HD
6515
B82
IT
STORAGE
H2+6
S
M
A 544046
United States U
Commission on Industrial
Relations
B
Me
AND
...
The National Erectors' Association
The International Association of Bridge and
Structural Ironworkers.
CEGR-
RECEIVED
By LUKE GRANT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1915
137
LIMARY
ARTES
VERITAS
LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
QUAERIS-PENINSULAM AMOCKU
ERKEISSALI310HANDLEEI
PRESENTED BY
THE AUTHOR
United States
Commission on Industrial Relations
The National Erectors' Association
AND
By
The International Association of Bridge and
Structural Ironworkers
LUKE GRANT
HI
6515
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1915
.382
エク
​BARNARD & MILLER PRINT, CHICAGO
137
CHAPTER
CONTENTS.
I. International Association Bridge and Structural
Ironworkers
II. The National Erectors' Association..
III. Early Negotiations for Trade Agreements.
IV. National Strike and New York Lockout..
5
. 11
20
26
V. Causes Which Led to Second National Strike.... 34
VI. Efforts to Reach a Settlement..
40
VII. Reasons Why Peace Conference Failed.
46
VIII. Indirect Causes of Open Shop War.
53
IX. Post & McCord Strike in New York...
59
X. Union Policies in Fight Against Open Shop..... 65
XI. Policies of Employers in Open Shop War....... 72
XII. Why Erectors Prefer Open Shop.
78
XIII. Why Unions Fight for Closed Shop..
. 86
XIV. Building Trades Unions and Restriction of Out-
put
PAGE
•
XV. Spies in the Ironworkers' Union..
XVI. Labor Violence and the Public Attitude...
303741
92
€ 99
.107
XVII. The Development of the Professional Slugger...114
XVIII. The Dynamite Campaign and Its Effects.
XIX. Why the Resort to Dynamite.
XX.
Conclusion ..
..121
132
139
CHAPTER I.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE AND STRUCTURAL IRON-
WORKERS.
The International Association of Bridge and Structural
Ironworkers was organized at a convention held in Pittsburgh
February 4, 1896. Five local unions were represented-New
York, Buffalo, Boston, Pittsburgh and Chicago. Each local
union had three votes in the convention, which was composed
of thirteen delegates.
Formed at a period when the use of structural steel in build-
ings was being developed, the organization had no fixed prece-
dents to follow. The erection of structural steel was at that
time just assuming the position of a distinct trade. In some
of the larger cities of the country, a few steel buildings had
been erected in the late '80s and the early '90s, but the in-
dustry may be said to have been in its infancy at the time the
International Association was formed.
Local unions of bridgemen existed in some sections of the
country for a number of years previous to the appearance of
the first steel skyscraper. The bridgemen were more skilled
in the framing of timbers than in the erection of steel, but
as the use of steel as a substitute for wood became general,
the same workmen readily adapted themselves to the changed
character of the work and became "bridgemen" instead of
bridge carpenters, as they had once been classed.
From bridge building to construction work, with the ap-
pearance of the first steel building, was a natural step for the
bridgeman to take, and in Chicago, the birthplace of the mod-
ern steel building, the Bridge and Construction Men's Union
was formed in 1891. Because of its having been the pioneer,
the Chicago union became Local No. 1 when the International
Association was formed.
Probably due to the fact that the trade of a structural iron-
worker does not require as high a degree of skill as some other
building trades, the wages paid the ironworkers when they
first organized, were much lower than the wages paid to other
M
6
mechanics with whom they came in contact on a building. It
was some years before the structural ironworker was recog-
nized as a skilled mechanic by the more favored and better
organized trades, and it required years of effort for the iron-
workers to advance their wages to the level of other trades,
or to a point commensurate with the hazardous character of
the work they perform.
From the lowest paid trade on a building, the ironworkers
through organization have advanced their wages in fifteen
years well toward the top of the column of upwards of thirty
unions in the building industry. The sharp advance in wages
in the structural iron trade has been more marked than in
most of the other trades in the building industry, for the rea-
son that the ironworkers started from a lower point.
The following comparison of the wage scale of structural
ironworkers for the years 1902 and 1914 in ten of the principal
cities, shows an average increase of 21 cents an hour in the
period:
City.
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo.
Chicago
Cleveland
Kansas City
Minneapolis
New York
San Francisco
St. Louis
•
•
Cents per Hour.
1902.
1914.
433
40
45
50
471
37
40
561
37 1/2
50
561
561
H+HA
621
2883
65
621
621
75
75
In a study of the character of the membership of the Bridge-
men's Union, there are three factors to be taken into consider-
ation: the comparatively small degree of skill required, the
extremely hazardous nature of the employment, and the shift-
ing character of the work, which necessitates being "on the
road" much of the time.
That the work requires less skill than most of the other
building trades, is shown by the fact that the period of ap-
prenticeship is fixed at six months in some agreements be-
7
tween the ironworkers and their employers, while the maxi-
mum apprenticeship period found in any contracts is eighteen
months.¹
In some agreements the maximum age of an apprentice en-
tering the trade is placed at twenty-five years, in other agree-
ments it is thirty years, and in the Pittsburgh district the
maximum age limit is thirty-five years. It will be seen that
if the lowest age limit is taken, the structural ironworker
apprentice may have reached the age of manhood before tak-
ing up the trade.
In most of the skilled trades where an apprenticeship of
from three to five years is required, the apprentices are boys
of eighteen years of age or under when they enter the trade.
Some unions provide that apprentices shall not be over seven-
teen years of age, while frequently they begin their apprentice-
ship at sixteen years.2
Boys are then in that formative period in their lives when
the precept and example of the journeymen with whom they
associate, have an influence on their character. In the well
organized trades, the apprentices are admitted to the union
during their apprenticeship period, and while they are being
taught a trade, they also are receiving lessons in self-govern-
ment and discipline. Attending meetings of their trade union,
they hear discussions on trade agreements and relations with
employers in their particular craft, so that by the time they
become journeymen, they are fairly well versed in matters
pertaining to collective bargaining and joint trade agree-
ments.
Owing to the heavy nature of the work of a structural iron-
worker, which requires strength more than skill, it may be
impracticable to employ youths as apprentices, but it is true
that the structural ironworker does not get the advantages in
1-In a national agreement between the Erectors' Association and the
International Association, effective May 1, 1903, and expiring Jan. 1,
1905, the apprenticeship period is placed at six months. Agreements
in New York, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh fix the period at eighteen
months. In Chicago the agreements make no specific provisions for ap-
prentices.
2-In_agreements between the Carpenters' Union in Chicago and its em-
ployers the age limit for apprentices is seventeen years.
:
8
training of the average building trades workman, who started
to learn his trade as a boy. The men who constitute largely
the membership of the bridgemen's organization, are those
who have tried other occupations and who have simply "drift-
ed" into the structural iron trade, attracted by the high wages
which it offers.
The second factor, the dangerous nature of the employment,
is shown in the number of fatal accidents which constantly
occur in the trade. For the fiscal year 1911-1912, as shown
by the report of the secretary-treasurer of the International
Association, 124 death claims were paid out of a total mem-
bership of 10,928. Of the 124 deaths occurring in the trade.
that year, 109 were due to accidents. This is 1 per cent of the
total membership.
The figures. are more striking if it is considered that out
of a total of 124 deaths in the year, only 15 were due to natural
causes. In other words, 87.9 per cent died as a result of acci-
dents and 12.1 per cent from natural causes.¹
1
The citizen on the street corner, who is fascinated as he
watches an ironworker on the end of a narrow beam twenty
or thirty stories up in the air, is apt to wonder that the acci-
dents are not more numerous than they are. The trade does
not look inviting to the man on the street. For that reason
only men endowed with physical strength and daring take up
the work. Facing danger daily develops in the ironworker a
sort of desperate recklessness, that the workman in a less
hazardous occupation does not understand.
In following his occupation as a bridge builder, which con-
stitutes a large part of the ironworker's trade, the workman
is compelled to be away from his home much of the time.
Railroad bridges have to be built many times miles away from
any habitation. The calling is one that hardly attracts the
home-loving married man. As a result, the trade develops a
class of roving and irresponsible workmen, more noted for
strength and physical courage than for trained skill and in-
telligence.
1-Report of Secretary McClory to Indianapolis Convention 1913. The
death rate from accidents furnished by Secretary Harry Jones.
9
When the modern steel building made its appearance, it
was followed in the natural course of events by the large con-
struction company, which took contracts for the erection of
steel structures in all parts of the country. Workmen were
sent by these companies from one city to another, so that the
nomadic habits developed in the bridgemen were perpetuated
in the structural ironworker. This condition does not exist
to the same extent today that it did ten years ago, but it still
exists.
G
The trade which a man follows has a powerful influence on
his character. If his work is uncertain and occasional, it has
a tendency to make him shiftless and irresponsible. If it is
exceptionally dangerous, he is apt to be daring and reckless.
If his calling requires him to travel, with only short intervals
in any given place, he is not likely to develop in a high degree
the social habits that tend to ideal citizenship. A man's mental
attitude toward the world is, in no small degree, determined
by his trade or calling, which creates his immediate environ-
ment.
Because of these things, which are a part of the structural
iron industry and inseparable from it, the average ironworker
is denied the opportunities for self-development that are en-
joyed by the average skilled mechanic in other trades. These
factors must be taken into account in seeking to understand
and explain certain actions and the forces and motives that
lie behind them.
Conditions in the structural iron trade have changed ma-
terially for the better in the last fifteen years. Steel construc-
tion is common in every large city, which means that efficient
workmen can be found in every large center of industry. The
necessity for traveling to find employment has been minimized,
but not eliminated in the erection of buildings. In the erection
of bridges, the conditions have not changed in that respect
and crews of workmen must of necessity be sent from one point
in the country to another where bridges are being built.
-
In describing the material from which the Bridgemen's
Union had to draw its membership, and the influence which
10
organization has had on the individuals, the business agent
of one local union said: "The organization has made men
of a lot of irresponsible bums. Most of us a few years ago
didn't know what it meant to wear a white collar. We were
only half civilized; just a lot of bums roaming around the
country.
"But we are being educated and the union is doing it by
raising wages and teaching us self-respect. The employers
have changed, too. I remember when a bridgeman wearing a
white collar couldn't get a job. The foreman would say he
was a dude, who didn't know his trade. It's different now. If
a man is well dressed when he is looking for work, the fore-
man will size him up and conclude that he is a decent fellow
who doesn't drink, or he could not afford to dress so well. So
a neat appearance is an advantage today, but it is only a few
years since the blue shirt fellows had it all in their favor. It's
been a hard fight, but the bridgeman today is a different fellow
from the bridgeman of even ten years ago. The union has
made mistakes. We realize that, but what could you expect
of us? A lot of irresponsible bums can't be expected to be
diplomats.''1
If this description of the structural ironworker, given by
one of them, is accurate, it can readily be understood why men
of the Sam Parks stripe gained ascendency in the early days
of the union. It may explain why strong-arm methods made
such a strong appeal to the membership when the union en-
countered opposition. It may explain why even the conserva-
tive men in the union, realizing the benefits which organization
had brought, might have been inclined to overlook the methods
used, as long as results were obtained. It may explain the
blind loyalty which the ironworker feels toward his union and
why he rallies to its support with his money and fealty when
he thinks its existence is threatened. It may explain why
agents of the union, convicted of violations of law in seeking
to further the union interests, are regarded as "martyrs'
and not as "criminals" by the union ironworker.
1-Interview with W. C. Aiken, business agent Pittsburgh Local.
22
11
CHAPTER II.
THE NATIONAL ERECTORS' ASSOCIATION.
The National Erectors' Association, against which the
Bridgemen's Union has waged a continuous fight since the
spring of 1906, was organized March 3, 1903, in New York City.
The name adopted at the time the organization was formed,
was the National Association of Manufacturers and Erectors
of Structural Steel and Iron Work. The shorter title was
adopted early in 1906 at the time the Association launched its
"open shop" campaign in the structural iron industry.
Any individual, firm or corporation, engaged wholly or in
part in the erection of iron and steel bridges or buildings, is
eligible to membership. The membership is restricted to such
firms as pledge themselves to the open shop principle; this
restriction having been imposed after the open shop campaign
began.
For a number of years the Association had no written con-
stitution or by-laws and its form of organization was exceed-
ingly loose. It was formed mainly for the purpose of dealing
with the International Association of Bridge and Structural
Ironworkers in matters pertaining to wages and hours of
labor. Its members carried on work throughout a large ter-
ritory and it was deemed expedient to have a national agree-
ment with the union.
The advantage in having such an agreement appeared to
be that uniform hours of labor and working conditions could
be established throughout the country and a wage scale fixed
for each locality, according to local conditions. Such an agree-
ment was entered into a few weeks after the organization was
formed. (See Appendix, p. 158.)
At the initial meeting at which the Association was formed,
there were fifty-four firms represented, including the largest
fabricating and erecting concerns in the country. Soon after
the New England employers withdrew for local business rea-
sons, which left the membership at about forty firms. This
12
membership with only a little variance has been maintained
up to the present time.
On the expiration of the agreement with the union January
1, 1905, it was not renewed on a national basis. The reasons
for this are not quite clear today, but it does not appear that
either side made any special effort to maintain the national
contract. The local unions at that time, as in fact they always
had been, were strongly impregnated with the idea of having
complete local autonomy within their respective jurisdictions
and preferred to deal with their employers locally.
The companies also may have preferred to have local agree-
ments, as this would give them an advantage in dealing with
the union. In localities where the ironworkers were well or-
ganized, the companies could make local agreements, while in
the absence of a national agreement, they would be free to
employ such men as they chose in localities where the men
were not strongly organized. As a matter of fact, that is what
the companies did, and was the cause of the final rupture in
contractual relations which led to the fight for the establish-
ment and maintenance of the so-called open shop.
C
While the agreement was not renewed on a national basis
in 1905, there was no indication that the firms composing the
Erectors' Association meant at that time to discontinue their
relations with the union. On the contrary, local agreements
were signed for New York, Philadelphia and other cities which
continued in force throughout the year 1905. In their main
provisions these local agreements were as favorable to the
union as had been the national agreement and more favorable
than the agreement between the New York Local and the local
contractors, many of whom were not members of the Erectors'
Association.1
1-The agreement between the iron workers in New York and the local
employers for the year 1905 provided that foremen should not be mem-
bers of the union. The agreement between the same local and the
Erectors' Association provided that there should be no restrictions in
the employment of foremen "regardless of whether such foremen are
members of the union or not." Article 13 in both agreements. See
Appendix, pp. 162-171.
13
As will be shown in more detail hereafter, the policy of the
Erectors' Association underwent a complete change in the
spring of 1906. Conditions at that time appeared favorable
for the inauguration of a policy that would break the power
and influence of the union.
In the fall of 1905 the union had declared a strike against
the American Bridge Company, by far the largest and most
influential member of the Erectors' Association. The strike
had been extended to firms holding sub-contracts from the
American Bridge Company, which resulted in the New York
Local of ironworkers being suspended from the Joint Arbi-
tration Board and the plan of arbitration, at that time in
force between the unions and the Building Trades Employers'
Association.
On January 1, 1906, the ironworkers in New York struck-
for an increase in wages. This involved members of the Erect-
ors' Association who had not hitherto been drawn into the
strike against the American Bridge Company, so that the
time appeared propitious to deal the structural ironworkers
an effective blow, as they were outside the reach of assistance
from the other unions in the building trades.
The Erectors' Association saw its opportunity to establish
open shop conditions on a national scale. A constitution was
adopted and the Association organized on a firmer footing
than it had hitherto been. Up to that time the only purpose
which held the members of the Association together was that
of dealing with the union. This was a weak link compared
with the purpose of crushing the power of that union, so that
for the first time in its history the Erectors' Association be-
came an aggressive force with a definite object in view.
ܕ
The object in view is outlined in Article III of the short
constitution adopted, which reads: "The object of this Asso-
ciation shall be the institution and maintenance of the open
shop principle in the employment of labor in the erection of
steel and iron bridges and buildings and other structural steel
and iron work." (Constitution Erectors' Association, Appen-
dix, p. 191.)
14
The government of the Erectors' Association is vested in
an executive committee of nine members, which has power
to levy assessments, hire and fix the salary of the Commis-
sioner and other employees and to determine policies. The
constitution contains eight brief articles dealing with mem-
bership, objects, government, dues and assessments and meet-
ings. It has never been considered of sufficient importance
to put in printed form. It provides that any of the articles
may be amended by a three-fourths vote of the entire member-
ship, except Article III quoted above. The inference is that
the open shop article is fixed and immutable and cannot be
changed while the Association lasts. (Constitution, Appendix,
p. 191.)
The membership of the National Erectors' Association in
September, 1914, was composed of the following thirty-three
firms:
American Bridge Co.
Blodgett Construction Co.
Brann & Stuart Co.
Eastern Bridge & Structural Co.
John Eichleay Jr. Co.
Fay Hunt Erecting Co.
Fort Pitt Bridge Works.
Heyl & Patterson, Inc.
Illinois Steel Co.
Kansas City Bridge Co.
Levering & Garrigues Co.
Lucius Engineering Co.
McClintic-Marshall Construction Co.
Midland Bridge Co.
Million Bros. Co.
Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co.
New England Structural Co.
Pennsylvania Steel Co.
Phoenix Bridge Co.
Pittsburgh Construction Co.
Post & McCord.
15
Riter-Conley Manufacturing Co.
Roanoke Bridge Co. (Receivers.)
Seaboard Construction Co.
Lewis F. Shoemaker & Co.
Snare & Triest Co.
Terry & Tench Co., Inc.
Van Dorn Iron Works Co.
Virginia Bridge & Iron Co.
Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co.
Western Steel Construction Co.
Worden-Allen Co.
Youngstown Construction Co.
During the first few years of the open shop campaign, the
assessments paid by members of the Erectors' Association
were based on the number of men each employed. Payment
on a tonnage basis was later adopted. From these figures it
is possible to arrive at a fairly accurate estimate of the extent
of the open shop movement in the structural iron industry.
In the year 1908 the members of the Erectors' Association
paid assessments on an average payroll of 3,512 men. The
number for the first six months of the year was 3,810 and for
the second six months, 3,214. For the first six months of the
year 1909, up to the time the tonnage basis was adopted, the
average number of men employed was 2,278. The falling off
in the number of "open shop" men is accounted for partly
by a business depression and partly by the fact that some
firms failed to pay assessments within the period mentioned.
In the same years, 1908-9, the membership of the Interna-
tional Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers was
9,607. It will be seen, therefore, that the Erectors' Associa-
tion was employing a force of about 36 per cent of the total
union membership. The membership of the union that year
was less than any year since 1905, but all the union members
are not engaged in structural erection work. Nearly one-third
of the total membership are ornamental ironworkers, who
are not employed to any extent by members of the Erectors'
Association. The union membership includes also machinery
16
movers, piledrivers and some shop men, so that it may be
said that about 45 per cent of the structural iron work done
in that year, was conducted on the open shop plan. Of course
a number of union men worked for members of the Erectors'
Association, while on the other hand a number of firms, not
members of the Erectors' Association, conducted their work
on the open shop principle.
If the tonnage basis is taken the proportion of union and
open shop work is approximately the same as shown by the
number of men employed. In the year 1913 members of the
Erectors' Association paid assessments on 948,000 tons fabri-
cated and 430,000 tons erected in round numbers.
The following table taken from the books in the headquar-
ters of the National Erectors' Association in New York,
shows the tonnage on which each firm paid assessments for
1913:
American Bridge Co....
Blodgett Const. Co.
Brann & Stuart Co...
APPROXIMATE TONNAGE FABRICATED AND ERECTED DURING 1913
by MemberS OF THE
NATIONAL ERECTORS, ASSOCIATION.
Eastern Bdge. & Str. Co..
John Eichleay Jr. Co....
Fort Pitt Bridge Works.
Heyl & Patterson, Inc..
Illinois Steel Co....
Kansas City Bridge Co...
Levering & Garrigues Co...
McClintic-Marshall Const. Co...
Midland Bridge Co.....
Mo. Valley Bdge. & I. Co.
New England Struct. Co..
Fabricated. Erected.
606,771
132,183
7,716
10,896
21,599
P
2,679
31,428
19,750
99,054
3,600
10,885
204
2,585
1,602
1,236
3,323
2,373
5,076
13,879
62,562
1,500
2,400
3,242
17
Fabricated. Erected.
73,962
*36,981
19,711
10,232
27,458
44,543
27,981
372
1,967
4,161
19,260
4,927
9,782
9,660
429,489
The total tonnage of fabricated steel contracted for that
year was approximately 1,300,000 tons.¹
1
Penna. Steel Co....
Phoenix Bridge Co...
Pittsburgh Const. Co...
Post & McCord.
Riter-Conley Mfg. Co....
Roanoke Bridge Co., Inc..
Seaboard Const. Co....
Lewis F. Shoemaker & Co...
Terry & Tench Co., Inc..
Western Steel Const. Co....
Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co..
Worden-Allen Co.
•
3,768
11,688
216
16,376
7,992
947,091
It will be seen, therefore, that on the basis on which they
paid assessments, the members of the Erectors' Association
erected 33 per cent of all the fabricated steel contracted for
in the country in 1913, while they fabricated 73 per cent of
the total.
It may be assumed that the members of the Erectors' Asso-
ciation do not pay assessments on more than their actual ton-
nage, so that if to the 33 per cent which they erected, is added
the work done by independent firms under the open shop policy,
the estimate of 45 per cent is a fair one.
This proportion of 55 per cent union and 45 per cent open
shop steel construction, is not evenly distributed throughout
the country. The open shop firms control practically all the
bridge work, where there are no other unions to assist the
Estimated on basis of 50% of tonnage fabricated. The Penna. Steel Co.
did not separate fabrication and erection tonnage in reporting to the
Erectors' Association. It is probable that the actual figures for erec-
tion are considerably higher, as this company erects most of the steel
it fabricates.
1-Figures supplied by Bridge Builders and Structural Society, New York.
18
ironworkers by sympathetic strikes. The union, on the other
hand, controls practically all the building construction work
in cities where the ironworkers are supported by other trades.
The stronghold of the Erectors' Association in building
work is in New York City, where under the existing relations
between the Building Trades Employers' Association and the
building trades unions, the latter are not permitted to call
strikes on any work being done by a member of the employers'
association. The structural iron contractors in New York,
whether members of the Erectors' Association or not, refuse
to make any agreement with the Bridgemen's Union. This
has been their policy since 1906, so that the entire trade in that
city is on the open shop basis, although a few general con-
tractors employ union ironworkers exclusively.
In Pittsburgh a somewhat similar situation prevails as to
the preponderance of open shop work in the district. Figures
furnished by the agent of the Erectors' Association in that
city showed 1,033 open shop men working during the week
ending September 26, 1914, in the Pittsburgh district, and 415
union men. The business agent of the union in a report made
to the international headquarters for the same period, placed
the number of open shop men at 1,000 and of the union men at
400, so that it will be seen both sides agree as to the proportion
of union and open shop men.
It is throughout the eastern portion of the country that the
open shop campaign of the Erectors' Association has been
most effective. Its influence appears, however, to be gradually
extending westward. The Erectors' Association recently
opened offices in Kansas City. In Chicago the Association
never has obtained a foothold in building construction work.
The Bridgemen's Union in Chicago works under an agreement
with the contractors and the same is true in most of the large
cities in the Middle West and the West.
The Erectors' Association maintains district offices and em-
ployment bureaus in New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland and
Kansas City.
With this view before us of the two contending factors in
19
an industrial dispute which has attracted wide attention for
nine years, it is necessary to revert to the conditions which
obtained in the industry previous to the outbreak of hostilities
and trace the history of the ironworkers and their employers,
to show the causes leading up to the dispute.
20
CHAPTER III.
EARLY NEGOTIATIONS FOR TRADE AGREEMENT.
During the first few years of its existence, the International
Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers appears
to have lacked many of the characteristics common to inter-
national labor unions. It was largely an organization on pa-
per, the separate local unions conducting their affairs as
seemed best suited to meet local conditions, without regard
to the international. There was little cohesion among the
locals and no centralized form of government such as was
later developed.
-
For the first few years the international officers received
no fixed salaries and worked at their trade, attending to the
affairs of the organization in their spare time. The headquar-
ters of the international were in the home of the secretary,
in the city from which he was elected. No journal was pub-
lished by the union to keep the membership informed on mat-
ters of common interest, and the international did not affiliate
with the American Federation of Labor until 1903, some eight
years after it was organized.
pla
In the year 1901 the organization began to function as an
active national union and appears to have made rapid prog-
ress from that time. In July of that year the Bridgemen's
Magazine appeared, and although conducted as a private en-
terprise until taken over by the international union in Jan-
uary, 1903, it appears to have had the effect of welding the
different locals more closely, so that there was more unity of
action among them.
At the convention of the international union in September,
1901, Frank Buchanan, a member of the Chicago Local, was
elected president. He was not placed on a permanent salary,
but he devoted a great deal of time in trying to put the organ-
ization on a firmer basis than it hitherto had been. He had
broad ideas and realized that if the organization was to be
21
made effective, united action on national lines would have
to be taken, instead of individual action by separate locals.
As one of his first official actions, Mr. Buchanan sought a
conference with Joshua Hatfield, president of the American
Bridge Company, to discuss the question of making a national
agreement. This conference, held November 25, 1901, resulted
in arranging for another meeting, which was held at Pencoyd,
Pa., on January 17-19, 1902. At this conference the American
Bridge Company was represented by H. F. Lofland, erecting
manager, and S. P. Mitchell, chief engineer. The international
union was represented by Mr. Buchanan and D. F. McIntyre,
at the time secretary-treasurer of the organization.
A tentative national agreement was reached, which appears
to have been the best proposition that was ever offered the
union by the American Bridge Company, or in fact by any
of the large employing firms. In the proposed contract, the
American Bridge Company agreed to employ only members
of the union on all its erection work within the United States,
and in territory outside the United States it agreed to give
preference to members of the union.
The jurisdiction claims of the union, which at that time were
causing some trouble with other unions, were fully recognized
by the American Bridge Company and what appears more
remarkable, Section 29 of the proposed contract provided
that the union might engage in sympathetic strikes "to pro-
tect union principles" without such strikes being regarded as
a violation of the contract.
This proposed agreement provided for a rather elaborate
plan of arbitration for the settlement of differences that might
arise over the interpretation of any clauses in the contract,
or any other differences not specifically covered. Under it
Boards of Referees were created in each of the three divisions
into which the country was divided by the company, known
as the Eastern, Pittsburgh and Western Divisions. Head-
quarters of these Divisions were in New York, Pittsburgh and
Chicago.
The Boards of Referees were composed of two members,
22
one selected by each side in each division. When a dispute
arose, if the two members could not adjust it, each selected
another member, making a Board of four, two selected by
the company and two by the union. If the full boards of four
could not agree, provision was made for the selection of a
fifth member, chosen by the other four, who could not be in any
way connected with organized labor or the bridge building
industry. A decision rendered by this independent umpire
was final and binding on both parties, and such decision had
to be made within six days from the date the fifth member
was selected.
Another provision of the agreement provided that when the
American Bridge Company sub-let a contract, the sub-con-
tractor was subject to all the provisions of the original agree-
ment. (Copy of Agreement, Appendix, pp. 149-158.)
In spite of the apparent advantages which the union would
have gained by the acceptance of this proposed contract, it
was rejected by all the large local unions in the country, with
little or no consideration. The local officials of these unions
today are at a loss to explain that seeming short-sightedness.
Mr. Buchanan and the members of his Executive Board realized
the importance of such a contract, as the American Bridge
Company was by far the largest employer of structural iron-
workers in the country and other large firms would in all
probability have accepted the same agreement without pro-
test. It would have resulted in completely organizing the
trade, at a time when it was poorly organized outside a few
of the larger cities. Mr. Buchanan and the Executive Board
strongly recommended its acceptance.
In upbraiding an official of the New York local union of
ironworkers some years later, for having rejected this pro-
posed agreement Mr. Lofland said: "I worked for three days
drafting the best agreement ever offered the ironworkers and
your union didn't give it three minutes consideration."
This union official in relating the incident added: "And
Mr. Lofland was right. We didn't give it one minute's con-
sideration. Sam Parks arose and said we didn't want any-
23
thing coming from Lofland and asked that it be thrown in the
waste basket, which it was. We realize now what we threw
away. ''1
It would appear that Mr. Buchanan's ideas were too far in
advance of the membership of the local unions, which believed
in purely local contracts and no interference from the inter-
national.
Although disappointed that the local unions did not accept
the contract proposed, Mr. Buchanan continued his efforts to
bring about national action to organize the trade. Early in
1902 when working at his trade on a building in Philadelphia,
being erected by a Chicago firm, Mr. Buchanan learned that
about one-half the structural iron work in Philadelphia was
being done under non-union conditions. He planned to union-
ize some of the larger jobs by tying up the work of the same
contractors in other cities.
In the furtherance of this campaign of organization, Mr.
Buchanan caused strikes to be called in New York and Mil-
waukee on work being done by the same companies that were
doing non-union work in Philadelphia.
At the same time, in 1902, the Philadelphia local called a
strike against the American Bridge Company, which lasted
from May 1 until August 13, and ended in a complete vic-
tory for the union. At the time the settlement was made the
company had about 400 non-union ironworkers in its employ,
most of whom had been imported from other cities. The set-
tlement provided that all of those men who desired to join the
union, should be permitted to do so and the rest should be
discharged. About two-thirds of the number joined the union.
The success of the Philadelphia strike was due largely to
the policy pursued by Mr. Buchanan and the membership of
the union began to see the advantage of national action. All
the large structural iron firms were doing an interstate busi-
ness, so that it was generally possible to attack them at points
where the union was strong and force them to unionize their
work at points where the union was weak.
1-Statement of Charles Massey, Business Agent New York Local.
24
This policy, while causing some dissatisfaction among local
unions, whose members could not see why they should be called
upon to strike to assist another local, probably hundreds of
miles distant, resulted in building up a fairly strong and ef-
fective organization.
G
At the convention of the International Association, held in
Milwaukee in September, 1902, President Buchanan among
other recommendations, urged that the president and secre-
tary be placed on fixed salaries and devote their entire time
to the work of the organization. He recommended that au-
thority be given the president to adjust difficulties without
waiting for the sanction of the Executive Board and that a
contingent fund be set aside for the use of the president, so
that he might proceed without delay to any part of the country
where his services were needed. In other words, he urged the
centralization of power and authority by vesting them in the
hands of the chief executive officer.
Among the other recommendations made by President Buch-
anan were, a uniform road scale to govern wages and work-
ing conditions in territory outside the jurisdiction of estab-
lished local unions; ownership and control of the Bridgemen's
Magazine; establishment of an apprenticeship system and affil-
iation with the American Federation of Labor.¹
The convention adopted all the recommendations, except
that dealing with an apprenticeship system, which was laid
over for one year to "permit the more thorough organization
of the men in the craft. '12
Following the convention a national road scale was adopted
and put into effect, providing for a nine-hour workday and
a minimum wage scale of $3.50 a day in all territory outside
1-Convention Proceedings, Bridgemen's Magazine, October, 1902.
2-No apprenticeship system has ever been adopted by the structural iron-
workers' organization, although most of the local unions make some
pretense of regulating the employment of apprentices. The Chicago
local, which is the strongest numerically in the International Associa-
tion, always has opposed apprentices and no provision for their em-
ployment is made in the agreements which the local makes with the
employers,
25
the jurisdiction of local unions. This was the first uniform
road scale adopted and it paved the way for a national agree-
ment with the employers, an advantage that Mr. Buchanan
did not lose sight of, in spite of his experience with the locals
when he asked them to adopt the contract negotiated in the
spring of 1902.
26
CHAPTER IV.
NATIONAL STRIKE AND NEW YORK LOCKOUT.
In the spring of 1903 the American Bridge Company was
operating under signed agreements with the local unions of
structural ironworkers in localities where circumstances made
that expedient. In other localities where the ironworkers
were not well organized, the company appears to have had
little regard for union rules and regulations, so there was a
good deal of friction.
In a report to the Kansas City convention of the interna-
tional union in September, 1903, President Buchanan said that
local unions in Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Jersey City
and Albany had "suffered grievances at the hands of the
American Bridge Company, and that this company had been
indifferent to the rights of these locals and had refused to
adjust them."
The "grievances" complained of appear to have been of a
more or less trivial character. No doubt they were aggra-
vating to the local unions, and had they been allowed to go
on without protest, it might have resulted in breaking down
established standards, as other employers would have insisted
on being granted like privileges.
Among the grievances enumerated by union officials active
at that time were: the employment of more than one non-union
foreman on a job; the holding back of a week's pay in making
up payrolls, while the established custom was to hold back
three days' pay; the working of three men on a riveting gang,
while other firms used four men; the employment of laborers
on false work that was claimed by bridgemen, etc.
In no instance has the claim been made that the American
Bridge Co. paid lower wages to bridgemen than the rate
agreed upon, nor did it require the men to work more hours,
unless the employment of laborers at a lower rate of pay
to do work claimed by skilled men, could be construed as a
method of reducing wages.
27
The grievances enumerated were violations of established
customs rather than of agreements, for in every written agree-
ment found, there is a provision that there shall be no re-
striction as to the use of machinery, or any limitation of the
work to be performed in a day. This provision is set forth in
the first proposed national agreement, heretofore referred to
as the most advantageous to the union which it had ever been
offered. In fact, the provisions against restricting the use
of machinery, or limiting the amount of work to be performed
in a day, have always been accepted without question by the
union, so that the employment of three men on a riveting gang
instead of four, could hardly be termed a violation of the agree-
ment.
In the only national agreement which ever existed between
the American Bridge Company and the International Asso-
ciation is a clause which reads: "There shall be no restriction
as to the use of machinery or tools, or as to the number of
men employed in the operation of the same." Another clause
in the same agreement reads: "There shall be no restriction
whatever as to the employment of foremen.''
