June 30, 1956,' upon
1"1956” was substituted for "1955" by sec. 2 (g) of the Mutual Security Act of
SEC. 106. SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND DER -
ICES.--(a) The President may, in order to carry out the purpose of
this chapter, sell or enter into contracts (without requirement for
charge to any appropriation or contract authorization) for the pro-
curement for sale of equipment, materials, or services to any nation or
international organization: Provided, That prior to the transfer of
any such equipment, materials, or services to any nation which has
not signed an agreement under section 142 of this Act or joined with
the United States in a regional collective defense arrangement, the
President shall have received commitments satisfactory to him that
such equipment, materials, or services are required for and will be
used by such nation solely to maintain its internal security, its legiti-
mate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the
area of which it is a part, or in collective security arrangements and
measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, and that
it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.
(b) Whenever equipment or materials are sold from the stocks of
or services are rendered by any United States Government agency to
any nation or international organization as provided in subsection
(a), such nation or international organization shall first make available
the fair value, as determined by the President, of such equipment,
materials, or services before delivery or, when the President determines
it to be in the best interests of the United States, within sixty days
thereafter or, as determined by the President, within a reasonable
period not to exceed three years. The fair value for the purpose of
this subsection shall not be less than the value as defined
in subsection
(b) of section 545: Provided, That with respect to excess equipment
or materials the fair value may not be determined to be less than a
the
minimum value specified in that
subsection plus the scrap value
or (ii) the market value, if ascertainable, whichever is the greater
.
Before a contract for new production is entered into,
or rehabilitation
work is undertaken, such nation or international organization shal
(A) provide the United States with a dependable undertaking to pay
the full amount of such contract or the cost of such rehabilitation
which will assure the United States against any loss on the contract
or rehabilitation work, and (B) shall make funds available in such
required by the contract or the rehabilitation work in advance of ta
time such payments are due, in addition to the estimated amount of
any damages and costs that may accrue from the cancellation of such
contract or rehabilitation work.
(C) Sections 105, 141, and 142 shall not apply with respect
assistance furnished under this section.
SEC. 107. WAIVERS OF LAW.-
to
1
1955.
FOREIGN AID
3111
y to
Vietnam
ines
e of
tion
lent
Rr such terms and conditions as he may specify, and upon its request,
e. of United States military equipment and supplies programed for Japan
for to meet its internal security requirements for which Department of
pro- Defense appropriations were obligated prior to July 1, 1953. No
10 appropriation shall be requested to replace the military equipment and
of supplies so transferred, and no funds heretofore or hereafter appropri-
has sted for the purpose of this chapter shall be available for reimburse-
rith ment to any United States Government agency on account of any
the transfer made pursuant to this section.
hat
I be CHAPTER 2-SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC, AND
Fiti-
DIRECT FORCES SUPPORT
the
Sec. 121. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC.—There is
and
hat
hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal
year 1955, to be made available on such terms and conditions, including
3 01
transfer of funds, as he may specify, not to exceed $700,000,000 for
expenses necessary for the support of the forces of nations in the area
of Southeast Asia, including the furnishing, as far as possible, of
tion
ahle
direct assistance to the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and
ent
, as well as to the forces of other free nations in the area
including those of France located in such Associated States and for
other expenditures to accomplish in Southeast Asia and the Western
ays
able
Pacific the policies and purposes declared in this Act. In addition, the
unexpended balances of funds allocated from appropriations made
pursuant to sections 304 and 540 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951,
as amended, for the purpose of support of the forces of the Associated
10)
States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and the forces of France
lue,
located in the Associated States, are hereby authorized to be continued
available for the purpose of this section through June 30, 1955, and to
ter
bio]
be consolidated with the appropriation authorized by this section.
hall
Assistance under this title shall be made available subject to the
provisions of sections 141 and 142, except that (1) in the case of assist-
ance to the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and
2) in the case of assistance (not to exceed in the aggregate 10 per cen-
tum of the amount appropriated pursuant to this section, excluding
pnexpended balances of prior appropriations) to other nations, the
the
President may waive specific provisions of section 142 to the extent
may deem necessary in the national interest to carry out the pur-
poses of this Act. The President or such officer as he may designate
shall report each instance of such waiver
to the Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the
Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, and Armed
Services Committees of
the House of Representatives within thirty days.
It is the sense of the Congress that no part of the funds appropriated
• be
under this section shall be used on behalf of governments which are
committed by treaty to maintain
Communist rule over any defined
territory of Asia.
1. No new funds were requested for this section for fiscal year 1956.
The word "section" was stricken out and the word "title" substituted by sec.
(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
par
G100
"act
uch
ents
he
tof
uch
to
ddi
ized
POI
at of
3112
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1950-1955
to
f(b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
SEC. 122. PRODUCTION FOR FORCES SUPPORT.-There is hereby
authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1955
,
to be made available on such terms and conditions, including transfer
of funds, as he may specify, not to exceed $35,000,000 - for manufac- In
ture in the United Kingdom of military aircraft required by United py
Kingdom forces for the defense of the North Atlantic area. In addi- ed
tion, unexpended balances of appropriations made pursuant to section
102 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, are hereby author-
th
ized to be continued available for their original purposes through
B
June 30, 1955, and the unexpended balance of the appropriation made
pursuant to the second clause of that section is authorized to be
consolidated with the appropriation authorized by this section.
SEC. 123. COMMON USE ITEMS.—There is hereby authorized to be fo
appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1955 not to exceed
$60,000,000 1 for the provision of any common-use equipment
,
materials, commodities, or services which are to be used by military
forces of nations receiving assistance under chapter 1 of this title
Programs authorized by this section shall be administered in accord-
ance with the provisions of chapter 1 or chapter 3 of this title.
SEC. 124.2 DIRECT FORCES SUPPORT.-There is hereby authorized
to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1956 not to P
exceed $317,200,000 to provide assistance in the form of direct forces
support to be delivered or rendered directly to the military forces of
nations eligible for military assistance under chapter 1 of this title
The President may, notwithstanding the provisions of section 50.
consolidate all or any part of appropriations made pursuant to this
section with appropriations made pursuant to section 103. Programs
authorized by this section may be administered in accordance with
d
the provisions of chapter 1 or chapter 3 of this title.
CHAPTER 3-DEFENSE SUPPORT
SEC. 131. GENERAL AUTHORITY.—(a) The President is hereby
authorized to furnish, to nations and organizations eligible to receive
military assistance under chapter 1 of this title, or to nations which
have joined with the United States in a regional collective defense
arrangement, commodities, services, and financial and other assistance
designed to sustain and increase military effort. In furnishing
such
assistance, the President may provide for the procurement and
trans-
fer from any source of any commodity or service (including processing
,
storing, transporting, marine insurance, and repairing) or any
nical information and assistance.
to exceed
(1) $46,000,000 for Europe (excluding Greece and Turkey);
OD
VE
C
S
b
$
t
n
8
0
tech-
d
1 No new funds were requested for this section for fiscal year 1956.
2 This section was added by sec. 3 b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
FOREIGN AID
3113
by
1
10D
or
UIT
ces
(2) $73,000,000 for the Near East (including Greece and
55,
Turkey), Africa, and South Asia; and
fer (3) $80,098,195 for the Far East and the Pacific.
AC- In addition, unexpended balances of appropriations heretofore made
ted pursuant to section 541 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amend-
died, are hereby authorized to be continued available for the purpose
of this subsection through June 30, 1955, and to be consolidated with
the appropriation authorized for the same area by this subsection:
ugh Provided, That portions of such unexpended balances which have been
ide allocated to assistance for Greece and Turkey shall be consolidated
be with the appropriation authorized by paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(c) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
be for the fiscal year 1956 to carry out the provisions of this section, not
red to exceed-
nt, (1) $92,000,000 for Europe (excluding Greece and Turkey);
(2) $102,500,000 for the Near East (including Greece and
Ele
. Turkey) and Africa; and
rd- (3) $827,800,000 for Asia.
Funds made available for assistance to Korea from appropriations
sed authorized by this section may be used in accordance with the ap-
toplicable provisions of section 132 of this Act.
(d) In providing assistance in the procurement of commodities in
of
the United States, United States dollars shall be made available for
Ele marine insurance on such commodities where such insurance is placed
01,
on a competitive basis in accordance with normal trade practice pre-
his vailing prior to the outbreak of World War II: Provided, That in the
event a participating country, by statute, decree, rule, or regulation,
ith discriminates against any marine insurance company authorized to
do business in any State of the United States, then commodities pur-
chased with funds provided hereunder and destined for such country
shall be insured in the United States against marine risk with a com-
pany or companies authorized to do a marine insurance business in any
by State of the United States.
Feb
Sec. 132. KOREAN PROGRAM. (a) There is hereby authorized to
be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1955 not to exceed
$205,000,000 to be expended, upon terms and conditions specified by
on in the President,
for defense support, relief and rehabilitation, and other
necessary assistance (including payment of ocean freight charges on
shipments for relief and rehabilitation, without regard to section 409
of this Act) in those parts of Korea which the President shall have
determined to be not under Communist control. In addition, un-
expended balances of funds heretofore allocated for the purpose of
-16
relief and rehabilitation in Korea pursuant to the paragraph entitled
“Relief and Rehabilitation in Korea,” chapter VII, Supplemental
Appropriation Act, 1954, and unobligated
balances of the appropria-
tion for "Civilian Relief in Korea," title III, Department of Defense
appropriation Act, 1954, are hereby authorized to be continued avail-
able for the purposes of this subsection through June 30, 1955, and to
Subsections (c) and (d) of sec. 131 were added by sec. 4 of the Mutual Security
ms
OS-
106
Act of 1955.
3114
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
8
will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world
No such assistance shall be furnished to a nation unless it
shall have agreed to the provisions required by section 142, and such
additional provisions as the President deems necessary to effectuate
the policies and provisions of this title and to safeguard the interest
be consolidated with the appropriation authorized by this subsection
.
(b) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Presi.
dent is authorized, at any time prior to twenty-four months from the
date of enactment of this Act, to transfer to the Republic of Korea,
by sale or charter and on such terms and conditions as he may specify
,
not more than eight C1-M-AV1 vessels. Any agency of the United
States Government owning or operating such vessels is authorized to
make such vessels available for the purpose of this subsection: Pro
vided, That if after investigation it is determined by the President
that there are privately owned C1-M-AV1 vessels offered and avail-
able for sale by American citizens as defined in section 2 of
the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, at prices equal to or less than
those provided for in subsection (b) (2) below, such vessels shall be
acquired by an owning or operating agency designated by the Presi:
dent for the purpose of this subsection. Funds made available pur-
suant to subsection (a) of this section shall be available for the purpose
of this subsection.
(2) Such transfers shall be made at prices determined under section
3 of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 (50 U. S. C., App. 1736):
Provided, That such vessels shall be placed in class in accordance with
minimum requirements of the American Bureau of Shipping by the
owning or operating agency, and the expense of placing in class shal
be reimbursed to such agency.
(c) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal
year 1955 not to exceed $3,452,615 for making contributions to the
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency or expenditure
through such other agency for relief and rehabilitation in Korea as the
President may direct. In addition, the unexpended balance of the
appropriation made pursuant to the last sentence of section 303 (6)
of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, is hereby authorized
to be continued available for the purpose of this subsection through
June 30, 1955, and to be consolidated with the appropriation author
ized by this subsection. Sections 141 and 142 of this Act shall not
apply with respect to assistance furnished under this subsection.
CHAPTER 4~GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO MUTUAL DEFENSE
ASSISTANCE
SEC. 141. CONDITIONS OF ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE. – No assis
ance shall be furnished under this title to any nation or
unless the President shall have found that furnishing such assistan
peace.
organization
of the United States.
1
1 No funds for fiscal year 1956 were authorized or appropriated for the purpos
of this subsection.
FOREIGN AID
3115
01.
Esi
ent
181
+
esi-
with respect to these matters, as the President may require.
SEC. 142. AGREEMENTS.-(a) 1 No assistance shall be furnished to
any nation under this title unless such nation shall have agreed to-
the
(1) join in promoting international understanding and good
:ea, will, and maintaining world peace;
ify
, (2) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to
ted eliminate causes of international tension;
I to
(3) fulfill the military obligations, if any, which it has assumed
ro
under multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to which
the United States is a party,
ail
.
(4) make, consistent with its political and economic stability,
of the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources
facilities, and general economic condition to the development and
be
maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive
strength of the free world;
(5) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to
develop its defense capacities;
(6) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of
the assistance furnished under this title in furtherance of the
6):
policies and purposes of this title;
(7) impose appropriate restrictions against transfer of title to
the
or possession of any equipment and materials, information, or
1al
services furnished under chapter 1 of this title, without the con-
sent of the President;
(8) maintain the security of any article, service, or information
the
furnished under chapter 1 of this title;
(9) furnish equipment and materials, services, or other assist-
the
ance consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the
the
United States or to and among other nations to further the
(8)
policies and purpose of chapter 1 of this title;
(10) permit continuous observation and review by United
ugh
States representatives of programs of assistance authorized under
this title, including the utilization of any such assistance and 2
provide the United States with full and complete information
Ose
101
100
ure
zed
TOT
006
3
ISE
ist
GOD
ace
lo
ald
(b) In cases where any commodity is to be furnished on a grant
basis under chapter 2 or chapter 3 of title I or under title II of this
Act under arrangements which will result in the accrual of proceeds
to the recipient nation from the import or sale thereof, such assistance
shall not be furnished unless the
recipient nation shall have agreed to
establish a Special Account, and 4
"(a)" was inserted by sec. 5 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
? The word "and" was substituted for "or” by sec. 5 of the Mutual Security
* The word "and" which appeared at the end of this subparagraph was deleted
by sec. 5 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955, and a period was substituted.
* Sec. 5 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 changed the designation of this
provision from "(11)" to "(b)” and revised the language of the introductory para-
graph which previously read as follows:
"(11) in cases where any commodity is furnished on a grant basis under any
provision of this Act other than chapter 1 of title I under arrangements which
will result in the accrual of proceeds to the recipient nation from the import or
sale thereof, establish a Special Account, and.
Act of 1955.
il
uch
ste
ests
San
3116
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
conditions as the President may specify, except that 30 per centum of the funds
sut
exc
tec
COI
we
IS
through June 30, 1955, and to be consolidated with the appropriations
1 The words "South Asia" were stricken out and "Asia' inserted, in lieu thereof.
2 The words "and to assist in maintaining economic and political stability in
3 This sentence was revised by sec. 6 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
It formerly read as follows: "Such assistance may be furnished on such terms and
appropriated pursuant to this subsection shall be available only for furnishing
(i) deposit in the Special Account, under such terms and sect
conditions as may be agreed upon, currency of the recipient
nation in amounts equal to such proceeds;
for
(ii) make available to the United States such portion of the 838
Special Account as may be determined by the President to be res
necessary for the requirements of the United States: Provided S
That such portion shall not be less than 10 per centum in the
case of any country to which such minimum requirement has
been applicable under any Act repealed by this Act; and
@
(iii) utilize the remainder of the Special Account for pro-
Sta
grams agreed to by the United States to carry out the purposes
for which new funds authorized by this Act would themselves 900
im]
be available.
Any unencumbered balances of funds which remain in the Account
CAT
upon termination of assistance to such nation under this Act
shall be disposed of for such purposes as may, subject to approval
by the Act or joint resolution of the Congress, be agreed to between
such country and the Government of the United States.
TITLE II—DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
of
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION.--(a) There is hereby authorized to be
appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1955, not to exceed- pro
(1) $115,000,000 for assistance designed to promote the eco an
nomic development of the Near East and Africa, and for other
types of assistance designed to help maintain economic and
political stability in the area;
sh
(2) $75,000,000 for assistance designed to promote the eco ago
nomic development of Asia and to assist in maintaining eco-st-
nomic and political stability in the area; and
pr
tie
(3) $9,000,000 for assistance designed to promote economie
development in the other American Republics and non-seli PE
de
governing territories of the Western Hemisphere and to assist in
In
maintaining economic and political stability in the area.
Such assistance may be furnished on such terms and condition
as the President may specify and shall emphasize loans rather than
F
grants wherever possible.3
(b) In addition, unexpended balances of appropriations
made pursuant to sections 206 and 302 (b) of the Mutual Securis
Act of 1951, as amended, and unexpended balances of funds allocate
authorized to be continued available for the purposes of this sectioned
do
by sec. 6 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
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81
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assistance on terms of repayment in accordance with section 505."
FOREIGN AID
3117
22
authorized by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) of this
od section, respectively
at (c) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
for the fiscal year 1956 not to exceed $73,000,000, $71,000,000, and
838,000,000 to furnish assistance under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3),
De respectively of subsection (a) of this section.
. SEC. 202, ADMINISTRATION.
2e
ES
1-
es
es
nt
et
al
21
20-
TITLE III-TECHNICAL COOPERATION
Sec. 301. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE.--It is the policy of the United
States and the purpose of this title to aid the efforts of the peoples of
economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and
improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the
exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment
capital to countries which provide conditions under which such
technical assistance and capital can effectively and constructively
contribute to raising standards of living, creating new sources of
wealth, increasing productivity and expanding purchasing power,
Sec. 302. GENERAL AUTHORITY AND DEFINITION.--The President
is authorized to furnish assistance in accordance with the provisions
of this title through bilateral technical cooperation programs. As
be used in this title, the term "technical cooperation programs” means
programs for the international interchange of technical knowledge
and skills designed to contribute primarily to the balanced and
Les integrated development of the economic resources and productive
nd
capacities of economically underdeveloped areas. Such activities
shall be limited to economic, engineering, medical, educational, labor,
20-
agricultural, forestry, fishery, mineral, and fiscal surveys, demon-
Sostration, training, and similar projects that serve the purpose of
promoting the development of economic resources, productive capaci-
nieties, and trade of economically underdeveloped areas, and training in
public administration. The term "technical cooperation programs”
in does not include such activities authorized by the United States
Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 6) as
are not primarily related to economic development, nor activities
20 undertaken now or hereafter pursuant to the International Aviation
Facilities Act (62 Stat. 450), nor activities undertaken now or here-
time after in the administration of areas occupied by the United States
Sec. 303. PREREQUISITES TO ASSISTANCE.-Assistance shall be
by made available under section 302 of this Act only where the President
determines that the nation being assisted-
(a) pays a fair share of the cost of the program;
(b) provides all necessary information concerning such pro-
gram and gives the program full publicity;
(c) seeks to the maximum extent possible full coordination and
integration of technical cooperation programs being carried on
in that nation;
This subsection was added by sec. 6 (a) (2) of the Mutual Security Act of
OS
Armed Forces.
ed
00
DS
of,
in
56.
id
ing
1955.
3118
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ME
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end of the subsection were added by sec. 7 (b) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of
end of the subsection were added by sec. 7 (b)-(2) of the Mutual Security Act of
(d) endeavors to make effective use of the results of the 21
program, and
(e) cooperates with other nations participating in the program
in the mutual exchange of technical knowledge and skills. bu
SEC. 304. AUTHORIZATION.-
be
SEC. 305. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.-Funds made available the
under section 304 may be expended to furnish assistance in the form in
of equipment or commodities only where necessary for instruction or reg
demonstration purposes.
SEC. 306. MULTILATERAL TECHNICAL COOPERATION.—As one means
of accomplishing the purposes of this title, the United States is
authorized to participate in multilateral technical cooperation pro- thi
grams carried on by the United Nations, the Organization of American
States, their related organizations, and other international organizam
tions, wherever practicable. There is hereby authorized to be appro-
priated to carry out the purpose of this section, in addition to the
amounts authorized by section 304, not to exceed-
(a) $17,958,000 for making contributions to the United Nations NO
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance; in addition, $24,000,000 m
for the fiscal year 1956 for contributions to the United Nations
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance;'
Ru
(b) $1,500,000 for making contributions to the technical coopera-Co
tion program of the Organization of American States; in addition,
$1,500,000 for the fiscal year 1956 for contributions to the technical
cooperation programs of the Organization of American States.?
Sec. 307. ADVANCES AND GRANTS; CONTRACTS.-The President
may make advances and grants-in-aid of technical cooperation pro- pui
grams to any person, corporation, or other body of persons or to any
foreign government agency. The President may make and perform of
contracts and agreements in respect to technical cooperation programs ex
on behalf of the United States Government with any person, corporate
tion, or other body of persons however designated, whether within or she
without the United States, or with any foreign government or foreign
government agency. A contract or agreement which entails commit all
ments for the
expenditure of funds appropriated pursuant to this time
may, subject to any future action of the Congress, run for not to for
exceed three years.
SEC. 308. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY BOARD.-There
shall be an advisory board, referred to in this section as the Board."
which shall advise and consult with the President, or such other
officer as he may designate to administer this title, with respect to
general or basic policy matters arising in connection with the operation
of
programs authorized by this title, title II, and section 413 (b)
The Board shall consist of not more than thirteen members app
pointed by the President, one of whom, by and with the advice and
1 The words commencing with “ in addition” and continuing through to com
The words commencing with “in addition and continuing through to be
ang
are
eit
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1955.
Mue
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1955.
FOREIGN AID
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Mutual Security Act of 1955.
The
consent of the Senate, shall be appointed by him as chairman.
members of the Board shall be broadly representative of voluntary
agencies and other groups interested in the programs, including
business, labor, agriculture, public health, and education. All mem-
bers of the Board shall be citizens of the United States; none except
the chairman shall be an officer or an employee of the United States
fincluding any United States Government agency) who as such
regularly receives compensation for current services.
TITLE IV-OTHER PROGRAMS
Sec. 401. SPECIAL FUND.-(a) Of the funds made available under
" this Act, not to exceed $50,000,000, in addition to the funds authorized
to be appropriated under subsection (b) hereof, may be used in
any fiscal year, without regard to the requirements of this Act or
any other Act for which funds are authorized by this Act, in further-
ance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President deter-
mines that such use is important to the security of the United States.
Not to exceed $100,000,000 of the funds available under this section
0
may be expended for any selected persons who are residing in or
escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estónia or the
Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied areas of Germany
and Austria, or any Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied
dreas of Asia and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union,
either to form such persons into elements of the military forces
nt
supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other
purposes, when the President determines that such assistance will
contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area or to the security
n of the United States. Certification by the President that he has
expended amounts under this Act 3 not in excess of $50,000,000, and
that it is inadvisable to specify the nature of such expenditures,
shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for such amounts. Not more
1 than $20,000,000 of the funds available under this section may be
o allocated to any one nation in
le
any
fiscal
year.
(b) * There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
for the fiscal year 1956 $100,000,000 for use in accordance with sub-
section (a) of this section.
Sec
. 402. EARMARKING OF FUNDS. Of the funds authorized to be
made available pursuant to this Act for the fiscal year 1956, not less
Section 8 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 added the subsection
designation " (a)”, substituted the figure $50,000,000 in lieu of $150,000,000, and
added the following words: “in addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated
under subsection (b) hereof."'
.
Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1956—“ Provided, That no funds appro-
priated in this Act shall be used to assist directly in the migration to any nation
In the Western Hemisphere of any person not having a security clearance based
in reasonable standards to insure against Communist infiltration in the Western
*The word "Act' was substituted for the word "section" by sec. 8. (a) of the
*This subsection was added by sec. 8 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
IS
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I
0
e
I
0
2
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|-
e
Hemisphere.
dy
3120
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ID
mit
1 The words "for the fiscal year 1956, not less than $300,000,000" were substi.
tuted for "not less than $350,000,000" by sec. 8 (b) of the Mutual Security Act
2 For text of Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see
5 This subsection was added by sec. 8 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1956
than $300,000,000 1 shall be used to finance the export and sale for Ex
foreign currencies of surplus agricultural commodities or products an
thereof produced in the United States, in addition to surplus agri com
cultural commodities or products transferred pursuant to the Agricul- of
tural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, and in accord pro
ance with the standards as to pricing and the use of private trade in
channels expressed in section 101 of said Act. Foreign currency
proceeds accruing from such sales shall be used for the purposes of der
this Act and with particular emphasis on the purposes of section 104 Sta
of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
which are in harmony with the purposes of this Act. Notwithstanding Oct
section 1415 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1953, or any of
:
other provision of law, the President may use or enter into agreements exc
with friendly nations or organizations of nations to use for such
purposes the foreign currencies which accrue to the United States the
under this section.
the
SEC. 403. SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN JOINT CONTROL AREAS.—()
The President is hereby authorized to furnish commodities, services par
and financial and other assistance to nations and areas for which the of
United States
has responsibility at the time of the enactment of this sec
Act as a result of participation in joint control arrangements where ting
found by the President to be in the interest of the security of the 195
United States. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the this
President for the fiscal year 1955 not to exceed $25,000,000 to carry
$80
out this section.
for the fiscal year 1956° not to exceed $21,000,000 to carry out this I oft
(b) 5 There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
section.
Sec. 404. RESPONSIBILITIES IN GERMANY.—Upon approval by the rear
Na
Secretary of State, a part of the German currency now or
deposited under the bilateral agreement of December 15, 1949, be €
tween the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (or
any supplementary or succeeding agreement) shall be deposited in seta
the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) Special and
8
Account under the terms of article V of that agreement, and currency
to
which has been or may be deposited in said account, and any portion
of funds made available for assistance to the Federal Republic of the
Germany pursuant to section 403 of this Act, may be used for expenses
necessary to meet
the responsibilities or objectives of the United States
in Germany, including responsibilities arising under the supreme
authority assumed by the United States on June 5, 1945, and under
contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany.
of 1955.
supra, pp. 2941-2947.
t
• The subsection designationem constantinos kahe following words “at the times
the enactment of this Act" which
appear after the word "responsibility,"
added by sec. 8 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
hereafter
for
IT
was
2
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in the
OD T
Hen
1957
1953
6
FOREIGN AID
3121
2
Expenditures may be made under authority of this section in amounts
and under conditions determined by the Secretary of State after
consultation with the official primarily responsible for administration
of programs under chapter 3 of title I, and without regard to any
provision of law which the President determines must be disregarded
in order to meet such responsibilities or objectives.
Sec. 405. MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND ESCAPEES. —(a) The Presi-
dent is hereby authorized to continue membership for the United
States on the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
in accordance with its constitution approved in Venice, Italy, on
October 19, 1953. For the purpose of assisting in the movement
of migrants, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated not to
exceed $11,189,190 for contributions during the calendar year 1955
to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, and
thereafter such amounts as may be necessary from time to time for
the payment by the United States of its contributions to the Com-
mittee and all necessary salaries and expenses incident to United States
participation in the Committee. In addition, the unexpended balance
of the appropriation made pursuant to section 534 of the Mutual
Security Act of 1951, as amended, is hereby authorized to be con-
tinued available for the purpose of this subsection through June 30,
1955, and to be consolidated with the appropriation authorized in
this subsection.
I
(b) of the funds made available under this Act not more than
$800,000 may be used by the President to facilitate the migration
t to the other American Republics of persons resident in that portion
of the Ryukyu Island Archipelago under United States control.
(c) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal
year 1956 not to exceed $1,400,000 for contributions to the United
Nations Refugee Fund.
(d) 4 There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
for the fiscal year 1956 not to exceed $6,000,000 for continuation of
activities, including care, training, and resettlement, which have been
undertaken for selected escapees under section 401 of this Act.
Sec. 406. CHILDREN'S WELFARE.-(a) There is hereby authorized
appropriated not to exceed $13,500,000 for contributions during
year 1955 to the United Nations Children's Fund.5
B
e
S
e
1
1
?
to be
the fiscal
í
i
I
Hemisphere.
\ The heading, which formerly read "Movement of Migrants and Refugees,"
was changed by sec. 8 (d) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1956—"Provided, That no funds appro-
priated in this Act shall be used to assist directly in the migration to any nation
in the Western Hemisphere of any person not having a security clearance based
a reasonable standards to insure against Communist infiltration in the Western
This subsection was revised by sec. 8 (d) (2) of the Mutual Security Act of
1955. It formerly read as follows:
"There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year 1955 not
to exceed $500,000 for contributions to the U.N. Refugee Emergency Fund.''
This subsection was added by sec, 8 (d) (3) of the Mutual Security Act of
Subsection designation “(a)" and subsection (b) in its entirety were added by
sec, 8 (e) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
41590057-Vol. 293
1955.
3122
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ei
W
AY
re
1 Subsection designation “(a)" was added by sec. 8 (f) of the Mutual Security
(b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year
1956 not to exceed $14,500,000 for contributions to the United Nations
T
Children's Fund.
SEC. 407. PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST.-(a)There
is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal
year 1955, not to exceed $30,000,000, to be used to make contributions
to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East. In addition, the unexpended balance of the appro- -re
priation made for the Palestine refugee program in the Mutual Secur-
ity Appropriation Act, 1954,2 is hereby authorized to be continued
pe
available for the purpose of this section through June 30, 1955
.
Whenever the President shall determine that it would more effectively
contribute to the relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement of Palestine
refugees in the Near East, he may expend any part of the funds made
available pursuant to this section through any other agency he may ! t
designate.
(b) 3 There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President th
for the fiscal year 1956 not to exceed $65,000,000 to be used to make
contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
SEC. 408. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.-(a) In
order to provide for United States participation in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated se
for the fiscal year 1955 not to exceed $3,200,000 for payment by the
United States of its share of the expenses of the Organization, and
thereafter such amounts as may be necessary from time to time for
the payment by the United States of its share of the expenses of the
Organization and all necessary salaries and expenses of the United
States permanent representative to the Organization, of such persons
as may be appointed to represent the United States in the subsidiary fo
bodies of the Organization or in any multilateral organization which
ch
participates in achieving the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty, and
of their appropriate staffs, and the expenses of participation in meet al
ings of such organizations, including salaries, expenses, and allowances fu
of personnel and dependents as authorized by the Foreign
Service Act
of 1946, as amended (22 U.S. C. 801), and allowances and expenses as
provided in section 6 of the Act of July 30, 1946 (22 U. S. C. 2877
(b) The United States permanent representative to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization shall be appointed by the President de for
and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall hold office
at the pleasure of the President. Such representative shall have the
rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary
shall be a chief of mission, class 1, within the meaning of the Foreign
Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S. C. 801).
Act of 1955.
3 This subsection was added by sec. 8 (f) of the Mutual Security Act of 1956.
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FOREIGN AID
3123
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(c) Persons detailed to the international staff of the North Atlantic
Tng Treaty Organization in accordance with section 529 of this Act who are
appointed as Foreign Service Reserve officers may serve for periods of
more than four years notwithstanding the limitation in section 522 of
al the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S. C. 922).
Sec. 409. OCEAN FREIGHT CHARGES.-(a) In order to further the
es efficient use of United States voluntary contributions for relief and
rehabilitation in nations and areas eligible for assistance under this
Act
, the President may pay ocean freight charges from United States
ed
ports to designated ports of entry of such nations and areas on ship-
55.
ments by United States voluntary nonprofit relief agencies registered
Ay with and approved by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign
Aid and shipments by the American Red Cross.
de
(b) Where practicable the President shall make arrangements with
By the receiving nation for free entry of such shipments and for the making
available by that nation of local currencies for the purpose of defraying
at the transportation cost of such shipments from the port of entry of the
ke
receiving nation to the designated shipping point of the consignee.
(c) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
for the fiscal year 1955 not to exceed $4,400,000 to carry out the
In
purposes of this section; and, in addition, unexpended balances of
sic
appropriations heretofore made pursuant to section 535 of the Mutual
Security Act of 1951, as amended, are authorized to be continued avail-
he able for the purposes of this section through June 30, 1955, and to be
nd
consolidated with the appropriation authorized in this section. There
is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal
he
year 1956 not to exceed $2,000,000 to carry out the purposes of this
(d) 2 There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
for the fiscal year 1956 not to exceed $13,000,000 to pay ocean freight
charges on shipments of surplus agricultural commodities, including
nd
commodities made available pursuant to any Act for the disposal
et abroad of United States agricultural surpluses. In addition, any
funds made available under this Act may be used, in amounts deter-
et mined by the President, for the purposes of this subsection.
Sec. 410. CONTROL ACT EXPENSES.—There is hereby authorized
to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1955 not to
exceed $1,300,000, and for the fiscal year 1956 not to exceed $1,175,000,
by for carrying out the objectives of the Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 1951 (22 U. S. C. 1611). In addition, in accordance
be with section 303 of that Act, funds made available for carrying out
ed
for
ed section. "
IS
.ch
jes
act
As
Ice
ad
1955.
This last sentence was added by sec. 8 (g) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of
This subsection was revised by sec. 8 (g) (2) of the Mutual Security Act of
1955. It formerly read: "In addition, any funds made available under this Act
may be used, in amounts determined by the President, to pay ocean freight charges
on shipments of surplus agricultural commodities, including commodities made
available pursuant to any Act
for the disposal abroad of United States agricultural
* [For text of Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, see supra.]
surpluses.
3124
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
AI
en
pe
t
8
ta
CI
OT
PC
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OD
carrying out such programs), and exchange of ideas and technical
(b) In order to encourage and facilitate participation by pripele
(1) shall make arrangements to find and draw the attention o
private enterprise to opportunities for investment and development
(2) shall accelerate a program of negotiating treaties for commere
1 The words "and for the fiscal year 1956 not to exceed $1,175,000" shid
appear in the first sentence of this section following the figure "$1,300,000" /
chapter 1 of title I of this Act shall be available for carrying out the
purpose of this section in such amounts as the President
may
direct!
SEC. 411.? ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER EXPENSE. (a) When
ever possible, the expenses of administration of this Act shall be
paid for in the currency of the nation where the expense is incurred. U
SEC. 412. CHINESE AND KOREAN STUDENTS.-Funds heretofore
allocated to the Secretary of State pursuant to the last proviso di
section 202 of the China Area Aid Act of 1950 (22 U. S. C. 1547) shal
continue to be available until expended, under such regulations a
the Secretary of State may prescribe, using private agencies to the
maximum extent practicable, for necessary expenses of tuition, sub-
sistence, transportation, and emergency medical care for selected
citizens of China and of Korea for studying or teaching in accredite
colleges, universities, or other educational institutions in the United
States approved by the Secretary of State for the purpose, or for
research and related academic and technical activities in the Unitel
States, and such selected citizens of China who have been admitted
for the purpose of study in the United States shall be granted per
mission to accept employment upon application filed with the Com-
missioner of Immigration and Naturalization pursuant to regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General.
Sec. 413. ENCOURAGEMENT OF FREE ENTERPRISE AND PRIVATE
PARTICIPATION.-(a) The Congress recognizes the vital role of fres
enterprise in achieving rising levels of production and standards of
living essential to the economic progress and defensive strength of
the free world. Accordingly, it is declared to be the policy of the
United States to encourage the efforts of other free nations to increas
the flow of international trade, to foster private initiative and com
petition, to discourage monopolistic practices, to improve the teda
nical efficiency of their industry, agriculture and commerce, and so
strengthen free labor unions; and to encourage the contribution al
United States enterprise toward economic strength of other frem
nations, through private trade and investment abroad, private per
ticipation in the programs carried out under this Act (including
use of private trade channels to the maximum extent practicable
information on the matters covered by this
section.
enterprise to the maximum extent practicable in achieving any
the purposes of this Act, the President-
in other free nations;
ol
were added by sec. 8 (h) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
2 The heading formerly read “Administrative Expenses” and was change "
sec. 8 (i) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
FOREIGN AID
3125
)
itedThat
per-
om
TATE
Is of
ho
the
the and trade, including tax treaties, which shall include provisions to
est encourage and facilitate the flow of private investment to nations
zen participating in programs under this Act;
be
(3) shall, consistent with the security and best interests of the
red United States, seek compliance by other countries or a dependent
area of any country with all treaties for commerce and trade and
taxes and shall take all reasonable measures under this Act or other
authority to secure compliance therewith and to assist United States
citizens in obtaining just compensation for losses sustained by them
hal
or payments exacted from them as a result of measures taken or im-
3.8 posed by any country or dependent area thereof in violation of any
the | such treaty; and
sube
(4) may make, until June 30, 1957, under rules and regulations
cted
prescribed by him, guaranties to any person of investments in con-
ited nection with projects, including expansion, modernization, or devel-
ited
opment of existing enterprises, in any nation with which the United
States has agreed to institute the guaranty program: Provided,
tted
(A) such projects shall be approved by the President as fur-
thering any of the purposes of this Act, and by the nation
concerned;
(B) the guaranty to any person shall be limited to assuring
any or all of the following:
(i) the transfer into United States dollars of other curren-
fret
cies, or credits in such currencies, received by such person as
earnings or profits from the approved project, as repayment or
return of the investment therein, in whole or in part, or as
compensation for the sale or disposition of all or any part
thereof;
(i) the compensation in United States dollars for loss of
all or any part of the investment in the approved project
which shall be found by the President to have been lost to
such person by reason of expropriation or confiscation by
action of the government of a foreign nation;
(C) when any payment is made to any person pursuant to a
guaranty as hereinbefore described, the currency, credits, assets,
or investment on account of which such payment is made shall
become the property of the United States Government, and the
United States Government shall be subrogated to any right,
title, claim or cause of action existing in connection therewith;
(D) the guaranty to any person shall not exceed the amount of
dollars invested in the project by such person with the approval of
the President plus actual earnings or profits on said project to the
extent provided by such guaranty, and shall be limited to a term
not exceeding twenty years from the date of issuance;
(E) a fee shall be charged in an amount not exceeding 1 per
centum per annum of the amount of each guaranty under clause
(i) of subparagraph (B), and not exceeding 4 per centum of the
amount of each guaranty under clause (ii) of such subparagraph,
and all fees collected hereunder shall be available for expenditure
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3126
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
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Sec. 414. MUNITIONS CONTROL.“(a) The President is authorized
to control, in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign
tion, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto,
other than by a United States Government agency. The President
(b) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every
person who engages in the business of manufacturing, exporting, a
importing any arms, ammunition, or implements of war, including
in discharge of liabilities under guaranties made under this sec-
tion until such time as all such liabilities have been discharged ors
have expired, or until all such fees have been expended in accord
.
ance with the provisions of this section;
I
(F) the President is authorized to issue guaranties up to a total
of $200,000,000: Provided, That any funds allocated to a
guaranty and remaining after all liability of the United States
assumed in connection therewith has been released, discharged,
or otherwise terminated, shall be available for allocation to other t
guaranties, the foregoing limitation notwithstanding. Any
payments made to discharge liabilities under guaranties issued
under this subsection shall be paid out of fees collected under
subparagraph (E) as long as such fees are available, and there-
after shall be paid out of funds realized from the sale of notes
which have been issued under authority of paragraph 111 (c)(2)
of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, when
necessary to discharge liabilities under any such guaranty:
(G) the guaranty program authorized by this paragraph shall
be used to the maximum practicable extent and shall be admin
istered under broad criteria so as to facilitate and increase the
participation of private enterprise in achieving any of the pur-
fo
poses of this Act;
b
(H) as used in this paragraph-
(i) the term "person” means a citizen of the United States or
any corporation, partnership, or other association created
under the law of the United States or of any State or Territory th
and substantially beneficially owned by citizens of the United
States, and
i
(ii) the term "investment” includes any contribution of
b
capital goods, materials, equipment, services, patents, proc-
esses, or techniques by any person in the form of (1) a loan of
loans to an approved project, (2) the purchase of a share
of
ownership in any such project, (3) participation in royalties
,
earnings, or profits of any such project, and (4) the furnishing
of capital goods items and related services pursuant to a com
tract providing for payment in whole or in part after the end of
the fiscal year in which the guaranty of such investment is
made.
policy of the United States, the export and import of arms,
t]
arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical dad
relating thereto, for the purposes of this section.
b
ac
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e
1
M
ei
8.
Q's
1
1 [See also the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, supra.)
FOREIGN AID
3127
9.
tes
ler
Te-
ces
eu
11-
bition ! through assisting the peoples of free Asia in their efforts to attain
e technical data relating thereto, designated by the President under sub-
or section (a) shall register with the United States Government agency
de charged with the administration of this section and in addition, shall
pay a registration fee which shall be prescribed by such regulations.
ER!
(c) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this section
or any rule or regulation issued under this section, or who willfully, in
å registration or license application, makes any untrue statement of a
de material fact or omits to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
shall upon conviction be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned
ed
not more than two years, or both.
ler SEC. 415. ASSISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.-When-
ever it will assist in achieving purposes declared in this Act, the Presi-
dent is authorized to use funds available under sections 131 and 403
2) in order to furnish assistance, including by transfer of funds, directly
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for a strategic stockpile of
foodstuffs and other supplies, or for other purposes.
al Sec. 416. FACILITATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF TRAVEL.--The
in- President, through such officer or commission as he may designate,
he shall facilitate and encourage, without cost to the United States except
for administration expenses, the promotion and development of travel
by citizens of the United States to and within countries receiving
assistance under this Act and travel by citizens of such countries to the
or United States.
ed SEC. 417. IRISH COUNTERPART.Pursuant to section 115 (b) (6) of
-9 the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, the disposition
within Ireland of the unencumbered balance, in the amount
of approx-
imately 6,000,000 Irish pounds, of the special account of Irish funds
of established under article IV of the Economic Cooperation Agreement
De between the United States of America and Ireland, dated June 28,
or) 1948, for the purposes of -
od
(1) scholarship exchange between the United States and Ire-
es
ng
(2) other programs and projects (including the establishment of
I
an Agricultural Institute) to improve and develop the agricultural
of
production and marketing potential of Ireland and to increase the
is
production and efficiency of Irish industry; and
(3) development programs and projects in aid of the foregoing
ed
objectives, is hereby approved, as provided in the agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Ireland, dated June 17, 1954.
SEC. 418. PRESIDENT'S FUND FOR ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
ent
MENT:-(a) The Congress of the United States reaffirms the policy of
the United States to contribute to international peace and security
economic and social well-being, to safeguard basic rights and liberties,
I and to protect their security and independence. The Congress here-
by recognizes that fundamental to these goals is an expanding eco-
106) nomic growth of the free Asia area based upon self-help and mutual
cooperation and full utilization of already existing resources and
land;
Soad
ton
AS
15
01
3128
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
exceed 10 per centum of the funds made available pursuant to any
provision of this Act may be transferred to and consolidated with thi
1 The introductory paragraph of sec. 3 reads as follows: "There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Department of State for contribution to the working
capital fund of the organization the sum of $560,000 and as annual appropriation
knowledge. The Congress expresses the willingness of the
people of the United States to support the foregoing objectives to
the extent to which the countries in the area continue to make effective
use of their own resources and external resources otherwise available
to them.
(b) In order to carry out the purposes of this section, there is hereby
authorized to be established a fund, to be known as the "President's
Fund for Asian Economic Development" (hereinafter referred to as
"the Fund”), and there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President for the Fund an amount of $200,000,000, such amount to
remain available until June 30, 1958.
(c) The President is authorized to utilize the appropriations made
available for the Fund to accomplish in the free Asian area the policies
and purposes declared in this Act and to disburse them on such terros
and conditions, including transfer of funds, as he may specify to any
person, corporation, or other body of persons however designated, or
to any friendly foreign government, agency, or organization or group
of friendly governments or agencies as may be appropriate: Provided
,
however, That such assistance shall emphasize loans rather than grants
wherever possible, and not less than 50 per centum of the funds
appropriated pursuant to this section shall be available only for
furnishing assistance on terms of repayment in accordance with the
provisions of section 505, and not more than 25 per centum of said
funds may be allocated for assistance to any one nation.
(d) In utilizing the Fund the President shall give preference to
projects or programs that will clearly contribute to promoting greater
economic strength in the area as a whole or among a group or groups
of countries of the area.
SEC. 419. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.—Section 3 (a) of Publie
Law 643, Eightieth Congress, approved June 14, 1948, as amended,
is hereby amended to read as follows:
*(a) such sums as may be necessary for the payment by the United
States of its share of the expenses of the
Organization as apportioned
by the Health
Assembly in accordance
with article 56 of the constitu-
tion of the Organization, except that payments by the United States
for any fiscal year of the Organization after 1958 shall not exceed
33% per centum of the total assessments of active members of the
Organization for such fiscal year; and’.”
TITLE V-MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 501. TRANSFERABILITY OF FUNDS. - Whenever the Presiden
determines it to be necessary for the purposes of this Act, 20 eur
following .
1
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FOREIGN AID
3129
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che
funds made available pursuant to any other provisions of this Act,
che
and may be used for any of the purposes for which such funds may be
to
used, except that the total in the provision for the benefit of which
the transfer is made shall not be increased by more than 20 per centum
le
of the amount made available for such provision pursuant to this Act.
Funds transferred under this section to furnish military assistance
under chapter 1 of title I may be expended without regard to the area
t's limits imposed by section 105 (c). Of any funds transferred under
this section for the purpose of furnishing assistance under section 201,
che
30 per centum shall be available only for furnishing assistance on
to
terms of repayment in accordance with section 505.
SEC. 502. USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY..(a) Notwithstanding sec-
de
tion 1415 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1953, or any other
provision of law, proceeds of sales made under section 550 of the
Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, shall remain available and
ny
shall be used for any purposes of this Act, giving particular regard to
the following purposes
(1) for providing military assistance to nations or mutual de-
fense organizations eligible to receive assistance under this Act;
ats
(2) for purchase of goods or services in friendly nations;
ds
(3) for loans, under applicable provisions of this Act, to increase
for
production of goods or services, including strategic materials,
id
needed in any nation with which an agreement was negotiated,
or in other friendly nations, with the authority to use currencies
received in repayment for the purposes stated in this section or
to
for deposit to the general account of the Treasury of the United
IPS
(4) for developing new markets on a mutually beneficial basis;
lic
(5) for grants-in-aid to increase production for domestic needs
ed
in friendly countries; and
(6) for purchasing materials for United States stockpiles.
ed
ed
Sec. 503. TERMINATION OF AssistANCE.—(a) If the President de-
BU termines that the furnishing of assistance to any nation under any
tes
provision of this Act-
(1) is no longer consistent with the national interest or security
che
or the foreign policy of the United States; or
(2) would no longer contribute effectively to the purposes for
which such assistance is furnished; or
(3) is no longer consistent with the obligations and responsi-
bilities of the United States under the Charter of the United
Nations,
he shall terminate all or part of any assistance furnished pursuant to
to
this Act. If the President determines that
any nation which is receiv-
09
ing assistance under chapter 1 of title I of this Act is not making its
he full contribution to its own defense or to the defense of the area of
which it is a part, he shall terminate all or part of such assistance.
Assistance to any nation under any provision of this Act may, unless
sooner terminated by the President, be terminated by concurrent
resolution. Funds made available under this Act shall remain avail-
ter
States;
hed
nt
red
ing
328
I
(i) funds which have been obligated on or before that date shall remain available
to which funds have been obligated on or before such date for procurement for,
shipment to, or delivery in a recipient country may be transferred to such country,
ties essential to such transfer and (B) for the necessary expenses of liquidating
2 SEC. 101 (d) of Ex, Or. 10575 [infra, doc. 18), as amended, established the
Office of Small Business in the Foreign Operations Administration. It was sub
sequently transferred to the State Department by sec. 102 (d) of Ex. Or. 10610
(infra, doc. 19) and was made a part of, or attached to the International Coopers
tion Administration by sec. 1 of Department of State Delegation of Authority &
3 The words "and sales" in the heading were added by sec. 9 (c) (1) of the
3130 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
able for twelve months from the date of termination under this sub
.
section for the necessary expenses of liquidating assistance programs,
(b) Unless sooner abolished under section 525, the Foreign Opera-
tions Administration shall cease to exist at the close of June 30, 1953. I
SEC. 504. SMALL BUSINESS.—(a) Insofar as practicable and to the
maximum extent consistent with the accomplishment of the purposes
of this Act, the President shall assist American small business to par-
ticipate equitably in the furnishing of commodities and services
financed with funds authorized under titles II, III, and IV, and chap-
ters 2 and 3 of title I, of this Act-
(1) by causing to be made available to suppliers in the United
States and particularly to small independent enterprises, infor-
mation, as far in advance as possible, with respect to purchases
proposed to be financed with such funds,
(2) by causing to be made available to prospective purchasers
in the nations receiving assistance under this Act information &
to commodities and services produced by small independent
enterprises in the United States, and
(3) by providing for additional services to give small business
better opportunities to participate in the furnishing of commodi-
ties and services financed with such funds.
(b) There shall be an Office of Small Business, headed by a Special
Assistant for Small Business, in such United States Government
agency as the President may direct, to assist in carrying out the
provisions of subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The Secretary of Defense shall assure that there is made avail
able to suppliers in the United States,
and particularly to small inde
pendent enterprises, information with respect to purchases made
by
the
Department of Defense pursuant to chapter
1 of title I, such infor-
mation to be furnished as far in advance as possible.
SEC. 505. LOAN ASSISTANCE AND SALES. --(a) Assistance under
this Act may be furnished on a grant basis or on such terms, including
1 This subsection which appeared as subsection "e)” in the Mutual Security
Act of 1954 was amended to read "(b)", and the former subsection "b)".
repealed, by sec. 9 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955. Former subsection
ferred by this Act may be exercised for the purpose of carrying out any function
authorized by title II; except that during the twelve months following such die
for the necessary-expenses of procurement, Shipment
, delivery, and other acting
operations incident to such functions."
as amended.
i
1
Mutual Security Act of 1955.
FOREIGN AID
3131
sub- cash, credit, or other terms of repayment (including repayment in
271. foreign currencies or by transfer to the United States of materials
verk- required for stockpiling or other purposes) as may be determined to
953. be best suited to the achievement of the purposes of this Act and shall
the emphasize loans rather than grants wherever possible. Whenever
oses commodities or services are sold for foreign currencies the President,
par notwithstanding section 1415 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act,
rices 1953, or any other provision of law, may use or enter into arrangements
hape with friendly nations or organizations of nations to use such currencies
for the purposes for which the funds providing the commodities or
ited services which generated the currencies were appropriated.
for-
1
ases
users
lent
7ail
.
Sec. 506. PATENTS AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION.
Sec. 507. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.-Except ...
18
Sec. 508. LIMITATION ON FUNDS FOR PROPAGANDA.--None of the
Lent funds herein authorized to be appropriated nor any counterpart funds
shall be used to pay for personal services or printing, or for other ex-
mes penses of the dissemination within the United States of general
odi propaganda in support of the mutual security program, or to pay the
travel or other expenses outside the United States of any citizen or
cial group of citizens of the United States for the purpose of publicizing
such
program within the United States.
the SEC. 509. SHIPPING ON UNITED STATES VESSELS.Such steps as
may be necessary shall be taken to assure, as far as practicable, that
at least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of commodities, materials
ode and equipment procured out of funds made available under
sections
by 103, 123, 131, 132 (a), 201, 304, and 403 of this Act and transported to
for
or from the United States on ocean vessels, computed separately for
dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liner and tanker services and computed
nde separately for section 103, and for sections 123, 131, 132 (a), 201, 304,
ding and 403 (taken together) is so transported on United States flag com-
mercial vessels to the extent such vessels are available at market rates
urity for United States flag commercial vessels provided such rates are fair
and reasonable; and, in the administration of this provision, steps
shall be taken, insofar as practicable and consistent with the purposes
of this Act, to secure a fair and reasonable participation by United
States flag commercial vessels in cargoes by geographic area. The
ocean transportation between foreign countries of commodities, mate-
rials
, and equipment procured out of local currency funds made availa-
ble or derived from funds made available under this Act shall not be
4 governed by the provisions of section 901 (b) of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936, or any other law relating to the ocean transportation of
commodities,
materials, and equipment on United States flag vessels.3
Sec. 510. PURCHASE OF COMMODITIES.-No funds made available
TAS
ction
COB-
ction
data
lable
pect
E for
atry
tiria
ating
the
sub
0610
1
enester
181
The words in the first sentence commencing with "and shall emphasize loans,"
and the second sentence, were added by sec. 9 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of
* See also 1954 amendment to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (PL 664,
83d Cong. ; 68 Stat. 832).
* This sentence was added by sec. 9 (d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
the
3132
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
(2) for such other disposition as the President shall deem to be in the
or whenever such retention is called for by concurrent resolution
provisions of law relating to the disposal of Government-owned
any such disposal or transfer shall revert to the respective appropria
curement of such equipment, materials, or commodities or to approp
(c) The President shall make appropriate arrangements with each
nation receiving equipment or materials under chapter 1 of title 1
(other than equipment or materials sold under the provisions of section
106) for the return to the United States (1) for salvage or scrap,
interest of mutual security, of any such equipment or materials which
under title II or chapter 3 of title I of this Act shall be used for the
purchase in bulk of any commodities at prices higher than the market
price prevailing in the United States at the time of purchase adjusted
for differences in the cost of transportation to destination, quality
,
and terms of payment. A bulk purchase within the meaning of this
section does not include the purchase of raw cotton in bales. Funds
made available under title II or chapter 3 of title I of this Act may be
used for the procurement of commodities outside the United States
unless the President determines that such procurement will result in
adverse effects upon the economy of the United States, with special
reference to any areas of labor surplus, or upon the industrial mobiliza-
tion base, which outweigh the economic advantages to the United
States of less costly procurement abroad. In providing for the pro-
curement of any surplus agricultural commodity for transfer by grant
under this Act to any recipient nation in accordance with the require
ments of such nation, the President shall
, insofar as practicable and
where in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, authorize the pre-
curement of such surplus agricultural commodity only within the
United States except to the extent that any such surplus agricultura
commodity is not available in the United States in sufficient quantities
to supply the requirements of the nations receiving assistance under
this Act.
SEC. 511. RETENTION AND RETURN OF EQUIPMENT.-(a) No equip
.
ment or materials may be transferred under title I out of military stocks
if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, determines that such transfer would be detrimental to the
national security of the United States, or that such equipment at
materials are needed by the reserve components of the Armed Forces
to meet their training requirements.
(b) Any equipment, materials, or commodities procured to cart
out this Act shall be retained by, or, upon reimbursement, transfer
to and for the use of, such United States Government agency
President may determine in lieu of being disposed of to a
nation or international organization whenever in the judgment of the
President the best interests of the United States will
be served thereb
Any commodities so retained may be disposed of without regard is
property, when necessary to prevent spoilage or wastage of such com
modities or to conserve the usefulness thereof. Funds realized from
tion or appropriations out of which funds were expended for the pro
ations currently available for such procurement.
+
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FOREIGN AID
3133
124-
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the
are no longer required for the purposes for which originally made
ket available.
ted
Sec. 512. PENAL PROVISION.
SEC. 513. NOTICE TO LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES.--When any trans-
fer is made under section 105 (d) or section 501, or any other action
nde
is taken under this Act which will result in furnishing assistance of
be
& kind, for a purpose, or to an area, substantially different from that
included in the presentation to the Congress during its consideration
tin
of this Act, or which will result in expenditures greater by 50 per
Cia
!
centum or more than the proposed expenditures included in such pres-
entation for the program concerned, the President or such officer as
tead he may designate shall promptly notify the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
SA House of Representatives and, when military assistance is involved,
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Repre-
and
sentatives, stating the justification for such change. Notice shall
Per also be given to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
this and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
rural
of any determination under the first sentence of section 401 (except
ities with respect to unvouchered funds), and copies of any certification
nder
as to loyalty under section 531 shall be filed with such committees.
SEC. 514. INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES.-
Foreign currencies or credits owed to or owned by the United States,
where arising from this Act or otherwise, shall, upon a request from the
Secretary of State certifying that such funds are required for the pur-
o the pose of international educational exchange activities under programs
It or authorized by section 32 (b) (2) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944,
JCB as amended, be reserved by the Secretary of the Treasury for sale to
the Department of State for such activities on the basis of the dollar
AIT value at the time of the reservation.
CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
! the
Sec. 521. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE PRESIDENT.-(a)
eby
Except as provided in subsection (b), the President may exercise any
.
power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such agency
d to
or officer of the United States as he shall direct, and the head of such
agency or such officer may from time to time promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out functions
under this Act and may delegate authority to perform any of such
functions to his subordinates acting under his direction. 2
(b) After June 30, 1955, the President shall exercise the powers con-
upon bim under title III of this Act through the Secretary of
ocks
hiefs
the
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ferred
State.
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le !
tion
150 U.S.C., app. 1641.
See Ex. Or. 10575, as amended [infra, doc. 18), Ex. Or. 10610 [infra, doc 19];
and State Department Delegation of Authority 85, as amended (20 Fed. Reg. 4825,
as amended by 20 Fed. Reg. 7950).
