) TIBI NON **:.::.:.: ::. :: HABEO Q11 OF Τ Η Ε L A W N A T U RE NATIONS 96 Ο F AN D Eight BOOKS. Written in L A T I N by the Baron PUFFENDORF, Counſellour of State to His late SWEDISH Majeſty, and to the late King of PRUSSIA Done into ENGLISH by BASIL KENNET, D. D. late Preſident of Corpus Chriſti College in Oxford. The THIRD EDITION: Carefully Corrected, with Two T A BLES To which are now added All the large Notes of Mr. B A R BEYR A C, Tranſlated from his Laſt Edition ; printed at Amſterdam, in 1712. Printed for R. Sare, R. Bonwicke, T. Goodwyn, J. Walthoe, M. Wotton, S. Manſhip, R. Wilkin, B.Tooke, R. Smith, T. Ward, and W. Churchill. 1717. JX 2136 7717 TO THE RIGHT HONOUR ABLE or nighet Sir Nathan Wright, Knight, LORD-KEEPER DO OF THE Die of Great Seal OF ENGLAND One of the LORDS of Her MAJEST Y's moſt Honourable PRI V Y COUNCIL, GC. T My Lord, botos lle dinge HE Author and Subject, here Pre- ſented to Your Lordihip, have, in Themſelves, the beſt of Claims to ſo Great a Protection: For, neither can He, whoſe known Capacity, Induſtry, and Integrity, renderd Him the Ornament of His own Profeſſion, and of His Prince's Council, apply Himſelf with more Succeſs, than to One, who has riſen, by the fame Steps, to a Nobler Eminence of Honour and Employ- ment; nor ought any other, than the Guar- dian and Diſpenſer of Publick Equity, be Acknowledg d as the Patron of the Law of Nature and Nations But the Ambition of this Addreſs was alike necdful, in reſpect a 2 of The Epiſtle Dedicatory. of the Tranſlators; as an Occaſion of acknow- ledging the Influence, which they feel from Your Lordihip's Authority, with regard both to their Function and their Studies: Your Lordihip eſteeming it no leſs worthy a Part of Your Character and Office, to Support the moſt Primitive Church, and the moſt Regular Univerſities; than to Preſide over the Juſtice of the Wiſeft State, or to Direct the Policy of the Happieſt Reign. I am, With all Duty and Reſpect, Dudu bre zone A IH SUSIbro MTOY bom orange Your Lordſhip's moſt Obliged 18910 fan clubul Soo Won Storiw of Humble Servant, total HOTLIO 2 Quai to buonondaior1 avro Ceris 2190908 SW DomiH vigas E 03 00 Bolsos yd. Delinesc orlw 90 volam bas son bas uomo 70 ongoin toldot sobito BASIL KENNET. od tipa bolcs to clic! bas reib od TOT PIOTIS. I oslo as bobeiwon'.A 10 Τ Η Ε egler o 10.10-28 18105 PREF A CE 1 Prough many have English con soggiorno to zahoitin THE ร้าว (3 4.3 at at bino doit mo broi 1901799.913 huo dyne with ancius i sidoto 1313? Po, podlien Arsip Not sou would send oss visto con slo T is a Dilemma frequently urged againſt Verſions of this kind, that when a Subječt lies remote from Vulgar Confideration, Perſons of Learning will purſue the Knowledge of it in the Learned Languages, whilſt others muſt remain equally Strangers to it in all . Which yet abates, proportionably of its Force, according as either the Original Performance has been leſs fortunate in Stile; or as the Improvements of the Modern Tongue have been able to extend themſelves to the abſtruſeſt Reaſonings, and to Speak even of Philafophy with the Advantages of Eloquence. As there is a Concurrence of theſe two Conditions , to juſtify the preſent Attempt; fo the ſecond of them, which, thro Perſonal Inability, may have been impair’d, ſeems yet to be recompenſed, by a pe- culiar Weight and Prevalency in the firſt . For the Commendation of our Author's Judge ment hath Jcarce been more Univerfal , than the Cenfure of his Compofition ;, which though, by Ally acknowledgʻd to be expreſive, yet to moſt appears to difficult and diſcouraging, ; . left theſe Irregularities, as the Token's of its Violence. It is true, He has not fail'd in the very Entrance of His Work, to apologize for this Defect of Ornament ; but the Plea He offers is, what may better excuſe the neceſſary roughneſs of a Subject, than the particu- lar Unhappineſs of a Writer. Another viſible Diſadvantage there was, which calld for Re- lief. Our Author having publiſh'd the firſt Draught of this great Undertaking in the Year MDCLX, with the Title of Elementa Juriſprudentiæ, having alſo employ'd the La- bour and Colle£tions of Twelve Years, in bringing it to its preſent Method and Name, was not content to have drawn together all Aſſiſtances , which were of direct and immediate Uſe, from the Stores of Morality , Politicks and Lap; but engaged himſelf in a longer and wider Search, running thro’ the whole Circle of Philological Authors, Ancient and Mo- dern, and diſpoſing, under the Heads of His Work, the moſt remote Examples, and il- luſtrations. Hence every Page came to be loaded, not only with numerous Citations at large, but with diſorderly Marks of Addition, Reference, Compariſon, and the like: as if the Confuſion of a ſwelling Margin had run over, and diſcharg'd it ſelf upon the Text. Thus the Periods were frequently disjointed, the Argument interrupted or obſcured, and the greateſt part of the main Body thrown into the diſagreeable Figure of a Common- Place. Some THE PRE FACE. Some Endeavours have been here applied towards the leffening of both theſe Im- perfections. In reſpect of Style, it is hoped, that the Mettal, how rude ſoever and in- capable of being poliſh'd 10 exact Beauty, fet after a ſecond melting, may appear leſs deform’d, and may paſs into more General Uſe. But tis beyond Doubt, that the other Inequality has been farther rectified, by our caſting under the Page the needleſs and mil- Jhapen maſs of Foreign Supplies : which it might have been no unpardonable boldneſs ut- terly to have pared away ; but that we ought to be cautious of practiſing upon an Author, and to take care, leaſt by cutting off an Excreſcency, we ſhould endanger the Life of a Deſign. Cuſtom has not ſo far prevail'd over Decency, as to engage the Tranſlators in pro- claiming the Juſtice of their Choice, and Merit of their Author. Much leſs would they ground his Charaĉter on the invidious Argument of Compariſon. To contend with the admired Names of Grotius, Selden, and the Right Feverend the preſent Lord Biſhop of Peterborough, is what He ought to decline in point of Modeſty, if not of Safety. Yet this ſeems to have fallen out to his Advantage, that no one of thoſe great Men attempted a compleat Body of Moral, or Political Do&trine. The Firſt chose rather to inſiſt on Authorities , taken from the Hiſtoaians, Civilians and Canoniſts than on Philoſophical Deductions, from the Nature of Men, and the Reafons of Things . The Second entred no farther into this Subject, than as the Jewiſh Inftitutions dire&ted His View. My Lord of Peterborough, having overthrown the deceitful Fabrick of a late Treacherous Builder, and ſettled the Science of Morality, on its trueft and deepeſt Foundations, left the Superſtructure to be rais’d by Inferior Hands. Thus, while each had a particular Boundary to his own Enquiries , All contributed to the Perfection of our Author's Syſtem : in which, as He abftains not from grateful Remembrances of theſe, and other Learned Benefa&tors, ſo He now teaches the Publiſher of this Tranſlation moft gladly to acknowledge the Favour and Aſiſtance of his Friends ; of whom Two eſpecial- ly, Reverend Mr. Percivale, and the Reverend Mr. Itchiner, by entirely rendring the Fifth and Eighth Books, have, with the ſame Kindneſs , accepted a Part in his Burthen, and allow'd him a Share in their Reputation and Succeſs . Avlageret social it to get mor ons 9 odstotomasto o Bota salitang gihisanet, Boden qochsalz - rot bolna shida ett ross synda ehf Ci su citata la o te feriegod N al in bed scii Bicoletne olis general esiinbrint samola to olut sci dzia XIOGM 206 Silti holange nociones 2x scritto 2 Bollo hos miod SIN and test hits Bouto **** does it in vuldugot it on the grad os taistos 101 buvo poparts Bulatio 1 buah bila M to 23001e ses autor? Mbus immers ni mechanin biyololi to store studie acht ordo personas maya yehier It is a conservadores do it to its schon maisons stish in 250 prosent dans plomo jos joghool od otehogan para 2325384 is so 900137 Double Politico THE ods 71 20 acto trages in a brutopil don tifosete bac sie w grillger! a to sci su koro) seis fora do xo 1990 mesta 800 y och andriozibulishompott som hon och and - rose to tough disegnilobs gift close se esordt voor jo tug pory act hoc 90019 0 Τ Η Ε CON C Ο Ν Τ Ε Ν Τ S S 2. T on. Sect. I. 2. enou A INOM BOOK I. Jest to not liom CHAP. I. 6. Whether any thing be good or bad before ang Inftitution. Of the Origine and Variety of Moral 7. Whether Shame be a Proof of it. sagt Entities. 8. Of the Extent of Moral Actions as to the Quality 9. Grotius's Opinion conſider’d. V Sect. 1. HE Introduction. Man's Life is govern'd by Moral 10. In Moral Quantities there is a Latitude. Entities, 11. What is called Morally Certain. 3. What are Moral Entities, what is their Cauſe and End. 4. The way of producing them. Their Inſtituti CHA P. III. Their Operation, and from whence. 5. Their Diviſion. Of the Underſtanding of Man, as it concurs to 6. Their State what, Moral Actions. 7. Their natural and adventitious State. 8. Peace and Wür, and bow manifold? 9. Determinate. States. T Wo Faculties of the Underſtanding. What is the Genius of the Repreſenta- 10. States having reſpect to Time. tive Foculty of the Underſtanding. 11. Certain Precepts concerning States, 3. The Underſtanding natural apprehends Things 12. The Diviſions of ſingle Perſons. Moral rightly. 13. And Compound. 4. Conſcience wbut it is, and how manifold. 14. Some Precepts about Moral Perſons. s. A right and probable Conſci nce. Is. Feigned Perſons. 6. Rules for a probable Conſcience. 16. Moral Things. 7. Rules how to chuſe Things profitable. 17. The Diviſion of Moral Modes. 8. A dubious Conſcience. 18. Titles, 9. A ſcrupulus One. 10. Ignorance, what it is, and how manifold. 20. Right. 21. The remaining Moral Qualities. II. Error, of how many Sorts. 22. Moral Quantities. 13. Speculative Error about necelſary Aktions. 23. How Moral Entities periſh. 14. Or indifferent ones. 15. Practical Error. 16. Error in an ill Action. CHAP. II. Of the Certainty of Moral Science. CHAP. IV. tad XI Seet. I. Mº OST Men deny that there is a des Of the Will of Man, as it concurs in or con- monſtrative Certainty in Moral Sciences. Jents to Moral Actions. 2. What is a Demonſtration. 3. The Principles of a Demonſtration. O F the Acts of the Will. 4. Demonſtration agrees to that Moral Science Of the Liberty of the Will. only, that treats of the Goodneſs or Evil 3. That the Will muſt of neceſſity be indifferent of Man's Actions. i. e. not forced to chule Good or Evil. 5. The Uncertainty of Moral Things is ob 4. How the Will is inclined to good Things, and jectedo to Goodneſs in general, 19. Power. Sect. 1. 2. Et S. The The C O N T E N T S. 16. The Matter of Laws. 17. Who is obliged by a Law? 18. The Diviſion of a Law? s. Certain Diſpoſitions of the Body ftir up the Will. 6. As alſo fome Habits. 7. And Paſſions. 8. Alſo Intemperance. 9. Actions of a Mixt Nature. 10. Involuntary and forced Actions. CHAP. VII . Sect. i. Hom W. Of the Qualities of Moral Actions. CH A P. V. OW many are the Qualities of Moral Of Moral Actions in General, and of Actions. their Application to the Agent, or their 2. A neceſſary, lawful Action. 3. The Goodneſs or Evil of tetions, in what Aptnefs to be Imputed. they confijt. 4. A good Action muſt have all things requiſite, an evil one is made Such, by wanting one HAT & Moral Action is. Condition. 2. Its Matter. 5. GOD can't be the cauſe of any Evil. 3. Its Form, where we treat of a Moral Cauſe. 0. Juſtice is either in Perſons or Actions, 4. A Moral A&tion conſider'd in it ſelf is a poſi 7. What is the Juſtice of A&tions. tive Entity. 8. Univerſal and particular fufti:e. s. The Cauſe or Ground why a thing may be im 9. Juſtice diſtributive. puted or not. 10. Commutative. 6. Things not to be imputed to a Man are Things 1. Grotius's Opinion about Juftice. wan neceſary. 12. Ariſtotle's Fudgment upon the ſame. 7. The Operations of our Vegetable Faculties. 13. Hobbes's Opinion of Tuſtice and Wrong. 8. Things impoſſible. 14. What is an unjuſt Action. 9. Things compelled, where meer Execution is 15. What an Injury is. treated of. 16. An Injury is done by Deſign and Choice only, 10. Things done through Ignorance. where the Nature of a Fault is treated of. 11. Things done, or ſeen in a Dream. 17. No Wrong is done to any Man, that wills it. 12. Evils to come to pafs. 13. But evil Actions proceeding from an Habit muſt certainly be imputed. 14. How other Men's actions may be imputed CH A P. VIII. Of the Quantity [or Eſtimation ] of Moral Actions. CH A P. VI. Sect. 1. HE abſolute Quantity of Moral A&tions. 2. Wbat Intention is requir’d to make Of the Rule of Moral Actions, or of Law an Action good before GOD's Tri- in General. bunal. 3. What Intention is good in human Judicatures. Law differs from Counſel. 4. What is a perfect and compleat Action, 2. From a Bargain or Covenant. s. The Relative Quantity of Actions. 3. And from Right. 4. What a Law is. À s. What an Obligation. CH A P. IX. 6. How it comes to paſs that a Man is obliged. 2. No Man is obliged to himſelf. 8. He that is to be obliged muſt have a Superior. Of the Imputation of Moral Actions. 9. How a Man may lay an Obligation on ano- ther. F actual Imputation. 10. It can't be done by meer Force. 2. Of Imputation thro' Favour. II. Nor by any Excellency of Nature alone. 3. Of Imputation from Debt. 12. What gives greater Force to an Obligation. 4. What can be effectually imputed to another. 13. The Lawgiver and Law ought to be known. 5. Merit, and Demerit what. 14. What are the Eſſential Parts of a Law? 6. How the Effects of Moral Actions may be en 15. What is the permiſſion of a Law? boliſhed. воок. to us. T" 1. A 0 The C Ο Ν Τ Ε Ν Τ S, BOOK II. CHAP. I. . It is not agreeable to the Nature of Man to live without Laws. Sect. 1. " W His Loubtful. Hether a Law may be impoſed on Man, is doubtful. 2. What Freedom of Will is. 3. What ſort of Freedom of Will is in God? 4. What is the Freedom of Beaſts? 5. Man too Noble a Creature to be allow'd ſuch a Freedom 6. The Corruption of ſuch a Freedom. 7. The Variety of Mens Tempers. 8. Man's Natural Weakneſs and Rudeneſs. 13. The Principles of natural Right are diſcover'd by the Light of Reaſon. 14. The true Original of the Law of Nature is derived from the Condition of Man. 15. The Fundamental Law of Nature. 16, 17, 18. Hobbes's Opinion is enquired into. 19. The former Original i: ſufficient. 20. The Obligation of the Law of Nature is from GOD. 21. Of the Establiſhment of the Law of Nature. 22. Some Things are ſaid to be of th, Law of Na- ture reductively and improperly. 23. Whether the Law of Nature is different from the Law of Nations. 24. A Diviſion of the Law of Nature. CH A P. IV. CH A P. II. Of the Natural State of M A N. Of the Duties and Performances of Man towards himſelf; as well in Regard to Sect. I. An's Natural State diverfly conſidered. the Improvement of his Mind, as to 2. His Miſery. the Care of his Body and of his Life. 3. Its Laws and Rights. 4. The State of Nature qualified. 5. Whether it has an Inclination to War. Sect. 1. 'Very Man is to take Care of himſelf. 6. Hobbes affirms it, and his Reaſons are pro- 1.EP 2. In what that Care conſiſts. ducid. 3. The Mind is to be inſtructed in Religion. 7. Men's Relation one to another concludes the 4. And all corrupt Opinions to be rooted out of it. negative 5. The Knowledge of a Man's Self is neceſſary. 8. Hobbes's Reaſons anſwered. 6. A Man ſhould know his soul and its Offices. 9. Reaſon is not to be deny'd its Uſe in the State 7. And how great its Abilities are. of Nature. 8. Nothing above its Abilities may be attempted, 10. The Manners of barbarous Nations do not 9. How much we are to labour after Fame. make up the State of Nature. 10. And how much after Riches. 11. Natural Peace has no need of Covenants. 1. And about Pleaſures. 12. Natural Peace is not to be truſted to. 12. Our Paſſions are to be governed by Reaſon. 13. Of our Study for Learning 14. Of the Care of the Body. 15. Of the Uſe of Life. CHAP. III. 16. What Obligations we are under to preſerve Life. Of the Law of Nature in general: 17. How far Life is to be employed in the Ser- vice of others. 18. Whether it is to be endangered for them. Sect. i. He Connexion 19. Whether Self Murder is Lawful. 2, 2. The Law of Nature is not com. mon to Man and Beaſts. 4. The object of the natural Law is not neceſſary before there is a Law. CHAP. V. , 6. Wbether the natural Law is common to GOD and Man. 7, 8, 9. The natural Law does not depend upon Of Self-Defence. the Conſent of Nations. 10, 11. Whether Profit be the Foundation of Law. Sect. H E Defence of a Man's ſelf is a lawful 12. Whether the Law of Nature appears plain Violence. from the End of the Creation, 2. And is ordain'd by the Law of Nature. T "T" Ta violence * b 3. What The C O N T E N T S. E" 3. What ſort of Defence is allowed in a Natural CH A P. II. State. 4. And wbat ſort in Cities? 5. Whether it is lawful againſt one that Miſtakes. That Men are to be accounted by Nature 6. Tbe time for ſuch Defence in a Natural State. Equal. 7, 8, 9. And how to be ſettled in a Civil State. 10. Of Maiming any part of the Body. Sect. 1. L'Very Man is to account another bis Equal. II. Of Chaſtity. 2. What is a Natural Equality. 12. Of a Box on the Ear. 13. Whether a Man is bound to fly. 3. The Popular Reaſons for it. 14. Whether the Chriſtian Religion commands 4. The Opinion of ſuch an Equality makes Mens otherwiſe. helpful to one another. 15. Slaughter committed in Self-defence, is guilt- 5. How things are to be divided by it among lefs. 6. Men offend againſt it by Pride. 16. Of the Defence of our Goods. 7. And by Affronts offered to others. 17, 18. Of a Nighi.Thief. 8. Whether any be Servants by Nature. 19. Of ſuch Defence as is made by him who has offered the Injury. 9. Whence has proceeded that inequality that is found among Men. many. 2:HOV CH A P. III. CH A P. VI. Of the Common Duties of Humanity. Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity. Sect. 1. Very Man ought to promote the Intereſts of Eu 2. And that either indefinitely. Sect. I. Ow many Kinds of Neceſſity there is. 3. Or definitely by common Humanity. Wherein the Right and Privilege of 4. A lefſer ſort of Examples, viz. Neceflity conſiſt s. 5. Of allowing a way through another's Land, 3. What Right it gives every One over himſelf, 6. And for Carriage of Goods, and directly over others. 7. Whether Toll may be required for ſuch a 4. And what indirectly. Pallage. 5, 6, 7. What Right it confers over other Mens 8. Of our touching upon a ſtrange Shore. Goods. 9. Of entertaining Strangers. 8. What we may do to Others Goods to preſerve 10. Of allowing a Settlement to Foreigners. our own Goods, H. Of granting a Market. 12. Whether a Man be bound to buy a Strangers Goods. 13. Of permitting Marriages. 14. Whether any ſingle Perſon may be denyed BOOK III. CH A P. 1. what is common to all. 15. Of Beneficence. 16. Of a Grateful, That no Man be hurt ; and if a Damage 17. And ungrateful Mind. be done to any Man, that Reparation be made. CH AP. IV. Sect. 1. T Hat no Man ought to do any Damage to 1.'T Har another, or his concerns. 2. That if any be done, it ought to be Repaired. 3. What a Damage or Hurt is. 4. Who are they that do an Hurt. 5. How ſuch as hurt others are obliged. 6. How many ways a Damage may be done. 7. An Example of Reparation in a Murderer. 8. In one that has maimed another. 9. In an Adulterer. 10. In a Raviſher. 11. In a Thief. Of the Duty of keeping Faith, and the Diverſity of Obligations to it. Sect. I. Time In Humane Societies Here muſt be Covenants and Agreements in all Humane Societies, 2. Covenants are to be kept. .3. Obligations are natural or adventitious 4. Atheiſm deſtroys all Natural Obligations. 5. A Natural or Civil Obligation. 6. What is the Force of each of them. 7. A Perpetual and Temporary Obligation. 8. Obligations not mutual. 9. Ok The C O N T E N T S. HOM time to come. 9. Obligations perfectly or imperfectly mutual. 4. Whether our utmoſt Endeavour is ſufficient 5. Whether a Man be obliged to bear ſuch Affli- Etions as are above Man's Courage and Strength? CHAP. V. 6. There is no Obligation to things unlawful. 7. Diſhoneſt Bargains do not oblige, though in our Power. Of the Nature of Promiſes and Pacts [or 8. Nor ſuch as can't be performed, but by some Covenants) in general. foul A&tion. 9. Whether thing's diſhoneſtly given can be rea covered. Sect. I. Hence adventitious Obligations ariſe ? 10. Other Men's Goods are promiſed in vain. What is vir. Hobbes's transferr 11. Tea, and our own, if they are under any ing of Right? Obligatiin to another 3. No Man has a Right to all things, as Mr. Hobbes aſſerteth. 4. In what a transferring of Right confifts ? 5. A meet Allertion doth not oblige. CH A P. VIIT. 6. An imperfect Promiſe obligetb, but does not give mother a Right. Of the Conditionis of Promiſes. 7. A Perfect Promiſe. 8. Promiſes in the Future Tenſe give no Right. 9. 10. 1. Whether there be a Power of obliging Sect. 1. Ow many ways is a Promiſe made ? in bare Pacts or Covenants, What is a Condition? 3. A Condition refers to the time preſent, or the 4. A Condition is either Caſual, Arbitrary of Mixt. + H A P. VI. s. An impoſible and unlawfal Condition. 6. The Addition of Place. Of the Conſent required in making Promiſes 7. The Addition of Time. and Pacts. 8. The difference between Bargains and Conditio- nal Promiſes. Sect. I. Onſent is required to make Promiſes and Pacts. 2. Conſent is fignifyed openly or Tacitly. CH A P. IX. 3. Conſent Suppoſes the uſe of Reaſon. 4. Great Drunkenneſs hinders it. 5. Of ſuch as are under Age. of the Miniſters or bgents concern’d in con- 6. Of Error in Promiſes. tracting Obligations for other Men. 7. Of Error in Promiſes and Contratis. 8. Of Fraud. 9. A Suſpicion of a Cheat makes Patts void. Sect. I. E may Promile and Bargain for 10. 11, 12, 13. Fear makes Promiſes and Paets another. void. 2. How many ſorts of Commiſſions there are ? 14. How Promiſes, null in themſelves, may be 3. How if a Deputy die before he has finiſhed? made valid. 4. The difference between a Deputy and Mediator. 15. Of the Conſent of the Perſon to whom a 5. How far another may accept a Promiſe for us. Promiſe is made. 6. Heirs can't accept a Promiſe for a Perfon dead. 16. Of the Signs and Inſtruments of Conſent. 7. Of a Burden annexed to a Promiſe. 8. The General Diviſion of Pacts or Bargains. " Compras WE CH A P. VII. BOOK IV. CHAP. I. of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants of Speech, and the Obligation which at- tends it. W cm. Se&. 1. E are obliged to things poſſible to be done only. 2. Promiſes of things impoſſible are void. 3. Impoſſibilities which ariſe about Covenants. b 2 Sect. 1. Se&. 2: 0 F the Uſe of Speech. Of the Diverſity of Signs. 3. Of The CO N T E N T S. 3. Of tbe Origin of Speech. 17. How an Heir is obliged by the Oath of the 4. Words ſignify according to Impoſition. Dead. 5. Impoſition is attended with a Compact. 18. & Diviſion of Oaths, as, 1. For Confirma- 6. This Compact is either General or Particular. tion. 2. In bearing Witneſs. 3. Deciſive 7. Whence the Obligation of diſcovering our Mind of a Controverſie. 4. Suppletory or Clear- to another. ing; 8. What Truth is, and what a Lye. 19. Whe ber every breach of an Oath is Peras 9. Every Untruth is not a Lye; and therefore jury. not Criminal. 20. Of the ways of diſpenſing with Oaths. 10. Of the Right which is violated by Lying, and whence 'tis deriv'd. II. How far Part of the Truth may be honeſtly conceald. 12. Simulation in Things how far lawful. CH A P. III. 13. Of Ambiguous Speech. 14. Of Mental Reſervations. 15. How far we may be allowed in Speaking of the Power of Mankind over [the] falſly to Infants. 16. It is lawful to Speak what is falſe, for the Preſervation of others. Things Cof the World.] 17. How far the Governours of States may be in- dulg'd in giving out falle Reports. He employed about worldly Things 2. Man uſes other Creatures by Gods Ordina- 19. It is Lawful to ſpeak falſe to a profeſs’d tion. Enemy. 20. Whether a Guilty Perſon, arraign'd, may 3. Man does no injury by deſtroying Vegeta- bles, deny the Charge. 4. Some doubts about killing and eating Living 21. What the Advocates or Counſèl may, in Creatures. this reſpect, do for their Client. 5. Which yet is maintained. 6. The abuſe of our Right over Living Creatures is to be reproved. 18. In what manner is is lawful to deceive an ill. Se&. I. T He greatest part of the Law is en CHA P. II. CHAP. IV. Of an O AI H. Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. Seet, 1. 2: 2. Sect. I. Roperty lities, 2. What is Property and Community. 3. That it has no piace, but where there are more Men than one. 4. It proceeds immediately from an Agreement a- mong Men. He Sanctity of an Oath. What an Oath is? 3. It muſt be taken only by the Name of God. 4. And according to the Religion of bim that Swears. 5. Of the Intention of bim that wears. 6. An Oath is an Additional Bond of an Obli- gation. 7. Of Oaths obtain'd by Deceit. 8. Of Oaths obtained by Fear. 9. Oaths to perform things unlawful bind not. 10. Nor thoſe, which hinder a greater good. 11. An Oath doth not alter the Nature of thoſe A&tions to which they are joyned. 12. An Oath excludes all Cavils. 13. But is not always to be interpreted ſtrictly. 14. Or without ſome Tacit Conditions and Limi- tations. 15. An Oath is to be explained by the intention of the Impoſer. 16. Of an Oail made in another's ſtead to oblige bim. 5. Of the Ancient Community of Goods. 6. By what degrees Men departed from it. 7. That it was profitable to Mankind. 8. The Opinion of the Ancients about the Ori- ginal of Dominion or Property. 9. Grotius's Judgment conſider’d. 10, 11, 12, 13. The Arguments of those who deny the Community of Goods uſed among the Ancients. 14. In what Senſe Dominion is ſaid to be by Na. tural Right. 15. How far Infants are capable of Pro- perty. CHAP The CONTENT S. CH A P. V. CHAP. VII. Of the Object of Dominion and Property. Of Additional Acquirements. Sect, I. WAT is requird to make things our | Sect. z: H ,משנס 2. Things conſumed in their uſe are in vain made our own, 3. A thing become cur own ſhould be capable of keeping 4. The uſe of some things made our own is com- mon to all. 5. The Divine Grant is not contrary to our Do- minion over the Sea. 6. Reaſons againſt all Property on the Sea, 7. What the uſe of the Sea is. 8. What parts of the Sea are made a Poleſion. 9. The main Ocean can't be in any Man's Do- minions. 10. How far Navigation and Commerce on the Sea is free. . 1. OW many ſorts of Additions. Additions properly belong to the Owner of the thing: 3. How many ſorts of Fruits. 4. The young ones of Beaſts belong to the Owner of the Damm or Mother. 5. Things planted paſs with the Soil. 6. How Buildings go along with the Soil. 7. The Paper goes along with the Writing. 8. The Canvaſs with the picture. 9. The Purple with the Garment. 10. Of New Models in Things. II. Of whole Countries left by Waters. 12. Of Fields belonging to Private Perſons. CH A P. viii. CH A P. VI. OF Right over other Men's Goods or Pola Jeſions. Of Occupancy: : Sect. 1. A Sect. I, T minion . Man may have a Right over other Men's Goods diverſe ways. 2. How many ſorts of Right we have over other's Goods. 3. The Right of holding in Fee [Simple.] 4. The Right of a Ground.plat. 5. The Right of an honeſt Pollefjor. 6. Services, what and of how many forts? 7. The Uſe with the Profits. 8. The bare Uſe. 9. The Habitation. 10. The Works of Servants. Ir. The Services of City-Eſtates. 12. And of country- Farms. He ſeveral ways of acquiring Do- minion, 2. The Original Methods of acquiring it. 3. Occupancy is gain’d in whole, or by parcels. 4. The Poſſeſion of Moveables depends on the diſ- posal of the chief Governour. 5. In ſome places the catching of Wild- Beaſts is allowed to every one. 6. In other places it is the privilege of great Men only. 7. Whether be that hunts contrary to the Law, bas a Property in the Beaſt he takes, 8. When things occupied ure underſtood to be im- movable. 9. When they are movable. 10. Whether a Wild Beajt becomes mine as ſoon as I have wounded it. II, Whether the Fish are ours, that are in our Ponds. 12. Things left become immediately the firſt Oc- cupants. 13. Of Treaſures. 14. Of Poleſions obtain'd by War. CHAP. IX. Of Transferring of Property in General. Sect. 1. I I proceeds from Property, that we may alienate a thing. 2. The The C ) N T E N T S. 2. The Conſent of two Perſons is required in eve ry Alienation. 3. Which is to be expreſſed by ſome Signs. 4. An Alienation is made entirely, or upon Con- ditions. s. Whether Livery be required in every Aliena- tion. 6. Property is either accompanied with, or ſepa- rated from Pofleffion. 7. What, and hiw manifold Pofeſſion is. 8. Horw Property is gain’d by bargaining only 9. True and feigned Delivery. 10. Provided that the Father owns them, 11. Or does not diſinherit them. 12. Of the Kight of Repreſentation. 13. Parents muſt ſucceed for want of Children. 14. And for want of tbem, the neareſt Relations in their Order. 15. Whether Friends may be preferred before Kindred? 16. Or Benefa&tors before Relations? 17. The Order among Kindred. 18. The Civil Laws allow a large Power of die (poſing Eſtates. 19: The Heir of the Diceas'd, how far he is oblig'd to pay bis Debrs. CH AP. X. P. CHA P. XII. Of Wills and Teſtaments. Of Ufucapion or Preſcription. Sect. 1. A fation ? O W many derivative ways of Acqui- 2. 2. Grotius's Definition of a Will is examin'd. 3. What is a Will to us 4. Whether Wills proceeded from the Law of Nature, is doubted. 5: The Ancients diſpoſed of their Goods while they were living. 6. How far Wills proceeded from the Law of Na- ture, and how far from Poſitive Laws? 7. An Inheritance given by Will, wanting due Form, may be enter'd upon, if nine oppoſe Sect. I. H. O W Uſucapion and Preſcription differ. What Uſucapion is by the Roman Laws, and where it takes place. 3. How far honeſt dealing is requir’d in Uluca- pion. 4. Continual Poſſeſſion is requir’d. S. The Reaſons of introducing Uſucapion. 6. Whether the Law for Uſucapion be penal, 7. Many refer Uſucapion to Civil Right. 8. Whether Uſucapion can ariſe from a tacit Dereliction of the Proprietor. 9. It ſeems to depend upon the tacit Agreement of Nations. 10. How Uſucapion may be prejudicial to Chile dren not yet born. 11. Uſucapion is alſo in uſe among diverſe Na- ţions. it. 8. But the Heir may null tbat Will, as if his An ceſtor had dyed Inteſtate. 9. Donation in caſe of Death. CH A P. XI. Of Succeſſions to Perſons who die Inteſtate. CHA P. XIII. Sect. I. SURAT Sect. I. Uccellion to Perſons that die Inteftate de of the Obligations which ariſe immediately pends upon a Preſumption of their Will. from Property. 2. Yet as it is agreeable to Reaſon. 3. Children are preferred before all others. 4. Parents are to maintain their Children. ✓ Very One is obliged to abſtain from Ano- E s. What is meant by Maintenance. ther's Goods. 6. Who are to be accounted children? 2. Other's Goods kept by us are to be reſtored. 7. What more than Maintenance is due to Chil 3. Which is proved. dren, and why? 4. And illuſtrated. 8. It is not neceſſary that Goods ſhould always be 5. Contracts made about Other's Goods, are void, equally divided among Children as ſoon as they are known. 9. Legitimate Children are to be preferred before 6. What is gained by tn. ther's Goods, muſt be Natural. reſtored. 33 The CONTENT S. 7. An honeſt Poflelor is not bound to reſtore, if the Goods are decay'd, or loſt. 8. But he is bound to reſtore the preſent Fruits. 9. And ſuch as are ſpent, if he muſt have ſpent others of the like Value. 10. But not them, he has neglected to gather. 11. He is not obliged, who has given away what was given him, but with a di- ftinction. 12. Nor if he has brold what he bought with a diſtinction alfo. 13. How may he recover the Price, who has really Gold another Man's Goods. 14. Whether if a Man buys another's Goods, he ought to reſtore them to the Seller? 15. He that has another's Goods, and knows not the Owner, may keep them. 16. Whether what's given for a bad Reaſon muſt be reſtored. 3. Some advice about what they have delivered. 4. Our Opinion about the Difference. 5. Contracts are divided into ſuch as oblige, 1. one Party only ; and, 2. ſuch as oblige both Parties. 6. And into Real, or bare Conſent, Verbal, in Writing 9. In ſome particular Name, and without a Name 8. Beneficial and Chargeable. 9. How many ſorts of Chargeable Contracts. 10. Of Mix'd Contracts. CH A P. III. Concerning the Equality that ought to be oba ſerved in Chargeable Contracts. BOOK V. CHAP. I. OF PRICE. Sect. I. T T Se&. I. A . 3. Sect. 1. Frer Property, the Meaſure of Things muſt be introduced 2. What is the Moral Quantity of Things. How many kinds of Price. 4. What is the Foundation of the Common Price of Things. s. Many Profitable Things have no Price, and why? 6. Why the Prices of Things Riſe. 7. Of the Price of Fincy. 8. Of the Lawful Price. 9. Of the Common Price. 10. The Cauſes why the Common Price riſes and falls. II. The Common Price is not ſufficient for the Commerce of Man's Life. 12. Hence an Eminent Price was ſet in Money. 13. Which, for the moſt part, was made of Metals. 14. How far the Governours of Societies may ſet an Eſtimate upon Money. 15. In ſo doing, they ought to have reſpect to Land. 16. The Value of Money is alſo ſubject to an Alteration. THE Equality to be obſerved in Chargeable Contracts. 2. The Faults of a Thing are not to be diſcover'd. 3. The Nature of a Contract requires it. 4. Whether what concerns not the Thing it ſelf, muſt be diſcovered? 5. The Faults known on both sides need not be mentioned. 6. N. Man is to be ſcar’d into a Contract. 7. In Gainful Contracts Equality need not to be ſerved. 8. In a Chargeable Contract nothing is suppoſed to be given. 9. How Inequality not foreſeen is to be corrected. 10. Whether Over-reaching in Buying be lawful, CHAP. IV. Of Gainful Contracts in particular. very dia CHAP. I. Of Contracts in General, that preſuppoſe the Price of Things. Se&. I. T , HE between Bargains and Contracts, according to Mr. Hobbes. 2. According to the Interpretation of the Roman Sect. I. Hat a 2. The Romans. 3. The Perſon commiſſioned ought to be ligent. 4. How far be ought to be indemnified. 5 Whether a Commiſſion can be ſatisfied by an Equivalent. 6. Of a Loan, and how it differs from a voluna tary Grant, 7. Of a Charge. Law, СНАР, The CO N T E N T S. CHAP. V. CHA P. VIIT. Of Partnerſhip Sect. 1. of Chargeable Contracts in particular ; and, Firſt, of Bartering, Buying and Selling Sect. I. O F Exchanging or Bartering. 2. When a Contract of Bilying and Sel- ling is compleat. 3. Of the Loſs or Gain of a Thing fold. 4. Of Agreements commonly join'd with Sales. 5. What the Buyer ought to perform to the Seller, and è contra. 6. Of Buying in Hope and Expectation. 7. Of Monopolies. OW many ways Partnerſhip may be brgun 2. Money and Labour are ballanced ſeveral ways. 3. Irregular Partnerſhip. 4. A Partnerſhip in all Goods. CHA P. IX. Of Contracts depending on Chance. C H A P. VI. Sect. I. Of Renting and Hiring. BA Argains mixt with Chance. 2. They are us’d, as well in Peace, 3. As in War. 4. Contraet's in Laying Wagers. 5. Contracts in Play. 6. Of Rafflings. 7. Of Lotteries. 8. Of Enſurance. Sect. I. W WA T.Things Hiring hath Common T Things hath Common with Buying 2. The certain Uſe of a Thing, if it be in- tercepted, tends to the Loſs of the Leſſor. 3. The uncertain regularly to the Loſs of the Lellee. 4. Whether the Same Work may be Let to many together. C H A P, X. Of Zcceſſory Bargains. CHAP. VII. A Of the Loan of a Conſumable Com- modity. Sect. 1. HAT a Loan is, and what a con- W lumable Commodity. 2. À double Uſe of theſe Things. 3. For what Things we are wont to be Credited. 4. Of tacit Lending: 5. Whether Lending be an Alienation. 6. What if Money be Altered in the intrinſick Value. 7. Or in the extrinſick Value? 8. The Doctrine of the Jews about Uſury. 9. That Uſury is not contrary to the Law of Na- Sect. I. Cceſory Contracts of two Sorts. 2. Variety of Additional Bargains. 3. An Additional Bargain, if it's lewd, is void. 4. Sometimes it diſorders Buſineſs. s. Being preſently added, is valid, if other Things agree. 6. Being added after ſume time, in the Negative, is liable to an Exception. 7. Being affirmative, how far 'tis Good. 8. Of Truſting. 9. A Surety can't be engag’d for more than the Debtor. 10. But he may be more ſtrictly Bound. 11. What Advantages the Law allows a Surety. 12. Of Bails. 13. The Uſe of Pawns. 14. A Pawn is either fruitful or barren. 15. Whether a Pawn may be gained by Uſe. 16. What is the difference between a Mortgage and a Pawn. CHAP ture. 10. The Arguments to the Contrary are anſwered. II. Some Contracts are much the ſame as Uſury. 12. The Evaſions uſed to avoid the Diſgrace of Uſury. The CONTENT S. Sed, muſt wage War without the Command of C H A P. XI. another. 16. Of theſe Words, Carthage ſhall be free. 17. A Conje&ture when a Law muſt be enlarged. 18. Of Tricks to evade a Law. By what means Obligations founded upon 19. A Conjecture when the Law ought to be re- Compact may be diſſolved. ſtrained upon the Account of some Defe&t in the Will of the Lawgiver 20. (An Obſervation upon this Conjecture.) Sect. 1. THE moſt natural Way of diſolving an 21. Or upon the Account of ſome Accident in- Agreement, is to perform the things conſiſtent with his Will, as where it is either agreed on. unlawful, 2. What if one pays a debt for one who knows 22. Or too grievous in Reſpect of the Performance. not of it? 23. What if two Laws are contrary one to 3. To whom we muſt pay ? another. 4. What muſt be paid? 5. To whom and by whom may Compenſation be made. 6. Where it may be uſed. 7. A Debt is paid by a Releaſe. CHAP. XIII. 8. How an Obligation is made void by a diſ- agreement. 9. The Knavery of one Party frees the o: her from of the Way of deciding Controverſies in the bis Obligation. 10. As alſo a Change of that Condition on which Liberty of Nature. the Obligation was founded. 11. How an Obligation ceaſes by Time. Hat is due to others is willingly to be 12. And how by Death. performed. 13. Of Delegation. 2. In a State of Nature there is no Judge. 14. Of Confuſion. 3. Controverſies, which can't be decided by Con- Is. Of Novation. ference are to be referred to Arbitrators. 4. There is a Covenant between an Arbitrator and the contending Parties. 5. Arbitrators, in a Doubt, are bound to judge CHAP. XII. by Laws. 6. Arbitrators are not to judge of the Poffeſioni 7. Of the Mediators of a Peace. 8. What if Deeds be left. Of the Interpretation of Compacts and 9. Of Witneſſes Laws. 10. Of the Execution of the Sentence. Sect, I. "W" IT" T n blir ted on Sect. I. HE Reaſon of the Order. 2. The Neceſity of a right Interpre BOOK VI. CHAP. 1. tation. 3: The Words are ordinarily to be underſtood accor. ding to the common Uſage. And of Matrimony 4. Words of Art according to the Art. s. Conjecture is ſufficient,when Words are dubious. Sect. 1. HE Coherence. 6. Or ſeem to contradict one another. 2. Matrimony the Propegatin of Man- 7. Conjecture muſt be taken from the Matter trea- kind. 3. Whether there be an Obligation to marry, 8. From the Effeet, or 4. A wandring Luſt oppoſite to the Laws of Na- 9. From the Coherence, Original and Place. 10. How the Senſe may be gathered from the 5. Mankind, not to be propagated but by Marriage. Reaſon of them. 6. What Obligation may be laid on Men to marrng 11. Some Words have both a large and ſtrict Sig- by the Laws of Nations. nification. 7. What it is by the Law of Nature. 12. Some Things are favourable, others odious. 8. How far the Laws of Nations may order con- 13. Rules are to be made from thoſe Diſtin&tions. cerning Marriage. 14. An Example of Two who came to the Goal The diſorderly Marriages of the Amazons. together. 10. The Laws and Rights of a regular Marriage. 15. How this Order is to be interpreted. No Man 11. Whence ariſes the Man's Power over the Wife. 12. Whether ture. * с The C Ο Ν Τ Ε Ν Τ 5, 12. Whether it be beſtow'd immediately by 3. And from her is derived to others, God. 4. On mbat Reaſon is Paternal Authority 13. Whether it neceſſarily implys a Pożver of Life grounded. and Death. 5. How far the Father bas more Rigbr tban 14. Whether Conſent, not Bedding makes the the Mother. Marriage. 6. How great the Power of the Father is, as I5. No Woman may marry more than one Hus- ſuch, over his Children. band. 7. Both in their Infancy and Childhood. 16. Polygamy in iſe among many people. 8. How far Children are capable of being 17, 18. Whether it be repugnant to the Law of govern'd at this time. Nature. 9. Whether a Father may ſell bis Son. 19. The trie Nature of Marriage is for one 10. Of the Obligation of Children made Man, and one Woman to be joyned to- free. gether. II. What Power Fathers have over tbeir 20. It is not lawful rafhly to part Man and Children, out of Civil Societies. Wife. 12. What Power in Civil Societies. 21. Adultery, and wilful Deſertion make a 13. How this Power is loff. Marriage void. 14. Whether Children ought to have their Pa- 22. Whether an intolerable ill Nature is a reaſon rents Conſent to their Marriages. for Divorce. 23. The Opinion of ſome Men, about the Senſe of the Law of God about Divorce. 24. Particularly of Mr. Milton. 25. Marriage requires ſuitable Qualifications of Nature. 26. An Error concerning Matrimony. 27. A marry'd Woman can't rightly marry ano- CH A P. III. ther. 28. Marriages with Kindred, why forbid- 29. How it comes to paſs that Men are aſhamed of a Maſter's Power. of their Genitals. 30. Of Nekedneſs. 31. The original of natural Sbame. 32. Marriages between Parents and Children Sect. I. THAT is the Relation of Mafter wicked. and Servant. 33. The Opinion of the Jews about it. 2. Servitude was not ordained by Nature. 34. Of the Marriages of Brothers and Siſters. 3. Nor by God immediately. 35. Of the other Degrees forbidden. 4. The Original of Servitude ſeems to have 36. Of ſecondary Wives. been from Contract. made the Number of Servants greater. 6. What is the Duty of Captives to their Maſters. CHA P. II. 7. They are almoſt of the ſame Nature with their Goods, Of Paternal Power. 8. Yet an Injury may be done them. 9. Of the Children of Servants. Sect. 1. HE Common Opinion of the Original 10. The Inconveniences of Servitude. of Paternal Authority. 11. How many Ways a Servant may become 2. According to Hobbs, the Original Power free. over Children is in the Mother. den? W S. War "T" BOOK The C O N T E N T S. BOOK VII. CHAP. I. Of the Cauſes and Motives inducing Men to eſtabliſh Civil Societies. 16. This Rule admits of a Limitation. 17. Of Equality of Votes. 18. Of joyning, or dividing Suffrages. 19. How many Perſons at leaſt, are requiſite to a Ruling Council. 20. Civis, or a Member of a Civil State, who may properly be fo term'd. 21. Subordinate Bodies, of how many kinds. 22. Inveſted with what Rights and Privileges. 23. Of Unlawful Bodies, and Factions. 24. The peculiar Duties incumbent on the Mem- bers of Civil States. I Naroduction. Sect. I. 2. Man naturally loves himſelf more than Company. 2. Yet the Love of Company does not im- mediately infer the Love of Civil So- ciety. 4. Many Vices in Man prejudicial to Civil Union. s. Whether Civil States aroſe in the World by Nacural Conſequence. Cauſe Eſtabliſhments. Origine of CHAP. III. or Majeſty. not ſufficient to ſecure the Peace of Man- kind. 9. Nor the fole force of Arbitrators; or of Co- venants. 10. Difference in Opinion greatly prejudicial 10 the Peace of the World. II. Men need a much more ſevere Reſtsaint, than the Law of Nature only. Overeignty, the Reſult of thoſe Covenants by which the Publick Body was firſt . 2. This done by tbe Divine Will and approbation. 3. Whether the Majeſty of Princes is imme- diately derived from GOD. 4. The Arguments wbich ſome make uſe of to prove the Affirmative. 5. Civil Authority not the Effe&t of War. 6. Whether a Father of a Family may, witb- out any new ått, commence a Prince. 7. How a Vaffal, or Feudacory, may become a Sovereign Lord. 8. Whether à Free State, or a Monarch, rea ſigning their Power into other Hands, are the efficient Cauſe of the Sovereignty produced. 9. Who has properly the Power of conferring the Regal Title: CH A P. II. CHAP. IV. Of the Parts of Sovereignty, and their Natural Connexion. "IM of the Inward Structure and Conſtitution of Civil States. Sect. 1. Se&. ME EN only are a ſufficient Defence againſt tbe Wickedneſs of Men. 2. To this End it is neceſary that many ſhould join together. 3. Thoſe who join'd in this manner ought to agree in their Reſolutions. 4. The Difference between the Polities of Bees and Men. 5. An Union of Wills and of Strength ne- cellary to a Civil State. 6. This Union produc'd by intervening Co- 7. The first Covenant, with the Decree fol- lowing upon it. 8. The ſecond Covenant, giving the final Perfection to a Civil Eſtabliſhment. 9. The Reaſon for which Hobbes will acknow Ledge but one Covenant. 10. Ibis Realon ſufficient. 11, 12. Hobbes's Arguments anſwer d. 13. A Civil State, how defined. 14. In a Monarchy, the Will of the Prince is the Will of the State. 15. Under other forms of Government, accord- ing to tbe regular Courſe, the Community is concluded by the Votes of the Major Part. venants. Sect. 1. N what Senſe the Supream Power may be ſaid to conſiſt of Parts. 2. The Legiſlative Power. 3. The Vindicative Power. 4. The Judiciary Power. S. The Power of War and Peace, and of making Leagues. 6. The Right of appointing Magiſtrates. 7. The Right of levying Taxes. 8. The Right of examining Doctrines. 9. Government, a more ſtrict Obligation than bare Compact, to. Who may properly be ſaid to hold a part in the Government. 11. The Connexion of Parts in the Supream Authority demonſtrated. 12. And illuſtrated. 13. Many are for dividing thoſe Parts. 14. Grotius amongſt the reſt ; whoſe Opinion is particularly diſcuſs’d. *C2 Of The CONTENT S. Sect. 1. 9. Limited Governments, how occaſion'd. CHAP. V. 10. Founded on what Covenants. & 11. In what reſpect the different parts of the Government may be limited. of the Forms of Commonwealths. 12. Of the Power of Eftates, Senates and Councils. HE Accidents of Civil States cannot 13. Hobbes anſwer d. TH 14. The various ways of bolding the Sovereign confiitute a new Species. Power. 2. Irregular Forms and syſtems of Government. 3. The three Forms of Regular Government. IS. A Temporary Sovereignty, whether poſſible. 4. Democracy ſeems to be the moſt Ancient 16. Of Patrimonial Kingdoms. Form. 5. Democracy no leſs inveſted with Supream 17. Of Kings, aſſumed by the free Act and Grant of the People. Power, than Monarchy. 6. Democracy, how conſtituted. 7. The ordinary Requiſites of Democracy. 8. How Ariſtocracy is eftabliſh'd : CH A P. VII. 9. And bow Monarchy. 10. In Bodies Politick, there may be Vices of Men, and Vices of State. Of the Ways of acquiring Sovereignty, 11. Yet theſe compoſe not a peculiar Species of eſpecially Monarchical. Government : 12. As neither do the various Accidents of De Sect. 1. mocracies and Ariſtocracies. " 'H E way of acquiring Sovereignty in is 13. Of the mixt Governments, propoſed by 2. In Ariſtocracies and Monarchies, various. modern Authors. 3. How far Government may be ſeiz'd on by 14. The Nature of Irregular States. juft Force. 15. This Irregularity beft illuſtrated by Ex- amples. 4. How far by unjuſt Force. 5. How a Perſon may be releas'd from the Go 16. States which admit of Provinces do not hence become neceſſarily Syſtematical. vernment of Anocher. 6. Election of bow many kinds. 17. Of Syſtems, occafion'd by a Common Prince. 7. Inter.regnum, what. 8. And Inter-reges. 18. Of Syſtems, compoſed by League and Confederacy. 9. Hobbes examin'd. 10. The Caſe of Pofthumous Iſſue, in the 19. Of the Communication of Councils and Hereditary Line, Buſineſs in theſe united Bodies. 11. Of Succeſſion in a Patrimonial King- * 20. Whether the greacer part ought here to con- dom. clude the leſs. 12. Of the ſame in Kingdoms eſtabliſh'd by 21. How theſe Syſtems are diffolv'd. the free A&t of the People ; and this either tid 22. The ſeveral Forms of Government compared. Simply Hereditary. 13. Or Lineal, 14. Or Tranſverſe. Guess 15 WECH A P. VI. 15. Of the Judge of Controverſies ariſing in the Caſe of Succellion. Of the Affections, or Properties belong- ing to Sovereignty. CHA P. VIII. Hºe TOW the ruling Power in a State comes to be ſtyld Supream. That the Supream Power is to be held 2. He that is inveſted with this Power is un- Sacred in Civil States. accountable. 3. And above Human Laws, 4. Of the Diſtinction between Real and Perſo-Sect. 1. 1.T H E Supream Power not to be refifted nal Majeſty in lawful Commands. 5. That a King may be Superior to a whole 2. Whether a Private Member can ſuffer Injury & People, demonſtrated. from the State. 6. The Arguments to the contrary refuted. 3. Subjects very prone to unjuft Complaints 7. Abſolute Governments, what. againſt their Governours. 8. Not occurring alike in all Forms of Civil Eſta 4. How many ways a Sovereign may injure his ago bliſhmentsa Subject. 3. Whether foto Seat, 1. The CON TEN TS. 5. Whether, in the Caſe of Grievous Injury and Oppreſſion, a Lawful Prince may be refifted. 6. The Name of a Tyrant does not juſtify the uſe of Violence in the Subject. 7. Grotius's Opinion. 8. No Princes are to be held Sacred, but ſuch as are truly inveſted with Royal Autho- rity. 9. In what Cafe an Uſurper may be acknow ledg’d for a Lawful Prince. 10. How far the Commands of an Uſurper oblige the Subjects, while their Lawful Sovereign is alive, tho in an Exild condition. 3. Whether the Definition of Crimes is left arbitrarily to the Deterinination of the Civil Law. 4. The Precepts of the Decalogue whether Civil Laws. 5. Whether any thing Juſt antecedently to the Civil Laws. 6. Whether a Sinful Command of a Superior may at any time be obey'd without Sin. 7. N. Sin lawfully committed upon the Com- mand of a Superiour. 8. Whether á Subject may lawfully bear Arms in an unjuſt War at the command of his Prince ? Sect. I. T" T. CHAP. II. CHAP. IX. Of the Power of the Sovereign over the of the Duty of Sovereigns. Lives of the Subject for the Defenſe of the Common-wealth. HE Office and Duty of Sovereignis, whence to be diſcover’d. Sect. I. HE Sovereign may hazard the Lives 2. The Obligation that Princes have to be well of his Subjects in War. inſtructed in it. 2. Whether lawful to refuſe bearing Arms upon 3. The People's afety is the Supreme Law. a Compact with an Enemy? 4. The Subjects are to be train d up in Good 3. No Man to make himſelf unfit to bear Manners. Arms. 5. Fit Laws are to be enacted. 4. The Obligation of a Souldier what. 6. And put in Execution. 5. Whether the Common-wealth may give up 7. Penalties are to be inflicted with Juſtice an innocent Subject. and Moderation. 6. The Common-wealth may deliver up a 8. The Subjects are to be reſtrain'd from Mutu Subject for an Hoftage. al Injuries. 9. An Able and Honeſt Miniſtry is to be im- ploy'd in State Affairs. 10. Taxes are to be equally laid, and rightly gather'd. 11. The Wealth of the State is to be advan- CHAP. III. ced. 12. Factions to be prohibited. 13. A Sufficient Force to be kept up for the Of the Power of the Sovereign over the oppoſing of Foreign Invaders. Lives and Fortunes of the Subject in Criminal Caſes Se&. I. BOOK VIII. CHA P. . T of the Power to dire&t the Actions of the Subject. HE Power of Life and Death whe- ther and bow transferr'd from particum lar Men to the Common-wealth, 2. In a Liberty of Nature no human Puniſh- ment: 3. But only in a Common-wealth. 4. Puniſhment, what. 5. Puniſhing, to what Species of Juſtice redu- ducible. 6. That one Man Should puniſh another, Hof unjuſt. 7. The Power of Puniſhing where lodgʻd. 8. Human Sec, 1. F the Nature of Civil Laws in ge- neral. 2. Whether a Civil Law may contradi&t the Natural, O The CONTENT S. pulſe; 8. Human Puniſhment ought to have ſome End. 9. The firſt End of Puniſhment the Amend. ment of the Offender. 10. Whether Lawful for any Man to correct any. II. The ſecond End of Puniſhment, Caution for the Injured. 12. The third, the general Security. 13. How far Private Men are allowed to infliet Puniſhment. 14. What Offences it is needleſs for human Juſtice to puniſh. 15. Whether lawful at any time to pardon? 16. How far this is lawful antecedently to the Penal Law 17. How far after it. 18. The Quality of a Crime to be eſtimated from the Object of it. 19. And from the Paſſion that gave the Im- 20. And from the Force of the Inclination and 'Intention; 21. And from the Obſtinacy and Reſolution of the Criminal; 22. And laſtly from Cuſtom and Habit. 23. What to be regarded in determining the Quantity of the Puniſhment 24. The meaſure of Puniſhments, what. 25. In Puniſhment the Perſon of the Sufferer to be regarded. 26. The Jewiſh Law whether an univerſal ad equate meaſure of Puniſhment. 27. Of Retaliation. 28. A Corporation or Community, how pu- niſhed. 29. The Crimes of Corporations wear out in Courſe of Time. 30. Every fatal Evil not an human Puniſh- 31. Difference between Damage ſuffered di- rectly and by Conſequence. 32. Difference between the Occaſion and the Cauſe of Evil. 33. N. Man to be puniſh'd for another's Crime. 7. Or upon a Criminal Account. 6. No diſhonour to refuſe to engage in a Duel when the Laws forbid it. 9. Simple Etteem not dependent upon the Pleaſure of the Government. 10. Nor to be ſacrificed for it. 11, Intenſive Esteem : 12. The Foundations of it. 13. Whether Power the ſole Foundation of Honour. 14. An Aptitude only for Honour the Reſult of thoſe Foundations. 15 What Perſons have a Right of Precedence to Others. 16. Arguments upon which Precedence is pretended to. 17. That of Antiquity examin'd. 18, 19. That of Power, of its Quality, and if Titles. 20. One Sovereign Prince not obliged to gield the Precedence to another. 21. How ſuch Princes might meet, without any Diſpute for Places, 22. Of Order between Equals. 23. The Power of appointing the Order of the Subjects lodg’d in the Sovereign. 24. Subjects of different Common wealths, how compar’d. 25. Nobility of Birth not from Nature : 26. But from the Inſtitution of Common- wealths. 27. Uſually is, and ought to be founded upon Merit. 28. The Nature of the Roman Nobility in the earlieſt of times. 29. Offices born in the State, the Meaſure of it afterwards. 30. What the Nature of the Modern Nobility in the greateſt Part of Europe. 31. Nobility of Blood little regarded in some Places. 32. How far Civil Honours depend upon the Common-wealth, ment. CHAP. IV. CHAP. V. Of the Power of the Sovereign in deter- of the Power of the Sovereign, both over mining the Value of the Subjects. the Publick Patrimony, and the Eſtates of Private Subjects. Sect. 1. ESC Steem defin'd and divided. 2. Simple Eſteem Natural. be either Entire. HAT Power the Prince bath over 4. Or Impair’d, W the Goods of the Common-wealth, s. Or utterly loft. where the Kingdom is his Pasrs- 6. Simple Eſteem Civil leſſen'd, or loft, either mony. from a certain State, 2. The 3. Which may The CO N T E N T S. 2. The Subjects do not every where owe the Propriety of their Eſtates to the Common wealch. 3. The Sovereign may make Laws to direct the Subjects in the Uſe of their Goods and Eſtates. 4. And alſo impoſe Taxes upon them. 5. What to be obſerv'd in the Impoſition of Cuſtoms. 6. And other Taxes. 7. Of the Sovereign or Tranſcendental Pro- priety. 8. What Power the Prince hath over the Goods that beling to the Common-wealth as ſuch. 9. Of the Alienation of the Kingdom, or any 10. A Prince cannot make his Kingdom a Fief, or Mortgage it, without the Conſent of his People. II. Nor Alienare any thing incorporated in the Crown. 19. Things Sacred not exempt from the Liber- ties of War. 20. Things, how acquired in War. 21. To whom the Acquiſitions of War bem long 22. Things incorporeal, bow far acquired in War. 23. A Loan, whether acquirable in War. 24. Dominion over the Conquer'd, how many ways acquired. 25. Things loft in War, how recovered. 26. Whole Nations, how reſtrained to Liberty, part of it. CHAP. VII. Of Compacts that relate to War. Sect. 1. TH Sect. 1. Chapter. THE Diviſion of Compacts that prea Suppoſe War. 2. Compacts that have no Tendency to remove C H A P. VI. the War, whether valid. 3. A Truce, what. 4 Of the Duration of Truces. 5. Å Truce leaves the Diſpute, the War began Of the Right of War. upon, undecided. 6. No need of a new Declaration of War when the Truce expires. T H E Diviſion of what follows in the 7. Truces contracted and made by expreſs Com- pact. 2. Peace the ordinary proper State of Man; 8. Of the Beginning and End of Truces. War extraordinarily indulged by Nature. 9. The Subject when obliged by Truces.. si 3. War either Offenſive or Defenſive. 10. What Liberties a Truce allows, and what 4. The Cauſes of War ought to be manifeft. forbids. 5. The Unjuſt Cauſes of War recounted. II. Whether a Man, taken in an Enemy's 6. Fraud lawful againſt an Enemy. Country, and forcibly detain'd, may be 7. How far Violence may be lawfully uſed a- kept Priſoner after the Truce is' ex- gainſt an Enemy. pired. 8. In a Common-wealth particular private What enſues upon Violation of the Men loſe their Right of War. Truce. 9. War either ſolemn or leſs folemn. 13. Of Compacts that relate to Safe Conduct. 10. A Magiſtrate as ſuch bath no Right to 14. Of the Redemption of Captives. make War. 15. Of the Compacts of Generals. On olingan 11. Whether he may make War upon a Preſump 16. Of the Compacts of Private Perſons in tion of his Prince's Confent. War. 12. How far an Injury, done by a Subject, may give Reaſon for a War againſt the Common-wealth. 13. Of the Equity of Reprizals. CH A P. VIII. 14. For whom we may juſtly make War. 15. Of the Declaration of War. Of Compacts that reſtore Peace. 16. Of the Liberties commonly uſed in War. 17. Of the Liberties uſed upon the Perſon of Sect. 1. Hether Compacts of Peace are invaa an Enemy. lidated by an Exception of Fear.? 18. Whether lawful to kill an Enemy by Aſal 2. Whether a Peace made with Rebels is fines? valid. 12. W 3. How The C O N T E N T S, 3 How far, upon a Pacification, the Goods of Private Subjects may be excuſed. 4. The Term limited for the Performance of the Condition of Peace, to be ſtrictly inter- preted. 5. How if a Peace be refer'd to the Deciſion of the Sword. 6. An Holtage ſucceeding his Prince can be no longer detain'd. 7. Of the Mediators of Peace. 6. How far a Subject may have an Aktion againſt bis Prince upon Matter of Con- tract. 7. The Contracts of the Subject liable to be over-ruled by the Tranſcendental Propriety. 8. How far Succeſſors are obliged by the Contracts of their Predeceſſors. 9. The Grants and Donations of Princes whether revocable. C H A P, XI. CHAP. IX. "T A Of Leagues. How Subjection ceaſes. Sect. I. Man ceaſes to be a Subject when his Sect. -I. H E Diviſion of Leagues. Prince dies without a Succeff r: 2. Leagues that eſtabliſh nothing but 2. Or, if he Removes out of the Common. what was due by the Laws of Nature wealth 3. Equal Leagues which, and what ſorts of 3. What to be obſerv’d in ſuch a Remove. them. 4. Whether lawful to remove in great Com- 4. Of Unequal Leagues, panies. 5. Of Two Confederates, which a Third 5 Whether lawful to counterfeit a Refuge. ought to eflift. 6. Whether the Commonwealth my eject a 6. Leagues Real, or Perſonal. Subject when over power'd by an Enemy. 7. Which may be diſtinguiſh'd either by parti cular. 7. Of Puniſhment. 8. Å Man is depriv'd of the Privileges of a 8. Or general Marks. Subject when over-power'd by an Enemy. Whether Exild and Depoſed Princes can 9. Whether a Subject ſurrendi'd to an Enemy, have the Benefit of their Leagues. 10. Future Allies, whether comprebended under and not accepted, continues a Member of the Commonwealth. the Name of Allies in general. 11. Leagues not to be ſuppoſed to be tacitly re newed. 12. What Obligations lie upon the Engagers, die batohen their Engagements are not own d and CHAP: XII. confirm’d. 13. An Engagement whether ratified by the of the Changes and Diſſolution of the Silence of the Sovereign. Commonwealth. 9. CHAP. X. »T" Promiſcuous Compacts of Sovereign Princes. Sect. I. T H E Diviſion of the Chapter. 2. How far a Prince may reſtore him Jelf to bis Right, when injured in Compact by a Foreigner. 3. How far, when by his own subjects. 4. The Contracts of Princes, bow far exempted from the Civil Laws. S. A Prince cannot diſpence with any valid Oath 2 be bath taken. 50 To Sect. 1. HE People continue the ſame, tho' the Form of the Common-wealth be changed. 2. The Debts of the Commonwealth not dif- charg'd by a Change in the Form of it. 3. The Acts of an Uſurper how far valid after bis Government is expir’d. 4. What Place a Commonwealth may Chal- lenge after a Change in it. s. One Commonwealth may divide into more : 6. More may unite into One. 7. The People, bow eternal? 8. How tbe Materiale of the People may be de- stroy'd. 9. How the Formale. OF I Gion ร yd OF THE L AW of NATURE (1) 910 003 juli io putovse nafte ut bisa A D N Does to aliorum nostro con una brѕ tо 991 v uton diw avbryo ang Shed arw NATIONS ISO 01 BOOK I. Containing the Preliminary Parts of that Knowledge. ora 2016 CH A P. I. -0211 of the Origine and the Variety of MorAL ENTITIES.oved The are 101 voto The CONTENTS of every Paragraph of the firſt Chapter. wieloletnih novo I. The Introduction. XII. The Diviſions of ſingle Perſons in II. Man's Life is govern d by Moral Entities. XIII. And Compound.obtineribotolog III. What are Moral Entities, what is their Cauſe and End. XIV. Some Precepts about Moral Perfonsinou IV. The Way of producing them. Their Inſtitution. i XV. Feigned Perſons. I od mnou go Their Operation, and from whencë. XVI. Moral Things. base V. Their Diviſion. XVII. The Diviſion of Moral Modes. 100.00 VI. Their State what. XVIII. Titles. Dus zod VIT. Their natural and adventitious State. XIX. Power. sirrygon Oman VIII. Peace and War, and how manifold? XX. Right. IX. Determinate States. XXI. The remaining Moral Qualities. X. States having reſpect to Time. XXII. Moral Quantities. XI. Certain Precepts concerning States.cl XXIII. How Moral Entities periſha T was the Buſineſs of the First with that Refpe& which their Dignity requir'd. and Highest Philoſophy (1), and Many Authors ſeem never ſo much as to have that by which alone it could ful- thought on them; others only touch them lightly I ly anſwer the Deſign of its Name, over, as idle Fictions, of no Uſe or Moment in and Inſtitution, to deliver the the World. When, at the ſame time, it was high- moft Comprehenſive Definitions ly expedient, that they ſhould be fully underſtood of Things, and to rank them a- by Mankind, who are endu'd with the Power of greeably under their proper Claſſes,ſubjoyning the producing them (3), and through whoſe whole General Nature and Condition of every Sort of Lives and Conducts their Force and Activity is Beings. Now as the Series of Natural Things (2) diffus’d. This Reflection obligeth us to premiſe hath been fairly enough regulated by thoſe, who ſomewhat on a Part of Knowledge generally neg- have hitherto apply'd themſelves to the Adorning lected; ſo far as ſhall ſeem requiſite to illuſtrate our of that Science, ſo it is evident, that Men have not Principal Undertaking. Eſpecially leaſt our Defi- been equally ſolicitous about Conſtituting the nitions of Moral Things ſhould, either upon ac- Entia Moralia, or Moral Entities, nor treated them count of their Obſcurity, or of their Novelty, Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. I. §. I. (1) Metaphyſicks are moſt probably meant by our Author's Philoſophia prima, becauſe it comprehends (as fome Philoſophers hold) not only the Science of Effences in general, their chief Properties, and moſt eminene Species, but alſo Natural Theolo- gy, and an Account of the Nature of Spirits. (2) Our Author reſerving the Diſtinction of Phyſical and Moral Entities to the next Paragraph, paſies it over here in the be: ginning of the Chapter. (3) How this is done, ſee $ 3. and 4. following. B prove 2 Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. Book I. prove a Stop to the Reader, who perhaps in Com- ed ſo far as to denote, not only the General Maſs mon Treatiſes bath rarely met with the like Terms. of Things, but alſo the Modes and Acts flowing And here, if thoſe who have been bred up in the from the internal Force of their Conſtitution, by nicer Delicacies of Letters, ſhall diſdain our En- which is produc'd that infinite Variety of Motions deavours of this kind, and caſt a cenſorious Frown which turns and manages all the Buſineſs of our on Words unknown to Ancient Eloquence; we on World. Thoſe Things which exerciſe their Ope- ly Petition them for this Favour, that as we often rations, either without any Senſe at all, or with pardon the Impertinences of their over-ſcrupulous pure down-right Senſe, or with ſuch as is aſſiſted Exactneſs, ſo they would be pleas’d to grant us the by very imperfect Reflection, are guided by the Toleration not to be Polite (1), whilft we profeſs fole Inſtinct of Nature, and are unable to govern a clofer Regard to the ſtrict Severity of Things, their A&tions by any Rules or Modes of their own than to the exterior Ornaments of Speech.' For Invention. But Man, who beſides his excellent how to expreſs ourſelves with more Advantage a Form and moſt accurate Contexture of Body, fit- bout theſe Matters, we are yet to ſeek; unleſs by ting him for the nobleſt and the quickeſt Offices of tedious Circumlocutions we would leave them Life and Motion, is endu'd with a ſingular Light more Obſcure and more Perplex'd than we found of Underſtanding, by the Help of which he is a- them. Againſt the Charge of Novelty, Tully ble moſt exactly to comprehend and to compare himſelf will be our Advocate : New Names (ſays Things, to gather the Knowledge of Obſcurities (2) he) are to be apply'd to new Things; nor is this to from Points already ſettled, and to judge of the be wonder'd at by any Man of ordinary Knowledge, when Agreement which Matters bear to each other; and he conſiders, that in every Art and Craft, not vulgarly hath alſo the Liberty of exerting, ſuſpending, or underſtood, there is a Variety of Terms coyn'd for that moderating his Actions, without being confin'd to particular Subject . And then giving Examples in any neceſſary Courſe and Method : Man, we ſay, the Liberal and Mechanick Arts, he concludes; is farther inveſted with the Priviledge of inventing A Philoſopher of all Men bath an eſpecial Right to this and applying new Helps to each Faculty, for the Priviledge; for Philoſophy is the Art of Life, and he that more eafy Regulation of its Proceedings. To would undertake to explain its Rules, cannot, from the conſider what numberleſs Modes and Notions have common Currency of Words, find Stock enough to anſwer been introduc'd for the Aſliſtance of the Underſtand- bis Occaſions (a) (3). But he that can upon no ac- ing, and for preventing the Confuſion which might count digeſt ſuch Harſhneſs of Stile, is left at his ariſe from the undiſtinguiſh'd Vaſtnefs of its Ob- Liberty to turn out of theſe rougher Tracts, and to jeets, is the Province of another Sort of Enqui- paſs immediately to a Field of more Smoothneſs rers. Our Buſineſs is to declare, how, chiefly for and Pleaſure. the Direction of the Will, a certain (5) Kind of II. All the Beings (4) which compoſe this Uni- Attributes have been impos'd on (6) Things and verſe, as they conſiſt of ſuch Principles as were by their Natural Motions; whence there ſprings up a the moſt Wiſe Creator temper'd and fitted for the peculiar Agreement and Conveniency in the Adi- producing of each particular Eſſence; ſo they have ons of Mankind, a grateful Order and Comelineſs every one of them their particular Properties , ari- for the Ornament of Human Life. And theſe At- fing from the Diſpoſition and Aptitude of their tributes are call’d Moral Entities, becauſe the Manners Subſtance, and exerting themſelves in agreeable and the Actions of Men are judg’d and temper'a Actions, according to that Portion of Strength with relation to them; and do hence aſſume a which their Divine Author and Founder hath im- Face and Habit different from the horrid Stupidi- printed on them. Theſe Properties we now uſually ty of the dumb Creation. call Naiural,ſince the Term Nature hath been extend- The Author in his laſt Edicions adds theſe Quotations here. (a) We find Manilius uſing the like Excuſe : Lib. III. V. 39. doc. Örnari res ipſa negat, contenta doceri. And though ſome Words of foreign Stamp appear, Et ſi qua externa referantur nomina lingua, Seem harſh, untun'd, uneaſy to thy Ear, Hoc operis, non vatis erit : non omnia fleti This is the Subjeft's, not the Writer's Fault: Poſſunt, do propria melius ſub voce notantur. Some things are ſtiff, and will not yield to Thought. I muſt be plain : and if our Art hach found Nor hope ſweet Verſe and curious Turns to find : Expreſſions proper, it neglects the Sound. I'll leave thy Paffions, and inſtruct thy Mind. Mr. Creech. To the ſame purpoſe, V. Lucret. Lib. 1. V. 137. & Horat. Art. Poet. V.48. which last ſpeaks thus : Si forte neceſſe est None may to us chat Liberty refuſe, Indiciis monſtrare recentibus abdita rerum, Suppoſing that it prudently be done. Fingere cin&tutis non exaudita Cethegis Continget: dabitur que licentia ſumpta prudenter. Licuit, ſemperque licebit Thus in Engliſh: Signatum preſente notâ producere nomen. If to expreſs Things new found out, we uſe It ever was, and e'er will lawful be New Words, unto the Ancients never known, To uſe the Words forg'd by Neceſſity. Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. I, II. (1) Cicero maintains it to be a childifh Thing to ſpeak Elegantly of Matters Philoſophical : In ſuch Caſes to ſpeak plain is ſuffici- ene, and learned Men have no other Intent, but to expreſs themſelves clearly. Cic. de fin. l. 3. c. 5. (2) L. 3. c. I. The following Part of this Diſcourſe plainly ſhews us, that he ſpeaks exprefly of ſuch Philoſophers as treat of Moral Knowledge, becauſe he diſtinguiſhes them from Logicians, Natural Philoſophers, Geometricians, doc. (3) Our Author infers from theſe Quotations, that 'cis as lawful for him, as theſe ancient Poets, to borrow ſome Terms from other Languages, to expreſs himſelf in this work, fince he can find none proper in his own, and he has no other way to render himſelf Intelligible. And this might have been a good Excuſe for the ancient Schoolmen, if they had not carry'd this Liberty too far, and made uſe of Terms wholly barbarous. (4) By Beings our Author means the Subſtances of Things, with all their Properties and Qualities, internal and external, as appears by what follows. (5) See Nore 2. upon S. 5. of this Chapter. (5) Men and their Adions are here underſtood, as $. 16. ſhews, III. WE Char. I. Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. 3 III. We may define our Moral Entities to be cer- Human Conduct, as ſuperior to Brutal, in being tain Modes fuperadded to Natural Things and Motions, capable of regular Beauty and Grace : that thus in by Underſtanding Beings; chiefly for the guiding and ſo inconſtant a Subject, as the Motions of Men's tempering the Freedom of voluntary A&ticns, and for the Minds, an agreeable Elegance and Harmony procuring of a decent Regularity in the Method of Life. might be produc'd. We call them Modes, becauſe we conceive Ens, or IV. As the original Way of producing Natural Being in general, to be more conveniently divided Entities is (4) by Creation, ſo the Manner of fra- at large, into Subſtance and (1) Mode, than into ming Moral Entities cannot be better expreſs’d Subſtance and Accident. And as Mede is contradi- than by the Term of (5) Impoſition. For theſe do stinguiſh'd to Subſtance, ſo it is manifeft, that Mo- not proceed from Principles ingrafted in the Sub- ral Entities have no Self-fubfiftence, but are found- ftance of Things, but are added, at the Pleaſure ed in Subſtances and in their Motions, and do on- of Intelligent Creatures, to (6) Beings already ly affect them after a certain manner. Of Modes, (2) perfect in their Nature, and to the real Producti- ſome flow, as it were, naturally from the Things ons of thoſe Beings; and conſequently obtain them.ſelves, (3) others are ſuperadded by the Inter- their (7) whole Exiſtence from the Decermination vention of an Intelligent Power. For whatever is of their Authors. The ſame Power afſigns them endu'd with Underſtanding, can from the reflex ſuch and ſuch Effects, which, when it fees conve- Knowledge of Things, and from comparing them nient, it can deſtroy (8) without cauſing any Na- with one another, form ſuch Notions as may prove tural Alteration in the ſubject to which they were very ſerviceable in the Direction of an agreeable apply’d. Hence their Force and Ability of Ope- and conſiſtent Faculty. Moral Entities are of this ration doth not conſiſt in this, that they can by the Original of which is juftly to be referr’d their internal Efficacy produce any Natural Moti- to Almighty God, who would not that Men on or Change in Things, without the Interventi- Thould paſs their Life like Beaſts, without Culture on of other Cauſes; but, partly in ſhewing. Men and without Rule; but that they and their Actions how they ought to govern their Freedom of Acti- ſhould be moderated by ſettled Maxims and Princi- ons, and chiefly in making them capable of re- ples; which could not be effected without the Ap- ceiving Benefit or Injury, and of exerciſing ſeve- plication of ſuch Terms and Notions. But the ral Works towards other Perſons, with ſome pecu- greateſt Part of them were afterwards added at liar Effect (9). And the Efficacy of Moral Enti- the Pleaſure of Men, as they found it expedient ties, produc'd by Almighty God, flows from this to bring them in, for the poliſhing and the metho- Principle, that he, by his Right of Creation, háth dizing of Common Life. And from hence the the Power of Circumſcribing, within proper Li- End of them is plainly to be diſcover'd, which is mits, that Liberty of Will with which he indulg'd not, like that of Natural Beings, the Perfection Mankind, and when it grows refractory, of turn- of the Univerſe, but the particular Perfection of ing it which way ſoever he pleaſeth, by the Force kind; Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. III, IV. (1) Our Author, without doubt, intends by this Diſtinction to make a Difference between Modes properly 10 called, which are not to be ſeparated from cheir Subſtance, and have no Exiſtence by themſelves; and ſuch, as being real Subſtances of them- ſelves, can have an independent Exiſtence from the Subject to which they are joyned. For the Term, Mode, in its true Signi. fication is oppoſed to Subſtance, and imports only the Modification, or Manner of Being. It is not the ſame with Accident. (2) For Inſtance, The Figure of a Body, which is really inherent in it; and therefore called an Internal Mode. (3) Such are Moral Entities, which are not in the Things themſelves, but depend upon the Operation of the Mind; and are therefore called External Modes, becauſe they are nothing elſe but certain Relations of objects or Idea's one to another. See The Art of Thinking, l. 1. c. 2. and Mr. Lock's Human Underſtanding, 1. 2. C. 28. (4) This Word is ſometimes uſed in Latin co lignify, the Eſtabliſhment of a Man in an Office, as, Conſul creatus est, He was made Conſul. (5) The French renders it Inſtitution which being uſed in Engliſh for every Thing that proceeds from mere humane Inventi. on and Appointment, in Oppoſition to what proceeds from Nature, may be better uſed here. (6) We muſt not imagine, that the Exiſtence of Moral Entities is always poſterior to the Exiſtence of the Things they are annexed to. 'Tis true in reſpect of ſuch as are of human Inſtitution only, but not of ſuch as are of Divine, becauſe they are ap- propriated to Man from the Moment of his Creation, of which Sort are all Natural Obligations, of which our Author treats, 1. 3. c. 4. §. 5. and the State of compleat Nature, of which he ſpeaks S. 7. So that there is no moment, in which a Man may be conceived free from all Moral Entities. Nevertheleſs, as Moral Entities, which are born with a Man, are not leſs true Modes than the other, though they do not proceed from the Subſtance and Phyſical Qualities of the Man, but from the Derermination and Will of the Creator, in ſuch manner as ſhall be explained in the following Note; yer theſe may be conceived abſtractly, as the Properties and Phyſical Qualities of Man, by Virtue of Divine Inſtitution. This Expoſition is taken ouc of a work of this Author's, called, A Specimen of the Controverſies with Puffendorf about his Right of Nature, &c. c. 3. S. 10. (7) To obviate all Objections againſt this Expreſſion of our Author, we ought to obſerve, That he makes two ſorts of Inſtitus tion. 1. Purely Arbitrary. 2. Another which has a Foundation in the Thing it ſelf, and which is a neceſſary Conſequent of what is before freely reſolved, and can't be oppoſed or contradicted: As for Example, An architect may or may not build a Palace; but when he has reſolved to do it, he muft neceſſarily order the Materials in a clear different Manner than if he were to build a Cottage; and he'd paſs for a Fool, if, after he had built a Cortage, he ſhould affirm it to be a Palace : yer this hin- ders not, but the ordering of the Materials proceeds from the Contrivance and will of the Architect. In like manner it was alto- gether free for GOD either to create Man or not; but after he had reſolved to ſend him into the World, it was neceſſary chac he ſhould lay ſuch Obligations on him, as became a rational and ſociable Creature ; ſo that if the Laws of Nature depend origi- nally on the Divine Inſtitution, they are not a pure Arbitrary Conſtitution, as the Ceremonial Laus given to the Jews were; buc an Inſtitution founded upon che very Nature of Man, and the Wiſdom of GOD, who can't will the End, but he muſt at the ſame time will the Means to the End. Nevertheleſs, though the Will of GOD can't be feparated from his Goodneſs and Wif- dom, yet we impute the Eſtabliſhment of the Laws of Narure chiefly to the Divine Will, becauſe it is not only the Principle of all Divine Actions, but becauſe GOD's Wiſdom and Goodneſs are Attributes entirely free, and ſo can't be conceived with- our the Will. Theſe Expofitions are taken from this Author's Works, viz. Specim. Controverſ. cap. 5. §. 9. Diſert. Acad. p. 743. Spicil. Controv. cap. 3. $. 9. (8) See the laft Paragraph of this Chapter. (9) By virtne of Moral Entities, we have a Right to do our ſelves, or require of others certain Things, or rather we are obliged to do them, or ſuffer others to do them. See Note 2, in the next Paragraph. B 2 of 4 Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. Book I. 1 of ſome threatned Evil: Men likewiſe were im- the latter is a Kind of imınoveable Subſtance, ex- power'd to give a Force to their Inventions of tended primarily, and of it ſelf, and which might the ſame kind ; by threatning fome inconvenience, ftill ſubliſt, if all the Natural Things, which now fill which their strength was able to make good, a- it, were remov’d: But States, and all other Moral gainſt thoſe who ſhould not act conformably to Beings, conſider'd formally as ſuch) obtain no high- them. er Condition than that of Modes or Attributes; V. Since then Moral Entities were inſtituted for ſo that upon taking away the Perſons ſuppos’d to the Regulation of Men's Lives, to which End it be in ſuch a State, the State it ſelf is in manifeſt is neceſſary, that thoſe who are to obſerve this Danger of loſing its own Exiſtence. Rule ſhould bear ſome ſettled Relations to one a Vil. There are two Sorts of Spaces; one accord- nother, ſhould govern their Actions by a fix'd Me- ing to which Things are ſaid to be in a Place, thod; and, laſtly, ſhould act with determinate Re- which the Logicians call Ubi, as here, there, &c. ſpects and Titles about ſuch Goods and Poſſeſſions and another according to which they are pro- as the Occaſions of Life require; we may hence con- nounc'd to be in Time, which they call Quando, ceive them to be principally inherent, 1st, In Men; as Yeſterday, to Day, to Morrow, &c. In the ſame 2dly, In the A&tions of Men; And, 3dly, after a ſort manner we may conceive a double Notion of (1), in Things; which Nature, either by her own State; one which denotes a Moral Ubi, and bears Strength, or with the Aſliſtance of Human Indu an Analogy to Place; another which includes a ſtry may produce. (2) But though it would be Reſpect to Time, ſignifying the Application of no Abſurdity to ſtate their Diviſion according to ſome Moral Effect to Perſons exiſting in ſuch a theſe three Heads or Subjects, yet it ſeems a more Time. The former State, which hath a Relation exact Method to make the Claſſes of Natural En to Place, may be conſider'd either Undeterminate- tities our Patterns in digeſting the Moral. Not ly, as it reſalts only from (4) Moral Qualities; only becauſe the former have more engag'd the or Determinately, as it ſuppoſeth a Dependance Studies of Philoſophical Men, and being compar'd on Moral Quantities, and on Compariſon. The with the latter, caſt a conſiderable Share of their State of Man conſider'd Undeterminately, is either own Light and Evidence upon them; but like- Natural or (s) Adventitious. We uſe the Word wiſe becauſe our Underſtandings are ſo immers’d Natural, not becauſe ſuch a State flows from the in Corporeal Images, as to be hardly capable of internal Principles of Human Effence, antecedent apprehending ſuch Moral Beings any otherwiſe to the Power of Impoſicion; but becauſe it was than by their Analogy to thoſe of Nature. impos'd by God Himſelf, not by Man, and af- VI. Now though Moral Entities do not ſubſiſt of fects us immediately upon our Nativity. We are themſelves, and for that Reaſon ought not, in ge- wone to conſider the Natural State of Man, either neral, to be rank'd under the Claſs of Subſtances, abſolutely, or with relation to other Men. The for- but of Modes; yet we find many of them to be mer Notion, till we can find a more convenient conceiv'd in the Manner of Subſtances, becauſe o- Terin, we may expreſs by the Word Humanity, im- ther Moral Things ſeem to be immediately found- porting that Condition in which Man is plac'd by ed in them, juſt as Quantities and Qualities inhere his Creator, who hath been pleas’d to endue him in the real Subſtance of Bodies. Farther, as Na- with Excellencies and Advantages in a high De- tural Subſtances ſuppoſe ſome kind of Space, in gree above all other Animate Beings (a). Of which they fix their Exiſtence, and exerciſe their which State this Principle is a direa Conſequence, Motions ; fo in Allufion to theſe, Moral Perſons that Man ought to be a Creature acknowledging are eſpecially ſaid to be in ſome State, which in and worſhipping his Divine Author, and admiring like manner contains them, and in which they per- his Works; and that 'tis expected that he ſhould form their Operations. Hence a State may not maintain à Courſe of Life far different from that improperly be defin’d a Mural Entity, fram'd and of Brutes. To this State is oppos'd the Life and taken up, on account of the Analogy it bears to Space. the Condition of Irrational Animals. And as Space ſeems no Principal and Original Be Since then the very being a Man is a State, ob- ing, but is devis’d, to be, as it were, ſpread under liging to certain Duties, and giving a Title to other Things, to hold and to ſuſtain them in ſome certain Rights, it cannot be out of the way to con- particular manner; ſo the ſeveral States were not fider the preciſe Point of Time, at which particu- introduc'd for their own fakes, but to make a Field lar Perſons may be ſaid to enter on ſuch a State. for (3) Moral Perſons to exiſt in. Yet there is in- And this we conceive ought to be fix'd on the ve- deed this Difference between State and Space, that ry firſt Moment, when any one may be truly call’d (a) Cicero Off. 1. c. 28. Nature hath given us a Perſon and Chara&ter to lultain, in a Degree of Excellence far above any other Creatures. Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. V, VI, VII. (1) See what the Author ſays S. 16. (2) All Moral Entities may be reduced to two Heads: 1. Right. 2. Obligation. Theſe are the Foundation of all Morality, which conſiſts either in Actions or Perſons, which have Right to act in ſuch a Manner, or are under an Obligation co do it. This Right and Obligation are Relatives, which always reciprocally ſuppoſe each other, as they refer to different Perſons. See Lib. III. c. 5. §. 1. In fine, as all Right, and every Obligation depends on the Authority of a Superior, who regulares by Laws the Actions of all that are ſubject to him, Natural Order requires, that we treat firſt of Human Actions, their Principles, and different kinds; and then of a Law in General ; after which, the Explication of Moral Entities, which are founded on Laws, will properly follow. (3) As for Example, when a Prince in favour to, or to reward any of his Subjects, eſtabliſhes an Ofice or Dignity, which he would not elſe have done, nor was otherwiſe neceſſary, but purely to advance the Honour of him for whom it was eſtabiſh'd. Such are all honorary Employments. (4) From the 17 to the 22 of this Chapter, the Author lhews what he means by Moral Qualities and Quantities. (5) Adventitious is a sort of Moral Stare, which is added by way of overplus to the State of Nature, in conſequence of fome human Action. a Man, Char. I. Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. 5 ces. a Man, though he as yet want thoſe Perfections to the other, nor have any Acquaintance by the which will follow his Nature in a longer Courſe: Means of Benefits, or of Injuries. To which may That is, whenſoever he begins to enjoy Life and be added a third Notion of a Natural Staté, as it Senſe, though his Mother hath not yet deliver'd abſtracts from all Inventions and Inſtitutions him into the World. Now becauſe the Obligations brought in, either by Human Induſtry, or by Di- cannot be fulfilld by him, without he underſtand vine Revelation, for the Grace and the Conveni- his own Nature and the Ways of Working, they ency of Life. for that Reaſon do not actually exert their Force, The Adventitious State is that which obligeth Men 'till he is able to ſquare his Actions by ſome Rule, at, or after their Birth, by the Authority of ſome and to diſtinguiſh them by their proper Differen- Human Conſtitution, the Diviſions of which will But the Rights, on the contrary, date their be better ſettled hereafter (3). Validity from the very Beginning of our Being, in But we ought to obſerve, by the way, that there's as much as they engage other Perſons, already ar no Reaſon why People ſhould imagine a State of riv’d at the full Uſe of Reaſon, to ſuch and ſuch Nature, in the Senſe but now deliver'd, to be a Performances towards us, and may turn to our Be- Thing that never was, or can be in the World; be- nefit, even whilſt we are incapable of apprehend- cauſe there was never any Set of Men joyn'd to- ing the Favour. Hence, it being a general Right gether barely by that Similitude of Nature, as it and Privilege of all Men not to be Hurt by Others, abſtracts from Confanguinity; Eve being knit to if the Body of a Fetus in the Womb ſhould ſuf- Adam in the Conjugal Tie, and all their numerous fer any unlawful Violence, the Injury is not only Deſcendants being cloſely united and ally'd by the done to the Parents, but to the Child; who, we Communion of Blood and Race. For we muſt ſuppoſe, may in his own Name demand Juſtice know, that the Bond ariſing from Nearneſs of Birth, on that ſcore, when he is grown up to Know- doth by Degrees wear our, amongſt Perſons re- ledge of the Adion (1). But before the Imperfect mov'd at a great diſtance from the Common Stock, Materials, (2) have acquir’d an human Form in the nor is eſteem'd of any farther force, when once Womb, if any one ſhould diſſipate or deſtroy got beyond the reach of thoſe ſeveral Appellations them, he can't properly be term'd Injurious with and (4) Terms which Mankind have invented to regard to that ſenſeleſs Maſs; tho' he hath indeed expreſs it by. And therefore ſuch a State, though broken the Law of Nature, by intercepting a Mem- it did not appear at the Commencement of Hu- ber of Human Society, and hath done an Injury to man Race, aroſe afterwards in a longer Tract of the Commonwealth, and to the Parents, by de- Time, when the Memory of the Univerſal Root, priving them of their promis’d Citizen and Off- and the Senſe of the Relation ſpringing from it, ſpring. were funk out of the Thoughts and Minds of Men. The Natural State of Man, conſider'd with rela VIII. But although every State ſuppoſeth, in the tion to other Men, is that which affects us upon the Perſon whom it affects, a Reſpect and Diſpoſition bare account of an Univerſal Kindred, reſulting towards others, in as much as it is attended with from the Similitude of our Nature, antecedent to ſome Right, or fome Obligation, neither of which any Human Act or Covenant, by which one Man we can conceive without an Object to imploy their is render'd peculiarly obnoxious to the Power of Force upon; yet ſome kinds of States do more ex- another. According to which Senſe, thoſe Perſons preſly include and denote a Relation towards other are ſaid to live in a State of Nature, who neither o- Men, whilſt they ſignifie the Manner and Proceſs bey one common Maſter, nor are at all ſubject one by which the Mutual Buſineſs of Mortals is on both (1) Another Example may be; If a Thing be given to an Infant before he comes into the World by Will, or by any other Title, when he is in Conception, the Infanc has a certain Right to it, ſo that if it be caken from him, he may legally require it, when he comes to an Age of Diſcretion: For it is ſufficient, that he declares, that his Goods were taken away without his Conſent. This Compariſon will clear the Matter. When any perſon in our Abſence robs us, or does us any manner of Damage, he does us a real Injury, though we may not know it till a long time after. We have taken this out of our Author's Work, callid The Elements of the Civil Law, p. II, 12. We may add, that by the Roman Law, an Infant in the Mother's Womb is ſup- poſed to be come into the World at all times, when any thing may be done for irs Advantage, as the Words of the Digeſt. 1. 1. Tit. III. de Statu hominum Leg. VII. import. Qui in utero eſt, perinde ac fi in rebus humanis eſſet, cuftoditur, quotiens de commodo ipſius partûs quæritur. See Leg. XXVI, of the ſame Title. Yet the Roman Lawyers are not well agreed upon this point ; for ſome of them hold, that the Foetus is a part of the Mother, or of her Entrails, and that it can't be called a Man, till it is born in- to the World, Partus enim, antequàm edatur, mulieris portio est, vel viſcerum. Digeft. 1. XXV. Tit. IV. Leg. I. $ 1. They bor- row'd this Nocion of the Stoicks, who in this agreed with divers others of the Ancient Philoſophers. See Julius Paulus written by Mr. Noodt. c. 2. and 11. (2) The Explication, which Philo the few gives upon Exod. 21. 22. is ſo very pertinent here, that 'cis a wonder our Author did not apply it. The Text is, If Men, in ſtriving together, hurt a Woman great with Child, ſo that fhe miſcarrý, tho' no o- ther Miſchief follow, they ſhall pay the Husband of that Woman ſuch a Fine, or Mulet, as he ſhall lay on them, and give it him before the Judges, but if Death follow, ye ſhall give Life for Life. Theſe Words may be underſtood of the Death of the Mother only, as Joſephus thinks, or of both the Mother and Child, as Philo ſuppoſes, according to the Opinion of this Author, 'Edy rele ' danasov, &c. If the Foetus be nor formed, he that ſtrikes the Mother, ought to make Satisfaction, as well for the Harm done her, as becauſe he hath hindred Nature from perfecting her work, and giving Life to ſo noble a Creature as Man ; but if the Foetus be already formed, every Member being in its Natural Place, and having its proper Qualities, the Perſon ought to be put to Death; Philo dex Leg. Special. See Selden de Jure Nat. do Gent. See Hebr. 1.4.c. 1. Further, if before the Fætus be compleatly formed, a Man by hurting the woman on purpole, cauſes a bodily Deformity, or other Infirmity in the Child; he may, when he is grown up, proſecute the Author of ſuch a Damage, and ſhall obtain Satisfaction according to his Damage, as our Author ſpeaks in a Place cited hereafter, where he trears alſo of another Queſtion, which deſerves our Notice, lib. 4. c. 12. S. 10. (3). Yet Our Author does no where do it formally, but he treats in their proper Place of the four principal Adventitious States, to which all the reſt may be reduced, viz. Marriage, the Relation of Parents and Children, Maſter and Servant, and Citizen, or Member of a Society. To this we may add the Diviſions of Moral Perſons, which our Author lays down in the ſame Chap- ter, S. 12. doc. (4) Viz: When we have paſſed the Degrees of Father, Mother, Grandfather, Grandmother, Brother, Siſter, Uncle, Aune, Nephew, Niece, Couſins, he and ſhe, and ſome others depend ing on them; for as we have no other Names proper for ſuch De- ſcendents, ſo cheLine of Kindred produces no ſuch ſtrong Ties between them, who are in ſuch diftant Degrees of Relation. fides o Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. Book I. Sides manag'd and tranſacted. Of this Sort the moft neral Diviſion, we ſettled with relation to Time, ſignal and material are Peace and War, which ewo in conjunction with ſome Moral Effect, may be States, (I) Libanius ſays, comprehend all the Af- divided, firſt, into Seniority and Juniority; both fairs, and all the Conduct of Life, Peace is that which are conſider’d, either with reſpect to che Du- State by which Men live quietly together, without the ration of Human Exiſtence, and are then callid Diſturbance of Violence or Injuries, and veluntarily dif- Age, the Degrees of which are Infancy, Childbood, charge tb Mutual Duties, as Matters of neceſſary Ob- Puberty, Touth, Manhood, fix'd Age, Declining, old, ligation. War, on the other hand, is a State of Men and Decrepit Age: or, with regard to ſome Adven- mutually engag'd in offering and repelling Injuries, or en- titious State, (7) according as a Man hath conci- deavouring forcibly to recover their Dues. Peace may nued a longer, or a ſhorter Time in it. Secondly, be divided into Common and Particular; the former Into Plen-age (8), when one is preſum'd able by ſuch as is maintain’d amongſt Men by Duties flow- his own Strength and Diſcretion to manage his Al- ing purely from the Law of Nature ; (2) the latter fairs; and Non-age, when a Perſon hath need of a ſuch as derives its force from expreſs Covenants Tutor, or Guardian, becauſe he is ſuppos’d, upon and Leagues, binding both Sides to agreeable Per- the account of Weakneſs of Judgment, incapable formances : This again is branched into Internal of dexterouſly proſecuting his own Buſineſs. The and External, the one (3) between Members of the Limits of this State are different, according to the fame Commonwealth, the other regarding Per- various Conſtitutions and Cuſtoms of Nations. fons of different Countries and Governments, Different from Non-age, is what we may call an whether as Common Friends, or as Special Con- Age capable of (9) meditated Guile; the Bounds of federates and Allies. A Common or Univerſal War which it is likewiſe impoſſible to aflign. Ælian in ingaging all Mankind at the fame time, is an im- his Various Hiſtory relates a very remarkable Way poſſible Suppoſition; this being a direct Conſe- of diſcovering ſuch an early Deceit. A Boy, ha- quence of the State of Beaſts. Particular War is ei- ving taken up a Golden Plate (b) dropt out of Di- ther Internal and Civil, or External; that, between ana's Crown, was indicted in Court: The Judges Members of the ſame; (4) this, between thoſe of dif- order'd a pack of trifling Play-things to be laid up- ferent Communities. When the Acts of War are on the Board, and amongſt theſe a Plate of Gold, ſuſpended, though the State ſtill continue, ſuch a and bid the Boy chufe which he lik'd beſt; who a- Ceſſation is call'd a Truce (a). de son biber gain laying hands on the Gold, was condemn'd as IX. States are ſaid to be conſider'd determinately, guilty of the former Sacrilege. when we meaſure them according to the high or XI. Before we proceed to other Matters, it ſeems low Degree of Eſteem which attends them, or ac- neceſſary for us to obſerve, that, through Scarcity counting as they are reckon'd more or leſs honour of Words we are frequently compell’d to expreſs by able. (5) For ſince peculiar Rights and Obligati- the ſame Term, the State it felf, and the Attribute ons accompany each State, every one obtains a proper to ſuch a State; though they are really di- larger Share of Splendor and Credit, either as its ſtinct, and form different Conceptions in our Rights are more numerous and (6) more forcible; or Minds (c). Thus, to give an Inſtance, Liberty is as its Obligations are directed towards the Perfor-us'd as well for a State with analogy to Space, as for a mance of ſuch Works as require a ſingular Ability Faculty of working with reſemblance to an Active of Parts and Wit. On the other hand, thoſe Quality (10). And ſo Nobility, ſometimes expreſſeth which demand only dull Pains and Labour of Bo- a State, ſometimes an Attribute, or Affection of the dy, are in very little Value and Repute. von Perſon in ſuch a State, in the manner of a Paſſive X. The latter Sort of State, which, in our Ge- Quality. So likewiſe the word Truce denotes both --- (a) Vide Grot. de Fur. B. do P. 1. 3. C, 21. (6) Lib. 5. Cap. 16. (c) Senec. de Benef . I. 2. c. 34. There is a vaſt multitude of things which have no peculiar words fix'd upon them; and theſe we expreſs not by proper, but by foreign and borrow'd Names. Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. VII, IX, X, XI. (1) Progymnaſm. p. s. c. Edit. Parif. Morel. Ariſtotle, as Mr. Hirtius obſerves, had before ſpoken to the ſame effect. Alantou det my vás o BIG, &c. The whole Life of Man is divided into Labour and Idleneſs, War and Peace. Pólit. I. VII. c. 14. Edit. Pariſ. 1629. (2) See Book the VIII. Chap. 1X. Se&t. 2, 3. &c. (3) Viz. So far as they execute the fundamental Agreement, punctually, for the ſake of which the Society was eſtabliſhed, and do not oppoſe by open Fact the Lawful Power, which is exerciſed over them; and ſo that Peace is nor diſturbed by any Sort of Violence, but only that which we are engaged not to uſe, when we entred into a Society. As for Example, The Internal Peace of a State ſuffers no Interruption, when the Magiſtrate uſes the Power entruſted to him to curb in and puniſh the Breakers of the Laws. But when the Subjects will by force deliver a Criminal from Punishment, and endeavour to oppoſe the Magiſtrate in the Exerciſe of his Legal Authority, this is called a Civil War, Element. Juriſprud. Univers. p. 17. The War alſo which breaks out among Confederates united together by a perpetual Alliance may alſo be looked upon as an Inteſtine War, ar Mr. Hir- tius there obſerves. The brood (4) When this ſort of War is extinguiſhed at its firſt Riſe, viz. without any regular Preparations on either Side, it is a Sedi- tion; when Subjects take up Arms unjuſtly againſt their Sovereign, it is a Rebellion. In Democracies and Ariſtocracies, when the People and the Magiſtrates make two Parties, and uſe Acts of Hoſtility one againſt the other, this is properly call’da Civil War, Element. Juriſprud. Vniverſ, p. 18. wiziao su (5) See Mr. Daumat’s Publick Right, Lib. I. Tit. IX. Se&. 1. and what our Author ſays 1. 8. c.4.vm blir (6) More forcible.] The French Tranſlator renders the words, validiora jura, more conſiderable, i. e. of greater Validity and Certainty; for the Honour of an Employ does not depend upon the Manner of obtaining it, but upon the Dignity and Privi, leges, which it confers on ſuch as are inveſted with it. And ſo this ſeems the better Tranſlation. 2006 2007 (1) And fo we ſay for Example, an Old General, an Old Soldier, a Young Apprentice, doc. 3) See Lib. III. Ch. VI. S. 4. and Lib. IV. Ch. IV. S. 15. O) The Roman Law declares ſuch as are in their Non-age, or not far from it, capable of Deceir. Igitur doli non capaces, ut ad- modumi mpuberes -excuſati ſunt. Digeft. Lib. 47. Tit. 12. de Sepulchro violato, Leg. III. S. 1. See Cujas's Obſervations Lib. VI. Cl. 22. do Digeſt. Lib. 47. Tit. 8. de vi bonorum Raptorum, Leg. II. S. 19. (10) The Author will explain a little lower, wiz. S. 19. what he means by Qualities Adive and Paſſive. the fo Chap I. Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. 7 the State of Peace, and the Manner of Settling it. without the Addition of Poſitive Laws and Conſti- Nor muſt we forget to hint, that as one Perſon tutions ? may be at the ſame time engag’d in ſeveral States, XII. Moral Entities, fram'd with Analogy to Sub- provided that the Obligations of thoſe States do not ftances, are call'd Moral Perſons (a); which are ei- interfere with one another, ſo the Obligations ad- ther particular Men, or ſeveral joyn'd in one Body hering to one particular State, may, according to by ſome Moral Tie, confider'd with the State and different Parts, be deriv'd from different Princi- Office which they maintain in Common Life. Mo- ples. And therefore he that only collects the Ob- ral Perſons are either Simple, or Compound. The ligacions flowing from a ſingle Principle, and o- Simple, according to the Difference of cheir Poſts mits the reſt, doth not preſently form a diſtinct and Employments, are either Publick, or Private; State incapable of other Obligations, beſides thoſe as their Dury is immediately apply'd, either to the which he hath taken notice of. Thus he that ga- Benefit of Civil Society, or to the particular Ad- thers ſeveral Parts of the Office of Prieſts purely vantage of (3) every Private Member. Publick from the Holy Scriptures, doth not in the leaſt de- Perſons, by the general Cuftom of the Chriſtian ny, but that they are likewiſe bound to ſuch Per- World, are divided into Civil and Ecclefiaftical. The formances as the Conſtitutions of particular Go- former (4) are either Principal, or Inferior. Of vernments ſhall farther enjoyn. So we that profeſs Principal Perſons, fome adminiſter Affairs with a in this work to treat only of thoſe Duties of Men, Supreme Power ; others either execute fome Part of which (1) the Light of Reaſon ſhews to be necef- the Adminiſtration by Commiſſion from the Su- ſary, do not at all pretend that there ever was, or preme Power, who are properly call’d Magiſtrates, now is, or ought to be, ſuch a State in which thoſe or elſe afliſt with their Advice and Counſel in the Obligations only ſhould prevail, excluſive of all o- Management of the Commonwealth. The Inferior thers. Nay, it would be almoſt a needleſs Diſqui- perform a leſs Noble Service to the Community, ſition to ſearch, whether ſuch a State of Men was and Act under the Magiſtrates, with reſpect to their once ſo much as likely to have been in the World. Publick Capacity. In War the Officers, whether For the Affertion, which fome ſo confidently lay of higher or lower Commiſſions, anſwer to Ma- down, could never yet be clearly made out; That giftrates, and are aſſiſted, in Subordination, by the If Man had continued in his Primitive Holineſs, the Common Soldiers. We reckon Men of that Pro- Law of Nature alone, as it govern'd him at firſt, so feſfion amongſt publick Perſons, in as much as ſhould have continu'd its Sway, except that one or two they are authoriz'd by the Supreme Power, either (2) Poſitive Commands might probably have been added immediately or mediately, to bear Arms in the to it. We may juftly queſtion, whether Mankind, Service of the Commonwealth. or although untainted with Sin, ſhould have always There is likewiſe a peculiar Species of Politick paſs’d their Time in the Compaſs of a ſingle Gar. Perſons, which we may ſtile Repreſentatives, becauſe den, ſuſtaining themſelves with the Fruits of Spon- they ſuftain the Character of other Perſons : ſuch taneous Growth, and not have cultivated and a. as, being inveſted with the Power and Authority dorn'd their ways of living, by Induſtrious Ma- of acting by another, do in his room tranfact Bu- nagement, and by Variety of Arts and Inventions. fineſs with the ſame Force and Validity, as if he For what Prejudice could it have been to their O- himſelf had manag’d it. Of this kind are Legates, riginal Innocence and Integrity, if upon the Mul- Vicars, Burgeſſes, &c. tiplication of Human Race, they had divided into A new Diſtinction hath been brought in of late, ſeparate Societies in the Forms of Commonwealths? between Miniſters (5) of a Repreſentative Cha- And what Notion can we frame of ſuch Societies, racer, who are Ambaſſadors properly ſo call'd; and (a) The Roman Lawyers ordinarily reſtrain the word Perſon to thoſe that are Free: and rank their Slaves amongſt the Goods they possesed. Mr. Barb. NOTES on s. XII. (1) In Oppoſition to Revelation, and particular Rules of the Civil Laws of every Country, froni whence ariſe three diftin&t Sciences, viz. Natural Right, which is common to all Men without Exception, Civil Right, which is or may be different accor- ding to the intereſt of every State, and Moral Theology. See the Author's Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen. Præf. $. 2. (2) It is not known, whoſe words theſe are, which our Author cenſures. As to the Queſtion it ſelf 'tis one of the moſt im- pertinent; for our Author elſewhere acknowledges, that it is very hard to imagine, how a Propriety of Goods and Government, on which our whole lives now are ſpent, could have Place in our State of Integrity, See his Spicil. Jur. Nat.c. 2. §. 9. and his Comment. Super, inven. Vener. Lipf. pullo. p. 386. Nevertheleſs ſome others have treated feriouſly upon this frivolous Queſtion; as Mr. Thomaſius Inſt. Juriſpr. Div. Lib. I. c. 2. §. 37. 38. and Mr. Hirtius in his Elem. prud. Civil. I. 1. Se&t. 3. S. 5. (3) There is another Reaſon, why they are called ſo, and that is, that they are ſettled in publick Employ's by the Autho- rity of a Civil Society, or of them that govern it. Whereas private Employments depend upon the Will and Choice of every Man, unleſs the State will interpoſe and confer them. (4) Why does he not define what is meant by Perſons Political, or Civil? They are ſuch, as ( for fo our Author himſelf ſpeaks. Elem. Juriſprud. Vniverſ . p. 23. ) adminifter by publick Authority thoſe Afairs which have a particular Regard to Civil Society, conſidered as ſuch, whereas Eccleſiaſticks are to take care of Matters of Religion only. Theſe laſt, though they oughc to be ſubject to their Sovereigns in Temporal and Civil Matters at all times, yer may and ought alſo to be independent, as to Spirituals, provided they keep within their Bounds, and do not ſet up any other Religion, befides the eſtabliſhed : and the Rea- ſon of ie is, that as Religion is a Thing in its own Nature Free, at leaſt , directly, and can'c be ſupposºd to be admitted into Ci- vil Society for no End, every Ecclefiaftical Society may do what it judges for the Intereſt of Religion, provided it encroach nec upon any Prerogative of the Civil Power. See what ſhall be ſaid hereafter, lib. VII. ch. 4. §. 11. Note 2. Nevertheleſs, 1 do not affere any Thing here, which may be a Foundation for any Principles contrary to the Engliſ Author, Of tbe Rights of the Chriſtian Church. (5) The Author here quores the work of Mr. Wicquefort, Entituled, The Embaſador, and his office, printed in his time with- out a Name, and under a different Title, viz. Memoirs concerning Embasſadors ; but lately publiſhed with many Additions, as above. Miniſters 8 Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. Book I. Miniſters of the ſecond Order, as Envoys or Refi- and Perſons of various (3) Ages require a various dents, who do not, like the former, expreſs the fall Treatment and Application. Power and Grandour of their Maſters (1). XIII. A Compound Moral Perſon is then conſtitu- With reſemblance to thefe Publick Repreſenta- téd, when ſeveral Individual Men are ſo united to- tives, Tutors and Guardians are concern'd for Pri- wgether, that wliat they will or act by virtue of thac vate Perfons, as they manage Affairs in Behalf of Union, is eſteem'd a ſingle Will, and a ſingle Act, Pupils or Minors given them in charge. and no more. And this is ſuppos’d to be done, On this point Mr. Hobbes (a) is miſtaken, when when the particular Members ſubmit their Wills he will have it frequently to happen in Commu- to the Will of one Man, or of one Council, in nities, that a Man ſhall bear the Perſon of an Inani- ſuch a manner as to acknowledge, and to defire o- mate Thing, which therefore is it felf not properly a Per-thers to acknowledge, for the common Act and fons as suppoſe of a Church, a Hoſpital , a Bridge, &c. Determination of them all, whatever that Man, For there appears no Neceſſity of introducing a or that Council ſhall decree or perform, in Mar- Fiction of Law, to conſtitute Perſons by whom a ters which properly concern ſuch an Union, and ny of theſe ſhould be repreſented. It being more It being more are agreeable to the End and the Intention of ir. Natural to ſay in plain Terms, that particular Men Hence it comes to paſs, that whereas in other Ca- are impower'd by the Community, to collect the fes, when many Men will or act any Thing, we Revenue, ſettled for the preſerving of ſuch Places, conceive ſo many diſtinct Wills and Acts as there or Things, and to carry on and ſuſtain any Suits are in number Natural Perſons, or Human Individuals; that ſhall ariſe on thoſe Accounts. vo To 1919 yer when they cloſe, and form a Compound Perſon, The Variety and Diviſion of Eccleſiaſtical Perſons they are ſuppos’d to have but a ſingle Will, and e- is obvious to every Man, according to the particu- very Adion which they perform is conſtrued as lar Religion in which he hath been bred up. Nor one only, although a Number of natural Indivi- can any Man of Letters be at a loſs to apprehend duals concur in its Production. And hence ſuch a what Kinds of Perſons are founded in the Manage- Compound Perſon doth and ought to obtain ſome par- ment of Schools. ticular Goods and Rights which none of the Mem- Private Perſons are of a vaſt Latitude and Ex- bers, in their private and ſeparate Quality, can tent; yet their principal Differences may be taken; claim or arrogate to themſelves (4). firſt, from their buſineſs, Craft, or Trade, which Here alſo we muſt remark, that as Natural Bo- imploys their Pains, and exhibits their Livelihood: dies continue the ſame, although in length of Time, and theſe are, either Creditable and Genteel, or by flow and filent degrees they receive a conſidera- ſuch as ſeem to carry in them more Baſeneſs, or ble Alteration from the various Acceffions and De- Drudgery. Secondly, From the Condition, or, as ſertions of their Particles; fo by the particular Suc- we may ſay, the Moral Situation which any one ceſſion of Individuals, the Identity of the Com- obtains in a Community; in which reſpect one is pound Perſon is not injur'd: unleſs at one and the a Citizen, with more or leſs Priviledges; another fame time ſuch a Change ſhould arrive, as would a Sojourner, and a third a Stranger. Thirdly, From entirely take away the Nature and Conſtitution of the Place in a Family, upon which account one is that united Body. On which Point we ſhall be ſaid to be a Houfholder, which may comprehend more large in (s) another Part of our Work. the Perſon of a Husband, a Father, and a Maſter; Compound Moral Perſons, or Societies, may, after another is call’d a Wife, another a Son, another a the manner of ſingle Perſons, be divided into Pub- Servant: Theſe may paſs for the ordinary Mem- lick and Private. And the former again are fub- bers of a Family; the extraordinary are Gueſts divided into Sacred and Civil. Of the Sacred, fome and Lodgers. Fourthly, Upon account of Race we may call General, as is the Catholick Church, and Birth; whence ariſe Nobles, (divided into dif- and likewiſe any particular Church, whether com- ferent Degrees in different countries) and Plebei- prehended within the Bounds of ſuch a Nation, or ans. Fifthly, From Sex and Age, whence come the diſtinguiſh'd from others by Publick Forms of Con- Differences of Men and Women, and the Diſtin- feflion. Others peculiar, as are Councils, Synods, Aions founded in Childhood, Youth, Manhood, Conſiſtories, Presbyteries, &c. Civil Societies are and Old-Age (2). For though the Diverſity of Sex, alſo either General, as a Commonwealth, of which and Number of Years, are not of external Impofi- there are many Species, as Simple, Compound, Re- tion, yet in the Method of a Social Life, they in- gular, and Irregular; or particular, as a Senate, volve ſome kind of Moral Notion; in as much as an Order of Knights, a Tribe, a Parliament, &c. different Actions are becoming in different Sexes, Armies may be called Military Societies, and confift (a) Leviath. cap. 16. Get i hela Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. XIII. (1) This is a viſible Miſtake in our Author, who has afferred the contrary elſewhere, and ought to have been corrected by Mr. Hirtius, who put out the Frankfort Edition in 1705; for there is great Reaſon to reject the Sentiments of ſuch Men ( as Chirles Paſcal, Richard Z sucheus, &c.) who affirm that Embaſſadors, properly ſo called, are as their Mafter himſelf, who ſends them; inſomuch, that the Prince or State, to whom they are ſent, ought to give them the ſame Honour, they would to their Ma- fter. The Character of an Embaſſador certainly gives neither the Dignicy nor Title of a Sovereign, and ſuch a Miniſter may not pretend, becauſe his Maſter has a Superiority above another Prince, that he muſt perfonally be preferred before him. See what our Author ſays, Lib. III. ch.4 S. 20. (2) In the Civil Law ſome other Diſtinctions are made among Perfons froin their Age and Sex. See Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order, Lib. I. Tit. II. Se&t. I. of the Preliminaries ; and the Interpreters upon the Digeſt. Lib. I. Tit. V. De ſtatu Hominuin. (3) Ages is not in the Original, but the Manner of Reaſoning, and Beginning of the Sentence require the Addition of it, as our Author himſelf does in his Elements. Juriſpr. Vniverſ. p. 28. (4) As for Example, No Private Perſon harh a Right to puniſh Criminals, although the Right to do it proceeds Originally from Private Perſons, the Sovereign only has that Power, (5) See Lib. VIII. Ch. XII. of Chap. I. Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. 9 of (1) Regiments, Troops, Cohorts, Companies, i obferv’d, that the Splendor of Men's Dignity hath &c. one Isolamp is ud frequently a ſtrong Influence on their Actions, and Amongſt Private Societies , we do not only recko that many Men have made very different Figures on Families, but all the (2) Colleges, or Corpora- in a Publick, and in a Private Station. But we tions in a Kingdom, or a City, as thoſe of the may reckon theſe Fancies amongſt the common Merchants, of the Artificers, and the like. To: Deceptions of Sight, occafion’d by gaudy Pomp make a minute Catalogue of every Species we and Show. The Caſe being much the ſame, as think unneceſſary to our preſent Deſign. iw bus when Country People imagine the Name and Ti- XIV. Concerning the Nature of ſimple Moral tle of Doctor to have ſome Share in the Force and Perfons, we have this farther to obſerve; That as the Succeſs of a Preſcription (d). Except indeed, óne and the fame Man may be in ſeveral States to that ſome kinds of Parts and Diſpoſitions are rouz’d gether, (3) provided they do not claſh with each and enliven’d by Buſineſs; and on the contrary, other, ſo he may ſuſtain ſeveral Perſons together, lye dormant in a State of Eafe (e). Yet there is upon Suppoſition that the Duties attending thoſe no Queſtion to be made, but that when God Al- Perſons may be perform’d together by him. For mighty impoſeth a peculiar Charge and Perſon on though upon a natural account one cannot be both any Man, he can, and often doth indue him with a Husband and a Wife, both a Son and a Daugh- extraordinary Qualities, beyond the Meaſure of ter; nor in a Moral Conſideration, at the ſame Moral Acquirements; as is evident from the Holy time, a Maſter and a Servant, a Judge and a Pri- Scriptures (f). H & miri sve one kort? foner, a Party and Witneſs; yet nothing hinders From what hath been offer'd on this Subjeđ it why the fame Man may not be, (for example ) appears, that the fews heretofore attributed too at home a Houſholder, a Senator in Parliament, an large Effects to their Regeneration, by which the Advocate in the Halls of Juſtice, and a Counſel- new Perſon of a Profelyte of Fuſtice was impos'd on a lor at Court. In as much as thoſe particular Offi- Gentile : as when they affirm'd, that there was no ces do not require and engage the whole Man; Force remaining in his former Kindred ; that he but may, at different times, be all conveniently ought not to eſteem, or uſe as Relations, his Bre- adminiſtred (a). And upon this Principle the wi- thren, Siſters, or Parents ; nor his Children be- fer Heathens undertook to defend Polytheiſm (b), gotten in his firſt Condition (g). The Cauſe of which they knew well enough was contrary to this Error was their abſurd Belief, that a new Soul Reaſon: for their Excuſe was, they only con- was infus’d into the Profelyte. ad 5098 ceiv'd ſuch a Number of Perſons in the fame Su XV. It may not be amiſs, in the laſt place, to preme Being, as might anſwer the Variety of O- obferve, that Men ſometimes frame a kind of Sha- perations which proceeded from his Eſſence and dows, or Images of Moral Perſons, for the repre- Nature (c)(4). ſenting of them in Sport and Jeft. Whence it came It's very plain from the Name and the Notion of to paſs that the Term of Perſon hath been peculiar- Inſtitution, that when a Man enters on the Capaci- ly challeng’d by the Stage. The Effence of a Feigna cy of a new Perſon, there is no Natural Change ed Person conſiſts in this , that the Hábit, Geſture, produc'd in him, no Generation of new Natural and Speech of another real Perſon be handſomly ex- Qualities, no Augmentation of old ones: but what- preſs’d: Thus the whole Procedure bears only á ever accrues to him from this Relation, is compre- Countenance of Mirth, and whatever ſuch a ficti- hended within the Sphere of Moral Things. So tious Actor ſays or does, leaves no Moral Effect be- when a Man's declar'd Conſul, he is made ne'er the hind it, and is valu'd only according to the Dexte- wiſer, nor when he lays down his Office doth he layrity and Artifice of the Performance. For which down any of his Parts with it. Though ſome have Reaſon we may, by the way, juftly wonder, why Vion 2012 (a) Cicero, Off. lib. 1. c. 30. We muſt underſtand, that we are by Nature inveſted, as it were, with two Perſons, or Capacities ; ônë and Common to Mankind, on account of our being Partakers of Reaſon, and of that Excellence by which we ſurpaſs the Beasts : the other proper to particular Men. A third is caft, upon us by Time or Chance : A fourth wè undertake and accommodate to our ſelues bý our open 1 Idem de Oratore. I suſtain Three Perſons at the ſame time; mine Own, the Adverſary's, and the Judge's. EM 14olls (6) Senec. de Benef. 1. 4. c. 7. There may be ſo many Appellations of GOD, as there are Employments. (c) Maxim. Tyrius, Diſſert. 23. The Gods are one in Nature, though many in Name. But we, Such is our ignorance, aſign them different Titles, according to the different Helps and Favours which they afford Mankind. si d29992 rindiT 592 ) Semana2 odt to mi3 to meet -Purpos de vendit. 1997 th II (b) Cauſidicum, vendunt ameshiftina; convenit illis, Et ftrepitu do facie majoris vivere emjus. Juv. Sat. 7.V. 135, &c. nounong (1) ( Vide Corn. Nep. Alcibiad. c. t. , ad nodig voor didá to s orla se bostire treba za maji zipa & bahtoisia elit a rierw Vide Exod. III. IV. Deut. XXXI". 9. Sam. X. 6; 9. Matr. X, 1. 19, 20, diftom co BEM od tort, tigilat e veta A $ (8) Vide Selden de 3. N. & G. 1. 2.C. d. baiba s Santana ni Soisalire a váloh hond nito.A lo rloosde yaw A () MOYO anyt) nemalang sud d. 31 st. 1788 ni bora noto19 9010 hot bolloo od bivorf RA 194091 so ventino cu Slow bas Mr. Barb. NOTE s. inson vorul seda no al moy 101 Sloors se (1) Our Author expreſſes thefe Parts of an Army according to the manner of the Romans, as Legio, Turma, Cohors, Manipu. 9.1.500.por lo 100 mg lus, &c. to which we have no Terms that will exactly anſwer, and therefore we are forced to tranſlate them thús. See the Trea- tifes of Juſtus Lipfius upon this Marter. Istuse nr 2 en (2) Collegia is a Name given to the Afſemblies of ſome particular Society of Men of one Trade or Calling in a City or Cor- totoisins le poration, and ſuch were the Collegia, or Societies of Coachmen, Augurs, Æſculapius, or Health, Dendrophori, or Timber-Merchants, &c, as we have at London Companies, or Collegia of Mercers, Drapers, &c. Vide Mr. Dauniat, of Publick Right, Lib. 1. Tit. 15. (3) Mr. Hirtius has treated at Large of this, and cleared it by a great Number of Examples in his Diſcourſe, De uno homine plures fuftinente Perſonas, which makes up a Part of the third Tome of his Commentaries, and ſmall Tracts, Printed at Frankfort on the Mein, A. D. 1700..... лока оз охil at 37 esto (4) See Mr. Le Clerc's Bibliotheque Choiſie, i. e. Choice Library Tom. 3. Art. Ignidan 916 29 arollo Voloviny s to one Roosa na to norbaita aloqu bas noteid te ble? Shkoz do С Peter 10. Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. Book I. Peter (1), Biſhop of Alexandria, approv'd of the But the Things themſelves obtain'd nothing hence, Baptiſm which Athanaſius, when a little Boy, had but an excrinſical Denomination, as they make the adminiſtred to one of his Play-fellows(a). Object of ſuch a Right, and of ſuch an Obligati. But the Inſtitution, which produceth true Moral on. So when certain Things are ſaid to be Holy Perſons, is allow'd no ſuch Liberty ; but ought al- or Sacred, no Moral Quality of Holineſs inheres ways to preſuppoſe fach Qualities as may contri- in the Things; only, an Obligation is laid upon bute to the ſolid Uſe and real Benefit of Human Men to treat them in ſuch a particular manner : Life: And he that in conſtituting Perſons hath nor and when that Obligation ceaſeth, they are ſup- a Regard to theſe Endowments, is to be efteem'd pos’d to fall again into promiſcuous and ordinary an extravagant Buffoon, and a vain Inſulter over Uſe. Yer if, ftill, any Man will poſitively main- Mankind (2). Thus Caligula might have made a tain, that there are ſome Things, as well as Per- Conful of the moſt Wicked, or of the moſt Senſleſs Sons, which ſhould be calld Moral, he muſt take Wretch in Rome, provided the Man had been a free care ſo to explain himſelf, that he may be underſtood Citizen, and could at leaſt have perform’d the to attribute this Morality to the Things, not formally, Common and Formal Part of that Office: Bur to as if it were inherent, but only objectively, as it is deſign his Horſe Incitatus the ſame Honour, was a terminated in them (3). Pitch of Madneſs, and of Infipid Raillery: nor a XVII. Thus much of thoſe Moral Entities which leſs Impudence than when he fet him up for a Maſter are conceiv'd with Analogy to Subſt ance. We are of a Family, and gave him a Houſe and Furni- now to enquire about thoſe that are really and for- ture; where there was good Entertainment pro- mally Modes , and paſs in our Notion as ſuch. vided for Gueſts invited in the Name of the Beaſt Modes may be conveniently enough divided into (b). An equal Madneſs was it, as well as a horrid (4) Modes of Affection, and Modes of Eſtimation : Impiety, that many of the Ancients, to flatter According to the former, we ſuppoſe Perſons to be their Princes, their Founders of States, and other affected in ſuch and ſuch a manner; according to Worchies, rank'd them after their Death in the the latter, both Things and Perſons may be rated Number of the God's (c). And what to think of and valu'd. The former fall under the Name of the Canonization amongſt the Modern Papiſts, no Quality, the latter of Quantity ; if we take both Man of Senfe is at a loſs.ro thoſe Terms in the moſt extended Senſe, Quali- XVI. As to Things conſider'd as they are the Ob. ties, ſo far as concerns our Buſineſs, may be divid- ject of Law (d), there ſeems to be no occaſion of ed into Formal and Operative. Formal Qualities are ranking them under the Head of Moral Entities. For fuch as do not tend, nor are directed towards any though Men are conceiv'd as different Perſons, up- A& or Work, but agree and are joyn'd with the on account of their different State or Office, yet Subject, in the manner of pure and naked Forms: Things do not raiſe ſuch diſtinct Notions in us, whence we may likewiſe call them Simple Attributes. with reference to their Owners, whether our felves Operative Qualities are, either Primitive, or Deriva- or others, or whether the Propriety be yet uncertain. tive. By the Primitive a Thing is conceiv'd fit and When at firſt ſome Things fell under particular able for ſuch an Ad: They are divided into Inter- Right and Dominion, and others were left exempt, nal(s), and External (6), and may be term’d we muſt not fancy, that they themſelves acquirá Moral Paſſive Qualities. The Derivative are thoſe any new Qualities; it ſeems rather, that upon in- which proceed from the Primitive, and are the (7) troducing this Propriety of Things, a Moral Qua- Axts themſelves, as the former were the Powers. lity aroſe amongſt Men, of which the Men were SEXVIII. Among Moral Attributes, Titles have a the Subjects, and the Things only the Terms : For, conſiderable place, which are apply'd for the Di- as during the Primitive Communion of Goods, any ftination of Perſons in Civil Life, with reference Man had a Right of applying to his proper Ufe, to their State and their Efteem. They are chiefly what equally belong'd to all; fo when one of two Sorts. Some directly fignifie the Degree of Maſters or Owners were conſtituted, there fprung sthe Rate and Value, which Perſons bear in com- up a Right in each particular Maſter of diſpoſing mon Account, together with the Qualities pecu- how he pleas'd of his own, and an Obligation in liar to Men of that Rank : but the State it felf all other Maſters. to abſtain from his Poffeffions. they only denote indire&tly and by the Bye, and 1, 2.com , (a) Sozom. I. 2. c. 17. Add the Argument of the Biſhops of Minorca in the Council of Trent, by Father Paul, B. 2. concerning the Intention of the Miniſter in the Celebration of the Sacrament. (6) Sueton. Calig. c. 55. (c) See Tiberius's Speech in Tacitus, An. IV. (d) The different Diſtinations of Things with reference to Law, will be explain’d in the 4th aid sth Books. Bet tons. a Mr. Barb. NOTES.stiges (1) The greateſt Number of Learned Men reject this Story, becauſe (as they prove) 8. Athanaſius was Eighteen Years old, when this pretended Baptiſm was adminiſtred. See the Life of this Father written by the Benediktines, but it is ſufficient for our Author's Deſign, thar the Fact was poſſible. (2) A witty Speech of Antiſthenes deſerves our Notice in this place. He adviſed the Athenians upon a certain time, to decree, that hereafter Alles Mould be called Horſes. Some preſent replied in Banter, That can't be. But Gentlemen (fays he ) you can chooſe for your Generals Men that know nothing of Warlike Affairs, and whoſe Qualifications conſiſt only in having a greater Number of Voices, Diog. Laert. Lib. VI. S. 8. Edit. Amſt. 110505 A me to (3) The different Diſtinctions of Things in relation to Right, ſhall be explain’d in Lib. IV. and V. See the Inſtit, l. 2. Tit. I. G Digeſt, 1: 1. Tit. 8. de rerum Divifione, as alſo Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their natural Order in the Preliminaries, Tit. 3. (4) Modi affe&ivi. Words hard to be tranſlated: The French renders them, Simple Modes; becauſe, as our Author explains them, they only modify, i. e. difpofe Moral Perſons. dono 20131002 to pigalle 9i w How Do 104109 (5) Internal Qualities are ſuch, as are really inherent in a Perſon, as Power, Right, Obligation; as alfo fuch Paſſive Qualities of which our Author treats in . 20. following. It were to be wiſhed, that our Author had been clearer in his Diviſions, which are not very Scholar-like. ca (6) External Qualities are ſuch, as are not annexed to the Perſon, but being fixed to External Objects, make an Impreſſion upon the Perſon. See $. 21. following. (7) Vit. Theſe derivative Qualities are nothing but the Efect and actual Operation of the primitive Qualities. In a word, pur Author ought to have avoided all this Jargon and uuprofitable Diftinctions of the Schools. that Chap. 1. Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. II that either more clearly, or more obſcurely, ac- convenient for the preſent Condition of their Afs cording as ſuch a Title is uſually attributed to fairs to flatter and careſs, or to deſpiſe and vilify fewer, or to more States. Of this kind are thoſe them. And even in the latter fort of Titles, as we Honorary Epithets, commonly prefixed to the above divided them, it frequently falls out that the Names of Great Perſons, as Marks of General Re- Title may continue, tho' the Thing itſelf, or the ſpect: as, the most Serene, the moſt Eminent, the Dignity and Right be in a high manner either bet- molt Illuſtrious: the lignification of which riſes higher, ter’d or impair'd. And farther, 'tis very uſual, chac or falls lower, according to the Condition of the in different Countries the fame Word ſhall expreſs Subſtantive to which they are joyn'd. Other Ti- very different Degrees of Honour. And therefore tles directly ſigrifie ſome particular State, or ſome it would argue a very unskilful Head, to place in the peculiar Seat and Place in a State, but indirectly de- fame Claſs all thoſe who bear the fame Title all over note that degree of Value and Repute which uſu- the World (2). It muſt not be forgot, that ſome- ally accompanies ſuch a State: as are the Names times a bare Title is atcributed to a Man without the of Moral Perſons, of thoſe eſpecially who fill any Thing, or without the Offices and the Profits which Poft of Honour. Now theſe Titles are not con- uſed to attend ſuch a Title; only to this intent, that fider’d, as they are only Notions repreſenting he may hence obtain the external Enſigns and Bad- to one Man's Underſtanding the State and Office ges of the Honour, and may acquire a more crea of another, but as by virtue of human Impoſition ditable Place and Seat in the Community of which they declare the Power and Authority of the Per- he is a Member, Laſtly, It is worth remarking, fon that enjoys them. So that 'tis not a vain Con- that chiefly in the Titles of the principal Houſes of tention about empty Ceremonies, when Men fre- Europe, the fame Title fometimes imports both the quently have ſuch hot Diſputes and Quarrels a- Family, and the Poffeffion of the mention'd Ter- bout Titles: becauſe upon the denial of a Title, ritory; ſometimes the Family only, without the we are ſuppos’d at the ſame time to deny the Poffeſion, yet with the Right of fucceeding to it State, the Office, the Power and the Rights, which according to the due Courſe and Order of Inheri- bol ſuch a Title generally expreſſes or includes. But tance.to sonom in here we muft be ſure to obſerve, that the Impo- 30 XIX. Moral Operative Qualities (3) are either A- ſition of moſt Titles is not perpetual and uniform ; ative or Paſſive. Of the former the moſt noble but in different Countries, and in the fame Coun- Species are Power, Right, and Obligation. Power is try at different times admits of very large Altera- that by which a Man is enabled to do a thing lawfully and tions. Thus the Titles of the firſt kind which we with a Moral Effects which Effect is, that the Per- mention'd, (or the Honorary Epithers) made uſe fon exerciſing this Power, ſhall lay an Obligation of by our Anceſtors, how mean and little do they on others to perform fome certain Buſineſs which found to the Ears of our own Age: while what he requires, or to admit ſome Action of his as Valid, was thought heretofore a worthy Mark for the or not to ſtop and hinder it ; or that he ſhall con- Greateſt of Mortal Men, ſhall now be deſpis’d by fer on others a Licence of doing or poſſeſſing fome- an Inferior Scribler? For which reaſon the increaſe thing, which Licence they did not before enjoy. of ſuch Titles does not always argue the increaſe of Whence appears how wide this Quality runs, and Dignity; but when the Titles (well higher, while how very diffuſive it is of it felf. Power, with re- the thing itſelf maintains its firſt condition, their ſpect to its Efficacy, is divided into perfect, and Value and Price is ſuppoſed to be conſiderably de- imperfect . The former is that, the Exerciſe of baſed. Sometimes alſo a certain Title is affix'd by which may be afferred even by Force, againſt thoſe way of Elogy and Complement to ſome particular who indeavour unlawfully to lett and oppoſe it. Order, becauſe the quality or thing meant by that Now Force is chiefly applied, within the Bounds Title, is or ought to be conſpicuous in the genera- of the fame Community, by an Action at Law, lity of the Members belonging to ſuch an Order and without theſe Bounds by a War. The latter, And hence thoſe Members, who are not really pof- or imperfe&t Power, is that, the Exerciſe of which, ſeſs’d of the thing, do however enjoy the Title (1). if any Man is unlawfully prohibited, he may be Thus in the Order of Men of Letters, many Per- faid indeed to be inhumanly dealt with, yet he ſons are faluted with the Appellation of most Famous, has no Right to defend it either by Proceſs of a and most Learned, who are as much any thing elſe Court, or by the Force of Arms, unleſs this (4) in the World as what thoſe Terms ſignify. And Inefficacy or Imperfection is ſupplied with abſo- ſo too, an idle unactive Nobleman muſt have In- lute Neceſſity. With reſpect to its Subject, Power duſtry, and Strength, and Valour applied to him in is further divided into Perſonal and Communicable. our Addreſſes. It happens likewiſe very common- The former is ſuch as one Man cannot lawfully tranſa ly, that Private Men, or others, either advance or fer to another. But then this muſt be conſider'd diminiſh the Titles of Perſons, as they judge it under ſeveral Differences. For ſome Powers are VI 30. 9. DOST Mr. Barb. NOTES on s. XVIII, XIX. (1) Hence it is that Cicero calls Titles of Honour, no certain Marks of Dignity. Lib. X. Epift. ad famil. Ep. 6. and obſerves a little after, that during the Troubles of the Commonwealth, ſeveral Perſons were honoured with the Titles of Conſuls, who were altogether unfit for that Dignity, Conſules di&ti, sed nemo in Rempublicam conſularis. See The Art of Thinking, Part II. Ch. VII. $: 2and The New Letters of Mr. Baile, on the Occaſion of his general Critical Remarks on Maimbourg's Hiſtory of Calviniſm.. Let. IV. S. 348. animosit yo bem citielloras (2) Vide Mr. Le Clerc's Ars Crit. Tom. 1. Part II. Selt. I. Cap. 13. ai 100 (3) We muſt underſtand by theſe Qualities, ſuch as our Author calls Original and Primitive, and in that number thoſe that he calls Internal. See s. 17. above. (4) As for Example, if a Man refuſe to let us paſs through his Ground, tho’ we do him no Injury, and we can paſs no other way, without great and manifeſt Danger, he is guilty of an inhumane Act towards us ; which nevertheleſs does not licenſe us to offer him any manner of Force; but if a Man finds himfelf'atracked, and can't otherwiſe ſave his Life, as when an Enemy pro- fecutes us furiouſly, then we may force a Paſſage. Puffend. Elem. Juriſpr. Univerſo R 91. See alſo what he ſays; 1. 2.6.6. C2 fo 12. Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities. Book 1. ſo cloſely united with the Perſon, that the Acts how any one acquir'd it. Whereas the Word Righe belonging to them cannot rightly be exerciſed by does properly and clearly ſhew, that the Quality Another. Such is the Power of the Husband over was fairly got, and is now fairly poffefs'd. Yet the Body of his Wife, which no Laws allow him to becauſe the ſeveral kinds of Power have for the diſcharge by a Deputy. In ſome again, tho' we moſt part a peculiar Name, which * that Quality, cannot transfer the Poſſeſſion, yet we may by De- by which we conceive ſomething to be due to us, legacy commit the Acts to the Adminiſtration of wants, we have thought it convenient to give it others; but in ſuch a manner, that the whole the name of Right in a peculiar manner, tho' we ſtrength of their Authority muſt be deriv’d from do not in other places abſtain from its more com- him, in whom thoſe Powers are originally ſeated, mon fignification, as may be obſerved in the fol- Of this kind is the Power of ſuch Kings as are con- lowing Parts of this Diſcourſe. We place Right in ſtituted by the Will of the People. For they can- the Claſs of Aktive Qualities, as by virtue of it any not transfer the Right of Reigning to Another, thing may be requir'd of Others. It may likewiſe and yet they may uſe the Service of Miniſters for be rank'd in the number of Paſſive Qualities, as it the Performance of the Aets belonging to that impowers us lawfully to receive any ching from Right. Communicable Power is ſuch as may be law. Others. For Moral Paſſive Qualities are thoſe by fully devolv'd upon Others ; and that either at which we are ſaid to do or ſuffer fomewhat, or to the Pleaſure of the Perſon ſo devolving it, or by admit and receive it. Of theſe there be three Kinds. the Authority or the Conſent of a Superior (1). One according to which we rightly indeed admit Laſtly, In reſpect of the Objects, the Generality ſomething, but in ſuch manner, that neither we of Powers may be reduced to four Heads. For ourſelves have any Power of exacting it, nor others they regard either Perſons or Things; and both theſe any Obligation to give it: Such is the Ability of as they are either our own, or other Mens. A Power receiving a Gift purely under the notion of a Ġra- over our own Perſons and Adions is called Liberty, tuity. And that this Quality is not meer Fancy and (2) the different Acceptations of which Word ſhall Fiction is evident from this one Conſideracion, that be hereafter diſcuſs’d. This muſt not be conceiv'd it may be reſtrain’d by a Law: A Judge, for Ex- as a diſtinct Principle from him who enjoys it, or ample, may be debarr'd the Liberty of taking a as an Authority (3) of conſtraining himſelf to any Gift from Parties engag’d in a Suit, under what thing which is oppos'd by his Inclinations (a): But Colour or Pretence foever. A fecond Species is as a Licence to diſpoſe of himſelf and of his Acti- ſuch as puts us in a Capacity of receiving fome- ons, according to his free Pleaſure ; which at the thing from Another, not ſo, that we can force it ſame time includes a Negation of any Impediment, from him againſt his Will, unleſs in Caſes of Ne- proceeding from a ſuperior Power. A Power over ceſſity; yet ſo, that he is oblig'd by ſome Moral our own Things or Goods, is called (4) Property, Vertue to pay or perform it. This (b) Grotius calls A Power over the Perſons of other Men is properly (8) Aptitude or Defert. The third Species is that Empire or Command(). A Power over other Mens by which we are enabled to compel another to Things, is what the Civilians term Service. fome Performance even againſt his Will, to which XX. Right is that Moral Quality by which we juftly Performance he is likewiſe fully oblig'd by the obtain either the Government of Perſons, or the poſſeſſion Force of ſome Law ordaining a Penalty upon his of Things, or by the Force of which we may claim fome Default. Here 'tis worth our remembring, that what as due to us. The Latin Word Jus is a very many Things in common reckoning paſs under the wide and ambiguous Term : beſides the ſignificati- Notion of Rights, which if we would ſpeak ac- on here uſed, it is taken for Law, and for (6) a Sy- curately, we fhould rather call Compoſitions, item or Body of Municipal Laws or Conſtitutions, made up of Power and Right in the ftria Senſe and likewiſe for a (7) Sentence pronounc'd by a of thoſe Words : At the ſame Time involving, or Judge. There ſeems to be this difference between ſuppoſing, ſome Obligation, fome Honour, or the the Terms of Power and Right, that the firſt does like. Thus the Right or Priviledge of being a more exprefly import the Preſence of the ſaid Qua- Citizen, contains both the Power of exerciſing lity, and does but obſcurely denote the manner with full Vertue all Acts peculiar to the Members fino 1100 (a) Vide L. 51, D. de Recept. L. 13. D. ad L. Aquil. (6) De Jure B. & P. l. 1. c. 1. §. 7. -Oos Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) Such was, among the Romans, the paternal Power, which a Father hach obtained by Adopting a Son; for there muſt alſo be beſides, a transferring of the Paternal Authority, confirmed by the People, Magiſtrate, or Prince. See Aul. Gel. Lib. V. Ch. XIX. and the Titles De Adoptionibus, in the Digeſts, and Inſtitutes. (2) See Chap. IV. of this Book, S. 2, 3. and Lib. IV. Ch. I. Todo (3) Neque autem imperare ſibi, neque ſe prohibere quiſquam poteft, i. e. No Man can command or forbid himſelf. Digeſt. Lib. IV. Tit. 8. De Receptis, qui arbitrium, doc. Leg. 51. See alſo Lib. IX. Tit. 2. ad Leg. Aquil. Leg. 13. (4) See Lib. IV. Ch. IV. (5) This Command or Authority is divided into, I. Abfolute, 2. Limited, ſee Lib. VII. Ch. 6. As alſo into, 1. Private, 2. Publick. The firſt is, that with which Private Perſons are inveſted for the Management of their private Concerns, as ſuch to which may be referred the Authority of Parents over their Children ; of Maſters over their Slaves, or Servants; of an Hui. band over his Wife; of a Schoolmaſter over his Scholars; of a Tutor over his Pupils, &c. The other is that which Publick Perſons are endowed with as ſuch, for the Advantage of the Civil Society. Puffend. Elem. Juriſpr. Univ. p. 93, 94. (6) Thus the Collection made by the Command of Juſtinian, is called the Civil, or Roman Law; and in the ſame Senſe this Book is entitled; The Right of Nature and Nations. (7) This is only proper in Latin. See Digeſt, L. I. Tit. 1. de Juſtitia do Jure Leg. 11. * This relates to what the Interpreters of the Roman Law call, jus ad Rem, or, a Right to a Thing. See what is ſaid Lib. IV. Ch. IX. §. 8. Note 2. Vlpian the Lawyer, as Mr. Hirtius thinks, calls it, jus crediti; i.e. a ſort of active Debt. Digeſt. l. 4. tit. 2. Quod metûs caufd, doc. Leg. 1 2. Par. 1. See Lib. L. Tit. 16. De verborum ſiguificat. Leg. 19, &c. And what is ſaid Lib. V. Ch. XI. S. I. Note 4. (8) See Ch. VIE 9.7. where we ſhall explain the Diſtinction of perfect and imperfet Right of Chap. I. Of the Origine and the Variety of Moral Entities13 . of that City, and alſo a Right of enjoying the Be- culiar Name. Of each Species we ſhall treat in its nefits proper to it, ſuppoſing in tbe Perſon an Ob- proper place. What we have hitherto inſiſted on ligation toward the Corporation. So, for Exam- about the Variety and Diſtinction of Moral Entities, ple, the Honours and Degrees of Learned Men in- may ſeem ſufficient to our preſent Deſign clude both the Power of performing certain Acti-M. XXIII. We will only add this general Remark, ons proper to ſuch a Dignity, and the Right of That, as Moral Entities owe their Original to Impo- ſharing in the Profits of their Order ; to which fition, ſo they draw their continuance and their Notion there is further added the height of Eſteem Changes from the fame Cauſe, and when that and Reſpect , which accompanies their Place and once ceaſes, they immediately vaniſh, juſt as when Ticle. we put out the Light the Shadow inſtantly diſap- XXI. An Obligation is that by which a Man is pears. Thoſe which are made by Divine Impoſition bound under a Moral Neceflity to perform, or ad- are not diſſolv'd but by the Divine Pleaſure. Thoſe mit, or undergo any thing. The ſeveral kinds of Ob- which are fram'd at the Will of Men, are deſtroy'd ligations † will be hereafter inſiſted on at large a). by the fame Power, without the leaft Alteracion There are alſo a ſort of (1) Moral Patible Quali- in the Perſons or Things, as to their Natural Sub- ties, which are conceiv'd to affe&t the Underſtand- ftance. For tho'it implies a Contradiction in the ings of Men in ſome certain manner : as in Natu- Nature of Things, that what has been done alrea- ral Qualities, thoſe have obtain'd the name of Patie dy ſhould be made not to have been done ; as that ble which affect the Faculty of Senſation. Of this a Man, who has been Conful, ſhould not have been Order are Honour, Ignominy, Authority, Gravity, Conſul; yet we find every Day how eaſy 'cis to Fame, Obſcurity, and the like. caufe a Man not to be for the future, what he has XXII. It remains that we ſubjoin ſomething a- already been : and we ſee at the ſame time all the bout the Modes of Eſtimation, or the Moral Quantities. Moral Entities that inher'd in ſuch a Man, entirely For 'tis evident in common Life, that Perſons and defac’d, and leaving no real Footſteps behind. Things are rared, not only according to the Ex- For 'tis impoflible that a Moral Entity ſhould ever tenſion of their Natural Subſtance, or according to grow up to the Strength and Force of a Natural the Intenſeneſs of their Motion, and their other Quality. Whence 'tis a very weak thing to be- Natural Qualities, conſidered as they flow from the lieve, that, when a Man is conſtituted ſuch or Principles of their Effence; but likewiſe accord- ſuch a Perſon, an Indelible Character is imprinted ing to another kind of Quantity different both on him barely by vertue of that Moral Impoſition. from Phyſical and Mathematical : and this Quan- For thus, when a Commoner is created a Noble- tity ariſes from the Impoſition and Determination man, he only acquires new Right, but does not at of a Rational Power. Now Moral Quantity is met all change his Subſtance, or the Qualities founded with firſt in Things, where it is called Price; ſecond- in it: And if a Nobleman be degraded, he only Iy in Perſons, where we term it Eſteem; both which forfeits the Rights of his Order, but the Benefits were included in the Notion of Value; and thirdly he holds from Nature, remain perfect and unim- in Aktions, where it has not yet acquired (2) a pe- pair'd (3). Shu ulo More diumo Son GOGO (a) Vide, 1. 3.6.4. to rosa, lodgid sa svima Mr. Barb. NOTES. See Ch. VI. S. 5. of this Book, and lib. 3. C. 4. not be used on 11 bars (1) Our Author calls theſe External Operative Qualities, $i 17. above, and the French tranſlates them, Moral Senſible Qualities. somoto (2) Vide, For the firſt, I. s. c. 1. For the ſecond, l. 8. c. 4. For the third, l. 1. c. 8. (3) The proper and real Foundations of Honour lofe nothing of their Value, although Men are ſtript of their Titles. Des metrius Phalareus lively exprefles this Macter, as he is quoted by Mr. Hirtius, when it was told that Philoſopher, That the A- thenians had thrown down his Statues ; Well, ſaid he, but they cannot overtårn that Virtue for the Sake of which they were ere&ted, Diog, Laert. Lib. 5. §. 82. See other Examples concerning the Manner how Moral Entities are deſtroyed, in the laſt Chapter of this Book, ş. 6.0 Rodos e motorno ad to on doit ud 5 90 de yd 10 bits bio pie аз Сн Ар LO dostane நாம மாமி மாய் o moto 9117 porto con i EM TO worlab boothum odisert 14 Book I. Of the Certainty of Moral Science. CHA P. II. Of the Certainty of MORAL SCIENCE. O dabei de buna doidy 03 11077 The Contents of every Paragraph of the ſecond Chapter. ſecond Chapter. doiron I. Moſt Men deny that there is a demonſtrative Cor- | VL. Whether any Thing be good or bad before any Inſti- tainty in Moral Sciences. tution. II. What is a Demonſtration. dove son VIL Whether Shame be a Proof of it. III. The Principles of a Demonftration. ichibion VIII. Of the Extent of Moral Ačtions as to the Quality. IV. Demonftration agrees to that Moral Science only, IX. Grotius's Opinion conſidered. pasion that treats of the Goodneſs or Evil of Man's Aktions . I X. In Moral Quantities there is a Latitude. V. The Uncertainty of Moral Things is objected. S. XI. What is called Morally Certain.al IT T has been an eſtabliſh'd Perſwafion among the and under a kind of Shadow and Figure. It becomes a generality of Learned Men, that Moral Know- Man well Inſtituted to require ſuch proof and ſuch expli- ledge is deſtitute of that Certainty which is ſo fa- cation of any matter, as the nature of the thing will bear. mous in other Parts of Philoſophy, and eſpecially For it ſeems equally abſurd, to demend Demonſtrations in the Mathematicks (1). The foundation of their from an Orator, and to let a Mathematician ſatisfy us Notion is this : they take Morality to be incapable with Probabilities (3). We, for our part, as we are of Demonſtration, from whence only true Science, not at all influenc'd by the Name of a ſingle Philo- and free from the fear of Error, can proceed, but fopher; ſo we intend to enquire what Anſwers are imagine that all its evidence riſes no higher than a to be return'd to the Principal Arguments urg'd by Probable Opinion. An unhappineſs that has been him, and others, ſo ſoon as we ſhall have premis d prodigiouſly Injurious to the moſt noble Diſci- a word or two concerning the nature of Demonſtra- plines, and the moſt neceſſary to Humane Life. tion in general. For hence it came to paſs, that Men of Wiſdom Il. To demonſtrate then, as we apprehend it, is and Parts were afraid of ſpending too much labour Syllogiſtically to deduce the neceſſary certainty of in cultivating Notions which depended on ſo weak any Matter propos’d from ſuch Principles, as being a bottom. And the ſame Principle furniſh'd thoſe its Cauſes, muſt needs make it known beyond who were intirely idle and negligent about theſe doubt and diſpute. Now tho’’tis manifeſt that Studies, with a fair excuſe; while they might al- there is ſuch a thing as we here define, and we ſee ledge, that there was no firm and demonſtrative Inſtances of it every day in Mathematical Opera- aſſurance to be had in ſuch Diſquiſitions, but that tions, to which no Man in his Wits ever denied they could only be profecuted in a rude and unac the Art and Power of Demonſtrating ; yer from curate manner. To which Ariſtotle contributed the falſe Expoſition of two or three Words, it has not a little, who in the common Judgment of the happen'd that the greateſt number of Philoſophers World, has arriv'd at the higheſt pitch of Moral have committed a wretched overſight in the Point, Attainments, and left no farther field for the face and have raſhly excluded this noble way of Proof ceeding Induſtry and Wit of Men. Ariſtotle then, from many parts of Knowledge, which had a juſt as to the truth of Ethicks, in his Treatiſe on that Title to its Poffeſſion. The chief occaſion of the Subject, addreſs’d to Nicomachin (a), delivers him Error was this : They found it laid down for a ſelf in the following Propofitions : It must not be Rule, that the Subje&t of a Demonſtration ought to expected, that all kinds of things ſhould be explain'd with be neceſſary, which they interpreted, as if in a de. the same accuracy . Honeſty and Juſtice, which fell un- monftrative Syllogiſm the subject of the Concluſion, der the confiderction of (2) Civil Knowledge, have ſo to which the Predicate was applied, ought always many different Faces, and are liable to ſo many Miſtakes, to be a thing neceſſarily exiſtent ; as for example, in that they ſeem to be only inſtituted by Law, and not ori- that thread-bare Inſtance, Man is rational, therefore ginally decreed by Nature. We ſhall therefore think it riſible, the Subject of the Demonſtration is Man, ſufficient, when we diſcourſe on ſuch Heads, or when we who muſt be own’d for a Necefl'ary Being (4). But argue from them, to ſhew the Truth in a ruder manner, in reality the Subje&t of Demonftration is not any («) Vil. Lib. I. cap. 1. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) If we would know the Reaſons, why it is falſely believed, that all demonftrative Knowledge borders upon Mathematical Quantity, we need read nothing but Mr. Lock's excellent Work of human Underſtanding, 1. 4. c. 2. S. 9, 10, doc. and Chap. 3. S. 19, 20. (2) Ariſtotle underſtands not by this, the Art of Government fimply, but the Knowledge of Morality, and the Condition of a Citizen, of whatever Degree he is. This very Word among the Greeks includes ſometimes all practical Sciences, as Oeconomicks, Rherorick, doc. See Mr. Hirtius's Introdu&t. Element. Prud. Civil. S. 8. (3) Theſe Words appeared fo plain to Mr. Budsus, that he was wholly of Opinion that Ariſtotle's Judgment about the Ori- ginal of Juftice and Honeſty was the ſame as Epicurus’s. See his Diſcourſe of Moral Scepticiſm, printed with his Anale&ta of Hiſt. Philof. in 1705. S. 12. However, Mr. Hirtius in his Notes upon that place, pretends to excuſe Ariſtotle, by ſaying, That lie wrote for ſuch of his Scholars, as, according to the Cuſtom of thoſe Times, applyed themſelves cloſe to Mathematicks, and on that Account fancied that they found Geometrical Demonſtrations every where. Hereupon he quotes a Paſſage in his "Meta- phyficks, where he ſays, That we muſt not expect a Mathematical Exactneſs in all ſorts of Subjects, no cempo Bonozidev pia binuciler'w, 1ib. 2. c. ult. and refers us to Rachelius's Introduction to the Philoſophy of Ariſtotle, Ch. 12. (4) He does not mean that Man has ſuch an Exiſtence that he can't but exiſt ; for that's the Property of God only. The Exiſtence of Man then, is no otherwiſe necefiary, than as God has determined to ſend him into the World, and that being ſuppoſed, he muſt exiſt till God deſtroys him. one CHAP II. Of the Certainty of Moral Science. 15 one fingle Term, but ſome entire Propoſition, the poſition to be demonſtrated, till we arrive at the neceffary Truth of which is from ſettled Principles firſt Principle, on which it depends. For they are fyllogiſtically inferr’d. Where ic ſignifies little, not the only Matters of Reaſoning, who are ſo whether or no the Subject of this demonftrable Pro- very quick and expert at their quicquid, their atgui, poſition neceſſarily exiſt , but’tis ſufficient, if grant- and their ergo ; but thoſe alſo, who beginning at ing its Exiſtence ſuch certain Affe&ioris neceſſarily evident Principles, underſtand how to frame an agree to it, and if it can be made out, that they do Argument by a juſt Train of neceſſary Conſequen- thus agree to it, by undoubted Principles. Thus ces. Another Requiſite in ſuch Propofitions is, a Mathematician never troubles himſelf to enquire that they be immediate (3), that is, that they flow whether a Triangle be neceſſary or contingent, ſo long immediately from one another, without any Gap as he can demonſtrate all the Angles of it to be or Interruption. For a demonſtrative Argument equal to two Right ones. And therefore the Sub- jould be work'd up in the manner of a Chain, ject of Demonſtration is only call'd neceſſary upon the Propoſitions being knit within one another, account of the neceſſary Connexion by which the like ſo many Rings, ſo chat if any one Link breaks, Predicate cleaves to it in Concluſions of that Na or proves deficient, the whole Frame muſt diffolve ture (1). and fall in pieces. Laſtly, 'tis neceſſary that the III. But what kind of Propoſitions thoſe ought Propoſitions in Demonſtration be the cauſes of the to be which we are to uſe in Demonſtration, will Concluſion, as containing the Reaſon why in ſuch a appear from the Conſideration of its End and Effect. Concluſion the Predicate neceſſarily agrees to the That then, which we require by Demonſtration is Subject (4). bolo Science, or a clear and certain Knowledge, every way, ſy. This being premis'd, it is farther obſervable, and at all times conſtant to itſelf, and plac'd beyond the that tho'tis a Thing common to all Moral Diſci- Fear of Miſtake. What we have Science pline not to take up with a bare Theory, but to paſs * Eth. Nicom. of (ſays * Ariſtotle) we imagine under an into Uſe and Practice, yet there is a vaſt Diffe- Impoſſibility of being otherwiſe. rence to be diſcover'd between the two Principal Therefore 'tis neceſſary the Propoſitions ſhould of them; of which one is concern'd about the be true (2) really and abſolutely, and not upon Con- Rectitude of Human Adions in order to Laws; the ceffion or Suppofiiion. For tho' from a Suppoſition other about the dextrous Government of our own, laid down, a long Chain of Concluſions may be and of other Mens Actions, for the Security and drawn; yet 'tis impoſſible that, being deriv'd from the Benefit of ourſelves, and more eſpecially of the a precarious Principle, the Streams Thould not re- Publick. For this latcer Part of Ethicks ought to liſh of the Fountain. And tho' we ſhould make be rank'd under the Name of Prudence, which Ari- the two moſt contradictory Suppoſitions in Nature, ſtotle ('s) defines; A Habit, ačtive according to Reaſon, one of which muft of neceſſity be true; yet we about the Good and Evil that can happen to a Man. can by this means only prove for certain id ori, Whence he thus ſettles the Duty of a prudent Per- as the Logicians call it, or that the Matter is really fon : It ſeems to me to be the Property of a Man of Pru- fo: for tỏ són, or the Reaſon why it is fo, requires, dence, to take right Conſultations about thoſe Things as an indiſpenſable Condition, the Firmneſs of the which are good for him, and of univerſal Uſe in well precedent Hypotheſis. The Propofitions of De- living. And theſe Opinions he builds upon Axi- monftration muſt likewiſe be the first and the oms drawn from the accurate Obſervation and higheſt that can be, ſo as to want no farther Proof, Compariſon of Human Manners and Events. Buc but to deſerve Credit upon their own Evidence; or thoſe Axioms do not appear ſo very firm and evi- however, ſo as at laſt to be reducible to ſome first dent, as to be the Ground of infallible Demonſtra- Truth. For as ſome Propoſitions are placéd at a tion, as well upon account of the wonderful Frail- leſs, and ſome at a greater Diſtance from the firſt neſs and Inconftancy that occurrs in the Wits and Principles; fo we muſt not imagine that every Tempers of Men, as becauſe the Events of Affairs Demonſtration can be finiſh'd in a ſingle Syllogiſm, are frequently turn'd in a little Moment, and dri- but we muſt carry on the Argument from the Pro- ven to a Reſult quite contrary to our Intentions 1.6.c. 3: Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) So that though the Actions of Men and all other Moral Entities not neceffarily exiſt, but depend upon the free Deter- mination of our Underſtanding, yet if we ſuppoſe certain Relations between Deeds which are actually produced, or may exiſt, and a Rule with which we may compare them, fome Right and obligation will as neceſſarily follow from thence, as ſuppouug a Triangle, it follows, that its three Angles are equal to two Right. Durga (2) Our Author argues here upon the Principles of Ariſtotle, whoſe Words are, 'AzÓS négw, &c. I call that ftration, which by Reaſoning produceth Knowledge, as ſoon as we apprehend it. Aud if this be the Way to know, it is a neceſſary Conſequence, that all demonſtrative Knowledge muſt be deduced from Maxims ſo evidently true, that they enforce a Concluſion immediately, and ſo are the proper Principles of the Thing to be demonſtrated. Arift . Analyt. Poft. l. 1. c. 2. D. If demonſtrative Knowledge be from neceffary Principles, 'cis plain, that all demonftrative Reaſoning muſt be from ſuch, Ib. Ch. 6. (3) Every Step or Degree of Inference ought to be known intuitively, i.e. at the firſt View, and of itſelf: viz, we muſt ſee the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Medium which unites the Terms cogether ; and which intervenes to ſhew the Agreemenc of the two Extreams at one ſingle View. See Mr. Lock's Eſay of the Human Underſtanding, Lib. 4. c. 2. S. 7, (4) Our Author might have obſerved here, that all that he was about to ſay of the Nature of a Demonſtration, is explained more at large in a Latin Boak entitled, Analyſis, &c. An Analyſis of Ariſtotle's Philoſophy, according to the Principles of Euclid. By Erhard Weigel, Profeſſor of Mathematicks ac Fena. This Perſon firſt encouraged Mr. Puffendorf to undertake this work, and furniſhed him with ſome Materials for it; as our Author owns in his Preface to his Elements of Juriſp. Vniuers. He adds there alſo, that no Man of his Nation has ſo well caught the Art of Demonſtration as that Profelſor. (5) Ariftot. Ethic. ad Nicom. lib. 6. c. 5. Cicero alſo calls Politicks, Prudentia civilis. Partit. Orat. Ch. 22. and 16 Of the Certainty of Moral Science. Book I. C C Te dy 715 AXÒS, &c. Any Man may affert it as a Probabis he Senfe of ancient Poet, cited by Ariſtotle, Rbetor. lib. 2. c. 24. and Expectations (a) (1). Nor is Haman Subtlery to produce crue and folid Science. Or, in other in the Applications of theſe Rules and Maxims words, its Decrees may be in ſuch a manner deriv'd baffled only by ſuch unlook'd for Accidents and from certain Principles, as to leave no Room, no Occurrences, but the Divine Wiſdom is pleas'd Excuſe for Doubt (e). Whatever contributes to the often to interpoſe, and to elude the craftieft Stra- improving of our Vertie, or of our Happineſs, tågems, and the beſt contriv'd Plots of Mortal Nature hath taken cåre to lay either directly before Deſigns. And therefore the ableſt Managers of us, or at a very eaſy diſtance for our Search. This Affairs aſpire not to act always with ſtrict Demon- Affertion will be more clearly made out, if we in ftration of Succeſs (2), but when they have tapa the firſt place conſider and examine the Arguments ply'd the moſt fage Circumſpection, and the moſt ufually alledg’d to the contrary. But, by the way, piercing Forecaſt, they commit the Iffue to Pro- we acknowledge Mr. Hobbes (f) to have been ex- vidence and Fate. (b) For tho' generally we may treamly miſtaken, when he contends that Ethicks know what can poſſibly happen, cho' we may com- and Politicks are therefore capable of a Demon- pare theſe poſſible Events together, tho' we may 'ftration à priori, i.e. by Reaſons drawn from the determine for certain, not only which of two pol- Nature of the Thing; becauſe we ourſelves are ſibilities is of greater, and which of lefſer Value, the Authors of the Principles of Juſtice and Inju. ſuppoſing them now to exiſt; but alſo what Effect ftice, of Right and Wrong, by making thoſe Laws can proceed from more, what from fewer Cauſes, and Compacts whence the Meaſures of Juſtice either now in being, or hereafter to be: and tho are to be taken: fince before any ſuch Laws or we may conclude that Effect, which can be pro Compacts were inſtituted, there was no ſuch duc'd by moſt Cauſes and Ways, to have the high Thing as Juſtice or Injuſtice, Publick Good orEvil, eft Degree of Probability, and therefore beſt to de- ' among Men, any inore than among Beaſts? (5) ferve our Hopes and Expectations (c); yet all Pof- The abſolute Falſeneſs of which Poſition we ſhall fibilities do not occur to the Mind at all. Times hereafter-(g) have occaſion to demonſtrate; as land Places ; or, if they do, are not always rightly there is alſo a Fallacy lurking under the word Pub- weigh’d and conſider’d: and by reaſon of ſtrangelick. til anoishoqeri opis autoritet 97070ta. and fudden Accidents, which could ſcarcely have --V..To proceed therefore to the Objections : been foiefeen, many Things which we at firſt Some affirm Moral Things in general to be uncer- thought to be moſt poſſible, or the moſt likely to tain and unftable; and no Science can be of a fall out, when we come to the Point, appear quite more firm and ſettled Nature than the Object an otherwiſe than we before imagin'd them. Hencé bout which it is employ'd. s To which it may be in Prudential Managements moſt-Men think it anſwer'd, That tho' Moral Entities owe their Ori- fufficient to follow that Rule of Ariſtotle (d): - We ginal to Impoſition, and therefore cannot be calld ought no leſs to bearken to the undemonſtrated Declara- Neceffary in an abſolute Senſe; yet they do not tions and Opinions of Skilfül, of Anciedt, or of Wiſe proceed from ſuch looſe and wandring Principles, Men, than to Demonſtration itſelf: for ſuch Perfons as that on this account all Knowledge about them found their ſight of Things on Experience, and ſo look in- ſhould be weak and uncertain. For the very Na- to the very Principles of action. But let others fight ture of Man, aflign’d him by the Wiſdom and out this Prize (3) As for the former and more Goodneſs of the Almighty Creator; requir’d the "noble-Species, which we aflign’d to Moral Diſci- Inftitution of the chief Part of them and theſe at pline, that which confiders what is Right, and leaft cannot be ſaid to be unſettled and uncertain. what Wrong in Human A&ions, the beſt Share of This will appear beyond Diſpute, when we come which (4) will ben illuſtrated in our preſent At to enquire into the Origine of the Law of Nature. tempt; this is built altogether on fo fure Grounds, Beſides, Human Adions are chiefly on this account that we thence draw genuine Demonſtrations, able call’d Moral, becauſe they are not neceſsary but free; -f(a) Tis not barely the Event of Things (fays Fabius in Livy, 1. 22.) which communicates this Knowledges for that is only as the In- Stru&tor of Fools: but it is the same immutable Reason which (b) 2 Sam. x. 12 will be for long as the World continues in its preſent Condition, (C) Vide D. Cumberland de. L. Nat. c. 4. 5. 4. 1. 4. (d) Ethic. 1.6.c.12. (e) Senec. de Benef. 1. 7.6. 7. De Homine, c. 10. (8) Cap. 7. S. 13. and L. 8. c. 1. S. 5. Here alſo we may obſerve, that fome Events are not , to the Tax , many . Di&tion. Tomp. 94 (2) In our babilities. It is a judicious Maxim of Deſcartes's, and, long before him, laid down by seveca. We muſt not expe&t a certain Knowledge of the Trátb, sbich ir hard to find out ; but we thuit follow Probabilities . All our Actions are grounded on this, so we Reaſon, not Truth leads: If we tarry till we can know what will happen well, and what is certain Truth, we may fit fill for ever. I will not fear'to follow Probabilities . Sen. de Be- nef. Lib. 4. Ch. 33. 3 Arnobius has a like Paffage, in the place where he anſwers the Pagans Objedions againſt the Faith of Chriſtians. (3) It is certain, that Politicks, as well as Phyſick is : a Conje&tural Science, as Mr. Bayle expreſſes himſelf, in his Rep.to the Queſt. of a Province, Tom. 1. p. 570. But whatever thác famous Philoſopher ſays, who, according to his Cuſtom, pretends to gather from thence fome Argumenes for Scepticiſm, p. 565. yet if he would ſeriouſly examine true Politicks, he would find that moſt of its Principles and Maximns have a Certainty in them, which cotnes very near a Demonſtration ; and as to thoſe Things which look like Problems, their Obfcurity proceeds rather from the Difficulty of Application, Ignorance of fome Circum- ſtances, or Want of Atrention, than any abfolute Impoffibility to eſtabliſh a Rule of Certainty upon them. See what Mr. Hir- tius ſpeaks here, and the Diſcourſe of Mr. Budeus, De Scepticiſmo Morali, s. 6. The Boaſting of the Seepticks proceeds from the Obſervation of the Behaviour of bad Politicians, and ambitious Sovereigns, and not from the Principles and Maxims which ariſe from the Natural Deſign of Civil Government, and the publick Good, ſeparate from the private of fome Perſons. (4) Our Author nevertheleſs explains the fundamental and principal Queſtions of Politicks in the two laft Books of this (5) For ſome pretend that the Determination of what is morally Good or Evil, depends upon the Will of the Sovereign. yet We go, Work. CHAP. II. Of the Certainty of Moral Science. 17 a. on the with of Sciences Wrirers, that there are ſeveral Things enctions. to underſtand what Power any Circumftance has Wifdom thought the Actions of Mankind ſhould yet from hence it does not follow, that upon the 'tis not worth while for Legiſlators in their written laying down of certain Principles, ſuch Affections Laws to preſcribe any thing about Caſes that very may agree to theſe A&tions, as may be undoubted- rarely happen, ſince ſuch may be eaſily determind ly demonſtrated concerning them. For 'tis evident, by the Judges out of the Principles of the Law.of that the Ads which fall under the Conduct of the Nature (b). Law of Nature, do in themſelves contain an in VI. But to make the Knowledge of the Law of trinſical Force and Power directing towards a So- Nature, of which we are now creacing, and which cial Life, tho' the actual Exerciſe of them depends includes all Moral and Civil Doctrines that are , we are properly ſaid to be free, and the Effects ſay, fully come up to the Meaſure and Perfection but Honeſt ) : act, the connection between our Actions and the cedent to all' Impoſition, and ſo to make theſe depending Effects is neceſſary and natural, and things the Object of our Natural and Perpetual conſequently capable of Demonſtration. Neither Law, in oppoſition to Poſitive Laws, where Mat- do they argue any thing to the purpoſe, who deny ters are right or wrong, juſt as the Lawgiver was the poſſibility of palling a clear Judgment on Hu- pleas'a to make them either . For fince Honeſty man Deeds, upon account of the great variety of (or Moral Neceflicy) and Turpitude are Affections Circumſtances, any one of which ſeems to put a of Human Deeds, ariſing from their Agreeableneſs Face and a new Quality on the Action; of Diſagreeableneſs so a Rule pr Law, and ſince whence it happens that Legiſlators can feldom a Law is the Command frame ſuch a Law as ſhall admit of no Excepțion, appear how we can conceive we can cos ceive any Goodnelis mot and where there ſhall not be frequent occaſion to Turpitude before all Law, and without the Impos neglect the Letter of the Statute, and to have re- (ab And truly, as for thoſe courſe to Equity for Relief. Becauſe indeed there who would eitabith an Eternal Rule for Morality are eſtabliſhựa Principles, by which it may be of the Aations, without reſpect to the Divine In- fhewn how much Weight and Force any Circum- jun&ion and Conſtitution, the Refüle of their En- Itance bears in affe&ing or varying any Adion. deavours ſeems to us to be the joining with God And theſe very Principles are the occaſion, that Almighty ſome Coeval Extrinſical Principle, which Law-givers are frequently leſs anxious about ex- He was oblig'd to follow, in afligning the Forms SON involv'd in extraordinary. Circumſtances (1), but on all hands, that God created Man, as well as proceed with more Security in the uſe of general every Thing elſe, according to his own Free-will . Words. For they take it for granted, that the From whence it evidently follows, that it muſt Judges whoſe Duty it is to examine particular needs have been his Power and Pleaſure to Axions the Rule of the Law, will be very able this Creature with whatever kind of Nature his how then ſhould it over any Fact (a) (2), to inferr’d, that conſtant and perpetual Decrees ſome be vefted with any Affection or Quality proceed. times fail; bue we ought rather to conclude, that ing from intrinſical and abſolute Neceſſicy, with new SSRS 111916 (2) And hence chiefly we are to draw the Reaſon of it, $. 3, 4, 5, 6. de Legib. Laws are to be enacted, as Theophraſtus us’d t? ſay, with Regard to Things, as they moſt commonly fall,out, not as they ſometimes happen beſide Expectation. , Little particular Caſes and accidental Exceptions, are not worth the Notice of a Legiſlator. (b) Add. D. Cumberland de L. N. C. 4, §. 4. n. Io (c) Selden de J. N. d. G. l. 1.C. 4. SA Pozostom vraldo llow od bigon is sw 31960 also ! Juoniin ev Mr. Barb. NOTES.OM ISTOV1 or 10 ,900915 ibaia bali (1) By theſe Principles (adds this Author ) the following Maxims of the Roman Lawyers are to be explained. Laws are to be made (ſays Theophraſtus) about ſuch Things as commonly happen, and not about such things as fall out nexpe&tedly and by Chance : For what happens once or twice, Lawgivers paſs over. Dig. Lib. 1 Tid. 3. De Legibus, Senatus con tonga Conjuetu.iine, Leg. 3, i. e. In a Word, Laws are made about Things that commonly happen, and not for extraordinary Cafes, which may fall out once or twice by Chance. See Ariſtot. Ethic. ad Nicom. Lib. s. Ch.14. and what is: faid Lib. 5. Ch. 12. S. 16 and 21 following. A . allows you sed od zgilan aku (2) We muſt ovn, that becauſe of this infinite Variety of Circumſtances, we can hardly come to a final Deciſion in our Ex- amination of all particular Caſes; yer that does not at all ſhake our Moral Certainty, nor leſſen the Uſe of it, for the Impo fi- , or , duced to the like Nature; fuch an Impoſſibility (I ſay) can't deſtroy thie Line perfectly Righe, a fingle Surface exactly round or plain, a ſingle Body compleatly regular, or whatever elfe may be re. cerning the Meaſure of Lines, Superficies, and Solids. It is ſuficient that they come ſo very near Exactneſs, that nothing confiderable can be deſired to niake them uſeful to us ; and ſo we may arrive at our Ends as well by the Principles of Morality, as by thoſe of Geometry. It is true nevertheleſs, that Things Moral, ſuch as God and Man, with their mutual Acts and Relations, can't be known fo diſtinctly and exactly, as Mathematical Queſtions, and to Moral Conclufions can't be fo perfectly known. But as to the Method, Rules of Demonſtration, and inferring one Thing from another, they are all exactly the ſame in Geomerry and Morality; and there is no more need of an abſolute Exactnefs for the Ufe of Life, than to meaſure the Diſtance of Place or E xtent of a Field Cumberland. de Legib, Nat. Ch. 4, Š: 48 m. . It is thought neceffarý to gire , the Reader this Paffage entire, (3) To remove all Équivocations, and leave no place for Cavil, we ought to obſerve, that we muſt own Things honeſt or diſhoneſt of themſelves, or in their own Nature, 1. By Way of Oppoſition to Human Appointment, as the Agreements or Opi- nions of Men. 2. In Reſpect of the Subject, with Relation to which they are thought 1o. As for Example, there are ſome Acts which agree to God no way, i.e. which he can't do withouc derogating from his perfections, and fó contradicting himſelf . There are Actions alſo, which of themſelves agree or diſagree with the Human Nature in our preſent State. But if we under- ſtand that an Action is honeſt or diſhoneſt in its own Nature, without any Relation to the Appointment of God, or the Laws which God hath impoſed upon us by our Creation, in this Senſe the Propofition is falſe. "Specim. Controvers, Ch. 5. §. 7. See Lib. 2. Ch. 3. S. 4, 5. following: D out 18 Of the Certainty of Moral Science. Book I. . STO10 ſaid properly to termin'd by no Obligation, be cannot be to be guilty of them, is to commit Sin. But 'tis by no out regard to the Inſtitution, and to Inſtitution, and to the good Human Actions is by us maintain's and eſtabliſh'd Pleaſure of the Creator (1) ? So that in reality all only in reſpect to Morality : For otherwiſe Acti- the Motions and Actions of Men, upon ſetting ons enjoin'd by the Law of Nature, have from the aſide all Law both Divine and Human, are per- Determination of the firſt Cauſe a native Force in fectly indifferent (2): And ſome of them are there- themſelves of producing Effects good and uſeful fore only ſaid to be naturally Honeft or Diſhoneft, to Mankind; as Adions forbidden by the ſame becauſe that Condition of Nature, which GOD Law are productive of contrary Effects. But this has freely beſtow'd on Man, ſtrictly enjoins the Goodneſs and Illneſs which an Action bears natu- Performance or the Omiſſion of them (3). Not rally and of itſelf, can never conſtitute any new that any Morality inheres of itſelf , and without all thing in Morals which are quite beyond its reach Law, in the bare Motion, or the meer Applicati- and concern. For there are many things highly on of Natural Power (a)! And therefore we ſee conducing to the Happineſs and Advantage of a Beaſts every Day doing ſuch things without Fault Man (s) which are not morally Good, as neither or Sin, in committing which Man would have being Voluntary Deeds, nor Performances of any been guilty of the higheſt Wickedneſs. Yet are Law (b); and many Actions which contriture to not the Natural Motions of Men and of Beaſts in Human Welfare, do in the ſame manner promote themſelves different, but ſome Adions of Men are the Benefit of Beaſts, in whom certainly they can- by the Authority of a Law inveſted with a a Moral not bear any Moral Quality. Thus the abſtaining Quality, which does not at all touch or affect the from mutual Hure, the moderate uſe of Meat and Proccedings of Brutes. Drink, the Care of Progeny or Off-ſpring, are Nor will it be to the purpoſe for any one to ob- equally ſerviceable in the Preſervation of Rational je&, that ſince Men are indu’d'with Reaſon, which and of Irrational Kinds ; and yér Beaſts are never is wanting in Beaſts, therefore there muſt be a faid to perform Actions morally Good (C). So tho Natural Difference between Human and Brutal all Human Actions falling under the Guidance of Actions. For if we conſider Reaſon, as uninform’d the Law of Nature, may be finally reſolv'd into with the Knowledge and Senſe of Law, or of that natural Strength and Force which they bear ſoine Moral Rule, it might perhaps even in this in advancing the Profit or the Harm of Men (6), Condition, furniſh Man with the Faculty of a&ing conſider'd either in a ſingle or in an united State; more Expeditiouſly and more Accurately than yet it does not follow on the other hand, that Beaſts, and might allift the Natural Powers by an whatever Thing is indu'd with a Natural Power of additional Shrewdneſs or Subtlety. But that it doing Good or Harm to any Species of Animals, ſhould be able to diſcover any Morality in Human is therefore the Object of the ſame Law. Actions, without reflecting on ſome Law, is equal Another Objection againſt the Doctrines we are ly impoſſible as that a Man born Blind ſhould make now eftabliſhing, is taken from that Paſſage in a Judgment on the diſtinction of Colours (4), Ariſtotle's Ethicks (7): Every Action and Another Argument in favour of our Opinion is fečtion does not admit a Mediocrity: For there are ſome fuggeſted by Ofiander, in his Notes on Grotius, de Affections which involve a kind of Pravity in their very Jure Belli & Pacis, p. 60. If (ſays he) there were any Name, as Malice, Impudence, and Envy, Such Thing as Moral Good or Evil before all Law, how rexice, or Rejoicing af another Man's Misfortune , and could there be any Obligation to make ſuch a difference in likewiſe fome Actions, as Adultery, Theft, and Murder . our Actions, ſince all Obligation proceeds from the Com- Now theſe and the like being Evil direčtly and in their mand of a Superior ? For Moral Good or Evil involve a own Natures, are not called Vices with relation to any Reſpect to a Perſon acting either of thoſe ways ; and if Exceſs or Defeet ; for abſolutely, and without any degrees that perſon be , means a good Conſequence, that becauſe we have But here we deſire it ſhould be well obſerv'd, fome Names of Actions or Affections, which of That this Indifference of the Natural Motion in themſelves, and without any Exceſs or Defect, timolano Tortugu: 255 deran atera is (a) Plato in Sympoſ. This is the Nature of every Action, to be in itſelf neither good nor vicious; as what we are now doing, Drink- ing, Singing, Arguing. Neither of theſe, conſider'd by it felf, honeſt or diſhonest ; but the manner of performing it gives every A&tion its proper Denomination. For what is done right, we call good, and what is done wrong, evil or indecent. The ſame Rule the Philo Jopher afterwards applies to Love. (6) Such are a quick Apprehenſion, Knowledge, Memory, &c. (c) Add. D. Cumberland de L. N. c. S. $. 9.0 fons Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) See Note 4. upon Ch. 1. $.4. (2) This will appear more plain from this Confideration : There are ſome Actions, in which the Phyſical Motion is entirely the ſame, but the Morality is very different ; the one being accounted good, or at leaſt allowable, the other evil and unlawful. As for Example ; To kill a Man is a Wickedneſs in a Thief, but a good Action, or at leaſt an allowable one, in an Executioner, Soldiers, or a Perſon that fights in his own Defence, doc. 1o that the Action in itſelf may be reckoned altogether indifferent. (3) Plato, in his Treatiſe of Banquets, ſpeaks to the ſame Effect. The Nature of all our Adions is ſuch, that they are nei- ther honeft nor diſhoneſt in themſelves, as to Drink, Sing, Diſcourſe, and ſuch like Actions, but 'tis the manner of doing that denominates the Action ; for what we do well, and according to our Daty, is honeſt, but what we do ill is diſhoneſt . (4) Here we muft diſtinguiſh between ſuch 'Terms and Expreſſions, as denote purely and ſimply the Motion of our natural Faculties, and theſe Terms and Expreſſions which fignify to us an Action purely Moral, i. e. à Phyſical and Moral Motion. As for Example : To labour, to kill, to ſpeak, ſignity only certain natural Motions, and thoſe indifferent : But when we ſay, He laboured to kill his Neighbour, He New an innocent Perſon, when he had no Right to kill, He ſpake ill of his Neighbour, theſe are bad Actions. And theſe are good ones, or at leaſt allowable ones, To Labour in our Calling, Slay an unjuft Ag- greffor, Speak fincerely, &c. There are alſo ſome ſimple Terms, which in themſelves contain both a Phyſical Morion and Morality. As for Example, Adultery, Inceſt, Theft, doc. as our Author fpeaks in his Difert. Academ. p. 733, 734. (5) Such are (faith Biſhop Cumberland, de Leg. Nat. C. 5. S. 9.) a quickneſs of Wit, Knowledge of ſpeculative Sciences and divers Arts, an happy Memory, Strength of Body, the Help of ourward Things, loc. (5) See what our Author writes, Lib. 2. Chap. 3. $. 21, 167) Ethic. ad Nicom, b. 2. c. 6. and every Aft ty med omogeneige CON tasnya imply CHAP. II. Of the Certainty of Moral Science. 19 imply Vice; therefore there are ſome Actions and have without Law; to take away the Life of a Affections bad in themſelves, without reſpect to Creature of the ſame Species with your ſelf; to any Law. Becauſe theſe Terms or Names do not take a Thing which another man had de- fignify bare Natural Motions and Acts, but ſuch fign'd for his Ufe, tho' he had obtain'd no Right entire Moral Motions and Acts as are repugnant by Law to exclude others from their Share in irs to ſome Law, and ſo take in and expreſs the whole Poffeffion. And the Reaſon why ſo few Perſons compaſs of a Moral Deed (1). For why, for Ex- can conceive and apprehend ſuch a natural Indif- ample, are Envy and its vile Conſequenes, which ference as we are maintaining, is only this, be- we but now mention'd under the Greek Name of cauſe from our Infancy we are taught to deteſt imzeeseranid, reputed evil Affections, but becauſe ſuch Practices; and this Abhorrence being im- the Law of Nature ordains, that a Man ſhould printed on our tender Minds, ſeems to grow into never be a Stranger to his own Kind, but ſhould a kind of natural Judgment; ſo that it feldoın en- bear a part in the Pleaſures and in the Sorrows of ters into Mens Heads to diſtinguiſh between the his Neighbours: to which Rule it is an open Con- Materiality and the Formality of thoſe Actions, or tradiction, to receive any Joy from the Calamity between our Performance of them as Natural, and of others, and to repine at their Happinefs and our Commiſſion of them as Moral Agents (2). Succefs (a)? And ſo what elſe is Impudence, but Hence it appears that Grotius had not confider'd a wicked Firmneſs and Hardineſs of Mind in the this Matter throughly (3), when a (3), when among thoſe Commiſſion of ſuch Things as the Law bids him Things to which the Power of God himſelf does be aſham'd of? For not to be aſham’d, or not to not excend, becauſe they involve a manifeſt Con- bluſh can never be a Fault, when we are not by tradiction, he reckons (b) the malignity of ſome Hu- fome Law-ſuppos'd and enjoin'd to do otherwiſe. man Actions. Indeed 'tis impoſſible that twice After the ſame manner, Adultery is the Pollution Two ſhould not make Four, becauſe twice Two of another Man's Wife, whom the Laws appropri- and Four are really the ſame thing, and only dif- ate to her Husband. Theft is the taking away of fer in Name, and in our manner of conceiving another Man's Goods, againſt the Conſent of the them. But the Contradiction which appears in Acti- Owner, who by the Law is made the fole Diſpoſerons repugnant to Nature's Law, is of a much lower of them. Murder is the Killing of a Perſon in his Degree, and can never riſe to an abſolute Impoſli- Innocence, and againſt the Laws. Inceſt is a bility. And upon the ſame account he derives this Conjunction with ſuch a Perſon as the Laws oblige Malignity from ſuch Actions as compar’d with us to abſtain from, upon account of the Reverence right Reaſon. For in the very Terms of right which Men are by Law likewiſe taught to pay to Reaſon, when apply'd to Man, there inheres a Nearneſs of Blood. And the ſame Judgment is to reſpect to the Law of Sociableneſs enjoind to Hu- be made of other Vices. But now, if from all man Race by the Creator. Thus at the ſame rate theſe you take away the Reſpect to the Law, and he alledges (c) for a Proof of the Independency the Morality inherent in ſuch Actions, the bare of ſome of Nature's Laws, the neceſſary Agreement natural Fact will involve no Abſurdity or Contra- and Diſagreement of Things to Rational and So- diction. For in a natural and abſolute Senſe theſe cial Nature. But Man obtain'd a Social Nature are altogether indifferent Things : to have Con- from the good Pleaſure of GOD ALMIGHTY, not junction with your neareſt Relation, or with the from any Immutable Neceſſity: and conſequently ſame Woman who is enjoy'd by another, ſuppo- the Morality of Actions agreeable or diſagreeable fing he has no peculiar Right to her, as he cannot to him as a Social Creature, muſt be deriv'd from (a) Add. Stob. Serm. II. (b) De J. B. & P. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 10. (c) Ibid. f. 12. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) It is true, that we ſometimes confound the poſitive Idea and phyſical Action with its moral Relation, though they are really two very diſtinct Things. As for Example, To drink Wine, or any other ſtrong Liquor, till we loſe the Uſe of our Rea- fon, is that which we call Drunkenneſs; but as that Word imports, in its ordinary Uſe, a moral Turpitude in the Adion con- trary to a Law, Men are obliged to condemn every Thing that is contrary to that, which we call Drunkenneſs, as an Evil Action, and contrary to the moral Law; but if a Man happen to have his Brain diſturbed, by drinking a certain Quantity of Wine, which was preſcribed him as a Medicine for the Recovery of his Health, though we may call ſuch an Action Drunkenneſs, con- fidering it as a Name of a mixt Nature, yet ’ris plain that if we compare it with the Law of GOD, our ſupream Rule, 'cis no Sin, nor a Tranfgreffion of that Divine Law, though Drunkenneſs is ordinarily taken in that Senfe. Mr. Locke's Eſſay of the human Vnderſtanding, Lib. I. Ch. 28. S. 16. There is a great Uſe of this Remark in the Queſtion of Lying, which is treated on Lib. 4. Ch. I. (2) Here's a racit Anſwer to an Objection that may be offered. There are ſome Men that have as natural an Abhorrence of ſome Vices, as others have of Meats. Now ſuch an Horror being a kind of natural Motion, or Paffion, it ſeems that our Senſe of the Turpitude of ſuch an Action, ought to be looked upon as a natural Quality, and not as a Moral one, reſulting from the Law of GOD. This Difficulty is ſpecious, and the Author ſeems to give it an Anſwer, which that we may under- ftand, let us unfold his Words; Cuſtom being a ſecond Nature, as the Proverb is, it happens, that ſome Perſons, of a more ele- vated Genius, conceive, from their Cradle, ſuch an Horror againſt ſome Vices of a more heinous Nature, that they retain ic the reſt of their Lives. This ſort of Antipathy proceeds more from a confuſed and indeliberate Thought, than a diſtinct Knowa ledge and Reaſoning about the Contrariety of thoſe Vices to the Law. As for Example, It is certain, that in the firſt Ages of the World, Marriages between Brother and Siſter were in Uſe, and authorized by the preſent Diſpoñicion of human Affairs, ſo that the moſt of our Divines and Lawyers acknowledge the Prohibition of theſe fort of Marriages to be only of politive Right; nevertheleſs, the Ufage of them being long lince aboliſhed by moſt Nations, Men have entertained fo great an Averfion to them, not only becauſe they are forbidden by their Laws, but upon the Account of the Impreſſions of their Education, that they look upon it as a monſtrous Thing for a Brother and Siſter to have a Carnal Love one for anocher. And it ſeems as if their Senſes were lock'd up in that Reſpect, for we may ſee young Men Converſe all their Days with their Siſters of extraordi. nary Beauty, and yet be under no Temptation, though very amorous towards others of their Sex. Such as háve tlieſe Impreffi- ons regard not the Laws, nor the Phyſical Motion of the action, but are ſtrongly perſwaded that they ariſe from a Turpitude in the Action, as contrary to the Nature of Man, as exceſſive Cold, or Heat, Grief, or other Phyſical Qualities deſtructive to his Being. Puffend. Letters do Specim. Controv. c. 5. §. 5. See Plato, cited Lib. 2. Ch. 4. S. 3. Not. 4. and Plutarch. de Virtut. Moral. Tom. 2. (3) See the Defence of Grotius, Lib. 2. Chap. 3. S. 4. Note s. the D 2 20 BOOKI Of the Certainty of Moral Science. - the ſame Original and Spring; and muſt be ac Human Axions of themſelves, and by the Force tributed to Man, not by an abſolute, but by an of their own Nature, not by the Power of external hypothetical Neceſſity; or upon ſuppoſal of that Impoſition; for this reaſon, becauſe our very Blood Condition which God was pleas'd freely to be ſeems to have a natural ſenſe of wicked Deeds, ftow on Mankind above the Privileges of the In- which it expreſſes by ſpreading a ſudden Redneſs ferior Creation. Nor can this Opinion of Grotius over the Face, whenfoever we are touch'd either find any Shelter or Protection in thoſe Places of with the Memory of them, or with the Reproach. Scripture which he quotes to fhew, that GoD Now they ſay 'tis very improper to attribute a ALMIGHTY permits Himſelf to be judg’d accor- Natural Effect to a Moral Quality ; but, on the ding to the Original. Laws, and therefore they contrary, that ſince ſuch a certain Motion of the muſt be abſolutely Immutable. For without doubt Blood raiſing a Redneſs in the Face, reſults in the God declar'd to Mankind from the very beginning manner of a Natural Effect from an Ill Action, that of Things, that He would be a Rewarder of the Illneſs or Pravity muſt likewiſe be applied to the Good, and an Avenger on the Wicked, Heb. xi. 6. Action as a natural and a neceffary Affe&tion or and that He would render unto every Man according Quality. In return to which, in the firſt place, to his Works, Rom. ii. 6. From which Declaration we confeſs that the moſt wiſe Creator has implant- his Veracity not permitting him to go back, Abra- ed in the Minds of Men the Paſſion of Shame, to bam had reaſon to make that Appeal which we find ſerve as it were for a Guard and Defence to Ver- Gen. xviii. 25. Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do tue, and for a Bridle to wicked Deſigns. And it right (a)? But how does it follow hence, that (1) is likewiſe probable, that unleſs God had deſign'd Human Actions have any Moral Quality antece-Man for an Agent, who was to frame his Proceed- dent to the Divine Impoſition. Nor does it ac all ings by a Law, he would never have mingled ſuch appear how the ſame Concluſion can be drawn a Paſſion in Human Conſtitution, ſince without from the Fifth Chapter of Iſaiah, where God is that Suppoſition it does not appear to be of any pleas'd to refer the Cauſe between him and his Vine- uſe at all in the World. But indeed it is no man- yard, to the Judgment of Iſrael and Judah, and ner of Contradi&ion, that a Moral Quality owing concludes, that he may lawfully neglect the far- its Original to Inſtitution, ſhould produce in Man, ther Care and Culture of it, ſince the degenerate (tho' not directly and immediately) a Natural Ef- Fruit made ſo ill a Return to his Pains. And laſt- fe&. For (3) the Soul being united by the cloſeſt ly, from that place in the Sixth of Micah, where Ties to the Body, while itſelf apprehends Moral God is ſaid to have a Controverſy with his people, Concerns, and is affe&ed with them, may at the and to reaſon with Iſrael, it ſeems to be hinted, that ſame time eaſily raiſe a peculiar Motion in ſome Men may by their own Judgment underſtand the part of the Body. Beſides, we ought to obſerve, Equity of returning Thanks for Benefits receiv'd; that Shame does not only ariſe from the Pravity but we cannot thence infer, that, becauſe Men of Actions, but alſo from any Fact, tho' not mc- who have a ſenſe of Kindneſs , are oblig'd to be rally Evil, which we think will leſſen our Cha- Grateful, therefore this Gratitude is not comman racter and Eſteem. For according to Des Cartes's ded by any Law, but is of itſelf, before all Law, Definition, it is nothing elſe but a Species of Sorrow, a neceſſary Duty. From all that we have urg'd founded upon Self-love, and proceeding from a Senſe or on this Head, it may appear, that the Sentence Fear of Diſgrace (b): Or, as Ariſtotle ſpeaks(c), it is which is frequently in the Mouths of moft Men, a certain Grief and Confuſion at Things which appear (2) That the Precepts of Natural Law are of Eternal hurtful to our Reputation. For Man is a moſt ambi- Verity, is ſo far to be reſtrain'd and limited, that tious Creature, and highly conceited of his own this Eternity ought to reach no farther than the Excellency, whence he takes an extraordinary Impoſition and Inſtitution of God ALMIGHTY, Pleaſure, if he can find out any Advantage or and the Origine of Human Kind. Tho'to ſay Perfection in himſelf, on the Strength of which he the Truth, the Eternity which we improperly may brag, and ſwell, and carry himſelf above the attribute to the Laws of Nature, is only to be Dimenſions of his Neighbours . And whenever rated in Proportion to the Oppoſition they bear to he apprehends theſe Talents to be the leaſt im- Poſitive Laws, theſe being fubject to frequent Alte- pair'd, and to weigh lighter in common Account, rations, while thoſe remain fixt and unchangeable. he immediately conceives the deepeſt Regret in VII. It may be farther objected, and with ſome his own Mind. Now the Heart, that chief Seat face of Probability among vulgar Judges, That of Human Excellency, being affected with this Honeſty and Turpitude muſt needs inhere in fome Paſſion, preſently fends up the Blood to be an («) Add. Ezek. xviii. 25. Rom, iii. 6. (6) De Paſſion. Art. 205. (c) Rhetor. I. 2. c. 6. init. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES. (1) What Grotius infers from hence is no direct conſequence. He alledges theſe Paſſages, to prove, that GOD conſents that Men may judge (as we may ſay) of his Conduct by the Principles of the Duties he impoſes on them, to which he himſelf conforms, as much as the great Diſtance between the Creature and Creator will permit. See the Diſcourſe of Mr. Noodt, of the Power of Sovereigns, with the Note of the French Tranſlator, printed, A. D. 1707. (2) Thoſe who have firft ſpoken of the Eternity of the Laws of Nature, muft mean it in Oppoſition to the Novelty and frequent Changes of the Civil Laws ; for they affert only, that natural Light had not its Beginning in the Times of Minos, So- lon, or Licurgus, bur exiſted before any Civil Society, and is as ancient as Mankind. Further, That this Right is not ſubject to Change, as Civil Laws are, which are aboliſhed according to the Neceffities of a State, or the Humour of Sovereigns, but it remains the ſame in all times and Places, and ſhall end only with Mankind. In fine, 'Tis no ways neceſſary to maintain, that the Law of Nature is Coeternal with GOD; for fince it has no Regard to him, and is only contrived for Men, on whom it is impoſed; to what Purpoſe is it to fuppofe, that it had a Being before Men? But if we ſay, that he had them from all E- ternity in his Præſcience, we attribute nothing thereby to the Law of Nature, but what's common to every Thing that exiſts. Puffend. Apolog. S. 26. (3) See the Paffage of Plutarch, s. 6. Note 10, and what goes before and follows it. out- CHAP. II. Of the Certainty of Moral Science. 21 outward Sign of it in the Face. But becauſe (1) them in itſelf. As for the Goodneſs or Pravity of Man does not only value himſelf upon account of Actions, as they denote their agreeableneſs or re- abſtaining from Evil Deeds, but for ſeveral other pugnancy to the Rule of the Law, in this reſpect Things, which are not endued with any Moral they ſeem capable of no manner of Latitude, but Quality, if he ſuffer in any of theſe latter Points, he whatever declines from Good muſt immediately be is equally liable to Shame : Thus we ſee many Per- pronounc'd Evil. Yer under other Conſiderations, ſons who cannot forbear bluſhing at their Lameneſs, at leaſt with reſpect to Men, they admit of ſome- or Baldneſs, at a Wen, a Crump-back, or any other thing like Latitude ; Latitude, properly ſpeaking, Deformity of Body, at ſome particular Diſeaſes, being applicable only to Quantity. And firſt , be- ar Poverty, bad Cloaths, at faultleſs Ignorance, cauſe in Laws the Force and Power of obliging or at harmleſs Miſtake, and at (2) many other Men is not always of the fame Tenour and De- Things, which are by no means morally Evil (a). gree, but appears more ſtrict in commanding and And anong Sins, thoſe eſpecially put a Man to forbidding fome Actions, and more looſe about the Bluſh, which directly argue a Lowneſs and De- others. Whence it comes to paſs, that we are jection of Mind, and which for that reaſon make forc'd to diſtinguiſh between Law and Equity, or us appear more contemptible (b); ner has the between what's rigorouſly and exactly juft, and Fear of this contempt the ſame general Power, (4) what's equal and fair to be done. The diffe- but only when we are in danger of ſuffering it rence between which Things is this, we lie under from thoſe Perfons, whoſe Efteem and good Opi- a more neceffary Duty of performing the former, nion we are particularly covetous of enjoying (b). but the latter engage our Obedience with a gentler And thoſe deſperate Wretches who have once ſin- Tie, and with an inferior Obligation. Yet theſe ned themſelves out of all Care of Credit, are not laſt have a wider Object than the firſt; the Offices afterwards (3) touch'd with the leaſt Bluſh upon of other Vertues being extended much farther than the Commiſſion of the vileft Wickedneſs (c). thoſe of Juſtice. It happens likewiſe very com- Whatever we have urg'd againſt the natural, the monly, that among Men, and in Human Courts, abſolute, and the neceſſary Goodneſs or Pravity ſmaller Deviations from the Law ſcarce fall under of Human Deeds, does not at all ſeem to rob moral Conſideration or Animadverſion. Many Things Knowledge of its requiſite Certainty, for this too are ordain'd and commanded in ſo weak and would remain fixt and unmov'd, tho' the Morality indifferent a manner, that they ſeem to engage of our A&ions depended entirely on Impofition. Men rather by affecting their Modeſty than their VIII. But if this Doctrine be true which we have Honeſty: ſo that thoſe who perform them deſerve aſſerted, what will become of that Moral Latitude, Commendation, thoſe who omit them are not which is ſo much talk'd of, and ſo frequently op- obnoxious to Reprehenfion. And among theſe pos'd to Mathematical Striętneſs? Does not that Matters Grotius (à) ſeems to reckon Concubinage, ſeem to detract ſomewhat from the Certainty Divorce, and Polygamy, before they were forbidden which we maintain ? This Doubt will be clearly by the Law of God: Theſe ( faith he) are ſuch folv'd, if it be conſider'd how far we affirm De- Things as Reaſon itſelf tells us it is more honest to abſtain monſtration to prevail in theſe Notions, and in from; yet not ſo, as that (ſetting aſide the Divine Pre- what Things this Latitude is to be found. Demon- cept) they include any grievous fault. ftrations therefore are here chiefly employ'd about But of theſe we ſhall treat in their proper place Moral Qualities, ſo far as thoſe Qualities appear (e). Hicher likewiſe is to be referr’d that Paſſage for certain to agree to ſuch Aations or Perſons : of Ariſtotle (f); He that declines but a little from When we enquire (for example) whether ſuch an right dealing, whether to the exceſs or to the defect, is Action be juſt or unjuſt, whether ſuch a Right, or not chargʻd with guilt ; but he that tranſgreſſes in a lar- ſuch an Obligation accrue to ſuch a Perfon, con- ger meaſure, becauſe hus faultineſs diſcovers and betrays fider'd in general, or as that perſonal Capacity is itſelf by its bulk. It may happen too that a Thing common to others with him. Now all theſe kinds in itſelf ſhall be unobliging and indifferent, and of Truths we maintain to be ſo clearly and cer- yet the performance or the omiſſion of it ſhall tainly deducible from their genuine Principles and either always, or however at ſome (s) certain Cauſes, that no Man in his right Wits, can enter- Juncture, be more for our Advantage and Uſe. tain a Doubt concerning them. And tho' we To this Caſe belong thoſe Paſſages of St. Paul in ſhould diſcover ſome little Latitude, or ſomething his firſt Epiſtle to the Corinthians, Chap. VI. ver.12. analogous to Latitude, in the Queſtions ; yet that Chap. VII. ver. 6,7,8,9. Chap. X. ver. 23. And would not be able to prejudice the Certainty of that Obſervation of Grotius (g), That ſometimes by (a) Add. Sirac. c. XLII. 9, &c. (6) Vid. Ariſtot. Rhet. I. 2. C. 6. (c) Add. Cartes de Paffion. art. 207. (d) L. 1. c. 2. f. 6. (0) L.6.c. 1. (f) Ethic. c. ult. (8) L. 1. C. 1. . 10. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) So far from that, that we are ſometimes aſhamed that we have done Things that we believe to be good, and not done Things that are evil. See Plutarch's Treatiſe of Falle Shame, Tom. 2. p. 528. (2) Seneca in his Letters, Numb. II. proves, that Bluſhing is the Effect of our Temperament, and that diverſe Cauſes produce it... As for Example, Pompey the Great could not help Bluſhing, when he appeared in a great Aſſembly ; and Fabianus the Philofopher and Orator bluſhed, when he came but to give an Evidence before the Senate. Seneca ſays it proceeds not from Weakneſs of Spirit, but from Surprize ; for what a Man is not accuftonied to, diſturbs ſuch as are ſubject to Bluſhing, (3) Tacitus has a like Remark, Annal. 11. Ch. 26. Ob magnitudinem infamie, doc. The Greatneſs of the Infamy gives Pleaſure to the Crime, in the Minds of ſuch as have caſt away all senſe of their Honour. Tacit. An. 11. S. 6. which Mr. Hirtius cires. (4) So that Equity includes not only what is really and fully due to any one, although he cannot require ir of us in Strict- neſs by any wricten Law, but all that is due to another upon a Principle of Humanity, or Charity, or any other Virtue, which is ſuch, that if we do not our Duty, he to whom we ought to do it can't complain of 'any Wrong done him; ſo that the Right from whence this Obligation ariſes, is that which is called by our Author, Imperfect. See chap. 1. §. 19, 20. foregoing, and ch. 7. $. 7, II, 16. Book 3. ch. 1. §. 3. and ch. 3. S. 16. and ch. 4. 5. 6. Book 8. ch. 1. S. J. (5) We may add, cr with Relation to certain Perſons. See what I have faid in my Treatiſe, printed in 1709. lib. 3. ch. 6. 22 Of the Certainty of Moral Science. Book I. 11 we may a in Sentence of an abuſe of Words, thoſe things which Realon shows to on the State. But that the Cauſes of doubting in be honest, or better than the contrary (1) iho they are ſuch Caſes proceed from the uncertainty of Moral not enjoin'd, yet fhall be call’d, Dictates or Ordinances of Matters, this we abſolutely deny. The reaſon the Law of Nature. From all that has been ſaid, why the Demonſtrations in Mathematicks are fo underſtand whether, and in what manner very accurate, is not the Abſtraction from Matter, there may be ſaid to be Degrees of Good. If then but another, that we ſhall produce by and by we conſider Good in a ſtrict Senſe, for a Congru- That in Morals the least Circumſtance alters the Matter, ity to the Law, 'tis as impoſſible there ſhould be is an ambiguous Expreſſion. If this be the ſenſe any thing better than what is Good, as that there of it, that the leaſt Circumſtance alters the Qua- ſhould be any thing ſtraiter than what is properly lity of an Action, that is, turns it from Good to ſtrait. Yet one Good may be pronounced better Evil, this Variation does not at all injure the Certi- than another, according to the different Degrees tude of Moral Knowledge. For a Line chat re- of Neceſſity which are found in both, and upon cedes never fo little from ſtraitneſs, degenerates account of which, if they cannot be both per- into crookedneſs, and yet no uncertainty ariſes form’d, one of them manifeſtly gives place to the hence in Geometrical Operations. But if this be other. To this purpoſe ſee Matth. VIII, 21, 22. the meaning of the place, that the leaſt Circum- where it was a good Thing to bury a dead Father, ſtance either raiſes or leſſens (3) the Quantity of but a better to follow our Saviour: Atts VI. 2. an Action ; this, at leaſt in Human regard, is not where it was a good Thing to miniſter to the Poor, always true; for trifling Accidents and Punctilio's Point we ſhall be larger hereafter (a). Laſtly, Judge. Yet if we grant this Suppofition, it will when Actions, in themſelves lawful and indifferent, not in the leaſt diminiſh the Certainty of Mora: are meaſur'd and rated according to their Uſeful- lity; ſince even in Mathematicks the ſmalleſt Ac- neſs or Expedience, one of them is declar'd better ceſſion, or the moſt inconſiderable Loſs, varies the than another, as ić is more advantagious to the Quantity. Lawful or indifferent Things, which preſent Circumſtance or Occaſion (2) compoſe the Medium between Commands and IX. According to our Doctrine already deli- Prohibitions, we have already obſerv'd only in ver'd, muſt that place of Grotims (b) be explain'd, this reſpect to incline ſometimes more to one hand, about the Cauſes of Doubt in Moral Actions; ſometimes to the other, as it appears more expedi- where he ſays, There is not an equal Certainty to be ent and uſeful fometimes to perform them, fome- met with in Morals and Mathematicks : which therefore times to omit them. Yet even hence nothing of happens, becauſe Mathematical Sciences treat of Forms, Uncertainty can ariſe, nor is any ſuch Medium as diſtinct and abſtracted from all ſorts of Matter, and form’d as we can clearly underſtand either to be becauſe the Forms themſelves are generally ſuch as will Good or Ill. So that thoſe Examples and Inſtances admit of no Medium, as we can find nothing which is of Twilight and Lukewarm water, are improperly not either crooked or ſtrait. But in Morals the least applied to the preſent Wafe; they being of that Circumſtance alters the Matter; and the Forms, of kind of Media we call Media Participationis, as Luke- mvhich they treat, have commonly ſome intervenient La warm Water partakes of hot and cold together. titude, by reafon of which they ſometimes approach nearer But thoſe Media which we call Media Negationis, as to one Extream, and ſometimes to the other. Thus be- are Indifferent and Lawful Matters, poffefs not tween Things abſolutely commanded, and abſolutely for the leaſt Share of either the Extreams, but equally bidden, there are ſome Things left indifferent ; but this deny them both. For we ſay in the ſame manner, medium of Indifference ſometimes inclines nearer to the Good is not Indifferent, and Evil is not Indiffe- Injunction, ſometimes to the Probibition. Whence fre- rent; and it does not appear, how a Medium of quently ariſes an Ambiguity, Somewhat like what we this Nature can prove a Cauſe and an Occaſion of meet with in Twilight, or in Water not perfectly hot. Uncertainty. As to this Affertion, we muſt confeſs, that, as a X. Yet as to the quantities which are uſed in bout other Actions, ſo eſpecially about making Morality, they, we confeſs, are capable of ſome War, a Doubt may probably ariſe, either becauſe Latitude, and it's chiefly on this account, that Ma- the Fact which occaſions the War is not yet fully thematical Knowledge is eſteem'd to have ſo much made out, or whether it be of ſo great Conſe- higher Degrees of Nicety and Exactneſs than Mo- quence as to deſerve a Proſecution by Arms, ral. The Reaſon of this depends on the different where the Caſe is ſo deſperate, and where the at- Conſtitutions of Natural and of Moral Quantity. tending Miferies are ſo numerous; or whether in For Natural or Phyſical Quantities may be accu- the preſent Jun&ure and Condition of the Com- rately compared, and meaſured, and divided into monwealth, it be a moot Caſe which courſe the moſt equal Parts; becauſe they are repreſented ought to be taken, either to return the Injury in as the Affections of Material Things, which are an hoſtile Manner, or rather conceal the Affront, the Objects of our Senſes. and deferr the Satisfaction, leit an untimely pur- ciſely determine, what Rule and Proportion they ſuit of Revenge ſhould draw greater Misfortunes bear to one another; eſpecially if we employ the Whence we may pre- (a) L. 1.C.3. §. 8. & L. 5. c. 12. §. 23. (6) L. 2. c. 23. f. 1. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) Such is, for Example, the Cuſtom of covering thoſe Parts of the Body which diſtinguiſh Men from Women : To which we may refer what St. Paul ſays of the Cuſtoms of his Time, i Cor. xi. 14. Nature itſelf teaches us, That if a Man have long Hair, 'tis a shame tolim; but if a Woman have long Hair 'tis ber Honour, as Frederick Gronovius explains theſe Words, in his Notes; buc our Author gives them another Turn, lib. 2. ch.3. 9. 22. (2) There are other Principles by which the reſpective Quality of Moral Actions may be determined. See ch. 8. S. 5. with the Note. (3) As for Example, It renders a Fault more or leſs excuſable, and a Crime more or leſs enormous. affiſtance CHAP. II. Of the Certainty of Moral Science. 23 proceed from the Impoſitions and the Eſtimation Rear but the inderſtanding. And in the Deciſion of rent, and to be determin'd by the private Bar Slike- modities, the Periods of the Price of ſome Com- alliſtance of Numbers, by the application of which not us’d to cut every thing to the quick. The Laws; all Queſtions of this kind are moſt exquiſitely and the Philoſophers (ſays (6) Tully) clear Subtleties in Solv'à. And beſides, thoſe Quantities are the ef a different manner : The Laws no otherwiſe than as fect of Nature, and conſequently immovable and Things may be felt and handled, by reaſon of their Groſs- neß Philoſophers as they may be diſcern'd by of intelligent and free Agents, whoſe Judgment Cauſes 'tis a Maxim vulgarly known, That the and Pleaſure not falling under natural Dimenſions, Judge does not concern himifélf with every petty the Quantities which they thus conceive and de- Circumſtance. And ſo when ſuch a number of termine, cannot be circumſcribed by any ſuch Honeſt Men are appointed (5) Arbitrators of any Meaſure, but retain, as it were, fomewhat of the Controverſy, there is fair room for Latitude in Loofneſs and Liberty of their Original. Nor in- their Judgment and Sentence (6). Farther, in ex- deed did the Ends for which Moral Quantities ecuring Vindi&ive Juſtice, there is an Indulgence were firſt introduced, require any ſuch punđual made of a convenient Latitude, not only on the Minuteneſs (í), but it was fufficient for the Uſe part of Clemency, but of Severity too. To which of Human Life, that Perfons, Things, and Actions purpoſe is that Saying of Tacitus (). All great Ex- ſhould be more grofly rated and compar'd cogether amples have ſomewhat of Injuſtice;, but the Injury they (2). Thus we diſcover a Latitude in the Value or do to particular Perſons is recompenc'd by the common Ad- Eſteem of Perſonş; by which tho’ we underſtand vantage they bring to the Publick; And that of Jaſon that one Perſon is to be preferr’d to another, yet in Plutarch (a); "Tis neceſſary that thoſe fhould ait un- we cannot exactly determine whether be exceeds juſtly in ſmall Matters, who intend to maintain Juffice him in a double, or treble, or quadruple Proporti- in the grand and chief Concerns (7). Moſt Vertues on of Worth. The like Latitude occurrs in the likewiſe, beſides Juſtice, admit a free Looſneſs and Valuation of different Things, and of Actions bé- Latitude in the Exerciſe of them; as for Example, longing to Commerce; on the account of which Pity, Liberality, Gratitude, Equity, and Charity. we can ſcarcely fix any (3) ſettled Price on any And ſo, in common Life, we apply the Names of other Things beſides thoſe which the Civilians call Habits under a Latitude of Signification (8). Thus Res fungibiles (a) Conſumable Goods, that is, ſuch as we call him a Juſt Man, who commits (tho’ deli- we borrow for our preſent Uſe, upon condition berately) but a few Pieces of Injuſtice. Laſtly, we of repaying them in the ſame quantity and quality; may obſerve, that if in Moral Conſideration ſome As co the reſt, we eſteem them equal and indiffe- Quantities are brought to an exact Standard, and as 9) fettled by Law, wiſe the Proportion between many Faults and Pu- and the like ; yet this preciſe Determination does niſhments is adjuſted with ſome Latitude: For not ſo much proceed from the Things themſelves, who, for example, can tell preciſely how many or from the Times, as from the Inſtitution and Laſhes, and how ſmartly laid on, comes juft up to Will Men e. (From all theſe Remarks we the Guilt of ſome particular piece of Thievery? conceive the Difference between Mathematical But in fuch Caſes we aſſign what Proportion we and Moral Demonſtrations to appear very Clear think fit, with great Looſneſs and Security. We and Evident; and it is no more than this, that the find too a very remarkable Latitude in many Buſi- former are chiefly employ'd about Quantity, which nefles and Affairs of Life (4). Human Lawgivers are is in its own Nature diſpos'd for the niceft Divifion (a) To underftand what is meant by theſe Terms, ſee B. 5. 6. 7. 1. 1. (6) Off. III. c. 17. (c) Annal. 14. C. 44. (d) De Sanitat. tuend. do Precept. Reipub. gerend. See alſo Ariſtot. Rhet.l.I.C.12. (e) Add. D. Cumberland de L. N. c. 8. f. 14. the boiwon See the Words of Biſhop Cumberland, S. 5. Nor mer. Barb. NOTES, 10 (2) The Author treats here of Quantities Moral , which are the Matter of Moral Actions. He ſpake in s. 8. of the Quantity or Degree of Extent, which he conceived to be in the fame Actions, in certain Reſpects. (3) Quæ funktionem in ſuo genere recipiunt, is an Expreſſion of the Civil Law; about which, ſee the Author, lib. 5. ch. 7. 9. 1. (4) This is the Foundation of that excellent Expreſſion of the Pagan Philoſopher Seneca: Quam anguſta Innocentia eſt, doc. De Irâ. lib. 2. c. 27. How little is the Virtue of that Man, whoſe Goodneſs extends no farther than the Law? How much larger is our Duty than the Rules of the Law direl? How many Things do Piety, Humanity, Liberality , Juſtice, and Fidelity require of us , which the Laws give no Commands for? What the Law forbids not, Honour and Conſcience reſtrains us from : for Example, The Law puniſhes the injuſtice of a Seller, when he has taken more than a juſt Price, but Philoſophy and Virtue order the Reſtitution of the leaſt Thing, which he has fraudulently got, more than the worth of bis Goods. See Grotius, lib. 3. ch. 10. 5. I. So when it is ordered, That one ſhall immediately pay a certain Sum ; it is to be underſtood with fame Limitacions; for it can't be ſuppoſed, that he muſt go that very moment, and deliver the Money into the Hands of him to whom 'tis to be paid. de solutionibus do liberat, doc. Leg. 105. (7) Some Reflections made by Mr. Bayle, Diłt. Hift. & Crit. p. 235. and 2317, are worth our Obſervation here. He ſays, The publick Good requires, in ſome caſes, that Juſtice ſhould depart from the Rigour of the Laws, becauſe an Injury done to a private Person, is a leſs Evil , politickly ſpeaking, than the Advantage that redounds to the Publick by it, is a Good - For this Reaſon it is, that the Laws condemn to the moſt rigorous Puniſhmencs, ſuch Servants as lie with their Maſter's Wife or Daughter, tho' they alledge that they were by many Promiſes and Threarnings drawn into it: Thus a Foorman was hang’d at Paris in 1698. For though the Excuſes be true, yet Juſtice will not releaſe them, that ſuch Perſons may expect no Favour, and ſo may be more cautious of Offending. Bodin the famous Lawyer, ſpeaking of a Law made by King Henry II, againſt Women who made away their Children, ſo rigorous, that it might happen that an innocent Woman might ſuffer by it, ſays, " That the Uſe of “ profitable Laws ought not to be ſuſpended, upon the Account of ſome Inconveniencies produced by them. And thereupon, he quotes a Saying of Cato's, That there is no Law that is profitable for all, 'tis ſufficient that it is beneficial for the moſt part, and generally. Liv. lib. 34. c. 3. See Montagne’s Eſsays, l. 3. c. 3. and Charron of Wiſdom, l. 3. c.2. (8) See ch. 7. 9. 6. following. cie, The Periods of time ſettled by Law, the Latin is Tempora fatalia, a Phraſe taken from the Roman Lawyers, who meant by it, ſuch a Term of Time, as after it no Appeal will lie againf a Sentence given by Law. See Cod. Lib.7. Tit. 63. Leg. 2. where you'll find Tempora fatalium Dierum, & fatales dies, and DSC 24 Of the Underſtanding of Man, Book I at an would nothing farther than whereas for certain ſuch a that honest and ſerious Perſon when be takes an Oath, Quality of ſuch a Subject, leaving the Deciſion of favears truly. And get this Evidence is not Abſolutely Moral Quantities to the larger Scope and Range of ſuch, but Conditionally, becauſe it is not directly impolli- Human Will. ble, but that a Man of theſe good Qualities may for- XI. But we muſt take heed of confounding this ſwear himſelf, ſince he may fall from bis Vertue and Ina Moral Certitude, which we have been ſo long e- tegrity. But now that Certitude, by which we know with that which is ſo often apply'a to Perjury to be an Evil, is very different from that Matters of Fact; as when we declare (for Exam- by which we believe a good Man is not guilty of ple) ſuch a Thing to be Morally Certain, becauſe it Perjury; nor is the latter Propoſition deduced has been confirm'd by creditable Witneſſes. For "fairly as a Concluſion from the former. Thus in this latter ſort of Moral Certitude is nothing elſe the ſame manner ghe Faith we give to Hiſtorians but a ſtrong Preſumption grounded on Probable is reckon’d Morally certain, when they teſtify a Reaſons, and which very feldom fails and deceives Thing, vaſtly remote from our Memory and us. Zeigler in his Notes on Grotius (a), has not Knowledge, and of which there is no real and fufficiently diſtinguiſh'd this inferior Certainty demonſtrative Proof now extant; and eſpecially from the former and the more noble Kind, while, if many agree in the Relation: Becauſe it is not tho' he grants the more general Precepts of Ethicks probable that many Perſons ſhould join together to bear an equal Evidence with the Propoſitions by Compact, in putting a Trick on Poſtericy, or of any Science properly ſo call’d, yet he affirms, ſhould entertain any hopes, that the Lie That the particular Concluſions bave a much ſhorter De nor in time be diſcover’d. And yet for all this, if gree of Certitude , and are often involv'd in dark Obſcur occaſion were, we could produce Examples of rities, by reaſon that the Things themſelves, concerning many popular Fables that have paſs'd through ſe- which ſuch Concluſions are form’d, are many ways veral Ages, under the Colour and Character of changable and contingent : And the Example he Truth, also as ar no 90181 O 0, (a) L. 2. c. 20. 1. I but on ylee ow VAS 10 9 bist) YA y yisou no Tinomonis do bankat abnu ciddi saban cadal o el orj stoino slots sobiks' 233 Tronto Coiffon 02931 wisud (rood sonsibno com 910 30510 100 107 worsted sto ne ustabion, from or is n C H A P. III. suponsorni maria galyseren in DILSOO CROY9 4601 ing word gistuse Hound supe more resw efter ed as ah. 300 of the Underſtanding of Man, as it concurs to MORAL ACTIONS. A in 2900 ron SCT979 id scbno -]aiust vast nieswiririqori singlim ris agnide The CÓNTENT's of every Paragraph of the third Chapter. I. Two Faculties of the Underſtanding. me sa mott 10 VIII. A dubioza Conſcience. Conſcience. wod balles de 11. What is the Genius of the Repreſentative Faculty of IX. A ferupulous One . Isorto the Underſtanding. X. Ignorance, what it w, and bow manifold. III. The Underſtanding natural apprebends Things Mo- XI. Error, of how many Sorts. XII. Error in Lawful Actions. V. Conſcience wbat it is, and how manifold. 28.79 Col XIII. Speculative Error about neceſſary Actions. Voi nici fton V. A right and probable Conſcience. XIV: Or indifferent Ones. VI. Rules for a probable Conſcience. XV. Practical Error. VII. Rules how to chuſe Things profitable. 1. XVI. Error in an ill Action, you kmon Astene Since Ince that Part of Knowledge which we have of Brute Creatures, that he is endow'd with a moſt undertaken to explain, is chiefly employ’d in noble and exalted Soul, which exerts itſelf not demonſtrating what's Right and what's Wrong, only with a ſingular Light, as to the Knowing and what's Good and what's Evil, what's Juſt and Judging of Things, but alſo with a prodigious what's Unjuſt, in Human Actions ; in the firſt Quickneſs and A&tivity, as to Embracing or place we are oblig'd to conſider and examine the Rejecting them. So that on this Score the Actions Principles and the Affections of theſe Actions, and of Mankind ought to be rank'd in a much higher to ſhow how by the Help of Imputation they are Claſs than the Motions of Beaſts, which proceed conceiv'd to be Morally join’d and connected to purely from the Spurs of Senſes, without the pre- the Authors of them: in this reſpect then, the Ex- cedent help of Reflexion (1), whatever Charon (b) cellency of Man chiefly outſhines the Condition has alledg’d to the contrary. That Power of the (b) De la Sagele. L. 1. C. 34. (1) Mr. Charron's Words are theſe, Man ſets himſelf above, and calling himſelf Maſter of all Creatures, diſdains the reſt . He divides them into Parts, and allows them what Faculties and Powers he pleaſes. On the other. Side, he degrades bimſelf as it were in Spite, he Groans, Complains, blames Nature as a cruel Stepmother to bim, and makes himſelf the Refuſe and most miſerable Creature in the World, both which are equally contrary to Reaſon, Truth and Modeſty. Nevertheleſs , Beaſts can't be reaſonably debaſed to the condition of meer Automata, i. e. Clock-work, such an Opinion must proceed from Preſumption, and not a ſerious Conſideration of their Aflions ; for as Mr. Locke ſpeaks very well : For Thall we believe that Dogs and Elephants do not Think, when we plainly ſee, that they can find out that in us which we can't diſcern in our ſelves ?. Do they not give us all the Demonftrations imaginable of their Senſe, except they can't tell us fo. It is hard indeed to fix the Bounds of the Faculties of the Souls of Beaſts, tho' Mr. Charron afferts, that they can from Particulars infer Univerſals; but yet we have ſufficient Reaſon to be convinced, that Beaſts act with fonte Knowledge and Reaſoning. See Mr. Lacke l. 2. cb. 9. g. 11, 14. & 10. $!o.& 11. $ 7,10,11. As alſo Mr. Le Clerc's Phyficks, 1.4. c. 12. What Mr. Puffendorf's Notion was in this Matter is hard to know, for he allows Beaſts in one place what he denies them in another. Human ral rightly. COM 1.2.1.1.190 Mr. Barb. NOTES. CHAP. III. as it concurs to Moral Actions. 25 Human Soul which it bears as a Light for its Gui- yond Human Ability that the Underſtanding dance and Direction, we commonly call the Under- Nould apprehend Things after another Manner ſtanding, and in this, as it is concern'd about vo than they appear; and ſince Credit or Affent can- luntary Actions, we conceive Two Faculties (1): not but anſwer the Idea of the Underſtanding, no One is that by which, as by a kind of Mirror, the Perſon can judge otherwiſe of a Matter, than as Object is ſhewn to the Will, with a general and he appears to have conceiv'd it; nor can he by confus’d Notice, whether it be Agreeable or Dif- any juft Law be compell’d to a contrary Judg- agreeable, Good or Evil. The Other is that byment: For fuppoſe a Man to be in the Wrong, which the Reaſons of Good and Evil, which in yet (3) a bare Injunction and Command will never feveral Objects offer themſelves numerouſly on make him the Wifer. Yet becauſe many Things both Sides, are weigh’d and compar'd, and Judg- eſcape a negligent Searcher, which offer them ment is given; what, when, and in what manner ſelves to the Notice of more curious Enquirers; we are to act ; and Conſultation taken about the and becauſe the Will may hinder the Underſtand moſt proper Means for the Accompliſhment of the ing from contemplating ſome Truth, by preſent- propos’d End. And here it muſt be obſerv’d, that ing other Objets to tempt and engage its Care; the Beginning of a voluntary Act ſhould regularly therefore an earneſt and affiduous Application of proceed from the Underſtanding, whence ariſes Mind is of vaſt Uſe in confirming the Judgment; the vulgar Maxim, and conſequently thoſe who'are entruſted with a Care and Authority over others, ought to make Ignoti nulla Cupido. all fair Proviſion for the Aſſiſtance and Direction of a ſerious Meditarion : aud they may likewiſe Objects unknown can never move Defire: engage Men by the Sanction of Puniſhments to apply with Diligence thoſe Means which are moſt Altho’ this Knowledge, which precedes the Acts likely to diſpel the Clouds and Perplexities of of Volition, is not always diſtinct, becauſe a con- Things, and to repreſent them in their genuine fus’d Notion is ſufficient to make the Will beftir it Colours and Condition (4). felf. And thus when we have not a tolerable III. Farther, Since the Underſtanding performs Knowledge of a Thing, we cannot be ſaid pro- the Office of a Light in our Courſe of A&tion, and perly and fully to deſire it ; yet we may deſire to fince when it doth not guide us aright, 'tis impoſſi- make Trial of it. ble but we ſhould loſe our Way, we ought to eſta- II. As to the former Faculty of the Underſtand- bliſh this as a certain Principle, That there is bothi ing, we muſt remark, that it is of the Number of in the apprehending Faculty, and in the Judgment, thoſe which are commonly callid Natural Faculties, a natural Rectitude, which, upon due Attention (2) contradiftinct to the Free : in as much as it is given, will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in reference not in the Power of Man to apprehend Things to Moral Things, and that neither of thoſe Pow- otherwiſe than as the Images of them preſenters are ſo far corrupted and deprav'd, as to put us themſelves to the Mind ; nor can the Will by any under a Neceſſity of being miſtaken. For at the Force hinder the Underſtanding from aſſenting to fame rate it would follow, that becauſe a Glafs ill a Propoſition which appears clear and evident to it. cut preſents every Image in a diſtorted Confuſion, But thus far a Man is at Liberty, he can more di- and becauſe the Tongue, when cover'd with the ligently conſider the Obje&t in view, and more Tincture of the Jaundice, is not able to diſcern exa&ly weigh in his Mind the oppoſite Reaſons of the Difference of Taſtes, therefore the Senſes to Good and Evil, and ſo not ſtick at the outward which thoſe Offices belong muſt be in general pro- Face and Semblance of Things, but pierce into nounc'd Fallacious and Uncertain. Neither could the deepeſt Secrets of their Texture and Conſtitu- it be charg’d on us as Guilt, that we have done a tion. And after ſo ftri&t an Enquiry and Exami- bad Action, if we were not furniſh'd with a clear nation, he can pronounce a poſitive Judgment in Diſcernment of Good and Evil; and it would be the Cauſe before him. The Underſtanding being the higheſt Injuſtice to impute that Error as ſinful, in this reſpect, as in many others, like the Eye, which was beyond our Power to avoid or ſhake off. that it makes a very important Difference, in be- Therefore, unleſs we would utterly ſubvert and holding Things with a roving and tranſitory Caſt, deſtroy all the Morality of Acting, we muſt by all and in contemplating them with a fix'd and ſteady Means maintain, that the Underſtanding of Man Application (a). And hence 'tis eaſy to conceive, is naturally Right and Certain, and upon ſuffici- how far this Power of the Soul falls under the Cul ent Enquiry and Meditation, does always appre- ture and Cognizance of Laws. For ſince 'tis be- hend Things clearly, and as they are in their own (a) Add. D. Cumberland, de L. N. c. 2. f. 9. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) To ſpeak truly, One Faculty cannot have another fixed in it, as in its Subject, becauſe every Faculty muſt have its pro- per Subject. Faculties, or Powers, (ſays Mr. Lock) belong only to agents, and can only be attributed to Subſtances, and not to any other Power. Hum. Underſtand. 1. 2. C. 21. S. 16. (2). By Natural Faculties, is meant, Paſſive Faculties, which receive the Impreſſions of objects, and do not properly. Act ar all ; for the Underſtanding is like the Eye, which diſcerns Ideas with the different Relations, without adding or diminifhing any thing; whether it only perceives the objects, or judges what is, or is not to be done: For in the Underſtanding there is nothing but bare Perception or Reception of Ideas. The Determination from whence Action proceeds, is an Act of the Will only. The Diſtinciion of the Schools, that is, Underſtanding is either Speculative or Practical; is founded upon the Nature of the objects it contemplates, and not upon the different Actions of the Soul : For the Soul is diſpoſed alike in the Preception of Good and Evil, Truth and Fallhood. See the Searches after Truth, lib. 1. ch. 2. and Mr. Clerc's Diſcourſe of Spirits, Se&t. 1. c. 3. (3) i. e. Without any Reaſon or Motive. (4) But if this fails , ’ris to no Purpoſe to have Recourſe to Force and the Authority of the Sovereign. Elem. Juriſpr. Vnia verf. p. 375. See lib. 7. c. 4. S. 8. and 11. E Nature 26 Of the Underſtanding of Man, Воок І. Nature and Conſtitution : And likewiſe that (1) of Reaſon, but an ordinary Portion of natural Light the practical Judgment cannot prove ſo far De- is ſufficient, provided that the Mind be not viti- bas'd and Degenerate, (at leaſt as to the general ated and obſtructed by ſome Diſtemper. To which Precepts of Nature's Law) as to excuſe the Acts Purpoſe Tully's Diſtinction about Folly and Mad- proceeding thence from being imputed as if they nefs is obſervable : Folly (ſays (b) he) if affifted with were Effects of invincible Ignorance (a). And a due State of Health, is able to maintain a competent here we deſire it ſhould be confider'd, that we are Sett of Duties, and to keep up, in ſome manner, the Cusl- not debating what Power the Underſtanding has ture and the Methods of Common Life ; but Madneſs is about Matters which depend on peculiar Revelati a perfect Diſeaſe, that quite Extinguiſhes the sight of the on from God. or what it can perform in ſuch ex- Mind, and involves all its Objects in a general Obſcu- traordinary Caſes, without the ſingular Aſliſtancerity (3). of Divine Grace, becauſe this is the Subject and IV. The Judgment paſs’d on Moral Actions by Buſineſs of another Profeſſion. Neither are we the Underſtanding, as it is ſuppos’d Conſcious of concern'd to examine whether in Speculative a Law, and therefore Accountable to the Law- Truths, requiring the moſt ſubtle Diſquiſitions of giver, is commonly calld Conſcience, which as it Mind, a Man may not through ill Information, either (4) precedes or follows the Action, we may, get ſuch firm Poſſeſſion of a falſe Tenet, as not to for Diſtinction fake, branch into Antecedent and be able to recover himſelf out of the Miſtake : Conſequent : This laſt is the reflex Judgment of the But we are diſcourſing only about the Power of Underſtanding, on Things done or forborn (5), the Underſtanding, as it is employ'd in fquaring approving what's Well, and condemning what's our Actions according to the Dictates of Nature. Ill; the Attendants of which are either Tranquil- And, as to this point, we conceive that there's no lity or Reſtleſneſs of Mind, according to the dif- Man of proper Years, and Maſter of his own ferent Teſtimony it bears; and as it gives us Oc- Reaſon, (2) ſo deſperately dull and ſtupid, as not caſion to expect either the Favour or the Diſplea- to comprehend, at leaſt, the moſt general Rules ſure of the Legiſlator, and either the Good-Will, of Natural Law, and thoſe which are of the great- or the Hatred of other Men (c). . The Former, eſt Uſe in Common Life, and not to diſcern the coming before the Action, informs us what is Agreement they bear to the Rational and Social Good and what Evil, and conſequently what to Condition of Mankind. And tho’a Perſon through be done, and what to be omitted. But here it is extream Idleneſs, may poſſibly never have thought carefully to be obſerv’d, that the Conſcience ob- of one or two Precepts, or through precipitate tains no other place in the Guidance of Human Raſhneſs may have fram'd wrong Opinions of Operations, than with reſpect to its being inſtru- Acting, or by bad Information, or a Mind cor- cted in the Knowledge of ſome Law, ſince Laws rupted with vicious Courſes, may have call’d their only are the proper Rules of (6) Acting. And Truth and Neceſſity in queſtion, or have taken up therefore, if any Man will attribute to the practi- other Rules of Action contrary to Natural Sug- cal Judgment, or the Conſcience, any peculiar geſtions; yet we do not by any Means acknow- Force or Ability of directing us in our Doings, ledge this ignorance or this Error to be Inſupera- owing neither its Original to, nor its Dependance ble, ſo as to hinder the Imputation of Deeds con on any Law, he will inveſt with a Legal Power fequent on ſuch a Principle. For theſe univerſal the vain Fancy of Private Men, and will bring Edicts are ſo clearly publiſh'd and explain'd, and the wildeſt Diſorder and Confuſion on the Affairs fo cloſely interwoven with our Being, that no one and Tranſactions of the World. For we muſt de- can be overcome with ſo brutal a Sottiſhneſs, as clare, that as far as our Diligence could reach in not to be capable of apprehending and diſcerning Searching, the Word Conſcience, in this ſtrange them; ſince to this Buſineſs there is not requir'd Senſe, is neither to be met with in the Holy Scri- any ſingular Force of Wit, any peculiar Shrewdneſs ptures, nor in the ancient Latin Authors : but it (a) Vid. D. Cumberland.de L. N. c. 2. S. 10. (6) Tuſcul. Quæft. 1. 3. (c) Plin. Panegyr. One Man may poſibly deceive another, but there's none who can deceive himſelf; Let him only look into his own Life and Condult, and take his Merit and Chara&ter from his Heart. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) See Note on S. 2. (2) V. the Note on Book 1. chap. 1. S. 4. of the Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Printed at Amſterdam in 1707. (3) Cicero cites this Caſe out of the Laws of the Twelve Tables, but to a clear different Purpoſe from what our Author uſes it, vix. To prove a Difference between Inſania, Madneſs, and Furor, Fury ; but our Author has no Regard to the Contexture of the Diſcourſe, and uſes the words to this Senſe only, Folly is no Impediment to the comprehending the common Duties of Life, but to be ignorant generally of all the Principles of Morality, is a Sort of Madneſs. In other Circumſtances the Words might be ſo underſtood, but our Author miſtakes them here. (4) This Diviſion is according to the Schools, Conſcience antecedent and conſequent ; but our Author reverſes the natural Order, in defining the Conſcience, which follows, before that which preceeds the Action. (5) Pliny Panegyr. ch. 74, doc. vide (c). (6) This is true, but it hinders not, but that the Conſcience may be the immediate Rule of Action : for a Man can't conform himſelf to a Law, unleſs he know it, and if he do Good without knowing it, he loſes his Pains, the Lawgiver regards ir nor. Nevertheleſs it follows not, but that every one may do all that he believes either permitted or commanded, after what Manner ſoever it comes into his Mind. Here are two Rules, which the moſt fimple may, and ought to follow, to facisfy themſelves, upon all Occaſions, that the Motions of their Conſcience are according to the Law. 1. To conſider, whether they are not out of the State of determining concerning an Action, by ſuch clear Arguments as may fatisfy any Man of Senſe. 2. To ſee that they have ſufficient Reaſons to do what their Conſcience leads them to withour farther Examination. In the firſt Cafe, 'cis evident, that we can't determine or attempt any thing but with an univarrancable Raſhneſs. In the other, we muſt of Neceſſity fufpend our Judgment and Action till we are fully ſatisfied. All the Inconveniences and Evils which are conſequent upon a miſuſed Con- Icience, come under the Breach of one or other of theſe Maxims, which are eaſy to be obſerv'd by ſuch as love their Duty. This appears chiefly in Matters of Religion, as every Man's Experience will teach him. See Biblioth. Vniverf. Tom. I. P. 343, 344. and Parrbahana, Tom. 2. p. 97. as alſo Biblioth. Choiſie, Tom. 10. P.336. was CHAP. III. as it concurs to Moral Actions. 27 Work by Inſtruments Mechanically prepar'd, and propos de conſcience two Opinions being was firſt introduc'd by the Schoolmen, and has leave the Mathematicians to demonſtrate the Rea- been maintain’d in theſe latrer Ages by the crafty ſons of their Operations. And Men are apo eſpe- Caſuiſts, for the better ſecuring of Mens Minds cially to content themſelves with theſe probable and Fortunés, to their own Authority and Advan- Appearances, when the Propoſition in Debate is tage. But if we have regard to the true and ge- remov’d at a vaſt Diſtance from the firſt Principles, nuine Signification of the Word, to do a Thing and therefore requires a tedious and troubleſome againſt Conſcience, is nothing elſe but to commit Deduction, which is commonly above the Capa- a voluntary Evil, knowing it to be , ſuch; and is city of thoſe who have not run the Courſe of the oppos’d to Tranſgrefling out of Ignorance and Sciences, nor cultivated their Reaſon by a Learn- Miſtake. And this we mean by Conſcience in ed Inſtitution. Yet hence can be drawn no Pro- our preſent Enquiry, recovering it to its ancient tection for that pernicious (3) Probability maintain'd Import, and exploding the new Abuſes that have by the later Caſuiſts, and eſpecially by thoſe of been oberuded on its Signification, 1009 the Order of the Feſuits, which reſolves itſelf into V. Conſcience rightly inform'd is of two Sorts; the ſole Authority of a ſingle Doctor, tho' deſtitute for either it clearly underſtands that the Perſwali- of Reaſons, and oppos’d by all other Judgments. on which it holds concerning, fome Performance For this Principle tends to the utter Subverſion of or Omiſlion, is built on certain Principles, and all Morality, and ſeems deſign d only for the agrees with the Laws, which are the Rule of Aći- keeping under the Senſes and the Conſciences of on and of Conſcience; or elſe it eſteems, indeed, Men, and making them depend entirely on the its Perſwafion as True and Certain, and fees no Pleaſure of the Prieſts : as has been prov'd at large Reaſon to doubt of it , tho'it cannot reduce it to by others (c). We need only obſerve farther, that a formal Demonſtration ; but, on the contrary, they act not at, all fairly when they confound relies chiefly on Arguments from Probability. In Probability of Fact with Probability of Judgment, the former Cafe Caſe it is commonly termd a (1) Right, and of Law. For indeed, in Matters of Fact the and in the lartér a Probable Conſcience . Concerning Authority of one Great and Credible Perſon may à Right Conſcience this general Maxim is eſtabliſh'd, raiſe a probable Preſumption, and obtain at leaſt That every voluntary Action againſt its Suggeſtie half the Force of a full Proof. But in defining on, and the Omiſlion of any Action which it de- Matters of Law, cwould be the higheſt Abſurdity clares to be Neceſſary, is Sin; and ſo much the and Raſhneſs to, attribute ſo much to the Decla- more heinous Sin, as the Perſon had a more perfect rations of one Man, not grounded on good Ar- Knowledge of his Duty; becauſe a Tranfgreffion guments, and at the ſame time contradicted by under ſuch Advantages argues a greater Pravity Perſons of equal Rank and Power, as that it and Corruption of Mind (a), A ſhould be ſafely admitted for the Square and The Difference of a Probable Conſcience from a Standard of Acting. Right, we conceive not to be in reference to the VI. For the Information and Direction of a Truth of the Perſwalion, but upon account of its Probable Conſcience, there are many Ruleș common- Ignorance and Inability, to reduce this Truth Ar- ly laid down, concerning which our Opinion is tificially into the Exactneſs of a Demonſtration ; this, That they take place only where there feems for which Reaſon it has not ſo evident and unſha- to be a Claſhing between ftriét Law and Equity; ken a Knowledge of its Certainty: For (as the or when both sides of the Queſtion are alike free Logicians ſpeak) nothing is Probable in itſelf , but from the Obligation of the Laws; yet ſo as that only with reſpect to our Underſtanding. And by one of them may ſeem to approach nearer to Ho- this Rule of Probability the greateſt Part of Man- neſty, or may appear more likely to produce ſome kind are Steer'd and Govern'd in their Proceed- Convenience or Inconvenience than the other. ings. to apprehend For in Matters abfolutely determind by the Com- Human Duties as they flow from their firſt Origin mand or Prohibition of fome Law, there is no and Foundation. And moſt Men rely with ſo room left for ſuch a free Choice, as that we may much Security on the Tenor of common Life (b), reject one side and take the Other, becauſe poſi- on the unqueſtionable Authority of (2) unſuſpect- tive Laws will not be ſatisfy'd with Equivalents, ed Teachers, and on the manifeſt Decency or but demand a punctual Obedience to their Den Conveniency of ſuch and ſuch Actions, that they crees. And therefore this Freedom of Election think it a ſuperfluous Trouble to make a more cu- muſt be confin’d to indifferent Things, to which rious Enquiry into the Reaſons and Foundations the Laws do not extend their Sphere and Autho- of them. In the ſame manner as the greateſt Num- rity. The chief Rules are theſe: of performing theird 1. In a Probable 144 (a) See Luke xii. 47, 48. (6) Vide I, II. C. III. L. 13. (c) Vid. Lud. Montalt. in Lit. Provincial. and upon them Wendrocbius, and Sam. Rachel. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) This Epithet is not well apply'd, for our Author owns that -a Right and Probable Conſcience are the ſame, a little lower : He ought rather to have called it a Clear Conſcience ; but his Diviſions are nor exact: Theſe are better ; An Antecedenc Conſci- ence is, 1. Reſolved. 2. Dubious. The Reſolved Conſcience declares poſitively, not only about the Quality but Execution of an Adion; in which, if it miſtakes, 'tis erroneous ; if it judges well, 'cis right; which will be clear or probable according as the Reafons which Men give of their Opinions, are cercain, or only probable. A Dubious Conſcience is either ſimply ſo, when che Underſtanding hangs like a Ballance, not knowing which Side to take, or whether the Action be good or evil, and ſo can't put it in Execution ; or ſcrupulous, when we are determined about the Morality of the Action, and Execution of ic, yet with ſome Fear of being miſtaken. Gott. Gerh. Titius's Obſerv. on Puffend. De Officio Hom. do Civ. Obf. 17. (2) See Lib. 2. ch. 3. S. 13: (3) See Buddeus's Diſcourſe, De Scepticiſmo Morali, S. 31. in his Analelt. Hift. Philof. To start E 2 one 28 Of the Underſtanding of Man, BOOKI. 3. one of which is founded on better Reaſons, the Things bearing a great Force in our Proceedings ; other is more fafe; either of the Two may be fol- according to that of the Apoſtle, i Cor. V. 12. low'd without Blame. All things (that is, all Things which he had been 2. Two Opinions being propos’d, of which one there ſpeaking of ) are lawful for me ; (5) but all is built on weaker Reaſons, the other is the more things are not expedient. And in Civil Buſineſs, Af- fafe, the latter ought juſtly to have the Preference. fairs are many times commitced to the ſole Wif- In a Probable Conſcience a Learned Man inay dom and Conduct of the Perſon employ'd, in follow that Opinion which ſeems to him to have which Caſes a Man is conceiv'd to have acted ill, the greateſt Degree of Probability, tho' perhaps it if by Imprudence or by Negligence he has taken may appear different to others: unleſs he is under the leſs profitable Courſe. In Debates therefore, Apprehenſion of incurring fome Inconvenience or ariſing about ſuch Things, to which we are bound Damage upon account of diſſenting from the com- by any Neceffity, or any determinate Obligati- mon Judgment. on, (for Neceſſity excludes all Deliberation and 4. An Unlearned Man may ſafely follow the Debates, and determinate Obligations leave no- Authority of Wifer Perſons. thing to the Agent, but the Duiy of Execution ;) 5. A Subject , or one plac'd under the Com- this is laid down for a Foundation, That nothing mand of others (1), may, upon the Order of his ought to be undertaken, from which, in Morai Superiors, fairly do a Thing which he does not Eſteem, (or as far as human Forelight can pierce certainly know to be Unlawful, tho' in his pri- into the Obſcurity and Uncertainty of future E- vate Judgment he does not think it very Probable vents,) there does ſeem likely to follow as much that it ought to be done. Evil as Good (6), or more Evil than Good. The 6. In Things of little Moment and Concern, Reaſon of which Maxim is evident. For as much (2) if there are probable Arguments alledg’d on of Evil as any Thing has join'd with it, ſo much both hands, either Side may be taken. it loſes of its Goodneſs, and conſequently, when 7. In Things of great Moment (3) if there the Good and Evil are in equal Degrees, the for- ariſe probable Arguments on both Sides , the ſafer mer is ſwallow'd up by the latter, and the Thing Part is to be preferr'd, or that from which there is depriv'd of the Nature and Denomination of cannot follow ſo great an Evil, tho' we are never Good. Hence that Field is reckon'd very unpro- fo much Miſtaken, as there might have done, had fitable, which does not in the Value of its Fruits we err'd in the oppoſite Opinion. exceed the Charges of Tillage (a). For thoſe VII. To proceed ; Tho' according to our pre- Matters which make the Subjects of ſuch Delibe- ſent deſign, we are engag'd only to treat of what's rations as we are now ſpeaking of, are underta- Good, and what Evil, what Juft and what Unjuft; ken purely on Account of the Uſe and Advantage leaving the enquiring about Things profitable and which may accrue to us from them (4) Unprofitable to another Part of Knowledge, (7)(b). As Corollaries from this Xenophon's yer it will not be much cut of the Way, if we here general Truth, we may ſubjoin the words at ) conſider in ſhort, what Rules the Underſtanding three Rules eftabliſh'd by Grotius (e): the Original. ought to have regard to, in Deliberations con I. If the Thing under Debate has an e- cerning Uſefulneſs and Convenience. Eſpecially qual Efficacy or Ability for the Production of Good and becauſe the Directions already laid down, depend Evil, that is, if we may as eaſily Gain as Loſe by very much on theſe; the Profit or Advantage of it, we may then venture on it, when the good Confe- 2) de R. Field that time turns to little Account (6) Xenophon. Rer. Græc. 1.6. They are very far from deſerving Commendation, who having carried off Glory and Vi&ory from many Encounters, do ſtill continue to engage, till being at length ſhamefully overcome, they loſe their former Honour and their former Labour. The Caſe is the ſame with thoſe Gameſters, who once meeting with a Run of good Fortune, are entic'd to venture on, till they loſe double to their former Gains, and, in Concluſion, are commonly Beggars. Theſe Examples ought to warn us in orr. Martial Affairs, 'that we never suffer our ſelves to be drawn into ſuch a Combat, where we muſt of Neceſity either win all or loſe all. Lucan. I, 1. Par labor atque inecus pretio majore pecuntur. Au equal Labour for a greater Prize. Iſocrat. Archidam. Two Things propos'd, the one plain and exident, tbe other doubtful and perplex'd; would it not be ridiculous for you to reje&t that which is beyond Diſpute, and to chooſe that which is Controverted and Uncertain (c) L. 2. C. 24. Lose Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) See Lib.8. ch. 1. §. 6. 2) This hath Place cominonly in Regard to thoſe Judgments, which we are obliged to make Ex tempore, upon ſome nrgent Occaſions, wherein Neceſſities of Life oblige us to act. See Biblioth. Vniverf. Tom. 5. p. 344. (3) As for Example, If the Debate be about putting a Perſon to Death, it is better to run the Risk, and ler a Criminal eſcape, than puniſh an innocent Perſon. This was the Deciſion, both of ſeveral ancient Philoſophers, which are quoted by Grotius, Lib. 2. ch. 23. §. 5. n. 2. and of the Emperor Trajan, who would have no Man condemned for Suſpicion, as he writes in his Ree ſcript to Aſia. Severus, for it is better that the Crimes of the Guilty eſcape unpuniſhed, than that an innocent Perſon ſhould be condemned. Digeſt. Lib. 48. Tit. 19. De pænis Leg. 5. For, as Mr. Bruyere ſpeaks, in' his Chapter of Certain Cuftoms, p. 506. If a Criminal be puniſhed 'tis a Terror to the Gang, but if an innocent Perſon be condemned, all honeſt Men are affrighted. In fine, War brings Evils upon many innocent Perfons, if then Judgments be divided, we muſt incline to Peace. (4) The Author does not mean by the Word Inutili, unprofitable, but noxious, or hurtful, as he plainly uſes it, Lib. 2. ch. 2. with the Note, and ch.3. S. 10. It is certain, that in Macters of Morality and Politicks, that which is oppoſed to profitable, is noxious. (5) The Words of the Apoſtle have no Manner of Connexion with what went before, but on the contrary, refer manifeſtly to what follows, either to the Liberty of eating certain Meats without any Regard whether it offends ochers or not ; or rather, tho' St. Paul applies it indeed to that particular Subject, it is a general Maxim, and extends to all Things indifferéne in their Nature. See Chap. 2. &. 8. Note 4. above. (6) Here is a plain Inverſion of the due Order of Things, contrary to the right Way of Reaſoning, and Sequel of the Dir- courſe. This Blemiſh is ſo notorious, that 'tis a Wonder the Author did not mend ic in his laſt Editions. (7) Theſe Words of Xenophon are deſigned only to ſhew, that when one has got an Advantage or Gain, he ought to take Care to preſerve it, and not run to the utmoſt Bounds of his Fortune. quence 9. CHAP. III. as it concurs to Moral Actions. 29 quence is a greater Good, than the ill Conſequence is an of a wiſe and cautious Man to abſtain from ſuch Evil: that is, If we are like to gain more by be- a Matter, unleſs he is driven on it by urgent Ne- ing ſucceſsful in the Attempt, than we can loſe, ceflity. if we prove (1) unſucceſsful. Thus it would be VIII. When the Judgment of the Underſtand- no Raſhneſs or Imprudence to hazard Ten Pounds, ing is at a loſs, and cannot diſcern whether 2 ſuppoſe in a dangerous Adventure, when we may Thing be good or evil, and conſequently, whe- get an Hundred, if the Chance prove fortunate(a). ther it ought to be perform’d or omitted, we call 2. If the Good and Evil which may proceed from the this a (2) Doubtful Conſcience . Concerning, which Thing in Debate, appear equal, we may then chuſe it, this Rule ought to be obſerv'd, That as long as with this Proviſion, that it has a greater Efficacy or the Judgment cannot by the Force of any Argu- Ability for producing the Good than the Evil : that is, ments be inclin'd to one Side more than to the o- if ’tis more eaſy that Gain ſhould ariſe from it ther, the Adion is to be ſuſpended; and that there- than Damage. In which Point we cannot omit fore, he who proceeds to do a Thing, about which the noble Argument of Arnobius (b): “Since this his Conſcience ſtill hangs in an Aquilibrium, com- (ſays he) " is the Condition of future Things, that mits a (3) Sin ; becauſe, as much as in him lies, “they cannot be felt or held by any anticipating he has tranſgreſs'd a Law. For he declares his “Touch, is it not much the clearer Reaſon, of Mind to this Effect, I am not indeed certain, whether cwo Uncertainties, the Expectation of which is or no this Action is repugnant to the Luws; but when equally doubtful, rather to believe that which ther it be or no, I am reſolu'd to undertake it. 'Tis “ brings fome Hopes along with it, than that good Advice (ſays (d) Tully) to forbear doing a Thing, which brings none? For in the former Caſe, where (4) we doubt whether it be fair and juft, or foul “there can be no Danger, tho' the Matter ex- and injurious : For when we are certain tbe Thing is peded never come to paſs: But in the latter we juſt, we have a clear Light and Guide to proceed by; but incur the higheſt Damage, if what we disbe- to act with an unſettled Judgment, does not free us lieved ſhould not prove a Falſity in the final E- from the Thoughts and Intentions of offering an Injury. vent of Things (c).” 3. If the Good and Evil Grotius (e) ſays, that this Rule, of abſtaining from ſeem to be unequal, and the Ability of the Thing to pros a doubtful A&ion, does not hold when we are oblig'd duce them not leſs unequal, then we muſt determine our to do either this or that, and yet are unſatisfied in either, Choice by one of the two Conditions, either that the A- whether it be juſt or not; for then we are allow'da to bility for producing Good compar’d with that for produ- chooſe that Side which appears leſs evil or unjuſt. For cing Evil, be greater in Proportion, than the Evil it whenfoever we are under the Neceſſity of making a Choice, ſelf compar'd with the Good (that is, If the Exceſs of the leſſer Evil aſſumes the Charaéter of Good. This Evil be leſs than the Ability for producing Good;) Obſervation, we think, ought rather to have a or, if the Good be greater, compar'd with the Evil, Place in Evils of Damage, than in thoſe of Mo- than the ability for producing the Evil, compar'd with rality; becauſe in the former it is reckon'd a Gain that for producing the Good: that is, If the Power and an Advantage, to avoid a greater Evil by ad- and Efficacy which ſeem to incline towards the mitting a leſs. mitting a leſs. But it cannot be applied to Moral Production of the Evil, be leſs conſiderable than Evils, Evils, without a very dextrous Conſtruction. the Degree by which the Good exceeds the Evil. Properly ſpeaking, therefore, of two Moral E- To which we will add this fourth Rule, That vils, neither is to be choſen. Yet it frequently where both the Good and the Ill Effect of a Thing; happens, that two Laws, either both Affirmative, and likewiſe its Ability for producing of both, re or one Affirmative and the other Negative, ſhall main uncertain and undetermin'd, 'tis the Part ſeem to claſh with one another, ſo that we cannot (a) Comp. Epi&tét. Enchirid. c. 35, 36. (6) L. 2. (c) Add. Penſees de M. Paſchal. c. 7. (d) Off. 1. (e) L. &.c. 23.4.2.1.2. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) Our Author, in his laſt Editions, quotes an excellent Paſſage of Arnobius to this purpoſe: Since future Things are of that Nature, that no Man can clearly diſcover them, nor foreknow their Events; no Man of Senſe, but of two Things equally uncer- tain, will chooſe that which he may hope ſome Good from, rather than that from which he can hope for none. “In ſhort, if the Evil that threatens us, has no Effect, we run no Riſque ; whereas we are expoſed to very great Danger, and hazard All, if, when the Time comes, we find by ſad Experience, that we were not afraid without Cauſe, Adv. Gentes, lib. 2. See lib. 2. ch.3. 8.21. not. 6. Our Author miſtakes, in annexing this to the firſt Rule of Grotius, whereas Mr. Paſcal, in his Thoughts, ch. 7. proves it ought to be joined to the ſecond. (2) Mr. Thomafius, in his Inſtit. Juriſpr. Divin. lib. 1. ch. 1. $ $9. affirms, that there is no ſuch Thing as a doubting Conſci- ence, becauſe Doubting is no Determination of the Soul, buc a Suſpending the Judgment only. But Mr. Titlus will not allow this to be a fufficient Reaſon to take away the Diſtinction; for beſides the Suſpenſion, there is a Determination, by which the Conſcience is put upon an Action, the Doubts which ought to prevent it ſtill remaining. (3) Mr. Titius (in his Obſervat. on Puffend. Obſerv. 19.) affirms, That this Maxim is not abſolutely true and without Reſtriction; for (ſays he) when an Agent has no more Intention to do Evil than Good, he is not blameworthy, unleſs the Action be found contrary to the Law; for he acts not according to the Nature of the Action in it ſelf, and therefore whatſoever produces that Quality contrary to the Deſign of the Agent, hinders the Impuration of a Crime to him, if the action prove evil. In fine, if te ſuppoſe the Agent to be careleſs whether he does Good or Evil, and that the Realons for and againſt him are altogether equal, his Diſpoſition, nevertheleſs, is corrupt before GOD, becauſe he has reſolved to act without a certain Knowledge that what he is about to do is good, or, at leaſt, harmleſs, and ſo he renders himſelf liable to fall into Error, and conſequently, en- gages himſelf, as much as in him lies, in all the Evil Effects. This hath Place in Matters of the greateſt Importance, as when We condemn any one, and do him any Miſchief any Ways: for the Juſtice of an Action ought to be ſo clear, that they to whom ir is done, may acknowledge it ſuch. See Parrhafíana Tom. 2. p. 406. (4) 'Tis a Maxim of Holy Scripture, which reaches us, That whatſoever we do without Faith, i. e. without a thorough Conviction of the Goodneſs of it, is sin. And all the Heathen Wiſe Men, both Greeks and Barbarians, have given us the ſame Rule. Qui in vero dubitat, male agit, cum deliberat : He thar doubts of the Truth, does Ill while he deliberates. Publ. Syr. See Grotius l. 2. ch. 23. §. 2. The Scholars of Zoroaſtres had this Rule, If it be dubious, whether an Action be Good or Evil, we muſt not do it, eill we are informed by our Doctors. Hyde in Sadder Portå 30. ſatisfy 30 Of the Underſtanding of Man, Book I. 2. ; fatisfy both at the ſame time (1). In this Caſe ourſelves to the forming of certain and determinate ignorant Perſons are apt to fancy, that a Compa- Judgments of all Things that offer themſelves to us. riſon is made between two Evils, or Sins of O. But we muſt obſerve farther, that theſe Judgments miſſion, and that i we are to do that, which it ought to be drawn from genuine and folid Science, would have been the greateſt Sin to have left un or from the Doctrine of the Laws of Nature, and done. Bue in Reality, we do not here of two from the Chriſtian Religion, purg'd from the vain Sins chooſe the lefſer; but that Action, which with- Additions of Superſtitious Men. For tho' without out this claſhing and interfering had been a Sin, this Security, the Mind may indeed be ſo far har- now.ceaſes to be ſinful, when we are oblig'd to den'd, as not to perceive any Fluctuation, or to feel a contrary Duty, by the Force of a ſtronger Law. any Remorſe of Conſcience, yet ſuch a Firmneſs Thus, for Example, when there ſeems to be a claſh- and Obduracy is neither of long Continuance, nor ing between the Affirmative Command, Give Alms, free from the Imputation of Sin. Whence we and the Negative, Do not Steal, without doubt we cannot approve of the latter Part of Des Cartes's muſt not be guilty of Thievery to gather Matter Preſcription, where he tells us, We should always for our Alms ; according to that of the Apoſtle, think our Duty is diſcharg’d, when we have done what we must not do Evil, that Good may cone of it. Yet we judg’d beſt, altho' we have made the worſt Judg- in this Caſe, not to give Alms, is not properly a ment that can be. For this is not to cure the Diſeale, Sin, becauſe Affirmative Precepts exert not their bur by an ill-temper'd Opiate, to bring a Drowfi- Force of Obligation, when there remains no Sup- neſs and Stupidity on the Mind. ply of Matter to furniſh out the Action. So a- gain, when a claſhing is made between the two -X. When the Knowledge of the Underſtanding Affirmative Precepts, Obey God, and Obey the Ma- is wanting, as to the Performance or the Omiſſion giftrate, no Queſtion but we ought to obey GOD of any Thing, we call this Ignorance. Which, as far rather than Men (2)(a): Not becauſe, of two as concerns our preſent Deſign, may be divided, Evils the leaſt is to be choſen, but becauſe it is not either with Reſpect to its (4) Influence on the Action, an "Evil to deny Obedience to the Magiſtrate, or with Reſpect to its Origine. With Reference to when it cannot be given without violating the the former, it is of two Sorts, one being the Cauſe Duty. we owe to GOD(3). For a weaker Oblic of the Thing ignorantly done, and the other not. gation always yields to a ſtronger, when both can- The firſt may be call'd Efficacious, and the other not be fulfill'd together. Concomitant. The firſt is the Negation of ſuch a * IX. To a Doubtful Conſcience a Scrupulous one is Knowledge in the Underſtanding, which, had it very near related; and this is, when the Judgment been preſent, would have hinder'd the Action. of the Underſtanding is poſſeſs’d with an anxi- Such was Abimilech’s Ignorance, Gen. XX. 4, s. ous. Fear, left the Thing which we fancy to be who, had he known Sarah to have been Abraham's Good, ſhould prove Evil, or vice verſa. Now Wife, had never entertain'd any Thoughts of when ſuch Scruples are founded on probable Ar- taking her for himſelf. The latter is a Negation guments, the Action is to be ſuſpended, 'till of ſuch a Knowledge in the Underſtanding, as they can be taken away and clear’d up, either by would not have hinder'd the Fact, ſo that the the Force of Arguments, or by the Authority of Man, tho' he had known what he was indeed ig- Wiſe Men: but when they proceed only from a norant of, yet would have done the Thing never- melancholy and a fuperftitious Softneſs and Indif. theleſs. As ſuppoſe a Man ſhould kill his Enemy cretion, they are by all Means to be diſcouraged, by a chance Blow, whom he would otherwiſe have and forcibly driven out of our Thoughts . There: Killd, had he known him to be in that particular fore 'tis a good Remedy which Cartes (b) preſcribes Place, where he now threw his Weapon caſually, againſt Fluctuation of Mind, and the Bitings of and without any Intention of Hurt (5). Thus the Conſcience which preceed an Action, to accuſtom Boy who flung a Stone at a Dog, and by miſtake (a) This was the brave Declaration of Socrates, I honour and eſteem you, O ye Athenians; but in point of Obedience, my Duty to God is to be ſatisfied before my Obligation to you. Plato Apolog. (6) De Paſſion.Arc.170. & 177. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) See Lib. 5. ch. 12. §. 23. (2) This Saying of Socrates is by many learned Men compared with the Paſſage in the Afts, Chep. iv. 19. v. 29. but, as Mr. Le Clerc obſerves, Ars Crit. To. I. he ſpeaks of his Dæmon or Genius, and not of the True GOD. (3) Hierocles ſpeaks much to this purpoſe, in his Diſcourſe of the Honour and Obedience due from Children to their Parents, and therefore is worthy our Notice. His Words are, Com. in aur. Pythag. Carmina p. 53. If it happens that the Will of our Parents is contrary to the Law of GOD, what can they do, who fall under ſuch ar Oppoſition of Laws, other than is uſually done, when any Duties are incompatible? For when the choice of two Things is offered, the one Good the other Evil, we must neceſſarily prefer the Good, if we can't fairly diſcharge ourſelves of both at the ſame time, &c. (4) The Diviſions of our Author are neither clear nor compleat enough; and therefore Titius in his 23d Obſervation rectifies them, by conſidering Ignorance, 1. With Reſpect to the Influence of the Object upon the Thing we act; whence ariſes Efficaci- Law, and an Ignorance of Falt. 3. With Reſpect to the Conſent of the Agent; whence reſults Voluntary and Involuntary Ignorance. (5). This Definition comes near the Opinions of the Peripateticks, which diſtinguiſh the Sorts of Ignorance and Error, by the Sorrow or Penitence, which the Agent ſhews, or not, after the Action, Ethic. Nicom. lib. 3. ch. 2. which, if it be allowed, ſcarce any one, but would eaſily avoid the Imputation of his Crimes. But Mr. Puffendorf 's Definition, depends not only upon a falſe Suppofition, but is incompleat, becauſe ir agrees nor to Actions allowable and indifferent. Nothing but want of Knowledge, which hinders acting, renders Error eficacious, and conſequently not to be imputed. Now ſuch Ignorance is thus diftinguiſhed, 1. It is efficacious, when it reſpects the necefiary Knowledge of the Action we are about, either as to the Nature of the Thing, or Intention of the Ageut, fuch Ignorance hinders Conſent, and being involuntary, can't be imputed. This may be eaſily ap- plied to particular Actions, as well Lawful as Unlawful. On the contrary, 2. Concomitant Ignorance, is that which reſpects chat Knowledge which has no Relation to the Affair we are about, and which not hindring Conſent, can'c preſerve us from Imputation. It is voluntary or Involuntary, and having no Influence upon the Buſineſs in Queſtion, can't contribute any thing to cauſe an Alteration. Tit. Obf. 25. hit CHAP. III. as it concurs to Moral Actions. 