It is quite evident, therefore, that the employment of three
men on a riveting gang, or more than one non-union foreman
on a job, was a violation of an established custom, but not of
the letter of the written agreement. It is probable, however,
that officers of local unions were more familiar with estab-
lished customs and rules in their respective localities, than
with the actual wording of the written contracts, and that
when the American Bridge Company violated customs, it
amounted in the minds of the union officials to a violation of
agreements.
These differences, minor as they may appear on the surface,
caused the Executive Board of the International Association.
to order a general strike against the American Bridge Com-
pany on March 12, 1903. It is possible that grievances of a
more serious character, such as the employment of non-union
men, existed in some localities, but the union officials dismiss
1-Copy of Agreement, Appendix, p. 160.
こ
​28
the subject with the general statement that there was "con-
tinual trouble" with the American Bridge Company and they
cannot remember any specific details.
The general strike had been in effect about three weeks
when President Buchanan secured an audience with the late
J. Pierpont Morgan, at the latter's residence in New York.
The meeting was arranged through the influence of officials
of the National Civic Federation. Mr. Buchanan outlined the
situation to Mr. Morgan in an hour's conversation, and the
latter said that while he did not approve of the closed shop
and some other features of unionism, he was in sympathy with
organizations of labor in a general way and he would see
what could be done in the matter.1
A few days later a conference was arranged between the
officials of the American Bridge Company and other members
of the Erectors' Association, which had been formed a week
or two previously, and representatives of the union, and a
national agreement was signed April 12, 1903, which became
effective May first and continued in force until January 1,
1905.
This settlement, which was claimed as a complete victory by
the union officials, may have had an important bearing on the
attitude taken by the union some two years later, when another
national strike was called against the American Bridge Com-
pany. The union felt that it was invincible, as it had scored a
victory over the largest corporation in the country and what
it had once done, it could do again.
Mr. Buchanan was greatly pleased at the signing of the
national agreement. He personally did not think the contract
was as good from the union standpoint as the one that the
American Bridge Company had offered a year previously and
which was rejected by the local unions, but it accomplished
what he had been aiming at from the time he was elected pres-
ident. It established contractual relations between the Amer-
ican Bridge Company and other large concerns and the iron-
1-Statement of Frank Buchanan, now a member of Congress.
29
workers on a national basis, and thus strengthened the position
of the international union.
In a report to the following convention of the international
union, President Buchanan in speaking of the agreement with
the Erectors' Association, said: "This Association consisted
of the principal structural iron manufacturers and erectors of
this country and was by far the largest and most powerful of
the associations of employers that had heretofore been
formed.¹
In actual wording this national agreement was an open shop
contract, but in practice and effect it was strictly union or
closed shop. The clause pertaining to employment read: "The
employer may employ or discharge, through his representa-
tive, any workman as he may see fit, but no workman is to be
discriminated against on account of his connection with a
labor organization."
As the agreement was negotiated during the progress of a
strike, it appears that provision was made to protect the men
who had remained with the companies during the trouble, as
one clause reads: "There shall be no discrimination against,
interference with or fines imposed upon foremen who have
been in the service of the employer during the time of strike.'"2
SARKA
The agreement provided that in case of misunderstandings
or disputes arising, the questions at issue should be submitted
to arbitration locally, without strikes, lockouts or cessation
of work. No provision was made as to how such local arbi-
tration boards should be organized, as was the case in the
more elaborate form of agreement rejected by the union the
previous year. Neither was any provision made that sub-
contractors taking work from a member of the Erectors' Asso-
ciation should be subject to the terms of the original contract.
The agreement provided that there should be no sympathetic
strikes on account of trade disputes.
An eight-hour workday was fixed for all localities where it
was the prevailing custom to work eight hours, and in other
1-President's Report to Convention, Bridgemen's Magazine, October, 1903.
2-Copy of Agreement, Appendix, p. 160.
30
places a nine-hour workday was the rule. The contract pro-
vided that the latter provision "may be subject to arbitra-
tion."
No minimum wage rate was established in the national
agreement, but in each city or locality, a separate clause was
added, specifying the rate of pay and the territorial jurisdic-
tion granted to the particular local union.
Cleveland
Columbus
That the Erectors' Association and the union worked in
harmony, following the signing of the national agreement, is
shown by various records. A conference was held July 14,
1903, between H. H. McClintic, H. A. Greene and J. F. McCain,
representing the Erectors' Association, and Thomas Graves,
J. E. McClory and J. M. Stark, representing the Cleveland
local, to decide on territorial jurisdiction in Ohio. The fol-
lowing jurisdiction was agreed upon:
.radius of 25 miles from City Hall.
.radius of 20 miles from City Hall.
.radius of 25 miles from City Hall.
Youngstown
Canton-City Limits.
..
C
Canal Dover, City Limits.
Ashtabula, including Erie, Pa., radius of 12 miles.
In the prescribed area the agreement provided for an eight-
hour workday and a minimum rate of 50 cents an hour. In
all other territory a nine-hour workday prevailed.¹
A similar agreement was signed in Philadelphia by H. F.
Lofland for the American Bridge Company and M. J. Cun-
nane for the union, establishing the wages at 50 cents an hour
and the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia local to a territory
within a radius of 50 miles from the City Hall of Philadelphia.2
Both sides to this contract agree that whatever the literal
wording was, or the construction that might be placed on cer-
tain clauses, it was in practice a strictly union agreement and
no complaint was made that the companies sought to violate
this understanding by employing any ironworkers not mem-
bers of the union. It also was the custom, established through
1-Bridgemen's Magazine, August, 1903.
2-Copy of Agreement, Appendix, p. 161.
S
31
a verbal agreement, that sub-contractors should be subject to
the terms of the agreement, in the same manner as the original
signers.
The national agreement seems to have been generally ob-
served by both parties during its life and no serious difficul-
ties arose in the trade, except in New York City, where the
building contractors in 1903 adopted what became known as
the Arbitration Plan and locked out the unions that refused
to accept it. The structural ironworkers' union was one of
those that balked at the Arbitration Plan and was locked out
and a dual union of ironworkers formed by the employers.
A few of the New York employers were members of the Erect-
ors' Association, but they held membership also in the local
association of iron and steel erectors, and it was as members
of the local association that they made the fight. The New
York lockout was a purely local affair and was not regarded
by the union men themselves as a violation of the national
agreement with the Erectors' Association. In fact Mr. Buch-
anan was in sympathy with the fight the New York employers
were making against the union, which at the time was con-
trolled by Sam Parks, with whose methods Buchanan did not
agree.
This issue between the New York local and the International
Association was fought out on the floor of the international
convention, held in Kansas City in September, 1903. Mr.
Buchanan won in his fight against the Parks faction and fol-
lowing the convention an effort was made to bring about a
settlement of the New York lockout. Parks previously had
been convicted in the courts of extortion and had regained his
liberty shortly before the convention, pending hearing on a
motion for a new trial. The new trial being denied, Parks
was again committed to the penitentiary and many of the iron-
workers in New York were demanding a new deal and a set-
tlement with their employers.
K
A meeting of the International Executive Board was held
in New York November 6, 1903, at which a proposed agree-
ment was drawn up and submitted to the employers, who were
32
members of the Building Trades Employers' Association.
It was rejected by the employers, who submitted a counter
proposition to the effect that the ironworkers accept the na-
tional agreement then in force with the Erectors' Associa-
tion, with the exception of the arbitration clause. As a sub-
stitute for that clause the New York employers proposed to
insert in the contract the arbitration plan of the Building
Trades Employer's Association, which by that time practically
all the building trades had accepted.
Mr. Buchanan and his Executive Board accepted the propo-
sition and the question then arose as to the disposition of the
dual union which had been formed by the employers and
chartered under the state laws. The employers wanted to
have the dual union chartered by the International and made
the regular organization.
This proposition was rejected by the union representatives,
but they offered to take into the union without any penalty
such of the old members as had left and joined the dual or-
ganization, and also take in such other members as could
pass an examination and prove their competency. The em-
ployers replied to that proposition, that their foremen would
determine the question of competency. The union represen-
tatives then offered to allow the employers to select three
of their foremen who with three members of the Executive
Board would form an examining board and agreed that ap-
prentice cards would be furnished to those who failed to qual
ify as journeymen.
The employers rejected this offer, as they were determined
to break up the old Local No. 2, so long controlled by Sam
Parks, and "scatter the clique" as one of them expressed it.
The negotiations were broken off temporarily and the fight in
New York continued.¹
About three months later, in February, 1904, a settlement
was made of the New York trouble, through the disbanding
of old Local No. 2 and the formation of four new locals in
1-Report of President Buchanan, Bridgemen's Magazine, December, 1903.
33
the district, two in New York, one in Brooklyn and one in
Jersey City. All the ironworkers in the district, union and
independent, were required to register and pay a registration
fee of 50 cents and all were accepted in the new locals with-
out discrimination.
The agreement granted full recognition to the locals and
provided for the employment of union men exclusively. The
structural ironworkers became a part of the General Arbi-
tration Board and the New York district became again thor-
oughly organized.
34
CHAPTER V.
CAUSES WHICH LED TO SECOND NATIONAL STRIKE.
Throughout the year 1904 the structural ironworkers made
steady progress, with no serious difficulty anywhere, after
the settlement of the New York dispute. In that year and
the year following, the organization reached the highest point it
had ever attained with respect to membership and influence.
As noted previously, there does not appear to have been
any serious effort made by either side to have the national
agreement renewed, on its expiration January 1, 1905. Offi-
cers of local unions in some instances sought to have the
American Bridge Company renew the contract in their re-
spective localities. In Philadelphia, Mr. Cunnane, the local
business agent, obtained an interview with Mr. Lofland of
the American Bridge Company, and on behalf of the local
union he offered to accept the old agreement for one, two or
five years. Mr. Lofland refused to sign.
At the time the American Bridge Company was building
a bridge over the Schuylkill River for the Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Company and on the afternoon of December 31, 1904,
all the ironworkers were laid off. Officials of the company
said they feared ice in the river might damage the false work.
Mr. Cunnane says he made a personal inspection of con-
ditions in the river and there was no indication of ice for
a distance of twenty miles up the stream. He asserts the
purpose of the company closing down in the middle of winter
was to compel the ironworkers to accept a less favorable con-
tract than the one just expired.
Some three weeks later a local agreement was signed with
the American Bridge Company, which Mr. Cunnane says was
less favorable to the union than the old contract. It seems
probable, however, that the differences between the new local
contract, and the old national one, were exaggerated in the
mind of Cunnane, for a reading and comparison of the agree-
35
ments do not show any important difference. The agreement
made with the Philadelphia local, except for a difference in the
wage scale, was the same as that made with the New York
district, which as already pointed out, was more favorable to
the union than the one made with the local association of
erectors in New York.
In the spring of 1905 it appears to have been the policy of
the Erectors' Association and the American Bridge Company
to sign agreements with the local unions in large cities like
New York, Philadelphia and Boston and to ignore the locals
in smaller cities. In February, 1905, the secretary of the
New Haven local sent a copy of a proposed agreement to the
Erectors' Association and in reply received a letter which
read: "I wish to advise that the articles of this agreement
are entirely unsatisfactory to us and under no circumstances
will we agree to such conditions.""
Another letter was sent by the local union, to which no reply
was made and it was this action which later led to the strike
against the American Bridge Company.
The New Haven local, according to the statement of the
secretary, was not in a position to enforce any demands in
February and matters were allowed to drift until the following
July, when the American Bridge Company sub-let the erection
of a railroad bridge to the Boston Bridge Company, a non-
union concern.
In the absence of a national agreement, or any contract with
the New Haven local, the American Bridge Company was,
of course, within its rights in sub-letting work to a non-union
concern. In fact, in the cities where local agreements existed
between the American Bridge Company and the ironworkers,
no provision was made in such contracts that work should be
sub-let only to union firms. There was a verbal understanding
to that effect and it was the practice to observe it. The New
Haven local was equally within its rights to declare a strike
against the American Bridge Company in its jurisdiction, as
it had no agreement, oral or written.
1-Statement of E. L. Warden, Bridgemen's Magazine, September, 1905.
36
The strike against the American Bridge Company was called
by the New Haven local July 28, 1905, in an effort to force the
company to sign an agreement and also to unionize the sub-
contract let to the Boston Bridge Company.
That this strike had the approval of President Buchanan
is shown by a letter which he wrote to Secretary McNamara
from New York under date of July 28, 1905, setting forth the
facts in the situation and requesting that the question of call-
ing a national strike in support of the New Haven local be
submitted to a vote of the Executive Board.¹
After the members of the Executive Board had voted in
favor of a national strike, Secretary McNamara issued from
headquarters in Cleveland, "Circular No. 30 To Local
Unions." In this circular it is stated that since the expira-
tion of the national agreement, the American Bridge Com-
pany had shown marked discrimination against the New
Haven local. The circular in part read: "No local union
should ever allow any work to proceed under the subterfuge
that it has been taken away from the American Bridge Com-
pany, as in the majority of cases this is but a move to outwit
local unions.''2
The national strike was ordered August 10, but it does not
appear that the order was generally obeyed, owing, probably,
to the fact that the convention of the international union was
to be held early in September and also owing to the difficulty
in determining what contracts had been sub-let by the Amer-
ican Bridge Company.
Contractors who had taken work under sub-contracts from
the American Bridge Company, frequently denied that they
had done so. In other instances the local unions refused to
enter the fight, or call strikes on work that was being done
under union conditions.
This was the situation at the time the international conven-
tion opened in Philadelphia in September. President Buch-
1-Exhibit No. 2, p. 1102, Vol. 2 Trans. of Record U. S. Court of Appeals.
2-Exhibit No. 4, p. 1098-9, Vol. 2 Trans. of Record U. S. Circuit Court of
Appeals Dynamite Conspiracy Trials.
37
anan, who at the two previous conventions, had been re-elected
by narrow margins, refused to be a candidate for re-election.
His retirement, which seems to have been singularly unfor-
tunate for the union at that particular time, was practically
forced, according to some of the delegates to the convention.
Mr. Buchanan believed he could have been re-elected had he
wished to be a candidate.¹
At the convention Frank M. Ryan, a member of the Chi-
cago local, was elected president to succeed Mr. Buchanan
and as there was a good deal of ill-feeling existed between the
two, it is probable that the personal equation was an im-
portant factor in the events which followed.
QË
The convention indorsed the strike against the American
Bridge Company, by the adoption of a resolution which was
the cause of the failure of future peace negotiations, because
it practically tied the hands of the executive officers.
The resolution adopted by the convention was as follows:
"Resolved: That the delegates to the ninth annual conven-
tion of the Bridge and Structural Ironworkers do endorse the
action of our late International President and the Executive
Board in trying to preserve the unity and solidarity of our
association, and we further instruct our incoming President
and Executive Board to do everything they can to fight these
1-Mr. Buchanan held a small amount of stock in the McCain Construction
Company, which at the time of the convention was fighting the union.
The stock was purchased at a time when the company was fair and
when Mr. Buchanan intended to retire as a union official and go into
business. Later when the company was declared unfair, he could not
dispose of his stock except at a sacrifice. Some of the delegates learned
of the stock transaction, and according to the stories, threatened to
bring the matter out on the floor of the convention, unless Mr. Buchanan
agreed to retire. Mr. Buchanan never denied the ownership of stock
in the company and considered it a straight business transaction. The
incident is mentioned chiefly because of the credence given in certain
quarters to stories reflecting on the integrity of Mr. Buchanan. What-
ever may be said of the impropriety of a union official holding stock
in a company which he might be called upon to fight in an official
capacity, there is no evidence of any dishonesty in the transaction.
Mr. Buchanan afterward disposed of the stock at a financial loss.
38
companies in their efforts to disrupt our association and not
to call this strike off until every existing grievance is set-
tled satisfactory to all our affiliated locals.''¹
Some time previous to the convention a strike had been
called against the Pennsylvania Steel Company, for employing
a repair gang to build an ore trestle within its plant at Steel-
ton, Pa. The strike had been called by a local business agent
against the direction of President Buchanan. The claim of
the company was that the work in question did not come under
the jurisdiction of the structural ironworkers.
G
This dispute was submitted to arbitration, the arbitrators
being John W. Hutchinson, Jr., for the company and John T.
Taggart, a member of the New York local for the ironworkers.
The two arbitrators reached a decision without having to
select a third man.
The finding of the arbitrators in substance was that the work
in question was "bridge work" as commonly understood, but
that the relations between the Pennsylvania Steel Company
and the union applied exclusively to the bridge and construc-
tion department, and that the union hereafter refrain from
claiming on behalf of its members any work in connection with
departments of the company, other than the bridge and con-
struction department.
A provision was made in the award which read: "Provided
that if at any future time it shall become the general custom
of steel works throughout the country to employ men who
are substantially members of the Association in the erection
of structural steel and iron for their own use, then the Penn-
sylvania Steel Company will do likewise.''
This finding was made about the time of the Philadelphia
convention, with the approval of President Buchanan, but does
not appear to have been announced until some time later. The
finding waived the claims of the union to work done by steel
companies for their own use, until that had become the general
1-Convention Proceedings, Bridgemen's Magazine, October, 1905.
2-Bridgemen's Magazine, November, 1905.
39
custom. The Illinois Steel Company at its South Chicago and
Joliet plants, was the only company of importance in the coun-
try which was at that time employing union structural iron-
workers in doing work around its plants.
This decision is of especial significance for the reason that
it was an exactly similar case which caused the break in the
peace negotiations at a conference held between the union rep-
resentatives and officials of the American Bridge Company in
October, 1905, when the union men would not waive their claim
to the work of building a tube mill at the McKeesport plant
of the National Tube Company.
Although this arbitration award was accepted by the union,
so far as the particular job for the Pennsylvania Steel Com-
pany was concerned, it was severely criticised by some of the
officials. Among the most severe critics was the newly elected
president, Mr. Ryan, who blamed his predecessor in office for
approving of the award.
i
40
..
CHAPTER VI.
EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.
Following adjournment of the Philadelphia convention,
President Ryan and the Executive Board held a conference
in Philadelphia with S. P. Mitchell, chief engineer of the
American Bridge Company, to discuss terms of settlement of
the strike. Mr. Mitchell offered to employ union ironworkers
on all erection work done directly by the company, but would
not agree to sign any written contract to that effect. Neither
would he give any guarantee that work sub-let by the company
would be done by union men.
Mr. Ryan and his Executive Board insisted upon having a
written contract and presented a draft of an agreement which
they had drawn up. Mr. Mitchell asked for further time to
consider the matter and take it up with the higher officials.
of the company. He agreed to meet the union representatives
again within three weeks.
Mr. August Ziesing was made president of the American
Bridge Company about September 1, 1905, a week or two pre-
vious to the time Mr. Ryan was elected president of the
International Association of Bridge and Structural Ironwork-
ers. The election of Mr. Ryan greatly pleased Mr. Ziesing, as
he had known Ryan for some years in Chicago and entertained
a rather high opinion of him. Accordingly Mr. Ziesing wrote
Mr. Ryan a letter, requesting him not to call any more strikes
against the company until an effort was made to reach a set-
tlement. Mr. Ziesing said he would be going to New York
in the near future and would be pleased to have a conference
with the union officials.
Mr. Ziesing says he received no reply to his letter and that
his request was ignored, as Mr. Ryan immediately proceeded
to call strikes on all work which there was reason to believe
had been sub-let by the company to firms employing union
men.
In pursuance of the policy of extending the strike as rapidly
41
as possible, Mr. Ryan proceeded to Chicago after the con-
ference with Mr. Mitchell and Secretary McNamara went to
Cleveland.
In Chicago Mr. Ryan urged that the men employed by the
Illinois Steel Company be called out and that the work being
done by the Kelly-Atkinson Company also be stopped. The
latter named firm was supposed to have taken a sub-contract
from the American Bridge Company, while the Illinois Steel
Company was a subsidiary of the U. S. Steel Corporation, as
was the American Bridge Company.
Some of the leaders in the Chicago local opposed the pro-
gram urged by Mr. Ryan. Among them was Mr. Buchanan,
Mr. Ryan's predecessor in office, who said the strike could be
settled amicably and that while negotiations for a settlement
were pending, it would be folly to call out more men. Mr.
Ryan made an appeal to the union and won his point and the
strikes were called.
Meanwhile the Cleveland local had refused to call its mem-
bers off some jobs supposed to have been sub-let by the Amer-
ican Bridge Company and Secretary McNamara caused the
union to be suspended. The fight was being pushed both
by Mr. Ryan and Mr. McNamara as vigorously as they could,
in spite of the fact that negotiations between the union and
the company had not been broken off and that Mr. Ziesing had
requested that matters be left in statu quo until he had an
opportunity to confer with the union representatives.
On leaving Chicago Mr. Ryan went to headquarters in Cleve-
land and while there was informed that the officials of the U. S.
Steel Corporation desired a conference. Accompanied by Sec-
retary McNamara he immediately went to New York and was
joined by Ben Moore, a member of the Executive Board.
The first conference was held in Mr. Ziesing's office. Mr.
Ryan pointed out that the company was employing non-union
men on a number of jobs, either directly or through sub-con-
tractors. He mentioned the job in New Haven, which was the
direct cause of the strike, a bridge job in Arkansas and two
bridge jobs in Illinois for the McKinley Traction System.
The erection of the McKeesport tube mill also was brought up.
dan
42
Mr. Ziesing said he had no supervision over such work as
the erection of the tube mill and suggested that the conferees
go and see W. P. Corey, president of the U. S. Steel Corpora-
tion. Mr. Ziesing and the committee went accordingly to
Mr. Corey's office.
No record appears to have been kept of the discussion which
followed and Mr. Ryan and Mr. Ziesing do not quite agree
as to the facts. E. H. Gary, chairman of the Board of Di-
rectors, was called into the conference, but his recollection of
what transpired is hazy. He was called in as a mediator and
his attitude throughout was conciliatory. That is Mr. Gary's
own statement and it is substantiated by Mr. Ziesing and Mr.
Ryan.
There were present at the second conference Mr. Gary, Mr.
Corey, Mr. Ziesing and Mr. Mitchell for the company and Mr.
Ryan, Mr. McNamara and Mr. Moore for the union.
Mr. Corey in opening the discussion said that the form of
agreement presented by the union representatives was dis-
honest and a most extraordinary proposition, as it required
the company to see that union men were employed on all sub-
contract work let by it. After Mr. Ryan explained that such
agreements were in effect in many localities and that the Amer-
ican Bridge Company itself had accepted the practice through
a verbal understanding, Mr. Corey appeared to be consid-
erably mollified and indicated that he did not see serious ob-
jection to the agreement.
St
When the McKeesport job was mentioned Mr. Corey said
he would not agree to unionize that work and asked Mr.
Ryan if the union meant to claim all repair work in the steel
plants. Ryan replied that he was not making any such claim
and pointed out that the Illinois Steel Company had always
employed union structural ironworkers on new construction
work in its plants.
Mr. Corey inquired of Mr. Mitchell how many men were
employed on the tube mill at McKeesport and on being in-
formed that there were about forty men, he remarked that
the situation was not as important as he had supposed. After
43
some further discussion, Mr. Corey advised the union repre-
sentatives to confer with Mr. Ziesing and try to have all the
other details settled and return later to take up with him
the McKeesport job.
The conference was resumed in Mr. Ziesing's office and an
understanding was reached on all the points in dispute, ex-
cept the erection of false work and the employment of la-
borers in handling material on the site of the job. These points
finally were left in abeyance to be taken up when a new con-
tract was being formulated at the beginning of the next year.
These minor details having been adjusted the union repre-
sentatives returned to Mr. Corey's office and informed him that
everything had been settled except the McKeesport job and
the question of having a written agreement. Mr. Corey con-
ferred with Mr. Mitchell in another room and returned and
informed the union representatives that he would not change
his position on the McKeesport job. On the question of a
written agreement, the company would not sign any contract
embodying all the union rules, but did offer to reduce to writ-
ing what it had agreed to do, that is, employ only union men
on all work done by it directly or by sub-contract; pay the
recognized rate of wages and work the recognized number of
hours.
When Mr. Corey refused to unionize the McKeesport job,
Mr. Ryan said he could not make a settlement, as his instruc-
tions from the convention were emphatic on that point. The
conference adjourned without a settlement.
That is substantially Mr. Ryan's version of what took place
in the several conferences held and the cause of the final
breakdown of contractual relations between the American
Bridge Company and the union.
Mr. Ziesing says the union representatives demanded that
the company should not sell steel to any concern employing
nonunion men and that Mr. Gary pointed out that such an
arrangement would amount to conspiracy and could not be
considered.
During the discussion when the union representatives were
44
insisting on having a written agreement, Mr. Gary remarked
that he did not see why that was essential, as Mr. Corey being
present and agreeing to certain conditions, would see that Mr.
Ziesing and Mr. Mitchell lived up to the terms agreed upon.
"We won't take your word for anything and want your sig-
natures in black and white," is said by Mr. Ziesing to have
been the reply of one of the union officials. Mr. Ziesing says
he recalls distinctly that one of the union men brought hiş
fist down on the table and said emphatically, "You'll sign
up an agreement or we won't settle. Your word doesn't go
with us," or words to that effect.
One of the union officials, according to Mr. Ziesing, said dur-
ing the discussion that the union would organize the shops of
the company by refusing to handle material manufactured
by non-union men and after that was accomplished the shop
men would refuse to handle steel rolled in non-union mills.
Mr. Ryan says that the question of shop work was not an
issue in the strike, consequently there could have been no
purpose in raising it during the discussion and that Mr. Zies-
ing's memory is at fault on that point. Mr. Ryan thinks, how-
ever, that Mr. Mitchell may have pointed out such possibilities
to Mr. Corey and Mr. Ziesing to prevent them making a settle-
ment with the union, as Mr. Mitchell showed by his attitude.
that he did not want a settlement.
In recalling to memory the discussion during the confer-
ences, Mr. Ziesing says three points stand out prominently in
his mind today. These points are the demand on the company
not to sell steel to non-union firms, the threat of organizing the
fabricating shops and a demand that the union steward on a
job should decide on whether a workman could be discharged.
He thinks the McKeesport job was only incidental, as it had
always been the practice of steel companies to use their own
repair gangs on such work.
After Mr. Corey had given his final word on the McKeesport
job, Mr. Ziesing says that he urged Mr. Ryan to accept the
compromise offered, saying: "It is your last chance, Ryan. If
you do not accept this proposition now, you will never have an-
other opportunity as long as I am president of the company."
45
"Oh, hell, you may not be president long," is the reply
which Mr. Ziesing says Mr. Ryan made to him.
After the conference with the steel officials ended without
a settlement having been reached, the union officials held a
conference by themselves in a hotel. The local union officers
attended this conference and Charles Massey, business agent
of the New York local, urged the acceptance of the com-
promise. The New York structural ironworkers were prepar-
ing to demand a wage increase on the expiration of their
agreement two and a half months later and Mr. Massey was
anxious to avoid trouble over the national issue. At that time
the New York local had not been drawn into the controversy.
Mr. Ryan went to Pittsburgh and appeared before that
local to urge that it waive claim to the erection of the tube
mill at McKeesport, so that a settlement could be reached.
He personally favored acceptance of the offer made by the
company.
The Pittsburgh local refused to consider the suggestion.
Some of the more radical members demanded to know if they
were being "sold out" or why their international president
was making such a proposition to them, in face of the action
taken by the recent convention. The result was that Mr. Ryan
left Pittsburgh resolved to keep up the fight.
46
CHAPTER VII.
REASONS WHY PEACE CONFERENCE FAILED.
• In looking for the direct causes for the breakdown of con
tractual relations between the American Bridge Company and
the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iror-
workers, there are two main factors to be considered. These
are, first, the well established policy of the U. S. Steel Cor-
poration to maintain the open shop and prevent the spread of
unionism in any of its departments, and second, the tendency
of the structural ironworkers, in common with all other or
ganizations of labor, to extend their sphere of activity and in-
fluence.
There were contributory causes, such as questions of pol
icy, personal ambition, mutual distrust, love of power, lack
of diplomacy, etc., but they were subordinate to and grew out
of the two main causes.
The policy of the U. S. Steel Corporation at the time of its
formation and for several years thereafter, was to prevent
the spread of organization among its employees, rather than
to crush existing organizations. This policy, pursued to its
logical conclusion, would in the end have the effect of crushing
the unions, but the process would be gradual and attract less
public attention than an open fight resulting in strikes or lock-
outs.
That this was the policy of the corporation in the beginning,
is shown by the strike of the Amalgamated Association of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers in 1901. The strike of the steel
workers took place a few weeks after the U. S. Steel Corpora
tion was formed. Before the strike was called, the represen-
tatives of the subsidiary companies, offered to renew all exist
ing contracts with the union. In other words, the offer was
made to sign up for all mills which had been signed for the
previous year, but not to include non-union mills which had
been absorbed in the combination.
47
This partial signing up of mills was not satisfactory to the
leaders of the Amalgamated Association. They feared the
purpose of the corporation was to close down and dismantle
some of the mills that had been union and transfer the busi-
ness to non-union mills.
There are good reasons to believe that that was in fact what
the corporation intended to do. Whatever the intentions of
the corporation were, the steel workers went on strike and
were defeated, being forced at the end of three months' strife to
accept a settlement for a smaller number of mills than they
could have obtained without a strike.
Early in September, 1901, after the strike had been in force
about three months, the corporation at a conference in New
York, brought about by representatives of the National Civic
Federation, offered to sign an agreement for 18 out of 24 tin-
plate mills, 14 out of 24 sheet steel mills and 7 out of 13 steel
hoop mills. Acceptance of this offer was strongly recom-
mended by Samuel Gompers, John Mitchell and others, but
was ignored by Mr. Shaffer, head of the Amalgamated Asso-
ciation. About two weeks later a settlement was accepted for
a smaller number of mills.¹
The negotiations before and during the strike of the steel
workers show that the company was determined to prevent the
spread of unionism, but was not opposed to making contracts
for mills already organized.
In defense of this policy, it is generally admitted that when
the U. S. Steel Corporation was formed, some of the sub-
sidiary companies which had been non-union, made it a con-
dition of their entering the combine, that the open shop policy
would be continued in their plants. In labor matters it has
been the policy of the corporation from its inception, to as far
as practicable, allow each subsidiary company to handle its
own affairs.
This policy of the U. S. Steel Corporation to treat with
1-Article by Samuel Gompers, American Federationist, October 1901. Copies
of telegrams and correspondence on file in offices of the National Civic
Federation in New York.
48
existing unions where they were in control and to discourage
the extension of their influence was shown a second time in
the conferences described in the preceding chapter. Mr. Corey
was willing that the American Bridge Company should con-
tinue to employ union structural ironworkers on contract
work, as it had been doing before the strike. He was unwilling
to concede the union the erection of the McKeesport tube
mill, which would have been an extension of its sphere of in-
fluence.
The unionizing of the McKeesport tube mill involved about
forty men for a few weeks at most. It does not appear that
the point was of sufficient importance to either side to cause
a permanent disagreement, had there been a sincere desire for
peace.
But the point involved more than appears on the surface.
The practice of the steel companies had been to do work for
their own use with non-union men, except in the case of the
Illinois Steel Company. Had the employment of union iron-
workers on the McKeesport tube mill been conceded, it would
have established a precedent that in all probability would
have led to disputes in the future and opened the way for the
structural ironworkers to extend the influence of their organi
zation.
As has been shown, the ironworkers in an arbitration award
gave up their claim to such work in the case of the Penn-
sylvania Steel Company's ore trestle at Steelton, until it had
become the general custom of steel companies to employ union
men on work of this character. It is true that award was
unpopular with the union ironworkers. It had been approved,
however, by Mr. Buchanan and the new president, Mr. Ryan,
probably felt that he had an opportunity to accomplish some-
thing that his predecessor had failed to accomplish and in this
way discredit his personal enemy and strengthen himself with
the rank and file of the union.
In addition to that personal satisfaction, the Philadelphia
convention had given positive instructions to its officers not
to make any settlement until every local grievance was sat-
49
sfactorily adjusted and the Pittsburgh local was determined
to obtain for its members the erection of the tube mill at
McKeesport.
It appears that the personal ambition of Mr. Ryan to do
better than his predecessor in office was a factor in preventing
a settlement. The Executive Board could have assumed re-
sponsibility for not adhering strictly to the instructions of the
convention. Some six months later, the Executive Board, on
the recommendation of President Ryan, allowed union men
to work on sub-contracts. The instructions of the convention
were as emphatic on that point as on the other, but as a mat-
ter of policy and expediency, the Executive Board ignored the
instructions and removed the ban on sub-contracts.
There was, of course, some difference between the points
involved. In removing the ban on sub-contracts, the Execu-
tive Board simply authorized union men to work on any job
on which union conditions prevailed, regardless of who had the
contract. Waiving claim to the work on the McKeesport tube
mill would have meant acquiescence in the company's proposi-
tion to do some of its work with non-union men.
wy
If the personal equation was a factor on the union side,
it probably was as much so on the side of the company. Mr.
Corey is said to have asked his directors to give him full
authority to deal with the structural ironworkers as he be-
lieved he could bring about a settlement. When he failed he
felt chagrined and took the matter as a personal affront. The
action of Mr. Ryan and his associates in refusing the com-
promise offered, is said by some who know Mr. Corey to have
caused a change in his attitude toward organized labor so
that he refused thereafter to have any dealings with unions.
Whether it was the action of the structural ironworkers that
embittered Mr. Corey against labor unions or not, it is a fact
that the corporation afterward discontinued contractual rela-
tions with the longshoremen and the lake seamen and pursued
& policy decidedly antagonistic to labor unions that was not
apparent in the earlier years of its history.