See Ex. Or. 10610 (infra, doc. 19] and State Department Delegation of Au-
thority 85, as amended.
nich
3134
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
ance.
That such authority conferred by this sentence shall be exercised in
1 See Part II of Ex. Or, 10575 [infra, doc. 18), as amended (20 Fed. Keg, 5577)
4 See Ex. Or. 10575, as amended, the Presidential letter of Nov. 6, 1954
Secretary of State, Ex. Or. 10610, and State Department Delegation of Authorit |
accompanying Ex. Or. 10610, the Presidential letter of Apr. 15, 1955, to the
☆ The material in parentheses was added by sec. 10 (b) of the Mutual Security
SEC. 522. ALLOCATION AND REIMBURSEMENT AMONG AGENCIES.-
Sec. 523. COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN POLICY.--(a) Nothing
contained in this Act shall be construed to infringe upon the powers or
functions of the Secretary of State.
(b) The President shall prescribe appropriate procedures to assure
coordination among representatives of the United States Government
in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the United States
Diplomatic Mission.
SEC. 524. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.-(a) In the case of aid
under chapter 1 of title I of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
have primary responsibility for-
(1) the determination of military end-item requirements;
(2) the procurement of military equipment in a manner which
permits its integration with service programs;
(3) the supervision of end-item use by the recipient countries,
(4) the supervision of the training of foreign military personne
(5) the movement and delivery of military end-items; and
(6) within the Department of Defense, the performance of an
other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assist
(b) The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery
and allocation of military equipment shall be determined by the
Secretary of Defense. The determination of the value of the program
for any country under chapter 1 of title I shall be made by the
President.3
SEC. 525. FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION.-Excepts
modified pursuant to this section or section 521, the Director of the
Foreign Operations Administration (referred to in this
chapter as the
"Director) shall continue to perform the functions
vested in him on
the effective date of this Act, * except insofar as such functions relate i
continuous supervision and general direction of programs of militar
assistance. The President
may transfer to any agency or officer of the
United States, and may modify or abolish, any function, office, a
entity of the Foreign Operations Administration (including any
fum
tion, office or entity thereof transferred to any other agency) k or at
officer or employee thereof, and may transfer such personnel, properti
records, and funds as may be necessary incident thereto: Provide
of Security
3 See sec. 3a. (Sthy of State Department Delegation of Authority No. &
amended.
Act of 1955.
FOREIGN AID
3135
8.-
1
ning
SON
sure
Lent
ates
accordance with applicable laws and regulations relating to the Civil
Service and Veterans' Preference.
SEC. 526. MISSIONS AND STAFFS ABROAD.—The President may
maintain special missions or staffs abroad in such nations and for such
periods of time as may be necessary to carry out this Act. Each such
special mission or staff shall be under the direction of a chief. The
chief and his deputy shall be appointed by the President and may,
notwithstanding any other law, be removed by the President at his
discretion. .
SEC. 527. EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL. (a) Any United States
Government agency performing functions under this Act is authorized
to employ such personnel as the President deems necessary to carry
out the provisions and purposes of this Act.
aid
shall
hicb
es;
nnel :
and
SOT
Sist-
SEC. 528. DETAIL OF PERSONNEL TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.2-
(a) Whenever the President determines it to be consistent with and
in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, the head of any United
States Government agency is authorized to detail or assign any officer
or employee of his agency to any office or position to which no com-
pensation is attached with any foreign government or foreign govern-
ment agency: Provided, That such acceptance of office shall in no case
involve the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government.
Ters,
the
gram
the
SEC. 529. DETAIL OF PERSONNEL TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
f the
AND
OR
TIONS.
Sec. 530. EXPERTS
CONSULTANTS
ORGANIZATIONS
THEREOF.—
Sec. 531. SECURITY CLEARANCE.
SEC. 532. EXEMPTION OF PERSONNEL FROM CERTAIN FEDERAL
S
the
m 01
ite to
Laws.
itars
of the
OI
7 815
vided
Sec. 533. WAIVERS OF CERTAIN FEDERAL LAWS.---
Sec. 534. REPORTS.-The President, from time to time while funds
Pucer appropriated
for the purpose of this Act continue to be available for
obligation, shall transmit to the Congress reports covering each six
months of operations, in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, except
verti
,
information the disclosure of which he deems incompatible with the
security of the United States. Reports provided for under this section
shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the
Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session. Such
reports shall include detailed information on the implementation of
sections 504, 413 (b), and 418 3 of this Act.
edin
5571)
106)
to the
thority
The proviso was added by sec. 10 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1955.
2 See also secs. 301-303 of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange
Act of 1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), 62 Stat. 6; 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (also, A Decade of
American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224–1234).
The words and 418', were added by sec. 10 (e) of the Mutual Security Act
pourity
of 1955.
3136
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
(5) the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended
(6) the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, as amended
13 22 U. S. C. $ 1556 note.
SEC. 535. COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.—
(a) The President is authorized to request the cooperation of or the
use of the services and facilities of the United Nations, its organs and
specialized agencies, or other international organizations, in carrying
out the purposes of this Act, and may make payments by advance
ments or reimbursements, for such purposes, out of funds made
available for the purposes of this Act, as may be necessary therefor
, to
the extent that special compensation is usually required for such
services and facilities: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be
construed to authorize the delegation to any international or foreign
organization or agency of authority to decide the method of furnishing
assistance under this Act to any country or the amount thereof.
SEC. 536. JOINT COMMISSION ON RURAL RECONSTRUCTION IN
CHINA.—The President is authorized to continue to participate in the
Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China and to appoint
citizens of the United States to the Commission.
CHAPTER 3. REPEAL AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 541. EFFECTIVE DATE.—This Act shall take effect on the date
of its enactment.
Sec. 542. STATUTES REPEALED.-(a) There are hereby repealed-
(1) an Act to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey,
approved May 22, 1947, as amended;
(2) the joint resolution to provide for relief assistance to the
people of countries devastated by war, approved May 31, 1947
as amended: 2
(3) the Foreign Aid Act of 1947; 3
(4) the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended; * including
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, the Inter
national Children's Emergency Fund Assistance Act of 1948, 4
amended, the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948," and the
China Aid Act of 1948, as amended;8
including the Economic Cooperation Act of 1950," the Chairs
Area Aid Act of 1950, as amended, 12 the United Nations Palestina
Refugee Aid Act of 1950,13 and the Act for International Develop
ment, as amended;
(7) the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950
, *
amended: 15
(8) thé Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950;"
1 22 U. S, C. § 1401 note.
9 22 U. S. C. $ 1571 note.
2 22 U. S. C. § 1411-1417.
10 22 U. S. C. $ 1501 note.
3 22 U. S. C. $ 1411 note.
11 22 U. S. C. $ 1501 note.
4 22 U. S. C. $ 1503 note,
12 22 U. S. C. & 1547 note.
5 22 U. S. C. $ 1501 note.
6 22 U. S. C. $ 1531 note,
14 22 U. S. C. $ 1557 note.
7 22 U. S. C. § 1409 note.
15 22 U. S. C. $ 1551 note.
8 22 U. S. C. § 1541 note.
16 22 U. S. C. $ 1558.
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(9) the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended;
he (10) the Mutual Security Act of 1952;
od (11) the Mutual Security Act of 1953;
ng
(12) section 12 of the joint resolution of Congress approved
November 4, 1939 (54 Stat. 10; 22 U.S. C. 452);
de (13) section 4 of the Act of March 3, 1925 (50 Stat. 887; 50
to
U.S. C. 165); and
(14) section 968 of title 18, United States Code.
be
(b) References in other Acts to the Acts listed in subsection (a)
shall hereafter be considered to be references to the appropriate
ng provisions of this Act.
(c) The repeal of the Acts listed in subsection (a) shall not be
deemed to affect amendments contained in such Acts to acts not
named in subsection (a).
IN SEC. 543. SAVING PROVISIONS.
che SEC. 544. AMENDMENTS TO OTHER LAWS.--(a) Title X of the
ant United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948,
as amended (22 U.S. C. 1431), is amended by adding the following
new section:
"INFORMATIONAL MEDIA GUARANTIES
ate
"SEC. 1011. The Director of the United States Information
Agency may make guaranties, in accordance with the provisions
1-
of subsection (b) of section 413 of the Mutual Security Act of
cey
1954, of investments in enterprises producing or distributing
informational media consistent with the national interests of the
the
United States against funds heretofore made available by notes
47,
issued to the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 111
(c) (2) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended,
for purposes of guaranties of investments: Provided, however,
ing
That the amount of such guaranties in any fiscal year shall be
determined by the President but shall not exceed $10,000,000."
(b) Section 1 of Public Law 283, Eighty-first Congress is repealed.
the
The Institute of Inter-American Affairs, created pursuant to Public
Law 369, Eightieth Congress (22 U.S. Ć. 281), shall have succession
until June 30, 1960, and may make contracts for periods not to
exceed five years: Provided, Îbat any contract extending beyond
June 30, 1960, shall be made subject to termination by the said
Institute upon notice: And provided further, That the said Institute
OP
shall
, on and after July 1, 1954, be subject to the applicable provi-
sions of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as amended (31
U. S. C. 1), in lieu of the provisions of the Government Corporation
Control Act, as amended (31 U. S. C. 841).
Sec. 545. DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this Act-
(a) The term "commodity” includes any commodity, material,
article, supply, or goods.
(b) The term "surplus agricultural commodity" means any agri-
cultural commodity or product thereof, class, kind, type, or other
Der
sus
ing
ine
85
122 U. S. C. $ 1651 note.
* 22 U. S. C. § 1675i note.
415900--57-Vol. 294
3138
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
با 18
to in paragraph (3) of this subsection), the actual or the projected
materials or an equivalent quantity of equipment or materials
of the same general type but deemed to be more desirable for
inclusion in the mobilization reserve than the equipment ar
(3) with respect to any nonexcess equipment or materias
1951, 65 Stat. 4, 34 U. S. C. 493-a-1; for text of act of Aug. 5, 1953, authorizing
1 For limitations on the transfer of naval vessels, see the Act of March 14,
specification thereof, produced in the United States either publicly
or privately owned, which is in excess of domestic requirements
,
adequate carryover, and anticipated exports for dollars, as determined
by the Secretary of Agriculture.
(c) The terms "equipment" and "materials” shall mean any arms
ammunition, or implements of war, or any other type of material
,
article, raw material, facility, tool, machine, supply or item that
would further the purpose of chapter 1 of title I, or any component
or part thereof, used or required for use in connection therewith
, or
required in or for the manufacture, production, processing, storage
,
transportation, repair, or rehabilitation of any equipment or materials
,
but shall not include merchant vessels.1
(d) The term "mobilization reserve," as used with respect to ang
equipment or materials, means the quantity of such equipment
materials determined by the Secretary of Defense under regulations
prescribed by the President to be required to support mobilization of
the Armed Forces of the United States in the event of war or national
emergency until such time as adequate additional quantities of such
equipment or materials can be procured.
(e) The term "excess” as used with respect to any equipment of
materials, means the quantity of such equipment or materials owned
by the United States which is in excess of the mobilization reserve
of such equipment or materials.
(f) The term "services” shall include any service, repair
, training
of personnel, or technical or other assistance or information necessary
to effectuate the purposes of this Act.
(g) The term "Armed Forces of the United States” shall include
any component of the Army of the United States, of the United
States Navy, of the United States Marine Corps, of the Air Force
of the United States, of the United States Coast Guard, and the
Reserve components thereof.
(h) The term "value" means-
(1) with respect to any excess equipment or materials fur
nished under Chapter 1 of title I the gross cost of repairing
rehabilitating, or modifying such equipment or materials prior
to being so furnished;
(2) with respect to any nonexcess equipment of materiak
furnished under chapter 1 of title I which are taken from the
mobilization reserve other than equipment or materials referat
the mobilization reserve an equal quantity of such equipment a
materials furnished;
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furnished under chapter 1 of title I which are taken from the
mobilization reserve but with respect to which the Secretary of
Defense has certified that it is not necessary fully to replace
such equipment or materials in the mobilization reserve, the
gross cost to the United States of such equipment and materials
or its replacement cost, whichever the Secretary of Defense may
specify; and
(4) with respect to any equipment or materials furnished under
chapter 1 of title I which are procured for the purpose of being
so furnished, the gross cost to the United States of such equip-
ment and materials.
In determining the gross cost incurred by any agency in repairing,
rehabilitating, or modifying any excess equipment furnished under
chapter 1 of title I, all parts, accessories, or other materials used in the
course of repair, rehabilitation, or modification shall be priced in ac-
cordance with the current standard pricing policies of such agency.
For the purpose of this subsection, the gross cost of any equipment or
materials taken from the mobilization reserve means either the actual
gross cost to the United States of that particular equipment or ma-
terials or the estimated gross cost to the United States of that particular
equipment or materials obtained by multiplying the number of units
of such particular equipment or materials by the average gross cost
of each unit of that equipment and materials owned by the furnishing
agency.
(i) 'The term "United States Government agency" means any
department, agency, board, wholly or partly owned corporation, or
instrumentality, commission, or establishment of the United States
Government.
SEC. 546. CONSTRUCTION.-(a) If any provisions of this Act or
the application of any provision to any circumstances or persons shall
be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and applica-
bility of such provision to other circumstances or persons shall not
be affected thereby
(b) Nothing in this Act shall alter, amend, revoke, repeal, or other-
wise affect the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as
amended (42 U. S. C. 1801).
(C) Nothing in this Act is intended nor shall it be construed as an
expressed or implied commitment to provide any specific assistance,
whether of funds, commodities, or services, to any nation or nations,
or to any international organization.
SEC. 547. REDUCTION OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—Notwithstanding the
foregoing provisions of this Act, such provisions shall not be construed
to authorize the appropriation for the fiscal year 1955, for the purposes
of titles I, II, and IV of this Act, of amounts (exclusive of unexpended
balances of prior appropriations authorized to be continued available
under such provisions) aggregating in excess of $2,918,040,000.
SEC. 548. UNEXPENDED BALANCES.--Unexpended balances of funds
heretofore made available under authority of this Act are hereby
authorized to be continued available for the general purposes for
which appropriated, and may be consolidated with appropriations
made available beginning in fiscal year 1956 for the same general
d
2
-
3140
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
1
1
2 Technical Cooperation Programs Around the World, Foreign Operations Admin-
istration, 1954, pp. 2-10. For further documentation on the subject of technical
mation and Documents, 83d Cong., 2d sess., Committee on Foreign Relations
assistance, see Development of Technical Assistance Programs: Background Infor
President by the International Development Advisory Board (Rockefeller Report),
purposes under the authority of this Act: Provided, however, That
unexpended balances in excess of $200,000,000 not obligated by June
30, 1955, in accordance with the provisions of section 1311 of the
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1955 (Public Law 663, Eighty-third
Congress), or reserved in accordance with the provisions of section
110 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1955 (Public Law
778, Eighty-third Congress), are not authorized to be continued
available after such date.
SEC. 549. (a) STATEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL POLICY.—It is the
sense of the Congress that inasmuch as-
(1) the United States, through mutual security programs,
has
made 'substantial contributions to the economic recovery and
rehabilitation of the nations of western Europe;
(2) due in part to those programs, it has been possible for such
nations to achieve complete economic recovery and to regain
their military strength; and
(3) certain other friendly nations of the world remain in need
of assistance in order that they may defend themselves against
aggression and contribute to the security of the free world,
those nations that have been assisted in their recovery should, in the
future, share with the United States to a greater extent the financial
burden of providing aid to those countries which are still in need of
assistance of the type provided under this Act.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that assistance under this Act
shall be administered so as to assist other peoples in their efforts to
achieve self-government or independence under circumstances which
will enable them to assume an equal station among the free nations
of the world and to fulfill their responsibilities for self-government of
independence.
17. DEVELOPMENT OF THE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM: Release of the Foreign Operations Administration
,
1954 (Excerpt) ?
It is important to the people of the United States that the less-
developed areas share in the technical advances that will help them
become strong partners in the free world. Our strength and wel.
being are dependent in good measure on theirs.
By helping these areas raise
the standards of living of their people
,
we can move forward in an expanding world economy.
.
Print, Nov. 22, 1954; Technical Assistance and Related Problems,
1956, 84th Cong., 2d' sess., May 7, 1956; Partners in Progress: A Reporter
GPO
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As of September 1, 1954, the United States was working directly
with 59 countries, upon their request, to help build the technical
knowledge and skills of their peoples. Of these, 39 were independent
nations, 19 were dependent overseas territories in Africa and the Carib-
bean area, and one was a United Nations Trusteeship. The joint
technical programs are designed to help other peoples develop ways
to help themselves, to strengthen their economies, to make them more
effective trading partners, and to contribute to the collective security
of the free world.
These 59 countries, representing more than 900 million people, have
asked the United States to share with them the technical knowledge
and skills that have played so great a part in our own development.
All of these countries want to better themselves and the lives of their
peoples. They want their farmers to learn how to grow more food;
they want to overcome the ravages of disease; they want greater
opportunity for their children.
Many of these nations have gained their independence since World
War II, and, strongly nationalistic, are anxious to maintain their
independence and freedom. Their political leaders have promised to
improve the lot of the people, and want to make that promise good.
Failure to do so can breed unrest and strife, and adversely affect the
interests of the U.S.
By helping to strengthen the economies, security, and independ-
ence of other free peoples, the United States enhances its own future.
It helps build the mutual security of the free world.
In the sharing of scientific findings and modern techniques, there is
a two-way flow of benefits. The United States gains as well as the
other countries. Mutual ties contribute both to peace and to progress.
As the strength of these countries grows, they become better cus-
tomers for the goods of the United States. To note one instance, Peru
in the last decade has made marked advances in its agriculture. One
outgrowth has been more buying of farm machinery from the U.S.
In 1942 there were fewer than 500 tractors in the country; now there
are more than 4,500. In 1943 Peruvian purchases of U.S. farm ma-
chinery were $453,000; in 1953 they reached $5.6 million.
World trade is vital to the free nations. The United States gets
strategic and other necessary materials from Latin America, the Far
East, and other areas. These areas in turn benefit from the sales of
their goods to us.
President Eisenhower last June advised the Congress that "our
country's participation in technical cooperation programs must be
vigorously advanced.” He described the programs as our most effec-
tive counter-measure to Soviet propaganda and the best method by
which to create the political and social stability essential to lasting
peace.”
Again in August the President advised them that "technical coop-
eration has proved itself as a practical and productive concept and
as the surest and most economical way, over the long term, to speed
the advance toward an expanding world economy and a higher general
standard of living."
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3142
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
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Where necessary, technical cooperation programs are supplemented
by assistance to key projects essential to the economic development of
a country. This type of help, known as development assistance, is
generally provided when the country lacks the material or financial
GROWTH OF FOA PROGRAMS
Long before governmental programs in technical cooperation got
under way, U.S. private organizations and institutions were sharing
the benefits of technical knowledge with peoples abroad. Church
groups, foundations, commercial firms, voluntary agencies, and others
still carry on this work.
But their projects, unlike those of FOA,' operate in limited areas.
The scope of FOA action is much broader; FOA works with host gor-
ernments in programs for the extension of nationwide governmental
services-in agriculture, health, education and other fields-to all the
people. FOA coordinates its programs with those of the voluntary
agencies and encourages these agencies to increase their activity.
Today's governmental programs of technical cooperation first took
root in the Americas. They sprang from the fertile soil of inter-
American agreements. A 1939 law authorized U.S. government
agencies to carry out cooperative tasks based on these agreements, and
an Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with American
Republics was set up in May of that year.
World War II speeded up the process. As emergency needs arose
the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was established
,
It undertook programs largely to overcome the health hazards that
stood in the way of obtaining essential materials, such as rubber and
metals, and to meet the food needs of the people. After the war the
Institute of Inter-American Affairs was reincorporated to continue
the cooperative programs. In Europe the U.Š. took part in the
European Recovery Program.
In 1949 President Truman asked for a broadened program to extend
“the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress” to al
the underdeveloped areas. The next year the Congress approved the
Act for International Development and a Technical Cooperation Ad-
sistance in some countries of the Far East, however
, was handled
by the Economic Cooperation Administration-later the Mutual
Security Agency–which was also handling technical exchange programs
with the industrial countries of Europe.
In 1953 President Eisenhower, for greater efficiency and econom
in foreign operations,
telescoped all three agencies--the IIAA, TCA
and MSA-into the Foreign Operations Administration. FOÀ NOW
conducts the cooperative programs with other nations.
Since its establishment by President Eisenhower in 1953, FOA bas
placed increasing emphasis
on expanding the work of technical cooperit
tion. Congress has provided increased
funds, more technicians are o
the field than ever before, and more American universities are
in the exchange of technical knowledge.
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capacity to undertake the needed projects itself or when the rate of
economic progress without supplemental aid would not serve the best
interests of the country and the United States. Development assist-
ance and technical cooperation in these instances are combined into
an integrated program directed toward the common objective of
economic strength among the free nations.
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THREE MAJOR AREAS
Today the Foreign Operations Administration carries on U.S.
technical cooperation in three major areas of the world-Latin
America; the Near East, Africa and South Asia; and the Far East.
FOA is cooperating on technical problems with 19 independent
k countries of Latin America and with 9 dependent overseas territories
in that area. The 19 nations include Mexico and three countries of
the Caribbean area: Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic; they
include the 6 countries of Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; and they include 9
countries in South America: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The 9 dependent terri-
tories are Barbados; Trinidad and Tobago; Windward and Leeward
Islands, British Guiana; Surinam; British Honduras; Jamaica; Nether-
2 lands Antilles; and French West Indies.
FOA is working in cooperative projects also in 13 countries of the
Near East, Africa, and South Asia, and with 11 African dependent
territories. The countries in Africa and the Near East are Egypt,
Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, and Libya; in
d
South Asia are Afghanistan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. The de-
1 pendent territories include Tunisia, French Equatorial Africa, Mada-
gascar, Angola, Mozambique, Belgian Congo, Ġold Coast, the Central
African Federation, Sierra Leone, Morocco, and Italian Somalia
(U. N. Trusteeship)
ed
FOA technical cooperation projects are under way also in seven
countries of the Far East: China (Formosa), Cambodia, Laos, Viet-
nam, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand.
Once a country asks the United States for technical cooperation, a
broad agreement is drawn up between the two governments. The
I requesting country agrees, among other things, (a) to bear a "fair
share" of the costs, (b) to integrate the programs and to make good
use of their results, and (c) to cooperate with other countries in
This broad agreement is generally followed by detailed agreements
on specific programs, each à part of the country's integrated plan for
6 economic development. For example, after Iran and the United States
in January 1952 agreed to undertake a technical program, a series of
d
special agreements were spelled out. Three programs were agreed to
if
in April 1952--one in agriculture, one in health, and one in education.
Agreements were signed in May in the
fields of industry, transporta-
1
tion, and community housing; they were followed in June by pro-
1954–FOA was succeeded by the International Cooperation Administra-
tion, which now administers the program; see infra, doc. 19.
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3144
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
6
knowledge along to others to set up a chain reaction for
3. To contribute to the economic development of the whole country
4. To help in the establishment of nationwide government agencie
that will have the resources--people, know-how, organization
funds, and acceptance—to carry on their service activities with
The cost of technical cooperation to the United States taxpayers
relatively small. Based on allotments for the fiscal year, ended June
30, 1954, the cost per person is less than a penny and a half a week.
grams for the development of natural resources and communications
Eight months later-in February 1953-a program in public admin-
istration was initiated in Iran.
Each of these agreements launched a series of technical projects
.
Under the agriculture program, for instance, members of the U.S.
mission and representatives of the Iranian Ministry of Agricultura
worked out a series of 17 projects. American technicians cooperated
with ministry officials and local technicians in putting these projects
into operation.
Efforts were turned first to developing basic research with emphasis
on irrigation, seeds, and principal crops of Iran. Training was ar
ranged for farm leaders from all parts of the country. A farm exter-
sion service was set up. Steps were taken to introduce better grains
and to import livestock for the improvement of native breeds. Wide
use of insecticides and pesticides was initiated. Tests of drought
resistant grasses were begun.
In carrying out technical cooperation programs FOA draws on the
specialized knowledge, skills, and experience of American universities
industry, and voluntary agencies as well as Federal and State agencies
It sends specialists abroad who help train local technicians, and it
brings individuals from cooperating countries to the United States
for advanced study or observation of techniques.
In the host countries U.S. technicians work side by side with min-
istry officials and local technicians. In Latin America, Servicios, tibat
is, joint agencies made up of representatives of the host country and
FOA, have been created within the individual ministries to carry out
the joint programs and administer the joint funds. In some other
countries a joint fund may be set up or joint planning may be done
by committees of host government officials and U.S. mission officers
Projects are carried out with a view to increasing
participation and
responsibility on the part of the host country so that ultimately i
can take over the work entirely.
In addition to benefitting the people immediately concerned, the
programs have four major objectives:
1. To show what can be done by local people using available **
sources and better techniques.
2. To train local technicians who will then be able to pass their
progress.
out outside .
COSTS ARE SHARED
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FOREIGN AID
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For the first year of operation under the Act for International
Development, that is, for the 12 months ending June 30, 1951, allot-
ments for technical cooperation were $39 million. For fiscal years
1952 and 1953 allotments were $127 and $145 million respectively;
allotments for 1954 were $105 million; for the 12 months ending June
30, 1955, Congress provided $116.5 million.
The contributions of the host countries to their technical cooperation
programs average more than twice ours; in some cases their contribu-
tions exceed ours by many times--27 times in the health program in
Brazil, for instance. As the programs gain momentum in any country,
popular support grows and the government provides more funds, more
facilities, and more personnel to this phase of the nation's economic
development.
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18. REVISED ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY UNDER THE
MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954: Executive Order No. 10575,
November 6, 19542
11-
nat
nd
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security
Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), by section 301 of title 3 of the United
States Code, and as President of the United States and Commander
in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered
as follows:
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If
1611--1613c).
for
PART I. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS AND FUNDS
Section 101. Foreign Operations Administration. (a) Exclusive of
the functions otherwise delegated, or excluded from delegation, by
this order, and subject to the provisions of this order, there are hereby
delegated to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration
all functions conferred upon the President by the Mutual Security
Act of 1954 : (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and by the Mutual
Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 4 (65 Stat. 644; 22 U. S. C.
(b) Subject to sections 103 and 107 (b) of this order, the Director
of the Foreign Operations Administration shall administer sections
402, 505, and 201 of the Act. In determining upon the furnishing of
1. Funds for technical cooperation in 1954 and 1955 are not strictly comparable
to those for earlier years. Included in the earlier allotments are funds which were
later identified as special economic aid” (fiscal 1954) and "development as-
sistance” (fiscal 1955). For example, U.S. funds for the technical cooperation
programs in Egypt are recorded as follows: $12.6 million for 1953; $3.2 million
for 1954. However, included in the 1953 program was $10 million
for roadbuild-
ing; this would now be identified as "development assistance” and not as "tech-
nical cooperation'. [Footnote in the original.]
2 19 Fed. Reg. 7249. The title of this executive order reads "Administration
of Foreign-Aid Functions."
Supra, doc. 16.
Supra, doc. 15.
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3146
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
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Section 102. Department of Defense. (a) Subject to the provisions
(b) of the Act as consists of determining that a nation or international
times other than in advance of delivery of the equipment, material,
or services, and (iii) the functions reserved to the President by sectw
(2) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 14
(3) So much of the functions conferred upon the President hi
sections 142 (10), 511 (b), 527 (a), 528, and 529 (a) of the Act as
relates to other functions under the Act administered by the Depart
respect to equipment or materials procured for military assistance
(b) The Secretary of Defense is hereby designated to make, a
the determinations provided for in section 107 of the Mutual Security 8
i Act of July 31, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 305-311.
assistance on terms of repayment pursuant to sections 201 (a) and 505
of the Act, and upon the amounts and terms of such assistance, the
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration shall consult with
the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Problems in respect of policies relating to such assistance
and terms. Whenever assistance on terms of repayment, under the
said section 505, involves funds available under chapter í of Title I
of the Act, the said Director shall consult with the Secretary of
Defense with respect to the amounts and terms of such assistance
,
The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration shall also
consult the said Council with respect to policies concerning the
utilization of funds in the Special Account provided for in section
142 (11) of the Act and concerning such other matters as are within
the cognizance of the Council pursuant to section 4 of the Brettent
Woods Agreements Act.
(c) Pursuant to section 527 (c) (2) of the Act, it is directed that the
authority made available to the Director of the United States Informa-
tion Agency with respect to his functions by section 2 of Executive
Order No. 10477 of August 1, 1953 (18 F. R. 4540), and by Executive
Order No. 10522 of March 26, 1954 (19 F. R. 1689), subject to the
provisions of law applicable in connection with such authority
, mer
be utilized by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration
with respect to his functions.
(d) It is hereby directed that the Office of Small Business provided
for in section 504 (b) of the Act
shall be in the Foreign Operations
Administration.
of this order, there are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Defense
(1) The functions conferred upon the President by chapter 1
Title I of the Act, exclusive of (1) those so conferred by section 1
(b) (3) of the Act, (ii) so much of those so conferred by section I
organization may make available the fair value of equipment
materials, or services, sold thereto or rendered therefor, at a time ore
107 of this order.
i
ment of Defense.
Appropriation Act, 1955 (68 Stat. 1224).
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FOREIGN AID
3147
Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United
505 (C) The Secretary of Defense (1) shall exercise the responsibility
the and authority vested in him by the Act and the responsibility and
cith authority delegated to him by this order subject to coordination by
and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and (2) shall
me keep the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration fully
the and currently informed of all matters, including prospective action,
el relating to the utilization of funds under the Act, the establishment
of of priorities under section 524 (b) of the Act, and the furnishing of
Ice military items under chapter 1 of Title I of the Act.
ราง
the
Section 103. Department of State. (a) There are hereby delegated
to the Secretary of State:
tion
(1) The functions conferred upon the President by the laws referred
tanto in section 101 (a) of this order with respect to negotiating and
entering into international agreements.
the
(2) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 105
m. b) (3), 405 (a), 413 (b) (2) and (3), and 529 (b) and (c) of the Act.
tive
(3) The functions conferred upon the President by section 504
LiFe(Q) (2) of the Act so far as they may relate to countries in which the
the Foreign Operations Administration does not have missions or
may employees.
tion
(4) So much of the functions conferred upon the President by
section 535 (a) of the Act as consists of requesting the cooperation
ide of the United Nations, its organs, and specialized agencies or other
ions international organizations in carrying out the purposes of the Act.
(b) The functions conferred upon the President by section 414 of
is the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State. In connection
with the carrying out of the said functions the Secretary of State
10
shall consult with appropriate agencies of the Government. The
designation by the Secretary of State of articles which shall be con-
illi
sidered as arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including
technical data relating thereto, under the said section 414 shali
require the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.
(C) The Secretary of State shall be responsible (1) for making the
United States contributions under the Act to, and formulating and
presenting with the assistance of the Director of the Foreign Opera-
tions Administration the policy of the United States with respect
to the assistance programs of, the international organizations referred
to in sections 132 (c), 306, 405 (a) and (c), 406, and 407 of the Act,
bi and (2) for making the United States contribution under section 408
tas
of the Act to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the United
States' share of the expenses of the Organization.
(d) All functions under the Act and the other statutes referred to
in sections 101 (a), 102 (b), and 105 (a) of this order, however vested,
i delegated, or assigned, shall be subject to the responsibilities of the
.
(e) The maintenance of special missions or staffs abroad, the fixing
of the ranks of the chiefs thereof after the chiefs of the United States
10
ente
崛​似​幽​棚
​14
art
nce
States,
3148
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
e ve
instances in which such utilization is deemed (1) to further the more
e
ti
th
he
9.
re
9,
PI
re
8
PM
tively, to any agency, department, establishment, or wholly-owned
section 107 (a) (2) hereof. The utilization of funds without regard
Government funds as authorized by section 411 (b) of the Act shall
be limited as far as practicable and shall in any event be confined to
diplomatic missions, and the authorization of the same compensation
and allowances as the chief of mission, Class 3 or Class 4, within the
meaning of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (22 U. S. C. 801 et seg.),
all under section 526 of the Act, shall require the approval of the
Secretary of State.
Section 104. Department of Commerce. (a) There is hereby dele-
gated to the Secretary of Commerce so much of the functions con-
ferred upon the President by section 413 (b) (1) of the Act as consists
of drawing the attention of private enterprise to opportunities for
investment and development in other free nations.
through whom shall be carried out the functions provided for in
section 416 of the Act.
Section 105. United States Information Agency. (a) The functions
conferred upon the President by section 1011 of the United States
Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948' (62 Stat. 6),
as amended, are hereby delegated to the Director of the United
States Information Agency and shall be carried out in consultation
with the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.
(b) The United States Information Agency shall perform the
functions provided for by law with respect to publicizing abroad the
activities carried out under the Act.
Section 106. Allocation of funds. (a) Funds appropriated or
otherwise made available to the President shall be deemed to be
allocated without any further action of the President as follows:
(1) Funds for carrying out chapter 1 of Title I of the Act are
allocated to the Secretary of Defense, but, for the purposes of the
second sentence of section 110 of the Mutual Security Appropriation
Act, 1955 (68 Stat. 1224), such funds shall be available only when
and'in such amounts as they
have been apportioned, for use, by the
Bureau of the Budget.
(2) All funds for carrying out the Act except those for carrying out
chapter 1 of Title I of the Act are allocated to the Director of the
Foreign Operations Administration.
(b) The said funds may be allocated by the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, respe
consistent with applicable law, subject, however
, to the provisions el
to the existing laws governing the obligation and expenditure
fi
tr
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SI
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of
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224–1234.
FOREIGN AID
3149
economical, efficient, or expeditious carrying out of functions under
the Act, and (2) to obviate or mitigate hardship occurring with re-
spect to personnel administering functions under the Act in connec-
tion with the administration of these functions or with respect to
the families of personnel by reason of the duties of the respective
heads.
(c) The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration shall
allocate funds to the Department of State for the contributions
referred to in section 103 (c) of this order.
Section 107. Reservation of functions to the President. (a) There
are hereby excluded from the functions delegated by the foregoing
provisions of this order:
(1) The functions conferred upon the President by the Act with
respect to the appointment of officers required to be appointed by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the transmittal of
periodic or special reports to the Congress, and the termination or
withdrawal of assistance.
(2) The functions conferred upon the President with respect to
findings, determinations, certification, agreements, directives, or
transfers of funds, as the case may be, by sections 104 (b), 105, 132
a), 141, 401, 403, 404, 410, 501, 503, 521, and 522 (b) of the Act, and
by sections 103 (b), 104, 203, and 301 of the Mutual Defense As-
sistance Control Act of 1951.
(3) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 101,
107 (a) (2), 415, 525, 533, and 545 (d) of the Act and, subject to
Part Iſ hereof, the functions so conferred by section 523 (b) of the
Act.
(4) The functions conferred upon the President by section 121 of
the Act, including all of the functions so conferred with respect to
waiving specific provisions of section 142 of the Act, but otherwise
excluding so much of the functions conferred upon the President by
the said section 121 as may relate to assistance for the support of
forces and other expenditures within Indo-China and either is fi-
nanced from the unexpended balances of appropriations made pur-
suant to sections 304 and 540 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951,
as amended, or is within an obligational limitation of $150,000,000
additional to the said unexpended balances.
(5) So much of the functions conferred upon the President by
section 409 (d) of the Act as may relate to funds allocated to the
Department of Defense by this order.
(b) The President shall hereafter determine the portions of the
sum of $350,000,000 provided for in section 402 of the Act and the
portions of the sum of $200,000,000 provided for in section 505 (b)
of the Act which shall be applicable to funds allocated pursuant to
the Act to the Foreign Operations Administration and the Depart-
ment of Defense, respectively.
3150
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
2
(7) Preparing and submitting such reports on the operation and
Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Ad
ministration, or the Director of the United States Information Agency,
(8) Recommending the withdrawal of United States personnel from
PART II. PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION ABROAD
Section 201. Functions of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic
Mission. (a) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in
each country, as the representative of the President, shall serve as
the channel of authority on foreign policy and shall provide foreign
policy direction to all representatives of United States agencies in
such country
(b) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each
country, as the representative of the President and acting on his
behalf, shall coordinate the activities of the representatives of United
States' agencies (including the chiefs of economic and technical as-
sistance missions, military assistance advisory groups, foreign in-
formation staffs, and other representatives of agencies of the United
States Government) in such country engaged in carrying out programs
under the Act, programs under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act of 1951, and the programs transferred by section 2 of Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 8 of 1953 ? (67 Stat. 642); and he shall assume respon-
sibility for assuring the unified development and execution of the Beid
programs in such country. More particularly, the functions of each
Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall include, with respect
to the programs and the country concerned, the functions of:
(1) Exercising general direction and leadership of the entire effort
(2) Assuring that recommendations and prospective plans and P
actions of representatives of United States agencies are effectively
coordinated and are consistent with, and in furtherance of the
established policy of the United States.
(3) Assuring that the interpretation and application of instructions
received by representatives of United States agencies from higher
$
authority are in accord with the established policy of the United
States.
(4) Guiding the representatives of United States agencies in work
ing out measures to prevent duplication in their efforts and to pro
mote the most effective and efficient use of all United States officers
and employees engaged in work on the said programs.
(5) Keeping the representatives of United States agencies fully
informed as to current and prospective United States policies
. SI
(6) Prescribing procedures governing the coordination of the fo
activities of representatives of United States agencies, and assurica
that such representatives shall have access to all available
information
essential to the accomplishment of their prescribed duties.
subsection as may be requested of the Secretary of State by
with respect to their respective responsibilities.
0
S
i
S
ST
01
re
21
pl
re
re
er
1 Infra, pp. 3184-3186.
FOREIGN AID
3151
the country whenever in his opinion the interests of the United States
warrant such action.
f
1
-S
1
11
Som
1.
DS
34.
1-
such
eci
(c) Each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall perform
his functions under this part in accordance with instructions from
higher authority and subject to established policies and programs of
the United States. Only the President and the Secretary of State
shall communicate instructions directly to the Chief of the United
States Diplomatic Mission,
1 (d) No Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall delegate
any function conferred upon him by the provisions of this Part
which directly involves the exercise of direction, coordination, or
authority.
ed
Section 202. Referral of unresolved matters. The Chief of the United
States Diplomatic Mission in each country shall initiate steps to
!
reconcile any divergent views arising between representatives of
United States agencies in the country concerned with respect to
programs referred to in the introductory portion of section 201 (b)
zid of this order. If agreement cannot be reached the Chief of the United
.ch
States Diplomatic Mission shall recommend a course of action, and
course of action shall be followed unless a representative of a
United States agency requests that the issue be referred to the
Secretary of State and the United States agencies concerned for
decision. If such a request is made, the parties concerned shall
and promptly refer the issue for resolution prior to taking action at the
ely country level.
Section 203. Further coordination procedures and relationships. (a)
All representatives of United States agencies in each country shall be
her
subject to the responsibilities imposed upon the Chief of the United
States Diplomatic Mission in such country by section 523 (b) of the
Act and by this part.
TK- (b) Subject to compliance with the provisions of this part and with
the prescribed procedures of their respective agencies, all representa-
tives of United States agencies affected by this part (1) shall have
direct communication with their respective agencies and with such
ully
other parties and in such manner as may be authorized by their
respective agencies, (2) shall keep the respective Chiefs of United
the
states Diplomatic Missions and each other fully and currently in-
ring
formed on all matters, including prospective plans, recommendations,
and actions, relating to the programs referred to in the introductory
portion of section 201 (b) of this order, and (3) shall furnish to the
respective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions, upon their
request, documents and information concerning the said programs.
Ad
PART III. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301. Definition. As used in this order, the word "functions"
embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, and discretion.
Section 302. Prior orders. (a) This order supersedes Executive
Order No. 10476 of August 1, 1953 (18 F. R. 4537).
the
Pro-
cers
tion
and
this
the
DCF
,
from
3152
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
(b) The reference in section 3 (c) of Executive Order No. 10560
of September 9, 1954 (19 F. R. 5927), to Part III of Executive Order
No. 10476 1 shall after the date of this order be deemed to be a refer-
ence to Part II of this order.
(c) Except to the extent inconsistent with law or with this order,
and except as revoked, superseded, or otherwise made inapplicable
before the time of issuance of this order, (1) all determinations,
authorizations, regulations, rulings, certificates, orders, directives
,
contracts, agreements, and other actions issued, undertaken or
entered into with respect to any function affected by this order
shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modified, or
revoked by appropriate authority, (2) each reference in any Executive
order to any provision of law repealed by the Mutual Security Act
of 1954 shall be deemed also to refer to the corresponding provision,
if any, of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
Section 303. Effective date. Without prejudice to anything done
under proper authority with respect to any function under the Act
at any time subsequent to the approval of the Act and prior to the
approval of this order, the effective date of this order shall be deemed
to be the date of the approval of the Act.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.
19. ADDITIONAL REVISION OF ADMINISTERING AUTHOR-
ITY UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954: Ex-
ecutive Order No. 10610, May 9, 1955 2
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security
Act of 1954,3 including particularly sections 521 and 525 thereof (68
Stat. 855, 856), and as President of the United States, it is ordered
as follows:
PART I. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
ADMINISTRATION
Section 101. Exclusive of the functions transferred by the pro-
visions of section 201 of this order, all functions conferred by law
upon, or delegated or otherwise assigned by the President to, the
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and all functions
conferred by law upon, or otherwise placed under the jurisdiction of
,
the Foreign Operations Administration (including, subject to the
provisions of sections 102 (b) and (c) of this order, all functions of
agencies, officials, and employees of the Foreign Operations Admin-
istration), are hereby transferred to the Secretary of State and the
Department of State, respectively.
I Supra, doc. 14.
2 20 Fed. Reg. 3179. The executive order bears the title "Administration of
Mutual Security and Related Functions."
Supra, doc. 16.
POST WORLD WAR
I I
FOREIGN
AID LEGISLATION
Grant and Loan Funds Authorized and Appropriated for
Major Foreign Aid Programs of the United States 1945 - 1956
Appropriations and Public Debt Authorizations Available Beginning in FY
Basic Authorizing
Legislation Reference
Con. P. L. Date Statute
TOBB No. Approved Vol. Page
Total Appro-
priated Incl.
Pub. Debt Auth.
1945-1956
Amount
Authorized
Appropriation Act Reference
Con. P. L.
Date Statute
Te68 No. Approved Vol. Page
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Item
Program or Function
78th
267
3/28/14
58
122
$1,350,000,000
1. United Wations Relief & Rehabilitation
2
3.
79th
262
12/18/45
59
612
ส่ jimin
1,350,000,000
&&&&
78th
79th
79th
79th
79th
382
259
269
391
521
6/30/44
12/14/15
12/28/45
5/27/46
7/23/46
58
59
59
60
60
629 $700,000,000
609
634
228
603
700,000,000
$ 550,000,000
750,000,000
135,000,000
465,000,0001/
1,900,000,000
$ 700,000,000
550,000,000
750,000,000
135,000,000
465,000,000
2,600,000,000
2,700,000,000
Total UERRA
$425,000,000
300,000,000
600,000,000
340,000,000
143,000,000
$1,300,000,000
79th
80th
Both
Both
Both
Both
81st
81st
82nd
82nd
83rd
83rd
84th
6. Covernment and Relief in Occupied Areas
7.
DO
8.
DO
9.
10.
DO
11.
DO
12.
DO
13.
DO
14.
15.
DO
17.
18,
DO
Total QARIQA
515
46
271
393
519
793
327
759
253
547
207
663
219
7/16/46
5/1/47
7/30/47
12/23/47
5/10/48
6/28/48
10/6/49
9/6/50
11/1/51
7/15/52
8/7/53
8/26/54
871753
60 560
61 71
61
625
61 943
62
22b
62 1057
63 711
760
65 747
60
180
67 430
825
466
425,000,000
300,000,000
600,000,000
340,000,000
143,000,000
1,300,000,000
912,500,000
288,000,000
22,500,000
11,000,000
3,100,000
3,100,000
3,000,000
4.351,200,000
79th
80th
80th
80th
80th
80th
818t
81st
82nd
82nd
83rd
83rd
84th
515
46
271
393
519
793
327
759
253
547
207
663
219
7/16/46
5/1/47
7/30/47
12/23/47
5/10/48
6/28/48
20/6/49
9/6/50
11/1/51
7/15/52
8/7/53
8/26/54
874/55
60 560
61
71
61
625
61 943
62 224
62 1057
63 711
64 760
65 747
60 180
67 430
$ 912,500,000
425,000,000
300,000,000
600,000,000
340,000,000
143,000,000
1,300,000,000
912,500,000
288,000,000
22,500,000
1,000,000
3,100,000
3.100,000
3,000,000
1,351,200,000
$ 288,000,000
$
22,500,000
$ 11,000,000
3,100,000
16.
$
825
455
3,100,000
3,100,000
725,000,000
1,083,000,000
1,300,000,000
*** 912,500,000
288,000,000
22,500,000
11,000,000
3,100,000
$3,000,000
2,000,000
Both
84
5/31/47
61
125
310,000,000
80th
80th
271
393
7/30/47
12/23/47
61
61
613
942
19. Ballet Assistance Post UIRRA
20.
DO
Total Relief Assistance
292,000,0002)
18,000,000
310,000,000
292,000,000
18,000,000
310,000,000
erܢ
310,000,000
80th
146
7/1/47
61
214
237,284,157
71,073,900
70,710,228
80th
Both
818t
818t
21. International Refugee Organization
22.
DO
23.
DO
DO
Total International Refugee Organization
271
793
179
759
7/30/47
6/28/48
7/20/49
9/6/50
61 623
62 2058
63 1450
74 610
70,500,029
71,073,900
70,710, 228
70,500,029
25,000,000
237,284,157
?
237,284,157
25,000,000
25,000,000
112,073,900
70, 710, 228
10,500,029
59
637
269
663
1,000,000
79th 269 12/28/45
79th 454 6/26/46
81st 2955
2955) 9/7/49
637
315
692
1,000,000
79th
Indefinite3791b
59
60
25. Asistance to the Philippines
DO
DO
12/28/45
8/8/46
1,000,000
916
26.
63
ML 7.
Mtle I
Assistance to Philippines
10,000,000
70,000,000
28.
29.
30.
31.
370
79th
60
61
62
63
60
4/30/46
128
88888
400,000,000
79th
80th
80th
Blet
818t
521
269
491
266
759
7/23/46
7/30/47
4/20/48
8/24/49
9/6/50
613
601
190
648
712
95,000,000
10,000,000
70,000,000
95,000,000
184,800,000
40,200,000
184,800,000
64
40,200,000
.
Mtle II - Assistance to Philippines
DO
79th
370
4/30/46
60
134
100,000,000
33.
47,918,000
42,500,000
79th
Mtle III - Assistance to Philippines
DO
DO
10
DO
DO
DO
DO
Total Assistance to Philippines
370
21,373,000
126,000
4/30/16
60
135
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
146,000,000
79th
Both
80th
816t
8lst
8lst
82nd
521
166
597
119
179
759
188
7/23/46
7/9/47
6/3/48
6/23/49
7/20/49
9/6/50
10/22/51
621
287
314
250
445
614
581
62
62
63
63
64
65
17,166,398
47,918,000
42,500,000
21,373,000
126,000
17,166,398
10,000,000
3,000,000
543,003,398
10,000,000
647,000,000
1,000,000
57,918,000
112,500,000
116,499,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
201,966,398
50,200,000
400,000,000
62. Assistance to Greece and Turkey
80th
Both
75
472
5/22/47
4/3/48
61
62
103
157
400,000,000
275,000,000
80th
80tb
8lst
271
793
327
7/30/47
6/28/48
10/6/49
61 613
62 1056
63 710
225,000,000
DO
DO
Total Aid to Greece and Turkey
13.
400,000,000
225,000,000
45,000,000
670,000,000
45,000,000
145,000,000
400,000,000
675,000,000
225,000,000
80th
389
12/17/47 61
934
597,000,000
W, Interin Ald
15.
DO
Total Interim Ald
80th
soth
393
470
12/23/47
3/31/48
61
62
942
109
522,000,000
55,000,000
577,000,000
522,000,000
55,000,000
571,000,000
597,000,000
80th
80th
8lst
40,000,000
Ad to Children:
46. International Children's Emergency Fund
DO
48.
DO
Total International Children's Emerg. Find
84
472
1707 7/14/49
5/31/47
473748
61
62
63
125
157
412
Both
Both
40,000,000
60,000,000
271
793
61 613
62 1056
7/30/47
6/28/48
35,000,000
40,000,000
35,000,000
100,000,000
40,000,000
35,000,000
75,000,000
818t
5358/6/5/50
64
209
82nd
45
6/2/51
65
60
19. International Children's Welfare Work
Total Aid to children
15,000,000
115,000,000
5,750,000
5,750,000
5,750,000
80,750,000
50. European Recovery Program
51,
DO
52,
DO
Total European Recovery Program
soth
818t
818t
472
47
535
4/3/48
4/19/49
6/5/50
62
63
64
137
53
200
80th
818t
816t
793
327
759
5,300,000,000
5,430,000,000
2,700,000,000
13,430,000,000
65,000,000
6/28/48
10/6/49
9/6/50
62 1055
63 709
64
757
40,000,000 35,000,000
4,000,000,00010
1,074,000,00011
3,628,380,000
,000,000,000 1,074,000,000 3,628, 380,000
65,000,000
2,200,000,00012)
4,000,000,000
4,702,380,000
2,200,000,000
10,902,300,000
2,200,000,000
53. Waited Nations Headquarters Loan
8/01/18
Both
62 1286
8lst
903
19
6/23/49
63
250
65,000,000
400,000,00013/
400,000,000
Far Eastern Aid:
54. (I) tid to China
55.
DO
56.
DO
57.
DO
58,
DO
Total Ald to Chine
80th
818t
818t
818t
8lst
472
47
447
535
911
4/3/48
4/19/49
2/14/50
6/5/50
1/6/51
62
158
63 55
64 5
202
64 1236
•463,000,000
14
15/
16/
80th
81st
818t
818t
8lst
793
47
4447
535
911
6/28/48
4/19/49
2/14/50
6/5/50
1/6/51
62 1056
63 55
64 5
64 202
64 1236
14
15
16/
IT
400,000,000
463,000,000
400,000,000
60.
59. (2) Assistance to KOREA - ECA
DO
ol.
DO
62.
DO
Total Assistance to Korea
818t
818t
816t
81st
10/10/49 63
739
10/28/49 63 975
2/14/50
5
6/5/50
202
343
430
447
535
8lst
Bist
8lot
318t
30,000,000
30,000,000
60,000,000
100,000,000
220,000,000
343
430
583
759
10/10/49
10/28/49
6/29/50
9/6/50
No.
63
63
64
64
739
975
289
758
30,000,000
30,000,000
50,000,000
30,000,000
30,000,000
50,000,000
90,000,000
200,000,000
90,000,000
90,000,000
110,000,000
3 1 58)
BCA
50,000,000
911
179
66.
50,000,000
911
179
431
179
0 - 57 ( Face p.
63. (3) Ciridian Reliet in Korea
Dept. of Defen. 818t
DO
82nd
65,
DO
82nd
66,
DO
83rd
Total Civilian Relief in Korea
Department
of Defense
1/6/51
10/18/51 65
6/30/52
8/1/53
64 1231
425
65 615
67 336
50,000,000
50,000,000
175,000,000
58,000,000
81st
82nd
82nd
83rd
431
64 1231
65 425
65 615
67 336
1/6/51
10/18/51
6/30/52
8/1/53
175,000,000
50,000,000
50,000,000
175,000,000
58,000,000
179
58,000,000
50,000,000
50,000,000
333,000,000
175,000,000
58,000,000
333,000,000
(4) Relief & Rehabilitation in Korea18/
418
83rd
207
8/7/53. 67
8/7/53
200,000,000
67
200,000,000
418
83rd
207
415900
200,000,000
110,000,000
140,000,000
50,000,000
Total Korea
753,000,000
258,000,000
175,000,000
733,000,000
1,216,000,000
400,000,000
110,000,000
140,000,000
50,000,000
175,000,000
Grand Total - Far Eastern Aid
258,000,000
1,133,000,000
POST WORLD WAR II
FOREIGN AID LEGISLATION
Grant and Loan Funds Authorized and Appropriated for
Major Foreign Aid Programs of the United States 1945 - 1956
Appropriations and Public Debt Authorizations Available Beginning in my
Basic Authorizing
Legde lation Reference
Con P. L. Date Statute
gress No. Approved Vol. Page
Amount
Authorized
Appropriation Act Reference
Con- P, L. Date
Statute
gress
No. Approved Vol. Page
TOERI Appro-
priated Incl.
Pub. Debt Auth.
1945-1956
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
Ita
Proma a function
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
67. Lown to Spaia (Public Debt runde) (see also
ita "Assistance to Spain" under Mutual
Security)29
81st
759
9/6/50
64
19/
758 $
-62,500,000
81st
68. Add to Yugoslavia
897
12/29/50
64 1122
50,000,000
20/
82nd
48
69. Dergancy Food Ald to India
6/15/51
65
69
190,000,000
21
63
sust
8lat
$
25
535
3/24/49
6/5/50
70. Balior to Palestine Refugees
71.
Total Rellet of Palestine Refugeer 22
16
203
818t
818t
16,000,000
16,000,000
27,450,000
43,450,000
119
759
6/23/49
976750
63
64
232
763
DO
16,000,000
$_27,450,000
27,450,000
16,000,000
27,450,000
45,450,000
8lst
535
6/5/50
64
2014
35,000,000
818t
72. International Development ("Point Pour")
759
9/6/50
64
758
26,900,000
26,900,000
80tla
369
73. Institute of Interamerican Artair 23/
8/5/47
62
780
15,000,000
2,500,000
80th
81st
818t
860 6/30/48
179 7/20/49
759 9/6/50
62 1184
63 456
64 615
4,751,600
74.
DO
81st
DO24
283
9/3/49
63685
75
35,000,000
50.000.000
2,500,000
4,751,600
5,000,000
12,251,600
2,500,000
5,000,000
5,000,000
4,751,600
Total Institute of Inter-American Arratrs
..
Hutal Detanse Moistance:
77.
63 715
63 716
63 726
63 716
818t
76. Title I, North Atlantic Treaty Countries
Title I, Creeco and Turkey
Mtle III, Irun, Karen and Philippines
79. Ganeni Ara of China
Subtotal
63 975
63 975
63 975
63 975
329
10/6/49
1,000,000,000
211,370,000
27,640,000
75,000,000
1,314,010,000
818t
430 10/28/49
500,000,000
211,370,000
27,640,000
75,000,000
814,010,000
78.