31 Tant. neither Ability nor Obligation to know. This An Inſtance of Ignorance about what, and in what, hit his Mother-in-law and kill'd her, ſaid, (1) T'a' account of not knowing what was to be done,or what rólamou sme se vennew Bende), Fortune had a better Aim to be avoided, which Ignorance he calls Ignorance than I. Some diſtinguiſh theſe two Species's of Ig- in Election (3), or Ignorance of Univerſals (4): for norance in this manner, That whac is upon the theſe every Man was oblig'd to know. But that former ſhall be ſaid to be done out of ignorance, Ignorance of Particulars, is the thing which renders what by the latter, to be done by one that is Igno- an Adion capable of being conſtrued Involuntary. Yer even in the latter Caſe, no Murder, ac- Theſe Particulars are, who, what, about what, and cording to the ſtrict and proper Senſe, is commit- in what, with what Inſtrument, for what Cauſe, and ted. For tho' that ill Affection of Mind was in it- by what manner. All theſe no Man in his Senſes ſelf vicious, yet it contributed nothing to the Fact. can be ignorant of together, becauſe he is at leaſt With reference to its Origine, Ignorance is divided apprehenſive of his own acting, and therefore can into Voluntary and Involuntary. The former is by reſolve the firſt Queſtion (Who?) But (5) in all ſome term’d Conſequent and Vincible, the latter An- the other Circumſtances Ignorance may intervene. tecedent and Invincible . The former, whether it be Thus Perſons offend who ſay (6) what they ought directly affected, or proceeds only from Idleneſs and not, not knowing that what they have ſaid ought Unattention, is when a Man knows not that which to be kept ſecret. And the ſame is the Caſe of a he could, and ought to have known: the latter, Man who intending to ſhow his friend ſome when a Man knows not ſuch things, as he had ſhooting Engine, ſhould let it go off, and kill him. Invincible Ignorance is either ſuch in itſelf (2) and not (which are the ſame thing) may be, when a Man in its cauſe, or elſe both in itſelf, and in its cauſe too. kills his own Son, miſtaking him for his Enemy, The former is, when in doing a thing a Man is Ignorance of the Inſtrument, is, ſuppoſe a Man ſhould not able to overcome the Ignorance from which throw a pointed Spear at another, and kill him, ta- it proceeds, and yet is in fault for falling into that king it to have had no Point. For what Cauſe, comes Ignorance. Thus frequently when a drunken Man to be conſider'd in Ignorance, in ſuch a Caſe as this, commits a Sin he does not know what he is doing, Suppoſe a Man ſhould apply a Remedy to another, yet he is culpable for not knowing it. The latter with deſign of preſerving his Health, and the Re- is, when a Man not only is ignorant of ſuch things medy ſhould (againſt his Knowledge) prove Mor- as could not be known before the A&ion, but is tal. The laſt Circumſtance is, in what manner; as alſo free from any blame upon the account of his if a Man in teaching another ſhould intend only falling into that Ignorance, or his continuing in to give him a ſlight Blow, but ſhould by accident it. On this Point is obſervable what Ariſtotle has deſperately wound him (7). The Roman Lawyers ſaid in his Ethicks, Book III. Chap. 1. 11. and what have treated under a peculiar Head concerning Euſtathius has commented on the place. Where Ignorance of the Law, and Ignorance of the Fa&t (8). he diſtinguiſhes between what is done by one being But they did not conſider Ignorance ſo much for Ignorant, and what is done out of Ignorance. For In- the force and uſe it had in Moral Actions, as for Itances of the former, he brings the Actions of a the influence it had on Matters of Right, and as it Drunken, or of an Angry Perlon ; for ſuch Men, made for the keeping, or (9) acquiring, or loſing tho' they often know not what they do, yet the of any Legal Poffeffion or Qualification. But Ignorance is not the Cauſe of their Ašting, but the their numerous Reaſonings about both Kinds, may GoDU Drunkenneſs, or the Anger, of which 'twas in their be reduc'd to this ſhort Iſſue, That Ignorance of Power to decline the former, and to reſtrain the the Law is, for the moſt part, join'd with ſome latter. He adds farther, that thoſe Perſons cannot degree of Culpable Negligence, (10) but Igno- be ſaid to do a thing unwittingly, who ſin upon rance of the Fact is not; and that therefore Equity Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES. (1) Plutarch, who mentions this Sentence, in two Places of his Works of Morality, makes this to be the Speech of the Step- Son, ON ITW râs; 'twas not badly thrown. De animi tranquil. p. 467. (2) This Divition is not very neceſſary, for only the laſt Sort of ignorance is involuntary or invincible ; for in Matters Moral, Voluntary comprehends not only what is formally conſented to, but what preceeds Conſent, if it be a neceſſary Conſequent of it. Titius Obſ.27. (3) i. e. When we are ignorant which of two Things propos'd to us is moſt Advantagious, or with what view we muſt act; as for example, when we prefer a profitable or agreeable Good before an honeſt one. (4) Such is the Ignorance of the Law of Nature, at leaſt of its common Principles ; and the Ignorance of the Civil Laws of the Government to which we belong: So that tho' we may Kill or Poiſon another without any ſuch Deſign, we can’t innocently per- ſwade ourſelves that Murder or Paiſoning is allowable. (5) There are ſome other particular Circumſtances, the Ignorance of which is as inexcuſable as that of general Principles. As for Example, If one ſhall Thoor off a Gun in a Publick Place, and kill a Man, it will be no Excuſe that he thought no Man would pafs that Way, because he muſt needs imagine that ſuch Places are much frequented. (6) Thus ſays Ariſtotle; Æſchilus the Poet, being accuſed for publiſhing the Myſteries of Venus Eleuſina, was acquitted, becauſe he knew not, that thoſe Things wbich he had ſpoken were to be kept ſecret. For the Ignorance of a Thing as to the Quality, or what, cons fifts not in being ignorant of what is done, but of its being of ſuch a Nature, or having ſuch a Quality. (7) Two other Circumſtances may be added; as, 1. The Time ; for we may be ignorant whether a Day be Holy or not, a Fettival, or Working-Day, doc. 2. The Place, whether it be Conſecrated or Common. (8) See the Digeſt. lib. 22. Tit. 6. and Cod. lib. 1. Tit. 18. ſee alſo Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order, Part It Lib. 1. Tit. 18. S.I. (9) Ignorance of Right (fay the Digeſt.Lib.22. Tit. 6. Leg.7.) hinders not from preſerving our juft Due, but is of no Uſe to acquire any thing. As to Crimes, their Judgment is, that Ignorance of what is forbidden by the Law of Nature, or Nations, or by the Revealed Law, is altogether inexcuſable; but as to what is contrary to the Civil Laws, Ignorance or Error excuſes fome. times, either wholly or in part, in which Cafe Men are conſidered as having Means, or not, to know the Law. (10) The Reaſon is, becauſe the Law may, and ought to be clear and determinare, but Facts are often very intricate, ſo that the wifeſt Men can't unfold them; and thereupon, in Matters of Fact, when Ignorance is groſs, it can't be alledged as a Reaſon available. Ibid. Leg. 2. do 6.6 9. S. 5. ſee Cujus Obſerv. V.39. directs 32 Of the Underſtanding of Man, BOOK I. . mer kich directs us to interpret (1) the former to the Man's ſome Actions, thinking thoſe ought to be omitted prejudice, and the latter not. which ſhould have been perform'd, or vice verſa ; XI. When not only a Knowledge of the Truth or whether ſome Error occurs in the very Exerciſe is wanting in the Underſtanding, but a falſe Per- of an Action by means of which the Action is not ſwaſion has intruded into its room, which paſſes applied ſo rightly as it ought to have been. The itſelf for Truth, then we ſay a Man has an Erro- former kind of Errors do nor, in our Judgment, neous Conſcience, or that his Mind is pofſeft by an at all hinder the Imputation of an Action to the Error. This Érror is (like Ignorance) either Vin- Agent, according as it ſhall appear to agree or cible or Invincible : The former is that which a diſagree with the Rules preſcrib'd him ; becauſe Man could and ought to have overcome, by ap- they muſt upon all accounts be eſteem'd ſuperable! plying ſuch Diligence as is (2) morally pollible, For he that would reftrain the Actions of another or as the common Condition of Humanity admits by a Rule, ought at the fame time to make a fuffi- and allows : The latter is ſuch as a Man could cient declaration of his Will, that it may be clearly not vanquiſh by all Diligence morally poſſible. known by the Perſon whom he is to oblige. For Where it muſt be obſerv'd, that ſhould we approve otherwiſe 'tis the moſt unjuſt thing in the World of that Saying of the Emperor Antoninus, Book IX. to require obedience to a Law, when either the Chap. 43. Whoſoever fins, does in that decline from his Law is unknown, or the diſcovery of its ſenſe ex- propos'd end, and is certainly deceiv’d (a); yet if the ceeds the Capacities of thoſe whom it affects. Error were not inſuperable, the ill Acions pro- Therefore, if a Man errs in Theory; that is, if he ceeding from it cannot be exempted from the fancy a thing to be commanded which is really number of Sins properly ſo call’d, nor ought to be forbidden, or vice verſa, he is ſuppos’d not to pardon'd in groſs by a promiſcuous Indulgence (3). have apply'd fufficiene diligence, and therefore XII. But it ought eſpecially to be remark'd, that he cannot refuſe to bear the Imputation of Faults Error has different Effects in Adions, which a committed upon ſuch an Error. This Doctrine is Man may undertake or omit as he pleafes, or the by ſome Caluiſts thus explain’d in other words. Exerciſe of which is left to his Free-will; and in. If the Conſcience entertain a vincible Error about fucli Adions as are enjoin'd or forbidden him by the an Evil Thing, the Man fins, as well if he acts cept our Conſent : And therefore thoſe Conſe- which was indeed forbidden, or that an Action quences do not flow from it, which are otherwiſe was forbidden, which was indeed commanded, he apt to follow on ſuch an Action as we have thus ſins by performing the former, and by the forbear- conſented to; eſpecially if the Error did not ſtealing the latter ; becauſe ſuch a Performance and on us thro' ſupine Careleſneſs and Neglect. And ſuch a Forbearance are repugnant to the Law, but therefore in Bargains an Error about a Thing, or the Agent might and ought to have known the about its Quality, upon proſpect of which a Man Law, according to its true import and ſignificati- was induc'd to come to ſuch an Agreement, ren on. And yet (4) the ſame Man has ſinn'd no leſs, ders the Bargain void. For in this caſe the Man if he has forborn an Action which was indeed for- is not conceiv'd to have agreed abſolutely, but bidden, but by him believ'd to be commanded; or upon ſuppoſal of the preſence of ſuch a Thing or if he has perform'd an Action really commanded, Quality, on which, as on a neceſſary Condition, yet ſuch as he imagin’d to be forbidden. For tho his Conſent was founded : and therefore the Thing. in theſe Caſes there be no external Acts regug- or Quality not appearing, the Confent is under nant to the Law, yet becauſe the Man thinks his ſtood to be null and ineffectual. Which Point falſe Notion and Conſtruction of the Law to be ſhall be diſcuſs’d more fully in its proper place. right, therefore the contrary Intention ſhall be XIII. But the Caſe ſeems to be very different in imputed to him as Sin: For the Evil Intention of Neceſſary Actions, or in ſuch as are commanded the Agent makes the Action appear Evil, at leaſt or forbidden by a Superior. Where we muſt firſt with reſpect to the Agent himſelf. From all enquire, whether the Error ariſes in the Theory, which it appears, that from an Erroneous Judg- or in the Practice; that is, whether a Man enter ment no Action can proceed which may be im- tains a falſe Opinion concerning the Neceſſity of puted as good and right to the Actor, and that (a) Add. Arrian Epictet. l. 1. cap. 28. do chap. v. 9. 13. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) For 'cis a Rule of the Law, That Ignorance of the Law hurts any Man, but of the Fact not. Digeſt. ibid. (2) See Chap. 7. §. 16. The Queſtions about invincible Ignorance and Error, have been much debated in France, in order to maintain the Rights of Conſcience in Matters of Religion, againſt the Attempts of luch Teachers as are againſt a Toleration, and are for profecuting all that differ from them, for which'tis convenient that the Curious conſult the Books. (3). It is certain, that when Men are arrived at the Heighth of Wickedneſs, they fin not for ſinning's Sake, but are ordinarily ſeduced by their Paſſions, which on a ſudden diverc the Mind from the Thoughts of their Ducy; but tho’a Man conſiders not the Sin formally in the Inſtant of Sinning, he is not leſs to be blamed, becauſe his Ignorance reſpects Things which he might and ought to know; and to the Maxim of M. Antonine, if underſtood with the Reſtriction beforementioned, will rectify the Error of the Philoſophical Sin of the Jeſuits. About which, fee Biblioth. Univerſ. Tom. 15. In fine, Since we never reſolve up- on an Action, but upon the Account of ſome poſitive Knowledge, and a fimple Defect of Light rarely carries us to any Action, "Ignorance and Error are ofren confounded in Morality, and what is ſaid of the one, may be applied to the other. (4) Moreover a Man likewiſe fins as much in doing a good Action contrary to his Conſcience, as by doing a thing evil in ir- felf, in following the Motions of an Erroneous Conſcience. The Reaſon is, becauſe in the firſt Caſe he directly and deliberately diſobeys God, which is the moſt aggravating Circumſtance of Sin; and beſides, all the good that can be in the Action can't be impured to the Agent, who could not but be ſenſible that he had no deſign to do it. Whereas in the other Caſe, there is no formal Contempt of the Authority of the Lawgiver ; nay, on the contrary, there is a Deſign to obey him : which ſhews that the Action contains in it ſome moral Goodneſs, altho' in ſome reſpects it may be accounted Evil, if the Error appears not unconque. rable, See the Philoſophick Comment. &c. Tom. II. 6. 8. when CHAP. III. as it concurs to Moral Actions. 33 when a Man is fally perſwaded that ſuch a thing neſt Intention, tho' with an inconſiderate Libera- is unjuft (1), the thing is unlawful for him to do, lity, conferr'd a Kindneſs on a wicked Perſon, who ſo long as his Perſwafion ſhall continue uncor will abuſe it toward the maintaining of his Diſor- rected. Add. l. 46. § 8. D. of Thefts. ders; he cannot at all boaſt of having done a good XIV. But if a Speculative Error be entertain'd A&tion, yet he fliall be excus’d from any Share in concerning a thing Indifferent, that is, if a Man the conſequent Wickedneſſes, and not be reckon'd ſhould be perſwaded that he ought to do, or to to have contributed any thing toward their Com- omit ſomewhat, which was indeed left free on miſſion. But when a Man has been particularly both ſides, he will only ſin if he acts contrary to commanded, to diſcover and obſerve preciſely the what this falſe Opinion ſuggeſts, upon the ac- Object, the Place or Time of acting, it will be a count of the Pravity of his Intention, but will hard matter for him to eſcape the Imputation not fin if he aĉts according to the Direĉtions of of thoſe EffeEts which ſhall proceed from the ill his Error. For Indifferent Things are plac'd with- applied A&tion, unleſs he can demonſtrate his Er- out the Bounds of the Law; which cannot be which cannot be ror to have been inorally inſuperable and unavoi- tranſgreſs'd by their Performance or Omiſſion: dable. Thus if you give your Servant a ſtrict And that Error appears very harmleſs which does Charge to wake you at ſuch a certain Hour of the not give occaſion to Sin. Yet it is plain, the Night, it will not ſerve him for an Excuſe of his Actions undertaken upon the Motions of ſuch an Default to ſay, that he miftook in telling the Error, cannot obtain thoſe good Effects which Clock; yet if by any Caſualty the Clock went otherwiſe follow the like Inſtances of Obedience wrong, or was out of order, the Servant ſhall be to the Laws: Thus, if a Legiſlator had conſtituted free from all Offence and Blame. ſuch a Reward to thoſe who comply'd with his Injunctions, this Reward could not be challeng’d XVI. It frequently happens too, than an Error by one, who through Error and Miſtake, ſhould intervenes in the Exerciſe of a bad Action, while have obſerv'd ſome indifferent things, fancying the Actor miſſes the Object at which he aim'd. them to be poſitively determin'd, and legally In which Cafe, the Malice of the Actor ſhall con- enacted. tinue the ſame as if he had not miſtaken, but the XV. But 'tis much more uſual that an Error Action itſelf ſhall be eſteem'd more or leſs Hei- Thould intervene in the Practice and Exerciſe of nous, according as the Object is on which it caſu- Actions commanded by the Laws: As ſuppoſe the ally lighted. Thus a Perſon who intending true object of the Action ſhould be remov'd, and kill his Enemy, accidentally kills another Man, another ſubſtituted in its place; or if we ſhould ſhall be nevertheleſs guilty of Murther. See l. 18, miſtake the Time or Place of the Execution en- $. 3. D. of injuries, & l. 14. D. L. Corneliam de Sicariis, join'd. Such Actions, as they are not follow'd by & Grot. in Sparſ. Florum ad h. I. Yet the Murther thoſe Effects which are otherwiſe due to Actions ſhall receive more or leſs Aggravation, according rightly apply'd ; ſo neither are they attended with to the Dignity or Meanneſs of the Man, who has the Effets proper to bad A&tions, becauſe the Er- been ſo unfortunately ſlain. Hitherto muſt be re- ror was not contracted by any Culpable Negli- ferr'd the Caſe of a Man's killing another out- gence. Which ſome Authors thus expreſs in other right, whom he intended only to wound, or to Words, An Intervening Error hinders the Action hurt in a leſs degree: for here the Fact itſelf muſt from being imputed on either ſide, making it nei- be the Rule to go by in Judgment; But when in ther Good nor Evil . Whoever (ſays Seneca Herc. fur.) the Exerciſe of a faulty Action a Man by Miſtake gave Error the Name of Wickedneſs. Thus, tho' lights on a lawful Object, ſuch an AEtion will be otherwiſe you would be freed from your Obliga- no farther Evil, than as it flows from an ill Inten- tion by paying a Man what you owe him, yet tion in the Actor; ſo that this Error ſhall hinder ſhould you pay him Undeſignedly, and by pure the Fa£t from coming under the Name of the Vice Miſtake, you will not indeed have committed a deſign’d to be committed. And therefore that Sin, but you will by no means have cancell’d the Saying of Seneca, of the Conſtancy of a Wiſe-Man, c.7. Obligation. Thus, when a Man has, with an ho- will not hold, at leaſt (2) in Human Courts and to Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) 'Tis on this account that the Roman Law has decreed, that he that takes away any thing from another, thinking that he does it without the Conſent of the Owner, commits a Robbery, cho' afterward he find that the Proprietor was willing he ſhould take it and have it for his own; but he that has as much as in him lies committed the Robbery can't be proſecuted in Law as a Thief. The Law is this; If I againſt the Will and Conſent of the Owner, as I believe, do meddle with his Goods, tho' the Owner is willing I ſhould' , whether am I guilty of Theft? And Pomponius fays, I am a Thief: yet it is crue, that if I am willing he ſhould have the uſe of them, tho' he know it not, he can't be impleaded as guilty of Theft. Digeſt. lib. 47. Tit. II. Of Thefts, Leg. 46. S. 8. (2) Indeed before God it is real Adultery; for, as the Author has obſerved more than once before, and as he hereafter ſpeaks, Chap. vii. S. 4. An Evil Intention renders the Action Evil, which otherwiſe is Good and Innocent, as to the Matter, and in itſelf; tho’a Good Intention is not ſufficient to render an Action, materially Evil , Good. Whereas, on the contrary, if a Man deſigns to do a Good Action, and happens (thro’Miſtake) to do an Ill One, there is no doubt but God will accept of that Intention, as if he had effected the Good, that he propounded to himſelf to do; and altho'it gives place, by accident, to fome Sin of another nature, 'tis no leſs commendable for the Good which he would have done, unleſs the Execution of a Pious Deſign, either become un profitable, or be hindred by the change of certain Circumſtances. So that the Maxim which our Author has laid down in the laft Section, I mean, That every A&tion, in doing of which we may fall into an Error, can neither be imputed to us as Good, nor Evil : This Maxim, I ſay, had need be underſtood with ſome Reſtrictions. Nor is it generally more true, that theſe ſort of Actions muſt always want, before Humane Judicatures, thoſe Effects which they would have, if they were well applied. As for Inſtance, If a Man, not knowing it, marries a Woman who hath a Husband already, or is a Relation within rhe Degrees forbidden, as he is no Adulterer or Inceſtuous Perſon, fuppofing that it be a real Error; ſo their Children cannor be repuced Baſtards, provided that both the Father and the Mother be under an invincible Ignorance in that Reſpect. This is the very Example that Mr. Hirtius alledges here, and we may alſo conſule his Diſcourſe of a Suppoſed Marriage, Tom. I. of his Commentaries and ſmall Works, Briuted in 1700i É Con- 34 Of the Will of Man, Book I. Adminiſtration of two (1) Faculties, by one of has more largely obſerv’d, Ethic. ad Nicom. I. 3.C.4. Conſideration (1), That if a Man lies with his own of Benefits, l. 2. c. 19. & l. 5. c. 13. in the End. Wifi, fancying her to be another's, the Man ſhall be an And compare Libonius Declam. 35. p.780. of Morel- Adulterer, phó the Woman be no Adulterefs. Add.Sen. lus's Edition. (1) Conſult alſo the New-Letters of Mr. Bayle, written upon the Occaſion of his General Criticiſing upon Mr. Maimbourg's Hiſtory of Calviniſm, Letc. IX. S. 12. CH A P. IV. Of the Will of Man, as it concurs in or conſents to MORAL ACTIONS. The CONTENTS of every Section of the fourth Chapter. I. Of the Asts of the Will. V. Certain Diſpoſitions of the Body ſtir up the Will. II. Of the Liberty of the Will. VI. As alſo some Habits. III. That the Will must of neceſſity be indifferent, VII. And Pulſions. i. e, not forced to chuſe Good or Evil. VIII. Alſo Intemperance. IV. How the Will is inclined to good Things, and to IX. A&tions of a Mixt Nature. Goodneſs in general. X. Involuntary, and forced Actions. T HE moſt Wiſe Creator being pleas’d to make wards the producing or obtaining of it. Intention Man an Animal governable by Laws, for (or Proærefis) is a Deſire Efficacious toward the obtain- this Purpoſe implanted a Will in his Soul, as an ing of an End; or it is an Ae of Will, by which it Internal Directreſs of his Actions ; that the Ob- effečtually tends toward an abſent End, and en- je&s being propos’d and known, this Power might, deavours Aqually to produce or to acquire it: by an Intrinſick Principle, and without any Phy- This Act being join’d with the Hopes and the At- fical Neceflity, move itſelf towards them, and tempts of procuring an End, we may eaſily con- înight chuſeth at which ſeem'd moſt Agreeable ceive what ſort of Things it is employ'd about : and Convenient, and reject that which appear- and they, to be ſure, muſt be Thirgs Poſſible in ed Unſuitable and incommodious. The Will themſelves, and Things in our Power; as Ariſtotle to Actions by , . . Election (4) is concern’d about are which it is ſaid to act ſpontaneouſly, and by the other in our Power . Every Man purpoſeth to do that alone which (2) freely. To Spontaniety, if we may ſo ſpeak, are be imagines (s) bimſelf able to compaß. Again, L:6. attributed certain Aas and Motions, of which C. 2. What is already done, cannot be the object of our ſome are Interior, commonly call’d' (3) Eliciti, Choice and Purſuit ; for no Man conſults of what is part, others Exterior, generally term’d Imperati . The but of what is to come, and is Changeable and Contingent. former are ſuch Acts as are immediately produc'd Whereas what is already done cannot be alter'd or recalld. by the Will, and terminated in the fame Power. And therefore Agatho well ſays, This alone is beyond Some of theſe are employ'd about the End, as the Power of God himſelf, to make that never to have Volition, Intention, Fruition ; others about the been done, which bath really been done. For it enters Means, as Conſent, Ele&ion, and Uſe. Volition is into the very Definition of Intention or lleguípears that Act of the Will by which it is ſimply carried that it be made with Reaſon and with Thought. toward ſome End, without regard had whether Tho' there be many Degrees of Intention, with re- the End be preſent or abſent; or that Ad by ference to its different Height and Force; yet, as which the End is barely approv'd of. Others call far as concerns the Occaſions and Purpoſes of this the Will of Simple Approbation, by which a Civil Life, 'tis ſufficient to divide it into Plenary Thing is underſtood to agree with the Nature and and Semi-plenary. The former is, that by which Inclinations of ſome Perſon, though he has not the Will determines on any thing after a full Ex- yet Actually and Effectually mov'd himſelf to- Mr. Barb. NOTES (1) See what is ſaid about this unprofitable and ill-deſigned niultiplying of Faculties in the ſecond Nore of the firſt Chapter foregoing. (2) Mr. Locke ſeems to have reaſon to believe, That Liberty is nothing elſe but a Power properly appertaining to Agents, and not an Attribute or Modification of the Will, which is itſelf nothing but a Power. See his Philoſophical Eſay about the Under- ſtanding, Lib. 2. c. 21. where this whole Matter about the Will, and Liberty in general, is treated on at large. Mr. Le Clerc in his Latin Treatiſe about Spirits, Se&t. 1. Ch. 3. is of the ſame Opinion with Mr. Locke, as to the Seat of the Will (as I may ſpeak;) but he elſewhere enters upon a more particular Examination of the Hypotheſes of that Great Philoſopher, and ſhews, that his Notions are neither exact nor clear. See his Choiſie Biblioth. Tom. xii. Art. 3. p. 83, doc. and Tom. xvii. Art. 6. p. 236, 237. (3) The Author makes uſe of the School diſtinction here of, Altus Eliciti, i. e. Acts ſpringing ap (as we may fay) from the very bottom of the Will; which being Terms not uſed in the French Tongue, they are better expreſſed by, The immediate Acts of the Will. (4) Our Author in all this Quotation follows very unfitly fome Latin Tranſlation, which had rendred the Greek, woodepenis, Election, inſtead of Deliberation, Conſultation, or Counſel. (5) This Writer being deceiv'd by the Latin Interpreter, tranſlates, cox ole tull äv zavé goue di aerê, qua ex ſeſe fieri poſſe exiſti- maverit, i. e. which he thinks may be done of themſelves, which being a Miſtake, the Engliſh Tranſator has truly avoided it, as I have done, by rendring it, which he believes himſelf able to execute. amination CHAP. IV. as it concerns Moral Actions. 35 the one than toward the other. Another Thing unalterable way of AEting; and which cannot be amination of the Matter, and without being dri- fuch a Place, and at ſuch a Time. We muſt add ven to it by the Violence of the Paſſions. The farther, That tho' the Reaſon, which makes à latter, when due Deliberation has not been taken, thing deſired or avoided, does not depend upon or when the Hurry of the Affections has created the Will, but upon the condition of the Object, a Confuſion and Diſorder in the Reaſon. Fru- according as it bears the Face of Good or Evil; ition (1) is the Reft, or the Delight of the Will in yet that Appetite and that Averſion, which thus the End now obtain'd and preſent to it. To which follow the Appearance of the Object, are not of is oppos’d Repentance, or an Averſion (common- ſo much Force and Sway, but that there ſtill re ly join’d with Shame or Grief), to ſomewhat mains in the Will a Liberty, whether or no it which we have before deſigned or affected. Con- ſhall determine itſelf to any external A&t about Sent is our fimple Approbation of Means, as we ſuch an Obje&t : eſpecially fince ſuch an Evil judge them proper for our Work : and theſe Means thing may bear the Countenance of Good, and when they are plac'd within our Reach and Power, conſequently be Deſirable, as long as it ſhall be employ the two remaining Acts mentioned in our ſet in Oppoſition to a greater Evil. And there- first Diviſion; for Election determines, and Uſe ap- fore to refute that Notion of Hobbs's de Homine, plies them to the compaſſing of the End propos’d. Cap. xi. §. 2. that Appetite and Averſion neceſſarily Thoſe Acts are callà Imperati or enjoin'd, which follow our Pre-conception of ſome Pleaſure, or are perform'd by other Human Faculties upon the of ſome Uneaſineſs likely to proceed from the Motion and Appointment of the Will. Object, no room being thus left for Free-will; II. Liberty is a Faculty of the Will, by which, we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh the Volition of fim- all Requiſites of Asting being given, it may out of ple Approbation, from effe&tual Intention or many propos'd Objects chuſe one or more, and legcipeos, (4) of which the latter does not ſo ne- reject the reſt; or if one only Object be propos’d, ceffarily depend on particular Objects. In the may admit that, or not admit it, may do or not Words following this Aſſertion, he applies a very do it. What we call the Requiſites of Aging, Idle piece of Nicety, while he obferves, That fome expreſs by the fingle Term Occaſion (2); now when we ſay a Man has free Will of doing this or that, from theſe the laſt Determination of the Agent is we ought always to underſtand it with this Condition, conceiv'd as a diſtinct thing, which being added if be pleaſes; for 'tis abſurd to ſay that a Man has free to the other Requiſites, we immediately proceed Will of doing this, or that, whether he will or no. to Action; and therefore thoſe Requiſites menti no Body is ſo Stupid as not to apprehend this on'd in the Definition of Liberty, do not include Contradiction: and 'tis extream Fooliſh to add that Share which the Man himſelf bears in the the very ſame thing which the Propoſition aſſerted Action, but are contra-diſtinguiſh'd to it. But as a Condition to it. To ſay that a Man may more particularly, we call (3) the Faculty of chu- freely will the doing of a thing, if he will, is the ſing one or more out of many Objets, Liberty of fame thing as to ſay, Peter runs if he runs: and Specification, or of Contrariety, and the Faculty con- who would ever give this Clauſe the Name of a cern'd in the Admiſſion or Rejection of one only Condition? From what has been ſaid it likewiſe Object, Liberty of Contradiétion, or Liberty of Ex- appears, how we are to judge of thoſe Notions erciſe. évi laid down by Monſieur Le Grand in his Inſtitutions Now Liberty is ſuppos'd to ſuperadd to Sponta- of Philoſophy, Part 7. Artic. 5. as if it were impof- neouſneſs, firſt an Indifference of Acts as to their fible for a Man not to defire what he clearly and Exerciſe ; ſo that the Will is not oblig'd neceffa- diſtinctly perceives to be Good; and as if a Man rily to exert one of its A&s, as to defire or refufe : finn'd only upon this account, in not having a for tho' in general it is impoſible but it ſhould clear and diſtinct Perception of Evil (s). affe&t Good, and refuſe Evil as ſuch, yet in refe * III. But the chief Affection of the Will, and rence to any particular Object propos’d, it may what ſeems immediately to flow from its Nature, determine on which Side it pleaſes, tho' perhaps it is an Intrinſecal Indifference , upon the account of may ſeem to have a greater Propenſion toward which it is not reſtrain’d to any certain, fix’d, and that Liberty ſuperadds to the Notion of Spontaneout entirely extirpated by the Force of any external neß, is the Freedom of Determination, ſo that the Will Means. And this Indifference we are the more may upon an internal Impulſe and Motion, exert firmly to aſſert and maintain, becauſe upon the either of its Acts of wiſhing or loathing, juſt in Removal of it, all the Moralicy (6) of Human Foc gb 19. otot Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) This Term (Fruition or Enjoyment) is very improper (as any Man "may obſerve ) becauſe the Notion of it, which he here lays down, is the Effect of Fruition, and not fruition itſelf. It is true that the Latin word Fruitio comes ſomething near it, but it is very hard to find a Word in French (or any other modern Language) fit to expreſs the Moraliſts Notion upon which theſe Diviſions are built. (2) See Chap. V. § 5. following. (3) This diſtinction does not appear to be very neceſſary. The Liberty of Contrariery implies no more than a double Act of the Liberty of Contradiction. As for Example, If a Man'is to chufe whether he ſhall read Greek, or Hebrew, he conſults with himſelf, 1. Whether he ſhall read Greek orno, and reſolves in the Negative. Then, 2. Whether he ſhall read Hebrew or no, and chooſes the firſt. This Inſtance is taken out of Mr. Le Clerc's Latin Diſcourſe of Spirits, Sect. I. Chap. IIT. 9. 12. (4). That is to ſay, Altho' we can't bur be ſenſible of ſuch Impreſſions as particular Objects make upon us, yet we are not ne- ceftarily carried to ſearch for them, or avoid them ; but a Man may by Reafon deny himſelf the Pleaſure which the Apprehenſion of it may flatter us with, and, on the contrary, expoſe himſelf to that Grief and Uneaſineſs, from which he might be exempted without thoſe Confiderations, which have induced him to undergo them. See Mote 5. upon Chap. V. §. 13. following. (5) See the former Chapter, Pag. 32. Note 4. and Chap. V. S. 13. following. (6) We may add to theſe Quotations another Saying of the ſanie Epiętetus; Ansis apodepérews 8 zí vetus, tiegvro zivetub, No Man is a Thief or a Tyrant of his own Will. See Gataker's Notes upon Marc. Antoninus, Lib. xi. §. 36. where the Emperor quotes the Words of the ſame Philoſopher. Actions F 2 36 BOOKI. Of the Will of Man, Actions is inevitably overthrown. So Arriani on For thus Proclus (ad Timæum) divides Atheiſts into Epictetus, l. 1. C. 17. What can overcome an Appetite? three Ranks and Orders; two of which he makes Another Appetite. What can conquer a Defire or an A. thoſe who deny GOD the Care of Human Aktions and verſion? Another Deſire, or another Averfion. You will Affairs; and thoſe who attribute ſuch a Care to GOD, Say, He that threatens me with Death compels me. I as impoſeth an abſolute Neceſſity on all Events, utterly deny it ; 'tis not the terrible Propoſal which lays the depriving Men of their Freedom and Choice. So allo Force upon you, but 'tis your own Choice which inclines Saluſt the Philoſopher ſpeaks in his Book de Diis & you rather to the Commiſſion of ſuch a Deed, than to the Mundo : To attribute Injuſtice, or Lust and Wantonneſ Deſire of Death. In this caſe therefore, as well as in all to the over-ruling Influence of Fate, is to make ourſelves others, nothing compelld you but your own Opinion; Good, and the Divine Natures Wicked. Again, In that is , nothing overcame your Will , but your Will. Plautus (Aulular.) when one ſays, I believe this was Idem 1. 1. c. 29. The Will is not conquerable by any the Will of the Gods, for otherwiſe I am certain it could thing but by itſelf . Add. Simplic. ad Epictet . C. 1. p.22. never have come to paß. Another anſwers him mer- Of which wicked Deſign thoſe Men are in a great rily, And I, for my part, believe , 'tis the will of the meaſure guilty, who fancy fome ſtrange kind of Gods, that I ſhould take you and hang you up for a Rasa Phyſical Predetermination in Human Deeds, by cal. which the Motion in itſelf, and as it is a Natural IV. For the right underſtanding of this Indiffe- Being, is fo determin'd by the firſt Cauſe, that it rence of the Will, ſomewhat ought to be premis'd cannot be done in any other manner; tho' it after- concerning the Nature of Good in general: Now wards receive its Morality from the ſecond Cauſe. tho' Good by many (2) of the Philoſophers is con- Nor are they in a leſs Fault, who from the Divine fider'd abſolutely, ſo that every Being really ex- Preſcience would derive an abſolute Neceflity on all iſtent may be pronounc'd Good; yet we, without our Proceedings. For tho' this Attribute of God regarding this Signification, which we judge to cannot be deceiv’d, yet that it does not take away be very uſeleſs, will only conſider Good, as it de- the Indifference of the Will, may be eaſily under- notes Reſpect to others, and as it is ſaid to be ftood, if we either clear the Word Preſcience, from Good to one, or for one. According to which the Imperfection which it ſeems to imply, as do all Senſe the Nature of Good (3) ſeems to confift, in other Terms taken from Human Things, and ap- thar Aptitude by which one thing is diſpos's to plied to the Divine Nature ; (ſince in God there benefit, preſerve, or compleat another ; becauſe can be no Succeſſion of Time ;) or if we ſay, this Aptitude depends either upon the Nature of that the Divine Concurrence does in ſuch a man the thing itſelf, or ſuch Properties as they have ner accompany Second Cauſes, as ſtill to leave naturally, or by virtue of Human Induſtry; and them the Power of acting in the way originally therefore this Good, to which we may give the allign'd them by their Creator, not debafing them Name of Natural, is firm and uniform, and has with reference to Moral Adions from Principal no Dependance on the erroneous and various into meerly Inſtrumental Cauſes. Add. Lucian, Opinions of Men. But becauſe Good does not ex- Minoe, & Jupit . Confut. Anton. le Grand Inft. Philoſoph. cite the voluntary Appetite of Man unleſs it be Cart. p. 8. c. 17, 18. How Prejudicial ſuch Noti- known, at leaſt under a confus’d Notion; and be ons are to a State or Kingdom, Grotius is well cauſe Knowledge ariſing from Senſe, gives but a aware when he obſerves, Obferv. de Dogmat. Reip. groſs Reprefentation of the genuine Natures and Nox. That thoſe who utterly diſcard the Doctrine of Conſequence of Things, ſo that the Underſtand- Free-will , can hardly avoid making God the Author . ing is often clouded with Error, and diſorder'd by of all Wickedneß ; an Attempt which (1) Plato bimſelf the violent Noiſes of Senſe and Paſſion; hence it declar'd ought not to be born with in a Commonwealth; comes to paſs, that many Men inveſt things fallly de Repub. L. II. Tão sexõvăra’äffa Sulav tå dind, with the Name and Notion of Good, and this is ána tòp Soov. We ought to affix any other Cauſe of Evil, what we call Imaginary Good. And farther, every but never to refer it to GOD. To the ſame purpoſe particular Perſon, as he underſtands a Thing to Suetonius ſpeaks well when he makes Tiberius (1.69.) make for his Profit, his Preſervation, or his Per- a Contemner of all Religion, fay, Quod omnia fato fe&tion, loves and deſires it ; and, on the contrary, agi crederet, for believing the World.to be guided by Fate. what he conceives to be Evil for him, he hates aná Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) The whole Sentence of Plato, of which our Author cites only the laſt part, is very Emphatical; God, becauſe He is good, can't be the Cauſe of all Things, as some affert, but is only the Cauſe of some fer Things among men, and no Cauſe of many; for good Things are much fewer than evil among us, and none can be the Cauſe of good Things but God, but we must ſeek out ſome other Cauſe of Evils than Him. Theſe Words are but a little before the place where that Philoſopher delivers the Words which Grotius refers to, reexão di utlov, &c. We must with all Zeal oppoſe them who affert, That God, who is good, is the Cauſe of any Evil : Nor must it be endured in any well-governed City, that any Man whatſoever, either Young or old, no not ſo much as a Poet by way of Fi&tion, should but lightly, much leſ plainly, either ſpeak, or hear any ſuch things, as are neither pious, convenient, nor conſonant in themſelves to be men- tioned, when ſpoken. (2) All the Metaphyſicians. 3) According to the Definition which Mr. Locke gives of Good (in his Philoſophical Esſay upon the Humane Underſtanding, Lib. 11. Chap. XX. S. 2.) every Thing is ſo called, which is proper to produce and increaſe Pleaſure in us, or to leſſen and ſhorten any Grief; or is able to procure or preſerve us in the Poffeffion of any other Good, or a Freedom from any Evil . And, on the contrary, every Thing is accounted Evil which is proper to produce or encreaſe Grief in us, or leſſen any Pleaſure, or is able to cauſe any Evil to us, or deprive us of any Good. This Definicion which reſpects the Effect chiefly, that Things good or evil work upon our Spirits, is conſequently more natural than that of our Author, which refers to the Diſpoſitions and Qualities of the objects, as to the Effect which they produce, with relation to the Conſtitution of our Nature in general, not diſtinctly ex- preſſing the ſenſe of Pleaſure or Pain, which in all Languages, and in the Opinion of all Men, are comprehended under the No- tion of Good and Evil. In fine, Tho' the Phlloſophers diſtinguiſh ſometimes between Agreeable and Profitable, and in ſome Caſes theſe two things may be oppoſed one to the other, yet ’tis certain that every real Good is both Agreeable and Profitable, as every real Evil is Diſagreeable and Diſadvantagious, if not at preſent, yet at leaſt in the conſequents, and at the end of a certain Time. See Note 5. of the following Page. avoids. CHAP. IV. as it concerns Moral Actions. 37 Ure; · to avoids. But as it is not requiſite to the Nature of ments, from thoſe which are (s) only painted and Good, and to its Power of moving the Appetite, tranſitory; we ſhall ſee how there muſt needs that it ſhould be conſider'd preciſely as Good only ariſe hence an infinite Variery in the Wills and for the Perſon deſiring, and abftracting from the Inclinations of Men ; and how all purſue what Advantage of others; eſpecially ſince upon ac- they think their own Good, but in different Paths count of the Society and Conjunction of Men, the and by different Means. Beſides, many Men do Good of others may redound to our Benefit and not know what Things are good for them, and ſo amongſt Mankind there is ſo fair an A. therefore do not deſire them; many more prefer greement about the general Nature of Good, and the fair Face and Semblance of Evil to Real and its chief Parts and Species's, that barely on the Subſtantial Good, and ſo reject what they ought ſcore of their being divided about ſome Particu- to deſire, and deſire what they ought to reject. lars, there's no manner of Reaſon either why we To which purpoſe Ariſtotle well obſerves, Ethic. ad ſhould deny the Univerſal, and Unſhaken, and Nicom. l. 3. c. 6. That to be deſirable by the Will, fim- Uniform Notions of Good, or why, in a State of ply and properly ſpeaking; which is truly good, but that Natural Liberty, we ſhould make it depend on to be deſirable by every particular Man which he ima- the bare Opinion of every private Man, in a ſtate gines ſó. What Gunther writes to Ligurinus may be of Government on the ſole Judgment of the Su- here applied, preme Magiſtrate, as the only proper Meaſures Tantum falfa loquendo and Rules for its Determination. Add. D. Cumber- Fallere nemo potest : veri ſub imagine falfum land, de L. N. 3. where he refutes Hobb's Notions of Good, etc. 1. f.20. As for the Moral Good Influit, do furtim deceptas occupat aures. which appears in Human Actions, it ſhall be dif When Falſhood bare and undiſguis'd appears, cuſs’d by and by in its proper place. It never can deceive : but when it wears From the foregoing Obſervations this manifeſtly The Garb of Truth, it cheats the heedleſs Ears. appears to be the Nature of the Will, that it is al- ways deſirous (1) of Good in general, and always Thus then in almoſt every Thing and every averſe to Evil in general. For it implies an open Action many Species of Good and Evil, both Real Contradiction, (2) not to incline towards that and Apparent, croud themſelves into our Thoughts, which ſeems agreeable, and to incline to that and when theſe have for ſome time variouſly agi- which ſeems diſagreeable to us. And therefore in tated the Mind, and driven it one while to favour this general Inclination of the Will there can be one, and one while another, at laſt the Will by an no Indifference admitted, as if it could (with the intrinſical Force determines itſelf to the embracing Appetite of fimple Approbation) ſometimes deſire of one Object, and diſcarding the reſt. And an Good and ſometimes Evil. But they are the par- Action perform'd in this manner, is call'd Spons ticular Goods and (3) Evils, which give room for taneous or Voluntary, which Ariſtotle thus defines, the Indifference of the Wills of particular Men, Ethic. ad Nicom. l. 3. c. 3. Tò èxśmroy Sady šo divut who at different Times, and upon different Occa- japged in our 648871 tai red Q & kete sa cv @cs i regiães. That is to fions, are very various in their Scents and Purſuits. be eſteemed Spontaneous the Principle of which is in the And there is this evident reaſon why it ſhould be Perſon acting, who likewiſe underſtands the Particulars ſo, becauſe there are ſcarce any Goods or Evils in which the Action conſiſts . Euſtrathius comments which appear to a Man in their native Colours, on this place to this purpoſe : Both theſe Conditions and without ſuffering any Mixtures, but common are neceſſary to the conſtituting a Spontaneous Action, ly they are blended and ſhuffled together; Good is that the Principle be in the Actor, and that the Actor adulterated with Evil, and Evil is ſweetned with know the Particulars. For be that a&t's out of Ignorance (4) Good; to which if we add the ſtrange Incli- has the Principle of acting in himſelf, and he that knows nation which we find to fome Good Things in the Particulars, may yet aɛt by the Compulſion of others. particular Perſons, and how all Men have not the And therefore neither of theſe Conditions by itſelf Ability to diſtinguiſh ſolid and durable Enjoy- can make a Thing properly Voluntary, Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES. (1) This is what is implied by that common Maxim, That all Men naturally and unmovably deſire their own Happineſs; for true Happineſs conſiſts not only in the Enjoyment of all good Things, of which they are capable, but in a Freedom from all Evil; the leaft Pain being ſufficient to marr our greateſt Pleaſure. (2) The Quotations which are annexed by the Author a little lower (viz. at the end of the Paragraph in the Englich Tranſla- tion, and are nored by a, b, c ) are more properly to be put in here, and eſpecially the laſt of them. I ſhall add, upon this Oc. cafion, a Paſſage our of the Emperor Marco Antoninus, Ti@s óx acòv 82, &c. Is it not a cruel thing to hinder Men from purſuing things, which they believe to be uſeful and agreeable to them. Lib. VI. S. 27. See Gataker's Notes upon the Place, where he has gas thered ſeveral Sentences out of ancient Writers to the ſame purpoſe. (3) Such are all thoſe that concern this Life. (4) Every Object (ſays this Author in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man, and Citizen, Lib. I. Ch. 1. S. 11.) makes different the great Value he has for himſelf. Others affect the Senſes with Pleaſure, and others move him by Self-Love, which engages him upon Self-preſervation. He looks upon the firſt as Honeſt and Convenient; the ſecond, as ſuitable; and the latt, as profis table. Every one of theſe Goods in particular draws him with more or leſs violence, according as the Impreſſions, which it makes upon the Heart, are more or leſs ſtrong See Note 3. of the foregoing Page. (5) Mr. Locke in his Phil. Eſ ay of Humane Underſtanding, Lib. II. Ch. XXI. S. 58. ſpeaks well to this purpoſe: The preſent Judgment of Good or Evil, which we make, is always right.' Indeed, things conſidered, as we a&tually enjoy them, are what they ſeem to be, ſo that in this caſe Good apparent and real are the same thing; for Grief and Pleaſure being eſteemed ſo as we feel them, and no more; the Good or Evil preſent is really no greater than it appears : and, by conſequent, 'if every one of our Actions be reſpected in itſelf, without any regard to its Conſequences, we can never miſtake in our Choice of Good, but must always infallibly adhere to the Better Part. Compare theſe words with what goes before and follows, where that Great Philofopher clears this Matter with much Solidity and Exactneſs. V. Buc 38 Book I. Of the Will of Man, V. But it does not always fall out that the Mind ference of Conftitutions, the Will ſometimes ſeems ſhall maintain a kind of Aquilibrium, and apply unable to hinder their Exiſtence, or their break- itſelf to ating or not acting, without any confi- ing out into Action, yet it may provide fo far, as derable Advantage on one ſide more than on the to ſee they ſhall not break out into Sin. Thus, if other. But for different Reaſons, and by different a Man be ſo far vanquiſh'd by the warm Motions Cauſes, it frequently bends with great Violence of Love, as to raiſe his Paſſion above Reſtraint, a one way; and ſometimes External Violence bears Power is ſtill left him of ſatisfying his Defires, in ſo hard upon it, as to take away its Strength and an innocent and lawful manner. See I Cor. vii. 2. to diſable its Powers. As the Mariner does not As the Mariner does not And thus Plato diſputes well, De leg. l. 12." That always cut the Sea with an even and proſperous however the moſt Unnatural of Luſts had pre- Gale, but ſometimes oppos’d by furious Winds, he vail'd in a Grecian State, that they might yet be hardly holds the Helm, and ſometimes being vio “ ſuppreft, by the Laws, if rightly fram'd and lently ſhaken out of his Seat and his Command, "apply'd. apply'd.” By the ſame Rule we muſt judge of he is oblig'd to commit his Veſſel to the Rage of what Horace de arte Poet. and Others have deliver'd the Tempeft. concerning the different Manners and Inclinati- Among the Things then which are forcible in ons of the ſeveral Ages of Life: Thus, for Ex- drawing the Will to one ſide, are the peculiar ample, if old Men are violently inclin'd to Co- Genius's and Diſpoſitions of Men, by which many verouſneſs, yet 'tis in their Power to ſeek Wealth Perſons are render'd extreamly Inclinable to ſome without injuring others, and without uſurping the kind of Actions. Theſe Diſpoſitions ariſe in a proper Goods and Poſſeſſions of their Neighbours. great meaſure from the Nature of the Climate and Add. Huart. Scrutin. Ingen. c.5. of the Soil, (as Lucan. I. 8. ſpeaks, VI. Another Thing that inclipes the Will vehe- mently to ſome particular Actions, is the frequent - Emollit gentes clementia Cæli. Libor Repetition and Cuſtom of thoſe Aations, whence it The Heavens ſweet Clemency comes to paſs that they are undertaken very Freely V 19 Softens the Tempers of the Men. and with great Diſpatch, and that when the de- fired Object preſents itſelf, the Mind ſeems by a And Herodot. Calliop. It is the ſettled Appointment of kind of Magnetiſm to be drawn towards it (4). Nature, that fuft Soils ſhould breed ſoft Men ; and that And theſe inclinations being join'd with an ex- the fame Lind ſhould never be famous for the Excellency ceeding Deſire and Dexterity of acting, paſs com- of the Fruits, and for the Vigour of the Inhabitants. monly under the Name of Habits, which as they To which add, Charon de la Sagelle , 1. 1. C. 42.) are concern'd about Moral Astions, either Good or from the Temperature of Humours in Mens Bo- Evil, are call'd either Virtues or Vices. There's dies, (occalion'd by the Food, the Age, the Diet, no reaſon why we ſhould tire ourſelves to reckon the Health, the Studies and Purſuits of particular up theſe according to their full Tale and Number, Perſons) from the Conformation of thoſe Organs, ſince moſt Authors who have hitherto profeſſedly which the Soul imploys in performing its Duties, treated of Moral Philoſophy, have fancied the and from the like Cauſes (a). Concerning all main part of their Buſineſs and of their Science which it muſt be in general aſſerted, That none diſcharg’d, by explaining only the Eleven Words of them, as they belong to the Production of a that ſtand for ſo many Virtues. It will fuffice to Moral Ađion, are of fo great Force and Vehe- obſerve in general, that thoſe Diſpoſitions of the mence, as to render it impoſſible for the Will to Mind are Virtues, by which a Man is inclin'd to take (1) the contrary Side (b). And tho' (2) as to Actions making for the Preſervation of himſelf, ſome particular Impulſes (3) ariſing from the dif- and of Human Society; and that thoſe on the (a) Add. Hobbs de Homine, c. 13. & Bacon de Augment. Scient. l. 4. c. 1. (b) Horat. L. 1. Epift. 1. Nemo adeo ferus est, ut non miteſcere poſſit, The fierceſt Soul to Temper may be brought, Si modo cultura patientem commodet aurem. If calm to Rules and patienç to be taught. It is my Opinion (ſays Socrates in Xenoph. Apomnien, 1.) that whatever is Good and Honest, Men by Exerciſe and Application may attain. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) A little Care and Diligence (adds this Author elſewhere) feldom fails of taming, and conſiderably amending theſe Natural Diſpoſitions. Bne if ſometimes it doch not perfectly ſucceed, it at leaſt prevents the Commiſſion of ſuch outward Ads as are puş niſhable in the Civil Judicatory, and the Difficulty which we find in conquering theſe kind of Inclinations, is abundantly reconi- penced by the Honour conſequent upon ſuch a Victory. The Duty of a Man and Citizen, Lib. I. Chap. I. 5. 12. (2) Socrates's Words ſignify no more than this, as Charpentier has very well tranſlated them ; It is my opinion, that all Virtue depena's upon Exerciſe and Ule; that is to ſay, To preſerve them we must praffice them, and the Series of the Diſcourſe will not suffer us to doubt that this is Socrates's meaning: So that theſe words are nothing to the purpoſe of our Author, who being deceived by the Latin Tranſlation, thought they ſignified, It is my Opinion that all Virtues may be acquired by Exerciſe. (3) See Chap. XIII . of Tome I. of Mr. Bayle's Anſwer to the Queſtions of a Provincial, where you'll find ſome curious Paffages about the Power of the Conſtitution. But if we reflect ſeriouſly upon this Marter, we muſt acknowledge, that thoſe over whom Nature has ſuch an abſolute Command, are commonly fuch Men as will take little or no Pains to conquer their Inclinations, or have taken no proper Methods tu do it. Theſe depraved Inclinations are a kind of Natural Diftemper, yer nor alcogether Incu- rable ; as Cicero very well obſerves, who alledges a notable Example to this purpoſe, viz. that of Socrates, who freely confeſſed, that he was naturally inclined to thoſe Vices which a Phyſiognomift charged him as guilty of, but that he conquered them by the aſſiſtance of Reaſon : Cicero's Words are, Qui autem naturâ dicuntur Iracundi, &c. Such Perſons as are ſaid to be by Nature paſionate, Merciful, Envious, or the like, are ſo made by some evil Diſpoſitions of the Mind, but are curable, as Socrates is ſaid, wheu Zopyrus, who proféſed himſelf to know every Man's Nature by tbe Figure of his Face, had in a great Aſembly loaded him with many Vices, for which he was laugbed at by all the rest; but Socrates cleared him of any miſtake, by ſaying that he had ſuch Inclinations, but he had maſtered them perfe&tly by his Reaſon. Tufc. Quæſt . Lib. IV. Ch. 37. See alſo the Author concerning Fate, Chap. V. (4) We may add, Or if it be abſent it hopes for it with very great Expe&tation ; as our Author ſpeaks in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, &c. Lib. I. Chap. I. §. 5. 13. con- CHAP. IV. as it concurs to Moral Actions. 39 and Uncleanneſ, in contrary are Vices, which addict us to Actions been often repeated, or if a Man were to be deſtructive of ourſelves, and of the Community eſteem'd leſs a Sinner, becauſe he had frequently to which we belong. And here Mr. Hobbs muſt finn'd. Eſpecially, ſince every Man is the fall under Cenſure for that Aſſertion in his Book Cauſe of his own obtaining a Habit, or of his De Homine, Ch. XIII. C. 9. where he declares, acting ſo ſuddenly and expeditiouſly. Ariſtotle has That, except in Civil Life, there can be no common an Obſervation very cloſe to this purpoſe in his Meaſure found out applicable to Virtues and Vices, and Ethicks to Nicom. Lib. III. cap. 8. 'oux oubles des de that, conſequently, in a State of Nature there can be mpdects éx6001 cian, xj ai feeis. Tõv'uev gS megetwv in' dpañas no fúch Meaſure eſtabliſh’d, by which, as by a Standard, mézee ménes xúcou touer, sidómas sei vel free ce thoſe Things which we call Virtues and Vices may be reprõis , reto?'énet.sae A s medecis ě záelv.G, 650$ 7? Settled and determined. For the Definition which powstão ena’ ón im spir-lo stesso n pest é zero zahogadu, ora we but now ſet down, will reach even to a Natu- rã TO Ĉnxcor. Actions and Habits are not spontane- ral State : and whatever things are enjoin'd as ous in the ſame manner ;. for as to our Ačtions we Virtues in Civil Communities, ought to agree to are. Maſters of them from the beginning to the end, that Definition; and if any Things ſhould be or- becauſe we underſt and all the Circumſtances that belong dain'd contrary to it, they ought to be reckon’d to them: but of Habits the beginning only is properly in Abſurd and Unreaſonable Commands. our power, continual additions being beyond our know- The Diverſity which appears in the Laws of fe- ledge or prevention, just as it happens in the increaſe of veral different Communities (1), does not hinder, Diſtempers . But becauſe we had originally the Power of but that there may be ſome Univerſal and Uni- doing ſo or otherwiſe, therefore the Habits likewiſe are to form Definition of the Vertues. For this Diverſity be conſtrued as ſpontançous, upon account of the Principle either is concern'd about ſuch things as are plac'd whence they ſpring On which Place Euſtrathius without the Sphere of Natural Laws, or it ariſes thus deſcants; We have a command only over the Be- from hence, that what is really a Precept of the ginnings of Habits, not over their Encreaſe or their End. Law of Nature, is in one place inveſted with the For the Progreſs and Improvement of them is unperceiv’d farther Force of a Civil Law, and in other places and unregarded, while they riſe and advance by ſilent not; or laſtly, it is an Evidence that fome Le- degrees; whence it happens, that ſome Men run deeper giſlators, in framing their Edicts, were not be now and then into Wickedneſs and Vice than they inten- friended by good Reaſon. Of which we ſhall ded (3). This may be ſeen particularly in Drunkenneſ have more to ſay by and by (2). Farther, tho’ Vices and Ill-Manners confirm'd freely and beedlefly, as if it were left to our pleaſure by long Uſe and Habit, ſeem to paſs into a kind whether we ſhould get a Habit or no, by a continuance of ſecond Nature, ſo as not to be without great of bad Practice, contract a Habit before tbey are aware. Difficulty reſiſted, as Calpurnius Flaccus fpeaks, De- Nor is it in Vices only that the Additions and Augmenta- clam. 2. When Modeſty bath once lost its Influence, no tions are undiſcover'd, but in Vertues likewiſe the Ad- Ruine, no Horror appears deform’d to Minds bent upon vances are made by ſuch ſecret ſteps, that a Man may Wickedneſs; and Lucian againſt an Unlearned Man, ſooner obſerve his own Proficiency, than he can know A Dog that is accuſtomed to eat Tripes can hardly be bow he came by it (4). brought off from it, (Add. Bacon's Elays, c. 37.) yet VII. Thoſe Motions of the Mind which they Actions proceeding from them ought nevertheleſs call Paſſions or Affections, chiefly excited by the to be reputed Voluntary, And altho' Actions Appearances of Good and Evil, have likewiſe a which precede any Habit, and by which it is in- great force in driving the Will violently to ſome troduc’d, are undertaken with a fuller Intention, certain Adions, beſides their ill Influence on the and with a more urgent Endeavour, than thoſe Judgment, which they frequently cloud and ob- which are perform'd after the Habit has been con- ſcure (a).' How many theſe are, by what Means tracted, when as it were without ſtaying for the they are either rais'd or allay'd, and what Uſe Command of the Will, the other Faculties ruſh and Service they have in Life, is moſt excellently ſwiftly upon the Object: yet neither the Goodneſs ſhown by Des Cartes (b) and his Follower Le nor Pravity of the Actions ſeem upon this account Grand (c); to whom may be added Mr. Hobbs (d). to be at all diminiſh'd. For 'twould be a thing It is enough to our Deſign, if we only remark, of very ill conſequence, if a Good Axion were that however violent the Affections may prove, therefore to be reckon'd leſs Good, becauſe it has they can never quite extinguiſh the force of our Will. (a) Pindar in his Olymp. Od. 7. ſays, is de ogey@y, &c. A troubled Mind betrays into Miſtake the wiſeſt Heads, (b) Cartes de Paſion. (c) Le Grand Inft. Phil. Cartes, p. 7. C. 9. (d) Leviath. c. 6. & de Homine, c. 12. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) See what I have ſaid in my Preface, S. 3: (2) See Book VIII. Chap. I. (3) The natural Conſequence of this is, that we muſt ever omit, and avoid, whatever has the leaſt tendency in the World to engage us in an ill Cuſtom. See what I have ſaid in my Treatiſe of Games, Lib. II. Chap. III. $. 2. (4). See the Author's Abridgments of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. I. Chap. I. $.13, and what he ſays in the follow, ing Chapter S. 13. But 40 Of the Will of Man, , Book I. But that Men of the weakest Souls may obtain (1) an ert their force; and unleſs theſe are diligently abſolute Command over their (2) Paſſions, if they uſe a kept under, the ou Sucillators or Conſent certainly Sufficient diligence in managing and directing them, as follows, when the Power of the Soul, which was Des Cartes has prov'd (3). Ovid's Medea put a conſtituted for the governing and reſtraining of Cheat upon herſelf when ſhe ſaid, the Affections, idly lets go the Reins, and permits itſelf to be dragg'd by thoſe it ought to guide. Sed trahit invitam (4) nova vis. This ou lugell geois then, or Conſent, he declares to eſpecially ſince ſhe acknowledges that the Judg- be Voluntary, and to be perform’d at the free ment of Reaſon oppos'd her Paſſion. Pleaſure of Man: But he tells us farther, that from diligent Attention and Exerciſe, but more aliudque cupido, eſpecially from the Holy Spirit of God, fufficient Mens aliud ſuadet, video meliora proboque Deteriora fequor. Metam. VII. 19, &c. firſt Motions (which the Philoſophers compare to may be obtain'd, even againſt theſe The Obſervation of Grotius on Matthew V. v. 22. the twinkling of the Eyes,) ſo as to hinder them is very applicable to our preſent purpoſe: He con from any long continuance, or any forcible (a) ſiders three diſtinct Things in Anger, the nao way. or Affection, the 'Osuuri or Impetus, aud the ousre le Beſides, that Man is arm’d by Nature with fois or Confent. The ndio or Faculty, ena- ſome peculiar Inſtruments for moderating the bling us to be angry, being implanted in us by Paſſions, and that he is engag’d by a ſtricter Ne- Nature, cannot be extirpated ; but it ſhould be ceflity to reſtrain them, in as much as he incurs a rank'd among thoſe indifferent Things which we far greater harm to his Health and Life from their may make either a good or a bad uſe of (s). But Violence and Rebellion, has been fully made out becauſe that part of the Mind where the tid. In or by Dr. Cumberland (b). To conclude this Point, Paſſions are feated, is in itſelf irrational, hence ſince ſome of the Paſſions are excited by the ap- it comes to paſs, that without expecting the Judg- pearance of Good, others by the appearance of ment of Reaſon, the 'Opuci or ſudden Sallies, ex- Evil, and accordingly ſpur us on toward the pro- 1 (a) Senec. de Ira. II. 4. (6) De L. N. c. 2. 1. 26, 27. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) This wholly depends upon our Endeavours cimely to conquer theſe dangerous Enemies. 'Tis a known Speech of Ovid's, Remed. Amor. v. 91, 92. Principiis obſta : Sero Medicina paratur, Oppoſe beginnings: Med'cine comes too late, Cum mala per longas invaluere mords. When long delays have haftend on our Fate. Indeed, as Mr. Montagne ſays (Esays Lib. III. Chaps xiii.) if a Man looks cloſely into the Motions and circumſtances of his Paſſions, which prevail uſually upon him, he may obſerve how they come, and abate a little of their Furiouſneſs and Courſe. They don't fall upon him all of a ſudden, and, as I may ſay, take him by the Throat, but they threaten, as it were, and creep on him by degrees. Seneca has ſome fine Reflections of this Nature, which I can't paſs over without notice, (Epiſt. 116. at the end, and De Irå Lib. II. Chap. xii, xiii. which deſerve alſo our peruſal); Scis quare non posſumus iſta? Quia nos poffe non credimus, &c. Do you know why we can't command our Paſions ? 'Tis becaule we don't believe we can. There's more in't. We love our Vices heartily and therefore we become the Defenders of them, and inſtead of baniſhing them, we do all we can to excuſe them. Nature has made us able enough to refist them, and to free ourſelves from their Dominion, if we would make uſe of our forces, if we would rally them, and employ them wholly in our oron Cauſe, or at least would not turn them against ourſelves. Our only hindrance is, we will not, and the Inability that we plead is a vain Pretence. There is nothing so hard but the Mind of Man may compaß and accuſtom itſelf to it, by fre- quent and daily Meditations. There is no Paſſion so fierce and cornmanding, but Education and Care can tame. The Soul can govern itſelf as it pleaſes. Some have found out a way to reſtrain Laughter altogether, others have forborn Wine, Venery, and all sorts of Drinks; others have accuſtomed themſelves to long and almoſt perpetual Watching, unleß with Slumbers for a ſmall Moment, other's have learned to dance upon a Rope, to carry vaſt Burdens, which bave ſeemed to be above all human Abilities, and to dive very deep into the Sea, and ſtay a long time without Breathing. See what ſhall be ſaid on Chap. V. S.13. Nore 6. & Heſiod de Oper. & Dieb. V. 290, &c. Edit. Cleric: (2) That is to ſay (as our Author ſpeaks in his Apology, S. 22.) at leaſt, that they do not produce any Action that is puniſh- able in Humane Judicatures. Indeed if we examine all the Laws of the World, we ſhall find none that wholly excuſe Offences committed in a violent Paffion; an Evidence, that all Legiſlators ſuppoſe, that it is in the Power of a Man to reſtrain his Paffi- ons. Ariſtotle has obſerved the ſame thing in theſe Words, Tosmos 'šorre, &c. To theſe things agree not only what's done privately by every one, but what's done by Lawgivers themſelves, who puniſh and corre&t all sorts of Offences, except ſuch as are done through Force or Ignorance, of which they are not the Cauſe. Ethic, ad Nicom. lib. 3, ch. 7. (3) Dict. loc. Art. 5. & Cicero Tufc. Queſt. 1.3. ſpeaks, All Diſeaſes and Diſturbances of Mind ariſe from the ſcorn and the negle& of Reaſon. (4) There is a place in Xenophon's Cyropédia, i.e. Book of Cyrus's Education, which contains ſome notable Reflections to this. purpoſe : “A Mede named Araſpes maintains there, That Beauty has no force naturally to incline a Man to depart from his Duty, whether he will or no; for if it were ſo (adás he) it would have the ſame effect upon all Men, as Fire burns every one " that comes near it. But we ſee that ſome are affected with Beauty and ſome not, One loves one Beauty, and another, another. "In a word, 'Tis a Voluntary Thing, and every one loves whom he pleaſes. A Father does not fall in Love with his Daughter, nor a Brother with his Sifter: Fear and Law reſtrain us from entertaining a deſire of ſuch Perſons as others love. " were there a Law ſtrictly forbidding Men not to be Hungry, becauſe they have nothing to eat ; or not to be thirſty, becauſe they “ have nothing to drink; nor to feel cold in Winter and Hear in Summer, no Man would obey ſuch a Law, becauſe 'cis above “ their power to do it. But Cyrus objected to this Affertion, If it be in our Power to love of not, why can we not ceaſe to love “ as we pleaſe? How comes it to paſs that Love tyrannizes over ſo many Men, who facrifice all to that Paffion, and put them- “ ſelves upon a thouſand mean Actions to pleaſe the Object loved? What is it that makes their Chains ſo ſtrong, and makes them “ avoid all means that may free them from their Slavery? Araſpes anſwers, They are Men of vicious and looſe Tempers, lazy “ Souls, and Slaves to their Appetites, who tho'they wiſh a thouſand times, that Death might deliver them from their Torments, yet they have not Courage to undertake it themſelves, tho' nothing were more eaſy, if they deſired it. Men of this ſort ſcruple “ nor to thieve to ſatisfy themſelves, and as they are in the Judgment of all the World puniſhable, becauſe nothing could force “them to rob another, ſo we may ſay, that the faireſt Countenance does not force a Man to love it, or ſeek that which he ought to « abſtain from. So that a Man who gives himſelf up to his Lufts, without referve, abſurdly accuſes Love of conſtraining them, “ when as indeed 'cis nothing but his own Weakneſs. Such as ſtand upon their own Honour and Integrity are ſubject to theſe Af- "fections, as well as others, they love Money, fine Horſes, and handſome Women, but they eaſily paſs them by when they can't « be attained without a Crime. This is the Subſtance of Xenophon's words, Kai o reavíox O- 'Agouns, &c. Xen. de Inſtit. Cyr. Lib. V. Chap. 1. §. 5, 6, 7. Edit. Oxon. See alſo Chap. II. S. 6. Pag. 19. Note 2, (5) See Seneca of Anger, Lib. II. ch. 3, 4. curing Whereas CHAP. IV. as it concurs to Moral Actions. 41 curing the one, and avoiding the other: this dif- Motion, and by theſe Means renders Men ex- ference is obſervable between them; that the for- treamly prone to Luft in the firſt place; Propert. mer kind afford little or no excuſe, if any thing 1. 4. be done otherwiſe than it ought to be, by their Inſtigation ; but the latter deſerve the greater de- -Potæ non fatis unus erit. gree of Favour and Pardon, according as the Her Sparks ſhe doubles in her Drink. threatning Evil which excited them was more un- grateful to Human Nature. For 'cis much eaſier to and not much leſs to Anger and Raſhneſs: Upon want a Good, not neceſſary to the preſervation of which Account Lycurgus us’d to call Wine, an evil Natüre, than to admit an Evil tending to the deſtru- Potion, (or a Magick Draught) becauſe it chang'd ction of our Nature: whatever Ariſtotle (a) has af, and turn'd Mens Minds. Hygin. Fab. 132. Iſocrat. firm'd to the contrary in that Maxim of his, Xdaemreó- ad Demonic. The Mind, when debauch'd with Liquor, Dzegu videñ pé ze stal. W ou pemano (1) It's harder to reſist Plea- is in the ſame Condition as a Chariot that has loſt it's ſure than Anger. When a Man has done an ill Action Driver : The latter is not more fatally hurried into Dan- out of obedience to an itching Luſt, he is ſuppos'd ger, than the former into Sin. And for the ſame Rea- for the ſake of the preſent Pleaſure, voluntarily Ton the Cretians, receiv'd this among other Laws, to run the hazard of bearing whatſoever Evil of their famous Minos, Mù ovpaívesy amúnors eis uigny may thence enſue: and therefore when he has al. (b), Not to Drink with one another ſo far as to Diſor- ready had the Enjoyment, which he thought equi- der and Exceſs. Among the Indians Drunkenneſs valent to the Evil that might ariſe from it, he can- lies under the heavieſt Cenfure, being rank'd in not upon any pretence plead for the Mitigation the Number of their five moſt heinous Sins, which of that Evil. But he that has done amiſs upon are ſaid to he theſe ; To lie with one's Mother, which the fear of an impending Evil, has all the Infir- takes in both a Mother-in-Law, and the Wife of mity of Human Nature apologizing and interce a Maſter or Teacher. 2. To kill a Brachman. 3. To ding in his behalf, ſince the only Cauſe of his ſteal Gold. 4. To be Drunk. 5. To Converſe and Miſcarriage was his being willing to admit what keep Company with Perſons guilty of any of theſe Crimes he imagin'd to be the leaſt of the Evils likely to (c) Mabomet too, under the Notion of Religi- befal him. But of thoſe Caſes we ſhall hereafter on, found Means to prohibic his People the Uſe have a larger field to conſider and determine, viz. of Wine, tho' they were naturally more addicted in Lib. VIII. Chap. III. J. 19.21. to it than moſt other Nations (3). VIII. Laſtly, The Vice (2) of Drunkenneſ is a great Whoſoever is voluntarily guilty of this Vice, Inciter of the Will to ſome particular kinds of ſince he knew, or at leaſt might preſume what Actions; and this is procur'd either by Drink, or Effects would follow it, can with no more Rea- by ſome other ſorts of Fumes, or by Opium, a fon deſire to be freed from the Imputation of thing of ſo univerſal uſe in the Eaſtern World, Faults committed under its Guidance, than he the effect of which is, that it diſturbs and drives can with a good Grace complain of a Shower of along the Spirits of the Blood with a moſt violent Rain falling into his Houſe, when he himſelf, Libendeavours to (a) Ethic. Nicom. I. 2. ch. 2. (b) Plato, Minoe. Add. Plin. l. 14.c. 22. Ariſtoph. Veſp. Drunkenneſs is all Mischief and all Ter- yor: It tears down Gates and Doors, and defies Oppoſition. And then you pay for it doubly the next morning, in your Pocket and in your Head. (c) Manil. Aftron. I. 5. Ardeſcit vitio vitium, vireſque miniſtrat Bacchus, do in flainma Sevas exſuſcitat iras. One Vice adds Fewel to another's Fire, muloyment And Bacchus makes their Fury blaze the higher. bola ob llI 70 Mr. Creech. Mr. Barb. NOTES. coniggande (1) Our Author might have obſerved, thar Ariſtotle contradicts himſelf , for elſewhere he thus ſpeaks, greenE TÁTELYV 2$, &c. 'It is harder to bear Grief, than to abſtain from Pleaſure, Lib. 3. ch. 12. See alſo the beginning of Chap. xv. aid vii. where he maintains, that Intemperance is more Voluntary and Shameful than the Tranſports of Anger. Muretus prove the firſt of theſe Propoſitions to be contradictory in his Poſthumous Comments Printed at Ingolſtadt 1602, but his Reafors are very weak; and I don'c obſerve that he ſpeaks any thing about thoſe Places that I ſhall quote prelently, to reconcile them with that he was treating of. He had a good opportunity, and I doube nor but he might have prevented fo palpable a Contra. diction. All that can be ſaid for Ariſtotle is, that after he had advanced ſuch a Paradox, he thought fit neceſſary to maintain his Propoſition, unu curgarting himſelf reaſon'd at length from the Light of common Senſe and Experience; for the Philoſo- phers hold this as a conſtant Maxim, That he that yeilds to Pleaſure is more to blame than he that is overcome with Grief, becauſe tis eaſier to conquer the firſt than the last. Ariſtotle does but repeat what his Maſter Plato aſſerted before him. A. Nûr šo molées, &c. Ath. Shall we ſay that he is worſt who is conquered by Grief or Pleaſure? Cl. He ſeems to me worſt who is conquered by Pleaſure, for we all agree, that he who is conquered by Pleaſure is shamefully baffled by himſelf, but the former is vanquiſhed by Grief. To this we may add the Authority of the Imperial Philoſopher Marcus Antoninus, lib. 2. ch. 1o. where he thus ſpeaks, Theo- phraftus, in his Compariſon of Crimes, following the common opinion, determines as a great Philoſopher, Thar thoſe which come from Luft, are greater than thoſe that proceed from Anger; for thoſe that are moved by Anger ſeem to act againft Reafon, contrary to their Purpoſe, and with a ſecret Remorſe; but they that follow their Luſts, and are conquered by their Pleaſure, appear more intemperate, and effeminate in their Faults. So that it is with great Reaſon and Truth, which is an Honour to Philoſophy, chat he adds, The Crime that is done with Pleaſure, is greater and more puniſhable, than that which is committed with Sorrow and Grief. Indeed he that is angry reſembles a Man, who having received an Offence, is provoked by Grief to revenge himſelf, whereas the voluptuary is moved by his own Paſſion to do an Injuſtice for his own Satisfaction. See further what is ſaid on Chapter 6. S. 14. (2) This Author elſewhere joins thoſe ſort of Vices, which deprive us of the Uſe of our Reaſon, either for a Time, or for the reſt of our Life. But, to ſpeak truly, the Effect of thoſe Vices, as well as Drunkenneſs, is not ſo much to incline the will to certain Things, as entirely to deſtroy the Principle of human actions, becauſe in that a Man knows not whac he does. Titius Obf. 37. upon Pufendorf of the Duty of a Man and Citizen, chap. I. §. 15. (3) See what is related in the Univerſal Library, concerning the Inhabitants of Siam, Tom. 10. p. 529, G Note 4 Out 42 Of the Will of Man, Booki out of a perulant Humour, has been pulling off is ſtrongly confirm'd by the harſhneſs of the Edia, the Roof. Plautus (c) has a merry Jeſt to this pur- and by the Care and Trouble of Obedience :) and poſe; Wine (ſays he) would be too cheap at the Price partly to the Hatred and Obſtinacy which we it now brings, if a drunken Man might do whatever be bear towards the Forbidder, whence we diſdain pleas’d, without being call’d to an Account. that our Liberty ſhould be abridg’d by a Perſon Yet in indifferent Actions, which are left to eve- who looks ſo ill in our Eſteem ; whereas, on the ry Man's Pleaſure to perform or omit, Drunken- contrary, it's the Nature of Love to make us wil- neſs is allow'd this Favour, that the Effect which ling to comply with the Commands and Deſires would have follow'd any ſuch Action, had it been of the Parry we affe&t. (1) deliberately perform’d, ſhall now be utterly IX. It is farther obſervable, That ſometimes invalid, ſince the overtaken Perſon acted with upon the Approach of extraordinary Dangers, much Diſadvantage. and ſuch as are ſuppos'd to exceed the common And, thoſe Cauſes which we have hitherto Strength and Firmneſs of Human Minds, the réckon'd up, are the moſt conſiderable among ſuch Will is fo vehemently urg'd and preſs’d, that it as impofe a kind of Phyſical Biaſs and Tendency gives Conſent to ſomewhat, which had ic been on the Will. That which morally inclines it moſt , free from that Neceſſity, it would have utterly ab- or at leaſt , ought to incline it, is Obligation: And hor’d. Adions of this kind have the Name of yet this, how great ſoever, neither takes away Mixt, being partly voluntary, and partly invo- che Will's intrinſick Liberty, nor renders the Acti- luntary. Thus far they are to be eſteem'a'Volun- on voluntary, tho' the Lufts and Paſſions may tary, in as much as their Principle is in the Agent, ſtrive vehemently to oppoſe it. Hither may be who is acquainted with the Nature and Circuma refer'd that Sentence of Ariſtotle, To 70te dnéosa qué ftances of the Thing he is going about : And in var av dei égéveats, 'Tis abſurd to call thoſe Things Invo- as much as the Will for the preſent Time and Ne- luntary, which we ought to defire and to purſue, Ethic. ceſfity, inclines toward them as toward a leffer Nicom. I. 3. C. 3: Evil, or toward one part of an Evil, when other- We ſay, Obligations ought to incline the Will; wiſe a greater or an entire Evil muſt be under- for ſuch is the perverſe Diſpoſition of Human gone: And this leſſer or partial Evil turns into a Minds, that frequently the very forbidding of a kind of Good, when both it and the Evil com- Thing, raiſes a Deſire of doing or of enjoying it par'd with it, cannot be both avoided together. (2), as Ovid Amor. III. 4. ſpeaks, Ariftotle Ethic. ad Nicom. 1. 5. c. 7. ſays, A leſer E- vil, if it be compar'd with a greater, may be eft eem'd Nitimur in vetitum ſemper, cupimuſque negatum. a kind of Good. So Quinctil. Inftit. VII. C. 4. In Quicquid ſeruatur, cupimus magis; ipſaque furem comparing Evils, that which appears lightest, must paſ Cura vocat. for Good. Ariſtot. Ethic. III. 1. Simply and abfo- Fuvat inconceſ a voluptas. lutely ſpeaking, no Man in bis Wits willingly throws Cui peccare licet peccat minus: Ipfa poteſtas away his own Goods, but for the Security or Preſervati- Semina nequitiæ languidiora facit. on of himſelf and others. Such Actions then are to be accounted Mixt, tho they approach nearer to Voluntary We court the more what Men the leſs will grant; than to Involuntary. Warm when Deni'd, and fiercer by Reſtraint. But the ſame Aaions are likewiſe in ſome De- What's cloſely kept improves in our Belief; gree Involuntary, becauſe the Will ſeems to be To hoard the Gold is to invite the Thief. driven on them contrary to its Inclinations, and Forbidden Pleaſures have a quicker Taſte. would never undertake them, if the impending They that have Freedom uſe it leaſt ; and ſo Evil were by any other Means poſſibly to be em The Power of Ill doth the Deſign o'erthrow. ſcap’d. For which Reaſon they have this Quali- Sir Charles Sidley. ty in common with Involuntary A&tions, that the moral Effects and Conſequences attending A&ions Which Unhappineſs, if we conſider its clofer and meerly Voluntary, do in theſe, in a great mea- "nearer Cauſes, may be refer’d, partly to the vici- fure, if not totally, fail (3). For tho Tometimes ous Curioſity of Mortals, who admire every a Man may have ſo ftrait an Obligation laid up- thing that they are Strangers to, (which Opinion on him, that even upon the Threats and Appre- (6) Aulular. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) If we will make a more curious and exact Difinction of the Effects of Drunkenneſs, we muſt obſerve how a Thing may be imputed to a Man which is done in his Wine, according to the ſeveral Degrees of Drunkennefs, viz. The One moderate, which does not hinder a Man's acting freely, and with Deliberation, the other ſtrips him eacirely of the Uſe of his Reaſon. This laft fort, if it be alſo involuntary in the Original, that is to ſay, if a Man falls not into it by his own Fault, brings forth Actions al. together involuntary, and conſequently furniſhes him with a ſufficient Excuſe ; but if Drunkenneſs be voluntary in its Principle, then we muſt diſtinguiſh Actions indifferent from Actions unlawful. As to the firſt, if a Man, for Example, make a Contract that hinders the Effects of an Imputation, becauſe thoſe fort of Actions require a particular Knowledge of what is done, and the Fault which went before them, and from which they derive their Original, is not ſufficient to make it of Force. See lib. 2. ch.6. S. S. But it is not the ſame in unlawful Actions, for if a Man be in an Eſtate, from whence 'cis his Fault if he fall, becauſe he might and ought to hinder it, his perfect Drunkenneſs will not excuſe him from the Crimes which he has committed thro' Excels of wine. And if he purs himſelf into that Condition on purpoſe to execute ſome ill Deſign, he deſerves a double Puniſhment. Titius Obſeru. 38. (2) See Montagne's Eſay, lib. 2. ch. 15. p. 451, &c. Edit. Fol. at Paris, 1657. (3) The Author ſpeaks nothing here of good Aations, or indifferent, but contents himſelf to ſpeak of ill ones only. Mixt good Actions are accounted for nothing, and every one may ſee the Reaſon. Indifferent Actions, done in the ſame Manner, can no more be imputed to the Agent, for tho' there is a kind of Will, it is nor fufficient to produce an Obligation. The Injuſtice of the Author of Violence, rendring him incapable of acquiring any Right by that Action, which is not fully voluntary, and conſe: quently laying no obligation upon him, who never conſented, but with Regret. Titius Obſerv. 40. See lib. 3. ch. 6. S. 10. henſions CHAP. IV. as it concerns Moral Actions. 43 henſions of Death, the moſt terrible of Natural ſtotle ſpeaks, Ethic. ad Nicom. III. 1, 2. Thoſe Thing's Evils, (1) he ought not to recede from it; yet ſeem to be involuntary, which are done either upon Force, where this does not expreſly appear, it is not eaſi or upon Ignorance. An A&tion cannot be ſaid to have ly preſum'd and ſuppos’d, as being too ſharp and been perform'd involuntarily out of Ignorance, unleſs it be rigorous for the Condition of Humanity: And followed with Sorrow and Repentance.(8) Now a Man where there is no ſuch ſevere Obligation impos'd, is properly ſaid to be compelld, when by the Force it would be downright Folly not to come off as of a ſtronger extrinſical Power, he is brought to cheaply as we can, and not to ſuffer as ſmall a apply his Limbs otherwiſe than he would, ſo as to ſhare of Evil as we may compound for. And expreſs his Averſation and Diffent by manifeſt therefore many things, which (2) would have de- Signs, and eſpecially by Corporal Reſiſtance and ſerv'd Reprehenſion, had they been undertaken Reluctancy. As if (to uſe Ariſtotle's Examples) without ſuch a Neceſſity, when they are done the Wind, or Men Superior to us in Power, ſhould vio- under the Urgency of ſo hard a Caſe, are com- lently carry us any where against our Conſent. Tully in mended by all fair and equitable Judges ; (3) other his Second Book of Invention, l. 2. c. 32. gives things deſerve Pity rather than Revenge. Otheran Inſtance after this manner; The Rhodians had things are for the ſame Reaſon, either entirely, or a Law, that whatever beak'd Veſſel ſhould at any for the moſt part (4) excus'd, and in others the time be found in their Harbour, it ſhould be con- Odium and Fault of the Action is devolv'd upon demn'd as Prize, and expos'd publickly to Sale ; the Perſon (5) who reduced him to that unhappy Now the Queſtion is, Whether a Veffel of this Extremity (6), the Man who perform’d the Deed kind, being driven into their Ports by a Tempeſt, being declar'd innocent. Ariſtotle diſcourſes well ought nevertheleſs to ſuffer the common Penalty ? on this point(7), Ethic. ad Nicom.l.1. For theſe kind 'Twas upon this Topick, that the Friends of the of Aktions, ſays he, Men are ſometimes commended, raviſh'd Lucretia (a) comforted her under her deep when for the ſake of great and honest Things, they have AMiction, by turning all the Guilt on the vile Suſtaind ſome Indecency or. Hardſhip. To ſome things, Author of the Crime, telling her, That the Mind ibo we allow no Praiſe, yet we grant a Pardon, when only properly ſinn'd and not the Body; and that there a Man bas done what be ought not, upon the fear of E- could be no Fault where there was no Deliberation or De- vils exceeding Human Nature, and not tolerable by fign. 1 Mortal Strength. And there are ſome things perhaps, This Reluctancy in Civil Courts is preſum'd to which no Man can be forc'd or compelld to commit, but have been us’d in ſuch Actions or Paſſions, as are ought rather to endure the utmost Extremities, and not vulgarly thought to be willingly perform’d or Death itſelf. Add. Euſtrath. ad. loc. But I queſtion undergone, and where all Signs of an Adual whether it were proper, (eſpecially for a Chriſtian Conſent are wanting ; whence aroſe the Term of Biſhop) to give this Example of a mixt Action, Interpretative Reluctancy. Familiarity with another Man's Wife, though in itſelf Thus whereas by the Jewiſh Law a Virgin is fupa foul and ſinful, yet ceaſetb to be ſo, if undertaken on pos’d to have ſuffer'd Raviſhment, if ſhe loſt her the Account of killing a Tyrant. Honour in the field, without Witneſſes; yet Philo X. Laſtly, ſince to make an Action Voluntary, the Jew (6) denies the Favour of this Law to reach there is requir'd not only that the Principle of a Maid, who admitted a Debauch willingly, tho? Motion be in the Agent, or that the Agent ad- in a Solitude: as neither can the ſame Law hurt a dreſs himſelf to work by the Impulſe of his own Maid in the City, who in the like Danger either Will, but likewiſe that he knows what he is doing, could not cry out or cried to no purpofe, and with- upon the want of both, or of either of theſe Con- out Relief. ditions, the Action is rendred Involuntary, as Ari A fore’d Thing may be ſo either in it ſelf, and (a) Liv. lib. 1. c. $8. (b) De Legib. Special. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (1) See lib. 2. chap. 6. §. 2. following: (2) As for Example, when a Woman, or Maid, ſays the Man that makes an Attempt upon her Chaſtity. See lib. 2. ch. s. S. 11. following. (3) Such is the Caſe of a Woman, who, in a Famine, is forced to eat her own Child, as it happened in the Siege of Jeruſalem, as Joſephus tells, lib. 7. de Bell. Fud. c. 8. and as it befell the 7 Engliſh Men, of which cur Author ſpeaks, lib. 2. ch. 6. 9. 3. (4) As when a Woman, or Maid, Nays herſelf to avoid the Loſs of her Chaſtiry, with which ſhe is threatned by an extravagang Man, who will ſatisfy his Lufts at any Rate. See lib. 2. ch. 4. S. 19. following, where Mr. Hirtius refers us to what the Author Ipeaks, lib. 2. c. 5. s. 15. of an Husband who ſlew his Wife's Gallant, or his Wife, when he took them in the Heat of their Luſt. but this is the Effect of a furious Anger, and Deſire of Revenge, which ought to be referred to $. 7. above, and not to mixe Acti- ons, ſuch as our Author calls them. I ſay the ſame of an Example which Mr. Hirtius gives of a Woman, that poiſoned her Hus- band and Son, becauſe they had killed a Son of hers by a former Husband. See Valer. Max. l. 8. ch. 1. in the End, and Aul. Gell. lib. 12. ch. 7, (5) See the following Chap. 9.9. Mr. Hirtius makes an Application, not very proper here, out of Juſtin, of the Phoceans, who ſeeing themſelves deprived of their Lands, Wives, and Children, went and robbed the Temple of Delphos, for the Hiſtorian re- flects upon it as a thing not to be excuſed altogether ; though they that committed it were leſs worthy of Blame, than thoſe who had brought them to this caſe of Deſpair. For ſo he ſpeaks, The Fat of the Phoceans, though all men abominated it upon the Ac- count of the Sacriledge, yet the Thebans, by whom they were compelled to this Neceſſity, were more deteſted than they. Lib. 8.ch. I. (5) Mr. Pufendorf might have joined with Euftrathius, another Biſhop more famous, who fell upon a looſe Thought about a Subject fomething near it, but of more Difficulty. Read Mr. Bayle's Dictionary, under the Head Acyndinus. See further concern- ing theſe ſort of mixt Actions, upon the account of which ſome Evil in itſelf' is committed, what is ſaid upon the following Chap. $. 9. Note 2. (7) See Chap. 3. S. 10. Pag. 30. aforeoging, about the beginning Note 5. (8) In fine, Sextus did not uſe an immediate Force upon Lucretia, as when a woman defends herſelf, as much as ſhe her Hands, Feet and Teeth. She was not forced, any otherwiſe than ſuch are, who refolve to caſt their Goods into the Sea for fear of Periſhing, She refifted his Threatnings of Death; but when Sextus threatned to expoſe her Reputation to eternal Dif- grace, ſhe did what he wiſhed and flew herfelf. So that this Example does not well agree to this Place, where he is trearing of mixt Actions. See Mr. Bayle's Dictionary. can, with G2 nor 44 Of Moral Actions in General, &c. BOOKI. not in its Cauſes, or elſe both in it Self and in its which now occaſion the Compulſion of him to a- Cauſe. The firſt is, When a Perſon remains in ny Fact. By the not being his own Fault, we ſuch a State at preſent, as to be unable to repel the mean, if he has done nothing but according to offer'd Violence, and yet was in a Fault for get- the Laws of Prudence and of his Duty. For if a ting into ſuch a State. Of this kind was the Rape Man performs the Office enjoin'd him, or uſes his of Dinah, Jacob's Daughter (a); for the Virgin Right any other way, and acts not raſhly or in- ought not to have wander'd among Strangers . confiderately, whatever Violence over-powers The latter is, When the Perſon has, not by his him, he will have no Guilt imputed to him, and own Fault, been brought into thoſe Streights, no Sin to anſwer for.us (a) Geneſis XXXIV. CHA P. V. ons de Of MORAL ACTIONs in General, and of their Application to the Agent, or their Aptneſs to be Imputed. Baloob Do leid The CONTENTS of every Section of the fifth Chapter. i. What a Moral Action is. VII, The Operations of our Vegetable Faculties. eia 9 II. Its Matter. VIII. Things impoſſible. - III. Its Form, where we treat of a Moral Cauſe.. IX. Things compelled, where meer Execution is treated of. IV. A Moral Action conſider'd in it ſelf is a poſitive X. Things done through ignorance. Entity. XI. Things done, or ſeen in a Dream. V. The Cauſe or Ground why a thing may be imputed XII. Evils to come to paſs. XIII. But evil Actions proceeding from an Habit must V1. Things not to be imputed to a Man are Things Di certainly be imputed. neceſſary. nici XIV. How other Mens Actions may be imputed to us. or not. HAY Aving in Purſuance of our Deſign examined a Power exiſting by Nature, or its Exerciſe con- and explained the Will and the Underſtand. fider'd barely by it ſelf; the other is the Depen- ing, as the Principles whence Human Adions ob- dance of that Motion or Exerciſe on the Deter- tain the Priviledge of being ranked in a different mination of the Will, as on a Cauſe that is truly Claſs from the Operations of Brutes, the next Free and acts by its own Reſolution. The Exer- thing which we are concerned for, is the general ciſe conſider'd feparately and by it felf, is, for Diſquiſition of Moral A&tions, ſince in diſcover- Diſtinction's fake, rather callid, an Aktion of the ing their Rectitude, or Pravity, the Science we Will, or of the Willing Power in a Man, than a are now engaged in is chiefly employ’d. Moral voluntary A&tion. LETS Actions then, are the voluntary Deeds of Men con We may farther conſider the Action (2) of the fider'd in common Life, as they include the Imputation of Will , either in it ſelf and abſolutely, as it is a Phy- their Conſequences and Effects. We call thoſe volun- fical Motion, undertaken upon the previous In- tary Deeds, which in ſuch a Manner depend on junction of the Will, or elſe reflexively, as the Ef- human Will as on a free Cauſe, that without its fects of it may be imputed to the Actor. Now Determination, (proceeding from its (1) internal Voluntary Actions, as they comprehend this Reflexi- Acts drawn forth by the previous Knowledge of on, are, by a ſpecial Approbation of the Word, the Underſtanding) they would never have been call’d Human Actions. And becauſe from theſe perform’d; and which therefore, as to their being Adions as they are performed well or ill, as they done or not done, muſt be refer'd to the Power of are agreeable or repugnant to their Rule, the Man. And theſe Actions are here conſider’d, not Law, one is ſaid to be a good or an ill Moral Man, as they are bare Motions produc'd by ſome Power (the Inclinations of the Mind reſulting from fre- according to the natural Conſtitution of Things, quency of ading, being likewiſe term’d Morals ;) but as they_proceed from the Determination of hence it comes to paſs that Moral Actions ſeem only the Will; a Faculty diſpos’d to embrace either part another Name for Human. of two contradictory Choices. "For a voluntary II. The Eſſence of Moral Actions, (1) accord- Action contains ſomething Material and ſomething ing to the laſt way of conſidering them, may be Formal; the firſt is nothing elſe but the Motion of divided into two Parts or Notions, a Material Mr. Barb. NOTES on s. 1. (1) The Original is, Altibus Elicitis, which is better rendred, Immediate Afts. See $. 1. of the preceeding Chapter. (2) The Original is, A&tio Voluntatis, which Expreſſion, tho''cis uſed in all the Editions, and his Elements of the Univerſal Civil Law, yer 'cis a plain Miſtake of the Author, contrary both to his own Diſtinction, and the following part of his Diſcourſe, for he ſays poſitively, When Moral A&tions include in, &c. The Engliſh Tranſlator was not aware of this. On S. 2. (1) That is to ſay, As they are voluntary Actions, whoſe Effects may be imputed unto Men. and CHAP. V. Of Moral Adions in General, &c. 45 and a Formal. The Material Part, or the Matter himſelf down a Precipice, the Piper is accus'd as the of a Moral Action, is of a very wide Extent: Such Perſon who bad caui'd his Death. A Club of young may be firſt any Phyſical Motion, whether it be Perſons, who had frequent Meetings and Entertain- of the Locomotive Faculty, or of the Senſitive ments, one day made an Agreement to Sup together by Appetite, or of the External, or of the Internal the Sea-fide; one of the Society being abſent, the other's Senſes, or of the Underſtanding, ſo far as con wrote his Name upon the Stone Table which they had cerns the Exerciſe of Apprehenfion. For the Act reared : The young Men's Father at his Return from a of Judgment depends fo much on the Quality long Voyage, landing in this place, and reading ihe In- which appears in the Obje&, that it is not capa- ſcription on the Stone, took it for his Son's Monument, ble of the Direction of the Will, tho’in forming and bang’d himſelf for Grief. "The Company is hereupon of that Judgment, our Free-will and our Induſtry impeach'd as acceſſory to his Death. Laſtly, the Ad- (2) are allow'd ſome Influence and Power: The miſſions or Receptions of another Man's Deeds, Act of the Will it felf may likewiſe be the Matter as far as my Defaulo contributed to their Producti- of a Moral Deed, if we conſider it in its Natural on, may be the Matter of my own Moral Actions. Condition, or as it is preciſely taken, for an Effe&t Thus a Rape is partly imputed to the Woman, if produc'd by a Phyſical Power, as ſuch. So like- it appear that ſhe rafhly ventur'd into ſuch a place, wiſe may be the Privation of any Phyſical Motion, where ſhe might have expe&ted to meet with ſuch which a Man might have produc'd either in it felf, violent Treatmento foichè noqo oituce o bo or in its Cauſe: For a Man may render himſelf 9 III. The Formality of a Moral Action conſiſts obnoxious to Puniſhment, as well by Omiſſions as in the Imputativeneſs of it, if we may fo ſpeak, by by Commiſſions. As alſo the Inclinations of the which the Effe&t of a voluntary Action may be Natural Powers toward certain Objects (acquir'd imputed to the Agent, or by the Voluntary Actions that have already pafs’d) properly belonging to him, whether he himſelf at leaſt fo far as they are Spurrs and Incentives to Phyſically produc'd that Effect, or whether he Afing. Nor lare my own Motions and Habits, cauſed it to be produc'd by others. And from this or the Privations of either, alone the Material Formality of the Action, the Agent likewiſe has Parts of my Moral Actions, but the fame Moti- a Share in the Denomination of Morality, being ons and Habits or Privations proceeding immedi- call'd a Moral Cauſe. br Whence we may eaſily diately from others (3), provided they could or underſtand, that the ratio formalis of a Moral ought to have been direčted by my Will. Thus Cauſe, in Stri&tneſs and Propriety of Speech, con- the Spartan Inamorato's were to (4) ſuffer for the fiſts in Imputation, conſider'd with Reference to Faults committed by their Minions (a). Nay, the Perſon in whom it terminates, and that there- the Operations of Brutes, of Vegetables, and of fore ſuch a Cauſe can be nothing elſe but a Volun- Inanimate Things, may furniſh out the matter of tary Agent, to whom the Effect is , or muſt be my Moral Actions, when my Will ſhould have imputed, upon account of his being either whol- guided their Proceedings. Thus even in the Law ly or partly the Author of it; and that therefore, of God, a Miſchief done by a Goring Ox is im- whether it be good or evil, both are to be reckond puted to the Owner, in caſe he knew before-hand as owing to him, and he is liable to give an Ac- that the Beaſt was faulty this way (b). Thus a count for both. Thus one Man is the Moral Vine-dreſſer is reſponſible, if, through his Negli- Cauſe of Hurt in another Man, whether he has gence, the Vine has ſpent all its fruitful Strength made his Head ſwell by Blows of the Fift, or whe- and Vigour in ſending out numerous and unnecef-ther he has broke it with a Club, or whether he ſary Suckers. Thus the Damages by Fire are Re- has ſet Dogs or Murderers upon him. Thus Anah pairable by the Perſons who occafion'd it; and was the Moral Cauſe (1) of Mules, he being res Waftes cauſed by the breaking in of the Sea, or corded in Geneſis 36. v. 24. to have firſt found them of Rivers, are to be made good by him who has out, or to have join'd the Mares and the Aſſes toge- either broke down, or negle&ed to keep up the ther for their Production. So Facob was the Moral Banks. Quinctilian (c) has propos’d two Decla- Cauſe of the different colours in Laban's Sheep, mation Lemma's much to our preſent Purpoſe. Chap. 30. ver. 37. And thus Lyfius ( Orat. contra A Piper bad play'd a Phrygian Ayre to a Man who was Ayorat) pleading againſt an Informer, upon whoſe offering Sacrifice, the Man running Mad, and throwing Accuſations many Perſons had been executed, calls Ch.1003 01 Olt C300 - (a) Ælian. V. H. l. 3. C. 10. (b) Add. l. 1. %. 1, 2, 3. D. fi quadrup. do 11. f. 5. D. ad L. Aquil. Lex. Wiſogoth. 1. 8. tit. 4. c.16.V. Exod, xxi. 29. () Inſt. Orat. l. 1. c. 10. and 1. 7.c. 3. Utstib toit on buch biggb Mr. Barb. NOTES on 5.2. V preno (2) If we will find the Author's Meaning, we muſt remember what he has ſaid, Chap: 3. §. 2. (3) That is, when one may or ought to engage others to do a certain Thing, or hinder him from it, or contribute towards the begetting a certain Habit, or prevent it, he is properly reſponſible for that which he did not properly do, and in which he was guilty of nothing but pure Negligence or want of Aging, which is yet looked upon as a real Action in reſpect to the Moral Effect. This reſpects all them who are charged with the Management of others. See S. 14, following. (4) See Ælian’s Various Hiſtory, lib. 3. ch. 10. and Mr. Perizonius's Comment on it. But that Example feems to be ill chofen, | fince there are many other which are commonly to be had. It is poſſible that this being ſo unlike our Opinions and Ceftoms, made this Author think fit to inſtance it in. For they pretended, that this Love, ſo dear and conſtant, had nothing but what was honeſt in it, and ſerved to inflame thoſe young men who were the Objects of it with the Love of Virtue, cho' in Time it de. generated into an infamous Converſation, chiefly among the Greeks. See Potter's Antiquities of Greece. Theſe Inamorato's be- ing then, as Ælian ſpeaks, the continual Guardians of thoſe they loved, 'tis no wonder that they were to anſwer for their Be- haviour. (1) But Moſes does not ſay in that place, that that Idumean was the firſt that cauſed Aſſes and Horſes to couple together, and ſo was, morally ſpeaking, the Original of Mules. Op is the Name of a People, and ſo ought to be tranſlated, not, He produced Mules, but, He fought againſt the Jemians, as Mr. Bochart has fully proved in his Herozoicon, Part I. Lib. 2.Ch.21. However, had the Thing in itſelf been true, this Author might better have paffed over chic Example: olis him On 5. 3. 46 Of Moral Actions in General, &c. Book I. him the manifest Cauſe of their Death. So alſo Ovid. ſtice, but againſt thoſe of Prudence and Fore-fight, Heroid. Epift. 12. and that therefore he ſhall not be reckon'd to have acted wickedly, but only rafhly or unadviſedly. It Phyllida Demophoon leto dedit, hospes amantem ; will not be amiſs to examine more cloſely what Ille necis cauſam præbuit, ipfa manum. the above-mentioned Author lays down in the ſame Poor Phyllis dy'd by him ſhe lov'd oppreſs’d; place. Firſt, therefore, he eſtabliſhes this as a Max- The trueſt Miſtreſs by the falſeft Gueſt. im, Whatever is Evil in its own Nature, ſo that it can He was the cruel Cauſe of all her Woe; never be chang’d into Good, yet may by Accident follow But her own Hand perform’d the fatal Blow. upon the Exerciſe, or upon the Defence of my Right, with- Mr. Poley. out my incurring the Guilt of Sin, and therefore I am not oblig'd to decline the Uſe of my juft Right in ſuch caſes. Yet it does not always happen, that a Man who Grotius likewiſe (6) propoſes a Rule much to the has barely given Occaſion to the Fact of another fame purpoſe, in his Third Book (b), but judici- Man, ſhould be (4) reputed the Moral Cauſe of ouſly tempers it with (7) a good Reſtriction. But that Fa£t : and therefore the Sentence pronounc'd our Author proceeds: A Sin is ſaid to follow by Acci- by Piſo, which Seneca ſpeaks of, was extream fool- dent upon another free Act, when upon the Uſe of a thing, iſh as well as cruel, when ordering a Soldier to be to which I have a Right, fome Effect follows, which i led to Execution, upon Suſpicion of whoſe Mur- have otherwiſe no Right to produce. For an Inftance der another Soldier had before ſuffer'd Death, he in this caſe may be alledg’d what Divines call gave his Reaſon in theſe Words (5), I order you to bė Scandal or Offence taken; concerning which they executed for being the Cauſe of the Condemnation of your tell us, That a Man ought not to omit an honest, Fellow Soldier. There ſeems no great Neceſſity that a pious, or a due Act, though a wicked Perſon we ſhould here, with the Author of the Treatiſe ſhould take never ſo much Offence at it; and this De Principiis Fuſti & Decori (a), diſtinguiſh between Rule they confirm by the Authority of our Savi- a Moral Caufe by it ſelf, and a Moral Cauſe by our. But now this very Example might have Accident. For a Cauſe by Accident is a Term of taught our Author to lay aſide his Term of Caula vaft Obſcurity, and very likely to create and en- per Accidens; ſince even in that reſtrain'd Senfe it courage vain Diſputes: And beſides, if we cannot would be little leſs than Impiery to call Him the rightly impute the Effeet of an Action to a Man, Cauſe of Evil who is the Spring and Fountain of we cannot upon any Account, call him a Moral all Good. We ought rather to ſay, That a Man Cauſe by Accident, tho' he contributed never fo who exerts a good and neceſſary Action, is by much to the material part of the Action. Yet no means the Cauſe of Sin in another Man, who thus far we muſt plainly acknowledge, that in ſhall thence take Occaſion of offending. Thus we weighing and rating the Greatneſs of the Imputa- commonly ſay, He who uſes his own Right, does tion, it is a very important Query, whether the no body any Wrong. no body any Wrong. But he further adds, Since en Action proceeded from ſuch a Perſon as the Prin- very Man has a Right of preſerving his Health, it is cipal, or as the Acceſſory : as likewiſe whether lawful for the Recovery of Health to make uſe of a Me- the Agent directly intended ſuch an Effect, or dicinal Potion, thỏ upon the taking of this Potion ſhould whether it proceeded from his Inadvertency, or follow Diſtraction ( for ſome little time) or Drunkenneſs, any other Concomitant Reaſon. For if the laſt or (Voluntary) Pollution, or Abortion (8), (in caſe both of theſe Cafes appear true, the Conſequence will the Mother and the Fætus muſt otherwiſe infallibly be, that the Action ſhall not be imputed to the periſh) and that therefore the Perſon who takes Perſon, as if committed againſt the Laws of Ju- the Medicine is only the Cauſe of ſuch EffcEts by (a) Velthuyſen, p. 161, (6) C. I. f. 4. and c. II. 8. 9. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (4) He muſt (as our Author ſpeaks in his Elements of the Univerſal Civil Law,) either do, or neglect to do ſomething that he was obliged to, otherwiſe another Man's Action has ſo neceſiary a Connexion with what he himſelf does or neglects, that it can- not otherwiſe happen. Further, we muſt conſider how far he, that gave the Occaſion, might know the Effect that would follow upon it, and that it is not neceſſary that he ſhould certainly know it, 'tis ſufficient that there was ſome Probability. I will explain this by an Example, if I leave a Piſtol charged, or ſome other dangerous Weapon, upon a Table, in a Room where every body has Liberty to come, I am not ſure that a Child, or any other Perſon will come, who, not knowing the Danger of the Weapon, will run the Hazard of killing or hurting himſelf, by meddling with it out of Curioſity; nevertheleſs, becauſe the Thing is poſſible, and I might fear ſuch a Thing might happen, I am cerrainly to anſwer for it. The ſame may be ſaid concern- ing the Good of which we have given Occafion. As it can't be attributed to us, if we were the Cauſe of it without our Know- ledge, and had no ſuch direct Deſign, ſo on the other ſide, 'is not neceſſary that we be ſure of the Succeſs of what we under. take for another's Advantage ; 'cis fufficient, that we had Reaſon to believe it; for cho'che Effect was not obtain'd, the Intention is very comendable at all times ; as, on the contrary, the Neglect is not altogether excuſable, although it luckily had no ill Con- y ſequence. (5) Seneca's Words are, ( De Ira. lib. 1. c. 16.) Te duci fubeo, quia cauſa damnationis commilitoni fuiſti. (5) This Rule (according to Grotius) takes place in the juſt Defence of a Man's ſelf, which this Author explains in another place. And ſo it does alſo when we labour after the Recovery of what belongs to us; for if we can recover the full Value, we have a Right to take it, nevertheleſs upon Condition that we return the Over-plus, if any be. So alſo we may Cannonade a Ship full of Pirates, or an Houſe full of Thieves, altho' we know there are ſome Children, Women, or other innocent Perſons in it, who are in Danger of being involved in the Ruin of thoſe that deſerve ir, Lib. 3. c. 1. §. 4. num. I. (7) He further adds, in the ſame place, Nurnb. 2. Thac thoſe things that a Man hach an indiſputable Right to do, are not to be allowed him to do in all Reſpects. Love to our Neighbour often hinders us from uſing that Right, and obliges us likewiſe to avoid thoſe Things which do, or may happen, contrary to our Intention, at leaft, if the Advantage we aim at be noc greater than the Damage which may juſtly be feared, or if there be an equal Probability of Benefic and Damage, the Hope of the Benefit be not better grounded than the Fear of Damage, but this muſt be left to every Man's Judgment and Prudence. But this ought only to be obſerved, That where there is a Doubt, we ought to incline to that fide, that is more favourable to another than to ourſelves, as the fureſt part. See what follows, and Ch.11. $. 8. of the ſame Book. See alſo what has been ſaid above, Ch.3.5.7. (8) See Book 6. Cbap. 2. 5. 6. following. 76 Accident. CHAP. V. Of Moral Adions in General, &c. 47 true Affections of the ſame kind; ſince as a Non Paſſions. Art. 144, 145, 146. . Accident. On which Doctrine we only obſerve that whatever neither in itſelf, nor in its Cauſe, that it had been much plainer to have ſaid, that was in a Man's Power and Diſpoſal, cannot be thoſe Effects are not to be accounted Sins in the rightly imputed to him (1). Nor is it any Breach Caſes here mentioned. Neither do all the Exam- of this Rule, that ſometimes a Man is oblig'd to ples brought by the fame Author to illuſtrate the perform a Buſineſs depending on Chance, and Moral Cauſa per ſe, or that which is truly and pro- conſequently not in his Power. For this Caſe can perly ſuch, rightly hold. For a Criminal, as he ſpeaks, never happen, unleſs the Man voluntarily takes on who is to ſuffer, tho' be go on to the Place of Execution, himſelf ſuch an Obligation (2). Thus much and aſcend the Ladder, cannot meerly upon this ac- therefore is in the Man's Power, to bind himſelf count be call’d the Moral Cauſe of his own Death, to repair a Damage, proceeding from Cauſes not becauſe if he had refus’d to go willingly, he had capable of Human Direction. To conclude then, been dragg’d along by the publick Officers. And that an Action or Fact ſhould be imputed, it is yet there is no reaſon why one Man who drinks ſufficient that it was not Involuntary, according Ímmoderately, or another who waſtes his Strength to our Diſcourſe in the preceding Chapter, Sect.1o. in honeſt and neceſſary Labours, may not be re- and that it was ſubject to the guidance of our Will. puted the Moral Cauſe of their own untimely But to make an Omiſſion truly Imputable , 'tis re- Deaths; tho' the former Perſon ſins and the latter quiſite that there have been both Power and Op- not; and tho' neither, properly ſpeaking, can be portunity for Performance, which Conditions of calld a Murtherer. But ſuch a one we ſhould Power and Opportunity ſeem to include theſe rightly call the Moral Cauſe of his own Death, who Four Things, First, That the Object be ready at is therefore condemn'd, becauſe he would not de hand. Secondly, That we have a commodious clare fuch Matters as might demonſtrate his own Place, where we may neither be hindred by 0- Innocency. thers, nor ſuffer any Evil from them upon our IV. It inuft be farther obſerv’d, that this Impu- Acing. Thirdly, That we have a convenient tativeneſs which we have made the formale of a Time, in which we are not call’d to the Diſcharge Moral Action, bears the Nature of a poſitive Form, of more neceſſary Duties, and which is equally from which, as from a Spring and Root, all the Seaſonable for thoſe who are to concur with us Affections, Properties and Conſequences of ſuch in the Action. And, Laftly, that our Natural an Action reſult. And therefore a Moral A&tion Powers adminifter fufficient Strength for the Buſi- may be call’d a Poſitive Being, (at leaſt in the Order neſs . When any one of theſe Conditions is want. of Morals, if not always in the Order of Naturals) ing without the Fault of the Man, it would be whether the Matter of it be a Phyſical Motion, or the moſt abſurd and unjuſt to lay the Omiſſion of any Privation of a Phyſical Motion. For to conſtitute thing to his Charge. Cicero de Invent. l. 1. Occaſion a Poſitive Being in Morality, 'tis ſufficient that we or Opportunity is a part of Time implying a Convenience conceive ſomething in it, from which there ariſe of doing a Thing, or not doing it. See Cartes of the Ens can have no Affections, ſo whatever has cer VI. Thus much being premis'd in general, it tain and poſitive Affections cannot upon any ac- will be worth our while to conſider more diſtinct- count be ſtil'd a meer Non Ens. ly and in particular, what Things may be imputed V. Now that a Moral Action ſhould belong, or to a Man, which proceed from a Phyfical Necef- ſhould be imputed to any Man, (in which we have fity, or from any Cauſe placed beyond the Di- aſſerted the ratio formalis of it to conſiſt,) there can rection of Men. And therefore 'tis a ſimple (1) be no other Reaſon or Cauſe, but that the Man Practice they tell of the Kings of Mexico, that at had Power and Ability to do it, or not to do it; the Commencement of their Reign they us'd to to perform or omit it. And this is ſo manifeſt á promiſe their Subjects, that they'd take care the Truth, that the moſt ignorant and unskilful Mor. Sun ſhould rife and ſet at due times; that Rain tals, when they are accus'd of any Omiſſion, or Thould fall as often as there was occaſion; and of any Fact, think they cannot bring a fairer Ex- that the Land ſhould bring forth Fruit. Neither cuſe, than to ſay in the firſt Caſe, that they could can it be imputed to Man, that Natural Caufes not do it, and in the other, that they could not help it. produce this and no other Effect, or that they So that it is to be eſtabliſh'd as a prime Maxim in produce it in this and no other way; as for In- Morals , That a Man is accountable for thoſe A&i- ſtance, that the Fire warms and not cools us. ons, the Performance or the Forbearance of which Yet thus indeed the Effects of Natural Cauſes fur- were both in his Power : Or (what comes to the niſh large Matter for Imputation, as their active Tame thing) that every Action dirigible by a Mo- Force is drawn out, or confirm'd by Man, ap- ral Rule, which a Man is able to do, or not to do, plying Actives to Paſſives, or exciting their may be imputed to him: And, on the contrary, internal Strength by proper Means. On which Mr. Barb. Notes on Chap. V. S. 5. (1) Culpam autem nullam esse, cum id, quod ab homine preſtari non potuerit, evenerit. Cicer. Tuſcul. Quæſt. 1. 3. c. 15; (2) See what is ſaid Lib. 5. Ch. 9. following. Sometimes alſo we muſt anſwer for an accidental Miſchance without engaging in it, becauſe we have neglected to do a thing to which we were obliged, althoº the neglect itſelf did not contribute at all to the unforeſeen Accident. See Lib. 3. c. I. 5. 6. Note z. and Lib. 5. c. 5. §. 3. following. Notes on Chap. V. S. 6. () This Author ought to have mention’d the Hiſtorian who relates this Fact. Mr. Titius (Obſerv. 47.) relates a favourable According to him it is the effect of great Wiſdom, and theſe good Kings would have Men underſtand no more by ir than this: That a Prince by his good Laws, and by the Prudence and Juſtice of his Government, can in ſome meaſure sa order the Stars and Ele. ments, that they ſhaŭt promote the good of his Subje&ts. Upon this foot cheir Affertion, as abſurd as it may ſeem at firſt fight, is not altogether withoue Ground, and proves, that even the American Princes are leſs Barbarous than many European. account 48 Of Moral Adions in general, &c. Book I. account a Plenty of Fruit is imputed to the Huf- Plutarch de Audiend. Poet. ſpeaks to the ſame pur- bandman, in as much as his diligent Culture obe poſe: Ulyſſes doth not upbraid (2) Therſites with his tain’d it from the Earth: Thus the Damage of Lameneſ, bis Baldneſ; or his Crook-back, but with his Fire is imputed to him that kindled it; and thus Scurrility and Impudence . Thus the wiſe Poet ſilent- the varied Colour of Laban's Lambs may be im- ly derides thoſe who are alham’d of Lameneſs, puted to the Subtlety of his Shepherd Facob (a). A Blindneſs, or the like Defects; it being his Judg- Natural Effect may be farther imputed to a Man ment, that nothing can be Blameworthy which is as he has mov'd the ſupream Cauſe and Director of not Vicious, and nothing Vicious the Cauſe of all Things to determine (2) ſuch an Effect. Thus which is in Fortune, not in ourſelves. As thoſe the Three Years Drought might be imputed to Elias who bruſh or ſtrike our Cloaths touch not the Body, ſo (b). As in fabulous Story a long Drought is ſaid thoſe who cenſure others for their Imperfections of Birth to have ceas'd on the Prayers of Æacus (c). Thus or of Fortune, vainly and fooliſhly ſtrike the outward too, the Death of the Men who fell in the Peſti- Parts, but never reach the Soul, nor thoſe Blemiſhes lence (d), might in ſome meaſure be imputed to which really deſerve Reprehenſion and Correction. Ibid. David, tho'not to the Degree of Murther. Add. Sympoſ. I. 2. qu. 1. Yet it was not without VII. Neither may we impute to a Man the Reaſon, that among the ancient Gauls, as Strabo Actions and the Effects of Vegetative Faculties relates, Lib. 4. The Young Men were Fin'd for exceed- which appear in his Body, as they ariſe from his ing the Meaſure of their Girdle : Becauſe they took it Birth, or from other Cauſes beyond his Diſpoſal. for granted, that ſuch a large Paunch, at ſuch a Man's Power, to ſupply early Years, could proceed from nothing elſe but thoſe Faculties with convenient or with unſuitable Lazineſs and Gormandizing. So ſays Nichol. Da- Objects, which may either maintain and cheriſh, maſcen. de Mor. Gent. The Iberians uſe a Girdle of a or weaken and extinguiſh their Force; as alſo to certain Meaſure, and whoever ſuffers himſelf to grow diſtort and abuſe their proper Organs. Thus he beyond thoſe Bounds, is look'd upon as highly Infamous. to whom Nature has given a large, a found, and The ſame may be faid of the other Faculties an able Body, is liable to no Imputation of Merit which Nature, and not our own free Pleaſure, on that ſcore. But to correct a weak Conſtitution has implanted in us, as that a Man has ſharp or by Induſtry and Exerciſe, and to encreaſe the Na- heavy Parts, quick or dull Senſes, a firm or a de- tural Powers, gives juft occaſion for Commenda- ceitful Memory; unleſs theſe Natural Abilities tion; and, on the contrary, to break or deſtroy have been improv'd or impair'd by the Man him- the ſame Powers by Idleneſs and Petulancy, turns ſelf. Hither muſt be referr'd that Obſervation of to a juſt Shame and Reproach. Ariſtotle in his Ethicks (e), Many Things according to Hence no Man can be fairly reprehended for our Nature we do and ſuffer, which we are truly con- a weak, or a tender, or a diminutive Body; for ſcious of, and yet which cannot be call'd Volunterý or In- diſtorted, or for maim'd Limbs, or for want of voluntary': as to grow old and to die. Theſe things Strength, provided that none of thoſe Infirmities therefore are not proper Matter of Imputation. were contracted by his Default. (1) Ariſtotle talks Neither can the getting of wicked Children be very pertinently to this purpoſe, Ethic. ad Nicom. imputed to Parents, provided they have not en- 1. 3. C. 7. Ou jóvóv de die fugas ngxici, &c. Not only courag’d them in their Vices by ill Education. * Faults of the Mind (ſays he) are Voluntary, but Whence the witty turn of Vindex will not hold in thoſe of the Body too in ſome Perſons, whom ftriệt Truth, when he ſaid, That Nero's Mother was we therefore diſcommend. For we do not blame juſtly put to Death by her son, for bringing ſuch a Mona thoſe that are naturally deform'd, but thoſe who ſter into the World (f). are grown fo by negle&t of Exerciſe, and by a VIII. It's evident likewiſe, That thoſe Things Careleſs way of Life. And the Caſe is the fame cannot be imputed, which exceed our Strength, as to any Meannefs or Unfightlineſs ariſing from either as to the Hindrance or the Performance of Diſtempers, or from the maiming of any part of them: provided that this Inability has not been of the Body. For Men will not reproach, but ra our own finful (1) Procurement. On which other pity his Blindneſs who had it from Nature, Foundation are built thofe common Maxims, or from a Diſtemper, or from an honourable That Impoffibilities are incapable of Obligation(2); Wound : But he will juſtly fall under univerſal That no Man can be conceivid to have enjoina Scorn or Cenſure who has loſt his Eyes by Drun- Impoſſible Duties in a Law; And that therefore kenneſs, or by any other kind of Intemperance. if any (3) ſuch thing occurr in a Statute, or a Coa s 6 (a) Gen. XXX. 37. (b) Kings xvii. 1. James v. 17. (c) Apollodor. 1. 3 cerea (d) 2 Sam. xxiv. 13, 17. (e) Lib. 5. c. 10.) (f) Philaſt. Apollon. 1. 5. (2) We muſt explain the words of our Author, who ſays only, Ad eum effe£tum determinandum, i. e. To determine that Effect; for it appears by the following Examples, and by the Nature of the Thing, that he treats here not only of the Exi. ſtence of the Effect, but alſo of its Non-exiſtence and Diſcontinuance. Notes on S. 7. (1) Vindex in Philoftr. in Vitâ Apollon. Thyan. l. 5. 6. 10. is ſaid to have ſlain his mother, becauſe ſhe brought him forth ſuch a deformed Creature. (2) Plutarch's Greek is, 'o egoitus ito sa 'Okyarkass, & zoo & percenço, i woto, ina’dxectÓWIG nodopera Ούτως "Όμηρή καθαγειλα τ αιωμένων οπι χωλότησιν, ή τυφλότησιν έτε ψέκτον ηγέμενα το μοι αισρόν έτε αιχejν το ήμας αλλά από τύχες γενόμενον, Καθάπερ, δει τα μαλια μας γενιες, εκ άποναι το σώμα, έτως οι δυςυχίας τίνα, ή δυσγενείας ονειδίζονες, εις τα έκα- εντείνονται κενωϊ. και ανοήτων, σ ψυχής δε και θιγγανεσιν, έδε τ αληθώς επανορθώσεως δεομέ- WWW, rj Meews. Plur. Notes on 8.8. (1) In this laſt Caſe we may lawfully be treated in the ſame manner as if we were in a ſtate of acting. Otherwiſe, as ſoon as any Obligation we are under becomes in the leaſt puniſhable or incommodious, we ſhall find a way to avoid it, by putting our- ſelves on purpoſe into a condition unable to fulnil it. (2) Impoflibilium nulla obligatio est. Digeſt. I. 50. (3) See Lib. III. Chap, 7. . 2, &c. following. им venant CHAP. V. Of Moral Actions in General, &c. 49 venant, or a Will, it is either to be eſteem'd as the fulfilling of the Law is impoſible, and yet that that Null, or elſe a more commodious Interpretation Impoſſibility does not injure the Liberty of the Will. For of it is to be found out (a). To this purpoſe we 'tis equally impoſſible for a particular Man to obey GOD's meer with a pleaſing Paſſage in Herodotus (b); He Command in all Things, and for a Multitude to abſtain tells us that when Themiſtocles deſir'd a Supply of from all manner of Lying. And he is as Money from the Inhabitants of Andros, ſupported himſelf from each particular Act of Sin, as the particu- by the two ſtrong Goddeſſes Perſwafion and Neceſ- lar Citizens are to keep themfeltes pure from Lies; and fity, the Andrians oppos’d him with two ſtronger yet this is never likely to happen in the World . Which Goddeſſes, Poverty and Impoſſibility. But here it Doctrine, as it is applied to Theological Points, muſt be carefully obſerv'd, that it is one thing to we leave to be diſcuſs'd by the proper Profeſſors. be Phyſically, and another thing to be Morally, Im- But if it keep within the Bounds of Human poſſible. The former Impoſſibility lays an Obſtacle, Courts, it does not appear why this ſhould not which binds up the Will in fuch a Manner, that rather be admitted than that affertion of Grotius . Sins that it ſhall loſe all its Labours and Endeavours. call Sins of daily Incurſion, he ſays, It may well be But a Moral Impoſſibility lays no Impediment doubted whether ſuch as theſe may rightly and properly be furpaſſing the Active Power which inheres in the call'd Sins, becauſe, though we are at Liberty' as to the Will, but on the contrary ariſes wholly from the doing each Particular, yet we ſeem to loſe that Liberty, Will itſelf. And in this Manner, we ſay, 'cis im- ivhen we conſider them in general . For how can theſe poffible that all Men ſhould conſpire together in Failures, taken Collectively, eſcape the Nature of delivering down a Lie to Poſterity, without any Sin, when at the ſame time each Particular of Profpe&t of Advantage : Or that any Man ſhould them is acknowledg’d to be ſinful? Tho' indeed léad a Life of fuch exa& Holineſs and Circum- ſuch ſmall Slips are in human Cognizance ſcarce fpe&ion (4), as not to offend (at leaſt through the look'd upon as puniſhable. precipitancy of his Paſſions) in ſome ſmaller In IX. Neither can thoſe Things be imputed ftance of Duty. Hence the Author of the Trea- which a Man does or ſuffers (1) upon Compulſi- tiſe De Principiis Jufti & Decori (c) infers, That a on: For they will belorg, in Moral Eftimation, to Legiſlator cannot indeed enjoyn what is Phyſically Impol- him who offers the Force, and he that receiv'd fible , but he may exact Obedience to Things which include executed them is look'd upon only as an Obje& or a Moral Impoſſibility . Becauſe in this he commands no an Inſtrument. "'Tis a Rule with Dionyſius Halicar- thing contrary to the Liberty of the Will, ſince all the noſſeus (e), That every thing which is Difficulty of obeying ariſes from the Will it felf . Thus ferves Excuſe. And Cicero (f ) argues with good Pris not impoſſible for any Man to frame a Lie gratis ; Reaſon, when he ſays, if we are oblig'd to pardon thoſe and if not for any Man, then not for the whole Multi- who hurt us out of ignorance, we are not bound to thank tude; and get ʼtis certain that the whole Multitude will thoſe who benefit us out of Neceſſity. Now Compul- hot do ſo. In the ſame manner every Man has the fion is ſupposid to be apply'd, not only when the Power of ſpeaking Truth, and conſequently a whole So- Principle of Motion is in another Man, who by ciety or Community ; and yet 'tis most certain, that a Force bends the Members of a Perſon, to ſome Commonwealth will never be ſo happy, as to have all its Adion or Suffering, of which the Perſon, by Members abſtain from falſe Speeches: get this Impoſſibi- ſtruggling and reſiſting, expreſſes his Abhorrence ; lity does not take away the Liberty of particular Men, but likewiſe, when a Man, by the Peril of Death or excuſe them from Jinning. Thus too we ſay, that or of any (2) other extream Evil, is put upon the or (a) Ovid. de Pont. I, 1, El. 8. ? Nulla potentia vires. 529 Præftandi ne quid peccet amicus habet. So far can no Degrees of Power extend all Frailty from a Mortal Friend. MUOD To purge Quin&tilian: İnſt.1.6.c.3. We uſually reckon it inhuman to upbraid a Man with his ill Fortune; either becauſe it comes without his Fault, or becauſe it may be the Cenſurors Turn to ſuffer next. (b) Vran. (c) Velthuyſen, p. 174. (d) L. 2. C, 20. f. 19. (1) L. 1. (f) De Invent. l. 1. Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. 8. (4) Mr. Hirtius alledges here the Encomium which Valerius Paterculus gives Scipio Æmilianus; viz. That in all his Life he never did ſpeak or think any thing, but what was commendable, Lib. 1. Ch. 12. Notes on S. 9. 1 (1) Our Author here ſpeaks of the Extremity that one is reduced to by the immediate Violence of a Perſon, who will force us to fuffer, or do ſome thing. But he ought alſo to have ſet down what a Man is conſtrained to do by other Circumſtances, which are not leſs preffing, and no leſs exclude all Imputation. In a word, we ought to reduce to this Head all the Effects of Neceſſity in general, of which we ſhall elſewhere ſee the Benefit, Lib. 2. Chap. 6. where the Paffages in the Margin may refer to the Caſes of Neceſſity, which are omitted. (2) Which he may ſuffer in that very Inſtant, as this Author adds, in fiis Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, lib. r chap. I. $. 24. tomia TORO DADO H Execution 50 Of Moral Actions in General, &c. BOOKI. 6 lingly a , he ought not rigorouſly to be puniſhed for the like Action, he can't attempt it without Hure to his own Conſcience. Here alſo De 4. and Mr. Tho. Execution of (3) fome Enormity to which he is own Mother, which Fact, in Oedipus, tho' com- otherwiſe exceedingly averſe; yet ſo that he ſhall mitted out of invincible Ignorance, yet tormented not be the Author of the Deed, but the other Per- him ſo, as to make him tear out his own Eyes. ſon who compelld him to it. Examples of the But when Ariſtotle, Ethic. Nicom. lib. 3. C. I. al- former kind are, when a Man by Superiority of ledges for an Inſtance of a forced Action, the doing Strength violently thuſts another upon a third Per a baſe thing, upon the Command of a (5) Tyrant fon, or ſtrikes him with a forcible Bend of the o who has our Parents or Children in his Hands, ther Man's Hand: Or when any one commits a and will ſave or kill them, according to our Obe- violent Rape upon a Woman that did not provoke dience or Diſobedience; what he then calls aio xeir 7, his Lewdneſs by her own Fault. Her Body in- or a baſe thing, (6) muſt be underſtood in a limited deed, in this Caſe ſuffers Diſhonour, but the Ble- Sence, ſo as not to reach thoſe more odious Vil- miſh doth not reach her Soul. The Body is ſtain’d, lanies we are now ſpeaking of. but the Mind is pure, ſays Lucretia in Livy, l. 1. c. 58. X. Ignorance likewiſe takes of all Imputation, See Hen. Stephens's elegant Diſcourſe on that Story ſo far as it renders che Action Involuntary (a). in his Apolog. for Herodot . c. 15. But a Nymph will This Point may be illuſtrated from ſeveral Paliages not have the Benefit of this Interpretation, when of Ariſtotle's Morals; Magn. Moral. lib. 1. c. 34. "Oray with a faint Reſiſtance ſhe lets her Ring be ſtoll'n fefe is ni dovold winie n ng apă Ede 71, én éxav Tšto megfe, &c. off from her (4) digitus male pertinax, as Horace calls Whenfoever (ſays he) Ignorance has been the oc- it. An Inſtance of the latter Compulſion may be caſion of doing a thing, that thing is not done wil- when a Sergeant, or a Guards-man is commanded to kill a Man whom he knows innocent, under . But when a Man is himſelf the Cauſe of his own pain of being immediately kill'd himſelf upon Re Ignorance, and out of that Ignorance commits fuſal : For he can by no Means lie under an Impu- a Deed, he plainly offers an Injury, and may in tation in this Cafe, ſince nothing is enjoin’d him Juſtice be accountable for the Crime. This is but the bare Execution, which in it ſelf is agree the Caſe of drunken Men, who if they commit able enough to his Perſon and Character, and any Diſorder under that Condition, without ought not to be refus’d upon the Hazard of loſing Diſpute do a real Injury, ſince they themſelves his Life: Eſpecially ſince tho'he threw away him- have been the Cauſes of their Ignorance. For ſelf, he could not by that Means fave the other 'twas in their Power, whether or no they would innocent Party. Yet it muſt be confeſt, that the tipple themſelves ſo far out of their Senſes, as to bare Execution of ſome Acts is ſo very foul and 'make them (for Example) beat their own Father. deteſtable, that it is a generous Bravery for a Man the fame Rule will hold in all other Inſtances of rather to die, than to apply his Body to ſuch O- Ignorance, the Cauſe of which is in the Agent, perations, tho', if committed, the Fault of them ſo that he who injures another upon the Strength would not light on himſelf, but on others. To of thoſe Pleas, is nevertheleſs properly unjuſt. which Caſe the Paſſage of Ariſtotle relates, above . But thoſe Perſons cannot by any means be called cited: An Inſtance of it may be, Suppoſe a Man unjust, who offend out of Ignorance not of their ſhould be commanded to commit a Rape on his own procuring. For ſuch Ignorance is to be (a) Xenophon. Cyropæd.l.3. I take all thoſe things which Mén commit thro' Miſtake; to be done againſt their Inclination and Deſign. Euripid. Hippol. Coronae. Your Ignorance and Error cleanſe the Deed from ſinful ſtain. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES. (3) Our Author then believes, that this laſt fort of Compulſion, as well as the firſt, excludes all ſorts of Imputation. He ex- plains himſelf bercer upon this Head, in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, lib. 1. ch. 1. S. 24. where he maintains, That we can have no more Ground to impute the Actions committed in the like Circumſtances, than to the Spear, or AX, that is uſed to kill an Enemy with ; At least, ſays he, whoever is reduced to that Neceſity, is not under any Obligation to ſacrifice himſelf for the Perſon to whom he ſees himſelf conſtrain'd, upon Peril of Life, to do ſome great miſchief. I own that this ſort of Compulſion much Jeffens a Sin, but yet it doth not ſeem to me (as Mr. Titius remarks, Oberv. 40. and 48.) ro free it from all Imputation at the Judg- ment-Sear of GOD. For indeed the Inſtance of the Spear and Ax is not well apply'd, for they are Inſtruments purely paſſive; whereas a Perſon forced by the Threatnings of ſome great Evil, without any phyſical and irreſiſtible Violence, acts with a kind of Will, and conſents in fome Manner to the Action, viſibly evil, which he performs. So that tho' before a Civil Judicature we may apply thoſe Principles which we fhall lay down, Lib. 2. Ch. 17. 5. 2, 3. following, for in the Example which our Author there alledges, of an Officer, who was commanded, under Pain of being put to Death himſelf, to put a Perſon to Death, for a Crime of which lie knew him innocent, the Evil he does to ſuch an one, is as great as if he would warrant it himſelf, otherwiſe this Execution were an uncertain Means, becauſe it depends entirely on him who laid the Obligation on him. And who is there that can affure himſelf, that the Perſon who forces a Man to do ſuch things, ſhall have a greater Reſpect for him that executes his Orders, chan for him againſt whom he has uſed this Force. This laſt Reaſon has yet a great Strength, as any one may fee, when a Son is forced to lie with his Mother: An Action which our Author ſeems to take ſome Pains to excuſe, when he is treat- mafius's Divine Civil Law, Lib. 2. Chap. 2. §. 149, and 161, doc. as alſo Wherner's Elements of the Law of Nature and Nations, Chap. 2. S. 9, Io. (4) The Author refers to theſe Words of Horace, Lib. 1.0d.9. Pignuſque direptum Lacertis, aut Digito male pertinaci. See alſo to the ſame purpoſe, Lib. 2. Od. 12. Aut facili Sævitia negat Quæ poſcente magis gaudeat eripi. (5) Mr. Pufendorf unwarily following a bad Latin Tranſlator, who has rendred theſe Words ill, though plain enough in them. ſelves. They that do it, ſhall eſcape, and, they that will not do it, ſhall periſh, as if the Greek had been, pačatles, whereas ic is, apežano, He that does it. The Engliſh Tranſlator has amended this Fault, (6) But why muſt this Caſe be excepted, if our Author's Principles be found? Or what Rule doth he give us, to diſtinguiſh theſe ſort of Things, where Force excludes not Imputation? The Truth is, we muſt either excuſe every A&t of Compulſion, how infamous foever it be in itſelf, or account every thing vicious, which we cannot do innocently of ourſelves, and in our own Name, let the Threarnings of him that would conſtrain us, be never ſo terrible. See Note 3. of this Paragraph. The Change of our Author, and the ſmall Connexion there is between his Notions in this Matter, ſhew that he has not conſidered it with ſufficient Attention, eſteem'd 6 ز 1 CHAP. V. Of Moral Actions in General, &c. 51 c Caken the Potion, died of it, he was condemned to Death without Mercy, Digeſt. eſteem'd Natural; as when little Children ſtrike who plead Ignorance of the Isaws, when the Points arere their Parents, their Natural Ignorance, which is eaſy, and ſuch as ought to have been known. The Caſe the Cauſe of the Fact, hinders. it from being is the ſame with all that are ignorant by their cun Nega I ftild Unjust; the Ignorance not at all depending lečtz Ithey being Maſters of their own (Powers, and scaper on their own Power '. 3. So alſo Seneca Phæniſ. ble of Diligence and Application. Ignorance of Uni- do Thebaid. besbri digaolod y porq slus verfals, and that which we were obligʻd to know boss par to ugesche vogels bruids does not take off Imputation, but only Ignorance 20-Aliquis intra vifcera 91090m lladt of Particulars, and of what concerns the preſenc Materna letum præcocis fati tulit; vhodi omo o Faab ss Ariftot. Ethic: l. 3.c. 2. He that is ignorant of Sed nunquid á peccavit ? am van sonil on his Duty, or Intereft, ought not to be ſaid to act againit else bis Will; for Ignorance upon Choice doth not produce an. An Infant with untimely Fate, involuntary, but a wicked Actionisa AndIgnorance of Dies in the Womb before the Gift of Light ; c Univerſals renders Men liable to Reprehenfionbut on Tg- And has it therefore finn'd? nombre norance of Particulars, or of the Circumſtances of the dea ang arroin Action, deſerves Pity and Pardon, in as much as the But this muſt be extended no farther than human Perſon thus offending doth truby proceed involuntarily. Confideration. Om smo An Example of this Ignorance is thus given by But in reference to Infants it is farther obſerva- Tully, de Invent. 1.2.c.31(5) There was a Law in fame ble, that we chide and beat them for fome Acti- certain Place, forbidding to Sacrificel a Calf to Diana ; ons, not becauſe in Human Judgment they be now a Company of Mariners being in Diſtreſs at Sea, ftrictly Crimes, but meérly for the ſake of Amenda made a Vow that if they gain'd the Port which was ment, that they may not prove troubleſome to now in ſight, they'd offer a Calf to the Deity who prea others by ſuch Tricks, or may not get an ill Ha- fided there. It happened that in that a very Port there bit, when they are little, and ſo keep it when they stood a Temple of Diana, to whom no Calf was to ber of: are grown up. And the ſame muſt be ſaid of De fer'd by : the Laws; but the Mariners not being acquainted lirious Perſons, provided their Diſeafe was not oc- with i beſe Laws, offer'd the Calf which they promisdi caſioned by their own Fault. For the Blows given and upon this Fact they are accus'da domic to one in this Condition, have no more the pro If an Action be done without any malicious per Nature of a Puniſhment anſwering to a Fault, Deſign, and not with Ignorance voluntarily con- than thoſe we give to a kicking Horſe; to break traced, but ſuch only as crept in by Inconſidera- him of that Cuſtom. Vid. Anth. Matthæ de Crimin. tion and Inadvertency (a), the Imputation is not Proleg.c. 2. 8:5, 6, 7, 8. od altogether taken away, yet it is conſiderablýi di- But he who is the Cauſe of his own Ignorance, miniſhed. And thus far only may we allow the and who has wittingly and willingly hindred him- Saying of Quinctilian, Inft. (1. 1. c. 61) Even an Er- ſelf from the Knowledge of thoſe things, which ror is commendable in thoſe who follow Great and Noble he might and ſhould have known, is in the famé Guides. Vide Ariſtot. Ethic. l. 5. c. 1o. Hither we Caſe as if he had offended upon Knowledge and may refer the Caſe propos’d by Ariſtotle (b), of a Deliberation. Ariſtot. Magn. Moral . l. 1.c.9. We then Woman that gave a Love-Potion to her Gallant, blame diſeas’d or deform’d Perſons when we judge them of which he died. Now the Athenian Judges ab- to have been the Author of their own Diftemper or Dif- folved the Woman from this Indictment, becauſe figurement; becauſe it was in their Power 10 have.. kept ſhe did the Fact undeſignedly, and only miſs'd the ſound and perfet. Effect of her Potion, and procur'd his Death in- And more fully, Ethic. l. 3. c. 7. Legiſlators correct ſtead of his Love, which was her only Aim. But and puniſh thoſe who commit Evil, provided they did to make this Sentence equitable, it muſt have it neither upon Violence and Compulſion: nor out of been ſuppos’d as a Principle, that the Woman Such Ignorance as they did not themſelves occaſion. For never ſo much as thought the Potion ſhe admi- otherwiſe, Ignorance it ſelf is puniſhable, when contra- niſtred was any way hurtful. For otherwiſe it Eted by the Perſon's own Fault. Hence there is a (4) were more rational to proceed according to (3) double Puniſhment ordain'd againſt Drunkards, becauſe the Law of the Roman Lawyers. Add. Anth. Matth. the Spring of that Vice is in a Man's Self, he having de Crimin. ad l. 48. D. tit. S. c.5. fa 6:. the Power of avoiding it ; and therefore what he doth XI. Farther, Since thé Images form'd by the through Ignorance in that Condition, is nevertheleſs to be Fancy in ſleep are not in our Power, nothing can charged upon him. In like manner they puniſh thoſe be imputed to us which we ſeem to do in a Dream, (4) Theſe are properly the emegtámaila of Ariſtotle. (b) Magn. Moral. 1. 1. C. 17. ili o riguard wegian Mr. Barb. NOTES. (4) The one for being drunk, and the other for having done wickedly in their Drunkenneſs , for he treats not of all ſorts of Drunkenneſs, but only of ſuch as do ſome Injury in their wine. Ariſtotle alludes to a Law of Pittacus, of which he ſpeaks, Polit. Lib. 2. Chap. 12. Our Author quotes it, Lib. 8. Chap . 3. S. 21. where we ſhall ſee upon what it is grounded.ale ani (s) Apud quoſdam Lex erat, ne quis Diana vitulum immolaret. Naut& quidam, cum adverſå tempeftate in alto j4&tarentur, var potiti effent ſe vitulum immolaturos, caſu erat in eo portu fanum Diana, loc. (3) The Roman Law is this, That when one gives a Potion to cauſe a Miſcarriage, or to cauſe Love, although the Party vho gives it has no Deſign to do Evil, nevertheleſs" by Reaſon of its Conſequences, he was condemned, beſides fome part of his Goods Confiſcated, either to the Quarries, if he were of a mean Condition, or to Baniſhinene into ſome Ille , if he were of a good , Lib : 48. Tit. 19. de Penis Leg. 38. S. 5. In fine, that we may have a juft Idea of invincible Ignorance, as to Imputation, les that be remembred which we have obſerved Chap. 3. $, 10. Note 5. For Ignorance purely concomitant, in the Manner we have explained it , be it vincible or invincible, doth not hinder Imputation, and to know whether it be inyincible or no, we muſt judge according to common Eſtimation, Titius Obſerv. 45. See Chap. 7. §. 16. following start only uerunt ſi portu H 2 52 Of Moral Actions in General, &c. . BookI. only as far as by thinking on ſuch things (1) in Antedated, or that it ſhould affect as backwards : the Day-time with Delight, we have fix'd the unleſs perhaps the future Crime ſhould depend on Idea's deeply in our Minds (a). Hence the Man fome (1) paſt or preſent Act of ours, as a necef- whom Tacitus (6) ſpeaks of, and reports to have fary Effect does on its Caufe : For it is a common ſeen the Emperor Claudius in his Sleep, cover'd thing to impute the Effect to him to whom the with a Crown made of Ears of Corn, was not guil- Cauſe properly belong’d. Indeed it is not at all ty of any Crime. And the Fiſherman in Theocri abſurd, that by Imputation of Favour a future Deed tus ( - ) entertain'd a very vain Scruple, when he ſhall procure ſome good Thing to the Agent, or appear'd concern'd for an Oath he had made in to fome Body elſe, long before it is perform'd. his Sleep never to venture out again to Sea (d). For ſince any Man may (if he pleaſes) do a Kind- Neither was Julius Cæfar. guilty of Inceſt, upon neſs gratis, it is certainly in the Power of a Bene- account of his ftrange Dream, recorded by Sueton. factor, who knows what will afterward happen, fe). Yet Byblis was not altogether innocent, when, to confer la preſent Favour under fome Term and as Ovid tells the Story, Condition hereupon to be fulfilled. But ſince ill Salobi dobili Adions cannot be imputed, but by way of Debt Sæpe videt, &c. 2017 or Guile, it would be the higheſt Abſurdity, to rec- kon ſo far backwards, as to lay Imputation on Per- In Sleep ſhe oft does the lov'd Shadow ſeem fons who neither had any Knowledge of Futurity, To graſp, and joys, yet bluſhes in her Dream. nor any Obligation or Power to hinder the Thing Mr. Oldham. from being done ; nor, laſtly, any Communi- cation of Action with the Author of the Fact Nor is Plutarch (f) much out of the way, when he (g)(2). maintains, that a fair Argument may be drawn XIII. Beyond theſe Exceptions no Human Acti- from a Man's Dreams, as to the Temper and Com- on ought to be reckon'd involuntary or incapable poſure of his Mind: and therefore 'twas a good of Imputation, tho? to undertake it be never fo Saying of Epicurus, That a wife Man will be like contrary to right Reaſon, or tho'any Diſorder of himſelf, even in bis Sleep(2). Diog. Laert. l. 10. Some Mind violently hurry us into the Commiſſion. apply to this purpoſe Pſal. xvii. 3. Vid. Claudian Indeed Plato (5) lays it down for a Rule, Tharin Præfat. ad. l. 3. de Raptu Proſerp. Theocrit. Idyll. 22. thoſe Injuries which 'tis impoſſible to repair, no Man is voluntarily injurious, becauſe no Man is -Και δεν υπνοις willing to admit the greateſt of Evils into any Πάσα κύων άρτων μανεύέlαι his Concerns, and much leſs into thoſe Things ' which are moſt dear to him, and moſt excellent The hungry Dog preſages in his Dream ' in themſelves ;' ſuch as is his Soul(i). To the A mighty Spoil of Crufts. fame Purpoſe Ariſtippus ſays in Diogenes Laertius, That all Miſtakes (by which he means all ſmaller XII. Laſtly, It is againſt Reaſon, that the im- Offences) deſerve Pardon, becauſe no Perſon is putation of any future Crime ſhould be as it were miſtaken willingly, but as he is compellid by C C of (a) Nonn. Dionys. 1. 4. L'ANTUTION 28 *Ερων όποις τελέα της εν ήμαι νυκή σοκά'et. -Fancy's idle Play Mimicks by Night the Labours of the Day. (6) Ann. 11. See Ammian. Marcellin. l. 15. c. 2. (c) Idyl. 22. (d) See Evagrius's Oath made in a Dream, in Sozomen, Hiſt. Eccl. b. 6. c. 30. (e) Cæſ. c. 7. Nam viſus erat per quietem matri ſtuprum intuliffe. (f) De Profet. Virtut. Sent. (8) Cicero de Invent. l. 1. A Remote Argument is ſuch as depends on a Cause and Principle too far diftant. For inſtance, If P. Scipio had not married his Daughter to Tiberius Gracchus, by whom ſhe brought forth the young Gracchi, the Seditions had been prevented which thoſe Brothers raisºd in the State : And therefore all those Diſturbances are chargeable on P. Scipio. (b) De Leg. l. s. (i) Vid. Tie meum p. 1085. do Marfil. Ficin. Præfat. ad Plato, 1.9. de LL. do Apolei. de Philoſophia. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S. II. (1) See what Mr: Bayle ſays, concerning ſuch as have dreamed that they were preſent at the Meetings of Magicians and Sorces rers, in his Anſwer to the Queſt. of a Provinc. Tom. 1. P: 304, 305. (2) Some of theſe Quotations of our Author are not much to the Purpoſe. He puts the Third Book of Claudian de Raptu Proferp. for the Second, and one Work for another ; for his Quotation is taken out of his Preface to his poem in VI. Conſul. Honori. Omnia que ſenſue voluntur Vota diurno, Pe&tore ſopito reddit amica quies. See Lucretius l. 4. p. 959, &c. and Cicero's Somn. Scrip. Chap. 1. Here he ought to have ſpoken of the A&tions of ſuch as walk in their Sleep, who have beaten, wounded, and killed others, while they were in that State. The Canon Law in the Clementines propounds ſuch a Suppofition, and determines, that their Actions are involuntary, and conſequently not puniſhable, Si furioſus, aut infans, ſeu dormiens bominem mutilet, vel occidat, nullam ex hoc irregularitatem incurrit, Leg. de Homicid. Vol. de caſ. lib. 5. tit. 4. But Mr. Hirtius adds, with Reaſon, (in his Trea- tiſe De Parem. Fur. Germanic, Lib. 3. Parem. 1. $. 4.) That if a Perſon that walks in his Sleep, being advertiſed of what he does in his Sleep, does not ſecure his Arms, and take other neceflary Precautions to hinder him from doing any Miſchief whatſoever, he is not excuſable. See Tiraquel. de Pæn. temper. Caul. s. Mr. Thomafius has publiſhed a Treatiſe of the Laws about Sleep and Dreams, which is the XI. of his Diſputations held at Leipſich, and are collected into one Volume, Printed 1695. NOTES on S. 12. (1) 'Tis in the Original, Preſent or Future, which is a plain Miſtake, and ought to be corrected thus, Preſent or Paft, for thay a fùcure Crime be impured by way of Retroſpection, upon the account of ſome Action, which it is neceffarily confequent upon, that Action muſt neceſſarily be produced. This is ſo true, that the Author himſelf, in his Elements of Univerſal Civil Law, p. 368. from whence theſe words are copied, expreſſes himſelf exa&tly fo. Neither the Engliſh Tranſlator nor Mr. Hirtius were aware of this Miſtake, which quite ſpoils the Senſe. (2) Remotum eſt, quod ultra quam fatis eft, petitur hoc modo. Quod fi Cornelius Scipio Corneliam filiam Tiberio Graccho non collocaffet, atque ex eâ duos Gracchos procreasſet, tant & feditiones nate non esſent, quare hoc incommodum Scipioni afcribendum videtur. Cicero de lavent. l. 1. C. 49. See alſo the Thought of Vindex above, $. 7. cfome 53 6 (a). But Ariſtotle hath in many places refuted corrupted by frequency of ſinning (4). If (lays , CHAP. V. Of Moral Adions in General, &c. • fome perturbation of Mind. And the Emperor our own Fault doth not render an Adion invo - Antoninus frequently advancech the like Dočtrineluntary, fo neither can an ill Habit, or a Mind this Opinion. As when (b) he recites the follow- he) a Man, not out of Ignorance, does things ing Argument of Socrates (1), defign’d to prove, which may denominate him Unjuft, he is vo- that it was not in our Power whether we would be Good luntarily Únjuft; but he cannot, at his Will and or Bad: 'Becauſe fuppofing we fhould ask any Pleaſure, turn from Unjuſt to Juſt again; (but one, whether he had rather be Juft or Unjuſt, this we are to underſtand' (s), either in a com- no Man would chuſe Injuſtice; whence it ſhould pound Senſe, i e. that he cannot be Juſt and Un- ( appear, that if ſome Men are wicked, they are juſt at the ſame time ; or elſe in this Meaning, not Wicked of their own Accord, and confe- that the bare Will cannot preſently aboliſh a con- quently none are of their own Accord Good. firm'd Diftemper of the Mind; tho’by long and ear- In Confutation of which Ariſtotle hath us’d theſe neſt Endeavour it may be overcome :) no more Reaſons ; That it would be abſurd for a (2) than a fick Man can be found again when he * Lawgiver to enjoin good Actions, and to forbid pleaſeth, tho' his Sickneſs, perhaps, was volun- ' and to puniſh Evil, unleſs both were éq' muiv, in ' tary, occaſion'd either by his intemperate Way our Power : And that otherwiſe there would be of Life, or by his Diſobedience to the Orders no manner of Cauſe why Virtue ſhould meet of his Phyſician : Such a Perſon at firſt had it with Praiſe, or Vice with Diſgrace and Re- indeed in his Power not to be fick ; but when proach.' In another Work (c) he handles the he hath once neglected his Health, it is not in Point more at large, and with good Reaſon (3) his Power to reſtore it: In the ſame manner as rejects that common Argument of the Stoicks, All one, who hath thrown a Stone out of his Hand, deſire and follow what appears Good to them; but now cannot recover it again, though at firſt he had no Man is Maſter of his own Fancy, but the Ends be che Power of throwing or not throwing it. purſues appear to him Juft, according as he is inclin d Thus the Unjuſt and the Intemperate, at firſt and diſpos'd. For in ſpight of this Objection, the might have been otherwiſe, and therefore were Underſtanding of what is Juſt, and what Unjuft, voluntarily ſuch, but being once under thoſe muſt be acknowledg’d both to be in the Power of Conditions, they are not it Liberty to be with- Man, and to be attainable without much Difficul- out them that is, before they have reform'd ty, or Labour (d). In the ſame place Ariſtotle and and correćted themſelves (6).' well obſerves, that as Ignorance contracted by It may not be amiſs to caſt an Eye upon what the (a) Lib. 4: 1:3. Lib. 7. f. 22, 63. Lib. 8. S. 14. Lib. II. S. 18. (6) Magn. Moral. l. 1. c. 9. (c) Ethic. l. 3. 6. 7 (d) Vid. Euſtath. ad loc. Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. 13. (1) Σωκράτης έφη, έκ έφ' ημίν ένεθαι το σσεσαίες &ναι ή φαύλες, ει 8 ης φησίν, ερωτήσεωντινα ξν, πότερον αν βέλoιτο δίκαιο ναι, άδικα, εθές αν λέγοιτο ή αδικίαν·--.... δήλον ως α φάυλοι ήνες ισιν, εκ αν εκόνες άησαν φάυλοι, ώςε Sõrov od ide ourf colMagn. Moral. lib. 1. ch. %. We may obſerve, that there is ſomething of Truth in this Norion, viz. That ordinarily Men do not fin for nothing, nor do any ill thing purely and ſimply for Evil-doing. 'Tis a common Maxim uſed by Saluſt, Men are wicked for Rewards, take away them and ſcarce any Man wil da Evil. Orat. 2. de Repub. Ordinan. See lib. 3. chap. 1. S. 1. not. s. following, and lib. 8. chap. 3. S. 19. note 1, 2. The Uſe of this Principle is to make us merciful to our Neighbours Faults, a Conſequence which the Emperor Antoninus draws from moſt of the foregoing Places, but when we deal with our ſelves, as we never are ſevere to our own Faulcs, let us turn the Ballance, and always ſay, as Max. Tyrius, though a Platonift, expreſſes himſelf pithily and in a few Words. Emériov i Loox Onelo MuchTou te casola. Difert. 41. p.426. Edit. Davis. (2) The Greek of Ariſtotle runs thus, o no toift nóg éx o dangas. de zi 38 8 vomogétus čx tą Tà paura mediev, til Τα καλά και σταδιαία κελέυει. και οι μεν τοίς φάυλοις ζημίαν τέλει αν πρέλη, όπ δη τους καλούς αν μη ωeάλη και του ατοπαν είη ταυτοι νομοθέτων εφ' ημών οι ωράφειν, αλλ' (ώς έoικεν) εφ' ημίν τεσσεσαίοίς άναι, και τα φαύλοις, έτι και μαρτυρύσιν οι τ' έπαινοι, και ψόγοι γενόμενοι, μ' δ τη αρετή Έπαιν, όπ ' κακία ψόγΘ, έπαινα- δε και ψόγΘ έκ οι τοίς ακεσίοις. Αrift. Mag. Mor. ch. 9. (3) The Greek is, Ει δέ τις λίγοι ότι πάντες έφιέναι το φαινομένα αγαθ. δε φαντασίας και Κύριοι, αλλ' οποία ποθ' έκασG- OF1 , TOLETO X To 731 paveroue ourã. Ethic. ad Nicom. I. 3.c.7. He anſwers to this, That as every one is himſelf the Cauſe of that Diſpoſition which cauſes Things to appear to us after a certain Manner, ſo he is in ſome Senſe the Cauſe of that Appearance, Conhole or discipport, oi uefur av fras@laurie of lEsais ont très détı@ ise.gaulaojas 831. trãs duro dítio. Scc Euftrathiu's (4) The Greek is, Ei , nè un ayvom tis medier og o Esoy SiruG fxwv äting av to, é une édum féACICA; & NxG Á Áuostad ξέτα δικαιώ, ε 8ο νοσών υμής, και ει έτος έτυχαν, εκών νοσά, άκρατος βιοτίνων και απειών τους ιατρούς , τότε μ' έν εις αυτώ μη νοσών περιμένω δε , έκ έτι. ώσπερ εδ' αρίθι λίθον, ότι αυτόν διωκτών αναλαβών, αλλ' όμως επ' αυτώ το βαλείν, και είναι: και ο αρχει επ' αυτά, έτω δε και το αδίκη, και το άκολάσω" εξ αρχύς μην ξύ τοιέτοις μη γενέθαι, διοξέκονες εισι, γενομένοις δε žreti bes un Srol. Ethic. Nicom. Lib. 3.c.7. (3) That 'is to ſay, that Sinners, as ſuch, can't deſire to be good Men. See the Art of Thinking, Part 3. Ch. 18. §. 6. Now that a Man may hinder himſelf from yielding to a Paſſion, and may reform an ill Habit at length, if he pleaſes to take the pains, appears not only from the ſecret Checks which he finds in himfelf when he fins, and the inward Senſe he has of the Freedom of Will by which he acts, but alſo by Experience. It often happens, that in the very Moment when a Man offends, the Preſence of ſome conſiderable Perſon, or of a Magiſtrate, who has Power to puniſh the Action, is of Force to prevent the Thing is able to make us refift a Temptation. Suppoſe, for Example, a Drunkard by Profeffion, being in perfect Health, and free from all Cares, comes thirſty into a favern, where he finds his Companions with Glaſs in hand, whº doubes, buc chat, upon a Wager, he could, and would refift all Allurements of the Objects which might tempt him, and the moſt carneſt Entreaties of his Comrades? Since then the Hopes of a ſmall Gain, or a little Vainglory, is able to oblige him to abſtain from a Thing he loves ſo well, why may he not be able, by little and little, wholly to abſtain from it, being moved with better Arguments and a Principle of Virtue. It is certain, at leaſt, that if a Prince reſolves to make ſevere Laws againſt Drunkenneſs, and ſees them well execuced, he'll ſoon put a ſtop to that Vice. 'Twas by this means that the Madneſs of Duelling, nor long ſince ſo very com- mon in France , Brandenburg, Saxony, &c. is almoſt quite laid aſide, becauſe of the ſevere Prohibitions of that pernicious Cuſtom; and we ſhould lec fewer Examples of it, if the Laws againſt it were not cluded by making a Duel paſs for a fingle Rencounter. can See 54 Of Moral Actions in General, &c. Book I. carriage Ill Step; the Moral Cauſe of that Mif- But this was indeed to cenſure and reproach Nature for got them by ill Actions, and partly becaufe they mand 4. the Author of the Treatiſe De Principiis Fuſti a o XIV. A Man is not only liable to have his own Decori, p. 165, &c. hach advanced on the Subject Actions imputed to him, bue likewiſe the Adions of Moral Habits . ar Thoſe Moral Habits which of other Men. Y Yet this cannot rightly be, unleſs we commonly call Evily are not (ſays he) really he has ſome way or other efficaciouſly concur'd in (7) Sins, nor worthy of Puniſhment, if confi- their Production. For otherwiſe Reaſon will ne- der'd in chemſelves becauſe they do not touch ver ſuffer that the Effect of a Moral A&tion ſhould the Effect with any Moral Cauſality, ſo long as be transferr'd from Oneco Another, unleſs this they continue H, bits, but only as they break out other Perſon had fome Influence on the Axion, into Aits. And if they prove a Hindrance to by ſome Performance or fome Omiſſion of his Virtue, this is done by an elicit Act of Men's own. Arrian. Epift. l. 1. 6. 28. (1)No Man ſuffers for Will, which will is then the Cauſe of the Moral the Fact of another . Marco Antonin. 1.8. 1. 53. Una Vice. But to eſtabliſh a Moral Cauſe ſuperior to to my Free-will my my Neighbour's Free-will (as his Life, the Will, is to take away the Nature of that Fa or his Body) is altogether indifferent. For although we culty, it is to turn one elicite into an enjoin'd Act, are all made one for another, yet i have four Minds and and to attribute to Habits an actual Efficacy of Underſtandings each of them their own proper and limit- operating without any Operation. For we ope; ed Juriſdiction. Elle another Man's Wickedneß might rate only by the Will, and anothing truly Moral be my Evil; which GOD would not bave, that it might can work before the elicite Ad of that Power not be in another Man's Power to muke me Unhappy. from which alone proceeds the Morality of any Thus when a sound arrives at our Ears againſt Performance. For an ill Habit before the Aět our Conſent, the bare bearing can be no Crime, of the Will, is only a Phyſical Thing, or a Mode if we proceed no further; unleſs, as (2) Lucian de of the Soul; but when the Soul works ſinfully Imagin. ſpeaks, You fancy any Crime in the bare Act of by the Will, then the Habit ceaſeth, and-is fuper- Hearing. Though ſometimes indeed a quiet and feded. The Efficacy by which ill Habits diſpoſe filent Hearing is conſtrued as a Token of Conſent. the Mind to ill Actions, is different from that And 'twas on this Account that the brave Germa- (for Inſtance) by which lewd Diſcourſe inftils nicus, when on the News of Auguſtus's Death, his Wantonneſs into the Minds of the Hearers: Be- feditious Soldiers offer'd him the Empire, ſtarted cauſe that Diſcourſe may be properly ſaid to work immediately in Confufion from his seat of Com- antecedently to the Will of him to whom it is ap- mand, as if he had been already tainted with Rebellion, plied, though the Effect doth not always follow.' Tacit. Anal. l. 1. c. 35. So alfo (3) Themift. Orat. 5: Which abſtruſe Doctrine may firly enough be ex- Heretofore, in Crimes of this ſort, no Diſtinction was plained by this Similitude: Splayneſs of Foot in made between Misfortune and Guilt : it being judg'd as it ſelf, and as long as the Foot reſts, is not a Fault heinous to hear a villanous Propoſal, though againſt one's againſt the Rules of Dancing, but when the Spark Will, as to contrive the Plot, or to attempt the Execution. not the of Toes , not ſider'd in itfelf, but the Will of him that hath ſo in our power to cloſe and contract them, as we do our awkwardly mou'd them. Eyes or our Mouth : Since theſe alone, of all our Inftru- The fame Author adds, That the Reaſon why ments of Senſe, are plac'd beyond our Will and Com we hate ill Habits, is partly becauſe the Perſons mand, lying ready to receive of Neceſſity every thing that are more prone to ill Actions on the account of at length, have reſtord our Faculty of Hearing to its juſt them: And that tbo' they are Diſeaſes of the Mind, Character of Innocence. get they do not deſerve Puniſhment in themſelves, but be- Sometimes, then, it happens that an Action is "cauſe they were voluntarily contracted. As if we fhould not imputed to the immediate Performer of it, but ſay, when we beat an unlucky Boy that puts out his to him who commanded it to be done. As when Ankle by a wanton and negligent Leap, the rea a Superior, under the Penalty of the ſevereſt E- ſon why we beat him, is not the putting out his vils, and ſuch as he is really able to inflia, enjoins Ankle (in itſelf,) but the idle Leap that caus'd it. a Subject the bare Execution of ſome Deed. Thus, Mr. Barb. NOTES. See Chap. 4. 6. 7. Note 2. foregoing, and Mr. Clerc's Ontology, Chap. 13. §. 4. In a word, we may ſay, with an ancient Greek Poet, That it is, in truth, hard to reform an ill. Habit, tha that is become almoſt natural, but not impoſſible, ſince we have ſeen fe- veral Perſons reform their Manners by good Advice given them by others, as his Words ſhew, Το 8 απoς ώαι χαλεποντ, ο Ξιωόντες γνώμαις ετερων Júlews, Weget ris, a'm 1: Μεταβαλλόντες τες τρύπες, Και οι πολλοι ταύτ' έπαθον Ariſtoph. Veſp. p. 504. 12 (7) Very well, but they are anſwerable for their evil Diſpoſitions, becauſe they have brought them on themſelves, by their own Fault. In ſhort, all theſe Reaſonings contain nothing in them but the idle Speculations of ſubtle Philoſophy. Out Notes on S. • (1) The Greek of Arrian runs thus, Ai draózesov prov zahti eftis, &c. Antoninus's thus, Toquã apadigstix To TË Tan- στον προαιρετικών εισης αδιαφόρον έσιν ως και το πνευματιών από και το σακίδιον και δε ότι μάλισα αλλήλων ένεκα κγόναμεν, όμως τα ηγεμόνικα η μ έκασον ή διαν κυρίαν έχε έπει οι έμελλεν και το πλησίον κακια εμέ κακόν άναι, όπερ εκ έδοξοτώ Θεώ, ίνα μη Ir lang ito sus ei tu fr. Marc. Antonin. Lib. 8. 9.50 (2) Lucian's Greek is this, "Exlos biul Tue voluilas drog.oeos &Omílw diversoApolog, in fine. 3) Themiſtins's Words (Orat. 19. de humanitate Ìheodofii.) are, Kal ránce refer s diexixeito ey TubM łyxańcuda didengar orsuxń. μας αλλ' εν καθεισήκει το ζαλάσαι τι η αθέσμων, και το ποιος το αρσελομενον, και τι τ φύσεως έγκλημα ήν σάτο και το ανθρώπε, όπ ή ακoίω εποιησεν αναπεπταμένω, και εκ ωσπερ τα βλέφαρα. και το σόμα εφ' ημιν κλίαν, και ανοιγνύαι, έτω και τα ώτα, αλλά άυτη μόνη σχεδόν ή αίθησις εκπεφυγε και εφ' ημών εξεσίαν, και έχει ανάγκη πάν το «εισοίον αυτή ωσπερ οικημα αθυ esh, και άνεων μένον. Συ δε * μεν ακούω' εξάλι παντάπασι τ εγκλημάτων. is 6 6 6 CHAP. V. Of Moral Actions in General, &c. 55. as (4) Procopius Hif. Goth. l. 1. well obſerves, “ An Caſe of Piſo in (6) Tacitus, whom Tiberius himſelf * Ambaſſador, at the Command of him whom he excuſed from having any Guilt in the Civil War, ſunce as repreſents, ſpeaks ſuch and ſuch Words; in which he was a Son be could not decline his Father's Onder's “ if there appear any Fault or Offence, it ought (d). But now his Father, by his Paternal Right not to be charged on him, but on his Maſter, and Power, could not have oblig'd him to engage whoſe Orders and Inſtructions he is under a Ne- in ſuch a Crime, and therefore he was mov'd only ceflity of obeying. When the Roman Senate de- by his Authority. clar'd the League with the Samnites to be Baſe and Secondly, He who gives a Conſent neceſſarily Inglorious, and voted the delivering up the Ge- requifite to the Performance, and without which neral, the Author of it, to the Enemy, it was a the Agent had not proceeded. Comp. Valer. Max. very ſenſleſs Propoſal mov'd by one of the Grave l. 2. f. 8. f. 2. (7) Liban. Progymn. He is to ſuffer for Fathers, that the ſame Puniſhment ſhould be in- the Fault, without whoſe Leave it had not been com- inflięted on the Perſon who held the Swine during mitted. Id. ibid. They are not ſo properly to be ac- the Ceremony of making the Agreement (a) (b). counted the Authors of Crimes, whoſe Hands commit When Mithridates put to Death Attilius and other them, as them, as they who gave the Power and Authority of Conſpirators againſt his Life, he pardon’d Attili- committing them. us's Freed-men, who were of the Company, Thirdly, He who ought to have forbidden an Òs do Torn S10 OVNO Rreferos (c), as Perſons that only obey'd ill Action, and did not; provided he had a full their lawful Maſter. Obligation thus to prohibit it, and that upon the But it's more uſual that the Action ſhall be im- account of that Obligation other Men had a Right puted both to the Performer and to the Com- of exacting ſuch a Prohibition from him. Vide mander of it. And this is chiefly done in theſe 1.45. D. ad L. Aquil . l. 2. de Noet al. a&t. l. 1. f. 1. D. three ways: Either, that the Commander ſhall be famil. furt. fec. Seneca Troad. Qui non vetat pec- the Principal Cauſe of the Action, and the Per care cum poſſit, jubet. Nor to forbid a Sin, when in former the Inferior and Acceſſory Cauſe, or that our Power, is to command it. Sophocl . Philoétet. (8) both ſhall be deem'd equally guilty, or that the Men are influenc'd into Vice by bad Inſtructors. Commander ſhall be the Inferior Cauſe, and the On this Score Diogenes beat a Schoolmaſter, whoſe Performer the Principal. And in all Caſes the Boys were too much given to their Bellies, Not Concurrence to another Man's AErion is made ei- imputing the Fault (as (9) Plutarch ſays) to them for ther poſitively or privatively, by ſome Commifli- not learning better things, but to him for not teaching on or Omiſlion. them. Libro, virtutem doceri polle. Vide Ælian. 1. 3. Firſt then, He is eſteem'd the Principal Cauſe C. 19. Juvenal. Sat. 14. of an Action conmitted immediately by another Nemo Satis credit tantum delinquere quantum Man, who commands ſomething to be done by one under his Power and Sway, or who by his bare Permittas ; adeo indulgent ſibi latius ipſi . (s) Authority, not eaſily to be reſiſted, moves a All think too ſtrait th' Indulgence they receive; Man to the Performance of ſome Deed, which And to themſelves a kinder Licenſe give. he could not have enjoin'd, by Command or Add. l. 4. 5.2. D. de Offic. Proconf. Thus Meſjalinus Power properly ſo call’d. And this laſt was the in Tacitus, An. 4. (10) adviſed, that a Decree of (a) This Cuſtoin of uſing Swine at Times of Pacification, is accounted for, Livy, lib. 1. c. 24. Si populus Rom. prior defecerit publico Confilio, dolo malo; Tu illo die, Jupiter, P. Rom. Sic ferito ut ego hunc Porcum hodie feriam : tantoque magis ferito quanto magis potes polleſque. ld ubi dixit Porcum Šilice percuſſit. To this Purpoſe, Virg. Æn. 8. 641. -C&Ja jungebant fædera Porca. See Mr. Ken. net's Rom. Antiquities, Part 2. chap. 17. (6) Cicero de Invent. 1. 2. Mamerlin. Paneg. 1. Whatever is tranſa&ted by his Commiſ-- Kon is properly the Deed of the Emperor. Seneca Troad. Ad authores redit fceleris coacti culpa. The Guilt of Miſchief atted upon Force turns on the Authors (c) Appian. Mithridates. (d) Ada. l. 37. Princ. D. ad L. Aquil. 1.11. S. 3, &c. D. de Injuriis ; Ant. Matth. de Crimin. Proleg.c. 1. f. 13, Mr. Barb. NOTES on s. 14. (4) The Greek is this, Λόγες σε όσες αν έκ πέμψαν 10 ακηκοως άπη, εκ αυτος εντευθεν αιτίαν ήν γε και κάγαθοι τύχωσιν όντες, εικότως αν λάβοι αλλ' ο μη κελέυσας φέρσιτο αν δικαίως το έγκλημα τέτο, τω δε πρεσβατή ο Φίσεργίαν εκτελέσαι ωείεςι μονον. Procop. Hift. Goth. 1. I. Among the Greeks, where a Maſter had an abſolute Authority over his Slaves, theſe were looked upon as meer Tools, whatever they did, whether Good or Evil, employed by their Maſter. See Baron Spanhemius upon Callimachus Hymn. in Cerer. Yet we ought to obſerve, that an Action perform’d at the Command of a Superior, is not altogether excuſable at the Judgment-Seat of GOD, eſpecially if he doth any thing which he knows clearly to be Evil in it felf. See S. 2. Note 9. So that we muſt by no means approve the opinion of the Ancients, That it is a ſort of Virtue to commit a Fault in Obedience to a Maſter, as the Poet fpeaks, Pro Dominis peccare, etiam virtutis loco est. Publ. Syr. v. 567. (5) Authority here, fignifies nor, a Power, or Command, which one has over another, but the particular Reſpect which a Per- ſon bears in his Mind to another, either upon the Account of his Merit, or Superiority, or ſome other Reaſon, which engages him to pay a great Deference to his Will and Pleaſure, (for which Reaſon the French Tranſlation renders it, La Conſideration, Re- ſpect, or Regard) according to Livy's Diſtinction, ſpeaking of K. Evander, Authoritate magis quàm imperio regebat ea Loca, Lib. 1. c. 7. He Ruled more by his Authority than Command. And, on the contrary, of a King of Numidia, named Capuſa, Quum magis jure gentis quàm Authoritate inter ſuos, aut viribus obtineret Regnum. Lib. 29. C. 29. He obtained the Kingdom more by Law of the Nation, than by any Authority he had with his people, or Power to oblige them. Tacitus alſo ſpeaks of the ancient German Kings, Mox Rex, vel Princeps, prout et ds cuique, prout nobilitas, prout decus bellorum, audiuntur, authoritate ſuadendi, magis quàm Jubendi poteftate, Ch. 11. Then the King, or Prince, as every one was more Aged, Noble, or Warlike, was liſtened to more for (6) Tacitus's Words are, Poft qua Tiberius Adoleſcentem ( Piſonem] crimine civilis Beli purgavit, Patris quippe Jusſa nec potuiſſe filium detre&tare. Tacit. Annal. lib. 3. c. 17. num. 1. (7) The Greek runs thus, oſ pelo più que, por púcarl G en dv 70 73 iné meginto fotov speito dirlw i meg xHv!ww opolder--- Avize αδικημάθα νομίζαν και ήταϊς χερσίν εργαζομένων δαλλον. ή 7 το δυνηθίώαι δεδωκότων. 'Liban. in Progymn. p. 12. D. (8) The Greek is, οι διακοσμενες προ των διδασκάλων λόγοισι γίγνονlαι κακοί. (2) His Words are, ΠαιδG οψοφαγάνα ο Διογενής τω Παθογωγό δακτυλον έδωκεν, Ορθώς και τα μη μανθάνον, αλλά και μη Earlo ti dusoluua mohous. In Libro, Virtutém doceri posſe. (10) Tacitus's Words are, Majalinus Cottacenſuit cavendum esse Senat în s conſulto, ut quanquam Inſontes Magiſtratus, do culpa aliena neſcii, provincialibus Vxorum criminibus, perinde quàm ſuis plecterentur. Tacit. Annal. 1. 4. C. 20. rum, 5, Senate 56 Of Moral Actions in general, &c. Book I. Senate ſhould pafs to puniſh the Magiftrates for the Road ſaw another Killd, or ſuffering any Vio- Crimes committed by their Wives, in Relation to lence, and did not reſcue him though he was able, the Government of the Provinces, whether they he was obnoxious to Capital Puniſhments. And themſelves were concern'd or unconcern'd in the if the Man was too weak to give Alliſtance and Fa&t. And thus too, by the Engliſh Laws, the Deliverance, he was oblig'd to diſcover and pro- Husband is oblig'd to Anſwer and to make Satisfa- fecute the Actors: Upon Default thereof, he re- &tion for the Wrong his Wife doth to another, ei- ceived a ſer Number of Blows, or was enjoin'd a ther by Word or Deed; becauſe he neglected to uſe three Days Abſtinence from Vi&tuals (e). And thus his Power of reſtraining her. Nay, if the Husband Abas King of Perſia, to clear his Country of Thieves, and Wife commit Felony together, the Wife is ac- publiſh'd an Order, that whenever any perſon was counted neither a Principal nor an Acceſſary in kill'd, or plunder'd the Inhabitants of the nextTown the Crime, becauſe ſhe is ſuppoſed to have acted ſhall be accountable for the Fact(f). So with the(13) upon Neceſſity, by vertue of the Obedience ſhe Spartans, he that did not reprove a Perſon who of- owed her Husband (a). fended in his Preſence, was punilhi'd as a Partner Fourthly, He who commands, or hires a Per- in the Crime. So (14) Cato exhorting the Magi- ſon to perform a Villany (b). ſtrates to put the Laws in Execution againſt Offen- Fifthly, He who afliſts; as he who brings and ders, told them, 'That thoſe who were able to re- holds the Ladder, while a Thief gets into a Win ſtrain wicked Doers, and yet neglected this Power, dow : He who ſtrikes the Money out of a Man's did plainly affent and contribute to their Enormi- Purſe, that another Rogue may pick it up: He 'ties (g). As for the Silence and the Diffimulati- that drives away a Man's Cattle, that his Comrade on of Magiſtrates, Plato (5) has given thoſe Crimes may ſeize them, and carry them off (o). their due Cenſure: The ſecond Enemy to a State (ſays Sixchly, He that conceals or receives ſtollen he) is the Man, who, thó' be be not ftrictly a Partner in Goods. Phocylid. Aupóteer. xam MS, Vj xre-bot pulu o this Villany (he means Treaſon,) yet while be enjoys og ó repur foes. They that receive are arrant Thieves no leß Leſ the higheſt Offices in the Comimonwealth, does not obſerve , than they that ſteal. Plato de LL. 1. 12. He that the Conſpiracy; and if he does obſerve it, but of a time- knowingly takes into his Keeping ſtoln Goods, Shaill be e rous Beſeneſs neglects to ſučcorr and to deliver his Coun- ſteem'd equal in Guilt to the Thief himſelf. L. 1. Princ. try. The Story of Scedofins's Daughters in Plutarch, D. de fugitivis . Add. c. 1. D. de receptatoribus, Amator. Narration. Grotiùs ad Prov. xxix. 24. He that & Edia. Reg. Theodoric. c. 116. Concerning the knows the Thief, and doth not, when requir' d upon Oath Alliftants or Abettors in Adultery, ſee. l. 8. 1. 9. D. ad before a Magiſtrate, diſcover him, is in Guilt equal to L. Julian de adulter. (11) Periander the Tyrant of him, Vide Levit. v. 1. (15) Corinth threw all the Bawds into the Sea, Heraclid. For the fame Reaſon, if a Keeper, who has un- de Polit. Add. Anth. Matth: de Crimin. Proleg. derraken the Care of a Madman, prove negligent, C. 1. f. 11. & ad 1. 47. D. tit. 10. C 1. & 2. and the Madman happen to do any Hurt, the Seventhly, He who did not affift the fuffering Keeper ſhall be anſwerable for the Fae, tho’ the Party, tho' he was oblig'd to do ſo. (12) Cicero Madman be not capable of Imputation. Vide l. 14. Off. 1. He that doth not, when he is able, guard and D. de Offic. præſid. protect an injur'd Perſon, is as much in Fault as if be Thoſe Perſons are reckon'd the Inferior, or leſs Should deſert bis Parents, his Country, or his Friends . principal Cauſes of other Men's Adions, who have Add. Anth. Matth. de 'Crimin. Proleg. c. 1. f. 15. advis’d, commended, or cajold them before the Thus Soldiers, who are hired for a Guard in a Facts, in ſuch a Manner, as that their Counſel, of Journey, if, on the Approach of a Number of Praiſe, or Flattery, has had any weight in promo- Villains, whom they are able to grapple with, ting their Undertakings. For otherwiſe, à Man they refuſe to fight, they are to be reckon'd them who barely commends a Crime, and yet by his ſelves among the Villains. Thus a Fire ſhall be Commendation contributes nothing to it, ought rightly imputed to the Watchman, who ſaw it not to be puniſht for the Crime it ſelf, but ſhould kindling, yet neglected to ſtop it, or call for help ſuffer for his ill Thoughts and Deſigns (i). It will (d). Thus åmong the Egyptians, if a Man on the not be very unjuſt to reckon thoſe in the ſame Claſs, (a) Chamberlain's Preſent State of England, p. 1. c. 16. (b) Vide Anth. Matth. d.l. f. 12. do ad l. 48. D. tit. 6. 3. S. 16: (c) Add. I. 54.5.4. 1. 66. /. 2. D. de furtis. (d) Add. Ezech. xxxiii. v. 6. (e) Diodor. Sic. l. 1. c. 77. Add. l. 3. D. Naute caup. Stab. I. 2. 1. 6. D. ad L. Pompeiam de Paricid. l. 7. d. c. l. 9. f. 1. D. ad D. Cornel. de fall. 1.6. S. 8. D. de re militari. (f) Vide Pet. de Valle Itinerar. P. 2. Epift. 1. (8) Vide l. 2. D. de noxal. a&t. l. 7. L. qui fine manumiſſione, t. 1. D. de Magiſtratibus contes (b) De LL. l. 9. (i) Ovid. Triſt. 1. 5. El. ult. Qui monet ut facias quod jam facis, ille monendo Who prompts you to go on, approves the Ways Laudat, do hortatu comprobat a&ta ſuo. You took before ; and his Advice is Praiſe. So in the Conſtitutions of the Lombards, l. 1. tit. 7. 1. 25. He that ſtands by and encourageth the Commiſion of any Villany, is himſelf adjudg’d an A&tor in it. Add. Rom. I. 5. ult. Quinctil . Declam. 255. To commit a Villany, and to approve of it, are A&tions naturally reſembling each other, Anth. Matth. de Crimin, Proleg. c. 1. 1.9, 10, & 14. (11) The Greek is, Tas neodywy os tão as yo te móvos. As to thoſe who are Procurers for Adulterers, fee Digeſt. Lib. 48. Tit. 5. ad Legem. Julian de Adulteriis, Leg. 8,6 9. (12) Cicero's Words are, Qui autem non defendit, nec obfiſtit, si poteſt, injurie, tam eſt in vitio quàm fi parentes, aut amicos, aut pas triam deferat. De Offic. l. 1. C. 7. Mr. Hirtius cites alſo Ariſtotle de Mirab. auſcult, where he ſpeaks of a certain Road of Italy, between France and Spain, in which the Inhabitants neareſt the Place were obliged to indemnify Travellers, if they had had any thing taken froin them, or received any Wrong or Injury. (13) Plutarch's Words (Inſtit. Lacon.) are there, 'Oré law ornádws me vo wrice pup vorld, 'evox the low omniuów, was se rj 8 euaplaya (14) Plutarch's Words are, Ilægopuestas de toca esgerlas emtidão Tois cenasteveciv, éneze mou swauéves Xwaven og's yeuxãos mere vlasy av so absoi, xaTaxendav. Plut. Apophthegm. (15) The Author himſelf a little lower ſays, Nothing is to be imputed to the Madman; whereuron it would have been hecter to have put this Example among thoſe Actions for which a Man is as much reſponſible as if they had been actually done by him. See Dig. Lib. 1. Tit. 18. De Offic. Praſid. Leg. 14. who niend is. Mr. Barb. NOTES. CHAP. V. Of Moral Actions in General, &c. 49 bound and ſuch , ; That can . . l. . கோணல் * Tð who by their Recommendation have preferr'd a gives Counſel to his Sovereign (whether a Monarch, er Man to the Care and Management of any Buſineſs, an Aſſembly) when he asks it, let it pleaſe o difpleaſe , ſince 'tis decent they ſhould bluſh for his Faults and cannot be puniſli’d, becauſe he gave it to ſuch as were Miſcarriages (a). willing to hear it, whatſoever it should be. But he But as to the Marter of Counſel, it's worth while here ſhould have added, if the Counſellor gives his to run over the Diſputes of the (16) Civilians , Opinion bona fide, and has a perfe&t Knowledge of the where they are arguing whether the Words Ope Matter in Debate. • For it is a piece of Wickedneſs and Confilio, by Help and by Counſel, are to be un to pretend to give a Judgment about a Thing derſtood in a Conjunctive or in a divided Senſe. which we are unacquainted with. He preſently For if Counſel imports the ſame as Intention or De- ſubjoins; But if one Subject gives Counſel to another to lign, he only will be guilty of another Man's do any thing contrary to the Laws, avhether that Coun- Theft, who aſlifted him in it, not out of Impru- ſel proceed from evil Intentions , or from Ignorance cnly, dency, but with premeditated Wickedneſs (b). it is puniſhable by the Commonwealth, becauſe Ignorance If Counſel has been given without Help, it will of the Laws is no good Excuſe, where every one is be requiſite to enquire, whether it were General to take notice of the Laws to which he is ſubject. or Special. The former kind is, for for Example, Hence that Maxim in England, commended ſo when a Man, hearing another complain of Pover- highly by Dr. Bates (f), cannot be receiv'd with- never mi- a Counſellor will not in human Cogni- ſtake, nor do any Man an Injury, becauſe all the Fault fance, paſs himſelf for a Thief. But if a Man has and Puniflıment is deriv'd, as it ought to be (19), on bis given ſpecial Counſel to another, as, if he has Miniſters and Counſellors , whoſe Duty is to Admoniſla the fhown him what way to break into a Houſe, told Prince, to deny him their Aſſiſtance, whin be enters on on ill him the fitteſt Time, and where the Things be Deſigns, and rather to quit their Places, than to obey him that may be moſt conveniently carried off, or when he commands the doing of any thing contrary to the how he may hide himſelf after the Fact, ſuch an Laws. Add. Gell. 1. 1. c. 3: Where he one will have a very ſtrong Twang of the Thief Chilon, that he was troubled with Remorſe of (c). It is farther obſervable, in reference to Conſcience, upon his having perſuaded the Judges Counſel, and other like Influences on other Men's to (20) abſolve a Friend of his manifeſtly guilty, Actions, that by them the Guilt is only commu and whom he himſelf had in private condemn'd. nicated; but not wholly devolv’d from the Actor 'Tis a remarkable Story which we find in the fame to the Exhorter, unleſs the former were under an Author, l. 11. c. 18. of a Perſon's being convicted (17) Obligation to put his Advice in Practice. as a Man-ſtealer, for hiding, with a Caſt of his Hence Diodotus in Thucidides (d) complains with Gown, a Runnagate Slave, who was paſſing with- good Reaſon, That the Orators in a State ſhould in ſight of his Maſter. be accountable for their Advice, and the People It is doubtful, whether we ſhould rank under not at all accountable for hearkening to them.' this, or under the former Claſs thoſe, who by their He adds (18), If he that believ'd, as well as he that. Example excite others to ſuch Sins, as they would perſwaded a Buſineß, were liable to be puniſhd, you have otherwiſe declined. Matth. xviii. v. 6. Ju- would proceed much more wiſely in jour Judgments. venal. Sat. 1. when you fall into Paſſions on any Diſappoint- Greg tot us in agris ment of your Hopes, you only puniſh bim who gave the Unius ſcabie cadit, & porrigine porci; Advice, and not your ſelves , who have always born Uvaque conſpecta livorem ducit ab'uva. So great a Share in the Miſtake or Miſcarriage. Hence ) From one infected Beaſt the Murrain reigns incident to the Nature of Counſel , that whatſoever it be, O'er all the Drove, and ſpreads them on the Plains: he that asks it cannot in Equity accuſe or puniſh it. For And one corruptedGrape its purpleNeighbour ſtains to ask Counſel of another, is to permit bim to give ſuch Add. Grot. l. 2. c. 17. f. 6. &c, and c. 21. . 2. &c. Counſel, as he fhall think best ; and conſequently he that Ant. Matth. de Crimin. Proleg.c. 1. 5. 6. &c. (6) L. 52. . 13. D. de furt is. (c) Vide Ant. Matth. de Crimin. Proleg. c. 1. f: 7: (d) L. 3.6.43. (e) Leviath. c. 25. i) Elench. Mot. p. 1. und 301010001 has Mr. Barb. NOTES on 5. 2. *MTE YOW!, douw dw 3* (16) The Words of the Roman Law are, Interdum quoque furti tenetur; qui ipſe furtum non fecit, qualis est is, cujus ope confilio fie factum est . Inftit. Lib . 12. Tit: L. De Obligationibus, que ex delito naſcuntur (and not De furtis , as this Author and Grotius cite it, for that's no Title in the Inſtitutions.) See allo Digeſt. lib. 50. tit. 16. De verbórum ſignif. Leg. 53. S. 2. de furtis Leg. 36. S. 1. (17) Which does not commonly happen ; but, on the contrary, he is reſponſible for his Fidelity orily, as cicero ſpeaks very well, Deinde, etiamſi te au&tore, quid debet, qui confilium dat; præter fidem, i. e. If we adviſe others for the beſt, we are not an- ſwerable for the Evene. Lib. 16. ad Attic. Epiſt . 7. See MF. Hirtius's Notes upon $. 12. of this Chop. :,() , 'E, 75 , rj S @ . . , wens i , . c Io (19) In England it is common to lay all the Faults of the Prince upon his Miniſters, who are indeed very often moſt guilty of them, but the Fault of the Miniſters does not always excuſe the Fault of the Sovereign; for they have their Reaſon and Judgment, and may over-rule them, ſo that if they ſuffer themſelves to be governd by thoſe that are about them, 'tis their Fault. In moſt Affairs they ought to fee with their own Eyes, and not leave themſelves to be biaffed by a vicious and corrupe Miniſtry. But if they are not able to ſearch into the bottom of Things themſelves, and diſtinguiſh between Good and Evil , they ought to leave the Governing the People to ſuch as are able, for I do not ſee but the Saying of Charles Barromaus, which he ſuch an Employ, why are they so ambitious as to ſeek it ? 'If they are capable, why so negligent? Mr. Bernard in his Nov. Rep. of Let- ters, ſpeaks the ſame rhing in plain Terms, which 'twere to be wiſhed Princes would conſider on as ferioully as they are judiciouſly (20) See the Reflections which Mr. De Sacy makes upon it, in his Treatiſe of Friendship, Lib. 2: But now, Thucid. lib. 3. C. 43. made. I From 50 Воок І. Of Law in general. From all theſe Obſervations it is eaſy to perceive his Permiſſion of Sins. For he is not oblig'd to the Reaſon and the Limitation of thoſe common reſtrain them in ſuch a Manner, as to make them Axionis ; What a Man does by another, of that he him- impoſſible to be committed: that is, by withdraw. Self is reckon'd the Author : We make thoſe things our ing our natural Strength, or extinguiſhing the Li- own, to which we grant our Conſent (a), (a), That which, berty of our Will: ſince upon the Removal of in Matters relating to 95, is done by others upon our Com- cheſe, no ſort of Moral Adions could be performa mand, obliges us our ſelves : That is eſteem d our Action by Man (b). the Execution of which we have impos'd on another; and Thai Permiſſion then of another Man's Action, the like. As for that Communication of Actions, is, void of - Il Moral Effect, which we give when to which reſults from the Union of a Moral Bodý, hinder the Action is beyond our Ducy, or above it will be hereafter explain'd in its proper place. our Strength; unleſs this Weakneſs and Inability When one is ſaid to partake of another's Action, is procur'd by our Fault, and unleſs the Ignorance upon account of his own Permillion, or becauſe aroſe thro' ſupine Negligence, and within that he did not hinder, the A&tion, in this caſe it is rés Degree of Diligence which we are oblig'd to ob- quiſite not only that he ſhould have been able by ſerve. his natural Strength to have hindred it, but like Laſtly, Nothing can be imputed upon the ac- wife that he ſhould have had an Obligation in- count of permitting a good Action, which we cumbent on him to hinder it.. When either of might indeed, but ought not to have hinder’d. theſe Two Conditions fails, nothing can be im. Thus he can impute nothing to me (or I owe him puted to him, who gives another leave to act at nothing) who has given me Permiſſion, or has not Pleaſure. And therefore GOD ALMIGHTY is forbidden me to uſe my Right; that is, has done capable of no Imputation, upon the account of me no Injury. (a) L.I.S. 1. D. do co per quem fa&tum erit. (b) 'Tis a notable Saying of Lucian, de Merced. Conduct. GOD is not in the Fault, but the Man that makes it. And thus we intend no inere than a Jest, when we say on Some Occaſions, Now I'll give it leave to rain, or the like. Thiw beloon on 160 ogbulodda borusquiver goqi COND bao ng sibat umido cos w oo guide toot CH A P. VI. in grote of the Rule of MORAL Actions, or of Law in Generdi. Blow boncin The CONTENTS of every Seation of the fifth Chapter. 1. A Lavy differs from Counſeli, X. It can't be done by meer Förce. II. From a Bargain or Covenant, XI. Nor by any Excellency of Nature alone, III. And from Right. Sin sieme a XII. What gives greater Force to an Obligation. IV. What a Law is. XIII. The Lawgiver and Law ought to be known. V. What an Obligation. XIV. What are the Eſſential Paris of a Law? VI. How it comes to paß that a Man is obliged. XV. What is the permiſſion of a Law? VII. No Man is obliged to himſelf . XVI. The Matter of Laws. VIII. He that is to be obliged must have a Superior. XVII. Who is obliged by a Laru? IX. How a Man may lay an Obligation on another. XVIII. The Diviſion of a Law. E come now to conſider of that Moral Rule, miffion, over which Perſon, at leaſt as to the pre- or Law (a), by which Moral Actions are ſent Buſineſs, he has no proper Power, fo as chat to be ſquar'd, and according to their Agreement he can lay any direct Obligation on him, but muſt or Diſagreement with which they acquire peculiar leave it to his Pleaſure and Choice, whether he Qualities (1) And here we muſt take Care in the will follow the Counſel, or not (2). Yet Coun- firſt place, accurately to diſtinguiſh Law from fel indeed may adminifter occafion to an Obliga- fome other things which ſeem to bear ſome Rela- tion, in as much as it furniſhes a Man with ſome tion to it, and which for that Reafonare frequent- Knowledge, by which an Obligation may be pro- ly-confounded with it : And theſe are Counſel , Co- duc'd or increas'd. Thus, a Phyſician cannot by venant, and Right. Now Law differs from Counſel Vertue of any Power or Command, order his Pa- in this, that by the latter a Man endeavours, with tient to take ſuch things, and to abſtain from o- Reaſons taken from the Nature of the Thing, to in thers; but while he ſhews one thing to be condu- duce another Perſon to ſome Performance or 0. cive, and another pernicious to Health, the Pa- W (a) See Book 2. C. I. Mr. Barb. NOTES. EN (1) Our Author ought to have treated in the beginning of this Chapter, of the Neceffity of a Law ia general, i. e. Pew thar it is not agreeable to the Nature of Man to live without ſome Law, which natural Order he follows himſelf, in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, lib. 1. ch. 2. §. I.. See alſo what he ſays, lib. 2. §. 6. (2) So the Civil Law teaches, Nemo ex confilio obligatur; etiamfi expediat ei, cui dabatur, quia liberum est cuique apud !e Explorare, an expediat fibi Conſilium. Digeft. lib. 17, cit. 1. Mandati. tient CHAP. VI. Of Law in general. 59 thou ſo, the Phyſician holds over him, but by the Law of People, and so were, in the Way of Bargain unwilling. Laſtly, The Right of a Com redres III. As for the Term of Right, as it imports a Right of a Lawgiver cannot be taken se tient is bound to embrace the former, and to avoid were made upon the Propoſal of the Magiſtrate, the latter; not of any which with the , and by the the , as it Nature, which commands every Man to take care or Stipulation, they gave them the Name of Cove- of his own Life and Health. But Law, though it nants and Agreements , before-mention'd. Tho' in- ought not to want its Reaſons, yet theſe Reaſons deed, neither upon account of the Major Part of are not the Caufe why Obedience is paid to it, the Peoples conſenting or agreeing to them, can but the Power of the Exactor, who when he has Democràtical Laws be properly ftilla Covenants . ſignify'd his Pleaſure, lays an Obligation on the For this Agreement is only the Manner by which Subject to act in Conformity to his Decree, tho' the Supream Power, lodgʻd in a General Aſſembly, perhaps they do not ſo well apprehend the Rea- exerts irs Force; that being taken for the Will and fons of the Injunction. To which Purpoſe Mr. the Decree of All, to which the Greater Number Hobbs (a) thus expreſſeth himſelf; Counſel (ſays he) gives Conſent .. Precept, So from the Thing preſcribed : But Law, or proper Com- cil by any Member about framing & Decree, is ve- mand, is a Precept, in which the Reaſon of our Obedience ry different from the Conſent which a Man de- is taken from the Will of the Preſcriber.1 For no Man clares at his Entrance on a Covenant : For in this can fay, Sic Volo, Sic fubeo, fo I will, and ſo I com- laft Cafe, a Perſon that diffents is not bound, and mand; unleſs ang such asri banals used the Party cannot proceed withouc him: whereas of uigved versuri bos in the former Caſe, even the difſenting Party is Stet pro ratione voluntas. gerigile tied and obliged by the Plurality of Votes. his Will is his Reaſon. cunodw.brain do The remaining Points of Diſtinction between We obey Laws therefore, not Principally up- a Compact or Covenant, and a Law, are obvious. on Account of the Matter of them, but upon For a Compact is a Promiſe, but a Law is a Command. Account of the Legiſlator's Will. And thus, Law In Compacts the Form of Speaking is, I will do ſo is the Injunction of him, who has a Power over thoſe to and for, but in Laws the Form runs, whom be preſcribes ; but Counſely of him, who basiino after an Imperative manner. In Compacts , ſince ſuch Power. To do the Things enjoin'd by Law, is Mat- they depend, as to their Original, on our Will, ter of Duty; to do thoſe appointed by Counſel, is Matter we firſt determine what is to be done before we of free Pleaſure . The End of Counſel is dire&ted toward are oblig'd to do it But in Laws, which ſuppoſe him who receives it: And this End he is at Liberty the Power of others lover us, we are in the firſt to weigh and to approve. But tho Law too has place obligʻd to ack, and afterwards the manner commonly ſome End directed toward thoſe who of acting is determin’d. And therefore he is not preceive it, yet it does not leave them the Right of bound a Compact, who did not freely tie himſelf exanining and reje&ting this End, but actually de- by giving his Conſent ; by giving his Conſent ; but we are for this reaſon termines it by enjoining it. - Counſel is only given to oblig'd by a because we owd antecedent thoſe are willing to have it, but Law reaches the (). at the Pleaſure of him who receives the Counſel ; but the Power of acting granted, or left free by the Laws, fure of thoſe on whom he impoſes the Law (b). U ng thing as the Law itſelf . That is, When we are II. Neither were thoſe Ancients accurate e- ſaid to have a Right by the Divine Law, of doing nough in their Expreſſions, who frequently apply fuch or fuch or ſuch a thing, g we muſt not imagine that to Laws the Name of (1) Common Agreements (c). the ſame thing is enjoin'd and commanded by the For beſides that,oneither the Divine Poſitive Laws, Divine Law, and that therefore we may fairly do nor the Laws of Nature, had their Riſe from the it, tho' it ſhould be forbidden by the Laws of Men. Agreement of Men, and therefore chat Title can For, For, lince a Man hath a Power of doing all ſuch only be attributed to Civil Laws ; even (2) theſe things as can proceed from his Natural Abilities, are not properly Covenants and Agreements, tho? except thoſe which are forbidden by-fome Law, there was indeed ſome Intervention of Compact hence,, by common Cuſtom of Speech, the thoſe at the Original of Civil Power. It's plain that Things which are not prohibited by ſuch or ſuch the Grecians, as in their other Politick Speeches, ſo a Law, we are ſaid to have a Right of doing (1) in this too, had an Eye to their own Democrati-sis by that, Law. Right therefore, in this ſenfe, de- cal Governments ; in which, becauſe the Laws notes a Liberty, but Lan 'includes fome Bond www abowibilomino zaidi oriz 10 sausius T (a) De Cive, c. 146: foto ime (b) Add Dig. B. 17. Titiv. De Mandato: 1 bag (6) Ew.hxin tūstersws: Sa Ariffotle Rhetor. (d) Vide Hobbs Loc. cit. . 2. Add. Grot. Annot. in Matth. Inſcript. vocab. n reutvà guxu. se 233sid:? Mr. Barb. Notes on Chap. VI. S. 2: and 3. (1) Kisvas ouathras, agius aonics, as the Greeks aimoſt every where in their Writings do: "So Ariſtotle defines a Law, Aóza asesopiv@ xed' oựconozí as noivin módows. 1 A Law is an Order decreed by the Cortimon Agreement of a City, Rhet. ad Alexandr. obat: a. See alfo Chap: 2,6 3. So Iſocrates calls an A# of Oblivion and indemdſty, owsien conces, the Covenant of a City: City, Lib. 10. cho ty See alſo the Digeft.Lib. 1. tit. 3. de Legib . Senatuſque Conſult. & Longa conſuet, Leg. 1, & 2. (2) Indeed the End of Civil Laws is to engage Men to the Obfervation of certain Things, by a Mocive more prevalent than a ny natural Obligation, i.e. by the Fear of Puniſhment, which the Breaker of them muft expect from certain Perſons inveſted with an Authority over them. But fuppoſe a Number of Men Thould feparare themſelves from any Civil Society, and agree toge ther to obſerve cercain Rules to at by, yet having no Sovereign Power provided with ſufficient Abilities to puniſh Tranfgreffors, this Engagement could have no other Efect, than fuch Agreements as are made by natural Right have, and by conſequence could not oblige as a Law. Element. Juriſprud. Univerſ: (1) This Ulage is not ill-grounded, for the Liberty which the Laws leave us, to do, or nor do contain Things, includes fome- thing more than a Negative Permiffion. See Note 2, on Paragraph 15. wola 26 item, 3011 1 BU115 con ad Alex. c. 1, 2, 3. TO WE'9751" 1 I 2 and 60 Of Law in general. Воок. . 7° that it is the Will 4 and Engagement, by which our Natural Liberty to exhibit ſuch and ſuch. Things to others; buc is reftrain'd (2), thoſe too which are concern'd about the other IV. In general, a Law, may conveniently enough Vertues, and which extend no farther than the be defin'd, a Decree by which a Sovereign obligeth a Sub- Agent's own Perſon. For which Reafon Laws ject to conform bis A&tions. to what he preſcribes (may, and frequently are, made againſt Drunken- We call it a Decree, not as it remains in the Mind peſs (c), and other kinds of Intemperance, which and Will of the Party decreeing, but as it is com Vices are ſo very prejudicial co the Parties com- municated to the Subject in ſuch a manner, as to mitting them (4). The ſame muſt be held as to let him underſtand the Neceſſity of his conforming (s) Sumptuary Laws, which preſcribe the Meaſure to it: and therefore the Term Decree is here equi- of Expences in Victuals, Cloaths, Building; and valent to Command. And we think it an, indiffe- other Furniture or Proviſions. In which Particu- rent matter, whether one ſhould call a Law a De Jars if any Man offends, he doth no one an Injury, cree or a Speech, provided it be not eſteem'd necef- provided he defray the Charges out of his own ſary to it, that it be promulgated either vivå voce, Stock: And yet there's no Queſtion to be made, or in Writing ; ſince it is ſufficient that the Will of. but that a Subje&t may by Laws be obliged to the Legiſlator be any way made known to the Sub- Frugality, which conduceth ſo highly to every jest, tho' it ſhould only be by the internal Sug- Man's Intereſt and Advantage... geſtion of Nagural Light. Therefore we take it V. But ſince in the Definition of Laws it hath to be an uſelęis piece of Subtlety and Niceneſs in been aſſerted, that they proceed from a Superior, Mr. Hobbs (a), when he maintains, that the Laws and that they have in themſelves the Power (1) of of Nature have no farther the Force of Laws, than Obliging, it ſeems neceſſáry that we here ſhew what as they are promulgated in Holy Scriptures by the Word Obligation is, and whence it ariſeth; as alſo who is of God; and not as they are certain Concluſions appre capable of receiving an Obligation, and how one bended by Renfon, concerning the dying or the omitting Man can Oblige another, or, which is the ſame of Things. For from the barę Dietates of Reaſon, thing, how it comes to paſs that one Man may, we do not only underſtand that the Obſervance of by Virtue of his Authority and Command, enjoin Nature's Laws is good and profitable to Mankind, another ſuch and ſuch Duties. Obligation, then, we have already defin'd; Ch I. of God, that Men ſhould govern their Aétions ? 21. a Moral Operative Quality, by which a Man by thoſe Rules; which is ſufficient to the Effence of is bound to perform fomewhat, or to ſuffer fome- a Law, Tho' ſtill indeed this Reply may be made, what. In thus defining Obligation we conſider it as that Natural Laws, even as they are the Dictates it inheres in the Perſon obliged. Biſhop Cumber- of Reafon, cannot be conceiv'd any otherwiſe land, Ch. V. f. 27. in his Definition proceeds ano- than in the manner of Speeches, Propoſitions, or ther way, conſidering Obligation as it is an Ad of Sentences (2). the Legiſlator, by which he ſhews or declares, As to Grotine's Définition (b), where he fays the chas Axions conformable to his Laws are neceffarý Law obligeth to that wbich is Right, we muſt ob to be done by the Perſons for whom the Laws are ſerve, that he ſuppoſeth ſomewhat to be Juſt and ordain’d. The Roman Lawyers call it (2) Bond of the Right before any Rule or Law; whence it muft Law, by which we are neceſſarily tied to this or follow, that the Law of Nature doth not make that. For by means of it a kind of Moral Bridle what we call Right, but only denotes or points is put upon our Freedom of Adion, ſo that we it out as a thing already Exiſtent. Concerning cannot rightly take any other way than what we which h Hypotheſis we have already declar'd oor are thus guided to. Not that it can fo far reftrain Mind, Chap. II. 5. 6. Mens Wills as to render them unable to ſteer a To conclude this Head, It is evident that under ďifferent Courſe, tho' at their own Peril : for in the Name of Laws, not only thoſe are compre- this fenſe Arrian's (c) Affertion will ever hold true, hended which belong to Juſtice ftri&ly ſo called, llegasgéoewe drzorgias ideia xúco, No Man is Mafter directing us, upon a full and perfe& Obligation (3), of another's Will. Tavo vinaoong 2003 (a) De Cive, 1. 3. 1. ule. 110rb) B. T. . t. 1. 9 Todore o Tips Mr. Barb. Notes on S. IV, V. (), In Epi&et. l. 4. C. 12. (2) This fully includes the general Notion of a Law. See the ſame Note. isilo 7911to zied ni an This Definition agrees only ro Obligatory Laws, i. .i which oblige us pofitively to act or not. But we ſhall thew in our fecond Note ôn . Is. that the General Noțion of a law taken in the full extent of it, as ’çis my deſign to explain it there, com- prehends beſides that a Permiſſion to act, or not act, in certain Caſes, as we judge convenient. (2) To make the Arguings of the Author compleats theſe words ought to be added,- But this is no foundation for Mr. Hobbs's Hypotheſis. (3) To underſtand this Diſtinction of perfe&t and Imperfe&t Obligation fee Chap. VII. of this Book, f. 7. and Book III. Chap. IV. 1.3, &c. See alſo what has been ſaid before, Chap. I $. 19. concerning Power...001 (4) To this we may referr a Law of Seleucius, commanding, That whoſoever of his Subje&ts happening to be Indiſpos’d, Mould drink pure Wine, unleſs upon the Advice of e Phyſician, if he recoverid, sauld ſuffer Death, for exceeding the Bounds of temperance without is of Opinion, that all the Laws which paſs under the Name of Seleucus, and of which we find divers Fragments in Authors, are all forged. See his Engliſh Diſcourſe on Phalaris, p. 339. and Novell. de Repub. des Lette by Mr. Bernard, June 1699. Art. v. (6) The Author will treat of them Lib. VIII. Chap. V. 8.3: There is a curious Academick Diſcourſe upon this Súbjęłt, among his more choice Academick Differtations (which I ſhall ſometimes quotė) printed ar Lunden in Sweden, Anno 1675. and reprinted at Amſterdam, under the Title of Anale&ta Politica, i.c. Politick Fragments, fome Years ſince, if I miſtake not. (1) This is the effect of all Laivs Obligatory, for as for the Laws of ſimple Permiffion, of which we ſhall ſpeak Note 2. §. 15. the Effect is to give a Moral Right, or Power, to have certain Things certainly and lawfully, or to do and require certain Actions of another, if we judge ir convenient. See Chap. I. §. 19, 20. aforegoing. (2) This Author gives the general Definition of the Inſtitutes, which properly reſpects Payments, or all other Engagements which Men enter into of their own accord, with relation to another; for chus it runs, Obligatia est Juris vinculum, quo neceffitate wſtringimur alicujus Rei folvendă ſecundum noftra civitatö fura. Inſtitut. Lib. 3. Tit. 14. princ. Now اما.. 21 2 1903 a SO CHA P. VI. Of Law in general. 61 other Obligation, and if there be any other, he believes that If it be looked into with care, it would be found to end in that. • Now, altho' there are many other things which poſe, may put himfelf under ſuch a Condition as have an Influence on the Will, in bending towards that it ſhall be unlawful for him afterwards to re- one fide rather than the contrary, yet Obligation cede. 650D hath this peculiar Force beyond them all, that Now a Man is ſuppos'd to have chang’d his whereas they only preſs the Will with a kind of Will, not only when he exprefly declates his pre- natural Weight or Load, on the Removal of which fent Difike of his former Choice, but likewiſe it returns of its own accord to its former Indiffe- when he hath done any thing inconſiſtent with rence; Obligation affects the Will in a Moral Way, his preceding Reſolution. And from this Princi- and inſpires it inwardly with ſuch a particular ple may be deduc'd the greateſt part of what the fenſe, as compels it to paſs Cenſure itſelf on its Civilians deliver concerning Repentance, or the al- own Actions, and to judge itſelf worthy of ſuffer- tering of a Purpoſe. For if we enquire after the ing Evil, if it proceed not according to the Rule general and ultimate Cauſe, why to repent of a preſcrib'd. And hence alone we may underſtand Deſign ſhould in ſome Aas be lawful, in others how ſufficient the ſtrength of the Obligation is to not, we ſhall find it to be no other but this, that the bending and inclining the Will; ſince there's ſome Ads are attended with an external Bond, nothing but the Thoughts of that Good or Evil (4) which forbids any Change of a Purpoſe once de- which our A&tions may bring on ourſelves or 0- clar'd; whereas in the reft, the Will is left to the thers, that can lay any Neceflity of ſuch a Perfor- Exerciſe of its intrinſick Liberty. The former mance, or of ſuch an Omiſſion, upon the Mind of Cafe uſually happens, when upon Suppoſition of a Man whilft in debate about future Concerns; ſup- Change in one Man's Reſolution ſome other Man poſing that the Will is allow'd its proper Liberty, would be highly injur'd and (1) prejudic'd, and ſo and that fuch Adions are to be exerted, as may be Occaſion would be adminiſtred to the breaking off properly imputed to the Agent. And in this re- of all Society and Commerce amongſt Men. And fpe& chiefly, Obligation differs from downright therefore from a Signification of the Will, this o- Compulſion, that altho' both do ultimately repre- ther Man is ſaid to obtain a Right, by means of fent fome Object of Fear, yet Compulſion only which heis now impower'd to make the promiſing fhakes the Will with an external Force, and drives Party ſtand to his word, and upon Default may it on to the choice of an ungrateful Thing by the proſecute himn by Force, either ſuch as he himſelf bare ſenſe of approaching an imminent Danger: can exert, or ſuch as proceeds from the Supream whereas Obligation doth farther engage the Per- Ruler, according as the Perſons live, either in a fon to acknowledge, that the Evil denounc'd a- State of Nature or of Civil Society. Therefore, gainſt the Tranſgreſſion of fuch or ſuch a Rule, when upon Declaration made of my Will, anothier doth not undeſervedly fall upon him, ſince by Man doth not obtain a Right over me, I am then obſerving the Rule he might have declin’d and at Liberty to repent of what I have done. And eſcap'd it. ſuch a' Right over us is then not obtain'd, when VI. As to Man's being capable of receiving the Sovereign under whoſe Power we live, hath Obligation, one Reaſon how he comes to be fo is, not given another Man Authority to require becauſe he indu'd with Will, which can turn to and exact that from us, which we have ſigni- either Side, and ſo guide itſelf by a Moral Rule; fy'd as our Intention (2). And hence it apo unlike thoſe other Beings which by ſome intrinſió pears why Poſitive Laws may be repeald by him cal Conſtraint are determin’d to one and the ſame that enacted them becauſe they do not convey way of acting. . Whence it follows, that fo far as to the Subjects any ſuch Right upon the Legilla- no Neceſſity is interpos'd by any external Princi- tor, by Vertue of which they may demand and ple, Man muſt be conceiv'd to be perfectly free, require their Continuance. Tho' fome Common- and to have a Power of doing all thoſe Things wealths have endeavour'd to preſerve the Perpecu- which fall within the Sphere of his Naturality of their Laws, by obliging the Members to de Strength and Ability. Nay, when he hath once clare upon Oath, that they will not conſent to determin'd and reſolv'd with himſelf, or when he their Alteration. Nay, tho' at the end of the Sta- hath once made any Choice, yet in the Determi- tute or Ordinance a Clauſe ſhould be affix'd, pro- nation, Reſolution, or Choice, conſider'd purely nouncing all Decrees that may hereafter be made as they proceed from the Will , there is no fuch contrary to this, to be null and void, yet ſuch a Force, but that he may, at his Pleaſure, rightly Clauſe cannot hinder the altering or reverſing of change or relinquiſh them: unleſs there intervene a Law by which no Man has obtain'd a Right. ſome ourward Reſtraint, forbidding any Alterati- For 'tis abſur'd that a former Decree ſhould dif- on of the Will, when once feteld 4 and declar'dannul a latter ; ſince abſolute Power cannot bind for a Man upon once ſignifying his Will and Pur- and reſtrain it ſelf; and ſince that which is in its donio 9 ons bund sich Ca NOS bol v ewol slodw920 296 Mr. Barb. Notes on 9. V. inilabas 10:38 (This is the opinion of Biſhop Cumberland, whoſe Words our Author tranſcribes,-i Another Engliſhman, in a Work which we hoped would have been turned into French, embraces he ſame Notion. According to him, the Ducy or Obligation of a Man can be nothing elſe but a Reaſon and Motive propounde; after an agreeable manner, and neceſſarily determining him to chuſe and prefer one manner of acting before another; and at Reafon or Motive can be no other than a great degree of Miſery ta ! be avoided, and Happineſs to be attained; which can't be avoided or gained by Ading after any other manner. He owns no Mr. Bernard exprefies Dr. Gaſtrel's ſenſe after this manner in his Nov. de la Rep. des Lettres, April 1700. el Mr. Barb. Notes on S. VI. It is a Rule of the Roman Laivyers, Nemo poteft mutare conſilium ſuum in alterius injuriam, i. c. No Man can change bis Pura poſe to another's Prejudice. Digeſt. Lib. I. Tit. xvii . De diverſis Reg. Jurts. Leg. LXXV. (2). We fall hereafter treat of ſeveral Cafes in which 'cis lawful for a man to change his Deſigns and latentions. See chiefly Lib. III. Chap. 6, 7. vd OW 62 Of Law in general. "BOOKI face VIII, when out of Hatred to Philip the Fair, ver ſo much reſolve to oblige bola are own Nature ſubject to change (3) cannot be felves, or (7) by their Sueceſſors. For upon theſe made fix'd and irrevocable (a). The Athenians in Aets a Right is obtain'd by other Men, which Thucydides (b), laid up a thouſand Talents in the ought not to be taken from them againſt their Citadel, denouncing a Capital Penalty againſt Conſent. Hence it appears, that when a Man rei him who ſhould either Decree or Perſwade the nounceth his Right, it is not neceſſary to add essa employing that Money to any uſe, except in Cafe preſly, that neither he nor his Heirs will do here: the City were attack'd by a Hoſtile Fleet And after any thing contrary to that Renunciation; yet upon cher Revolt of the Inhabitants of Chios; and that if they do attempt any ſuch Matter it their Fears engag di chem to repeal that Decree (s). Thall be eſteem divoida For, fince in Deeds of When Princes (4) add exprefly in ſome of their this Natúre a Man plainly declares his receding Conftitutionsp that altho they ſhould hereafter from this Right to any thing, and profeffethro order any thing to the contrary in a particular tranſlate it on another Perſon, it would be evi: Edict, yet the Magiſtrates and Judges ſhall not dent, without that additional Claule, that he can obey or regard any ſuch Command; this Addition noti(with any Force for Effect) afterwards difpoſe doth by no means amount ſo high, as to prove of that Thing, having no longer any Righteor they may not abrogare ſuch Conſtitutions, but Title to it. And for the ſame reaſon, becauſe råther fhews, that the latter Orders are not ferious, whilſt the Teftator livés, no Man hath abtain dra or that they dropt from them unawares. iAnd Right by vertue of his Teſtament, he máy fairly fometimes by this ſubtle Artifice they cut off and alter it, even tho’rhe had ſtrengthen'd it with a prevent the Importunities of fawcy Petitioners, Clauſe, declaring all Wills that ſhould hereafter whom perhaps it would not be ſafe for them abſo- be made to be invalido! For this indeed carries lutely co deny (d). balinimbes et bipow noi sooo Grounds enough to make us prefume, the later But there's need of diſtinguiſhing very nicely Will did not proceed from his ſerious Intentions: between the poſitive Law itſelf, and that Right yet if that very Clauſe be revok'd in that lacrer which it occaſions to be obtain'd. The Law itſelf Will, the former will be of no Vercueror Efficacy. may be diſannul'd by the Author, but the Right And ſo in Deeds and Inſtruments of Conveyances acquir’d by vertue of that Law, whilft in Force, and other Contracts, if a Diſpute arife about any muft ſtill remain : For, together with a Law, to Point, (8) that which bears the latter Date ſhall take away all its precedent Effe&s, would be a take place of that which was made firſt. high piece of Injuſtice : For example, (5) Sup VII. From what has been ſaid, we may like- poſe it were a Law in any State, that as a (6) Man wiſe ' gather the reaſon why a Mañ cannot be difposd of bis Poffeffions by Will , ſo the Right to them oblig?d to himſelf, or why he cannot enter inte Mould ftando , it would be very fair, in this caſe, any Agreement or Promiſe purely directed to his for the Sovereign to retrench this Liberty of Te+ own Perfon, no other Party being concern’d with ftaments, and to order that for the future all theſe him. For he who obrains a Right by any Obliga- Inheritances Shall pafs to the Heirs at Law.voc Yet tion, may fairly wave that Right, when by ſo do it would be unreaſonable to take away from Per+ ing he injures not a third Man. But now in this ſons what fell to them by Will, whilft the former Caſe the obliged and the obliging Party, or he Law was in Ufe and Vigouf. ir And by the ſame that owes the Right, and he that obtains Rule we may judge of that Action of Pope Bonie one and the ſame. Therefore ſhould a King of France, he recall?d all the Indulgences Obligation would be in vain, fince he could ex which his Predeceffors had granted to the French cuſe himſelf from Performance at ihis: TPleaſure: Nation ; which Harry Stephens hath ſo juſtly ridi- And he that can diſpence with himſelf in this cul'd in his pleaſant Apology for Herodotus (e). manner is actually Free. Beſides, ſuch an Obli- We muſt take care likewiſer to diſtinguiſh the gation could be of no manner of uſe; becauſe other Ads of Sovereigns from their Laws, leſt any when a Man gives or dénies any thing to himſelf , ſhould imagine that all their juft Donations, Alie, he neither gets byrthe Performance, mor cloſeth nacions, or Compacts, may be retracted by them, by the Omiffion (f 1.910d me abbm sono di bson ad catcored 1 259199ls anioncon View 5 theo siod 10 homlolo noiset 2. (a) Vide Cicero-ad Attic. 1. 3. Ep: 23. in corso (B) L. 2. Ed. dxohl p: 38.1 aid. c) Ibid! 1. 8. D:4762d 99707 (d) Vid. Codi l. s. cit, 8e fi ex reſcripto nupti, petantus. Wsi fe) Cap.140.j ni stor (f) Ada Senec. de Benef.i5.0.7, &c. vis Jib bin 1990 19703 Susus Mt. Barbeyrac's Notes on $.&as goibbidiol plate bewocinot If Kings were Infallible, as they would in the Cafd before us always take proper Meaſures , and $and Command nothing but what is for the great Advantage of the Stare, we might believe that whatever Laws and orders they make ought never to be altered but ſince the contrary is evident by Experience, it is as abſurd, as prejudiciat to a Society, to affirm, That what is once reſolved and eſtabliſhed, in what manner ſoever it is done, ſhould always coneinue-in Force, whatever Inconveniences may arite from it. The ancient Kings of Perſia; whoſe Laws were looked upon as unalterable, found themſelves often obliged to hinder their Effect by cafliy obferve the band Confequences of it, auf they were careful to do their Dúty, unfels "hey were nok place congelma opel nion of themſelves, and puffed up with a falſo Notion of Grandour.ark onda (4) See Mr. Hitius's Diſcourse, entitled, De Lege, Clauſulâ, ut nè abrogari unquam poffit, menita; i. c. 05 #Law ftrengthened will a Clauſe, that it shall not be repealed, which is the firſt Tome, third of his ſmall Tracts and Comments. (5) So in the Civil Law, new Laws and new Conſtitutions have no force bur for the future, they meddle what's paſt as theſe words import,- Leges de Conſtitutiones futuris-certum eſt dare formam negotiis, non ad fakta Præterita revocari. Cod. Lib, T. Tit. xiv. De Legib. do Conftitut. Principum, Leg. 7. Sec Mr Daumat's Civil Laws according to the Order of Nature, Tit. I. Sext. i. S. 13, doc. of the Preliminaries. .IV No 29111081 inftitut Lista Law of the of the XII, Tables, Ut quiſque Legaffet sue Rei, ita jus efto, i e. As every Man bequeaths-bis Goods lef Right be. Lib. II . Tit. 22. De Lege Falcid. in the beginning See allo Digeft. 1. Tit. 16. De verbor. Significat. Leg. 120,ona estet (7) See Lib. VIII. Chap.10, following me to laria Montes See Lib. V. Chap. 12. $. 6. yol ? ord licht 9W ($) II. kena But nez outi Dorus 11300 SVDI DUOT! not wich 2osa CHA P. VI. Of Law in general. 55 to, But whereas it is fometimes ſaid, that a Man is cede froin it. And that ſuch is the Nature of obliged to preſerve himſelf (1), the meaning of Man, every one's Obſervation may inform him. this is no more but that the Exerciſe of that Ob- IX. Obligations are laid on human Minds pro- ligation, inherent in every Man, is terminated perly by a Superior, that is, by ſuch an One as not in a Man's own Perſon, but it bath likewiſe a re- only hath ſufficient Strength to denounce ſome ference to God the Author of Natural Law, as to Evil againſt us upon Non-compliance, but hath him who hath a Right of requiring the Perfor- likewiſe juſt Reaſon, to require the retrenching of mance of that Obligation, and of puniſhing its our Free-wills by his own Pleaſure. For when a- Neglet : And therefore a Man is ſo far bound ny one is endued with theſe Qualifications, ſo to confult his own Preſervation, as he is a Servant ſoon as he ſhall command any thing, and ſhall a- felf a uſeful Member. In the lame manner as a riſe in the Rational Faculty a Fear mix'd with Maſter may rightly puniſh his Servant, and a So- Reverence, the former proceeding from his Power, vereign his Subject, who hath render'd himſelf the latter from the Confideration of ſuch other unfit to diſcharge his proper Labours and Em- Reaſons, as without that Motive of Fear, and ployments . Neither is this Maxim, that a Perſon barely by way of Counſel, ought to prevail on cannot oblige himſelf, confin'd to ſingle Men, but us to embrace the Command. Hence we con- extends to whole Bodies and Societies (2). As for ceive, that the Right of impoling Obligations on that which fome Authors urge about a Man's another, or, which comes to the fame Thing, the ſwearing to himſelf, That he will, for inſtance, Right of commanding another, and of preſcribing refrain from this or that Enormity to which his Laws doch not ariſe barely from Strength, or from Evil Appetites incline him, this Obligation bears the Superior Excellency of Nature (1). Strength the Nature of a Vow, the exacting of which ap- indeed, may of it felf ſo far bend me contrary to pertains to Almighty God(a). my Inclinations, as to make me chuſe rather, for VIII. Another Reaſon why, ſince the Will of a while, to obey another's Will, than to venture Man is capable of conforming to a Rule, ſuch a the Experience of his Force: But this Inducement Rule may be preſcrib'd to it, and an Obligacion ceafeth, when once the Fear is over, and I ſhall laid on it thus to conform, is, becauſe he ſtands then have no Reaſon why I ſhould not act rather under the Command of a ſuperior Power. Theſe according to my own Pleaſure, than according to two Conditions put together, render Men liable his. And where a Man can bring no other Argu- to Obligations, proceeding from Eternal Princi- ment for my Compliance to his Orders, but Force ples. For when the Powers of any Agent are ſo and Violence, nothing hinders, but that if I judge tied up by Nature to an uniform way of acting, it expedient for my Affairs, I may try all Means as that it cannot by its inward Motion ſteer a dif to repel the Violence, and to aſſert and vindicate ferent Courſe, the Adion thus produc'd is rather my own Liberty (2). Phyſical than Moral, and ariſeth rather from Ne X. It may not be improper here, to examine cellity than from Obligation. And, on the other that Aſſertion of Mr, Hobbs, which he hath laid hand, where a Perfon acknowledgech no Superior, down in his Book, De Cive (b), and which runs there can be no effential Principle apt to reſtrain thus, in the Engliflo Improvement of his Leviathan his Inward Liberty. And, altho' ſuch an one (c). The Right of Nature, whereby GOD reigneth o- Thould never ſo. exactly obſerve à certain Method ver Men, and puniſheth thoſe who break his Laws, is of proceeding, and conſtantly refrain from fome to be deriv'd not from his Creating them, as if he re- kinds of Adions, yet this would not be taken for guir’d Obedience as of Gratitude for bis Benefits, but the Effect of any Obligation, but of his own free from his irreſiſtible Power. The Argument with Pleaſure. It follows then, that he alone is capa- which he defends this Notion is carried on to this ble of Obligation, who (1) can have Knowledge Purpoſe. All Right over others being either by of a Rule preſcrib'd him, and háth a Will intrin Nature, or by Compact, that Right may be faid fically free, able to ſteer contrary ways; which to be granted by Nature, which Naturé doth Will muſt, however, when a Rule is injoin'd it Now ſeeing all Men, by Nature, by a Superior, be ſenſible that it ought not to re- had a Right to all Things, they had a Right every one 6 o not take away. 1x. (a) Com. Felden ad Grot. I. 2. c. 13. 1. I. (6) C. 15. f. s. 10 (c) P. 187. Mr. Barb. Notes on S. VII, VIII, and IX. (1) That is to ſay, That Man is the object of the Duties that refpe& himſelf, but not the Foundation of them; and if he is obliged to preſerve himſelf, (for Example) or improve himſelf, he is not the Cauſe of it himſelf altogether, as if he could lay an Obligation upon himſelf , but becauſe GOD will have him do ſo. See Lib. II. Chap. 4. S. 16. (2) This is, becauſe theſe Bodies are looked upon as a ſingle Moral Perſon. See what is ſaid above, Chap. I. $: 13. (!) Theſe Words ought to be added, acknowledgeth a Superior, can- and the Author himſelf has not omitted them in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. I. Ch. 2. §. 4. where the reſt of this Sentence is found word for word. (1), all the Power of obliging an intelligent Creature, as Man, is founded upon the Ability and will which he hath to make himſelf Happy, or leſs Miſerable, than he would be if he diſobeyed. If Man were ſuch a Creature, that he muſt neceſſarily be Unhappy, or that it were impoſſible that his Miſery could be increaſed or diminiſhed, GOD might force him indeed to act af- ter ſuch or ſuch a Manner, but he could not properly oblige him to it (Gaſtrill in his Extract of the New Rep. of Letters.) It were alſo in vain for an intelligent Being to pretend to ſubject another's Actions to a certain Rule, if it be not in his power to re- ward his Obedience, and puniſh his Diſobedience, and that by, ſome Good or Evil, which is not the natural Effect or Produce of the Action itſelf, for that which is naturally profitable or unprofitable, works of itſelf without the Help of any Law. Mr. Lock's Philoſ. Elay, p. 428. (2) Terent. Adelph. Malo codetus qui fuum officium facit, &c. He that doth his Ducy out of Fear of Puniſhmere, will be ſure to take care whilſt he is under Apprehenfion of being diſcoverd: but upon the Hopes of Privacy and Security, he never fails to give a Looſe to his old Inclinacioss. of 56 Of Law in General. BOOK I. cf. them to reign over all the rest. But becauſe this Right to Extrinſical (3). So that, on the whole Matter, could not be obtain'd by Force, it concern’d the Safety of by bare Force, not the Right of Reſiſtance, but every one, laying aſide that Right, to ſet up Men with only the Exerciſe of it, is extinguiſh'd. We may Sovereign Authority, by common Conſent to rule and de explain the Point by the Caſe of Brutes, with fend them: Whereas if there had been any Man of Power which we Men live in a lawleſs State: Now thoſe irreſiſtible, there had been no Reaſon why he ſhould not of them which we can inafter by our Strength, by that Power , have ruld and defended both bimſelf and we lay hold on, and employ in our Service ; but them, according to his own Diſcretion. To thoſe there if any of them eſcape our Power, we are not apt fore, whoſe Power is irreſiſtible, the Dorninion of all Men to complain of any Injury receiv'd from them. adhereth naturally by their Excellence of Power; and Nor can it here be replied, that Brutes are not ca- conſequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdom - pable of Obligati n; and that therefore they can- ver Men, and the Right of afflicting them at bis Pleas not be tied and engag'd any other way, than by Sure, belongs naturally to Almighty GOD, not as Crea- Strength : For Mr. Hubbs himſelf acknowledgechi, tor and Gracious, but as Omnipotent. Now in this (b), That a Captive of War, although capable of Diſcourſe, there are ſeveral Things that deſerve to Obligation, yet is under none, whilſt he is re- be cenſur'd. For, in the firſt place, it may be ſtrain'd only by Natural Bonds, and before the In- queſtion'd, whether or no thoſe two Expreſſions, terpoſition of any Faith or Compact ; and that A Rigbt of Sovereignty (upon account of Strength) therefore, ſuch an one may give his Conqueror is granted by Nature, and, A Right of, &c. is not ta the ſlip, or may aſſault him violently, ſo fuon as ken away by Nature, hang very well together. Be- he finds Opportunity. Seneca de Ira. 1. 2. c. 1 1. cauſe in moſt Caſes, my not taking away a thing Nature hath fo order’d Things, that he whoſe Greatneſ is by no means an Argument, thar I therefore depends on the Fear of otbers, is not without Fear, him. grant it. And ſince, not to be taken away, and to be felf. Were we diſpos’d to be tedious, we might granted, are different Things; ſuch a Righit may farther ſhew, that this Maxim of Mr. Hobbs is ſeem to be granted by ſome other Principle than meer Abſurdity and Nonfence, if applied to GOD Nature, tho’ Nature doth not take it away. : Be- Almighty. For how can Nature be ſaid to have fides, that Maxim, All Men by Nature had a Right granted any thing to GOD: Since Nature is either to all things(1), ought to be interpreted with great God himſelf, or, at leaſt, the work of Goo? Caution. By Right (b), he means the Liberty For theſe Reaſons therefore, and becauſe it ſeems which every Man hath of uſing his natural Fa- unworthy of the Divine Goodneſs, we conclude, culties according to Reaſon. Therefore his Prin- that the Right of Commanding, or the Sovereign- ciple, in a ſound Senſe, will amount to no more ty of God, as it denotes the Virtue of imprinting than this ; By Nature, that is, upon the Removal Obligations on Mens Minds, is not to be deriv'd of all Law, every Man may fairly uſe his Natural from the bare Conſideration of his Omnipotence. Strength againſt thoſe whom his Reaſon inſtructs Neither do tlioſe Arguments, brought by Mr. him thus to deal with, for the ſake of his own Pre- Hobbs from Scripture, prove the Truth of his Po- fervation. But it doth not hence follow, that fition. When God ſeems to have Recourſe to his barely by y natural Strength an Obligation, properly. Abſolute Power , about the Calamities fent on Foto, ly ſo call'd, may be laid on another: For to com we cannot hence infer, that he hath no Right o- pel and to oblige, are very different Matters; and ver his Creatures, but what ariſeth from thac tho’ Natural Strength be ſufficient for the former, Power only. Job himſelf, at the beginning of his yet the latter cannot be perform'd by that Superi- Sufferings, made a true Declaration, by what ority alone. For, even according to Mr. Hobbs's Right God had depriv'd hini of his Goods, ana own Notion, as one Man hath a Right of compelling of his Children: The Lord gave (fays he) and the others, ſo thoſe others have a Right of reſiſting bim. Lord hath taken away : That is, why may not be recall But now Obligation cannot ſtand with a Right of at his Pleaſure, thoſe Things which he gave upon the ſame reſiſting; becauſe it preſuppoſeth ſuch Reaſons as free Account (c)? But when his Grief had ſo far pre- inwardly affecting Men's Conſciences, make them vaild on his Reaſon, as to make him enter into conclude, by the Judgment of their own Mind, Expoſtulation with Heaven, then God, to repreſs that they cannot boneſtly, and therefore rightly re the Inſolence of the Complaint, alledg’d his Power, fift. And though it be irrational, to contend vio- ſince the Sufferer had now neglected to conſider lently againſt a ſuperior Strength, and by that the other Reaſons of the Divine Sovereignty and means to draw upon ourſelves (2) greater Mif- Command. And thus we commonly deal with chiefs; yet there remains in us a Right of trying obſtinate and refractory Subjects; when they re- all Ways, either to drive off the Force, by the fuſe to hear our Reaſons, we ſhew them our Strength, dexterous Application of other Force, or to elude to make them underſtand not only their Sin, bue it by Subterfuge and Eſcape : But neither can this their Folly too in oppoſing our Dominion. In the Right conſiſt with that Obligation which is preciſely fame Manner, if a Perſon complains of the Mif- ſo term’d, and which Grotius commonly oppoſeth fortunes of Good Men, and the Proſperity of the . (a) Vide de Cive, c. 1. f. 7. Et (b) De Cive, c. 8. 8. 2. fc) Add. Senec. ad Polyb. c.29. Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. 10. (1) See Book 2. Chap. 2. §. 3. (2) Pindar. Pyth. Od. 2. Toti xév TEON de, &ić. To kick againſt the Goad is a very dangerous Artempt. (3) But this External Obligation impoſes alſo, according to Grotius, a Neceſſity of not reſiſting. All the Difference is this, That the Internal Obligation has Reſpect to Righit, properly ſo called, by Virtue of which we act according to Reaſon, and agreeable to the Light of Conſcience, wfiereas an external Right, which produces an external Obligation, imports no more than Impunity to him that uſes this Right, and hinders not but that he may do Evil in the Ufe of it, altho' in this laſt Cafe he can't refft law- fully. Grrtius, among other Inſtances, gives an Example of the ill Treatment which a Priſoner of War receives from a Conque- ror, and a Subject from his Prince. See De Fur. Belloc l'acis Prolegom. $. 41. and Lib. 1. ch. 4. $. 3. and Lib. 3. ch. 7. G. 6,7: Wicked, CHAP.VI. Of Law in general. 65 Wicked, when he perſiſts deaf to the genuine fions of Cowards ; derived from GOD himſelf, and Cauſes of that Proceeding, in the laſt place, we reaching even to Brute Creatures; for even amongst theſe, confound him with the Divine Omnipotence : As Nature gives larger Privileges eind Portions to the Strong if we ſhould ſay, You that fancy your ſelf injur’d, go than to the Weak. Livy hath expreſs’d the Notion and try your Strength againjt GOD for Satisfaction. more conciſely, Omnia fortium efle, that the World Nor is it a better Inference of Mr. Hobbes, when was made for the Bold and the Strong. Callicles (in he ſays, that the Obligation of paying Obedience Plato's Gorgias) purſues the fame Argument: In to God is incumbent on Men, upon account of the firſt place, he lays down this Suppofition, that their Weakneſs. For this could only make it a Nature and Law are many times contrary to each piece of Folly in us, not to redeem ourſelves by other: He inſtanceth in the Caſe of Injury; to re- obeying, from ſome greater Evil: But it doth not ceive which is by Nature the moſt baſe and vile, at all take away our Right of defiring, and of en- (7) as the Treatment of a Slave, not of a free Subject'; deavouring, by all means, to eſcape the Superior yet to do an Injury is much worſe in the Conſtru- Strength which thus oppreſſeth us. But ſuch a ation of the Law. He obſerves it to have been Right is utterly excluded by every true Obligation. the Policy of Law-givers to encourage this latter Nor is this Conſequence good, Of Two Omnipo- Notion, ſo to order the uſeful Engines of Praiſe tents, neither can oblige the other, therefore Men are o- and Diſpraiſe, as to hinder others from growing too blig’d to GOD, only becauſe they are not Omnipotent ; powerful for them; well knowing, that they were were the Antecedent never ſo unqueſtion’d. Not otherwiſe (8) an unequal March for the Multitude. to ſay, that the Fancy of Two Omnipotent Ben (9) Now Nature her ſelf (ſays he) as I imagine, Shew's ings is (4) an impoſſible Suppoſition. Neither did it to be just and right, that the Good and the Strong our Saviour intend to aſſert his Right againſt Saul ſhould have, in every thing, a larger Share than the Bad by that Argument, It is hard for thee to kick againſt and the Weak. And therefore, whereas Xerxes and the Pricks; but rather to reprove the Boldneſs and Darius had both made uſe of this Pretence, the for- Vanity of Saul's Deſign. Nor was that mighty mer againſt the Grecians, the latter againſt the Scy- Convert afterwards invited by Ananias into the thians ; he ſays they did all this according to the Law Chriſtian Faith, barely by being inform'd how of Nature. He complains, that the rigid Doctrine much above his Strength it was, to deſtroy that of Juſtice damps and oppreffeth the generous Spi- Profeſſion. We have applied ſo much the more rits of young Men; or that, on the contrary, Diligence to the confuting of this Opinion, the when any one breaks thro' thoſe formal Reſtraints, more Danger we apprehend of its being abus'd by he ſeems to ſhake off his Ruft, and to ſhine in all the violent and head-ſtrong Men. In Thucydides (s.) Splendor of Natural Right. On this Principle, he ſays, the Athenian Ambaſſador ſpeaks to this purpoſe, Hercules drove off Geryon's Oxen, who neither fold We follow the common Nature and Genius of Mankind, nor gave them him; the Hero having a natural Right which appoints thoſe to be Maſters who are ſuperior in to the Oxen, and all the other Goods and Pofeſſions of In- Strength. This Law is not of our making, nor are we ferior Puny Mortals. And this is indeed the Maxim the first who have uſed it; but we received it as it came which the great Bullies of Mankind would have down to us, and we ſhall leave it to guide the Practice of prevail in the World: Hoc Ithacus velit, & magno all Pofterity. Dionyf. Halicarn. I. 1. It is a Law of mercentur Atridæ. Plutarch's Opinion is much more Nature common to all Men, and which no Time hall dif- moderate, and might be admitted with leſs Ex- annul or deſtroy, that thoſe who have more Strength and ception, (10) It is the first and principal Law of Na- Excellence, shall bear Rule over thoſe that have leſs . ture (ſays he) that he whoſe Circumſtances require Pro- (6) Brennus (in Plutarch's Camillus) calls it a most te&tion and Deliverance, ſhould admit him for his Ruler ancient Law, that which gives to the Valiant the Pollefwho is able to reſcue and to defend him. Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. IO. (4) See how Mr. Locke proves this, in one of his Letters written in French, becauſe it was to be ſhewed to a Perſon of Quality, who did nor underſtand Latin. Two Omnipotent Beings are altogether inconſiſtent, becauſe we muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe, that the one muſt always will what the other does; and in this caſe, he, whoſe Will is neceſſarily determined by the other, conſe- quently has not that Perfection; for 'cis better to be free, than to be ſubject to the Determination of another's Will. But if they are not both reduced to the Neceſſity of willing the ſame Thing always, then the one may deſire to have that done which the other would not, in which Caſe the Will of the one muſt prevail over the Will of the other, and ſo he, of the Two, whoſe Power can't bring about what he would, can't be Omnipotent, becauſe he can't do ſo mụch as the other. So that there can't be Two Omnipotenc Beings, and conſequently nor Two Gods, p. 413. See allo Mr. Clerc's Ontology, Se&. 3. ch. 10. S. 3. (5) Ηγέμεθε 8 το, το θείον δέξη το ανθρώπειόν τε σαφώς διά πανό τσό φύσεως αναγκαίας, και αν κρατή αρχαν, και ημάς άτε θέν- 7ος ή νόμον, έτε κειμένω είοι χρησάμενοι όνία δε παραλάβοντες, και εσόμενον ο αει κατιλήψαντες χρώμεθα αυτώ. Τhucyd. lib. 5. ch.ios. See alſo Dionyſ. Halicarn. lib. i. ch. 5. (6) Brennus's Words, in Plutaroh's Camillus, are theſe, ou Niš uuchs ge devido ide å dikov stoffves, and Tớ tregutáto ** νόμων ακολεθένες, ος το κρείθονι τα 8 πόνων δίδωσιν αρχώμενα από τα Θεϊ, και τελάτών εις τα θηeία. Στότοις εκ φύσεως ένεσιν ο ζητείν πλέον έχειν τα κρείττονα υποτυποδιεςέρων. (7) Plato's Words are, 'Oude 38 dydgós rôtó y'a tenue to de dixer ta, can' disparód's tivo, &c. (8) It appears plainly by this place, as it is printed in all the Editions of the Original, that this Writer did not conſult the Greek Authors, which he quotes, nor, thro’ Inadvertence, did he ſometimes throughly underſtand the Latin Tranſlation. Callicles ir Plato fays, οι τιθέμενοι της νόμες, οι ασθενείς άνθρωποι εισί και πολλοι. νVords both very clear and coherent with the former Diſcourſe, but Marfilius Ficinus having tranſlated them in an ambiguous Manner, unleſs one conſiders them throughly, thus, Qui Leges condunt, imbecilliores ſunt ac multitudo ipſa est; Mr. Pufendorf' thought that he had faid, Lawgivers are weaker than the People, as if the Latin had been, imbecilliores multitudine ipsâ, or in the Greek, der SSE POI * romây, whereas the senſe of Callicles is, That Laws were firſt eſtabliſhed by the People, who thought themſelves not ſtrong enough to defend themſelves againſt the In- ſults of others, and chiefly by thoſe people, which ſuppoſed the Grear ones to oppreſs them, and ſo I have render'd it, tho' the Engliſh Tranſlator did not mind it. (9) Η δέ γε (διμαι) φύσις αυτή αποφάιναι αν, ότι δίκαιόν όξι και αμείνω τα χείρον πλέον έχειν, και η δικα]ώτερον θα αδυνατώθέρα. Ibid, (1ο) Ο 8 πρώτG- (ως έoικεν) και κυρώτας νόμG τώ σώζεθαι δεομένω, ή σώζων δικιάμενον, άρχνία κατά φύσιν αποδίδωσι. Plutarch in Pelop.p. 290. K XI. Othe 66 Of Law in general. Book I. XI. Others there are who derive the Origine of in himſelf a Principle of guiding his own A&ti- Sovereignty, or of the Power of impoſing Obli- ons, which he may judge fufficient for his Turn ; gations on another, from Eminency or ſuperior there appears no Reaſon why he ſhould ſtand pre- · Excellency of Nature, which they pretend is of ſently convicted in his own Conſcience, if he acts it ſelf ſufficient for that great Purpoſe. They rather by his own Pleaſure, than at the Will of an- draw a main Argument from the Nature of Man, other, who in Nature excels him. And therefore in whoſe Mind, as in the moſt excellent Part, is tho' that Notion of the Epicureans, was moſt fenſe- feated the ci ha uovendo, the Directive Power. To leſs and impious, in which they deſcrib'd the Gods, illuſtrate which, they alledge the Authority of as enjoying their own Happineſs with the higheſt Cicero (1), when he commends the Latin Phraſe Peace and Tranquillity, far remov'd from the exire de poteftate, as applied to thoſe, who are car- troubleſome Care of human Buſineſs; and neither ried away from Rational acting, by the Fury of ſmiling at the good, nor frowning at the wicked their Paſſions and Luſts; ſuch Men being truly Deeds of Men; yet they rightly enough inferr'd, gone out of the Power or Command of their Minds. that upon this Suppoſition, all Religion, and all (2) Ariſtotle likewiſe, is brought in to ſtrengthen Fear of Divine Powers, was vain and uſeleſs. For their Party, becauſe he hath ſomewhere declar'd, who will Worſhip another, that is neither willing that if a Man can be found excelling in all Vir- to aſlift, nor able to injure him (3)? The Contem- tues, ſuch an one hath a fair Title to be King. plation of ſo Noble a Being as this, may indeed Thus the moſt ſuperlative Pre-eminence of GOD, excite Wonder in us, but it can never produce O- would, they ſay, deſerve Veneration, though he bligation. Beſides, we Chriſtians confeſs, that had never created the World. Farther, to this Pre- there are created Spirits indued with a Nature far eminence of Nature they add Non-accountableneſ; ſurpaſſing our own; and yet we acknowledge no and affirm, That for chis Reaſon only, if Man u. Sovereignty that they bear over us, immediately ſeth Brute Creatures (whom he ſo far excels) any on their own Account. Apocalypſ. XXII. 9. Mar. otherwiſe than with Decency and Moderation, he Antonin. I. 6. c. 44. If the Gods do not at all regard or may do it fairly and ſecurely, and they have no order Human Affairs (which yet it is the highest Impiety Right to complain of their hard Treatments: Be to imagine) to what Purpoſe are our Sacrifices, our Sup- cauſe when one contends with another about Mat- plications, and our Oaths, and our other A&ts of Wor- ters of Right, he doth, as it were, compare him- ship , by which we suppoſe the Divine Powers to be ever ſelf with him, and is willing that both ſhould be preſent and converſant amongst us? Cicero de Natur. judg'd by the fame Law; but this cannot be ad- Deor. l. 1. c. 2. There have been Men in the World, mitted in Two Natures ſo vaſtly different, that who thought the Gods not in the leaſt concern'd about one may be ſaid to have been made for the ſake of Human Affairs. Were this Opinion admitted for true, the other. And therefore they pretend, that God there could be no ſuch thing as Piety, Holineſs or Religi- declar'd Mens Right over Brutes, purely on ac on amongst Men: For to pay theſe Regards to the Divine count of their ſuperior Nature. Whence, they Natures, is moſt agreeable to Goodneſ and to Purity, pro- tell if a Man, for abuſing his Cattle happen vided they take notice of our Actions, and are the Au- to be puniſh'd by the Magiſtrate, this is not done thors of any Benefits and Advantages in our Lives. But in Favour of the Beaſts, but for the ſake of the o- if the Gods are neither able nor willing to help us, nor at ther Subjects, whoſe Intereſt it frequently is, that all beſtow their Care and Obſervation on our Proceedings, every one ſhould uſe well what he pofleffeth. On and ſo derive no Bleſſings, no Favours upon Mankind, to the ſame Score, they ſay, the Body ought not to what End is our Worſhip, our Honours, and our Prayers, complain, though it ſhould, by the Command of the Tribute which we now pay to the Immortal Being ? the Soul, be waſted and worn out in Labours; ſince As no Virtue can ſubſiſt in Hypocriſy and Shew, so efpe- it is in ſo high a Degree ſurpaſs’d by that Nobler cially Piety would be ſoon lost in that Diſguiſe; and then Part. farewel to all Holineſ, and all Religion ; which being But, to deliver our own Judgment, we cannot önce baniſh'd the World, what could follow but the Mi- yet be perſuaded, that from a bare Tranſcendency Sery of utter Diſorder, of Univerſal Confufion? And of Nature, can ſpring a Right of impoſing Obli- again, What Piety can you owe to him from whom you on others, who have in themſelves a Power have receiv'd no Benefit? Or how can be claim ang of being their own Governors and Directors. For thing as his Due, who hath no Merit to plead in his Be- neither doth a Superior Nature always imply a half? Idem de Nat. Deor. I. 2. The common Ti- Fitneſs to Rule an Inferior; nor do the different tle which our Anceſtors gave Jupiter was, Opti- Degrees of Perfection, in natural Subſtances, im- mus Maximus, moſt eminent in Goodneſs and in Great- mediately denote a Subordination, and a Dépen- neß. In which we find Goodneſs, or Beneficence, dance of one upon the other. But rather, lince preferr’d to Greatneſs; it being a more noble, and the Perſon who is to receive the Obligation, hath more excellent, as well as the moſt acceptable us, gation Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. II. (1) Tully's V Vords are, Itaque nihil melius, quam quod' est in conſuetudine Sermonis Latini, cum exiffe ex poteſtate dicimus eos, qui effrænati feruntur, aut libidine, aut Iracundia, Tuſc. quæſt. lib. 3. ch. 5. To which VVords it may be convenient to add another Taffage of Cicero's, which will ſhew that the former is very well apply'd, Qui igitur exiſſe ex poteftate dicuntur, idcirco dicuntur, quia non ſunt in Poteftate mentis, cui regnum totius Animi à Naturâ tributum est. They therefore who are ſaid to go beyond their Power, are ſo termed, becauſe they are not under the Command of their Underſianding, to which Nature has given ſupreme Go- vernment of the Soul. (2) See this Author's Treatiſe De Republica, lib.3. ch. 17. (3) The Greek of Antonine is, 'El Nicat miei undevo-Bexiguor Tou Coi gedi) TRASEUHL refe&xonov, ñ um guclu, unde euxáus- θα, μηδέ ομνύωμεν, μηδε τα άλλα ωρασσόμεν, από έκατι ωι προς παρόνας, και συμβιενας τας τες πράσσόμεν. "And Tully's Latinis, Sin autem Dii neque posſunt nos juvare, neque volunt, nec omnino curant, nec quid Agamus animadvertunt, nec eſt quod ab his ad hominuin vitam permanare poßit, quid est quod ullos Diis Immortalibus Cultus, honores, aut preces adhibeamus. See alſo Tully de Nat. Deorum, lib. 2, ch, 25. Prero. CHAP. VÌ. Of Law in general. 67 Prerogative to be Good, than to pofſeſs the high- mit another for his Sovereign, declares, by this his eft Degrees of Majeſty and Strength. Ovid. de own proper Ad, that he will conform to his Sove- Pont. I. 2. El. 9. reign's Pleaſure. Though indeed to make a Law- ful Sovereignty ariſe from Conſent, it is farther ne- Nunquid crit quare folito dignamur honore ceſſary, that by this new Subjection, no prejudice Numina, fi demas velle juvare Deos? be offer'd to the well-grounded Right of a third What Vows would to regardleſs Powers be paid ? Perſon, and that the one Party nay juftly have They loſe their Altars, if we loſe their Aid. ſuch Subiects, and the other Party as juſtly ſuch a Governour. From theſe two Springs we conceive The Inſtance about Bruces is nothing to the pur- all thoſe Obligations to flow, which do, as it were, pofe ; for they are not held by Obligation, but caft an inward Tie and Reſtraint upon the Liberty only by Force, or by the Enticement of Food : of our Wills. But becauſe 'tis beyond the Power Neither would they act contrary to their Natures, of any Moral Bonds, utterly to ſuppreſs our Na- Thould they endeavour to throw off the Yoke and tural Freedom of acting; and becauſe ſuch is ei- the Authority of Men. As to the Argument a ther the Lightneſs or the Wickedneſs of moſt Mens bout the Soul,when that is ſaid to bear a Sovereign- Minds, that they deſpiſe theſe Grounds of Domi- ty over the Body, the Speech is Figurative : For nion, as feeble Reaſons for Obedience; hence Sovereignty, or Command, is not properly under- there ariſeth a Neceſſity of adding ſome further ſtood but between two Perſons, or two compleat Motive, which may work on our diſorderly Lufts Natures ; and the Body is ſubject to the Soul, by with a ſtronger Effect than the bare Senſe of De- virtue of the Phyſical Combination, not of any cency and Honour. And this Addition is the more Moral Tie. Laſtly, the Citation from Ariſtotle, requiſite, in as much as, generally ſpeaking, the if a King were to be conſtituted by free Election, Wickedneſs of one Man tends to the Damage of the Crown ought to be given to the moſt defer- another : Whereas we ſhould be more willing to ving Perſon (4) (a); yer would not he bear the leave a Man to his own Guidance, provided his Sovereignty by a Right deriv'd purely from his Sins would incommode no Body but himſelf. Now ſuperior Gifts and Excellencies, but by virtue of there is nothing which could have ſuch an Effe & the Donation made him by the Conſent of the as this, but the Fear of ſome Evil to be inflicted Electors. upon our violating an Obligation, by ſome ſtron- XII. It muſt be acknowledg'd therefore as a cer: ger Power, whoſe Intereſt it was, that we ſhould tain Truth, That neither Strength, nor any o not have thus offended. So that Obligations re- ther NaturalPre-eminence, is alone ſufficient to de- ceive their final Strength and Authority from rive an Obligation on me from another's Will; but Force, and from a Snppoſition that he, whoſe Bu- that it is farther requiſite, I ſhould either have re ſineſs it is to ſee them obſerv’d, is furniſh'd with ceiv'd ſome extraordinary Good from him, or ſhould ſo much Power, either originally inherent in him- voluntarily have agreed to ſubmit my ſelf to his Di- ſelf, or conferr'd upon him by others, as to be able rection. Plin. Paneg. Chap. 38. (1)Nature doth not or- to bring ſome conſiderable Evil on the Diſobedi- dain amongſt Men as ſhe doth amongſt Beaſts, that the ent. For amongſt wicked Subjects, He muſt needs Power and the Sovereignty ſhall paſs to the ſtrongeſt. For, be a very precarious Ruler, whom they can deſpiſe as we naturally yield and give up our ſelves to fome without Danger. On the contrary, His Domini- fingular Benefactor, (2) ſo if it appears that this on is ſettled on a firm Bottom, who, in the firſt Benefactor both intends my Good, and can con- place, bears a juſt Title to it, and, beſides this, fult it better than I my ſelf am able, and, farther, hath ſo much Force always at his Command, as is doth actually claim the guidance of me, I have no ſufficient to reduce the Seditious, and to reſtrain Teaſon in the World to decline his Government and the Tranſgreſſors. (3) Sophocl. Ajác. Flagellif. p. 61. Sway. Especially if it ſo happen, that I am behol- Ed. H. Steph. den to him for my very Being, Acts xvii. 24, &c. For he who firſt confer'd on Man the Benefit of Nor Laws, nor Governments could ſtand ſecure, Free Ading, why may not he, by his own Right, Without the Guard of Fear; nor Mighty Chiefs retrench that Freedom in fome Particulars? And Secure the Faith of Armies, but ſuſtain'd then, as for the other Cafe, he that conſents to ad By aweful Dread, and Shame of doing ill. Ed. H. Steph. (a). So far the Saying of Cyrus will be true, That no one ought to be a Governor, who is not better than his Subjects. Plus tarch in Apophthegm. And in the jame Senſe we must take what Socrates urgeth in Xenophon. De Rebus Memorab.l. 3. p. 453, 454. Mr. Barb. NOTES. (4) Plutarch's Words are, “Asxey de pun devi negrix av, os & xpcéflwy ési epxxuévay, (9) Pliny's Latin is, Nec uti inter Pecudes, fic inter homines [Lex Nature) poteſtatem do Imperium valentioribus dedit. (2) This and the following Reaſons ſerve racher to make an obligation ſtronger and more reaſonable, than to eſtabliſh it upon a lure and proper Foundation ; for, in my Judgmenr, there is properly but one general Foundation of an Obligation, to which all others may be reduced, and that is, Our Natural Dependance upon the Supream Authority of GOD, who has given us a Be. ing, and being Almighty, can puniſh thoſe that diſobey him; and, on the contrary, reward thoſe that obey him. From hence siſeth all lawful Authority, upon the account of which, one Man commandeth another; for that is lawful only when it is confor- mable to the Will of GOD, known to us, either by Revelation, or the mere Light of Nature. But if amongſt Men, che imme, diate Reaſon why they ought to be ſubject to the Command of another is ordinarily this, that they have voluntarily conſented to it, that Conſent, and all other Engagements whatſoever, which they enter into, are obligatory upon the Account only of thac Maxim of Natural Right, which tells us, That every one ought to obſerve what he has engaged himſelf to. See Lib. 2. ch. 3. 9.20. following (3) The Greek of Sophocles is, où 28 abt'st' även vó Mos rodas Φερέιν' αν ένθα μα καθεσήκοι δέος. Ουκ άν εργτ ε σωφρόνως άρχιτ' έτι Mudlen póßt weh Banguee pinnoiss'égov. K 2 68 BookI. Of Law in general . Arrian (4) Epift. l. 1.6. 29. p. 164. Ed. Cantab. 'Tis Puniſhers, as contemn the Authority and Re- suot Man who is the Lord of another Man, but Life and ſtraints of other Men. Juvenal. Sat.13.V.193.&feqq. Death, Pleaſure and Pain, are the proper Sovereigns whom we obey: Take away theſe, and bring me before Cur tamen hos tu Cæſar, and ſee how little Majeſty without Terror can Evafiſe putes, quos diri conſcia fati prevail upon a Man's Reſolution. Mens habet attonitos do ſurdo verbere cædit, From our Diſquiſitions on this Head, ſome Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum? Temper may be found and applied to that Maxim, Pæna autem vehemens, & multo Sævior illis which ſome have more crudely utter'd, that Right Quas aut Cæditius gravis invenit, aut Rhadamanthus, and Law is nothing elſe but what pleaſeth the ſtronger Nocte dieque fuum geftare in pectore teſtem. Party: For indeed Laws can hardly obtain their outward End and Effect, unleſs they are ſupported But why muſt thoſe be thought to 'ſcape that feel and arm’d with Strength, ſo as to be able, up- Thoſe Rods of Scorpions and thoſe Whips of Steel, on Occaſion, violently to force a Compliance. Which Conſcience ſhakes, when ſhe with Rage con- Solon, as he us’d to ſay of himſelf, atchiev'd the (trouls, greateſt Things, ovi líny Te xj Siung ouvegućous, by cou And ſpreads amazing Terrors thro' their Souls? pling together Fuſtice and Strength, Plutarch Solon, Not ſharp Revenge, nor Hell itſelf can find p. 86. Ed. Wechel. And there is no Argument of A fiercer Torment than a guilty Mind; greater Efficacy in Human Affairs, than that which Which Day and Night doth dreadfully accuſe, Scylla in Ovid (Metam. l. 8. v.59.) uſeth concerning Condemns the Wretch, and ſtill the charge renews. Minos, Mr. Creech. In caufag; valet, caufamq; juvantibus armis. And indeed it highly concerns the common Good With a good Cauſe, he brings as good a Sword of Mankind, that all Men believe and confeſs the to ſecond it. - Certainty of a Divine Tribunal, incapable of the leaſt Corruption, where Judgment is to be paſs’d Even all that Pleaſure, and Joy of Conſcience, on thoſe, who, by means of Cunning, Colluſion, upon Performance of our Duty, and thoſe Hor or Strength, have declin’d the juſt Performance of rors and Tortures of Mind, which are the con their Ducy. Hither may be refer'd that of Plutarch ftant Attendants of Sin, both which we are in (adverf. Colot.) 'Tis eaſier to build a City without Ground Piety oblig’d to admit and acknowledge, proceed to hold and ſupport it, than to make a Commonwealth from the Strength and Power of Almighty God, either unite or ſubfift, without the Acknowledgment of a who can eaſily make ſuch Wretches their own GOD and a Providence. (5) They, Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES. (4) The Greek of Arrian is, "Av9pwr G SVIguay xúero suest' annce Sévaloj Iwn, xj vdova rj móvo, é mei zweis 76 Tall äzuje wol Kairu ega, rj fet, nãu'eu Two (5) Ρlutarch's Words are, 'Αλλα πόλις άν μοι δοκεί μάλλον έδαφος χωρίς, ή πολιτεία η τει 9τών δόξης αναιρεθείσης παντα πασι cu sarev na Belv, nadbira tugoon. But our Author treats more largely elſewhere, of the Uſe of Religion in the Life of Man, and ſhews us, how it is the principal and moſt ſtrong Bond of Society. In the independant State of Nature, if there were no Fear of a Deity, ſo far as every one found himſelf able to oppreſs another with Impunity, they would attempt any thing as they pleaſed : Honeſty, Modeſty, and Fidelity would be eſteem'd meer Chimera's and empty Names; no Man would take himſelf obliged to do any Good but upon the Account of his own Impotency. Further, without Religion no Civil Society can be main- tained; the Fears of Temporal Puniſhments, the moſt folemn oaths and Engagements, to be faithful Subjects, the Reputation of keeping our Engagements inviolably, and the Knowledge of the Cares of our Kings and Governors, to ſecure us from the Incon- veniencies of our natural State, are not of themſelves ſufficient to keep Subjects to their Duty; for Death being the only Thing in the World which is moſt feared by them who believe no GOD, we can't but acknowledge the Truth of that Maxim, He that knows to die, knows not to be forced. He that has Reſolution enough to die bravely, is capable of attempting any thing againſt his Sovereign, and he can't want ſome ſpecious Motives or Pretences to entertain ſuch a Deſign; as for Example, The Defire he hath to avoid the Evils which he apprehends from the preſent Government, an Endeavour to procure himſelf the Supream Power, but, above all the Juſtice which he may fancy himſelf to do by ſuch an Attempt, either becauſe his King may ſeem to him not to diſcharge his Duty, or becauſe he flatters himſelf, that if he were in his place he could do much better. Such Pre- tences as theſe readily preſent themſelves, when Men have a mind to put ſuch Projects in Execution, and they may effect their Deſigns, if the Prince neglects in the leaſt to ſecure himſelf againſt the Attempts of Affaffins (in ſuch Caſes, who can anſwer for his Guards themſelves?) or ſeveral Perfons conſpire together againſt him, or in a foreign War, his Subjects revolt to the Enemy. Beſides, Subjects themſelves would đo many Tujuries one to another, for as in Civil Judicatures Sentence muſt be given according to the Acts and Proofs that are evident, all the Crimes, from which ſome Profit may be acquir’d, may paſs for good Management, which every Man applauds himſelf for, as often as he is ſo lucky as to commit them without Wirneſs . No Man would exerciſe any Acts of Charity, or do any friendly Offices, were it not for the certain Hope of ſome Glory or Advantage, which would redound to him by it. If the Senſe of all Chaſtiſement from Heaven were baniſhed no Man could depend upon another's Fidelity, every one would live in perpetual Diſquiet chro' fear and ſuſpicion of fome Deceit, or baſe Uſage from their Equals. Nor would so- vereigns themſelves be better diſpos'd than their Subjects to good Actions. For having no Principle of Conſcience to keep them in, they'd fell all offices, yea, Juſtice it ſelf ; they'd aim at nothing but their own Intereſt, to which they'd ſacrifice the Hap- pineſs of their Subjects. And if they apprehended their Subjects to revolt, they'd endeavour to weaken them as much as poſſible, as the only way to maintain their Authority againſt Attempts of the Oppreffors. The Subjects, on the other fide, for fear of Op- preffion, would ſeek all Occaſions to ſhake off the Yoke, and in the mean time live in Diſtruſt one of another. The Husband and Wife, at the Diſagreement that happens between them, would lay hold on the Sword or Poiſon to deſtroy each other, and live in Fear of their Children, Servants, and the reſt of their family. For fiuce without Religion there is no Conſcience, it will be hard to diſcover theſe fort of Crimes, which are uſually committed in ſecret, and are feldom diſcovered, but by ſuch Means as ariſe from a guilty Conſcience. The Duties of a Man and Citizen, lib. 1. ch. 4. S. 9. Thus our Author explains this Point, and Experience verifies his Affertion. We may add to this, two Examples, which the excellent Author of Parrhaſiana makes ufe of to prove the ſame thing. The Hiſtory of China (ſays he ) tells us, that the Great Men among the Chineſe believe neither the Be- ing of a GOD, who governs all Things, nor the Immortality of the Soul, and so we ſay that the Virtue of the Chineſe conſiſts in nothing but a profound Diſimulation of their Vices, Mem. de Le Chine Tom. 1. Lib. 5. and Tom. 2. Lib. 1. Among the Jews, the Sadducees wlto denied the Immortality of the Soul, tho' they believed a GOD, and tho' they rejected a Providence, made it appear by their Converſation, that they could not be of that Opinion, but they muſt be Enemies to Society. For Joſephus fays of them, de Bel. Judo CHAP. VI. 69 Of Law in general . They therefore who would preſcribe Laws to nothing derogatory to the Sovereign's Power. others with any Effect and Validity, muſt build For it is not to be ſuppos’d that a Miniſter ſhould their Power on the Foundations which we have vent that for a durable Decree of his Prince,which here eſtabliſhed. is not ſo, or that he ſhould impudently uſurp ſo XIII. But that a Law may be able to exerciſe extravagant a Power; ſince in an Enterprize of its directive Force, there is requir'd in the Perſon this Nature, there could be no hopes of Conceal- for whom 'tis made, a Knowledge both of the ment, or of eſcaping due Puniſhment for ſo info- Law-giver and of the Law. For how can any lent an Offence. As to the other neceſſary Point, Man pay Obedience, who neither apprehends to that the Senſe of a Law may be clearly appre- whom it ſhould be paid, nor to what Duties his hended, it is incumbent on the Promulgators, to Obligation binds him? And here it will be ſuffici- uſe the greateſt Plainneſs that the Thing is capable ent, that a Man hath once been Maſter of ſuch a of: Contrary to that Management of Caligula, Knowledge: For he that forgets what he once who wrote his Laws in ſmall Letters, and fix'd them knew, is not at all loos’d from his Obligation, in a high Place, in this Manner only ſhewing them ſince he might well have ſecur'd his Remembrance, to the People. (a) bad he taken up, as he ought to have done, a real If any thing in the Laws ſeems obſcure, the Defire and Reſolution of obeying. Now to the Explication of it is to be ſought, either from the Knowledge of the Legiſlator, 'tis hardly poſſible Legiſlator, or from thoſe Perſons who are by him any Man ſhould be a Stranger. For, as to natural appointed to judge according to the Laws. For it Laws, that they have the ſame Author with the U- is their Buſineſs, obſerving a right Interpretation, niverſal Frame of Things, none can be ignorant, to apply the Laws to particular Caſes, or upon the that will but make Uſe of their ordinary Reaſon. Propoſal of ſuch or ſuch a Fact, to declare the Much leſs can the Author of Civil Laws be hid Sovereign's Pleaſure concerning it. (6) from the Apprehenſion and Notice of his Subječts: We cannot here but obſerve, that the Notion Since he is conſtituted, either (1) by the expreſs maintain'd by ſome Authors, That the Conſent of and open Conſent of thoſe Subjects, or elſe (2) by the People is requiſite to make Laws oblige the Subject in their tacit Agreement, whilſt they any way ſub- Conſcience, is neither true in the Laws of Nature, mit to his Command. How we arrive at a Senſe nor in the Civil Laws of Monarchical or Ariſtocra- of Natural Laws, by the Contemplation of human tical Rulers ; nor indeed at all, unleſs it be under- Condition, we ſhall hereafter have occaſion to ex- ftood of implicite Conſent, as a Man by agreeing plain. Civil Laws are convey'd to the Subjects to the Sovereignty of another, is at the ſame time Knowledge, by a Promulgation, publickly and ſuppos’d to have agreed to all the future Acts of (3) perſpicuouſly made. In which there are t'vo that Sovereignty. Though it would really be ve- Conditions which ought to be clear and certain, ry uſeful, and contribute much to engaging the firſt, that the Laws proceed from him who hath Subjects in a voluntary Obedience, if the Laws the chief Command in the State ; and, fecondly, could be made with their conſentand Approbation; that the Meaning of the Laws is ſuch, and no o- eſpecially ſuch as are to paſs into their Lives and ther. The former Condition is then known, when Manners. Agreeable to this is Pericles's Saying in the Sovereign promulgates a Law either by his Xenophon. Apom. l. 1. p. 418. Ed. Steph. Whoever, ei- own Voice, or by Perſons of his Deputation. ther by written or unwritten Commands enjoins another to That theſe Perſons publiſh Laws by the Command do a thing, without perſwading him that he ought to do and Authority of the Sovereign, there is no Que- it, ſeems to me, not to uſe Law büt Violence. Comp. ftion to be made, if it appear that they have been Sanderſon de Oblig. Conſcient. Præle&t. 7. ſ. 22. (4 employ'd uſually by the Sovereign in declaring (5) his Will; if the Laws are brought into Uſe at ju XIV. As in the Sovereign, or in him who is to dicial Proceedings, and if they contain in them govern another by Laws, two things are requiſite , (a) Dio. Caf. in Excerpt. Piereſc. I. 59. (6) Comp. Hobbes de Cive, c. 14. J. 11, &c. and Leviath. c. 26. Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. 12, 13. Jud. lib. 2. ch. 12. The Sadducees are rude and inhuman one to another, and as cruel to their own Countrymen the Jews, as to Strangers. In fine, that Religion may produce all the good Effects to Society which naturally reſult from it, it is neceffary that we have righe Apprehenſions of the Deity, otherwiſe, if we form to ourſelves a Deity too merciful, or ſuch an one as favours our Sins, either by his Example or any other way, Religion will be ſo far from firmly upholding Society, that it will utterly deſtroy it. So that according to the Principles of the Heathens, every one may reaſon as he in the Poet does, As miſerable a Mortal as I am, Mall not I be wiſer than the greateſt of the Gods ? Teren. Eunuch. A&. 3. Scen. 5. Wherefore we muſt think that the virtuous Heathen either did not believe what was commonly reported among them, about the Vices of their Gods, or were not aware of the Con- ſequences that naturally followed from the Principles of a Religion fo monſtrous. See what ſhall be ſpoken, Chap. 3. Lib. 2. §. 19. Note 2. and Chap. 4. S. 3. Note 4. (1) This is done either when a Multitude of Men joyns together to make up a Civil Society, or when a Society, already formed takes an Oath of Fidelity to their Sovereign. We ſhall treat more at large of this Subject, Lib. 7. (2) This hath place always when we enjoy the Protection of a Srate, and of the Laws eſtabliſhed ; for we muſt be ſuppoſed to conſent tacitly to ſubmit ourſelves to the Laws, tho' we have nor formally engaged to do it, as Plato obſerves in the Caſe of the Citizens of Athens, who had Liberty to go whither they would, unleſs they ſubmit to the Government of that famous Common- vealth, ος δ' αν υμών οραμάνη, ορών όν τρόπον ημείς οι Νόμοι] τας δε δίκας δικάζουν, και τ' άλλα ή πόλιν διοικεύω, ήδη φα- rufe To TOO OMOAOTH KENAI 'EPT.2, suv, å av muss xensuó es trois TAUTA. În Criton, and in the next Page, the Greek is, έργω αλλ' και λόγω. (3) In the ancient Times, before the Invention of writing, Laws were compoſed in Verſe, which were frequently ſung in pub, lick, that Men might remember them, Ariſtot. Problem. Se&t. 19. Problem. 