There is another point to be considered in connection with
50
the demand for the erection of the tube mill at McKeesport
The structural ironworkers were on strike against the Amer-
ican Bridge Company. The tube mill was being erected by the
National Tube Company. While both were subsidiaries of the
U. S. Steel Corporation, it does not follow that the American
Bridge Company could dictate to the National Tube Company
as to the men it should employ. Mr. Gary says that un-
doubtedly he had the authority to direct the National Tube
Company to employ union ironworkers in the erection of its
mill, but such action would have been so entirely unprece
dented that he would have been unlikely under any circum-
stances to issue such an order. It would, he says, have been
an interference with the authority of local officers, alike dis-
tasteful to them and to him and contrary to the established
policy of the larger corporation.
In insisting on the erection of the tube mill, the ironworkers
reached out and included something that was not an issue
when the strike against the American Bridge Company was
called. That such work properly came within the jurisdiction
of the union is not disputed, nevertheless the demand was
something in the nature of a secondary boycott, or an attempt
to unionize the work of one company through another, a policy
that has failed more often than it has been successful in labo
disputes.
Both Mr. Ziesing and Mr. Ryan agree that in the confer-
ence with the officials of the U. S. Steel Corporation, the offer
was made to employ union bridgemen on all erection work
done by the American Bridge Company on a direct contract
or through a sub-contractor. The company would not sign
a written agreement embodying all the rules and regulations
which ordinarily go with such contracts, but did offer to reduce
to writing its proposition to employ union men exclusively,
pay the recognized wages and work the uniform number of
hours.
In agreeing to do that the company met substantially the
demands which caused the strike and had the union represen-
tatives accepted the offer and waived their claim to the erec-
tion of the tube mill, they would have won every point for
which they struck. In view of these admitted facts, it cannot
be said that the company was at that time bent on destroying
the structural ironworkers' organization.
The failure to reach an agreement must be set down to the
action of the Philadelphia convention in adopting a resolution
which gave the officers no discretionary power and the too
strict adherence by the officers to that resolution.
Delegates in a convention of a labor union may properly lay
down fundamental laws for the guidance of the membership.
When they undertake to lay down hard and fast rules, or a
line of conduct for the guidance of their officers during a
strike, they are apt to make a serious blunder. Successful
prosecution of a war, or a strike, demands centralized author-
ity.
The experience of the ironworkers in dealing with large
corporations, may have taught them to hesitate before placing
absolute power in the hands of their officers, but there seems
little doubt that the failure to do so, prevented a settlement
of the strike in October, 1905, and brought on the open shop
warfare in the structural iron industry, which five years later
attracted the attention of the entire country.
Mr. Ryan has been criticised for not accepting the settlement
offered. He might have done so in spite of the orders of
the convention and succeeded afterward in justifying his ac-
tion in the eyes of his constituents. It is not at all certain,
however, that he could have so justified his conduct, for the
ironworkers at that time were intoxicated with power and
Mr. Ryan and his Executive Board believed they could win
everything for which they were contending.
If they could have foreseen the results, they would no
doubt have acted differently. It is much easier, however, to
look backward and criticise than to look forward and antici-
pate. Mr. Ryan tried to have the Pittsburgh local change
its position on the McKeesport job, but when the local refused
he stopped there. A better general might have settled in spite
of the protest of a single local, when larger interests were
S
52
at stake. There were ways through which a single local could
easily have been brought to time by the international. But
Mr. Ryan was too conscientious to go against the expressed
instructions of the convention and so committed a fatal blun-
der.
Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation
of Labor, considers this mistake one of the three most costly
blunders made in recent years in the American labor move-
ment. The others were made by Theodore Shaffer when he
rejected the offer made before the steel strike in 1901 and by
Sam Small when in 1907 he rejected a settlement that could
have been obtained for the commercial telegraphers from the
telegraph companies.
1
1-Interview with Mr. Gompers.
53
CHAPTER VIII.
INDIRECT CAUSES OF OPEN SHOP WAR.
In the preceding chapter it has been shown that the direct·
cause of the break in contractual relations between the Ameri-
can Bridge Company and the structural ironworkers' organ-
ization, was the demand that the erection of a tube mill at
McKeesport be done with union men.
Had this point been conceded, it would have meant the ex- *
tension of the jurisdiction of the union to work that it hither-
to had not been able to control, except in the plants of the
Illinois Steel Company at South Chicago and Joliet.
It was this extension of power and influence that the com-
pany most feared. The erection of the tube mill in itself
was of little importance, involving the employment of some
forty men for a short time. But the concession if granted,
might have proved an entering wedge for still further tres-
pass on what the company regarded as sacred domain. Give
the union an inch and it will try to take a yard, was the way
the company officials looked at the matter. They feared the
unionizing of their fabricating shops and possibly through
them of their rolling mills.
The American Bridge Company fabricates on an average
about 35 per cent of all the structural steel manufactured in
the country. In 1913 it fabricated 47 per cent of the struc-
tural steel contracted for that year. The amount of its opera-
tions varies according to trade conditions, but since 1905 it has
erected on an average less than one-fourth the tonnage it has
faricated and shipped. The following table of figures fur-
nished by President Ziesing of the company, shows the ex-
tent of its operations:
54
STATEMENT OF TONNAGE SHIPPED AND ERECTED BY THE AMERI-
CAN BRIDGE COMPANY SINCE 1905.
Year
1905
1906
1907
1.908
1909
1910
1911
1912
Shipped
407,238
554,326
591,653
342,141
457,138
499,794
501,032
561,821
1913
620,500
1914, to Sept. 30 403,633
Erected
100,732
115,149
184,164
114,548
43,664
138,735
74,629
101,346
174,932
}
From a business point of view the American Bridge Com-
pany would not care if it did not erect any structural steel.
Erection work, as explained by Mr. Ziesing, is merely inci-
dental, and is carried on as a business precaution to protect
the company's larger manufacturing interests. The company
maintains an erecting force and equipment to guard against
the possibility of erectors combining and refusing to handle
its manufactured products. Without an erecting force the
company might be placed at the mercy of erectors, or at least
in a less advantageous business position than it now occupies.
With its own erecting force the company is in a position to
bid on a bridge, or the structural steel in a building erected
complete, thus insuring the use of its manufactured products.
Its policy is to sub-let erection work, especially on buildings,
although even then, it is the largest erector of structural steel
in the country.
The International Association of Bridge and Structural
Ironworkers claims jurisdiction over the men employed in the
fabrication of structural steel in the shops. It has made sev-
eral unsuccessful efforts to organize different shops of the
American Bridge Company. There are a few small locals of
shop men affiliated with the International Association at the
55
present time. The reason that all the shop men are not or-
ganized, is that it has been found impossible of accomplish-
ment.
Some of the building trades unions, notably the sheet metal
workers, carpenters and marble workers, control the men in
the shops in their respective crafts. Why not the structural
ironworkers? That was the thought uppermost in the minds
of the officials of the American Bridge Company when discuss-
ing terms of settlement of the strike.
If the structural ironworkers had complete control of erec-
tion work, it would be a natural step for them to take ad-
vantage of that situation to force the unionizing of the shops.
Refusal to handle steel fabricated by non-union men would
be a natural and powerful lever to use. Were the shops
organized refusal on the part of the men to handle steel
rolled in non-union mills would not be entirely illogical. It
would be highly improbable, because the workmen in the steel
mills do not come under the jurisdiction of the structural iron-
workers, but the officials of the steel companies do not over-
look probabilities or possibilities.
It is true the structural ironworkers have never refused to
erect non-union made material to aid the shop men, but the
reason is that they have not considered it practicable to do so.
They do not deny the desirability of such action if the chances
of success looked favorable. Most of the agreements which
they have with employers guard against such sympathetic
action by providing that there shall be no restriction of the
use of manufactured material. Such a clause in an agree-
ment is in itself an admission of the possibility, and were
the ironworkers in a position to do so, they probably would
not sign agreements containing such clauses.
In view of the possibilities in the situation and in the light
of the well established policy of the U. S. Steel Corporation
and its subsidiaries to limit the scope of union activity, it can
readily be understood why the company hesitated about con-
ceding to the union the erection of the McKeesport tube mill,
or any other point that would widen the union sphere of
influence.
56
Mr. Ziesing is very certain that the union representatives
made threats that they would organize the shops and refuse
to handle steel rolled in non-union mills. He is certain also,
that the union representatives asked that the company should
not sell steel to firms employing non-union men in erection
work.
Mr. Ryan is equally certain that no such threats or demands
were made. He says it would have been ridiculous to have
made such demands, as the ironworkers had always handled
non-union made material coming from smaller concerns, and
if they meant to change that policy they would be unlikely to
start with the largest corporation in the industry, which of
fered the least chance of success.
Assuming that Mr. Ziesing and Mr. Ryan have both told the
truth to the best of their recollection, as to what transpired
in the conferences, there is only one plausible explanation of
the conflicting statements. The conferences took place nine
years ago and it would be difficult, if not impossible for any
one of the participants to remember clearly all the points
discussed, especially as the conferences lasted two days. It
is reasonable, therefore to assume that each one would remem-
ber most distinctly the particular points which most impressed
him at the time.
In a long discussion in which seven men participated, it is
entirely probable that many points were brought up which
created a different impression on the minds of those who
heard them. If the union representatives spoke of refusing
to handle non-union made material, or asked the company not
to sell steel to non-union erectors, they knew they were asking
for something they did not expect to get. That being the case
they would regard such points as trivial and incidental and
might forget a week afterward that they had been discussed.
They would attach no importance to them, but might advance
them to offset some points advanced on the other side. The
things they did expect to get, such as a written agreement and
the erection of the McKeesport tube mill, they would not be
apt to forget, as in their minds those things were fundamental.
57
This explanation appears the more plausible from the fact
that today Mr. Ziesing has hardly any recollection of the dis-
pute over the erection of the tube mill and thinks it was one
of the little incidental demands. Mr. Ryan on the other hand,
says it was the only matter of importance on which no under-
standing could be reached and was the real cause of the break
in relations and his memory on that would be apt to be much
better than Mr. Ziesing's.
It is Mr. Ryan's opinion that the points raised by Mr. Zies-
ing, were in reality advanced by Mr. Mitchell, the chief en-
gineer of the company, to prevent a settlement. He blames
Mr. Mitchell for the break between the company and the union.
This is disputed by Mr. Ziesing, who was Mr. Mitchell's super-
ior officer. Had Mr. Ziesing been fully satisfied, Mr. Mitchell
could not have prevented a settlement.
But Mr. Ziesing was not satisfied and he frankly states that
the reason was very largely the fear of union interference in
the fabricating shops and with the sale of manufactured ma-
terials. He says the ironworkers have several times tried to
organize the shops of the company, so that the threat did not
appear as idle to him as it might have appeared to the union
representatives.
The possibilities in the situation were great enough in the
eyes of the company officials to cause them to positively refuse
to give the union men the erection of the McKeesport tube
mill, which might have proved an entering wedge.
As a matter of choice the company always preferred to work
open shop. In well organized centers it made agreements with
the unions as a matter of expediency. Even when the com-
pany was working under agreements with the local unions.
Mr. Ziesing says there were times when it was necessary to
hire non-union men, because the union could not always fur-
nish men to meet the company's requirements.
The operations of the American Bridge Company differ ma-
terially from those of a large contracting firm, whose activities
are restricted to large cities where labor always is available.
In taking a contract for a bridge in some isolated part of the
58
country, the company frequently was obliged to find non-union
men, as the union could not always find men willing to go.
After having organized a gang of bridgemen or "floaters"
who were ready to go anywhere, the company was unwilling to
discharge such gangs. Its policy was to keep them as much
as possible in territory where no local union had jurisdiction,
but there were times when that could not be done and trouble
arose with a union where a nonunion gang came within the
jurisdiction of a local. That appears to have been one of the
causes of friction when the company worked under an agree-
ment with the union.
Another cause of friction was the practice of the company
to employ laborers in the erection of false work. On isolated
jobs where open shop conditions prevailed, there was, of
course, no objection raised to this practice. When the com-
pany sought to erect false work with laborers within the juris-
diction of a local union, there would immediately be a protest
and sometimes a strike. The union ironworkers have always
contended for the control of false work and it has been con-
ceded them wherever union conditions prevail.
Such restrictions naturally made the company prefer open
shop conditions as a matter of choice, so that at the time of
the final break there were a number of influences which
strengthened the company's determination to sever its rela-
tions with the union. The erection of the McKeesport tube
mill furnished the direct pretext and put the company in a
defensive position, because hitherto the union had not been
able to control such work.
59
CHAPTER IX.
Post & MCCORD STRIKE IN NEW YORK.
7
Up to the time that negotiations were broken off between the
union and the American Bridge Company, the strike had not
effected New York with respect to sub-contracts.
The firm of Post & McCord in that city, was commonly
supposed to be a part of the American Bridge Company, al-
though it was denied by members of the firm. Some years
before the firm of Post & McCord had sold its fabricating
shops to the American Bridge Company and confined its op-
erations to erection work. It purchased all its structural steel
from the American Bridge Company.
That there was a close connection between the two com-
panies was admitted, but that the firm of Post & McCord was
a part of the American Bridge Company was not established.
That the New York local union of ironworkers was working
under an agreement with the firm of Post & McCord, as a
member of the local association of steel erectors, is not dis-
puted by any one.
Mr. Ryan went to New York and asked the local union to
declare a strike on Post & McCord's jobs, on the ground that
it was a subsidiary of the American Bridge Company. While
some of the local officers did not think the action wise, there
was no objection offered in the meeting of the district council
when the strike order was passed. Even then the local busi-
ness agent Charles Massey hesitated to call the strike and told
Mr. Ryan that he believed it would be a losing fight.
Mr. Ryan said the Cleveland local had been suspended for
not obeying the strike order and that he would not play any
fa orities. Unless the strike was called, he said, he would
suspend the local. The strike on the Post & McCord work
was called on November 1, 1905.
The structural ironworkers' union was at that time repre-
sented on the General Arbitration Board of the Building
Tres Employers' Association and the building trades'
60
unions. The firm of Post & McCord protested against the call-
ing of the strike, in violation of its agreement with the union
and a meeting of the representatives of the employers and
unions in other trades was called November 3d. The iron-
workers were ordered to return to work and they refused,
Some further efforts were made to induce the ironworkers
to return to work, the point being raised by the employers that
there was no evidence that the firm involved was connected
with the American Bridge Company and that the local agree-
ment prohibited the calling of such strikes.
Mr. Ryan insisted that he had proof that the firm of Post
& McCord was in reality the American Bridge Company op-
erating under another name in New York City and that any
agreement made by a local was not binding when the inter-
national ordered a strike.
A meeting of the General Arbitration Board was held on
November 16th and a resolution was adopted directing the
ironworkers to return to work and that the question of
whether the firm of Post & McCord was a part of the Ameri-
can Bridge Company be submitted to a special board, such
board to give a decision not later than November 18th. This
resolution was adopted by a unanimous vote of 46 on the
employers' side and 32 for and 10 against on the union side.
The ironworkers refused to return to work, and the special
board to determine the status of the firm of Post & McCord
was not appointed. The ironworkers were then suspended
from the General Arbitration Board.¹
1
The suspension of the ironworkers, with the practically
unanimous consent of the other building trades unions, may
have been influenced by the fact that it was the second time
within a few months that they had gone out on strike in
violation of their agreement with their employers. In July,
1905, the ironworkers struck on the Commercial Cable Bu
ing in New York against Milliken Brothers, because members
of a riggers' union were employed by another firm on the same
job to erect smokestacks. On that occasion they were ordered to
1-Records of the Building Trades Employers' Association.
61
return to work, but it took them several days to comply with
the order.¹ When they struck the second time, the employers
were ready to take drastic action and most of the unions were
willing to acquiesce.
At the time the ironworkers were suspended from the Gen-
eral Arbitration Board, they were preparing to demand a
wage increase on the expiration of their agreement January
1, 1906. The wages paid at the time were $4.50 a day and
the men were asking for $5 a day. This increase being re-
fused, the men struck involving practically all the erectors in
New York, including the members of the National Erectors'
Association.
This strike appears to have galvanized into action the Na-
tional Erectors' Association, which up to that time had pur-
sued a non-aggressive policy. While it had members in some
ther cities, New York was its chief stronghold and as the
New York local of ironworkers had placed itself outside the
support of other unions in the building trades, the time seemed
advantageous to inaugurate an open shop policy.
The National Erectors' Association looked for a man to
direct the open shop campaign and finally selected Mr. Walter
Drew. He was a young attorney who had previously been the
secretary of a Citizens' Alliance in Grand Rapids, Mich. and
had given some study to the methods of labor unions and had
written a good deal on the subject. He was thoroughly imbued
with the open shop idea, and the injustices of the closed shop
so-called, as he viewed it. He drafted a constitution for the
government of the Association in which the open shop prin-
ciple
was emphasized and convinced the members of the execu-
tive committee that it was feasible and practicable to establish
and maintain the open shop in the structural iron trade.
The American Bridge Company had, of course, been operat-
1-Records of Building Trades Employers' Association. The ironworkers
made application to be re-admitted to the General Arbitration Board
May 21, 1906, but the employers objected and no action was taken on
the application. The union has never been able to get another agree-
ment with the New York employers.
62
ing on the open shop basis since the strike against it was called
some months previously and as it was the dominating force
in the Erectors' Association, Mr. Drew did not find it so diffi-
cult to bring the other members to his point of view. The
New York employers were bitter against the union, while the
ironworkers did not appear to have many friends among the
other unions. The declaration for the open shop was made.
formally on May 1, 1906.
S
Conditions in the structural iron trade were in a rather
chaotic state in the spring of 1906. Employers friendly to the
union believed that the wage increase demanded was in excess
of what trade conditions warranted and they were unwilling to
pay it. A series of conferences were held between those
friendly firms most of whom were general contractors, and
the union representatives and finally a settlement of the local
strike was reached on the basis of 60 cents an hour, or $4.8
a day. Some six or eight firms agreed to the compromise and
the ironworkers returned to work for them. The others, how-
ever, stood firm against granting any increase, or making any
agreement with the union. In fact they refused to meet the
union representatives to discuss a settlement and after a time
the firms who had agreed to pay $4.80 a day, returned to the
former scale of $4.50 and open shop conditions prevailed gen-
erally in New York City.
For the next year or two the open shop campaign was
actively pushed by Mr. Drew. A great deal of printed matter
was issued from the offices of the Association. It was a prad-
tice to put circulars in the pay envelopes of the open shop em-
ployees, advising them that they did not need a union card
and if asked for one on any job, to notify Mr. Drew and their
statements would be regarded as confidential. They were in-
formed through these circulars that there was not the slightest
possibility of any of the open shop firms recognizing the unic,
the dynamiting outrages occurring about that time having the
effect of making the employers more determined in that re-
spect.¹
1-Circular issued by Mr. Drew September 15, 1908.
63
The New York local also was active and frequently issued
circulars in answer to those issued by Mr. Drew. In 1908 the
union filed a complaint under the Prevailing Wage Law of
New York against the McClintic-Marshall Company for pay-
ing less than the prevailing wages on the erection of some of
the Chelsea piers. The union complaint was based on the fact
that the company was employing cheap labor in assembling
and shifting material around on the ground, that on a union
job would have been done by skilled bridgemen. When actual
erection work was started, the company paid the union rate
of pay. After an investigation by the comptroller's depart-
ment, the complaint was dismissed, as it was not found that
the law had been violated.
When the union filed the complaint, William Green, who was
President and business agent of the New York local asserted
that Mr. McClintic, president of the company had offered to
employ union men to the extent of 75 per cent of the total
working force and to "take care of Green financially" if he
would withdraw the complaint. Mr. Green refused the offer
and alleged bribe.¹
In another circular dated October 22d Mr. Drew denied
that any bribe had been offered Green, stating that as the
comptroller's department had decided there was no violation
of the law, there could have been no purpose in seeking to
bribe anyone. Of course the decision was not given until
several weeks had elapsed after the complaint was filed, so
that a bribe might have been offered to have the complaint
withdrawn. At least so Mr. Green asserted in a second cir-
cular issued November 17th in which he challenged Mr. Mc-
Clintic to make an affidavit that the charge was untrue.
While the fight was going on in New York the ironworkers
received no increase in wages, although wages had been ad-
vanced in Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis and other
lalge cities.
'n December, 1909, the Iron League Erectors' Association
1-ircular issued by New York Union October 5, 1908.
64
of New York and the National Erectors' Association sent out
the following announcement with respect to wages:
"On February 1, 1910, the rate of wages for competent, all
around bridgemen and structural ironworkers in New York
City paid by members of this Association will be raised to 60
cents an hour and on July 1, 1910, to $5 a day.
"Although no demand upon us had been made from any
source, we believe that trade conditions and future prospects
justify such increases. The open shop, which we are more
than ever determined to maintain, has brought about healthier
and better conditions in our industry and in the relations be-
tween employers and employees and it is these which have en-
abled us to take this action at this time.
"We ask the continued confidence and cooperation of our
men in the future as in the past. These things mean greater
results from the joint efforts of the employer and his men and
make possible better returns for both."
This increase in wages is the only one which the structul
ironworkers in New York have received in more than twee
years.
1-Records on file offices National Erectors' Association.
65
CHAPTER X.
UNION POLICIES IN FIGHT AGAINST OPEN SHOP.
The policy of the structural ironworkers with respect to sub-
contracts differs from that usually pursued by other unions in
the building industry. Most of the unions are interested only
in securing the work for their members, and if a contract has
been awarded to a non-union firm and is later sub-let to a
union firm, the union is satisfied. There is a certain piece of
work to be done, and if it is done under union conditions, the
average union in the building trades does not concern itself
about who held the original contract.
The reason that the ironworkers pursued a different policy,
probably, is due to the fact that they had to deal with large
corporations, who might find it convenient to employ union
men in one locality and non-union men in another. If the
American Bridge Company, for instance, found that it could
not employ non-union men on a job, because of the sympathetic
action of other unions, it naturally would sub-let the work to
some firm that was employing union men. In this way it
would be possible to carry on its business with little interrup-
tion, employing non-union men where it could do so without
interference and sub-letting the work where it could not.
By adopting a policy of working for the American Bridge
Company in places where it was compelled by force of circum-
stances to employ union men, or sub-let its work, the iron-
workers could not hope to completely organize the erection
work of the company. They, therefore, made a stand for all
the work, or none. In doing so they antagonized union firms
for whom they had always worked. They over-estimated their
own strength and risked losing, probably three-fourths of the
work of the company, for the sake of controlling the other
fourth.
That this had been the policy of the structural ironworkers,
before the last strike against the American Bridge Company
was called, or before Mr. Ryan became international presi-
66
dent, is shown by the records of the organization. The cause
of the strike, as stated, was the awarding of a sub-contract to
a non-union firm.
As previously stated Secretary McNamara in "Circular No.
30 To Local Unions" clearly outlined the policy of the or-
pr-
ganization in the following language: "No local union should
ever allow any work to proceed under the subterfuge that it has
been taken away from the American Bridge Company, as in
the majority of cases this is but a move to out-wit our local
unions."
The wisdom of risking so much already secured, in the hope
of obtaining a little that for a time seemed beyond reach,
may well be questioned. Experienced labor leaders would
have hesitated, preferring to hold on to what they had and
reach out for more from time to time as a favorable opportun-
ity presented itself. Had the ironworkers adopted that policy,
the open shop campaign of the employers would in all proba-
bility have failed before it was fairly started. In the language
of one of the officials of a local union of ironworkers, the policy
resulted in the union "being shot to pieces" in the first few
months of the fight.
In New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cleveland and other
large cities, structural iron work that was proceeding under
union conditions, was stopped in pursuance of this policy.
In some instances at least, there was nothing more thanja
suspicion that such work was originally contracted for by the
American Bridge Company. From the most reliable informa-
tion obtainable, the firm of Post & McCord in New York, is
not, nor ever was, a part of the American Bridge Company.
The strike on the work of that firm started the open shop war
in New York and forced other concerns into it that otherwise
might have kept aloof.
-
In Chicago the union ironworkers were called out of he
plant of the Illinois Steel Company, because like the American
Bridge Company, it was a subsidiary of the U. S. Steel Cor-
poration. It carried on its own erection work independently,
however, and as has been shown, it was the only steel plant of
!
67
consequence in the country that employed union structural
ironworkers inside its grounds. The stopping of these men
could have had little or no bearing on the strike against the
American Bridge Company. The men were receiving union
wages and working under union conditions and they were in-
formed that if they quit they would not be re-employed.
Some of the leaders in the Chicago union saw the danger in
going too far afield in the prosecution of the strike and they
opposed calling the men off the Illinois Steel Company's
work. Among those was Frank Buchanan, the former inter-
national president. Mr. Buchanan said it would result in the
union losing work that it then controlled without having any
effect on the strike. Mr. Ryan made an appeal to the member-
ship to "beware of the white shirt fellows" meaning Mr.
Buchanan, who was not working at his trade at the time. The
appeal won and the men were called out. They have been out
ever since.
The firm of Kelly-Atkinson Company in Chicago also suf-
fered as a result of the policy of the ironworkers on sub-con-
tracts. The firm had a contract for the erection of part of an
elevated railroad. There appeared some doubt as to whether
the American Bridge Company was the original contractor.
Mr. Buchanan on August 22, 1905, while he was still interna-
tional president, wrote a letter to Secretary McNamara stat-
ing that he had investigated reports that the Kelly-Atkinson
work was a sub-contract from the American Bridge Company
and he was of the opinion that the reports were not correct.¹
Mr. Ryan made a second investigation after he assumed
office and found that the work was a sub-contract. At least
he ordered a strike on the work and kept it tied up for several
months, until the Executive Board lifted the ban on sub-con-
tracts.
in Philadelphia the Ettor Erecting Company was building
an elevated railroad and employing union men. It was a sub-
contract from the American Bridge Company. The union men
!
1-Exhibit No. 7, p. 1104, Vol. 2 Transcript of Record, U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals in Dynamite Conspiracy Cases.
68
i
were called off, in spite of the protests of the local union
officers. The American Bridge Company finished the work
with open shop men.
So far as can be seen this policy of calling strikes on sub-
contracts did not hamper the American Bridge Company in
the slightest degree. It did have the effect of antagonizing
firms that had employed union men and wished to continue
doing so. It is difficult to conceive of a policy better calçu-
lated to strengthen the position of the open shop employers.
The union played into their hands. Some members of the
union, forbidden to work on sub-contracts, left the organiza-
tion and went to work on open shop jobs, exactly as many of
the steel workers did in the strike of 1901. The American
Bridge Company controlled too much work, either directly or
through sub-contractors for the union to place a ban on it all.
There was not enough work left to keep the members of the
union employed, so it was inevitable that in time some of
them would seek employment in spite of the union.
Had the union permitted its members to work on any job
where union conditions prevailed, whether a sub-contract from
the American Bridge Company or not, it would not have been
possible for the open shop firms to obtain the number of ex-
perienced ironworkers that they did obtain in the first six
months of the fight. If work was to go on and if union men
refused to do it, other men had to be found. In a trade where
the wages paid are as high, and the degree of skill required as
low as that of the structural ironworker, it always is possible
to get workmen.
That this policy of refusing to allow union men to work on
sub-contracts taken from the American Bridge Company, was
a mistake, was admitted by officials of the union themselves
after an experience of a few months. In May, 1906, some nine
months after the strike was called, the Executive Board, acting
on the advice of President Ryan, authorized local unions to
allow their members to work on sub-contracts, provided the
work was done under union conditions.
While this change in policy improved conditions for the
69
union ironworkers in some cities, it came too late to repair the
damage already done. New York City by that time was prac-
tically lost to the union and its influenee had been greatly
weakened in other places. The business agent of the Phila-
dephia local said that during the time the ban was in force.
on sub-contracts, the union in that vicinity lost 60 per cent of
it's influence.
Shortly after permission was given local unions to allow
their members to work on sub-contracts, a movement was
started among them to obtain what they termed "local
option," which meant permission to work for any open shop
firm in a given locality, if given union conditions, regardless
of the fact that such firm might be employing non-union men
in some other locality.
Delegates from New York, Brooklyn and Philadelphia went
to the headquarters of the international union in Indianapolis
in February, 1907, to urge the Executive Board to authorize
the "local option" policy. Their argument was that they
could force some open shop firms to employ union men in their
respective jurisdictions. There is no doubt that in the first
few months of the fight, some open shop firms would have
agreed to employ union men exclusively in certain districts.
Architects and owners of buildings who wished to avoid labor
difficulties, would not let contracts to open shop firms, where
there was danger of other unions joining in sympathetic
strikes. This limited the opportunities of the open shop firms
in some cities, so that as a matter of business they would have
agreed to union conditions on some jobs.
The Executive Board would not consider such a policy. Mr.
Ryan was very emphatic against it. He contended that if a
local was permitted to follow such a policy in its own jurisdic-
tijon, without regard to other locals less favorably situated,
there would be no use in having an international union. He
could not see the force of the arguments of the "local option"
advocates, that if one local controlled conditions within a
radius of twenty-five or fifty miles and other locals controlled
for like distances, the open shop employers would be hemmed
into restricted areas.
70
From a union standpoint no doubt Mr. Ryan was right, but
the open shop employers were steadily gaining ground and
it might have been good tactics to restrict their activities
wherever it was possible. It is true that through fear of
sympathetic strikes and sometimes political influences, the
open shop employers occasionally lost a contract that they
would have obtained had they employed union men, but the
gains they made through steadily increasing the number and
efficiency of their open shop working forces, more than offset
the occasional losses of contracts which they sustained.
The "local option" question was a subject of controversy
and discussion at each convention of the ironworkers for sev-
eral years. Because of the peculiar conditions in New York,
which was entirely open shop, inasmuch as no signed agree-
ments existed, the local there in 1908 received permission to
allow its numbers to work on open shop jobs. All the iron
erectors in the city except a few general contractors, were
working on the open shop plan, so that it appeared to be a
necessity to permit the union ironworkers to work by the side
of open shop men to preserve what was left of the organiza-
tion.
Although the "local option" advocates kept up their fight
in each convention, it was not until the convention in Indian-
apolis in February, 1913, that the policy was adopted. It did
not work as successfully as its advocates had hoped. Accord-
ing to the opinions of some local officers in open shop territory,
the policy resulted in weakening instead of strengthening the
union.
The theory of the "local option" advocates proved wrong
in 1913 but it does not follow that it might not have been right
in 1907 when it was first proposed. At that time there were
fewer open shop men in the trade and many of those had linn-
ited experience. Each year that passed gave the open shop
employers an advantage, by enabling them to train their non-
union forces to greater efficiency. By 1913 the open shop
policy had been firmly established in the bridge building
branch of the trade and in the construction branch in a nu m-
71
ber of cities. It was too late for the union to overcome the
advantage the employers had gained.
The plan followed in New York City of allowing union men
to work by the side of open shop men did not bring the results
that the union hoped for. It was expected that by permitting
union men to work on the same jobs with open shop men, the
latter could be induced to join the union. Instead of the open
shop men joining the union, many of the union men left the
organization and took chances with the open shop forces. The
open shop men always were in a majority on a job, so that the
influence of the union men was practically nil. The employers
did not permit stewards on the jobs and if any coercion was at-
tempted by active union men, they were promptly reported to
the employer and discharged.
In the convention held in Peoria, Ill., in September, 1914,
resolutions were introduced declaring the "local option"
policy a failure and providing for a return to the old condi-
tions. After a long discussion the resolutions were amended
to give discretionary power to the Executive Board.
As finally adopted the resolution read:
"Resolved, that this convention in executive session in-
structs the General Executive Board to order to cease work for
any firm that is unfair to any other local union, when after
investigation they deem it for the best interests of the Inter-
national Association.""
Convention Proceedings, Bridgemen's Magazine, October, 1914.
72
CHAPTER XI.
POLICIES OF EMPLOYERS IN OPEN SHOP WAR.
In their fight to establish and maintain the open shop prin-
ciple in the erection of structural steel and iron, the employers
pursued wiser tactics during the crucial period than did their
union opponents. They adopted no hard and fast rules of
policy, but adapted themselves to circumstances and acted as
seemed most expedient.
After the National Erectors' Association announced its
open shop policy on May 1, 1906, its members did not deviate
from that policy to the extent of holding any formal con-
ferences with union representatives, or entering into any
agreements with them. But they had no objections to employ-
ing union men if they could find any willing to work for them.
Neither did they hesitate to sub-let contracts to firms employ-
ing union men, if that plan appeared to offer any advantage.
As the open shop fight progressed and the non-union work-
men increased in number and efficiency, the leading firms in
the Erectors' Association became a little more strict in the
matter of letting sub-contracts to firms employing union men
under closed shop agreements. Preference was given to open
shop firms and in some instances cash bonds were required to
guarantee that the work would be done on the open shop prin-
ciple.
In numerous instances, however, sub-contracts containing
an open shop clause were awarded, with full knowledge that
matter of letting sub-contracts to firms employing union men
rules. If a union firm was the lowest bidder on a sub-contract,
the members of the Erectors' Association were inclined to
look at the business side of the proposition and wink at a viola-
tion of the open shop principle. An open shop clause in the
contract probably eased their consciences, but they did not
let their principles stand in the way of profits.
There were occasions when even the open shop clause as
▾
73
omitted in the awarding of sub-contracts, when the successful
bidder was a responsible firm employing union men.
The
Snare & Triest Company was given sub-contracts in New York
by the American Bridge Company and the Pennsylvania Steel
Company and the open shop question was not raised. The
firm employed union men exclusively on such contracts.¹
This firm erected two of the Chelsea piers on a sub-contract
from the Pennsylvania Steel Company when the open shop
fight was at its height in New York and employed only union
The McClintic-Marshall Construction Company erected
the other piers at the same time with open shop men.
men.
The American Bridge Company sub-let the erection of the
approaches to a bridge over the East River in New York to
the Oscar Daniels Company, knowing that the firm employed
union men. The work was completed under union rules.