500,000,000
211,370,000
27,640,000
75,000,000
814,010,000
64
64 374
64 375
64 375
64 375
818t
80. Mtle I, larth Atlantic Treaty Countries
81. Mtle II, Greece, Tekey and Iran
82. Mtle II, Koron and Philippines
83. General Aron of China
Subtotal
621
7/26/50
1,000,000,000
131,500,000
16,000,000
75,000,000
1,222,500,000
81st
759
759
759
759
759 9/6/50
1,455,523,72935)
131,500,000
16,000,000
75,000,000
1,678,023,729
64
1,455,523,729
131,500,000
16,000,000
75,000,000
1,678,023, 729
64 1063
64 1063
64 1063
64 1063
3,504,000,000
193,000,000
843
81.t
9/27/50
818t
3,504,000,000
193,000,000
843 9/27/50
3,504,000,000
193,000,000
ght. Title I, North Atlantic Treaty countries
89. Mtle U, Qreece, Turkey and Iran
86. Title , Koru, Philippines and General
Are at China
Subtotal
644 1063
64 1063
303,000,000
4,000,000,000
303,000,000
4,000,000,000
303,000,000
59,000,000,000
Total Mutual Defense Musi.tance
6,536,510,000
814,010,000
5,678,023, 729
6,492,033,729
Hatual Security:
82nd
165
Title I, burrope:
87. Klitary Assistance
88. Economic and Technical Assistance
Total Title I
20/10/51 65
65
373
374
65
65
730
731
5,028,000,000
1,022,000,000
7,050,000,000
100,000,00027
$4,818,852,45726
1,022,000,000
5,840,852,457
4,818,852,457
1,022,000,000
840,852,451
82nd
89. Assistance to Spain
249
10/31/51 65
731
65
731
100,000,000
100,000,000
65
Title II, Hear East and Africa:
90. litary Adistance
91. Esananic and Technical Assistance
Totul mtl. II
65
65
374
375
396,250,000
160,000,000
556,250,000
731
65 731
396,250,000
160,000,000
556,250,000
396,250,000
160,000,000
556,250,000
82nd
165
10/10/51
82nd
249 10/31/51
Mtle III, Asia and Pacific:
92. Mary Assistance.
93. Economic and Technical Assistance
94. Contributions to UNKRA
Total mtl. I
65 375
65 376
65 376
65 731
65 731
535,250,000
237,500,000
45,000,000
817,750,000
535,250,000
237,155,866
28
1772,405,866
535,250,000
237,155,866
772,405,866
Mtle IV, American Republics:
95. ltary Apistance
96. Technical Assistance
Total Titlo IV
65
65
377
376
38,150,000
21,250,000
59,400,000
65
65
731
731
38,150,000
21,245,653
59,395,653
38,150,000
21,245,653
59,395,653
Subtotal Mutual Security
2,583,400,000
7,328,903,976
7,328,903,976
Title I Girope:
97. Klitary Assistance
98. Economic and Technical Assistance
Total Title I
66
66
141
141
66
66
652
652
3,415,614,750
1,282,433,000
34,698,047,750
(25,000,000)29)
$3,128,224,750
1,282,433,000
4,410,651,750
(25,000,000) 297
3,128,224,750
1,282,433,000
4,410,657,750
99. Asbistance to Spain
66
141
66
652
(25,000,000)
Title II, Near Bast and Africa:
100. Military Assistance
101. Economic and Technical Assistance
Total Title II
66
66
142
142
560,316,500
181, 114,000
741,430,500
66
66
652
652
499,116,500
181,114,000
680,230,500
499,116,500
181, 114,000
60,230,500
82nd
400
6/20/52
82nd
547 7/15/52
Title III, Asia and Pacific:
102. Mitary Assistance
103. Economic and Technical Assistance
104. Contributions to URKRA
Total Title III
66
66
142
142
66
66
652
653
66 143
564,807,500
321,412,500
45,000,000
931,220,000
540,807,500
270,571,250
811,378,750
540,807,500
270,571,250
811,378,750
Title IV, American Republics:
105. Military Assistance
106. Technical Cooperation
Total Mtlo IV
66
66
143
143
57,685,750
20,329,000
78,014,750
66
66
653
653
51,685,750
20,329,000
72,014,750
51,685,750
20,329,000
72,014,750
415900 O -57 ( Face p. 3158) No. 2
Mtle V:
107. Movement of Migrants
108. Ocean Freight, voluntary Relief Packages
109. Multilateral Technical Cooperation
110. United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund
Total Title V
66
66
66
147
147
150
9,240,500
2,587,500
15,708,750
66
66
66 653
653
653
9,240,500
2,587,500
9,171,333
9,240,500
2,587,500
9,171,333
66
151
66
653
16,481,000
44,017,750
6,666,667
27,666,000
6,666,667
27,666,000
Subtotal
6,492,730,750
6,001,947,750
6,001,947,750
POST WORLD
WAR I I
FOREIGN AID LEGISLATION
Grant and Loan Funds Authorized and Appropriated for
Mejor Foreign Aid Programs of the United States 1945 - 1956
Appropriations and Public Debt Authorizations Available Beginning in FY
Basic Authorizing
Legislation Reference
Con. P. L. Date Statute
Te88 No. Approved Vol. Page
Total Appro-
priated incl.
Pub.Debt Auth.
1945-1956
Appropriation Act Reference
Con- P. L. Date Statute
gress
No. Approved Vol. Page
Amount
Authorized
Ita
Program or function
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Mutual Security: (Continued)
83rd
18
7/16/53
83rd
218
8/7/53
67
152
2,129,689,870
67
478
1,860,000,000
1,860,000,000
Title I, Surope:
1. Utary Assistance
112, Mutual Defense Financing, Defense Support,
Economic and Technical Assistance
13. Maputacturing in France
1. Hudutacturing in United Kingdom
Total Title I
67
67
67
152
153
153
250,000,000
100,000,000
100,000,000
2,579,689,870
67
67
67
478
479
479
220,000,000
85,000,000
85,000,000
220,000,000
85,000,000
85,000,000
2,250,000,000
2,250,000,000
Title II, Rear Bast and Africa:
us. ltary Assistance
16. Klitary Aid (sec. 202(b))
17. Economic and Technical Assistance
118. Special Economic Assistance
Total Title II
67 152
67 156
67 154
67 154
305,212,637
50,000,000
43,792,500
194,000,000
593,005, 131
67 478
67 479
67 479
240,000,000
30,000,000
33,792,500
147,000,000
450,192,500
240,000,000
30,000,000
33,792,500
147,000,000
50,192,500
67
152
1,081,620,493
67
478
1,035,000,000
1,035,000,000
Title III, Asia and Pacific:
19. illtary Assistance
120. Mutual Defense Financing, Defense Support,
Economic and Technical Assistance, Taiwan
and Indochina
121. Force Support, Indochina
122. Economic and Technical Assistance, Defense
Support, Other Than Taiwan and Indochina
123. Special Economic Assistance India & Pakistan
Total Title III
67
67
153
153
84,000,000
400,000,000
67
67
478
479
84,000,000
400,000,000
84,000,000
400,000,000
67 154
67 154
72,200,000
94, 400,000
1132, 120, 193
67
67
479
479
51,278,001
75,000,000
1,645,278,001
51,278,001
75,000,000
1,645,278,001
Titl. IVAmerican Republics:
124. litary Assistance
125. Technical Assistance
Tota Titi IV
67
67
152
154
15,000,000
24, 342,000
9000
67
67
478
479
15,000,000
22,342,000
592342,000
15,000,000
22,342,000
37 342,000
&
Non-Regional
126, Mutual Special Weapons Planning
127. Basic Materials Development
128. Ocean Freight, Voluntary Reliet Packages
29. Movement of migrants
130. Multilateral Technical Assistance
131. International Children's Welfare Work
132. United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
Total Non-Regional
67 153
67
154
67
155
67 155
67 155
67 155
67 155
100,000,000
7,500,000
1,825,000
10,000,000
13,750,000
9,000,000
71,000,000
213,075,000
67 479
67 479
67 1479
67 479
67 479
67 479
67 479
50,000,000
19,000,000
1,580,166
7,500,000
9,500,000
9,814,333
50,700,000
148,094,499
50,000,000
19,000,000
1,580,166
7,500,000
9,500,000
9,814,333
50,700,000
148,094, 199
Subtotal
5,157,232,500
4,531,507,000
4,531,507,000
133. Local Currency
67 159
98, 396,000
Subtotal
5,255,628,500
4,531,507,000
4,531,507,000
83rd
665
8/26/54
83rd
778
9/3/54
Title I. Mutual Defense Assistance
134. Chapter 1. Mlltary Assistance
135. Chapter 2. SEA & W. Pacific & DPS
136. Chapter 3. Defense Support
Total Title I
68
833
68 837
68 838
1,591,000,000
795,000,000
407,550,810
2,793,550,810
68 1220
68 1220
68 1220
1,192,700,000
795,000,000
406,098,195
2,393,798,195
137. Title II - Development Assistance
138. Titre III. Technical cooperation
139. Title IV - Other Programs
Subtotel
1,192,700,000
795,000,00030
406,098,195
2,393,798,195
184,500,000
116,457, 62130
86,744,000
2,781, 499,816
68
68
68
840
841
843
199,000,000
136,528,000
123,789,190
3,252,868,000
68 1220
68 1221
68 1221
184,500,000
116,457,621
86,744,000
2,781, 499,816
84th
138
7/8/55
69
69
84th
208
Title I Mutual Defense Assistance
140. Chapter 1. Military Assistance
142. Chapter 2.
DIS
142. Chapter 3. Defense Support
Total Title I
8/2/55
283
284
284
1,133,000,000
317,200,000
1,022,300,000
2,472,500,000
69
69
69
435
435
435
705,000,000 705,000,000
317,200,000 317,200,000
999, 200,000 999, 200,000
2,021,400,000 2,021,400,000
69
113. Title II Development Assistance
TICI III Technical cooperation
145. Title IV - Other Programs
Subtotal
69 285
286
69 287
69
182,000,000
172,000,000
459, 300,000
3,265, 800,000
435
435
436
69
162,000,000 162,000,000
153,000,000 153,000,000
366,941,750 366,941,750
2,703,341,750 2,703,341, 750
Grand Total of Mutual Security Acts
of 1951 and 1954, as amended
25,870, 427,250
7,328,903,976 6,001,947, 750 4,531,507,000 2,781,499,816 2,703, 341,750 23,347,200,292
Subtotal Appropriated 1945-1956
700,000,000 1,901,000,000
782,918,000 6,993,573,900 2,904, 709,228_5,787, 108,027 8,446,323, 729 7,404,403,976_6,187,947, 750 4,792,607,000 2,784,599,816 2,706,341,750 51,391,533,176
Authorizations to Expend Public Debt Funds
(10 lieu of Appropriations
1,000,000,000
150,000,000
62,500,000
27,254, 316
60 535
116. European Recovery Program
17.
DO
118. Loan to Spain
219. Emergency Food Aid to India
150, British Loan
151. Export-Import Bank
152,
DO
153.
DO
154. Subscriptions to IBRD
155. Subscriptions to IMT
156. Subacription to IFC
Both
81st
81st
82nd
79th
79th
82nd
83rd
79th
79th
84th
3,750,000,000
472
47
759
48
509
173
158
570
171
171
350
4/3/48 62 137
W/19/19 63 53
9/6/50 64 758
6/15/51 65 69
7/15/46 60
7/31/45
59 526
10/3/51 65 367
8/9/54
68 677
7/31/45 59 514
7/31/45 59 514
8/11/55 69 669
DO
3,500,000,000
33
34
3,750,000,000
3,500,000,00035
1,000,000,000
500,000,000
3,175,000,000
2,750,000,00036/
35,168,000
1,000,000,000
1,000,000,000
150,000,000
62,500,000
27,254,316
3,750,000,000
3,500,000,000
1,000,000,000
500,000,000
3,175,000,000
2,750,000,000
35,168,000 35,168,000
35,168,000 15,949,922, 316
500,000,000
3,175,000,000
2,750,000,000
3158) No.
Total Public Debt Authorizations
14,710, 168,000
9,425,000,000 3,750,000,000 1,000,000,000
150,000,000
89,754,316 1,000,000,000
500,000,000
Authorizations to Transfer Agricultural
Commodities from C.C.C. Stocks
5/23/55 69
5/23/55 69
61
62
4159000 - 57 ( Face p.
157. Wheat to Pakistan
158. Pamine Relief
159. Farine Relief & Other Assistance
160. Sules for Foreign Currency
DO
162. Transfers to private voluntary relief agencies
& the United Nations Children's Fund for
distribution abroad
83rd
83rd
83rd
83rd
84th
T7
216
180
480
387
6/25/53 67
80
8/7/53 67 476
7/10/54 68 454
7/10/54 68 4454
8/12/55 69 721
69,385,83137/8/ Bith 40
100,000,00038 84th 40
300,000,00039
700,000,00040
800,000,00040
69,385,832 69,385,832
100,000,000 100,000,000
300,000,000
B/
700,000,000 E)
800,000,0003 800,000,000
E
162.
300,000,000B/
700,000,0003
DO
818t
439
10/31/49 63 1051
248,146,000
5,742,000€/
46,777,000€/
2,150,0003
420,000€ 66,660,0003 126,397,000
248,146,000 3
POST WORLD WAR II
FOR E IGN AID LEGISLATION
Grant and Loan Funds Authorized and Appropriated for
Major Foreign Aid Programs of the United States 1945 - 1956
Appropriations and Public Debt Authorizations Available Beginning in FY
Basic Authorizlag
Legislation Reference
COD P. L. Date Statute
ST688
No. Approved Vol. Page
Total Appro-
priated incl.
Pub.Debt Auth.
1945-1956
Appropriation Act Reference
Con. P. L. Date Statute
gre88
Approved Vol. Page
Amount
Authorized
No.
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Program or function
Authorizations to Transfer military Vessels
82nd
467
7/8/52
66
443
82nd
83rd
510
188
7/1/52 66
8/15/53 67
587
363
DO
163. Patrol-Type Vessels to Japan
164. Ivo Submarines to the Government
of the Netherlands
165. Ivo Submarines to the Government of Italy
166. lot to Exceed 25 Craft Not Larger
than tobe Destroyer-Type to Any friendly
lation in the Par Last
167. Sull Aircraft Carrier to the
Goverment of France
168.
DO
169. Tvo Submarines to the Government of Turkey
170. Various Authorities to sell Surplus
Property and Merchant ships og Credit Terus
83rd
67
/
302,806,000
188
113,241,000$ 71,536,0003/ 115,308,0003/
363
302,806,00042
2,721,0003
83rd
84th
83rd
188
168
214
7/26/55
8/7/53
67
363
69
373
67471
-
in
1,485,000,00043/3/
58,000,0003
11,000,000E/
1,000,00037
+95,000,0003 524,000,00 395,000,000
1,000,000
3/
1,485,000,000
700,000,000 11,821,000,000 5,056,918,000 8,388,573,900 2,962, 709,2285,953,850,027 8,586,576,045 8,407,553,976 6,301,608,750 4,930,803,000 4,526,304,816 3,710,895,581 21,346,793, 323
75,896,877,238
CRAID TOTAL
24
Botimated (1n most lästances on the basis of transfer activity as reported in publication entitled "Foreigo Grants and Credits by the United States Government,")
issued by the Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce.
Extended IIAA through 6/30/55. P.L. 663, 83rd Congress extended the IIAA to 6/30/60.
25) Includes $455,523,729 to cover previous contract authorization, P.L. 329, 818t Congress.
26) This Pigure includes $44,476,271 to cover previous contract authorization, P.L. 329, 81st Congress.
27/ Assistance to Spain was not authorized in P.L. 165, 82nd Congress, authorization and appropriation was made from P.L. 249, 82nd Congress, 10/31/51,
Stat. 65.
1 Third Deficiency Appropriation Act 1946. $465,000,000 to remain available until 6/30/47.
2/ $40,000,000 appropriated for ICT (Ita 46), making total Relief Assistance P.L. 271, 80th Congress $332,000,000.
37 Philippine Military Assistance Act. Blective for five years ending 7/3/51.
Pirst Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1947. Authorized no more than $19,750,000 to be available from Military Establishment Appropriation in FY 1947 for the
purpose of P.L. 454.
5/ Authorized extension through 6/30/51 for public roads and port and barbor facilities.
28/ Unobligated balances of prior appropriations for assistance to Koren under authority of Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950, P.L. 447, 82nd
Congress, continued available through 6/30/52.
29/ $25,000,000 included in total for Title I.
30 P.L. 24, 84th Congress, 4/22/55, authorized the transfer of $6,500,000 from
Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance."
*Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific" to "Contributions to the United
6/ In addition to sunds specifically appropriated under "Assistance to Greece and Turkey, E.O.P." after 1948 economic aid was given to Greece and Turkey through
the Economic Cooperation Administration, and after 1949 military assistance was included in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
7 Extends authorization and availabilty of ICEF appropriation through 6/30/50.
31 Authorization included 10 Item No. 50 - Of the $1,000,000,000 appropriated $27.7 million was utilized in the Investment Guaranty Program. This latter
program originally authorized in the amount of $200 million is excluded from this schedule.
32 Authorization included in Item No. 51.
33) See Item No. 67 for authorization.
Authorization included in Item No. 69.
34
35 Authorization of $700,000,000 by P.L. 792, 76th Congress (54 Stat. 792), increased to $3,500,000,000 by P.L. 173, 79th Congress.
36) Public debt authorization $950,000,000; also authorized transfer of $1,800,000,000 from Exchange Stabilization Fund created by Gold Reserve Act of 1934,
as amended.
8/ In addition to authorizing $15,000,000 for International Children's Welfare Work, P.L. 535 extends authorization and availability of ICEF appropriation through
6/30/52.
9/ Subsequent to YY 1951 basic authorization and appropriation was made under Mutual Security Act. See Items No. 110 and 131, also included in Items No. 139
and 145.
10/ $4,000,000,000 was appropriated for period 4/3/48 through 6/30/49 which includes FY 1948 and 1949. See also public debt authority Item No. 246.
u/ $1,074,000,000 P.L. 327, 818t Congress appropriated for period 4/3/49 through 6/30/49 (FY 1949), $3,628,380,000 appropriated for FY ending 6/30/50 (FY 1950).
See also public debt authority itex No. 147.
12/ bcludes $50,000,000 reserve under Section 1214, P.L. 759, 81st Congress and rescinded under Chapter XII, P.L. 253, 82nd Congress, dated 11/1/51 (65 Stat. 755).
13 P.L. 793, 80th Congress appropriated the $400,000,000 for the period 1/3/48 through 6/30/49 which includes FY 1948 and 1949.
14 Authorization under P.L. 472, 80th Congress, and appropriation under P.L. 793, 80th Congress, extended from 4/3/49 through 2/15/50.
15) Authorization under P.L. 472, 80th Congress, and appropriation under P.L. 793, 80th Congress, extended from 2/15/50 through 6/30/50.
16 Authorization under P.L. 472, 80th Congress, and appropriation under P.L. 793, 80th Congress, extended from 6/30/50 through 6/30/51.
17 Authorized President to utilize not more than 3 percent of funds appropriated for ERP under P.L. 759, 81st Congress.
18/ Transferred from Department of Defense appropriations.
19 from public debt funds. See Item No. 148.
29 $37,800,000 funds previously appropriated for FRP under P.L. 759, 818t Congress.
$162,745,684 from funds previously appropriated for ERP under P.L. 759, 818t Congress, $27,254, 316 public debt funds. See Item No. 149.
Subsequent to YY 1951 basic authorization and appropriation was made under Mutual Security Act. $60,063,250 18 included in totals for Mutual Security FY 1953,
37 P.L. 77, 83rd Congress, 6/25/53, authorizes the Commodity Credit Corporation to make available to Pakistan, out of wheat stocks acquired through price-
support operations, not to exceed one million long tons of wheat. P.L. 40, 84th Congress, 5/23/55, appropriated $69,385,831 to reimburse Commodity
Credit Corporation for its investment in wheat transferred to Pakistan by P.L. 77, 83rd Congress, 6/25/53. 610,976 long tons of wheat were moved.
38) Authorization to the Commodity Credit Corporation to expend not more than $100,000,000 out of its stocks for famine relief or other urgent relief re-
quirements. P.L. 40, 84th Congress, 5/23/55, appropriated $9,545,830 to reimburse the Commodity Credit Corporation for "Emergency Panine Relief to
Friendly People."
39/ Authorization to the Commodity Credit Corporation to expend not more than $300,000,000 out of its capital funds for famine relief and other assistance.
No programs of assistance shall be undertaken under this authority after 6/30/57. The amount shown for the appropriation is estimated on the basis that
all the authorization will be used.
40/ Title I of P.L. 480, 83rd Congress, authorized possible charges to the Commodity Credit Corporation capital fund in a three-year period ending 6/30/57,
from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. Some of the foreign currencies may be used for foreign grants or loans.
Amouate shown for appropriations are estimated on the basis that the total authorizations will so be used.
41/ Amounts shown are estimated value of commodities troreferred abroad through 6/30/55 under Section 416 of P.L. 439, 81st Congress, as amended by
Section 302 of P.L. 480, 83rd Congress.
42 No dollar value stipulated in the authorization. No app.opriation required. Amount shown represents estimated value of transfers through 6/30/55.
43) Amounts shown are approximate values of credits utilized in fiscal year shown. Authorized under various Surplus Property Disposal Legislation.
Item No. 101.
415900 O - 57 ( Face p. 3158) No. 4
23/ Reincorporated for three years - $5,000,000 per year.
Local Currency
This exhibit does not include local currency fundo generated or othervise made available pursuant to the various grant aid programs and utilized, or programmed for utilization, for the purposes of the authorizing statutes except for Item 132. Also, there are excluded local currencies generated, or to be generated, under the pro-
bioloas of Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, or under the provisions of Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, relating to the use of surplus agricultural commodities. There are included, however, dollar funds appropriated for the Mutual Security
Program but Congressionally earmarked for the purchase of surplus agricultural commodities by Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1952, as amended, and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.
FOREIGN AID
3153
1
Section 102. The following are hereby transferred to the Depart-
ment of State:
(a) All offices of the Foreign Operations Administration, exclusive
of the office of Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.
(b) The Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the functions
vested in it by law, which functions shall remain therewith.
(c) The International Development Advisory Board (68 Stat.
842) and the functions vested in it by law, which functions shall re-
main therewith.
(d) The Office of Small Business, provided for in section 504 (b)
of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 851), and in section 101
(d) of Executive Order No. 10575 of November 6, 1954 (19 F. R.
7251).
Section 103. (a) The Secretary of State shall establish, with the
offices, personnel, and facilities transferred to the Department of
State by or under section 102 (a) and 302 of this order, an agency in
the Department of State which shall be known as the International
Cooperation Administration. The agencies transferred by sections
102 (b), (c), and (d) of this order shall be made a part of or attached
to the International Cooperation Administration. The International
Cooperation Administration shall be headed by the Director of the
International Cooperation Administration referred to in the first
sentence of section 103 (b) of this order. The said Director shall
report directly to the Secretary of State. Except as may be other-
wise provided by the Secretary of State in respect of the matters
referred to in section 104 of this order, the functions transferred by
section 101 hereof shall be carried out by or under the International
Cooperation Administration or the Director thereof. The said Ad-
ministration, including all its officers and agencies, and all functions
transferred by this Part shall be subject to the direction and control
of the Secretary of State. To such extent as the Secretary of State
shall prescribe, consistent with law and without diminishing assign-
ments made or required to be made by this order to the International
Cooperation Administration or the Director thereof, the said Ad-
ministration and Director shall be deemed to be the successors of
the Foreign Operations Administration and the Director thereof
respectively, in respect of transfers to the Department of State and
the Secretary of State made by this order.
b) The title of Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Ad-
ministration is hereby changed to Director of the International Co-
gperation Administration. The Director of the International Co-
iperation Administration may, as he deems proper, change the title
1 and utilize in connection with the functions transferred by this
order any other office of the Foreign Operations Administration
Kansferred hereby.
Section 104. (a) The Secretary of State, after consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, shall make appropriate arrangements for carry-
Supra.
415900-574-vol. 2-95
3154
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ing out the function of coordination referred to in section 102 (c) (1)
of Executive Order No. 10575 of November 6, 1954.
(b) The Secretary of State or, if he shall so direct, the Director of
the International Cooperation Administration shall (1) carry out the
functions under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951?
transferred by section 101 of this order, (2) carry out the functions
under section 501 (a) (2) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (as con-
tinued by section 525 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954), (3) make
the determinations authorized by the last sentence of section 524 (6)
of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, and (4) coordinate the functions
of the International Cooperation Administration and other affairs of
the Department of State.
PART II. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Section 201. So much of the functions under chapter 2 of Title I
of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 now vested in or delegated to or
otherwise conferred upon the Director of the Foreign Operations Ad-
ministration or the Foreign Operations Administration as consists of
furnishing to recipients eligible under that chapter, equipment, mate-
rials, or services which are delivered or rendered directly to the mili-
tary forces of the recipient country or its agent (including a civilian
contractor with such force) for the exclusive use, or to be under the
exclusive control, of such military forces and without entering into or
being processed by the civilian economy of the recipient country ex-
cept as above provided is hereby transferred to the Secretary of De-
fense and the Department of Defense, respectively.
Section 202. The determination of the value of the program for
any country under so much of chapter 2 of Title I of the Mutual Se-
curity Act of 1954 as pertains to the functions transferred by section
201 of this order shall be made by the Secretary of State.
PART III. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301. As used in this order, the term functions includes
powers, duties, authority, responsibilities, and discretion.
Section 302. So much of the records, property, personnel, posi-
tions, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and
other funds of the Foreign Operations Administration as the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine shall be transferred to the
Department of Defense. There are hereby transferred to the De-
partment of State all other records, property, personnel, positions, and
unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds
of the Foreign Operations Administration (including those of the
Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the International Development
Advisory Board, and the Office
of Small Business, which shall be trans-
ferred with those agencies, respectively). Such further measures and
dispositions as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may deem
necessary in order to effectuate the transfers provided for in this sec-
Supra, doc. 15.
FOREIGN AID
3155
tion shall be carried out in such manner as he shall direct and by such
agencies as he shall designate.
Section 303. (a) The Foreign Operations Administration, including
the office of Director of the Foreign Operations Administration but
excluding all other offices of, and all agencies and positions of, the
Foreign Operations Administration, and excluding also all functions
transferred by the provisions of this order, is hereby abolished.
(b) The memberships of the Director of the Foreign Operations
Administration on the following bodies, together with the functions
of the said Director in his capacity as member of each thereof, are
hereby abolished: (1) The National Security Council, (2) the Opera-
tions Coordinating Board, (3) the Council on Foreign Economic Pol-
icy, (4) the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal,
(5) the Defense Mobilization Board, and (6) the Interdepartmental
Committee on Trade Agreements: Provided, That the Director of the
International Cooperation Administration' or his designated repre-
sentative shall participate in the deliberations, and assist in connection
with the affairs, of the bodies mentioned in items (2) to (6), inclusive,
above, and of the Committee for Reciprocity Information.
Section 304. Nothing in this order shall be construed to derogate
from the authority of the President, after the date of approval of this
order, (1) to delegate functions conferred upon him by the Mutual
Security Act of 1954 or by other law other than as transferred or other-
wise assigned by this order, (2) to transfer to any agency or officer of
the United States, or to modify or abolish, any function, office, or
entity of the Foreign Operations Administration or the successor
thereof or any officer or employee thereof, or (3) to transfer such per-
sonnel, property, records, and funds as may be necessary incident
Section 305. Except to the extent inconsistent with this order, all
determinations, authorizations, regulations, rulings, certificates, or-
ders, directives, contracts, agreements, and other actions issued, un-
dertaken, or entered into with respect to any function affected by this
order and not heretofore revoked, superseded, or otherwise made in-
applicable,
shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modi-
fied, or terminated by appropriate authority; but any reference therein
to any officer or agency abolished by this order shall hereafter be
deemed to be a reference to the appropriate successor officer or agency
under this order.
Section 306. This order shall become effective at the close of
1
thereto.
.
r
2
.
June 30, 1955.
l
t
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
1
:
3156
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
20. COUNTRIES HAVING ENTERED INTO ARRANGEMENTS
FOR GRANT MILITARY AID UNDER THE MUTUAL
SECURITY PROGRAM: Map, December 31, 1955 1
.
1 Ninth Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the
six months ended December 31, 1955 (1956), p. 12.
T
per
37
IN EUROPE
NORWAY
UNITED
KINGDOM
GERMANY
(FED. REP.)
BELGIUM
FRANCE
SPAIN
BENMARK
NETHERLANRS
BUXEMBOURG
YUGOSLAVIA
m
0
IN AFRICA & ASIA
JAPAN
PORTUGAL
SIN LATIN AMERICA
PAKISTAN
REP. OF KOREA
CUBA
HAITI
DOMINICAN REP.
HONDURAS
NICARAGUA
REP. OF CHINA
LAOS
CAMBODIA
FREE VIET NAM
PHILIPPINES
IRAN
GUATEMALA
ETHIOPIA
COLOMBIA
THAILAND
ECUADOR
PERU
BRAZIL
CHILE
URUGUAY
Countries which have signed grant military oid agreements
Other free world countries
Soviet bloc countrie
As of Dec. 31, 1955
3158
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
1 Post World War II Foreign Aid Legislation-Grant and Loan Funds Authorized
and Appropriated for Major Foreign Aid Programs of the United States, 1945-1956,
tion Administration, Jan. 27, 1956. For similar information for the period
by the Clearing Office for Foreign Transactions, Department of Commerce (1952),
G. STATISTICAL REVIEW OF THE FOREIGN AID
PROGRAMS, 1945-1955
21. POST WORLD WAR II FOREIGN AID LEGISLATION-
GRANT AND LOAN FUNDS AUTHORIZED AND APPRO-
PRIATED FOR MAJOR FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1945-1956: Tabular Compilation, January 27,
1956 1
[See following chart]
Appendix Tables L to N, pp. 107-118.
FOREIGN AID
3159
nations receiving assistance, when such assistance provided under section
chapter 3, Defense Support, of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
material from the Office of Business Economics, U. S. Department of Commerce.
22. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOREIGN GRANTS AND
CREDITS, POSTWAR DECADE, JULY 1, 1945, THROUGH
JUNE 30, 1955: Tabular Compilation by Program (Military and
Other) and by Area, November 4, 1955 (Excerpt) 1
(Prefatory Note: Grants are largely outright gifts for which no payment
is expected, or which at most involve an obligation on the part of the
receiver to extend aid to the United States or other countries to achieve
a common objective. Credits are loan disbursements or transfers under
other agreements which give rise to specific obligations to repay, over a
period of years, usually with interest. In some instances assistance has
been given with the understanding that a decision as to repayment will
be made at a later date; such assistance is included in grants. At such
time as an agreement is reached for repayment over a period of years, a
credit is established. Such credits, cannot, as a rule, be deducted from
specific grants recorded in previous periods; an adjustment for grants
converted into credits is made at the time of agreement. All known
returns to the United States Government stemming from grants and
credits are taken into account in net grants and net credits.
The measure of foreign grants and credits generally is in terms of goods
delivered or shipped by the United States Government, services rendered
by the United States Government, or cash disbursed by the United States
Government to or for the account of a foreign government or other foreign
entity. The Government's capital investments in the International
Bank ($635 million) and International Monetary Fund ($2,750 million)
are not included in these data although they constitute an additional
measure taken by this Government to promote foreign economic recovery.
Payments made to these international financial institutions do not result
in immediate equivalent aid to foreign countries. Use of available dollar
funds is largely determined by the managements of the two institutions,
subject to certain controls which can be exercised by the United States
Government.
Mutual security military grants" include mutual security program
aid for common-use items which are to be used by military forces of
123 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, is administered in
accordance with chapter 1, Military Assistance, of Title I of that act.
"Mutual security other grants" include (1) mutual security program aid
for economic and technical assistance use from military aid appropria-
tions, (2) mutual security program aid from appropriations for common-
use items which are to be used by military forces of nations receiving
assistance, when such assistance is administered in accordance with
amended, and (3) also transfer of funds for the support of forces of Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Vietnam (and forces of France located in such states)
and of funds in support of production for forces support.
“Military equipment loans" are included in this report as part of
military grants; these "loans" are essentially transfers on an indetermi-
nate basis, generally requiring only the return of the identical item, if
available.
In essence, this was the requirement pertaining to wartime
lend-lease transfers of watercraft, which were included as grant transfers
1 U. S. Government Foreign Grants and Credits, Postwar Decade, July 1, 1945,
through June 30, 1955, prepared in the Budget Division, Office of the Controller,
International Cooperation Administration, Nov. 4, 1955, pp. 1-2; using source
This compilation also includes a breakdown of the major areas, listing 86 different
countries, specific international organizations, etc.---not reproduced here. The
Prefatory Note is a definition of terms used in the chart, and appeared as an
introduction to the chart.
"*"-i
...
3160
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
in these data. The transfers reported for Canada represent the loan
and return of aircraft, for example, under the program announced by the
Defense Department August 15, 1952.
“Special country programs” include Greek Turkish aid, Chinese mili-
tary aid, Chinese stabilization, Philippine rehabilitation, Yugoslav aid,
Berlin investment fund, Libyan special purpose fund under exchange of
notes of September 9, 1954, and Mexican foot-and-mouth disease eradica-
tion program.
For security reasons data by country do not include the military aid
furnished principally under the mutual security program. In these
exhibits, the military assistance under mutual security is reflected in
summary manner in the appropriate geographical area. Transfers of
military assistance generally reflect the area of consignment of the
equipment; in particular data for Asia and Pacific include shipments to
Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) while those for Western
Europe include shipments to France, a part of which may have replaced
equipment used by the French forces in Indochina. Because of the
inclusion of dependencies in the grouping "Western Europe," data shown
for other groupings, particularly “Near East and Africa," are correspond-
ingly understated. The aid shown in the table includes credits which
have been extended to private entities in the country specified; the net
credit shown for Canada, for example, represents credits extended to
private entities in Canada. Country data include grants of Government
agricultural surpluses through American voluntary relief agencies and
international organizations.
Columns may not add in all instances due to rounding of figures.]
[See following chart]
*** The

SUMMARY OF FOREIGN GRANTS AND CREDITS
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOREIGN GRANTS AND CREDITS --BY PROGRAM, MILITARY AND OTHER, BY COUNTRY
Postwar Decade, July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1955
WORLD-WIDE
Total
Military
(In thousands of dollars)
TOTAL WESTERN EUROPE
Total
Military
TOTAL
Other
Program
TOTAL EASTERN EUROPE
Other
TOTAL NEAR EAS AND AFRICA
Militry
Other
Other
Total
ET GRANTS & CREDITS..
$51,336,208
$14,663,454
$36,672,754
$33,408,941
$9,028,887
$24,380,054
$1,100,684
$4,316,387
$1,884528
$2,431,859
NET GRANTS.
40,349,300
14,663,454
25,685,847
24,736, 733
9,028,887
15,707,846
798,066
3,806,977
1,884528
1,922,449
Gross New Grants.
44,098,638
14,826,766
29,271,873
27,813,441
9,111,667
18,701,774
1,059,891
4,016,599
1,899101
2,117,498
Mutual security...
30,268,564
13,194,953
17,073,611
22,474,475
9,054,311 /
13,420,164
23,221
2,946,579
1,347559
1,599,020
Civilian supplies...
5,844,338
5,844,338
2,678,728
2,678,728
UNRRA, post-UNRRA, and interim aid..
3,443,092
3,443,092
1,575,997
1,575,997
756,588
317,791
317,791
Lend-lease...
1,905,589
679,073
1,226,516
837,793
837,793
277,348
8,297
8,297
Special country programs.
1,675,896
649,934
1,025,962
50,417
50,417
657,686
530,202
127,484
Military equipment loans.
302, 806
302,806
57,355
57,355
21,340
21,340
Other.
658,355
658,355
138,674
138, 674
2,732
64,906
64,906
Le88:
Prior grants converted into credits.
2,256,266
2,256,266
1,969,707
1,969,707
222,493
8,741
8,741
Less:
Reverse grants and returns.
1,493,072
163,311
1,329,761
1,107,001
82,780
1,024,221
39,332
200,881
14,573
186,308
Mutual security counterpart funds..
812, 302
36,833
775,469
682,261
26,604
655,657
89,904
1,018
88,886
Reverse lend-lease.
133,421
133,421
107,146
107,146
Casb war-account settlements for
lend-lease and other grants..
119,509
119,509
173
97,000
97,000
Return of lend-lease ships..
423,074
122,514
300,560
316,792
56,176
260,616
39,159
13,977
13,555
422

Return of civilian supplies.....
803
803
803
803
Return of military equipment loans,
3,964
3,964
NET CREDITS.
10,986, 908
10,986,908
8,672,208
8,672,208
302,618
509,410
509, 410
Gross New Credits.
12,116,274
12,116,274
8,581,657
8,581,657
123,220
657,270
657,270
Export-Import Bank (including agent-banks).....
4,475,937
4,475,937
2,304,980
2,304,980
61,984
319, 616
319,616
British loan...
3,750,000
3,750,000
3,750,000
3,750,000
Mutual security...
1,844,175
1,844,175
1,461,347
1,461,347
159,537
159,537
1,485,429
1,485,429
1,005, 412
1,005,412
61,236
152,001
152,001
Surplus property (including merchant ships)....
Lend-lease (excluding settlement credits)......
70,572
70,572
22,884
22,884
18,532
18,532
Other.
490,160
490,160
37,030
37,030
7,581
7,581
Plus:
Prior grants converted into credits...
2,256,266
2,256,266
1,969,707
1,969, 707
222,493
8,741
8,741
Less:
Principal collections..
3,385,632
3,385,632
1,879,155
1,879,155
43,095
156,601
156,601
Export-Import Bank (including agent-banks).....
1,951,969
1,951,969
1,009,449
1,009,449
29,645
63,410
63,420
British loan....
182,737
182,737
182,737
182,737
Mutual security....
32,420
III
32,420
27,881
27,881
1,539
4,539
Surplus property (including merchant ships)....
418,913
418,913
255,968
255,968
13,449
64,405
64,405
Grants converted into credits.
100,388
100,388
84,100
84,100
7,950
7,950
415900 - 57 ( Face p. 3160) No. 1
Lend-lease (excluding settlement credits)......
62,703
62,703
10,220
10,220
150
150
Other..
636,502
636,502
308,799
308,799
16,146
16,146
al Includes contributions to the multilateral-construction program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, some part of which may be disbursed in Greece and Turkey, as NATO members.
SUMMARY OF FOREIGN GRANTS AND CREDITS
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOREIGN GRANTS AND CREDITS --BY PROGRAM, MILITARY AND OTHER, BY COUNTRY
Postwar Decade, July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1955
(In thousands of dollars)
TOTAL ASIA AND PACIFIC
Military
TOTAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS
Military
TOTAL CANADA
Military
TOTAL UNSPECIFIED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND AREAS
Total
Military
Other
Total
Total
Other
Other
Total
Program
Other
$10,153,216
$6,778,622
$3,374,594
$1,236,531
$224,419
$1,012,112
$ 5,780
-
$
$ 5,780
NET GRANTS & CREDITS...
$1,114,675
$151,028
$963,647
9,468,040
3,374,594
NET GRANTS.
6,093,446
484,816
224,419
260,397
1,054,675
151,028
903,647
9,609,461
3,383, 303
6,226,158
Gross New Grants...
540, 612
277,704
262,908
3,964
3,964
1,054,675
151,028
903,647
Mutual security...
4,142,808
2,364,351
1,778,457
383,774
277,704
106,070
297,707
151,028
246,679
Civilian supplies...
3,165,610
3,165,610
UNRRA, post-UNRRA, and interim aid....
415,563
415,563
377,153
377,153
Lend-lease...
747,018
679,073
67,945
5,769
5,769
29,364
29,364
Special country programs
873,902
119,732
754,170
93,891
93,891
Military equipment loans.
220,147
220,147
3,964
3,964
Other..
44,416
44,416
57,176
57,176
350,451
350,451
Le86:
Prior grants converted into credits....
53,181
53,181
2,144
2,144
1
Less:
Reverse grants and returns.
88,240
8,709
79,531
53,652
53,285
367
3,964
3,964
39,629
8,709
Mutual security counterpart funds.....
30,920
508
502
6
1
.
1
Reverse lend-lease...
26,275
26,275
.
1
Cash war-account settlements for
lend-lease and other grants...
22,336
22,336
Return of lend-lease ships..
53,146
52,783
363
1
Return of civilian supplies...
Return of military equipment loans..
3,964
-
3,964
-
1
.
NET CREDITS.
685,176
685,176
751,715
751,715
5,780
5,780
60,000
U
60,000
Groba New Credits..
1,279,698
1,279,698
1,246,236
1,246,236
163,194
163,194
65,000
65,000
Export-Import Bank (including agent-banks)....
431,485
431,485
1,212,170
1,212,170
145,700
145,700
British loan,
Mutual security..
223,290
223,290
Surplus property (including merchant ships)...
241,975
241,975
24,804
24,804
Lend-lease (excluding settlement credits).....
29,156
29,156
Other....
353,792
353,792
9,262
-
9,262
17,494
17,494
65,000
65,000
Plus:
Prior grants converted into credits.....
53,181
53,181
2,144
U
2,144
Less: Principal collections.
647,703
647,703
496,665
496,665
157,414
157,414
5,000
5,000
280,358
280,358
423,406
423,406
145,700
145,700
Export-Import Bank (including agent-banks)....
British loan..
Mutual security.
Surplus property (including merchant ships)...
66,855
66,855
415900 O- 57 ( Face p. 3160) No. 2
18,234
18,234
1
Grants converted into credits...
6,192
6,192
2,144
2,144
Lend-lease (excluding settlement credits).....
52,333
52,333
Other...
294,294
294, 294
551
551
11,714
.
11,714
5,000
5,000
Part XIX
NTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES OVERSEAS
INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE FUNC-
TIONS, 1938–1953 1
From the termination of the Creel Committee (Committee on Public
nformation, George Creel, Chairman; established by Executive Order,
pril 14, 1917) in 1919 to the end of World War II, the only semblance
a concerted overseas information program consisted of the informa-
ional activities undertaken in the late 1930's in connection with the
nter-American System. These activit led to the establishment in
938 of the first specialized machiner he Department of State to
deal with international information functions—the Division of Cul-
tural Relations (Departmental Order 768, July 28, 1938); as well as
ation of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and
ilal Cooperation (first meeting as "Committee on Cooperation
th
American Republics,” May 26, 1938);? and, on August 16,
940, the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Rela-
dons between the American Republics (changed on July 30, 1941 to
Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, on March 23, 1945 to
Vffice of Inter-American Affairs; terminated May 20, 1946).
The World War II programs started "from scratch,” aside from
the activities in the American Hemisphere, and evolved in a more or
ess haphazard manner. The American Hemisphere program was
as a supplement to broad commercial and social wartime
programs. For other areas, the overseas information program was
oined with the domestic information program, first under the Coordi-
ator of Information, then in the Office of War Information (OWI).
hus quite distinct bases of organization were followed in the different
During World War II, the Department of State's role in the field of
* Adapted from Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on
verseas Information Programs of the United States, Organization of the United
tates Overseas Information Functions (Staff Study No. 4; Committee Print, 1953).
Department of State Press Releases, XVIII, p. 610. By November 1938 it
as generally called the "Inter-Departmental Committee on Cooperation with the
merican Republics.". It became the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific
od Cultural Cooperation in December 1945.
3161
developed
reas.
-:1
3162
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
hion
international information activities, as distinguished from purely Mar
cultural relations, was chiefly that of furnishing essential information resp
and policy guidance to the civilian and military information agencies
. Info
Up to 1944, this role was performed in part by the Division of Current polie
Information (established by Departmental Order 206, May 24, 1921), Dani
and in part directly by the geographical officers of the Department
. men
In the field of cultural relations, the Division of Cultural Relations, DIA
and the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural The
Cooperation were concerned primarily with the inter-American Mar
program.
On January 15, 1944 (Departmental Order 1218), the Department Secr
.
created an Office of Public Information, into which most of its domestic T
and foreign information functions, including cultural relations, were lugu
grouped. The new Office was under the Assistant Secretary for fect
Administration.
On December 20, 1944 (Departmental Order 1301), greater recogni- loop
tion was given information functions by the creation of the position of LA.
Assistant Secretary in charge of Public and Cultural Relations (later sets
Public Affairs). The name of the Office of Public Information was state
changed to the Office of Public Affairs-under the new Assistant servi
Secretary. Within this Office a new International Information Divi-
sion took over the overseas information activities, while the Division of
Cultural Cooperation handled the cultural relations program.
With the transfer of the overseas functions of the Office of War 2.
Information and the Office of Inter-American Affairs (Executive
Order 9608, August 31, 1945), the Department established (Depart-
mental Order 1336) the Office of International Information and
Cultural Affairs (OIĆ). The Office of Public Affairs was left with the la
responsibility for the Department's work in domestic public affairs. for
By the end of 1945, the OC had emerged as the agency chiefly respon- M
sible for the administration of the Department's overseas informational o sp
and cultural relations functions. The office contained five operating doing
divisions: Press and Publications, Broadcasting, Motion Pictures, Unit
Exchange of Persons, and Libraries and Institutes. It remained forlo
essentially unaltered until the fall of 1947, when its program was
1 Se
greatly curtailed because of drastic reductions in its appropriations.
Se
On August 15, 1947, the title of OIC was changed Departmental
D
Announcement 685) to the Office of Information and Education
Exchange (OIE).
the be
Following the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act (United States even
the
Information and Educational Exchange Act, Public Law 402,
January
live ir
27, 1948) · and the granting of additional funds, OIE was split into two in Ju
units (Departmental Announcements 12, 14, 15, April 22, 1948); luppo
Office of International Information (QII) and Office of Educational or
Exchange (OEX). The Smith-Mundt Áct and the Fulbright Act
(Public
Law 584, August 1, 1946) 2 made possible great expansion of
the exchange program.
Late in 1949, the Department of State created (see Public Notice 34
Depa.
1236)
excha
The P
1951
fecti
satior
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224-1234.
* Ibid., pp. 1235–1236.
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3163
1
y March 6, 1950) the position of a General Manager, who was made
ne responsible for formulating and executing the over-all International
3. Information and Educational Exchange Program (IE), within the
at policy directives of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. On
), January 16, 1952, a major reorganization Departmental Announce-
t. Jnent 4) established the International Information Administration
78 IIA), described as a "semiautonomous” unit in the Department.
al The Administrator of the new unit combined the duties of the General
in Manager of IE with most of the overseas information responsibilities
of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, reporting directly to the
at secretary and Under Secretary of State.
ic The United States Information Agency (USTA) was established on
re kugust 1, 1953,2 as independent of the Department of State, but sub-
or fect to policy guidance therefrom. USIA also absorbed the informa-
sion functions of the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical
1- Cooperation Administration, already to some extent integrated under
of JA. The exchange program under the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt
er slots and certain other legislation remained in the Department of
as state to be administered by the International Educational Exchange
At Service (IES) under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.
i-
of
ar
(1
2. THE CAMPAIGN OF TRUTH: Address by the President,
ve
April 20, 1950 (Excerpt)3
t-
nd
be I am convinced that we should greatly extend and strengthen our
's. forts for making the truth known to people in all the world.
- Most of us have recognized for years, of course, how important it is
al bo spread the truth about freedom and democracy. We are already
18 oing some very good work-through the Voice of America and the
$, Inited States information offices and libraries in many parts of the
ad orld, through
the exchange of students, through the United Nations
AS
S.
See infra, doc. 5.
al
See infra, doc. 7.
Delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington;
Department of State Bulletin, May 1, 1950, pp. 669-672. This address marked
de beginning of a greatly expanded information program, with further impetus
es given by the first Soviet atomic explosion, a National Security Council reappraisal
7
the Nation's position in the world (calling for, in part, an expanded and aggres-
we information program), and the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea
in June 25, 1950. Congress appropriated $79 million for the fiscal year 1951 in
apport of the expanded program, which was 24 times the appropriation granted
al fiscal year 1960, and 4 times that for 1949. The basic authority under which
it program operated in the Department of State was the Fulbright Act of 1946
PL 584, 79th Cong., 2d sess.; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1235–
of
1236) and the Smith-Mundt Act (the United States Information and Educational
exchange Act of 1948, PL 402, 80th Cong., 2d sess.; ibid., pp. 1224-1234).
The Psychological Strategy Board, established by Presidential directive of June 20,
1961 (infra, doc. 4), attempted to provide high-level guidance for the more
diective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved
ational policies, of psychological operations.
TO
be
1
Or
re
Cl
st
re
m
I
ur
fo
fo
Il
effi
foi
pr
ne
pr
R
1
ing to people behind the Iron Curtain the true story of world events:
have had the valuable aid of the United States Advisory Commission
3164 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
and its affiliated organizations, and in other ways. But events have
shown, I believe, that we need to do much more, both ourselves and in
collaboration with the other free nations. We must use every means
at our command, private as well as governmental, to get the truth to
other peoples.
Private groups and organizations have an important part to play.
Our labor unions have already done fine work in communicating with
labor in Europe, in Latin America, and elsewhere. The story of free
American labor, told by American trade unionists, is a better weapon
against Communist propaganda among workers in other countries than
any number of speeches by government officials.
The same principle applies to other groups. The best way for
farmers in other countries to find out about us is to talk directly with
our own farmers. Our business men can speak directly to businessmen
abroad. We need to promote much more direct contact between our
people and those of other countries.
We should encourage many more people from other countries to
visit us here, to see for themselves what is true and what is not true
about our country. We should find more opportunities for foreign
students to study in our schools and universities. They will learn
here the skills and techniques needed in their own countries
. They
will also see at first hand the rights and duties of citizens in our land
of democratic institutions.
Our colleges should train more Americans to go abroad as teachers,
especially to teach modern methods of farming, industry, and public
health-and, by example, to teach our concepts of democracy. The
notable record of our many charitable and religious organizations who
send teachers abroad is proof of what can be done.
Another major part of our effort must be carried out through our
great public information channels-newspapers and magazines, radio
,
and motion pictures. We must strive constantly to break down or
leap over barriers to free communication wherever they exist. We
must make full use of every effective means of communicating informa-
tion, in simple, understandable form, to people whose backgrounds and
cultures are different from ours.
This poses an enormous challenge to groups such as yours, a chal
lenge which can be met only by extraordinary inventiveness and
enterprise. I am confident that the American
press can and will make
a tremendously useful contribution toward finding new solutions.
The Government's programs for telling the truth about the United
States to the peoples of the world also need constant improvement
.
Our present overseas information and educational exchange program
is getting results. For example, the Voice of America has been carry
:
It has been so successful that the Soviet
Government is using a vast
amount of costly equipment in an attempt to drown out our broadcasts
by jamming. We must devise ways to break through that jamming
and get our message across. And we must improve and strengthen
This is not a conclusion reached by Government
officials alone. We
un
th
ale
wh
tas
ad
ha
for
pe
aid
pro
of
nis
of
mo
mi
tru
an
of
no
for
sel
pre
an
1
2
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3165
on Information created by the Congress. Your own society is ably
represented on that Commission by Mark Ethridge and Erwin D.
Canham. The members of the Commission have given intensive
study to the overseas information program and have made repeated
recommendations that it be substantially expanded. Similar recom-
mendations for the exchange program have been made by the Ad-
visory Commission on Education, headed by Dr. Harvie Branscomb.
I have been glad to see that many Members of the Congress have
urged an improved and expanded program in these fields—as shown,
for example, by the resolution introduced recently by Senator Benton
for himself and a number of his colleagues.
Because of the pressing need to increase our efforts along this line,
I have directed the Secretary of State to plan a strengthened and more
effective national effort to use the great power of truth in working
for peace. This effort will require the imagination and energies of
private individuals and groups throughout the country. We shall
need to use fully all the private and governmental means that have
proved successful so far and to discover and employ new ones.
REACHING UPWARD THROUGH TRUTH
Our task is to present the truth to the millions of people who are
uninformed or misinformed or unconvinced. Our task is to reach
them in their daily lives, as they work and learn. We must be
alert, ingenious, and diligent in reaching peoples of other countries,
whatever their educational and cultural backgrounds may be. Our
task is to show them that freedom is the way to economic and social
advancement, the way to political independence, the way to strength,
happiness, and peace.
This task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our
foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a
peaceful world. It is as important as armed strength or economic
aid. The Marshall Plan, military aid, Point 4-these and other
programs depend for their success on the understanding and support
our own citizens and those of other countries.
We must make ourselves known as we really are not as Commu-
nist propaganda pictures us. We must pool our efforts with those
of the other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to pro-
mote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We
must make ourselves heard round the world in a great campaign of
We have tremendous advantages in the struggle for men's minds
and loyalties. We have truth and freedom on our side. The appeal
of free institutions and self-government springs from the deepest and
noblest aspirations of mankind. It is based on every man's desire
for liberty and opportunity. It is based
on every man's wish to be
self-reliant and to shape his own destiny.
As we go forward with our campaign of truth, we will make lasting
progress toward the kind of world we seek-a world in which men
and nations live not as enemies but as brothers.
The Commission was established by sec. 601 of the Smith-Mundt Act.
Similarly established.
truth.
1
2
3. PROGRAMS CONDUCTED
3. PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN 1950 TO PROVIDE A TWO WAY STREET: :
Chart, June 30, 1950 1
PROGRAM FUNDS*
AREAS AFFECTED
AUTHORIZATION
EUROPE & BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH
PROGRAM
NEAR EAST, SOUTH
ASIA, AND AFRICA
FAR EAST
AMERICAN
REPUBLICS
Under
Program Under the Buenos Aires Treaty
(Convention for the Promotion of Inter-
American Cultural Relations): Provides for
Exchange of Professors, Teachers, and Stu.
dents, Between the United States and 16
Other American Republics.
Buenos Aires
Treaty of
19/93/36
USIE Program
$1,196,539
Philippine Rehabilitation Program: Provide
grants for Philippine citizens for training in
the United States in scientific, technical, and
public service felch.
P. L. 370
79th
Congress (os
amended by
P. L. 809 of
the soch
Congress).
0
Dollar equiva.
lant in foreign
currencies
$4,965,000
Dollo equiva.
lone in foreign
currencies
$1,931,214
Dollar equiva.
lant in foreign
currencies
$800,000
Program Under the Fulbright Act: Provides
for the Exchange of Students, Teachers,
Professors and Research Scholars Between
the United States and Certain Other Coun.
tries (Financed by Foreign Currencies Ob-
tained from the sale of United States
Surplus Property).
P. L. 584
79th
Congress.
邊疆
​3
$990,000
Institute of Inter-American Allairs Program:
Provides o United States Agency, To Col.
laborate with Countries of the American
Republics in Planning, Financing, and
Executing Special Technical Programs.
P. L. 369
Both
Congress (os
amended by
P. L. 283 of
the 8154
Congress).
3
3106
$803,156
$981,464
$945,090
$3,838,096
P. L. 402-
Both
Congress.
USIE Program: Provides lois World-Wide
Program of Information and Educational,
Cultural, Scientific, and Technical Exchange
ol Persons and Materials Between the
United States and Other Cooperating
Nations. (Funds Shown Provide for the
USIE Educational Exchange Activities
Described in the Body of this Report,
Exclusive of such Operating costs Overseas
os Salories and Expenses of American and
Local Employees, Rent and Utilities, Etc..).
un
$964,499
Program for Exchanges With Finland; Pro-
vides for a Program of Exchange of Persons
& Educational, Scientific, and Technical
Materials Between the U. S. and Finland;
to be Financed by Payments on World
Wor Debts by Finland.
P. L. 965-
0194
Congress.
[第
​$1,560,899
Chinese Student Aid Program: Provides
U. S. Financial Assistance to Needy
Chinese Students in the United States.
P.L. 397--
U15
Congress
1
$8,181,843
Garmon Information and Educational Ex-
change Program: Provides for information
and educational exchange program with
the Western Zone of Occupied Germany,
(Funds shown for Educational Exchange
only).
P. L. 397-
8151
Congress.
*The cost of domestic operations of these programs was $2,041,188 which included professional and technical services, screening, placement, and guidance of foreign grantees, orientation services,
services to private and Government programs, and cost of direct management and administration.
**The program for aid to destitute Chinese students in the United States, initiated in fiscal year 1919 by an allocation of $500,000 from ECA to the Department of State, was expanded in 1950
when a total of $10,000,000 was appropriated to be available until expended.
1 Two Way Street: International, Educational and Technical Exchange in Fiscal Year--1950. Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, June 30, 1950 (Department
of State publicatiop 3893; 1950), p. 3.
3167
mi
Q
sig
-
ag
ор
ne
ex
an
5.
$
assist in carrying out his responsibilities. The director shall determine
agencies for assignment to full-time duty or on an ad hoc task force
to necessary personnel procedures within their respective depart-
director and the staff such assistance and access to information as
3168 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
BOARD: Presidential Directive, June 20, 1951 1
DIRECTIVE TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
It is the purpose of this directive to authorize and provide for the
more effective planning, coordination, and conduct, within the frame-
work of approved national policies,
of psychological operations.
There is hereby established a Psychological Strategy Board re-
sponsible, within the purposes and terms of this directive, for the
formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and
agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national
psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordina-
tion and evaluation of the national psychological effort.
The Board will report to the National Security Council on the
Board's activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological
operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies
,
and programs by the departments and agencies concerned.
The Board shall be composed of:
a. The Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence, or, in their absence, their
appropriate designees;
b. An appropriate representative of the head of each such other
department or agency of the Government as may, from time to time,
be determined by the Board.
The Board shall designate one of its members as chairman.
A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall sit with the
Board as its principal military
adviser in order that the Board may
ensure that its objectives, policies, and programs shall be related to
approved plans for military operations.
There is established under the Board, a director, who shall be
designated by the President and who shall receive compensation of
16 thousand dollars per year.
The director, within the limits of funds and personnel made avail-
able by the Board for this purpose, shall organize and direct a staf to
individuals employed for this purpose, including part-time expertos
and/or individuals detailed from
the participating departments and
this directive shall be under the centren of the director, subject only
ments and
agencies.