28. Horace de Arte Poet. (4) This Author, in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, lib. I. ch. 2. S. 6. ſays, That it is the Buſineſs of their Employ; a Circumſtance worth our Obſervation. For we may doubt of the Validity of the Action of any Miniſter, or Magiſtrare, which belongs not to his office, unleſs it plainly appears that the Supream Governor hath given him a Commiſfion extraordinary. (5) The Greek of Xenophon runs thus, návle obrezi cévor i Ilseiraća o od tis un citas dveyndje tive Trolling o'rt you can ofte μο, βία μάλλον, ή νόμος είναι. that 70 Of Law in general. BOOKI. 6 Ć exture Evil; and that good things are deſir'd up- fity (3) of Performance, unleſs it be ſtrengthned that he underſtand what is fit to be preſcrib'd, and from their End (2) the Publick Good, a part of that he have ſufficient Strength to denounce and which is communicated to every honeſt Subject, to execute fome Evil on thoſe who ſhall not con than from the Penalties they threaten, the Fear form to his Rules: (for we ſuppoſe the Perſons for of which can prevail only on a few Men, and whom the Laws were made, to have both Power thoſe the moſt wicked in the Commonwealth.” and Inclination to diſobey them) So.every Law To this purpoſe Bp. Cumberland diſcourſeth. On conſiſts of two: Parts; in one is defin'd and declar'd whoſe Opinion we may firſt obſerve, that if we what is to be perform’d, or omitted; in the other would comprehend under the Term of Sanction is fignify'd, what Evil ſhall be in-curd by thoſe even the good Things and the Rewards following who tranſgreſs in either reſpect; and this latter the Obſervation of Laws: it is requiſite, that thoſe part is uſually term’d the Sanètion of a Law; About good Things ſhould really proceed from our Obe- which Biſhop Cumberland (a) hath open'd a wide dience, and be, as it were, bought and purchas’d Field of Enquiry, whilſt contrary to the General by it. But now 'tis apparent, that all the good Opinion of the Lawyers, "He maintains that the Things we poſſeſs, we do not obtain by conform- Sanction of Laws is made, not only by Puniſh- ing to Laws; and therefore thoſe which we any o- ments, buc by Rewards too, and more princi- ther way acquire, do not come under the Notion pally by the latter than by the former. That as of Rewards. Thus, our Selves, our Lives, and to the Sanctions of the Laws of Nature, it is im- all the natural Benefits we enjoy are not paid to poſſible by any natural Signs more openly and us as the Rewards of fulfilling any Law, but the more forcibly to perſwade Men to do a Thing Divine Goodneſs freely conferr'd them on us, be- (1), or to judge with good Authority, that ſuch fore we could ſo much as think of any Law to be a Duty is commanded by the Governor of the fulfill'd. Neither is the Continuance of theſe good World, than if ſuch Acts are grac'd by him with Things, (ſince it proceeds from the inward Force natural Rewards. That, altho' in the Sanction of natural Subſtance) deriv’d from any Performan- of Laws by Men, uſe is made of negative Con- ces of ours, but is the Gift of our Great Creator, ceptions, and of Words properly expreſſing them, who (b) makes his Sun to ſhine on the Evil and the yet in the Nature of Things, that which drives Good, and ſendeth Rain on the Fuft and on the Unjuft. us on to Action, is ſome poſitive Good, which Thus likewiſe, what a Man gets by his proper we hope to preſerve, or to acquire upon keeping Labour and Induſtry, he doth not directly and off thoſe things that would have a contrary Ef- principally aſcribe to his own Obedience, but to feet. That Privations and Negations do not his Creator, who gave him the Strength, and to move the Will of Man, and that the avoiding of himſelf, who rightly employ'd it. Yet this Effect Evil is by no means its Object, any farther than indeed, we may obtain by Laws, both the Preſer- as it denotes the Preſervation of ſome Good. vation of thofe good Things which either the free That, whatever Strength is uſually aſcribed to Bounty of Heaven, or our own Diligence hath natural Puniſhments and Evils, in engaging Men procur'd us, from the Incurſions and Aſſaults of o- to ſhun and decline them, is all to be reſolv'd in- cher Creatures, that might otherwiſe hurt or de- to the atcrađive and impulſive Force of thoſe ſtroy them; and likewiſe the Encreaſe of the ſame Goods which the Puniſhments or Evils would de- Enjoyments by various Methods and Means: And prive them of. That, thus all thoſe Things which therefore theſe Advantages only, in as much as 'tis are commonly ſaid to be done for the ſake of e- in the Power of the Legiſlator to make them good, ſcaping Death or Want, might be more properly are properly to be efteem'd Rewards. And that affirm'd to proceed from the Love of Life, or of theſe may have a perfect Force, in diſpoſing Men Riches. That, unleſs Life went before it, Death to Obedience, the Legiſlator is to ſignify, that would fignifie nothing, and that the former ſuch Effe&ts will moſt certainly follow ſuch a would never be fear'd, if the latter were not firft Cauſe. deſir’d. That, the Nature of Things moves our We may obſerve farther, That altho' the Will * Affections more ſtrongly with the Love of a may be incited to an Action, by the Propoſal of preſent Good, or the Hope of a future, than ſome Good, likely to proceed from thae Action, with the Hatred of a preſent, or the Fear of a this Conſideration doth not impoſe any Necef- on account, not of the oppoſite Privation, but with the Commination of ſome Puniſhment, to be of their inward Agreeableneſs to our Natures. incurr’d upon Non-Compliance. And therefore, That, Civil Laws receive a firmer Eſtabliſhment that any good Effect proceeds by natural Conſe on C yet (a) De Leg. Nat. Prolegom. ſ. 14. &c. 5. 5.40. (6) Matth.v.45. Mr. Barb. NOTES on s. XIV. (I) Theſe Words, ut quicquam agant, i. e. that they may do any thing, which are omitted in all the Editions of this work, ei- ther by the Neglect of the Author, or careleſneſs of the Printers , quite ſpoil the Senſe. The fingliſh Tranſlator has not taken the pains to confule the original, where theſe words are expreſſed diſtinctly, chap. 5. S. 42. He hath alſo careleſly copied out a Fault in the Impreſſion, in theſe Words, aut cum Authoritate judicare, for indicare, i. e. to judge, for to thew with Authcrity, which makes the Senſe diſagreeable. (2) Theſe Words, which wiſe Legiſlators and good Citizens have propounded with a Deſire of, ought to be added to render the Senſe of Biſhop Cumberland more clear, tho’ they be not in the Original. (3) Mr. Lock proves in a moſt ſolid Manner, " That it is not the moſt poſitive Good, but Uneaſineſs, (as he calls it ) that uſually « determines the Will. That is to ſay, that Good, nay the greateſt Good, tho’ sve judge it ſuch, does not determine the Will , 6 at leaſt, to deſire it with an Earneſtneſs proportionable to its Excellence, yet this Defire makes us uneaſy, becauſe we are de « prived of it. As for Example, perſwade a Man, as long as you pleaſe, that Wealth is more advantagious than Poverty ; make s him to ſee and confefs, that ſuitable Conveniencies of Life, are to be preferred before a ſordid Indigency, if yet he be con- ss cented in this latter Eſtate, and finds no Inconveniency in it, he'll perſiſt in it contrary to your Advice, his Will is not inclined to any Adion whereby he will renounce it. Esay of Hum. Underſtand. lib. 2. ch. 21. $. 35. See the following part of the Chapter. quence CHA P. VI. 71 Of Law in in general. quence from any Action, is indeed a Token of the no doubt, but that the Action is really and di Superlative Bounty of our Creator, who is ſo wil- rectly enjoin'd. To which we may add, that the ling to confer that Good on us, and ſo kindly Minds of Men (4) are mov'd more forcibly by the invites and perſwades us to embrace it. Yet this Infli&tion of Evil, than by the Poffeffion of Good. muſt not preſently be thought a neceſſary Argu- It muſt be confeſs’d, that the Acquiſition of Good ment, that He at the ſame time commands us, by hath very powerful Charms: eſpecially when it performing the A&ion, to acquire ſuch a Good. is freſh, and join'd with the Deliverance from He might perhaps judge it fufficient to have of- fome preſent Evil. But the Senſe of this Pleaſant- fer'd us fa fair an Occaſion of receiving his Mu- neſs wears off in a long Courſe of Poffeffion; and nificence. But if ſome Evil be farther pronounc'd when once that Motion of Mind ceaſeth, which againſt us upon Omiſſion, then there can remain either the Abſence of the Good, or the freſh En- (4). The famous Mr. Bayle maintains the contrary Opinion in his Treatiſe upon a Comer, ſaying, That a Man has more Love for Joy, than Hatred to Sorrow; which l'aradox he precends to prove thus, No Man (ſays he) ſcruples to put himſelf into an uneaſy and forrowful Condition, provided it carries a phew of Mirth and Pleaſure This appears from the Examples. of so many young Maids, who being tranſported with the Expe&tations of ſome preſent Pleaſure, suffer themſelves to be led into fuch Actions, as they are ſenſible will produce a long train of Miſeries : ds alſo by the Exemple of great Numbers of Men, who have found a thouſand times, that the eating of certain Meats, and their drinking too much, has cauſed terrible Pains in them, who yet will not reſtrair their Appetites from them, when they have occaſion. But 'cis my Opinion, that theſe young Maids and Drunkards do not uſually think of the bad tendency of their Actions, ſo far are they from determining, after they have exadly compared the preſent Pleaſure with the Miſery that will follow, Tis not then a time of Reflection; we might do it when we are ſerious, and the Object and Occaſion being at a diſtance, our favourite Paffion is filent; but when the Heart is briskly attacked in a ſenſible place, all theſe good Reflections vaniſh, we dream of nothing but the greateſt Satisfaction, and never trouble ourſelves with what may happen. The preſent Plea- Sure, unleſs it be very ſmall and next to nothing, fills the narrow Capacity of our Soul, and ſo engroſſes the whole Mind, fo that it troubles not itſelf to think at all of things abfent, (as Mr. Locke ſpeaks, Eſay of Hum. Vnderſt. p. 326.) The Orator Eſchines ſpeaking of thofe who engage themſelves in ſome great Wickedneſs, ſays, That they neither conſider on the Diſgrace or Puniſhment, which they bring on themſelves, but are wholly employed with the thoughts of that Pleaſure they ſhall obtain, if they compaß their deſign; 'Oups η αιγώ», έσ' απείσονται κηφθένες λογίζονται, άλλ' έφ' δις καιωρθώσαντες ευφρανθήσονται, έτοις κεκαλώ ται. . Timarche p. 197. But if, rotwithſtanding the Earneſtneſs of the Deſire which the Preſence of the Object excites, there are ſome which invite them to conſider the Conſequence of the Action, they always have a great Inclination to farter themſelves. They think, that tho' the Conſequence is important, nevertheleſ 'tis not ſo certain, but that it may happen otherwiſe, or at least that it may be avoided by ſome means or other, as by Induſtry, Courtſhip, change of Behaviour, &c. (Mr. Locke of Hum. Under ft. p. 328.). Further inore, the prevailing Power of preſent Pleaſure, by which they are hurried, is, properly ſpeaking, a real Sorrow, for in the fic of a violent Paſſion, the earneſt Deſire, which is inflamed by the nearneſs and allurements of the object, cauſes ſuch an Uneaſi- neſs, as affects us in the ſame manner, as what we ordinarily call Grief, and the Uneaſineſs preſent being greater, determines the Will, as Mr. Locke has very well proved, altho' the future Sorrows, to which Men expoſe themſelves by ſuffering themſelves to be carried away by the prevailing Power of preſent Pleaſure, may be ſeen at a diſtance, and as a greater Evil in its own Nature than what they feel themſelves actually preffed with, the Deluſion cauſed by a ſmall difference of Time, inclines the Mind to chooſe the worſt part. Most of our Pleaſures (ſays Montagne, according to the Opinion of the Heathen Wiſemen, viz. Seneca, Ep.51,&c.) tickle and embrace us, to ſtrangle us, as the Thieves which the Egyptians called Phileras, did ; and if the Head-ach ſeize us before Drunkenneſ we abſtain from over-much drinking, but the Pleaſure going before, deceives us, and ſo conceals the conſéquence from us. See the ſame Thought in two Comick Poets quoted by Atheneus in his Deipnoſophiſts, Lib. I. & XV. whoſe Words Gataker recites in his Preface to Marcus Antoninus. If at the ſame Moment (ſays Mr. Locke) that a Man takes the Glaß in his hand, the pleaſure. that he finds in drinking were accompanied with that Pain in the Head, and qualms of Stomach which never fail to ſeize fome Men Some few Hours after they have drunk to exceſ, I do not believe that any Man would, upon theſe Conditions, put the Cup to his Lips, whatever pleaſure he might have by drinking. So that in the Examples alledged by Mr. Bayle, and in other like Caſes, none can propound to himſelf to undergo any Uneaſineſs or Sorrow, provided it paſſes with us for Pleaſure, but he ajms to free himſelf from fome Uneaſineſs, or Grief that lies upon him, which his Paffion, or erroneous Judgment hinders him from coinparing fully with the degree or certainty of Sorrow at a diſtance. The other Reaſon of Mr. Bayle is, That Men ſtick not to paſs thro ' many Sorrows and Uneaſineſſes, provided at length they can arrive at Pleaſure. The Corfars (1ays he) having received an Affront, will hide themſelves five days together in the Buſhes to wait for their Enemy, being well contented to feed on the Roots of Graß all th while, on condition, that they may have the ſatisfa&tion of ſeeing their Ambuſh ſucceſful. But we may rather ſay, that the Uneafinels or Grief which theſe Men have conceived at the Affront given them by their Enemy, who has provoked, and the eager deſire of Revenge with which they are poffeſſed, renders them inſenſible of thoſe leffer Diſturbances which are cauſed by the Coldneſs . of the weather, or an hungry Appetite. We can obſerve very few Men, who will willingly undergo any great Pain or Trouble, to arrive at the Enjoyment of thoſe Pleaſures of which they are moſt ſenſible, but when indeed only ſome ſmall inconvenience, or little Uneaſineſs, which they think can eaſily be born, attends, there needs no great Reſolution to open a way to the pofleffion of that Object which has made to great Impreſſions upon our Heart. But the profpect of ſome great Evil abates the Eagerneſs of the ſtrongeſt Paſſions, and fills pliable Minds with ſuch a Fear, as keeps them from ſwallowing the Bairs of Pleaſure : But if Sometimes to ſatisfy thefe Deſires Men run themſelves chearfully into great Troubles and ſharp Sorrow, we muſt think, that as ſoon as they are ſenſible of what they have done, they'll immediately repent of their Raſhneſs and Imprudence; the Pleaſures, whoſe ſweet Morſels have drawn us away, will then appear to have been bought too dear, and we thall renounce, with all our Hearts, the hopes of all we once accounced delightful, to be delivered from the Evil we endure, a Proof ſufficient that we have not well conſulted our own Good, or that the violence of our Paffions ſo blinded us, char we did nor perceive all the Bitcerneſs of the Sorrow, into which we have blindly thrown ourſelves. To come then to the Subject our Author is on, Suppoſe that two Lawgivers, willing to ſettle the ſame Law, ſhould pr opound, the One great Rewards to ſuch as obferve it, and the other fevere Punilhments to ſuch as break it, Do we think that the firſt would more effectually engage Men to Obedience, than the other? no Body, I believe, will ventyre upon the Affirmative; for there may be many Men who will not much regard the greateſt Re- wards that can be given, and being contented with their preſent Condition, aſpire nor to any higher degree of Happineſs : Buc how few are there who will not be affrighted at the proſpect of a great Puniſhment, tho' they do not attentively conſider it. For one Man who will yield to a Temptation in ſpite of ſuch Threarnings, we ſhall find a thouſand who will not in the leaſt be affected with the hopes of the greateſt Rewards, eſpecially if to deſerve them they muſt offer force to any ſtrong Inclination? I Thall add one Remark more, which is this, If a Man were more ſenſible of Good than Evil, thoſe Sins into which Men fall for fear of Trouble, ought to be puniſhed with greater Severity, than thoſe which we are drawn into by the love of Pleaſure. Now this Conſequence which naturally flows from the Principle of Mr. Bayle, is contrary to the Judgment of all the wiſeſt Legiſlators and moſt able Philoſophers, as well as the conſtant practice of all the Judicatures of the moſt Civilized Nations; and I am apo to think, that Mr. Bayle himſelf would nor approve of a more gentle Trearment towards that young Maid who (as he inſtances) ſuffered herſelf to be carried away with the prevalency of a preſent Pleaſure, than of her who yields to the Threarnings of a furious Spark. See Chap. IV. §. 7. Notes there, and what the Author farther ſays, Lib. VIII. Chap. III. $. 19. as alſo Grotius, Lib. II. Chap. XX. S. 29. N. 2. with the Nores. I am aware alſo that in the fame Book in which this Maxim, which has occa- fioned this large Note, is contained, theſe words, which will confirm my laft Reflection, are found, I much doubt (ſays Mr. Bayle) whether the Prevalency of that Pleaſure which hurrieth us, will be able to diminiſh the Crime, p. 345. joyment 72 Of Law in general. BOOK I. joyment of it rais'd, there remains ſcarce any perfect, viz. ſuch as have no Puniſhment enacted thing but a dull Acquieſcence and Contentment. for Offenders, as Macrobius ſpeaks, (7) or which Whence it comes to paſs that many Perſons, then wanted this Penal Sanétion. Such a one they only begin to value their good things, when they reckon the Lex Cincia, (8) which had no other either have loft, or are in danger of loſing them. Clauſe added at the end to enforce it, (9) but this, But Grief, into which all Evils and all Privations He that doth otherwiſe ſhall be accounted to have done of Good are at laſt reſolv'd, is not itſelf a bare wickedly. But I ſhould conje&ture, that in that Privation, but a Thing of a moſt poſitive Nature, Law either the Infamy alone was thought a ſuffi- anå of ſuch prodigious Strength, as to be able ſocient Puniſhment, or it was left to the Power of far to extinguiſh all (5) Senſe and Value of Hap- the Cenſors to fix ſome further Mark of Diſgrace pineſs, as ſometimes to make us deſire ſo ſevere a on the Delinquents in this point. That ſuch Per- Remedy as Death, for its Cure. fons were not altogether unpunilh'd we may fairly Hence, we think, Civil Legiſlators have ſuffi- conclude from Tacitus (10)." Cicero de Legibus, l. 2. cient Grounds and Reaſons for chuſing to make C. 9. (11) The Puniſhmeut of Perjury is from Men Dif- the Sanction of their Laws conſiſt racher in Puniſh- grace, and from Heaven Deſtruction. Livy, L. 10. c.9. ments than in Rewards. The Obſervance of Hu: gives us an Inſtance of another Law feemingly Im- man Laws is indeed advantagious enough in ge- perfect. (12) The Valerian Law, ſays he, when it had neral, as it ſecures the Poſſeſſion and Enjoyment forbidden the Scourging, or the Beheading of a Man, who of thoſe bleſſings which attend a Civil Life : But ſhould make an Appeal, only added, that whoever acted were the Exerciſe of common Virtues enforc'd by thus, a&ted wickedly. This I suppoſe (so great was the the propoſal of particular Rewards, 'twere impoſ- Modeſty of Men in thoſe Days) might be thought a fuffi- fible to furniſh Stock enough for ſo profuſe a cient T'ie for a Law : But in our Times ſuch a Simplicity Bounty. On the other hand, (6) the denouncing of Expreſſion would be us’d in no Threats, but thoſe of Puniſhments was the ſureſt way to make Men which were deſign'd for Feſts. In the fame Rank we ſhake off that heavy Drowſineſs with which moſt may place the Law of (13) Zalcuchus mention'd of them are beſotted and benumm’d: And becauſe by Diodorus Siculus, L. 12. c. 20. Let no Citizen proſe- generally the Tranſgreſſion of the Laws is join'd cute bis Enemy with implacable Hatred, but let him so with the Hurt of others, and with ſome imaginary maintain Enmity with him, as if he were ſhortly to re- Good of the Offender, therefore it ſeem'd moſt turn into Favour and Friendſhip. He that doth other- expedient to repreſs the enticing Allurements of wiſe, let him be reputed a Man of a Fierce and Barba- Sin, by repreſenting the frightful Image of that rous Diſpoſition. Unleſs you'll ſay, that in this Cafe, Pain and Grief which was unavoidably to follow as well as the former, the Infamy may well be in- it. Thus we find that Civil Laws do always come terpreted as a Puniſhment. And ſo likewiſe in enforc'd with a Penalty denounc'd againſt Tranſ- thoſe other Laws recited immediately after by the greffors, either expreſly defining the kind of Mulct fame Author, L. 12. c. 21. Let not a Free Woman, or Puniſhment: or elſe intimating that it is left unleſ ſhe be drunk, go attended with above one Maid. undetermin'd to be ſettled by the Diſcretion of Let her not ftir out of the City in the Night-time, unleß the Judges, and of thoſe who are to take care of when she goes to proſtitute herſelf to her Gallant. putting the Laws in Execution. Indeed the Ro- her not wear Golden Ornaments, nor Garments intera man Lawyers tell us of ſome Laws which were im woven with Gold, unleſs jhe deſigns to ałt the Courteſan, Let (5) One ſmall Pain is ſufficient to ſpoil all the Pleaſures we enjoy. The Reaſon of it is, becauſe ſo long as we are troubled with any Uneaſineſs we can't think ourſelves happy, or in the way of Happineſs, becauſe every one looks upon Grief and Un- eaſineſs as things inconſiſtent with Happineſs. Mr. Locke of Hum. Underſt. p. 299. (6) The Original being ſo confuſed in this place, that the Author's Reaſonings quite loſe their force thereby, I have thoughe fit to remedy it, by tranſplanting two fmall Sentences, and changing the Connection, vix. after De leur Loix, put, Car il falloit, &c. thus in the Engliſh Tranſlation, after Rewards, 1. 9. put, The denouncing of Puniſhments, 1. 17. and reading ro, follow it, rea turn to, The Obſervance, &c. I. 5. and ſo go on at 1. 17. becauſe to put the firſt Periods into a Parentheſis, as the Author does, makes an harſh Confuſion. (7) Inter Leges quoque illa imperfe&a eſſe dicitur, in qua nulla deviantibus puena ſancitur. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. I. II. C. 17. (8) The Cincian Law is fo called from M. Cincius the Tribune, who propoſed it, A. V. C. 549. It forbad all Advocates and Pleaders to take any Money or Preſents, from whence Plautus calls ir Muneralis. See Tacit.l.11. c. 5. (9) The Latin is this : Qui ſecus fecerit, improbé feciſſe videbitur. It is not known whence our Author took theſe words : but theſe ſort of Laws do nor make void what was done againſt their Prohibition. Imperfe&ta Lex est, veluti Cincia, qua fupra certum modum donari prohibet, exceptis quibuſdam cognatis, do li plus donatum fit, non reſcindit, i. e. Cincias's Law is an imperfect one, be- cauſe tho'ir forbids all moderate Fees and Gifts, unleſs to ſome Kindred, yer if more be given it makes them nor void. Ulp. Inſtit. Tit. I. §. 1. See Lib. III. Chap. VII. §. 6. following. (10) Who ſays, Annal. 13. S. 42. Suillii opprimendi gratiâ repetitum videbatur Senatus conſultum, Penaque Cincie Legis adverſus eos qui pretio cauſas or aſſent, i. e. The Cincian Law was made to ruin Suillius. Cicero de Legibus, l. 2. c. 9. (11) Perjurii Pæna divina exitium, humana dedecus. (12) The Latin is, Valeria Lex, quum eum qui provocaſſet, virgis cadi, Securique necari vetuiffet, quis adverſus ea feciſſet, nihil ultrà, quam improbè faftum, adicit. id, (qui tum pudor hominum erat) viſum, credo, vinculum Jatis validum Logis. Nunc vix ſerio ita minetur quiſquam. But here, by the Bye, we may obſerve, that the laſt words of this Pafíage are much varied in the Manu- fcripts, where they are greatly corrupted. Gronovius the Father faintly conjectures, that they ſhould be read thus, Nunc vix llo ſummas pænas minetur quiſquam ; and he builds it upon two of the beſt Manuſcripts, which read thus, Nunc vix fi ſummo ſerio metur, &c. Others add, Ita, & ſervata, which being joined with the former Readings, and keeping to the ſenſe, we may ga- ther the true Reading to be, Nunc vix ſi ſuinmis cruciatus minetur quiſquam, i. e. Men at this day can hardly be kept to their Duty by the plainest Denunciation of the most severe Puniſhments. (13) Diodorus Siculus's Greek, is, legsálflwr und'éve 7 Tomiño 'tomantenu einde daraxlov 'fzexv. å ma' stes Tày xb egy ay nadpBeh- γειν, ώς ήξονα παλιν εις συλλυσίν, και φιλίαν. τον διά παρ αυτά ποινα διαλαμβάνεται παράλούς πολίταις ανήμερον, και άγιον ψυχιω. ... Γωναίκι ελάθέρα μη πλείω ακολοθίν μιας θεραπύησΘ, έαν μη μεθύη, μηδέ οξιέναι νύκλο ε ε πόλεως, ή μη μοιχόομένω: μηδε περιτίσεις κυσία, μηδε είτα παρυφασμένω, έαν μη τάραν 5 μηδε7ον άνδρα φορείς δακτύλιον ισόγευ- σον, μηδε ιμάτιον ισομιλήσιον, εαν μη εταιρεύεται, ή μοιχευεται, διό και ραδίως (ας των τροφίμων αιοεάις υπεξαιρέσεσιν άπιστέψε η βλαβερές υφής, και ακολασίας των επιτηδιαμαίων, έδεις και εβάλετο η αιγαν κόλασιν, ομολογήσει λαλαγκλάς, εν τοις maitais . See Montagne's Eſſays, Lib. 1. Chap. 43. Digeſt. Lib. XL. Tit. 47. De Religioſis, Lo Sumptib. Funér. doc. Leg. xiv. 9. 14. & Lib. 47. Tit. 12. De Sepulcbr. viol. Leg. 3. $. 4. Let mia CHAP.VI. Of Law in general. 73 Let not a Man wear a Ring allied to Gold, or a Gar- Compulſive Power, or the Power of exaEting from ment approaching near to Mileſian Richneſs, unleſſ he be the subject a Conformity to the Rule (14) pre- guilty of Fornication or of Adultery. Thus (as the Hi- fcrib'd them by decreeing and actually inflicting itorian proceeds to obſerve) by ſuch Scandalous Ex- Penalties, is properly in the Perſon of him who ceptions and Conditions, he eaſily diverted his Subjects made the Laws, or of him who hath the Care of from the purſuit of Luxury and of Intemperance. For no their Execution. Liban. Orar. V. Laws were of no one could bear the expoſing himſelf to bis Fellows by ſo Force-without Judges to put them in Execu:ion. Bare foul a Diſgrace (a). Statutes have neither Ears to bear our Cauſe, nor Feet Thus then, there are two Parts of a Law, one nor Hands to baften to us and defend 28 : But all the Definitive, and the other Vindicative, which is the Aſſiſtance which Juſtice gives us, is convey'd by its Mi- Penal Sanction. Theſe, we ſay, are two Parts of the niſters. Tho’’tis a common thing with Writers to fame Law, and not two Species of Laws. For as attribute to the Laws themſelves ſuch Effects, as in it is loſt Labour to ſay, Do this, if nothing follow a ſtrict ſenſe belong to the Supreme Power. Of beſides ; ſo it is abſurd to ſay, You ſhall undergo ſuch which kind of Speech, that one Paſſage of Apu- a Penalty, unleſs it have been before ſignified by leims (6) may be a ſufficient Inſtance, Quod Lex in what means we ſhall render ourſelves obnoxious Urbe, Dux in Exercitu, hoc est in Mundo Deus. What to this Suffering. We muſt therefore take notice, the Law is in a City, what the General is in the Army, that the whole ſtrength and force of a Law pro- (16) ſuch is GOD in the World. When Livy ſays, perly conſiſts in declaring what our Superior is (17). The Commands of the Laws are more powerful pleas'd we ſhould perform or omit, and what Pe than thoſe of Men; this is ſo far true in Democra- nalty we ſhall incurr upon Default. Whence alſo cies only, that the Magiſtrates cannot recede from it may be underſtood in what ſenſe the Power of the Laws, nor over-rule their Force. Obliging is attributed to the Law. For, properly Legiſlators, as fuch, are ſaid to compel, only ſpeaking, the Power of obliging, or laying an in- Morally; not that by any Natural Violence they ward Neceſſity on Perſons to act in ſuch a man- fo conftrain a Man, as to render it impoſſible for, ner, is in him who bears the Sovereign Command. him to act otherwiſe than as they direct; bụt be- But the Law is only the Inſtrument of Sovereignty, cauſe, by declaring and exhibiting a Penalty a- by which the Ruler makes his Pleaſure known to gainſt Offenders, they bring it to paſs that no his Subject, which being once diſcover'd, an Ob- Man can eaſily chuſe to tranſgreſs the Law; ligation to Obedience is produc'd in them by Vir- fince, by reaſon of the impending Penalty, Com- tue of his Supreme Authority. Hence too it ap- pliance is in a high degree preferable to Diſobe- pears, that the vulgar Diſtinction of the Power of dience.. a Law, into Directive and Compulſive, was ill made; -»XV. Now by attributing thus to Laws the unleſs by the Compulſive Power we underſtand Power of Obliging, we immediately exclude Per- the Penal Clauſe. For the proper Efficacy of a milions from the Number of true and proper Laws: Law conſiſts in directing, as it declares the Will of Tho' Modeſtinus (c) tells us, the (1) Virtues of Law the Sovereign, and denounceth Threats againſt are to command, to forbid, to permit, to puniſh. For the Subject, if he prove Diſobedient. But the (2) Permiſſion is not properly an Action of the Law (a) Add. l. 11. C. 7. D. de Relig. Sumptibus Funeral. & l. 3. f. 4. Leg, de Sepulchro violato. (b) De Mundo, p. 749. Ed. in uſum Delph. (c) L. 1. D. de L. L. T. 3. (14) The Original is; ab ipfis, for, ipſis preſcriptam. (15) This Author cites only the Latin Verſion of Libanius's Oration V. He has ſome Declamations, but I have never ſeen his Orations. (16) The ſenſe of this Paffage is certainly taken out of Ariſtotle, who ſpeaks exactly the ſame thing in his Book De Mundo, Chap 17. (17) Imperiaque Legum potentiora, quàm hominum. Tit. Liv. Lib II. Chap. 1.1 Mr. Barb. Nores on 8. XV. (1) The words of the Digeſt are, Legis virtus Chec] est, imperare, vetare, permittere, punire, Digeſt. Lib. 1. Tit. 3. Leg. 7. (2) This is not always true, for every one knows, that Laws ſometimes poſitively grant certain particular Privileges and Rights; if we carefully reflect upon the nature of things Moral, we ſhall find that the general Notion of a Law, as it implies a Conſtitu. tion by which a Superior orders the Actions of ſuch as are ſubject to him, includes not only an Obligation to do or not do cer- tain things, but alſo a Liberty to do or nor do others. So that Liberty imports always a Conceſſion, either expreſs or tacit, which is a poſitive thing. And indeed on what are all the Rights we have founded, but upon the poſitive Will of our Superior, by virtue of which we may defend ourſelves, or require the Protection of the Law againſt all them who endeavour to moleſt us in the Enjoyment of ſome Lawful Right. Farther, Right and obligation are two Relative Notions, which always go hand in hand. And why may we not allow a Law of meer Permiſſion, as well as a Law Obligatory? Certainly, if this Law be neceſſary to impofe upon us a neceſſity of acting, or nor acting, the other is no leſs neceſſary to put us in a ſtate of acting or not acting with Security and Impunity, as we think fit. Grotius, who, like this Author, affirms, that Obligation is the Eſſence of all Law, ſeems tacicly to acknowledge in the fame Chapter (Lib. I. Ch. 1. §. 17.) chat Permiſſion is comprehended in the Notion of a Law. We muſt therefore allow, That the Law of meer Permiſſion is an Ordinance or Conſtitution by which a Superior gives to thoſe that are ſubject to him, a Right or Moral Power to have Things ſafely and lawfully, or to do and require of another certain Actions, if he judges convenient. See what Mr. Titius ſpeaks much to the ſame purpoſe in his Obſerv. on Pufendorf, 50, 51. Mr. Selden has already maintained the ſame Opinion, and uſes a Compariſon very proper to make it underſtood, viz. Al the Boundaries which divide my Field from my Neighbour's, ſet out the Extent of his Field as well as mine ; ſo the Obligatory Right, which determines what Aktions are commanded and what forbidden, being once ſettled, there neceſſarily follows a Right of meer permiſſion, which has for its Objet all other Aftions, about which the Lawgiver has determined nothing Authoritatively, and conſequently permit s every Man to do, or not to do, as he pleaſes. De Jure Nat. & Genr. Lib. I. Chap. 4. Again, we muſt remember, that there is a great difference between the Permiſſion of Human Laws and Divine, for the Permiffion of Divine Laws is always abſolute, ſo that every one has a full Right to do all that they permit, provided the Things permitted are not forbidden by any Humane Law, to which he ought to ſubmit, in Obedience to ſome other Divine Law; but as to Humane Laws, the Permiſſion which they give is for the moſt part imperfect, which implies only Impunity in Humane Judicatures, as our Author explains himſelf a little lower. Never- theleſs I am aware, that this Author forgetting his Principles feems to allow, beſides a Law of meer Permiſſion, for ſpeaking of the Goodneſs or Evil of Actions in the following Chapter, §. 3. he ſays exprefly, By a Law I mean always here a Law which in- diſpenſably obliges to some thing, and not a Law that only permits. Legem neceſſitantem, non permittentem. Grotius alſo ſpeaking of the firſt Right of the Occupant, ſays, It is founded upon the Natural Right of bare Permiſion. Eft hoc jus ex jure Naturæ per- mittente. Lib. II. Ch. 3. S. 5. L. but 74 Of Law in general. Воок І. but the Negation of an Adion. Whatſoever determin'd nothing plainly about ſuch an A&ion, things the Law permits, thoſe it neither commands or hath declar'd it ſhall be Lawful ; or, laſtly, be- nor forbids , and therefore it really doth nothing cauſe Civil Ordinances frequently leave many at all concerning them. Some maintain, that things to the Modeſty and common Honeſty of there is nevertheleſs a kind of Obligation in Per- every particular Man (b). miſſions ; not indeed affecting him to whom we ſay Some have more accurately obſerv'd concern- a thing is permitted, but binding up a third Perſon ing theſe Permiſſions of Civil Laws and Civil from giving him any hindrance in caſe he under- Courts, that they are made either by the A&tion take what the Law thus permits. Tho' this is of the Law, or only tacitely. To the former they by many reſtrain’d to ſuch things as are fully and refer the Omiſſion, or paſſing by of a Marter, perfectly permitted, ſo as not to take in thoſe lef- not ſimply, and, as it were, by accident, but ſer and imperfect Permiſſions which may be more when the Deſign and the Form of the Law run properly ſtil'd Indulgences or Connivances. Thus, in ſuch a manner, that the Legiſlator fhews his for Example, the Laws of ſome Countries per- Intent of making a full enumeration of Particu- mit the killing of a Wife taken in Adultery ; yet lars : For in ſuch a Caſe he is ſuppos'd to have they do not forbid others from uſing their utmoſt permitted whatever he hath not exprefly reckon'd to hinder her Death. But if we would be accu- up amongſt Things prohibited; provided the Mat- rate and exact in our way of Talking, even this ter be not repugnant to Natural Honeſty. Thoſe Effect doth not properly reſult from the Permiſ- things are underſtood to be tacitly forbidden, fion of the Law, but from every Man's juſt Liber- which the Civil Power lets paſs by conniving ar, ey (3). For about thoſe things in which the Law tolerating, or diſſembling ; either for the preſent gives me no ftop or hindrance, I have a perfect only, or for a longer time, ſo as to let them ob- freedom of acting, the chief Effect of which is, tain the Force of Cuſtoms. Yer a Permiſſion that no Man ought to diſturb me in the harmleſs granted by a Civil Law cannot cauſe that an Acti- Exerciſe of it. So that for a Law exprefly to per on ſhall not be contrary to the Divine Law, or mit thoſe Things to which we claim a ſufficient ſet it beyond the Fear of the Divine Puniſh nient. Licence by their not being prohibited, which can We may farther remark, that when a Thing is not well fall under Doubt or Diſpute, ſeems little ſaid to be permitted, which is not determind by better than uſeleſs and ſuperfluous. As likewiſe, the (6) expreſs Command or Prohibition of any it is not always neceſſary, that when any prohi- Civil Law, we are not to cavil at the Words of biting Law is repeald, an Ad hitherto forbidden, the Law, but to conſider the Scope and Intention ſhould by an expreſs Ordinance be declar'd per- of it. For many things are contain'd in the fenfe mitted : Since upon removal of the former Impe- of the Laws, and are ſuppos’d to be really im- diment, our natural Liberty doth, as it were, te- plied by them, either as they are neceffary Con- vive and recover itſelf. There are indeed two ſequences, or upon account of their near Affinity ſpecial Caſes, in which Civil Lawgivers are wont and Reſemblance to the determin’d Caſes. Regard to uſe expreſs Permiſſion : Firſt, when Licence and is likewiſe always to be had to Natural Law, or to Impunity is indulgd to ſuch an Act, within ſuch Common Honeſty, which is the perpetual Sup a Meaſure; and, ſecondly, when the Licence or plement of Civil Decrees. Laſtly, Thoſe things Impunity is to be purchas'd by ſome Fine or Bur- which are tolerated only for a time, or upon the then. Of the former Caſe, ſome give an Inſtance Score of Neceflity, cannot fall under the proper in the Laws of moſt Countries permitting Uſury, Notion of Rights. All (7) which Obſervacions within ſuch a fix'd Degree: Of the latter, in are chiefly to be underſtood of the moſt perfect or the Conſtitutions of ſome Places, where Women plenary Permiſſion (c). are allow'd to proſtitute themſelves, upon Condi- tion of paying a certain Tax (4): which whe XVI. The Matter of Laws in general, is what- ther it be well or ill done we are not now to dif- ever can be done by thoſe Perſons for whom the pute, (a) (5). Laws are made, at leaſt at the time of their Pro- Legal Permiſſion is divided into Plenary, which mulgation. For if any Man afterwards, by his gives a Right of acting, and makes the Deed al own Fault, loſeth his Ability to fulfil the Law, the together lawful; and leſs Plenary which either af- Force of the Law doth not thereupon ceaſe and fords Impunity, or Freedom from Impediment, or expire; but the Legiſlator hath Power to puniſh both. Now that ſeveral Things find an Impunity him, for rendring himſelf thus incapable of amongſt Men, is occafion'd by ſome of theſe Rea conforming to the Rule preſcrib'd him. But, o- fons : Either, that the Matters exceed the Reach therwiſe, to make ſuch a Law as the Subject can- of Human Courts and Cognizance, as do the not fulfil, and yet hath not loſt his Power of ful- Faults of Kings; or, that Human Law hath either filling by his own Fault, is not only a moſt vain, (a) Vid. Evagr. Hiſt. Ecclel. I. 3. C. 39. Of the Tribute paid by Common Strumpets, which Anaſtaſius the Emperor took off. See B.VIII of our Author, c. 1. 1. 3. (6) Vid. Digeſt. I. 50. cit. 17. (c) Vid. Bæcler in Grot. 1. 2. c. 1. 1.9. Mr. Barb. Nores on S. 15. (3) But the free uſage of this Faculty in ſuch and ſuch Cafes, is an effect of the Permiſſion of the Sovereign Legiſlator, who has impoſed Laws upon us in giving us a Being. See Note 2. above, (4) See Evagrius's Ecclef. Hift. Lib. III. Chap. 39. about a Tribuce called Chryſargyrus, which was levied upon the Curtezans, and which was aboliſhed by Anaſtaſius, as our Author there obſerves. (5) See what is ſaid Lib. VIII. Chap. 1. §. 3. (6 in all the Editions of Pufendorf it is printed Volente do fubente ( and therefore the Engliſh Tranſlator renders chem, the expreſ Command ) but the Author would have ſaid, Vetante aut fubente, as the Connection of the Diſcourſe requires, for Velle do fubere fignify the ſame thing. (7) See Lib. V. Chap. XII. §. 17. following. but CHAP. V1. Of Law in general. 75 ſon of the Law reacheth, and to whom (1) the call'd from Baniſhment, lay under but a moſt unjuſt Deſign (1). As to the ſubject ſame happen to be denied to Perſons of the like Matters which employ the particular Species of Condition, Occaſion ſhould be given to Anger Laws, we ſhall more conveniently conſider them and Reſentment, whilft Men of equal Circum- in their proper place. ſtances are not admitted to equal Favours. Plus XVII. To know who is capable of being 0 tarch hath recorded ſeveral Inſtances of very nice blig'd by a Law, we need ſeek no further than to and ſubtle Diſpenſations. As when Agefilaus fu- the Right of the Legiſlator; which certainly takes ſpended the Laws for one Day, with this Form, in all thoſe who are ſubject to his Command. Let the Laws feep to Day (a) (4); to hinder thoſe What Perſons the Legiſlator intended to oblige is Perſons who had fled in an Engagement, from ſuf- plain enough from the Law itſelf. For in all Laws fering the uſual Diſgrace. So when Demetrius de- it is ſignified whom they concern ; either by ex ſir'd to be admitted at once into all the Athenian preſs Determination, made ſometimes by a gene- Myſteries, whereas it had ever been a Cuſtom to ce- ral Sign, ſometimes by a Reſtriction to certain In- lebrate the Greater Myſteries in November, and the dividuals ; or elſe by ſome Condition or Reaſon, Leſſer in August, Stratocles publiſh'd a Decree, that which a Subject finding in himſelf, at the ſame the Month March, in which Demetrius viſited Athens, time apprehends that he therefore ſtands oblig'd by ſhould be callid, firſt November, and then August ſuch a Law. Regularly then, a Law obligeth all (b). What the ſame Author reports of Demofthenes Perſons ſubject to the Legiſlator, whom the Rea- is more plauſible: Demofthenes, upon his being re- a Pecuniary Matter of it may be applied. For otherwiſe, Tu- Muld, and the Law forbidding that he ſhould be mults and Confuſions would continually ariſe a- entirely diſcharg'd from it without Payment, mongſt Subjects, the Prevention of which Diſor- they invented this way of eluding the Law; they ders was a principal Reaſon why Laws were firſt had a Cuſtom of giving Money to the Man who introduc’d. And therefore no body ſhall be e- prepar'd and adorn'd the Altar, at the Time of Sa- ſteem'd exempted from a Law, unleſs he can ſhew crificing to Jupiter the Deliverer : This Office, and his peculiar Privilege. Yet this indeed frequently this Money, they decreed Demofthenes ; and under happens, that a Man may be exempted from the that Pretence allotted him fifty Talents, the Sum Obligation of a Law, after the Time of its being in which he had been amerc'd. The Lacedemoni- enacted, and this we call being diſpens’d with. For if ans made uſe of much fuch another Evaſion in the Legiſlator may rightly abrogate or repeal a Law, Reference to Lyfander. It was a Law amongſt he may as fairly ſuſpend the Effect of it in ſome them, that no Man ſhould bear the ſame Office a- certain Perfon. Diſpenſation differs from Equity(2), bove once (5) but now reſolving to let Lyſander with which it is generally confounded, in this Ré- have again the Chief Power in a Naval Expediti- ſpect, that the former cannot be granted, but by on, they gave (6) Aracus the Formal Command of one endued with Legiſlative Power; whereas an the Fleet, but join'd Lyſander with him (7) in a inferior Miniſter of Juſtice, not only may, but private Station, with expreſs Orders, That the Ge- ought to apply the latter ; ſo that if he follow the neral ſhould never act contrary to his Advice (c). I ftria Letter of the Law, in a Caſe where there is know not whether the Spaniſh Cuſtom mention'd room for an Equitable Conſtruction, he ſhall be by Naudaus (d), may not be reckon'd likewiſe a- judg’d to act contrary to the Mind and Intention mongſt theſe nice Permiſſions : 'In Spain, he ſays, of the Legiſlator. Diſpenſations therefore depend when they deem a Man to be guilty of Trea- on the free Grace of the Lawgiver, but Equity on ſon, they appoint Judges to ſit on him in ſecret, the Office and Duty of the fudge. In granting who form a Proceſs, and condemn him to ſuffer Diſpenſations (3), great Prudence is to be usºd, 'Death, after which they ſeek by any means to left by a promiſcuous Indulgence, the Force and put the Sentence in Execution. And this they Authority of Law be enfeebled: or left, if the practiſe as a Salvo to their Conſciences; that C (a) Plutarch Aphthegmı Lacon. do Ageſil. Appian. Libye. (6) Idem Demetr. in Alexandr. p. 672, do 679. (c) Diodor. Sic. 113.6. 100. Plutarch Lyſand. Add. Valer. Max. l. 6. c. 5. S. 3. (d) Coups d'Eſtat. cap. 3. p. 193. Mr. Barb. Nores upon S. XVI, and XVII, (1) It is neceſſary that what is forbidden ſhould produce ſome Advantage, either to thoſe for whom the Law is made, or to others, for 'tis not reaſonable that the natural Liberty of Subjects ſhould be reſtrain'd, and no Profit thereby redound to any body, De Offic. Hom.do Civ. lib. 1. ch. 2. S. 8. See what is ſaid, Lib. 7.ch. 9. S. 5. Laws are made only about ſuch things as com- monly happen, as is obſerved above, Chap. 2. S: 5. Again, as to what concerns our natural Right in particular, we ought to take Notice, with Mr. Titius (Obſerv. 59.) 'That natural Right, which is Obligatory, has for its Object ſuch Actions as carry with them fome Convenience, or Inconvenience, neceſſary for the human Nature, as hath been proved, Lib. 2. Ch. 3. As for all other Actions, which we may call indifferent, the natural Right of fimple Permiſſion leaves every one at Liberty to diſpoſe of them as he pleaſes. But moſt of theſe laſt are for the moſt part regulated in different Manners, by the poſitive Laws of GOD and Man, as the Legiſlative Power ſees convenient. (1) See Lib. 5. Ch. 12. 8. 10. following. (2) Şee Lib. 5. Ch. 11. S. 21. following, as alſo his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. i. ch. 2, 5, 10. Farther, to ſpeak properly, what he here calls Equity, ought to be called, An Interpretation according to Equity; as Titius ſpeaks, Obſerv.62. See a little Treatiſe of Grotius's upon this Subject, printed in the latt:er Editions of his Book De jure Bél. do Pac. which is en- titled, De Æquitate, indulgentia do facilitate. (3) See Mr. Bayle, in his Divers Obſervations about a Comet, p.455. and the Second Volume of his Parrhaſana, p. 178. (4) The Greek of Plutarch is, Και φήσας, όπ τες νόμος δεί σήμερgν εάν καθα'δειν, εκ δε σήμωegν ημέρας κυρίες και σεις το λοιπόν. (3) The Word, bis, being omited in all the Editions of this Author, ſpoils the Senſe quite ; and therefore as the French Tranſla- tor adds, deux fois, ſo the Engliſh puts in, above once. (5) Here's a great Miſtake in all the Editions of the Original, putting Aratus, the Name of a General of the Achaans, a very different Perſon from this Admiral, for Aracus. (7) The Latin lays, Privatus, as the Engliſh Tranſlator renders, but ſurely our Author meant, Legatus, a Deputy ; but however that be, 'tis ſafeſt to follow Plutarch, who calls him, Emsaadis, i. e. Prafe&tus Claſis, a Counter-Admiral, at leaſt. See further about theſe ſorts of intricate Diſpenſations, in Montagne’s Eſ ays,lib. 1. ch. 22, L 2 they 76 Of Law in general. Book I. C mind by the Pleaſure of Superiors. We may im- they may not be accus'd of Injuſtice in puniſh Some are us’d to call Poſitive Law by the Name ing Men capically, without a legal Knowledge of Voluntary : Not as if the Law of Nature (2) did of their Crime.' not proceed from the Will of God, but becauſe no XVIII. Law may be beſt divided, with reference to Poſitive Law had ſuch an Agreeableneſs with hu- its Original, into Divine and Human; the former ha man Nature, as to be neceſſary in gen ral for the ving God, and the latter Man for its Author. But Preſervation of Mankind, or, as to be known and if we conſider Law as it bears a neceſſary Agree- diſcover'd without the Help of expreſs and peculi- ableneſs to the ſubject (1) Matter, in this Reſpect ar Promulgation. And therefore the Reaſons of we divide it into Natural and Poſitive. The for- this Law are not to be drawn from the general mer is that which is ſo exactly fitted to ſuit with the Condition of human Race, but from the particu- Rational and Social Nature of Man, that human lar, and ſometimes the (3) temporary Advantage Kind cannot maintain an honeſt and a peaceful of ſeparate Communities. So that upon the Uni- Fellowſhip without it: or, in other words, that on of Men in Societies, they are fix'd and deter- fulneſs ariſing from its internal Efficacy, towards prove our Notion of Poſitive Law by that Paſſage Men in General. Though there be alſo a farther of Ariſtotle (a). (4), where he ſays, That Laws pro- Reaſon of this Denomination; in as much as this ceeding from inſtitution and Uſefulneſs, bear some Re- Law may be found out and known by the ordina- ſemblance to Meaſures : For the Meaſures of Wine and ry Sagacity of Men, and from the Conſideration Corn, for inſtance, are not every where the same; but of human Nature in Common. A greater where the Merchants buy, and leffer where they Poſitive Law is that which doth not by any Sell. means flow from the general Condition of human Divine Law is again divided into Natural and Nature, but from the ſole Pleaſure of the Law- Poſitive (b): But Human Law ſtrictly taken, is on- giver ; tho theſe Laws ought likewiſe to have their ly Poſitive (s), of the particular species, we ſhalı Reaſon and their Uſes; in reference to that parti- diſcourſe in their Place (6). cular Society for which they are enacted. oldth ni() Vide, Ethic. ad Nicom. I. 5. c. 10. Et Vid. l. 15. D. de condit. Inſtit. (b) Divine Natural Law is diſtinguiſh'd from Poſitive, becauſe this is alterable by the Authority that made it, That is not, but is Eternal and Immutable. See what our Author ſays in Book 2. chap. 3. §. 4. - Como Smet Mr. Barb. NOTES on S. XVIII. : (1) The Text here is either corrupted or nor clear. It may be rectified partly from his Elements of Univerſal Civil Law, where our Author thus expreſſes himſelf; Quantum autem ad Materiam, quadam cum ipſa humana Natura, quâ talis, conditione manifeſte congruunt, & ex ea fluunt, i. e. As to the Marter (of Laws] ſome plainly agree with the human Nature, as ſuch, and others flow from it. And partly from his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. 1. Chap. 2. S. 15. where he ſays, Sed ſi Lex Sconfideretur prout neceſſariam, & univerſalem, Congruentiam cum hominibus, vel minus habet, doc. i. e. If the Law be conſidered, as it has a neceſſary and univerſal Agreement with Men, though in the loweſt Degree, doc. The Engliſh Tranſlator is ſo far from clearing this Paſſage that he has made it more obſcure, by taking it in a wrong Senſe, for he underſtands by the Word Subje&tis, in the Original, the Subje&t. or Matter of the Law, whereas the Author plainly treats of the Perſons upon whom a Law is impoſed. (2) See what we have ſaid, Chap. I. $.4. and Chap. 2. 5. 6. with the Notes. (3) The Author here cites Vitellius's Reflection, Morem accommodari, prout conducat, i. e. To accommodate the Cuſtom to the Inte- reſt of State. Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. ch. 6. (4) Αriftotle's Words are, Τα δε, κατα σωθήκίω, και το συμφέρον το δικαίων, όμοια όξιν ταϊς μέτρους, 8 παναχα ίσα τα οιγηρα, και σιτηρά μέτρα, αλλ' ε μ ων&ναι μείζω, ε Α' πωλέσιν ελάω. (5) This is an effential and diſtinguiſhed Character between Laws Natural and Poſitive, the firſt are immutable, ſo juft every way, that no Authority can change or abrogate them lawfully; whereas Poſitive Laws are ſo arbitrary, that as a lawful authority may eſtabliſh them, ſo he may change and aboliſh them as he ſees Occafion. (6) Grotius ( Lib. 1. Chap. 1. S. 15.) affirms, That there is a Divine Voluntary Right, that obliges all Men, as ſoon as they come Tuficiently to their knowledge; and adds, Thar chis Right hath been publiſhed upon three Occaſions, viz. I. Ar the Creation of our firſt parents. 2. After the general Deluge. 3. By the Goſpel. This great Man did not proceed to Particulars; but, ſome Years ſince, Mr. Thomaſius, Profeſſor at Hall in Saxony, compoſed a Syſtem of the Divine Poſitive Univerſal Laws, in his In- ſtitutions of Divine Civil Law, printed in 1702. But this able Lawyer being none of thoſe who count it an Honour to defend what they have once afferted, right or wrong, did, at length, own himſelf miſtaken, and pulled down his own Building, when he found the Foundation to be weak. See his Sele&t Obſervations, made at Hall, Tom. 6. Obſervat. 27. and his Principles of the Law of Nature and Nations, drawn from Common Senſe, printed in 1705, and again in 1708. Others affirm, That all the Laws which relate to a Divine Poſitive Right, either oblige all Men in all Ages, Places, and Nations, or may be deduced tromi Principles of Natural Right, which we ſhall prove true as to lome, in Lib. 6. chap. I. $. 35. note 2. CH A P. CHAP. VII. 77 Of the Qualities of Moral Actions. CH A P. VII. . Of the Qualities of Moral ACTIONS. The CONTENTS of every Section of the ſeventh Chapter. 1. How many are the Qualities of Moral Actions. IX. Juſtice diſtributive. II. A neceſſary, luwful Action. X. Commutative. III. The Goodneſ or Evil of Actions, in what they | XI. Grotius's Opinion about Fuſtice. confift. 1 XII. Ariſtotle's Fudgment upon the ſame. IV. A good A&tion must have all things requiſite, an | XIII. Hobbes's Opinion of Fuſtice and Wrong. evil one is made fuch, by wanting one Condition. XIV. What is an unjust Action. V. GOD can't be the Cauſe of any Evil. XV. What an Injury is. VI. Juſtice is either in Perſons or Actions. XVI. An Injury is done by Deſign and Choice only, VII. What is the Juſtice of Actions. where the Nature of a Fault is treated on. VIII. Univerſal and particular Juſtice. XVII. No Wrong is done to any Man, that wills it. 0 U R next Buſineſs is to conſider the qualities Now by common Uſage of Speech, not only thoſe of Moral Actions: Now according to theſe, Things are ſaid to be Lawful, which neither Di- Actions are ſaid to be Neceſſary, or not Neceſſary, vine nor Human Law forbids, and which there- Lawful or Allow'd, and Unlawful or Diſallow'd, fore may be undertaken without Sin or Blame, but Good or Evil, Just or Unjust. So that the Quali- likewiſe thoſe things which altho' prohibited by ties of Moral Action muſt be Neceſſity, Licenſe the Laws of Nature, yet the Laws of particular or Allowance, and the Oppoſites of theſe, which States fo far permit, as not to impoſe a Penalty on want proper Names; together with Goodneſs and them in human Cogniſance ; leaving them to eve- Illneſs, Juſtice and Injuſtice (1). ry Man's private Conſcience and Honour (3). II. A neceſſary Action is that which by vertue of Tully's Obfervation is admirable to this purpoſe, It the Law or the Command of a Superior, the Per- is not lawful (ſays he) for any Man to fin; but we com- ſon to whom the Law or the Command is given, mit an Error in Speech, whilſt we ſay that ſuch a thing is bound abſolutely to perform. For in this con- is lawful, which is indeed tolerated or allow’d. The fifts the Neceflity of Moral A&tions, that they former kind of Actions we may call perfectly lawful ought not to be omitted, nor yet to be done in the latter imperfectly. So (4) Lampridius reports of the another Manner than what is enjoin'd ; though by Emperor Severus, that he had ſome Thoughts of prohi- our Natural Power and Strength we are able either biting the publik Profeſſors of Lewdneſs : But he feared to omit them or to do them in another Manner, this might rather increaſe Debauchery in Private; Men Yet it is uſual for the Lawyers to ſay abſolutely, naturally affecting what is unlawful, and purſuing with that a thing which wants only this Moral Necefíi- Eagerneſ and Fury any Practice which hath been forbidden ty, cannot be done (a). To a Neceſſary Action is op- them. pos'd not only a Forbidden Action, exprefly prohi But farther than this, we ſometimes in a very bited by the Laws or other Orders of the Superior, looſe Senſe, term even thoſe Things lawful, which but likewiſe a Lawful or an Allow'd Action, which all Men agree and confeſs to be the moſt baſe and the Laws neither command nor forbid, but leave vile; whenſoever the Perſon who performs them it to every Man's Pleaſure, whether he will under- is Maſter of ſo much Strength, as to be too big for take or decline ic (2). Cicero pro Balb. There are human Puniſhment or Reprehenſion. Senec. de ſome things which we ought not to do, tho' we might Clement. l. 1. c. 18. Tho' we commonly say, All things lawfully do them : But on the other hand, whatever we are lawful towards a Slave, yet there are indeed ſome cannot lawfully do, it's very certain we ought not to do. things which common Nature forbids us to act towards (a) Nam quæ fa&ta ladunt pietatem, Exiſtimationem, verecundiam noftram, do (ut generaliter dixerim) contra bonos mores fiunt : nec facere nos poſſe credendum est. Dig. 1. 28. c. 7. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES. (1) The Morality of Human A&tions may be confider'd two ways, 1. In the Manner the Law diſpoſes them, in which Reſpect they are either permiſſive or neceffary. The firſt are ſuch as the Law gives Right pofitively to do, if we will, and not, as our Author affirms, upon the account of which the Law orders a thing to be done in ſuch a Manner, for this Definition agrees to ſuch Actions only, as are allowed by an imperfect Permiſſion, of which he ſpeaks a little lower. 2. As they agree, or diſagree with the Law, and fo Actions are either good, or bad, or indifferent. This Diviſion ſeems more exact than our Author's Titius Obferv. 64, 65. See our Notes on Chap. 6. 8. 2. Note 2. and our Notes on this Chap. 9. 5. Note 5. (1) Nam qua fa&ta, &c. For we ought to ſuppoſe thoſe things impoſſible to be done, which prejudice Piery, Reputation, Honour, and, in general, good Manners do forbid or hinder. (2) A 78 é mexend çaí Tis moeiv toñTQ ' N un molhv xexcóru tey i. e. What a Man is not ordered to do, that he is not hindred from doing. Liban. Declam. 16. The Author himſelf cites this Paffage in his later Editions. (3) There are ſome things not to be done, tho' lawful, but whatever is not lawful, that ought not to be done. Tully's Words are, Etfi peccare nemini licet, ſed Sermonis errore labimur; 'id enim licere dicimus, quod cuique conceditur. Tuſc. Quæſt. lib. 5. c. 19. (4) This Quotation making little to our Author's Purpoſe, and containing ſomething obſcene in it , 'cis no Damage to omit it, and inſtead of it put ſome of the Sayings of the Roman Lawyers, viz. Digeſt. lib. 50. tit. 17. De divers . Reg: furiſ. Leg. 144. Every thing is not honest that is lawful. And Leg. 198. We ought to conſider, not only what is lawful, but what is alſo honeſt. Mr. Stryck Prcom feffor at Hall in Saxony, has publiſhed a Diſcourſe of the Law of what's lawful, but not honeſt, reprinted in 1704 in 4to, where we may find a very particular Account of Things permitted and authorized by Cuſtom, which in themſelves are contrary to natu- ral Honeſty, and much more co Chriſtianity, altho' the Author had but little of his Matter from any certain Places, A Max 78 Of the Qualities of Moral Actions. BOOKI. a Man, one of our own Species and Condition (5). or the End or the Circumſtances of the Action; an III. We call that Aétion good Morally, (for the Action is Morally Good or Evil for one of theſe other kind of Goodneſs, term’d Natural or Mate- Reaſons, either becauſe the Agent is ſo diſpos’d as rial, by which a Thing or an Action tends to the the Law requires him to be, or otherwiſe ; or, Benefit or Perfection of any one (1), is explain'd becauſe the Action is directed towards the proper in another place. Tho' we muſt obſerve, that in Object, with that End, and thoſe Circumſtances the Precepts of Natural Law, and in moſt Civil which the Law preſcribes, or with the contrary. Conſtitutions, it goes along with this Moral Good- But here it muſt be obſerved, that to make an neſs, and amongſt rational Creatures (2), ſeems to Adion good, 'tis neceſſary, thac it not only con- give the firſt Spring or Occaſion to it) or in Moral form to the Law in all its material Requiſites and Eftimation, which is agreeable to the Law, and Conditions; but likewiſe, that in reſpect of its For- that Action evil, which is diſagreeable. In as much mality, it be exercis’d, not out of Ignorance, or as the ratio formalis , the proper and diſtinguiſhing any other Cauſe, beſides the Intention of paying Nature of the Goodneſs or Illneſs of Actions, con Obedience to the Law. And therefore an Action, fifts in a Relation determining them towards a di- tho' otherwiſe on the account of the Matter of it re&tive Rule; and this Rule is what we term a Good, may, by reaſon of the bad Intention of the Law ; (under which Name we here mean a neces- Agent, be imputed to him as Evil. For a Man fitating, and not a permitting Law, and if it be Hu- who deſigning an ill Thing doth a good one, hath man we ſuppoſe it not contrary to thoſe which by no means a Title to any Reward for his service: are Divine,) (3) for when a deſign'd Action is As he in Valerius Maximus (a) who intending to formed according to the Rule preſcrib’d, and ex- kill Fafon, luckily broke his Impoſthume. Upon a{tly agrees with it, it is ſaid to be Good: Where the ſame Account, he who miſpends his lawful as if it is undertaken againſt the preſcrib'd Rule, Power in ill Service, is guilty of Sin: as a Judge, or varies from it, it is calld Evil; and, in one ſuppoſe, who abuſeth his Authority of puniſhing Word, Sin. Now it is plain, that any directing Offenders , to the ſatisfying his own private Re- Rule, for inſtance, the Mariner's Compaſs is ſaid fentments. For which Reaſon the Carthaginians to be the Cauſe of his right Sailing, and of his com- fentenc'd their Generals to Death, if they had un- ing to the Port, not ſo much in regard that the dertaken an Enterprize, tho' with good Succeſs, Ship takes a Courſe falling in with its Direction, yet with ill Counſel and Deſign (1). Liv. 38. as becauſe the Pilot guides himſelf by it in mana C. 48. Val. Max. l. 2. c. 7. 8. 1. Extern. But, on the ging the Steerage: In like manner, a Law is ſaid other ſide, an Aäion as to the Matter of it Evil, to be the Cauſe of Rectitude in an Action, not cannot (2) by vertue of the honeft Intention of the when the Action, however intended, is agreeable Agent, be turn'd into Good. Whence the Reaſon to it; but when the Action proceeds from the Di- is clear, why a Man cannot uſe his own Sins as Ctate of the Law, and from ſome Dependance on Means for the Attainment of any virtuous End, it; that is, from an Intention of paying Obedi- or why we muſt not do Evil that Good may come of it, ence to its Injunctions. Whence, if a Man by Rom. iii. 8. For to render an Action Evil, it's chance, or without thinking of any Obedience to ſufficient that it be incongruous to the Law, in a Law, performs a thing preſcrib'd by that Law, any one Point or Condition, whether Material or he may indeed be faid to have done rightly, or not Formal : that is, If either the Diſpoſition of the A- ill, in a negative, rather than in a poſitive Senſe, gent, or the Object, or the End, or any one of but he cannot be ſaid to have done morally well, the Circumſtances contradict what the Law directs. no more than one that by diſcharging a Gun at 'Tis a moſt vain Diſtinction of ſome Men, when venture and random hath brought down a Bird, they affirm that an Action, as to the Subſtance of can be ſaid to have ſhot skilfully, and like a Marks- the Work, may be good, altho' the End required by the Law be not intended by the Agent. For IV. Farther, ſince the Law determines either the End makes a main part of the very Eſſence of the Diſpoſition of the Agent, or elſe the Object, a Moral Action, in as much as it enters into the man. (a) L. I. c. 8. f. 6. Extern. (5) The whole Chapter treating of a Maſter's Power over his Slaves, is worth peruſing. (1) See Book 1. cbap. 4. §. 4. and Book 2. chap. 3. §. 21. (2) Seneca's Words, Ep. 120. may ſerve as an excellent Comment upon our Author's Notion, Nobis videtur Obſervatio collegiffe, & rerum fæpe fa&tarum inter ſe Collatio per analogiam noſtro intelle&tu do honeftum do bonum judicante -- Noveramus Corporis Sanitatem, ex hâc Cogitamus esſe aliquam et Animi. Noveramus corporis vires, ex his Collegimus esse, & animi Robur. Aliqua benigna falta, aliqua humana, aliqua fortia, nos obſtupefecerant, hæc cæpimus tanquam perfeita mirari, i.e.“ Our Notions of Goodneſs and “ Honeſty are the Reſult of the Reflections and Compariſons, which the Mind makes by Analogy upon ſuch things as it often « lees and obſerves. We know that there is ſuch a Thing as Health of the Body, and from thence we conclude, that there muſt “ be alſo an Health of the Soul. We know that the Body hath Force and Strength, and from thence we infer char the Soul alſo “ hath ics Force. We are wrapped with Admiration at the view of ſome eminent Acts of Goodneſs, Humanity, and Courage, “and we begin to look upon chem as Parterns of Perfection." (3) The two following Periods not being well placed in the Original, muſt be a little varied to make the Diſcourſe coherent, (1) Theſe rio Paffages cited by our Author are nothing to the Purpoſe; and, tho' clear in themſelves, are miſtaken by him in this whole Diſcourſe. The firſt is that of Livy, where Kn. Manlius, anſwering thoſe that conteſted with him about the Honour of the Triumph, under a Prerence that he had managed the War againſt the Gallogreci, or Galatians, with ſufficient Conduct, ſays, That he was ſure to carry his Cauſe, tho' it were not before a Roman, but Carthaginian Senate, who are ſaid to crucify their Ge- nerals, if they acted by bad Advice, tho' they were ſucceſsful, for ſo are his Words, In quo confiderem equidem cauſé meæ, eti- amfi non apud Romanum, ſed Carthaginenſem Senatum agerem, ubi in crucem tolli imperatores dicuntur, fi proſpero eventupravo confilio gesle- runt. The other Paſſage is out of Val. Maximus, whoſe words are much the ſame about this Cuſtom at Carthage. Mr. Pufendorf believes that theſe Words, pravo Confilio, fignify, with a bad Intention, whereas they plainly fignify, without taking good Meaſures; as Montagne rightly takes them, when he ſays, The Carthaginians puniſh'd the ill Conduct of their Captains, although they made a- mends for it by their good Succeſs. Efſays, lib. 3.ch. 8. p. 693. Fol. (2) What is faulty, 'cis no matrer with what Intention it is done. Publ. Syr. ſee thie next Chap. 9. 2, 3. Intention Chap.VII. Of the Qualities of Moral A&tions. 79 Intention, which is a Principle of the greateſt Moral Things. GOD, the Author of all natural Force in determining the Action's Quality. Hence Beings, need not, and ought not to be eſteem'd it is finful to direct an Action, not only to an ill the Author and Cauſe of all Moral, (3) ail Noti- End, but likewiſe to any other End, than what is onal, and all artificial Beings. Some looſe Think- preſcrib'd by the Law, Matth. vi. 5. Juv. Sut. 8. ers muſt needs be touch'd with a ſtrange Itch of 9. 215. Caufa facit rem diffimilem. Nor is an ac- Wit, when they imagine they have given us an compliſh'd Fact only, or ſuch as hath obrain'd its extraordinary Specinien of their Philoſophical End, accounted Wickedneſs, but even a com- Subtlety, in numbring God among the Cauſes of menc'd Enormity: And this latter is by Civil Laws our finning. For a Man who hath the leaſt In- ſometimes puniſh'd with equal, or however with fight into the Conſtitution of Morality, will judge little leſs Severity than the former ; according as nothing more abſurd, than to enquire whether or they find it neceſſary to repreſs a Villany in its firſt no He be the Cauſe of an Action, who forbids it by Riſe and Appearance. Senec. de Conſtant. Sapient. a Law, and puniſheth it for being done after his 6.7. All Villanies before the Accompliſhment of the Work Prohibition. As for God's concurring to the are compleat in reſpect of the Guilt. Phyſical part of an Agion, he can with no more V. This Goodneſs and this Evil of Adions as Reaſon be on this Account ftill’d the Author of they conſiſt formally in ſuch an Agreeableneſs or Sin, than one who hath furniſh'd an Artificer with Diſagreeableneſs to the Law, as we have been Materials to work upon, can be reckon'd the Cauſe ſpeaking of, ſo they depend entirely on him as entirely on him as of a Deformity in his unskilful Work. Where- their efficient Cauſe, who performs an Action fore, to uſe the Term or Name of Cauſe in a Siga which the Law either commands or forbids. For nification fo very improper, and ſo remote from his Determination ſo conſtitutes the A&tion in the common Senſe, is to join our Pride and Ambition Rank of Moral Beings, that it muſt be imputed to in offering an Irreverence to the Divine Nature. him, and to him only (1). And therefore thoſe Philo Judæus de profug. (4) What greater Inſtance of Men have torinented themſelves with a needleſs Blaſphemy con there be, than to make GOD, and not Fear, who, left they ſhould ſeem to make God our ſelves, the Author of Evil? Maxim. Tyr. Diſertat. Almighty the Author of Sin, have plac'd the ratio 3. (5) Theſe dreadful Names of Furies, Fates, and formalis of an Evil A&tion, in the Privation of Con- Deſtinies, what are they but the pecious Pleas and Ex- formity to the Law(2). For tho' the Poſition of any cuſes of human Wickedneſs, by the Means of which we Form neceſſarily infers the Privation or Abſence are want to charge our own Faults upon the Providence of of the contrary Form; yet how miſtaken muſt he Heaven? When, alas! theſe, and all the other Miniſters be in his Opinion, who would ſeek for the Eilence of Terror, and over-ruling Neceflity, which we ſo often of a Thing in this Privation. Nor will be find him- complain of, are Monsters of our own making, and ſuch ſelf any great Proficient in Wiſdom, who hath ar as we carry about us in our Breaſt. Idem. Differt. 25. riv'd to know that Straightneſs is the Privation of Let the Wretch who fins upon Choice, take all Crookedneſs, and Crookedneſs the Privation of the Guilt upon himſelf, and let God be clearly Straightneſs. But theſe Inventions and theſe Fears juſtified (6). of Men, both proceeded from their Ignorance of VI. We are, in the next place, to diſcourſe of Juſtice, (3) Seneca's Words, Omnia Scelera, etiam ante effe&tum Operis, quantum culpæ ſatis est, perfe&ta ſunt. The Scholars of Zoraſtres ſays, We muſt baniſh every Sin from onr Hands, Tongue and Thought. In Sadder Portâ 71. They add elſewhere (Portâ 25.) as alſo from our Eyes. See what this Author ſays afterwards, Lib. 8.c.3. S. 14 S.S. (1) That is, as the immediate Author of the action; for, as our Author himſelf (hews ar large, Chap. 5. §. 14, the Actions of another may alſo ſometimes be imputed to a Perfon. (2) This Notion much reſembles Ariſtotle's Opinion of the Principles of natural Bodies, an.ong which he ranks Privation. See the Art of Thinking, Part III. Chap. 18. §. 1. where the Author ſeems to have taken the Expreſſion from Montagne's Esays, Lib. 2. chap 12. P. 393. Fol. (3) The Author underſtands by this the Operations of our Underſtanding. (4) Que poteft ene blaſphemia gravior, quàm contendere, non ex nobis mala provenire, fed ex Deo. (5) The Greek 15, Εοικε δε ταυτά τα ονόμασα έναν μοχθηρίας ανθρωπίνης, ευφη μοι Σπος ροφα, αναθεν και αυτής ή αήαν τα Δαιμονίω, και τώς μοίραις, Εριννύσι-.-.-. 'Η δε Εριννυς, και η Αίσα, και οι Δαίμονες, και όσα άλλα διανοίας ήμαρτεμένης (for fo it muſt be read, with 'Heinſius inſtead of oiua pukuns) ivórcles tv ev Lux ñ ve Saguévido (6) Our Author treats here only of Actions morally good or bad, i. e. fully agreeable, or plainly contrary to ſome Law in Force. But he ought alſo to have ſpoke ſomething of Adions morally indifferent, i.e. which every one may lawfully do or nor do, according as he pleaſes, by vertue of a Law of ſimple Permiſſion. See 5.1. Note 1. Thar chen we may have a true Norion of this laſt fore of Actions, we muſt obferve, that the Term Indifferent may have three Significations, which ought to be carefully diſtinguiſhºd, for, 1. If we ſay, that an Adion may be indifferently either commanded, or forbidden, or permited by the Laiv, even in this Senſe we muſt acknowledge all human Actions are not indifferent; as for Example, Man-Slaughter can't be commanded nor per- mitted, becauſe it is ſo great a Prejudice to the human Nature 2. But if we conſider our Actions, as Morions purely Phyſical, and with a Relation to any Rule, in one word, without a Regard to any Law, 'tis certain that in this Reſpect all Actions are in- different. See Chap. 2. 5. 6. aforegoing. Laſtly, (and 'tis in this Senſe that our Author creats of it here) if we conſider an Acti- on as freely permitted by the Law. This is an Action morally indifferent, which we may in a negative Senſe call good, becauſe it is not evil. Now there can be no Difficulty in judging of theſe fort of Actions; for what elſe can thoſe things be, which are neither commanded nor forbidden, by any Law, Divine or Human, and which we have Power to do, or not do, as we ſee fit? The Schoolmen faoliſhly affirm, That Dancing (for Example) confider'd abſtractly in itſelf, is morally indifferent; but it ceaſes to be fo in the very Moment when we look upon it as a particular Action, done by luch, or fuchi a Perſon, at ſuch, or fuch a Time, in fuch, or ſuch a Place, with ſuch, or ſuch an Intention, for an Action thus ftripped of all its Circumſtances is a meer Chimæra and Nothing. So that if Dancing be morally indifferent, it muſt be fo with relation to certain Circumſtances of Perfons, Times and Places. It fignifies nothing to ſay that every particular 4 ction that is done with a good or bad Intention, ought to be good or bad, for this Concluſion is not abſolutely true. An Action done with a good Intention is good only in a negative Senſe, that is to ſay, either not evil, or indifferent, fo far as ſome law has formally preſcribed it, for there are a great number of Actions done for a are not commanded by any Law, and conſequently can't paſs for ſuch as are good poſitively. This is almoſt all taken out of Mr. Titius's Obſerv. 65. 'Tis long ago fince that learned Englishman Thomas Gataker ſpake fomething like this a- gainſt the vain Subtleties of the Schoolmen, about Actions indifferent. See his Treatife of the Uſe and Nature of Lors, printed at London, 1619. Chap. 5. S. 4. where he mentions the famous Diſtinction of the Stoicks, aud cites, among others, a Paſſage of Aulus Gellius, who has the ſame Notions, which I ſhall ſet down here, because he exprefles the fame thing well in it, Omnia, que 73 in 80 Of the Qualities of Moral Adions. BOOK I. Fuſtice, concerning which, it ought to be our firſt ſtice, or Timerouſneſs, is not to be reckon d'in the Num- Obſervation, that the Signification of this Term ber of bad Men, ſo neither is he who hath perform’d Some as applied (1) to Perſons, is very different from Atts of the oppoſite Virtues, immediately to be rank'd a- that, by which it denotes an Attribute of Actions. mongſt the Good. But the true Judgment of Perſons is For when we uſe (2) it with regard to Perfons, to to be made, not from any ſhort period of acting, but be fuit, imports as much as to delight in acting from the whole Courſe and Tenor of Life . Agathias juſtly, to ſtudy after Juſtice, or to endeavour in (1.5.) hath left a very judicious Cenſure of thoſe every thing to do what is juſt : And to be Unjujt, People in Conſtantinople, who upon a terrible Earth- is to neglect Juſtice, or to think it ſhould be mea- quake in the City, had contended with each other ſur'd, not according as it is really due, but as it in the Performance of Good and Pious Works, All ſuits with preſent Advantage. So that a Fuft Man this they did (ſays he) for a certain Time; ſo long as the may perform ſeveral Unjuſt, Actions (3), and an Un- Impreſſion of the Fright was freſh and ſtrong upon their juft Man ſeveral Juſt Actions. For he is to be e- Apprehenfion. But when the Calamity began to abate, ſteem'd a Juſt Perſon, who doth Juſt Things in moft of them return’d to their former Looſeneſs of Practice. Obedience to the Law (4), and Unjuſt Things on Now ſuch a ſudden Motion of the Mind, ſuch a Fit, as ly thro' Infirmity; and he an Unjuſt Perſon, who it were, of Goodneſ, cannot be callid true Fuffice, or ſo- doth Juſt Things in Fear of the Puniſhment an lid and fruitful Piety, ſuch as is wont to be form’d in nex'd to the Law, and Unjuſt Things either out Men by right Opinions and conſtant Application; but an of Perverſeneſs and Pravity of Mind, or for the unnatural Diſguiſe, an ill-contriv'd Stratagem, a meer procuring of Glory, or any other ſeeming Bene- buckſtering in Holineſs, taken up as a Preſervative d- fir. Hobbes de Cive, c. 3.8.5. And to the fame Pur- gainſt the Common Evil. Virtue upon Neceſſity is juſt as poſe Pliny, in his Panegyr.c.56. A Wicked Man may do long liv'd as the Fear that occafions it. Hence it ap- many Things, in themſelves commendable : But to deſerve pears, that the Definition of (a) Juſtice ſo much Commendation in his own Perſon, is the Prerogative of a in vogue with the Roman Lawyers, in which they Man truly Good and Virtuous. (5) Philemon in Strabo. call it, A Conſtant and perpetual Inclination to give every (7) one their Due, belongs to the Juſtice of Perſons, not to that of Actions. And this we take to be very He is not Juſt who barely acts no Wrong, Inconvenient: In as much as the Science of Law But he who ſpares, when fraught with Power to is chiefly employ'd about the Juſtice of Actions, and Nor will the Conqueſt of a Puny Luft (harm: toucheth on the Juſtice of Perſons only by the bye, Enſure his Triumph; but a Strength of Soul and in ſome few Particulars. Fit to ſuſtain the united Force of Sin, VII. The Juſtice of Perſons differs from their d And foil Temptation in its laſt Attack. Goodneſ chiefly in this, that Goodneſ barely denotes Solid in Worth, and generous Honeſty. a Conformity to the Law, but Juſtice farther in- Nor bent with crooked Guile, nor brib'd with cludes a Reſpect to thoſe Perſons towards whom - (Praiſe, the (1) A&tion is perform’d. So that we apprehend He courts the Virtue and contemns the Fear. that Action to be Fuſt, which with full Deſign and Intention is applied to the Perſon to whom it Architas de Viro bono & beato (6). As he who was due. And therefore Juſtice, in this Senſe, bath ſome time or other been guilty of Immodeſty, Inju- will be nothing elſe, but the right Application of Serm. 9. (a) Inſtit. I. 1. tit. 1. Dig. 1. 1. tit. 1. l. 10. in rebus humanis fiunt, ficut Dodi cenſuerunt, aut honeſta ſunt, aut turpia ; wherein he omits the third Member of the Diviſion, as other good Authors do, for the Reaſon which Mr. Noodt gives us, in his Book entitled Probabilia furis, i. e. The Probabilities of the Law, lib. 1. ch. 12. Que fuâ vi re&ta aut honeſta ſunt, ut fidem colere, patriam defendere, amicos deligere, ea fieri oportet, five im- peres Pater, five non imperet. Sed que his contraria, quaque turpia do omnino iniqua ſunt, ea nè ſi imperet quidem. Qua vero in medio ſunt d d Græcis tûm edc ooey, tum uéou appellantur, ut in militiam ire, rus colere, bonores capeſſere, cauſas defendere, uxorem ducere, uti juſſum proficiſci, accerfitum Venire, quoniam da hác do his fimilia per ſe ipſa neque honeſta sunt, neque turpia, ſed proinde ut å nobis aguntur, ita ipſis a&tionibus aut probanda ſunt, aut reprehendenda, propterea in ejuſmodi omnium rerum generihus Patri parendum eſſe cenſent, doc. Lib. 2. chap. 7. ſee allo Velthuyſen of the Principles of Juſtice and Decency, p. 19, &c. $.6. (1) This is not only true concerning Juſtice, but alſo concerning all Morality in general, i.e. concerning every Virtue and Vice. (2) We muſt indiſputably treat of the Juſtice of Actions, before that of Perſons, becauſe this laſt ſuppoſes the firſt, as appears by the Definition which our Author gives of it. The way to underſtand theſe Expreſſions, to do juſtly, to delight in Justice, is not to be ignorant what Juſtice is. (3) Laudabilia multa etiam mali faciunt, ipſe laudari, niſi Optimus non poteſt, Plin. Panegyr. chap. 56. Sinners themſelves do many things commendable, but only the beſt Men deſerve Commendation. (4) There is alſo a Caſe when we may do juftly in a negative Senſe, i. e. not unjuſtly, altho' the Thing in itſelf be nor Juft. This happens when a Man is really in an Error, or ignorant, as it often comes to paſs, both in reſpect to Right and Fact. On this Ground Grotius maintains, and that with good Reaſon, That War may ſometimes be juſt on both ſides. See his De Jure belli do Pacis, lib. 2. ch. 23. $. 3. and what ſhall be ſaid Lib. 8 ch. 6. §. 4. note 2. (5) The Greek is, ’Avsp. Di norsós cstu, sxó un diseñv *Έχειν διωά μοβ και κρατών αζημίως. Αλλ' οςς αδικείν άμμο και βέλεται: ουδ' ός και ταύτα πάνα διατηρεί μόνον. Ουδ' ες τα μικρά λαμβάνειν αποχετο 'Αλλ' όσες άδoλoν γνησίαν τ' έχων φύσιν 'Αλλ' ες τα μεγάλα καρτερεί μη λαμβάνων, Ειναι δίκαια, και ε δοκείν είναι θέλει. (6) Ου τοι δε ακολασαίνονlα έν ίσι καίροις, έδε ή αδικάστανα, έδε ή αποδει λιάσανα ες των κακώς τακλέον άνδρας, έδε μεντων τέτωντι κατορθώσανίας ές των αγαθώς --- ταν δε αληθιναν κείσιν υπόθ' ένα κάιρον αποβλέπονται, εδ' επί χρόνε τι πλάθο, αλλ' 67 novca Brov. (7) Juſtitia eſt conſtans do perpetua volunt as jus ſuum cuique tribuendi, Inftit. lib. 1. tit. 1. de Juſtitia. & jure Digeſt. lib. 1. tit. I. S. 10. See the Explication of this Definition, in Mr. Noodt's Probabilia Juris. lib. 3. chap. 1, 2. S. 7. (1) There is not properly any difference between Goodneſs and Juſtice, for, as our Author himſelf ſhews us above, the Idea of a good Action contains in it the Notion of an Object agrecable. We may better diſtinguiſh good Actions according to the threefold Object which they may have, viz. GOD, other Men, and our Selves. Thoſe that have GOD for their Object, are com- prized under the general Name of Piety: Thoſe chat have other Men for their Object are contained in the Term of Juſtice; and thoſe that directly regard our Selves may be reduced to Temperance or Maderation. This Diviſion, which is the moſt common, ſeems to be the plaineſt and moſt natural. the Buddaus (Elem. Phil. pra&t. Parx? CHAP. VII. Of the Qualities of Moral Actions. 81 the Action to the Perſon. We ſhall chooſe to di- ed by more ſevere Courſes and Means; whereas vide Juſtice chiefly with Regard to the Matrer in regard to the latter, it is meer Folly to apply a which is owing, or which bears a Relation to an- Remedy more grievous than the Diſeaſe. Beſides, other by way of Debt or Due. there uſually paſſeth between Men fome Covenant But we muſt obſerve beforehand, that ſome A- about the former, but not about the latter ; and ctions may be call'd pure and others mixt. The conſequently, ſince they are left to every Man's former are perform’d and finiſh'd by the Motion Conſcience and Modeſty, it would be very im- of ſome of our Powers applied in ſuch a certain proper to extort them violently from another (5), Manner to the Obje&t; of this kind are Honouring, unleſs in Caſes of extraordinary Neceſſity. In Paying Duty and Reſpect, Loving, Hating, Com- Civil Communities this Difference ariſeth from the forting, Praiſing, Diſpraiſing, &c. the Product of particular Laws and Conftitutions allowing or dif- all which is nothing elſe but the cauſing the Ob- allowing an Action in ſuch or ſuch Cafes. Tho' ject to be really affected, or to be thought affected moſt Commonwealths do in theſe Points follow by the Action in a certain way, either with Com- the Tract of the Law of Nature ; except where placency or Diſſatisfaction. But the latter, or the they have ſome particular Reaſons adviſing the Mixt Aštions, are join’d wirh the transferring of contrary. fome Advantage or Diſadvantage on the Perſon VIII. When then, we exhibit to another either towards whom they are exercis'd; and therefore Actions or Things due to him only by Imperfet their Effect conſiſts principally in ſome Operati- Right, or when we exerciſe towards another Acti- on, either profiting or hurting another Man in his ons not coming under the Head of ftri&t Com- Perſon or in his Goods (2). Again, there are Again, there are merce, we are ſaid to have obſerv'd, General or U- ſome Actions which make a great part of Com- niverſal Juſtice. As when a Man fupplies another merce amongſt Men, and are valu'd at a certain with his Counſel, Goods, or Help, as he hath Rate; others have no Price or Rate impos'd upon need ; or when he performs the Offices of Piery, them: Concerning which Difference we ſhall en- Reverence, Gratitude, Humanity or Beneficence quire farther hereafter (3). Laſtly, we muſt take towards thoſe to whom he is in Duty bound to pay notice that ſome Things are Due to us Perfectly, o- them. This Kind of Juſtice only enjoins that the thers Imperfectly. Thoſe Things which are due to Debt be paid, not conſidering whether the Thing us in the former Manner, if voluntary Payment given in Payment be equal to the Reaſon why it be not made, we may conſtrain the Debtor to dif- is due or not. Thus a Man fufficiently diſchar- charge, if we live in a natural State, by Arms and geth the Duty of Gratitude, if he make all the Re- main Strength; if we are Members of the ſame turn that his Abilities will allow; tho” perhaps the Civil Society, by preferring an Action againſt him Kindneſs he hath receiv'd were in Value much in Courts of Juſtice. But what is due to us in the greater (1.) latter way, we ought neither to claim by Methods But when we perforin towards another Actions of Hoftility, nor to extort by legal Proceſs . It falling under Commerce, or ſuch as transfer any is uſual (4) with Latin Authors, to expreſs Per- thing on another, to which he had Perfect Right, fet Right by the help of the Word Suus, as when this is callid Particular Juſtice. they ſay a Man claims ſuch a thing, Suo jure, By bis IX. Now this Perfect Right accrues (1) either to own Right. Now that ſome things ſhould be thus ſingle Perſons by a Covenant (tacit or expreſs) due to us Perfetly, and others Imperfe&tly, the Rea made with ſome Society, in order to their being ſon amongłt thoſe who live in a State of natural admitted Members of it; or to a Society by a Co- Liberty is, the great Diverſity of Precepts in Na venant made with fingle Perſons, in order to the ture's Laws, of which ſome conduce to the very receiving them into the fame Community: Or, Being, others only to the well-being of Society: laſtly, from (2) Pacts made between any Par- And therefore; ſince there's leſs Neceſſity of per- ties concerning Things or Actions falling under forming theſe latter than the former, Reaſon Commerce, When we pay thoſe Things which ſhews that the former may be requir'd and execut are due upon the Pact of a Society with a Mem- (2) For Example, a Gift, a Loan, a Theft, Murder, &c. (3) See Book 5. Chap. I. S. 5. (4) As for Example, when we ſay, ille ſuo Jure hoc poftulat : fee Grotius, lib. 1. ch. 1. S: 5. with Gronovius's firſt Note. And we alſo ſay ourſelves, we muſt render to every one their own; we wrong no Man, when we require our own. (5) We could not otherwiſe diſcern ſuch as are truly good, from ſuch as do juſtly againſt their will, if there were no Duty to which we might be conſtrained. S. 8. (1) It is nevertheleſs no great Virtue to own an Obligation to ſuch as have done us Good, provided that the Acknowledg- ment does not much ſurpaſs in its Effects, che Obligation we have to our Benefactors, for, according to the Maxim of JESUS CHRIST, If we love thoſe only, that love us, what Thauks have you? Matth. vi. 46. 8. 9. (1) This Diviſion is not complear, becauſe it contains in it the Obligation we are in to another, by vertue of ſome En- gagement that we are entred into, or of a Society to which we are joined. Now there are Things which our Neighbour may re- quire of us in ſtrictneſs, without any relation to a particular Society, Promiſe, or Convention ; as not to do them any Injury, to make good a Damage done them, and to look upon them as Beings equal with ourſelves. It would pleaſe me berrer, with Mr. into that which Equals uſe one towards another, and that which Superiors exerciſe towards their Inferiors. The firſt may be ſub- divided into ſeveral ſorts, viz. The Duties which a Man may in ſtrictneſs exact of all other Men, and a Citizen of every Perſon ſubject to the ſame Government. The other contains divers Kinds, as there are divers Kinds of societies, where ſome command and others obey, which is much the ſame as Grotius's fus Re&torium do Æquatorium, lib. 1. ch. 1. 5. 3. The Epithec of Univerſal, given to the other general ſort of Juſtice, is alſo very improper. We had berter call it Imperfe&t Juftice. (2) Our Author here uſes the Term Convention, but it muſt be underſtood in a large Senſe, which comprehends perfect Pro- miſes, of which he ſpake Lib. 3. Chap. 5. 6. 7. which confer upon him, to whom the Promiſe is made, a perfect Right to require the Accompliſhment. For in theſe ſort of Promiſes, the Acceptation of him to whom the Promiſe is made, is a kind of Engage- mene on his part. See Lib. 3. Chap. 5. §. 1. M ber, 82 Of the Qualities of Moral A&ions. Воок І. ber, or of a Member with a Society (3), upon the Goods diſtribute least to him that deſerves most, and Accounts juſt now ſpecified, we are ſaid to exer- most to him that deſerves leaft, provided I рау ciſe Diſtributive Juiſtice. For whenever a Man is what I bargain'd. for ; and ufeth the Authority of receiv'd into a Society, a Pact is either exprelly, our Saviour, in the XXth of St. Matt. ver. 13, &c. or, at leaſt, tacitely made between the Society and to confirm his Opinion : All chis, if rightly con- the Member now to be introduc'd, by which the ſider'd, makes nothing to the Purpoſe. For in the Society engageth to give him a juſt Share aud Pro- place of Scripture above-cited, it is ſhewn indeed portion of the Goods which it enjoys as a common that he doth not offend againſt Commutative Ju- Body: and the Member promiſech, that he will ſtice (which governs the Contracts about Hire, bear his proper and equal part of thoſe Burdens &c.) who out of his Liberality gives to fome & which conduce to the Preſervation of the Society, larger Reward than their Service deſerves; or who, confider'd as ſuch. The exact Determination of to the Wages due upon this Commutative Juſtice the proper Share of Goods to be aflign’d to the adds ſomething out of free Bounty, which is com- Member, is made according to the Rule and Va- prehended under Univerſal Juſtice. But how doth lue of the Pains or Charges employ'd by him, to this affect our Diſtributing Juſtice, the Buſineſs of wards preſerving the Common Society, in propor- which is nothing elſe, but to aſſign to many Per- tion to the Pains or Charges contributed by the o- ſons their proper Shares of a Thing, to which all ther Members. On the other hand, the Determi- of them have a Perfect, though (in regard to the nation of the proper Share of Burthens to be laid Quantity) an Unequal Right? And then as for the on the Member, is made according to the Value of Word Diſtributing, which occurs in the Inſtance al- the Benefits receiv'd by him from the Society, ledg’d from Scripture, this doth not in the leaſt conſider'd in proportion to the Advantages which make the Ad fall under Juſtice, ſtrictly call’d Di- the reſt of the Members enjoy. Hence, ſince it ſtributive; but only hints that the Labourers were generally happens, that one Member contributes many, to every one of whom their Wages were to more towards the Preſervation of the Society than be paid according to commutative Juſtice (5). another, and that one likewiſe exceeds another in To clear the Doubts rais’d on this Head by Groo deriving Advantage from it, the Reaſon is very tius, in his firſt Book and firſt Chapter, we need apparent, why, upon the Suppoſal of many Per- only obſerve, that his (6) Expletive Juſtice doch noc ſons, and of this Inequality amongſt them, we exactly come up to Commutative, nor his Attributive ought in the Exerciſe of Diſtributive Juſtice, to to Diſtributive; and that his Diviſion is not found- obſerve a Comparative Equality : Which conſiſts in ed on the ſame Bottom as ours. For ours is chiefly this, that what Proportion the Merits of one Per- taken from the Matter which is owing, and from ſon bear to the Merits of another, ſuch Propor- the Cauſe of owing it; but his from the Manner and tion ſhall his Reward bear to the other's Reward. the Degree in which a Thing is ow’d. Whence the (4) For, as Philo Judaus de Monarchia l. 2. p. 640. Reaſon is evident why the parting of Gain in Ed. Genev. obferves, 'tis high Inequality to give equal Contracts of Societies, is by him referr'd to Exple- Honours to thoſe who are not equal in Merit. Arrian. tive, and by us to Diſtributive Juſtice. The obſer- Epictet. I. 3. C. 17. This is a ſettled Law of Nature, ving of (7) Geometrical Proportion in theſe that he who is more excellent, ſhould on that very account Caſes, is indeed only Accidental ; fince 'tis noe have a Inrger Share of good Things, than be who is leß. neceſſary, that the Members Mould have contri- Thus, for inſtance, if Six Things of the fame buted unequal Shares, but they might as well have Value are to be diſtributed amongſt Caius, Seius, contributed equally, and then in parting the Gains and Titius, upon Suppoſition, that Titias exceeds a ſimple or ſtrict Equality muſt have been follow'd. Caius in a triple Proportion, and Seius in a double, As for that Cafe ftated by Grotius, If (8) one Man Titius ſhall have three, Seims two, and Caius one. only be found fit for a Publick Office, his Reward shall Nor is it requiſite to this Equality, that the Re- be aſſign'd bim according to Simple, or Arithmetical ward fully anſwer and come up to the Merits of Proportion; it muſt be farther enquir’d, whether the the Perſon; but 'tis ſufficient, that what Propor- Man had a Perfect, or (9) Imperfe&t Right to this tion the Service of the one bears to the Service of Office. If the latter, the Caſe will then belong the other, the ſame Proportion there ſhould be be to Univerſal Juſtice: If the former, we agree to Gro- tween their Shares of the Common Benefits. tius's Remark, that the Species of Proportion calld And the ſame Rule muſt be follow'd in diſtributing Geometrical, is, tho' generally, yet not always fol- Burthens. low'd in Diſtributive Juſtice. Nor have we taken As for what Mr. Hobbes (a) alledgeth, to over- the Difference of our two kinds of Juſtice from throw this Reffective Equality, that I may of my own their making uſe of a different Proportion. And (a) De Cive, 3. . 6. (3) We muſt remember this Reſtriction, for otherwiſe a Society may treat with any one of its Members, as it would treat with another Society, or as particular Perſons treat one with another. (4) Philo's Words are, Το γδ τοις τας αξίας ανομοίοις ομοία Σπονέμεν άνισον. Arrian's, Νόμος του φυσικΘ- ή κρείτονα τα zeiesco naborzew ev x geliwo izi. The true Meaning of which words is, That 'tis a Law of Nature, that good Men, as ſuch, ñould have the Advantage of Sinners, and if ſo, they are nothing to our Author's Purpoſe. (5) Hobbes gives another Example, ſee the next Section. 6) Our Author will explain and examine more largely this Definition of Grotius, in $. 11. of this book. (1) To underſtand what Geometrical Proportion is, the beſt way is to give an Example of it: when I ſay then, Six is co Two, as Twelve is to Four, there is a Geometrical Proportion ; becauſe Two is as often found in the Number Six, as four is found in the Number Twelve. (8) This is to ſuppoſe a Thing impoſſible, (ſays Gronovius the Elder, in his Notes) viz. That all Citizens, one only excepted, ſhould be equal, which can only happen when they can have but one Noſes Mouth, Eyes, and, in a Word, a Face exaltly alike. See Mr. Vander Meylin in his Comment on Grotius, Tom. I. p.31. (9) See Lib. 3. chap. 1. §. 4. following. fo & CHAP. VII. Of the Qualities of Moral Actions. 83 fo, for the other Inſtances of Grotius, the aſſigning even Names and Titles are reckon'd part of our of Legacies belongs not to Diſtributive Fuſtice, but to Patrimony, and may paſs in Payment to others.) Univerſal : And when a City or State repays out of the So that if a Man pays me what is my Due by a Common Stock, what ſome particular Members have ex- PerfeEt Right, he gives me no new Thing, but on- pended on the publick Account, Commutative Juſtice is ly fills up the place of a Thing which before was exercis'd, and not Diſtributive. Becanſe the Rea- abſent, and which in the mean time (2) was ſup- ſon of the Debt ariſeth, not from that Pact by plied by an Action. For Example, a Man who which the Society firſt admitted the ſaid. Members, hath borrowed a Book out of my Study, when he but from a particular and a very different Con- reſtores it, doth not properly increaſe my Study, tract. but only (3) fills up a Place made empty on his X. When we exhibit to another Things or Acti- Account. But ſuch things as I have only an Imper- ons due (1) upon reciprocal Pact, and coming in- fe&t Right to receive, I cannot reckon my own, to Commerce, this is calld Commutative Juſtice. nor put them into my Patrimony ; ſince they de- And ſince Pacts of that Kind tend to this Iſſue, pend entirely on the Modeſty and common Ho- that for a Thing or Action of my own falling un- neſty of another Man, who may not, by any vio- der Commerce, I receive from another an equi- lent Means, be compelld to pay them. And valent Thing or Action, at leaſt ſuch as I eſteem therefore 'twould be ridiculous, if a Beggar, for equivalent ; the Reaſon is hence obvious, why in Inſtance, ſhould make over to a Shoe-maker, for this Species of Juſtice a ſimple Equality is requir'd, the Price of a pair of Shoes, an Alms which he which we commonly call (2) Arithmetical Propor- expects to receive from ſome rich Perſon. Thus tion, but that the ſtrict Mathematicians will allow then, he who renders to another any thing due by it that Title we dare not engage. The Thing or Imperfect Right, doth properly attribute, give or Action then, coming in Commerce to another, add to him ſomewhat which he could not before For this Reaſon Grotius calls Attribu- fame Value in Moral Eſtimation. For, the Ob- tive Juſtice che Companion of thoſe Virtues which jection of Mr. Hobbes (a) that if we fell our own tend to the Benefit and Advantage of others, as Goods at the higheſt Price that can be, we do no Injury to Liberality, Mercy, Humanity, and the like. For the Buyer, who inclin’d and conſented to the Bargain, theſe Dues Men receive only by Imperfect Right. Shall be examin’d at large hereafter (3). As for When he adds to theſe, Providentia rectrix, or Vindicative Juſtice, which according to our Notion State-Providence, he is, in our Judgment, chiefly conſtitutes a particular Species, it will be conſi- to be underſtood of the Diſtribution of thoſe Re- der'd in a more convenient Place (4). wards, to which the Subjects have only an Imper- XI. It may be worth our while to take farther feat Right; in which, tho' a greater Liberty may Notice of (6) Grotius's Opinion concerning Juſtice, be taken than in giving thoſe which are due upon which he, neglecting the uſual Diſtinction of Ge- Contract, yet it would be, perhaps, moſt adviſea- neral and Particular, divides into Expletive and At- ble to proportion every Man's Share to his Merits, tributive. This Difference is founded on the Di- as the fureſt way to prevent Strifes and Complaints. verſity of that Right which one Man hath to re- (4) Thus Iſocrates (Areopagit.) p. 247, 248. Ed. Pariſ . ceive any thing from another, which, as we have obſerves of the old Athenian Miniſters, One Thing already obſerv'd, is either Perfect or Imperfe£t ; the which prov'd of great Advantage to them in the Ma- latter being alſo term'd Amplitude, in Oppoſition nagement of the Commonwealth was this ; that whereas to ftri&t Right. Therefore an Act belongs to Exple- there are two ſorts of Equality, one which gives exactly tive Juſtice, when we render that to another which the Same Portion to each Man, and another which propor- is due to him by a Perfe&t Right; but to Attributive tions Mens Shares to their particular Merits, they were Juſtice, when we render that which is due to him not ignorant which of theſe two was most beneficial to a only by an Imperfect Right. Now the Reaſon of State : But rejecting that as unjuſt, which dealt out the theſe two Appellations of Juſtice ſeems to be this ; Same Allotment to good and bad Men without Diſtinction, whatſoever is due to me by Perfeɛt Right, is con- they choſe the other which aſſigns Honours and Puniſhments ceiv'd to be already in ſome meaſure my own (i), according as every Man deſerves, for the Šureſt Guide of and conſequently ſo long as it is withheld, fome- their Proceedings. what of my own is ſuppos’d to be wanting. (Thus Why Grotius forbore the Uſe of the cominon A- (a) De Cive, c. 3. S. 6. (b) L. 1. C. 1. f.8. S. X. (!) The Engagement is not always mutual. Underſtand this in the Manner I have mention'd before, Lib. 3. ch. 1. S. 3. (2) This Author obſerves here with Reaſon, that he uſes not the Words Arithmetical Proportion, in the Senſe of the Mathematia cians, tho' we find that Plutarch, de amore fraterno, uſes it for an Exact Equality, but he ſpeaks of it a little lower, $. 12. proper ly, when he relates the Opinion of Ariſtotle. (3) Viz. Lib. 5. Chap. 3. 9. 10. (4) Viz. Lib. 8. Chap. 3. S. 5. S. XI. (1) Id apud fe quiſque habere videtur, de quo habet a&tionem, habetur enim quod reti poteſt, i, e. Every one ſeems to be in poſſeſſion of that for which he may have juſt Action ; for that is poſſeſſed that may be required, Digeſt. Lib. 1. Tit. 16. De ver- borum ſignificatione Leg. 143. (2) The Author underſtands by this, either the Act of Engagement into which a Manis entred, or the Right a Man hath to re- quire his Due, which Right he expreſſes by the Phrafe, To have an Action againſt another. (3) Gronovius the Father, and Mr.Van der Meylen, in their Nores upon Grotius's Treatiſe, of the Right of War and Peace, affirm, Thár his Diſtinction bears much the ſame Senſe, as the ordinary one of Juſtice Commutative and Diſtributive, and that, as in Latin the Word Explere fignifies ſometimes to facisfy, Juſtice Expletive is ſo called, becauſe by the Practice of it we ſatisfy thoſe to whom we owe any thing which they have a Right to require, by way of Return of what they have received. But all chis is of little Importance. (4) Μέγισον δ' αυτούς σωεβάλετο πεις το καλώς οικείν την πόλιν, όπ ολυοϊν ίσο τέτοιν νομιζομένων ή και η μη ταύτον άπασιν Σπο- γεμίσης, σε πείς παροσήραν έκαςοις, εκ έγνόεν τέτων την χρησιμωτέρων, αλλά την με ξ αυτών αξιώσαν τας χρησές, και πονηρές αποδοκιμάζον ως εδικαίαν έσαν τον και κατ' αξίαν έκασον ημώσαν, και κολάζεσαν περενο. But here we muit take nδείce of a Miſtake in our Author, who has rendred xon d'Scrar ; præmia, for pænas attribuit, he renders Rewards for Puniſhments. riſtotelian M 2 84 Of the qualities of Moral Actions. Воок І. Equa- riſtotelian Terms, he himſelf gives this Reaſon, be- properly an Arithmetical Proportion, the third cauſe the Word Evvenaantixò doth not come up to Number exceeding (5) the ſecond just as much as the full Import of Expletive ; for, that he who is the ſecond exceeds the firſt (a). Theſe two kinds poffeſs’d of my Goods ſhould reſtore them again, of Juſtice belong properly and principally to thoſe doch not proceed from any ouvracyus or (5) Com- who bear ſome high Command in a state. For mutative Contract, and yet it belongs to Expletive 'tis the Duty and Office of ſuch, and not of pri- Juſtice : that is, tho' I have a perfe&t Right of re vate Perſons, to distribute the Publick Goods a- trieving what is my own, from any Poffeffor, yet mongſt the particular Members; and to correct the my Action is not founded upon any Contract Inequalities which ariſe either in Contracts or (6) made between us about the Reſtitucion ; but 'tis Crimes, by reducing them to a Parity. It is the fufficient to my Purpoſe, if I can prove myſelf to Buſineſs of the Judge to reduce thoſe things to an be the true Maſter and Proprietor of the Thing lity, which upon account of an Inequality are unjuſt. thus withheld. It is clear then, that there may be The third Species of Juſtice aſſign’d by Ariſtotle, an Act of Expletive Juſtice without any ovánnay use is Reteliation, which ferves to regulare the Commu- or Contract." Neither doth the other Term dreve- tations made between Man and Man, by compa- Pintor) fully anſwer that of Attributive; becauſe it ring Things that are different and unequal, and ſuppoſeth' a Neceſſity of many Perſons, amongſt reducing them to a Geometrical Proportion. To whom the Diſtribution is to be made. But now give an Inſtance, were a pair of Shoes to be ex- Attributive Juſtice may be exercis’d towards a ſin- chang’d for a Horſe, the Queſtion would be, how gle Perſon, when he alone is fit to receive ſuch an many times the Price of the Horſe contains the Honour or ſuch a Reward. OF Price of the Shoes, which ſuppoſing to be twelve XII Ariſtotle's Opinion concerning the Species times, the Rule of Retaliating or Compenſating is, of Juſtice, as far as we can apprehend, ſeems to that twelve Pair of Shoes be given for one Horſe be this . General Juſtice, which he calls the Univer- (b). And this Species of Juſtice belongs as well Sal (1) Exerciſe of Virtue towards others, is a Duty to Men of Private as of Publick Capacities. As which belongs to all Men. Particular Juſtice he for our former Remark, that the other Species af- divides into three Kinds. Firſt Diſtributive, which fign'd by Ariſtotle, concern'd principally the Magi- (2) takes in the Partition of Honours or Money, ſtrates and Judges; this will be eaſily granted by or other things capable of being divided amongſt any who take a cloſer View of his Moral Works ; the Members of the fame State. Secondly, Cor. For they will find that in ranging and marſhalling rective, which conſiſts in rectifying (3) Commuta- the Virtues, he had always in his Head the Idea of tions : And of theſe ſome are Voluntary, others fome Grecian State; in which time all the Subjects Involuntary. The former are made without Con- had not the ſame Duties to perform, 'tis no won- ftraint, as Buying and Selling, Hiring and Let- der that he hath given us fome Virtues applicable ting to Hire, in Loans, Uſury and Suretiſhip. only to Men of particular Quality and Degree. The latter conſiſts in (4) Crimes, when Men are XIII. Mr.Hobbes (c) hath advanc'd one ſingle No- forc'd to a Commutation againſt their Wills: For in- tion of Juſtice to comprehend every Kind; ma- ſtance, when my Goods paſs to a Thief; for then king it nothing elſe bue a keeping of Faith, and there ariſeth an inequality, he having more, and I fulfilling of Covenants ; which Opinion he bor- leſs than we ought. The Correction then of this row'd from Epicurus (d). Commutative Juſtice, he Inequality is made by taking from him what he ſays, takes place in Contracts, as in Buying and Selling, had above his Due, and reſtoring it to me. Thus, Hiring and Letting to Hire, Lending and Borrowing, ſuppoſe a Man, by the Fraud of the Seller, gives Exchanging, Bartering, and the like. (1) Diſtributive Nine Shillings for a thing that is worth but Six; Juſtice (tho' improperly ſo call’d) is, he ſays, the Three Shillings are to be taken from the Seller and Juſtice of an Arbitrator, when being truſted by them given to the Buyer, to make an Equality. Now who make him Arbitrator, if he perform his Truff, be between theſe three Numbers, 3, 6, 9, there is is ſaid to diſtribute to every Man his own. Nor will (a) Vide Felden ad Grot. l. 1. c. 1. 5. 8. (b) Vid. Ariſtot. Athic. 1. 5. c. 8. & Michael Ephes. in loc. Eund. (c) De Cive, 6,3.8.6, & Leviath. c. i5. (d) In Diog. Laert. l. 10. circ. fin. (5) We muſt not take the Term owéanay pict, Exchange, or Contract, in the natural and ordinary Signification, but in the Senſe that Ariſtotle uſes the VVord. See the next Paragraph, and Gronovius's Nores upon Grotius. S. XII. (1) Theſe are Ariſtotle's VVords, I wille Siregnosuín o óans destos coa xeñois megszaacy. Ethic. Nicom. lib. 5. chap. 5: (2) Ariſtotle further goes on and ſays, Tís de xet tad je po Dravoguins έν μέν έσιν , το εν ταϊς διανομείς ή τμής, κευμάτων, και τ άλλων όσοι μένα τους κοινωνήσει η πολιτείας έν σε, τον τοίς σωαλλάΓαστ διωρθότικον, τότε δε μέρη δυο, το συναλλαγμάθων τα μεν εκάσια όξιν, τα δε ακέσια, έκέσια τα τοιάδε, οίον οράσις, ωγή δανεισμό, εγγύη, εύσις, παρακα- Talhun, ultwols---darxowv, &c. ibid. (3) By the VVord Ewannayre, which fignifies a Contralt, Exchange or Commutarion, Ariſtotle means every Action by ver- tue of which we are obliged to do any thing to another, whether in preſent, or for the future: In a word, every Affair in which we may have Commerce one with another. So that we muſt not take this Term in the Senſe that it is commonly uſed in, for we ſhall afterwards ſee that it is to be taken in a more large Signification, which would extreamly perplex us, if we ſhould follow A- riſtotle's Notion without Examination, or it were necefíary to know his Idea's of it. (4) By Crimes, we underſtand, all ſorts of Injury done to another. (5) This Sentence, which was not in the firſt Edition at all, is ſo very much corrupted in all the others, (the laſt of 1705 nor excepted) either chro' che Fault of the Printers, or Overſight of the Author, that we can make no Senſe of it his Words are, Quia Exceſus, quo poſterior numerues priorem ſuperat, ſunt æquales. Doubtleſs he intended to have faid, Exceſſius, quo poſterior nume- rus ſecundum ſuperat, do excesſus, quo fecundus priorem ſuperat, ſunt Æquales, as the Engliſh and myſelf have tranſlated it. In fine, an Arithmetical Proportion is found alſo berween four Degrees of Magnitude, of which the firſt exceeds the ſecond, or is ex- ceeded by it, in an equal Quantity, as the third exeeeds the fourth, or is exceeded by it; as for Example, five is to ren, as ſeven is to two. (6) So Ariſtotle ſpeaks, "25€ To Senov rozog čvorov öv iodhledy Theği T ó sexesis: Ariſt. Ethic. ad Nicom. lib. 5. chap. 8. §. XIII. (1) We ought to obſerve, Thac Mr. Hobbes owns no Equality to be obſerv'd as to the price of Things, which are the Matter of Contracts. See his Leviathan, Chap. 15. he CHAP. VII. Of the Qualities of Moral Actions. . 85 he allow any other Equality to be obſerv'd but jury, is not only acquir’d by Covenant, but was this, that ſince we are all equal by Nature, one given at firſt by Nature, without the Intervention Man ought not to arrogate to himſelf more Right of any human Act: And ſo the Aſſertion, that an than he allows another, unleſs he hath obtain'da Injury can be done to no Man unleſs we have greater Right than ordinary, by the Intervention transfer'd (3) ſomething on him by Covenant or of Covenants. Farther, ſince, according to his Gift, is falſe and unreaſonable. Sentiments, an Injury, or an Unjuſt A&tion, or The other Poſition of Mr. Hobbes (c), that Ju- Omiſſion, is nothing elſe but the Violation of a ftice as well as Property owes its Original to Civil Covenant ; he hence infers, that we cannot offer Conſtitutions, we ſhall hereafter conſider and re- an Injury to a Man, unleſs we have before cove- fute. nanted with him. This Affertion is founded on Indeed ſo far is it from being rational to reſolve his old Maxim, of the Right of every Man to all all Juſtice into Performance of Covenants, that, Things , which he hath ſtretch'd far beyond its juft on the contrary, before we can know whether any Limits; ſo that he imagines, before any Covenant Covenant is to be perform’d, we ought to be cer- is made, by which one Man might transfer his tain that it was entred upon, either by the Com- Right to another ; every Man hath a Right of do- mand, or with the Permiſſion of the Laws of Na- ing to others what he pleaſeth ; and thus, only ture; that is, that it was juſtly made (d).. uſing his Right, he cannot be ſaid to commit an From what hath been here offer'd, it is farther Injury (a). But we ſhall by and by (2) ſhew, that evident, that altho' otherwiſe Damage and Injury this Right of every Mon to all Things can be extend are very different things, and though it be poſſible ed to no farther Senfe than this, That Nature al- that (4) the Injury of an A&ion may redound to lows a Man to uſe all ſuch Means as Reaſon ſhall one Man, and the Damage to another ; yet the judge conducible to his firm and laſting Preferva- Inference which Mr. Hobbes draws from this Con- tion: As indeed Mr. Hobbes himſelf in his Defini- fideration will not hold, that a bare Damage, and tion of Right (b), inſerts the Uſe of Reaſon. But not an Injury is done to him, who is either hurt now found Reaſon will never adviſe us, out of or hath ſomething taken from him, by a Man our own Pleaſure and Humour, to put ſuch Af- with whom he had paſs’d no Covenant. Nor do fronts on another, as cannot but provoke him to the Inſtances which he brings to countenance this War, or to a reciprocal Deſire of hurting us. Be- Conjecture, make very much to the Purpoſe (e). fides it implies a manifeſt Contradiction to ſay, When the Maſter , ſays he, commands his Servant to give that upon the Suppofal of many Men equal in Money, or to do a Kindneſs to a third Perſon; if it be o- Rights, each of them hath a Right to all Things ; mitted, the Injury is done to the Maſter, but the Da- ſince the Right of one Man to all Things, if it mage to the third Perſon. But indeed, if the Servant hath any Effect, muft extinguiſh the Rights of the does not pay the Money which is due as he is or- reft ; and if the Right hath no Effect upon the o- der’d, the Creditor ſhall ſuffer (5) no Damage ſince thers, it is uſeleſs, abſurd, and ridiculous; For his Action remains good againſt the Maſter. Nor, in Moral Account, not to be, and not to be effe&tual, if a Servant being commanded to do a Kindneſs to are much the ſame. And indeed, how can we calí another Man, fails in performing it, ſhall the other that a Right, which another may oppoſe with an Man incur any Damage: Tho' he is indeed guilty equal Right? Who would ſay, I had the Right of Theft, or the like Crime, if he intercept and of commanding a Man, if he, by the ſame Right, keep for his own Uſe, what he ought, on his might deſpiſe my Orders ? Or, that I had a Maſter's Account, to have deliver'd to others. For, Right of beating another, when he too had a beſides that from the not receiving of a Kindneſs Right of returning my Blows, and, if he pleas’d, which is not ftrialy due, Damage properly fo with Advantage and Increaſe ? 'Tis certain there- call'd cannot ariſe (f), the other Perſon may com- fore, that he that doth theſe Things to another, plain to the Mafter, who will be ſure to compel hath no Right of doing them, and conſequently the Servant to his Duty. And tho' we ſuppoſe the is injurious. On the contrary, the other Party Servant to have been never ſo far from doing an hath a Right that ſuch Things ſhould not be put Injury to the third Perſon, yet for all this, 'tis cer- upon him, and is therefore injur'd. Thus we ſee, tain he did not what by Right he ought to have that ſuch Right as being violated produceth an In- done; becauſe he affords the other Man ſufficient (a) Vid. Gaffend. Syntagm. Epicur.par. 3. c. 26, 27. (b) De Cive, c. I. $. 7. (c) Lev, 6.15. (d) Dr. Cumberland de LL. c. 8. 8.6. (ej De Civé, c.3. j. 4. (f) Vid. Grot. l. 2. c. 17. 1. 2. (2) Viz. Lib. 3. Chap. 5. 5. 3. (3) This Expreſſion of Mr. Hobbes is founded upon his great Principle, That every Man hath a Right to every Thing; for, according to him, in every Engagemene we yield to another the Right which we had to certain Things, and to break an Agree- ment is to require, in ſome meaſure, what we had granted. (4) This ought to be underſtood either of one and the ſame Action, in which ſeveral have concurred, but ſo as that ſome have acted without an evil Intention, and others with a Deſign to injure; or of an Action done by a ſingle Perſon, but in ſuch a Mad- ner as that the Effect redounds to ſeveral others, and in Reſpect to ſome it is an Injury, but in Reſpect to others it is a ſingle Da- mage, as if a Man, deſigning to kill another, he ſays or hurts a third Perſon, contrary to his Intention. (3) He may receive one at leaſt for the preſent, if he had a neceſſary Occaſion for it, and becauſe he had it not in hand, he ſuſtained ſome Lofs , cr loft an Occaſion of getting ſome Advantage. Further, it may happen, that his Maſter might become al- together inſolvent, or not in a Capacity of paying for a long time, when any of theſe Inconveniencies happen from this, that a Maſter has given Money to his Servant to pay his Creditor, the creditor has a full Right to require, that the Servant pay him that Şum, as a Thing belonging to him, tho’ he knows nothing of his Commiſſion ; for the Servant, by keeping the Money, does whar in him lies to cauſe the creditor to loſe his Debt. We may alſo add, the Deceit of the Servant has fruſtrated the Liberality of his Maſter, for tho' theſe works of Charity are in their own Principle nor rigorouſly due, yet from the Moment that a Maſter de- termines to do ſome good to the Poor, and he is actually kept oue of that Money, that ſhould enable him to give, the Servant, by keeping it, robs the Poor of it, as much as if he had already received it ; for Men have a true Right to that which is lawfully given, in reſpect of the Donor, inſomuch as that he can't demand it again, unleſs upon ſome extraordinary Reaſons. See Book 5. Chap. 6. 8. 1. Note 3. following. Grounds 86 Of the Qualities of Moral Actions. BOOKI. Grounds of a Complaint againſt him. His other denying him any Good which he had a fair Title Inſtance Mr. Hobbes thus propoſeth in his Levia to require. (1) For good Things are of that Na- than; C. 15. p.75. Private Men may remit to one a ture, that they may be given to any Man without nother their Debtsy but not Robberies, or other Violences a Reaſon, provided a Third Perſon is not defraud- whereby they are endamag’d: Becauſe the detaining of a ed thereby : And the Evils likewiſe which a Man Debt is an Injury only to themſelves, but Robbery and hath merited, we may without Injury withhold Violence are Injuries to the Perſon of the Commonwealth. from him, if at the ſame time we do not enda- Which we are willing enough to admit, provided mage others by our Forbearance. An unjuſt Adi- he will not hence infer, that in Crimes an Injury on, therefore, either brings upon another Man is not likewiſe done to the particular Perſon who what it ought not to bring upon him, or denies is hurt. But as he propoſeth the ſame in his Book and withholds what it ought to give him. For the De Cive, C. 3. f. 4. it is by no means to be endur’d. Denial or omiſſion of an Aétion, is, in Moral Ac- He ſays, that in a State, if any one hurts another, count, itſelf an Action. with whom he hath not Covenanted, be damageth the Party on whom he brings the Evil, but he doth an Injury XV. But an Unjuſt A&tion, proceeding from only to him who holds the Sovereign Power in the State. Intention, and treſpaſſing on the perfect Right of For, if one of my Fellow-Subjects hurts me by another, is, in one Word, call’d Injury . Which if Violence, doth he offer an Injury to the King only we would exactly ſtate, we muſt again obſerve, and not to me? Or ſuppoſe we ſhould grant, as that a Man may be hurt three ways; either, if he Mr. Hobbes deſires, that when Men live in a Na- be denied what he ought to have (a), or if that tural Liberty, each of them hath a Right to all which he now hath for his own be taken from things, yet will this hold good amongſt the Mem- him, or if ſome Evil be put on him by another, bers of the fame Republick, who own one com who had no juſt Right of doing it. As to the mon Maſter? As to what he ſubjoins, that if the firſt of theſe ways, things may be ſaid to be due Perſon who receiv'd the Damage, ſhould accuſe the other to a Man, either by the bare Law (1) of Nature, of injuring him, he would be anſwer'd in this manner, yet ſo as that he hath no perfect Right to them; What are you to me? Why ſhould I act according to your of which kind, are the Offices of Humanity, Bea Pleaſure, rather than my own, ſince I don't kinder you neficence, and Gratitude: Or elſe by Covenant, from acting by your own Will, rather than by mine? and that either ſuch as is expreſs and particular, Tis ſo far from being true, that if no particular Co- or ſuch as is containd under our Obligation to venants have interven'd, this way of Speaking will not Civil Laws, by which we engage ourſelves to per- be free from Reprehenfion, that we ſhould rather ima- form thoſe things towards others, which the Laws gine a Man to be out of his Senſes, who ſhould command us to exhibit. If things of the latter hope by ſuch a way of arguing to ſatisfy the Com- kind are denied a Man, an Injury is properly done; plaints of one whom he had hurt. Yet one thing but there is no proper Injury in the Denial of Mr. Hobbes hath well remark'd, that the Term of things which belong to the former kind; tho Injuſtice ſignifies with reference to the Law, but the there be a Sin indeed committed againſt the Law Term of Injury with reference both to the Law, and to of Nature. Yet neither doth the Law of Nature the particular Perſon. For, when an Unjust thing itſelf allow of compelling another by Violence to is done, all may call that unjust, or it is unjust to pay theſe Duties, (eſpecially if the compelling all. But an Injury may have been done, not to me, Party have no Power and Authority over the or to him, but to a third Perſon, and ſometimes other;) unleſs upon urgent Neceſſity : Since the to no private Subject, but to the State only; as Nature and Property of thoſe Offices requires that when a Man is kill'd in a Duel, for Inſtance, upon they be perform’d voluntarily, and without the a fair Challenge. For in this Caſe, the Party who Motive of Fear. Thus far therefore, and no far- receiy'd the Hurt cannot complain of having an ther, will the Maxim of Mr. Hobbes hold true, That Injury done him, ſince he himſelf agreed to the an Injury cannot be done, but to a Man with whom a Chance of the Unlawful Combat : But the Le- Covenant has been made. But when we ftudiouſly giſlator may, however, proſecute the Survivor for and induſtriouſly bring an Evil on another Man, tranſgreſſing his Prohibition. unconſenting and unprovoking, either by taking from him any Good which he poffefſeth, or by XIV. Having arriv’d to know what Juſtice is, poſitively inflicting on him an Evil; in theſe Caſes we may eaſily ſettle our Notions of Injuſtice, and an Injury is always done, whether a Covenant of its ſeveral ſpecies. An Action, then, is Unjust, hath interven'd or not. For Nature hath given either when we apply it deſignedly, to a Perſon this Right to every Man, that no Evil be offer'd to whom we ow'd a different A&tion, or when we him from another Man, without his own preced- deny another ſomewhat which was really his due. ing Demerit : Nor is it allowable for any Perſon, That is, We are equally guilty of a Breach of Ju- unleſs when provok'd, to hurt another, any farther ſtice, by doing any Evil to another which we had than the due Exerciſe of Government ſhall require. no Right to do, and by taking from another, or We add, unleſ provok’d, becauſe to make an Ati- (a) Marc. Anton. 1. 9. 1. 5. It often happens that there may be Injuſtice in the not doing of a thing, as well as in the doing. S. XIV. (1) The three following Sentences ſeem ill placed in the Original, and therefore ought to be altered, and another Expreſſion lorened, becauſe it contains a needleſs Repetition. S. xv. (1) Ex mero Jure Nature, by which our Author underſtands what he elſewhere calls abſolute Duties, that is to ſay, ſuch as are grounded upon the Original Conſtitution of our Nature, and which every Man is obliged to perform to another Man, conſidered preciſely, as ſuch, in oppoſition to thoſe who ſuppoſe ſome other Eſtabliſhment, or other human Act, and which they call Duties conditional. See Lib. II. Chap. III. S. the laſt following, on CHAP.VII. Of the Qualities of Moral Actions. 87 on properly Injurious, there is requir'd the zo zes or Treſpaſſes, he then makes a kind of Subdiviſion, and Tepor, that it be done first : For Ariſtotle tells us, (2) tells us, that thoſe which are done beſide Reaſon are that he who returns another what he first Suffer’d from Misfortunes, and thoſe which are done not beſide Reaſon bim, cannot be ſaid to do an Injury. are properly Tralles. Now shof Things are beſide Red- XVI. In an Injury, properly ſo call’d, it is far- Son wbich bappen very rarely end unexpectedly; as if a ther requir’d, that it proceed from Intention and Man by ſuddenly thruſting open a Door" frould ſtrike bis deliberate Deſign of hurting or vexing another . Father , who ſtood accidentally behind it'; or if, whilst And therefore the Harm which is done caſually in be is exerciſing himſelf at his Favelin, place thro Ignorance and Unwillingly, is not us’d to come which none are wont to paß, he wounds fome body who under the Name of Injury. As ſuppoſe a Soldier happen'd to come by when the Weapon was flying. For that is exerciſing himſelf , in the uſual Place, at theſe, and ſuch like Accidents, fall out beyond all Thought caſting his Javelin, ſhould ſtrike it through a Man and Expectation. But Actions done inleed ignorantly, that paſs’d by accidentally : Or, if a Lopper of but not beſide Likelihood or Probability, are call'd Trel- Trees ſhould let fall a Bough upon a Perſon who paſſes. For, a Man who exerciſing his Bow and Arrows had no Right to be in that Place. So Antiphon, in a Place commonly frequented, ſtrikes any Perſon, doth an ancient Orator, defends a Young-man who had properly treſpaſ; as a Man is then always ſaid to do, unfortunately kill'd a Child with a Caſt of his when he himſelf was the Principle and Cauſe of the Un- Javelin: (i) He was engagʻd, ſays he, in no forbid- luckineſ of the Action : But now the Man whom we den Exerciſe, but in his proper and neceſſary Buſineß ; Speak of , was no doubt the Principle and Cauſe of what nor by himſelf, but with his Companions in Arms: Nor he did, ſince he (4) voluntarily chose ſuch a place to shoot did he ſtrike the Youth by an unskilful Throw, at a di- in, where it was probable fome body or other would paß ſtance from the Mark : but he guided the Weapon with by. exact Art and Care, and was so far from doing any An 'Apágrupa, or Treſpaß of this Nature, is what thing amiſ, that he rather ſuffer'd in having his Throw the Civilians properly term Culpa, or a Fault; spoiled, and in being hindred from hitting what he ſo which they ſay is committed through Negligence or well aim'd at. Unskilfulneſ, when a Man is either careleſs or ig- Ariſtotle (2) tells us, That the doing of a thing juſtly norant of ſuch things as he ought, and was able, or unjuſtly, depends on its being done voluntarily or in to have known, and to have obſerv'd. Of Fault's voluntarily. And again, That when we do a Hurt they make three Degrees, anſwerable to the De- beſide Reaſon, it is only a Misfortune ; but when we do grees of Diligence, by the Omiſſion of which the a Hurt which is not beſide Reaſon, and yet not out of Fault is contracted. Firſt then, there is a (5) ge- Malice, then we commit an "Aquesturice, or Treſpaß. neral Diligence of all Men, not work'd out by On which Place Michael of Epheſus thus comments: Labour and Wit, but deriv'd, as it were, from Of Hurts, Some are done out of ignorance and against common Senſe. Next to this, there is a Diligence our Wills, others with our Knowledge and Conſent. more improv'd (6) proper to every Man in his Thoſe which are done out of Ignorance, are again divided own Affairs; and which is requir'd by Nature in into ſuch as are done without any Likelihood, and beſide all the Management of Human Life, according to Expectation; and ſuch as are done, tho' involuntarily, yet each perſon's Capacity and Parts. Laſtly, there not befide all Expectation and Probability. Therefore after is a Diligence of the greateſt Exactneſs and the Philofopher hath ſaid, that all Hurts proceeding from Accuracy, us’d only by the moſt knowing and Ignorance fall under the general Names (3) of Errors experienc'd Men G) in their own Buſineſs and OBEY . Omiſſion. (2) O 28 dón'éma. Je, xj ri d'UTò év117010ov, & dorsi Adiraiv. Arift. Ethic. ad Nicom. Lib. V. Chap. 15. See what is ſaid, Lib. II. Chap. v. and Lib. III. Chap. I. §. 7. S. XVI. (1) Antiph. Orat. 7. p. 56. Edit. Hanov. Ore 18 & terenuévwr, dance meseleyjévcov Jezueréta, étt er quereloué- νοις, αλλά εν τη τ ακονιζόντων τάξει ήκονίζεν, έτε το σκοπό αμαρών, εις τες άφεσώτα ακονίσας, το παιδG έτυχεν, αλλά πανία ορθώς, ως οπτν δει δρών, έδρα σαν και δεν ακεσίον, έπαθε δε, διακωλυθεις το σκοπό τυχείν. (2) 'Αδικημα δε και δικαιοπράγημα ώριςαι εκασία και Ακεσίω "Όταν μεν παραλόγως ή βλάβη γένηται, ατυχήμα, otar no us agnów5, dvd to set xi sts, evaluuc. Éthic. ad Nicom. Lib. V. Chap. X. (3) A little before the words which he is about to quore, are theſe, Tà pels let'égvoías, de rapth ucila ésiv. And here, to ſpeak by the Bye, Grotim, Lib. III. Chap. XI. §. 4. num. 2. renders auastánce, Infortunium, a Misfortune thro”. Miſtake, whereas he fays in another place, that it ſignifies, Culpa aliqua ; I am amazed thar neither Mr. Courtin, in his Tranſlation; nor Gronovius the Father, in his Nores, did amend this Slip in their Author. (4) We may call it, An indire&t will, becauſe he did not directly and formally intend to hurt any Man; but he did, or neg. lected to do a thing, from whence a Damage did redound, which was occafioned (as may eaſily be preſumed ) by that Ágion or (5) Lata culpa est nimia negligentia, i. e. non intelligere, quod omnes intelligunt. Digeſt. Lib. L. Tit. XVI. De Verborum fignif. Leg. CCXIII. See allo Leg. CCXXIII. and Lib. 22. Tit . 6. De Juris do fatti ignorantia, Leg. IX. § 2. It would be ( for Ex- ample) a great Fault, if having borrowed a Robe, you leave it in your Porch, where the firſt comer may carry it away. () Si cum diſtrahere deberet, non fecit, lata culpa, non levi, dom rebus ſuis conſueta negligentiâ, hujuſmodi Rei rationem reddet, Digeſt . Lib. XXXVI. Tit. I. Ad Senatûs conſultum Tribellian. Leg. XX1. S. 3. Si venditor eam diligentiam adhibuiſſet in inſula cuſtodienda, quam debent homines frugi, de diligentes preſtare, &c. Lib. XVIII. Tit. VI. De Periculo da commodo Rei vendita Leg. XI. Si nihil appareat Conveniſſe, talis Custodia de fideranda eſt a venditore, qualem bonus Paterfamilias fuis Rebus adhibet Lib. XVIII. Tit. I. De contrah. empt. Leg. XXXV. 5.4. Si quis non ad eum modum, quem hominum natura deſiderat, diligens est, &c. Lib. XVI. Tit. 3. Depoſaiti , vel contra Leg. XXXII. It would (for Example) be a ſmall Fault, if when a Man has received a Thing to keep, he leaves it in his Chamber and puts it not in his Trunk, or forgers to take out the Key of the Trunk where it is. In fine, the Lawyers ordinarily call this fort of Negligence by the Name of clpa, i.e. a Fault. See, for Example, Digeſt. Lib. IX. Tit. II. Ad Leg. Aquiliam Leg. XXXI. but ſometimes we mean by it one of the two other forts, of which we muſt judge by the ſequel of the Diſcourſe. (7) In lege Aquilia, & Leviſſima culpa venit, Digeſt. Lib. IX. Tit. II. Leg. XLIV. In rebus commodatis talis diligentia preſtanda est, qualem quiſque diligentifimus Pater-familias suis Rebus adhibet, Lib. XIII. Tit . VI. Commodaci vel contra, Leg. XVIII. A Fault of this Nature does not excufe (for Example) him that hath borrowed any Thing for his Uſe, if the Thing lent be loft. See Lib. V. Chap . IV. 9. 6. following. This alſo would be a very ſmall Faule, if through heedlefneſs a Man Thuts the Chamber where he has laid the Thing entruſted to him, but badly, and going away forgers to ſee whether he has well turned the Key of his Door. Con- 88 Of the Qualities of Moral A&ions. BOOK I. ges (9). Concerns (8). To this laſt kind of Diligence they Unjust and Wicked. Hence Facts proceeding from An- oppoſe their Culpa leviſſima, to the ſecond; their ger, are always interpreted as done unadviſedly; for Culpa levis, and to the firſt , their Culpa lata. As to the Principle and Cauſe of ſuch Miſchances, is not the this Culpa lata, they obſerve, that it is equivalent angry Perſon, but he who provok'd him to Anger. to Malice and Deceit, in Contracts and other Civil XVII. Laſtly, It is requiſite to the making an Buſineſs, and in Caſes of Reparation for Dama- Action properly Injurious, that it be done to a But that (10) in Criminal Matters it Perſon againſt his Will. For 'tis a Maxim in every bears not ſo hard an Interpretation; where how- Man's Mouth, that volenti non fit injuria, Nothing ever it doth not take away, but only extenuate can be an Injury when the Party is willing to receive it. the Guilt. The Effects of the Culpa levis and Culpa Ariſtotle ſays, (1) A Man with his own free Conſent may leviſſima they fhew at large, when they treat about be hurt, or may ſuffer things which are in themſelves Performances of Contracts. Unjust; but be cannot properly be injur’d, except it be The Treſpaſies we have hitherto ſpoken of, are against his Will. See Dig. 1. 50. tit. 17. De diverſ. ſupposid to be done without Intention. But now reg. Juris. Nemo videtur fraudare eos, qui ſciunt 6 if a Man through the violence of his Paſſions, and conſentiunt. The Reaſon of which is, that both only with an Imperfe&t and Semiplenary Intention the Good which I take from a Man, and the Debt is driven to hurt another, this Hurt ſhall not be which I withhold from him, with his Conſent, exempted from the Name of Injury, altho’ the Man are, as it were, Gifts from him to me : But now, be not immediately, for ſuch a Fac, branded with who will ſay I do an Injury, by taking what is the Character and Style of Unjust (11). Ariſtotle's given me ? Nor can that be eſteemid Evil which Diftin&tion is excellent in this caſe : An ill thing, a Man deſires to receive; ſince all Evil neceſſarily ſays he, done with Knowledge, but without Deliberation, includes an Abhorrency of the Will from embra- is unjuſtly done ; ſuch are the Effects of Anger and of cing it. But then it muſt be ſuppos'd, that the other Natural and Neceſſary Paſſions. For Perſons who Man enjoys the full uſe of Man enjoys the full uſe of his Reaſon, and is not offend on ſuch accounts, commit Injuſtice indeed; yet they zranſported with the Violence of any extravagant are not for this Reaſon accounted Unjust and Wicked Affection (2) (a). Hence Ariſtotle, Éthic. l. 5.C.15. Men, becauſe the Hurt did not proceed from any medi- gathers, that a Man who in a Paſſion lays violent tated Malice. But when a Man burt's another out of hands on himſelf, doth an Injury not to himſelf, Choice and Deſign, then only be incurs the Name of but to the State, which he robs either of a Gene- ral, ز (a) Add. Ant. Matth. de Crimin. Proleg. c. 3. f. 2, 3. Mr. Hobbes's Definition which he gives in his Book de Cive, c. 3. 1. 7. is founded upon a wrong Suppofition, that Injury conſiſts in nothing bnt the Violation of a Covenant. (8) In all things which are not capable of an exact and Mathematical Meaſure, we may always diſtinguiſh of three Degrees at leaſt, viz. two Extreams and a Mean, which ſometimes comes neareſt the firſt, and ſometimes the laſt. If we admit of a greater Number, we muſt determine juft to a Point, where each Degree begins and ends, without which there will be no way to diſcern them : But Pris not neceſſary when we confine ourſelves to three. It ſufficerh then to conſider here Watchfulneſs as well as Neg- ligence, either as being raiſed to an higher Degree, or as finking to che lower, between which is the Medium, which inclines ſometimes to one side and ſometimes to another. Now theſe middle Degrees (as we may fay) muſt be meaſured according to the Nature of thoſe things, which are the Objects of our Cares, as they are more or leſs confiderable, and confequently require more or leſs Caurion. This Comment is taken out of Mr. Titius's Obſervations Ratiocin. in Comp. Jur. Obf. 397. See alſo a curious Diſcourſe of Mr. Thomaſius, encitled, De uſu Prat. Doetr. diffic. 7 ur. Rom. &c. printed at Hal in Saxony, 1705. (9) Magna negligentia Culpa est, magna culpa Dolus est, Digeft. Lib. L. Tit. XVI. De verbor. fignif. Leg. CCXXVI. See alſo Lib. VI. Tit . 3. Depoſiti vel contra, Leg. XXXII. and Mr. Noodt’s Probabilia furis, Lib. I. Chap. XIII. 9. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. (10) In Lege Corneliâ dolus pro fa&to accipitur, nec in hâc lege culpa Lata pro dolo accipitur, Digeft. Lib. XLVIII. Tit . 8. Ad Leg. Corn. de Sicariis & Veneficiis Leg. VII. There is a Cafe, or as Mr. Titius ſpeaks, a groſs Fault in unlawful Actions, which renders them culpable, as well as Deceit, or a bad Intention, as for Example, If a Man orders another to be ſtricken with a Sword, with a deſign only to hurt him, exprelly forbidding the Perſon commiſſioned to ſlay him, to whom he would have it done, he Thall nevertheleſs be thought directly and maliciouſly to have murdered that Perſon, if he die of the Wound, which may and often does happen and deſerved to be treated as a Murderer. For he indirectly willed it; and being the Effect of a formal ill De- fign, it ought to be looked upon as a malicious Act, and not for a ſingle Fault. See a like Cafe, Digeſt. 48. Tit. 19. De Penis Leg. XXXVIII. $. 5. So thoſe that fight a Duel, they have a Deſign often only to wound and hurt one another, yet this hinders not but if one of them be killed, the other ſhall be counted a Murderer, (11) The Greek is, “Όταν δε, είδως μου, μη φesβελάσας εξή βλάβη γενήθαι] αδίκημα, διον όσα π δια θυμον, και άλλα πάθη, όσα αναγκαία, ή φύσικα συμβαίνει τους ανθρώπους, που το βλέπονίες, και αμαράνοντες, αδικίσι μεν και αδικήματα εσιν μεντοι πω άδικοι Δια ταύτα δε πόνηροι, έδε γδ Μια μοχθηeίαν ή βλάβη, όταν δ' εκ τωροαιρέσεως, άδικο, και μοχθήρος Λιό καλώς Td in Quum, én en megvolds upí vetus, 8 DS dgger Quio 7601āv, a'ia' ó ósgious Ethic. ad Nicom. Lib. V. Chap. x. See alſo Cicero de Offic. Lib. I. Chap. IX. With Grevius's Notes. 00267 Hinw Hinwht Boblbogen friw 2017 S. XVII. (1) Ethic. 1. 5. c. 11. Brámietele père en this excèy, rj te adres . Téget, éderci de seis &scóv. (2) Thefe Limitations are not ſufficient to prove the Maxim he is ſpeaking of true, and therefore the Philofopher Hermids with Reaſon maintains, That no Man muſt make uſe of the Ignorance of a Seller, to his own Advantage, unleſs he will incurr the Guilt of doing a great Wrong. A good Maxim, which every one ſhould practiſe, (Phot. Biblioth. p. 1044.) as Mr. Bayle obſerves in his Hiſtorical Critical Di&tionary. To ſet this important Marter in a due Light, I ſhall borrow ſome Judicious Reſtrictions made by Mr. Placette, upon this Maxim in his Treatiſe of Reſtitution, p. 74, &c. I. The Conſent of the Sufferers ought to be counted for nothing, unleſs it be abſolutely free and voluntary. Now there are three Orders of things which may hinder that Liberty, ſo that his Conſent is not ſo full and entire, as to authorize what he ſuffers, viz. In the firſt Rank is every Thing thac debars us of the uſe of Reaſon, as Infancy, Folly, and Drunkenneſs; in the ſecond, Fear and Force; and in the third, Ignorance, Heedlef- nefs, and Error. As to the firſt, there is no dificulty; as to the ſecond, we will ſuppoſe that Fear or Force proceeds directly or indirectly from him who gives his Conſent; laſtly, as to the third, That Conſent is of no uſe, becauſe he thac gives it knows not what he conſents.to, nor fees the Prejudice which he does himſelf by it ; for if he be ignorant in whole or in part, his Conſent is not voluntary, and no Man can, without Injuſtice, make an advantage of his Ignorance. Indeed Ignorance renders the Actions which ie produces more involuntary, than Fear does, for this does not render an Action involuntary, but when it is cauſed by him that is to get by it; whereas Ignorance has always that Effect, whatever be the Cauſe of it. I own, that the Injuſtice is the more notorious, when he that gets by the Action deſignedly leads him that gives his Confent, into the Error, but this does noc prevent, that there is no Cauſe but he that gets by it: Thas he that buys precious Jewels at a low Price, of an ignorant Perſon that knows nor the Value of them, does him an Injury, if knowing it himſelf he doth not advertiſe him of it. ewo ſorts of Rights; the one we are ſo much Maſters of, that we can diſpoſe of it as we pleaſe, ſuch is that which every Man has II. There are CHAP. VIII. Of the quantity of Moral Actions. 89 ral, or a Soldier, or an Artificer, or the like, ac- dictum. Tho' Ariſtotle's Reaſoning in that place, cording as his Station was. Upon which account (the Law commands not a Man to kill bimſelf; but it hath been a Cuſtom in moft Commonwealths, what it doth not command it forbids ;) is falſe and to puniſh ſuch Offenders even after their Death, abſurd; unleſs we ſay, that by resíver, commands, by affixing fome Mark of Diſgrace on their Bodies he rather means permit s. and on their Memory. Add. Mich. Ephef. ad loc. has of his own Goods. The other we can't renounce, becauſe a ſuperior Law forbids it, ſuch is that which every Man has over his own Life, for we may defend ourſelves againſt an unjuſt Aggreſſor, cho' we can't deprive ourſelves of it. The Maxim which imports, That we can't do an Injury to ſuch as conſent, has place only in Reſpect to the firſt fort; for as to the laſt, which are in their Nature unmoveable and unalterable, a Conſent given to the Violation of them is ever Null and void. Thus when an Hur. band lecherouſly conſents to the Debauching of his wife, thar does not hinder but that Crime is really Adultery. III. Altho'the Conſent of him that is deprived of a thing, may be ſufficient to acquit him that deprives him, of the Injury in Reſpect of the Per- ſon deprived, yet we ought to cake care, thar a third Perſon, who has ſome Intereſt in the Thing, be not injur’d, as for Example, * Wife, Child or Creditors. IV. Laſtly, the Conſent of him that is deprived of any thing belonging to him, muſt be known to him that does it, if not by a full aſſurance, yer by a probable Preſumption, grounded upon good Reaſon; for if it afterward ap. pears that the Perſon who was thought to conſent did not, tho’the Action may be innocent when it was done, yet he ought to make good the Injury done thereby, cho'he did not think he did any. CH A P. VIII . Of the Quantity (or Eſtimation] of MORAL ACTIONS. HA The Contents of every Section of the ſeventh Chapter. 1. The abſolute Quantity of Moral A&tions. III. What Intention is ſufficient in human Judicatures : II. What Intention is requir’d to make an A&tion good IV. What is a perfeet and compleat A&tion. before GOD's Tribunał. The Relative Quantity of Actions. Aving done with the Quality, it comes next CANOPUS, and be who is only one Furlong diſ in our Way to ſay ſomething of the Quantity tænt from the ſame City, may be ſaid both alike not to be of Moral A&tions; or to conſider on what Account at CANOPUS; lo be that fins leſ, and he that fins they fall under different Rates and Meaſures. Now more, are both at an equal Diſtance from doing well, we find the voluntary Deeds of Men to be capable But becauſe this Diſtance between evil Adions and of undergoing a double Meaſure or Valuation, eị the Law, if any one will exactly compare them ther abſolutely in themſelves or relatively towards with other Kinds of Quantity, may have ſome one another. As to the abſolute Eſtimate, the Likeneſs to a Right-lined Angle, whoſe Greatneſs Caſe is very different in Good and in Evil Actions. is meaſured by the Arch of a Circle, having ſtraight For in a good Adion, if we conſider it formally Lines drawn from the Circumference to the Cen- and preciſely, we diſcover nothing which bears ter, therefore when I was young, and ſtudied the any Analogy to Quantity : Since the Goodneſs of Rudiments of the Law, I compared them to a it conſiſts only in an Agreeableneſs or Conformity Circle; but in my riper Aģe I have thought it bet- to the Law, which doth not appear capable of ter to lay aſide ſuch Niceties, and explain them Meaſure. Hence good Actions, conſider'd, as we more plainly. ſaid, preciſely as to their Form, are not better one II. Farther, ſince to the Goodneſs of an A&ioni than the other; tho' they ſurpaſs each other in Ex- it is requiſite, not only that what the Law com- cellence as to their Matter, with Regard to the mands be fully done, but likewiſe, that it be done Condition of the Object, and to the Intenſeneſs with ſuch Intention as is agreeable to the faid or Stridneſs of the Obligation. But now, an evil Law; it appears hence, that to make an Action Adion, as declining from the Legal Rule, is con- be eſteem's perfectly Good, there is a Neceflity, ceiy'd to bear a greater or a leſs Diſtance from it; not only that the Preſcription of the Law be an- and on that Account may, even conſider'd formally ſwer'd in all its Parts; but beſides, that the only and in it felf, be eſteem'd greater or leß: In the thing which prevaild on the Mind of the Agent, ſame manner as one Crooked Line may recede far- and put him on ſuch a Proceeding, was a Defire ther from a Right line than another doth. For of paying ready Obedience to the Legiſlator. And Zeno's Argument in Diogenes Laertius (a), is not for this Reaſon, ſince we are, in the Divine Law, worth confuting: All Sins, fays he, are equal ; for commanded to love GOD, with all our Hearts, and with (1) ad nothing is truer than Truth, nor faller than all our Souls, and with all our Strength, and our Neigh- Falſity, ſo neither can Deceit be greater than Deceit, nor bour as our felves, Mark xii. 30, 31. 'tis manifeft, Sin than Sin. As be that is an bundred Furlongs from that no Adion can be approv’d by God Almighty (a) L. 8. See Cicer. Paradox. cig. Mr. Barbeyr ac's NOT.ES on Chap. VIII. S. J. (1) His Greek is this, 'Αρίσκει και αυτοίς ίσα ηγεϊώς τα αμαρλήματα Ειδάλης αληθές μάλλον έκ όξιν, έδε ψεύδος ψα- ες, έτως σε απάτη απάτης, δέ αμάργημα αμαρτήμα. και ο εκατον αδες απέχων Κανώμε, και ο ένα, επίσης εκ έσιν & Κα- va Bosne čas zjó mãos, o kaeftov a poplavwv, tions xx cinn er tớ xe Top Div. Diog. Laert. in Zenon. Lib. 7. Leg. 120. (2). Theſe are the Elements of the univerſal Civil Law, printed at Hay in Saxony, 1660, and reprinted at Francfors on the Mein N in 1680. P. 317! go Adions. Book I. Of the Quantity of Moral tutions (1) the B do vious to their Senſes, which are by no means the name , as entirely Good (1), but ſuch an one as was un- upon Knowledge and Deliberation, as it proceeds dertaken with the fulleſt Intention, and in which from a former and fuller Deſign. And ſince an ill the Agent propos'd nothing elſe to himſelf, but a Intention is to Mortal Judges ſcarce niore evident Compliance with the Pleaſure of his Creator. E. than a good one, by reaſon of their Incapacity to ſpecially, ſince the Divine Searcher of Hearts can- ſearch into the Heart; they are us’d to ſettle this not but diſcover the leaſt Wavering in our Reſolu- Point by the Help of various Indications and Con- tions, and the ſmalleſt Obliquity in our Deſigns. jectures, which we ſhall elſewhere explain at large Whoever conſiders this Point as he ought, will (3). non find but very little Inclination to boaſt of his Up IV. With regard to the Matter of Moral Adi- rightneſs towards GOD. ons, that good Action is eſteem'd Perfect in its III. But in human Account, ſo exact a Diligence Kind, which hath attain'd its utmoſt Complement, is not requir’d. For fince our Earthly Law, or to which no part is wanting that it ought to givers propoſe as the chief End of their Conſti- have. Thoſe which decline from this Perfection are Benefit of their Subject, which reckon’d inferior in a greater or leſs Degree, ac- commonly proceed from the outward Performance cording to their Diſtance from it ; whether the and Exerciſe of the Adions, whatever the Inten- Cauſe of this Defect be, that the Adion' was de- tion of the Actor may be ; hence they are uſually ſtitute of ſome part which Mould have made it ſatisfied if the exterior Action be conformable to compleat, or that it was (1) only attempted, and their Injunctions. And ſo much the rather, becauſe not actually perform’d. On the other hand, of they are unable to dive into the Receſſes of Mens evil Actions, that is reckon'd the worſt in its kind, at any Agent, but by Conjectures, and by Signs ob- and every one is leſs Evil, according as it falls ſhorter of this final Completion. lible Guides in diſcovering our And here we twofold Difference and Purpoſes. Therefore they value good Adions in (2) the objects of Actions, as ſet down in Laws. only as they appear to Senfe, or ſo far as the Reach For ſome admit of a Diviſion, others do not: or, follicitous how full or ſincere the Intention of the muſt either entirely perform, or entirely omit Agent was, provided his exterior Work deſerve them, or do what's directly contrary to them : their Approbation (2). Yet in evil Actions, even But in others, it is poſſible to perform ſome one amongft human Judges, more more Regard is had to part only, and to omit the reſt ; or ſomething the Intention. And where this fhall appear to may be done which is oppoſite to them, not di- have been abſolutely wanting, as happens in things realy, but in an inferior Degree. We may like- done upon invincible Ignorance or Error, the Acti- wiſe conſider Objects under a fecond Diftin&tion : on ſhall be accounted involuntary : And fuch an For ſome of them contain things into which they A&ion, as it is not uſually imputed to the Agent, fo may be divided, as into fo many Species. Thus is it conceiv'd to be deſtitute of all Moral Quanti- the Affirmative Law of the (3) fixth Command- ty. But otherwiſe, an evit Adion undertaken ment enjoining us to fuccour our Neighbour in BE S. II. (1) See the precedent Chapter, S. 3, 4. Waboni S. III. (1) See Mr. Noodt's Diſcourſe about Liberty of Conſcience, tranſlated into French, and printed at Amſterdam in 1707, and what I have ſaid in my Treatiſe of Sports, lib. 3. ch. 6. S. 19. anyola There is a pretty Paſſage to this purpoſe in Plutarch, which it may be pleaſant to read here. 'Ey ellen 28 tois tud osušosy képpois, (2) When the Intention is dubious or equivocal, we ought to incline to that Side which is moſt favourable to the Agent. και Φράγμασιν , επαινέ μύοις αιτίαν φαύλω ποτίθησι, και καταγεται ταϊς διαβολάις εις ισοψίας ατόπες τει η εν αφανεί «εγαρέ OEWS, med Earl o autó (which laft Words ſhould rather be read iš medžano outo) zồ Temel 7 uivov fuqavãs & Swéuero fény ku Domov ETI 096p, rj.xxxon Teias esp Borlu šaçaois. De Herodoti malignitate. They, who like Herodotus can't deny that an them to be evil, endeavour by their Calumnies to create Suſpicions in other Men's Minds, manifeſtly atrive at the heighth of En is , vy and ill Nature. 1 obſerve (ſays Mr. Montagne very well) that the greatest Wits of our Time employ their Ingenuity to darken the Splendor of the brave and generous Actions of the Ancients, by putting a bad Interpretation upon them, and deviſing ſome vain Cauſes and Occaſions of them. A cunning Cheat! Left I Mould grant an A&tion to be very excellent and good, I will find out five bundred vicious Intentions, Lib. 1. Chap 36. The famous Mr. Bayle, in his News Letters upon Mr. Maimbourg's Critical Hiſtory of Calviniſm, Let. 12. S. 12. affirms, That the Laws of Charity, which oblige us to put a favourable Conftruction upon the actions of our Neighbour rather than a diſadvantagious, are altogether contrary to Reaſon, but I have endeavoured to invalidate his Proofs of that poſiti- on in my Treatiſe of Sports, Lib. 1. Ch. 3. (3) See Lib. 8. Chap. 3. S. 19, 20. S. IV. (1) An Attempt is counted for an Action, when the Impediment of performing ariſes from an Impoſſibility coming on it by ſome unforeſeen Accident, or invincible Hindrance, and not from any Refuſal or Diſcouragement in the Perſon acting. Seneca has a fine Paflage to this purpoſe, of which Mr. Hirtius cites a pare ; 'tis this, Quædam ejus conditionis funt, ut effe&tum pré- Stare debeant ; quibuſdam pro effe&tu est, omnia tentâle ut efficerent. Si omnia fecit ut fanaret; peregit Medicus ſuas partes. Etiam damnato Reo, oratori conſtat Eloquentie officium, ſi onni Jure uſus est. Laus Imperatori etiam victor & Duci redditur, fi & pru- durius, quod veram amicitiam experiretur. Locupleti donare non potuit, ſano ad fidere, felici ſuccurrere. Gratiam retulit, etiamfi tu bene- ficium non recepiſti. De Benef. lib. 7. ch. 13. '• Some things are of that Nature that they muſt produce an Effect, in other things is 'tis the ſame with an Effect to have endeavoured. The Phyſician has done his Office, if he has done all he can to cure. The « Pleader, if he has urged the Law well; and General, if he liath managed with Courage and Conduct, tho' a ſuitable Succeſs do « not follow. Thanks is fufficient, where no Requital can be made. (2) The Original expreſſes itſelf thus, Obje&ta A&tionum, i. e. The obje&ts of A&tions, but the object of Action can neither be commanded nor forbidden, but the Perſon who does, or nor does a thing, and ſo our Author himſelf uſes it in the next Pa- ragraph. Doubtleſs he means, the matter of Actions, and the Miſtake ariſes from hence, that in his Elements of the Univerſal Civil Law, he had ſaid, (P. 317.) the Obje&ts of Laws, for in changing the Expreſſion, he was not aware, that Astions would noc well fit the place of Laws. (3) Our Author calls this the Fifth, and the nexş Commandment che Şixth, according to the Lutheran Diviſion of the De- calogue. all 72 CHAP. IX. Of the Imputation of Moral Actions. 91 all Neceffities and Diſtreſſes of his Body, contains ſome part of it, and keep back the relt. But when under it in the Mannet of different Species, the I not only deny a Man his Due, but farther take Preſervation of his Life, of his Members, of his ſomething from him, or bring any Evil upon him, Health, the turning away of any thing that doth, this Aą will be quite of another Species, and bear or may grieve, or moleft him, the ſupplying him no Reference or Affinity to the former. with Food in Time of Famine, óc. And the op V. Beſides all this, ſince one may be concern'd poſite or negative Law, in the fame Command about a more noble, another about a more ignoble ment, forbidding us to hurt the Body of our Neigh- Obje&t; and ſince one may produce more Good or bour, comprehends, in like manner, Murther, Evil than another; it is plain, that upon this account Maiming, Wounds, Stripes, Threats (a), &c. likewiſe, amongſt good Actions ſome are far bet- Thus too the Affirmative Law, in the (3) Se- ter than others, and amongſt ill Actions, ſome far venth Commandment, enjoining Chaſtity, con- (1) worſe than others. Horace's(6) Inſtance may tains under it, Purity of Thoughts, Modeſty of ſerve to illuſtrate this Truth; Words and Geſtures, Abſtinence from unlawful Love, &c. And the oppoſite Law, forbidding Nee vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet, idemq; Unchaſtity, comprehends Adultery, Fornication, Qui teneros caules alieni fregerit borti, obſcene Speeches and Geſtures, and impure Ima Et qui nocturnus divím ſacra legerit. ginations. For, to give an Inſtance in this Caſe, obſcene Words do not reſpect Adultery in the way Reaſon will never callt an Equal Sin, of a Part or Degree: But becauſe the Divine Law To rob an Orchard and a Sacred Shrine. giver was pleas’d, for Brevity fake, to comprehend many Special Ads under one General Law, hence Add. Cicero pro Muren : Where he ſmartly refutes the it comes to paſs, that he who commits ſimple For- Stoicks Notion, that All Sins are equal. And his Pa- nication, doth as fully and entirely ſin againſt the radoxes, Chap. 3. as alſo Montaign's Eljays, Lib. 2. Seventh Commandment, as he that is guilty of A- Chap. 2. in the beginning, and Gaſſendus Phil. Epic. dultery. Therefore, as to theſe Objects, when Lib.z. Yet in many Cafes Horace's Reaſoning will what the Law commands is not perform’d, we muſt hold good, L. i. Epiſt . 15. of Neceſſity either quite omit, or do directly the contrary. But other Objects of A&tions, as deter- De mille fabæ modiis quum ſurripis unum, min'd in Laws, are in ſuch a Manner diviſible, Damnum est non facinus pacto mihi lenius iſto. that they ſeem to conſiſt of (4) Integral Parts. So that here it is not neceſſary we ſhould do all, or 0 When from a Thouſand Pecks you ſteal but one, mit all, or perform the contrary; but 'tis poſſible Leſs Lofs is felt, but no leſs Guilt is ſhown. to perform one part, and to let the reſt alone. For Example, the Law commands me to pay the La And this is the Relative Eſtimation of Adions, bourer his full Hire; now I may perhaps pay him which is treated of at large, Book VIII. Chap. 3. (a) Vid. l. 47. t. 10. D. de Injuriis. (b) B. 1. Sat. 3. v. 115, 116, 117. (4) We muſt underſtand them of Parts really diſtinct one from the other, and which conſequently can exiſt ſeparately. S.V. (1) Since this Author does not expreſs himſelf either diſtinctly, or largely enough upon this important Subject here; and in the place Lib. 8. to which he refers us, treats of Evil Actions only ; I ſhall give you an Abridgment of what he ſays in his Elements of Vuiverſal Civil Law. The relative Quantity of Aktions may be conſider’d, 1. in reſpext to the Obje&t. For the more no- ble the Obje£t is, the more is that good A&tion, done to that Obje&t, better than another ; and, on the contrary, an evil Altion the more Criminal. See Lib. 8. Chap. 3. S. 18. 2. In Refpe&t to the State and Condition of the Agent. And ſo a Benefit conferr’d by an Enemy, is more conſiderable, than that which is received from a Friend. And, on the contrary, an Injury done by a Friend is more Marp, and af- feits more than that done by an Enemy. See the ſame place, S. 20. 3. In Refpe&t to the Ations themſelves, according as we take more or leſ Pains to do them. A good A&tion, the more difficult it is, the more excellent and more cominendable, otherwiſe all things are equal. On the contrary, the more eaſily an evil Action may be avoided, the more enormous it is above others of the ſame Kind. 4. In Reſpe&t to the Effe&t and Conſequences of an Action, on which account an A&tion is better or worſe, accordingly as the good or bad Conſe- quences are, or may be foreſeen and prevented. 5. In Refpet to the circumſtances of Time and Place. See the place already quoted: in fine, 'Tis evident from this Compariſon of good Actions one with another, that ſome are more excellent than others, accor- ding as the Practice of ſome ought to give Place to the Practice of others, ſince we can't diſcharge all at the ſame time. See what is ſaid about this, Lib. s. Chap. 12. S. 23. stessa CHA P. IX. 100 sider of the Imputation Of the Imputation of MORAL ACTIONS. The CONTENTS. 1. Of aétual Imputation. IV. What can be effe&tually imputed to another. II. Of Imputation thro' Favour. V. Merit, and Demerit what. III. Of Imputation from Debt. VI. How the Effe&ts of Moral Actions may be aboliſhed. WH HAT Conditions are required to make an have formerly ſhown at large: It remains, that Action capable of being imputed, or of be we ſee how and by what means it may be actually ing confider'd as really belonging to a Perſon, we imputed, ſo as to produce ſome Moral Effect, either in N2 92 Of the Imputation of Moral Aions. Booki. in the Agent, or in ſome other Man. And here with Honours not otherwiſe his Due. But to puniſh we muſt firſt of all diſtinguiſh between thoſe A- the innocent for the Father's Crime, is (Atrictly Qions which are directed by Law, and thoſe which ſpeaking ) unreaſonable (2). This indeed may are left to every Man's free Pleaſure. A&tions of happen, that the Father's Fault ſhall be the Occa- the former Kind are then ſaid to be imputed to the fion of not conferring on the Son, or of taking Agent, when the Legiſlator or Sovereign declares from him, thoſe Things which he was neither to him to be the Author of them, and at the ſame receive nor to retain, but under certain Conditi- time decrees (1), that the ordinary Effects of ſuch ons. But a Perſon thus dealt with, cannot be Adions ſhall redound on him, or ſhall be conceiv'd ſaid to ſuffer an Evil, which his natural State as inherent in him. But the latter Kind of Acti- would otherwiſe have made him a Stranger to. ons are then ſaid to be imputed, when he, who For Nature, in this Cafe, gave no Security to the without being bound by any Neceſſity, hath exer- Children that they ſhould certainly poſſeſs the Pa- cis'd them for the Uſe and Benefit of another rents Goods, or that they ſhould be admitted to Man, doth fignify, that he undertook ſuch an the like Poſts of Honour: But their Right to thoſe Action for the other Man's fake, and out of an In- Goods, or thoſe Honours, proceeded on theſe tention to oblige him. The latter Senſe of the Conditions and Proviſo's, that the Parents ſhould Word Imputatio is moſt frequent in Claſſick Au- deliver them down ſafe and untáinted, and ſhould thors, and the former more in uſe with the Divines not fall under ſuch and ſuch Penalties by their and Moraliſts. But there is between them this Crimes. Nor can he, by any means, be ſaid to manifeſt Difference, the former tends from the be in a worſe Condition than human Nature ad- Legiſlator or Sovereign toward the Agent, but the mits or allows, who having no Paternal Inheri- latter proceeds from the Agent, and reſts in the tance, is forced to work out his Fortunes by his Perſon, for whoſe Sake or Uſe the Adion was per- own Induſtry. form’d. It is Juſt, likewiſe, ſo far to proceed againſt in- II. The former Kind of Imputation is ſubdivided nocent Children upon account of their Parents into Imputation of Favour, and imputation of Debt. Demerits, as to oblige them to quit the Kingdom Imputation of Favour is when a Man, out of pure or State. For no Man hath a Right from Nature Benevolence, derives upon another the Effects of of living in this or that Territory, but (3) every an Action perform’d by a third Perſon; which Ef- one attains to ſuch a Right by ſome Act of his fects the fecond Party had no Right to, without the own, or of other Men: And it may be a Condi- Grant of the firſt. Or, when one, out of free tion of keeping this Right, that he ſhall loſe it in Kindneſs makes a larger Effect redound to the Per- caſe his Parents are found guilty of ſome parti- former of a certain Action, than the Action would cular and high Offences. It is not repugnant otherwiſe of it ſelf have produc'd. But this laft to Reaſon, that the Poffeſſion of a Right ſhould Inſtance will hold good in Matters of Reward on- depend on contingent Terms. Though, that the ly (1), not in Matters of Puniſhment. For, as Laws of ſome Countries are too rigorous and ſuch is the Nature of good Things, that they may ſevere in this point, no Man can pretend to de be given to another gratis, without any Colour or ny. Condition; ſo, if a Man is not willing to confer III. Imputation of Debt conſiſts in this, that thoſe a good Thing on another, by the Name of a pure Perſons, whoſe Intereſt it concerns that an Action Gratuity, he may lawfully do it under the Notion be done or not done, do declare that the ſaid of rewarding him for ſome imputed Action, which A&tion belongs to the Agent, and that the Effect either did not otherwiſe belong to him, or could affign'd to that Action ſhall redound or fall upon not have given him a Right of demanding ſuch a him. Hence, if in any Law a certain Reward Benefit. But, on the other hand, common Rea- be decreed to ſuch or fuch a good Action, ſo ſoon ſon will not allow me, on the ſame Pretence, to as the Sovereign, or the Guaridian of the Laws derive on another the Effects of an evil Action, ſhall underſtand that particular A&ion to have which he is not really guilty of, and without been perform’d by any Man, 'tis manifeft, that the Imputation of which, theſe Effects would not the Man hath immediately a Right of demanding follow his natural State and Condition. And the promis’d Reward. But when a Man is en- therefore 'tis very incongruous and abſurd, that join'd to do a thing, ſolely by the Authority of either for a Faule purely another's, I ſhould have the Commander, and without any ſuch Propoſal thoſe things taken from me, which Nature gives of a Reward, he ought to reſt ſatisfied with the every Man, on the very Account of his being a bare Approbation of his Superior, and to eſteem Man; or that, under the ſame Colour, ſuch things it a very ſufficient Recompence, that he hath a- ſhould be impos'd on me, as Nature, by an Indul- voided his Diſpleaſure, which would neceflarily gence Univerſal to all Mankind, hath forbid- have follow'd upon Default. On the other ſide, den us to ſuffer without Reaſon. A Prince, for when an ill Action hath been committed, ſo ſoon Example, may impute the Father's Merits to a Son as the Author of it is diſcover'd, he hath reaſon not illuſtrious by his own Acchievements; and to fear the Execution of the Legal Penalty. may on the account of thoſe Merits, load him As to inferior Perſons, to whom neither the Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. IX. g. 1. (1) That is to ſay, adjudging to him the Rewards, and decreeing to him the Puniſhments inflicted by the Law, with all their Conſequences. §. II. (1) The Author will explain, Lib. 5. ch. 12. 9. 12. the Diſtinctions which the Civil Lawyers make in treating upon Bargains and Laws, of Things, 1. Odious. 2. Favourable. and, 3. Mixt. But here he treats only of Things Advantagious and Diſadvantagious. (2) See what is ſaid, Lib. 8. Chap. 3. S. 31. (3) See Lib. 8. Chap. 11. §. 6, 7. following. Guardianſhip, CHAP. IX. Of the Imputation of Moral A&ions. 93 Guardianſhip, nor the Execution of the Laws do Adultery by a Tyrant, had forc'd the Sword out belong, if they either approve a good Action, or of his Hand and kill'd him, deſir'd a Gratification reprehend a bad one, their Judgment can affect from the State, he is put off with this Rebuke, im- only the Credit and Character of the Agent. Ac- putat nobis quod deprehenſus in adulterio mori noluit. cording to that elegant Saying of Diodorus Siculus He reckons we are indebted to him, becauſe being taken (1), Praiſe is a kind of a Reward of Virtue putting us in Adultery he had the Senſe to ſave his own life: And to no Charges, and Diſpraiſe is a Puniſhment of Vice in- (2) Tully, in his ſecond Philippic , denies himſelf to flicting no real Wound. have any Obligations to Antony upon account of It is farther to be obſerv’d, that when the Inte- his not being murder'd by him: Where lies the Kind- reſt of many Perſons is concern’d in the doing or neß to me (ſays he) in your keeping your ſelf from so the not doing of an Action, if one of thoſe Per- borrid a Villany? Others maintain the Reaſonable- ſons ſhould forgive and not impute it to the Agent, neſs of our preſent Aſſertion from this Topick, he cannot by this Means abate any thing of the that the Omiſſions of ill Axions are purely non Right of the others, which he hath no Power to Entia, and conſequently can have no poſitive Af- controul. Thus, if a Man hath done me an In- fections or Properties. Tho'to ſuch an Argument jury by an illegal Fact, I may forgive him for my it might perhaps be anſwer’d, that even theſe O- own Part and Concern, but at the ſame Time I miſſions may, in Moral Account, paſs for Entities, do not in the leaft derogate from the juſt Pretenſi as they are the real and actual Reſtrictions and ons of the Publick, and of the Sovereign Autho- Confinements of our Natural Powers. rity. And thus too the Pardon which God Al But now, if for the ſake of another Man, I do mighty is pleas’d to vouchſafe to repenting Sinners, what I might rightly and properly have omitted, doch not at all impair or hinder the Proceedings of or omit what I might fairly and conveniently have human Judicature. But when all the Perſons done, it is highly reaſonable, that I ſhould impute whom the doing or the not doing of a thing con- my Service to him; or, that I ſhould, by virtue cerns, agrec that they will not impute it, in ſuch a of my Right, demand of him to acknowledge my Caſe the Deed is conceiv'd to be Null and Void as Kindneſs, and his own Obligation, according to to all Moral Effects. Now the Perſons concern'd the Quality and Condition of it. This Imputation in a Thing's being done or not done, are either cannot rightly be laid, unleſs there was in the A- the Objects or the Directors of the Action; that ctor a real Intention of procuring ſome Good to is, thoſe towards whom the Action is perform'd, the other Man; and in the Receiver an expreſs, and to whom it brings either Good or Evil, and or, at leaſt, à preſumptive Conſent to admit it. thoſe who have a juft Power of guiding and fu- For no Man can impute or reckon to us a Service perviſing ſuch an Action. For which reaſon, if, forc'd upon us againſt our Will: And it would be in Caſe of an Injury, the Deed be forgiven by the a much higher Degree of Impudence, to charge Perſon to whom it was offer’d, by the Civil Ma- ſuch a Fact to us for a Kindneſs, as was perform’d giſtrate, and by God Almighty, in Moral Efti- either without any Regard to our Benefit, or per- mation it ſhall be ſuppos'd undone, and conſe- haps with a Deſign to hurt us. Thus he muſt be quently ſhall be attended with no ill Effect. extreamly fooliſh, who would deſire a Reward IV. Very different from the Imputation of from a Man whom he (3) had reſtor’d to Health which we have been ſpeaking, is that by which by breaking an Impofthume, otherwiſe incurable, the Agent is ſaid to impute an Action, which he whilſt he intended to give him a Mortal Stab. Yet might have omitted, to the Party for whoſe Sake (4) Marius Celſus, in Tacitus (b), when he was and Uſe he perform'd it. A Man who hath ex- brought before Otbo as one of Galba’s Servants and actly fulfild the Command of his Superior, may Confidents, immediately confeſling his Loyalty to indeed expect the Approbation of his Performance, his old Maſter, propos'd it as an Example, how as from all others, ſo eſpecially from him who en- faithful he would be to the New Emperor; and join'd it. But he cannot lay claim to any farther thus reckonid he had already oblig'd Oibo by ſtick- Reward, unleſs ſuch as is exprelly promis'd in the ing reſolutely to Galba. And thus Eudoxia when Law (a). For the fame Reaſon, no Man can de- ſhe was married to the Emperor Theodoſius, ſent mand that it ſhould be imputed to him, in order to for her Brothers, by whom ſhe had been formerly the giving him any right, that he hath abſtain'd expelld her Father's Houſe; and was ſo far from from a bad Action, forbidden by the Laws, or by reſenting their Injury, that ſhe rather paid them any Command of his Superior; but he muſt be Thanks, as the Authors of her Promotion : Since ſatisfied that his Obedience hath pleas'd him who unleſs ſhe had been driven from Home, ſhe had requir’dit . For ſince upon acting contrary to the never ſeen Conſtantinople (c). Law, he would have juſtly incurr’d a conſiderable When the Parties concern'd and intereſted do Evil, to eſcape ſuch a Puniſhment muſt paſs with agree in defining the Rate at which a Thing ſhall him for a Reward. Hence in Seneca's Controverſies, be reckon'd or imputed, in this Caſe a Covenant 1. 4. Controv. 7. when a Man, who being taken in intervenes, expreſſing how far, or to what value (a) See Luke xvii. 9, 10. (6) Hiſt. 1. 4. (c) Zonar. Tom. 3. Add Gen. xlv. 5. 1. 20. So III. (1) Diodorus’s Words ate, ksiv é refes Etawy 'k za 3100 åpetas e de avor, ó Set tózos 7 weic powaćTHTO divdo zahyns: In Excerpt. Piereſc. (2) See Lib. 8. ch. 3. $. 16. following. §. IV. (1) This Example had been better plac'd a little lower, where the Author ſpeaks of thoſe who do ſome Service with- out any ſuch Deſign, and by Conſequence have ſome other Motive for their Actions. (2) Tully's Words are, Quale autem beneficium est, quod te abſtinueris nefario ſcelere, Philip. 2. ch.z.' (3) See Tully, De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. chap. 28. and Plutarcb de Capiendâ ex Inim. Utilit. (4) Tacitus's Words are, Celſus conſtanter fervate erga Galbam fidei crimen confeſſus, exemplum ultro imputavit. Hiſtor. lib. i. ch.7i. the numb. 2 94 Of the Imputation of Moral Actions. BOOK I. 3 the Immputation fhall extend, and beyond which it But notwithſtanding all this, if the Legiſlator ſhall not reach in any Buſineſs or Tranſaction (a). do exprelly declare, that upon the Performance For Merit (as Mr. Hobbes (b) obſerves) preſuppoſeth e of ſuch or ſuch an Action, the Agent ſhall have Right, and implies, that the Thing deſeru'd is due by a Right of demanding ſuch a Reward; there's no Promiſe. doubt to be made, but he may fairly and juftly re- V. Hence 'tis eaſy to gather what is the Force quire it. But the bare Omiſſion of forbidden A- of Merit, or what Adions are properly Meritori. ctions is utterly unable to produce any Merit, or ous, which ſome Men would vainly ſet to the ac any Matter for Boaſting or for Praiſe. Philoftrat. de count of God himſelf. Now the main Spring of all Vit. Apollon. Tjan. 1.6.c.i. (4) It is not an Act of Juſtice Merit, is the Performance of a Work which we to abſtain from Injuſtice, nor an A&t of Prudence to have did not owe : or, which the Perſon towards whom declin'd a Fooliſe Reſolution, nor of Valour not to defert it is exercis'd had no Right of requiring from us. One's Colours, nor of Temperance not to fall into the baſe For he that performs a Thing which he lay under Effeminacy of the Medes ; nor will a bare Negative a full and perfect Obligation of doing, only dif- Goodneß entitbe jou to any Commendation : When we chargeth his neceſſary Duty, and lays no Foun- eſcape Puniſhment, but yet do nothing worthy of Honour dation for any conſequent Merit. M. Senec. Cont. and Reward, ſuch an Indifference cannot reaſonably be 1. 1. c. 8. (1) Give me leave to perform fome Service call’d Virtue. Add Luke xviii. 11. Ammian. Marcell. to my Country, which may properly be a Piece of Merit : 1. 30. C. 11. To forbear Plunder and Rapine, zs a falſe What I have bitherto done in the common Courſe of Arms, Foundation for Praiſe. is not owing to me, but to the Laws. Julius Capitoli It remains then, that the only A&tions whereby nus, in his Life of Antoninus Pius, reciting the Rea we can obtain Merit towards other Men, are fuch ſon of the Emperor's obtaining that Title, from às we do not owe to them; at leaſt, not by a full lending his Hand to ſupport his ancient Father-in- and perfe& Obligation: Whether natural Reaſon Law, in the Preſence of the Senate adds, This Ačtin' either commands or adviſeth them in general; on was really no great Argument of Piety: Since the Debt leaving the Application of them to particular Per- we owe our Parents is ſuch, as rather denominates a Man fons in our Power ; or whether they are only not impiores if he neglects. than Pious if be pays (2). Nei- enjoin'd by the Civil Laws. For whatſoever I ther is it fair to impute a Thing which we do not owe another as a full and proper Debt, to that he owe to a Perſon againſt his Conſent; and much hath already a Right, and therefore when I pay leſs, if our doing of ſuch a thing did not turn to ſuch a Due, I do not, properly ſpeaking, pare 'his Benefit. Whence it is clearly apparent, that with any thing which I have then a Right of re- no Man can pretend to any Merit with reference taining or of otherwiſe applying, becauſe upon to Almighty God, even tho' it were poſſible for denying and keeping it back, I ſhould bring a real him to pay a full Obedience to all the Divine Laws. Injury and Damage on the Perſon to whom I And that, therefore, God cannot any other way ſtand engag’d. And therefore fince Things which become a Debtor to Mortal Men, but upon ac I owe in this Manner, do already belong, in fome count of his free Promiſe, the Breach of which reſpect, to another Perſon, and I have no longer would be repugnant to his (3) Goodneſs; not a Power to diſpoſe of them as I pleaſe, they can- that any Right, properly ſo call’d, is thence de not be proper Matter for the founding of Merit. riv’d to us. Indeed no Adions enjoin’d by Ver- But when I perform any thing towards another tue of a Supreme Authority, do produce Merit to- Man, which I was not bound to pay by any pera wards the Enjoiner. For tho’ borh the Sovereign feet Obligation, ſuch a thing really paſſing from me, of Heaven, and the Inferior Rulers of the Earth, and accruing to him, leaveth in me either a per- are wont frequently to confer certain Good things fect or an imperfe&t Right of receiving an equiva- on thoſe who comply with their Commands, in lent Return. And this is properly Merit (d); the order to the encouraging and exciting their Obe- Retribution or Payment of which, when it is de- dience; yet to the Payment of theſe good things termin'd by expreſs Covenant, we call Wages : they are not bound by the Merits of the Agent, or But when as to the Manner, the Time, and the as in the manner of Covenants ; but by their own Quantity, it is left to the Equity of the other free Offer and Promiſe : And therefore they can- Party, it bears the Name of Reward. Now upon not be ſo properly call’d Rewards as Gratuities in ſuch Accounts and Conſiderations we may receive the ſtricteſt Senſe of that Word (c). four Kinds of Things, (5) Corporeal, Incorpo- (a) Comp. Matth. xx. 13, 14, (b) Leviath. c. 1o. (c) Euripides Rhes. Rewarded Vertue gives a double Joy. (d) Add. Senec. de Beneficiis, l. 3. c. 21, 22. S. V. (1) The Latin of Seneca is this, Sine me aliquod merituin in Patriam conferre, adhuc militia mea Legis munus est. And Julius Capitolinus's Words are , Quod quidem non ſatis magnæ pietatis est argumentum, quum Impius ſit magis, qui ifta non faciat, quam pius, qui debitum reddat, Chap. 2. (3) The Author might have added here, the Words which an ancient Rhetorician makes his Son ſpeak, when his Father would hinder him from going to War the fourth time, to ſecure him from the Danger, Sine me aliquod meritum in patriam conferre, adhuc inilitia mea Legis munus est, Seneca Controv. Lib. 1. Contr. 8. Suffer me to do a meritorious Service to my Country, for as yet I have done no more in War than I was obliged to do by the Law. (3) Or rather his veracity; which this Author himſelf mentions in his Elements of Univerſ. Juriſpr. and therefore unficly omits it here. For it is properly out of his Goodneſs that GOD at firſt promiſes a Reward to our imperfect Performance; but his veracity that he performs ſuch Promiſe. See Nehem. ix. 8. 33. I John 1. 9. where he is called Just, who departs nor from the Truth, neither in his Diſcourfe nor Deportment. (4) The Greek, Mà 28 dxgloo wlw, tò usi cd erby ---- ETE 78 geovners, zo ur elvontws to cvbu vã edimo divd peid, tò un λίπαν και ταξιν: επ σωφροσύη, το μή ως το ή μοιχόν εμπισθεν έτε άξιον επαινε, το μή κακών φαίνεται παν για και τιμής τε και 77 uweicu looy doesntev, šmw e petí. (5) See the Explication of this Diſtinction of the Lawyers, Lib. 4. Chap. 9. 4. 7. real, CHAP. IX. Of the Imputation of Moral Actions. 95 It is But Senle (2) Our Author here quotes can hardly be thought to our Author's purpoſe : for it plainly appears by what follows, and is real, Moral, and (6) Notional. Of the firſt ſort after the Completion of a Corporal puniſhment, are, Money, Land, &c. of the ſecond, the Grant, Moral Puniſhment, or Infamy with its ſcandalous of Privileges and Immunities ; of the third, Ho- Marks continues. Secondly, he whom the Judges nours and Dignities ; of the laſt, Statues, Inſcrip- have acquitted, pafſeth in Human Eſteem for an tions, Crowns, and the like Tokens and Teſtimo- Innocent Perſon. The third way is, when the nies of Worth. Add. Montaigne El. 1. 2. c. 7. Delinquent dies. Tho' ſometimes in extraordnary And thus, as hath been ſhewn, Merit ariſeth Crimes, for a Terrour to others, Severities are from thoſe A&tions which we do not owe to others; ſhown on the Body, the Goods, and the Memory and chiefly as they are uſeful and beneficial to of Wretches after they are dead. Fourthly, by them. On the contrary, from Evil Actions, eſpe- length of time Crimes are ſo far taken away, as cially ſuch as damage or injure others, arifeth De that the Author cannot be afterwards try'd on the merit ; by Virtue of which, a Man is oblig’d to fame Account. Senec. Oedip. make Satisfaction for the Harm he hath done : But in general, all Evil Actions produce a Guilt, by Latere ſemper patere quod latuit diu. V. 826. which the Agent is fuppos'd liable to undergo What long hath lain conceald ſhould ever lie. ſome Penalty : Which Point we ſhall hereafter find more room to explain. See Lib. VIII. c. 3. Tho' Lyfias (Orat. 12.) denies that a Crime can VI. As the actual applying of Imputation cauſeth be blotted our by any ſpace of Years. (2) The the Effects of Moral A&ions to exiſt; ſo the ceaſing Fifth and laſt way is the procuring of Pardon for and as it were the recalling of it , doth diffolve and the image from the Sovereign Power Point the Caſe is very near the ſame in Good Actions and dormant, as the Astinn.is either conceald, or in Evil. For both Good and Evil Adions whilſt throughly diffembled or pardon'd (as it were) be- they are ſuch, or ſo long as they are enjoin'd or pro- forehand: So when once theſe Effects have bro- hibited by the Laws, muft neceſſarily be attended ken out in Publick, their Moral part may indeed with Imputation ; at leaſt (1) in the firſt and plain be effac’d, but not their phyſical. For what is Import of that Term. when a Lawis repeaľd once done cannot in a Physical or Natural the Action about which it was concern'd can no be rendred undone; but it may be fo order'a, as longer be imputed. The Imputation of an Action that it ſhall no longer have any Moral Effect in not properly due, he alone can remit, whoſe In- Civil Life. Thus a Man who hath been whipp'd tereft it is that the Effect or Conſequence of the A- for a Miſdemeanor, muft ftill keep the Scars and &tion ſhould be made good. Therefore if he who Signs in his Back, tho' all the Diſgrace and Scan- hath perform'd a Work remits the Imputation, the dal of the Puniſhment may be remov'd by a De- Wages fe due cannot on any account be cree of the Government. And when the Imputa- demanded. But to make this Releaſment or Re- tion is taken off, the Ation is to all Intents and miffion; is not in the Power of the Perſon for Purpoſes, no more than if it had never been whom the work was done ; it being the Credi- done (c). tor's part to forgive, and not the Debtor's. So like We need only add by way of Remark, that thoſe wiſe to take off the Imputation of an III Action, as Authors are ſtrangely overſeen, who in order to to any Force and Efficacy, belongs to thoſe whoſe the taking away the Guilt of an Évil Action, beſides the Maker and Guardian of the Law, not to the the Habit of Juſtice and Honeſty. In the ſame Author of the Fact. manner, as by plaiftring over a Wall we rid it of The Civilians reduce the chief Ways by which the Spots that were in it before; and as we drive Crimes are cancell'd or extinguiſh'd in Human away an ill Smell by burning Frankincenſe in a Courts, to theſe Five. Firſt, when the Puniſh- Room. Which Miſtake was occafion'd by their ment defin'd by the Law ſhall be compleatly un- Ignorance of Moral Things, and becauſe they dergone: For no Man is puniſh'd twice, and with imagin'd that Moral Qualities were produc'd and equal Severity for the ſame Individual Fault . deſtroy'd in the ſame way as Phyſical: The Abſur- Though many Puniſhments indeed leave a kind dity of which Notion is plain enough from what of laſting Stain behind them (a): And frequently we have before deliver'd. dit odio zaid (a) Vid. Sueton. Claud. c.16. (b) All which are treated of at lærge by Anton Matthæus de Crimin. ad. l. 48. D. tit. 19.0 (c) And thus we are to underſtand thoſe sentences of Ovid de Pont. L. 1. El. Mors , Tis lets to feel than to deferve our "Dooin. od baro We non peccarim mors quoque non faciet. Pena poteft demi, culpa perennis erito 919FI mobllo Death's kind Releaſe may end my Baniſh'd State, quatre The Penalty may ceaſe, but ne'er the Crime To My Sin will live, and mock the Power of Fate. (6) Our Author underſtands by this a thing that ferves only to raiſe fome high Thoughts of ourſelves in our Minds, a and ſigni; fies fomething done for that by human Inſtitution. : S. VI. (1) To underſtand this, we are to know, that this Author ( in his Elements of Juriſpr: Univers.p: 357.) divides Impu- tation into Simple and Efficacious : Simple Imputation conſiſts in fimply approving or diſapproving an Action, fo far as there redounds no Effect from it to the Agent. And this ſort of Imputation may be made indifferently by any, whether he hath any Intereſt or no in the A&tion that is done or not done. An Efficacious Imputation is that which produces fome Effect with-rela. tion to the Agent, and this belongs to thoſe whoſe interest it is thaerehe za orica Man adviſes Oedipus to keep thar always, termine the had lain . ſpoken by the ſame Old Man, that he intends nothing about the Impatation of Crimes , for (thus he fays) Sepe eruentis veritas , paruif maligo 2. 837. for they who make ſuch Diſcoveries, often endamage themſelves by laying open the Tłuth. -133 6 19. So ba QUINOD i tibi vino 9013 goivom 30 $040 A 147904 bois OF 96 OF T Η Ε LAW of NATURE A N D YOO NATIONS И * BOOK II. od Сній. І. It is not agreeable to the Nature of Man to live without Laws. H Н bagi The CONTENTS: 1. Whether a Law may be impoſed on Man, is doubtful. (V. Man too Noble a' Creature to be allowed ſuch a Freedom, II. What Freedom of Will is . VI. The Corruption of ſuch a Freedom. III. What ſort of Freedom of Will is in God? VII. The Variety of Mens Tempers. IV. What is the Freedom of Beaſts? VIII, Man's Natural Weakneſſ and Rudeneſ. Aving in the preceeding Book ex: the full range of this flexible Faculty, without any plaind the Condition of Moral Limit of Impediment. For to what purpoſe, ſome Things in general, together with will ſay, did God firſt make us entirely free to the moſt frequent Uſes of the Com- all things, and afterwards confine us to certain mon Terms, (which Notices if inſerted otherwiſe, Bounds and Rules? And as the Motion of our Joints and only as Occaſion ſerv'd would have interrupt- is render'd uſeleſs by the Reſtraint of Chains and ed us in our Buſineſs, and broken the Series of our Fetters, ſo may che Liberty of the Will ſeem vairi Undertaking :) we come now to fall more directly and of no manner of uſe, if we can incline to on our main Deſign, and the firft Enquiry we many things which muſt of Neceffity be forborn, are here to make is, whether it would be conve- and if we can be averſe to many things, which we nient or not for Men to paſs their Lives without muſt as neceſſarily purſue and undertake. the Reſtraint of any Law. Whence it will evident- II. In tracing this Point to its proper Spring, ly appear, why the All-wiſe Creator hath not in- we think it convenient firft of all to ſhow, that an veſted them with ſuch a wild Liberty, as ſhould abſolute Liberty would be ſo far from being uſe- impower them to a& metely as they lift, and as ful, that indeed it would be deftru&ive to Häman their wandring Inclinations lead them; without Nature ; and that therefore the binding and re- being under the Reſtraint of any Rule, (1) Ne- ftraining it with Laws is highly conducive to the ceflity, or Law. For fince God Almighty has Good, and to the Safety of Mankind. And this been pleas’d to endue Man with a Will, (that is, Conſideration rightly purſued, will at the ſame with a Power working by a kind of internal Im- time diſcover what Scope may be fairly indulg'a, pulfe, and enabling him to incline towards ſuch and how far the Reins may be given to our Free- agreeable to him, and to dom. Here then we muſt know, that Liberty in Turn from fuch things as ſeem Inconvenient or general implies, an Internal Faculty of doing and of Unpleaſant;) and with ſuch a Will as cannot be omitting things according to the Direction of our Jude- compell’d; a Doubt may be rais’d, whether it did ment. When we call it (1) a Faculty or Power, we not become the Divine Goodneſs, to allow him intimate, that the Perſon to whom this Liberty is sat din noi ona Mr. Barbeyrac's Notes on Chap. I. §. I. (1) Our Author does not treat here of á Phyſical, but Moral Neceſſity, ſuch as is explain'd Lib. I. Chap. VI. §. 14. ad fin. and Chap. VII. §. 2. Neceſſity is no more than an Obligation. S. II. (1) Our Author ſays only, A Faculty, which Term implies no more than a Power of A&ting, or Moving, doc. for there are Faculties purely Paffive, and therefore I have added this Definition of a Faculiy, to do, or not, that we are to underſtand by it, a Power of Acting or Moving, not only itſelf, but communicating a Motion to other Things, and Modelling them after a cer- applied bain manner. CHAP. I. 97 that he ſhould live without Law. applied, is Maſter of ſufficient Strength for many Excellency to let us not expect in vain, what he Performances, and has a Force and Ability not commands us to expect; or becauſe to violate å only to move himſelf, but to imprint Motion on Promiſe, implies ſome kind of Imperfection, from ocher Things, and to affect them in a certain which the Supreme Nature is molt immenſely re- Manner. We term this Faculty Internal, to figni- mov’d. Upon which account, we Men do not fy that its Force and its Motion ariſe from an in- challenge the Divine Promiſes as of Right belong, ward Principle, contrary to that outward and vio- ing to us, but receive them with Huinility and lent Impulſe which is the Cauſe of Movement, Reverence, as Gratuities proceeding from God's rather in a Log than in a Man. Laſtly, we add, free Pleaſure. For 'cis not here as in human Pro- according to the Direction of our Judgment, to hint miſes, where there lies an Obligation to Payment, that the Motion is not rais'd at a Venture, or by where the Promiſe turns into a Debt, and what ſome blind kind of Force ; but that the Agent is was before free, is brought under a Neceſſity: Buc ſuppos'd, in ſome Degree at leaſt, to have had a thoſe things which God performs upon Promiſe, Knowledge of the Object, and to have determin'd do as fully retain the Nature of Gifts and Benefits, himſelf to Action after ſome ſort of Deliberati- as thoſe things which he diſpenſes, without any on, ſo that the immediate Reaſon of his acting ſuch ſeeming Engagement. Thus may we weak ſhall be, becauſe he was pleas’d to act. At the Mortals faintly repreſent the Divine Liberty ; but ſame time it will be underſtood, that all Rubs and that alone which we can determine with Certainty Hindrances which may (2) either prevent the about it is, that it ſurpaſſes, in an infinite Man, Motion, or turn it another way, ought to be ſup- ner, both our Notion and our Condition (b). pos'd abſent, when we ſtate the Notion of Liberty IV. Bruce Creatures which are plac'd below in Perfection and without Alloy. our Degree of Being, do, however, enjoy a Li- III. Matters being thus ſettled, if we caſt our berty proper to their Nature and State. But this Eyes over the Univerſal Frame of Things, we ſhall Liberty cannot be otherwiſe than very Ignoble, find that many have no Liberty at all, ſuch as are ſince the Power of theſe Animals is confin'd to all Inanimate and Vegetative Creatures. Others ſuch narrow Bounds, and ſince ſuch is the Dulneſs enjoy ſeveral kinds of Liberty, and in ſeveral of their Senſes, and ſuch the Lowneſs of their Degrees. An univerſal Liberty, void of all Hin- Appetite, that they are concern'd about very few drance and of all Defect, is applicable only to Objects, and regard even thoſe but very negligent- God Almighty; this is conceiv'd as the moſt no- ly and ſuperficially; nor are excited by any thing ble Attribute of his moſt perfect Eſſence, admit- but what is extremely groſs and perpetually obvi- ting no Bounds or Circumſcription, and intimate- ous, and tends to the Service of their Belly. As ly join'd with Omnipotence. And therefore, the to other Matters, they have no Cuſtom, no Law, Reaſon why God doch not do (1) ſome things, or no Right to bind them, in tranſacting either with why he doth not always do (2) all things, is not one another, (1) or with Mankind. Ainongſt a to be fetch'd from the Deficience of his Liberty, few of them there is ſome Semblance of Marriage, but from his own abſolute Pleaſure (a). So like- but of ſuch as is obſerv'd in the bare Act of Con- wiſe when we ſay he cannot do all things, this junction and in ſome Shew of Love or Liking, does not proceed from any outward Impediment, not in any Strictneſs of ſerious and conſtant Fide- whether (3) Natural or Moral , but from his own lity. Moſt of them, as ſoon as they have ſatisfied Intention and Deſign, which we Mortals endea- their luftful Defires, retain no farther Mark of vour to conceive in Proportion to his Greatneſs Love, no Senſe of Shame, no Regard of Off- and his Excellency. In which Senſe we are to in- ſpring. Some indeed are moſt paſſionately fond terpret that common Saying, That GOD is a Law of their Young, but then their Kindneſs continues to himſelf . Thus too the Juſtice which we aſcribe no longer than till they are able to provide foc to God, is not to be ſuppos’d to bear a regard to themſelves. After this Period, all Love is loft and any Obligation, or to any Right in another Per- forgot on both ſides; the Dams take no Care or fon, as the Nature of Human Juſtice neceſſarily Notice of their Progeny, and the Progeny do implies. Bat in as much as he has ſhown, both not ſhow any Gratitude, any Senſe of Debt or by his works and by his Revelations, that ſuch a Duty to their Dams. Thoſe Beaſts which feed on Manner of a&ing is ſuitable to his moſt compleat Fleſh, tear and devour without Diſtinction, what- Nature, hence we come to expreſs it by the ſame ever is agreeable to their Palate ; and many when Term which denotes our own equitable Dealings they fall out, pull one another in pieces without towards other Men. Thus the Reaſon why Gon's Regret. Being ignorant of the Laws of Proprie- Promiſes do not fail, is not becauſe his Liberty ty, whenever a ſharper Hunger than ordinary was reſtrain'd by any Obligation ariſing from his pinches them, we may ſee them fighting furiouſly Promiſe ; but becauſe it is agreeable to the Divine for the common Paſture or Prey; and what ſome - (a) See Pſalm cxv. 3. Epheſ. i. 11. (b) Add Cumberland. de Legg. Nat. c. 7.6.6. (2) There are, in general, two ſorts of Obſtacles or Impediments, which hinder us from acting according to our own Wills, the one Phyſical, as Bonds, Fetters, Priſons, doc. The other Moral, as a Bond, Law, Government, Authority, doc. Elem. Jur. Univerſ. p. 20. S. JI!. (1) For Example, doth not make ſeveral Moons to circulate round the Earth, as may be ſeen to go round the Planers of Jupiter and Saturn. Apologia Pufend. S. 7. (2) As to create every Day new Kinds of inanimate Bodies or Animals, Ibid. (3) See Note 2. of s. foregoing. When we ſay that GOD can't do a thing abſolutely, as for Example, Lye, or be worſe than his Word: for ſince there is no Being ſuperior to GOD, to lay any Obligation upon him, nor more powerful than he, to hinder him from doing as he pleaſes, or to conſtrain him to abſtain from certain Things, and do others, the Inability which we attribute to GOD can proceed from nothing, but his own good Pleaſure, and infinite Perfections, Ibid. See Chap. 3. S. 5,6. following, §. IV. (1) See Chap. 3.52. following. O have 98 It is not agreeable to the Nature of Man, BOOK II. P.159, &c. have laid up or ſeiz’d for their private Uſe, the o- furing the Safety and Preſervation of ſuch Beings, thers make no Scruple to invade and to devour. as are not only produced by Nature with ſuch vaft Nor is there among them any ſuch thing, as E- Fertility and with ſo little Pains, but are likewiſe ſteem, as Honour, as Command, as Prerogative, denied the Privilege of an Immortal Soul; and unleſs ſuch as is deriv'd purely from Superiority whoſe Life conſiſts in nothing elſe, but in the cu- of Strength. It muſt be confeſt, that Likeneſs of rious and accurate Diſpofition of the little Parts Kind does produce in ſome Creatures a Shew of of Macter, with the additional Benefit of Motion. Friendſhip and of Society. Hence many delight Hence God is pleas’d, in producing and in de- to live in Herds, and thoſe which are more fierce ſtroying theſe inferior Animals, to give us fre- than others, have ſome Averſion to preying on quent Inſtances, and evident Tokens of his Power. their own Kind. Thus Juvenal obſerves, Sat. 15. Another Reaſon why Brutes had no need of the Reſtraint of Laws, is, becauſe their Appetite is rais’d by nothing elſe but by Hunger, or Thirſt, -Parcit or by ſalacious Deſire, for their Satisfaction in all Cognatis maculis fimilis fera : quando leoni which Enjoyments Nature has made ſuch large Fortior eripuit vitam leo? quo nemore unquam Proviſion. Neither is it likely, that their unli- Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri? mited Way of Proceeding ſhould render them very Indica tigris agit rabida cum Tigride pacem hurtful and deſtructive co Mankind, ſince we are Perpetuam : Jævis inter ſe convenit urſis. enabled, by our fuperior Strength and Cunning, to prevent any ſuch unhappy Effe&s (a). Beaſts of one Kind from other each refrain: V. Now why the Great Creator ſhould not in- No Weaker Lion's by the Stronger ſlain : dulge us Men in ſo lawleſs a Liberty, many Rea- Nor from his larger Tusks the Foreſt Boar fons may be given, ariſing both (1) from the Pri- Commiſſion takes his Brother Swine to gore. mitive and from the Acceſſory State and Condi- Tyger with Tyger, Bear with Bear you'll find, tion of Humane Nature. The Dignity of Man, In Leagues Offenſive and Defenſive join'd. and his Excellency above all the other Parts of the Mr. Tate. Animal World, made it requiſite that his Actions ſhould be ſquar'd by ſome Rule; without which But, not to fay that there's ſomething of a Poe- no Order, no Decorum, no Beauty can be con- tical Figure in theſe Expreſſions, we may only ceiv’d. Hence it is his greateſt Honour that he take notice, that this ſeeming Relation is but a has obtain'd an immortal Soul, indu'd with the very weak Bond for a laſting Friendſhip: ſince 'tis Light of Underſtanding, with the Faculties of immediately broken whenever the Concerns of judging and of chuſing things, and with an admi- the Belly intervene. Thus you ſhall ſee a Litter rable Capacity for Arts and Knowledge. On of Puppies play very lovingly together, but throw which account he is juſtly term’d, a piece of Meat amongſt them, and you breed a Santius animal, mentiſq; capacius alte dangerous and a general Quarrel. The Reaſon Et quod dominari in cætera pollet. why ſome Creatures exerciſe a little Shadow of Duty, Love, Faith, and Gratitude towards Men, an Animal bleft with Loftineß of Mind and with Sana is purely to be referr'd to Cuſtom, and to their Elity of Reaſon, and fram'd for the Dominion and som Deſire of being ſupplied with Food. If theſe Ob- vereignty of all the rest (b). ſtacles are once remov'd, and if they find them Farther, That the Soul was deſign'd by the All- ſelves of ſufficient Strength, Man himſelf cannot wiſe Creator for a much nobler End than to ſerve eſcape their Violence, if he unhappily provokes only as Salt to keep the Body freſh, may be ga- them. The Liberty of Brutes then is not reſtrain’d ther'd from this Conſideration, thar the greateſt by any Intrinſical and Moral Tie: Tho' their Ex- and moſt ſhining part of its Faculties are ſuch as ternal Motions are often violently put under Con- contribute either little or nothing to the Preſer- finement by Men. Now if any one is ſo curious vation of the Body, which (2) might be ſecur'd as to enquire on what account Brute Creatures without any ſuch mighty Parade, without fo are allow'd ſo unbounded a Freedom, the plain Great and Pompous a Proviſion. It's plain, that Reaſon ſeems to be, becauſe God Almighty has the Power and the Activity of the rational Soul, not given them a Mind capable of the Know- (3) is chiefly exercis'd about ſuch Things as belong ledge of Right and of Law. There was indeed (4) to the Worſhip of God, and to a Life (5) of no occafion to be ſo very careful and exact in en- Society and of Civility. And 'tis principally for (a) Add Charron of Wiſdom, B. 1. c. 34. (b) Solinus (cap. 3.) calls Man a Being whom Nature has prefer’d to all othersa in Excellency of Senſe, and in Capacity of Reaſon. 9. V. (1) We muſt underſtand by the Primitive State, that in which Man was when he came out of the Hands of his Creator, conſidered purely and barely as a Man, before he had any Uſe of his Faculties, where his Acceſſory State (poft ſuperveniens) is that wherein he is left to himſelf, and conſequently ſuppoſes the Uſe of his Faculties. The firſt' is treated of in this Paragraph, and the other in the three following. (2) This appears from the Example of ſome Beaſts, which live a long time, as Stags; and of ſome Trees, as the Oak, which continue a long time, tho' they have no Senſe. Cumberland, Chap. 2. 3. 4. (3) The Sagacity of our Mind confits (not in finding out what ſort of Meats, Exerciſe, or Medicines are proper to lengthen out our lives here; for the moſt able Phyſicians and Philoſophers have had but a very imperfect and uncertain Knowledge of thoſe chings. Ibid. (4) See Chap. 3. S, 20. following, Note 2. 5) Cicero obſerved this, when he reckoned up che Advantages of Men above Beaſts in theſe Matters, in theſe Words, Eadem- que Natura, vi Rationis, hominem conciliat homini ad Orationis do ad vit & Societatem Nec vero illa parva vis Nature eſt, rationiſ- que quod unum hoc animal ſentit, quid ſit ordo, quid fit quod deceat, in faltis, di&tiſque qui modus, i. e. “Nature by the Force of 6 Reaſon renders Men fit for Converſacion Nor is this a ſmall Force of Nature and Reaſon that Man only is ſenſible what ** Order is, and how both Words and Actions are to be moderated.” De Offic. lib. 1. chap. 4. See alſo De Legibus, lib. I. chap. the CHAP. I. that he ſhould live without Law. 99 the Service and Furtherance of theſe Great Ends, In Man the God deſcends, and joys to find that it can (6) from known Things infer and ex The Narrow Image of his Greater Mind. plain thoſe which are leſs known, that it can di- Mr. Creech, ſcern and judge what is agreeable and what diſa- greeable to it; that it can form Univerſal Noti VI. Another Reaſon why it was inconvenient ons by Abſtradion from Singulars; that it can by to allow Man the ſame extended Liberty as Brutes, proper Signs communicate its Notions to others, (1) was his prodigious Corruption and Degene- can form Inventions, can apprehend the Nature of racy ſo many Degrees beyond theirs. That we Numbers, Weights and Meaſures, and compare charge him thus, no one will wonder, who has them with one another; that it can perceive the had the Curioſity to reflect a little on the various Beauty and the Force of Order and Method;: Purſuits and Inclinations of Mankind. Beaſts are that it can either raiſe, or repreſs, or moderate ſollicited only by their Belly and by their Luft: Affections; that it can hold in Memory an end. And then their Luft has ſome Shew of Tempe- leſs Compaſs of Things, and call out, as it were rance, provoking them only at certain Times and at its Beck, any part of the Stock which it has oc- Seaſons, and being exercis'd not for empty and cafion to uſe; that it can turn its Sight inward up- fuperfluous Pleaſure, but for Increaſe and Propa- on it ſelf, recollect its own Dictates, and by them gation of their Kind. Oppian Cyneg.l. 3. v.151,152. judge of its Actions, whence ariſes the Force and the Authority of Conſcience. Of all theſe, Powers Ου γαρ τις θηρεασι νόμG- γαστης ότι πλήθH" and Abilities there would be very little Uſe, or Εις λίγος έρχεμένοις τελέειν φιλοτίσιον έρων: rather none at all, in a Lawleſs, a Brutal and an Unſociable Life (a). Now the more Gifts GOD Beaſts in their Joys a decent Temp'rance keep; has beſtow'd on Man, and the greater Inlarge Nor offer Love, when 'tis the Time for Sleep. ments he has granted to his Wit and Mind, the more baſe and unſeemly would it be, that all theſe But the Carnal Deſires of Men do neither obſerve noble Endowments ſhould ruft for want of Cul- any ſet Times for their Eruption, (2) nor are by ture and Regulation, ſhould be vainly ſpent and any Means ſo moderate in their Heat, as to make ſquander'd away without Uſe, without Order, no farther Efforts than are neceſſary for the Pre- and without Grace. Nor was it altogether in ſervation of Human Species. Again, the Hunger vain, that God indued Man with a Mind appre- of Beaſts is eaſily ſatisfied with ſuch Food as Nature henſive of Accuracy, and of Decency; but it was has ſpread in all Places for their Suſtenance; nor without doubt intended, that he ſhould ſo imploy do their Meals ſtand in need of the Formality of the Powers he had receiv'd as to manifeſt the Glo- Furniture, or of the Incentives of Sauce. And ry of his Creator, and to promote his own true when they find this Appetite reliev'd and quieted, Intereſt and Happineſs. The Heathen Poet was they put an End to their Buſineſs and their Care. able to make ſuch an Inference as this: (Nor are they very forwardly, diſpos’d to Rage or Miſchief (3), provided they are unprovok’d, and Quis dubitet hominem conjungere cælo ? that their two chief Deſires are at reſt.) But now Eximiam natura dedit linguamq; capaxq; the Food of Man muſt not only ſatisfy his Belly, Ingenium, volucremq; animum ; quem deniq; in unum but tickle his Palate (4). Nature has taken care Deſcendit Deus atq; habitat, Seq; ipſe requirit. that Beaſts ſhould have no need of other Cloath- ing beſides, what ſhe has given them. But Man Then who can doubt that Man the Glorious Pride turns the Infirmity of his Nakedneſs into an Occa- Of all, is nearer to the Skies alli'd ? fion of Vanity and Pride. Beſides, do not Men Nature in Men capacious Souls has wrought, float in a whole Tide of Affe&tions and Deſires, And given them Voice expreſſive of their thought. utterly unknown to Beaſts? Covetouſneſs, (5) Ama (a) Add. Cumberland de Legg. Nat. c. 2. 4. 4. who likewiſe in the 33d Se&tion of the Same Chapter, has drawn moſt admirable Proofs from the Frame and Structure of Human Bodies. (6) See Chap, 3. §. 10. following, Note 5. and Cicero de. Nat. Dear. Lib. 2. chap. 59. S. VI. (1) Lycurgus, an ancient Poet, quoted by J. Lipſius upon Seneca, Epift. 103. ſays, That were it not for this, no Laws need be made for Man; and that Man is naturally a fierce Beaſt, who differs nothing from them we call ſo, but that he lifts his Head towards the Heavens. His Words are theſe, Θείς Φού, πως πονηρον εν ανθρώπων φύσις Το σμάλον, Ου γδ άν που έδεήθη νόμο Οίει τιτάλλων διαφέρει θηeίων "AvIpasovs, Oj de luxejv, aimae ghices. Πλαί εά τ' άλλα, τετο δ' ορθον θηeίον. Mr. Hirtius has collected together abundance of Authorities about this Matrer, which we may find in his Elements of Civil Pru- dence, Part I. Se&. 1. S. S, doc. I know they are not all to the Purpoſe, nor taken at the firſt hand, for the firſt of them gives a juſt Suſpicion to the contrary. Seneca ſays indeed, Cæterum idem ſemper de nobis pronunciare debebimus malos effe nos, ma- Los fuiffe, invitus adjiciam, & futuros esse. De Benef, lib. 1. chap. 10. But there is nor one Word of what Mr. Hirtius adds, as if it were fubjoined in the ſame place, Vis amplius dicam ? Homo est omnium animalium pefimum, ac deterrimum, quo nihil pejus, ac atrocius. See Lib. 7. Chap. I. §. 4. Note 5. following. , (2) ld evoord tatov, Ljevechtatov (7 {áær å oppnO] év! dpetasxj. reg's coegdioca, rj & Su Slw geleison. Ariſtot. Pol. lib. 1. chap. 2. in fine, Man without Virtue is the moſt profane and wild Creature, as to Venery and Eating. (3) Nunquam enim illas (ferds] ad nocendum, niſi neceſſitas inigit, aut fame, aut timore, coguntur ad pugnam. Homini perdere hominem libet. Seneca Epift. 1oz. “ Nothing but Neceſſity drives the Beaſts to hurt one another, either Hunger or Fear forces “them to fight. Men take a Pleaſure in killing one another. ” (4) To complear the Senſe, we may add, out of this Author's Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. 1. Chap. 3. 5.4. And he often deſires more Food than his Stomach can digeſt, as well as that which reſpects Revenge, in the Enumeration of thoſe Paſſions of Man, which are unknown to Beaſts. of which the Author ſpeaks a little lower. (3) Uni (animantium) ambitio, uni avaritia, uni immenſa vivendi cupido, uni ſuperſtitio , uni ſepulturæ cura, atque etiam poſt ſe de futuro. Plin, Nat. Hiftor. lib. Præm. bition, up ) 7. 02 100 It is not agreeable to the Nature of Man, Book II. bition, Vain-glory, Envy, Emulation, Conten- Puniſhment; what would become of the World, tions of Wit, Superſtition, the Care of future if they were left to the wild Sway of their Cor- Things, and the Spur of Curioſity, do all claim ruptions, if they had no inward Bridle to curb Entertainment in Human Breaſts, and yet are their Inclinations and to check their Purſuits. Add. Strangers to the dumb Creation. Manilius Aſtron.l.4. Ariſtotle's Problems, Se&t. 29. Queſt.7. Plin. Nat. Hift. I. 18. Proeme. Iamblichus Protrept. c. 20. That Nuello votorum fine beati Men ſhould maintain a Familiarity with one another, Vieturos agimus ſemper, nec vivimus unquam, and at the ſame time live contrary to the Laws, is an Pauperiorq; bonis quiſque est quo plura requirit : impoſſible thing : For by this Means they woulă ſuffer Nec quod habet numerat, tantum quod non habet optat. more Injury and Damage, than if every Man led a sea Quumq; ſui parvos uſus natura repoſcat, parate Life by himſelf. On theſe Accounts, and for Materiam ſtruimus magnæ per vota ruinæ, the Neceſſities, Law and fuftice are to be admitted as Luxuriamq; lucris emimus, luxuq; rapinas, it were for Sovereigns amongst Men, without the Go- Et ſummum cenfris pretium est effundere cenfum. vernment of which they could not continue or ſubfift. VII. It is ſtill farther obſervable to our Purpoſe, Why ſhould deluding Hopes diſturb our Eaſe, that a much greater, Variety of Diſpoſitions may Vain to purſue, yet eager to poſſeſs? be diſcover'd in Men than in Beaſts. All the ſea With no Succeſs and no Advantage crown'd, : veral kinds of irrational Creatures are for the Why ſhould we ſtill tread on th' unfiniſli't Round? moſt part indu'd with the ſame Inclinations, and Grown Grey in Cares purſue the ſenſeleſs Serife, rais'd and incited by the ſame common Appetites And ſeeking how to live, conſume a Life? and Affections. We may underſtand a whole Spe- The more we have, the meaner is our Store, cies by the Knowledge of one ſingle Member of The unenjoying craving Wretch is poor. it. But amongſt Men there are not more Heads But Heaven is kind with bounteous Handit grants than Wits; and every one is equally zealous in A fit Supply for Nature's ſober Wants : giving the Preference to his own Opinion, and She asks not much, yet Men preſs blindly on, to his own Poffeffions. So Horace, Sat. 1. Lib. 2. And heap up more, the more to be undone: ſpeaks, By Luxury they Rapine's Force maintain, What that ſcrapes up, flows out in Luxury again. Quot capitum vivunt, totidem Studiorum millia. 16 And to be ſquander'd, or to raiſe Debate, As many Men as live, of them the Brain Is the great only Uſe of an Eſtate. As many thouſand Studies entertain. Mr. Creech. Philemon in Stobæus, Speech 2. (1) If a Man Should Liban. Declam. 9. is not á Man a mild and peaceable get together thirty thouſand Foxes, hé'd find that they Animal, So far as Words go; but in Reality Savage and not only have all one Nature, but all one Method and Ungovernable? For when do we hear of Lions inder- Tenour of Life: But among st US, as many Bodies are taking an Expedition againſt Lions ? When do wild there, ſo many ways of Living may we diſcover. Plin. Beaſts war against their own Kind ? What Perjury do Pan. There are no Things in the World more likely to we find amongst them? What Breach of Covenants ? diſpleaſe all, than ſuch as are done with an Aim of plea- What Perfidiouſneſs and Avarice, what inſatiable Love ſing all . Nor are all mov'd with a ſimple and an of Riches? What Intemperance, what Adultery can we uniform Deſire, but with Propenſions as vaſt in lay to their Charge? Whoever conſiders and exa their Number, as they are various in their Mixture mines the unhappy Variety of Contentions and and Compoſitions. Nay, the ſame Man is very Quarrels that continually ariſe amongſt Men, frequently unlike, and unequal to himſelf, and will find that the greateſt part of them proceed what he moſt eagerly deſir’d, he ſhall at another from ſuch Inclinations and Propenſions, as never time moſt ſtrongly abhor: diſturb the Peace of Brutes (a). Now in ſo vio- lent a Fierceneſs, and in ſo wide a Diverſity of magno curarum fluctuat æftu, Affections and of Deſires; what a Life would Men Atq; animum nunc huc celerem nunc dividit illuc ; lead, were they deſtitute of the Benefit of Law In parteſq; rapit varias, perq; omnia verfat (b). to unite and to compoſe them? We ſhould ſee no- thing but a furious Multitude of Wolves, of Lions, This way and that he turns his anxious Mind, of Dogs tearing and devouring one another. E Thinks, and rejects the Counſels he deſign'd. very Man would indeed be a Lion, a Wolf, a Explores himſelf in vain through ev'ry Part, Dog, to his Neighbour, or rather a Monſter, And gives no Reſt to his diſtracted Heart. more pernicious and more ſpiteful than the fierceſt Mr. Dryden. of theſe Creatures; ſince Man, of all Living Things, is the moſt able to hurt Man, and, if left Neither is there a leſs Difference in their Studies, to his own furious Paſſions, the moſt willing. And their Inſtitutions, and their Inclinations to employ lince Men are continually bringing ſo many Evils and exert their Vigour of Mind, as appears from and Miſchiefs on one another, while they now live the numberlefs Profeſſions, and the endleſs Me- under the Force of Law, and under the Fear of thods of Living. (2) Quintus Calaber l. 1. Now (a) Add. Charron Of Wiſdom, B. 1. C.34. 7. 12. and c. 39. n. 11. (6) Virg. Æn. 8. v. 19. Add. Charron de la Sageſe, 1. 1. c. 38. S.VII(1) His words are, "Εαν τρισμυρίας αλώσικας τις συναγάρι μίαν φύσιν απαξάπασιν, τρόπον δ' ένα' ημών δε όσα και τα σώμαλα in zent non volevo, Tocétos ésiv rj menys i stiv. And Pliny's Nulla magis omnibus diſplicent, quam que fic fiunt, tanquam omnia bus placeant. (2) His Words are Πάσι δ' άρ' ανθρώποισιν δμων γένο αλλ' επί έργα Al Men indeed have th' fame Original Στροφών' άλλOέπ' άλλα But them to divers Works their Genius's call. CHAP. I. that he Mould live without Law. IOI as the more Voices there are, the more harſh and Let us ſuppoſe a Man bred up by another, juſt ſo unpleaſant would be the Sound, unleſs they far as to be able to walk, and without hearing a join'd in Confort and Harmony; ſo would human Word ſpoken, inſomuch that he ſhall be deſtitute Life be nothing elſe but Noiſe and Confuſion, of all Inſtruction and Diſcipline, and enjoying no were not the jarring Diſſonance compos’d and Knowledge, but ſuch as ſprouts naturally from the ſweetned by Law, and turn'd into a Muſical A- Soil of his Mind, without the Benefit of Cultiva- greement. As Things ſtand, this exceeding Va- tion. Let us ſuppoſe the fame Man to be left in a riety of Parts and of Diſpoſitions, is at the ſame Wilderneſs or Deſert, and entirely depriv'd of the time an Ornament and an Advantage to Mankind; Company and of the Affiftance of others . What ſince when it is thus rightly temper'd, there na a wretched Creature ſhould we at laſt behold! A curally reſults from it ſo admirable an Order and mute and an ignoble Animal, Maſter of no Powers Grace, as could not have been produc'd by an U- or Capacities, any farther than to pluck up the niverſal Likeneſs. And beſides there was likely to Herbs and Roots that grow about him ; to gather be much leſs Claſhing and Conteſt in ſo vaſt a Mul- the Fruits which he did not plant; ito quench his titude, whilſt their various Humours and Inclina- Thirft at the firſt River, or Fountain, or Ditch that tions led them to quite different Objeas of Choice. he finds out in his Way; to creep into a Cave for The ſame wiſe Counſel Providence ſeems to have Shelter from the Injuries of Weather, or to cover us’d in ſpreading ſo wonderful a Diſtinction of over his body with Moſs, and Grafs, and Leaves : Features over the Faces of Men. For ſince diffe- Thus would he paſs a heavy Life in moſt tedious rent Offices are to be diſcharg’d, and different Be- Idleneſs; would tremble at every Noiſe, and be haviour to be us’d towards different Perſons, there ſcared at the Approach of any of his Fellow Crea- would ariſe a moſt wild and fatal Diſorder, if all tures, 'till at laſt his miſerable Days were conclu, Men exactly reſembled one another, and could ded, by the Extremity of Hunger, or of Thirſt, or not be diſtinguiſh'd but by Artificial Marks, which by the Fury of a ravenous Beaft. That Mankind would be liable to ſo many counterfeiting Cheats. therefore do not paſs their Life in a more forlorn Add. Dr. Cumberland, de L. N. c.2. 8.28. And there and a more deplorable Condition than any other lies this farther Secret in this Natural Diſtinction, living Thing, is owing to their Union and Con- that one Face pleaſes the Fancy of one Man, and junction, to their Intercourſe with the other Part- one ſeems more agreeable to another ; ſo that out ners and Companions of their Nature. The Divine of the Univerſal Stock, every Man may chuſe Saying, 'Tis not good for Man to be alone, is not to be what he thinks moſt beautiful, and what may en- reſtrain'd to Matrimony, but ſeems to belong in gage his Affection with the ſweeteſt Comfort and general to any Society with other Men. But now Delight. without Law, 'tis impoſſible that any Society ſhould be either introduc'd or maintain'd in VIII. Beſides all this, it was inexpedient for Strength and Quietneſs. And conſequently, un- Man to live without Law upon account of his ex- leſs Man had been deſign'd for the baſeft and the ceeding Weakneſs; which is our laſt Reaſon. A moſt wretched Part of the Animal Creation, it was few Days will ſet a Brute Creature in a Condition not by any Means convenient that he ſhould live of providing for himſelf; nor is he in any great looſe from all Direction and Obligation of Law. Need of the Company of others for his Aftſtance Plutarch's Philofophy could teach him, that a ge- and Support. But Man from his firſt coming into neral and unbounded Licenſe of Acting, was dif- the World, undergoesla long and tedious Courſe agreeable to the Condition and to the Dignity of of helpleſs Infirmity. Quinétilian Declam. 306. The Man. (2)Thoſe Perſons only (ſays he, De Audit.) Frailty of Human Nature appears moft in its Beginning who live in Obedience to Reaſon are wortby to be ac- and early Growth. The Beasts See (1) their Young im- counted Free. They alone Live as they will, who mediately after the Birth, a ſtanding on their Feet, and have learnt what they ought to will. Thoſe who give ſeeking for the Dugg : But we are forc'd to take up the the Reins to unworthy Practices and Purſuits , uſe ar belpleſs Infant, and to protect him from the Cold :. And, imaginary Freedom, to purchaſe a real Diſſatisfaction. after all this Nicety and Care, it is not unlikely, he may From all theſe Remarks it is ſufficiently evident, die between the Arms of the Parents and the Boſom of the that the Natural Liberty of Man, ſuch as really Nurſe. Add. Plin. N.H. 1.7.Præfat. What a length and truly agrees to him, and not only in an ab- of Years is requir’d, and what Diligence of Infor- ſtracted Senfe, muſt always be underſtood as mation, to enable him by his own Strength to ac- guided and reſtrain’d by the Ties of Reaſon, and commodate himſelf with Food and Cloathing? by the Laws of Nature (3). 1. VIII. (1) Quintilian's Words are, Caducum circa initia animal; homines ſumus, nam ferarum, pecudumq; fætibus est ſtatim ingreffus, do ad ubera impetus: nobis tollendus infans, do adverſus frigora nutriendus: fic quoque inter parentum manus, gremiumq; nutricis ſæpe la- bitur. And Theocritus's, theſe, "Aras do danov suxe 0 g Pod dica pwtãy, i. e. GOD made Man to want each others Help. To theſe we may add the fine Deſcription of Seneca, Quid est homo imbecillum corpus, do fragile, nudum, ſuapte naturâ inerme, aliena Opis indigens, ad omnem fortune contumeliam projeètum, quum benè lacertos exercuit, cujuſlibet fere pabulum, cujuſlibet vi&ima, ex infirmis fluidiſque contextum, & lineamentis exterioribus nitidum; frigoris, astus, laboris impatiens : ipſo rurfus fitu, lo otio iturum in tahem, aliment a metuens fua, quorum modo inopia, modo copia rumpitur; anxie, ſollicit&q; tutela, precarii spiritus, & male hærentis , quem pavor repentinus, adjeétuſque ex improviſo sonus auribus gravis excutit : Soli femper fibi nutrimentum vitiofum do inutile, i.e. What is Man? His Body is Frail and weak, Naked and Defenceleſs, wanting Help, and expoſed to Misfortunes; when he is ar- rived at ſome Strength, a Prey to Beafts, every Body's Sacrifice; made up of Infirmities, tho' of a neat Compoſure,, unable to undergo Heat, Cold, or Labour'; growing Diſeaſed by Idleneſs; ſuſpecting his Food, by Want and Plenty of which he is fome. times ruin’d; anxious and ſollicitous ; of a precarious and inconftant Mind, which a ludden Fear and Noiſe diſtracts; his Nou. riſhment is vicious and unprofitable to himſelf alone, De Conſol. ad Marciam, Chap. 11. Our Author feems to have had theſe Words in his Thoughts, becauſe he expreſſes himſelf much to the ſame Effect. (2) His Words are, Ω τα λόγω του επομένες άξιον έσι μόνες έλθέρες νομίζειν. Μόνοι δ, άσε μελέθαι μαθόντες ως βάλοναι ζώσι, τοϊς δε άπαιδαύταις, και παραλίες ορμάις, και αξεσι αεννές ερή, και μικρών εν πολλώ το μετανούν, έκέσιον. Με ακάir. in princip. (3) See Buddei Elementa Philoſophie praktice, Part II. Chap. 3. where he is both particular and large.in ſhewing how People incorporated into Sociery are under a neceſſity of having Laws impoſed upon them. СНАР, IO2 Book IT. Of the Natural State of Man. С НА Р. II. 1. 3 Of the Natural State of M A N. 13 bre The CONTENTS. I. Man's Natural State diverfly conſidered. VIII. Hobbes's Reaſons anſwered. II. His Miſery. IX. Reaſon is not to be deny'd its Uſe in the State of III. Its Laws and Rights.nl 16 Nature. IV. The State of Nature qualified. dell|x. The Manners of barbarous Nations do not make up V. Whether it has an Inclination to War. the State of Nature. VI. Hobbes affirms it, and his Reaſons are produc’d. XI. Natural Peace has no need of Covenants. VII. Mens Relation one to another concludes the negative. XII. Natural Peace is not to be truſted to. B Y the Natural State of Man in our preſent double Notion of a State is anſwerable to the două Enquiry, we do not mean that Condition ble Manner in which we may conſider the Men which is (1) ultimately deſign’d him by Nature, who are to compoſe it, either as each particular as the moſt perfect and the moſt agreeable ; but Man lives in a Natural Liberty towards all others; ſuch a State as we may conceive Man to be plac'd or as ſome Men have entred into a Society between in by his bare Nativity, abftracting from all the themſelves, but are join'd to all the reft of the Rules and Inſtitutions, whether of Human Inveň- World, by no other Ties beſides thoſe of commoni tion, or of the Suggeſtion and Revelation of Humanitý. Heaven for the Addition of theſe Aſliſtances II. Now to form in our Minds ſome Image of ſeems to put another Face on Things, and to frame this Natural State, ſuch as it would be if deftitute human Life anew, by an exacter Model. By this of all Arts and Afliſtances either invented by wide Exemption we do not only exclude all the Men, or reveald by God, we muſt fancy a Man various Arts and Improvements, and the Univerſal thrown at a Venture into the World, and then Culture of Life, but eſpecially Civil Conjuncti- left entirely to himſelf, without receiving any far- ons and Societies, by the introducing of which ther Help or Benefit from others, than his bare Mankind was firſt brought under the decent Ma- Nativity; we muſt likewiſe ſuppoſe him to be fur- nagement of Order and Regularity. That we niſh'd with no larger Endowments of Body or may be able to form clear and diftin&t Notions of Mind, than ſuch as we can now diſcover in Men, this ſuppos’d State, we will firſt conſider it in it- antecedent to all Culture and Information; and ſelf, and examine eſpecially what Rights and laſtly, we muſt take it for granted, that he is not what Inconveniencies attend it; that is, what foſter'd under the peculiar Care and Concern of would be the Condition of particular Men, if Heaven. The Condition of ſuch a Perſon could there were no Arts or Inventions ſer afoot, and not prove otherwiſe than extremely Miſerable, no Communities form’d and eſtabliſh'd in the whether he were thus caft upon the Earth in In- World. And then, ſecondly, we will conſider it fancy, or in Maturity of Stature and of Strength. in order 10 other Men, whether in this Regard it If an Infant, he could not but have ſadly perifh'd, bears the Semblance of Peace or of War; that unleſs ſome Brute Creature had, by a kind of is, whether Men who live in a Natural Freedom, Miracle, offer'd its Dugs for his Support ; and ſo as neither to be ſubject to one another, nor to then he muſt neceſſarily have imbib'd (1) a fierce acknowledge a common Maſter, are likely to and ſavage Temper, under the Nurſery and prove Enemies or Friends. In this ſecond Confi Tutelage of Beaſts. If in Perfection of Limbs deration the State we are ſpeaking of, is capable and Size, we muſt, however, conceive him naked, of a Subdiviſion, being either full and abſolute, able to utter nothing but an inarticulate Sound, à and ſo bearing an equal Regard towards all Men Stranger to all Inſtitution and Diſcipline, amazed in general; or elſe limited and reſtrain’d, as it has and ſtartled at the Things about him, and even Reſpect only to a certain Part of Mankind. This at his own Being: The Admonition of Hunger Mr. Barbeyrac's Notes upon Chap. II. S. I. (1) If Mr. Titius (Obſervat. 452.) had conſidered well theſe Words, he would not have criticiſed upon our Author, as call- ing that Eſtate Natural very unfitly, which is contrary to Nature, i. e. to the Intention of GOD, who appointed Man for So ciery. See what our Author ſays at the End of $. 4. S. II. (1) This appears from an Inſtance which Procopius (Lib. 2. Gothicorum) relates of a Child nurſed by a Goat. Mr. Hirtius alſo quotes Harthknoch’s Hiſtory of Poland, Lib. I. Chap. 2. who relates fomething like it of an Infant who had been fuckled by a Bear, and being brought to Warſaw, was preſented to Caſimire King of Poland, in 1661. I fall alſo add at length a like Story which the ſame Mr. Hirtius has fet down in his Treatiſe of Society, the firſt Principle of the Law of Nature, Set, 1. S. 8. yec leaving the Reader at Liberry to ſee into the Truth of it, cho' the Author warrants it. “ In 1344 there was a Child found in “ Helfe, who, as we underſtand ſince, was taken away by Wolves, when it was about three Years old, and wonderfully main- “ tained by them. They carried it to a Tree, where they had laid up the greateſt part of their Prey, and in the winter they “dug a Ditch, into which they caſt Leaves, and Herbs, which they laid under the Child, lying themſelves by it to keep it “ from the Cold. They taught it to go on the Hands and Feet, and run like themſelves, inſomuch chat by Cuſtom it would run as ſwiſt, and make as great Leaps. When he was firſt taken, they bound fome Pieces of Wood to liim, to reſtore him, and “accuſtom him not to go like a Beaſt with his Face downward. He was carried to the Court of Henry Prince of Heſſe, and was “ often heard to ſay, That if it were not for him, he had rather live amongſt the Wolves again, than among Men." This Story is related by the Author of the Additions to the Hiſtory of Lambert de Schaffnaberg, about 1344. would CHAP. II. Of the Natural State of Man. 103 previous Labour and Guidance of others; and how Tunc la amicitiam cæperunt jungere habentes Aut genue would make him ſeize greedily on any thing that Sed nemora atq; cavos montes Sylvafq; colebant. was near him, his Thirſt would direct him to the Et frutices inter condebant fqualida membra, first Water, and Dens or Trees would afford a Verbera ventorum vitare imbreſq; coaéti. Refuge from the Injuries of Weather. Should Nec commune bonum poterant ſpectare, nec ullis we ſuppoſe a Number of ſuch helpleſs Wretches Moribus inter fe fcibant nec legibus uti. thrown together by Nature on ſome uninhabited Quod cuique obtulerat præda fortuna, ferebat, Soil, we cannot but think that they would ſo Spome fuå ſibi quiſque valere & vivere dočtusi long however continue in a brutal Wildneſs and Et Venus in (ylvis jungebat corpora amantum, Diſorder, till at laft, either by their own Wit and Conciliabat enim vel mutua quamque cupido, Experience, or by ſome Hints and Inſtructions Vel violenta viri vis atq; impenſa libido. taken from the Conduct of Mute Creatures, they ſhould by Degrees arrive at fome Method and E Illud erat curæ quod ſacla ferarum legancy of Living, and as Virgil ſays, Infeſt am miſeri faciebant fæpe quietem. Varias uſus meditando extunderet artesy Inde caſas poſt quam ac pelles ignemq; pararunt; Studious Need might beat out Uſeful Arts. Et mulier conjuncta viro conceſſit in unum, Caft aq; private Veneris connubia lata This will eaſily be acknowledg’d by any one that Cognita funt, prolemq; ex ſe videre creatam. looks about on the numerous Improvements and Tum genus humanum primum molleſcere cæpit : Alliſtances which we make uſe of in our daily A- Ignis enim curavit ut alſia corpora frigus Etions, and at the ſame time conſiders how difficult Non it a jam poſſent cæli ſub tegmine ferre. it would be for any Man to invent all theſe of his Et Venus imminuit vires ; pueriq; parentum own Head, if he were not put in the Way by the Blanditiis facile ingenium fregere" Superbum. great a part of theſe Ornaments and Convenien- Finitima inter fe, nec cædere nec violare: cies of Life, would at once enter into the Thoughts Et pueros commendarunt muliebreq; ſaclum, of the Generality of Mankind. Hence it is no Vocibus & geftu cum balbe ſignificarent, Wonder that the Heathen Writers, who under- Imbecillorum elle æquum miſerier omnium. ſtood not the true Origine of Men as deliver'd in Non tamen omnimodis poterat concordia gigni, Holy Scriptures, ſhould make ſo foul a Repreſen- Sed bona magnaq; pars fervabant fædera caſti; tation of their Primitive State. Nec potuiſſet adhuc perducere fæcla propago. Quum prorepſilent primis animalia terris At varios linguæ Sonitus natura coegit Mutum & turpe pecus, glandem atq; cubilia prenſant Mittere, & utilitas expreſſit nomina rerum, &c. Unguibus & pugnis, dein fuſtibus, atq; ita porro Pugnabant armis quæ poft fabricaverat uſus. Then Man was hard, as hard as Parent-Stones, Donec verba quibus voces Senſuſq; notarent And built on bigger and on firmer Bones. Nominuq; invenere; dehinc abfiftere bello, Oppida cæperunt munire, & condere leges, Contented they with the poor eaſy Store Ne quis fur effet, neu latro, neu quis adulter. That Sun and Earth beſtow'd, they wiſh no more, Soft Acorns were their firſt and chiefeft Food. When the firſt Fathers of our Human Brood, When thirſty, then did purling Streams invite Dirty and Dumb crawld from the teeming Mud; To ſatisfy their eager Appetite. A War began with Nails, and Fiſts, and Heads, For Acorn Banquets, and for Leafy Beds. They knew no Uſe of Fire to dreſs their Food, Cudgels came next in play ; and riper Hate No Cloaths, but wandred naked thro' the Wood. Arm'd them with furer Inſtruments of Fate. They liv'd in pady Groves, and Caves confin'd At length their Voice grew Index of their Thought, Were Shelter from the Cold, the Heat, and Wind. Joyful to name the Things for which they fought. No fixt Society, no fteddy Laws, Now Rage began to cool, and Force to ceaſe, No publick Good was ſought, no common Cauſe. And gen'ral Parlies work'd a gen’ral Peace. But all at War, each rang'd, each ſought his Food, Towns roſe, and Laws were ſettled, to remove By Nature taught to ſeek his private Good. Invading Thefts, and check licentious Love. Then to renew frail Man's decaying Race, Or mutual Lust did prompt them to embrace, This is Horace's Deſcription, and we may expect Or elſe the greater Vigour of the Male, a fuller from Lucretius. Or ſome few treacherous Preſents did prevail; Some Acorns, Apples ſome, ſome Pears beſtow, genus humanum multò fait illud in arvis The Thing the ſame, the Price was leſs than now. Durius, ut decuit Tellus quod dura creálſet. The moſt they dreaded was the furious Beaſt, Quod ſol atq; imbres dederant, quod terra creârat For thoſe i'ch' dead of Night did oft moleſt, Sponte fuâ, Satis id placabat peétora donum ; And lengthen into Death their flumbering Reſt. Glandifer as inter curabant corpora quercus ; But when they built their Hutts, when Fire began, And Skins of murther'd Beaſts gave Cloaths to Mang At ſedare fitim fluvii fontefq; vocabant. When One to One confin'd in chaft Embrace Enjoy'd ſweet Love, and faw a num'rous Race; Nec dum res igni fcibant tractare, nec uti Then Man grew ſoft, the Temper of his Mind Pellibus, du Poliis corpus veſtire ferarum : Was chang'd from rough to mild, from fierce to kind. For Et } Plerumque. 104 Of the Natural State of Man. Book II. For us'd to Fire, his Limbs refus’d to bear once ſuch, that Men, in thoſe Days, before the Settlement The piercing Sharpneſs of the open Air: of Natural or of Civil Laws, wandred ſeparately about Luft weaken'd him, and the ſweet playing Child the Fields, and poffeß'd no more than what they could Tam’d his Wild Sire, and into Peace beguild. get or keep by mutual Force, and Wounds, and Slaugh- Then Neighbours by degrees familiar grown, ters. Now between our preſent way of Life, poliſh'd Made Leagues and Bonds, and each ſecur’d his own. with Humanity and Civility, and that Rude and Bar. And then by Signs, and broken Words agreed, barous Courſe, the only diſtinguiſhing Marks are Law That they would keep, preſerve, defend, and feed and Violence. Vid. de Invent. I. 1. Defenceleſs Infants, and the Female Train; Euripid. Supplic. A Right which Picy urg'd them to maintain. I praiſe the generous Pow'rs, that fenc'd our Life Tho' this fixt not an univerſal Peace, With Rules and Graces from the Lawleſs Herd ;: Yet many kept their Faith, and liv'd at eaſe; By giving firſt a Soul, and next a Tongue, Or elſe, almoſt as ſoon as it began, The Soul's Interpreter; and Fruit for Food, The Race had fall’n, this Age ne'er ſeen a Man. And kindly Rain to breed a future Store: Kind Nature power of framing Sounds affords, And cloſe Abodes, to skreen us from the Rage And theſe at length convenience turn'd to Words. Of threatning Skies; and Sails to wing our Courſe Mr. Creech. To diſtant Shore, to join the Globe in Trade, And mix the Common Treaſures of Mankind. We have much the ſame Story in Proſe from Diodor. Sic. l. 1. c. 8. They tell us, that Men at their It is a general Cuſtom with the Poets to attribute first Origine led an Irregular Life, in the manner of to the Gods the Invention of all things uſeful in Beaſts ; Scattering themſelves about in ſearch of Food, Human Life. Vid. Oppian. Halient. l. 2. v. 16, 6c. which was preſented them by the Savoury Herbs, and However fabulous theſe Accounts appear, yet the Fruits which grew of their own accord. But being ſo far the Authors of them were in the right, that infeſted on every ſide with the wild Beaſts, they learnt upon ſuppoſal of ſuch an Origine of Mankind, by Uſe the Security of Mutual Aſiſtance; and being (4) the Face of Nature would have born all theſe forc'd in Fear to unite in Society, they came acquainted Features which we now eſteem ſo monſtrous and by degrees with their Similitude of Figure and Shape. extravagant. In the ſame manner being ignorant Tbe first Men, before any Inventions of Conveniency and of the State of Paradiſe, they pleas'd themſelves Uſe, Supported Life with great Labour and Trouble ; in making Deſcriptions of a ſingular and conſtant being, as yet, diſtitute of Cloaths and Dwellings, unac- Temperateneſs of Air, and of a ſpontaneous Fer- cuſtom'd to the Relief of Fire, and Strangers to all tility of the Earth, in the firſt and the Golden Siveet and Regular Food. Being ignorant of Stores and Age of the World. Becauſe they thought it im- Proviſions, they neglected to ſecure So much of the Fruits poffible that Human Race could have been pre- of the Earth as was requiſite for neceſſary Suſtenance. ſerv'd, as according to their Notion they were And thus many periſhed in the Winter by Hunger and produc'd, if the Weather and the Seaſons had been Cold. But being afterwards Inſtructed by gradual Ex- then as changeable and as unfteddy as now, perience, to ſpend that ſharp Seaſon in Caves, and to lay and if the ſupport of Food had not been more up a Stock of Neceſſaries, and finding out the Uſe of Fire eaſy to procure (a). And indeed, tho’it is clear and other Comforts and Supports, they began to introduce from the Authority of Scripture, that the Primitive many Arts, and many Advantages of Living. Add, Mortals, by the Divine Direction and Aſſiſtance, Lib. 1. c. 43. Cicero pro P. Sectio. Who amongst (5) arriv'd at a very early Knowledge of the moſt you does not know the Condition of Nature to have been neceſſary Arts, (See Gen. iii. 21, 23. and iv. 17,22.) which (a) Vid. Ovid. Metamorph. 1. 1. v. 107. Virg. Georg. 11. v. 336. Lucret. li s. At novitas mundi nec frigora dura ciebat, Nature whilſt Newy no cruel Cold brought forth, Nec nimios aſtus ; nec magnis viribus aur as. Nor raging Hears ; nor arm'd the ſtormy North. (4) Altho' Mankind was never in ſuch a ſtate of Nature as we have deſcribed, yet it is good to imagine what that Eſtate was, not only to convince us, how great an Advantage we receive one from another, and by that means may be induced to a reci procal ſenſe of Love and Sociableneſs, but alſo becauſe it may happen, that every Man may be reduced to that Condicion, either altogether or in part. Such an one, for Example, may an Infanc be, who is left in a Deſart, where no Man paſſes; and 'if this Infant, who is thus forſaken by his cruel Parents, lives to grow up without any humane Affiftance, he'll repreſent to us perfectly, that ſtate of Nature we are now ſpeaking of., Nay, a Perſon at Man's Eſtate, who by a Shipwreck, or ſome other accidenc, is caft upon an Iand that is Deſart and Uninhabited, will find himſelf in ſome degree of that ſtate of Nature, becauſe he'll be forced to call to mind Arts, and other Conveniences of Life, that he may more eaſily provide for his Neceſſities. I have taken this out of the Academical Diſcourſe of our Author, De ftatu hominum Naturali, S. 5. (5) This appears from this Expreſſion in the firſt of thoſe Texts, And God made Coats of Skins and cloathed them ; which, ac- cording to the Hebrew, imports, that God taught them to make them; for otherwiſe how could the firſt Men, who were deſti- ture of all neceſſary Inſtruments of Iron, and before there was any Cuſtom to kill Beaſts, in ſo little a time find out that Inventi- on, and bring it to any Perfection by their Induftry. From hence we may infer, in my Opinion, that Divine Providence inſtru- cted them in ſeveral other things which were as neceſſary for human Life, and no leſs difficult to find out. So God commanded our firſt Parents to till the Ground, and get their Bread by the Sweat of their Brows, or to that end, 'cis probable, he taught them the Nature of the Grain, the Time of Sowing, and the Manner of Tillage and making Bread ; which Things they could not have diſcovered of themſelves, but by long Experience and many Trials. The Hiſtories of Greece tell us, that the ancient Inha- bitants there, having loſt the uſe of Bread-Corn, I know not by what accident, lived upon Acorns and wild Fruits, before the ufe of Husbandry was reſtored among then ; whereas the Sacred Hiſtory tells us, that Adam's eldeſt Son was an Husbandman, which Thews, that the Art was well known beföre; and conſequently, ſo was the uſe of Iron; for 'tis not neceſſary for us to underſtand what the Scripture ſays of Tubal-Cain, Gen. iv. 22. that he was the Inventor of Iron; for we may ſuppoſe the more plain uſe of thar Mecal was before diſcovered, and that Tubal-Cain found out a way of forging it into more curious Works ; for 'cis laid only that he poliſhed all Works of Braſs and Iron. As ro Fire, the Invention of it among the Greeks was looked upon as ſuch a con- fiderable Thing, that they feigned that Prometheus brought it down from Heaven. 'Tis related of the Inhabitants of the Canary and Philippine Iſlands, and of an Idle bordering on China, called, Los Jordenas, that they knew nothing of Fire till the Spaniards arrived there; and perhaps they had been in this Ignorance many Ages, neither their own Ingenuity, nor any Chance, having been CHA P. II. Of the Natural State of Man. 105 which they daily improv'd and increas’d by their (14) Peace, Security, (15) Riches, (16) Decency of own Induſtry and Application; yet the Condition Ornament, Company, Elegancy, Knowledge and Bene- of Men had been moſt deplorable and baſe, if no volence (6). And I believe there cannot be a more Societies had been ſet on foot, bur every one effe&tual way found out to ſilence the Complaints reign'd a ſeparate Prince in his own Family, and and Murmurs of the Common People, when they ſuffer'd his Children, when once grown up, to pretend to find Fault with the Miſcarriages and ſeek their Fortunes in a State of Natural Liberty. the Impoſitions of the Government, than if we And then we might pronounce of all Mankind, as would lay before them a true Proſpect of the Mi- Euripides does of the Cyclops, they would be ſery and Confuſion which attends a Natural State. Which trouble thoſe Perſons had certainly a right Nouides, ánée dos divideis deroso Notion of, who brought into a Proverbial Saying, (17) That unleſs there were ſuch things in the World as as Wandring Swains; never hearing, and never heeding Courts of Juſtice, Men would infallibly devour one Hobbes has (6) been lucky enough in another, painting the Inconveniences of ſuch a State. Out III. What kind of Rights attend Men in a State of Society (ſays (a) he) we are defended only by our of Nature we may eaſily gather, as well from that ſingle Strength; in Society, by the Strength of all. Out Inclination common to all living Things, by of Society no Man is (7) Sure to keep poſſeſſion of what which they cannot but embrace and pra&tiſe with his Induſtry has gain'd; in Society every Body is ſecure the greateſt Readineſs and Vigour, all poſſible from that danger. To conclude; Out of Society we have ways of preſerving their Body and their Life, and 8) the Tyranny of Paſſions, (9) War; (10) Fear, (1r) of overcoming all ſuch Things as ſeem to drive Poverty, (12) Filthineſ, Barbarity, Ignorance, and at their Deſtruction; as from this other Confide- Wildneſs ; in Society we have the Sway of (13) Reaſon, ration, that Perfons living in ſuch a State are not one another. been able to gain the Uſe of lo neceſſary a Thing. See Geo. Hornius de Origin. Gent. American. Lib. I. Chap. 8. Lib. II. Chap. 9. We find alſo, that ſeveral Nations have been ignorant a long time of the uſe of Iron, tho' they had Mines of that Metal in their Country. We muſt then believe, that the firſt Men were early inſtructed by Divine Providence in theſe ſort of Things, and many other Neceffaries of Life. And if a long time after we diſcovered ſome People among whom the Uſe was loſt, 'twas becauſe they had choſe a barren Country, or becauſe ſome ambitious Perſons had forced great Numbers of Men, by their irrefiftable Power, to fly into far diftant Deſarts, where they wanted all the Inftruments of Tillage uſed in the Places they had loſt; or ſome Colony going to ſettle itſelf in a far Country, neglected to carry thoſe Inſtruments, or loſt them by the way, by ſome unknown Acci- dent, after which 'twas very hard to recover them, becauſe Traffick was not yet fettled. Nevertheleſs, fome have endeavoured. to ſupply chis Defect, by making uſe of other Materials for the ſame End. Thus ſeveral People of America uſe, inſtead of Iron, Oyſter-ſhells, the Bones and Teeth of fome Creatures, Canes, and ſuch like Things.. See Dapper's Deſcription of America. This is alſo taken out of our Author's Treatiſe quoted in the foregoing Note. (a) De Cive, c. 10. f. 1. (6) Comp. Polyb. l. 4. c. 45. Where he relates the Miſeries uf the Byzantines, occaſion’d by their endleſs War with the Thracians. (6) Our Author ought not to have approved Mr. Hobbes's words fo generally, as Mr. Titius has obſerved, (obs. 450, 461.) as I ſhall fhew in this and the following Nores. And firit, what Mr. Hobbes ſays is not abſolutely true; for what hinders but in a ftare of Nature, many may join together in their own Defence ? I own, that ſuch a Protection, tho' founded upon an united Force, is not comparable to what is found in a well Regulated Society; but this may in fome meaſure be fufficient to guard us from the Inſules that we are liable to in a ſtate of Nature, becauſe 'cis not likely that we ſhall be attacked by ſo great a num- ber of Enemies at one time; for it often happens in a Civil Society, that Private Perſons are oppreffed by the Forces of the whole Body, an Inconvenience not to be feared in a ſtate of Nature. (7) On the contrary, In the ſtate of Nature we ſeem to enjoy, for the moſt part, the Fruits of our Labour with greater Sea curity; for poor Subjects are very often flea'd by evil Princes. (8) This he ought alſo to have proved, for why ſhould our Paffions have greater Command of us then ? If the Fear of Laws keeps the People to their Dury, it will make a like Impreſſion upon the Great Ones, and Perſons of Quality, but they eaſily find our ways to evade the Laws; for thoſe in whom the Paſſions reign with the greateſt Fury, and in a manner moſt prejudicial to Society, are beyond Contradiction theſe Perſons in Authority, of which we can't find any Examples in a ſtate of Nature, nor cauz any there be in a Condition of doing ſo much Miſchief. (9) Wars are nor a neceſſary Conſequence of a ſtate of Nature, and our Author proves it a little lower,'S. 5. againſt Mr. Hobbes. There would be doubtleſs ſome Wars, but neither 10 furious, nor ſo cruel, nor with ſuch great Armies, as to lay wafte large l'rovinces and great Kingdoms. (10) There want not as niany means to appeaſe and leſſen Fear. See what is ſaid Lib. VII. Chap. 1. S. 7. And in Civil Go- vernments is there not often more reaſon for terrible Apprehenſions from Princes and their Miniſters. (11) Labour and good Husbandry would eafily furniſh us with all things neceffary for Life. None but Sluggards and Prodigals would fall into Poverty, and this often happens as well in Civil Societies. (12) This is founded upon the falſe Hypotheſis of Mr. Hobbes, that A State of Nature is a ſtate of War. But that Civil Socie eties are not free from theſe Inconveniences, the Empire of Muſcovy ſhews, as alſo do ſeveral People of Aſia, Africa, and America, which are neither leſs Miſerable nor Barbarous for having a King. (13) Whence come thoſe Monſters of Ambition, Coverouſneſs, Pleaſure, Cruelty, and Inhumanity, which ordinarily reign in the Courts of Princes, and whoſe contagious Examples ſpread almoſt always to their Inferiors? (14) The horrible Perſecutions which the Subjects ſometimes ſuffer, and the bloody Wars which often harraſs the moſt flou. riſhing States and Empires, prove, that Peace and Tranquillity do not more ordinarily flouriſh in Civil Societies, than in the ſtate (15) How comes it to paſs that we ſee ſo many reduced to Beggary, and ſo many Subjects raind by Extortion? (16) Under theſe fine Names are often hidden Vanity, Sortifhaeſs, Folly, Peđantry, irrégular Paſſions, and ſubtle Cheats. There is no good thing that can be ſecured to us by Sociery, but it may have place in a ſtate of Nature. Further, this Beauty, Politeneſs, and Pleaſures of Life, of which Men boaſt fo, are found only in great Cities; the Ruſtick Behaviour is fill kept up every where in the Country, in the moſt Civilized Kingdoms. Let us then, by way of Concluſion, make an exact Parallel be: tween che States of Nature and Civil. Experience teaches us, thac contrary to the Natural Appointment of the Creator, and thro' Man's Corruption, boch States are often troubleſome and unhappy ; but Civil Government being a proper Means to reſtrain the Malice of Men, the Civil State, without Contradiction, may be more Sociable and Happy than tlie ſtace of Nature ; but then we muſt ſuppoſe the Civil Society to be well governed, otherwiſe, if a King abuſe his Power, or devolves the Management of Civil Affairs to Miniſters both Ignorant and Vicious, as it often happens, a Civil State is more unhappy than the State of Nature ; which appears by the Wars, Calamities, and Vices which ſpring up from ſuch Abuſes, and from which the ſtate of Nature is free. See what Mr. Loćke ſays in his ſecond Treatiſe of Civil Government, Chap. 1. S. 10. and Chap. 18. 9. 17. near the End. (17) 'Tis a Proverb of the Jewiſh Doctors. See Grotius, Lib. I. Chap. 4. §. 4. num. 2: P ſubject of Nature. 106 Of the Natural State of Man. BOOK II. fubject to any Sovereignty or Command. For one, to do all things whatſoever and against whomſoever from the former Reflexion is follows, that Men be pleas’d; and to poſleſs, uſe, and enjoy all that he plac'd after this manner in a Natural State, may would or could. Whence it may be underſtood, that in uſe and enjoy the Common Goods and Bleſſing, a State of Nature, Profit or Utility is the Meaſure of and may act and purſue whatever makes for their Right. Which Notions, however Paradoxical they own Preſervation, while they do not hence injure appear at firſt View, yet no Man can fairly draw the Right of the reſt. From the latter Suppoſiti- from them a Licence of doing any thing to any on it is clear, that they may uſe not only their perſon, who conſiders that Hobbes, even in this own Strength, but their own Judgment and Will State of Nature, ſuppoſes a Man ſubject to the Laws (provided they are form’d and guided according of Nature,and to the Government of (1) found Rea- to the Law of Nature) for procuring their own ſon. But ſince ſuch an unbounded and injurious Defence and Safety. And in this reſpect likewiſe, Licence could never, by any Man in his Wits, be the State we are treating of has obtain'd the Name thought a likely Means for the laſting Preſervation of Natural Liberty ; in as much as, antecedently antecedently of himſelf, we muſt preſume that it was never to all Human Pact and Deed, every Man is con- granted or intended by Nature. And ſuppoſe ceiv'd to be perfectly in his own Power and Dif- ſome Man ſhould be ſo extravagant as to endea- poſal, and not to be controllid by the Pleaſure or vour the putting it in Practice, it's plain his Ex- Authority of any other. On which account too, periment would turn in a high manner to his own every Man may be thus acknowledg’d equal to Prejudice and Miſchief. So that the only fair every Man, ſince all Subje&tion and all Command Senſe of Hobbes's Principle is this ; the Things are equally baniſh'd on both ſides. According to which make for the Preſervation of Men, Nature this Temperament, we ought to correct and ex- has láid in common, before they have divided plain thoſe Aſſertions laid down by Mr. Hobbes, them amongſt themſelves by Covenant : And he in the beginning of his Book De Cive, That the first that has no Superior, may by the Direction of his Foundation of Natural Right, is the Liberty which each own beſt and ſoundeſt Reaſon, do any thing that Man hat), to preſerve, as far as he is able, his own is truly conducible to his laſting Safety. But if Life and Limbs, and to apply all his Endeavours to- that Philoſopher really intended his Words, with wards the guarding his Body from Death, and from Pains. the ſame Harſhneſs, and the fame groſs Appear- From which it follows, That ſince 'tis in vain to ance which their Countenance bears, and to re- have a Right to the End, if one bas not likewiſe a Right ject our kind and favourable Interpretation, the to the Means, therefore every Man has a Right of uſing Fault is his own, and let him ſhift how he can to all Means, and of doing all Actions, without which he eſcape the perpetual Cenſure and Reprehenſion cannot defend and enſure himſelf. But now ſince in of wiſe Men. This is evident, that the Author of a Natural State no Man is ſubject to another as to the Theologico-Political Treatiſe, who goes common- a Superior, to whoſe Pleaſure his own Will and ly by the Name of Spinoſa, has deſcrib'd that Right Judgment ſhould be ſubmitted, hence every Man is of all Men to all Things which atrend a Natural by Natural Right a Judge, whether the Means which štate, in moft horrid and barbarous Terms; and he uſes, and the Actions which he performs, are neceſſary therefore it may not be improper to take the Trou- to the Preſervation of bis own Life and Limbs or not, ble of diſcuſſing his Notions on the Point. By the For altho’ in this Cafe one Man ſhould pretend to Right and Inſtitution of Nature, he underſtands no- give Advice to another, yet the other not having thing elſe, but the Rules of the Nature of every In- ſubjected his Will and Judgment to his Controul, dividual thing, according to which we conceive every ſtill judge of this Advice, whether it be pro one of them to be naturally determind to a certain man per and expedient to be follow'd or not. And her of Exiſtence and of Operation. For example, Fiſhes therefore he may, perhaps, do according as he was are naturally determin’d to ſwim, and the bigger of them advis’d, but then it will not be for the ſake of the to eat the leſſer; and therefore Fiſhes, by the highest Na- Counſellor, but becaufe he himſelf approves of tural Right, pleß the Water; and by the ſame Right, the Propoſal ; and confequently he will at laft a&t. the larger kinds of them prey on the ſmaller. Here it is by the Determination of his own Judgment. obfervable, that by the Term of Right he does not From all which he concludes, That Nature has gi- expreſs any Law diređive of an A&ion, but only one a' Right to all things; that is, in a the Power of acting (2) and what may be done meer natural State, or before Men had bound themſelves without Injury, and that therefore 'tis by no means to one another by any Covenants, it was lawful for every a fair Conclufion, that one ought neceſſarily to do may ven to every * S. III. (I) Mr. Hobbes, as he himſelt ſays in á Note upon Ş. 1. of the ſecond Chapter, underſtands by Right Reaſon, nor as moſt do, the Infallible Faculty, but the Power of Reaſoning, i. e, the proper and true Arguings which every one makes uponi his own Actions, ſo far as they conduce to the Advantage or Decriment of other Men. If we ask him what is this true Reaſon- ing, he'll anſwer, It is founded upon the Principles laid down in the foregoing Chapter, S. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. upon the State of War, wherein he ſuppoſes all Men to be naturally one againſt another; a falſe Suppofition, which our Author will confure a little lower, S. 5, c. So that we ſee, that according to Mr. Hobbes, all is reduced to every Man's Judgment, either well or ill founded. This appears clearly from what he poſitively maintains, That in whatever manner a Man deals with a Perſon, with whom he makes a Bargain, or Contralt, he does him no Injury; See above Lib. I. Chap. 7. §. 13. If a Man fins againſt GOD, or the Laws of Na- ture, "tis, according to him, becauſe we prerend ſomething is neceſſary for our Preſervation, which we know in Conſcience nor to be fo. Note on Chap: 1. S. 10. See alſo that on Chap. 3. $. 27. . (2) The Words of the Original, in all the Editions of Germany and Holland (for in that which the Author publiſhed at Lunden in Sweden in 1672, there is nothing of this Confutation of Spinoza) not excepting that which Mr. Hirtius put out in 1706, the words are placed as we find them in this Engliſh Edition, but they make a ſtrange Horch-potch; for if we examine into the ſequel of the Diſcourſe, and the Deſign of the Author, we may eaſily diſcern them miſplaced; for theſe laſt words, And what may be done without Injury, ought not to refer to the pure Faculty of acting, which may do a great deal of Injury, but co the Laws, which forbids doing an Injury to any Man, and therefore I have placed it in its right Order in my Tranſlation, all CHAP. II. Of the Natural State of Man. 107 tot all thoſe things, which one has (3) a Right of do- fo contradiſtinguiſh'd to Free Agents: And there- ing. Farther, as it is an improper Acceptation of fore Men, as to thoſe Actions which are left to their the Term of Natural Law, to make it denote that own Guidance and Direction, are determin’d to according to which every thing acts by a certain certain Ways and Courſes not by Nature, but by and determinate manner, ſo is it likewiſe impro- fome Law; and conſequently they are not pre- per to apply the Name of Right to that Power and ſently inveſted with a Right of doing all things manner of acting which appears in Irrational Be- within the reach of their Natural Powers and ings : For he alone can be truly ſaid to have a Abilities. But the Vanity of ſuch Reaſonings will Right of acting, who acts on previous Reaſon and more fully appear, if diveſting them of their dark Deliberation. He proceeds to tell us, That Nature Turnings and Intricacies we chus clearly propoſe abſolutely conſider'd has the highest Right of dying what-them; God has the higheſt Right to all things ; ever it can; that the Right of Nature extends itſelf as the Power of Nature is the Power of God, there- far as the Power of Nature : for the Power of Nature fore Nature has a Right to all things : But the 'as the very Power of God, who hath the highest Right Power of Nature is the Power of all the Individu- to all things. Here, if by Nature abſolutely conſider'd, als together; therefore each Individual has a Right (4) he mean God in conjunction with all created to all things. Let any Man judge whether the Things, we grant his Aſſertion, and willingly ac- Connexion in this Argument be juſt or not. Spi- knowledge in God the higheſt Right to all things, noſa very fallly declares, that in this point no diffe- yer ſuch a Right as is ſuited to the Perfections of rence ought to be made between Men, and the other Indi- his Eſſence. But if by Nature he underſtand the viduals of Nature ; or between Men who underſtand Univerſity of Created Beings, as contradiſtin- and exerciſe Reaſon, and thoſe who do not ; nor between guiſh'd to the Creator, then we may deny the Men in their Wits, and Fools and Madmen. For, as Power of Nature to be the Power of God him to the firſt part of this Aſſertion, the Queſtion ſelf, or that theſe two Powers have the ſame La- of Right ought not to proceed but about titude and Extent. The Power of Nature is in- the Right of Men. And as to the latter part, deed produc'd by God, but not in ſuch a manner aliho' ſome Men may have a quicker and ſome a as to exhauſt all the Power of the Divinity, but flower uſe of Reaſon, yet whoever has any uſe at to contain itſelf within the Bounds preſcrib’d by all of that Faculty may at leaſt underſtand thus its Author. His next Inference runs thus, Since much, that (6) in order to his own Preſervation the univerſal Power of all Nature is nothing elſe but the he has no need of an unlimited Right to all things, Power of all the Individuals taken together, it follows and that therefore ſuch a Right doth by no means that each Individual has the highest Right to all things belong to him. As for thoſe who have no manner that it can compaß, or that the Right of each Individual of uſe of Reaſon, 'twould be frivolous to diſpute extends itſelf as far as the determinate Power of the about their Right; nor from the unhappy Cir- Same Individual. But 'tis beyond me to apprehend cumſtances of diſeas’d Perſons, can we pronounce the Concluſiveneſs of this Argument, The Power of any thing about the Natural Condition of Man- all Nature is the Power of all the Individuals together; kind : Nor is it impoſſible for any one of theſe therefore each individual has the highest Right to all poor Creatures to be preſerv'd otherwiſe than by things. For is it not rather true, that each Indi a Right to all things. The Reaſon which he ſub- vidual has a certain and definite Share or Por- joins is equally vain and fruitleſs, For whatſoever tion of Right; and that therefore no particular any thing ałts by the Laws of its Nature, it acts with Individual can fairly arrogate to itſelf that Right the bighest Right; in as much as it a&ts as it is by Nam which is proper to all ; as they make up one Uni- ture determind, and cannot do otherwiſe. Becauſe we verſal Nature ? He adds, And becauſe it is a ſupreme deny Man when he acts by the Laws of Nature, Law of Nature, that every thing endeavour as far as to affect a Right to all things, or to be determin'd it is able to continue in its own State, and this not with by Nature to the Exerciſe of any ſuch Right. any regard or reſpe&t to other things, but only to it- Spinoſa's Concluſion therefore is falſe, Amongst Self, benoe it follows, that each individual has the high- Men, as they are conſider'd to live only under the Coma Reaſon operate as it is naturally determin’d. Here, beſides that of Reaſon, or who has not yet acquir’d a Habit of Vire Law of Nature is us’d in an improper Senſe, it is tue, doth as well by the highest Right live according apparently falſe as to Men at leaſt, that their Na- to the Laws of his Appetite, as be who directs bis Life ture is ſo determin'd, as to make them endeavour by the Laws of Reaſon. That is, as a wife Man bas their own Preſervation and Continuance (5) with the highest Right to all things which Reaſon ſuggests, or reſpect to themſelves only, without any Care or according to the Rational Laws if living ; lo an igno- Conſideration for others. Properly ſpeaking, thoſe rant and ſenfeleſ Perſon has the highest Right to all things are ſaid to be Naturally determin'd which things which bis Appetite affe&ts, or according to the are tied to an uniform Method of ačting, and are Laws of living by Appetite. But now the Natural (3) In Reality, the meer Phyſical Power of doing a thing does not prove, that we are indiſpenſably obliged to do it, nor that we can lawfully do it if we will; at leaſt, it ſuppoſes what is in queſtion, chat a Phyſical and Moral Power are one and the ſame thing. (4) We may fee plainly enough that Spinoza does not acknowledge 'a GOD, or ſuch an Intelligent Being as is all Perfect, What he calls God is nothing but the World, which he ſuppoſes eternal, and not created. (5) See S: 5. below, and the following Chapter, where Society is created on. () This is ſo true, that Mr. Hobbes, whoſe Notions at the bottom are not much diſtant from Spinoza's, makes a neceſſicy to come to fome Agreements, which according to him are the foundation of Juſtice, upon which it could not be poſſible to preſerve ourſelves, by making uſe of that boundleſs Right about every thing, and against all Men. See his Book de Cive, Chap. 1. 9.11.13. and Chap. 2. 5. 