It appears, however, that the American Bridge Company
was stricter in the matter of sub-contracts than some of the
other large firms in the Erectors' Association. The New York
firm of Terry & Tench was the successful bidder on a sub-
contract for the erection of the Madison Avenue Bridge in
New York City in 1907. The American Bridge Company in-
sisted on an open shop clause in the contract. Terry & Tench
had no objections, it being the intention of the firm to accept
the clause and employ union men exclusively as it had been
doing up to that time.
Mr. Drew, the commissioner of the Erectors' Association,
was asked for an opinion if such an open shop clause was en-
forceable. He said it was not, but that he would draw up a
clause that would meet the requirements. He accordingly
drew up a clause providing that an agent of the Erectors'
Association be allowed to visit the work and hire or discharge
men to insure the job being done under open shop rules. Terry
& Tench would not accept such a clause and the contract was
canceled.2
The Pennsylvania Steel Company let a sub-contract for the
1-Statement of Arthur W. Buttenheim, Secretary of the Company.
2-Statements of Mr. Tench and Mr. Drew.
74
erection of a viaduct to J. H. Greiner, a Philadelphia cpn-
tractor who was employing union men. He was required to
put up a cash bond of $6,000 that the work would be done on
the open shop plan. He did not wish to get into trouble with
the union, while at the same time he wanted to get the contract.
The matter was quitely arranged with the business agent of
the Philadelphia union and Mr. Greiner started work with an
open shop force. Gradually the open shop men were found
to be "incompetent" and discharged. The union business
agent saw to it that union men were on hand to fill the places.
In three weeks the job was entirely unionized and it was
finished before the Pennsylvania Steel Company knew of the
arrangement. Mr. Greiner, however, did not get another sub-
contract from that company or any other member of the
Erectors' Association and soon afterwards joined the union
and went to work at the trade.¹ 1
The Strobel Steel Construction Company of Chicago tojok
a good many sub-contracts from the American Bridge Com-
pany and at one time was a member of the Erectors' Associ-
ation. It employed union men exclusively and when it per-
sisted in this policy it was expelled from the Erectors' Asso-
ciation.2
The National Erectors' Association never imposes any
penalties in the shape of fines on its members for violation of
the open shop principle to which they are pledged. They
are expected to live up to the open shop rule on all work done
by them directly, and as far as possible see that any work
sub-let by them is carried on in the same way. Occasional
lapses from the rule are overlooked, but if a firm persists in
ignoring the rule so that it is apparent that it is not trying to
observe it, that firm is dropped from membership.
It has been charged by union officials that the National
Erectors' Association has coerced some firms into declaring
for the open shop. It has been shown that the members of the
1-Statement of M. J. Cunnane, Business Agent Philadelphia Local.
2-Statement of Mr. Drew.
75
Erectors' Association control the output of approximately 75
per cent of the fabricated steel used. The American Bridge
Company alone fabricated 35 per cent or more, so that it would
appear plausible that pressure might be brought to bear on
some erectors through this control of manufactured material.
There does not appear to be any foundation for these
charges, at least through the control of manufactured material.
Any reputable contractor finds no difficulty in obtaining ma-
terial. The competition among the steel companies is too
keen to permit of any discrimination on account of the em-
ployment of union or non-union men in erection work. Com-
plaints of this nature when carefully followed up were, with-
out exception, found to be without merit.
A seemingly well authenticated case was learned in New
York City, where a large general contracting firm which em-
ploys union men, was said to have had trouble with the Amer-
ican Bridge Company in the way of procuring material. In-
vestigation proved that the trouble arose over an entirely dif-
ferent matter and that it was the general contractor, who for
business and personal reasons, quit purchasing material from
the company. It was not a case of the company refusing to
sell or make prompt delivery, but of the contractor refusing
to buy.
This particular firm is not on friendly business relations
with the American Bridge Company and when its manager
said that he had never heard of the company refusing to sell,
or delay the delivery of material on account of the employment
or non-employment of union ironworkers, it may be assumed
he was not speaking in defense of the company. As a matter
of fact he scouted the idea as ridiculous and said that any one
familiar with conditions in the structural iron trade would
know that such a charge could not be true.¹
Officials of the American Bridge Company have stated that
in their last conference with the representatives of the struct-
ural ironworkers' union, the latter asked the company not to
sell material to firms employing non-union men in erection
1-Statement of Mr. Rowan, Manager James Stewart Co. New York.
76
work. Mr. Gary said that such action would render the com-
pany liable to prosecution for conspiracy. The same would
hold true if the company refused to sell to firms employing
union men and if it tried to delay deliveries it would lose the
business. The American Bridge Company is in business to
sell all the steel it can, and as Mr. Ziesing said, it is not con-
cerned about what is done with the steel after it has been de-
livered.
Because no coercive tactics have been pursued in the mat-
ter of control of manufactured steel, it does not follow that
the Erectors' Association has not used pressure on union firms
in another direction to have them work open shop. This has
been done in the way of refusing to let a sub-contract to a
union firm, or by insisting on an open shop clause in such
contracts.
If a firm had little work on hand and had a chance to secure
a favorable sub-contract from the American Bridge Company,
or any other large open shop firm, the business temptation to
declare for the open shop and accept the contract would be
great. In some instances the temptation was too strong to
resist, so that in this way the Erectors' Association did exer-
cise pressure on independent union firms.
On the other hand, if the union could bring sufficient prés-
sure to bear to cause a contract to be taken away from an open
shop firm and given to a union concern, it did not hesitate to
do so.
As a matter of fact the union sometimes succeeded in
doing that and hailed it as a victory. If the thing was legiti-
mate in the one case, it was equally so in the other. It was all
a part of the fight and in playing the game, the records prove
that the employers kept within the law much closer than did
their opponents.
Va
While a few firms may have been forced to declare for the
open shop to procure contracts, they are exceptions. As a
general rule the open shop employers are such from choice.
The truth is that many union concerns would prefer to work
open shop if they could do so without danger of sympathetic
strikes on the part of other unions. Some large general con-
77
tractors who employ union ironworkers exclusively, contribute
to the support of the National Erectors' Association. They do
not advertise the fact and are classed as strong advocates of
unions, but privately they indorse the open shop campaign.
They feel that it has benefited them by keeping the union iron-
workers in check. The union is less apt to cause trouble over
minor infractions or rules when the possibility is always pres-
ent of an employer hiring open shop men.
78
CHAPTER XII.
WHY ERECTORS PREFER OPEN SHOP.
Assuming that the structural iron erectors who have adopted
the open shop policy, have done so from choice, it follows that
they must have had some business reasons for doing so. What
are the reasons?
A great deal of literature has been issued by associations of
open shop employers, tending to show that the fight is purely
one of principle; that principle being the right of a workman
to work where and for whom he pleases and under such con-
ditions as he may see fit.
It is not necessary to waste time or space in discussing that
plea. Until society provides a plan for assuring every man,
who is able and willing to work, an opportunity of doing so, it
is idle to talk about his sacred right to work.
Setting aside, therefore, the thoughtless and many times
hypocritical plea of some open shop employers, that they are
contending for a fundamental principle, the matter may be dis-
cussed from a purely business point of view.
If employers who are fighting for the open shop would
frankly admit that they are doing so for business reasons to
increase their power and profits, and if labor unions who are
fighting the open shop would admit that they are doing so for
precisely the same reasons, the public would hear less mean-
ingless twaddle about abstract principles. No matter how
many high-sounding phrases may be used in discussing the
subject, in the last analysis it is a common, ordinary question
of dollars and cents.
In the structural iron trade, New York City furnishes a
good illustration of the effect of the open shop on wages. That
city is the stronghold of the National Erectors' Association
and the wages paid structural ironworkers are lower than in
any of the leading cities of the country. They are lower than
the wages paid in most of the other building trades in New
79
York, where the unions are working under contractual rela-
tions with their employers.
Not only that, but the wages paid structural ironworkers in
New York are 50 cents a day higher than the scale of the Erect-
ors' Association for any other city in the country, which makes
the difference between the open shop and the union scale still
more marked.
The National Erectors' Association has not issued a wage
scale since November, 1912, while the union scale has been
raised in a number of cities since that time. The open shop
electors have three different rates of wages applying to all the
principal cities in the country. Those rates for an eight-hour
workday are $5 in New York City and vicinity, $4.50 a day in
seventeen and $4 a day in thirty-four other cities.
It should be said that the rates of the Erectors' Associa-
tion are standard and as most of the work of its members is
bridge work, the differences in some instances may be less
than they appear. Some of the unions have a lower road
scale than their city scale, so that outside of New York and
vicinity, it might be fairer to compare the scale of the Erectors'
Association with the road scale of the unions. By doing so
the advantage in favor of the Erectors' Association is very
slight, as only a few locals have a lower road scale than their
city scale.
On the average the wages paid by members of the Erectors'
Association are considerably lower than the wages paid by
firms employing union men.
The following comparison of the open shop and union scale
for structural ironworkers in twelve leading cities in different
sections of the country is a fair illustration:
80
City.
New York....
Buffalo.
Chicago
Cleveland
Denver
Boston
Minneapolis
St. Louis
Louisville
San Francisco
Indianapolis
Baltimore
•
Open Shop Scale.
Cents per Hour.
621
561
.561
.561
561
•
.50
50
..50
.50
..561
561
561
1
Union Scale.
Cents per Hour.
621
65*
68
70
561
621*
621
75*
50
75*
68
561
In comparing open shop with union wages in the structural
iron trade, there is one condition that should be considered.
The open shop men have more steady employment, which, of
course, increases their annual earnings, so that they would
more nearly equal the earnings of the union men. The open
shop employers strive to keep their gangs steadily employed,
while the union employers, doing work in large cities have no
difficulty in procuring competent men at any time. The sup-
ply of open shop men is more limited, which has a tendency
to give them steadier employment.
| Aut
But aside from the question of the nominal rate of pay per
hour, there are other reasons why the erectors prefer the open
*The rate quoted is that claimed by the union, which does not agree with
the rate given for those cities by E. M. Craig, secretary of the Building
Construction Employers Association of Chicago, whose tables are pre-
pared with great care from information received from various sources.
Mr. Craig's figures for 1914 for San Francisco are 62 cents an hour and
for St. Louis 60 cents an hour. The rates shown in Mr. Craig's tables
are 62 cents an hour for Buffalo and 56 cents for Boston. The Bal-
timore scale for 1914 is 50 cents a day lower than the scale for 1913.
In St. Louis the scale for structural ironworkers was 65 cents an hour
for 1911-12-13 and in 1914 a strike was called for 75 cents an hour
The employers fought the increase and an independent union was formed.
The rate claimed by the union may be paid on some jobs. but may not
be the standard rate recognized in that locality.
81
shop. As a matter of fact the open shop employers deny that
they pay less than union employers to competent bridgemen.
They say they do not object to high wages. What they do
object to are the rules and restrictions imposed by the union
and the interference of walking delegates. Several large em-
ployers who recently turned from union to open shop condi-
tions say they were driven to the change by the actions of
some local business agents of the union.
In that respect, however, the question again resolves
itself into one of dollars and cents. The union rules and re-
strictions of which the employers complain, are simply meth-
ods used by the union to get more wages for its members, or
more work, which is the same thing. The union rules may not
mean a higher rate of pay per hour. The minimum rate is
generally well established and seldom cause for dispute. It
is the jurisdiction of work which causes the real trouble and
adds to the cost of construction where the union controls, or
reduces the cost where open shop conditions prevail, without
changing the standard rate of pay per hour.
One of the chief causes of friction between the American
Bridge Company and the union, at the time when contractual
relations obtained, was the question of the erection of false-
work. The union has always claimed that the erection and
removal of falsework is a part of the structural ironworker's
trade, and it is so conceded in all agreements that have been
made. That means of course, that falsework must be erected
and removed by union men, receiving the minimum rate of
pay.
On an open shop job the employer may, if he chooses, do
such work with unskilled labor. The laborers probably receive
about one-half the pay of skilled bridgemen. On a union job
the employer would have to pay skilled men to do this class
of work, so that it can readily be understood why union "rules
and restrictions" are objectionable from the employer's point
of view. Relieved of such rules, the open shop employer could
afford to pay skilled men the highest rate of pay and still
profit over his competitor who employed union men.
82
The erection of falsework, however, requires some degree
of skill, so that it does not furnish as clear an illustration of
the cost of some union rules, as does the handling of material.
In all agreements made between the union ironworkers and
their employers provision is made for laborers handling ma-
terial in yards and storage points, and for delivering ma-
terial from such yards and storage points to the site of the
work. The site of the work is defined:
(a) In the case of buildings, within reach of the derricks,
or other appliances used in erecting the materials.
(b) In the case of bridges, viaducts and similar struc-
tures, to the point of the structure nearest the storage yard.¹
The agreements provide also that in the removal of old
structures laborers may handle the material after it has been
dismantled and landed by bridgemen, which means that skilled
workmen must do the dismantling and lowering of the ma-
terial.
Gla
The enforcement or non-enforcement of these rules mean
a material difference in the cost of erection. The handling
of structural iron does not require skill. A sturdy laborer
could handle it better than a less sturdy skilled workman.
The erection of a viaduct may be taken as an example of
how the rule works. If the work is being done under union
conditions, laborers may deliver the material to the point of
the structure nearest the storage yard. Suppose the employer
decided to establish a storage yard along the side of the via-
duct, if the conditions made that practicable, laborers would
then be handling the material over the entire length of the
viaduct. Suppose again the walking delegate visited the job
and stopped the work, demanding that bridgemen handle
the material from the point nearest the extreme end of the
viaduct. The employer quite naturally would resent such
"union interference" as it meant to him the employment of
high-priced men to do work that could be satisfactorily per-
formed by laborers. It cuts down his profits, while it in-
A
1-See Agreement Appendix p. 165.
83
creases the profits of the bridgemen by giving them more
work.
Whether the work should be done by the high-priced or the
low-priced man, is a matter on which opinions will differ.
The employer will, of course, contend that it is uneconomic
to pay skilled labor for doing unskilled work, but the union
ironworker is not interested in that phase of the subject. His
philosophy is that the work should always go to the high-
priced man, if he can get it, and he is in a union to help him
get it.
Gy
One of the largest structural iron firms in New York turned
from the union to the open shop in 1913 over the question of
handling material. The business agent of the Brooklyn union
stopped the work, because laborers were handling material
that was claimed to be the work of bridgemen. In speaking
of the reasons for declaring for the open shop, a member of
the firm complained bitterly of "grafting walking delegates"
and said they had driven him to work open shop. It was the
rules and regulations of which he complained, not of wages
cr hours of labor.1
Another question which at one time caused friction is the
number of men used in a riveting gang. It was the custom
to employ four men in a gang, although a literal reading of
the union agreements shows that employers could use a fewer
number without any violation of the contract. Some of the
employers tried to work three men in a gang. Under certain
conditions, when the heating furnace was close to the spot
where the rivets were to be used, three men might work in a
gang with fairly good results. The experiment, however,
proved uneconomical and was generally given up after a
trial. Practically all firms, whether union or open shop, em-
ploy four men in a riveting gang. While the plan was being
tested, however, it caused trouble and furnished employers
with another instance of "union interference."
Complaints of employers that union stewards on jobs are a
1-Statement of Mr. Tench of the firm of Terry & Tench.
84
source of trouble and annoyance are probably greatly exag-
gerated. All the ironworkers' agreements provide that no
person not authorized by the employer, shall interfere with
workmen during working hours.
Mr. Ziesing says that in his last conference with union
representatives a demand was made that the steward be al-
lowed to pass judgment on the reasons for discharging a
workman. On that point, Mr. Ziesing probably voiced his
fears of something that might be possible, because the iron-
workers were unlikely to ask something of the American
Bridge Company in that respect, that they did not ask or ex-
pect of other employers.
None of the rules and regulations referred to apply on
open shop jobs, where the employer is free to do as he likes.
The skilled open shop workmen do not like to see laborers
doing work which they think bridgemen should do but they
are powerless to prevent it. Some of them complain that
their trade is being taken away by laborers, which indicates
that the desire to control the work is not confined to the union
ironworker. The desire is a common one, the difference is
that the union ironworker is in a position to gratify that de-
sire and the open shop man is not. A union card does not
greatly change human nature. The non-union man of today
may be the union man of tomorrow, or vice versa, but in mat-
ters affecting his own particular trade, he is apt to think
pretty much the same way all the time.
Th
In addition to the financial reasons for opposing union
rules and regulations, there is the natural human desire to do
as one pleases. Some employers resent the idea of being
forced to do anything, whether it costs them anything or
not. They feel that as they have to pay the fiddler, they
should have the right to dictate the tune.
If a city policeman ordered an erector to remove some ma-
terial from the street because it obstructed traffic, he would
comply without question. But if the walking delegate-the
policeman of the union-ordered him to remove it with skilled
85
men instead of laborers, he would resent such an interference
with his rights.
In the one case the removal would be ordered for the public
good; in the other for the good of the union ironworkers, who
are a part of the public. In both instances it would be an in-
terference with the right of an individual to do as he pleased.
CON
Because of these rules and restrictions, it is readily seen
why the iron erectors prefer the open shop. And by the same.
token it is easily seen why the union ironworkers oppose it.
The employer believes that the union rules interfere with
rights that are his by law and custom. The union ironworker
knows that the open shop rules restrict his opportunities to
earn bread and butter.
86
CHAPTER XIII.
WHY UNIONS FIGHT FOR CLOSED SHOP.
To understand why some unions will stake their very exist-
ence to obtain a closed shop agreement, so-called, while other
unions are ready and willing to accept open shop contracts,
it is necessary to understand something of the peculiar condi-
tions obtaining in the particular trade. It is necessary also
to understand the meaning of the term "open shop" for it
does not convey the same meaning in every instance.
The building trades unions, without exception, aim at hav-
ing union or closed shop agreements with their employers.
Whatever the actual wording of these agreements may be,
they mean that the employer on his part agrees to hire mem-
bers of the union, and the union on its part obligates itself
to supply all the competent workmen needed in the particular
line of work. Such agreements are not altogether one-sided,
because the employer is assured of having an adequate labor
supply at all times to meet his requirements.
These trade agreements mean that a committee represent-
ing the employers and a committee representing the workmen,
have met in joint conference and drafted certain rules fixing
wages and conditions of employment in that particular trade.
They mean that both sides recognize the principle of collec-
tive, rather than individual bargaining.
Agreements between the railroad companies and the vari-
ous railroad brotherhoods do not provide for the exclusive
employment of union men. The railroad brotherhoods do not
assume the responsibility of supplying all the competent men
required by the railroads. These agreements are commonly
known as "open shop" agreements, and the railroad brother-
hoods are quite willing that they should be so regarded. But
for all practical purposes they are as effective as the so-called
closed shop agreements in the building trades.
Street railway companies frequently make open shop agree-
87
1
ments with unions of their employes and the issue of the
closed shop is seldom raised. Certainly that issue would not
be regarded by the union officials as a sufficient cause for a
strike, if it did not involve the question of discrimination
against union men. If a street railway company was willing
to make a contract with its employees and show no discrimina-
tion as between union and non-union men, such a contract
would be acceptable to the union.
It is difficult for some to understand why one union will
accept an open shop agreement while another will not. Is the
building trades workman differently constituted from the lo-
comotive engineer or the street car motorman? Of course,
he is not, but he is forced to adopt different tactics to obtain
the same results, due to the different conditions in his trade.
Mr. Drew, Commissioner of the National Erectors' Asso-
ciation, says that the structural ironworkers never accepted
the open shop principle in good faith, and like hundreds of
others, he points to the railroad brotherhoods as conspicuous
examples of unions that have accepted the open shop and pros-
pered under the system.
The conditions surrounding the railroad trainman and the
building trades workman are entirely different. It has been
said that the contracts between the railroad companies and
the brotherhoods are for all practical purposes union agree-
ments, as effective as if they were closed shop contracts. The
reason is this: The representatives of the railroads meet in
conference with the representatives of the brotherhoods and
agree on certain schedules of wages and hours for the differ-
ent classes of men in train service.
Those schedules apply alike to union and non-union men
in the different classes. There is no individual bargaining,
or no individual cutting of wages once the schedules have
been adopted. The adoption of the schedule has at once elimi-
nated the competition of the non-union man. The union men,
in other words, have set the standards of employment, which
is all that a building trades union does when it makes a closed
shop contract.
-
88
If the employer in the building trades made an open shop
agreement, the union men would not be protected as are the
railroad employees from the competition of the non-union man.
The contractor might employ union men on one job and non-
union men, at a lower rate of pay on another job. Or he
might, as he has done in the past, employ union and non-union
men on the same job at different rates of pay and in this way
break down standards, or prevent them from being estab-
lished. The opportunities for doing so, in a trade where men
are being constantly employed and discharged, are too many,
and the building trades workman insists that the competition
of the non-union man be eliminated by specific agreement.
It might be possible, of course, for a building contractor
to agree to pay certain wages under an open shop agreement,
but if he did that the main incentive for desiring an open
shop agreement would be removed. He might as well sign a
closed shop agreement and that is what he does. Besides
trade union agreements are much like civil laws. Their en-
forcement depends upon the force of opinion behind them. It
is well known that a law which is obnoxious to a majority of
the people is non-enforceable. An open shop agreement in
the building trades would be worthless in practice, no mat-
ter how well it may sound in theory. A closed shop agree-
ment is enforceable only because of the organized strength of
the workmen behind it.
-
A closed shop agreement does not mean that the building
contractor or his foreman asks a workman on being hired
whether he is a member of the union. He hires him and the
union steward on the job sees to it that he has a union card,
or that he makes application to join. The picture, sometimes
painted, of the employer with tears in his eyes telling a work-
man that he would like to employ him, but cannot do so be-
cause he is not a member of the union, is purely fanciful.
The main purpose of the closed shop agreement in the build-
ing trades is to give the union power to control conditions, to
establish and maintain recognized standards. The union can-
89
not control conditions in the trade, unless it controls the men
engaged in that trade.
But there is another reason. The high wages and short
workday in the building trades, have been brought about by
organized effort. That will not be disputed. The union man
therefore does not think that the non-union man, who has not
contributed either money or work to improve conditions,
should reap a reward that he does not deserve. The good
conditions have been brought about in spite of the non-union
man. Usually the non-union man has done his best to retard
every advance that has been made. In the opinion of the union
man his non-union competitor is not entitled to much consider-
ation. The union man does not feel that he is treating his non-
union competitor unfairly when he compels him to either join
the union and contribute his share to its support, or get off
the union job.
mga
It may be said that the same line of reasoning applies to
the non-union railroad employee. It does, but the railroad
brotherhoods do not have to rely on closed shop agreements
to build up and retain their membership. There are other
conditions in connection with railroad work that are as im-
pelling as the closed shop agreement in the building trades.
There are three good reasons why the railroad brother-
hoods can afford to accept open shop agreements and prosper
under them: The first reason has already been alluded to. It
is that once the schedule of wages and hours has been adopted
it applies to every employee in that line of service and there
is no danger of the non-union man breaking down the estab-
lished standard.
Another reason why the railroad brotherhoods grow in
strength and influence without the aid of a closed shop agree-
ment is found in the strict rules of discipline maintained by
the railroads. An employe in railroad train service is sus-
pended or discharged for a slight infraction of the rules. If
he is a member of a brotherhood, he can appeal to a commit-
tee and if he has been unfairly treated, the brotherhood will
insist on his reinstatement. If he is not a member he has to
90
fight his own battle and the chances of his reinstatement are
slim. The stricter the rules, the more incentive there is for
employees joining the brotherhoods for their protection.
The third reason is the insurance features of the railroad
brotherhoods. The occupation is a hazardous one and acci-
dents are numerous. The brotherhoods provide insurance for
their members at a much lower rate than they could obtain
in any other way.
Those factors explain why the railroad brotherhoods do not
have to rely on closed shop agreements. The employees bar-
gain collectively under the open shop plan and are given pro-
tection by the brotherhoods, both with respect to security
in their jobs and insurance against accidents.
—
There is another factor to be considered and that is the atti-
tude of the employers. Although the railroad brotherhoods
are frequently pointed out as examples of successful open
shop unions, the railroad company is not a fair example of
the open shop employer. All the large railroad systems in
the country, with one or two exceptions, recognize the prin-
ciple of collective bargaining and meet representative com-
mittees of their employers to discuss working conditions.
This is not the policy of the average open shop employer.
The open shop employer in the structural iron industry, in
the metal trades and elsewhere, does not recognize the prin-
ciple of collective bargaining. Assuming that the open shop is
in reality open, that is, that union men can find employment
there without discrimination, such union men have no voice
in making the conditions of employment. The wages and
hours are fixed by the employer, so that the shop is to all in-
tents and purposes non-union. The fact that some members
of a union may be employed in that shop does not alter the
situation in the slightest degree. If men cannot have a voice
in fixing conditions of employment or bargain collectively
for the sale of their labor power, they might just as well not be
members of a union. Men join unions mainly for practical
If the union cannot help them in a practical way
they will not join it.
reasons.
91
Open shop advocates who point to the relations between
railroad companies and the various railroad brotherhoods to
prove their contention, often fail to take the attitude of the
railroad companies into consideration. If the railroad broth-
erhoods are to be contrasted with the unions in the building
trades, or in the metal trades, the railroad companies should
be contrasted with the employers in those trades.
Recognition of the union is not an issue among the railroad
companies. The right of the brotherhoods to legislate for all
the employees in their particular line of service, is fully rec-
ognized by the companies. The railroad companies, there-
fore, are not open shop employers in the sense that the mem-
bers of the National Erectors' Association and the Metal
Trades Association are. Those associations do not recognize
the right of their employees to bargain collectively. The
employees are not permitted to set up the standards for all
men engaged in their particular line of work.
On the contrary, these employers refuse to recognize the
union in any way. They may employ a union man, in the same
way that they might employ a Catholic or a Methodist, but
such employment would have no significance. That is the
reason why union men commonly refer to the so-called open
shop as a "non-union" shop, or as a shop that is "closed"
to union men.
92
CHAPTER XIV.
BUILDING TRADES UNIONS AND RESTRICTION OF OUTPUT.
The relative efficiency of open shop and union workmen has
been much discussed and many statements have been made on
both sides of the question that are exaggerated and mislead-
ing.
It is generally conceded in the building trades, that the best
workmen are members of the union in their respective crafts.
Even the open shop employers concede that as a general state-
ment. They say, however, that through the power of the
union, the workmen restrict output, so that while the union
man, as an individual, may be capable of doing more efficient
work than the non-union man, he frequently proves, as a mat-
ter of fact less efficient.
There is undoubtedly a tendency among members of some
unions in the building industry to restrict output under cer-
tain conditions. This has been shown in the Eleventh Special
Report of the United States Commissioner of Labor (p. 274),
the reasons given being the seasonal character of the work
and the idea that by going easy the job will last longer.
-
But if this tendency is admitted, it does not necessarily fol-
low that it is confined to union men. It is much less a ques-
tion of union rules than it is one of trade conditions at the
time. During a season of abnormal activity, when there is a
scarcity of men in a particular trade, the output naturally will
be somewhat less than in a season of business depression when
there are many idle men in the trade. This is equally true
on a union or on an open shop job, for the tendency to take
things easier when there is a feeling of security in the job,
is a human rather than a union one.
In a season of industrial depression, no rules which a union
might make are strong enough to prevent the individual work-
man putting forth his best efforts to hold his job. The com-
petition of the idle man on the street is stronger than any
union rule and as the seasons in which there is a scarcity of
.
93
labor, are exceedingly rare in the building industry, the ques-
tion of restriction of output is not a serious one. It is, of
course, more apparent in some trades than in others, depend-
ent on the supply of labor in the particular trade.
In the structural iron trade, in which about 45 per cent
of the work is being done under open shop conditions, the
union cannot possibly have a monopoly on the labor supply,
so that the opportunity to restrict output is limited, even if
the inclination to do so is admitted.
If one listens to the conversation among union ironworkers,
as they congregeate around their meeting halls, or in saloons
where they gather, he will hear something like this:
"We certainly are making things hum on our job. Stuck
up a whole story today. Never saw anything like it.”
"Yes, you damned fools and two weeks from now you will
be out of a job and wondering how it happened.'
Here we have in a snatch of an actual conversation the
whole story. There was no restriction of output. On the
contrary the job was going too fast to last. The fear of unem-
ployment when the job was finished, which is at the bottom of
restriction of output in the building trades, was present, but
less ominous than the fear of immediate discharge. If the
ironworkers on the job did not "stick up a story a day," the
assumption is that the job would not last two days for them.
If they did "stick up a story a day," the job would last until
it was finished, in a few days or a few weeks as the case might
be.
Interviews with members of some large structural iron
firms which recently turned from the union to the open shop,
showed that there is little foundation for the claim that union
men are less efficient than open shop men. On the contrary,
those employers said that if there was any difference the ad-
vantage lay with the union men. They said the best open shop
men they have were former members of the union.
One employer said that when he employed union men ex-
clusively, he had occasionally observed a tendency on the part
94
of a riveting gang to "go a little easy." When he saw such
a tendency, he said, that gang was promptly discharged and
there would be no more "soldiering" on that particular job.
This confirms the statement that the competition for jobs usu-
ally is strong enough in the structural iron trade to check any
tendency to restrict output.
S
In some of the literature issued by Mr. Drew, Commissioner
of the National Erectors' Association, statements have ap-
peared that a union gang of riveters have driven in a day
about one-third the numbers of rivets driven by an open shop
gang. Mr. Drew is not an ironworker. He is a lawyer and
it is his business to present his case in the most favorable
light he can.
But if such statements are accepted at their full face value,
they do not prove the greater efficiency of the open shop gang.
Any one with practical knowledge of a trade understands how
conditions may vary on different jobs, or even on the same
job.
To make a comparison between the number of rivets driven
in a day on buckle plate on a bridge girder, with the number
driven in column splices on a building would be ridiculous.
An open shop gang driving rivets in buckle plate on a bridge
girder might easily drive 400 rivets a day and not be as effi-
cient as a gang which drove 150 on column splices on a build-
ing. There is the difficulty of getting at the work, the raising
and lowering of scaffolds and a dozen other conditions, which
the practical ironworker, whether a journeyman or an em-
ployer, understands.
K
A
On the same building the conditions vary so much that it
might be quite possible for an open shop gang to make a much
better showing than a union gang in the matter of driving riv-
ets. A foreman who was anxious to have an open shop gang
make a better showing, could easily arrange it so that they
would. If he was a union foreman, the reverse would prob-
ably be the case and the union men would show to greater ad-
vantage.
To make comparisons that would mean anything, the condi-
95
tions under which the work was performed would have to be
the same. The practical employer or foreman knows what a
fair day's work is, and the bridgeman who does not do a fair
amount of work, will not last long on any union job.
It is not the practice among the ironworkers, or other unions
in the building trades to take up the cause of a discharged
workman. The foreman on a job may discharge a man if he
does not like the color of his hair and the union will not ques-
tion such a discharge. All agreements between the iron-
workers and their employers, provide that the employer or his
representative may discharge any workman as he sees fit.
A general rule among building trades unions, is that the em-
ployer may discharge a workman at any time, provided al-
ways that he hires another union man to fill the vacancy.
Should a workman be discharged for laziness or incompe-
tency and appeal to his union, he would receive little sym-
pathy among his fellows. It is a fact that some building.
trades unions have disciplined members for appearing on a
job in an intoxicated condition which led to their discharge.
Generally speaking, it is not true that a building trades union
will compel an employer, through the threat of a strike, to
keep on a building any workman whom he may desire to dis-
charge.
If it is true that the employer in the structural iron trade is
free to discharge workmen as he sees fit without interference
on the part of the union, it follows that there can be no serious
restriction of output, unless as stated, there is unusual activ-
ity in the trade and competent men are scarce. Such periods
of unusual activity are rare and when they occur the open
shop man is quite as apt to "ca canny" as is the union man.
There is another factor to be considered in connection with
the alleged restriction of output and that is the "pacemaker.
The "pacemaker" is less common, perhaps, among the build-
ing trades than in the shop or factory, where the opportunities
for setting a pace are greater. But he is not unknown in
the building trades. He is found in all the unions and is the
cause of the adoption of rules prohibiting "rushing."
99
96
The "pacemaker" is an exceptionally fast workman, who
frequently receives a few cents an hour more than the union
scale. Even when he does not receive extra pay for setting
a pace for others to follow, he performs more work than the
average man, with less physical exertion to himself. He is
sometimes described by his fellows as "a natural born me-
chanic who can make every move count."
In adopting rules against "rushing" as
rushing" as some building
trades unions have done,¹ although they are a dead letter in
dull seasons, it is not so much the purpose of such rules to
restrict the activities of the exceptional man, as it is to pro-
tect the average man who cannot maintain the pace, no matter
how he may try.
The "rusher" might be allowed to "work his head off"
were it not for the fact that one man after another is dis-
charged, because he cannot keep up to the pace. If the fore-
man would recognize that the "rusher" is an exceptional man
and not discharge other men because they are only average,
there would be no trouble.
But that is not what the foreman has the "rusher" for.
He is there to urge others on by his example, and when the
foreman continually refers to the amount of work the "rush-
er" is doing, the other workmen come to regard him as a com-
mon enemy. He is warned to "let up on it" and probably
does. The union then is blamed for restricting output. But
the foreman is not without blame in the matter also. He
brought about the restriction by discharging men who were
not able to keep up the pace set by the "rusher."
It is common for an employer to advance a plea that a
graded scale of wages would solve the problem, as then men
would be paid "what they were worth." It sounds plausi-
ble, but it does not work in practice in the building trades.
The difficulty about the plan is, who is to determine what a
man is worth? The workman is apt to have a very different
idea of his worth to that of his employer.
1-Eleventh Special Report, U. S. Commissioner of Labor, p. 272.