The participating departments and agencies shall afford to the
Ini
thu
pri
to
UP
ga
&C
an
Ad
fo:
Se
C
Cr
fo
th
1 Department of State Bulletin, July 2, 1951, p. 36.
19
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3169
| Secretary is responsible.
may be specifically requested by the director in carrying out his as-
signed duties.
The heads of the departments and agencies concerned shall ex-
amine into present arrangements within their departments and
agencies for the conduct, direction, and coordination of psychological
operations with a view toward readjusting or strengthening them if
necessary to carry out the purposes of this directive.
In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum
extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments
and agencies.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
5. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (IIA) IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Departmental Announcement 4,
January 16, 1952 1
1. Purpose
The purpose of this announcement is to establish the United States
International Information Administration (IIA) for the conduct of
the Department's international information and educational exchange
programs, to describe the functions assigned to this organization and
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and the functions
with respect to IIA programs assigned to other areas of the Depart-
ment, and to maintain and further strengthen integration of the United
States international information and educational exchange programs
with the conduct of foreign relations generally.
2. Establishment of United States International Information Admin-
istration
There is hereby established within the Department of State the
United States International Information Administration. This or-
ganization shall be headed by an Administrator who shall be directly
accountable to the Secretary and the Under Secretary for the planning
and execution of the Department's programs under the Smith-Mundt
Act (Public Law 402, 80th Congress) 2 and related legislation and
other
foreign information' activities for the administration of which the
3. Administrator of the United States International Information Ad-
ministration
a. Serves as Chairman of the Psychological Operations Coordinating
Committee 3 and discharges the responsibility of the Secretary of State
for international information and educational exchange programs in
the interdepartmental field.
Not previously published.
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224–1234.
Established Aug. 17, 1950; see the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 28,
1950, p. 335.
41590057-Vol. 2
-96
3170
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
to
bi
th
th
ec
A
al
81
PI
PI
SU
United Nations Affairs, plans and implements UNESCO's programs
Department and UNESCO and between the National Commission
dom of information encountered in operations of public affairs pro-
f. Advises the Bureau of United Nations Affairs of obstacles to free-
munications industries to interpret and to secure advice and support
grams; assures the maintenance of liaison with American mass com-
for United States policies and actions related to freedom of infor
b. Directs the development of international information and edu-
cational exchange (IIA) policies designed to implement and strengthen
the foreign policies of the United States, with the advice of the regional
bureaus and other areas of the Department as appropriate and with
the aid of guidance from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs.
c. Directs the planning of IIA programs, with the advice of the
regional bureaus.
d. Directs the execution of all IIA programs at home and abroad,
submitting field communications for the advice or review of those areas
of the Department having specific advice or review authority with
respect to the matters dealt with in such communications.
e. Determines the selection and assignment of personnel to the IIA
program, at home and abroad, under the personnel policies and pro-
cedures applicable to the IIA program, securing the review of the re-
gional bureaus as to the selection of the chief public affairs officers at
posts abroad and their advice as to their principal subordinates.
4. Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
a. Participates in the formulation of policy of the Department from
the standpoint of public opinion factors and advises the Secretary
,
the Under Secretary, and other top staff of the Department on public
opinion factors, domestic and foreign, involved in the formulation of
departmental policy.
b. Develops policies on public information and directs the execution
of programs designed to keep the United States public informed on
international affairs and to maintain contacts between the Depart-
ment and the United States public.
c. Provides guidance to the development of international informa-
tion and educational exchange policies and serves as the staff officer
to the Secretary responsible for the approval of major IIA policy
guidances.
d. Develops policies for and supervises the conduct of a program
research on American policy, historically considered, for use of the
Department and the public, in consultation with other areas of the
Department.
e. Develops policies on substantive matters relating to United
States participation in UNESCO, subject to review by the Bureau of
in this country, serves as the channel of communication between the
reau of United Nations Affairs pertaining to UNESCO.
mation.
CE
SI
0
a
fo
W
fo
of
S
ti
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3171
5. Regional Bureaus
The responsibility and authority of the regional bureaus with respect
to information policy for their areas are not changed. The regional
bureaus shall have the following functions with respect to programs of
the United States International Information Administration:
a. State the foreign policies applicable to the region as a basis for
the development of international information and exchange policies.
b. Advise II A on the development of international information and
educational exchange policies applicable to their regions and the
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs on policy guidance to IIA.
c. Consider and advise IIA on program plans applicable to their
areas, with the right of appeal in the event of differences.
d. As requested by IIA, or upon own initiative, advises IIA on the
area suitability of ITA materials and activities.
e. Advise IIA on the total IIA complement to be stationed at each
post.
f. Review the IIA selection of the chief public affairs officer for each
post and advise on the selection of his principal subordinates.
g. Advise IIA on budgetary provision to be made for administrative
support of IIA staff and operations at posts abroad.
6. Departmental Support for II A Operations
6.1 Adequate services will be provided to IIA by strengthening the
central facilities of the Department where required or by establishing
special facilities within IIA. It is intended to assure the provision
of services in such a manner that the requirements of IIA will be met
and the responsibility of the Administrator for the IIA program will
not be impaired, at the same time maintaining the necessary uni-
formity of policy and practice, and retaining centralized facilities
where important economies can be effected without impairing service
6.2 The basic lines to be followed in providing administrative
support for IIA in the immediate future are set forth below. Con-
tinuous study shall be given to all phases of administrative support
operations and further modifications shall be made where experience
proves that they are necessary to provide adequate support for the
program.
6.3 Departmental services in the fields of communication, security,
building operations and like services will be utilized by IIA.
6.4 Personnel operations will be conducted by the central facilities
of the Department, but modifications in existing policies on appoint-
ment, promotion, salary, transfer, etc., and special procedural ar-
rangements will be made wherever such adaptations are necessary in
the interests of effective operation of the IIÀ program. In order to
assure that full attention is given to the needs and problems of the
IIA program, a special IIA unit will be organized
within the Office
of Personnel.
6.5 IIA will prepare, present and justify its own budget and
manage its own financial affairs, subject to such review by the Deputy
for IIA.
IIA
3172
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ar
pr
to
w
in:
DC
in
WO
tic
ag
ha
an
sei
TIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES:
Recently I heard a speaker say that "no one any longer questions
Educational Exchange Program; no one any longer says that ideas
and other countries, confess to their belief that the only possible
will be which nation or which group of nations will produce the
fastest airplanes, the most efficient bazookas, the most maneuverable
Under Secretary for administration as is necessary to assure com-
pliance with general departmental budget and fiscal policies.
6.6 A special IIA unit within the Division of Central Services will
handle IIĀ procurement.
ch
7. Administration of IIA Programs at Posts Abroad
7.1 The United States diplomatic mission chief shall continue to PC
be fully responsible for the conduct of IIA programs at his post. The
public affairs officer serves as a principal member of his staff with
If
the status of chief of a major section of the mission. Mission chiefs
are encouraged to delegate to public affairs officers authority to
communicate with the Department in the name of the mission chief
on as broad a range of IIA matters as practicable.
7.2 The mission chief will be responsible for assuring that the IIA
program works cooperatively with the other operating United States
programs within his country and provides information support to
ho
such programs.
7.3 The mission chief shall be responsible for seeing that adequate
administrative support is provided for IIA programs in accordance
sh
with their requirements. Administrative support will normally be
th
provided by the administrative officer of the mission. Other organ-
izational arrangements may, with the approval of the mission chief
,
be made whenever required to assure efficient support of IIA opera-
tions. The name "United States Information Service" will continue
to be used to identify the program abroad.
in
8. Installation of Reorganization
The Deputy Under Secretary for administration shall be responsible mi
for providing leadership in the installation of the new plan of organiza-
I
tion set forth in this announcement and in facilitating the transfers
of personnel, funds, records and equipment.
efi
6. THE OVERT INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EDUCA-
March 31, 1952 2
of
th
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it:
bo
WE
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ini
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1 Howland H. Sargeant.
? Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 31, 1952, pp. 483-489.
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3173
0
o
O
1.
$
0
8
e
2
le
and hard-hitting tanks and that expenditures on such frippery as
propaganda are largely wasted.
Although I do not agree with their conclusion I want to make it
clear that I regard propaganda as only one of four major instruments
to support the attainment of our national policy objectives whether
we are in peace or war. Propaganda alone is no substitute either for
policy or for action. It must be used in concert with the other major
instruments of national policy-political, economic, and military
power. Propaganda is 90 percent deeds and only 10 percent words.
If we do the right things and make them known to others in an
intelligent way, we succeed in our propaganda task. For example,
f
we could shout for many weeks in every medium of mass communica-
tion that we use that we intend to stay in Berlin until the danger of
aggression from the East is checked and until the German people
have the opportunity freely to determine the kind of government
and the kind of unification they may want. All this will mean little,
however, as long as the words are unaccompanied by deeds. When
we mount in the face of a Soviet blockade of Berlin an airlift which
sets a plane down every 3 minutes on Templehof Airdrome, and we
show the capacity to supply the people of the city of Berlin with
the necessities of living to an extent even greater than when the city
1, was supplied by rail and surface transport, then we have developed
& mighty propaganda symbol to all the world. Similarly, appoint-
ment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers
in Europe, was a propaganda symbol. He stood above all for victory
in Europe and inspired a feeling of renewed confidence and determi-
nation among the peoples of Western Europe that Soviet aggression
le might be prevented or, if it occurred, could be successfully resisted.
There is another dangerous fallacy abroad which I shall mention.
I find that many people regard Soviet propaganda as invincible,
infallible, and all-conquering. Soviet propaganda is apparently
effective in many circumstances. I believe, however, that Soviet
propaganda has serious fundamental weaknesses which are capable
of being exploited by the free world. I believe this in spite of the
fact that in the fifteenth century Louis XI of France proclaimed the
simple doctrine that "if they lie to you, you lie still more to them”
and
George Orwell in his frightening picture of the
totalitarian state
of 1984 shows a ministry of truth on whose vast white façade stretch
these slogans: “War iš Peace; Freedom is Slavery; Ignorance is
s |
Yet one of the most vulnerable points is the demon-
di strable contradiction between Soviet words and Soviet deeds. This
contradiction, evident even to the peoples of the Soviet Union and
t its satellites, 'is accentuated by blunders that the so-called infallible
propaganda machine makes from time to time-and, to take
& phrase from the late Mayor LaGuardia, "When they really pull a
I boner, it is a beauty.”
For example: Despite their most valiant efforts to convince the
world that the United States and the Republic of Korea are the
aggressors in Korea, the Soviet propaganda machine has failed in
its task. Most of the peoples in the world don't believe them. When
t-
LIS
11
Strength.
Soviet
o
8
e
3174
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
one
cons
an i
the
the
importance of ideas. We improvised a psychological warfare mech-othe
anism which achieved some success--both tactical and strategic.
At the end of World War II, we did remember some of the lessons and
What happened was that in August 1945 the President by Execu-stan
personnel, resources, and funds of OwI, Office of Inter-American
tration. Those which related to the propaganda and educational
Affairs, Office of Strategic Services, and Foreign Economic Adminis-
consolidated under the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs, William Benton, now junior Senator
from Connecticut, who was invited by Secretary Byrnes to take over
the hard task of cutting down a wartime information program to
peacetime proportions. Incidentally, in that process Mr. Benton was
Mr. Vyshinsky at the General Assembly rejected the disarmament
to ti
proposals of the Western Powers with the statement that he had time
fain awake all night laughing at these proposals, the Kremlin belatedly dev
realized that a propaganda blunder of the first niagnitude had been of so
made. In Italy and other Western European countries, pictures
appeared of Mr. Vyshinsky emphasizing his laughter over the dis- high
armament proposals and asking the question: "Does Mr. Vyshinsky
speak for you?” All the doves and peace rallies the Communists
can muster will not completely erase that picture.
F
Against this background I should like to sketch the following broad whe
topics (1) The development of an overseas information program; kind
(2) the recent reorganization of that program; (3) the scope of the that
program;(4) the content of the program; (5) the results we are getting; clear
and (6) some special problems of United States propaganda in the
future.
Info
Alex
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM
auth
In briefest compass, the U.S. Government did not become interested
poin
in any kind of international information and educational exchange
program before the years immediately prior to World War II
. Be- Unit
fi
ginnings of what we call educational exchange and cultural relations
were made in 1938 and underwent a vast wartime expansion under
worl
F
both the Nelson Rockefeller operation (the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs) and the Office of War Information (Owi). Even going
before that period, we as a nation had used propaganda from time to
time as one of the basic instruments of our national policy and
OT
strategy. More than 30 years ago, for example, during the First of th
World War, Woodrow Wilson understood the power of persuasions th
He correctly estimated the
force of ideas and his Fourteen
Points be who
came a powerful weapon for the Allies and a major factor in the sur
.
render of Germany. His "conditions of a just peace” reached the alert
people behind the enemy lines and undermined their will to resist. what
They gained for
America a position of world leadership. Of course
between the wars we promptly forgot most of these lessons we had pdva
learned, and in the Second World War we again had to discover the upper
a
salvaged some of the equipment of propaganda.
exchange functions
ever
reach
task
.
are
strer
Foui
ORG.
R
1
Janu
Infos
need
were
requ
TA
s
S
1 See Ex. Or. 9608, Aug. 31, 1945; 10 Fed. Reg. 11223.
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3175
January 3 is an attempt to give the Administrator of the world-wide
Information and Educational Exchange Programs all the tools he
to try to find out just what the job was for the U.S. Government in
time of peace, using these instruments of persuasion which we had
developed. In a period of about 3 months, Mr. Benton cut personnel
of somewhat over 10,000 back to roughly 3,000. He lost almost every
one of his top wartime administrators who had been drawn from the
highest levels of the private mass communications business. He met
considerable ignorance and apathy as to any need for continuing such
an instrument of international persuasion.
From the end of the war until January 1948 the issue was in doubt
whether in fact the Congress would appropriate money to sustain any
kind of peacetime information program. One of the great tributes
that history should pay to Senator Benton is that he saw the issue
clearly and he fought it through to a successful result, culminating in
the passage in January 1948 of what is now known as the International
Information and Educational Exchange Act' sponsored by Senator H.
Alexander Smith and Senator (then Congressman) Karl Mundt which
authorized a permanent program of this kind. However, I want to
point out that this legislation concentrated primarily on authorizing
the creation of better understanding between the peoples of the
United States and the peoples of other countries and on presenting
"a full and fair picture of the United States" to other peoples of the
world.
From January 1948 until April 1950, the program experienced heavy
going and drastic-fund reductions. During this period of time, how-
ever, a considerable amount of progress was made.
On April 20, 1950, the President called for that all-out expansion
of these efforts which he styled the "Campaign of Truth." 2 He said
at that time: "Our task is to present the truth to the millions of people
who are uninformed, or misinformed, or unconvinced. Our task is to
reach them in their daily lives, as they work and learn. We must be
alert, ingenious, and diligent in reaching peoples of other countries,
whatever their educational and cultural backgrounds may be. Our
task is to show them that freedom is the way to economic and social
advancement, the way to political independence, the way to strength,
happiness, and peace. The task is not separate and distinct from
other elements of our foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we
are doing to build a peaceful world. It is as important as armed
strength or economic aid. The Marshall Plan, military aid, Point
Pour--these and other programs depend for their success on the under-
standing and support of our own citizens and those of other
countries.”
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF THE PROGRAM
Reduced to its essentials the reorganization announced late in
needs to do his job and the administrative flexibility which will be
required. It also lifts the status of the whole program since the new
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224–1234.
Supra, doc. 2.
1
2
Supra.
3176
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
for
tra
tia
38
Ho
rela
the
$24, 659,778 $20, 730,000 $31, 180, 900 $47,300,000 $121, 301, 789 / $85,000,000
administrator, a distinguished economist, ' businessman, and more
recently, college president, Wilson Compton, reports directly to the
Secretary and Under Secretary of State. He is no longer responsible
in his operations to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs who,
under the earlier concepts, was not only responsible for determining
information policy but was also ultimately responsible for the opera-
tions of the program itself.
Under the reorganization the Assistant Secretary can become far
more a staff officer of the Secretary and other top officers of the De-
partment. He is relieved of any necessity for participation in operat-
ing decisions of the new International Information Administration
(IIA); he retains the responsibility for seeing that the information
policy pursued by the IIA is in line with foreign policy objectives and
current foreign policy decisions.
The Administrator of the Ila gains under the reorganization a
consolidation of authority in his own hands which in the past was
somewhat divided between the General Manager of the program,
the
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the regional bureaus, and the
central administrative offices of the Department. The Administrator
now takes the responsibility for the supervision of the planning and
conduct of all the overseas aspects of these programs—a job formerly
performed by the Department's regional bureaus. He also acquires
considerably greater flexibility in handling the mechanics of his
administration.
THE SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM
We shall know how good our reorganization is only after we have
actually got it working. I should like, though, to give an indi-
cation of what this program includes: In’the fiscal year 1948 around
2,500 people participated in the program that operated
on a budget of
approximately 20 million dollars. This was the low point of the pro-
gram in the postwar years. We were forced
to close down a number of
our overseas posts and fire a number of skilled and experienced people
in the very year in which the Marshall Plan was getting under way
v in
Europe and the Soviet propaganda campaign against us was really
beginning to roll. Since 1948, however, we have been building up
again. The supplemental appropriation of 79 million dollars. We
received in the fall of 1950 following the President's call for a greatly
expanded
Campaign of Truth resulted in an operation with four times
as many people on board as in the lean year 1948—and with nearly
six times as much money. Our current strength is slightly under
12,000 people, at home and abroad, and our appropriation for 1952 is
$85,000,000.
USIE Personnel and Appropriations, 1947 to 1952
4, 118
Whi
I
the
ope
1,01
leve
Len
We
suc.
mai
PRE
T
WOT
IUC
des
sup
ing
do
ing
boo
lang
Bus
&10
des
ma
pla
Lor
MO?
1952
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
T
Cou
11, 568
we
Authorized Personnel.
Appropriation Amount.
6, 030
10,807
and
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3177
London and Manila speed up the work.
The program consists of three primary fast media--radio, press and
publications, and motion pictures--and two of what are usually called
slow media” but what I prefer to call deep penetration media-in-
formation centers and exchange programs.
Most important of all are the people overseas on the firing line itself
who constitute USIEthe United States Information Service.
Radio. The world-wide radio network of the Voice of America
transmits programs in 46 languages around the clock and has a poten-
tial foreign listening audience of some 300,000,000 people. It operates
38 domestic shortwave transmitters with overseas relay bases at
Honolulu, Manila, Munich, Tangier, and Salonika plus use of BBC
relays at Wooferton, England. Soviet jamming of programs to
the U.S.S.R. and the Iron Curtain areas began in the spring of 1949
and became increasingly severe.
We have taken major steps to over-
come jamming, including such spectacular developments as the recent
commissioning of the first of our high-powered floating transmitters-
which was formally inaugurated at Washington on March 4.
Radio, of course, is our primary means of hammering holes through
the Iron Curtain to carry messages of truth to those peoples. Despite
operation of at least 250 sky-wave jamming installations and at least
1,000 ground-wave jammers, our latest monitoring reports indicate a
level of understandable reception of 25 percent inside Moscow and
Leningrad, and between 75 and 80 percent in many outlying areas.
We have relays over the local stations of various countries including
such important ones as France, Italy, Korea, Greece, Austria, Ger-
many, and a number of the Latin American countries.
PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS
1 We use the news to get facts across in a number of ways. A 9,000-
word daily wireless bulletin supplies U.S. information Officers in 67
U.S. diplomatic missions with
official news and
background material
designed for local use abroad. By airmail and pouch the press branch
supplies 170 points all over the world with a weekly air bulletin cover-
ng a number of short topics designed for the local press abroad. We
do à major job in a steadily expanding publications operation includ-
i ng publication of more than 60 million copies of magazines, cartoon
books, photo pamphlets, leaflets, and educational materials in 30
anguages. Best known'is Amerika, the big handsome slick-paper
Bustrated monthly about this country printed in Russian of which
around 20,000 copies continued to be distributed in the Soviet Union
despite Soviet obstructionist tactics. We do a major job with visual
materials, including news and feature photos, wall posters, and plastic
plates for use in newspapers abroad. Regional production centers at
8
3
f
3
1
? }
T
3
ľ
3
MOTION PICTURES
6
D
Through documentary motion pictures shown in more than 90
countries we are reaching audiences of more than 1 million people
They are produced with sound tracks in over 30 languages
and are shown to a wide variety of rural as well as urban groups,
everyday.
3178
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
T
including churches, labor organizations, youth groups, and primary
and secondary schools. Newsreels are used for very current and
immediate hard-hitting topical material. "Eisenhower" and "A
Plan for Peace” are examples of fast use for maximum impact.
OVERSEAS INFORMATION CENTERS
DO1
tit
a
spre
mat
ai
tT]
Tesi
(4
revo
One hundred and forty-six U. S. Information Centers and 31
binational centers in 78 countries throughout the world are distributing
American books, newspapers, and magazines, reaching additional
millions. I often think of these centers as the arsenals of ideas for the
freedom-loving and prodemocratic individuals in many of these
countries. Last year these centers recorded more than 24 million
visits from foreign nationals. There are more than 1 million books,
periodicals, Government publications, and printed materials in these
centers. In addition to library services, the centers carry on cultural
and educational activities, including English-language teaching in
many places.
ligh
(
Uni
EXCHANGE OF PERSONS PROGRAMS
One of the ways to straighten people out about the facts is to let
them see for themselves. Government grants enable teachers
,
research scholars, labor leaders, newspaper publishers, editors, and
reporters to come here to see what we are like. Similar grants permit
Americans to travel abroad. During fiscal 1951 more than 7,500
persons received grants-in-aid for exchanges between the United States
and 71 foreign countries. Our emphasis in these exchange programs is
more and more on leaders, molders, and communicators of opinion.
wit]
A
I
acri
stre
whi
ing
COU
peo
V
An
USIE ITSELF
AUI
our
Me
of
ano
pro
sch
Approximately 850 American officers operate at 175 foreign-service
posts in 84 countries and territories, ably and devotedly assisted by
4,000 local employees. This inventory to be complete should also
include the information officers and their staffs at Paris and the Mar-
shall Plan countries who operated under the Economic Cooperation
Administration (now the Mutual Security Agency). It should also
list the information activities conducted by the military services in
Japan and Austria and the psychological warfare program in Korea
today.
THE CONTENT OF THE PROGRAM
This has been simply a bare-bones inventory of the facilities and
media that we are using. The content of our output is
, of course, the
real test of the job that we are doing. The content—what we have to
say—in the long run cannot be superior to the actions and decisions
taken by the free nations themselves. The policies and actions of the
American Government and the behavior of the American people con-
stitute the hard core of any content or any message
that we may carne
through our different media. I am often asked what it is we are trying
to say in our output.
ple
tio
SD!
me
of
of
NI
lis
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3179
listen to our radio broadcasts.
To put it very briefly, we are trying to make people believe
(1) That Soviet communism is not the progressive revolutionary
movement it pretends to be but a reactionary conspiracy that would,
liit succeeded, re-create the Dark Ages.
(2) That the "true revolution" in human affairs is the inevitable
spread of freedom and the equitable distribution of the spiritual and
material benefits of freedom.
(3) That while this "true revolution" will inevitably triumph, it will
triumph in our lifetime only if all peoples resolutely and cooperatively
resist the Communist conspiracy.
(4) That the United States, which since 1776 has given this "true
revolution” its greatest impetus, is a strong, determined, and en-
lightened power which champions this concept of freedom not only for
its own people but for all peoples.
(6) That it is in the self-interest of all peoples to cooperate with the
United States in pursuit of this common goal.
(6) That this cooperation is gradually, often painfully, materializing,
rith a consequent increase in unity, confidence, and determination.
Are we making progress in the achievement of our objectives?
I can state categorically that we are. America's message is getting
across, and it is getting results. At the same time, however, I want to
stress the fact that there is no such thing as a clear-cut, black-versus-
white test of progress. There are too many intangibles. It is exceed-
ingly difficult to measure the opinions and reactions of our own
countrymen. It is a good deal more difficult to do the same for
peoples of other countries and other cultures.
We do have a number of concrete indications of our effectiveness.
And those indications are steadily increasing.
AUDIENCE REACTION
Take the question of audience mail. The Voice of America alone---
our radio operation--gets an average of a thousand letters a day.
Mail has increased three-fold since 1949. In ninety-nine cases out
of a hundred, the letters we receive either give us a pat on the back
and urge us to expand our efforts or urgently request a copy of our
program schedule booklet. In 1951, we sent out almost six million
schedule booklets (5,751,529).
A lot of these audience letters come by air mail from such faraway
places as India, where airmail stamps are a pretty expensive proposi-
In crucial pressure areas-areas where the free world and the Soviet
sphere are in immediate contact-considerable progress has been
made in building up our audience at Soviet expense. For example,
in West Berlin,
once the exclusive preserve of Soviet radio, 98 percent
of the radio listeners are regular Voice of America patrons. One out
of every 25 Swedish radio listeners tunes in on the Voice regularly.
Our record behind the Iron Curtain is real cause for confidence.
Nine out of every 10 radio listeners in the Soviet zone of Germany
At Naples, a woman recently sewed together a ticket for a showing
tion,
AN
3180
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
ovel
Con
T
curr
PRESS CAMPAIGN
pass
Or S
effo
DEF.
Between 5,000 and
cember 1950 is typical of such gag laws. It subjects a person caught
spreading "warmongering news or propaganda by word of mouth"
to from 1 to 10 years in prison. Deciphering the Communist double
talk, that law means that any person caught repeating what he hears
1 The German-Soviet nonaggression pact and protocol of Aug. 23, 1939; Nazi-
Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Department of State publication 3023; 1948),
of an American film-a ticket which her pro-Communist husband had
ripped to shreds.
At Helsinki, Finland, one of our films was shown in competition
with an important Communist party meeting. Several party func- equi
tionaries preferred to see the movie rather than attend the meeting. | Alb
In Yugoslavia, a film in which President Truman defines American und
foreign policy has been borrowed twice by the central committee R
of the Communist Party.
In Burma (Kachin), the people have gone to great lengths to get
cast
our films to their villages. Often, our trucks are stopped by the
and
dense undergrowth. The villagers have then volunteered to carry P
heavy movie projectors, generators, and other equipment on poles fren
slung over their shoulders.
Con
Our record in the press-materials field indicates a good measure of
progress as well.
A specific example of how a well-thought-out press campaign can
0
get concrete results comes to us from Italy, where our people made
excellent use of the twelfth anniversary of the infamous Molotov- Iron
Ribbentrop pact of 1939. We distributed a series of feature articles of d
on the pact well in advance. When the anniversary arrived, virtually mean
every non-Communist paper in the country carried something on the great
B
treaty.
What efforts are being made to prevent our messages from reachingwe
the audience?
Án important measure of the effectiveness of our over-all informa-
tional program lies in the lengths to which the Communists have the
been going to insulate the peoples under their control against our
propaganda. Some of the things being done to keep the people the
behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains
from seeing, hearing, or reading inte
our informational materials are almost inconceivable.
The Soviet Union has been engaged in a tremendous jamming cam.
paign ever since the Voice of America began broadcasting. The end
Soviets now have over 2,000 stations engaged in nothing but jam
-
10,000 technicians man these jamming stations.
I
We are told that the Soviets and their satellites spend almost as
af61
much on jamming as we do on our entire international
radio program. Fra
lite countries is another means toward the same end-keeping America Am
from putting its case before the enslaved peoples.
underlying theme here. The Czech defense of peace” law of Det
pp. 76-78.
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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3181
over the Voice of America or the BBC, or what he reads in a non-
Communist publication, can be summarily jailed.
The licensing and taxation of all persons in possession of radio
· equipment are common practices in the Soviet satellite areas. In
Albania, among other places, every known possessor of a radio is
under constant scrutiny.
Recently, the Communists have taken to turning off the electric
current in towns and villages during the hours when American broad-
casts are coming through. We have had such reports from Bulgaria
e and Lithuania among other places.
Perhaps one of the best evidences of our effectiveness lies in the
frenzied tirades against our informational media which appear in the
Communist press and in speeches by Communist leaders. Few weeks
pass in which Pravda does not complain about the Voice of America
or seek to impress its readers with the “fact” that lending ear to our
f
efforts is a most dangerous and unpatriotic practice.
7
DEFECTORS
S
J
e
r
e
e
and
1
e
One of our best sources of information as to how people behind the
Iron Curtain are reacting is the defector. And there has been a flood
of defectors from Soviet-controlled Europe during the past several
y years. We recognize, of course, that the average defector is under
é great emotional strain and that many tend to overstate their case.
But we have checked the stories of defectors very closely. Further,
8 we have discovered that a considerable area of agreement exists
among the many accounts which we have received from such people.
We have learned, among other things, that a great percentage of
the soldiers of the Red army in Soviet-controlled Germany listen to
our broadcasts. We have learned that even the political commissars-
the officers charged with seeing to it that soldiers are properly ori-
g
ented listen to the Voice.
We have learned that it is becoming an increasingly common prac-
tice to scrawl the wave-lengths of American broadcasts across fences
on sidewalks in the Baltic and other Sovietized areas.
d
COMMERCIAL SURVEYS
In France we made surveys in 1948 and in 1950 by the Gallup poll
$ affiliates. We found in those years that our audience has increased in
France from 16 to 24 percent of the adult population of the country;
that there are 7,000,000 people in France who listen to the Voice of
| America at least occasionally; and that every weekday we can expect
an audience of 1,000,000 people which expands to between 2,000,000
and 3,000,000 people every Sunday. Half of the adult population of
France has heard of the Voice of America programs. Our problem,
we know from that survey, is to get more and more of them coming
The analysis of the audience shows that, generally speaking, our
listeners include a high proportion of the better educated and urban
In Germany, public opinion surveys made under the supervision of
0
a to their receivers.
5
residents.
}
3182
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
enterprise-Radio Free Europe. The Voice of America and Radio
an
ess
"letters from America" campaign sponsored by the Common Council
United States and their counterparts abroad; encouraging private
production of a leaflet to be placed in the hands of all American mo
positive and affirmative content is included in advertising campaigns
conducted abroad by American firms; bringing newspaper editors and
reporters to this country to work on American papers for short
Of course I should mention a very important project of private
the High Commissioner's office show that in the same couple of years F
we have increased our audience in the U.S. zone of Germany from
4,000,000 to 6,000,000 people.
The same sort of survey showed us that in Sweden we have an oc-
casional audience for our English-language program of 15 percent
of the total population, over 700,000 people, and that we have a be
regular audience for our English-language program of about 100,000
,
who are weighted on the side of public opinion leaders and of youths
. Pe
T
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF U.S. PROPAGANDA IN THE FUTURE
H
th
I have taken you on a rapid and cursory inspection of what we are
doing in the Campaign of Truth. A more leisurely and thorough
by
survey would include more details on such subjects as the building
up of an integrated organization at the highest levels of Government
A
(the Psychological Strategy Board) for the coordination of our psy-
U.
chological strategy and the complementary work of the Psychological
Ir
Operations Committee for the coordination of our overseas information
operations; it would include some remarks on what we are doing in the
kn
research and planning fields.
Above all, no one of us is fooled into thinking that the job being og
ор
done by the Government's International Information Administration-
or by all agencies of Government combined constitutes more than
a fraction of the impact of the United States and the American people re
on peoples abroad. We know that there are many voices of America
the GỈ abroad in his attitude and daily conduct, the tourist
, the po
businessman, the American newspapers, magazines, and motion
pictures, the statements of the President and of
all of these and many more are the voices of America.
One of the most significant developments of the past 2 years tha
been the increasing cooperation of private enterprise in this country
in every form and variety with the overseas information programs of
ba
the Government. We have a special staff exclusively devoted to
working with private enterprise which has been forced, because of the ter
great expansion of its activity, to open offices not only' at Washington
and New York but at San Francisco, New Orleans, Houston, Chicago
, i no
and other points in the United States. What kind of things do they
help stimulate and develop? Publishers of various American maga per
zines have agreed that their overseas newsstand returns be given you
without cost to Usie offices abroad for appropriate distribution, the heat
Th
traveling abroad with some Do's and Don'ts; helping to see let
periods, etc.
fra
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1
For
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3183
e
n
Free Europe (RFE) are two members of the great free-world team that
is fighting Soviet imperialism on the side of personal and national
freedom throughout the world. Radio Free Europe, financed by
private citizens through individual contributions to the Crusade for
Freedom, is an enterprise concentrating on the captive countries
behind the Iron Curtain: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ru-
mania, Bulgaria, and Albania. It is a citizen's station over which
Poles are able to speak to Poles, Hungarians to Hungarians, etc.
They speak as "The Voice of Free Poland,” “The Voice of Free
Hungary," and so on. They look at their peoples' problems through
their own eyes.
In contrast the Voice of America is a worldwide network financed
by U. S. Government funds and speaking for the U. S. Government
and the American people. It sees world problems largely through
American eyes. It is the only American voice heard in the Soviet
Union and in many other parts of the globe. In the area behind the
Iron Curtain, in which both VoA and RFE operate, their aims are
essentially the same: to keep alive the hope of liberation; to let listeners
know that they have not been forgotten; to stiffen their resistance
-8
against their Communist oppressors; to expose the lies of their
oppressors and the unworkability of communism. Both expose the
fraudulent basis of authority on which the Moscow-dominated
le regimes rest. Both combat communism and the persecution of religion
and denial of human rights. Both report the superior industrial
he power and fighting potential of the free world over the Soviet enslaved
world.
Von, which has responsibility for full reporting of official American
acts and documents, American news, and world developments, cannot
devote the major part of its Iron Curtain broadcasts to events inside
ry
those countries. RFE, giving less time to events outside those
of countries, specializes in three types of broadcasts. (1) RFE reports
back all truth that can be learned about what is going on in the lis-
be teners' own country: (2) RFE spreads fear in the ranks of the Com-
munist officials of the regime by denouncing and threatening with
retribution all evil doers about whom it can obtain accurate informa-
tion, including reports on dissolute private life and instances of
personal cruelty and criminal acts; (3) RFE weans Communist youth
workers and intellectuals from allegiance to the Moscow-dominated
be regime.
ci I was interested to see that Gordon Dean, the Chairman of the
he Atomic Energy Commission, is quoted as saying in a recent interview
ite that he regards the job he and his colleagues are doing as "the second
most important task in the world that we have here at the Commission.
The first, I think, is somehow or other to pierce the Iron Curtain and
let the ordinary Russian know our real, and peaceful intentions."
Mr. Dean's remarks fit rather interestingly with the statement made
urt by General Eisenhower in July 1950 in his testimony on Senate Resolu-
tion 243 1 when he said that “Truth, in my opinion, could almost be
te
Resolution in support of an expanded information and exchange program.
For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1950, p. 102.
01
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classification laws, as now or hereafter amended, except that the
Sec. 2. Transfer of functions.-(a) Subject to subsection (c) of this
section, there are hereby transferred to the Director, (1) the functions
vested in the Secretary of State by Title V of the United States
Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended, and
167 Stat. 642. The plan entered into force Aug. 1, 1953, after approval by
the Congress under the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended.
3184 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
classified as our T-bomb, if you want to call it that, in this warfare. ..
It is a terrific responsibility to decide how much to do, where it would
be better to divert a dollar into a tank, and where it is better to put a
dollar into this information effort. But I am quite certain of one
thing: that you could find no soldier, no man of experience in the busi-
ness of fighting, . who would decry for one second the importance
of morale, and if you do not have morale you know you cannot win,
There is just not enough to win without morale. I believe that can
be done by truth.'
7. REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 8 OF 1953 ESTABLISHING
THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, JUNE 1,
1953 1
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
Section 1. Establishment of agency.-(a) There is hereby established
a new agency which shall be known as the United States Information
Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Agency,
(6) There shall be at the head of the Agency a Director of the
United States Information Agency, hereinafter referred to as the
Director. The Director shall be appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall receive compensa-
tion at the rate of $17,500 a year. The Secretary of State shall advise
with the President concerning the appointment and tenure of the
Director
(C) There shall be in the Agency a Deputy Director of the United
States Information Agency, who shall be appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall
receive compensation at the rate of $16,000 a year. The Deput!
Director shall perform such functions as the Director shall from time
disability of the Director or in the event of a vacancy in the office
to time designate, and shall act as Director during the absence or
of the Director.
(d) There are hereby established in the Agency so many new
offices; not in excess of fifteen existing at any one time, and with
such title or titles, as the Director shall from time to time determine
.
Appointment thereto shall be under the classified civil service and the
compensation thereof shall be fixed from time to time pursuant to the
compensation may be fixed without regard to the numerical limitations
on positions set forth in section
505 of the Classification Act of 1949,
as amended (5 U.S. C. 1105).
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2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224–1234.
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3185
1
so much of functions with respect to the interchange of books and
periodicals and aid to libraries and community centers under sections
202 and 203 of the said Act as is an integral part of information
programs under that Act, together with so much of the functions
vested in the Secretary of State by other provisions of the said Act
as is incidental to or is necessary for the performance of the functions
under Title V and sections 202 and 203 transferred by this section,
and (2) functions of the Secretary of State with respect to information
programs relating to Germany and Austria.
(b) Exclusive of so much thereof as is an integral part of economic
or technical assistance programs, without regard to any inconsistent
provision of Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953, and subject to sub-
section (c) of this section, functions with respect to foreign information
programs vested by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, in
the Director for Mutual Security provided for in section 501 of the
said Act are hereby transferred to the Director.
(c) (1) The Secretary of State shall direct the policy and control
the content of a program, for use abroad, on official United States
positions, including interpretations of current events, identified as
official positions by an exclusive descriptive label.
(2) The Secretary of State shall continue to provide to the Director
on a current basis full guidance concerning the foreign policy of the
United States.
(3) Nothing herein shall affect the functions of the Secretary of
State with respect to conducting negotiations with other governments.
(d) To the extent the President deems it necessary in order to
carry out the functions transferred by the foregoing provisions of this
section, he may authorize the Director to exercise, in relation to the
respective functions so transferred, any authority or part thereof
available by law, including appropriation acts, to the Secretary of
State, the Director for Mutual Security, or the Director of the Foreign
Operations Administration, in respect of the said transferred functions.
Sec. 3. Performance of transferred functions.-(a) The Director may
from time to time make such provisions as he shall deem appropriate
authorizing the performance of any function of the Director by any
other officer, or by any employee or organizational entity, of the
Agency.
(6) Representatives of the United States carrying out the functions
transferred by section 2 hereof in each foreign country shall be subject
to such procedures as the President may prescribe to assure coordina-
tion among such representatives in each country under the leadership
of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.
1 The President's message to Congress of June 1, 1953, stated: “ While
divesting the Department of State of the foreign information
programs, the reor-
ganization plan does not transfer the responsibility of that Department for the
educational exchange programs authorized
by the various acts of Congress. Close
coordination of our information and educational exchange programs, will, of
course, be effected by the Secretary of State and the Director of the United States
Information Agency (Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, p. 851).
* Supra; pp. 3090–3093.
Supra, pp. 3059-3086.
415900_57-Vol. 2
3
-97
3186
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
&
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inclusive, in this section 1 (b) may provide for an alternate member
(c) The head of any agency (other than any agency represented
i 18 Fed. Reg. 5379. The Executive order bears the title "Establishing
Sec. 4. Incidental transfers.-(a) So much of the personnel, property,
records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and
other funds, employed, used, held, available, or to be made available
in connection with the functions transferred or vested by this reorgani-
zation plan as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine
shall be transferred to the Agency at such time or times as he shall
direct.
(6) Such further measures and dispositions as the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget shall deem to be necessary in order to effectuate
the transfers provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be
carried out in such manner as he shall direct and by such agencies as
he shall designate.
Sec. 5. Interim provisions.--Pending the initial appointment under
section 1 of this reorganization plan of the Director and Deputy
Director, respectively, therein provided for, their functions shall be
performed temporarily, but not for a period in excess of 60 days
, by
such officers of the Department of State or the Mutual Security
Agency as the President shall designate.
8. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING
BOARD: Executive Order No. 10483, September 2, 1953
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
statutes, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as
follows:
SECTION 1. (a) In order to provide for the integrated implementa-
tion of national security policies by the several agencies, there is
hereby established an Operations Coordinating Board, hereinafter
referred to as the Board, which shall report to the
National Security
Council.
(b) The Board shall have as members the following: (1) the Under
Secretary of State, who shall represent the Secretary of State and shall
be the
chairman of the Board, (2) the Deputy Secretary of Defense
,
who shall represent the Secretary of Defense, (3) the Director of the
Foreign Operations Administration, (4) the Director of Central
Intelligence, and (5) a representative of the President to be designated
by the President. Each head of agency referred to in items (1) to (4),
ber representing the agency concerned when such regular member is
for reasons beyond his control unable to attend any meeting of the
Board; and any alternate member shall while serving as such have
in
all respects the same status as a member
of the Board as does the
regular member in lieu of whom he serves.
Ex. Or. No. 10589 of Feb. 28, 1955 (20 Fed. Reg. 1237).
0
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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3187
I
1
under section 1 (b) hereof) to which the President from time to time
assigns responsibilities for the implementation of national security
policies, shall assign a representative to serve on the Board when the
Board is dealing with subjects bearing directly upon the responsibilities
of such head. Each such representative shall be an Under Secretary
or corresponding official and when so serving such representative shall
have the same status on the Board as the members provided for in the
said section 1 (b).
(d) The Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs may attend any meeting of the Board. The Director of the
United States Information Agency shall advise the Board at its
request.
SEC. 2. The National Security Council having recommended a
national security policy and the President having approved it, the
Board shall (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct,
advise with the agencies concerned as to (a) their detailed operational
planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the coordination
of the interdepartmental aspects of the detailed operation plans
developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and
coordinated execution of such policy and plans, and (d) the execution
of each security action or project so that it shall make its full contri-
bution to the attainment of national security objectives and to the
particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve
in the world, and (2) initiate new proposals for action within the
framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and
changes in the situation. The Board shall perform such other
advisory functions as the President may assign to it and shall from
time to time make reports to the National Security Council with
respect to the carrying out of this order.
Sec. 3. Consonant with law, each agency represented on the Board
shall, as may be necessary for the purpose of effectuating this order,
furnish assistance to the Board in accordance with section 214 of the
Act of May 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 134 (31 U. S. C. 691). Such assistance
may include detailing employees to the Board, one of whom may
serve as its Executive Officer, to perform such functions, consistent
with the purposes of this order, as the Board may assign to them.
Sec. 4. The Psychological Strategy Board shall be abolished not
later than sixty days after the date of this order and its outstanding
affairs shall be wound up by the Operations Coordinating Board.
Sec. 5. As used herein, the word "agency” may be construed to
mean any instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government,
including any executive department.
Sec. 6. Nothing in this order shall be construed either to confer
upon the Board any function with respect to internal security or to
in any manner abrogate or restrict any function vested by law in, or
assigned pursuant to law to, any agency or head of agency (including
the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Director
of the Office of
Defense Mobilization).
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
}
1
1
1
Established by a Presidential Directive of June 20, 1951; supra, doc. 4.
3188
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
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delivered in the appropriate, languages and dialects of the listening
1 U.S. Information Agency, The U.S. Overseas Information Program (Washing-
9. OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAM: Publication of the
United States Information Agency, 1955 1
"It is not enough for us to have sound policies, dedicated to goals of
universal peace, freedom and progress. These policies must be made known
to and understood by all peoples throughout the world. This is the re-
sponsibility of the U.S. Information Agency."'~_DWIGHT D. Eisen-
The President created the U.S. Information Agency on August 1,
1953, as an independent agency responsible for the Government's
overseas information program.?
To carry out this responsibility, the Agency maintains 206 overseas
information posts in 78 nations of the free world. To the captive
millions behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, the Agency's powerful
radio network, the Voice of America, daily beams objective news
reports and commentaries giving the truth about U.S. policies and
actions.
Four Major Tasks.-By means of press, publications, radio, tele-
vision, motion pictures, exhibits, libraries and personal contacts,
the
U.S. Information Agency performs four major tasks:
(1) Explains U.S. policies and objectives.
(2) Counters hostile propaganda.
(3) Demonstrates the harmony of U.S. Policies with the legitimate
aspirations of other peoples.
(4) Presents abroad aspects of American life and culture which will
promote understanding of U.S. Policies and objectives.
The Director of the U.S. Information Agency reports to the Presi-
dent through the National Security Council. Daily foreign policy
guidance is provided to the Agency by the Secretary of State.
Country Programs.--Known overseas as the U.S. Information Serv-
ice (UŞIŠ), the Agency's information program in each foreign country
is conducted by the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) working directly
under the U.S. Ambassador or Chief of Mission. The PAO is assisted
by a small professional staff headed by Americans but composed in
large part of citizens of the country. Each country program
fully tailored to the customs and interests of the people.
In Western Europe, parts of the Far East, and eight countries of
Latin America, for instance, television plays an important role. In
some less developed areas, mobile exhibits and bookmobiles are em-
ployed. In areas where the illiteracy rate is high, posters, comic books
and cartoons are effective. The Voice of America's
broadcasts are
audience Program content is carefully selected and edited.
The PAO is the focal point for all operations in his area.
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ton, Government Printing Office, 1955).
2 See supra, doc. 7.
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3189
Press and Publications.—More than 10,000 newspapers and maga-
zines in the free world, with an estimated circulation of more than a
billion readers, regularly receive information material through the
Agency's Press and Publication Service.
The Service sends by wireless a 7,000-word news file from Washing-
ton 6 days a week to USIS posts in 66 countries. The posts translate
and adapt the file and furnish it immediately to local newspaper and
radio editors. In addition to news, features and commentary, the
wireless file includes full texts of important foreign policy statements
by the President, the Secretary of State and other Government leaders.
Newspaper and magazine features, background kits on subjects of
international interest, such as the peaceful use of atomic energy, as
well as photographs and plastic plates, are also distributed for use in
thousands of overseas publications. This includes 59 newspapers and
magazines which are published abroad by the Agency itself.
The Service also provides cartoon strips and panels to many news-
papers in foreign countries. Some of these strips appear in more than
947 newspapers in 65 countries, with a readership estimated at more
than 100 million.
During an average year, about 150 million leaflets, pamphlets and
posters are distributed throughout the free world.
Voice of America.-Broadcasting around the globe, 7 days a week,
24 hours a day, the Voice of America speaks in 39 languages, presenting
more than 75 programs daily from its studios in Washington, as well
as other programs from Munich, Germany. Voice broadcasts consist
primarily of factual news and commentary. They are designed as a
continuing, reliable source of truth to peoples overseas.
More than three-quarters of the daily program schedule of the Voice
is directed over the Iron and Bamboo Curtains to the U.S.S.R., the
satellite countries of Eastern Europe and Red China. More than 55
hours of programs daily are directed to the Soviet Union and the Com-
munist areas of Eastern Europe. Twenty hours daily, programs are
transmitted to peoples behind the Bamboo Curtain in three Chinese
dialects, and in Korean and Vietnamese. To overcome Communist
jamming, programs originating in Washington and Munich are re-
corded at overseas relay bases and repeated over short, medium and
long wave. Many of the programs are repeated several times a day,
on various wave lengths, at peak listening periods.
Letters from behind 'the Curtains and reports from escapees and
defectors attest that Voice programs do get through, despite Red
Other Voice language programs, totaling 22 hours a day, are beamed
to free world countries. In addition, English-speaking foreigners are
served through seven daily half-hour, world-wide English programs.
Voice facilities include 14 modern broadcasting studios in Washing-
ton, a radio center in Munich, Germany, and Station RIAS in West
Berlin. Million-watt transmitters are located at Munich, the Philip-
pines
and Okinawa. The Agency's floating transmitter, installed on
the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Courier-now anchored in the Mediter-
ranean-relays programs to the Soviet Union and the Near East. The
jamming.
1
(
f
i
S
I
lation overseas some 18 million books by U.S. authors. In addition.
The Agency's book translation project, to date, has put into circu-
3190 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Voice's 30 transmitters in the United States are operated by private
broadcasting companies.
Public tours of the Voice of America studios are conducted Mondays
through Fridays. Studios are at 330 Independence Ave., S. W.,
Washington, D. C.
Newsreels and Feature Programs on TV Film.--These are provided
weekly to 33 television stations in 22 countries of Europe, Latin Amer-
ica, the Far East and Africa. One weekly program, "The Magic of
the Atom," documents U.S. progress in the peaceful use of atomic
energy.
Motion Picture Service.-Films showing American life and support-
ing U.S. foreign policy, as well as pictures exposing international com-
munism, are produced (or acquired) and distributed by the Agency's
motion picture service. Some are sent abroad in as many as 39 lan-
guages. An increasing number are being produced overseas, with
local backgrounds and actors. All films are based on the recommenda-
tions of overseas information officers, who know what will be effective
in their particular areas.
Many of the pictures are shown in the commercial movie bouses
abroad, and all are shown noncommercially to selective audiences, in
cluding leaders of public opinion, government officials, business and
labor leaders, professional, educational and civic groups.
The Agency operates 210 film libraries abroad. More than 6,000
16-mm. sound projectors are maintained for use by USIS personnel
and for loan to groups and organizations.
To make film showings possible in remote areas, the Agency bas
336 mobile units equipped to generate their own electric power.
centrated largely in the Near East and Far East, these units provide
many people with their only opportunity to see motion pictures
. In
many cases, films are the only means of reaching these people with
the United States' message.
Information Centers and Exhibits.— The Agency's information
centers are located in 67 countries. In Latin Åmerica, the centers
åre operated in co-operation with the local governments and are
known as "binational centers. Each center includes a library
,
In addition, staffs of Americans and citizens of the country conduct
lecture and concert programs, provide classes in English, arrange
film showings, exhibits and special cultural events.
The centers provide direct contact with the people, and are en
effective means of presenting U.S. culture to the world.
Through
the use of traveling exhibits and bookmobiles, the infor-
prepared especially for local, national or international fairs. Others
the “Atoms for Peace” exhibits already seen by millions in Europe
,
Latin America and the Near East.
1
21
0
2
0
Con-
E
Some exbibits are
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3191
2
tional Exchange Service.
about 4 million other U.S. books have been distributed to key indi-
viduals and institutions abroad.
American publishers and motion picture distributors are encouraged
to sell U.S. publications and films abroad through the informational
media guaranty program which assures the conversion into dollars of
foreign currency receipts.
Office of Private Cooperation.—Through the work of the Agency's
Office of Private Cooperation, private American groups, business
firms, nonprofit organizations and individuals are encouraged to assist
in carrying out the Government's overseas information program.
These private projects are varied and include: letterwriting, over-
seas advertising, mailing inserts, town affiliations, and collection of
books and magazines for overseas distribution.
Communist Propaganda Expenditures. The propaganda expendi-
tures of Moscow and Peiping are variously estimated at from $1
billion to $3 billion yearly roughly 10 to 30 times the amount the
United States expends on its program of truth.
"The United States Government is in the international information
field out of sheer necessity. It dare not pull out of this field any more
than it would dare to pull out of military defense. Russia's military
might is within her own boundary, but her propaganda might is on the
D loose in the world. We must do all in our power to thwart it, unmask
1
its lies and pretenses, and break its hold over allegiances and loyalties
of men.”—United States Advisory Commission on Information
10. INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM:
Publication of the Department of State (With Chart), March
1956 1
SCOPE.—The International Educational Exchange Program is
principally concerned with strengthening our foreign relations through
the interchange of persons between the United States and other coun-
tries
. The program (which began in 1938 with a small number of
exchangees from the other American republics] involves an annual
interchange of about 6,000 people between the United States and
over 70 countries of the free world.
PURPOSE.—The Congress of the United States has authorized this
program "to promote a better understanding of the United States
in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the
people of the United States and the people of other countries."
Specifically, it seeks
To build up a greater and more accurate store of knowledge and
International Educational Exchange Service, Facts About the International
Educational Exchange Program (Department of State, March 1956). The accom-
panying chart was specially prepared for this volume by the International Educa-
S
e
1
1
1
8
}
1
}
1
3192 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
a
a
fo
Consult for three months with their American colleagues and
become acquainted with the contemporary American scene; or
Undertake three to six months of specialized training and ob-
information about the United States in other countries, so that
respect for and confidence in our aims and policies will be in-
creased;
To contribute to a better understanding in the United States of
the way of life, the culture, and the aspirations of other people;
and
To promote greater stability in international relationships by
broadening the community of interests between the people of the
United States and other free peoples and by increasing awareness
of the common principles underlying a free and orderly society.
PARTICIPANTS.—The success of the program depends primarily on
the careful choice of participants. Those selected are persons who
,
because of their background and experience at home and through
their activities and contacts while abroad, can make a positive con-
tribution to mutual understanding between us and the people of
other countries.
About one-third of the participants each year are Americans who
receive grants to go abroad to-
Do graduate study for a year at universities and other institutions
of higher learning;
Teach for a year in elementary or secondary schools;
Lecture preferably for a year or at least a semester or carry on
advanced (post-doctoral research for six months to a year at
universities and other institutions of higher learning; and
Serve as consultants at the invitation of foreign groups or lecture
before general audiences on topics of current interest. These
people often visit several countries and spend from three to six
months overseas.
The other two-thirds of the people exchanged each year are nationals
of other countries who receive grants to come to the United States to
Study for a year at our colleges and universities. Most of these
grantees are between the ages of 25 and 35, are already launched
on their professional careers at home, and are studying at the
graduate level in this country;
Teach for a year in our elementary or secondary schools;
Undertake six months of specialized study and observation of
teaching methods at the elementary and secondary school level
;
doctoral) research for three months to a year at our colleges
,
Lecture for a year or at least a semester or do advanced (post-
universities and other institutions of higher learning;
t]
P.
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A
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P
е
t
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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3193
servation in their field, often combined with actual on-the-job
experience.
Grants are also made to young people in certain other countries to
attend American schools abroad.
SPECIAL PROGRAMS.—In addition to the exchange of persons listed
above, the International Educational Exchange Service is responsible
for three other types of educational exchange activity-
The Cultural Presentations Program, financed by the President's
Emergency Fund for International Affairs, provides limited as-
sistance to outstanding American cultural and sports groups for
tours abroad. These tours are building better understanding of
and friendship for our country through the common language of
music, art, and athletics. The program assistance supplements
private financial support and the income received by professional
groups for overseas commercial performances.
Books and scientific equipment to Finland and India are supplied
under special legislative authority.
Assistance to American-sponsored schools in the other American
Republics is also a special activity of the program.
EXCHANGE-VISITOR PROGRAMS.—The Smith-Mundt Act places in
the Department of State responsibility for certifying exchange-visitor
programs to facilitate entry of foreign nationals into the United States
for educational activities which will further the purposes of that Act.
In discharging this responsibility the Department must be assured
that any program so designated does contribute, in a reasonably effec-
tive way, to the objectives of the Smith-Mundt Act.
Extensive and continuous assistance and guidance are given to the
American sponsors requesting these designations so that their pro-
grams will measure up to required standards. Hospitals, medical
schools, library groups, and industrial firms are among the groups
which bring foreign nationals to this country for bona fide educational
purposes. More than 2,100 exchange-visitor programs involving an
estimated 30,000 visitors have been designated.
SIGNIFICANCE OF ACTIVITIES.-Whether grantees engage in study,
teaching, research, or specialized observation and consultation, their
activities, in addition to producing personal, professional benefits,
serve the goals of the program in one or several of the following ways.
Many of the activities which the program encourages are concerned
with securing a clearer understanding of the life, institutions, and
culture of Americans and their historical background. Among the
activities are those which increase the knowledge overseas of our
literature, language, history, and political and social institutions.
Some spread information about characteristically American practices
such as free public libraries or agricultural extension work. Others
share specific skills of joint concern, for example, the peaceful uses of
Act of Jan. 27, 1948: A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224-1234.
1950-1955
ant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. This Service, headed by &
I
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the operations of and for selecting individuals and educational
The Board of Foreign Scholarships is responsible for supervising
institutions qualified to participate in the program authorized
The Role of the Department. The International Educational Ex-
change Service functions under the general supervision of the Assist-
Director, is organized into two principal parts: Staffs for planning,
3194 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
atomic energy. And specialized groups demonstrate American educa-
tional, artistic, and cultural achievement, for example, through per-
formances abroad by outstanding musical, theater, and dance
groups.