3. Spinoza himſelf, as our Author obſerves at the end of this Paragraph, afferts, That it is more advantagious to follow the Maxims of Reaſon, than the Defires of Nature only, State P 2 108 Of the Natural State of Man. Book II. ſes away; and State or the Command and Dominion of Nature, thing which it's poſſible for the Appetite to purſue. This ſuppoſes Reaſon in Men, nor are other Laws pre- Affertion, if applied to Men, is manifeftly falfe ſcrib'd to the fagacious and others to the ſimple. and abſurd. But if it includes all living Creatures, Thoſe who are govern'd purely by Appetite, are and be meant in this Senſe, that there is no Way Subjects incapable of Right or Law. But when or Manner of Self-preſervation, which ſome Ani- the Appetite in Men proceeds contrary to their mate Being doth not follow and inake Uſe of, Reaſon, they are ſo far from living by any Right, out of Natural Inſtinct, then it is nothing to the or by any Laws, that they are continually guilty Purpoſe ; ſince the only Queſtion is, whether of tranſgreſſing the Laws. The Corollaries which Men have ſuch a Right to all Things, as they may he deduces are no truer than the foregoing Propo- uſe againſt all other Men. Bue that Spinoſa inten- fitions. The Natural Right of each Man is not deter- ded the latter Senſe is evident from what follows, mind by found. Reaſon, but by Defire and by Power. And no wonder, for Nature is not reſtrain’d to the Laws For all Men are not naturally determin’d to operate ac- of human Reaſon, which concern only the true Profit and cording to the Rules and the Laws of Reaſon; but on the Preſervation of Men; but comprehends an Infinity of contrary, all are born ignorant of all Things, and before other Things, which fall under the Univerſal Order of they can attain to know the true und rational Way of all Nature, of which Man is but a little part. He Living, and acquire the Habit of Virtue, a great part afterwards confeffes, that it is more convenient of their Age, (altho’ they have been well educated,) paf- for Men to live according to the Laws and infalli- get notwithſtanding all this, they are in ble Dictates of Reaſon, which point out their true the mean time bound to live, and to preſerve themſelves Intereſt and Advantage. But then what occaſion to the beſt of their Power; and this Obligation is fulfil- was there for the feigning of ſuch a Right, as led by obeying the fole Motion of their Appetite , ſince Na- Man, if he intended to be ſafe, muft neceſſarily ture' has yet given them no other Guide, denying them relinquiſh ; while other Animals, which exerciſe the actual Power of living by ſound Reaſon ; and there a kind of Right to all things, lie under no Necef- fore they are no more obligd to live by the Laws of true fity of quiting it for their own Preſervation ? Nei- Senſe and Judgment; than a Cat is obligʻd to live by ſuch ther indeed, could ſuch an abſurd Abdication be Laws as are proper only to the Nature of a Lion. For neceſſary for Man, upon fuppofal, that Nature had to make a Man obligʻd to live according to Rea- inveſted him with the fame Right. fon, it is not neceffary that he ſhould be naturally IV. We are ready to acknowledge it for a moſt determind to act according to the Laws of Reaſon, certain Truth, that all Mankind did never exiſt that is, that he ſhould not be able to act otherwiſe; together in a mere Natural State: In as much as but it is ſufficient, that he has ſo much Natural upon the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, we Power, as may enable him to abſtain from bring- believe all human Race to have proceeded from ing Injuries and Troubles on other Men; than one original Pair. Now it's plain that Eve was which nothing in the World can be more eaſy. ſubject to Adam, Gen. iii. 16. and thoſe who were Neither is the Manner and Method of preferving born of theſe Primitive Parents, and ſo on, did himſelf ſo very difficult and laborious, as to make immediately fall under Paternal Authority, and him ſtand in need of a Right to all Things. And under Family Government. But ſuch a State then from him who through Defect of Age is yet might have befallen Mankind, if, as ſome of the in abſolute Ignorance, none can require a more Heathens believ'd, they had in the beginning of accurate Direction of his Proceedings, than is con their Being, leapt out of the Earth like Frogs, or fiftent with his low Capacity, and his ſmall and had come up from Seed, like Cadmus's human feeble Efforts of Reaſon. But that what is done Crop, Ovid. Metamorph. L. 3. ver. 122, 123. Which in this State of Simplicity may not prove very Fable is, methinks, a very exact Repreſentation hurtful or troublefome to others, Nature has care of that State of Nature, and of chat War of all fully provided; by giving it fo little Strength of Men againſt all, which Hobbes would introduce ; its own, and by commending the Care and Gui- where dance of it to thoſe of maturer Years, The fol- lowing Inference is as falſe as the former. Wbat- -furit omnis turba, fuoq; foever therefore any one, confider'd only under the Com Marte cadunt fubiti per mutua vulnera fratres. mand and Guidance of Nature, ſhall judge convenient for himſelf, either by the Direction of Reaſon, on by the Rage hurries all; and in fo blind a Fray, Impulſe of his paſſions, this by the bigheſt Natural Right The ſudden Brothers fall a mutual Prey. be may deſire, and may feize upon by whatever he can, whether by Force, or by Fraud, or by Entreaty, or the A State of Nature then did never naturally eaſieſt way be can think of ; and conſequently be may rec- exift , unleſs qualified, and, as it were, in part'; kon every one his Enemy, who would binder him from namely, while ſome Party of Men join'd with ſatisfying his Inclinations. As alſo this, Whence it ſome more in a Civil Body, or in ſome Confede- follows, that the Right and the Inſtitution of Nature, racy like that; but ſtill retain’d a natural Liberty under which all are Born, and the moſt part Live, is a- againſt all others. againſt all others. (Tho' it muſt be own'd that verſe to nothing, befides that which none can deſire, and the more and the ſmaller thofe Societies were, which none can binder ; not to Contentions, not to Ha- into which Men at firſt divided, the nearer Ap- tred, not to Anger, not to Deceit, nor abſolutely to any proach was made to a meer Natural State. (2)Thus S IV. (2) The three Senrences following, in my Opinion, are unfitly placed, and may better be ranged thus, Thus in the Primitive Age Liberty, And when of Old Mankind- among Men, Therefore not the firſt Mortals, doc. Ler the Reader judge. of CHAP. II. Of the Natural State of Man. 10g 7 ſhould govern himſelf and his Actions by the of Old, when Mankind were parted into di- firſt and principal Point? This firſt and principal ftinct Families, and now ſince they are fallen Point muſt be Government, or the Sovereign (3) into ſeparate Communities, thoſe might have Power in Society, without Regard to which, no been then, and may now be ſaid to live mutually Society can be defir'd by Thinking and Speaking in a State of Nature, neither of whom obey the Beings. Nature it ſelf inſtructs us, that Govern- ochers, and who do not acknowledge any Com ment is eſſential to all Society, but that ſuch a Li- mon Maſter among Men. Thus in the Primitive berry as excludes all Government, tends to unna- Age, when Brethren left their Father's Houſe, and tural Confuſion. Add. Becler. ad Grot. Proleg. ſec up particular Families for themſelvesindependent What may be return'd in anſwer to all this Pro- from any other, then they began to live in a Na- ceſs of Argument, is clear from the preceeding tural State or Liberty. Therefore not the firſt Doctrine. A meer Natural State, is a Repreſenta Mortals , but their Offspring, did actually exiſt in tion of Mens Condition abſtracting from all hu- ſuch a State. Now a State of Nature thus tem man Inſtitution; but doth not ſuppoſe that Nature per'd and qualified, is attended with none of thoſe intended Man for ſuch a way of Life (5). For Inconveniences which follow a meer natural Li. by the fame Allowance of Expreſſion, an entire berty, eſpecially if we apply it to Publick Com- Ignorance of all things may be ſaid to be natural munities : And beſides, it paſſes for the higheſt to Man, or to be born with him ; without imply- Pitch of Honour amongſt Mortals, by vertue of ing any ſuch thing as that it ſhould be repugnant the united Strength of the whole publick Body, to to Nature for Men to acquire very high Degrees acknowledge ro Earthly Superior. So chat Com- of Knowledge. Beſides, we have been fo cauti- monwealths, and the Governors of them, may ous as to attribute no ſuch Natural Liberty to Man, fairly declare themſelves to be in a State of Natus as ſhall be exempt from the Obligation of Natural ral Liberty, while they are furniſh'd with ſuffici- Law, or of Divine Commands. But ſuch a Li- ent Strength to ſecure the Exerciſe of that Grand berty as excludes all human Sovereignty and Su- Privilege. Whereas, when Men live ſingly in a periority cannot be ſaid to contradict Nature, any meer Natural State, it is no manner of Pleaſure more than it can be ſaid to reach as far as Infinite or Advantage to them to own no Superior; in as it ſelf. Government indeed is Natural ; that is, it much as upon account of their own ſmall Force was the Deſign of Nature that Men ſhould conſti- and Ability, their Safety muſt needs be in perpe- tute Governments amongſt themſelves. But this tual Doubt and Danger. doth not make it e'er the leſs Natural, that he There are ſome indeed who maintain with great who himfelf bears the ſupreme Government and Eagerneſs, that ſuch a Natural State either doth Command amongſt Men, ſhould himſelf be ex- not at all exiſt, or is not rightly call’d Natural; empt from all other human Command, and in that and they form their Argument in the following Senſe ſhould enjoy a Natural Liberty: Unleſs in Manner. Nature inclines Men to an Orderly So- the ſame Order, we can fancy ſomewhat before the ciety or Fellowſhip; now there being no ſuch thing first, fomewhat Superior to the Supreme. Upon as Order without Government, it follows that there the fame Account it is in general very agreeable can be no Society without Government, and that to Nature, that he who hath no Lord or Maſter to be ftild Natural than Liberty. To ſtrengthen Guidance of his Private Reaſon. this Aſſertion, they alledge the Authority of Cicero, (4) Nothing (ſays he, De Leg.lib.3.c.1.) is ſo agreeable V. There is a Diſpute of much greater Conſe- to the Right and to the Condition of Nature, as Go- quence, whether this Natural State, in Regard to vernment : Without which no Houſe, no State, no Nas other Men, bears the Semblance of War or of tion, not Human Race in General, not the Univerſal Peace: Or, which comes to the fame Thing, Nature of Things, not the World it ſelf could ſtand. whether they who live in a State of Nature, that For the World obeys GOD, and the Seas and the Earth is, who do neither obey one another nor own a obey the Superior Frame of the World, and the Life of Common Lord, ought to be reckon'd Enemies Man is led in Conformity to the High and the Sovereign amongſt themſelves, or quiet and peaceful Friends. Law. Hence they bring a general Accuſation a And here our firſt and chief Buſineſs muſt be to gainſt Hobbes, for feigning ſuch a State under the examine the Opinion of Hobbes, who as he calls Name of Natural, as is unworthy of human Na- his meer natural State not a ſingle War, but a Waç ture, and more agreeable to that of Beaſts, who of all Men againſt all, fo he maintains, that when are ignorant of Reaſon and of Speech. For that ſome Men have agreed to enter into all Men have a Liberty of doing, of deſiring, of immediately quit their hoftile State in Regard to pofſefling all Things, no Reaſon, no Nature truly one another, but ſtill continue againſt all the reſt y judging can adviſe. Such înclinations of the World. Thus in his Book de Cine, c.9.6.3: may indeed flow from depraved Nature, but can. Every Man is an Enemy to to every Man whom he neither not be the Dictates of right Reaſon, which by ſerves nor obeys. (He ought to have added, and defiring Society, doth at the ſame time deſire an with whom he has no Common Maſter.) And again, Order in Society, and by that means cuts off all C. 13. S. 7. The State of Commonwealths amongſt thema ſuch licentious and irregular Motions. For what ſelves is Natural, that is , Hoftile. And tho they ceaſe Order can be conceiv'd without tending to ſome to Fight, yet this Intermiſſion muſt not be calld & Peace, (3) See Plato concerning this whole Matter, De Legib. lib. 3. a good way from the Beginning. P.680, 681. Tom. 2. Ed. Steph. and Ariſtotle's Politicks, lib. 1. chap. 2. Edit. Pariſ. (4) He means by ie the Law. Theſe are his Words, Nihil porrò tam aptuin est ad jus, conditionemque Nature (quod cùm dico, Legem à me dici, & nihil aliud intelligi volo) quam imperium, fine quo nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum univerſum genus ftare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipſe mundus potest. Nam & hic Deo paret, do huic obediunt maria, terræque, co hominum vita juſſis ſupreme Legis obtemperat. (5) See Chap. 3, s. 13 and 16, following, at the beginning. rightly bhi II Of the Natural State of Man. Book II. but a Breathing-time, during which each Enemy, obſer- founded almoſt all the Pretenſions and all the De- ving the Motions and the Countenance of the other, rates bates which can fall out between the Governors bis Security, not by Covenants, but by the Strength and of one Common-wealth, and their Neighbours of Deſigns of bis Adverſary. (He ſhould have added, other Countries or Dominions; we imagine it will and by his own Force (a). ) He adds, in his Levia not be loft Labour, if we proceed to a cloſer and than, cap. 13, That Wur conſiſts not in Battle only, or a ſtricter Diſcuſſion of the Arguments alledg’d on the Act of Fighting, but in a Traťt of Time wherein the either hand. Will to contend in Battle is ſufficiently known: And VI. That the State of Nature then is a State of that therefore the Notion of Time is to be confider’d in War, Hobbes endeavours in this Manner to demon- the Nature of War as in the Nature of Weather. For ſtrate. The Reaſon why Man is continually in as the foul Weather lieth not in a Shower or two of Rain, Fear of Man, and conſequently in a State of War but in an Inclination thrreto for many Days together : with him, he draws from this Principle, that So the Nature of War confifts not in actual Fighting; Men have both the Power and the Will of hurting btt in the known Diſpoſition thereto, during all the Time one another. That they have the Power of hurt- there is no Aſſurance to the contrary. Nor indeed was ing one another, he fhews by obferving that Men Hobbes the firſt Inventor of theſe Notions; for we of ripe and ſettled Age, are commonly equal in meet with ſomewhat much of the ſame Strain in Strength. For thoone may frequently have the Plato's Firſt Book of Laws; where Clinias a Cretan, Advantage of another in bodily Force, yet ’tis is giving the Reaſons why the Law-giver of that poſſible that the Weakeſt may kill the Strongeſt, Country introduc'd a great number of Ordinances either by ſecret Machination, or by Confederacy in Reference to Military Affairs, he concludes, with others; in as much as the Stouteſt Mortal (1) By which Condu&t be ſeems to me to bave, accus' has his vital Parts no better enſur’d from extreme many Men of extreme Folly and Ignorance, in their not Violence, than the moſt Puny and (1) Impotent being ſenſible, that all Cities are in a perpetual War with Wrerch (6). Neither is it probable that a larger all. And that which we call Peace is no more than a Degree of natural Cunning (in which, of two bare Name, while in Reality Nature bas ſet all Commu- Men one commonly exceeds the other) ſhould be nities in an unproclaim'd War againſt one another. able to ſecure a Man's Safety, while he has no We may obſerve, by the way, that ſome Au- Guard and no Protector but himſelf. Farther, thors have given a very anaccurate Explication of ſince the greateſt Evil that Men can bring upon this great Queſtion; while they tell us, that by a one another is Death, and ſince this may as well natural State is underſtood that Condition by be brought on the ſtout by the weakly, as on the which we are conceiv'd to live fingly, or out of weakly by the ſtout, he fays it follows that thoſe Society; and that this is a State of War, that is, who can bring on one another the greateſt Evil, of Inclination to poſſeſs what another hath, and muft, in Effect be of equal Power and Strength. to drive the Owner from it ; ſo that their whole As to the Will of hurting others, this, he ſays, Meaning amounts to this, that if Men liv'd with-is in ſome Men out of Neceflity, and in fome out out all Society, they would be engag'd in a perpe- of Luſt and Pleaſure. For while ſome are for fual Quarrel; or, if Men did not lead a Social living as they lift, for arrogating to themſelves Life, they would continue in a State of endleſs undue Honours, and for petulantly ſetting on Diſcord. But now here's a great Impropriety com their quiet Neighbours, it's impoflible but that mitted, the oppoſing a State of Nature to a Social thoſe Neighbours, how modeft foever they may Life ; for thoſe who live in a State of Nature both be, and how willing foever, to allow others an e- may, and cught, and frequently do, conſent to qual Liberty with themſelves, muft neceffasily de- live Socially fend themſelves againſt the Violence of their Al- But ſince, upon this Queſtion rightly ſtated, are ſailants (c): Beſides, he tells us, that the Will of (a) Juſt as Oppian deſcribes the State of Fiſhes, Halient. I. 2. Jn mutual War they ſwim, and mucual Hare, And hence the Scaly Tribes, with wakeful Eyes, The Weak the Strong, the Smaller feed the Great : Still watch, and live and die upon Surprize. Deſtructive Rage boils in the reſtleſs Flood; Unfixt, Unwearied, all their Age they ſtray, Each frights and fears, purſues and is purſu'd. In Hopes or Fears to find or prove a Prey. (b) Seneca de Ira. l. 1. c. 3. There is no one fo lowo or contemptible who may not hope to wreak his Revenge on the greateſt Person, We are all ſtrong enough to do Miſchief. (c) It is very probable there may be ſome Perſon like Achilles, Jura negat fibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis. | Scorning all Judges and all Law but Arms, Or like thoſe whom Manilius deſcribes, Nec pacem a bello, civem diſcernit ab hofte, Who make no Difference between War and Peace, Ipſe ſibi lex eſt, dos qua fert cunque libido, Bur Friends and Foes with equal Fury ſeize. Precipitat vires : laus eft contendere cuntis. They every Thing to wild Condition draw; Their will their Ruler, and their Sword their Law. Nulla quies placet, in nullo funt otia fru&tu, They ſcorn chat Reft which private Minds enjoy, Sed populum, turbamq; petit, rerumq; tumultus, Bur fawn upon the Crowd, and court Employ, Seditio, clamorq; juvat. Love Noiſe, and Stirs, and Tumults. M. Greech, S.V. (1) Plato's Words are, "Avorav s moi donc xatuz vāvou T zonawy ces & parlavbylwv,87 zóneu o dei mã oi de Bis Zwog's ési megs de recous Tai's mes ώ και καλεσι οι πλείσει και ανθρώπων είρωω, σατ' άναι μόνον όνομα, τω δ' έργα πάσαις προς πάσας τας πόλεις αεί πόλεμον ακήρυκον κατα φύσιν ε3). De Legibus. lib. Ι. princ. S. VI. (1) Seneca's Words are, Deinde nema tam humilis est, qui pænam vel ſummi bominis fperare non poſſit. Ad nocendum potentes ſumus. We may add what Q. Curtius delivers in a Speech to the Scythians, Leo quoque aliquando minimarum avium pabulum fuit. Nihil tam firmam est, cui periculum non fit etiam ab invalida, Lib. 7. Chap. 8. Num. 15. hurting CHAP. II. Of the Natural State of Man. III Subject of so and . bon. hurting ariſes frequently from the Contention of Body, ſince Juſtice and Injuſtice have nothing to Wit, while every Man thinks himſelf wiſer than do but with Societies and eſtabliſh'd Corporations: his Fellows, and yet at the ſame time cannot bear Tho'a Man may indeed ſin againſt Reaſon, by the ſame Arrogance in others. Hence, he ſays, it uſing unfit Means for his own Preſervation. comes to paſs that it is not only odious to contra VII. Theſe Notions are in ſome meaſure tole. dict, but likewiſe not to confent: For not to con rable, if propos'd only by way of Hypotheſis. ſent to another in a Thing, is tacitely to accuſe And that Hobbes deſign'd them for nothing more, him of Error in that Matter; and to diffent in ve we may be apt to conclude from thoſe words in Ty many Things, is as much as to count him a the Eighth Chapter of his Book de Cive; But to re- Fool, in not being able to apprehend ſuch an turn again to a Natural State, and to conſider Men as cvident Truth, as every one takes his own Opi- if they were juſt now riſen out of the Earth like a Muſh- nion to be. Hence ſince all Pleaſure and Satiſ rome, and of full Stature without any manner of Obli- faction of Mind conſiſts in this, that one be able gation to one another. Yet in the 13th Chapter of to prefer one's ſelf to others, 'tis impoſſible buc the ſame Book, and frequently in other Places, that now and then ſome Signs of Conteinpt to he calls the State of Publick Bodies, not by way wards others will break out ; than which no Af- of Suppoſition, but ſeriouſly and abſolutely, Ná- front is more provoking to human Minds (a). tural, that is, as he explains it, Hoſtile. Which The laſt and moſt frequent Cauſe of a mutual De- ſeeming Contrariety we may do him the Juſtice fire of hurting, ariſes, according to Hobbes, from thus to reconcile; it ſhall be pure Hypotheſis, that hence, that (b) many deſire one and the ſame thing all Men did at any time live together in ſuch a at once, which frequently they neither can nor State of Nature, as they would have done if they will enjoy in common, nor yet divide: From had riſen ſuddenly in a great Multitude from the whence it follows, that it muſt be given to the Earth: But what he ſeriouſly maintains ſhall be ſtronger; and who is the ſtronger, can only be only this, that ſuch a Natural State doth really ex- known by Fighting (c). Upon all theſe Accounts iſt amongſt ſome Men; that is, amongſt ſuch as he declares it to be impoſſible but that Men ſhould are neither ſubject one to the other, nor to a live in perpetual Fear and Suſpicion of one ano. Common Maſter, as is now the Caſe of all eſta- ther. And that ſince not only natural Paſſion but blifh'd Communities. And this indeed is his own Reaſon too, recommends to every Man his own Judgment, as he has moderated it in his Leviathan. Safety in the higheſt Manner, and indulges him Tho' (ſays he) there never had been any time, wherein in the Uſe of all Means for the attaining of that particular Men were in a Condition of War one againſt End, the Fitneſs of which, no Superior being yet another; yet in all Times, Kings and Perſons of Sove- admitted, is to be determin’d by each Man's par- reign Authority, becauſe of their Independency, are in ticular Judgment ; hence there muſt neceſſarily continual Jealoufies, and in the State and Poſture of ariſe a Deſire rather of preventing others, than Gladiators, &c. of yielding to their Invaſion: From whence there But the contrary Opinion ſeems more reaſona- will at laſt reſult a State of infinite War, of all ble, as what is clearly favour'd by the Origine of Men againſt all; the Conſequence of which is, Mankind, as related in the infallible Records of that it ſhall be lawful for any Man to do to any Holy Scripture ; which repreſent the natural State Man, either ſecretly or openly, whatever he ſhall of Man, nor Hoftile, but Peaceful, and ſhew that think expedient for his own Affairs: In doing Men in their true Condition are rather hearty which, altho' his Reaſon ſhould ſometimes fail Friends than ſpightful Foes. From theſe Sacred him, yet he would not offer an Injury to any Hiſtories we learn, that the firſt Man being by (a) Cicero Off. 1. ch. 27. Contraque fälli, errare, labi decipi tam dedecet, quàm delirare, & mente eſſe captum. To be miſtaken, de- ceiv’d or put upon, is reckon’d no leſs Diſgrace, than to Doat, or to be out of one's Wits. Hora::' Ep. 1. 1. 2. Vel quia nil re&tum, nifi quod placuit fibi, ducunt; Or making their own Tafte che Rule of Wir; Vel.quia turpe putant, parere minoribus, lo que Or to their Juniors ſcorning to ſubmit ; each Imberbes didicere, fenes perdenda fateri. . En That what they Beardleſs learnt, Au Beard they ſhould forget. Juvenal. Sat. 15. Summus utrinque In furious Anger they each other mock; Inde Furor Vulgo, quod Numina vicinorum Each calls the other's God a ſenſeleſs Stock, Odit uterque locus, quia Solos credit babendos His own Divine, tho' from the ſelf ſame Block Eſe Deos quos ipſe colit. One Carver frand chem Mr. Tate. (b) Cicero Off, 1. Nam quicquid ejuſmodi eft, in quo non poſſint plures excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum ſit, San&tam ſervare ſocietatem. Whatever is of that Nature, as not to admit more than one to excel in it at the ſame time, uſually proveth the exceedingly to endanger the ſacred Peace of Society. Sit iſta in Grecorum levitate perver- fitas, qui maledi&tis infe&tantur: eos à quibus de veritate diſſentiunt. Cicero de fin. bin. do mal. Lib. 2. Chap. 25. It is a Perverſeneſs nor peculiar to the Grecian Levity, to reproach thoſe from whom they differ in Opinion. See alſo Charron Of Wiſdom, Lib. 1. Chap. 7. Edit. Bourd. (c) Thus Socrates diſcourferh, Xenophon. Apomnem. l. I. Quot za's é x row of dr Ogwritol mel rebel gineco (δέονlαι ας αλλήλων, και ελευσιν, και σωεργενες ώρελίσι, και τέτο σωινες χάριν έχεσιν αλλήλοις) τάτε πολέμικα, τάτε γαρ αυτα καλά και ήδέα νομίζοήες, η τέτων μάχούθαι, διχογνώμονενες έναντιέναι, πολεμικών, δε, και έρις και begin irgjerns rele o ficovén en 'épws, pudotos de Jóv. Men have partly a natural Propenſion to Friendſhip . For they stand in of each other's Aſiſtance, and are comforted with each other's Pity, and make the Return of mutual Thanks, upon receiving mutual Helps and Favours. And partly they are enclin'd to Enmity ; for taking a Fancy to the Same Things, as good and plea- (ant, they muſt needs fall into Quarrel and Oppoſition about them. Now Anger and Contention are the proper Marks and Chara&ters of Enemies.. And then Envy, and suspicion, ond Covetouſneſs never fail to produce the moſt violent Hatred. Seneca de Ira l. 2. c. 34. The deſiring the Same Thing, which ought to be the Band of Love and Friendſhip, is often the Cauſe of Hatred and Sedition. For theſe which they affe&ł being perhaps ſmall, and not to be posſess’d by one, unless he can take them forcibly from another, adminiſter Occaſion to fighting and reviling. Add. Charron de la Sageſſe. l. 1. c. 39. n. 8. ६ I need Divine II2 Of the Natural State of Man. Book II. Divine Power produc'd out of the Earth, a Com- ther, unleſs we firſt ſuppoſe, that in the Begin- panion was foon join’d to him different in Sex, ning of Things a multitude of Men ſtarted up to- whoſe Subſtance was therefore taken out of him, gether, without being beholden to one another for to engage him immediately in the deepeſt Love their Production. Ariſtot . Rhetor. l.1.c. 11. ( 3 )Becauſe and Affection for her, as being Bone of his Bone, and whatever is according to Nature, is pleaſant and agree- Fleſh of his Fleſh. This Primitive and Original able, and becauſe thoſe Things which are allied in their Couple God Almighty was pleas'd to unite in the Original have a natural Reſemblance to each other, all moft Solemn Manner, and with the moſt Sacred Things that are thus related, and thus alike are, com- Tie; and ſince from them all Human Race order- monly speaking, as mutually delightful a's Man tó Man. ly deſcended, we may conceive Mankind mutual- Cicero de Fin. I. 3. Nature bath given Min an U- ly engag’d, not only by ſuch a vulgar Friendſhip niverſal Recommendation to each other; on which account, as might reſult from Similitude of Nature (a), but every Man owes ſo much to his Neighbour barely for by ſuch a tender Affection as endears Perſons allied the ſake of being a Man like himſelf, as ſhould hinder by a nearneſs of Race and of Blood: Altho' the him from ſhowing any Unkindneß or Strangeneß. Idem. Senſe of this kind Paſſion may be almoſt worn off de Nat. Deor. I. 1. Do you not ſee how full Nature amongſt the Deſcendants, by Reaſon of their is of Charms and Engagements, as if ſhe intended to act great Diſtance from the common Stock. Now if the kind Procureſ to herſelf? Do you imagine there is an any Man ſhould pretend to diveft himſelf of this ny Monfter of Land or Sea, which is not delighted with Affection, and entertain a Temper of Hoſtility a the Fellow-Monſter of its own Race and Shape? And is gainſt all others, he ought to be cenſur'd as a Re- it any Wonder then, that she ſhould have inftilld this volter from the primitive and natural State of Principle into Man ( the moſt Noble Member of her Mankind. Nor will it ſignify much here to Family) to think nothing ſo beautiful as Man? Quin- object, that even from this Account of Matters it ctil . Declam. S. There is a Publick, or Univerſal, follows, that the natural State of Men is a State Kindred among ft Men, derived from Nature their Com- of War; in as much as if Societies were therefore mon Mother. Add. M. Antonin. l.9. f. 9. Where he inſtituted at the Beginning of the Worid, to make proſecutes at large the Argument of the Likeneß of Men (1) live peaceably together, it muſt be true on Naturc, enclining Men to Unity and Love. Add. & the contrary fide, that without Societies, Men D. Cumberland. de L. N. c. 2. f. 18. We muſt inter- would not have liv'd peaceably, and that hence a. pret only of particular Love and Hatred that Say- roſe the Neceſſity of making Societies be born with ing of Beliſarius in Procop. Hift. Vandal. l. 2. By them. To which we reply that our preſent En- Nature Men have neither mutual Affection nor mutual quiries are not made after ſuch a natural State, as Averſion. But their particular Actions, either by their may be conceiv'd by the help of Abſtraction, but Agreeableneſs inviting our Company and Friendſhip, or after ſuch an one as really has been and is now in by their contrary Diſpoſitions provoking our Hoftility; ren- the World. And that therefore, ſince the firſt der ſome the Objects of our I.ove; others of our Hate. Mortals were plac'd in ſuch a State as inſpir’d them VIII. As to Mr. Hobbes's Reaſons, they are eaſily with Love, and not with Enmity, and ſince from anſwer'd. In the firſt place, thoſe cannot imme- this State all the reſt of Mankind deſcended, it is diately hurt one another, who are divided by Di- plain if Men were mindful of their firſt Original, ſtance of Place; for he who is abſent cannot hurt they might be rather accounted Friends than Foes. me, except by fome Body elſe who is preſent, and Nor were Societies therefore eſtabliſh'd amongſt my Poſſeſſions cannot be deſtroyed unleſs by one Men from the Beginning, to hinder a Natural upon the Spot : Therefore, ſince thoſe who live State from taking place, but becauſe human Kind ſeparately, or at a Diſtance from one another, can could not otherwiſe have been propagated and offer no mutual Hurt ſo long as they continue thus preſerv'd. But a State of Nature did then ariſe, diſtant, it doth not appear why ſuch Men ſhould when Men being largely multiplied could no not rather be reckon'd Friends than Enemies. For longer be contain'd in one Society. (2) Hence if any Perſon is more inclin’d to call them Neuters, it's Nonſence to ſay that without the Help of a So- he ought to underſtand, that the Term of Friend- cial Condition, Mankind at the Beginning of their ſhip may be there fairly applied, where there is Being would have liv'd like Enemies one t oano- neither Will nor Power to injure (1). And then (a) And ſuch is that ſpoken of in L. 3. D. de Juſtit. Jure. (6) This is contrary to Ariſtotle's Notion of Friendſhip, who makes it to conſiſt, not only in doing no Injury to others, but in the real and outward Performance of Kindneſs towards them. S.VII. (1) The Original has it, nè illi pacatè viverent, that they might not live in Peace. A groſs Contradiction, tho’ it be continued in all the Edicions, even that of Mr. Hirtius in 1706, and therefore I have changed the Words, and rendred them, That they might not live in perpetual Diſcord, as the Engliſ has alſo. (2) Tradition has preſerved ſome plain Footſteps of it among the Pagans. See Grot. de Ver. Rel. Chriſtiane Lib. 1. 9, 16, and the Interpreters upon Alts vii. 26. (3) The Greek of Ariftotle is, Και επει το κατά φύσιν ήδ, τα συγΓενώ σε κατά φύσιν αλλήλοις εςιν, άπαντα τα συγγενή και 6 morc, vidéa, ws Emi to Tonů, olov dv@gmro &vpctw, xj ITTO int", ve vím - Cicero's . Words are, Ex hoc noſcitur, ut etia am communis hominum inter bomines ſit naturalis commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine, ob id ipſum quod homo fit, non alienum videri. And again the ſame Author ſays, Non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix, bo quaſi ſui fit lena Natura? An putas ullam ele terra marique belluâm, quæ non ſui generis belluâ maximè dele&tetur ? - Quid igitur mirum fi boc eodem modo homini natura pre- ſcripſit, ut nihil pulcrius, quàm hominem putaret, eam effe cauſam quod Deos hominum fimiles putemus. Beliſarius's Words in Procopius are, Φύσις μν δ, έδενες και παντων ανθρώπων οικειώς αν, ή εναντίος αλλήλοις έχοιεν, αι δε σεάξας ενώσων, ή τώ ομοτρόπω ας ζυμμαχίαν συνάλεσας, ή το διαλλάουοντε ή γνώμης ες το δυσμενές διακρίνεσαι, φίλες (άν έτωι τύχοι) ή πολέμαι αλλήλες S. VIII. (1) The Original imports, Word for Word, by the Will and Power not to hurt ; but ſince our Author treats here of ſuch Men as are not in a Condition to do Injuries one to another, tho' they have a Deſire to do it, I believe that this Sentence may be better tranſlated, A ſimple Want if a Deſire to hurt, joined with an Impoſſibility to do it aftually, may paſs for Friendſhip. 7018 OID. as CHA P. II. Of the Natural State of Man. II , ſays he, having try'd their Force againſt as for that Equality of Strength which Hobbes af- and Deſign 'to hurt us, no Man of Senſe will ad- ſerts, it is certainly more (a) (2) fit to reſtrain, mit. (5) Cicero (Off. 1.) rightly calls it, an Injury than to provoke a Deſire of hurting. For no Man out of Fear, when he that is contriving to do another in his Wits is very fond of coming to an Encoun- Man Miſchief , doth it by way of Prevention, Suſpecting ter with his Equal, unleſs he is either driven upon he should otherwiſe Soffer Hurt from the Quarter where it by Neceſſity, or by the Fairneſs of the Oppor- he now offers it. Hobbes is the more inexcuſable for tunity put in Hopes of Succeſs. Otherwiſe, to maintaining that his Natural State cannot be re- engage in an unneceſſary Fight, where the Blows mov'd' and broken up, but by letting in the So- one gives will be return'd with no leſs Force, and vereignty of another, and by uniting in the ſame where the Event is meerly dubious; is no better Commonwealth. For that chofe Commonwealths, than Fool-hardineſs. For when two equal Com- how diſtinct ſoever, which are allied by Friend- batants are ſo far engag'd as to put both their Lives ſhip and by Leagues, ſhould ſtill continue in a in Danger, neither of them can poſſibly gain ſo State of mutual War, is a Contradiction evident much by the Victory, as he muſt loſe who is killid to the common Senſe of Mankind. Nor ſhould in the Fight; nor is it ſo much to have taken away we (as he would have us) diſcard all Peace, as not another's Life, as to have hazarded one's own. For deſerving that Name, which is not fufficiently the Danger to which I expoſe my Life, takes from firm and certain, any more than we ſhould for- me more Good, than can poſlibly accrue to me bear ſaying, that ſuch a Man is in Grace and Fa- from my Enemy's Life being in the fame Danger; vour with another, becauſe the Wills of Men are nor is his Safety increas'd upon account (3) of the ſubject to continual Alterations. Uncertainty of mine : But each Party is a Loſer, IX. We muſt likewiſe take ſpecial Care to ob- and yet the Loſs of neither turns to the Advantage ſerve, that we are not difputing about the Natural of the other. State of a meer Animal, govern'd by the ſole Im- Beſides, the Cauſes alledg’d by Mr. Hobbes, why pulſe and Inclination of the ſenſitive Soul; buc Men muſt have a mutual Deſire of hurting, are of an Animal whoſe nobleſt and chiefeſt Part is only particular, and therefore cannot infer a Ne- Reaſon, the Sovereign and Controller of all other ceſſity of an Univerſal War of all Men againſt all, Faculties; and which, even in a Natural State, but only a War of ſome particular Men againſt has a common, a firm, and an uniform Meaſure ſome others . And then it doth not always hap- to go by; namely, the Nature of Things; which, pen, as he would ſuppoſe; that modeſt and civil laſtly, is very free and ready in offering it ſelf, ſo Men, ſhould have a more fierce and infolent Ge- far as to inſtruct us in the general Precepts of neration living car them; or if the Caſe be ſo, Living, and the Dictates of Natural Law. And yet it is not neceſſary that the latter ſhould be in thoſe who would rightly deſign and repreſent a a Humour of invading the former. Contention of State of Nature, ought by no means to exclude Wit prevails only amongſt Men exalted above the the juſt Uſe of this Reaſon, but ſhould join it ordinary Level; the greater and vulgar Part of with the Operations of the other Faculties. For Mankind have none, or but very flight Touches as much then as Man has not only the raſh Cry of of that Diſeaſe. Nor has the All-wiſe Creator his Luſts, but alſo the ſober Voice of Reaſon (not been ſo unkind or ſo ſparing in his Proviſions for meaſuring it ſelf purely by private Intereſt) to human Race, that two Perſons muſt always lay hearken to, if his wild Affections incite him to a Claim to the ſame Thing. Farther, the general War, ſuch as that extravagant one of all Men a- Wickedneſs of Men may have ſo much Effect as gainſt all, his Reaſon will be more powerful in dif- to hinder any one from raſhly thruſting, or offer- Iwading him from it; and that chiefly by giving ing (as it were) his bare Breaſt to another, eſpe- him theſe two Intimations, that a War undertaken cially if he has not a Knowledge of him (b) (4). without Provocation from the other Party, is both But that this Suſpicion or Diffidence ſhould pro- (1) unſeemly and unprofitable. For it is eaſy for ceed ſo far as to the ſeizing or the oppreſſing an- any Man to gather thus much, that he did not other, unleſs he hath declar'd a particular Defire exiſt of himſelf, but was produc'd by ſome Supe- (a) See D. Cumberland de L. N. c. 2. S. 29. Thus the Scythians argue in Q. Curtius, l. 7. c. 8. The firmeſt Friendſhip is between Equals, and thoſe ſeem properly to be Equals, who have not made Experience of each other's Strength. So Caſar (de B. č.1.3) admo- niſheth Pompey, that this was the only time to treat of Peace, whilſt both ſeem'd Equals, and each had good Confidence of his own Power. Florus makes the like Remark on another Occaſion. The Romans and the Parthians each other, and Craffus on the side of the former, and Pacorus of the latter, having given them Examples of their mutual Abilities, they renew”d their ancient Friendſhip with equal Deference and Reſpe&t. In Thucydides, L. 3. S. 11. Edit. Oxf. Mutual Fear is aſſerted to be the ſureſt Guard of States, becauſe on either Side the doubting of their Safety would keep them from any open Attempt of Violence, though it were never so much in their Deſires. (6) Plautus Aſinar. A Man doth not shemo himſelf a Man, but a Wolf, to another whoſe Temper and Deſigns he is not acquainted with. (2) The Latin of Q. Curtius is, The Scythians thus ſpeak to Alexander, Nam do firmiſſima eft inter Pares amicitia, do videntur parés eſe, qui non fecerunt inter se periculum virium. Cæſar's Words are, Hoc unum eſſe tempus de Pace agendi, dum ſibi uterque con- föderet, la pares ambo viderentur. "The Words of the Embaſſadors of Mitylene in Thucydides, are theſe To derrimãou deo uóvor πσον ές ξυμμαχίαν, δδαραβαίνειν τ βελόμwG τω [and not το as it is commonly read] μη σε έχων άν επελθεϊν αποτρέπεται. (3) The Original in moſt of the Editions runs thus, Quoniam inde certa eſt mea, which imports a contrary Senſe than the Au. thor ſeems to intend, but in the Edition of Frankfort the Reading is true, inde incerta, as it is in Dr. Cumberland, from whence this Sentence is taken; and fo I have tranſlated it, as alſo doth the Engliſh Tranſlator. (4) See Chapter 5. §. 6. and Lib. 3. Chap. 6. S. 9. and Lib. 8. Chap. 5. Note 3. following. (5) Cicero's Words are, Atque ille quidem injuria, que nocendi cauſà de induſtria inferuntur, ſæpe à metu proficiſcuntur, quum is, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet, nè ſi id fecerit, ipſe aliquo afficiatur incommodo. §. IX. (1) It is in the Original, inutile, but the Sequel makes it evident, that it ought to be underſtood, hurtful and prejudicial, and not barely, unſeemly and unprofitable. See Note 1. upon $. 7. of Chap. 3. Lib. I. Q rior, 114 Of the Natural State of Man. Book II. rior, who conſequently retains a Power and Au not only be uſed againſt Beafts, but likewiſe againft ſuch thority over him. And when he finds himſelf Men as, tho' they were born to obey, do yet refuſe Sub- ſpurr’d on as it were by a double Principle, of ječtion. We have numerous Teſtimonies to this which one is wholly fixe on things preſent, the o Purpoſe in ancient Writers. Vid. Homer. Odyl. g. ther can embrace in its Thought what is abſent or v. 73. and Odyll. 1. v. 252. on which Place Didy- future ; of which one drives him furiouſly on mus tells us, that the Profeſſion of Robbers amongſt the Dangers, Doubts, and Diſorders, the other con Ancients was not Infamous but Glorious. Diodor. Sic. ducts him to nothing but what is comely and ſafe; l. 3. c. 49. The Lybians on no account obſerve any man- he will conclude without any Difficulty, that 'tis ner of Right, or any manner of Faith towards Strangers. the Pleaſure of his Creator, he ſhould rather fol- Cæfar reports of the Germans, that thoſe Robberies low the latter Guide than the former. And when do not fall under Cenſure or Reproach, which are pra- to this Confideration is added, the exceeding étis'd beyond the Bounds of each particular State : And great Benefit and Advantage of that quiet Condi- the Excuſe they alledge for them is, That they ſerve tion which Reaſon adviſes, a Man cannot but na- for the Exerciſe of Youth and the Diſcouragement of Idle- turally incline to Peace. Eſpecially, ſince if at neß. de B. G. 1.6. He tells us farther, That every any time he ſhould happen to neglect his Reaſon, State reckon'd it the greateſt Honour and Glory to have and follow his blind Paſſions, he would find by as large Solitudes round them as poſſible, caus'd by their the fad Event that he took the wrong Meaſures, own Devaſtations: eſteeming it a noble Teſtimony of their and would be ready to wiſh thoſe Things to be Velour, that their Neighbours were fore’d to quit the undone, which were done againſt the Orders and Country, and that none are ſo hardy as to live near Directions of his nobleſt Faculty. From all which them. Mela, l. 3. c. 3. gives the like Account of we conclude, that the Natural State of Men, al- the Germans in general, but Tacitus ſpeaks in man- tho' they be conſider'd as not united in Common ner only of the Vendredi, a particular People a- wealths, is not War, but Peace. And this Peace mongſt them. Of the Spaniards, Plutarch (in Ma- chiefly depends on the following Laws and Condi- rio) reports, that Robberies paſsid amongſt them till that tions; that no Man hurt another, who doth not Time for Gallant Adventures. And Thucydides fays as aſſault and provoke him; that every one allow o much of the ancient Grecians, L. 1. To the ſame thers to enjoy their own Goods and Pofleffions ; purpoſe ſome produce the Roman Law, (l. ult. D. that he faithfully perform whatever ſhall be cove- de Colleg.) where thoſe Covenants are declar’d valid nanted for, and voluntarily promote the Intereſt which paſs between s&S 671 netider egxouévwv, or orxouévwy, and Happineſs of others, in all Caſes where a Perſons who unite on the account of Booty or Prey. Tho ſtricter Obligation doth not interfere. For ſince Salmafius,de Ufuris l. 1.c.22. corrects the ancient Read- the Natural State of Man includes the Uſe of ing into cis xyzóacia, on the account of a drinking Match. Reaſon, we muſt by no means ſeparate from it Polybius,l. 3.mentions it as a Clauſe in a League be- thoſe Obligations which Reaſon tells us we lie un tween the Romans and Carthaginians, that the former der. And becauſe every Man may diſcover it to ſhould neither drive Booty to Maftia and Farſeium, be- be moſt for his Intereſt and Advantage, ſo to ma- yond the Fair Promontory, nor exerciſe Merchandize : nage his Behaviour, as to procure rather the Be- As if both theſe Practices had been then eſteem’de- nevolence, than the Enmity of others ; he may qually lawful. Juſtin, l. 3. ſays of the People of eaſily preſume from the Likeneſs of Nature, that Phocis, that they ſupported themſelves by Piracy, which other Men have the ſame Sentiments about the at that time was lookd upon as Glory. Sextus Empiric. Point as himſelf. Therefore it is very foul Play, Hypot. 1. 3. C. 24. Toʻrob and poil is reckon’d by no in deſcribing this imaginary State, to ſuppoſe that means diſgraceful amongst many of the barbarous Nati- all Men, or however, the greateſt part of them ons: Nay, the Cilicians are ſaid to have accounted do act with Diſregard and Defiance to Reaſon, theſe Adventures moſt highly creditable and renown’d, so which is by Nature conſtituted ſupreme Directreſs as to pay Honours to the Memory of ſuch as died in their of human Proceedings; and ſuch a State cannot, Proſecution. And Neſtor, in the Poet, having kindly without the higheſt Abſurdity, be call’d Natural, receiv’d Telemachus and his Company, asks them, which owes its Production to the Neglect or to the Abuſe of the natural Principle in Man (a). What, are you Rovers of the Plundering Trade? X. It will be in vain for any one here to object, the ſtrange Barbarity which reign'd among moſt Now if Robbing had been then ſcandalous, it is of the ancient Nations and People; who ſeem to not likely he would have entertain'd with ſo much have had ſcarce any other Pleaſure, or any other Civility Perſons whom he ſuſpected of ſuch a Buſineſs, but the Purſuits of Plunder and (1) Prey; Courſe . L. 2. D. de Captio & Poſtlim. If there be a and amongſt whom Robbery paſs’d for one of the Nation, with which we beve no Tye of Friendſhip, particular Profeſſions and Ways of Living. For Hoſpitality, or League, we muſt not preſently eſteem them thus Ariſtotle in his Politicks, reckoning up the Enemies : Yet whatever of ours comes into their poſſesſion ſeveral Callings or Lives of the Herdſmen, the belongs to them; and even a Free Man of our Country, Husbandmen, the Fiſhermen and the Hunters, if taken by them becomes their slave. Comp. 1. 118. adds to the reſt the big an Teixòs, the Life of Thieves. de verb. fignific. Dio Caffius, 1.54. ſpeaking of the And afterwards, War is in ſome fort a Natural Rbatians, Often plundering, ſays he, their Neighbours way of acquiring Poſſeſſion. For Hunting, or violent- the Gauls, they had driven Booty from the Borders ly purſuing, is one of its chief Parts; and this may Italy, and bad infeſted the Romans and their Allies in of (a) This is moſt largely demonſtrated by Biſhop Cumberland, to whom the Reader is recommended for fuller Satisfa&tion. $. X. (1) Here our Author uſes Virgil's Words, as he makes Numanus, firnamed Remulus, to ſpeak, mm Semperque recentes Conve&tare juvat prædas, do vivere rapto. Æneid. IX, v. 612,613, thair CHAP. II. Of the Natural State of Man. I15 their Pallage through thoſe Parts: And it was then a re- eſtabliſh'd by bare Nature, without the Interven- ceiv'd Cuſtom amongst them, to deal in this Manner tion of any human Deed ; and that therefore it de with all thoſe whom they were united to by ſolemn Leagues pends ſolely on that Obligation of Natural Law and Agreements . Iſocrates (Panathen.) obſerves of by which Men are bound as they are reaſonable the Triballians, there are no Men who obſerve a ſtricter Creatures; and doth not owe its firſt Introduction Concord amongst themſelves; but then they endeavour to the Agreement and Covenant of Men. Hence utterly uo deſtroy all beſides ; not only their Borderers and to us it ſeems uſeleſs to frame any Pacts or Leagues, Neighbours, but any people to whom they can force an barely for the Defence and Support of this Üni- Acceß. Add. Grot. 1. 2. C. 15.1.5. (2) This ancient verſal Peace (1). For by ſuch a League or Bond, Hoſtility, amongſt other Reaſons that are given nothing is fuperadded to the Obligation of the for it, might proceed, in a great meaſure, from Law of Nature ; or, no Agreement is made for the groſs Superſtition and Idolatry of thoſe Natie the Performance of any thing, which Men were ons, by which every People imagin’d themſelves not before by the Law of Nature bound to pera to have peculiar Gods, and thoſe only true ones. form : Nor is the former Obligation rendred Vid. Juvenal. Sat. 15. ftreighter or firmer by ſuch an Addition. For In Return to this vulgar Argument, 'tis ſuffici we ſuppoſe both Parties to remain in a Natural E- ent to ſay, that in thoſe blinder Ages of the World, quality, and conſequently not to be held to their the Dictates and Informations of ſound Reaſon, Covenant by any other Tie, than that of Reve- were choak’d and ſtifled by the Prevalency of cor- rence towards God Almighty, and Fear of ſuch rupted Manners. Yet it doth not follow from Evil as may fall on them if they break the Agree- hence, that there was no Man, even in thoſe Nati- ment. Though indeed there appears ſomewhat ons, ſenſible enough to apprehend that the Laws of of Baſeneſs and Foulneſs in refuſing a Thing which Nature were violated by this Courſe of Robberies one has exprelly engag'd to perform. As for the and Spoils, or to diſallow that State to be Natural, Power and Liberty which the injur'd Party hath, into which wild and ungovernable Men had of proceeding againſt ſuch a Violator of Nature's thrown themſelves, in Neglect and in Contempt Law, this is altogether the ſame, whether any an- of the nobleft Part of their Being. For that a tecedent Covenant hath been made or not. Men promiſcuous Liberty of Rapine doth not flow as a of any tolerable Culture and Civility muſt needs Conſequence from a State of Nature, is evident, abhor the entring into any ſuch Compact, the becauſe the like ill Effect is not ſeen in the State Heads and Conditions of which imply only thus which different Commonwealths now bear to one much, that the Party concern'd ſhall not offend another, which is really Natural. Nor muſt we in ſome point, which was before an expreſs Com- admit what Hobbes farther aſſerts, that ſuppoſing mand of Nature. Beſides, we ſhonld be guilty Matters ſtood thus, Robbery or Pillaging would be con- of great Irreverence towards God, ſhould we trary to the Law of Nature. For thoſe who had ſuppoſe, that his Injunctions had not already laid plunder'd us in this Manner without Provocation, a ſufficient Neceſſity upon us, unleſs we ourſelves we might have treated with the like Violence, and voluntarily conſented to the ſame Engagement; have made Repriſals on their Poffeflions for the as if our Obligation to obey the Divine Will de- Loſs of our own : But then we could not have pended on our own Pleaſure. Therefore in every ſhown ſuch rough Uſage to a third Perſon, who Covenant ſome Matter is to be inſerted, the Per- had offer'd no Injury or Moleftation to us before. formance of which the other Party could not have The Impudence of ſome Perſons in breaking the required from me, by a bare Right of Nature, or Law of Nature, is no juſtifying Example for us which by virtue of that Right only I did not fully to imitate. Nor is the Remark more tolerable and perfectly owe him; tho' it now becomes a true which Hobbes ſubjoins, that this Kind of Life was not and abſolute Debt, upon my Declaration, and his without Glory to them who exercis'd it valiantly, and yet Acceptance of my Conſent. Thus, as a Man who not cruelly. As it was the Cuſtom of fome, who laid lets himſelf out to hire as a Servant to another, doth Hands on every thing elſe, to ſpare the Perſons not ſet it down exprefly and immediately amongſt Lives, and to paß by the Ploughing Oxen, and all the the Terms and Conditions of the Bargain, that he Inſtruments of Husbandry, which they did not as if will not act perfidiouſly towards him, or that he they were oblig’d to it by the Law of Nature, but pure- will not pillage or plunder him ; ſo that would be ly conſulting their own Glory, lę st their Cruelty should a ſhameful Agreement, in which a Man ſhould betray their Cowardice. A wondrous Glory indeed, only bind himſelf not to break the Univerſal to accompliſh only half a Villany, when to have Peace towards another; that is, not to uſe ſuch a carried it through, would not have turn’d to ſo Right againſt him, as he obtains and exerciſes over inuch Advantage. Beaſts. Yet ſuppoſing any ſuch Robberies and XI. When we affirm that the Exerciſe of a Depredations, as we have been lately ſpeaking of, Peace towards all Men as ſuch, is the Natural to prevail amongſt ſome Barbarous Nations, then, State of Man, we imply that it is inſtituted and in order to the reſtoring the Univerſal Peace, there violent (2) Bue this very Example may prove to our Author, that his Conjecture is not good, fince the Poet ſets it down as a fingular Example, and he could not but know, that the Heathens did not hate, and perſecure one another purely for Religion's fake. The Truth is, it was their Ignorance of the Law of Nature, and of the true Religion, which cauſed them to approve of theſe publick Robberies. And if any perſons looked upon them as unjuſt, yet they were forced, in a manner, to practice them, partly for their own Preſervation, and partly by way of Repriſal, We may find that the Iſraelites themſelves uſed them, as appears from the Example of Jephthá, Judges xi . 3. upon which Place conſult Mr. Le Clerc's Comment. In fine, We may obferve, that in the Sele&t Obſervations, printed at Hall in Saxony for ſome Years, there are two Diſcourſes upon this Subject worth our reading, viz. the fixth and ſeventh in Tome VII, thus entituled, the one, Hiſtoria de latrocinio Gentis in Gentem; and the ocher, Moralitas Latrocin. Gent. in Gent. The Author is, fames Thomaſius, the Father of Mr. Thomaſius, the famous Profeffor of Law at Hall in Saxony. S. XI. (1) See Lib. 8. Chap. 9. §. 2. following. Q 2 would 116 Of the Natural State of Man. Book II. (3) i. e, por refers us to would be occaſion to enter into Covenant, by Power of Fugurtha, we are told the chief Things which all Parties ſhould tie themſelves to the Pra- that frighted him and ſet him on his Guard, were dice of the Law of Nature towards one another. the Nature of Mankind, covetous of Dominion and Go- The Caſe is much the ſame, when two Nations, vernment, and violently bent on gratifying its Defires ; hitherto engag’d in War, fall , by Agreement, and then the Advantage of Opportunity, which by the lay down their Arms on both ſides; for ſuppoſing fair Hopes of Gain and Succeß, is able to ſeduce Men that they do not come to any Terms of Settle- to ambitious Practices, who were otherwiſe moderate e- ment about particular Matters and Performances; nough in their Wiſhes and in their Purſuits. Indeed then the only thing concluded on and eſtabliſh’d, theſe pernicious Charms of Avarice and of Am- is that General and Common Peace. We find in- bition have taken ſo faſt hold on human Minds, deed in Hiſtory, many Examples of Common- that even the moſt mild and gentle Doctrine of wealths reduc'd to ſuch Éxtremities, as to purchaſe our Saviour CHRIST, which is perpetually in- of their Spoilers this (2) Univerſal Peace and For- culcating the Rules of Peace, of Kindneſs, of bearance of Injuries, not only by Compact, but Good-will, of Propenſion to forgive Injuries, of by Tribute. Claudian de Laudib. Stilicon. l. 1. v. 210, Humility, of Contempt of Riches and Worldly 211. ſays, that the Ancients were obliged to do ſo, Power; hath not been able to extinguiſh the moſt in theſe Verſes, unjuſt Oppreſſions, Treacheries, and Wars amongſt the Profeſſors of that Holy Religion. So that Plu- Illi terribiles, quibus otia vendere ſemper tarch's(3)Deſcription will too exactly hit the Chara- Mos erat, du fæda requiem mercede paciſci. Eter of ſome Chriſtian Princes, whoſe De fires, not Seas, nor Mountains, nor Deſarts, can ſtop and conclude; not the Thoſe dreaded Foes, Bounds which ſeparate Europe and Aſia can circumſcribe, Traders in Peace, and Huckſters of Repoſe. When ſuch ambitious Spirits border on one another's Polles- fions, it is ſcarce poſſible that they ſhould live ſatisfied If between Nations or People, hitherto not with their proper Shares, and abſtain from mutual In- known to one another by Benefits or Injuries, by juries and Invaſions. In effe€t they are continually en- Peace or War, any common Leagues are made, gag’d against each other, Envying and Plotting being without deſcending to particular Points or Con- the neceſſary Conſequences of their Temper. As for the ditions; ſuch Leagues are ſuppos'd to be entred two Names of Peace and of War, they uſe them just as on for the Eſtabliſhment of a Friendſhip, which they do Money, not as they are determind by Reaſon, best is reckon’d to imply a cloſer Union, than is pro- according to Cuſtom and Convenience. Nor doth Pa- duc'd by thar general Peace of Nature. Or elſe terculus's Remark affect only the Romans and Car- we may take them only for ſolemn Proteſtations thaginians, when he ſays (4), Amongst thoſe people, made by both Parties, that they will for the fu- there was perpetually either a War, or a Preparation for ture obſerve (3) their mutual Offices and Duties. War, or a a deceitful Peace. Therefore, as it is the In the ſame manner as Perſons related, at their Duty of an honeſt and good Man to reſt content- firſt Meeting, or their firft Knowledge of one an ed with his own Lot, and not diſturb the Portion other, are us’d to make long Declarations and of his Neighbour either by actual Invaſions, or by Promiſes to expreſs their mutual Benevolence and covetous Deſires : So it becomes a cautious and Love. wary Man, and one who has a true Care and XII. After all, it muſt be confeſs’d, that this concern for his own Safety, in ſuch a Manner to Natural Peace is but too weak and uncertain, and believe all Men his Friends, as that they may foon ſuch as without other Aſſiſtances, would prove but turn his Enemies; in ſuch a Manner to obſerve a very mean Defence to the Safety of Mankind; this Peace with all the World, as a State which ſo that we might well enough expreſs, and repre- may ſuddenly be converted into War (b). And ſent it in Ovid's Verſe(a); the famous Saying of Dionyſius Halicarnalleus (5), ſhould often run in our Thoughts : So long as Pax tamen interdum est; pacis fiducia nunquam, Wicked Men have the Power of doing Miſchief, they A Peace which all pretend, yet none can truſt. cannot want the Will. For which Reafon Euripides (6), tells us, that a a prudent Diffidence is a most uſeful The Cauſe of which Unhappineſs is the great and advantagious Quality : And that a wiſe Man Wickedneſs of Men, their unbridled Luft of Power, ought (7) neither to a&t like a Sheep, nor like a and their Deſire of encroaching on the Rights and wild Beaft, to be neither tame in ſuffering Violence, Poffeffions of others. When Micipſa King of Nu nor furious in offering it(c). midia, in Saluft (2), grew jealous of the growing Tacitus, in deſcribing the Manners of the German ulogom Povsowa (a) Vid. de Trit. l. 5. Eleg. 2. v. 71.)(b) Comp. Sophocl. Ajar. Flagell, v. 688, doc. (c) Add. Hobbes de Cive, c. 13. f. 7, 8. . . . 01632 what our Author has ſaid a little before. S. XII. (2) Saluft. Bello Jugurth. c. 2. Terrebat eum (vir Micipſam] natura mortalium avida imperii, do præceps ad explendam animi cupidinem; praterea Opportunitas, ſuaque do liberorum ætatis, que etiam mediocres viros ſpe preda tranſverſos agit. (3) Plutarch in Pyrrbo, 6. 389. Edit. Wechel. Ois 28 may, xx ogG, 6x droixnto ngejía Técoles est in aansovežias, &B' οι διαιρενες ευρώπω 'Ασίαν τέρμονες δείζεσι τας όπθυμίας ---- Δυοϊν δε ονομάτων, ώασερ νομισμάτων, πολέμε, και ειρίύης, το παρατυχόντι χρώνα πεις το συμφέρον, έ τες το δίκαιον. Vid. L. 1. C. 12. Aut bellum inter eos populos (viz. Romanos, do Pænos] aut belli præparatio, aut infida Pax fuit. (5) Β. 6. "Εαν δ' αν παρά τη διώαθαι πόνηρα δράν, έκ ελλείψει τους πονηροίς το βελέθαι. (6) Eurip. Helen. v. 1633, 1634. ---Σώφρον δ' άπισίας Ουκ έσιν έδεν χρησιμώτερgν βροτοίι. . (7) The Greek is, Mòais teó Batov, ci xj Caxis, À Bréflexov, ass Onelov. We know not from whence theſe words are taken. The Engliſh Tranſlator attributes them to Euripides, but withont any Certainty. Nation, ( ol: CHAP. II. Of the Natural State of Man. 117 Nations, hath left theſe two Characters of the and Horſes make them Famous and Terrible, in the midſt Chauci and the Cherufci, very remarkable for their of their Peaceful Repoſe. The latter, he tells us, c. 36. Oppoſition (8). The former he calls a mot noble were too fond of cheriſhing a long and a decaying People, who chuling to maintain their Greatneß by their Eaſe. This mas more pleaſant to them than Safe. For Fuſtice, living in Secrecy and Quiet, without Ambition, amongst ſtout and daring People, 'tis never the true way and without Infolence, by never inviting War, they ne to lie ſtill; and where Men are buſy in Action and Con- ver feel it; by never doing, they never ſuffer Violence tention, Honeſty and Probity belongs to the Titles of the and Spoil . And this is the principal Mark of their Vir- Conquedor (9). Thus the Cheruſci, who had once the tue and of their Power, that their Superiority is not ob- Repute of Equity and Juſtice, now lie under the Imputa- tuin'd by Inzury. Yet they have always Arms ready at tion of Folly and Cowardice . So true is the Obſerva- hand for their Defence ; and upon Occafion could bring tion of Dio the Orator (10), that thoſe who are best together a mighty Army: And their Numbers of Men prepar’d for War, may most ſecurely live in Peace. (8) Tacit de Morib. German. c. 35. 1. 4, 5, 6. Populus inter Germanos nobiliffimus, quique magnitudinem suam malit juftitiâ tueri, fine cupiditate, fine impotentiâ, quieti ſecretique, nulla provocant bella, nullis rapribus, aut latrociniis populantur. idque præcipuum virtutis, do virium argumentum est, quod, ut ſuperiores agant, non per injurias adfequantur. Prompta tamen omnibus arma, ac ſi res poſcat, exercitus ; plurimum virorum, equorumque, do quieſcentibus eadem fama. 0) The ſame Author's Words are, Cheruſci nimiam, ac marcentem diu Pacem inlaceſfiti nutrierunt, idque jucundius, qnàm tutius fuit, quiæ inter impotentes, do validos, faljè quieſcas, ubi mana agitur, modeftia, & probitas nomina superioris ſunt.' Ita qui olim boni æquique Cherufci nunc Inertes, Aulti vocantur. (10) órat. 1. de Regno. p. 6. Ed. Par. Morell. "OT1 tos rebanese. Contudo negeorda quívors, Tótols pánosa testy ciplaw dyay. CH A P. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. The CONTENTS. I. The Connexion. XIV. The true Original of the Law of Nature is deri- II, & III. The Law of Nature is not common to Man ved from the Condition of Man. and Beaſts. XV. The Fundamental Law of Nature, IV. The object of the natural Law is not neceſſary be- XVI, XVII, & XVIII. Hobbes's Opinion is enquired fore there is a Law. into. V, & VI. Whether the natural Law is common to XIX. The former Original is ſufficient. GOD and Man. XX. The Obligation of the Law of Nature is from VII, VIII, & IX, The natural Law does not depend GOD. upon the Conſent of Nations. XXI. Of the Eſtabliſhment of the Law of Nature. X, & XI. Whether Profit be the Foundation of Law. XXII. Some Things are ſaid to be of the Law of Nature XII. Whether the Law of Nature appears plain from reductively and improperly. the End of the Creation. XXIII. Whether the Law of Nature is different from XIII. The Principles of natural Right are diſcover'd the Law of Nations. by the Light of Reaſon. XXIV. A Diviſion of the Law of Nature. 1. SIIS Ince then it appears inconſiſtent with the fitive Conſtitutions; are Points which require the Nature and the Condition of Man, that more careful Examination, becauſe if this Baſis he ſhould live entirely looſe from all Law, and and Groundwork ſhould be ill laid, whatever we perform his Actions by a wild and wandring Im- afterwards build upon it muſt fall of Courſe. Tis pulſe, without Regard to any Standard or Mea- (1) a good Rule of Plato (in Cratyl . p. 299. Edit. ſure; it follows, that we make Enquiry into that Francof.) A Man ought to be very ſtrict and accurate in moſt General and Univerſal Rule of human A- examining the firſt Principle and Foundation of Things, Gions, to which every Man is oblig'd to conform, and no leſ copious and diſtin£t in explaining them; in as as he is a reaſonable Creature. To this Rule much as theſe Points being once clearly ſettled, the whole Cuſtom hath given the Name of Natural Law, and Scheme of Doctrine regularly follows.. And ſo much we may call it likewiſe the Law Univerſal and Per- the more ought this Rule co be obſerv’d in our pre- petual ; the former, in Regard that it binds the ſent Subject, the more Truth there is in that Re- whole Body of human Race, the latter, becauſe mark of (2) Lactantius, l. 3. c.7. p. 224. Ed. Oxon. it is not ſubject to change, which is the Diſadvan- Becauſe in framing the Manners and forming the Model, tage of Poſitive Laws. What this Law is, whence of Life, it is the bighest and most fatal Danger to mif. the Knowledge of it ariſes, what are the chief take; we ought to apply the ſtricter Diligence to the Study Marks and Tokens by which it is diſcover’d, what of our Duty. In this great Point there is no Allowance Matters are to be referr'd to that, and what to po- for Error or Diſagreement, all ought to be of one Opinion Mr. Barbeyrac's Notes on Chap. III. I. roei of epgãos návo reģyual o návle dvseenonw aózov y les zonalis' oxéfov, et ορθως, άτε μη ζωόκειται. Εκείνης σε εξεταθίσης ικανώς τα λοιπά φαίνεθς εκείνη επόμενα. (2) Laftantius's Words are, Et quoniam in diſponendo vita ftatu formandijq; moribus, periculo majori peccatur, majorem diligentiam neceſſe est adhiberi, ut fciamus, quomodo nos oporteat vivere Hic vero nullus diffidio, nullus errori eſt lorus, omnes unum ſen- tire oportet, ipſamq; philoſophiam, uno quaſi ore præcipere, quia fi quid fuerit erratum vita omnis evertitur. and Ac 118 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. and to declare with a Common Mouth the ſame Doctrine: Beaſts very much alike, on the Performance of Since the least Slip may overturn the Rule and Order of which the former are ſaid to have fulfilld the Living To the ſame purpoſe Diogenes Apollonias, Law ; yet in Stricneſs and Reality they are ex- (in Diog. Laert. I. 9.) Segm. 57. Every Diſcourſe, in tremely different, fince they are done by Brútes my Judgment, ought to take its riſe from ſome clear and out of ſimple Inclination of Nature, but by Men manifest Principle; and the Style made uſe of ſhould be out of Obligation, of which thoſe other Crea- plain and grave. tures have no Senſe. And therefore we muſt ſup- II. The Roman Lawyers defin'd (1) the Law of poſe Authors to ſpeak Figuratively, when they at- Nature, to be that Law which Nature teaches all Li tribute to ſuch inferior and dumb Animals, Jué ving Creatures ; which therefore is not peculiar to ftice, Fortitude, Pity, Gratitude, or Chaſtity; on- Man, but is apprehended and obſerv'd by other ly becauſe they perceive in ſome of their Proceed- Animals . So that according to this Hypotheſis, ings the Shadow and Semblance of theſe Vir- thoſe things muſt be ſaid to belong to the Law of tues (b). For Things which ſeem alike in their Nature, which Brute Creatures either affect and external Face and Appearance, are by no means purſue, or avoid and abhor : Whence it naturally the ſame, if they proceed from different internal follows, that there muſt be a Law common to Men Principles. As for Grotius's Opinion (c), that and Beaſts. Which Opinion it's likely might pro- ſome Acts of other Creatures are diſpos’d in an ceed from that famous old Notion about (2) the extraordinary manner, by (4) an external Reaſon Soul of the World, of which all other Souls were a or Principle, as the Works of Bees and of Ants, kind of Someowuldor Particles, being in them- and the Frugality which ſome ſeem to uſe about ſelves all of the fame Nature, but exerting diffe- what they have got, for the Benefit of their Kin- rent Operations, according as they fell on diffe- dred and Off-ſpring; this is allowable only if we rent Bodies, and met with different Organs for mean by it, that the Nature of theſe Creatures is the Conveyance of their Srength and Powers. in ſuch a manner temper'd by the Divine Creator, Nearly allied to this Fancy was the Metepifúzwars, as to be capable of producing ſuch Actions ; noć or Tranſmigration of Souls , according to which that any outward Principle violently guides and Men and Beaſts were thought to differ only in their ſteers them (5), as a Pilot doth a Véffel. Nor is Corporeal Figure, having Souls altogether of the it difficult to underſtand, why they do not diſco- ſame Nature, and mutually lending to each o ver the ſame Cunning in other Matters equally ther (a). But the general Conſent of Learned obvious ; if we fuppofe with (6) the New Philo- Men hath diſcarded this Common Law of Ani- ſophers, that whatever Form Irrational Animals mate Beings : In as much as it is impoſſible to enjoy, ariſes purely from the Figure and Diſpoſi- conceive how a Creature ſhould be capable of tion of Material Particles, and from the Variety Law, and at the ſame time incapable of Reaſon of their Movements. of their Movements. Eſpecially ſince even a- Hefiod. Op. & Dier. 1. 1. mongſt Men we may find thoſe who are extreme- Tiv de 38 av Spas join, voặcov [ aixnes] detáže Kegvia, y quick and ready at ſome ſorts of Buſineſs, yet "Ιχθυσι με, και θήρσι, και οιώνοις πιπίωοίς ſtrangely dull and heavy about others, not more Ειν αλλήλες, έπει και δικη έςιν επ' αυτος. difficult and abſtruſe : Which can proceed from 'Ανθρώποισι δ' έδωκε δίκω, ή πέλλον αρίση nothing elſe, but from the particular Diſpoſition Γίνεται of their Parts, eſpecially of the Brain and Spi- This Law did Fove for Human Race ordain : rits (d) Thoſe therefore who will have a Law of The Beafts, the Fiſhes, and the Feather'd Train Nature in Brutes, becauſe they ſee them acting He left to mutual Spoil and mutual Prey, now and then with ſome Appearance of Regula- But Juſtice gave co Men, rity and of Deſign, abuſe the Term of Law, by an undue and unneceſſary Application. And altho' there are ſeveral Actions of Men and Beſides, there can be found no Dumb Creature opor doido (a) Vid. Virgil. Æn. V: 724, &c. Ovid. Met . L, XV. v. 75, &c. (b) Vid. Selden. de L. N. & G. Secund. Hebr. 1. 1. c. 5. (c) Prolegom. de J. B. & P. & l. 1. de Ver. Rel. Chriſtiana. (d) Vid. Plutarch Conviv. Sept. Sapient. p. 163. E.dWech. $. II. (1) Jus Naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam fits iſtud non humani generis proprium, ſed omnium animalium, quæ in terrâ, quæ in mari nafcuntur, avium quoque commune est. Videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia, feras etiam, iſtius Juris perita cenferi. Digeft. B. I. T. 1. Of Juſtice and Law. Leg. 1. §. 3. See Inſtit. B. I. Tit , 2. §. 1. (a) Tis certain, that this was the opinion of the Stoicks, as Juſtus Lipſius in his Phyfiol. Stoic. Lib. 1. Diß. 8. and Lib. 3. Di). 8. makes it appear, and moſt of the Roman Lawyers were of the fame Principles as that Sect of Philoſophers, as Mr. Gran ving has proved by many Examples. See his Originės fur. Civil. printed at Leipſick in 1708. p 80, &c. But it does nor from hence follow, that the Definition of Natural Rights which Vlpian gives, is grounded on this opinion, as after our Author, Mr. Buddeus in his firft Diſcourſe of the Errors of the Stoicks, which is amongſt his Analełła Hiſt. Philoſoph. $ 6. and Mr. Ludovici in his Delineatio Hift. Furis Divin. Nat. Poſit. doc. S. 14. affirm, who alſo quotes, fa. Thomas Phyfic. Chap. 38. Queft. 32. and Hornius de Subje&to fur. Nat. &c. for they ſuppoſe, as ehey neceſſarily muſt, chat the Stoicks attribute Reaſon to Beaſts, but they take it for granted, by a Petitio principii, without Proof, ſince they alledge no 'Authority but the Definition itſelf, which they produce, to prove, that according to them, theſe ancient Philoſophers muſt believe that Beafts bave Reaſon. The concrary ap- pears by divers plain Paſſages. In homine optimum quid eft ? Ratio, (fays Seneca) Håc antecedit Animalia, Deos fequitur Quid in homine proprium? Ratio. Epift. LXXVI. p. 294, 295. See alſo his CXXIV. Epift. p.621, 622. 'Tis certain that the Stoicks did not acknowledge a Law common to Man and Beaſts. Cicero is plain as to this point, Et quo modo hominum inter bomines juris effe Vincula putant, fic homini nibil juris effe cum beſtiis. De finib. bon. & mal. Lib. 3. Chap. 20. and Diog. Laertius. "En åpé- Fue curbis unsev ?) vilio Singeov teistä innafcada de Tov vouoriin tee, &c. In Zenone, Lib. 7. Ş. 129. p. 446. Edit. Amstel. See what is laid upon $. 3. Note 10. following. As alſo Cicero de Offic. Lib. 1. Ch. 16. and Grotius, Lib. I. Ch. 1. 9. II. (4) The Original has ic, Principio intrinſeco, contrary to the Connexion of this Diſcourſe, and the expreſs words of Grotius. But Mr Hirtius has amended it in his Edition of 1705, and made it, extrinſeco, as it ought to be. (5) See Mr. Bayle's Dictionar. Hiſtoric. do Critic. Tom. III. p. 2616. of the fecond Edit. (5) Nevertheleſs our Author does not follow that Syſtem, as we may judge from many places in his works, which ſuppoſe the contrary. See what I have ſaid, Lib. 1. Chap. 3. §. 1. Not. 1. which CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general ΙΙ9 which performs all the Duties and Offices of Man; Interpretation, that GOD will ſometimes make on the contrary, there is ſcarce any Rational Pro- even Wild Beaſts (2) the Inſtruments of puniſhing ceeding, to which fome Brutes do not (6) act di- Murtherers. Others again underſtand by every re&tly oppoſite. Yet in Harangues to the People, living thing (3) only every Man, as if God only it is reckon'd a high Aggravation of a Crime, to declar'd that no human Murtherer ſhould eſcape ſhow, that even Brute Creatures abhor the Com- his Juſtice. In Leviticus xviii. 23. and xx. 15, 16. miſſion of ſuch Enormities. Thus Plato (a) ſays, Command is given, that if any Man or Woman that in arguing againſt the Unnatural Vice of are found guilty of Beſtiality, (4) the Beaſt ſhall Pollution with the ſame Sex, it would be proper be ſton'd, without any difference of Age. Yet to appeal to the Nature of Beaſts, in whom we the Jews obſerv'd ſuch a difference of Years do not diſcover the ſame foul and monſtrous in regard to the human Parties of both Sexes; Practices (b). ſo that if a Boy were not above Nine, and a Girl III. Some Perſons indeed (rather I believe to above Three Years old, they maintain'd that no ſhow their Wit, than out of any ſerious Deſign) Puniſhment ought then to be inflicted, either on have aſſerted this Community of Law between the Perſon, or on the Beaſt ; becauſe they would Men and Beaſts, and back'd their Aſſertion with not allow that the Pollution forbidden in the Law a numerous heap of Arguments, all which have could be actually committed at ſuch an Age. Now been long ſince moſt ſolidly confuted. It ſhall be when they ſton'd the Beaſt, they did not do it be- enough for us to touch lightly on the Proofs which cauſe the Beaſt had properly offended; but partly they draw from Scripture. That Text then in left the Sight of that Creature ſhould incite ſome Gen. ix. 5. Your Blood will I require at the hand of other Perſon to the like Foul Paſſion, and partly every living thing, according to ſome Expoſitors, left the Beaſt remaining alive ſhould keep up the imports only thus much, that God would revenge ſcandalous Remembrance of the Human Offender, the Murther of a Man committed, not only by the who had ſuffer'd Puniſhment, Gratian, Cauſ. 15. Hands or the Weapon of another, but by the Fury queſt. 1. C. 4. The Reaſon why the Beaſts were order'd of Wild Beaſts ſet on him by the others Command. to be kill'd, ſeems to have been becauſe they would renew In as much as in the Antediluvian Times many the unhappy Remembrance of the foul Crime. Philo Fu- violent Tyrants and Oppreſſors us’d to keep wild deus (de ſpeciat . leg.) adds a third Reaſon, Lest the Beaſts, to ſerve for Executioners of thoſe who Beast ſhould bring forth any deteſt able Monſter, ſuch as diſpleas’d or affronted them (1). Others give this uſually proceed from Unnatural impurities, and ſuch as (a) L. 8. de LL. p. 913. Ed. Francof. (6) Senec. Hyppol. v. 910, 911. Fera quoque ipſa Veneris evitant nefas, The Beaſts themſelves avoid enormous Love; 10 Generiſque leges inſcius ſervat pudor. And Modeſty unconſcious and untaught Preſerves the decent Laws of Sex and Kind, Add. Oppian. Cyneget. I. 1. v. 239, doc. & Halient. 1. 1. V. 702, &c. which laſt place may well be urg'd againſt Parents who ſeem to have loſt their Natural Affection. (6) Mr. Bayle has made ſome Reflexions which may pleaſe the Reader, and therefore I ſhall give him them in his own words: It is a pretty Common-place in Morality, to compare Mens Irregular Aflions with the Regular Motions of the Beasts. (See Horace E- pod. 7. Juvenal. Satyr. 15. and Boileau Sat. 8.) But how finely ſoever it may appear, and however it may affect, it is never- theleſs but a weak way of arguing; for firſt, it may be eluded by way of Banter, and ſecondly may be more ſeriouſly anſwered by this Maxim : Nil Agit exemplum litem quod lite refolvit. That Argument is of no force, Which when retorted is the worſe. Barbard, the wife of Sigiſmond the Emperor, deſigning to marry again after the Death of her Husband, one ſuggeſted to her the Example of the Turtle, which always remains Single after the Death of her Mate. To which ſhe anſwered, If you will pro- poſe to me the Example of a Beaſt, inſtance in that of Pigeons and Sparrows. Thus the firſt ſort of Argument is eaſily ſolved with- out any Inconvenience. Nor is the other more difficult, for the Man whom you'll ſend to School to the Beaſts, to learn his Dury, will reply, he deſires no better Maſters, for he'll tell you, I ſhall learn of them to yield up Right to force. The ſtrongeſt Dog makes no ſcruple to take the Morſel from his Fellow. How often do we ſee Dogs quarrelling for their Meat ? Will not Chickens fight one with another in the ſight of their Common Morher ? Do not Cocks fighe ſo furiouſly one with another, that nothing but the Death of one of them can end the Combat? Do not Pigeons, the very Image of Mildneſs, often come to Blows one with another? What more furious Quarrels are there than thoſe of Bulls ? Does any thing but Force decide Right among them in Matters of Love? (Horace Lib. 1. Sat. 3. p. 110.) Cán a more unnatural Barbarity be any where Learned than at this School! Do not ſome Beaſts devour their own Young ? Shall I not learn Inceft from them? (Ovid Metamorph. Lib. X. v. 323, Loc.) Muſt I learn to conform myſelf fo to them, as to lay up my Proviſions as the Ant does ? (Horace Satyr, Lib. 1. Sat, 1. v. 32, doc.) May tot I reſcue myſelf from that hard Bondage which makes all Men groan, and wrings ſuch grievous Complaints from them as theſe; How bleſt are you, No Laws but thoſe of Love ! whilft humane Laws Wild Beaſts, that are, in loving, tyd unto Inhumanly condemn us for that Cauſo. Paſtor Fido. This does not hinder but that ſuch Moraļity may be properly applied to the greateſt part of Mankind, Di&tionar. Hiſterir. Lo Crit. Tom. 1. p. 475, 476. See what our Author has ſaid, Chap. 1. §. 4. Grotius alſo obſerves, that there is no Action commendable in Man, but GOD has impreffed ſome Footſteps of it in the Beaſts which are deſtitute of Reafon, De Jure Bel. & Pac. Lib. 2. Chap. 19. S. 2. num. 2. in the Notes. Laſtly, it is always certain, thar no Right common to Man and Beaſts, can be eſtabliſhed, nor can the Inſtinct of Beaſts be taken for a Rule of Natural Right, properly ſo called; and ſuch as take ſuch a Courfe run a great hazard of falling themſelves into Scepticiſm, or leading others into it, by the manifeſt Uncertainty of the Maxims built upon ſuch weak Principles. See the Diſcourſe, De Scepticiſmo Morali, among Mr. Buddeus's Anale&te Hiſtor. Philoſoph, S. 32. $ III. (1) This is but a Viſion of ſome Rabbi. See Selden of the Law of Nature and of Nations among the Hebr. B. I. c. 5! (2) Some turn it thus, God will require your Blood at the hand of every Beast; but the Prepoſition in the Original will not bear that Tranſlation. (3). I have corrected our Author's Expreſſion, Others underſtard by every living Creature Man only; as if every living Creature were in the Text of our Copies or Verſions, whereas it is found only in the Samaritan Copy, which is corrupted. See Mr. Le Clerc's Notes upon this Paſſage. (4) Our Author ſays, the Beast ſhall be stored; but that's only a Conjeſture of the Rabbins, for the Scripture determines nor how the Beaſt Thall be lain, Ed. Argent. 320 I 20 Of the Law of Nature in general, Book II. no Pious Man can bear the ſight of (s). Thus too We may excuſe thoſe Leárned Compilers of the Deut. xiii. 15, 16. God commands the Iſraelites, in Roman Laws, by urging in their Defence, that by rooting out the Idolatrous Nations to deſtroy the the Term of the Law of Nature (e', they meant that very Beaſts ; only to ſhow the heinouſneſs of that (7) Order inſtituted by the Great Creator, chief- Crime, not as if the Beaſts could be partakers of ly in thoſe things which make dire&tly for the pre- it. It is obſervable, that if a Gentile living amongſt ſervation of Nature, or of the Species and Indivi- the Jews, had been polluted with a Beaſt, the duals of all Animate Beings. And it is the more Man only ſuffer'd Death, but the Beaſt eſcap'd (a). probable, that they took it in ſuch a Senſe, becauſe According to the Law in Exodus xxi. 28. the go (8) they ſet down as the chief Heads of this Law, ring Ox was to be fton'd; not becauſe he had only the Conjunction of Sexes, the Procreation properly committed a Fault, but that he might and Education of Off-ſpring, and Self-defence. not offer the like Hurt another time, and that the Many other Authors have us'd the fame Terms in Owner who had negligently kept him, might be the ſame improper manner; as particularly Mr. puniſh'd by his Lofs : And hence they were not Yves of Paris, in his Treatiſe concerning the Na- allowed to eat the Fleſh of ſuch an Ox. This tural Law ordain’d by God over all Created Things, Puniſhment was thought ſufficient when the Own- and Des Cartes, in his Principles of Philoſophy. er was but ſlightly in Fault, or when he was ig. We may conclude this Point with the excellent norant of the Fierceneſs of the Beaſt : Whereas if Obſervation of Plutarch (f) Nature, ſays he, as in he knew him thus furiouſly diſpos’d, and ſtill neg. thoſe Trees and Shrubs which we call wild, ſhe hutha lected to keep him up, he paid for the Miſchief ſown the crude and imperfect Principles of true and with his own Life, being made a ſad Partner in pleaſant Fruits; ſo in Brutes hath implanted an imper- the Puniſhment. And here again the Rabbins tell feet Love of their Off-spring, not belonging to the Head us, that the Ox was ſton'd only when he had of Juſtice, nor reaching beyond the Inducements of Profit kill'd a few, not if a Gentile had periſh'd by his and Advantage. But in Man, whom ſhe produc'd for Violence. And indeed it was a Cuſtom in ſeve a Rational and a Civil Being, for the Worſhip of God, ral other Nations, to deſtroy ſuch things as had for the Obſervation of Juſtice and of Laws, for the been the Inſtrument of any Miſchief, or of any building of Cities, and for a Social and Friendly Life; Misfortune (6). Thus it appears from the Orations in Man, I ſay, ſhe has fix'd the Seeds of this Love in of Domofthenes againſt Ariſtocrates, and of Aſchines a fairer and in a more plentiful manner : And in this againſt Creſiphon, that by the Athenian Laws, Stones, the bath follow'd the first Principles of his Body, and the Clubs, Axes, and ſeveral other ſuch things, when Original Ingredients of his Conſtitution. they had been made uſe of in the Commiſſion of Murther, were brought formally into Court, as IV. Others make the Obje&t of Natural Law to it were in order to undergo a Penalty. Thus the be ſuch Acts as do in themſelves include a Moral Statue of Theagenes in Thaſos having unfortunately Neceſſity or Turpitude, and which are therefore killd a Man by falling on him, the People order'd in their own Nature either abſolutely Requiſite or it to be draggʻd into the Sea (6). St. Ambroſe (c) Unlawful, and which we muſt of Conſequence calls the Copulation of Aſſes and Mares, by which ſuppoſe to be neceſſarily commanded, or neceſſa- Mules are produc'd, forbidden, not becauſe the rily forbidden by God. And this Mark, they Beaſts contract any Guilt in thoſe Practices, but ſay, diſtinguiſhes Natural Law, not only from becauſe Men are forbidden to procure any ſuch Human, but from the Divine Poſitive Law, which Unnatural Mixture (d). doth not command or forbid things in their own (a) Add. Selden. de J. N. & G. l. 1. C. 4. & Mornac. ad Leg. 7, D. de his qui effuderint vel dejec. Lib. 9. Tit. 3. ib) Vide Div. Chryfoft. in Rhodiac. p. 340. Edit. Morell. (c) Hexaemeri, l. 5. c. 3. (d) Levit.xix. 19. Vide Selden & Ant. Matth. de Crimin. Proleg. c. 2. I. 1. The Account which Thuanus (1. 5.) gives of the Proceſs againſt the Mice in Bur- gundy is no more than a Jeſt. (e) L. 1. T. 2. D. de fuſto do fure. (f) De Amore prolis, Edit. Wechel. P. 495, (5) Our Author hath forgot a fourth Reaſon, as conſiderable as any of them, which is this, That GOD, that he might make us senſible how deteſtable ſuch abominable Crimes were to him, would have every thing deſtroyed which contributed any way to the Com- miſſion. (6) The Officers of Lyons, Maçon, and Autun in the XVth Age, paſſed ſeveral Sentences upon the Beaſts that annoyed their Country. Sometimes alſo they cauſed the Caſe of the Inhabitants and Beaſts to be pleaded Judicially by their Advocates, who produced the Reaſons for each Party, before they paſſed Sentence. See the Critical Hiſtory of Superſtitious Praktices, written by F. Le Brun, an Extract of which is found in the News from the Republ. of Letters, in July 1702. Article IV. p. 63. (7) There is all the Evidence in the World to believe, that they underſtood by it what the Stoicks call, ti copā Te velde múmy, as Mr. Hirtius briefly obſerves. See Aul. Gellius, Lib. XII. Chap. V. do Cicero de fin. bon. & mal. who tranſlates ir, Prima ſecun- dum Naturam, Lib. V. Ch. 7. Nor that they believed, that this Natural Impreſſion, which inclines Men to preferve themſelves and theirs, is exactly the ſame, as is obſerved in Beaſts, or that it eſtabliſhed a Common Right in either of them; but they held, that this latter had ſome Relation to the former, and the Likeneſs of the Outward Effects made this Natural Right to be looked upon to be in ſome ſort common to Man and Beaſts, in a Figurative Nocion. See Vinnius upon the Inſtitutes, Lib. 1. Tit. 2. init. This appears, in my Judgment, from the Manner in which Vlpian expreſſes himſelf, for he doth not ſay that the Beaſts are; iſtius juris perita, but only, perita cenſeri, that is, they did not properly know the Engagements of Natural Right, but are only thought to know them. The ſame Vlpian fays elſewhere. That a Beast in hurting a Man, or doing him ſome Damage, does bim na Injury, becauſe he doth not know what an Injury is; from whence ir follows, that there is no Right common to Man and Beaſt. Pauperies est damnum fine Injuriâ facient is datum. NEC ENIM potest animal injuriam feciſſe, quod ſenſu caret. Digeſt. Lib. IX. Tit. 1. Leg. I. $. 3. (8) Hinc deſcendit maris atque fæminæ conjunétio, quam nos matrimonium Appellamus, hinc Liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio. Die gert: Lib. 1. Tit. 1. De juſtitiâ & jure, Leg. I. Nam jure hoc evenit, ut quod quiſque ob tutelam corporis ſui fecerit, jure feciſſe exiſti- metur. Ibid. Leg. 3. This laſt Law, as it is placed, has reſpect to the Righe of Nations, as Vinnius upon the Inſtitutes" has ob- and this appears by the Reaſon alledged by the Lawyer of Florence, from whom theſe words are taken, for he appeals to Nature, which has eſtabliſhed a kind of Relation among us, by virtue of which one Man can’t, without a Crime, do any Evil to another. Our Author, who ought to have obſerved this , ſays, That divers Learned Men, and among them Tues of Paris, in his Treatiſe De Jure Nato à Deo rebus creatis conftituto, and Mr. Deſcartes, in his Principles, have made a wrong uſe of this Term, Natural Right. Nature ſerved; CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. I 21 Nature neceſſary or unlawful, (1) but by forbid- poor Inhabitants of the Earth (c); yet when He ding Things makes them unlawful, and by com once decreed to create him a Racional and a Social manding Things makes them neceſſary: while the Being, it was impoſſible but that the preſent Na- Things forbidden by the Natural Law are not tural Law ſhould agree to him ; not by an Abfo- therefore Evil, becauſe God hath forbidden them, lute, but (2) by an Hypothetical Neceſſity. For but God therefore forbad them, becauſe they ſhould Man have been engaged to the contrary were in themſelves Evil: And, on the other hand, Performances, not a focial Animal, but (3) ſome the things enjoin'd by the ſame Law, are not made other Species of barbarous and horrid Creatures good or neceſſary by God's enjoining them; but had been produc'd. Notwithſtanding all which, were therefore enjoin'd by God, becauſe they it remains for a certain Truth, that antecedently were in themſelves fimply good and neceſſary (a). to the Impoſition of any Law, all Actions are to But now beſides that upon admitting this Opini- be efteem'd indifferent. For by decreeing to cre- on, it would remain a moſt perplexing Doubt ate Man, that is, to create an Animal whoſe Acti- what thoſe A&s are which we thus ſuppoſe in ons ſhould not be all Indifferent, God immedia themſelves Unlawful, and by what diſtinguiſhing ately conſtituted a Law for his Nature. Neither Token they may be clearly known from others: from our Aſſertion, that all Actions are in them- We have already ſhewn in our former Book (b), felves indifferent, before the Application of Law, that no Actions are in themſelves Good or Bad, doth it follow, that God could have order'd our Honeſt or Vile, till they are made ſo by ſome Law. worſhipping Him with Blaſphemy, or (4) with Nor ought any Man to be ſhock'd with fuch a Contempt ; as Vaſquez (d) raſhly maintains. For Scruple as this ; If all the Morality of Human a Rational Creature, that is, a Creature indued • Actions depends on ſome Law, might not God with the Faculty of apprehending Things as they therefore have fo fram’d the Law of Nature, as to truly are, cannot form any other Conception of enjoin things directly contrary to the preſent Du- God than to acknowledge Him a Being not only ties; for example, if amongſt the mutual Offices vaſtly his Superior in Nature and Dignity, but due from Men to one another, He ſhould have likewiſe his proper Lord and Governor in the put Killing, Stealing, Fornicating, and bearing higheſt degree. For otherwiſe he would con- • Falſe-witneſs; and amongſt the prohibited Acti- ceive a meer Idol, or indeed any thing rather ons, Gratitude, keeping Faith, paying Loans, than a God. But now it is plainly contradictory, and the like.” For here, tho' it ſeems altoge- to ſuppoſe a Being at the fame time the moſt E- ther a needleſs and an impudent Curioſity to en minent and the moſt Deſpicable; a Governor quire what God might have done, when it ap- deſign'd purely to be inſulted on by his Subjects; pears plainly what He hath done ; yet if any Man and to expreſs our Acknowledgment of the Ex- ſhould perfift in ſuch Vanities, we may aſſure cellency and the Power of the Divine Nature, by him, that ſuch a Doubt as we have been propo- ſuch Signs as denote directly the contrary. There- ſing, implies a manifeſt Contradi&tion. For altho'fore to ſay that God cannot eſtabliſh ſuch horrid God was not oblig'd by any Neceſſity to create Abſurdities by a Law, doth no more detract from Man; (as I think thoſe Perſons have but a very his Omnipotence, than to ſay, that He cannot narrow and unworthy Notion of the Divine Pow- die, that He cannot be untrne, that He cannot er, who believe it would have diminiſh'd any make Things undone, which have been already. thing from God's Glory, not to have made thefe done. 6 (a) Vide Grot. I. 1. C. 1. f. 15. n. 1. (6) C. 2. f. 6. (c) Vide Job xxxviii. v. 4. (d) Controv. Illuſtr, 1. 1. c. 27. B. 9. Gc. 1. §. IV. (1) Grotius (Lib. I. Ch. 1. S. 15. num. 1.) criticizes upon the Philoſopher Anaxarchus, as having ſpoke too generally, that what Things "GOD Wills, He Wills not becauſe they are Just, but they are Just becauſe He Wills them. This was the Occaſion Alexander the Great, deſpairing of the Life of Clitus, his Favourite, whom he had Alain in his Paſſion, becauſe he had ſpoken Sincerely to him, Anaxarchus, to comfort him, ſaid to him, in vile Flattery, 'Our Oiste Te Nxley H Trépedego ó Zeus, rj fpuv, iva táv to pregner ind få ypativo Huilov mi rý Siretsov. Plut . in Alexand. p. 695. i. e. Knopºſt thou not that the Poets ſay, that Jupiter has Themis, i.e. Right and Juſtice ſitting oy him, which ſignifies, That all that a Prince does is Holy,Right and Juft? By which Anaxarchus gives us to underſtand, That as G ÓD regulares Juſtice according to his Will, 1o a Prince can change, as he pleaſes, the Rules of Right and Wrong. This is juſt the Language of Flatterers, and the Principle of Mr. Hobbes, who deftroys all Juſtice, and yields up plainly the Will of GOD to the Humour of Princes, fince all that a Prince does being Juſt, becauſe he does it, if he thinks good to do it, GOD muſt Will it alſo, and approve of it as Juſt. Plutarch elſewhere relating this Story, maintains that Anaxarchus did very ill to ſpeak fo to Alexander, becauſe inſtead of adviſing him to repent of his Fault, he had laid down a Maxim, which would encourage him to do the ſame again. The truth is (ſays he) that Jupiter has not Ju- ſtice ſitting on his Side, but is himſelf perfet Juſtice, and is more ancient, as well as more perfe&t than all Laws. This Fiction of the Ancients tends to make us underſtand, that without Juſtice, fupiter himſelf could not Govern as He ought, Ouxe opgas de αφελίμως και εφ' οίς ήμαστε μεθάνοιαν αυτό τον σεις τα όμοια θαρρύνειν τώμενΘ. Ει 3 σε 1α τα εικάζειν, ο μ Ζευς έκ έχει και Δίκίω πάρεδεον, αλλά αυτό δικη κ θέμις έρη, και νόμων και πρεσβύται, τελειότα οι παλαιοι έτω λέγεσι, κράρυσι, that this Philoſopher in eſtabliihing the Will of GOD, as the Foundation of Right and Wrong, ſuppoſes ac the ſame time, that his Wil is not purely arbitrary, but that he immutably follows what the Perfection of his Nature requires. See alto the Reflexi- on which Arrian makes upon this Matter in his Expedit. Alexand. Lib.4. Ch. 9. (2) We underſtand by Hypothetical or Conditional Neceffity, that which is founded upon ſome Suppoſition without which it could not be. And ſo in the 'Matter in hand, we muſt ſuppoſe the will of GOD as a Condition, withouc which there could be no Law of Nature, ſince if GOD had not freely determined to fend into the World ſuch a Creature as Man, we can'c con- ceive that there ſhould be any Rule of Life given, which ſhould neceffarily agree to the Conſtitution of a Reaſonable and Soci- able Creature. See Lib. 1. Ch. I. §. 4. Note 4. (3) That is to ſay, In caſe GOD had created a Creature like us in Body only, and in outward "Shape, and by Reaſon of that Refemblance had called him, MAN, this is only a Suppofirion, and a Reduction ad abſurdum, to make us underſtand the Ridi, culouſneſs of the Hypotheſis . See alſo what our Author ſays in his Difertationes, Academ P: 747. (4) Our Author obſerves here, that the Sacrifices of Hercules of Lindus, of whom, among others, Laftantius ſpeaks, (Inſtitut . Divin . Lib. 1. Ch. 21. p. 98, 99. Édit. Owon.) are the abominable Invencions of ſenſeleſs Men. R Wę I 22 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. 7 We may obſerve farther on this Argument, that Colour to believe that He will either reverſe or if the Definition of natural Law is to be founded alter the Law of Nature, ſo long as He brings no on that neceſſary Honeſty or Turpitude of ſome Change on human Nature it ſelf; and ſo long as Actions, it muſt be always perplext and obſcure, the Actions enjoin’d by this Law do by a natural and run round in an unconcluding Circle; as will Conſequence promote Society, in which is con- appear to any Man who examines the Definition tain'd all the Temporal Happineſs of Mankind; laid down by (5) Grotius. And Dr. Cumberland ex- while the contrary Actions do by as ſtrong a Ne- cellently remarks, c. 5.8.9. that in defining the ceffaty deſtroy that Society : That is, ſo long as Law of Nature, when we uſe the Word Good, Beneficence, Kindneſs, Fidelity, Gratitude, and we muſt mean Natural, and not Moral Good; the like Practices, fhall have a Power of engaging ſince it would be the higheſt Abſurdity to define a and of winning on Men's Minds; and Injurioul- Thing by ſuch Terms as ſuppoſe it to be already neſs, Treachery, and Ingratitude, a Power of rai- known; thoſe very Terms being deriv'd as Confe- fing and provoking them. And therefore fuppa- quences from it, and depending on it as to their fing human Nature and human Affairs to be fixe own Evidence and Certainty. and conſtant, the Law of Nature, tho' it owed V. Thoſe Authors who ſearch for the firſt Pat- its Original Inſtitution to the free Pleaſure of GOD, tern or the Original Draught of Natural Law in remains (2) firm and immovable; unlike to thofe God himſelf, are divided into two Parties. For Divine Poſitive Laws which depend in ſuch a man- fome placing the Spring and Fountain, as it were, ner on the Divine Will, as not to ſeem ſo neceffa- of it in the Divine Will, do thence conclude, that in rily requiſite to the good and ſafe Condition of as much as that Will is in the higheſt Manner free, Mankind in general. Beſides, tho' this Opinion the Law of Nature may therefore be chang’d by be ſo far right, as it makes God the Author of na- God, or (1) the contrary be commanded, as is the tural Law, a Truth which no Man in his Wits can Caſe and the Condition of Poſitive Laws. Others doubt of (3); yet it ſtill remains an Uncertainty, affirm this Natural Law to be founded after ſuch a by what Means this Divine Will is to be known, Manner in the eſſential Holineſs and Juſtice of God, and what Tokens there are to evince, that God as to repreſent and expreſs a Kind of Image or Co- intended to comprehend ſuch or ſuch a thing un- py of thoſe Attributes . And hence likewiſe, they der the Law of Nature . And the ſame Inconve- ſay, proceeds the Immutability of the Law of Na- nience attends likewiſe on the latter Opinion. For ture: In as much as the Divine Juſtice and Holi- though no one can be guilty of ſuch horrid Im- nefs are utterly incapable of Change or Alteration. piety, as to aſſert that the Law of Nature contains Concerning the former of theſe Opinions, we any thing in it repugnant to the Divine Holineſs have this to remark, that it was indeed at firſt en or Juſtice (4) ; yet it would be very difficult to tirely free to the Divine Pleaſure to produce or not prove, that the fame Law is fo exact a Copy or to produce an Animal to whom the preſent Law Reſemblance of thoſe Attributes, that in what of Nature ſhould agree. But that ſince God Al- Manner foever God Almighty is pleas'd to deal mighty hath been pleas'd to create Man, a Being with his Creatures, particularly with Men, in the not poſſibly to be preſerv'd without the Obſervati- fame Manner the Law of their Nature commands on of this Law, we have no manner of Reaſon or Men to deal with one another. Nor doth it ap- (5) Our Author proves this in his Apology, s. 19. thus, If we demand of them who define the Natural Law ſo, What Things are the Matter of this Law? They'll anſwer, Such as are Honeſt or Diſhoneſt in their Nature. If we again ask them, What are thoſe? They can anſwer nothing elſe, than that they are the Matter of the Natural Law. This makes well for the Schoolmen. But can't we ſpeak ſomething here in the Behalf of Grotius? I own, that the Notions of this Great Man are not ſufficiently cleared and freed from vulgar Prejudices : But I am very much miſtaken, if he has not found out the Truth, and can't explain his Notion ſo, that when the thing is ſearched to the Bottom, the Difference between him and our Author will prove a verbal Diſpuce only. The Right of Nature (fays Grotius, Lib. I. Chap. 1. §. 10. num. 1.) conſiſts in certain Principles of Right Reaſon, by which we know that an Action is Honeſt or Diſhoneſt morally, according to the necesſary Agreement or Diſagreement it bath with a Reaſo- nable or Sociable Nature. So that it is no Circle ; for if you ask Grotius whence comes that neceffary Honeſty or Baſeneſs of the Actions commanded or forbidden by the Law of Nature, he'll anſwer you, From the neceſſary Agreement or Diſagreement with a Reaſonable and Social Nature. Very well. He ſeems to acknowledge alſo, with our Author, that this Neceſſity is not abſolute and independant upon the Will of GOD. This appears not only by the following Words, which finiſh Grotius's Definition, And by conſequence GOD, who is the Aut bor of Nature, orders or forbids ſuch an Action, but by what he ſays in his Preface, where he ex- preffes himſelf more fully, The Law of Nature, as well that which conſiſts in our uniting in Society, as that which is ſo called in a more extenſive Senſe. This Right, I ſay, altho’ it flows from the internal Principles of Man (i, e. from the Conſtitution of the liu- man Nature) may nevertheleſs, and that with Reaſon, be attributed to GOD, becauſe he has implanted ſuch Principles in us. I will now leave it to any Man, whether the Commentators upon Grotius have not miſtaken his Senſe, and if when he ſpeaks of Honeft or Diſhoneſt Actions, he does not mean them in the ſame Senſe that our Author allows them, as I have Thewed above, Lib. I. Chap. I. S. 4. Note 4. and Chap. 2. S. 6. Note 1. S. V. (1) Mr. Buddeus eſteems them Scepticks who favour this Opinion, For, ſays he, they may eaſily imagine that it is uncertain, whether G Ó D has not changed this or that Law, in this or that Cafe, and whether he does not command what we ſuppoſe forbidden, and on the contrary forbid what we believe commanded, ſince he may do it at all Times without any Hindrance according to them. De Scep- tic. Moral. 9. 32. p. 257. (2) The Immurability of the Natural Law is a Principle acknowledged by all ſuch, as reaſon well, Hear what the Roman Lawyers ſay about this Matter, Sed Naturalia quidem jura, que apud omnes gentes peræquè obſervantur, divina quadam Providentia conftituta, ſemper firma atque immutabilia permanent; ea vero, que ipſa ſibi quæque civitas conſtituit, fæpe mutari ſolent, vel tacito conſenſu populi, vel alia poſtea lege lata, Inſtitut. lib. 1. tit. 2. S. II. ſee alſo the Digeſt. lib. I. tit. 1. De juſtitia do juré. leg. Ih. and lib. 4. tit. 5. De capite minutis, Leg. 8. as alſo a Paſſage in Cicero, which is quoted a little lower, S. 20. Note 4. and Mr. Noodt's Probab. Juris, lib. 2. chap. 11. (3) Upon this it is that they ought to reflect, who lay down for the fundamental Principle of the Law of Nature, the will of GOD, affirming, that there is no great Difference between that and our Author's Hypotheſis, whereas what we ſeek chiefly to know is, what is the General Rule, by which we may diſcover what is the Will of GOD, that we may draw from that Rule, by direct Conſequences, all the Maxims of the Natural Law. (4) In which Senſe we allow the Saying of Euripides, (Hecub. v. 800.) GOD bim elf alts by a Law, i.e. by the Rules of Right and Wrong. See Lib. 7. Chap. 6. S. 3. Note I. pear CHAP. II. Of the Law of Nature in general. 123 pear how a Right which is to obtain amongſt Per- which we reckon honest amongst Men. Shall we call fons by Nature equal, can be copied from that them Valiant and Brave, able to endure Hardſhips, and tranſcendent Right, which the Creator uſerh to encounter Dangers ? Shall we pronounce them Liberal? wards His own Works ; that is, how a Law im- Who then ſhall be the object, or what the Matter of their pofing a mutual Obligation on Men, can repre- Bounty? Certainly we must not oppreſs them with the ſent any Image of Omnipotency, which no Laws, Load of Money or Treaſures. In like Manner it would no Obligations can reſtrain (5). For that Argu- be an impertinent and troubleſome Commendation, to ſay ment drawn from Scripture, about Man's being they are Temperate; in as much as they have no inordi- created in the Image of God, is of no Force as nate Affections to govern and reſtrain. And ſo thus, if to the preſent Caſe. For even thoſe who confeſs we run through the whole Train of human Actions, we that Image to be loft, do yet acknowledge the ſhall find them all ſo mean and contemptible, es to be in- Senſe of Natural Law to have ſtill remain'd in finitely unworthy of the Heavenly Natures. Catull. Man. Amongſt our felves we uſually call him a ad Manl. 68. lin. 141. Holy or Righteous Perſon, who abſtains from groſſer Sins, and regularly obſerves his Duty: But Atqui nec divis homines componier æquum eft. now, who ever fram'd a Notion of the Divine No juſt Compariſon 'twixt Gods and Men. Holineſs by ſo unworthy a Model ? He amongſt Men is accounted Juſt, who makes it his conſtant From this Conſideration, that we ought not to Purpoſe and Reſolution to hurt no body, and to admit any Law common both to God and Man, pay every one their Due: But in God it is Juſtice we may draw an eaſy Anſwer to thoſe Inſtances, to deſtroy his Creatures, even in the moſt grievous which ſome give of God's diſpenſing with the and painful Manner. Neither can he ſo owe a Law of Nature, as when he commanded Abraham Perſon any thing, as to be accus'd with doing an to kill his Son, and the Iſraelites to rob the Egyptia Injury upon withholding it. If he hath been aus, aus, of their Veſſels of Silver and Veſſels of Gold. pleas'd to promiſe any thing to Mortals, he indeed For God the Supreme Lord and Diſpoſer of all performs it: Not becauſe by virtue of ſuch a Pro- Things, hath a much higher and fuller Right over miſe they obtain a Right againſt God; but be- his Creatures, than one Man can have over ano- cauſe it would be ſome kind of Derogation from ther, who is by Nature his Equal. Therefore we his Greatneſs and Goodneſs, to command Men to cannot properly call it a Diſpenſation of the Law expect any Favour from him, and afterwards to of Nature, when a Man by expreſs Command fruſtrate their Expectations. For he who breaks from Heaven, executes God's Right upon other his Promiſe, either wants Power to perform it, or Men, meerly as His Inſtrument. Comp. Grot . l. 1. elfe through Inconſtancy or Diſhoneſty falls from c. 1. 8. 10.n.6. None, I believe, can be fo fimple the Engagement he had once well made, or elſe as to imagine, that when the Object is chang'd, at the ſame Time of making his Promiſe, he was or the Circumſtances varied, the Law it ſelf fuf- ignorant how the State and Condition of Things fers Alteration. When the creditor hath forgives a would be, when it was afterwards to be fulfill’d; Debt, it loſeth that Name, and therefore is no all which Caſes imply fome kind of Failing and longer comprehended under the Law which en- Imperfection. Hence God cannot but obſerve his joins Payment. And as for the other Inſtance, Promiſes, and Men ought not but to obſerve theirs: when the Goods of a Perſon who gave a Thing Hence human Promiſes turn into Debts, but Divine in Truſt, are adjudg’d to the Publick Treaſury, Promiſes are made good out of pure Favour. neither the Law is chang'd nor its Object. For What Rules the Vindicative Juſtice of God pro- thus runs the Law, He who receives a Thing in Truſt, ceeds by, is far above our Apprehenſion to diſco- ought to reſtore it either to him who committed the Thing ver. But thus much is certain, that they are not (being his own) to his Charge, or to bim on whom the altogether conformable to the Methods of human Right deſcends (7). Now this Law cannot affect Judicature. Ariſt. Ethic. Nicom. I. 10. c. 8. (6)What the Thief, becauſe the Thing was not his own ; Kind of A&tions ought we to attribute to the Gods? Shall nor to the former Owner, who is ſuppos'd to be we ſay they are Just? But alas ! It would ſeem most at preſent a Baniſh'd Man, becauſe the Propriety ridiculous to fancy, that they are concern’d in driving of all that was his paſſeth to the Publick. Bargains, in reſtoring Loans, and the like Performances, VI. But neither do the Arguments which the (5) We muſt add here two important Obſervations. I. That there are ſeveral Acts of human Juſtice which can't be attributed to GOD, becauſe of the Excellency of his Nature. Such are a great number of the Acts of univerſal Juſtice, and thoſe of par- ticular Juſtice, which regulate Contracts, invented to carry on the Buſineſs and Neceffities of Life. See Pſal. l. v. 10, 11, 12. Rom. xi. 35. For who, for Example, dare reaſon thus ? Pay your Debrs, becauſe GOD pays his. Be grateful, becauſe GOD is kind to them that ſerve him. Obey your Governors, becauſe GOD is ſubject to his Superiors. Honour your parents, becauſe GOD honours his. Are not theſe Arguings manifeſtly abſurd? II. Moreover, as we know GOD by his Works, and by afcen- ding from the Effect to the Cauſe, we can'c know the Perfections of GOD, but by taking from the Perfections of the Crea- tures, and eſpecially from Man's, whatever is imperfect, and then attributing them to GOD, when they are ſo purified. Thus having obſerved that theſe are the Perfections of Man, to keep one's Promiſe, ſpeak the Truth, do no Man any Injury, diſtribute Juſtice impartially, we thence conclude, that they ought to be in Him, who is the firſt Cauſe and abſolute Lord of the World, but in a moſt excellent Manner, and worthy of the Supreme and Sovereign Being. It would be ridiculous then to eſtablish Di- vine Juſtice upon the Foundation of Human, becauſe this laſt is better known than the firſt, as Dr. Cumberland, De Leg. Nat. Prolegom. §. 6. and Chap. 5. S. 13. acknowledges. I have taken this out of the Specimen Controvers. Pufendorf' motarum, &c. Chap. 4. 9.4. and out of his Epiſt. ad amicos p. 262. (4) Αriftotle's Greek is this, Πράξεις οποίας απονείμαι χρεών αυτούς και πότερα τις δικίας και η γελοιοι φαινεται συλλάλονες, και ωρακαταθήκας αποδιδόντες, και όσα άλλα τοιαύτα' αλλά τας ανδρείας και ισομένοντας τα φοβερα και κινδωδονίας, όπ καλόν και τας ελάττείει και τίνι και δώσεσιν και άτοπον οί', ή και έσται αυτούς νόμισμα, ή π τοιον σώφρονες, τι αν δεν ή φορτικός και έπαι- νθ. όπ έκ έχεσι φαύλας όπθυμίας και διεξι&σι πάνlα φαίνοιτ' άν τα πει τις ορέξεις, μικρα και ανάξια Φτών. (7) See Lib. 4. Chap. 13. $. 5. following. R2 Author 124 Of the Law of Nature in general. BOOK II. Author(a) of the Treatiſe de Principiis Jufti & De whom Nature has ſet them on a Level : Or, to cori produces, ſeem forcible enough to eſtabliſh a uſe Grotius's (e) Terms, that the Jus Re&torium, and Twofold natural Law, Divine, and Human, which, the fu Aquatorium, the Right of Governors, ſuppoſing the preſent Order of the World to continue, do and the Right of Equals are exactly the ſame fall in with one another (1). For in as much as all Thing. Law implies Obligation, and that again preſup Neither muft we let that Aſſertion paſs by un- poſes ſome external and ſuperior Principle, it doth cenfur’d, which the Author of the ſame Treatiſe not appear how we can, without Abſurdity, ap- lays down, pag. 52. That GOD ought neceſſarily to ply any ſuch Matter to God. And it is a like Im- eſteem the Laws of Nature as Just, the Order of the propriety to ſay, that (2) GOD is oblig?d by Him- Univerſe being eſtabliſh'd in the Manner we now behold: ſelf, or by His own Effence. Nor will that Text And that He cannot but own every Deviation from them which he alledges, of Rom. i. 32. ever prove (3) to be indecent and unjust. For without doubt thoſe ſuch a Law to be in God. For ſince the Gentiles, imperious Terms, GOD ought neceſſarily, are very from the Dictates of their Reaſon, were able to unſuitable to the Majeſty of an Omnipotent Le- gather the Knowledge of the Law of Nature, the gillator. Nor is here any Neceflity to be diſco- next thing which they muſt infer, was, that God ver'd in the Caſe (5), except ſuch as owes its O. the Legiſlator would not ſuffer the Law to be vio- riginal meerly to the Divine Pleaſure. The Rea- lated without puniſhing the Offender. Therefore ſon which he ſubjoins is not ſtrong enough to main- upon the Violation of that Law, there ariſes a tain his firſt Poſition; All Things, ſays he, which Right to God (if it be decent ſo to ſpeak) of ex- our Thoughts can imagine, bave always ſome kind of ading Puniſhment; or upon Commiſſion of the geois or Relation, ariſing from the intrinſick Nature of Sin, God moſt juſtly executes what He before the Thing, and which cannot be separated from the threatned. But who can conclude from hence, Thing, without offering Violence to Reaſon. For this that God is obnoxious to Law? What follows is Nature, and this adhering Relation, Things have an ambiguous Expreſſion, that the Supreme Right of not from themſelves, but from the Free Will of GOD over His Creatures is diſcover'd by Natural Rea- God; and the Decrees of His Will cannot proper- fon from thoſe Principles, which make the Foundations ly be called His own Law. Thus, the Reaſon of Natural Right and Equity amongst Men. For if why amongſt Men one Benefit obliges to the Re- this only be the Senſe of it, that in many Cafes turn of another; why Violation of Covenants, God doth proceed in the ſame Manner in his Inhumanity, Pride, Slander, can never be allows Dealings with Men, as He would have them fol. able, is, becauſe God hath given Man a Sociable low in their Tranſactions with each other; it will Nature, and as long as that Nature remains unal- eaſily paſs without Contradi&tion (b). For thus ter'd, thoſe Things which are agreeable to it muſt God by the Natural Law, hath enjoin'd Men to be good and honeſt, and thoſe which are repuga keep their Promiſes, as he will firmly keep thoſe nant to it uncomely and unlawful. But who can which He makes Himſelf (c). So He forbids hu- hence infer, either that there is but one Law, com- man Judges to condemn the Innocent, declaring mon to God and Men, or that Things are indu- that He himſelf will acquit them in His own Judg- ed with any géors or Habitude, independent from ments (d) (4). But if it be meant to affert that the Divine Diſpoſal ? God hath no more Right over His Creatures, than VII. Thofe who found the Law of Nature on Men are allow'd to obtain over each other; there the Conſent of Mankind in general, or on the A- will be need of more convincing Arguments to greement either of all, or however of the moſt, make us believe, that the Supreme Lord and Ma- and the moſt poliſh'd Nations, ſeem chiefly to fol- fter hath no fuller Right over His Servants, than low (1) Ariſtotle, as the Author and Patron of their the Servants have over their Fellow-Servants, with Opinion. He, in his Ethicks to Nicomachus, B. si (a) Velthuyſen. p. 253. (6) See Luke vi. 35. (c) Rom. iii. 4. Hebr. vi. 17, 18. (d) 2 Chron. xix. 6, 7. Rom. ii. 2. (e) L. 1.C. I. 1. 3. 1. 2. S.VI. (1) Our Author here breaks off his Diſcourſe in a ſtrange Manner, to confute a Writer which he had read over in too great hafte. Velthuyſen does, no where make two diſtinct Kinds of Natural Right, one to which GOD is ſubject, and the other to go- vern Man, but that Natural Right which he calls Divine, as well as that which he calls Human, is a Law only for Man. He has no Word thar fo much as intimates, that he would eſtabliſh a Righe common to GOD and Men. He only endeavours to prove, that the Law of Nature, which is caught us by Reaſon, is really a Divine Law, and that GOD can't diſpenſe with it, but he muſt contradict himſelf, fo far as the Conſtitution of Things is ſuch as he himſelf appointed at the Creation of the World. This appears both by the Coherence of his Diſcourſe, and by what he had before ſaid, p. 52, 53. I had not minded to juſtify this Author in this ſecond Edition of my Work, if I had not forgot in my firſt. I know not how to read what follows in the Original. (2) I know nor what our Author means here, for theſe words are not the Perſon's whom he confutes. (3) Nor is this Mr. Velthuyſen's Conclufion which he aims at. His Deſign was only to prove, that the Gentiles might know very well, that by breaking the Laws of Nature they diſobeyed GOD, and ſo deſerved his Corrections, ſo that he might juſtly puniſh with Death any that had finned againſt the Law of Nature. From whence it follows, that in ſinning againſt the Law of Nature chey finned againſt the Law of GOD. (4) Mr. Velthuyſen ſays not the leaſt Thing that tends that way. He only aſſerts, that GOD, notwithſtanding his Almighty Power, does nothing but what's agreeable to his Perfections. There is nothing, ſays he, of a worſe Conſequence in Religious Mat- ters, than to teach that GOD dnes many Things wherein human Reaſon can ſee no Fuſtice. For, if this be allowed, we deſtroy all rea- ſonable Worſhip; Men will be obliged to renounce the Uſe of right Reaſon. They muſt do and believe, in Reference to GOD, Things con- trary to the Light of the cleareſt Reaſon, and conform to ſuch Notions as to them are incredible, &c. (s) I can't ſee that Mr. Velthuyſen intends any other Neceſſity here, than what is founded upon the Perfections of the Deity, who permits us nor to will the End, without willing at the ſame time the Means neceſſary to arrive at it, for this is the Prirciple he uſes, as well as our Auchor, to diſcover the Original of the Laws of Nature. See &. 1 2. following. S. VÚT. (1) The Greek of Ariſtotle is, Þú rizov per singlov td may texê outle'égov dwicuiv, rj to do xeiv, . And again, Ei 83 μαντοναι τι πάνες, φύσει κρίνον δικαιον, και άδικον, κάν μηδεμία κοινωνία προς αλλήλες ή μήδε σωθήκη. See Cicero's Tuſc. Quaft. Lib. 1. Chap. 13, 14. The Conſent of all Men in any Point, is to be efteem'd a Law of Nature. And again, The Conſent of all Men is the Voice of Nature. C. IO CHAP. III. . Of the Law of Nature in general. 125 6.10. сails that Natural Juſtice, which bears the ſame Some too there are, who fall foul upon our Force in all Places, and doth not depend on particular Sen- Learning, in proſecuting which we ſpend ſo much timents. And in his Rhetorick, B. sic. 13. he tells good Time; they will have it to be no better than a us, there is a General Right and Wrong, or Just and Prop, or a Crutch to ſupport and aſſiſt our Dal- Unjust, believ'd and profeßid by all Men; although no neſs: In as much as the good Diſpofirion of many Society ſhould be inſtituted amongst them, and no Co- Men carry them on to a natural Innocence and venants be tranſacted. Probity, without Improvement or Ornament of Now beſides, that this Way of proving the Law Letters'; and becauſe it requires no great Clerk- of Nature is only à pofteriori (2), and therefore fhip to be an honeſt Man. It is likewiſe too evi- cannot ſhew the Cauſe and Reaſon of the Thing; dent that high Attainments of Knowledge are ſo is it very ſlippery and uncertain, and involv'd not always bleſs’d with the Attendance of good in an endleſs Maze of Doubts and Perplexities. Manners or of good Temper (c). Many Nations To appeal to the Conſent of all Mankind, Mr. we ſee pride themſelves in the tedious Pageantry of Hobbes (a) obſerves it to be inconvenient upon this vain unneceſſary Things; deſpiſing thoſe who lead Account, becauſe at this rate it would be impoſſi- a Life of leſs Gallantry and more Simplicity. Yet ble for a Man, actually uſing his Reaſon, to ſin a were we to ſeek for Innocency and Integrity, we gainſt the Law of Nature. In as much as his Con- might, perhaps, find them much fooner amongſt ſent being wanting, who is a part of Mankind, theſe plain and unartificial Mortals, than amongſt the common Agreement muſt needs be maim'd their ſtately and formal Neighbours. (5) 'Tis a and imperfect. Then again, becauſe it would not ſhrewd Remark of Juſtin, l. 2. c. 2. ſpeaking of be fair to gather the Laws of Nature from the the Scythians; It ſeems wonderful, ſays he, that meer Conſent of thoſe who break them more frequently Nature ſhould give them, what the Grecians, with the than they obſerve them (3). For, as Iſocrates (6) long Inſtitutions of their Wiſe Men, and the Precepts of ſpeaks, It is a natural Misfortune which we all lye un- their Philoſophers could never attain ; and that the pom der, that we ſhould more frequently Tranſgreſs than Per- liteſt Manners ſhould be diſtanc'd and out- done in the form our Duty. Compariſon with Barbarity. Of ſo much greater Benes Nor will it be a more happy way of arguing to fit on one ſide was the Ignorance of Vice, than on the o- appeal to the Conſent of all Nations. For, were ther the Knowledge of Virtue. Vid. Valer. Max. 1, 1. it poſſible for us to underſtand all the Languages of c. I.if. 2. Extern. Sext. Empiric . Hypotyp. l. 2. c. 5. Ancient and Modern People, yet we ſhould be where we meet with ſeveral Things to the ſame ſtill far enough to feek in the Knowledge of their Purpoſe. Manners and of their Inſtitutions. We cannot - Beſides, that ſuch a Conſent can be of no Force, hit off this Difficulty by ſaying, that the Conſent appears from this farther Reflection; that the num- of the moſt Civiliz'd Nations is ſufficient, and that ber of Fools far exceeds that of wiſe Men; and the Opinions of Barbarians are not to come into that few Perſons have form’d their Opinions upon the Account. For, what Nation any ways able to a full Search into the Foundations of Things; but manage and to preſerve it ſelf, will own the Title moft Men follow on in the Track of others, and of Barbarous ? Or what Nation can take ſo much yield an implicit Aflent to their Notions, without on it felf, as to deſire its own Manners and Pro- applying their own Thoughts or Judgments to the ceedings ſhould be the Standard in Trying all o Points in Debate. Farther, altho' we have a to- thers, and that whatever People did not exactly lerable Aſſurance of the Conſent of moſt people, conform to its Model, ſhould be immediately (4) at leaſt as to the general Precepts of natural Law ; pronounc'd Barbarous and Savage ? Heretofore and altho' we may preſume on the Conſent of the the Pride of the Grecians, cenſur'd all as Barbari- reſt, from the Principles of thoſe who are better ans, who liv'd without the Bounds of their Coun- known to us, yet it is more ſafe to conclude hence, try. The Romans afterwards ſucceeded them, as what thoſe Nations eſteem juſt and equal amongſt well in their Arrogance as in their Empire. And themſelves, than what they think fair Ways of at the preſent, ſome few Nations here in Europe, dealing with Strangers; all whom (6) are by ſome have the Vanity to prefer themſelves to the reſt of People accounted Enemies, and treated accor- the World in the Opinion of their own Civility dingly (d). and Improvements of Living. But there are not - VIII. Tho' the common Uſe and Cuſtom of wanting other People, who imagine themſelves to mány Nations may ſeem to be alledg’d with more have the Advantage of them in all Reſpects: And Force for proving a Thing to be lawful or allows 'tis an old Proverb amongſt the Chineſe, that them- able, than for the proving it to be actually com- ſelves only have two Eyes, only the Europeans one, manded by the Law of Nature; yer that we can- and all the reſt of the World are ſtark blind. not with any Security make ſo much as the former (a) De Civé, l. 2. S. I. (6) Orat. ad Philipp. () Plato Epiſt. 10. Firm Integrity, Faith, and ſincere Dealing, this I take to be the true Philoſophy. (d) Add. Montaigne's Eſays, 1. 1. c. 30. (2) That is, not from the Nature of the Thing it felf, but from fome External Principle, as from the Conſent of People. (3) The Greek is, 'Αλλα πάνες πλείω πεφύκαμεν εξαμαράνειν, ή κατορθέν. (4) Charron reckons this among the fooliſh Opinions that are in the World, to condemn and reject all Things, Manners, Opini- óns, Laws, Cuſtoms, and obſervances, as barbarous and evil without Knowledge of them, meerly becauſe they are not uſed by us, and are not thought proper for our Practice. Of Wiſdom, Lib. 1. Chap. 6. §. 9. numb.2.' See alſo Lib. 2. Chap. 8. and Chap. 2. §. 5. Let the Reader further confult Mr. Brugere's Characters in his Chapt. of judgments, p. 420. and he'll find ſomething very ingenious and ſmart upon this Subject there. (5) fuſtin's Words are, Prorſus ut admirabile videatur, hóc illis naturam dare, quod Græci longa fapientium Do&trina præceptiſque Philoſophorum conſequi nequeunt, cultoſque mores incult å barbarie ſuperari. Tanto plus in illis profcit Vitiorum ignoratio quam in bis cognitio virtutis. () This appears eſpecially by the Example of two of the moſt famous People in the World, I mean the Greeks and Romans. See Parrhafiana, Tom. 1. Page 202, 203. and Mr. Le Clerc's Ars Critica, Tom. 1. Part 2. Sect. 1. Chap. 6. G. 2, doc. of 126 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. them- of theſe Concluſions ſeems probable from the great (b) the Sceptick, to ſhew that there is no Certainty Variety and Contradiction diſcoverable in the in the Notions of Honeſty or Diſhoneſty, hath Manners and in the Inſtitutions of the moſt fa- raked up a great Heap of theſe contradictory Cu- mous People upon Record. So that we may well ſtoms and Inſtitutions. But he hath ſtumbled ve- apply to the preſent Caſe, that Saying of (1) So- ry fatally in the very Entrance of his Deſign, crates(a), óx els cold airs ze di leonenss Kataqeúzes, tis. zou while he talks in this Manner: Amongst us Pollution Tomass exccégwv. You conſult no very expert Maſters, with the Male Sex is unlawful and abominable; yet a- when you refer yourſelf to the Multitude for Inſtruction. mongst the Germans, as is reported, it is no Diſgrace, To the ſame Purpoſe Plutarch (b) obſerves, that but rather a faſhionable Practice. For the Grecians the Laws of Men are vaſtly different, fome making one were ſo ſcandalouſly addicted to this unnatural Thing to be Good, and ſome another : And Tacitus's Vice, that Plato, in his 8th Book of Laws, thought Deſcription of an Army compofs'd of various Na- there was need of urging fome Reaſons to prove tions, may ſerve to repreſent the ſame wide Diſa- the Poſſibility of reſtraining it by Publick Edi&ts. greement. Their Languages, their Manners, their De- And that the Bæotians, Sextus Empiricum's Country- fires, ſays he, are different ; and while ſome will have men, ought not to ſtand excepted from this Impu- one Thing to be lawful, and ſome the contrary, amongſt tation, may be gather'd from a Paſſage in Corneli- them all, nothing can eſcape as unlawful (c). To give us Nepos's Life of Epaminondas; though perhaps the ſome Account of this 'Variety by way of Speci- vile Cuſtom had ceas'd in thoſe Parts before this men. Ariſtotle (d) reports of Tome favage Nations Sceptical Philoſopher wrote. on the Confines of Pontus, that it is cuſtomary vaild there, he himſelf afterwards relates. But with them, to borrow one another's Children, to what he reports of the Germans, is ſo groundleſs a furniſh out their Feafts. And theſe people he Falſity, that 'tis wonderful how it ſhould enter in- preſently after calls Irrational, Wild, and living on to the Head of any one, who is the leaſt acquaint- ly by Senſe. Eufebius, in his Book de Preparatione ed with the Manners and the Story of that Na- Evangelicà (e), reckoning up the foul Cuſtoms and tion. He adds, that the Cynick Philoſophers, and Manners which had been corrected by the Doctrine Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chryſippus, eſteem'd the ſame of the Goſpel, amongſt others, mentions the Pol- foul Enormity an indifferent Thing. That ſome lution with Mothers and Siſters in Perſia, (which of the Indians thought it no Indecency to be fami- Diogenes Laertius (f) too takes notice of from the liar with their Wives in Publick. That in ſeveral Authority of Socion) the eating of human Fleſh, Parts of Egypt for Women to proſtitute themſelves and the murdering of Children under a religious was look'd on as a creditable Profeſſion; and that Mal getæ, and the Derbices us’d to kill their Rela-ſelves a Fortune by the Jilting Trade, and then to tions when they grew very old, and make an En- Marry. That the Stoicks held it to be no irrational tertainment with their Bodies; that the Tibareni Practice either to frequent the Stews, or to main- in Cappadocia, threw their Ancient Perſons down tain one's ſelf by Pimping. That the Perſians con- Precipices; that the Hyrcanians caſt out their Dead tracted Marriages with their Mothers, and the E- to the Birds, and the Caſpians to the Dogs to be de- gyptians with their Siſters: The former of which, vour’d. Hither alſo may we refer thoſe foul Watch- Zeno maintaind to be agreeable to Reaſon (i). ings and other Ceremonies, deſign’d for the Ho- That Chryfippus permitted a Father to have Chil- nour of their Gods, but mixt with all the Licen- dren by his Daughter, a Mother by her Son, and tious Practices of Adultery and Lewdneſs; as al- a Brother by his Siſter. That Plato allow'd the ſo the human Sacrifices barbarouſly murder'd on Community of Wives. That 'twas a receiv'd Cu- their Altars. The ſame excellent Author (g) gives ftom with many of the Barbarians to feed on Man's the following Relations out of Bardeſanes the Syrian. Fleſh ; which the Stoics themſelves approv'd of. 'Tis a Law amongſt the Getulians, that the Women of- That, amongſt many others, Adulteries paſs’d for fer their Bodies to whomſoever they pleaſe, eſpecially to indifferent Matters. indifferent Matters. That the Scythians offer'd Strangers; and that their Husbands ſhall not accuſe them Strangers to Diana ; and kill'd their own Parents, on theſe Accounts, or pretend to cenſure them as guilty of when they arriv'd beyond the Age of Sixty Years. Adultery. The ſame Liberty obtain'd amongst the Bac- That by a Law of Solon's at Athens, the Parents trians. Whereas, on the contrary, amongst the Arabi were impower'd to put their Children to Death. ans, all Adultreſſes were puniſhed with Death, and if That the Roman Gladiators, after the Performance Suſpected only, underwent some leſſer Penalty. In Par- of their Murther, receiv'd Honours and Rewards. thia and Armenia it is provided by Law, that no Man That Thieves amongſt the Spartans were puniſh’d, fhall be accus'd for killing his Wife, bis Son, his Daugh- not for ſtealing, but for letting themſelves be catch'd ter, or bis unmarried Brother or Siſter . Among st the That the Amazons, if they happen'd to bear Male Atrians Petty Robberies are puniſhi'd with Stoning ; a- Children, willfully made them Cripples, to pre- mong it the Bactrians only with the Ignominy of being vent their Performance of any Manly Actions or publickly defiled with Spittle . The Wiſe Men of Greece Exploits. He enlarges farther about the different are not aſhamed to court the Love of little beautiful Boys. Opinions in reference to the Divine Nature, a- In Britain many Men polleſ one Wife. In Parthia ma- bout the Diverſity of Religious Rites and Ceremo- ny Women belong to one Husband. (2) Sextus Empiricus nies, about the various Manners of Burial, and (a) Plato Alcibiad. I, (b) In Themiſtocl. Pyrrhon. Hypotheſ. 1. 2. c. 5. p. 125. Ed. Wech. (c) Hift. 3. L. 3. c. 39. in fill . (d) Ethic. 1. 7. 6. 6. (e) L. 1. c. 3. (f) See bis Preface, f. 7. with Menage's Notes. (8) L. 6. c. 8. (b) Pyrrhon. Hypothef. I. 3. 6. 24. (i) Ibid. chap. 23. Zeno's Speech, as there repreſented, reacheth the higheſt Degree of Looſeneſs and Impudence. S. VIII. (1) But here he ſpeaks of the Multitude or Populace, and not of the Conſent of ſeveral Nations. (2). Theſe Remarks againſt Sextus Empiricus, in Favour of the Germans, contain only an uſeleſs Digreffion, which might well be ſpared, as I have done. the 1 CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general I 27 the abſurd Procurements of Death (a). Tully (b) guiſh what thoſe Nations admit for natural Law; reports that the Egyptians, having their Minds over and what for Poſitive and Civil. We may add to come by wicked Errors, will ſooner let themſelves be cut this Conſideration, that meer Uſe and Cuſtom in pieces, than they will hurt a Serpent, an Alp, a Cat, when it hath born a long and an unqueſtion’d Sway, a Dog, or a Crocodile : And if they happen unawares to frequently puts on the Face and Semblance of Na- do any of theſe Creatures a Miſchief, they voluntarily tural Reaſon. 'Tis manifeft, fays Agathius (d), that undergo any Puniſhment. Busbequius (c) informs us, whatever I.aw or Inſtitution bath obtain’d thro' a long that Theft is an honourable Practice amongſt the Courſe of Time amongst many people, then certainly cry Colchians: And Fran. Alvarez that in Abylynia the it up for moſt excellent and moſt equitable; and if any Cuſtom is, for the Thieves to preſent a part of thing be attempted contrary to it, this they reject as ridi- their Booty to the King, keeping the reſt without culous, and unworthy of all Credit and Álowance. We Scandal for their own Uſe. Philo Judæus de Temu- have a famous Example to this Purpoſe in Herodo- lentia, p.208, 209. Ed.Genev. (3) And theſe Things may tus (e)Darius, for Experiment's fake, put the give us warning not eaſily to credit thoſe Uncertainties, Queſtion to the Greeks, who were under his Com- which being diffus'd thro almoſt the whole World, have mand, what Summ of Money he ſhould give them thrown both Greeks and Barbarians into common Errors to feed on the Bodies of their deceas'd Parents, af- of Judgment. I mean thoſe early Inſtitutions, thoſe Na- ter the Manner of the Indians. Upon their Refu- tional Caftoms, thoſe Ancient Laws, through the whole fal to comply on any Conſiderations; he ask'd Summ of which we cannot find one in which all agree; ſome of the Indians, what they'd take to burn their but in every Country, People, City, Street, and even in dead Parents after the Grecians Faſhion, and not to every Houſe, the Men, at leaſt, differ from the Women, eat them : But they ſetting up a general Outcry, and the Children from both. And indeed I do not won deſired the King to have better Thoughts of them. der, that a confus’d and miſcellaneous Rabble, meer Beſides, to have been inur'd in any Opinion from Slaves to Laws and Cuſtoms, however introduc’d, inur’d one's Infancy, is ſo forcible a Prepoffeflion, that al- from the Cradle to yield Obedience to them no leſs than to tho' the Opinion be falſe, yet it ſcarce enters into Maſters or Tyrants, and having their Mind cow'd, and any Perſon's Head to queſtion it; at leaſt it paſſes broken by Severity and Blows, and not able to aſpire to with an uncontrol'd Currency, amongſt Men of any Great and Manly Attainments, ſhould believe the vulgar Parts and Capacities. (1) Ariſtot. Problem. Traditions they receiv'd from their Anceſtors, and let- Se&t. 18. qu. 6. Thoſe Things wbich Men have at firſt ting their Reaſon lie without Uſe or Exerciſe, affirm made Choice of, and to which they have been accuſtom'd, Things or deny them unexamin'd and unobſerv’d. But I in theſe they are not able to judge for the better. For cannot forbear wondering at the Philoſophers; who, their Mind is already corrupted by evil Prejudices and whilſt the greateſt Part of them pretend to hunt for the Prepoſſeſſion. Cicero. Tuſc. Quæſt . I. 4. C. 3. Some real Truth and Certainty of Things, dividing themſelves Perſons are tied and refrain'd in their Notions, before into ſo many Troops and Orders, pronounce of almoſt every they are capable of judging what is beſt, and afterwards, Matter, Great or Small, ever with Difference, and often in the weakeſt part of their Age, either following the O- with Contradiction. Add. Montaigne's El. l. 1. c. 22. pinions of Some Friends, or taken with the Speech of the and Charron of wiſdom, l. 2. c. 8. .4, 7. firſt Mafter they have heard, they give their Verdiets on Points wbich they do not in the leaſt underſtand, and bea IX. But that Notion of extracting the Law of ing carried with the Violence, as it were, of a Tempeſt, Nature from the Manners and Cuſtoms of the to ſome particular Doctrine or Sect, they cleave to it as if World, is accompanied with this farther Inconve- they were bugging a Rock to ſave their lives. And a nience ; that 'tis almoſt impoſſible to find any Na- little after, I know not how it comes to paß, that most tion, which is govern'd purely by Natural Law; Men had rather continue in a Miſtake, and quarrel and but every Country hath its own particular Laws fight in Defence of an Opinion which they have once lov’d fuperadded, either in Writing or otherwiſe; to be and embrac’d, than to examine without Obſtinacy or Par- made uſe of when the People have any Bargains tiality, what is deliver'd with most Agreement on all or Tranſactions with their Fellow-ſubjects. And ſides. Add. Mich. Montaigne's El. l. 1. c. 22. Philo many times Affairs in Debate between whole Na- Jud. de Abrahamo p. 294. B. Ed. Genev. Inveterate tions are decided either by Civil Law common to Cuſtom uſually bears as much Force as Nature it ſelf. both, or by the Law of Nature, as it is not Na- To the greateſt part of Mankind we may apply ked, but Cloath'd, as it were, with many poſitive Sextus Empiricus's (2) Saying, they follow the uſual Additions. So that it is no eaſy Matter to diſtin- Ways of Life without Thought or Reflection (f). And abcow To (a) Add. Diog. Laert. in Pyrrho. 1.9. (6) Tuſc. Queſt. l. 5. 6. 27. (c) Epift. 3. (d) L. 2. 6. 20. (e) Thalia. p. 112. Gr. Edit. H. Steph). (f) Pyrrbon. Hypoth. l. 3. c. 24. (32) Phild's Greek is, Εκεί δ' ημάς και παρακαλεί μη λίαν τους αφανέσι «ευπεύειν, α χεδόν ανά πάσαν την οικε εδώην ανακέχυτα, κοινόν "Ελλησιν ομά και βαρβάροις επάρνια η εν σε κείνειν όλιθον, τίνα εν ταύτ' όξιν, αγωγαί δίπειν αι εκ παίδων, και έ9η πα- Τι παλαιοί νόμοι, ών έν έδέν ομολογείται ταύτιν ή νεα πάσιν, αλλά και χωρίς και έθνη, κ πόλεις, μάλλον και και τι κώμην και οικίαν εκάσης, άνδρα μεν έν και γυναίκα και νήπιον παίδα, τοις άλλοις διακέκείνα τα γεν αιχeg παρ' ημίν ετέροις καλά, πονγκ, απρεπή, και οι δίκαια, άδικα- Εγώ έ τιθαύμακα ει συμπεφορημένα και μιας όχλΘ ετών και νομων ή οπωσεν εισος Lévay draens dig, da wir en avaggevar un reegex's eav (for to it ough to be read, inſtead of dixéeiu], as v Stavo toy κράννων, εκμαθών, κατακεκονδυλισμένα την ψυχήν, και μέχρι και νεανικών φρόνημα λαβείν μή δυνάμνΘ, πτύει τις άπαξ και φων και πληθύς και εν τοις έσι σαφές και αψάδες επιμορφάζεσα κράν, και άφη και λάχες διακόκειται , και δόγματα ασυμφώνα, πολλάκις 3 και ενάντια και σε ενής τίθενται σε τυχόντα, αλλά έχουν οι πάντων μικρών και μεγάλων, εν οίς αι ζητήστις σιωίσαν ται. 28 i dodvora sia caunas megcupboets . Tully's Words are, Nam cæteri primum ante tenentur adftri&ti, qua'm, quid esſet optimum, judicare potuerunt : deinde infirmiffimo tempore ætatis aut obſecuti amico cuidam, aut una alicujus, quem primum audierunt, oratione capti, de re- bus incognitis judicant, & ad quamcunq; funt diſciplinam quaſi tempeſtate delati , ad eam, quaſi ad ſaxum, adhereſcunt. (2) S. Empiricus's Words are, "Ende ö ározászos tñ Blotixħ tupňosi. Euripides ng 128 Of the Law of Nature in general. BOOK II. Man among them wore long Hair, it was a Shame to him, whereas if women had long Hair it was Honourable. (3) Euripides's Obſervation is no leſs true, that the Photinus's wicked Counſel in Lucan, B. 8. v. 488. Traditions which we receiv'd from our Parents, and which Et ſegg. proceeds on the ſame Principles. are grown up with us, no Reaſon can confute, no ſtrength of Wiſdom can over-rule (a). To the ſame Head - Sidera terra we may refer that Text of the (4) Apoſtle, 1 Cor. Ut diſtant, & flamma mari; fic utile recto. xi. 14. and that Remark in Plato, in his ſeventh Sceptrorum vis tota perit, ſi pendere juſt a Book of Laws, that our uſing one of our Hands Incipit ; evertitq; arces refpeétus honeſti . more readily than the other, proceeds purely Libertas ſcelerum eft quæ regna inviſa tuetur. atei from Cuſtom : In as much as Nature equally fa- vours both. Amongſt many People Honour and As Fire from Water, as each Heavenly Light Reſpect are meaſured by the Length of Beards(b); From Earth, fo Profit ftands remov'd from Right. whereas, on the contrary, the greateſt part of the If nice Regards to Faith and Truth are ſhown, Americans think it a brutiſh Indecency to appear Your Scepter drops, and you unhinge your Throne. with any Beard at all (c). The way to fix all bated Reigns has been But all this while, we do not aſcribe ſo much To grant a general Liberty of Sin. Force to Cuſtom, that it ſhould be able in ſuch a manner to deprave and reduce the Judgment of Ariſtippus too, and Pyrrho in Diogenes Laertius (e), Reaſon, as to render the Truths concerning Natu- deliver themſelves very grofsly concerning the o: ral Laws impoſſible to be apprehended (d). rigin of Juſt and Unjuft. But of all the Ancients none diſputed this Point ſo largely as Carneades is X. This ſtrange Diverſity of Laws and Manners, ſaid to have done. His Arguments, as Lactantius by which moſt Nations in the World contradict (f ) hath contracted them, are (2) to this Effect. each other, hath, without doubt, been the Occa. That Men firſt inſtituted Laws to fecure and to fion why ſome Men have aſſerted that there's no promote their own Advantage; whence they came ſuch Thing as Natural Law, but that all Law firſt to be ſo various according to their different Mani- aroſe from the Convenience and the Profit of par- ners, and different Times; but that there was no ticular States, and is incapable of any other Mea- ſuch thing as Natural Law in the World. That ſure. Thus Horace, Serm. l. 1. Sat. 3. v.98, 111, &c. Mankind and all other Animate Beings, are by the Guidance of Nature, carried on to the Purſuit of Atq; ipſa utilitas, juſti prope mater do aqui. their own Profit ; and that conſequently there can be no Juſtice; or, if there be, that it muſt be the Jura inventa metu injuſti fateare neceſſe est, higheft Folly, in as much as it would make a Man Tempora ſi faſtofq; velis evolvere mandi. injure himſelf in conſulting the Conveniences of Nec Natura poteſt juſto ſecernere iniquum, others. That all Nations famous for Empire and Dividit ut bona diverſis, fugienda petendis. Command, and the Romans themſelves, who then reign’d Maſters of the World, if they would be Of Mother Profit, Juſt and Right were born. juſt, that is, if they would reſtore every one his own, muſt return to their ancient Cottages, and Turn o'er the muſty Annals of Mankind, to their Primitive Poverty (g). In clearing up And you'll confeſs that Laws were firſt enjoin'd theſe Objections, it will not be amiſs to begin with Thro' fear of Wrong: Meer Nature never knew, Tully's Remark, in his fecond Book of Offices, c. z. Or Good, or Bad to ſhun, or to purſue. (3) Profitable, ſays he, is a Word which by the Corrup- tion of Time and Cuſtom is perverted inſenſibly to the Sig- Ovid Ep. Heroid. 4. v, 131, &c. makes his Phedra nification of ſomewhat that may be ſeparated from Hone declare her Mind to the ſame Purpoſe. fty; ſo as to make ſomething Honeſt which is not Profita- ble, and ſomething Profitable without being Honest: An Ifta vetus pietas evo moritura futuro, Error of the moft pernicious Conſequence to the Life Ruſtica Saturno regna tenente fuit. of Man. On which account, in his third Book of Fupiter eſſe pium ſtatuit quodcunq; juvaret. the ſame excellent Work, c. 3. he tells us, that som erates us’d to curſe the Authors who firſt divided theſe That Thread-bare Virtue only held its Sway, Names in Notion and Opinion, which were in Nature ſo Whilſt heavy Saturn ruld the Sons of Clay. inſeparably united. For thoſe Maſters of falſe Poli- Jove broke the dull Reſtraint; by Jove's Decree ticks cheated the heedleſs Vulgar with the Ambi- Profit is made the Teſt of Piety. guous Term of Profit; which is of two kinds, as (a) In Bacchis, v. 201, &c. (6) Vide Arrian. Epiftet. l. 1.c. 16. (c) Vide Rochefort. Deſcript. Antill. p. 2. c. 8. $.6.& c.9. (d) Add Selden de 7. N. & G. Secund. Hebræos I, 1, c. 6. (e) See Book 2. and Book 9. (f) Divine Inſtitutions, 1. 5. c. 17. (8) Add. Grot. Prolegom. N. 16, &c. (3) Euripides's Words are, Tateos moet dozes, é o l'epíaixas xeira Κεκτόμεθ', όπως αυτά καταβαλεί λόγG, Ουδ' δι' άκρων το σοφόν έυρηλα φρενών. (4) St. Paul in that Place Thews us only the Power of Cuſtom, which is ſo ſtrong, that Nature it ſelf taught the Corinthians, that if any S.X. (2) Laftantius's Words are, Ejus, i.e. Carneadis.] Diſputationis hæc fuit fumma:Jura ſibi homines pro utilitate ſanziſſe ſcilicet,varia pro moribus do apud eofdem pro temporibus fæpe mutata, jus autem naturale nullum effe. Omnes do homines, & alias animantes ad'utili- tates juas, naturâ ducente, ferri: proinde aut nullam efle juſtitiam, aut fi fit aliqua, ſummam eſſe. Stultitiam, quoniam fibi noceret alienis commodis conſulens Omnibus populis, qui florerent imperio, do Romanis quoq; ipfis qui totius orbis potirentur, fi iuſti velint effe hoc est, fi aliena reſtituant, as caſas eſſe redeundum, & in egeſtate G miſerii jacendum. (3) Tully's Words are, In quo ( verbo) lapſa conſuetudo deflexit de via, ſenſimq; eo deduéta est, ut honeſtatem ab utilitate ſecernens, do conſtituerit honeftum eſſe aliquid, quod utile non eſſet, & utile quod non honeftum, qua nulla pernicies major hominum vitæ potuit ad Again, Itaq; accepimus, Socratem execrari ſolitum eos, qui primum hæc naturâ coherentia opinione diftraxiffent. ferri. it CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. 129 it is rated by two different Principles. One fort have been their chief End and Deſign, to hinder of Profit is that which appears ſuch to the depravid Men from ſquaring their Aations by fo falſe a Mea- Judgment of ill compos'd Affections ; theſe being ſure. For ſhould any one reſolve to direct all his mov'd chiefly by preſent and tranſitory Advanta. Proceedings to his own private Advantage, without ges, and very little ſollicitous about future Con- any Regard to the reſt of Mankind, ſince all o- cerns. (4) The other and the true Profit is ad- ther Men might as well take the ſame Courſe, judg’d ſo by ſound Reaſon, which doth not only there could not but arile the deepeft Confuſion, conſider Things at Hand, but weighs and exa- and a kind of War of All againft All, a State (6) mines the Effects and Conſequences which they the moſt Unprofitable and the moſt inconvenient are likely to produce. Which therefore muſt pro- in the World. On the contrary, it is very mani+: nounce that alone to be truly profitable, which is feft, chat he who by obſerving the Law of Nature! univerſally ſuch, and which gives Aſſurance of endeavours to win the Affections and the good Conſtancy and Duration (a), but can never judge Grace of others may conceive much farer Hopes it a deſirable Thing to enjoy a Momentary Advan- of Profit attainable by their Affiſtance, than hez tage, drawing after it a Train of endleſs Mifchiefs . whoitruſting to his own fingle Power, takes the 'Tis a moft unhappy and a moſt dangeroqs Plea- Liberty of treating others as he lifts (c). Nor is iti fure, in the Heat of a Fever to relieve ourſelves poffible for Men to frame a Notion of any Profit, with cold Water, which will be ſure afterwards to which will be their own Peculiar, or to which all redouble our Tortures. Actions perform'd in: Con. Men will not have as good a Title as themſelves; formity to the Law of Nature have a double Ex- fince Nature hath'never given any Man fo large a cellency, not being only Honeſt, that is, conducive Privilege, as to let him exerciſe any kind of Right to the Preſervation and to the Increaſe of the Ho- againſt others, the Uſe of which they are not al- nour and the good Credit of Men; but likewiſe low'd to turn again upon him. Therefore 'cis a Uſeful and Profitable, promoting their Intereſt and great Miſtake to fancy 'twill be Profit able to you, Advantage, and contributing largely to theit Hap- to take away either by Fraud or Violence, what pineſs . And this latter Quality is ſo far from be another Man hath acquir'd by his Labour (d); ing an unworthy Attribute of Virtue, that even in fince others have not only the Power of reſiſting Holy Scripture, 1 Tim. iv, 8. Godlineſ is ſaid to be you, but of taking the ſame Freedom with your Profitable to all , having both the Promiſes of this Life Goods and Poſſeſſions. And you have as little and of that which is to come. On the other Hand, Reaſon to think it will prove advantagious to you thoſe Actions which contradict the Law of Nature, to break your Faith; ſince your own Example are always Baſe and Diſhoneft, and tho' they now may be made uſe of to your own Prejudice. Iſo- and then bear ſome Appearance of Profit and of crates in Areopagitic. p. 252. (7) They judge thoſe who Pleaſure, yet theſe Charms are quickly over, and break Faith and Contracts, to injure the Poor more than never fail of being attended with a more conſide- the Rich. The latter, by loſing ibeir. Dependants, could rable Croud of Evils and Misfortunes (b). (5) Tully ſuffer only ſome little Damage in their Revenues. The in his firſt Book of Offices, Chap. 4. talks admira- former, if they were thrown off by their Patrons, whoſe bly for our preſent Buſineſs. Betwixt a Man and Support and Aſſiſtance they continually needed, must be a Brute, ſays he, there is eminently this Difference; reduc'd to extreme Indigence and Miſery (8) The ſame the one is carried on by Senſe, and to that only which is Orator, in Orat. de Pace. p. 285. Éd. Pariſ. placeth preſent, with little or no Regard to what is either paſt or the chief Strength and Foundation of all his Ad- to come : Whereas the other, by the Benefit of Reaſon fees vice to his Countrymen, in this Principle, that the Conſequences of Things; their Riſe and their pro- there is more Gain and Profit in a peaceful Competency, greſ, and couples together Cauſes and Effects; compares than in a needleſ Purſuit of Abundance . That Juſtice Reſemblances of Actions and Events; tacks the preſent is much more eligible than Injury, and the Care of their to the future ; and ſo taking in his whole Life at a View, own Poſſeſſions, than the Deſire of other Men's (e). (9) he prepares all Things neceſſary for the Uſe and Comfort Nor ſhould any preſume ſo much on his own of it. Therefore 'tis ſo far from being true, that Strength and Power, as to imagine that others will Civil Laws were firſt inſtituted for the ſake of this not repay him with ſuch Uſage as they receive Momentary and Baſtard Profit, that it appears to from him. For all true Power ariſes from a Con- (a) Marc. Antonin. l. 7. . 74. Thoſe Aktions are profitable or advantagious which are agreeable to Nature, (b) See Prov. xx. 17. v. 3, 4. ix. 17, 18. xxi. 6. (c) Add. D. Cumberland, c. 2. §. 2, 9. n. 2. (d) See Prov. 1, 13, 14, &c. (e) Which Afler- zion he afterwards proves at large, and which is much more to the preſent Purpoſe than that above-mention’d by our Author. (4) As the Objets which are near us are commonly eſteemed greater, than thoſe vaft Bodies that are at a Diſtance; ſo in Rea fpect of Good and Evil, the preſent have the Advantage, and, in Compariſon of thofe that are ar a Diſtance, are always the greareft : So the moſt of Men are like Prodigal Heirs, believe a leffer Good in preſent preferable to the Reverſion of a greater ; and ſo for the preſent Poffeffion of a ſmall thing, they'll part with a large Inheritance which would certainly come to them. This proceeds from a falſe Opinion. Every one ought to know, wherein conſiſts his pleaſure, for what is abſevt now, will one. Day be preſent certainly, and then having the Advantage of Nearneſs, he'll ſee Things at their juſt Proportion, and fo prevenc in Time the unreaſonable Eſtimate he has ſet on them by reaſon of the unequal Meaſures. Mr. Locke’s Eſay of the Underſtanding, lib. 2. chap. 21. 9.93. See alſo, what goes before and follows. (3) Sed inter hominem, & belluam hoc maximè intereſt, quod hæc tantum, quantum ſenſu movetur, ad id folum, quod adeſt, quodque praſens est ſe accommodat, paululum admodum ſentiens præteritum aut futurum. Homo autem, quod rationis eſt particeps, per quam con- Sequentia cernit, cauſaſque rerum videt, earumque progreſſus de quafi anteceſfiones non ignorat, ſimilitudines comparat, & rebus præfentibus ndjungit, atque adnettit futuras, facilè totius vite curſum videt, ad eamque degendam præparat res neceſſarias. (6) of the Word Inutilius, Tee Note I. on 5.9. of Chap. 2. of this book. (7) This Paſſage of Iſocrates is nothing to our Author's purpoſe, as any one may diſcern at the firſt fight. (8) τω με ήσυχίαν ώφελιμωτέραν, και κερδαλεωτέραν τη πολυφραγμοσύης, ή και δικαιοσύίω η αδικίας, 3 3 14ίων οι μέλειαν τή άλλοτειων επιθυμίας. (9) “ There are more Men that can poiſon, ſteal, and cheat us, than there are againſt whom we can commic thoſe Crimes. Eve- very one is more liable to be offended, than offend; for among 20 Perſons that are Equals, it is manifeſt every one of them “has leſs Power againſt the Nineteen, than they agaipt him.” Bayle's Did. Hiſt. do Crit. Tom. III. 2745. Col. 2, S junction 130 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. ,' wy oi . év Ž , y PSV then junction with other Men, whom 'tis impoſſible to Aſſurance of general Profit ; for while it takes place byi keep together by your ſingle Force. So that if the Univerſal Conſent of all parties, there ariſes tie that falle and ſpurious Profit were to be the Mea- Common Advantege, that Men do not-mutually give end! ſure of all our Proceedings, the Life of the ſtouteft receive Injuries, but live in Peace and Quietneſ together: Mortal would be as often in Danger, as it ſhould which as it is good and profitable, fo doth Nature incite ſeem profitable to any one to rid him out of the every Man to embrace and to purſue ited Tho' it muft Way : And whoever took ſuch a Courſe would be obſerv'd by the way, That what Gaſſendus afeér- only fet a fatal Pattern, and chalk out the Waywards delivers about a different Profit, among dif- to his own Deſtruction. On the whole Matter ferent Perſons, and about a variable Juſtice, muft then, not Juſtice, but Injuſtice is really the higheſt not be admitted in Regard to Natural Law, but Folly; which, tho' it may ſeem to ſucceed for the only to Civil Conſtitutions. Diodor. Sicul. 1. 23. preſent, yet is neither generale nor lafting; and Eclogar. Epicurus; in the Book which he calls, Seru to the Diffolution and Deſtruction of human tled Notions, affirms, That a Life led acoörding to F1- Safety ; Men being chiefly guarded and ſecur'd ſtice is free from all Trouble and Diſquiet ; but that injući from Dangers by Society and by Friendlineſs. ftice was full of Diſturbance and Difquiet. "Lucrecius; Nori will this hold true only of particular Men, 1. 5. 1151, &c. bitons has wolna dous but likewiſe of whole States and Communities; is too olvasni od: sisut there having never been any Commonwealth fo Circumretit enim vis atque injuria quemque, too disin Powerful, or fo well eſtabliſh'd, as not ſometimes Atque unde exorta eft ad eum plerumque revertit . bobot to ſtand in need of their Neighbours Affiftance ; Nec fácile eft placidam ac pacat am ducere vitam, imot ſince no ſingle Kingdom could long bear up againft Qui violat faétis communia fædera pacis.on ebaello the united Forces of a ſtrong Confederacy. bo to stond ik of Scienelorl sd 03 Quintilian obſerves (10) that an ill Example can Becauſe diffufive Wrong can ſpread o'er all, as nuo never be truly advantagious ; for tho' it may give fome No State's fecure; nay, of the Wrongs recoil Delight as the Occafon now ſtands, set it afterwards With double Force on the Contriver's Pall.svb draws on us a beavier Load of Miſchiefs. It is impof- Nor can thoſe Men expect to live at Eaſe, alborg ſible, afays Demoſthenes, Olynthiac. 2. to obtain any Who violate the common Bonds of Peace. its goi firm and durable Power by Injuries, by Perjury, and by Ou Mr. Creech: Lies. Epicurus himſelf, in his Notions of Juſtice, was very honourable and very fair, as Gallendus In ſhort, any one is able to judge what a Contra- hath given us this ſhort Repreſentation of them diction it is almoſt to common Senſe, to make ſuch (a). Juſtice not only never burts any one, but, on the a Profit as is oppoſite to Juſtice, the Standard of A contrary, always carries along with it ſomething conducing ating (11) The Sophift Protagoras in Plato, p.225. to the Eaſe and Tranquillity of the Mind; which it like- Ed. Franc. Ficin, though a Trifler in other Matters, wiſe farther ſupports with the Hopes of wanting , nothing yet had Wit enough to ſpeak ſmartly on this Point. that uncorrupted Nature can deſire. A Soul where In- In other Habits, ſays he, if a Man pretend, for Exam- juſtice hath taken up its Seat, cannot but be in perpetual ple, to be an excellent Piper, when he doth not underſtand Diſorder and Confuſion, whilft when it attempts any a Note, be either raiſes the Laughter or the Indignation thing with never ſo much Secrecy, yet it bath no Ali of thoſe that bear bim; and his Friends admoniſh bim of rance that the Fact will always be undiſcover'd. And his Madneſ and Vanity. But the Caſe is quite otherwiſe ſince Juſtice is defign'd for the Promotion of the Common in Injuſtice. For ſuppoſe Some Perſons know another to be Good, it's plain that nothing can be juſt which doth not really Unjuſt, yet should the Man himſelf confeſ that he tend to the Advantage of whole Societies, and of each is guilty of that Vice before Strangers, they would take Member in particular. And becauſe every one by the it for granted, that he was out of his Wits; maintains Guidance of Nature, defires and purſues what is good ing that ſuch a Wickedneß is never to be diſcover'd, but for him, it is neceſſary, that whatever is just ſhould be the contrary Virtue always to be pretended to, whether it according to Nature, and ſhould therefore be callid Natu- be really practis'd or not. Not to counterfeit Juſtice tal. And this Juſtice is nothing elſe but the Pledge and therefore they take to be a Senſeleß Extravagance; ſince W 970 971991 VOTRE (a) Syntagm. Part 3. c. 24, & 25. Vide Ciceron. de Fin. Bonorum Lo Malorum, B, 1. C. 16. (10) Nunquam prodeſt malam exemplum, etiamſi in preſenti occafione quadam dele&tat, in futurum tamen altius nocet. Declam. 254. Oủx ésiv, **Ardges Allesciou did exšvla, ni omogxšvla, mai folosi for dubapur bebuice xThouartodo () '() 'Avantas ési, i na taj λώσιν , ή χαλεπαινέσι, και οι οικείοι ωeoστόνες νεεσεσιν ως μαινόμενον» αν και δικαιοσύνη, και εν τη άλλη πολιτική αρετή, εάν τινα και ει δώσιν, ότι άδικο εσίν, έαν έτος αυτός καθ' αυτή τάληξη λέγη εναντίον πολλών, και εκεί σωφροσώην ηγενθο ταλως λέγειν, εντώθα μανίαν, και φασι πάνας δεν φάναι 2) δικίες εάντιόσιν, εάντε μή, η μαίνεται η μη στειτοιε μόνον δικαιοσώην, ως α vay nexors Mira, ovlev i go uwoye Tws METEX HV o`tás, h . ?? r v Opásmoes. But I do not fee well how this Paflage and the fol- lowing one of Quintilian make for our Author's Purpoſe, ſince they only prove the Maxim of the Duke of Rochefaucaut, That, Hypocriſy is an Homage which Yice pays to Virtue. Moreover, there is not any thing that can prove, that Profic may be oppot ſed ro Juſtice, and any Man's private Intereſt to the Publick. I ſhall alledge ſome more pertinent Authorities to this purpoſe, our of Seneca and Arrian's Epi&tetus. Scneca's Words, Epiſt. 48. are, Nec poteft quiſquam beatè degere, qui fe tantum intuetur, qui om- nia ad utilitates ſuas convertit : alteri vivas oportet, fi vis tibi vivere. Hæc focietas diligenter do San&té obſervanda eft, que nos omnes omnibus miſcet, do judicat aliquod eſſe commune jus generis bumani : i.e. . 'Tis not poſſible for any Man to live happily who regards « of Mankind." Árrian's Words in Epi&et. Lib. 1. Chap. 19. are, Kembar TE Co zás] Tobably púar To 1931xã São retrox daosy, ένα μηδενός 7 Ιδίων αγαθών δύνται τυγχάνειν, ή μη τι άς η κοινών θρίλιμων ωeoσφέρεται, έτως έκέπ ακοινώτατον άνεται τα πάν- Te curs Crera 2010v: i. e. “GOD hath diſpoſed the Nature and Order of Reaſonable Creatures in ſuch a Manner, that every one 6 of them ſhould advance each other's Intereſts, ſo as contributes to the publick Advantage, 1o that tho'we refer all to our pri- « vare Advantage, we ought yet to do what in us lies to promote chat of others.” M. Antoninus has many ingenious Reflections in his VVorks tending this way. whoever a 32 CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. IZI 6 , ; whoover makes a contrary Profesſion deſerves to be dri- themſelves, through the Information of their Sen- ven out of human Converſe and Society. (12) No Man ſes, do perceive what is agreeable to their Body is so bad, ſays Quinctilian (a), as that he deſires to and what not ; without the leaſt Apprehenſion of feem Bad. And almoſt every Body ſpeaks more Honeſty or of Diſhoneſty. But if he means the honeſtly than he either thinks or acts. Rational Nature, we deny the Poſition, as abfo- But the Divine Providence hach ſufficiently con- lutely falſe. As for Carneades his Argument, that futed this pernicious Opinion, by making its bold- if the Romans would be juft, that is, if they would eft Patrons and Affertors feel the fatal Conſequen- reft vre every one his own, they must return to their pri- ces of it. To give an Inſtance or two. Lyfander, mitive Cottages; and that therefore Juſtice is Folly; in that crafty Deſigner, who manag'd moſt Affairs vulgar Eſteem this may bear ſome Semblance of a 'by Cheats and Shuffles, who plac'd all Right in plauſible Truth; but to thoſe who look farther in- Profie, who affirm'd Truth and Lies to be indif- to it, it will appear exceeding empty and triling. ferent Things, and either to be moſt valuable as For ſince whatever Right we aſſume upon others, it was moſt advantagious; who bragg'd that Men they may in like manner uſe againſt us; it can by were to be deceiv'd with Oaths as Children with no means be profitable for us by injurioully ſeizing ' Dice or Bounding Stones ; as Plutarch(b) and Po- on other Mens Goods, to invite them to make Re. lyænus (c) give his Character; did he build his For- priſals on our own. And in ftating the Nature tunes on a firmer Bottom, than if he had made and the Definition of Profit, we are not to conſider Truth and Honeſty the Mark and the Standard of what ſeems advantagious to ſuch or ſuch a Man, his Proceedings (d)? Agefilaus (e), who at other at ſuch a particular Time, to the Prejudice of o- ſtice for the Queen of Virtues, without which, nefit and Expediency. Thus, for inſtance, let us Valour and Fortitude would be of no uſe, yet ſuppoſe an Officer to have rais’d a vaſt Eſtate, by when Phæbidas had without Orders poſſeſs’d him- robbing the publick Treaſury: ſuch an one cere ſelf of the Fort Cadmea, defended that Boldneſs tainly imagines it would be Folly in him, to make by ſuch Kind of Rhetorick as this, That the Ati an exact Reſtitution, and ſo to return to his firſt on of Phæbidas was to be rated and judgd of according Narrowneſs of Fortune. But when the Prince, to the Benefit and Advantage it brought to the State. upon convi&ting him of Extortion, hath adjudg's Since whutever conduc’d to the publick Good of Lacede- his Goods to the Treaſury, and his Perſon to the mon, was to be done at a Venture ; whether Men were Goal or Gallows, do we then think he took a wiſer impower'd by Commiſſion for ſuch Performances or not. Courſe to raiſe himſelf in the World, than ano- Bu was not this very Exploit the Occaſion of the ther Perſon who refts contented with a competent Spartans miſcarrying in their Deſign of rendring Maintenance, innocently acquir’d? Thus I know themſelves Maſters of Greece? not whether it had not been better for the Roman XI. Theſe Foundations being fettled, 'tis eaſy People to have fate down with Satisfaction in the to ſolve the Objections of the oppoſite Party. 'Tis Enjoyment of that moderate Wealth which at ridiculouſly weak to conclude, that ſuppoſing dif- firſt they got together without the Expence of ferent States to have ſet up different Laws upon their Virtue or Honour ; than when they had ri- the account of Profit, therefore there can be no fled and plunder'd all the whole world, to turn Perpetual or Natural Law. For all Civil Laws do their Weapons upon themſelves, and to expoſe the either preſuppoſe or include the chief Heads of the feeble Carcaſs of their Empire to be torn in pieces Law of Nature,thoſe by which the Safety of Mankind by the barbarous Nations. Nor do the other Ar- is fecur’d: Neither are theſe in the leaſt injur'd or guments of Carneades as fet down by Lactantius impair’d by the particular Ordinances, which each (1), require any long or any laborious Reply. For Commonwealth finds a Neceſſity of ſuperadding, if any think it a piece of Wiſdom in the Seller of for its ſeparate Intereſt and Benefit. Penal Laws, a Houfe, to diſſemble its being infected with the or Sanctions, we acknowledge to have been infti- Plague, certainly it muſt be own’d for Wiſdom in tuted out of Fear of Juſtice, or to reſtrain the Wic- the Buyer, if he either give falſe Money for his kedneſs of Men, when the bare Dictates of Natu- falſe Goods, or to puniſh the Author of the Cheat ral Law were found inſufficient for that Purpoſe. by the ſevereſt Methods. Laſtly, as for thoſe C2- When Horace denies that Nature is able to diſtin- ſes, whether it be fair (2) in a Shipwrack for a guiſh betwixt Right and Wrong; we agree with ſtronger Mán to force a Plank from the Arms of a him, if he means only that Nature which Man weaker, or in a Flight, for a found Man to diſpof- bears in common with Brutes ; whereby Bruces feſs a wounded Soldier of his Horſe, preferring (a) Inſtitut. l. 3. c. 8. Ed. Lugd. Bat. p. 251. (b) Plutarch. Apophthegm. Lacon. p. 229. Ed. Wech. (©) Stratag. l. 1. c. 45. (d) Vide Cornel. Nep. Lyſand. (e) See Plutarch, in Ageſil. p. 608. (12) Nec enim eft quiſquam tam malus, ut malus videri velit, 5. I. (1) Bonus vir, inquit, ſi babeat fervum fugitivum, aut domum inſalubrem, do peſtilentem, que vitia folus ſciat, do ideo proſcri- bat, ut vendat, utrumne profitebitur fugitivum fervum, & peſtilentem domum ſe vendere, an celabit emptorem? le profitebitur, bonus qui- dem quia non fallit, ſed tamen ſtultus judicabitur, quia vel parvo vendet, vel omnino non vendet ; ſi celaverit, erit quidem ſapiens, quis rei confulet, ſed Idem malus, quia fallet. Rurfus fi reperiat aliquem, qui aurichalcam se putet vendere, cum ſit illud aurum , plumbum cum ſit argentum ; tacebitne, ut id parvo emat, an indicabit, ut magno? Stultum planè videtur malle magnó. Divine Inſtitut, I. $. c. 17. n. 5, 6, 7. (2) Again, La&antius adds, Ibid. n. 10, &c. Nempe juſtitia eft, hominem non occidere, alienum prorſus non attingere, quid ergo juſtus faciet, li forte naufragium fecerit, & aliquis imbecillior viribus tabulam ceperit ? Nonne illum deturbabit tabula, ut ipſe confcendat eâq; nicus evadat, maxime cum fit nullus medio mari teſtis ? Si ſapiens eft, faciet, ipfi nimirum pereundum eſt, niſi fecerit. Si autem mori maluerit, quam manus inferre alteri, jam non juſtus ille, ſed ſtultus est qui vite ſus non parcat, dum parcit aliene. Item : Si acie fuorum fuſa, hoſtes inſequi cæperint, do juſtus ille fuerit načtus aliquem (aucium equo inſidentem, eine parcet, ut ipſe occidatur, an dejiciet ex equo, ut ipfe poffit hoftem effugere ? Quod fi fecerit ſapiens, ſed idem malus, fi non fecerit fultus fit necesſe eſt, licet juſtus. S2 his 132 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book T. his own Preſervation to the Safety of his Fellow, mon to Man with Himſelf; or that the Order pre- we ſhall hereafter find Occaſion to diſcuſs and to ſcrib'd by Him to Man, that is the Obſervation of determine them (a). It will be ſufficient for the the Law of Nature, doth produce the End for preſent to make this ſhort Remark, that Actions which God created the World. Nor can the Crude- done upon extreme Neceſſity, and out of Confter- nefs of the following Aphoriſm paſs with ordinary nation of Mind ariſing from imminent Danger, Digeſtions: That the Natural Neceſſity which is in and which do therefore meet rather with Excuſe, GOD doth lay on Men a Neceſſity of purſuing Virtue, than with Approbation ; ought by no means to and of flying Vice. Yet ſuppoſe we ſhould be brought be eſtabliſh'd for common Rules of Proceeding (b). to grant all this, and then ſhould guide our Search XII. The Author of the Treatiſe De Principiis after the Law of Nature by ſome fuch general Max- juſti á decori, in ſearching after the right Notion of im and Rule, Whatever Things are by Nature ſo disa the Law of Nature, follows this Method. In the pos’d, as to hinder the End which G O D fropos'd in the firſt place he lays down this Confeſs’d Principle, Creation of the World; all thoſe Things are prohibited by That there is a GOD, and that He created the World the Law of Nature; But whatever Things are ſo natu- in Wiſdom; which no Man in his Senſes will diſpute. rally order'd, that the End before-mention'd cannot be ob. He adds, that GOD bath declar'd bis Reſolution of ex- taiń'd without them, thoſe are certainly enjoin'd or com- erciſing the Virtues of Truth and Juſtice, in His Govern- manded by the ſame Law: We ſhall ſtill be at a loſs ment of the World (č). But here, beſides that it ſcarce to underſtand what neceſſary Relation every parti- ſeems right to conceive the Divine Juſtice or cular Precept of the Law of Nature bears to that Truth after the Manner of Virtues, it is ſufficient- End; whilſt the End itſelf is not perfectly diſco- ly manifeft, that the Diſpoſition or the Inclination ver’d by us. Thus, for Example, there would to Juſtice which we attribute to GOD (1), is very be need of a Train of Deductions, to make me different from that which Men are to exerciſe to apprehend, that the End for which the World was wards one another: In as much as the former de- created cannot be attain'd without honouring one's notes that Method by which an infinitely Great Parents, or that Theft is repugnant to the ſaid and Good Creator is pleas’d to govern his intelli- End. 'Tis meer trifling therefore to ſtick upon gent Creatures; whereas the latter obtains only a ſuch General Terms, without calling in the Affi- mongſt Perſons by Nature equal, and ſubject all ſtance of nearer and more diſtinct Principles. And alike to a Common and a Supreme Lord. Neither the Foundation of the Law of Nature muſt be always can it be at all made out that Divine and Human left in the dark by him who can make no farther Juſtice are capable of the ſame Meaſure, from this Progreſs in the Queſtion, than to tire us with ſuch Argument, that in Holy Scripture we are frequent- Repetitions, that (3) ſince the World was made in Wif- ly referr’d to the Example of God (d): For in dom and Order ; and ſince Man hath his part aſſign’d him thoſe Paſſages the Holy Spirit is pleas'd to follow in the Univerſal Harmony ; therefore that Order ought the uſual Way of Reaſoning (2), from a Greater to neceſſarily to point out to every Man bis Duty, in every a Leſ. But from theſe Principles the faid Author, Action or Proceeding. P. 9, 10. concludes, that in the Creation of the World XIII. Thus far moſt are agreed, that the Law GOD propos'd to Himſelf ſome End. That He hath ap- of Nature is to be drawn from Man's Reaſon; pointed Means ſufficient for the obtaining that End. That flowing from the true Current of that Faculty, a Man Jhall certainly be puniſh’d, if he deviates from that when unperverted (1). On which account the Order which GOD would have us obſerve, in the Profe- Holy Scriptures declare it to be written in the cution of the End propos’d by Him to Himſelf, and to Hearts of Men, Rom. ii. 15. This we judge to Mankind. And on the contrary, Mall certainly be re be a moſt manifeſt Truth, that altho' the ſacred warded, if he direct his Life according to the Order pre- Writings do throw in a more enlarged Light to Scribd by his Creator. In fine, that the Juſtice of GOD direct us in the cleareſt View of Nature's Law, implies nothing elſe, but His Lawful Diſtribution of Re- (2) yet the fame Law may without any extraor- wards and Puniſhments. In Regard to this Do&trine, dinary Aſſiſtance be found out and ſolidly de- I queſtion whether it can be ſaid with any tolera- monſtrated, by the bare Force of Reaſon, ſuch as ble Senſe, that GOD hath conſtituted an End, com God firſt implanted and ſtill preſerves in Man- (a) See Chap. 6. of this Book. (b) Add. Velthuyſen, de Principiis fufti & Decori, p. 114, &c. (c) Pſalm xcvi. v. ult. (d) Luke vi. 36. Matth. v. 44, 45. xviii. 33. S. XII. (1) I do not ſee that Velthuyſen ſays any thing that can intimate the contrary. His Notion is, That GOD hath diſpo- ſed all Things in a manner ſuitable to his Perfections; and this is that Natural Neceffity of which he ſpeaks a little lower. (2) Our Author ſays, That in thoſe places of Scripture the Arguments are drawn, à minori ad majus, 1. e. from the Leſs to the Greater; whereas 'tis evident that they are drawn juſt the contrary way; for thus the Argument rúns, and he himſelf ſpeaks to in another place: “ If GOD, who is the Lord of all the world, and has from all Eternity enjoyed a compleat Happineſs, who is “Self-ſufficient, and has no need of Pardon, is very merciful to his Creatures, who have provoked him to Anger by their Sins, “ with how much greater Reaſon ought Men to have compaffion on their Brethren, whoſe Pardon they themſelves often want, “and whoſe Help they can't live without? If a Mafter hath Pity of his Servants, the Servant ought much more to have Pity on “ his Fellows. If GOD cauſes the Sun to riſe on wicked Men, much more ought Men to do good to their Enemies. Men, I ſay, " who are ſo ſubject to offend one another, and who have ſo great Need of Aſſiſtance one from another.." Specimen Controvers. Chap. 4. S. 5. To call this way of Arguing, à minori ad majus, is contrary to the Language of all Orators and Logicians. See Ariſtót. Rhet. Lib. 2. Chap. 23. and Top. 2. Chap. 1o. as alſo Quinttil. Inſit. Orat. V. 10. (3) 'Tis true, that this is not much to the purpoſe, but we muſt own, that Velthuyſen did not much depend on it, and though he does not explain himſelf ſo diſtinctly as our Author, yer he lays down a Principle which reaches to the very bottom of that which eftabliſhes Society, in another place, which is this, “ That which is ſuch in General, and of that Nature thar Men can't “ diſpenſe with the Obſervation of it, without bringing a great Prejudice to all Mankind, or which if Mankind ſhould permit “ to every body, 'twould be to their great Damage, whatever is ſuch, ſay I, is forbidden by the Law of Nature,” Page 115. S. XIII. (1) Něy ñ é gav gvoon and gedură, ti coi meg.xle6v 737, ij o ws. Being endued with a Soul, you may know from your felf, what and how you ought to udt. Dio Chryloft. Orat, 10. de Servis, p. 156. Ed. Morell. (2) See what I have ſaid in my Treatiſe Of Games, Lib. 1. Chap: 3, $, 2. kind. CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. 133 7 kind. Yer here we by no means think it neceſ- whole (7) Series of common Life, that few of ſary to maintain, that the General Principles of them ſo much as doubt whether they may not pro- Natural Law are innate, or imprinted, as it were, ceed by other Methods. Whoever confiders this upon Mens Minds, from their very Birth, in the Matter accurately, will diſcover, that 'tis very manner of diſtinct and actual Propoſitions ; ſo as hard to give a Reaſon for many Practices, which to be readily expreſs’d and utter'd by them, as yet the common People undertake without Scruple ſoon as they arrive at the uſe of Speech, without or Heſitation. To borrow an Inſtance from a late farther Inſtruction or Meditation. For that theſe Author (d), If a Man be found committing a Robbery, Native Idea's or Original Characters are no better the Multitude preſently join Hands and Minds to purſue than unwarrantable Fictions (3), any one may and to ſeize the Thief: But if upon a Quarrel one Man diſcover, who will be fo curious as to obſerve hath kill'd another, every Body wiſhes he may get off nicely the Steps by which Children make their ſafe ; at least no Body willingly aſſiſts in the taking of Progreſs in Knowledge, clearing themſelves by him. The Reaſon of ſuch a Difference the Vulgar little and little from the Ignorance of their Infanc underſtand not, which is this; Every one is more State. Nor is it a Conſideration of little Weight in danger from a Thief, who deſigns to plunder where- in this Point, that the Holy Scriptures frequently ever he can meet with Booty ; than from an Actor of deſcribe Infancy and Childhood (4) by the Igno- Manſlaughter, who intends Miſchief to none but to the rance, and Ripet Age by the Knowledge of Perſon who gave him Provocation. Therefore when Right and Wrong (a). Dr. Cumberland muſt be we acknowledge the Law of Nature to be the our Guide and Maſter in theſe Diſquiſitions, who Dictate of Right Reaſon, our Senſe and Meaning hath moſt clearly demonſtrated (b), that altho' is this, that the Underſtanding of Man is endued we rejea che Notion of thoſe Innate Propoſitions, with ſuch a Power, as to be able from the Con- the Knowledge of the Law of Nature is truly templation of Human Condition, to diſcover a and really imprinted on Human Minds by God, neceſſity of living agreeably to this Law; as like- as He is the firſt Mover and Director of them: wiſe to find out ſome Principle by which the Pre- Whence likewiſe any one may readily diſcover, that cepts of it may be clearly and ſolidly demonftra- 'cis his Will and Command we ſhould a&t according ted (e). Nor is it any Rub or Prejudice to this to that Law. That Phraſe in Romans II. 15. which Doctrine, that the artificial Method of demon- is urg'd ſo hardly by ſome Authors, is certainly ſtrating theſe Natural Precepts, is not known or (5)Figurative, and implies no more than a clear apprehended by all Men; and that moſt Perſons and certain Knowledge treaſur'd up in the Me- both learn and obſerve the Law of Nature by Cu- mory; of which the Perſons ſpoken of are con- ftom, and by the common Courſe and Tenour of victed in their own Conſciences, by what means ſo- living. For we ſee every day the common Me- ever thoſe Notions firſt enter'd into their Thoughts. chanicks and Artificers performing many things, Thus too thoſe Sins which in Jeremiah xvii. 1. are either by Imitation, or by the compendious Di- ſaid to be engraven on the Tables of the Heart, in as rection of Inſtruments, the Proof of which they much as they are actual Tranſgreſſions, could not do not in the leaſt underſtand : And yet this doch be diſcover'd at the Nativity of the Offenders (c). not hinder ſuch Operations from being truly Ma- That Readineſs which we ſee in Children and in thematical, or from being founded on folid Prin- the Ignorant Multitude, to diſtinguiſh Right from ciples of Reaſon. Hence it likewiſe appears what Wrong, is owing in a great Meaſure to Exerciſe Rule we are to meaſure our Reaſon by, in judg- and Uſe; whilſt from their early Years, and the ing of its Fitneſs for the Diſcovery of Natural firſt opening of their Reaſon, they obſerve Good Law: or whence we may be aſſur’d, whether Things to be approv'd of, and Evil Things to be ſuch a Dictate proceeds from Right, or from de- exploded; the former to be attended with Praiſe, prav'd Reaſon. The Dictates of Right Reaſon are the latter (6) with Puniſhment. Their Minds are true Principles, which agree with the Nature of ſo fix'd and diſpos’d by daily Practice, and by the Things well obſerv'd and examin'd; and which yet (a) Vid. Jonah iv. II. Dent. I. 39. Ilaiah vii. 14, 15, 16. (6) Prolegom. ſ. 5, 7, 8. (c) Add. Luke ii. 51. Proverbs vii. 3. (a) De Principiis Juſti do Decori, p. 81. (e) Add D. Cumberland, de L. N. C.4, 1.3. (3) Our Author treats more at large of this in his Apology, S. 24. and in his Specimen Controverſ. Chap. iv. S. 23. Buc Mr. Locke has ſet it in its full Light in his Eſay upon Man's Underſtanding. See alſo what I have ſaid in my Preface, s. 3. (4) Our Autbor muſt underſtand here by Good and Evil, Reti & Turpis, Honeſty and Diſhoneſty, but that is not the true Notion of this Expreſſion in the Sacred Writers, who, according to the Idiom of their Language, would have us to underſtand by that Phraſe in general, All that can't be known, becauſe in reality all things that we know are either Good or Evil, i.e. Profi- table or Hurtful; as is judiciouſly obſerved by Lud. Capellus in his Nores upon Gen. iii. 5. which it would be well to conſult ; as alſo Mr. Le Clerc's Commentary on the ſame Place. Nevertheleſs, if any Conſequence ought to be drawn from the Expreſſions of Sacred Writers in marcers of Philoſophy, in reſpect to which they commonly follow the moſt popular Notions, we might in- ferr, that theſe Paſſages very much favour the Opinion of thoſe who deny Innare Ideas, ſince he that ſays All, excepts nothing. In fine, we find this way of ſpeaking among the Profane Authors. See Mr. Le Clerc's Ars Critica, Part II. Sect. 1. Chap. 2. 9.25. pag. 153. Tom. I. and Hefiod's Theogonia, v. 900. (5) See Grotius in his Nores upon this paffage, and Le Clerc's Ars Critica, p. 194,&c. Tom. I. ad Edit. (6) See Mr. Locke's Philoſophical Esſay, Lib. 2. Chap. 28. S. 10, 11, 12. (7) Add to this the manifeſt Proportion that there Maxims have with the Light of Right Reaſon, for it is perceived by the moſt Simple, the very Moment that 'cis propounded, and they underſtand it, tho they would never have found it out themſelves, nor can they apprehend the Reaſons ſo well as to deliver their Thoughts diſtinctly about it. Further, it is certain, that no Man at the Age of Diſcrecion, can reaſonably pretend an invincible Ignorance for his Excuſe ; but yet it is no leſs true that Education, Inſtruction, and Example, are the ordinary Means by which Knowledge is conveyed into the Mind of Man, and without is either the Natural Light would be almoſt wholly extinguiſhed, or we thould not attend to it. This Experience ſhews us, not only among ſeveral Savage Nations, but even among the more Civilized, there being many Men that make good this fad and mortifying Truthi Whence we may conclude, that every one ought to take ſpecial Care to contribute as much as may be to the Inſtruction of other's in their Dury, and to eſtabliſh, confirm, and ſpread abroad fo neceffary a Knowledge. are 134 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. are deduc'd from other true and firſt Principles, Debauchery, becauſe ſuch Courſes are repugnant by the Rules of Good Conſequence. On the con to the Dignity of the Sacerdotal Office ; he ſays trary, thoſe are Didates of deprav'd Reaſon, in nothing but Truth, in all this, but he doth not which a Man either lays down falſe Principles, or alledge the laſt and the ſtrongeſt Reaſon, ſo as to by a wrong Method deduces falſe Conciuſions. ſet the Matter beyond Doubt and Diſpute (b). For (8) at the ſame time as we affirm the Law of Altho', as hath been already obſerv'd, it is not - Nature to be imprinted on us by the Nature of in the Power of every Man, to deduce the Law Things, we imply that it is moſt true and infallible: of Nature artificially from its Principle : yet thac Since Nature preſents us with nothing but what it may be properly ſaid to be known to all Men really exiſts, and produces no Effect that can be enjoying the uſe of their Reaſon, it is ſufficient, charg’d with Falſhood : All Falſity ariſing from if even Perſons of tolerable Heads are able to ap- the Miſtakes of Men, whilſt they either divide prehend the Demonſtration when propos’d by ſuch Notions as naturally cleave together, or join others, and clearly to perceive the Truth of it, ſuch together as Nature hath ſeparated and plac'd by comparing it with their own Natural Condition. at a diſtance (a). And this Courſe of Judging As for the loweſt degree of Mortals who are ac- being duly follow'd, we need not fear that any quainted with the Law of Nature, chiefly by Poo one ſhall be able to foiſt upon us for Natural Law, pular Information and by common Uſe, they either the frantick Notions of his ill purg’d Brain, ought to require no farther Proofs of its Certainty, or the irregular Defires of his miſguided Mind. than that firſt the Exerciſe of it is maintain’d by For 'tis in vain for that Man to make his Appeal their Superiors, by whoſe Authority they are to to Reaſon, who cannot demonſtrate his Aſſertions be guided; and then, fecondly, that they them- from Principles of unqueſtion d Truth, and ſuch ſelves cannot find any probable Reaſons by which as agree with the Nature of Things; in as much they might either confure or weaken its Force; as all Truth and all Rectitude conſiſts in the agree- and laſtly, becauſe they are every Day ſenſible of ment of Conceptions and of Propoſitions with the its Uſefulneſs, and of the Benefits which it confers Things themſelves, which they are intended to upon Mankind. And upon this account the Law expreſs. And he who hath not Parts enough to of Nature appears to be ſufficiently promulgated ; frame and unite the Chain of a Demonſtration, ſo that no Perſon of competent Years and of ſound niuft ſupply that Defect by an exceeding Stock of Underſtanding, can by any means plead invinci- Impudence, if he deſires any regard ſhould be had ble Ignorance of it. to his vain Conje&tures, when they run aftray For the eaſy Knowledge of what the Law of from the receiv'd Opinions of Mankind. More- Nature dictates, Hobbes (c) commends the Uſe of over, it is manifeft to all thoſe who underſtand this Rule, When a Man doubts whether what he is the force and the manner of Demonſtrations, that going to do to another be agreeable to the Law of Nature, there is not only a Neceſſity that the Principles let him ſuppoſe himſelf in the other's room. For by this made uſe of be true, and the firſt or higheſt that means, when Self-love and the other Paſſions, we can aſcend to, but likewiſe that they be pro- which weigh'd down one Scale, are taken thence per and peculiar to the Queſtion in Debate, and and put into the contrary Scale, 'tis eaſy to gueſs ſo very clear, that the Mind apprehending by which way the Ballance will turn. (9) Moſchus their Means, the Cauſe of the Thing aſſerted, may Idyll.V.v. ult. reſt ſatisfied, and neither deſire nor want any far Στέργα τους φιλάουλα, ίν' ήν φιλέητε, φιλήσθε. ther Proof. Now againſt this Rule of finding out Love thoſe who Court, that thoſe you court may love. the Dictates of Right Reaſon, thoſe Authors have not only tranſgreſs’d, whoſe Foundations of Na- Add Selden de J. N. & G. 1.7. C. 12. Ariſtotle (in tural Law we have already examin’d : But thoſe Diogenes Laertius 1.5. Segm. 21.) being ask'd how too who think it ſufficient to build thac Law on we ought to behave ourſelves towards our Friends, ſo ſlender a Bottom as this, That Natural Honeſty anſwer'd, As we wiſh they would behave themſelves confifts in the agreement of Reaſon and Appetite ; the towards us. L. 2. t. 2. D. quod quis juris in alterum, Rule of which Honeſty is the Excellency and the Dignity &c. Senec. de Ira, 1. 3. C. 12. Let us ſuppoſe ourſelves of Human Nature, and that most Noble End for which in the ſame Circumſtances as the Perſon with whom we Providence ſeems to have given us the Dominion and the are angry : That which now puts us in a Paſion, is only Poſſeſſion of the World. For tho' we could argue the wrong Opinion and Eſtimate of ourſelves : We are never ſo fairly, this Action is ſuitable to the Ex- unwilling to SUFFER what we are willing to DO. cellency and the Dignity of Man, and therefore 'Tis a Saying in Confucius (in Marcinus's Hift. Sin. honeſt and to be perform’d; yet this doth not l. 4. C. 25.) Never do to another what you are unwil- furniſh us with any clear and certain Knowledge, ling to ſuffer from him. The fame Precept was in which our Minds may reſt ſafely without far- made uſe of by Ynca Manco Capace, the Founder of ther Enquiry: But the Queſtion ſtill remains, in the Peruvian Empire ; in order to the reducing his what that Excellency conſiſts, and by Virtue of Subjects to a Life of Civility. De la Vega l. 1. c. 21. what Cauſe it comes to agree to Mankind. Thus, And indeed this is no other than that Great Rule if one ſhould ſay to a Clergy-man, It doth not preſcrib'd by our Saviour himſelf, of Doing to become you to frequent Taverns and Houſes of Men as we would be done by. Match. vii. 12. (a) Idem c. s. f, 1. (6) Comp. Rechel. Prolegom. ad Ofic. Ciceronis, f. 38, doc. (c) De Cive, c. 3. f. 26. & Leviath. c. 15. (8) This Period was not in the firſt Edition of this Work; and not being exactly fitted to the Coherence of the Diſcourſe, I have changed the Reading in my Tranllation, but without any prejudice to the Author's Senſe. (%) we find the fame Maxim in Sadder, or the Collection of the Precepts of Zoroaſter, made by the Perſian Magi (Porta. 71.) in Mr. Hyde’s Book. See the Pallage of Hierocles ſet down in my following Nores. Dr. CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. 135 Dr. Sharrock is of Opinion (a) thar this Rule is that he loves himſelf as highly as is poſſible, that not Univerſal, becauſe if ſo, a Judge muſt needs he endeavours by all Ways and Means to ſecure abſolve the Criminals left to his Sentence, in as his own Preſervation, to obtain whatrappears con- much as he would certainly ſpare his own Life, ducible to his Good, and to repelo what is ini his were he in their Place : I muſt needs give a poor Judgment Evil (b), And this Self-Love ( reguřáp. Petitioner what Sum foever he deſires, becauſe I ly ſpeaking) is ſo very ſtrong as to ſupercede any ſhould wiſh to be thus dealt with, if I was in his Inclination which a Man may have for another Condition : Or I muſt clean my Servant's Shoes, Someoimes indeed Men ſeein to affect others with becauſe I require him to clean mine. But the a more tender Paſſion than themſelves, to be more Rule will ftill remain unſhaken, if we obſerve, delighted with their Happineſs, and more diſturb'd that not (10) one Scale only, but both are to be at their Misfortunes ochan at their rown. Thus conſider'd; or that I am not only to weigh and Des Cartesi (c) obſerves, that the Love whichá examine what is agreeable to me, but likewiſe Good Parent bears towards his-Children is ſo very what Obligation or Neceſſity lies (ir) on the pure, as to make him deſire neither the gaining other Perſon, and what I can demand of him, of any thing by them, nor the poſſeſſing them in without injuring either of our Duties. Yet we any other manner than he doth at preſent, nor muſt confeſs, that this Precept cannot be eſteemid the being join'd to them by any ftri&ter Engage a. Fundamental Axiom of the Law of Nature ; ments than thofe of the preſent Union. But coni ſince it is only a Corollary of that Lawl which fidering them as his other ſelf, he feeks their Good obliges us to bold all Men equal with our ſelves; and equally with his own, or rather with greater Care, therefore may be demonſtrated d priori. in 100 in as much as he reckons himſelf and his Children XIV. According to our Judgment, there ſeems to make up but one entire Thing, of which noc no way fo dire&tly leading to the Diſcovery of the thinking himſelf the better Part, he frequently Law of Nature, as is the accurate Contemplation prefers their Advantage to his own, and is not of our (1) Natural Condition and Propenſions. afraid to ſecure their Safety by his own Deftrudi- Altho' in this Confideration regard muſt be had on (d). But now beſides that ithis Love is not to ſome Things which are extrinſical to a Man, always conftant, there are other Reaſons why and chiefly to thoſe which are likely to promote Parents are ſometimes willing to have the Misfor- his Intereſt, or to procure his Damage and Incon- tunes of their Children transfer'd on themſelves, venience. For whether this Law was impoſed on namely, becauſe sthey think themſelves more able Man to advance his Happineſs, or to check his to fuftain them: or becauſe they cannot but con- Wickedneſs, (which might otherwiſe break out to fefs, that Perſons of thoſe tender Years are more his own Deſtru&tion) (2) we cannot proceed more worthy of Life and of Safety. And a Reaſon clearly in gaining a Notion of it, than by exa- why on the other hand Parents are ſo highlý ſa- mining in what Points and Reſpects he hath need tisfíd and pleas?d with the Succeſs and Proſpérity of Alliſtance, and in what he hath occafion for of their Off-fpring, may be, becauſe they are Reſtraint and Controul. In the firſt place then, ſenſible a great part of the Glory will redound to Man hath this in Common with all other Crea- themſelves, for bringing ſuch excellent and wor- tures endued with a senſe of their own Being, thy Perſons into the World (e). Qui tanti talem Obní ponoro alobrow Madovolil TWITT (a) De Officiis, C. 2. n. II. (6) Cicero de Fin. 1. 3. c. 5. So ſoon as any Animal is born it is endear'd, and, as it were, recommended to itself for its own Preſervation, and for the loving of its own Condition, and of every Thing that tends to the preſerva. tion of it : Being at the ſame time made averſe to Deftru&tion, and to all things which feem pernicious. Valer. Flacc. 1. 5. v. 644. El amor, lo cunétis Tere dos cunétis rerum tutela ſuarum. O exorft as Beni ise By Nature all love and protect their own. Add Diog. Laert. 1.7. In Zen. Marcus Antoninus, 1. 17. f. 8. Epictetus Enchirid. c. 38. n. 2. Cicero de Officiis, 1. 1. c.4.99 (c) De Paffionibus, Arc. 82. (d) See 2 Sam. xviii. 33. Euripid. Alceſt. v. 653. uſque ad 705.17. (e) See Lake xi. 27. . Balaihia R Die store once (10) Hierocles laying down the ſame Rule, adds this Reſtriction, A Maſter, ſays he, ought to think how he would be treated, if he were a Slave; and this laſt, if he were a Maſter bom be would be ſerved. XT MENTOS-refe25.cimiv megtuir úzens ó abro, ás σαφής. πανί &ν χρήση, έκ τε τη σαυτόν με εκείνον, εκείνον και σαύτον εαυθέως. και η οικέτη εώτ' άν τις καλώς, ενθυμηθείς πως av áziustev inervor cum opso épeas, ketep ensino rele viv Sonotus, dümes ho. A pud s tob. Serm. 82. (ii) So that, altho' a Judge, if he were in the place of a Criminal, would undoubtedly wiſh, as well as he, to eſcape the Pu- niſhment inflicted by the Law; nevertheleſs he ought to paſs Sentence, becauſe otherwiſe the can'c diſcharge the Ducy of his Office, and will bring on himſelf much crouble by ſuch an Indulgence. We muſt relieve the Poor, buc noc co hurt ourſelves much by it, nor ſatisfy his inſatiable Avarice. It is juſt to uſe our Servants kindly, but we are not oblied to make clean their Shoes; this were to become a Servant inſtead of a Maſter. In a grear Buſineſs, for Example, in a Diſeaſe, a Mafter may and ought, unleſs by another's Fault, to do ſuch Services for his Servants as they have a Right to require of him; but to go farther. is to reverſe the Order of Society, and accuſtom his Servants to Idleneſs, or rather to make them infolent in the highet degree.: 0751001 Marca: c) 997 207077 $. XIV. (1) The very Name of Natural Right ſhews us, That the Principles ought to be deduced from the Nature of Man, as many of the Ancients have acknowledged. Natura enim furis, ſays Cicero, explicata eft nobis, eaque ab hominibus repetenda Natura, De Leg. Lib. 1. Chap. 5. IIxeg.rige i og quos matosis ve Dúnews covor.drogusumma di Ta wiet autè, aj tregoisoo, ει μη χείρον μέλλει διατίθεται σε ή ως ζώα φύσις. εξής και παρατηρητέον, τι επιζητεί σε και ως ζώε φύσης, ο παν στο παραλιτά έον, Η μη εξειν μέλλά διατίθεται και ως ζώα λογικά φύσις· ε Λ ο λογικόν, ευθύν, και πολίτικον, τέτοις δε κανόσι ώμων, μηδέν gresepjá. Marc. Antonin. Lib. X. $. 2. i. e. Conſider well what your Nature requires, as if you were governed by Nature only; and da this, if the Nature of the Creature be not any ways diſordered. Ther, conſider what the Nature of the Creature requires, and do not refuſe to do it, if it be not contrary to the Nature of a Reaſonable Creature ; for he that speaks of 4 Reaſonable creature, ſpeaks of a Political one ; i. e. One born for Society. If you obſerve theſe Rules you need not be uneafy for any thing. Further, Our Author speaks only of a Natural Obligatory Right, he thinks not in the leaſt of the Natural Righ by Simple Permiſfion. See above, Lib. 1. Chap. 6. S. 16. Note 1. and what is ſaid in the laſt Noce of this Chapter. (2) The laſt of theſe Periods was added in the Second Edition, and is not well placed. To start broeit genuete 3 136 Of the Law of Nature in general, Воок ІІ. Mens devoting themſelves arătat Tuch Ways of genaere Parentes (a)? It is likewife evident, that nance, chat to live happily and conveniently they many Perſons have contentedly fuffer'd Deach for. have continual Occaſion for the works and for other Perfons, whom they either lov'd with an the Supplies of their Neighbours, in as much as entire Affection, or to whom they devoted them- their own Times as well as Power, would fail felves with an abſolute Service. For thefe Men them to procure the moft uſeful and the moſt nem fancied themſelves to be join'd to iſuch Friends ceſſary Things; bſo on the other Hand, particular or Maſters as Jeffer parts of the whole, and there Men have Convenience of furniſhing others with fore choſe to be themſelves deſtroy'd for the Pre- many Things, which they themſelves do not want: fervation of the greater Part (6)! Prodopius (c) and which therefore would turn to no Uſe or Ac- tells us, that amongſt the Eprbalife Hunns the more count, unleſs they were thus beſtow'd and diſpen- Wealthy. Men pick out about Twenty, or per- fed (2). 1: And as Merr thus appear to be ſo valtia haps more Perſons for their ſpecial Friends; theſe Supportisand Help to each other, oſo, may they are conſtant Gueſts at their Tables, and have the likewiſe in as eminent a manner prove a mutual Uſe and Command of all their Riches and Poft Plague and Miſchief ; and they do often actually feflions, being allow'd a kind of a Common Right prove fo, either upon the Inſtigation of their Bru- over all Things : And when their Patron happens tiſh Paſſions, or being compell’d by the Neceflity to die, Cuſtom obliges them to be put alive wish of defending themſelves from the Injuries and the him into his Grave. Japan, we are affur’d by the Authors who defifted on more largely by us in the firſt Chap ſcribe that country and People (d). The Truth ter of this Book (F). But we defire it ſhould be is, in the Opinion of ſuch Perfons, the Boaſts of well'obferved, that in ſeeking out the true. Condi- Faith and of Affection with the Glory thenčeia- tion of Men we have aſſign'd the firſt place and In- -riſing, are of more Value than all the Thingse influence to Self-Love, not as if each particular Man the World beſides, and are not over-purchas'd at oughe in every reſpect to prefer himſelf to all o- the Expence of Life itſelf. ad Some too being de- thers, for to meaſure all Things by his own private priv'd of a near Friend, or of a fingulare Bene- Advantage, eſtabliſhing his Yeparate Intereſt for Fador, do caſt away their own Lives only out of his chief End and Deſign; but becauſe a. Man is Impatience and Deſpair, imagining ic is impoffi- by Nature fooner ſenſible of the Love he bears tol ble they ſhould be otherwiſe chan very Miſerable, wardso himſelf, than of that which he bears to having loſt him on whom alone all their Hopes wards others, in as much as it is natural for him and Fortunes depended. Certain it is, whatever ſoover to perceive his own Exiſtence, than the Ex- a Man doth for others, he never forgets himſelf; iſtence of others. And farther, becauſe the Care and Satan, in Job ii. 4. well expreſs'd the com- of me and my, Affairs, belongs to no body fo pro mon Temper and Inclination of Mankind, when perly as to my ſelf. For altho' I propoſe the com- he ſaid, Skin for Skin, and all that a Man hath, will mon Good for the Mark of Aging, yet hinde! I be give for bis Life. likewife am a part of Mankind, to the Preſervati- Beſides this Self-Love, and this Deſire of prefer- on of which fome Care is due, this Care muft ving himſelf by all Means and Methods, there is needs lie more eſpecially and more forcibly on me diſcoverable in Man a wonderful Impotency and my ſelf, than on any Perſon elſe in the World. natural Indigence; ſo that if we ſhould conceive XV. Thus much being granted, it is an eaſy any ſingle Perſon, quite deftitute of the Aſiſtance Matter to diſcover the Foundation of Natural of others, we ſhould conclude his Life was given Law. Man is an Animal extremely deſirous of him rather for a Puniſhment than for a Blefling. his own Preſervation, of himſelf expos’d to many It is farther manifeſt, that, next to the Support Wants, unable to ſecure his own Safety and Main- and the Defence of Heaven, Men draw their chief tenance without the Aſiſtance of his Fellows, and Help and Comfort (3) from one another. For, capable of returning the Kindneſs by the Forche- as the Strength of particular Perſons is fo unable rance of mutual Good : But then he is often ma- to compaſs their Preſervation and their Mainte- licious, inſolent, and eaſily provok’d, and (1) as 3 (a) Æn. 1.610. On the other ſide, it was a gallant Saying of Epaminondas, that amongſt all the Good and Fortunare Accidents of his Life, none ſtruck him with ſo real a Pleaſure, as that he won the famous Victory at Leuctra, before he had loft either of his parents. Plutarcb's Apophthegm. p. 193 Ed. Wech. (6) Vid. Cartes de Paſion. Art. 83. Calar de B. G. I. 3. c. 22. concerning the Soldurii. (C) De Bello Perf. I. 1. c. 3. (d) Vid. Franc. Carron. in Deſcript. Japan, c. 7. Of the Æthiopians, ſee Diod. Sic. l. 3. c. 7. (e) Senec. de Irâ, I. I. c. 5. Men are born to be Helps to each other. Mare, Antonin. I. 2. C. 1. We are born for mutual Support and Afiftance, and have each of us our proper Office to diſcharge for the General Benefit the Feet, the Hands, the Eye-lids, the Teeth, or any Members of the Body. (f) Add Dr. Cumberland, c. 1. f. 15, 16. 10 we (3) Cicero proves at large, (De Offic. Lib. 2. Chap. 3, 4, s.) that there is nothing that a Man can receive more Good.or Evil from, than from his Like. After which he thus concludes, Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat Dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus do profint do obſint, primum hoc ftatuo eſſe virtutis, conciliare animos hominum do ad uſus ſuos adjungere, Chap. s. Juſt the fame Conſequence as our Author draws in S. following. S. XV: (1) Mr. Titius affirms, that the Conſequence is nor good, but he is certainly miſtaken ; for our Author deduces Socia- bleneſs from all theſe Characters put together, and not from any ſingle one. - Buc in one Thing Mr. Titius ſeems to ſpeak wich Reaſon, when he ſays, That our Author in fecrling Sociablenels in that Manner, gives us Cauſe to believe, that every one's pri- vate Advantage is the Foundation of Natural Right, becauſe, according to him, if a Man becomes Sociable, 'cis becauſe he can' preſerve himſelf without it, nor enjoy ſuch Conveniences of Life as are neceſſary in this world. I own, that our own Intereſts will engage us to be Sociable, but 'cis not therefore a Confequent, that we muſt raiſe the Obligation of practiſing the Laws of Nature directly upon it; for there are Cafes in which we mult ſacrifice our own Intereſt to others Advantage and the Good of So- ciety. I may adà, that our Author himſelf, in his Element. Juriſprud. Univers. p. 431, &c. makes Self-Love and Sociableneſs two diſtinct Principles of Duty; and I do not know for what Reaſon he ſhould change his Sentiments. See what is ſaid Note s. of this Paragraph, and what the Author ſays in the beginning of S. 16.03.18 power- CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. 137 powerful in effecting, Miſchief, as he is ready in ed to them by Benevolence, by Peace, by Chari- deſigning it. Now that ſuch a Creature may be tý, and ſo, as it were, by a filent and a fecret Obli- preſerv'd and ſupported, and may enjoy the good gation. It would therefore be a Charge moſt no- Things attending his Condition of Life, it is ne- toriouſly falſe, ſhould any inſinuare, that the Soci- ceſſary that he be Social, that is, that he unite him- ableneſs which we eſtabliſh is perfectly indifferent, ſelf to thoſe of his own Species, and in ſuch a and hath an equal Regard to Good Society and to Manner regulate his Behaviour towards them, as Bad. We ſaid it was the Duty of every Man to that they may have no fair Reaſon to do him Harm, promote and to practiſe Sociableneſs as far as in but rather incline to promote his Intereſts, and to bim lies; becauſe, for as much as it is not in our fecure his Rights and Concerns (2). This then will Power to oblige all ocher Men to behave cheni- appear a Fundamental Law of Nature, Every Man felves towards us as they ought, we have done ought, as far as in him lies, to promote and preſerve our Duty when we have omicced nothing which peaceful Sociableneſ with others, agreeable to the main we were able to perform, in moving and engaging End and Diffoſition of Human Race in General (3). For them to exerciſe the like Sociableneſs towards us. by Sociableneß we do not here mean a bare Readi- From all which it follows, that ſince he who obli- neſs or Propenſion to join in particular Societies, ges us to any End, cannot but at the ſame time be which may poſſibly be form’d on ill Deſigns, ſuppos’d to oblige us to thoſe Means which are ne- and in an ill Manner; as the Confederacies of ceſſary to the Attainment of that End, all Actions Thieves and Robbers; as if it were ſufficient only which neceſſarily conduce to this mutual Sociableneſ, are to join ourſelves with others, let our Intentions be commanded by the Law of Nature, and all thoſe on the what they will. But by this Term of Sociableneſ, contrary, are forbidden, which tend to its Diſturbance, or we would imply (4) ſuch a Diſpoſition of one Diſolution. Man towards all others, as ſhall ſuppoſe him unit This (5) Method of diſcovering the Law of Nature, (2) Nihil eſt profe&to praſtabilius, quàm planè intelligi nos ad juſtitiam effe natos, neque Opinione fed naturâ conftitutum esſe jus. Id jam patebit, fi hominum inter ipſos Societatem, conjun&tionemq; per ſpexeris, Cicero de LL. 1.C.1o. “You will ſee clearly chat Right doch not depend on Opinion, but on the Eſtabliſhment of Nature; if you conſider the neceffary Union and Alliance of Mankind. Σω αλλήλοις ή ανθρώπες κανομία διαιτάς έχ ο ' μείζωοάν αυτοίς ζημίαν έτω γίνεται εκείνης ή και ένα διαίτης. Ξambilich. Protrep. cap. 2. " That Men ſhould live together, and yet without Law, is abſurd and impoſſible; for at this rare, Sociecy would “ be more dangerous and prejudicial to them, than if they dwelt ſeparately and fingly without any Communication.” (3) To explain this Rule more fully, I think this ought to be added. From whence it follows, that whoever is oblig'd to aim at a certain End, is oblig'd at the ſame time to make uſe of the Meanis, without which it can't be obtain'd. Whacever contri- butes neceſſarily to an univerſal Sociableneſs, ought to be looked upon as preſcrib’d by the Law of Nacure; and, on the contrary, whatever diſturbs it, to be forbidden by the ſame Law. (4) Whenever à Thing appears advantagious or noxious to Society in general, in what State ſoever Men are, in every place, and at all times, we muſt look upon it as either abſolutely commanded or forbidden by the Law of Nature. So altho' Theft or A- dultery may in certain Circunſtances, and through the Corruption of Manners in certain Countries, have cauſed little no Trou- ble in ſome particular Societies; as ſome affirm, chat Experience hath proved in the Kingdoms of the Maſageta and Lacedemoni- ans, yer theſe two Crimes are not a whit the leſs contrary to the Law of Nature: For if they were allowed always and in all States, there would reſult from them, without doubr, monſtrous Inconveniences and terrible Diſorders; and, on the contrary, every Society whatſoever, muſt be more quiet and happy, where the Members of it religioully abſtain from Robbery and debauch- ing their Neighbour's Wife, than where ſuch Attempts are frequently made. Our Author explains himſelf well enough upon this Subject in ſeveral Places of this Book, and in his other Works, viz. his Spicilegium Controverſ. circa fus Natur. Chap. 3. §. 13. So that I am amazed that certain Men, who labour to confute him, and pretend to take a new Method in explaining the Law of Nature, make continual Alterations in a Thing ſo clear. (5) Our Author (in the beginning of the following $. of this Chapter, and in his Specimen Controverſ. Chap. s. $ 25. as alſo in his Spicilegium Controverf. doc. Chap. 1. S. 14.) declares, that he deſigns to explain here the Duties of Men only which properly refer one to another: For, according to him, our Duties toward GOD belong to Natural Theology, and Religion is no other ways concern'd in a Treatiſe of Natural Right, than as it is a more ſtrong Cement of human Society. As for the Duties of Man to him- ſelf, they are derived partly from Religion and partly from Society. So that were Men independant on GOD's Authority, and no way concern'd in Society, we could not conceive how he could be ſubject to any Obligation from himſelf. If ſome had at- tended to this Syſtem of our Author, they would not have ſpent ſo much Paper in delivering Objections ſo ill grounded. Never- theleſs I own, that he did well to prevent theſe Cavils by putting out a Treatiſe containing all the Duries of Man, of which we may know the Neceſſity by the Strength of Reaſon only, and which, if we rightly underſtand the Thing, are contained in the Idea of the Law of Nature, otherwiſe we muſt agree, that his Method to prove the Principle of Sociableneſs is ſubject to ſome Inconveniences, as we have obſerved above in Note s. But all this may be rectified in ſome meaſure, by keeping cloſe to the , to be the Foundation of Natural Right, either as it came out of the Hands of the Creator, or as franied afterward diverſly by fome human Aēts. I. From this Principle only, That Men are G O D's Workmanſhip, ic evidently follows, that they ought to ſhew towards that Supreme Being, all the Sentiments which are comprehended in the Notion of Religion, and of which we ſhall treat in Chap. 4. S. 3. Note 2. following. Moreover, GOD having conſulted the Preſervation and Happineſs of Mankind (as ir appears plainly) both by the Faculties he has endowed him withal, and by that ſtrong Inclination which carries us irrefiftably to ſearch after Good, and avoid Evil. He alſo requires, doubtleſs, that every one ſhould not only preſerve and make Himſelf hap- py, but alſo contribute his utmoſt Endeavours to the Preſervation and Happineſs of others. There are alſo two other Funda- mentals of the Natural Law in general, taken in its full Extene, and they are, 1. Love of Ourſelves, in a true Senſe; and 2. So- ciableneſs. Inſomuch that as Religion contains all the Duties of a Man cowards GOD, To Love of Ourſelves (for ſo it may be beſt expreſſed to avoid all Equivocation) comprehends all that we are directly obliged to do in Relation to Ourſelves; and Sociable- neſs all that is due to others. See $. 24. Note 3. So that Sociableneſs is oppoſed to Self-Love, and Self-Love is no farther a Foundation of Sociableneſs, than as we are bound to Others, becauſe we love Ourſelves. But there are two diſtinct Principles, which though they have one great Relation, and equally concur in the Sight of the Creator, do yeč differ in the Main, and ought wiſely to be managed, ſo that we muſt keep an equal Ballance, as much as is poffible, between them. I ſay, as much as is poſſible, for it ſometimes happens that we can't ar the ſame time perform all the Duties which flow from theſe three great Principles of the Natural Law; and in ſuch caſes we ought to regulate ourſelves by theſe general Maxims. 1. That our Duties toward GOD ſhould always be preferred before all others. 2. That when there is a kind of Oppoſition between two Duties of Self-Love, and cwo of Sociableneſs , we ought to prefer that which is attended with the greatest Advantage, i e. we muſt conſider whether the Good which ſhall be procured to Ourſelves or to Others in performing either of chefe Duries is more confiderable, than the Good char fhall redound to Ourſelves or to Others by the Omiſſion of that Dury, which we can't ar preſent diſcharge without neglecting Come other. 3. If, all Things elſe being equal, there is an Oppoſition between Self-Love and the Duties of Society, whether it happens T 138 Of the Law of Nature in general. Воок ІІ. for any living Rival. And it is Society alone which whole World, after the Example of Hercules, whom Nature, doth not only appear, upon Examination, theſe Secondary Reaſons of Sociality, is that to be the moſt plain and eaſy, but it is likewiſe which Tully takes notice of in his firſt Book of Of- own'a for the moſt proper and genuine Way by fices, c. 44. There are ſome People, ſays he (7), that full Conſent of the greateſt part of Learned Men. fancy all Leagues and Alſociations amongst Men, to ariſe There's no need of heaping up Teſtimonies and from the Need that one Man hath for another, toward Authorities, but we may, let Seneca ſpeak for all the supplying of our natural and common Neceſſities: Be- the reſt. (6) By what other Means, ſays he, are cauſe (lay they) if Providence had deliver'd us from we preſerv’d, but by the mutual Aſſiſtance of good thus Care of looking after Food and Cloathing, by appoint- Turns ? This Commerce and Intercoarſe of Kindneſſes, ing ſome extrcordinary way for the Procurement of it : adds Strength and Power to Life, and, in caſe of ſud- no Man of either Brains or Virtue would ever trouble his den Aſſaulis , puts it into a better Condition of Defence, Head about Buſineſs, but wholly deliver himſelf up to the Take us all aſunder, and what are we, but an eaſy and attaining of Wiſdom. But this is a Miſtake; for even an unequal Prey to Wild Beaſts? Man by Nature is weak in that Condition a Man would fly Solitude, and wiſh for on every ſide: Society fortifies his Infirmity and arms his a Companion in his very Studies: He would be willing to Nakedneſs. Thoſe two Excellencies , of Reaſon and Teach and to Learn, to Hear and to Speak. He talks of Society, render bim the moſt potent of all Creatures, to the fame Purpofe in the Third Book of that who would otherwiſe be obnoxious to Injuries from every Work, c. 5: (8) It is more according to Neturi, for a Thing about him. Thus by the Help of Union be commands Mun to undergo all ſorts of Labours and Troubles for the the world, who, if divided, would ſcarce be a Match Service and the Conſervation (if it were poſſible) of the gives him his Sovereign Sway over the inferior Creation. the Gratitude of Men barb plac'd for his Virtue among This was the Thing which firſt reſtrain'd tbe Violence of the Gods ; than to live in Solitude, and not only free from Diſeaſes, which lent Crutches and Supports to Old Age, Cares, but even wallowing in Pleaſures and Plenty, with and adminiftred Conſolation to Grief." Take away thus, all the Advantages of Strength and Beauty over and a- and you cut aſunder the Band of Union, sbe vital String bove. This it is that makes all Great and Glorious Spirits of Mankind (a). prefer the former Kind of Life to the latter. What the There are other lefs principal Cauſes, or rather ſame Author obſerves in his Laliss, is rather appli- Arguments of a Sociable Nature in Men, For cable to Particular Friendſhip than to Common Example, becauſe nothing is more ſad and diſa- Society : Friendſhip first aroſe rather from Nature than greeable than perpetual Solitude (b)? Becauſe o- from Weakneß; rather from the Bent and Inclination of therwiſe we ſhould have no Uſe of our Tongue, Mens Minds, than from the Confideration of the Profit it that moſt noble Inſtrument, by the help of which would produce. Mankind have this Advantage above all other liv We would have it obſerv'd, that the Fundamen- ing Things, that they are able to expreſs their in- tal Law of Nature eſtabliſh'd by us, doth not dif- ward Sentiments in articulate Sounds (c): Becauſe agree (9) with chat which Dr. Cumberland hath every good and excellent Perſon is deſirous of ſhow- laid down in his work on that Subje&t (d), con- ing his worthy Deeds amongſt others. Amongſt cerning the Study and Endeavour after the Com- ز 101 happens through the Fact of another or not, then Self-Love ought to prevail, but if there be an Inequality, then Preference ought to be given to that of the two ſorts of Duties, which is accompanied with the greateſt Profit. See what is ſaid upon Chap.s. and 6. of this book. II. But it often happens, that Men, without leſſening the general Obligations, which refule directly and im- mediately from their Original Conſticution, and the Appointment of the Creator, add thereto by their own Will, or by fome Contract and Poſitive Law, divers private Engagements, which are united with the object of the Law of Nature, as it is a Rule of Action which requires ſuch Engagements. In ſhort, all Men ought throughly to conform their Actions to their Original Con- ficution, but in a different Manner, according to the different Eſtate they are in, as all the parts of a Clock concur to fulfil the Contrivance of the Artiſt, although every Wheel move in a way agreeable to its particular Form. Sec S. 22. and 24. follow- ing. (a) 'Arne 78 and es, &c. Men are the Defence of Men, Cities of Cities; as the Hand rubs the Hand, and the Fingers wafli the Fingers. All Safety is Confederacy. Plin. N. H. I. 9. c. 46. Add. Marc. Antonin. 1. 4. . 4. & 1.5. S. 16, & 29. where he calls So ciety the Good or Happineſs of a rational Creature; as it is frequent with him to term Man a Creature Sociable by Nature. Vide & 1.7. T.55. Liban. Declam. 19. p.499. Nature appointed Man to be a Companion, and an Aſſiſtant to Man. (6) Cicero de Fin. 1. 3. c. 20. No Man would be willing to lead a Life of Solitude, though in an Infinity of Delights and Pleaſures. Whence'tis eaſy to apprehend, that we are born for Natural Conjun&tion and Community. (c) Vid. Quin&til. Inſtitut.l.2. c. 16. (d) C.1. /.4. (6) Vt fcias per ſe expetendam eſse grati animi adje&tionem, per le fugienda res eft ingratum eſſe, quoniam nihil aquè concordiam bu- mani generis diſſociat & diftrahit , quàm hoc vitium. Nam quo alio tuti fumus, quam quod mutuis juvamur officiis . Hoc une inſtructior vi- ta, contraque incurſiones ſubit as munitior eft, beneficiorum commercio. Fac nos fingulos, quid fumus ? præda animalium & vi&time, do imbecilliſſimus do facilimus ſanguis. Quoniam cæteris animalibus in tutelam qui fatis virium eft, Quæcunque vaga naſcuntur, & aštura vitam ſegregem, armata funt : hominem imbellia cingit : non unguium vis, non dentium, terribilem cateris fecit; nudum, & infirmum Societas munite Duas res dedit, quæ illum obnoxium, validiffimum facerent, Rationem & Societatem. Itaque qui par esſe nulli pol- (et, si ſeduceretur, rerum potitur. Societas iui Dominium omnium animalium dedit ; Societas terris genitum, in alienæ Natur& tranſmiſit imperium, & dominari etiam in mari juffit. Hec morborum impetus arcuit, (ene&tuti adminicula profpexit, solatia contra dolores dedit : hæc fortes nos facit, quod licet contra fortunam advocare. Hanc tolle o unitatem generis humani, quâ vita suſtinet ur, Scindes. De Be. nef. Lib. 4. Chap. 18. (7) Nec verum eft , quod dicitur à quibuſdam, propter neceffitatem vita, quod ea que natura defideraret, conſequi fine aliis, atque effi- , nent, quasi virgula divina, ut ajunt, ſuppeditarent, tum optimo quifque ingenio, negotiis omnibus omiffis, totum ſe in cognitione, & scientia collocarent. Non eft ita, nam bo Solitudinem fugeret, & focium ftudii quæreret, tum docere, tum diſcere vellet, tum audire, tum dicere. Gold 5 (8) Magis fecundum naturam, pro omnibus Gentibus, li fieri poßit, conſervandis, aut juvandis maximos labores, molefiaſque ſuſcipere imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum Memor, in concilium Celeſtium collocavit, quàm vivere in folitudine, nor modo ſine ullis moleſtiis, fed etiam in Maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine do viribus. (9) There are leveral other Authors whofe Principles being well underſtood, may be reduced to this, though there appears ſome Difference in the Language and Method. See Mr. Hirtius's Diſcourſe De Sociabilitate primo fur. Nat. princip. Se&. II. & bildo vid cum mon CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general 139 . and Happineſs, or hath not Strengthens Quiet mon Good, and the demonſtrating all pollible Be- made Oppoſites; but thoſe different Inclinations nevolence towards all Men. For we, when we are in ſuch a Manner to be temper'd, that the for: maintain that a Man ought to be Sociable, do at mer do not overthrow or diſturb che laccer (6) the ſame time intimate, that he ought not to make When by the Enormity of wild Lufts this Tempe- his own ſeparate Good the Mark of his Proceed ramenc is broken, and ſo all take up a Reſolution ings, but the Benefit of Mankind in Common; of ſeeking each his own Advantage to the Injury that no Perſon ſhould purſue his private Advan- of others; then ariſe choſe Heats and Conténti- tage, by oppreſſing or by negle&ting other Men; ons which divide and confound Mankind. For and that none hath reaſon to hope for Happineſs the avoiding which, the bare Care of our private and Succeſs, who either injures or defpiſes his Safety commands the Obſervation of Social Laws, Neighbours. ſince we cannot enſure our own perſons without From this Social Nature of Man, and from the their Aſliſtance and Protection. As for Hobbes's De- Conſideration that every one is born, not for him- monftrarion, in which he ingeniouſly enough de- ſelf alone, but for all human Kind, the Lord Bacon, duces thoſe Laws which we call Natural, from the in his work of the Advancement of Learning, Book 7. Principle of Self Preſervation, the firſt Remark t. 1. deduces ſeveral excellent Corollaries; as, that that we ſhall offer concerning it is this; that ſuch an active Life is preferable to a contemplative one; a way of Proof doth indeed clearly enough make that the Happineſs of Manis to be ſought for in Vir- out, how conducive 'cis to the Safety of Men, that tue(10), not in Pleaſure; that the Fear of ſudden they act according to theſe Dictates of Reaſon. and unexpected Accidents ought not to deter us, ei- But it is not an immediate and dire&t Concluſion ther from managing publick Affairs, or from main to ſay, a Man hath a Right of ufing thoſe Means taining Society and Commerce with other Men: for his Prefervation, therefore he is oblig'd as it Laſtly, that we ought not to withdraw ourſelves were by a Law, to obſerve and to purſue them. from Civil Buſineſs, out of a tender and ſcrupulous For to give thoſe Dictates of Reaſon the Force and kind of Humour, or out of an Averſion to the uſual Authority of Laws, there is need of proceeding Methods of Complaiſance. In which place the on ſome other Principle, than whac he lays down. ſame noble Author farther obſerves, that there ne In the next place, great Care is to be taken left ver was any Philoſophy, Religion, Law, or Diſci- any ſhould conclude from ſuch Arguments and Po- pline found out in the World, which fo far ex- fitions, that when he hath once enſur'd his own alts che publick Good, and debaſes private Inte- Safety, and ſet himſelf out of Danger, he need reſt, as the Chriſtian Inſtitution appears to have not trouble himfelf about the Security of other done. Men; or that he may inſult how he pleaſe, over XVI. Let us conſider now whether or no the ſuch a perſon as doth not contribute to his c. 1. f.2. claſhes with what we have been deliver- diſturb it. For we therefore give Men the Name ing on this Head. Certainly he hath been intern of Sociable Creatures, becauſe they, of all living preted with very great Rigour, and with very little Things, are the fitteſt and the moft able to pro- Reaſon by ſome Learned Men, when they cenſure mote the Advantage of each other: Neither is any him for teaching, that Nature did not inſtitute Society, inferior Creature capable of receiving ſo great but Diſcord, amongst Men, and, as they hence infer, Benefit (1) from Man, as Man himſelf . Again, that all Kind of human Society is against the Deſign of the Excellency and Perfection of any particular Nature (a). Which is much the ſame thing, as if I Perſon riſe the higher, the more he deſerves of the ſhould talk thus, Speech is by Nature actually born with Community by his publick Benefactions and 90 Man; therefore all Speech which is afterwards learnt, Works of this kind are reckon'd the moſt Noble, runs againſt Nature's Intention. Or thus, All Men being ſuppos’d to proceed from the greateſt Wiſ- by Nature come into the World little; tberefore it is a- dom: Whereas any worthleſs Wretch, or a meer gainſt Nature that they ſhould grow up to larger Dimen- Fool, may be able to trouble or to hurt his Fellows. fions. Or, Men are by Nature ſubject to Diſeaſes; Beſides, fappofing every Man's private Advantage aberefore it is against Natüre, to make uſe of Diet, or were eſtabliſh'd for the Mark of his Actions, if Phyſick to prevent or to cure them. We muſt conteſs, many Perſons ſhould happen to fix that private Ad- that this Notion of Hobbes, looks at firſt View ex- vantage on the very fame Thing (2), there will tremely paradoxical; eſpecially if a Man doth either be a Neceſſity of ſaying that theſe not conſider diligently the Ambiguity of the Word Defires including a plain Contradiction, are con- Nature. i But for fear any one ſhould hereafter befiftent with Reaſon, which is the higheſt Abſur- cheated by the ſame doubtful Philoſophy, and led dity: Or, ſince none can pretend that his Deſire fatally into Error; let us firſt obſerve, that Self- ſhould have the Preference of the reſt, we fhall Love and Sociableneſs ought by no means to be be forc'd to admit it for a Truth, that no Man many YUV 107 3122 (a) compt. Conring. in Jure Civili, c. 14. in fin. (b) Arrian. Epi&et.t. 1. c. 19. God has diſpos’d the Nature and Conftitution of ra- tional Creatures after ſuch a manner, that they can't advance their private, without contributing, ſomething to the publick Intereſt. Community doth not exclude the purſuit of private Advantage, (10) Virtue is the cauſe of Happinels, but it is not Happineſs itſelf. All Happineſs confifts eſſentially in Pleaſure, although, there being diverfe forts of Pleafure, every one will not make a Man Happy. This might be eaſily proved, if this were a proper place. Sec a fine Pafſage of Montagne's upon this Subject, Esays, Lib. 2. Chap. 19. Init. vo S. XVI. (1) Our Author muſt mean Harm, for to ſay Benefit would not be agreeable to right Reaſoning. 2) Again, our Author is guilty of an Inadvertency, for inſtead of ſaying, on the very ſame Thing, he doubtlefs meant to ſay, on Things very different from one another , as appears from his Reaſoning afterwards, and from Dr. Cumberland, c. 5. . 16. whole Notions or Author follows, If right Reaſon, ſays that Engliſh Writer, di&tates to Perer, that all his Happineſs, and the End that he aims at, confits in the Enjoyment of the full Right of the Lands which John and James pofjeſs, as alſo of their perſons, and of Goods of all others in general, right Reaſon cannot inſpire James and John to place their Happineſs in the Enjoyment of a full Right in the Lands and Perſon of Peter, and of ali otbers, for that mould imply a plain Contradi&tion, &c. T2 ought the 140 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. that they ace hurt- ought ſo to make his own Profit the Aim of his Pro- ſons, but they are both extremely agreeable and ceedings, as not to conſider and to regard the Good confiftent, as appears ſufficiently from the Rule of others. Farther, whoever attempts to draw e- propos’d by our Saviour, Matth. xxii. 39. when he very thing to himſelf and to his own Intereſt, with- commands us to love our Neighbours as Ourſelves (4). out looking towards his Neighbour, will not only Indeed Reaſon plainly informs us, that whoſoever labour in vain, (it being impoſſible that all Per, hath a hearty Deſire for his own security muſt not, fons and all Things ſhould be diſpos'd according cannot neglect the Care of his Fellows. For, to the contradictory Deſires and Wills of Particu- ſince our Safety and Happineſs depend for the lar Men) but he will likewiſe invite others to moſt part on the Benevolence and on the Aſſiſtance plunder and to deſtroy him. Moreover, if that of others, and ſince the Nature of Men is ſuch, only can be ſaid to be Good to a particular Perſon, that for Benefits conferr’d they expect a Return which conduces to his ſeparate Intereſt, it follows, of Kindneſs, and when no ſuch Return is made, that in reſpect of all other Perſons it muſt be Evil, refrain from farther Favours: No Perfon in his in as much as their Intereſt or Profit is not further- Wits can fick ſo cloſe to the Purſuit of his fepa- ed by it :- And ſo what one covers and purſues, all rate Advantage, as to diveft himſelf of all Regard the reſt will oppoſe and keep off, which cannot to the reſt of the World: But rather the more ra- but raiſe perpetual Claſhing and contending a- tionally he loves himſelf, the more earneſt he will mongſt Men(a). Laſtly, although another Perſon be in endeavouring by good Turns to procure the hath done me neither Good nor Hurt, and though Love of other Men. For no one hath any reaſon he hath nothing in him to raiſe either my Fear or at all to hope, that Men will voluntarily contri- my Love, yet Nature obliges me to eſteem even bute towards advancing his Happineſs, whom ſuch a one as my Kinſman and my Equal; which they know to be malicious, perfidious, ingrateful, Reaſon alone, (had we no others) were ſufficient and inhuman, and that theſe wicked Practices are to enforce the Practice of a friendly Society and the Requitals which he will make for their Boun- Correſpondence amongſt Men. And upon this ty; on the contrary, it ſhould be expected, that Confideration, ſuppoſing there was a Nation in they will all join together in ridding the Earth of the World maintaining Peace and Juſtice amongſt ſuch a Monſter, or, at leaſt, in reſtraining him themſelves, and of ſuch mighty Strength as to be from doing farther Miſchief . formidable to all others, and ſo not reſtrain'd from XVII. Neither is the following Argument which hurting them by the Fear of a like Return ; yet the Hobbiſts make uſe of at all concluſive; Parti- ſhould this Nation or People aſſault, drive, kill, or 'cular Men when they join Society or Company drag into Slavery their weaker Neighbours, as of with certain others, have Regard to ſome peculi- ten as they thought convenient, we ſhould pro ar Good or Benefit, which is likely to redound nounce them actually guilty of a Breach of the to themſelves : Therefore human Nature in ge- Law of Nature. And yet (as we ſappoſe) theſe neral is not determin’d to Society, or, I am not People might preſerve themſelves, whether they oblig’d to behave my ſelf in a focial Manner to allow'd any Rights to others or not (3). In the wards him, from whom I do not expect ſome ſame manner, none will commend the Life and particular Advantage.' For thus much indeed is Profeſſion of Robbers, becauſe they exerciſe ſome evident, that the Reaſon why certain Men join in litele Juſtice towards thoſe of their Gang, becauſe any certain Species of Society, is either becauſe their Captains divide the Prizes equally amongſt they have a peculiar Refemblance and Agreement them, and becauſe he who either openly or ſecret in Diſpoſition of Mind, or in other Qualities; or ly robs one of the Crew, is (even by Thieves) ad- elſe becauſe they think they ſhall better obtain judg’d unworthy of farther Partnerſhip and Society fome End which they drive at, amongſt theſe Per- with them (b). This Rule of extending our Care fons than amongſt others . But, (beſides that, re- beyond our own Perſons, is ſo much the more di- gularly ſpeaking, no Man hath the Property of ligently to be attended to, the more evident it is, belonging to no particular Society) even amongſt that a Man of more Strength and Power than or- Men who are united only by the common Tie of dinary, is likely to be tempted to the Violation Humanity, that general Sociableneſs and Peace ſufficiency; that dantly provided for, he need not give himſelf the ing one another unjuſtly, and that as far as their trouble of maintaining Peace and Friendſhip with ſtricter and particular Obligations leave room, they his Neighbours. a mutually promote and communicate their Intereſts But to conclude this point, as the Care of our and their Goods. N Enduro own particular Preſervation doth not exclude a XVIII. Hence it is clear what Anſwer ſhould Concern for Society, ſo neither doth a kind Re- be made to that Objection, if one Man lavid another gard for Society ſuppreſs our Affection to our Per- naturally, that is, upon account of bis being a Man, C (a) Self-Intereſt is a poor Centre of a Man's A&tions, ſays my Lord Bacon, Ef. 23. (6) Vide Ciceron. Off. 2. C. II. nie (3) Nec magis vituperandus eſt Proditor Patria, quam communis utilitatis, aut ſalutis deſerto“ propter fuam utilitatem, aut Salutem Cicero de Fin. 1.3.6.1993“ A Betrayer of his Country is not more foully ſcandalous, than he who deſerts the common Benefic or - Safery for the Procurement of his own.." corso 169 (4) Qui ſtadium currit eniti do contendere debet, quàm maximè poſſit, ut vincat ; ſupplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere, nullo modo debet. Sic in vita ſibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad ufum, non iniquum eſt, alteri deripere jus non eft. Chryfippus apud Ciceron. De Offic. Lib. 3. Chap. 10. In running of a courſe a Man may be allow'd, nay, he ought to ſtretch and contend bis utmost for tbe Vi&tory: But be must not, on any account, trip up his Antagoniſt's Heels, or thruſt him out of the Liſts by main Force. So in Life, it is very fair and allowable, for every Man to get, by boneſt Means, wbatever makes for Uſe and Advantage ; but 'tie by no means lawful tbat he should take it away from other so them CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in goricral. 141 may , . then there can be no Reaſon given, why every one ſhould be manag’d with more Conveniency, and with not love every one equally, all being equally Men: Or why more Succeſs. And altho' when a Man unites a Man ſhould chuſe to frequent their Company moſt, from himſelf to any particular Society, he hath a prime whom he receives either greater Honour or greater Profit. Regard to his own Intereſt, and but a ſecondary In this Fallacy, common Society is confounded one to the Intereſt of his Companions ; not being with particular and ſtricter Confederacies, com able to carry on his own Matters without ſuch a mon Love, with ſuch as ariſes from peculiar and Conjunction ; yer this doth not hinder him from ſingular Cauſes. For to deſerve that common Af- being oblig'd ſo to purſue his own private Ends fection, no Property is requir'd but barely the be- and Advantage, as not to injure either the Corpo- ing a Man. Nature having, for the Reaſons above ration in general, or any fingle Member of it, and affign’d, really conſtituted a generals Friendſhip ſometimes to poſtpone his ſeparate Good, for the amongſt Men, from which no Perſon is excluded, Advancement of the common Benefit.ad. unleſs he hath rendred himſelf unworthy of it by What is urged about the Original of great and his monſtrous Villanies. Now, altho’ by the good laſting Societies, or States, (it being ſaid that they Diſpoſal of the All-wiſe Creator, our Natural are not deriv'd from mutual Benevolence, but Laws are ſo fitted to Human Condition, that the from mutual Fear ; by which Word they mean any Obſervation of them is join'd with the Intereſt kind of Precaution and Fore-fighe,) is entirely be- and Advantage of the Obſervers; ſo that even fide the Purpoſe. For as the Queſtion doth not this common Love is exceedingly profitable to at preſent proceed about the Riſe of Civil Society Mankind: Yet in afligning the Cauſe and Reaſon in general; ſo farther, it is highly agreeable to our of it, we are wont to have recourſe, not to the natural Condition, that whereas fingle Perſons or Benefit proceeding from it, but to the General a few join'd in Confederacy might lie perpetually Nature in which it is founded. For Example, if expos'd to the Inſults of ſuch Wretches as purſue we are to give a Reaſon why one Man ought not their private Ends without Regard to their Neigh- to hurt another, we do not uſually lay, becauſe bours; many ſhould unite in a Body, and ſo an abſtaining from mutual Violence is profitable, ftrengthen their Guard againſt farther Affaults and (altho'ic is ſo indeed in the higheſt degree) but, Miſchiefs . Neither is it indeed abſolutely necef- becauſe the Perſon being another Man, that is, ſary, to the proving any Society agreeable to Na- another Animal related to us by Nature, (1) it ture, to ſay that it aroſe entirely from mutual Be- would be a Crime to offer him any harm (a). nevolence. And yet even this Principle muft be Yet beſides this common and univerſal Affecti- allowed ſome little Share at leaſt, in the forming on, fome Circumſtances may make a Man love of States, ſince the Perſons who firſt begin them one Perſon in a higher degree than another : Sup- are commonly join'd on the account of Kindneſs poſe becauſe their Inclinations particularly agree, and Good-liking, though many others Perſon is more able or more willing to promotement of Fear. But as for this Fear, which is look'd his Advantage; or becauſe their Race or Original on as the Cement of States, as likewiſe for that makes them allied to each other. As to that Ob- Diſpute, whether or no Man by Nature be wav ſervation about Mens being more willing to fre- Metixòv, we ſhall examine them more at large when quent ſuch Company, where they find themſelves we come to enquire into the Riſe and the Origi- preferr'd to others in Honour and in Profit ; the nal of Commonwealths. Reaſon of the Thing is this, becauſe every one XIX. This Principle which we have eſtabliſh'd muſt naturally love his own Intereſt, if he have for deducing the Law of Nature, as it is the moſt Wit enough to underſtand it. But this Love is by genuine and the moſt clear, ſo we take it to be in no means repugnant to the ſociable Nature of ſuch a high Degree (1) adequate and ſufficient, Mankind, if it doth not riſe to ſuch a guilty that there is no natural Obligation bearing a Re- height, as to diſturb the Harmony and Agreement gard to other Men, the Reaſon of which is not which is univerſally to be maintain'd amongſt terminațed here, as in the chief Head and Foun- Men. For Providence did not for this Realon tain of Duty: Yet, as we ſhall hereafter ſhow, give us a Sociable Nature, that we ſhould there. to give theſe Dictates of Reaſon the Force and fore (2) neglect ourſelves and our own Affairs. Authority of Laws, there is a Neceſſity of ſuppo- But rather we are ſtudious of Society on this very ſing that there is a God, and that his Wife Provi- account, that by a mutual Communication of dence overſees and governs the whole world, and Aliſtance and of Goods, our own Concerns may in a particular Manner the Lives and the Affairs of DO Wito a 1313 uitda to 7290700 Onion (a) Lucian in Amoribus, Tom. I. p. 893, Ed. Amft. We do not, like Brute Creatures, affe& Solitary Meditations, but joining together in a Friendly Society, we make our joys to be the greater and our Afiations the leß, by being mutually communicated: And our Pleaſures baving many Sharers in them, fill us with the truer Satisfa&tion and Delight. Dio Chryfoftom, Orat. 12. tells us, that the Reaſon why Jupiter hath often the Title of pinto and Starpeio, The Kind and The Friendly, is, becauſe he gathers, as it were, all Mankind into Unity and Society, and would have them prove Friends to each other, without the least Mixture of Hatred or Oppoſition. In like man- mer, ſays he, he is callid, Eevic, or Hoſpicable, becauſe we ought really to think no Man a Stranger to us. besoin S. XVIII. (1) This is what the Roman Lawyers ſay, Cum inter nos cognationem quandam natura conſtituit, confequens eft hominem kom mini inſidiari nefas effe. Digeft. Lib. 1. Tit. I. De Juſtit . & Jure, Leg. 3 Norry! (2) Seneca has very well obſerved this, and ſays, Thaſ the higheſt Point of Friendſhip is to look upon one's Friend as a Per- ſon who ought to be as dear to us, as we are to ourſelves ; we ought to provide for the Intereſts one of another. I will, ſays he beſtow upon him that is in Want, but in ſuch a meaſure as not to be reduced to Neceſity my felf. I will ftep in to the Aſſiſtance of him who is in Danger of periſhing, but not ſo as to periff with bim. Quum fumma amicitiæ fic, amicum fibi æquare, utrique fimul con- Hulevdum eſt. Dabo egenci, fed ut ipſe non egeam, ſuccurram perituro, fed ut ipſe non peream. De Benif. Lib. 2. Chap. 5. S. XIX. (1) See Note 5. upon the isch Paragraph. Mankind. 142 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. Times this Morive, has had falſe and It be, perhaps, in Reli- ftanding their other falſe ſuperſtitious Idea's, as appears from the Example of che Pagans. But, as much as Atheiſm pleaſes fome Mankind. For we cannot by any Means ſubſcribe would be obſerv'd out of a bare Regard to Inte- to the Conje&ure which (2) Grotius ftares, in his reft, as thoſe are which the Phyſicians preſcribe in Prolegomena, or Introduâion, N.XI. That the Laws the Regimen of Health. Grotius ſeems to have of Nature would take place, ſhculd we (as we cannot taken the Hint of that Notion from a Paſſage in without the moſt borrid Impiety) deny either the Being of Marcus Antoninus (b); if, ſays the Emperor, the GOD or His Concern in buman Buſineſs . For, ſhould Gods do not conſult about any of our Affairs, which the any Wretch be ſo horribly ſenſeleſs as to maintain vileft Impiety can ſcarce believe ; why then’tis fit that that wicked and abſurd Hypotheſis in the rankeft I ſhould conſult or deliberate about my own Concerns : way, and ſo hold Men to have deriv'd their Being And all And all my Deliberation muſt be concerning what is moft wholly from themſelves ; according to them, the profitable for me. Now that is moſt profitable to every Edicts of Reaſon could not riſe ſo high as to paſs one, which beſt agrees with his Nature and Conſtitution. into a Condicion of Laws; in as much as all Law And my Nature is to be rational, and to be a Sociable ſuppoſes a Superior Power. (3) 'Tis a good Ob- Member of ſome City or State. My City and Country, ſervation of Tully, De Naturà Deorum, l. 2. c. 2. 1 as I am Antoninus, is Rome, as I am a Man, is all know not, ſays he, but that upon taking away Religion the World: Thoſe things therefore which are profitable to and Piety towards ibe Gods, all Faith and Society of bu- theſe Communities, are the only Things which are good man Kind, and even the moſt excellent Virtue of Juſtice, and expedient for me. muſt be baniſh'd the World (a). Unleſs the Rules As to what a certain Learned Man objects, that (a) Liban. Declam. 3. p. 230. Ed. Pariſ . Where there is no Honour of the Gods, there can be no Fidelity amongſt Men. (6) See his Moral Reflexions, B. 6. S. 44. (2) Mr. De Courtin, the Tranſlator of Grotius, explains theſe Words, but ſomething obſcurely, and ſeems alſo to miſtake him, telling us, that he maintains, That Man's Natural Light, without any Star of GOD, would carry a Man in a moſt efficacious Manner to ſeek Good and avoid Evil, by all means poſſible, in Obedience to that Law only which Reaſon preſcribes, and with the Execution of which Conſcience is charged. I ſuſpect that Grotius never deſigned to expreſs himſelf with ſo much Philofo- phical Exactneſs, and that there is little Rhetorick in that Paffage, if the Senſe being rightly underſtood has that Meaning; That che Maxinis of the Law of Nature are founded upon the Conſtitution of Mankind, and neceſſarily contributing to the Advantage of every one, will not ceaſe to take place, and be practifed outwardly in lome Meaſure, although no Deity be acknowledged; but then they can't be looked upon as Duties, nor can be put in practice, but upon the Account of ſome Intereit or Vainglory. Mr. Bayle goes much farther, and maintains, in his confiderations upon a Comet, pag. 554. Thac Reaſon, without any Knowledge of GOD, may ſometimes perſuade a Man, thar a Thing is honeſt, and good, and commendable to be done, not for the Advantage coming by it, but becauſe it is ſuitable to Reaſon. The famous Chancellor Bacon, (whoſe Authority, no more than Grotius's, Mr. Bayle doth not take notice of ) has delivered much the fame Thing, in his Serm. Fidel. 117. where, making a Parallel between Su- perſticion and Atheiſm, he reafons much after the fame Manner in his conſideration on a Comer, though more largely. My De- ſign is not to examine Things throughly, and therefore I ſhall only make ſome ſhort Reflexions. I own, that Religion is neither the only, nor principal Baſis of Seciery ; but then, in my opinion, we muſt allow, 1. That the Nocions of Honeſty being ſtript of all Relation to the Will of GOD, the Supreme Lawgiver, the Author of our Being, the Prorector of Mankind, and of Society, are meer Chimera's, or meer barren Principles, pure Speculations, incapable of laying a Foundation for good Morality, or to produce ſolid Virtue. if we look upon the Atheist (fays Mr. Bayle himſelf) in the Diſpoſition of his mind, we shall find that he, not being awid by any Fears of "Puniſhment, nor encouraged with the Hopes of GOD's Bleſsing, muſt reſign himſelf to the Government of his Paſions. 2. That, ſo far as we can judge by Conjecture, a Society of Atheiſts, all Things elle being equal , would be more corrupt, and ſubject to more Disorders, than any of thoſe who retain Tome Principles of Religion, although imperfect and incoherent. I I ſay, All Things elſe being equal. For it would be ridiculous, to compare, for Example, a polite and well-inſtructed People with a ſavage Nation, who have not Senſe enough to do any Evil . We muſt beſides, if we will exactly diſtinguiſh the Effects proper to Atheiſın, and a good or bad Religion, ſuppoſe the Perſons ſo compared together, to be very near furniſhed with the ſame Nori. ons, and to be in the ſame Situacion, and under the fame Circumſtances in general, otherwiſe we ſhall be in Danger of attributing to Religion, what really proceeds from Nacure, Education, Cuſtom, or the like; which Religion is very little or nothing conducing to, or we may accuſe Religion of Impotency, by reaſon of ſome invincible Obſtacles in them, upon whom it would not fail to produce its Effect, were it nor that they are ignorant of the moſt neceſſary Point. Upon this foot I maintain, that Religion, tho corrupred, would produce better Effects chan Atheiſm, that it would diſturb Society lets, and that the Good it would do, would be much greater than the Evil it would cauſe. I will not deny, but there may be amongſt theſe Atheiſts, Men of Senſe and Philoſophers, who, reflecting that it is better for Men to ſubject themſelves to certain Rules of Life, than for every Man to follow his Humours only, may obſerve them outwardly, lo far as they are exempt from ſuch Circumſtances, as ſome great Intereſt preſent, or ſome violent Paffion forces them upon, ſuch Councils as are reaſonable, calm and aware of the Conſequences. But the common fort of ignorant People, and Idiots, which make up the greateſt part of Society, are not able to inake ſuch Reflections. To curb in there- fore the violence of their Paffions, and to outweigh Mens private Intereſts, which often claſh with the publick Good, ſome more obvious Principle, twhich all the world may be fenfible of, and which may make the deepeſt Impreffions upon them, mult be found out, and that, in a Word, can be no other than the Fear of a Deity. Experience fufficiently confirms this, char in all was the Cauſe of in many ., did always to their Princi- ples, and for it might well happen, that many Pagans did nor perceive nor draw the Confequences which followed from the false Notions which they had of the Deity. ?Tis certain, that not only the Philoſophers, bur the Vulgar looked upon the Gods as the Revengers of the Violation of the Laws of Nature. See what is ſaid in the next Chap. S. 3. Note 4. Since then there are among Atheiſts the fame Principles of Diſorder, as among Pagans, from which no Man can be reftrained but by Religion, it ſeems plain that Vice muſt reign with much leſs Controul and Extent in the Society of Atheiſts, than in a Religious One, alçho' their Worſhip gious Societies, by Superftition and falſe Zeal; and I own, that theſe Inconveniences, which ariſe from the Abuſe of Religion, are great, but the Disbelief of a Deity would produce much greater. As much as the Norions of Religion are perverted, and though they are made uſe of as an Occaſion or Pretence of confirming or engaging many Perſons in the Commiſſion of Crimes, yet they fail nor to diſcourage and deter others, and thoſe of a much greater Number. 's The Notion of a GOD, and of an inviſible Judge who will puniſh Vice and reward Virtue, are naturally ſo fatt linked together, that the moſt finple have a Senfe of it, notwith neſs and Debauchery; Conſequences which are clear to the light of all the world, and can't but bring Deſtruction to a Society, which is compoſed of Men endowed with fuch irreligious Principles. If the Nations which are ſo barbarous as to have uo Reli- gion be objected, beſides chac the Hiſtories which give an accounc of them are contradicted by more modern and faithful Relations. chefe People are either nor formed into any Society, or are fo illiterate and ſtupid, as there is little Difference between them and the Beaſts, as the ingenious Writer of the Rights of the Chriſtian Church, has very well obſerved in his Preface, S. 18. See alſo Lib. I. Chap. 6. Ş.13. Note 7. aforegoing, and Chap. 4. 5.3. Note 4. of this Book, following. tubo (3) Tully's Words are theſe, Atque haud Scio, an Pietate adverſus Deos Sublata, fides etiam & Societas humani generis, & una 'ex- cellentiſſimi virtus fuftitia tollatur. See alſo Libanius, Declam. 3. p. 250. particularly CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. 143 I Cor. XV. 19. a particularly the Virtue of Fortitude, cannot be de- it rather contradies and hinders the Preſervation, monſtrated from our Principle, unleſs we farther the Sociableneſs, the Peace, and the Tranquility of fappoſe the Immortality of the Soul; fince other. Mankind. But the Genius and the Scope of Chri- wife there would be no Reward to a Man who ftianity differs vaſtly from theſe meer Natural ſhould throw away his Life on a good Cauſe: This Schemes; and the holy Apoſtle had good Reaſon will require no great pains to anſwer. For altho' to affirm, (8) that if in this Life only we bad Hope really to deny, or ſo much as to call in queſtion in Chrift, we ſhould be of all Men the moſt miſerable. ſo certain a Truth be extremely impious; yet without bringing this high Point into the Argu XX. But to make theſe Dictates of Reaſon ob- ment, it is poſſible to demonſtrate, that a Soldier tain the Power and the Dignity of Laws, it is ne- may fairly be commanded to fight to Death, in ceſſary to call in a much higher Principle to our the Behalf of his Country. For, beſides that, Afliftance. For altho' the Uſefulneſs and Expedi- there appears yet no clear Reaſon why we muſt ency of them be clearly apparent, yet this bare ſacrifice, as it were, every good Action to ſome Confideration could never bring ſo ſtrong a Tie external Reward; thus much is univerſally agreed on Mens Minds, but that they would recede from on, that 'tis in the Power of the Sovereign to arm theſe Rules, whenever a Man was pleas'd either the Subje&s, and to lead them out againſt the E- to neglect his own Advantage, or to purſue it by nemy, in Defence of the State ; and farther, when ſome different Means, which he judg’d more pro- they find it requiſite to forbid every one under per, and more likely to ſucceed. Neither can the pain of capital Puniſhment, to quit his Station by Will of any Perfon be ſo ſtrongly bound by hi Flight. Now of two Evils the leſſer is moft cer own bare Reſolution, as to hinder him from act- tainly to be choſe. But it is a leſs Evil to fight ing quite contrary, whenever the Humour takes with extraordinary Danger, and even to the laſt him. And altho' we ſhould ſuppoſe many Perſons Breath, than to ſuffer unavoidable Death for ruu- ftanding in a Natural Liberty, and combining to ning away. And therefore that Soldier muſt be keep theſe Precepts, yet the Force of them could the greateſt Fool, as well as the greateſt Coward, then laft no longer, than the Agreement from who would not chufe rather to fall honourably bý whence they derivd it. Nor would the Obligati- the Enemies Hand, having firſt anticipated his own on then only ceaſe, when all the conſenting Par- Revenge, than to deliver up himſelf to be igno- ties ſhould pleaſe to alter their Minds ; (as is now miniouſly diſpatch'd by the Executioner (4). It the Manner of receding from mutual Covenants ſeems ſufficient that a Man fight with all his Force by common Conſent ; ) but even during the ge- and Ability, let his Inducement to this Behaviour neral Agreement, the Power of obliging would be what it will. Nor is it requiſite to the Preſer- be wanting to the Compact: In as much as we ſup- vation of States, or of Society amongſt Men in poſe, that Dictate of Reaſon which commands us to general, that every particular Perſon ſhould be in- ſtand to our Bargains and Promiſes, not yet to have dued with ſuch a Firmneſs of Mind, as the Terrors obtain'd the Authority of a Law; and therefore of Death cannot ſhake or overcome; all Souls 'tis at every one's Pleaſure to renounce the Cove- not being capable of this noble Pitch of Valour, nant, whether the other Perfons concern'd are Beſides, the Uſe of Fortitude doth not only diſco- willing or not. Laſtly, the meer Force of human ver it ſelf in bearing Death undauntedly upon ex- Command ſeems inſufficient to inveſt theſe Di- treme Occaſion; but is chiefly employ'd in vigo. Etates with the Power of Obligation. For ſince rouſly withſtanding, and in driving off the Dan- no ſuch Command could take place otherwiſe ger of Death, as it preſſes on us. Many Difficul- than by the Intervention of Covenants, and ſince ties are not otherwiſe to be avoided, than by un- Covenants owe all their Strength to ſome Law, it dergoing others of almoft equal Hazard : 's) And doth not appear how there could ariſe any human Fate ſooner overtakes the Coward, than it maſters Sovereignty capable of Obligations, unlefs the the Valiant. It is farther obſervable, that ſetting Dictates of Reaſon were beforehand receivd for aſide the Suppoſition of the (6) Soul's Immortali- Laws. Or ſhould wel grant the Fancy of ſome, ty, it doth by no means appear that the chief End that human Government depends only on human and Happineſs of Man () conſiſts in Pleaſure. Conſent, and then make theſe rational Duties be For beſides that in the Doctrine of Natural Law, enjoin'd the Subje&ts like other Laws; yet even treated of in this Manner, the Immortality of the thus they would obtain no more Power than poſi- Soul is by no means denied, but only abſtracted tive Conftitutions, which depend on the Will of from ; it's plain that the Pleaſure of the Body, the Legiſlator, both as to their Original and their in which Epicurus is vulgarly thought to have plac'd Duration (a). It is therefore on all accounts to be his Summum bonum, is ſo far from promoting, that concluded and to be maintain'd, that the Obliga- . (a) Comp. Selden de J. N.GG. l. 1. c. 7. -4) póßw uwzóvar voduivxoir ou es vi er sproet dévelop or un mouév . lamblich. in Protrept. “When the Valianteſt Men “ ſuſtain Death, they do it for fear of greater Evils." vol (5) Horat. 1. 3. od. 2. v. 14, Loc. Mors do fugacem perſequitur virum; zido Nec parcit imbellis Juventa 1 bac Poplitibus, timidove tergo. :) (6) All that the Author ſays here is true; but we muſt alſo declare that the moſt effectual Mocive to leſſen the Fears of Death, and make us out-face, as I may ſay, the Dangers, which the Defence of a good Cauſe engages us in, is the Höpes of another Life, and the Proſpect of the Reward which ſhall be given to good Men ; the Courage produced by any other Principle is but a falié Bravery, in compariſon of the Undauntedneſs which naturally follows that Perſwafion, when it is ſtrong and the idea of it is vi- gorully impreſſed on the Mind. See the News from the Rep. of Letters, July 1707. P. 79. and Aug. p. 178. (7) See S. 15. Note 10. above. (8) See what is ſaid at the End of S. 21. with Note 6. tion 144 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. tion of natural Law proceeds from God him- fcience inherent in the Minds of Men that are ſelf, the great Creator and ſupreme Governor of nat corrupted and debauched with Vice; by which Mankind'; who by Virtue of his Sovereignty hath they are convinc'd, that to ſin againſt Nature's bound Men to the Obſervation of it. And thus Law, is to offend him, who hach a Sovereign much may be demonſtrated by the ſole Light of Power over Mens Souls, and who is to be feard, natural Reaſon. Here then we lay it down as a even when we do not apprehend any Danger from granted Truth; that God Almighty is the Crea- human Puniſhment (c). tor and Governor of the World, ſince it hath been The Laws of Nature would have a full and per- ſhown with ſo much Evidence by Wiſe and Learned feet Power of binding Men, altho' God Almigh- Men,and ſince no Perſon of Senſe and Underſtand- ty had never propos'd them anew in his reveal'd ing ever call'd it in Queſtion(I). Now this Supreme Word. For Man was under Obligation to obey Being having ſo form’d and diſpos’d the Nature his Creator, by what Means foever he was pleas'd of Things and of Mankind, as to make a Sociable to convey to him the Knowledge of his Will. Life neceſſary to our Subſiſtence and Preſervation; Nor was there any abſolute Neceſſity of a particu- and having on this account indued us with a Mind lar Revelation to make a rational Creature fenfi- capable of entertaining ſuch Notions as conduce ble of his Subječtion to the ſupreme Author and to this End, and having inſinuated theſe Notions Governor of Things. No one will deny but that into our Underſtandings by the Movement of Na- thoſe Perſons who were not acquainted with the tural Things, deriv'd from Him the firſt Mover; Holy Scriptures, did yet ſin againſt the Law of and likewife moſt clearly repreſented to us their Nature: Which we could not affirm, did this Law neceffary Connexion and their Truth: Hence it derive its Force from the Promulgation made of follows, that it is the Will of God, Man ſhould it in the Sacred Writings. On this account we frame his Life according to that Diſpoſition and can by no means admit of that Notion ſtarted by Method which he ſeems peculiarly to have aſſign'd Hobbes (a), Since thoſe Laws, ſays he, which we call him, above the Life of Brutes. And ſince this Natural, are nothing elſe but certain Concluſions appre- cannot otherwiſe be atchiev'd and compaſs’d, than bended by Reaſon, concerning things to be done and things by the Obſervance of Natural Law, it muſt be ſup- to be omitted; and ſince Law, in a proper Senſe, is only pos’d that God hath laid an Obligation on Man the Speech of him, who by vertue of his Right commands to obey this Law, as a Means not ariſing from hu- Men to execute or to abſtain from ſome Performances ; man Invention, or changable at human Pleaſure, therefore they are not Laws as they proceed from Nature, but exprefly ordain'd by God himſelf for the Ac- but only as they are enacted by GOD in Scripture . For compliſhment of this Deſign. For when any So we do not take it to be eſſential to a Law, that it vereign enjoins his Subject the Purſuit of ſuch an be conveyed to the Subje&s Notice in the Form and End, he is at the ſame time ſuppos’d to oblige him Manner of a Propoſition ; but we reckon it ſuffi- to make uſe of thoſe Means, without which the cient that the Will of the Sovereign be gather'd End cannot be attain'd(a). Nor is this the only and underſtood any way, whether by internal Sug- Proof of Man's being oblig'd to a Social Life by geſtion of the Mind, or from the Contemplation the Command of God, that, as the Condition of of our State and Condition, and of the Nature of Mankind ſtands at preſent, we could not ſupport thoſe Affairs and Tranfations which are to engage and ſecure our felves unleſs this Perſwafion were our Life. And indeed he himſelf acknowledges as firmly rooted in our Minds; and that by Order of much, in another part of the ſame Work (e), where the Divine Providence it ſo falls out, that by a na- he obſerves, that the Laws of GOD are declar'd three tural Conſequence our Happineſs flows from ſuch ways; firſt by the tacite Dietates of Right Reaſon, &c. A£tions as are agreeable to the Law of Nature, Beſides, the Laws of Nature as they are deduc'd and our Miſery from ſuch as are repugnant to it: by Ratiocination, cannot be apprehended other- But it is farther confirm’d by this Conſideration, wiſe than in the Manner of Propoſitions, and that in no other Animal there is diſcoverable any therefore in this Reſpect they may be allow'd to Senſe of Religion, or ony Fear of a Deity (6)(2). bear that Name. But as in Civil Laws it matters To which may be added, that tender Senſe of Con- not, whether they be promulgated in Writing, or ( 09.00 2 (a) Vide M. Antonin. l. 9. J. 1. (0) Vide Protag.de Platon. p. 224. Ed. Wech. Ficin.se (c) Tis remarkable what Tacitus ſays, An. 6. c. 6. of Tiberius. His own Crimes and Villanies were by his Conſcience turnºd inta the greatest Puniſhments to him. And it was not without Reaſon, that the great Maſter of Wiſdom us’d to affirm, That could we open the Hearts of Tyrants, we should diſco- ver the Strokes and wounds of Guilt : The Body not being more cut and tormented with Stripes, than the Mind is with Cruelty, Luſt, and ill Deſigns. Cicero de Finib. I. 1. c. 16. If there be any who think themſelves ſufficiently guarded and ſecur'd againſt the Diſcovery of Men, they yet dread the Majeſty of the Gods: And judge all thoſe Cares and Diſquiets which Night and Day, prey upon their minds, to be ſent from Heaven, as a preſent Puniſhment for their Crimes. Seneca in Lactant. 1. 6. c. 24. Vain Madman. what can it profit thee to have had no Witneſs of thy Villany, when thou always carrieſt a Conſcience about with thee? Albricus de Deorum. Imagin. A wicked Man is never Maſter of his own Countenance. Add. Juvenal. Sat. 13. The Advantage of a Good Conſcience, Martial hath thus hap- pily expreſs’d, L. 10. Ep. 23. Ampliat ætatis ſpatium fibi vir bonus : hoc eft Good Men live twice: It doubleth every Hour Vivere bis, vit a posle priore frui. To look with Joy on that which paſs’d before. Add. Philoftrat. de Vit. Apollon. 1.7.0.17. (d) De Cive, c. 3. f. ult. (e) c. 4.5. 3. §. XX. (1) The ſtrongeſt and moſt natural Proofs of this Fundamental Truth may be found in Locke's EŞay of Human Under- stand. B. 4.6.10, S. 9,6c. See Le Clerc's Latin Treatiſe of Pneumatology, Part 3. c.1. (2) Επειδή ο άνθρωπG- θείας μέπη μοίρας, ενώ τον μεν δια και το Θεϊ σε γενίαν, ζώων μόνον θεές ενόμιση, και οι χώρει βωμές 7 , eizea eta Sear, i.e. Man is the only one of all the Creatures, who by reaſon of the Relacion which he has to the Divine Being thinks that there are Gods, and erectech Altars and Images to them. Plato gathered this Norion from Socrates his Maſter, as it appears from what Xenophon relares, memoirs of Socrates Lib. I. Chap. 4. Numb, 13. See alſo Cicero de Legib. lib. 1. Chap. 8. and La&antius de Ira Dei, chap. 14. 8. 2. viva CHA P. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. 145 viva voce (3) fo the Divine Law is of equal Obli- rightly from God. Thus Plutarch (c) Touriv 65 gation, whether it is diſcover’d to Men either by fore 3 ore Stõ, vì to refJH 263W. To follow GOD and God himſelf in a viſible Shape, and with the re to obey Reaſon is the ſame Thing. But Tully hath left ſemblance of a human Voice, or by holy Men, the moſt noble Teſtimony for our Purpoſe, as it is peculiarly inſpir’d from Heaven; or whether, laft- cited out of his Books de Republicà by Lactantius(d): ly, it be work'd out by natural Reaſon, from the (5) There is indeed, ſays he, 'a Law agreeable to Na- Contemplation of human Condition. For Reaſon, ture, and no other than right Reaſon, made known to all properly ſpeaking, is not the Law of Nature it- Men, conſtant and perpetual ; which calls us to Duty by felf, but the Means, upon a right Application Commands, and deterrs us from Sin by Threats; and of which that Law is to be diſcover’d. Nor doth wholė Commands and Threats are neither of them in vain the Manner and the Method of promulgating a to the Good, though they may ſeem of little Force to the Law belong to its inward Eſſence and Conſtitution. Wicked. This Law we are neither allow'd to diſannul, Farther, altho' it ſeem à more clear and a more nor to diminiſh ; nor is it poſſible it should be totally re- compendious Way of revealing one's Will to ano- vers’d; the Senate or the People cannot free us from its ther, to force it upon his Senſes by expreſs Words Authority. Nor do we need any other Explainer or Ina and Speeches : Yet that is likewiſe reckon'd to be terpreter of it beſides our ſelves. Nor will it be different ſufficiently reveald, which we muſt unavoidably at Rome and at Athens, now and bereafter ; but will diſcover, if we make Uſe of the Occaſion offer'd, eternally and unchangably affect all Perſons in all Places: and keep the way that we are put into. And thus GOD himſelf appearing the univerſal Maſter, the uni- Man, who by the Bounty of his Creator, enjoys verfal King. 