97
Some years ago the union lathers in Chicago adopted a
graded scale. Three classes of workmen were created, each
with a different wage scale. In a dull season they all became
third class workmen and in a busy season they were all first
class. The net result was a reduction in wages in dull sea-
sons. The plan was discarded and a uniform minimum scale
adopted.
A bonus over the minimum scale has been tried in some
trades, but that would not be practicable in the building trades
where the work is seasonal. Every man would expect to re-
ceive the bonus in busy seasons and no one would re-
ceive it in dull seasons. The work of the building mechanic
cannot be apportioned with a degree of accuracy that is possi-
ble in a shop or factory. In a shop or factory, where the work
is minutely sub-divided, hundreds of workers may be perform-
ing exactly similar operations, under exactly similar condi-
tions.
In the building trades the facilities for work vary and the
operations are seldom exactly the same. It is impossible,
therefore, to standardize a day's work as may be done in the
shop or factory. The minimum wage scale, adopted by the
unions and the employers, appears to be the most practical
and equitable method of adjusting wages.
The minimum scale does not reduce all workmen to a "dead
level" as is so often asserted. It is true that it protects the
average man when he is employed. But in dull seasons it will
invariably be found that the less efficient men are out of work.
A lower wage scale for the less efficient would not create more
work and furnish them employment. It would, however, pull
down the wages of the more efficient, who would still continue
to do the work, but at a lower rate of pay.
If the unions did not set a minimum scale of wages, the
minimum would be set by the necessity of the idle man on the
street and standards of living would be lowered. Can society
afford to countenance or encourage such a condition? The
"dead level" which the minimum scale is sometimes charged
with creating is in reality a "living level" which assures the
98
average, or the less efficient workman, a living wage when he
is employed. Abolish it and establish a standard set by the
necessities of the idle man on the street, and the workers
would be reduced to what might in more truth be termed a
"dead level."
99
CHAPTER XV.
SPIES IN THE IRONWORKERS' UNION.
The employment of spies in labor unions is a common prac-
tice, especially with large corporations. Espionage is closely
related to violence. Sometimes it is the direct cause of vio-
lence and where that cannot be charged, it often is an indirect
cause.
If the secret agents of employers, working as members of
labor unions, do not always instigate acts of violence, they
frequently encourage them. If they did not they would not
be performing the duties for which they are paid, for they are
hired on the theory that labor organizations are criminal in
character.
If they find that labor unions are not criminal organizations
and that acts of lawlessness never are discussed in union meet-
ings, they have nothing to report to those employing them.
If they do not report matters which the detective agencies
employing them can carry to corporations to frighten them, it
follows that they cannot last long as spies, or "operatives”
as they are professionally known.
The very nature of the business, therefore, makes it vir-
tually necessary for the spy to do either of two things. Either
he must make reports that are false, in which case discovery
would be inevitable sooner or later, or he must create a basis
on which to furnish truthful reports. The latter plan is the
better suited to his purposes, and he governs himself accord-
ingly.
Whether the particular act of lawlessness he has in mind is
an attack on non-union workmen, or the destruction of prop-
erty, he will not find it impossible in any union, at least in the
building trades, to find some who are ready to listen to him.
Į
Men who engage in this kind of work are not troubled with
conscientious scruples. They should not be confused with real
detectives, whose business it is to prevent the commission of
100
crime, or bring the perpetrators to justice. Law and order
are essential to the well-being of any community and every
honest citizen believes in their enforcement.
But the union spy is not in business to protect the commu-
nity. He has little respect for law, civil or moral. Men of
character do not engage in such work and it follows that the
men who do are, as a rule, devoid of principle and ready to go
to almost any extreme to please those who employ them.
At the bottom of the whole system of espionage in labor
unions, is the one word, GRAFT. The individual operative
grafts on the detective agency employing him and the agency
grafts on the corporation which pays the bills. In neither case
is there honest value received for the money that is paid. The
system is an incentive to the commission of crime.
In the structural ironworkers' organization, the spy system
flourished for a number of years. Officials of the American
Bridge Company and of the National Erectors' Association
say the system has been discontinued, at least so far as the
employment of private detective agencies are concerned. The
Erectors' Association still employs some detectives directly,
but they are openly known as such and, of course, are not
members of the union.
In the early years of the open shop fight, Mr. Drew of the
Erectors' Association says he engaged the Thiel Detective
Agency, the Corporations' Auxiliary Company and some oth-
ers. Mr. Drew "supposes" that these agencies placed their
men in the different local unions of ironworkers. The acts of
violence that were being committed at the time, he thinks,
warranted the employment of such spies.
How far some of these spies were themselves responsible
for acts of violence, is difficult to determine, because the spies
were unknown except in a very few instances. Where they
were known they were expelled from the union, after being
given a trial. One man named Berry was expelled from the
New York local in 1908 and is now said to be the active head
of an independent union of ironworkers in St. Louis. Another
man named Darling was expelled from the Hartford, Conn.,
101
local in 1910. A man named Blake was admitted to the Phila-
delphia local, but disappeared when he was suspected of being
a spy.
In the spring of 1906, a man named Guthrie was admitted to
the New Jersey local. A short time afterward, with two other
members of the union he was arrested carrying dynamite into
a building being erected by Post & McCord at Twenty-second
street and Second avenue in New York City. He was re-
leased on bonds, said to have been furnished by a member of
the Iron League Employers' Association. The other men
pleaded guilty and were sent to prison. Guthrie disappeared.
The suspicion among the union ironworkers at the time was
that Guthrie was a spy, who planned the explosion and in-
formed his employers when the attempt was to be made, so
that the arrests followed. Of course, he found willing accom-
plices, or it would not have been possible for him to go as
far with the plan as he did. But if he suggested it, as charged
by the union officers, he was more guilty than the willing tools
who assisted him in his plans.
While the identity of the spies became known in the unions
in only rare instances, suspicion pervaded every local. Dozens
of men were suspected although sufficient evidence against
them could not be found to warrant bringing them to trial.
The effect was utterly demoralizing on the unions. Honest
men were deterred from expressing their views on questions
of policy, because of the fear that they might be considered
agents of the employers. Men mistrusted each other, as they
did their officers. There is nothing quite as repugnant to the
honest union man as the idea of being thought a spy.
Mr. Ryan had a reputation among his fellows of being in-
corruptible. When he went to Pittsburgh, after the last con-
ference held with officials of the American Bridge Company,
and urged the local to waive its claim to the erection of the
McKeesport tube mill so that a settlement could be reached, it
can be readily understood how he felt when he was accused
of trying to "sell out." Had he taken advantage of his au-
thority and made a settlement in spite of the Pittsburgh local
J
102
which he might have done, he would have saved himself and
the organization many subsequent troubles, but he might
never have been able to overcome the suspicion that he had
"sold out." And the American Bridge Company was to a
large extent responsible for creating that feeling of suspicion
in the minds of the union ironworkers.
In 1903, when Mr. Buchanan was president of the ironwork-
ers' organization, he had occasion to see something of the es-
pionage system. During the national strike in March of that
year, Mr. Buchanan had no fewer than eight of these spies on
his staff at one time. Eight men, drawing pay from the Amer-
ican Bridge Company and other iron erectors, secretly were
reporting to Mr. Buchanan. In fact, he frequently wrote the
reports which they sent to their employers.
If there were eight at one time who were "double-crossing"
their employers, it is reasonable to assume that there were
a number who were not. It gives some idea of the extent of
the system even at that time, when the employers and the
unions were working under contractual relations.
The American Bridge Company at that time and after-
ward, maintained an agency in the Frick Building in Pitts-
burgh under the charge of a man named Thomas H. Morgan.
Mr. Buchanan in 1903 bribed a clerk in Mr. Morgan's office
and obtained a list of members of the union who were sup-
posed to be on the payroll of the company as secret spies.
The list contained twenty-five or more names, among them
being the names of some prominent officers of local unions.
There were names of men on the list of whom Mr. Buchanan
was suspicious but there also were a few names of men in
whom he had the utmost confidence. That fact made him at-
tach little importance to the list. He came to the conclusion
that Mr. Morgan was carrying a padded payroll, or that the
bribed clerk had given him a fictitious list.
-
That union spies were active in the affairs of the ironwork-
ers' organization at that period, there appears little doubt.
It appeared to be the business of Mr. Morgan and other agents
not only to keep watch on union affairs, but to endeavor to
103
control union elections. That money was furnished by em-
ployers to control delegates to the international convention
in Kansas City in 1903, is commonly believed among union
ironworkers.
It was at the Kansas City convention that Mr. Buchanan
waged a fight against Sam Parks of New York and won by
a close margin. In New York stories are told of the amount
of money spent among delegates to bring about Mr. Buchan-
an's re-election. In Pittsburgh and other cities, stories are
told of the money spent to defeat Mr. Buchanan.
The first thought that comes on hearing such stories eleven
years later is that they are untrue. It would not appear rea-
sonable that employers were using money to defeat Mr. Bu-
chanan and also to re-elect him.
C
Careful study of the peculiar conditions existing in the
trade at that time, however, tends to confirm the stories. It is
quite probable that money was used to influence votes both
for and against Mr. Buchanan.
In New York the employers were making a desperate fight
against Sam Parks. The ironworkers were locked out for
having rejected the Arbitration Plan of the Building Trades'
Employers' Association. A new independent union had been
formed and Mr. Buchanan favored the union as a means
through which to eliminate Parks and the methods for which
he stood. It is not only possible, but highly probable that the
New York employers were willing to pay for the elimination
of Parkism. This would explain why some delegates who at-
tended that convention from the Parks faction, state posi-
tively that money was used to influence votes for Mr. Buchan-
an. It does not follow that Mr. Buchanan knew anything
about it.
On the other side of the question stands the fact that Mr.
Buchanan had that year conducted a successful fight against
the American Bridge Company and the Erectors' Association
and had forced them into signing a national agreement. It is
not unreasonable therefore, to suppose that they might have
preferred to see another man at the head of the organization.
104
Mr. Morgan of Pittsburgh is credited with having been the
disbursing agent on that side.
It is of little importance now how the money was used in
that convention. It is mentioned to show that employers were
greatly interested in the control of the ironworkers' organiza-
tion, which was no more a part of their business than it would
have been the business of the union ironworkers to try and
control an election in the National Erectors' Association.
It was all a part of the espionage system to control the
union and destroy its effectiveness. It is probable that the
extent of this attempted control was greatly exaggerated in
the minds of the union ironworkers. The effect on their
minds would have been the same whether there actually were
spies in every local union or whether they only suspected it.
It aroused in them a feeling of bitter antagonism against the
firms opposing them, that made reprisals natural, if not in-
evitable. The ironworkers felt that the existence of their
union was being threatened from without and within. That
did not justify the resort to physical violence and the destruc-
tion of property which marked the fight against the open shop,
but it suggests an explanation for the attitude of mind which
made such acts possible.
In a report to the Philadelphia convention in 1905 Mr. Bu-
chanan said on the subject of spies in the union:
"Sadly enough I find in many of our affiliated locals some
persons who are traitors to their cause. These people, how-
ever, are generally of the same type and are easily detected
by those who use discrimination and judgment. They are
people who take the side of the employer in nearly every case
and when occasion demands, they charge dishonesty to those
who support efforts to win, whether they are members of the
rank and file, the local officers or the national officers.
"You must watch these people if you would, not that they
get the upper hand. They are regular in their attendance at
the meetings; they are prompt to take the floor in defense of
their masters; they talk louder and longer than any one else.
They do their work in the meetings; they talk it upon the jobs,
105
before the labor union convenes, after some of the members
have gone home and by sheer physical force even drive per-
sons to support their claim.
"You must watch these people if you would not that they
be thrown out; their advice should not be taken. 'A house
divided against itself cannot stand,' and if these people are
allowed to have their way, you as a labor organization might
as well disband. It cannot win a fight. It cannot make good
the promises it makes its membership and it is a useless thing,
not because the employers are too strong, but because the
stealthy, scheming traitors to the cause are too numerous and
too successful."'1
It is evident that the men Mr. Buchanan had in mind were
those who openly espoused the cause of the employers and
sought to discredit the local and national officers. Such men,
however, are not the most dangerous in a union. The spy
who is on the payroll of a detective agency, usually is loud
in his denunciation of the employers. He aims at being among
the most radical, so that he may be elected to some important
office. If he openly sided with the employers he would not
be apt to get elected. So he pursues a different line of policy
for the purpose of getting elected and at the same time ward-
ing off suspicion as to his real purpose. Once elected to an
important position he is much more valuable to his employer
and can better betray the men he was elected to represent.
In the Dynamite Conspiracy trials in Indianapolis, it was
shown by testimony that H. S. Hockin, a member of the Execu-
tive Board of the International Association of Bridge and
Structural Ironworkers, and the man who for three years di-
rected the dynamite campaign in the destruction of bridges
and buildings, was keeping L. L. Jewel, erecting manager for
the McClintic-Marshall Construction Company, and later De-
tective Burns, informed of the movements of the dynamiters.
Had he not occupied a position of influence in the organization,
that would not have been possible.
1-Convention Report, Bridgemen's Magazine, October 1905.
M
106
The evidence in the trial does not show that Hockin became
"conscience-stricken" until July, 1910, after he had been found
out grafting on Ortie McManigal, by "holding out" from $50
to $75 on each job dynamited by the latter. This had been
going on for about three years before the discovery was made.
Within two weeks after Hockin's dishonesty was found out,
he went to Mr. Jewell and informed him about the work of
destruction.¹
1
Two months later, in September, 1910, Hockin informed
Detective Raymond Burns of the identity of McManigal and
J. B. McNamara.
While there is nothing in the testimony to show that Hockin
had any connection with the employers or detectives until
the summer of 1910, there is a strong suspicion in the minds
of some union officials that he was a spy from the first and
succeeded in getting elected on the Executive Board to better
enable him to carry on the work of destruction.
In opposition to this theory is the fact that Hockin directed
the work of dynamiting for three years without the perpe-
trators being discovered. Had he been in the employ of the
erectors during that time, it would appear unlikely that the
campaign of destruction could have been carried on success-
fully so long.
The facts in the case, however, are that McManigal and J. B.
McNamara caused some ten explosions after their identity
was known to Detective Burns and during the time they were
being "shadowed." From that it does not appear that it al-
ways is the work of detectives to prevent the commission of
crime.
-
1-Testimony of Mr. Jewell p. 2675-2690, Vol. 3 Transcript of Record, U. S.
Circuit Court of Appeals.
107
CHAPTER XVI.
LABOR VIOLENCE AND THE PUBLIC ATTITUDE.
No phase of the industrial problem attracts quite as much
public attention as a resort to physical force during strikes
and lockouts. There is more misrepresentation and down-
right hypocrisy in connection with violence in industrial dis-
putes, than there is with any other phase of this tremendously
human problem.
It is natural that the subject of violence should attract more
public attention than any other phase of an industrial dispute,
although it is only incidental. Fundamental questions like
the right to bargain collectively; the right to receive a fair
living wage; the right to healthful sanitary conditions; the
right to have some leisure time for rest and recreation, are all
vitally important to the workers engaged in a strike, but they
fail to attract the attention of those not directly interesed.
That indefinite factor, known as the public, is never greatly
interested in a strike or industrial war, unless it directly feels
the pressure. If the strike affects the supply of some article
of daily consumption, or inconveniences the public with re-
spect to food, fuel or transportation, then the public takes an
interest in the struggle.
Even in such cases, the chief interest of the public is to have
peace; peace at any price, so that it may not be inconvenienced.
The public has a rather smug conscience and is less inter-
ested in seeing that justice is done in a labor dispute, than that
it may have its daily wants and comforts supplied without
trouble or inconvenience.
When a strike is of such proportions as to affect the con-
venience of the public, or is attended with a great deal of vio-
lence, the public may then begin to take sides with the actual
participants in the struggle. In such cases the result usually
is blind partisanship, without regard to the merits of the con-
troversy.
There can not be an educated public opinion without knowl-
108
edge of the exact facts and it is impossible for the public, as
such, to obtain the necessary first hand information. It is sel-
dom that an official body makes a complete investigation of an
industrial conflict and publishes its findings for the guidance
of the public, at a time when such findings would be of value.
If public opinion, which has proved a powerful influence in
other directions, is to be used to further justice in indus-
trial disputes, some machinery should be created to make that
public opinion an educated one. If public opinion is not
formed on a knowledge of the facts, it is worse than useless,
because it tends only to stir up class prejudice and intensify
the struggle.
Acts of violence, committed during strikes, have greater
influence on public opinion than the fundamental issues. As
these acts of violence, at least the spectacular ones that reach
the eyes and ears of the public, are usually committed by the
strikers and their active sympathizers, it follows that public
opinion, based on such acts, is adverse to the strikers.
But it may happen, and frequently does, that the employer
is guilty of the first act of violence. It is a form of violence
that is within the written law; but violence, nevertheless.
The violence committed by the strikers usually is a violation
of the written law, consequently it is condemned and the par-
ticipants punished. The violence committed by the employer,
which is not a violation of the written law, is overlooked, or
never thought of by the public, because attention has not been
directed toward it.
It is puerile to contend that force and violence are not ac-
companiments of strikes and lockouts. In the very nature of
things they must be. A strike, or lockout, is simply a method
of applying force to attain a certain desired result. It can-
not be anything else. In the case of a strike, the workers
withdraw their labor power to force an employer to grant
certain demands. In a lockout the employer closes his factory
to force the employees to accept certain conditions which he
desires to impose. It is force either way it is looked at.
In shutting down a factory in order to bring about certain
109
conditions which he desires, an employer may be guilty of
using the most ruthless kind of force. He is within his rights
under the written law, consequently he feels justified in hold-
ing up his head among his fellows and denouncing acts of vio-
lence committed by strikers.
But he is himself guilty of using force. He uses the weap-
ons of hunger and want; thus making helpless women and
children-non-participants in the struggle-suffer, so that he
may attain his desired ends.
When the door of the factory closes and the employees are
paid the wages due them, the employer takes the position
that his former workers have no further interest in his fac-
tory. The law says he is right in that position. He is not,
therefore, violating any written law.
The doors of the factory open a week later and the employer
announces that any man or woman, willing to accept the condi-
tions of employment which he has established, may find work
in that factory as long as there are positions to be filled. The
employer is again within his rights under the law. There is
no incentive for him to violate the written law, because the law
agrees with him in what he desires to do.
But the workers who were locked out because they refused
to accept the conditions imposed, or because they demanded
improved conditions, take quite a different view of the situa-
tion. They feel they have a property right in the jobs they
formerly held. That the law holds they have no such right,
and that anyone who is willing to accept the conditions, shall
have a right to fill the jobs, without fear of molestation, does
not alter the situation in the minds of the workers. They
look upon the new employees as enemies, who are taking the
bread and butter out of their mouths and the mouths of their
families.
They cannot see the justice of the law. It is quite plainly
on the side of the employer, at least in the particular instance
in which they are vitally interested. They refuse to accept
the dictum of the law and of the employer, that they no longer
have any claim on their former jobs. They want the jobs,
110
which they think are theirs. In order that they may get the
jobs, it is necessary to prevent others from taking them. They
cannot go to the employer and ask him not to fill their old
positions. He has already made himself perfectly clear on that
point.
ཟླ
What is the natural thing for the strikers to do? Prevent
new employes from taking the jobs in that factory, of course.
If that can be done by peaceful methods, so much the better.
If it cannot, then it must be done by violent methods. The
important thing is that it be done. That is the way the work-
ers view the situation, the law to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.
,
The factory is picketed. The courts have held that “peace-
ful picketing" is not unlawful. It may be lawful, but it is
entirely useless and ineffective. It is not necessary for the
courts to restrain "peaceful picketing" although they some-
times have done it. The only purpose in picketing a factory
is to prevent certain workers taking the places vacated by
certain other workers. The theory of "peaceful picketing"
is, that the workers seeking employment in that particular
factory, will voluntarily turn away when they are told that a
strike or lockout is in progress.
In actual practice they do nothing of the kind, or only in
rare instances. The pickets know that; so do the employers.
It is not necessary that the pickets actually assault the em-
ployees who desire to enter the factory. If the pickets as-
semble in sufficient numbers, it is possible to intimidate those
seeking employment, without actually assaulting them. But it
is the fear of possible assault that brings results; not moral
suasion. The "moral suasion" argument is good in the court-
room or on the public platform, but around the factory it
counts for practically nothing. Every one with practical ex-
perience of conditions knows that. It is better to meet the
facts squarely than to dodge them by subterfuge and hypoc-
risy.
In his testimony before the United States Commission on
Industrial Relations, at a public hearing in New York, Vin-
111
cent St. John, secretary of the Industrial Workers of the
World, said that he believed in violence, if it was necessary
to win. He said that if the destruction of property seemed
necessary to bring results, then he believed in the destruction
of property.
In defense of his views he said the employers did not hesi-
tate to destroy the property of the workers, which is their
labor power, by forcing them into mills and factories at an
early age; by depriving them of the chances to attain an edu-
cation; by working them long hours so that their health and
efficiency became impaired and their labor power, which is
their property, destroyed.
The views of Mr. St. John are extreme and most labor lead-
ers will openly repudiate them. But there is no denying
the fact that Mr. St. John gave public expression to views
that are privately entertained by tens of thousands. It is
results that the workers are striving for and the history of
the labor movement proves that they have been compelled to
fight for every important improvement in conditions which
they now enjoy.
It is true that fighting does not necessarily mean resort to
physical violence. The workers have made marked progress
through legislation, but in that field, as in the industrial field,
they have had to meet and overcome the same determined op-
position.
The railroads of the country for years fought against the
introduction of automatic couplers and other safety devices
intended to protect the lives and limbs of the workers. Em-
ployers generally have fought against every effort to reduce
hours of labor by legislation. They have opposed measures
intended to protect health and life in mines, mills and fac-
tories.
There are some conditions, however, that cannot be im-
proved by legislative enactment. The question of physical
violence and violation of law, is therefore largely one of local
conditions. As the laws are mainly designed to protect prop-
erty rights, with little regard for human rights, it is inevita-
112
ble that in fighting for the latter, the law will at times be vio-
lated.
In the case of the lockout in the factory referred to, it might
be possible for the workers to keep strictly within the law.
They might submit to the conditions which the employer im-
posed, or they might quietly go about their business and find
employment elsewhere, if they could. That is what the em-
ployer and what the law says they must do. But it is not
human nature to do it. It is not the way of progress. Had
the workers always taken the course which the letter of the
law requires them to take, they would, in all probability still
be working twelve or fourteen hours a day.
There are different forms in which force may be applied. It
may be applied without any violation of the written law.
The form of application depends on the peculiar conditions in
the situation and the training and environment of the person
applying the force.
If it is a banker, business or professional man, who seeks
to obtain an advantage over a competitor, he will resort to
methods that are not definitely prescribed by law. He may
impair the credit of his competitor so that he cannot borrow
capital necessary in his business. He may undersell him in
the market and force him to the wall. He may adopt a dozen
different methods to attain his end.
If it is a hodcarrier, or a structural ironworker who is
applying the force, the method used will be entirely different.
The hodcarrier sees a competitor who is underselling him and
his first natural impulse is to "punch the head" of that
competitor. He follows the impulse, too, if there is no police-
man in sight. The finesse of the professional man is unknown
to the hodcarrier. He does the thing that is natural for a man
of his training to do to obtain the advantage he desires.
The underlying motive of the hodcarrier, however, is the
same as that of the professional man. He is aiming to advance
his material interests and he takes what seems to him the most
direct route to that end.
So it runs through our whole business and social life. Force
113
is everywhere apparent, differing only in degree and method
of application. The nature of the force is determined by
the immediate environment of the person applying it. It
may be legitimate, that is, within the written law, or it may
be otherwise according to circumstances. But it is there.
Force always has been used when it seemed necessary to
attain the object sought. A baby will kick and scratch to
obtain possession of a prized toy. It is a natural instinct
which centuries of civilization and culture have been unable to
eradicate.
The use of force may be a symptom of savagery or of
strength and virility, according to the point of view and the
object for which it is invoked. In legalized warfare the man
who fights and maims his fellows, is hailed as a hero. In
an industrial war the man who maims an opponent is termed
a "thug." Monuments are erected to the memory of one and
prison doors yawn open to receive the other. In both instances
violence is committed. And the law of property rights makes
the difference.
114
CHAPTER XVII.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL SLUGGER.
The use of force and violence to attain a desired end, is
a common attribute of mankind. It did not originate with
labor unions. Neither are they the only agencies which prac-
tice it. The industrial history of the last few years shows
that some of the most violent strikes have been among unor-
ganized workers.
When such revolts occur among unorganized workers, vio-
lence and disorder are always more pronounced than where
there is an organization, for the reason that there is no re-
straining influence among the strikers. Organization implies
order and system and every observer of industrial disputes
knows, that the more perfect the organization, the less violence
accompanies a strike.
The explanation of that fact is, of course, simple. It is not
the mere act of striking that produces violence. The violence
begins when the employers attempt to resume work with non-
union employes. If a trade is almost perfectly organized, the
employers seldom attempt to resume operations, hence there
can be no violence, because there is no occasion for it. But
the organization of the workers also has a tendency to mini-
mize violence, because of the better discipline which it pro-
duces and the confidence it gives the strikers in their ability
to secure justice without a resort to physical force.
Judy
In 1910 more than 50,000 coal miners in Illinois were on
strike for six months and no violence was committed. In fact
there were fewer breaches of the peace in the mining sections
of the state during the strike, than was usual in normal times.
The strikers had less money to spend in saloons, consequently
there were fewer personal brawls.
In Colorado in 1913-14 with one-fifth of the number of
miners involved, there was a reign of violence and lawlessness
that shocked the country. Yet the coal miners in Colorado
115
are much the same kind of men as the coal miners in Illinois.
It was the attitude of the coal operators and local conditions
which produced opposite results.
In Illinois no attempt was made to operate the mines with
non-union men. There was consequently no need to employ
mine guards and other agencies that tend to disturb the peace.
Both sides were content to make the contest one of endurance.
In Colorado the operators assumed an entirely different po-
sition. They would not even discuss conditions with the rep-
resentatives of the miners. They determined to operate the
mines in the way it pleased themselves. Violence was met
with greater violence and the result was bloodshed and murder.
Comparison of the two strikes mentioned, shows that organi-
zation of labor is not primarily responsible for violence. The
Illinois miners were much better organized than were the
Colorado miners. The analogy tends rather to show that per-
fect organization eliminates or minimizes violence, because
it removes the immediate cause, which is the unorganized
worker.
It has been said that there are different methods of apply-
ing force to attain a desired result, some within the written
law and some that are not. So there are different forms
and degrees of violence in connection with labor disputes.
The impulse to "punch the head" of a man who takes a job
which another man feels belongs to him, although he has no
legal right to it, is a natural impulse. The average mind
cannot conceive of such an act being a heinous crime. But
it is the beginning which frequently leads to heinous crimes.
Violence grows.
From "punching the nose of a scab"
openly, where he has a chance to strike back, it is only a
few steps to lying in ambush for him and trying to brain him
with a bludgeon.
In recent years there has been a marked change in the
nature of the violence committed in the building trades and
in the methods used. The ordinary workman who in former
days was apt to use his fists on the head of a "scab" for the
sake of "the cause", seldom does so now. His place has
116
been taken by the professional thug and gunman. Violence
has become commercialized and made more brutal. Assaults
on non-union workmen are seldom made openly as in former
days when the strikers did the assaulting. The professional
slugger lies in wait for his victim, assaults him with a bludgeon
or probably shoots him to death.
There are several reasons for this change for the ordinary
assault with fists, committed on the impulse of the moment
by the otherwise law-abiding workman, to the murderous,
brutal assault committed by the hired thug. Employers have
organized into associations in their respective lines of busi-
ness. Through these associations they have been able to give
publicity to acts of lawlessness and arouse public sentiment.
They have stirred up public officials and aided in the detec-
tion and punishment of offenders. They have invoked the
aid of the courts and obtained injunctions making punish-
ment more certain and more drastic.
M
These repressive measures have made open assaults on non-
union workmen by crowds of strikers dangerous in large cities.
So the professional slugger has been developed. It is not
necessary that he be a member of the union for which he
does the slugging. He may not be a member of any union;
oftentimes he is not. He is not interested in "the cause."
He is ready to commit any kind of crime for pay. He may be
employed in a gambler's war one day; in a labor war the
next and the following day involved in a political row. He
will slug for either side in a contest if he is paid his price.
If the destruction of property seems more expedient than
the slugging of non-union men, the professional will attend to
that. It makes no difference to him what the crime, or who
hires him to commit it.
These professional gunmen and sluggers are to be found in
every large city. They usually work under a leader of their
own choosing. The agent who employs them does business
with the leader of the gang. He tells him the nature of the
"work" he wants done and the price he will pay. The leader
attends to the details. When the crime has been committed,
117
the agent who hired the professional may, with some degree of
truth, say he does not know who committed it. He does not
know who did the actual "work" and he does not care to in-
quire.
That such a system of organized thuggery obtains in many
of the building trades unions is beyond dispute. The rank
and file of the unions do not know anything about it, for
obvious reasons. The agent who has the "work" done is him-
self frequently in ignorance of the identity of the actual per-
petrators. That being the case, it would be absurd to suppose
that the rank and file of the union know.
"Do you approve of violence in labor disputes?" was the
question put to an old member of a building trades union in
Chicago, who has been active in union affairs for a quarter
of a century.
"Did we ever get anything in the early days without vio-
lence?" he asked in reply. "But," he added, "I don't believe
in the professional sluggers who are employed today. A bunch
of murdering, blackmailing crooks. I wouldn't have them
around me and I protest every time an appropriation is made
for 'organizing purposes.'
"Punch a scab? Why that is all right. I have done that
and we never thought of pay for it. Of course it isn't so
necessary today with the perfect organization we have, but
there isn't the same spirit in the boys now. We used to go out
and clean up a job and the union didn't even allow us car
fare. Now the professional bums and blackmailers wouldn't
cross the street to hit a scab unless they are assured of their
pay. I don't believe in that kind of violence.”
99
This is the point of view of a man much above the average
in intelligence. It shows the distinction which the union man
makes between "punching a scab" for the good of "the cause'
and the professional thuggery that has been developed in re-
cent years. It shows the difference between fighting for what
is conceived to be a principle and fighting for hire. The law,
of course, cannot make any such fine distinction. Neither does
it alleviate the pain and suffering of the victim, to know that
he was slugged "for principle" rather than for pay.
118
In giving his views on the subject of violence, the union man
quoted above told an interesting story of what he said was
the first organized, systematic violence in connection with
building trades strikes in Chicago. It was during a strike
of carpenters in 1886 for an eight-hour workday. The trade
was poorly organized at the time and there were more ten-hour
than eight-hour jobs in the city.
The "general" who organized the violence spent a few days
studying a map of the city and noting reports brought him
of the various jobs under construction and the number of
men employed on each. The location of the jobs was marked
on the map. When the time came to strike the blow the "gen-
eral" distributed his forces with care and precision. He
wished to avoid physical force if possible, so he arranged it.
that the invaders in every instance would outnumber the in-
vaded.
The union men who were working on eight-hour jobs did not
begin work until 8 o'clock. The non-union men began work at
7 o'clock. The union men who worked in the near vicinity
of the non-union jobs were directed to meet on certain street
corners at 7 o'clock next morning. The orders of the "gen-
eral" were obeyed to the letter and at precisely the same
minute, dozens of non-union jobs were "cleaned out" in dif-
ferent sections of the city. The union men who did the
cleaning" were all at their own jobs ready for work at 8
o'clock, so they had good alibis if necessary.
"And it worked to perfection," said the man telling the
story. "It struck terror to the hearts of the scabs and the
bosses at the same time. They didn't know when the lighting
might strike again. And there was little actual violence.
Most of the scabs ran when we entered the buildings and not
a man was arrested. The scabs joined the union in hundreds
in the next few days. That was the first organized violence
in the building trades in Chicago and it won for us. Of
course, I believe in violence of that kind when it is necessary
to win."
(6
G
Such were the methods used before slugging was commer-
cialized and made a business for professionals.
119
Not all the violence in connection with strikes, however, is
committed by professionals. Should a general strike in a
trade take place in a city and the employers attempted to re-
sume with non-union men, the strikers would be apt to try
and prevent it and clashes would follow. In the building
trades, however, which are well organized, general strikes in
a trade are unusual. Because of the through organization;
the necessity for proceeding with certain jobs and the ease
with which the contractor can shift the added cost on to the
owner, there are some who are always ready to meet the union
demands.
Most of the building trades strikes in recent years have been
directed against individual employers on particular buildings.
The number of men involved on any particular job is compara-
tively small, so that a few professional sluggers can take care
of the situation. There is less danger in the professional
getting caught, as his experience enables him to elude the po-
lice.
Many statements are made that labor unions do not believe
in violence. If the statements mean that the average union
man would not himself commit violence, they are true. If
they mean that the average union man, in the building trades,
does not approve of violence, if it brings the results sought,
then the statements are not true. The average building trades
mechanic is interested in results and he is not apt to inquire
closely into the methods used, if the results are attained. The
fact that he has no personal knowledge of acts of violence,
relieves his mind of responsibility.
Ask the ordinary union man in any building trade if he
approves of violence and he probably will answer that he
does not. He would not think of assaulting a non-union man
himself. He would not destroy property under any circum-
stances.
If he hears or reads, however, of a building that is being
erected by non-union men in his particular craft, having been
destroyed by dynamite and that the employer as a result has
decided to employ union men, he does not feel overwhelmed
with grief over the outrage.
120
If he attends a meeting of his union and hears a veiled re-
port that an “accident" happened on a certain job the other
day and that the omployer has since signed an agreement with
the union, he will nudge his companion and whisper "good
work." He may add, "of course, I don't believe in that sort
of thing, but it seems to bring results." And his companion
will reply that the business agent is "all right" and both will
vote for his re-election.