Of equal importance are those activities which help us to develop
and broaden our knowledge of the life, institutions, and culture of
other areas of the world. These include grants to foreign professors
to teach at American colleges and universities, to the staffs of these
institutions to do research abroad, and the interchange of graduate
students. It likewise includes the work of many Americans whose
study and research abroad enlarge the corps of experts needed for
many types of overseas service and enrich our educational curriculum.
Still other activities draw their primary significance from the special
role which the participants play in their home countries, for example
,
the visits to the United States of members of national legislatures, trade
union officials, top newsmen, or leaders of youth groups. Others con-
centrate primarily on the establishment and strengthening of contacts
in significant institutions overseas or between institutions and organiza-
tions in the United States and those in other countries. Finally,
some activities are designed to complement the work of other United
States Government agencies, private organizations or international
bodies of which the United States is a member. In this group, for
example, would fall certain social science projects which undergird
some of the technical assistance programs of the International Co-
operation Administration.
In going about their educational work and in their everyday living
,
the participants reflect in their views, behavior, and services the ways
of life and attitudes of their
own countries. They may also informally
present such matters in discussions, lectures, or published writings
.
All of the participants, when they return home, interpret their ex:
perience to their fellow-countrymen in terms which they can best
understand. The informal give and take of such discussions make
these contacts a highly effective form of communication.
METHOD OF OPERATION: The Role of Advisory Groups. – Two public
boards, appointed by the President, have been designated by the Con-
gress to advise and assist the Department in the administration of the
educational exchange program.
The United States Advisory Commission on Educational Ex-
change was established by provision of the Smith-Mundt Act
and is responsible for formulating and recommending to the
Secretary of State policies and programs.
by the Fulbright Act.
L
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3195
reporting on, and evaluating the substantive program, an operations
staff for the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and a staff to provide
necessary administrative services and facilities; and five operating
divisions which conduct the programs for both American and foreign
grantees and which provide special services necessary to educational
exchange activities.
Four reception centers are operated by the Department at New
York, Miami, New Orleans, and San Francisco to handle arrivals of
incoming participants in the program. These centers arrange to
meet grantees at docks and airports and assist with hotel accommoda-
tions and internal travel in the United States. Local programs for
visitors are also often arranged and carried out by reception center
personnel working with community groups. These local programs
frequently supplement the regular activities of a grantee who may be
in transit through the city where the center is located.
Participation of Other Agencies.- The Smith-Mundt Act recog-
nized the diverse nature of the operations necessary to conduct an
international educational exchange program and provided for the
maximum use by the Department of the services and facilities of other
Government agencies and of private groups. Contracts are made
on a continuing basis with certain of these agencies for the services
needed. Short-term arrangements are also made with many others
for handling evaluation studies and for particular programs involving
foreign specialists.
Three agencies assist in the screening of American candidates and
the placement and supervision of foreign grantees.
The Institute of International Education: for persons studying
in educational institutions.
The U.S. Office of Education of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare: for persons teaching in elementary or
secondary schools, or undertaking specialized study and obser-
vation of teaching methods.
The Conference Board of Associated Research Councils: for
persons engaging in university teaching or post-doctoral research.
Three agencies assist in arranging programs in this country for
foreign grantees who come to the United States for short periods to
consult with their colleagues.
The Governmental Affairs Institute: for those primarily in-
terested in public administration and government.
The Department of Labor: for those primarily interested in
labor and industry.
The American Council on Education: for those primarily inter-
ested in education and related fields.
Practically all federal agencies assist in the selection of foreign
specialists and arrange programs for them in the United States.
The American Council on Education also provides orientation for
}
3196
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
of the United Nations is also given. Such help usually includes ar-
Foreign Service posts to announce American exchange opportunities, to
cal Assistance Administration and to some of the specialized agencies
Assistance to the fellowship programs of the United Nations Techni.
certain foreign grantees at the Washington International Center, and
professional assistance to American-sponsored schools in the other
American Republics.
The American Language Center of American University, Washing-
ton, D. C., provides English-refresher courses for foreign grantees who
have special needs for short periods for intensive study in speaking
and understanding English.
In addition a large number of organizations and institutions volun-
tarily assist the program in many ways. Screening committees com-
posed of persons from many professional and other occupations give of
their time extensively in recommending American candidates from the
thousands of applications submitted. Each year financial assistance
estimated at between $8 and $10 million is contributed from non-U.S.
Government sources as tuition, maintenance, and other stipends
.
Other services, not easily measurable in terms of dollars, are the hos-
pitality and program assistance given to foreign visitors by civic
groups, community and professional organizations, and literally
thousands of individual Americans.
Overseas Administration. The administration of the program over-
seas, under the supervision of the Foreign Service establishments
, is
carried out through contractual arrangements with the United States
Information Agency. In those countries participating under the Ful-
bright Act, binational Educational Commissions, established by Exec-
utive Agreement with each country, play a large part in supervising
and administering the program. Binational selection committees
help in preliminary screening of student applications in most of the
countries where educational exchange programs are conducted
;
Ministries of Education also aid in announcing opportunities for teach
ers and in recommending candidates; and other agencies of local
governments cooperate in similar fashion.
COOPERATION WITH OTHER PROGRAMS.—The many agencies, organi-
zations, and institutions conducting educational exchange programs
find that
greater effectiveness can be achieved through the reciprocal
services they give each other.
Thus, thë Department assists groups and individuals and foreign
governments in carrying out programs in which the objectives are
similar to ours. Each year from 200 to 700 projects for these
groups
involving more than 6,500 exchanges are facilitated by the Depart-
ment.
The assistance given involves such services as (1) arranging with
in planning exchange projects; (3) providing professional and.com
cooperating with Foreign Service posts to facilitate
tours Abroad of
American groups and individuals.
i
T:miniai;
12 in
VALAI
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3197
d
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of
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3.
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7
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ES
.
3
ranging placement for persons coming to the United States for practical
training and experience.
Similar assistance has been given to the NATO Cultural Council.
Selection procedures for American candidates under the NATO fellow-
ship program have recently been established. Increased support to
NATO has resulted from the fact that, since 1952, the Department
has brought groups of outstanding newsmen and cultural leaders from
the NATO countries to the United States under its own program.
EFFECTIVENESS. --Several major sources of information provide
evidence that the program has been successful in fulfilling its purpose.
These include accounts of personal experience, appraisals by respon-
sible officers and private citizens, and evaluation studies by private
research organizations.
The grantees themselves emphasize specific activities and accom-
plishments. Their reports reflect rich personal insights and
gains both in knowledge and understanding. They also reveal a
sense of individual responsibility for continuing to improve
international understanding.
Responsible public officials and private citizens observe the
program in operation around the world and at home and make
careful appraisals. These appraisals provide information that
goes beyond the experience of the grantee and provide more
general evidence of program results. Their reports tell of the
effects of educational exchange—how new knowledge, ideas, and
skills are employed when grantees return home; how the grantees
write books and articles and lecture on their exchange activities;
how American studies courses in foreign universities and area
studies in American universities are strengthened; and how re-
turned grantees take an active part in "alumni associations" and
other groups through which they keep in touch with America.
Private research organizations, employing a variety of social
science techniques, make objective evaluations of program re
sults. These studies have compared groups of returned grantees
with those who have not had such experience; they have studied
the grantees in "before and after" settings.
The studies concerning returned American grantees illustrate
wider knowledge and appreciation of other cultures and interna-
tional problems, and certain personal :accomplishments accruing
to them as individuals.
Studies of foreign grantees show that firsthand observation of
America helps to correct their unrealistic and often unfavorable
views of us; that they gain more accurate knowledge of American
culture, American achievements in many fields, and of general
conditions in the United States; that when they return home they
share their experience not only with their friends and associates
but with the general public through lectures, articles, radio,
etc.; that their compatriots consider them among the most reliable
sources of information about the United States.
e
1
i
1
i
3198
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
T
Cor
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proj
Act
T
Cor
mer
food
P
Uni
Am
10
2
3
AUTHORITY.—There are several legislative authorities under which
funds for conducting the international educational exchange program
of the Department are made available. Dollar funds appropriated
annually by the Congress under the provisions of the Smith-Mundt
Act are used jointly with foreign currencies available under provisions
of the Fulbright Act in the interest of economical administration
and to expand the scope of the program.
The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of
1948, Public Law 402, 80th Congress (also known as the Smith-
Mundt Act), provides the basic authority for reciprocal educational
exchange programs between the United States and other countries
and authorizes the annual appropriations by the United States
Congress.
An Act for Cooperation with the Other American Republics, Public
Law 355, 76th Congress, provides for the annual exchange of gradu-
ate students between the United States and the 20 other American
Republics under the terms of the Convention for the Promotion of
Inter-American Cultural Relations. Appropriations for this phase
of the program are made under the general authority of the Smith-
Mundt Act.
Public Law 584, 79th Congress (also known as the Fulbright Act)
provides that certain foreign currencies owed to or owned by the
United States as a result of surplus property sales abroad may be
used to finance exchanges between the United States and certain
foreign countries for study, teaching, lecturing, or advanced
research
,
or other educational activities. Pursuant to this legislation, Executive
Agreements are negotiated with individual countries to provide for
educational exchange programs. No appropriations are authorized
under this Act.
The Mutual Security Act of 1952, Public Law 400, 82d Congress,
amended the Fulbright Act by providing for
the use for educational
exchange of foreign currency credits owed to or owned by the United
States and not required by law or agreement to be expended or used
for any other purposes.
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,
Public Law 480, 83d. Congress, authorizes proceeds from the sale
of surplus agricultural commodities for educational exchange programs
established under other legislative authorizations.
3
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1224-1234.
2 53 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1290.
3 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1235–1236.
4 66 Stat. 141.
Supra, pp. 2941-2947.
$
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 3199
The Finnish Educational Exchange Act, Public Law 265, 81st
Congress, provides that part of the annual payment of Finland's
World War I debt to the United States may be used for educational
exchanges between the two countries. The contractual costs of this
program must be financed by appropriations under the Smith-Mundt
Act.
The India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951, Public Law 48, 82d
Congress, 2 authorizes the use of certain sums, payable by the Govern-
ment of India to the United States as interest on the emergency
food relief loan, for educational exchanges between the two countries.
Public Law 701, 79th Congress, authorizes the instruction at the
United States Merchant Marine Academy of citizens from the other
American Republics.
163 Stat. 630.
2
Supra, pp. 2227-2229.
360 Stat. 961.
:
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:
:
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1
The ...22
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*W*2174
WT13.2.9
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM
Number of Exchanges by Country and Category
(Cumulative 1949 through fiscal year 1954; figures for fiscal year 1955 listed in separate column) 1
Grants to Americans
Grants to Foreign Nationals
Adv. Research
Univ. Study and Univ.
Lecture
Teacher
Specialist
Area and
Country
Univ. Study
Adv. Research Tchr. or Tchr.
and Univ.
Dev.
Lecture
Leader and Study, in U.S.
Specialist Schools
A broad
Total
1955
1955
1955
1956
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
Prior
1955.
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1956
Prior
1955
OTHERURAMERICAN
3
2
3
1
43
26
111
Snow
1
2
7
1
1
3
6
6
52
2
1
9
18
10
58
14
12
27
11
1
25
2
6
1
2
1
1
1
I
4
2
.
2
2
2
3
3
1
13
10
10
4
7
6
10
1
9
6
4
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
3
54
35
25
35
17
24
8
29
13
6
14
3
12
5
4
4
3
4
1
1
3
1
REPUBLICS
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
British Guiana
British Honduras
British West Indies.
Chile.
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic.
Ecuador
El Salvador
French West Indies
Guatemala
Haiti.
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru.
Uruguay
Venezuela
7
5
6
11
1
1
5
1
3
1
1
1
11
7
97
60
330
.2
1
17
144
89
59
89
31
47
28
1
86
50
34
302
42
57
25
94
66
49
4
1
-
1
10
6
3
2
1
5
1
1
16
1
5
18
10
6
i
-
1
6
1
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
11
5
9
5
19
2
-
1
31
10
8
10
16
2
24
23
14
70
20
26
12
43
17
11
NAలులులులులు.
10
4
1
53
4
7
3
8
12
4
3
5
5
31
1
5
3
12
10
11
1
3
1
1
2
14
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
12
3
4
2
مسافت در هر
4
3
2
1
-
4
2
2
9
118
19
107
23
4
2
41
15
641
107
40
9
206
49
252
157
1, 790
1
1
-
-
Area Total
EUROPE
Australia.
Austria
Belgiunr 2-
Canada .
3200
85
177
114
22
13
16
66
54
30
20
14
6
17
19
21
124
434
130
27
49
28
72
84"
44
22
14
11
25
25
29
8
4
7
17
141
49
งงงง
18
7
2
13
10
6
517
1,087
507
1
。
138 ]
35
63
14 1
18 1
7
63 T
81
38
23 1
530
AN
21
12
244
213
2
40
28
209
77
12
16
28
*50
i
1
111
*** 51
2
28
22
53
29
209
87
14
13
31
40
18
69
168
513
7
15
25
42
8
32
55
357
13
38
22
16
21
23
27
40
10
4
644
9
1
5
5
138
190
1, 144
4 939
14
5
449
14
290
73
368
35
58
226
210
4
2
84
2
.46
13
72
75
201
44
49
21
.2
41
16
71
86
31
1
22
20
415900_-57-Vol. 2
27
75
42
86
9
22
1
277
2
104
32
159
1
16
-7
14
90
19
18
18
5
4
2
2
11
68
2
53
24
52
11
53
99
194
4, 486
27
5
160
6
53
15
43
24
15
54
19
8
16
132
1
37
1
9
2
5
5
530
633
4, 130
12, 049
72
16
2, 291
27
1,034
320
1, 184
43
43
210
35
18
41
4, 742
1
12
5
12
2
1
2
17
89
CO
3
9
1
1
4
1
4
4
10
3
1
4
15
21
25
18
1
8
1
10
32
10
7
5
911
-
1
139
2
2
324
1
50
ܚ
2
603
1
101
1
1
1
1
4
154
5776
2
94
4
20
609
100
Denmark.
60
Finland
17
France.
1, 399
- Germany
382
Iceland
Ireland
2
Italy,
605
Luxembourg 1:10
Netherlands.
165
New Zealand
.67
Norway
122
Portugal,
Spain
Sweden
1
Switzerland
Trieste
Union of South
Africa
:2
United Kingdom..
.928
2 Yugoslavia...
Area total.
4, 125
NEAR EAST AND AF-
RICA
Aigpianistan
Nigeria
Belgian Congo
Brand Fr. Cameroons.
Brand Fr. Togoland.
Cexión
2
33
Ethiopa
Chana (formerly Gold Coast).
Gréede.
53
56
"Irak WT11
5
Iraq-
1
Israel.
Jordan
Kenya
Lebanon
851
1, 252
283
1, 007
221
599
11
9, 287 11,028
1, 729
331
1,686
258
5, 620
593
321
334
29, 536
1
2
1
8
1
4
1
10
1
2
2
7
6
73
2
1
43
134
13
1
17
.
3
65
-1
13
2
24
25
5
9
6
12
4
43
Egypt--ARTTI
1
1
2
12
27
2
2
44
34
16
6
8
1
11
9
23
1
6
3
1, 487
208
1
113
21
9
9
70
68
8
29
8
4
20
4
2
5
3
6
1
1
1
47
73
19
12
3
26
44
25
4
12
4
4
241
388
68
72
9
8
5
2
11
23
13
4
1
7
1
3
3
3
142
613
6
18
2, 394
838
231
178
61
14
12
28
8
3
3
29
38
3
6
35
81
59
21
22
3
1
12
2
1
2
4
4
8
13
..
NN
2
1
1
5
3
2
2
1
3
3
3
Liberia.-77
2
12
17
.
3
2
1
1
3
5
2
3
2
5
2
...5
1
Libya.
Morocco.
Nepal.--
Nigeria
Nyasaland
Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia.
Sierra Leone...
Syria.
Tanganyika.
6
1
32
10
12
7
1
153
35
153
3
23
1
4
20
23
2
56
3
8
7
29
1
384
8
1
58
7
8
.1
8
2
3
5
2
1
5
2
26
3
See footnotes at end of table.
3201
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM--Continued
Number of Exchanges by Country and Category-Continued
(Cumulative 1949 through fiscal year 1964; figures for fiscal year 1955 listed in separate column) 1
Grants to Americans
Grants to Foreign Nationals
Univ, Study
Adv. Research
and Univ.
Lecture
Teacher
Area and
Country
Specialist
Univ. Study
Adv. Research Tchr. or Tchr.
and Univ.
Dev.
Lecture
Leader and Study in U.S.
Specialist Schools
Abroad
Total
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
Prior
1955
11
19
4
5
1
12
1
51
2
4
7
5
4
13
2
21
4
1
123
NEAR EAST AND AF.
RICA Continued
Tunisis.
Turkey
Italian Somaliland.
Sudan
Uganda
Zanzibar
76
2
1
514
1
1
19
342
3
2
17
1
1
-
1
1
2
1
1
4
2
5
?
1
1
?
184
19
347
67
210
34
57
17
1, 237
196
272
35
214
41
476
115
1, 661
208
5, 370
10
1
18
7
1
15
40
36
2
9
4
1
58
15
34
14
9
4
35
83
1
-
1
Area total
FAR EAST
Burma
Formosa
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan..
Korea
Malays:
Philippine Islands.
Thailand
2
18
1
11
26
7
32
2
4
1
1
3
76
9
1
2
11
165
22
54
13
1
69
1
2
74
24
34
668
85
29
236
109
2
7
1
1
1
.
6
117
33
2
16
1
1
30
18
3
49
72
17
6
38
5
2
3
24
23
7
I
89
83
50
26
52
61
15
5
5
34
79
61
15
25
19
5
30
2
8
12
1 1 1 1 1
345
154
12
230
1, 509
302
90
617
521
12
9
76
1
1
1
-
5
1
1
1
1
3
31
4
14
5
10
25
5
6
96
23
218
17
Cambodia
3
3
Laos 3*
1
30
2
2
4
3
10
Viet-Nam
2
6
Borned.
14
209
67
73
25
79
13
1, 265
334
223
98
267
73
405
269
336
57
3,878
Area Total.
Combination of Countries
(1949-1985)
1
73
51
125
Grand Total
4, 478
903
1, 916
440
1, 294
282
849
107
12, 430 1,665
2, 264
473
2, 373
421
6, 753 1, 134
2.318
599
40, 699
3202
!
I The tablo above should be used with certain explanations and interpretations. Although the dates given are 1949 through 1955, the program was not in operation in all of
tha MuintriAR TEHA HOJA NArior Tha tiahla AS siyeñ. includes grants awarded under the Fulbright Act (PL 584. 79th Cong.. 2d sess., Aug. 1. 1946: A Decade of American Foreign
The teble above should be used with cortain cxplanations and interprctations. Although the dates given are 1949 through 1955, the program was not in operation in all of
the countries for the wholo period. The table, as given, includes grants awarded under the Fulbright Act (PL 584, 79th Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 1, 1946; 1 Decade of American Foreign
Policy, pp. 1235-1236) as well as those under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (PL 402, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 27, 1948; ibid., pp. 1224-1234)
and other legislative authority. For a special listing of grants awarded under the Fulbright Act, see Swords Into Plowshares-A New Venture in International Understanding: The
Story of the Educational Exchange Program Authorized by the Fulbright Act of 1946 (Department of State publication 6344; 1956), Appendix 1, p. 47,
In addition to the totals given in the table, there were, for the period 1939-1948, 5,481 exchanges which are not listed by country. These exchanges were principally with the
other American Republics under the provisions of PL 355 of the 76th Congress, 1st session (approved Aug. 9, 1939; 53 Stat. 1290), which implements the Convention for the Pro-
motion of Inter-American Cultural Relations signed at Buenos Aires, Dec. 23, 1936 (Treaty Series 928; 51 Stat. 178). These include grants to Americans as follows: 142 students,
230 research scholars, 1 teacher, and 641 specialists. The following grants were awarded to nationals of other countries during this period: 1,807 students, 39 research scholars,
140 teachers, and 2,481 leaders and specialists, of whom more than 500 were trainees from the Philippines under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act (P1370, 79th Cong., 2d sess.,
approved Apr. 30, 1946; 60 Stat. 128). In some instances these early figures were estimated totals.
During the period 1949–1955 emergency aid:grants were given, following the withdrawal of the Government of China to Taiwan, to 3,641 Chinese nationals to enable them to
complete educational projects. Of these grantees, 3,498 were students already in the United States, 104 were teachers and research scholars, and 39 were Chinese students and
scholars from other areas of the Far East who were brought to the United States under provisions of the legislation. For the details of this program, see Program of Emergency
Aid to Chinese Students (Department of State publication 6343; 1956). Sixty-one Korean students were also given assistance under this program.
: Belgium and Luxembourg were combined under Belgium for 1949 and 1950.
• Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam were grouped under Indochina for the years 1950, 1951, and 1953. Figures in this table were included under Viet-Nam for those years.
3203
mi
fo
sti
of
ar
th
FI
al
dc
G
ut
G
R
PE
service capable of meeting the present and future needs of the Depart-
? An Analysis of the Personnel Improvement Plan of the Department of State,
3 For the text of the report to the Secretary of State by the Secretary's Ad-
mittee were James H. Rowe, Jr., Robert Ramspeck, and William E DeCourcy.
Part XX
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE
FOREIGN SERVICE
Organization
[FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946: Public Law 724 (79th Congress,
2d Session), August 13, 1946] 1
1. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROWE-RAMSPECK-DECOURCY
COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS: Directive of the De:
partment of State for the Improvement of Personnel Systems and
Personnel Management of the Departmental and Foreign Services,
April 16, 1951 2
A. GENERAL EXPLANATION
This is a directive to improve the personnel systems and personnel
management of the Departmental and Foreign Services. The course
of action outlined
below stems from
the findings and recommendations
of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel. This course
of
is designed to improve personnel management primarily by
administrative adjustments. It is consistent with the objectives
advocated by the Advisory Committee but does not at this time go as
far as the program recommended by the Committee.
B. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES AND BASIC APPROACH
The principal objectives of this directive are to-
1. Obtain, develop, and maintain an experienced and versatile career
160 Stat. 999.
visory Committee on Personnel, see ibid., pp. 19-67.
ac
D
T
ju
ex
th
to
h
។
0
S
of this com-
3204
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3205
ment and the Foreign Service of the United States in the conduct of
foreign affairs and to provide means for quickly supplementing this
staff whenever conditions require temporary or permanent expansion
of personnel.
2. Make maximum use of the skills and abilities of Departmental
and Foreign Service personnel and broaden the range of their usefulness
through training and developmental programs.
3. Eliminate inequities in the treatment of certain categories of
Foreign Service employees.
4. Increase through voluntary means the flexible use of domestic
and Foreign Service personnel interchangeably between overseas and
domestic assignments, including a greater interchange with other
Government agencies concerned with foreign affairs and increased
utilization in the Foreign Service of qualified persons not now in the
Government by means of lateral appointment to the Foreign Service
Reserve.
5. Establish and maintain uniformly high standards in all phases of
personnel management.
These objectives should be accomplished basically by administrative
adjustments under the present Foreign Service Act of 1946 and in the
Departmental personnel system, supplemented by legislative measures.
The administration of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 should be ad-
justed so as to supply a substantially increased number of trained and
experienced officers for present and future needs of the Government
in the conduct of foreign affairs. Concurrently, the administration of
the Departmental personnel system should give particular emphasis
to developing a larger staff of persons willing and qualified to serve at
home and abroad.
Achievement of these objectives will provide an informed basis for
possible further integration in the future of the Departmental and
Foreign Services under an improved personnel career system and for
utilizing this system for staffing additional civilian overseas activities
of the United States Government.
C. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
The Director of Personnel is hereby authorized and directed to
develop and recommend to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administra-
tion implementing instructions and drafts of legislation and to take
such other action within established delegations of authority as is
necessary to accomplish the action steps outlined below. Policy and
procedural changes affecting the Foreign Service will be submitted
to the Board of the Foreign Service.
D. SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENT STEPS
The steps set forth below should be taken without delay to improve
and strengthen the personnel management of the Departmental and
Foreign Services.
"PL 724 (79th Cong., 2d sess.), Aug. 13, 1946; 60 Stat. 999.
3206
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
ganized in line with the intent of the Foreign Service Act of 1946
indicate that, after an adequate opportunity, they are incapable of
5. Additional improvements in Foreign Service personnel management
(a) Complexion and use of personnel categories.-Appointments to
the Foreign Service and subsequent assignments and use of per-
The Foreign Service Staff category should be sharply reor-
1. Estimate of personnel requirements
Subject to the limitations imposed by a state of national emergency
of indefinite duration, the types, levels, and numbers of personnel that
will be required by the Department of State and the unified Foreign
Service of the United States for the conduct of foreign affairs of the
Government should be estimated for each of the next five years and for
a longer period if practicable. This estimate should be used as a gen-
eral guide in developing both short- and long-range programs for
recruitment, training, promotion, and assignment of Departmental
and Foreign Service personnel.
2. Exchange program
The scope of the present exchange program should be stepped up for
an indefinite period with particular reference to: (1) the inclusion on &
voluntary basis of Departmental employees occupying positions in
which overseas experience is essential or desirable and,* (2) the in-
clusion on a voluntary basis of employees of other agencies in numbers
adequate to meet the needs of such agencies. As a consequence,
there should be an increase in the number of assignments of Foreign
Service personnel to the Department and to other agencies.
The performance records of participants in this program should
adequately recognize the added experience acquired by all such
officers.
3. Recruitment
More vigorous and far-reaching recruitment efforts should be under-
taken both for the Departmental and Foreign Services, using as a
basis the projection of personnel needs referred to in item .. In
recruiting persons for positions in the Department for which dual
service at home and abroad is desirable, efforts should be made to
employ persons who are qualified and willing to serve abroad.
Departmental and Foreign Service recruitment activities should be
closely coordinated and to the extent possible recruitment standards
should be devised for types of work common to the two services.
4. Separation of unfit employees
Departmental and Foreign Service employees whose records clearly
should be made of the probationary period in this connection.
sonnel should be made in accordance with the following:
1
1
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3207
and in accordance with the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee concerning the functions of a clerical and technical
branch. As a consequence the Staff category should be used
primarily to perform technical, technical-administrative, clerical,
and other closely related functions. Both permanent and
temporary appointments may be made to the Staff category as
the needs of the Service require.
The Foreign Service Reserve category should be sharply
redefined so that it is in fact the temporary-appointment vehicle
for supplementing the Foreign Service officer category. In this
connection the Foreign Service Act of 1946 should be amended to
extend the period of service of a Reserve officer from four to five
years. The Reserve category should be used to perform work
which the Foreign Service officer category is insufficiently staffed
to handle; to carry out special projects or programs of a temporary
or emergency nature; to help in the initial staffing of new or ex-
panded programs of a continuing nature; for the present exchange
program; and as a means of enabling other agencies to temporarily
assign personnel to the Service under a positive interagency
exchange program to be worked out with those agencies. Con-
currently, the Reserve category should not be used to staff activ-
ities normally performed by the Foreign Service Staff category.
In keeping with the Foreign Service Act of 1946, the Foreign
Service officer category should be built to the strength necessary
and used as the vehicle for staffing those executive and pro-
fessional functions of a continuing nature which the Advisory
Committee recommended be staffed by a Foreign Affairs officer
branch.
(b) Expansion of the Foreign Service officer category. The appoint-
ment of class 6 Foreign Service officers should be substantially
increased to support the larger corps of Foreign Service officers.
Lateral entry into the Foreign Service officer category should be
substantially increased in accord with the provisions of section
517 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 but by the following liber-
alized measures:
(1) The present percentage limitations on the number of
Vacancies that can be filled by lateral entry should be removed for
the next three years. The number of vacancies to be established
should take into account such additional needs for Foreign Service
officers as may be required by the Government generally and for
which the requisite funds can be secured.)
(2) Positive efforts should be made to induce qualified Depart-
mental and Foreign Service Reserve and Staff personnel to com-
pete for appointment under section 517.
(3) For each person appointed as a Foreign Service officer
under section 517, a corresponding increase should be made in
the authorized strength of the FSO category so as to assure
maintenance of adequate promotional opportunities for Foreign
Service officers presently employed.
2
1
l
Oy
e
S
f
.8
o
por
6
3208
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
Increased emphasis should be placed on a positive program
tunities equal to those of "general officers”. Executive ability
cupational or area specialization should have promotional oppor-
should be given full recognition in selecting officers for promotion
hardship posts should be extended on an equal basis to all American
(h) Pay and related benefits.-Salary differentials for service at
(4) Candidates appointed as Foreign Service officers under
these provisions should meet a standard with respect to experi-
ence, performance, and other evidences of qualifications which,
in the aggregate, is comparable to the average of the Foreign
Service officer class to which appointment is made.
(5) Section 413 (b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 should
be amended to permit persons appointed as a Foreign Service
officer to receive salary at any one of the rates provided for the
class to which they are appointed.
(c) Curtailment of Staff officer appointments. There should be :
gradual curtailment in the appointment of permanent Foreign
Service Staff officers for work which should be performed by Foreign
Service officers or Foreign Service Reserve Officers. This should
be accomplished as rapidly as the other categories can be expanded
to meet normal replacement needs; but without prejudicing com-
pelling or emergency requirements for staffing expanded program
activities of a continuing nature.
(d) Examination and selection.-Assure that the methods of ex-
amination and selection of personnel for all levels and all categories
are consistent with the needs of the Department and the unified
Foreign Service. In filling positions in labor, agriculture, and
commercial categories, the qualifications standards to be applied
will be developed in consultation with the member agencies of
competence.
Assignment.--Improved methods should be devised for the
assignment, development, and utilization of personnel, including
provisions for more realistic post complements and, to the extent
practicable, elimination of excessively short tours of duty at any
post.
As soon as additional qualified staff are available, increased use
should be made of Foreign Service personnel in staffing special mis-
sions and programs in the foreign-affairs field and delegations to
international organizations,
(f) Training. - Present training programs and efforts should be
maintained and expanded if possible, with particular reference in
such fields as international security, psychological warfare, civil
affairs, and intelligence.
executive development.
E) Promotion. The present promotion system, based on regular
and
systematic evaluation of employee qualifications,
should be como
tinued and strengthened. Adequate provision should be made for
meritorious promotions. Foreign Service officers who develop
oc
personnel
mt
of
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3209
Legislation should be secured providing for an improved salary
schedule and pay plan. The present separate schedules for the
Foreign Service officer and Staff categories should be integrated into
a single schedule which will reflect a reduction in the number of
staff corps classes and an increase in the number of FSO classes.
Legislation should be sought to place permanent Foreign Service
Staff personnel under the Foreign Service retirement and disability
system to the extent that actuarial and related studies make this
feasible. Except for purposes of disability retirement, future extra
retirement credit for service at unhealthful posts should be elimi-
nated when salary differentials for service at hardship posts are
extended to all American personnel.
The Foreign Service leave system should be reexamined and con-
sideration should be given to adjusting present leave benefits in the
case of persons assigned to the United States to correspond more
closely to leave benefits currently accruing to departmental
employees.
(i) Šelection-out.-A selection-out process should be retained for
the Foreign Service and should be used to retire from the Service
those who fail to meet performance requirements and those whose
usefulness has become so marginal as to unduly inhibit the advance-
ment of more able employees.
6) Emergency provisions.-Provision should be made for the
Secretary, whenever he determines an emergency to exist, to--
Recall any retired Foreign Service officer to active service.
Make temporary promotions in all categories of personnel.
Extend the period of service of a Reserve officer for an additional
two years beyond the proposed five year maximum based on an
extraordinary and compelling need in connection with a specific
project.
Extend the period of service that an officer or employee of the
Foreign Service may serve in the United States, not to exceed one
additional year, based on an extraordinary and compelling need
in connection with a specific project.
6. Additional improvements in departmental service personnel manage-
ment
(a) Dual service positions.-Positions in the departmental service
for which overseas experience is an essential or highly desirable
qualification should be identified. To the extent that it is practical
to do so these positions should be filled by persons possessing this
qualification.
(b) Recruitment and selection. Consistent with the difficulties
imposed by the national mobilization effort and in the interest of
building for the future, a maximum effort should be made to in-
crease the employment of promising junior officers for the depart-
mental service. In this connection, programs of intern training
should be continued and strengthened in close coordination with
entrance level requirements for the Foreign Service.
3210
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
]
1
11
1
The planning staff in the Office of Personnel should be strengthened
The limited legislation needed to accomplish the above improve-
(c) Promotion.—Positive steps should be taken to develop an
improved promotional system for the departmental service which
will assure periodic evaluation of employee fitness for promotion.
(d) Training and career development.--Efforts should be made to
develop further training and career-development programs for the
departmental service. Legislation should be secured to enable
departmental officers to receive training at Government expense
in the same manner that Foreign Service personnel now receive
training
Increased emphasis should be placed on the Department's pro-
gram of executive development, with particular reference to broad-
ening the range of experience and competence of junior depart-
mental and Foreign Service officers through training and work
assignment rotation.
(e) Turn-over,-Efforts should be made to reduce voluntary turn-
over of well-qualified personnel by improved placement and full
utilization of employee skills and abilities.
E. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Appropriate officers of the Department should be kept advised of
progress toward achievement of the objective of an improved personnel
system.
The Director of Personnel should arrange on an informal basis to
obtain advisory assistance from other departments represented on
the Board of the Foreign Service and from appropriate
officers of the
Department as will help him implement this directive. These arrange-
ments should be considered as supplementary to (and not in lieu of
established procedures governing the advisory functions of the Board
of the Foreign Service with respect to the personnel management
the Foreign Service. Maximum participation of other interested
agencies in interagency bodies should be encouraged.
Employees should be kept informed periodically of important
developments affecting their interests.
The continuing administration
of the personnel program should be
adjusted to conform to directives and instructions issued to implement
the policies expressed in this directive.
in this directive. This staff should include representatives of depart
.
mental personnel and of the Foreign Service and should consult with
other Government
agencies which rely upon the support of the Foreign
Service abroad.
gress no later than May 1, 1951.
1
of
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3211
-1
ch
TOWARD A STRONGER FOREIGN SERVICE: Report of the
Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel (the Wriston
Report), May 18, 1954]
1
20
de
le
se
2. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WRISTON COMMITTEE:
Letter From the Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Public
Committee on Personnel, June 15, 1954 2
e
4
11
DEAR DR. WRISTON: I have received and carefully studied the
report of the Public Committee on Personnel transmitted by your
letter of May 18.3 At my instruction, the report has been printed
and is being released today.
I should like to commend the Committee for the thorough and
penetrating manner in which its public-spirited members, under your
able chairmanship, have dealt with the very difficult personnel and
administrative problems of the Department of State. It was the
complexity and vital importance of these problems, most of which
have been recognized but left unsolved—for some years, that per-
suaded me to seek appropriate corrective recommendations from this
group of outstanding private citizens.
I felt that this study could not be attempted while the Department
and Foreign Service were undergoing the dislocations of the reduction-
in-force necessitated by budgetary restrictions. With that obstacle
passed, we could proceed. Accordingly, I share the view of the
Committee that now is the time for action.
of
el
1
ne
2-
1
d
of
d
it
le
It
d
ir
Department of State publication 5458 (1954). The report was submitted
on May 18, 1954, was approved by the Secretary on June 7, 1954, and was made
public on June 15, 1954. On Mar. 3, 1954, the Department of State announced
the establishment of a Public Committee on Personnel to study and advise on
measures necessary to increase the effectiveness of the career service to meet
the vastly increasing responsibilities in the field of foreign policy that had devolved
upon the President and the Secretary. Members of the committee included:
Norman Armour, Foreign Service officer, retired, former Assistant Secretary of
State, and former Ambassador; John A. McConé, president, the Joshua Hendy
Corp., Los Angeles; Robert Murphy, ex-officio member, Deputy Under Secretary
of State; Morehead Patterson, chairman and president, American Machine and
Foundry Co., N. Y.; Donald 'Russell
, president of the University of S. C., and
former Assistant Secretary of State; Charles E. Saltzman, general partner,
Henry Sears & Co., N. Y., and former Under Secretary of State for Adminis-
tration; John Hay Whitney, senior partner in J. H. Whitney and Co., N. Y.;
and Dr. Henry N. Wriston, president of Brown University. Dr. Wriston was
to serve as chairman of the committee (Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 15,
1954, pp. 413-414). The Department of State announced on Mar. 5, that the
committee's field of interest would include the basic organization of the Service
and its strength; personnel management with particular reference to the improve-
ment of recruitment, training, and career-development programs; and the require-
ment to increase public confidence and fortify personnel morale (ibid., p. 414).
Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, pp. 1002–1004.
3 Ibid., p. 1004.
* See Toward a Stronger Foreign Service: Report of the Secretary of State's Public
Committee on Personnel (Department of State publication 5458; 1954).
h
D
2
3212
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
re
se
fu
th
of
th
All
PE
VE
PES 2
I have issued instructions to initiate these forwardlooking recom-
I have been particularly concerned that the professional service,
which bears the responsibility for carrying out the vastly intricate
business of foreign affairs, has not expanded and broadened to meet
the growing demands of today in the manner envisioned by the
Congress when it passed the Foreign Service Act of 1946. I am,
therefore, particularly pleased that the Committee's recommenda-
tions not only embody an immediate program for strengthening this
service, but also provide a long-range method of maintaining that
essential strength.
As a first and fundamental step, I have today recommended, and
the President has agreed to, the nomination of Mr. Charles E. Saltzman
as Under Secretary of State for Administration. Mr. Saltzman, who
served as one of the members of the Public Committee, is also a former
Assistant Secretary of State. He will have the duty of initiating and
directing the execution of this new program. Under my supervision
he will also be in complete charge of the administrative offices and
operations of the Department, and will
, of course, have my full
support in carrying out his mission.
Mr. Thruston Morton, with exceptional ability and devotion to
public service, has been carrying the additional job of Acting Deputy
Under Secretary for Administration. Mr. Saltzman's appointment
will enable Mr. Morton once again
to devote
full time to his duties
as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. I am grateful to
him for the administrative leadership he has provided during the
interim period while the Committee was formulating its recommenda-
tions.
Mr. Saltzman believes, and I concur, that this new program com
be fully launched and well underway by December 31, 1954, at
which time the statutory authority for the
position of Under Secretary
of State for Administration expires, and at which time Mr. Saltzman
intends to return to his business, from which he is taking
of absence.
I heartily endorse the two key recommendations made by the
Committee:
A. Integration of the personnel of the Departmental home service
and the Foreign Service where their
functions and responsibilities
converge.
B. The bold and imaginative recruitment and scholarship programa
whereby the Foreign Service would obtain a constant and adequate
flow of qualified young men and women representing the best cross
section of American
life. Under this program, members of Congress
would in the future have a part in selecting the candidates for the
Foreign
Service Corps, much as they now do for West Point and
Annapolis.
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mendations. Specifically, I have
taken the following actions:
1 PL 724 (79th Cong., 2d sess.), Aug. 13, 1946; 60 Stat. 999.
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3213
1. By signing certain orders, I have accepted as valid your central
recommendation that those officers of the Departmental home
service and the Foreign Service who perform similar and related
functions should be integrated into one personnel system. Such a
system, as you point out, car fortunately be built, in large part, on
the excellent existing statutory foundation of the Foreign Service Act
of 1946.
2. I believe, with the Committee, that the national interest dictates
the creation of a Foreign Service Officer (Fso) Corps that is more
flexible and broadly versatile than at present. We must take into
particular account the need for specialized skills in the solution of the
vastly complex problems of today. I have directed that this be done.
3. I have accepted the Committee's recommendation that a
substantial number of Departmental positions, probably about 1,450,
be designated for staffing by the Fso Corps, and that the present
incumbents of those positions be encouraged to enter the new Foreign
Service to serve at home or abroad, as the Department's needs require.
4. I also agree that all officer positions abroad under the Chiefs
of Mission should be similarly designated, and members of the Foreign
Service Reserve (FSR) Corps and such of the Foreign Service Staff
(Fss) Corps as presently hold those positions should likewise be
encouraged to
5. I have endorsed the Committee's recommendations that a
revised and liberalized examination process should be instituted to
effect these transfers, which I expect will raise the strength of the
Fso Corps from about 1,300 to nearly 4,000.
6. I have issued instructions to consult with appropriate members
of the Congress regarding the Committee's report and its recom-
mendations with the objective of putting into effect as quickly as
possible the fundamental recommendations of the Committee related
to the proposed integration program. I understand from your report
that certain minor amendments to existing legislation will be necessary
to carry out this program.
7. I have also directed that action be taken to seek legislative
authority for the scholarship program proposed by the Committee.
This program, providing for two-year scholarship awards to out-
standing young men and women after competitive examinations,
would insure the constant renewal of the Foreign Service from colleges
in all parts of the country. It seems to me that the scholarship
program is a most important and unique feature of the Committee's
recommendations.
8. I agree with the Committee that Congressional appointment to
the competitions for the majority of these scholarships is desirable,
with the Executive Branch having an appropriate share.
9. Since the scholarship training program will require legislative
sanction and, in any case, will take time to initiate, there is need for
immediate and interim action. I am particularly gratified that the
Committee considered this factor, and I have adopted the recom-
mendations to modernize and speed up the examining and appointment
procedures for Foreign Service officers of the beginning grade.
1
1
1
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3214
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
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10. I have endorsed your recommended steps to insure that entering
officers will be truly representative young men and women, from
all sections of our country.
11. I agree with the Committee's analysis of the importance of the
training function of the Foreign Service Institute in preparing our
diplomatic officers for their tasks, and for inculcating in them the
skills and knowledge so necessary in the practice of present day foreign
affairs. To this end, I have accepted your recommendations for
strengthening the Institute so that it will have a status more nearly
equivalent to that of our war colleges, as envisioned by the Congress
when it enacted the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
12. I am completely in agreement with the Committee's views on
the importance of establishing a true career development system,
especially as reflected in the training and assignment of the Depart-
ment's personnel. Only through the existence of such a system can
the Department attract and hold the highly qualified and dedicated
body of men and women who must make up our professional service.
These, it seems to me, are the basic recommendations of the Com-
mittee, and they will be put into effect as rapidly as possible. There
are, of course, a few other detailed recommendations dealing with
personnel administration which require further study by myself and
the other senior officers of the Department. I have in mind such
suggestions as those concerning the inspection function, allowances
and retirement benefits, and leave and salary adjustments. I shall
see that this study is vigorously carried forward.
I am glad to have the Committee's endorsement of the Department's
present effort to complete its security screening program as quickly
as possible. We shall
continue that effort, and shall equally, of course,
continue to insure that this program is administered with the most
careful fairness and objectivity.
Please allow me to express to you, and to the other members of the
Committee, my appreciation of your efforts and my conviction that
you have made a substantial contribution to the strength and future
of the Department of State and its career service.
Sincerely yours,
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
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ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3215
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRISTON COMMITTEE'S
RECOMMENDATIONS: Report of the Third Audit Meeting of
the Public Committee on Personnel, December 13, 1955 1
:
4
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In accordance with your request the members of your Committee
have completed a third review of actions taken by the Department
in carrying out your orders implementing our recommendations.?
Deputy Under Secretary Loy W. Henderson and his staff presented
a detailed review of developments since our meeting last February.
We note progress toward the implementation of many of the recom-
mendations in our report to you, and the supplemental suggestions
following our second meeting. Mr. Henderson is to be warmly con-
gratulated on a fine performance and on the initiative and untiring
devotion which he has shown in the crucial position which he holds.
The Committee is gratified that, with the sympathetic interest of
the Congress, the Department has obtained much of the legislative
authority required to meet its various recommendations.
Among the principal actions are the following:
Public Law 250 % authorized the appointment of three Deputy
Under Secretaries of State, thus permitting the establishment of the
position of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.
The position of Career Ambassador of the United States has been
created (P. L. 250, Sec. 4) and we note that steps have been taken
which should shortly enable the President to name a few outstanding
Career Ministers to that high position.
Section 821 of the Act of 1946 has been amended 6 so that retire-
ment annuities of Foreign Service officers may be calculated on the
basis of the highest five years of service for which full contributions
to the fund have been made. This action removes the former ceiling
which we viewed as unjust; it gives more equitable treatment to
B
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)
1 Issued as a “Departmental Notice" on Jan. 23, 1956. See in this connection
statement by the Secretary of State of Feb. 2, 1956; Department of State Bulletin,
Feb. 13, 1956, pp. 248–249.
* The first audit report, dated Oct. 12, 1954, was also issued as a “Depart-
mental Notice,” on Nov. 4, 1954. See in this connection Department of State
statement of Oct. 4, 1954 (ibid., Oct. 18, 1954, p. 570); statement by Secretary
Dulles of Sept. 8, '1954 (ibid., Sept. 27, 1954, pp. 444-446); and address by
Charles E. Saltzman, Under Secretary for Administration, on Sept. 10, 1954
(ibid., pp. 436-444). The second audit report, dated Feb. 26, 1955, was made
public on Mar. 23, 1955, also as a “Departmental Notice"; ibid., Apr. 11, 1955,
pp. 623–627.
Loy W. Henderson was designated Deputy Under Secretary for Administra-
tion, effective Jan. 26, 1955.
* Reference is to second audit report noted above.
• PL 250, 84th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 5, 1955; 69 Stat. 536.
• Ibid., 537.
3216
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
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Members of the Committee who have travelled extensively during
Service” had, notwithstanding, been filled by persons with Civil
officers of long service. Also of benefit is the provision which permits Ser
Foreign Service officers to choose whether they wish to receive the teg
pay differential at a hardship post or credit for time and a half
wh:
toward retirement. Provisions for education allowances for children
of Foreign Service employees serving overseas and for a home transfer foi
allowance give a much brighter aspect to the entire allowances struc-
ture in which the Committee has a continuing interest. The officers
who did the necessary work to implement the authorizing legislation tio
deserve commendation.
FO
Section 413 (b) of the Act' has been amended to permit appointment to
of lateral entrants at any salary step within a Foreign Service officer fing
class, thereby permitting transfer without diminution of salary. The the
results of this action on the rate of integration and in equitable
treatment of officers being integrated are notable. Congress has Co
established a ceiling of 1,250 (in addition to the first authorization of
500) on the number of lateral entrants who may be brought into the cla
Foreign Service officer corps and has undertaken to review a request POS
for added authority if the need should arise.
"u
New Legislation:
the
The Committee has been asked for its views on additional legislation
Th
to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946,
Wb
It fully supports the proposal for an increase in salaries of Chiefs of
ex]
Mission and of the senior Foreign Service officer classes. It is like-
wise sympathetic to the Department's plans to request the Congress
Ag
for authority to permit a modest number of additional lateral appoint-
ments (in the neighborhood of 100 to 125) to be made from among
persons who were not on the rolls of the Department or the Foreign
lat
Service Reserve or Staff as of March 1, 1955, yet possess abilities
Th
needed in the Foreign Service.
of
sho
the past year and observed conditions in foreign posts also stressed
the need for additional facilities, most particularly housing and.com
missaries, recreational facilities, provisions for education and health
for Foreign Service personnel and their dependents in hardship areas
,
As
We note that the Department is considering
requesting authority and
that these be pursued vigorously
with the appropriate
committees of lon
Congress.
th
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Foreign Service Positions:
wl
After unusually careful consideration, the Committee noted with ha
concern that several positions, which had been designated as “Foreign
org
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160 Stat. 1003.
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3217
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$ Service classifications, who were either unable or unwilling to be in-
tegrated. This practice breaches the basic policy of the program,
f which was to cease staffing Foreign Service positions with Civil Service
personnel and to transfer those who had not been integrated into non-
r Foreign Service posts.
The Committee notes that your directive as set forth in Depart-
S mental Circular #115, dated September 8, 1954, read "With excep-
tions based on individual circumstances, Departmental officers holding
Foreign Service positions' who are unwilling to transfer will be moved
t to 'non-Foreign Service positions in the Department or assisted to
find other employment. The Department will endeavor to minimize
the disruption to the careers of such employees. Every effort will be
made to complete this phase of the program within three years". The
Committee now discerns a tendency not to pursue this directive with
f sufficient vigor. This was evidenced by the fact that very few persons
classified in the Civil Service have been moved from Foreign Service
6 positions into others still classified in the Civil Service. Further
evidence indicated that nothing has been done to encourage those
"unwilling" to transfer to find other employment. It seems clear to
the Committee that the difficult problems in effecting so large a re-
organization are sufficiently numerous under the best circumstances,
They will most certainly be multiplied by the adoption of expedients
which readily harden into routine practices and defeat the clear and
explicit directive of the Secretary.
Age:
The problem of the application of age limitations to the transfer of
lateral entrants has been of continuing concern to the Committee.
The adoption of more liberal regulations by the Board of Examiners
of the Foreign Service is, therefore, encouraging: These modifications
should help to meet the Committee's apprehension that the previously
more restrictive standards tended to perpetuate the duality in Foreign
Service personnel administration which the present program is de-
signed to eliminate.
Assignment and Career Development:
Career development is a field in which the Committee has had a
long-standing interest and one which has particular significance for
the future of the Foreign Service. Members of the Office of Personnel
have outlined their views, their long-range planning and the steps
which they have taken. Ít is evident that much time and thought
has been devoted to the problem. Nevertheless a great deal remains
to be done.
5
1
Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 27, 1954, pp. 444-446.
415900_57--Vol. 2_99
3218
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
R
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the departure for home leave and transfer of previous incumbents.
is made there (will] be further provision for the “full staffing factor”.
The Committee has given close attention to the report of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Personnel on the problems involved in sending
to the field Departmental officers who have been integrated and in
creating an even flow between the field and the Department without
disrupting the work of either. It is fully convinced that this process
will not proceed either at the pace that it should, as smoothly as it
ought, or as effectively as it needs to, until the job analysis for each
post has been put upon punch cards and the personnel characteristics,
experience, skills and capabilities of each officer have also been put on
punch cards, and put into active use.
Only when this is done will it be possible to make the swift and
accurate assignments which are so essential to the smooth operation
of so complex a process. We consider it essential that this should
be put in the hands of some person of experience and skill charged
with it not as a matter of marginal attention, but as his central
responsibility; the process should be started without further delay.
It would not substitute mechanical for personal judgment, but
should help speed up and make more effective and economical &
routine operation presently carried out laboriously by hand. This
would facilitate more speedy personal judgments.
We are gratified to learn of plans to reappraise officers periodically
for personnel purposes and to enable assignment officers to benefit
from multiple rather than one man appraisals. With the growth of
the Foreign Service there is need to improve and extend the informa-
tion available to officers in charge of assignments. Without such
information no career development system can be meaningful. A
necessary corollary to this improvement of personnel information must
be the selection and training of qualified officers for administrative
work, for specialized economic tasks and for other specialized fields.
Man-in-Motion:
The Committee was particularly happy to note clear evidence of in-
creased effectiveness in the presentation of the needs of the Depart-
ment to the Bureau of the Budget. It expressed the hope that these
procedures will be still further strengthened in future presentations.
We are greatly pleased also at the cooperative spirit manifested by
the officers of the Bureau of the Budget toward Departmental requests
.
At our last meeting we were impressed with the necessity for de-
veloping a realistic personnel and budget procedure in order to keep
full post complements available at all times in Foreign Service estab-
lishments. We are informed that the Bureau of the Budget has recog,
nized this need in principle. The Department's plans for its fiscal
year 1957 budget would permit the assignment of replacements to
positions designated as of special importance simultaneously with
C
1
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E
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3219
Recruitment:
$
We congratulate the Department on the impressive success of its
recruiting program. It has resulted in more than ten times as many
persons taking the written examination for the Foreign Service in
1955 than 1954. This is clear evidence that the reputation of the
Foreign Service among young people has been restored and they are
ready to make it their careers.
We note also that the new form of examination has produced
substantially the same percentage of passing grades as the earlier
examination, the figures for six years being:
1950
20. 2
1951
22. 79
1952
22. 4
1953
20.8
1954
20. 7
1955
19.7
The screening in the oral examinations is being carried forward
rigorously. A somewhat smaller percentage of those who have passed
the written examination are being accepted after the oral examination.
The wastage of prospective officers through security requirements
continues to be negligible. From these observations the Committee
concludes that there is no evidence of any deterioration of quality
because of the revisions in examination procedures which have been
initiated during the last 18 months.
As has been the case in the past and as the Committee hoped, no
"specialized” preparation for the Foreign Service dominated the
recruitment; indeed, those with the broadest and most fundamental
educational programs showed the best percentages in passing the
written examination.
However, we consider it important that the results of the examina-
tions be continuously evaluated with a view to determining whether
the new procedures are producing not only the number but also the
type of officer required to meet the needs of our representation abroad.
Such continuing reappraisal will pay worthwhile dividends and will
assist in maintaining the momentum built up through the growing
awareness in the colleges and universities of the rewarding possibilities
of a Foreign Service career.
Delays in Processing:
The Committee is seriously disturbed, however, by the present
delays in processing applicants for the Foreign Service officer corps,
particularly prospective FSO-6's.
Even with increased centers where the written examinations for
entry into Class 6 may be taken, with the decentralizing of the oral
examination process to various parts of the United States and with
the modification of the former requirement for full security clearance
for applicants before oral examination, it still remains a fact that the
completion of the appointment process is requiring a minimum of
1
3220
1950-1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
01
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about six months. While it is realized that delay in many cases arises
from unavailability due to military service or other causes, we believe
that a determined attempt should be made to speed up this operation.
The striking improvement in recruiting rests upon assurances that
protracted waiting between examination and appointment would be
remedied. Failure to carry out those assurances would impair the
improved relationship with educational institutions.
Foreign Service Institute:
We are pleased with the evidence of the strengthening of the For-
eign Service Institute. With the approval of the White House and
the Secretary, the training plans of the Institute have been given
high priority and the program has been expanded. Organization
has been markedly improved, and the staff has been augmented both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Junior and mid-career officer
training courses have been instituted.
The Director of the Institute is to be commended on the devotion
and imagination he has brought to his work. Three points, however
,
we would like to emphasize. First, the physical facilities remain
unsatisfactory. In spite of energetic attempts to ameliorate the situ-
ation, the results fall short of providing the facilities such a high-level
institution should have. Second, we reiterate our conviction that
the Institute program should be greatly strengthened for the career
development of senior officers. Third, the language program should
be enlarged and made more readily available.
There
are and long have been more full time language students en-
rolled in the Foreign Service Institute for a considerable period of
time who come from the Air Force than from the Department of
State and the Foreign Service. This means simply that the budget
of the Air Force has for years provided enough persons so that when
an officer is to be assigned overseas as an attaché there are replace-
ments available to carry on while
he spends many months studying
a foreign language. This is wise and we commend the Air Force for
the procedure.
It is obvious, however, that the Foreign Service has more need for
foreign languages than the
Air Force. Yet it has been so restricted
in available personnel that it has not released adequate numbers of
men from daily tasks to permit mastery of the language of the country
to which they are to be assigned. We observe with satisfaction that
the number is increasing and that requests in the next budget proposa
to increase it still further; we earnestly hope that this practice will
continue to be developed.
We also feel strongly that the mere requirement that a person shall
“pass an examination” in a modern foreign language before he is
ment that before he is promoted to Class 3 he should be given the
a
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3221
opportunity for further study, if necessary, so that he shall not have
lost what knowledge he had but will actually be in fluent command
of the appropriate language. In order to make this possible, however,
further personnel must be found to permit releasing Foreign Service
officers for study on a more comprehensive basis than heretofore.
With regard to earlier recommendations regarding the services
which can be adequately and economically performed elsewhere on
a contract basis we have noted that university assignments have been
substantially expanded and that the Institute has plans for further
expansion.
In connection with this and other developments within the Insti-
tute we are pleased to learn that the Department will reconstitute
an Advisory Committee. In our judgment this Committee should
be formed soon so that its advice may be available to the Institute
and give it added prestige.
The Committee has at all times been aware of the Foreign Service's
difficulties in finding needed specialists. It heard with particular
satisfaction that arrangements are being entered into with the De-
partment of Commerce for the exchange of some Foreign Service
personnel with Commerce personnel and that a like arrangement
has been made for the exchange of an officer with the Budget Bureau.
This process is certain to promote better understanding of the prob-
lems of mutual concern. We hope this practice may be expanded
and that it will facilitate the staffing of posts requiring specialists,
particularly during the difficult transition period. We feel also that
some problems of staffing which have been acute can be met by
greater use of the Foreign Service Reserve provisions of the Law of
In our discussion there was comment upon recent articles appearing
in newspapers and periodicals critical of the Foreign Service and the
Department. These have stressed faults or shortcomings to the cor-
section of which your program was directed. These articles and letters
have seldom taken cognizance of the new administrative program or
of the progress which has been made in its implementation. The
Committee recommends urgently that ways be found not only to
employ all the available facilities of the Department but also every
other means to bring to the attention of the public the essential
nature of the program and the steps which are in progress to carry
it out and the benefits to the Department and the Foreign Service
which will ensue therefrom.