'Tis He who is the Inventor, the Ex- the Faculty of comprehending both his own and pounder, the Enacter of this Law; which whoſoever other Mens A&tions; and of judging whether or shall refuſe to obey, ſhall fly and loath his own Perſon, and no they are agreeable to human Nature, cannot bis thus but take occaſion (ſuppoſing there are more Men the ſevereſt Penalties, though he eſcape every thing elſe in the World beſides himſelf ) to obſerve and confi- which falls under our common Name and Notion of Pusa der how ſome of thoſe Actions do really thus a- niſhment. Sophocles ſpeaks very honourably on the gree to the Inclination and to the Condition of fame Subject in his firſt Oedipus, Act 3d, p. 187. Mankind (a): Ed. H. Steph. Although to render a Law obligatory there is a Neceſſity of making it known to the Subject; and - vócson uffirades, &c. altho' to deduce the Law of Nature from the Sug- geſtions of Reaſon, and to apprehend its Founda- The lofty Laws tion, and its neceſſary Connexion with the State Deriv'd from Heaven and High Olympian Jove, of Humanity, be not the Gift of every Perſon; And not the mean Device of Mortal Men. yet hence it can neither be pretended, that this Law doth not oblige all Men, or that it may not Mr. Selden, in his Diſcuſſion of this point, hath be ſaid to be known by the Light of Reaſon. For ſhown (e), that although the Gentiles did acknow- to give a Law a binding Force, a popular and ſim- ledge the chief Heads of Natural Law to be ſome- ple Knowledge is ſufficient; nor is an artificial De- times violated through the corrupt Manners of monſtration and Deduction abſolutely requiſite to Men; and to be (as it were) opprefs’d and ſtifled this Purpoſe. And altho' 'tis (4) very probable by wicked Ordinances and Confticutions; yet they that the chief Heads of Natural Law were expreſ- were at the ſame time fully perſuaded that their ly deliver'd by God Almighty to the firſt Mortals, co durodí nguov, or, what was really juſt and fit to be and were from them communicated to others by done, did by Order of the Gods perpetually re- Cuſtom and Inſtitution ; yet the Knowledge of main the ſame, and hold the ſame Force of Obli- that Law may nevertheleſs be ſtild Natural, in as gation. Whence aroſe that common Opinion a- much as the neceſſary Truth and Certainty of it mongſt them of the Puniſhment of Wicked Men may be drawn from the Uſe of Natural Reaſon. in another State; when they had been guilty of At the ſame time, becauſe thoſe Propoſitions which any monſtrous Offences againſt the Law of Nature. repreſent to us the Law of Nature, are inſinuated And ſince they thus believ'd the Gods to be the A- into Mens Minds from the Contemplation of the vengers of its Violation, we may take it for grant- Nature of Things; on that account they are juſtly ed, that they thought them too the Authors and attributed and referr’d to God, the Author of Na- Founders of its Authority. On the other Hand, ture (b). ſuch of them as had any Senſe of any Virtue, did The Wiſeft of the old Heathens acknowledg’d as fairly ſuppoſe, that Good Men exerciſing Piety the Authority of Natural Law, and deriv’d it never faild of the peculiar Countenance and Con- (a) Add. Dr.Cumberland, c. 1. f. II. &c. 5. f. I. (4) De 7. N. do G. l. 1. c. 8. (b) Add. Dr. Cumberland, c.i. f. 10. (c) De Auditione. (d) L.6.c.8. (3) Theſe words, which are found a little lower, Nor doth the manner - as far as, Conſtitution, may be more properly added here, as any Man may eaſily diſcern. (4) See the Extract of an Engliſh Sermon of Dr. Barrow's in Tom. 3. of the Univerſal Library, p. 322. (5) Cicero's words are, Eft quidem vera Lex, reta Ratio, Natura congruens, diffuſa in omnes, conſtans, ſempiterna, que vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando à fraude deterreat : quæ tamen neque probas fruftra jubet , aut vet at ; nec improbos jubendo aut vet ondo movet. Huic Legi nec obrogari fas est ; nec derogari ex hac aliquid licet ; neque tota abrogari poteft. Nec vero aut per Senatum, aut per po- pulum folvi hac Lege posſumus : neque eft quærendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius. Nec enim alia Lex Rome, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia pofthac ; sed do omnes gentes, & omni tempore, una Lex, do ſempiterna, do immutabilis continebit ; unuſque erit communis quafi magifter do imperator omnium Deus, ille Legis hujus inventor, diſceptator, lator : cui qui non parebit, ipſe se fugiet, ac naturam kominis aſpernabitur , atque hoc ipſo luet maximas pæna, etiamfi cetera fupplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit. U fideration 146 Of the Law of Nature in general. BOOK II. ſideration of Heaven. (7) Thus lamblichus (a) We pleas’d to aſſign to ſuch and ſuch Performances of must take this therefore for a certain Truth, that nothing the Laws ſuch perpetual and natural Effets, pro- properly Evil jhall bappen to a Good Man, either in this ductive of the Good and Profit of Mankind. And Life or after it. Nor are the Affairs and Concerns of ſuch theſe are thoſe which Dr. Cumberland calls Natural a Perſon neglected by the Immortal Deities. And Euripi- Rewards. A third kind of Goods proceed from des (6) ſays, Good Min do at last obtain what theirVirtue fome certain Actions, either by the Pleaſure of the bath defero'd: But Evil Men fhall never arrive at any Legiſlator, or by the Covenant and Agreement of tolerable Degree of Happineſ.. But Mr. Selden farther Men; of which the former are call'd, xar'lEogày , Thews (c) it to have been a conſtant Opinion a- Rewards, or arbitrary Returns, the latter more mongſt the Primitive Chriſtians, that in the Inter- properly Wages . In the ſame manner may Evils be val betwixt the Creation and the Publication of divided. Some of them follow the very Nature the Decalogue, thoſe natural and univerſal Laws and Condition of Men; (if we abſtract the firſt were given to Mankind, which were afterwards Cauſe and Original of that Condition; ) or they inſerted in the Mofaical Conſtitutions. Hence happen without the particular Default of him was drawn that moſt excellent Obſervation of St. who ſuffers them. Which we may, in a found Chryfoftom (d), that to the Commandments about Senſe, call Fatal Evils, oppoſing the Word Fare, the honouring of Parents, about Murder, about nor to the Divine Diſpoſal, but to the peculiar Adultery, and about Theft, God was therefore Faultineſs of the Perſon on whom theſe Evils light. pleas’d to add no Reaſon, becauſe thoſe Duties Others do, by Natural Conſequence and Connex- were already well known and underſtood, as being ion, proceed from Sins; which are by fome Au. main Points of the Law Natural; whereas to the thors term’d Natural Puniſhments . Laſtly, others Ordinance concerning the Sabbath-day, a Reaſon there are which ariſe from Sins, by the peculiar of the Precept was deſignedly affix’d, upon account Determination and Diſpoſal of the Legiſlator be- of its being poſitive and arbitrary (e). To conclude, yond the manner of Natural Effects: In which the all Legiſlators have believ'd that their Laws, of Quality, the Manner, the Place and Time of the what Kind foever, would derive the greateſt Evil depend on the Legiſlator's free Pleaſure. And Strength and Authority from the Succours of Reli- theſe are what we would properly call Puniſhments, gion: As appears from their ſolemn Cuſtom of or (in a looſer Senſe of the Word) Arbitrary Pu- uſhering in all their Conſtitutions with the Wor- niſhments. ſhip of the Gods (f). XXI. It is well worth our while to treat more Thus much being premis’d, we proceed to re- diftin&tly and more carefully concerning the Sancti- mark, that altho' the Omnipotent Creator might on of the Law of Nature. And to this purpoſe, by vertue of his Sovereign Right have requir'd beſides what we have formerly deliver'd about the our Obedience, without making any good Fruit San&tion of Laws in general, we will firſt of all proceed thence to our own Advantage : yet it hath obſerve, that the Goods and Evils which happen pleas’d his infinite Goodneſs, ſo to order and conſti- to Man, may be both divided into three Ranks or tute the Nature of Things and of Mankind, that Claffes. And as for the Goods, ſome of them pro- by a kind of Natural Connexion ſome Goods ceed, either from the free and liberal Donation of fould attend the Obfervance, and ſome Evils the the Creator, or from the voluntary Benevolence Tranſgreſſion of Nature's Laws. Thus a conſtant of other Men, or from the Induſtry of the Acquir- Obedience, is follow'd by (1) Serenity and Secu- ers, to which Induſtry they determin’d themſelves rity of Conſcience, join'd with a good and cer- by their own free Choice. And it is plain, that And it is plain, that tain Aſſurance; by a good Frame and a ſettled this firſt fort are not owing to the Obſervation of Tranquility of Mind (8); by the Preſervation of the Laws. Other Goods there are which flow, by a the Body from many Evils, not fatal : Beſides an natural Conſequence, from fome Axions which infinite Number of Advantages, which may be ob- the Laws command: The Creator having been tain'd by the mutual Benevolence and good Offi- (a) Protrep. c. 13 (b) Euripid. Ion. v. 1620, &c. (c) See Book 7. Chap. 9, 10. (d) Orat. 12. ad Pop. Antiochen. (e) Add. Selden, ibid. Chap. 9. and Lib. 7. Chap. 9, 10, (f) See the Form which introduceth Za- leuchus's Laps in Diodor. Sic. l. 12. c. 216 (8) See Archbiſhop Tillotſon's 38th Sermon, Folio, pag. 451, &c. See likewiſe page 51. and 74, &c. (7) Jamblichus's Greek is, “Ev 77 šv rīto darosios ou de angels, on 8 x tészy ävdee dija Jõ xoxòo ed èv, šte Jõpe, šte tend thousle, mode dueneitar od few trail Téty medyua Tao Thele very, Words Plato alſo makes Socrates to ſpeak, at the End of his Apolegy, p.41.' and Cicero has tranſlated them, Tuſc. Quæſt. Lib. I. Chap. 41. Euripides's Words alſo are; Σέβονία δαίμονας θαρρείν εων Εις τέλΘ- οι μεθλοι τυγχάνκσιν αξίων Οι κακοί ', ώασερ πεφύκασ’ αποτ' άαeάξιαν αν. G. XXI. (1) “ It is certain (ſays Montagne) I know not how to expreſs the Satisfaction that we enjoy in ourſelves by well- “ doing, nor the generous Bravery that accompanies a good Conſcience. A Soul couragiouſly Vicious may provide for its Secu- “rity at all Adventures, but it can't have the pleaſure and Satisfaction. 'Tis none of the leaſt Comforts, that ic finds itſelf free 66 from the Infection of a corrupt Age, and can ſay in itſelf, if any Man could look into my Breaſt, he ſhould not find me guilty “ of troubling or ruining any Man, neither of Revenge, nor Envy, nor breach of the publick Laws, nor of Diffeiſin, nor Dí- « ſturbance, nor ill Language; and tho' the Licentiouſneſs of the Time allows and inſtructs, yet I have not put my Hands to che “ Goods or Purſe of any Man, nor eat of any Man's Bread but my own, either in War or Peace, nor made Uſe of any Man's La- « bour without Wages. Theſe Teſtimonies of Conſcience are pleaſing, and 'cis our Benefit that this Comfort is Natural, and the " Reward which we can never want. To expect the Reward of virtuous Actions from the Commendation of Men, is an uncertain 1 and troubleſome Foundation." Eſays, Lib. 3. Chap. 2. p. 596. ces CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. 147 xxxi, 22, &c. 7015 egéronlas, é nadov EHV T Trovnpoyº ina's X izgu ishu o [for ces of other Men (a)(2). On the other hand from yond Diſpute, that more Advantages moſt ſurely the Violation of the ſame Laws, ariſe by a natural and certainly follow from good and juſt Proceed- Connexion, Diſquiet of Conſcience, Diſturbance ings, than we can in reaſon expect from the oppo- and Degeneracy of Mind, Deſtruction of the Bo- ſite Vices (c). And altho' the whole Train of thoſe dy, and numberleſs Evils , which may be occaſion'd Goods do not attend on ſuch a conſcientious Be- by che withdrawing of other Mens Aſſiſtance, or haviour, as in the Nature of Things they were by the Violence of their provok'd Revenge (3) (b). diſpos’d to do (4), yet we have a fair Probability Now altho' theſe Rewards, and theſe Puniſh- that many of them will not diſappoint us; at leaſt, ments, are by ſome imagin'd not to proceed with that we ſhall obtain a greater Share than we could Certainty enough from good and evil Actions; be- have hop'd for from a Courſe of Diſhoneſty and Wic- cauſe many Perſons in Return for Benefits receivę kedneſs. And ſo by this means we provide much only Hatred, Envy, or Injury; whilft others on better for our own Security, and have much fairer the contrary do ſecurely enjoy the Fruits of their Grounds to hope that others will, in their turn, be Wickedneſs, without Moleſtation or Puniſhinent ; alike ready to promote our Intereſts and Concerns; whence we cannot be infallibly aſſur'd before-hand than if, laying aſide all Regard to our Neighbours, that our good Deeds will be equally repaid by o we directed every thing towards our own private ther Men ; (tho the Fruit which ariſes in our ſelves Advantage; and therefore infinitely better than if, from ſuch honeſt Practices is not capable of Hin- by the Exerciſe of Violence or of Deceit, we endea- drance or of Interruption :) yet thus much is be- vour’d to make our own Gains and Profits out of „(2) Seneca de Ira 1, 2, C. 23; calls the unmou'd. Tranquility of a happy Mind A Great Resyard. Idem Ibid. The way to Happineſs is plain and ealy. For what can be more comfort able to the mind than Calmne}}? What more troubleſome than Paſſion? What more at rest than Clemency? What ſo full of Bufaneß as Cruelty? Modeſty and Chaſtity enjoy a perfe&t Leiſure, whilst Lust is ever tir’d with laborious Purſuits. To, conclude, the Poffefion of every Virtue ftands us in little Cost on Trouble, but Vices are all Chargable to be kept. Add. de Irâ, 1.2. c. 30. & ult. and l. 3. c. 5, 26. See the Story of Hercules, at the two Ways in Xenoph. A pomnem. I. 2. Prov. viii. 19. X. 9. xii , 5, 10, 25. ing of Tully, ad Attic . 1.9. Ep. 12. on a profligare Wretch, Viciſcentur illum mores ſui, His own Praćtices will be reveng?d upon him. . his : See Prov. v. 9, 10, 11, vi. 33, 34, 35, xii. 13. xiv. 14, 32, 34. sviia 13. xix. 29. xx. 1. xxii. 5. xxiii. 20, 28, &c. Sirac. xix. 3. (c) See Prov. xi.31. Vid. Iſocrat. de Permutatione, p. 576. (2) Seneca's Words are, expe&tat Nec ut quibuſdam di&tum est, arduum in virtutes, com aſperum iter eft; plano adeuntur. Non vane vobis au&tor rei venio. vane vobis au&tor rei venio. Facilis eſt ad beatam vitam inite modo bonis aufpiciis, ipſiſque Diis benè juvantibus, Multo difficilius est, facere iſta que facitis. Quid enim quiete otiofius eſt animi, quid Srâ laboriofius? quid clementiâ remiſſzus, quid crudelitate negotiofius? Vacat pudicitia, libido occupatilſina est; omnium denique virtutum tutela facilior est , pitia magno coluntur. We may add to this Montagne’s Meditation, Elay, Lib. 1. Chap. 25., * Virtue is not, as the Schools ſpeak, placed on the top of a Two-headed Mountain, rough and not to be afcended. They that purſue it may at- “ tain it. On the Reverſe, ſhe has her Abode in a fine fertile and pleafant Plain, from whence ſhe beholds all Things below her; 6 and if we labour to find her, our Way lies through ſhady and green Roads, ſweet, flouriſhing, and pleaſant; of an eafy and “ ſmooth Afcent, like that of the Celeſtial Vaults The Price and Excellency of Virtue conliſts in the Eaſe, Pleaſure, “ and Profit of the Practice. The Difficulty is ſo little, that an Infant may exerciſe it as well as a Man, and the Simple as well as the wife. The Rule is its chief Inftrument, and not Force. Socrates her firſt Favourite, willingly left his Buſineſs to glide " aloug in Eaſe and Activity in her Paths. She is the nurſing Mother of all Pleaſures, The makes them ſuitable, and renders them “ ſure and ſafe, and moderating them keeps us in Breath and Appetite. Abridging us of what ſhe refuſes, the makes us more eager of what ſhe allows us, and ſhe allows us all Things that are ſuitable to our Nature plentifully, to Satiety, at leaſt, if not to Wearineſs, like an indulgent Mocher, unleſs we will fay that a Regimen of Sobriety and Temperance is an Enemy to Pleaſure. " If a common Fortune befals it, ſhe can make her Eſcape, or paſs through it, and make another, not more fleeting and tranſito- ry. She knows how to be rich and powerful, and lie in Beds of Roſes. She loves Lite, Beaucy, Fame and Health, but her “ peculiar Office is to teach us to uſe our Goods regularly, and to ſpend them freely; an orice more noble than ſevere, without “ which the whole Courſe of our Lives is churliſh, curbulent, and deformed, and can we do leſs than confine theſe Rocks, Thicker “ and Monſters? " See alſo Mar. Antonin. Lib. 5, 9. (3) “ That is not Vice, really lice, which offends not, and in a true Judgment does not aceuſe. For there is ſuch an apparent “ Deformity and Inconvenience in it, that they ſpeak with Reaſon who ſay, that it is principally produced by Beſtiality and Ig. “norance, ſo hard is it to know it and not have it. Malice fucks up the greateſt part of the Venom and poiſons it, an Ulcer in the Fleſh, and Repentance in the Soul, which always tears and wounds it felf, for tho' Reaſon extinguiſhes almoſt “all other Griefs and Sorrows, yet it begers Repentance, which is ſo much the niore grievous becauſe it is bred within, as the “Cold and Hear that affects the Sinews is always more ſharp than that which outwardly affects.” Montagne, Lib. 3. Chap. 2. I could not forbear copying out theſe fine Thoughts, of which Seneca alſo hath one, Epift. 81. Qumadmodum Attalus nofter dicere folebat, malitia ipſa maximam partem veneni ſui bibit. (4) A Paffage of Iſocrates in Orat. de Permutat, is worth our Notice here, where he ſays, Owoudl w dok nis dictul 78s Thy xi > x aj , 7 ( To it fhould be read, and not ήγεμένες] κ α θεοίς , και ως ανθρώποις πλέον οισεται ή άλλων. εγω μεν ο οίομαι, τέτας μόνες, ών δεί πλεονεκτείν, τες και άλλες δε γινώσκειν εν ών βέλπόν όξιν ορώ 8 τες με την αδικίαν προτιμώνας, και το λαβών τι σ' αλλο- τείων μέμφον αγαθόν νομίζοντες, όμοια προθαι τοις δελεαζομένους και ζώων, και καταρχάς μεν πολαύονται ών άν λάβωσιν ολίγω δ' ύπρον εν τοις μεγίσους κακούς όντα της και μεθ' ασεβείας, και δικαιοσύνης ζώνlας, έντε τοις παρέσι χρόνοις ασφαλώς διάφονίας, και οτι το σύμπαν τα αιωνε ηδιες τις ελπίδας έχονlας, και ταυτ' ε μή και πάντων όπως είθισται συμβαίνειν, αλλά το γ' ώς ότι το πολύ τέτο γίγνεθαι και τρόπον, χρή και τις ει φegνένας, έπαδή το μέλλον αν σωοίσειν και καθορών, το πολλάκις ώρελίν τύτο φαίνεθα Φροαιρεμένες. Πάντων δι' άλογώτατον πεπόνθασιν, όσοι κάλλιον μεν επιτησάμα νομίζεσιν τή, και θεοφιλέτρον, τα δικαιοσύνης της αδικίας και χεiegν ' οίονα βιώσεθαι της ταυτή χρωμένες, και η πονηeίαν πειρημένων. which is thus Englified, “I wonder that any one can be perfwaded, that they who apply themſelves conſtantly to Piery and Juſtice ſhould think themſelves more unhap- ру than Sinners, and don't promiſe themſelves more Advantages both from GOD and Man. As for me, I believe that only good Men enjoy moft plentifully what is worth ſeeking, and Sinners, on the contrary, know nor their own true Intereſts . For whoever prefers Injuſtice before Juſtice, and ſuppoſes his chief Happineſs to conſiſt in extorting other Mens Goods from them, is, in my Judgment, like the Beaſts that bire at an Hook, who are pleas’d at firſt with the Sweetneſs of the Eait, buc foon after « find themfelves embroiled in very great Troubles. But, on the other Hand, they that apply themſelves to Piety and Juſtice, are not only in Safety for the preſent, bur meer with agreeable Hopes, that all their Life ſhall be happy. I own, this does not * always happen, but Experience verifies it to be true for the moſt part. Now in all things wherein we can’ infallibly foreſee & the Succeſs, a wiſe Man will chooſe that fide which commonly proves moſt advantagious. But nothing is more unreaſonable & chap their Opinion tyho believe that Juftice is ſomething fine and more agreeable to the Nature of the Gods than Injuſtice, and yet imagine, that they who apply themſelves to the firſt, ſhall be more unhappy than thoſe who give themſelves up to the U 2 the Vice leaves di larrer, 148 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book II. the Loſſes of other Men. By this way of reckon- and Forecaſt, and permit ourſelves to be driven at ing therefore it appears, that the Value of that Re- random by the blind Guidance of Chance. But ward which will follow upon a good Action, doth, this point is indeed as clear as any thing in Na- all things rightly conſider’d, exceed the Gain of ture, and hath been made out to full Advantage the oppoſite illegal Practice. by Dr. Cumberland. We deſire it ſhould be well obſerv'd, that whilſt There remains therefore this only Queſtion we are here treating about the Natural Effects of farther, whether or no beſides the Natural Effects Good and of Evil A&tions, we do not by any means of Evil Actions, and beſides thoſe which ariſe reckon amongſt theſe Effects thoſe kind of Goods from the Sanction of Civil Laws, there are ſtill which we but now rank'd in the firſt Claſs, and others in reſerve appointed by God's free Plea- which our own Prudence and Induſtry either can- ſure, and to be (5) inflicted by virtue of his So- not obtain, or cantiot avoid. Such Things both vereign Prerogative; or whether God hath not may, and generally do happen alike to Virtuous added to the Sanction of the Laws of Nature fome and to Vicious Men. Thus a wicked Perſon may Arbitrary Puniſhment : Eſpecially ſince it is ap- by the Gift of Nature, poſſeſs a vigorous and a parent, that the Natural Conſequences and Effects healthy Body, while perhaps a Man of Honeſty of Evil Adions are frequently interrupted, and and Piety labours under a weak and crazy Confti- that the Wickedneſs of many Men ſeems to turn tution. And thus Death lays hold promiſcuouſly to their Gain and Advantage. Now what the on the Juſt and on the Vile. But the only Goods Scripture hath declar'd in this Matter, is plain and we here allude to are ſuch as it is in the Power of beyond all Diſpute. But waving that Authority, Human Reaſon to provide for us ; and which do the affirmative side of the Queſtion may be defen- therefore, in fome meaſure, depend upon our ded from ſeveral Confiderations : As from that own Ac. Now altho' ſome part of thoſe Goods moſt ancient and moſt univerſal Tradition, con- which we intend by the Obſervance of the Law cerning a certain Revenging Divinity (6), and of Nature to obtain from other Men, has a De- the Pains after Death. Of which Opinion we pendance on their Kindneſs and on their Probity, have two fair Inſtances in the Caſes of Jonas and and ſo is not abſolutely in our own Power; yet, of St. Paul ; (Fonas i. 7. Afts xxviii. 1, c.) for for as much as in all Probability, they have the there being no natural Connexion and Conſe- fame End and Deſign with our ſelves, we have at quence, either between Fonas's Crime and the leaſt fair reaſon to hope for and to expe&t ſuch Tempeft, or between the Fa£t of Murther and good Uſage and Retribution from them, tho' we the biting of the Viper, the People who were pre- cannot give ourſelves an infallible Aſſurance of it, ſent at both Accidents, immediately ſuppos’d that before it comes. Scarce any Man hath met with God Almighty did thus extraordinarily interpoſe fo many Enemies in the World, as not to own his Hand to puniſh ſome heinous Wickedneſs (a). himſelf indebted to ſome Benefactors. And we Moreover, it being moſt certain that it is the Di- fee that the Evils which Men procure to one ano vine Pleaſure thoſe Laws ſhould be obey'd, and ther, have never been able to prevail to the utter nor leſs manifeft, that the Natural Effects of them Ruine and Deftruétion of Human Race: Which is may be (partly at leaſt) eluded; it is highly pro- a plain Evidence, that Good Actions have oftner bable, that God will find ſome other way of pu- attain'd their juſt End and Reward, than they have niſhing ſuch Offenders : Eſpecially ſince the fail'd and been diſappointed of it. On the other Gnawings of Conſcience, and the want of Quiet fide, altho' a Perſon who neglects or diſobeys the and Security, which conſtantly attend Evil Men, Law of Nature, may ſometimes, by an unaccoun- do not always riſe to ſuch an afflicting degree, as table Concourſe of External Cauſes, receive a to ſeem a ſufficient Plague and Penalty for their whole Flood of Goods and Benefits from other Crimes (b). But becauſe whatever Arguments Men ; yet becauſe in this Caſe thoſe Effects are, we can alledge à priori, will not amount to a De- with regard to him, meerly contingent, and do monſtration, but only to a high Probability; and very ſeldom fall our in ſuch a manner, we may becauſe this Arbitrary Puniſhment preſuppoſes conclude, that Nature and Reaſon did not pre- ſome poſitive Determination of the Divine Will, fcribe, much leſs command the Means by which which we can hardly come to a knowledge of he atcain'd, only caſually, to ſuch an End. Rea- without a particular Revelation; and ſince our fon, on the contrary, moft clearly ſhews us, that Induction and our Experience are at preſent im- we take a much more probable way to Happineſs , perfect, we can ſcarce avoid confefling, that to by acting on a fertled Deſign, and by applying thoſe who ſee only (7) by the Light of Natural the beſt Means we can to the gaining of our Pur- Reaſon, this Controverſy muſt ſtill appear in poſe, than if we ſhould throw aſide all Counſel ſome meaſure dark and obſcure, XXII. As 1 (a) Add Grot. de Veritate Rel. Chr. L. 1. f, 19, 20, 21, 22. L. 2. f. 9. (6) Add Dr. Cumberland, C. 5. f. 25, (5) Our Author expreſſes himſelf thus ; Manu velut Regiâ exercendo; in which he alludes to an Expreſſion of the Roman Lawyer Pomponius, ſpeaking of the firſt Roman Kings who governed all Affairs as they thought fit, becauſe they had no written Law; Et quidem initio civitatis noſtræ Populus fine Lege certà, fine jure certo primum agere inſtituit, omniaque MANU A REGIBUS GUBER N A BANTUR. Digeft . Lib. I. Tit. 2. De Origine Juris, &c. Leg. 2. §. 1. See Tacitus's Annals , Lib. III. Chap. 26. (6) which was call’d Nemeſis. [or síxx) and was thought to have the Care of puniſhing the Crimes which were unpuniſh'd upon Earth; either chro’ Negligence, or thro' want of Power, of this there is a fine Deſcription in Ammian. Marcellin. B. 14.c. 2. (7) This is true, but not to leſſen the Efficacy of the Laws of Nature, fo far as they are known by the Light of Reafon alone, let us add ſome Reflexions, and to this End, I think I can't do berrer, than to make uſe of the Words of a great Philoſopher of this Age, whom I have already quoted in ſeveral places, who thus ſpeaks ; “ The Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life, “ which God has eſtabliſhed to give greater force to his Laws, are of Importance ſufficient to determine our Choice concerning 6 all the Good or Evil Things of this Life, when we conſider the Happineſs or Miſery to come as poſſible, of which none can doubt. Whoever, ſay I, agrees that an excellent and infinice Felicity is a poſſible Conſequence of a good Life which he hath "Jiyed CHA P. III. . Of the Law of Nature in general. 149 XXII. As to the matter of the Law of Nature, make Wills, or to Buy and Sell; yet Proprieties Grotius obſerves (a), that many Things are referr'd being ſuppos’d, as in the former Caſe, it naturally to this Law not properly but reductively, for as much follows, that a Perſon at his Death ſhall have the as the Law doth not oppoſe or forbid them. As Power of diſpoſing of his own Goods; and that thoſe Things are term’d Juſt, not only which are Men, by the Intervention of Bargains and Con- in ſtrict Juſtice due, but which Juſtice doth not tracts, ſhall be at Liberty to alienate ſuch Things contradict: (tho' it would be better to call ſuch as belong to themſelves, as belong to themſelves, for the Procurement of Things permitted, than plainly just.) But perhaps thoſe which are in the Poffeffion of others. this Diſtinction of Grotius might be more conve Grotius farther obſerves on this Subject (2), that niently applied to thoſe Conſtitutions which ac- ſometimes by abuſe thoſe Things are referr’d to cording to the particular State of Men, the Deſire the Law of Nature, which Reaſon indeed ſhows of Peace and Tranquillity hath at any time intro- us to be Honeſt, and better than their Oppoſites, duc'd: as likewife to the Actions undertaken in tho they are not properly matter of Debt and Conformity to fuch Conſtitutions. For we ſhall of- ftrict Obligation. Of which kind are many high ten hear the Lawyers debating fuch Caſes as theſe, and uncommon AEts of Liberality, of Mercy and whether the Pofjeſſion of Things, whether Preſcription, Clemency ; as likewiſe whenever a Man recedes whether the making of Wills, and whether buying or from any part of his Right, not being compelld felling, do belong to the Law of Nature, or not. by Neceflity. Theſe Matters St. Paul illuſtrates in Which Doubts cannot eaſily be reſolv'd, unleſs we his firſt Epiſtle to the Corinthians, Chap. vi. v. 12. diftinguiſh between choſe Things which the Law Chap. vii. v. 38. Chap. x. V. 23. (b). of Nature determines, by commanding or forbid Socrates (c), when a Rafcally Fellow had offer'd ding them : and thoſe things which Men have him an Injury, would not complain of it to the been induc'd to ordain for the neceſſary Promo- Judge, but reckon'd it (as he ſaid) no more than tion of Society (1), the Liberty of doing which if an Aſſe had kick'd him. And Cato, as Seneca flows immediately from this Human Ordinance tells us, when he receiv'd a Blow in the Face, and Inſtitution : and then we ſay of theſe laſt was ſo far from reſenting the Affront, and from Things, that they belong to the Law of Nature defiring Satisfaction, that he would not venture by way of Reduction. Thus the Dominion or the fo far as to forgive it, but denied that any ſuch Poffefſion of Things, doth not immediately ſpring thing had been done. Thinking it better not to from Nature, nor can we alledge any direct and acknowledge the FaƐt than to proſecute it. expreſs Precept for its Introduction : yet it may XXIII. There is ſtill one Queſtion behind, be ſaid in ſome meaſure to be enjoin'd by Natural which requires our Determination. Whether or Law, in as much as when Mankind began to niul no there be any ſuch thing as a particular and tiply in the World, it was requiſite to their peace- poſitive Law of Nations, contradiſtinęt to the Law able Condition, that the Primitive Communion of Nature. Learned Men are not come to any of Goods ſhould be laid aſide. Thus Preſcription is good Agreement in this point. Many aſſert the not plainly commanded by the Law of Nature ; Law of Nature and of Nations to be the very fame yet upon Suppofition of Things being divided in- thing, differing no otherwiſe than in external to diſtinct Proprieties, the Peace of Mankind Denomination. Thus Hobbes (e) divides Natural ſeems to favour it; left otherwiſe the Titles to Law, into the Natural Law of Men, and the Natural Things ſhould remain always in doubt. Thus, Law of States, commonly called the Law of Nations. laſtly, Nature doth not poſitively enjoin us to He obſerves, That the Precepts of both are the Same : "lived here upon Earth, and an Oppoſite State a poſſible Recompence of an Irregular Life, ſuch a Man muſt neceſſarily own “ that he judges amiſs, if he concludes from thence, that a Good Life, joined with a certain Aſſurance of Eternal Felicity “ which he may attain, is not preferrable to a Wicked Life, accompanied with the Fear of luch horrible Miſery, into which ir, " is poſſible the Wicked Man Thall one day fall, and where nothing can be his Comfort but the terrible and uncertain Hopes of " being Annihilated. All this is very evidenc, ſeeing Good Men have nothing to receive in this world but Evil, and Sinners are “ in a perpetual Felicity; which yet often happens otherwiſe, inſomuch as Sinners have no great Reaſon to boaſt of their Eſtate, in relation to the Good Things that they actually enjoy; or rather, if we conſider all Things well, they have, I believe, the s' worſt part, even in this Life ; but when we put Infinite Happineſs into the Ballance with Infinite Miſery, if the worſt happen a to a Good Man, which is that he is Miſtaken, it is the greateſt Advantage that the Sinner can have; but if the contrary hap- what Man would run the hazard, if he be a Perſon of any Thought? Who, I ſay, will be ſo much a Fool, as to expoſe himſelf to the danger of being poſſibly infinitely Miſerable, whereas he can get nothing by ir bue a pure Negative if he eſcapes the Danger ? But, on the contrary, the Good Man hazards a Negative only againſt an Infinite Happineſs, which he ſhall attain if his Expectations fucceed. If his Hope be well grounded he is eternally Happy, and if he be Miſtaken he is nor unhappy, be- "cauſe he'll be ſenſible of nothing. But, on the other fide, if the Sinner judges rightly he is not Happy, but if he be Miſtaken " he is eternally Miſerable. Is not this one of the moft viſible Irregularities of Thought that any Man can fall inco, nor to ſee ac the firft fight , which Side ought to be preferred in this controverſy ? Mr. Locke's Philof. Efſay upon Man's Underſtanding, Lib.2. Chap. 21. $. 70. This is the reſult of alinoſt all Mr. Paſcal's Reaſonings in his Meditations, Chap. 7. The Reader alſo would do well to read Mr. Clerc's Pneumatology, Chap. 9. Sect. 2. S. 9. to the end of the Chapter ; and Mr. Bruyer's Characters, or Manners of the Age, in his Chapter of Brave Spirits, p. 560, &c. See alſo a Paſſage out of Arnobius, quoted above, Lib. 1. Cbap. 3. $. 7 pen, Note 5 (a) L. 1. C. I. f. 1o. n. 3. (6) So Ulpian, (L. 4. [ 1. D. de alien. jud. mut. caus.) The Pretor doth not diſapprove of his Proceeding, who choſe rather to loſe his Right, than to engage in long Suits and Contentions. This averſion to Strife doth by no means deſerve Reproof. (c) See Plutarch of the Education of Children, p. 10. C. Ed. Wech. (d) De Ira, L. 2. C.32, doc. de Conſtant. Sapientis, C. 14. (e) De Cive, C. 14. 4, 5. §. XXII. (1) There are two forrs of Duties preſcribed by the Law of Nature, taken in its full extent, the one flowing from the natural and primitive Conſtitution of Man immediately, and the other ſuppoſes humane Eſtabliſhment. Theſe laft are but the Conſequence of the former, or a ſuitable Application of the General Rules of the Law of Nature to the private Condition, and diverſe Circumſtances of every one. See s. 15. above, Note s. and the laſt Paragraph of chis Chapter. We may obſerve the ſame in all the Duties, particularly, of which this Author treats. (2) See above, Lib. I. Chap. 2. $. 8. Note 5. But 150 Of the Law of Nature in general. Book IT. But that for as much as States when they are once in and others are refer'd to the Law of Nations, as ſtituted, aflume the Perſonal Proprieties of Men, bence the ways of acquiring things, the Buſineſs of Con- it comes to paß, that what, speaking of the Duty of tracts, &c. do indeed belong either to the Law particular Men, we call the Law of Nature, the Same of Nature, or to the Civil Laws of thoſe Coun- we term the Law of Nations, when we apply it to whole tries where they are obſerv'd: Many People and States, Nations, or People (1 ). This Opinion we, States agreeing in ſuch Points, which otherwiſe for our part, readily ſubſcribe to : Nor do we con do not depend on the Univerſal Reaſon of Man- ceive, that there is any other Voluntary or Poſi- kind. Now it is not proper or fair to conſtitute tive Law of Nations, properly inveſted with a theſe as a peculiar and diſtinct Species of Law; true and legal Force, and obliging as the Ordi- in as much as the Reaſon why ſuch Conſtitutions nance (2) of a Superior Power (a). And thus we are common to many Nations doth not ariſe from do not really differ in Judgment from thoſe who any mutual Covenant or Obligation, but is wholly are more inclin'd to call that the Law of Nature to be attributed to the particular Pleaſure of the which conſiſts in a Conformity to Rational Na- ſeveral Legiſlators, who by accident agreed in ture, and that the Law of Nations, which flows theſe Ordinances, without the leaſt regard to one from the Conſideration of Human Indigence, the another. And therefore this kind of Cuſtoms and Relief of which ſeems to be the main end and de- Decrees, may be, and frequently are, alter'd by ſign of Society. For we, as well as they, deny one People, or Kingdom, without adviſing with that there is any poſitive Law of Nations proceed their Neighbours. ing from a Superior. And whatever is deducible Nor is Feldenius's Diſtinction to be deſpis'd, from Reflections on the Indigence of Human Na- who in his Obſervations on Grotius (b) tells us, that ture, we refer immediately to Natural Law: only the Roman Lawyers, by the Law of Nations (3), we were unwilling to define and explain this Na- underſtood the Power and Liberty which Stran- tural Law by a Conformity to Rational Nature ; gers and Foreigners were allow'd to tranfact Mac- becauſe by this means we ſhould eſtabliſh Reaſon ters in the Roman State ; and by the Civil Law, that for the Rule and Meaſure of itſelf; and fo this way which was proper to the Citizens only, all Foreign- of demonſtrating Nature's Laws would run round ers being excluded from its Benefit. That on this in a Circle. account (4) Wills and Marriages were ſaid to be of Moſt of thoſe Matters which by the Civilians the Civil Law, and Contracts or Bargains , of the quire him. (a) Add Boecler, iu Grot. L. 1. C. 1. f. 14. and in L. 2. C. 4. 1.9. (6) L. 2.C.2. 1. 20. and C. 8. f. 1. S. XXIII. (1) It is poſſibly from this diſtinction of the Law of Nations from the Natural Law, that we are accuſtomed to judge otherwiſe of the Actions of Princes, or Commonwealths, than of Private Perſons, as Mr. Bernard has obſerved in relating Mr. Buddæus's Words, as a good and ſmart Nocion, in his Elemen. Philoſoph. Pra&t. p. 236. I Thall give you them in the Extract made of them in the News of the Republ. of Letters, March 1704. “ If one private Perſon offends another without Cauſe, we "call that Action Injuſtice, but if one Prince encroaches upon another without Cauſe, by Invading his Dominions, by robbing с his Subjects, and plundering his Towns and Provinces, it is called War, and 'twere too much Boldneſs to call it Unjust, To o break Bargains made and agreed on, is a Crime between one Man and another : but among Princes, to break the moſt folemn “ Alliances, is Prudence, i.e. the Art of Governing 'Tis true, they always alledge ſome plauſible Pretences, but they matter - nor whether they are believed Juft or Unjuſt. Be they called Chears, Frauds, Lyes, Double dealings, Rapine, Theft, or the “ like Crimes, which are abhorred in the Common Sort, all the World will commend, or at leaſt excule them, if a Prince or a " whole Nation commits them." (2) There is neither a Superior nor Inferior. All People are naturally Equal, and conſequently no one People can impoſe Laws upon another, much leſs can they all together impoſe Laws upon themſelves. But if we ground this pretended Law of Nations upon the Conſent or Agreement of the People, we run from our Subject ; for beſides that there is a difference between an Agree- ment and a Law, this would not produce a particular Law diſtinct from the Natural, but it muſt be referred to that general Law of Nacure which obliges us to keep all Covenants. Further, Neither all People, no nor the greateſt and more civilized part, did ever yet agree together to obſerve thoſe ſort of Cuſtoms which are faid to belong to the Law of Nations ; nay, chere is not ſo much as One, in which they exactly agree in the practice of it. How they become Obligatory ? See Mr. Titius's Obſervat. on Pufendorf, XCI. num. 14. Mr. Buddeus's Elemen. Phil . pra&t. p. 206, 207. as alſo a Diſcourſe de Lytro, Sect. I. S. 2, &c. in Tom. I. of the Comment. & Opuſc. of Mr. Hertius. The ſecond of theſe Authors had occaſion to obſerve, after he had created of the Law of Nature, the Application that people might make of it one to auother, ſo far at leaſt as the thing would permic and re- (3) 'Tis not exactly the Notion of the Roman Lawyers, for they underſtand by the Law of Nations, properly ſo called, that which the Light of Natural Reaſon has eſtabliſhed among all Men, and ſo is common to all Nations, i. e. as the Definition ſuppo- ſes, to all thoſe that follow the Light of Reaſon. It chiefly conſiſts of ſuch Things as the Neceſſities and Buſineſs of Life oblige us to eſtabliſh, for we refer to it Civil Government, Propriety of Goods, all Contracts almoſt, Slavery, and the Freedom of Slaves, the Rights of Wars, doc. Quod verò Naturalis Ratio inter omnes homines conſtituit, id apud omnes populos peræquè cuſtoditur, vaca- turque Jus Gentium, quafi quo jure omnes gentes utantur Nam uſu exigente, lo humanis neceffitatibus, gentes humana jura quædam fibi conftituerunt. Bella etenim orta ſunt, do captivitates ſecuta do ſervitutes. ---- Et ex hoc jure gentium omnes pene contractus introdu&i funt. Inſtit. Lib. 1. Tit. 2. S. 1, 2. Manumiſſiones quoque furis Gentium ſunt Ex hoc Jure Gentium introduéta bella : diſcret e gentes : regna condita : dominia diſtin&ta : agris termini poſiti: ædificia collocata : commercium, emptiones, venditiones, locationes, condu&tiones, obligationes inſtitute ; exceptis quibuſdam, que (à) jure civili introdukt e funt. Digeft. Lib. 1. Tít. I. Leg. 4, 5. So that the Law of Nations is near a-kin to thoſe Laws of Natural Right which our Author calls Condi- tional, s. 24. And the Roman Lawyers ſometimes confound it with the Laws of Nature, becauſe the Rules of both are founded 'on Natural Reaſon. See Grotius upon that Paſſage of Çicero, where by the Law of Nature, i, e. the Law of Nations, one Man can't promote his own Intereſt at the loſs of another : Neque verò hoc folum Natura, i. e. pure Gentium conftitutum ests et non liceat ſui commodi caufa nocere alteri. De Offic. Lib. 3. Chap. 5. p. 296, &c. See alſo Mr. Hertius, de Lytro, Sect, 1. . 7. (4) The Roman Lawyers do not refer Marriage to the Civil Law, becauſe, according to them, it belongs not only to the Law of Nations, but Law of Nature ; Hinc (ex Jure Naturali] deſcendit maris atque fæemine conjun&tio, quam nos Matrimonium appellamus, Digeſt. Lib. 1. Tit. 1. Leg. 1. $. 3. They only ſay, that to make a Marriage-Contract valid, which is the effect of the Civil Law, boch the Perſons, who are to be married, muſt be Citizens of Rome. See Ulpian Tit. 5. $. 3, 4. Seneca, de Beneficiis, Lib. IV. Boeth, in Top. Cicer. Chap. 4. Likewiſe, altho'a Will, to make it valid, requires certain Formalities, and Strangers can neither make a valid Will, nor Inherit by a Will. (See God. Lib. 6. Tit. 24. and Dion. Gothofrid, upon it.) Nevertheleſs, Wills were re- puted to be from the Law of Nations, as appears from this, Thst a Soldier Inight make a Perſon condemned to Baniſhment, or condemned for all his Life to the Mines or Quarries, his Heir, becauſe they ftill had a Right by the Law of Nacions. Ut ſunt in Opus publicum perpetua damnati, dar in Inſular deportati, ut ea, quidem, que Juris civilis ſunt, non habeant, qus vero Juris gentiuin, habeant. Digeſt. Lib. 48. Tit. 9. De Pænis, Leg. 17. §. 1. See Lib. 29. Tic. 1. De Teſtamente Militis, Leg. 13, S. 2. See allo che Law of the Code quoted Lib. 4. Chap. 1o. S. 4; Note s. Law 35. CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. ISI Law of Nations, becauſe the former were reſtrain'd to the Law of Nature ; he is guilty of no other to the Citizens, whereas Strangers were admitted Sin, but a ſort of Unskilfulneſs, in not adjuſting to a Share and Right in the latter. his Proceedings to the nice Models of thoſe Many Authors do farther rank under the Title who reckon War in the number of the Liberal of the Law of Nations, ſeveral Cuſtoms mutually Studies. As a Gladiator is accus’d of Inexpert- obſerv'd by tacit Conſent, amongſt moſt people nefs , when he wounds his Antagoniſt otherwiſe pretending to Civility ; eſpecially in the Affairs than by the Rules of Art. Whoever therefore and Tranfa&tions of War. For after that the moſt wages War in a juft Cauſe, may flight theſe For- poliſh'd Parts of the World came to eſteem Martial malities at Pleaſure, and govern himſelf purely Glory as the greateſt of Human Honours, and to by the Law of Nature : Unleſs he thinks it more think that a Man had no ſuch fair way of ſhown for his Intereſt to obſerve them, as a means to ing his Excellency beyond others, as by being render the Enemies leſs ſevere towards himſelf able by his Boldneſs and his Sagacity to deſtroy and his Men. On the other hand, he who pro- many of his Fellows ; upon which account there fecutes an Unjuft Quarrel, if he punctually fulfils perpetually aroſe either unneceſſary or unjuſt theſe Niceties, is ſo far in the Right, as to appear Contentions ; For fear great Captains, if they Wicked with ſome kind of Temper and Modera- us’d the full Liberty of a juft War, ſhould bring tion. However, theſe Reaſons not being general, too much Envy on their Power, and expoſe them cannot conſtitute any Law of an (6) univerſal ſelves to general Hatred ; many Nations found it Obligation. Eſpecially ſince as to any Reſtraints convenient to temper the vigorous Fierceneſs of which depend on tacit Agreement, it ſeems rea- Hoſtile Proceedings, by a ſhew of Clemency and ſonable that either Party ſhould have the Liberty of Magnanimity. Hence aroſe the Cuſtoms of of abfolving themſelves from them ; by making exempting certain Things and Perſons from Mar- expreſs Declaration that they will be holden by tial Violence; the particular manners of hurting them no longer, and that they do not expect or re- Enemies to ſuch degrees, of treating Captives, quire the Obſervance of them from others. and the like. Machiavel in his Prince, Chap. 12, Hence we find many fuch Pra&tices to be worn relates one Pra&tice of this Nature, which I que out by Time, or overcome by the Prevalence of ſtion whether it were worthy of the Name and contrary Cuftom. Neither have (7) thoſe Men the Profeſſion of Soldiers; he ſays, It was firſt any good reaſon of Complaint, who cenſure this introduc'd by Alberigo de Como of Romagna, and Doctrine as a Notion by which the Security, the kept up in the Italian Wars of the laſt Age, chiefly Intereſt, and the Safety of Nations are robb’d of by the Foreign and Mercenary Troops, the op- their ſureſt Guards and Defence. For the Enfu- poſite Generals endeavour'd with all poſſible In rance of theſe Advantages and Bleſſings doth not duſtry, to rid themſelves and their Soldiers of all conſiſt in the Practice of ſuch mutual Favours, Trouble and Fear : And their way was, by killing but in the due Obſervance of the Law of Nature; no one in Fight ; only taking one another Priſo- a much more ſacred Support; and which whilſt ners, whom they afterwards diſmiſs’d without they enjoy, they have little need of inferior Me- Ranſom. When they were in Leaguer before a thods of Protection. And ſure it ſhows much Town, they ſhot not rudely amongſt them in the more Excellency and Worth in any Cuſtom, to Night; nor did the Beſieged diſturb their Camp derive it from the Law of Nature, than to eſta- with the like Incivilities. They made no In- bliſh it only on the Conſent of different People. trenchments for their Security whilſt encamped ; Amongſt the chief Heads of that Voluntary Law and when Winter came on, never lay at all in the of Nations which Grotius maintains, he reckons the Field. And to behave themſelves in this manner Law (8)of Embaſſies. Now as to this point it is our was part of their Diſcipline and Inſtitution. An Opinion, that the Perſons of Embaſſadors are Sa- Agreement ſomething like this Strabo tells us of, cred and inviolable, even amongſt Enemies, by the Lib. io. between the Eretrians and the Chalcidians, meer Law of Nature; provided they do not come forbidding the uſe of Miſfive Weapons againlt purely as Spies, nor enter into any hoſtile Deſign each other. To which we may add the Cuſtom againſt the Perſon to whom they are fent ; altho obſerv’d by the ancient Indians, of letting the in the ordinary Courſe of Buſineſs, and of Trea- Husbandman remain ſafe from all Injury and ties, they prefer their Maſter's Intereſt to all others. Moleſtation, even in Civil Wars (a). For in as much as ſuch Perſons are neceſſary for But altho' theſe Cuſtoms ſeem to include ſome the procuring, the preſerving, or the ſtrengthning kind of Obligation ariſing from tacit Confent ; of Peace by Leagues and Covenants ; and ſince yet if one who is engag'd in a Lawful War, the Law of Nature enjoins us to embrace Peace by ſhall negle&t them, and profeſs that he will not all honeſt Ways: It muſt at the ſame time be fup- be bound by ſuch Reſtraints ; provided what is pos’d to have provided for the Security of thoſe contrary to them may be rightly done according Men, without whoſe Intervention this good End (a) Arrian. in Indice. Chap. II. (5) Cuſtom never obtains the force of a Law in any Stare, but by the tacit Conſent of the Sovereign, which may eaſily be preſumed. But when one People treats with another, how muſt it be determined what repeated Acts, and what ſpace of Time Mall render a Cuſtom Obligatory? Moreover, great Revolutions often happen, inſomuch that nôr only the Sovereign, but alſo the Government itſelf is wholly changed, and in this caſe , why ſhould a new State, or a new Prince, be obliged exactly to obſerve a Thing which they never confenced to ? This is whát Mr. Hertius has well obſerved ? See his Diſcourſe, De Lytro, (7) Samuel Rachelius is plainly meant here as appears to me by what Mr. Hertius ſays in the fame Diſcourſe, $. II, where he mentions a Diſcourſe, De Jure Gentium, of that Lawyer, who was Profeſſor at Keil in the l'rovince of Holſtein. (8) See what is ſaid Note 1. g. 12. Chap. 9. Lib. 8. before quoted, S. 2. cannot 152 Of the Law of Nature in general . 7 Book II: cannot be obtain'd (a). To this Right of perſonal cerning the keeping of Faith, doth oblige us to ſtand Safety, is join'd another of being exempted from to ſuch Agreements; yet the Agreements them- the Juriſdiction of the Sovereign to whom they felves cannot be call'd Laws, in any Propriety of are ſent ; at leaſt in all Matters relating to their Speech or of Senſe. Beſides they are almoſt infi- Office. Since otherwiſe they would not have full nite in Number, and commonly are ſettled only Power and Liberty to promote their Maſter's Inte- for a Time. Nor do they any more conftitute a reſt , with due Application and Vigour, were they part of Law in general, than the Covenants and oblig'd to give an account of their Management to Bargains of particular Subjects with each other, any Authority, beſides that which they repreſent. do belong to the Body of the Civil Law of the Other Privileges commonly attributed to Embaſſa- Kingdom : But they are rather to be eſteem'd the dors, eſpecially to thoſe who reſide in Courts, not Subject and the Concern of Hiſtory (c). Aids for the ſettling or the ſecuring of Peace, but XXIV. Of all the Diviſions of Natural Law, chiefly for the diving into the Secrets and Policies that ſeems to us moſt accurate and moſt covenient, of a State, theſe depend abſolutely on the Indul, which conſiders, in the firft place, a Man's Beban gence of the Prince who entertains them; and viour towards himſelf , and then towards other Men. therefore, if he fees convenient, he may deprive (1) Thoſe Precepts of the Law of Nature which them of theſe Favours without the Breach of any bear a Regard to other Men, may be again divided Law, provided he will ſuffer his own Miniſters into Abſolute and Hypothetical , or Conditional . The abroad to be treated in the ſame Manner. former åre ſuch as oblige all Men in all States and The (9) Right of Burial, which, according to Conditions, in Conditions, independent from any human Seccle- Grotius, ſeems likewiſe to make a particular Head ment or Inſtitution. The latter preſuppoſe ſome of the Law of Natioris, may be well referr'd to the publick Forms and civil Methods of Living to have common Duties of Kindneſs and Humanity (b). been already conſtituted and received in the World. Nor are the other Inſtances which he offers of Con- Which Diſtinction Grotius hath thus expreſs’d in fequence enough to eſtabliſh a new Species of Law, other Words; The Law of Nature is concernd, not on- ſince they may with Convenience enough be al- ly about ſuch things as exist antecedent to human Will, low'd a Place in the Syſtem of the Law of Nature. But likewiſe about many things which follow upon ſome As for thoſe Perſons who (10) rank under the Law Acts of that Wil. Whence altho' the Dominion or of Nations, the particular Compacts of two or more the Propriety of Things as it now ſtands is efta- States,concluded by Leagues and Treaties of Peace, bliſh'd by the Pleaſure of Men, yet ſuch a Settle- to us their Notion appears very incongruous. For ment being once ſuppos’d, Natural Law informs us although the Law of Nature, in that part of it con that tis a Sin to take the Goods of another Man, 6 (a) Add. Marſelaer Legat. l. 2. c. 13. (6) Add. Ant. Matth. de Crimin. Proleg. c. 3. f. 5. (c) Add. Selden de Mari Clauſo, l. 1. c. 2. Concerning Unwritten Laws, or Cuſtom, beſides others, fee Becler. ad Grot. 1.2.c.4.4.5. . (9) Altho' after Death whatever Treatment the Corpſe of the Dead meet with, is all one to it, the Right of Burial is not a whit the leſs founded on the Law of Humanity, inſomuch that it is a kind of Puniſhment to be deprived of Burial, as the Practice of Civil Judicatures ſhews, and the Uneaſineſs of ſuch, as in their Life-time are troubled at the Thoughts that their bodies, when dead, ſhall be caſt into the Highway, To this we may add, that, according to the Cuſtoms and ordinary Opinions of Men, Bu- rial is a Mark of Honour. Now to deny a Man the Honour that he may lawfully claim, although but by an imperfect Righr, is without Contradiction, a Breach of the Law of Nature. It is to no purpoſe to object, that a dead Man is not ſenſible of what is done to his Carcaſe, yet he may be really wronged for all that, for 'tis not neceffary that an injured Perſon thould know or feel the hurt done him, or be in a Condition to obtain his Right. (See Lib. I. Chap. 5. 6. 7. Note 4.) All the World agree, that an Infanc in the Cradle may be wronged, and fo may an Idior, although the firſt knows not what it ſuffers, and the other does not underſtand the Hure done him. Laſtly, the Relacions and Friends of the Dead, do in ſome Manner repreſent his Perſon, and a Right to require the Honour of Burial for him. But, by Burial we are to obſerve, that all the laſt Ducies to be paid to the Dead are underſtood, whether it be by burning of the Body, or inrerring it ; for this depends upon Cuftom, which alone de- termines how the Memory of the Dead is to be honoured. Moreover, as we have intimated, a certain kind of Puniſhment is fome- times inflicted upon the Bodies of ſuch as have committed enormous Crimes, and this is chiefly practiſed upon ſuch as have killed themſelves, and conſequently the Magiſtrate can puniſh them any other way, to affright others and diſcourage them from the like Attempts. But the Rights of War do not extend ſo far, as to deny Burial of Main Enemies , this Refuſal anſwers not to the lawful Ends of War, and can have no other Principle than barbarous Cruelty. I have taken this almoſt all out of Buddeus's Ele- ment. Philoſoph. Prałt . We may add upon this laſt Article what Plato ſays, viz. That it is a great piece of Cowardice to treač the Rody of him with whom we are at War as an Enemy; in ſo doing we act like Dogs, who bite the Stones caſt at them when they can't come at him that throws them. Και γυναικείας, και σμικράς διανοίας, όξιν, πολέμιον νομίζαν το σώμα τα τεθνηκότG- απολαμένα το εχθρό, λελοιπό7G 3 ώ επιλέμε, ή οίει η διάφορων δραν του τύτο ποινας - κυών, οι τοις λίθοις, οίς αν βλώσι PLAST OLVT5, Tð Banaóv órázó ulas. De Rep. Lib. 5. Tom. 2. Mr. Thomaſius nevertheleſs maintains, that there is no Evil in refuſing Burial to Enemies, and he affirms it a Thing altogether indifferent; but I leave it to others to examine whether whac he ſays about it in his Inſtitut. Juriſpr. Divin. Lib.3. Chap. 1o. deſtroys the Principles I have laid down. He alſo ſays, That fup- poſing there be ſome Obligation to grant a Burial, the Refufal of that Duty of Humanity is no juſt Cauſe of War. I own it, but it ought to be conſidered, that this Refuſal in ſome caſes ſhews a bloody Diſpoſition, and may be more juſtly made a Cauſe of War, than many other Things that are. (10) 'Tis the ſame Mr. Rachelius, beforementioned, in his Book De Jure gentium, in which he follows Herman Conringius's Dif. courſé De fure, as I underſtand from Mr. Hertius. S. XXIV. (1) We muſt add, towards GOD. See what is ſaid above, S. 15. Note 5. and in the next Chapter, S. 3. Note 2." This Diviſion is very natural and ancient. We find it in Tuſc. Quæſt. Lib. 1. Chap. 26. Hæc Philoſophia Hæc Philoſophia nos primum ad illorum (De- orum) cultum, deinde ad jus hominum, quod ſitum est in Generis humani Societate, tum ad modeftiam, magnitudinemque animi erudivit, i. e. "Philofophy teaches us firſt of all the Worlhip of a God, then the Duties of Men one to another, which are founded upon the • Society of Mankind, and then on a Moderation and Greatneſs of Mind.” Every one knows that the Goſpel obliges us to reſpect GOD, our Neighbour, and Ourſelves, as the three principal objects, and greateſt Originals of our Duty., This Diviſion is clearly deduced from St. Paul's Words, Tit. ii. 12. The Grace of GOD, which bringeth Salvation teacheth us to deny Ungodlines and worldly Lusts, and to live ſoberly, righteouſly, and godly in this preſent World. We may alſo here take notice of that Paitage of the Philofophick Emperor, Τράς σας, η μεν προς το απον αεικείμενον, και προς τις θλαν αίτιαν, άφης συμβαίνει πάσι πένα j ö teós tès ouubisvesoi.e. “We have three obligations, the one to the Cauſe which is ſurrounding us, i. e. our Body; the o: ther ties us to the ſupreme Cauſe from whom all Things come, which happen in this World, i. e. GÖD, who is the Univerſal Reaſon; the third and last obliges us to all Men, i, e. 3s joined in Society." M. Antonin. Lib. 8. S. 27. without CHAP. III. Of the Law of Nature in general. 153 without the Owner's Conſent (a).' That is, Sovereignty over us. Thus much indeed is cer- there are many Things which as to the Exerciſe of tain, that the Violaters of Civil Laws do, by break- the Ad are Arbitrary, or where it is left to the free ing their intervening Covenant, mediately fin a- Pleaſure of Men whether they will perform ſuch gainſt the Law of Nature. And yet there ſtill re- an A& or no: But the Act being once perform’d, mains a prodigious Difference between theſe Na- there follows upon it, by vertue of ſome Precept tural Laws which we call Hypothetical, and the Po- of the Law of Nature, a Moral Neceſſity or Obli- fitive Laws of Civil Governments; in as much as gation; or elſe the Manner and Circumſtances of the Reaſon of the former is drawn from the Con- the Act are by the fame Law adjuſted and deter- dition of Mankind conſider'd in general; but the min’d. Thus, for Example, altho' the Law of Reaſon of the latter is taken from the particular Nature doth not command me to buy of another, Intereſt of any Nation or State, or from the bare yet ſuppoſing me to buy at my own Pleaſure, it Pleaſure of the Legiſlator. Therefore our Civil commands me not to ſeek my own Gain to the Poſitive Laws are not ſo many Precepts of the Na- Damage of the other Party, nor to cheat him in tural Hypothetical Law, but do only borrow their the Bargain. And many ſuch Precepts of the Force of obliging (3) in human Regard, from the Law of Nature there are, which cannot take Vertue of ſome ſuch Hypothetical Precept of Na- place, or indeed be underſtood, unleſs upon Sup. ture. Now of thoſe human Inſtitutions which poſition of diſtinct Proprieties of Things, and ſerve for Foundations of theſe Hypothetical Pre- of the Eſtabliſhment of Civil Authority. Yet it cepts, the three chief are (4) Speech, the Dominion cannot hence be prov'd, that even all poſitive Laws and the Price of Things, and (5) human Sovereignty are part of the Law of Nature, becauſe Nature o or Command. And by this Diviſion we ſhall here- bliges us to obey the Commands of the Supreme after guide our Proceedings, when we arrive at Magiſtrate, tho' our own Conſent gave him his that part of our Deſign. (a) Vid. l. 1. S. 3. D. de furtis. l. 42. D. de verb. Signif. (2) See above, S. 22. Note 1. (3) The laſt Editions ſay, in foro humano, and the Engliſh Tranſlator follows them, rendring it, in human Regard, whereas the firſt Editions expreſſed it, in foro Divino, as the Reaſoning of the Author plainly requires; and Mr. Hertius in his Edition in 1706 hach fuffered this Miſtake to paſs. (4) See Note on . 8. Lib. 3. Chap. 9. (5) All that our Author fays in this Chapter reſpects only the Obligations of the Natural Law, which obliges us to act or not ałt indiſpenſably, and which hath for its Object ſuch Actions as contain in them an Agreeableneſs or Diſagreeableneſs to the hu- man Nature ; but, as I have already ſaid above, L. 1. C.6. S. 16, N. 1. we muſt acknowledge a natural Law of ſimple Permiſſion, by virtue of which we may do or not do, according as we judge fic, every thing which has not a neceſſary Agreeableneſs or Dif- agreeableneſs with the Nature of Man, unleſs it be exprefly ordered or forbidden by ſome poſitive Law, either Divine or Human. 'Tis upon this natural Law of fimple Permiſſion that all Rights, as well natural as acceſſory and acquired, are founded, as Liberty, the Right of ſuffering no Evil from others, Empire or Authority over Perſons, and other ſuch like Things, which ordinarily receive di- vers Changes, according to the Will of Man. For Actions permitted by the Law of Nature may become Obligatory, and after- wards return to their natural Indifference. Mr. Selden (as is before obſerved) acknowledgech this Right of ſimple Permiſſion. See his Treatiſe De Jure Nat. do Gent. Secundum Hebræos Lib. 1. Chap. 8. And if we examine what our Author ſays hereupon in the beginning of s. 22. we ſhall find, that he can't forbear owning a Right of ſimple Permiſſion. See Lib. I. Chap. 6. 8.15. Note 2, CHA P. IV. Of the Duties and Performances of Man towards himſelf; as well in Regard to the Improvement of his Mind, as to the Care of his Body and of his Life. The CONTENTS I. Every Man is to take Care of himſelf, XI. And about Pleaſures. II. In what that Care conſiſt s. XII. Our Paſſions are to be governed by Reaſon. III. The Mind is to be inſtructed in Religion. XIII. Of our Study for Learning. IV. And all corrupt Opinions to be rooted out of it. XIV. Of the Care of the Body. V. The Knowledge of a Man's Self is neceſſary. XV. Of the Uſe of Life. VI. A Man should know his Soul and its Offices. XVI. What Obligations we are under to preſerve Life. VII. And how great its Abilities are. XVII. How far our Life is to be employed in the Service VIII. Nothing above its Abilities may be attempted. of others. IX. How much we are to labour after Famé. XVIII. Whether it is to be endangered for them. X. And how much after Riches. XIX. Whether Self-Murder is Lawful. Ltho this be a Quality common to (1) Man, for his own Preſervation, and is naturally glad to that with other Animals, that he is concern'd be in as good a Condition as poſſible; yet Mr. Barbeyrac's Notes on Chap. 4, S. I. (1) This Objection ought firſt to have been anſwered, before our Author had entred upon this Subject, viz. How a Man can be under any Obligation to himſelf? Our Author meddles not with it till he comes to 9.16. where ſee Note 2. This Neglect proceeded from hence, that the fifteen firſt Paragraphs were not in the firſt Edition, but being added in the ſecond, the Obje. ction became ſo far poſtponed. A X his 154 The Duties of Man with regard to Himfelf. Bookll. bis (2) Care of himſelf ought to be of a much more draw us all; more or leſs, out of the ſtraight Path refin'd, and of a much nobler Strain, than what of Reaſon; and unleſs we bridle and reſtrain we can ſuppoſe in Brute Creatures, there is good them, pour out a Flood of foul and unworthy A- Reaſon to conclude: Not only becauſe he hath re- ctions, thro' the Courſe of our whole Lives. And ceiv'd more Endowments than they, and ſuch as it may, perhaps, quicken our Induſtry, to conſider are more capable of fruitful Culture and of uſeful that we have but one Time allow'd us to act our Improvement; but farther, becauſe he cannot per- Part in, and cannot hope for a ſecond Entranc form the Duties to which he ſtands oblig'd, unleſs on the Stage, to amend the Faults of our firſt Per- he brighten and quicken his Faculties by good Ex- formance. For that old Complaint in Euripides erciſe, and make them more vigorous and more will ever be as vain and ineffectual as when it was ready, in the Production of worthy Actions. Be- firſt made: (3) fides, the Labour which a Man ſpends on his own Improvement, is not terminated in himſelf; but Me miſerable! that Men ſhould be deny'd ſpreads abroad its Fruit to the Benefit of all Man- The Gift of ſpringing to a ſecond Youth, kind; and the better any Perſon approves himſelf A double Age! The Structures which we raiſe in the Management of his own Gifts and Abilities, If found defective, later Cares reform, he is juftly eſteem'd the more excellent Citizen of New modell’d: But our own unhappy Frame the World, and the more generous Benefactor to Stands without Change, and falls without Repair ! his Fellows. Wherefore Man, in his Endeavours to fulfil the Laws of Sociery, to which he is by his O! might we turn our Steps, and tread again Creator directed and deſigned, hath good Reaſon The Path of Life, what Slips we once had made to imploy his firſt Pains and Study on himſelf; We would correct, and every cheating Maze fince he will be able to diſcharge his Duty towards Avoid, where Folly loft our Way before. others with ſo much more Eaſe and Succeſs, the more diligent he hath been in advancing his own Now ſince Man conſiſts of two Parts, a (4) Soul Perfection. Whereas he who is unuſeful to him- and a Body, whereof the former is the great Prin- felf, and idle in his proper Concerns, can give o- ciple and Spring of human Actions, the latter fup- ther Men but little Reaſon to expect Advantage plying the Place of a ſubordinate Inſtrument, the from his Pains. Care and Improvement of the firſt and nobleſt There is ſcarce more Neceſſity for our engaging Part, may juſtly challenge the Precedence in our in this Care, than there is Sollicitude and Difficul- Endeavours (5) ty in the Proſecution of it. For, in the firſt place, II. (1) The Culture of the Mind which all Men Men are born in an entire Ignorance of Things, are oblig’d to undertake, and which is abſolutely and their Minds whilft yet tender, may be eaſily neceſſary for the Performance of human Duty, ſo far defiled and tainted with vile Opinions, that conſiſts chiefly in theſe Particulars ; that we ob- it will afterwards be no eaſy Labour to waſh off tain true Opinions concerning all ſuch Things as the Stains. Beſides, we bring hereditary and in- our Duty bears any Reference to, that we fet à bred Corruptions with us into the World, which right Judgment and Price on thoſe Objects which (2) Our Author here puts the Care of preſerving a Man's ſelf, before that of perfecting himſelf, which is indeed the more na- tural Order ; for beſides that the Idea of Preſervation is a Thing more ſingle than that of Perfection, our Being certainly pre-ex- ifts our Well-being; and in vain a Man thinks of perfecting himſelf, if he has not before taken all the Care he can of preſerving himſelf. But if the Author expreſies himſelf well in this firſt Period, 'tis by meer chance, for he forgers himſelf the next Moment, and takes a clear contrary Method in this Chapter; for all he ſays in this, and the thirteen following Paragraphs, concerns only the Care of perfecting a Man's ſelf; and he begins nor till the fifteenth to ſpeak of his Life and the Preſervation of it. Further, we muſt obſerve, that according to the Principles I have above laid down to rectify our Author's Notions, (Chap. 3. S. 15. Note 5.) the Duties of Man to himſelf directly and immediately flow from Self-Love, which obliges him both to preſerve himſelf, and put himſelf into as good a Condition as poſſible to attain all the Happineſs that he is capable of. Montagne's Words may be pertinent here, “ The principal Ofice (ſays he) which we have here, is for every one to govern himſelf. 'Tis the chief End of our Be- ing here. He that forgets to live well and piouſly, and thinks to diſcharge his Duty by ordering and managing others, is a « Fool. He that is careleſs of his own Health and chearful Converſation, to ſerve others, rakes, in niy Opinion, an ill and un- o natural Courſe.” Eſſays, Lib. 3. Chap. 10. P: 748. But we muſt always ſuppoſe, that Self-Love muſt be managed accordiog to every one's Condition, and without any Prejudice to Religion or Society. See the general Rules which I have laid down in the Noré above quoted. (3) Euripid. Supplic. 1080. & ſeqq. "O1406. Ni Bag tom ovv xx oziv zóne Nexs sis m, rregulas of resov; *Αλλ' εν δόμοις μ' ώ μη καλώς έχη, Γνώμαισιν υσέρgισιν εξορθάμεσα. be 'Armia 8x Essiv, till nulla veel sis zij hegyes, eitis Saveplavov, Διπλή βία λαχόνες, εξορθάμεθ' άν. See Gataker upon Marcus Antoninus, Lib. 2. S. s.p. 6c. Edit. Londin. 1652. (4) So Saluſt ſpeaks, Sed omnis noftra vis in animo do corpore fita eft. Animi imperio, .corporis ſervitio magis utimur, alterum nobis cum Diis, alterum cum Belluis commune eſt. De Bel. Catelin. Chap. I. (3) Thus Plato judiciouſly reflects to the fame Senſe, K.ch, u što 9 [we uonównl.ce] on tunais ousantéov, x eis si Baezafos Ewuá twv ö, rj genueltog i omruenetan ezégous Toey do tkov, i.e. We must all confeſs, that the Soul is to be chiefly taken Care of, and above all things to be looked after. The Care of our Bodies and Eſtates we may commit to otbers. In Aleib. 1. p. 443. See al- Lo his Book De Legib. Lib. 5. in che beginning; and Cicero de fin. Lib. s. Chap. 12, 13.5 S. II. (1 ) This Paragraph and the following afford an Example of the Corrections and Additions which I have made of the lem- ma's in the Margin, to fit them to the Subject created on. The Author Thews in what this Care confifts, as if he were ſpeaking in general of the Care a Man ought to take of himſelf, whereas this Paragraph treats only of the Care of the Soul in Oppoficion to that of the Body. In the following Paragraph he diſtinguiſhes, and explains more diſtinctly the different Ducies, which make che parts of the general Duty. fou commonly Od to Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 155 12 00 commonly excite our Appetites, and that we tem Choice. That this Eternal Being exerciſes a Son per and regulate our Paſſions by the Direction of vereignty not only over the whole world, or over ſound Reaſon (2). o voltoi op Mankind in general, but over every Individual III. Amongſt the Opinions then which it highly Human Perſon: Whofe Knowledge nothing call concerns all Men to ſettle and to embrace, the eſcape: Who,' by Virtue of his Imperial Right, chief are thoſe which relate to Almighty Gov, hath enjoin'd Men ſuch certain Duties by Natural as the Great Creator and Governor of the Uni- Law, the Obſervance of which will meet with verſe. That there is really exiſting a Supreme his Approbation, the Breach or the Neglect, with Being, from whom all other Things derive their his Diſpleaſure: And that he will Original , and the Principle of their Motions not require an exact Account from every Man, of his as from a dull and ſenſeleſs Power (as the Wéight, Proceedings, without Corruption and without for Example, in a Clock) but as from a Cauſe en- Partiality (1). du'd with Underſtanding and with Freedom of Now as the main Parts (2) of human Duty turn oni scurec 209 lo vino dt 10 bus daun 50.59jga on 70 to 9d do M (2) Seneca hath a fine Paſſage to this purpoſe, which begins thus, Epift. 66. Edit. Gronov. Animus intuens vera, peritus fugiendo rum, & petendorum, non ex Opinione, ſed ex Naturâ pretia rebus imponens pulcherrimus, ordinatiffimus, cum decore, cuin via ribus Sanus & ficcus, imperturbatus, loc. i.e. “ The Mind looks into the Truth, is skilful in knowing what is to be avoided and “ deſired; fets a Price on Things, not according to the common Opinion, but according to its Nature - is moſt beautiful, “ orderly, graceful, and tho' of great Force, yet is found, uncorrupted, and undiſturbed, Go." ODOT: tout §. III. (1) Primus eft Deorum cultus (ſays Seneca) Deos credere, deinde reddere eos majeſtatem ſuam, reddere bonita' emn, fine quid nulla majestas est. Scire illos eße, qui preſident mundo, qui vniverſa vi ſuâ temperant, qui bumani gen-ris tutelam gerunt, interdum cu. risſi fingulorum. Hi nec dant malum, nec habent ; ceterum caſtigant quofdam, & coercent, & irrogant Pænds, do aliquando ſpecie boni puniunt. Vis Deos propitiare, bonus efto. Satis illos coluit, quiſquis imitatus est. Epiſt. 95. i. c. “ The Worſhip of God conſiſts, * firſt of all in believing that they are, and then acknowledging their Sovercigney and Goodneſs, without which there can be “ no real Greatneſs. We muſt alſo be throughly perſuaded, thar they govern the World, and by their Power order and diſpoſe “all Things, who take Care of Mankind in general, and ſometimes concern themſelves in private Affairs. They neither are E- “ vil, nor do any, yet they correct ſome Perſons to reſtrain their Malice, yea, and ſometimes puniſh them whom they ſeem to “ favour. Would you have them propicious and kind to you? Be Good. They honour them moſt, who imitate them. See Cicere de Legibus, Lib. 2. Chap. 7. and Epi&tet. Enchirid. Chap. 38. (2) Our Author, in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. I. Chap. 4. hath given us a Syſtem of Natural Religion ; i. e. the Duties of Man to GOD, which, becauſe I have faid, Chap. 3. S. 15. Note 5. ought not to be excluded our Knowledge of the Law of Nature, I ſhall here give an Extract of what he chere fays, which is, Thele Duties, fo far as they can be diſcovered by the Light of Reaſon only, may be referred in general, to ſuch as concern, 1. The Kaowledge, and, 2. The Worſhip of GOD. So that the Syſtem of Natural Religion comprizes Propoſitions, 1. Speculative, and, 2. Practical. The Spe- culacive Propofitions are, I. That we muſt believe, 1. That there is a GOD. See S. 20. of the foregoing Chapter. 2. Thar this GOD creared the World. See his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. 1. Chap. 4. 5. 3. 3. That He governs all Things by his wife Providence, which takes particular Care of all Mankind. And indeed it is the ſame in Reſpect to Morality, to deny the Exiſtence of GOD, as his Providence, as the Pagans the mſelves did acknowledge. See the Paffages quoted Chap. 6. Lib. 1. S. 11. Note 3. 4. That nothing can be atrributed to GOD chat implies the leaſt Imperfection. For, tince he is the Firſt Cauſe of all Things, he can't be ſuppoſed, without a manifeſt Abſurdity, to have any In perfection, nor want any of thofe Per- festions, of which we, who are his Creatures, can form to ourſelves any Notion, See the Abridgment above mentioned, s. s. and what is ſaid in the next Paragraph of this Chapter. The practical Propoſitions of Natural Religion contain all the parts of, 11. Divine Worſhip ; which is either Outward or Inward. The inward conſiſts in the Honour that is given to GOD. Nowv Honour being nothing ellë but the Opinion which we have of the Power or Goodneſs of any thing, we honour GOD, when with Re. gard to his infinite Power and Goodneſs, we conceive of him all the Sentiments of Reſpect and Reverence we are capable of. From whence it follows, that we muſt love him, as the Fountain and Author of all good Things, hope in him, as the Being upon whom all our Happineſs depends, both now and for ever; ſubmit entirely to his Will, having a Perſwafion that he will do all Things for our Good, and that he knows better than ourſelves what is convenient for us; to fear him, as a Being of infinite Power, by which he is able to inflict the moſt terrible Evils upon thoſe that offend him; laſtly, to obey him in all Things with the moſt profound Submiſſion, as our Creator, and Lord, Almighty, and of all Goodneſs, Outward Worſhip conſiſts principally in the following Duties. 1. We muſt give GOD Thanks for all the good things we receive from him. 2. We must, as far as in us lies, regulate our Actions according to his Will, i. e. actually obey him, ſo far as Ignorance and hunian Frailty will permit. , ſtand in need of, and to deliver us from all the Evils which threaten us. Indeed, Prayer is a ſign of our Hope and Confidence, and Hope implies a ſpecial, though tacir Dependance upon the Goodneſs and Power of him in whom we truſt. 5. When we are obliged to take an Oath, we ought to ſwear by the Name of GOD, and afterwards obſerve religiouſly what we have engaged ourſelves to, by taking GOD to witneſs, as his infinite Knowledge and Power does require. 6. We ſhould never ſpeak of GOD, but with the greateſt Care and Circunſpection, for it is a ſign of Fear, and that is a tacit Regard to the Power of him whom we fear. From hence it follows, that we muſt not uſe the Name of GOD lightly and without Neceſſity in our common Diſcourſe, for this ſhews want of Circumſpection ; that we ſhould never take an Oath, but upon Neceſſity; that we ſhould never curiouſly and nicely ſearch into the Nature of GOD, and the Acts of his Providence; for that were to confine the Divine Nature within the narrow Bounds of our own feeble Reaſon 7. Whatever we do in Relation to GOD, ought to be moſt excellent in its Kind; and proper to fhew our moſt profound Reſpect to him. 8. That we muſt honour him, and ſerve him, not only in private, but publick, and in the fight of Men. For what a Man does only in private, looks as if he were aſhamed to do it. Whereas publick Worſhip is a Teſtimony, not only of our Zeal, but is alſo an Example to others, and often induces them to join in the fame Acti- 9. and laſtly, We muſt apply our felves as cloſe as poſſible to the practice of fuch Duties as the Natural Laiv preſcribes, both in reſpect to our felves and others; which ſome call an Indire&t Worſhip. Indeed, as the Contempt of GOD's Commands is the greateít Affront we can offer to him, ſo, on the contrary, there is no Sacrifice ſo agreeable to him as Obedience to his Laits. Now the Law of Nature is a Divine Law, as we have before proved. This is what our Author has delivered in fort. I might alledge ſeveral Paſſages of Heathen Authors to this purpoſe, but this Note is already too long : Nevertheleſs we will add what Mr. Thomaſius (Inftit. Juriſpr. Divin. Lib. 2. Chap. 1. §. 11, doc.) has faid, viz. That the Law of Nature indiſpenſably requires a die rect outward Worſhip, ſo far as is neceſſary to thew that we do not contemn the Deity, and not ſo far as it conſiſts in giving a pofitive Honour to the Deity, by ſome exterior Acts, the Omiſſion of which is no ſign of Contempt to him. This able Lawyer grounds this Affertion upon chis, That GOD has no need of our Service, and that as he is the searcher of Hearts, the inward Worſhip, without which all outward Acts of Piery are of no Worth, is ſufficient to diſcharge us of the Obligation we owe to the Supreme Being, on whom we depend. As to what concerns other Men, Mr. Thomaſius ſays, That the Omillion of the outward Worſhip does not hurt either Human Society in general , nor Civil Society in particular, provided there be an inward Worſhip paid. But it does not from thence follow, in my opinion, that there is no Neceffity of worſhipping GOD outwardly, and thao this Neceflity is not fufficiently known by the Light of Reaſon ; for how can we conceive that there is a true Piery containd in the Heart, unleſs it fhew itſelf by fome Ourward Ads of Religion? Men are made in ſuch a Manner, that they do not think that they ſew a ſufficient Reſpect one to another, if they do not give ſome Proofs of it by word of Mouth, or ſome figuificant A&i- 4. X2 on, 156 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. . on this Belief, ſo is it the only Foundation of that pay him, as to embrace them with peculiar Fa- ſweet Tranquillity and Acquieſcence of Mind, vour, and to give them a Title to Eternal Life, which Men inwardly enjoy, and (3) the very which good Effects do follow only that Inſtitution Fence and Bulwark of all that Probity which we and Way of Service which he hath reveal'd in a are to exerciſe towards our Neighbours; without ſingular Manner to the World: Yet a ſerious Per- which no Man can ſeriouſly and heartily do a ſwaſion concerning the Divine Exiſtence and Pro- good A&tion himſelf, or give ſufficient Caution vidence, under whatever particular Apprehenſions, and Security of his honeſt Intentions to others(a). or particular Worſhip, hath however thus much And although it appears from the Ordinances of of Force and Efficacy, as to render Men more ob- the Chriſtian Religion, that God is not ſo far ſervant (4) of their Duty. To prove this Afferti- pleas’d with every Kind of Worſhip which Men on we need only conſider, that there have been of old on, ſeeing they can no ways be aſſured of the Sincerity of each others Intention. But if the inward Worſhip of GOD is neceſ. ſary for the Welfare of Society, as Mr. Thomaſius ſuppoſes it, I can't ſee how ſuch a purely Spiritual Religion can be of any great Ure; unleſs we will ſuppole that all Men are equally capable of knowing their Duty to GOD, and as careful to practiſe it, ſo thar none need to be inſtructed or exhorted by others. Mere Talk is not ſufficient for che ignorant and common People, which are the greateſt part of Mankind; there muſt be ſomething that will affect their Senſes, and rouze their Attention, without which they'll forget the Being of a GOD. So that though I might enlarge upon the Obligation to our ward Worſhip, of which we ſhall ſpeak more afterward, Chap. 6. §. 2. we muft grant, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary. And though Mr. Thomaſius declares that he was al- ways of that Opinion, yet I ſee him owning, in his Fundament. Fur. Nat. & Gent. p. 150. that outward Worſhip is neceſſary for the Regulation of Honeſty and good ,Order, which, as he explains theſe Terms in the general Reformation of his Syſtem, lay an Obligation, if not ſo binding, yet at leaſt as true and indiſpenſable, in my Judgment, as that he calls Juſt. (a) Grotius in lib. Sapientiæ, Cap. 12. v. I. How high ſever come people talk about Honeſty's being deſirable merely on its own Ac- count'; yet ſo great is the force of theſe outward viſible Things upon our Mind, that without a full Perſwafion of the Divine Providence and Retribution, and without some Syſtem of Law to guide Men in the true Way of Alting, it is impoſible bat that they would wander into moſt grievous and fatal Dangers. For, as human Reason is looſe and giddy, when the Paſſions have overcome the judgment, and the Manners are ſuited to the Paſions, it eaſily finds out a Colour and Diſguiſe for Sin, and ſo long obſtinately refuſeth to hear, till it grows quite deaf. Therefore the wiſe Man pronounceth thoſe to be miſerably vain, who are ſo far from having a careful Regard to the Knowledge of GOD and of bis Providence, as to let thoſe great Points depend on every Man's Fancy and Choice: Than which nothing can be contriv’d more deſtructive, I do not ſay to good Manners, but to Government and Society. (3) Boethius de Conſolat. Philofoph. in fin. Magna vobis eſt, ſi diſſimulare non vultis, neceſſitas indi&ta probitatis, cùm ante oculos agitis Judicis cuncta cernentis, i.e. “ Your living under the Eyes of an All-ſeeing Judge, lays a kind of a Neceſſity upon you to « be Good and Virtuous.” (4) Lucian de Imaginib. "25 6ool to Jehov pesi ev tagéeyw obxov, ŠTOA megs av Apónes å erson äv &ex, i. e. “ Thoſe who are “ moſt ſtrict and conſcientious in their Dury to GOD, are the moſt honeſt and regular in their Dealings with Men." It is certain that Religious Motives are of great Force to wean Men from Vice, and engage them to Virtue, however confuſed and imperfect Mens Nocions of the Deity are. This may appear ſomething difficult to conceive in reſpect of the Heathens, but we have ſome Proofs of Fact. I don't ſpeak of Philoſophers, who had more clear Notions of Religion than the Vulgar, although they dared not deliver them openly. Mr. Selden (in his Treatiſe De Jure Nat. do Gent, Secundum Hebræos, Lib. 1. Chap. 8.) has collected ſeveral Authorities to make it evident, that moſt of them looked upon the Laws of Nature as derived from GOD, who will puniſh the Tranſgreſſion of them, and reward their Practice. And 'twould be rio hard thing to add to them many other Paſſages. Nay, the very People, notwithſtanding their prodigious Superſtition into which they were plunged, yet préſerved fome Tincture of this importatit Principle, either by reaſon of that natural Relation there is between the Idea's of GOD and Sanctity, which hin- dered ſuch Men as had not wholly given themſelves up to Vice, from attending to the Conſequences of the received Opinions, or becauſe there remained ſome Footſteps of the ancient Tradition of the only true GOD, the Creator of the World, and the Au- thor and Protector of human Society. This ſeems plainly to ariſe from the common Opinion among inoſt of the Heathens con- cerning the Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life. (See what our Author has ſaid Chap. 3. 9. 20 ) We may alſo find ſome expreſs Words relating to this Matter in the Poets, who, as every one knows, accommodated themſelves to the common Opini- ons. Selden has alledged many in the Place above quoted; we ſhall produce ſome others, viz. in the Oedipus of Sophocles, A&t. 3. the Chorus. Ei voi gwein osporle ubieg tar Let th' Gods be ſo propicious co me Εύσε ον αγνείαν λόγων As I preſerve my ſelf in Sanctity Έργών τε πάντων, ών νόμοι πρόκειναι In Words, and Deeds, by th' Laws unto us given “Υψίποδες Ερανίαν δι' αιθέρα Noc by poor Mortals, but the GOD of Heaven. Τεκνοθίνες: ών ΟλύμπG Which Laws no Mortal can aboliſh quite Πατος μόνο, έδε νιν θνα τα For GOD's in them, and by his Pow'r and Mighe Φύσις ανερων ετικεν, έδε Will triumph over all that is not right, Μιω ποπ λάδι κατακριμάστε: For He can ne'er grow Old Μέγας εν τέτοις Θεός, Oudynegoutte See alſo the Antigone of the fame Poet, v.455. Euripides in his Jon. v. 440, &c. and a Paſſage in Heſiod, which our Author hath quoted in the foregoing Chapter, S. 2. Note 3. to which we may add v. 321, doc. in the work of this laſt Poet. I will conclude with Cicero, who was not leſs ſuperſtitious, (De Legib. Lib. 2. Chap. 7.) Vtiles autem eße opiniones has, quis neget, cum intelligat, quam multa firmentur f urejurando, quant & ſalutis fint foederum Religiones ? Quàm multos Divini Supplicii metus à ſcelere revocarit? quamque San&ta fit Societas civium inter ipſos, Diis immortalibus interpofitis tum judicibus tum teſtibus, i.e. “ Who can deny the Uſe- " tulneſs of theſe Opinions, (viz. of the Gods and Providence) when he confiders, how many Things are confirmed by Oaths ? " How much the Security of Leagues and Alliances depend on Religion? How many the Fears of Divine Vengeance keeps from 6. Wickedneſs? And how careful Citizens are to diſcharge their Duties to each other, becauſe they believe the immortal Gods are “ not only the Witneſſes, but will be Judges of their Aštions.” See what I have ſaid Lib. I. Chap. 6. S. 12. Note 7. and Lib. 2. Chap. 3. §. 19. Note 2. I ſpake in this laſt Nore ſomething touching a Compariſon between a Society of Atheiſts, and another, of ſuch as have ſome Notion of a God, though imperfect and incoherent; but ſince chat Note was compoſed and printed, Mr. Bayle hath put out (in 1704) a Continuation of diverſe Meditations upon Comers, where he ſpeaks fomething that may ſerve to ſtrengthen and explain my Affertion, but I ſhall firſt begin with what Mr. Le Clerc has ſaid upon this Subject, in his Biblioth. Choiſie, Tom. 5. p. 302, 303. in Anſwer to this Queſtion, whether Atheiſm is to be preferred to Pagan Idolatry ; To which he ſays, “ We muit, - in my opinion, diſtinguiſh firſt of the Societies, conſider their Opinions abſtractly, and then on the one ſide deſcribe Atheiſm, " and on the other Idolatry, 'Tis poſſible we may find one ſort of Idolatry better than Atheiſm, and another worſe ; and ſo I ** can neither fay Yea nor Nay, to Mr. Bayle's general Queſtion. In the ſecond place, when we come to conſider, not on the O- pinions in general, but the Societies in themſelves, which profefs the Pagan Idolatry or Atheiſm, we muſt make alſo ſome cu- s rious Diſtinctions, and divide the Queſtion into ſeveral Propoſitions, according to the different Cafes which are put, and to 16 which. Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 157 old, and ſtill are, Men profeſſing Religions which who from the Experience of long Travels, pre- we muſt own to be deſtructive to Salvation, as tend to affirm, that Chriſtianity hath not been able ſuppoſe Mahomet ans, or Pagans; who nevertheleſs to alter the common Diſpoſitions of fome Nation by vertue of their Perſwafion of God's Providence, towards particular Vices; and that tis not eaſy to have ſhown no inconſiderable Care and Concern diſcover the Truth of that Holy Religion, from for Honeſty and Juſtice ; fo as not to be outdone the Manners and the Practices of thoſe who pro- by many Chriſtians, at leaſt as to External Per- fefs it. Though I ſhould imagine the Reaſon of formances. Nay, there are not wanting Perſons, that Unhappineſs to be chiefly this, becauſe the Chriſtian " which we muſt anſwer negatively or affirmatively, according to their Nature.” Mr. Le Clerc gives us an Example in the ſame Volume, ſpeaking of the Hiſtory of the Incas, written by Garcilaſo de la Vega, pag. 380, 381. Theſe are his Words, “ If whar Garcilasſo de la Vega ſays of the Opinions, Laws, and Manners, of the Subjects of the Incas, be true, there is no Idolatrous Na- « tion in the World, nor excepring the moſt polite and learned, where there are ſuch good Laws, or ſo well obſerved. Their se Religion which chiefly conſiſts in worſhipping the Sun, whom they believe to be the Father of the Yncas not with Human Sacrifices, " as they do in the other parts of America, but with Beaſts and other Things, is the leaſt corrupted of any among the Idolaters. « Beſides the Sun, they hold that there is another Deicy, which they call Pacha-camac, a Word chat lignifies, in their Language, “ The Soul of the World. They ſpeak of this God as a Being invitible, whoſe Nature is incomprehenſible, and who created the « Sun and the Stars. They believe the Immortality of the Soul, and have ſome confuſed Notion of a Reſurrection. Suppoſing “ that all this that Gar. de la Vega ſays is true, we may fay, that ſuch an Idolatrous Society as chis, is incomparably better than a “Society of Atheiſts, and, in ſome Reſpects, may be preferred to ſome Societies, that otherwiſe have better Principles.” Tho' this Queſtion in itſelf be not very important, becauſe a Society of meer Atheiſts is a Thing no where to be found, at leaſt, not in any Country; yet I doubt not, but many Perſons wiſhed that Mr. Le Clerc had deſcended to more particulars. I ſuppoſed in my Nore, to which this is only a Supplement, that I did not intend to ſpeak of the Opinions of the Atheiſts or İdolaters, conſidered in themſelves and abſtractly, buc only of the Effects they are able to produce in reſpect to Societies. I ſup- poſed alſo, that in the parallel between a Society of Idolaters and Atheiſts, we might conceive an Idolatry which did not deſtroy the principal Fundamentals of Religion, i.e. the Effence and Providence of ſome Deity. For it is certain, that Faith in the Ex- iſtence of a God, without Faith in his Providence, is at the bottom indirect Atheiſm, as to Moralicy. Upon which Foot I think that, all Things being otherwiſe equal, a Society of Athefts, i.e. a People compoſed of Men Learned and Unlearned, Perſons of all Orders and Conditions, bearing that Character ; ſuch a Society, I ſay, will be more corrupt than another which preſerves the fundamental principles of Religion, though mixt with Errors, and Things inconſiſtent with the Truth. And ſince in this Queſtion we have chiefly an Eye to the ancient Heathens, let us ſuppoſe, for Example, that the Commonwealth of Greece, or ſome Roman Province, were on a ſudden turned Atheiſts, and no Man had any Senſe of Religion; I ſay, that after ſuch a Change, that Com- monwealth or Province could not keep up any tolerable Order in Civil Society, but there would be among them many more Diſor- ders than were before. And my Reaſons are theſe, Among the Heathen, the People were not iguorant of the Agreement there is between Religion and the Laws of Nature. The Poers, who principally dealt with the People, have delivered many Things (as Mr. Le Clerc in his Bibliotheq. Choiſie, Tom. 3. Thews) that prove that the true Notion of GOD was not quite blotted out of their Minds. For Example, the moſt ancient of them, Homer and Hefiod, ſpeak thus of the Gods, That they are Almighty, Immortal, Good, Omniſcient, Wiſe, Happy, the Lovers of Virtue, and Enemies of Vice, &c. Moreover, the Unicy of the Godhead itſelf was not altogether unknown to the Poets, although Mr. Bayle ſeems to think that all the Heathens were ignorant of that Truth. No- thing can prove this better and more fully, than theſe Verſes of Sophocles, in a Tragedy now loft, but preſerved to us in Grotius's Excerpta, pàg. 1494 Είς ταϊς αληθείαισιν, ας ες θεός, In Truth there is no more Gods but One, “ος έegνον τ' έτπυξε, και γαλαν μακραν, Who made the Heaven, far extended Earth, Movt te zá@gmov oidud, reivé Lewr Bias The blue ſwelling Sea, and fierce Winds. Θνητοι και πολλοί καρδίαν πλανώμενοι Yer many Men being grofly deceived, “Ιδρυσάμεθα πημάτων παραψυχής, Have erected, to comfort themſelves in Trouble, Θεών αγάλμαθ' έκ λίθων, ή χαλκέων, Images of the Gods, of Gold, and Stone, and Braſs; *Η ευσυτεύκων, ή λιφαντίνων τύπες And offer Sacrifices to them in their Aſſemblies, Θυσιάς και τέτοις, και καλας πανηγύρεις And think that they are Religious. Τα χοντες, όπως δυστον νομίζομδυ. Several other Paſſages, beſides what are alledged above, might be produced, to prove that the Practice of Virtue was well plea- fing to the Gods; on the contrary, Vice odious, notwithſtanding the Crimes attributed to them in their Fables. Mr. Bayle, in the Continuation of diverſe Meditations, pag. 654.) ſays, “That ſingle Theft, for Example, and lying, were not contrary to the Ore “ dinances which their Gods had exprefly delivered, and ſo they believed that their Gods did not regard them.” I own, that the Prieſts ſpake very little of Morality to the People, but this hinders not but that the principal Duties of the Law of Nature were known among the People, who looked upon them as Laws to which the Gods required their Obſervation, although their Notions of them were very obſcure, and corrupted by ill Cuſtoms. This is what the Poets always ſuppoſed, who contributed more to their entertaining the Notions of Virtue and Vice, than the Prieſts, who, as wicked as they were, dare not openly contradict them. We find in Euripides this fine Sentence, which he makes a Woman to ſpeak, and ſay, That the Gods abherred all-Oppreſſion, Extortion, and every unjuſt Way of enriching our ſelves. The ſame Poet alſo ſays, that every Crime is A GREAT IMPIET Y, as well as a great Folly, in theſe Words, Tè d' auraxaggeiv å oil eie uszáan, Kexopeórwr ' dvdgão trackvoid Oreft. v. 821, 822. Ed. Cant. See Heſiod. Oper. & Dier. v. 180, doc. 219, doc. and 238, 239. Ed. Cler. and Mr. Earon Spanhemius's Comment on Callimachus, Hymn. in Jovem. v. 3, and in Cerer. v. 19. Many more ſuch paſſages might be collected out of the Poers; but there is a remarka- ble place in Plato that may not be paſſed over. That Philofopher, treating of Incest, ſays, That it was looked upon with ſuch Hor- ror, that Men of no Honeſty, yea, and the Common people, would not entertain ſuch wicked Defires, for a Siſter (for Example) though ſhe were never fo fair. And that which extinguiſhed thoſe Impure Thoughts was this, That Inceſt PASSED FOR AN UNLAWFUL AND ABOMINABLE ACT WITH THE DEITY. No Body, ſays he, contradi&ts it, every one knows this from his Cradle, and all the World keeps to it in both jocular and ſerious Diſcourſes. The Stage repreſents Thyeſtes's, Oedipus's and Macareusºs who flew themſelves for the Inceſtuous Commerce which they had with their Siſters. His Words arc, Euineov poñerce κατασβέννυσι πάσας τας τοιαύτας ηδόνας ... τη ταύτα ΕΙΝΑΙ Φ Α ΝΑΙ ΜΗΔΑ ΜΩΣ ΟΣΙΑ, ΘΕΟΜ Ι Σ Η ΑΕ, και αίσχρών αίσχισα. το δ' αίπον ας' και σε όξι, το ΜΗΔΕΝΑ ΑΛΛΩΣ ΑΛΓΕΙΝ ΑΥΤΑ, αλλ' ευθύς οξυο κινου και μην έκαν, ακέειν τε λεόντων αεί και παναχύ ταύτα, ο γελοίοις τε άμα, αν πάση τεσπαδή τραγική λες μ' και πολλάκις, όταν και Θυέσας, ήτίνας Ο' ιποδας εισάγωσιν, ή Μακαρέας τινας αδελφαίς μιχθένας λαθραίος, όφθένας 3, επoίμως θάνατον εαυτοίς οπι- 745761) cs díxlu s djuptias. De Legib. Lib. 8. p. 838. Ed. Steph. So that it was a common Opinion, that even in this Lite Crimes do not go unpuniſhed always, but whoever violates the Law of Nature, hath great Reaſon to fear the Effects of Divine Vengeance. Plautus has a fine paſſage to this purpoſe, ſufficient to Thew how great Impreſſion ſuch a perfwaúon makes upon the Minds of the Common People. Ardurus one of the Conſtellations, is introduced, ſaying, Thar Jupiter the King of Gods and Men, had ſent him and other Conſtellations, i. q. inferior Deities which preſided over the Stars, lie' fent them, i ſay, into all pares, to be Witnelles 158 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. Chriſtian Doctrinel and Worſhip, being received which they happen to be born, reſides rather in by moſt Men, noe upon their own Choice and their Mouth than in their Heart; whence it Judgment, but from the Cuſtom of the State in comes to paſs, that fo few are ſeriouſly inclin'd to reform moi 905191) Atque -010 Witneſſes of the Actions, Manners, Piety and Fidelity of Men, and to ſee how every Man enriched himſelf. " We wrote down diſtinctly (fays Arcturus) the Names of thoſe who made ute of Falſe Witpeffes, to carry their unjuft Cauſes, or who deny 's their Debts upon Oath before a Judge, and carried them to 7 upiter, and by this he knows every Day who they are, that by " their Crimes pull down his Judgments upon their Heads. He knows them that are ready to take an Oach to get their " Cauſe, and ſuch as get it unjuſtly by the Favour of the Judges. He reviews their Cauſe, and judges it anew, condemning “ the Offender to ſo great a Puniſhment, that the Gain they have made by it is inconſiderable. He hath the Names of Good « Men written in another Book. Theſe Wicked Men Hátter themſelves, that they can appeaſe Jupiter with Offerings and “crifices, but they loſe both their Labour and Coft, for he regards nor any of the Prayers or Services of Perjured Perſons. A “Good Man will be eaſily heard, and obrain Favour of the Gods, but the Sinner cannor. This I advertiſe you of, Oye Vir- tuous, who live in Piery and Integrity: Continue in them, that ye may receive the benefit of your good conduct. ” The Poet thas expreſſes himſelf, on to Tesnes Coquim HISTED OVE os 1 2Toob nt Is nos per gentes alium alia diſparat, Bonos in aliis tabulis exfcriptos habet. meil nich v 26 ** Hominum qui fa&ta, mores, pietatem do fidem hoc ſcelefti in animum inducunt fuum,ad phiog ** Storie Noſcamus, lit quemque adjuvet Opulentia: Jovem ſe placave poſſe donis, hoftiis : Job Qui falſas lites falſis teftimoniis ' SITIOS un Et operam for fumptum perduunt : ideo fit, quia non baste? un tonovic Petunt, quique in jure abjurant pecunia: w Nihil ei acceptum e{t a perjuris ſupplicia. Podeu Peloto Eorum referimus nomina exfcripta ad fovem. Facilives, la qui pius eft, à Dîs fupplicans, citishia to 1002 Cotidie ille ſcit, queis hic quærat malum, en Quam qui bele tu, et, inveniet veniam ſibi, slini online Qui heic litem apilci poſtulant perjurio, Iccireo moneo vos egin bac, qui eſtis boni, Malires falſas qui impetrant apud judicem : Quique et atem agitis cum pietate do cum fide, Y TODO w Iterum ille eam rem judicatam judicat, a Retinete porro, poft faétum at lætemini. Abiti lobi Majore multâ mul&tat, quam litem auferunt. Rudent. Proleg. v. 10, Lc. glo Horgung Som legioni I do not know what Mr. Bayle thought, when reciting exactly what the Conſtellation afferred upon the Roman Theatre, he ad- ded thereupon, (Reſp. ad Provincial. Tom. 4. p. 320.) “ This was not to teach Men, but only in this , that they ſhould not offend " the Deicy perſonally in abuſing Oaths, which they have taken to bear Witneſs with the greateſt Formality, which if they do, “they need not fear his Anger." But, on the contrary, is it not very evident, that the Poet ſpeaks of Honeſty and good Manners in general, without which all outward Acts of Religion are no ways acceptable to GOD, and if he mentions other Crimes join- ed with Perjury, it is only to give an Example of the moti enormous Wickedneſs, and ſuch Circumſtances as aggravate the hei- nouſneſs of it. Nor is Mr. Bayle more happy in Citiuiſm than he is in Reaſoning, “So that (adds he) Common Lies, Evil- Speaking, Lewdneſs, Drunkenneſs, and an hundred other Diſorders may promiſe themſelves Impunity in Reſpect of the Gods. Be it ſo, yet it will be always true, that Religion will be of Force to keep Heathens from Fraud, Cheating, Double-dealing, doc. in which it has much the Advantage of Atheiſm; and we know that many Heathens were faithful in their Dealings, for fear of bringing down Vengeance upon them in this world, and, on the contrary, to obtain Succeſs of the Gods in their Affairs. As to the Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life, we know that an ancient Tradition, which is much inculcated in the VVritings of the Poers, made the Opinion common almoſt every where. But can we think that thoſe Puniſhmeprs were only deſigned for them who neglected the outward Worſhip of GOD, or directly offended his Majeſty? Read the Deſcription of Hell written by Virgil, and you'll ſee that not only the Titans, Gyants, Salmoneus, Tityus, Ixion and Pirithous, are puniſhed, but Brethren that are Ene- mies, and they who beat their Father'; thoſe who deceive their clients and Dependants, hoard up their Riches, and will nei- ther impart them to their Fathers nor Friends; thoſe who have been Nain in the Act of Adultery; who have engaged in unjuſt VVars; ſuch as make no Conſcience of breaking their Promiſes made to their Maſters. Another cries out, as loud as he can, “Learn by my Example, to do Juſtice, and not to flight the Gods.” Another hath fold his Country, and betrayed it to a Tyrant. Another for Money has made Laws and abrogated them. Another has committed Inceſt with his own Daughter. “If I had, adds Sibyll," an hundred Tongues, and as many Mouths, with a voice that would never fail, it were impoſſible for me to reckon up all the different forts of Crimes which are puniſhed in that place, or the Names of all the different forts of Puniſhments 6. which the wicked ſuffer.” Theſe are his VVords, DHA Hic, quibus inviſi fratres, dum vita manebat, Diſcite juſtitiam moniti, & non temnere Divos. Pulſat uſq; Parens, do fraus innexa Clienti; Vendidit hic auro Patriam, Dominumque potentem tudo Aut qui divitiis joli incubuere repertis, Impoſuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit, Nec partem poſuere ſuis, quâ maxima turba eſt; Hic thalamum invafit natæ vetitoſque hymeneos. to the Quique ob adulteriuin caſi; quiq; arma ſecuti Impia, nec veriti dominorum fallere dextras; Non mihi ſi lingue centum fint, oraque centum, Incluſi poenam exſpeliant Ferrea vix, omnes ſcelerum comprendere formas, magna teſtatur voce per umbras : Omnia pænarum percurrere nomina poffim. Æneid. 1. 6. v. 608. He, on the contrary, repreſents Good Men in a place by themſelves, viz. in the Elyſian-Fields, enjoying the Happineſs of another Life, and being, as ir were, under the Conduct of a wiſe Cato. Secretoſque pios, his dantem jura Catonem. Æneid 8. v. 680. There are, I own, inany ridiculous Fables mixed with theſe Deſcriptions of the Gods, and another Life, and the blockiſh Mul- tirude did apparently depend more upon the Chimera's of the Poers than on the Truths which they had interſperſed in their V Vorks. But is it credible that among the People themſelves, which comprehends the illiterate part of Mankind in general, there ſhould be many who have acknowledged, at leaſt, in part, the Abuſe, and gave great Attention to the true Principles of Natural Religion, tho' mixed with many Fallities. Theſe Notions eaſily enter into the Mind of any Man that will make uſe of the Light of Nature, and Men without Study are ſometimes better diſpoſed to receive the Truch, and leſs pejudiced, than fuch as profeſs themſelves Learned, (See Parkhaſiana, Tom. 2. p. 103, &c.) The Poers might here alſo ſhew the People the way, and give them Occaſion to think that they did nor themſelves believe che Abſurdicies which chey attributed to the Gods, as Hercules's VVords in Euripides may prove. 'Eqw @ Tès Ocès éta ', un déuss, I don't believe the Gods love unlawful Beds, Στέργείν νομίζω, δέσματ’ οξά αν χεesir: Or that they put one another in Fetters and Chains: Ούτ' αξίωσα πώποτ', ότε πείσομαι, Nor can I perſwade my ſelf to believe Ουδ' άλλον αλλά δεασύτω πεφυκέναι. . That one of them is Maſter of the other. Δά τον γδ ο Θεός, Η αρ ες' όντως θεός, God, who is really fuch, can ſtand in need Ουδενός, αιωδών οίδε δύσηνοι λόγοι. Of Nothing. Theſe are the falſe Accounts of the Poets: See alſo Mr. Baron Spanhemius, upon Callimachus's Hymn. in Fovem do in Iphigenia Taurica, where the Quire thus fpeaks, v.385, Sic. Ed. Cambr. - Eza H Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 159 reform their Mind by its Directions. For I doubt National Vices, might be repreſt, would Men not, but that at leaſt the External Acts even of but apply themſelves in earneſt to the leading a Life • Ew we er 'Tis incredible to me that Tantalus ſhould feaſt the Gods, Tai Tantalar neõlov esihudla, And that they ſhould eat the Fleſh of Children, *Απςα κείνω, παιδες ηθη ναι βορά. I rather think, that the inhabitants of that Country Tές ' ενθαι δ', αυτές ένας άνθρωποκτόνες, VVere accuſtomed to Homicide, and to juſtify their Crimes Εις ή τον το φαύλον αναφέρειν δοκώ. They attributed them to the Gods; for I can't perſuade myſelf Ουδένα γδ οίμαι δαιμόνων ή κακόν, , That any God can be guilty of ſuch a VVickednes. Pindar had before ſaid much the fame Thing, reflecting upon the ſame Fable, Εμοί δ' άπορα, γασρίμαρος To me it is abſurd to ſay, that God's a Glutton, Μακάρων τιν' ειπείν, I muft withhold Afſent. They chat thus abuſed 'Αφίσταμαι, 'Ακέρδεια λίλογχν Thoſe Happy Beings ſhall ſurely be puniſhed. Θαμινα κακαόρως. - Olymp. I. 82. The fame Poet, as Mr. Le Clerc obferves (Biblioth. Choiſ. Tom. 6. p. 269.) ſhews a little higher that he was ſenſible of the Falf- hood of theſe Fables, ſaying, “Romantick Stories and Fables, ſet out with divers Fictions, do more eaſily gain Entertainment « in Mens Minds, than true Hiſtories. A flouriſhing Rhetorick which pleaſes Men, fercing off a Thing makes a Thing almoſt in- “ credible to be believed. But length of Time certainly diſcovers the Truth. Men ſhould always ſpeak well of the Gods, for “they run the leaſt Hazard. » Πιο Η θαύμαζα πολλά, Koi ämsové urcalo msonga . Kai Ti και βροτων φρένας. Οι "Eup.svas to mandéres, in adam “Υπέρ ή αληθή λόων Αμέραι δ' οπίλοιποι, Δεδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλους Μάρτυρες σοφότατοι, γιατί Εξαπατώνι μυθοι, "Es des ei ocuering Χάρις δ' άπερ άπανία το &- 'Ερικός αμφί δαιμόνων. Η εταιρία και χα τα μίλιχα θνητοί, , Kendo usiwv 78 atid, er wollton por Επιφέesισα τιμών, Theſe Reflections may eaſily come into the Minds of the moſt ſimple Perſons, that will but make Uſe of their Natural Senſe. For 'cis probable that the Poets did not hatch them in their own Brains, but here, as in other Things, followed the Dictates of Nature. We have always obſerved theſe Things to happen among Chriſtians, and doubtleſs the ſame things happened among the Heathens. Among the Papiſts, in ſome Countries eſpecially, one word from a Prieſt will raiſe the Mob againft an Heretick, as they call them; bue yer there are many honeſt Men, who abhor ſuch a Diabolical Madneſs, and do not believe that any Man may be perſecuted for his Religion ; though the Clergy inculcate that Doctrine with all the Earneftneſs poſſible, to ſatisfy their Ambition, Pride and Avarice, and to engage the People in their Intereſts, who ſuffer themſelves to be led blindly by their Ha- rangues, eſpecially when they ſuggeſt Things agreeable to the r brutiſh and irregular Inclinations. We may alſo ſay the ſame of diverſe Opinions, which are received by the ſeveral Parties of Chriſtians. The Doctrines of Tranſubftantiation, Impanation, and the Ubiquity of Chriſt's Body, are ſuch grofs Contradictions, that none can believe them, and though ſome Men make a Pro- feffion of that Faith, they no more believe them than ſuch as deny them. (See what I have ſaid in my Preface to Tom. III. of Archbiſhop Tillotſon's Sermons.) But there are other ſpeculative Opinions and moral Maxims, either entirely or very unſound, which the Preachers deliver from the Pulpit, without convincing many Men, who by the Strength of meer Natural Reaſon per- ceive the Abſurdity of theſe Doctrines and Maxims, or explain them in a clear different Senſe from the Preachers, as appears when they are queſtion’d about them in familiar Terms. The Pagan Fables were in like Manner abſurd, and why may we nor al- ſo believe that many among the People looked upon them as falſe, and kept to the Fundamentals of Nacural Religion, though with ſome Mixtures of Error and Imperfection. Did not Men then make Uſe of their Reaſon? Or were thoſe Truths ſo obſcure that they could not be found out but by long and profound Meditation? We may with much greater Reaſon ſuppoſe, that they, whoſe Education has been above the common fort, in going to the Schools of the Philoſophers, and carefully reading their Books, ſhould be happily freed from the Superſtitions and groſs Nocions of Heatheniſm. With what Liberty did the Philoſo- phers inſult the Religion of the Vulgar ſeveral ways? “We may believe (ſays Mr. Forutenelle, in his Hiſtory of Oracles, Diſſert. 1. Chap. 8.)“ thar among the Pagans Religion was a ſort of Practice, whoſe Speculation was a Thing indifferent. Do as others do, " and you may believe as you pleaſe.” This is a wild Notion, but the People, who ſaw not the Weakneſs of it, were contented with it, and the Philoſophers ſubmitted readily to it, becauſe they got by it . Mr. Bayle alſo (in his Diverſe Meditations, p. 367.) owns, That there were, among the Heathen, Men of ingenuity and good Senſe, who, without Philoſophy, had ſometimes tolerable Notions of the Deity. It is true, that, according to him, they were not to be regarded, becauſe when they had heard the Rea- ſonings of the Philoſophers, about the Nature of the Gods, as ſoon as they were gone, they did as others did. But it is no ways neceſſary in the Queſtion we are debating, to find ſuch Men among the Pagans as had the Courage to oppoſe the common Errors or Worſhip eſtabliſh'd by publick Authority. 'Tis ſufficient that ſeveral did acknowledge the more groſs Abuſes of Superſtition and Idolatry, and acquire fuch Notions in Religion as were able to produce ſuch a Degree of Honeſty, as they could not have had if they had been Atheiſts. The Deſcriptions of the Pagan Corruptions, made by Mr. Bayle (in his Continuation of Diverſe Meditations, p. 702, &c.) do not prove the contrary. Theſe ſort of Deſcriptions oughe not to be taken in a Metaphyſical Gene- rality, 'tis fufficient chac, according to the Rules of good Criticiſm, they agree to the greateſt Number. Farther, the Men of vehom I am now ſpeaking, not daring, for fear of incurring a general Odium, to openly oppoſe thoſe ſtrange Abuſes of the Vul- gar, deſerve cercainly to come under that Deſcription as well as the Philoſophers, as having ſuppreſſed the Truth which they knew, according to the Reproof given them by se Paul, Rom. i. 18. But you'll ſay, we muſt not attribute the Honeſty of theſe Men to the Religious Notions they bąd received : It was cauſed by a Principle of Honour, Fear of Laws, che croſfing of Paſſions, and ſeveral other Intereſts proceeding from Self-Love. That this is all the Virtue which moſt Men have, as we ſee among Chri- Rians, can'c be deny?d, but doth it thence folow, that no Heathen was incliud to Virrue by a Religious Motive, or with a reſpeco to the Puniſhments and Rewards which are diſtributed by the Deity, either in this Life or the next. "I can't deny, ſaith Mr. Bayle, (in his Diverſe Meditations, p. 439, 440.)" but there have been ſome Heathens, who making a good Uſe of their know- a ledge of the Nature of God, have by that Motive ſubdued the ſudden Force of their Paſſions. But then (ſays he) 'cis moſt 5 probable, that when this Motive was ſo prevalent, their Paffions were ſo moderate, that they might have been reduced by Reafon, without that Help.” So we may as well believe, that among Chriſtians no Man is Vircuous purely through his Religịous Principles, becauſe there are Laws and Difgrace attending every Crime; nay, in a word, all the other Motives which have place in Heatheniſm. Moreover, what we have ſaid of the Laws may fuggeſt a Reflexion not to be ſlighted. Theſe wife Lawgivers of Antiquity ſo much eſteemed and reſpected by all the VVorld, at the ſame time that they appointed that the Gods ſhould be worſhipped in their ſeveral Countries, forbad, under the moſt rigorous Puniſhments, moſt of thoſe Crimes which the Vulgar at- tributed to their Deities. And is it not natural to infer from thence, that they looked upon the Fables as abſurd Relations of the Poets, which the People pleaſed themſelves with? At leaſt, this is the Reaſoning of Lucian in his Necromancy, Tom. 1. p. 327. de rès vorros élas rá vanie Tchas mesmas ei ole muonea civ er en diye bevov, i.e. « On the one fide I can't imagine that the Gods . 65 comic 160 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf Book II. Life ſuitable to their Profeſſion (5). So are the Opinions contrary to theſe Truths moſt IV. As this Perſwalion, and whatever elſe we carefully to be barr'd off and excluded. And here are able co learn concerning the Worſhip of God, we would not only be underſtood of Atheiſtical either from Reaſon or from Revelation, is firſt of and Epicurean Principles, but of thoſe numerous all to be implanted in a rightly Cultivated Mind: Notions which appear to be deſtructive of true “ comniit Adultery, or that there are among them Diviſions, or at leaſt that they think theſe Things Juſt and Honeſt; and on « the other ſide I fee, that the Lawgivers have ordained the contrary, which they would not have done, had they thought them “ profitable.” But you'll ſay again, The very Notion of Honeſty, confidered without any reſpect to Religion, might incline the Heathens; for Example, To render Men their Dues, tho’they might keep them without any apprehenfions of Puniſhment from the Laws, or Diſgrace otherwiſe. But I'll leave it to any, Conſidering Man, if the Reaſonings which Mr. Bayle attributes to an Atheist, can come into any Man's Mind but ſome fubtil Philoſophers, who are exerciſed in deep and abſtruſe Metaphyſical Medications. 'Tis not conceivable that any Philoſophers, whether Atheiſts, or not, ſhould be inclined to practiſe the Maxims of Virtue, by no other Motive, but its own Beauty, whether inward or outward. It is very evident, that all that is ſaid about theſe Notions of Honeſty, is in the Mouth of moſt Men, eſpecially Atheiſts and Epicureans, meer empty Talk and pure Declamation, of which the Mind is not perfuaded. Nor are we more ſure that all thoſe who ſay, That Honeſty is natural to Virtue, and Diſhonefty to Vice, that Virtue is worthy to be loved for itſelf, and is its own Reward, (Continuation, &c. 761.) have by that means excluded all Relation between Honeſty and the will of GOD, as the Example al- ledged by Mr. Bayle out of Cicero, gives us Reaſon to believe. It is true, that he maintains, That unleſs we could eſcape the Eyes of God, as well as Men, we ſhould not ſuffer ourſelves to hearken to any Motions of Avarice, Injuſtice, Debauchery, or Intem- perance. But does not the ſame Author declare poſitively elſewhere, that God is the Author of the Law of Nature ( Lib. z. De Repub. apud Laétantium Lib. 6. Chap. 8.) in theſe words, Unuſque erit communis quaſi Magiſter, do Imperator omniurn Deus; ille Legis, illius [viz. RECTÆ RATIONIS, NATURÆ CONGRUENTIS) INVENTOR, DISCEPTATOR, LA- TOR, doc: See the whole Paffage quoted above, Chap. 3. S. 20. Note 5. What do I ſay? In the ſame Book of the Of- fices from whence this Paffage is taken, which Mr. Bayle quotes, do we not find, that the Law of Nature is both an Human and Divine Law ? Atque hoc multo magis exigit ipſa Naturs Ratio, que est Lex Divina do Humana, Lib. 3. Chap. 5. Edit. Græv. And a little lower, chap. 6. he explains himſelf better, Qui autem Civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, bi diri- munt communem humani generis Societatem : quâ fublatâ beneficentia , liberalit as, bonitas, juſtitia funditus tollitur : quæ qui tollunt, etiam adverſus Dens Immortales impii judicandi ſunt, i.e." They that hold, that the Rights eſtabliſhed among Citizens are to be “ regarded, yet will not allow them to Strangers, and theſe laſt deſtroy the Society general of all Mankind, with which Bouncy, “ Liberality, Humanity, and Juſtice muſt fall . Now to attempt this is an Impiety againſt the Gods themſelves, ſince it is the de- “ ſtruction of that Society they have eſtabliſhed among Men.” The ſame thing appears in many other Paſſages of that famous Roman. Whoever then will conſider what I have ſaid, will perhaps agree, that notwithſtanding the Pagan Blindneſs, Religion hath won from Vice, and inclined to Virtue, many Men who without that had never been Virtuous, eſpecially ſuch of the People as were not able to make or underſtand all the Reflections which the proſpect of Intereſt, or Fame, and the Norion of Honeſty might ſuggeſt to the Philoſophers. As for others they would not be leſs corrupted, ſuppoſing they were Atheiſts . Generally ſpeaking, we may ſay, in my opinion, that the Falſe Notions of Religion abate the Evil of an Action rather than produce any; they ſerve for an Excuſe or Pretence, but never invite into any Crimes of themſelves, even thoſe who are otherwiſe inclined có thein. For the moſt part, thoſe whom we think to be ſeduced by Superſtition, or by falſe Conſequences drawn from the true Principles of Religion, act altogether by another Motive, which is, if not the only, the chief Caufe at leaſt of their Conduct : Theſe are ordinarily the downright Hypocrites, Men without any Religion, and falle Devoto's , who (as Mr. de la Bruyere ſpeaks, p.478.) under a King that is an Atheiſt will be Atheiſts, or who, if they have noc extinguiſhed quite all ſenſe of a Deity, and a Proviá dence, yet at leaſt look upon theſe great Truths as ſome indifferent Problems. Montagne ſpeaking of a great Nuniber of Chriſti . ans, fays, that ſome fallly make the world believe, that they believe what they do not; others, and thoſe a great Number, cheat themſelves with a falſe Norion of Faith (Eſſays, p. 316. Edit . Pariſ.) and how much greater Reaſon have we to think that Pagi- niſm affords Men of that Character? I do not deny but there are ſome Men which engage themſelves in Evil Actions out of a Principle of Religion, but if Idolatry and Superſtition feducerh them, in fome Reſpects, 'cis becauſe what is otherwiſe good and true in Paganiſm had no Influence upon them to keep them from Vice, and incline them to certain Virtues; infomuch, that the Evil that Religion produces on the one ſide, is compenſated by the Good it doth on the other; for we muſt not imagine, that the greateſt Bigots to Paganiſm did only draw, or obſerve all the Conſequences which naturally followed thoſe things, which they attributed to their Gods. What I have ſaid above proves the contrary, and no Man but muſt as readily agree to it, as Mr. Bayle, who has taken great Pains to prove it, That Men do not realon and act always according to their Principles, and perhaps has much deviated from his Subject. A Pagan may, for Example, proftitute his Daughter upon ſome Feſtival in hononr of the Gods, and for all thar be honeſt in his Buſineſs, a Religious Obſerver of his l'romiſes, Serviceable, Charitable, doc. for fear of the Gods. They are uſually ſome ſpecial Notions of Religion which make Impreſſions upon Men, and which determine them to do Good or Evil; but the general Notion of a Deity, that he puniſhes Vice and rewards Virrue, works more effectually upon them, a Notion fo affecting to Mens Minds, that it often hinders the Effects that had Principles would have upon ſuch as profeſs Religion. But I ſhali fay no more in this matter, yet tho I have enlarged myſelf beyond the Bounds of a Nore, I can't but add ſomething more about it ; Mr. Bayle who has quoted that Paffage of Grotius upon which our Author Criticizes, explains it thus ; (Continuat. dc. p. 768.) We ſhould be obliged to follow the Law of Nature, if we ſuppoſed that there were no God nor Providence; but his way of expreſſing himſelf , viz. Hæc locum aliquem haberent, etiamfi daremus, &c. fhews, that he means no more than what's expre? fed in my Note. I know not what Mr. Bayle means by thefe words, Law and Obligation; but in the Language of the Philoſophers a Law ſuppoſes a Superior, and Jus comes from Jubeo, becauſe Right and Law proceed from the Authority of a Superior. Our Author, as I think, has very well proved in the foregoing Chapter, Ş. 20. and Lib. 1. Chap. 6. $. 7,8. That Man's Will cannor impoſe any Obligation, properly ſo called, upon itſelf, and that Maxims of Reaſon are not ſufficient of themſelves to determine the will neceſſarily this way or that way. All that Mr. Bayle ſays, proves only, 1. That an Atheiſt knows that Thankfulneſs and Gratitude are two different Things, as are alſo Faithfulneſs and Deceitfulneſs, a Circle and a Triangle. 2. He can perceive that the Maxims of Virtue are not purely Arbitrary, but that they have a Foundation in the Nature of Things, and imply a certain Convenience. But can that alone make him certainly follow thoſe Maxims contrary to his private Intereſt, and the bent of his Defire? I can't think it can ever come into an Atheiſt's Mind, much leſs, that he fall have the Courage to facrifice his Earneſt Paſſions to thoſe fine Notions. He may think it becomes a Reaſonable Creature to conform to Reaſon, but from the Moment that theſe Maxims of Reaſon are oppoſed by the Enjoyment of any Pleaſure in which he promiſes himſelf more Satisfaction than he ac preſent enjoys, he'll filence his Reaſon and follow the Allurements of Senſe. Let us ſpeak the Truth, Suppoſing the Impiery of the Atheiſt, he does not act unreaſonably in following the Voice of Nature, whoſe words, according to Mr. Bayle, are, (Conti- nuat. doc. p.31.) “We muſt Eat and Drink well, enjoy all the Pleaſures of Senſe, prefer our own Intereſt before another's, accom- C modate ourſelves to every Thing that is agreeable, to do a Wrong rather than fuffer any, to revenge Ourſelves, &c. See more againſt Mr. Bayle in Mr. Bernard's Extract of his Continuation, &c. in his News from the Rep. of Letters, May 1705. and in his Diſpute againſt Mr. Bayle, April 1707; Art. 3: May, Art. 4. fune, Art. 3. August , Art. 3. and September, Art. 4. (s) we may add to this, That tho?the Chriſtian Religion be not obſerved as it ought, inſomuch thac there is little or no dif- ference between the Manners of Chriſtians and Pagans, yer Chriſtianity has divers great Advantages above Paganiſm, as Mr. Le Clerc has made it appear, in his Treatiſe of Infidelity, Part 2. Chap. 5. p. 222. To the Examples that he has produc’d, to thew the good Effects of the Chriſtian Religion, we may add this very remarkable one, that by it the Cuſtom of expoſing infants is utterly aboliſhed, which was ſo much uſed by the Greeks and Romans, as Mr. Noodt in his Julius Paulus The ws. Religion, told him Fate te pas his Fate to ſteal : Yes, bus CHAP. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 161 Religion, of Good Manners, and of Human So. A Son his Father, Father kills the Son, ciety, which it is in an high manner the Intereſt On niutual Wounds ewo headlong Brothers run. of Mankind, to ſee abſolutely roored up, and Theſe Combats prove the force of Ruling Powers: baniſh'd out of the World. Such is that Fancy of For they are too unnatural to be curs. the Stoical Fare, or the unchangeable Courſe and Nay, this Opinion's ſettled by Debate, Wheel of Things and Actions ; by which Men are 'Tis Fate, that we ſhould thus diſpute of Fate. made only the Tools or Engines of their own 0: cingo Mr. Creech. perations, it not being in their Power to manage them with any Freedom of Choice, or with any And this Superſtition ſtill bewitcheth a great part Direction of Counſel. For admitting this Hypo- of the Eaſtern World, where no Buſineſs of Mo- theſis, it doth not appear, why the Actions of ment is undertaken without conſulting the Aftro- a Man ſhould be morally imputed to him, rather logers, that they may reçd, as the Phrafe is, what is than the Motion of a Clock to the Wheels by written in Heaven. (3) To which purpoſe Father which it is perform’d, or what would be the uſe Bernier tells a pleaſant Story of a Gardener of Abas of Religion, what the Equity of Laws and of King of Perſia, who rooting up fome Trees which Puniſhments. Seneca Oedip. the King, by Direction of his Aftrologer, had de planted in a Fortunate Hour, and being thereupon Fati iſta culpa est; nemo fit fato nocens. rebuked, turning to the Aſtrologer, Sure, ſays he, The Fault is Fates ; and Fate can fix no Guilt. you was out in your Calculation : For thoſe Trees could never have the benefit of lucky Stars, which were ſet Vid. ibid. v.980, &c. Homer lli. T. at Noon, and unfortunately pulld up at Night. Ano- ther Relation like this, he gives us of a certain 'Ey w od čr cnós vilu, Slave, a Run-away from Goa, who ſet up in the 'Anne Zeus is kõiga tj. neegpõiles City Debli for an Expounder of the Stars, and ’Eevveus . foretold many ſtrange Events with good Confi- The Fault's not mine, but Jove’s and Fate's, dence to the People : Every now and then look- And the Night-wandring Hag's. ing upon his Mariner's Compaß and Compaß and his Hour-Book, as the Noble Inſtrument of his Art. When ſome Zeno (in Diog. Laert. 1. 7.) retorted this Objection who had formerly a Knowledge of him, declar'd very pleaſantly, tho' he did not refuce it : As he their Wonder at his new Profeſſion and Equip- was correcting his Slave who had been catch'd in ment, his Reply was, A tal Beftias, tal Aſtrologuo. a piece of Thievery, the Fellow in way of Excuſe For fuch Beaſts, ſuch an Aſtrologer. But all this kind , your too to be beat for it. Marcus Antoninus way of cheating Ignorant People of their Money, gives a more ſerious Judgment on the Point, (2) undertaken by ſome Confident Knaves, who in The Gods (ſays he, l. 1. c. II.) have put it into every their talk of future Occurrences are not ſo much Man's Power and Choice, to avoid whatever is truly ſupported by their own Arts, as by the Credulity Evil. There is an Opinion nearly allied to this, of their Hearers : If Things fall out as they bold- which ſuppoſes, the Conſequences of Cauſes and ly gueſs’d, they preſently riſe in Honour and Cre- vable Decree, that God hath left himſelf no li- Miſtakes make no noiſe. Tacitus, Hill. 1. 1. calls berty of interpoſing in particular Caſes. Thus all the Pretenders to Aftrology, Gentes bominum po- Miracles, all extraordinary Aliſtances of Heaven, tentibus infidum, ſperantibus fallax : "A Pack of all Effects of Prayers, of Repentance, and of A “ Men unfaithful to the Great, and diſappointing mendment, ſeem to be entirely cut off at one to All of eager Hopes and Defires. Add, Hobbes Stroke. To this we may join that ancient and de Homine, c. 14. 1. 12. Agathias, l. 1. I cannot be- widely receiv'd Perſwaſion, that the Poſitions of lieve that the cauſe of Evil is fix'd in the Courſe of the Stars laid an indiſpenſable neceſſity on Hu- the Stars, and in the Fatal Appointment of Unconceiva- man Actions and Events; or that the Hour of ble Neceſſity. For if the Power of Fate every where Nativity determin’d the whole Proceedings of prevails, all free Election of Man's Will is deſtroy'd; Life . Which Manilius, one of the Affertors of it, and with it, all Precepts, all Arts, all Diſcipline must and thoſe who have led Pious and Vertuous Lives, will be depriu'd of their future Ex- - Furit alter amore pectation. Nor do I think it allowable to aſcribe Mu- Et pontum tranare potest, du vertere Trojam. tual Wounds and Slaughter to the Deities. Vid. Grot. Alterius fors eft fcribendis legibus apta: de Veritate Rel. Chriftianæ, l. 4. l.n. Now be- Ecce patrem nati perimunt, natoſ que parentes, fides the other numerous ill Conſequences of ſuch Mutuaque armati coeunt in vulnera fratres : a Superſtition, this Miſchief follows of Courſe, Non noftrum hoc bellum est: coguntur tant a movere, that whilft Men are continually. gaping at the Inque ſuas ferri pænas, lacerandaque membra. Stars, they have neither Leiſure nor Inclination Hoc quoque fatale est fic ipfum expendere fatum. to guide their Lives by the Rules of ſound Reaſon. Helen ſays wiſely in Euripides : One, mad in Love, to Troy will carry War, Or ſwim the Flood, and view the Torch from far; Γνώμη δ' αρίση μάπς ήτ' ευβουλία. Prudence and Good Counſel are the beſt Prog- Another is determin'd to the Bar. [noſticators. 'twas you os V thus delivers, come to e to nothing; (2) The Greek is, kai Teis wir ve 7 d'an detay vexois , ivc pell sexzialn ó öv8fw7Q, IT 'N Tò mäv kozv7o oi @soi. (3) Our Author might have ſpared himſelf the pains of reciting theſe two Scories. Statius, anoistike Y 162 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. Statius, Theb. 2. (4). with a Security of finning. He who believes that Quid craftina volveret ætas his own Offences ſhall be forgiven him for the Scire nefas komini. Nos pravum ac debile vulgus fake of Another's Deſerts, can ſcarce be hinderd Scrutamur penitus fuperus : hinc pallor & ire, from finking into the baſeft Diffoluteneſs, unleſs Hinc metus, infidia que el nulla modeſtia voti. he be at the ſame time fully perſwaded, that there is ſtill an Obligation incumbent on him, to apply What future Years ſhall bring to paſs all his Endeavours to the Practice of a moft Holy 'Tis Sin to know. We a weak, puny Race, Life. Examine Heaven and ranſack Fove's Decrees, Farther, It is no leſs peſtilent than brutal an Wirely to antedate our Miſeries. Opinion, to pretend that the Wickedneſs of ſome Hence all our Miſchiefs ſpring, our Rage, our Fears, Actions is excus’d with God, upon account of Our treach'rous Wiles, and our immodeſt Prayers. their Dexterity or Humour ; and that ſome Sins paſs only for Jeſts in the Cognizance of Heaven. Moſt pernicious likewiſe is that conceit, which As the old Poets feign’d their Deities to take no makes God to allow a kind of Marker of Sins, notice of the Perjury of Lovers, and to forgive ſo as to let them be bought off with Money or their Thefts and treacherous Intrigues (d). Nay, other Preſents, or perhaps with ſome vain Cere- their Madneſs proceeded ſo far, that they were monies and ſet Forms of Speech, without Amend not afraid to introduce their Heavenly Powers as ment of Life. No leſs abſurd is it to imagine, the Actors of dereftable Villanies ; aſſigning ſo that God Almighty is delighted with ſuch Inven- many Tutelar Gods to have the Care, as it were, tions of Men, ſuch Inſtitutions and Ways of Li- and the Guidance of ſo many particular kinds of ving, as are diſagreeable to Human and Civil So- Wickedneſs. Now the Argument which Fulgen- ciety, as it is tenper’d by the Dictates of Reaſon tim (e) draws hence is right and concluſive: If and the Laws of Nature. Such may we reckon there were any Deities (ſays he, meaning Mercury the greateſt part of the Monaſtical Orders, which and Laverna) preſiding over Robberies, how could thoſe we find in vaſt Numbers, not only in Chriſten- A&tions be criminal before Human Judges, which had dom, but amongſt the Turks and the Heathens. Divine Authors and Patrons to defend them (fj? We ſhould alſo carefully avoid all ſuch unworthy Euripides diſputes as well on the fame Point. and ſuperſtitious Notions, as debafe and diſhonour the Divine Nature or Worſhip. Every ſenſible min 'Ourét' ev 3 párys va xãs ! Man ought to be as (5) Antoninus ſays his Father Λέγειν δίκαιον, ει τι τ Θεών κακά Μιμέ μεθ', αλλά του διδάσκοντας τάδε. was, 0:05: Bris zagis d'Hordre povics (a), Devout without Superſtition (6). If Human Vices are but Tranſcripts drawn 'Tis another wicked Opinion, that the bare Ex- From Deeds Divine, and Copies ſet in Heaven, erciſe of Piety towards God is ſufficient, without Should Men be blam'd who act what theyare taught, any regard had to Honeſty, and to thoſe other Or thoſe Immortal Guides who teach 'em wrong? Duties which are to be practis'd towards our Neighbours: As if the Externals of Divine Wor- Nor was the poor Indian much out in his Infe- ſhip, when exactly perform’d, were able to make rence, who when a Spaniard boaſted to him, thar amends for a Courſe of Injuſtice towards other he was a Chriſtian, a Son of the Great Creator of Men : Or, as if it were lawful to ſcrape up Mo- Heaven and Earth, whoſe Laws he came there to ney in our Life-time, by all Means and Methods, publiſh and proclaim, anſwer'd him to this effect: good or bad, provided at our Death we leave If 'tis by Command of your God, that you thus invade ſomewhat to be ſpene in Pious Uſes (c). Nor leſs other Mens Dominions, and there ſpoil, burn, kill, and unreaſonable is the Fancy, that a ſingle Man commit all other Wickedneſs at pleaſure; you may rest ſhould be able not only to fulfil his own Duty to allur’d, that we will not on any account believe in Such God, but to transfer ſome of his Merits on o a God, or receive his Ordinances among st us (g). thers; as if one Perſon's Negligence in his Duty It is wicked likewiſe to believe, that thoſe Pray- was to be ſupplied by the over Righteouſneſs of ers can pleaſe God, by which a Man deſires that o another. Of the fame Stamp is that vain Con- thers may ſuffer an undeſerv'd Evil, for the promo- jecture, that upon account of the Satisfaction and ting or the occaſioning of an Advantage to himſelf . the Merit of Christ, we have a leſs Obligation As ſuppoſe, if the Inhabitants of a Sea-Coaſt lying on us to Probity and Sanctity of Manners; ſhould pray, that many Shipwracks might happen and that the Hope of thoſe Bleſſings furniſhes us on their Shore. Nor do I take thoſe ſolemn Sup- (a) L. 6. 1. 30. Add, Bacon, Eſſay 17. (b) See Plutarch's Treatiſe of Superſtition. Item, Charron of Wiſdom, lib. 2. G. S. . 10. (c) Add, Charron de la Sageße, 1.2. c. s. ſ. 25, doc. (d) Tibull. 1. 3. Perjuria rider amans um Jove laughs to hear Love's harmleſs Perjury, Jupiter, do ventos irrita ferre jubet. And bids che Winds go loſe it as they fly. (e) Mytholog.il. 1. (f) Senec. Hypolit. Deum eße Ainorem, turpis do vitio favens Love was firſt Deifid by Luft and Vice: Finxit libido ; quoque liberior foret When Men to gain a Patron to their Sin Titulum furori Numinis falſo addidit, And free purſuit of Pleaſure, fix'd the Stamp Of Heaven on Hell, a Fury made a God, (8) Benzo. Hiſt. Nov. Orb. I. 2. 6. 13. (4) The ſame Poet, in another place, gives the Deſcription of all ſuch Perſons as pretend to Divination, in theſe words, -Tis â perles 'es' dring; What's an Aſtrologer? I thus reply, “O, ολίγ' αληθή, πολλα και ψάλη λίγα A Man that ſpeaks few Truths, but many a Lyc, Τυρον, όταν και μη τύχη, διοίχεται. Which, when found out, he takes his Heels to tly. Spoken by Iphigen in Aulid. v.956. Edit. Cant. (5) See what Mr. Bayle ſpeaks abouç çhis Macter in his Medications upon a Comet. plications Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 163 plications to contain much more Holineſs which which he enjoins us to know our ſelves; deth not mean, are perform’d, either upon the engaging in an un- that we ſhould be careful in knowing our Limbs, our juſt War, or upon any Succeſs obtain’d in it. Stature, or our Figure ; for our Bodies indeed are not Thoſe Perſons too muſt needs lie under a great our ſelves. But when the Oracle ſays, Know your Self, Miſtake, who fancy the Breach of ſome Precept it ſays in Effect, Know your own Mind and Soul. For of Natural Law to be a part of Divine Worſhip. the Body is no more than the Soul's Veſſel or Receptacle. As they who are for treating in a hoſtile Manner, And no Astion is properly done by your ſelf, but what all ſuch as differ from them in Perſwalion; who proceeds from your better and nobler Part (a). Now aſſert that Religion is to be propagated by the from this Knowledge of himſelf rightly purſu'd, a Sword ; that no Faith is to be kept with Men of Man is brought to underſtand his Condition; and a contrary Profeſſion, no political Friendſhip (as the Office he is to bear in the World: Whilſt he they call it) and no Offices of Humanity to be ex- apprehends, that he did not exiſt of himſelf, but ercis'd towards them, but that they are to be a- ow'd his Original and Being to a much Sublimer voided, even in common Converſation, as Un- Principle; that he is endow'd with far more noble holy and Unclean; that Violence, Wickedneſs, Faculties, than he ſees enjoy'd by the Beaſts about Treaſon, Perfidiouſneſs, Sedition and Rebellion, him ; laſtly, that he was not born by himſelf, are not only lawful, but commendable, if under nor purely for his own Service, but that he is a part taken on a Religious Account (7). To conclude, of human Kind, and is oblig'd to behave himſelf the following Opinions are not of leſs fatal Effect ſociably towards other Men. And from theſe than thoſe which we have already mention'd: Fountains may eaſily be drawn the compleat That is imports nothing to ſolid Felicity, whether Knowledge of human Duty. Vid. Marc. Antonin. a Man apply himſelf to a Virtuous or to a Vicious l. 10.5.6. (3) Perſ. Sat. 3. Life, and that Good Men are (8) entituled to no better State or Condition than the Wicked. Quem te Deus elle That the higheſt Pleaſure a Man can expect or ob- fuffit, & humana qua parte locatus es in re tain, is the preſent Gratification of his Senſes ; Diſce. and that the Soul periſhes with the Body. Laſt- ly, that all Law, even that which we call Natural, Study thy ſelf : Learn in what Rank and State, is a meer human Device, not referable to God as The wiſe Creator hath ordain'd thy Fate. the Author of it. nor deriving from him its Force and San&tity. Theſe therefore, and ſuch like No- It belongs likewiſe to our underſtanding our ſelves tions, are entirely to be rooted up out of human (4), to know our own Power, and how far it ex- Minds, in as much as they deſtroy our Dury to tends, either in exerting our Actions, or in form- Almighty God, and prevent or intercept all'En- ing our Deſigns (b). And farther, what is the deavours of conforming our Life and Manners to true Effect and Conſequence of every Practice; the Guidance of good Reaſon. and what Reſpect and Uſe the Things without us V. When this principal Care is over, the main have to our ſelves and to our Happineſs. Concern behind is for a Man accurately to exa VI. From this Knowledge it follows, that a Man mine his own Nature, and to ſtudy to know him- muſt apprehend his Subjection to Almighty God, ſelf. An Enquiry which Antiquity ſo much va and the Obligation which lies upon him, according lued as the Forerunner of true Wiſdom, that to the Meaſure of the Gifts he hath receiv’d, both Tvã Sa oz autóv was thought an Inſcription worthy to to celebrate the Divine Majeſty, and to ſhow be ſet in Letters of Gold, and confecrated in the himſelf a ſociable Creature in his Tranſactions Delphian Temple. (2) On which Tully hath given with his Fellows. And in as much as God hath us this Comment, The Precept of Apollo, ſays he, in beſtow'd on him the Light of Underſtanding, he (a) Add. Caſaubon ad Perſ. Sat. 3. v. 67. and Plato in his firſt Alcibiades p. 448. Edit. Francofurt. Ficin. Explication of that noble Sentence in Zenophon Apomnem. l. 4. Add, Bacon Ill. 36. (6) See Socrates's (7) See Mr. Bayle's Philoſophick Commentary upon theſe VVords, Compel them to come in, &c. Part 1. Chap. 4, &c. (8) Cicero de Naturâ Deorum, l. z. c. 35. Vt enim nec Domus, nec Respublica ratione quadam, & diſciplina defignata videatur, fi in ea nec re&tè fa&tis præmia exſtent ulla, nec ſupplicia peccatis ; ſic mundi divina in homines moderatio, profe&to nulla eſt, ſi in ea diſcri- men nullum eſt bonorum do malorum, i.e. Heaven is certainly not at all concern'd in the Government of Men, if it doth not make a Diftin&tion between the Good and the Wicked. S. V., (2) Tully's Words are, Nimirum hanc habet vim praceptum Apollinis, quò mònet ut ſe quiſque noſcat; non enim, credo, precipit ut membra noſtra, aut ftaturam, figuramve noſcamus, neque nos corpora ſumus Cum igitur noſce te, dicit, hoc dicit, noſce ani. mum tuum. Nam corpus quidem quaſi vas eſt, aut aliquod animi receptaculum. Ab animo tuo quicquid agitur, id agitur à té. (3) Perfus's preceeding words are elegant and pertinent. Diſcite vos, miſeri, do Cauſas cognoſcite Rerum, Learn, wretched Men, and know the Cauſe of Things, Quid ſumus, & quidnam vi&turi gignimur, ordo What’ris we are, and why we have our Beings. Quis datus, aut meta, quàm mollis flexus Go unde, What is the Order, and what Nature's Courſe, Quis modus argento, quid fas opt are, quid aſper What we may wiſh for, and what Money's Force, Viile nummus habet, Patriæ, chariſque propinquis Whar Profit it doth yield ; what to beſtow Quantum elargiri deceat, quem, &c. Upon our Country and our Kindred coo. Study, doc. (4) “ This great precept is often alledg'd in Plato, Mind thy own Buſineſs, and know thy Self. Each of theſe Sentences con- tains in general our whole Duty, and ſeems to include the other. He that will do his own Buſineſs, muſt learn this Leſſon firſt, " to know himſelf, and he that knows himſelf, will not undertake any Buſineſs as his own, that he is not acquainted with ; for as if he loves and takes care of himſelf, he'll refuſe needleſs Employments and unprofitable Thoughts and Propoſals.” Montagne’s EMays, l. 1. c. 3. ought Y 2 164 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. ought certainly to conclude, that he is not to do lible for him to arrive at any comfortable Conditi- every thing at Random, and (1) without End or on : Since, (6) as Sophocles obferves, Deſign, but that whatever he undertakes, he ſhould firſt weigh the Matter in hand, and regu- Πολλώ το φερναν ουδαιμονίας late his Method of proceeding about it (a). And Πρώτον υπάρχει conſequently, that he propoſe an End (2) agree True Wiſdom is the Spring of Happineſ: able to his Nature, and rightly moderate and direct both his own Actions, and all other due Means VII. If a Man thus rightly apprehend and con- towards the Attainment of that End. And this fider his own Strength and Power, he will diſco- in ſuch a Manner, that he neither proceed in the ver that it is of a finite Nature, having certain Application of the Means, before the End is fix'd Limits beyond which it can never extend itſelf ; and determind; nor ſettle ſuch an End as he muſt and therefore, that there are many Things in the afterwards want Means to arrive at. Another In- World which he cannot manage or compaſs, as ference cloſely ally'd to this is; that ſince Truth many that he cannot hinder or refift. Other and Right are always Uniform and without Alte- Matters there are which do not abſolutely exceed ration, ſo he ought always to form the fame Judg- human Power, but which may be intercepted and ments of the ſame Things, and when he hach prevented by the Oppoſition of other Cauſes. And once judg’d truly, to be always conſtant in his a third Kind of Things we cannot compaſs by our Mind and Reſolution. Farther, that his Will and bare Strength, nor allifted by Dexterity and Ad- his Appetite do not get the Start of (3) Good dreſs. Applicable to theſe Reflections is the fa- Judgment, but follow and obey it; never making mous old Diſtinction of the Stoicks, dividing Reſiſtance to its Decrees (4). For he who obſerves Things into tã do sição and tã óx ép súr, thoſe in this Courſe of Proceeding, will be ſure to act with our Power, and thoſe without or beyond it. What Prudence, with Conſtancy and with Moderation. ſeems to be moſt under our Command, is our He will make it his chief Aim and Rule, as Lucan own Will, and the Power of that Faculty in exert- deſcribes Cato, ing Actions proper to our Species of Being. For although the Will hath ſome croſs and ſtubborn --- Servare modum, finemq; fueri, Principles adherent to it, which bend and ply it Naturamq; ſequi, patriæq; impendere vitam : continually from its due Aquilibrium, yet hath a Nec fibi ſed toti genitum ſe credere mundo. Man nothing in his whole Nature more nearly and cloſely tied to him, nothing which is leſs capable To keep a Mean, to eye the chief Deſign ; of being hindred by external Powers, and there- To follow Nature, as a Guide Divine, fore nothing the Motions of which do more pro- To pay his country's Ranſom with his Blood, perly belong to his Perſon, and may accordingly And private Pleaſure quit for publick Good : be imputed. Hence it follows, that every Man To raiſe his Soul to Univerſal Cares, ought to make it his main Care and Concern, And in his Pains give all the World their Shares. rightly to imploy his Force and Abilities, in con- formity to the Rules of Reaſon: At leaſt to ſettle He that acts otherwiſe, inſtead of keeping a de- a conſtant Reſolution of diſcharging, as far as in cent Pace in the Journey of Life, ſeems to rowl him lies, every thing which ſeems agreeable to his and tumble through the World (5): His Proceed- Duty, and to the Deſign of his Being. For this is ings are perpetual Contradi&tions; and 'tis impof- the Teſt by which we are to rate the Worth of e- (α) Ταξον πνα ήδη χαρακτήρα σαυτω, και ύπον ον φυλάξης όλη τη στυτά ών, και 'Ανθρώποις εντυγχάνων: Epiξt. Ench. . Chat. 4. S. VI. (1) Seneca has a fine paſſage relating to this Subject, Epift. 71. Ideò peccamus, quia de partibus vitæ omnes deliberamus, de tot â nemo deliberat. Scire debet, quid petat, ille, qui ſagittam vult mittere, & tunc dirigere, do moderari manu telum. Errant confi- lia noftra, quia non habent quo dirigantur. Ignoranti quem portum petat, nullus ſuus ventus eft. Neceſſe eſt multum in vitâ noftrâ ca- ſus pofit, quia vivimus calú, i. e. “ The Original of our Errors is, that no Man contrives ſerioully to draw up a Scheme of his « whole life, but contents himſelf to deliberate occaſionally upon fome particular Actions. The Gunner ſhould know his Mark, " before he take his Aim to ſhoot. Our Counſels are diſappointed, becauſe we keep not the End in our Minds. The Wind can “ never blow well for him, who don't know the Port he is Sailing to. Fortune muſt do much among us, who leave ſo much to « Chance in our Lives.” See Cicero's Paradoxes, Chap. 5. with Grevius's Notes, and M. Antoninus with Gataker's, Lib. 2. S. 16. and 1. u. $. 21. See alſo Plato de Repub. 57. p. 695. and Montagne's Eſays, Lib. 2. Chap. 1. at the End. (2) All the World knows that famous Principle of Morality laid down by the Stoicks, who ſay, That we muſt live agrreable to Nature. See Seneca, M. Antoninus, Epi&tetus, &c. but chiefly M. Antonin. Lib. 5. Chap. 16. (3) Cićero has very well obſervd, Efficiendum autem eſt, ut Appetitus votioni obediant, eamque neque præcurrant, nec propter pia gritiam, aut ignaviam deſerant, fint que tranquilli, atque omni perturbatione animi careant. Ex quo elucebit omnis conſtantia, omniſque moderatio, i. c. “ We mult bring all our Affections into Subjection to our Reaſon, and not ſuffer them either to ourrun it, or thro 6. Sluggihneſs to deſert it. They muſt alſo be calm and not diſturb our Minds. And then we ſhall be eminent for Conſtancy 66 and Moderation.” (4) i.e. Never to inquire into them, but after mature Deliberation, and never to act againſt our own Conſcience. See Tully de Off. 1. 1. c. 29. (5) Theſe words are Horace's, Epift. 1. Lib. I. v. 69. Et vitæ diſconvenit ordine toto. 6) Lipſius, in his Politicks, tranſlates the words thus, Lib. i. Chap. 7. Longe Prudentia felicitatis primas tenet, i. e. “ That “ Prudence that makes a Man Happy, is certainly the chiefeſt by much.” Bur VViſdom is incomparably much more advantagious and valuable than Happineſs or Proſperity: So that this Sentence makes nothing to our Author's Purpoſe, who is proving, Thar V Viſdom is the means to arrive at Happineſs . Nevertheleſs I thought fit to obſerve, that this paſſage of Sophocles is explained, as I have underſtood it, in the Greek Comment of Triclinius, for others follow an Explication which to me ſeems not true, and which they embraced, without being aware that apô Toy has ſometimes a comparative Signification. very Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 165 very Perſon, and to meaſure his intrinſical Good- is any room for human Caution and Foreſight; ſo neſs and Excellency: (1) Arrian. Epictet. l. 1. c. I. when we have done all that lies in our Power, we What therefore, on the whole Matter, are we to do? Io cannot enſure an Event which doch not depend improve, and to put to the beſt Uſe thoſe Things which on our Direction, and of which (5) we have no are in our Power, and to deal with other Things as their certain Knowledge till it actually happen. As I Nature (2) require. phicrates us’d to ſay 'twas unworthy of a General VIII. As to the other Matters which lie without to ſay, I did not think it ; ſo 'tis below a wiſe Man us, we are ſo far to employ our felves about them to make the like ſorry Reflection. It was a good as they do not ſurpaſs our Strength, as they tend Wilh of the Poet ; to a lawful End, and are worth the Labour which we ſpend in the Purſuit. For Things above us, a - Careat ſucceſſibus opto wiſe Man will not loſe his Hopes and his Pains Quiſquis ab eventu facta notanda putat. upon them; he will reckon it Folly to endeavour with vaft Toil the Attainment of ſuch an End, Ne’er may Succeſſes bleſs which he knows his own Force, together with the The Man who meaſures Actions by Succeſs. Aliſtances he expects, unable to compaſs: Or un- leſs he be at leaſt certain that the very Probability Yet this abſurd Opinion is ſo ſtrong and ſo uni- of obtaining the End is of more Conſequence than verſal among the Mahometans, that they take good any other Effect, which he could without queſtion Succeſs to be an infallible Argument of the Juſtice have produc'd at the ſame time, and with the ſame of a Cauſe, and an open Sign of the Approbation Labour. (1) Other Things he will leave to the of Heaven. Whereas ſuch a Notion is indeed to Direction of Providence, and will compoſe his be rank'd amongſt the ridiculous Follies of the Mind as well as he is able, (2) for a peaceful Ac- loweſt and moſt ignorant Vulgar. For 'tis evi- quieſcence in every Event. He will not (3) vain- dent to any Perſon of Common Senſe (6), that ly diſquiet himſelf on the account of Evils which as Juvenal ſays, either have already happen'd, or may hereafter fall out without his Fault: And ſo he will cut off Multi the greateſt part of human Troubles which are Committunt eadem diverſo crimina fato ; wont to be produc'd either by vain Hope driving Ille crucem ſceleris pretium tulit, hic diadema. us on ill Deſigns, or by the more violent Motions of Grief, Anger, or Fear (a). That Sins alike unlike Rewards have found, From theſe conſiderations this farther Conſe- And whilſt this Villan's Hang'd, the other's Crown'd. quence may be drawn, that Man, as he is guided only by the Light of Reafon, ought not to frame Hence likewiſe we learn, that as it is the part of to himſelf , or to aſpire after any other Happineſs a wiſe Man (7), not to bound his Sight at the in this world, than ſuch as ariſes from the prudent Things before him, but to extend his Conſidera- Government of his Faculties, and from thoſe Af- tion and his View to Things to come, and to fiſtances and Supports which we are ſure the Di- drive on his well-form's Reſolution with his vine Providence will afford us, in the Univerſal whole Strength, without ſuffering either the Adminiſtration of Things. From the fame Prin- Threats of Fear, or the Flatteries of Pleaſure to ciples we may infer, that as we are not to leave turn him aſide : So is it as ſure a Mark of a Fool Things to mere Hazard and Chance, whilſt there to drive directly againſt the Stream, and not rather See alſo numb. 224. (a) Arrian. Epictet. 1.2.c. 7. What can be better for us, than that which hath the Approbation and the Appointment of GOD himſelf? S. VII. (1) Arrian's VVords are, Ti šv sei ; td to siurūv, Béatisu Mele Ta or del av, Tois ö ár 2015 xeñatas, as me qu xe. (2) M. Antonin. 1. 6. 32. Τη 3 διανοία αδιάφορα, όσα μη εν αυτής ενεργήματα, όσα και γι αυτής εςιν ενεργήμια ταύτα πάνlα επ' αυτή έσν. και τέτων μεν τοι, ά οι μόνον το παρόν ωρα γματεύεται τα 8 μέλλονια, παρωχικό τα ενεργήμαθα αυτής, και ω- Tee i'm ci reposa, i.e. “ All Things are indifferent to my Soul, except its own Operations. For all its Operations depend upon it. “But only thoſe about which it is buſy at preſent are dear to it; ſuch as are paſt and to come are equally indifferent." See al- 1o S. 50. of the fame Book. S. VIII. (1) Permittes ipfis expendere Numinibus, quid Let's leave it to the Gods to do what they Conveniat nobis, rebuſque ſit utile noſtris. think agreeable and profitable for us, Nam pro jucundis aptiffima quæque dabunt Dî. We ask what plea fes us, they give what's fit and beſt. Carior is illis homo, quam ſibi. They love Man better than himſelf. Juv. Sat. 1o. v. 347, doc. (2) 'Twas a Maxim of the Pythagoreans, That wiſe Men are prepared for all Events which may happen to Man, and whoſe Management depends nor on himſelf. Kui li wrois (ſays f amblichus) Trachy leadece, rjó für dĩ, 7 dv@gwrivwv ou p.77 wuólo e mego- δόκητον έή) αρg τοϊς νεν έχεσιν, αλλά πάνα Φυσδοκών, αν μη τυγχάνεσιν αυτοί κύριοι όντες. De Vita Pythag. Chap. 31. η. 196. (3) “ Repreſent to your ſelves in your Minds all the Evils that can befall you, yea, the moſt intollerable, ſuppoſe yourſelves certain to ſuffer them, and on the contrary is it not more eaſy and natural ro baniſh ſuch Thoughts? They'll happen ne'er the "logner, nor continue e'er the longer. We may enlarge and prolong them by our Thoughts, yea, fo incorporate them before. "hand in our ſelves, and entertain them, tho' we have not truly any Senſe of them. They diſturb us enough whenever they come; (ſays one of the Leaders, not of the tendereſt, but hardeſt Sects) therefore favour thy ſelf. Believe what thou lovelt beft . Recollect thy ſelf , and uſe all Means to prevent thy ill Fortune. Don't loſe thy preſent Eaſe for fear of future Evil, Cand be not now miſerable, becauſe thou ſhalt be at ſuch a time.” Thoſe are the Words of Mr. Montagne, Eſays, Lib.3. Ch.12. See alſo Seneca, Epift. 13, 24, 74, 98, doc. (5), Liban. Declam. 21. Oze"sos tj ones évàę tñ grauen, wġ ois megcianzho, xeive): não to trépcs cixons Jhon os Bebe- alufer d'Ecov, & fer í tov eshots füG, i.e. " A good and diligent Man proceeds according to his Judgment, and to the Noti. ons which he hath form’d of Things: And although the Event doth not anſwer the Worthineſs of his Defign, he is no leſs “induſtrious for the future." See Marc. Antonin. Lib. VI. 50. VII. 38. VIII. 47. See Mr. Montagne's Eſsays, upon this Subject, That 'cis not reaſonable to judge of Actions by the Event. Lib. 1. Chap. 31. 3. (7) So Terence ſpeaks, Iſtuc eſt ſapere, non quod ante pedes modo eft Videre, ſed etiam illa, que futura funt, Adelph. Ace 3. Scene 4. to and Lib. 3. Chap. 8. 166 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. the more ; Vel Sole puro. to accommodate his Inclinations to the Events, Ibid. Ode 10. when they will not conform themſelves to his In- Rebus anguſtis animoſus atque clinations (a). Laſtly, ſince human Foreſight is Fortis appare, ſapienter idem ſo weak in diſcovering future Things, and fince Contrahes, vento nimium ſecundo, they are very far from being under our Guidance, Turgida vela. though they frequently fall out well beyond our Hopes and Expectationsíb); hence it is plain, that The more you are oppreſs’d, bear up we ought neither too ſecurely to truſt our preſent Weather the Tempeſt, 'till its Rage be o'er. Condicion, nor to ſpend too much Care and Anxi- But if too proſp'rous and too ſtrong a Gale ety on what is to come, And for the ſame reaſon Should rather ruffle than juſt fill your Sail, Infolence in Proſperity, and Deſpair in Adverſity, Leſſen 't, and let it take but ſo much Wind are to be both avoided as equally dangerous and As is proportion’d to the Courſe deſign'd. equally abſurd. 'Twould be eaſy to illuſtrate this Dryd. Mifcel. 2. p.422. Doctrine with endleſs Teſtimonies of Authors. Take the following for a Specimen. Arrian. Epict. L. 2. Ode 29. 1. 2. C. I. In Things which do not depend upon our Ele&ti- Ille potens ſui on, let us be bold and venturous, but in Things which Latuſque deget, cui licet in diem are capable of Choice and Counſel, let us be timerous Dixiſſe vixi ; cras vel atra and cautious(c). Juvenal, Sat. 10. Nube polum pater occupato, Nullum numen abest fi ſit prudentia; ſed te Nos facimus, fortuna, Deam, cæloque locamus. He lives in true Delight And Maſter of himſelf appears, All Heav'n ſtands ready to affiſt the Wiſe, but we Who ſtrange alike to Hopes and Fears, Make Fortune a celeſtial Deity. Can boldly ſay each Night, To Morrow let my Sun bis Beams diſplay, Horat. Carm. III. 4. Or in Clouds hide them ; I have liv'd to Day. Vis conſilii expers mole ruit ſua: Mr. Cowley. Vim temperatam Dii quoque promovent Idem. I. 2. Sat. 9. In majus Quifnam igitur liber? Sapiens; fibi qui imperioſus, Quem neg; pauperies, neq; mors neq; vincula terrent. Force, without Wiſdom for its Guide Reſponſare cupidinibus, contemnere honores Sinks with its own unweildy Weight, Fortis, & in ſeipſo totus teres atq; rotundus, But with delib'rate Art apply'd Externi ne quid valeat per lave morari. The Gods advance it to a nobler Height. He's Free, who wiſely can himſelf controul, Lucret. l. 3. And challenge Fate and Death to ſhock his Soul. presenten und Petere quod inane est nec datur unquam, Brave to reſiſt the Tide of wild Deſire, Atque in eo ſemper clarum perferre laborem; And Proof againſt Ambition's cheating Fire. Hoc est adverſo nix antem tradere monte All round and ſmooth, that no external Load, Saxum, quod tamen a ſummo jam vertice rurſum May fix a Rub, to check him in his Road. Volvitur, bo plani raptim petit æquora campi. Juvenal, Sat. 13. For, ſtill to ſeek, and ſtill in Hopes devour, Dicimus autem, And never to enjoy deſired Power, Hos quoque felices qui ferre incommoda vitæ, What is it but to rowl a weighty Stone Nec jactare jugum vita didicere magiſtra. Againſt a Hill, which ſtraight will tumble down? Almoſt a Top, it muſt return again, As Happy thoſe, tho' not fo Learn'd, are thought, And with ſwift Force rowl thro' the humble Plain. Whom Life inſtructs, who by Experience taught Mr. Creech. For new to come from paft Misfortunes, look, Hor. Ode 2. 1. 2. Nor ſhake the Yoak, which gauls the more’ris ſhook. Aquam memento rebus in arduis Mr. Creech. Servare mentem : non ſecus in bonis Idem, Sat. 10. Ab inſolenti temperatam Permittes ipſis expendere Numinibus, quid Lætitia. Conveniat nobis, rebuſque fit utile noſtris. Nam pro jucundis aptiſſima quæque dabunt Dii ; Learn, Friend, to keep an even State, Charior ejt illis homo quam ſibi. Whatever Scene your Cares imploys, Amongſt the Smiles or Frowns of Fate. Intruſt thy Fortune to the Powers Above, Nor mean in Grief, nor infolent in Joys. Leave them to manage for thee, and to grant (*) Cedere majori virtutis fama ſecunda eſt. Mart. 'Tis next to Congu’ring, wiſely to Submit. (b) 'Oulxan doxolo- covouévæv, the dark Miſt of Futurities. Tryphiodor. (c) Plutarch de Superſticione. 'Apetūs 78ands deis esiv, darías reóquois, i.e. GOD is tbe Hope of Courage and Virtue, not the plea and Excuſe of Weakneſ and Cowardice. In- deed Self-Love is the Cauſe chat we are alhamed co own chat the Evil thar befalls us happens through our own Fault, and ſo we charge Fortune, as Mr. La Fontaigne ſpeaks fuicably, Fab. 11. Lib. 5. Noching happens here below And are we Fools ſo co take our Meaſures? But ſhe may us anſwer to, This Excuſe we meditate VVe do make her Rule our Fare, Ve accuſe our Luck, not to be long She is the Author of our Adventures. Fortune always has the V Vrong. What Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf.. 1674 to carry What their unerring Wiſdom ſees thee want; 10 Reaſon, and promoting the Good of Human In Goodneſs as in Greatneſs they excel : Society; and as far as it openis a wider Field for Oh that we lov'd our ſelves but half ſo well! ſuch Generous Undertakings. But how large a BUDI 1avg Mr. Dryden. Share ſoever we obtain of theſe Favours, and even Defyr brs otio, ylagu by Honeſt Means, good heed is to be taken thee IX. Another neceſſary part of Human Improve our Mind doth not ſwell with Arrogance and Vaim, ment, is to be able to let a juft Price cn thoſe glory(4). Much more fooliſh and ridiculous is it things which are the chief in moving our Appetites. to boaſt of, and to value our felves upon, what is Becauſe from the exact Worth and Value of them empty and vain, and gives no ſolid Proof of our we are to judge how far we may juftly.labour to be Worth. Therefore Demonaftes in Lucian, when he concern d'about them. Amongst theſe, that which ſaw a Fellow priding himſelf in the Wideneſs of appears with moſt Figure and Splendor, and which his Purple, Hark you, Friend, (fays he) a Sheep us’d is moſt capable of ſolliciting Elevated and Noble this fine Burthen before you, and yet was Souls, is the Opinion of Worth and Excellency, bxet a Sheep. But when we wane Occaſions and the Foundation of Glory and of Praiſe.. Now as Opportunities of ſhowing our Worth, and are not to this concern, we are in ſuch a manner to form able to procure them, we muſt bear this ill For- and diſpoſe our Mind, as to endeavour as far as tune with Patience, ſince there is nothing in it poſſible the (1) procuring and the preſerving that that can be charg’d upon our Default (5). On the kind of Eſteem which is (2) fimply ſo call’d, being other hand, it appears to be at the ſame time the bare good Opinion of good Men: In as much wicked and fooliſh, to affect and uſurp the exter- as this regularly flows from the Obſervance of the nal Enſigns of Honour, when the inward Founda- Law of Nature, and of our Duty: and becauſe the tions of it are wanting : As it is dereftable Mad- want of it may lay open an occaſion to a Thouſaud neſs , to aſpire to Fame and to Honours by evil Miſchiefs and Inconveniences (a). And if this Arts, and by Deeds repugnant to Reaſon; and to good Reputation be aſſaulted by the Lies and Ca- deſire the ſhining above others, only to be able to lumnies of Wicked Men, we are to ſpare no La- inſult over them, and to make them obnoxious to bour in reſtoring it to its primitive Purity. But our Pleaſure. Laſtly, ſince we are not always al- when it is not in our power to overcoine Slander, low'd the Liberty of building our Fortune as we or to ſtifle the falſe Conceptions that the World pleaſe, ſince it muſt fometimes depend on external may entertain about us we are to comfort our Cauſes; our Mind is to be put into ſuch a Temper, Selves (3) with the Teſtimony of a good Conſci as when we have once done our beſt, to reſt ſa- ence, and with the Aſſurance that our Integrity is tisfied with the Lot thac falls to our Share ; and to ſtill known to God (6). look on thoſe Things which we are not able to As for that Eſteem, which we uſually term Inten- compaſs and to obtain, as Matters which do not five, as Honour and Glory, we are ſo far to purſue concern us, and which therefore are not worthy it, as it redounds from worthy Actions, agreeable our Grief or our Anger (6). potom X. For P.8. p. 420. Lib. s. $. 3. (a) See 2 Cor. viii. 21. Vide Eſais de Morale par Mr. Placete, Vol. 4. Diſcours 6, & 7. (6). Add. Le Grand Philol. S. IX. (1) Negligere quid de ſe quiſque ſentiat, non folum arrogantis et, fed etiain omnino diſſoluti. Cicero de Off. Lib. 1. Chap. 28. To be careleſs what others think of us, is a Sign not only of great Pride and Preſumption, but alſo of entire Impudence. See Gravius's Notes. Street (2) See the Explication of this Diviſion of Eſteem into ſimple and diſtinctive, Lib. 8. Chap. 4. §. 2. and what I have ſaid upon the laſt in my Treatiſe of Games, Lib. I. Chap. 3. §. 6. (3) Seneca has very well obſerved, that no Diſgrace ought to diſcourage us from doing Good, Si gratum eſſe non licebit, niſi ut videar ingratus, fi reddere beneficium non aliter qudin per ſpeciem injurie potero, equiſſimo animo ad honeftum confiliuin, per mediam infa- miam tendam. Nemo mihi videtur pluris eſtimare virtutem, nemo illi effe magis deuotus, quàm qui viri boni famam perdidit, ne conſci- entiam perderet, i. e. “When I can't ſheiv my Gratitude unleſs I expoſe my ſelf to the Diſgrace of being thought ungrateful, * and I can't be thought to do a Kindneſs, but it will be taken for an Injury; I will ſtill perfiſt ſincerely in my honeſt Deſign to execute it, though I wade through Diſgrace. For no Man ſeems to have a greater Etteem for Vircue, or to be more devo- ted to it, than he, who to ſave his Conſcience, has loſt the Reputation of a good Man.” Seneca Epiſt. 81. Seneca Epiſt. 81. See Marc. Antonin. (4) Plin. Panegyr. Chap. 71. Nam cui nihil ad augendum faftigium ſuperest, hic uno modo creſcere poteſt, si se ipſe ſubimittat, ſecurus magnitudinis (ue, i. e. "He who hath already arrivd at the nobleſt Pitch of Eminence, hath this only way left of improving " his Height, by ſtooping to the Arts of Humility and Condeſcenfion, as ſecure of his own Greatneſs. (5) Hor. Carm. III. 2. Virtus repulsa neſcia ſordide On its own Worth true Majeſty is rear'd, Intaminatis fulget honoribus, om And Virtue only is her own Reward; Nec ſumit aut ponit ſecures, With ſolid Beams and native Glory bright, Arbitrio popularis aur &. novaland She neither Darkneſs dreads, nor covers Light. True to her felf, and fix'd to in-born Laws, Nor ſunk by Spight, nor lifted by Applauſe. Claudian. de Conſular. Mall. Ipſa quidem Virtus pretium ſibi; Solaq; latè Virtue the Tribute ſcorns of Vulgar Eyes, Fortune ſecura nitet, nec facibus ullis And in herfelf her richeſt Portion lies. Erigitur plauſuve petit clareſcere vulgi ; With native Rays ſhe ſhines, nor owes a Beam Nil opis externæ cupiens, nil indiga laudis, To glittering Honour, or to glofly Fame. Divitiis unimoſa ſuis, immot aque cunctis Unmov'd at Earthly Storms, to Heaven ally'd, Cafibus, ex alta mortalia deſpicit arce. From Heaven ſhe looks, and laughs at Mortal Pride. (6) Seneca Agamemn. Modicis rebus longius ævum eſt. Exceſs of Fortune kills, or cloys, ignon Felix mediæ quiſquis turba Bur Temp'rance is the Health of Joys.brow , Happy the Man whoſe middle State Aura ſtringit littera tuta Fearing to tempt the Tide of Fate, Timiduſq; mari credere cymbam, Securely guides with wary Oar Remo terras propiore legit. His humble Bark along the Shore. Mr. Prior. A Ideitt 168 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. va 2002 X. For the better maintaining and preſerving Et quantum natura petit. - himſelf in the World, a Man hath likewiſe need - Satis eft populo fluviuſque Cerejque. of external Goods and Poſſeſſions; as it is fre- quently a part of our Duty to provide them for True Bliſs is frugal, every Brook and Field others. Concerning which it is the Command of A full Supply for Life and Nature yield. Reaſon and Nature, that we endeavour (1) the Tudton Procurement of them, ſo far as is conſiſtent with Lucret. 1.5. od ja our Strength, our Opportunities, and our Hone. Quod fi quis vera vitam ratione gubernets egift fty. The Ant which Virgil (a) makes fo prudent a Divitiæ grandes homini ſunt vivere parcè011 Provider for Old Age, is even in the Divine Writings Aquo animo. buio 976 9W propos'd amongſt the Examples of harmleſs Indu- ftry(b)(2). But becauſe our Wants are not infinite, Would Men but once live up to Reaſons's Rules, but lie in a very little Compaſs, therefore we muſt They would not ſcrape and cringe to wealthy moderate our Deſire and our Purſuit of theſe For 'tis the greateſt Wealth to live content (Fools. Things, according to the juſt Occaſions of Na- With little. noi Mr. Creech. ture, and the Meaſure of Sobriety. Socrates in Diogenes Laertius, when he us’d to ſee the prodigi Claudian. in Rufin, I. Dogo has ous Quantity of Goods expos’d to Sale in the pub- Vivitur exiguo melius; Natura beatis (:) od old og lick Places, would cry out, zbowy szal xiptar iu té di Omnibus elle dedit ſi quis cognoverit uti. s 10 Unid What a number of Things are there bere which I do not want ! Juv. Sat. s. Life runs the beſt on little: Nature's Store in as Can make all Happy that will uſe their Power. I Ventre nihil novi frugalius. The Belly is a frugal Gueſt. Horat. Carm. III. 16. Hotel bas ēl slina Contracta meliùs parva cupidine 3 nits1000 boog Idem. Sat. 14. da Vectigalia porrigam, roli 70 il Menfura tamen que Quam fi Mygdoniis regnum Halyattici ito l'on aimed Sufficiat cenſus, ſi quis me conſulat edam : Campis continuen : multa petentibus į Joni di non In quantum ſitis atq; fames & frigora poſcunt. Defunt multa, benè eft cui Deus obtulit, 0310 Parca quod fatis eft manu. If any ask me what would ſatisfy To make Life eaſy, thus would I reply: Thus Paraphras'd by Mr. Cowley. As much as keeps out Hunger, Thirſt and Cold. A Field of Corn, a Fountain, and a Wood, Mr. Dryden, Jun. Is all the Wealth by Nature underſtood. The Monarch on whom fertile Nile beſtows (3) Apuleius Apolog. I would chuſe my Fortune as I All which that grateful Earth can bear, would my Coat, rather neat and fit, than too long or Deceives himſelf if he ſuppoſe, too full . In as much as in all Things which we apply to That more than this falls to his Share. the Service of Life, whatever exceeds Conveniency and Whatever an Eftare doth beyond this afford, Moderation, turns more to Burthen than to Uſe. Un Is not a Rent paid to the Lord; weildy Poffefſions, like vast and monſtrous Rudders , will But is a Tax Illegal and Unjuft Sooner drown than guide us: They clog with Plenty, and Exacted from it by the Tyrant Luſt. ſurfeit with Exceſs. Much will always wanting be To him who much deſires. Thrice Happy he Lucan.l.4. To whom the wiſe Indulgency of Heaven Diſcite quàm parvo liceat producere vitam, With ſparing Hand but juſt enough has given. Idem Herc. Oetæ. Malè penſantur magna ruinis; Falls are the ſad Rewards of Height: Felix alius, magnuſq; volet; Let others burſt in ſwelling Great. Me nulla vocet turba potentem; Give me no Title from the Crowd, Stringat tenuis littora puppis. But let my gentle Bark be row'd, Nec magna meos aura phaſelos Cloſe to the Bank, whilſt fluttering Gales 30) Jubeat medium ſcindere pontum. Court me in vain to hoiſt my Sails. Tranſit tutos Fortuna finus, When angry Vengeance puts to Sea Medioq; rates quærit in alto, She leaves in peace the filent Bay, Quarum feriunt ſuppara nubes. At the call Maſts her Thunders fly, 1 Whoſe blazing Streamers ſtrike the Sky. Add Oedip. v. 882, &c. See alſo Val. Max. Lib. 7. Chap. 2. §. 1. exter. () Inopi metuens Formica Jene&te. Georg. 1. 1. V. 186. (6) Prov. vi. 6. xiij, 7. $. X. (1) See my Treatiſe of Games, Lib. I. Chap. 3. S. 7. (2) Eurip. Ele&tr. v. 80, 81. 'Apzés 38 Štis Hiségewu dva sóuce The Wrerch that hopes Βίον δίαιτ' άν ξυλλέγειν άνά πόνε. To help his idle Hands with idle Prayers, And will not work to Live, ſhould fairly Scarve, 2017 By Gods and Men unpitied. (3) Apuleius's Words are, Fortunam, velut tunicam, magis concinnam, quam longam probare, quippe etiam ea fi non geſte, tur, do trahatur, nihilominus quam lacinia præpendens, impedit, & præcipitat? Etenim in omnibus ad vite munia utendis, quidquid aptam moderationem ſupergreditur, oneri potius, quam uſui, exuberat. Igitur & immodice divitia, velut ingentia de enormia gubernacula, facilius mergunt quam regunt : quod habent irritam copiam, anxiam nimietatem. Our Author in this Paragraph heaps together a great Number of Quotations confuſedly. Idem Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 169 Idem 1. 1. Epiſt. 10. Non tibi ſepoſitas infelix ſtrangulat arca Liceat ſub paupere tetto Divitias, avidiq; animum diſpendia torquent Reges, & regum vita præcurrere amicos. Freneris : expoſiti cenfus & docta fruendi woll Temperies. A Cottager may match in true Delights Kings, and their more luxurious Favourites. In ſtilling Cheſts your Wealth is not confin'd, Nor, lent on greedy Uſe, torments your Mind ; Idem l. 1. Ep. 12. But nobly ſpreads, on decent Ends employ'd, Pauper enim non eſt cui rerum ſuppetit uſus. By Moderation, and with Art enjoy'd (6). He's never Poor that holds enough for Uſe. We are farther to conſider, that Nature is not Quinctil. Declam .13. It is Wealth enough to deſire wanting in a plentiful Proviſion for the Neceſſities no more. Turpilius in Priſcian. The happieſt Livers of her Sons(c). That the Riches which we hoard are the contented Maſters of little Fortunes. up for future Uſe, are expos’d in the mean time to a thouſand Dangers, and ſometimes give us more We muſt not then on any account give too looſe Trouble in keeping them, than they gave us La- Reins to our deſire of Getting; much leſs muſt bour in getting them (d). Laſtly, that whatever we invade the Wealth of others by Injuries and we leave heap'd together, at our Death, muft fall Evil Deſigns (a). And thoſe Things which we to an Heir, who may not only be unworthy of have fairly made our ſelves Maſters of, we are to the Gift, but may deſpiſe and deride the Giver (e): account no otherwiſe, than as Helps to our Necef- As therefore an honeſt Occaſion of acquiring ſities, and Inſtruments to make us deſerve well of Riches is not to be neglected, ſo the Mind ought Mankind. But the Mind muſt by no means fix to be put into ſo even a Temper, as not to loſe it and enſlave it ſelf, to poſſeſs and to preſerve them ſelf, if it ſhould happen to loſe them. Horace hath merely for their own Sake: or to be perpetually taught us the beſt way of dealing with Fortune : employ'd in the endleſs Labour of increaſing them. 'Tis downright Phrenſy, as Juvenal ſays, Laudo manentem ; ſi celeres quatit 3:13 Pennas refigno qua dedit, & med Ut locuples moriaris, egenti vivere fato. Virtute me involvo; probamq; Puperiem fine dote quæro. Living, to ſuffer a low ſtarving Fate, fie In hopes of dying in a Wealthy State. Which a Great and Noble Wit hach thus moſt hap. pily Paraphras'd: On the other ſide, 'tis a very good part of the Let her love whom ſhe pleaſe, I ſcorn to woo her; Character which Statius gives of a wiſe Man, Whilſt ſhe ſtays with me, I'll be civil to her ; (2) Hor. Sar. 1. Denique fit finis quærendi, cumq; habeas plus, | Stop then your ſwelling Riches as they grow; 2 Pauperiem metuas minus; do finire laborem And let baſe Want, with its Retinue, ſhow, Incipias, parto quod avebas. Ar greater Diſtance, a leſs dreadful Foe. S Ceaſe your vain Care, let all your Labours ceaſe, when your large Wiſh is crown'd with full Succeſs. Eumen. Panegyr. Thoſe who make not Reaſon the Bounds of their Deſires, are never ſatisfied with any Profuſeneſs of Fortune; and thus Happineſs ever ſides by them, whilſt being full of Hopes, and void of real Enjoyments, they lose the preſent in gaping after the future, Add. Charron de la Sageſe, 1. 1. 6. 21. (b) Hippodamus de Felicitate. The Poffeſion of Good Things contributės nothing to Hap- pineſs, without the Uſe. Add. Theocrit. Idyll. 16. Horat. Epod. 1. Haud paravero I would not labour to abound Quod aut, avarus ut Chremes, terra premam, In what I might with no leſs Care, Diſcin&tus aut perdam ut nepos, Like a baſe Miſer or a Spendthrift Heir, Squander above, or bury under Ground. Idem Carm. IV. 9. Non poſſidentem multa voc averis The wide Poffeffor vainly clainis Rette beatum: re&ius occupat Amongſt his Titles and his Names, Nomen beati, qui deoyum The Term of Happy, which ſhould bleſs Muneribus ſapienter uti The Man that wiſely lives on leſs. ---Callet, Idem L. 1. Epiſt. 2. Semper avarus eget; certum voto pete finem: 1 The Miſer's ever poor : Thy Vvilh ſhould fall Quod fatis eſt cui contingit nil amplius optat. On ſome fix'd End: who has enough, has all. Idem L. 2. Epift. 2. Vtar, do ex modico, quantum res poſcit, acervo I'll uſe my little Store, and freely take Tollam : nec metuam quid de me judicet hæres, VVithout Concern, what ſair Occaſions lack. E Quod non plura datis invenerit. And let my greedy diſappointed Heir Rail when I'm gone, and curſe my want of Care. () Arrian. Epictet. I. 3. c. 24. No Man is properly an Orphan ; we have a common Father, who is conſtantly buſied in providing (d) Horat. Carm. III. 16. Creſcentem ſequitur cura pecuniam. Care in proportion ſwells with every Bag. (e) Bion. Idyll. 5. 'Ες πόσον & δειλοί, καμάτως κ' ας έργα πονεί μες, How vainly wretched do we ſpend our Years Ψυχαν δ' άχει τίνα ποτό κέρδεα και το τέχνας In uſeiefs Labour and in idle Cares? Βάλλομες, ιμίρονες αεί πολύ πλέον όλβω. The Chaſe of VVealth unwearied we purſue, Λαθόμεθ' ή άρα πάντες, όπ θναπί οθωόμεθα And loſe the preſent, for a future View. But not one thinks how ſoon his Mortal Line Muit ladly break, and end his wild Defigu. z But Add. Gell. 1. 10. C. 17. for us. 170 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. But if ſhe offers once to move her Wings, ther Train, than Trouble, Danger, Damage and I'll fling her back all her vain Gew-gaw Things, Diſgrace. As therefore 'tis next Degree to Mad- And, arm’d with Virtue, will more glorious ſtand, neſs, to invite Uneaſineſs and Torment without Than if the Bitch ſtill bow'd at my Command. Uſe or Occaſion: So is it very rational to allow I'll marry Honeſty, though ne'er ſo poor, our ſelves a moderate Taſte of lawful and inno- Rather than follow ſuch a dull blind Whore (a). cent Pleaſures, without ſuffering them to over- whelm and to drown us. But this is to be fix'd As to Expences, we are to uſe ſuch a Moderati- as an inviolable Rule, that no Pleaſure muſt be on about them, as moſt willingly to undertake ſuch purchas'd ar ſo dear a rate, as the Neglect or the as our Duty requires of us, and yet not to ſqan- Tranſgreſſion of our Duty. der our Fortune at a venture, without Neceſlicy XII. The laſt Care which 'lies on us in the im- and without Reaſon (b). For 'tis equally fooliſh and proving and well-ordering of our Mind, is with abſurd, not to apply our Riches to the ends for our utmoſt Diligence to maintain its Sovereignty which they are given us, and vainly to throw them over its own Motions and Affections; the greateſt away on Inferior Uſes and Deſigns. The former part of which do not only impair the Health of the Vice including numerous Breaches of our Duty; the Body and the Vigour of the Soul, but caft ſuch a latter leading the direct way, to Debt, Poverty, Cloud on the Judgment and Underſtanding, as to Rapine, Deceit, and a Thouſand other Enormities wreft them violently from the ways of Reaſon and and Miſchiefs (c). of Duty. So that a Coldneſs of the Paſſions is, as it XI. In Reference to Pleaſure and Pain, 'tis not were, the Natural Principle of Prudence and Pro- only the Permiſſion but the Advice of Reaſon, bity amongſt Men (1). It may not be amiſs to that we avoid as much as poffible all unneceſſary run with ſome light Remarks through the Particu- Trouble and Diſquiet; and not only endeavour lars. Joy is in it ſelf a Paſſion moſt agreeable to to keep our ſelves free from Grief and Diſguſt, but Nature. But ftri&t Care is to be taken, that it do likewiſe to entertain our Senſes with ſuch Objects not break out on improper Occaſions, as upon as are (1) agreeable and delightful to them (a), the Misfortunes of other Men: And likewiſe, But to a ſingular and exquiſite Gratification of that it do not drive us on any thing that is vain Senſe, the Mind is by no means to be accuſtom- and trifling, or baſe and indecenti Sorrow (2) is ed ; in as much as this kind of Epicuriſm either a Canker that waſtes alike the Body and the Mind. weakens and enervates a Man, equally oppreſſing This therefore is, as much as poſſible, to be re- the Vigour of Body and of Soul, and rendring mov’d and expelíd; unleſs ſo far as the Offices of them both unfit for any ſerious Buſineſs ; or ſteals Humanity oblige us to expreſs our Concern and our Time from better and more neceſſary Imploy. Pity at the Misfortunes, or at the Deaths of o- ments; or waſtes and conſumes our Wealth, and thers; and as it is requiſite to the great Buſineſs of our Conveniences of Life; or often, being join'd Repentance. Love is a friendly Motion to Man- with ſome criminal Practice, draws after it no o kind; yet this is ſo wiſely to be manag’d and mo- (a) Add. Charron de la Sageſse, l. 1. c. 39. n. 2.8.9. (6) Horat. I. 2. Epift. 2. Diſtat enim ſpargas tua prodigus, an neque ſumptum You may be Gen'rous, and yer nor Profuſe; Invitus faciøs, neque plura parare labores. Vain Squandering differs wide from chearful Uſe, Which neither fears to break the preſent Stor Nor labours in the needleſs Search of more. (c) Lucan. L. 1. Hinc Uſura vorax, avidumq; in tempore fænus, Hence greedy Uſury, hence Trufts betray'd, Et concuſ a fides, do multis utile bellum. | And War, to Wickedneſs a gainful Trade. Ovid. Epiſt. 5. Quaſq; male emiſit nunc male quærit opes. V Vhar Vice h'as ſpent by Vice he would repair. (d) Vide Charron de la Sagesſe, l. 2. c. 6. n. 1, 2. S.XI. (1) Mr. Montagne has ſome curious Thoughts on this Subject, which are worthy our Obſervation. “Nature, ſays he, like a'n « indulgent Mother, has enjoined us no Actions for our Neceſſities, but what it is a Pleaſure to perform; being invited to them, o not by our Reaſon only, but by our Appetite, ſo that it is Injuſtice to corrupe thoſe Rules. VVhen I ſee Cafar and Alexander in " the midſt of their great Employments, enjoying human and bodily Pleaſures fo fully, I can't think it was for the Refreſhment “ of the Mind, but to ſtrain it, by introducing thoſe violent Actions and laborious Projects, through Greatneſs of Courage, into " an ordinary Courſe of Life. If they had been thought wiſe Men, what had been their ordinary Calling? This laſt. The Ex- u traordinary That the Soul affifts and favours the Body, and does not abſolutely refuſe to ſhare in its Pleaſures, but “ ſeems to be delighted with them, it is to preſerve a Moderation, as the wiſer Part, for fear through Indiſcretion Men ſhould turn them into Trouble ; for Inreinpecance is the Bane of Pleaſures, and Temperance is ſo far from being any Abridgment of “ them, that 'tis a ſweetning of them. I direct my Soul to look upon both Grief and Pleaſure with a view equally regular and firm, but on the one pleafantly, and on the other ſourely ; and, according to its Ability, robe as careful to ſhorten the one, as enlarge the other. The clear ſight of good Things is always attended with a diſtinct Knowledge of Evil, and Grief hath fome- «.thing noc avoidable at the beginning, as Pleaſure hath ſomething avoidable in the end, which may cut off all Exceſs. Plato “(De Legib. Lib. 1. Tom. 2.) couples them together, and will have it the Duty of Courage to encounter Grief and the charming “ Delights of Pleaſure, with equal Bravery. Theſe are the two Fountains at which whoever draws, where, when, and how he “ ought, whether he be Citizen, Man, or Beaſt, he is Happy. The firſt he muſt take as a Medicine, merely for Neceffity, and ſparingly, the other to ſatisfy his Thirſt, but not co Drunkenneſs. Grief, Pleaſure, Love and Hatred, are the firſt things an “ Infant feels. If Reaſon happens to guide them, they follow it, and that is Virtue.” Esſays, Lib. 3. Chap. ult. There are ma. ny other curious Thoughts both before and after, see Porpbyr. de Vit. Pythag. 8. 39. and what I have ſaid in my Treatiſe of Games, Lib. 1. Chap. 4. S. 8. §. XII. (1) Quinctilian Declam. 295. Magni affe&tus Jura non fpe&tant, i. e. " Great Paſſions are above Laws." See. Lib. 1. Chap. 4. S. 7. (2)“ i neither love nor value this Paſſion (faith Montagne) although the World fet a peculiar Efteem upon it, and gives it a 6 particular Honour. They call it Wiſdom, Virtue, and Conſcience. Fooliſh and vain Commendations! The Italians have given « it a much properer Name, calling ir, a corroding Humour. It is a Quality always noxious, always fooliſh, and the Stoicks main- “ rain it to be Bafe and Cowardly, as their wiſc Men have ever eſteemed it.” Elai, Lib. 1. Chap. 2. See alſo Charron of Wiſdom, Lib. 1. Chap. 33. and Lib. 3. Chap. 29. derated Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 171 derated by Reaſon, that it does not throw itſelf a Dum abeft quod avemus, id exſuperare videtur way on an ill Obje&t; that it does not procure Cætera; poft aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus ; baſe and unworthy Fuel to its Flame ; that it does Et fitis æqua tenet vitai ſemper bianteis, &c. not hinder the Exerciſe of other Duties, nor de- generate into Diſquiet and Diſeaſe: That if it fer- - Abſent Pleaſures ſeem the beſt ; ile on a Thing ſubject to Lofs, or to Corruption, With wing’d Deſire and Hafte we thoſe purſue, ie ſtick not ſo cloſely to it, as upon the Failure of But thoſe enjoy'd, we ſtraightway call for new it, co make the Soul unable to recollect and to reco- Life, Life we wiſh ſtill eager ao live on, &c. ver its Force (3). (4) Hatred is pernicious as well Mr. Creech. to che Perſon who employs it, as to him againſt whom it is employ’d. This therefore is to be di- Fear, as it is a dangerous Enemy to Human Minds, ligently quench'd and Atifled, leaſt it betray us to fo is it a Motion (8) altogether uſeleſs and unſer- Injuries and Breach of Duty againſt our Neigh- viceable. For that Good Caution which fome bours. And if ſome Perſons do really deſerve our make to be the Product of it, may ariſe without its Averſion, yet 'twould be ſtill Folly to create, on Affiftance from a wary Circumſpection, and from their account, Uneaſineſs and Diſquiet to our a Prudence alike untouch'd with Anxiety, or with ſelves. Envy is a moſt deform's Monſter, ſome- Confternation. Anger is a moft Deftru&tive as well times producing ill Effects in others, but always as a moft Violent Paffion; which is to be refifted in the Envious Perſon ; who like Iron, o'er-run with our utmoſt Strength and Endeavour. And with Ruft, not only defiles but deſtroys himſelf con whereas (9) fome alledge in its Favour, that it ex- tinually (5). Hope, altho’ a Paſſion more eaſie and cites our Valour, and confirms our Conftancy in mild than others, yet it is to be guided with ſuch Dangers; its Effect is indeed dire&tly contrary, for a Temper, that it do not make the heart fick; nor, it binds a Man's Spirit and Courage, and drives by aiming at Things either vain and (6) uncertain, him headlong to his Ruine (10)(11). Anger (12) or beyond its Strength and Reach, tire it ſelf to no is the most improvident Thing in the World: and ſeldom purpoſe, and become as Ariſtotle terms it ég engaegros acts but what we afterwards repent of. Nearly relat- trúarlov, a Waking Dream: And that we do not falled to Anger is the (13) Deſire of Revenge, which under Lucretius's Cenſure and Character; when it exceeds a moderate Defence of our ſelves and (3) Sophocles Antigone. Μη νιώ πότ', ώ παϊ, τας φρενας υφ' ηδονής i Never let Woman rob thee of thy Wits: Γυναικός, ένεκ' εκβάλης Euripid. Hippol. Coron. Χρης και μετείας εις αλλήλες Men ſhould be mod'rate when they fix their Love, Diaías Sváros avarigradtad And ne'er give up their Freedom and their Soul. Και μη προς άκρον μυελός ψυχής The Bards of Paſſion ſhould be loofly tyd, Ευλυτα ο 27 έργήθρα φρενών, Fit for a wider or a cloſer Knot. 'ATÓ Törants, rj Ew devou 1 Our Author here affirms, that the Maxim of Euripides agrees exactly to a Subject contrary to what he applies, I mean, Ha- tred and Enmity, and that it ought rather to be looked upon as a Precepr, not to make too great a Number of Friends. Where- as the Poet only condemns ſuch an Exceſs of Familiarity as cauſes us to carry our Kindneſs beyond the Bounds of Duty, and makes the Loſs of the Thing loved intollerable. This is evident from the Verſes following, which are an Explication upon the foregoing. Ούτω το λίαν γ' οσον επαινω is under cazar. Και ξυμφύσεσι σοφοί μοι. (4) "Anger and Hatred (ſays Montagne) alſo, are above the Duty of Juſtice, and are Paſſions of Uſe only to them who can't “ be kept to their Duty by plain Reaſon. Utatur Motu animi, qui uti ratione non poteſt.” Eſſays, Lib. 3. Chap. i. (5) Ovid. Metamorph. Videt ingratos int abeſcitque videndo Pale Envy with pernicious Joys ſurveighs Succesſus hominum, carpitq; do carpitur una, Others Succeſs; and in Reflection preys Suppliciumque ſuum eft. Upon her ſelf; her Sin's her Puniſhment, Add. Bacon's El. 10. (6) Horat. Lib. 1. Epiſt. 2. Invidia ſiculi non invenere Tyranni Envyt a Torment that no Arr can reach, Majus tormentum, Of Cruelty improv'd (8) See Montagne, Lib. I. Chap. 17. (9) Ariſtotle ſays that Anger ſerves inſtead of Arms to Courage and Fortitude. This is very probable, but they that oppoſe (Senec. de ira, Lib. I. Chap. 16.) anſwer in Drollery; “ 'Tis a kind of Arms of a new Invention, for if we take away other Arms " that will fail us, our Hand can't weild that, but that guides our Hand, that holds us, and we do not hold it. Montagne’s Eſsays, Lib. 2. Chap.31. in the End; read the whole Chapter, which is very fine and inſtructive, (10) Ira furor brevis eſt, Anger is a ſhort Phrenzy. Hor. Lib. 1. Ep. 2. Add. Liban. Progymn. Vituper. Ire. (1) Scarius, Theb. 10. Ne frena anime permitte calenti, Give nor the Reins to Paſſion in its Courſe, Da ſpatium tenuemq; moram: male cunéta miniſtrat Let Silence cool, and Leiſure break ics Force: Impetus. Fury does all Things ill (12) Horat. Lib. 1. Epiſt. 2. Qui non moderabitur ir& The Man of Rage, whoſe Mind is not his own, Infe&tum volet esse dolor quod ſuaſerit, & mens Muſt often grieve, and often wiſh undone Dum pænas odio per vim feſtinat inulto. What paſs’d when Raſhneſs, deaf to wiſe Debare, Prompted the ſpeedy Vengeance of his Hace. (13) Marcus Antoninus ſays, "Aeso teimos duuventui, si un Novostas. “The beſt way of revenging ourſelves is not to reſemble him that has done us an Injury, See what is ſaid in the following Chapter, Seneca has a proper Paflage for our Purpoſe of which our Author quotes a part elſewhere, Non enim ut in beneficiis honeftum eft, merita meritis repenſare, ita injurias injuriis; illic, vinci turpe eſt, hic vincere. Inbumanum verbum eft , eo quidem pro juſto receptum, vltio, do d contumelia non differt, niſi ordine. Qui dolorem regerit, tantum excuſatius peccat Magni ani!ni eft, injurias defpicere, ultionis contumeliofiffimum genus Z 2 eft The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. i, e. “ We muſt not behave our felves Wercome. Revenge is an in human Word, though the Thing which ic fignifies is looked Youch the Sciences: He will nor have any Conſtraint or Force to be uſed with Children, or have them treated like Slaves, but co be inſtructed with pleaſure, because nown. "On (W &70) fev ud India annoias & egon zu pri por Je VHV, oi les no το σώμα και πόνοι, βία και μασιν αλλά παίζοντας τηέφε, ίνα ή μαλλον οιoς τ' ή, καθοραν, εφ' ώ εμας πεφύκεν, Dc Rep. Lib. 172 and of our Dependants or Concerns, and a jutt Af- Life, no Man can raiſe a Doubt about their Ex- ſertion of our Rights againſt the Invaders of them, cellency and Uſe. But concerning the Study of turns, beyond Diſpute, into a Vice (a). Letters, many have been ſo bold as to maintain, XIII. In ſuch Duties then, as we have already that Learning is not only uſeleſs, but deſtructive reckon'd up, doth that Culture of the Mind chiefly to Mankind; and thac for this Reaſon we find it confift, which all are oblig'd to undertake, and to have been forbidden in ſo many Common- in the implanting and inforcing which thoſe Per- wealths, above the Degree of Reading, Writing, ſons ought to employ eſpecial Care and Concern, and managing Accounts. Every one knows the who have the Information and Inſtitution of others common Reproaches that are caſt on Scholars : committed to their Care. For the want of this Of their Unfitneſs for Buſineſs, their Weakneſs of Improvement, or the Diſpoſition directly contrary Courage, and of Civil Prudence, their Awkward- to it, are both repugnant to Human Duty, and neſs in Geſture and in Converſe; with a thouſand lay ſuch a Rub in our way as it is not eaſy to get more Reflections of the fame Nature, which ſome over. And therefore whoever is found deſtitute of Men have thought themſelves very Eloquent in ſuch a neceffary Perfe&ion, juſtly falls under com- ferring out (b)(2). mon Cenfure and Reproach. Now to come at the Truth of this Queſtion and There is ſtill behind (1) a more peculiar Culture to know how to ſet a juſt Value on ſuch Attain- of the Mind, conſiſting in the various Knowledgements, let us firſt lay this down for an undoubted of Things, and of Arts and Diſciplines. This can- Principle, that to the acquiring of Wiſdom and not be abſolutely neceffary to the Diſcharge of Prudence, bare Letters are by no means fufficient, our Duty in general : And therefore every one is without a native Excellency of Soul. If this Hap- to moderate his Purſuit of them, according to his pineſs be wanting, we can no more produce Wil- own Capacities and Occaſions, according to the dom by Scholaftical Inſtitution, than we can pro- Cauſes which drive him on ſuch Searches, and the cure a rich Harveſt of Corn by Ploughing on the Fruits which he may fairly hope to obtain from Barren Sands. For 'tis one Thing to be a great them. Now as for thoſe Arts which adminiſter to Reader, and another to be a prudent Man(c). And the Neceſlicies and to the Conveniences of human Qninctilian's Judgment is right, when he ob- eft, non eſſe viſum dignum, ex quo peteretur ultio, Multi leves injurias altius fibi demiſere, dum vindicant ; ille magnus & nobilis eſt, qui, more magna ferą, latratus minutorum canum ſecurus exaudit. Minus, inquies, contemnemur, ſi vindicaverimus injuriam. Si tanquam ad remedium venimus, fine ira veniamus, non quaſi dulce ſit vindicari, ſed quaſi utile. Sæpe autem ſatius fait diffimulare, quam ulciſci, , as under Theſe tis good but ; there “ upon commonly as juſt and innocent. It differs nothing from an Injury but in Time. The Aggreffor does the firſt Injury, and “ he that revenges himſelf does another in his Turn, this laſt is but little more excuſable than the former. A Great and Gene- “ rous Soul contemns Injuries. The moſt injurious Revenge, and moft mortifying to the Aggreffor, is to be judged unworthy of “ Revenge. Many Men in revenging a fmall Injury, have gained nothing but an Affrone more ſmarting and hard to be forgot- “ ten. Å Lion hears the Barkings of little Whelps without Regard. But you'll ſay, by revenging our ſelves we prevent others “ Contempt of us : Very well. But if you uſe Revenge as a Remedy, do it withour Paſſion and Anger, and behave yourſelves, “not as if you delighred in it, but as a Thing profitable. Nevertheleſs we muſt own thar it is more advantagious often to dil « ſemble an Injury than to revenge it." De Irå, Lib, 1, Chap. 32. with Juſtus Lipſius's Notes on it. (a) Add. Le Grand. Philofoph. p: 8. c. 12, &c. (5) Eraſmus (Epift. 12, 1, 17.) giving a Character of a Learned Man, adds, He was skill'd in common Prudence and Knowledge of Affairs, which is generally wanting to Scholars. Procop. Hiſt. Goth. l. 1. Learning and Virtue are different Things; and good Diſpoſitions are moſt commonly broken and com’d by rigorous Inſtitution. Theodorick us’d to ſay, 'tmas impoſſible that they who had been bred up in Fear of the Rod, ſhould ever arrive to ſuch a Degree of Courage, teinn Swords and Spears. Plato de Repub. l. 7. No Free-born Subjelt ought to be inſtructed in a Servile Manner. Seneca Hippol, Ingenia melius re&ta ſe in laudem ferunt, Great Souls move ſtraighteſt in the Paths of Praiſe, Si nobilem animum vezet a libertas alit. When left to follow their free Narive Benc. Plato Gorg. When they (the Philoſophers) apply themſelves to the Management of Publick on e ele eli vate Bufines, they are moſt con- temptibly ridiculous. Arrian. Epillet. I. 1. c. 11. calls a meer Scholar, an Animal that all . c. 24. Charron. 1.1. C. 39. 1.3. c. 14. n.19, doc. (c) 'Tis the Saying of an old Poet, 'Qs & Nvivá Intes, år pes všs mapħ, i.e. Learning ſignifies nothing without a Mind, or Gerius. which is the fifth among his Selecta Jur. Nat. & Gent." §. XIII. (1). We may find ſeveral curious Remarks, upon this Subject in Mr. Baddeus's Diſcourſe, entitled, De cultura Ingenii, (2) Among the Paſſages here collected together by our Author, there are two nothing to the Purpoſe; viz. The firſt is of Plato, whom our Author makes to ſay, That a young Man of honeſt nt Condition ought not to apply himſelf to any Science in a ſervile way. His Words are. Nullam diſciplinam ingenuum Serviliter oportet diſcere. In which he ſeems to mean, That the Study of Phi- lofophy is only agreeable to Slaves. But this is not the Senſe of Plato in that place! He only ſpeaks of the Manner of teaching chem, cheir Diſpoſitions are σώμα ψυχή 2017cmtuxñö Julia , i , . . 7. Tom. 2. This is the very Notion which Mr. Locke has his Treatife, the Education of ſee 9. 73, doc. and $. 131. of the laſt Edition at Francfort in 1708. Plato is ſo far from diſcouraging any from the Study of the Sci- ences, that he tells us particularly in that Book, what thoſe are that Children ought to learn early, and ſays, with Reaſon, that they that cry down Philoſophy, as of no Uſe to the Vulgar, never underſtood it, and that moſt of thoſe that meddle with it are not well qualified for it. Vve will alſo rehearſe fome VVords of the fame Philoſopher, and ſo the Heedleſsneſs of this Author will give an Opportunity to produce fonie Quotations, which contain ſome remarkable Thoughts , viz. Tà gõv vui ciude inuice (1s ' έχω) και η ατμία φιλοσοφία δια ταύτα σε αντίθωκεν (ο και πότερον είπομεν) ότι ο καθ' αξίαν αυ της άποναι, και ο νόθας έδει Deo, anne gendies. The other Paflage unfitly applied is Seneca's Hippola v. 459, 460. where we may plainly ſee that he is ípeak- ing of a clear different Thing, than of a Mind not adornd with the Study of Philofophy. ferves, a he CHAP. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 173 ferves (a) (3), that Prudence can do more without tom, and maintains a ſeparate and a ſuperior E- Learning, than Learning without Prudence. There- fteem: Tho' if it condeſcends to enter the common fore that Perſons naturally Fooliſh and Stupid are Diviſion of Sciences, it muſt be placed under this not turn'd into great Sages by the Application of firſt Head. (7) Morality is concern'd about the liberal Studies, doth no more detract from the Ex- Improvement of Mens Minds, and the Advance- cellency of ſolid Learning, than it doth from the ment of a ſocial Life; Phyfick hath the Health of Efficacy of Medicines, that they are not able to the Body under its peculiar Care ; and Mathema- recover Dead Men. To him that bath ſhall be given: ticks are of apparent Uſe and Benefit in the In- Matth. xxv. 29.(4): And Learning, as Horace vention of ſo many Arts for the Profit and for the ſays, Lib. 4. Ode 4. v. 33, 34. vim promovet infitam; Conveniency of human Life. By that Learning and where that vis inſita, that Natural Vigour is which we term Elegant and Curious, we under- wanting, the other Gift is vainly beſtow'd. ſtand ſuch as is not indeed of fo neceſſary Uſe, We may obſerve farther, that as Learning can as to render the Life of Man leſs Sociable or leſs not alter native Foily, fo neither can it reform a Convenient upon the want of it; and yet is wor- native Diſpoſition to Wickedneſs and to Impiety; thy of the Enquiries of Ingenious Perſons; be- which, on the contrary, grow more incurable by cauſe it either leads us deeper into the Diſcovery its Application; drawing thence a Supply of of the ſecret Works of Nature, or ſhows the fin- Arms for their open Defence. 'Tis a Remark of gular Excellency of Human Wit and Cunning, or Hobbes (b), that without I.earning it is impoſſible for a- preſerves the Memory of Things and Adions, and ny Mando become either excellently Wiſe, or (unleſs his the Records of Mankind. And ſuch may we rec- Memory be hurt by Diſeaſe, or ill Conſtitution of Or- kon the Knowledge of various Tongues, Natural gans) excellently Fooliſ (c). Experiments and Speculations, the more fine and But the whole Courſe of thoſe Purſuits which ſubtile Parts of Mathematicks, Hiſtory of all kinds, paſs under the Name of Learning, is not all of the Criticiſm, (as it preſerves Authors correct and en- fame Nature, and therefore ihould not be all tire) Poeſy, (8) Oratory, and the like. Which are rated at the ſame Price. We may divide Learning all in themſelves excellent, and worthy of Praiſe, then into three Kinds, ſuch as is Uſeful, ſuch as is and ſerve for the Garniture and Ornament of Hu- Elegant and Curious, and, laſtly, ſuch as is Vain and man Improvement ; according to which Meaſure, Inſignificant (6). Uſeful Learning may be again di- both the Practice and (9) the Value of them are to vided into three Claſſes, Morality, Phyſick, and be ſtated and determin'd. Mathematicks. For Divinity ſtands on its own Bot Vain Learning we call, not only ſuch as is made (a) Quintilian Inſtit. I, 6.c. 6. Plus fine Do&trina Prudentiam, quam fine Prudentia facere Do&trinam, certum est. (6) Leviath. c. 4. (c) Add Bacon, Eſſay 48. (3) Montagne’s Words are, “ The moſt Learned are not the leſs Fooliſh. I love and honour Knowledge as much as they that « have it, and if it be rightly uſed, it is the moſt noble and powerful Acquirement of Men. Bur as to thoſe (and there are a " vaft Number of them) who place their chief Excellency and Worth in it, and referre their Underſtanding to their Memory, “ Sub aliena umbra Latentes, (as Seneca ſpeaks, Epift. 33.) and can do nothing without a Book : I hate them, if I may lo ſpeak, s almoſt as much as a Blockhead. In my country and Time Learning has done much Service to the Purſe, bur little to the “ Soul. If it meets with dull Men, it loads and choaks them, becoming a crude and undigeſted Maſs, if with ayry Minds, it " purifies their VVills, and ſo ſubtilizes their Notions as to turn them into nothing. 'Tis a thing of almoſt an indifferent Nacure ; "a very uſeful Addition to a generous Mind, but pernicious and hurtful to any other: Or rather 'ris a Thing of a precious Uſe, “which can't be attaind at a cheap Rate. In one Man's hand 'eis a Scepter, in another's a fools-bauble.” Ejays, Lib. 3. Chap. 8. (4) This Maxim of the Goſpel, which our Author applies in the Stile of a Preacher, is meant in another Senſe. (6) See Seneca de Brevitate Vita, Chap. 13. and his Epiſtle 88. where there are alſo many other fine Reflections on Study: (7) I wonder our Author hath ſpoke nothing of Logick, which is abſolutely neceffary, whatever Science we purſue, if we will do it with Benefit. See Mr. Clerc's Preface to his Latin Logick, and The Art of Thinking, as alſo the Second Volume of Par- Thaliana, Art. 2. (8) This Science though of no great Uſe, yer is often pernicious, becauſe 'ris very ſubject to be abuſed. Let us hear Mon- tagne about this Marter. “An Orator of old ſaid, That it was his Work to make ſmall Marrers appear grear. He is a Cobbler “that makes great Shoes for a ſmall Foot. They were whipped in Sparta who profeffed any Arc of Cheating or Deluding. We may believe thac Archidamus King of Sparta could not hear without Aſtoniſhment the Anſwer of Thucydides, when he was asked, who was beſt at Wreſtling, Pericles or He? He ſaid, This is very hard to determine, for when I have thrown him to the * Ground, he'll perſwade them that ſaw it, that he did not fall , and ſo win the Prize. They that mask and paint Women do leſs “Evil becauſe 'cis no great Matter whether we fee them in their pure natural Shapes or no, but theſe make it their buſineſs to deceive, not our Eyes, but our Judgmene, and to baſtardize and corrupt the very Eſſence of Things. Thoſe Republicks who maintain’d a regular Order and Policy, as the Cretans and Lacedemonians, ſet no Value upon Orators. Ariſtotle defined Rhe- torick wiſely, calling it, an Arc to perſuade the People, but Socrates and Plato called it an Art of Soothing and Deceiving ; e and thoſe thar deny this in the general Deſcriprion, verify it fully in their Rules. It is an Inſtrument invented to manage and ftir up the Mulcitude and diſorderly Societies, which is never made uſe of but as a Medicine. Where the Vulgar or the Igno- rant, or both, have the Power, as they had at Athens, Rhodes, and Rome, or Things were in mighty Confuſion, there Orators " were plentiful.” Efays, Lib. 1. Chap.51. Where we may find many other fine Things about this matter. To theſe we may add the Judgment of a Modern Author, whoſe Authority is of great Weight. “In Diſcourſes by which we ſeek rather to please and divert, than to initruct and complear the Judgment, we can't blame ſuch ſort of Ornaments as are taken from Figures. except Order and Elegancy, the whole Art of Rhetorick, all its near Applications and figurative Expreſſions, ac- cording to the Rules of Eloquence, ſerve only to beger falſe Notions in the Mind, and corrupt the Judgment, ſo that in Effect, they are nothing but perfect Cheats, and confequently ought to be avoided in all Diſcourſes which are deſigned to inſtruct, * for they muſt be eſteemed great Defects, either in the Language or Perſon that uſes them, ſo far as Truth is concerned. Hence it may appear how little Regard and Concern Men have for the Truth, fince theſe fallacious Arts have ſo great Eſteem and Re- “ ward given chem. But Eloquence, like the fair Sex, hath Charms too powerful to admit of any Contradiction, and compris in vain to diſcover any Faults in theſe Arts of Deceiving, fince Men rake Pleaſure in being cheated. Mr. Locke's Phil. Ejay, &c. p. 642. See alſo what I have ſaid upon this Subject, concerning the Pulpit, in my Preface upon Tom. 2. of Archbiſhop Tillotſon’s Sermons. As co Poetry, there is an excellent Diſcourſe in Art. 1. of the Parrhafiana, Tom. 1. which 'ewill be a plea- fure to read. (9) We muſt obſerve here, that ſome of theſe Sciences are neceſſary, if not in themfelves, yet in Reſpect to others, in which no Progreſs can be made but by their Help, fuch, for Example, is Hiſtory, in Reſpect of Politicks, and Criticiſm in Reſpect of Hiſtory and Divinity. See Mr. Clerc's Ar's Critica in the Preface. up 16 57 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. Allies, that tbey Mould not teach Children Letters or Mufick : Thinking it the most grievous Puniſhment that could be inflicted, to live in , 174 up of falſe and erroneous Notions; but likewiſe who went to the Engagement very good Friends, come all thoſe Inventions of Crafty or of Idle Men, fet away most violent and ſpiteful Enemies (c). up to amaze our Minds, and to hinder us from the But ſuppoſing things rightly order’d, can any Purſuirs of ſolid Knowledge. Amongſt which, as one doubt, whether a Perſon endow'd with good we muſt needs reckon many Opinions of the Old Natural Abilities, and inſtituted in ſolid Learning, Philoſophers, ſo very diſagreeable to the apparent will not diſcharge the greateſt Affairs with more Nature of Things; ſo we think it will not be over- Accuracy and with more Diſpatch, than if he de- ſevere to join to them the greateſt part of that pended on the bare ſtrength of Nature, and neg- barbarous Cant, which went under the Name of lected other Alliſtances (d)(11)? But then all School Learning in the Ages preceeding the Refor- thoſe who apply themſelves to Study, ſhould be mation of Religion; and which is ſtill reſolutely exa&ly careful, firſt that they direct their En- maintain'd by Tomie Men, either becauſe they quiries to a good End, the ſervice of Life, or know no better, or becauſe they are aſham'd to the Improvement and Perfection of their Minds; unlearn, what they have made themſelves Maſters and not make uſe of them for idle Amuſements, or of with ſuch prodigious Labour, or becauſe 'tis pleaſant Methods of palling away Time. Ariſtip- the manifeſt Intereſt of the Papal Monarchy to keep pus (12) in Diogenes Laertius, being ask'd what Things Mens Wits employ’d on Trifles, for fear they ſhould Ingenuous Children ſhould be taught, anſwer'd, make ſome very dangerous Diſcoveries (a). Now Such as they may uſe when they come to be Men. the greater Proficiency any perſon hath made in 'Twould not be only ſhameful, but wicked, if thoſe ſolid Knowledge, the more he deſpiſes theſe empty whoſe Heads are ill’d with brave Notions and and unprofitable Enquiries. Sentences, ſhould do no more Good than common Another thing to be conſider'd by thoſe who Ideots (13) (e). The Egyptians call'd their Li- diſpute about the Uſefulneſs of Learning is this; braries Phyfick-Shops for their Souls, intimating their that the Faults of bad Inſtitution and of Hotbrain'd Uſe as well as their Excellency (f). And Arrian's Pedants, are not to be charg’d on the Sciences Epictetus (8) thought he could not give a worſe themſelves (b). Is it likely, that ſound Knowledge Character of Mens being fally and inſignificantly and Wiſdom ſhould be learnt in ſuch a School as Learn'd, than to ſay that they were Lyons in their Agathias deſcribes under the Philoſophaſter Uranius? Schools, but meer Vermin out of them. At their Meetings, ſays he, every one talks as he pleaſes They are likewiſe to take heed, that they do not about the Sublimest Matters, and Points of Divinc Sci- reſolve all Science (14) into bare Authority (h), ence; and tho' they are perpetually canvaſſing theſe Que- and Cuſtom of Speech, and an unintelligible Set ſtions, yet they neither perſwade others, nor will ever lay of Terms; but that they ſearch into the ſolid aſide the Notion they themſelves bave taken up, but Foundations of Things, and build their Schemes whatever they be, defend them Tooth and Nail, against on evident Reaſon. As for thoſe Things which all Oppoſers. When the Diſputations are over they depart they cannot yet bring to clear Demonſtration, mutually incens’d, and vent their Rage against one ano- there muſt be no Stubbornneſs or Obſtinacy in ther, like quarrelling Gameſters, in the most abufive mnintaining them; but a former Opinion muſt be and foulest Ribaldry (10). Thus the Contention ends, willingly quitted, upon a better and a more cer- without the least Profit given, or receiv’d; and thoſe tain Information; becauſe ʼtis very likely another (a) See Hobbes's Leviath. c. 46, 47. Plutarch (in Alexand.) has left this Cenſure of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks, that they can af. ford no real Advantage to the Teacher or the Learner. Martial. ll. Epig. 86. Turpe eſt difficiles habere nugas, 'Tis ſhameful Men ſhould needleſs Knots invent Et ſtultus labor eft ineptiarum. To prove Jaboriouſly Impertinent. (0) Vid. Charron, 1. 3. C. 14. n. 21, &c. (c) The Maſter is deſcrib'd very agreeable to his Scholars, Bearing above the reſt only by Impudence, and Volubility of Tongue, he appeard the firſt Fool of the Herd, and conquer'd thoſe that knew nothing, by know. ing juſt as much. The like Form of Diſputation is ridiculd by Lucian, in his Accuſato, and in Charron. (d) Plutarch de E- ducar. The Life of Contemplation is of no vſe unleß Allion be added. And the Man of Ation cannot but miſtake and miſcarry, without the Aſiſtance of study and contemplation. Saluft. Jugurth. The more Reaſon have we to wonder at the Perverſneß of thoſe who ſuffer their Parts and Genius, the beſt and the nobleſt Advantage of a Mortal Nature, to ruſt in Idleneſ, and to grow dull and barren through want of Culture. Ælian. V. A. 1. 7. c. 15. When the Mitylenians were Maſters of the Sea, they impos’d this Penalty on their Revolted utter Ignorance of the Liheral Arts. Add, Cic. Off. I. where he ſpeaks of the Study and Search of Truth. (e) I hate Men (ſays Old Pacuvius, in Gell . 1. 53. c.8.) that are Philoſophers in opinion, and Drones in Buſineſ. Ifocrates Encom. Helen. The Sophiſts onght to have inſtruśted their Scholars in Things which are of Uſe in Common Life, and to have exercis’d them in the skilful Management exquiſite Attainments in unneceſſary Speculations, and that it is much better to excel others a little in Great and Important Things, than to go far beyond them in ſmall Matters, eſpecially in ſuch as contribute nothing to the Aſſiſtance of Life. Lucian in Conviv. 'Tis to na Purpoſe to be wiſer, unleſ we are Better. (f) Diodor. Sic. l. I. C. 49. (6) L. 4. c. 5. (b) Horat.l.1. Epiſt. 1. verſe 14. Nullius addi&tus jurare in verba Magiftri. Vide Ciceron. de Nat. Deorum, l. 1. c.5. Seneca, de Vita beata, c.l. (10) See about the Abuſe of Diſputes, a fine Paſſage in Montagne's Eſays, Lib. 3. Chap. 8. which is copied out with ſome ſmall Alteration of Words, by the Author of the Art of Thinking, Part 3. Chap. 19. 5. 7. (11) Plutarch's Greek is, 'O JE OPNIX'S (BIO) o meg.xlixš did wastewy, évoqeans'O 9 mesinler i morgious Q12000 φίας, άμεσα και πλημμελής. The Author allo quotes here the Saying of an ancient Greek Poet, Γράμμαθα μαθείν δει, και μάθονία võivé xrv, He that affects Learning ſhould grow wife by it. (12) The Greek is, o 3' By ’Aistrosewoontes, tivo ozir à di Toù relašs müdos desen vévev; 'fon, ois avdiges garów.eyor xsú- coulan . (13) Iſocrates's Words are, Os Coopesa's) explū epe elevus TOÁTAS * Teloletes, of in uery tis nógois é benéyxov meramaixuévns, er και τις έρρις πολιων ήδη χρόνον, εξεληλεγμένης του αληθείαν διώκειν, και σε τας ωegξως, εν αίς πολιτώόμενα, τις συνθας παι- δέυειν, και ή εμπειρίαν ή τέτων γυμνάζειν, ενθυμεμένες ότι πύλυ κράτος και οι χρησίμων όπιεικώς δοξάζειν, ή ειταχρήστων ακριβώς επίσαθαι, και μικρών σείεχαν εν τοις μεγάλους, και πολύ διαφέρον εν τις μικρέις, και τοις μηδε προς ή βίον ωφελέσιν. Lucian's Greek is,"22 fèy opero ivães on coats Té paluuald, HALA tis žoge j * Biov pu pu treds TÒ Bex.pcoy. (14) Tully's Latin is, Obelt plerunque iis, qui diſcere volunt, authoritas eorum, qui docere profitentur, definunt enim ſuum judicium ad- bibere : id habent Ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident. Man Chap. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 175 Man may have more quick and more piercing Labours, or any other way. Upon this account Parts than our ſelves; and becauſe every new Day Gluttony, Drunkenneſ (4), Immoderate Uſe of Wo- may correa fome Miſtake in the former. And men, and the like Exceſſes are to be avoided. ”Tis this teachable Diſpoſition is a moſt infallible Mark a famous (5) Saying of Democritus in Plutarch (d), (15) of a generous Mind (a). Laſtly, Care is to if the Body Should bring an Action of Damage against be us’d, that they do not in ſuch a Manner bury the Soul, the Soul would be ſure to be cast. Though themſelves amongſt their Books, as to neglect o to this it might be replied, that the Miſtakes of ther Duties, and rider themſelves (16) unfit for the Mind in Reference to food, and Pleaſure and the Genius of a il and Sociable Life. For Pe- other Things, which concern the Preſervation of dantry of Mind (17) Vice not peculiar to Scho- the Body, do all proceed from its yielding to the lars, but runs i byme Meaſure through the whole Corporeal Appetites and Affections, contrary to World, and in s Men of all Orders, Profeſſions the Admonitions of Reaſon: So that the Mind is and Condition ✓ never of it ſelf the Cauſe of bringing the Body in- XIV. But although the principal and the moſt to a worſe Condition than ordinary. And there- laborious part of human Improvement is concernd fore to Democritus's Saying on one ſide, we will about the Mind, we muſt not in the mean time oppoſe the no leſs renown'd Sentence of (6) Theo- (1) neglect the Body ; ſince (2) the Mind makes phraſtus on the other; The Soul (ſays he) pays large Uſe of its Supports, and can never riſe to any Rent to the Body for its Dwelling. great Atchievement, if this Inferior be ill affected. XV. Our Life is given us by our Great Creator, We are oblig'd therefore, as much as in us lies, as a kind of courſe or Race, in which we might to ſecure (3) a Sound Body for our Sound Mind to exerciſe our Strength and Abilities by the Directi- lodge in (b); and rather to harden our Limbs and on of Reaſon: And therefore it is not to be mea- Conſtitution by long Endurance of Labour, than ſur’d by ſo many times drawing Breath, but by a to ſoften or break their Strength by Effeminacy conſtant Succeſſion of good AĞtions. Every one and Idleneſs (c). Pyrrhus is ſaid to have made this is therefore to take Care, that he be not bolov only Requeſt to the Gods in his daily Devotions, 206 áségns (e), an äzdG dségns (e), an uſeleß Burden to the Earth ; unpro. üzdévev, to be well in Health, judging this Bleſſing to fitable to himſelf, and troubleſome to others, (2) contain under it all Degrees of Happineſs. Care born only to increaſe the Number of Mankind, is likewiſe to be taken that our Bodily Force and and to devour the Proviſions of Nature, (3) and Vigour be not weaken’d by Intemperance in Meat that he do not only live for the Sake of his Palate or Drink, or by unſeaſonable and unneceſſary (f) (4). Farther, ſince human Farther, ſince human Induſtry com- monly (a) Plin. N. H. 1. 3. Proem. 'Tis not to be look'd upon as a Wonder, that Mortal Creatures Mould be incapable of knowing all Things. Idem 1. 11. c. 3. By my frequent Contemplations on Nature, I have been inſtru&ted never to call any thing incredible that ſhe performs. Diog. Laert. 1.10. In Natural Enquiries we are not to proceed according to ſtri& Method and Rules, but according as the various Ap- pearances offer themſelves to our Obſervation, and incline our fudgment. Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. The Authority of thoſe who pretend to Teach, often proves a Hindrance to thoſe who deſire to Learn. For by this means they negle&t to apply their own Fudgment, and to take every Thing for fixt and certain, which they hear deliver'd by thoje whom they admire. Quindtil . Inftit. I. 3. c. 1. They love the Path which they firſt trod in, whatever it be. And you will find it a moſt difficult Task to make Perſons change ſuch Opinions as they imbib'd when they were Children; becauſe every one rather wiſhes to have his Trouble over, than to continue it, to have learnt formerly, than to be a Learner now. Idem l. 7. c. ult. No Body is willing to ſee a Thing lesſen'd, in which he once appear°d Great. Yet, as Plato obſerves, de Repub. 1. 5. 'Tis very unjuſt to be angry with the Truth. And aŭ farther Study would be in vain, if it were unlawful to improve the Diſcoveries of thoſe that went before us. (6) To this End it may be uſeful to read that incomparable Book, Medicina Mentis do Corporis, by Mr. Tchernhauſen. (c) Vide Diodor. Sic. 1. 1. c. 45. (d) De Sanitate tuenda. Add. Bacon Eſ. 30. (e) Homer, II. £. (f) Ovid. de Pont. l. 1. El. 6. Mors nobis tempus habetur iners, To be Idle's to be Dead. Sil. Ital. 1.3. Quantum etenim diftant a morte filentia vite? A filent Life is an untimely Grave. Theocrit. Idyl. 14. More 77 dã oic zovu xa webv. Buſineſs ſhould be pli'd whilſt Age is green. Add. Gell. !. 19. C. 10. (15) Sophocl. Antigone. 'Am'avdeg xlwns hoopòs, to dev Sarev | True Wiſdom is noe Sciff or Poſitive, Plona'ágegyšš įv, aj to us Teiver ägar. Nor thinks it a Diſgrace to be Inform’d. (16)." A Learned Inſtitution leads aſide from right and plain Reaſoning, thoſe who keep their Eyes and their Thoughts con- tinually fix'd upon their Books." Lucian Conviv. (17) Here is a Fault in the Original, that quite ſpoils the Senſe, viz. initium, for, vitium; and 'cis ſurprizing that Mr. Hertius did not correct it in his Edition of 1706. Indeed all this is taken,' word for Word, out of the Art of Thinking, Diſc. 1. and the Author ought to have referred us to the Original where he had it. S. XIV. (1) See Plato (in Charmid. p. 464.) Seneca Epiſt. 14. in the Beginning, and Hierocles upon Pythagoras's golden Verſes, P. 153, 182. Edit. Lond. (2) Corpori vaco, cujus fulturis animus fuftinetur. Plin. Epiſt. Lib. 1. Ep. 9. The Author alludes to this and the following Paffage though he does not quote them; nor are they diſtinguiſhed by the Italick Letter. (3) Orandum est, ut fit mens Sana, in corpore Sano, i. e. We must pray for a Sound Mind in a Sound Body. Juv. Sat. 10. V. 356. (4) Juvenal. Sat. II. Виссе | Fools only make Attempes beyond their Skill Noſcenda est menſura tua A Wife Man's Power's the Limit of his Will. This Verſe does not reflect upon an Exceſs in Eating and Drinking, but upon ſuch exorbitant Expences as Men are at, nor, conſidering whether they are Rich enough to bear them. For 'cis a Proverbfignifying, That Men ought in all Things to examine themſelves, what they are capable of, and able to do. Our Author more fitly referrs us to Socrates his Words about Intemperance, in his Memoirs collected by Xenophon, Lib. I. Chap. 3: (3) Plutarch's Greek is, "Ns ei to owree dorésoul to tñ fuxiña mencow's šx år mérles dropugar. The Reflection which our Author makes upon theſe Words, is not altogether proper, for though Briskneſs of Spirits, and other Motions of the Body have great Influence upon the Soul, there are other Paffions purely Spiritual, as Coveroufneſs, &c. which are not leſs violent, and do much Hurt to a good Conſtitution of Body. See my Treatiſe of Games, Lib. 3. Chap. 4. 5.6. and Chap. 5. 9. 11, &c. (16) His Greek is, Πολυ τω σώματι τελών ενόικιον ή ψυχίω, in Ρlut. §. XV; (2) Nos numerus ſumus da fruges conſumere nati. Hor. Lib. 1. Ep. 2. v. 27. (3) Juvenal is referr'd to without Quotation, Aut quibus in folo vivendi cauſa Palato est. Sat. 11. v. 11. (4) Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. 1.2. Mihi enim, qui nihil agit, esse omnino non videtur, i.e." He that doth not ſhew himſelf in Action, " ſeems to me to have loſt his very Being." But this is nothing to our Author's purpoſe. For by theſe words one of the Dialogills i 167 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. monly exerciſes it ſelf one of theſe two Ways, Buſir. The like Cuſtom was receiv'd amongſt the either in procuring Things feceſſary for the Pre- Peruvians, under their ancient Incas; the Nobility ſervation of Life, or in diſcharging the Offices of alone being allow'd to improve themſelves by the a Social and a Civil Condition ; which admit of Study of Letters. De la Study of Letters . De la Vega. l. 4. c. 19. Tis a true great Variety, and do not all ſuit alikė with all Obſervation of Xenophon, Cyropæd. I. 2. Thoſe Perſons Men's Capacities and Abilities (a); it is manifeſt arrive at the greateff Height and Perfection in particular that every Man ought with early Care to chuſe Attainments; who have given themſelves wholly to some out and undertake ſuch a Courſe of Life as is Ho- Single Purſuit, avoiding Multiplicity of Buſineſs and of neft, Profitable, and Comporting with his Parts Enquiry. As he ſays well in another Place, Lib. 8. and Strength. In which Choice (6), Men are 'Tis impoſſible that a Man who profeſſeth many Arts toge uſually determin'd, either by Impulſe and Inclina- ther ſhould excel in all. Hence it appears, that not tion of Genius and Fancy, or by ſome peculiar only thoſe Perſons do live in a State repugnant to Aptneſs of Body or Mind, or by Condition and ſound Reaſon, who maintain themſelves by Rob- Quality of Birth, or by the Goods of Fortune, bery or Villanies ; but thoſe too, who withdraw or by the Authority of Parents, and ſometimes by themſelves unneceffarily from the common Duties the Command of the Civil State, or laſtly, by the and Offices of Life: fuch are many of the modern Invitations of Opportunity, or by the Compulſion Hermits and Monks, as well as ſome of the ancient of Neceſſity. (5) Iſocrates in Areopagit . gives us Philoſophers. But thoſe who chiefly fall under this Account of the old Athenians. Under ſo great this Cenſure, are the ſturdy and able Vagrants, who an Inequality of Fortunes, they could not preſcribe to all abuſe the Divine Name into a Trade of getting the same common Exerciſes ; and therefore, they put them Money, and make God, as it were, their Tribu- in different Ways according to their Circumſtances and tary. The Wickedneſs of theſe Varlets is the Condition. The Meaner ſort they cngag’d in Agriculture greater, if they voluntarily maim or diſtort any and in Trading ; well knowing, both that Idleneß was of their Limbs, ſo as to render themſelves incapa- the Cauſe of Poverty, and Poverty a Temptation to In- ble of doing the World any Service, though they jury and Miſchief . So that by removing this Fountain ſhould afterwards deſire it . 'Tis a Cuſtom very of Vice, they thought they should prevent the Evils remarkable amongſt the Chineſe, that no Perſon of which us’d to flow from it. As for the more Wealthy, found Strength is permitted to beg, although he be them they comfelld to apply their Minds to Horſemanſhip. blind; ſuch unfortunate Wretches being imploy'd Feats of Body, Hunting, and Philoſophy: Apprehending in turning Mills, from which Service they earn that ſuch Employments and Amuſements muſt needs have their Subliftence (c). this good Effect, to make ſome excel in Virtue, and to Again, Since Time runs on with ſuch ſwift keep others from being notorious in Vice. It was an Or- Steps, fince Death ſurprizes Men ſo often when dinance amongſt the Egyptians and Indians, that e- they leaſt expect it, and is always beyond their very Man ſhould follow his Father's Trade. Diodor. Power to avoid ; thence it follows, that 'tis our Sic. l. 1. c. 74. and l. 12. c. 41. (6) The Reafon of Duty to make an early (7) Uſe of Life, not to which Inſtitution is given by Iſocrates, in Laud. begin too long a Thread of Actions, not to lay Dialogiſts labours to prove a Providence, againſt the Epicureans that denied it: for, ſays he before, To maintain that there are no Gods, and to deprive them of all Care and Action, is much the ſame thing; for he that doth not, &c. So that this Paſſage could noc be fitly applied to the Idleneſs of Man, but by a Preacher : He might much better have quoted Saluft's words, who ſays, “That “ they only live truly, who are buſied in doing Good, the Idle Man's Life is Death.” Sed multi mortales dediti ventri, atque Somno, indo&ti, incultique vitam, ficuti peregrinantes, tranfiere, quibus profe&to contra naturam corpus voluptati, anima neri fuit. Eorum ego vitam, mortemque juxta exiftimo, quoniam de utrâque filetur. Verum enim vero is demum mihi vivere, atque frui arimâ videtur , qui aliquo negotio intentus, præclari facinoris, aut artis bonæ famam quærit. De Bell . Catilim. ch. 2. Maximus Tyrius alſo ſays, That Idleneſs belongs to none but a Dead Man, zö ö ónov, e weeyuooun tivo åv åaas on sale) verpo. Differt. 5. Mr. Bruyere alſo has a fine paffage, which may perhaps agree better than all theſe Quotations of old Authors. - There are ſuch Creatures made by "GOD as are called Men, who have a Soul, which is a Spirir, whoſe Life is wholly employed, and all their Thoughes taken up “ in fawing Marble: This is very filly, and a thing of little Worth; and there are others that wonder at it, but are neverthe- “ leſs uſeleſs, and ſpend their Days in doing nothing ; this is worſe than ſawing Marble.” Chara&ter of the Manners of this Age, Chapt. of Judgments, pag. 450, 451. See what I have ſaid in my Treatiſe of Games, Lib. 1. Chap. 1. §. 1. and Lib.4. Chap.6. (a) Vide Eſais de Morale, Vol. 3. pag. 44, 202. (6) Vide Mr. Oſtervald's Cauſes of Corruption, Engl. Ed. p. 227, doc. (c) Mart. Hift. Sin. 1. 1. c. 34. (5) Iſocrates's Greek is, "Amavas, Life Sev BH Teis ouita's åper drengildis og biovr' ls, avouéxws Temel Bioy Excuteceso mis press θεσίαν ήρμοθεν, έτως εχάσεις wesσέλα σν. τες μου ισοδεέστρον αράπονίας, όπι τας γεωργίας και τας εμπορίας έτρεπον ειδότες, τας με απορίας, δια τας αργίας κγνομένας τας και κακερίας, δια τας οπτείας" αναιρένιες &ν τίω αρχών και κακών, απαλλάξειν δοντο, και και άλλων αμαρτημάτων και μετ' εκείνων γιγνομένων, τες βίον έκαναν κεκτημένες, πεί πιππικών και τα γυμνάσια, και τα κωνίσια, και η φιλοσοφίαν, ήνάγκασαν διατείξεων έρώνες εκ τέτων, τες με διαφέρονίας καιγνομένας, του 3 και πλείσων κακών αποχαμένες. (6) Ifocrates only ſays, that Bufiris would have no Man have more than one Trade, or Profeſſion, becauſe 'tis noe poſſible to excel in feveral. Αεί τοϊς αυτοίς τας αυτές πράξης με τα peeίζεται προσέταξεν ειδώς τες με μεταβαλλομένες τις εργασίας, πεις δεν ξεργών ακριβώς έχοντας τες και οι ταϊς αυταίς ωeάξεσι σιωεχώς επιμένονας, ας αρβολήν έκαςον αποτελενίας. So that he had better liave joined this with what he quotes out of Xenophon's Cyropeed. Lib. 2. Chap. 1. 9. 8. and Lib. 8. Chap. 2. S. 4. (7) “ The moſt glorious and principal Work of Man is to live well . All other Things, as to Reign, get Eftates, Build, are “ but Appendages and Helps for the more - They are mean Souls who are buried in Buſineſs, and do not know how to “ diſentangle themſelves, nor to leave them and reſume them.” Montagne’s Eſſays, Lib. 3. Chap. ult. too CHAP. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 177 coo valt a Train of Deſigns (a). We ought like- fince Society, for which a Man is ſent into the wiſe to have the Accompes of our Life always World, cannot be well exercis’d and maintain'd, drawn up in a Readineſs, and to harden our Minds unleſs every one, as much as in him lies, takes betimes againſt the Terror of Dying ; that without care of his own Preſervation ; (the Safecy of the a trembling Reluctancy, without repining at our whole Society of Mankind, being a thing unintel- Creator's Pleaſure, we may reſign, when he de- ligible, if the Safety of each particular Member mands it, what he lent us of his Free Bounty, un were an indifferent Point), ic manifeſtly appears, der no Terms of keeping (b). that a Man by throwing aſide all Care of his own XVI. How paſſionately every Man loves his Life, tho' he cannot properly be ſaid to injure him- own Life, and how heartily he ſtudies the Secu- felf, yet is highly injurious both to Almighty rity and Preſervation of it, is evident beyond Dif- God, and to the general Body of Mankind (c). pute. But it will admit of a Debate whether the It was not rightly inferr'd in the Argument we bare Natural Inſtinct which he enjoys in common juſt now mention'd, that the Law of Nature did not with Beafts, inclines him to theſe Defires; or concern itſelf with this Matter, becauſe Inſtinct whether he is not engag'd in them by fome Supe- did before drive us on the like good Reſolution. rior Command of the Law of Nature. For, in as We ſhould rather imagine, that the Force of In- much as no one can, in a legal Senſe, ſtand oblig'd ſtinct was ſuperadded (as an able Second) to the to himſelf, ſuch a Law ſeems to be of no Force Dictate of Reaſon; as if this Help alone could or Significancy which is terminated in my felf, ſcarce make a Tie ſtrong enough to keep Man- which I can diſpenſe with when I pleaſe, and by kind together. For indeed, if we reflect on the the Breach of which I do no one an Injury. Be- Troubles and Miſeries that conſtantly wait on Hu- ſides, it looks like a needleſs thing to eſtabliſh a man Life, and do ſo far outweigh that little and Law about this point, ſince the anxious Tender mean Portion of Pleaſure (3), which through a neſs of Self-love would beforehand drive us ſo perpetual Repetition, grows every Day more flat forcibly on the Care of our own Safety, as to and languid, ſo that we muſt needs loath it in render is almoſt impoſſible for us to act other- every Enjoyment; and if we conſider farther, wiſe (1). If then (2) a Man were born only for how many Men have their Days prolong’d only himſelf, we confeſs it would be convenient that to make them capable of more Misfortunes and he ſhould be left entirely to his own Diſpoſal, and Evils; who is there, almoſt, who would not rid be allow'd to do whatever he pleas'd with himſelf , himſelf of the Burthén of Life, as ſoon as poſſible, But ſince by the univerſal Conſent of all Wiſe if Inftint did not render it fo light and ſo ſweet; Men it is acknowledg’d, that the Almighty Cre or unleſs ſo much Bitterneſs or ſo much Terror ator made Man to ſerve him, and to ſet forth his were join'd to our Notion of Death? And yet Glory in a more illuſtrious manner, by improving who is there almoſt who would not break through the Good Things committed to his Truſt; and the bare Oppoſition of Inftin&t, had not the Com- ز 1 3. (a) Martial, 1. 1. Epigr. 16. Ars longa vita brevis. Hippocrat. Non eft, crede mihi, Sapientis dicere vivam : The Future is the Tenfe of Fools. Delay Sera nimis vita eft craſtina : vive hodie. May make to Morrow Late ; be Wiſe to Day. Horat. I, 1. Epiſt. 4. Inter ſpem curamque timores inter do iras, Whilſt Hopes, Cares, Fears and Frets to plague you join, Omnem crede diem tibi diluxiße (upremam; Think every Day your laſt that is to ſhine. Grata ſuperveniet, que non ſperabitur , hora. 'Tis not expe&ting makes a Bleſſing dear : An Hour's Reprieve is worth a Vulgar Year. Sil. Ital. Lib. Brevit aſque vet at mutabilis hore Time ever on the Poſt and on the Change, Prolatare diem. i Forbids us to delay. Horat. Carm, l. 4. Vite ſumma brevis fpem nos vetat inchoare longam. The ſhortneſs of our Mortal Line Forbids a longer Thread in our Defign. (b) Sil. Ital. l. 3. Virtus futile nomen, Vertue's but an Idle Sound, Ni decus adfuerit patiendo, ubi tempora lethi Unleſs undaunted Honour keeps our Ground Proxima fint. Againſt the laſt Attack of Fate. Plin. N. H. 1. 7. C. 40. One Day paſſeth Judgment on another, and the laſt on all. Arrian Epiktet. l. 1. c. I. Tūs äexs sad sons, la títe, nevágoncio trös; w's Pegounet te daaóreide Spor Boulce. When my Time is come, I will be prepar'd immediately to leave the World. After what manner? Why; like a Perſon who is reſtoring what was lent him. Add, M. Antonin. I. 12, . 12. and Bacon, Eflay 2. See alſo Mont agne's Eſſays, Lib. I. Chap. 19. (c) Compare Ant. Matth. de Crim. Prolegom. c. 3. f. 4. S. XVI. (1) Senec. de Benef. Lib. 4. Chap. 17. Supervacuum eſt enim, in quod imus, impelli : quemadmodum nemo in amorem ſui cohortandus est, quem adeo dum naſcitur trahit. 'Tis needleſs to drive us, whicher we are going of our own accord. No one wants an Exhortacion to be perſwaded to love himſelf, ſince he drew in that Principle with his firſt Breath. See alſo Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates, Lib. I. p. 423. (2) The Obligation of preſerving and compleating a Man's Self, proceeds directly from Self-love plainly, which we have proved, $. 15. Note 1. of the foregoing Chapter, to be one of the principal Fundamentals of all our Duties. Indeed Inſtinct alone cannot always fo forcibly conquer our own Idleneſs and Negligence, as to make us know fufficiently, what is really profi- table , or hurtful, to our own Self-preſervation, as Experience teaches. on the other ſide, 'tis fometimes too fierce, and ſome- times too blind, to leave to its Direction entirely, a Thing that requires ſo much Circumſpection, as the Care of ourſelves , and our true Intereſt does, which ought to be managed in ſuch a manner, as not co be prejudicial to Religion, the Rights of others, or good of Sociecy. (3) Mr. Bayle has over and over provºd in his Hift. and Crit. Di&tionary ( as may be found in its Index) The Miſeries of Life are more and greater than its Comforts. The places are marked in his Index. See alſo my Treatiſe of Games, Lib. 3. Chap. 1. §. 3. Аа mand 178 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. BookII. mand of our Creator ſecur'd us with a much ſtron XVII. 'Tis a Queſtion of more Difficulty, whe- ger Bar and Reſtraint (a)? Nature, fays Quincti- ther at all, or how far a Man hath Power over lian, hath invented this chief Device for the his own Life, either to expoſe it to extreme Dan- Preſervation of Mankind, to make us die unwil- ger, or to conſume it by flow Means and Degrees, lingly, thus enabling us to bear ſo vaſt a Load of or laſtly, to end it in a ſudden and violent man- Misfortunes as falls to our Share, with ſome Pa ner (d). Many of the Ancients allow'd a Man tience and Quiet.? And Socrates in Xenophon (b) an abſolute Right in theſe Points, and thought he declares it to be copš dupureszē Téxynuce, the Artifice of might either voluntarily offer his Life as a Pledge a Wiſe Workman, or Builder, to have implanted in for another's, or devote it freely, without any Men a Deſire of producing Offspring; in Wo- ſuch Deſign of preſerving the Life of his Friend; men a Deſire of Nurſing and bringing them up; or whenever he grew weary of Living, mighé and in all, when brought up, a vaſt Deſire of prevent the Tardineſs of Nature and Fate. Pliny 'Living, and as great a Fear of Death.' And (e) calls the Ability to kill one's ſelf, the most ex- this laſt Motive is the main Security of every Man cellent Convenience, in the midst of ſo many Tor- from the Violence of others. For how eaſy were ments of Life. Whom we can by no means ex- it to Kill, were it not ſo hard to Die? Hence he Hence he cuſe from Hat Impiety, for daring to think ſo ab- preſently becomes (4) Maſter of other Mens Lives, jectly (1) of the greateſt Gift of Heaven. It is who hath once arriv'd at the Contempt of his own. our Bulineſs to examine what ſeems moſt agreeable And the regard that others have to their own in this Caſe, to the Law of Nature. And here we Safety, is the beſt Defence of mine (c). may take it firſt of all to be true beyond Diſpute, (a) Quin&t. Declam. 4. What Satisfa&tion, O wretched Mortals, can it prove, to keep the Soul for ſo many Tears, or, if Nature al- low'd it, for infinite Ages, in the unpleaſant and weariſome reſtraint of the Body? If we diligently weigh and examine all our Joys, all the Pleaſures, which in this univerſal Scene of the World, either attrast our Sight or flatter our Vſe, we shall find the whole Life of Man to be no more than a ſingle Day. They muſt be low and abje&t Minds which are not tired with this poor Circulation of A&tions. so that he who by Application to honeſt Arts is able to underſtand what is the Perfe&tion of Goodneſ and true Happineſ, will think no Death un- timely: and thoſe who refer the Deſign of our Being chiefly to the Mind and Soul, muſt every Day be ſurfeited of Life : Te expet I ſhould now give an account how many things there are in this ſhort Stage, which we ought to avoid and decline; that I ſhould ſet our Fears and our Calamities againſt our foy and our Succeß. Let us then weigh thoſe dear Comforts for which we weary the Gods with vain Pe- titions, and on the account of which we complain of the Shortneſ of Life. And what are they, but Vanity, Greedineß, Luxury and Luſt? And ſhall not we be aſhamed for the sake of ſuch Scandalous Privileges, to bear Weakneſ, Grief, and tedious Diſtempers; and even to court'their ſtay, when we have an Opportunity of throwing them off and eſcaping? (6) Xenophon Apomn. l. 1. (c) Add, Charron, l. 2. C. II. n. 8. (d) See Montagne's Eſſays, l. 2. c. 3. (e) N. H. 1. 2. c. 7. (4) 'Tis the Expreſſion of Seneca, Ita dico, quiſquis vitam ſuam contempfit, tus est Dominus. Epiſt. 4. & Mr. Corneille, in his Cinna, makes Æmilius ſpeak of Auguſtus; Whatever Care or Order thou dost take, He that deſpiſes his own Life, doth make Himſelf Maſter of thine. Act. I, Scene 2. *This Verſe is alſo found in Seneca's Tragedy, Hercul. Oet. v. 443. Contempfit omnes ille, qui mortem prius. He contemns all Men that contemns Death. $. XVII. (1) Mr. Montagne's words are here remarkable: After he has alledged the Reaſons of ſuch as hold it lawful to kill themſelves, he goes on and ſays, “ Several hold, that they may not leave this world without the expreſs Command of him that « ſent them into it; and that God hath placed us in it, nor for ourſelves only, but for his own Glory, and the good of others, and He is to releaſe us when he pleaſes, and not we ourſelves ; That we are not born for ourſelves, but for our Country; and " therefore the Laws call us to an Account of Ourſelves, for their Intereſt, and have an Action of Murder againſt us.” Nay, we are in another World puniſhed as Deſerters of our Stations. as Virgil (in his Æneids, Lib. 7. v. 104, doc.) and Lucretius Lib. 3. v.79.) ſpeaks. Proxima deinde tenent mæſti loca, qui ſibi lethum Thoſe doleful Souls in the next Rooms of Hell, Infontes peperêre manu, lucemque peroſi Who, without Guilt, did ſay themſelves, do dwell. Projecere animas 'Tis an Argument of much Bravery and Courage, rather to lug the Chain that clogs us, than break ir. Regulus's Conſtancy is more commendable than Cato's Deſpair. 'Tis Indiſcretion and Imparience that haſtens our Pace ; Virtue will not turn its back upon any Misfortunes, it rather ſeeks our Trouble and Afiction, as its Nouriſhment. The Threarnings of Tyrants, Fires, and Executioners rather invigorate and enliven it. (See Horace, Lib. 4. Ode 4. v. 55, &c.) And Seneca's Theb. or Pheniſ. Act, 1. p. 190, doc. Rebus in adverſis facile est contemnere vitam; Fortiter ille facit, qui miſer ello poteſt. Mart. Lib. 11. Epigr. 57. It is a sign of Cowardice, and not of Courage, to caſt a Man's ſelf into the Grave, under an heavy Tombſtone, to avoid the Strokes of Fortune. Courage will not be beat out of its Way, or Courſe, by any Tempeſt that attends ir. Si fra&tus illabatur Orbis, If the World falls about his Ears, Impavidum ferient ruine. The Ruins will not raiſe his Fears. Moſt commonly, when we are flying from other Troubles we fall into this. By avoiding Death we ſometimes run headlong to it. Hic rogo, non furor est, ne moriare, mori? Mart. Lib. 2. Epigr. 80. As thoſe who, for fear of a Precipice, throw themſelves head long from it. (See Lucan. Lib. 7. p. 104, doc. and Lucretius, Lib. 3. v. 79, &c.) Contempt of Life is ridiculous, for our Being is our All. Things which have a more Noble and Excellent Being, may ſlight Ours, but 'tis againſt Nature for us to deſpiſe it ourſelves, and bring ourſelves to neglect it. 'Tis a particular Diſ. eaſe, which no other Creature is troubled with, to hate and deſpiſe ourſelves. 'Tis a like Folly to deſire to be another Thing than we are. The Conſequence of ſuch a wiſ does not concern us ſo much, as contradict and hinder itſelf. He that deſires to be made an Angel, does nothing for himſelf : He deſires nothing better, for having no Exiſtence, how can he be ſenſible of, or rejoice at that Amendment? The Security, Indolence, Impaſſibility, and Privation of the Evils of this Life, which we purchaſe by dying, bring no Profit to us, In vain he avoids War, that can't enjoy Peace; and in vain he flies from Pain, who has no way to get Eaſe. All Inconveniences are not ſo heavy, as to make us deſirous to die to avoid them; for fince there are ſo many ſudden Changes in human Affairs, it is hard to judge when we are come to the full end of our Hopes. All Things, ſays an anciene Pro- verb, are full of Hopes to a Man as long as he lives. Eſſays, Lib. 2. Chap. 3. Madam Deſhoalieres has ſome fine Verſes to this purpoſe. In greatnes of Courage Men do not know But Diſgrace follows them hard, as they deſerve. When they are got to the Rank of the Hero's. By one Death they have eſcaped a thouſand. Thoſe Greeks and Romans who themſelves flew, Home ſweet is it to troubled Hearts to figh! | That they might make themſelves famous, It is more noble, more difficult Ithat great Thing have they done ?? They're departed this Life ; To bear a Misfortune, than to be delivered from it. Diverſe Reflex. Stanza x. Tom. I. that CHAP. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 179 that ſince Men both can and ought to apply their mand us to lay down our Lives for our Brethren) that, Pains to the Help and Service of another; and without any ſuch rigid Injunction of a Superior, ſince ſome certain kinds of Labour, and an over a Man fhould voluntarily expoſe himſelf to a Pro- ſtraining Earneftneſs in any, may ſo affect the bability of loſing his Life for others ; provided he Strength and Vigour of a Man, as to make Old hath good hopes of thus procuring their Safety, Age and Death come on much ſooner, than if he and that they are worthy of ſo dear a Ranſom: had paſs’d his Days in Softneſs, and in eaſy Pur- For it would be filly and ſenſeleſs, that a Man ſuits; any one may, without Fault, voluntarily ſhould venture his own Life for another whom contract his Life in ſome Degree, upon account 'tis impoflible to preſerve; and (2) that a Perſon of obliging Mankind more ſignally, by fome ex of Worth and Excellence ſhould ſacrifice himſelf traordinary Services and Benefits (2). For fince for the Security of an inſignificant paltry Fellow (b). we do not only live to our felves, but to God, We conceive it then to be Lawful, that a Man and to Human Society; if either the Glory of may either give himſelf as a Surety for another, our Creator, or the Safety and Good of the Ge- eſpecially for an Innocent and a Worthy Perſon, neral Community require the ſpending of our or as a Hoſtage for the Safety of many, in the Lives, we ought willingly to lay them out on Caſe of Treaties ; upon pain of ſuffering Death, ſuch excellent Uſes (a). Pompey the Great, in a if either the accus'a Perfon doth not appear, or time of Famine at Rome, when the Officer who the Treaty be not obſerv’d. Tho' the other Party had the Care of tranſporting the Corn, as well as to whom he ſtands bound on either of chefe ac- all his other Friends, intreated him not to venture counts, cannot fairly put him to Death upon ſuch to Sea in fo ftormy a Seafon, nobly anſwered Failure; as we ſhall elſewhere make out. But them, That I ſhould goʻtis neceſſary, but not that I that thoſe vain Cuſtoms of Mens devoting them- ſhould live. And Achilles in Homer, when his Fate ſelves out of Foolhardineſs and Oftentation (ſuch was put to his Choice, preferr'd a haſty Death in as we obſerv'd to be in uſe amongſt the Faponeſe), the Glorious Adventures of War, to the longeſt are contrary to the Law of Nature, we do not in Period of Age, to be paſs’d idly and ingloriouſly the leaſt doubt. For there can be no Virtue in at home. an Action where there's no Reafen. Nor do we XVIII. Farther, in as much as it frequently pretend to maintain, that the Law of Nature ob- happens, that the Lives of many Men cannot be liges a Man to prefer the Lives of others to his preſerv'd, unleſs others expoſe themſelves, on their own; eſpecially ſuppoſing the Caſes and Circum- Behalf, to a probable Danger of loſing their own'; ſtances to be equal. For beſides that the common this makes it evident, that the lawful Governour Inclination of Mankind is an Argument to the may lay an Injunction on any Man in ſuch Cafes, contrary, we might alledge the Teſtimony of not to decline the Danger upon Pain of the ſevereſt Witneſſes beyond all Exception, allowing a Man Puniſhment. And on this Principle is founded the to be always dearest to himſelf, and Charity ſtill to Obligation of Soldiers, which we ſhall enlarge begin at home (c). upon in its proper place. 'Tis a Noble Saying of XIX. It remains that we examine, whether or Socrates in Plato's Apology, (I) In whatever Station no a Man, at his own free Pleaſure, either when a Man is fix'd, either by his own Choice, as judging it he grows weary of Life, or on the account of a- the best, or by the Command of his Superior ; in that he voiding ſome terrible impending Evil, or ſome ought reſolutely to continue, and to undergo any Danger ignominious and certain Death, may haften his that may aſſault him there; reckoning neither Death nor own Fate, as a Remedy to his preſent or t to his any other Evil ſo grievous, as Cowardice and Infamy. future Misfortunes (d). On this point we have a Nor doth it ſeem at all repugnant either to Na- famous Saying of (1) Plato, in Phado, frequently tural Reaſon, or to the Holy Scriptures, (which com mention's with Honour and Commendation by ز (a) Statius Theb. X. Felix, qui tant a lucem mercede relinquit. Happy, who at a Price ſo noble fold Horat. Carm. III. 2. A fleecing Life! Dulce do decorum eft pro patria mori. How Sweet, how Glorious is the parting Breath Mors do fugacem perſequitur virum, With which our injur'd Country's Peace we buy? Nec parcit in bellis juventa In vain the Coward flies : whilft ſwifcer Death Poplitibus, timidoque tergo. Hangs on his Back, nor ſpares the quivering Thigh. (6) Grotius ad Jonah. C. 1. v. 12. If one Man does well in offering to die for the Preſervation of many (as Phocion told Demoft- henes) how much more is he in Juſtice oblig’d to this, who apprehends himſelf to be the cauſe of the common Danger ? (c) See 2 Corinth. viii, 17, 14. L. 14. Prin. D. præſcript. verb. 1. 6. C. de ſervit. I. 2. f. 9. D. de aqua pluv, arc. Nor can any Argument for the contrary be drawn from L. 5. 1. 4. D. Commodati, L. 1. f. 28. D. de Santo Silan. Add, Traff. de Principiis Guſti do Decori, p. 12, doc. (d) Vid. Lipſii Epift. Cent. 2. Ep. 22. Dr. Donne's Box távåt, Ef. de Morale, Vol. 1. p. 50. (2) In fine, We may obſerve with Mr. Titius (Obſerv. 115.) That the effect of theſe great Undertakings is not always ſo cers: tain, that we need believe, that they thereby infallibly ſhorten their Days. Moreover, the equal Poize between Self-love and Sociableneſ, doch nor confift in an indiviſible Point, but contains a conſiderable Extent. Laſtly, Sociableneſ ſometimes prevails more than Self-love. See what I have ſaid in the foregoing Chapter, S. 15. Note 5. S. XVIII. (1) The Greek. Ou är tis eau Tòr túžiuviz nouvevo beansov 7), i rad opgeno Ingoing ev paūga di, as fucà δοκεϊ, μια οντα κινδυνεύειν, μη δεν υπολογιζόμενον, μήτε ανάλον, ιτε άλλο τι μίδεν πε5 τα ασε. (2) There would be not only Folly, but great Injuſtice in it, for the Law of Nature poſitively ordains, That all other Things being equal, every one ſhould love himſelf better than others, and preferr his own Intereſt before theirs, in a Thing of that great Conſequence as Life is , which is the Foundation of all the good Things of this world. By a much ſtronger Reaſon, if he that runs the hazard of his Life, can't endure that a Perſon of Merit and worth to Society, ſhould ſacrifice himſelf to ſave him. 5. XIX. (1) Plato plainly treats here of the Private Inſtructions which the Pythagoreans gave their Scholars, juſt admitted into their Schools, and in which they diſcover the Reaſons of the moſt abſtruſe and private Doctrines of their Philoſophy. Theſe ſecret Inſtructions they called their 'Arópfuld, about which ſee Scheffer, De Not. Jo Conſtit. Phil Ital. Chap. 1o. What Plato Tays before of Philolaus, a Pythagorean Philoſopher, will not allow us to doubt, that the Reaſon which he fers down here, as very obſcure and hard to comprehend, is no other than what the Pythagoreans give, to prove that Self-murder is not allowable. And °cis the ſame exactly which Cicero attributes to Pythagoras, De Sene&t. Chap. 20. Аа 2 Chriſtian 180 Book II. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Chriſtian Writers: ''s tv move opreĝo touèr os óvogWTOs, Sampſon, who choſe to die by his own Strength, vj Så de Ecu Too Ĉn Taútus aúcio, 8 d Stodd ego rev. We when he (4) found the True Religion expos'd to are plac'd, as it were, upon the Guard, in Life; Scorn in his Perſon and Misfortunes: And of Saul, and' a Man must not rid himſelf of this Charge, or who (5) fell on his own Sword, left he ſhould bafely deſert his Post. Which Laétantius hath ex- have been derided and inſulted over by God's preſs’d more fully in his Divine Inſtitutions (a): As, and bis Enemies; and left, if he ſhould have yiel- ſays he, we did not come into the World upon our own ded himſelf Priſoner, the Slavery of his Country Pleaſure or Choice, ſo neither usust we quit our Station and Kingdom ſhould inevitably follow. For the otherwiſe than by the Command of him who gave it us ; Jews are of Opinion, that Saul recover'd his Wif- who put us into this Tenement of the Body, with Orders dom and Honour, as to the laſt Act of his Life; to dwell here, till be ſhould pleaſe to remove us. It is in as much as after the Ghoſt of Samuel had fore- worth while to hear how Plato (2) deſcribes the told his Death in the Battel, yet he refus'd not to Self-Murderer, whom he hath condemn’d to a dif- engage for his Country and for the Law of his graceful Burial. He that kills himſelf, preventing by God; whence he merited eternal Praife, even Violence the Stroke of Fate, being forc'd to his End nei- by the Teſtimony of David; who likewiſe com- ther by the Sentence of the Judges, nor by any inevitable mended ſo highly the Piety of thoſe Men, who Chance, nor on the account of defending his Modeſty in honour'd their Prince's Reliques with a decent extreme Danger; but thms unjuſtly condemning and ex- Burial. ecuting himſelf, out of Cowardice and Unmanlineſs of Some extend this Exception and Allowance to Spirit. Ariſtotle hath well ſeconded his Mafter. many other Cafes which bear a Reſemblance to To die, ſays he, (b) either to get rid of Poverty or the former. And the Foundation they build upon of Love, of any other Trouble or Hardſhips is ſo far is this, that as no Man can be properly bound or from being an Act of Courage, that it rather argues the oblig’d to himſelf, ſo no Man can do an Injury to meaneſt degree of Fear. For 'tis Weakneſs to fly and to himſelf, when he takes away his own Life. As avoid thoſe things which are hard and painful to be un- for a Man's being engag'd by the Law of Nature dergone (c). Grotius (d) hath obſerved, that Per to preſerve himſelf, they ſay the Reaſon of this fons Guilty of Self-Murther were excluded from is, becauſe he is conſtituted and appointed by decent Honours of Burial, both amongſt the Gen- God for the maintenance of Human Society, which tiles and the Jews. But amongſt the latter, one he muſt not by any means forſake, like an idle Caſe is commonly excepted, and allow'd as a juſt Soldier, who runs away from the Poſt afſign'd Reaſon for killing one's felf; and that is (3) when him in Battel : And that therefore my Obligation a Man finds he ſhall otherwiſe be made a Re- to ſave my own Life, is not a Debt to myſelf, but proach to God, and to Religion. For acknow to God, and to (6) the Community of Mankind. ledging the Power over our Lives not to be in So that if that Reſpect to God and to Mankind our own hands, but in God's, they took it for be taken off and be remov'd, the Care of my Life granted, that nothing but the will of God ei- is recommended to me only by Senſitive Inſtinct, ther manifest or preſumptive, could excuſe the De- which not riſing to the Force of a Law, an A&ion fign of anticipating our Fate. As Inſtances of repugnant to it cannot be accounted ſinful. On this excepted Cafe, they alledge the Examples of theſe conſiderations, they think the Caſe of thoſe 1 (a) Div. Inftit. l. 3. c. 18. (b) Ethic, 1. 3. C. H.N. c) Senec. Phæniſl. Non eſt Virtus Valour is not, to be afraid of Life, Timere vitam; ſed malis ingentibus But bravely to reſiſt impending Woes, Obſtare, nec ſe vertere ac retrodare. And never to ſubmic or to retire. Martial, L. 11. Epig. 57. Rebus in anguftis facile eſt contemnere vitam; Cowards in Miſery may court their Fate; Fortiter ille facit qui miſer eße poteſt. He's Brave chat dare perfift Unfortunate. Virgil aſſigns a Place in Hell to Self-murtherers. Qui fibi letum They Infontes peperere manus, lucemque peroſi Who prodigally throw their Souls away ; Projecere animas. Fools who repining at their wretched State, And loathing anxious Life, ſuborn'd their Fate. Mr. Dryden. Procop. Hift . Goth. I. 4. To throw away our Life when there can be no Advantage, is precipitate Madneß : And tho' ſuch a blind Fierce- neß hath ſome vain Shadow of Courage, yet it will always paſs for Folly, in the Judgment of wiſe Men. Ammian. Marcellin, 1. 25. C. 4. If we conſider right, it is juſt the ſame Fearfulneſs and cowardice, to deſire Death when we ought not, and to refuſe it on a proper Occaſion. Add, Roger de Bramin. p. 2. c. 19. Nicol. Trigant. de Regno Chine, 1. 1. C. 9. Charron, 1. 2. C. II. n. 18. (d) L. 2. c. 19. f. 5. (2) De LL.. 1. 9. “Ο, αν εαυτόν κλείνη, θα ειμαρμένης βία αποστρών μοίραν, μήτε πόλεως ταξάσης δίκίω μήτε τπειωδιωίω, και αούκιω @es αντσέση τύχη αναγκαθείς, μήδι αιoύνης την απόρε, και αβία μεγαλαχών, αργίας και και ανανδρίας δειλία εαυτώ δίκιο a dirov 7.3n Támos de Tois 876 peptiot, we mov jell xi muovas, &c. See a Paſſage of Mr. Montagne's, quoted s. 17. Note 1. where you'll find an Abridgment, and a lively Repreſentation of the principal Realons which can be alledged againſt thoſe who believe that Self-marder is allowable, and fome other Paſſages which our Author puts in the Margin here. (3) This Reaſon does not excuſe Self-murder at all. Suppoſing that we do not any thing to diſhonour God on our part, 'cis not our Fault, if profane Perſons take an occaſion unjuſtly to ridicule their Creator; and this doch not at all authorize us to violate the expreſs Prohibitions both of the Natural Law and Revelation, in departing out of this Life without his Leave. (4) 'Twas done rather out of Revenge againſt the Philiſtines, and God puniſhed himſelf by hearing his Prayers. See Mr. Le Clerc on Judges, xvi. 28.30. (5) See Mr. Le Clerc upon 2 Sam. I. 14. (6) Ariſtotle obſerves, (Ethic. l. 5. c. 15.) that thoſe who are guilty of their own Deaths, are more properly Injurious to the Commonwealth than to themſelves ; and that therefore they deſerve the Ignominy commouly inflicted on their Reliques. Perſons CHAP. IV. The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. 181 Perſons deferves a favourable Judgment, and at they might well preſume on the Confent and leaſt a kind Pity, rather than a rigorous Cenſure, Leave of Mankind, to whom they were already who lay violent Hands upon themſelves, when loft: It being no one's Intereſt that they ſhould they ſee that they ſhall otherwiſe infallibly ſuffer not anticipate their Death for ſo little a time, to a Death of Torture and Ignominy from their Ene- avoid the feeling of ſuch Tortures and Abuſes as mies; ſince it cannot be for the Intereſt of the Pub- might, perhaps, tempt them to yield to a more lick, that they muſt needs die in fo infamous a man- grievous Sin: And in as much as it ſeem'd un- ner: Or elſe, when they ſee ſuch an Injury likely reafonable to condemn Generous Souls to ſuch to be offer'd to them, as if they undergo, they a Neceſſity, as that they muſt wait for the Sword ſhall be ever after ſcorn’d and derided by the reſt of Villains, who would inhance the Bitterneſs of Mankind. Of the former fort are thoſe who of Death, by their foul and ignominious U- feeing themſelves condemn'd to Death, either by ſage (c). Cruel Enemies abroad, or bloody Tyrants at home, But to leave this particular Point without ven- have wilfully prevented the Stroke ; either to a- turing at a Determination; thus much we take to void the Tortures and the Shame of a Publick Ex- be evident, that thoſe who voluntarily put an end ecution, or to procure ſome Benefit to their to their own Lives, either as cired out with the Friends or Families by this Expedient. Thus Ta- many Troubles which commonly attend our Mor- citus, Ann. VI. giving an Account of ſome of the tal Condition; or from an Abborrence of Indigni- Accus’d Perſons under Tiberius, who made themſelves ties and Evils, which yet would not render them away, obſerves, that the (7) Fear of the Executioner diſgraceful Members of Human Society; or through rendred theſe sets very frequent. And that whereas Fear of ſuch Pains and Torments as by reſolutely ſuch as ſuffer'd Death in Publick, were denied the enduring, they might have become uſeful Ex- Privilege of Burial, and had their Goods confiſcated; amples to others; cannot be well clear'd of the thoſe who died by their own bands were decently interr’d, Charge of Sinning against the Law of Nature. Sir and their Last Wills ſtood good with full effect ; theſe Thomas Moor ſeems to be of another Opinion in his Indulgences ſerving as a Reward for their Hafte. Utopia, but his Reaſons do not prevail with us to And here, by the way, we may remark, that alter our Judgment. Martial's Cenſure doth not always hold good, But thoſe are, on all Accounts, to be exempted from the Crime of Self-Murther, who lay violent Furor est, ne moriare, mori ; Hands on themſelves, under any Diſeaſe robbing them of the Uſe of Reaſon. Many Perſons like- 'Tis mad to die for fear of Death; wiſe who have run into Voluntary Deſtruction, upon an exceeding Fright and Confternation, For, as Æſchines (a) hath well diſtinguiſh’d, To have on that account been excus'd by Moderate die es not ſo terrible, as to bear the Infamy that attends and Candid Judges (d). ſome kinds of Deaths. It ought to be obſerv'd farther on this Head, The other ſort of Perſons whoſe Death we ob- that it makes no difference whether a Man kill ſerv'd to be ſo favourably interpreted by ſome himſelf, or force others to diſpatch him. For Caſuiſts (9) are thoſe Women and Beautiful Boys, he who at ſuch a Time, or on ſuch Occaſion, who have killd themſelves to avoid the Violation ought not to die, is by no means excus’d, if he of their Chaſtity (b). And in their Behalf, they makes uſe of another Man's Hands to procure his urge this plauſible Excuſe, that being aſſaulted Death; ſince what a Man doth by another, he is with ſuch a Danger as they could not other- ſuppos'd in Law to have done himſelf, and muſt wiſe, unleſs by a Miracle, eſcape, they might therefore bear the Guilt or Imputation of the Fact. well conclude, that their Almighty Sovereign and David was guilty of the Death of Uriah, tho he General now gave them a Diſmiſſion, and that got ic effected by the Hands of the Ammonites. So (a) Orat, de falf. Legat. (6) Vid. Paul. Diac. I. 15. & Eufeb. H. E. 1. 8. c. 24, 27, (c) Cicero Tuſc. Qu. I. Caro left the World rejoicing that he had met with an Opportunity of Dying. For that Divine Power which dwells in us, forbids us to depart without his Leave. But when Heaven preſents a fair Occaſion, t formerly to Socrates, now to Caco, and often to other Perſons, I dare engage, that a truly wiſe Man will quit with Joy this Vale of Darkneſs, to enter into Happineſs and Light. And yet ſuch an one will not violently break the Chains of his Priſon; for this the Laws forbid him ; but he will go out quietly and fairly, when God is pleaſed to give him his Enlargement; as if his Releaſe from the Reſtraint were ſign”d by the Proper Magiſtrate and Power. Compare L. 3. 1.6. D. de bonis eorum qui ante ſententiam. L. 45. 1. D. de jure fifci. Add, Quintilian, Declam. 4. Ant. Matthe : de Crim. ad 1. 48. tit. 5. c. 1. 1.9. Grot. ad Judic.c. 16. v. 30. (d) &. Curtius, L. 4. c. 16. When Fear hath once got Poſeſſion of the Mind, Men grow deſperate, and dread nothing but that firſt Obje&t of Terror. Lucan. L. 3. Mille modos inter lethi mors una timori est Amongſt a Thouſand ways of Death, they fear Qua cápere mori That only which in part they feel Mors timore appetita, Death deſired thro' Fear, is a Phraſe with Sueton. Add, L. 14. f. 3. D. quod metus cauſa, and Montaign? Eflay, L. 1. C. 17. (7) Tacitus's words are; Nam prompt as ejuſmodi Mortes, metus carnificis faciebat, do quia damnati publicatis bonis, ſepultura prohị. bebantur; eorum, qui de se ſtatuebant, humebantur corpora, manebant teſtamenta, pretium feſtinandi. (9) This is not a ſufficient Reaſon to juſtify Self-murder, for they ought to comfort themſelves with the Teſtimony of their own Conſcience, which can't blame them in that reſpect, and bear patiently the unwarrantable Cenſures of Men, and the other Inconveniences which may redound from ſuch a Violence. True Chaſtity, as Mr. Thomafius fpeaks very well (Inſtitut. Furiſpr. Divin. Lib. 2. Chap. 2. S. 76.) is a thing which no Man can cake away by force, and 'cis without Reaſon that they are leſs eſteem- ed ſo, who have been obliged to yield to a greater Powen to 182 The Duties of Man with regard to Himſelf. Book II. were Pilate and the Phariſees guilty of that of our we cannot approve of thoſe Laws, which in ſome Saviour, tho' they did not themſelves faften him Countries either command or permit People to to the Croſs , but order'd the Soldiers to do it. make themſelves away. Such a Law Diodorus Si- Altho' the Perſon who lends his Hands to ſuch a culus, L. 2. C. 57. reports to have been in force Şervice, may likewiſe bring himſelf in for a Share amongſt the Inhabitants of the Iſland Ceylan, or- in the Fault. For this Reaſon we don't admire the daining, “That the People ſhould live only to Reflection which Florus (a)(10) makes on the Deaths " ſuch a Number of Years, which being run out, of Brutus and Callius; Who, ſays he, doth not won they eat a certain Herb that put them into der, that theſe Wiſe and Great Perſons did not employ " their long Sleep, and diſpatch'd them without their own bands in their concluding Strokes? Perhaps it o the leaſt Senſe of Pain. Add, L. 3. Ch. 33. was part of their Perſwaſion, that they ought not to And thus too amongſt the Creans, all Perſons 2- defile themſelves by ſuch Attempts, but that in delivers bove Sixty Years old, were obliged by the Laws to ing their most Holy and most Pious Souls from the Con- poyſon chemſelves, to ſupply Food for the rest (c). finement of their Bodies, they ſhould make uſe of their Though Ælian gives this better Reaſon for the own Judgment, in the Intention, and of other Mens Practice; “ That having arriv'd at ſuch an Age Wickedneſs in the Execution. For if it were unlawful they were conſcious to themſelves, that they for them at that time to end their Lives, it was were no longer able to promote their Coun- indifferent whether they fell by their own, or by " try's Intereſt by their Service; growing now others Violence. But if it were lawful, how can “ towards Stupidity and Dotage” (d). Procopius, any Wickedneſs or Guilt be imputed to the Ser- Hiſt. Oeth. L. 2. relates a Cuſtom of the Heruli, vants who aſſiſted them? Tho' the Hiſtorian by which thoſe who were weaken'd and diſabled, might, in fome meaſure, be excus'd, if the ſame either by Diſeaſe or Age, voluntarily ſent them- Cuſtom were practis'd in his Country, which felves out of the World : The Wives hanging Æſchines mentions amongſt the Grecians, that if a themſelves at the Tombs of their Husbands, if Perſon murther'd himſelf, the Hand that per- they loſt them in this manner. Alian, L. 4. C. 4. form'd the Deed was buried apart from the reſt reports ſomewhat to the ſame purpoſe of the of the Body (b). Sardi, and the Bebricei ; and Strabo, Lib. 2. and To conclude, Since we deny that a Man hath Herodotus, Clio in fin. of the Maſſageta, who may abſolute Power over his own Life, it is plain that be conſulted at Leiſure. (a) lib. 4, 7. (6) Orat. contra Creſiphonr. (c) Strabo, L. 10. Heraclid. de Polit. Vide, H. Lib. 3. Chap. 37: : . (d) Add, Valer. Max. Lib. 2. Chap. 6. f. 7, 8. (10) Thus Deianira ſpeaks in Seneca (Herc. Oet.) Dextera fternar tud, Yours fhall be the Hand of Fare, Sed mente noſtra. And mine the Will. СНАР. 183 С НА Р. V. Of Self-Defence, V wiſe. I. The Defence of a Man's ſelf is a lawful Violence. XII. Of a Box on the Ear. II. And is ordain'd by the Law of Nature. XIII. Whether a Man is bound to fly. III. What ſort of Defence is allowed in a Natural State. XIV. Whether the Chriſtian Religion commands other IV. And what ſort in Cities? V. Whether it is lawful against one that Miſtakes. XV. Slaughter committed in Self-defence, is guiltleſs. VI. The time for ſuch Defence in a Natural State. XVI. Of the Defence of our Goods. VII, VIII, IX. And bow to be ſettled in a Civil State. | XVII, XVIII. Of a Night-Thief. fiai X. Of Maiming any part of the Body. XIX. Of ſuch Defence as is made by him who has of- XI. Of Chaſtity. fered the Injury. Ciu تردد Tderet O Self-Preſervation, which not only the ten with his Fellows, and all the Laws of Nature, dereft Paſſion, but the exacteſt Reaſon re which bear a regard to other Men, do primarily commends to Mankind, belongs Self-Defence, or tend towards the Conſtitution and the Preſervati- (1) the warding off ſuch Evils or Miſchiefs as tend on of this Univerſal Safety and Quiet. Yet Na- to our Hurt, when offer'd by other Men. This ture is not backward in giving us an Indulgence Defence of our ſelves may be undertaken two to fly even to Force, when we cannot by other ways, either without hurting him who deſigns the means ſecure ourſelves from Injuries and Aſſaults. Miſchief againſt us (2); or elſe by hurting or de- For the Obligation to the Exerciſe of the Laws of ſtroying him. As to the former Expedient, no ſen- Nature and the Offices of Peace, is mutual, and ſible Man can queſtion, but that it is altogether binds all Men alike; neither hath Nature given lawful, and blameleſs . But concerning the latter, any Perſon ſuch a diſtinct Privilege, as that he many have entertain'd a Scruple ; in as much as may break theſe Laws at his Pleaſure, towards by putting it in Practice, we hurt or deſtroy a others, and the others be ſtill oblig'd to maintain Man like ourſelves, with whom we are oblig'd the Peace towards him. But the Duty being mu- to live in a Social manner, and whoſe Death ſeems tual, the Peace ought to be mutually obſerv'd. And to be as great a Lofs to Mankind, as our own. therefore when another, contrary to the Laws of And beſides, becauſe a forcible Repulfe of an Ag- Peace, attempts ſuch things againſt me, as tend greffor,may cauſe more Diſturbances and Outrages to my Deſtruction, it would be the higheſt Impu- in human Society, than if we ſhould either de- dence in him to require me at the ſame time to cline the Miſchief by Flight, or paciently yield hold his Perſon as Sacred and Inviolare : that is, our Body to it, when an eſcape is impoſſible. Yet To forego my own Safety, for the ſake of letting that the Defence of ourſelves may not only be un- him practiſe his Malice with Impunity (4). But dertaken the firſt of theſe ways, but (3) when ſince in his Behaviour towards me he ſhows himſelf that proves ineffectual, even with the Hurt of the unſociable, and ſo renders himſelf unfit to receive Aſſailant, we are inform’d, as well by the Judg- from me the Duties of Peace, all my Care and ment of Reaſon, as by the concurring Teſtimony Concern ought to be how to effect my own Deli- of the Learned and Unlearned World. 'Tis true, verance from his hands; which if I cannot accom- Man was created for the maintaining of Peace pliſh without his Hurt, he may impute the Miſchief He treats of the firſt in Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. V. S. I. (1) This is well ſtated by the Roman Lawyers, for they lay it down as a Maxim of the Law of Nations ( which we call the Law of Nature) vt vim atque injuriam propulſemus : Nam jure hoc Evenit, ut quod quiſque ob tutelam corporis ſui fecerit, fure feciſſe exiſtimetur, Digeft . Lib. 1. Tit. 1. De inftit. & Jure Leg. 3. See alſo Lib. 9. Tit. 2. Ad Leg. Aquil. Leg.4. in princ. Indeed, as Mr. Titius obferves (Obſerv. CXX.) there may be ſome Oppoſition between Self-love, and the Duties of a Community, either in reſpect to the Good Things which can't be poſſeſſed by two Perſons at the ſame time ; and in this caſe Self-love ought often to thew itſelf; or in reſpect of Evil , which equally threatens ochers and ourſelves. Our Author, in this and the next Chapter, treats of this laſt Oppoſition, which happens either by the Act of him towards whom we ought otherwiſe to obſerve the Laws of the Community, or without any Act on his part. He explains the firſt Caſe in this chapter, and clears the other in the following; for the Fact of the other, which produces this oppofition, is either Malicious, or not. this Paragraph, and will ſpeak of the ocher in s. s. (2) We may add this Explication here, which our Author uſes in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib.r. Chap. 5. §. 