121
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE DYNAMITE CAMPAIGN AND ITS EFFECT.
The arrests April 12, 1911, of Ortie E. McManigal and J. B.
McNamara, the self-confessed agents of the structural iron-
workers in the destruction of property by explosives, and the
arrest ten days later of J. J. McNamara, secretary of the In-
ternational Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers
as the directing head of the alleged dynamiters, threw the
country into a form of national hysteria. The importance
of the arrests was magnified out of all proportion with their
actual bearing on the industrial situation.
This was largely a result of the spectacular and sensational
manner in which the arrests were made; the confession of
McManigal; the way in which J. J. McNamara was taken out
of the State of Indiana in violation of the established legal
procedure in such cases and the desire for publicity and
notoriety on the part of the private detectives employed by
the National Erectors' Association, who made the arrests.
Overshadowing every crime with which the alleged dynamit-
ers were charged, was the destruction of the Los Angeles
Times Building on October 1, 1910, through which twenty-one
persons lost their lives. Through carefully planned publicity,
the destruction of the Times Building was skillfully coupled
up with the destruction of numerous bridges and buildings
throughout the country, and in the public mind, the structural
ironworkers were charged with the entire responsibility.
The International Association of Bridge and Structural
Ironworkers, as an organization, had nothing to do with the
Times explosion. J. B. McNamara pleaded guilty to having
caused the explosion and he was, according to the evidence
adduced in the Dynamite Conspiracy Trials, the same agent
who caused numerous explosions on buildings and bridges for
the structural ironworkers. That is the only connection be-
tween the structural ironworkers and the Times explosion.
While the same agent was employed, because of his expert
122
knowledge of explosives, it does not follow that his employers
were the same. Who did employ McNamara to blow up the
Los Angeles Times has never been determined. No one except
McNamara himself has been tried or convicted of the crime.
The Times explosion, therefore, must be considered separate
and apart from the hundred other explosions and attempted
explosions on buildings and bridges throughout the country.
Without in any way attempting to minimize the enormity
of the crime which cost the lives of twenty-one human beings,
it may be said on the most reliable authority, that it was
not the intention of McNamara to take human life. The charge
of dynamite used, was not of itself sufficient to wreck the
entire building. The explosion did not stop the running of
the presses.
According to the authority of Mr. Clarence S. Darrow, who
defended the McNamara brothers and who knows the facts
better, perhaps, than anyone else except McNamara himself,
what actually happened was this: The charge of dynamite
was placed near a number of barrels of printer's ink, which
contains petroleum in large quantities and is highly inflamma-
ble. The force of the explosion burst the ink barrels and scat-
tered the flaming fluid all around. The building was a fire-
trap and the flames spread so rapidly that the men at work
had no chance to escape. They were suffocated or burned
to death.
While McNamara could not foresee the results of his work,
he, of course, took chances and it does not greatly mitigate
his crime to say that he did not intend to take human life.
Although he was a zealot, ready to do anything in his blind
devotion to a cause, as he conceived it, he must have realized
the grave possibilities of his act, if he was capable of reason-
ing at all.
Aside from the Los Angeles Times explosion, for which the
structural ironworkers were not responsible, no loss of life
attended any of the other explosions, extending over six years
that the dynamite campaign covered in the war against the
open shop in the structural iron industry. The destruction
123
of property was not as great as commonly supposed, for the
reason that buildings under construction are open and are
not susceptible to serious damage from an explosion.
While the estimated loss caused by a few of the explosions
ran into thousands of dollars, the average loss probably did
not exceed $1,000 for each explosion. Some of the larger
structural iron firms carried dynamite insurance and the cost
of the premiums was added to the contract price, so that in
many instances there was little financial loss to the erectors.
They were, of course, compelled to employ additional watch-
men and in other ways subjected to inconveniences and delays
that were costly, but in dollars and cents the dynamite cam-
paign appears to have cost the union more than it did the
employers.
According to the testimony of McManigal, who turned
state's evidence, and the union records introduced in evidence
during the trial of the officers of the ironworkers organiza-
tion in Indianapolis, the price paid by the union for each
explosion was $200 and expenses.
From February, 1908, to April, 1911, 70 explosions took
place; 43 on jobs of members of the National Erectors' As-
sociation and 27 on work of independent contractors.¹ Of
the known explosions McManigal was the agent in twenty cases
and J. B. McNamara in sixteen cases. In all about one hun-
dred explosions, or attempts to dynamite, occurred from the
beginning of the year 1906 until the end of the year 1911.
Cla
The Dynamite Conspiracy Trials, as a result of which
twenty-two former officials of the ironworkers' union, in ad-
dition to the McNamara brothers, are now serving sentences
in a federal prison, cost the organization at least $150,000
as shown by the records, independent of what the ironworkers
contributed to the defense of the McNamara brothers. If to
this sum is added the price paid to the actual agents who
wrought the work of destruction, together with their expenses,
| Ja
1-U. S. Brief, p. 27, U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Dynamite Conspiracy
Cases.
124
it will be seen that the average cost to the union of each
explosion was about $2,000, or twice the estimated cost to the
employers. In addition the union is continuing to pay $25 a
week to each of the men in prison, except H. S. Hockin, so
that from a financial point of view the dynamite campaign
must be considered a failure for the union.
Did the campaign pay in other respects? What effect did
it have on the growth and financial standing of the organiza-
tion? What effect on the smaller contractors who were not
in a position financially to assume risks?
In a previous chapter it has been shown that the National
Erectors' Association is today in a stronger position than it
ever occupied. Its membership controls a larger proportion
of the steel erection work than it did when the fight began.
Its force of open shop workers are more efficient due to their
greater experience. As some of its members were protected
against financial loss through dynamite insurance, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the campaign of destruction might
have been continued indefinitely without causing a change of
the attitude of the Erectors' Association. On the contrary the
dynamite outrages increased the determination of members of
the Erectors' Association not to have any further dealings
with the union.
Toward the end of the year 1911 negotiations were opened
between the Employers' Association of Architectural Iron-
workers of New York and the union, looking toward the mak-
ing of a contract. The employers seemed willing to enter
into a union agreement with the finishers, or architectural
ironworkers, but were prevented from doing so by the Board
of Governors of the Building Trades Employers' Association.
The reason given was the revelations in connection with the
pleas of guilty of the McNamara brothers. As the members
of the Employers Association of Architectural Ironworkers
were under bonds of $1,000 each, not to make an agreement
with a union without the approval of the Building Trades
Employers' Association, the negotiations were dropped.¹
1-Report of J. E. McClory to Indianapolis Convention, February, 1913.
125
It is an open secret that the finishers, or architectural iron-
workers in New York, could today secure a union agreement
with their employers if they would sever their affiliation with
the International Association. They are being punished be-
cause of their affiliation in the same national organization
with the structural ironworkers and the dynamite outrages
are given as the excuse for refusing to recognize the latter.
These facts point to the conclusion that the dynamite cam-
paign was ineffective so far as it was directed against the
National Erectors' Association and that it weakened the in-
fluence of the organization with some independent employers.
<
On the other side, while the campaign of violence was in
force, many small employers who feared that their work might
be destroyed made agreements with the union. Since the ex-
plosions stopped with the arrest and conviction of the con-
spirators, many of these smaller employers have declared for
the open shop. It is this condition which a prominent union
official had in mind when he said: "The mistake was not in
using dynamite, but in getting caught at it. Had we been
able to keep it up we would have won. It kept the little fellows
in line and since it stopped they have gone over to the big
fellows."
This view is not shared by many of the union ironworkers,
most of whom say that the entire campaign was a serious.
mistake, which cost the organization a great amount of money
and loss of prestige, with few compensating returns. An oc-
casional job here and there was unionized, following an ex-
plosion in the immediate vicinity, but on the whole dynamite
as an organizing force failed to accomplish the main purpose
for which it was intended.
While the dynamite campaign does not appear to have had
much effect on the big open shop employers, except to intensify
the feeling of bitterness toward the union, it does seem to have
had a beneficial effect on the numerical strength and financial
standing of the organization.
When the open shop fight began the paid up membership
of the International Association of Bridge and Structural
126
Ironworkers was 9,776. This was the membership reported
in the Philadelphia convention in September, 1905. The same
report showed a treasury balance of $1,013.64. Several death
claims and other obligations were unpaid at the time the report
was made, so that the organization in reality was in debt at the
beginning of the strike.
At the Peoria convention in September, 1914, the report
of the secretary-treasurer showed a paid-up membership of
13,184 and a treasury balance of $117,439.25. The membership
and treasury balance year by year since the strike began, is
shown in the following table:
Year.
1904-5 ..
1905-6.
1906-7
1907-8 ...
1908-9
1909-10 ..
1910-11
1911-12
1912-13
1913-14
•
Membership.
10,216
9,776
11,574
10,422
9,607
10,872
12,230
10,928
12,222
13,184
Treasury
Balance.
$1,013.64
6,305.35
15,849.39
18,159.64
24,689.03
34,229.67
51,191.09
101,052.03
107,586.41
117,439.35
The increase in membership may be accounted for by the
formation of new locals in some small cities, not organized in
1905 and by the inclusion of locals of machinery movers, pile-
drivers and shop men, so that it has no particular significance.
It does not denote that the organization controls a larger pro-
portion of structural steel erection work than it did in 1905.
On the contrary, while it is not possible to estimate accurately,
because the structural steel business fluctuates so much, every
indication is that the union controls a smaller percentage of
the trade than it did at the beginning of the strike. There
has been no appreciable increase in membership of the local
unions in any of the large cities, while there has been a de-
cided falling off in some eastern cities where open shop con-
ditions prevail.
127
The substitution of reinforced concrete for steel in recent
years has prevented any remarkable increase in the volume
of output of structural steel. The tonnage of the American
Bridge Company for 1907 was greater than that of any sub-
sequent year until 1913, and as this company manufactures at
least 35 per cent of the total output of the country, the figures
may be taken as fairly indicative of the industry as a whole.
It is doubtful, therefore, whether the apparent increase in
membership of the ironworkers' organization, as shown on
the face of the reports, is due to the dynamite campaign, or in
spite of it. Careful analysis of the facts indicates that the
latter theory is the correct one.
The remarkable increase in the treasury balance, however,
cannot be explained on any other basis than that the member-
ship approved of the campaign and willingly contributed to
support it. The members believed that the open shop fight
directed against the union, was, in fact a war of extermination
and their loyalty was such that they were ready to meet every
assessment levied without protest.
This is a condition which obtains in every labor union. In
times of peace it is often difficult to collect ordinary dues and
a suggestion of a special assessment would result in a protest
that the executive officers would have to explain to the satis-
faction of the membership. When the same union is engaged
in a fight with its employers, it is an easy matter to collect
dues and assessments. Opposition brings out the latent fight-
ing qualities in a union as in an individual. It infuses into it
new blood and dispels the lassitude which frequently appears
after a long period of peace.
No union can stand still and hope to hold its membership.
It must advance, either by peaceful methods, or by fighting.
If it advances rapidly without much opposition, it is apt to
develop a false notion of its own strength and importance,
which frequently leads to abuse of power. For that reason the
union that has had to fight for every concession gained is
likely to be much more conservative and much more stable than
the union that has had smooth sailing.
128
The structural ironworkers are no exception to the rule. In
the early years of their organization they had strikes, but
most of them were won easily. They had won over the Amer-
ican Bridge Company in local strikes and over the National
Erectors' Association in a national strike. They felt that they
were invincible and that it was not necessary for them to pay
high dues and assessments. The need of a strong defense
fund did not appeal to the ironworkers in 1904, which accounts
for the fact that the officers at that time were handicapped
in their work for lack of funds.
The following table shows the receipts of the national or-
ganization for a period of ten years:
Year.
1904-5 ....
1905-6.
1906-7 .
1907-8 .
1908-9 ..
1909-10 .
1910-11
1911-12
1912-13
1913-14
Receipts.
...$35,580.54
50,118.53
61,361.60
.65,956.59
54,601.35
76,083.70
88,577.23
..150,171.59
95,655.07
..133,612.01
A comparison of the foregoing table with the table on mem-
bership, shows that in 1911-12 the membership was only 712
greater than in 1904-5, yet the receipts were more than four
times as great, which means that each member contributed
about four times as much in the latter year as he did in the
former.
It was in the fiscal year 1911-12 that the officers of the In-
ternational Union were arrested in connection with the dyna-
miting outrages and the membership loyally supported them
by paying heavy special assessments. The comparison proves
the truth of the statement that it is when a union meets de-
termined opposition that its treasury swells and that it is
129
difficult to collect dues and assessments when victories come
easily.
Another evidence that the campaign of violence had the
approval of the membership of the union, is shown by the
elections in the national conventions. When Mr. Buchanan
was international president from 1901 to 1905, which was un-
doubtedly the most constructive period in the history of the
organization, he had opposition for re-election at every con-
vention. In 1903 he was elected by some two votes and in 1904
he had only four or five votes to spare. In the same period
of four years, the office of secretary-treasurer was filled by
three different incumbents.
H
From 1905 until 1913 there was no change in the chief ex-
ecutive officers. Mr. Ryan was re-elected president at each
convention, as was Mr. McNamara secretary-treasurer. The
latter was re-elected at the Milwaukee convention in 1911 at
the time he was in prison in Los Angeles, some two months
before he pleaded guilty. Mr. Ryan was re-elected at the
Indianapolis convention in 1913 after he had been convicted
and while an appeal was pending.
These facts have frequently been pointed to in criticism of
the ironworkers' organization. The explanation appears sim-
ple enough. Some may still believe that the convicted officials
were innocent of the charges, in which case simple justice
would demand their re-election. Delegates to a convention
probably would know the facts, but would take a different view
of the situation from that of the average outsider and therein
lies the true explanation.
Assume that the men were guilty as charged and that their
conviction was not the result of any "frame-up." They did
not plan the destruction of buildings and bridges to further
any personal ends of their own. What they did was done in
the interests of the organization as a whole. That it may
have been a mistaken policy does not alter the situation. It
was undertaken in the belief that it would benefit the union.
Why then should the union repudiate its own instrument? If
the dynamiters had not been caught and if the campaign of
130
violence had won, the leaders would have been regarded as
successful generals.
Because they were caught and because the policy did not
win, is that a sufficient reason for repudiating them? Would
it not be cowardly and morally wrong for the union to step
from under and throw the entire blame on the officers? The
officers were acting for the union, with at least the tacit ap-
proval of the membership. The assessments paid show that.
Under the circumstances could the union do less than re-elect
the officials? Could it do less than pay their salaries while
they are in prison, since they are there for doing what they
believed would further the interests of the union?
Had the ironworkers' union disclaimed responsibility for
the dynamite campaign and placed the entire blame on the
officers by expelling them from membership, it probably would
have been commended by some social reformers, but would
have been condemned by workingmen generally. Society does
not always ostracize the transgressor of moral or civil law.
To expect a labor union to do so, especially when the trans-
gressions committed were aimed at furthering the material
interests of that union, is to expect something unreasonable.
That is the view the average union man takes of a situation
of the kind, whether he is an ironworker or some other me-
chanic. It may not be a moral view as some would look at it,
but there is no cant or hypocrisy about it. The question here
is not whether that view is the right one from a moral stand-
point, but whether it is the correct one from the ironworkers'
point of view.
B
The National Erectors' Association and other organizations
of employers have termed the dynamite conspiracy as "The
Crime of the Century." It stirred the public mind as few
labor wars have done. The facts are, however, that there
have been many other industrial wars that resulted in a much
greater loss of life and greater destruction of property.
In the first few years of the open shop fight in the structural
iron industry, the assaults on non-union men were numerous
and vicious. About one hundred such assaults are recorded
131
and three deaths of watchmen are traced to these attacks. In
the dynamite campaign, as has been stated, there was no loss
of life or serious injury to any person and the war was prose-
cuted over a period of more than six years.
In the Colorado coal strike, 74 known deaths occurred in
a period of about seven months, before the arrival of the Fed-
eral troops on the scene. Measured by the loss of human life
the structural ironworkers' fight against the open shop pales
into insignificance in comparison with some local strikes which
attracted little public attention.
1
132
CHAPTER XIX.
WHY THE RESORT TO DYNAMITE?
Destruction of property is not an unusual accompaniment of
industrial disputes, the particular form varying according to
circumstances. In a dispute between a telephone or telegraph
company and linemen, the destruction will consist of cutting
wire cables. If between glaziers and their employers, plate
glass windows will be smashed. Woodwork sometimes is
gouged and defaced in a carpenters' dispute. Whatever the
particular form of the vandalism, the object is the same, i. e.,
to put the employer to additional expense in the hope that he
may be compelled to employ union instead of non-union men.
In the case of the structural ironworkers explosives were
used because that appeared to be the method which would
cause the most destruction. The dynamite bomb had been
used in other industrial wars long before the ironworkers
adopted it. It was a common weapon in strikes of the Western
Federation of Miners in Colorado, Idaho and other western
states. It was used extensively in Chicago during a strike
against the telephone company, when explosions in under-
ground conduits were common occurrences. It has been used
frequently in wars among gamblers and as a means of extort-
ing blackmail, independent of any labor dispute.
The particular agent of destruction used, therefore, has
little significance. What is significant is the attitude of mind
which justifies such acts and makes the commission of such
crimes possible.
As a rule in labor disputes where there is a resort to the
destruction of property, it comes only after other methods to
obtain the desired results have failed. The first form of vio-
lence comes in the shape of attacks on those who take the
places vacated by strikers. When that proves ineffective;
when the strikers find they cannot prevent the work being
done, the next step is to seek to destroy that work.
The underlying motive is the firm conviction in the minds
133
of the strikers that the particular work belongs to them. They
may have refused to perform that work except under condi-
tions acceptable to them. These conditions may not be accept-
able to the employer. Still the workers cannot in their minds
separate themselves from their jobs and they feel justified in
wreaking vengeance both on those who took their places and
on the employer who permitted and encouraged it.
With the structural ironworkers, assaults on non-union men
marked the beginning of the fight against the open shop. As
has been said these assaults were numerous and vicious, but
proved wholly ineffective. The number of non-union jobs
increased, while the chances of employment of union men de-
creased. If the non-union men could not be frightened or
intimidated because of the assaults, other methods had to be
tried.
Assaults on non-union men did not hurt the employer, phy-
sically or financially, but if the work was destroyed it might
touch him in a vulnerable spot. He would have to stand the
financial loss, which might cause him to hesitate before under-
taking to erect another building with non-union men.
That is the way the ironworker looked at it. The fact that
it was unlawful to destroy property would give him little con-
cern. According to his code of ethics, the "snakes'" had no
right to take his work. They didn't contribute to the support
of the union. They were willing to accept the good wages
and conditions which the union had brought about without
helping to support it. They were enemies of society in gen-
eral and of the union ironworkers in particular. They were
attempting to break down and destroy certain standards which
the union had established. Therefore any means to force them
off that work, or into the union, were justifiable, as the union
ironworker looked at it.
That the employer had a right to employ non-union men if
he chose to do so, would not strike the union ironworker for-
cibly. He is not concerned about nice points of law or ethics,
That the hated "snake" had a right to work; that he probably
1-The term applied by union ironworkers to non-union men.
134
had a family to support; that he was not violating any law
by working, would not appeal to the union man. The latter
lives daily in a union atmosphere. He does not hear the rights
of the employer, or of the non-union man discussed. Only
the rights of the union man, or the wrongs, real or fancied,
which he has to endure, are topics of conversation in union
halls.
It is not to be wondered at, that after years in such an en-
vironment, the average union man sees only one side of the
question and that is the union side. He loses perspective, if
he has ever acquired it.
It is not because he is incapable of reasoning. On the con-
trary the union school develops remarkably clear thinkers and
able reasoners. If their arguments are all directed toward one
end, that is only natural. It is well known in the legal pro-
fession that a lawyer who has been a prosecuting attorney for
years, loses his ability to defend an accused person. He loses
mental poise and aims to secure a conviction regardless of the
evidence.
If it is true that a prosecuting attorney, with all the ad-
vantages that come with education and training, loses mental
poise as a result of continuous thought along one groove, it is
not to be wondered at that the union man, without such train-
ing, develops a biased mental attitude. He can hardly be
blamed if he does not see matters from the employer's point
of view, even if that point of view may be the correct one.
And if employers refuse to meet and discuss working condi-
tions with their employes, how is either going to learn the
viewpoint of the other?
To the union man, the union means something more than
a machine to maintain fair wages and working conditions.
It means an agency for securing employment, if employment is
to be had in his particular craft. The union man pays dues
into his union for protection. He expects his union to protect
him against the competition of the non-union man. If a union
man is out of work while a non-union man in his craft is work-
ing, then the union man feels he is not receiving the protection
135
for which he is paying. At the bottom of the whole problem
lies the dread of unemployment and the competition for jobs.
The union man feels that he should be a preferred customer
and have first choice in the matter of obtaining work. If that
work must be obtained at the expense of the non-union man,
that does not make any difference. It is for that the union man
is paying dues. The aim of the union is to have a monopoly
of work in a particular trade. It differs from an oppressive
monopoly in that any competent workman may join the union
and share in the benefits.
Because of that fact, union men are prone to resent an im-
putation that a union is monopolistic in its tendencies. But
it is, nevertheless. In fact the strength or weakness of a union
is measured by the extent that it is able to monopolize the work
in a particular trade.
By way of illustration, suppose that an open shop firm se-
cures a contract for the erection of a large building or bridge
in or near a city where the structural ironworkers are organ-
ized. Union men out of work daily see the open shop men at
work. They complain to their business agent and at their
union meetings. They declare they cannot find jobs while
"snakes" are steadily employed right under their noses. They
demand to know what they are paying dues for. The business
agent realizes that a storm is brewing and he must do some-
thing.
One night the bridge or building is wrecked by dynamite.
Next day the contractor decides to make a contract with the
union. The idle men are given jobs. At the next meeting of
the union the business agent may report that the job in ques-
tion has been "straightened out" and as a result all the idle
members have found employment.
Is it reasonable to suppose that the members of the union
do not understand why the job was "straightened out?" Is
it natural to suppose that they will demand to know of their
business agent if he was responsible for the explosion? They
wanted to get that work and they got it. They do not know, of
136
course, who caused the explosion. They do not care to inquire.
It brought results and that was what they were looking for.
Do they believe in violence? They didn't destroy the prop-
erty and they don't know who did. They probably adopt res-
olutions denouncing the unknown perpetrators and offering
a reward for their arrest and conviction. The Western Feder-
ation of Miners in convention offered a reward for the arrest
of the men who blew up the Independence depot in June, 1904,
killing fourteen men. Harry Orchard afterward confessed
that he and Steve Adams did it, acting as agents for the officers
of the union.
In this way do union men collectively approve of violence
that few, if any of them, would individually commit. As a
matter of principle they believe that violence is wrong. But
principle in the abstract has less weight in their minds than
the immediate and concrete necessity of finding work. And
if violence seems to open the only way leading to a job, then
the average building trades workman feels that the end justi-
fies the means.
There is another factor to be considered in the fight of the
ironworkers against the open shop. That is the union em-
ployer. It would be unjust to charge the union employer with
direct responsibility for any of the outrages committed against
open shop firms, although unconsciously, he may have been
an indirect cause.
In any of the building trades, the contractor who is em-
ploying union men complains if a competitor is allowed to go.
on under non-union conditions. He feels that it is not fair to
him to be compelled to live up to union rules and regulations,
when his competitors are not subjected to like restrictions.
When he is visited by the union business agent because of
some minor infraction of a rule, he is apt to get angry and say:
"Why don't you go after the non-union work and leave me
alone? Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones are employing non-union
men. They can underbid me on every job I estimate against
them. They are not paying the wages. But you don't bother
them. You keep after me. I am growing tired of it and if
137
something is not done soon, I shall quit employing union
men."
The argument is logical and the union business agent knows
it. If he does not make some effort to stop the non-union
work, another firm, probably, will be lost to the union. He is
pressed by the members of his union demanding protection
from the unfair competition of the non-union man, and he is
pressed by the union employer who demands protection
against his unfair competitor. Neither suggests violence, but
if the non-union firms will not meet the business agent or dis-
cuss conditions with him, he resorts to the only expedient
which appears open to him. Either the non-union men are
assaulted, or an attempt is made to destroy the work.
The structural ironworkers tried both methods and the lat-
ter seemed most effective and least dangerous. In the begin-
ning of the trouble, when the slugging of non-union men was
the rule, the arrests were numerous and many convictions were
obtained. The dynamiters carried on their work of destruction
for five years before they were caught.
The main reason for the resort to dynamite is found in the
uncompromising attitude of the open shop employers. The
American Bridge Company offered to compromise in the early
stages of the fight and the union representatives rejected the
terms of that compromise. After that the attitude of the em-
ployers was unyielding. Every effort on the union side to
bring about a conference, after its officers realized the mistake
that had been made, proved unavailing.
Without a conference, no settlement of the strike was pos-
sible. For the union it meant either unconditional surrender
or a fight to a finish. There was no middle course open while
the employers refused to confer.
The question here is not whether the American Bridge Com-
pany was right or wrong in refusing to hold further confer-
ences after its peace offer was rejected and after attempts
had been made to destroy its property. It is a matter of fact
that it did refuse.
When the hopelessness of the situation became apparent to
138
the union officials, resort was made to the destruction of prop-
erty. Diplomacy was out of the question, so dynamite was
tried. It proved to be a colossal blunder, as was the rejection
of the peace terms offered in the beginning of the fight.
The campaign of violence was a failure because of the de-
termination and financial resources of the employers opposing
the union. Had the ironworkers expended the same money
and energy in trying to organize the open shop men by legiti-
mate methods, the results might have been different.
139
CHAPTER XX.
CONCLUSION.
In a study of conditions obtaining in the structural iron in-
dustry and the relations between the ironworkers and their
employers, the most striking fact is, that the application of
physical force will neither establish nor maintain just and fair
relations between employers and employes.
Many instances might be cited in the industrial world, where
the use of physical force has, for a time, won advantage for
the side that has used it. Such gains, however, are temporary
and do not make for permanent industrial peace.
An employer may at times through force of circumstances
be compelled to submit to certain conditions which he believes
are unjust. Fear of violence and the destruction of property
may cause him to make terms with a union against his will
and business judgment. But if he is forced to submit through
fear or business necessity, he will break from the restraint
on the first opportunity.
Workingmen on the other hand may be compelled to submit
to conditions which they regard as irksome, if the advantage
is on the side of the employer. They submit sullenly, because
they are compelled to do so by force of circumstances. In-
stead of co-operating with their employers under such condi-
tions they are constantly looking for the day when they can
turn the tables and get the upper hand.
Force may subjugate one side or the other in an industrial
dispute, but it will not remove discontent. It will not establish
justice. When one side is all-powerful and the other side is
subservient, there is sure to be injustice. Where there is in-
justice, there will be discontent.
The abuse of power is not always on the side of the em-
ployer. Where unions are in complete control, abuses are as
apt to develop as where the employers exercise absolute
power. In neither case is the condition conducive to indus-
trial peace. Abuses may sometimes be more fancied than real,
140
due to the inability of one side to comprehend the motive of
the other side. Frequently it is not the act itself that consti-
tutes the abuse, but the manner in which the act is performed.
If an employer issues an order because he has the power to
do so, without regard to the wishes of his employees, the order
may be obeyed, but it may create a great deal of dissatisfac-
tion. If a union adopts a certain rule, imposing some re-
striction on the employer, without his knowledge or consent,
the rule may be enforced, but it will arouse the antagonism
of the employer. If the union representatives and the em-
ployer sat down together and discussed the matter in the light
of reason, they would probably agree that the issue was not
so important after all.
The aim of a teacher in a public school is to have the pupil
perform a certain work without making it appear a task.
That would hardly be accompished if the teacher stood over
the pupil with a birch rod. The task would be performed,
but the pupil would find little pleasure in the work. His good
opinion of his teacher would not be enhanced by the perform-
ance and the task probably would be poorly performed.
Grownups are not so different from children in that respect.
They resent the too free exercise of power over them, unless
the reasons for it are explained. The explanation many times
will remove the cause of dissatisfaction. It does not meet
the situation to say that it is not the business of the employee
to reason why, but to obey orders.
In the ironworkers' controversy there was too much of an
uncompromising attitude shown on both sides. There was too
much of the spirit of wishing to do certain things because of
possessing the power to do them.
The ironworkers were the first to display an uncompromis-
ing attitude two months after the strike began. The American
Bridge Company offered to meet substantially the demands
made when the strike was called. It offered to employ union
men on all its erection work, whether done by it directly or
by sub-contract and to pay the recognized rate of wages.
But the Philadelphia convention of the union added a new
141
12.
demand, which in substance was that the American Bridge
Company should compel the National Tube Company to em-
ploy union ironworkers on the erection of a tube mill at Mc-
Keesport. The strike was against the American Bridge Com-
pany and it was not erecting the tube mill. The union could
have accepted the settlement that was offered and won its
original demands.
The convention, however, gave emphatic instructions to its
officers not to settle until every demand was met. Subsequent
events proved that it is unwise for delegates in a convention,
who are not in possession of all the facts and details, to outline
a policy of conduct for the executive officers in a strike. The
officers of the ironworkers' union could not accept a compro-
mise settlement unless they ignored the instructions of the
convention.
Later when the union realized the mistake that had been
made and was ready to compromise, it was the American
Bridge Company that assumed the uncompromising attitude.
Its officers refused to hold further conferences with the union
representatives. Without a conference, a settlement of the
strike was impossible. The union had erred and there was no
pardon for it. The company had opened its doors once and
invited the union to step in, provided it did not go too far.
When it refused the doors were forever barred. It was then
that the union, to use a metaphor, tried to blow the doors open
with dynamite. They are still closed and barred.
The policy pursued by the ironworkers' organization in the
beginning of the strike, in refusing to allow its members to
work on sub-contracts, taken by union firms from the Ameri-
can Bridge Company, gave the open shop employers a decided
advantage in the contest, an advantage which the union was
never afterward able to overcome. This policy was rescinded
by the National Executive Board on the advice of President
Ryan some eight months after the strike began, but by that
time the open shop policy had been firmly established in some
localities.
Pursuance of this policy on sub-contracts, led to the open
142
shop war in New York City and caused the suspension of the
ironworkers from the Joint Arbitration Board of the building
contractors and building trades unions. This weakened the
union by placing it in a position where it did not have the
sympathetic support of other trades and in a corresponding
degree it strengthened the position of the open shop employ-
ers.
The strike on Post & McCord's work in New York, which
marked the beginning of the open shop war in that city, cannot
be regarded as anything but a violation of a local agreement.
There is no conclusive proof that the firm of Post & McCord
was directly connected with the American Bridge Company,
while on the other hand, the fact that the firm was a party to
a local agreement with the ironworkers' union is not disputed.
That the international union had authority to order a local
on strike, may be admitted. That it was wise or expedient
to exercise that authority when the local was under contract
with its employers, may be questioned. More especially is
this true in the particular instance under consideration, for
the reason that the strike on Post & McCord's jobs was called
November 1st and the local agreement would have expired by
limitation two months later.
Another policy of the ironworkers' union which furnishes
one of the chief reasons for the employers desiring to maintain
open shop conditions, is its claims of jurisdiction of work.
The employers have always desired to employ unskilled la-
borers at lower pay to perform certain classes of work claimed
by the union for its members at the union rate of wages.
Employment of unskilled labor at low wages to do work
claimed by skilled labor at higher wages decreases the cost
of production. From an economic standpoint that should be
encouraged. But here it is difficult to reconcile economic the-
ory with actual practice. Behind the desire of the skilled
workman in the building trades to control all the work he can,
even when such work might be satisfactorily performed by
unskilled labor, lies the question of unemployment.
The dread of unemployment lies at the bottom of most of the
143
jurisdictional disputes in the building trades. If every skilled
workman was assured of steady employment twelve months
in the year, he would not feel so jealous if he saw an unskilled
laborer, or a skilled workman in another craft, doing work
which he believed belonged to the men of his own trade.
The structural ironworker knows from practical experi-
ence that he is out of work about one-fourth of the time under
normal conditions. It is therefore natural for him to try to
extend his trade jurisdiction as much as possible and prevent,
if he can, laborers from doing work which he otherwise would
have to do. The fight of the unions for closed shop agreements
in the building trades, is not entirely one for wages and hours,
but also one for control and jurisdiction of work. The more
work each union can control, the more work its members be-
lieve they will get.
The question of unemployment has a direct bearing also
on the question of efficiency and restriction of output. The
slogan today is efficiency and scientific management. If there
is not enough work now to keep the average building trades.
workman employed more than nine months in a year in normal
times, it is difficult for him to understand why he should in-
crease his efficiency so that he could perform that work in
eight months. To him it looks like reasoning from the wrong
end, so that the average union man is not wildly enthusiastic
over efficiency systems. He is not convinced that he will
create new work by increasing his output. As his most press-
ing problem is to find work, because of an over-supply of labor
in his particular trade, he cannot see wherein he is ineffi-
cient.
-
The American Bridge Company and other members of the
National Erectors' Association have maintained the open shop
because they believe it has been to their financial interests to
do so. Under the open shop policy they are free to conduct
their operations as best suits themselves. If they desire to em-
ploy laborers at a low rate of pay to perform work that under a
union agreement would be done by skilled men at higher wages,
they do so without fear of strikes. In this way the aggregate
144
wages of the ironworkers are reduced, although the nominal
rate per hour for skilled men may be maintained. The fight
for the open shop is at bottom a fight for increased profits for
the employers.
Comparison of open shop and union wage scales in the struc-
tural iron industry, shows that the open shop scale is consider-
ably lower. In New York City, which is on the open shop basis,
the wages of ironworkers are lower than in other large cities
and have been advanced only once since the fight began in
the spring of 1906. As steel erectors who employ union men
frequently bid successfully against open shop erectors, it
would appear that the economy effected through open shop
operation is entirely at the expense of the workmen. If the
cost of production is reduced, the consumer does not profit
by it.