This Committee was appointed in March 1954 and has been in
service, at various times, for a year and two-thirds. Since our major
report, in June 1954, we have had three auditing sessions.
1946.
Toward a Stronger Foreign Service: Report of the Secretary of State's Public
Committee on Personnel (Department of State publication 5458; 1954).
3222 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
It was upon the suggestion of this Committee itself, when it made
its original report, that you continued it in a consultative capacity in
order to advise you as to progress in implementing those portions of
the program which you specifically approved. The principles of the
reorganization have now been established and much of the machinery
for the implementation has been framed.
The Committee feels, therefore, that it ought not to continue in
the capacity of "watchdog" unless, on thorough review by you and
the officers associated with you, you are convinced there are positive
reasons for so doing.
ܝܚܚܪܚܵܕܵܢܵܣܵܗܚܵܝܝܵܪܵܛܺܚ܀ ܚܺܘ݂ܬܵܚܰܝܢܺܝܝܰ: ܚܚܙܟ
دفنه، نه "شنتشن
ORGANIZATION OF THE
SECRETARY
DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARLAT
S
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUNE 1,1956
S/S
UNDER SECRETARY
DIRECTOR GENERAL
FOREION SERVICE
0118
DIRECTOR
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
ADMINISTRATION
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY.
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
FOR ADMINISTRATION
FOREIGN SELCE
INSPECTION COXPS
ICA
SOIFICN SERVICE
INSTITUTE
OPS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR POLICY PLANNING
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
MUTUAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
ATOMIC ENERGY AFFAIRS
LEGAL ADVISER
COUNSELOR
S/P
U/MSA
SIAE
Office of International Financial de
Development Affairs . OFD
Lend Lease & Surplu. Property
Division - LL
International Finance Division
FN
Economic Development Division
ED
Ollice of Transport & Communic..
tione . TRC
Aviation Division - AY
Shipping Division SH
Telecommunication, Division
TD
Office of International Trade & Re.
sources ITR
Economic Defense Division - ECD
Fuela Division - FSD
International Buninco. Practice.
Division - BP
Trade Agreements and Treatie.
Division - TAD
International Resource. Div. IRD
A$$LSTANT SECRETARY.CONTROLLER
ADMINISTRATOR
HIIREAU OF
SECURITY AND CONSULAX AFFAIRS
Sca
Cilice of Personnel - PER
Manajemen & Service. Diy . MSD
Employment Division EMD
Personnel Operation. Div. POD
Allowance. Div. - ALD
Classification & Wagt Admin. Div.
Orlice of Keluget und Mipratio: Affair. - OKM
Pussport Office - PPT
Visa Office VO
Office of Special Consular Services SCS
Ollice of Security - Y
Div. of Physic*l Security . SYM
Div. at Evalvativna SYE
Div. of Investigation - 5171
Office of faunition. Control - MC
CWD
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
ASSISTANT SECÅETARY
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
R
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Ollice of General Services OGS
Div. of Supply Management - SD
Div, of Operating Facilities - FD
Div. of Records Management - RM
Despatch Agency - DA
Office of Special Service. - Oss
Div. of Communications - DC
Div. of Visual Service. - VS
Div. of Publishing Services PB
Div. of Language Services - LS
Cryptography Stult - CY
Foreign Reporting Sta! - REP
Arta and Monuments adviser AM
Clemency and Parole Board . CPO
Safety Director DS
international Educational Exchange
Service . ILS
UNESCO Relations Suit URS
New# Division - ND
Public Studies Diviston - PS
Public Service. Division - SEV
Historical Division - HD
DEM
Office of Intelligence Research - OIR
Div. of Functional Intelligence - DFI
Div, of Research for American
Republic. - DRA
Div. of Research for Western
Europe - DRW
Div. of Research for USSA and
Exetern Europe - DRS
Div. of Rescarch for Fur East - DRF
Div. of Research for Near East,
S, Asia, the Africa - DAN
Olfice of Libraries and latelligence.
Acquisition - OLI
Div. of Acquisition and Distribution-
LAD
Library Division LR
Div. of Biographic Information BI
Ollice of Budget .OR
Dir, of Program Review DPR
Div. of Financial Management
Office of Finance • OF
Div, of account, ACD
Dly, of Audit - AUD
Office of Foreiga Building. - HBO
Regulatian. & Procedure. Stall - AIRP
-
.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
NEAR EASTERN, SOUTH ASIAN,
AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AISLSTANT SECRETARY
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ASSDTANT SECRETARY
INTONATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
ARA
EUR
10
NEA
Office of Middle American Adair. - MID
Office of South American Affairs OSA
Ottice of Inter-American Regional
Political Affair. - RPA
Ollice of Inter-American Repional
Economic Affairs - REA
415900 O -57 ( Face p. 3222) No. 1
Office of British Commonwealth and
Northern Luropean Alinir. • BNA
Office of Eastern Luropean Atair.
Office af Greek, Turkish and Iranian
Affairs - GTI
Office of South Aslan Alfair. - SOA
Office of Neur Lautern Atairs NE
Office of African Affair. - AF
ottice of Chinese Adair.
Office of Northeast Asian Affaixo . NA
Olrice of Southeast Asian Affair. - SEA
Orlict of Southwest Pacific Affair.
SPA
aulice of Dependent Ares Allair. ODA
Quice of UN PUtiel . becurity
Altair. - UMP
Quice of International Iconarnick
Social Abar. -OCS
arrice of latarutional Conference. OIC
Otico al lateralianl Administration
OLA
Office of German Alairs - GER
olice of Wettera Luroptan Affair.
WE
Office of Europeia Aeglonal Affairs
RA
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, CONSULAR OFFICES, AND DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3223
Passports
6. AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE IS-
SUANCE OF PASSPORTS: Statement by the Department of
State, May 24, 1952 1
1. The Secretary of State has discretionary authority in the issuance
of passports, both as a power inherent in the exercise of the Presi-
dential authority to conduct foreign relations and as a matter of
statutory law.2
2. Various Secretaries of State have exercised the right to refuse
passports or withdraw passports already issued. Various courts and
attorneys general of the United States have rendered opinions in
which the discretionary authority of the Secretary of State in the
issuance of passports has been recognized. In an opinion of August
29, 1901, the Attorney General stated:
Substantial reasons exist for the use by Congress of the word “may” in connec-
tion with authority to issue passports. Circumstances are conceivable which
would make it most inexpedient for the public interests for this country to grant
a passport to a citizen of the United States. For example, if one of the criminal
class, an avowed anarchist for instance, were to make such application, the
public interests might require that his application be denied.
Without expressing any opinion as to whether a passport should be granted to
Ng Faun, I advise you that it may, in your discretion, be granted or withheld. 3
In the case of Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325 (1939), the Supreme Court,
after holding that the Secretary of State should be included in a decree
declaring the plaintiff to be a natural-born citizen of the United States,
had the following to say:
The decree in that sense would in no way interfere with the exercise of the Secre-
tary's discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude
the denial of a passport on the ground 4 that Miss Elg had lost her American
citizenship.
3. For many years the Department has refused passports to persons
for many reasons. For example, passports are denied when evidence
in the Department's files shows that the applicant for the passport
is a fugitive from justice or mentally ill or likely to become a public
charge abroad, et cetera.
4. For many years the Department has also refused passports to
persons when it had in its files clear evidence that they had, on pre-
vious trips abroad, engaged in political activities in foreign countries.
5. The Department reexamined its policy respecting the issue of
passports to Communists and persons believed to be Communists
and subversives after both the judicial and legislative branches of the
Department of State Bulletin, June 9, 1952, pp. 919–920.
2 See the act of Aug. 18, 1956 (11 Stat. 60), the act of June 14, 1902 (32 Stat.
386), and the act of July 3, 1926 (44 Stat. 887).
3 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 509-511, at 511.
4 This phrase in the opinion of the Supreme Court as reported in 307 U. S.
325 reads“on the sole ground."
1
3224
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
I
01
+
th
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Government had made certain findings concerning the Communist
movement in the United States. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in upholding the conviction of the 11 leading Com-
munists in New York, found that the conspiracy in which they were
participants was a “clear and present danger to the United States.” 1
The Congress of the United States, in the Internal Security Act of
1950,2 made these findings: That there exists a world-wide Com-
munist revolutionary movement, the purpose of which is by treachery,
deceit, espionage, and sabotage to establish a Communist totalitarian
dictatorship in countries throughout the world; that, due to the world-
wide scope of the movement, the travel of Communist members,
representatives, and agents from country to country is a prerequisite
for the carrying on of activities to further the purpose of this revolu-
tionary movement; and that individuals in the United States, by
participating in this movement, in effect, repudiate their allegiance
to the United States and transfer their allegiance to the foreign country
which controls the Communist movement.
It was decided that, in view of the findings by the court and the
Congress, it would be inappropriate and inconsistent for the Depart-
ment to issue a passport to a person if information in its files gave
reason to believe that he is knowingly a member of a Communist or-
ganization or that his conduct abroad is likely to be contrary to the
best interests of the United States. This policy has been followed
since February, 1951, and, in view of the national emergency pro-
claimed by President Truman : and the conditions existing in various
areas of the world, it is believed that it should be closely adhered to.
6. A passport certifies to foreign governments not only the citizen-
ship and identity of the bearer, but requests them to permit him safely
and freely to pass and, in case of need, to give all lawful aid and
protection. Possession of the passport indicates the right of the bearer
to receive the protection and good offices of American diplomatic
and consular officers, abroad. The right to receive the protection of
this Government is correlative with the obligation to give undivided
allegiance to the United States. A person whose activities, either
at home or abroad, promote the interests of a foreign country or &
political faction therein to the detriment of the United States or of
friendly foreign countries should not be the bearer of an American
passport.
7. Passports are refused only on the basis of very clear and definite
reports from the investigative and security offices of this Department
and of other Government departments and agencies and from foreign
governments containing well-authenticated information concerning
past and present activities and associations of the applicant. The
decision not to issue a passport or to withdraw a passport already
issued does not represent the judgment of the Passport Division alone,
but is reached after consultation by responsible officers of the Passport
is
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ho
of
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to
51
1 This is apparently based on the statement, in the Court's opinion, "We holdy 1?
that it is a danger 'clear and present'" (183 F. (2d), 201-237, at 213).
D
2 PL 831 (81st Cong., 2d sess.), Sept. 23, 1950; 64 Stat. 987.
18
3 Proclamation 2914 of Dec. 16, 1950; 15 Fed. Reg. 9029.
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3225
Division with security officers, and political and administrative officers
of the Department. This group varies according to the area or areas
in which the applicant desires to travel. The decision is therefore
the decision of the Department.
8. Any applicant who has been refused a passport has every right
and is given every opportunity to request further consideration of
his case and may present any evidence or information which he may
wish to have considered. The particularity with which he may be
informed of the contents of the reports in the Department's file de-
pends, of course, upon the source and classification of such reports,
but it is usually possible to inform him in a general way of the nature
of the evidence and the information upon which he has been refused
à passport. Any new evidence or information which the applicant
may submit is referred to the officers who first examined the case
for evaluation and expression of opinion as to whether a passport
may be issued. The Department cannot violate the confidential
character of passport files by making public any information contained
therein.
9. The Secretary of State has the authority to establish any
administrative procedures respecting passports which he may deem
appropriate. These procedures are under constant review and a
continuing effort is made to see that they are fair and efficient. There
is a board in the Passport Division for questions of loss of nationality.
The consultations between officers of the Passport Division and officers
of other divisions of the Department and with the Foreign Service
abroad, in effect, constitute in a given case a most fair and compre-
hensive board of review action in the denial of a passport in the interests
of the United States. I
7. REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ISSUANCE OF
PASSPORTS, AUGUST 28, 1952
2
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by paragraph 126 of Execu-
tive Order No. 7856, issued on March 31, 1938 (3 F. R. 681; 22 CFR
51.77), under authority of section 1 of the act of Congress approved
July 3, 1926 (44 Stat. 887; 22 U.S.C.211 (a)), the regulations issued on
March 31, 1938 (Departmental Order 749) as amended (22 CFR 51.101
to 51.134) are hereby further amended by the addition of new $ $ 51.135
to 51.143 as follows:
Sec.
51. 135 Limitations on issuance of passports to persons supporting
Communist movement.
51. 136 Limitations on issuance of passports to persons likely to
violate laws of the United States.
1 See in this connection statement by Secretary of State Acheson of June 18,
1952; Department of State Bulletin, July 7, 1952, pp. 40-42.
2.17 Fed. Reg. 8013-8014. See in this connection statement issued by the
Department of State on Sept. 2, 1952; Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 15,
1952, p. 417.
3226
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
n
it
S
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a
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A
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m
in
ad
B
Sec.
51. 137 Notification to person whose passport application is tentatively
disapproved.
51. 138 Appeal by passport applicant.
51, 139 Creation and functions of Board of Passport Appeals.
51. 140 Duty of Board to advise Secretary of State on action for
disposition of appealed cases.
51. 141 Bases for findings of fact by Board.
51. 142 Oath or affirmation by applicant as to membership in Com-
munist Party.
51. 143 Applicability of $$ 51.135 to 51.142.
AUTHORITY: $$ 51.135 to 51.143 issued under sec. 1, 44 Stat. 887;
22 U. S. C. 211a.
$ 51.135 Limitations on issuance of passports to persons supporting
Communist movement. In order to promote the national interest by
assuring that persons who support the world Communist movement
of which the Communist Party is an integral unit may not, through
use of United States passports, further the purposes of that movement,
no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate return to the
United States, shall be issued to:
(a) Persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have
recently terminated such membership under such circumstances as to
warrant the conclusion-not otherwise rebutted by the evidence-
that they continue to act in furtherance of the interests and under
the discipline of the Communist Party:
(b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with
the Communist Party, who engage in activities which support the
Communist movement under such circumstances as to warrant the
conclusion--not otherwise rebutted by the evidence that they have
engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination, or
control exercised over them by the Communist movement.
(c) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with
the Communist Party, as to whom there is reason to believe, on the
balance of all the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in
activities which will advance the Communist movement for the
purpose, knowingly and wilfully of advancing that movement.
$ 51.136 Limitations on issuance of passports to persons likely to
violate laws of the United States. In order to promote the national
interest by assuring that the conduct of foreign relations shall be free
from unlawful interference, no passport, except one limited for direct
and immediate return to the United States, shall be issued to persons
as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance of all the evidence,
that they are going abroad to engage in activities while abroad which
would violate the laws of the United States, or which if carried on in
the United States would violate such laws designed to protect the
security of the United States.
$ 51.137 Notification to person whose passport application is tenta-
tively disapproved. A person whose passport application is tentatively
disapproved under the provisions of 3 51.135 or $ 51.136 will be
T
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ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3227
notified in writing of the tentative refusal, and of the reasons on which
it is based, as specifically as in the judgment of the Department of
State security considerations permit. He shall be entitled, upon
request, and before such refusal becomes final, to present his case
and all relevant information informally to the Passport Division.
He shall be entitled to appear in person before a hearing officer of
Passport Division, and to be represented by counsel. He will, upon
request, confirm his oral statements in an affidavit for the record.
After the applicant has presented his case, the Passport Division will
review the record, and after consultation with other interested offices,
advise the applicant of the decision. If the decision is adverse, such
advice will be in writing and shall state the reasons on which the
decision is based as specifically as within the judgment of the Depart-
ment of State security limitations permit. Such advice shall also
inform the applicant of his right to appeal under $ 51.138.
$ 51.138 Appeal by passport applicant. In the event of a decision
adverse to the applicant, he shall be entitled to appeal his case to the
Board of Passport Appeals provided for in 8 51.139.
$ 51.139 Creation and functions of Board of Passport Appeals.
There is hereby established within the Department of State a Board
of Passport Appeals, hereinafter referred to as the Board, composed
of not less than three officers of the Department to be designated by
the Secretary of State. The Board shall act on all appeals under
$ 51.138. The Board shall adopt and make public its own rules of
procedure, to be approved by the Secretary, which shall provide that
its duties in any case may be performed by a panel of not less than
three members acting by majority determination. The rules shall
accord applicant the right to a hearing and to be represented by coun-
sel, and shall accord applicant and each witness the right to inspect
the transcript of his own testimony.
$ 51.140 Duty of Board to advise Secretary of State on action for dis-
position of appealed cases. It shall be the duty of the Board, on all
the evidence, to advise the Secretary of the action it finds necessary
and proper to the disposition of cases appealed to it, and to this end
the Board may first call for clarification of the record, further investi-
gation, or other action consistent with its duties.
51.141 Bases for findings of fact by Board. (a) In making or re-
viewing findings of fact, the Board, and all others with responsibility
for so doing under $$ 51.135 to 51.143, shall be convinced by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, as would a trial court in a civil case.
(b) Consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party
line on a variety of issues and through shifts and changes of that line
will suffice, prima facie, to support a finding under $ 51.135 (b).
$ 51.142 Oath or affirmation by applicant as to membership in Com-
munist Party. At any stage of the proceedings in the Passport
Division or before the Board, if it is deemed necessary, the applicant
may be required, as a part of his application, to subscribe, under oath
or affirmation, to a statement with respect to present or past member-
ship in the Communist Party. If applicant states that he is a Com-
3228 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
munist, refusal of a passport in his case will be without further
proceedings.
$ 51.143 Applicability of $8 51.135 to 51.142. When the standards
set out in $ 51.135 or $ 51.136 are made relevant by the facts of a
particular case to the exercise of the discretion of the Secretary under
$ 51.75, the standards in $$ 51.135 and 51.136 shall be applied and
the procedural safeguards of $$ 51.137 to 51.142 shall be followed in
any case where the person affected takes issue with the action of the
Department in granting, refusing, restricting, withdrawing, cancelling,
revoking, extending, renewing, or in any other fashion or degree
affecting the ability of a person to use a passport through action taken
in a particular case.
Date of issuance: August 28, 1952.
For the Secretary of State.
W. K. SCOTT;
Acting Deputy Under Secretary.
8. RULES OF THE BOARD OF PASSPORT APPEALS,
JANUARY 4, 1954 1
{
I
I
8
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board of Passport Appeals
by the Regulations of the Secretary of State issued on August 28,
1952 (17 F. R. 8013; 22 CFR 51.139) 2 and pursuant to the authority
vested in the Secretary of State by paragraph 126 of Executive Order
No. 7856, issued on March 31, 1948 [1938] (3 F. R. 681;22 CFR 51.77),
under authority of section 1 of the act of Congress approved July 3,
1926 (44 Stat. 887; 22 U. S. C. 211 (a)), the regulations issued on
March 31, 1938 (Departmental Order 749) as amended (22 CFR 51.101
through 51.143) are hereby further amended by the addition of the
following rules of the Board of Passport Appeals as adopted by the
Board, and approved by the Secretary for incorporation as $8 51.151
through 51.170 of Subpart B of Part 51 of 22 CFR:
Sec.
51.151 Organization of Board.
51.152 Decisions of the Board.
51.153 Counsel to the Board.
51.154 Examiner.
51.155 Chairman.
51.156 Prior administrative remedies.
51.157 Petition.
51.158 Delivery of papers.
51.159 Notice of hearing.
51.160 Appearance.
1 19 Fed. Reg. 161-162. See in this connection statement issued bythe Depart-
ment of State on June 6, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, June 27, 1955, pp.
1050–1051.
Barnets 2 2
a
r
t
8
8
2 See supra.
I
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3229
er
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де
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an
als
28,
Sec.
51.161 Applicant's attorney.
51.162 Supplementary information to applicant.
51.163 Hearings.
51.164 Admissibility.
51.165 Argumentation.
51.166 Privacy of hearings.
51.167 Misbehavior before Board.
51.168 Transcript of hearings.
51.169 Notice of decision.
51.170 Probative value of evidence.
AUTHORITY: $8 51.151 to 51.170 issued under sec. 1, 44 Stat. 887;
22 U, S. C. 211a.
$ 51.151 Organization of Board. The Secretary of State shall
appoint a Board of Passport Appeals consisting of three or more
members, one of whom shall be designated by the Secretary as Chair-
man. The Chairman shall assure that there is assigned to hear the
appeal of any applicant a panel of not less than three members in-
cluding himself or his designee as presiding officer, which number
shall constitute a quorum.
$ 51.152 Decisions of the Board. Decisions shall be by majority
vote. Voting may be either in open or closed session on any question
except recommendations under $ 51.140, which shall be in closed
session. Decisions under $ 51.140 shall be in writing and shall be
signed by all participating members of the Board.
$ 51.153 Counsel to the Board. A Counsel, to be designated by the
Secretary of State, shall be responsible to the Board for the scheduling
and presentation of cases, aid in legal and procedural matters, infor-
mation to the applicant as to his procedural rights before the Board,
maintenance of records and such other duties as the Board or the
Chairman, on its behalf, may determine.
$ 51.154 Examiner. The Board may, within its discretion, appoint
an examiner in any case, who may, with respect to such case, be vested
with
any or all authority vested in the Board or its presiding officer,
subject to review and final decision by the Board, but, an applicant
shall not be denied an opportunity for a hearing before the Board
unless he expressly waives it.
$ 51.155 Chairman. The Chairman, or his designee, shall preside
at all hearings of the Board, and shall be empowered in all respects to
regulate the course of the hearings and pass upon all issues relating
thereto. The Chairman, or his designee, shall be empowered to
administer oaths and affirmations.
$ 51.156 Prior administrative remedies. It is required that prior to
petitioning for an appeal, an applicant shall (a) exhaust the adminis-
trative remedies available in the Passport Office, as set out in $ 51.137,
and (b) comply with the provisions of $ 51.142, as a part of his applica-
tion, if deemed necessary by the Passport Office.
$ 51.157 Petition. An applicant desiring to take an appeal shall,
within thirty calendar days after receipt of the advice of adverse
ler
7),
3,
On
01
che
Ehe
51
art-
PP.
3230
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
decision by the Passport Office, file with the Board a written petition
under oath or affirmation which shall, in plain and concise language,
refute or explain the reasons stated by the Passport Office for its
decision.
$ 51.158 Delivery of papers. Petitions or other papers for the atten-
tion of the Board may be delivered personally, by registered mail, or
by leaving a copy at the offices of the Board at the address to be stated
in the advice of adverse action furnished applicant by the Passport
Office.
$ 51.159 Notice of hearing. Applicant shall receive not less than
five calendar days notice in writing of the scheduled date and place
of hearing which shall be set for a time as soon as possible after receipt
by the Board of applicant's petition.
$ 51.160 Appearance. Any party to any proceedings before the
Board may appear in person, or by or with his attorney, who must
possess the requisite qualifications, as hereinafter set forth, to practice
before the Board.
$ 51.161 Applicant's attorney. (a) Attorneys at law in good stand-
ing who are admitted to practice before the Federal courts or before
the courts of any State or Territory of the United States may practice
before the Board,
(b) No officer or employee of the Department of State whose official
duties have, in fact, included participation in the investigation, prep-
aration, presentation, decision or review of cases of the class within
the competence of the Board of Passport Appeals shall, within two (2
years after the termination of such duties appear as attorney in behalf
of an applicant in any case of such nature, nor shall any one appear
as such attorney in a case of such class if in the course of prior gov-
ernment service he has dealt with any aspects of the applicant's
activities relevant to a determination of that case.
$ 51.162 Supplementary information to applicant. The purpose of
the hearing is to permit applicant to present all information relevant
and material to the decision in his case. Applicant may, at the time
of filing his petition, address a request in writing to the Board for such
additional information or explanation as may be necessary to the
preparation of his case. In conformity with the relevant laws and
regulations, the Board shall pass promptly and finally upon all such
requests and shall advise applicant of its decision. The Board shall
take whatever action it deems necessary to insure the applicant of 8
full and fair consideration of his case.
$ 51.163 Hearings. The Passport file and any other pertinent Gor-
ernment files shall be considered as part of the evidence in each case
without testimony or other formality as to admissibility. Such files
may not be examined by the applicant, except the applicant may
examine his application or any paper which he has submitted in con-
nection with his application or appeal. The applicant may, appear
and testify in his own behalf, be represented by counsel subject to
the provisions of $ 51.161, present witnesses and offer other evidence
in his own behalf. The applicant and all witnesses may be cross-
examined by any member of the Board or its counsel. If any witnes
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3231
şe,
its
2n-
on whom the applicant wishes to call is unable to appear personally, the
Board may, in its discretion, accept an affidavit by him or order evi-
dence to be taken by deposition. Such depositions may be taken
before any person designated by the Board and such designee is hereby
authorized to administer oaths or affirmations for the purpose of the
or depositions. The Board shall conduct the hearing proceedings in such
ted manner as to protect from disclosure information affecting the na-
ort tional security or tending to disclose or compromise investigative
sources or methods.
lan $ 51.164 Admissibility. The Board and the applicant may intro-
ace duce such evidence as the Board deems proper. Formal rules of evi-
ipt dence shall not apply, but reasonable restrictions shall be imposed as
to the relevancy, competency, and materiality of evidence presented
the to the Passport Office's stated reasons for its decision and/or to the
Lust application of $ 51.135 or $ 51.136 to applicant's case.
tice $ 51.165 Argumentation. All argumentation shall be directed to
the application of the passport regulations to the facts of the particular
.nd-
case. The Board will permit no oral argument or motions relative
fore
to the legality or propriety of the hearing or other procedures of the
ctice Board. Submission of such argument or motions will be confined
to the filing of written briefs, objections, or motions to be made a
icial
part of the record. The Board will not undertake to consider any
rep- such motion or contention.
thin
$ 51.166 Privacy of hearings. Hearings shall be private. There
shall be present at the hearing only the members of the Board,
half
Board's Counsel, official stenographers, Departmental employees
concerned, the applicant, his counsel, and the witnesses. Witnesses
shall be present at the hearing only while actually giving testimony.
$ 51.167 Misbehavior before Board. If, in the course of a hearing
before the Board, an applicant or attorney is guilty of misbehavior,
he may be excluded from further participation in the hearing. In
addition, he may be excluded from participation in any other case
before the Board
$ 51.168 Transcript of hearings. A complete verbatim stenographic
transcript shall be made of hearings by qualified reporters, and the
and
transcript shall constitute a permanent part of the record. Upon
request, the applicant and each witness shall have the right to inspect
the transcript of his own testimony.
$ 51.169 Notice of decision. The Board shall communicate the
action recommended under $ 51.140 on all cases appealed to it, to the
Gor-
Secretary of State. The decision of the Secretary of State shall be
notified in writing to the applicant. Such notice shall be given the
applicant as promptly as possible after his hearing before the Board.
$ 51.170 Probative value of evidence. In determining whether there
is a preponderance of evidence supporting the denial of a passport
ppear the Board shall consider the entire record, including the transcript
of the hearing and such confidential information as it may have in its
possession. The Board shall take into consideration the inability of
the applicant to meet information of which he has not been advised,
(2)
pear
gov-
ant's
se of
vant
time
such
the
such
shall
; of 8
{ case
2 files
may
CON-
ect to
dence
CROSS-
itness
3232
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
specifically or in detail, or to attack the creditability of confidential
informants.
Adopted by the Board of Passport Appeals December 30, 1953.
Dated: January 4, 1954.
(SEAL]
THRUSTON B. MORTON,
Chairman,
Board of Passport Appeals.
JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State.
Immigration and Visas
[IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952: Public Law
414 (82d Congress, 2d Session), June 27, 1952] 1
9. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING
IMMIGRATION QUOTAS, JUNE 30, 1952 2
WHEREAS under the provisions of section 201 (b) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Com-
merce, and the Attorney General, jointly, are required to determine
the annual quota of any quota area established pursuant to the
provisions of section 202 of the said Act, and to report to the President
the quota of each quota area so determined; and
WHEREAS the Acting Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary
of
Commerce, and the Attorney General have reported to the President
that in accordance with the duty imposed and the authority con-
ferred upon them by section 201 (b) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, they jointly have made the determination provided for and
computed under the provisions of section 201 (a) of the said Act;
and have fixed, in accordance therewith, immigration quotas as
hereinafter set forth:
Now, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the
United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority
vested in me by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do hereby proclaim
and make known that the annual quota of each quota area hereinafter
}
?
4
!
Sept.
166 Stat. 163. The act was amended by PL 770, 83d Cong., 2d sess.,
3, 1954; 68 Stat. 1145. For a discussion of the changes in the visa work of the
Department of State and the Foreign Service under the act of 1952, see ar-
ticles by Eliot B. Coulter in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 2, 1953, pp.
195–203 and Feb. 9, 1953, pp. 232–239.
2 66 Stat. c36..
3 PL 414; 82d Cong., 2d sess., June 27, 1952; 66 Stat. 163.
1
11
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3233
enumerated has been determined in accordance with the law to be,
and shall be, as follows:
Area
No.
Quota area
Quota
SvOCTA CON
.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
0
Afghanistan.
Albania
Andorra
Arabian Peninsula
Asia-Pacific triangle
Australia
Austria .
Belgium
Bhutan.
Bulgaria
Burma
Cambodia
Cameroons (trust territory, United Kingdom)
Cameroons (trust territory, France)
Ceylon
China
Chinese
Czechoslovakia
Danzig, Free City of
Denmark
Egypt
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France.
Germany
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Greece
Hungary
Iceland,
India
Indonesia.
Iran (Persia)
Iraq
Ireland (Eire)
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Korea
Laos,
Latvia
· Lebanon
Liberia
Libya.
Liechtenstein
Lithuania.
Luxembourg
Monaco
Morocco
Muscat (Oman)
Nauru (trust territory, Australia)
100
100
100
100
100
100
1, 405
1, 297
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
105
2, 859
100
1, 175
100
115
100
566
3, 069
25, 814
65, 361
308
865
100
100
100
100
100
17, 756
100
5, 645
.
.
185
100
100
100
235
100
100
100
100
384
100
100
100
100
100
100
3, 136
100
Nepal
Netherlands
New Guinea (trust territory, Australia)
415900-57—Vol. 2-100
3234
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
11
Area
No.
Quota area
Quota
,
100
2, 364
100
100
100
100
6, 488
.
IS
pe
ti
.
WO
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
438
100
289
100
100
100
100
100
250
as
New Zealand
Norway
Pacific Islands (trust territory, United States administered)
Pakistan
Palestine (Arab Palestine)
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Ruanda-Urundi (trust territory, Belgium)
Rumania
Samoa, Western (trust territory, New Zealand)
San Marino.
Saudi Arabia
Somaliland (trust territory, Italy)
South-West Africa (mandate)
Spain
Sweden.
Switzerland
Syria.
Tanganyika (trust territory, United Kingdom)
Thailand (Siam):
Togo (trust territory, France)
Togoland (trust territory, United Kingdom)
Trieste, Free Territory of .
Turkey.
Union of South Africa
U. S. S. R.
Vietnam
Yemen
Yugoslavia
+
3, 295
1, 698
100
100
100
100
100
100
225
100
fes
fe
ni
in
U
be
ор
0
.
2, 697
100
100
933
res
of
fro
Es
So
th
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pl
N
The provision of an immigration quota for any quota area is
designed solely for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality
Act and shall not constitute recognition by the United States of the
political transfer of territory from one country to another, or recogni-
tion of a government not recognized by the United States.
The following proclamations regarding immigration quotas are
hereby revoked: Proclamation 2283 of April 28, 1938; Proclamation
2603 of February 8, 1944; Proclamation 2666 of September 28, 1945;
Proclamation 2696 of July 4, 1946; Proclamation 2846 of July 27, 1949;
and Proclamation 2911 of October 31, 1950.1
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the City of Washington this thirtieth day of June, in the
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two, and of the
(SEAL] Independence of the United States of America the one hundred
and seventy-sixth.
th
se
ar
tv
SO
m
152 Stat. 1544; 58 Stat. 1125; 59 Stat. 883; 60 Stat. 1353; 63 Stat. 1278;
64 Stat., pt. 2, A449, respectively.
B
li,
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3235
10. REFUGEE RELIEF ACT OF 1953,1 AS AMENDED BY THE
ACT OF AUGUST 31, 1954 2
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the Refugee Relief Act of 1953.
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 2. (a) "Refugee” means any person in a country or area which
is neither Communist nor Communist-dominated, who because of
persecution, fear of persecution, natural calamity or military opera-
tions is out of his usual place of abode and unable to return thereto,
who has not been firmly resettled, and who is in urgent need of
assistance for the essentials of life or for transportation.
(b) "Escapee” means any refugee who, because of persecution or
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion,
fled from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or other Commu-
nist, Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied area of Europe
including those parts of Germiny under military occupation by the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and who cannot return thereto
because of fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political
opinion.
(c) "German expellee" means any refugee of German ethnic origin
residing in the area of the German Federal Republic, western sector
of Berlin, or in Austria who was born in and was forcibly removed
from or forced to flee from Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, or areas provisionally under
the administration or control or domination of any such countries,
except the Soviet zone of military occupation of Germany.
(d) “Administrator" means the administrator of the Bureau of
Security and Consular Affairs established in the Department of State
pursuant to subsection (b) of section 104 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
3
SPECIAL NONQUOTA VISAS; NUMBERS
Sec. 3. There are hereby authorized to be issued two hundred five
thousand special nonquota immigrant visas to aliens, specified in
section 4 of this Act, seeking to enter the United States as immigrants
and to their spouses and their unmarried sons or daughters under
twenty-one years of age, including stepsons or stepdaughters and
sons or daughters adopted prior to July 1, 1953, if accompanying them.
* PL 203, 83d Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 7, 1953; 67 Ştat. 400.
2 PL 751, 83d Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 31, 1954; 68 Stat. 1044. Refugee Relief
Act of 1953.
with Amendments of August 31, 1954 (House Judiciary Com-
mittee print, Oct. 1, 1954). See also the article by Frank L. Auerbach entitled
"The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 as Amended” in the Department of State
Bulletin, Sept. 27, 1954, pp. 452-458 (printed also as Department of State pub-
lication 5615; 1954).
* PL 414, 82d Cong., 2d sess., June 27, 1952; 66 Stat. 174.
3236
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
t
a
b
ប
si
J
ALLOCATION OF SPECIAL NONQUOTA VISAS
SEC. 4. (a) Special nonquota immigrant visas authorized to be
issued under section 3 of this Act shall be allotted as follows:
(1) Not to exceed fifty-five thousand visas to German expellees
residing in the area of the German Federal Republic or in the western
sectors of Berlin or in Austria: Provided, That the visas issued under
this paragraph shall be issued only in the German Federal Republic
or in the western sector of Berlin or in Austria.
(2) Not to exceed thirty-five thousand visas to escapees residing in
the area of the German Federal Republic or the western sectors of
Berlin or in Austria: Provided, That the visas issued under this para-
graph shall be issued only in the German Federal Republic or in the
western sector of Berlin or in Austria.
(3) Not to exceed ten thousand visas to escapees residing within
the European continental limits of the member nations of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization or in Turkey, Sweden, Iran or in the
Free Territory of Trieste and who are not nationals of the area in
which they reside: Provided, That such visas shall be issued only
in the area or areas mentioned in this paragraph,
(4) Not to exceed two thousand visas to refugees who (a) during
World War II were members of the armed forces of the Republic of
Poland, (b) were honorably discharged from such forces, (c) reside on
the date of the enactment of this Act in the British Isles, and (d) have
not acquired British citizenship.
(5) Not to exceed forty-five thousand visas to refugees of Italian
ethnic origin, residing on the date of the enactment of this Act in
Italy or in the Free Territory of Trieste: Provided, That such visas
shall be issued only in the area or areas mentioned in this paragraph.
(6) Not to exceed fifteen thousand visas to persons of Italian ethnic
origin, residing on the date of the enactment of this Act in Italy or in
the Free Territory of Trieste, who qualify under any of the prefer-
ences specified in paragraph (2), (3) or (4) of section 203 (a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act: Provided, That such visas shall
be issued only in Italy or in the Free Territory of Trieste.
(7) Not to exceed fifteen thousand visas to refugees of Greek ethnic
origin residing on the date of the enactment of this Act in Greece:
Provided, That such visas shall be issued only in Greece.
(8) Not to exceed two thousand visas to persons of Greek ethnic
origin, residing on the date of the enactment of this Act in Greece, who
qualify under any of the preferences specified in paragraph (2), (3)
or (4) of section 203 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act:
Provided, That such visas shall be issued only in Greece.
(9) Not to exceed fifteen thousand visas to refugees of Dutch ethnic
origin residing on the date of the enactment of this Act in continental
Netherlands: Provided, That such visas shall be issued only in con-
tinental Netherlands.
(10) Not to exceed two thousand visas to persons of Dutch ethnic
origin, residing on the date of the enactment of this Act in continental
Netherlands, who qualify under any of the preferences specified in
paragraph (2), (3) or (4) of section 203 (a) of the Immigration and
I
b
SI
ai
23 is Oosten
II
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3237
Nationality Act: Provided, That such visas shall be issued only in
continental Netherlands.
(11) Not to exceed two thousand visas to refugees, residing within
the district of an American consular office in the Far East: Provided,
That such visas shall be issued only in said consular office district and
only to refugees who are not indigenous to the area described in this
paragraph.
(12) Not to exceed three thousand visas to refugees, residing within
the district of an American consular office in the Far East: Provided,
That such visas shall be issued only in said consular office district and
only to refugees who are indigenous to the area described in this
paragraph.
(13) Not to exceed two thousand visas to refugees of Chinese ethnic
origin whose passports for travel to the United States are endorsed by
the Chinese National Government or its authorized representatives.
(14) Not to exceed two thousand visas to refugees who on the date
of the enactment of this Act are eligible to receive assistance from
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East: Provided, That such visas shall be issued only in the
area described in this paragraph.
(b) The allotments provided in subsection (a) of this section shall
be available for the issuance of immigrant visas to the spouses and
unmarried sons or daughters under twenty-one years of age, including
stepsons or stepdaughters and sons or daughters adopted prior to
July 1, 1953, referred to in section 3 of this Act, of persons referred
to in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Any allotments of visas provided in paragraphs (5) and (6),
paragraphs (7) and (8), and paragraphs (9) and (10) of subsection
(a) of this section, shall be available bilaterally within each of the
three ethnic groups therein defined.
ORPHANS
SEC. 5. (a) Not to exceed four thousand special nonquota immi-
grant visas may be issued to eligible orphans as defined in this Act
who are under ten years of age at the time the visa is issued: Provided,
That not more than two such special nonquota immigrant visas may
be issued to eligible orphans adopted or to be adopted by any one
United States citizen and spouse, unless necessary to prevent the
Separation of brothers or sisters.
(b) When used in this Act the term "eligible orphan” shall mean
an alien child (1) who is an orphan because of the death or disappear-
ance of both parents, or because of abandonment or desertion by, or
separation or loss from, both parents, or who has only one parent due
to the death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or
separation or loss from the other parent and the remaining parent is
incapable
of providing care for such orphan and has in writing irrev-
ocably released him for emigration and adoption; (2) (a) who has
been lawfully adopted abroad by a United States citizen and spouse,
or (b) for whom assurances, satisfactory to the consular officer to
whom a visa application on behalf of the orphan is made, have been
3238
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
a
IS
w
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
en
SO
19
m
mi
given by a United States citizen and spouse that if the orphan is
admitted into the United States they will adopt him in the United
States and will care for him properly; and (3) who is ineligible for
admission into the United States solely because the nonpreference PE
portion of the quota to which he would otherwise be chargeable is th
oversubscribed by applicants registered on the consular waiting list
at the time his visa application is made: Provided, That no natural
parent of any eligible orphan who shall be admitted into the United
States pursuant to this Act shall thereafter, by virtue of such parent-
age, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under the Immigration
w
and Nationality Act.
be
(c) The assurances required in this section shall be in lieu of the al
assurances required in section 7 of this Act, and the provisions of sec-
tion 7 (d) (2) shall not apply to eligible orphans as defined in this su
section.
pa
be
ot
SEC. 6. Any alien who establishes that prior to July 1, 1953, he
lawfully entered the United States as a bona fide nonimmigrant and
that he is unable to return to the country of his birth, or nationality
,
or last residence because of persecution or fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, or political opinion, or who was brought to the
United States from other American republics for internment, may, not
au
later than June 30, 1955, apply to the Attorney General of the United sh
States for an adjustment of his immigration status. If the Attorney im
General shall, upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances mi
of the case, determine that such alien has been of good moral character
for the preceding five years and that the alien was physically present
in the United States on the date of the enactment of this Act and is
me
otherwise qualified under all other provisions of the Immigration and Sta
Nationality Act except that the quota to which he is chargeable is tyj
oversubscribed, the Attorney General shall report to the Congress all
tio
the pertinent facts in the case. If, during the session of the Congress
in which a case is reported or prior to the end of the session of the
Congress next following the session in which a case is reported, the
Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it of
approves the granting of the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence to such alien, the Attorney General is authorized, of
upon the payment of the required visa fee, which shall be deposited sul
in the Treasury of the United States to the account of miscellaneous of
receipts, to record the alien's lawful admission for permanent residence
as of the date of the passage of such concurrent resolution. If, within fift
the above specified time, the Congress does not pass such a concurrent
resolution, or, if either the Senate or the House of Representatives qu
passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not approve
the
of
granting of the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent sat
residence, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien in
to
the manner provided by law: Provided, That the provisions of this
section shall not be applicable to any aliens admitted into the United
States under the provisions of Public Law 584, Seventy-ninth Con-
CO.
an
SOI
mi
to
bei
sec
4
ant
arr
me
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3239
gress, second session (60 Stat. 754), Public Law 402, Eightieth Con-
gress, second session (62 Stat. 6): Provided further, That the number of
aliens who shall be granted the status of aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence pursuant to this section shall not exceed five
thousand.
ASSURANCES
.
5
e
e
at
d
Y
ES
er
it
Sec. 7. (a) Except as otherwise herein provided, no visa shall be
issued to any alien under this Act unless an assurance, in accordance
with regulations promulgated pursuant to this Act, shall first have
been given by a citizen or citizens of the United States that such
2
alien, if admitted into the United States, will be suitably employed
without displacing some other person from employment and that
such alien and the members of such alien's family who shall accom-
pany such alien and who propose to live with such alien will not
become public charges and will have housing without displacing some
other person from such housing. The spouse and unmarried depend-
ent sons and daughters under twenty-one years of age, including step-
2
sons and stepdaughters and sons or daughters adopted prior to July 1,
1 1953, of such alien, shall not be required to have such assurances
made in their behalf. The assurances shall be submitted to the Ad-
ministrator and it shall be the duty of the Administrator to verify the
authenticity and bona fides of such assurances and such assurances
shall be subject to final acceptance and approval by consular and
immigration officers. Blanket assurances, or assurances not sub-
mitted by a responsible individual citizen or citizens, shall not be
considered as satisfying the requirements of this section. The assur-
ances for employment and housing shall be indexed and filed in such
manner so as to show the specific address or addresses in the United
d
States in which both the employment and housing are available, the
type of employment and housing which are available, and the condi-
11 tions and terms of the employment. Each assurance shall be a per-
sonal obligation of the individual citizen or citizens giving or sub-
mitting such assurance. This subsection shall have no applicability
to the alien eligible under paragraph (6), (8), or (10) of section 4 (a)
it of this Act, if such alien provides satisfactory evidence that he will not
become a public charge. No visa shall be issued under the allot
d
of forty-five thousand visas heretofore made by paragraph (5) of
d
subsection 4 (a) of this Act to refugees in Italy, or under the allotment
of fifteen thousand visas heretofore made by paragraph (7) of sub-
section 4 (a) of this Act to refugees in Greece, or under the allotment of
fifteen thousand visas heretofore made by paragraph (9) of subsection
4 (a) of this Act to refugees in the Netherlands, to an alien who
qualifies under the preferences specified in paragraph (2), (3), or (4)
of section 203 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, untiſ
at satisfactory evidence is presented to the responsible consular officer
to establish that the alien in question will have suitable employment
and housing, without displacing any other person therefrom, after
ed arrival in the United States. Verification of such available employ-
ment and housing shall be made in accordance with such regulations
IS
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Dr
IS
do 3.5th 3.9.33
De
3240
1950–1955
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
th
of
Ac
ra
ра
of
SE
as the Administrator may, in his discretion, prescribe for the adminis-
tration of the Act, including job order clearances by the United States
Employment Service and its affiliated State employment services, and
a certification by local housing authorities wherever they exist and are
authorized and prepared to make such certifications.
(b) Any alien admitted under this Act and subsequently deter-
mined to have been inadmissible under the provisions of this Act at
the time of entry shall, irrespective of the date of his entry, be taken
into custody and deported in the manner provided by sections 242 and
243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 208–214).
(c) Assistance rendered an alien in connection with his transporta-
tion to and resettlement in the United States shall not be regarded as
a cause for excludability as an alien likely to become a public charge.
No alien with respect to whom assurances have been furnished as
provided in this section shall be deemed to be a pauper under para-
graph (8) of section 212 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(66 Stat. 182).
(d) No alien shall be issued a visa under this Act or be admitted
into the United States unless he shall present to the consular officer
at the time of making application for a visa or to the immigration
officer at the time of application for admission (1) a valid unexpired
passport or other suitable travel document, or document of identity
or nationality, or other documentary evidence that he will be assured
of readmission to the country of his nationality, foreign residence or
in which he obtains a visa under this Act and (2) a certificate of read-
mission guaranteeing his readmission to the country in which he
obtains a visa under this Act if it is subsequently found that he
obtained a visa under this Act by fraud or by misrepresenting &
material fact.
ad
the
in
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS
are
by
AT
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int
SEC. 8. The Secretary of State may, for the purposes of this Act,
make such arrangements with foreign governments and with the
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration as are neces-
sary and appropriate for the purpose of financing the overseas trans-
portation of persons who may be issued visas under this Act, such
arrangements to be mutually beneficial to the economies of the United
States and the countries concerned, as well as to such persons. Such
arrangements, where appropriate, may seek to enable immigrants
under this Act to transfer into dollar currency personal assets neces-
sary for defraying the cost of transportation and for use in the United
States. Arrangements between the United States and the other gov-
ernments concerned and the Intergovernmental Committee for Euro-
pean Migration should also provide for such cooperation and assist-
ance as may be required in the administration of the program author-
ized under this Act in the territory of the intending immigrant's
residence. All transportation by ships or airplanes of aliens under
this Act to the United States, the cost of which is defrayed in whole
or in part by the Government of the United States, shall be by ships
or airplanes registered under the United States flag, if available.
reg
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Th
Sei
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an
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(a)
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3241
SEC. 9. Within the categories established in section 4 of this Act
the determination of the eligibility of persons to receive visas and
of the admissibility of such persons into the United States under this
Act shall be made without discrimination in favor of or against a
race, religion, or the national origin of such persons.
EXEMPTIONS FROM VISA FEES
Sec. 10. Persons receiving visas under this Act shall be exempt from
paying the fees prescribed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 281
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 230-231).
1
5
1
r
e
2
SECURITY AND OTHER INVESTIGATION; EFFECT OF MISREPRESENTATION
SEC. 11. (a) No alien shall be issued a visa under this Act or be
admitted into the United States unless there shall have first been a
thorough investigation and written report made and prepared by such
investigative agency or agencies of the Government of the United
States as the President shall designate, regarding such person's
character, reputation, mental and physical health, history and eligi-
bility under this Act, and such investigations in each case shall be
conducted in a manner and in such time as the investigative agency or
agencies shall determine to be necessary.
(b) No person shall be issued a visa or be admitted into the United
States under this Act if the consular officer or the immigration officer
knows or has reason to believe that such person is ineligible for a visa
or is subject to exclusion from the United States under any provision
of the immigration laws or is not eligible under the terms of this Act.
(C) No person shall be issued a visa or be admitted into the United
States under this Act unless the consular officer and the immigration
officer, after an inspection and examination of such person abroad,
are entirely satisfied upon the basis of affirmative evidence adduced
by the applicant that the applicant has established his eligibility for
à visa and his admissibility into the United States under this Act and
under the immigration laws and regulations: Provided, That no per-
son to whom a visa shall be issued shall be exempt from inspection and
examination at a port of entry.
(d) No person shall be issued a visa under this Act or be admitted
into the United States unless complete information shall be available
regarding the history of such person covering a period of at least two
years immediately preceding his application for a visa: Provided,
That this provision may be waived on the recommendation of the
Secretaries of State and Defense when determined by them to be in
the national interest.
(e) Any person who shall make a material misrepresentation to
any agency of the Government entrusted directly or indirectly with
the administration, investigation, enforcement, or any other function
relating to the implementation of this Act, for the purpose of gaining
admission into the United States as an alien eligible hereunder, shall
be excluded from admission into the United States under section 212
(a) (19) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 183).
3
1
1
1
3
1
S
r
e
S
3242
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955
PRIORITIES
SEC. 12. Priorities in the consideration of visa applications under
this Act, except in the case of applications filed under paragraph (6), the
(8) or (10) of section 4 (a), without priority in time of issuance of sha
visas as between such priorities or as between priority and non-
priority cases under this Act shall be given to-
(1) Persons whose services or skills are needed in the United States,
if such need has been certified to the Administrator, at his request
,
ret
by the United States Employment Service and who are to be employed
to
in a capacity calling for such services or such skills; and
the
(2) Persons who are (A) the parents of citizens of the United States,
fro
such citizens being at least twenty-one years of age, or (B) spouses
or unmarried sons or daughters under twenty-one years of age, in-
cluding stepsons or stepdaughters and sons or daughters adopted
wh
prior to July 1, 1953, of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
rul
residence, or (C) brothers, sisters, sons or daughters of citizens of
Th
the United States.
SEC. 13. No priority in the consideration of visa applications under
No
this Act shall be given to persons who were determined to be eligible
or preliminarily eligible under the provisions of section (2) (c) of
Public Law 774, Eightieth Congress, as amended,' solely because such
Per
persons were determined to be so eligible or preliminarily eligible.
res
and
on
the
me
@
a I
Na
as 1
PERSONS INELIGIBLE; OATH ON ADMISSION; PENALTIES
SEC. 14. (a) No visa shall be issued under this Act to any person
who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person
or group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin.
(b) Before being issued a visa every alien eighteen years of age or
older, authorized to be admitted under this Act, shall take and sub-
scribe an oath or affirmation that he is not and never has been a person
specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), or (H)
of section 212 (a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66
Stat. 184-186), except as provided in subparagraph (I) of such section,
and shall be liable to prosecution for perjury if such oath or affirmation
is willfully false. If any alien not entitled to be issued a visa under
this Act and not entitled to be admitted into the United States shall
nevertheless gain admission, such alien shall, regardless of the date
of his entry, be taken into custody and deported in the manner pro-
vided in sections 242 and 243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(66 Stat. 208–214).
(c) Any person or persons who shall knowingly violate, conspire
to violate, induce or attempt to induce any person to violate any pro-
vision of this Act shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not more than $10,000 or shall be imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
S
Coz
on
a fi
full
the
S
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1
1 PL 774, 80th Cong., 2d sess., June 25, 1948; 62 Stat. 1009.
ORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3243
APPLICABILITY OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
SEC. 15. Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act all of
the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 163)
shall be applicable under this Act.
LOANS
5
SEC. 16. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to make loans not
to exceed $5,000,000 in the aggregate, to public or private agencies of
the United States for the purpose of financing the transportation
from ports of entry within the United States to the places of their
resettlement, of persons receiving immigrant visas under this Act,
and who lack resources to finance the expenses involved. Such loans,
which shall mature not later than June 30, 1963, shall be made under
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to this Act: Provided,
That such loans shall bear interest at a rate of 3 per centum per annum
on the unpaid balance from their maturity date until final payment.
No public or private agency shall be eligible to receive a loan under
the provisions of this Act while such agency is in default in the pay-
ment of any loan made to it pursuant to the provisions of the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
ELIGIBLE ALIENS TO BE NONQUOTA IMMIGRANTS
Sec. 17. Any alien granted a visa under this Act shall be deemed
a nonquota immigrant for the purposes of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (66 Stat. 163).
r
1
1
r
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 18. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such funds
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
REPORTS
1
C
1
SEC. 19. The Administrator shall report to the President and the
Congress on the operation of the program established under this Act
on or about January 15 and June 15 of each year and shall submit
a final report not later than June 15, 1957. Such reports shall include
full and complete details regarding the administration of the Act and
the administration of the funds provided for in section 16 of this Act.
t
TERMINATION
Sec. 20. No immigrant visa shall be issued under this Act after
December 31, 1956.
1
1 Ibid.
3244
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950–1955
11. REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE REFUGEE RELIEF
PROGRAM, DECEMBER 31, 1955 (Excerpt), With Chart
1
PART I-PROGRESS REPORT
GENERAL STATEMENT
1955
1
More than two-thirds of the life of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953,
as amended, has run its course. The original legislation was enacted
by the Congress on August 7, 1953, with a specified termination date
of December 31, 1956.
Of the 209,000 nonquota immigrant visas allocated by the Congress
for issuance under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as amended, 73,331
visas have been issued worldwide as of December 31, 1955. Of this
total, 77 percent were issued during 1955 and 49 percent from July 1,
1955, to January 1, 1956. Visas were refused or canceled on an
additional 21,997 applicants. More than 107,000 applications are
currently under active consideration. These pending applications
probably will yield some 77,000 visas if the present rejection and
cancellation rates continue. Procedures have been streamlined and
paperwork cut considerably. There has been a substantial reduction
in the period between the time an assurance is received by the Office
of the Administrator in Washington and the time a final visa deter-
mination is made by the appropriate American consular authority
abroad. Security requirements have been held at the level deemed
necessary by the proper authorities to protect the best interests of the
United States. Însofar as the factors are under the control of the
Government, the program is prepared to issue as many visas as
possible in each of the categories and in the areas authorized.
The refugee relief program is not a single program but a composite
of different programs for diverse beneficiaries in various areas. Pro-
gram prospects and status, therefore, are better viewed in the light of
the various categories of beneficiaries in each area. Certain indi-
vidual visa allocations will be, or have already been, reached. On the
other hand, it is doubtful if allotments in other categories will be met.
It is evident that, under existing circumstances, and barring unfore-
seen changes, considerably less than the authorized 209,000 nonquote
immigrant visas will be issued by the termination of the refugee relief
program on December 31, 1956." The graphic presentation given here
(fig. 1) illustrates this fact. Figure I shows the current status of the
program by section of the act in terms of visas already issued plus the
potential yield from pending applications and shows quite vividly the
extent to which additional assurances would be required for the
issuance of the full allotment of visas.
HUDIA
STATUS OF PROGRAM - IEC. 31,
1 Fifth Semiannual Report of the Administrator of the Refugee Relief Act of 1968,
As Amended (House Judiciary Committee print), Mar. 6, 1956.
2 Supra.
1.8.51
53,
je
he
ᎾᏓ
li-
of
Du
te
En saan B
1,
w
ie
FIGURE 1
STATUS OF PROGRAM - DEC.
1955
Numerical
Authorization
as follows:
90,000
10,000
2,000
209,000
60.000
17,000
17.000
2,000
5,000
2,000
4,000
Section:
4(a)
4(a)
4(a)
4(a)
4(a)
4(a)
4(a)
· 4(a)
4(a)
1&2
3
5&6
7&8
9&10
11
12013
4(c)
4(c)
4(c)
100-
95
90
1
85
36
80
40
Potential
Yield. From
Assurances on
Hand,
75
71
70
65
70
60
57
55
55
53
50
45
40
23
37
35
45
64
60
Visas Already
Issued
30
1
25
47
20
17
14
30
30
15
26
12
10
18.5
12
5
Expeilee & Escapee
Germany &
Austria
Escapee
NATO & Turkey,
Sweden, Iran,
Trieste
Polish Veteran
Great Britain
20
5
0
Asian & Chinese
Nationalist Refugec
Far East & World Wide
Refugee & Relative
Refugee & Relative
Greece
Refugee & Relalive
Netherlands
Non-Asian Refugee
Far East
Palestinian Refugce
Near East
Orphan
World Wide
Italy
SUMMARY INDEX
(Names of persons, except those of the two Presidents and two Secretaries of State
whose terms of office are covered by this compilation, have been omitted.)