12. 1. e. Taking good heed that he ſhall not gain his Ends in inſulting us; or that he may have reaſon to fear the (3) We ought to obſerve this Limitation well, how unjuſt foever the Attempt of the Aggreſſor may be, the Community obliges us to ipare him, if we can do it without Prejudice to ourſelves. By this Juft Temper we may, at the ſame time, pre- ferve the Rights of Self-love and Duties of Community. The Roman Lawyers have owned this Truth, Injuria autem (ſay they) occidere intelligitur, qui nullo jure Occidit. Itaque qui latronem ( Inſidiatorem occiderit , non tenetur, utique ŚI ALITER PERI- CULUM EFFUGERE NON POTEST. Institut. Lib. 9. Tit. 3. De Leg. Aquil. S. 2. See Mr. Noodt's excellent Treatiſe, Ad Legem Aquiliam. Chap. 4. p. 15, 16. (4) Herodian, L.4. C. 5. Ομε, και ευλογον, και αναγκαίον, και μέλλον θα πεί σε δεινόν, αμύναθαι μάλλον, ή πομείνει τη μεν Mes su u popã rõ movle, vjellavopis Motores a In Extrean Danger, nor only mecellity, but Reputation, obligeth Unfortunate, we ihould be reproach'd as Cowards. us rather to avenge an Injury, than ſustain it. Since ſhould we fall by ſuch a Miſchief, at the fune cime that we are pitied as ill Succeſs of his Attempt. to 184 Of Self-Defence. Book II. to his own Wickedneſs, which put me under this P.33." That ſince amongſt other things contribu- Neceſſity (a). For otherwiſe, all the Goods which ting to the Preſervation of Man, Nature hath we enjoy either by the Gift of Nature, or by the given us all a quick Senſe of Pain, a Deſire of Procurement of our own Induſtry, would have Revenge, together with Hands for the hurting been granted us in vain, if it were unlawful for us others, or the defending ourſelves; we may to oppoſe thoſe in a forcible manner, who unjuſtly “ hence infer, that theſe Gifts not being beſtow'd invade them. And honeſt Men would be expos’d a on us in vain, it is the Pleaſure of God that ready Prey to Villains, if they were never allow’d we ſhould employ them in procuring our own to make uſe of Violence in refifting their Attacks. “ Safety. And that therefore, not to uſe my So that upon the whole, to baniſh Self-defence “ Hands againſt an Aſſailant, tho' to the Pro- though purſued by Force, would be ſo far from curement of his Death (3) would be the ſame promoting the Peace, that it would rather con " thing as voluntarily to cut them off. Tho’in- tribute to the Ruine and Deſtruction of Mankind. “ deed he afterwards confeſſes, P. 118. that this Nor is it to be imagin'd that the Law of Nature, “ Law of Self-preſervation is not of ſo ſtrict ne- which was inſtituted for a Man's Security in the cefficy, but that there may ſometimes happen World, ſhould favour ſo abſurd a Peace, as muſt “ ſuch Caſes, as ſhall either diſpenſe with a Man's neceſſarily cauſe his preſent Deſtruction, and “ Obedience to it, or leave him free to do as he would in fine, produce any Thing ſooner than a pleaſes. ſociable Life. For our Parts, we think it ought principally to II. But now, whether a Violent Self-defence, and be conſider'd, whether it much concern the In- ſuch as is join'd with the Hurt or the Slaughter of tereſt of many, that the Perſon Invaded ſhould the Affailant be an obliging and a neceſſary. Ducy, ſurvive, or whether he ſeem only to live for him- (as we have already ſhown it to be a lawful, and ſelf . In the former Caſe we conceive, that there an allow'd Practice,) is a Queſtion not ſo eaſy to lies an Obligation on a Man to ſecure his own be determin'd. In ſtating which Point we do not Life by any poſſible Means. But in the latter ſpeak of Souldiers, or of the Guards hired by Cafe we take it to be a thing of Permiſſion, or Travellers, who whilſt they defend themſelves Allowance only, not of Command, to defend with the Slaughter of the Enemies or the Robbers, One’s ſelf by the Death of the Aggreſſor, eſpeci- at the ſame time prote& and deliver their Coun- ally if his Life would have been of great Service try, (1) or the Men who have put themſelves under and Profit to many people; and if we may pro- their Care. But we confine ourſelves to the Caſe bably conjecture, that by dying in ſuch an Ata of thoſe who are excited to make ſuch Defence by tempt, he incurrs the Danger of Eternal Damna- their own (2) Particular Danger (b). Now there tion. For tho' the greatneſs of a ſurprizing Ter- are ſome who will have this Defence to be ſo ſtrict ror will ſcarce fuffer one exactly to weigh the a Command, that it cannot be taken off even by Merits of Perſons; and tho' ſuch a Danger as a Civil Conſtitutions; and conſequently that he who Man voluntarily throws himſelf into, and may ſuffers himſelf to be killd, when he might have at his Pleaſure get rid of, ought to find little Re- violently refifted, ought to be look'd upon as guil- gard or Conſideration from others, eſpecially from ty of Self-Murder (c). Which is ſomething like the him who is the Subject of his Fury, and at whoſe Čuſtom in Sparta, where the Ephori puniſh’d a Coft he is thus extravagant (el) (4): Yet that an Man, for having ſuffer'd many Perſons to injure Act from which ſo great Evils would be brought him (d). upon another (as there would ſometimes from The Author of the Treatiſe, De Principiis Jufti this Violent Defence), ſhould be reckon'd a Mat- & Decori, declares in Favour of this Opinion: and ter of ſtrict Duty, and the Omillion of it a Sin, the Argument he proceeds on is to this purpoſe, we ſee little Reaſon to allow. Eſpecially, ſince the 1 (a) Hor. 2. Sat. 1. V. 44. Nec quiſquam noceat cupido mihi pacis : at ille Hurt not a Peaceful Min: but if you try Qui me commovit, (melius non tangere, clamo;) His Patience far, (you'd beſt keep off, I cry ;) Flebit. You may repene your Boldneſs. (6) Plutarch in Phocion : '0 ' Qwxlwv, em ti megéu i avdese [Nirévoga Boleni peèv vel egeveg menéuevo, šon ms d'ev udir τω Νικάνοι, και μη δεν απ' αυτά ωegσδοκών δεινόν. ει δε μή μάλλον εθέλειν άδικέμενΘ, ή άδικών φανερά γένους. τύτο και τα έωσε μεν άν τινι σκοπενι δοκoίη καλοκαγαθικώς λελέχθαι, και γενναίως, και ας πατρίδα επικινδυνων σωτηρίαν και τα τα κράτη- γώ και άρρων, εκ διδα μη μιζόν παραβαίνει, και ορεσβύτερον το ορος του πολίτας δικαιον. When he was cenſur’d by ſome for letting Nicanor, the Embafiador of Caſander, enjoy his Liberty, he anſwer'd, that he did not diſtruſt the Man, nor appre- hend any Danger from him : But if things ſhould happen otherwiſe, he would be glad to let the World ſee, how much more willing he was to receive an Injury, than to offer one. This, if he look'd no farther than his own Perſon, was ſpoke with Honeſty, as well as with Bravery:. But if a Man by ſuch an A&t of Generoſity endangers the Safety of the State, eſpecially being himſelf in a Pub- lick Truſt, I queſtion if he does not violate that greater and more ſacred Law, his Obligation to his Country. (c) Vid. Zeigler ad Grot. Lib. 1. c. 3. f. 3. (d) Plutarch Lacon. Inſtitut. re) Iſocrates adverſ. Callimach. Is it not ridiculous and abſurd, that he ſhould petition you for Mercy in ſuch a Danger, «s purely depended on his own Will; which he freely run into at firſt, and from which he has ſtill means of being deliver’d. §. II. (1) Add, Grot. Lib. 1. c. 2. & c. 3. f. 3. To whom we may apply that Saying of Seneca (Phænifl.) Vitam tibi ipſi ſi negas, multis negas. By chuſing Death your felf, you hazard the Lives of many. (2) In general, No Man can releaſe his own Rights, or renounce his private Intereſts, when they are intermixed with ano- ther's, who will not allow us to do it. To this the Example of Phocion, alledged by our Author. See Letter (c). (3) Mr. Velthuyſen does not ſay this, 'cis our Author's Comment. (4) Liban. Declam. 33. A 38 8 x 'é za Jev, óx disināv, ToữTA OÚ Toyés par i fermecoso He who unleſs he had offer'd one Injury, had not fuffer'd another, is equally the Cauſe of both. Old CHAP. IV. Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. 185 Old Maxim might be ſo well applied to this Cafe, this Liberty is ſtinted, in Perſons living together that any Man may renounce his own Privilege, pro- under a Civil Government. vided he doth not thereby injure a third Perſon : Which It is then a good Rule of Prudence, that a wiſe Quinctilian (5) hath thus expreſs’d and illuſtrated, Man ought to try all other Expedients before he This, ſays he, is the Nature of all Benefits, that they proceed to Arms, or Violence(1). For in as much do not impoſe a Neceſſity, but grant a Power. Whatever as all Combat and forcible Contention is of un- Expedient you invent to procure the Honour or Safety of certain Iſſue, it would be adviſable firſt to make another, loſes the Name of a Privilege, if you compel Experiment of ſafer Remedies and Redreſſes, e're bim to make uſe of it. Run over all the Inſtitutions we enter the Lifts, and come to a formal Engage- and all the Rights of Mankind, and you ſhall never ob ment (a). Thus if I can cut off the Invader's Serve that the Law is so fondly follicitorus for our Good, Acceſs to me, I am a Fool if I unneceſſarily meet as to extort that from us, by which it intends only to do him Hand to Hand. And if I can defend my ſelf us a Favour. with a Wall or a Gate, 'tis abſurd in me to expoſe III. But in order to more exact Judgment of my Breaſt (2) to my Foe. Farther, Wiſdom ad- Self-defence, and to know by what Rule it ſhould viſes us to put up a ſmall Injury, if we can with be moderated, and how far it may rightly pro- Convenience, and ſo rather to recede in ſome De- ceed: first of all we ſhould examine, whether the gree from our Right, than by an unſeaſonable De- Defendant live in a State of Nature, or of Civil So- fence, to expoſe our ſelves to a greater Danger : ciety; ſince the Bounds of this Practice are much Eſpecially if that Thing or concern of ours, up- narrower in the latter than in the former Conditi- on which the Attempt is made, may be eaſily Which Difference not being obſerv'd by ma made amends for, or repair’d (3). Thus a Man ny Authors, hath been the Occaſion of their de- who hath a Debt owing him from another, ſup- livering ſuch Things in general concerning Un- poſe to the Value of Ten Pounds, would act more blamable Self-Defence, as will hold true only under wiſely, in my Judgment, if he made up the Buſi- one particular State. But now if we firſt diſtinctly neſs by any Kind of Compoſition, than if he en- explain what Right we have to ſuch a Practice in gag'd in a troubleſome Suit, where the Lawyers a State of Nature, it will appear with great Eaſe Fees might exceed the main Sum which he endea- and Evidence, how far, and on what Grounds vours to recover(b). Ас on. (5) Declam. 7. Omnium beneficiorum iſta Natura eſt, ut non fit neceffitas ſed poteſtas. Quicquid in honorem alicujus inventum eſt, deſinit privilegium vocari poße, ſi cogas. Coalta, ſe videtur, jura percurrite, nuſquam adèo pro nobis ſollicita lex eft, ut quod præſtat, extorqueat. See Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws, Tit. 1. Selt. 4. 5.4. But we ought here to obſerve, contrary to our Author's Hypothe- fis, That Self defence is not ſo inſeparable a Right, that we may uſe it or not, at all Times as we ſee fit. The Law of Nature does not allow us to defend our ſelves only, but it poſitively orders us thereby to love our ſelves, and do all we can for our Pre- ſervation. See Mr. Van der Muelen's Commentary on Grotius, Lib. 2. Chap. 1. §. 8. & 9. and Mr. Titius's Obſervat. 121. If we were not under this Obligation, it would follow, that any Man might ſuffer himſelf to be killed as often as he was attacked, and no Man need to be concerned for his Preſervation. Now who fees nor that this tends to the Deſtruction of a Community, and to deprive it of the moſt honeſt Men? Beſides, ſuch as ſurvive would have a fair Occaſion to leave the VVorld. It is true that the Creator hath provided by a natural Inſtinct, that every one ſhould defend himſelf, infomuch that we are more apt to offend on the other side than this; but this ſhews, that Self-Defence is not a Thing abſolutely indifferent in its own Nature, or barely permitted, ſo that it is always at our Liberty to ſuffer our ſelves to be Slain. All that has been ſaid, tends only to this, that a Man may, yea, ought ſometimes to renounce his Right of defending himſelf, as we ſhall Thew below. And that in theſe laſt Caſes, the Fear, into which the greatneſs of Danger, and the Force of our Natural Inſtinct throws us, may excuſe or free them from Blame, who ſave their own Lives by the Loſs of theirs whom they ought rather to have ſpared with the Expence of their own. We may alſo believe, on the other Hand, that if one ſacrifices his Life chrough great Kindneſs, or ſome other weighty Conſideration which he has for the Unjuft Aggreffor, who does not of himſelf deferve ſuch a Sacrifice, he is excuſable, for yielding to a Motive of that Nature, as to be of Force enough to overcome Self-Love and Fear of Death. See s. 5. Note 1. fol. lowing. $. III. (1) Omnia prius experiri verbú, qudm Armis Sapientem decet. Ter. Eunuch. Act 4. S.-7. V. 19. (2) Terent . Eunuch. Tu quod cavere poſſis Stultum admittere est, i. ..“ 'Tis extreme Folly to meet a Danger that you may a- u yoid.” (3) Plautus Amphitru. Act. 2. S. 2. 001 Bacche bacchanti ſi velis adverſarier station Oppoſe the raving Gypſy in her Fit, Ex inſanâ inſaniorem facies, feriet ſæpius: bao.coShe'll get more Fury, and you'll get more Blows, wit (3p but art1 Si obſequare, unâ refolvas plagâ. vices.c; begildas Be Gentle, and her confecrated Wand See alſo Trucul. A&. 4, Scene 2. v. 5500 OR Smalt viis to anae vos gumon 3M bilo bi na tano 22b to act boog istrin si May then excuſe you with a ſingle Stroke., juttu Martial, Epig. 64. L. 6. Was I 280 Sed miſerere tui, rabido nec perditus ore te te ge Have Pity on yourſelf, and, tho? you'r ſtou. triche 1975 hitala si Fumantem naſum vivi tentaveris urſi. SMC2 a 2 As Maſtiff Breed, don't take a Bear by th’Snout. (a) Liban. Ban. Declam. 1. Πρώτον μεν και τα δίκαια, το λόγο παράθι λαμβάνειν, αλλά μη τοϊς οπλοΐς επιτηδάν, ανθρωπινώτερον Sebèy. It is a more Worthy and more. Manl Way of Proceeding; not to run presently to Arms and Violence, but to try fir if our Right may not be recover'd by fair Means. ei 109 Storliebrow TH 10 guiaomirt 21. svim detech sorabileyicidi - Martial, 1. 7. Épig. 64. do Ilumn 101 orog og en overs son biwow ICT Bilang Ah miſer. G demens ! viginti litigat annis bus baill Would any Wretch prolong his Suit, a Score orliomvi huo pa Quiſquam cui vi cui vinci , Gargiliane, licet ?1929 i stoidy. Of doubtful Terms, that might be Cast before? Morla con Home Origa tor tooxe na xão uéza váno dvorptivo 'Tis wiſe to cloſe ! A A great contention with a little Lols.Dohoto Pindar, Olymp. Oder 10. Næro ä upeistarwy St Hy & Toege wifi'is hard to end a Quarrel with the Great too Egày a paveia mizas nj Mapvana un orl di sua War is as blind as Chance: The doubtful Day It was very wife Conduct that which Ifocrates reports of himſelf, (de Permut.) Theſe, lays he, were the Arts I made use of ; never to offer any Damage or Treſpaß: And, in caſe I receiv’d any Injury from others, not to make my self my own Redreſler ; but to refer the Controverſy Theocrit. Idyll. 23. And ifthm. Ode 4. Bb 186 BOOKII. Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. 1 At the ſame time it may be obſerv'd, that the maintain that neceſſary and natural Order, we ſhould injur'd Party doth not owe this Patience and Mo- render Society it ſelf unſociable (a). But we do by no deration, to the Perſon from whom he receiv’d means aſſert, that this Infinite Liberty of reſiſting is the Damage ; who as far as lay in his Power, hath to be actually made Uſe of in all Caſes; becauſe broke off all Duties of Humanity and Commerce ſeveral intervening Conſiderations may prevail with him; but to his own Security and Quiet. with the injur'd Party not to proceed to Extremi- And therefore if a Man provok'd by Anger or ties: But only that the injurious Perſon cannot Pain ſhould happen to exceed theſe Bounds, he complain of hard Meaſure, though he be repell’a does no Injury to the Provoker, but can only be with the utmoſt Violence and Severity. The Life faid to have (6) acted imprudently, or without of Men would be then indeed moſt properly ren- fufficient Temper and Diſcrecion. dred Infociable, if, in a Natural State, any Bounds But when by the Application of theſe moderate were ſet to the Liberty of Reſiſtance. For what Expedients, I cannot ſecure my ſelf from the im- an Age of Torments ſhould I undergo, if another pending Danger, I am then to oppoſe Force with Man were allow'd perpetually to lay me on only Force, and am compelld to enter the Combat. with moderate Blows, whoſe Malice I could not During which, if the Injurious Party continue to otherwiſe ſtop or repel, than by compaſſing his puſh on his Malicious Deſigns againſt me, and do Death? Or if a Neighbour were continually to not declare his Sorrow and Repentance for his infeft me with Incurſions and Ravages upon my Fault, and his Willingneſs to renew the Peace, I Lands and Poſſeſſions, whilft I could not lawfully am at Liberty to kill him. And although he do kill him, in my Attempts to beat him off? For not directly attack my Life, as ſuppoſe he only ar ſince the chief Aim of human Sociableneſs, is the tempts to load me with a great Number of Blows, Safety of every Perſon, we ought not to fancy or to maim me hy the Loſs of fome Member not in it any ſuch Laws, as would make every Good Vital, or to rob me of my Goods ; yet ſince he and Modeft Man of Neceſſity Miſerable, as often hath once broke the Peace with me, and ſince he as any wicked Varlet ſhould pleaſe to violate the gives me no Caution or Security, that he will not Law of Nature againſt him. And it would be from theſe leffer Injuries proceed to much greater, highly abſurd to eſtabliſh Society amongſt Men, I may even in theſe Caſes make uſe of Extremities on ſo deſtructive a Botton as a Neceſſity of en- for my own Deliverance. For at the ſame Inſtant, during Wrongs. Wherefore he is to be reckon'd as a Man profeffes himſelf my Enemy, (which he a fooliſh and baſe Traitor to his own Safety, who doth while he injures me without Shew of Repen. whilſt an Enemy perſiſts in the Exerciſe of Hoſti- tance) he gives me, as far as 'tis in his power to lity, vainly ſpares his Life, and chuſes rather to give it, an (7) Infinite Liberty of proceeding againſt Periſh than to Deſtroy. For the Law of Nature him. Some indeed there are who do not approve obliges me thus far only to be Mild and Merciful of this Liberty of reſiſting in infinitum; for (ſay they) towards my Enemy, as that if he ſhall expreſs a there can be no Natural Right of Defence and of Refi- Sorrow for what is paft, and an Inclination to de- ftance againſt Injuries, but ſuch as is conſiſtent with fiſt from farther Injury, ſhall make Retribution that Order, which is the chief End and Deſign of a So- for my preſe.it Damage, and give Security for his cial Life. Therefore in reſiſting by Natural Right , this not offending hereafter, I may entirely ſpare and Exception is always underſtood, unleſs the Social Or- pardon him, and, renewing the Peace, may per- der be infring' by my prefent refifting, to which form all friendly Offices towards him, as he ſhall Order Nature hath the firſt and chiefeſt Regard. And towards me (8). For mere. Revenge, which pro- if this Caution were not interpos’d, upon our failing to poſes no Aim but the Grief or the Deſtruction of Controverſy to the Deciſion of Friends. Lucian. Eunuch. This is highly ridiculous, that men who pretend to Philoſophy, should engage in Suits and Quarrels ; whereas they ought to compose in a Friendly Manner, their Differences of the greatest Conſequence. Add. 1. 4. 1.1. D. de alienat. jud. mut. That which Polybius (in Excerpt. Piereſc.) applies to the Achaans, proves a Truth in many other Cafes, ca u Tuzéws Xterbus . Ja čx av forcówu uf. Unless we had been quickly loſt, we had never been ſavd. Seneca, de Irá 1. 2. C.14. Red- son often preſcribes Patience, when Anger calls for Revenge: And when we might have eſcap'd ſmaller Evils, we ſink our ſelves into greater. Some upon the Reſentment of one affronting Word, have been caſt into Baniſhment : They have incurr'd the severelt Troubles, by not being able to digeſt a ſlight Injury'; and been made arrant Slaves, hy their diſdaining a petty Encroachment on their Liberty. See Stobens, Serm. 19. To this may be applied, the (*) Interpretation of Matth. v. 17. offer'd by Grotius, l. 1. C.1.5.8. Though others will have thar Saying to relate to Men who are under Oppreſſion, and who cannot obrain Juſtice. (Comp. Lamentat. iii. 28, 29, 30.) Whereas in a well-ordered Commonwealth every one is obligʻd to apply himſelf for Redreſs of Injuries to the Judge, (Levit. v. 1.), not for the ſake of Revenge; (Levit . xix. 17, 18.) but with a good Deſign of defending the Laws and Juſtice of his Country, and to hinder wicked Men from reaping any Gain or any Pleaſure from their Crimes. Lyſias , Orat. contra Tbeomneſt. 1 take it te be a sign of a most Litigious and a moſt Ungenerous Temper, to ſue a Man for an affronting Word. It was a Law amongſt the Cyrenians, that the Ephori ſhould bring the Litigious Citizens before the Court of Juſtice, and impoſe a Fine on them, with the Addition of a Diſgrace. Arrian, Epicter, 1. 1. c. 28. Suppoſe I ſtand is deaf, as a Stone when I am abus’d; what Advantage can the Slanderer reap from his Calumny? Seneca de Irå. To deſpiſe Injuries is a Mark of a Great and Generous Mind. 'Tis one of the moſt grating ways of being revenged upon a Man, by ſeeming not to think him worthy our Revenge. He is truly Brave and Noble, who like. Some Princely Beaſt, can hear the puny Dogs barking about him with Scorn and Security." (a) Vide Becler. ad Grot. l. 1. c. 4. 7. 2. (*) This Explication does not give us the true Meaning of CHRIST's Words, whoſe Senſe is certainly this, as Mr. Le Clerc ex. preſies it: “ JESUS CHRIST would not have us to go to Law for ſmall Matters, leaſt having ſuffered one Injury, we bring up. a on us another. Moderation much gains and ſweetens Men's Minds, and ſooner makes an end of Quarrels than the Penalties “ which the Magiſtrates inflict according to Law. The Revenge which is exerciſed by their Means, is often the Cauſe of irrecont 66 cileable Animoſities between Families, (6) Theſe are a Confuſed Heap of Citations. 6) Antiphon. Orat. il. Ou 28 Teta, dance usb? ov!, ústaciova. dixeron os dpavlos áronégav sivi, i.e. " The firſt Aggreſſors « in an Injury not only deſerve to ſuffer the ſame, but much greater Evils.” (8) It is a Rule of Hefiod's, Oper. do Dier. l. 2. Ηγ37' ει φιλότημα, δικα εθέλησι παραχείν, But if the injurious Friend the Wrong repair, Adas And beg a Re-admiſſion to thy Care, Reject him not him CHAP. V. Of the juſt Defence of Onefelf. 187 14 him who hath hurt us, is deteſted and diſcarded by eſpecially in Regard to their Dealings with their Nature, as falling under the Vice of Cruelty. Whence Fellow-Subjects. For againſt theſe who live un- it follows, that the Remembrance of Enmities der the ſame Government and Laws (either perpe- and Contentions ought as ſoon as poſſible to be tually, or only for the time being) they ought to be defac'd out of our Minds. On this account, as ſo moderate in the Uſe of this Violent Self-defence, we find the Story in Tully, the Tbebans were ac as then only to berake themſelves to it, when the cus’d in the General Diet or Council of Greece, for Time and Place will not admit of any Application ſetting up a Brazen Trophy of their Victory over to the Magiſtrate for his Alliſtance in reprefling the Lacedæmonians; in as much as it did not become ſuch an Injury, as puts either their Life, or ſome- one Grecian State to fix an eternal Monument of their thing as valuable as their Life, or (1) fome Good Quarrel with another. For it ſeems, the Cuſtom which can never be repair’d, into preſent and ma- was to raiſe their Trophies only of Wood, to nifeſt Danger. And even in ſuch a Cafe we are, prevent their long and reproachful Continu- by our own Strength only, to rid our felves of the ance (9). preſent Miſchief, leaving both the Puniſhment, But farther, Perſons in a Natural State may not and the Caution for future good Behaviour, en- only repel a preſent Danger that threatens them, tirely to the Magiſtrate's Determination. Cicero but having got rid of that Fear, may purſue their (2) tells us, that Nothing is ſo contrary to Rights and Succeſs againſt the Aſſailant, till ſuch time as, up- Laws, as the uſing Force in a well-order'd Common- on ſufficient Caution given, they ſhall think them- wealth : But then 'tis his own Obſervation in ano- ſelves ſecure of him for the future. Concerning ther Place, that theſe Laws are filent, when Arms which Caution, this is to be obſerv'd; if a Man ha- appear bent against 15 ; and do not command us to wait ving injur’d me, ſhall preſently after, repenting for their Help and Protection, when we should most cer- of what he had done, deſire my Pardon, and offer tainly ſuffer an unjust Violence, before we could procure a Reparation of the Damage, I am then oblig'd to be just Redreß. reconcil'd to him, and cannot fairly demand any By theſe Rules and Foundations which we have farther Security than his Faith and Promiſe. For laid, may be decided moſt of thoſe Diſputes, his voluntary Repentance, and Application to me which are uſually bandied in Authors, concerning for Pardon, (10) are a ſufficient Argument of his the Meaſure and the Moderation of Unblamable firm Reſolution to offer me no Wrong for the fu- Self-defence. ture. But he who muſt be brought to Repentance V. Some Men have rais'd a Doubt, whether by main Force, and who then only thinks of beg- ſuppoſing a Perſon aſſaults me by Miſtake, with- ging Pardon when his Strength fails him in profe- out any evil Deſign againſt me, and intending to cuting his Violences; ſuch an one is not ſafely to employ his Force againſt another, I may in ſuch be truſted on his bare Promiſe: And therefore in a Caſé kill him in my own Defence. For the order to our farther Security, we muſt either cut clearing of which Point Grotius (a) lays down this off from him all Power of doing Miſchief, or we Principle to proceed upon, that the Right of De- muft lay ſome ſuch Bond or Confinement on him fence doth primarily and abſolutely ariſe from that as ſhall hinder him from appearing ever after for Favour of Nature, by which ſhe hath recom- midable to us: In as much as his Malice having mended every Man moſt ſtrongly to himſelf, been once expreſs'd, and never rightly purg'd or whence no one can refuſe to apply all his Endea- amended, hath rendred him a juſt Object of our vours for the Procurement of his own Safety; and perpetual Suſpicion. not from the Injuſtice or the Sin of the Aggreſſor. IV. But that which is a lawful Practice in Men, It will therefore be ſufficient to render my De- living under a Natural Liberty, who are to work fence innocent, if the Affailant have no Right to out their Safery by their own Strength, and ac- invade or to deſtroy me, (1) and I lie under no cording to their own Judgment, can by no means Obligation of taking Death at his Hands, without be indulg’d in the Members of Civil States; and Reluctancy or Refiftance. Farther, ſince in the Caſe (a) L. 2. c. 1. 1.3. Add. Gell. l. 4. c. 14. Quin&tilian Declam. 13. 'Twas on this account we receiv’d Laws and Magiſtrates from Inſtitution of our Anceſtors ; that no man might be the Redreſſer of his own Grievances : And left, if private Revenge ſhould purſue every Crime, there should be a conſtant Succeſſion of Injuries, and all Parties prove alike guilty. (9) De Invent. I. 2. See Flor. l. 3.c.2. in fin. Seneca Herc. Fur. Si æterna ſemper odia mortales agant, Should Men maintain Immortal Hate, Nec ceptus unquam cedat ex animo furor, Nor guell the Fury riling in their Breaft; Sed ar ma felix teneat, infelix paret; Bur ſtill the Fortunate their dreaded Arms Nihil relinquent bells. Shake, and th' Unfortunate new Force prepare, To try another Field ; the General War Would clear the World, and drive a common Spoil. (10) See a paſſage of Arrian, quoted a little lower, at $. 19. Note 1. S. IV. (1) Some Good.] In ali the Editions of the Original, not excepting that of 1706, there is a groſs Fault, which ſpoils the Senſe, 1. e. Damnum, for Bonum ; but it is corrected in his Abridgment of the Duties of 'a Man and citizen, Lib. I. Chap. 5. 8. 16. where this Sentence is, word for word. (2) De II. Lib. 3. Nibil est enim exitiofius civitatibus, nihil tam contrarium juri, do Legibus, nihil minus Civile, quam compoſit å Republicâ, quicquam agi per vim. Pro Milone. Silent enim leges inter arma, nec ſe expe&tari jubent, cum ei, qui expe&tare velit, ante injufta pæna luenda fit, quàm juſt a repetenda. See Mr. Noodt, ad Leg. Aquil. 6.4. S. V. (1) We ought to obſerve theſe two Conditions, for upon them depend ſome caſes which our Author makes no mention of , as that of a Perfon being aſſaulted by his Prince. What we are to think of this, is this, in my Judgment. I luppoſe, thac he that defends himſelf reſolves to free himſelf of the unjuſt Aggreffor, by killing him, otherwiſe he had better ſuffer himſelf to be killed, than come under the Hand of the Executioner, and ſuffer cruel Torments. This being premis'd, the Prince who would kill me, does it either Maliciouſly, and with Deliberation, or elſe in a Paffion, which he can't govern. In the firſt Cafe, I may as lawfully defend my ſelf againſt him as againſt my Equal . See my Comment on the Abridgment of the Duties of a Man aná Citizenia Bb 2 188 BOOK II. Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. Caſe propos’d the Love of our own Perſons and ſeizing us : And that no Suſpicion or Fear, whilft Lives muſt needs gain an eaſy Conqueſt over all yet uncertain, is ſufficient to juſtify our aſſaulting other Conſiderations, it is impoſſible but that a another. But this Affertion too will prove very Man who finds himſelf expos'd to equal Danger unaccurate, unleſs we relieve it with our Diſtincti- with another, muſt, if he follow Nature, give his on between a Natural and a Civil State. For as in own Deliverance the Preference in his Regard: neither Caſe the Point of Danger, which theſe And ſince ſuch a Danger as we are ſpeaking of is Men ſpeak of, can be underſtood without ſome brought on me without my deſerving it, my Fact Latitude, ſo is it moſt certain, that Perſons plac'd is, for that Reaſon, the leſs odious, if I turn the under a Natural Liberty are allow'd a longer Space Miſchief on the Author. All this being taken for in making their Defence by Violence, than thoſe granted, 'twill be very eaſy to decide all thoſe who live under the Protection and Aſſiſtance of a Particulars and Cafes which may happen about the Government. Point in hand. As ſuppoſe a Madman, or a Per In as much as Nature obliges us to maintain ſon walking in his Sleep and affrighted with ſome Peace with others, it may and ought to be preſum'd, terrible Dream, ſhould make an Attempt upon my that every one will fulfil this Obligation, unleſs he Life; in as much as he hath no Right of aſſaulting give manifeſt Evidence of contrary Deſigns, and me, and I have good Reaſon to prize my ſelf a unleſs it be apparent that he quits his Obedience bove all Things, it doth by no means appear why to ſound Reaſon, which advis’å him to this Duty. I ſhould prefer his Safety to my own. But here it But conſidering how prone the greateſt part of muſt neceffarily be ſuppos’d, that I could not de- Mankind are to violate this Precept of Reaſon, cline the threatned Danger any other way: Which whoever hath a true Concern for his own Safety, is not ſo ſcrupulouſly obſerv'd, when a Man at will fortify himſelf betimes by all innocent Me. tacks me upon a Grudge, or upon a manifeſt ill thods of Defence; as ſuppoſe by ſhutting up the Deſign. The ſame Deciſion will hold, in caſe a Avenues againſt ſuch as are plotting any hoſtile Soldier, fighting with good Intentions, aſſaults Deſign; by providing Arms and all other (1) Ne- me, whom he miſtakes for one of his Enemies. ceffaries for offenſive or defenſive Force ; by en- For if even an Enemy had a Right of reſiſting tring into Confederacies and Alliances ; by keep- him, there's no Reaſon why I, who am in no ſuch ing a watchful Eye upon the Motions and At- State of Oppoſition, ſhould patiently run upon tempts of others, and the like. Thus we juſtly his Sword: But he ought to impute it to his own eſteem it Wiſdom in a Commonwealth, to think Folly and Heedleſsneſs, that he thus drives a Friend of War during the full Enjoyment of Peace. And on the Neceſſity of an hoftile A& ; ſince he ought altho' Innocency will always find a ſtrong Guard to have known againſt whom his Force was to be and Support in the Divine Providence, yet is it employ’d. The fame is to be ſaid, when a private moft ſenſeleſs Vanity for that Man to expect Mi- Man, lying in wait for one with whom he hath a racles from Heaven for his Deliverance, who lies particular Quarrel, fets upon me, inſtead of him, ſtill in a drowſy Idleneſs, and negle&s aîl Care of by Miſtake. For why ſhould I, upon account of his own Affairs. And even in Civil States, where the Aggreſſor's Blunder, be brought under a har our Goods are in ſome Meaſure ſecur'd againſt der Condition than that other Man, whom per- Thieves and Ravagers, by the Severity of Penal haps he had ſome Reaſon to hate? Such an Allai- Sanctions, he would be reckon'd a very ill Huf- lant is indeed by the (2) Cornelian Law of Rome band, who ſhould forbear to ſecure his Doors in guilty of Murder. For though there was an Er- the Night, or to lock up his Cloſets and his Cheſts. ror in the Perſon, yet there was no Error in the To this purpoſe we are inform’d, that the Old Deſign; but the Will and the Attempt of commit- Romans us’d to ſeal their meaneft Utenſils and ting Murder were both manifeſtly declar'd(a). Houſhold Goods with their Rings, to ſecure them VI. To render the Defence of our ſelves entirely from pilfering Slaves ; over whom, at the ſame innocent, it is commonly thought a neceſſary time, they had the free Power of Life and Death Condition, that, as to the Time, the Danger be (b). juſt upon us, or, as it were, in the very Point of But now, though my providing thus far for my L.1. C.5. Ş.20. In the larter Caſe, I ought to ſpare him, and rather ſacrifice my own Life than take away his, provided that he did nor by his own Fault pat himſelf into a Condition where he could not command himſelf; for if a Prince, knowing himſelf ſub- ject to ſuch violent Tranſports of Anger, and Lion-like Fury, gives himſelf up to his Temper, without any Reſtraint, and takes no Care to avoid Provocations, at leaſt in certain Circum?łances, and to keep himſelf from Drink, he deſerves to be had in no Regard, and we have as much Right to defend our felves againſt him, as if he acted in cold Blood. He had a Deſign to hurt us, if nor formally, yet incerpretatively, at leaſt, and the Intereſt of a Society is ſo far from requiring us to ſuffer our ſelves to bé ſlain by ſuch a Sovereign, that it ought it ſelf to fear him. After all, there is nothing more cafy for Princes, ſince few of them are good Men, than to keep themſelves from ſuch Extravagances. If a Society loſes by a Change, it alſo gets ſometimes by it, and perhaps it would be better for it, if Men would not allow Princes ſo great a Liberty, to ſatisfy their Paſſions, and if Succeſſors had before their Eyes ſome ſad Examples of an unhappy Fate, which their Predeceſſors had brought upon themſelves, by thinking all Things lawful for them. What I have ſaid, will, by a much ſtronger Reaſon, have place in Reſpect to the Miniſters of a Prince, and his inferior Magiftrates, for whom, doubtleſs, there is much leſs Regard to be had, than to the Perfon of the Sovereign himſelf. I ſhall ſpeak ſomething, $. 14. Note ult. of the Caſe, where the unjuſt Aggreffor is a Father. (a) Add. L. 18.3.3. D. de Injurin, do Grot, in Sparſ. Flor. ad l.14. D. ad L. Cornel.de Sicar. (b) Vide Tacit. An. II. 1. (2) The Cornelian Law, which is created of in the Diget. Lib. 48. Tit. 8. puniſhed Murders committed deſignedly, and with full Deliberation, whereas the Aquilian Law punihed Murder committed thro’ Tome Imprudence and Fault, tho' very ſmall, and without any Deſign. See Mr. Noodt, ad Leg Aquil. Chap.4, 5. §. VI. (1) Such are principally in Relation to Srates, Fortreſſes built on the Borders of Kingdom s. See Mr. Thomaſin's Diſ- courſe upon this Subject, entitled, Non-Ens a&tionis Forenſis contra ædificantem ex æmulatione, S. 18, &c. Security CHAP. V. Of the juſt Defence of One felf. 189 Security can be injurious to none, yet before I juſt Cauſe of ſetting upon him, becauſe he doth can actually aſſault another under Colour of my not yet expreſs this ill Will towards me in particu- own Defence, I muſt have Tokens and Arguments lar. For it is not ſufficient Proof that a Man de- amounting to a moral Certainty, that he enter- figns to hurt me, becauſe he hath already hurt 0- tains a Grudge againſt me, and hath a full Deſign thers; in as much as he might be provok'd to his of doing me a Miſchief, ſo that, unleſs I prevent Attempt on them by ſome particular Reaſons, him, I ſhall immediately feel his Stroke. Amongſt which he doth not find againſt me. An Injury theſe Signs and Tokens, giving me a Right to then done to another, gives me no Licenſe of fal- make a violent Aſſault on another Man, I muſt ing on the Aggreſſor, whilſt I am tied to both by no means reckon his bare Superiority to me in Parties only by the common Band of Humanity. Strength and Power; eſpecially if that Happineſs But I may happen to be united by a more peculiar derivd its Increaſe from harmleſs Induſtry, or Obligation to the injur’d Perſon ; as if upon his from the Bounty of Providence, without the Op- Deſire, I have promis’d and engag’d to aſlift him, preſſion of others. For 'twould be inhuman Ma- For it is very agreeable to Social Nature, that a Man lice, to envy another, and to endeavour to take who hath himſelf receiv'd no Wrong, ſhould yet from him a Bleſſing which he came ſo fairly by. join Forces on Covenant with another, to help 'Tis a very groſs Knack of Philoſophizing which him to drive off an unjuſt Affault, as being allied ſome Men have got, when they tell us, by way of to him by thoſe general Ties which hold together Advice, He that is able to hurt you, undoubtedly is all Mankind. Becauſe, ſuppoſing the two Parties willing; and therefore, without farther Warning, down to be otherwiſe indifferent to me, yet it is a ſtand- with him, as you love your own Safety. This Kind of ing Rule that an Injury receiv’d ought to incline Doctrine is manifeſtly deſtructive of all Sociable me to Favour, and an Injury offer'd (3), to Hatred Commerce amongſt Men; and the Authors com- and Averſion (c). But farther, if on good and monly cited in Defence of it, either are ſuch probable Grounds I ſuſpect that this powerful Ag. whoſe Character prevents their Authority, or elſe greffor, when he hath diſpatch'd his firſt Prey, will in the Paſſages alledg’d from them, they ſpeak curn his Force upon me, and uſe his former Con- only of Precaution of our dealing with thoſe queſt for the Inſtrument of another ; I may then Wretches, who have given us ſufficient Tokens of more readily aflift the diſtreſs'd Party, becauſe his their Reſolution to hurt us (a) (2). . And whereas Preſervation is likely to enſure my own Safety. ſome Men bring Examples inſtead of Arguments As a wiſe Man will lend his beft Help towards for ſo baſe a Practice, this is to make another's Sin quenching a Fire in his Neighbour's Houſe, when the Rule and Standard of my acting (b). Yet be- his own is the next in Danger. cauſe any Man may abuſe his Strength to ill Pur More than this, if it appear by clear Tokens poſes, therefore, as we ſaid before, we ought to that a Man is at preſent under a real Deſign of fence againſt Danger, by timely and by harmleſs hurting us, though he doth not yer proceed to Methods. the open Execution of it, ſuppoſing us to live in Nay, although ſuch a mighty Neighbour hath a Natural State, we may immediately enter on our ſhown himſelf to have the Will of hurting as well own Defence by violent Methods, and prevent the as the Power, he doth not yet give me directly a Foe; provided that either upon a friendly Admo- (a) And as for that Saying of Cicero, (Epiſt. Fam. 11. Ep. 28.) Even Slaves have been always allow'd this Liberty to fear accor- ding to their own Judgment, not anothers; we may oppoſe to it the ſharp Return of Vibius Criſpus (in Quintilian 1. 8. c. 5.) Who ever gave you Permiſſion to fear ſo unreaſonably? Nay, Cicero himſelf hath fufficiently overthrown this Opinion, Who, ſays he, ever made ſuch an Ordinance as this, or to whom can this be granted, without the manifeſt Danger of the whole Community, that a Man may law- fully kill him, by whom he mall pretend to fear being hereafter kill’!? Orat. pro Tull . in Quinctil. I. 5. c. 13. (6) Add. Alberic. Gentil. de Jure Belli, l. 1. c. 14. (C) For that of Exodus ii. 14. only holds in a Civil State. (2) Our Author quotes theſe words of Cicero, as favouring the Opinion which he confures, At hæc etiam ſervis ſemper libera fuerunt, timerent, gauderent, dolerent fuo potius, quàm alterius arbitrio. Bur if we conſider the following part of the Diſcourſe, we ſhall find that the Words will not bear the Senſe which he gives chem. The Latin of the following paſſage in Quintilian is, Quis hoc ftatuit unquam, aut cui concedi fine ſumma omnium periculo poteft, ut eum jure potuerit occidere, à quo metuiſe ſe dicat, nè ipſe pofterius occideretur. (3) That the Laws of Nature, which tend to the preſervation of Mankind, may be obſerv'd, without which they are uſeleſs, and that no Man may offer an Injury to his Neighbour, Nature has given every Man a Right to puniſh the Violation of its Laws, both in Reſpect to all Mankind, and to private Perſons. The Laws of Nature, as well as all others, which are impoſed upon Men here below, would be altogether uſeleſs, if no Body in the free State of Nature had Power to execute them, by protecting and preſerving the Innocent, and reſtraining the Infolent. For all Men being naturally equal, it follows, that if in that Eſtate every one have Right to puniſh the Breach of the Law of Nature, there is no Man bur hath it in as large an Extent as another. Theſe are the Principles of the illuſtrious Mr. Locke, in Part II. of his excellent Treatiſe of Civil Government, Lib. 2. Chap. 2. We Thall elſewhere obſerve the Conſequences which he draws from it in Relation to other Matters of Importance. See Lib. 8. Chap. 3. $. 4. Note 3. Hence it appears, that our Author is miſtaken, when he affirms, That unleſs we are under ſome particular Engage nient to help a Perſon that is wronged by another, we are not obliged to oppoſe this latter, unleſs he inſults us directly. Much rather, we not only have a Right to eſpouſe the Quarrel of the Injured, but alſo, according to the Laws of Humanity, we are in- diſpenſably engaged to defend him, if we find our felves able to do it. This is the Confequence of the Principle of Sociable- nefs, as Mr. Titius, with much Reaſon maintains, Obſerv. 131, And I wonder our Author did not mind it, fince, in Lib. 1. Chap. 5. S. 14. he approves of that fine Maxim of Cicero, Qui non defendit, nec obfiſtit, ſi potest, injurie, tam est in vitio, quam ſi Parentes, aut amicos, aut Patriam deſerat, i.e. “ He that does not prevent or reſiſt an Injury, if he be able, is as much to blame, as he as that forſakes his Friends, Parents or Country.” Menander alſo has a fine Sentence relating to this Marter, ſaying, “ If any one " would be as much concern'd for the Injuries done to another, as if he receiv'd them himſelf, and vigorouſly undertake the De. “ fence of them that are oppreffed, there would not be ſo many Evil-doers, and thoſe that are would not be fo daring. Eίοδο ή άδικανή’ ασμένως ήμώετο Ουκ αν οι πλέον το κακον ημίν ήυξατο "Ενας ημών, και σωμη γωνίσατε Το Jπονηρών, αλλά παρατηρά ενοι, "Iozos voulwr i nov to negoros Και υγχάνονες, ής έδεε τιμωρίας 'Αδίκημα, και σωφegίον αλλήλοις πικρώς, "Ήτοι ασάνιση σφόδρ' αν ήσαν, ή πιο παυμένοι, In Stober4 Tit. 43. See Mr. Le Clerc's Note on this Fragment, P. 3. nition 199 Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. BOOK II. s nition he is not likely to be driven from his hoſtile Thoſe Moraliſts are widely miſtaken, who, as Intentions, or that the giving ſuch an Admonition Grotius (a) ſays, maintain, " That I may lawfully would prove of ill Conſequence to our Affairs. 'kill, not only the Man who offers me preſent For no Man is oblig'd to expe&t patiently the In Violence, but him too whom I ſhall have diſco- fult of another, that he may thereby build the ver'd to plot and conſpire againſt me; as by Poy- Juſtice of his Violence on the abſolute Neceſſity ſon, by falſe Accuſation, Falſe Witneſs, the of his Defence. And therefore, in this Cafe, he • Procurement of an Unjuſt Sentence, or the is to be accounted the Aggreſſor who made the firſt like.' Nor is the Abſurdity at all leſſen'd by Motion towards hurting his Neighbour, or who chat Reſtriction which they add (3), if either tha conceiv'd the firſt Deſign of Miſchief, and was Danger cannot otherwiſe be avoided, or if we are not preparing to accompliſh it, though the other Party ſufficiently affur’d that it cannot. Becauſe ſuch a De- uſing greater Expedition, may have ſurpriz’d and lay of Time as is here ſuppos’d, how ſhort foever, oppreſs’d him before he could bring his Plot to Per- may put us on many good Ways of Redreſs and fection. For it is not abſolutely neceſſary to the Relief; beſides (4) the Variety of Accidents which Notion and Buſineſs of Defence, that a Man re may perhaps work our Deliverance. It is mani. ceive the firſt Stroke, or that he only ward off or feſt, that theſe Authors ſuppoſe a Civil State, be- elude the Blows that are aim'd at him ; but he too cauſe in that only we can conceive ſuch Things as ſhall be interpreted to act by way of Selfc-Defence, unjuſt Judgments, Accuſationis, Witneſſes, &c. who, taking his Foe tardy, hath prevented the For the Suppreſſion of which Injuries, if we per- Miſchief that was hatching againſt him (4). mit the Subjects to inflict Death, what occaſion VII. But we muſt by no means allow an equal have we for Magiſtrates or for Laws? No Man is Liberty to the Members of Civil States. For in Danger of being condemn’d, if he can prove here, if the Adverſary be a Foreigner, we may the Accuſer guilty of Calumny and Forgery. reſiſt and repel him any way at the Inſtant when Yet, if being unable to make this out, he aſfaults he comes violently upon us : But we cannot his Life, 'twill be hard to excuſe him from the Le- (without the Sovereign's, Command) either aſſault gal Cenſure and Penalty of Murther. But when him whilſt his Miſchief is only in Machination, a Man is already actually ſet upon, and reduc'd or revenge our felves upon him after he hath per to ſuch Streights, that he hath not Power or Op- form’d the Injury againſt us'(1), left we ſhould, by portunity to implore the Aſſiſtance of the Magi- this raſh and unwarrantable Proceeding, involve ſtrate, or his Neighbours, he may then make uſe our Country in an unneceſſary and unſeaſonable of Extremities in repelling the Aſſailant: Yet the War. And' a much greater Degree of Caution Reaſon and Ground of his proceeding to ſuch Vi. muſt be us d in our Dealings with our Fellow-Sub- olence, muſt not be that he may revenge him- jects. For though I underſtand that ſuch an one is ſelf for the Injury offer’d; but only becauſe he now coming to do me a Miſchief, or that he could not otherwiſe ſecure his Life from the immi- threatned me deſperately in Publick, this will on nent Danger. And therefore ſuppoſing that Dan- no Account bear me out in aſſaulting him ; but I ger to be more eaſily driven off, he cannot law- am to inform againſt him before the common Ma- fully purſue the Aggreſſor, ſo as to ſtrike or harm giftrate, who is to require Security for his good Be- him in his Flighe(6). haviour. But if the Magiſtrate refuſe to interpoſe, VIII. It appears then from theſe Conſiderati- I may then conſult (2) my own Safety by what ons, that under Civil Governments the Time of Means I can, with the ſame Freedom as if I were making an unblamable Self-defence, is ſet within plac'd under a Natural State and Condition. very narrow Bounds, and indeed reduc'd almoſt thus (a) L. 2. c. 1. (b) Vide l.3. 8.9. D. de vi do vi armata. (4) Demoſthenes, Philip. 3. 'Ons ois végw ang Feilw Toûta melawv, xj xataoxda?ówc, sto įuoi concus, xoty centre Beanu, unde Tod'n, i e. “He who is preparing and contriving Wiles for my Deſtruction, is moſt certainly engag'd in a Hoftile « Stare with me, though he has not yet attack'd me with his Darrs or his Spears.". Thucydid. 1. 6.“ We ought, not only to cha- “ ftiſe the open Actions of our Enemies, but to prevent, by due Puniſhments, their ſecret Counſels and Deſigns : For they will be " before-hand with us, if we neglect to be ſo with them.” Procop, de Bel. Perfic. l. 2. c. 3. Auror 78 sipleblow goi év 2015 γένοιν ο πρώτοι, αλλ' οι άν επιβαλλοντες εν συνδαις ταις πίλας αλοίον, το έγκλημα των εγκεχειρηκότι κάν από το κατορθέν πίρα- 11 ou, i.e. “ Thoſe break the Peace, not who firſt take Arms, but who are diſcover'd in any Plot againſt their Neighbours and « Friends. For whoever actempts and deſigns Miſchief, hath really committed the Crime, though his Endeavours prove unfuc- « ceſsful. Phil. Jud. de Leg. Special. “We do not only reckon them our Enemies, who affault us with Fleets or Armies, but “them too who by Sea or Land make Preparations againſt us.” See Alberic. Gentil. advoc. Hiſpan. l. 1. c.9. Leges Wijogoth. 1. 9. tit.4.c.6. S. VII. (!) See what this Author ſays, Lib. 8. Chap. 17. $. 8. (2) We may add, and that of ours. So Moſes ſeeing one of his Brethren, an Iſraelite, ſuffer Wrong, he defended him; and in vindicating the Perſon injured, flew the Egyptian, Exod. ii. 11, 12. and Acts vii. 24. for, as Mr. Le Clerc ſays upon this laſt Paf- ſage, “ Moſes knew very well that the Iſraelites could obtain no Juſtice of the Egyptian Judges. And when Power is arrived at " that height that Juſtice can't be had, and the Foundations of Civil Sociecy are deſtroyed, we return again to a State of Na- “ ture, in which 'tis lawful for every one to defend himſelf and his friends, againſt all Force, without ſeeking Help, in vain, from $ them who will not affift us. But this Right can't be made uſe of bur in extreme Confuſion, as Ægypt was, where any Injuries “ might be done the Iſraelites, without any Fear from the Ægyptian Judges. (3) Grotius reads it thus, but careleſly. He maintains, that all the Reaſons which he mentions there, are not ſufficient to pre- vent'a Perſon who has ill Defigns againſt us, and kill him, altho' he can find out ſome way to eſcape the Danger, or is not ſure that he can otherwiſe eſcape ir, which Determination he founds upon the Remedies and Accidents which a little Space of Time may produce. But he adds, that there are ſome Divines and Lawyers, who extend this Favour farther, i.e. as any one may fee, who grane to the Perſon againſt whom any thing is attempted, a greater Liberty, believing that he hath Right to prevent his Enemy, although he could avoid the Danger ſome other way. So theſe Moraliſts do not perplex themſelves in any manner with the Reſtriction of which our Author ſpeaks. Grotius embrares the Exception in the Negative, and maintains it againſt them, Nevertheleſs I afſerc, That if you examine the Thing in it ſelf, he doth not ſufficiently diſtinguiſh berween the State of Nature and Civil Scare, as will appear by what our Author ſays afterwards (4) See Aul. Gelius, Nott. Attic. Lib. 13. Chap. 17. and Erafmu upon the Two Proverbs taken from thence, so to CHAP. V. Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. I91 to a Point or Inſtant, yet ſuch as admits fome ſmall which Condition is by fome Authors added to Latitude, and in which a ſlight Exceſs will eſcape mitigate Baldus's Opinion. And therefore altho' the Magiſtrate's Cenſure. IX. As to the common Determination, that an Underſtanding Judge will be beſt able to ſettle this killing a Man in our own Defence is then on- the Innocency of any Defence, from the Cir- ļy innocent, when we cannot poſſibly eſcape the Danger cumſtances of the particular Facts: Yet we think by other Means ; this is not to be interpreted in too it may be afferted in general, that the exakt Time ſtrict a Senſe, but admits of a reaſonable Latitude, when a Man may fairly deſtroy another in his own upon account of that Perturbation of Mind which Defence, begins at the Inſtant, when the Aggreſ- ariſes from fo ſurprizing and ſo imminent a Mif- for ſhewing plainly his Deſign upon my Life, and chief. For it is ſcarce poflible that a Man under being furnith’d with Strength and Weapons for fo terrible Apprehenſion ſhould be ſo exa& in con- the Execution, is already got into a place whencefidering and diſcovering all Ways of Eſcape, as he he may perforin his Miſchief; Allowance being who being ſet out of Danger can fedately delibe- only made me for juſt ſo much Space as is neceſſa rate on the Caſe. Hence, as it is meer Raſhneſs rily requir’d for me to attack him in, before he at- for me to come out of a fafe Hold to him who tacks me. For Example, if a Man is making to challenges me, ſo if another affault me in an open wards me with a naked Sword, and with full Sig- Place, I am not ftri&ly oblig’d to betake my felf nification of his Intention to ſtab me, and I at to Flight, unleſs there be near at hand a Place of the ſame time have a Gun in my Hand, I may moſt ſecure Refuge, nor am I always bound to fairly diſcharge it at him whilſt he is at a Diſtance, draw back from the Onſet. Becauſe I then turn and cannot yet reach me with his Weapon, be- my defenceleſs Parts to the Danger, and there is cauſe, ſhould he get too near me my Arms would great Hazard of tripping or falling ; and beſides , be of no Uſe. And the ſame holds more ſtrongly when I have once quitted my Poſture of Guard, in Relation to Bows, and Inſtruments of that Na- tis not very eaſy to recover my ſelf. Neither ture, which ſignify nothing at all, unleſs we give doth it render my Defence blamable, if I choſe to them full Room and Space to exert their Force in, run the Hazard of ſuch Accidents, rather than o- Again, ſuppoſe a Man approach me with full De- mit ſuch Buſineſs, which was either a part of my ſign upon my Life, and is only arm’d with Piſtols, Duty, or which however I had a Liberty of acting. or the like, whilft I am furniſh'd with a longer As ſuppoſe, whilſt I am going to any publick Piece, I am not oblig'd to wait till he comes with- Place, about my Affairs, I kill a Man that ſets in Piſtol-ſhot, but may prevent him with my Arms upon me in the Way, I am not the leſs innocent, before he can uſe his own. For this is what the becauſe if I had ftaid at home the Thing had not Laws call (1) to meet a Danger in time, which is en happen’d. For the publick Security would be ill ſteem'd much better, than to revenge it after it hath ta- guarded, and our Liberty would ſtand us in little ken Effect. The Continuance of this Time for in- ſtead, if we might not make Uſe of it in oppoſing nocent Defence is ſo long as till the Aggreſſor either thoſe ſudden Violences which others offer us, out is repuls'd, or hath retreated of his own Accord, of pure Malice and wicked Deſign. whether repenting of the miſchievous Deſign in There is no need of proving Balſamon's Di- the very Moment that he was performing it, or ftin&tion(b) to be ridiculous; À Man (ſays he) elſe becauſe he fees he is like to loſe his Aim; as who kills another in his own Defence, is free from all ſuppoſe his Sword is broke, or his Piece hath miſs’d Guilt if the other Perſon had first given him a Mortal Fire, or ſhot beſide us ; ſo that at preſent he can Wound, or the like Miſchief ; but if the Hurt that was hurt us no farther, and we have an Opportunity first offer'd him be ſlight and curable, the Slaughter of of retiring into a Place of Safety. For the Re- the Aggreſſor is then unjust, and be must anſwer for the venge for paſt Injury, and the Caution for future Fa&t. Security, belong to the Care of the Magiſtrate, Much more pleaſant is their Nicety, who make whom we are to addreſs on thoſe Accounts (a). it a Queſtion, Whether an Equality of Weapons be ne- Whoever, enjoying the Prote&ion of a Civil Go- ceſſary to the rendering a Defence innocent. As if the vernment, ſhall kill another beyond theſe Bounds Aggreſſors were ſo generous, as conſtantly to give and Conditions, under the Notion of Self-defence, Notice to the other Party of their Deſign, and of cannot be acquitted as entirely guiltleſs. Whence the Arms they purpos’d to make uſe of; that they we may perceive how unreaſonable the Aſſertion might have Leiſure to furniſh themſelves in like of Old Baldus is, when he declares, if a Man manner for the Combat. Or as if in theſe Ren- chance to ſay to me, I'll kill you where ever I find you where ever I find you counters we were to act on our Defence by the from bence forward, I may, without incurring any Pe- ftrict Rules of the common Sword Plays, and nalty, take his Life by way of Prevention, either in the Tryals of Skill, where the Champions and their midst of his Threats, or whenever I can do it with moſt Weapons are nicely match'd and meaſur’d for our Convenience. For though I be not oblig’d to wait better Diverſion. till he performs his Threats, yet in a Common But it muſt be obſerv'd on this Head, that the wealth" I ought to purſue other ways of Safety Plea of Self-defence ſhall not excuſe or indemnify than by killing him : Even when it appears from him, who being challeng’d to meet in the way of the former Courſe of his Life that he is not back- Duel, doth by fo appearing put himſelf into ſuch a ward in making good fuch bold Reſolutions ; Condition, that he muft either kill or be kill’d. Loch. Can.43. (a) Vide l. 45. S. 4. D. ad L. Aquiliam. * Mention'd by Sichard ad C. Cod. (6) Ad Epift. Bafil. ad Amphie (1) The Words of the Çode are, Meliss enim est occurrere in tempore, quàm poft Exitun vindicare. Cod. Lib. 3. Tit. 27. Quando biceat unicuiq; fine judice ſe vindicare, doc. Leg. !. For 192 Of thé juſt Defence of oneſelf. Book II. For in the Eſtimation of ſuch a Fact, the Danger Capital Puniſhments for Offences of this Kind, ſo will not be conſider’d, ſince the Laws forbad him they might farther give a Liberty to all honeft to meet it; and therefore he will not only be guil- Women, to uſe Extremities in their own Defence, ty of Manſlaughter, but will ſtand obnoxious to upon Danger of loſing what 'tis impoſſible for thoſe other Penalties which are particularly or them to recover, and for which no Reparation dain'd againſt the Cuſtom of Duelling. can be made them. Amongſt the Jews, as Mr. X. There is one Enquiry commonly made far. Selden (b) tells us, a Man was allow'd to kill ano- ther on this Point, and that is, Whether it be ther, not only in his own Defence, but in the lawful for a Man to kill another, who comes up- Defence of a third Perſon, if unjuſtly aſſaulted, on him, not with a Deſign to take away his Life, whether with Regard to Life, or to Chaſtity of but only to Maim him ; provided the Danger can- either Kind (c). And thus the Sentence of not be otherwiſe avoided. And here, as to a N«- C. Marius was highly applauded amongſt the Ro- fural State, we may ſafely hold the affirmative Side mans, when he not only abſolv’d, but crown'd of the Queſtion. For Nature hath inſpir'd us the Soldier who had kill'd his Nephew, a Tribune, with ſo tender a Care to preſerve our Bodies or Colonel in the Army, for ſolliciting him to an whole and entire, that we cannot but make uſe of unnatural Debauch (d). St. Auguſtine (e) hach a all Ways and Methods for that purpoſe ; and the Saying, that the Holineß or Purity of the Body is ne- Loſs of one Member, eſpecially if it be of the ver lost, whilst the Purity of the Mind remains, tho’ moſt noble Kind, is reckon'd almoſt equal to the the Body Suffer Violence (F). But it follows no Loſs of Life it ſelf . Beſides, Death is frequently the more from hence, that forcible Raviſhers are not Conſequence of ſuch barbarous Treatment; and I to be repelld with Extremities, than that becauſe have no Security but that the Villain will proceed a good Man is tranſlated to eternal Happineſs, to greater Miſchief . Laſtly, as we have hereto- therefore he ought not to defend himſelf with Vi- fore hinted, ſuch an Attempt declares a Man my olence againſt a Villain who attempts his Life. open Enemy, and conſequently gives me a Li- 'Tis (2) obſervable what Lyſias (g) reports, that cenfe in infinitum of acting againſt him. the Attick Laws decreed a ſeverer Puniſhment a- Nor do the Laws, even in Civil Governments, gainſt him who perſuaded a Woman to an Unchalt feem to engage the Subjects to ſuch hard Conditi- Compliance, than againſt him who compeľd her ons, as that they muſt rather ſuffer themſelves by mere Force. The Reaſon we find lubjoin'd, to be maim'd, than uſe Extremities in repelling becauſe (fays he) Man who commits a violent Rape is the Affailant: For fince ſuch a Degree of Pati- Supposd to be bated by whom he abufes. Whereas thoſe ence ſurpaſſes the ordinary Strength and Conſtan- who by Flattery and Inſinuations tempt Women to their cy of Mankind, 'twould look very rigid to re- Defires, do by, this Means gain a greater Intereſt and quire it, only in Favour of a Malicious Rogue. Authority with them than their own Husbands, and con- But when ſuch an Injury is once actually receiv’d, Sequently have the whole Family in their Power and the Proſecution of the Malefactor is to be left en- Diſpoſal: beſides the Inconvenience of confounding the tirely to the Magiſtrate. Childrens Birih, and hindring all Diſtinčtion between XI. The Defence of Chaſtity is in almoſt all Na- thoſe who came lawfully, and thoſe who came unlawfully tions eſteem’d equal to the Defence of Life, and into the World (b). doth in the ſame manner excuſe the Slaughter of XII. 'Tis another famous Queſtion, Whether thoſe who attempt it. The Reaſon of this Favour the Danger of receiving a Box of the Ear, or ſome is grounded on the natural Conſideration, that the ſuch ignominious, though ſlight Injury, will ex- Honour of Women is their chief Treaſure and Or- cuſe the killing of a Man in our own Defence. nament; together with the Reſpect had to the And Grotius's Deciſſion (i) makes it not to be repug- Weakneſs of the Fair Sex, which 'twas conveni nant to Expletive Juſtice. The Senſe of which 'Ex- ent ſhould be guarded by all poſſible Means from preſſion is this, that ſince Expletive Juſtice is equal. (1) Violence and Abuſe (a). Even in Civil States, ly violated by deuying one that which he had a as the Legiſlators might very reaſonably appoint perfect Right to poſſeſs, or perfect Right to poſſeſs, or by bringing ſomewhat (e) De (a) Quintilian. Declam. 349. You have drawn a Virgin into as great an Injury, as War it ſelf could have offer’d. (6) L. 4. C. 3; (c) Lex Wiſogoth. 1.3. tit.3. c. 6. Conſtitut. Sicul. I. 1. tit. 22. (d) Plutarch in Mario. Plato de LL. 1. 9. He that hath debauch'd a Young Perſon of either Sex, Mall be lawfully killd, not only by the abuſed Party, but hy the Father , Brothers, or Children. Civitate Dei, 1.1.c.18. (f) Add. Gratian. Cauf:. 32. qu . Soc1; 2; 3; 4, Plautus Amphitry ; Haue promeruit quainobrem vi. tio verteres, mea vį ſubacta eſt facere. You can't lay to her Charge, what she did upon my compulfion. Senec. Hippolit. Mens Impudicam facere non caſus folet Not on Chance, but on the Will Unchaſtity depends. (8) Orát. 1. (h) Liban. Declam. 2. It is a much greater Wickedneſs to tempt and entice a Maid to be conſenting to her own Abuſe, than to injure her by meer-Force. ! ) L. 2. c. 1. f. Io S: XI. (1) The Affront is fo much the greater, becauſe a Woman of Honour may be reduced to that hard Neceffity, up, from her own Blood, a Child to an Enemy, Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. 1. Chap.5. 5. 22, See what I have ſaid upon thár Place of this Author's Abridgment, and Mr. Thomaſius's Juriſprud. Divin. Lib. 2. S. 114. Mr. Bayle, in his anſwer to the gue- ſtion of a Provincial, Tom. 4. Chap. 28. p. 412, affirms, That if that Law of the Decalogue, Thou Malt do no Murther, doth not o- blige a Woman, who breaks it to ſave her Life or Cháſticy, it follows, that the other Laws of the Decalogue include the ſame Condition in obſerving them, provided it be no Damage to my Life or Honour ; and ſo as often as the obſervation of any of, chefe Articles of the Decalogue expoſe us to any certain Danger of loſing our Life or Honour, we may excuſe our felves from it as well as from the Obſervation of this Precept, Thou shalt not kill . To me the very Recital of ſuch an Argument is its own Con. fucation. And I ſhould wonder that Mr. Bayle ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be blinded with ſuch weak Reaſons, if I did not plainly ſee, that he has eſpouſed the falſe Notions of ſuch as pervert the Moral Doctrines of the Goſpel, by ſuch Explications as are contra- rý ro the Rules of good Senſe and Criticiſm. (2) See Digest. Lib. 11. Tit. 3. Leg. 3. S. 3. where is the like Deciſion in the Caſe of Slaves. See alſo what is ſaid Lib. 6. Ch. 1, 9:21. Note 2. to raiſe on CHAP. V. Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. 193 on . on him which he had likewiſel a perfect Right not mutual Conſent to Fifty-Cuffs, and deal freely to ſuffer ; when a perſon is kill'd for offering an with each others Facé and Head, can on neither Injury of this Nature, there can be no Complaint fide complain of an Injury of this affronting Na- made that a Breach of Expletive Juſtice hath been ture. Nor is it eaſy to conceive how a Man that committed upon him. For he who firft makes an beats Arms, and is preparing to uſe them for his Attempt of any Miſchief againſt another, retains Defence, can be capable of receiving a Blow no Right why the other ſhould not proceed to Ex- under the ſame Notion and Aggravation of Con- tremities in returning it ; for, (what comes to the tempt . Beſide, 'tis a great Miſtake to fancy that a fame thing) gives the other an Infinite Right of op- Man's Honour is feally impair’d by fuch a Triffe ; poſing him ; though other Conſiderations may for (2) Honour would be a moft fragile and a moſt frequently hinder the injur'd Partý from a full and precarious Good, if 'twere in the Power of every rigorous Uſe of this Right. Nor will it fignify ſaụcy Fellow to diminiſh and to infringe it. any thing to obje&, that in ſuch Returris chát & And as for the Contempt which is fhown in such quality is neglected which Juſtice commonly re an Adion, this may be either quite taken off , or quires . For that Equality is chiefly concern'd with however eaſily repaira by the Magiſtrate, by fer- the Exchanges of Things, and the Diſtribution of ting a heavy Fine the Offender, and by en- common Goods. But Evils, which by way of joining him farther to perform in publick Tome War are mutually offer'd, cannot be exactly re Marks of Honour and Reſpect to the Perfon whom duc'd to any ſuch Meaſure, nor is it neceſſary he hath injur'd. Nor is the Vulgar Notion of a- they ſhould. (1) As for Grotius's Remark, that ny Weight, which fancies the Courage of Men, the Degree of burting in War ſhould be ſtated according and eſpecially of soldiers; 'to be 'indamag'd in its to the manner of Reftitution and Reparation in Civil . Chara&er, by the receiving theſe kinds of Af- Damages, (there is good Reaſon for this Limitation fronts, and that therefore their Credit muſt be to it) as nearly as we can : And then that Modera- vindicated by Sword and Duel. For that Man tion doth not ariſe from any Right inherent in the ſhows ſufficient Teſtimonies of his Courage, who Enemy, but from the Generoſity and Courage of bravely maintains and · diſcharges the Office afa the Victor. Grotius adds, that Charity doth not of it fign'd him by the State. And there are much more Self require our patiently ſuffering ſuch an Affront, in noble and more ſhining Occaſions of exerciſing Favour of the Perſon who offer'd it ; tho' the Doctrine of Valour, than, contrary to the Laws of Reaſon and the Goſpel doth indeed forbid the Repulſe of fucb At- of our Country, to purfüe an immoderate Paſſion, tempts by violent Means. ' or to engage in the Hazard of an unneceſſary and For our Parts, we have already ſhown, that in unprofitable Combat. Yet if, as it commonly a Natural State, a Man cannot be requir’d to bear falls out, upon the offering of ſuch an Injury, even a ſlight Injury, (eſpecially if it be continued) Swords are immediately drawn, and the Man who without endeavouring, even by the utmoſt Vio- thus began the Fray happens to be kill'd, or defpe- lence, to keep it off. And we read, that the moſt rately wounded, 'tis reaſonable that the other Holy King David, for an Affront put upon his Party ſhould have his Penalty mitigated, upon ac- Ambaſſadors, rais'd a War, to almoſt the utter count of the high Provocation. But 'tis an into- Ruin of a Nation (a). lerable Paradox which ſome maintain, that a Man 1. But 'tis very doubtful, whether in Members of may fairly kill another, not only to avoid an Af- a Civil State, the fame violent Procedure is excu front of this Kind, but for the Recovery of his fable. It is indeed in common Judgmert a moft Honour, after the Affront has been actually given, high Affront to receive a Box on the Ear, and the and the Party who offer'd it is filed. Reaſon of this Opinion amongſt many of us Eu We may add to theſe Obſervations, that though ropeans, ſeems becauſe we treat our Ser the Rare and Eſtimation of Things is not to be yants in this Manner, and other Inferiors plac'd determin’d by the Multitude, but by the Judg- under our Diſcipline. And hence'tis a Cuſtom in ment of wife Men, yet if in any State the Re- ſome places, when Perſons are firſt allow'd the ceipt of ſome particular Injury is attended with Uſe of Arms, or come out of their Apprentice- extraordinary Scandal and Diſgrace, there ought hip, and the like, to give them a Box on the Ear, to be a moſt ſevere Puniſhment ordain'd againſt in formal Manner, to put them in mind of their Delinquents in this Point'; in' as much as all Men former Condition, and to let them underſtand, have not Philoſophy enough to put up theſe pro- that they are above ſuch Treatment for the future. voking Indignities; and becauſe it would be in- Therefore to offer ſuch an Affront highly dif- conſiſtent with the Chara&ters and Stations which graces the Sufferer, and ſuppoſes him to be un- fome Men are to maintain in the Commonwealth, worthy of bearing Arms, or of being reckon'd a ſhould they be expos’d to the Contempt and De- mongťt free and grown Men. But here we muſt riſion of the meaneſt Subjects. The Magiſtrate obſerve, that ſuch a Blow never appears ignomi- then hath little Reaſon to be angry, if neglecting nious and diſgraceful, but when it is given before or refuſing to give Redreſs in Complaints on this the other Party prepares for Reſiſtance: For thus Score, a Man aſſerts his own Honour by what Slaves and Children are beaten without the Liber- Means he can, though only in Regard to the O- ty of Oppoſition. Therefore thoſe who fall by pinion of the Vulgar, ſince the ſame Opinion (a) 2 Sam. X.4, doc. (12. Theſe Words of Grotius, as our Author expreſſes himſelf, ought to have been found in the ſame place with the foregoing and following, but I can't find them either in thoſe Places, or in the Third Book, where Grotius treats expreſlly of the Diigo ſi- tion which Men ought to obſerve in War. (2) See Lib. 8. Chap. 4. S. 8. following. 01 would Сс 199 Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. Book II. W. pair’d (a). would otherwiſe load him with ſo much Reproach. who oppoſes an Aſſailant Breaſt co Breaſt, rather Therefore thoſe Governors who would effectually than he will lay himſelf open to his Violence, by ſuppreſs all Duels and private Combats, ought to running off on a Diſadvantage. enact the moſt grievous Penalties againſt thoſe Laſtly, Grotius hath done well to cenſure thoſe who ſhall offer ſuch a Blow or other Affront as is Authors, who allow that we may lawfully kill a Man reckon’d ignominious in the Opinion of the par- who bath ſaid any ſuch Thing of us, as we think will ticular Country. For the Courſe and Manner of injure our Repute and Character with good Men. For, Civil Life will not bear that refind Philoſophy of if the Man hath ſpoken falſe, have we not many Gratius ; ſince Honour is no more than an Opinion of Ex- more convenient ways of wiping off the Calum- cellence, and the Sufferer of ſuch an Injury ſhowvs bimfelf ny. And if he hath faid nothing but Truth, excellently patient, his Honour is ratber increasd than im- muſt we ftudy the Concealment of one Sin by out the Commiſſion of another? How much better is XIII. From what hath been ſaid it may likewiſe Plato's Law (2), If a Man kill a Slave who hath not be underſtood, whether in Caſes of Aſſault, a injur’d him, only out of Fear he ſhould diſcover ſome Man is oblig'd, if he can conveniently, to betake baſe Action, or on the like account; be ſhall undergo the himſelf to Flight, ſo as that the Slaughter of the Same Penalty as if be bad murther'd a free Subject or Aſſailant is never juſtifiable under a Poſſibility of Citizen? running from him., Now here it is plain, that in XIV. All this ſeems plainly enough deducible a State of Nature the Aggreſſor hath no Right, by from Reaſon. But many raiſe a Scruple about whóch the other Party is bound to decline his Vi- theſe Doctrines, in regard to the peculiar Tem- olence in this Manner, rather than oppoſe it. per and Genius of Chriſtianity, afferting that al- And the Reaſon why a Man (under this Natural though it be indeed lawful to kill a Man who un- Condition) ſometimes chuſes rather to fly than juſtly attempts our Life, yet 'tis an Adion (1) fight, is not out of any Favour to him who ſets him who ſets more praiſe-worthy to loſe our own Life in ſuch a upon him, but becauſe he thinks it moſt conveni- Caſe, than to take his. Becauſe he thus dying in towards each other: And who will ever maintain, ſiſtent with Juſtice to rid our felves of a leſs Evil, that when one King unjuſtly invades the Realm of by bringing a greater on another Man. Now, another, the injur Prince is oblig'd to ſave him tho the Solution of this Difficulty doth not proper- ſelf, if poſſible, by flying ; for fear he ſhould kill ly fall under our Buſineſs; yet we think the Main- ſome of his Enemies by making Reſiſtance? tainers of this high Notion would do well to con- But under Civil Governments, we are to fly, ſider, that in the Conſternation of Danger, and if we can with Convenience, rather than take a- in the Heat of Fighting, a Man hath little Lei- way the Aſſailant's Life. Nor can ſuch a Flight ſure for a nice Reflection on ſuch Reaſons; in as be at all Baſe or Unworthy of a Man at Arms; in much as all his Thoughts and Faculties are taken as much as it is not undertaken out of Cowardice up with conſulting how to ſave him from preſent or Neglect of Duty; and becauſe Reaſon can Death. Again, the Perſon who is thus aſſaulted, never think this a fic Occaſion of exerting my Va- is not always ſo well prepard, as not to need lour, when I only kill a Fellow-Subject without ſome farther Time for compoſing his Mind and any Neceſſity, from whom the Magiſtrate could Conſcience, and for making up his Bundles, before have ſufficiently ſecurd me. We added this Re- he takes his long Journey, as Varro (2) ſpeaks. Be- ftri&ion, if we can with Convenience, becauſe, (as fides, it doth not appear very probable, that I hath been already hinted in part) we are not al- ought in this Cafe to be more follicitous for the ways oblig'd to retreat and to turn our_Backs, Soul of the other Man, than he himſelf is. And ſince we thus expoſe ourſelves to a greater Danger therefore if he, neglecting this great Concern in- of Wounds and Miſchief, as well as to the additi- vade my Life, ought I to pay fo precious and ir- onal one of falling; and since a Man who hath recoverable a Ranſom, for reſcuing him from one once betaken himſelf to his Heels, if he meet Danger of incurring ſo fad a State (3)? For it with a Stop, or if the Aggreſſor happen to over is very doubtful whether, if I ſhould now ſpare take him, cannot eaſily recover himſelf into a him, to my own Ruin, he will not, for all my Pofture of Defence. Therefore in caſe there be Charity, ftill deſerve, and ſtill meet with the not a Place of ſafe Refuge near at hand, he doth fame terrible Sentence. 'Tis a Maxim vulgarly not tranſgreſs the Bounds of innocent Self-defence, known, that no Regard is to be had to ſuch a 1 (a) Vide Alls xvi. 37. S. XIII. (1) TIedes A and garðy, ſays Oppian, Cyneget. Lib. 4. V. 35. Hares have their Armour in their Feet. A need- leſs Quotation. (2) De Legib. Lib.9. "Eur Gris Saidov uleion under e Nušvid, pobes ö yn ylwuths aigsãy épgav, rý nex@vavirš ziyun tale, ši nuo άνετα άλλα τοιέτε, καθάπερ άν ή πολίτίω κείνας υπείχε φόνε δικας, ωσαύτως και σε τοιέτο Ράλι και αυτιά αποθανόν(G-, έτως ύσεχέτω. s. XIV. (1) Mr. Fortſchius Profeſſor of Divinity at Tubing, undertakes to defend St, Ambroſe, and ſome other Fathers, who maintained, that Chriſtian Charity would not allow a Man to lay an Unjuſt Aggreffor, and that he ought to ſuffer himfelf to be lain. But if we examine the Words of this Divine, Diſert. 1. in Offic. Ambroſi, we ſhall find, that after he has diſcourſed long, he does not touch upon the Reaſons of our Author. I find only one thing reaſonable, which I have obſerved above, S.2. Note 5. vir. That in following the Principles of Mr. Pufendorf, he aſſerts, That he chat ſlays his Unjuft Aggreſſor, ought to have more than a ſimple Permiſſion. (2) De Re Ruſtica. Lib. I. Chap. 1. Annus enim Otogeſimus admonet me ut ſarcinas Colligam, antequam proficiſcarè vitâ. (3) Plin. l. 2. Epiſt. 1o. Purum eſt providum ſperare ex aliis, quod tibi ipſe non præſtes, i.e." You are very improvident, if you expect that from others, which you will nor do. This Paſſage does not make the Icaſt to this Author's Purpoſe. Danger CHAP. V. Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. 195 Danger as a Man throws himſelf into by his own Aſſiſtance, when the Buſineſs we muſt neglect for Default, and from which he may deliver himſelf that good Office is of more Conſequence, than if he pleaſes. Now in the Caſe before us, pro- the Thing we thus endeavour to ſave or reſcue vided he draw off or forbear to treat me in this for another. And beſides all this, it may very Injurious Manner, the Danger to which he ex- fairly be queſtion'd, whether a perſon who ar- poſes his Soul, ceaſes as to the preſent Marter. faults us in a violent manner, cught to keep the And doch not this Opinion allow greater Favour Title of a Neighbour, as the word ſeems to be and Indulgence to Wickedneſs , than to Goodneſs, meant in our Saviour's Command (c). whilft it makes the former, as it were, Sacred Lactantius (d) hath cenſur’d Tully (6) for deſcribing and Inviolable ? For according to ſuch Rules, a Good Man to be one that doth Good to as many as the moſt Holy and Vertuous Men would be al- poſſible, and that hurts no Body unleſs provok’d." o ways oblig'd to yield their Throats to Villains what a most excellent and a most true Sentence (fays and Murtherers, left, by reſiſting, they ſhould (7) the Father) hath he ſpoild by the Addition of ſend them immediately on their Road to Hell (a). two Words! For what occaſion had be to ſay, unleſs That Saying of our Saviour, in which he com- Provok’d? If a Good Man may thus burt another mands us to love cur Neighbour as our felves, Matt. when he is provok’d, the very Offering that hurt, will xxii. 39. ſeems not ſo ficly to be interpreted of make him loſe his Character and Name : It not being the Degree of Love, as of the Truth and Sincerity; leß Evil to return an Injury, than at first to give it. in as much as no Man diſſembles or counterfeits For whence ariſe all the contentions and the Combats a Paſſion towards himſelf. And that Phraſe, ds which we behold among st Men, unleſs from this Mif- thy ſelf, looks like a Proverbial Speech, importing carriage, that Impatience oppoſing Wickedneſs, occaſions a ſincere and hearty Kindneſs (b). But ſhould we lo many Tempeſts in the World? Whereas, if in oppo- take the Expreſſion in the higheſt Senſe (4), it ſing the ſame Wickedness we ſhould make uſe of Pati- would ſcarce follow, that ſuppoſing the Love of ence, than which there is no truer Virtue, and none our ſelves and of our Neighbour not capable (in more worthy of Human Nature, we should as effectua ſome Inſtance) of being anſwer'd both together, ally extinguiſh the ill Deſign, as if we were pouring the former ought to yield to the latter (5). Nor Water upon Fire. But indeed, as the Impatiency are the Proofs which we find ſometimes alledgʻd of the Injur’d Party is frequently the occaſion of from Exodus xxiii. 4, 5. and Deuteronomy xxii. 4. unneceſſary Combats, which might with Conve- ſufficient to evince, that the Love of our Neigh- nience have been avoided ; ſo, on the other hand, bour ought to take place before our own real Patience is not always infallible in the Cure of Advantage : For it cannot thence be gather’d, Malice and Villany. Nor doth the Virtue which, that we are firſt to help our Neighbour's Beaſt under that Name, is ſo highly recommended to out of the Ditch, if our own be in the ſame Con- Chriſtians, equally oblige us to the putting up dition ; or that we are oblig'd to give ſuch an (8) all Injuries promiſcuouſly, without Difference (a) Comp. Grotius L. I. c. 2. 1.8. & c. 3. f. 3. (b) Vid. 1 Sam. xviii. 1, 3. (c) See Luke x. 29, &c. where, by the Term of Neighbour, we are to underſtand every Man who hath need of our Help, and whom we shave opportunity of Benefiting. (d) Inſtitut. L. 6. c. 18. (4) If as often as a Man finds himſelf in the fame Danger as another, he ought indiſpenſably to reſolve to periſh to ſave him, he is obliged to love his Neighbour better than himſelf. Moreover, this Command of CHRIST is a general Maxim, which can't be of Uſe to determine a particular Caſe, and inveſted with the Circumſtances of all particulars, ſuch as this, when a Man finds he can't at the ſame time ſatisfy the Love of Himſelf and his Neighbour, for, all things elſe being equal, the Love of a Man's Self ought to be preferred, as appears by St. Paul's Words, 2 Cor. viii. 13. The Determination of that Caſe, in which there is an Oppoſition between the Love of a Man's Self and Sociableneſs, depends upon other Principles, from which it may be in- ferred, Thar as there are ſome caſes in which the Love of a Man's Self is to be preferred before every other Thing, ſo there are other Caſes, when the Preſervation of another may be preferred before his own. This is taken out of the Apology of our Author, which is in the Eris Scandica, $. 32. coba27 (5) Præclarum illud est, et ſi queris, re&tum quoque, do verum, ut eos, qui nobis cariſſimi eſle Debeant, &què ac nofmet ipſos amemus ; ac verò plus fierî nullo fatto poteft : nè optandum quidem eſt in amicitia, ut melille plus quàm fé, ego illum pluſquam me. Perturbatio vita, ſi ita fit, atque officiorum omninm conſequatur, i.e. “ Thus much indeed is Brave, and Right, and True, who ought to be moſt dear “to us, as well as our ſelves. But to love them berrer is abſurd and impoſſible. 'Twould be ridiculous for me to wiſh, that my “ Friend and I ſhould each of us prefer the othér's Perſon and Intereſt to his own; becauſe ſuch a Change of Hearts could 56 not but be follow'd with a Confuſion of all Ofices of Life.” Cicero Tuſc. Quæft. 1. 3. c. 29. (6) Tully's Words are, Eum virum bonum effe, qui profit, quibus poffit, noceat nemini niſi laceſſitus injuriâ. Our Author might here have oppoſed to this Cenfure of Lattantius or her Words of Cicero, which will thew, thar that Orator believed, that a good Man ought to ſpare his greateſt Enemies, when he can do it without Danger to his own Life. Jugulare civem, nè jure quidem quiſquam bonus vult. Mavult enim commemorare le, cum poſſit perdere, peperciſſe, quam cum parcere potuerit perdidiffe. Hæc in homines alienifſi- mos, denique inimiciſſimos, viri boni faciunt, & hominum exiſtimationis de communis humanitatis cauſa: ut cum ipfi nihil alteri ſcientes incommodarint, nihil ipſis jure incommodi cadere poßit, Oratio pro Quintio. U (7) La&tantius's Words are, o quam fimplicem, veramque sententiam duorum verborum adjeftione corrupit ! Quid enim opus fuerat adjungere, niſi laceſſitus injuria? — Nociturum esſe dixit bonum virum, fi fuerit laceſſitus; jam ex hoc ipfo viri boni nomen amittat, neceſſe est, fi nocebit. Non minus enim mali est, referre injuriam, quam inferre. Nam unde certamina inter homines, unde pugne, con- tentioneſque naſcuntur, nifi quod improbitati oppofita impatientia, magnas Sæpe concitat tempeſtates? Quod fi patientiam, quâ virtute nihil nihil homine dignius inveniri poteft improbitati oppofueris, extinguetur protinus, tanquam igni aquam fuperfuderis.hu! (8) This may be inferred from the Words of CHRIST, Matth. v. 39, 40. in which Patience is moft earneſtly recommended. For that Divine Teacher ſays not, if any one will play, wound, or ſmite you mortally, bear it patiently, but, If any one ſmite you on the right Cheek, turn to him the other alſo, for a Blow on the Cheek is a ſmall Injury in itſelf and eaſy to be born. Moreover, in theſe Words there is a Proverbial Expreffion, which imports thus much, That, rather than revenge our felves of them that have done us any Perſonal Wrong, we ſhould rather ſuffer our felves to receive ſome new Injuries. Nor doth JESUS CHRIST ſay, If any Man will take away all your Goods, or the greatest part of them, do not reſiſt the Spoiler, nor oppoſe his Injuſtice, neither by your OWR AE and Deed, nor by ſeeking Prote&tion from the Magiſtrate, but, If any Man ſues you at the Law, and takes away thy Coat, let bim take thy Cloak alſo i. e. rather than engage thy ſelf in a Law-ſuit for fo ſmall á Marter, be ready to undergo a fresh Loſs. See Grotius, and Mr. Le Clerc on this Place. The Heathens alſo acknowledge, that we ought ſometimes, though not always, to depart from ſomething of our Right. See Cicero De Offic. Lib. 2. Chap. 18. Сс2 and 196 Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. Book II. and Diſtinction. He that defends himſelf in a But it cannot be hence inferr'd, that ſuppoſing a Lawful manner, doth not act diretly for the Man to have the Lives of none, or of very few Hurt of another, but for his own Preſervation : depending on him, ſuch an one may not fairly And he who repels a Wrong is not Injurious, but kill an Aſſailant, who is perhaps of more Service he who offers it. 'Tis one thing to exerciſe an to the Publick, or in whoſe Life the Intereſt of unblameable Defence, and another thing to pro more Perſons are concern'd. For at this rate, a ſecure an unmerciful Revenge. The latter may Man who is either Unmarried, or without Chil- as great a Sin as the firſt Offer of an Injury, dren, muſt in no Caſe kill an Invader, who hath but the former can never fall under ſo hard a a Family, for fear his Wife and Children ſhould Cenſure. be left Deſolate and in Want. But if the Affe&ti- But farther, thoſe who maintain that in Caſes on and Concern for theſe Relations could not of this Nature it is more commendable to be killd, hinder the Injurious Party from attempting his than to kill, add this Exception, Unleſs the Party Villany, what Reaſon hath the other Perſon to affailed be a more uſeful Perſon than the Aſſailant. As give his own Life for the Prevention of their if it were always poſſible for me, under the Ap- Misfortune and Trouble ? prehenſion of fo imminent Danger, to weigh my Plato (10) in his Syſtem of Laws hath been Abilities nicely with thoſe of the other Man, and very nice and exact on this point : If the Life of to determine, whether the World would have a Son, ſays he, be attempted by his parents, did ever. more occaſion for his Service than for mine. any Law allow him in ſuch a Caſe to kill thoſe who This is beyond Diſpute, that he on whom the gave him being, although in his own Defence ? So far Safety of many depends, and whoſe Office or from this, that he is oblig'd and commanded to suffer Duty it is to keep off Violence from others, ought all Extremities; rather than to engage in ſo unnatural not to reſign his own Life for the ſparing an un a Deed. But if upon account of a Tumult, or Sedition, juft Invader ; tho' he ſhould be of ſo mild a Dif or the like occaſion, a Brother kills bis Brother, to pre- poſition as with Piſo in Tacitus (9), to think it as ſerve himſelf from his Violence and Affault, he shall be great a Miſery to kill another, as to die himſelf. And equally guiltleſs as if he had ſlaughter'd an Enemy. the Reaſon is evident, becauſe by throwing him- As for the Additional Clauſe, if a Slave in his own ſelf away, he betray'd the Safety of ſo many other Defence kill a Free Man, be shall be obnoxious to the Perſons. This is the Caſe of thoſe who accom- Same Penalties as a Paricide, this was not the Fault pany Travellers by way of Guards ; as likewiſe of the Lawgiver, buc of the Age. of Princes, of Generals, and other Commanders, whoſe Deaths are uſually attended with ſo wide XV. From what hath been obſerv'd on this a Ruine, and to whom we may apply that Saying Head it appears, that a Slaughter committed of Lucan : within the juft Bounds of Self-Defence, doth not tain the Author with any real Blemiſh or Guilt, Cum tot in hac anima populorum vita, Saluſque and conſequently doth not render him obnoxious Pendeat, da tantus caput hoc fibi fecerit orbis, to any Puniſhment: and that it is not to be Sævitia est voluiſſe mori. rank'd amongſt thoſe Actions, which, tho' they are in themſelves finful, yet Human Laws favour Since one Dear Life enſures and guards us all, with Impunity, upon account of the violent and And with the World's great Head, the World almoſt unavoidable Tranſports of Paflion : As muſt fall, when they allow the Husband to kill the Adul- Twere Cruelty to court your Fate (a). terer (1). If therefore in any Places fome Pe- nalty (a) And that of Alexander's Friends in Quintus Curtius, L. 9. c. 6. What God can ſecure to us a long Enjoyment of this Light, this Bulwark of Macedon; when you so often, with a kind of Greedineſ, expoſe your Perſon to certain Danger ; not refle&ling home many l'bouſand of Lives you bazard in one. () Tacitus's Words are, Si nobis aut perire hodiè neceſse eſt, aut quod &què apud bonos miferum eſt occidere. Hift. Lib. I. Chap 29. (1ο) De LL. Lib. 9. Ουδ' αμινομένω θάναον, μέλλονι σοτ γνέων τελετήσεις, παρέξει νόμο έδεις κλείναι ο πατέρα, ή μητέeα, του εις φώς και εκείνα φύσιν αούνας, αλλ' υπομείνανα τα πάνlα πριν, πειν τι εάν τοιέτο. 'Αδελφός και αν αδελφών κλείνη, αν χάσεσι μάς γενομένης, ή τινι τόπω τοιέτω άμυνόμενα άρχονία χειρών πρότερον, καθώς πολέμιον αποκλείνας, έσω Xuntapo 'Εαν 5 άυ δελG- έλαερον αμυόμενο αποκλείνη καθώς και κείνας πατέρα, τοίς αυπίς ένοχG έσω νόμοις. To treat of this Queſtion more exactly, I obſerve, That in Truth the Laws may by reaſon of ſome Inconveniences, punilh all Children, who ſhall Ilay their Father or Mother, though in Defence of their own perſons, becauſe we may ſuppoſe the Caſe 1o very rare, that it would be to no Purpoſe to make ſuch an Exception, which might be an Occaſion of fuffering a real Par- ricide to go unpuniſhed. But if the Thing be conſidered as it is in itſelf, without any Relation to Civil Tribunals, we muſt, in my Judgment, thus think of it. 1. If a Father be hurried by his Paſſions, which he can't maſter, to kill his Son, and knows noc what he is doing, as I have ſpoken, in the Caſe of one attacked by his Sovereign, Note 1. of s. s. fo I ſay here, that he cught to ſuffer himſelf to be flain, rather than imbruc his Hands in his father's Blood. 2. Buc if we have Reaſon to fear, thar a Fa- ther is inclined with fome Knowledge and Deliberation to put us in Danger of our Life, we ought to avoid the leaft Occafions to provoke him, and abſtain from doing many of thoſe things which we have Right to do, if we were concerned with any o; ther. 3. But if , after we have done all we can on our Part, we ſee our ſelves infallibly in Danger to loſe our Life by the Hand of him, who, above all Men, is bound to preſerve it, though in this caſe we may, if we will, ſuffer our ſelves to be lain, our of Exceſs of Love and Kindneſs, and in Regard to him from whom we have derived our Being, yet I do not believe him guilty of Murder and Parricide, if, in defending himſelf, he ſlays the Aggreſſor. The Right of Defending our felves is prior to any bligation we have to another, and a Father, if he ſo far forgers himſelf, as to fall into ſuch an extravagant Paſſion againſt his own son, deſerves not to be looked upon as a Father. S. XV. (1) Of which fee Lib. 20, 22, 34. 32. D. ad L. Jul. de Adulter. and Lyfias Orat. 1. pro cade Eratoſthen, where he ſhews, that by the Attick Conſtitucions it was allowable to kill, if catch'd in the Fact, the Abuſer, not only of a wife, but of a Cono cubine'; and as Demoſthenes extends it, of a Mother, a ſiſter, or a Daughter. And the Reafon he gives is this ; Becauſe what- ſoever Perſons we fight for againſt our Enemies, to reſcue them from Injury or Affront, for the ſake of the same Persons the Law. pero O- mits CHAP. V. Of the juſt Defence of One felf. 197 Mr. Dryden. naley or Expiation hath been enjoind the Actors ever had llain a Man involuntarily, quitted his of juſt Slaughter, it either belong'd not to the Country till ſuch time as the Gymnoſophifts had Caſe of Innocent Defence, or it was introduc'd purg'd him by their Ceremonies (a). And we without any true Ground or Reaſon : or, laſtly, find Æneas in Virgil declaring in Reference to the it might be applied for the making Men under- Holy Reliques, ſtand how heinous a Crime it was to kill unjuſtly, (2) when the killing even upon a juſt Account Me bello è tanto digreſſum do cæde recenti ſtood in need of ſome Satisfaction. (3) Philo che Attrectare nefas ; donec me flumine vivo Few, in his Life of Moſes, Lib. I. tells us, He com Abluero. manded the Priest to perform a ſolemn Purgation, on tboſe who return'd freſh from the Slaughter of their E In meʼtis impious Holy Things to bear, nemies, becauſe tho the Laws did by no means forbid Red as I am with Slaughter, new from War: ſuch Attempts, yet he who kills a Man, tho' by Com Till in ſome living Stream I cleanſe the Guilt. pulſion, and in repelling an Injury, ſeems to contract Some Stain, upon account of the near Relation which Mankind bear to one another, being all deriv’d origi In the 18th Canon of the Council of Nantes, nally from the ſame Head. And this therefore was held under Pope Formofus, we have this nice In- the reaſon of the Ceremony, to take off the very Appear- junction; If a Man by accident, and unwillingly hath ance and Shadow of Guilt. As for the Benefit of the been Author of another's Death, let him repent forty Aſylums or Places of Refuge and Sanctuary, a Man Days with Bread and Water; when this Courſe is over, who preſerv'd his own Life by the Death of an let bim for two years be separated from the Congrega- Affailant, ſeems to have had no occafion for theſe tion of the Faithful, and let him neither Communicate Reliefs ; but only he who had been the Author of nor Offer. After the space of two Years, let him Offer another's Death by an involuntary Stroke, yet with the Congregation, but not Communicate. At the ſuch as upon exact Care and Diligence he might end of the five years let him be receiv’d to full Commu- have forborn and avoided. That Place in the nion, but let his Abſtinence from Meats continue at the firſt of the Chronicles, Chap. xxix. ver. 3. doth not Diſcretion of the Priest. Yet neither doth this Ca- belong to the Caſe of Self-defence ; and (*) the non touch the Caſe of Defence, nor can it well Building of a Temple ſeems to have been forbid- be vindicated from too much Rigour. Thus too den David, not ſo much becauſe he had gather’d what we meet with in the Laws of the Lombards, any Pollution by his Slaughters in War, as be. (b) ſeems not capable of being extended to the cauſe he who had acquir'd ſufficient Honour to Buſineſs in hand, or if it be, may deſervedly fall himſelf by Martial Archievements, ought not to under the Cenſure of unreaſonable Severity.' De have robb'd his Son of ſuch an occaſion of grow- Mornay (c) tells us, that 'tis religiouſly obſerv'd by ing Glorious by the Works of Peace. The Scho- the Judges in France, ſcarce ever to abſolve Per- liaft on the Oreſtes of Euripides informs us; that ſons in Cauſes of this Nature, without enjoining 'twas an ancient Cuſtom amongſt the Grecians, them at the ſame time to beſtow peculiar Lar- for thoſe who kill'd any one upon a juſt Reaſon, geſſes upon the Poor, and ſometimes to be at the immediately to ſhow their Weapons to the Sun for Charges of Chriſtian Sacrifices, or Propitiations for the a Token of their Innocence; as defiring him to Soul of the Party killd. And tho' the latter part be Witneſs of the Fact, who, in their Opinion, of this Cuſtom ſmells too much of Superftition; overolook'd and overheard all things. And beſides yet every good Man hath reaſon to be deeply this Formality, they applied fome Means of Ex- afflicted and concern'd, when he is put under the piation, and were oblig'd to undergo one Year’s Neceſſicy of depriving Another of Life, by any Baniſhment: Which Baniſhment is likewiſe men- fuch unfortunate Means. tion'd by Plato de LL. 1.9. Vid. l. 16. /. 8. D. de XVI. Indeed, the Defence of Life, of Limbs, Pænis & Groti in flor. Sparſ. ad loc. And we learn and of Chaſtity, as of Irreparable Goods, admits farther from Demofthenes, and from the Scholiaft fo large a Degree of Favour, as to ſtand exempted on Ariſtophanes, that at Athens when a Man had from one of the Poſitive Divine Laws, and to be kill'd another, and pleaded to have done it juſtly, conſtrued as no Breach of the Sabbath. Vide the Cauſe was tried in a peculiar Court, cald i Maccab. I. 32, &c. Joſeph. Antiq. L. 12. c.8. (1) the Delphinian, with Alluſion to the Oracle of A- For thoſe who maintaind the contrary Opinion, pollo at Delphi. Amongſt the Egyptians, Barb. who- are not without Reaſon ſcouted by Plutarch and tit. 27. & lib. 7. tit. mits us to kill even Friends, if they offer them any unjuſt Violence. For fince Enemies and Friends are to be judgʻd and diſtinguiſh'd by their A&tions, thoſe that praktice Hoſtility, we may proſecute in an hoſtile manner. Amongſt the Perſians, he that kills the Adulterer and the Adultereſs at the fame time, is preſented with a new Garment as a Reward of his Service to the State. Add, Olear. Itin. Per fic. L. 5. c. 22. Val.Max. L. 9. c. 1. ſ. 13. Ant. Mattha. de Crimin. ad L. 48. D. tit. 3. c. 3. f. 13, &c. Adverf. 820. (a) Vid. Philoft. de Vir. Appolon. 1. 6. (0) L. 1. tit. 9. 1. 19. & capit. Carol. I. 4. 295. (c) Ad. Leg. 3. D. de Fust. Lo Jure, in which there appears búr little Superſtition. (2) Porphyry, as Mr. Hertim obferves, ſpeaks very well, that the Reaſon why Lawgivers command, that Murthers committed without any Deſign, and upon Neceſſicy, ſhould noć be wholly exempted from Puniſhment, is, for fear it ſhould be a Pretence το any to attempt it on fet purpofe. Επι και ακέσιον Φόνον εκ έξω πάσης ζημίας καθεσησαν οι νομοθέται, όπως μηδεμίαν wdão πρόφασιν τους εκείως τα των ακείως δρώνων έργα μιμεί θα σωριμίοις. De Abftinent. Lib. Ι. (3) The Hiſtorical Remarks made here by the Author, had better have been placed under a Noce. See Numb. xxxv.10,&c. (*) See Mr. Le Clerc upon that place, who gives another Reafon more apparent. S. XVI. (1) I may add, That as Mr. Le Clerc obferves, Jeſus Chriſt alludes to this Opinion of the Jews, when he ſays to them who were offended becauſe he did Cures upon the Sabbath-Day, Is it lawful to do good on the Sabbath-day, or to do evil, to Save Life or to deſtroy it ? Mark iii. 4. Aga- Deut. xix. 1, doc. 198 Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. BOOKIT. Agatharchides, as Joſephus obſerves in his Antigui Thoſe who have tormented themſelves in main- ties (a'). And therefore 'tis ſtrange that the ſame taining the more rigid fide of the Queſtion, build Author, in his firſt Book againſt Appion, ſhould chiefly on two Suppoſitions ; firſt, that a juſt celebrate, as worthy of all Commendation, that Puniſhment ought always to be fo equal to the A&t of the Jews which we read of in the Hiſtory Crime, that the guilty Perſon be not depriv'd of of the Maccabees, whilſt refuſing to make Refift- a greater Good than what he attempted to hure ance on the Sabbath-Day, they preferr'd this or to deſtroy in another (2). The Falſeneſs of Command of God to their own Lives, and to which we ſhall elſewhere make out. Secondly, the Liberty of their Country: Unleſs he is to That the Hurts which we offer to an unjuſt In- be underſtood as rather praiſing the Good Inten- vader, in Defence of ourſelves and our Poſſeſſi- tion, than the Deed itſelf. ons, are Puniſhments in a proper Senſe, and conſe- But in Reference to the Defence of Things or quently ought to be ſtated by the Rules of Vin- Goods, which as they may be reſtor'd or com- dicative Juſtice. But this Hypotheſis is no truer penſated, ſo they ſeem not all of thein abſo- than the former. For all Puniſhment proceeds lutely neceſſary to Man's Happineſs, it will bear from a Superior againſt a Subject, by Virtue of a Diſpute whether theſe may be preſerv'd and ſe- his Sovereign Right; and the Degree of it is cur'd by the Uſe of Extremities. Eſpecially ſince meaſur'd with reſpect to the Publick Good. But many are very ready to approve of what Taxilles Defence is a thing of more ancient Date than ſaid to Alexander in Plutarch, What occaſion is there, any Civil Command, and chiefly takes place a- Alexander, that you and I must needs Quarrel and mongſt thoſe, neither of whom are ſubject to the Fight; ſince you neither came to rob us of our Water other; and is moderated with regard to our own nor of our Food, which are the only two things that Safery, and to the Neceſſity of Self-preſervation. Men in their Wits think worth contending for. Indeed amongſt thoſe who live under the ſame Civil Government, the Liberty of Natural De- Euripid. Supplic. fence is very much reſtrain’d. Becauſe the in- Τετο και μόνον βροτοίς, &c. ward Tranquility of a State could not ſubſiſt, ifthe For, Life alone's th' Irreparable Lofs; Subjects were to return Hoftilities to each other, Breaches of Fortune have an eaſy Cure. for every Injury or Affront. The Members then of a Community may ſo far only make uſe of Vio- The Judgment and the Cuſtom of all Nations is lent Defence, as it is not taken off or forbidden manifeſt in this point, whilſt they allow Men by the Genius of Civil Society, or by the Laws of to fight for their Goods and Poffeffions, even to the State. the State. And the Laws of moſt Places, tho'they the Slaughter of thoſe who wrongfully invade allow one Subject to repel another who invades them. It is plain likewiſe, that moſt War is en- him, by offering a greater Evil, than the Invader gag'd in, not for the ſake of deſtroying Mens deſign'd againſt him (3); yet according to the Lives, but of winning their Lands or their Wealth. regular Courſe of Proceeding, they would not And it would be reckon'd a very pleaſant Humour have private Perſons apply Extremities, in oppofing in an Enemy, if to hinder himſelf from being ſuch Injuries as are levelld only againſt things that oppos'd by violent means, he ſhould make Prote- may be reſtor’d or repair’d. In as much as ſuch ſtation, that he came not to kill but to rob. Thus Reparation or Reſtitution may eaſily be procur’d much therefore is certain, that he who is killd by the help of Government; whereas when there in the Attempt of plundering or of waſting ano- is no Government to interpoſe, Men cannot be ther Man's Goods, hath no Injury done him: forc'd to make Requitals, but by War. There is Tho', in other reſpects, thoſe Goods do not bear no need then of being ſo ſollicitous with 'Grotius an equal Proportion to the Life of a Man. For in (b) to make up the Inequality between the thing invaded a Natural State, he who offers any kind of Injury and the Life of the Invader, by our Favour to the Defen- with a malicious Intent, immediately becomes a dant, and our Hatred and Rigour againſt the Guilty Par- Enemy; and then he can have no Right inhe- ty. Unleſs we join with Bæcler in his Explanation rent in himſelf to forbid the uſe of the utmoſt of the Place, and ſay no more than this, that ſince Extremities againſt him. And ſince another hath in a Cauſe or Action of this kind, it is generally no more Right to invade my Poſſeſſions, than tó very difficult to determine what was done within, affault my Life, I have certainly an equal Licence and what beyond the due Bounds, it is not repug- and Power to defend them both. Beſides, fince nant to Nature that we turn our Favour on the Life cannot be preſerv’d without a competency ſide of the Perſon who ſuffer’d, or was likely to of Goods, he that goes about to rob me of theſe, ſuffer, the Damage, and our Hatred upon the doth, by conſequence, endeavour to deprive me Plunderer or Thief; that is, when the Cafe is of that. And indeed, it is clearly evident, that doubtful, we may fairly pardon in the former the the Security and Peace of Society, and of Man- Death of the latter. In Civil States therefore it is kind, could very hardly ſubſiſt, if a Liberty were ſufficient, that a Man do not exceed the Limits not granted to repel by the moſt violent Conrſe, of Defence, appointed by the Laws of his Coun- thoſe who come to pillage our Goods, for which try. And yet if he ſhould tranſgreſs theſe Mea- Men have commonly a very hearty Love and ſures he doth no Injury to the Invader, but only Concern. is guilty of a Breach of Civil Law. But it may be (a) L. 12. C. 1. Add. Grot. ad 1 Maccab. xi. 37. (6) L. 2. C. I. f.11. (2) See Lib. 8. Chap. 3. S, 23, 24. (3) Such was the Athenian Law mention’d by Demoſthenes (adverf. Ariſtocrat.) ordaiping, That he who killd another in de fence of Goods, which this other Perſan was taking or carrying off by Violence, ſhould not be chargeable with any Guilt. The Greek is, Και εαν φέρονα, ή αρνία βία αδίκως, ευθύς αμυνόμενα κτίμι, νωποινεί εθνά ναι κελεύει. ask'd CHAP. V. Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. 194 > OLIO may be be proper at least ask'd farther, whether it is not at leaſt a Sin a- mitting a Thief, taken in the A&t, to be kill'd, if gainſt Charity, ro kill one who comes to plunder the thing happen'd in the Night, or if being the Day- us of a Reparable Good. In anſwer to which, it time, be defended himſelf with his Árms against the is our Judgment, that Charity towards one who Diſcoverer. As for the Sign of Crying out, the profeffes Hoftility againſt us, takes place only ſo Twelve Tables requir’d it only in the Caſe long as we have probable Hopes of bringing him, of the Day-Thief when he fought in his own by this means, to Repentance and to Peace. Buc Defence. Si luci furtum faxint, si se telo defenfint, when theſe Hopes appear fruitleſs, he that ſpares quiritato, endoque plorato : Post deinde ſi caſi ſint, fe his Enemy betrays himſelf. Or if at any time my fraud: efto. Comp. 1. 3. S. D. ad L. Aguil. where Reaſon perſwades me, that a Thing of little and the Term æque is mollified by Tribonian. Yet it is deſpicable Value is not to be defended with the not improbable, that in Courſe of time, and up- ſame Eagerneſs and Violence, I forbear, in this on the Authority of Wiſe Men, that ancient Law Caſe, not for the ſake of the Robber or Invader, was plainly mitigated, as Cujacius allows, L. 14. bur partly becauſe I would not give myſelf fó Obferv. 15. This appears from Ulpian, L.5. ad Edi&t. much Trouble about a matter of ſo flight Con- whoſe words are fully recited in the Compariſon of cern, and partly becauſe I would not ſeem Nar- the Jewiſh and Roman Laws, firſt publiſh'd' by Peter row-ſpirited and Coverous, by reſenting to ſo Pithaus. Which are maim'd, as we have them in deſperate a height, ſo inconſiderable a Damage., L. F. D. ad L. Aguil. (Add. L. 9. D. ad L. Cornel. de Sicar.) The reaſon of which Alteration perhaps XVII. It for us, on might be, that it was a Practice ſometimes with occaſion, to reflect on that moſt noble Lawgiving Villains to ruſh out of their Houſes and murder Licence to kill a Night-Robber, but not one that Perſons, and then pretend that they found them comes in the Day-time (1); which we read in in the Ad of Thievery: As likewiſe, becauſe Exodus xxií. 2. and which hath been ſo often imi- Houſes which are ſtrongly built, and ſtand thick tated in the Grecian and the Roman Conſtitution. together, cannot eaſily be robb’d without the Ma- Thus the Law of Solon recited by Demoſthenes, fter's Negligence; or at leaſt cannot afford Rogues (contra Timocrat.) (2) If any one, in the Day-time, ſo frequent Opportunities. Compare Juſtin L. 2. ſteal above fifty Drachmx, all Perſons are impower'd c. 2. f. 9. Whence Cujacius conjectures, that the to bring him before the Court of the Éleven. But if he ſaid Law as by L. 1.C. quando bic unicuique, was ſteal in the Night, whatever the Value be, it shall be abrogated in Towns and Cities, and only allow'd allowable either to bring him before the Judges, or to to hold good in the Country. Tho' indeed this purſue, and wound, or kill him. For which Ulpian Order which he cites, doth not ſpeak of Thieves the Rhetorician, gives this Reaſon, (*) In the Day who make their Attempts in Privacy and Silence, we may call for Aſſiſtance, which in the Night cannot ſo but of violent Robbers and open Affailants; as well be had.' So Plato de LL. 1.9. He that kills a Thief appears from the Reaſon ſubjoin'd, That they may entring his Houſe in the Night ſhall be blameleſ. The meet the Death which they threaten’d, and incurr that fame we find in the Roman Twelve Tables. Tho' which they deſign’d against others. Sextus Caecilius in as to this, Caius (L. 4. f. 1. D. ad L. Aquil.) affirms, Gell. L. 20. c. 1. explains this Law of the Twelve That the Roman Law doth indeed permit a Man to Tables falſly, when he makes it relate to the inſi- kill the Night-Thief; but then it obligetb him to give dious Violence of Nightly Murtherers (3). Now the Notice of it by crying out. The latter part of which Reaſon of ſuch Diſtinction we take to be this, that Affertion, fac . Godefredus (ad LL. 6. Tali) obſerves in the Day we may eaſily ſeize the Thief and re- to be a Specimen of Tribonian's Mild Diſpoſition, cover our Goods; whereas in the Night he may in as much as that there was no Clauſe originally in flip from the Houſe undiſcover’d; it being diffi- the Twelve Tables, appears from Cicero Orat. pro cult to know him in the dark; or if one Perſon Milon. The Twelve Tables, ſays Cicero, allow the ſhould chance to have a Knowledge of him, yet killing of the Night-Thief by any means poſſible , but the this would not convict him, unleſs, which cannot Day-Thief only if he defend himſelf with his Weapon. be done without great Trouble, more Witneſſes M. Senec. I. 1o. Con trov. ult. The Law whieb pere are call’d out of their Beds. But in this Opinion mits the killing of the Night-Thief any way poſſible, there is one thing which ſtartles moft Men, and doth not ſpeak of him as condemned, but as ſurpriz’d in puts them to ſome Loſs and Difficulty ; for they A. Gell. 1. 11. C. ult. when he reports are apt to argue thus, ſince the Laws which make that Draco made Theft Capital, and Solon only this Allowance do not decree a Capital Puniſh- Double Reſtitution; adds, that the Roman Decem- ment againſt Robbers, it looks like an Abſurdity, viri took the middle way between the Severity of the that private Perſons ſhould be indulg’d with a Li- former, and the Mildneſs of the latter ; then only per cence of proceeding farther in theſe caſes, than the Fact. (1) The Words are, If a Thief be found breaking up Can Houſe] and be ſmitten that he die, there ſhall no bloud be shed for him. But if the Sun be riſen upon him, there ſhall be bloud fhed for him, for he ſhould make full reſtitution, if he hath nothing, then he shall be ſold for his Theft, (to make Satisfaction.] (2) The Greek of Demofthenes is, 'Ei ő tis vÚstwę onišv xaénior , Fôtov Flavou, rj Storleivoen zij op cô trece drúxov tu: (*) Olpian’s Greek is, Εν νύκτι μείζονα τιμωρίαν έδειξεν, επειδήπερ μείζον όσιο έγκλημα και νύκ/G, εν 8 ημέρα δύναται τις, και βοηθες καλέσαι ευτώ εν 5 νυκτί, έκέτι. Plato's words are, Νύκλως φώρα εις οικίων εισίοντα όπι κλοπή χρημάτων, έαν έλων κλείνη τις, καθαρός έσω. (3) Mr. Noodt has thewed in S. 1. of Law IV. ad Leg. Aquil. that there was no addition of Tribonian's, nor any thing con- trary to the Law of the Twelve Tables. He treats there of Reſtitution, nor Puniſhment. The Cornelian Law, as well as that of the Twelve Tables, allows an abſolute Impunity to them who flew a Thief in the Night, whether they cried out or no, whether they might have avoided killing of him or no; but the Aquilian Law did not exempt them from paying Damages and Fines, unleſs when there was an abſolute neceility of ſlaying the Aggrefior to ſave their own Lives. Obſervat. Lib. 1. Chap. 15, and his Pro- babil. Juris Lib. I. Chap.9. as alſo ad Leg. Aquil. Chap. 5. ths 200 Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. Book II. In anſwer to which it may be obſerv'd, that all the Sovereign Power thinks proper for itfelf to do. kill him, tho’ barely for the Preſervation of my thoſe Laws concerning the Puniſhment of Thieves, me with his Weapon, but when upon my endea- do ſuppoſe the Things ſtollen to be reſtor’d or vouring to recover my Things from him, he em- compenſated, upon the Apprehenſion of the Fe- ploys it againſt me for his own Security. lon. And in order to this they judg’d the giving XVIII. And therefore it is clear, that they are of two-fold, or ſometimes of four-fold to be fuf- in the wrong who make the Reaſon of the 'fore. ficient ; according to the different Cuſtom of par- faid Law to be only this, Lest if the Robber eleapd ticular Commonwealths. But it doth not hence in the Night the Crime ſhould paß unpuniſh'd. As to follow, that therefore the ſame Laws, in Caſes Grotius's (b) Diſcuſſion of this point, there are where Reparation was not to be had, could not many things in it to which we cannot ſubſcribe. furniſh the Subject with ſome larger Power taken He makes the Laws we have been ſpeaking of to out of the Stock of Natural Liberty. For the be founded on this Bottom, that the Legiſlators , Lawgivers of Kingdoms and Republicks have not hereby intimated, no Man ought ko be killd direčtly for always thought it neceſſary, in ordaining Penal- the ſake of our Goods. Which is more than we can ties for Offences, to take their Standard from diſcover in thoſe Laws which treat of ſuch Thieves what in a State of Nature the Right of War al as creep into Houſes with Deſign to carry Things low'd to be done. Thus there are ſome States in privily away. 'Tis true in the Caſe of the Nightly the World where Adultery is not a Capital Crime; Thief, it may happen that whilft I endeavour to and yet the Husbands are Indemnified if they kill ſave my Goods, my Life too may be in danger. the Adulterers upon ſurprizing them in the Act. And then the Slaughter of the Thief is permitted Now ſuppoſing Men to be plac'd in a Natural Li me upon a double account. Nor here will it be berty, the Performance, or the very Offer of an an Objection againſt my Innocence, that I ſeem Injury to their Bed, is plainly a ſufficient Cauſe to throw myſelf into this Danger, by attempting of War, and how far the Licence of War extends to retain or to recover my Matters. For I am every one is ſenſible. And yet theſe Laws would then engag'd in a lawful and almoſt a neceſſary not ſtretch the Puniſhment of Adultery when Act; from which no Effe& that ariſes without my once actually committed, to ſuch Violence as Fault, can be imputed to me. But were it not might be allowable in a War undertaken upon lawful to kill another purely on the account of that Score. But for their Indulgence to private Goods, how can we utterly clear him from all Perſons of farther and ſeverer Methods, we may Guilt, who for the Preſervation of thoſe Concerns borrow this very good Reaſon from Dr. Cumber- caſts himſelf deliberately into fuch a Condition as land (a), that in as much as Offences of this kind makes it neceſſary for him either to kill, or to be eſcaping the Cognizance of the Civil Magiſtrate, kill'd? As we do not allow him the Plea of Self-de- do frequently paſs unpuniſh’d, therefore whenfo- fence, who kills a Man in a Duel voluntarily under- ever their Circumſtances make them capable of taken. receiving Puniſhment, it hath been thought. The other Reaſon which Grotius aſſigns for the proper to allow the moſt rigorous and ex- Hebrew Law ſeems not of ſufficient Strength and treme; that the Boldneſs of wicked Men, as much Solidity. In as much (ſays he) as by Night Witneſſes as it increaſes by Common Impunity, ſo much it of the Fact are difficult to be procur’d, therefore (1) more may be leſſen'd and kept under by the Fear of eafy Credit is given to him who ſhall affirm (*) that he meeting ſometimes with fo grievous and ſo terri- kill'd the Thief in defence of his own Life; as having ble a return. That Clauſe in the Roman Law found him with an Inſtrument that might have done giving Authority to kill a Day-Thief, Si telo ſe de- burt. For granting that the Hebrew Word in the fenderit, If he defends himſelf (4) with his Weapon, Text cited by him fignifies an (2) Inſtrument of plainly intimates, that I am hereby permitted to Digging or Stabbing, yet if the Intent of the Law tors on it. (a) L. 5. ſ. 26. (6) L. 2. c. 1. f. 12. (*) If the Affirmation or Word of every particular food for a legal Evi- dence in this caſe, this great Inconvenience would follow, that any malicious Perſon (tho* lus Credit be no berier than his Temper) might, with Impunity, deſtroy his Neighbour, if he would but give his Word his Neighbour firſt affaulted him. (4) See the Authorities alledged in the firſt Nore of this $. and chiefly Cicero's Orat. pro Milons, Ch. 4. and the Commenta- §. XVIII. (1) Then (ſays Grenovius the Father in his Notes upon Grotius) here is only a bare Fiction of Law, as in the Caſe of Preſcription and Poftliminium. But can ſuch a weak Foundation be of force fufficiens to give one Right to ſay a Man whoſe Life he ought to have preſerved? We ought rather to hold, that he ought to call for the Affiftance of his Fellow-Citizens a- gainſt the Actempts of an unjuſt Aggreſſor, and more, that the Laws grant us an extraordinary Prorection and ſpecial Privileges. Among the ancient Scythians, as Juſtin relates, L. 2. C. 2. Robbery was a Crime puniſhed with the greateſt Severity and greateſt Reaſon, becauſe if that had been permitted, what could they have enjoy'd whoſe Goods conſiſted in Herds of Cattle, which could never be ſhut up? For this Reaſon che driving away of Cattle (Abigeatus) is puniſhed more ſeverely even by the Law of God, chan Theft, Exod. xxii. I. altho' the Thing ſtole be of much greater Value than the Beaſt. (See Mr. Le Clerc's Notes upon chat Text.) So that in the Night, while Men ſleep, the Law's awake, as we may ſay, and when the Proprietors of Goods are leſs able to take care of themſelves and defend their Goods, it deterrs Thieves by making them apprehenſive of a greater Pu- niſhment than if they rob in the Day-time. Moreover, there is a great Preſumption that a Night-Thief comes armed, and Lawgivers ſuppoſe it as a thing undoubted; for all things being commonly made faſt in the Night, can a Thief be ſuppoſed with his Hands only to break thro' a Wall, force open Gates, Cheſts and Cupboards ? Wherefore for this Reaſon, becauſe all things are ſhut faſt, we can't believe that a Thief will come in the Night without Arms and Engines to enter by force a place which he ought to look upon as a thing Sacred. See Cicero's Orat. pro Domo. Chap. 41. (2) Our Author hath Reaſon to doubt, whether Mp3 Bammakhtereth, ſignifies, with an Inſtrument to break thro', 'cis more probable it means, in breaking thro', as the LXX and Vulgar tranſlate it. But Mr. Le Clerc has very well obſerved, that it comes much to the ſame, fince none can break thro' a Wall but with an Inſtrument. We may add with the ſame Commentator, that this Expreſſion is founded upon the Eaſineſs of breaking thro’ Walls, for it appears, that heretofore, as well as at this day, chat moſt of the Houſes in the East, as well in the Country as Cities, were built with Clay, ftruck upon Laths placed a-croſs, and whited over with Lime. Hence Job, Chap. iv. 9. alludes to it, when he ſays, That Man dwells in houſes of Clay. had CHAP. V. Of the juſt Defence of oneſelf. 201 And they . . had been as he makes it, 'e would have been much to confeſs, that a Man who in defence of his plainer to have ſaid, If be be found with a We.pom. Goods only lays hold on the Night-Robber, (if Nor indeed is ir, after all, a good conſequence he can with Safety and Convenience) and carries to ſay, that becauſe the Thief was found arm’d him before the Magiſtrate, acts much more gene- with a Weapon, therefore he came certainly to , souſly than if he had unneceſſarily depriv'd him alfault the Life of the Perſon who kill'd him. No of Life (b). more doth it follow, that becauſe by the Law of the Twelve Tables the Day-Thief could not be XIX. The laſt Point uſually diſputed on this kill'd unleſs he defended himſelf with his Weapon, Subject is, whether the Party who firſt gave and therefore there lies a fair Prefumption againſt the begun an Injury, may fairly reſiſt the other Man Nightly Thief that he actually made uſe of his when he endeavours to return or to revenge it. Weapon in the ſame manner. For that Law gave Many here take the Affirmative ſide, upon this Commiſſion to kill Conditions, and by any Means poſſible. In after felves by their own Pleaſure and their own Force, the Nightly Thief (3) without Reaſon, that whilft Men undertake to right them, Ages indeed, (4) this farther Clauſe was added they are ſeldom very exact in proportioning the to it, Si parcere ei fine periculo fuo non potuit, dum ren Puniſhment to the Crime. But we conceive the ſervare e conatur (a)if whilst be endeavours to save Queſtion ought to be determin'd with more Cau- bis Goods he cannot fare this Robber's Life 2018 bout ma tion and with more Diſtinction. The Law of Na- nifest Danger. But before this Addition it cannot ture then commands, that he who has Injur'd an- be prov'd, that a Perfon ſtood guilty of Homicide other ſhould offer him Satisfaction : And at the who had kill'd a Nightly Thief, tho' there were ſame time it obliges the other Party to pardon the Witneſſes to prove that the Party Alain never Offender, when he intreats him with Signs (1) of brought him into danger of his Life. The Ex- Penitence, offering Reparation for paft Damages, ample of a Maid Raviſh'd in the Field, which and Security for his future Good Behaviour (6) Grotius here alledges, is nothing at all to his pur- He therefore that refuſes to make Satisfa&tion, and poſe : For in thac Caſe, the Law expreſly com- hereupon reſiſts the Perſon demanding it, mani? mands us to preſume that Violence was offer'd her. feſtly heaps one Injury upon another. But when But in the Matter we are now concern'd about, we á Man refuſes to accept fair Satisfaction when of- cannot diſcover that any Preſumptiim of Mortal fer'd him, and reſolves to profecute his Revenge Danger is made or ſuppos’d by the Laws. As indeed by open Arms, in this Cafe he practices unjust it is not the Buſineſs of theſe Purloining Raſcals Force, and conſequently it can be no Fault to make Fight, but to Run. Yer after all we are ready Reſiſtance againſt him (d) (2). **ulle bus o quan 10 Tabor ed (a) In l.9. D. ad L. Cornel. de Sicar. (b) Add. Groenewgen de Leg. abrogatis, ad L. Aquil. where he obferves, that the Dutch Laws do not require the Sign of Cry. ing out in the diſpatching of a Night-Thief. Comp. Leg. Wijogoth L. 7. tit. 2. cap. 16. Leg. Burgundion. addit. I. tit. 16. c. 1, 2. Leg. Friſiorum, Tit. 5. Conſtitut. Sicul. Tit. 13. Capital, Carol. & Ludovic. L. 6. c. 19. ***) Quintilian Declam. 5. There's nothing more honourable than the concluſion of a Quarrel, But whilſt the Parties are bot with ſecret Delives of Miſchief, 'tis in vain to pretend an outward Reconciliation. M. Antoninus, L. 1. f. 7. vejviceth in this Happineſs of bis own Temper, that he was eaſily placable, and willing to be reconciled to thoſe who had given him any Cauſe of Offence, ſo soon as they deſired it. Add. & L.9.1. 8. & Senec. de Trâ, L. 2. C. 34. L. 3. C. 25, 27, 42. Amongst the Chineſe, who prefer Moral Philoſophy to all other Parts of Knowledge, there is ſcarce any one fo cruel as to deſire to revenge an Injury with the Death of him that offer'd it : any. In clination to harm the Author. Neuhof. Deſcript. Chin. c. 1.0 Ons Svirs 5W 23150 TOT DIL (d) Comp. Liv. L. 9. & Grot. L. 2. C. 1. f. 18. & Bacler ad loc. See the Story of the Private Combat in Davila, L. 15. p. 1027. (3) Duşdecim Tabula nočðurnum furem, quoquomodo ; diurhúm autem, ha fet fi ſe telo defenderit, interfici impunè woluerunt. Cicero " Pro Milone, cap. 3. oldal ory Santa 011 (4) Furem no&urnum fi quis occiderit, ita demum impunè feret, fi parcere ei fine periculo ſuo non potuit. Digeft. Lib. 48. tit. 8. ad Leg. Cornel. de Sycar. Leg. 9. But Mr. Noodt hath Mewed very well, that that Law is ill placed, and that Tribonian had taken no more care than Vlpian, from whom 'cis taken. Lib. 37. ad Edi&tum, where he ſpeaks of the Reparation of the Damage to which the Aquilian Law condemned him, and not of the Puniſhment ordered by the Cornelian. See his Probabil. Jur. Lib. 1.c.9 8.6. S. XIX. (1) The Philoſopher Arrian ſays, That the only way to attone for a Crime, is, in his opinion, to confeſs it, and Thew Repentance, for, adds he, the Fault appears not ſo great to him that has received it, when the Offender acknowledgech that he hath done ill, and he hath realon to hope that he will ſo no more , becauſe he ſeems ſo much troubled for what he has done. Μόνη και η μοιγε δοκά "Ιασις αμαξίας, ομολογείν τε αμαρόντα, και δήλον ε7επ' αυτο μελαγινώσκονία, ως Τοίς παθόσον η άγαει και πανί» χαλεπα τα παθήμαlα φαινόμενα, εί ο δράσας αυτά ξυγχωρότη, όπ και καλά έδρασεν αυτώ π τίνι ες το μέλλον ταυ- τίω ελπίδα αγαθω υπολειπομένων, μη ποτε αν παραπλήσιον τι αμαρτιν, ί τοίς είσθεν πλημμελεθείσιν άχθόμεν, φαίνοιτο, De . ( two they will not take a ſlender Reparation for a fufficient Satisfaction, or ſome Signs of Repentance for Recompence. But as to thoie Damages which Fellow-Citizens do one to another, and for which the Laws preſcribe a Sacisfaction, it is more eaſy to de. termine which of the Contenåers ſhall paſs for the Aggreffor. Obſerv. on Pufendorf, before I end this Chapter, we ſhall fupply a conſiderable Omiffion of our Author, which neither 'he nor Grotius ha taken norice lor, and that is, el chaine for which every one hath to defend his Liberty. Mr. Lacké hach proved the Juſtice and Extent of chat Right which all have to de- fend themſelves; Whoever, ſays he, endeavours to usurp an Abſolute Power over any one, puts himſelf into a state of War with him; fo tbat this last can't look upon the Proceedings of the former but as a plain Attempt against his Life. Indeed, from the Moment that a Man labours to bring me into Subjection to him againſt my Will , I may preſume, that if I fall into his hands he will treat me as he pleaſes, and make no ſcruple co flay me in his Humour. Liberty, if I may ſo ſay, is the Balwark of my Preſervation, and the Foundation of all Things that belong to me; ſo that he that will make me his Slave, authorizes me to repel him all man- ner of ways, that I may ſecure my Perfon and Goods . But here we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh the State of Nature from the Civil State ; for 'cis upon this that the extent of our Right, that we have to defend ourſelves againſt them who would bring us into Subjection to them, depends. Man's Natural Liberty confifts in acknowledging no Superior Authority upon Earth, and follow- ing the Laws of Nature without any dependance upon any other Man. Liberty, in a Civil Society in not ſubmitting to any Le- gillative Power but that which is eſtabliſhed by the general Conſent of the whole Body, nor to any other Government than what they acknowledge, nor to any other Laws than thoſe which the ſame Legiſlative Power may make according to the extent of the Righe which ic hath received. But of this I ſhall ſpeak more largely elſe where. See that Engliſh Author's Treatiſe of Civil Go- vernment, whoſe Notions I have mentioned Lib. 2. Chap 3,84. S. 17, & 22. liogge ind 0010 001016/11 Dd C H A P. (a) la 1.9 d. ad L. Corneli'de Sien arer cani two that oil 202 Book II. CH A P. VI. Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity, The CONTENTS. 1. How many kinds of Neceſſity there is. IV. And what indirectly. II. Wherein the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity V, VI, VII. What Right it confers over other Mens conſiſts. Goods. III. What Right it gives every One over himſelf, and VIII. What we may do to Others Goods to preſerve our directly over others. own Goods. | Pity. T THE Caſe of Neceſſity is a thing in every Body's the Excuſe which we allow to Human Infirmity, Mouth, and the Force of it generally ac- and on the Indulgence of our Mercy and knowledg’d in the World : Hence we commonly But that Neceſſity of Convenience is ſtill much wea- ſay, that it hath no Law, that 'tis a ſuppos’d or pre- ker, and weighs very little either in the Defence fumptive Exception to all Human Ordinances and or the Excuſe of Actions ; unleſs when the Cauſe Conſtitutions; and that therefore it gives a Right comes before ſuch a Judge, as hath more regard of doing many things otherwiſe forbidden (a). to his own partial Inclination, than to the Sug- Now whence this Force or Power ariſes, and geſtions of Wiſdom and to the Demands of how far it extends, we ought with the more Ac- Right. curacy to examine ; becauſe ſome Caſuiſts ſeem Now our Buſineſs on this Subject lies chiefly in to allow it none, or very little Efficacy, as to the examining and ſtating the Neceſſity of Safety, and Morality of Human Actions. But before we in conſidering what force it hath to exempt any proceed to this Enquiry, we may obſerve in ge- Action from the Obligation of Common Laws: neral, that (1) Tully in his Second Book of Inven- that is, Wherher we may not ſometimes do things tion, C. 57. 58. makes a twofold Neceſſity, the one forbidden, and omit things commanded by the ſimple and abſolute, which can by no poſſible means Laws, when we are (not by our own Fault') (2) be reſiſted, alter'd, or abated; and the other Con- caſt into ſuch Straights, that we cannot otherwiſe ditional or Reſpective. This again he divides into ſecure our own Preſervation. And here it is ap- three Kinds, with regard either to Honeſty (b), to parent, that the Favour, the Right, the Leave, or Safety, or to Convenience. Of which, he ſays the whatever it is that in ſuch Cafes we attribute to firſt is by many Degrees the higheſt, the ſecond Neceſſity, doth ſpring from this ſingle Principle, of next Moment and Confideration, and the that it is impoſſible for a Man not to apply his third very much inferior, and not able to ſtand utmoſt Endeavour towards preſerving himſelf; in Competition with the reſt. He proceeds to and that therefore we cannot eaſily conceive or give it for a Rule, that altho' Honeſty be better ſuppoſe, ſuch an Obligation upon him, as ought than Safety, yet in ſome Cafes we may give the to outweigh the Deſire of his own Safety. Preference to the latter ; when what we take from Honeſty in the conſulting our preſent Safety II. No Good and Pious Man can queſtion, but may be recover'd and made up by our future that God Almighty, who is the abſolute Maſter of Vertue and Integrity : When this cannot be done, our Lives, and whoſe free Bounty gave us the pre- Honeſty is abſolutely to be prefer'd and embrac’d. carious Enjoyment of them, may impofe on us fo Others chuſe to ſay, that when the Neceflity of ſevere a Law, that we ought rather to die, than Safety is prefer'd to the Neceſſity of Honeſty, ſuch a to recede the leaſt degree from it. Of which Fact cannot be defended in a direct way, and by kind the Jews took their Law againſt eating any Preſcription of Right, but leans wholly on Swine’s Fleſh to be ; as we find in the Hiſtory of es (a) M. Senec. L. 4. Controv, 27. Neceſſity is the great Patronage and Shelter of Human Infelicity. Callimach. Hymn. in Del, Neceſity's a Mighty Goddeſ. Add, Orat. Lentul, in Liv. L. 9. C. 4. 06) To which belongs that Saying of Pliny. L. 1. Epiſt. 1 2. The Beſt and Higheſt Reaſon paſſeth for Neceſſity with Wife Men. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. VI. $. I. (1) Tully's Words are ; Atque etiam hoc mihi videor dicere, eſſe quaſdam cum adjun&tione neceſſitudines, quafdam fimplices do abſolutas. Puto igitur effe banc neceffitudinem, cui nullâ vi refifti poteſt ; que neque mutari, neque leniri poteft. - Quod adjungitur omni tempore, id pertinebit aut ad boneſtatem aut ad incolumitatem --- aut ad commoditatem. . - Ac ſumma quidem neceffitudo videtur effe boneſtatis; buic proxima incolumitatis, tertia, ac leviſima, commoditatis : quæ cum his nun- quam poterit duabus contendere. Hace autem inter se sæpe neceſſe eſt comparari, ut quamquam præftet honeſtas incolumitati, tamen atri potiffimùm conſulendum fit, deliberetur. Quâ in re fieri poterit, vt cum incolumitati conſuluerimus, quod fit in præſentid de boneſtate delibatum, virtute aliquando do induſtriâ recuperetur, incolumitatis ratio videbitur babenda : cùm autem id non poterit, honejtatis. Farther, we muſt obſerve, that Neceſſity which we muſt fuppofe always happens without this Fault, who is reduced co it, begers a Conteſt not only becween Self-love and Sociableneſs, but alſo between Self-love and Religion; as alſo between the divers Duties of Self-love. The Conteſt between Self- love and Sociableneſs happens when the Perions with whom we ought to have dealt otherwiſe, have no part in the Neceſſity to which we are reduced : For our Author hach ſpoken in the foregoing Chapter of the Conteſt produced by the Reaſon of another's Fact, whether Malicious or not. S:e the Notes on the following Paragraph. 20 A 31 de Lingua e letos (2) Either in his Perſon or Goods, as it appears from the following part of this Chapt:ren en team of the CHA P. V. 203 Of the Right and Privilege of Neceflity, the Maccabees. And their Judgment was then in- the Nature of Man, that the Caſe of Neceſſity is deed right; becauſe as the Caſe ſtood with them, not comprehended under the General Terms of a to eat that ſort of Fleſh was look'd on as an open Law. An Inſtance of this our Saviour himſelf Denial of the True Religion. Whereas, were hath been pleas'd to give us, in David's eating they under no ſuch hard Circumſtances, it was the Shew-bread (2), intimating, that the Matter no Sin for a Man to keep himſelf from ſtarving and the Reaſon of the Law which forbad that by feeding on this forbidden Meat, when no other Action in general, could not be ſuppos’d to have could be procur’d. Sometimes too by the Autho- any ſuch rigorous Deſign, as that a Man ought rity of a Civil Sovereign, Men may receive fo rather to die with Hunger, than to touch the ſtrict and rigorous Commands, that they muſt ra- Confecrated Food (2). ther part with their Lives, than omit the Duty It is plain then, that as to Poſitive Laws this enjoin’d them. But the Obligation of Poſitive Privilege of Necelity is admitted and allow'd : Laws is not always preſum'd to be ſo harſh and But 'cis a Point much more difficult to determine, ſevere. For in as much as the Authors of theſe, whether the ſame Favour can take place in (3) or of any other Rules and Conſtirutions in the the Laws of Nature: that is, Whether in Necesſary World chiefly deſign’d by them to promote the Caſes we may fairly omit what is Naturally com- Safety or Convenience of Mankind, we may ſup- manded, or perform what is Naturally forbidden. poſe them, generally ſpeaking, to have had before As for the firſt Queſtion, it appears from the Na- their Eyes the weak Condition of Human Nature; ture of Affirmative Precepts, that whenever they and to have reflected on the Impoſſibility which oblige a Man to the actual exerting of ſuch a Per- every Man lies under, not to avoid, and to drive formance as is enjoin'd, they at the ſame time off , all things that aim at his Deſtruction. Upon fuppoſe him to have Opportunity, Subject, and this account then, (1) moſt Laws, eſpecially thoſe Power of acting ; But now we may fairly judge which we call Poſitive, are judg’d to except the theſe Conditions to be wanting, when I cannot Caſes of Neceſſity; that is, not to oblige, when the do a thing without the Loſs of my Life. Since to Obſervance of them muſt be attended with ſome throw off the Love and the Care of ourſelves, is Evil, deſtructive of our Nature, or exceeding the juſtly rank'd amongſt impoſſible Attempts; or ordinary Patience and Conſtancy of Human however amongſt ſuch as furpaſs the common Minds : Unleſs when this very Caſe is included Strength of Mens Souls. Therefore, unleſs it plainly in the Injunction, either by expreſs men either be exprefly and particularly provided by tion, or becauſe the Nature of the Buſineſs cuts the Law, or deducible from the Quality of the off all Exception and Reſerve. Hence it is clear, Buſineſs to be undertaken, that I muſt rather lay that no ſuch Power ought to be attributed to Ne- down my Life than omit the Duty, all affirma- ceſſity, as that it ſhould give us the Privilege of di- tive Edicts of Nature may be underſtood to ex- rectly violating a Law, or of committing a Sin; cept the Caſe of extreme Neceſſity : Eſpecially but we only preſume from the favourable Intenti- when a Man hach not fallen under ſuch Neceffity on of Legiſlators, and from the Conſideration of through his own Neglect and Default. Thus Í (a) See Matt. xii. 4. Add. Caſaubon Exercitat. ad Baron. 1. n. 9. S. II. (1) Otherwiſe, as Mr. Thomaſius obferves, the Publick Good redounds from the Good of Private Perſons; and for the moft part, the Preſervation of a Private Perſon is more advantageous to the State, than the Obſervation of any Human Law. Inftit. Juriſpr. Div. Lib. 2. Chap. 2, S. 131. (2) We muſt ſay the ſame thing of Prohibitions to keep Days of Feſtival, to which our Author's Words referr, Neceſit as feriis caret, out of Pallad. de re Ruſtic. Lib. I. Chap. 6. Neceſſity makes no Holidays. (3) Theſe Principles are more exact, and proper to decide all Queſtions which can be propoſed in this matter; They are bor- rowed from Mr. Titius's Obſerv. CXLI. and partly from Thomaſius's Inſtit. Juriſpr. Divin. Iib. 2. Chap. 2. S. 130, doc. but we muſt diſtinguiſh between the Laws which concern God, and thoſe that relate to Men. As to the firſt of theſe, we may lay down theſe two Rules ; 1. That always in doing or not doing a certain Action, we ſhew directly, or indirectly, ſome Contempo of the Divine Majeſty, the Law which' forbids, or orders this Action otherwiſe, admits of no Exception in Caſes of Neceſſity; for in this laft Caſe, the Nature of the Thing itſelf makes it evident, that no Man ought to preſerve his own Life by any thing whereby God is diſhonoured. 2. But if in doing, or not doing a certain Action, we do not directly, or indirectly, ſhew any Contempt of the Divine Majeſty, the Law which forbids, or orders that action otherwiſe, does not indiſpenſibly oblige, in a Caſe of extreanı Neceſſity, for then the Glory of God nor ſuffering any Affront, his Infinite Goodneſs will not allow us to pre- ſume that he will nor oblige us to expoſe our Lives needleſly, or our Goods. So that as we cannot commir any Action poſitive- ly forbidden by the Law of Nature, without the wing at leaſt indirectly fome Contempt of the Supream Legiſlator, thele fort of Negative Laws admic of no Exception in the Caſe of Neceſſity; and ſo much the more, if we do not find ourſelves reduced to this Dilemma, either to die, or break fome Negative Maxim of the Natural Law, which thro' the Violence of him that propoſes it, either formally, or by Interpretation, may make us contemn the Authority of the Supream Legiſlator. Wherefore we muſt reſolve rather to die, than lie (for Example) with our Mother, or ſlay a Perſon whom we know to be Innocent. See what we have ſaid upon Lib. 1. Chap. s. S. 9. Note 2. Bue we may, to avoid a great Evil, with which we are threarned by an unjuſt Ag- greffor, promiſe fomething, even with an Oath, without Intention of Swearing, or Contracting by ſuch a forced Act, any valid Obligation ; for in that Cafe 'tis neither a true Oath nor Promiſe, and he that forces us unjuſtly, does it only becauſe he thinks we have a greater Reſpect to the Deity, otherwiſe he would not value it , fo far is he from engaging us to violate our Duty,that he would vine Law, as they are otherwiſe indifferent in themſelves, the Exception of the Caſe of Neceffiry hath place, or not, in that re- (pect, according as in doing of them ive thew, or not, ſome Contempt of the Divine Majeſty, which muſt be judged of by Circumſtances. The firſt is ſeen in the Example of David, and the other in the Seven Brethren ſpoken of in the History of the Maccabees, upon which our Author reaſons well. As to the Natural afirmative Laws, which concern the Divinity, Mr. Titius believes with Mr. Thomaſius, that they do not indiſpenſably oblige to an outward poſitive Worſhip, whoſe Omiſſion may be a dgn of ſuch a Contempt. See what is ſaid upon Chap. IV. of this Book, S. 3. Note 2! But alcho' ſome Acts of Ourward Worſhip are exprefly commanded by ſome Poſitive Law, we are not obliged to practiſe them in the Caſe of Extream Neceſſity, unles the Omiſſion paſles for an open, or tacit Abjuration of the Religion which we eſteem true, as in the Caſe of Daniel, chap. 16. or when it Thews a Contempt of the Divinity directly or indirectly, which doos nor commonly happen. I ſhall ſpeak in Nore s. of the Privileges of Neceſſity, with relation to the Duties which concern Men themſelves. D d' 2 am 204 Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity. Book II. o deliver out of Danger, whereas in the other 'tis the Malice of Man, am not bound to furniſh an hungry Perſon with violated a Law, unleſs the A&t can be rightly im- Bread, when I want it for my own Suſtenance puted to him. Now an Act may proceed from a (a)(4); Or to help a Man that is drowning, Man two ways, either as he is the Principal, or as when I cannot ſave him without loſing my ſelf. he is the inſtrumental Cauſe of it. And this Inftru- Seneca's Reſolution is good in both Caſes, I will mental Cauſe is again of two kinds, either as it give (ſays he (b) to thoſe that are in need ; but ſo as exerciſes no Motion but what is impreſs’d on it by not to put myſelf in the same needy Condition : i will the Principal Cauſe, and againſt its own Natural ſuccour thoſe who are ready to perish ; but ſo as not to Inclination, if it have any; or, as it applies itſelf expoſe my ſelf to certain Ruine. upon its own proper and internal Impulſe to ſuch As for the Negative Precepts, or the Prohibiti- a Performance, tho' the Influence and the Di- ons of Natural Laws, this in the firſt place is moſt rection of the firſt Cauſe do likewiſe aſſiſt in the certain, that no Neceſſity can make it allowable for Operation. If then a Man be, according to this us to undertake an Aétion directly diſhonouring latter way, Inſtrumental in an Act, the Aat may Almighty God; as ſuppoſe, to blaſpheme or to not only be imputed to the Principal Cauſe, but alſo deny him, and renounce his Worſhip and Service, to him, as his true and proper Work. But if he tho' for the avoiding of preſent Death. For in as be Inſtrumental or Concurrent only in the former much as God is able to inflict on a Man a much manner, the Act ſhall not be imputed to him, but more grievous Evil than Natural Death can be only to the Principal Agent. What farther Con- imagin'd to be, our Reaſon doth with good Pro- ditions are requiſite to this Caſe ſhall hereafter bability aſſure us, that he will requite us with a be (6) more largely explain’d. much more noble Happineſs, when we part with our Lives for his Sake : On the other hand, it III. Thus much being premiſed, we may go on would be abſurd, as well as impious, to ſin againſt to diſcuſs the particular Caſes, and Queſtions uſu- the Divine Honour for the eſcaping of a leſſer ally diſputed on this Head. In reference then to Evil, than what he incurs by ſuch an Offence (c). a Man's felf, tho'otherwiſe he hath no ſuch Right Yet the unhappy Caſe of thoſe who yield to the and Power over his Members as to deſtroy, to di- Force and Violence of Tortures, is not altogether ſtort, or to maim them at his Pleaſure; yet it unworthy of our Pity. ſhall be lawful for him to cut off a Limb, that is Concerning thoſe Laws which contain the mu- either poſſeſs’d by an Incurable Gangrene, or that tual Duties (5) of Men, it may be firſt obſerv’d, is rendred uſeleſs by a Wound; in the former that ſome of theſe Natural Precepts do preſuppoſé Cafe (1), to keep the whole Body from periſhing, ſome Human Deed or Inſtitution; which, as may or the ſound Parts from being infe&ted, and in the be gather'd from its End and Purport, not extend- latter, that the uſe of the other Members be not ing to the Caſe of extreme Neceflity; the ſame hindred by the Clog of an unſerviceable and cuma Exception may be fairly underſtood in the Law. berſome Appendage. Whether the extreameſt And then we may remark farther, that a Man Neceſſity doth farther give a Man any Right over cannot be ſaid by his own Act immediately to have his own Life, that is, whether for the eſcaping a (a) See 1 Corinth, viii. 13. (b) De Benef. L. 2. C. 15. (c) Carpyllod. in Antholog. * *He dordeong Good Men, whatever Scenes of Fare they fee, 'Ανδρέαν ευσεβίης απόλαλε χάρις. Shall ne'er be Loſers by their Piery. (4) This Paffage is quoted Chap. III. S. 18. Note 2. of this Book. (s) As often as in doing any Action otherwiſe forbidden, with relation to another, or ourſelves, we find a ſure way to avoid ſome great Danger, without falling into ſome greater Evil, or equal to that from which we keep ourſelves, the Law permits an Exception of the Caſe of Neceffity. 2. But if the Performance of the like Action is no furer way of eſcaping the Danger and the Evil which may redound from it, appears greater, or equal, the Law does not allow the Exception of a Caſe of Neceſſity. By ſure means we underſtand thoſe which have a Natural and Neceſſary Power to remove the Danger wherewith we are threat- ned, and not a pure arbitrary Force, which depends upon the Fancy of hiın who has brought himſelf into that Neceſſity; for in ' and ſuch a Malice as incends either directly, or indirectly, to oblige us to diſobey the Magiſtrate. We may add, that the Cer- tainty of the Means of which we are ſpeaking, is not an abſolute and infallible Certainty, and ſuch as ought to be underſtood in a Negative Senſe, rather than a Poſitive, i. e. inſomuch that withont ſuch a Means we are loft, and are not ſure we ſhall eſcape if we put them in practiſe. A Man, for Example, who is purſued, may be at length Convicted, but to make his Eſcape runs in hafte upon a Cripple who ſtands in his way, this is no hindrance but that he might make his Way, altho' he did ſome great Damage to him who was not able to retire, for Nature allows every one to maintain his Ground as long as he can. As for the great Injury which may ariſe from that to which Neceſſity leads us, it ought alſo to be meaſured phyſically, for we neither can, nor ought to compare the Moral Evil which may be on the one ſide, or the other, becauſe that's the Thing in Queſtion. Pro- vided therefore that there be no Fault in him who is in danger, which muſt always be ſuppoſed here, the Circumſtances ob- ſerved, are ſufficient to enable us to make a probable Conjecture of the Will of GOD, for the Law of Nature, which without Contradiction tends to the Happineſs of Mankind, when we can be probably delivered from a great Evil by expoſing ourſelves to a Jeffer, we have Reaſon to chooſe the latter. But if the Evil which we embrace is equal to that from which we ty, and we cannot otherwiſe promiſe ourſelves any Certainty, to avoid the Danger by that means, in this caſe nothing can diſpenſe with our Obedience. See Mr. Titius's Obferv.CXLI. "As to the Affirmative Precepts of the Law of Nature, which referr to another, our Author has treated of them well enough. (5) See Lib. VIII. Chap. 1. 5. 6. and what I ſhall ſay upon it contrary to our Author's Notions . S. III. (1) We may in this place apply the Principles laid down in Note 4. of the precedent Ş. Indeed the loſs of a Member is withour Contradiction a leffer Evil than the loſs of Life, and is alſo a ſure means to keep ourſelves from Danger. The ſame Thing hath place, as any one may ſee, in the Caſes where to ſave a more noble and neceſſary Member, we are contented to be deprived of one leſs conſiderable and uſeful. But we ought to obſerve, 1. That it is ſufficient here to ſuppole a bare Permiſſi- on, there being but few Men who have Courage ſufficient to bear ſuch a painful Operation as the Cutting off a Member dange- roully affected is , and therefore had rather die of their Wounds in eaſe. 2. That Neceſſity to which we are reduced ought not to be underſtood in its utmoſt rigour. So that when we have in ſome manner contributed by our own Faule to put ourſelves into ſuch an Extremity, we may not lawfully, to retrieve our Affairs, reſolve upon a thing otherwiſe unlawful. See Mr. Titius's Obſerv, CXLII. 1 Death CHAP. VI. 205 Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſity. Death of Ignominy or of Torture, he may lay third place, doth there lie any Objection of Cru- hold on more gentle Means of leaving the World, elty, when the Perſon dying for the Safety of his we have enquir'd and ſtared in the preceeding Companions, receives the Inſtrument of Death Chapter. We may proceed therefore to examine with leſs Grief and Reluctancy than the others what Right Neceſſity can give us over others, To apply it. There is another Cafe worth examin- feed on Man's Fleſh in the deſperate Extremity of ing, (3) ſuppoſe in a Shipwrack more Men leap Famine, when no other Suftenance can be pro- into the little Boat than it is able to carry, and cur’d, is a lamentable, indeed, but not a ſinful, the Boat belongs to no one by a more peculiar Expedient. But as for thoſe Inſtances, when in Right than to the reſt ; whether they may not Diſtreſs and Want of all Proviſions, Men have fairly draw Lots who ſhall be caſt over-board; been kill'd to preſerve their Fellows, either by and whether if any one refuſe thus to take his Compulſion and againſt their Conſent, or elſe by Chance, he may not be thrown out without far- the Determination of Lot, the Deciſion of them ther Deliberation, as one that ſeeks the Deſtru- is a Point of ſome Difficulty and Uncertainty. ction of the whole Company. But theſe Caſes In as much as whatever the Law againſt Murther being ſuch as very rarely fall out, (4) we chooſe ſuggeſts on one ſide, the Sharpneſs of Hunger at preſent to ſuſpend our Poſitive Judgment con- pleads as loud on the other, and the Belly, that cerning them. Advocate without Ears: Eſpecially, conſidering that unleſs this unhappy Means was made uſe of, IV. This may more frequently happen, that the whole Company muſt have inevitably periſh’d. two Perſons being under imminent Danger of This is one of thoſe Caſes in which a Man ought their Lives, both muſt unavoidably periſh, unleſs to die rather than commit the Fact, it being di- one of them, for his own Deliverance, haftens, rectly contrary to the Laws both of God and by ſome Act, the Fate of the other, which would Nature (a) (2). To this purpoſe we have a Story however have ſoon arriv’d. Or, that upon Ne- of Seven Engliſh-Men, who being toſs'd in the ceflity we may bring on another, indire&ly, the Main Ocean without Meat or Drink, killd one Danger of Death, or of ſome grievous Hurt; of their Number, on whom the Lot fell, and who not deſigning to harm him, but only to exerciſe had the Courage not to be diſſatisfied, afſwaging, ſuch an Act as may probably prove miſchievous in ſome meaſure with his Body, their intolerable to him ; at the ſame time defiring any other way and almoſt famiſh'd Condition : Whom when to get rid of our Neceſſity and Streights, and en- they at laſt came to Shore, the Judges abfolv'd of deavouring, as far as lies in our Power, to make the Crime of Murther. Ziegler upon Grotius (6), the Damage fall light on the Suffering Party. giving this Relation, is of Opinion, That the Men Now this kind of Hurt, as we judge it not to cauſe were all guilty of a great Sin, for conſpiring against the any Sin in the Giver, ſo we think the Receiver Life of one in the Company, and (if it ſhould ſo happen) ought to look on it as purely an Accidental Evil, every one against his own ; thus regarding Bodily Peril upon account of which he has no reaſon to be more than the Danger of their Souls. That no one ought angry at the Author. Let us conſider an Inſtance to have ſet ſo little a Value on his Life, as to loſe it for or two of both Caſes. If I, being a Skilful Swim- ſatisfying the Hunger of the rest : And that the rest mer, fall into deep Waters with another utterly ought not to have been ſo cruel to their Fellow, in Com- ignorant of that Art, and he, as the uſual way is, pliment to their own Stomachs. But to this it might clings faſt about me, who am not able to drag be anſwer'd, that 'tis too harſh and rigorous a out both Burthens; who will blame me for uſing Cenſure, to ſay that thoſe Men conſpire against all my Strength to get rid of him, and ſo to pre- the Life of another, who agree to take the Chance vent my own Death, tho' perhaps I could, with of dying one of them, for preſerving the Lives hard ſhift, have held him ſome few Minutes above of all the reſt (c). And conſequently they could Water ? so in a Wreck (1), if I have taken Pof- put their Souls into no Danger by this Unfortu-' ſeſſion of a Plank which will not hold two, and nate Reſolution. Nor is the Charge of underva- another ſwimming towards me, ſhall endeavour luing their Lives any better grounded ; ſince he to throw himſelf upon it, to the Deſtruction of only can fall under this Imputation who throws us both; there ſeems to be no Reaſon why I himſelf away without Neceſſity. Nor, in the ſhould not apply the utmoſt Violence in keeping (a) Homer Odyſ. 8. Oj 78 77 sogeçñ, &c. The Belly, like a Bold Pecitioner, Breaks rudely in, and forceth you to hear. (b) Ad Grot. L. 2. C I, from Nich. Tulpius Obſervat, Medicin. (c) See Jonah, 1. 7, &c. (2) Mr. Titius's Obferv. CXLIV. thinks it neither unlawful, nor of an indiſpenſible Obligation, but he ſays, “ That they who are reduced to this Extremity, ought not nevertheleſs to reſolve upon a thing ſo ſad and inhuman; for altho' commonly the ci Affections of Men one to another, eſpecially ſuch as are neither Parents nor Friends, are very cool, yet when they are involved si in any common Danger, the ſenſe of that naturally awakens our Thoughts of Humanity and compaſſion, which make us chooſe s rather to die ourſelves, or wait the unforeſeen Events of Divine Providence, than have recourſe to ſuch an irkſome and barba- " rous Expedient, by which we are not yet ſure that we fall ſave our Lives. (3) In truth, the Maſter of the Shallop doth not ſeem to be obliged to draw Lots with the others, which he permitted lo- pingly to come into it, and conſequently he might make them caft Lors to ſave himſelf, (4) Our Author determines it by ſaying, it ſeems fo to me, in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, Lib. I. Chap. 5. 6. 2. him, becauſe he brings upon me as great an Evil directly, as that he faves 'himſelf from. Moreover, I am here the firſt in S. 1V. (1) But if that other being ſtronger than I, drive me from my Plank, the Neceſſicy of ſaving his Life will not excuſe time, the Plank belonged to me by the Right of the firſt óccupant, and ſo he could nor drive me from it without Injuſtice. We muft ſay the ſame thing of a Man who, when an Army is routed, will ſeize upon an Horſe which belongs to a Wounded Perſon, and leaves him infallibly expos’d to the Fury of the Enemy, to ſave his own Life the more certainly. Theſe are the two Caſes mention'd by Laftandins, in the place above quoted, Chap. 3. S. 11. Note 2. him 206 Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity. BOOK II. much more in a Caſe of Neceſſity, in which we can't practite him off. And thus likewiſe if two Men are pur- Curtius, L. 4. C. 16. when things were not brought ſued hard by an Enemy, bringing Death in his to deſperate Excremity, bravely refus’d to break Hand, if both cannot be ſaved, one of them may, down the Bridge of the River Lycus, which he for his own Security, either by breaking down had paſs’d with ſome part of an Army in a Re- a Bridge, or ſhutting a Gate after him, leave the treat; making this Generous Declaration, That he other in imminent danger of being kill’d. This bad rather give a Pusſage to thoſe that purſu'd, than kind of Neceſſity often happens in War ; where take it from thoſe that fled. tis a Rule, that at any time ſome few are to be An Inſtance (3) of the other Caſe which we left in Diſtreſs, for ſecuring the Main Body. mention'd in general, may be this : Suppoſe a Arrian de Expedit. Alexand. L. 6. It was neceſſary to Perſon of more Strength than myſelf, follows me ſet aſide the care of ſingle Perſons, in Proſecution of the cloſe with Intention to kill me, and I meet one Common Safety. Virgil Æn. IX. v. 722, &c. in a narrow Paſſage, thro' which I muſt take my Flight, if upon my Requeſt he will not get out PANDARU S ut fuſo germanum corpore cernit, of the way, or if he has not time or room to Et quo fit fortuna loco, qui caſus agat res; ſtand off, I may throw him down and run over Portam vi multa converſo cardine torquet, him, tho' the Fall, in all probability, will be very Obnix is latis humeris : multoſque ſuorum, grievous and hurtful to him: Unleſs he be ſuch Manibus exclufos, duro in certamine linquit. an one as, by virtue of ſome peculiar Obligation, I am bound at any time to ſerve voluntarily with When Pandarus beheld his Brother kill'd, my own Danger. And if the Perſon who thus The Town with Fear and wild Confuſion fill'd. ſtops my Flight be not able to look to himſelf up- He turns the Hinges of the heavy Gate, (Weight. on my calling to him, as ſuppoſe a Lame Man With both his Hands, and adds his Shoulders to the or a Child, I ſhall certainly deſerve excuſe, if I Some happier Friends within the Walls inclos’d; attempt to leap over him (either being on Horſe- The reſt Thut out to certain Death expos’d. back or a-foot) rather than to fall into my Ene- Mr. Dryden. mies hands by my Delay. As for that other Ex- ample, which ſome give, it plainly appears not to And again, L. XI. v. 884, &c. after the Defeat be without Fault: The Caſe is this, (4) A Captain of the Latin Horſe, flying from a Battle, and being cloſely follow'd by the Enemy, one of his Men happening to be got just before Pars claudere Portas, him in the Crowd, be runs him thro' to get off with Nec Sociis aperire viam, nec manibus audent the more Expedition. Now here the Captain was Accipere orantes. ſtrong enough to have made his way only by puſhing down the Fellow that ſtop'd him, and Then in a Fright the Folding Gates they cloſe, therefore ought not to have us’d ſo violent Means. But leave their Friends excluded with their Foes. Yet if in getting by him he had undeſignedly hurt Mr. Dryden. him with his Arms, the Miſchance would have been very pardonable. But in caſe a Man either Compare Livy, L. 26. 15. Where the Thurini made out of a Frolickſome, or a Cruel and Barbarous a wicked and treacherous uſe of this Pretence. Humour, ftops me on purpoſe, and refuſes to Florus (L. 2. C. 18.) ſays of the Numantines, At make room for me to eſcape, I may preſently length they entred into a Reſolution of Flight : But this uſe him as an Enemy, and thruſt him down by their Wives prevented, by cutting in pieces the Harneſs any means I can, how much foever he is like to of their Horſes ; committing a baſe Cruelty through an ſuffer by the Bruiſe (a). To conclude this point, extremity of Love. Tacitros (Ann. 14. C. 32,33.) cen as the declining Death any way admits of much ſures it as the Effect of ill Conduct, or of Trea- Favour and Excuſe, ſo if the Danger offer'd be chery, that when the Romans were beſieg'd in Ca- no more than a Maiming, or a Grievous Wound, molodunum, Non motis ſenibus eu fæminis juventus fola and we fly from it with the Hurt of thoſe that reftiterit : the Young and Able Men did not throw chance to ſtop us, the Fact will bear much the out the Women, and Perſons ufeleſs through Age, fame Apology or Defence. For he who offers and ſo clearing the Place make it more capable ſuch a Violence may be refifted, as much as if he of Defence. (Add. Livy, L. 5.c. 40.) On the directly attempted to murther us; and when we contrary, he tells us in the fame Story, that Sue are compellid to conſult our Safery by Flight, the tonius reſolu'd to hazard the Loſs of one Town for the Confternation we muſt needs lie under vindicates Security of the whole Province ; and therefore he would our Innocence, as to any ſudden and unfortunate not be mov’d by the Cries and Intreaties of thoſe who Accident that we chance to treſpaſs in. begg’d him to ſtay and protext them : But giving the Sign for Marching, be receiv'd all into his Troops that V. Let us enquire in the next place, whether were willing and able to follow him ; and as for thoſe the Neceſſity of preſerving our Life can give us whom either the Weakneſs of their sex, or the Burthen any Right over other Mens Goods; ſo as to make of their Age hindred from ſtirring, they were left to it allowable for us to ſeize on them for our Re- the Mcrcy of the Barbarians. Yet Darius in Quintus lief, either ſecretly, or by open Force, againſt (a) Comp. La&ant. Inſtitut, l. 5.c. 17. which some have vainly oppos’d to the Opinion here deliver’d. (2) Theſe fort of Caſes have no difficulty in them, for he treats of che affirmative Precepts of the Law of Nature, which chem, but at the Expence of our own Preſervation. See Mr. Titius, Obferv. CXLV. (4) It is eaſy to fee, that the action here alledged is not innocent, This Officer might have made way for himſelf forci- bly, by thruſting the Soldier aſide, but if he had hurt him with his Arms undeſignedly, he was excuſed. the CHAP. VI. Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity. 207 the Owner's Conſent. For the more clear and ſuch Alms as was proper for him, could force him folid Determination of which Point, we think it to it by an Action at Law. 'Tis no Wonder neceſſary to hint in ſhort on the Cauſes upon therefore, that they ſhould forbid their Poor on which Diſtinct Proprieties were firſt introduc'd in any account to ſeize on the Goods of others, en. the World; deſigning to examine them more at joining them to take only what Private Perſons, large in their proper place (a). Now the main or the Publick Officers, or Stewards of Alms Reaſons on which Proprieties are founded, we take ſhould give them on their Petition. Whence the to be theſe two, that the Feuds and Quarrels ſtealing of what was another's, cho' upon extreme might be appe:as'd which aroſe in the Primitive Neceflicy, paſs’d in that State for Theft or Ra- Communion of Things, and that Men might be pine. But now ſuppoſing under another Govern- put under a kind of Neceflity of being Induſtri ment the like good Proviſion is not made for Per- ous, every one being to get his Maintenance by ſons in Want, ſuppoſing likewiſe that the Cove- his own Application and Labour. This Diviſion tous Temper of Men of Subſtance cannot be pre- therefore of Goods was not made, that every Per- vaild on to give Relief, and that the Needy Crea- fon ſhould ſit idly (1) brooding over the Share of ture is not able, either by his work or Service, Wealth he had got, without aſſiſting or ſerving or by making Sale of any thing that he poffefles, his Fellows ; but that any one might diſpoſe of to allift his preſent Neceflity, muft he therefore his Things how he pleas’d, and if he thought fit periſh with Famine? Or can any Human Inſti- to communicate them to others, he might at leaſt tution bind me with ſuch a force, that in caſe a- be thus furniſh'd with an Opportunity of laying nother Man neglects his Duty towards me, I muſt Obligations on the reſt of Mankind. Hence rather die, than recede a little from the ordinary when Proprieties were once eſtabliſh'd, Men ob- and the regular way of acting? We conceive tain'd a Power not only of exerciſing Commerce therefore, that ſuch a Perſon doth not contract to their mutual Advantage and Gain, but likewiſe the Guilt of Theft, who happening, not through of diſpenſing more largely in the Works of Hu- his own Fault, to be in extreme Want, either of manity and Beneficence; whence their Diligence neceſſary Food, or of Cloaths to preſerve him had procur’d them a greater Share of Goods than from the Violence of Weather (2) and cannot others: Whereas before, when all Things lay in obtain them from the voluntary Gift of the common, Men could lend one another no Ali- Rich, either by urgent Intreaties, or by offering ſtance but what was ſupplied by their Corporal ſomewhat equivalent in Price, or by engaging Ability, and could be Charitable of nothing but to Work it out, fhall either forcibly or privily Re- of their Strength(b). Farther, ſuch is the Force of lieve himſelf out of their Abundance ; eſpecially Propriety, that the Proprietor hath a Right of deliver- if he do it with full Intention to pay the Value ing his Goods with his own Hands; even ſuch as of them, whenever his better Fortune gives hini he is oblig'd to give to others. Whence it follows, Ability. Some Men deny that ſuch a Caſe of that when one Man has aay thing owing from Neceſſity, as we ſpeak of, can poſſibly happen. another, he is not preſently to ſeize on it at a ven But what if a Man ſhould wander in a Foreign ture, but ought to apply himſelf to the Owner, Land, Unknown, Friendleſs and in Want, ſpoil'd defiring to receive it from his Diſpoſal. Yet in of all he had by Shipwreck, or by Robbers, or caſe the other Party refuſe thus to make good his having loſt by ſome Caſualty whatever he was Obligation, the Power and Privilege of Propriety worth in his own Country; Mould none be found doch not reach ſo far as that the Things may not willing either to relieve his Diſtreſs, or to hire be taken away without the Owner's Conſent, ei- his Service, and ſhould they rather, (as it com- ther by the Authority of the Magiſtrate in Civil monly happens) ſeeing him in a good Garb, fu- Communities, or in a State of Nature, by Violence ſpect him to beg without Reaſon, muſt the Poor and Hoftile Force. And tho' in regard to bare Creature ſtarve (3) in this miſerable Condition? Natural Right, for a Man to relieve another in It may be objected indeed, that in Proverbs vi. 30, Extremity with his Goods, for which he himſelf 31. he is call'd a Thief, and pronounced obnoxi- hath not ſo much Occaſion, be a Dury obliging ous to the Penalty of Theft, who ſteals only to only Imperfectly, and not in the manner of a Debt, fatisfy his Hunger. But whoever cloſely views ſince it ariſes wholly from the Vertue of Humanity; and conſiders that Text, will find that the Thief yet there ſeems to be no Reaſon why by the ad- chere cenſur'd is neither in ſuch extreme Neceſſity, ditional Force of a Civil Ordinance, it may not as we are now ſuppoſing, nor ſeems to have fal- be turn'd n'd into a ſtrict and perfe& Obligation. len into his needy Condition meerly by ill For- And this Selden obſerves to have been done among tune, without his own Idleneſs or Default : For the Fews : Who, upon a Man's refuſing to give the Context implies, that he had a Houſe and (4) Lib. 4. C. 4. (6) See Ephef. iv. 28. der The State. The idea of the 920 1919 190 S: V. (1) Aut qui. Divitiis ſoli incubuere repertis, Nec partem poſuere fuis, &c. 13 Virg. Æn. VI. 618, 611. (2) If in a Caſe of Neceſſity a Man may innocently do ſome Wrong to another in his Perſon, ſo far as to put him in Dan. ger of his life to ſave his own, by a much Aronger Reaſon will he be permitted, in like Cafes, to take away or deſtroy the Goods of another, which are of much leſs Value than Life and Members. Tbomaſ . Inſtit. Juriſprud. Div. Lib. 2. Ch. 2. S. 168. Note 1. and Titius's Obferv, CXLVII. bat (3) Mr. Hertius has alledged an Example here, which is this; When the Magiſtrare, in a grcat Scarcity of Proviſions, con- ſpires with thoſe that will not open their Granaries, that they may fell their Corn the dearer, or at leaft he neglects to hinder Monopolies , and puniſh the Barbarous Cruelty of thoſe who to enrich themſelves, care not how many Men they bring to sd nuppur odo delamos o DITU VUC Goods Beggary 208 Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity. BOOK II. -וע to fome Perſon of the Country,2,be Danger. own him , , Goods ſufficient to make (4) Sevenfold Reſtituti. Neceſſity? Yet this Grotius doth by no means al- on; which he might have either Sold or Pawn'd; low. Again, Grotius requires Reſtitution to be a Chapman or Creditor being eaſily to be mer made in theſe Caſes : But I am oblig'd'to no ſuch with in Times of Plenty and Peace. For we have Duty, when I take a Thing no Grounds to think, that the Fac there menti- Right. Beſides, he forgot to mention how dif- ond is ſuppos’d to be committed, either in the ferent the Caſe is, when a Man falls under ſuch Time of War, or upon account of the extraordi- Neceflity by his own Sloth or Negligence, and nary Price of Proviſions. Beſides, this Thief was when it comes on him without his Fault. Which faulty on another Account : For if he had not Diſtinction being omitsed, a Right ſeems to be wherewithal to maintain himſelf, the Laws oblig'd given to idle Knaves, whoſe Vices have brought him to ſell himſelf for a Slave (a). 9; 1013 SIT E them into Want, to ſeize forcibly for their own W the Uſe the Fruits of other Mens honeſt Labours VI. Grotius (b) propoſes another way of ſolving and ſo continuing their Poverty and their Lazi. the Difficulty under our preſent Debate: He ſays, neſs together, to put a Neceflíry on Induftrious that the firſt Introducers of diſtinct Proprieties muſt Perſons of feeding ſuch uſeleſs Bellies for No- be underſtood to have done it with this Exception thing. But all Wife Men, as they allow ſuch as and Limitation, that the Right of this Propriety are innocently Miſerable to deſerve Aliſtance excluding others from the Uſe of every Man's and Relief; ſo they adviſe us to pack off Mendi- proper Goods ought then to expire and to give cant Drones and Lubbards, with the old Anſwer place, when another cannot poflibly without that the Ant gave the Graſhopper in the Fable (c! making uſe of them, be ſuſtaind or preſervd : Since then it is lawful for every Proprietor r to di And conſequently, that in ſuch a Caſe of Neceſſity ftinguiſh between fuch as are Indigent out of a thing poſſeſs’d in Peculiar, when another Man's Misfortune, and ſuch as are reduc'd to the fame Life cannot be fav’d without it, is turn'd again Condition by their own Demerit and Neglect; into Common. Or, what amounts to the fame 'ris plain, that he has ſuch a Right over his own Purpoſe, that when Men originally inſtituted-ſe- Goods, as ſhall in ſome meaſure prevail even a- parate Proprieties, they agreed by Mutual Cove- gainſt a Perſon in extreme Neceſſity : So far at nant, to forbear uſing the particular Goods of leaſt as that he ſhall have the Privilege of judging, each other, any farther than the Owner ſhould whether the Man be an Object worthy of his Re. give leave : Yet fo as to make it allowable in lief or not ; that it may be in his power to oblige extreme Neceſſity, for a Man to ſeize on any and win a neceſſitous Perſon by his ſeaſonable thing abſolutely-requiſite for his Preſervation, as Succours : For nothing raiſes the Value of a Kind- if it ſtill lay in its primitive Iridifference and neſs ſo much as its being done for the Removal of Community. For ſince in Written Lows, that In an extreme Diſtreſs? But all this Merit and Ob- terpretation is to be follow'd which recedes the ligation is cut off, when we give another, only leaſt from Natural Equity, he preſumes this will what he might otherwiſe, as his own Right and hold more ſtrongly in regard to Cuſtoms, which Due, violently take from us. q po e obtain only by tacit Agreement. And ſurely it We think therefore, that this point of Diſpute muſt be in the higheſt Degree Equitable, that will be more clearly determin'd by the Principles a Man be permitted to ſave this Life, by uſing and the Method which we have laid down: that any Thing at hand, when all other Means failis, By ſaying, in fore, that the Wealthy Perfon him. oothieu is bound to relieve him who Innocently wants, But this Expoſition lies open to ſeveral Ex- by an Imperfect Obligation ; to the performing ceptions and Difficulties : For if Neceſſity gives a of which though regularly no Man ought to be Man a Right of ſeizing on the Goods of others, compelld by Violence, yet the force of Extreme as if they lay in Common, what hinders but Néceſſity is ſo great, , as to make theſe Things re- that, if he have ſufficient Strength, (1) he may coverable by the ſame Means 'as thoſe which are take them from the Owners, when they theme truly and rightfully due : that is; ' By making felves are at the fame time pinch'd with the like Complaint (2) to the Magiſtrate, or when the Joia) See Levit. xxv. 39. Selden L. 6. C.7. Nothing can be drawn to the contrary from Prov. xxx. 7. Other Authors give this Example of Extreme Neceflity. A man being in an unknown Country, is attack’d' by an unjust Aſſailant, and cannot otherwiſe fave himſelf than by freedy Flight. He band, o Herre which he ſees no means of reſtoring, aus wed becauſe he is Ignorant of the owner, as becauſe he may be obligd to ride far to eſcape the (6) L. 2. c. 2. 1.6. (c) And thus in Plutarch, Apothegm.) when a Captain of Coafting Robbers ma made an Inroad into the Territories of Lacedemon, and being taken; urgd in his own Defence, That he was neither able of himſelf to pay his Companions, nor could prevail with thoſe that had Money to fupply him; and therefore he ventur’d to take it hyrForce . Cleomenes call'd this Proceeding, our top G ni moyneid, A very compendious Wickedneſ. Add. Pandulf. Collenut. rer. Neapoldit. l. 5. p. 373. (4)-Grotius in his Nores upon this Text a firms that it ought to be rendred, If he be taken-in-the-Feet-he thali reſtore feverfold. i. e. He ſhall not be oblig'd to any thing but Reftitution, according to the Law_preſcribed, which ſuppoſes always, that the Thief hath ſomething, ſince he muſt reſtore out of it what he has taken. See Exod. xxii. S. VI. (1) I do not perceive how this can follow from Grotius's Hypotheſis, It is certain, that when a Proprietor can't ſpare the Bread, for Example, or Corn, which he hath for his preſent Uſe himfelf, 'tis not permitted to any other, tho? he be in never ſo great Neceſſity, to take them away from him by Force. But yet the Maxim is no leſs true, which ſuppoſes, that in one is for only who is in actual Poffefsion of it, altho" the is his , and we can't take any thing from him but when he hath an Overplus, and we can't otliér wife find any Means to lupply our Wants. See what is ſaid Lib. 4. Chap. 4. Note 2. So that our Author has done well to depend upon other Reaſons, which he alledges afrerward, and which are ſufficient for his purpoſe. -fi(2) This is the only Refuge that they have, who believe that the greateſt Neceflity caffor"authorize any Mañ ro take another Man's Goods, of himſelf; but as Mr. Thomaſius has obſerved, Inſtit. Juriſp. Diu. Lib. 2. Chap. 2. $. 171, they acknowledge ta- citly, that'he thae is reduced to that troubleſome Neceſſity, has a full Right to require what he wants for only thoſe things which are due by virtue of a compleat Obligation, can be the Subject of the Magistrace's Deciſion. Urgency He finds ready at belonging an inrost Property V1 ; Chap. VI. Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity. 209 As Urgency of the Diſtreſs cannot allow time for is much more proper and more agreeable to che ſuch an Expedient, then by ſeizing what is ready Point; Melior est cauſa ſuum non tradentis, quam ac hand, either in a ſecret or in an open manner. poſcent is alienum. He who refuſes to deliver what is his Now the chief reaſon why we affirm thoſe things own, has a fairer Cauſe than be who demands what is which proceed purely from the Virtue of Huma- another Man's. nity, to be owing only by an Imperfect Right, is Thirdly, We lay it down as an indiſpenſable that Men may be allow'd both an occaſion of Condition, that Reftitution is to be made if pof- ſhowing their voluntary Propenſion to the Dif- fible ; eſpecially if the Thing taken were of great charge of their Duty, and likewiſe of endearing Value, and ſuch as the Owner could not well others to them by their voluntary Benefits. But part with without ſome Conſideration. But if now if a Man ſhould deſpiſe theſe conſiderations, the Thing were ſmall and inconſiderable, and mult a poor neceſſitous Creature be familh'd be the Loſs ſo light that the Owner's Fortune could cauſe he cannot prevail on the Unmerciful Miſer? not feel it, 'twill be ſufficient, when opportunity Certainly ſuch an Inflexible Churl ought rather ſerves, to ſhow that we ſhould not have been to be depriv'd of his Gift and of his Merit toge- wanting in Graticude, if his Greedineſs would ther; ſince he had not Heart enough to venture have given us leave to be obliged to him. on an Act of common Humanity. for Grotius's requiring (s) Reſtitution, it ſeems From what has been hitherto offer'd it is eaſy not to ſuit with his Hypotheſis. For if upon a to gather the Reaſonableneſs of thoſe Exceptions Caſe of Neceſſity the Right of Primitive Commu- which Grotius ſubjoins to his and our main Aſſer- nion returns, ſo as to give a Man a juſt Title to tion. For ſince nothing but inevitable Neceſſity the Goods of others, then Reftitution can on no can juſtify the taking by force what is owing only account be deſir’d or demanded. But ſince this upon an Imperfe&t obligation, in the firſt place it is is neceſſarily to be made, it appears that the Right clear, that all fairer Courſes are firſt to be tried, of the Owner doth not expire thro' the Necef- as complaining to the Magiſtrate, begging and fity of the Petitioner ; but that he ought volunta- intreating, promiſing Reſtitution if we are ever rily to have given Relief, either gratis, or upon able, or offering to diſcharge the Debt by equi- Receipt of the Price of the Thing, or any other valent Labour and Service. Secondly, This Li- Compenſation. Which Duty when he neglects cence can by no means take place, when the to perform, then indeed the Neceſſity of the Di- Owner of the Thing which we want, lies under ſtreſs’d Perſon gives him a Right of taking the as great a Neceſſity as we ourſelves: On the con- Thing by Force, but ſtill with the ſame Burther, trary, we ſuppoſe the Owner to abound. This or under the ſame Condition which the Owner Caution or Exception may be extended farther, might have impos'd on him; that is, either to re- and we may ſay, that a diſtreſs’d Perſon cannot fund the Value hereafter, or at leaſt to make a fairly take a Thing from the Owner without his grateful Acknowledgment of the Benefit. Conſent, if it be only manifeft, that upon the Loſs of that Thing the Owner will hereafter fall VII. If we look on other Authors, we ſhall into the like Indigent Condition. For in theſe find them much divided about this difficult Point. Caſes 'tis fit Charity ſhould begin at home. That The fourth Chapter of the fifth Book of the De- Rule of Civil Law which Grotius applies to the cretals (b), enjoining Penance to Thieves who ſteal preſent Buſineſs, that when the Confiderations on both out of Neceſſity, is by the Gloß expounded of little fides are equal, the Caſe of the preſent Occupant (3) is to and indifferent Neceſſity, not of ſuch as is Extreme be preferrd: doth not ſeem ſo exactly to hit the and Inſupportable. Covarruvias (c) delivers his Purpoſe. For that Maxim only imports, that Opinion almoſt to the fame purpoſe as Grotius. Judgment ought to be given for the Poffeſor, The Reaſon (ſays he) wby a Man in extreme Neceſſity whilſt the Claimant's Title and his are alike dil- may, without incurring the Guilt of Theft or Rapine, putable. But in the Matter before us, the Poffef- forcibly take Goods of others for his preſent Relief, is ; ſor's Right and Title are granted, and the only becauſe this condition renders all things Common. For Queſtion is, whether I am obligʻd by the bare it is the Ordinance and Inſtitution of Nature itſelf, Law of Humanity, to periſh myſelf for the fake that Inferior Things ſhould be deſign d and directed to of preſerving another : which is a Paradox that ſerve the Neceſſities of Men. Wherefore the Diviſion no Man will pretend to maintain. The other of Goods afterwards introduc'd into the World, doth not Sentence which Grotius applies out of Cürtins (a), derogate from that Precept of Natural Reaſon, which (a) L. 7. C. 1. (b) Cap. fi quis X.de furti. (c) P. 2. f. 1. n. 3. (3) But this is only an Accomodation which Grotius makes of a Maxim of the Roman Law, In pari causâ poffesor potior haberi debet. Digeſt , Lib. 1. Tit. 17. De diverſis Regulis furis. Leg. 128. (4) Mr. Van der Muelin (in his Commentary, Tom. 2. p. 88.) affirms, that Grotius pretends to ſpeak of the Right of Vlage, and not of the Right of Property, which, according to him, are ewo diſtinct things ; ſo that a Man may have a Right to uſe a Thing, which for all that may properly belong to another. But this doth noç take off the Difficulty for the Queſtion is to know upon what the Right of Uſage is founded ? Grotius delivers himtelf fully, (num. 2.) “ That the Ancient and Original Right which every Man hath to the uſe of all Things revives in the Caſe of Extream Neceffity, as if they remained in common; for ſo as long as a Community of Goods continued, no Man was obliged to reſtore what he had taken for his Uſe, becauſe nothing belonged to one more than to another, and every Man had an equal Right to uſe every thing, inſomuch, that if a Man were s ſeized of a greater quantity of Things than he had an abſolute need of, by himſelf, every other Man had a full Right to take "s from him by force whatever was ſuperfluous, and neceſſary for his Support in extream Want.” On the contrary, Grotius alſo openly rejects the Opinion of them who eltabliſh the Right of taking the Goods of another in the like Cafe, upon this Foundation, " That every Proprietor is obliged, by the Rules of Charity, to impare to ſuch as are in Neceffity. » (num. 4.) So that I see not how the Hypotheſis of that Great Man can be made good, and preſerve itſelf from falling in with the Princi- ples of our Author, who has produced a Solution more natural and coherent. Еe Suggeſts 210 Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſity. BOOK II. 1 ons. Suggeſts that the extreme Wants of Mankind may be determining it, include no other Turpitude or in any manner remov'd by the uſe of Temporal Polleji- Indecency than ſuch as Perſons of Breeding and There is alledgʻd a Paſſage of St. Ambroſe Quality are guilty of, when the Severity of Fa- from Gratian, Decret. c. Sicut. hi. diſt. 47. It is the mine compels them to feed on the baſeſt and moſt Bread of the Hungry which you detain : It is the Rai- filthy Meats. And then the Rule about Conve- ment of the Naked which you lock up. Perefius (a), niencies and Inconveniencies is beſide the Que- arguing on the ſame fide alledges, that in this ftion, which only ſuppoſes fome little Matter to Caſe a Man is compell’d to the Action by a Force be taken from a wealthy Perſon, who doth not which he can't reſiſt ; and then, that the Owner's feel the Loſs, to keep another from periſhing by Conſent may be preſum'd on, becauſe Humanity the Extremities of Hunger or of Weather. The obliges him to fuccour thoſe who are in Diſtreſs. fame Author obſerves, on (2) the Lex Rhodia de Beſides, he obſerves, that the Neceſſitous Perſon jaetu, that tho' for the Publick Benefit, in a time doth not properly take the Goods which were of Scarcity, every Man is oblig'd to bring what another Man's, but which lay in common: And Corn he has by him into the Common Market, yet he is bound, when he has obtain'd delive- yet People are not hereupon impower'd to carry rance from his Want, to make fair Reſtitution. off what they pleaſe, becauſe they are in Want, Anton. Matthæus (b) is of Opinion, that a Diſtincti- and others abound; but the whole Buſineſs is to on ſhould be made in this Cafe between the Crime be left to the Care and to the Direction of the and the Puniſhment ; the Crime of Theft, he ſays, Magiſtrate. But muſt the Poor therefore be con- is not taken off even be extream Penury, but he tent to ſtarve, when the Magiſtrates neglect to would have the Puniſhment either wholly remitted, make due Proviſion for their Suſtenance ? or conſiderably mitigated and abated. Now that As to what ſome urge, that there doth 110t ap- the Crime of Theft is committed even under pear any Diffenfation of the Law in this Matter, 'tis theſe Circumſtances, he endeavours to prove from an Objection that may be eaſily ſpar'd. For fuf- the Definition of Theft in the Civil Law, which ficient Reaſons have been given why we may well he makes to reach this Action : Theft, the Em- preſume, that the Law which forbids Theft is not peror Juftinian tells us, is a fraudulent ſeizing on to be extended to the preſent Caſe. the Goods of others, for the ſake of making a Gain of them. But we may fairly plead, (in Oppoſition VIII. Laftly, The Danger or Neceſſity of our to Matthæus ) that neither of theſe Imputations own Goods ſeems to allow us the Privilege of can fall on the Fact which we defend. For how deſtroying or of invading thoſe which belong to can this be term’d a fraudulent ſeizing on another other Men: Yet with theſe Proviſo's, that the Man's Goods, when both the Owner lay under an Danger did not happen thro' our Fault; that we imperfe&t Obligation of giving the Thing deſir’d, cannot find a more convenient way of (1) remo- and the other Perſon had a Right, by Virtue of ving it ; that we do not ruine a more valuable his preſent Condition, to poſſeſs himſelf of it by Thing of our Neighbour's, for ſaving one of our the moſt convenient means he could ? Nor can own, inferior in Price and Conſideration : that, he well be ſaid to take a thing of another Man's in caſe the other Thing had not been loſt but for for the ſake of making a Gain of it, who deſigns our fake, we pay the Price of it ; and laſtly, that it purely for the Relief of his extream Diſtreſs, if what belong’d to our Neighbour muſt have with full Wiſhes and Reſolutions to reſtore, or to otherwiſe been deſtroy'd, together with ours, if repay it as ſoon as poſſible. That part of his Ar we had not preſerv'd (2) the latter by making a- gument is meer Bravado, where he tells us, that way with the former, that then we conſent to no Violence can compel a Wiſe and a Good Man bear a part in the Damage. On this Foundation to defile himſelf wilfully with any uncomly Adi- is grounded the Equity of the Rhodian Law de on: And that in theſe Caſes every one ſhould, as jactu, by (3) which it was provided, that if for Tully (c) (1) adviſes, rather patiently endure his own the lightening of a Ship the Men were compelld to Inconvenience, than treſpaß on the Conveniencies of others. throw any Goods overboard, the Loß ſhould be made up by Now beſides that 'tis an eaſy matter to talk Philo- general Contribution, ſince it happen'd upon account of fophically, whilſt we do not ourſelves feel the the general Safety (e). Thus too if my Veſſel Hardſhip any farther than in Speculation (d); the driven upon the Cables, or the Nets belonging to Fact under Debate can, according to our way of another, I have Liberty to (4) cut them in Pieces, be 1. (a) Ad Tit. Cod. de furtis, f. 3. (b) Ad. 1.47. D. tit. 1. f. 7. (c) Ofic. l. 3: (d) Vid. Oppian Halieut. 3. V. 197. (e) Vid. Tot. titul. together with the Commentators on that and on the Naval Laws. S. VII, (1) Tully's Words are; Suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius, quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. (2) The Digeſts have alſo another Law, commanding, that if Proviſions fail at Sea, every one fhould bring out their Store and leave it in common, Eo magis quod, fi quando ea [Cibaria) defecerint in Navigatione quod quiſque haberet, in Commune conferret. Lib. 14. Tit. 2. De Lege Rhodia de Jałtu. Leg. 2. S. 2. S. VIII. (1) We muſt take care that the Way appear ſure. Titius's Obſerv. 148. maya add, That the Proprietor nor foreſeeing, or before he foreſaw that Neceſſity, did not conſent to the Loſs of (3) The Words of the Digeſt are, Lege Rhodia Cavetur, vt fi levanda navis gratiâ jałtus mercium fa&tus est, omnium contribu- tione ſarciatur, quod pro omnibus datum est. Lib. 14. Tit. 2. De Lege Rhodia de jału, Leg. 1. See the Treatiſes of divers Au- thors. De Legibus Nauticis, as alſo Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order. Part 1. Lib. 2. Tit. 9. Se&t, 2. $.6, doc. (4) Item Labeo fcribit (ſays the Digelt) ſi cum vi ventorum navis impulſa eſſet in funes Anchorarum alterius, & Nauta funes pre- cidiffent, fi nullo alio modo, niſi præciſis funibus explicare ſe potuit, nullam actionem dandam. Idemque Labeo G Proculu's, o circa Retia Piſcatorum, in qua navis inciderat, aſtimarunt. Planè fi culpâ nautarum id faftum effet, Lege Aquilia agendum. Lib. 9.Tit.2. Ad Leg. Aquil. Leg. 29. $. 3. See Mr. Noodt's excellent Treatiſe, Ad Leg. Aquil. Chap. 18. in fin, and Chap. 29. (2) We his Goods. if CHAP. VI. Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſity. 2II to his own if I cannot otherwiſe get clear. And if my own that it is lawful for him who wages a Just War, Neglect did not bring me into that Trouble, I to poffeſs himſelf of a Place ſeated in a Country am to anſwer but for half the Coſt. Thus in a that is at Peace with him ; if there be certain Fire, I may pull down my Neighbour's Houſe for (and not only imaginary) Danger, that the Ene- the Security of inine, if I am willing to make my will otherwiſe ſurprize it, and from thence good all that he ſuffers by the Miſchief. For tho' annoy him with irreparable Miſchief: in (5) one of the Roman Conſtitutions (a), ir is he take nothing but what is neceſſary determin’d, that in caſe the Fire had actually Security, as the bare Cuſtody of the Place, leaving reach'd to the Houſe that was pulld down, the both the Juriſdiction and the Profits to the right Perſon who procur'd it ſhall not be Reſponſible ; Owner; and fully purpoſing to reſtore the Cuſtody yet the common Opinion inclines more to Equi- too, ſo ſoon as the Neceflity that brought him ty (b), which aſſerts, that upon ſuch Demoliſh- thither ſhall ceaſe. To theſe Conditions it ſhould ment of one Houſe for the Security of many, the be added, that the Lord of the Place is firſt to Damage ſhall be repair’d by thoſe Neighbouring have frequent notice given him, and to be deſir'd Inhabitants who thus eſcap'd the Danger; though that he would himſelf ſecure and defend the Place, the Houſe which they in this manner ruine hath upon a Promiſe from the other Prince to defray not been touch'd by the Flames. For it would be the Charges; or that he would demoliſh and ren- indeed unreaſonably hard, that when (6) I have der it untenable, if he thinks that the moſt pro- ſav'd my own Concerns by deſtroying thoſe of per Method. And another equitable Caution is, another Man, the whole Loſs ſhould be thrown that in Caſe the new Poſſeſſor has expended any upon him, whilſt the whole Advantage lights on Sum in raiſing Works and Fortifications, the pro- Rules and Principles the per Lord is not oblig'd to refund, unleſs he in- Roman Lawyers deduce moſt of their Doctrine tended to have built the fame Defences himſelf ; concerning that kind of Damage which they call in as much as the other did not make it his Aim Damnum Infectum (c) (7). Thus, for Example, if purely to improve the Place, but chiefly to ſecure my next Neighbour has a Ruinous Houſe, very his own Territories. his own Territories. Becler, in his Notes on this likely to tumble to the Prejudice of my Effects, Paſſage of Grotius, well obſerves, that it is appa- he ſhall be oblig’d to give me Security for an rent from the Uſage of all Ages and of all Nati- ſwering all Damages that I ſuſtain ; and if he re ons, that no one thinks himſelf oblig'd to allow fuſe this Condition, upon applying myſelf to the another thus to ſeize on any Fort or Place of his, Prætor, I obtain (8) an Edict, impowering me to (10) if he be able to hinder his Attempt. And enter the Ruinous Place. On the fame account that therefore if the other do actully take Por- they affert, that (9) in caſe a Man has a Field feffion, the Fact is ſuch as may admit of eaſy ſurrounded in ſuch a manner on all ſides, by the Pardon, but not ſuch as can be fairly and ſtrictly Lands of others, that he cannot get to it without defended on the Grounds of Natural Law. To ſeemingly committing a Treſpaſs ; the Borderers which purpoſe we may conſider farther, that 'tis Thall be compell’d by the Judge to grant him Paf- very probable the Enemy may hence entertain a ſage, at leaſt upon the offering of a reaſonable Suſpicion, that the Lord of the Place is in ſecret Conſideration. Confederacy againſt him; and ſo the whole Grotius (d) makes this farther Deduction from Burthen of the War may be eaſily devolv'd on the Do&rines we have been now laying down, the third Party. And tho' the Enemy be well 1 XXXIX. tit. 11. (a) L. 7. 1. 4. D. quod vi aut clam. (b) Add. L. 49. f. 1. D. ad L. Aquil. (c) De Damno Infe&to. Vid. Digeſt. (d) L. 2. C. 2. f. 10. (5) The Words of the Digeſt are; Si perveniſſet [ignis, eo uſque ] abſolvi eum oportere quoniam nullam injuriam aut Damnum dare videtur, æquè perituris edibus. Lib.43. Tit. 24. Quod vi aut clam, Leg. 7. $.4. See Lib. 9. Tit. 2. Ad Leg. Aquil. Leg. 49. $. I. and what Mr. Titius ſays in his Obſervations in Compend. Fur. Lauterbach. Obſerv. 420, as alfo Mr. Noodt. Al Leg. Aquil. Chap. 19. (6) Mr. Titius hach reaſon to ſay, that theſe Rules are good in Speculation, but the Application is very hard, and almoſt impracticable in Civil Societies. Indeed, we can't for the moſt part be affured, that he who hath beat down his Neighbour's Houfe, had reaſon to think that he could ſave his own that way, and that he was obliged to it by Neceſſity; for without this how can we determine, whether he ought to make good the Damage? Moreover, Burnings almoſt always happen by ſome Fault, or at leaſt by Imprudence and Negligence, and very often we know not whom to charge them on, or how they began; and if the Author be ſometimes diſcovered, 'tis found uſually that he is unable to make up the Damages of ſuch as have ſuffered. Laſtly, when the Fire is come by meer chance, we can't exactly tell how the Neighbouring Houſes can be preſerved from the Fire by the demoliſhing of one already beat down, and fo'tis impoſſible to ſtate exactly who are bound to make good the Da. mage, and how much each ſhall contribute. Experience alſo proves, that upon theſe fad Occaſions, they who received the Damage are conſtrained to bear it themſelves, unleſs the way of Reparation be fixed beforehand by fome Agreement, or Order of State, or the Bounty of others affords them a voluntary Relief. The Order therefore eſtabliſhed in ſome places, that the Damages that come by fuch Accidents ſhould be ſatisfied by the Publick, and ſo every one is obliged to contribute to the Relief of the Miſerable, is highly commendable, Obſerv. on Pufendorf Cl. and on Lauterbach CCCCXX, It is alſo a wife Eſtabliſhment, and will be of excellent Uſe if it be well managed, which has been lately made in Pruſſia, where all ſuch as have Houſes are obliged to pay ſome ſmall Annual Rent to the Directors of the Fire-Cheſt, where there is a Bank made up of ſuch Contributi- ons, which are deſign’d to make good the Damages of ſuch Owners of Houſes as are burnt, according to the Valuation made of them, and according to which they pay that Rent. (7) See Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order. Part 1. Lib. 2. Tit. 8. Sect. (8) So the Digeſt ſays, Si intra diem d Prætore conſtituendum non caveatur, in posledionem ejus Rei mittendus eſt. De Damno infecto , doc. Leg. 4. S. I! See Titius's Obſervat. on 1. auterbach. 989. (9) They build upon this Law, to which I have elſewhere referred, Lib. 3. Chap. 3. §. 7. Si quis Sepulchrum habeat, viam autem ad sepulchrum non habeat, do à vicino ire prohibeatur Præſes compellere debet, juſto pretio ei itur preſtare. Digeft. Lib. 11. Tit. 7. De Religionis, &c. Leg. 12. init. (10) This has place no leſs, when the Owner of the Place has no Power to defend himſelf, for if he can and doth not, 'cis the Sanie as if he gave Paſſage to his Neighbour's Enemy; fo that this laſt may look upon him himſelf as a new enemy. ſatisfied 3. 212 Воок II Of the Right and Privilege of Neceſſity. facisfied that the Place was ſeiz'd without the caſe, it can never be adviſable for a Man to Leave or Concurrence of the Lord, yet if he admit more Strangers into his Houſe, than he reſolve and endeavour to diſpoſſeſs thoſe who can conveniently get rid of when he pleaſes: hold it, the Innocent Prince cannot but feel Since otherwiſe he is under a Neceſſity of ber ſome part of the Calamities of Arms; which if ing at their Diſpoſal; and muſt perhaps be con- he keeps off by any Means, he cannot juſtly fall tent to walk out of Doors, and to leave all to under Reprehenſion. And thus too in a leſſer his New Maſters (11). (11) There is not the leaſt difficulty in the Example alledged by Grotius, in the ſame place, concerning them who having need of a Veffel to ſave themſelves, or defend themſelves, take the firſt they meet, and uſe it upon the Conditions required. See Xenophon de Expedit. Cyri. Lib. 5. Chap. I. and Mr. Hertius's Diſcourſe de Colliſione Legum. Se&t. II. S. 14. in Tome 1. of his Opuſc. and Comment. Воок Samuel Puffendorf OF THE L AW of NATURE AND NATION S. BOOK III: CH A P. I. That no. Man be burt ; and if a Damage be done to any Man, that Reparation be made. 1. That no Man ought to do any Da. VI. How many ways a Damage may be image to another, or his concerns. done. II. That if any be done, it ought to be VII. An Example of Reparation in a Repaired. Murderer. III. What a Damage or Hurt is. VIII. In one that has maimed another. IV. Who are they that do an Hurt. IX. In an Adulterer, V. How ſuch as hurt others are obliged. X. In a Raviſher. XI. In a Thief. 7 HAT Duties the Law of Nature en- of abſolute Duties, or ſuch as oblige all Men antes joyns a Man to Exerciſe towards cedently to any Humane Inſtitution, this ſeems himſelf; and what Indulgence, what with Juſtice to challenge the firſt and nobleſt Place, Licence or Favour it allows him in that no Man hurt another; and that in Caſe of any the Preſervation of his own Perſon or Goods, we hurt or damage done by him, he fail not to make Re- have hitherto endeavour’d to ex- paration (1). For this Duty is not only the wideſt (*) B. II. plain (*). We may now paſs on to of all in its extent, comprehending all Men, on thoſe other Natural Precepts which the bare account of their being Men; but it is at contain the Duties we are to practiſe towards other the ſame time the moſt eaſie of all to be perform’d, Men. Theſe we have formerly divided into Abſo- conſiſting for the moſt part purely in a Negative lute, and Hypothetical or Conditional. In the Series Abſtinence from Acting; except that its Asliſtance Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chapter I. p. 292. (1) Par. $. 1. Not that they are always independent upon every Humane Act or Eſtabliſhment. Our Author incimates the con- trary clearly at the end of this Paragraph, in numbring up the things to which this Maxim extends. No Man can be ignorant, that we ought not to neglect ſuch Duties of Humanity, as concern Bargaining, as for Example, to refuſe to ſell any Man what he Stands in need of. But the Reaſon why he calls thoſe Duties, which he treats of in this and the following Chapter, Abſolute, is becauſe thiey are the Natural Conſequence of the Univerſal and Original Conſtitution of Mankind, and ought to be paid to all Men, though they have no other Relation to us, but a bare Similitude of Nature. Whereas conditional Duties always ſuppoſe ſome Hu- male Act, Agreement, or other Accident, and oblige only under certain Circumſtances, and with relation co certain Perſons. Nefas eſt nocere Patria, &c. It is a Crime to injure ones Country, and conſequently a Citizen, who is a Member of it. Then we muſt injure no Man, becauſe every one is our fellow Citizen of the Great City of the World. Do the Hands endeavour to hurt she Feer, or Eyes the Hands? As therefore the Members of the Body keep a fair Correſpondence with one another for the Preservation of the who'e : So Men ought to deal Friendly one with another, becauſe they are born for Society, which can't be preſerved, unleſs all the Parts, of which it is compounded, love one another, and endeavour mucually their own Preſervation- Sen de Ira, 1. 5. c. 31. Beſides this Pallage, which our Author refers to a little lower, pleaſe to Read, Epift. 95. p. 464. &c. Edit. Luga Bat. 1672. ard Epiſt. 103. All Ducies which relate to Society may be comprizid under theſe three Generals. 1. To do evil to no Man. 2. To hin- decathers from do ng the Miſchie?, which they threaten to do. 3. To do all the good we can fincerely. Theſe three Principles Field an infinite Nuniber of par icular Conſequences according to the difference of Subjects . Qur Author ſpeaks here of the firſt, and of the other civo cogether in Chap. III of this book. "Titius 151. C. 3. + A is 2 That no Man be hurt Book III . ; ز $ is no tranſact with me in the Common Offices of ty; engaging Men to keep thein Sacred and Invis to refer only to Šamage (1) which ſeems properly the Propriety of any thing is made over to us; lines in an extended Senſe, ſo as to make it take in like- is ſometimes neceſſary in reſtraining the Lufts and tage all he meets, would be more willing to find the Mo- Paſſions, when they fight and ſtruggle againſt Rea. ney by Chance, than to take it lng fon, amongſt which Rebellious Delires, that bound- one who wonld not be letter plens d to enjoy the Fruits leſs Regard which we ſometimes Thow to our own of his Wickednejs, without the Practice of it (4) (b) private Advantage, ſeems to be the Principal, and Tully ſays excellently to the faine purpoſe, that for the Ring-leader. Beſides, it is the moſt neceffary a Man to rob and injure another to promote his own of Humane Duties, in as much as a Life of Society Advantage, is more againſt Nature, than Death of cannot pollibly be maintain’d without it . For fup- Poverty, or Pain (c). poſe a Mant to do me no good, and not ſo much as to II. Farther, it follows froin this Precept, that in Caſe a Man be hurt or injur'd by another, in any re- yèt provided he do nte no harın, I can live with hiin Jpeet , the Perſon who ſtands juſtly chargʻd as Author of under ſome tolerable Comfort and Quiet. And in- the wrong, ought, as far as it lies in his Power, to make deed this is all we deſire from the greateſt part of Reparation (1.) For otherwiſe it would have been Mankind ; a mutual Intercourſe of good Turns ly- & vain Command not to harın another, if the Party ing only between a few. But what poſſibility is who actually ſuffers ſuch a Harın, muſt be content there of my living at Peace with him who hurts to put it up without farther Notice, and leave the and injures lince Nature has inplanted in e- Offender to enjoy in Peace the Fruit of his Injury, very Man's Breaſt fo tender a Concern for himſelf, never obliging him to refund or to reſtore. Fur- and for what he poſſeſſes, that he cannot but apply thermore, were not Reſtitution made a neceſſary all means to reſiſt and repell him, who in either Duty, neither would wicked Men ever abſtain from reſpect attempts to wrong him (a)? Now as the wronging others; nor would thoſe who have been ſtrength of this Precept is a Guard and a Fence to injured, find it an eafie task to compofe their Mind thoſe things which we receive from the immediate in ſuch a manner, as to maintain Peace with the hand of Nature, as our Life, our Bodies, our Mem- Other Party, ſo long as they have obtain'd no Re bers, our Chaſtity, our Reputation and our Liber- compence or Conſideration for their Sufferings . III. The Word it be it Goods and thro' all thoſe Compacts or Inſtitutions, by wiſe all manner may be offer'd to a without it they could obtain no Force or Effect . Man's Body, his Chaſtity, or his good Name. In Whatever therefore we can on any good Title call this Latitude then, it implies all Hurt, Spoil or Di- our own, Men are by this Precept forbidden to take minution of whatſoever is already actually, our away, to endamage or to impair, or any way to own; all Interception of what by a perfect and ab- withdraw it from our uſe, in Whole or in Part. folute Right we ought to receive, whether ſuch The faine Duty is virtually contain’d in many Af- Right be the Original Gift of Nature, or whether firmative Commands, which enjoyning ſome one it be allow'd us by Humane Inſtitution and Law. poſitive Practice, remove and reſtrain the contrary And laſtly, all Omiſſion or Denial of any Duty, or Enormities. How plainly the neceſſity of this Law Performance, which others by a perfect Obligation inſinuates it felf into the Minds of all Men, let ſtand bound to pay us (2). We ſay by a perfect Seneca's Obfervation inform us. Ask a Common Obligation ; becauſe if the Obligation in the other Rogue (ſays he) whether he had not rather obtain Party be only Imperfect, and we conſequently have by honeſt Means, what he now gets by Theft and Vil- only an Imperfect Right, the with-holding of any Liny: He who makes it his Gain to aſſault and pil- ſuch Due, cannot really be eſteem'd a Damage. (a) Seneca of Anger. B. II. 6. 31. It it a Sin to injure ones Country; and therefore to injure a Fellow Subject, in as much as he is a Member of our Country: The Parts ought to be held Sacred, if the whole deſerve our Veneration. And hence like: wiſe, the Perſon of every Man ought to be inviolable, becauſe every Man is our Fellow-Citizen in the Great and Univerſal Society. What a Diſtraction would ariſe, ſhould the Hand practiſe Miſchief againſt the Feet, or the Eyes prove Treacherous to the Hands? As all the Members conſpire in an exact Union and Agreement, becauſe the ſafety of each in particular is the Intereſt of the whole Body , to particular Men ought to ſpare each other, becauſe we are all born for Society. And no Society can re. main ſecure, without a firm Love and Concord amongſt the Members of which it is compoſed. (4) Nay, Cicero further ſays, That there is no Man, who had not rather ſatisfie his deſires without incurring any Guilt, though he were ſure to go unpuniſhed. For ſays he, Lib. De fin. 3. c. 11. who is there, or ever was of that coverous Temper, or excrd- vagant Deſires, who had nor much father obtain that, which he is reſolved to get by fomc wicked Means, without making uſe of them, though he were affured of Impunity. (b) Sen de Benef. 1. 4. C. 17. (c) De Offic. I. 3. C. 5. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on §. 2. p. 293. (1) That a Man be obliged to make Satisfaction for any wrong done to another, it is neceſſary, 1. That the injury done be forbidden by ſome Law, either Natural or Poſitive. 2. That it was done through our Fault, and that the Will did either directly or indirectly concur in char Action, by which the Injury is done. 3. Laſtly, That he who has ſuffered no Damage, is no way conſenting to it. For if he give his Conſent, either directly or indirectly, though with ſome Reſtrictions, the Prohibition of the Law ceaſes, and conſequently fo does the Obligation to Reſtitution. Our Author ought to have taken notice of. Three Condicions diſtinctly, becauſe they are the Foundation and Key of all the Chapter. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on §. 3. p. 294. (1) In the Roman Law the ordinary ſignification of Damage is this, ſome hure done to our Goods, or Poffeffions, produced in- mediately by the l'erſon, who is the Author of it. This suppoſition is founded entirely upon the aquilian Law, and ſerves only to diſtiaguilh the different forts of Actions, which are brought to Juſtice, by their ſeveral Circumſtances. Titius 155. Juftin. Inft. do Digeft. 1. 33. tit. 2. leg. 3. (2) From hence it appears by this firſt Law of Natural Right, vir. That we ought to do evil to no Man, that all ſorts of A- &tions in general are forbidden, by which any Wrong or Injury is done to our Neighbour in reſpect to all things, to vvhich he has an undoubted Righr, viz. Murder, Wounds, Blows, evil words, Affronts, Calumnies, Rapine, Extortion, Theft, Pillaging, Fraud and Force, either direct or indirect, mediate, or immediate, doc. as this Author expreffes himſelf in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, 1. 1. c. 6. §. 3. Ic ought alſo further to be obſerved, that a Damage or Hure may be done to the Soul by neglecting to inform the Mind, or regulate che Paſſions of ſuch, as we are obliged to inſtruct or reform, and much diora by leading them on purpoſe into any Error or Vice, from which we ought to reſtrain chem, proceed CHAP. I. 3 Or, Reparation to be made. Perſon whom he thus ſendo o For ſince all Performances of this kind ought to or Fraud ſhall prejudice or obſtruct him, he may proceed from the voluntary Motion of ſome vertu- demnand Satisfaction ; tho' not to the full value of ous Principle in the Giver, and ſince I have no the Office deſired, yet to the value of his uncer- Power or Licence to exact the Payment of them by tain Expectation (5). And now we are ſettling the force, it would by no means be convenient that I Notion of Damage, we are farther to remark, that ſhould think my ſelf Damaged, in not receiving it affects not only the thing it felf, which being ei- ſuch things as I could not otherwiſe expect, than ther our Poffeflion or our Due, is hurt, deſtroy'd in the way of free Gift and Benefit. And as I can or intercepted, but likewiſe the Fruits or Profits not reckon thoſe things amongſt my own which I accruing from the thing, whether they have been have only a Fitneſs or Capacity to poffefs, ſo I have already received (though then indeed they inay be no reaſon to complain of injurious Practice, it they valued as particular Goods or Things) or whether happen to be kept from me. Ariſtotle ſays elegant- they are yet only in Hope and Proſpect , if the ly to this purpole, he who out of a narrowneſs of Spi- Owner had a Right of receiving them (a), provi- rit refuſes to allift another with bis Wealth, doth not ded ſtill a Deduction be made of the Expences, he bereby increase it, and ſince he has not more, the would have been put to in ſecuring and gathering leſs. On the ſame Principle is founded the Argu- Charge of the other Party. Now the value of Fruits ment which Cicero makes uſe of in his Defence of in Expectation riſes and falls according as the time Plancius, that altho' the other Gentleman Latera- of receiving them is more or leſs diſtant, and con- nenfis might perhaps be the more worthy Compe- fequently the Iſſue more or leſs uncertain. Thus titor, yet it was in the Power of the People to paſs the loſing a Field of Corn in the Blade, will not be him by, and to chuſe Plancius into the Office of rated ſo high as if it had been deſtroy'd in the Ear Ædile, in as much as neither of the Candidates had Some Conſideration too is allowed for what we call a Perfect Right to that Honour. It is a Privilege, Civil Fruits. Thus he who fets on Fire another ſays he, belonging to the very Condition and Conftitu- Man's Houſe (b), is not only bound to rebuild it ; tion of free States, that they be able by their votes, but likewiſe to make good the Rent, which it to give to a Perſon, or to take from him what they will. would in the mean time have brought to the Own- Yet in the ſame place the Orator diſtinguiſheth be- er, Philo Judaus (c) informs us, that in his Nation, tween what the People could do, and what they ought when a Man had any way damaged his Neighbour, to do; the Term ought implying that lefs perfect Ob- and done Penance for the fact, he was obliged, be- ligation, by which we ſtand engaged to the Exerciſe ſides paying to the full Value, to add one filth part of every Vertue. But here * Grotius more, as a Comfort to the Perſon who had ſuſtain’d * Lib. II. c. well adviſes us to take heed of confound- the wrong. 17. S. 3. ing Points which belong not to the ſame Laſtly, it is a clear Point, that all Evils or Mif- head. For the People in a Commonwealth, who chie's following by a Natural Conſequence froin a- are obliged to confer Honours on the moſt deſer- ny Damage given, ought to be adjudg’d Parts of it ving, only by the Rules of State-Prudence, yet in (d) (7). Strabo (e) relates of King Ariarathes of Cap- caſe they intruſt any perſon with this their Power padocia, that having ſtopt up the little Paſſages, of chuling Officers, if he prefer thoſe who are leſs by which the River Melas emptied it ſelf into the worthy (), the others who are paft by, cannot bring Euphrates, that fo covering the greateſt Part of the an Action of Injury or Damage againſt the Elector. Neighbouring Plain, he might divert himſelf with Yet the People, by whoſe Deputation he acted, have the Childiſh play of making little Iſlands ; at length a Right of calling him to an Account for his Pro- the Damms all giving way on a ſudden, the Flood ceedings, and may require Reparation for any Da- Pour'd it felf fo violently upon Euphrates, as not on- mage which the Commonwealth hath fuſtain'd by ly to make it carry off part of the Cappadocian his unworthy Choice (4). And thus to a Citizen Country, and ſome of their Houſes, but to cauſe endued with Arts and Abilities ſufficient for the great Waſte and Miſchief in the Lands of their diſcharge of an Office, tho’in reference to obtaining Neighbours, the Galatians : Whereupon the matter it, he has no Right which will hold good againſt being refer'd to the Arbitration of the Romans, they the State; yet he has an equal Right with others condemn’d the King in Damages of thirty Talents. to ſue for it; in which Right if any Perſon by Force (f) (8). (3) That is to ſay, as Grotius expounds it, He doch nothing contrary to Juftice, properly ſo called. See l. I. C. 7. S. 11, 12. (4) See Juſtinian's Novels, 128. c. 16. in fine, & 124. of Julian's Abridgment, c. 556. which is quoted and corrected in Gro- novius's Nores upon Grotius, (5) Grotius maintains (S. 3.) that the ſame thing takes place when any one hinders another from giving a Legacy, either by Violence or Fraud, for it being a kind of Right to be capable of a Legacy, it is a real Injury to deprive a Teltator of the Li- berty or Will which he hath to give any Perſon a Legacy, which he is in expectation of. (6) Grotius adds, or for the Improvement of the thing. See for the diſtinction of the Fruits, what is ſaid, I. 4. C. 7. §. 3. (7) So Libanius Pergamen fays, He that gives the Occaſion, muſt be anſwerable for all the conſequences. See Exod. 22. 6. Digeſt . I. 9. t. 2. ad leg. Equil. leg 7. S. 7. leg. 27. . 8. leg. 30. $. 3. (8) The Lasvyers here diſtinguiſh between damnum emergens and lucrum ceſſans, (i. e.) an emergent Damage, and a ceaſing Pro- fit. The firſt is the Lofs which one fuffers by the diminiining his Gocds in preſent. The other is the Damage one receives by the Lors of that Gain which he might make. But we ought alſo to obſerve, that there are ſome Events which are the direct and immediate Conſequents of the action, from which the Damage proceeded, in ſo much that it may be ſaid, it was the Cauſe of it, others there are that have a parricular Cau'e independant on that Action, that was the Occaſion of it, or at leaſt had no relation to it, but by ſome mere Accident. See concerning this the Civil Laws drawn up in their Natural 'order by Daumatius Part 1: 1b. 3. tit s. where you'll alſo find in the Prefaces to thoſe Titles fome Obſervations very important about the difference there is between the Damage that ariſes from ſtoppage of Payment, and other forts of Damages and Intereſts. $a) Vid. 1. 62. f. 1. D. de rei vindic. (6) Vid. l. 5. C. de rei vindic. Add. 1. 22. f. 1. 1. 23. princ. D. ad L. Aquilian. (6) De (d) See Exod. XXII. 6. I. 27. 1. 8. 1. 30. 1 3. D. ad L Aquil. M. Seneca, 1. 5. except. Controverf. s. (e) L. 22, () Liban. Progyin. To rapizor thv dipogulis veronzoso mwv xori calde ris nógov. That which gave the Occafion is esteem'd the Cauſe of al Accidenis that follow. Adil. 7. D. ad L. Aquil. Lex Wiſigothorum, 1. 8. Tit , 2. c. 1, 2, 3, do tit. 3. C. 3. FA 2 IV. In above. Viltimis. 4 Book II That no Man be burt; IV. In ſtating who are to be eſteemid Authors of and who are not, that when any one did not give Damage, it will be neceſſary to recollect from our real Afliſtance in the Act of Dainage, nor by any firſt Book, Chap. 5. how many ways the Act of one antecedent Motion or Default, caus'd it to be un Man may be imputed to another. A Perfon then dertaken, nor came in for any part of the Advan- may damnifie his Neighbour, not only immediately tage, ſuch a Perſon tho’ by giving any the leaſt occa- by himſelf, but likewiſe by the Miniſtry of others. fion to an ill Action he contracts a Sin, yet ſhall And farther, a Damage immediately done by one not be obliged to Reſtitution (2). And hence 'tis Man, may be chargeable upon another, (who is con- eaſie to conclude on the other ſide who Thall be ob- fequently obliged to make Reparation, in as much lig’d. Thoſe who inſult over their afflicted Neigh- as he contributed fomewhat to the Action, either beurs, and rejoyce in their Calamities brought on by doing what he ought not, or by omitting what them by wicked and injurious Men, are fintul 110 he ought to have done (a) (I). He may ſtand guil- doubt in an heinous manner (b); and yet it would ty of this Charge in three ways and degrees; for he be abſurd to affirm, that they are bound to repair may either be the Principal Cauſe, or he niay be ſuch Damages as they delight to ſee. The ſame muft equally concern’d with the Actor ; or laſtly, he may be ſaid of thoſe who defend, excuſe or praiſe a be only an Acceſſary, and an Inferior Cauſe of Treſpaſs already committed, provided they do not all which Caſes this may, in general be obſerv’d, hereby hinder the Duty of Reititution, as likewiſe that the Perſons thus chargeable are bound to Re- of thoſe who either with Succeſs to ſuch a Fa& be- Hitution, according as they were either the real fore it is comunitted, or entertain a filent Joy and Cauſe of the Damages, or contributed to it in whole, Satisfaction during the performance. There is no or in part. For it otteni happens, that Perſons may ground to build a contrary Opinion on the Paſſage concur leſs principally to the Fat of another Man, of Cicero (c), which ſome would make uſe of to that by fome Omiſſion or Commiſſion, and yet that he purpoſe (3). What difference is there, ſays he, be would moſt certainly have done the ſame Damage, tween him who perſwades a Man to an ill Action, and whether they had thus concurr’d or no; ſo as to ren- him who afterwards approves of it? Or what ſignifies der their Concurrence altogether ſuperfluous. Now it whether I would have a thing done, or whether I here tho they are juſtly puniſhable for the Will rejoyce when it is done? For the Orator imploys and the Endeavour, yet ſince no part of the pre- this Sentence, not to expreſs his Mind ſeriouſly (4), fent l'amage flow'd from them, they cannot be re- but to refute an impertinent Objection. And had quired to make Reftitution. Some indeed are for it been ſpoken never fo gravely, it could not be bringing off all Acceſſaries at a venture ; becauſe ſtrain’d to high, as to affert the Neceſſity of Repa- fay they, if theſe had not lent their Counſel or Af ration in theſe Caſes. And therefore Ammianus Mar- fiftance, there would not have been wanting others cellinus (d) ſeems not very properly to apply this ſay- to help forward with the Miſchief, and confequent- ing of Tully to the buſineſs of Probus, Præfectus Pra- ly the Damage had been done without their Means. torio to the Emperor Valentinian, who, as he re- But this Argument is of no Weight, 'tis fufficient lates, did indeed never command any of his Clients , on to make them guilty, if their Aid had any real Et- Servants to undertake an unlawful Action ; yet it be ficacy in producing the Treſpaſs ; and had thoſe found them to have committed any Crime, he protected other Perſons join’d their Hands to the Buſineſs, they and defended them in ſpite of Juſtice it Self, without too would have been proportionably reſponſible. ever enquiring into the Fact, and without the leaft re- This Rule then may be fix'd as an Univerſal Stan- gard to Honefly or Truth. For here the dependence dard, to know who are bound to make Reparation, on ſo great a Patron, added Strength and Boldneſs a Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 4. p. 296. (1) This ſeems to be contrary to what our Author proves in other places, viz. lib. 4. C. 13. $ 6. For though one does not what he ought to do, he does not do any ſuch real Damage, as to be obliged to Reſtitution. It is ſufficient that a Man have a Right to do a thing, to ſecure hin from a juſt Imputation of any ill Conſequences, that may reſult from it to another. The Ro- man Lawyers maintain che truth of this Muxim, char no Man does wrong to another, unleſs it be he that does that which he has no right to do, Digeft. I. 50. Tit. 17. de diverſis reg. Fur. Leg. 151. If in cheſe Caſes any one receives a Damage through our means, 'cis his Misfortune, but ſince 'uis none of our Fault, it can't be reaſonably expected that we ſhould make any amends. (2) By the Roman Law the Approvers and Authors of any Miſchief are liable to the fame Puniſhment. Imo & fi erat ſervus, dc.' It a Servant be about to run from his Maſter, or rob him, and another commends his Deſign, he is guilty, for he ought not to encourage his Wickedneſs by Commendation. Digeſt. I. 11. Tit. 3. de ſervo corrupto leg. 1. $4. Mr. Bayle in his Diſcourſe about Defamatory Libels, and Grotius before him, approve of this Law, which they lay, is built upon this ſure Maxim, That they who approve an Action, 'cis very likely, would do it if they could, (i. e.) if ſome reaſon of Self-Love did not hinder them from engaging in it. The firſt alſo approves of the Law of Valentinian and Valens, which make thoſe Men liable to a Capital Puniſhment, who accidentally meeting with a Libel, diſperſe it, whereas they ought to have torn it, or barnt it. Vide Cod. I. 18. Tir. XXXVI. de famoſis libeilis. For ( he adds) I can't conceive, but he who in the like Caſe diſperſes a Libel, has as great defire to injure, as he chac compoſed it, and conſequently deſerves as great a Puniſhment, as the Author. For certainly in this laſt Caſe there is ſomething more than a mere Approbation. To diſperie a Libel, which might and ought to have been ſuppreſ- ſed, either afrogether or in part, is to do an Injury directly to the Party defamed, and joyn with the Author of the Libel. As to the Law of Ulpian, if a Slave is fully reſolved to rob his Maſter, or get away from him, the Approbation given to theſe Actions, which he is about to do, fince is neither encourages nor confirms him in this unlawful Action, does not ſeem fufficient to oblige to any Satisfaction, as Mr. Bayle infers. For though a Man would do a thing with Pleaſure were it not againſt his Intereſt, yet in my judgment he is not Puniſhable, unleſs he do it, by any Humane Laws, (of which he is ſpeaking) eſpecially if he never de- fired to do it, and his Approbation did not determine, nor encourage the Actor. (3) The Latin is, Quid intereſt inter fuaforem fa&ti & probatorem? aut quid refert, utrum voluerim fieri aut gaudeam fa&tum? Cic. Philip. II. C. 12. (4) Cicero does not ſeem to ſpeak any otherwiſe than he does, who ſpeaks his Thoughts ſeriouſly. 'Twere better to anſwer, as this Author does afterwards, that he ſpeaks nor of a Reparacion of Damages, but only of the Viciouſneſs of the Intention of ſuch as approve others Crimes. (a) Nemo damnum facit (ſay the Roman Lawyers) niſi qui id fecit, quod facere jus non habet, Digeſt. Lib. 2. Tit. 17. Pſalm CXXXVII. v. 7. (c) Philip. II. c. 12. (d) L. 27. (6) See to CHAP. I. 5 Or, Reparation to be made. to their Enormities; and his Protection interpoſing, an Inſtance. Here are three Men then, who at the hindred them from making good the Damages they ſame time, tho' perhaps in different Parts, all fet had been guilty of (5). As to the point of Counſel- Fire to an Houſe. This Fact of burning the Houſe, ling or Adviſing, this is moſt certain, that he who ſeems to have proceeded from each Man entire, and ſuggeſts to another the way and nuanner of com- in whole, although not from each alone; in as much mitting a Treſpaſs, is bound to Reparation. Where- as the ſame Miſchief would have follow'd, had one as the fame Obligation doth not ſeem to lie on only applied the Fire. But fuppoſe ſeveral Perſons thoſe who either perſwade a Man in general Terms join in beating, or cudgelling a Man, one of whom to apply himſelf to an ill Courſe, as to Theft or perhaps gives him a Wound in the Head, another Robbery, for inſtance, or joyn their approbation breaks his Arm, and a third ſtrikes out his Eyệ; and Conſent (6) to his Reſolution, when already here each Perſon Shall not anſwer for the whole fixt and ſettled, as is often the Caſe with timorous Hurt, but only for that part of it, which he himſelf Counſellors , or baſe Flatterers of Princes (a). Laſt- effected. Though in Cafe one of them eſcape, it is ly concerning thoſe who concur to an injurious A- uſual to condemn the reſt who are taken in the ction, by omitting ſomewhat which they ought to whole, eſpecially when it appears, that they com- have perform’d, this inay be obſerv’d, that their bined together to execute the Miſchief: We may Omifiion doth then only bind them to repair the ſtill ſet this Matter in a clearer light, by diſtin- Damage, when it is of a Duty, to which they ſtood guiſhing between diviſible and indiviſible Acts . The engaged by a perfe&t Obligation; not if the thing latter which we are concern'd with, are ſuch in was only a matter of Charity and Humanity. For, which many Perfons concur, but in ſuch a manner ſince what is owing to me in this imperfect Manner that the whole Act would have follow'd from the I cannot yet account my own, neither if it be inter- Endeavours of one only, and therefore cannot con- cepted can I go about to recover it (7), whatever veniently be divided in Shares amongſt them all, Ziegler in his Obſervations on Grotius (b), alledges of this kind are the firing of Houſes, the breaking to the contrary. down of Banks and Damms, or the like. For the V. Where therefore many Perſons have concurr'd faine Damage would have enſued, had one only of to one Act of Damage, in making Reparation, this the many Parties ſet his Hand to the Exploit; fo Order ſhall be obſerv'd; thoſe ſhall be in the firſt that it is impoſſible to define and ſettle what part place chargeable, who ſet forwards the Miſchief (1), of the Fire or of the Flood proceeded from each in either by their Commands, or by ſome other power- particular. When many joyni in an Act of this Na- ful Means, amounting almoſt to a neceſſary Infiu- ture, each perſon ſhall be thus far Reſponſible for ence. And the immediate Actor of the Crime, or the whole; that in caſe they are all apprehended, he who was thus forced to lend his Hands for its Per- they ſhall contribute equally to the Reparation ; formance, ſhall in theſe Caſes be eſteem'd only as but if upon the Eſcape of the reſt, one only be the Inſtrument. Where any one appears to have en- taken, he hall then be charg’d with the entire Summ. gag’d himſelf in the Enterprize, without being dri- After the ſame manner, if ſome of the Perſons ap- ven on it by Neceſſity, he ſhall be firſt Obnoxi- prehended, prove Inſolvent, the whole Burthen ous, and then the Reſt who contributed their Alli- İhall be laid on thoſe who have more Subſtance ſtance. Yet ſo, that if the former of theſe Parties and Ability. In this too the Reparation of Da- concern’d ſhall have made good the Damage, the mage, differs from the Exaction of Puniſhment, that others ſhall be then clear, as to Reparation, tho' not in the former, if full Payment or Reftitution be as to Puniſhment. But what if an Act proceeds made by one of the Parties concern'd, the reſt are from many Perſons, who are all Authors or Cauſes cleared and excus’d; ſince it is not conſiſtent with of it in the very fáme Degree; ſhall each Party be Equity, that the ſame Damage ſhould be twice made reſponſible for the whole, or only for an equal Share good, (though by way of Puniihinent, this is fre- of the Damage? Grotius (c) pronounces in this Cale, quently practis’d.) But on the other hand, in Pe- that each Perſon is to anſwer for all, if the whole Fać nal Caſes, nothing is more uſual, than that every proceed from each, tho' not from each alone. Which particular Accomplice in a Crime be made to ſuffer Rule is ſomewhat obſcure, unleſs we illuſtrate it by all that the Law inflicts (d). (5) The French Tranſlator here adds, so that there was ſomething elſe beſides a mere Approbation, or defence of the wrongs done to others, which ſeems to make our Author's reaſoning more clear. () This Reſtriction ought to be added, Eſpecially if by the fundamental Laws of a Kingdom, the Miniſters are obliged to de- ny their content to their Prince, as it is in England. Sce che Paſſage cited out of Dr. Bates's Elench. Mot. Nup. Angl. Part I. to be compar'd with our Author, 1. 1. C. 5. 14. (7) Cerca inly of the Perſon himſelf, who has refuſed to do any of thoſe Duties, but if he was hindred by ſome other Perfon, he has a Right to require Damages of this Latter, if not before Humane Tribunals, which often ſuffer many Wrongs, yer by the immutable Rules of Juſtice and Equicy. See $ 3. above, Note 8. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 5. p. 298. (1) For the Rule of the Law is this. He does the wrong, who commands it to be done, but he is in no Fault, who is under a neceſſity to obey. Digeſt. Lib. L. Tit. XVII. De diverſis Reg. Jur. Leg. CLXIX, (a) Compare Ant. Matthæus de Crimin. Proleg. c. 1. 1. 7. 89. (6) L. 2. C. 17. 1. 9. (c) ibid. f. 11. (d) Such a Cafe we have in Quintilian Inſtitut. I. 7. c. 6. Two Thieves had ſtolen together Ten Thouſand Seſterces, they were ſued in Court, and forty Thouſand demanded of each Man, according to the Law enacting, that every Thief thall pay Fourfold. They petition that each may pay no more than Twenty Thouſand. Here the Judgment oughc to go againſt the Thieves, in as much as by the Roman La ivs theſe A&tions of Reftitution are reckon'd under the Head of Puniſhments, l. ult. de Oblig. quæ ex deli&, naſc. 1. 7. 1.5. 1.8. D. de Juriſdictione, 1.6, prin, D. arborum furtim ceſarum : 1. 34. D. de injuriis. Add. 1.11. 1.2, 4. D. ad L. Aquil, 1. 5. 1. 1. 2. ibid. l.is. I. 2. D. quod vi aut clam. I. 2. 1. 9. D. de furtis. Hoſtman illuſi. Queft. 33. VI, Now 6 Book III. That no Man be burt; * Lib. II. c.17. 66 CG VI. Now whenever we hurt or endamage ano- ther, we do it either out of full Purpoſe and preme- "Exlaves ã ¿Tiego e póvor. š o funcver ditated Guilt, or by a fault of Negligence only, Aiua mencis à miegs atzpunean whoshida and not of Deſign; (and this Negligence, as it is more or leſs Groſs and Supine, is more or leſs Cul- -Striving to ſave your Friend, you have him ſlain, pable.) Or laſtly, we may do it by meer Chance, fo His Blood will cleanſe your Hands, it ne'er can ftain (d) . that the Injury cannot rightly be imputed to us (a). Na Among fome People, thoſe Damages are not only 2. But in Caſes of pure Chance, where the hurtful imputed to a Man which are committed with his Action is not mix'd with any Fault of ours, (3) it Affiftance or Concurrence, but thoſe likewiſe which is evident we are not oblig’d to Reparation. For are cauſed by his Servants or Cattle, without his when I have done nothing that can be fairly laid poſitive Influence. It is beyond doubt, that he who to my Charge, there ſeems to be no Reaſon why offers Damage to another out of an evil Deſign, is the Misfortune, and the Damage of a Harm which bound to make Reparation, and that to the full Va- I unwillingly caus’d, ſhould rather fall on me, than lue of the Wrong, and of all the Conſequences flow- on the Perſon who receiv'd it (e). Yet if a Perſon jug from it. But thoſe likewiſe ſtand reſponſible, of Wealth hurt a Poor Man, though meerly by who commit an Act of Treſpaſs, tho' not deſigned- Chance, it will become him by fome Act of Libe. ly, yet by ſuch a piece of Neglect as they might rality, to ſupport and comfort the Sufferer. As for eaſily have avoided (1). For it is no inconſiderat thoſe Actions which lie againſt us for any Treſpaſs ble part of Social Duty, to manage our Conver- or Hurt committed by our Cattle or Slaves and the fation with ſuch Caution and Prudence that it do like, * Grotius is of Opinion, that not become terrible or pernicious to others; and they owe their Riſe to Civil and Po- $ 12, Men under fome Circumttances and Relations are fitive Laws; in as much as the Ma- obliged to more exact and watchful Diligence (b) fter or Owner being Innocent of the Fact, is not by (2). Indeed the ſlighteſt Default in this point, is any Natural Obligation made reſponſible for it. Yet ſufficient to impoſe a Neceſſity of Reparation ; un- others hold that Actions of this kind, are moſt agree- leſs under one of theſe Exceptions, either that the able to Natural Equity, although they are not pre- Nature of the Buſineſs was ſuch as diſdain’d a Care ciſelyſuggeſted by the Law of Nature. It is one of more nice and ſcrupulous, or that the Party who Plato's (F) Conſtitutions, “ If a Man or Woman be- receives the Wrong is no leſs in fault, than he who ing a Servant, ſhall injure the Goods of another gives it; or laſtly, that ſome Perturbation of Mind Perſon, either by an unskillful, or by an immo- in the Perſon, or ſome extraordinary Circumſtances “ derate uſe of them, the Perſon who receives the in the Affair, leaves no room for accurate and con Wrong, not being himſelf the Cauſe of it, the ſiderate Circumſpection; as ſuppoſe a Soldier in “ Maſter ſhall either make him Satisfaction for the the heat of an Engagement ſhould hurt his next Man Damage ſuſtain’d, or ſhall deliver the offending with his Arins, whilſt he brandiſhes and employs "Servant into his Power and Pleaſure. And the them againſt the Eneiny. To this purpoſe the Story ſame way of proceeding is obſervable in the old in Ælian (c) is remarkable ; “ A Young Man tra- Roman Story of Evander, delivering up his Servant velling towards Delphi, as he defended his Com- Cacus to Hercules, who had convicted hiin of ſtealing panion from the Robbers, happen’d to kill him his Cattle (4). But why the Owner of a Beaſt ſhould by an unlucky turn of his Weapon ;, and upon rather ſuffer Damage, than he who upon provoking Application to the Oracle, receiv'd his Pardon a Creature (5) not Violent by Nature, has without in this comfortable Anſwer: the Owner's Fault receiv'd a Hurt, the Reaſon ſeems Mr. Barbeyrat's NOTES $ 6. p. 299. (1) See the Civil La ws drawn up in their Natural Order by Mr. Daumat. Part I. 1. 2. Tit. where you will find a great Number of theſe ſort of Cafes decided, wherein it appears, chat there is nothiug but the indirect and interpretative Will of him that cauſes the Damage. This (2) Among the Laws of Mofes. (3) This Reſtriction ought carefully to be obſerved. For when the accidental Caſe is an effect of ſome fault, which produced it, we are indiſpenſably required to make good the Damage, the Obligation to repair being the effect of the Fault and not of the Chance. See Mr. Daumat. Civil Laws, Part I. Lib. II. Tit. IX. We ought to remember that we may be engaged by ſome A- greement to anſwer for ſome accidental Caſes, and then, as any one may ſee, the Obligation to make good a Damage is an Ac of our Will, which the Accident gave us only an Opportunity to fulfil our Promiſes. See 1. 5. c. 9. following. Mr. Thomaſius goes farther, and maintains, that a Man is bound to make good any Damage, of which he is only the Phyſical Cauſe, altho' he does not do any wilfal Injury; but the Welfare of Humane Society does not ſeem to require, that our Obligation to ſatisfie a Damage ſhould extend ſo far. Humane Society will be happy enough, if every Man carefully abſtains from endamaging others, not only out of a formal Deſign, but thro' the leaſt Negligence, (4) The Author in his laſt Edition, which this Tranſlation follows not, places the next Paragraph, and that moſt properly, here, but then it muſt be rendred, it is clear, inſtead of, much more is it clear. (s) This Reſtriction is made by the Civil Law only, for according to Natural Right, it imports no more than a Beaſt, that fol- lows the diſpoſition of thoſe of its own Kind, or not, provided that it carries it ſelf in the uſual way when it does the Hurt. Nevertheleſs, ſince it often happens through Man's Default, chat a Beaſt does Miſchief, though it follows its own Natural Incli. nation, and thoſe Damages which happen by its extraordinary Morions, could noc elle ſo eaſily happen, this Diſtinction muſt not be neglected. Tit. Obſ. 261. To this we may add alſo the Damages, that are cauſed by an Infant, a Madman, or one ſeized with a Fit of a Frenzy. Mr. Thomaſius maintains, with Reaſon, that the Damage ought to be repaired out of the Infant's or Madman's Goods: For though neither of chem are capable to do a Wrong knowingly, it is ſufficient that they are the Phyſical Cauſe of a Damage, which they have no Right to do; For the Obligation to Reſtitution ariſes from the thing it felf, and Na- tural Equity, and not from any Agreement or Crime. For if we may oppoſe a Madman, when he does us any Wrong, why may we nor expeet Sacisfaction our of his Goods, whea he has done it? 'We muſt ſuppoſe ſuch a Reſtriction here. This Satisfaction is the more juſt, becauſe it is commonly the fault of ſuch as are to take care of ſuch Child or mad Perfon, (1) Lyſias Orat. xxx. Ουδενί και δεν εκάσιον δυσύχμα έγινε αι No Misfortune. happens to any Man by his Good Will. See Exod. XXI. 28. &c, 33, &c. do Grot, ibid. (6) Vid. 1. 6. 1. 7. 1. 14. D. de offic. Præfidis. I. 27. 1. 9. in fin. f. 29, 34, 35. 1.27, 29. 1. 2, 3, 4. ad L. Aquil . Deuteron. XXII. 8. (c) Var. Hiſt. 1. 3. C. 44. (d) Add. Epi&tet. Enchir. C.39. do Simplic, in eum circa fin. 8. 1 44.1.52. ſ. Aquil. com ibi Interp. (e) Add. l. 5. 1. 2. 1. 7. 1. 3. ad L. Aquil. (f) De Leg. 1.11. (6 4. D. ad L. to CHAP. I. Or, Reparation to be madë. to be this, that the Settlement of Proprieties does fible for thoſe Damages which his Beaſts commit, not impair or prejudice this Antecedent Natural either by his own Fault or Inſtigation, or by their Precept of Reparation. And therefore, ſince fup natural and accuftoin'd Violence, and the common poſing things to lie in their primitive CommunityForce of their peculiar Inſtinct. For the Owner in cale I had been hurt by a Beaſt, I had the power pught either not to keep fuch Creatures, or careful- of requiring, or ſatisfying my ſelf upon the Beaſt , ly to reſtrain them from doing Miſchiel (7.) by any ineans I thought fit; this. Power or Liberty Of Reparation in general, we have this farther of proceeding, is 119t ſuppos'd to be taken froin ine to obſerve, that when the Hurt or Wrong is done by the Introduction of diſtinct Proprieties. And in by an Evil and Criminal Act, there to make good as much as the owner of ſuch a Beaſt makes a Gain the Damage, is not ſufficient to take off the Puniſh- of him, and I ſuffer'd Loſs by him, the Reparati- ment (b). Though the voluntary Offer of Requital, on of Damage taking place in Equity and conmon as a Sign of Penitence and Sorrow, frequently lef- Favour before the Procurement of Profit , it hence ſens the Severity of farther Proſecution (8) (c.) appears, that I cani rightly demand of the Owner, It is time now to illuſtrate this Doctrine by ſuch either to make good the Lofs fuſtain'd; or in caſe Inſtances and Examples as Grotius (chiefly) will ſuch a Charge would riſe higher than the Value of fupply us with. the Beaſt, then to deliver him up as a Criminal, VII. An unjuſ Slayer is obliged to defray the to be deſtroy'd (6). The ſame Rule holds much Charge of Phyſicians and Chirurgeons, and give to ftronger in the Caſe of a Slave, ſince he is by Na- thoſe Perſons whom the deceas'd was by full and ture made liable to anſwer for any Damage he ſhall perfect Duty bound to maintain, as Parents, Wife give. But now, ſince he has no Goods of his own and Children, (not to any whom he kept out of to repay or requite the Lofs, and ſince his very Charity and Pity;) ſo much as the hope of their Body is his Maſter's, it follows in Equity, that the Maintenance ſhall be fairly valued at ; Regard be- Maſter either repair the Wrong, or give him up to ing had to the Age (d), both of the Deceas'd (1), the Sufferer. Eſpecially ſince without his Proviſion, and of themſelves (e) (2). As to Ziegler's Opinion a Slave would be impower'd to act what Hurt and on this place of Grotius, that ſome Confideration is Miſchief he pleas'd; whilft neither he (who is Pof- to be allow'd for the Gain which the Deceas'd might feſſor of nothing, nor indeed of himſelt) nor his have acquired, had he lived longer, which confe- Mafter could be obligʻd to Reſtitution. Nor, ſhould quently would have made their Portions the the Maſter by the fevereſt Courſe of Blows, or of larger; we think it will ſcarce hold good; in as Impriſonment puniſh the Offender, would this be much as all Advantage of this kind being yet un- any real Satisfaction to the injured Party (a). certain, cannot be reckon d amongſt our Poſſesſions ; Much inore then is it clear beyond the leaſt and fince future time lies equally open to Loſs as Doubt or Diſpute, that the Owner ſtands reſpon- to Gain ; and laſtly, ſince it cannot clearly be made Tit. 8. $ 2. (6) Beſides this, we may obſerve with Mr. Hirtius, that it may be commonly preſumed, that the Maſter of ſuch a vicious Beaft knows its Fault, and if when it has done a Miſchief, he will neither reſign it, nor pay the Damage, he may be thoughe to approve it. (7) If a Slave or Beaſt be put on by any other perſon than the Maſter of it, 'tis plain that ſuch a perſon is obliged to make good the Damage. But we muſt then ſuppole, that the Perfchi hurt has not through his own faale occafion'd the Damage done him by the Slave or Beaſt; For in this caſe he can blame none bue himſelt, and the Slave did nothing but what he might do in hits own Defence. In a Word, no Proprietor is obliged to ſatisfie a Damage, where he is guilty of no Faule, unleſs his Slave of Beaft have done a Miſchief of their own accord. Vide the Civil Laws in their Natural Order by Mr. Daumat. Part 1. 1. 2. (8) But there can be no true Repenrance without Reſticution. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 j. p. 302. C. But it may be objeſted, How can it be known how long the Perſon Nain might have lived? Mr. Placette in his Treatiſe of Relicurion, 1. 3. c. 4. chus anſwers, That the length of no Man's Life can certainly be known, but it may be probably guer- ſed at two ways. As, 1. By what the Law has determined about it, which fixes it to do Years, and ſo if the Perſon ſlain was 40 Years old, the perſons intereſted mult be ſatisfied for the Gaios of 20 Years, but then he muſt not be much above, and all De- ductions muſt be conſidered. 2. Bur the beſt way feems to be to refer the Matter to the equitable Judgment of one or more Arbi. trators, who are wiſe and prudent Men, who conſidering the Conſtitucion, Health and Frugality of the dead Perſon, may de- termine beſt what is moſt reaſonable rn allow. (2) The manner of computing the value of their Maintenance is ſer down in Digeſt. 1. 35. Tit. 2. ad Legem Falcidiam, Leg. 68. Bur Tirius upon this Author obferves, that no exact eftimation can be made of a Damage by this and the following Examples, and therefore in this caſe we ought to ſubmit to an Accommodation. I may add, that every one ought to conſult his own Con- ſcience well, and conſider, that it is better always to make ſuch a Reparacion as may ſeem ſomething more than the Damage done, than expoſe himſelf to be thought not to have done enough, for the Cauſe of the perſon damag'd is always more favour ed, than of him that did ir. (a) Vid. Interp. Jur. Rornar. ad Tit. fi quadrupes, paxperiem, do ad L. Aquiliam, & de damno infe&o. (b) vid. I. 48. furtis (9) The Fench Tranſlation puts this Clauſe inco the Text after (c), and 'cis ſo in the Original. See Luc. XIX. v. 8. Tis remarkable, what Glycus tells us, in his Annals of Michael the Paphlagonian. But the Emperor Michael, fays he, “ Did not forbear all his Life time to lament his villany towards Romanus III. and endeavour'd by building Monaſteries, by Charity to the Poor, and other good works to appeaſe the Anger of God. And this Mechod might have prov'd beneficial to him, had is le laid down the Empire (for che ſake of which the fact had been committed, and throwing off the Adulcreſs, the Empreſs, for the love to whom he had done that Wickedneſs, tewail'd his Sin in a private Condition. But he neglecting ſuch means of Repentance, and ſtill uſing Zoa as his Wite, ftill holding faſt the Imperial Dignity, and only making a thew of doing good at the Publick Charge, thinking thus to obtain his Pardon, betray'd an Impious Opinion of God Almighty, as if he would fuffer us to buy our own Forgiveneſs at the Loſs of other Men e.Valer. Mar. 1. 2. c. 8. 1.4. So much difference there is, whe- you really ada ginning of a Benefic, and the end of an Injury. () Sec Mr. Placetse's Treatiſe of Reſtitution,' 1. 3. 5.4. (9) The way of any thing to another, or whether you only reſtore what you had taken from him, as there is between the be- Teckoning the Maiarenance we learn from L. 68. D. ad L. Falcidiam. tlier out, 8 Book III That no Man be burt; cut, how much the deceas’d would have ſpent of And thoſe alſo who commit the fame Mortal Vi- any ſuch Gain, had he been ſuffer'd to live and to olence, through their own Unwarineſs and Neglect . procure it (3) Examples of which Caſe we find ſet down in the Now he is an unjuft Slayer that kills a Man, who Inſtitutions (c) (4). As if a Soldier practiſing with had a Right not to be kill'd by him, and who his Arms in another place, than what is ſet apart therefore by the Act that caus'd his Death was for thoſe Exerciſes, ſhould ſay a Man who was ca- truly injur'd. And this Right appears to belong to ſually palling by; or if one who is not Soldier every individual Perſon, lince Nature by a gene- fhall happen to do the ſame; though in the place ral Command binds all Men to live like fociable ordain’d for the publiek training of Military Iden. Creatures, and to abſtain from inutual Hart. Whichi But if a Soldier in the ſame place of common Du- Right a Man may, as far as in him lies, renounce's ty ihall undeſignedly take away a Man's Life, he at leaſt fo as to make it fair and juſt for him to ihall ſtand excuſed; for he was performing his pro- be hurt by ſuch or fuch particular Perſons; and this per Buſineſs , and the other Party was in the fault may be done either tacitly or exprefly . He tacitly for throwing himſelf into the Danger (d). If a diſclaims this Right, who in a violent inanner ſets Feller of Wood ſhall with the Limb of a Tree which upon another without juſt Cauſe. For fince the o- he is cutting down kill a Servant paſſing by in the ther has Right of repelling the Violence, by High Road, or in a Way near a Town ; without any means he can, the Aſſailant is to accuſe him- having firſt cried out to give Warning. But in Telt only for any harm he ſuffers in the Repulſe of Cafe he did thus cry out, and the Servant negle- own unlawful Force. The ſame Right is ex- cted to ſave himſelt upon timely Notice, the Fel- preſly renounced by him who enters into War with ler ſhall not be charged with his Death. No more anuther upon mutual Appointment and Confent ſhall he if the fame Misfortune happen’d at a di- For 'tis a Law of War, that every one have fair ſtance from the High-way, or in the middle of a Liberty y to uſe his full Endeavours for the Defeat Field, altho' he did not give the uſual ſign of cry- and Suppreffion of his Enemy (a). And though in ing out; becauſe there the Stranger had no Right ſuch War the prevailing Perſon may perhaps ſin of paſſing, and conſequently ventured at his own againſt Charity, yet the Violation of Charity only, Peril (e). will not oblige him to repair the Loſs he has thus If a Phyſician deſtroy his Patient, either by plain WOW occaſion’d. Neglect and Deſertion, or by adminiſtring through The Life of a Freeman does not admit of any Ignorance, improper and dangerous Medicines (5). Rate or Valuation ; and had it any, there is no If a Muletier, through Weakneſs or Unskiltul- Perſon to whom the Debt ſhould be paid. For his neſs, ſhall have ſuffer'd his Mules to run over any Life does not properly belong to his near Relati- Perſon ; provided he undertook this Buſineſs of dri- ons, it is only their intereſt that he fhould live; ving at his own Choice, or made it his Profeſſion, and therefore the Value of that Intereſt or Advan- not if he was preſs’d and compell’d to the Service tage being paid to them, they can demand no ſuch proteſting at the ſame time his want of Art or of farther Recompence as the full worth of his Lite . Strength (8) The Caſe is otherwiſe with a Slave or Vallal, who In the Alcoran (h), he who ſhall ignorantly kill being entirely the propriety of his Maſter, and a Muſulman, is enjoyn’d to make good to his Rela- lalling under Exchange and Commerce, in the tions the Damage they ſuſtain’d by his Death; manner of other Goods, has really a Price ſet upon redeem one Perſon of his ownReligion from Slavery. him, which, if he be wrongfully kill'd, the Malter It ſeems probable that thoſe likewiſe were obli- has a Right to denand. if it ſeem hard and ſome- ged to ſome ſuch Method of Reparation, who by what like Inhumanity to rate out Slave thus in the the favour of the Jewiſh Law, enjoy’d the Privi- fame manner as we would our Beaſt, it may be lege and Protection of the Aſylums, or Cities of Re- anfwer'd, that we do not make this Valuation of fuge (i). Since in the Caſe there ſpecified, of a his Perſon, but only of the Work and Services Man's killing his Neighbour by the fall of the Head which he would have done us. of his Axe from the Helve, the Man is not entirely Thoſe in like manier ſtand bound to Reparation, blameleſs, in as much as he ought to have ſtrength- who kill another in their Sports or Recreations, ned his Inſtrument better, for the Prevention of which is eſteen’d equal to deliberate Miſchief (1). ſuch a fad Miſchance (5.) But how it came to be 88.99.1 and to ༣ ། (3) Mr. Van Muelen in his Conimentary upon Grotius, I. 2. c. 17. $ 16. believes that the nature and certainty of the Gain which the dead perſon might have made ought to be examined. If his Gain were altogether uncertain, ſo that it depended more upon Chance than the Induſtry of the dead Perſon, no Sarisfaction ought to be made; but if his Gain were morally certain, and would have in all appearance been produced by the Labour and Induſtry of the dead Perſon, as the Gain of ſome Traders, Mer. chan's and Artificers is, then he ought to facisfie the Perſons concerned for the Gain loft according to the equitable Eſtimation of an Arbitrator, who ſhall make as exact Deductions for all Expences which the dead would have been at, as poſſible, and conſider the Circumſtances our Author mencions. (4) See thac excellent Treatiſe upon this Subject compoſed by Mr. Noodt, Ad Legem Aquiliam. (5) Our Author obſerves a little higher, that the Alcoran in the Chapter of Women appoints, that if a Perſon againſt his Will, kills a Muſulman, he maſt not only make Satisfaction to the Parents of the perion Slain, but alſo redeem a Captive Muſul. man at his own Charge.osia (2) To this purpoſe we have a Story in Plutarch's Laconian Apopht begms; that Two Boys, one of them with a Sickle, gave other a Mortal Wound when the Coinpanions of the wounded Boy, who had haltend to part the Fray, promis'd him to re- venge his Death on his Murtherer; by no ineans, ſays he, this would be to act unjuſtly: For what he hath done to me is no more than I had done to him, had I been ſtrong enough to have prevented him. Add. 1. 4, 5,7. f. 4. 1. 52. f. 1. D. ad L. Aquil. (6) Vid. 1.4. f. 1: D. ad L. Cornel de Sicar, do 6. Godefred. 1.10. D. ad L. Aquil. Digeft. 1. 48. Tit . 8. (c) De L. Aquil . f. s. &c. '(d) Add. 1.9.1.4. D. ad I. Aquil. & Antiphon. Orat. VII. (e) L. 31. D. ad L. Aquil. Add. Leg. Burgundión, Tic.46. (f) vid. Plin. I. 29. C. 1. Leg. Wijogot hor. 1. XI. Tit. 1. c. 6. (8) Add. 1.5.1. 3. 1. 7. 1.2.5, 6, 8, 1. 8. 1. 9. princip . 1. 31. 1,5 I. 3. D. ad L. Aquil.do confer cum c. 8. 9. Se. X. de Homicid. (b) In the Chapter of Wives. (i) Num. XXXV.do Deuteron. the XIX, allow'd, CHAP. I. 9 Or, Reparation to be made. ged to pay allow'd, that the (6) Revenger of Blood ſhould diſ was the real occaſion of them, the Perſon who gave patch ſuch an Innocent Slayer, if taken without it ſtood farther bound to pay for his ſecond Cure; the Bounds of his Sanctuary, which ſeems not al- if they proceeded from any other Cauſe; he was not together conſiſtent with a Regular State of Go- reſponſible : As often as the Wound being imper- vernient, we have this only reaſon to aſſign, that fe&tly heald broke out again, he was ſtill charged God was pleas’d to grant ſome little Inſtances of with the Expences, but not after it had been once Indulgence to the Cruel and implacable Genius of brought to a perfect Cure. It might be added, that that People (a) (7). his Obligation continued only in Caſe the Wound VIII. He that has mained a Man, ſhall be obli- thus broke out of it ſelf; not if the thing happen'd the Charges of the Cure, and to make thro' the fault of the Patient, or thro' the Unskil- up what he now gains leſs than before, by his La- fulneſs of the Chirurgeon. bour or Calling (). On this Head the Jewiſh Con In rating the allowance to be made the Sufferer ftitutions are very worthy of Remark, as we find for the Ceſſation of his Work, they confider’d him them deliver'd in Conſtantine l'Empereur (c). He as a Keeper of Cucumers. The Jewiſh Doctors thus that hurts his Neighbour is reſponſible on five Acó enlarge on the Point; they ſuppoſe hiin already to counts; for the Damage, for the Pain, for the Cure, have receiv'd Satisfaction for the Defect or Damage for the Ceſſation of Work, and for the Affront or ſuſtaind in his Body, and likewiſe for the Pain he Diſgrace. The Damage they compute in this Me- has endured. And therefore ſuppoſing him, (for In- thod. If, for Example, he has beat out the others ſtance) to have loſt the uſe of a Hand or a Foot, Eye, or cut off his Hand, or broke his Leg, they they do not now conſider what Gain he would have then conſider the ſuffering Party as if he were a made, had thoſe Limbs remain’d entire; but be- Slave to be ſold in the Market, and ſo reckon how cauſe he hath been already paid for the diſabled much he would have yielded in Sale before the Part, they only compute what Damage he ſuffers, Hurt, and how far his Price is now fallen. For during his Sickneſs in reſpect of ſuch Work, as he they judged there would be no certain way of ſet- could have perform’d, though maim'd in Body, if ling theſe Rates and Accounts, ſhould they in well in Health. And they think he may fairly this Cafe diftinguiſh between the different Quali- demand fo much for every day of his Sickneſs, as his ties and Conditions of Men, ſince the Profellions daily Wages had been for watching a Cucumer of Life, and the States of Perſons admitting fo end- Garden. But becauſe it is a different thing, whe- lefs a Variety, the Sufferer would be always throw- ther a Man loſes a Hand or a Foot; whether on- ing in ſome new Reaſon to inhance the Damage, ly lying ſometiine ſick of his Wound, he after- and aggravate the Hurt, and conſequently to en- wards recovers without prejudice, or whether he is large his Demands of Compenſation. They thought actually depriv'd of a Limb. Maimonides propoſes it convenient therefore to ſet all Men, with regard a nicer and more exact way of rating the Cellation to this Buſineſs, in the one general Condition of of Work, according to particular Caſes. If the Suffe- Slaves, the juſt value of whom was diſcoverable rer ſhall not be maim’d, but only caſt into a Sick- beyond diſpute, So that if the maim'd Perfor, neſs, and confined to his Bed, or if the affected ſuppoſed to be a Slave, would before the hurt have Limb only ſwell for a time, and afterwards regaini brought fifty Sheckels, and could be ſold afterwards its foundneſs and uſe, the other Party ſhall allow for no more than thirty, the Maimer was enjoyn'd him daily for the loſs of his work, according to the to pay him twenty Sheckels. vi uſual Wages or Hire receiv'd by Men of the fame As to the point of Pain, if a Man, for inſtance, Calling. But if he is maiin’d in a Limb, or has loſt had burnt another, although in the Nails, where no a Hand, Satisfaction being already inade him for Bliſter follows, they conſider'd how much a Perſon that loſs, or what they call Damage being before of that State and Fortune would have taken to ſuf- diſcharged, as to the bare Ceſſation of his Work, fer voluntarily ſuch a Pain. For one inay find a they then conſider him as a Keeper of Cucumers, wealthy or a nice and delicate Perſon, who would and computing the Pay, generally allowed for not be hired at any rate to endure a Slight and this work, order him ſo much for every day of his moderate Smart ; and at the ſame time one may Illnefs. In like manner, if he has loſt a Leg, théy. light on a Poor and hardy Labourer, who would conſider him as a Sentinel or Watchman at a City be content to undergo foine ſharp degree of Tor- Gate; if an Eye, they ſuppoſe him to work at turn- ture for the earning of a Penny. Farther, in rate. ing a Mill; and fo agreeably of all other Hurts ing the Pain, they proceed thus ; they ſuppoſed, for and Miſchiefs . Inſtance, that a Perſon of that Condition was con- is. Laſtly, in rating the Affront or Diſgrace, they demn'd to have his Hand cut off, and then they con- conſider the Condition and Degree of both Parties. ſider'd how much he would give to loſe his Hand, Since an Affront is much more provoking from a rather by ſome eaſie conſuming Application, than mean and vile Perſon, than from one of Quality by the violent ſtroke of a Sword; and ſo much the or Power; and ſince the ſame piece of diſreſpect Party froin whom the Hurt was receiv’d, was bound may be light and inconſiderable to orie of vulgar to give him on account of the Pain (d). Condition, and yet be heinous and intolerable, if Concerning the Cure, they obſerv'd theſe Rules. offer’d to a Man of Honour. And here we may by If after the Cure perform'd, any Sores or Tumours the bye obſerve the Diſtinction added, concerning arofe , in Caſe it appear'd that the former Wound the Place or the Scene of the Action, which fome- (6) The Revenger of Blood was evidently the next Heir, or neareſt Relation of the Dead Perſon. See Mr. Le Clerc's Nocess The Author quotes Hom Odyſ. l. 15. 1. 272. do Tacit. German. c. 21. See allo Mr. Hirtius's Differtation, entituled, De Herede Occifi Vindice, in Tom. III, of his Comments, and ſmall Tracts, loc. (7) Cercainly ſuch a permiſſion can't be allowed under the Goſpel See the Interpreters of Matth. V. 38. doc. (2) Compare Tacitus German. c. 21. Homer. Odysſes, 0. v. 272. (6) Confer.1. 13. prin. D. ad 1. Aquil. I. 7. D. de his qui deject. vel Effud. (c) In Babakama, c. 8. 1. 1. (dj Conf. l. s. princ. col. 1. D. de injuriis . Where fince there is this difference made between Verberatia and Pulſatio, that the former is with, and the latter without Pain, it ſeems to follow that even Pa'n may fall under Valuation, + B times IO That no Man be burt. 3 BOOK III. much varies this Point. Thus if a Man the Inheritance, falls under that kind of Damage, , Thomafius in. Inftit. uripr, Div. 1. 2.C. 2lays, that the times very ſliding down from the Roof of a Houſe,ſhall hurt one which Men are ſaid to cauſe only Indirectly, and ly that paſſes by, and at the ſame time affront hinn, Conſequence. For as to the direct Crime of Adul- for Inſtance, by making the Dirt fall on him, he tery, that does by no means belong to Pecuniary fhall be reſponſible for the Damage or Miſchief, not Damage. On this point Ziegler obſerves that. Grof for the Ignominy. Thus much we have gather'd tius is indeed in the right, when he aſſerts , that from the Jewiſh Laws; and on the ſame Head the the Husband ought to be ſecured from the Burthen of Reader may conſult the Roman ; particularly, l. ult. keeping the Adulterous Off-ſpring : But that it will D. de his qui effuderint vel dejec. & l. 3. D. Si qua- bear a Diſpute, whether Reſtitution ſhould be made drupes. Where we muſt take notice, that when 'tis to the Legitimate Children for what they ſuffer by ſaid Scars and Deformity are not capable of being ſuch a Partner in the Inheritance. For he ſays the prized or rated, the Rule (1) will hold good only Queſtion here is concern’d-only about the Mothers in the Caſe of Freemen. For ſince the debauch'd Eſtate, to which the A lulterous Children cannot Manners of that Nation, ſet a higher Price than or- be adınitted, but by the Ordinance and Preſcripti dinary on handſome Slaves, they might confequent- on of Law. And therefore when the Law of any ly claim a pecuniary Satisfaction from thoſe who Nation does thus actually allow them to ſhare in Thould rob a Slave of this Advantage, by a Wound the Maternal Inheritance with the Legitimate, the in the Face, or any Injury of that kind. So the Damage here given proceeds from the Law it felf , disfiguring the Face of a Virgin or unmarried Wo- and not from the Adulterers. To which might be ſometimes is the beſt part of added, that the Adulterers are not obliged to ſuch their Fortune, may be reckon’d anongſt Hurts, re- Reparation for this farther Reaſon, That Children quiring Compenſatio1). And indeed Deformity, if have not a perfe&t Right to the Goods of their Live very remarkable, is in general a fad Unhappineſs, ing Parents; and no Neceſſity of Reparation can rendring us diſagreeable to others, and expoſing us arife but froin the breach of a perfet Right. Thus to the Conteinpt and Deriſion of Proud apd of Sa- a Parent cannot be ſaid properly to injure the Chil- tyrical Men. Yet Scars receiv'd in War, paſs for dren by palling to a ſecond Marriage, though their marks of Honour and Valour by the common Vote Hopes of Inheritance may ſink conſiderably by ſuch of Mankind (a). a Proceeding. But the Truth is, the Inſtance ala As to the Compenſation after an Act of Maim- ledged by Grotius, abſtracts both from the Provifi- ing, this is farther obſervable , that in ſuch Cafes ons made by Civil Laws, about the Succeſſion of the Limb it ſelf is not properly rated or valued, it Adulterous Children, to the Goods of their Parents, being a thing really incapable of a pecuniary Price; and alſo from the Penalties decreed againſt the A- but the deſign of theſe Proceedings is only to repair dulterers, if convicted ; and 'tis but reaſon to affirm the Damage fuſtaind by the loſs, or by the difuſe with him, that the Adulterers tho' unconvicted or of ſuch a Part, with regard to the difference of undiſcover d, do really owe fuch Reparation, both Thes, of Perſons, and of Abilities; and whilſt the to the Husband and to the Legitimate Children (2). Judge is ſettling theſe Points, 'tis neceſſary he ſhould: For by the End and Deſign of the Matriinonial ſpeak of the Members themſelves (b) via Torre de Covenant, the Children had a perfect Right, that IX. The next Inſtance produced by Grotius (1) no one ſhould thruſt new Co-heirs amongſt them, of the Adulterer and the Adultereſs; who he ſays beſides the law.ul Husband of their Mother. And are bound not ouly to ſave the Husbaud harmleſs, by the faine Covenant the Husband had a Right us to the Maintenance of the fpurious Iflue, but of refuſing to maintain, not only out of his own likewiſe to make good to the Legitimate Children proper and ſeparate Goods, but likewiſe out of his any Damage which they hall-fuftain, in Cafe fo Wife's. Dowry, the baſe Progeny of his polluted falfe a Sharer ſhould be admitted with them into Bed. como 21. not bewolls visi ataupun bas sidicimahe te them in Mr. Earbeyrac's NOTES on S 8. p. 305. (1) And the Reaſon, which the Roman Lawyers give, is, becauſe liberum Corpus nullam recipit aſtimationem, i. e. the Body of a Freeman is not capable of any Valuation, as the Body of Slaves is, bue Mr. Titius as well as this Author diſapproves of ibis.Reafon, and fays that thiough Freemen are not commonly boughe and fold, as Slaves are; it is not a good Inference, thag a Freeman chat is hurt may not reafonably require a Reparation by a certain Price of the Scars, and Deformities, which as the neceflary Confequents of the Wounds he has received. - His Reputation, for Example, is as little capable of a Valu- Some Men indeed through a of Soul, either real, or affected, think it below them i to take Money in compenfation of the Blows and Hurts they have received, but this hinders nor, shati they have righg to require ſuch a Satisfaction, if they pleafe; and that it may be made by Money, for as Grotius ſays, Lib. II. Chap: XVil, ş. 37. Money is phe common meaſure of all things, which are profitable to Man, 91 low birobi STO non solo. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 9. p. 306. Ines otse omitt vad 190 (1) See upon this Head concerning the Batistaction for the Damage done by Adultery, Mr. Placette's Treatiſe concerning Re- ſtitucion, 1. seven botthat the Reafon prod $: 50. ! our Author, taken from the Contract of Marriage is tar fetched, and agrees not of Marriage are made between the Man and Woman only, and no ways include the Children, (ſunt extra pa&ta) but our Author affirms not chat Children are not comprehended in the Engagement of Marriage from whence they proceed, and which were made rso they were brought forch into the World, but ſays cnly, that by virtue of the end of Marriage-contracts the Children have a right to believe that no perſon may diſappoint them of their Hopes. Now it is certain, that if the Facher or Mother had not committed Adultery, the Portion of the Legieimare Children out of the Godds already gotten, had been much greater ; lo chat all the difficulty. which remains is about the Goods, which the Father, or Mother, may get after the Birth of an illegitimate Child. But however uncertain the. Gains are, the Jeffening of the inheritance of the lawful Children is not leſs Real, nor a tefs neceflary Conſequent of Adultery, ſeeing they are already goeten, for the Reparation of the Damage muſt be made firſt. And it imports, that the Damage proceeded immediately from the will of the Father (which is another Reaſon of Thomafius's) for the Father's Will could not have acted ivithout an objection propounded to it. () See the Example of M. Servilius in Livy, l. 456. 39. Add. Senec. de Benefic. l. 5. c. 24. 1. 13. Princ. D. ad L. Aquil . (6) Becleri ad Grat. 1.2. c1. 1. 6. is buc 27 (2) Mr. X. If CHAP. I. Or, Reparation to be made. :) II If the thing Itoin X. If a Man has either by Force or Fraud defiled his Goods, without Remedy and Reſtitution. There- a Virgin, he is obligd to pay her ſo much as the fore 'tis an abſurd way of proceeding in ſome States appears to be damnified in her hopes of Marriage, where (2) the Magiſtrate claims the Goods found by the loſs of her Honour. For pure Virginity isą on the Robber, and commands the true. Owner of very valuable Pofleffion, and as it were the com- them to content himſelf with ſeeing the Villain mon Portion which Nature gives her Daughters (a). brought to publick Juſtice (f). Nor is it more; a- And therefore he who robs a Maid againſt her Will greeable to the Law of Nature, that the Charges of of this Treaſure, ought fo largely to refund to her, Puniſhing the Thief lhould be laid on the Perſon that the Improvement of her Fortune may hide the he has robb’d, ſince the inflicting due Penalties, be- Blemiſh of her Body. Though indeed the true way longs entirely to the Government, to effect which of proceeding is, that he marry her himſelf; unleſs if more Expences are requird, than the Eſtate of hinder'd by the Difparity of their Condition,or ſome the Criminal amounts to the Remainder is to be other extraordinary Circumſtances (b). But ihe who made up by the publick; eſpecially fince at other by a luſtful Compliance, voluntarily parts with her times the Treaſury gains fo conſiderably by For- Chaſtity, is to thank her ſelf for the Lofs. Yet com- feits and Confifcations, For Inſtance, if á State monly ſpeaking, the Man in theſe Caſes is pre- engage in a War, upon account of ſome private fum'd to be more faulty than the Woman. He who Members who have been injured, all are obliged to ſhall entice a Virgin to proſtitute her ſelf on the contribute to the Charges, as well as thoſe whoſe promiſe of Marriage, ſhould be bound to make good Defence is particularly undertaken. The Caſe iso- that Engagement. Nor will the Objection hold here, therwiſe, if the Judge puts it to the injured Partjes that Covenants about baſe or diſhoneſt things are Choice, whether he had Goods, invalid. For ſince the Law of Nature requires no or ſee the Thief executed; for here if he prefer the Interval betwixt the Covenant and the Completi- latter Condition, he can lay no claim to farther on of Matrimony (c), (all ſuch diſtance being intro- Satisfaction. Though the Judge cannot fairly pro- duc'd by Civil Čuſtoins and Conſtitutions) (d), with poſe ſuch Terms, ſince the Puniſhment of Malefa- regard to that Law, we can ſcarce call this a baſe ctors ought not to depend on the Pleaſure or Hu- Condition, “ You ſhall be my Wife (1), provided mour of private Men, but on the Publick Advan- you conſent, that I ſhall inmediately uſe you tage of the State. as ſuch. Or if there be any thing which ſeems foul in fo over-haſty a Match, it is not judg'd tius will have it to be paid for according to a mid- fufficient to invalidate the Contract; becauſe Mar- dle Valuation ; not to the full Worth, nor yet con- riage is, in this caſe, the more favourable ſide. ſiderably leſs. Which Direction Ziegler does not XI. A Thief or Robber is bound to reſtore the without reaſon diſlike. For what Title has the thing taken away, with its natural Increaſe or Im- Thief in this Caſe to Favour? If I can demand provement (e); and to make good, not only the the full and higheſt Price when to oblige a Perſon, Damage (1) actually enſuing to the Owner, but like I fell a thing otherwiſe not Vendible, why ſhould í wiſe the furceaſing of his Gains ; and this , although here make any Abatement to the Thief, who ſeizes he be compelld to ſuffer the juſt Puniſhment of his my Goods againſt my Will? And is my Chapman Crime. For'tis the injur'd Party who demands Re- only upon Compulſion (8) (3)? And in this caſe paration, and it is the Cominonwealth which re too Reparation is due from the Thief or from his quires Puniſhment for the Publick Good; and the Heirs (4), yet not beyond the Value of the Inheri- Judge can by no means reckon this as a Satisfacti- tance,) although he has ſuffer'd the Corporal Pe- on to the private Perſon, ſo as to make him lofenalty of his Crime. For it does by no means look 66 ni all. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 10. p. 306. (1) From henceforth the Marriage is made and conſummated, in a State of Nature, ſays Thomafius, ubi fupra s. $7. 20 Mr. Barbegrac's NOTES on § 11. P: 307 (1) See S. 3. Note 11. above. (2) See lib. IV. 6. 13. S. 4. following near the end, and what Mr. Hirtius ſays upon it there, and his Diſcourſe de ſuperioritate temporali S. 56. Nevertheleſs Mr. Thomaſius in his Treatiſe de Stat. Imper. poteft. Legiſlat. s. 41. maintains, that ſuch a Claim, Seizure, or Confiſcation, although it is eſteemed by ſome people to be contrary to all natural Right, may be juſtified by very good Reaſons, if long Cuſtom, and expreſs Law has ſettled it in that country. As for Example, The intention of the People, or Legiſlator may be to make the Proprietors more watchful to preſerve their Goods, or they may appoint ſuch ſtoln Goods, as they have recovered to bear the neceffary charges of the Officers of Juſtice, who are to puniſh Thieves, which otherwiſe muſt be born by the Publick. We will nor inquire how far theſe Reaſons may avail in Conſcience, but Thall only obſerve that it hath nothing contrary to Natural Equity, among ſuch people as have conſented to ſubmit to ſuch a Law, or Cuſtom; which equally affects Yet when the ſtoln Goods fall into the Hands of a Stranger, the Maxims of pure Natural Right ought to take place, and then luch an uſage can be no ways Authorized. Mr. Thomafius pretends here to make uſe of the opinion of fuch as are of a contrary Judgment, who acknowledge that ſtoln Goods may be confiſcated, and given to ſuch Subjects of the State to whom they are of use, for he ſays, in the opinion of all our Doctors, the Right of Repriſals is not contrary to Law or Nature: Here- upon he alledges the Example of Theft and Adultery. But it is here much the ſame to put a man to Death, or ſeize his of Repriſal, which otherwiſe would be contrary to the Law of Nature, we do bue defend our felves againſt one (3) The Roman Law on the contrary will have that which is ſtole or loſt to be valued at the higheſt Rate, for fo it fpeaks, Placet tamen id tempus fpe&tandum, quo res unquam plurimi fuit, Digeft. I. 13. Tit . I. De condi&t. ex cauſa furti Leg. VIII. S. 1 but Lib. 9. Tit. 2. ad Leg. Aquil, Leg. II. adds, qu.inti id in eo anno plurimi fuit, and Lib. 12. Tit. 3. de in litem Jurando, Leg. 9 (4) See lib. 4. ch. II. S. 19. following. (a) Apuleius in Ap:103. A beautiful Maid, though in the Condition of Poverty, hath a fufficient Portion, ſhe brings her Huf- band sweetneſs of spirit and Difpofition, fair Charms and honeſt Purity. And indeed Virginity alone is commonly, and ought to be eſteemed by the other Sex, a full and juſt Recommendation. (b) See Exod. XXII. 16, 17. Deuteron. XXII. 28, 29. (C) See Tobit. VII. 10. 18. (d) Vid. Gratian Cauſ . 27. Queſt. 2. Cap. 39. (e) Vid. 1. 4. c. 7.1.3. (f) vid. Caroli V.Ord. Crim. Art. 218. Add. l. 3. 8.12. D Le Peculio. I. 56. 1. 1. D. de furtis. 1. 7. princ. D. de incendii ruina. (6) Add. l. 9, D. de in litem jurando. 1. 2. princ. D. ad L. Aquil . verb. quanti id in ce arno plurimi fuit. 1. 8. f. 1. l. ult. D. de Condit. furtiv. + B 2 like Effects by way kind of Enmicy. I 2 Book III. That all Men are to be accounted like Injuſtice or Cruelty, that the Offender after he which cleave as it were to the Goods and Poſiedl- has thus fatisfied the Law, either by Death or o- ons, and follow them to any new Maſter. And fuch ther bodily Pair, ſhould likewiſe recompenſe the is this Debt for Damage given. Perſon he has endamaged. The trite Objection of The other Species of Hurt are more eaſie to be Mors omnia folvit (a), Death pays all , has no manner fettled and decided ; and ſome of them will hereaf- of Force in the preſent Buſineſs. Death indeed dif- ter be particularly infifted upon in their proper charges perfonal Performances, but not proper Debts, places (6) (6). Lair (6) Our Author has collected ſeveral Examples more particularly in his Elements of the Civil Law, P: 453. &c. but before we end this Chapter, let us in a few Words after the Example of Budæus, make an Application of thele Maxims, which we are about to Eſtablish for the Right of Nations, taken in the ſenſe our Author intends it, lib. 1. ch. 3. S. 23. People then may do ill to, or offend each other in reſpect, either of the Body, or the Eſtate, which anſwers to the Life of Man, or of the Govern ment, or of his Reputation, or perfect Rights ; or laſtly, ſome of the Members, or Citizens, who may be damaged either in their perſons, or their Goods, or Repucation, or their Rights. Moreover, one People may offend another, either directly, when by the Order of their Sovereign, who Reigns in Chief, they cauſe a Damage to be done to another in any manner; or indi . rectly, when a Sovereign does not puniſh the Miſchiefs done by his Subjects to another People, or if he could hinder them, doch not, as for Example, If he does not uſe the beſt means he can, and ought to prevent or reſtrain Robberics, and Piracies; it inſtead of paying his Troops, he reduces his Soldiers to a neceſſicy of pillaging both friends and Enemies; if he affords a Re. ception to thoſe who have wronged and injured the Stare. (See Grotius lib. 2. c. 17. 5. 20.) In all thefe Cafes he is obliged to Reflitution. And the other State has not only reaſon to take Arms, it the thing be troubleſome, bye to continue a War, till it can gaia it ſelf a Security for the future, which is not allowed to one Citizen againft another. But of this we ſhall treat more largely, when we come to ſpeak of the Rights of War. (). Ex. Novell, 22. c. 20. (b) As for the Treſpafles done by Beaſts, which the Roman Lawyers term Pauperies, conſult their Observations, ad Tit. D. ſi Quadrupes. bodisi GT L city buttibu Oto Plata ro will miss 03 TO CHA P. CHA P. II. 05. That all Men are to be accounted by Nature Equal. II. 1. Every Man is to account another bis Equal. VI. Men offend againſt it by Pride. 1. What is a Natural Equality to this VII. And by Affronts offered to others. III, The Popular Reaſons for it. VIII. Whether any be Servants by Nature. IV. The Opinion of ſuch an Equality makes Men help. IX. Whence has proceeded that Inequality that is found ful to one another. V. How things are to be divided by it among many. among Men. B every Man ESIDES Affection which ry Conſtitution Nature. . The word MAN maintains for his own Life, and Body, and Pofa is thought to carry fomewhat of Dignity in its found; feffions, by which he cannot but reſiſt and repel and we commonly make uſe of this, as the laſt and whatever threatens Deſtruction to thoſe dear Con- the moſt prevailing Argument againſt a rude Inful. cerns; we may diſcover likewiſe deeply rooted in ter, I am not a Beaſt , a Dog, but I am a Man as well his Mind, a moſt tender Efteem and Value for him- as your ſelf (a). as your ſelf (a). Since then Human Nature agrees ſelf; which if any one endeavour to impair, he is equally to all' Perſons, and ſince no one can live a ſeldom leſs (and ſometimes much more,) incens'd, fociable Life with another, who does not own and than if a Miſchief had been offer'd to his Perſon, reſpect him as a Man; it follows as a Command of or to his Eſtate. This Paſſion, though it may be the Law of Nature, that every Man efteem and treat heighten'd and improv'd by various external Cau- another as one who is Naturally bis Équal, or who is fes, yet ſeems to lay its firſt Foundations in the ve- a Man as well as he (1). Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chapter II. S 1. p. 308. (1) This is a Conſequence of the Maxin, which was to be explained in the preceeding Chapter; for every one having a perfect Right to expect, that he be regarded and treated as a Man, he thar doth ocher wiſe with another does him a real Ďa. mage. This Dury being founded on an immovable Condition, viz. That men fhould be uſed preciſely as Men, is not only gene: ral, but of perpetual Obligation, infomuch, that notwithſtanding all the inequality by the Changes and Diverſity of additional Titles and Degrees, the Rights of Natural Equality always remain unmovable, and agree to every one in Relacion to another, whatever Condition he is in. There are neverthelefs ſome Superiors ſo infolent that they plainly violate this Duty, creacing their Inferiors after an inhumane Manner, by exacting of them exceſſive Labours, Naying them, or expofing their Lives to danger without Neceffity, as if they were Beafts ; for though it be common for men to contemn each other, yet we ought to look upon ſuch contemptible Perſons, as of the fame Nature with our ſelves. We ordinarily content our felves to account others as fool . h, and inconſiderable Perſons; in a word, as Perſons of no Merit, or accompliſhments, as we eſteem our ſelves, Titius Obſ. 172. (a) Stacius, Thebaid. 12. Hominuin inclyte Theſeus, · Brave Theſeus, they were Men like all before, Sanguis erant omnes eademq; in Sydera, eoſdem And Humaa Souls in Human Frames they bore, Sortitus animarum, aliment aqveſtra creati. With Tou to take their Parrs in Earthly Feafts, With you to climb on Heaven, and fit Immortal Gueſts. word, de Petrons of no Metic.com II. For CHAP. II. by Nature Equal. 13 vance, or II. For the better underſtanding this Equality a• not only when a Man compares himſelf with o- mongit Men, we may obſerve, that Mr. Hobbes (a) thers, but when he compares others amongſt reſtrains it to a parity of Strength, and of other Hu- themſelves, and is not concernd as to his own In- mane Abilities which attend a ripe and perfect Age; tereft, which fide carries the Advantage. Nor do and would from hence infer, that all Men have good we always favour and commend him, who con- Cauſe, naturally to fear each other (1). For he in- fpires with our own Thoughts and Deſigns; but deed can ſtrike 10. Terrour into me whoſe power whom the fair contrivance and the good Succeſs of reaches not far enough to hurt ine. But now a- his Project, entitles to our Approbation. And al- mongſt Men, he who is inferior to another in bo- though ſuch is the Natural Temper of Man, fo gree- dily ſtrength, inay either by Treacherous Contri- dy of Eſteem and Applauſe, that every one Dildainis by Art and Dexterity, take away the to be upbraided with Folly or (2) Imprudence, and Life of the ſtouteft Mortal (L). Since therefore the is exceedingly incens'd againſt thoſe who boaſt of greateſt of Natural Evils , which can proceed from Hu- much larger Talents, much higher Attainments mane Power is Death, which any grown Perfon is than his Neighbours, yet it does not follow hence able to bring upon another ; ſince thoſe may be that no one allows another to be wiſer than him- term’d Equal, who can do equal Miſchief to each felf . For what if we fanfie Two Men falling to other, and ſince to kill is equally (becauſe in the gether into the ſame Danger, one of whom by his higheſt degree) to Miſchieve, it follows hence that dexterous Management comes cleanly off, whilſt the Men are by Nature equal (c). When he fubjoins other is baſely hamper’d, and eſcapes not without that the preſent Inequality has been introduced by Cạ- conſiderable Hurt or Prejudice, will not the latter vil Law, he ſeems to me very much to have forgot- here acknowledge his Fellow to have had a bet- ten himſelf . For he had been ſpeaking before of the ter Head-piece than himſelf? This is, indeed, a part natural Equality of Men's Strength, to which it is of that Freedom which Men equally enjoy, that a a great Impropriety to oppoſe the Unequalneſs, ari- wiſer Perfon ſhall have no right to challenge the fing from Politick Inſtitutions, which does not af- Government of one more fimple, unleſs with his fect or regard the Strength of Men, but their State Conſent; eſpecially if the latter profeſs himſelf to and Condition ; does not make one Man ſtouter than be contented with his own little Sagacity, and not another, but greater in Quality and Honour. Nor deſirous of the Controul, and the Direction of others. has the ſame Author much better Succeſs, when he But although the Conſideration of equal Strength pretends (d) to diſcover in the Faculties of the Mind, is thus far ſerviceable to our preſent purpoſe, that a greater Equality than that of Strength. He ſays in- it may reſtrain one Man from raſhly inſulting over deed, that all Prudence is but Experience, which Na- another, in as much as all Contention with an Equal ture in equal time equally beſtows on all Men, in thoſe is of dubious Iſſue, and becauſe it is extreme Fol- things they equally apply their Minds unto. But do not ly to deſire the hurting another by, undergoing our we ſee one Man piercing more deeply than another ſelves the ſame Proportion of Miſchief: Yet the(3) into the Conſequences of things (e), applying more Equality which we are now treating of , if of a dif- dexterouſly what he obſerves, and diſtinguiſhing ferent Species, and the inviolable Obſervation of with more Perſpicacity, the likeneſs or unlikeneſs it, is in the higheſt Degree Conducible to the com- of Caſes and Circumſtances? And hence it frequente mon Benefit and Intereſt of Mankind. And here, ly comes to paſs, that of Two Men who have been as in all other things, may we juſtly admire the employ’d an equal Time in the fame Buſineſs; one wiſe Contrivance of Nature, that whilft ſhe diſtri- ſhall grow Eminent for Management and Addreſs , butes amongſt Men the Goods of the Body and of whilft the other's Natural Heavineſs ſhall be little the Mind, by unequal Parcels and Meaſures, ſhe in- amended, by fo long a Courſe and Experience of Af troduces this general Equality, to form an agreeable fairs . Nor does the great Diſparity of Men's Pru- Harmony amongſt all the other Varieties and Diſ- dence ariſe only from their own faiſe and overwean- proportions. For as in well order'd Common- ing (onceit of their Particular Worth; every one think- wealths, one Subject may exceed another in Riches ing himſelf to have a higher Degree of Wiſdom than or in Honour, but all are equal Sharers in the Com- the Vulgar; that is, than all except a few, whom by mon Liberty; ſo under this Regulation of Nature, Fame, or for concurring with himſelf, be is pont how much foever a Man may furpaſs his Neigh- to approve and admire. For this Diſparity appears, bours, as to bodily or Intellectual Endowments, he Mr. Barbeyrai's NOTES on $ 2. p. 309. (7) in the Original this Paragraph is full of Miſtakes, Omiſſions and Superfluities, which fometimes render the Diſcourſe very intricate ; I have endeavoured to unfold it, and rectifie' it, as well as I can, by following the Nocions both of the Author, and Mr. Hobbes, whoſe Principles he recites with all Exactneſs. 7000! ſeems to be the erue Reading. (2) The Latin, even in the laſt Edition in 1706 hath, impudentian, but doubtleſs it is a fault in the Print, for imprudentiam 23. Mr. Titius makes our Author ſay that the Natural Equality of Men, or the Natural Equality which they have one to ano- ther Thews it felf in Three Things. 1. Their equality of Strength. 2. Inequality of the Goods of Nacure, and Fortune. 3. The Sanie Natural Obligations, but he miſtakes our Author's Senſe, for after he has rejected the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes, who inſiſts upon an Equality purely Phyſical, viz. of Strength and Natural Faculties, he confines himſelf to the Confideration of our Moral Equality, which he calls an Equality of Right, which he ſuppoſes to ariſe from our Conformity of Nature, which is made clear by theſe words of our Author. Although Nature has beſtowed fome excellent Qualities of Body and Mind upon fome, which the denies to others; yet all are obliged to obſerve the Maxims of the Natural Law one to another. (a) De Cire, C, 1.1.3. (5) Senecae de Ira, 1. 1. C. 4. There is no Man to contemptibly weak, who may not hope ſome way or other to wreck his Revenge on the braveſt Perfon breathing. We are all ſtrong enough to do Miſchief. (c) It is the Argument of Palas in Virgil's Totidem nobis animæq; manufq; Our Hands are equal, and our Lives the ſame. (.) Leitban, c. 13. (P) See the Earl of Clarendon's Survey of the Leviathan. Loode on the Nature of Man, cap. 5. is 14 Book III. That all Men are to be accounted Neigh- is ſtill obliged to pay all Natural Duties, as readily ligation is able to make up to us fome other way and as fully as he expects to receive them; nor do what we loſe by being more juſt than our thoſe Advantages give him the leaſt Power or Pri- bours. But our Obligation to the practice of Na- vilege to oppreſs his Fellows. Nor on the other tural Duty and Right, although impoſed by the ſu- fide, does the bare unkindneſs of Nature or of For- preme Lawgiver, does thus far agree with Obliga- tune, ſet a Man in a worſe Condition than others, tions of common Bargains and Covenants, that fo as to the Enjoyment of common Rights. But what- ſoon as one Perſon recedes from it (6), he can no long- ever one Man requires or expects from others, the er require the fame Offices from another; and be faine may others (all Circumſtances being alike) de- fides, the other Party does hence acquire a Right of mand from him, and the fame Judgment one de- compelling hinn by force to make Satisfaction. crees againſt another, he is obliged in like caſe to Though the Genius of Civil Society makes it ne- fubmit to himſelf (a)" (4). On this Account we can ceffary to abridge and allay this Liberty adhering by no means admit of Cicero's Rule which he lays to a State of Nature, for the ſupport and mainte- down in his third Book of Offices z Lex ipſa nature, nance of Government and of Peace. &c. The Law of Nature-it jelf, which preferves and III. Other Reaſons there are Popular and Plauſi- holds together the common Profit of Mankind, does de ble, which might give us no little Alliſtance in dif- cree, That things neceffary for Life and Suſtenance, covering, and in illuſtrating this Equality. Amongſt may be transfer'd from an idle and uſeleſs Perfon, to which this is not the leaſt conſiderable, that we all a Man of Wiſdom, Goodneſs , and Valour, who ſhould derive our being from one Stock, from the fame com- he be' Juffer'd to perif), would exceedingly prejudice the mou Father of Humane Race. On this conſidera- Publick" by his Death (5). Much more unworthy of tion Boethius Checks the Pride of the inſulting No- Approbation is that ſaying of the American, record-bility. You ed by Montaign (b), who coming to Roan in the Reign of Charles IX. and being ask'd what he ob Quid genus & proavos ſtrepitis? ſerv'd t that was fingular in France, anſwer'd that Si primordia veſtra, amongſt other things, he could not but wonder to nt Autoremq; Deum Speétas, entot Bot T1 fee ſome Perſons abounding in all manier of Plen- of Plen- Nullus degener extat L. HILDO ty, and others oppreſs’d with the moſt grievous"Ni vitiis pejora fovens, Want, begging at their Doors, and not rather chu Proprium deſerat ortum.ount online fing to invade and pillage them for their own Sup- port. For as thoſe who excel in the Goods of the Fondly , our High Defcent we boaſt; Mind, of the Body, or of Fortune, ought not to If whence at firſt our Breath we drew, treat Men of lower Condition with Haughtineſs and The common ſprings of Life we view, Infolence, ſo neither ought theſe to envy or to rifle The airy Notion foon is loft.ru their Superiors. And this Equality we may call an Equality of Th' Almighty made us Equal All: Right, the Principle from which it {prings is this, But he that ſlaviſhly complies that the Obligation to a focial Life equally binds To do the Drudgery of Vice, all Men, in -as inuch as it is the inſeparable Com- Diſowns his High Original. panion of Hunan Nature, conſider'd finply as ſuch. Mr. It chiner Where we may obſerve farther, that between Ob- ligations enjoyn’d by a Superior, and thoſe which Farther, that our Bodies are all compoſed of the ariſe from Mutual Compact, there ſeems to be this fame Matter, frail and brittle, liable to be deſtroy'd difference, that the latter imınediately ceaſe to by a thouſand Accidents of Miſchief. We all owe a Man, when the other Party hath broken the A- our Exiſtence to the fame Method of Propagation greement; whereas the former may ſtill engage us we are all by the ſame Degrees faſhion'd and com- to fome Performances towards a Perſon who is want- pacted in the Womb of our Mother; and the No- ing in a mutual return of Duty. And the reaſon of bleſt Mortal in his Entrance on the Stage of Life, this is, becauſe the Author and Impoſer of the Ob- is not diſtinguiſh'd by any difference of Pomp or more TÚLI V tur. c. 2. S. 7. (4) Here we may apply the Determination of the Roman Lawyers. Quod quiſq; furiſ. &c. The ſame Law which we uſe againſt othiers, we ſhould ſubmit to our ſelves, Digeſt. Lib. H. Tit. II. for the chiet part of Equity is Equality, Sen. Ep. XXX, as alſo de Irå, lib. 1. c. 14. Phedr. 1. 1. Fab. 26. Diod. Sic. 1. 13. c. 30. Eurip, Phænisſ. v. 538. Quint. Declam. 3. Cumberland de leg. Na- (5) Our Author ſeems not fufficiently to have attended to the Connexion of Cicero's Diſcourſe, if he imagines that the Orator lays it down for a general Maxim, That we may always take the Goods of Fortune from them, who are not ſo worthy to en- joy them as we are, as if a Perſon of great Meric had a ſufficient Title and Right to ſtrip a Proprietor of the Goods he is law- fully poffetled of, whereas Cicero ſpeaks only of an extraordinary Caſe, viz. in extream Neceffity, and then, as rigid as he ſeems to be, builds his determination not upon thar Right which every one has to preſerve himſelt, but upon the good of Society, whofe intereſt it is to preſerve ſuch a Perſon, for he ſays, that our of ſuch a Caſe, the moſt honeſt Man in che World, cho he be almoſt famifhed, may not take a morſel of Bread from any Man, which may be of uſe to 'others. In a word, Cicero had raken ſuch great Care 'to prevent any ſuch looſe interpretation of his words, that it is aſtoniſhing, how our Author could fo ftrangely pervert his meaning. () See Book II. c. 5. §. 1. above. (a) As phedras ſays, 1. 1. Fab, 27. Sui quiſque exempla debet aquo animo pati. Every one ought to bear it patiently, when his Example is curn'd upon himſelt . Diodor, Śic. 1. 13. c. 30. 'Tis but juſt that a Man ſhould himſelf ſubmit to that Law, which he hath preſcribed to others. Quintilian Declam. 3. We muſt needs think that every one when he paſſeth Judgment ters approves of that which he himſelt would have done in the like Caſe. Add. Cumberland de Leg. Nat. c. 2.1.3. Senec. Epift . 30. Equality is the firſt part of Juſtice. Euripides Phil. ’ris beſt my Son to keep Equality; And States to Scates, and links confederate Wars. The Mighty Band which Friends unites to Friends, (b) B. 1. C. 30, Paſſage, on Mac- CHAP. II. soetaruby Nature Equal, da sodi 15 on the old fer omnes. Paliage, from the loweſt of Mankind (a). Our ought as freely to be at their Service, when they Growth and Nourishment is perform'd alike, and want his help on the like Occaſions. One good turn the groſs remainders of our Food are carried into the requires another, is the common Proverb. For , he ſame Common Shore. Laſtly, our Life haſtens to the mult certainly eſteem others unequal to hiinſelf, who fanie General Mark; Death obſerves no Ceremony, conſtantly demands their Aid, and as conſtantly de- but knocks as loud at the Barriers of the Court, as nies his own. And whoever is of this inſolent Tem- at the Docr of the Cottage (b), and after Death, our per, cannot but highly diſpleaſe and provoke thoſe Bodies are reſolv'd into the fame Duſt and Corrup- about him, and ſoon give occaſion to a breach of tion (C). Beſides, wiſe Men are ever preſling it up- the Common Peace (1). It was a manly and gallant on our Conſideration, that we are alike obnoxious Reproof which Cara&tacus gave the Romans, Num fi vos to the ſports of Fortune, to the endleſs variety of omnibus imperitare vultis, Jequitur ut omnes fervitutem Dangers and Miſchances ; or rather, that the Divine accipiant? Becauſe you deſire to be Maſters of all Men, Diſpoſer of all things, enſures 110 Man in his preſent does it follow that al Men muſt deſire to be your Slaves (2) State, or in the Poffeffion of unſhaken Felicity: And indeed, it as much implies a Contradiction But according to the Secret Counſels of his Provi: to deterinine differently in my own Cafe, and ano- dence, expoſes diverſe Men to various Changes, and thers , when they are exactly Parallel, as to make Troubles , as if he pleaſed himſelf in raiſing the Poor contrary Judgments on things really the ſame. Since out of the Duft, and cafting the High down to the then, every Man is well acquainted with his own Ground. See (*) at the bottom of the Page. Nature, and as well at leaſt as to general Inclina- Our Chriſtian Profeſſion ſuggeſts many Motives to tions, with the Nature of other Men, it follows that the ſame purpoſes as that God does not eſteemn Man he who concludes one way as to his own Right, and according to their Nobilty, their Power, or their another way as to the ſame Right of his Neighbour, Wealth, but according to their fincere Piety and is guilty of a Contradiction in the plaineſt Matter: Goodneſs . And that at the laſt great Day of Judg. An Argument of a Mind unſound in no ordinary ment, of the Diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſh Degree. For no good reaſon can be given, why what ments in another Life, no regard will be had to thoſe I eſteem juſt for my felf , I ſhould reckon unjuſt for who ſwell in Port and Figure, beyond their Neigh- another in the ſame Circumſtances. Thoſe therefore bours of this world. are moſt properly fociable Creatures, who grant the IV. This Equality being admitted, there flow from fame Privileges to others, which they deſire ſhould it ſeveral Precepts, the Obſervation of which bears be allow'd themſelves (d); and thoſe the other a very great force in the maintaining of Peace and Hand, are moſt unfit for Society who imagining Friendſhip amongſt Men. And this in the firſt themſelves a Degree above vulgar Mortals, would place is moſt manifeft, that he who would uſe the have a particular Commiſſion to do whatever they Alliftance of others in promoting his ownAdvantage, pleaſe; they give themſelves a free Pardon for all arcut. We Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 4. p. 312. 6, () The French Tranſlator in this place goes on thus. For according to the Remarks of a Judicious ancient Chriſtian Doctor, (uz: Lalantius Ift. Div. l. 3. c. 23. Nihil ſapienter fit, &c. Nothing is conformable to the Rules of wiſdom, which being pradifed by every one, becomes Hurtful and Evil. (2) The Author here ſets down a Speech of Cara&tacus, a great Commander of the Britains, the ancient Inhabitants of Eng- land, which he ſpoke with much Courage to the Romans. Num fi vos, &c. but this Paffage were better placed elſewhere, ſince he doth nor here treat ac all of the Right of commanding others, but only of requiring a Duty. (a). See Wiſdom VII. 5. (b) Mors &quo pulſat pede pauperum tabernas_Regumque turres. Θανάτω πάντες οφειλόμεθα. How The World owes us all to Deatho bueno s 2 Sil bipazione anime (c) Claudian in Ruffin. I. 2. Bentu vitam, , Deveniunt, ubi hulum-marent' diferimina fati, tot i From Earth's wide Stage, the moreal Actors Nullus honos, vanoq; exutum nomine regem, And here partake an undiſtinguiſh'd Doom. Proturbat plebeius egens. Alide their Honours with their Robes they throw The Herald and his Trade are loft below. 48. urisht. so nav isbote The King depoſed, forgets the Duſt he made; And the rude Pealant crouds che Royal Shade. Phocylides, ITav)es voor vexes, the Dead are all upon a Level. Lucian 'loclipici estén ñ d'o ng Diyoso a marles, the Grave admits no difference in Title or Degree . Cicero de Leg. l. 2. It is moft agreeable to Nature, that Death Thould take off all Diſtinction of Fortune. Statius. Theb. X. -Titulique in more latentes. O gak Ticles hid in Duſt. Add. Sirach. x. (4) Qui ne tuberibus propriis offendat amicum a om gic He that would have his Bötches not offend, to mojitve poftulat, ignofcat verrucis illius : &quum est notaro Muft wink at puny pimples in his friend, odia Peccatis veniam pofcentem reddere rui jus. dom Indulgence fhould be múcual, they that want Hor. l. Sar. 3. The largeſt Pardon, ſhould the largeſt grant. Shou; Valet ima summis owo Mu Mutare, do inſignem attenuat Deus. Obſcura promens. Hor, I. 1. Od. 34 GOD can quite change the Conditions of Affairs, and the Stations of Men. Idem 1.7. quod quifque uiter nunquam homini faris caurum est in hot as. No Man is provided againſt the “Accidehes of the nexes SOTOO AT 255909.500 Tanta eſt rerum difcordia in eos, pis osal -Hence there ſprings Et fubtenta malis bona ſunt, lacrymeq; ſequuntur That various Diſcord which is ſeen in things: Vita, le in cun&tis fervat fortuna tenorem, nebub 41104 In one continued ſtream no Fortune flows, Uſque adeo fermixta fuit, nec permanet unquam, Amifitq; fidern variando cuneta Joy mixes Grief, and Pleaſure's urg'd by Woes: Forced 420T inconftancy in every part appears, Which Wiſdom never trufts, but Folly fears. to aradaulid bin slonis going to be to us mind ho. Mr. Creech, A moſt noble ſtrain ivé have to the ſame purpoſe in Séneca’s Thyeſtes, Ille qui donat diadema fronti, &c. cod Arrian (in Epičet.) tells a Story of a poor Shoemaker, whom his Maſter Epaphroditus fold off as a'Slave of liccle uſe. In fome fine the man got the Honour of Working at his Trade for the Emperor; and then 'twas pleaſant to ſee how Epaphroditus made come, on rg 0 4.9.&c. bis 2 sum , Us . Hour. Manil. lib. his Court to him. things 16 That all Men are to be accounted Book III. ܪ ad nor For things, and vouchſafe not to others the leaſt Indul- private Man (3). "Galba in Tacitus (d), gives Paſo gence; they demand the Principal Share of com an admirable piece of Advice to the ſame purpoſe . mon Honours, and of common Goods ; though their Utiliſimus idem ac brevilimus bonarum malarumq; re- Right and Title is not diſtinguiſh'd by any peculiar rum delectus eſt cogitare, quid aut volueris fub alio Excellence or Advantage. For as in railing an E- principe aut nolueris. The beſt and the ſhorteſt rule to difice, a Stone which by reaſon of its rough and an- obtain the true Art of good Government, is to confider gular Figure, robs others of inore room than it fills what you would your jelf approve, and what you would it ſelf, and upon account of its exceeding Hardneſs, condemn in another Prince ; and accordingly to pra- cannot conveniently be cut into Regularity, and ſo etiſe the former, and to avoid the latter. And Seneca hinders the whole Frame of Building from cloſing (e) joyns in the ſame wiſe Direction ; This (ſays he) together, is thrown aſide by the Workman, as un is the Sum of my Advice, Jhet ſuch behaviour to- fit for all Uſe and Service; fo thoſe uncover Ices, thoſe wards an Inferior, as you would have a Superior Joca greedy Churls, whoſe rough and ſavage Temper in- towards you (f). clines them to heap Superfluities on themſelves, and to V. The fame Equality teaches a Man how to car- deprive others of meer Neceſſaries, and whoſe vi- ry himſelf, in caſe he be appointed Arbitrator of olence of Paſſion makes them uncapable of being any Right betwixt others, namely, that be treat reclaim'd, are indeed the great Impediments of So- them as Equals , and give no Favour or Indulgence to ciety, and the Plagues of Mankind. Hence it is a one above the reſt, except ſuch as he can claim by vir- Command of Nature's Law, that no Man who has tue of ſome peculiar Right. For he that by a partial not obtain'd a particular and eſpecial Right, ſhall arro- preference of one Perſon to another, violates the gate to himſelf a larger ſhare than his Fellows ; but Rule of Natural Equality, is at the ſame time ſhall admit others to an Enjoyment of equal Privileges guilty of an Injury, an1 of an Affront, by deny- with himſelf (a). Therefore the Comınillioner in ing a Man what is his juſt Due, and by detracting Livy (b), who came to treat with the Common Peo- from that Worthineſs, which Nature gives him in ple in Sedition, was guilty of Infolence, when he common with his Fellow (1). It follows as a told them, Satis fuperq; humilis eſt, qui aquo jure in Corollary from this Doctrine, that if the thing civitate vivit, nec inferendo injuriam, nec patiendo. which is to be diſtributed amongſt many, admit He is bumble enough, and indeed toó humble in a not of a Diviſion, the Perſons who have an equal State, who is content to live upon equal Terms and Right to it, uſe it in common, and without ſtint, Rights, neither doing an Injury nor taking one. As if the quantity of the thing will allow it; if not, if it were a hard Caſe that the Privilege of Nobility that they then uſe it in a certain and limited man- ſhould not be ſtrong enough to diſpenſe with that ner, and with proportion to their Number. For it Fundamental Law of Equity, Do as thou wouldft he is not poſſible to find out any other way of obſer- done by (c)! On this Principle is built ving an Equality in theſe Caſes. But if the thing * Plin. Pane- that gallant Compliment of * Pliny to can neither be divided, nor poſſeſs'd in common, gyr. c. 2. n. 4. the Emperor Trajan, Unum ille ſe ex then the uſe of it ſhall either be taken by turns nobis, & hoc magis excellit atque eminet quod unum (2) (8), or if this Courſe too fail of Succeſs, and if ex nobis fe putat : nec minus hominem fe quam homi- likewiſe one of the Contenders cannot give the others præefe meininit . He thinks himſelf one of us, an Equivalent to ſecure to himſelf the whole Enjoy- and 'tis this makes him more our Superiour, that he ment of the thing deſired, then one ſhall Carry paſſes in his own Judgment for our Equal, and remem- from the reſt, by the fair Deciſion of a Lot; which bers himſelf to be no leſs a Man than the meaneſt Sub- is the moſt proper Remedy that can be applied to je&t whom he governs. For that excellent Prince all Differences of this kind, in as much as it takes when he accepted the Supreme Command, had pro- away the Notion of Contempt, by ſetting all the miſed that private Men ſhould find him ſuch an Parties on a Level, Emperor, as he himſelf deſired to find, whilſt a Man, yet does not in the leaſt diſgrace him (h) Would yoni (3) The excellent Saying of Seneca to this purpoſe is very remarkable, Sic cum inferiore vivas, quemadmodum tecum velles ſu- periorem vivere, Deal fo with your Inferiors, as you would have your Superiors deal with you. Epift. 47. & de ira c, 28. borbe Mr. Barbeyrai's NOTES on 6 5. (1) For as an ancient Author (viz. Livy, 1. 34. C. 4.) ſpeaks, Quod alii liceat, tibi non licere aliquid naturalis aut pudoris aut in- not be , . (2) When things are to be enjoyed by curns, the Lor muſt decide who ſhall have the firſt turn. Hobbes c. 3. $ 17. a Thus the Tribune of the Commons ſpeaks in Dionyſius Halicarnasſ&us, Antiq. Rom. lib. 7. C. 41. With regard to the under. written Laws of Nature, Oye Senators, we demand that the People may thus far enjoy the ſame Rights with you. We grant that thoſe of your Number who excel in Vertue and in Fortune, ought to poſſeſs the chief Offices and Honours of the State: But this Privilege we preſume may be fairly challeng’d by every Member of a Commonwealth, to be ſecured from Injuries, and to obtain Juſtice againſt thoſe who offer them. Lactant. Div. Inſtit. I. 3. c. 21. He that would bring Men to an Equality, muſt take off all the vain humour of Arrogance and Pride; and ſhow thoſe who ſwell with Power and Grandeur, that they are indeed on the Level with their molt needy Vaffals. Add. Sen.de Ira, f. 2. c. 28. (6) Book III. Chap 53. (c) See the arrogant manner of the Satisfaction given by the Duke of Joinville to Mareſcote in Gramond. Hift. Gal. I. 8. (d) Hiſt. 1. 16. (e) Epiſt. 47. (f) Hence appears the intolerable Inſolence of that Saying in Lucan. I. 5. v. 340. Nunquam ſic cura Deorum i 1911 golul --Heaven chinks not on the vulgar Herd, Se premit ut veſtræ morti veſtræq; faluti, poticano Their Deaths to haften, or their lives to guard ; Fata vacent ; procerum motus hæc cunéta Jequuntur, то на Fortune dildains to coure ſo mean a Care, Humanum paucis vivit genius. genius. ti bor19110 Nor leſs than Cefar is a Mark for Her. The Fate of Subjects on their Lords muſt turn, And little Mortals for the Great are born. This my Lord Bacon calls a Gygantean Temper of Mind, poſſeſſing thoſe grand Diſturbers of the World, who feem to aim at nothing leſs than to render all Men happy or miſerable, according as they appear their Friends or foes; and as it were to make all Nature bear their own Image; which is properly fighting againſt Heaven, De Augment. Scient. 1. 7. C. 2. (8) Curtius I. 7. c. 6. In this hor Contencion between the two Parties of Horſe and Foor, for the Honour of carrying their Prince, Alexander finding it would be difficult for him to make the choice, and that he could not ſatisfie one order without diſguſting the other, commanded they ſhould bear his Litter by curos. (h) Proverb. XVIII. 18. it ADIOCO bow Hobbes CHAR. II. 17 by Nature Equal. CC Hobbes (a) has divided Lots into two ſorts, Arbi ought to eſteem or diſeſteem himſelf; and then trary and Natural. The former is ſuch as the Com be makes out, that the only juſt Cauſe of eſteeming petitors agree upon, engaging to ſtand to the E ourſelves, ariſes from the lawful uſe of our Power vent, whilſt they cannot by any Art govern or fore “ of free Choice, and from the Command and Autho- ſee it; and therefore this kind of Lot with regard“ rity which we exerciſe over our Wills; ſince be- to Men, depends entirely on meer Chance and For “ fides the Actions which depend on that Faculty, tune. Natural Lot, he ſays, is either firſt Seizure, “ there is nothing in us that can properly, merit by which a thing which can neither be enjoy'd in “ Praiſe or Diſpraiſe. Hence be concludes, the true common nor divided, paſſes to him, who ſhall firſt “ Notion of Generoſity which Prompts a Man to lay Hands on it with a deſign to keep it ; or Pri “ value hinſelf as highly as in Reaſon he ought, mogeniture, by virtue of ſuch Paternal Goods as to conſiſt in this, that he acknowledge nothing can neither be divided nor poffeſt in common by to be truly his own but this free Diſpoſition of many Children, are adjudg’d to the Firſt-born. “ his Will, that he be ſenſible he cannot purchaſe Yet if we accurately conſider things, there will Blame or Commendation, otherwiſe than by the appear to be no proper Lot but what we may call “ill or the good uſe of this Power, and that at the Arbitrary. For 'tis not eaſie to allign a Reaſon ſame time he feel within himſelf a full Pur- why ſuch an Event as a Man cannot procure by poſe and Reſolution of uſing it well. He pro- his own Induſtry, ſhould give hiin a Right which “ ceeds to obſerve, that thoſe who have ſuch a true ſhould hold good againſt his Equals, unleſs this “ Senſe of themſelves are eaſily inclin’d to think, Right was aflign’d or adjudg’d to this particular " that every Man judges of his own Worth in the Event, by the Arbitrary Appointment and Agree “ ſame manner, ſince there is nothing in this No- ment of Men. Thus a thing which no one has a “tion which hath any Dependence on external particular Right to claim, belongs (3) by Compact Things or Perforis. That for this Reaſon they ne- to the firſt Seizer; becauſe when diſtinct Proprieties ver deſpiſe others, but are ready to excuſe their were introduced, there ſeems to have paſs’d this ta Faults, as proceeding rather from Miſtake, than cit Agreement amongſt Men, that thoſe things Deſign. That as they think themſelves not much which were not peculiarly aſſign’d to any Owner, “ Inferior to thoſe who exceed them in Wealth, Ho- and yet could not without a prejudice to Mankind nour, Beauty, Wit, or Learning, knowing that always left in common, ihould be the Right of theſe Advantages ought not to come into the Ac- the firſt poſſeſſor. And thus too the Right of Pri count; ſo when they find themſelves poſſeſs’d of mogeniture, owes its original to Humane Conſtituti “ the like Goods, they do not fanſie they are much on and Compact. For otherwiſe, why ihould the Superior to thoſe who want them. Hence, he younger Brothers born of the fane Parents, be pla ſays , there is diſcoverable in the moſt generous ced in a worſe Condition than the Eldeſt, barely up Spirits an honeſt Humility; a Vertue conſiſting on account of an Accident or Circumſtance, which " in the Reflection which we make on the Infirmi- it was not in their power to hinder (b)? Now the ty, of our Nature, and upon the Miſcarriages reaſon why theſe two Claims by Primogeniture, and “ which we either have formerly been guilty of, or fir At Seiſure, are ſometimes, though improperly calld may be hereafter, theſe being no leſs than we ſee Lots , is this, becauſe they cannot be foreſeen or di- “ committed by others; whence it comes to paſs, rected by any power of Humane Induſtry, and be " that we prefer not our felves to any Perſon liv- cauſe it reflects no real Diſgrace on a Man to loſe “ing, wiſely conſidering that all Men have the the Preference, for want of theſe Advantages (4). “ fame Faculty of Free-will, and may all imploy VI. This Rule of Equality is likewiſe tranſgreſs'd“ it to as good uſe. He remarks farther, that thoſe by (1) Pride, when a Man (2) for no Reaſon, or with who entertain a good Opinion of themſelves for out ſufficient Reaſon, prefers himſelf to others, bear any other Cauſe, are not endued with real Gene- ing a lofty Carriage towards them, as baſe Under- “ roſity, but puffed up with empty Pride, which lings , unworthy of his Conſideration or Regard. “ as it is always Vicious, ſo it is aggravated the How vaſtly diſtant this Temper is from the Ver more, the more unjuſt the Cauſe is on which the tue of Generoſity and true Greatneſs of Mind, Des “ Self-Conceit is founded. And the moſt unjuſt Cartes has moſt elegantly ſhewn in his Treatiſe of “ Cauſe of Pride, is the being proud without Cauſe; “ He lays it down as a Principle, “ that is when a Man being conſcious to himſelf, “ that it is one of the chief Parts of Wiſdoin to " that he has no real Merit which ſhould entitle “ know how and on what Accounts every one him to Eſteem, imagines Glory to belong to 66 c CC the Paſions. 1. 2. c.4. (3) We ſhall make it appear in its proper place, that this is a falſe Suppofition. See Lib. IV. C. 4. part. 4. Note 2. (4) This Point is more largely diſcourſed of, Lib. 4. C. II. $ 8. & Lib. 5. c. 9. § 2.& Lib. 7. c. 7. $ 11. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 6. p. 315. (1) Pride taken in its moſt extenſive Meaning does not always directly oppoſe the Natural Equality of Men, as may ap- pear from $1, Nore 1. All that our Author ſays here refers only to Mens Reputation in general. For Pride in general ſigni. fies nothing elſe than a very high Opinion of a Man's felt. See Titius Obferv. 179, &c. and Thomafius's Inftit. of°Juriſpr. Div. (2) When any one has lawfully gorten a Righe which gives him a Preheminence above others, he ought to value and maintain it, provided that he avoid a'i vain Ortentation, and all Contempt of his Inferiors. And on the other ſide Inferi- ors oughe not in this caſe to refuſe them a preference, but pay them the Honours which they may lawfully require, as our Author ſays in his Treatiſe of the Duties of Men and Gitizens. lib. 1. c.7.9 5. Our Author cites at the bottom of this para graph a Paſſage out of Euripides , thewing us, that if any one is arrived at a degree of Diſtinction, he ought not to be proud, but on the contrary have the greater Affection for his friends, by how much he ſees himſelf in a better Condition to do them Service. Iphig. in Aulid. v. 343. He alto recites a Paſſage oue of Lucian, Tom. II . p. 14. of Images. Ojdels 78 pgovhois, &c. No Man will envy Perſons in Authority, if they uſe their power with Moderation. **Tis the abuſe of Power that begers Enry. Mr. Ablancourt delivers the ſame. What goes before, and what follows after, deſerves Reading. (a) De Cive c. 3 f. 15, &c. Leviath. Engl. p. 78. (6) Therefore Ariſtotle ſays, Brothers are equal, except they differ in Age, Erbic. 8. c. 52. + c " every 18 Book III. That all Men are to be accounted 06 CC CC every one that pleaſes to uſurp it, and that the nable, and inflames the Sufferer with the greateſt greater Share a Man claims of it, the greater he violence of Anger and Revenge. For we find ma- really enjoys (3). A Vice fo extreamly abſurd, ny Perſons who will expoſe their own Life to pre. " that 'tis ſcarce credible any ſhould proſtitute them- ſent Danger, and much more break the Peace with felves to fuch a Baſeneſs, were there not a Pack of others, rather than put up ſuch a grating Indigni- " idle Flatterers in the World, who by their falſe ty. In as much as every Act of this Nature is a Praiſes, ſwell Men of heavy Parts, into this moſt Wound to a Man's Glory or Reputation, of which ſtupid Degree of Folly, which the Poet (a) calls a Goods we are more proud, and more tenderly ſen- " kind of Madneſs. fible than of any thing elſe we poſſeſs, and in the Nor does a Man's Advancement to Honour or ſafe and flouriſhing State of which, almoſt the whole Power, give him any juſt Reaſon to be Proud; on Pleaſure of our Mind conſiſts (1). which Point Menalaus in Euripides (b), thus admira VIII. From what has been offer'd on this Head, it bly expoſtulates with Agamemnon. is eaſie to diſcover the Abſurdity of that Opinion, derived from the Ancient Greeks, of ſome Men's be- porod? To traédale, degåev Aeroidais, &c. ing Slaves by Nature. Which if taken in the ſame Crudeneſs of Senſe as it bears in the Expreſſion, is You know when with Ambitious Aim you ſtrove, directly repugnant to that Natural Equality, which To lead the Greeks to Troy, and rule the War, we have been endeavouring to eſtabliſh (e). Thus How meek you look d, how low you ſtoop'd to reach much indeed is moſt evident, that ſome Men are The meanefi Hand; your Hoſpitable Gate, endued with ſuch a Happineſs of Wit and Parts, as Free of Acceſs, let in the Vulgar Tide ; enables them not only to provide for themſelves and Tou, as in order thro' the Ranks you paſt, their own Affairs, but to direct and govern others. With Courteous Arts of Popular Addreſs, And that ſome again are ſo extreamly Stupid and Salated, Man by Man, the gaping Crowd, Heavy, as to be unfit to govern themſelves, ſo that And fore'd your Honours on unwilling Clowns : they either do Miſchief or do nothing, unleſs others That low Compliance might advance your Pride, guide and compel them. And farther, that theſe And in the common Market Purchaſe Praiſe. Iaft being commonly furniſh'd by Nature, with But Maſter of your Wiſh, and voted Chief ſtrong and hardy Bodies, are capable of bringing Of our united Force, lofty you grew many notable Advantages to others by their Labour Int Mariners as in Place; your Doors were barr’d, and Service. Now when theſe have the Fortune to Four Friends (once Friends, but now intruding Slaves) live in Subjection to a wiſe Director they are with- Drove back with Scorn; your ſelf, like ſome Rich Gem, out doubt fix'd in ſuch a State, as is moſt agree- Deeply encas’d, and veild from Vulgar View, able to their Genius and Capacity. If therefore But a good Man, if Wealth or Dignity theſe two Parties of Men voluntarily conſent to the Exalt his Staté, ſhould keep his Soul unmov’d Eſtabliſhing of ſome common Government a- From Vertue's Centre, and elude the Charms mongſt them, it is conſonant to Nature, that the Of ſwelling Infulence; ſhould freely ſmile former be inveſted with the Power of Commanding, On Friends beneath, and ſerve them with more Will and the latter with the Neceflity of Obeying, by When his improv'd Condition gives more Power. which Method the Intereſts of both will be belt promoted and ſecured. And in this Senſe we may * Lucian (c) has left an excellent Obſervation to without Danger admit of Ariſtotle's Aphoriſin, laid the ſame purpoſe, No Man, ſays he, will envy one down in his firſt Book of Politicks, c. 2. Tè ugu dren advanced to Eminence and Grandeur, if he ſee him 'Levov tý dravórą wegweěv, &c. which according to bear his Fortune with Moderation. (2) Heinfius his Paraphraſe, runs to this purpoſe; No- VII. A much heavier Breach of this Equality is it, thing is more ſuitable to Nature,than that thoſe who excel for a Man to ſhew his Contempt of others, by out- in Underſtanding and Prudence, and are able to judge ward and open Signs; whether by Actions or Words, of things at a Diſtance, ſhould rule and controul thoſe by a Look or a Laugh, or any ſuch Affront; one who are leſs happy in theſe Advantages; on the other kind of which is often expreſs’d by troubling band, thoje whole bodily Strength and Vigour, enables another with a Ridiculous or a diſagreeable Preſent them to put the Commands of wiſer Men in Execution, (d). Which Sin is to be reputed ſo much the more are by Nature framed and deſigned for Subjection and Heinous as it gives the higheſt Provocation imagi- Obedience. From this Conſtitution of things, the So- (3) This Vice is not only ridiculous in itſelf, and with relation co him that is guilty of it, being ſo fooliſh as to value Inimſelf without any ground, but is very injurious to others; ſince he muſt at leaſt imagine, chat the reſt of Mankind are fuch Sots and Fools, as to pay their Reſpects co Perſons of nó manner of Merit. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 7. p. 316. (1) There is a Paſſage in Mr. de la Bruyere's Characters in the Chapter, of Man, worthy of our Reading, becauſe it confirms and illuſtrates the Notion of our Author. 'Tis this: They who take away our Goods by Force or Injuſtice, and rob us of our Honour by Calumny, ſhew their Hacred to us fufficiently; but yet they do not equally prove that they have no Eſteem for us On the contrary, Mockery is an Injury, which leaſt of all deſerves Pardon; it is the Language of Contempt, and ſuch an one as is eafi'ieft underſtood; it attacks a Man in his laft Entrenchments, i.e. the opinion of himſelt; it renders a Man ridiculous in his own Eyes, and couvinces him that he has the worſt Diſpofition to him poſſible, and ſo renders him irreconcileable. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 8. p. 316. (2) There is a Letter of Dan. Heinfius's in the varions Readings of Janus Rut gerfius, l. 4. c. 3. wherein he ſhews, that Arift Atle did not ſpeak of the Natural Condition of ſuch as are naturally diſpoſed to be Slaves, but of their Natural Servitude. And he endeavours to reconcile the Maxims of Philoſophy with the Civil Lawyers,who ſay, that Slavery is contrary to Nature. See Note S. following, and Lib. VI. c. 3. $ 2. (a) Pindar. Olymp. 9. Tè veux aetere naeg. Hargóv navícron d'horpéner. To boaſt unſeaſonably is the Character of Madmen. (b) Iphigen. in Aul. (c) De Imaginibus. (d) Add. l. 5. 1. 1. D qui ſatiſdare cogantur, Matt. V. 22. (e) And therefore Strabo, 1. 1. 1peaking of thoſe who adviſed Alexander to treat all Græcians as Friends, and all Barbarians 15 Enemies, wiſely obſerves, that the Diſtinction ought rather to have been founded in the Goodneſs, than Badneſs of the Perſons ; many Grecians being wicked and cruel, many Barbarians vertuous and obliging. vereign CHAP. II. 19 by Nature Equal. vereign and the Slave receive equal Advantag, the A Soul with Sage Experience fraught, Benefits and the Conveniencies are alike on both ſides Whoſe generous Worth and ſteadfaſt Thought, (a). Yet it would be the greateſt Abſurdity ima. Nor Frowns of Adverſe Fate could grieve, ginable to believe, that Nature actually inveſts Nor ſmiling Happineſs deceive. the Wiſe with the Sovereignty over the Weak A Mortal Enemy to Knaves, and Imprudent, or with a Right of forcing them to And Gold that makes them: Gold enſlaves ſubmit and obey againſt their Wills. For no Sove The wicked World, but owns its Charms reignty can be actually eſtabliſhid, unleſs ſome Hu A Match too weak for Vertues Arms. mane Deed or Covenant precede. Nor does a Natu Not Conful of a ſingle Year, &c. ral fitneſs for Government preſently make a Man Go- vernour over another, who is as Naturally adapted And what Plutarch reports of Pelopidas, that he for Subjection; nor, ſuppoſing a thing to be profi- held the Supream Command longer than the Laws al- table for another, is it therefore lawful for me to low'd of, leaſt his Succeſſors thro’Idleneſs or Miſs force it upon him againſt his Inclination. For all management, ſhould prejudice the Affairs of the Men enjoy a Natural Liberty in the ſame Meaſure State, muſt be look'd on as an Inſtance, not of any and Degree, which before they ſuffer to be impair’d ftanding Right, but of an extraordinary Indul- or diminiſh'd, there muſt intervene either their own gence (d). Conſent, Expreſs, Tacite, or Interpretative, or ſome And here too we have an Opportunity of inter- Fact of theirs, by which others may obtain a Right preting that ſaying of Albutius in Seneca (e), which of Abridging them of their Liberty by Force, in is commonly cited on this Subject. By Niture a caſe they will not part with it by a Voluntary Sub- Man is neither Bond nor Free; 'twas Fortune that miſſion. 'Twas therefore well urged by Quinctili- afterwards introduc'd theje Names. That is, ſo long an's Declaimer (b). What hath Nature produced a as all Men were Equal, they could not be diſtin- mongſt all her Works which ſhe hath not ſet in a State guiſh'd in our Mind by ſuch a State as is oppolite of Freedom? I forbear to ſpeak of Slaves, whom the to their Natural State of Equality. But afterwards, bard Chance of War hath deliver'd up as a Prey to the when thoſe who loſt or quitted that Natural State, Conquerours, though they were born by the fame Laws, got the Appellation of Bondmen, in like mannet by the ſame Neceſſity, by the ſame Accidents contribua thoſe who retain'd it did now entirely engroſs the ting to their Original. They draw Breath out of the Title of Free. The thing may be explain'd by this Same free and common Air; and 'twas not the Decree familiar Inſtance in a like Cafe; fo long as there of Nature which gave them Maſters, but the Unkind- are no Military Men in a State, the Subjects all neſs of Fortune. 'Tis a Maxim of Ulpian, that all keep the ſame common Name and Condition ; but Men by a Natural Right are born free (c); which when part of the Subjects are liſted into armed Freedom Grotius interprets, To be ſuch as is on- Troops, the Diſtinction of the Souldiery and the ly a Privation of Servitude, not a Contradi&tion Country immediately ariſes. And according to this to it; that is, it provides, á Man ſhall not be Explication may we admit of that Notion, which by Nature a Slave, but it gives him no Right that Ariſtotle (f) cites and rejects, that Bondage and Free- he ſhall not become a Slave afterwards; for no dom owe their Original to Law. For were not Ser: "Man is in ſuch a Senſe Free, as that it ihall be im- vitude introduced by humane Compacts and Conſti- poslible for him to loſe his Liberty. The ſame tutions, ſuch a Difference would be unintelligible, Truth may be thus explain d in other Words; ſince all Men being placed by Nature in the fame equal Nature hath produc'd all Men Equal, and ſince Ser. State; as the Emperor ſpeaks in the Inſtitutions vitude cannot be conceiv'd without Inequality, (for (8), whereas before all Men enjoy'd the ſame general Servitude neceffarily brings in a Diſtinction of Su- Name, the Law of Nations brought in three kinds of perior and Inferior? Whereas in the Notion of Li- Men, Liberti, Servi, and Libertini; Men that are berty, it is not requiſite that we ſhould have an In- Torn Free, Menthat are Slaves, Men that being at firſt terior, but 'tis fufficient that we are Subject to no Slaves have obtained their Freedom. Or it inay be e- Superior;) it follows that all Men Naturally, and nough to juſtifie that Saying, which Ariſtotle dife Antecedently to any Humane Deed, are conceiv'd likes, to give it this Senſe, the Rights of Liberty and to be Free. But Natural Ability, or the Poffeffion Servitude, as they are conſider'd in Men living under of fuch Qualities as are Requiſite for any State, do ſettled Governments, are defined by Civil Laws. not immediately ſet a Man in that State. Every Many other Conſiderations there are of fufficient one who hath Capacity enough to rule a People, or Strength, to overthrow that vain and groſs Opini- to command an Army, is not without more adoe a on of Slaves by Nature. For there is ſcarce any Man King or a General. Nor can ſuch an accompliſh'd fo dull and ſtupid, but he fanſies it will be more Man as Horace's Lollius preſently challenge to him- proper and convenient for him to live according to felf the Conſular Faſces; tho” he fully anſwer that his own Inclinations, than to ſubmit himſelf to the Command, and to the Pleaſure of another. This Natural Deſire appears more evidently in whole Eft animus tibi Nations, none of which are ever ſo low-fpirited as Rerumq; pruders , & ſecundis to prefer a Foreign Governour to a Prince of their own Country and Race. Laſtly, ſince Nature does Vindex avara fraudis & abſtinens not actually conſtitute any Superiority or Govern- ment, and ſince thoſe Natural Slaves whom Ariſtotle Conſulq; non unius anni, &c. L. 4. Od. 9. fpeaks ſo much of, are commonly Men of ſtrong fine Character, Temporibus dubiilq; re&tus, Ducentis ad je cuncta pecuniæ; (a) Apuleius in Philoſoph. delivers the ſame Opinion. It is moſt agreeable, ſays he, that a Man who is neither by Nature dor Induſtry prepared for a righe way of living, Thould not govern, but be govern'd ; ſhould be a Servant, not a Maſter; ſhould up, Commanding (6) Declam. 13. (*) Vipote cum jure naturali omnes liberi naſcerentur, &c. Digeft. I. 1. de Juſtitia & Fure . (d) Add. Corne? Nep, in Epamino... Lite 1.2.3.4.2. (C) III. Controvers, 21. 05) Polit. 1.1, c.z. () Lib. I. tit. s. f. 1, of C 2 Hands 20 Book III. That all Men are to be accounted, &c. Hands and alle Bodies, there would be a hard Scuf- moſt undoubted Principle, that the bare force of fle betwixt them and their wiſer Neighbours for the ſuch a Natural Aptitude, does neither give the one Maſtery; in which Contention the latter Party with a Right of impoſing a Condition of Servitude, nor all their Sagacity, could not promiſe themſelves oblige the other to receive it. any infallibie. Succeſs. Ariſtotle's Argument bor IX. It will be proper to add ſomewhat in ſhort, row'd from the Poets, deſerves likewiſe to be concerning the other kind of Equality, which differs thrown out as moſt Arrogant and Unreaſonable . from the former, in that it is rather a Conſequent , Therefore, ſays he (a), the Poets tell us, 'tis juft (3) than an Ingredient of the State of Nature; we may the Greeks should rule the Barbarians, as if to be a call it an Equality of Power, or of Liberty, by Barbarian, and to be a Slave were naturally the ſame which all Men are reckon’d Naturally Equal in this thing (b). For according to this Doctrine, if we Reſpect, that Antece dently to any Deed or Com- had a Mind to deſtroy any Nation differing from us pact amongſt them, no one hath Power over ano- in Cuſtoms and Manners, it were only to brand ther, but each is Maſter of his own Actions and A- them with the reproachful Name of Barbarians, and bilities. This Equality is taken away when Men then to invade them without farther Colour or Ex- enter into a Civil State, where whilſt one or more cuſe. It is manifeft, that this abſurd Notion of the are inveſted with the Power of Commanding, and Grecians aroſe chiefly from hence, that they were all the reſt enjoin’d the Duty of Obeying, there a wholly inclin’d to a Democratical Government: riſes the greateſt Inequality imaginable between the Whereas their Mighty Neighbours the Perſians were Sovereign and the Subject. But ſince there ſtill ap- conſtant Maintainers of a Monarchy, whom for this pears fome Inequality, even between the Fellow and other Reaſons they mortally hated beyond all Subjects, not only with regard to Honour and E- Bounds of Juſtice or Humanity. On this account ſteem (d), but likewiſe as to the Power which one Iſocrates (c) calls the Perſians çúch nodemáss, Enemies obtains over another; we may obſerve that part of by Nature to the Greeks, “ And ſays that in the this Inequality proceeds from the State of Fathers of general Councils or Aſſemblies, before any Buſi- Families, who being the chief Rulers before the In- “neſs was tranſacted, a ſolemn Ćurſe was denoun- ftitution of Publick Governments, brought into fuch “ced againſt thoſe who ſhould deſire Peace or Governments the Power which they before held o- “ Friend hip with the Perſians; and that at the ver their Wives, their Children, and their Servants “ Great Feaſt of the Myſteries, the publick Heralds (e). So that this Inequality being more Ancient “ forbad all of that Nation, as Murderers, to be pre- than the Erection of Civil States, can by no means « fent at the Holy Ceremony. owe its Original to them ; nor do they give this As for Araſtotle's whole Diſcourſe on this Subject, Power to the Fathers of Families, but leave it in we ſhall put a more Reſpectful and a more favour- their Hands as they found it; though in fome Places able Conſtruction on his words, if we ſay that by it is thought convenient very much to abridge, and making two kinds of Servitude, Natural and Legal, to reſtrain it. If any further Inequality, as to he means the former to be when a Man of more Power, be diſcoverable amongſt Fellow-Subjects, it Strength than Wit, ſerves another, whoſe Parts and is plain the Fountain and the Occaſion of it muſt Genius diſpoſe him for Command ; in which Caſe be the ſupream Civil Authority. For thoſe whom both enjoy a Condition moſt agreeable to their Na- we ſuppoſe to have paſs’d into a publick State, did ture and their Neceſſities. And that the Legal at their Entrance on it, make over to their common Servitude which he ſpeaks of, is when a Perſon of Sovereign, ſo much of the Power which they before good Endowments and Abilities of Mind, is thro' poſſeſs’d, as was neceſſary to ſupport this new Con- the Meanneſs of his Birth, or the Hardneſs of his For- ftitution. And therefore in caſe any Perſon had be tune, compelld either by his own Fear, or by pub- fore this Change transfer'd to another, any Right lick Conſtitutions to ſerve a Maſter Inferior to him- over himſelf, that Right would either ceaſe and be ſelf in thoſe Accompliſhments of Mind; and when- extinct in the preſent Regulation, or it muſt fub- ever this happens, 'tis ſcarce poflible but that the mit to the Pleaſure and Diſpoſal of the Superior Vaffal ſhould hate his Lord; whereas on the other Authority. But after a Man hath once join'd hinifelf hand, theſe Relations produce a firm Love and a as a Member to any Civil Community, he cannot kind of Friendſhip, when each Party bears that on any Account give another ſuch Power over him. Character which is moſt ſuitable to his Diſpoſition felf , as ſhall hold Valid againſt the Right, acqui- and to his Power. But ſtill this muſt be fixt as a red by the chief Ruler ; ſince this would be to ad- (3) This Norion proceeded partly (as our Author obſerves) from hence, that the Greeks were paſſionately in love with the Liberty of a Democracy, whereas the Perſians were devoted to Monarchy, partly from the exceſſive and inhumane Hatred which the Greeks had to the Perſians. Hence it is that Ifocrates ſays in his Panathen. that the Greeks are by Nature Enemies to the Perſians. We may alſo obſerve, that the Greeks in their publick Aſſemblies, before they made any Decrees, pronounced an Anathema or Curſe againſt all thoſe Citizens who ſhould ſeek to make Peace, or have any Friendſhip with the Perſians, and in the Celebration of their Myſteries, the Eumolpides and publick Heralds excluded from that Ceremony, in Hatred to the Perſians, all other Barbarians as Murderers. Panegyr. in fine, the illuſtrious Algernoon Sidney ſays, that the Natural Liberty of Man is a Principle received by Greeks, Romans, Spaniards, French, Germans, Britains, and in a Word, by all Nations, who profeſsa any Generoficy, long before the Nativity of our Saviour, inſomuch that the Aſians and Africans, á lazy and effeminate People, becauſe they never attempted to preſerve their Liberty, nor were able to govern themfelves, deſerved the Name of Slaves by Nature, a Name given them by Ariſtotle, and the Philoſophers of his Time, who made a very little difference between them and Beaſts. See § 1. in the Notes. Nevertheleſs , 'cis hard to excufe Ariſtotle altogether for thoſe falſe Nocions which he had about the manner how thoſe Nations ought to reſpect and treat one another. See the place cited in my Preface out of Plutarch, Strabo, and Ariſtotle himſelf at the Letters (k kk) and (111). (2) Polit. 1. C. 1. (6) Euripid. Iphig. in Aulid. Bag begwo do "Enanyes, &c. 'Tis fir Barbarians own the Grecian Sway, Wiſe Fature made the Law; 'twas Nature form'd Them to obey, and us to be obey'd. (c) Panegyr. do Panathenaic. (d) of which ſee Book VIII. Chap. 4. (e) See the Firſt Chapter of the Author's Introduction to the Hiſtory of Europe. And not char Greece ſhould ſerve a barbarous Lord. alul mit CHAP. III. 21 Of tbe Mutual Duties of Humanity. mit two independant Maſters, who 'tis impolli- does not of it felf, cauſe any Inequality amongſt ble to ſerve both at once. Whatever Inequality Fellow-Subjects; only as great Wealth affords Men therefore amongſt Fellow-Subjects commences, after matter of actual Hurt or Benefit to others, on which the Settlement of the Civil State, muſt take its Rife, ſcore the poorer fort are wont to ſeek the Favour either from the Publick Adminiſtration, on account of the Rich, by the moſt ſubmiſſive Methods of Ad- of which the Sovereign conveys by Delegacy, to dreſs, either to obtain Advantage, or to ſecure ſome of the Subjects, a command over others; or themſelves from Injury (a). But there is nothing from ſome certain Privilege, granted by the ſame in this Civil Inequality , any ways Repugnant to Supream governing Power. But Diſparity of Riches thoſe Precepts, which we have before deluced from a Natural Equality (1). Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6.9. p. 318. (1) People are obliged the more to reſpect one another as Equals, becaufe they are always in an Eftate of Natural Liberty, and conſequently in a perfect Equality of Right one towards another, whereas if we come to particulars, there are diverſe civil Inequalities, which ſet Bounds to our Natural Liberty and Equality. Nevertheleſs, we may obſerve ſome Inequality among Peo ple in reſpect to their Reputation, either fimple or with diſtinction. Simple Reputation is lefſened, or entirely loft, when any People violate the Maxims of Civil Right with a wilful Deſign, and thereby render themſelves worthy to be treated as the Ene- mies of Mankind. For a People that deals in fuch a manner muſt be looked upon only as a Body of Thieves and Pirates. See Lib. 8. c. 4. 85. As to our Reputation with diſtinction, ſee what is ſaid in the ſame place at 8 15, &c. (a) Compare Luc. Antiſt. Conſtans de jure Ecclefiaft. tit: 3. CHA P. III. Of the Common Duties of Humanity. 1. Every Man ought to promote the Intereſts of others. XI. Of granting a Market, . And XII. Whether å Man be bound to buy a Strangers III. Or definitely by common Humanity. . Goods. IV. A lejer ſort of Examples, viz. XIII. Of permitting Marriages. V. Of allowing a way through anothers Land, XIV. Whether any ſingle Perſon may be denyed what is VI. And for carriage of Goods. common to all. VII. Whether Toll may be required for ſuch a Pufage. XV. Of Beneficence. VIII. Of our touching upon a ſtrange Shore. XVI. Of a Grateful, IX. Of entertaining Strangers. XVII. And ungrateful Mind. X. Of allowing a Settlement to Forigners. is but a poor thing not to have hurt another, fices betwixt them (b). It was a noble Saying of or not to have robb’d him of his juſt Eſteem (a): Plato (c). 'Exasos impôvox autą móvov zízorev, cinna' tñs glué This Negative Kindneſs to a Man will barely lainder στως ημών το με ή η πατρί μερίζεθαι, το δεπ οι γωνήσαντες him from having any fair Reaſon to hate, but can o dos nostoi pidon. Which Paſſage Tully has thus bor- give him little Encouragement to love us. To knit row'd and enlarg'd upon in his Offices. Non nobis Men's Minds more ſtrongly together, it is neceſſary ſolum nati ſumus, &c. We are not born for our felves to add to this Forbearance of mutual Evil, the real alone; our Country, our Parents, and our Friends have Practice of mutual Good. The Debt which I owe all a Share, and an intereſt in our_Being. 'Tis a upon account of my being a fociable Creature I have Maxim with the Stoicks, that as the Earth and all the not yet Diſcharg'd, whilft I have not eſtrang’d a Productions of it were created for the Uſe of Men, ſo Man's Affection from me by any Miſchievous or Men themſelves were, for the ſake of Men, brought Diſtaftful Deed; but I ought farther to promote into the World, that they might Alist , and Benefit, his actual Profit and Benefit , that I may ſhew it is each other. In this we ought to follow the Guidance of a Pleaſure to me to ſee others Partners of my Na- Nature, to bring common Goods together, and freely ture, and Sharers with me in the Goods which we lay them in Common, and by an Intercourſe of giving poſſeſs. The near Relation which Men naturally and receiving kind 'Offices, by Art, Induſtry, and by bear one to another, is loſt , unleſs it be cheriſh'd all our Faculties, to cement the Society of Man- and kept up by a conſtant Commerce of kind Of kind (d). (a) Quantulum eſt ei non nocere, cui debeas prodeje. Seneca, Epift. 95. (6) Seneca, Epift. 95. What a poor thing is it not to hurt him whom you ought to benefit? (c) Epift. 9. ad Archift. (d) Idem off. 3. magis est secundum naturam, &c. it is more a- greeable to Nature, for a man to undertake all ſorts of Labour and Trouble, for the Service and Conſervation (if it were poſ- Jible) of the whole world, than to live in Solitude, not only free from Cares, but in the midſt of the greateſt Pleaſures. Add. Lały . Div. Inftit. l. 6. c. 10, II. phil. Jud. quod Deus eft immutab. Thoſe Wretches are worthy of the utmoſt Deteſtation who regard only their private Intereſt , and neglect the common Good of Mankind; as if they were born for themſelves alone, and not for an innumerable Society, for their Parents, their Wife, their Children, and in general for all the World. Heliodorus Æthiop. 11. acquaints us that it was one of the Maxim's amongſt the Gymnoſophiſts, 'never to neglect a Soul, when once entred into a Humane Body, ſhould it fall into Danger or Diſtreſs. Liban. Declam. 19. When I do but fpeak the word Man, I imply Mercy, Cour- tefy and Kindneſs, Add. Philoft. de vit. Apol. I. 5. c. 1. Marc. Anton. 1. 3. 1. 4. The good Perſon confiders, that whatever par- takes of Reaſon is of Kin unto him; and that to care for all Men generally is agreeable to the Nature of a Man. idem l. 4. 1 3. Men are born for the ſake of each other. Add. id. I. 4. f. 4. Seneca Epift. 95. We are all Members of a grear Body. Nature produced us under a mutual Relation, from the fame Principles, and for the fame Deſigns. This inſpired us with a Love one for another. She caught us the Leffons of Equity and Juſtice ; ic is upon account of her Conſtitutions, that we ought to cſteem it a greater 22 Book III. Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. ; Now if the Law of Nature engages us to concern It was a Law amongſt the Mileſians, that he who our ſelves with ſo much earneftneſs for the good of had ſpent his Fathers's Eſtate, ſhould be denied the our Fellow-Creatures, it muſt on the contrary con- Benefit of his Father's Sepulchre (d). Such an ex- demn it, as a thing vile and unworthy of a Man to travagant Spendthrift, Manilius deſcribes. rejoyce in the Amfictions and Calamities of others, eſpecially of Innocent Perſons; or on the other ſide Ille patri, natiſq; reus, quas ceperit ipfe to grieve and repine at the Proſperity of his Neigh Non legabit opes, cenſumq; immerget in ipſo. bours? Tanta fames animumq; cibi tam dira cupido II. Now we may promote the good of other Men, Corripit, ut capiat ſemet, nec compleat unquam, either Indefinitely or Definitely, and this either ſo Inque epulas funus revocet, pretiumq; Sepulchri (e). as to part with ſomewhat of our own or not. A Man Indefinitely advances the common Benefit, when Who minds himſelf alone, he ſo poliſhes and prepares his Mind or his Body, He wrongs his Father, and he cheats his Son : as to render them uſeful to the Publick; particular His Race in vain with Expectation wait, ly by Sagacity of Parts and Judginent, he diſcovers For in himſelf he buries his Eſtate. ſuch Inventions, as may ſerve the Neceſſities or the So vaſt his Gluttony, his Luft ſo wild, Conveniencies of humane Life. Columella (a) ob That he devours himſelf, yet is not fillid; ferves with great Wiſdom,“ That it would be a And whilſt his Appetite proceeds to crave, thing of the higheſt Value, and Advantage in He eats his Funeral, and he ſpends his Grave. “ the World, if every one were ſenſible of his own Mr. Creech, Ignorance, and always deſirous to learn what he “ knew himſelf at preſent to be defective in. The Apoſtle amongſt the Reaſons, obliging a Man Hence it appears, that thoſe Perſons are guilty to Labour, ſets down this as no inconſiderable one, of a Sin againſt Nature's Law, who neglect to ex. "Iye é mu puslessóvai tớ xsoíar égoun, that he may have to erciſe themſelves in ſome honeſt Art or Employ: give to him that needeth (f). And Horace could ask ment, by living unprofitable to themſelves, and the covetous Man, troubleſome to others, uſe their Soul only for Salt, to keep their Body from ſtinking. Cur eget indignus quiſquam, te divite ? Numerus tantum & fruges conſumere nati; Born only to increaſe the number of Mankind, and Why ſhould any one undeſervedly reduced to Po. to help to rid, and devour the ſuperfluous Fruits of verty, continue to want whilſt you abound? Nature. For the rooting ſuch uſeleſs Animals out Such great Churls are like Swine, good for no- of their State, the Egyptians had a Decree, obliging thing till they are dead. The old Greek Epigram all Men to give in their Names to the Magiſtrates, rallies them very pleaſantly, and repreſents them and withal to intimate by what Calling or Profeſſi- very juſtly, on every one got his Livelihood. He that brought in a falfe Account, or practis'd an unlawful way of (1) Πλεν φασί σε πάνες, εγω ο π φημι πι εοθαι, Gain, was puniſh'd with Death (b) (1). In the ſame Χρήσεις και πλάτη μαρυς, 'Απολλόφανες. Rank we may juſtly place thoſe, who having a ſuf 'Αν μελέχης αυτών συ, σα γίγνεαι: αν φυλάπης ficient Fortune left them by their Anceſtors, think Κληρονόμοις, από νύν έγνεθαι αλλότρια. their own Induſtry would be unneceſſary Trouble, ſince they have gain’d ſo fair a Subſiſtence by the The World may think you Rich, I'll ſay you're poor'; Induſtry of others; and accordingly ſacrifice their None e'er was rich but he, who uſed his Store. Time and Thoughts to Sottiſhneſs and Sloth. Nor Uſe it, and’tis your own; but if you Spare does Virgil without good Reaſon aſſign a Station in Till Death, you're only Steward for your Heir. Hell, to thoſe uſeleſs and unmerciful Wretches, In my Opinion we ought not to judge more fa- Qui divitiis ſoli incubuere paratis, vourably of thoſe uſeleſs Burthens to the Earth, Nec partem poſuere ſuis (c). who under the pretence of Religion, ſtudy only the Improvement of a fat Carcaſs, and in a lubberly Who to Lucre ſold, Lazineſs conſume the Fruits of other Mens honeſt Sit brooding on unprofitable Gold; Labour. Zozimus the Hiſtorian, though in other And dare not give, and ev’n refuſe to lend things as Profane as Paganiſm could make him, To their poor Kindred, or a wanting Friend. , yet has paſs’d a Cenſure juſt enough, on ſome of Mr. Dryden. theſe Mõnaſtick Brethren; they abſtain (ſays he) greater Unhappineſs to do Hurt than to receive it : It is by her Orders that our Hands move ſo readily to the Affiftance of our injur'd Neighbour. Ler thar good old Verſe be ever in your Mind and in your Mouth. Homo ſum, humani nihil a me alienum puto. I am a Man, and I eſteem nothing a Stranger to me, which is of Kin to Humanity. Let us lay our Natural Powers in Common, Humane Society is built like an arch of Stones, which is by this means only ſupported and upheld from Ruin, that each part hinders the fall of the other. Add Bacon's Ef. 13. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. 3. § 2. p. 320. (1) The People of Sardis had a Law to the same effect, as Ælian relates in his var. Hift . 1. 4.c. 1. where ſee allo Perizor. To this we may adà, that the Senate of the Areopagus was obliged by Solon to enquire how every Man got his Livelihood, and puniſh them who had no Buſineſs . The fame Lawgiver alſo made a Law, that no Son ſhould be obliged to maintain his Father, who had nor in his Youth took care to bring him up to ſome Trade. See the Life of Solon in Plutarch. (2) Theſe Verſes have no known Author, but they are found in the Anthologia. (a) De re ruſtic. l. 11. c. 1. (b) Diodor. Sic. I. I. c. 77. Ælian. Var. Hiſt. 1. 4.C. I. mencions ſuch a Law amongſt the Sardians (4) . . . (©.$( ) ef. IV28 from CHAP. III. 23 of the Mutial Duties of Humanity. ир from lawful Wedlock (a), and fill City and Country capable of ſerving their Country in publick Em- with numerous ſwarms of Men, ujeful neither for War, ployments, is an Humility, not altogether coin- nor for any other ſervice of the Commonwealth. Tet mendable. And therefore it was too high a ſtrain of they have purſued their Deſigns with ſo much Succeſs, Philoſophy in Similis, chief Miniſter to the Empe- from thoſe times to the prejent Age, that they have en rour Adrian, when quitting all his Honours and groſs’d to themſelves the greateſt part of the Lands and Offices, and ſpending his laſt ſeven Years in the Eftates, and under Colour of communicating all things Country, he left this Sentence for his Epitaph. Here with the Poor, have almoſt reduc'd all others to Pover- lies Similis, whoſe Life was ſo many Tears long, but ty. To theſe we may add ſuch begging Strollers, as he lived only Seven. Xiphilin. they tell us are found amongſt the Chineſe, who By theſe and the like Methods then may we pro- fight with their Heads like Rams, till you part them mote the Good of others Indefinitely, and in. Ge- with ſome piece of Bounty; or ſuch as threaten toneral; or without propoſing to ſerve particularly lay violent Hands on themſelves, unleſs you give ſuch or ſuch a Perſon, but by laying, as it were, them what their Lazineſs craves (6). Valerius Maxi- our Benefits in Common, and offering them to the mus juſtly commends the Cuſtom of the old Mafi- publick Uſe (7). But ſome on this point will have lians, who as he reports the Matter, “Uſed to ſhut the Curioſity to enquire, whether ſuppoſing a Man their Gates againſt all ſuch who made the Plea to find ſuch a famous Secret, as what they call the “ of Religion a Cloak, and Shelter for Idleneſs; Philoſopher's Stone, the Art of changing with little thinking it highly worth their Care to reinove by Trouble, the meaneſt Materials into the richeſt Me- “ all the Methods of Diſcouragement, ſuch a tals; whether I ſay, he ought to Communicate fo “ falſe and dronelike Superſtition. (Lib II. Ch.VI. rich a Diſcovery. And if any ask ſo nice a Queſti- S. 7.) (3). on, we may venture to reſolve it in the Negative, On the other Hand, thoſe worthy Perſons have ſince were it poſſible to bring this grand Invention been ever celebrated with the higheſt Praiſes, whoſe into ordinary Practice, Trade would be ruin’d, In- happy Parts and Study have invented new Arts, and heritances and all kind of Riches would loſe the Advantages of living; and then have not kept the good Force and Authority which they now bear in Benefit of them to themſelves, but communicated the World; and the whole Method and decent Or- them freely to all Mankind. For as Horace ob- ders of Life, would be changed into endleſs Tu- ſerves, mults and Confuſion (8). III. We may be ſaid to ſerve or benefit others, Paulum ſepulta diſtat inertia more definitely and expreſly, when we confer on par- Celata virtus L. 4. Od. 9. ticular Perſons, any thing that may be uſeful and profitable to them. And this we may often perform, Conceal'd Vertue or Worth, has little Advantage not only without our own Lofs and Prejudice, but above the dulleft Idleneſs. likewiſe without giving our ſelves any Labour or Virgil has wiſely placed in his Elyſian Paradiſe, Trouble. To deny, or to grudge another a Kind- neſs of this eaſie Nature, is juſtly cenſured as moſt Inventas qui vitam excoluere per artes, deteſtable Malice and Inhumanity. For ſuch a Quiq; ſui memores alios fecere merendo (c). Power by which we may oblige others, and not in- Æn. 6. jure our felves, unlefs it be on due Occaſion, put into Action and Effect, appears to be Vain, and Thoſe who by Arts invented, Life improv'd, only turns to the Reproach of him that has it. Hence Or by deſerving made themſelves remember d. it is uſual to compare ſuch unreaſonable Churls to Sir William Temple (4). the Dog in the Fable, who refuſed that Provinder to the Oxe's Hunger, which was ſo improper to ſatisfie Thus Antiquity advanced many (5) to Divine Ho- his own. Therefore when we diſpenſe this kind of nours, who had rendered humane Life more Com- Benefits, we regard only Man in general or the modious , by being the Authors of uſeful Diſcove- common Nature which we all enjoy. Thus Ariſto- ties , or of wiſe and wholeſome Inſtitutions (d) (6). tle, when ſome reproved hin for beſtowing an Alms Hence the Retirement of great Men, whilſt they are on a vicious Perſon, wiſely anſwer’d, • * Tgónov, 1 15, as alſo c. 43. (3) See alſo Eraſmus's Letter to Servatius, inſerted in his Life, which is allo at the beginning of his Letters, Edit. Lond. 1642. (1) So Cicero ſpeaks, Impellimur autem natura, &c. We are vehemently inclined by Nature to endeavour the Profit of many, chietly by teaching them, and laying before them the Rules of Prudence, and Reaſons of things. De fin. bon. do mal. l. 3. c.8. (5) See what Diodorus Siculus alledges as the Reaſons why the Ægyptians worſhipped Iſis and Oſiris as Gods. Lib. I. c. 13, 14, (6) Here the French Tranſlator confirms our Author's Judgement from Cicero and Seneca. Of which the former ſays, Nature herſelf ftirs us up to do all the Service to Mankind which we are able; and above all , to reach Men ſome new thing, and inſtruct them in the manner how they ought to govern themſelves. De Nat. Deor. I. 1. c. 14. To which the latter adds, the moft curioas and profitable Knowledge would be no pieafure to me if I ſhould keep it to my felf. If any one would communicate to me any thing, be it Wiſdom it lelf, upon condition that I muſt keep it ſecret and impare it to no Man, I would refuſe it without far- ther thought. The Poffeffion of nothing is pleafing which we muſt enjoy alone. Epift.6. See Sophocles Oedip. Tyran. as alfo Sal- maſous upon Spartian in Adrian. c 9. (9) On the other fide, when any one labours to make himſelf a general Benefactor to Mankind, others ought, as much as in ii Men can't make any other or better acknowledgement, they ſhould not forget to publiſh their commendations, and make their Memory immorta?, which is indeed the principal Reward of ſuch as devote themſelves to the Service of the Publick, and for which others are encouraged to imitate their Example , as our Author ſpeaks in his Duties of a Man and Citizen, 1. 1. c. 8. 93: beſides many curious and diverting things. "Tis compared in the form of a Dialogue, it was printed at Hall in Saxony. A. D. 1702. 6.5(b) of whom fee Neuhof. in Legat. (c) Thoſe who inſtructed, and adorned Life by the Invention of Arts. He Deans thoſe Philoſophers that advanced any ureful Improvement in the World. Servius de loc, Lucret. Lib. ad 5. in init , (d) vid. Diodor. Sic. I. 1. c. 13, 14, 15; doc. 43. άλλα 24 Book III, Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. " adra hr@geofyov naby aaa (a). I did not relieve the Man- Plutarch (c) reports of thoſe falſe Accuſers, who took ners, but the Man; or as fomne report it, 8x airbgawa, away Socrates his Life, “ That the Athenians think- áraá tố drogamin. Not the Man, but Humanity. ing them the vileft Men that lived, expreſs’d fo Thus ſuppoſing me to be unwilling to keep a high a Degree of Hatred and Averfion to them, thing any longer ; either becauſe I am overſtock’d, " that they would neither lend them Fire, nor ſó or becauſe the Pofleſſion of it is ſome way trouble “ much as anſwer them when they ſpoke, nor bath fome, how barbarous would it look in mne, not " themſelves in the ſame Water which they had rather, to leave it ſafe and entire, that it might uſed, but would order their Servant to pour it a- prove ſerviceable to others, than to embezil and way as Polluted and Defiled, till impatient of a deſtroy it. The caſe indeed is otherwiſe in War, “ State of conſtant Reproach, the Wretches became where we ruine what we cannot keep, leaſt the Ene " their own Executioners. In the ſame City, when my ſhould employ it to our Prejudice. Men were condemn’d for ſome Heinous Crimes, it was In like manner we are to allow freely to others, held unlawful to let them light Fire, to be in their thoſe things which they call res innoxis utilitatis, Company at an Entertainment, or at any part of things of Innocent Profit, or of harmleſs Uſe. Let us hear Religious Worſhip (d). Tully ſettling this point. As to thoſe things, ſays he, When Seneca fays, who will call it a Courteſie or which Men ought to hold in Common, we may apply to Benefit, to give a piece of broken Bread, an Alms of many Caſes, the Inſtructions which Ennius gives us in ſmall Money not worth keeping, or the favour of light- one Inſtance. ing a Fire; he does by no means deny the Obliga- tion that lies on all Men, freely to diſpenſe their Ut Homo qui erranti comiter monſtrat viam, Kindneſſes; he only ſhews how impudent and how Quafi lumen de fuo lumine accendat, facit : baſe it would be for a Man to value himſelf on ſuch Nihilominus ipfi luceat cum illi accenderit, petit Bounty, and to expect a return like ſome To ſet a wandring Traveller in's way, mighty Benefactor. For although theſe inconfide- Is but to light one Candle with another : rable Offices prove ſometimes of great Value and Yet put not out your own; let that no leſs Conſequence to the Receiver, yet the Cheapneſs Shine clear, and not be loſer by its Bounty. of them in reſpect of the Giver, be they never fo luckily timed, hinders them from being placed to From this one Example, we may ſufficiently appre- Accompt (2), hend, that whatſoever we can part with to another, IV. For the farther Illuſtration of theſe Offices of without any Damage to our ſelves, this it is our Duty Humanity, Plutarch will do us good Service whilft to give, though to a Stranger. Of which kind are he diſcourſes fo admirably on thoſe old Roman Cu- theſe cheap and common Benefits, to afford Water from ſtoms of leaving ſomething always upon the Table , a River, Fire from Fire, good Counſel (1) to a Man and of never putting out their Lamps. Theſe Pra- that is in doubt or diſtreſs. All theje things are pro- ftices (ſays he) (e) Jerv'd as Lellons of Humanity. fitable to the Receiver, without any loſs or trouble to For neither is it lawful for us when we have fatified the Giver. Wherefore we ought both to uſe them our our own Hunger, to throw away the reſidue of our ſelves, and likewiſe to exhibit them to the common Good. Proviſion, nor to ſtop up, or any way to conceal a Spring, But in regard, that particular Perſons have not much when we have drank enough of the Water our ſelves; nor to give, whereas the number of thoſe that want it is al- to remove the Marks and Directions of ſailing and jour- moſt Infinite, in exerciſing this Duty of common Boun- nying, after they have ſerv'd our own Occaſions. But ty, we muſt have a reſpect to Ennius's wife Caution, all theſe things are to be left behind us, that they may NIHIL OMINUS IPSI LUCEAT; that is, we muſt afterwards prove uſeful to other Men. In like man- keep enough to have the means of being Liberal to our ner, it is a very unbecoming Niggardlyneſs to put out a own Relations and Dependants (b). Candle, when we have made what uſe of it we intended; Oftheſe Favours, then none is to be debar'd, unleſs but we ought to leave it, that thoſe who come after us may ſuch an one, as by his Abominable Villany, has have the Benefit of its Light. Nay, were it poſſible to be rendred himſelf deteſtable to Mankind, and un-effected, we ought to lend others our Sight and our Hear- worthy the common Privileges of his Nature. Thus ing, and even our Wiſdom and Courage, to imploy for If Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 3. p. 322. (1) Plato fays truly, that Counſel is a ſacred thing, déztai je ovu brand isgón xeñuce divas In Theagen. Tom. I. The Pythagor reans alſo held the ſame Maxim, and obliged thoſe of their sect to give the beſt Advice they could to ſuch as deſired it. See Jamblich. de Vit. Pythag. c. 18.8 85. (2) For according to the Maxim of * Terence, 'tis by no means the part of an ingenuous Man to expect our Acknowledgements without his Meric. Nor ought we to think that we lay'a grear Obligation upon others by ſuch a Preſent as the Latin Poer f Ho- race ingeniouſly banters. The Calabrians when they preſent their Fruits to ſuch as come to viſit them, ſay, Eat, Spare not. dheir Friends anſwer, we have eat enough, they ſay, take them, put them in your Pockets, they'll be an acceptable Preſene.com your Children If they reply, we are as much obliged to you as if we carried them all away. They again ſay, if you will prote cake them, we'll give them the Hogs. Who ſees not that they can't tell what to do with that they io prodigally give? Such Pro- digality has and does make many perſons ungrateful. (*) Ego, Charine, neutiquam officiam liberi effe hominis puto Cum is nibil promereat, poftulare id gratis apponi fibi. Ter. Andr. Act. II, Scene I. (t) Non quo more pyris veſci Calaber jubet holpes, Tam teneor dono quam ſi dimittar onuſtus, Tu me feciſti locupletem veſcere ſodes. Ut libet hec porcis hodie comedenda relinques. Jam fatis eſt. At tu quantumvis tolle. Benigne Prodigus & Jultus donat, que ſpernat, do odit, Non inviſa feres pueris munuſcula parvis. Hæc seges ingratos tulit, de feret omnibus annis. Horat. Lib. 1. Epift. 7. v. 14, (a) Diog. Laert. !. s: (b) Idem Off. 3. Amongſt the Athenians, a Publick Curſe was denounc'd againſt him who mould re- fule to ſet a Man in the right way. (c) De Invid. G Odio. (a) Vid. Or at, Dinarck. contra Ariſtogit. Add. Sophocl. Oedip. Tyran. V. 44, &c. Euripid. Oreſt. v. 46, do 513. (e) Quaft. Sympos. L. VII. Q: &c. their CHAP. III. 25 Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. to Mankind. their Service, whilſt going to our Repoſe, we for ſome But though the uſe of Water is Common, yet time loſe the uje of them our ſelves (a). the Popefion of then may, no doubt bę turn'd in- Prometheus, in Lucian, chargeth the Gods with to a Propriety. On this Account we find the Il- Envy, and Narrowneſs of Spirit , that they ſhould raelites offering to pay for what Water they or reſent ſo highly his Action of communicating Fire their Cattle ſhould drink, in palling through the “ Since this could not be the leſs for Country of Edom (c). However, if the Waters are being made Publick, nor be it ſelf extinguiſh'd in great Plenty, what the Current throws out at by lending its Light to others. random, we ought freely to afford to all; ſo far as To the ſame Head belongs the uſe of running Wa- our Indulgence brings no Trouble or İnconvenience ter, for the ordinary Occaſions of Life. For tho' on our felves (4); Rivers may be the Property of whole States, or of We ſee then, that Duties of this kind do origi- private Perſons, yet Hunanity enjoyns us to allow nally belong to the Law of Nature; yet 'tis not the Privilege of drinking,or of drawing for otherUſes unuſual to have many of them farther confirm’d and to any one, not actually engag’d in Hoftility againſt enjoyn'd by Civil Conſtitutions . It may not be im- us. We think the Point is ſettled with inore Člear- proper to ſet down an Inſtance or Two. Solon's Law neſs this way, than if we ſhould ſay with Grotius, about Wells we find thus recorded by Plutarch. Be- that the River (1), as a River, is the peculiar Right of cauſe the Country hath but few Rivers, Lakes, or large ſuch a People ,but as running Water(2) it remains in Com- Springs , and moſt uſe Wells , which have been dug, he mon. For it ſeems leſs agreeable to call the ſame thing made a Law, that where there was a publick Well with- in different Reſpects, Proper and Common, than to in four Furlongs, all ſhould draw at that; but when it affirm that the uſe of a thing ought by the Laws was farther off, they ſhould ſearch after a private Well. of Humanity to lie freely open to all, though the And if upon digging ten Fathom deep they could thing it ſelf may be really a Propriety, or Peculi- find no Water, that then they ſhould fetch from their ar (3). Now to impute this as a Loan, which would Neighbours to the Quantity of about ten Gallons every otherwiſe be loſt, and will be immediately repair'd day. For he thought it prudent to make Proviſion a- by the Springs, would look moſt ridiculouſly Sordid gainſt Want; not to encourage Idleneſs. The ſame (6). Thus Latona argues with the Lycian Clowns « Author tells us, that Plato in his Laws, permits in Ovid Metam. VI. none to borrow Water from their Neighbours, but “ ſuch as having firſt dug in their own Ground as Quid prohibetis aquas? uſus communis aquarum eft. deep as the Clay, could find no Spring. For he Nec folem proprium natura nec aera fecit ; would have thoſe only come in for a Share with others, Nec tenues undas : ad publica munera veni. who could not provide for themſelves. And the Spar- What Rudeneſs Water for my uſe denies, tan Legiſlator Lycurgus, allows a Perſon in Neceffi- Whoſe endleſs ſtore the Common World ſupplies ? ty to make uſe of the Servant, the Beaſt, and even Nor Light nor Air did Heaven create for one; the Food of another Man (d). Nor gentle Streams: I crave a Publick Boon. CC Notes upon it. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 4. p. 223, (1) i. e. Conſidering in general the whole extent of the Shore, which is contained in the Lands of any perſon. (2) Which changes every Moment, it properly belongs to none but him who takes it up to drink. (1) The French Tranſlator places the following Period from the Word Now, to Boon, becauſe he thinks it improperly placed here, at the end of this Paragraph, and adds, This Chapter is one of thoſe which wants diverſe Amendments, as may be diſcera , ped by comparing his Tranſlation with the Original. See Lib. IV.C. 5. $ 2. (4) The Laws of diverſe Nations preſcribe alſo ſometimes the ſame Offices. By the Law of Moſes the Proprietor, Lev. xix. 9, 10, 22, 23. Deut. xxiv. 19, 21. was obliged to leave the Corners of his Field unreaped, and not to glean up the Ears (caca tered by the Reapers. He was to leave them for the poor and Strangers. The ſame thing he was to do with the Grapes that remained after the Vintage, upon the Tree, or were fallen upon the Ground, as alſo the Olives that did not fall from the Tree, when ic was fhaken. It was alſo allowed to Travellers to pick a Bunch of Grapes in the Vineyard, or an Ear of Corn in the Field, provided they eat only to ſatisfie themſelves, and carried nothing away. Selden de fúr. Nat. & Gent. 1. 6. c. 6. fol. Arch, Jud. Lib. 4. c. 8. So alſo in the Roman Law it is forbid Fiſhers to kindle a Fire upon the Shore in the Night, for fear that ſuch as are failing on the Sea ſhould take it for a Signal of a ſafe Port, and ſo run the hazard of being caſt away.' Digeft. 1.47. de incendio, ruina, &c. Tit. g. Leg. 10. (a) Idem Queſt, Rom. Or doth this Cuſtom teach us, that we ought not to loſe any of thoſe things which we have in Plenty, as Fire, Water, or other Neceffaries ; but when we have ſerv'd our own Occafions, to leave them for the uſe of others. Theocrit. Idyl. 26. Mr. Creecha Mercury of all the Gods reſents it moſt, When we deny a Stranger what is juſt. It is one of Pythagoras's Aphoriſins in Diog. Laert. Not to cut down nor to hurt a Tree capable of bearing Fruit. See Menage's (6) Plautus Trucul. Defluvio qui aquam derivat fibi niſi, Derivetur tamen omnis ea aqua aqueat in mare. Ovid. Quis vetet adpofito lumen de lumine ſumi ; Atque cavum vaftas in mare ſervet aquas, (c) Numbers XX. 19, compared with 2 Chron. XXXII. 3. See likewiſe Genef. XXVI. 20, 21, 22, (d) Xenophon de Rep. Lac. A Stranger travelling alone, or with one Companion only, ought to have the Liberty to taſte the Fruit which, he meets with in his way, by the common law of Hoſpitality. Add. Lex Burgund. Tit. 28. 1.1. It. Selden. 1.6.c.6. Phocylides, "Asegov e's oi nov NEai, &ic. Receive the Baniſh’d, and conduct the Blind ; To lift the Weak; ſupport a Wretch undone: And let the Ship-wreck'd Sailor move thy Mind, Pity thy Foe, and ſave his finking Beaſt; ... For Sailing is uncertain : kindly run Direct the Stranger, ſuccour the Diſtreſs'á, doc. Add 1. 13, D. de incendio ruina. Quintil. Declam. S. GOD hath made us for mutual Support and Succour ; and that each Man ſhould endeavour to defend others from what he fears himſelf. This is not properly Love, or any Perſonal Eſteem and Revc, rence; but a provident Fear of the like Accidents , and a Religious Apprenſion of common Dangers. when we relieve a famiſh'd Wretch (*), we do but as it were pity our felves. Hence in a Siege we lay our Proviſion in common. Hence in a Diſtreſs at Sea the Food of one Paſſenger hath fupported the whole Company. And hence too ariſeth that affection which puts us on covering with Earth (1) the dead body of a Stranger; and how haſty foever our Journey be, we never fail ftopping to perform, in ſome fort or other, this pious Office. (*) This is well exprelled in the ancient Verſe of Publius Syrus. (t) See the Notes above on Chap 3. Lib. 2. $ 23. Note 9. Homo, qui in homine calamitoſo eft mifericors, meminit ſuia # D V. Amongſt 26 Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. Book III. 16 26 OG CC ic V. Amongſt the ſame Duties of Humanity, Gro- Numbers of thoſe who would enter, doth not feem tius, L. 2. C. 2. “ Reckons the granting free Pafo a ſufficient Reaſon to deny Paſlage; fince a Multi- Sage through any Lands, Rivers, or parts of the tude as well as a few. Perſons inay inoffenſively Sea, which have fallen under our Propriety, ifa- uſe this Privilege, and not treſpaſs againſt the ny have juſt Occaſion to deſire it; as ſuppoſe Law of Nature. However, the fame Law impow- when any People expellid out of their own Coun ers us to take ſecurity of the Men, whom we admit, try, are going to find a new Seat; or when they to engage them to do no Damage, or to repair what “ deſire to trade and correſpond with a Nation, they do. For the common Proverb tells us, that “ which we divide from them; or when they are Opportunity makes the Thief; and he is a very un- marching to recover what is their own in a juſt wile Maſter of a Houſe who lets in ſo many Strang- “ War; or when, being at a diſtance from home, ers, as to be turn'd out himſelf. Nor are there want- they are haſtening to the Defence of their Coun- ing Inſtances of ſeveral Cities, which have loſt their try, at preſent under ſome extraordinary Danger Liberty, by unwarily receiving too great a number or Diſtreſs. But we ought to allow this point a of Armed Gueſts . And what thould make us more fuller Diſcuſſion. Thus much then is clear beyond Cauticus is, that few Generals deſerve the Encomi- all doubt, that in caſe the Requeſt be made by a um, which Tully (c) on this Score hath given of ſmall Number of Men unarm’d, and willing to live Pompey the Great, that he march'd his Legions thro at their own Charge, Paſſage is to be granted them, Aſia, in ſuch a manner, as to keep not only the Hands, provided they ask it upon an honeſt and neceſſary but even the Feet of ſo vaſt an Army, from commit Account. But the Caſe of great Armies is not lo ting the leaſt Treſpaſs, on any peaceful and friendly caſily to be decided; ſince the admitting of them Perfon. When the Helvetians , or Suiſſes in the Gal- may create juſt Fears and Suſpicions in us, not lick War, fent Deputies to Cefar, to beg a Paſſage only on their own Account, but in reſpect of the through the Roman Province, we find Cajar, reject People, whither they are bound. Grotius main- ing their Petition, on this very good Account , tains, that notwithſtanding any ſuch Fear, their Pe “ He remembred how the ſame People had foriner- tition is to be complied with for this Reaſon; “Be- “ ly defeated and kill'd L. Cafius the Roman Con- « cauſe in that grand Diviſion of things, by which “lul , and forced his Soldiers to paſs ignominiouſly “the Primitive Community was aboliſh'd, and di “ under the Toak; and he imagined it ſcarce poli- “ ſtinct Proprieties introduced, all may be ſuppos’d “ble, that Men who were Enemies in their Hearts, to have reſerv'd to themſelves, ſo far the uſe “ ſhould purſue their way fairly, and without “ of each other's Poſſeſſions, as ſhould be ſerviceable“ launching out into any Injury or Diſorder (d). to their Wants, and not injurjous to the Owner; Many ways of taking Caution or Security in this « and that therefore when any ſtand in need of ſuch Cafe are propos’d; as firſt, that they ſhall paſs thro' a Uje, they have a Right to demand it. Įf any without their Arms; but 'tis very hard to get this diſlike this Argument, a plainer Reaſon may be thus Condition accepted of by Military Men; ask them offer'd, that the Law of Humanity obliges every to part with their Weapons, and they take it as if Man to allow another the harmleſs uſe of his Goods you deſired leave to cut off their Hands (2). It may or Poffeffions; which upon urgent Neceſſity, may be a more proper Expedient, that the Forces make be challeng’d in a forcible manner, in as much as their Paſſage in ſmall and ſeparate Bodies, or that the Denial of it is preſum'd to ſpring, either from Hoſtages be given for their peaceable Behaviour. Groundleſs Diffidence, or from wicked Perverſeneſs For what ſome propoſe, that thoſe who grant the of Mind, Yet in ſuch Cafes, Leave is firſt to be Paſſage, ſhall hire fufficient Guards at the Charges ask'd fairly and peaceably, and Violenice muſt not of thoſe who deſire it, would take up too much Mo- force a Paſſage whilſt it is yet uncertain, whether ney as well as too much Time. the Lord of the Place grounds his Refuſal on any It is farther ſaid on the ſame ſide, that it will juſt Reaſon, or acts only out of a Barbarous and In- not juſtifie us in denying this Favour to alledge, hoſpitable Temper. When Cimon the Athenian Ge- that Paflage may be had elſewhere, upon taking a neral going to alliſt the Lacedemonians, with his larger Circuit ; becauſe ſhould this Pretence always Troops broke through the Territories of the Corin- be uſed, the Requeſt would never be granted, tho thians, without giving notice to the State, Lachar- in the moſt Reaſonable Caſe, and ſo the Right would tes the Corinthian gave himn that handſomne Reproof, utterly ceaſe and come to nothing. It is ſufficient rej S Juegy rófano M07 picy, xr eineres mestregu i top therefore, in their Opinion, if without any Frau- rúelcy measūCUI (a), That when a Man knock’d at ano- dulent Deſign, Paſſage be there deſired, where it ther's Door, he forbore in Civility to enter, till the lies moſt ready and convenient. Maſter bad him come in (b) (1). Some there are who maintain the Right of free Thoſe who take the ſame ſide of the Queſtion Puffage, on this Argument, (3) that Highways are with Grotius, add, that a Fear upon account of the common to all Mankind, and do not come under - Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 5. p. 326. (1) The Carthaginians, to ſhew that they had a Right to a Countrey which Majinija King of Numidia conteſted about with them, alledged among other Reaſons, that Maffiniſa himſelf had granted it ; becauſe when he purſued Ciphires, who had eſca- ded out of his Kingdom, and cook his Rour round Cyrene with a Party of Numidians, he begged leave of the Carthaginians paſs through that very Countrey, as then depending upon Carthage without contradiction. See farther about this Right of Paſ- fage, as about a Right of Trading where we pleaſe. Selden's Tract, Entic’led, Mare Clauſum, Chap. 20. (2) As Florus I. 2. c. 18. ſays, That the People of Numantia are ſaid to have looked upon ſuch a Propoſal, when it was offered them, as a Condition of Peace. See Freinſhemius's and Grevius's Notes upon the place. (3) Mr Hirtius cites here a Treatiſe of Adrian Beier upon this Subject. An des quatenus tranſitus pro exercitu per territorium als terius poftulari do denegari poſit , (i. e.) How far Paflage for an Army through another Prince's Territories may be deſired, or denied. (a) Plutarch in Cim. (b) And thus Telaphus in Diæys Cretenſis rightly accuſeth the Greeks, that profeſſing to come as Friends, they ſhould give no Notice of their Viſit. (c) Pro Lege Manil. (d) Cæſar Comment, de B.G. 1. 1. C. 7, 8, the CHAP. III. 27 . Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. the Propriety of thoſe, in whoſe Territories they this means fix the Seat of the War in our own Coun- lie. As it at the firſt' Creation of the World, the try, For what if the other Party ſhould meet and Roads had been Chalk' out immediately by the Di (5) ſtop his Adverſary, whilſt yet in our Bor- vine Hand, and lett as Univerſal Benefits. A No- ders? And I do not fee how we could blame him tion tco Ridiculous to deſerve a ſerious Refuta- for this Proceeding, ſince he is by no means ob- tion. lig’d to receive the Foe into his own Dominions; On the other ſide there have been good Argu- on purpoſe to rid us of the Burthen and of the Trou- ments ofter’d, to evince that this (4) Liberty of Pal ble. It ſeems therefore the ſafeſt way of acting in Jage for an Army of Strangers is not owing by a this Caſe, if we can without meer Natural Right, without any Compact or Con- judice to our own Affairs, to deny the Enemy Paf- ceffion intervening; eſpecially when the Cafe is, ſage, and actually to oppoſe him, if he endeavour that an Enemy to ſome of our Neighbouring States to force it without our Conſent. But it we are ei- deſires leave to carry his Troops againſt them, thro' ther too weak to hinder his Progreſs, or inuſt on our Territories. For it ſeems to be part of the Du- this Score engage in a dangerous War; the Plea ty, which we owe to our Neighbours, eſpecially of Neceſſity will fairly juſtifie us to our Neigh- ſuch as have been kind and friendly, not to ſuffer bour (c). any Hoftile Power to march along our Country, to Ziegler in his Obſervations on Grotius aſſerts, that their Prejudice, provided we can hinder the Deſign in this Caſe, no one can Naturally have a Right of with no great Inconvenience to our ſelves (a). And paſſing through the Lands of another, but all ſuch it is indeed one expreſs Article in moſt Leagues, Right muſt be obtain’d by Compact; juſt as no that neither Party ihall grant Paſſage to the Foes Man has the Liberty of going through the Fields of the other (b). Nor will it ſolve the Difficulty, of a private Perſon, unleſs ſuch a Service is impo- to ſay that we ought to allow Paſſage, if the War ſed on the Fields, by Virtue of their particular which is undertaken be juft; not it it be unjuſt . For Tenure. He ſays this will eſpecially hold good, there is commonly much time and much Thought, when we have juſt reaſon to apprehend Danger requir’d to make ſuch a Judgment; and beſides it is from ſuch a Conceſſion (6). And this Point too he lookd upon as a piece of Raihneſs, to thruſt in our illuſtrates by a Parallel Caſe between private Per- Arbitration between two armed Parties, without fons, You may have a Right of making a Tho- their defiring it, and to conſtitute our felves Judges rough-fare of Titius's Yard; but if you appear there of fo great à Cauſe. But farther, ſuppoſing we often with Fire and Torches, ſo as to endanger the grant the Requeſt, it is very poſſible, we may by Buildings, Titius's Fear cannot indeed, in this caſe, (4) In this caſe the Benefic deſired is not a Service without hurt; for there is a preſent Damage, and a great hazard of a fu- ture. For if an Army in its March cauſes ſometimes Waſte and Diſorder in an Allies Countrey, and among their own Coun- trey-men themſelves, what will ic do in a ſtrange Nacion? Hiſtory, both Ancient and Modern, and preſent Tranſactions furniſh 'us with many Examples. See Tacitus's Hift. 1. 2. c. 12. $ 7. Plin. Panegyr. C. 20. numb. 4. Phil. de Comines 1. 6. c. 2. Farther, a great Number of Men, which paſs through a Countrey, muſt-of neceffity make Proviſions dearer, by which means the greateſt parc of the Natives ſuffer, but the Conſequences, which may be apprehended, are far more burdenſome, which we ihall here- after diſcourſe of, when we come to ſupply the Defects of the Author, according to the Senſe of Gronovius in a large Note up: on Grotius. I. 2. c. 2. § 13. numb. 1. (5) This is not the only Danger. For he to whom Paſſage is granted, may be overcome, and put to the worſt; and if ſo, let the Cauſe of making War be juſt or not, he will certainly revenge himſelf upon thoſe who did not keep his Enemy from in- vading him. But fuppoſing there be nothing to fear from the ſtrange Troops which are ſuffered to paſs, the Abercors of the contrary Opinion agree, that many Precautions ought to be obſerved. The Men that are always in Arms are eaſily tempred to abuſe them, and commit great Outrages. Moreover, if they are very numerous, and find an opportunity to ſeize on a confide. rable Prey, how often have we ſeen Armies of Strangers ravaging or ſeizing to their own Uſe the Eſtates of a People who have called them to their Succour; nor have their folemn oaths and Treaties been able to decer them from this foul Perfidiouſneſs. See Juſt. 1. 4. C. 4. n. 5. & 8. 3. Tit Liv. Lib. VII. chap. 38. and what Wittikind ſays concerning the Saxons l. 1. Annal. What then may we expect from ſuch as are under no ſuch ſtrict Engagements, but only barely promiſe to do us no Injury. Furthermore, as in the Bodies of Living Creatures the moſt render Parts, and ſubject to be dangerouſly affected, are the inward, called the Vitals; ſo all States almoſt have this in common, that the farther Men advance into the heart of a Countrey, they find it more weak and unarmed. The Carthaginians, otherwiſe invincible, were conquered near Carthage by Agathocles and Scipio. Hannibal faid he could never beat the Romans but in Italy. It is then a very dangerous thing, conſidering the Covetouſneſs of Men, which are never ſatisfied, to lay open theſe Secrets to Strangers, who having Arms at hand, may make an advantage of our Weakneſs , and puniſh our Imprudence. To this we may ada, that in all States there never want Men turbulent and diſaffected, who are ready to fir up Strangers either againſt their Fellow Citizens, Sovereign or Neighbours, as we are told by Francis Beau- his Commentaries on the Fiench Affairs; and Phil. de Comines I. 7. c. 7. ſpeaking of the Inhabitants of Piſa, to whom King Charles VIII. gave Liberty, when he paffed through the Kingdom of Naples, to conquer ir; and by Tacitus about the People of Lyons, Hift. l. 1. c. 65. Theſe Precautions are always neceffary to be obſerved, unleſs where ſuch a Paffage can't be prevented, for we may be often deceived, tho' sve ufe all imaginable Circumſpection. And whoever allows a Stranger to enter his Countrey, he gets either a Maſter or an Equal, But if we have no Reaſon to fear any thing either from him that would paſs, or from him againſt whom he marches ; yet he certainly deprives his Subjects of the Advantage of the Commerce, which his Subjects might have with that Neighbour, upon whom they let in an Enemy. See what is farther ſpoken out of Gronovius, (6) If a Prince may forbid the Inhabitants of his own Countrey to go armed in all parts of his Dominions, with much more he hinder Strangers. See Cicero Lib. V. in Verrem, c. 3. Moreover, if a private Perſon has a Right to keep any from coming upon his Ground to hunt ſo much as Birds, Inſtitut. 1. 2. Tit. 1. de Rerum Diviſ. 8 12. And Thall not a Sovereign have power to deny Paſſage to an Army of Strangers. See Juſt. Lib. 9. c. 2. Tit. Liv. 1. 37. c. 7. Caſar de Bell. Gall. l. 1. c. 8. jo. Fred. Gronov. As alſo the Diſcourſe of Mr. Bynkerſhoek De Dominio Maris, c. 4. publiſh'd A. D. 1703. (2) And therefore 'twas unreaſonable for the Romans in Livy, B. 21. c. 20. to define the Gauls, that they would not grant the Carthaginians a fiee Paſſage into Italy, becauſe they would thereby turn the War upon themſelves, and expoſe their own Coun, tey to be waſted for the security of another, to which they had no obligation. We have not (ſay they) received any Advan- Vantage from the Romans, nor Damage from the Carthaginians, which may oblige us to take Arms for the one, or againſt the Other: (1) Šee the League of the Romans with the Carthaginians in Livy, B. 38. C. 38. and with the Ætolians; Polyb. Excerpt. heat 28 (1) 'Tis remarkable what Plutarch reports in his Life of Lyſander, that when the City of Athens was oppreſsd by the Thirty Tyrants, the Thebans paſsa a law, that whoever ſhould carry Arms thro" Beotia againſt the Athenian Tyrants, ſhould be free from the Norice of the Theban Eyes or Ears. + D 2 abſolutely caire in hi Nore 9. Reaſon may 28 Book III. Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. But abſolutely take away your Right; but he may hind- about their Borders ; and when at length they were er you from going in fo dangerous a manner, and oblig'd juſt to touch on (8) fome part of their Coafts, conſequently may abridge your Privilege, though they did not take occaſion froin the former moft in- he cannot annul it. But as to this way of arguing human Treatment, to commit any Violence or Tres- we muſt obſerve, that in the Queſtion now before paſs in their March (b). As to the ſame People , us, we do not by the Liberty of Paffage underſtand when Sihon King of the Amorites, not only refufed any ſettled and conſtant Service, but only an Oc- them the like Privilege, but came out Arm’d to op- caſional and as it were a Momentary, uſe of ano- poſe them, probably before they had reach'd his ther's Territories or Poffeffions, to which we are Coafts , and therefore ſet upon them without any driven, either by Neceflity, or by the Profpect of Reaſon or Provocation, we find he was overthrown fome extraordinary Advantage, when it would be in the Combat; but he ſeems to have ſuffer'l this Inhumanity in the other Party, not to comply Fate, not ſo much for denying them Paſſage, as for with our Wants, and with our Requeſt. rafhly encountring them upon ſo little Colour or Examples, which are of ſo great Weight in deter- Pretence. For otherwiſe it would have ſeem'd too mining other Queſtions, have little Force as to the hard to puniſh the Neglect of a piece of Humani- Deciſion of this. For generally as People have been ty with the Ruine of a whole Nation ; ſince it ap- ſtronger or weaker, they have required Paſſage with pears that theſe Amorites were ſeated without the Modeſty, or with Confidence, and have in like Borders of the (9) Land of Promiſe, the Inhabitants of manner granted, or refuſed it to others (7). “ Agefi- which God Almighty had by a ſpecial Decree, ad- “ laus in Plutarch, when the Trallians (a) demand, judgʻd to utter Extirpation and Deſtruction. “ Nor “ed an hundred Talents, and as many Women for will it alter the Cale to ſay with ſome, that the A- " the Price of his Paſſage through their Country, s morites here to make their Fear juſtifiable, ought " ask'd them pleaſantly, Why the Commiſioners were not to have rejected ſo fair Conditions, but ſhould not there ready at hand to receive them; and with “ have immediately treated about accepting and out farther delay march'd forward, encounter'd regulating them, but that now by refuſing all « and routed them. He ſent to the King of Ma peaceable Conference and Commerce, they had “ cedon, to defire the fame Favour, who anfwer “ rendred themſelves liable to be dealt with, as the ing, that he would take time to conſider of it; “ moſt unjuſt and moſt unfaithful of Men: For « let him conſider of it, ſays Agefilaus, and in the by the common Right and Privilege of Mankind, a mean while we will go forward. The Macedo- Breach (10) of the Law of Humanity, does not de “ nian admiring, and fearing fuch Spirit and Reſo- ſerve the utmoſt Rigour, and Extremity of Pro- “lution, hunbly requeſted him to paſs at his plea- ceeding. « ſure. VI. Amongſt theſe Matters of Harmleſs Profit , is that of the Iſraelites, when deſiring to paſs thro Grotius reckons the perinitting Goods and Merchan- the Edomites Country, they voluntarily offer'd dice, to be carried through our Dominions. Ziegler the following Conditions. “ That they would accuſes Grotius of a Contradiction on this point , “ march alorig the King's Highway, without turn- whilft in one place he ſays, That no one can have a « ing into the private Fields or Vineyards, and Right of hindering any Nation from maintaining Traf, “ would immediately tender Money for every fick and Commerce with any other (1) Nation that is thing of theirs which they ſhould have Occaſion Remote from them; and yet in another place of the to uſe. The Edomites rejecting theſe Terms, ſame Chapter he grants, That it is lawful for one ‘and endeavouring in a Hoſtile Manner to hinder Nation to contract with another, for all the Goods of their Paſſage, they did not think it juſtifiable to ob one kind not to be found elſewhere; ſo that no other tain it by Force, but took a large Compaſs round People shall have the Liberty of buying them. But 06 66 (7) To theſe Examples, which rather prove what was done, than what ought to be done, we may oppoſe ſome Examples more remarkable, viz. of ſome People who have been badly rewarded for their Eaſineſs in granting Strangers Troops to paſs their Countrey. So it was thar Phebidas got pofleffion of the Caſtle Cadmsa, Diod. Sic. Lib. 45. с. 20. And the City of Meſſina was taken by the Captains of Agathocles's Army, Polyó. Hi2. Lib. I. as Gronovius obſerves. See the Diſcourſe of Buddeus about theſe Expeditions among his Sele&ta fur. Nat. do Gen. $ 30. (8) They never entred into Idumea, but marched upon the Borders of it, and bought their Proviſions of the Idumeans. See Mr. Le Clerc upon Deut. 2. 29. (9) It is a wonder that our Author, contrary to ſeveral expreſs Paſſages in Scripture, ſhould exclude the Amorites from the Number of the Seven Nations which God had ordered to be deſtroyed, viz. Deut. 7. 1. and 20. 17. Nevertheleſs, it is true, chat thoſe whom he here ſpeaks of were not in the Land of Promiſe properly ſo called, which contained all the Countrey becween Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea, and conſequently if King Sihon had granted the Iſraelites a quiet Paſſage, they had not exes cuced the Sentence which God had pronounced, upon that part of the Amorites. See Mr. Le Clerc upon Gen. 10. 16. and Numb. 21. 22. (10) See Mr. Thomafius's Inſtitut. Juriſpr. Div. Lib. 2. c. 6.9 16. in fine. Mr. Buddeus in his Elemenrs, Phil. Pra&t. Part II. C. 4. 88. 8-16, &c. maintains, that ſuppoſing the War which that Prince, who deſires a Paſſage thro” our Countrey, makes, is juft and neceſſary; and on the other fide we have no reaſon to fear any thing either from him that is to paſs, or him againſt whom he marches, we are under an indiſpenſible Obligation to allow him a Pallage, and his Reaſon is, becauſe the Law of Nature obli- ges every one to affiſt thoſe who are unjuſtly oppreſſed ; and with much greater reaſon ought we to be no hindrance to ſuch as undertake their own Defence. See Lib. 2. c. 5. 5 6. Note 3. above. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 6. p. 329. (1) Grotius ſeems to underſtand, either mediately or immediately. This appears from the Reſtraines which he pues upon the Trafick, which he ſuppoſes to be allowed between the two Eſtates, of which the one engages to ſell the other a certain fort of Wares which grow no where elſe, it being meant, as he adds, that the People who have obtained the Privilege of buying theſe Wares only, are ready to ſell them again to others at Reaſonable Rates. For granting that we have Necefiaries of Life fufficient to fatisfie Nacure, it matters nor of whom we have them. So that our Author's Diſtinction might have been ſpared. (a) Or the Troades, as we find them called in the Lacon. Apothegm. of the lame Author. (6) See Deut, 11, 12, 34. Numb, 20. 14. now CHAP. III. Of tbe Mutual Duties of Humanity. 29 now by this Contract of Ingroffinent, it is plain o- him in the Advantage? Which we ſhall be, if whilſt ther Nations are thus far hindred from trading in the we lie thus in the midſt between two people, we fame Country. Yet it is eaſie to bring off Grotius, take Care not tº let ſuch Goods pals from one to by ſaying, that in the former Paffage by hindering, the other , without going firſt through our own he underſtands not hindering them by Virtue of ſome Hands (2). And unleſs this be admitted for fair precedent Bargain or Covenant, but hindering them and equitable Dealing, I ſee not on what Grounds we by open Methods of Violence. Yet on the whole can defend thoſe (3) Staples , and other Rights which it muſt be confeſs’d, that he has not brought the we find in foine Countries, by Virtue of which Fo- prefent Queſtion to a full and clear Deciſion. For reign Commodities are ſtopt and carried to the pub- truly ſpeaking, the Law of Humanity does not ſeen lick place of Sale, and Strangers are permitted to to oblige us to grant Paffage to any other Goods, Traffick, not immediately betwixt themſelves, but except luch as are abſolutely Neceſſary for the fup- at ſecond-hand with the Natural Subjects. port of their Life, to whom they are thus convey d. VII. From what has been ſaid, there may well an But as for thoſe who import ſuch Commodities, as riſe this farther Queſtion, Whether the Law of Hu- improve and encourage Luxury; or from which inanity will permit us to require Toll, or Cuſtom for thoſe who deal in them do not ſeek any Supply of Goods tranſported through any Land, River, or nar- real Wants, but rather an Exceſſive Gain, and an row Sea, ſubject to our Dominion. For at firſt ſight Indulgence to covetous Deſires, I do not fee what it ſeems Inhumane, not to grant ſuch a Privilege Right they have to demand Paſſage through our without Price, which the Law before-mention'd, al- Coaſts for this kind of Traffick, or on what Preten- lows freely to all Mankind. fions they can claim ſuch a Privilege as their Fue. Now why Cuſtom ſhould be impoſed on Goods cara I confeſs, there fcarce appears any probable Co- ried over Land, there is this manifeſt Reaſon, be- lour on which we ſhould deny unarined Veſſels the cauſe ſuch heavy Conveyance fometimes treſpaſſes Liberty of an open Sea, which we are Maſters of, on the Fields, adjoyning to the Common Roads, and whilſt they are bound to a third People, with whom becauſe the Sovereign of the Country is put to we are at Peace. And to this point, chiefly relate Charge, both in repairing the Ways, and in ſecura all thoſe Authorities and Teſtimonies of Authorsing the Paſſengers (1). And farther, if it be necef- uſually produced in the main Diſpute. But thus fary to erect Bridges for this purpoſe, it is plain in much we may reaſonably do, we may ſtop the Vef- Equity that the Sovereign may ſet up a Toll to re- fel in ſuch a Caſe, and force them to leave their imburſe himſelf for thoſe Expences; and at the Cargo in our Territories, that we may have the Be- ſame time, he who does require ſuch Toll , is oblig'? nefit of the firſt Purchaſe. For beſides that the not only to let the Bridges ſtand, but likewiſe to frequent Paſſage of Strangers may, ſome time, cre- keep them in conſtant Repair. 'Grotius on the ate Danger, or at leaſt may give Suſpicions to our 1 Kings X. 19. obſerves, that a great Toll was paid State, what fhould hinder us from deriving that to Solomon for the Horſes brought through Judaa Profit on our own People, which would otherwiſe from Egypt, to the Syrians, or to the Hittites; and be made by Foreigners; ſince in inatters of Favour, thus too no Frankincenſe was tranſported without we ought conſtantly to prefer the former to the lat- Cuſtom. The like Impoſitions are reaſonable in thoſe ter. And though in Strictneſs it be indeed no Da- Places, where by the Induſtry of the Natives, the mage to us, if we permit the free Tranſportation of Roads are rendred more ſhort or more eaſie; as by theſe Commodities, and tho’ the third Party who the filling up of Pits and Ditches, or by other uſe- receives them, does not properly injure us by mak- ful Labours, for the Convenience of Paſſengers and ing a Gain, which 'twas in our power to have ſe- of Goods. Thus of old, had any one cut through cured before him, yet ſince he has no Right of ex the Iſthmus, and join’d the Ionian and Ægean Seas, cluding us from ſuch a Gain, why ought we not to he might fairly have required fome moderate Tolí love our felves Leſt, and to be before-hand with of the Merchants and Sailers; which they would (2) As the Duties of Humanity are reciprocal, and he that has received a Benefit ought to make fome Acknowledgment of it, Strangers have no juſt Reaſon to complain that they are obliged to put their Goods to Sale in the Countrey, provided they'll buy them at a reaſonable Price, becauſe by that means they will ger by them, tho' perhaps nor ſo much as they would have done if they had carried their Merchandices farther. But if the Merchandices or Wares be ſuch as we are well ſtored with, or trade with our felves, we may poſitively refuſe them coming in; becauſe 'tis evident, that ſo much Profit as theſe Traders make in pafling through our Countrey, 'eis ſo much Lofs to our felves. But if in retuſing a Paſſage, we deprive the Strangers that demand of that Profie they might make, without any Advantage to our felves, 'tis inhuinane to envy others the Benefic which we can't obtain our ſelves; and ſo much the more, if the other people to whom they would carry theſe Merchandices, can't have them any where elſe, but at an exorbitant Price. See Mr. Buddaus, as above, Ś 4, 5. Mr. Hirtius in his Note upon this Place of our Author agrees, that nothing hinders but the Right of Staple may take place among Citizens of the ſame State, either with relation to Strangers, who come to ſell their Merchandices and Wares in their Countrey, (i. e.) They may not allow them to fec them to Sale but in a certain place, but he does not fee why luch Perſons as bring Foreign Commodities, whether of their own Growth or Manufacture, to carry them into a third Countrey, ſhould be obliged to put them to Sale; eſpecially if the People through whoſe Countrey they are carried, have no great need of them. For my pare, there ſeems to me to be no Injuſtice in it, provided we are willing to furnith theſe ſtrangers with ſuch things as they are ſeeking elſewhere, when they have paffed our Countrey, whether of our own Growth or Manufacture, at a reaſonable Rate. For why ſhould they go far for what they may have near hand? And why thould they nor acconimodate themſelves among us, who are nearer than others? ſo long as they may make a tolerable Gain, though not so great as if they were ſuffered to go farther. So that in this caſe it is at our liberty either to allow Paffage, or not, for Foreign Commodities; and all that we are to beware of is, that in denying we do not pre- judice the Commerce of the Inhabitants of our own Countrey, and bring ſome other Inconvenience on them; but this is a mac- (3) Stapulu, this word comes from the German, Stapulen, which fignifies, to put into an Heap or Pile. See Mr. Menage's Etymolog. Diction. Lo Marquard de Jur. Mercat. Lib. 2. c. 6. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES 6.7. p. 330. (1) In ſome Countries, they who receive theſe Tolls were obliged to make the Roads ſafe. So that if a Man were robbed io the Day-cime, they were bound to make good what he had loft . Some ſay, that this Cuſtom is uſedat this Day in ſome places of England and Italy See Furetiere's Didition, in che Word Peage, and the Saxon Laws, Lib. 2. Art. 27. ter of Prudence only. not 30 Book HII, Of tbe Mutual Duties of Humanity. (G CG not have been unwilling to give, the Voyage being near Rocks and Quickſands, for the keeping of now perform’d with more Expedition and more Se- Fires to direct Vellels in the Night, or for ſcow- curity. And though this Project was never ſet on ring the Coaſts of Pirates. But whatever is de- Foot, Strabo informs us, “ That the Merchants of manded farther, than upon theſe Accounts, will not Aſia and Italy, rather than paſs out of one of theſe admit of ſo good Defence; in as much as the Seas into the other, by the tedious and dangerous Paſſage of unarmed Ships is plainly one of thoſe “ Coaſt of Malea, were extreamly well ſatisfied to harmleſs Benefits which Humanity lays in Common, put in at Corinth, and ſo carry their Effects over Yet where ſuch Pretenſions are made, the Pleas Land; notwithſtanding the Duties to be paid which ſupport them do not ſeem altogether abſurd; “ there for all Imported or Exported Goods. Ano as that no one ought to be blamed for making the ther Reaſon which fome bring to affert the Equity beſt of his Dominions, as for raiſing ſuch Profits of Impoſitions on Land-Carriage, is this , that by from his Waters as others do from their Land. ſo perpetual Confluence of Strangers, the price of That, ſince he who enters the Territories of ano- Proviſions is exceedingly rais’d. To which we may ther, is for that time his Subject, we may compel add in Concluſion, that a Sovereign, on this Ac- the Ships of Foreigners, whilſt they paſs through count, requires fome Acknowledgment from the our Sea, to let our Subjects have the firſt Purchaſe Goods of Foreigners, becauſe he ſuffers them by paf- of their Goods; and that if we give up this Claim, fing through his Territories, to receive ſuch Goods we may require ſome reaſonable Confideration in immediately from a third People; whereas ſhould he Lieu of it. That although we cannot perhaps ſet up erect a Staple, the Gain and Benefit would be fair- a Staple in ſuch a Sea, becauſe the third Nation ly intercepted by his own Subjects. whither thoſe Ships are bound, may not have the As to the River Tolls, this amongſt other Ar- uſe of Sailing, and therefore cannot fetch the Goods guments, may be offer'd to juſtifie them, that ſince from us, neither have we, it may be, the Liberty the Water by continually preying on the adjoining of carrying them thither; yet it ought not to be Lands, and ſometimes by overflowing them, is the thought hard if we put in for ſome little Share in Cauſe of no inconfiderable Damage, for the Preven- the Gain, ſince we permit Strangers to fail through tion of which it is often neceſſary to ſecure them our Water, with ſo much Expedition and Conveni- with Banks and other Works of great Charge and ence. But upon the whole, it muſt be confeft, that Labour, it ſeems by no means unreaſonable, that ſince this Toll by Sea is, for I know not what Rea- towards the making up of theſe Lofles, fone mo- ſon, accounted more Odious than what is demanded derate Confideration thould be allowed by thoſe by Land, it ought to be exerciſed with great Pru- who gain Advantage by the River, without being dence and Moderation, and without the leaſt Ap- concern’d in its ordinary Miſchiefs. It is true in pearance of Extortion or Avarice. And after all the Capitularies of Charles the Great (a), one Order there inay, 'tis very likely, (3) be a Sovereign (or forbids to take Toll in thoſe Rivers, Ubi rullum ad- Two) who ſhall claim an Exemption from the com- jutorium præſtatur itinerantibus, where no Aſſiſtance is mon Duty, and build his Pretenſions on good Rea- given to the Paſſengers (2) but this fon; as that his Dominions bordering on the ſame (*) V. Lex Conſtitution ſeems to have been made Sea (4), encloſe it ſo at both ends, as to give him Longobard, lib. 13. Tic. 1. Leg. in Favour of the Natural Subjects, a fair Title to its uſe; or that on ſuch a uſe of it, and there is no neceſſity of extend- his Coinmerce with Foreign Nations, and confe- ing it to Foreigners (*); quently the Good and Safety of his own People al- It is a more difficult Point, to ſtate the Equi- moſt entirely (5) depends. For in theſe Caſes it ty of Tolls demanded in Seas. This indeed is be- would be unrealonable, that to obtain the Liberty yond Diſpute, that the Sovereign of a Sea may of a harmleſs Paffage by Sea, he ſhould be reducid impoſe Duties anſwerable to the Charge, which to a kind of (6) Tributary Condition; nor will any he beſtows about it; as for the ſetting up of Marks (2) Either in taking care that the Commodities be not indamaged, or for the Safety of their Perſons. (3) Our Author has a principal Refpect here to the Streight of the Sound, for he was at that time Profeſſor at Lunden in the Province of Schonen, belonging to the Swedes ſince the Peace of Ratſchild. (4). This Reaſonſ proves nothing. The Subječts of this Prince trade together by Land, but if they will tranſport their Merchandices by an Arm of the Sea, why ſhould they refuſe more than other People to pay an Impoſt to the Mafter of the Streight, either as a Satisfaction for the Charge he is ac co ſecure them a commodious Navigation, or as a ſmall Acknowledgment of the Profit they reap themſelves from an open Paffage, which ſhortens their courſe, and makes their Trade more flouriſhing ? And though there be no other Communication between the Countries of that Prince, which are above and below the Streights, this does not at all leffen the Right of him that has the Poffeffion of it. Otherwiſe it would follow, that he thar hath a Coun- try ſurrounded with anothers States, ſuch, for example, as are Avignon, and Orange in the Kingdom of France, hath a Right to aſſert, that the Lord of that Country which incloſes his muſt ſuffer 'all Merchandices and Goods to paſs backward and for- ward without paying any Tax or Impofition, which our Author will never grant. And I can't ſee what Privilege Navigation can pretend to more, fince the Gulphs and Streights of the Sea, according to our Author's own Principles, Lib 4. c. 5. 58. be. long no more to any Prince, whoſe Countrey they border on, than the Highways taken out of his Lands. See Mr. Bynkerſhoeke's Diſcourſe, De Dominio Maris, c. 4 p. 28. (5) Suppoſe that the People be ſo poor, that a moderate Tax laid upon their Goods and Merchandices which they tranſport , would diſable them from trading, and providing themſelves the Neceſſaries of Life. In this caſe the Maſter of the Streight will be obliged to ſuffer the Vefſels of that people to paſs without exacting any Cuftoms of them. But yec he may take them of Foreign Merchants for their Paffage ; becauſe, though it ſeems to be a leffening their Profits, yet they know how to indemnifie themſelves in ſelling their Merchandices , without which their Fellow. Citizens, to whom they ſell them, muſt either want ſome of the Neceſſaries of Life, or buy them at an exorbitant Price. And tho' perhaps, if the Maſter of the Streight ſhould altogether refuſe them a Paſſage, they would be in great want of ſeveral things, yet it does not follow, that they muſt therefore be exem- pted from ſuch Cuſtoms, becauſe that open Paffage procures a flourilhing Trade, and a great abundance of all things they have need of, and much more. (6) That_Prince is no more tributary to the Maſter of a Streight for paying a Cuſtom, than a Traveller in a ſtrange Country, paying che Toll of a Bridge or River is tributary to the Lord of the Country, who receives it. It is noc (as an Engliſh Author, viz. Mr. Maleſworth in his memoirs affirms) a servile Acknowledgement of the Sovereignty of that Prince over the Seas, o which the Streight is a Key. We may as well ſay, that by paying the Toll over a Bridge or River, which are on the border of a Prince's Country, we attribute to him the Sovereignty over all the Country. (2) Lib, 3.8 , 12. Add. Lex Longobard. Lib. 3. Tit. I. Leg. 21. 21. olle CHAP. III. Of the Mutual Daties of Humanity. 21 ; ? one be much inclin'd to cenſure him, if upon fo o But in Caſe the oppoſite Shore is poffefs’d by a- dious a Provocation he endeavour by any pollible nother People, ſo that the Sea is either held in com- Means, to free himſelf from ſuch Exaction and Op- mon by both, or elſe as a middle Point divides the presſion. Nor will it render his Reſentments leſs Confines of the two Dominions, though here per- juſtifiable, to alledge on the other ſide, that other haps one of the States only may by Compact or Nations have agreed to pay the Impoſition: becauſe Conceffion require Toll of Paſſengers, yet the Sub- their Support and Safety is not ſo immediately con- jects of the other State ſhall by no means ſtand lia- cern'd in the uſe of ſuch a Sea, and therefore they ble to the ſame impofition, ſince they fail in their may afford to allow the Sovereign of the Sea a ſhare own Water (10). in their Gains, without Gruding or Repining. As the VIII. Under the ſame Head of Common and In- Cafe is very different, (7) whether a Man deſires a nocent Privileges, Grotius (c) likewiſe reckons the Way through my Grounds, becauſe without this Pri- liberty of Sailers, to touch and to reſt a little on vilege, he would be as it were excluded from the any ſhore, for the ſake of Health or of freſh Wa- World, and confined to Solitude, or becauſe he ter, or on any other juſt Account. Thus the Tro- could not otherwiſe carry off the Fruit of his own jans complain in Virgil (d), Land; and whether he makes the ſame Demand, purely to ſhorten his Paſſage, and impoſes a Bur Quod genus hoc hominum? quave hæc tam bar- theri on my Eſtate, not to relieve his own Neceſſi- (bara morem ty, but to promote his Convenience and Eaſe. Permittit patria ? hofpitio prohibemur arena, They tell us, that the King of Abyſinia, or Æ Bella cient, primâq; vetant confiftere terra, thiopia pretended of old to a certain Tribute from Si genus humanum & mortalia temnitis arma, Egypt ; upon account that the River Nile, to which At Sperate Deos memores fandi atque nefandi. that Country owes its fruitfulneſs, took its riſe in his Dominions; and that afterwards when the Turks What Men, what Monſters, what Inhuman Race; had ſeiz’d on Egypt, and uſed great Severities to What Laws, what barbarous Cuſtoms of the place, wards the Chriſtians, the Abyſinian Prince made an Shut up a deſart Shoar to drowning Men, attempt to have turn’d the Channel of the Nile And drive us to the cruel Seas again! into the Red-Sea, but without Effect. Theſe Pre If our hard Fortune no Compaſſion draws, tenſions and theſe Proceedings, which bear fome Re Nor Hoſpitable Rights, nor Human Laws; lation to the Caſe before us, we cannot but look up The Gods are juſt, and will revenge our Cauſe. on as unjuſt (8). Mr. Dryden. Some would determine this whole Buſineſs by the means of Compact and Covenant, which Method we But 'tis obſervable that they profeſs'd before. think not to be altogether accurate and deciſive, For it remains ſtill in Queſtion, what was the ori Non nos aut ferro Libycos populare Penates ginal reaſon of theſe Covenants; and whether the Venimus, aut raptas ad littora vertere prædas; Maſter of the Sea may deny paffage to others, until Non ea vis animo, &c. ſuch time as they ſall enter into the ſame Ar- ticles of Agreement. Though indeed when ſuch We come not with deſign of waſtful Prey, a Covenant has once paſs’d without any Natural To drive the Country, force the Swains away: Flaw or Weakneſs, which might render it invalid, Nor ſuch our Strength, nor ſuch is our deſire. both Parts are obliged ſtrictly to obſerve it; fo Mr. Dryden. that the People who uſe the Paſſage deſired, ought on no account to deny the ſettled Impoſition, and Whence we are taught that the party who deſires the Maſter of the Sea ſhall not raiſe the Duty this Favour, ought to appear on ſuch Coaſts with higher, than what he has been thus eſtabliih'd by moſt innocent Intention, fo as neither to create any joint Conſent (a). Nicephorus Gregoras (b) reports, Danger to the Inhabitants, nor any probable that the Caliph of Egypt obtain'd by Covenant of Grounds of Fear. And therefore Dido's Anſwer to the Emperour of Conſtantinople, Licence for the this Speech, is exceedingly wiſe and proper. Merchants of his Country to paſs through the Thra- cian Bosphorus. Which Privilege was therefore fo Res dura, & regni novitas, me talia cogunt eaſily granted at firſt, becauſe it feem'd a matter Moliri, & late fines cuſtode tueri : of little Importance. But when in courſe of time it appear’d to be a Point of very conſiderable Con- My cruel Fate, fequence; it was found impobilile to revoke the And Doubts attending an unſettled State, Grant, after it had been by long Cuſtom enforced Force me to guard my Coaſts. Mr. Dryden. (7) But our Author himſelf, reciting the ſame Example above, l. 2. c. 6.9 8. ſays, according to the senſe of the Interpre- ters of the Roman Law, that he is obliged to grant a Paffage, eſpecially if he make ſome Acknowledgement. See Digeſt . 1. 11, from the circumſtances he fuppofes in favour of his Prince, be well grounded, and if this Prince has any way to oblige the Ma- ſter of the Streight to let him carry his Merchandices free of all Toil , ficnce other People pay it willingly. (8) This inſtance, tho’our Author paſſes a true Judgment as to the Pretenfions of the Abyſine Prince, yer has little or no rea lation to the Cuſtom or Toll which a Mafter of a Streight exacts of the Merchandices which paſs through it. (10) But our Author elſewhere acknowledges, viz. Lib. 4. c. 5. § 8. that whoever has ſettled himſelf firſt upon one of the Coants of the Streight, and has taken poffeffion of the whole Streigh, he that comes afterward to inhabit on the other ſide is Maſter only of his own Ports and Shore. So that in this caſe the firſt occupant has a Right to require Cuſtoms of the Veſſels of the other, as if he had both ſides of the Streight, unleſs he be diſpenſed with by any Agreement, (a) Add. Becler, ad Grot. L. 2. c. 2. (. 14. (6) Lib. 4. (c) L. 2, C. 2, f. 15. (d) Æneid. I. For and eſtabliſh'd (9). (9) What does this prove? 32 Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. Воок III, Philo. Jud. in his Life of Moſes, ſays, chat For before we grant any thing of this kind, we found the ſtricteſt Relation, and the moſt facred ought to be well aſſured whether the Perſons ap- Friendſhip (c). But to give a Natural Right to proaching come as Friends, or as Enemies, what ap- theſe Favours, it is requiſite that the Stranger be pearance the Fleet makes, what force and figure abſent from his own Houſe, on an Honeſt, or on a the Men bear who are to land ; and farther whether neceſſary Account ; as alſo that we have no Obje- they are free from all contagious Diſtempers (a). ction againſt his Integrity, or Character, which When there ariſes no Obſtacle on either of theſe inight render our Admiſſion of him, either Dange- Accounts as it would be then moſt barbarous Inhu- rous or Diſgraceful ; and farther, that he cannot at manity, to deny the Liberty of harmleſs Acceſs to preſent hire Lodgings for his Money. And there- ſhore, ſo that Favour being once granted, calls for fore in Ancient Times, when publick Inns either one more, altogether as reaſonable, the Privilege of were not in uſe, or elſe were accounted Scandalous , erecting little Momentary Huts for preſent Shelter, and unworthy to receive a good and vertuous Gueſt , which is neither any prejudice to the Shore, nor any the Neceſſity of this Duty was greater and more Abridgment of our Right and Property: Indeed ftri&ly binding than it is now in moſt parts of Europe, Reaſon forbids that any one ſhould raiſe a laſting where we meet with ſo many of theſe Houſes, ex Structure or Edifice on the Strand, without expreſs actly fitted and furniſh’d, not only for all Uſe and allowance from the Sovereign (1), eſpecially if it Convenience, but even for Ornament and Splen- could not be done but by indamaging others (b). dor. Although ſome Nations have by formed Compact Now although Inhoſpitality be commonly, and for ſettled the Point of Acceſs to Shores and Ports(2), the moſt part juſtly cenſured, as the true mark of a yet this does not hinder the like Kindneſs from be- Savage and Inhumane Temper, yet the Point will ing due by Natural Right; ſince many Duties ari- now and then bear a Diſpute, eſpecially as to the ſing from thoſe Vertues which impoſe only an Im- Caſe of thoſe who wander into Foreign Countries, perfečt Obligation, are frequently ſtrengthen’d and purely on the account of Curioſity; whether or no confirm’d by civil Covenants and Laws (3). Be- ſuch Perſons may claim free Admiſſion by any Na- ſides, our preſent Aſſertion regards chiefly this ex- tural Right (1). The Spartans to juſtifie themſelves traordinary Caſe, when Perſons contrary to their in driving all Strangers from their Coaſts, thought Intentions, are driven by ſome Violence on a Fo- this one Reaſon fufficient, left the Converſe of reign Coaſt; whereas theſe Covenants which ſome- Strangers ihould introduce a Corruption, or a Con- times paſs betwixt Nations, uſually have for their tempt of their receiv'd Manners and Cuſtoms (d). Subject the point of conſtant and continual Acceſs In anſwer to which it is well urged by ſome, that on common Occaſions. Therefore for this latter In- what we practiſe at home is not always the beſt, dulgence, it is on no account Abſurd to require ſome nor what others do abroad the worſt; if then a Fo- moderate Confideration. But in the former Caſe it reign Cuſtom be really better, it is abſurd to would be extreamly baſe and fordid, to charge as deſpiſe, and to reject it on the ſcore of its being a Debt ſo ſinall a Řelief of Perſons in Diſtreſs, and Foreign. That this is the Temper and Property of as it were to ſet a Price upon our Charity. Curs to fawn on Domeſtick Slaves, and to bark at the IX. Another Duty of Humanity is the Admiſſi- moſt noble and excellent of Strangers. That thoſe on of Strangers, and the kind Reception and Enter- Men uſually contract a Roughneſs and Clowniſh- tainment of Travellers. Some of the Ancients car- nefs of Behaviour, who never breath out of their ried this Point to the heighth of Ambition and O- native Air, and ſee no more of the World than ftentation, conceiving the Right of Hoſpitality to what paſſes under their Noſe (e). As to the Que- Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 8. p. 334. (1) See Mr. Noodt's Book called, Probabilia Juris, (i, e.) The Probabilities of the Law, Lib. 4. C. I. (2) Sometimes, on the contrary, as our Author obſerves a little below, one People agree with another that they will not come into the Ports, nor on the Coaſts one of another, as appears from two Treaties made long ago berween the Romans and Cartha- ginians. Thac the Romans and their Allies ſhall not ſail beyond the Fair Promontory,unleſs they are driven farther by a Tempeſt, or by the Purſuit of their Enemies; and if thro’ theſe means they paſſed their Bounds, they ſhould buy nothing, nor meddle with any thing but what is either neceſſary for Sacrifice, or to repair their Veſſels, and ſet ſail again to return within five Days. Polyb. 1. 3. This was their firſt Treaty. The ſecond was, that no Roman ſhould trade into Sardinia or Africk; that they ſhould not build any City there, nor land, unleſs to get Proviſions, or repair their Veſſels; and if they were driven afhore with a Tempeſt, they ſhould depart within five Days. Ibid. (3) See s 1. above, and Lib. 2. c. 6. S. 5. where you'll find Examples of theſe imperfect Obligations, which have been made perfect by the Determination of the Legiſlator, who has made them effectual by Law: As alſo, See Lib. 4. c. 2. below. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 9. p. 335. (1) For the fame Reaſons Lycurgus forbad the Lacedæmonians to travel out of their own Country, left they ſhould learn the bad Cuſtoms and coarſe Manners of Strangers. Plut. Inft. Lac. See Potter’s Archeol. Grac. I. 4. c. 21. (a) Add. Plin. N. H. I. 26.c. 1. (6) Vid. I. 50. D. de atq; rer. dom. (c) Ariſtot. Mag. Moral. I. 2.C. 11. Of all kinds of Friendſhips that ſeems to be the firmeft ' which is expreſsa in the courteous Entertainment of Strangers; becauſe the Perſons here having nor the ſame Ends and Intereſts to propoſe, cannot ſo eaſily fall into Contention, as thoſe who are Members of the ſame State. Homer fays, the Poor and Stranger are the Care of Fove ; and again, the Suppliant Stranger craves a Brother's Love. In Lucian (de Dea Syria) amongſt the Crimes which brought Deucalion's Flood upon the World, we find theſe which fol . low. They practiſed all kinds of Injuſtice; for they neither kepe their Oaths, nor receiv'd Strangers, nor gave a pacient Hear- ing to the Requeſt of the Miſerable. of the Humanity which the Indians (hew to Strangers, See Diod. Sic. 1. 2. c. 42. Add. Plato de L. L. 1. 12. Ælian (V. H. I. 4. C. 1.) recices this Law of the Lucanians, if at Sun fet a Stranger arrives, and deſires Rc- ception in a Houſe; in caſe the Maſter refuſe to admit him, let him be puniſh'à as an Offender againſt the Laws of Hoſpitality : Add. Lex Burgund. Tit . 30. f. 1. Hemoldus (in Cron. Sclav. I. 1. c.82.) reports of the ancient Sclavi, If a Man be diſcover'd to have denied Lodging to a Stranger (a Rudeneſs which ſeldom happens amongſt them) the People joyn in a Body to pull down his Houſe, and to ruin his Eftate; which way of proceeding is permitted by the Laws. Strangers have the ſame Rights as Suppliants. (d) The Chineſe have much the ſame Conſtitutions in reference to Strangers. Vid. Nieuhof. Gen. Deſcript. Chin. c. 1. call'a, exſecrabilis velut defertio Juris Humani , as it were a deteſtable Defertion of the Law of Humane Nature. 'Tis a Saying of Periander in Plutarch ( Sympoſ.) I commend thoſe States and thoſe Magiſtrates which firſt give Audience to Strangers, to their own Subjects. 1. and then ſtion CHAP. III. of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. 33 IS that , . , . c§ , ſtion before us then, thus much is certain, that if reigners, in theſe they ought not to binder the Spa- our People are kindly receiv’d by any Nation a, niards from their Share : For Example, If other Stran- broad, we ought to entertain the Men of that Na- gers were permitted to dig Gold, the Spaniards might tion with an equal return of Civility. As on the fairly claim the ſame Liberty. other hand, thoſe who drive us from their Coaſts , on which Point fome have judged it worth conſi- cannot without the moſt ſtupid impudence, petition dering, firſt, whether thoſe Privileges were granted to us for a more courteous Treatinent. But fuppoſing others, by way of Debt, or by way of free Gift and any one Nation contented with what it finds Favour. For of thoſe things which Men cannot at home, utterly refrains from all Foreign Travel, claim froin me as ftri&tly their Due, I may be more it does not appear what Obligation ſuch a State can liberal to one than to another. And in the next have to admit thofe who would viſit it, without ne- place, whether theſe new Comers will behave them- ceſſary or weighty Cauſe. The Caſe is ſomewhat felves with the ſame Juſtice and Modeſty as the like that of a private Man, who in his Houſe or former, who made uſe of our Goods without our Gardens, poflefles ſome rare Curioſity, or other va- Prejudice or Inconvenience ; and whether theſe late luable Sight; ſuch an one does not apprehend him- Gueſts propoſe no other End of their Vifit. Sup- felf, tied freely to let in all Spectators; but who- poſe I give one or two of my Neighbours leave to ever is thus gratified either rewards, or at leaſt ac come into my Garden, as often as they pleaſe, knowledges, it as an extraordinary . Favour. And and to gratifie themſelves with taſting my Fruit; this ſeems the more reaſonable, becauſe the Grounds it may be, there breaks in afterwards a rude He- of prudent Caution and Suſpicion are ſo numerous, ctor, who is for tearing up my Trees, and would that we may, eaſily make uſe of one or other of kick me out, to plant his own Body in my proper them, to juſtifie us in keeping ſuch Perſons at a di- Land; my Caſe is bad if I may not be allow'd to ſtance, as would too curiouſly examine and pry into ſhut the Gate againſt ſuch an intruding Villain (b). our Affairs. But let others ſettle this Controverſie. As to our Therefore the Spaniſh Cafuiſt (a) has not made ma- main Queſtion, it is look'd on by moſt as the fafeſt ny Converts by the Reaſons he lays down to juſti- way of reſolving it, to ſay, That it is left in the fie his Country-men in their Proceedings againſt the power of all States, to take ſuch Meaſures about Indians. The firſt Right on which he founds their the Admiffion of Strangers, as they think conveni- Title, is that of Natural Society and Coinmunica- ent; thoſe being ever excepted, who are driven tion, which he draws up into this Aſſertion, The on the Coafts by Neceſſity, or by any Cauſe that Spaniards bad a Right of Travelling and of living in deſerves Pity and Compallion. Not but that it is thoſe Countries, provided they did the Natives no barbarous to treat in the ſame cruel manner, thoſe Harm, and from this Privilege none could reſtrain who viſit us as Friends, and thoſe who aſſault us Natural Communication does not hinder a juſt Pro- as is deduced from another Head (d) (2). prietor from communicating his Goods by ſuch Me But having once admitted Strangers and Foreign thods, and upon ſuch Conſiderations as he finds ne- Gueſts, to turn them out again, unleſs by good Rea- ceſſary. And farther, that it ſeems very Groſs and ſon, is uſually cenſured as ſome Degree at leaſt of Abſurd, to allow others an Indefinite or unlimited Inhumanity (e). From the number of theſe good Right of travelling and of living amongſt us, with- Reaſons, St. Ambroſe and with him Grotius (f) ex- out reflecting either on their Number , or on the de- cludes the Caſe of Grievous Scarcity and Dearth fign of their coming; whether fuppoſing thein to afflicting a People. To whoſe Judgment we ſubſcribe paſs harmleſly, they intend only to take a ſhort with this Suppoſition, That there are ſtill Means view of our Country, or whether they claim a leſt, though perhaps very hard and preſſing, to ſave Right of fixing themſelves with us for ever . And both Natives and Strangers, and if the latter have that he who will ſtretch the Duty of Hoſpitality been formerly, or may be hereafter uſeful and ſer- to this extravagant Extent, ought to be rejected as viceable to us; and of ſuch only St. Ambroſe ſpeaks. a moft unreaſonable, and moſt improper Judge of But in caſe we are not obliged to the Foreigners a- the Cafe . The Second Principle he lays down is, mongſt us, and there be no Neceſſity of their periſh- That it was lawful for the Spaniards to traffick with ing, ſhould we ſend them off, there ſeems to be no thoſe People, and the Sovereigns on either ſide could not reaſon why the Subject on their Account, ſhould be binder their Subjects from ſuch Intercourſe. But here content to ſtruggle with a Famine (8) Men of more ſober and moderate Judgments, con X. In the fame Claſs of Duties, Grotius (b) places fefs themſelves unable to find out any ſuch liberty the allowing of a perpetual Habitation to Strangers, of Trading, as Princes may not abridge their Sub- who being driven by Violence out of their own jects of, for the good of the Commonwealth ; much Country, are forced to feek out a new Seat, pro- Jels fuch as Thall force and obtrude Strangers upon vided ftill, that they ſubmit to the eſtablifh'à Go- us, whether we will or no. His third Reaſon is vernment, and behave themſelves with ſuch Pru- this. If the Indians bad amongſt them any Rights dence and Decency, as to adminiſter no Occaſion and Privileges allowd in common to Natives and Fo- to Factions and Seditions (i). DIST COTT (a) Franciſcus a Vittoria Relejt. 5.1. 3. (6) Add the Anſwer given by ſome of the Americans to the Spaniards, in Montaigne's Efſays, 1. 3. c. 6. (c) Vid. Diod. Sic. 1,1, c. 67. (d) Add. Ziegler ad Grot. I. 2. c. 2. 1. 23. (e) Vid. Liv. l. 2. c. 37, 38. (f) De offic. 1. 3. c. 7. Grot. I. 2. c. 2. 1. 19. (8) Vid. Sueton. Auguft. c. 42. ebu Becler. ad Grot. d. l. () Lib. 2. c. 2. f. 16, 17. (i) Euripides Medea, Xps ģ Ekvov, doc. . A Stranger ſhould conform In Maners to the State that entertains him. Socer arma Latinus, near Imperium folenne focer mihi menia Teucri, ora qu do jogi 103 So among che Articles of Peace propoſed by Æneas in Virgil, Gonftituent, urbiq; dabit Lavinia nomen. iv 2000170 CM Latinus ſhall the Regal Scepter bear, Latinus firſt in Peace, and chief in War. of E Humanity, oth we find this for one : 90781 34 Book III Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. Humanity, it is true, engages us to receive a ſmall be ſo conveniently placed and diſpoſed, as to ren- number of Men expelld their Horne, not for their der them incapable of giving any Jealouſie to the own Demerit and Crime; eſpecially if they are e Government. "If on the whole, it appears that the minent for Wealth or Induſtry, and not likely to Perſons deſerve our Favour and Pity, and that no diſturb our Religion, or our Conſtitution. And thus reſtraint lies on us from good Reaſons of State, it we ſee (1) many States to have riſen to a great and will be an Act of Humanity to confer ſuch a Be. flouriſhing Height, chiefly by granting Licence to nefit on them, as we ihall neither feel very Burthen Foreigners to come and ſettle annongſt them; where- ſome at preſent, nor are likely to repent of here as others have been reduced to a low Condition, after. If the Caſe be otherwiſe, we ought ſo to by refuſing this Method of Improvement. tenper our Pity with Prudence, as not to put our But no one will be fond of aſſerting, that we ſelves in the ready way of becoming Objects of Pity ought in the ſame manner to receive and incorpo- unto others. Farther, ſince whatever we beſtow rate a great Multitude, eſpecially if now in Arms, on ſuch Petitioners, we may juſtly reckon as a or naturally addicted to War; ſince it is ſcarce pof- matter of free Bounty in us, hence it follows, that fible, but that their Admiſſion ſhould highly en- they are not preſently to lay hands on what they danger the Natives. Therefore every State may pleaſe, nor to fix themſelves as it were by ſome be more free or more cautious in granting theſe In- Right, in any ſpot of Waft-Ground they find a. dulgences, as it ſhall judge proper for its Intereſt mong us; but that they ought to reſt ſatisfied with and Safety. In order to which Judgment, it will be the Station and the Privileges we aflign them (a). Prudent to conſider, whether a great increaſe in the XI. The next office of Humanity mention’d by Nuinber of Inhabitants will turn to Advantage; Grotius, is that we allow every Man the Privi- whether the Country be fertile enough to feed fo lege of procuring for himſelf, by Money, Work, iany Months; whether upon Admiſſion of this exchange of Goods, or any other lawful Contract, new Body, we ſhall be ſtraitned for room; whether ſuch things as contribute to the convenience of Life; the Men be induſtrious or idle; whether they may and that we do not abridge him of this Liberty, ei- Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTE on § 10. P. 337. (1) See Parrhaſiana, Tit. 1. p. 265, es, and a Diſcourſe De conſcribendo Milité, § 18. among the Select Diſcourſes, Jur. Nat. Gen. of Mr. Buddeus. (a) What hath been ſaid may be illuftrated by theſe Hiſtorical Examples. Latinus, in Virgil Æn. II. offers the Trojans this Condicion : Eft antiquus ager Tuſco mihi proximus amni, A tract of Lands the Latines have poffefs'd, Aurunci Rutulig; ferunt & vomere duros Along the Tiber, ſtretching to the Weſt, Exercent colles, atque horum aſperrima pafcunt, Which now Rutilians and Auruncans Till, Hæc omnis regio do celſi plaga pinea montis And their mix'd Cattle graze the fruitful Hill; Cedat amicitia Teucrorum for føderis aquas Thoſe Mountains filld with Firrs, that lower Land, Dicamus leges ; fociosq; in regna vocemus, If you conſent the Trojans ſhall command, Cali'd into part of what is ours; and there On Terms agreed the common Country Share. Mr. Dryden. Servius on this paſſage obferves, from Cato's Origines, that the Land here mention'd contain'd 100 Acres. He tells us likewiſe, for fear we ſhould think that the King was liberal of what did not belong to him, thar to thoſe words Aurunci Rutuliq; ferunt, we muſt joyn the mihi in the preceding Verſe; the Auruncans and Rutilians having that Country allow'd them in a way of free Stipend, or elſe being placed there by the King as his Husbandmen, to manage the Crown Lands. The Scory is told more at large by Dionyf. Halicarnaſ. L. 1. The Cimbrians in Florus (1. 3. c. 3.) petition the Roman Senate, that ſo Brave and Warlike a People would give them a little Portion of Land as a kind of Pay, promiſing in return, that their Hands and their Weapons ſhould be ever employd in the Cauſe of Rome. Bur (as the Hiſtorian there reflects) what Land could the Romans give them without quarrelling amongſt them. ſelves, on the point of ſuch arbitrary Diſtribucions? And how could the Senate without manifeſt Injuſtice diſpoſe of the Proper- ty of private Men? Beſides, poſſeſſing ſo many things as were likely to raiſe the Appetite of needy Strangers, they judg’d it up- ſafe to admit ſo ſtrong and ſo fierce a Nation into their Limits. In Cafar (de B.G. 1.4 ) the Tenteri and Ufipetes perition’d in this boaſting manner : That they did not voluntarily leave their own Country to ſeek a foreign Sear; chat if the Romans would accept of their Service, they were able to ſhew themſelves no unprofitable Friends; only they deſire fome Lands to be aſſign’d them, or to have the Privilege of keeping what they had alrea- dy gorren by their Arms. The Anſwer which Cæſar ſent them was to this purpoſe; That 'twas unreaſonable in thoſe Men to in- vade another Country, who could nor defend their own. That there were no vacant Lands in Gallia ; eſpecially not to hold fo vaſt a Multitude, without prejudice or danger. Though indeed he had ſtill another more ſecret Reaſon, why he would not have thole new Neighbours. In Tacitus (A. XIII. C. $5.) the Antibarii being at a loſs for a Dwelling, having therefore ſeated themſelves in ſome Lands be- yond the Rhine, belonging to the Romans; excuſed themſelves, nor alcogether unreaſonably, in theſe Words: That the main part of the Land was uſeleſs; being only employ'd now and then by chance in feeding Beaſts for the Army. Thar the Romans ought to reſign a place which was filld only with Beaſts, when they might relieve the Diſtreſs of Men; and prefer Friends and Subjects to Delarts and Solitudes. That as Heaven was poſſeſs'd by the Gods, ſo Earth was given to Mankind; and whar Parts were void of Inhabitants, lay in common to all the World. (Which Principle Sir Thomas More eſtabliſheth amongſt his Utopians, 1. 2.) This Meffage deſervd a more favourable Anſwer than thoſe moft haughty Words of Avitus, That they ought to ſubmit to the pleaſure of their Berters. That the Gods, whoſe Aſſiſtance they now implore, had choſen the Romans to be Commad. ders of the World, and to diſpoſe of it as they ſhould think convenient, without ſuffering any other Judges but themſelves. The Emperor Probus ſettled an hundred Thouſand of the Baſtarne in the Roman Territories; who all proved fruitful and quiet. But he uſing the ſame liberty of Tranſplanting vaft Numbers from other Nations, as from the Gepidi, * Theſe Tyrants the Gautunni, the Vandals, &c. all theſe broke their Promiſe, and whilſt the Emperor was engaged in the were ſuch as revol. War againſt the * Tyrants, wandred by Sea and Land almoſt through the whole world, and 1pread no ſmall ted from the Em- Cloud on the Glory of Rome. Flav. Vopiſc. peror then reigning, and cauſed themelues to be proclaimed Emperors by the Soldiers. See Salmaſius upon the Thirty Tyrants of Trebellius Pollio. So likewiſe in Ammianus Marcellinus, the Goths deſerting their Seat for fear of the Huns, begg'd leave of Valens to fix them. ſelves in Thrace, promiſing to live quietly, and to lend him their Service when he ſhould have Occaſion. Soon after other barba. rous People put up the ſame Requeft, to whom Valens granted the like Favour, hoping that from theſe Numbers he mighe draw Men for his Troops, without any great Charge. Yet this Indulgence proved afterwards his Ruin ; as the Hiſtorian demonſtrates at large. Add. Socrat. Hift. Ecclef. 1.4.c. 28. ther CHAP. III. 35 Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. ther by any Civil Ordinance, or by any unlaw- not favour its own Subjects more than Strangers; as ful Combination, or Monopoly. For that as Trade by demanding lefs Cuſtom of the former, than of and Commerce highly promote the Intereſt of all the latter, or by giving them the Right of firſt Purs Nations, by ſupplying the unkindneſs of the Soil, chaſe. PA which is not every where alike Fertile, and by XII. Though, as has been ſhown, we are oblig'd making thoſe Fruits ſeein to be born in all places in many Caſes to ſell, yet as Grotius (8) obſerves , of the World, which are to be found in any one (a): no Law ties us to a Neceſſity of buying. In as So it cannot be leſs than Inhumanity to deny any much as every Man is naturally free to accept, or Son of the Earth the uſe of thoſe good Things, which to refuſe what Purchaſe he pleaſes; and no one has our common Mother affords for our ſupport; pro- juſt Reaſon to complain, becauſe another is content vided our peculiar Right and Propriety be not in- to want ſoinewhat which he could ſupply him with. jured by ſuch a Favour. And therefore the Megel- And therefore we find it forbidden in many places, renjans (in Plutarch) when the Athenians had for as well Ancient as Modern, to import ſome parti- bidden them entrance to all their Ports and Mart: cular Commodities : either left any Damage ſhould Towns complain’d that this was done taeg. Ta xorvci by this means ariſe to the State; or tu excite the Sirasa, contrary to the Law of Nations. Induſtry of our own Subjects; or to hinder our Mo- But this Affertion will admit of many Reſtricti- ney from palling into Foreign Hands. ons. For we do not ſeem in Duty obliged to com Therefore the Spaniſh Caſuiſt lately mention'd, municate to others ſuch Goods, as belong not to the is widely miſtaken when he aſſerts, that by the Law Necelties, but to the Pleaſure and the Superfluity of Nations every one has a Right of Trading in fo- of Life. And then, if Scarcity lies upon us, we may reign Parts, of importing what the People there want, juſtly keep what we have to our felves. Could Fo- and of exporting Gold, Silver, and other Goods in ſepb have diſcover'd that the Corn of Egypt was which they abound. For fuppoſing I declare my felf not ſufficient to ſupport the Natives, under the ſe- well fatisfied with what I poffefs of my own, with ven Years Famine, he might with good reaſon have what Face can another force his Things upon me, forbid the Exportation of it to Foreigners (b). So whether I will or no? the Athenians once decreed it to be Capital for any When the contrary is enacted, for Example, when Subject of that State, to carry Corn for Sale, any in fome Places, every Houſholder is obliged to buy where but to Athens (c). Beſides, we may fairly yearly ſuch a Quantity of Salt, this ariſes from the exclude others from Trafficking with us for things Power of Princes over their Subjects, and that Ne- not abſolutely needful for the ſupport of Life, cellity of buying, is a kind of Tax or Tribute. Thus when by ſuch a Permiſſion, our own Country would too a Ruler may enjoyn his People, that if they loſe a conſiderable Advantage, or ſuſtain (though want ſuch a particular Commodity, they ſhall buy by indirect. Conſequence, ) fome notable Evil . it only of ſuch a Perſon. Which kind of Laws are For Example, one Kingdom ſuppoſe produ- very juſt, when they promote the Intereſt of the ces admirable Horſes; what ſhould hinder the Commonwealth. In the ſame manner we find it Government there from paſſing an Act to prohibit it often coinmanded by Authority, that the Subject the carrying into Foreign Parts, any that are fit for do immediately buy up Corn and other Neceſſaries, breed? For ſhould the fine Strain grow Common, even in remote Parts, when there is danger of a the Country would loſe its greateſt Profit, and its Scarcity, (eſpecially upon Apprehenſion of a Siege ;) greateſt Ornament. And this beautiful Race is af- or to bring down Proviſions to a more reaſonable fected abroad, not for neceſſary uſe, but for Pomp. Price amongſt us. But that I ſhould go about to and Pride, for Elegance and Éaſe (d). In one of compel a Man, over whom I have no Power to the the old Roman Conſtitutions , it is made Capital to purchaſe of my Commodities, this is what no Rea- carry Wine, Oil, or Arris to the barbarous Nati- fon will juſtifie or excuſe (1). For upon what Pre- ons. They thought the Prohibition about the Wine tence can I aſſume ſuch Authority over the Purſe of and Oil, no leſs neceſſary than the other about the another, who is not my Subject, as to preſcribe the Weapons , fearing left the Barbarians by taſting ſuch Matter, and the Meaſure of his Expences, and generous Productions of the Empire, ſhould endea- to teach him how he ſhould provide for his Necef- vour to inake themſelves Maſters of ſo rich a Soil. fities, or for his Pleaſures? And though my Gain And we find in Livy (e), that when Aruns of Clu- be in the mean time hinder’d or lefſen'd, yet this fium invited the Gauls into Italy, he made them a Conſideration can by no means abridge the other Preſent of Italian Wines, as the Encouragement and Party of his Natural Liberty. Or, if I would have the Reward of their Expedition (f). him thus contribute to my Advantage, I ought to Laſtly, there lies no Reſtraint on a State why, in encourage him by mutual good Offices , and render Reference to the Exportation of Goods, it ſhould my ſelf worthy of the Favour. But if a Man being (1) See the Diſcourſe of Mr. Thomaſius, Entitld, De pretio affe&tionis in res fungibiles non cadente, c. 2. S 1, 2, s. (a) Liban. Orat. 3. God hath nor enriched every place with all his Bleſſings; but hath divided his Gifts according to the dif- ference of Countries, that he might incline Men to Society, by the want of mutual Aſliftance; and he diſcover'd to Men the way of Trading, that what was the Product of any particular soil , might by this means be enjoy'd in common by the whole world. (6) Quintil. Declam. 12. Whilſt we were felling to the neighbouring Nations, and urged on by the hopes of ready Gain, we neglected a due regard to the publick Safety, and having emptied our Stores abroad, brought a Famine upon our ſelves at home. () Lycurg Orat. contra Lecerat. (d) In Livy (1.43.c. 5.) Upon the Requeſt of the Gallick Ambaſſadors, it was order'd, that they ſhould have the liberty of buying Ten Horſes, and of carrying them out of Italy. (e) L. 5. c. 33. () Add. Numb. 13. 14. 10, 20. (8) Plato de L. L. 1. 8. Let'no Man import Frankincenſe, nor other Foreign Things uſed in Sacrifices, nor Pur- ple, hor any Colours which are nor produced at home ; nor in ſhort, any Commodity, but ſuch as is abſolutely neceſſary; and on they allow no Entrance to Merchants, fuffer no Wine or any other Incitement to Luxury to be imported; imagining that the uſe of chefe Delicacies muſt needs weaken Mens Minds , and unbend the ſtiftneſs of their Courage. The ſame Author tells us of the Svein, that if Beaſts are brought from other Parts for their Afliſtance, they refuſe to make uſe of them; and as for Wines they abfolutely forbid the Importation of them, being of Opinion, that thoſe Liquors Totten and effeminare the Spirits of Men, and tender them unfit for laborious Employments. + E 2 ſtock'd 36 Book III. Of tbe Mutual Duties of Humanity. ſtock’d with ſuch particular Commodities, offers to in Race and Blood : And that when theſe Agents vend his Abundance, where-ever he can find were diſiniſs’d after a Reproachtul manner, it was Chapmen, it would, in this Cale, be moſt Inhuman, then at laſt thought proper to gain Relief, by the and Unjuſt to hinder him from thus furniſhing him- joint Application of Cunning and of Force. And ſelf with other things, which he wants for the ne what makes the thing ſtill carry a better Force is, ceſſary Occaſions of Life (a). That this way of catching Wives was in thoſe Times , XII. Another Duty of the fame Rank, is the not only a Common, but a laudable Practice; Dios giving Licence to Men of other Nations, eſpe- nyfius calls it, An. Ancient and a Grecian Cuſtom, cially if ſeated in our Neighbourhood, to follicite, and the molt renowned Method of obtaining Maids in and contract Matrimony with our Subjects, when Marriages Add Judges XXI. 22. It is true, Vio- they, are at a loſs for Women ainongſt themſelves (1). lence can feldom be neceſſary in this Cafe, ſince As for Inſtance, if a People compos’d-only of Men, it's never difficult to find Women enough, who ſhall either being expelld their own Country, or upon be ready of their own accords, to accept of any fome other neceſſary Account, aſe fix'd near us, and Husbands that are not abominably Vile and Scan- defign to forin a new State. For to live without dalous. WOT the Aſliſtance of the other Sex, is what the Frame To reject thoſe who ſeek our Alliance by ſuch and Temper of few Men can bear, Celibacy in a Propofals, would be very hard Dealing. And tho' Healthy Conſtitution, is the Gift only of excellent the denying of a Woman for a Wife, be not in it Souls; and to ſeek other Satisfactions in this Caſe ſelf, a juft Cauſe of cominencing a War, yet is it, that Nature adviſes or allows, would be foul and if the Refuſal were accompanied with Reproach. brutal. Beſides, as Florus obſerves, Res tantum unze As the Inhabitants of Rhegium, when Dionyſius of us atatis eft populus virorum (2), A State made up of Sicily fent to deſire a Wife amongſt them, returned onle Sex, viz. Men, cán laſt but one Age. Upon this in Anſwer, That they would grant him none but Principle, many are willing to defend, or at leaſt the Daughter of their Common Executioner. See to excuſe the famous Exploit of Romulus, the Rape Diodor. Sic. 1. 14. C. 108. & Strab. 1. 6. like Inſtance of the Sabine Women. Authors indeed are divided is to be met with in Paulus Venetus, 1. 1. C. 52. On about the Reafon and the manner of this Proceed- the other hand, ſhould a Prince by Vertue of his ing Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus reports, that the main Sovereign Authority, compel the Women of his deſign of Romulus was to obtain the Friendſhip Country to accept of ſuch Husbands as have no- and Alliance of the Neighbouring Nations, by join- thing in them to deſerve Affection, this would look ing with them in Marriage; and that, though he like Inhumanity; eſpecially in Caſe the Fortunes began this Project in an injurious way, yet he ima- and Conditions of the Parties were unequal . The gind that in time this ill Beginning would produce Speech of Canuleius in Livy, where in the Name of a good Concluſion, and that a fair Correſpondence the Populacy (3), he intreats the Senate, that they and Familiarity, would be eſtabliſh'd ſo ſoon as would allow them the Privilege of Marriage, a Fa- they ihould have clear'd themſelves to the new vour granted to Foreigners, and to Neighbour Brides, by the Plea of Love, and to the Father's Nations; and that they would not exclude them and Relations by urging that the Stratagem was ſet from the number of Mankind, does not belong to on Foot, not out of Affront and Abuſe, but as a the Queſtion before us, although produced as an neceſſary Relief to a deſperate Condition. Yet it Inſtance by Grotius. For the Plebeians did not then muſt be confefs’d,this ſeems a very prepoſterous way feel a Scarcity of Women, but the Aim and Deſign of gaining Friendſhip. See Tacit. An. 1. 1. c. 55. of this Petition, was to raiſe themſelves to an equal What he reports of Segeftes, that when Arminius had Pitch with the Nobility, and means of Marrying in- ſto'len his Daughter againſt his Conſent, Gener in- to Patrician Families. Otherwiſe, when Women are viļus, &c. The Names of Son-in-Law, and Father- plenty, there is no Occaſion of winning a Bride by in-Law, which when there is a mutual Conſent of main Force of Arins : Invenies aliam ſi te hac .fa- Parties uſed to be a Band of Love and Endearment, fidit. As for thoſe Civil Laws which forbid Marriage proye now the Seed of Hatred, and the Incitement with Foreigners, or between Subjects of different to niortal Diſcord.se Ranks,they always preſuppoſe that every one is able Others pretend that Romulus by this Attempt, only to find out a Match ſuitable to his Condition, and ſought an Occaſion of quarrelling with his Neigh- they are generally founded on fuch Reaſons as thefe, bours, which feems very Improbable. The com- that the Splendour of great Families may be pre- mon Defence of the Fact , is to alledge the want of ſerv’d; that our Women may more eaſily get Huf- Women, and fo to have Recourſe to Neceflity': but bands at home, whilſt our Men are not allow'd to then Authors take care to tell us, that Commiſfio- get Wives abroad; or that the (4) Riches and the ners were firſt fent about to treat with the People Affections of our People, may not by the means of on the Affair, and to beg that they would not think Inter-Marriages be eſtrang’d from us, and ſettled it hard to let Men like themſelves mix with them on a Foreign State. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 13. (1) See Mr. Buddeus's Diſcourſe, Encicld, Juriſpr. Hiſtorice Specimen, S 9. among his Sele&a Juris Nature di Gentium. (3) Res eſt unius ætatis populus viroruin. Flor.1.1. c. 1. numb. 10. C) Canuleius's Words are, Connubium petimus, quod finitimis, externiſque dari folet~-ut hominum -numero fimus. Liv. Dec. S Lib. 4. c. 3. (4) This Clauſe in Mr, Hirtius's Edition, with his Notes, is thus rendred, nè opes aut effe&tus noftrorum in alias Civitates pune Connubia transferantur ; whereas other Editions have it, as it ought to be, affe&us. This renders it credible, that 'tis not a faule of the Impreffion, but, as Mr. Hirtius remarks by way of Supplement, a thing contained in the Author's Expreſſion. For fear (ſays he) à Citizen in reſpect to the Alliance and Riches of ſome powerful Stranger, ſhould exalt himſelf above others, or on the contrary, for fear a powerful Stranger ſhould make uſe of his Alliance to a Citizen to become a Maſter of the State. For 10 Ariſtotle obſerved, That Dionyſius the Younger, having married a Woman of Locris, found a way by means of that Alliance to poſſeſs himſelf of the Government of that Republick, "Polit.1.5.6.7. But all this is not comprehended in the Word affectus, of wliich Mr. Puffendorf 1peaks. (a) Add. Bæcler, in loc. citat. Gror. XIV. Laſtly, Chap. III. 37 Of the Mutual Duties of Humanity. inſtruct us, Lib. 2. 6. 6, XIV. Laſtly, Grotius adds, that any Right com as Pliny (1) obſerves to be call’d Ambition or Oftenta- mon to all, and conſequently any Obligation to a tion, or any thing rather than Liberality. Wiſe Duty to be perform’d towards all, ariſes from this Men have made it their chief Buſineſs to preſcribe Suppoſition, that we grant ſuch an Indulgence pro- Rules for the guiding and perfecting of theſe Obli- miſcuouſly to every Strangers becauſe then, if any gations: And the ancient Books of +Morality, are one be excluded from the Privilege, he is manifeft- not on any Subject more copious, or more clear. ly injurd. For it is an Affront and Reproach to (2) Tull. Off: 1. Beneficentia , qua nihil eft natura bir- debar a Man, without particular Reaſon, from a mand accommodatius, multas habet cautiones, &c. The common. Advantage; this being to make hiin unequal Duties of Liberality or Bounty, than which there is and inferiour to others. Hence Grotius concludes, nothing more agreeable to the Nature of Man, fall That if it be in any place permitted to Strangers, under many Limitations (3). For in the firſt place it to Hunt, to Fiih, to Hawk, to gather Pearls , to ſhould be our Care to ſee that our Bounty prove not receive Legacies, to ſell Goods, to contract Marri- a Prejudice, either to the Perfon we would oblige, ages , (even without being compelld to it by Scar- or to any other Body; and then that we do not city of Women ;), no Nation can be denied the give above our own Ability, nor above the Meriti fame Liberties, except they have forfeited them by of the Receiver. As to this laſt Point, we are Prin- their own Default. But this Aſſertion will ſcarce cipally to regard thoſe, to whom we our ſelves al- hold. For the Conceſſions here ſpoken of, muſt be ready ſtand Obliged, and then others as they have made either expreſly or tacitly. When we grant a more or leſs Need of our Aſiſtance. We are like- thing exprefly to another, we do it either Precariouſly , wiſe to conſider the ſeveral Degrees, by which we or in the manner of a Paet or perfitt Promiſe. Now ftand related in the World. Of theſe the Firſt and that any one ſhould give a perfect Right over a moſt Extenſive, is the Univerſal Society of Man- thing of his, ( 1100 due by the Law of Nature) to kind. Nearer than this is the Alliance between all Nations known and unknown, without Limit Perſons of the ſame Nation, of the ſame Province, or Reſtraint, is a Caſe which I believe never did, of the ſame Language, of the fame City. There is and never will happen. For every one is deſirous yet a nearer Tye of Kindred. And here the Firſt to know at leaſt, on whom he beſtows his Benefit, Society is in Wedlock, the next in Children ; the and in what meafure. But when a Man either by Relation of Brothers comes afterwards, and then of Paft or free Favour, has granted ſuch a particular Brothers and Siſters, Children and Men, the Mat- Privilege to all that cone under his Friendſhip or ches and Alliances between different Families . But Acquaintance, for a meer Stranger to pretend a the moft Excellent and Strongeſt of all Alliances is, Right to the ſame Indulgence, would be very Im- when Good and Vertuous Men join in Familiarity, pudent and very Wicked. As for thoſe things upon account of the Agreement of their Manners. which we permit Tacitly, or as it were overlook, Idem de Finib. 1. 5. In omni honeſto, &c. In all the they are reckon’d of Courſe to be of the fame Na- Compaſs of Honeſly,there is nothing fo illuſtrious or of fo ture with Precarious Favours; and ſuch may be fair- great a Latitude, as the Conjunction and Society of Men ly revoked, either upon the Change of our Affairs with Men, including a mutual Communication of Con- and Circunſtances, or becauſe the Perfons who en- veniencies, and general Love for Mankind. This Dear. joy'd them did not make ſo prudent and modeſt a neſs begins immediately upon ones Birth, when the Child uſe of them as they ought. Becler. ad Grot. is most Affe&tionately beloved by the Parent, from the XV. What we have hitherto touch'd on, are but Family, it by degrees ſteals abroad into Affinities, Vulgar Degrees of Humanity, the Omniſfion of which Friendſhips, Neighbourhoods ; then amongst Members implies a moft baſe and abject Teinper of Mind. A of the ſame State, and amongſt States themſelves, uni- much higher, and more illuſtrious Strain of the ſame ted in Intereſts and Confederacies; and at length Duty, is when a Man out of pure Benevolence and ſtretcheth it ſelf to the whole Extent of Human Race. Inclination, ariſing either froin a Native Generouf- In the Exerciſe of all theſe Duties, we are farther to neſs of Soul, or from Pity and Compaſſion to a obſerve what every Man bath moji need of, and what Perſon in Diſtreſs, is at ſome Pains or Charge in be- with our Help be may, what without our Help he can- ftowing freely on another, what may relieve his not attain; ſo that in ſome caſes the Tye of Relation, Neceflity, or procure his Advantage. Kindneſſes of muſt yield to the point of Time; and ſome Offices there this Noble Rank, are by way of Eminence ſtiled are which we would rather pay to one Relation than to Benefits; the mamer and meaſure of Diſpenſing another. Thus you ought jooner to help a Neighbour which are coinmoly to be adjuſted with regard to in with his Harveſt, than either Brother, or a fami- the Condition of the Giver, and of the Receiver. liar Acquaintance; but on the other ſide, in a Suit at And theſe are the things which open to Mankind Law, you ought to defend your Brother, or your Friend the largeſt Field of doing Good, and of acquiring before your Neighbour. See Seneca's Treatiſe of Be- Glory, if they are temper'd and regulated by true nefit , which it would be tedious here to abridge . Prudence and Greatnefs of Mind. For to throw Piutarch (in Sympoſ.) tell us 'twas a Rule amongſt about Favours without Reaſon and Judgment, ought, the Pythagoreans, not to take a Burthen from their chap. 38. numb. 4. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 15. (1) Ambitio eniin, Ġ jallantia, & effufio, & quidvis potius, quam liberalitas exiftimanda eft, cui ratio non conſtat. Plin. Paneg. (2) See the Commentators upon theſe and ſeveral other Paffages, where Tully trears of Beneficence. See Marc. Antonin. Lib. s. wherein Mr. Le Clerc gives a fine Defcription of Liberalily, and wherein he Thews excellently well the falfe Notions which Men ordinarily have of that Verrue. "Tis the 12th Chapter of his Book, which he Entitles, Refle&tions upon our good or ill Luck, as me commonly call it in the buſineſs of Lotteries. A work printed at Amſterdam in 1696. (3) Under the Nation of Beneficence we may comprehend all the Services we do to others in averting the Dangers they are threatned witbal. Iwas a Precept of the anciene Gymnofophifts , as appears from a Saying of Charicles in Heliodorus, which our Author cices above, 'Oud gS bi mor deputed cvxcvdúvw Lugle orasiver Spariodoar wapidav, ev 38 xj pôTO masáy leque Fellow, 38 Of tbe Mutual Duties of Humanity. Book III. Fellow, but to help him bear it; and this they did liged to a certain Perſon, in this Caſe it is law. to exclude all Idleneſs and Eaſe. Though S. Paul ful for us to refuſe the Benefit he offers. But then could have taught them a better Reaſon, 2 Corinth. great Care muſt be taken to do this without giving VIII. 13. Not that other Men be eaſed, and you the leaſt Suſpicion of Contempt; fince otherwiſe , burthen'd, but by an Equality, &c. to reject a voluntary Favour (3), Carries in it a 1 Add Ambrof. Offic. 1. 1. c. 30. and from him Gra- manifeſt Affront. tian Dift. 86. C. 14, &c. & Cauſ. 1. Queſt , 2. Chap. Take away the Neceſſity of returning Kindneſſes , 6, 7. Socrates in Xenophon ('ANOLLV.) lays down this and no Man will ever begin them; for then it woulă as a Rule in our Aſſiſtances, to our Friends or to plainly be acting againſt Reaſon, to part with our Strangers , and in almoſt all the Concerns of Life, Bounty, whilſt we know it would be thrown away . To do according to our Ability (4). To pohys And thus all Beneficence, all mutual Truſt and good + +- XVI. The Vertue anſwering to Beneficence in the Will muſt be baniſh'd out of the World ; there muſt Giver, is Gratitude in the Receiver, by which he be no ſuch thing as free Help, or antecedent Me demonſtrates, that the Kindneſs was acceptable to rit, no way of endearing and engaging one Man to him, and upon this Score entertains a hearty Re- another. Comp. Hobbes de Cive, c. 3. f. 8. Ariſtot, ad fpect for the Author of it, ſeeking all Occaſions of Nicom. 1. 9. c. 2. (4). It will hold good for the moſt making a Requital, as far as his (1) Abilities will part, that we are rather to return a Benefit, than give himn leave. For it is by no means abſolutely to ſerve a Friend in the way of Gratuity, as we Neceſſary, that.our Return ſhould be preciſely, as ought likewiſe rather to pay a Debt, than give a much in Valųe as the Courteſie amounts to, but way our Money to our deareft Confident. In Gene- good: Will and earneſt Endeavour, are frequently ral, what we owe of any kind is firſt to be made allow'd to ſatisfie an Obligation. Ovid. de Ponto good; yet if a free Gift to another Perſon, would at 1. 3. El. 8. omilla ed ei tasd 13150 the ſame time plead more Honeſty, and more Ne. host onio Montalt ceſſity, it is then to have the Preference in our Dil Sed qui, quam potuit, dat maxima, gratus abunde eft, pofal.' Add Socrates, his Diſcourſe of Brotherly Et finem pietas contigit illa fuum. Tot Love, in Xenophon.. 'Atrouw. 2. (5). Tully is admirable He that repays to his Extent of Power, on this point of Gratitude : It is, ſays he, of all Du- Were not more Gratelul with the Nobleft Store. ties, the moſt indiſpenſably Neceſjary. If Heſiod bids Балалар се us reſtore what we borrow, if we can, in a larger The Reaſon of this Duty ceaſes, when ever we Meaſure; what ought we to do when we are as it were have a juſt Exception againſt the Donour, and are challeng'd by a Prior Obligation? Are we not in this fully allur'd, that his Bounty was more in Pretence Cafe to imitate fruitful Fields, that ſtill return more than in good Will (2). But here wiſe Men give than they receiv’d. For if we make no Scruple to ob- us an Excellent Caution, that we ſhould not be too lige thoſe whom we hope to be the better for hereafter; curious in enquiring upon what Grounds and Mo- How then ſhould we behave our ſelves towards ſuch tives a Man has been our Benefactor; becauſe this as we are the better for already? Since there are two Niceneſs of Examination will ever afford a Plea, forts of Liberality, the one of beſtowing, a Benefit , and a Colour to Ingratitude. the other of returning it; it is at our Choice whether The more apt in their own Nature Benefits are to we will give or no; but an honeſt Man is not at Li- unite and to engage the Minds of Men, the more berty in the point of returning, provided it can be ſtrictly does Reaſon enjoin us to apply our ſelves done without Injury. with Vigour and Induſtry, to apply our felves with It is obſervable, that Cicero here makes Gratitude Vigour and Induſtry, to a juſt Requital. When a a part of Liberality, and conſequently, hints, that Man has expreſs’d ſo much Dependance upon me, it is not tied up to Laws, altogether fo ftrict as as to confer the prior Obligation, I am bound at thoſe of Juſtice, which commands us to repay leaſt not to ſuffer hijn to be the worſe for his Kind- we owe upon Contract, moſt punctually and pre- neſs, and I ought never to receive a good Turn, citely (a). It may be remark'd farther, that when but with Reſolution to hinder the Author, if pofli- he ſays the former kind of Liberality, the beſtom- ble, froin repenting of what he has done. If uponing of Benefits is in our Choice, he ought not to be ſome particular Reaſon we are unwilling to be ob- underſtood in an abſolute Senſe, for it is plain we 2:04 th what (4) To theſe rare Paſſages of the Ancients, we may add a ſmall Sentence taken out of our Author himſelf in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, I. 1. c. 8. $ 5. The manner of exerciſing Beneficence and Liberality much inhances the Value of Benefits, as when a Man does a good Office with an air of Chearfulneſs and Briskneſs, and with all the ſigns of a good Will. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 16. (1) 'Tis a Maxim of the Scholars of Zoroaſtres, Præceptum eſt, ut ſi quis beneficium facit alteri, tum alteri incumbit illud eadem quantit ate rependere, quantum poterit. In Sadder. Porta. 95. We are cominanded, that if any does a benefit to another, that other is obliged to do the like, if he be able. (2) As for Example, If a Man keeps me from drowning, I have no manner of Obligation to him, if he threw me into the Water, as our Author ſpeaks in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen. Lib. 1. c. 8. $ 6. See Seneca de Benef.l.6.c. 26. (3) 'Our Author in his laſt Edicions interrupts the thread of his Reaſonings with this Remark, That when one refuſes a Benefit , we thould take care that we give no Suſpicion of Contempt to him who civilly offers us his Service, otherwiſe ſuch a Refuſal is a kind of Injury. (4) Ariſtot'e maintains, that as it is a greater Duty to reſtore what one has borrowed, than to lend to a Friend ; ſo it is ordi . narily to make an Acknowledgement of a Kindneſs, than to do one to a friend; at leaſt there is greater Reaſon drawn from Honeſty and Neceſſity to engage us to the Duties of Gracicude, than Friendſhip, according to the Pallage our Author quotes out of Ariftotle, και τα μεν ευεργεσίας ανταποδοτέον επί το πολύ μάλλον, ήχάeιςέον εταίροις, και άσπες δανειον, και οφείλει αποδυτήν μάλλον, ή εταίρω δοτέον -- αν και αρτάνη η δέσις των καλώ, ή το αναγκαίο, προς ταύτ' αποκλιτίον. (5) His Words in the Latin are, Nullum enim officium refe enda gratia magis neceſarium est. Quod fi ea, quæ utenda acceperis majore menfura, ſi modo poſſis jubet reddere Hefiodus, quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus? An imitari agros fertiles, qui multò plus effe , runt quam acceperunt ? Eterim ſi in eos quos fperamus nobis profuturos, non dubitamus officia conferre, quales in eos esſe debemus, qui jam profuerunt? Nam cum duo genera Liberalitatis funt, unum dandi beneficiis, alterum reddend, demus necne in noftra poteftate eft; non reddere viro bino non licet, modò id facere poßit ſine injuria. De Offic. 1. 1. C. 15. (4) Vid. Ambroſe de offic. l. 1.C.31. Gell. 1. 1. C. 4. are Chap. III. 39 Of the Mutual Daties of Humanity. “ ctors (b). are under fome Obligation, even to Antecedent Be “ chance to obtain, they immediately hate the Per- neficence, but the point is, that this Obligation does “ fons to whom they have been obliged, becauſe not carry ſo much Strictneſs in it, as that which “ either wanting Will to make Requital, or dem binds a Man to Gratitude ; or to endeavour the ap ſpairing of Ability, and at the fame time fanſi- proving himſelf by all good Will, and goud Service ing all the World to be Mercenary, and that 110 to his Benefactors. good Turn is done without Hopes of Retribu- It happens, 'tis true, very frequently that in the tion; they apprehend themſelves to have exceed- doing a Kindneſs , there is more true Love on the ingly baulk'd and diſappointed their Benefa- part of the Giver, than of the Receiver. The Rea- ſon of this is enquired into, by Ariſtotle in his E Learned Men have diſputed, whether or no there thicks, B. 9. C. 7. There being too much Ground ought to lie an (3) A&tion againſt his Vice, in Courts in fact, for that Politick Remark of Tacitus, Bene- of Civil Judicature. Seneca (€) takes the Negative ficia eo uſque lata funt dum videntur exolvi poſje : ubi fide of the Queſtion, and the Reaſons he proceeds multum antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur. Add upon are chiefly theſe ; “ Firſt, That if a Benefit Hobbes Leviathan, C. 11, &c. Where he tells us, that “ be ſtrictly to be repaid like a Sum of Money, or the receiving great Benefits from a Superior, inclines“ as if it were let out to hire, it then loſes the (4) to Love, but the receiving of the like from Equals or “ Name of a Kindneſs, and becomes a Loan or Inferiors, does not, unleſs there is Hope of being able “ Debt; Secondly, That whereas the requiting of a to requite them. “Good Turns do ſo far yield an a good Turn is eſteemed an Act highly Vertuous, greeable Satisfaction as we fanſie our ſelves able to it muſt ceaſe to be Vertuous, were it once made repay them: when they much exceed this Mea “ Neceſſary: Thirdly, Laſtly, That there muſt needs “ ſure, the Debt grows deſperate, and ſo produces “ ariſe more Cauſes on this Head, than all the a ſullen and a ſecret Hatred, inſtead of a real (5) Courts in the World would be ſufficient to try. < Kindneſs and Affection. Themift. Orat. 3. By the Perſian Conſtitution, there XVII. But though the bare Notion of Ingratitude is a ſettled Penalty decreed againſt Ingratitude; as does not imply a real Injury, in as much as it is being the readieſt Incentive to Hatred, and Ill Will, not the Violation of any full and perfect Right, yet And where this Vice is not puniſhable by Law, it it paſſes in common Cenſure, for a Vice more foul, produceth more deſperate Enmity, and more fatal more odious and deteſtable, than Injuſtice it ſelf (1). Contention. Add Xenophon Cyrop. 1. 1. Add M. For it is look’d on as an Argument of a moſt Abject Antonin. l. 9. C. 42. & Val. Max. 1. 2. c. 6.f.6,7.& and Degenerate Soul, for a Man to declare himſelf 1. 5. c. 3. f. 5. To theſe Inſtances and Arguments, unworthy of the fair Opinion which another enter- other Authors have anſwer'd at large. See Becler's tain d of his Honeſty, to be Proof againſt (2) Benefits A&tio Ingrati. Our Deſign leads us no farther, than and conſequently paſt all Senſe of Humanity (a). to obſerve, that from every Tranſgreſſion of the The account which (In Paffion Artic. 294.) Des Law of Nature, it does not preſently follow, that Cartes gives of Ingratitude, is very Rational and there muſt lie an Aktion, (or the Reſemblance of an very Elegant. “ It is the Vice, ſays he, of Men, Aktion) againſt a Man in Natures Court. This is who are either madly Proud and 'Vain, and to certain, that the Divine Juſtice hath reſerv'd fevere imagine every thing to be due to their Merit; Puniſhments to be inflicted on ungrateful Perſons in or elſe ſenſeleſly Stupid, and ſo unable to reflect another Life: And in this preſent World they ought on the Benefits they receive; or laſtly, pitifully to ſuffer the Hatred and Deteſtation of all Man- * Weak and Abject, who when they feel their own kind, and to be adjudg’d unworthy of the leaft "* Infirmity and Want, ſue with the meaneſt Sub- Benefit or Favour. But why a Man cannot be ſued "miſſion for the Aſſiſtance of others; which if they in an Action, at the Civil Bar, for fimple Ingratitude, Mr. Barbe yrac's NOTES on § 17. (1) The Reaſon that Tully gives of the evil Eye of Ingratiude is this. Omnes immemorem beneficiis oderunt, eamque injuriam in de- terrenda Liberalitate fibi etiam fieri, eumq; qui faciat, communem hoſtem tenuiorum putant, (i.e.) The Ingrateful is hated by all the World, for their Proceedings diſcourage them who are inclined to Liberality, which is an Injury which every Man ſhares in ; infomuch that the ingrateful Man is accounted the common Enemy of all thoſe who need help from powerful Perſons. Cicer. de Offic. 1. 2. c. 18. (2) O, και το χρυσών εκ εποιησεν ήμερον If Benefits will not affect the Mind, Τι δ' άν δράφιον άλλο ή πινων πότε. There's nothing in the World will make us Kind. Greg. Nazianz. Lucian alſo 1peaks to the ſame purpoſe, as in (a). See alſo the Reflections which Mr. De Evremont makes upon ungrateful Pere Tons, Tom. 3. p. 79. and in his Miſcellanies. Printed at Amſterdam 1706. (3) This was practiſed heretofore not only among the Perſians (as appears from Xenophon Cyropæd. Lib. 1. P: 3. Álian. Hift. Animal: 1. 8. c. 3. & Themiftius Orat. 22. de Amicitia, but alſo among the Athenians. For Valerius Maximus says, In qua urbe (Athenis) adversus ingratos a£tio conſtituta eſt . Lib. 5. c. 3. $ 3. extem. See allo Lib. 2. c. 6.8 6. de Petit.de Legib . At ben. Lib. 2. Tit . 6. & Lib. 4. Tit. 8. which Paſſages Mr. Bayle did not remember, when he ſaid, in his Thoughts about a Planet, That none but the medes have made any Laws againſt ingrateful Perſons, for which he quotes Xenophon and Seneca de Beneficiis; Lib . 3. c. 6. in which laſt the Editions read Macedonum for Medorum, about which, See Muret. Var. Le&t. Lib. 12. C. 3. See alſo, Briſſon. de Regn. Perſarum, Lib. 2. p. 198, 199. (4) Seneca's Words are thele, Primum omnium pars optima beneficii periit, ſi a£tio, ficut certa pecunia, aut ex conduło, aut locato datur. Deinde, cum res honeftiffima fit referre gratiam, definit esse honefta, fi neceſſaria eft. -Adjice nunc, quod huic uni legi omnia fora vix fufficient. De Benef. Lib. 3. c. 7. (3) In fine, Beſides, that there is hardly any Man but complains, that he has been ungratefully dealt with, it is very hard to weigh exactly the circumſtances which encreaſe or leſſen the Value of any Benefit. See what Séneca lays of this, (a) Lucian id Antholog, dava aynis, &c. A Thankleſs Wretch is like a broken Sieve, Lets out, and loſes faſter than you give. Add Pheraula's Judgment concerning the Nature of Man in Xenophon Cyropæd. 8. A Favour ſhould be treafured in the Soul, A Wretch that Stifles Benefits beſtow'd And made the Mother of a kind Return, ( De Benef. 1.3.6.6, &c. Scarcely deſerves the generous Name of Man. that (6) Sophocles Ajace. 40 Of the Duty of keeping Faith; Book III , είτε 7 *hat is, forgetting a good Turn, or for neglecting Signedly, without looking for any farther Fruit, than to requite it, when he had Opportunity, there ſeems the Action it ſelf. Is it not ſufficient Satisfaction to to be this plain Reaſon; that the very Cauſe of my have relieved and aſſiſted one that is a Man as thou art? conferring the Kindnefs (that is, of iny giving fome. Doft thou demand a Reward for doing what thy Nature what without taking Security for its return) was obliges thee to do? to afford the Party an Opportunity of ihewing him But when a Man is guilty of mix'd Ingratitude, ſelf Grateful out of pure Honeſty, not out of fear or when he not only neglects to requite à Courte- of Compulfionand on my own part to demon- fie, but anſwers it with Injuries and Abuſes ; the ſtrate that what I beſtow'd was not done out of a Injury thus offer’d, founds an Action in Natures fordid Deſires of Gain, but out of Humanity and Court, or a Cauſe of War,; and its being accompa- good Nature, ſince I required no Caution, or Enfu- nied with an ungrateful Mind, as it highly aggra- rance of being repaid (6). Antoninus will teach us vates the Fact, and renders it more Vile and Odi- better Philoſophy. When thou accuſeft a Man (ſays ous, ſo it engages the Sufferer more ſpeedily to ſeek he) of Falſeneſs or Unthankfulneſs; turn the Centure Redreſs; and to puniſh the Villain the more fe- upon thy felf. For the Fault is without doubt thine; verely, in Regard, that Benefits themſelves could that thou didſt not confer the Favour freely and unde- not reclaim him (a). LISCALE 94 (6) "O gav () eitis xej , , , msuv , esores, της σής πράξεως ευθύς απειληφέναι πάντα και καρπών. Τί ο σλέον θέλεις, ποιησαι άνθρωπον, έκ αρκεί σοι και κατά φύσιν την σω τι έπραξαι και τότε μίδον ζητάς και ως ει ο όφθαλμα αμοιζήν ασήει και ότι βλέπει και ή οι πόδες ότι βαδίζεσι, ώσσές ο ταύτα ασπρός τόδε τιμονεν, άσες κατα την ιδίαν καθασκέυην ενεργεία απέχει το ίδιον, όπως και ο άνθρωπG- ευεργετικό πέφυκως,δσό- εαν τι ευεργέικον, ή άλλως εις τα μέσα συνεργάτικον πράξη πεποίηκε, προς καθασκέυασαι, και έχει το έαυτά, Lib. 9.5 42. (d) How far the Neceſſity of returning a Benefit is taken off by a ſubſequent Injury, Seneca teacheth us, de Benef. 1.6.c. 4, a , $. & Epiſt. 81. TTC 2 78 1 VI. VII. IX. is oor die het ons gelobt CHA P. IV. 1. KOT 180 pores & BDA co Of the Duty of keeping Faith, and the Diverſity of Obligations to it. 1. There muſt be Covenants and Agreements in all | V. A Natural or Civil Obligation. Humane Societies. What is the Force of each of them. II. Covenants are to be kept. A Perpetual and Temporary Obligation. III. Obligations are natural or adventitious. VIII. Obligations not mutual. IV. Atheiſm deſtroys all Natural Obligations. Obligations perfectly or imperfetly mutual. a suolelios HE Dutieshitherto explain’d, are mutually ow- nite, cannot in the ſame manner extend it ſelf to all ing upon account of that Common Relation, Perſons, it is agreeable to Reaſon, that ſuch Acts as which Nature has eſtabliſh'd amongſt Men; altho are not already beſpoken by an Antecedent Obligation we ſuppoſe no Antecedent Ad to have paſs’d be- lying on us, ſhould be made ſure to thoſe, who by ei- tween them (1). But it would be unreaſonable to třing into Covenant with us, firſt obtain a Right to re- confine within theſe narrow Limits, all the Offices ceive them (2). Therefore, that the true Fruits of that Men are to exerciſe towards each other. For a ſocial Nature, the mutual Offices of Mankind might the firſt place, ali are not of ſo good and honeſt be practis'd with more Frequency, and more Regu- Diſpoſitions, as to perform every thing, whereby larity, it was neceſſary for Men to bargain, and a- they can benefit their Neighbours, oụt of pure Hu- gree amongſt themſelves, that they would perform manity, and Charity; without being ſecure of Re to each other, ſuch and fúch Services, they could tribution. And then, many things which we ſhould not be abſolutely ſecure of, by the bare Law of Hu- be glad to receive froin others, are of ſuch Value manity. So that their Buſineſs muſt be to ſettle be- and Conſequence, that we cannot in Modeſty deſire fore hand, what every Man ow'd to another, and what them gratis . Or perhaps it does not become our For- he ſhould by Virtue of his Right, accept and chal- tune or Station to be beholden to another, for ſuch a lenge in return (3). Benefit. Therefore unleſs an Equivalent be paid, com Hence it is eaſie to apprehend how the Offices of monly the other Party is unwilling to give, and fre- Humanity or Charity, differ from thoſe which are quently we are unwilling to receive. Again, others are requir’d by full and proper Right, and which are many times Ignorant, how they might ſerve and oblige the Objects of ſtrict Juſtice. The foriner are not us. Laſtly, in as inuch as the Power of Man being Fi- owing upon any Covenant, either Expreſs or In- נון Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. IV.S 1. (1) See Chap. I S I Note 1. aforegoing, and Chap. 9. $ 8. with the Note on it. 3) The Period, which is placed here, and is joyned to the foregoing by the word, Deniq; Finally, ſeems deſigned for a nero and laſt Reaſon to prove the Neceflity of Voluntary. Engagements. But, as any one may difcern, that period ſuppoſes a Necef- ſity of ſuch Engagements already eſtabliſhed: For it endeavours to ſhew the Right which an Agreement or Promiſe gives over the Actions of another; and ſo has bred Confuſion in our Author's Work. This has proceeded evidently from the Negligence of our Author in inſerting his Additions; for the Sentence, which cauſes this Diſorder, is not found in the firſt Edition, (3) I have added the following Sentences to complear our Author's Reaſoning, as he has done himſelf in his Abridgement a Man and Citizen, Lib. I c. 8. $ 2. This is what is done by Agreements or Promiſes: For tince our Abilities are fo limited , that they can't extend at the ſame time and in the Tame manner to the Neceſſities of all Men, Reafon tells us, that he that has acquired by an Agreement or Promiſe any particular Right to the Actions of another, which were not before, as we may fay, engaged to any other, has a Power to diſpoſe of theſe Actions according to the Agreement. of plicite CHAP. IV. 41 and the Diviſion of Obligations. Plicite, but purely by, force of that Common Obliga- tures, moſt religiouſly to obſerve and perform them. tion with Nature has laid upon Mankind. But what For were this Aſſurance wanting, Mankind would I owe another upon Pact or Agreement, I therefore loſe a great part of that coinmon Advantage, owe him becauſe he has obtain'd a new Right, hold- which continually ariſes from the mutual Inter- ing good againſt me, by virtue of my free Promiſe courſe of good Turks (1). Ariftot . Rhet. I. 1. C. 15. or Conſent. Farther, whatever I tranſact with ano. Take away Covenants , and you diſable Men from ther by way of Covenant, is deſign’d not for his being uſeful and aſſiſtant to each other (2). Tull. Whereas in Duties of Hu- Off. 1. 2. c. 11. So great is the force of Juſtice, that manity, the Caſe is quite otherwiſe. For, although even thoſe who live by Outrage and Villany, cannot the Performance of theſe be in general Neceſſary, for Subſiſt without ſome Shadow and Semblance of this Ver- the rendring the Life of Man Comfortable and Com- tue. Which he ſhews in the Inſtances of Thieves modious, and conſequently be an Advantage to the and Pirates. Fårther, were not Men moſt ſtrictly Performer, by giving him good Grounds to expect neceſſarily tied to keeping their Promiſes, we could fair Treatment; yet with regard to particular Acts not with any certainty build on the Alliſtance of of Kindneſs , a Man does theni not for his own fake, others, in the ordinary Affairs of Life. And then but for the ſake of the Party who receives them. breach of Faith is the apteſt thing in the World to For a Benefit, if confer’d upon a Principle of pri- found an endleſs Succeſſion of Quarrels and Com- vate Intereſt, loſes its Nature and its Name. plaints. For in Caſe I have actually perform’d my Thus then the Duties of Humanity or Charity, part of the Contract, and the other Perſon fails, and thoſe ariſing from Covenant, do afford a mutu- whatever I have done or given is abſolutely loft: And al Aliſtance, and ſupply to each other, whilſt thoſe if I have not as yet proceeded to any actual Per- things which Charity either cannot, or does not ordi- formance, it is, however, a Trouble, and it may narily procure, are obtain'd by Pact ; and in Matters be a Prejudice to me, to have the Courſe of my about which no Pacts have paſs’d, Charity comes in, Deſigns and Buſineſs overturn’d; ſince I could have and ſerves our turn as well. And although to fix ſettled things by other Ways and Meaſures, had not the Subject, and the Conditions of Covenants be left this Man offer'd to tranſact with me. And 'tis moſt to the Pleaſure of particular Perſons; yet that there Unreaſonable, that I ſhould be expoſed to Scorn fhall be ſome fuch Agreements, the Law of Nature and Cenſure, for entertaining a kind Opinion of a does (indefinitely and in general) command ; in Perſon's Goodneſs and Honeſty. We are therefore as much as without theſe Tranſactions, there would to eſteem it a moſt Sacred Command of the Law be no poſſible means of preſerving Peace and Socie- of Nature, and what guides and governs, not only ty in the World (4). So ſpeaks Ifocrates adverſ: the whole Method and Order, but the whole Grace Callimach. So great is the force of Leagues and Co- and Ornament of Human Life, that every Man keep venants, that ſcarce any Affairs, either of Grecians his Faith (3), or which amounts to the ſame, that or Barbarians, are tranſacted in any other manner. he fulfil his Contracts (4), and diſcharge his Pro- By means of theſe we traffick abroad, and bargain miſes (a). at home. By means of theſe we terminate private Dif III. But in as much as Pacts or Covenants, thoſe ſentions and publick Wars. Theſe we all make uſe eſpecially which are Expreſs, do impoſe an Obliga, of , as an Univerſal Good to be enjoy'd in Common tion on us, which Nature did not before enjoyn, at by Mankind. leaſt not in ſo preciſe and determinate a Manner; II. When Men have once engaged themſelves by it inay not be here Inconvenient to run over the Pałts, their Nature obliges them as ſociable Crea- Principal Kinds, and Diviſions of Obligations. Obli- OD (4) Ιocrates's Greek is this, Τοσαυτίω σ' έχεσι δύναμιν [αι συνθήκαι) ώστε το πλήκα βία, και τους έλλησι, και τους βαρδα- μς, συνθηκών είναι ταύταις και πρέυοντες, ώς αλλήλες αφικνέμεθα, και πειραζόμεθα. ών έκασοι τυγχάνομεν δεόμενοι μετα τέτων και τα συμβόλαια τα προς ημάς αυτές ποιέμεθα, και τας ιδίας έχθρας, και τις κοινες πολέμες διαλυόμεθα τότε νόμω κοινώ- πίντες άνθρωποι διατελεμεν χρώμενοι. . Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 2. (1) The Greek of Aritatle is this, “Ωστ ακύρων γιγνομένων των συνθηκών] αναιρείται η προς αλλήλες χρεία των ανθρώπων. (2) Cicero's Words are, Cujus [Juſtitie] tanta vis eft, ut nec illi quidem, qui maleficio, & fcelere paſcuntur, poffint fine ulla par- ticula Juſtitie vivere. Confule ailo plato about this matter, in a Paſſage which Grævins quotes, and Simplicius upon Epi&tetus Chap. 58. near the end. (3) We muſt add, of what Condition or Religion foever he be, to whom we engage our ſelves for any thing. It is a Precept of the Scholars of Zoroaſtres, a ſort of Men in this not ſo looſe, and more honeſt, than many Chriſtians, Cum quocunque feceris pakkum, id ne frangas._-_Nec putes tecum dicere, Quamvis paštum fregero, id mihi tamen non erit peccatum, & fibi fit cum aliquo in Religione noſtra, five extra eam, res perinde est , (i. e.) With whomſoever you make an Agreement, you muſt not break it Nor muſt you ſay with your felf, if I break my Agreement, I ủo not fin, whether it be made with a Perſon of our own Reli- gion or not. In The. Hyde De Re'ig. Vet. Persarum, &c. In s'adder Porta. 28. See alſo the fine Thoughts of Montaigne upon the indiſpenfible Neceſſity of keeping a Man's Word, Lib. 3. c. 9. The Pythagoreans to accuſtom themſelves to keep their words in Matters of Importance, thewed the greateſt- Exactneſs in things of a trifling Nature. And of this they tell a pleaſant Story. is One Lyfis, a Philoſopher of that Sect coming one day out of Juno's Temple, met one of his Fellow- Diſciples, named Eurypha mus, going into it, who deſired him to ſtay till he had payed his Devocions. Whereupon he ſets him down before the Tem- i ple; but Euryphamus having unhappily fallen into a deep Meditation, forgot his Promiſe, and departed at another Door. Neverthels Lyſis, without Diſcouragement, ſtaid paciently all that Day, the next Night , and good part of the next Day, when being in their school, and hearing some talking of Lyfis, as if they knew not what was become of him, he called to mind what he had promiſed, and went to relieve this fcrupulous Obſerver of his word. f ambl, de Vita Pythag. c. 30. $ 185 Doubtleſs this is an over.nice Exactneſs ; but 'tis better to offend on this ſide, than ſuffer ourſelves to be guilty of the leaſt Nego (4) The Author begins here to diſtinguiſh between Agreements or Contracts, and Promiſes, whereas in other places he uſes who makes the Promiſe; and therefore to avoid all Equivocation, and not to make things obfcure without the Neceffity, it is better, when we ſpeak'so in general, to ufe the Word Engagement. (a), See Dionys. Halicarn I. 2 where he tells the Story of the Conſecrating Faith amongſt the Goddeſſes by Numai Euripides Xρή αψευδες ναι τoίσι γυναίοις σόμα. . Truch the belt Mark of Honour and of Race. + F gations Heracl. 42 Of the Duty of keeping Faith; Book III, . gations then in the firſt place, are diſtinguiſh'd into of ruling and of puniſhing in his Kingdom of Nature Connate and Adventitious (1). Vid. Sander. de Oblig. froin his Irreſiſtible Power : but did any one ever ima- Jur. Prele&t. 1. f. u. The former are ſuch as all gine that an Atheiſt was able to reſiſt the Power of Men fall under by Vertue of their being Creatures, God? And therefore Atheiſts are not, ſtrictly fpeak. endued with Reaſon, or ſuch as neceſſarily attend, ing, God's Enemies ( as Hobbes defines Enemies, who and accompany the rational Nature, conſider'd in are neither under a Common Sovereign, nor under each that ſimple and general Notion. Although, in Re- other) but his Rebellious Subjects, and conſequent- gard that all Men are born Infants, and as yet i1r- ly guilty of Treaſon againſt the Divine Majeſty, as capable of the exerciſe of Reaſon, theſe Obligations Hobbes himſelf , has elſewhere (d), exprefly acknow- do for ſome time lie without Act or Force; and do ledged. And agreeably to this he defines Treaſon then at length exert their Power, and render Men againſt human Power to be, " When one either by capable of contracting Guilt, when the Underſtand-“Word or Deed, does in general manifeſt and de ing improving by Age and Uſe, makes us ſenſible “ clare, that he will no longer ſubmit to that Man of them. And from this Period they date their In or Council of Men, in whom is lodg’d the ſupream fluence, and produce their penal Effects, ſhould a “ Adminiſtration of the State, or when a Man whol- Man be never fo Negligent in weighing and conſi 66 throws off the Bond of Civil Obedience. It is dering their Authority: Therefore Ignorance of the 110 ſuch obſcure matter, therefore to aſſign the par- Law of Nature, is an inſufficient Plea, to excuſe a ticular Species of Sin, to which Atheiſm belongs . Perſon of mature Years; though he ſhould urge that Nor is the following Aſſertion built on better it never came into his Head to reflect whether this Grounds, That Atheiſts cannot be puniſh'd any other. Law had ſettled ſuch a Point or not. Adventitious wiſe, than by the Right of War; as the Poets repre- Obligations are ſuch as fall upon Men, by the In- ſent the Gods, routing by force of Arms the old tervention of fome human Deed; not without the Giants that aſſaulted Heaven. On the contrary, Conſent of the Parties, either Expreſs, or at leaſt that Evils inflicted in Martial Encounters are not Preſumptive. properly Puniſhments, we ſhall hereafter have Olin iv. Amongſt Connate Obligations, ſuch as are portunity to fhew. A Sovereign muſt not preſently planted, as it were, in our Being, the moſt Eminent be ſaid to make uſe of the Right of War, when he is that which lies on all Men with reſpect to Al- reclaims his Refractary Subjects. For the bare Right mighty God, the fupream Governour of the World; of Sovereignty includes thus much, That the Perſon by Virtue of which we are bound to adore his Ma- inveſted with it, ſhall have the Power of reducing jefty, and to obey his Commandments and his Laws. thoſe to Obedience by Force, who refuſe a volunta- Whoever wholly violates and breaks through this ry Submiſſion. Much leſs are thoſe Rebellious Op- Obligation, ſtands guilty of the moſt heinous Charge pofers of lawful Authority, to be accounted juft Ė of Atheiſm'; becauſe he muſt at the ſame time, de- nemies, or ſuch as have a Right of making Refi- ny either the Exiſtence of God, or his Care of hu- ftance. man Affairs, Which two Sins with regard to their It does not excuſe Hobbes to alledge that Paſſage Moral Conſequences and Effects, are Equivalent to of the Pſalmiſt, The Fool hath ſaid in his Heart There each other; and either of them overthrows all Re- is no God. As if there was any ſuch Nicety in the ligion, repreſenting it as a frightful Mockery, in- Scripture Language, to call thoſe only Fools who troduced to awe the Ignorant Vulgar into ſome De- ſin out of Miſtake, and not thoſe who offend Wil : cency and Duty (a). Therefore we ought in Juſtice fully. Or, as if this too were not the higheſt Folly , to Diſcard and Explode, as moſt foul and ſcanda. by a wilful Sin to incur the moſt intolerable Tor- lous, that Notion of Hobbes (b), in which he would ments, for the ſake of a very ſlender Pleaſure, or rank Atheiſm amongſt the Faults of Imprudence or perhaps no Pleaſure at all. Again, it is by 10 Ignorance; as if it were not properly a Sin, but a means a Matter of ſuch Difficulty, to diſcover the Miſtake or Folly, more worthy of Pardon than of Pu- Being of a GOD by Natural Reaſon, as to find niſhment. The Argument he makes uſe of runs out the Proportion between a Sphere and a Cylinder ; thus, The Atheiſt never ſubmitted his Will to the Will the Inſtance which Hobbes makes uſe of. It may of God, in as much as he never believ’d there was ſuch not be indeed in the power of every unlearned Per- a Being. But now it is impoſible any one ſhould have ſon to form, or to apprehend an Artificial Phi- a Sovereign Power over us, unleſs he obtair'd it by our loſophical Demonſtration of God's Exiſtence ; but he Conſent. Therefore fince the Atheiſt was never under cannot thence claim a Privilege of ſecurely doubt- the Kingdom of God, it follows that he is not obliged ing or denying it. For in as inuch as the whole by the Laws of that "Kingdom. But here it is moft Race of Men in all Ages have conſtantly held this grofly falſe, that all Sovereignty is conſtituted by Perſuaſion; whoever would attempt to aſſert the the Conſent of the Subject; for this will hold only contrary, muft of Neceſſity, not only folidly con- with regard to humanDominion ; where unleſs by our fute all the Arguments produced on the other ſide, own Contract and Confent, we cannot loſe the but alſo alledge better and more plauſible Reaſons Power of reſiſting another, who is by Nature our E- for his own particular Opinion. And farther, ſince qual. But who will pretend to affert that GOD the Safety and Happineſs of Mankind have been hi- has not a Power of commanding his Creatures , un- therto thought to depend chiefly on this Belief, it is leſs they voluntarily agree to inveſt him with ſuch requiſite, that he likewiſe prove Atheiſm to contri- Authority? Nay, Hobbes (c) has ſufficiently confu- bute more to the Intereſt, and the good of all Men, ted himſelf by deducing the Right, which God has than the Acknowledginent of a Deity. Which be- Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 3. (1) Arrian in his Diſſertation on Epi&etus, Lib. 3. c. 2. diſtinguiſhes alſo between Exéress pusixes xj bai#7oi, Habitudes, of Relacions Natural and Impoſed. (a) Ambroſ. Offic. I. 1. c. 26. Nothing hath more influence in promoting an honeſt Life, than our Belief, That we have ſuch a Judge of our Actions, as no Secrecy can eſcape, no Indecency but will diſpleafe, no good Performance buc will delight. Add Laltant. De Ira Dei, c. 8. (6) De cive, c. 14. 1. 19. c. 15. 1. 2. (c) C. 15. f. 5. (d) C. 15.1. 19. ing Chap. IV. 43 and the Diviſion of Obligations.) ing a Task manifeſtly Impoſſible; the Atheiſts are this he only ridiculouſly confounds the Natural with to be judg’d Offenders, not only againſt the Divine the Poſitive Divine Law. He proceeds to affert, Majeſty, but againſt all Mankind. And they de- That Man confider'd in a state of Nature, is free ferve the leſs Favour on this Account, becauſe theſe from all Religion, not only upon account of Ignorance, very Men who would reverſe the Judgment of all Peo- but by virtue of that common Liberty, in which all ple and of all Ages, do arrogantly aſſume to them are born. For, ſays he, if Men were by Nature bound felves a deeper Sagacity, a clearer Light of Under to the Divine Law, or if the Divine Law were a Law ftanding than the World (1) was ever acquainted with by Nature, it would be ſuperfluous that God ſhould af- before. And conſequently, though their Unbelief be terwards enter into a Contract with Men, and oblige indeed an Error, and a moſt fatal and deſtructive one, them by Oath and Covenant. Now it is clear that yet it is ſuch as they did not fall into through Impru- theſe Pacts or Covenants pafs between God and dence or Simplicity, but by a vain and impudent Men in reveald Religion, not in Natural, to which Pretence of more than ordinary Degrees of Wif- a Man immediately ſtands obliged upon account of dom (a). his being created by God a reaſonable Creature. So It will be a very eaſie Labour to refute thoſe Ar- that Spinoſa's Concluſion is moft Vain and Senſeleſs, guments, which Spinoſa (b) has alledged in defence That Divine Law began from that time, when Men bý of this Notion of Hobbes. The Theſis he lays down expreſs Compact, promiſed to obey God in all things, to work upon is this, Every one who cannot govern by which deed they receded, as it were, from their Na. himſelf by Reaſon, may by the higheſt Right of Nature, tural Liberty, and transfer’d their Right upon God, live according to the Laws of his Appetite. And fore- juſt as Sovereignty is confer'd in Civil States. For the ſeeing it might be here objected, That the Affertion ſupport of which Doctrine it is neceſſary to fup- was contrary to the reveal'd Law of God, he an- poſe, that Men in a State of Nature, had not their ſwers, That a Natural State is both in Nature and Exiſtence from God Almighty: Time Antecedent to Religion ; which with Regard to From this Obligation, by which Men are bound Natural Religion is as abſolutely falſe, as what he to pay Obedience unto God, ſprings the Obligation ſubjoins, That no Man knows by Nature, any Obliga- of all Men towards all Men, as ſuch; by Virtue of tion lying on him to obey God, and that no Reaſon which they are engaged to lead a ſocial Life. How tan obtain this Knowledge, but ſuch as is confirm’d by this is to be diſcover'd, it has been formerly our the Signs of Revelation. Therefore the Confequence Buſineſs to fhew. he draws is moſt Abſurd, That before Revelation, no V. There is another famous Diviſion of Obliga- Man was bound by any ſuch Divine Law, as it was tion, into Natural and Civil; but ſuch as is by diffe- impofſible for bim to be ignorant of ; and, That a Na- rent Authors, differently ſtated (c). Grotius ob- tural State is to be conceiv’d without Religion or Law; ſerves, that the Lawyers ſometimes call a thing of and for that Reaſon without Sin or Injury. In all Natural Obligation, the doing of which Nature ſhews 59097 Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 4. (!) Mr. Bayle in his Thoughts about a Comet (Art. 177.) diſtinguiſhes between two forts of Atheiſts, the one, which begius to doubt, and the other, which have paſſed all doubting. Of the firft fort are ordinarily all thoſe who bear the Name of Lear- ned, but falſly; and glory in their Reaſon and the contempt of bodily Pleaſure; as alſo thoſe whoſe Souls are ſubject to all ſorts of Vices, which are capable of the worſt Aggravacions; and perceiving chat che Fears of Hell cauſe them no ſmall Diſquier, and imagining that 'tis their Incereſt that there Thould be no God, endeavour to perſuade themſelves that 'cis ſo. Others become Atheiſts becauſe they have been great Sinners, and are full of as much Malice as can crowd inco any Man's Soul. The ſecond fort are Infidels without deſign, and Moral Men. Mr. Bernard in his News about the Republick of Learning, November 1701. calls them both Atheiſts by Reflections ; but he after diſtinguiſhes them thus, giving the Name of Atheiſm in Fancy to him who begins to doubt, and of Atheiſm in Heart who are paſt doubting. According to this Author, 'tis undeniable, that there are Atheiſts in Heart in the World, for, ſays he, Perhaps, 'tis hard to maintain, that there are Atheiſts in Mind in the World, who are confirmed in Atheiſm, but there are fuch perhaps as labour under ſo many Scruples concerning the Being of a God, chac they think it a thing ſo very dubious, that they can have no certainty of it. But the ſame Author fays, There are a theifts without Reflection, who believe po God, becauſe they have never thought of it, but being ſo wholly taken up with ſenſible objects, it never came into their minds to ſuſpect that there is any thing in the World but what they ſee, never inquiring after the Principle of their Being. There is no doubt but there are ſuch Atheiſts, withour returning to the fabulous Relations of the Chineſe and Caffres. In my opinion, there is nothing more judicious than theſe Reflections, and this Syſtem of the different forts of Atheiſts. The Notion of our Author above-mentioned is not much different from the common Hypotheſis of Divines, who with regard to common Experience determine a matter of Fact by. Metaphyſical Reaſons. I can't then but wonder, that he gives ſuch a careleſs Solution of the Queſtion, which he touches by the by, viz. Whether Atheiſts ought to be puniſhed ? He maintains elſewhere (viz. in his Book, of the Duties of a Man and Citizen) that they ought to ſuffer the moſt ſevere Puniſhments, Graviffimis pænis eft coercenda eorum impietas. Bút on the contrary, Mr. Titius fays, that ſuch Men ought not to be treated to Leverely. For, ſays he, that Method of Puniſhment and Force is not proper to cure a Man of Atheiſm; the only Puniſhment of ſuch as are in Error, if they will not be inſtructed, is to leave them to God's Judgment, Obſerv. 95. on Puffend. For my part, I profefs, That if an Atheiſt makes an open Declaration of his Opinion, and labours to get himſelf Followers by miſleading ſuch weak ludgments as are not alle to anſwer his Sophiſms and Subcilcies, or by encouraging thoſe vicious Perſons, who are ready through the Wickedneſs of their Hearts to embrace his Teners, ſuch a perſon may with as much Juſtice be puniſhed as he that teacheth others to thieve, murder or cheat. In this caſe our Author's Reaſons are very good: For thoſe who diſturb a Society by endeavouring to deſtroy an Opinion fo univerſally received, and which is looked upon as one of the ſtrongeft Props of it, de! ferve as little to be treated as Criminals, as an Atheilt , conſidered as ſuch, for perplexing the common Belief of a God. Leo him be content that he has found out the unhappy Secret of ſhaking off all. Tyes of Religion, and applauding his own Impiety, advantage of Humane Society, knowing how ſtrong Impreffions the Fear of God has made upon moft Men. (See the philoſophick hould they be puniſhed purely as Atheiſts? The Nature and End of Puniſhments as they are uſed in Humane Judicatures, does hot in my Judgmenc, require that they ſhould be uſed upon fuch. Their Impiety will be ſufficient Puniſhment, if they continue par dit to their Death, bur 'tis poffible they may ſee their Error, and by Confideration remove the Sophiſms by which they are ac pelene blinded. Theſe Arguments will have a Atronger force, as to Atheiſts, by Reflection, andtherefore need not be enlarged on ovosud Sa) Comp. Jean de Eſpagne de Erroribus Popularibus, f. 1. c. 6. Bacon Elſay 16. and Advancement of Learning, 1. 3. c. 2. Add plato de L. 2. 1. 9. near the end, where he diſtinguiſheth the ſeveral kinds of Atheiſts, and directs with what Penalties they ought to be reſtrained. (b) Traétat. Theolog, Politic, c.15. (C) L. 2. C, 14. f. 6. + F 2 44 Of the Duty of keeping Faith; Book III Hence it is, that the Prærors explained and corrected to be good and honeſt, although it be not ſtrictly a confirm’d by the Authority of Civil Conſtitutions, Debt: As for an Executor to pay the entire Lega- This is the Diſtinction commonly made by the In- cies, without reſerving to himſelf, what the (1) Fal- terpreters of the Roman Laws. cidian Law allows him; to requite à Courteſie re VI. This Diviſion of Obligations into Natural and ceiv’d; to pay Debts which the Creditor has in Law Civil, is a Subject which we ought to infiſt farther forfeited; or to the exacting of which the Macedo- on in our preſent Enquiry; yet not ſo much to de- nian Decree may be oppoſed (2). When any thing rive thence the Original of luch Ties, but the Ef of this kind is voluntarily paid (3), a Man cannot cacy. or Force, which they bear in Common Life recover it again, on Pretence that it was not due (4), So that by Natural Obligations we mean ſuch as though he might at firſt have refus'd to pay it. it.' binds us only by Virtue of the Law of Nature; and Sometimes we call that a Natural Obligation which by Civil Obligation, ſuch as is ſupported and affift- truly binds us; whether it cauſe in the other Party ed by Civil Laws, and Civil Power. The Efficacy a Perfect, or whether only an Imperfect Right. In of both is conſider'd with Regard either to the Sub- like manner by a Civil Obligation we ſometimes je&t, the Perſon in whom the Obligation inheres; or mean ſuch, as is void by the Law of Nature, but the Object, the Perſon in whom it terminates, or to depends purely on a Civil Law, of which the Obli- whom it is directed. In the firſt Reſpect, the Effi- gatio literarum, (when a Man confeſſes a Debt in cacy or Vertue of Natural Obligation, chiefly con- Writing, which he really never contracted;) is fiſts in this, That it binds a Man's Conſcience; or commonly brought as an Inſtance; at other times that every Perſon at the ſame time when he fails it ſignifiers ſuch as is grounded on both Laws, Na- of performing it, is ſenſible that he has diſpleas'd tural and Civil ; or ſuch as will bear a good Action Almighty God; to whoſe to whoſe Mercy as he owes in Courts of Civil Judicature. his Being, ſo he knows he ought to pay all Others with more Clearnefs, aſſign Three Species poſſible Obedience to his Laws. And although we of Obligation, purely Natural, purely Civil , and Mixt, cannot indeed, in the Law of Nature, diſcover any The firſt depends entirely on Natural Equity (5); preciſe and determinate Penal Sanctions, yet we ought and in ſuch a manner, as not to found an Action in on all Accounts to acknowledge, that it is enforced Civil Courts. The ſecond ariſes merely from the by ſome ſuch due Fruits and Confequences; and that force of Civil Law, in the Strictneſs and Rigour of the Author of Nature will infallibly inflict great which it will bear an Action; though ſuch an Evils on thoſe who violate this Obligation, which (6) Action will always in Point of Equity be inva- the juſt Performers of it ſhall as infallibly eſcape. lidated (7) by the Judge (8), as the Obligatio lité. For the Truth of which Belief , amongſt many Ar- rarum before mention'd. The third is ſuch as is at guments, one very conſiderable Preſumption is that the ſame time ſupported by Natural Equity, and remorſe of Conſcience, which attends the Actors of Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 5. (1) Which is the 4th part of the Inheritance, which the Roman Laws affign the Heir, inſomuch that if the Legacies exceed this 4th part, the Heir is not oblig'd to pay the Overplus. See the Digeſts, Lib.35. Tic. 2. ad Lez. Falcid. and Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order, Part 2. Lib. 3. Job (2) Our Author adds this Sentence to explain Grotius's Words above-mentioned, which Gronovius interprets otherwiſe. For he ſays, the Debt is diſcharged by the Puniſhment of the Creditor, when the Debtor is excuſed from paying whar he owes to a Man who is disfranchized, or condemned to perpetual Baniſhment; but Grotius's Quoracions, and the following Diſcourſe Mew, That the Diſcharge granted by virtue of the Puniſhment of the Creditor was made by the Macedonian Law. Now this Decree was ſo called from a certain Ufurer, who was the Cauſe of ir, called Macedo, and for bad lending to an Heir, and declares all Obliga- tions void thac were made by him. Inſomuch that they who had lene Money, could not in Juſtice require any thing. See the Digeſts, Lib. 14. Tir. 6. $ 4. See alſo the Interpreters of Suetorius in the Life of Vefpafian, Chap. 11. There was alſo a Law like it among the Lucans, 'E a'r mis erótø Daveirur zglo sxeyx Sm, ségetal duro. if any ſhall lend Money to a Prodigal, he ſhall loſe is. Nicol. Damafcen de Moribus Gent. Voit (3) We ought to take particular Notice of this Word Voluntarily, which our Author adds to expound Grotius's Opinion, who doubtleſs fuppofed it. Nevertheleſs, Mr. Hirtius, both here and in his Differtation of an Action for a Debt due naturally, but not by Humane Laws, which is in Tom. 3. of his ſmall Tracts and Comments, criticizes upon Grotius and our Author, as if chey had ſpoken of a Payment by Miſtake. He muſt ſuppoſe that they had forgor the Principles of Law, and did not remember what the Roman Lawyers had laid down as an eſſential Condition of requiring again a thing not due, He that pays a thing which he knows not to be due, muſt be ſuppoſed to give it. Et quidem, fi quis debitum ignorans folvit, per hanc aâionem condicere poteft , Sed fi fciens non debere foluit, ceffat Repetitio. Digeft. Lib. 12. Tit. 6. De Condi&t. indeb. Leg. 1. Cujus per Errorem Dati repetitio eft, ejus confulto Dati donatio eft. Lib. 5o. Tit. 17. De Diverſ. Reg. Jur. Leg. 53. tes (4) Conditio indebiti is a Righe of requiring a thing in Juffice, which one has paid, but was nor due. See Digeft. Lib. 12. Tit.6. But that ſuch a Right has no place by the Falcidian Law appears from theſe Words of the Roman Lawyers, Solutum verò non repes titur. Digeft. Lib. 35. Tit. 2. Leg. 1. $ 17. As to the Macedonian Law, their Opinion is very plain, Quanquam autem folvendo non repetant, quia naturalis obligatio manet. Digeſt. Lib. 14. Tit. 6. Leg. 9. in the end, and 10. (5) As for example, If a Minor has borrowed any thing without the Conſent of his Guardian, the Creditor can demand no- thing of him in Juftice, but the Minor is fill obliged by natural Right, or in Conſcience, to pay what he has borrowed. See Chap. 6. S 4. Nares. following. tot een 1159 Com (6) This appears by full Reſtitutions, but in the main this Obligation being purely civil comes to bothing, as the Roman Lawyers themfelves have acknowledged, ſaying, Ie marrers nor, if a Man has no Right, if it can be made void by an Excep- cion. Digeft. De Diverf. Reg. Jur. Leg. 112. See Mr. Noodt, De Forma emendandi doli mali, Chap. 5. (7) Among the Rornans that only was called a Law, which was Enacted by the votes of the People, upon the Propoſal of the Head of the Senate. They had alfo Plebiſcita, which were the Decrees of the People, made upon the Propoſal of che Officer, choſen out of their own Order. The Laws and Plebiſcita, with the Senatûs Consulta, or Decrees of the Senate only , the Conſtitutions of their Princes, the Edids of their Magiſtrates, and Determinations of their Lawyers, make up the Body of the Civil Law. For every Prætor, or Judge, when he entred upon his Office, put out an Edict, in which he inſerted not of ly, what he thought juft and equitable in the Eicts of his Predeceffors, but he added new Conftitutions, and ſometimes made void fome old ones. This is what is called, Jus Pretorium, the Law of the Prætor, or Jus Honorarium, The Honorary Law, bei cauſe the Prætor had the Ticle of Honoratus, (i. e.) a Perſon honoured. the Deciſions of the Civil Law, and ſupplied fome Defects. See the Inſtitut. Lib, 1. Tit. 2. De Jur. Nat. Gent. do Civil. $ 3; I can't here but advertiſe the Reader by the bye concerning the Reſcripts of the Emperors, that Mr. Skulting, Profeffor at Franes ker, publiſh'd there nor long fince, viz. in 1708, a good Diſcourſe to thew the Force they were of (8) See the Inſtitut. Lib. 4. Tit. 13. $ 9. 4. Tit. GAS oil &c. Wickedneſs, CHAP. IV. and the Diviſion of Obligations. 45 race (a). eſcaping human Diſcovery, and human Puniſhment. than by gentle and eaſie Methods; as by perſwading, Wickedneſs , even whilſt they are in fair hopes of and Humanity, we cannot challenge any otherwiſe, A Difquiet, which no good and wife Man can ima- admoniſhing, deſiring or intreating. But we mult gine to proceed from bare Simplicity, from Cư- not apply Force to the moſt obftinate Refuſer; un- ftom, or from Fear of ſecular Juſtice; but from a leſs in Cafe of extream Neceffity (2) The Reaſon much higher Principle, a Senſe of God's Sovereign- of which Proceeding ſeems to be this , That human ty, and a Dread of his Vengeance. Cicero pro S. Society cannot be preſerv'd, in a very eaſie or peace- Rocio. Every Man that is Diſhoneſt , lives in a ful Condition, without the conferring of thoſe mu- perpetual Fright, every Man's Wickedneſs haunts tual good Offices; and therefore Nature ſeems to him, his Folly and his Madneſs difturb him; his have let them aſide, as conſtant Subjects of exerci- evil Thoughts and guilty Conſcience terrifie and di- fing Men's particular Benevolence, by means of ftract him. Theſe are the Conſtant and the Dome- which they might win on the good 'Opinions, and ſtick Furies, which Plague and Torture the Impi- the Affections of each other. And now it is clear pus. Add Selden. de F. N. & G. 1. 1. C. C. 4. p. 47, that thoſe things which may be recovered by Force, &c. Nor can I believe that any Man by flying to are not fo apt to procure the Favour, or to unite the impious Refuge of Atheiſm, ever found there the Minds of Men, as thoſe which we give only fo good Security againſt theſe Terrors, but that his upon our own free Motion, and which we might wicked Mind would frequently recoil, and ſhake deny withour Fear or Danger. But what is due to himn with more Violence than before. And we have us, upon an intervening Pact, if not voluntarily ſcarce had an Inſtance of any ſuch bold Defier of tender’d, we may procure by forcible Means. As Heaven, who has not at length been driven into a we may likewiſe defend by Force, our juft Poffef- Confternation by his own Crimes, and turn'd a Pe- fions and Goods, when an Attempt is made upon nitent in Horrour, according to that of Ho- them, by any injurious Affailant Civil Obligati ons, or fuch as have been confirm'd by the Autho- 2. Although to bind the Conſciences of Men, berity of Civil Laws, create an Aktion in Courts of principally the Effect of Natural Obligation, yet Juſtice, by, vertue of which I am to carry the the fame Power is communicated to Civil Obli- Defailant before the Magiſtrate, who has a Power gation, provided the Object of the latter, be not of compelling him to the Performance of his Duty: repugnant to the former. And therefore, Civil Laws. But even in States , Obligations purely Natural, or do alſo bind the Conſcience, fo far as they are con- ſuch as have not been enforc'd by the Sanction of ſiſtent with the Law of Nature. Both Obligations Civil Laws, are left wholly to the common Modeſty, do farther agree in this Reſpect, that the Duties they and Conſcience of Men, and to their juft Dread of enjoyn, a Man ought to perform Voluntarily, and a Divine Sovereign and Judge; and the Subject as it were upon his own internal Motion. ought not by a Courſe of Violence, to be brought "And 'tis this which makes the chief Difference to the Obfervance of them. between Obligation and Compulſion; by the latter, What Obligations ought to be confirm'd by Civil the Mind is, by external Violence, driven upon á Ordinances, it is the Buſineſs of Legiſlators to deter- thing contrary to its inward Inclinations : but what- mine; and they are to meaſure their Expediency ever we perforin on the former Account, is ſuppos’d and Uſe according as they feem likely to con to be done upon the Approbation of our own Judg- tribute to the inward Happineſs, and Tranquili- ment, and the hearty Diſpoſition of our Will. ty of the State (3). As it would be ridiculouſly If we conſider theſe Obligations again, as they re- Troubleſome,to diſturb the Judge on every petit Aca gard the Object, or as they produce fome Effect in count, ſo it would be an Error on the other hand, the Perfon, to whom by Virtue of them, ſomething to imitate the Cuſtom of the Seres, (in Strabo l. 15.) is due, they have this Force Common to both, That who (4), he tells us, had no Hearings in Court, but what being thus due, is paid or perform’d, may be upon Murther or Scandal, theſe being ſuch Mif- fairly accepted and poffefs'd. But when the other chiefs as the Sufferer could not prevent; whereas it Party neglects or refufes to make good his Obli- is in every Man's power not to be cheated in a Bar- gation, there is then a Difference in the manner of gain, only by conſidering well whom he truſts. compelling him, between the Natural and the Civil Much to the fame purpoſe, is what he reports of Obligation, or between thoſe who live in a ſtate the Indians, That they have no Action at Law, up- of Nature, and thoſe who are ſettled under a Poli- qn matters of Faith and Truſt, nor do they make ty or Government. To thoſe who live in their Na- uſe of Witneſles or Seals, but believe each other on tural Liberty, the Precepts of the Law of Nature be their bare Words. Comp. Ælian V.H. l. 4. C. I. ing of two kinds, do cauſe the fame diſtinction in Add Senec. de Benef. 1. 3. c. 15. the Obligation to perform them. Thoſe things which VII. Obligation may again be divided into Pera Nature enjoyns one Man to pay to another, without petual and Temporary. The former is that which any Antecedent Pact, as are the Offices of Charity cannot be taken off ſo long as the Perſon exiſts, in minio antipolo de mi Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 5 6. 6) is the ſame se with (a) at the bortom of the Page.cinora assiv to n ... Is y Borih to 3500 Jum bclis) 531 Sec Lib. 1. c. 7.5 8 and Lib. 2. c. 6. S so aforegoing, (3) See Lib. 8. c. 1. $ 1: (4) See Lib. 5. Chap. 2, $ 3. where the Author recites the ſame thing is said (a) Hor. 1. 1. . 34. Parcus Deorum Cultor, G infrequens Inſanientis dum Sapientiæ Conſultus erro : Nunc retrorfum Vela dare, atque iterare curſus Cogor reli&tos. Theſe Words of Horace our Author ufes here without quoting him ; although, as Mr. Dacier very well obſerves, the Poet ſpeaks whom there in Joque only. 46 Of the Duty of keeping Faith, &c. Book III whom it inheres. Such is our Connate Obligation to- State of Inequality, was it in their Power, to inveſt wards God; which, even with reſpect to the Exer- any perſon with ſuch an extraordinary and trans ciſe, can at no time be ſuſpended or diminiſh’d. fcendent Right, as ſhould Diſengage him from all Such likewiſe is the Connate Obligation of all Men, Obligation and Duty towards other Mortals (3). towards all, as Partners of the ſame Nature, which IX. Mutual Obligations are ſuch as anſwer to one no Perfon can throw off, ſo long as he makes a Part another ; ſo that the Party who on the one hand re of Mankind; yet the Exerciſe of it may ſometimes, ceives a Due, on the other hand is bound to repay with regard to ſome particular Perfons, be ſuſpend- it (1): Theſe again are ſubdivided into imperfet ed. And this happens, when I devolve into a State ly Mutual , and perfectly Mutual. The former are of War with another. For the Obligation being Re- ſuch as anſwer unequally, one of them being op procal, in caſe one Party break it, and return Hofti- posd to another, which is either different in kind, lities for the good Offices of Humanity, the other of in Vertue and Efficacy. This ſeems to happen Party is no longer bound to deal with him in a chiefly on account of one of theſe two Reaſons, ei- friendly manner, but may maintain his own Safe-ther that the Perſons are unequal, one having a ty, and his own Rights, although with the hurt of Right of Commanding, the other a Necellity of 8 the unjuft Oppoſer. Yet the fame Obligation may beying; or becauſe Perſons in other Reſpects equal , ſtill be faid to remain perpetual in this Reſpect, That as to fome particular Buſineſs, refuſe to receive an ſo foon as our own Safety is provided for, and en: Obligation of the ſame Strictneſs, on both ſides. For fured, we ought to be ready to renew the Peace, it is clear that Obligations do thus differ in Force or and to return to the exerciſe of all Courteſie and Efficacy, ſome producing a perfect Right in the Per- Humanity, towards the Party who began the Con- ſon, towards whoin they are directed; ſo as to found tention. Amongſt Adventitious Obligations, we com an Aktion in human Cogniſance, to be proſecuted monly reckon Perpetual, the Obligation of Children either by War, or before the Judge, according as towards their Parents, and that which paſſes be- the Parties live, either in a State of Nature, or un- tween Husband and Wife; which ſhall elſewhere der a Form of Civil Government, whereas others be explain’d at large (i). produce only an imperfe&t Right, ſo that the Per- To Temporal Obligations are ſuch as may ceaſe and be formance of them ought not to be extorted by cancell’d, whilft the Perſons in whom they inhere, Violence . From the former of theſe Cauſes, ariſe do yet exiſt in the World. the Obligations imperfectly Mutual, betwixt Princes 20 VIII. Farther, ſince it generally happens, that and Subjects , betwixt States and particular Mem- Obligations anſwer one another, it may be uſeful to bers, betwixt Maſters and Servants, Parents and divide them into Mutual, and not Mutual . An Ob- Children; all which will be examined in their pro- ligation not Mutual is, when one Party ſtands bound per Places . The latter Cauſe of making Obligations to perform ſomewhat towards another; yet ſo that imperfectly Mutual, chiefly happen in Cafes of Gra- the other Party ihall lie under no Correſponding tuitous Promiſes, and the Performances of them. For Obligation, nor be tied to inake Equivalent Requi- whilft I promiſe any thing to another out of free tal. Such is the Obligation of Meri towards God, Favour, I perfecty oblige my ſelf to give it, and the by which they are engaged to pay him abſolute other Party has a Right of requiring it from me. Obedience; but he on his Part is not conſtrain’d by. But becauſe I did not engage him to pay me an E- Virtue of any ſuch external Obligation (1), to make quivalent, he is bound to me only by the Law of any Return for their Obedience. Ainongſt thoſe Gratitude, which ties him much more loofly than if Obligations where both Parties are Men, (if we ex- he were my Debtor upon Pact. For we cannot on cept a few Contracts, binding only one fide,) there ſuch unlimitted Obligation build our Hopes or our Af are none to be met with of this fort. And the Rea- fairs, and therefore ſhould the Party prove ungrate- fon is, becauſe it ſeems Repugnant to the Natural ful in the higheſt Degree, we do not reckon our Equality of Men, and one Perſon ſhould be bound ſelves properly to have receiv'd any Lofs or Pre- to another, and the other Perſon lie under no En- judice: For 'tis a Miſtake in ſoine Authors to af- gagement towards him. For we cannot (2) appre- ſert, “ That Nature gives us a perfect Right to claim hend them to be fociable Creatures, who are not u- a Return of our Benefit, from an ungrateful Per- nited by a common Tie, who have not a mutual “ fon (2); though in moſt common-wealths, the Communication of Services; but of whom one ſeems Courts of Law refuſe to admit an Action on that to be made as it were for the fake of the other, “Score. Nor is this a good Conſequence, The Ne- and the other is not bound in Return to contribute ceſſity of returning a Kindneſs, is greater than that of any thing towards his Intereſt or Happineſs. Nor, giving one; therefore the latter is founded upon an when Men by Political Inſtitutions introduced a Imperfect Right, the other upon a Perfect . 70 gr a 312000019 Co sdt, as no Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 7. (1) See Lib. 6. c. 1, and 2. Mr. Barbeyrat's NOTES on $ 8. (1) Our Author expreſſes himſelf thus by way of oppoſition to that which the Goodneſs of God requires of him. See Lib. 2. c. 1. 3. and c. 3. 5 5. aforegoing. (2) This Period, not containing at leaſt directly a Reaſon of what the Author was ſpeaking of before, I ſuſpect that the word enim has crept into the Text inſtead of etiam, either through the Careleſneſs of the Author or Printers; althoir is found in the laſt Edition of 1706, of which Mr. Hirtius had the Overſight. (3) We can't maintain this, without encroaching upon the Prerogative of God, who impoſes theſe Duties on Men by the Conſtitution of their Nature. This we ought nicely to obſerve, that we may underſtand the juſt Extent of the Rights of a King, which are founded upon the Power which every Man can and is willing to grant to him over himſelf. See my Notes on Lib. 7. c. 8. following. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S. 9. (1) See Lib. 5. c. 2. $ 5. following. (2) See c. 3. S. 17, aforegoing. For CHAP. V. Of the Nature of Promiſes, &c. 47 For, however the Caſe may ſtand before, yet rent Degrees in Obligations of the ſame kind (4) ; wheu I once promis’d to do a Favour, there lies eſpecially when we are to compare fuch Duties, as greater Necefity on me to perform it, than on the o- concur in point of Time (a). ther Party to return it (3). For there may be diffe- (3) To perfect the Reaſoning of our Author, we muſt remember, that the foundation of the difference between perfect and imperfe&t Right ariſeth from the neceſſary or unneceffary influence that a thing hath in eſtabliſhing Peace and Society among Men, and not fimply a degree of Obligation from the matter of the thing. So that though we are more indiſpenſibly obliged to the Duties of Thankfulneſs than of Beneficence, the firſt ought not to authorize us to uſe Force or Juſtice to make us perform them, rather than the laft; because neither of them are of that Nature, that the continuance of Peace or Society doth neceſla- rily require the practice of them. In ſome caſes the Duties of Gratitude ought to give place to thoſe of Beneficence, as when a Benefactor may want, or at leaſt ſpare without any great Loſs or Trouble a thing of which another Perſon has great need. (4) See my Notes on Lib. 5. c. 12. $ 23. following. (a) Comp. Bæcler, ad Grot. I. 1. C. 1. f. 4. See what ſhall be ſaid hereafter in Lib. 5. c. 12, f. 23. ز C H A P. V. Of the Nature of Promiſes and Pacts (or Covenants) in general. I. Whence adventitious Obligations ariſe ? VI. An imperfe& Promiſe obligeth, but does not II. What is Mr. Hobbes's transferring of Right? give another a Right, III. No Man has a Right to all things, as Mr. Hobbes VII. A Perfex Promiſe. aſſerteth. VIII. Promiſes in the Future Tenſe give no Right. IV, In what a transferring of Right confifts? IX. X. XI. Whether there be a Power of obliging in V. A meer Affertion doth not oblige. bare Paxts or Covenants. ITU now follows in Courſe, that we enquire how ligations proceed, either from a Simple, or from a fuch Obligations as are not born with Men, ſhould Mutual At; of which the former is properly calld a by virtue of ſome Act of theirs be laid upon them; free Grant or Promiſe, the latter a Pał or Covenant. by which means there ariſes, at the ſame time, in II. But in as much as all acknowledge that Pro- other Perſons a Right which before they wanted. miſes and Pacts do transfer a Right to others, before For theſe two Moral Qualities have ſuch a mutual we proceed, it inay not be improper to examine Relation and Dependence, that whenever there is Hobbes's Opinion (b), about the transferring of Right. produced an Obligation in one Man, there imme- He then, from his Project of a State of Nature, hav- diately ſprings up a Correſpondent Right in ano-ing inferrd, That every Man hath naturally a Right ther; for 'tis impoſſible to apprehend that I am to every thing, and having farther ſhown, That bound to any Performance, unleſs there be fome from the Exerciſe of this Right, there muſt needs Perſon in the World, who can either fairly require ariſe a War of every Man againſt every Man, it , or at leaſt fairly receive it of me. Though the a State very unfit for the Preſervation of Man- Remark will not hold vice verſa, that where-ever kind; he concludes, “ That whilft Reaſon com- there is a Right in one, there muſt preſently be an mands Men to paſs out of this State of War, into a Obligation in another. For Example, the Magiſtrate “ Condition of Peace, which Peace is conſiſtent has a Right of requiring Puniſhment for Crimes ; but “ with a Right of every Man to every Thing, it ſuch a Right as is attended with no Obligation in the at the ſame time preſcribes that Men ſhould lay Criminal (1)(a). Unleſs we ſolve the Doubt by this “ down ſome part of this univerſal Right. A Man, Diſtinction, That if we take Right in a ſtrict and “ he ſays, inay lay down, or diveſt himſelf, of his cloſe Senſe, for a Power or Aptitude, to have any Right two ways, either by ſimply renouncing it, thing, then there is always in fome other Perſon or by transferring it to another. The former is an Obligation anſwering to it; but not if the word “ done if he declares by ſufficient Signs, that he be taken for a Power of doing any thing. This then,“ is content it ſhall hereafter be unlawful for him in the firſt place is clear, that all Adventitious OL to do a certain thing, which before he might have Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. 5. $ 1. (This is not abſolutely true. See my Notes on Lib. 8. c. 3. $ 4, 5. But Mr. Thomafius, to fhew thar Right and Obliga- tion do not always anſwer to each other, alledges the Example of two Perſons, who in a Shipwreck getting upon one Plank, which could not ſave them both, had each of them right to thruft off his Companion, and conſequently, there was no Obliga- tion to anſwer each other, Fundam. Jur. Nat. Gw Gent. Lib. 3. c.7. $ 10. But this only proves, That there may be a Cafe where one Man's Right becomes of no worth by the Oppoſition of an equal Right in another Perſon. In like manner, certain other Duties 1o claſh ſometimes, that one of them muft give place in certain Circumſtances, without being leſs obligatory in general. In the example of the Plank, we muſt ſuppoſe, as I have ſaid elſewhere, that it belonged no more to the one than to the other, and neither of them was ſeized of it alone. ' For then the Right of Property of the firſt Occupyer would lay an Obligation of giving place on him, againſt whom any of theſe Titles could be alledged. But yet the other, who was not in the fame Cafe, be it he to whom the Plank did appertain, might lawfully hinder him from uſing that Inſtrument to ſave his Life, which providence had furniſhed him with, 10 tar is it from this, that he ought to help us, if he can, to ſeize it. (a) 'Tis true, Puniſhmenes are not due to Criminals by virtue of any Compact, but fince the Right of Life and Death, or the bisher of the Sword is conterr'd upon sovereigns, we are obliga nor to refinem when they make use of that Right, though it C. 2. 1. 3. 8ác. « Leviath. Engl. Book 1.C 14. upon our own perſons. See Mr. Barbeyrac's French Tranllation of this Book, Lib. 8. c. 3. 1. 4. Nore 8, and fo S. (b) De Cive “ lawfully be 48 Book III, Of the Nature of Promiſes 10 ૯૮ 06 16 Field; but he does not by this Act prejudice the at large in its proper place all be made out more lawfully done. The latter, if he declare by ſuffi- all other Men have an equal Right to obſtruct or pre- « cient Signs to another Perſon, who is willing to vent us. Thus much then we allow, That every “ receive ſuch a Right from him, that he conſents Man has naturally a Power or Licence of applying “ it ſhall be for the future, as unlawful for him- to his Uſe, any thing that is deſtitute of Senſe or “ ſelf to reſiſt hijn in the doing of a certain thing, of Reaſon. But we deny that this Power can be as he might before have juſtly reſiſted him. call’d a Right, both becauſe there is not inherent in Hercé he infers, That the transferring of Right con- thoſe Creatures, any Obligation to yield themſelves fifts purely in Non-reſiſtance; or that, he who in a unto Man's Service, and likewiſe, becauſe all Men State of Nature, transfers Right to another, does not being naturally equal, one cannot fairly exclude the give the other Party a new Right which before he reſt from poflefling any ſuch Advantage, unleſs by wanted, but only abandons his own Right of re- their Conſent, either Expreſs or Preſumptive (1), he fiſting ſuch a Perſon in the exerciſe of his . Which has obtain’d the peculiar and fole Diſpoſal or En- Affertion, according to his Hypothefis, he thus makes joyment of it. And when this is once done, out; “ Before any ſuch Act of transferring Right, he may then truly ſay he has a Right to ſuch a “ the Perſon to whom it is ſaid to be transferr'd, Thing. Or to decide the Buſineſs more briefly, we " had a Right to all things, and therefore it was may make uſe of this Diſtinction, That a Right to impoflible to give him a new one; but the Per- all things Antecedent to any human Deed, is not « ſon transferring, loſes his Liberty of juſt Refi- to be underſtood Excluſively, but Indefinitely only; “ ſtance, which before hindred the other, from ex- that is, we muſt not imagine one may engroſs all to erciſmg his Right in its full Extent. Therefore, himſelf, and exclude the reſt of Mankind; but only “ whoſoever in a state of Nature acquires a Right, that Nature has not defined or determined, what Por- “ only gains this Privilege, To enjoy his Primitive tion of things ſhall belong to one, what to another, Right ſecurely, and without juſt Diſturbance; till they ihall agree to ſhare her Stores amongſt 'em, “ for Example, If a Man in a State of Nature by by ſuch Allotments and Diviſions. Much leſs will “ Sale or Gift , makes over his Field to another, he the fame Equality amongſt Men admit, That one “ “ Ground, not the Right which all other Men have rather, true, That 110 Perſon will have a Right to “ to it; or which comes to the ſame, He declares govern any other Perſon, unleſs he acquire it in a pe- “ that he will not reſiſt, or hinder ſuch a particu- culiar manner, either by his Conſent, or by ſome « lar Perſon, who has a inind to make uſe of the other Antecedent Deed, as ſhall be made out more ; (2 “ of Mankind, who ſtill keep their Primitive IV. The proper Notion then, of transferring and Right, as well to this Spot of Earth, as to every of acquiring Right, will appear with more Exact- thing elſe which Nature affords. neſs, if we premiſe, that ſome Rights bear a regard III. But as we have formerly made out (a), that to Perfons, others to Things; and that the latter this Hobbefian State is by no means Natural to Man, kind of Rights is again divided into Original and a Creature deſign d for a Social Life, ſo neither can Derivative. I acquire a Right over a Perſon, if he we admit of what the ſame Author thus eſtabliſhes, either expreſly or tacitly Conſents, that I ſhall pre- as the Conſequence and Reſult of it, ſuch a Right fcribe to him what he ought to do, to ſuffer, or to of each Man to all things, as ſhall produce any Ef- forbear; by virtue of which Agreement he both ob- fect in reference to other Men. For the clearer Il- liges himſelf, voluntarily to ſtudy Obedience to my luſtration of this point, it is neceſſary to obſerve, Pleaſure, and at the ſame time grants me a Right That not every Natural Licence, or Power of doing of compelling him, in caſe of Default , to his Duty, a thing is properly a Right, but ſuch only as in- by propoſing ſome conſiderable Evil, which I ſhall cludes fome Moral Effect, with regard to others, otherwiſe bring upon him. A Man then acquires an who are Partners with me in the ſame Nature. Thus, Original Right over Things, when all others either for Inſtance, in the old Fable, the 'Horſe and the expreſly or tacitly renounce their Liberty of uſing Stag had both of them a Natural Power or Privi- ſuch a Thing, which before they enjoy'd in Com- lege of feeding in the Meadow ; but neither of them mon with him. This Original Right being once e- had a Right, which might reſtrain or take off the ſtabliſh’d, by virtue of which the Primitive Com- Natural Power in the other. So Man, when he im- munity of things was taken off, the transferring of ploys in his Deſigns and Services, Inſenſible or Ir- Right is nothing elſe but the palling it away from rational Beings, barely exerciſes his Natural Power, me to another, who before was not Maſter of it. if without regard to other Men, we here preciſely Hence appears the Abfurdity of ſaying, That the conſider it in reference-to the Things or Animals, transferring of Right conſiſts barely in Non-reſiſtance . which he thus uſes. But then at length, it turns In as much as that negative Term cannot expreſs the into a proper Right, when it creates this Moral force of the Obligation, ariſing from ſuch an Act; Effect in other Perſons, that they ſhall not hinder which properly implies an inward Inclination to him in the free uſe of theſe Conveniencies, and inake good the Contract: Though Non-reſiſtance be ſhall themſelves forbear to uſe them without his indeed one Conſequence of the Obligation, and with- Conſent. For 'tis ridiculous Trifling to call that out which it cannot be fulfilled. The Inſtance a- Powera Right, which ſhould we attempt to exerciſe, bout the Field propoſed by Hobbes, does not come CC 16 Di Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 3. (1) Our Author reaſons here upon a falſe Suppoſition, which I ſhall confute in its proper place. See my Notes on Lib: 4.C.4: All that can be ſaid is this, That before the Property of Goods was ſettled, no Man ought to exclude another alvvays from che uſe of any one thing, and when they had no farther uſe of it, it returned to the firſt Occupier, as if he had enjoyed it himſelf by that Title. (2) See c. 2. $ 7. of this book, and Lib. I. c. 6. $ 12, and Lib. 6.C. 2, 3. and Lib. 7. Ci 23. (4) Lib. 2. c. 2. § 7, &c. up Chap. V. and Pacts in general. 