There is another important, if less direct, reason why the
American Bridge Company and other large structural iron
firms desire the open shop. They are much less interested
in erection work than they are in the manufacture of struc-
tural steel in their fabricating shops. They fear the unioniz-
ing of their shops much more than they do their erection work.
The structural ironworkers' organization claims jurisdiction
over the men in the fabricating shops and has made many
efforts to organize them, although such efforts have largely
been unsuccessful.
The tendency of the U. S. Steel Corporation and its sub-
sidiary companies, has been to prevent the spead of organiza-
tion among the employes. The tendency of the ironworkers
and all other organizations of labor, is, and always has been
to extend their sphere of influence. Therein lies the main
reason for the clash of interests in this particular situation.
The demand of the structural ironworkers that the McKees-
port tube mill be erected by union men, was not in itself very
important. It involved the employment of some forty men
for a short time. But it was an encroachment of the union
in a territory hitherto largely free from union regulations.
It might have opened the way for further union aggression.
145
It is true that the erection of the tube mill had nothing directly
to do with the unionizing of the fabricating shops of the
American Bridge Company. Had the union been able to force
the employment of its members in the new field, however, it
would naturally have been encouraged to further efforts in
some other direction.
The officials of the U. S. Steel Corporation realized that if
the power of the union was to be curbed, the opportune time
had arrived. The demand for the erection of the tube mill
placed the union in the position of the aggressor. In refus-
ing to accede to the demand, the company took a defensive
position.
Later as the fight grew in intensity, the American Bridge
Company and some of its associates in the National Erectors'
Association became the aggressors, to the extent of insisting
that firms taking sub-contracts from them should complete
them on the open shop basis. The union, on the other hand
used its power and influence to have contracts taken away
from open shop firms and frequently it succeeded. Through-
out the long campaign, the facts show that the union was on
the aggressive and the open shop companies on the defensive.
The erection of the McKeesport tube mill ceased to be an
issue early in the fight for the reason that it had been com-
pleted. The fight of the union then was to recover the ground
that had been lost in the first few months. The fight of the
companies was to hold the advantage they had gained. At
times an open shop firm made peace with the union. At other
times a firm that had been union went over to the open shop
side.
Such gains or losses, however, were incidental. The prin-
cipal firms which declared for the open shop in May, 1906, are
still open shop and have been so continuously. If they have
suffered the loss of a contract here and there, they have at-
tributed it to the fortunes of war, but such losses have not
changed their attitude.
The union has believed throughout that it was in a fight for
existence. That in large measure is true. It does not con-
146
flict with the statement that the union was on the aggressive
and the employers on the defensive. The open shop policy, as
understood and practiced by the National Erectors' Associa-
tion, means the destruction of the union.
Open shop firms will deny that statement and point to the
fact that they are employing union men. They are; but not
as union men. The open shop erectors do not recognize the
right of their employes to bargain collectively. Their em-
ployes have no voice in setting wages or working conditions.
The employes are simply animated machines who have to do
as their employers dictate. They have the privilege of quit-
ting their employment if the conditions do not suit them,
which is about the only privilege which the open shop erectors
accord their workmen.
As labor unions are organized and exist for the purpose of
advancing the material well-being of their members, they can-
not exist if deprived of the exercise of their functions in that
direction. The policy of the National Erectors' Association
prevents the ironworkers' union from exercising the functions
for which it was organized. That means the destruction of
the union in effect, if not nominally. It means that the union
is reduced to a position where it is wholly incapable of pro-
tecting the rights of its members. Its existence under such
circumstances is a matter of little importance to the em-
ployers.
!
The officers of the ironworkers' union knew what the open
shop policy of the erectors actually meant. They knew if that
policy succeeded, the union would lose to a like extent. That
increased their determination to fight. Denied the opportunity
of conferring with representatives of the Erectors' Associa-
tion, or ending the struggle on the basis of a mutual agree-
ment, they resorted to drastic measures. They found them-
selves over-matched and, believing the existence of their or-
ganization was at stake, they hit below the belt in trying to
turn the tide in their favor.
-
-
If the union resorted to unfair and unlawful methods in
the prosecution of the fight, the erectors were in a degree re-
147
sponsible. The system of espionage which they maintained
in local unions, before and after the outbreak of hostilities,
did much toward creating and preserving the spirit of hos-
tility which made the destruction of property possible.
It has been shown that the employers maintained a system
of espionage in local unions at a time when they were working
under contracts with such unions. That does not indicate that
they signed the agreements in good faith. If they did sign the
agreements in good faith, why was it necessary to keep paid
spies in the local unions? Why was it necessary to seek to
influence elections in the unions?
That the employers had paid spies in the unions does not
admit of doubt. That the system bred suspicion among the
members of the union and hatred of their employers, is equally
certain. If the employers were not bent on weakening or de-
stroying the influence of the union, at the time they openly
recognized it by signing contracts, why the employment of
spies?
When the members of the union knew, or suspected, that
these paid spies of the employers infested every local, were
they not justified in believing that the employers were se-
cretly aiming at the disruption of the union? Is it strange
that they should resort to secret methods of retaliation?
Organization raised the wages of structural ironworkers
almost 50 per cent in a period of fifteen years. It was natural
that they should rally to the support of that union when they
believed that its existence was threatened. It was natural that
they should feel bitter toward the employers who were hiring
secret spies to destroy that union.
The employment of spies by the employers was as inde-
fensible as was the resort to dynamite and the destruction of
property by the ironworkers, although the one was within
the law and the other was not. The system of espionage was
established years before the campaign of destruction began.
It cannot, therefore, be urged in defense of the system that
it was made necessary because of the outrages that were
being committed.
148
Pernicious as was the effect of the spy system on the union,
it did not justify the resort to violence and the destruction
of property in the eyes of the law. But it went a long way
toward justifying them in the eyes of the union ironworkers.
The employers say that the spy system has been discontin-
ued. It probably has, because under present conditions the
open shop erectors are not greatly interested in the union.
They feel they have won the fight for the open shop and all
they ask of the union is that it leave them alone.
The union ironworkers cannot accept that view. With from
45 to 50 per cent of the structural steel erection on an open
shop or non-union basis, it is inevitable that the ironworkers
will keep on trying to organize the men in the industry. They
look upon the open shop, not only as a check on further prog-
ress, but as a menace to the retention of what has already been
gained. They feel they must keep on fighting to prevent the
spread of the open shop policy, or take a backward step.
Under such conditions there cannot be peace in the industry.
Fear of the consequences may prevent a recurrence of violence,
but it will not remove the cause. Fear of the law will not re-
establish amicable relations between the companies and the
union. Only the recognition by each side of the rights of the
other can accomplish that, and both sides must agree on what
those rights are and define them by mutual consent.
149
APPENDIX TO REPORT
ON
NATIONAL ERECTORS' ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION BRIDGE AND STRUCTURAL IRONWORKERS. CONTAINING
COPIES OF AGREEMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION AND
BY-LAWS OF THE NATIONAL ERECTORS'
ASSOCIATION.
MEMORANDUM
of
PROPOSED
AGREEMENT
Between the American Bridge
Company
and the
International Association of
Bridge and Structural Iron
Workers
As submitted by the International
Executive Board after hearing the
Report of the Committee represent-
ing the Company and the Associa-
tion.
MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE
Held at Pencoyd, Pa.
January 17, 18 and 19, 1902,
Between the INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE AND STRUC-
TURAL IRONWORKERS, represented by Mr. Frank Buchanan,
President, and Mr. D. F. McIntyre, Secretary and Treasurer,
and the AMERICAN BRIDGE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, represented
by Mr. S. P. Mitchell, Chief Engineer, and Mr. H. F. Lofland,
Erecting Manager, Eastern Division, for the purpose of dis-
cussing a working agreement between the Association and the
Company.
1.50
The following paragraphs were passed upon and again sub-
mitted to the Company by the International Executive Board
after their meeting in Pittsburgh, January 20th to 25th; see
minutes of meeting:
1. That there shall be no limitation as to the amount of
work a workman shall perform during working hours.
2. That there shall be no restriction as to the use of ma-
chinery or tools.
3. That there shall be no restriction as to the use of any
manufactured material, except prison-made.
4. That no person shall have the right to interfere with the
workmen during working hours.
5. That the Company shall be at liberty to employ or dis-
charge through its foremen, any journeymen members of the
Association or apprentices employed under the Agreement,
as it may see fit, but no man is to be discriminated against
by reason of his connection in any way with a labor organi-
zation.
6. The Association shall not discriminate against the Com-
pany by permitting its members to work for other employers,
who have not signed a scale of wages equal to the scale agreed
upon between the Company and the Association.
7. Where one shift is employed, the number of hours fixed
upon to constitute a day's work may be worked between the
hours of 6 a. m. and 6 p. m. in cases where the Company finds
it to its advantage to shift the regular working hours, on ac-
count of trains, tides or other conditions affecting the work,
over which it has no control, it being understood, however,
that the hours worked are to be consecutive with only the usual
interval or cessation of work for meal time, commonly known
as "dinner hour.'
""
8. For the time worked in excess of the hours fixed upon
to constitute a day's work for one shift, time and half time
will be paid, except as stated below. On Sundays throughout
the year, February 22nd, Decoration Day, Fourth of July,
Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day, or the days that are
observed as these holidays, double time will be paid for any
151
time worked within the 24 hours constituting the calendar
day. No work shall be performed on Labor Day except in
case of dire necessity, when the property of the Company is
in jeopardy, and the service of the men is required to place
the same in safe condition. Double time will be paid for any
time worked on Labor Day.
Within the territory fixed upon for the cities of New York,
Newark, Philadelphia, Chicago and St. Louis, work may stop
at noon Saturday during the months of June, July and Au-
gust, and double time will be paid for any time worked on
Saturday during these months after 12 o'clock noon.
9. In case it is desired by the Company, two separate shifts
may be employed on the same piece of work, paying each shift
only the regular scale of wages agreed upon for the hours
fixed as constituting a day's work. In case of working two
shifts the hours of work of the day shift may be arranged
by the consent of the Company and the men, as may be most
advantageous, but the hours of employment of each shift
not be less than the hours fixed upon to constitute a day's
work. No member of the Association will be allowed to work
in two shifts unless he is paid at the over-time rate, for all
work performed in excess of the hours fixed upon as a day's
work.
10. The Company will pay the men employed on regular
pay days, at least twice every month. Where legal enactments
require it, and where it is the local custom and practicable,
by reason of the work being located near enough to the Divi-
sion Office, the men will be paid weekly. The custom will be
that no more than one week's time will be held back except in
cases where the work is located at such a distance from the
Division Office as to make this impracticable.
11. The following branches of work are to be covered by
the Agreement. The erection and construction of bridges and
viaducts, either steel or cast iron, steel stacks, steel coal bunk-
ers, steel grain elevators and tanks, steel stand pipes, steel
water tanks, steel towers, blast furnaces, stoves, and all work
pertaining thereto, and all steel or cast iron work pertaining
-
152
to buildings, including foundation beams, columns, beams or
girders, and structural work for safe deposit vaults; also the
wrecking of bridges, viaducts, and steel buildings, the erection
and removal of all necessary falsework or scaffolding, and
any work required to change or alter in the field material
shipped from the shops, such as framing, cutting, bending and
drilling. In addition to the above classes of work, the Agree-
ment will cover the following work, where the Unions handling
same are amalgamated with this Association: Sidewalk vault
light frames, stairways, metallic lathing, metal ceilings, rolling
steel curtains, ornamental front work (solid or shell) and
corrugated sheet work when attached to steel frames. Isolated
pieces, such as plates, anchors, caps, corbels, light lintels, etc.,
may be set by other mechanics. The framing of lumber for
false-works and travelers, and the framing and placing of
lumber for the wooden floors of any structures may be done.
by carpenters or other mechanics. Operating machinery in
draw bridges, or other structures may be set and adjusted by
other mechanics.
12. When Foremen are members of the Association, they
shall not be subject to the rules of the Association while acting
as Foremen, and no fines or penalties shall be entered against
them by the Association while acting in such capacity.
13. Whenever two or more journeymen members of the
Association are working together on a piece of work, a steward
may be selected from one of their number to represent the
Association. The man selected to act as steward shall not
leave his work or interfere with workmen during working
hours, and shall perform his duties as an employe of the Com-
pany.
14. For the purpose of interpreting the Agreement made
between the Company and the Association, for the settling
of all disputes that may arise between the Company and the
Association, and to decide upon and regulate all matters of
mutual interest during the life of the said Agreement, Boards
of Referees shall be appointed as follows:
In each of the Three Divisions, into which the United States
153
is divided by the Company, and known by it as the Eastern,
Pittsburgh and Western Divisions, each party shall appoint
one member to serve on a Board of Referees for the regulating
of all questions arising under the Agreement, in each of the
respective Divisions. The headquarters of these boards shall
be New York for the Eastern Division, Pittsburgh for the
Pittsburgh Division, and Chicago for the Western Division.
Each party will then appoint one additional man who will
serve as a member of each of the Three Boards, so that each
Board in each Division will consist of four members, two of
which will be appointed by the Company and two by the As-
sociation. The members of the Board of Referees shall be
appointed to serve for one year, dated from the date of the
Agreement. The members so appointed may be removed from
time to time by the Association or the Company respectively,
if it is found that the appointee is unsuitable for membership
of the Board. Any vacancy occurring in the Boards shall be
filled by the Company or the Association respectively appoint-
ing a member to fill said vacancy.
15. All questions that may arise between the Company and
the Association under the Agreement, and all matters of mu-
tual interest, shall first be referred to the two local members
of the Board in the Division in which the question arises,
who shall render a decision within six days after receipt of
notice that their services are required. If these two members
of the Board cannot agree, the two additional members con-
stituting the Board may be called in, and the matter re-sub-
mitted for adjustment, and a decision must be rendered within
six days after said additional members have received notice
that their services are required. If the four members con-
stituting the Board cannot agree, a fifth person will be selected
by the said Board, the said person to be in no wise identified
with organized labor or the bridge building industry, nor
shall he be an incumbent of any elective political office. The
question at issue shall be submitted to the Board of Five so
constituted, and a decision shall be rendered within six days,
after the fifth member is selected, and signifies his intention
of serving on the board. The decision rendered by the Board
154
of Five so constituted, shall be final and binding on both
parties.
16. The Company and the Association will respectively as-
sume the expense in connection with the meetings of the
Boards, so far as the salaries and expenses of their own mem-
bers and witnesses are concerned; and any additional expenses
that may be incurred over and above the expenses just speci-
fied, shall be shared equally by the Company and the Asso-
ciation.
17. Any member of the Association in good standing, or
representative of the Company, except a Foreman, shall be
eligible for membership in the Boards, provided he holds no
elective public office, either municipal, county, state or na-
tional. Any member shall be disqualified to act on the Boards
and shall cease to be a member thereof, immediately upon his
election to any public office of employment.
18. In evidence of good faith and to guarantee the payment
of any fines imposed as described below, each party to the
Agreement agrees to furnish to the other party a satisfactory
bond, said bond to be binding and kept in force for the full
amount during the life of the Agreement. In case either party
fails, wilfully refuses or neglects to abide by the decision ren-
dered by the Board of Five Referees, as aforesaid, then and
in that case upon the motion of either the Company or the
Association, a Board of Three Arbitrators shall be selected
as described below, to take evidence in the matter and render
a decision as to whether or not the accused party has wilfully
refused or neglected to abide by the decision of the Board of
Five Referees, and shall determine upon any fines to be paid
by the delinquent party to the other party, the decision of
the said Board of Three Arbitrators being final and binding.
The amount so awarded shall in no single case exceed the
amount of the bond. In the selection of the Board of Three
Referees, the Company will select one member, the Associa-
tion one, and the two members so selected shall choose the
third member. No person shall be eligible for membership on
the Board of Arbitrators who is in any way connected with
Gary
155
"
organized labor or the bridge building industry, or who holds
any elective public office, either municipal, county, state or
national.
Any expenses that may have to be incurred on account of
the appointment of the Board of Three Arbitrators shall be
shared equally between the Company and the Association,
except the salaries and expenses of the officers, members, em-
ployes, witnesses, etc., of the Company and the Association,
which expenses will be assumed by the Company and the Asso-
ciation respectively.
19. No strikes, lockouts, stoppages or interferences with
any of the work being conducted under the agreement shall be
resorted to, pending a decision of the Board of Referees.
20. The Board of Five Referees shall have the power and
their decision shall be binding on both the Company and the
Association, to make working rules in conformity with the in-
tent of the Agreement, and to pass on any questions that may
arise between the parties under the Agreement, but they shall
not have the power to change any of the stipulations of the
Agreement or to make rules conflicting therewith.
21. The Agreement is to remain in force for one year from
the date thereof.
22. Each party to the Agreement must notify the other
party at least four months before its expiration of any change
of any character whatsoever, which may be desired for the
ensuing year.
ܝ
23. It is agreed that there is to be no infringement of the
noon hour, except by mutual agreement between the foreman
on a piece of work and the majority of his men.
24. The Agreement is intended to cover work performed
by the Company's forces within the territory included within
the United States of America. When the Company contem-
plates sending structural ironworkers to perform work out-
side of the United States, it agrees to give preference to mem-
bers of the Association, and in such cases special agreements
will be made with the men sent, as may be found advisable to
suit the varying conditions. The Company or firm agrees to
-
-
156
notify the Association when the services of such men are re-
quired.
25. The Association agrees to furnish upon the demand of
the Company or its representatives, as many of the various
classes of experienced structural ironworkers as the Company
may require for the protection of its work, in any part of the
territory covered by the Agreement; but in the event of a
failure or inability on the part of the Association to furnish
the men called for, the Company shall be at liberty to employ
any other men not members of the Association, as it may see
fit, without in any way violating the Agreement or giving
cause for strikes, stoppages or interferences with the work.
It being understood, however, that men so employed shall not
receive less than the prevailing rate of wages agreed upon
for the place or district in question. It is further agreed that
when the Company calls upon the Association to furnish struc-
tural iron workers, that only experienced men or those who
have been employed at least eighteen months on erection work
will be furnished.
26. In cases where the Company furnishes transportation
for men from one point to another or allows them time while
traveling, and where any of the men so transported fail to
go to work or leave the work for which they have been en-
gaged before earning sufficient money to reimburse the Com-
pany for the amounts paid for traveling expenses or time
allowed, then and in such cases, the Association agrees to
furnish at its own expense, a man or men to take the place of
the man or men who have failed to go to work or have left the
work as above stated. The Company agrees that when the men
have remained on such work until its completion, to furnish
them return transportation to the point from which they had
been originally taken. It being understood that men will not
be engaged and sent to any piece of work under misrepre-
sentation on the part of the Company, as to the conditions
existing at the point to which they are sent.
27. As far as the Company is concerned, it will not object
to the business agent of the Association visiting the work,
157
provided said business agent does not talk to, call off or in any
way interfere with the men employed during working hours.
28. The Company agrees that after material has been un-
loaded on the site of the work, the handling of the same is to
be done by members of the Association, or the apprentices
as herein provided, except when it is necessary to use tackle
or derricks, the unloading of material is to be done by mem-
bers of the Association or apprentices where the tackles or
derricks are the property of the Company.
29. A sympathetic strike ordered by other trades, or by
one of the central bodies, where it is necessary to take part
to protect union principles, shall not be considered a violation
of this Agreement.
30. In the erection of buildings and small structures, or in
the erection of bridges which are operated from one side of
the stream, but one non-union foreman shall be employed, but
when the work is so divided as to make it necessary to work
it in sections, or when the bridges are sufficiently large to
make it advantageous to separate the erection of the false-
work and the steel work, or on bridges that are worked in
sections as from both sides of a stream, or in the erection of
viaducts which are operated from both ends of the structure or
in any instance where one section is separated and removed
from the other, more than one non-union foreman may be em-
ployed; but in no instance shall more than two such non-union
foremen be employed on one piece of work.
31. The Company shall have the right to employ appren-
tices, and such apprentices shall serve on erection work for a
period of not less than eighteen months before being eligible
for membership in the Association or before receiving the
rates of wages agreed upon for members of the Association.
No man shall be employed as an apprentice whose age is over
thirty-five years.
32. The Association agrees to the employment of appren-
tices in the ratio of one apprentice to every ten bridgemen or
structural iron workers employed, members of the Associa-
tion.
158
33. When the Company is the original contractor, and sub-
lets the work to another firm or company, the sub-contractor
shall be subject to all the terms and conditions of this Agree-
ment.
Hours, Rates of Wages and Jurisdiction Asked for by the
Association.
Rates per
Jurisdiction. Hours. Hour.
Cents.
50
50
50
Chicago
New York
Pittsburgh
Boston.
Washington
Buffalo
Milwaukee
Kansas City
Newark
Albany
Philadelphia
Baltimore
Cleveland
St. Louis
Minneapolis
Wheeling
Omaha
Scranton
Denver
Detroit
Cincinnati
Salt Lake City.
San Francisco
Richmond
Portland, Ore.
Indianapolis
•
Cook County 8
8
25 miles
75 miles
50 miles
25 miles
.100 miles
50 miles
50 miles
25 miles
25 miles
• 50 miles
50 miles
.100 miles
.150 miles
. 50 miles
State of W. Va.
50 miles
50 miles
State of Colorado
25 miles
. 75 miles
50 miles
50 miles
25 miles
State of Oregon
50 miles
Outside of the limits fixed for cities described
above
8
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
8
8
8
8
8
9
8
8
8
8
8
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
8
8
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159
Principles and Working Rules Relating
to the Employment of Bridge and
Structural Ironworkers in the Erec-
tion of Bridges, Buildings, etc.
Eight hours shall constitute a day's work in localities where
it is now the prevailing custom to work eight hours. In other
localities nine hours shall constitute a day's work; this, how-
ever, may be subject to arbitration.
Time and half-time will be allowed for time worked in excess
of the hours fixed upon as constituting a day's work for one
shift, except as follows:
On Sundays throughout the year, Decoration Day, Fourth
of July, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day or the days ob-
served as these holidays, double time will be allowed for any
time worked within the twenty-four hours constituting a cal-
endar day. No work shall be performed on Labor Day except
in case of dire necessity, when the property of the employer
is in jeopardy and the service of the men is required to place
the same in a safe condition; double time will be paid for any
time worked on Labor Day. Only straight time will be al-
lowed for time worked on Saturday afternoon, but a half-
holiday Saturday afternoon without pay may be granted by
arrangement between the employer and the workmen.
C
-
When two separate shifts are employed on the same piece
of work, each shift will be paid the regular prevailing rate of
wages per hour. Hours for each shift may be arranged be-
tween the employer and workmen as may be most advan-
tageous, but the hours of employment of each shift will not
be less than the hours fixed upon as constituting a day's work.
Workmen will be paid every two weeks upon pay days fixed
by the employer, except in localities where it is required by
law or where it is the prevailing custom to pay weekly.
It will be the general custom to withhold not more than one
week's time, to enable the employer to prepare the payrolls,
etc.
160
When any workman is discharged or laid off, he shall be
paid in full within twenty-four hours.
When a workman leaves the service of an employer of his
own accord he will receive the pay due him at the next regular
payday.
There shall be no restriction or discrimination on the part
of workmen as to the handling of any materials entering into
the construction of the work upon which they are employed.
There shall be no limitation placed upon the amount of work
performed by any workman during working hours.
There shall be no restriction as to the use of machinery or
tools or as to the number of men employed in the operation of
same.
There shall be no restriction whatever as to the employment
of foremen.
There shall be no sympathetic strikes called on account of
trades disputes.
No persons other than those authorized by the employer
shall interfere with workmen during working hours.
The employer may employ or discharge, through his repre-
sentative, any workman as he may see fit; but no workman
is to be discriminated against on account of his connection
with a labor organization.
There shall be no discrimination against, interference with,
or fines imposed upon foremen who have been in the service
of the employer during the time of strike.
Apprentices to learn the trade may be employed in propor-
tion of one apprentice to every seven bridgemen and such
apprentices shall serve on erection work for a period of not
less than six months before being eligible for membership in
a labor organization, or before receiving the wages agreed
upon for members of such organization. No man shall be
employed as an apprentice whose age is over thirty years.
The apprentices shall perform such duties as may be assigned
to them by the foreman in charge.
Laborers may be employed for unloading and handling
161
materials in yards and storage points and for the removal of
materials from such yards or storage points to the site of the
work.
Such work as the framing of falsework and travelers, the
framing and placing of wooden decks (ties and guard rails)
and all woodwork on mill buildings, the painting of structural
steel and iron work and the placing and adjusting of operating
machinery in other structures may be performed by such men
as the employer may select.
In cases where misunderstandings or disputes arise be-
tween the employer and workmen, the matter in question
shall be submitted to arbitration locally, without strikes, lock-
outs or the stoppage of work pending the decision of the arbi-
trators.
Effective from May 1, 1903, to January 1, 1905.
(Clause pertaining to Philadelphia.)
Wages to be 50 cents per hour for first class bridgemen and
jurisdiction of Local No. 13 to the territory within a radius
of 50 miles from the City Hall of Philadelphia.
Signed
H. F. LOFLAND,
M. J. CUNNane.
162
WORKING RULES
as agreed upon between Local Unions Nos. 11, 35, 40, 45 and
52 of the International Association of Bridge and Structural
Iron Workers and the Eastern District Committee of the
National Association of Erectors of Structural Steel and Iron
Work.
Effective until January 1st, 1906.
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CITY AND VICINITY.
EMBRACING
the territory within a radius of Thirty-five (35) miles of
N. Y. City City Hall and all of Long Island.
THIS AGREEMENT shall go into effect immediately and shall
expire January 1, 1906, and applies only to the territory
within a radius of thirty-five (35) miles of the City Hall
of New York, and all of Long Island.
Art. 1.-Eight (8) hours shall constitute a day's work.
Art. 2. Bridgemen will be employed at the rate of fifty-six
and one-fourth (561c) cents per hour and apprentices will
receive thirty-one and one-fourth (314c) cents per hour.
Art. 3. Time and half time will be allowed for time worked
in excess of the hours constituting a day's work for one shift,
except as follows:
Art. 4. On Sundays, throughout the year, New Year's
Day, Washington's Birthday, Decoration Day, Fourth of
July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day, or
on the days that may be observed as these holidays, double
time will be allowed for any time worked within the twenty-
four (24) hours constituting the calendar day. No work shall
be performed on Labor Day, except in case of dire necessity,
where the property of the employer is in jeopardy, and where
the service of the men is required to place same in safe con-
dition. A half-holiday on Saturday afternoons throughout
the year, without pay, will be granted. Any work performed
on Saturday afternoon will be paid for at double time.
• add home pa
jungă.
163
Art. 5. When two (2) separate shifts are employed on the
same piece of work, the men in each shift will be paid the reg-
ular straight time rate of wages per hour. The hours for each
shift may be arranged between the employer and the work-
men, as may be most advantageous, but the hours of employ-
ment on each shift will not be less than the hours fixed upon
as constituting a day's work.
C
Art. 6. Barring delays from causes beyond the control of
the employer, workmen will be paid on the job once a week
upon pay days to be fixed by the employer.
Art. 7. It will be the general custom to withhold not more
than three (3) days' time to enable the employer to prepare
the pay rolls, etc.
Art. 8. When any workman is discharged, or laid off, he
shall be paid in full at the office within twenty-four (24) hours,
upon presentation by him of time check, provided the work
upon which he is engaged is located in Manhattan. If the
work is located outside of Manhattan he will be paid on the
job.
Art. 9. When a workman leaves the service of an employer
of his own accord, he will receive the pay due him on the next
regular pay day.
Art. 10. There shall be no restriction or discrimination
on the part of a Union or workman as to the handling of any
materials entering into the construction of the work upon
which they are employed.
Art. 11. There shall be no limitation placed by a Union or
workman upon the amount of work to be performed by any
workman during working hours.
Art. 12. There shall be no restriction on the part of a
Union or workman as to the use of machinery or tools, or to
the number of men required to handle or operate same.
Art. 13. There shall be no restriction on the part of a
Union or workman whatever as to the employment of fore-
men. The employer may employ on one piece of work as many
foremen as in his judgment are necessary for the safe, expe-
164
ditious and economical handling of same, regardless of
whether such foremen are members of a Union or not.
Art. 14. A Union or workman shall not take part in any
sympathetic strike whatsoever, until the question in dispute
is arbitrated under Article 23 provided for that purpose.
Art. 15. No persons other than those authorized by the em-
ployer shall interfere with workmen during working hours.
The Union, however, may appoint a steward on each job. All
complaints or grievances shall originate with the job steward
and the representative of the employer on the job, and shall
be made in duplicate in writing, one copy to be given to the
representative of the employer, and one copy to the Union
or their representative.
G
Art. 16. The employer may employ or discharge through
his representative any workman as he may see fit, but no work-
man is to be discriminated against solely on account of his
connection with a labor organization.
Art. 17. There shall be no discrimination against, inter-
ference with or fines imposed upon foremen who have been in
the service of an employer during the time of a strike.
Art. 18. The Union shall, upon demand, furnish the em-
ployer with a sufficient number of competent workmen to meet
his requirements, and, in case the Union fails to do so, the
employer shall be at liberty to employ such other men as may
be found by the employer or his representative to be satis-
factory as to character and competency.
Art. 19. Workmen classified as "Bridgemen" and enti-
tled to receive the rate of wages agreed upon for bridgemen,
will be skilled mechanics and shall be competent to perform
such work as the erection of structural steel and iron and
ornamental metal work; the rigging and handling of travel-
ers and other important mechanical appliances used in the
erection of work; the erecting in place and connecting of
members entering permanently into a structure, and the driv-
ing of field rivets.
Art. 20. Apprentices may be employed in the proportion
G
165
of one (1) apprentice to every seven (7) bridgemen, and such
apprentices shall serve on erection work for a period of not
less than one and one-half (1) years before being eligible for
membership in a bridge and structural iron workers' union,
and before receiving the rate of wages agreed upon for bridge-
men. No man shall be employed as an apprentice whose age
is over thirty (30) years. Apprentices shall perform such
duties as may be assigned to them by the foreman in charge,
the intention being that apprentices shall be given such varied
duties from time to time as will enable them to learn the trade
and fit them for the position of bridgemen.
Art. 21. Laborers may be employed for the unloading and
handling of materials in yards, and at storage points, and for
the distribution of materials in same. Laborers may also be
employed for the handling and delivering of materials from
yards and other storage points to the site of the work-site of
work being understood to mean:
(a) In the case of buildings, within reach of the derricks
or other appliances used in erecting the materials.
(b) In the case of bridges, viaducts and similar structures,
to the point of the structure nearest the storage yard.
In the case of removing old structures, laborers may be em-
ployed for the removing of the materials after same have been
dismantled and landed by the bridgemen.
Art. 22. Such work as the framing of falsework, the fram-
ing of travelers, the framing and placing of wooden decks
(including ties and guard rails) and all wood work on mill
buildings, the placing and adjusting of operating machinery
in drawbridges and machinery in other structures and the
field painting of structures may be performed by such men
as the employer may select irrespective of their connection
with any Union.
Art. 23. In case of misunderstandings or disputes arising
between an employer and his workmen, the matter in ques-
tion shall be submitted to arbitration locally without strikes,
lockouts or stoppage of work, pending the decision of the
arbitrators. These arbitrators shall consist of two (2) rep-
166
resentatives appointed by the employer and two (2) repre-
sentatives appointed by the Union, and these four (4) so ap-
pointed shall select a fifth (5th), who shall be a disinterested
party, and the decision of the arbitrators shall be rendered
within six (6) days and be final and binding upon both par-
ties, and not subject to appeal. None of the definite articles
of these rules shall be subject to arbitration.
MEMORANDUM
OF
AGREEMENT
LOCAL NO. 40
UNITED HOUSESMITHS' AND BRIDGEMEN'S UNION
Ca
OF NEW YORK.
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, Entered into this 23d day of
January, 1905, by and between the IRON LEAGUE ERECTORS'
ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION OF ARCHITECTURAL IRON
WORKERS, ORNAMENTAL BRONZE AND IRON MASTERS, all of the
City of New York, Associations by their officers duly author-
ized, parties of the first part, and the District Council of the
UNITED HOUSESMITHS' AND BRIDGEMEN'S UNION, OF NEW YORK
AND VICINITY, comprising the following locals of the Interna-
tional Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers:
Local No. 35, United Housesmiths' and Bridgemen's Union
of Brooklyn.
Local No. 45, Bridge and Structural Iron Workers of New
Jersey.
Local No. 52, United Housesmiths' and Bronze Erectors of
New York.
Local No. 40, United Housesmiths' and Bridgemen's Union
of New York.
Local No. 11, United Housesmiths' and Bridgemen's Union
167
of Newark, N. J., by their officers duly authorized, parties of
the second part.
WITNESSETH:
First-This agreement shall apply only to men employed
in the erection of structural steel and ornamental iron and
bronze work, within a radius of thirty-five (35) miles from
the New York City Hall, in the States of New York and New
Jersey and including the whole of Long Island. It shall take
effect immediately and continue in force until January 1st,
1906, and thereafter from year to year unless either party
hereto shall have given three (3) months notice in writing to
the party of the other part, prior to the expiration of any
year, of a desire to change the agreement for the following
year.
Second-The parties of the first part agree to employ only
members of the UNITED HOUSESMITHS AND BRIDGEMEN OF NEW
YORK AND VICINITY. It is agreed, however, in case the Union
is unable to supply competent workmen in sufficient quantity,
the parties of the first part shall be at liberty to hire other
men who may apply, and who have been examined and found
satisfactory as to character and competency, by the parties
of the first part or their representatives. The parties of the
second part shall be at liberty to admit such men to member-
ship in their Union, and the parties of the first part shall not
in any way prevent or oppose the said employees from join-
ing said Union.