Acheson, Dean (addresses, statements, ments concerning, 376-377, 381, 2496,
correspondence, etc.): Asia, U.S. posi- 2497, 2500, 2504.
tion in, 1436–1437, 2310–2322; Aus- Aggression, problem of defining in U.N.,
trian State Treaty, 38, 1823-1824; 200–204.
Bonn agreements, 1727-1728; China, Agricultural Trade Development and
"People's Republic of, U.S.S.R. rela- Assistance Act of 1954 (as amended),
tions with, 2.65-2468, U.N. represen- 2941-2947.
tation of, 340–341; China, Republic of, Agricultural workers, U. S.-Mexican
U.S. policy respecting, 2449-2452; agreement on, 1376-1403.
collective security, 169-179, 2616– Albania (see also Europe, Eastern):
2617; Czechoslovakia, Slansky trial in, Eastern European Mutual Assistance
2111-2112; Europe, Eastern, U.S. pol- Treaty (Warsaw Pact) ratified by,
icy in, 2067–2068; Europe, Western, 1239n; Prague Conference of 1950
U.S. policy in, 1432-1441; Foreign attended by, 1782n; U.N. membership
Ministers' consultations (1950), 1432– of, 136n, 335n, 337; U.S. policy
1441; Foreign Ministers' deputies respecting, 2085-2086.
meeting (1951), 1789–1793; German Algeria, U.N. debate on, 2301-2302.
remilitarization, reunification, etc., American Republics (see also American,
1782–1784; Hungary, release of U.S. Inter-American, and individual coun-
fliers, 2123; Indochina, U.S. economic try headings): "atoms for peace"
and military aid to, 2365-2366; Italy, program, participation in, 1340n;
release of from peace treaty obliga- communism (international), measures
tions, 1683, U.S. economic aid to, against adopted by, 1292–1302; cul-
1681–1683; Japanese-U.S. security tural exchange program (U.S.) with,
treaty, 886-888; Korea, U. S. policy 1327–1330; economic and technical
respecting, 171, 174, 176-178, 1948–
programs in, 1316–1325, 1333–1336,
1952, 2527-2528, 2533-2536, 2551, 1338-1340; Finance and Economy,
2615–2622, 2649–2650, 2666-2667, meeting of Ministers of, 1337-1340;
2668; Libya, independence of, 2303; fisheries problems in, 1343–1346,
Middle East Command, 2182-2183; 1356–1364; Foreign Affairs, Fourth
national defense, 13-16, 17, 18; North Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
Atlantic Council activities, 1624–1629; of, Final Act of, 1292–1299; military
North Atlantic Treaty, 815-825, 854- assistance agreements (U.S.) with,
864, 1505–1519; Rumania, travel re- 1303; nonintervention principle in,
strictions in, 2151-2152; Spain, U.S. 1271-1274; technical cooperation pro-
relations with, 1690–1696; U.S.S.R., gram in, chart of, 1326.
relations with, 6-10, 170–171, 1928- American States, Organization of
1936, 1944-1952; U.S. foreign policy, (OAS): charter establishing, ratifica-
5–18, 25, 32–39.
tions of, 1278n; Council of, decisions
Afghanistan:
Afro-Asian (Bandung) and resolutions by, 1260-1292, 1311;
Conference attended by, 2344; U.N.,
technical cooperation program of,
admitted to, 136n; U.S. emergency
chart of, 1326.
food aid program for, 2229-2230. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement
Africa (see also individual country Antarctic region, claims in, 1430–1431.
(Bogotá Pact), ratifications of, 1278n.
headings), 2296-2309.
ANZUS Council, communiqués on meet-
Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference: com- ings of, 2328–2333.
muniqué of, 2344-2352; preliminaries ANZUS Treaty: text, 878–880; U.S.
for, 2344n; U.S. addresses and state- ratification action on, 463, 880–885.
I
II
SUMMARY INDEX
Arab League. (See Arab States, League national technical conference on,
of.)
2823–2832, 2836, 2837; U.N. General
Arab refugees. (See Palestine refugees.) Assembly resolutions on, 2823–2824,
Arab States (see also Arab-Israeli 2837–2841; U.S. addresses and state-
relations and regional and individual ments on and proposals for, 96-98,
country headings); defense and eco- 377-378, 385–386, 1705, 1706, 2011,
nomic cooperation, treaty for, text 2798-2805.
and ratifications, 1249-1253, 1249n; Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 2853–2877.
. League of, pact establishing, text and Atomic Energy Agency, International,
ratifications, 1243–1249, 1243n. 2802–2804, 2805–2808, 2809-2810,
Arab-Israeli relations (see also Arab 2823, 2824, 2832–2835.
States and regional and individual Atomic Energy Commission, United
country headings): armistice agree- Nations, 348n, 348–349, 2745–2747,
ments governing, texts of, 698-724; 2837, 2839–2840.
armistice borders, tripartite declara- Atomic Energy Commission, United
tion on, 2237-2238; U.N. Conciliation States (see also Atomic Energy Act of
Commission for Palestine, role in, 1954), 2825–2826, 2860-2861.
2244-2245; U.N. Truce Supervision Australia (see also ANZUS and SEATO
Organization, role in, 2241–2244, headings, and Southeast Asia): Col-
2248–2250; U.S. addresses and state- ombo Plan, member of, 2339; Japa-
ments on, 374-375, 2170–2171, 2174 nese peace treaty ratified by, 437n;
2175, 2177-2180.
Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Argentina: atomic energy, civil uses of, Treaty ratified by, 915n; trust ter-
U.S. agreement with, 2883n; Japanese ritories administered by, 153n; U.N.
peace treaty ratified by, 437n; Rio ECOSOC, member of, 149n; U.N.
Treaty, ratified by, 811n, reservations Security Council, nonpermanent
at signing, 795; U.N. ECOSOC, member of, 141n.
member of, 149n; U.N. Security Austria (see also Austrian State Treaty
Council, nonpermanent member of, headings) : Austrian State Treaty
141n; U.N. Trusteeship Council, ratified by, 683n; EPU membership
member of, 155n.
of, 1012; neutrality of, 687-688,
Armaments, conventional, limitation 1777-1778, 1859-1860, 1866; Occu-
and control of (see also Disarmament), pation regime in, easing of, 1822-
work of U.N. respecting, 2739–2745. 1823; OEEC convention ratified by,
Armaments, regulation and limitation 998n; Soviet interference in, 1766-
of. (See Atomic energy and Dis- 1769, 1769–1776; travel requirements
armament.)
in, 1769; U.N. membership of, 136n,
Armed Forces (U.S.) abroad, criminal 335n, 337, 688–689; U.S. relations
jurisdiction over, 1532-1534, 1565– with, communiqué on, 1776–1777.
1566, 1572–1575, 1577, 1579–1580, Austrian State Treaty:
1581-1593, 2215-2217.
draft texts: abbreviated ("short
Arrest of Sea-Going Ships, International draft”), 1829–1832; "long draft”,
Convention for the Unification of 1833n;
Certain Rules Relating to, ratification text (final), 643–675, accessions to,
action on, 319n.
672n, ratifications of, 683n, U.S.
Asia. (See Far East, Southeast Asia, ratification action on, 676-697.
and individual country headings.) Austrian State Treaty negotiations:
Atomic energy (see also other Atomic conference on (Berlin Foreign Min-
energy headings): information
on, isters Meeting), 1840-1841,
1842
sharing of, 1635n, 2853-2860, 2861- 1844-1845, 1847-1849, 1858–1861,
2883; radiation effects of, U.N. 1864-1867, (quadripartite commun.
resolution on, 2840-2841.
iqué) 1870, (tripartite communiqué)
Atomic energy, international control of 1870-1871, 1874, 1876;
(see also other Atomic energy headings deputies (Foreign Ministers) for,
and Disarmament): U.S. addresses work of, 1826, 1837, 1877-1881;
and statements concerning, 52–54, U.N.' General Assembly resolu-
163–164, 175, 348-350, 1933, 2798- tions concerning, 678, 1834-1835;
2805; U.S. proposals for, 2757-2759, U.S. addresses and statements on,
2767, 2783–2789.
38, 68, 83, 94, 355, 367, 1824-1826;
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of (see Western Powers (France, U.K.,
also other Atomic energy headings) : U. S.) action on:
international agreements for, 2835- declarations and statements, 1458
,
2836, 2837, 2883–2887, 2883n; inter- 1722, 1822, 1827, 1884; notes to
1
]
1
communiqués
,
SUMMARY INDEX
III
11
d
d
of
3
e
7.
at
-Y
y
l-
.
U.S.S.R., 1791, 1826, 1828–1829, ments concerning, 1858–1861, 1864-
1832–1833, 1835–1836, 1837–1838, 1867; China, "People's Republic" of,
1840-1841, 1842, 1844-1845, 1846, question of participation in, 1842,
1882-1883, 1885; summary of, 1877- 1843, 1846-1847, 1849; Germany,
1881,
U.S. statements concerning, 1850–
Azores, U.S. military facilities in, 1855, 1859, 1869–1870; Korea, prob-
agreement with Portugal concerning, lem of considered at, 2685; prepara-
1685 1689.
tions for, 1839-1850; report on,
85–90; U.S. addresses and statements
Bacterial weapons.
(See Disarma- at, 1850–1870.
ment.)
Bermuda Conference of Heads of Gov.
Baghdad Pact (Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, ernment, 1953 (France, U.K., and
Turkey, and U.K.): text and rati- U.S.): communiqué of, 1468–1470.
fications of, 1257–1259, 1257n. Bogotá Pact. (See American Treaty on
Balkan Pact (Greece, Turkey, and Pacific Settlement.)
Yugoslavia): agreements constitut- Bolivia: Rio Treaty ratified by, 811n.
ing and ratifications of, 1235-1239; Bonn Agreements of 1952, as amended
1235n.
in 1954, 483–610.
Baltic States (see also individual country Borneo (British): Colombo Plan, mem-
headings), U.S. policy respecting ber of, 2339.
sovereignty of, 2006-2091.
Brazil: atomic energy, civil uses of, U.S.
Bandung Conference. (See Afro-Asian agreement with, 2883n; Japanese
Conference.)
peace treaty ratified by, 438n; Rio
Battle Act. (See Mutual Defense As- Treaty ratified by, 811n; U.N.
sistance Control Act.)
ECOSOC, member of, 149n; U.N.
Belgium; atomic energy, civil uses of, Security Council, nonpermanent
U.S. agreement with concerning, member of, 141n.
2883n; Brussels Treaty ratified by, Brussels Treaty, 1948 (see also Western
971n, Paris protocols to ratified by, European Union): text, 968-971;
975n; Council of Europe, Statute of ratifications of, 971n; amendments of
ratified by, 1011n; European Coal by London Conference Final Act,
and Steel Community treaty ratified 1476–1479, 1483, by Paris protocols,
by, 1077n; EDC treaty, parliament- 972–989; Germany, Federal Republic
ary action on by, 1471n; EPU of, accession to, 972-976; Italy, ac-
membership of, 1012; Japanese peace cession to, 972-976.
treaty ratified by, 438n; North At- Bulgaria: Eastern European Mutual
lantic Treaty ratified by, 814n, pro- Assistance Treaty (Warsaw Pact)
tocols to accepted by, 854n, 872n; ratified by, 1239n; peace treaty with,
OEEC convention ratified by, 998n; violation of human rights provisions
trust territories administered by, of by, 2070-2081; Prague Conference
153n; U.N. ECOSOC, member of, of 1950 attended by, 1782n; U.N.
149n; U.N. Security Council, non- membership of, 136n, 335n, 337; U.S.
permanent member of, 141n; U.S. relations with, 2091-2095.
relations with, communiqué on, 1660- Burma: Afro-Asian Conference attended
1661.
by, 2344; Chinese forces in, 2353;
Bell Report. (See Mutual Security, Colombo' Conference attended by,
Public Advisory Board for, report of, 2344n; Colombo Plan, member of,
and Philippines, Republic of: eco- 2339; independence of, 34n, 51n,
nomic survey mission to, report of.) 2312n; Japan, peace treaty with, 439n;
Berlin: access to (see also Germany, U.N. membership of, 136n; U.N.
Soviet Zone of), 1765, 1939; Bonn Trusteeship Council, member of,
agreements, provisions of regarding, 155n; U.S. relations with, communi-
486, 488, 490, 533; uprising in
qué on, 2354.
(1953), 1744-1746; Western Powers' Buy American Act, revision of, 2921,
position in, agreements, commun-
2936.
iqués, declarations, and reports con- Byelorussian S.S.R.: U.N. ECOSOC,
cerning, 612, 617-618, 638, 1198, member of, 149n.
1482–1483, 1737, 1740–1742, 1758.
Berlin Foreign Ministers Meeting, 1954 Cambodia (see also Indochina): Afro-
(France, U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.): Asian Conference attended by, 2344;
communiqué (quadripartite) of, 1870, armistice agreement in, 767-775;
2372–2373; communiqué (tripartite) Colombo Plan, member of, 2339;
of, 1870-1871; Austria, U.S. state- independence of in French Union,
41690057_vol. 2 101
s
n,
7.
rt
-
0,
S.
n.
2,
-1,
D-
é)
or,
U-
on
26;
I,
és,
58.
to
IV
SUMMARY INDEX
51n, 74; Japanese peace treaty rati- tions concerning, 2496–2510, U.S.
fied by, 438n; U.N. membership of, aggression in charged by, 174–175,
136n, 335n, 337; U.S. aid program for, 2469-2470, 2476-2481,
2476-2481, 2487-2490;
2401.
Geneva Conference on Korea and
Canada (see also NATO headings and Indochina, position of at, 2382–2390,
St. Lawrence Seaway): atomic energy, 2695-2701; Indochina, intervention
civil uses of, U.S. agreement with, in by, 2370–2371, 2373–2381, 2393–
2883n; Colombo Plan, member of, 2395; Korea, aggression in by, 2581-
2339; Defense, Permanent Joint 2585, 2593-2594, 2602–2609; recog-
(Canadian-U.S.) Board on, 1405; nition of by U.S., question of, 87–88,
defense relations with U.S., 1405– 2376–2377, 2462, 2497-2498; students
1406, 1427-1430, 1451; Distant Early of in U.S., question of return of, 2492,
Warning (DEW) Line in, establish- 2505, 2506–2507, 2514, 2515, 2516-
ment of, 1429; economic relations with 2517, 2518; travel restrictions in,
U.S., 1403-1405; Europe, military 2084-2085; U.S.S.R., treaty of alli-
commitments of in, 1480, 1489–1490; ance with, text and interpretation of,
Industrial Mobilization Planning 2463–2468; U.N. representation of,
Committee, Joint Canadian-U.S., question of, 338–342, 2377–2378,
1403; International (Canadian-U.S.) 2462; U.S. consular posts and per-
Joint Commission, 1407; Japanese sonnel in, closing and withdrawal of,
peace treaty ratified by, 437n; Mid- 2453–2456; U.S. nationals imprisoned
Canada Defense Line in, establish- by, efforts for release of, 2511-2514,
ment of, 1429-1430; North Atlantic 2515-2519.
Treaty ratified by, 814n, protocols to China, Republic of (see also Far East
accepted by, 854n, 872n; "Pine Tree" and Formosa): atomic energy, civil
Line in, establishment of, 1427-1428; uses of, U.S. agreement with, 2883n;
Trade and Economic Affairs, Joint Burma, forces of in, 2353; economic
Canadian-U.S. Committee on, 1404; aid (U.S.) to, 2449, 2452, 2459-2462;
U.N. ECOSOC, member of, 149n; Formosa, withdrawal to, 2313–2314;
U.N. Security Council, nonpermanent Japan, separate peace treaty with,
member of, 141n.
439n, 460n; Japanese peace treaty,
Captive peoples, draft House resolution position of respecting, 460-461; Korea,
on, 1957–1961.
offer of troops for service in by, 2541-
Caracas Conference. (See Inter-Amer- 2542; mutual defense assistance agree-
ican Conference, Tenth.)
ment with U.S., 2470-2471; mutual
Caracas Declaration, 1299-1300.
defense treaty with U.S., 945–947,
Ceylon: Afro-Asian Conference attended supplementary notes and statement
by, 2344; Colombo Conference at- concerning, 947–949, U.S. ratification
tended by, 2344n; Colombo Plan, action on, 950-965, U.S. statement on,
member of, 2339; dominion status of, 2323–2326; people of, U.S. friendship
34n, 51n, 464n, 2312n; Japanese peace for, address concerning, 2472-2475;
treaty ratified by, 438n; U.N. mem- U.N. ECOSOC, member of, 149n;
bership of, 136n, 335n, 337.
U.N. representation of, 338–342,
Chile: atomic energy, civil uses of, 2377–2378, 2462.
U.S. agreement with, 2883n; fisheries Collision (at sea), International Con-
problem concerning, 1356–1364; vention on Certain Rules Concerning
Japanese peace treaty ratified by, 438n; Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of,
Rio Treaty, declaration of concerning,
796, ratified by, 811n; U.N. ECOSOC, Collisions or Other Incidents of Naviga-
ratification action on, 319n.
member of, 149n;' U.N. Security
tion, International Convention for
Council, nonpermanent member of,
the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
141n.
lating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters
China, "People's Republic" of (Com-
munist China) (see also Far East,
of, ratification action on, 318n.
Formosa, and Korea headings): Afro- Colombia: atomic energy, civil uses of,
Asian Conference attended by, 2344;
U.S. agreement with, 2883n; Peru,
aircraft and ships in the China area,
dispute with, 1290; Rio Treaty
attacks on by, 2519–2523; Berlin
ratified by, 811n; U.N. ECOSOC,
Foreign Ministers Meeting, question
member of, 149n; U.N. Security
of attendance at, 1842, 1843, 1846–
Council, nonpermanent member of,
1847, 1849; embargo (U.N: and U.S.)
141n.
on, 2595, 2614–2615, 2622–2626; Colombo Conference: Afro-Asian (Ban-
Formosa area, cease-fire in, negotia- dung) Conference, plans of for, 23449.
SUMMARY INDEX
V
1
1
)
Colombo Plan; members of, 2339; U.S. Greenland, defense of, U.S. agree-
role in, 2338–2344.
ment with concerning, 1661-1667;
Colonialism, U.S. attitude respecting, North Atlantic Treaty ratified by,
847, 2173-2174.
814n, protocols to accepted by, 854n,
Cominform, establishment of, 33n. 872n; OEEC convention ratified by,
Continental shelf, doctrine of, 1352- 998n; U.N. ECOSOC, member of,
1356.
149n; U.N. Security Council, non-
Costa Rica: Japanese peace treaty permanent member of, 141n.
ratified by, 438n; Nicaragua, disputes Dhahran Airfield, facilities of, U.S.-
with, 1260-1267, 1279-1285; Rio Saudi Arabian agreement on use of,
Treaty ratified by, 811n; U.N. Trus- 2199-2206.
teeship Council, member of, 155n. Dien Bien Phu, siege and capitulation
Criminal jurisdiction. (See Armed of, 2380, 2383, 2387.
Forces (U.S.) abroad, criminal juris- Disarmament (see also Armaments and
diction over.)
Atomic energy headings) : armed
Crusade for Freedom, 2069, 2113, 2128. forces, numerical limitation of, pro-
Cuba: Dominican Republic, disputes posals concerning, 2760-2767, 2779–
with, 1286–1287, 1289–1290; Japa- 2782; atomic weapons, control of (see
nese peace treaty ratified by, 438n; Atomic energy, international control
Peru, dispute with, 1288; Rio Treaty of); bacterial weapons, elimination of,
ratified by, 811n; subversive elements
proposals
concerning, 2767–2768,
in, OAS decisions concerning, 1271- 2784-2789; conventional weapons (see
1273, 1277; U.N. ECOSOC, member Armaments, conventional); Geneva
of, 149n; U.N. Security Council, non- Conference of Heads of Government
permanent member of, 141n.
discussion of, 113, 2011, 2015-2016,
Cultural relations and exchange programs. 2841-2843; Geneva Foreign Ministers
(See International Information and Meeting discussion of, 118, 2035-2037,
Educational Exchange Programs and 2844-2846; inspection methods, pro-
individual area and country headings.) posals concerning, 378-379, 386–387,
Currency convertibility, U.S. policy re- 2016-2017, 2750-2759, 2777-2779,
specting, 2927-2929, 2939-2940
2841-2844, 2846–2850; U.S.S.R. po-
Customs Simplification Act of 1953, re- sition regarding, 1970–1971, 2773,
vision of, 2898, 2920, 2922, 2934.
2778, 2783–2786, 2788–2793, 2846–
Cyprus: Greek-Turkish dispute con- 2850; U.N. General Assembly action
cerning, 2277.
regarding, 2748–2750, 2708–2769,
Czechoslovakia: aircraft incidents with, 2796–2798, 2851–2853; U.S. addresses
2103–2104, 2112-2113, 2115-2117; on, 28-29, 69–71, 98-99, 130-131, 175,
Austrian State Treaty acceded to by, 348–350, 357, 369, 378-379, 386–387,
672n; border violations (U.S.) alleged 2011, 2794, 2841-2844; U.S. efforts to
by, 2099–2102; commercial relations promote, 1872, 1876, 2759-2760,
with, suspension of, 2106; consular 2809–2821.
establishment, reciprocal (U.S.-Czech) Dominican Republic: Cuba, disputes
curtailment of, 2095–2098; Eastern with, 1286-1287, 1289–1290; Haiti,
European Mutual Assistance Treaty disputes with, 1268–1273, 1277-1279,
(Warsaw Pact) ratified by, 1239n; 1287; Japanese peace treaty ratified
Germany, U.S. policy in, charges of by, 438n; Rio Treaty ratified by,
concerning, 2106-2108; Oatis, William siín; U.N. ECOSOC, member of,
N., imprisonment of by, 2104,2106; 149n; U.N. Trusteeship Council,
Prague Conference of 1950 attended member of, 155n.
by, 1782n; Radio Free Europe and Dulles, John Foster (addresses, state-
VOA, activities of protested by, 2099, ments, correspondence, etc.): Albania,
2101-2102; Slansky trial in, 2111- 2085–2086; American Republics, U.S.
2112; travel restrictions in, 2084- relations with, 1333–1336; ANZUS
2085; U.N. ECOSOC, member of, Treaty, 880–882; Arab States, U.S.
relations with (see Middle East
subheading, infra); Asia, U.S. position
Danube River, navigation of, treaty in, 2322–2328; Atomic Energy Agency
provisions regarding, 394, 402-403, (International), proposals for, 2805-
2808, 2809–2810; Austria, neutrality of,
Denmark: atomic energy, civil uses of, 1777–1778, 1859-1860, 1866; Austrian
U.S. agreement with, 2883n; Council State Treaty, 94, 355, 367, 676-682;
of Europe, Statute of ratified by, Baltic States, 2087--2091; Belgium,
1011n; ÊPU membership of, 1012; 1660–1661; Berlin, status of, 1758,
by
n
2,
1-
Or
TS
149n.
of,
11,
671.
Y
of
,
2
1.
VI
SUMMARY INDEX
Ei
1765, uprising in, 1745–1746; Berlin war problem in, 2703–2704, reunifica-
Foreign Ministers Meeting, 85–90, tion of, 87-88, 95, 353-354, 2383-
1850-1870; Bulgaria, 2095; captive 2385, 2679, 2685–2692; Laos, U.S.
peoples resolution, 1959–1961; China, policy in, 2369–2370; London (Nine-
People's Republic" of, Formosa Power) Conference, 1484–1487, 1492;
area cease-fire agreement with, 2496– Middle East policy, 2168-2175, 2176-
2510, Indochina, intervention in 2180, 2239, 2240–2241; NATO, U.S.
by, 2370–2371, 2373–2381, 2393– policy respecting, 1445-1449, 1655–
2395, recognition of, 2376-2377, 2497– 1657; Philippines, U.S. relations with,
2498, U.N. representation of, 341-342, 2360; Poland, U.S. policy respecting,
2377-2378; China, Republic of, mu- 2144, 2145; Rumania, U.S. relations
tual defense treaty with, 947-948, with, 2156, 2157-2159; Ryukyu Is-
950–957, 2323–2326; Cyprus dispute, lands, restoration of Japanese sov-
2276; disarmament, 98-99, 118, 357, ereignty in, 2430, retention of U.S.
369, 378-379, 2016-2017, 2035-2037, rights in, 2427-2428; SEATO, U.S.
2809-2810, 2846–2850;' East-West policy respecting, 919–928, 2326–
contacts, 2021-2032, 2037–2038; 2328; Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian agree-
Egypt, 2226, 2240-2241, 2304; ment on, 2304; Suez Base agreement
Europe, U.S. armed forces in, 1479, (U.K.-Egyptian), 2226; Thailand, U.S
1484–1487; Europe, Eastern, 355-356, policy respecting, 2369–2370; tri-
368, 2017; Europe, Western, security partite consultations (with France
of, 1441-1445, 1449-1457, 1497-1504, and U.K.), 1463–1468, 1758, 1761-
and problem of German reunification, 1762, 1884, 1926–1927, 2396-2397;
1890–1891, 1895-1896, 1903-1921, Tunisia, autonomy for, 2300;
1922–1926, 2035–2036; European De- U.S.S.R., U.S. relations with, 122,
fense Community, 95, 614, 1442,
1962-1963, 1969–1971, 2016-2018,
1443, 1446–1447, 1453–1456, 1470- 2240–2241, 2688–2689; United King-
1473, 1498; Far East, U.S. position dom, consultations with, 1704-1705,
in, 2322–2328; Formosa, U.S. policy 2239; United Nations, U.S. policy re-
respecting, 376, 954, 955–956, 2323– specting, 92-100, 323-330, 350-359,
2326, 2498–2510; France, consulta- 364-380; U.S. foreign policy, outlines
tions with, 1672–1675, 2381, 2400- of, 71-77, 80–85, 92-100, 104-111,
2401; Geneva Conference of Heads of 122–129; Viet-Nam, tinification of,
Government, 1887–1888, 1890–1891, 2404; Wriston Committee proposals,
1895-1896, 2016-2018; Geneva Con- 3211-3214.
ference on Indochina and Korea,
2383–2390; Geneva Foreign Ministers East-West contacts: Geneva Confer-
Meeting, 115–122, 1903–1921, 1922- ence of Heads of Government, dis-
1926, 2021-2032, 2035–2039, 2846– cussion of at, 114, 2010, 2012-2013,
2850; Germany, neutrality of, 1885-
Geneva Foreign Ministers
1886, 1887-1888, reunification of, Meeting, discussion of at, 2018–2035,
1843–1844, 1850-1855, 1859, 1869– 2037-2038.
1870, 1890-1891, 1895–1896, 1903- East-West trade, 36, 1992–1993, 1998.
1921, 1922–1926, 2035–2036; Ger- Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as
many, Federal Republic of, resto- amended, emergency food aid pro-
ration of sovereignty to, 613-623, gram to India under, 2227-2229.
1472, 1473-1474, 1492, 1497-1504; Economic Cooperation Administration,
Germany, Soviet Zone of, status of, transfer of functions of, 3070, 3087.
1761-1762; Goa controversy, 2294- Economic Report, Joint Congressional
2296; Greece, U.S. relations with, Committee on, 'recommendations of,
2276; Guatemala, Communist inter- 3027-3029.
vention in, 1308-1311, 1311–1316; Ecuador: fishery rights of, 1343–1346,
Hungary, U.S. relations with, 2124- 1356–1364; Japanese peace treaty
2125, 2134-2135; India, U.S. rela- ratified by, 438n; Rio Treaty ratified
tions with, 2294-2296, Indochina, by, 811n; U.N. ECOSOC, member of,
U.S. policy respecting, 354, 367,
149n; U.N. Security Council, non-
920, 2370–2371, 2373–2381, 2383- permanent member of, 141n.
2390, 2391-2395, 2404; Israel, U.S. Educational Exchange Program. (See
relations with, 2254-2255; Italy, con- International Information and Educa-
sultations with, 1683–1685; Japan, tional Exchange Programs.)
448-462, 888-893, 2427–2428, 2430, Egypt (see also Arab-Israeli relations):
2442–2443, 2446–2448; Korea, defense Afro-Asian Conference attended by,
of, 898-902, 2674-2676, prisoner of 2344; Arab League pacts ratified by,
1
)
1
1
1
+
1
SUMMARY INDEX
VII
1243n, 1249n; arms shipments to from U.S. aid to, 2192–2194; Pan American
Soviet bloc, 2240–2241; Aswan Dam, Highway, 1341-1342; SEATO, forma-
financial assistance to for construc- tion of, 2383; state of the Union
tion of, 2230; Israel, armistice agree- messages, 61-65, 77–80, 100-104, 129–
ment with, 698–707; Japanese peace 133; United Kingdom, U.S. relations
treaty ratified by, 438n; Middle East with, 1468-1470, 1705-1707; United
Command negotiations with, 2180- Nations, U.S. policy respecting, 360-
2187; Sudan, position of on status of, 364; Western European Union, U.S.
2303–2305; Suez Canal, Israeli ship- policy respecting, 989-990.
ping in restricted by, 2251-2254, El Salvador: Japanese peace treaty
United Kingdom, agreement with ratified by, 438n; Rio Treaty ratified
concerning, 2223-2226; U.N. by, 811n; U.N. Trusteeship Council,
ECOSOC, member of, 149n; U.N. member of, 155n.
Security
Council,
nonpermanent Eritrea, federation of with Ethiopia,
member of, 141n.
2305-2306.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. (addresses, Escapee program. (See Mutual Security
statements, correspondence, etc.): Program.)
Arab-Israeli armistice borders, tri- Estonia, U.S. respect for sovereignty of,
partite declaration on, reaffirmation
2086-2089, 2090-2091.
of, 2238; atomic energy, civil uses of, Ethiopia: Afro-Asian_Conference at-
1706, 2011, 2798–2805, 2853–2860;
tended by, 2344; Eritrea federated
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, revision
of, 2853–2860; atoms for peace pro-
with, 2305–2306; Japanese peace
posal, 2798–2805; Bermuda Confer-
treaty ratified by, 438n.
ence of Heads of Government, 1468 Europe, Council of: European Coal and
1470; Burma, joint statement with
Steel Community, protocol on rela-
Prime Minister of, 2354; captive
tions with, 1078–1079; European
peoples resolution, 1957-1959; dis-
Political Community, protocol on
armament, 69–71, 130–131, 2011,
relations with, 1231-1232; Statute of,
2794, 2798–2805, 2841–2844; East-
1001-1012, ratifications of, 1011n,
1710n.
West contacts, 2010, 2012–2013;
EDC, U.S. policy respecting, 1198- Europe, Eastern (see also individual
1200; Europe, Eastern, U.S. policy in,
country headings): "Molotov Plan"
2069; European security, 1888–1889,
for, 33n; Mutual Assistance Treaty
1893–1894, 2009-2010; foreign eco-
of (Warsaw Pact), 1239–1242, ratifi-
nomic policy, 2930–2940, 2948–2953;
cations of, 1239n; Prague Conference
Formosa, U.S. policy in, 63-64, 2475, of Foreign Ministers of, declaration
2483–2486; France, U.S. relations with,
issued by, 1782-1784; U.S. policy
1468–1470, 1675–1676; Geneva Con-
respecting, 355-356, 368, 384, 2010,
ference of Heads of Government, 111-
2017, 2067–2068, 2069.
114, 1888–1889, 1893-1894, 2005- | European Coal and Steel Community:
2014, 2841–2844; Geneva Conference treaty establishing, 1039–1078, ratifi-
on Indochina, 2382–2383, 2397–2398; cations of, 1077n; Council of Europe,
Germany, Federal Republic of, ter- protocol concerning relations with,
mination of occupation regime in,
1078–1079; European Political Com-
623–626, U.S. relations with, 1729– munity, integration with, 1214-1217;
1733, 1735–1736; Germany, reunifica- transitional provisions of, convention
tion of, 1888–1889, 1893–1894, 2009- on, 1079–1097; U.S. agreement with,
2010; Germany, Soviet Zone of, 1097-1107; U.S. support of, 30, 50,
uprising in, 1746–1749; inaugural 1627, 1670.
address, 57–61; India, reassurances European Defense Community (EDC):
to on U.S. aid to Pakistan, 2192-2194; European Political Community, pro-
Indochina, U.S. policy in, 2382, 2397- posed integration with, 1214-1217;
2398, 2401–2402; Information Pro- Germany, Federal Republic of, par-
gram, administration of, 3186–3187; ticipation of in, 1197-1198, 1720-
Iranian oil controversy, 2271-2272, 1722, 1725-1727, 1748; NATO com-
2275; Japan, U.S. relations with, mitments to, 1171, 1173-1174; Three-
2443–2441; Korea, U.S. policy in, Power (France, U.K., U.S.) support
63-64, 2382, 2729–2731, 2733–2734; of, 1197-1198, 1463, 1465, 1469;
Middle East, U.S. arms supply United Kingdom commitments to,
policy in, 2239; Mutual Security 1172–1173; U.S. commitments to,
Program, administration of, 3093– 1198-1200, Western European Union,
3101, 3145–3155; Pakistan, purpose of comparison of with, 633–634.
VII
SUMMARY INDEX
:
European Defense Community, treaty 1955), table of, 2236; credits under
establishing: text, 1107–1150; pro- lend-lease, charts of 3031-3037;
tocols, declarations, and treaties sup- grants and credits (1945-1956), charts
plementary to, 1151-1198; Brussels of, 3158-3160.
Conference on, communiqué of, 1200- Foreign Economic Policies, Special
1201; ratification of, attempts at,
Assistant to the President on, report
95, 614, 628, 1442, 1443, 1453-1456, of (Gray Report), 2888.
1470–1473, 1498, 1503n, 1627–1628, Foreign Economic Policy, (Randall)
1673-1674, 1705-1706.
Commission on: establishment of,
European Economic Cooperation, Or- 2895–2898; report of, 2898–2930.
ganization for (OEEC): convention Foreign economic policy (U.S.) (see
and protocols establishing, 992–1000, also International Development, Act
ratifications of, 998n, 1710n; NATO for; Mutual Security Program; Stra-
support of, 1614; Three-Power (France, tegic materials; Tariff beadings; Tech-
U.K., U.S.) support of, 1459–1460; nical Assistance; Trade headings; and
U.S. support of, 1436, 1625.
regional and individual country head-
European Payments Union, agreement ings): Agricultural Trade Develop-
and protocol establishing, 1012–1039. ment and Assistance Act, as amended,
European Political Community: Statute provisions of relating to, 2941-2947;
of, draft treaty embodying, 1201- Commission on (Randall Commis-
1230; Council of Europe, protocol on sion), establishment and report of,
links with, 1231-1232; European Coal 2895–2930; congressional recommen-
and Steel Community, integration of dations on, 3027-3029; Presidential
with, 1214-1217.
recommendations
on, 2930–2940,
European unity and security (see also 2948–2953; Special Assistant to the
Brussels Treaty; Europe, Council of; President on, report of (Gray Report),
NATO; Western European Union; 2888.
and German and_other European Foreign Ministers' (France, U.K., U.S.)
headings): Berlin Foreign Ministers consultations, communiqués, declara-
Meeting, consideration of at, 1855- tions, and statements on, 1197–1198,
1858, 1861–1864, 1868, 1870, 1871, 1458–1468, 1680, 1709–1713, 1720-
1872-1873, 1875; Geneva Conference 1723, (with Germany) 1724-1727,
of Heads of Government, considera- 1737, 1758, 1761-1762, 1779–1780,
ation of at, 113, 1896–1897, 2015; 1822, 1827, 1870-1871, 1926–1927,
Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting, 2060.
consideration of at, 1897–1898, 1903– Foreign Ministers' (France, U.S.S.R.,
1921, 1922–1927, 2035–2036; Three- U.K., U.S.) consultations, communi-
Power (France, U.K., U.S.) support qués, declarations, and statements on.
of, 1461, 1462, 1464-1465; U.S. sup- (See Berlin Foreign Ministers Meet-
port of, 30-31, 33, 35, 50, 62, 126, ing and Geneva Foreign Ministers
373–374, 1432–1457, 1497-1504, 1505- Meeting.)
1510, 1881-1883.
Foreign Ministers' deputies (France,
U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.), consultations
Famine relief: Agricultural Trade De- of on: Austrian State Treaty, 1826,
velopment and Assistance Act pro- 1837, 1877-1881; German settlement,
visions governing, 2945; for Afghani- 1785–1793.
stan, 2229-2230; for India, 2227-2229. Foreign Operations Administration (see
Far East (see also individual country also Mutual Security Program):
headings), U.S. policy in, 2310-2328. establishment and functions of, 3090-
Far Eastern Commission, membership 3093, 3095-3101, 3142, 3145-3152;
of, 449n, 889n.
program of, 3140-3145; transfer and
Finland, U.N. membership of, 136n, liquidation of functions of, 3152–3155.
335n, 337
Foreign Service Act of 1946, 3204.
Fishery rights and resources, inter- Foreign Service personnel (U.S.): China,
national and inter-American, 1343– "People's Republic" of, withdrawal
346, 1349–1352, 1356–1364.
from, 2453-2456; Hungary, harass-
Forced labor, U.N. resolutions con- ment of in, 2121-2122, 2131-2134;
cerning, 266–268.
integration program for, 3211-3222;
Foreign aid (see also International De- management system for, directive
velopment, Act for; Mutual Defense concerning, 3204–3210; Rumania, re-
Assistance Program; and Mutual strictions on in, 2149, 2151–2152.
Security Program): credits to Near Formosa (Taiwan): cease-fire negotia-
East, South Asia, and Africa (1945- tions concerning, 2496–2510; China,
SUMMARY INDEX
IX
ference
on
“People's Republic" of, threat of to, understandings with U.S. concern-
954, 955–956, 2323–2326, 2487–2510, ing, 1668–1669, 2365-2368, 2369-
U.S. aggression charged by, 174–175, 2370, 2371–2372, 2400–2401, Viet-
2469-2470, 2476-2481, 2487–2490; Minh forces in, cease-fire agreements
defense of, China, Republic of, agree- with, 750–787; Italian peace treaty,
ments with concerning, 945–949, interpretation of, joint declaration.
2470-2471, U.S. armed forces, use of by (with U.K. and U.S.), 1680;.
in, 63–64, 376, 955–956, 963–964, Japanese peace treaty ratified by,
2468, 2475, 2483–2487, 2490–2492, 437n; Korea (see also Geneva Con-
U.S. statements concerning, 954,
Indochina and Korea
955–956, 2323–2326, 2493–2496; Ja- subheading, supra), armistice in guar-
pan, renunciation of claims to by, anteed by, 2662, 2692–2693; Laos,
426, 450; neutralization of during independence of in French' Union
Korean conflict, 2469–2470; U.S. accorded by, 51n, 74; London (Nine-
policy respecting, 2448–2452, 2456- Power) Conference, role of at, 1474-
2463.
1491; Middle East, arms supply
France: Austrian State Treaty ratified policy in, joint declaration by (with
by, 683n; Austrian State Treaty U.K. and U.S.), 2237; Middle East
negotiations, role of in (see Austrian Command negotiations, role of in,
State Treaty negotiations: Western 2180-2181, 2183-2185; North Africa,
Powers' action on); Berlin Foreign policies of in, 2296-2302; North
Ministers Meeting, role of at,_85–90, Atlantic Treaty ratified by, 814n,
1870-1871 (see also Berlin Foreign protocols to accepted by, 854n, 872n;
Ministers Meeting); Bermuda Con- NATO, role of in, 1594-1660 (see
ference of Heads of Government, also NATO); OEEC convention rat-
role of at, 1468--1470; Brussels Con- ified by, 998n; Paris (Nine-Power)
ference on EDC, role of at, 1200- Conference, role of at, 1492–1493;
1201; Brussels Treaty ratified by, Southeast Asia, policy of in (see
971n, Paris protocols to ratified by, Indochina subheading, supra); South-
975n; Cambodia, independence of in east Asia Collective Defense Treaty
French Union accorded by, 51n, 74; ratified by, 915n; trust territories
Council of Europe, Statute of ratified administered by, 153n; U.S.S.R.,
by, 1011n; disarmament, position relations with (see Austrian State
(see Disarmament); European Treaty negotiations, Berlin Foreign
Coal and Steel Community treaty
Ministers Meeting, Disarmament,
ratified by, 1077n; European Defense East-West contacts, Geneva
Community treaty, parliamentary ference headings, and Germany);
action on by, 95, 614, 628, 1456, United Nations, role of in (see
1470–1473, 1471n, 1498, 1503n, 1674, United Nations headings); U.N.
1706; EPU membership of, 1012; ECOSOC, member of, 149n; United
Geneva Conference of Heads of States, relations with, communi-
Government, role of at, 111-114, qués, letters, etc. on, 1458–1470,
2015–2018 (see also Geneva Con- 1669-1677 (see also Foreign Min-
ference of Heads of Government); isters' consultations and organiza-
Geneva Conference Indochina tional and subject headings), Viet-
and Korea, role of at, 785–787, Nam, independence of in French
2692-2693, 2695–2701, understand- Union accorded by, 51n, 74; Yugo-
ings with U.S. concerning,. 2381, slavia, consultations with, 2165.
2396-2397; Geneva Foreign Ministers
Meeting, role of at, 115-122, 1926- GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
1927, 2032–2039 (see also Geneva
and Trade). (See Tariffs and Trade,
Foreign Ministers Meeting); Ger- General Agreement on.)
many, settlement in, position of
Gaza strip, Israeli attacks in, 2247-2248.
respecting (see Germany); Germany,
Federal Republic of, occupation re- Geneva Conference of Heads of Govern-
gime in, termination of, protocol and
ment: directive to Foreign Ministers
related agreements on ratified by,
issued by, 2015-2016; disarmament,
485n, restoration of sovereignty to,
proposals concerning made at, 2841-
position of respecting, 1197–1198,
2843; East-West contacts, problem
1458-1462, 1709-1713, 1720-1723,
of considered at, 2009–2014; Germany
1724_1727 (see also Germany, Federal
and European security, problems of
Republic of), Saar, agreement with
considered at, 1887–1896; prepara-
concerning, 613; Indochina, aid to, tions for, 1886–1887; results of, 111-
on
con-
on
X
SUMMARY INDEX
!
114, 2016–2018; U.S. aims at, 2005– prisoners of war of in U.S.S.R., efforts
2008.
to obtain release of, 1729, 1733, 1938–
Geneva Conference on Indochina and 1939, 2060, 2063, 2066; rearmament
Korea:
of, question of, 1782–1785, 1788–1789;
Indochina phase: armistice agree- reunification of (see also subhead-
ments approved at, 750–785; Final ing on elections in, supra): Berlin
Declaration of, 785–787; results of, Foreign Ministers Meeting consider-
U.S. views on, 787–788, 2397-2398; ation of, 85-86, 94, 1850-1855, 1859,
U.S. aims and policy at, 2382-2397; 1869–1871; Eden Plan for, 1873, 1898,
Korean phase: declaration (sixteen- 1899, 1900-1903, 1905, 1922; Geneva
nation) issued at, 2692-2693; results Conference of Heads of Government
of, 2695–2701; U.S. aims at, 2685– consideration of, 113, 125-126, 1888-
2692;
1891, 1893, 1895, 1896-1897, 2009-
preparations for, 1704-1705, 2372- 2010, 2015, 2017; Geneva Foreign
2381, 2685.
Ministers Meeting consideration of,
Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting: 1897–1927, 2035-2036; Potsdam agree-
communiqué (quadripartite) of, 2039; ment concerning, Soviet violation of,
declaration (tripartite) of, 1926–1927; 1938; tripartite (French, U.K., U.S.)
disarmament, proposals concerning efforts to obtain, 1465-1466, 1711,
made at, 2844-2850; East-West con- 1756–1757, 1779–1780, 1791; U.S.
tacts, problem of considered at, 2018- position respecting, 354-355, 368, 373,
2032; Germany and European secur- 638–639, 1435, 1437, 1502, 1728, 1729,
ity, problems of considered at, 1897– 1733, 1747–1748, 1778-1779, 1843–
1926; preparations for, 2015-2016; 1844.
results of, 115-122, 1926–1927, 2032- Germany, Federal Republic of (see also
2039.
Germany and Germany, Soviet Zone
Genocide Convention, ratification action of): Allied High Commission for,
on, 3n, 166n.
charter of, revision of, 1714-1717,
Geophysical Year. (See International decisions and proclamations by, 1717-
Geophysical Year.)
1720, 1734; Arbitral Commission on
Germany (see also Germany, Federal Property, Rights, and Interests in,
Republic of, and Germany, Soviet establishment and charter of, 494,
Zone of): Austrian State Treaty pro- 581-582, 595-596, 600-607; Arbitra-
visions affecting, 645–646, 650, 653– tion Tribunal in, establishment and
664; Berlin, problem of in relation to charter of, 489–490, 491-498, 576,
(see Berlin); Berlin Foreign Ministers 607, 609, 616; armaments in, control
Meeting discussion of, 1850–1855, of, London (Nine-Power) Conference
1859, 1869–1871;
declaration concerning, 1478-1479,
elections in: Éden Plan for, 1873, Paris Protocol (No. III) to Brussels
1898, 1899, 1900–1903, 1905, 1922; tri- Treaty concerning, 620, 634, 979-984;
partite (French, U.K., U.S.) efforts assets of in U.S., 1734; Bonn agree-
to obtain, 1756–1757, 1779–1780, ments on (see Paris Conference deci-
1794–1795, 1797-1798, 1809-1814, sions, infra); Brussels Treaty acceded
1819–1821, 1839-1840, 1842–1844, to by, 972-976, Paris protocols to
1882, 1883; United Nations efforts to ratified by, 975n; civil aviation in,
obtain, 1795–1797, 1798–1809, 1814- agreement concerning, 598–600;
· 1819; U.S. efforts to obtain, 1747– Council of Europe, Statute of acceded
1748, 1778–1779, 1780-1781, 1783, to by, 1011n; European Coal and Steel
1785, 1850-1855, 1859, 1869–1870; Community treaty ratified by, 1077n;
Foreign Ministers' deputies (France, European Defense Community, pro-
U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.) for, meetings posed participation of in, 1197-1198,
of, 37n, 1785–1793; Geneva Confer- 1720-1722, 1725–1727, 1748, treaty
ence of Heads of Government con- establishing, parliamentary action on
sideration of, 1887–1896; Geneva by, 1471n; EPU membership of, 1012;
Foreign Ministers Meeting considera- finance convention with, 539-556,
tion of, 1897–1926; neutrality of, 639, 640; forces and their members in,
question of, 1885–1886, 1888; occu- tax treatment of, agreement on, 607-
pation forces in, question of with- 610, 639-640; Foreign Affairs, Minis-
drawal of, 1855, 1867-1869, 1891; try of, establishment of in, 1719n;
peace treaty for, efforts to obtain foreign forces in, presence of, conven-
(see also subheadings on elections in tion on, 610-612, 617, 639-640; for-
and reunification of, supra and infra), eign forces in, rights and obligations
1780–1781, 1783, 1797–1798, 1839; of, convention on, 498–539, 634-637,
SUMMARY INDEX
XI
639, 640; London (Nine-Power) Con- 1758, road tolls, 1758–1761, water-
ference decisions concerning, 619, ways controls, 1765.
1475-1476, 1478-1479, 1481, 1482, Ghana (Gold Coast); Afro-Asian Con-
1490–1491; North Atlantic Treaty, ference attended by, 2344; self-gov-
accession to by, preliminaries to, 618- ernment in, Senate resolution on,
619, 841-850, 1481-1483, protocol on,
2306.
613-615, 618, 622, 623–626, 627-643, Goa, controversy over between India
871-873, 1501; occupation regime in, and Portugal, 2294–2296.
revision of, 1714-1718, termination of, Gold Coast. (See Ghana.)
483-485, 1461, 1475–1476, 1492–1493, Gray Report. (See Foreign Economic
1638, 1734; Paris (Four-Power) Con- Policies, Special Assistant to the
ference decisions affecting, 483-612, President on, report of.)
627-643; Paris (Nine-Power) Confer- Great Britain. (See United Kingdom.)
ence decisions affecting, 1492–1493; Greece: atomic energy, civil uses of,
rearmament and defense contribution U.S. agreement with, 2883n; Balkan
of (see also subheading on armaments Pact agreements ratified by, 1235n;
in, supra, and Germany: rearmament Council of Europe, Statute of acceded
of), Austrian State Treaty provisions to by, 1011n; Cyprus, dispute with
concerning, 650, London (Nine-Power) Turkey over,
2276-2277; defense
Conference decisions concerning, 1476, facilities in, use of by U.S., agree-
1490–1491, 1492, North Atlantic ment on, 2188-2189; EPU member-
Council decisions on, 1608–1609, Paris ship of, 1012; Japanese peace treaty
Protocol (to Brussels Treaty) on, 620, ratified by, 438n; North Atlantic
977–979, U.S. position regarding, 630- Treaty acceded to by, 853–871,
631, 1471, 1473, 1507–1508, 1888- 1614–1615, protocol to accepted by,
1889; reparations settlement with, 872n; OEEĆ convention ratified by,
584–585; restitution of property by, 998n; U.N. ECOSOC, member of,
567-584; retained rights in, tripartite 149n; U.N. Security Council, non-
agreement on, 612, 638-639; Saar, permanent member of, 141n; U.S.
agreement with France on, 613; aid to, 859-860, 869-870, 2173.
sovereignty, restoration of to, Paris Greenland, defense of, agreement be-
(Four-Power) Conference agreements tween the U.S. and Iceland concern-
affecting, 483-612, 627-643, tripartite ing, 1661-1667.
(French, U.K., U.S.) views on, 1197 Guatemala: Communist intervention in,
1198, 1458–1462, 1709–1713, 1720- 93, 1303-1316; disturbances in, OAS
1723, 1724-1727, United States views decisions respecting, 1271–1273, 1277;
on, 613–643, 1435, 1472, 1473-1474, Honduras and Nicaragua, disputes
1727-1728, 1732–1734; Three Powers with, 1291-1292; Japanese peace
and, relations between, convention treaty ratified by, 438n; Rio Treaty
on, 486–498, 615-617, 640, 1503n; ratified by,
by, 811n, declaration of
U.S.S.R., relations with, 1737 and concerning, 795; U.N. Trusteeship
note; U.S. authority and functions in, Council, member of, 155n.
Executive order on, 1735–1736; U.S.
relations with (see also other sub- Haiti: Dominican Republic, dispute
headings), communiqués on, 1729– with, 1268–1273, 1277-1279, 1287;
1734, 1736-1737, state of war between,
Japanese peace treaty ratified by,
termination of, 1723-1724, trade be-
438n; Rio Treaty ratified by, 811n;
tween, 1730-1731, war claims in, U.N. Trusteeship Council, member of,
1734; war criminals of, 1730; war and
155n.
occupation, settlement of matters Heads of Government (France, U.K.,
arising out of, convention on, 557-607,
U.S.) consultations. (See Bermuda
639, 640.
Conference of Heads of Government.)
Germany, Soviet Zone of (East Germany Heads of Government (France, U.S.S.R.,
and German “Democratic Republic''):
disorders in, 1742–1744, 1746–1750;
U.K., U.S.) consultations. (See Ge-
Eastern European Mutual Assistance
neva Conference of Heads of Gov-
Treaty (Warsaw Pact) ratified by,
ernment.)
1239n; Prague Conference of 1950 High seas, regime of, 1346-1355.
attended by, 1782n; remilitarization Honduras: Guatemala and Nicaragua,
of, 1737-1739; status of, 1756–1757, disputes with, 1291-1292; Japanese
1761-1762; Western Zones of Ger- peace treaty ratified by, 438n; Rio
many, relations of with respecting Treaty ratified by, 811n, reservation
interzonal barriers, 1750–1756, 1757– concerning, 795.
XII
SUMMARY INDEX
Human rights: covenants (draft) con- attended by, 2344n; Colombo Plan,
cerning, 204-227; U.N. resolutions on, member of, 2339; independence of,
244-246; U.S. policy regarding, 5-10, 34n, 51n, 464n, 2312n; U.N. ECOSOC,
25, 71–77, 227-244, 346-347; Uni- member of, 149n; U.N. membership
versal Declaration of, actions on,
of, 136n.
204n.
Information Program. (See Interna-
Hungary: Eastern European Mutual tional Information and Educational
Assistance Treaty (Warsaw Pact) Exchange Program.)
ratified by, 1239n; Prague Conference Inter-American Conference, Tenth: dec-
of 1950 attended by, 1782n; U.N. larations of, 1299-1302; U.S. state-
membership of, 136n, 335n, 337; U.S. ments at, 1333-1336.
relations with, 2067-2068, 2084-2085, Inter-American Economic and Social
2117-2135.
Council, resolution of concerning
technical assistance, 1316-1325.
Iceland: Council of Europe, Statute of Inter-American Peace Committee, work
acceded to by, 1011n; defense of, of, 1285–1292.
agreement with U.S. concerning, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
1677–1679; EPU membership of, Assistance (Rio Pact/Treaty): text
1012; North Atlantic Treaty ratified of, 789–796; applications of, 1260-
by, 814n, protocols to accepted by, 1285, 1309, 1311; ratification of, 811n;
854n; OEEC convention ratified by, U.S. ratification action on, 796–812.
998n; U.N. membership of, 136n. International Cooperation Administra-
Immigration: quotas for, Presidential tion, establishment and functions of,
proclamation establishing, 3232-3234. 3152–3155.
Immigration and Nationality Act of International Court of Justice: advisory
1952, 3232.
opinions of, concerning human rights
India: Afro-Asian Conference attended clauses of treaties of peace with
by, 2344; Colombo Conference at- Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania,
tended by, 2344n; Colombo Plan, 2070-2079; compulsory jurisdiction
member of, 2339; Goa, controversy of, acceptance of by Italy and the
over with Portugal, 2294-2296; Japan, Federal Republic of Germany, 975–
treaty of peace with, 439n; Kashmir, 976; Czechoslovak refusal to accept
dispute over with Pakistan, 2277– jurisdiction of, 2115n; decisions of
2294; Republic of, establishment of, respecting Iran, competence of Court
34n, 51n, 464n, 2312n; U.N. ECOSOC, respecting oil controversy in, 2264,
member of, 149n; U.N. Security 2269, Morocco, rights of American
Council, nonpermanent member of, nationals in, 2296–2297; Hungarian
141n; U.N. Trusteeship Council , refusal to accept jurisdiction of,
member of, 155n; U.S. relations with, 2126n; Iranian refusal to accept
2172, 2192–2193, 2227-2229, 2321- jurisdiction of, 2264n; U.S.S. R. re-
2322, 2551–2552.
fusal to accept jurisdiction of, 1974n,
Indochina (see also Cambodia, Laos, 2264n.
and Viet-Nam): armistice agreements International Development, Act for
in, 750–788; Associated States of, (Point 4): text of, 3047--3054; adminis-
aid program for, 1668-1670, 1673, tration of, 3055–3058; program under,
1675, 1676-1677, 2365-2366, 2371– 31, 51, 2951, 3140–3145.
2372, 2400–2401, 2403, independence International Development Advisory
of, 1467, 1468, 2363–2365, 2372, 2392, Board: establishment of, 3118-3119;
2394, SEATO, extension of benefits report of (Rockefeller Report), 2888.
of to, 916, 920, 930, 940, U.S. recog- International Finance Corporation, es-
nition of, 2364-2365; Communist tablishment of, 388, 2951 and note.
agression in, Chinese Communist International Geophysical Year, Ant-
threat of, 2370–2371, 2393–2395, arctic explorations in connection with,
NATO policy respecting, 2368–2369, 1430-1431.
tripartite (French, U.K., U.S.) con- International Information and Educa-
sultations concerning, 1461, 1466- tional Exchange Programs: Campaign
1467, 1468, 1470, 2367, 2368, U.S. of Truth under, 3163–3165; Educa-
policy respecting, 354, 367, 1436– tional Exchange Program under,
1437, 2373–2381; Geneva Conference 3172-3184, 3191–3203; history of,
on (see Geneva Conference on Indo- 3161-3163, 3174-3176; Operations
china and Korea: Indochina phase). Coordinating Board, establishment
Indonesia: Afro-Asian Conference at- of under, 3186–3187; Psychological
tended by, 2344; Colombo Conference Strategy Board, establishment of
.
SUMMARY INDEX
XIII
nonpermanent Japan: administrative agreement with,
tended by, 2344; atomic energy, civil
under, 3168–3169; scope of programs armistice agreement with, 719–724,
under, 3166-3167, 3176–3184, 3188- Truce Supervision Organization in,
3203; U.S. Information Agency, es- obligations of to, 2241-2244, water
tablishment of under, 3163, 3184- diversion dispute with, 2245; U.N.
3186, 3188; U.S. International Infor- membership of, 136n; U.S. relations
mation Administration, establishment with, 374-375, 2170-2171, 2174-2175,
of under, 3169–3172.
2177-2180, 2231-2236, 2254–2255.
International Law Commission, report Italy: atomic energy, civil uses of, U.S.
of on regime of territorial sea, 302– agreement with, 2883n; Brussels
321.
Treaty, accession of to, 972–976,
International organizations: U.S. citi- Paris protocols to ratified by, 975n;
zens, employed by, regulations govern- Council of Europe, Statute of ratified
ing, 297–298; U.S. contributions to, by, 1011n; European Coal and Steel
restrictions on, 272–273.
Community Treaty ratified by, 1077n;
International Organizations Employees European Defense Community treaty,
Loyalty Board, establishment of in parliamentary action on by, 1442,
U.S. Civil Service Commission, 295, 1471; EPU membership of, 1012;
297-298.
North Atlantic Treaty ratified by,
International Security Affairs, Office of, 814n, protocols to accepted by, 854n,
establishment of in Department of 872n; OEEC convention ratified by,
State, 3045-3047.
998n; peace treaty with, interpreta-
International Security Affairs Commit- tion of, tripartite (French, U.K.,
tee (Interdepartmental), establish- U.S.) declaration on, 1680, obligations
ment of, 3043-3045.
of under, release from, 1683, U.S. rati-
Iran: Afro-Asian Conference attended fication action on, 391-419; Trieste
by, 2344; Baghdad Pact ratified by, settlement, role of in, 419-425; trust
1257n; Japanese peace treaty ratified territories administered by, 153n;
by, 438n; oil controversy in, settle- U.N. membership of, 136n, 335n, 337,
ment of, 2261-2275; U.S.S.R., rela- 1680n; U.S. relations with, communi-
tions with,
1942 – 1943; U.N. qués on, 1681-1685.
ECOSOC, member of, 149n; U.N.
Security Council,
member of, 141n; U.S. economic aid 2406-2423; Afro-Asian Conference at-
to, 2271-2272, 2275.
Iraq: Afro-Asian Conference attended uses of, U.S. agreement with, 2883n;
by, 2344; Arab League pacts ratified Burma, treaty of peace with, 439n;
by, 1243n, 1249n; Baghdad Pact China, Republic of, treaty of peace
ratified by, 1257n; Japanese peace with, 439n; Colombo Plan, member of,
treaty ratified by, 438n; U.N. Trus- 2339; criminal jurisdiction of over
teeship Council, member of, 155n; U.S. armed forces in, 1579–1580,
U.S. policy respecting, 2171.
2416–2418; defense capacity of,.2446–
Ireland: Council of Europe, Statute of 2448; economic situation in, 467,
ratified by, 1011n; EPU membership 2319-2320, 2434–2437, 2442-2443,
of, 1012; OEEC convention ratified 2458; GATT, accession of to, 2436,
by, 998n; U.Ni membership of, 136n, 2445; India, treaty of peace with,
335n, 337.
439n; Japanese peace treaty ratified
Israel (see also Arab-Israeli relations): by, 437n; Korea, independence of
atomic energy, civil uses of, U.S. recognized by, 426, 450, 459–460,
agreement with, 2883n; Egypt, armi- 477-478; mandates system of trans-
stice agreement with, 698-707, Gaza ferred to U.S., 427n; mutual defense
Strip in, attacks on by, 2247-2248, assistance agreement with, 2437–2441;
Suez Canal shipping restricted by, occupation of, international affairs of,
2251-2254, Truce Supervision Organ- conduct of under, 2405, security
ization in, obligations of to, 2248- arrangements with upon termination
2251; independence of, 51n; Jeru- of, 2423-2425; peace treaty with, text
salem, movement of capital to, 2254- of, 425–439, agreements supplemen-
2255; Jordan, armistice agreement tary to, 440-442, conference on, U.S.
with, 712–718, Qibya incident with, statements at, 442-462, principles for,
2246–2247; Jordan River development draft of, 450-451, ratification of,
project, talks with concerning, 2231- 437n, 438n, U.S. ratification action on,
2236; Lebanon, armistice agreement 439–440, 463–483; prisoners of war of,
with, 707–711; Palestine refugees, efforts for release of, 1944, 2059, 2062,
concern of with, 2257–2261; Syria, 2065–2066; rearmament of, 2432-2434;
:
1
XIV
SUMMARY INDEX
over
1
Ryukyu Islands of (Amami Oshima 2702; U.S. policy respecting, 2685–
group), restoration of to, 2430, U.S. 2692, 2729-2730, 2733–2734.
rights retained in, 2427-2428; security Korea, Republic of (South Korea) (see
treaty with, text of, 885–886, U.S. also other Korean headings): ad-
ratification action on, 463, 473, 888– ministrative control
certain
896, U.S. statements on, 455–456, areas of, restoration of to, 2694–2695;
886-888; state of war with, termina- currency stabilization in, 2732–2738;
tion of, 2325-2327; U.S.S. R., "peace economic aid to, 2320, 2527-2528,
declaration” with, 439n; United Na- 2532–2536, 2730–2732, 2736–2738,
tions, forces of in Far East, stationing 3113–3114; independence of, 5ln,
of in, 2405-2406, membership of in, 464n, 2312n, 2320n; mutual defense
efforts to obtain, 335n, 338, 384, 425, assistance agreement with, 2529–
450, 452, 454, 468; U.S. relations 2531; mutual defense treaty with,
with, communiqués and statements text of, 897-898, U.S. ratification
on, 2430–2437, 2443,2444, 2446-2448; action on, 900–912, U.S. statements
war criminals of, 2060-2062; World on, 898–900, 2675, 2730; prisoners of
War II forces of, SCAP General war, nonrepatriated, release of by,
Order No. 1 respecting surrender of, 2658-2662; U.S. relations with, joint
2451n.
communiqués, letters, and statements
Jerusalem, status of: U.N. resolution on, 2673–2674, 2674-2676, 2729–2731,
respecting, 2254; U.S. policy regard- 2733-2734, 2736–2737.
ing, 2170, 2179, 2254-2255.
Korean Armistice Agreement: text of,
Jordan: Afro-Asian Conference attended 724–750; Military Armistice Com-
by, 2344; Arab League pacts ratified mission under, terms of reference of,
by, 1243n, 1249n; Israel, armistice 731-733; negotiation of, 2627–2658;
agreement with, 712–718, Qibya in- Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-
cident with, 2246–2247; U.N. mem- mission under, terms of reference of,
bership of, 136n, 335n, 337; U.S. 743–750; Neutral Nations Supervisory
policy respecting, 2171.
Commission i'nder, terms of reference
Jordan River development project, of, 733–737; prisoners of war, repatria-
2176, 2231-2236.
tion of, provisions for under, 737-747;
sixteen-nation declaration respecting,
Kashmir, India-Pakistan dispute over:
2662, 2692–2693; violations of, 2703-
U.N. mediation of, 2277-2294; U.S.
2728.
policy respecting, 2172.
Korean conflict (see also other Korean
headings): cease-fire in, U.N. group
Katyn massacre, U.S. report to U.N.
on, establishment and work of,
on, 2143-2144.
2594–2596, 2601–2602, 2605–2606;
Kem Amendment (to Third Supple- China, Republic of, offer by of ground
mental Appropriation Act of 1951),
forces for use in, 2541-2542; Chinese
3105n.
Communist intervention in, 2581-
Korea (North and South) (see also other 2585, 2593–2594, 2602–2609; com-
Korean headings): Japanese forces in, batant activities in, designation of,
surrender of, SCAP General Order 2596, 2736; germ warfare, use of in,
No. 1. respecting, 2451n; Japanese charges of, 35, 2666-2673; North
peace treaty provisions regarding, Korean attack initiating, 2536-2538,
426, 450, 459-460, 477-478;
2572-2575; prisoners of in,
relief and rehabilitation of: U.N. nonrepatriated, escape of, 2658–2662,
Commission for Unification and Re- sick and wounded, exchange of,
habilitation of Korea (UNCURK), 2654–2658, repatriation of, negotia-
establishment of, 2576–2578, reports tions for, 2642-2643, 2647–2654;
of, 2577n; U. N. Korean Reconstruc- U.S.S.R., involvement of in, 2555-
tion Agency (UNKRA), establish- 2556, 2636–2637, 2638–2640, 2647,
ment of, 2585–2593, reports of, 2663–2665; U.N. Command in, con-
2588n; U.S. policy respecting, 176– tributions to, 2565–2566, 2626, es-
178;
tablishment of, 2550–2551, reports
reunification of: conference for, and activities of, 2560-2565, 2575,
negotiations on, 353-354, 1845, 2372- 2578; U.N. Commission on Korea,
2373, 2673-2684, 2685, 2692–2693; reports of concerning, 2537-2538,
Geneva conference on, 87-88, 95, 2572–2575; U.N. General Assembly
2382-2385, 2685-2692, 2695-2702; resolutions on, 2576-2578, 2585-
U.N. resolutions on, 2576–2578, 2585– 2593, 2594–2595, 2602, 2608-2609,
2593, 2643-2644, 2676-2678, 2701, 2614–2615, 2643-2644, 2651-2654,
war
SUMMARY INDEX
XV
use
on
i
2663, 2669-2670; U.N. Security Coun- | Lithuania, U.S. policy respecting sov-
cil resolutions on, 2538–2539, 2540– ereignty of, 2086-2089, 2090–2091.
2541, 2550, 2565–2566, 2583–2584, London (Nine-Power) Conference: Final
2668–2669; U.S. action and policy Act of (with annexes), 1474-1491;
in, 63–64, 174, 342, 345–346, 351–352, Berlin, decisions respecting reached
353-354, 1948–1952, 2539-2540, 2552– at, 617, 1482-1483; Brussels Treaty
2560, 2566-2572, 2579–2580, 2608, revision, decision respecting reached
2609–2614, 2615–2622; U. S. armed at, 1476–1479, 1483; European se-
forces in, authority for of, curity, statements concerning made
2542-2549.
at, 1479–1489; Germany, decisions
Korean Economic Affairs, President's concerning made at, 619, 1475–1476,
Special Representative for, report of 1478-1479, 1481, 1482, 1490-1491;
(Tasca Report), 2731--2732.
NATO, recommendations concerning
Korean "People's Republic" (North made at, 1479-1491; preparations for,
Korea) (see also other Korean head- 1470-1474; results of, 1492, 1499-
ings): embargoes (U.N. and U.S.) 1500.
trade with, 2595, 2614-2615, Luxembourg: Brussels Treaty ratified
2622–2626; U.Se travel restrictions by, 971n, Paris protocols to ratified
in, 2085.
by, 975n; Council of Europe, Statute
Kurile Islands, status of, 426, 450, of ratified by, 1011n; European Coal
453, 470, 471.
and Steel Community treaty ratified
by, 1077n; European Defense Com-
Laos (see also Indochina): Afro-Asian munity treaty, parliamentary action
Conference attended by, 2345; armi-
on by, 1471n; ÈPU membership of,
stice agreement in, 775-785; Colombo 1012; North Atlantic Treaty ratified
Plan, member of, 2339; emergency
by, 814n, protocols to accepted by,
aid program for, 2369_2370; inde- 854n, 872n; OEEC convention rati-
pendence of in French Union, 51n, fied by, 998n.
74; Japanese peace treaty ratified
by, 438n; U.N. membership of, 136n, Malaya, Federation of: Colombo Plan,
335n, 337.
member of; 2339.
Latin America. (See American Re- Manila Conference (1954): agreements
publics.)
made at, 912-917; preparations for,
Latvia, U.S. policy respecting sover- 2383; results of, 96, 919–923; U.S.
eignty of, 2086–2091.
statement at, 917-919.
Lebanon: Afro-Asian Conference at- Manila Pact. (See Southeast Asia Col-
tended by, 2345; Arab League pacts
lective Defense Treaty.)
ratified by, 1243n, 1249n; atomic Materials Policy (Paley) Commission,
energy, civil uses of, U.S. agreement
report of, 2893.
with, 2883n; Israel,' armistice agree- Matsu Islands. (See Quemoy and
ment with, 707-711; Japanese peace
Matsu Islands.)
treaty ratified by, 438n;
U.N. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, revision
ECOSOC, member of, 149n; U.N. of, 2926, 2937.
Security Council, nonpermanent Mexico: agricultural workers, U.S.
member of, 141n; U.S. policy respect-
agreement with concerning, 1376–
ing, 2171.
1403; Japanese peace treaty ratified
Lend-lease settlements: status of (as of
by, 437n; Rio Treaty, declaration of
1955), 3030–3037; U.S.S.R., negotia-
concerning, 796, ratified by 811n;
tions with concerning, 2039–2058.
U.N. ECÖSOC, member of, 149n;
U. N. Security Council, nonperman-
Liberia: Afro-Asian Conference at-
ent member of, 141n; U. N. Trustee-
tended by, 2345; Japanese peace ship Council, member of, 155n.
treaty ratified by, 438n.
Mid-Canada defense line, establishment
Libya: Afro-Asian Conference attended of, 1429–1430.
by, 2345; Arab League pact adhered Middle East. (See Near and Middle
to by, 1244n; defense facilities in, East.)
use of by U.S., agreement on, 2207–Middle East Command, negotiations
2223; friendship and alliance, treaties respecting, 2180-2187.
of with France, Italy, and U.K., Migrants from Europe, Intergovern-
2209n; independence of, 51n, recog- mental Committee for Movement of,
nized by U.S., 2302–2303; U.N. mem- U.S. contributions to, 3080, 3121.
bership of, 136n, 3351, 337; U.S. Military aid (assistance) to foreign
policy respecting, 2173.
countries. (See Mutual Defense As-
XVI
SUMMARY INDEX
as
sistance Program and Mutual Se- East and Africa, aid to under, 3062-
curity Program.)
3065; technical cooperation program
Mindszenty case. (See Hungary.)
under, 3117-3119; termination of
Monroe Doctrine formula, application assistance under, 3079, 3129–3130;
of to other areas, 907, 937, 938, 960. transferability of funds under, 3128-
Morocco: Mohammed V returned to 3129.
from exile, 2299; U.N. General National Security Council, effect of
Assembly resolution concerning, 2298; Mutual Defense Assistance Act on
U.S. nationals, rights of in, 2296–2297. functions of, 3044-3045.
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: Near and Middle East (see also Arab
administration of, 3038–3039; amend- States and individual country head-
ment of, 3039-3042.
ings): arms supply policy in, 2239-
Mutual Defense Assistance Control 2241; border disputes in, 2241-2255,
(Battle) Act: text of, 3101-3105; 2276-2296; economic aid to, 2227–
administration of, 3123-3124.
2236, 3062-3065; military arrange-
Mutual Defense Assistance Program ments in, 2180-2206; U.S. Policy
(see also Mutual Security Program): respecting, 2167–2180.
administration of, 3038–3039, 3043- Nepal: Afro-Asian Conference attended
3047; authorization for, 3039-3042; by, 2345; U.N. membership of, 136n,
European program under, 1439–1440; 335n, 337.
military assistance agreements nego- Netherlands: atomic energy, civil uses
tiated under with China, Republic of, of, U.S. agreement with, 2883n;
2470–2471, 2470n, with Japan, 2437– Brussels Treaty ratified by, 971n,
2441, with Korea, Republic of, 2529– Paris protocols to ratified by, 975n;
2531, with Spain, 1696–1698, with Council of Europe, Statute of ratified
Yugoslavia, 2160-2163.
by, 1011n; European Coal and Steel
Mutual Security, Public Advisory Board Community treaty ratified by, 1077n;
for, report of (Bell Report), 2893. EDC treaty, parliamentary action
Mutual Security Act of 1951, on by, 1471n; EPU membership of,
amended in 1952 and 1953: text of, 1012; Japanese peace treaty ratified
3059-3086; administration of, 3086- by, 438n; North Atlantic Treaty
3088, 3095–3101.
ratified by, 814n, protocols to accept-
Mutual Security Act of 1954, ed by, 854n, 872n; OEEC convention
amended in 1955: text of, 3105–3140; ratified by, 998n; U.N. ECOSOC,
administration of, 3145–3155.
member of, 149n; U.N. Security
Mutual Security Agency: establishment Council, nonpermanent member of,
and functions of, 3070-3071, 3086- 141n.
3088; transfer of functions of, 3092, New Zealand: Colombo Plan, member
3097.
of, 2339; Japanese peace treaty
Mutual Security Program (see also ratified by, 437n; Southeast Asia
Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Collective Defense Treaty ratified by,
administration of, 3086-3101, 3145– 915n; trust territories administered
3155; agricultural commodities (sur- by, 153n; U.N. ECOSOC, member of,
plus), sale of under, 3085–3086, 3119- 149n; U.N. Security Council, non-
3120; American Republics, aid to permanent member of, 141n.
under, 3068–3069; Asia, aid to under, Nicaragua: Costa Rica, disputes with,
3065-3068, 3127–3128; authorization 1260-1267, 1279–1285; Guatemala
for, 3059–3086, 3105-3140; defense and Honduras, disputes with, 1291-
support assistance under, 3112–3114; 1292; Japanese peace treaty ratified
development assistance under, 3116– by, 438n; Rio Treaty ratified by, 811n.
3117; escapee program under, 3060, Nigeria, self-government for, Senate
3119; Europe, aid to under, 3060–3062; resolution on, 2306.
investment guaranties under, 3075- Non-self-governing territories.
(See
3076, 3077, 3124-3126; military assist- Colonialism and United Nations
ance agreements negotiated under headings.)
with American Republics, 1303n, with North Atlantic Council: organization of,
Japan, 2437–2441, with Libya, 2207- 1594-1600, 1613, 1614, 1622; sessions
2223, with Pakistan, 2194–2198, with of, 1594-1660.
Spain, 1696–1698, with Yugoslavia, North Atlantic Treaty: text of, 812–815,
2160–2163, map illustrating, 3156– ratifications and accessions to, 814n,
3157; mutual defense assistance agree- 853n, 854n, U.S. ratification action
ments, provisions of governing, 3073– on, 815–852; Germany, Federal Re-
3074, 3108–3112, 3114-3116; Near public of, protocol on accession to,
as
.....1
SUMMARY INDEX
XVII
ence
✓
871-873, acceptances of, 872n, 1503n, Norway: Council of Europe, Statute of
U.S. ratification action on, 613-643; ratified by, 1011n; EPU membership
Greece and Turkey, protocol on of, 1012; Japanese peace treaty
accession to, 853–854, acceptances of, ratified by, 438n; North Atlantic
854n, U.S. ratification action on, Treaty ratified by, 814n; protocols to
854–871.
accepted by, 854n, 872n; QEEC
North Atlantic Treaty Organization convention ratified by, 998n; U.N.
(NATO) (see also North Atlantic ECOSOC, member of, 149n; U.N.
Council and North Atlantic Treaty): Security Council nonpermanent
armed forces of (see also SACEUR member of, 141n.
subheading, infra), 1618–1620, 1621,
French position regarding, 1522, OAS (Organization of American States).
1523–1524, Italian position regarding, (See American States, Organization
1524, 1528, "long haul” concept re- of.)
specting, 1446, 1449–1450, U.K. posi- Oatis case. (See Czechoslovakia.)
tion on, 1522–1523, U.S. position on OEEC (Organization for European
(see subheading on U.S. troops as- Economic Cooperation). (See Euro-
signed to, infra); European Defense pean Economic Cooperation, Organ-
Community, proposed relation to, ization for.)
1171, 1173–1174, 1198–1200, 1621; "Open skies' proposal. (See Disarma-
German defense contribution to (see ment: inspection methods.)
Germany, Federal Republic of: re- OTC (Organization for Trade Coopera-
armament and defense contribution
tion). (See Trade Cooperation, Or-
of); infrastructure of, U.S. contribu-
ganization for.)
tions to, 3039–3042, 3060–3062, 3107-Outer Mongolia, U.N. membership of
3108; London (Nine-Power) Confer-
recommendations concerning,
proposed, 335ń.
618, 1480-1481, 1491-1496; reorgani- Pacific area: military security in, 2317-
zation of, 1609-1612; review of ac-
2319; regional arrangements in, 445-
tivities of, 1639-1652; SACEUR
446, 911.
(Supreme Allied Commander, Eu-
Pacific Charter; text of, 916-917; re-
rope), establishment of, 1505, 1506,
1606-1609, troop commitments to,
ports on, 921–922, 928; Senate con-
1476--1477, 1479-1480, 1484–1490,
sideration of, 943.
Conference at-
1501-1502; Secretary-General's report Pakistan: Afro-Asian
on, 1639–1652; SEATO, comparison
tended by, 2344; atomic energy, civil
with, 936-937; Status of Forces of,
uses of, U.S. agreement with, 2883n;
agreement on, 1529–1544, ratifications Baghdad Pact ratified by, 1257n;
of, 1543n, U.S. ratification action on,
Colombo Conference attended by,
1561-1582, revision of (proposed),
2344n; Colombo Plan, member of,
1582–1593; Status of International
2339; dominion status of, 34n, 51n,
Military Headquarters of, protocol 464n, 2312n; India, dispute with over
on, 1553-1559, ratifications of, 1559n,
Kashmir (see Kashmir); Japanese
U.S. ratification action on, 1561-1581;
peace treaty ratified by, 437n; mutual
Status of NATO, National Repre-
defense assistance agreement with
sentatives and International Staff,
U.S., text of, 2194-2198, preliminaries
agreement on, 1544-1552, ratifications to, 2191, purpose of, 2192–2193;
of, 1552n, U.S. ratification action on,
Southeast Asia Collective Defense
1561-1581;
tax-relief agreements
Treaty ratified by, 915n; Turkey,
(U.S.) with members of, 1576n;
agreement for friendly cooperation
Turkey, preliminary association with,
with, 1253–1256; U.N. ECOSOC,
2187; U.S.S.R., proposal of to join,
member of, 149n; U.N. Security
1873; United Nations, relation to,
Council, nonpermanent member of,
829, 831, 834-835, 838–839, 844-846;
141n; U.S. relations with, 2172, 2321-
U.S. nationals employed by, agree-
2322, communiqué on, 2198-2199.
1552–1553, 1560-1561, Palestine refugees: U.N. General As-
ratifications of, 1552n; U.S. troops sembly resolutions respecting, 2257–
assigned to, congressional authority 2261; U.S. contributions to relief of,
for, 1526-1528, testimony concerning,
2256-2257, 3064, 3084-3085, 3122;
1504-1526, policy respecting, 989– U.S. policy respecting, 2170–2171,
991, 1199-1200, 1587-1588, Wherry 2177, 2178.
resolution on, 1520n; Western Euro- Paley Report. (See Materials Policy
pean Union, relation to, 973.
Commission, report of.)
ments on,
Kansa
XVIII
SUMMARY INDEX
)
Pan American Highway, 1341-1342. 1239n; information services of in U.S.,
Panama: Japanese peace treaty ratified closing of, 2137-2138; Katyn massacre
by, 438n; Panama Canal and Canal in, 2143-2144; religious persecution
Zone, U.S. agreement with concern- in, 2145; Prague Conference of 1950
ing, 1364-1375; Rio Treaty, ratified attended by, 1782n; repatriation mis-
by, 811n.
sion of in Germany, closing of,
Paraguay: Japanese peace treaty rati- 2135–2137; ships of in Far East,
fied by, 438n; Rio Treaty ratified by, incidents concerning, 2524–2526; sub-
811n.
versive activities of U.S. in alleged by,
Paris agreements (1954). (See Ger- 2140-2143; travel restrictions in,
many, Federal Republic of: sover- 2084-2085; U.N. ECOSOC, member
eignty, restoration of to, and Western of, 149n; U.N. Security Council,
European Union.)
nonpermanent member of, 141n;
Paris (Nine-Power) Conference: com- Wyszynski, Cardinal, arrested by,
muniqué of, 1492-1493; North Atlan- 2145.
tic Council communiqués and resolu- Portugal: atomic energy, civil uses of,
tion approving results of, 1493–1496, U.S. agreement with, 2883n; Azores,
1637–1639; preparations for, 1474- use of military facilities in, U.S.
1492; results of, 1497-1504; Western agreement with, 1685–1689; EPU
European Union, protocols to Brussels membership of, 1012; Goa, dispute
Treaty establishing signed at, 972- over with India, 2294–2296; North
989.
Atlantic Treaty ratified by, 814n,
Paris protocols. (See Western European protocols to accepted by, 854n, 872n;
Union.)
DEEC convention ratified by, 998n;
Peru: Colombia, dispute with, 1290; U.N. membership of, 136n, 335n, 337;
Cuba, dispute with, 1288; fisheries U.S. relations with, communiqué on,
problems concerning, 1356-1364; Jap- 1689.
anese peace treaty ratified by, 438n; Potomac Charter, 1707.
Rio Treaty ratified by, 811n; U.N. Prague Conference of Foreign Ministers..
ECOSOC, member of, 149n; U.N. of Eastern European countries (1950):
Security Council, nonpermanent mem- attendance at, 1782n; declaration
ber of, 141n.
issued by, 1782–1784, 1785, 1786,
Philippines, Republic of: Afro-Asian 1787, U.S. reaction to, 1782–1787.
Conference attended by, 2345; atomic | Prisoners of war. (See subheadings
energy, civil uses of, U.S. agreement under Germany, Japan, Korean en-
with, 2883n; Colombo Plan, member tries, U.S.S.R., and United Nations.)
of, 2339; economic survey mission to, Psychological Strategy Board, estab-
report of (Bell report), 2355–2357, lishment and functions of, 3168–3169.
2359; independence of, 34n, 51n, 464n, Puerto Rico, U.N. General Assembly
2312n, 2320n; Japanese peace treaty resolution on cessation of transmission
ratified by, 438n; mutual defense of information on, 247-249.
treaty with U.S., text of, 873–875,
U.S. ratification action on, 463, 875-Qibya incident, 1467-1468, 2246--2247.
877, Council established under, 2360; Quemoy and Matsu Islands, defense of,
Southeast Asia Collective Defense 2491-2493, 2495, 2496.
Treaty ratified by, 915n; trade agree-
ment with U.S., revision of, 2360- | Radio Free Europe, 2069, 2099, 2101-
2363; U.N. ECOSOC, member of, 2102, 2128.
149n; U.N. Trusteeship Council
, mem- Randall Commission, establishment and
ber of, 155n; U.S. relations with, report of. (See Foreign Economic
2320–2321, 2357–2359.
Policy, (Randall) Commission on.)
Pinetree line (U.S.-Canadian air de- Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as amended
fense), establishment of, 1427–1428. in 1954, 3235–3243.
Pleven Plan. (See European Defense Refugee Relief Program, report on,
Community.)
3244-3245.
Point 4 Program. (See International Refugees. (See Mutual Security Pro-
Development, Act for.)
gram: escapee program; Palestine
Poland: Austrian State Treaty, acceded refugees, and refugee headings, supra.)
to by, 672n; Bulgarian interests in Reparation Agency, Inter-Allied, mem-
U.S. represented by, 2091n; consulates bership of, 585n.
general of in U.S., closing of, 2145; Reparations (World War II),
Eastern European Mutual Assistance Austria, 653, from Germany, 584-585;
Treaty (Warsaw Pact) ratified by, from Japan, 432–437.
from
حسظالمسلمين عن الدعخششنتنغضنمننممنملهع: جيهان
SUMMARY INDEX
XIX
log
'e
so been the
le
le
i
19
I
b,
}
3
1
}
Rio Treaty. (See Inter-American Treaty draft covenant provisions on, 205,
of Reciprocal Assistance.)
219; U.N. General Assembly resolu-
Rockefeller report. (See International tions on, 249–251; U.S. position on,
Development Advisory Board, report 71-77.
of.)
Southeast Asia (see also SEATO and
Rumania: Eastern European Mutual individual countries): collective se-
Assistance Treaty (Warsaw Pact) curity in, tripartite (French, U.K.,
ratified by, 1239n; information activi- U.S.) consultations on, 1458–1459,
ties of U.S. in, charges by, 2147-2148; 1461, U.K.-U.S. consultations on,
Ploesti trials in, U.S. position regard- 1704–1705, 1706, U.S. position on,
ing, 2153-2156; Prague Conference 96, 2387–2388, 2391–2392; Colombo
of 1950 attended by, 1782n; publica- Plan, role of in, 2338-2344; U.S.
tions of in U.S., suspension of, 2156; aid to, 2236; U.S. policy respecting,
subversive activities of U.S. in alleged 2168-2169, 2172, 2173, 2310–2328.
by, 2150–2151; travel restrictions in, Southeast Asia Collective Defense
2084–2085, 2148-2149, 2149-2150, Treaty (Manila Pact): text of (with
2151-2153; U.N. membership of, protocol), 912–916; ratifications of,
136n, 335n, 337; U.S. policy respect- 015n; U.S. ratification action on,
ing, 2157-2158, 2159-2160.
923-945.
Ryukyu Islands, 426, 450, 453, 469, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization:
471-472, 2427–2428.
Council of, communiqué on meeting
of, 2334–2337; establishment of, 2326-
Saar: Council of Europe, Statute of 2328, 2383; Formosa question, role
acceded to by, 1011n; Franco-German of in, 2509–2510; NATO, comparison
agreement on, 613 and note; French of with, 936–937; U.S. policy respect-
position respecting, 1674.
ing, 96, 375–376, 917--923.
SACEUR. (See North Atlantic Treaty Soviet Union. (Sée Union of Soviet
Organization.)
Socialist Republics.)
Saint Lawrence Seaway and power Spain: atomic energy, civil uses of,
project: construction of, U.S. au- U.S. agreement with, 2883n; military
thorization for, 1418–1424, U.S.-Cana- facilities in, agreement for U.S. use
dian agreement on, 1424-1427; pre- of, 1696–1698, negotiation of, 1695-
liminary negotiations for, 1405, 1406- 1696; mutual defense assistance
1409; Senate consideration of, 1414- agreement with the U.S., 1696n;
1417; Special Cabinet Committee's NATO, question of joining, 841;
recommendations concerning, 1413– U.N. membership of, 136n, 335n,
1414.
337; U.S. policy respecting, 1690-
Saint Lawrence Seaway Corporation 1695, 1698.
Act, 1418-1424.
State, Department of: educational
San Francisco, U.N. 10th anniversary exchange functions of, 3194-3195;
meeting at, U.S. addresses at, 360- International Cooperation Adminis-
370.
tration, establishment of in, 3152-
San Francisco Conference for the 3155; International Security Affairs,
Conclusion of a Japanese Peace Office of established in, 3045-3047;
Treaty: treaty and related agree- Mutual Security Program, role of in
ments signed at, 425-442; U.S. administration of, 3072-3073, 3087,
addresses and statements at, 442- 3088-3090, 3091-3092, 30943095,
462.
3098–3100, 3133–3134, 3147-3148,
Saudi Arabia: Afro-Asian Conference 3150–3151, 3152-3154; organization
attended by, 2345; Arab League of, chart of, 3222; passport functions
pacts ratified by, 1243n, 1249n; of, 3223–3232; personnel system of,
Dhahran Airfield, U.S. use of facil- recommendations concerning, 3204-
granted by, 2199_2206; 3222; Refugee Relief Program ad-
Japanese peace treaty ratified by, ministered by, 3235–3245; U.S. Inter-
438n; U.S. policy respecting, 2171. national. Information Administration
Schuman Plan. (See European Coal established in, 3169-3172.
and Steel Community.)
Stockholm "peace appeal”, 36, 105.
SEATO. (See Southeast Asia Treaty Strategic materials: U.K.-U.S. agree-
Organization.)
ment on allocation of, 1701–1702;
Self-government and self-determination U.S. legislation concerning, 3075,
(see also Colonialism and United 3101--3105.
Nations headings): Afro-Asian Con- Sudan: Afro-Asian Conference attended
ference position on, 2348–2349; U.N. by, 2345; condominium in, Egyptian
415900457_Vol. 2 102
1
1
XX
SUMMARY INDEX
T
T
abrogation of, 2303—2304; independ-Trade. (See Customs Simplification
ence of, Anglo-Egyptian agreement Act, Foreign economic policy, and
on 2305n, U.S. statement on, 2304; tariff and trade headings.)
Mixed Electoral Commission for, Trade Agreements Extension Act of
2304–2305.
1951, 2888-2892.
Suez Canal: Israeli shipping in, Egyptian Trade Agreements Extension Act of
restrictions on, 2251-2254; U.K.- 1953, 2893–2898.
Egyptian agreement on, 2223-2226, Trade Agreements Extension Act of
U.S. statement on, 2226; U.S. Policy 1955, 3022-3026.
respecting, 2169–2170, 2176.
Trade agreements policy (U.S.), recom-
Sweden: Council of Europe, Statute mendations concerning, 2919, 2923-
of ratified by, 1011n; EPU member- 2925, 2932–2933, 2949.
ship of, 1012; OEEC convention rati- Trade Cooperation, Organization for
fied by, 998n; U.N. ECOSOC, mem- (OTC): agreement establishing, 3014-
ber of, 149n; U.N. membership of, 3021; U. S. policy respecting, 131,
136n.
2989-2990, 3027.
Switzerland: atomic energy, civil uses Trade and Economic Affairs, Joint
of, U.S. agreement with, 2883n; Bul- U.S.-Canadian Committee on, 1404,
garia, representative of U.S. interests 1405.
in, 2091n, 2094n; EPU membership Trieste, Free Territory of: Italian peace
of, 1012; OEEC convention ratified treaty provisions governing, 393, 394,
by, 998n.
397–399, 406, 408, 410-411, 413;
Syria: Afro-Asian Conference attended memorandum of understanding (Italy,
by, 2345; Arab League pacts ratified U.K., U.S.) on, 419–422; memoran-
by, 1243n, 1249n; Israel, armistice dum of understanding (Italy, U.K.,
agreement with, 719-724, dispute U.S., Yugoslavia) on, 423-425; Stat-
with, 2245; Japanese peace treaty ute of, 424; tripartite (France, U.K.,
ratified by, 438n; U.N. Security U.S.) consultations on, 1467.
Council, non-per nanent member of, Truman, Harry S. (addresses, state-
141n; U.N. Trusteeship Council,
ments, correspondence, etc.): For-
member of, 155n; U.S. policy respect-
mosa, U.S. policy respecting, 2448-
ing, 2171.
2449, 2456–2457, 2459-2468; France,
U.S. relations with, 1669–1671; Ger-
Tachen Islands, 2481-2483, 2490-2491.
many, termination of state of war
Taiwan. (See Formosa.)
with, 1723-1724; Hungary, mass de-
Tariff policy (U.S.), recommendations
portations in, 2122–2123; Iranian oil
concerning, 2919-2925, 2932–2934. controversy, 2264–2265; Japan, peace
Tariffs and Trade, General Agreement treaty with, 442-447, termination of
on: text of (as amended in 1955),
state of war with, 2425–2427; Korea,
2953-3013; contracting parties to,
U.S. policy in, 2539–2540, 2550-2551,
ninth session of, 2953–2954; Japan,
2552–2560, 2566-2572, 2579-2580,
accession of to, 2436, 2445; U.S.
2596, 2608, 2609–2614; Libya, in-
policy respecting, 2923, 2933-2934,
dependence of, 2302; Near and
3027.
Middle East, U.S. policy in, 2167-
Technical assistance: Inter-American
2168; NATO, Supreme Coinmander
program for, 1316–1326; U.N. pro-
for designated by, 1505, 1506, U.S.
gram for, 262–265, 387–388; U.S.
forces assigned to, 1504; state of the
program for (see Mutual Security Union messages of, 1-5, 18–24, 27-32,
Program).
40-57; Truth Campaign, 3163–3165;
Technical Cooperation Administration:
U.S.S.R., U.S. relations with, 1952-
establishment and functions of, 3055–
1954, 1989–1991, 2609–2614 (see also
3058, 3142; program of, 3140–3145; state of the Union messages); U. K.,
transfer of functions of, 3094.
relations with, 31–32, 1699–1701;
Territorial sea, international regime of,
U. S. foreign policy, 25–27, 345–350
302–323, 1346-1355.
Thailand: Afro-Asian Conference at- Trust territories. (See United Nations
(see also state of the Union messages).
tended by, 2345; Colombo Plan,
headings).
member of, 2339; U.N. membership
of, 136n; U.N. Trusteeship. Council, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
member of, 155n; U.S. aid to, 2369- 153n, 427n.
2370, 2396.
Tunisia: autonomy for, French-Tun-
Tourism, efforts to promote, 2020, 2023– isian agreement concerning, 2300n;
2024, 2032, 2927, 2937-2938, 2952. U.N. General Assembly resolution
:
i
1
SUMMARY INDEX
XXI
1
7
f
f
f
bycost
respecting, 2299–2300; U.S. policy (see also Geneva Foreign Ministers
regarding, 2300.
Meeting); Germany, settlement for,
Turkey: Afro-Asian Conference attended attitude of toward (see Germany);
by, 2345; Baghdad Pact ratified by, Germany, Federal Republic of, rela-
1257n; Balkan Pact ratified by, tions with, 1737 and note; Japan,
1235n; Council of Europe, Statute peace "declaration" with, 439n, peace
of acceded to by, 1011n; Cyprus, treaty with, attitude of toward, 449,
dispute with Greece concerning, 2276- 451, 464, 465, 471, 480-481, prisoners
2277; EPU membership of, 1012; of war of, policy of respecting, 1944,
Japanese peace treaty ratified by, 2059, 2062, 2065-2066, trade with by,
438n; Middle East Command nego- 479-480; Korea, armistice in, attitude
tiations, role of in, 2180–2187; North of toward, 2636-2640, 2647, conflict
Atlantic Treaty acceded to by, 853– in, involvement of in and responsi-
871, 1614-1615, 2187, protocol to bility for, 2555–2556, 2636-2637,
accepted by, 872n; OEÉC convention 2638–2640, 2647, 2663–2665, settle-
ratified by, 998n; Pakistan, mutual ment in, attitude of toward (see
cooperation agreement with, 1253– Geneva Conference on Indochina and
1256; U.N. ECOSOC, member of, Korea and Korean headings); Middle
149n; U.N. Security Council
, non- East Command, objections to by,
permanent member of, 141n; U.S. 2185–2187; minorities (ethnic and
policy respecting, 859-860, 869-870, religious), persecution of by, 1961–
2173, 2190–2191.
1962; North Atlantic Treaty, adher-
ence to proposed by, 1873; Prague
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic: Conference of 1950 attended by,
U.N. ECOSOC, member of, 149n; 1782n; prisoners of World War II
U.N. Security Council, nonpermanent held by, 1729, 1733, 1938-1939,
member of, 141n.
1944, 2059, 2060, 2062, 2063–2066;
Union of South Africa: Japanese peace treaties and agreements violated
treaty ratified by, 438n; racial pol-
1937–1944, 1999–2005; U.N.
icies of, U.N.
U.N. General Assembly ECOSOC, member of, 149n; U.N.
resolutions on, 331, 2307–2309.
specialized agencies, membership in,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 165n; United States, agricultural
(U.S.S.R.): Austria, policy of in delegations, exchange of with, 1995-
(see also Austria and Austrian State 1997, aircraft of attacked by, 1972–
Treaty negotiations), 1769–1776; Aus- 1989, clergymen of, reciprocal priv-
trian State Treaty ratified by, 683n; ileges extended to, 1999–2005, friend-
Baltic States, subjugation of by, ship of for peoples of, congressional
2086-2091; Berlin, regime of in (see resolution on, 1952-1954, lend-lease
Berlin); Berlin Foreign Ministers settlement with, negotiations for,
Meeting, role of at, 85-90, 1870-1871 2039–2058, Mutual Security Act of
(see also Berlin Foreign Ministers protested by, 1954–1955, trade of
Meeting); China, "People's Republic" with, U.S. proclamation on, 1989–
of, treaty of alliance with, 2463–2468; 1991, travel restrictions in on citizens
disarmament, position of regarding, of, 1955–1956, 1963–1968, travel
1970–1971, 2773, 2778, 2783–2786, restrictions on citizens of in, 2084-
2788-2793, 2846-2850; East-West 2085; Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, relations with,
contacts, attitude of respecting (see U.N. resolution
on,
2163–2164,
East-West contacts); Eastern Euro- visited by leaders of, 115n.
pean Mutual Assistance Treaty (War- United Kingdom (Great Britain): atom-
saw Pact) ratified by, 1239n; Egypt, ic energy, civil uses of, U.S. agreement
arms shipments to by, 2240-2241; with, 2883n; Austrian State Treaty
Formosa, U.S. intervention in charged ratified by, 683n; Austrian State
by, 174–175, 2469–2470, 2476–2481; Treaty negotiations, role of in (see
Geneva Conference of Heads of Austrian State Treaty negotiations:
Government, role of at, 111-114, Western Powers' action on); Baghdad
2015–2018 (see also Geneva Con- Pact-ratified by, 1257n; Berlin Foreign
ference of Heads of Government); Ministers Meeting, role of at,
85–90,
Geneva Conference on Indochina and 1870-1871 (see also Berlin Foreign
Korea, role of at, 785–788, 2397-2398, Ministers Meeting); Bermuda Confer-
2695–2701 (see also Geneva Confer- ence of Heads of Government, role of
ence on Indochina and Korea); Gen- at, 1468-1470; Brussels Treaty rati-
eva Foreign Ministers Meeting, role fied by, 971n, Paris protocols to rati-
of at, 115-122, 1926–1927, 2032-2039 fied by, 975n; Burma, independence
i
;
4. www
XXII
SUMMARY INDEX
U
U
U
U
of acknowledged by, 34n, 51n, 2312n; by, 34n, 51n, 464n, 2312n; Paris
Ceylon, dominion status accorded to (Nine-Power) Conference, role of at,
by, 34n, 51n, 464n, 2312n; China, 1492-1493; Southeast Asia, policy of
"People's Republic" of, aircraft inci- in, 1704–1705 (see also Geneva Con-
dents with, 2522, U.S. interests in ference on Indochina and Korea);
represented by, 2522–2523, 2709– Southeast Asia Collective Defense
2710; Colombo Plan, member of, Treaty ratified by, 915n; strategic
2339; Council of Europe, Statute of materials, allocation of, understand-
ratified by, 1011n; disarmament, po- ing with U.S. concerning, 1701–1702;
sition on (see Disarmament); Egypt, Sudan, agreement with Egypt con-
agreements with on Sudan, 2304, on cerning, 2304 and note; Suez Canal
the Suez Canal Base, 2223–2226; Base, agreement with Egypt respect-
Europe, military commitments to ing, 2223–2226; Trieste, understand-
under SACEUR, 620, 1479–1480, ings of regarding, 419–425, 1467; trust
1487–1489; European Defense Com- territories administered by, 153n;
munity, association agreement with, U.S.S.R., relations with (see Austrian
1471n; EPU membership of, 1012; State Treaty negotiations, Berlin
Geneva Conference of Heads of Gov- Foreign Ministers Meeting, Disarma-
ernment, role of at, 111-114, 2015-2018 ment, East-West contacts, Geneva
(see also Geneva Conference of Heads conference headings, and Germany);
of Government); Geneva Conference United Nations, role of in (see United
on Indochina and Korea, role of at, Nations headings); U.N. ECOSOC,
785–787, 1704–1705, 2396–2397, 2692– member of, 149n; U.S. relations with,
2693, 2695-2701 (see also Geneva 1458–1470, 1699-1707 (see also For-
Conference on Indochina and Korea); eign Ministers' consultations and
Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting, organizational and subject headings);
role of at, 115-122, 1926–1927, 2032- Yugoslavia, consultations and under-
2039 (see also Geneva Foreign Minis- standings with, 423-425, 2165.
ters Meeting); Germany, settlement United Nations (see also other United
in, position respecting, 1465-1466, Nations headings): armed forces for,
1711, 1756–1757, 1779-1780, 1791, 164, 189-190, 191, 192-193, 194–200;
1794-1795, 1797-1798, 1809-1814, economic development, fund for of,
1819–1821, 1839-1840, 1842-1844, 70, 388; flag of, display of, 301; mem-
1873, 1882, 1883, 1898, 1899, 1900– bership in, 136n, 334-338; personnel
1903, 1905, 1922' (see also Germany); policies of, 274–300; technical assist-
Germany, Federal Republic of, occu-
program of, 262–265, U.S.
pation regime in, termination of, contributions to, 3078, 3118; tenth
protocol and related agreements on anniversary of, 359-370; U.S. policy
ratified by, 485n, restoration of sov- respecting, 2-3, 11, 16-17, 34, 47-48,
ereignty to, position on, 1197–1198, 92–100, 130, 169-186, 324-325, 348,
1458–1462, 1709-1713, 1720-1723, 350-380.
1724-1727 (see also Germany, Federal United Nations Charter: text of, 134-
Republic of); India, dominion and re- 161; review of, U.N. General Assem-
public of acknowledged by, 34n, 5in, bly' resolution on, 333-334, U.S.
464n, 2312n; Iranian oil controversy, statements on, 323–333, 358–371,
role of in, 2261-2262, 2269–2270, 388-390, U.S. Senate consideration of,
2273-2275; Italian peace treaty, in- 819-820, 826-827.
terpretation of, joint declaration by United Nations Collective Measures
(with France and U.S.), 1680; Japa- Committee: report of, 195–200; U.S.
nese peace treaty ratified by, 437n; proposals to, 194–195.
Korean Armistice Agreement guaran- United Nations Command. (See
teed by, 2662, 2692–2693; London Korea.)
(Nine-Power) Conference, role of at, United Nations Commission for Unifica-
1474–1491; Middle East, arms supply tion and Rehabilitation of Korea
policy in, joint declaration by (with (UNCURK). (See Korea.)
France and U.S.), 2237; Middle East | United Nations Commission on Human
Command negotiations, role of in, Rights: covenants drafted by, 204
2180-2182, 2183–2185; North Atlantic 227; U.S. proposals to, 227–239.
Treaty ratified by, 814n, protocols to United Nations Commission on Korea,
accepted by, 854n, 872n; NATO, role 2537–2538, 2572–2575.
of in, 1594-1660' (see also NATO); United Nations Commission (Ad Hoc)
OEEC convention ratified by, 998n; on Prisoners of War, report of, 269-
Pakistan, dominion status accorded to 271.
ance
ܚܺܝܤܚܫܫܝܙܶܝܰܫܫ ܝܝܿܢ « ܝܝܰܫܳܫܝܺܠܝ̈ܫܐܫܚܫܚܚܒܗܬ݁ܬ݁ܐܪܒܪܬܙ
SUMMARY INDEX
XX
:
C
United Nations Commission to Investi- slavia, hostile activities of U.S.S.R.
gate Conditions for Free Elections in against, 2163-2164.
Germany: establishment of, 1795– United Nations International Law Com-
1797; reports of, 1798-1809, 1814- mission, sixth session of, report on,
1819.
302-321.
United Nations Conciliation Commis- United Nations Korean Reconstruction
sion for Palestine, 2244–2245.
Agency. (See Korea.)
United Nations Economic and Social United Nations Representative for
Council: membership of, 149n; reso- India and Pakistan, fifth report of,
lution of, 266-267.
2286-2294.
United Nations General Assembly: United Nations Secretary-General:
rules of procedure of, amendment of, reports, letters, etc. by on: For-
188, 190-191;
mosa question, invitation to “People's
resolutions of on: Algeria, 2302; Republic of China to attend Security
atomic energy, 2823–2824, 2837–2841; Council meetings on, 2490; Korean
Austria, peace settlement for, 1834– prisoners of war, Communist deten-
1835; Burma, Chinese forces in, 2353; tion of, 2713–2714; twenty-year pro-
charter review, 333–334; China, rep- gram for achieving peace, 162–167;
resentation of, 338-340, 341; China, U.N. personnel policies, 274–292;
"People's Republic of, aggression by reports, letters, etc. to on: Austrian
in Korea, 2608-2609, strategic em- State Treaty negotiations, 1877-1881;
bargo against, 2614-2615; collective Formosa, Communist charges of U.S.
measures, 187-192; Cyprus, 2277; dis- aggression in, 2476-2480; Katyn
armament, 2768-2769, 2796–2798, massacre, 2143-2144; Korea, armistice
2851-2853; Disarmament Commis- negotiations respecting, 2627-2636,
sion, U.N., establishment of, 2748- Communist attack on, 2537-2538,
2750; Ethiopia and Eritrea, federation 2572–2575, Geneva Conference on,
of, 2305-2306; forced labor, 267–268; 2695–2701, prisoners of war of, Com-
Germany, free elections in, 1795– munist detention of, 2710-2711, Uni-
1797; human rights, 244-246; human fied Command in, additional forces
rights clauses of treaties of peace with for, 2626; prisoners of World War
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, II, 269–271, 2065-2066; territorial sea,
2080-2081; Jerusalem, international regime of, 321-323; U.S.S.R., attacks
regime for, 2254; Korea, armistice by on U.N. aircraft, 2664–2665,
agreement in, 2643–2644, cease-fire bomber of shot down by U.S., 2663–
group in, 2594–2595, Geneva Confer- 2664; U.S. armed forces, use of by
ence on, results of, 2701, germ warfare U.N., 192–193; world calendar reform,
in, investigation of, 2669-2670, polit- 301-302.
ical conference on, 2676-2678, politi- United Nations Security Council: mem-
cal settlement in, 2702, prisoners-of- bership of, 141n;
war problem in, 2651-2654, 2711- resolutions by on: Gaza Strip,
2712, U. N. Commission for Unifica- attacks in, 2247-2248; Korea, Unified
tion and Rehabilitation of, 2576-2578, Command in, 2550, 2565–2566, U.N.
U.N. forces in, tribute to, 2663, U.N. assistance for, 2540-2541, withdrawal
Reconstruction Agency for, 2585– of North Korean forces from, 2538-
2593; Korea, "People's Democratic 2539; Qibya incident, 2246–2247;
Republic" of, strategic embargo Suez Canal, Egyptian restrictions on
against, 2614–2615; Morocco, 2298; Israeli shipping in, 2251-2252; Syrian-
non-self-governing territories, 247– Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission,
261; Palestine, U.N. Conciliation authority of, 2241–2244; Syrian-
Commission for, mandate of, 2244- Israeli water diversion dispute, 2245;
2245; Palestine refugees, 2257-2261; U.N. Truce Supervision Organization,
peace through deeds, 168-169; pris- authority of, 2241-2244, 2248, 2249–
oners of World War II, 271-272; 2250.
twenty-year program for achieving United Nations Truce Supervision Or-
peace, 167-168; Tunisia, 2299-2300; ganization, 2241-2244, 2248–2250.
Union of South Africa, apartheid poli- United Nations Trusteeship Council,
cies in, 2308-2309, treatment of peo- members of, 155n.
ple of Indian origin in, 2307-2308; United States Congress, laws enacted
U.N. membership, 334-337; U.N. by: Agricultural Trade Development
personnel policies, 292–293, 298–300; Assistance Act of 1954, as amended
uniting for peace, 187–192; Yugo- in 1955, 2941-2947; Atomic Energy
i
Ali
XXIV
SUMMARY INDEX
Act of 1954, 2861–2877; Customs U.S. forces assigned to, 1526–1528;
Simplification Act of 1953, 2898; De- Philippines, mutual defense treaty
partment of State Appropriation Act with, 876–877; Rio Treaty, 800-812;
of 1953, 341; Far Eastern Assistance Rumania, treaty of peace with, 404–
Act of 1950, 2532–2533; Foreign 419; Southeast Asia Collective De-
Service Act of 1946, 3204; Formosa, fense Treaty, 929–945; U.S.S.R.,
use of U.S. forces to protect, 2486- persecution of religious and ethnic
2487; Immigration and Nationality minorities by, 1961-1962.
Act of 1952, 3232; India, emergency Uruguay: Japanese peace treaty ratified
food aid to, 2227–2229; International by, 438n; Rio Treaty ratified by,
Development, Act for, 3047–3054; siin; U.N. ECOSOC, member of,
international organizations, U.S. con- 149n.
tributions to, 272–273; Mutual De-
fense Assistance Act of 1949, amend- Venezuela: atomic energy, civil uses of,
ment of 1950 to, 3039–3042; Mutual U.S. agreement with, 2883n; Japanese
Defense Assistance Control Act of peace treaty ratified by, 438n; Rio
1951, 3101-3105; Mutual Security Act Treaty ratified by, 811n; U.N.
of 1951, as amended in 1952 and 1953, ECOSOC, member of, 149n.
3059–3086; Mutual Security Act of Viet-Nam, “Democratic Republic" of:
1954, as amended in 1955, 3105–3140; Afro-Asian Conference attended by,
Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950, 2345.
2256–2257; Refugee Relief Act of Viet-Nam, State of: Afro-Asian Confer-
1953, as amended in 1954, 3235-3243; ence attended by, 2345; armistice
Saint Lawrence Seaway Corporation agreements respecting, 750–767; Co-
Act, 1418–1424; Trade Agreements lombo Plan, member of, 2339; inde-
Extension Acts of 1951, 1953, and pendence of in French Union, 51n, 74;
1955, 2888–2892, 2893-2898, 3022– Japanese peace treaty ratified by,
3026; United Nations Flag, display 438n; recognition of by U.S., 2363-
of, 301.
2364, 2404–2405; reunification of,
United States House of Representa- conditions for, 2404; U. S. aid program
tives: resolutions and reports of on: for, 2401–2403; U. S. refugee aid to,
China, U.S. policy in, 2456-2463; 2398–2400.
China, "People's Republic" of, ag- Vogeler case. (See Hungary.)
gression in Korea by, 2602; Oatis Voice of America (VOA), programs of
case, 2106; Soviet people, American objected to by Czechoslovakia, 2099,
friendship for, 1952–1954; U.N., 10th 2101.
anniversary of, 359–360.
United States Senate: resolutions and | Warsaw Pact, text of, 1239–1242.
reports of on: ANZUS Treaty, 882- Washington, Declaration of, 1292–1293.
885; Austrian State Treaty, 682-697; West Irian (West New Guinea), Nether-
Bulgaria, peace treaty with, 404–419; lands-Indonesian dispute over, 2350n.
Caracas Declaration, 1302; China, Western European Union: protocols to
"People's Republic" of, aggression in Brussels Treaty establishing, 972–989,
Korea by, 2602, U.N. representation ratifications of, 975n, U.S. Senate
of, 340; China, Republic of, mutual consideration of, 619-620, 633–634;
defense treaty with, 957–965; dis- Armaments, Agency for Control of
armament, 2794–2795; Germany, Fed- under, 621, 634, 974, 984–989, 1477,
eral Republic of, restoration of sov- 1502–1503; Council of, creation and
ereignty to, 1732, termination of functions of, 619, 633, 974; EDC,
occupation regime in, protocol and comparison of with, 633-634; forces
related conventions on, 627-643; of members of, 620, 634, 977–979, 991;
Germany, Soviet Zone of, friendship U.S. policy respecting, 989–991.
for people of, 1749–1750; Gold Coast, Wheat Agreement, International, U.S.
self-government for, 2306; Hungary, views of shortcomings of, 2014, 2915.
treaty of peace with, 404-419; Italy, World Health Organization (WHO),
treaty of peace with, 404–419; Japan, U.S. contributions to, 3128.
peace treaty with, 463–483, security
treaty with, 893-896; Korea, mutual Yemen: Afro-Asian Conference attended
defense treaty with, 902–912; Nigeria, þy, 2345; Arab League pacts ratified
self-government for, 2306; North by, 1243n, 1249n; Ŭ.N. membership
Atlantic Treaty, 825-852, protocols of, 136n.
to, 864-871; NATO, Status of Forces Yugoslavia: Austrian State Treaty
and related agreements, 1561-1582, acceded to by, 672n; Balkan Pact
J
1
t
Le montant des animation materials wer:
SUMMARY INDEX
XXV
agreements ratified by, 1235n; eco-
nomic relations with U.S., 2164;
mutual defense assistance agreement
with U.S., 2160-2163; Trieste settle-
ment with (see Trieste); U.S.S.R.,
hostile activities of against, U.N.
resolution on, 2163–2164, visit of
leaders of to, 115n; U.N. ECOSOC,
member of, 149n; U.N. Security
Council, nonpermanent member of,
141n; U.S. relations with, communi-
qué on, 2165-2166; Western Powers
(Francé, U.K., U.S.), consultations
with, communiqué on, 2165.
с
.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1957
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