Third-All men to be employed and paid by the hour.
Eight (8) hours to constitute a day's work, except on Satur-
days, when work shall cease at twelve o'clock. Overtime shall
be paid for at the rate of time and one-half except on Satur-
day afternoons, Sundays, and the following legal holidays,
viz: Washington's Birthday, Decoration Day, Fourth of July,
Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and New
Year's Day, or on the days that may be observed as these
holidays, for which double time will be paid. Unless abso-
lutely required no work is done on Sundays or legal holidays.
No work is to be done on Labor Day, and no man is to be dis-
168
charged for refusing to work overtime except in the case of
accident or actual necessity. The parties of the second part
agree to work in regular night gangs, at regular time, wages
and hours.
Fourth-The parties of the first part agree to pay weekly
on the job at regular pay days.
Fifth-No apprentice to be employed by the parties of the
first part without the written consent of his parents or guar-
dian to such employment, and shall serve a term of one and
one-half (14) years in case of structural apprentices. At the
end of such time, said apprentice may become a member of
the Union, provided he passes the necessary examination.
The ratio of apprentices on structural work to be not more
than one (1) apprentice to every seven (7) skilled mechanics.
Sixth-The Union to appoint a Steward on each job. All
complaints shall originate either with the job steward, or the
representative of the employer on the job, and shall be made
in duplicate in writing, one copy to be given to the business
agent or representative of the parties of the first part, and one
copy to the parties of the second part or their representatives.
Pla
Seventh-All grievances or complaints which cannot be sat-
isfactorily adjusted between the individual employer and the
parties of the second part or their representatives, shall be
submitted to the joint Board of Conciliation of the Iron trade,
which shall consist of three (3) employers elected by the in-
dustry, and an equal number of representatives of the parties
of the second part, who shall be elected by the UNITED HOUSE-
SMITHS AND BRIDGEMEN OF NEW YORK AND VICINITY, from
among members of said Union, who are at the time of their
service on said board regularly in the employ of some em-
ployers, members of the parties of the first part, or BUILDING
TRADE EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION. A majority vote of the said
Board shall be conclusive in relation to all matters submitted
to it and in case of a tie vote, the said Board shall have power
to agree upon an Umpire or Referee, whose vote shall be simi-
larly conclusive and binding, and the parties hereto agree to
abide by the decision of the Board. The BOARD OF CONCILIA-
-
169
TION will form such rules as may be necessary to govern its
own proceedings.
Eighth-In consideration of the mutual covenants herein
contained, the parties of the second part hereby agree not to
take part in any sympathetic strike whatsoever, and they
hereby agree not to go out on strike until after any grievances
have been submitted to the BOARD OF CONCILIATION above re-
ferred to and a decision reached. The parties of the first
part hereto agree not to order or carry out any lock-outs until
in like manner any grievance has been submitted to the BOARD
OF CONCILIATION above referred to and a decision reached.
Ninth The parties of the first part hereby agree to pay the
following wages:
All men employed on structural work except apprentice
work at the rate of 564 cents per hour.
Finishers, 561 cents per hour.
Finishers Helpers, 37 cents per hour.
Apprentices, 314 cents per hour.
Finishers helpers not to be employed on structural work.
In finishing work, it is understood that one helper to be al-
lowed to one finisher, in the erection of work.
Tenth-The parties of the first part shall be at liberty to
employ such men as they see fit in unloading trucks, in fram-
ing false work, in painting and handling material for storage
purposes at storage points. It is understood that when ma-
terial is delivered at the building within reach of the derricks,
that the handling of same shall be done afterwards by mem-
bers of the Union.
Eleventh-There shall be no restriction or discrimination
on the part of the workmen as to the handling of any mate-
rials entering into the construction work upon which they are
employed.
Twelfth-There shall be no restriction placed by any work-
m
170
man or the Union upon the amount of work to be performed by
any workman during working hours. There shall be no re-
striction on the part of any workman or the Union as to the
use of machinery or tools, or as to the number of men re-
quired to handle or operate same.
Thirteenth-There shall be no restriction whatever as to
the employment of foremen. The employer may employ on
one piece of work as many foremen as in his judgment are
necessary for the safe, expeditious and economical handling
of same, and it is understood that the foremen so employed
are not to become members of any Union and that no foreman
shall be discriminated against by the Union.
Fourteenth-No person, or persons, other than those here-
in expressly authorized shall have the right to interfere with
workmen during working hours.
Fifteenth-In the erection of bronze work, in the employ-
ment of men, preference will be given to the parties of the
second part, provided the same are competent.
Sixteenth-The parties of the first part shall have the right
to employ any foreman on their work as a pusher or skilled
mechanic without his being obliged to have the card of the
Union; this is only to apply as a temporary measure and as
soon as practicable and possible the foreman is to return to
his regular duties. Not more than two (2) such men to be
employed on any job at one time and for not more than two
(2) weeks and for not longer than eight (8) weeks in all dur-
ing the year. No foreman can work under this clause for any
employer unless he has worked in the capacity for such em-
ployer immediately before.
Seventeenth-The Joint Arbitration Plan adopted in con-
ference, July 3d and 9th, 1903, between the Unions of New
York City and the Building Trades Employers' Association,
shall be a part of this agreement, and both parties shall be gov-
erned according to its provisions.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereto this day, set
171
their hands and seals, the day and year first herein above
mentioned.
Signed
IRON LEAGUE ERECTORS' ASSOCIATION,
By John Cooper, President.
EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION ARCHITECTURAL
IRON WORKERS,
By Robert T. McMurray, President.
BRONZE IRON MASTERS,
By A. S. Richey, President.
DISTRICT COUNCIL UNITED HOUSESMITHS AND
Bridgemen of NEW YORK AND VICINITY,
By Charles Massey, President,
William Green, Secretary.
WORKING AGREEMENT
OF THE
UNITED HOUSESMITH AND BRIDGEMEN INTERNATIONAL UNION,
Local No. 13, oF PHILADELPHIA, PA.
Article I.
The party of the first part agrees to employ only members
who are in good standing in Local 13, or who have declared
their intentions of becoming members of Local 13. In the
event of the party of the second part being unable to supply
the required number of men to the party of the first part, they
shall be at liberty to employ such men as may qualify as
mechanics, and who are willing to become members of Local
13.
Article II.
The party of the first part shall be at liberty to employ such
men as they believe qualified for unloading material at storage
points, and at storage points only. The sorting or distributing
172
of all material at any point in or about the job shall be per-
formed by members of Local No. 13.
Article III.
The party of the second part agrees to work in regular
shifts, at regular hours, time and wages, when two or three
shifts are required, but when a man is requested to work in
more than one shift he shall be paid at the rate of double time
for all work performed over eight hours. When a member is
requested to start work before 8 a. m. he shall be paid at the
rate of double time. All work performed by the party of the
second part above eight hours shall be paid for at the rate of
double time. When only one shift is required, the eight hours
shall be made between 8 a. m. and 5 p. m. By mutual consent
of both parties, the noon hour may be curtailed.
Article IV.
Eight hours shall constitute a day's work, except on Satur-
day, when all work shall cease at noon.
Article V.
The party of the first part agrees to pay weekly on the job
on regular stated pay days. Waiting time shall be paid at the
rate of double time, when the men are compelled to wait for
wages due them after the regular stated pay day.
Article VI.
It shall be the general custom not to hold more than three
days' pay to enable the employer to prepare the pay roll.
Article VII.
It is understood that the men's wages due them on the regu-
lar pay day must be paid them not later than one hour after
the men stop work on the regular stated pay day; otherwise
double time shall be paid the men after that time.
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173
Article VIII.
Holidays, or days observed as such, New Year's Day, Wash-
ington's Birthday, Decoration Day, Fourth of July, Thanks-
giving Day, Christmas Day, and from Saturday noon until
Sunday midnight, the scale of wages for work done on these
days shall be paid for at the rate of double time. No work
shall be performed by any member of Local 13 on Labor Day.
Article IX.
No member shall be discriminated against for refusing to
work on holidays or overtime, or because he retains member-
ship in Local 13.
Article X.
Men who are discharged or laid off shall be paid off within
twenty-four hours, on the job, or at the office if in the City of
Philadelphia; if outside of the City of Philadelphia, the mem-
bers who are discharged or laid off shall be paid off on the
job, or transportation furnished him to the office of the com-
pany he was employed by.
Article XI.
Apprentices shall be allowed at the ratio of one apprentice
to every seven mechanics, and his duties shall be of such work
as will enable him to become a skilled mechanic, but under no
consideration will he be allowed to have charge of any part of
the work while serving his apprenticeship, such as handling
plans or issuing orders, and it is understood that no appren-
tice shall be employed by any contractor who has not got the
required number of mechanics in his employ. No apprentice
to be over twenty-five years of age, and he shall serve an ap-
prenticeship of eighteen months before he is eligible for mem-
bership as a mechanic in Local 13.
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174
Article XII.
The business representative shall appoint a steward on each
job, who shall perform his duties as steward at such times as
will not interfere with his regular work, and should any griev-
ance arise on the job with his own trade or any trade affiliated
with the Building Trades Department, he shall notify the busi-
ness agent of his organization. The business agent shall use
every means to adjust all grievances without the stopping of
work. A strike called by the Building Trades Department, or
by the Central Labor Union, or by the International Associa-
tion of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, to support trade
union rules, shall in no way be termed a violation of this
agreement.
Article XIII.
Timekeepers shall not perform nor do any work in or about
any job unless they carry a card in Local 13.
Article XIV.
There shall be but one foreman allowed on any job. Assist-
ant foreman and all others shall be members of Local 13.
Article XV.
The business representative of Local 13 shall be allowed to
visit all jobs at all times.
Article XVI.
Riveting gangs shall be composed of not less than four men
at all times.
Article XVII.
Local 13 will be responsible for members that ship out of
town on jobs in the jurisdiction of this agreement, it being
understood that the men must ship out through the office of
this Union, and transportation to be paid by the employer.
175
Article XVIII.
When contractors ship men out of town through the repre-
sentative of Local 13, it is understood that traveling time shall
be paid the men at the rate of sixty (60) cents per hour. This
to apply to the amount of time they are traveling.
Article XIX.
When contractors send men from one job to another, they
shall pay the car fare for the men, and the men shall also be
paid for the time of going from one job to the other. It is
understood that the men shall go by the most direct car line
when sent from one job to the other, or they will not be paid
by their employers for the time of traveling.
It is further understood that when men are requested to re-
port on any job, and the work is not ready, and the contractor,
or his representative, requests the men to wait on the job, they
shall be paid for the time they are waiting.
Article XX.
Contractors who take men out of town on work which is in
the jurisdiction of this agreement, and when the men are com-
pelled to remain idle for six days, their board shall be paid by
the employer; otherwise the employer shall ship the men back
to their local.
Article XXI.
Finishers' helpers shall be employed at the ratio of one
helper to each finisher.
Article XXII.
This Union forbids piece work of all kinds.
Article XXIII.
There shall be no laborers employed on the job, except to
carry bolts, rivets or coal; all other work is to be done by
members of Local 13.
176
Article XXIV.
The scale of wages shall be as follows: Men classed as
bridgemen, sixty (60) cents per hour, $4.80 per day. For
eight-hour men, classed as finishers, sixty (60) cents per hour,
or $4.80 per day for eight hours. Men classed as finishers'
helpers, forty-five (45) cents per hour, or $3.60 for eight hours.
Apprentices shall be paid according to their ability.
Article XXV.
Territory covered by this agreement shall be the County of
Philadelphia and two hundred (200) miles from the County of
Philadelphia where no organization holds jurisdiction over, as
was granted them by the International Association of Bridge
and Structural Iron Workers of America.
Article XXVI.
This agreement to go into effect on May 1, 1912, and to
continue until April 30, 1913, and from there on from year
to year, unless by mutual consent, and on three months' notice
by either party shall this agreement be discontinued after
April 30, 1913.
Signed for Local 13 by
By..
Signed for Contractor
By.
No signed agreements.
Pittsburgh.
177
WORKING RULES RELATING TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF
LOCAL UNION No. 3, oF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS.
Article I.
Eight hours shall constitute a day's work in the Pittsburgh
district. Time and one-half time will be allowed for time
worked in excess of the hours fixed upon as constituting a
day's work for one shift, except as follows:
Article II.
On Sunday through the year, Decoration Day, Fourth of
July, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day, or the days ob-
served as those holidays, and after 12 o'clock noon Saturday
throughout the year double time shall be allowed. No work
shall be performed on Labor Day, except in case of dire neces-
sity, where the property of the employer is in jeopardy, and
where the services of the men is required to place the same
in safe condition. Double time will be allowed for any time
worked on Labor Day.
Article III.
When two or more shifts are employed on the same work,
the men in each shift shall be paid the regular straight time
rate of wages per hour. The hours for each shift may be
arranged between the employer and workmen, as may be most
advantageous, but the hours of employment on each shift will
not be less than the hours fixed upon as constituting a day's
work. When one shift is employed, the hours of work shall be
between 8 a. m. and 5 p. m., except in cases of necessity, or
when otherwise mutually agreed upon between the employer
and employes.
Article IV.
Workmen will be paid every week at 12 o'clock noon Satur-
day on job. It will be the general custom to withhold not
178
more than one and a half (1) days' time to enable the
employer to prepare the pay roll.
Article V.
When any workman is discharged or laid off, he shall be
paid in full within twenty-four hours on the job. When a
workman leaves the service of an employer of his own accord,
he will receive the pay due him on the next regular pay day.
Article VI.
There shall be no limitation placed upon the amount of
work to be performed by any workman during working hours.
There shall be no restriction on the part of the Union or
workmen as to the use of machinery or tools, or the number
of men required to handle or operate the same.
Article VII.
There shall be no restriction on the part of the Union or
workmen as to the employment of foremen. The employer
may employ on one piece of work as many foremen as in his
judgment are necessary for the safe, expeditious and econom-
ical handling of the same, regardless of whether such foremen
are members of the Union or not, so long as such foremen do
not perform the work of journeymen, or act in the capacity of
"Pusher," except where a foreman is employed temporarily,
for the sole purpose of retaining him in the service of the
employer.
Article VIII.
No person other than those authorized by the employer shall
interfere with workmen during working hours, and in no case
shall stewards, when employed on the work, transact any busi-
ness in connection with his Union, or interfere with other
workmen during working hours.
179
Article IX.
This Union, upon demand, is to furnish the employer with
a sufficient number of competent workmen to meet his require-
ments, and in case the Union fails to do so, the employer
shall be at liberty to employ other men. In this case mutually
satisfactory arrangements, as to the transportation, are to be
made with Secretary of the Local Union in advance.
Article X.
Workmen classified as Bridgemen, and entitled to receive
the rate of wages as agreed upon for Bridgemen, shall be
skilled mechanics, and shall be competent to perform such
work as the erection, rigging and handling of travelers and
other important appliances used in the erection of work, the
erecting in place and connecting of members entering perma-
nently into a structure, and driving of field rivets under com-
petent foremen.
Article XI.
Apprentices may be employed in the proportion of one Ap-
prentice to every seven (7) Bridgemen, and such Apprentice
shall serve on erection work for a period of not less than one
year and a half before being eligible for membership in a
Bridge and Structural Iron Workers' Union, and before re-
ceiving the rate of wages agreed upon for Bridgemen. No
man shall be employed as an Apprentice who is over thirty-five
years of age. Apprentices shall perform such duties as may
be assigned to them by the foreman in charge; the intention
being that the Apprentices shall be given such varied duties
from time to time as will enable him to learn the trade and fit
him for the position of a Bridgeman. Apprentices shall re-
ceive not less than 40 cents an hour.
Article XII.
Laborers may be employed for the unloading and handling
of materials in yards and storage points, so long as such mate-
180
rial is handled by hand, and no rigging or machinery is used
to handle same.
Article XIII.
In case of removal of old structures, members of the Union
shall be employed to land, dismember and remove same, except
such material as can be removed by hand, and no rigging or
machinery is used in removing same.
Article XIV.
Such work as the framing, placing and removing of false-
work, pile-driving, and the framing and erection of derricks
and travelers, and the assembling and erection of all iron and
steel in reinforced concrete work in the field, shall be per-
formed by members of the Union.
Article XV.
Framing and placing of wooden decks, including ties and
guard rails; the placing and adjusting of operating machinery
in draw bridges, and the machinery in other structures, shall
be performed by such men as employer may select.
Article XVI.
In case of misunderstandings or disputes arising between
an employer and his workmen, the matter in question shall be
submitted to arbitration, locally, without strikes, lockouts or
stoppage of work, pending a decision of the arbitrators, con-
sisting of three disinterested persons, one to be appointed by
the employers, one by the Union, and the third by the two
first selected, whose decision shall be rendered within six (6)
days, and be final and binding on both parties, and not subject
to appeal.
Un
None of the definite articles of these rules shall be subject
to arbitration.
Article XVII.
This Agreement shall be effective from May 1, 1914.
181
Article XVIII.
The jurisdiction of Local Union No. 3 shall not exceed one
hundred and thirty-five (135) miles in radius from City Hall,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Article XIX.
The wages of Bridgemen shall be 62 cents per hour.
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE
ARCHITECTURAL IRON LEAGUE
AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION BRIDGE AND STRUCTURAL IRON
WORKERS' UNION No. 1 OF CHICAGO.
MAY 1, 1912, TO APRIL 30, 1915.
AGREEMENT.
This agreement, made this 30th day of April, 1912, by and
between the Architectural Iron League et al. (Employers),
party of the first part, and the Bridge and Structural Iron
Workers' Union No. 1 of Chicago, of the International Asso-
ciation Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, party of the sec-
ond part, for the purpose of preventing strikes and lockouts
and facilitating a peaceful adjustment of all grievances and
disputes which may, from time to time, arise between the em-
ployer and mechanics in the Bridge and Structural Iron and
Steel trade.
The territory covered by this agreement is a radius of fifty
miles from Chicago City Hall.
2. NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.
Witnesseth, that both parties to this agreement hereby cove-
nant and agree that they will not tolerate nor recognize any
182
right of any other association, union, council or body of men,
not directly parties hereto, international, national or local, to
interfere in any way with the carrying out of this agreement;
and that they will use all lawful means to compel their mem-
bers to comply with the arbitration agreement and working
rules as jointly agreed upon and adopted.
3. PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH THIS AGREEMENT IS BASED.
Both parties hereto this day hereby adopt the following
principles as an absolute basis for their joint working rules,
and to govern the action of the Joint Arbitration Board as
hereinafter provided for:
1. That there shall be no limitation as to the amount of
work a man shall perform during his working day.
2. That there shall be no restriction of the use of machinery
or tools.
3. That there shall be no restriction of the use of any manu-
factured material except prison-made.
4. That no person shall have the right to interfere with
workmen during working hours.
5. That the use of apprentices shall not be prohibited.
6. That the foreman shall be the agent of the employer.
7. That all workmen are at liberty to work for whomsoever
they see fit.
8. That all employers are at liberty to employ and dis-
charge whomsoever they see fit.
4. HOURS.
Eight hours shall constitute a day's work, except on Satur-
days during the months of April, May, June, July, August,
September, October and November, when work may stop at 12
o'clock noon, with four hours' pay for the day.
5. OVERTIME.
Time and one-half shall be paid for overtime between the
hours of 7 and 8 a. m. and between the hours of 4:30 or 5 and
183
7 p. m., and for Saturday afternoons during the months of
April, May, June, July, August, September, October and No-
vember. Where only one shift of men are employed on the
job, if the same men work after 7 o'clock p. m. double time
shall be paid. Where a single shift is employed, beginning
work after 5 p. m., time and one-half shall be paid for the first
eight hours and double time thereafter.
6.
HOLIDAYS.
Double time to be paid for work done on Sundays through-
out the year and also for work done on the following five holi-
days (or days celebrated as such): Decoration Day, Fourth
of July, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day and New Year's
Day. Sunday and holiday time to cover any time during the
twenty-four hours of said calendar days.
7. EXTRA SHIFTS.
Where work is carried on with two or three shifts of men,
working eight hours each, then only single time shall be paid
for both night and day work during week days, and double
time for Sundays and the above mentioned holidays. Where
two or three shifts are employed double time shall be paid for
all overtime. The regular workday shall be between the hours
of 8 a. m. and 5 p. m. Where more than one shift is employed
the second shift shall commence work not later than 5 p. m.
Where three shifts are employed seven and one-half hours
shall constitute a day's work for all shifts, for which a full
regular day's pay shall be paid.
8. LABOR DAY.
No work shall be done on Labor Day.
9. WAGES.
The minimum rate of wages to be paid shall be sixty-eight
(.68) cents per hour from April 30, 1912, up to and including
April 30, 1915, payable in lawful money of the United States
or checks. All workmen in this trade shall demand and re-
ceive the wages called for in this agreement.
184
10. PAY DAY.
It is agreed that journeymen shall be paid at least every two
weeks if paid in currency, or once every week if paid in checks,
as agreed between the employer and the employes on the job.
Payment shall be made on the job not later than 5 p. m.
every other Tuesday when paid in currency, or, if payment in
check is desired, the foreman must be notified not later than
Saturday noon preceding.
11. TIME AND METHOD OF PAYMENT OF WAGES.
All wages are to be paid on the work in full up to and in-
cluding the Saturday night preceding pay day. Where a
workman quits work of his own accord, he shall receive his pay
on the next regular pay day. When a man is discharged, he
shall be either paid in cash on the work, or given a time check
immediately, which shall be paid at once on presentation at the
office of the employer, and if he is not paid promptly upon his
arrival at the office, and if he shall remain there during work-
ing hours, he shall be paid the minimum wages for such wait-
ing time, Sundays and holidays excepted.
12. BRANCHES OF WORK COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT.
The following branches of work are covered by this agree-
ment: The erection and construction of bridges, structural
steel and cast iron, including steel foundation beams other
than rails in buildings, viaducts, steel stacks, coal bunkers, bins
or hoppers, whether used for coal, grain, ore, stone or any
other material. Hanging ceilings, where dimensions of angles,
tees, etc., exceed one and one-half inches. Structural iron and
steel work for support of boilers, hoppers, elevators, bank or
deposit vaults, derricks, cranes and gas holders, and the jack-
ing up of all elevated roads and bridges, wrecking of bridges,
viaducts and structural steel and iron work of fireproof build-
ings and the erection and removal of all false work from
bridges and viaducts, all cast iron or steel mullions except
those in store fronts; all frames for openings except those
Categ
185
where iron or calomine doors are to be hung; all porches or
verandas and balconies except stairs, railings and wire mesh
work; all skylights or pent houses except shell ornamental cast
work or operating devices; also structural work to support
escalators; all cell jail work except doors, stair work, balconies,
brackets, wire mesh and bar work; all canopies except where
ornamental shell work is attached or intended to be attached;
all ventilators, elevator pockets, all exterior wheel or corner
guards, overhead travelers made of eye beams or channels;
structural work for conveyors for coal, ashes or any other
material; all structural steel and iron work for sidewalks and
the framing of travelers and derricks. All bulkhead or sluice
gate work in connection with pumping stations or dams and
locks, also all necessary changes pertaining to this classifica-
tion of work, such as drilling, chipping, bending, etc.
The setting of isolated pieces, such as plates, caps, corbels,
lintels, etc., may be done by other mechanics.
It is further agreed that after the material has been un-
loaded at the site it shall be handled by members of the party
of the second part. When material is unloaded by tackles or
derricks, it shall be done by members of the party of the sec-
ond part.
There shall be no infringement on the noon hour.
Piece work shall not be permitted.
If the party of the first part sublets any portion of his
work covered by this agreement, the sub-contractor shall be
subject to the terms of this agreement.
13.
No member or members affiliated with the second party shall
leave the work of the party of the first part because non-union
men in some other line of work or trade are employed on build-
ing or job where said second party is employed.
14. FOREMAN.
The foreman-if a union man-shall not be subject to the
rules of this union while acting as foreman, and no fines shall
186
be entered against him by his union for any cause whatever,
while acting in such capacity; it being understood that a fore-
man shall be a competent mechanic in his trade and be subject
to the decisions of the Joint Arbitration Board. There shall
be but one foreman on each job.
15. STEWARD.
Whenever two or more journeymen members of the second
party are working together, a steward may be selected by
them from their number to represent them, who shall, while
acting as steward, be subject only to the rules and decisions
of the Joint Arbitration Board. No salary shall be paid to a
journeyman for acting as steward. He shall not leave his
work or interfere with workmen during working hours and
shall perform his duties as steward so as not to interfere with
his duty to his employer. He shall always, while at work,
carry a copy of the working rules with him.
16.
APPRENTICES.
Each employer shall have the right to teach his trade to
apprentices, and the said apprentices shall serve for a period
of not less than
years, as prescribed in the apprentice
rules to be agreed upon by the Joint Arbitration Board, and
shall be subject to control of said Joint Arbitration Board.
17.
ARBITRATION.
Both parties hereto agree that any and all disputes between
any member or members of the Employers' Association on
the one side, and any member or members of the Union, on the
other side, during the life of this agreement, shall be settled
by arbitration in the manner herein provided for, and for that
purpose both parties hereto agree that they will, at their
annual election of each year, elect an Arbitration Committee to
serve one year and until their successors are elected and quali-
fied. In case of death, expulsion, removal or disqualification
of a member or members on the Arbitration Committee, such
vacancy shall be filled by the Association or Union at its next
187
regular meeting. The Arbitration Committee for each of the
two parties hereto shall consist of five members, and they shall
meet not later than the fourth Tuesday of January of each
year, in joint session, when they shall organize a Joint Arbi-
tration Board by electing a president, vice-president, secre-
tary, treasurer and umpire. The Joint Arbitration Board
shall have full power to enforce this agreement entered into
between the parties hereto, and to make and enforce all lawful
working rules governing both parties. No strikes, lockouts or
stoppage of work shall be resorted to pending the decision of
the Joint Board. When a dispute or grievance arises between
a journeyman and employer (parties hereto), or an apprentice
and his employer, the question at issue shall be submitted in
writing to the presidents of the two organizations, and upon
their failure to agree and settle it, or if one party to the dis-
pute is dissatisfied with the decision, it shall then be submitted
to the Joint Arbitration Board at their next regular meeting.
If the Joint Arbitration Board is unable to agree the umpire
shall be requested to sit with them, and, after he has heard
the evidence, cast the deciding vote. All verdicts shall be de-
cided by majority vote by secret ballot, be rendered in writing
and be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute.
18. WHO ARE DISQUALIFIED TO SERVE ON ARBITRATION COM-
MITTEE.
No member who is not actively engaged in the trade, or
foreman, nor holds a public office, either elective or appointive,
under the municipal, county, state or national government,
shall be eligible to act as the representative in this trade arbi-
tration board, and any member shall become disqualified to
act as member of this trade Joint Arbitration Board and cease
to be a member thereof immediately upon his election or ap-
pointment to any other public office or employment.
-
19. UMPIRE.
An umpire shall be selected who is in no wise affiliated or
identified with the building industry, who is not an employe
188
nor an employer of labor, nor an incumbent of a political
elective office.
20. MEETINGS.
The Joint Arbitration Board shall meet to transact routine
business the first Tuesday in each month, but special meetings
may be called on three days' notice by the president upon ap-
plication of three members.
The Joint Arbitration Board has the right to summon any
member or members affiliated with either party hereto against
whom complaints are lodged for breaking this agreement or
working rules, and also appear as witness. The summons
shall be handed to the president of the association or union to
which the member belongs, and he shall cause the member or
members to be notified to appear before the Joint Arbitration
Board on date set.
21. FINES FOR NON-ATTENDANCE.
Failure to appear when notified, except (in the opinion of
the Board) valid excuse is given, shall subject a member to a
fine of twenty-five dollars for the first offense, fifty for the
second and suspension for the third.
22. SALARIES.
The salary of each representative of the Joint Arbitration
Board shall be paid by the Association or Union he represents.
23. QUORUM.
Seven members present shall constitute a quorum in the
Joint Arbitration Board, but the chairman of each of the two
Arbitration Committees shall have the right to cast the vote in
the Joint Arbitration Board for any absent member of his
committee.
24. STOPPAGE OF WORK AND PENALTIES
No work under construction by any member or party to
this agreement shall be stopped for any cause whatsoever, ex-
189
cepting by joint order signed by the presidents of both organ-
izations, parties to this agreement, or the Joint Arbitration
Board, and any member or members affiliated with either of
the two parties hereto, violating any part of this agreement
or working rules established by the Joint Arbitration Board,
shall be subject to a fine of from ten to two hundred dollars,
which fine shall be collected by the president of the Associa-
tion or Union to which the offending member or members
belong, and by him paid to the treasurer of the Joint Arbitra-
tion Board not later than thirty days after the date of the levy-
ing of the fine.
If the fine is not paid by the offender or offenders, it shall
be paid out of the treasury of the Association or Union of
which the offender or offenders were members at the time the
fine was levied against him or them, and within sixty days of
date of levying same; or in lieu thereof the Association or
Union to which he or they belonged shall suspend the offender
or offenders and officially certify such suspension to the Joint
Arbitration Board within sixty days from the time of fining,
and the Joint Arbitration Board shall cause the suspension de-
cree to be read by the presidents of both the Association and
Union at their next regular meeting and then post said decree
for sixty days in the meeting rooms of the Association and
Union. No one who has been suspended from membership in
the Association or Union for neglect or refusal to abide by the
decisions of the Joint Arbitration Board can be again admit-
ted to membership except by paying his fine or by unanimous
consent of the Joint Arbitration Board.
All fines assessed by the Joint Arbitration Board and col-
lected during the year shall be equally divided between the
two parties hereto by the Joint Arbitration Board at the last
regular meeting in December.
25. RULES FOR ARBITRATION BOARD AND FOR PARTIES HERETO.
All disputes arbitrated under this agreement must be settled
by the Joint Arbitration Board, in conformity with the princi-
ples and agreements herein contained, and nothing herein can
190
be changed by the Joint Arbitration Board. No by-laws or
rules conflicting with this agreement, or working rules agreed
upon, shall be passed or enforced by either party hereto
against any of its affiliated members in good standing.
26.
TERMINATION.
It is agreed by the parties hereto that this agreement shall
be in force between the parties hereto from April 30, 1912,
to and including April 30, 1915.
27.
Any individual, firm or corporation signing this agreement
and agreeing to abide thereby, and not affiliated with any
organization connected with the Building Construction Em-
ployers' Association, may, with the consent of a majority of
the Arbitration Board and upon payment of an initiation fee
of $50 and $25 per annum to the treasurer of the Joint Arbi-
tration Board, receive the benefits of arbitration herein con-
tained.
These funds to pay expenses of the Joint Arbitration Board,
and, if any balance is left at the annual meeting, same to be
divided equally between the Bridge and Structural Iron Work-
ers' Union No. 1 and the Architectural Iron League et al.
All parties to this agreement desiring to send members of
the second party outside of fifty miles radius, a minimum wage
of four dollars and fifty cents ($4.50) for a nine hours' day
shall be paid.
On behalf of the party of the first part:
EDWARD HAUPT,
ADDISON E. WELLS,
ALBERT E. Dennis,
GEORGE W. GEARY,
JOHN GRIFFITHS.
On behalf of the party of the second part:
P
JOHN L. WARD,
GEORGE M. CLARK,
JAMES H. MARTIN,
JAMES COUGHLIN,
JOSEPH CARMODY.
191
CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS
OF
NATIONAL ERECTORS' ASSOCIATION.
CONSTITUTION.
Article I.-Name.
The name of this Association shall be National Erectors'
Association.
Article II.-Membership.
Section 1. Any individual, firm or corporation engaged
wholly or in part in the erection of iron and steel bridges,
buildings or other structural iron and steel work, shall be
eligible to membership upon agreeing to support the principles
embodied in the Constitution of this Association.
Sec. 2. The individual, firm or corporation desiring mem-
bership shall make application in the form prescribed by the
Executive Committee.
A three-fourths' (3) vote of the General Executive Commit-
tee in favor of an applicant shall elect.
Sec. 3. Membership may be terminated upon payment of
all dues and assessments to date of termination, as follows:
(a) By resignation after three (3) months' written notice
to the General Executive Committee.
(b) By permanent discontinuance of the member's busi-
ness.
(c) By a three-fourths' (3) vote of the General Executive
Committee.
Article III.-Object.
The object of this Association shall be the institution and
maintenance of the Open Shop principle in the employment
of labor in the erection of steel and iron bridges and buildings
and other structural steel and iron work.
192
Article IV.-Government.
The government of this Association shall be vested in a
General Executive Committee and in District Executive Com-
mittees.
K
The General Executive Committee shall consist of at least
five (5) members, and not more than nine (9) members, to be
elected annually by the members, each member of the Associa-
tion being entitled to one (1) vote for every one hundred dol-
lars ($100.00), or majority fraction of one hundred dollars
($100.00), dues paid annually; provided, that every member
shall have at least one (1) vote; and provided, that not more
than one (1) individual from a single firm shall have member-
ship on the Committee.
The General Executive Committee shall from time to time
appoint and fix the salaries and terms of employment of a
Commissioner, as the general executive officer, and of such
other employes as it may consider necessary.
Article V.-Dues and Assessments.
The expenses of the Association shall be met by monthly
dues (and special assessments, when necessary), the amounts
of which shall be fixed by the General Executive Committee
proportionately to the average number of workmen employed
in erection work by each member.
Article VI.-Meetings.
The General Executive Committee and the District Execu-
tive Committees shall call all meetings of the whole associa-
tion membership and of the district membership respectively,
and shall fix the time, manner and place for holding same.
Article VII.-Amendments.
This Constitution, except Article III, may be amended at
any time by a three-fourths' (2) vote of the entire membership
of the Association, provided that written notice, including a
copy of the proposed amendment, shall be given each member
at least thirty (30) days in advance of the date of voting
thereon.
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