49 ther Men ſhould renounce the uſe of the fame Max. 1. 7. c. 8. v. 5, 6. See Grot. B. II. c. 11. f. 2. to the point in Hand; for beſides, that it is very hood and Diilimulation. But we are by no means up abfurd to call that an Act of Selling, when I only obliged to continue always in this Deſign; filice the quit my Pretenſions to a thing, whilſt all other Meninind of Man has not only a Natural Power of chang- till keep theirs ; even according to his own Do-ing, Opinion; but likewiſe a Right; ſo as to do it Ctrine, Propriety of things had its riſe from Civil without Fault, when there is no particular Obliga- Government (1), after the State of Nature was ſuppo- tion impoſing a Neceſſity of holding firmly to a ſed to be paſs’dl and gone. Therefore during the Reſolution already taken and declared. Yet theſe State of Nature, no Man could call the Field his ownl; Changes of Purpoſe are liable to juſt Cenſure, if ei- and conſequently not Sell it. “ He ought indeed ther the former Judgment from which we receded, "to have expreſs’d himſelf thus : Since in a State was better than this laſt; or if by altering our Mea- “ of meer Nature, Things belong’d no more to one fures ſo unexpectedly, we expoſe a Perſon to Diſap- " than to another, therefore if a particular Perfon pointment and Deriſion, who did not deſerve to un- “ deſired the ſole uſe of any thing, to inake him kind Treatinent at our Hands. See the Paſſage be- " Maſter of his Wiſh, it was neceſſary, that all o tween 2. Cecilius and T. Marius Urbinas in Valer, “ " thing. If they did this gratis, the Act had ſome- Though'it be often a juft (3) Puniſhment to baſe « what in it like a Gift; if with ſome Burthen or Flatterers and Deſigners, to balk them of their gree- “ under foine Condition, it was then a kind of dy Hopes, and to cheat the gaping Crows, when " a Contract (2) (a), for which we have no Name. they have prepared their Mouths for the Morſel. “ But ſhould one Man have renounced his Power Vid. Plin. 2. Epiſt: 20. Comp. Grot. 1. 2. C. 11. over ſuch a thing, this could have been no preju- f. 2. “ dice to others (3), and conſequently, he only VI. We may call it an Imperfe& Promiſe, when a “ would have been debarr’d from the uſe of it, who Man determines his Will to the doing a Favour « had thus freely quitted all Title to it. hereafter, with a ſufficient Sign to make it firin and V. Let us now carry on our enquiries, and exa- lafting, or ſo as fully to declare his Willingneſs to mine how a Man may contract an Obligation, and lie under an Obligation, but not ſo as to give the o- confer a Right on another, by means of his own ther Party any proper Right of compelling him to Promije. To underſtand the Nature and Effects ſtand to his Word. The like to which happens in the of this kind of Tie, we muſt in the firſt place ob- Duty of returning Kindneſſes, where the Receiver ſerve, That there are two ways of ſpeaking about is obliged to make a grateful Acknowledgınent, giving, or doing a thing to another, which now is, though the Giver has not a full Right to require or which we inagine, will hereafter be in our it. Some are of Opinion, that it is hardly polli- Power. The firſt way is, When we barely expreſs ble to produce an Inſtance of this kind of Proinile, our preſent Mind about a future A&t; yet ſo as to in the Law of Nature, barely conſider'd. It is uſu- lay no Neceſſity on our ſelves, of perſevering al- al to alledge for Examples, the Promiſe of an ab- ways in the ſame Reſolution. An Inſtance we have ſolute Prince made to his Subject, of a Maſter to his in what Tiberius in Tacitus (1) writes to his Fa- Servant, of a Father to his Son, whilft yet under vourite Sejanus, Ipfe quid intra animum volutaverim, his Power; by all which the Parties promiſing, quibus adhuc neceſſitudinibus immiſcere te mihi parem, ſtand obliged to make good their Engagement; but omittam ad prafens referre. I forbear to tell you at the others ſeem to want a Right of demanding it preſent, by what Fortunes, and by what Alliances I am from them, becauſe they are allow'd in no Court to conſidering to unite you to my ſelf. Such a bare Aſſer- bring an Aktion againſt them upon Default. But tion, neither founds an Obligation in me, nor a now the Lameneſs or Defect of theſe Promiſes does Right in the other Party (2). And to render it not ariſe from any intrinſick Weakneſs or Invalidi- Vertuous and Unblameable, there is only this Con- ty; but from that Superiour Quality or Station in dition requiſite, That we ſpeak as at preſent, we re- the Promiſers, which hinders the Obligation from ally think, and do not impoſe upon a Man by Falſe- taking its full outward Effect. Others inſtance in Mr. Barbeyrai's NOTES on S 4. (1) See Mr. Hobbes's Treatiſe De Cive, c.6.916. and c. 14.9 10. and what our Author ſays, Lib. 8. c. 1. § 2. following. (2) I ſhall explain this Term, Lib. s. C. 2. $ 7. (3) This is grounded upon a falſe Hypotheſis, as I have ſhewn in Nore I. of the foregoing Paragraph. The truth is, That till a Man abandons a thing, of which he had poffeſfed himſelf, with a deſign to make uſe of it, it belongs to him, and no Man may difpofleſs him of it'; but if he releaſes it to another, as from hand to hand, this latter acquires the ſame Right, and conſe- quently excludes the Right of all others, until he again in his curn leaves to the firſt Occupier the thing which he had power to diſpoſe of all the while he had it, becauſe the Cellion of him who was in poſſeſſion before him, gave him power to prevent any other who would be Maſter of it. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S. 5. (1) Tac. Annal. Lib.4. c. 40. Numb. 9. Ed. Ricq. (2) Nulla promiffio poiest conſiſtere, que ex voluntate promittentis ftatum capit. Digeſt. Lib. 45. Tit. I. De Verborum Obligatio- nibus, Leg. 108. (3) The Author plainly ſpeaks here only of thoſe wandering hopes which ſome ſuffer others to conceive, or rather give them, to diſappoint the Coverouſneſs of thoſe who would cheat us, or deceive us of our Inheritance. So that here is no real Promiſe, nor any real Declaration of our Will fully, but not irrevocable, as was formed at the time, when the words or other equivoca- ting Signs were ſpoken, by which the Deceiver was deluded himfelf , and pleaſed himſelf with Smoke. See Lib. 4. c. 10.9 3. following. It may be convenient here to ſay ſomething of ſuch Promiſes , which, though made in jelt, were valid among the Romans, provided they were made in the form of a Stipulation. For if one ſay to another, Doſt thou promiſe me this or that? And he ſay, I do promiſe, the firſt had a juft Action againſt the other, and he was adjudged to make good his Promiſe, tho' he had no deſign to engage himſelf. But at length they found out an expedient to hinder the Effect of this fcrupulous Obſervation of Laws, contrary to all Natural Right: It was this, Altho' ſuch a promiſe would bear a juft action, it was eluded, and made null by the Right of the Prætor, who found out a poſitive Exception. See upon this Subject the fulius Paulus of Mr. Noodt, Chap. 11. and his Treatiſe, De forma emendandi Doli mali, &c. publiſhed in 1709. Chap. 11. (4) We ſhall explain this Term in Lib. 5. c. 2. f. 7. * G an 50 Of the Nature of Promiſes, Book III on, an imperfe&t Stipulation ; when the Civil Laws en our Pleaſure. It muſt be well obſerv'd, that what join, that Promiſes ſhall be made under ſuch a par- we here deliver, concerns only ſuch Promiſes as are ticular form of Stipulating Words; and will not per- made betwixt Men (1): For thoạit be impoflible , init a Man to ſue another upon his Promile, if it that the Divine Promiſes ſhould fail, yet it would did not run preciſely in thoſe Terms. Here they be highly Arrogant and Indecent to ſay, That theſe obſerye, That in caſe the Parties concern’d, fully in- ſeeming Engagements on God's Part do give a Right tended to contract a perfect Obligation, and omit- to Man, which ſhall hold valid againſt his Maker. ted the ſett Form of Law, only through Error or Add Grot. loc. cit. S. 3, 4. Imprudence, the Promiſer is by Natural Equity en VIII. It is a nice Remark of Mr. Hobbes (a), and gagʻd to perform his Word, though the other Perſon worthy our Notice, That in relinquiſhing or tranſ- cannot force hiin to it by an Aktion in Courts of Ci- ferring Right, if we make uſe of no Signs except Words , vil Judicature. But neither have we in this Exam- thoſe words ought to be of the time Preſent or Paft ple a Promiſe, which is Imperfe& upón account of For he for inſtance, who fliall ſay in the Future , the Law of Nature, but by Virtue of a Poſitive To Morrow will I give, plainly ſhews that he has Law, which ties up its Effect to ſuch a punctual not given already; and therefore the Right he has Form of Speech, a Reſtraint, which naturally it over the thing promiſed continues firm and entire did not lie under. A true Inſtance then, of all'im- all this Day, and all the next Day too, and fo perfe&t Promiſe is, When I expreſs my ſelf in this unleſs in the mean time he actually give it, or paſs manner, I really deſign to do this, or that for_you; away the Right of it by a new Promiſe. Yet in and I deſire you'd think I am in Earneſt , and ſpeak Truth. Caſe, beſides his Words, he made uſe of other Signs In which caſe I am bound to perform my Word, ra- ſufficiently arguing, that it was his Will to transfer ther by the Law of Veracity than of Juſtice; I lay the Right at preſent; then the Words, though Gram- an Obligation on my ſelf, but I give the other Par- matically Future, ſhall not hinder the Engagement ty no Right of forcing me to performn it. Men have from taking full Effect. But where theſe other naturally ſomewhat of Greatneſs and Generoſity in Signs are wanting, we ought to be very tender of their Temper, upon account of which they had putting ſo wide and forced an Interpretation on much rather ſeen to do a good Office, purely on the Verbs of the future Tenſe, as to make them imply free Motion of their own Virtue, than for the ſake a preſent Act of Alienation. For ſince we are not of any Right which another has to challenge it from wont to make over our Goods to others, without them. To this Head we may refer the Promiſes of the Proſpect of ſome Advantage to our felves , Men in Favour and Authority, when not by fair which Advantage does not, in theſe Acts of Grace Words and general Complements (1), but in a ſe- or free Gift, viſibly appear; therefore, in conſtru- rious and particular Manner , they engage to aſſiſt ing ſuch an Act, to which Men are commonly 2- ús by their Recommendation, Interceffion, Promo- verſe, we ought not to preſume on any thing far- tion or Suffrage; which yet they would not have a ther, than what is by expreſs Tokens of the Will Man challenge from them by virtue of any Right, declar'd. Eſpecially ſince it is uſual by theſe Terms but deſire they ſhould be imputed wholly to their to ſignifie only a Simple Mark of Good Will (1), Generoſity and Honour. Even the Law of Nature and ſuch as ſhall, at preſent at leaſt , have no El- does not ſeem to allow, that a Man ſhould be com- fect. So that whilft a Man fpeaks in the Fu- pellid to the Performance of theſe Promiſes; ſince ture (2), he is ſuppos’d to be yet under Delibera- in the very Act of Engaging himſelf, he made a tion; and before the time prefix’d, perhaps his af Tacit Reſerve againſt ſuch Proceeding; that his fection and the Merits of the Perſon may alter; or Benefit might carry the more Grace and Beauty in ſome Misfortune may intervene, rendring it Incom. it, by being remov'd as far as poſſible froin Necef- modious for him to part with what he intended. In ſity and Conſtraint. the ſame manner as he that makes his Will, does not VII. A perfect Promiſe is, when a Man not only transfer his Right immediately on the Heir ; but he determines his Will to the Performance of ſuch or is ſuppos'd ever to have this Clauſe or Condition in fuch a thing for another hereafter, but likewiſe ſhews his Mind, Such a Perſon ſhall be my Heir, unleſs I al- that he gives the other a full Right of challenging ter my Will before my Deceaſe. Though indeed, it be or requiring it from him. When we engage to give look'd upon as an Argument of Levity and Incon- away a particular thing, or to perform a particular ftancy, for a Man to cheat and delude another, with Service, the former is a kind of Alienation of our Goods, falſe Hopes and Expectations. or at leaſt ſomewhat in order to it; the latter is an The Caſe is very different, if I expreſs my felf Alienation of ſome part of our Natural Liberty; in thus, I have given, or do give to be deliver'd to Mor- as much as we are now to ſtick to the Reſtraint and row: For this is plainly, giving a Man to day the Confinement of our Promiſe about a Matter, which Right of having a thing to Morrow; or transferring before we might have uled, or done, or omitted at Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6. (1) See § 10. following. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 7. (1) See Lib. 2 Chap. I. $ 3. foregoing. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 8. (1.) is the ſame as (1) ar the bottom of the Page. (2) We may obſerve here, as Mr. Hirtius directs us, what the Modern Lawyers call, Tra&tatus ineundarum Conventionum, i.C. & Treaty in órder to an Agreement, or, Paéta contra&tuum præparatoria, i. e. Some previous Covenants in order to contracts , which we niay call , Preambles or Diſcourſes, by which we feem diſpoſed to enter upon a Bargain, and teſtifie fome deſire of Agreement, but conclude nothing poſitively for in this caſe every Man is free, and there muß be a nevy Treaty to render the Agreement full and entire. Hence it is ſaid in the Digeſts, That if any one hath promiſed to lend us any Money, we may receive it, or not, as we pleaſe, Qui pecuniam creditam accepturus ſpolpandit Creditori futuro, in poteſtate habet, ne Creditori je obſtringat , Lib. 12. Tit. I. De Rebus Creditis, &c. Leg. 30. Sce what Mr. Hirtius ſays there, as his Parcemia fur.German. Lib. 1. c. 8. $ 5. (a) De Cive, c. 2. 1. 6, &c. & Leviath. Engl. Pt. I. c. 14. (1) In the laſt Editions of the Original there is effe&tum for effe. &xm, which encirely corrupts the Senſe; and yet Mr. Hirtius has retained it in the laſt Edition of 1706. to CHAP. V. and Pacts in general. SI to him to day the Right over a thing, which ought may lay on himſelf a Neceſſity of ſome future Per- to morrow to be actually deliver'd to him. Nor is fornance (3) (4) (5).Tull . Off. 1. c. 7. The Foundation it any Objection againſt what we have been aſſert- of Juſtice is Faith, that is to ſay, a Firmneſs and ing, That according to the ordinary form and man- Truth in our Words, Promiſes and Contracts. Hence ner of Speech, moſt Promiſes are expreſs’d in Terms fome will have the word Fides to be call'd quia fit of Futurity. For in the moſt folemn Engagements quod dictum eſt, becauſe that which was ſaid is done, by formal Stipulation, or by, Oath, we uſe the ſame Ulpiah in l. 1. D. de Pactis. What is ſo agreeable to way of ſpeaking, ſhall have ſuch a thing of me; human Faith, as to obſerve mutual Agreements ? I will give ſuch a thing, &c. The reaſon of which Vid. D. 1. 2. C. 14. de Pastis. It was a very wicked Cuſtom is. That the delivering of a thing promis?d, Jeſt of the petit Prince of Bantam, when being re- generally follows at ſome Diſtance. And indeed, proved for breach of Promiſe, he anſwer’d, His we can ſcarce call it a Promiſe, when at the ſame Tongue had rio Bone in it, to make it more ſtiff tiine the Intention of giving is declared, and the than was neceſſary for his Intereſt. Whether Con- thing actually tendred; in as much as there ſeems nanus has with any Colour oppoſed this univerſal here, either to have been no Obligation, or ſuch as Judgment, will appear, if we beſtow a little time expired in the very minute that it was contracted. on taking his chief Arguments under Confiderati- However, it is plain the generality of Men never on. In the firſt place then, he ſays, That he who think they properly have a thing, till they get firm rafhly believes a Promiſe made without Cauſe is no leſs hold and full poſſeſſion of it. If then theſe Terins to blame, than the vain Perſon who made it. Now of Futurity occur in a perfect Promiſe, as for In- here all the Difficulty lies in explaining what he ſtance, To inorrow I will give you an hundred Pounds, means by a Promiſe made without Cauſe. Įf he the ſenſe of them amounts to this, I now give you a would be underſtood of ſuch Promiſes as if not per: Right to have and to require of me the ſaid Sum; form’d, it brings no Loſs or Prejudice to the Party, and I likewiſe oblige my ſelf on the day appointed, to to whom they were directed, and if fulfill’d, muſt deliver it to you accordingly. We may ſettle the needs create Trouble or Damage to the Performer; whole Point with more Brevity, by only ſaying, we are willing to allow, that Engagements of this That Verbs of the future Tenſe, made uſe of in Pro- kind produce no Obligation. For how can a Man miſes , and eſpecially the Term of Giving, do either have any Right of requiring me to put my ſelf to imply an Olligation hereafter to be contracted, and any Charges, or any Toil, in doing a thing which then they neither transfer the Thing nor the Right to ſhall profit him nothing (6) (l)? And it is indeed another ; or elſe they import the delivering of a thing againſt Reaſon, to undertake an Action which can hereafter, the Right to which either is now, or has produce no Good, and may produce Evil. Thus for been formerly transferr’d; and then they do not hinder Inſtance, fuppoſe you had got me to promiſe you the Promiſe from being moſt Perfect and Compleat. that I would forbear eating four Days together ; up- IX. It is requiſite, that whilſt we are engaged on on what account ſhould I ſtand to ſuch a raſh En- this Point, we endeavour to ſettle a famous Que- gagement, if ſo long a Faſt would Prejudice my ftion, which has been much canvaſs’d by Authors, Health, and yet would contribute nothing to your Whether there can be a force of obliging in bare Pro- Intereſt or Advantage? Therefore in this Cafe, it miſes, or in bare Pacts, whilſt they are no more than is alike Vain and Fooliſh in one Man to make the Verbal Agreements, and are not ſtrengthen’d by a- Promiſe, and in the other ſeriouſly to challenge ny actual (1) Performance betwixt the Parties (2)? the Performance of it. Beſides, ſince Promiſes are Connanus the Civilian has been the Principal Aller- matters of Grace, or free Favour, they ought to be tor of the Negative Side; whoin Grotius (a), and o- interpreted under this Condition or Limitation, thers have laboured to confute. And indeed, it has Provided I can compaſs the thing I ſpeak of, without been the fixt Opinion of Wiſe and Learned Men in any conſiderable Damage to my felf . Nor can the Per- all Ages, That Faith ouglit to be kept inviolably, ſon to whom I make the Promiſe be ſo impudent and though given only in Words; or that a Man by unreaſonable, as to deſire that my kindneſs ſhould Speaking only, without the Intervention oí any Deed, be an Injury to me, and that I ſhould enrich him Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6.9. (1) Euvenaayrect. See what is ſaid, Lib. 5. c. 2. $ 2,3• (2) Comment. Jur. Civ. Lib. 5. c. 1. Bue Mr. Buddeus in his Element. Philof. Prat. Part 2. c. 4. 8 9. afferts, That this Lawyer is fally accuſed of any ſuch Opinion. Mr. Hirtius alſo rejects the Opinion of a certain nameleſs perſon, who juſtified Connan, and maintains, That chat perſon ſpake only of fimple Contracts, conſidered as they are uſed in the Roman Judícature. For he Jays, We muſt here diftinguiſh between theſe two Propofitions, The one is , Thar Promiſes produce a Natural Obligation, and the other, That the Natural Obligation which arifes from a Promiſe, does not produce a Civil Obligation, which is founded upon a Maxim of the Law of Nature, which auchorizes a Sovereign Prince to declare what Obligations Thall be valid, and what null. Nevertheleſs, according to Mr. Hirtius, we need only to read Connan's Reaſons to convince us, that he denies Promiſes to pro- duce any, Obligations able naturally and of themſelves to give a perfect Right; without the Alfiſtance of the Civil Law. (3) The Latin of Cicero is, Fundamentum Juſtitie est fides, (i.e.) dieorum conventorumq; conftantia do veritas, eaque de cauſa fi. dem appellat am, quia fiat quod di&tum eft. (4) And Ulpian's, Quid tam congruum fidei humanæ, quam ea, qua inter eos placuerünt ſervare? (5) is the ſame with (b) at the botcom. CO) We muſt diſtinguiſh here between Pacts of Agreements, which may be called Momentary, which are performed immedi- ately, and leave no durable effect after them, and succeſſive, whoſe performance is accompanied with a long train of Effects. As to the firſt, there is no neceſſity that they ſhould have any impulfive Cauſe, or ſuitable Motive; but as to the latter, they do pot oblige, unleſs they have a fufficient impulline Cauſe, or which comes to the fame; unleſs they tend to profit. The fort of Engagements without this are not only unprofitable, but hurtful to Society; becauſe by the duration of their Efects they may caure Trouble and Diſorder in the Affairs of the World. As for example , if any one promiſe nor ro alienate his Eſtate without the Confene of his Neighbour. See the Digeſts, Lib. 2. Tit. 14. De Pattis, Leg. 61. (and Mr Hirtius's Diſſertation, Encicled, De Palto, ne Dominus rem ſuam alienet, Tom. 3. Opufc.). In fine, Men having establiſhed Pacts and Covenants for their advan? tage and not to hurt or deceive one another, every Agreement, whichaims noc at the laſt of theſe Views, may be, and oughe to be looked upon as null by the Natural Law. Tit. obferv. in Lauterbách. Ob. 59. Sec Lib. 5.0.2. $ 3. Note 3. (a) I 2. c. 11. f. 1. &4. (b) Vid. D. 1., 2. T. 14. Leg. 61: + G2 by 52 Of the Nature of Promiſes, Book III me it muſt be by iny own Loſſes (7). It often falls out (8), that depend upon his Word, if he deſign’d not fully to even not to keep ones Promiſe ſhall be juſt. juft. For oblige himſelf to the making it good? For the de all muſt be referr'd to the Fundamental Rules of Ju- nying of a Benefit is then only void of Injury, when ſtice; as firſt, That no Man be wrong'd, and ſeconda Man is bound to confer it only by the Law of Hu- ly, That the Publick good be as far as poſſible pro- manity ; not when by expreſs Proiniſe he has given moted. It may likewife happen, That the Perfor- another a Right to receive it. mance of a Promiſe or Contract, would prove high X. Connanus urgeth farther, « That ſince Pro- ly prejudicial (9), either to one of the Parties, or to “ miſes of this kind commonly ariſe from Oſtenta- the other. For if Neptune ( as it is in the Story) tion, rather than good Will, or at leaſt from had not made good his Promiſe to Theſeus, Theſeus “Raſhneſs and Inconſiderancy, ſuppoſing the De- had not been ſo unfortunately deprived of his Soni ſign to be real; the Fortunes of Men would be Hippolytus. Therefore neither are we to keep thoſe “ in great Danger, were they bound to perforin e- Promiſes which are unprofitable to the Perſon to very thing they ſaid. It was perhaps on ſome whom they are made; nor thoſe which are more fuch Principle, That the Ancients imagined the hurtful to our ſelves than advantageous to him. It Oaths and Proteſtations of Lovers were invalid, and is a breach of Duty to prefer a greater Damage to a that the Gods excuſed the breach of them, as pro- lefs. If you promiſe to plead another Man's Cauſe, ceeding from Minds blinded with Paffion. Plato in and in the Interim your Son falls dangerous ill, it Sympoſ. & Poetæ paflım. But indeed the Danger will be no Violation of your Duty to recede from here mention’d is chiefly in Imagination. For we the prior Engagement; and the Fault will be much do not attribute a Power of obliging to any Promiſes , greater in the other Party, if he complain of ſuch a but to ſuch as are inade upon ſerious and deliberate Diſappointment. Tull . Off. 1. Vid. D. L. 50. T. purpoſe; and he that miſtakes jeft for earneſt (1) 17. ought to pay for his want of Apprehenſion. On the Add. Senec. de Benef. 1. 4.c. 35.39. Tull . Off . 1. 3. other hand to proiniſe really more than one can This Caſe is propoſed, I have a Remedy given for conveniently perform, as acknow- the Dropfie , upon this Condition, That if it cures me, I ledg’d a Fault, ſo it would be a much greater, and am never to uſe that Medicine again. Within a few indeed a piece of Barbarity, ftri&ly to challenge Tears after I have been thus cured, I relapſe into the and require it. Aurelian, in Flavius Vopiſcus, c. 35. Same Miſeaſe, and the Perſon with whom I contracted Setting out on an Expedition, and promiſing the People will not give me leave to make any farther uſe of it. to beſtow Crowns of two pound weight on them, if he What am I to do here? It is Inhumanity in him to re- returned vi&torious, when the Diſtribution was to be fuſe me, beſides, that my uſing it would do him no made, the Crowns proved only of Bread, whereas the hurt. Í may therefore Jafely conſult my own Life and People expected them of Gold (2). And beſides, we Health. the ſhould take care to diſtinguiſh between ſuch Terms But if by a Promiſe made without Cauſe, Connanus of (3) Honour and Eſteem as Perſons made uſe of to underſtands only a Gratuitous, or free Promiſe with expreſs in an indefinite manner, their good Affedi- out proſpect of Gain; then his Affertion will over on towards us ; and ſuch particular Engagements as throw the whole Buſineſs of Beneficenice and Libe- they bind themſelves by, to perform ſomewhat on rality, and make all the Offices of Humanity baſe our behalf: For Men of good Nature and good Breed- and mercenary Performances. For why should not ing often expreſs their Kindneſs and Civility'in ve- I credit of a Maii who knowing his own Abilities, ry ample Terms; they declare themſelves to be ena has bid me expećt ſome free Gift from him, purely tirely ours, and offer all they have to our Service that I may have occaſion to love and to eſteem and Diſpoſal (a) (4). Old Æolus in Virgil had this him? And ſince if he had pleas'd, he might ſafely piece of Gallantry : have forborn the Promiſe, why did he order me to (7) This is contrary to Nature, according to the Roman Lawyers. Jure Nature æquum eſt, neminem cum alterius detrimento do injuria fieri locupletiorem, Digeſt. Lib. 50. Tit. 16. De Diverſ. Reg. Jur. Leg. 206. (8) The Latin of Cicero is this, Sed incidunt fæpe tempora, cum ea, quæ maximè videntur digna ejfe juſto homine, eoque, quem virum bonum dicimus, commutantur, fiuntque contraria, ut reddere depoſitum, promiſa facere, quæq; pertinent ad veritatem, & ad fidem, ea migrare interdum, do non ſervare ſit juftum. Referri enim decet ad ea, quæ propoſui in principio, fundamenta juſtitie, primum, ut nequis noceatur ; deinde ut communi utilitati ferviatur. Cum tempora commutantur, commutatur Officium, do non ſemper eſt idem, poteft enim accidere promiſſum aliquod, & conventum, ut id effici fit inutile, vel ei, cui promiſſum fit, vel ei, qui promiſerit. Nam, fi ut in fabulis eft, Neptunus, quod Theſeo promiſerat, non feciſſet, Theſeus filio Hippolyto non esſet or batus. Ex tribus enim optatis, ut fcribitur , hoc erat tertium, quod de Hippolyti interitu iratus opt avit (See Eurip. Hippolyc. v. 1315,&c.) quo impetrato, in maximos lu&tus incidir . Nec promiſſa igitur fervanda ſunt ea, que fint iis, quibus promiſeris inutilia, nec fi pius tibi noceant, quam illi profint cui promiferis. Contra officium eft majus non anteponi minori, ut fi conſtitueris te cuipiam aduocatum in rem præſentem eße venturum, atque interim gra. viter agiotare filius cceperit, non fit contra officium, non facere, quod dixeris, magiſa; ille cui promiffum fit, ab officio, si se deftitutum queratur. Cicero de-Offic. Lib. 1. c. 10. Si quis medicament um cuiquam dederit ad aquam istercutem, pepigeritq; ne illo medicamento unquam poſtea uteretur, fi eo medicamento (anus fa&tus fuerit, & annis aliquot poſt inciderit in eundem morbum, nec ab eo quicum pepi. ger at impetret, ut item eo liceat uti, Quid faciendum fit? Cum is fit inhumanus, qui non concedat uti, nec ei quicquam fiat injurie, vite do ſaluti conſulendum. Ib. Lib. 2. c. 24. where there are alſo ſome other Examples. (9) See Lib. I.C. 3. S 7. Note 1. da ai ? tema.109 Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 10. (1) See 65 Nore 3. aforegoing, a (23. Mr. Thomaſius thinks that the People were beſotted when they believed the Croivns ſhould be of that weight; but on the other hand, that the Emperor mocked his Subjects by giving his Promiſe ſuch a ſtrait Interpretation, which look'd like a Trick. There was really cauſe to believe that the Crowns promiſed by the Emperor were nor Crowns made of Dough. (3) Ea autem fola Dida five Promi ſa admittenda funt, quæcunq; fic dicuntur, ut praftentur, non ut jawentur, Digeſt . Leg. 21. Tit . D: De Ádilitio edi&to, Leg. 19. See Mr. Hirtius's Parcemia Jur. German. Lib. 1. c. 1o. lagi Od to (4), is the ſame as (a). (a) See what Ahab faid to Benbaład, 1 Kings 20. 3, &c. Tho' Joſephus in his Antiquities, 1. 8. c. 8. otherwiſe interprets the buc Benhadad took them in a ſtrieter Meaning, for the very propriety and possession. Add. Polyb, excerpt. Leg. 13. G Liv. l. 36. cože cerning Phanéas the Ætolian Ambaſſador. SA and Tuus CHAP. V. and Pacts in general. 53 , a then is the from thoſe, when Tuus, O Regina, quid optasse other Mens Inconſtancy and Irreſolution. The Explorare labor : mihi juſſa capeſſere fas eft . Law of Nature commands us to lend to another, fo Æn. 1. v. 80, 81. far as we can do it without any conſiderable Preju- dice to our felves. But the Obligation is rendred o amore ſtrict and binding, if by our own free Offer Great Queen, be pleas'd to ſay we reduce this general and unlimited Injunction of The thing you wiſh: my Duty's to obey. Nature to a particular Engagement, and aſſure the Party that he may expect for certain it ſhall be Here the Goddeſs had been uncivil, ſhould ſhe fulfild. So that this Argument is plainly falſe; have taken advantage of his general Compliment. If I had not promis'd, it had been nevertheleſs the Words of this Nature then, how ever ſeriouſly deli- Duty of a juſt and good Man to relieve the Indigence ver’d, oblige a Man to no certain Performance, but of others; therefore it is laudable to ſtand to Promiſes, only ſerve to teſtifie his hearty Reſpect and kind not becauſe we have bound our felves by giving our Inclination towards another (a). But thoſe Pro- Word, but becauſe the Party is in real want of our miſes by which we impower another to expect ſome Succour. particular and determinate Service from us, ought He is willing to grant thus much, That if a Man moſt ftri&tly to be fulfill’d, becauſe the other Par- by breaking his Promiſe, has caus’d the other Party ty building on our word has adjuſted his Affairs ac to ſuffer Damage; (who for inſtance might depend cordingly. So, though there now and then hap- perhaps on his Word, and ſo neglect to provide for pens an Inſtance of a vain Prodigal, who ſhould have his own Neceſſities ;) that in this caſe he ihould be been put under Government for a Fool or a Mad- bound to make good the Loſs ſuſtained. And from man, that ruins himſelf by profuſe and inconſide- this Conceifion we may as fairly infer, That Pro- rate Engagements, this ought to be no Reaſon why miſes may be challeng'd, and that we ſtand oblig’d we fhould affirm all Verbal Obligations to be In- to perform them, left we prejudice the Perſons lid, and baniſh them from the uſe of human Life: to whom they were directed. But it is very dana As we don't condemn Suretiſhip in General, though gerous to draw thence fuch Conſequences as theſe ; many have ſuffer'd fo feverely by it. Upon the That when you would not be in a worſe Condition, whole, fince an expreſs Promiſe paſſes into a Debt, ſhould I break my Promiſe, than you was before I made Men ought to be very cautious of engaging for more. 'it , I may then have liberty of revoking it ; [uppofing than they are able to compaſs. And 'tis not Mode that nothing yet been done towards the Performance. ſty, but a vicious Weakneſs in any Perſon to be fo And it is more againſt Nature for you to require me eaſie ard tender, that he dares not deny the moſt to make good this Engagement againſt my Will for your impudent and unreaſonable Petitioner (5) Gain and Benefit, than it would be for me to recal it XI. What Connanus alledges more in defence of without your Detriment. For the Duty of Humanity his Opinion, may be folv'd with little Difficulty, is not fulfill'd by your not hurting another; but "Tis fit that ſome things ſhould be left you ought as far as you are able poſitively to ad- to every Man's Honeſty and free Bounty, and vance his Good. Therefore when you have peculi- that ſhould not be reduced to the Rigour and arly engaged your ſelf to ſuch a kind Performance Neceſſity of ſtrict Obligation. That the ſtudy on his behalf, to repent of your deſign only with of Integrity and Conſtancy would improve a- this Confideration, That it is not like to be the mongſt Mankind, were there but a Field left for worſe for your Inconſtancy, looks as if it were a thoſe Vertues to exert and exerciſe themſelves thing not worth a Man's Regard to improve the pell’d to obſerve all the Promiſes they make fame with theſe Verbal Promiſes as with thoſe Pacts But that otherwiſe it was a great and glorious which have receivid the farther Confirmation of thing to perform, what by Words or other Signs fome Deed between the Parties , and no one will " the more glorious , the leſs it ſeeind conſtrain’d. that our change of Mind will not render the other But indeed there is ſtill left ſcope enough for Li- Perſon's Condition worſe, but only negatively, not berality, though you give a Man a Right (of de better. Beſides, as Grotius well obſerves from this inanding ſomewhat from you, which at firft you Opinion of Connanus, taken in fo groſs and general might have ſecurely denied him.iz à manner as he expreſſes it, 'twill follow, That And fince there muſt needs paſs ſuch a mighty (1) Articles of Agreement made between the number of Promiſes amongſt Men, whilſt they con- Princes and the People of different Nations, ſo long tinually want the aſſiſtance of each other, it is as nothing has yet been perform’d on either ſide, more for the Intereſt of Humane Affairs, That there are invalid ; and eſpecially in ſuch places where mhould be leſs Glory in the Act of keeping Faith, 10 particular forms of Leagues or Covenants have than that fo inany perſons ſhould be deluded by been receivd into uſe. And were this true, a ge- ette better (5) To which purpoſe Terence ſpeaks in his Andria, A&t 4, Scene 1. v. 5, Coc. - Imo, id genus eſt hominum pefimum Tum impudentiſima corum ratio eſt, Indenegando modo queis pudor eft paululum auro Quis tu es. Quis mihi es? Cur meam tibi? Heus Post, ubi jam tempus eſt promiſſa perfici Tum coa&ti neceſario ſe aperiunt do timent, Proximus Sum egomet mihi! attamen, ubi fides Et tamen res cogit eos denegare, ibi 9 90* Si roges, Si roges, nil pudet. Hic ubi opus eſt, Plutarch alſo in Brutus relates it thus , Tu éro töv dverger teen die megóv|wv 57100, &c. It is unbecoming a great Man to yield zwij u Non verentur, illic ubi nibil opus eft, ibi verentur. to impudene Petitioners. Brutus uſed to say, They do not leem to have employed their Youth well, who are not able to deny (1) We ſhall treat of this, lib. 8. c. 8. & 9 following: Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 11. («) Add. Fern. Vafq. Controver! illuftr. l. 1. c. 10,1. 20, &c. nera) He ſays, 86 any thing. CA 92 54 Of the Conſent required in Book III. cu 5. 60. in the Nores. neral Diffidence and Jealouſie muſt reign amongſt ſerving, That the Reaſon of this Caution in the Civil Mankind, and no one muſt believe another any Law was not becauſe ſerious Promiſes do not bind farther than he can ſee him. Which cloſe and im- by the meer Law of Nature ; but that the Ceremony mediate way of tranſacting the Condition and Cir- of theſe ſolemn (2) Forms might put Men on conti. cumſtances of many. Men will not admit of; who dering throughly, whether it was expedient for may nevertheleſs have occaſion to ſettle Buſineſs thein to enter into a. Promiſe, which it would be with each other. impoſſible afterwards to revoke. As likewiſe, that The laſt Argumeitt of Connanus taken from the the things proinis’d might by this means be expreſsa Practice of the Roman Courts of Law, which gran- more punctually and plainly, leſt any Obfcurity in ted an Aktion only upon ſuch Proiniſes as were that reſpect might give Occaſion to future Cavils confirm'd by Stipulation, is eaſily anſwer'd by ob- and Diſputes (a). (2) See Lib. 5. c. 2. $ 3. following: But Mr. Thomaſius maintains, nevertheleſs, thac they that eſtabliſh'd theſe Forms among the Romans, had ſuch deſigns as tended more to advance their private Intereſt, than the publick Good. The Patricians labour by this means to keep the People in a dependance upon them, and by making the Laws obſcure, interpreted them as they pleated, and by multiplying Forms of Law without end, open a large Field for Contentions and Diviſions. This Pomponius che Lawyer tells us plainly in a Fragment preſerved in the Digeſts, Deinde ex his Legibus (duodecim tabularum] eodem tempore fere agiones compofita funt, quibus inter se bomines diſceptarent, quas a&tiones, nè. Populus prout vellet inſtitueret, certas, ſolenneſq; voluerunt, &c. Et quidem ex omnibus qui ſcientiam [Furis civilis] na&ti funt ante Tiberium Coruncanium (He was the firſt of the People that arrived at the Dignity of Pontifex Maximus, (i.e.) The High-Prieſt) publicè profeſjum neminem traditur, cateri autem ad hunc vel in latenti jus civile retinere cogitabant, ſolumq; conſultoribus (vacare] potius, quam diſcere volentibus præftabant, Lib. r. Tit. 2. De Origine furis, Leg. 2. $ 6. 35. See the Navi Juriſpr. Rom. by Mr. Thomafius. l. 1. p. 12, doc. and his Divine Civil Law, l. 2. (a) Add. I. 19. Tir. 5. D. præfcript. verb. . bil CH A P. VI. Of the Conſent required in making Promiſes and Patts. It IV. SIN Conſent is required to make Promiſes and Paesi IX. A Suſpicion of a Cheat makes Paets void. Conſent is ſignifyed Openly or Tacitly. OD X. XI. XII: XIII. Fear makes Promiſes and Packs III. Conſent ſuppoſes the uſe of Reaſon. void. : Great Drunkenneſs hinders it. XIV. How Promiſes, null in themſelves, may be made V. Of ſuch as are under Age, valid. VI. OfError in Promiſes. Count XV. Of the Conſent of the Perſon to whom a Promiſe VII. Of Error in Promiſes and Contracts. is made. VIII. Of Fraud; TOV XVI. Of the Signs and Inſtruments of Conſent. Hon NCE the regular Effect of Pacts and Promiſes interpreted for Confent. Thus to be filent, is to is to abridge and reſtrain our Liberty, and to own your Crime, Euripid. Iphigen. in Aulid. v. 1142 . lay on us the Burthen of neceſſarily doing ſuch or vid. D. Lib. 50. Tit. 17. But in all theſe Excep- ſuch a thing, which before we might have perform'd tions it is ſtrictly required, That the State and Con- or omitted at our pleaſure; there can be no better dition of Affairs be ſuch as ihall on every ſide Argument to hinder a Man from complaining of conſpire to ground the Preſumption; and that not this Burthen, than to alledge, That he took it upon ſo much as one probable Conjecture appear to the him by his own free Will and Confent, when he contrary. For otherwiſe it would be very hard had full Power to refuſe it (1). ROMU Meaſure to put a Man under Obligation, upon any 11. This Conſent is uſually declared by expreſs little Hint or Symptom of Agreement. And thus Signs, as by Speaking, Writing, Nodding, &c. Yet we ſee wherein the proper Nature of a Tacit Puff ſometimes, without the help of any ſuch Tokens, it conſiſts; That it happens, when we expreſs not our is ſufficiently gather’d from the Nature and Cir. Conſent by the Signs generally made uſe of in Hu- cumſtance of the Buſineſs (a) (I). And it is well mane Commerce and Tranſactions ; but leave it to known that (2) Silence it ſelf in many Caſes, is be ſuppos'd from the Buſineſs it felf, and from the 57 ORE 197W DA Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. 6. § 1. (1) The wiſe King Solomon has expreſſed this matter well in theſe Words, which Grotius has quoted, My Son, if thou haft promiſed any thing to another, and thou haſt bound thy hands in favour of him for whom thou art engaged, thou art fnared with the words of thy mouth, thou art taken with the words of thy Mouth, Prov. vi. 1, 2, Hence it is that the Hebrews call Promiſes a Bond, Numb. xxx. 5. See alſo what Grotius ſays, Lib. 2. C. II. S. 4 numb. 1. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 2. (2) Qui tacet, non utique fatetur, ſed tamen verum eſt eum non negare. Digeft. 1. so. Tit. 17. De Diverfis Regulis Juris. Leg. 142. See Numb. xxx. 5. with Mr. Le Clerc's Notes, and Mr. Hirtius's Paræmia Jur. German. c. 7. (a) Labeo ait convenire posle vel re; vel per Epiſtolam, vel per nuncium ; inter abſentes quoq, [posſe]: fed etiam tacite conſenſu con- venire intelligitur. Digeft. 1. 2. Tit. 14. de Partis, Leg. z. Conventiones etiam tacita valent. ibid. Leg. 4. See alſo l. 13. Tic.6. Commod, vel contr. Leg. 13. $ 2. in fin. . . . Circumſtances CHAP. VI. making Promiſes and Patts. 55 Circunftances that attend it (3). What we moſt this is not a place where Men are treated for 10 cominonly meet with of this kind is, That when thing. fome principal and leading Contract has been entred In like manner, the Obligation between a Guar- upon by, expreſs Agreement, ſome other Tacit Pact dian and his Ward (5), has its Riſe from a Tacit is included in it, or flows from it, as we cannot Contract (a). but apprehend upon conſidering the Nature of the As for thoſe Tacit Pacts which we obſerv'd to flow Affair. In the ſame manner moft Covenants leave from Principal Contracts, and which we may call fome flight Exceptions and Conditions to be underſtood. Acceſary, theſe Examples will ſhew the Nature and But we muſt have a care of ſtretching theſe Indul- the Manner of them. A Man that bargains with gences any farther than is well conſiſtent with the another to have free Ingreſs to a Place (6), is fup- carrying on of Trade and Buſineſs in the World ; left pos’d at the ſame time to obtain Liberty of Regreſs they fhould prove of ill Conſequence to the Vali- from it, though this be not expreſly mentioned, be- dity of Contracts, by rendring them too flippery cauſe otherwiſe the former Agreement would be to and uncertain. no purpoſe. A Prince or Magiſtrate, who by Cove Of Tacit Pa&ts, it may not be amiſs to offer theſe nant gives leave to Strangers to frequent his Mar- few Inſtances. A Stranger comes into a State where kets, is ſuppos’d to conſent likewiſe, That they ſhall Foreigners are treated with great Civility, and he carry home the Goods they purchaſe there. As 017 comes in a friendly manner here , though he does the contrary, it would be moſt ridiculous Madneſs not exprefly fwear Fealty to the Government, yet for me; ſuppoſing I have ſold a Field to another, he is ſuppos’d by the very Act of his coming, tacit- to deny him the Liberty of poffeffing it here, and ly to have engaged, That according to his Rank to deſire he would tranſlate it to another place. In and Condition, he will conforın to every Law of the ſame manner, he who lets out a Chamber to the Place, fo foon as he ihall underſtand that ſuch hire, is ſuppos’d to conſent withal, that the Lodger a Law was deſign'd to reach all manner of Perſons ſhall make uſe of ſuch other parts of the Houſe, as who ſhould abide in thoſe Territories. And on the he cannot be without; as of the Doors, Entries and other ſide, the Government tacitly engages to grant the like; at leaſt ſo far as to have free Acceſs to his him Security and Protection, and the Benefits of Apartment, and free Paſſage from it. publick Juſtice. Inſtances of Tacit Exceptions and Conditions are A Man is abroad at a diſtance from his Family ſo frequent, that 'tis not neceſſary to ſet down any and his Concerns, in the inean time a Neighbour in particular. But we muſt obſerve this of them without particular Orders, tranſacts fome Buſineſs in general,That they were ever to be interpreted with for him; here again we muſt ſuppoſe a Tacit Pact, the greateſt Strictneſs and Severity of Judgment ; by virtue of which the one having lent his free and that they will hold good no farther than it ap- Aliftance and Service, the other is bound to requite pears from very fure Grounds and Preſumptions, the Pains, and to refund the Charge. In as much that they were conſented to by the Parties whom as it may be fairly preſum'd (4), That had the ab- they concern. Add. 1. 22. D. de Probation. & Pre- ſent Party known how Affairs ſtood, he would rea- ſumptionib. l. 24. For otherwiſe, it would be eaſie dily have conſented to the whole Management. to thruſt a troublefoine Obligation upon a Man againſt A Gueſt ſits down to a Table at a publick Houfe; his Will. And were too great a Licence given to and though he has not exchang'd a word with the theſe ſecret and implied Reſerves, there is ſcarce Hoft about the Price of his Dinner, yet by the bare any Covenant, which might not be either annulla Act of fitting down to eat, he is ſuppos’d to conſent or evaded (7) (b). to the Payment of his Scot; ſince all know that Our Author di. (3) A Tacir Conſent properly ariſes from certain things done, or omitted on purpoſe; but yet of themſelves do not imply directly an Approbation of the thing that is a doing. Further, we diſtinguiſh a preſumptive or ſuppoſed Conſent, as the Roman Lawyers ſpeak, which confifteth in this, That though a perſon be abſolutely ignorant of what paſſes, and conſequently could aeither indirectly nor directly agree to it, yer we ſuppose he acquiefces in it, becauſe we believe, That if he knew it, he would freely confent, or at leaſt that he ought lo to do by the Maxims of Natural Équiry: But this ſort of Conſent is of no uſe nor neceſſity in Civil Life; and the Lawyers invented it only to found certain Obligations upon, for which they could not ſee any true Principles. If we conſider this matter well, we Mall find that what they refer to a preſumptive or ſuppoſed Confent, may cafily be deduced, either from a Tacit Conſent properly ſo called, or from the neceſſary Duties of Sociecy, without any other Conſent. And hence it is, that the Terms Tacit and preſumptive are often uſed one for another in this caſe. ſtinguiſhes neither the Terms nor Notions, as appears from the Examples he alledges of them that do another's Bufinels at his and of thoſe who take upon chem a Guardianſhip. Titius's obferv. on Puffendorff, 105, 106. and in Compend. Lauter- bach Obſerv. 56. See l. 4. C. 13. $ 5. Note 11. We may alſo find ſome very good Remarks upon this Diſtinction of a Tacit and Preſumptive Conſent in Mr. Thomafius's Inſtitut. Juriſprud. Divin. I. 2. c. 7. $ 19, &c. whoſe Notions, though they ſeem diffe- rent, may caſily be made to agree with our Authors, which I have recited and repreſented in my manner. See alſo Mr. Thoma- faus's Diſcourſe, Entitled, Philoſophia Juris de Obligationibus do A&tionibus, with the third among his Difputations at Leipfick, c. 2. 5132, doc. (4) see the foregoing Nore, and what is faid farther, 1. 4. C. 13. Norc 3. following. (5) See l. 4. c. 4 sis. and 1. 5.c. 4 S 1. Note 5. ( See Grotius, De Fure Belli da Pacis, 1.3.c.21.9 16. and Mr. Hirtius's Diſcourſe, De Literis Communicatis pro Pace, $ 13. (7) is the ſame with (b). (a) Add Grot. I. 3. c. 24. See what we ſhall fay hereafter in Book 4. C. 4. f. 15. (6) The Roman Lawyers give this inſtance afa Tacit Palt in 1. 2. tit. 14. D. de pa&is , leg. 2. If I reſtore to my Debcor his Bond or Caution, it ſhould ſeen there is a Tacic Agreement berween us, that i demand nor the Loan. Yet here according to the Simplicity of Natural Law, there appears to be no occafion of introducing a Tacit Palt, fince it is much plainer to ſay, Thar by the returning back the Caution the Debt is fup, pos?d to be forgiven, and conſequently no room left for an A&tion upon it. But that the Civil Law choſe this round-about way of proceeding, was the effect of Caution, left an Obligation really contracted ſhould ſeem to be cancelld by bare Conlent. Another Example eney produce, and ſay, Suppoſe that in a Leale of a Karin there be this Clauſe, Thac in caſe the Farmer does not Till the Land, in confideration that the Lands are Lett at a low price; but on the contrary, if it happens to be Letr at an higher price, should come thereby to the Farmer, Digeft, 1. 19. tit. 2. Locati, condutti, leg. 51, in the beginning, Ex Lege fundum locavi, ut si a 1 56 Book III Of the Conſent required in be III. To inake a Man capable of (1) giving a ſerie to others. But if the Madneſs be judgʻd Incurable, ous and firin Conſent, 'tis above all things neceſia- the Perſon is in all Legal and Moral Conſiderati ry, that he be maſter of his Reafon; ſo far as to on to be accounted Dead (5). Vid. l. 1. T. 6. D. de underſtand the buſineſs in hand, to know whether it bis qui ſui vel al. jur. ſunt. l. 8. t. 18. D. de Ofic . be convenient for hiin, and whether we have Præfid. I. 2. D. de Procuratoribus, l. 5. 1. 2. D. ad l. Strength and Ability to perform it ; and when Aquil. he has well conſidered theſe Points, to be able to tex IV. Farther (1), ſince the uſe of Reaſon is exceed- préfs his Agreement by ſufficient Indications. Hence ingly hindred, and ſometines entirely oppreſs’d by it follows, That the Promiſes of Infants (2), of Mad- Drunkenneſs, it is an uſual Question, Whether a Per. inen, and of Ideots (3), are utterly invalid. But fon under that Diſorder, can bind himſelf by any as to the Caſe of Madneſs, it is particularly eto Covenant or Proiniſe. Which we think ought to obſerv'd, that this does not render a Man's Acti- be decided in the Negative, in caſe the intempes ors null and void in inoral Eſteem, any longer rance were fo great, as entirely to drown and over- tian-during the actual Continuance of it. But fo whelm the Underſtanding. For it can by no means long as he enjoys lucid Intervals of Sence, there's be eſteem'd a real and deliberate Conſent, if a nothing. hinders why he ſhould not be able effe&u* Man ſhould with never ſo much Eagemeſs of In- ally to oblige himſelf for fuch time as the Diftem- clination, run into an Engagement, and expreſs his per allows hin the uſe of his Reaſon. Yet the Fit Agreement by Signs which would at other times jeturning ſuſpends his Power of contracting or of be Valid, whilſt his Mind lies as it were under a performing any Buſineſs, till he again recover the ſtupifying Charm, and he is bewitch'd out of his Government of himſelf and of his Actions. There- Reaſon. It would indeed be highly impudent for fore the Cominon Maxim in Civil Law, That a Perſon to challenge the Obſervance of ſuch a Madneſs coming upon a. Man deftroys not any Buſineſs Promiſe, eſpecially if it could not be perform'd which he bad before duly perform’d, is to be under- without conſiderable Burthen or Trouble. And if ftood of ſuch Affairs or Concerns as can be com- it farther appear, that he purpoſely took advan- pleated and diſpatch'd at once. Of this kind is a tage of the other Man's Weakneſs, and cunningly Will or Teftament (4), which being once rightly made drew him into an Egagement under that Diſtein- ſtands good; unleſs it be revoked by a ſufficient per of his Brain, he ſtands liable to be puniſh'd as Declaration to the contrary ; ſuch as a diſtracted an arrant Cheat. But when a Man after the drunken Perſon cannot givelo But in caſe a Man lies under Fit is over, ſhall upon being put in mind of his fuch an Obligation as is to be fulfilld by diſtant Promiſe acknowledge and confirm it; it ſhall then Acts , all requiring the uſe of Reaſon, it is plain be Obligatory, yet not by Virtue of what paſs’d that if he fall into Diſtraction, the Duty is there. when he was drunk, but of what he ſince did when by ſuſpended. Thus if a Perſon bargain with me he was fober ( 2). Yet the Merriment of a chearful to work at my Affairs for a certain time; if he Cup, which rather revives the Spirits, than ſtupifies happen to be ſeiz'd with a Phrenzy, the Obligation the Reaſon, is no hindrance to the contracting of expires, in as much as he is now incapable of mak juſt Obligations; eſpecially if they be afterwards ing it good. Although indeed, in hopes that a Per- renew'd at more fober Seafons. To this purpoſe , fon in this Condition may recover his Health, we the account which Tacitus, De Mor. Germ. c. 22.gives uſually ſuppoſe him ſtill to have inherent in him us of the old Germans is very remarkable. 'Tis at all-his former-Obligations, Powers and Rights, the their Entertainments, ſays he, that they commonly make Charge of exerciſing which is for a tine committed up Differences, contract Alliances, chule Princes, and non ex Lege coleretur, relocare eum mihi liceret, & quo minoris locaſſem, hec mihi præſtarétur (nec convenit, ut fi pluris locaffem, hoc tibi præftaretur) videtur autem in hac ſpecie id filentio convenije, nequid præftaretur, fi ampliore pecunia fundus effet locatus, fi. e.) ut hæc ex conventione pro locatore tantummodo interponeretur. ment, it is more Naturăl to affirm, That the Conditions on which this kind of Contract was founded cannot be extended ſo far as to benefit the Hirer, who is indeed worthy of no manner of Favour, in as much as he hath neglected to Cultivare his Land, accor- ding to bargain. Vid. D. 1. 17. tit. 1. Mandati, vel contra, leg. 6. 1. 2. 1. 19. tit. 2. Locati, condukti, leg. 13. in fine, & 14. Cad. I. 2. tit. 3. De Pattis, leg. 2. Nr Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 3. (1) Every true Conſent ſuppoſes, 1. A Phyſical Power of conſenting, 2. A Moral Power, 3. A ſerious and free uſe of them. Our Author treats of the firft here, and the others afterwards. (2) Infans, & qui infantis proximus eſt non multum à furioſo diſtat. Inſtitur. Lib. 3. Tit. 20. De Inutil. Stipul. S 9. (3) Furioſus nullum negotium gerere poteſt, quia non intelligit quid agit. Inſtitut. 1. 3. cit. 20. De Inutil. Stipul. s 8. Furioſi, nulla voluntas eft.Digeſt. Lib. 50. Tit . 17. De Diverſ. Reg. Juris Leg. 40. fon(4) Nam neque testamentum re&te fa£tum, neque ullum aliud negotium rečie geſtum, poftea furor interveniens perimit. Inftit. Lib. 2. Tit. 12. 91. See alſo God Lib. 6. Tit. 22. Qui teſtamenta facere posſunt, &c. Leg 9. (5) We call properly a Civil Death, the State of them who are condemned to Death, perpetual Baniſhment, or any Puniſhment, which implies an Excluſion from Society and a Civil Life, upon which account they are as if they were not. Among the ancient Romans ſuch as loſt their Freedom, or Right of Incorporation, either both together, or the laſt only were accoun. ted in the ſame Stare, which was called Capitis Maxima, & Media Diminutio, as the Digeſts ſpeak. Intereunt autem homines qui- dem maxima aut media capitis diminutione. Dig. Lib. 17. Tit. 2. Pro Socio, Leg. 63. 9 10. See alſo, Inſtit. Lib. 1. Tit. 16. De capito Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 4. (1) I have tranſpoſed this Paragraph, and put the Author's fifth Section inſtead of it, making this my fifth, becauſe the Aur thor after he had ſpoken of the Promiſes of fuch as have loſt their Reaſon, ought, according to his own Method, to have went on to the Promiſes of Infants, and not have interrupred the thread of his Diſcourſe by treating of the Promiſes of Drunkards , which might better. make a Chapter by it felf, becauſe Drunkenneſs is a tranſient Accident, whereas Infancy and Folly are States of long continuance. By this Tranſpolition, not at all inconvenient, I preſerve the Natural Order of things, which will be my Excule. Excuſe.no (a) 'Tis a general Rule, That ſuch Agreements as are null upon the account of ſome Incapacity of the perſons making chen, may become valid, if that Incapacity ceales, and the perſon approves or ratifies the ſaid Agreement. So if a Minor, being come to Age, ratifies or executes a Contract swhich he made in his Minority, it becomes as irrevocable as if it were made after he came of Age. See Digeſt. 1. 26. tit. 8. De Authoritate do Conſenſu Tutorum Lo Curatorum, leg. 5. $ 2. & Cod. 1. 2. tit. 46. si major fačtus ratio habuerit, See alſo what our Author ſpeaks $ 14. in this chapter, and what i have ſaid in my Treatiſe of Sport, yer in other Diminutione. t. 2. c. 1. $ 7. CHAP. VI. 57 making Promiſes and Paits * Crebro nutantem. în fine diſpatch 720ft affairs of Peace and War. They one of the Benches, the Emperour commanded think no time ſo proper as this, becauſe the generous the Cryer to take no notice of the wor- beat of the Liquour, as it opens their Hearts, and thy Chapman that Nodded * to the capitis motu takes off all Diſguiſe from their Thoughts, ſo it inſpires Price propoſed. And the Buſineſs was them with brave Reſolutions and hardy Attempts, They fo managed, that the poor Gentleman are Strangers to Craft and Di ſimulation, and the Li- had laid out Ninety Thouſand Sefterces before he berty of the Table gets out all they know, and all they knew a Word of his Bargain. Vit . Calig. Chap deſign. But the jettling and finiſhing of Buſineſs is 38. Therefore if Drunkenneſs had no other il Et- left to the next Day, when their Minds are cloſed and feet , but that it made a Man ſeem to give fome In- their Fudgments grown cool. Thus they make the right dications, which at another time would imply Con- uſe of each Time; they conſult whilft they cannot dif- fent, it would not on this bare Account be eſteem'd jemble , and they refolve when they cannot miſtake. The unlawful. And ſince a Man cannot contract an Obli- like is reported of the Perſians by Herodot. in Clio. gation by Promiſe or Pact, without agreeing to it, 1. 1. C. 133. Athenaus, 1. 4. c. 6. Curtius, 1. 7. C. 4. and at the ſame time underſtanding the Buſineſs, Add. Plutarch Sympoſ. Qu«ft. 1. 7. C. 9, & 1o. (3). we cannot infer his Conſent to ſuch an Engagement It is true indeed, that Faults committed in Drun- from his firſt conſenting to make uſe of a thing, kennefs, are not on that account excuſable (4). Le- which would probably hinder the Exerciſe of his gilators have then thought fit to puniſh even Igno- Reaſon. Eſpecially if we conſider, that Men fel- rance, when the Perſon is the cauſe of his own Ig- dom drink meerly for the ſake of ſtupifying their norance. And therefore a double Penalty is uſual- Brain, but their general deſign is to comfort and ly enacted againſt drunken Offenders. For here the chear up their Spirits; and the former effect ſteals Éxceſs, and conſequently the Ignorance, was of the upon them almoſt inſeriſibly, whilſt they unwarily Man's own procuring, it being in his power to proſecute the latter. To make the difference ap- avoid them. Ariſtot. Ethic. l. I. C, 5. f. 10. It pear more manifeſtly, we may add, that ſince the was one of Solon's Laws, That a Governcur taken iroperty of a Crime or Offence is to bring fome E- in Drunkenneſs, Thould be put to Death; and Pitta- vil upon fome Man, and of a Promiſe to bring him cus decreed, that a Fault committed under this Dif- fome Good, which before was not his due, and ſince order ihould have a twofold Puniſhment. Laert. I. to be poſitively hurt or injured, is more odious in 1. in Pittac. Becauſe, though a Perſon whilſt the the eyes of common Juſtice, than barely not to acă fit is on him knows not, perhaps, what he does, quire ſome Benefit, there is much more reaſon yet in as much as he voluntarily applied himſelf to why Drunkenneſs ſhould invalidate a Promiſe, the uſe of ſuch things as he knew would caſt a than why it ihould cancel a Tranſgreſſion. As for Cloud on his Underſtanding, he is ſuppoſed to have a Man's being bound to pay for that uſeleſs load of yielded Conſent to all the Effects of that Diſorder. Wine which he pours down after his Stomach is al- Yet it will not follow from this Conſideration, that ready overcharg'd, and which he would refuſe were the Promiſes of Drunken Men are Obligatory; be- he in his Senſes; this Obligation ariſes from the cauſe there is great difference between committing Contract, made at the firſt ſitting down, by which a Crime, and contracting an Obligation. For ſince he engaged himſelf to give the Price of whatever there lies an abſolute Prohibition againſt all Sin, he ſhould drink, though he drank it to no purpoſe. therefore Men are to avoid all Occaſions that may If during this Fit of fottiſh Extravagance, he be probably draw them into a Violation of their Du- guilty of any miſchievous Frolicks, as throwing, a- ty. And how many Enorinities Drunkenneſs be- way the Liquor, deſtroying the Veſſels or the Win- trays a Man to, is obvious to the meaneſt Appre- dows and the like, he ſtands bound to make Satisfa- henfion. An Action then in it ſelf ſinful, can by no ction by the general Law of Reparation for Damages. means loſe that Character by proceeding from ano V. How (1) long Children continue under ſuch a ther Sin which led and diſpoſed a Man to it. But Weakneſs of Reaſon as Renders them incapable on the other hand, ſince it is left to our free Plea- of contracting Obligations, we cannot univerſally fure, whether we will contract new Obligations or determine; in as much as ſome arrive at a Maturi- no, we are not (as in the other Caſe) bound to ty of Judgment fooner than others. Therefore in avoid all Occaſions which may render our Conſent ſettling this point, Regard is to be had to the daily imperfect and invalid. As we are not bound to de- Actions and Proceedings of the Perſons, from whence cline Sleeping, out of a fear that others ſhould in- the beſt Conjectures are to be made about their Under- terpret our 6) Nodding or Winking for a token of ſtanding; or commonly we have recourſe to the po- Agreement to ſomewhat which they propoſed. To ſitive Laws of the Country; all States almoſt hav- this purpoſe, Sueton tells us a jeſting piece of Kna- ing fix'd this Period by their particular Conſtituti very in Caligula. He inade an Auction of his ſu- ons, and ſooner or later (2), according as they found perfluous Gladiators; and as the Cryer was per- their People to be naturally more brisk and appre- forming the Sale, Aponius Saturninus, a Gentleman henſive, or more ſluggiſh and heavy. Amongſt the of the Pratorian Dignity, happening to ſleep upon Jews, a young Man might oblige himſelf by Pro- 2. (3) See Mr. Thomaſius's Diſcourſe, De Hominibus propriis, do Liberis Germanorum, S 12. Max. Tyrius, 1. 12. and Dr. Potter's Greek Antiquities, 1. 4.C. 20. as alſo Briſſon. de Reg. Pers. 1. (4) Some Nations in ficted a double Puniſhment upon ſuch as had committed any Crime in their Drink; and by one of Solon's Laws it was enacted, if a Ruler or Magiftrate were found drunk, he ſhould be put to Death. The Words are, Tos "Agxovlig ay fels Sucov anpagni, Savator Breed shiv Snpicy. Diog. Laert. in Solone, 1. 1.957. See Menage upon this Paflage, (3) In all the Editions of the Original it is niet ando ; but beſides, that the ſhutting of the Eyes is no sign at all of Conſent, the Páfiage of Suetonius, which cur Author quotes, Thews, that either he or the Printers ſet it down for nutando. Mr. Barbeyrat's NOTES on S 5. (1) This Paragraph is the fourch in the Original. See Note 1. on the former Paragraph. (2). This Age is not the ſame tor all Contracts, for there are ſome things that they can do at 14 Years of Age, and others not H miſe 58 Book III Of the Conſent required in miſe after thirteen years of Age, and a young Wo- Not ſo much as (as Grotius fays in B. 2. c. 11. $ 5.) man after twelve. But becauſe Perſons of tender becauſe he who enters into Contract in any place , Age, though they may ſometimes tolerably under- is during that Affair, bound by the Laws of the Coun Stand Buſineſs , yet for the moſt part act with too try as a kind of Temporary Subject, as becauſe no inuch Vehemence and Raſhneſs, are too free and State will admit of an (6) Action in its Courts of eaſie in their Promiſes, eager and over-confident in Juſtice, upon a Buſineſs not conformable to its Con- their Hopes, proud of being thought Generous and Ititutions, unleſs it has particularly declared, that Liberal, Ambitious and Hafty in contracting Friend- in judging the Cauſes of Strangers, the bare Law ſhips, and not furniſh'd with prudent Caution and of Nature ſhall be followed. The ſame is to be ſaid Diffidence, it has been wiſely order'd in moſt Com- of Contracts made by Letter, between the Subjects mon-wealths, That in contracting all Obligations (3), of different States, when upon default, either of they ſhall be ſway'd by the Authority of graver them ſues the other in the Courts of his own Coun- Heads; till ſuch time as their Raſhneſs and Heat of try. For though here the injured Party inay not Youth ſhall appear to be in a good meaſure abated. have made himſelf, ſo much as for a time, a Sub- Hence in ſome places, whatever they do in their ject of the other Common-wealth; yet if he deſires own Names, during their Minority, is declar'd Null Redreſs by its Aliſtance, he muſt ſubmit his Cafe and Void, in others, if they have been cozen’d or to the ſtanding Laws (7). Or fuppofing two Subjects over-reach'd, they are allow'd to recover full Sa- of the fame Nation ſhould enter into a Pact or Pro- tisfaction (4). Vid. l. 11. ſ. 3. &c. 1. 24. f. 1. l. 44. miſe, in fone place which acknowledges no Sove- D. de Minoribus. The Law of Nature it ſelf plain- reign, as on the wide Ocean, or in ſome Deſart I- ly directs, that theſe Proviſions ſhould be made by jland, they muſt nevertheleſs have recourſe to the poſitive Conſtitutions. Eſpecially ſince he would Laws of their Country, if they would obtain a full juſtly forfeit the Character of his Honeſty, who and perfect Right to what they bargain’d for”; or ſhould make his Advantage upon this eaſie Age, and an Action to hold good in Court upon Failure on ei- enrich himſelf at the Coſt of thoſe, who for want ther ſide. How the Caſe ſtands with Reference to of Judgment and Experience, either could not fore- the Acts of thoſe Perſons who are placed above the fee, or do not rightly apprehend the Loſs (a) (5). Power of Civil Laws, it will be our Buſineſs elfe- The ſame Law of Nature enjoins, that when any where to enquire (8). Statutes or Cuſtoms of this kind have been eſta VI. Another thing which invalidates Conſent (1), bliſh'd in a Common-wealth, they ſhall be ſtrictly and by Conſequence the Promiſes or Pacts that are obſerv’d; not only by the Subjects amongſt them- built upon it, is Error or Miſtake (2); through but in all their Tranſactions with Foreigners. which it comes to paſs, that the Underſtanding is ſelves the (3) The Attick Law in this reſpect pur Women in the caſe with Minors; not allowing them to bargain for any thing beyond a Buſel of Barley, dedi a gyáóuns a Devès, on account of the Weakneſs of their Judgment. Dion. Chrylost . Orat. 75. If&us. Orat. 9. (4) The Law grants this Privilege to him who hath been injured by any Act, as a Party to it, to look back to the Age he was before that act, if there be a juft Cauſe. See Digest. I. 4. tic. 1, and what Mr. Hirtius ſays upon that Ticle in his Obſervat . in Compend. Juris Lauterbach, where he carefully diſtinguiſhes the Maxims which may be drawn from Natural Right, from the -Sub- tleries which the Roman Lawyers have perplexed thar Matter with. See alſo Daumat’s Civil Laws, Part 1.1.4. tit. 6. (5) We ought to obſerve (as Mr. La placette ſpeaks in his Treatiſe of Confcience, p 6c.) That if, for Exnmple, we meer with ſuch a dull underſtanding at the Age aſſigned by the Law,chat there is not Sence enough to oblige them ſufficiently, we ought nor to play upon their Simplicity, and engage them to do what we pleaſe upon that presence. Doubtleſs, ſuch an Action would be unjuſt; and in this caſe we ought to ſay, as in many others, We ought to attend more to the Intention of the Law, than the Terms. But here is another important Queſtion to be examined inco, and that's this, whether if a Young Man engages himſelf before he arrives at the Age fixed by the Law, he is bound in Conſcience to do what he has promiſed ? For Example, if he has borrowed any thing before that Age, he is bound to pay it when he comes to it? Mr. Placetre ſeems to have determined this Queſtion very well in theſe Words, The Caſuiſts of the Church of Rome, even the ſtricteſt of them, anfwer by this Diſtinction, If young Man has made a good uſe of what he borrowed, and in general, if the Agreement he has made be profitable and ad- vantageous to him, he is obliged to ſtand to it; but he is not obliged, if he hath got nothing by the bargain, viz. if he has ſpent what he borrowed upon his Debaucheries, and other Exceſſes. But Mr. La Placette adds, This is not my Opinion, and ſays, I can't allow, thar a Man ſhould ger by an ill Action, and free himſelf from his Engagement by a Fault. We may have regard to other things, and in the firſt place conſider whether he with whom we have contracted loſerh any thing otherwiſe by the breaking the Bargain. For if he loſeth nothing, but all the Damage he ſuffers, is only, that his hopes are diſappointed, I believe we are nor obliged to make good the Promiſe we have made in chat manner; but if he loſes any thing, as it ordinarily happens in bor- rowing, we muſt look at ſomething elſe ? Hath he lent willingly and without any ill deſign? Did he foreſee the ill uſe that was like- ly to be made of what he lent ? if he did foreſee it, and did lend with an evil Intention, he ought to loſe what he lent, pure the Loſs to himſelt; but if he had no ill deſign, and lent freely, 'tis ny Opinion he ought to be paid ; and I am perſwaded, to do the contrary, and take the advantage of the Law, is a Faule, which not only a render Conſcience, but an honeſt Man in the Eſteem of the World, ought to be aſhamed of. See my Treatiſe of Sports, 1.2.C.4. $ 12. and what this Author ſays, l. 4. C. Z. $ 11. following. (6) Mr. Hirtius in his Treatiſe, De Colliſione Legum, which is in Tom. I. of his Comments and ſmall Tracts, proves at large, that we often judge according to the Laws of another State, when we have made an Agreement, either where the thing of which we have treated is found to be, or where one of the Parcies has his Dwelling. (7) Grotius is of Opinion, 1. 2. C. II. $ 5. numb. 3. that in this caſe we ought to judge only according to the Rules of Natural Right; and Mr. Hirtius agrees to his opinion. See the fore mentioned Diſcourſe, $ 56. and another of the fame Volume, De Commeatu Literarum, $ 16, &c. (8) See 1. 8.c. 10. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 6. (1) The three Conditions which are generally required in a full and free Conſent, as I have noted above, 8 3. Nore I. are not to be met with. 1. In Promiſes made in jeſt and by way of Compliment. 2. In Promiſes made in Miftake. 3. In Promiſes made by the Deception of others. 4. Nor in ſuch as are made thro' Fear. (2) This the Law ſays, Non videntur, qui errant, conſentire, Digeſt. 1. 50. tit. 17. leg. 116. & 2. See alſo Leg. 76. & l. 2. tit. Is De Juriſdi&tione, leg. 15. So Seneca, Demens eſt, qui fidem præſtat errori. De Benef. 1.4.C.36. He muſt be a Fool, who will pero form what he has promiſed through Error. But here we muſt mean an Efficaceous Error, as this Term is expounded, l. 1. c. 3. § 10. Note 2, and not a Concomitant Error : For by this Diſtinction our Author's Rules in ſome places muſt be explained and re. &tified. Titius Obferv. 213. See the Nores upon che next Paragraph. (a) Demens eſt, qui fidem præftat errori. Sen. De Benef. 1. 4. C. 36. and im- cheated CHAP. VI. making Promiſes and Pasts. cheated in its Object, and the Will in its Choice and Son's Death, which proving falſe, the Will became Approbation. We ought here carefully to diſtin- Void and įneffectual; ſince it appears that his be- guilh, whether the Cafe relate to a Promiſe or to a lief of that Report was the fole Reaſon of his al- Pact. As for Promiſes we may lay down this for a tering his Meaſures. And hence too it is eaſie to certain Rule, That if a Promiſe be grounded upon anſwer that over nice Queſtion of Sir Thomas Browne Belief and Preſumption of ſome Fact (3) which in his Religio Medici ; Whether it was lawful for the really never was, or when in making an Engage Perſon whom Lazarus had made his Heir to poſſeſs the ment, of this kind I ſuppoſed ſuch an Action, or Goods (7), or whether the Owner upon his being ſuch a Quality, without regard to which I lould reſtored to Life, had not a Right to challenge never have given my Confent; in this caſe my them again. Where the latter inuft without doubt Promiſe is naturally Null and Void, provided it be affirm’d. For the reaſon why the Goods of the appear evident from the Nature and Circumſtances Deceas’d paſs away to others is, becauſe they them- of the Buſineſs, that I agreed to the Propoſal pure- felves are taken out of the World, and confequent- ly on account of that Fact, or of that Quality, ly have no farther need of theſe. Poſſeſſions. Hence which I took for granted. Becauſe, here I did not in many places, ſome part of the Goods are fet a- promiſe abſolutely, but upon Preſumption of a ne- ſide to be given to the Poor, or to the Church for ceſſary. Condition ; which Condition failing, what- the Benefit of the Soul of the Deceas’d. And in ever was built upon it, muſt conſequently come to the Pagan Superſtition, it is uſual to bury or burn nothing (a). Thus, for Inſtance, ſuppoſe I have ſome of the Goods with the dead Body, for the fer- been inform'd that you have done me a Kindneſs vice of another Life. in promoting and well ordering my Affairs, and up But in caſe the Promiſer was negligent in ſearch- on this ſcore I have promis’d you a Gratification; ing into, and examining the Condition, upon which you will not ſay I am bound to ſtand to my Word (4), he built his Conſent, he ihall be bound to repair when I find the Intelligence was abſolutely falſe. any Damage, that is ſuſtain’d by the other Party, By the ſame Rule we may decide the Caſe propoſed upon account of his idle Engagement, by Cicero in Lib. 1. De Oratore, c. 38. A falſe If the Promiſe was not grounded upon the pre- “ Report was brought home of the (5) Death of a fence or abſence of ſuch a Quality, as a neceſſary a certain Souldier, abroad in the Wars. His Fa- Condition, then though the Promiſer was miſtaken "ther believing the Story, alter'd his Will in fa- in that Point, yet his Obligation ſhall ſtand good. of another Heir, and afterwards died. The If the Promiſe were but in part occaſion’d by an Souldier at laſt returning fafe, ſues the Poſſeſſor Error, it may as to the reſt of it reinain valid; “ of his Inheritance. It was here urged for the unleſs one part were included by way of Condition Plaintiff, that the Civil Law declares ſuch Wills of in another; or unleſs the Parts cannot ſeparately a Father to be Null (5), in which the Son is neither be perform’d; for then an Error in part deſtroys made Heir, nor yet particularly, and by Name, dif- the whole . inherited; neither of which was done in the Will VII. As for Miſtakes in Palts, it ſeems neceſſary now under Conſideration. But to this the Defen- to diſtinguiſh whether the Perſon was through Er- dant might have return’d, that the Law cited on ror, drawn into the Bargain, or whether there proves the other Side plainly ſuppoſed that the Father to be an Error, as to the Thing or Subject for which knew his Son to be living, which here he knew not, he bargaind. In the former Caſe we ſhould again but imagin’d the quite contrary. Therefore it might enquire, whether any Step is made towards Perform- perhaps have been a more clear and eaſie way of af- ance or not. If I am prevaild with to enter into ferting the Souldier's Title, to proceed only upon a Pa&t or Contract upon Miſtake, and I find this the Law of Nature, and to alledge, that the Fa- Miſtake out, before any thing is done in order to ther’s Will was grounded upon Suppoſition of his the fulfilling of the Agreement, it is but Equi- G vour (3) The Lawyess diſtinguiſh between an Error of Fact, and an Error of Right, (i. e.) of Right Poſitive, and build diverſe Des terminations upon it. See Daymat's Civil Laws, pare i. 1. 1. tic. 18. $ 1. (4) Mr. Thomafius in his f urifput. Divn. I. 2. c. 7.8 43. ſays, That a Man is obliged in this caſe to keep his Word, eſpe. cially if he did not exprelly inſert that Condition in his promiſe, or he in whoſe behali he is engaged, uſed no falſe pretences to perſuade him. But from the moment that he knows in any wiſe that he promiſed upon the account of ſome Service done by him to whom he made the Promiſe; the Condition is of the fame Nature as the ching. And ſo the Non-performance of the Condicion makes the Promise nul, as much as if he had declared it before-hand in expreſs Terms ; ſince, as we may ſuppoſe, no- thing elſe could incline him to promiſe. Another thing is in the Caſe of Horſes bought upon a falſe Report; as our Author fpeaks in the following Paragragh, where read Nore 2. (5) The Words in Latin are, De cujus [ M litis] morte, cum domum falſus ab exercitu veniſſet, & Pater ejus, re credita, teffa- mentum mutaget, & quem ei usum esset, feciffet Heredem, esfetque iple mortuus. Res delata eft ad centumuiros, cum Miles domum Teveniſſet, egilletq ; lege in hereditatem paternam teſtamento exheres filius. See alſo, Val. Maximus , l. 9. c. 7. 8 1. and Mr. Schul- ting's Oracion De Furij prid. M. T. Cicer. p. 260. 260. Mr. Thomaſius in the place before quoted, $ 44. obferves, that this Example is nothing to the purpoſe. For, he ſays the senſe of a Will ought to be expounded in a clear different manner from en Agreement or Promiſe, as well becauſe a Will gives no Right to him to whom the Teſtator has bequeathed his Goods, as be- cauſe he requires an acceptation on his pare. Belides, in Wills we ought to have ſome regard to the Laws, and above all , to ſuch Conſtitutions as are made in behalf of Children. But it is evident, that our Author fpeaks here only of the manner, how the Queſtion ought to be determined by Natural Right only. I ſhall ſhew in its proper place, that a Will gives a Right to him that is appointcd an Heit, although it be not an irrevocable Right. (6) So the Law ſpeaks, Inter cetera, qux ad ordinanda teſtamenta neceſſario deſiderantur, principale jus eſt de liberis heredibus in- Miruendis , vel exberedaniis, ne preteritis ijis, rumpatur teftamentum. Digeft . 1. 28. tit. 2. De liberis & pofthumis Heredibus in- (67) There was a Book printed in 1905, wherein this Queſtion was ſeriouſly handled. The Title is, Henrici Verduyn. Diſqui- fitio Juriſprud. de Teftam. eg Heredit. Lazari bis mortui, aliorumque bis mortuorum. In ordinem redegit __ auxit Tobias Boel, ku- nior iekus. We may learn the Subſtance of it in a little time from the Extract of it given in the Works of the Learned printed at Paris, Anno 1705, do 100 (a) 15. D. de Jurisdict + H 2 table ſtituendis, &c. leg. 30. 60 Of the Conſent required in Book III. table, that I ſhould have liberty to retract ; efpe- now find that he has no occaſion for his Purchaſe; cially if upon making the Engagement, I plainly yet he cannot force the Seller to refund the Price declared the Reaſon of my Proceedings (1). But if the and to take back his Horſes, unleſs this Condition Error be not diſcovered till the Pact is either wholly was expreſly mention' in the Agrement. or in part perform’d, then the Perſon who lay un But when there happens to be a miſtake about der the Miſtake, cannot demand a Releaſement any the Thing which is the Subject of the Contract, then farther than the other ſhall, upon a Principle of the Buſineſs is Null; not ſo much upon account of Humanity, be content to allow him (2). For In- the Miſtake (3), as becauſe the Laws and Terms of ftance, A Man being at a diſtance from home, re- the Agreement are not really fulfilld. In as much ceives falſe Intelligence, that he has loſt all his as in all Bargains the Matter, about which they are Horſes. Upon this Inforination he enters into Con- concern'd, and all the Qualities of it, good or bad, tract for the purchaſe of new ones; but before the ought to be clearly underſtood, and without ſuch a Money or the Horſes are deliver’d, he finds himſelf diſtinct Knowledge the Parties cannot be ſuppoſed to have been deceiv'd in the former News. Here to yield a full Confent. And therefore upon diſ we judge he is not bound to fulfil the Bargain, in as covery of any Defect, the Perſon who was likely much as the Seller very well knows, that the falſe ac- to ſuffer may either draw back from the Engage- count of his Misfortune at home, was the Reaſon ment, or may compel the other to ſupply what is of his Purchaſe. Yet he is in Equity obliged to wanting (4); and likewiſe to make Satisfaction for make fome Conſideration to the Seller ; at leaſt to Dainage, if occaſion’d by his Deceit or Default. And repay the Damage which he ſuſtains by loſing the this, not only if the Defect be immediately found Bargain. But in caſe the Money and Horſes were out, but if it appear at fome diſtance of Time. on both ſides deliver’d, though the Buyer ihould Which Period or Interval, when it is not fix'd and Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 7. (1) Provided (as our Author ſays in his Abridgment of the Duty of a Man and Citizen) that the other that makes the Contract receives by ir no Damage, or that it be repair’d to him. The Example that is alledged a little lower, ſhews, that it is another Condition which the Author puts. But ſee Nore 2. (2) The Author is not conſiſtent with himſelf here. For if in the firſt Caſe there is any good Reaſon to excufe him who has nade a Miſtake, ſo that he may lawfully retract, why ſhould not the ſame Reaſon be good in the ſecond Caſe? (The delivering of a thing conſidered in it ſelf is a Phyſical Act, which can't deprive him of his Right, who has it; nor give it to him that has none, Whence it comes to paſs, that when one hath paid what he ought not, he has not leſs Right to require again what he has done, than if he had forgiven him that which he had not delivered. See Mr. Thomaſius's Juriſprud. Divin. I. 2. c. 7. $ 45, 46.] Further, if in the firſt Caſe we have Right to recant, how are we obliged to repair the Damage? The truth is, in both Caſes we are indiſpenſibly obliged to keep our Word. For if the Error be invincible, 'cis nevertheleſs only concomitant. (Sec 1. 1. C. 3. $ 10. Note 2.) and conſequently does not exclude a neceffary Conſent in our Agreements. In fine, this Reaſon obliges us to conclude, that the Price doth not at all influence the Engagement farther than as it is an Indication of our manner of Deal. ing, and can't be formally inſerted into it as a Condition to render it null, ſo that the Error which is committed thereupon can have no manner of Effect as to the validity of the Contract. The Roman Lawyers own the truth of this Principle in a like Cafe, I mean, in the Subject of a Delegation made thro' miſtake. See Digeft. 1. 46. tit. 2. De Novationibus do Delegationibus, leg. 12, 13. The ſame thing has place in an Onerous Contra&t. For Example, in a bargain of Sale, when there is a Miſtake, as to the perſon with whom we treat, taking him for another. For this is only an Error Concomitant, having nothing in the Contract which neceffarily requires that he with whom we treat ſhould be certainly ſuch or ſuch a Man, or at leaſt that he ſhould declare himſelf, and we ſhould affirm, that we dealt only with Peter, (for Example) and no other. Moſt of the Interpreters of the Ro- man Laws do indeed quote ſome Laws, which ſeem to eſtabliſh the contrary; but if we examine choſe places, we ſhall find that they treat of ſome Act of Liberality or Service, or ſuppoſe in the perſon dealt with ſome Care, Induſtry, or other particular Quality; for then 'eis eſſencial to a Contract, that the Contracter be certainly he whom we believe him; inſomuch that if we are miſtaken in char, the Error is Efficacious. Titius Obſerv. in Puffend. 214. and in Lauterbach. 513. (3) The Author oppofech things here one againſt another, which have no appearance of Oppoſition, but are the Conſequenrs one of another. For the Error, in which one of the Contracters was, ſhews, that he conſented to a thing that really was, conſequently, that the other Contracter did not ſatisfie the Intention of the firſt. Titius Obſerv. 215. In fine, this hath place alſo, when the Seller as well as the Bayer really believes, that a Baſon of Tin, for Example, is Silver and no other Metal. For the Error of both the Contracters does not hinder, but that it is eſſential to the Bargain, char che Bafon ſold ſhould be Silver and no other Mecal. See Digeſt. I. 18. tir. 1. De contrahenda Emptione, leg. 14. But it is not ſo, when the Thing, or the Qua- lity of it, wherein the Error conſiſts on both ſides, doth not come into the Bargain. As for Example, if a Man ſays only, How much will you have for this Balon or Metal? without explaining himſelf any farther, whether he is about buying a Vellel or maſſy piece of Silver. In that caſe, ſays Mr. Thomafius, the Contract is in ſtrictneſs good and valid, although fair dealing does require, that the Seller, to whom he has paid for Tin inſtead of Silver, ſhould give him part of the Price back again. For we muſt lay this down as a general Maxim, That in a doubt, if a Man miſtakes, 'çis fo much the worſe for him ; becauſe it be long'd to him to explain himſelf. See Juriſprud. Divin. I. 2. c.7.939, doc. and C. 11. $ 22, 23. and what Thall hereafter be ſaid, 1. 5. c. 12. $ 5. Note 4. (4) This is too much from the purpoſe. Something more exact ought to have been ſaid to give us an idea of the Effects of an Efficacious Error. This Maxim may be added to thoſe of our Author, If he that is miſtaken aims at that chiefly wherein the Error lies, the Agreement is abſolutely void, and he hath liberty to recant; but if he had not the thing it ſelf in view, although he could heartily wiſh it had been what he believed it , the Agreement is good, and he can have a Righe only to demand ſome Satif- faction for the Fault he overlook'd. As for Example, if à Man in a great Neceſſity buys an Houſe, which afterwards he finds to be ſubject to ſeveral Services, as he did not principally endeavour to have it free from all Services, that alone don't break the Bargain; but he may demand of che Seller, that he leffen the Price in proportion to the Inconvenience that thoſe Services brings with which he did not think the Houſe was charged. It is very probable that the Roman Lawyers did follow this Principle in their Practice. Nevertheleſs the Determinations which we find in their writings are neither accurate enough, nor conſonant one with another, as this Reaſon will thew. That they may build the Efficaciouſneſs of Error upon the Connection of the thing in which they are miſtaken, with the Effence of a Bargain, they only Conſider the Natural Conſtitution of the thing in it ſelf . Hence they diſtinguiſh the Error which hath for its Subject the Subſtance or Matter of a thing about which they treat, from that which falls only upon the Qualities of the thing. But here we are not examining what relation the object of Error hath to the Macer of an agreement, we only enquire upon what foot the Bargainers conſidered it; and if it appear that they had only fome certain Quality in view, 'eis the Error alone that reſpects that Quality, that can make the Bargain null, as much as if it fell ap- on the thing it ſelf, Titius ob/erv. in Puffend, 216. and in Lauterbach. 511. See Nore s. ac che bottom of the following Pages 1 by CHAP. VI. 61 making Promiſes and Patts. by the Civil Laws, is to be determin’d by the Art of Cookery, and the Man whom I receive proves Arbitration of ſome honeſt Referee; that no In- utterly Ignorant of the Buſineſs, and incapable of dulgence may be given, either to Fraud of the ſerving me in that Condition (6) one Party in concealing, or to the ſupine Negli VIII. Much more ought a Miſtake to render a gence of the other in examining the Buſineſs . And Promiſe or Pact Invalid, if it were occaſion’d by the the larger ſpace of time is to be allow'd, if the De- (1) Fraud of one of the Parties, who by that means fect were ſuch as did not appear to external View, drew the other into the Engagement. What force or could not be diſcover'd but by Men of extraor or effect , the Practice of Deceit in theſe Mat- dinary Sagacity and Skill. ters will bear, may be clearly ſtated by making As to that Common Maxim with the Civilians, theſe Enquiries ; firſt, as to the Author of the Kna- That an Error in the Eſentials of a Pue, diſannuls very, whether he with whom we bargain’d, or a the Agreement (a), but not an Error in the Acci. third Perſon. And in the next place, whether the dentals or Circumſtances ; we are ſo to interpret Deceit was really the Cauſe of our Engagement, it, as by the Eſentials to underſtand, not only what without which we had not ventur'd upon it, or whe- makes up the Phyſical Eſſence of the thing bargain’d ther it was only accidental to the Buſineſs , which for, but likewiſe thoſe "Qualities of it, to which the we had nevertheleſs undertaken, but were now Contracter had an eſpecial Eye and Regard (5). cheated in the Thing and its Qualities, or the true For it frequently happens, that in a Bargain fomne price and value of them. If the Trick was put Quality of the thing Mall be chiefly eſteem'd and upon us by a third Man, the Party with whoin we valu’d, and the Subſtance or natural Conſtitution tranfact, not having been acceſſory to it, and the be only look'd on as a neceſſary Adjunct or Ve- Thing for which we bargain’d 'proves without hicle (6). Thus my Contract will not only be Fault (2); in this caſe the Agreement ſhall ſtand void if I buy fuch a particular Slave of a Merchant, good (3), but we may recover of the Knave what- and he ſends me a different Perſon (7): But like- ever we loſe by his contrivance. If the Party him- wiſe if I bargain’d with him for one skilful in the ſelf with whom I Contract, by fome Deceit draws (5) The Intention of the Contracters muſt be known by the Circumſtances. Here's an Example taken out of the Determina- tions of the Roman Lawyers, wherein yet they do not expreſs exactly the difference between the two Caſes propounded, Quod fi me virginem emere putarem, cum effet jam mulier, emptio valebit, in ſexu enim, non eft erratum. Cæterum fi ego mulierem venderem. tu puerum emere exiftimafti, quia in ſexu error eft, nulla emptio, nulla venditio eft. Digeft. 1. 18. rit. I. De contrahenda Emptione, &c. leg. II. $1. The Reaſon, why, If a Slave which is bought prove a Woman, whereas he thought it a Man, the Bargain of Sale is pot void, is becauſe there is no other apparent Mark of a Woman from a Man, but the bigneſs, he had no cauſe to think he bought a Man rather than a Woman, but that he did not ſufficiently explain himſelf; ſo that the Error is only Concomitant, and can't turn to the prejudice of the Seller. But 'eis not the ſame as to the Sex, which are ſo differenced by the Habits, that they can't be miſtaken, unleſs by ſome Fraud or Diſguiſe. And ſo the Buyer muſt be ſuppoſed to make his Markets for the Sexes according to their Habits, and then the Error is efficacious, and conſequently the Bargain is null . Titius in Lauterbach. Obs. 514 If the Buyer believing that he purchaſes a Man, the Seller, who knows his intention well, leads him into an Error, and ſells him a Woman without declaring it, the Contract is void as the Law fpeaks, Si quis virginem ſe emere putaset, cum mulier veniſſet, la fciens errare venditor cum paffus fit, redhibitionem quidem ex hac cauſa non ese, verum tamen et empto competere a&tionem ad reſolven. dam emptionem do pretio reſtituto mulier reddatur. Digeft. 1. 19. eft. I. De A&tion. Empt. di Vendit. leg. 11. S. s. See what Mr Noodt lays upon this Law in his Treaciſe, De forma emendanda Doli mali, &c. c. 9. () Plerafque res aliquando propter acceſiones emimus, fi cum Domus propter Marmora, do Statuas, Tabulas pistas ematur. Di. geft. 1. 18. tic. 1. leg. 34. in initio. (7) Vid. l. 18. princ. D. de Contrah. emptione. Cicero (pro Qu. Roſcio, c. 10.) ſpeaking of a Slave who was at the ſame time claim'd by Fannius and Roſcius; what belong?d to Fannius (ſays he) his Body; what to Roſcius, his A&tivity : Nor his Face but his Skill was valuable. The ſhare which Roſcius had in him was worth double to that which Fannius could challenge, &c. Obs, Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 8. (1) By Fraud, (which the Civilians call Dolus malus, or Dolus only) is underſtood any ſort of Surprize, Deceit, Craft, Cheat or Diffimulacion. In a word, any corrupt Methods, direct or indirect, pofitive or negative, by which Men maliciouſly deceive others. For there are innocent Érrors, as that of a Medicine, which inftead of curing enrages the Diſtemper. Itaque ipſe [La- beo] fic definit, Dolum malum efle omnem calliditatem, fallaciam, machinationem, ad circumveniendum, fallendum, decipiendum alte- cum adhibitam, Labeonis definitio ver a eſt. Digeft. 1. 4. tit . 3. De Dolo malo, leg. 1. $ 2. Non fuit autem contentus Prætor DOLUM dicere, sed adjecit, MALUM, quoniam veteres dolum etiam bonum dicebant, & pro Solertia hoc nomen accipiebant, &c. ibid. 5 3. See Mr. Noodt's Treatiſe De forma emendandi Doli mali, c. 1. & 2. In fine, tho' where there is a Fraud in the one part, there is always An error in the other; yet ordinarily the Invalidity of a Contract is entirely founded upon the evil intention of the Contracters: For that Reaſon alone is in che main fufficient to make an Engagement void. 2) The Lawyers call a Damage without Deceit, Dolus in reipsa, which is grounded on this Law of the Digefts, 1. 45. tit. 1. De Verbor . Obligation. leg. 36. Si nullus Dolus interceſie ftipulantis, ſed ipſa res in je Dolum habet, &c. But we ought rather to call it the Vice or Fault of a thing, than a fraud. For the word Fraud agrees properly only to a Perſonal Cheat (as we ſay) which ſuppoſes an ill Deſign in one of the parties, or a third, and an actual performance of ſome Deceit. Fraudis interpretatio as the Roman Lawyers themſelves ſpeak) ſemper in jure civili , non ex eventu duntaxat, ſed ex confilio quoque deſideratur. Digeft. ipferred, is commonly miſunderſtood, as Mr. Thomaſius obſerves in his Diſcourſe De Equit ate Cerebrina leg. 2. Cod. de reſcindend. Vendit. c. 2. $ 4. See l. 5. c. 3. $ 9. (3) It being underſtood that the Motive which by the Deceit of a third Perſon, inclined us to promiſe or treat, hath a nie- ceffary Relation to the Foundation of the Engagement, i. e, that the Error is purely concomitant. For if (for Example) any ode makes me believe that all my Horſes are dead, and I declare to him that ſells me others, that I did not buy them, but upon this Suppofition, that the News is true. The moment that I diſcover the Fallhood, the Bargain is void, by virtue of the Condicion which was formerly mentioned, and the Seller to take care of him that hath deceived me. See 57. Note 2. before-going. (1) Vid. 1. 57. D. de Oblig. LAT. (6) Add. 1.9, 10, 11, 14. 41. f. 1. D. de Contrah. emptione. me 62 Of the Conſent required in Book III. mono piece eſt mibi; 201 Code, which imports, that after a Marrer concluded, if he who has ſome way been guilty of a Cheat, re- me into the Buſineſs (4), I am then free from all Ob- World, and reckons every piece of Knavery a gation to performance (a). If the Deceit were not of Wit (1); or if as to the preſent Buſineſs I find Antecedent to the Contract, but happend in it, he has a manifeſt Deſign upon me; I ſhall be a ri- with reference to the Thing bargain’d for, its Qua- diculous Fool, if by truſting to his Faith, I expoſe lities, &c. The Agreement ſhall be ſo far void, as my ſelf to his Fraud, and to his Scorn. For he that that it ſhall be at the pleaſure of the ſuffering runs into a Share with his Eyes open, falls not on- Party, either to reverſe the whole Buſineſs or to ly without help, but without pity (2). require Satisfaction for his Damage (5). A Matter not eflential to the Agreeinent, nor expreſly confi (**) Promiji lingua, cadem nunc nego ; der'd in it, ſhall not prejudice its Validity; tho’ Dicendi, non rem perdendi gratia hæc nata perhaps one of the Parties might have a ſecret and in Curcul. Act. 5. Scen. 3. verſe 27, 28. Ny Refpect to ſome ſuch thing in the very Act of driving the Bargain (6). Upon what Right a Man 'Twas my Tongue ſaid it; and my Tongue unſays may proceed, in Caſe he be egregioufly cheated, it. Nature never gave me a Voice to be the Inſtru- as to the Price of any thing contracted for, we ſhall ment of my own jundoing. And again in Rudent: hereafter examine and declare. Act. 5. Scen. 2. verſe 68. and Scen. 3. verfe 17, IX. It comes now in Courſe, that we conſider the 18. Point of FEAR, what Power it has in rendring hu- man Acts incapable of producing an Qbligation, Que hoc faftio eft? non debes? non tu juratus es mihi? There are two Species of Fear, which eſpecially fall Juratus film, & nunc jurabo fi quid voluptati eft mihi. under this Enquiry. The former ariſes from ſome Jusjurandum reiſervanda non perdenda conditum eft . Vice or ill Dipofition in the Perſon with whom we Leno. tranſact, or elſe froin his ill Will to us in particu What a ſtir's here? don't you owe it? did not lar; whence we entertain a probable Suſpicion, that you ſwear Payment? he will deceive us. The other denotes a vehement Pimp. Yes, I ſwore and I'll ſwear again, when- terrour of the Mind, caus’d by the threatning of ever it pleaſeth my Fancy. Oaths were invented fome grievous Miſchief, unleſs we engage in the to preſerve Mens Goods and Eſtates, not to ruin Promiſe or Pact deſired. As to the firſt fort of Fear, them. mit this is evident beyond diſpute, that if I ſee a Man The Character which Polybius in B. 6. p. 498. A. who makes it his coinmon practice to cheat all the Ed. Wech. Caſaub. gives of the Grecians is not much boy on * (4) Indeed 'tis abſurd to imagine that a Man can by a deſign'd and wicked Chear, lay a valid obligation upon anether on our account. Nemo 'ex ſuo deli&to meliorem fuam conditionem facere poteſt (lay the moſt judicious Roman Lawyers.) Digest. I. 50. tit. 17. De Divers. Reg. Jur. leg. 134. $ : Nevertheleſs, theſe Lawyers, as Mr. Titius obſerves (Lauterbach. Obſerv. 116, 117.) deliver here many vain Diſtinctions. For they affirm, that a Fraud, which has been the Cauſe of a Contract, does render it null in it ſelf, and by Right, (ipso Fure) unleſs when Sincerity may be pretended, (i, e) when a favourable Conſtruction can be put upon Rules of Equity, if we do not infift rigorouſly upon the Terms. But in an Act of Rigorous Right, where we muft frict- ly obſerve what is faid or written, the Fraud does not hinder the Contract from being valid, although it may be reverſed by a full Reftitution. For the Laws in this caſe always allow the benefit of Reſtitution, which comes to the ſame thing as to the Da. mage of the perſon cheated. But according to Natural Right, a Fraud does no leſs diſannul a Contract of Rigorous Right, than a Faithful Contratt . Mr. Titius ( in Lauterb. obferv. 1148,&c.) maintains a 'ſo with Reaſon, that this ditinction of Acts of good Faich and Rigorous Right is not conformable to Natural Right by the Principles which ought to take place in all ſorts of Acts, which admit of an equirable Conſtruction, as Mr. Noodt acknowledges, De Forma emend. Dol. mali, &c. c. 4. where he obſerves that before the Prator Caius Aquilius Gallus there was no regard had to Contracts of Rigorous Right, unleſs there were ſome formal Agree- ments, and the perſon cheared were a Minor. See l. 5. c. 2.5.8. infra. bud. (5) The In:erpreters of the Roman Law have hitherto affirmed, that in this laſt Caſe a Contract is neither null by Right, nor ſubject to be made void by a full Reſtitution, when it is tranſacted by a Contract of good Faith, and has no other source than an Adion done in good Faith, beſides the Exception of Deceit. But the famous Mr. Noodt, who has made admirable Diſcove- ries in the moſt knotty parts of the Civil Law, undertakes to prove in his Excellent Treacife De Forma, emendandi Doli mali in contrahendis negotiis adm Ji apud Veteres, printed in 1709, That this Diſtinction of the Modern Lawyers has no Foundation in the Writings of the Ancients, and that every Fraud, whether it conſiſts in the way of treating, or be found in the thing it ſelf, or the Price renders the Contract made in good Faith always null in it ſelf, and by the Civil Law, inſomuch that the perfon cheated being ſummoned by the other Contracter to anfwer is, has no more to do but prove the Cheat on his part, without oppofing co him the Exception of a Fraud, and the Prætor or Judge muſt declare the Contract null by Right. But if he who is damaged be- comes the Plaintiff, he may either declare the Contract entirely null by Right, or ſuffer it to be in force, if he judges it con. venient, ſaving to himſelf in both Caſes to require a Reparation of the Damage, which comes to him by the Cheat, when the Defendant hall demand a Ceffation of the Contract. This laſt Circuinſtance is remarkable, and I cook the more notice of it, becauſe it confirmed the Norion I had delivered in my Treatiſe of Sports, where I had ſaid (before Mr. Noodt's Treatiſe appear- ed) following my own Reaſon, 1.2.c. 1. $ 11. That there is this particular in all Contracts made by Force or Error, or in a word, which are not perfectly free on the part of one of the Contracters, that it is lawful for this laſt to make what advantage he can of it, but the other hath no Righę to eaſe himſelf of the Damage done him contrary to his intention, &c. Mr. Noodt hereupon quotes a Law of the quires a Nullity of the Contract, ſuch a Demand, which is fhämeful , ought not to be granted to its Author. Tranſaktione finita quum ex partibus suis imagis dolum intercefise, quam eorum, contra quos preces fundis, confitearis , instaurari grave, nec non crimingum tit (6) Altho', adds our Author in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, 1. 1. c. 9. $ 13. the other Contracter has Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on on $ 9. __(1). Plautus has given us a good Charáťter of theſe fort of Men in the perſon of a Seller of Slaves, who demanding if he had noc promiſed to pay the Money for which he had fold a Boy, in caſe any one would warranc him to be free, anſivers, as in the Latin Quotation at (**) in the Text. (2) Our Author leaves us here to gueſs at his Meaning about the validity of an Agreement, which notwithſtanding the know. ledge of the ill deſign of the other Contracter, we have engaged our ſelves in with him for ſomething, but he explains himſelf in his Abridgment of the Duty of a Man and Citizen, I. 1. c. 9. $ 14. where he lays down this Rule, He that crufts to the Promiſes or Agreements of a perſon who makes no ſcruple of violating his Faith, and breaking his moſt íacred Engagements, acts with a great deal of Imprudence, but that is not a Reaſon ſufficient to render the Engagement null and of no effect. The Reaſon is plain, he' ought to have taken care not to engage, and if he be deceived 'tis his own Fault, he can blame none but himſelf. (a) Vid. Diodor. Sic. l. 2. C, 28. v the it by . v12 3: better. CHAP. VI. 63 making Promiſes and Paits. better. The publick Bankers of Greece (ſays he ) deal with ; and in general, all Faith and Truſt be if you lend them only a ſingle Talent with ten baniſh'd froin amongſt thoſe who are not fubject to Bonds, as many Seals, and twice as many Witnef- a common Ruler or judge. For ſince we cannot be fes, yet will never be prevaild upon to be honeſt. infallibly certain of any Man's Honeſty, and ſince But whether this Fear or Suſpicion of being deceiv'd, the World is for the moſt part inclin’d to Wicked- can render invalid a Pa&t already made, and can ab- nefs; and farther, fince in a State of Nature, every ſolve the ſuſpecting Party from a neceſſity of Per- Man orders his Buſineſs according to his own Opi- forinance, will appear when we ſhall have confi- nion, and is Judge of the Fuftneſs of his own Fears, der'd the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes, on this Point. He it will follow that a Suſpicion, though Vain and then lays it down for a Rule, that a Covenant where- Groundleſs, ſhall render a Contract Invalid ; and in neither of the Parties perform preſently, but truſt therefore that Pacts are of no manner of uſe except one another, in a State of Nature, becomes void, if on under Civil Governments . And it is an exceeding either ſide there arije a juſt Fear (a). Which Aller- hard Cenſure, to think the greateſt part of Men fo tion we cannot admit of, but under this Conſtructi- groſly vile and Wicked, as that (ſetting aſide the on; that one Party after the Covenant is made has Čivil Power) the Fear of God, the Regard to Faith juft Reaſon to fear, that when he has perforin'd the and Truſt, and the Force of found Reafon ſhall Engagement on his fide, the other perſon will fly have ſo little Influence on their Minds. Whereas, off. And by a juſt Reaſon to fear, we mean ſuch as on the contrary there feems to be ſtampt on the is grounded on plain Indications and Proofs . For Souls of all Men, in indelible Characters, a juſt it is highly Injurious to queſtion a Man's Fidelity Senſe of the Duty of keeping their Faith Sacred without good Evidence, when we have experienc'd and Inviolable; an Argument for which Truth, we it in former Inſtances. And indeed Mr. Hobbes him- may draw this eaſie and natural Reflection, That felf by a ſubjoyn’d Note, brings his words to this we can find no Man who will openly profeſs Per- qualified Senſe; unleſs (ſays he) there ariſe ſome fidiouſneſs, but every one who recedes from his Word new cauſe of Fear from ſome Fact, or other ſign of the or Bargain, pretends to have done it on very Juſt Will , in one Party, tending to Non-performance, the and weighty Reaſons. A Common-wealth which Fear cannot be eſteem'd jujt . For that which could not breaks its Faith with one of its Neighbouring States, hinder a Man from promiſing, ought not to be admitted immediately engages its Faith again, to procure as an hindrance of performing. That is, tho' before the Alliance and Confederacy of another; and thus the entring into the Covenant, one of the Parties endeavours to avert the Danger it lay under from might entertain fome Suſpicion, that the other that Baſeneſs and Treachery, by the Help of the would impoſe upon him; yet by the very Act of fame Duty which before it violated. We ought Covenanting with ſuch a Perſon, he as it were re- therefore to preſume, that every Man will do what nounces this Fear,and declares it inſufficient to hin- is Juſt and Honeſt, till his contrary Practice forces der his believing and truſting him. And otherwiſe, us to change our Opinion (4). To diſtruſt every no Engagement could paſs between them. But at Body, ſays Lucian, is a moſt ridiculous Folly. From firſt this feeins to have been Hobbes's Judgment, all which we may venture to conclude, That this that a Pa& thus made would be void, though there diſtruſt of Men's Faith ariſing from the general Pra- Should no ſuch fear ariſe after the Concluſion of it. vity of human Nature, is not ſufficient to juſtifie the As appears both from his Work of a Body Politick (3), Non-performance of Contracts (5). And therefore written in the French Tongue, where we do not the Excuſe of the Mitylenians for deferting the Con- meet with this Reſtriction; and from the reaſon af- federacy of the Athenians, was Vain and Ground- figned by him in the Latin Treatiſe, for that Rule leſs, as it is given by their Ambaſſadors in Thucy- of his ať preſent under our Examination. And the dides, B. 3. C. 12. Edit. Oxon. Pag. 154. When they reaſon he gives for it is this, Becauſe he that perc had War, they for Fear courted us; and when they forms firft, betrays himſelf to the covetous Deſigns of had Peace, we for Fear courted them. Thus our the other Party , upon account of the ill Diſpoſition of Faith on both ſides was not preſerv'd as is uſual moſt Men, inciting them to ſtudy and advance their by mutual good Will, but by mutual Diſtruſt; own Intereſt ly right or wrong. But it is againſt Rea- and they who could be firſt encouraged by Securi- fon, that one ſhould perform now, whilſt it is impro- ty were likely to be the firſt that ſhould break the bable that the other will perform bereafter. Whence Union. it is plain (6), That he derives the Cauſe of this Suf Nay, ſhould we diſcover ſome particular Vices picion, and Diffidence from the general Pravity of in a Perſon, this is not always a good Reaſon for Mankind. And by this means inult the greateſt us to recede from an Engagement made with him (6). number of Mortals , be branded as Perſons unfit to For there are many Vices which have no ill Influ- (3) This is a Miſake of our Author, for 'cis only a Tranſlation into French, as Mr. Barbeyrac obſerves. T(4) The Author here cites a Paſſage from Lucian's Dialogue of the Liar or Incredulous, Tercia mies, ipn : "Twv, em öv do magi. Theſe are the words of a Man very credulous in Matters of Magick, who reproved another that did not believe his Relations concerning it, but if our Author had minded the Connection of the Diſcourſe, he would have found that he had mil.apply'd theſe words, to which the judicious Maxim of the Philofopher Seneca had been more pertinent, Utrumque enim vitium eft, loin omnibus credere, & nullis, sed alterum horeſtius dixerim vitium, alterum tutius, (i. e.) We muft neither truft all the World, 'nor diftruft them, both of thele things are faulty; but the firſt in my opinion is moſt honeft, and the other moſt fafe, Epift. 3. Sec Hefiod in his Book De Oper . & Diebus. And as to the following Maxim of our Author, See 1.8.c. 4. 3. following. (5) The Greek is, Και οι μεν ημάς εν τω πολέμω δεθλόπς έδεράπευον, ημείς και εκείνες οι ησυχία το αυτι έποιέμες, ο π τοις άλ- λοις μάλισα έννοια, πίσιν βεβαίοι, ημίν τέτο φός έωegν παρείχε σέει τε το πλέον η φιλία κατεχόμενοι σύμμαχοι ήμεν, και όποτε και θα σου παρόσοι ασφαλεία θράσο επι πεοπρgι τι και παραβάσεται έμελλον. (6) Mr. Hirtius here quotes to this purpoſe certain Words of Terence, which he makes a Buyer of Slaves to ſpeak, Leno fum, fateor , Pern'cies communis adoleſcentium, perjurus , Peſtis ; tamen tibi a me nulla eft orta injuria, (i. e.) I own, I am a Buyer of Slawes, the Ruin of young Men, a Perjured perſon, a common Plague; but for all this I have done you no Injury. Adelph. Act. 2. Scene 1, v. 34, 35. drine is thus deliver d. If a Covenant be made, &c. p. c. 68. (a) De Cive, c. 2. f. 11. (6) And much more plain from his expreſs Words in the Engliſh Leviathan, where the fame Do- ence 64 Book III, Of the Conſent required in ence on the Duty of keeping Faith. Thus ſuppoſe Add. Polyb. 1. 8. C. 1, 2. 1. 10. C. 34. Cicero in Verr. a Man to be inclin’d to Luft, Drunkenneſs, or Cruel- He who hath proved falſe to his own Party is the ty, thoſe ill Habits conſider'd barely in themſelves, common Enemy of Mankind. No wiſe Man ever do not hinder but that he may be a ſtrict Obſerver truſted a Traytor. Idem pro Rabir. When a Man of his Word, and a conſtant Performer of his Co- hath been once Perjur’d, he ought to be no more venants . And farther ſtill , ſhould we find a Per- believºd, though he ſwear by all Heaven together, ſon addicted to ſuch Vices as do commonly preju- Add. Senec. de Benef. 1. 4. c. 27. dice Fidelity and Truſt; as if we obſerve in him a Thus much we willingly allow, that in caſe a deſultory Lightneſs and Inconſtancy of Mind, an Man openly diſclaims ali Religion, or if he enter- inſatiable Deſire of Riches, or a violent Strain of tain ſuch Opinions as amount to the ſame, we ought Ambition ; yet even theſe Qualities do not give us to place no tarther Truſt in his Pacts or Promiſes , an abſolute Liberty of refuſing to make good our than as either his manifeſt Advantage, and Intereſt word, when we have paſs’d it on his Account. For obliges him to ſtand to thein; or as we can by force in the firſt place, it may often happen that a Man reduce him if he fly off. Such Perfons are thoſe pro- out of a particular Inclination may practice Diſho- fels’d Atheiſts (9), who either deny the Being or the neſty towards cthers, and yet may live fairly and Providence of God; and nearly related to them, are juſtly with me. And then, (as has been lately ob- the Maintainers of the Mortality and Impunity of ſerv?d) by my very Act of bargaining with a Per- human Souls. For 'tis impollible, but that Men of ſon whoſe Diſpoſition I am acquainted with, I de- theſe Principles ſhould meaſure all Right, and all clare thoſe Vices which I know him Guilty of, to Juſtice by their own Profit and Convenience. Into be inſufficient to hinder me from truſting him, and the ſame Herd we inay pack all thoſe who practice fo renounce all my Privilege of making Excepti- ſome Villany or Vice for their ſet Trade and Em- on againſt his preſent Morals, after the Buſineſs is ployment; as Pirates (10), Thieves, Murtherers, concluded between us. For otherwiſe nothing would Pimps , Courteſans and other profligate Wretches who have been firmly tranſacted, ſuppoſing one Party take Perjury for a Trifle, and make a Jeſt of ſacrel at firſt to have made ſuch a Reſerve as ſhould Obligations (11). Thus Tacitus ſpeaks upon the Oc- when he pleas'd overthrow the whole Proceedings (7). caſion of one Gannaſcus, who having ferved the Ro- Though indeed when I have been once deceiv'd by mans a long time run over to the Germans. Nec ir- a Man, I ſhall act very imprudently if I engage in rite aut degeneres infidiæ fuere adverſus transfugam any Contract with hiin again, without requiring & violatorem fidei, i. e. (AN. 11. C. 19.) The Treache- particular Security. And the very Proverb will ry ceas’d to be diſhonourable by being practis’d tell me, That if ſuch a Knave cheats me once 'tis againſt a perjur'd Renegado. bis Fault, but if he cheats me a ſecond time 'tis my And this we are farther ready to acknowledge, own (8). Add. Senec. de Benef. 1. 4.C. 27. Cic. de Tui- that although the Argument of Mr. Hobbes, which vent. I. 1. C. 39. Or even after the Pact is conclud- we have here endeavour'd to refute, does not per- .ed: Suppoſe I find by evident Tokens, that he is form the Service he intends it for ; that is, does not contriving to play me a Trick, I ſhall be an en- take off the Validity of Pacts in a Natural State; yet gregious Fool if I betray my ſelf Voluntarily to his is in ſome meaſure capable of good uſe, in as much Deſigns. Cicero de Invent. 1. 1. c. 39. It's the high- as we may draw from it the following Rules of Pru- eſt Pitch of Madneſs to rely on their Fidelity, whoſe dence. Never to depend inuch on a Covenant, but Perfidiouſneſs you have often experienc'd. Hence when we know that the Intereſt of the other Party Menelaus cries out in Homer. 1. 3. Iliad. v. 105, is conceru'd in the Performance of it, as well as our 106. own; and that upon Default he is likely to ſuffer fome greater Evil or Inconvenience, than he can in- *Αξεγε δη Πριάμοιο βίον όφρ' όρκια τα μνη cur by ſtanding to the Agreement. Aúris, étoi oi maides Kaspianos rj žmsos. That he who enters into a Contract with his Sue perior ſhould fo order Matters, as that his Superior Bring Priam's ſelf to ſee the Contract made, Thall be oblig'd to be the first Performer. For if For Priam's Sons are Faithleſs and unſtaid. the weaker Perſon diſcharge his Part firſt, the Effect will probably be, either that he ſhall be diſappoint- ida (7) There is a Paſlage in Cicero very pertinent to this purpoſe, Nam illud quidem neque dedi, neque do fidem infideli cuiquam, circo re&te a Poeta, quia cum tra&taretur Atræus perſone ſerviendum fuit, ſed ſi hoc ſibi ſumunt, nullam esſe fidem, quæ infideli data fit , videant ne quæratur latebra perjurio, (i. e.) When the Poet makes Atreus ſay, I never have, nor do believe a faithleſs Perſon, he had reaſon to make that wicked King ſay ſo, to make up his Character. But if we lay down this as a general Rule, That Credic given to a faithleſs Man is void, I fear that under this pretence an Excuſe will be found for Infidelity and Perjúry. De Ofic. 1. 3. c. 29. (8) Cicero's Latin is, Primo quidem decipi incommodum eſt, iterum ftultum, tertio turpe---ſumma igitur amentia eft in eorum fide Spem habere, quorum perfidia toties deceptus fis. De Invent. l. 1. C. 39. See allo Homer's Iliads, 1. 3. v. 105. Cicero, 1. 1. in Verrem, C. 15. Sen. de Benef. 1.4.c. 27. Polyb. I. 8. c. 1, 2. and 1. 10. C. 34. (9) Mr. Vander Muelen in his Commentary upon Grotius, Tom. 2. will not agree to the Opinion of our Author. For he ſays, Experience ſhews, that theſe ſort of Men have not fo altogether put off Humanity, but are uſually conformable to the Rules of Honeſty and good Senſe eſtabliſhed among Men, and if they do not act with any fear of a Deity, yet they do it with the Pro- ſpect of their own Advantage and Preſervation. So that though we know thar a Man is infected with thar dereftable Opinion, we have no Right under that pretence to break our Word with him, and neglect to perform the Agreements made with him. We were at our liberty to agree with him, or nor; but from the Moment that we have conc'uded an Agreement with him, we are ne. ceſſarily obliged to perform it. It is a clear different thing when we deal with Traitors, Thieves, Pirates, &c. Mr. Bayle has alſo proved at large in his Thoughes upon a Comer , and the Enlargement of that Work, that Atheiſts are not always wicked and faithleſs, and that they may through a Principle of Honour or other Humane Motives abſtain from groffer Vices. (10) The Author here ſpeaks only of that Circumſpection that we ought to uſe in treating with ſuch Men. For he denies not but we are obliged to obſerve what we have freely promiſed. See what he ſpeaks a little lower, s 11. in the place whøre he ex; amines the Maxim of Cicero. D? Offic. l. 3. c. 29. See alſo 1. 8. c. 4. & 5. (11) We may eaſily diſcern that this Paſſage is not very pertinently alledged. ed CHAP. VI. . making Promiſes and Pacts. 65 O. Ayer dia * may ty (12). our Author ſays here is not contrary to the Maxim which we have defended above after him, l. I, c. 6. § 14. For though in nor ed and deluded; or that he muſt depend entirely looks upon as good. Now it appears. no leſs Good, on the Favour and good Grace of the other, for what and deſirable to the Will, to avoid an imminent E- he expects in return. vil, than to acquire an abſent Benefit; and towards Thus Socrates of Achaia, replied to the Demands the attaining of both theſe Ends, we employ the of King Artaxerxes; the King deals moſt unreaſo- moſt likely Means, although they be ſuch as we nably by us ; what he deſires to receive from us, he ſhould not barely on their Account chufe or em- would have to be immediately deliver’d; but what brace. For we commonly make uſe of Methods he is to give us in return, he expects we ſhould af- in themſelves ungrateful and troubleſome for the terwards humbly ſue for. Diod. Sic. 1. 14. C. 24. For eſcaping of a Danger, as for the acquiring of a Plea- the fame Reaſon, facilior fides Speratur ex pari, we ſure(1.) Though indeed, the Hopes of compaſſing a truſt more ſafely to the Faith and Honeſty of Good does more ſweeten the Grievouſneſs of theſe an Equal, Quintil. Declam. 312. Means or Methods, than the Care of preventing an And laſtly, That he expoſes his Safety to mani- Evil. For which Reaſon Ariſtotle (a) calls thoſe feft Danger, who by performing a Covenant wea- only mixt (that is, partly voluntary, partly invo- kens himſelf, and ſtrengthens the other Party ; upon luntary) Actions (2), which are undertaken for the hopes that in Requital, and according to the Agree- fake of declining ſome Miſchief which we are like ment , he ſhall afterwards receive the like Alliſtance to ſuffer; as in that trite Inſtance, of throwing and Succour. For 'tis a piece of Folly to give a Goods over-board in a Storm. Though as great real and ſubſtantial Good, in exchange for Words, Hardſhips as any of this kind, are undergone by Writings or Seals, when we have nothing to oppoſe the Wreſtlers, and other Engagers in the publick to the Charins of Ambition and Covetouſneſs, but Games, to prepare their Body for thoſe Exerci- the ill-grounded hopes of Honeſty and Fideli- ſes (b). What we would obſerve then is this, That although Actions perform’d upon Fear of a greater Maurocen. Hift. Venet. l. 5. p. 193. Ed. Ven. I dare Evil, ought to be accounted Spontaneous, and tho' not venture to place the Security of our Affairs in a the leſſer Evil, which in thoſe Caſes we chuſe, is as League. For ſuch is the Nature of Confederacies, that Things then ſtand, the real Object of our Deſire; they are frequently hindred, and interrupted by the yet all this is not ſufficient to found an Obligation various Events of things; different Ends proposºd, in us towards another. For ſince every Obligation draw the Strength and Minds of the Allies diffe- is directed towards ſome other Party, to whom it is rent ways; and whilſt each State purſues its own to be made good, and whọ thereby obtains a Cor- ther ſent in equal Proportion, nor at the time agreed one Perſon has in him the due Grounds or Princi- upon; hence ariſe Suſpicious, and Eſtrangement of ples of an Obligation, but it is requiſite, that there Affections, from this open Quarrels, and from Quar- be in ſome other Perſon Principles fit to create à rels utter Deſertions, and Violations of the main Con- Right. For we can have no Notion of an Obliga- tract ; and thus at length, thoſe of the Confederates tion, unleſs a Right anſwer to it, or be confequent who are leaſt able to make Reſiſtance, become a Prey upon it. As I can owe nothing, if there be no Per- not only to their Enemies but to their Allies. ſon who can rightly demand any thing from me. X. We are now to proceed to that other Species Therefore ſuch Fear alone invalidates and deſtroys of Fear; ariſing froin the Approach or the Appre- an Obligation, as is caus’d by ſome Vice or Imperfe- henſion of ſome grievous Miſchief. And in ſtating ction in the other Party, rendering him incapable this Point it is neceſſary, that we go back to fur- of acquiring a Right (3.) And ſuch a Defect is e- niih our felves with ſome clear and fundamental very injurious Action; which cannot be ſaid to Principles. And ſuch is this undoubted and original produce a Right without a manifeſt Contradi- Truth, That our Will naturally inclines to what it &tion (4). For to pay what another has a Right to 20voldo ใน (12) This Quotation is not very neceffary, becauſe that Hiſtorian there creats in general of the Inconyeniencies which ariſe by Alliances of one State with another. 5d voile 108 ob Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 10.be (1) As for Example, The ancient Wreſtlers, as our Author obſerves a little lower, undergo chearfully the Regimen.of a very duftere Life, and great Farigues, that they may win the Crown of the Olympick Games. See Epi&et. E nchirid. c. 35. in fine. What general Man is more ſenſible of Evil than Good, that hinders not, but that ſometimes he may reſolve to do ſome things dif- agreeable in themſelves upon ſome Occaſions, to obtain a Good which he looks upon as much more conſiderable, or to avoid an Evil more troubleſome. And then the Hope of Good makes us think the Means leſs troubleſome, than the Deſire of avoiding the Evil does, as well becauſe we embrace theſe Means with an entire Liberty in the firſt Cafe, and not in the latter, as becauſe the Acquirement of Good is ſomething poſitive, which produces a new Pleaſure and Advantage, whereas a Deliverance from Evil leaves us in the ſame Eſtare we were. to bigo motoarelo motiv (2) See l. 1. C. 4. $ 9. before going. 13. Nihil conſenſui tam contrarium eſt, qui ac bone fidei judicia ſuſtinet, quam vis & metus, quem comprobare contra bonos mores eft. Digeft . I. 50. tic. 18. De Diverſis Reg. Jur. leg. 116. See tit. 2 1.4. Quod metûs cauſa geſtum erit, and Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order. Part 1. I. 1. tic. 18. § 2. We may add alſo what Cicero ſays, fam illis promiffis ftandum non effe, quis non ? . I. rently, but of thoſe only that were given freely without any Violence, and without a Mind corrupted with the Potions, * Charms, or Fawnings of a Woman, being juſtly perſuaded that there is no difference between Seducement and Force; and placing in the ſame Rank, Surprize and Force, Pleafure and Pain, as the things which equally cloud our Reaſon. Et arrive και προσηκόν τως τα πειθαι παρά το βέλτισον έλεν ηγέμενα τα βεαθώαι διαφέρουν, αλλ' ας ταυτό και απάτίω τη ανάγκη, και το πάνω τον ηδονίω εμενΘ, ως εκ ήταν εκείναι λογισμών ανθρώπε δυνάμένων. (4) See the Law of the Digeſts, cited $ 8. Noce (2) Ethic . 1. 5. 6. I. See what we have faid of theſe in l. 1. c. 4. f. 9. (6) Vid. Epiftet. Enchir. c. 35. + I demand, 130 21009 as 4. Nuo 66 Of the Conſent required in Book III, tract. Titius's Obferv, 224: demand, is a Precept of the Law of Nature ; and ger I apprehended from another Quarter (2). Thus, fhould an Injury (that is, a Deed or Fact directly it I hire a Guard of Souldiers to defend me againſt contrary to that Law) be able to cauſe any ſuch Ef- Robbers, I am no doubt oblig?d, ſtrictly to pay them fect , the Law of Nature would lend Strength and Af- the Price of their Service. And a Man who being fiftance to its Enemy, and manifeſtly contribute to reduc'd to a low Condition, procures by large Pro its own Deſtruction. 'We may as well ſay, that a miſes, the Help of others, and having by their Law which forbids Thieves, may at the ſame time Means eſcap'd the Danger, is afterwards backward reckon their Trade and Practice amongſt the honeſt in performing, contracts the double Guilt of Perfi. ways of Gain (5). diouſneſs, and of Ingratitude. XI. But, before we apply theſe Remarks more A Promiſe is likewiſe Valid, if made to a third cloſely to the Point, it is neceſſary that we make Perſon, through our Awe and Dread of a lawful Sum farther Enquiry, whether the Author of the Fear perior (3); who had a juſt Right of Commanding was the Party with whom we are engaged in Bufi- us, and of denouncing a Penalty upon Default. For pels, or ſome other Perſon. And then again, whe- here the Party to whom I make the Engagement is in ther he had a juft Power and Authority of preſent. no Fault; and I can only blame my ſelf for being ing ſuch a Fear to our Mind or not. For this is true driven to a thing through Fear of Puniſhment, which beyond Diſpute, that in caſe I have taken an Obli- I ought voluntarily to have undertaken. Thus gation upon me through Fear of Miſchief, threat ſhould a King lend a Body of his Souldiers for ned by a third Perſon, neither at the Inſtignation, Guards to a Foreign Prince, and for the greater Se nor with the Confederacy of the Party, to whom the curity, command them to ſwear Obedience to the Engagement was made (1), I ſtand firmly bound to Stranger ; they ſhall not afterwards fly from their perforin what I promis' him. For there appears new Obligation, upon pretence that they were no Fault in him, which might render him incapa- brought to it by Fear; ſince the Fear proceeded ble of acquiring a Right upon me, and on the con- from him, who had a Sovereign Right of laying trary, he ‘inay juftly challenge a Requital, in that this Injunction on thein, and of forcing them by any he lent me his Alfiftance, in warding off the Dan- Methols to their Duty. Methods to their Duty. In the ſame manner, (5) To clear this Matter, it is neceſſary to make ſome Reflections. I. The Reaſon which our Author alledges taken from the Incapacity made by the Cauſe of Fear, to acquire any Right from the other Contracter, is very good, but there is another drawn from the perſon in whom the Fear is, That his Conſent is not ſo free as is required in all Promiſes and Agreements, which ought to be perfectly voluntary. 'Tis not here as it is in Actions criminal and evil in themſelves, which ought not to be committed for fear of the greareft Menaces, though the Force yielded to may leffen the Crime. Becauſe as we ought and may obey the Law that forbids then, we are thought to be free fo far as is neceffary to make us culpable, though we have nothing in view but the Trouble which we are immediately threacned with. But in the matters of Promiſes and Agreements all that is not done without Artifice and Conſtraint from him with whom we engage, is looked upon with Reaſon not to have a good ground of Confent, and confequently is void in it felf, becaufe we act about things indifferent, which we need not determine farther than we ſee con- venient. The Law thar leaves us ac liberty to do them or nor, lays no Necefficy upon us to keep what we are engaged to contrary to our Will and Intereſt. Reafon and Prudence will oblige us rather to depart from our Righes, than expoſe our felves to the il effect of Force; but if there be no Damage to us, nothing can oblige us to make good an Act which is null in it felf, unleſs we fear a worſe Conſequence than appears in doing it. Mr. Daumat, who has uſed (in his Civil Laws reduc'd to a Natural Order, Part 1. Lib. 1. tit. 18. 92.) this Reaſon to fhew the Nullity of forced Engagements, but explains them obſcurely, has not forgot the other Reafon taken from him who is conſtrained to promiſe or treat. 2. Our Author ſeems to think that the Evil, which be ing apprehended, is fufficient to make forced Promifes and Agreements void, ought to be very terrible, whoſe Proſpect may af . frighe the moft courageous perſons. "Tis certainly the Opinion of the Roman Lawyers, who confine chis Fear to the danger of loling Life, or ſuffering lome violent bodily Pain. Metum accipiendum Labea dicit, non pro quolibet timore, fed majori malitate ---qui merito do in hominem conſtantiſſimum cadat. Digeft. 1. 4. cit. 2. leg. 5, 6. Talem metum probari oportet, qui ſalutis periculum, vel corporis cruciatum contineat. Cod. I. 2. tit. 4. De Tranſactionibus, leg. 13. Bur ſuppoſing always, that the Fear is unjuſt, i do not fee why the Apprehenfion of a ſmall Evil is not ſufficient to make Promiſes and Agreements void, if that be the prin- cipal Motive, and wichow it Conſene had not been given. The leaſt Injuſtice in my opinion gives no more Right to the Author of ic than the greateſt. But the Fear muſt not be a vain one, for he that refigns himſelf up to Parick Fears, muſt blame him- felf, Vani timoris non eft jufta excufatio, Digeft , t. so. cit. 17. De Diverfis Reg. Jur. Leg. 184. Otherwiſe, as Mr. Daumat obſerves, all the world would not have the ſame Reſolution to refift Force and Menaces. There are ſome Men ſo very weak and timorous that they yield to the leaſt Impreſions ; fo that the leaft Force prevails as much on them, as the greateſt on the moſt courageous , and 'tis principally for their fake that the Laws puniſh Matters of Fact and Oppreſſions. But if the fame Laws do not allow the Fear of a ſmall Evil to be ranked among the Cauſes of nulling a Contract, it proceeds from hence, according to the judicious Re- flection of Mr. Placette in his Treatiſe of Reftitution, that the Lawgivers would prevent the Multiplication of Suits, which are without Contradiction a great Evil; but they have left, adds he, the Rights of Conſcience entire, and their Authority hinders not but that we may obſerve exactly what thar inward Law prefcribes upon that and the like Subjects. We muſt then conclude, chat by Natural Rigắr all Force, and every kind of Violence, direct or indirect, all Menaces, and in general all unlawful Influences which oblige Men, contrary to their Inclination, to give their Confent, which otherwiſe they would not, takes away that Liber- ty which is neceflary to make an Engagement valid, and confequently renders all Promiſes and Agreemenrs in ſuch caſes null and void. I ſhall farther add only one Paflage is Plato, wherein that Philoſopher afferts, That the Agreements to which a Man is obliged by an unjuſt Force, ought to be valid no more than thoſe which are contrary to the Laws, or are not in our power to execure, by reafon of Rome unforefeen Accident, “Όσα πς αν ομολογιών ξυνθέθαι, μη ποιή κασει τις ομολογίας πλίω ών αν νόμοι απείργων, ήψήφισμα ή τίνΘ- υπό αδίκε βιαθείς ανάγκης ομολογήση, και έων από πύχης απροσδοκήτε τις άκων κωλάθη σίκας είναι η ásam citeañis opcorozices in Tcūs quasancion dingus, c. De Legibus, 1. 1. Tom. 2: Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Su. (1). Whether the Evil be at a diſtance and uncertain, or ir be according to all appearance juſt ready to happen. In the firſt Cafe it is plain, that Fear from a third perſon can't invalidare a Promife or Agreemenr.. In the other, though the Fear be pre- fent,it has, no manner of influence upon the Nature of a Promiſe or Agreement. All that it does is, that it gives the perſon engaged a Right to accuſe the third perſon, by whoſe unjuft Force he made the Engagement, and without which he had made no con- magis te de vi koſtium vel latronum, vel populi tuerer, vel liberarem, aliquid à te accepero, vel te obligavero, non debere me hoc edi&to teneri, nifi, iple banc tibi uim ſummiſi. Ceterum fi alienus fum à ui, teneri me non debere, ego enim opere potius meæ mer- cedem accepiffe videor. Digeft . 1. 4. cit., 2. leg. 9. 9 1. (3) Non eam vim quam Magiſtratus intulit, fcilicet jare licito, Go jure honoris, quem ſuſtinet. Ibid. leg. 3.51. This Author in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, 1. 1. c.9. is. adds, with Reſpect or Deference to a perſon to whom we have great Obligations. And 'tis for this Reaſon that he reports an Example of a Child who married againit his own Inclinacion co pleaſe his father, although he could have abſolutely freed himſelf. See l. 6. C. 2. $ 14. following. (2) Si quo Should CHAP. VImaking Promiſes and Paits. V . 67 gitur ut deſignet, quis ei metum, vel vim adhibuit, do ideo ad hoc tantum Aston paliw facientis. fhould we ſuppoſe that a Father might betroth his ment in the Party who ſuffer'd it; becauſe ſhould Daughter to a Man, quite againſt her Inclination; he offer to do (6), or to give what in the Agree- in this caſe, when ſhe, out of fear of her Father's ment he promis’d, he ought in common Juſtice, im- Authority, has given her Faith to the leſs agreca- mediately to receive full Recompence; or full Rem ble Spouſe, ſhe cannot afterwards diſappoint him. ftitution (7). And 'twould be a fooliſh and idle For there is no Fault in him, to prejudice his Right, way of ačting, when we are once gót clear of the accrujing from that Promiſe; and the Daughter ought Danger, to pay voluntarily what we promis d upon freely to have obey'd her Father's Pleaſure; and Force, and then to require Reparation of the Da- fo cannot plead Compulſion, when ſhe had no Right mage (8). Martial. L. XI. Epig. 59. to reſiſt. Thus far then it is a Point of Moment to conſider, who was the Author of the Fear. But in Quid ſi me tonſor cum ftri&ta novaculà ſupra elt, other Caſes, the Rule of the Roman Lawyers holds Tunc libertatem divitiaſq; roget? good, That it makes no difference from what Perſon Promittam : Nec enim rogat illo tempore tonfor, the Fear proceeds; that is, when no one has a Right Latro rogat; res eft imperioſa timor. of putting us into fuch a Fear; and when the Fear Sed fuerit curva cum tuta novacula theca, is actually the Cauſe, not the bare Occaſion only of Frangam tonſori crura manuſq; fimul. the Promiſe or Pxet, conſequent upon it (4). Thoſe Promiſes then, or Pacts we take to be Inva My Barber with his Razor on my Throat, lid, which a Man is compell’d to engage in, by the Asks me for Wealth and Freedom, and what not: unjuſt force of the Party, to whom they are made. I promiſe all, whilſt Danger ties my Hands, For ſince he who extorts any thing from another, byt For not the Barber but the Rogue demands; uſing unjuſt Terrours, is by the Law of Nature But when fierce Razor to ſafe Sheath withdrew, bound to reſtore it; and muſt conſequently make I'd ſpoil his Dancing and his Fiddling too. good what the other Perſon loſes by fuch a forced Bargain. So (5) Seneca l. 4. Coritrou. 25. The Que- Eſpecially ſince the other Party, when he dernánds ſtion is whether Force and Neceſſity render a Bu- or accepts our Promiſe, does by that very Act de- fineſs Invalid, when they did not proceed from the clare manifeſtly, that 'tis far from his Thoughts and Party contracting? What Influence, (will he ſay) Deſigns to make us any Satisfaction. Beſides, how “ Can your Compulſion have on me when it was not I ridiculous would it be in you to reckon it a piece " that compell’d you? The Puniſhment cannot be of Merit, when you forbear a Miſchief which the mine, unleſs the Fault were mine. But the other Laws forbid you to commit; to pretend that you do denies this way of arguing. The Laws, ſays he, as a Man a Kindneſs , by refraining from fome noto- to the preſent Caſe, doth not profecute him that ricus Villainy. And therefore Cicero (a) utterly “ offers the Violence, but alliſts and relieves him denies himſelf to have been obliged to Antony, that ſuffers it; it ſeeming unreaſonable, That a for not killing him at Brundufium. What Benefit , “ Man ſhould be bound by an Engagement thruſt what Favour is it ſays he) that you with-held your upon hiin againſt his Will. Whence the Necefli- Hands from the fouleft Wickedneſs? What Kindneſs “ ty proceeded, is a Point of no Weight in the Dif- can Thieves boaſt of bút that they ſpared a Man's Life, pute. That which renders the Contract unjuſt, is when it was in their power to have murther’d him? the hard Fortune of the Sufferer, not the Perſon of the Doer. Idem Controverf. 1. 4. Ç. 8. If it be Horat. 1. 1. Epiſt. 16. ſaid it was not I that applied the Force but ano Non furtum feci nec fugi ſi mihi dicat ther; the Anſwer is, That Man who makes his Ad Servus, habes pretium loris non ureris aio. vantage by Violence, offer'd by ſome other Hand; Non hominem occidi ; non paſces in cruce Corvos. is no leſs Guilty, than if he had been himſelf the actual Performer. (9) Id. de Arte P. DOO The Neceſſity of Reparation in the Party who of godt revitavi denique culpam fer'd the Violence, takes off all Obligation to pay- Non laudem merui. (4) In hac ultione non quæritur is qui convenitur, an alius metum fecit, fufficit enim boc docere- metum ſibi illatum, vel vim, do ex hac ve eum qui convenitur, etfi crimine caret, lucrum tamen fenfiffe. Nam cum metus habeat in ſe ignorantiam, merito quis non aſtrin- acceptam pecuniam faceret, vel rem traderet, vel quid aliud faceret. Digeft . l. 4i tir. 2. Quod metus cauſa, leg. 14. $ 3. (5) The Latin of Seneca is, An fi eft in re vis & neceſſitas, ita tamen refundantur, quæ per vim do neceſitatem gefta funt, fi vis com neceſitas à paciſcente adhibita eft? Nihil, inquit, meâ an tuâ cogaris, fi non à me cógeris, meam culpam oportet effe, ut mea pæna ſit. Non inquit, neq; enim Lex adhibenti vim-iraſcitur, sed-paſſo ſuccurrit, do iniquum illi videtur, id ratum effe, quod aliquis , non quia voluit admota ad lucrum fuum utitur. See alſo Mr. Noodt, De Juriſdi&t, do Imperio. (5) There is no Neceſſity here to have recourſe to this Fiction of Law; and our Author ought the more to have avoided it, becauſe he condemns it himſelf, when he criticizes upon Grotius's Opinion, at the end of 'S 12. in this Chapter. He had better have infifted upon the Principle he laid down above, viz. The Incapacity that the Author of force ſhould obtain any Right by ſuch extorted Engagemenes, and the want of Liberty in the perfon, which gives ſuch a forced Conſent. See $ 10. Note 3. The Argument'our Author ufes here can only be ad hominem againſt the Roman Lawyers, who having ſearched into the idle Fallacies have done in other Matters, maintain, That the Contracts of Rigorous' Right extorted by an unjuſt Fear are valid in Equiry, altho” they ought afterwards to be diſannulled by the Prætor. See Inſtitut, l. 4. tit. 13. De Exceptionibus, $1. and Mr. Noodt, De Forma emendandi Doli mali, c. 16. (). This is a Term of Law by which is underſtood a Diſcharge which two perſons Debrors to one another, give one another. of this our Author will treat in Lib. 5. c. 11.9 5. Vid. Digeft. 1. 44. tit. 4. De doli mali do metus Exceptione, leg. 8. (8) This Note is put into the Text.**** (9) Horace is there treating of another Marrer, and ſo the Quotation is not proper. (a) Philip. 2, + I 2 Speak front , Tv of this Head, as 68 Of the Conſent required in Book III Speak Slave your Merits, I ne'er fled nor Stole; one of them make their eſcape, the reſt are obliged You've 'ſcaped the Scourge, and ſtill your Hided to pay the Price he was valued at. Whether an keeps whole:S Oath added to Promiſes of this kind, does more con- I've done no Murther; and you feed no Fowl. firm and eſtabliſh their Force, we ſhall hereafter examine. I merit Pardon, but I win no Praiſe. It is a noted ſaying of Tully in his third Book of Offices, C. 2.9. (12). If you have agreed with Thieves to Add. 1. 7. f. 3. D. de pactis . Seneca, 1. 2. Controv. give them ſuch a Sum to ſave your Life, it is no De 13. Not to do a Villainy will never paſs for a Be- ceit to recede from your Promiſe, though you have nefit . Quin&ilian. Declam. 330. To make an end given your Oath too for the Performance. For Roba of an Injury is by no means to begin a Kindneſs. bers or Pirates are not in the number of any particu- No more is a Man bound to perform his Promiſe, tar and lawful Enemies, but ſhould be look'd on as the who in a Cafe of this Nature (10), gives Security Adverſaries of Mankind; and therefore no true Faith for the Perfon in Diſtreſs; although his own Fear or Oath can properly paſs between us and them. Which is not the Cauſe of his entring into the EngagementAffertion we thus far allow holds good, that a Pro- For ſince Suretiſlip is a kind of Inferior Contract, miſe made to ſuch Men through the Compulſion admitted to confirin and ſtrengthen the main Buſi- of Fear ſhall not be binding. But the reaſon on neſs; it would be abfurd (at leaſt with regard to which Tully proceeds, is not ſatisfactory to many Natural Law) to attribute more Efficacy to the for- Perſons; eſpecially, if extended to ſuch Pacts or Pro- mer than to the latter; to make the Principal miſes, as we commence with the ſame Villains, Debtor lefs ftri&tly obliged, than he who comes into without being brought to it by Violence. For tho the Buſinefs purely for his Aſſiſtance (a). The by the common Cuſtom of Nations (13), a lawful Caſe is otherwiſe, if this third Party for the relief Enemy and a Robber are treated in a different of the Sufferer, contract an Obligation, in which he Method, yet the latter cannot be ſaid immedi- himſelf is the Principal, 110t the Surety, or the Ac- ately to loſe all Rights of Humanity; at leaſt, if cellary. For Inſtance, if a Man out of Kindneſs he ſtill deal with ſome Perſons in a fair and peace- and Pity, ſhould promiſe fome Reward to a Villain, able Manner. For when he tranſacts with me, upon Condition he will ſet a poor Wretch at Li- without influencing my Conſent by Fear, he bar- berty, whom he has got under his Power (11). For gains not as a Robber, but like any other Man, Now here the Contracter himſelf is not properly put un a Robber is call’d a common Adverſary, becauſe der Fear, nor can he uſe thoſe Exceptions, which he does not like other Enemies, offer War pecu- might be made by the Perfon he delivers ; in as liarly to any Party, but practiſes hoſtile Force much as he engages upon his own Score, not in the upon all, without Diſtinction, that fall into his name of the other; and cannot be ſaid to build his Hands. Upon which account, in order to quell , Bargain on a primary Obligation; fice indeed, and to ſuppreſs him, there is no need of the For- none paſs’d but what he freely fet on Foot, and of malities of denouncing War, and liſting Souldiers which he took the whole Burthen on himfelf . And againſt him ; but Nature Commiſſions every Manto he ought to eſteem it a thing well worth his proſecute him in a military way. But it may ſtill Pains or Coſt, to have faved the Life of an inno- be affirm'd, that as by Tully's own Confeflion, a cent Man, and to have acquired the Glory of Bene- State of Hoftility does not hinder us from being ficence, in ſo extraordinary a Degree. bound to obſerve Faith with an Enemy; fo neither But if a Perſon in this Čaptive Condition, upon is this common Hoſtility of the Robber an Hindrance making Terms for his Liberty, ſhall leave Hoſtages to our performing a Covenant made with him; eſpe- to continue under the power of the Villains, till cially if, as we have all along ſuppos’d, he lays aſide ſuch time as he ſhall have perform’d what he pro- the Part of an Enemy, in the Act of Covenanting, miſed; he is then indeed bound to make good his Grotius forms another Objection to this purpoſe; Word; yet not by Virtue of his Contract with the “ Such as are notoriouſly Wicked, and are no part Rogues, but of that whereby he ſtands engaged to “ of any Civil Society, inay, if we regard the Law the Friends whom he has left in his room. In Mo “ of Nature, be by any Man puniſh'd. (This rocca, and other parts of Africk, the whole Body (14) Hypotheſis we ſhall examine in another of Chriſtian Slaves paſs their Faith for each parti place.) Now they who may be puniſh’d, and even cular Man of their Number, that he ſhall not go “ with Death, may likewiſe be diſpoild of their off; and by means of this Security, they are allow'd “ Goods,may be difpoffefs'd of their Rights. But, to walk the City without their Chains, and in caſe and in caſe « mongſt their Rights, that which accrues to them a (10) This is the Deciſion of the Roman Lawyers, who ſay at the ſame time, That if the Surety has engaged thro' Fear, and he for whom he is Surety engagech himſelf volunrarily, the Engagement of this latter is good, but of the other null. Labeo ait, ſi quis per metum Rens fit conſtitutus, & fidejuſſorem nolentem dederit ipſe do fidejuſor liberabitur. Si folus fidejuſor metu acceffit, non etiam Reus, Solus fidejufor liberabitur. Digeft . l. 4. tit. 2. Quod metus caufa, leg. 14. $ 6. See l. 5.C.10. $ 9 following. (11) Mr. Hirtius maintains, that in this laſt Cafe the Engagement is not valid, unleſs there be an open Donation of what is de livered or promiſed on that account. For, ſays he, though he be engaged in perſon, 'tis only to ſave another, who is unjuſtly oppreſſed. The Author himſelf in the following Chapter, $ 9. puts the like Engagement among ſuch as are extorted by Fear, or gotten by Surprize, and in Sport. This Criticiſm is well grounded, altho' in the Caſe he is ſpeaking of the Engagement be free, he to whom it is made can acquire no more Right by our Promiſe, than by thoſe for whom the Engagement is made. (12) Cicero's Latin is this, ut fi prelonibus paftum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nulla fraus eſt, ne ſi juratus quidem id non feceris. Nam Pirata non eſt perduellium numero definitus, fed communis hoftis omnium, cum hoc nec fides debet, nec jusjurandum effe communi. See alſo what is ſaid, 1.4.c. 2. S 8. (13) Heliodor. Ethiop. I. 1. c. 3. p. 56. When we make War upon Thieves, we do not finiſh it with the uſual Ceremonies of Articles and Leagues. The Greek is, Ου και επι ρητοϊς πότε λήξεικG- έληξε πόλεμG- έδε ό σπόνδαις έχει την τελευτών. Bur fee Grotius, l. 3. c. 19 § 2, Numb. 2. (14) See l. 8. c. 3. & 4. following. (a) Vid. Inſtit. l. 3. tir. 21. De Fidejuſſor. $ $. 6 from CHAP. VI. 69 making Promiſes and Pacts. « from our Promiſe is one, and therefore that too “ Promiſe through Fear, is therefore naturally ob- may by way of Puniſhment be taken from them. lig'd to perform it, becauſe he plainly gave his But Grotius anſwers this Argument with great Eaſe.“ Conſent, and fuch Conſent as was full and abſolute For he that voluntarily bargains with a Thief, know- “ according to the preſent poſture of Things (3). For, ing him to be ſuch, does by that very Act renounce as Heliodorus ſays, 1. 5. c. 15. p. 253. Edit. Lugd. all Exception againſt his Perſon, which might other “ Life is ſo precious, that we feldoin think we buy wiſe render the Promiſe Invalid. Elſe the Buſineſs < it too dear; though he had never paſs’d his Con- Was Vain and Inſignificant, and nothing really ſent, had he been ſecure from the Danger. But paſs'd between them. Should I be got out of my Anſwer to this , 'tis ſufficient to repeat what we for- Road, and promiſe a Thief fome Reward for fet- merly obſerv’d, That ſince every Obligation ariſing ting me right again, there is no doubt to be made, from a Contract , fuppoſes a Correſpondent Right in but I ought freely to pay it. And thus too the Ro- the other Party, it is not enough that I have in me man Lawyers, rightly maintain , That what- the neceffary Cauſes, and Principles of an Obligati- « foever is depoſited with us by a Thief, ought to on; but 'tis Requiſite, That the Perſon with whom « be reſtored to him (15), if the true Owner of it I deal, be free from all ſuch Defects as might hin- * does not appear. To which, they ſhould add this der him from obtaining a Right upon me. And farther Condition, That the Man who receives the therefore my having the power to give a thing, does thing in Truſt, does not know the Fraud of the not preſently make another have a Power of receiv- other. For in Caſe he is ſatisfied, that the Perſon ing it. Since then an Obligation without a Right, is a Villain, and that the Goods are ſtoln, I do anſwering to it, is of no uſe or purpoſe; it cannot not ſee how he can take them in Charge, without be imagined, that my bare Conſent ſhould bind me bringing himſelf in as an Acceſſary to the Crime. to a Performance, which the Law of Nature for- XÌI. But many indeed there are, who maintain bids the other Perſon to receive at my Hands. And that Pafts and Promiſes, though extorted thro' Fear, this is manifeſtly the preſent Caſe. For the fame have yet the Force and Power of Obliging (1). Law which prohibits the Application of Violence Some urge the Authority of the Roman Law, and Terror, muſt needs at the ſame tiine prohibit which by giving full Reſtitution (2), ſhould ſeem the Acquirement of any Right, or any. Gain, by to ſuppoſe, that thoſe Engagements are in ſtrict fuch wicked Means. What Grotius ſubjoins appears Juſtice binding, but ought to be reliev'd and correct- not altogether agreeable, " That if he to whom ed in Courts of Equity. But 'tis eaſie to vindicate “ the Promiſe was made, did obtain it of the other the Practice without drawing any ſuch Concluſion Party, by putting him in a Fear, though never from it. For ſince the Parties are Members of a « fo Night, he is oblig'd to releaſe the Promiſer if Civil State, the Court does not preſently take it for " he deſire it; not becauſe the Engagement was In- granted, that one of them offer'd Violence to the “ valid, but by reaſon of the Damage which he un- other; and ſince that Point may bear a Diſpute, it juſtly occaſion'd. Now if I can at my Pleaſure ſeems convenient, fo long to keep up ſuch a Con. “ or Deſire be freed from my Obligation, I am al- tract, and to ſuppoſe it good, till the Judge ſhall“ ready actually quit of it. What need is there then receive manifef Evidence, That the Allegation of of this round-about way of Application? You ought Fear, on which the Aktion was grounded, was really to releaſe me from my Obligation, if I requeſt it? Is juſt and true. But it does not follow hence, That it not more Faſie, and more Natural to ſay, Since Contracts of this kind, or other Buſineſs which may you compelld me by Force to make the Promiſé, I owe be difannull’d, by a peremptory Exception at Law, are you nothing; and 'tis idle in you to demand that of me, in themſelves Firm and Obligatory, ſince the For- which ſhould I pay, you are oblig’d immediately to re- mality of that way of Proceeding, though proper ſtore (4). Add. Senec . Controverſ. 4. 26. Civil Judicature, yet is not agreeable to the Sim XIII. The ſame Opinion is defended by Mr. Hobbes plicity of the Law of Nature; at leaſt, when the (b), though by different Arguments. He ſays, Co- Caſe happens between Perſons who do not acknow- nenarts entred into by Fear, are not therefore Invalid, ledge a common Judge. becauſe they proceed from Fear ; for then it would fol- Grotius afferts (a), « That a Man who makes a low, that thoſe Covenants by which Men unite in Ci- 2 (15) Quod fi ego [cui ſpolia abſtulit Latro] ad Petenda ea non veniam, nihilominus ei reſtituenda funt, qui depoſuit, quamvis male quafita depoſuit. Digeft. 1. 16. tit . 3. Depoſiti vel contra, leg. 31. 91. See 1. 4. C. 13. $ 5. following. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S. 12. This is the Opinion of Mr. Montagne in his Eſſays, 1. 3. c. 1. who thus delivers himſc'f, what my Feat has once made me reſolve, I am obliged to make good without Fear; and though nothing forces me to it bür my Tongue without my Will, yet I am obliged to make good my word. As for my felf, whenever I have inconfiderately deliver'd my Thoughts, I have made a Conſcience nevertheleſs of diſowning them. Otherwiſe we ſhall come by degrees to aboliſh all the Right which a third perſon obrains by our Promiſes . Quafi vero forti viro vis posſet adhiberi (Cicero de offic. 1. 3. c. 30. upon which ſee Grevius's Notes.) In this alone hath the Law a Secret Interelt to excuſe us in the Non performance of our Promiſes, it we have promiſed a thing wica ked and unjuſt in it felf, for the Right of Vertưe ought to prevail above the Right of an Obligacion. (2) This hath only place in Contracts of ſtrict Right, for thoſe of good Faith would be null in themſelves, and by the Civil Law. It is true , that according to the Roman Lawyers , the Word annul , make void, reſcind, make god fully, may be indifferent them, the Judge may declare them null one way or another, either as having no Force in themſelves by the Tenure of the Civil ww, or being void by fome Exception made by the Defendant. Scc $ 6. Nore 5. foregoing, and Mr. Noodt's Treatiſe, De Forma emendandi doli mali , &c. c. 15, 16. where it will appear that our Author's Reaſon to excuſe the courſe of Proceedings in the Roman Coure is no ways folia,' fince the Judge had always time to know the Force, whether the Contract were in it ſeli good or (3) Heliodorus’s Greek is, 'Aragó mois afegy may TV TE971 pórteg. A trivial Sentence. (4) Here we may apply the Maxim of the Roman Lawyers, Non videtur quiſquam id capere, quod ei neceſſe eſt alii reftituere, He ſeems not to receive any thing, that mult of acceſſity reſtore it. Digeft. De diverſ. Reg. Juris, leg. si. on which ſee the Nore of Dion. Gothofred. (a) Lib. 2.C.11.87. (b) De Cive, c. 2. $ 16, vil 70 Of the Conſent required in Book III We may do many te luch a vil Life, and make Laws, muſt be Invalid; for the the latter part of the Agreement, it is no good Con- Fear of mutual Slaughter, is the Cau;e of one Man's ſequence to ſay, 11. It is lawful for me to promiſe ſubmitting himfelf to the Government of another. It and to pay the Villain; therefore he has a Right would follow likewiſe, that a Man a&t's Irrationally; of requiring the Performance from me ; or there who believes bis Captive, bargaining with him for his fore I ſtand bound towards him by ſome inward Ranſom. Now in the firſt of theſe Reaſons “ Tie upon my Conſcience. there is a plain Ambiguity in the Term of Fer. things luwfully, which we cannot be engaged to do For that Fear which engages Men to enter into Cia by any Obligation. I may lawfully throw away iny vil Societies, is of a quite different kind from that Goods ; but does it therefore follow, that another which we are now conſidering (1) The former is a can oblige me to ſuch an Extravagance. So that Caution againſt ſome Evil which may happen in- the Rule which the ſame Author lays down on this definitely, I know not when, nor which way. The Subject in his Leviathan (a), is likewiſe falſe; What latter is a dreadful Apprehenſion of grievous Evil, foever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same juſt now coining upon me, and which I am not able I may lawfully Covenant to do through Fear; and what to refift . Therefore the Covenants which we inake I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break. For he for the Procurement of mutuali Aſiſtance againſt ought to have added this Condition, Provided the a common Enemy, are entirely of another Nature, other Party can honeſtly demand it of me, from thoſe by which we promiſe fome Reward, to XIV. There is on this point, ſtill one Queſtion free our ſelves from a Danger, which ao Villain un- behind, which requires our Examination ; Since Pro- juſtly brings upon uis (2). As to the latter Reaſon; miſes made through Miſtake, or through Fear, are we readily acknowledge, that a Rogue acts very void; ſuppoſe the Party after he gets rid of his Mi, irrationally, when having firſt extorted a Promiſe ſtake, or of his Fear, is inclin'd to ſtand to his Bar- by Force, he afterwards yields Credit to the Per- gain, What muſt be the way of ratifying ſuch Pro- fon, as if the whole Buſineſs had been honeſtly and miſes, and of putting them in full Force? For an fairly tranſacted. For that Wickedneſs and Folly Obligation that was at firft Invalid (1), may after- ſhould meet together, is no Contradiction. Onwards recover its Strength, by the Intervention of the other ſide, we inay venture to ſay, That he ſome new Cauſe, fit to create a Right; which in would not act very rationally, who being got ſafe the preſent Café, muſt be a clear and voluntary from a Miſchief, with which he was unjuſtly threat- Conſent. Some then are of Opinion, That for the ned, ſhould freely pay the Ruffin the Price of his Confirmation of ſuch a Promiſe, no more is Requi- Villany (3). 1*(**) Dionyf. Halicar. 1.18. p. 509 in fin. ſite, than an internal Act of the Mind, or a full Edit. Lipſ. Whatever is extorted from private and free Agreement to the Buſineſs, though it be Men, or from publick States. by Force and Neceſſi- not expreſs'd by any outward Sign. For the out- ty, holds no longer than the Neceſſity it ſelf con- ward Sign, they ſay, has paſs’d before ; and this tinues. To being now enforced by the clear and free Determi- He adds, 'tis univerſally true that Pacts oblige, nation of the Mind, nothing is wanting to the Pro- whenfoever a Good is receiv'd, and when the Act of pro- duction of a firm Engagement. Others diſlike this mißng, and the Thing promis'd are both lawful. But way of deciding the Controverſie; becauſe they it is lawful for me both to make a Promiſe for the re-t conceive that the Internal Conſent, and the Exter- fóuing of my Life, and alfo to give what I will of my nal Sign, ought to exiſt together, and that therefore own, even to a Robber. But indeed, what the Rob-all antecedent external Act, cannot be a Token of ber in this Caſe performs for the Traveller, in for- a ſubſequent internal Act, which perhaps was not bearing to take away his Life unjuſtly, cannot be then thought of. And upon this Account, they to call’d a Good. The abſtaining from an Injury, ought make ſuch a Promiſe Valid, require a new Verbal not paſs for a Benefit:And we are then onlyſaid to have Promiſe and Acceptance. Grotius (b) offers a inid- done fome Goud to a Man, when we have conifer'd dle Judginent, that 'tis indeed abſolutely neceſſa- red and preſerved fome which he before enjoy’d; ſubſequent internal Conſent; becauſe, the other of-have deliver'd him from fome Evil or Danger, Party would elſe have no Aſſurance of his Right; which fell upon him without our Fault (4). As to but there is no Neceſſity the Signs ſhould be Verbal , HT ...no ola Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 13. (1) See Lib. 7. Ć.11. S 7. 1 cdo (2) For, as our Author adds, nothing hinders but that a Man may be both wicked and imprudent at the ſame time, accord: ing to the Saying of Menander recorded by Stobąus, Serm. 2. 'Acuraózesón ésiv mouneia, Wickedneſs is a thing that always wants Reaſon and Conſideracion, (3) The Words of the Roman Ambaſſadors ro Marcius Coriolanus make to our purpoſe as they are cited by Dionyſius Halicar- naſſenfis, as at (**) in the Text. (4) And therefore it was a fooliſh Excuſe ailedged by Polycrates in Herodotus, 1.3. p. 112. Thal. Edit. Græc. H. Steph. when he pillages his Friends and Enemies without diſtinction, that to reſtore to his Friends what he took from them, would be a greaca er Obligacion, than if he had altogether forborn the Injury. 99341girio 600 Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S. 14. (1) There is among the General Rules of the Roman Law a Maxim, which appears quite contrary, Quod initio vitiofum eft, non poteft traktu temporis convaleſcere , Digeft. le so. civ. 17. De Diverſis Reg . Jur. leg. 29. And this Maxim is afterwards applied to the making of an Heir, Quæ ab initio inutilis fuit inſtitutio, ex post-fatto convaleſcere non poteſt, Ibid. leg. 210. But we may cern from divers examples of the Roman Law, that this Principle has not always been followed, even in the matter of Wills . See Digeft . I. 12. tit . 1. de Rebus Creditis, &c. leg. 12, &c. and Diony). Gothofredus upon the Rules quoted above, as allo Mr. Dau. mats Civil Laws in their Natural Order, Part 2. 1. 1. tit. 16 Set. 2. $ 31. (a) Cap. 14. (b) Lib. 2. C. II, $ 20. boilags ſince CHAP. VI. 71 making Promiſes and Pacts. fince others may ſerve as well to the purpoſe; as lieceſſary; in as much as this leſſer Sum may per luppoſe the (2) Promiſer underſtanding his Error, or haps no ways anſwer his Occaſions, or turn to his being deliver'd from his Fear ſhall voluntarily give Profit; and therefore unleſs this expreſs Acceptance what he engaged for, or if the thing be already given, intervened, he ſhall be reſponſible only for ſuch a Thall not endeavour to recover it, when he has con- Sum as he firſt ask'd me to ſupply him with (3). venient Means; or ſhall treat afterwards with the It may not here be amiſs, to conſider Plutarch's Ob- other Party, about the ſame thing as he would a- ſervation, Sympoſ. 1.9. 4. 13. p. 742. B. Edit. Wech. bout any thing elſe, which the faid Party lawful. That the words of the Perſon that propoſeth the ly poſtéſſes . To which Decifion we readily Sub- Conditions, have much more Power and Authority, fribe. than his to whom they are offer'd, in as much as he XV. We are farther to obſerve, That to the ren- has no Liberty of adding to them.' That is, becauſe dring of a Promiſe good and valid, there is requi- the latter can obtain no Right, but what reſults red, not only the Conſent of the Perſon who makes froin the Conſent of the former. If the Promiſer it(1), but likewiſe of him to whom it is made (a)(2); fhew his Agreement to the Requeſt of the other and this latter Conſent too (as well as the former, Party, barely by Nodding, or any other Sign of the muſt be expreſs’d by Signs ſufficient; and for this a like Nature, it ſhall be ſuppos’d that the Requett bare Nod will ſerve, if the thing offer’d, either be a was tacitly repeated (4). Add. Grot. 1. 2. c. 16. matter of free Bounty,or have been before requeſted. f. 32. For if the other Party do not Conſent,or do abfolute Add. l. 3. D. de pollicit. Vid. D.1. 50. tit. 12. de pol- ly reject the Propoſal, the thing promiſed ſtill re- licit. Whence ſome have concluded, That to render mains in the power of the Promiſer; though he had a Promiſe Valid, the bare Ac of the Promiſer is fuf- Sworn to part with it; for even an Oath cannot ficient. Grotius (1. 2. C. 11. f. 14.) anſwers, That a transfer a Right before Acceptance; and has only Promiſe once made cannot indeed be revok'd; ſo as this effect, That it makes it unlawful for me to re always to lie ready for Acceptance,tho’ before Accep- voke my Offer, till I am aſſured of the other Man's tance, the Obligation is not fully contracted.But thoſe Refuſal. For he that proffers any thing of his own who look more cloſely on that Paſſage in the Civil to another, does neither intend to force it upon him Law may find, That Ulpian teacheth no more than againſt his Will, nor quite to give it over, and this (5), a Covenant is the Conſent and Agreement throw it away at a Venture; and therefore he loſes of two Perſons, but a Promiſe is only on the part nothing of his Right and Title to it, in caſe the o- of the Offerer; where it is not denied, but that Ac- ther Perſon refuſe to take it. If a Requeſt paſs'd be- ceptance makes even the latter Firm and Obligato- fore-hand, it ſhall continue in Force, unleſs it be ry. And indeed the State or City, of which Ulpi- exprefly revoked ; and in this caſe the Acceptance an ſpeaks, had before ſignified its Acceptance, in is ſuppoſed to have been made in the very Petition; caſe the Promiſe were made on the Account of Ho- provided ftill, That what is offer'd, be equal to nours, already granted or now deſired ; and only what was deſired. For if a Man ask me to lend refuſed it when the Promiſe was made without him a greater Sum, and I proffer a leſs to make Cauſe (6), Vid. 1. 1. f. 1. d.t. 1. 19. D. d. donat, And ſuch an Engagement good, his expreſs Acceptance is again, l. 3. f. 1. d.t. Things thus deliver'd without (2) This is determined in the Code on the account of a perſon who complained that a Bill for a Sum of Money was excorted from him, which he upon that account paid. Quum te non ſolum caviſſe, verum etiam ſolviffe pecuniam confitearis, qua ratione, ut vim paffus reftitui, quod illatum eſt, poſtules, perſpici non poteft, quando verifimile non fit, ad folutionem te proper age amiſa querela de Chirographo, utpote per vim extorto, nifi do in folvendo vim te paffum dicas, (1. e.) Seeing you confeſs that you did not only give Se- curity for, bue paid the Money, we can't ſee how you can obtain a Reftitution, as if it were forced from you, becauſe you have complained of the Bill, as exrorted, unleſs you can aver that you were alſo forced to pay it. 1. 2. tit. 20. De his, qua vi, &c. leg. 2. It is alſo ſaid in leg. 4. of the ſame Ticle, that Conſent after the Force offered makes the Contract valid. Si per vim aut metum mortis, aut cruciatûs corporis venditio à nobis extorta eſt, eo non eam poftea conſenſu corroboraſtis, &c. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 15. (1) Non poteſt liberalitas nolenti acquiri, Digeft. I. 39. tit . 5. De Donation. leg. 19. 82. Liberality can't be ateribured to a per- ſon unwilling. And again, Invito beneficium non datur, l. 5o. tit. 17. De Divert. Reg. Jur. leg. 69. A Kindneſs can't be done to a Man againſt his Will. See 1. 44. tit. 7. De Obligat. do A&t. leg. 55. (2) The French changes the Order of the Author here to render his Reaſonings more clear. (3) Ρlutarch's Greek is, Κυριότερον έται και τα προκεκλημένε λόγον οι 5 δεξάμενοι και υπακέσανες έχει κυριοι προσπθέντες. -Farther, Mr. Hirtius obferves here, chat there is this difference becween Engagements advantageous to one Party only, and ſuch as are for the advantage of both, that in this laſt the Promiſe muſt exactly anſwer to the Demand, whereas in the firſt no ſuch thing is required. For if any one (as the Roman Lawyers exprefs it) ſays thus, Wilt thou give me ten Crowns ? and I an- fiver, Tweney; I am engaged for Ten only. Bat on the contrary, it he ſays, Wile thou give ewenty Crowns and I anſwer, Ten, I am engaged for no more than Ten; for Ten is included in Twenty, but twency is not in Ten. But in a Contract of Hire, for Example, it the Leafor require Ten Crowns, and the Leaſee thinks he has hired for Five, the firſt is not obliged to paſs it over for that, tho' Five be contained in Ten. on the contrary, if the Leafor believes he has Lett for Five Crowns, and the Lea- sce underftood him Ten, this laſt is obliged to pay no more than the former meant, as the Laws following direct . Si ftipulanti mibi decem, tu viginti reſpondeas, non effe contrast am obligatiònem, nifi in decem conftat, contrario quoq; fi me viginti interrogante, tu decem reſpondeas, obligatio niſi in decem non est contra&ta, licet enim oportet congruere fummam, attamen manifeſtifimum eft viginti di decem inege. Digeft . 1. 45.tit . 1. De verb. Obligat, leg 1. 84. Si decem tibi locem fundum, tu autem exiſtimes quinque de conducere, nihil agitur. Sed etfi minoris me locata Jenſera, tu pluris te conducere, utique non pluris erit condu&tio, quam quanti ego putavi, Lib. 19. (4) For Example, if one fays to another, Wilt thou lend me a thouſand Crowns, and I will pay thee s per Cent. Inrereſt, and repay it in five months and he only anſwers, Yea, or, I will ; 'tis as much as if he had faid, Yea, I will lend you a thouſand Crowns, for which you ſhall pay me intereſt at 5 per cent and repay me in five Months; and to he engages himſelf under thoſe Conditions, and he can require no more of him, and on the other fide he can do no leſs lawfully to oblige us. 9. Vlpian's Words are theſe, Paltum eft duorum confenfus, atq; conventio, Pollicitatio autem offerentis folius promiffum, & ideo of illud conftitutum, ut fi ob honorem pollicitatis fuerit falta (municipibus ] quaſi debitum exigatur . Digeft. 1. so. cit. 17. De Pollici- *) Si quidem ob honorem promiferis, decretum ſibi vel decernendum, vel ob aliam juſtam caufam tenebitur ex pollicitatione, fin very fine caufa promiſerit, non erit obligatus, (i c.) If one promiſe for fome Honour conferred or to be conferred, or for ſome other ist Caule, he hall be obliged by his promile; but it he promiſes for no Caufe, he is not obliged, Ibid. leg. 1. L. See alco, Lib. 39. cic. 5. De Donat. leg. 19. (a) Lib. 19.8 2. Digest.de Donatione. Cauſe, 2 ſhould cit. 2, Locati conduli, leg. 52. $ationibus, leg. 3. in princip. 72 of the Conſent required in Book III. The uſe of Teſtimonies is uſual and neceffary to prove Matters of Fact. We ſhall treat of the uſe of Wir- See alſo Pollux, l. 9. c. 6, $ 70, and Mr. Caufe (7), are forbidden to be claim'd; becauſe the bition on himſelf of the like Nature; all which Propriety of the things being already transfer'd on Perforinances fall under ſome general Vertue, tho the Community, they could not properly be deli- the determinate Manner and Proportion of them ver'd without the Publick Acceptance. are not matters of ſtrict Precept. On the contrary, Since in all Obligations whatſoever, there is re- ſuch Vows as only create trouble to the Undertaker , quired the Conſent of the Perſon to whom they are and no Benefit to other Men; we eſteem no better directed (8), or who obtains a Right by them; de- than Idle and Superſtitious, eſpecially if they claring (by himſelf or Deputy,) that he accepts prove an hindrance to other Duties. the Obligation, and the Right which it transfers to A Scruple has been moved ſometimes, whether him; and this with Signs fuíficient, to expreſs the the Obligation in the Promiſer begin at the very Mo- inward purpoſe of his Mind; we may hence un- ment, when the Offer is accepted by the other Par- derſtand ſomewhat as to the (9) Firmness of Religious ty; or whether it is farther neceſſary, that the Ac- Vows, or Engagements voluntarily undertaken with ceptance be formerly made known to the Proiniſer . regard to Almighty God. And it ſeems impoſſible And here it is certain, a Promiſe may be deſignd, to make theſe with any Forcé, unleſs God has by and be expounded two ways, either thus, I engage Revelation declared his Acceptance of them; or myſelf to do the thing if it ſhall be accepted; or thus , unleſs he has conſtituted ſome Vice-Gerent upon I engage my ſelf to do the thing if I ſhall underſtand Earth, to judge of their Validity. For otherwiſe that it will be accepted. Now which of theſe two a Man cannot be certain, whether it is the Will of Senſes the Promiſer intended, is to be gather'd and God, he ſhould, or ſhould not bind himſelf in this preſumed from the Nature of the Buſineſs . If the manner; whether his Vows are pleaſing or diſplea- Promiſe were a matter of pure Generoſity, without ſing to Heaven. Efpecially ſince the Subject of Reſtriction or Limitation, we are to believe it was Vows muſt be ſuch matters as God has not by way meant in the former Senſe; becauſe here the Pro- of Command, punctually and preciſely required at miſer haſtens as it were to lind himſelf, without our Hands. For 'tis abſurd and contradictory to ſtaying for any Formality in the other Party. But reckon that an extraordinary Performance which thoſe Promiſes are to be underſtood in the latter is a inatter of ſtrict and neceſſary Duty; and how Senſe, which expreſs ſome arbitrary or mixt Condi , can we be aſſured except by Revelation, That any tion eſſential to the Engagement (10). Compare Act which God has not enjoyn’d will be accepta- Grot. l. 2. c. 11. f. 15. ble to him? And to engage in Vows without know XVI, It remains that we add a Remark or two ing whether they will be receivid or not, is idle about the Signs of Conſent, which are abſolutely ne and uſeleſs. But may we not in many caſes, rea- ceſſary to the producing of any Obligation, in as fonably preſume on the Divine Conſent and Appro- much as the bare Acts of the Will can have no Ef- bation? This we think can only be done in thoſe fect amongſt Men, unleſs manifeſted and declare) things which are Indefinitely agreeable to the Law by ſome external Tokens. Of Signs, the more im- of Nature, and therefore to the Will of God; but perfect are ſome particular Motions and Geſtures, in which the Application to Perſons, Places and neceſſary to be uſed in Commerce, when the Par- Times, and the Allotment of the particular Quan- ties tranſacting are unacquainted with the Language tity are left to the Pleaſure, and the Judgınent of of each other. The more perfect are Words, and Men. Thus we take thofe Vows to be good and juſtifi- ſuch Words as are underſtood on both ſides (1). See able, by which a Man binds himſelf to beſtow ſuch 1 Cor. 14, 11. And to make theſe declare the Will a Sum of Money in Charity to the Poor, or on o more clearly and more firmly, it has been a con- ther pious Uſes; provided that ſuch an Act of Boun- ſtant Practice, both to make uſe of Witneſſes in Con- ty be no hindrance or prejudice to any Duty abfo. tracts of Weight and Moment (2), to whoſe Memo- lutely neceſſary. Or if he enjoyn himſelf ſet Days ry and Conſcience Appeal might be made, in Cafe of Faſting; or reſolve to abſtain froin ſome parti- either of the Parties denied the Engagement, cular Meats and Drinks, within a fixt Meaſure and vild at the Expreſſion, and allo (as a higher Degree Quantity ; or if he deny himſelf the uſe of ſome of Confirmation, ) to ſet down the Terms of the ſuperfluous Ornaments ; as the wearing of Jewels, Covenant in Writing (3). Inſtead of which the Gre- Pearls, and Gold; or lay any Command or Prohi- cians ſometimes uſed Talies. v. D. L. 22, Tit. 4. de fide - (7) Si quis, quam ex pollicitatione tradider at rem Municipibus, vindicare velit, repellendus eft à petitione, Ibid. leg. 3. If any Man require a thing which he hath given to his Freemen, he is to be denied his Petition. (8) Mr. Thomaſius in his Fundament: Jur. Nat. & Gent. 1. 2. c. 7. 8 15. draws a Conſequence from hence to ſhew the Vanity (palliat am ambitionem he calls ic) of ſuch Authors, who ſay in their Prefaces, that 'tis to make good their Promiſes to the Publick that they put out this or that work. And Mr. Bayle had before ſaid in his Advertiſement of his Continuation of divers Thoughts about a Comet, that the Promiſes of ſuch Authors is not looked upon as an Engagement by Contract, nor is the Publick cong cerned it they break their word. isitno (9) See Mr. Le Clerc's Notes upon Gen. xxviii. 21. and Numb. xxx. 3. (10) Theſe Terms will be more fully explained, c. 8. of this Book, $ 4. eloping sites vp ibu tip reit Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 16. (1) Hence it comes to paſs perhaps, (as our Author adds in his later Editions that the Turks do not think themſelves obliga to keep thoſe Contracts or Treaties which are nor written in their own Language and Characters. See Marſelaer Legat. l. 1. c.30 has judicioully determined, 'Utrum autem Latina, an Greca, vel qualibet alia lingua stipulatio concipiatur, nihil intereſt, fcilicet, fi uterq; ftipulantium intelle&um ejus lingua babeat. Nec neceffe eft eadem lingua utrumq; uti, fed fufficit congruenter ad interrogatare- Sponderc. Quia etiam dico Græci Latina lingua obligationem contrahere poſſunt. Inftit. 1.3. tit. 16. De Verborum obligat. SI. (2) Teſtimoniorum uſus frequens do neceſſarius eſt. ad fidem rei geste faciendam. Digeft. 1. 22. tic. 5, De Teſtibus, leg. 1. in princip. leg. 11. zieffes, 1.sc. C. 13. 89. ute (3) Fiunt enim de bis Scripture, ut quod a&um eft, per eas facilius probari potest. Writings are made in Covenants, that the Matters of Fact may be more eaſily proved, Digeſt. 1. 22. tit. 4. De Fide Inſtrumentorum, &c. leg. 4. See Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order, Part 1. l. 1. tit. 1. Sect. 1. § 1o, doc. and 1. 3. cic, 6. Sect. 2. Hemſterhuis's Note on it. or ca- TOON lanan ito: 2393 inftrum. CHAP. VI. making Promiſes and Patts. 73 inftrum. For the Memory of Witneſſes may be priv'd of them by ſome Misfortune. And for this Treacherous, or their Integrity capable of Corrup- reaſon it will become a careful Man to ſecure his Bu- tion (4); but Writings are a much ſtronger Security, ſineſs by good and legal Inſtruments; and not to re- both againſt Forgetfulneſs , and againſt Unfaithful- ly too much on the bare Words, or Faith of thofe neſs. And as for bare Words , it is an uſual way to he deals with. Thus King (7) Perſeus (in Plutarch elude them, by pleading that they were utter'd thro' de vitiofo pudore, p. 533. B. T: 2. Éd. Wech.) lend- Raihneſs, before the thing had been conſider’d. But ing a Friend Money, required Security in the com- Writings do exclude all ſuch Prevarication ; whiļſt mon Form. The Gentleman deſiring the reaſon of they are drawing up, they ſet the Buſineſs clearly his Strictneſs; I lend according to Law, (replied and leiſurely before the Eyes of the Contracter; fo Perſeus) that I may receive without Law; in a fair that if he once declare his Approbation of them, and friendly manner. Juvenal, Sat, 13. he muſt be judg’d to have yielded full Conſent to the Engagement, and cannot afterwards pretend that Tam facile & pronum eſt Superos contemnere teſtes, he was drawn in by Palfon or Precipitancy. Nor Si mortalis idem nemo ſciat. are Writings liable to ſuch violent and crafty In- terpretations as are often put upon Men's Diſcourſe; When Murena (in Appian. Mithridat. p. 214. in which one Particle artificially inſerted, and thro' C. Ed. H. Steph.) made War upon Mithridates, and the quickneſs of the Pronunciation palling undiſco- was accuſed by that King's Commiſſioners of Act- ver’d, ſhall unravel and overturn the whole Affair . ing againſt the League, he ſophiſtically denied, that And there it is not without good Reaſon, That more he ever ſaw any League. The meaning of which Credit is given to Authentick and Unqueſtion’d In- was, that Pompey had not indeed left Articles of ſtruments, than to the Depoſitions of Witneſſes; ſince Peace in Writing, but thought it fufficient to fhew what a Man teſtifies againſt himſelf, is much ſtronger his Agreement by Fałt, and accordingly had drawn Evidence than what can be offer'd by others; and off his Army. Richerius reports of the Turks, that ſince the Charge never lies ſo heavy upon him, as they are ſo conſtant to their Promiſe, fo ſecure of when his own Authority is produc'd againſt him: mutual Fidelity, that in their Bargains they uſe no Yet the Force of unqueſtionable Witneſſes muſt then Bond or Writing; but the whole Buſineſs depends be admitted as Superiour, when they make out by on the Word of the Parties, if preſent; if not, on fufficient Proors, that the Inſtruments produced, are the bare mentioning of their Names. Garcilaſs de Suppoſititious or Corrupted. la Vega teſtifies the like of the old Inhabitants of Farther, although the Strength and Firmneſs of Peru. Royal Comment. 1. 8. c. 16. It is vulgarly Covenants does not abſolutely depend on ſuch Wri- known, that if a Creditor ſhall reſtore the Inſtru- tings or Deeds, in as much as they may rightly be ment of Obligation (8), or ſhall cancel or deſtroy it made without them (5), and may as to the Law of with his own free Conſent, and with the Pri- Nature ſtill hold good, though theſe Tokens ſhould vity of the Debtof, it ſhall be fuppos’d that the by any Accident be loſt (6); yet in Courts of Ci- Debt is forgiven; but not if the Debtor got the vil Judicature, where they proceed on full and ma- Writings out of his Hand by Stealth, or any other nifeſt Evidence, the greateſt Regard imaginable is unlawful Means. . And from all this it appears that had to Credentials of this kind. And commonly Seneca (a) (9) carries his Philoſophy a Strain too high, if ſuch are not produc’d, the Party who ſhews ano- when he calls Bonds and Papers of Contract, by na ther upon a Debt or Promiſe, loſes his Cauſe; better a Name than, Inania habendi fimulachra, Vain unleſs he can make it appear, that they were once and idle Images of Title and Poffeffion. actually in his Cuſtody, and that he ha been de- (4) Writings on Parchment were inverted to put Men in Mind, or convince Men of their Word, the Diſgrace of Mankind, (as Mr.de la Bruyere ſpeaks in his Characters, Chap. Of Man) which 'tis likely he took out of Seneca, (De Benef. 1. 3. C. 15.) Ad bibentur ab utraque parte teſtes, ille per tabulas plurium nomina, interpoſitis parariis facit turpem humano generi fraudis, do ne- quitiæ publice confeſſionem! Annulis noftris plus quam animis creditur in quid imprimunt ſigna! Nempe, ne ille neget accepiffe, quod accepit, (i.e.) Witneſſes are produced on both ſides, the one produces a Scroll of many Names drawn up by the Scrivener. Oh horrid Confeſſion of the publick Fraud, and Wickedneſs of Mankind! We truſt more to our Seals than Souls! Why do we impreſs our Seals ? Left ſuch as we deal with ſhould deny what they have received. See Juvenal, Sat. 13. (5) Si Res geſta (ſay the Digeſts, l. 22. cit. 4. De fide Inſtrumentorum, &c. leg. 5.) ſine literarum quoq; conſignatione, veritate fa- &um ſuum prabeat, non ideo minus vilebit, quod inſtrumentum nullum de ea intercepit. See lo 5. c. 13. 9 8. following, (i. e.) If a Mat- ter of Fact were duly and truly done without any Writings Sealed, 'tis not of leſs Force becauſe there is no Inſtrument made concerning it. (Nec oberit tibi amiſſio inſtrumentorum, ſi modo manifeſtis probationibus eos debitores apparuerit, (i. e.) The lofs of a Bond is no prejudice, if the Debt can be fully proved. Cod. 1. 4. cit. 21. De fide Inſtrum, leg. 1. See alſo, leg. 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and l. 4. cit. 19. De Probationibus, leg. 20, 21. (7) This Nore is in the Text. (8) See $ 2. Note 7. above. (9) Seneca's Words are, Video iſtic diplomata, & lyngraphas, o cautiones, vacua habendi fimulachras (2) Benef. 1. 7.C. TO. + K CHAP 74 Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. Book III, C H A P. E of our of free Tacit Condition of the VII: Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. I. We are obliged to things poſſible to be done only. | VII. Diſhoneſt Bargains do not oblige, though in our II. Promiſes of things impoſſible are void. Power. III. Impoſſibilities which ariſe about Covenants. VIII. Nor ſuch as can't be performed, but by ſome IV. Whether our utmoſt Endeavour is ſufficient? foul A&tion. V. Whether a Man be obliged to bear Juch Afli&ti- IX. W bether things diſhoneſtly given can be recovered. ons as are above Man's Courage and Strength? X. Other Men's Goods are promiſed in vain. VI. There is no Obligation to things unlawful. XI. Tea, and our own, if they are under any Obliga. tion to another, W are in the next place to enquire into the invincibly Ignorant; I ſeem in this caſe, neither Mattter or Subject of Promiſes, and of Co- obliged to make good my Word, nor to repair the venants; or to what things only we can bind our Loſs, which the other Party fuffers by the Diſap- felves by our Word or Bargain. In this reſpect then, pointment. Eſpecially if the Posſibility of the it'is indiſpenſibly Requiſite, that we have both a thing, were either expreſly mention’d as a neceſ- Natural and a Moral Power of doing what we engage fary Condition, or tacitly pre-ſuppoſed on both för ; or that the Performance be neither above our ſides (a). For Inſtance, I promiſe to lend a Horſe, Strength, nor forbidden us by any Law. For when which at preſent is at ſome diſtance from me; and a thing is placed within my Reach and Ability, the Horſe dies before he gets to ine ; as I cannot and I have likewiſe a Liberty to diſpoſe of it, there here be bound to make the Horſe forth coming, fo is no Reaſon why I ſhould not voluntarily oblige neither am I reſponſible for any Damage the Man my ſelf to conferit on another, ſo often as I can ſuſtains, who was to have uſed him. For he muſt by this ineans contribute to the Uſe and Advantage conceive me to have built my Promiſe on this Ta- of human Life. On the other Hand, it would be cit Condition, provided the Horſe arrives ſafe at my Vain and Impertinent to contract an Obligation a- Hands; which Condition failing, without my De bout ſuch Matters, as either exceed our Strength, fault, the Force of the Promiſe links and is Ineffe- or are prohibited by a ſtronger Obligation lying ctive . If both the Promiſer, and the other Party upon us; in as much as, directly and lawfully, it know the thing to be Impoflible, and know each o- could produce no Effect. thers Conſciouſneſs as to this point, the Engage- II. It follows evidently from hence, That no ob- ment ſhall paſs for no better than a Jeſt . But if ligation can lie to Impoſibilities (1); a Sentencecom- the Promiſer only knew the Impoſſibility, and not monly in the Mouths of all ſorts of Perſons, but the other Party, he ſhall pay to him what he loſes, fuch as cannot fully be underſtood without a clear by being thus impoſed on. If the Proiniſer was and accurate Examination. In order to which it careleſs, and neglected to examine and weigh his be, in the firft place, convenient to diſtinguiſh own Strength, ſo as to promiſe an Imposſibility, between thoſe Obligations which we voluntarily which upon due Conſideration, he might have found bring on our ſelves by our own Act, and thoſe to be luch, the main Obligation ſhall be void; which are laid on us by the Command and Autho- becauſe he ſuppoſed the thing to be poſſible, as a rity Superiours. He that his own Agreement. Yet upon ac, Motion, binds himſelf to perform a thing which he count of his Neglect and Default, he ſhall be bound knows to be impoſible, cannot be reckon’d well in his to anſwer the Damage which befalls the other Par- Wits (2): For he reſolves and Engages to do that, ty, through the Diſappointment; but then it muſt which at the failie time he foreſees he thall never be be obſervd, That the Hope and Expectation of able to Compaſs. Advantage from ſuch an Inſignificant Promiſe, But it does not always follow, That he who by ought not to come under the Notion of Damage . Pack or Promiſe undertakes an Impoſſibility, ihall be The ſame Rule holds good in Covenants, ſo that entirely free from all Necefſity of Perforinance, tho' he who through Negligence has bargain’d to per- the thing it ſelf cannot ſtrictly be accompliſh'd. In- form what is impoflible, ſhall be free upon paying deed if I have promis'd a Man ſomewhat, which I what the other Party ſuffers ; but then he muſt like- had then good Grounds to think would be in my wiſe releaſe the other Party, from any Obligation Power, but which is now above my Power, or will made on his ſide; or if the thing be already given be rendred fo before the Day of Performance, by an or perform’d, he muſt either reſtore it, or offer an Accident of which at the time of the Bargain I was Equivalent. may 1 Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. VII. § 2. (I) See l. 1. c. 5. 5 8. aforegoing. (2) Or he deſigns to banter him to whom he is engaged. Mr. Thomaſius in his Inſtit. Juriſpr. Div. I. 2. c. 7. $ 8. diſtinguiſhes here two ſorts of Impoſſibilities: The one of things abſolutely impoſſible to all Men, as to fly, to touch the sky with the Hand, c. the other of thoſe which are impoſſible to certain Men only, as to have Children, to pay two thouſand or an hundred thoutand Crowns, &c. The Rules which our Author gives hereafter about the caſes wherein one is bound to fulfil his Promiſe, tho' of a thing impoſſible: Theſe Rules, I ſay, reſpect the laſt ſort, and not the firſt. For hethar will believe that a Man may fly, or drink up the Sea, is as great a Fool as he that engages to do it. (a) Vid. I. 2. 1. 3. doc. Digeſt. Si quis cautionibus, &c. III. But Chap. VII. Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. 75 diſannull’d, if nothing has former Caſe the Pałt is reaſon Merchants and other great Traders, though III. But farther, when the thing, at the time of through what Cauſe or what Neceflity the Man con- making the Promiſe or Pact appearl Poſſible, and tracted fo deep Scores. And he deſerves inore or afterwards becoines Iinpoilible, we muſt enquire leſs Commiſeration and Favour, as the Cauſe was whether this happen'd by meer Chance, or by De- inore or leſs grievous and unavoidable. For this fault and Deceit. In the been perform'd on undone by meer Accident and Misfortune, are rec- either ſide. If any thing have been already donekon'd to be in a Condition leſs capable of Mercy, towards it by one of the Parties, the other ſhall give than others who have been driven by ſome particu- it back, or pay the value of it (1); if neither of lar Urgency, to the like Inſolvent State. For the theſe can be done, he is to uſe his beſt Endeavours, former took up ſo large Sums on Truſt, purely for that the Man be not a loſer by him. For in Con- the ſake of making farther Gain and Advantage by tracts, the firſt Regard is had to the thing expreſly them. And in as much as they profeſs the Art of mention’d in the Agreement; when this cannot be growing Rich, as their peculiar Calling, they are to obtain’d, it is ſufficient to give an Equivalent ; but be blamed for not foreſeeing and preventing even whatever happens, all imaginable Care is to be u- Caſualties ; ſuch as the loſing all they are worth at fed, that the other Party ſuffer no Prejudice. But one ſudden Stroke; ſince they ought not to have ven- when a Man ſhall by Trick and Deſign render him- tured their whole Effects in a ſingle Bottom. This ſelf incapable of performing his Part, he ſhall not is contrary to the Judgment of Pliny, who thinks only be bound to do the beſt he can, but he ought it the ſafeſt Courſe to try the Uncertainty of For- likewiſe to have ſome Puniſhment inflicted on him, tune by Variety of Poſſeſſions. Epift. 19.1. 3. numb. 4. as it were in ſupply to his Defect. Ed. Cellar. King Philip (in Juſtin. l. 9. c. 1. in fin.) Theſe Principles well applied, might determine beſieging. Byzantium without Succeſs, at the ſame moſt of the Doubts in the Caſe of Inſolvent Debtors: time made an Inroad into Scythia; for the ſake of A Man that falls into ſuch a Condition by Misfor- Plunder ; ſeeking ( according to the Policy of Mer- tune, and without his own Default, is obliged only chants and Dealers) to defray the Expences of one to uſe his utmoſt Endeavour, to give every one War with the Spoils of another. their due. And here Equity and Humanity (2), Livy (1.40. c. 21. p. 661. in fin. Ed. Gronov.) re- engage us to make an allowance of Time, ſo much ports of Antigonus, That being in great Diſtreſs at as thall be neceſſary for him to look about him, Sea, when he had all his Friends with him in the and to ſeek out all honeſt ways and means of Pay Ship, he call'd his Children about him, and ſtrict- ment (a). For to ſeiſe immediately on all he pof- ly charg’d them both to remember themſelves, and ſeſſes, and to ſend him and his Family a Begging, to caution their Poſterity, That they never enga- would be a moſt unmerciful Barbarity (3). The ged with their whole family together in Difficul- Roman Laws were ſo favourable to certain Perſons, ty or Danger. in Caſes there ſpecified, as to order that they ſhould Yet it is plain the Ancient Romans had little re- be condemned in no deeper Sum than they were a- gard to theſe different Circumſtances. For thus Sea ble to make good (1). Yet unleſs the Creditor ſhall ca argues ; (Benef. 1.7. C. 16.) (5) Can you imagine our have forgiven all that exceeds their preſent Abili- Forefathers were ſo imprudent, as not to apprehend ties, they ſhall be bound to pay the Reſidue, upon how unjuſt it muſt be to put a Man who had waſted the Improvement of their Fortune and Condition. a Loan in Dice or Lewdneſs, in the ſame Caſe with Thoſe who have turned Bankrupt out of Knavery, him, who by Fire, Thieves, or fome fadder Misfor- or ſome other way by their own Fault, may be juſt- tune, had loſt other Men's Money with his own? ly compell’d to undergo ſome painful Puniſh- They allow'd no Excuſe, that Men might learn in ment (4),; that their Body may in ſome meaſure all Caſes, moſt ſtriatly to keep their Faith. And it pay for the Defect of their Purſe (c). were more ſafe to reject the juſt Plea of a few, than In the Caſe between the Creditor and the Debtor, to admit all to a Privilege of offering their Apolo- there is another Point that ought to be conſider'd; gies. In Muſcovy, inſolvent Debtors are firſt found- Matrimonio Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 3. (1) This is true in ſuch Agreements where the transferring Property is not concerned, as in Contracts of Hiring ; but it is noc ſo in them, where a Right of Property is acquired, as for Example, in a Bargain of Sale. For if a thing ſold periſh by miſchance, the loſs is the Buyer's, who has the Property and the principal Right in him, if we conſider the Principles of Natural Right. Hence it is that the Seller keeps the Price of his Goods, or cauſes the Buyer to pay it, tho' he has never received them. Titius Obferuat: 230. See what is ſaid, l. 5. c. 5. $ 3. (2) See what I have ſaid in my Treatiſe of Sport, 1. 3. c. 5.833 (3) Such were, for Example, the Husbands who were obliged to pay back their Wives Portions. Maritum in id quod facere poteſt condemnari exploratum eſt,'(i.e) It is a known thing to condemn the Husband to do what he can, Digeſt. I. 24. cit. 3. Soluto Dus quemadmodum petatur, leg. 12. The Men of War, l. 42. tit. 1. De Re judicata, &c. leg. 6. Dlvers Relations, as Father and Mother, Patrons, their wives and Children, as alſo their Fathers and Mothers, Givers, Fathers in Law, Ibid. leg. 16, 17, 19, 21. See alſo leg. 49, 50, and l. 42. tit. 3. De ceſſione Bonorum, leg. 6, 7, (4)- Cujus Fortuna laborans Whoſe deſ p'rare Fortune, ſince it can't by Gold Non potis eſt au o venales ſolvere noxas, Redeem ics Crimes, Bonds therefore it muſt hold. Ar&tatur vinclis Gunther. Ligurin. l. 8. near the End. See Mr. Hirtius's Paræmia fur. German. I. 1. c. 89. (5) Seneca's Latin is this, Quid tu tam imprudentes judicas majores noſtros fuiffe, ut non intelligerent iniquiffimum efle, eodem loca eum haberi, qui pecuniam, quam à Creditore acciperet, libidine, aut alea inſumpſit, & eum, qui incendio, aut latrocinio, aut aliquo caſu triftiore, aliena cum ſuis perdidit? Nullam excuſationem receperunt, ut homines ſcirent fidem utrique præftandum, fátius enim erat : paucis etiam juſtam excufationem non accipi, quam ab omnibus aliquam tentari. De Benei. l. 7. c. 1o. (a) See Matth. xviii. 25, 26. (6) Vid. I. 12. Digeſt. De Soluto Matrimonio, 1.6. I. 16, 17, 19, 21. Digeft. De Re judicata, 1.49, so. d. t. 1.4. 1.6.1.7. Digeft. De ceffione Bonorum. (c) vid. Gell. 1. 20.c. 1.circa fin , as likewiſe Appius's Diſcourle in Dio nyf. Halicarn. 1. 5. p. 330, doc, Edic. Lips. in fin. compared with Livy, 1. 8. c. 28. + K 2 1y 76 Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenant s. Book III . ly whip’d, and then compelld to be Slaves to their Condition of returning the like. But now the Will of Creditors (7). him who offers the preſent Good, has for its abſolute IV. It is proper for us on this Subject to examine Object; any return of good equal in Value to the thing the Notion of Mr. Hobbes (a), which he ſeems to exprefly promis’d by the other Party; but the thing it lay down in too general a Manner, That Covenants Self is affected, not ftri&tly and abſolutely, but under do not oblige to the thing it ſelf, but only to the utmoff Condition of its Poſſibility. Yet on the contrary, I Endeavour. That is, ſince we not obliged to Im- would chuſe to ſay, That whoſoever exhibits to ano- poflibilities, and ſince nothing is in our power but ther any preſent Good, does abſolutely and directly our utmoſt Endeavours, what we cannot by its means bend his Deſire towards that particular future Good, obtain, is to us impollible, and conſequently is ex- expreſs’d in the Bargain ; and this as well in Contract cluded from being the Matter of Obligation. But of giving, as in Contracts of doing. For the Law of he ought indeed to have inſerted this Condition, Nature doth not feein to afford Ground for that Di- Provided we have not by our own Fault or Frand, In- ftinction which fome make, that in Bargains of giv. capacitated our ſelves for ſuch a Performance. For if ing, a Man is preciſely obliged to give (1), whereas this be our Caſe, the Obligation is not ſatisfied by in the Bargains of doing, he is not preciſely obliged our utmoſt Endeavour ; but when our power of Pay- to do the Work, but may be releas'd by a Commu- ment ceaſeth, our Puniſhment muſt come in to make tation. But when he cannot obtain what was pe- up the reſt. Therefore the Affertion ought to be li- culiarly promisºd, he then to keep himfelf from luf . mited to thoſe Covenants , in which upon account fering Loſs, deſires ſomething of equal Value. And of fome Thing or Aktion at preſent reach'd out un- if this too cannot be paid him, nor the thing reſtord to us, we promiſe fome future Labour or Aſliſtance. which he firſt gave on his Part, the other Man ful- For here, ſince fuch Futurities are uncertain to hu- ly ſatisfies his Obligation, by offering what his A- man Foreſight, ſo that either our ſtrength may bybilities will admit of. fome Accident be impair'd, or ſome unaccountable But, in Contracts of Lending, and others of the turn of Things may render it extreamly difficult, if fame Nature, it will not hold that the Debtor is not utterly impoflible for us to meet with an Op- freed from his Obligation, by uſing his utmoſt A- portunity of Performance; and farther, fince our bility and Endeavour. For when ally thing is taken Sagacity may be miſtaken either in rating our own in way of Loan, (eſpecially if it be not in a caſe Power, or in weighing the Difficulty of the Un- of extream (2) Neceſſity) the Creditor ſuppoſes dertaking, the Contractors muſt for theſe Reaſons that the Creditor is both willing and able to pay, be ſuppos'd to have been mindful of their own frail and the Debtor himſelf pretends as much; and on Nature, and conſequently not to have agreed on a- this Suppoſition, the whole Contract is founded. If ny future Action or Work, but with this Condition then at the time prefix'd for Payment, the Debtor and Proviſo, That their Abilities and Opportuni- with all his Stock and Effects cannot make up the ties remain'd the fame, and that they had not over- Suinın; though here it be at preſent impoſſible to rated their preſent Strength. In theſe Caſes then, ſqueeze more out of him; yet he ſhall ſtand enga. he who has us’d his utmoſt Endeavour, inay be right- ged to make good the reſt hereafter (c). ly ſaid to have done his Duty; eſpecially when in In ſimple Promiſes, when he engages to do a thing the very midft of the Performance , fome croſs Ad- which is not, as to the Event, fully and abſolutely venture which we could not poſſibly have prevent in our Power; ſome ſuch Condition as this ought ed falls in, and either quite intercepts, or wreſts a- always to be underſtood, if Fortune favour. me, if ſide the Fruit of our Labour. no croſs Accident intervene, or what better becomes That the Rule will hold good, only in this kind the Piety of a Chriſtian, if it pleaſe God (d). But of Covenants, is farther evident from what Mr. Hobbes poſitively to ſwear or vow that we will accom- diſcourſeth immediately before. We very frequent. pliſh ſuch an uncertain Enterprize, is not only moſt ly, ſays he, contract about ſuch things as then indeed extravagant Rafhneſs , but moſt wicked Preſumpti- feem pojille, but which afterwards we find to be im- on. Such was the Oath of Labienus and his Party, poffible (1), yet this does not free us from all Obligati- recorded by Cafar, by which they engaged them- on. And the reaſonis, becauſe he who promiſes an Un- ſelves not to return into their Camp without ob- certainty hereafter, receives a preſent Good, on the taining the Victory (e). (7) Among the Athenians alſo inſolvent Debtors were given to their Creditors to be made their Slaves, or to ſell them into Foreign countries, and many were forced to ſell their Children ; but Solon aboliſh'd that inhumane Cuſtom. See Plutarch in his Life. Some alſo have thought, that among the Romans there was a Law of the 12 Tables, which allowed Creditors to cur thelr Debrors in pieces, and part them among them, which Opinion is ſupported by the Authority of Quintilian, Inſtit. Orat. I. 3. c. 6. Aul. Gell. No&t. Attic. 1. 20. C. 1. and Tertull. Apologet. c. 4. But Mr. Bynkerſhock proves fully in his Obſervations, I. 1. c. 1, that it allowed only the Sale of his Perſon to his Creditor by way of Auction. We may compare with this Book a Memoir found in the A&ta Eruditorum at Leipſick, Febr. 1710. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 4. (1) It is a Principle of the Roman Law, Si minus, quia non facit, quod promiſit, in pecuniam numeratam condemnatur, ficut evenit in omnibus faciendi obligationibus, (i.c.) If a Man performs not his Promiſe, he is fined a certain Sum, as is uſual in other Obli- gations of doing a thing. Digeſt. I. 42. tit. 1. De Re Judicata, &c. leg. 13. $ 1. Secundum quem Celſus ait poffe dici, juſta aſtia matione fa&ti dandam elle petitionem, (i e.) According to whom Celfus fays it may be affirmed that the Defire may be anſwered by the Value of the Deed, 1.45. cit. J. De Verbor. Obligat. leg. 72. in init. But this is obſerved at this day more in many places, and in the Roman Law there are divers Limitations about it, as Mr. Hirtius obſerves, with others before him, that the Reaſon of this Maxim was, That the Romans eſteemed it a kind of Slavery to be conſtrained to do any thing for another. Et ſunt quidem be Pæne, fi quis generaliter tra&tare velit, inciviles, invitum hominem jubere facere, quod facere non poteſt, (i. e.) They are Puniſhments , generally ſpeaking, unfit for Sociery, to force a Man to do that againſt his Will which he cannot do. Digeft. 1. 48. tit. 19. De Pænis, leg. 9. $ 10. See Vinnius upon the Inſtit. I. 3. cit. 16. De Verbor. Obligat. $ 7. And Mr. Thomaſius's Diſcourſe De Pres tio affe&t. c. 2 8 4. roos (2) See my Treatiſe of Sport, 1. 3. C. 5. $31. (a) De Cive, c. 2. 1. 4. (b) It muſt be ſuppoſed that we have not had Opportunity of making Tryal. (c) See Matth. xvii. 25, doc. (d) See James iv, 15. (e) Caſar de Bel. Civ. 1. 3. c. 87. n. 6. Add Afts xxiii, 21.6 Selden. de J. N. & G.1.4. c. 7. V. There CHAP. VII. 77 of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. V. There is another knotty Queſtion propoſed of Mankind, eſpecially of the military Sex, to ſu, by Mr. Hobbes (e), which we ought here to diſcuſs, ſtain a probable Danger of Death, ſtill joyn'd with Whether a Man can by Covenant oblige himſelf to a Power of reſiſting to the laſt. And there farce fuffer ſuch Evils, as exceed the ordinary Strength, ever happens ſuch a Caſe in War, that ſome Per- and Conſtancy of human Minds; for Inſtance, whe- fons muſt be thrown away, and offer’d up as Victims ther he can bind himſelf not to reſiſt another, who to the Enemy, without a Liberty, and an Oppor- ſhall go about to kil or to wound him. Now who, tunity of defending themſelves by Courage or by ever cloſely and carefully conſiders this point, will Craft . So that it appears from the Neceſſity of pre- be able to diſcover on what account Mr. Hobbes ferving Commonwealths, and from the uſe and pra- thought good to take the Negative Side; Namely, ctice of all Nations, That whenever it is Requiſite, to ſhew that bare Pacts, are not a fufficient Guard a Commander may lawfully enjoin a Souldier, to and Caution, to the Security of Mankind; and oppoſe the Enemy in ſuch an aſſign'd hiin Station that 'tis not enough for a Man to engage by Cove- to his laſt Breath, though 'tis probable he may die nant, that he will freely undergo due Puniſhment, upon the Spot; and may as lawfully inflia Capital fo often as he ſhall commit an Injury; but for the Puniſhment on thoſe who ſhall quit their Poft, after preſervation of Peace in the World, it is farther ſuch an expreſs Order to the contrary. For he that neceſſary that Civil Governments ſhould be eſta- liſts himſelf in the Number of armed Men, does by bliſh'a, which may bring Offenders to Juſtice, tho' that Act lay aſide all Claim to the Excuſe of Natu- againſt their Wills. Which Principle we acknow- ral Fearfulneſs , and is bound not only to enter the led to be moſt juſt and true, and ihall enlarge upon Field, but likewiſe, not to leave it, without the it in its proper Place. At preſent it may be worth Order of his Leader. Neither is there any Abſur- our while to examine more nearly the Arguments dity in that Martial Puniihment of killing a Man, which he produces. He ſays then, No Man is by any becauſe he declined being killed. For is it not much Covenant which he ſhall make, obliged not to reſiſt a worſe to ſuffer ignominiouſly under the Hand of the nother, when he offers mortal Violence, or Wounds, or Executioner (1), than to fall with Honour under any bodily Miſchief. For here is implanted in every the Sword of the Enemy (2). Add. 1. 1. f. 28. De one the higheſt degree of fearfulneſs, by which he ap- Senatuſconſulto Silaniano & Claudiano, &c. By one prehends the threatned Evil, as the greateſt Imaginable, of the Roman Laws, Servants who preferr’d their and therefore by a Natural Neceflity , flies and avoids own Lives before their Maſters were puniſh'd with it as much as poſible ; and is ſuppos d incapable of do- Death, D. B. 29. t. 5. We muſt add, That in Caſe in otherwiſe. When he is arrived at ſuch a beight of a Perſon be of ſo weak and cowardly a Temper, Fear, it cannot be expe&ted but that he will conſult his as to ſhrink at thoſe Dangers which the common own Safety by Flight or by Combat. Since then no Hardineſs of Men is able to ſuſtain ; his peculiar In- Man can be obliged to an Impoffibility, thoſe to whom firmity of Mind ſhall by no means abſolve him Death, or Wounds, or other corporal Pains are pre- from his Obligation. fented, and who have not Conſtancy enough to bear them, Mr. Hobbes proceeds to obſerve, That ſince we are not bound to venture the Tryal. Upon this Argu- dare truſt him, who is bound to us by Covenant, whilſt ment, we may remark, That to ſuffer Death with we lead Criminals to Execution in Chains, and under out Reluctancy, is not a thing abſolutely beyond Guards; it ſhould ſeem that they are not by Covenant human Strength. And therefore if God has Com- ſuficiently obliged to Non-reſiſtance. The Remark in manded us to lay down our Lives, rather than com- moft Caſes is true (3), yet ſometimes Perſons really mit ſome particular Action, no doubt but we are bound by Covenant to us, are not ſo abſolutely ftri&tly bound to yield a ready Obedience. But thus truſted but that we think it expedient to provide a- much we are willing to acknowledge, That ſince ſuch gainſt their Perfidiouſneſs, by a Security of armed a Degree of Conſtancy is beyond the Strength of the Men (b). He adds, A Covenant of this kind would generality of Men, no one ſhall be preſumed to be uſeleſs , a Man indeed may Covenant thus, Unleſs I have bound himſelf by his own free Covenant to do this or that in the appointed day, kill me; that ſuch a rigorous Task. For human Laws and hu- is, you ſhall have a Right of proceeding to Capital Pu- man Contracts, ought all to be made with an Eye niſhment againſt me upon my Default ; but to Covenant and Regard to human Infirmity. thus, unleſs I do ſo or ſo, I will not reſiſt you when Yet this Conſideration ought not to be drawn ſo you come to kill me, is a thing both unpractiſed and far as to prejudice the Force of Military Diſcipline; infignificant. He proves his Point after this man- asif a Souldier under imminent Peril of Death might ner. “ Such a Covenant inuſt be made, either be- defert his Poſt, upon Pretenice, that a Man cannot be tween ,a State and a Subject, or between two obliged to undergo Death, as being a thing Impofíble . « Subjects of the fame State, or between two Per- For we deny that it is a thing above the Fortitude “ fons living in a Condition of Natural Liberty. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6.5. (!) This proves, that when a Puniſhment is once fixed, it is better to die fighting courageouſly, than run the riſque of the Scaffold or Halter, but this doth not prove, that there is nothing abfurd or unjuſt in eſtabliſhing ſuch a Puniſhment. To clear this we muſt affirm, That it is ſometimes neceſſary that a Man expoſe himſelf to Dangers, yea, to Death, for the Preſervation and Defence of many others, the Safety of the Publick being to be preferred before our Private. And when one is engaged, as in this caſe of which we are ſpeaking, and many others, we have no reaſon to complain of him that inflicts the Puniſhment, to which we have Openly or Tacitly confented, if we perform nor our Engagements. See what is ſaid 1. 8. c. 2. following: (2) Servi quoties Dominis fuis auxilium ferre poffunt, non debent eorum faluti ſuam anteponere --Ultimum itaque fupplicium pati de- bet [ Ancilla, cui Percusſor Domine mortem minatus erat, li proclama let) vel hoc, ne cateri servi credant, in periculo Dominorum fibi quemq; conſulere debere. (3) See what is ſaid I. 8. c. 3. & 4. Note 8. (a) De Cive, c. 2. f. 18. (6) Senec. Thyeſt. v. 644, 645, 646. Arx urbem premit, A Caſtle awes a Town, Et contumacem regibus populum ſuis, And holds a People, ſtubborn to their Kings, under the ſtroke. 11 Habet ſub i&tu. In 78 HUL CC co CC CO ૮૮ (C 6, In the firſt Caſe it would be uſeleſs, becauſe 'tis applied to the Caſe of two diſhoneſt Evils, or of two enough to ſecure to a State the Power of puniſh- Evils, the one diſhoneſt, the other unprofitable . For ing Offenders, if each particular Subject engages of two Evils of Commiflion, we are to chuſe nej- by Oath or Fealty, that he will not forcibly de- ther (5). But it ſometimes happens, that we cannot “ fend or reſcue any Perſon, who ſhall be thus led fulfil two Affirmative Precepts , the Omiſſion of to fuffer Juſtice. In the ſecond Caſe it would be which feparately conſider’d, would be ſinful, yet “ alike impertinent; becauſe in Civil Governments upon their meeting together the Omiſſion of one of private Men have not the Right of killing. In them is look'd upon as lawful. And in this Caſe of the third and laſt Caſe, it would be of no more the two Evils of Omiſion, the leſſer is to be choſen; “ uſe or force than in the former ; becauſe if the or rather the interfering with a more noble Pre- “ Parties covenanted, that one of them ſhould be cepț, ſhews the Omiſſion of the leſs noble Precept “kill’d upon Non-performance, a preceding Cove- to be no Evil or Sin. For in all inferior and fub- nant muſt be ſuppos’d to have paſs’d, importing ordinate Laws, this Reſtriction is ever underſtood, " that he ihall not be kill'd before the Day fix'd So far as we can comply with them, and not intrench “ for Performance. For according to his Hypothe- on Engagements of a higher Nature. Thus not to ſis, in a State of Nature, before any Pacts have been obey God, and not to obey the Civil Magiſtrate , introduced, each Man hath a Right of killing each if taken afunder, are both notoriouſly Sins ; and Man elſe. “ Therefore upon default of Perfor- yet, ſuppoſing both the Obligations cannot at once mance,on the ſet Day there returns a Right of War, be anſwer’d, as when the Magiſtrate commands any or a Hoſtile State, in which it is lawful for any thing contrary to the Divine Law, in this Cafe , “ Man to attempt what he pleaſes againſt another; Diſobedience to our earthly Governours ceaſes to be " and conſequently the Right of reliſting will re- Evil; becauſe that Law which binds us to conform turn at the ſame time. I would rather chuſe to to the Will of human Sovereigns, is always under- eſtabliſh the Truth of the 'Aſſertion another way, ſtood with this Proviſo and Condition, that they en- by ſaying, that the Force of Covenants if ſtrain'd join nothing repugnant to the Laws of God. to the higheſt, does reach ſo far, as not only to lay We are in many Caſes likewiſe permitted, rather on the Parties an intrinſical Neceſſity of performing to chuſe the bare Execution of another Man's Sin (6), the Conditions, but likewiſe to give each of them or a Concurrence by way of Inſtrument, than fome a Right of compelling the other to a Compliance (4), Evil, very prejudicial, or very grievous to be born, in caſe he draw back, by propoſing and preſenting with which we are threatned upon Refuſal. Which fome Evil. And that therefore every Covenant may Point we have elſewhere more Iargely diſcufs’d. be reſolv'd into this Senſe, I engage to do this or this Neither is it allowable, as was juſt now hinted, for you, if I fail,you ſhall have a power of compelling me to make any ſuch Compariſon between an Evil, by violent Means . Now to add a ſecond Covenant Troubleſome or Damageable, and a Sin, ſo as to about Non-reſiſtance, would here be uſeleſs and ab- chuſe the latter rather than the former; as for 11- ſurd. For then this ſecond Covenant muſt be en- ſtance. If a Man ſhould rather act contrary to his forc'd again by a third, including ſome Penalty, as expreſs Duty, than ſlip the Opportunity of ſome if I relijt you, when you attempt to compel me to Per. Advantage, or ſuſtain ſome real Loſs; how poſitive formance, you ſhall have a power of offering Violence foever his corrupt Judgment may be in concluding or Evil to me. Thus it is plain, the ſecond Cove- the Sin to be the lefler Evil. For, were this ad- nants add nothing at all to the firſt; for the firſt mitted, the Force and Efficacy of Obligations would gave a power of reducing the Defailant by Violence; depend upon every Man's Opinion; and conſequent- and 'tis as eaſie to break this as that. "What need ly would vaniſh into nothing, if I were not bound s there then of backing one Covenant with ano to an Action, when the Omillion of it upon account ther, when ten may as well be broken through as of ſome external Regard, appear'd to me more de- fireable than its Perforinance. Thus it would be The laſt Argument urg'd by Mr. Hobbes, runs but a poor Excuſe for a Thief to alledge for himſelf , thus, Could there be ſuch a thing as a Covenant for That he thought it a leſs Evil to lay Hands on the Non-reſiſtance, we ſhould by it be obliged out of two Goods of his Neighbours, than to get his Livelihood preſent Evils, to chuſe that which appeard the greater. by his own Pains and Labour. Indeed Obligations For certain Death is a greater Evil than Reſiſtance are ſo far from loſing their Force in theſe Cafes, and Combat. But of two Evils it is impoſible for us that they never exert it more vigorouſly; for 'tis not to chuſe the lejjerç therefore by ſuch a Covendnt the very Nature of ſuch Engagements to produce we fiould be tied to an Impoſibility, which contradicts in Men an intrinſical Neceflity of ſuch Performan- the whole Nature of mutual Engagement. Now hereces, as they would otherwiſe be averſe to, upon out- it is neceſſary, that the Rule about chuling the leſſer ward Conſiderations and Reſpects. Evil, be accurately ſtated and explain'd. And this VI. To make a Promiſe or Paet truly Obligato- properly ſpeaking, can take place only in two un- ry, it is farther Requiſite, that we have a Moral profitable or hurtful Evils, conſider'd as ſuch. In Power of performing the thing agreed upon. which Caſe it looks like a kind of Gain, to ſuffer if the thing be unlawful, and we conſequently want only a Part of an inevitable Loſs or Damage: But this Power, we cannot tie our felves by any ſuch the faine Rule muſt by no means be extended and Engagement (1) (a). For every Promiſe receives its (4) And by conſequence the other is obliged not to refift, till he ſhall obtain his Right, otherwiſe his Right will do him do good. See concerning this Mr. Thomaſius's Juriſprid. Divin. l. 3. c. 7. $ 88, doc. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 6. (1) Palta que contra Leges, Conſtitutioneſq; vel contra bonos Mores fiunt, nullam vim habere indubitati Juris eft. Cod. de Pactis , leg. 6. See alſo the Digeſt. 1. 28. tit. 7. De Conditionibus Inſtit. leg. 15.1.45. tit. 1. De Verborum Obligat. leg. 35. $ 1.& leg. 123 & Inftit. I. 3. tit. 20. De inutil. Stipulat. $ 24. (a) 'Tis indiſputably certain, that Pasts againſt Laws, Conſtitutions and good Manners, have no Power of binding Men. C. de Paris, leg. 6. Vid. D. 28. tit. 7. de Condition. Inštitut. one? tarde . . HOME Force Chap. VII. Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. 79 pro. en ; Force from the Ability of the Promiſer (27)and never Abſurd and Contradictory, that an Obligation which reacheth farther, or a Man cannot bind himſelf derives its Vertue from the Law, ſhould put us un with any Effect to a Buſineſs which he wants Abi- der a Neceility of doing ſomewhat which the Law lity to compaſs. But now the Law by forbidding abſolutely prohibits? And when we are once plac’d any Action, takes from us the Moral Power or Abi- in Subjećtion to Laws, the bare Act of our own lity of ſetting about it, and of entring on any Ob- Will is not ſufficient to repeal or to evade them. ligation to perform it. For would it not be moſt Therefore he who promiſeth a thing unlawful, fins, (?). The validity of unlawful Agreements not being ſufficiently explained by our Author, who has created of it too generally, and without regard to ſuch true Principles as the Solution of divers Caſes contained in it depends on, I have thought fit to pro- pound ſuch Medications as I have had about this Subje&, ever ſince the Firſt Edition of this book, under theſe Heads: 1. That every Act which is attended with ſomething, contrary to the Rules of Vertue, is not invalid upon that account barely, provided that the thing in which we are engaged be innocene in it felf, it implies, that one or other of the Concra åters, or both of them, offend in certain reſpects, viz. the Engagement, without conſidering the Parties, is not accompanied with all the Qualities of Right. Not to ſpeak of ill Motives, which render the moſt innocent Actions criminal. As for Example, A Merchant who deals in contreband Goods, may act againſt his own and Families intereft, without being obliged to perform the Bargains he has made for them. A Vintner, who ſpends all his time in drinking with Drunkards, certainly does ill, as well as Treatiſe of Games, but that does not hinder, that ſuch as have gained by fair Play, may lawfully take their Winnings, and ré quire what is due to them. Further, we oughe to conſider that the End of a Law which forbids certain things, is not only to make void all that may be done upon that account, but to hinder their Commiſſion, and, above all, to ſtrip them of their per and immediate Effects, eſpecially if they are of any continuance. So, for Example, if a Judge, who is corrupted, gives an unjuft Sentence, he, in whoſe Favour je is given, may in Conſcience take the benefic of the Judgment; but if the effect of an Engagement contracted by means of ſome unlawful thing, exiſts entirely, the Law will not authorize it, but leaves the things in the State they were, and denies the Contracter irs Protection, as not deſerved by him. This being laid down, we muſt II. Diſtinguiſh becween that which is contrary to Natural Right, and that which is unlawful only, becauſe it is forbidden by ſome Civil Law. As to thoſe ſorts of Agreements which proceed from the firſt ſort of things unlawful, I ſhall reduce them to thele following Rules. 1. If after any one has engaged himſelf in a thing unlawful in it felf, he will not perform it, he to whom he is engaged can't force him, and he can't reaſonably complain that he has broke his Word, whether he hath got any thing by The Reaſon of it is not only becauſe (as our Author ſpeaks very well) the Lawgiver by forbidding it takes away all liberty to do it, and by conſequence alſo all Right of requiring it of any perſon whatſoever, but alſo in every Matter wherein he is engaged contrary to his Duty, it may be preſumed that he did not give his full and free Conſent, eſpecially if he be to act any enormous Crime, as if a Man promiſe to blafpheme, or commit Sacrilege, or Perjury, or murder a Man, 'doc. When then he comes to repent of his Criminal Engagement, 'tis not a bare Preſumption, though that be ſufficient, but 'cis an infallible fogu that he did not think that he promiſed ſuch things, and he to whom he promiſed them ought to acquit him for that Rcaſon, fince 'tis the very ſame which we all make uſe of in not keeping our Word. If he has got nothing by it, he has loft nothing, tho he deſerves it. But if he hath given any thing, as it was under a Condition, and that ſuch an one as is thought morally impoſ- fible, he muſt reſtore it, becauſe it was not given with any regard to him, and ſo much the more, becauſe he can't keep it with. out giving ſome Reaſon to believe that he does really repent; and that to his fault in promiſing he adds another of having a dea fign of making an advantage of his Error, and cheating him of his Şubſtance. Reftitution is in this caſe indiſpenfibly necef- fary, fince he that gave it thought he did well in promiſing a thing upon a bad Foundation; as it a blind perſon through a falſe Zeal ſhould promiſe another to change his Religion againſt the Dictates of his own Conſcience. 2. If he whom we have engaged to commit a Ctime, doch actually execute it, we are not obliged to pay him what we have promiſed him. This were to reward a Crime, and encourage thereby not only him that has already broken che Law, but others to break it hereafter for the like Motives. On the other ſide, he to whom the Promiſe is made, may and ought to know, chat he does not think it a thing to which any Man would engage himſelf with mature Deliberation, and if he pretends certainly to enjoy the Reward of his Crime, he is a Fool to truſt to a bare Promiſe. The only reaſonable Foundation for hopes that a Man's Word will be kepr, is the Honeſty of him that gives ir ; and can we repoſe any Confidence in that Man, who requires things contrary to Honeſty? How faithful foever he may be believed, who expects us to keep our Engagements, in that he has ſollicired us to do an ill thing, have we not Reaſon to think that he will no more fcruple to break his Word, chan to require what he propoſed, when we gave him ours? He certainly offends againſt Charity, who will oblige any Man co do an ill thing for a Reward ſake. But ſince it be- longs to us to reject his Propoficion, and we are indiſpenſibly obliged ſo to do, he can't require the performance of our Promiſe upon a presence that we do him an Injury, or fruſtrate his Deſign; becauſe, tho' he ſeems to be injured, he muſt blame himſelf for it. As he ought to repent that he hath attempted with too much Succeſs, ſo he muſt preſume that we promiſed but looſely, and are left to hearken to our own Paſſions. 3. But when we have given any thing on the occaſion or proſpect of an evil Action, we can demand nothing again from him who hath received it. For when the Wickedneſs is done, there is no help; we do noc render our felves more culpable by leaving that which is not in our power to take away. When there is only a bare Promiſe, the Will of transferring the thing promiſed upon that account,muſt not be thought full and entire: We promiſe much eaſier than perform, and when we have promiſed on the view of ſome Criminal Action, there is a ſpace before the Execution following to prefume he may recant his ralh Engagement; but the fame Moment that he delivers the thing agreed on, he ſtrips himſelf abſo lutely of the Right of Property, and he to whom he gave it, acquires ic, by a Title diſhoneſt indeed, but not unjuſt in relation to us; becauſe it ſhews the ſame Conſent of the Proprietor as if he had done ſomething honeft or indifferent. The validity of an Alienation conſidered in it ſelf doch nor depend on the Nature of the Subject for which we pare with a thing in reſpect to another, Let the Morive be good or nor, we are Maſters of our own Goods, and may diſpoſe of them as we pleaſe ; all the abuſe of them is , when we beſtow them not with a proſpect of ſomething honeft, or at leaſt indifferent. If a transferring of Property becomes null only becauſe there was ſomething diſhoneſt in the ſubject , we Thall eaſily find a thouſand Pretences to elude the moſt lawful Contracts. A Man, for Example, who has borrowed Money at the moſt reaſonable Intereſt , may refuſe to pay any Intereſt, or require what he hath paid, under a presence that he believes paying of Ufury unlawful, and contrary to Natural Right. Buç fays Mr. Titius Obſerv. in Lauterbach 354) one of the Contracters gains, and the other loſes; and why ſhould either of them have any advantage, fince they both fin? 1 anſwer with our Author, $ . That he that hath given, believes himſelf to have re. ceived a thing of equal value. As is the Price, fuch is the Pay. 'Tis not material, whether in the main there be any advantage eis fufficient that the pleaſure of Satisfaction is reputed for a real Gaie. Further, tho' if we conſider him who hath received, that he deferves no Reivard for his Crime, no more doth he deſerve to recover what he hath given. For he that rewards ano ther for committing a Sin, is commonly eſteemed, and that with reaſon, more to blame than he who ſuffered himſelf to be cor, fupted, becauſe he commitred the wickedneſs with more deliberation, and bribed a perſon to do Evil, who perhaps would not have been guilty of ſuch a foul Action. To deprive a Man then of all Right of recovering what is actually given for an Action evil in its own Nature, it may ſuffice, that the Acquirement was made near to the Rules of Contracts uſed in Cafes honeſt or inno- cent, that is to ſay, There was no Fraud nor Force practiſed on the pare of the Receiver, and the Price was not exorbicant. But be further ſaid, Can any Man in Conſcience retain the infamous Reward of the Crime he has committed? No; without doubt. If we fuppofe a perſon to examine himſelf, and conſult his own Conſcience, the Queſtion is needlefs : For fuch an one can't buc repent , and then he will neither regard nor demand the Reward of Iñiquity, nor keep it if he has received ic already. But if it be reſtored, it will not fol'ow that he has any Right to require it; and if he knows that he may require what he has gi- men on this occaſion, he may have recourſe to thoſe Means which are proper to recover what another refuſes to give. The Care has place chiefly in the independence of the State of Nature; and it Teems to me that then the Reſtoration is not more juft in reſpect it may 80 Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. BOOK III. . Queſtion, but he fins doubly, who performs it (a). Whence in the Effects conſequent upon it; and becauſe fres this farther Conſequence may be drawn, that thoſe quently the Inconveniencies attending a Difan Promiſes are not to be kept (3), which would prove nulment would be greater than the Act it felf, if hurtful to the Perſon, to whom they are made; it permitted to ſtand Valid, would produce (c) (4). being a general Command of the Law of Nature, VII. To proceed diftin&ly in a cloſer Examina- that we do no harm to another, knowingly and wil- tion of this point, it is firſt mov'd as a fully, though he out of Folly ſhould delire it. whether an Obligation for the Performance of an Moreover, ſince a good and valid Obligation can- Act in it ſelf Vicious, be Good and Valid, whilft not be contracted about unlawful Matters, it fol- things ſtand as at firſt, and no ſtep is made towards lows that Acts undertaken againſt legal Conſtituti- the Execution. And here it is certain, That fuch a ons, are by Vertue of the fame Law Null and Void, vicious (1) Agreement does produce an Obligation or the Magiſtrate is ſuppoſed to have already de- on neither ſide, and that Parties ought in Honeſty clar'd them ſo (b). Yet in many caſes, it is a con to recede from their Bargain (2). Senec, Hercul. ſtant Practice in Common-wealths, to impoſe a Finé Oet. V. 480, 481. on the Perforier of ſome unlawful Act, and not to diſannul the Act, becauſe there was perhaps, more Præſtare fateor pofle me tacitam fidem, Indecency in the Momentary Performance, than Si fcelere careat ; interim ſcelus eft fides. reſpect to him that gave, than the Approbation of the Subject for which he gave, can be a Commendation to him. 'Tis upon this that we muſt ground the Maxim of the Roman Law, which imports, That if an Agreement be diſhoneſt, both in respect to him that gives and receives, the firſt can't require any thing again, but in this caſe the Poffeffor has the advantage. Porro ax. tem, fi & dantis Go accipientis turpis cauſa fit, possesſorem potiorem inje, Go ideo repetitionem ceffare, tamet fi ex ftipulatione folutum eſt, Digeſt. l. 12. cit. 5. De Cond Stione ob turp. & injuſt. cauſam, leg. 8. Io which nevertheleſs the Roman Lawyers do not always follow cheir own Principles, ſince when Men play at the Game call'd Hazard, which was forbidden, and look'd upon as diſhoneſt , they allowed the Loſer to require his Money again, even beyond the ordinary Term of Preſcription. Bue as I have Thewed in my Treatiſe of Gaming, 1. 3. c. 9. $ 15. in this laſt Caſe the unhappy Gamefter can have no recourſe to Juſtice to recover his Money, becauſe in taking upon him to game, he renounces the Benefit of the Law. The fame thing may have place, in my Judgment, and for the ſame Reaſon, in all other diſhoneſt Engagements, ſuppoſing that the Law permits Men to recover again what they have given on that account. Thus much of things evil in themſelves, and contrary to the unchangeable Rules of Na. tural Right, after which it will not be hard to ſtare the validity of ſuch Agreements as are not unlawful, otherwiſe than as they border upon ſuch things as Civil Laws forbid. But here we muſt diſtinguiſh between a Stranger and a Fellow-Citizen. 1. If we treat with a Stranger about things forbidden in our Couptrey, he either knows them forbidden or not. If he knows them, he has either ſearched out the Agreement or not; if he has ſearched out the Agreement, we are obliged neither to do the thing, nor to make good the Damage he may have by it, but only to reſtore what he has already given. The Reaſon is, becauſe in this caſe he may and ought to ſuppoſe that we are but ſlightly engaged, and that we are tempted by the advantageous Propofitions that he made us. Beſides we often expoſe our ſelves to great Mulats, or other Puniſhments more troubleſome, of which we can't fuppoſe that any perſon would run the riſque. But if we our ſelves have ſearched the Agreement, we are not really obliged to execute the ſame thing, but we muſt indemnifie him with whom we are engaged. I ſay, we are not obliged to execute the ſame thing, for tho' Strangers are not ſtrictly obliged to inform themſelves of what paffes among us, and may behave themſelves as they fee convenient, without enquiring into the particular Laws of our Srate, yet they oughe in Equicy to preſume, thar a Citizen who re- cants an Engagement which he has entred into contrary to his Dury, did nor engage with mature deliberation, or at leaſt did nor foreſee the Obſtacles that oppoſed the execution of his Promiſe. But ſince he has ſearched the Agreement, and ſeems to have paſſed all theſe Confideracions upon it, 'tis juſt that ſome way or other he ſhould indemnifie him that has truſted to him. Bnt if the Stranger knows not of the Prohibitions, whether he has ſearched the Agreement or no, then we have a more indi. ſpenſible Obligation to render to him all that he hath ſuffered by truſting to our Word; and we ought to think our felves happy that he doth nor impute it to us as an Injury that we were filent, and let him take other Meaſures than he would have done if we had ſpoken our Minds freely. But if the Prohibitions come only when the Market is made and concluded, then we are not ob- liged to make good any Damages. For in this we ought to be ſuppoſed nor to have conſented but under a tacic Condition, that there was no Obſtacle from the Sovereign. 2. But if thoſe that creat together about a thing forbidden by the Law are Members of the ſame Scare, they are both ſubject to the Puniſhment really, becauſe they could not be ignorant of the Law, and upon that account they are looked upon to treat together as if there were no Law about it, and ſo to renounce the Benefits which mighe accrue thereby to either of them. So, though they did ill to engage themſelves, they ought, as far as in them lies, ſuffer their Engagement to continue in force, and neither of them break it without the Conſent of the orher ; yer if we can't execute che thing to which we are engaged without ſome great prejudice, he to whom we have promiſed ſhould content himſelf with an Equi- valent. I ſay, every one ought, as far as in him lies, to ſuffer the Engagement to take effect, for ſo long as there is nothing done on either part, each of them is free to recant, as if they had done a ching evil in its own Nature, becauſe in chis Caſe we may be thought to have conſulted well, or acted with mature deliberation. As for Example, if I have promiſed any Man to game with him contrary to Law, I am no more obliged to meet him, than to preſent my ſelf in the Field to that Man who has challenged me to a Duel, which I have accepted; but when I have actually play'd and loft, I cannot have a recourſe to Law to recover my Money, nor uſe any forcible way to regain it; eſpecially if there was no Cheat put upon me by him who has won it of me. See my Treatiſe of Gaming, l. 3.c. 9. 15, 16. So again, If a Merchant has promiſed another to furniſh him with certain contreband Goods, when they liave agreed for the Price, the one may refuſe to ſtand to the Bargain that he ought not to have made, and the other, with whom he has not kept his Word, ought to repent him that he had promiſed ſuch a thing, and be eaſie that it took nor effect; but if the Merchandize be actually delivered, or any thing be received as an earneſt of Deli. very, which is therefore hoped neither the Buyer can lawfully refuſe to pay the Price agreed on in the firſt Cafe, nor the Seller himſelf to deliver the Bargain without ſome prejudice to himſelf, and incurring a great Puniſhment: For then 'tis fufficient to reſtore what he has received, or an Equivalent. With theſe Limitations nothing hinders but that an Engagement contrary to che Laws purely Civil may be of Force between one Bargainer and another. There are Agreements which the Laws forbid, bue they ſuffer them nevertheleſs to ſubfiſt contrary to their Prohibition, for they may be valid between the Parties, altho' che Law nulls them, in as much as that and the Magiſtrate allow no Action for the Relief of either of them after they have conſented with full and entire Liberty. (3) See what is ſaid, 1. 5. c. 12. $ 22, in the End. (4) Șee Grotius, l. 2. c. 5. § 14. 16, with the Notes of Gronovius the Father, and what our Author ſays above about Imperfect Laws, I. 1. c. 6. $ 14. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 7: (1) This is the determination of the Roman Law, Generaliter novimus turpes džipulationes nullius esſe momenti, veluti ſi quis bo- micidium vel ſacrilegium ſe fa&turum promittat. Diget. l. 44. tit. 1. De Verbor. Obligat. leg. 26, 27. (2) Thus Apollonius Tyanaus (in Philoftrat. l. 3. c. 7, p. 130. Ed. Morel. Parif.) having promiſed to bring a Vellel richly laden into the Hands of Pirates, led 'em a quite contrary Courſe, and deluded their Expectation of Booty. (a) Add. 1.15. D. de Condition . Inſtitut. I. 35. f. 1. 1. 123. D. de Verb, Obligat. (b) Lex Wiſigothorum, 1.2 tit. 5.c.7. (c) Thus in Apollonius Rbodius, Argon. 1. 4. Alcinous being conſtituted Umpire between the Colchians and the Argonau, gave Judgment as dows, “That if Medea had been acquainted with Jaſon's Bed, ſhe ſhould ſtill remain in his Pofleffion, if not, ine ſhould be re- “ ſtored to her father. We have the Same Story in Hygin. Fab. 23. Apollodor. Biblioth. l. 1. 1. 25. Orpheus in Argon. Thus CHAP. VII. 81 Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. Thus for Inſtance, if a Man hire an Aflalline to which was not at firſt entirely wanting, (in as much commit a Murther, and the Aſfaſline upon better as the thing was done by mutual Confent,) but Thoughts reſolves againſt the Villany, the Hirer was only hindred from diſplaying it ſelf by that Vice cannot compel him to fulfil his Covenant. And on or Defect, with which it was attended; namely, its the other Hand, if the Hirer repenting of his wick- contributing to the Commiſſion of a Sin. But ſhould ed Deſign, orders the Affaffine not to proceed, the we admit this Doctrine, the Edict of Natural Law Affafline ſhall not force him to continue in his Re- forbidding us to enter into Covenant about unlaw- folution for fear of loſing the promis’d Wages. Nei- ful Matters, would be void, if when the wicked ther ſhall he in this caſe demand the Money of Terms of the Covenant on one ſide were put in the Hirer, as on whoſe account purely he now de- Execution, the other Party muſt by the Law of Na- fifted, and was hindred from earning it. Nay, if ture be bound to ſtand to his Agreement. What after he has been thus countermanded he go on, and an inſignificant Order would it be to prohibit Theft, accompliſh the Miſchief,the Hirer ſhall not be guilty if the Act of ſtealing being once over, the Goods of the whole Fact, but ſhall be condemn’d, only in to were to remain in the Poſſellion of the Thief, with- much as ſhall ſeem a proportionable Penalty, for out Blame or Danger? And that Remark is very conceiving a Murther in his Imagination, of which falſe, “ That there was not Originally wanting to he repented before it was put in Execution. “ the Vicious Covenant, an internal force of oblig- Grotius (a) obferves, That a Promiſe of this kind ing; but that it was only kept in Suſpence upon is therefore Vicious and Void, becauſe it is made to account of the attending Wickedneſs, till ſuch excite a Man to do a wicked Act (b). “ time as it ceas'd to be ari Incentive to Sin. For VIII. It is a ſecond point of Enquiry, whether to give a Pact an inward Obligatory Force, it is in Cafe ſuch a Villany having been once commit- not enough that it be made with the Conſent of ed, according to the Bargain, the other Party be both Parties, but the Subject of it ought to be ſuch obliged to pay the Price agreed upon. Which Gro- a thing as Men have a Right and Power of diſpo- tius affirins ; becauſe, ſays he, the Price or Reward fing of at their Pleaſure. Otherwiſe if mutual Con- before the fact was accompliſh'd had indeed a Ble- fent were ſufficient to produce an Obligation, it miſh and Imperfection, as being the Incentive to would be eaſie to overthrow all Laws, ihould Men Wickedneſs , which blemiſh ceaſeth, when the Wick- but enter into a Covenant to break them; and thus edneſs is once paſt, and the Crime perform’d. But the Law of Nature would manifeſtly contribute to we cannot but declare our ſelves of a contrary O- its own Deſtruction. It is our Judgment then, that pinion ; for a Bargain of this kind is ſo far from with regard to the Law of Nature, neither the Actor ceaſing to be Vicious, when the Deed is over, that of a Villany, can by any proper Right demand the it ſeems then to arrive at its higheſt pitch of Baſe- Wages promis’d him, nor is the Perſon who hired neſs, as having gain’d its end. Unleſs it be a ſinaller him bound to pay the Reward by any inward Tie degree of Sin to have ſtollen, than to think of ſteal- affecting the Conſcience. And that therefore the ing; to receive the Wages of Villany, than to hope Court of Natural Juſtice, does not think it ſelf con- for and expect them; to pay the Reward, than to cern’d to enquire, whether or no a Man has coin- promiſe it. Indeed if the promiſe be in its ſelf mitted -a Wickedneſs, gratis, or to trouble it ſelf in Vicious, becauſe it is the Incentive to Wickedneſs, giving him Relief. Indeed, if the Cut-throat here, the fulfilling of the Promiſe will certainly be Vi- or any other Man retain’d for the Execution of cious, as being the Recompence of Wickedneſs , and ſome unjuſt Violence, ſhall upon the other Parties an Encouragement and Invitation to new Miſ- refuſing to pay him his Hire, do him fome Miſchief chiefs. And on this account fome ſecret Stain or in Revenge, no body will pity the Sufferer, nor Blemiſh is commonly thought to ſtick on ſuch Re- think that he has been treated injuriouſly, but on- wards, even a ter they have paſs’d to a third Pof- ly that he has been dealt with in his own way. feffor by a juft Title; becauſe they were at firſt the This then we muſt obſerve, That although Cove- Wages of Iniquity. Thus the Fews were forbidden nants in themſelves Vicious, are not Obligatory by to bring the Price of Whoredom, as an Offering, any Intrinſical Force or Vertue, nor fit to produce into the Houſe of God (). Thus when Judas (d) an Aktion in Courts of Juſtice, yet they have forne brought back the Wages of his Treaſon, the chief kind of Effect upon a Man, who having at firſt Prieſts thought it not lawful to put it into the Trea- freely conſented to them, refuſes afterwards to make fury. And thus it is a known Proverb, That a Fa- then good. For they hinder him from having a- mily ſeldom thrives on an ill-gotten Eſtate (1). Therefore ny Right to complain of hard Uſage, in caſe the we can by no means aſſent to what Grotius deli- other Perſon violently bring him to a Compliance, vers, That till the time of performing the Villany, or inflict ſome Evil on him for his Refuſal. It is true the Force and Efficacy of a Vicious Promiſe, remains the Law of Nature forbids , that a Man ſhould have in Suſpence; juftas doth the Efficacy of conditional forfeited his Claim, by another's dealing injuriouſly, Promiſes till the Condition be made good, and of or be compelled to pay what he does not juſtly Promiſes about things at preſent Impoflible, till the owe, or ſhould be puniſh'd for denying ſo unrea- things do really fall under our Power, as we have fonable a Demand. But he who agrees to a vici- probable Hopes they will , at our firſt makinig the ous Covenant, does by that very A&t quit all claim Bargain : But that when the fact is once is committed to the Favour of this Law, in as much as he en- the Obligation then breaks out, and exerts its Force, deavours, ſo far as he is able to give another an un- og 300 bb Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 8. (1) This Proverb, as any Man may perceive, makes noe much to out Author's purpoſe ; becauſe it is deſigned to few, that ill-górten Goods will noc profper, and that they vaniſh as they came. Sa Lib. 2. c. 11.8.9. (b) Thus Apollonius Tyanaus (in Philoſtrat . I. 3 C 7 p. 136. Edit. Morel. Pariſ.) having promiſed to bring a Vettel richly laden into the Hands of Pirates, led 'em a quite contrary Courſe, and deluded their Expectations of Boocy. (-) (C) Deuteronom. xxiii, 18. 7oſeph. Antig. 4. 8. (d) See Matth. xxvii. 6. + L juſt 82 Book III. Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. Juſt Power over him. And thofe Evils are adjudg’d accuſed theſe Bargains of Injuſtice upon another to fall very deſervedly on Perſons, to which they Score. give Occaſion by their own Fault (2). For In Sola viro mulier Spoliis exultat ademptis: ſtance, the Law of Nature forbids, that a Virgin Sola locat noctes, Jola locanda venit, ſhould be rob’d of that Title and Character againſt Et vendit quod utrumque juvat, quod uterque petebat; her Will; yet if ſhe once conſents to her own Dif Et pretium, quanti gaudeat, ipfa facit. honour, the has ſuffer'd indeed an irreparable Loſs, Que Venus ex aquo ventura eſt grata duobus ; but ſhe cannot complain of any Injury that has been Altera cur illam vendit & alter emit? done her (3). And thus too in Common-wealths, Amor. Lib. I. Ep. 10. V. 29, &c. where Duels are prohibited by Law, a Man who has receiv'd a Challenge, is not bound to come into the 'Tis the Nymphs Privilege the Spoils to win, Field, though he has given his word to appear. Yet To let her Nights to hire,and traffick with her Sin. if he freely meets his Antagoniſt , and happens to be She ſells what both enjoy, what both invite, wounded in the Incounter, he cannot ſay, that he And ſets the Price upon her own Delight, has ſuffer'd Wrong, or demand the Charges of his What both with Pleaſure doth alike ſupply, Cure. 'Tis hard if one muſt fell and t’other buy. Grotius in favour of his Opinion, urges the Ex- ample of the Patriarch Judah in the Scripture (a), This ſtill remains true, That a Man cannot who appear’d very earneſt and follicitous to fend fairly pretend to be diſpleas’d with a piece of Wick- Thamar the Price of her playing the Harlot. To edneſs, which has been undertaken with his Confeit, this Mr. Selden (b) anſwers, " That in the Juug- and for his Service. ment of thoſe times it paſs’d for lawful, for a “ Woman free from Marriage, and other Reſtraints, Medea to Jaſon, in Ovid's Epiſt. Ep. 12. 131, 132. to beſtow her felfupon a Man, without any con Ut culpent alii, tibi me laudare neceſſe eſt, “ dition of living together; and this either Gratis, Pro quo fum toties eſe coata nocens. or for a Reward. And that therefore this Agree- “ ment was able to produce a Good and Valid Ob- Others may blame, you muſt of Force commend, ligation, being made about a Matter, which if For whoſe ſweet fake I dared ſo oft offend. not Naturally, yet was civilly Lawful, or accord- "ing to Opinion of States and People in thoſe Niſus to Minos, Metamorph. 1. 9. v. 130, 131. Days. We may ſay farther, That moft Men think Scclus hoc patriaque, patrique, Oficium tibi fit. they ought in point of Generoſity to pay fomething for the purchaſe of their Pleaſures. And beſides, What's to my Country, and my Friends a Sin, Judah might not expreſs ſo much Care and Con- to you's a Kindneſs. cern (4), leaſt the Harlot ſhould loſe her Wages, but Jeaſt he himſelf ihould loſe his Staff and Ring, the Senec. in Medea. v. 5oo. 503. Pledges he had left in her Hands. Another Argu Cui prodeſt Scelus, is fecit. ment on Grotius's fide, may be alledged in that Paf Tibi innocens fit, quiſquis pro te eſt nocens. ſage of the Roman Laws (c) (5), What is given to a Strumpet cannot be recoverd; yet not becauſe bothParties The Gainer by a Villany is deem'd the Actur; are in a Fault ; for indeed the whole Offence, as to he that fins for you, ſhould in your Eyes be ſpotleſs this Point is on the ſide of the Giver. 'Tis vicious in Innocence. the Strumpet, to practice ſuch a Profeſſion, but ’tis not vicious in her to rececive the Fees of her Profeſſion. Though it be a very uſual, and a very good Cu- The ineaning of which Determination is no nioreftom of Princes, to take the Benefit (in fome Ca- than this; though to make an open Trade of Lewd- fes) of Men's Treaſons and Villanies, and to puniſh neſs , and to own as much before the Ædiles, did not the Traytors and the Villains, that the Infection may fall under the Penalty of the Laws in the Roman not ſpread by Encouragement. Of this Proceeding, State, yet all Good and Vertuous Men, thought it we have a very remarkable Inſtance, recorded by inoſt Bafe and Scandalous to engage in fuch a way Paulus Orofius in his Hiſtory (d), Sulpitius having of Life. However, when Perſons had once fix'd been voted in Senate a Publick Enemy, was brought themſelves in ſo vile a Calling, they contracted no into their Hands by the Treachery of his own Slave; new Vileneſs, by making the uſual Gain and Ad- the Conſuls, with a wiſe Diſtinction, order'd the Fel- vantage of it. Or to ſpeak more conciſely, the low to be preſented with his Freedom, as a Reward Buſineſs was thus; the Romans granting Toleration for his Service to the State, and to be caſt headlong to Courteſans, the Bargains and Contracts made on down the Tarpeian Rock, as a Puniſhment for be- the Score of that Profeflion, were in their Law ad- traying his Mafter. Add Zonar. Tom. III. in Theo- judg’d to hold good and valid. Ovid indeed, hath phil. ab initio. 1 (2) It is a Maxim of the Roman Lawyers, Quod quis ex culpa fua damnum ſentit, non intelligitur damnum ſentire, He that brings a Loſs on himſelf by his own fault, is not fuppofed to ſuffer any. Digeft. I. 50. tit. 17. $ 203. (3) Though in this Caſe Ovid's Rule commonly holds true. -Ipfo Crimine dotata eft, demeruitque virum, Epift. Heroid. 6.137, 138. She brings her Portion in her Crime, and wins the Husband in the Spark. (4) He mightily feared, and that with Reaſon, that if his Pledge were known to the World, his Wickedneſs would be divulged, and himſelf expoſed to the Scoffs of the Inhabitants. And for this Reaſon 'twas that he did not go himſelf to find Thamar. Sed quod. Meretrici datur , repeti non potest, ut Labeo & Marcellus ſcribunt, ſed nova ratione non ea, quod utriuſque turpitudo verfatur, fed folius dantis; illam enim turpiter facere, quod fit Meretrix, non turpiter accipere, cum fit Meretrix. Digeft : 1. 12. cic. So De Conditione ob turp. vel injuſt. cauſam, leg. 4. $ 3. (a) Gen. xxxviii, 20, loc. (b) De 7. N. & G.1.5 C.4. (c) Lib. 4 1. 3. D. de Condit. ob. turp. Cauſ. & 1. 12. tit. 5. (d) L. 3. C. 18. IX. The Chap. VII. Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. 83 IX. The third Queſtion moved on this Head is, perhaps coſt me no Trouble, yet if I bargain to re- whether a Reward given for Villainous Service, may ceive fome Confideration on that Account, I may be redemnanded or recover'd. And here the Law of fairly demand the Payment, and the other Perſon Nature affords 110 Pretence for ſuch a Recovery, fro- cannot recover what he thus parts with; unleſs I vided the Receiver has not dealt deceitfully with the forced him to make a large and unreaſonable Pro- other Party. And the other has not ſuſtained a miſe, by filling his Head with falſe Frights, or great Damage (?). In as much as the Giver by de- any other Stratagem of Knavery. Thoſe Promi- livering up the thing promis’d, intended no doubt ſes are likewiſe Valid, which we make to incite to transfer the Propriety of it: and this too in way another to the more read, and the inore exact Per- of Debt, in Confiderttion of a Service perform d formance of his Duty. For theſe paſs for matters for him, which he himſelf valued at this Rate. Now of free Bounty and Gratuity. But if the thing was we know that when any thing is given, even Gratis, before owing to us in a perfe&t Manner (b), and yet all Right of Recovery ceaſeth. Nor will it alter the Perſon who is to perform it, refuſes Compliance, the Cale to urge, That the thing was here obtain’d unleſs upon our Promiſe of a new Reward, we take on an unjuſt Title, and by Ways and Means ex- this Cale to be the ſame, as in Engagements made preſly forbidden by the Laws. For this Allegation through Fear or Guile; and therefore to require the cannot with any colour be made by the Perſon who ſame way of Proceeding. If then in a State of Na- gave the Reward; in as much as he voluntarily tural Liberty, a Man refuſe to pay me my due, it bargain'd for the wicked Service, and when that is plain he does it upon Preſumption of his own was perform’d for him, thought himſelf to receive Strength, and becauſe he believes it is not in my ſomewhat equal in value to the Price agreed upon; power to compel him. And conſequently, if he nor can he complain of a Villany, of which he deny to fulfila Covenant fairly made, without a himſelf was the Principal Author. Indeed the Il new Supplemental Condition, he immediately gives legality of the Means by which the Reward was ac me juſt Cauſe of uſing Hoſtility to reduce him, quired, if conſider'd in regard to the publick Au- And if my preſent Affairs will not permit me to thority, ſhall produce this Effect, That it ſhall be engage in a Method of War, but incline me to a- in the Magiſtrates Power, to take the thing from gree, though on hard Terms (2), I may afterwards the Receiver by way of Punishment, and (if he require Satisfaction for the Damage I now ſuffer; ſees fit) to reſtore it to the firſt Owner. For In- unleſs I end the Matter by an Act of voluntary For- ſtance, if a cunning Strumpet ſhall chouſe an un- giveneſs. Yet it quite alters the Cafe, if his denial wary young Man out of a conſiderable Sum of Mo- did not proceed from meer Unfaithfulneſs and Wick- ney, the may fairly be obliged to refund, ſince e edneſs,but from his being able to fhew that he was ex- ven in the moſt vicious Bargains, fome Shadow of ceedingly injured in the former Covenant, to which Juſtice is kept up, and the Laws of Contracts in he now demurs. As for the Members of Common ſome ſort obſerv’d. wealths, if they refuſe to anſwer an old Bargain But farther, ſince it is accounted moſt baſe and without ſome additional Reward, they will be vile in a Man, to demand a Reward, for doing a compellid to be honeſt by a Courſe of publick Ju- thing which it is his Duty to perform Gratis, it is ſtice. made another Queſtion, whether what he have pro To this we may add the Diſtinction of the Ro- mis’d or given for a thing before juſtly due to us, man Lawyers (c) in Caſes of Vicious Service, whe- may be with-held or recover'd. Some anſwer abſo- ther the Fault or Wickedneſs was on the part of the lutely (a), That if we reſpect the Law of Nature, Receiver only, or of the Giver only, or of both. In Promiſes of this kind are Good and Valid, ſince the firſt Inſtance, they allow an Action of Reco- thoſe likewiſe are fo, which we make without any very ; but not in the other two. particular Reaſon or Proſpect . Yet that at the ſame Ř. We are likewiſe Morally unable or uncapable time whatſoever Damage is ſuſtain’d by violent Ex- to perform any thing (1), or to oblige ourſelves to tortion, ought to be fully repair'd. Perhaps the ſuch Performance,about the Goods or Actions of other Buſineſs may be more clearly ſettled, if we diftin- Men; which are not ſubject to our Pleaſure and Dif- guiſh whether the thing which we ſay was before poſal. And being thus independent from us, we due to us, was due upon an Imperfect, or upon a cannot by any Act of ours, whether of Promiſe or perfect Obligation. If the foriner, our Promiſe of of Bargain, give another a Right over them, by Vir- a Reward for it ſhall hold good, and we cannot tue of which he ſhould claim them as his Due. Hence fue for Recovery. Thus for Inſtance, although the 'tis a Rule with the Civilians (2), " That in caſe Law of Humanity obliges me to ſet a Traveller in one Man promiſe that another ſhall give or ſhall his Way, and though ſuch a piece of Service may “ do fuch or ſuch a Thiag, neither of them ſhall CC 50 od 9V8 01 vi 010 3V Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 9. Nismod (1) See what I have ſaid about this Matter in my large Nore on 96. And 1. 4. C. 13. $ 16. (2) Mr. Hirtius affirms the contrary, and his Reaſon is, that by ſubmitting to a new Treaty, tho' upon hard Condicions, he de: prives himſelf of his Right. And if one ſuch Agreement, adds he, made after War be valid, why ſhould it not be ſo when Men think by that Means to avoid it. But ſee 1. 8. c. 8. $ I. UST 11 sr 11 Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 10. (1) Add alſo the things which are not in our Diſpoſal, alcho' otherwiſe they really belong to us. See what I have faid in my Treatiſe of Games, 1.2. C. 4. $4, doc. (2) The Words are, Si quis alium daturum fa&turumve quid promiſerit, non obligabitur, niſi ſi Spondeat, Titium quinque aureos datua rum. Inſtitut. 1. 3. tit. 20. De inutil. Stipulat. s 3. See Cujas's Obſerv. 12. 36. (a) See Grotius, 1. 2. c. 11, ſ. 10. (6) Add. 1. 12. tit. 5. D. de Condi&t. ob turp. cauf. (c) Liban. Orat. s. I receive only thoſe Advantages which the law allo ivs me and where is the Favour in this caſe. He thar hath been obliged with a Kindneſs, ought to make Requital to his Benefactor. Buc we can owe no ſuch return to a Judge, who doth not act out of favour to us, bue as the Neceſſity of the Law directs him. & ftand + L 2 1110 84 Of the Matter of Promiſes and Covenants. Book III . . my “ ſtand obliged (3). Which is very juſt and true, But if the third Perſon be one placed under if we ſtick to the bare Words of ſuch a Promiſe. Governance and Command, his Things or Actions Fut becauſe it ſeems inconvenient, that an Act fe- are not accounted anothers, but my own; ſo far as riouſly undertaken ſhould produce no Effect, we are my Authority over him extends . And thus far 1 apt commonly to interpret Promiſes of that kind in can by Promiſe or other Engagements effectually this Senſe, That the Perſon Promiſing, will take the diſpoſe of them, ſo as not only to bind my ſelf to care to bring the other Party to Performance (4), in ſee the Agreement made good, but to cauſe that the whoſe Name he now ſeems to inake the Engagement. Perſon in whoſe behalf I tranſact , ſhall as ſoon as But if I make a Promiſe to a Man in fo expreſs and he is acquainted with my Pleaſure, be obliged by direct Terms as theſe, that I will endeavour to pre- vertue of my Power over him, to perform the Con- vail on a third Perfon, to do for him ſo or ſo; I am dition. Though the common and regular way of then obliged to labour by all means morally poſſible, proceeding in theſe Caſes, is to apply to the princi- to move that Perſon to a Compliance. We ſay by pal Promiſer, and to require him to force the Per- all means morally poſſible, That is, ſo far as the other ſon under his Care and Direction to a Compliance; Man can honeſtly deſire me, and ſo far as is confi- and upon the Obſtinacy and Default of the governá ſtent with the Nature and Method of Civil Life. Party, the Action at Law ſhall lie againſt his Go- And if in this Cafe, I omit nothing on my Part (5). vernour, unleſs he has reſign’d his Charge, and left See Grotius, Book II. c. 11. ſ. 22. and Book III. c.21. him wholly to his own Diſpoſal . f. 30. And yet the third Perſon refuſe to grant the XI. Laſtly, I am Morally incapacitated make a Requeſt, I am not bound to make good the De- Promiſe with any Effect, to a third Perſon, about fault; unleſs this was an expreſs part of my Pro- ſuch Things or Actions of mine, to which another miſe, or was implied in the Nature of the Bufi- has already acquired a Right; unleſs perhaps this neſs (6). But if I promiſe in this manner, Un- other Party be content to wave his Claim (1) leſs a third Perſon do ſo or ſo, I will forfeit thus much, For he who by a former Engagement has made it is manifeſt that if the third Perfon fail, my En- over his Right, can have no power left to dif- gagement will ſtand good againſt me. Somewhat poſe of it anew. And all Pacts and Promiſes like this we meet with in the Roman Conſtituti- might be cancelld and eluded with very little ons (7), which decree that in caſe a Perfon diſpoſes Trouble, were we allow'd to enter into new ones, ei- in way of Legacy, a thing which belong’d to ano- ther directly contrary to the former, or any way ther Man, and which he knew ſo to belong, the inconſiſtent with them, as to the Performance. In Heir ſhall be obliged to redeem, and to reſtore it, this caſe therefore, the latter Contract is diſannuľa or if it cannot be redeemed, to give the value of it and render'd ineffectual by the former, or as we to the Owner. Yet certain it is, that a Promiſe ſhould rather ſpeak, the former ſhews that the lat- of what kind foever, cannot lay an Obligation on ter can be of no Force or Uſe. Hence for inſtance, are the third Perſon, nor give the other Man a Right all thoſe Covenants void, which Subjects make either of requiring any thing immediately from him. among themſelves or with others, in prejudice of the hin- (3) So alſo the Digeſts direct, Qugiunq; gerimus, cum ex noſtro contra&tu originem trahunt, niſi ex noftra perſona obligationis initium Sumant, inanem a&tum efficiunt, & ideo, neque ftipulari, neque emere, vendere, contrahere, ut alter suo nomine re&te agat, poffumus , Digeft. De Obligar. & Action. 1. 44. tit. 7. leg. II. Certiſſimum enim eft ex alterius contra&tu neminem obligari, Cod. 1. 4. tit . 12. Ne Vxor pro Marito, &c. leg. 3. (4) In this latrer Cafe the Roman Lawyers themſelves affirm, That the Promiſe obliges. Qui fi effe&turum ſe at Titius daret, Spoſponderit, obligatur, (i. e.) If he promiſed to procure that Titius ſhould give, he is obliged, Inſtitut ubi fupra. See Mr. Hirtius's Differtation, De Oblig. alium datur, fa&turumve in Tom. 3. of his Commentaries and ſmall Tracts, printed in 1700. (5) So Livy, l. 2. c. 31. He ſeem'd to have ſatisfied his Obligation, in as much as he contributed nothing on his fide to der the buſineſs from being perforn'd. (6) This hath place only in ſuch Engagements where both Parties are concerned, and not in ſuch as are the pure effect of the Liberality of one of the Parties. See the Examples cited by Mr. Hirtius in the Diſcourſe laſt mentioned, Sect. 1. $ 8. (7) Theſe are the Words, Non folum autem Teſtatoris vel Hæredis res, ſed etiam aliena legari poteſt, ita ut Heres cogatur red mere eam, & præftare; do fi non poteſt eam redimere, aſtimationem ejus dare -Quod ita intelligendum eſt, ſi defun&tus ſciebat ali. enam rem esſe, non fi ignorabat. Inftic . I. 2. tit. 20. De Legatis, 94. Idemque Juris est, ſi potuiſſes emere, & non emeres. Dig. 1. 32. leg 30. $ 6. The Reaſon of this Law, which appears at firſt fighe very harſh and rigid, is, That the Teftator is preſumed un- willing to do a thing fo ridiculous as to give away what he had nothing to do with. So that he is accounted to have bought the thing bequeathed, if it can be, if not, the Legatee muſt have an Equivalent. See Mr. Daumat's Laws in their Natural Order, Part 1. Lib. 4. tit. 2. Sect. 3. & 3, doc. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 11. (1) This Author in his Abridgment of the Duties of a Man and Citizen expreſſes himſelf after a more general way, I. 1. C. 9. $ 19. Unleſs the other waves his Claim of Right, (Niſi forte in eum caſum quo alterius jus expiraverit) which may fiely be added here: Mr. Thomafius in his Inſtit. f uriſprud. Divin. l. 2.c. 7. $ 95, 96, 97. adds another Reſtriction to the words recited, Un. Jeſs he that hath promiſed may fairly hope that the Caſe may happen. So a Servant may ſafely engage himſelf to ſerve another Mafter, when the time which he is hired to ſerve his preſent Maſter is expired. And the Owner of an Houſe may promiſe to ler an Apartment of his Houſe to another when the time which the preſent Occupier is to enjoy it is expired. But it is an un- lawful Promiſe, and conſequently null, to engage himfelf to become a Subject of another Prince or State, upon Condition that the State of which he is a Member be ruin'd by a Civil War, or deſtroyed after ſome other manner. By the Roman Laws no Man can proiniſe faithfully to give a Man a Freeman, when he is made a Slave, nor a publick Thing, upon ſuppoſition that it may become our private Poffeffion. Nec impendenti erit ftipulatio ob id quod publica res in privatum deduci, do ex libero ſervus fieri po- teftim-Sed pretinus inutilis eft. Inftit. 1. 3. tic. 20. De Inutil. Stipulat . § 2. And 'cis nor without Reaſon, adds Mr. Thomaſius, That Chriſtian Princes declare a Promiſe of Marriage made by a perſon married, in cafe his Wife or her Husband die, to be null, and puniſh both Parties that have made fuch a Promife. Nevertheleſs, the ſame Author in his Fundam. Jur. Nat. da Gent, and his Notes upon Huber. De Jur. Civ. ſays, That the Puniſhment inflicted in this Cafe ſeems to be very rigorous, and favours of Popiſh Principles about Marriage as a Sacrament. But Grotius thinks luch a Promiſe invalid in its own Nature. 1.2.c. 11. 8 8.1.3. WS I Duty Chap. VIII. Of the Conditions of Promiſes. 85 Duty and Allegiance they owe to their lawful So- his own Maſter , beſides the general Obligation iin- vereignis (a) (2) plied in that State and Condition of Servitude, and It is a cominon Rule, That he who has the Prece- the Reaſon of this was, becauſe his Maſter had be- dency in Time, has the Advantage in Right. Not that fore a full Right over all that he poſſeſs’d, and all Time conſider'd barely in it ſelf can make any ſuch that he could do to any advantageous Purpoſe. Difference; but becauſe the whole power over a If a Man, contrary to theſe Duties, ſhall have de- thing being formerly ſecur’d to one Perſon, bars all ceived and prejudiced another by promiſing a thing, others from obtaining a Title to it afterwards. And which either was not his own, or was before other- hence too it coines to paſs, that a Servant cannot wiſe beſtow'd and ſecur’d; he ſhall be oblig'd to diſpoſe of his Labour (3), otherwiſe than his Ma- make good the Damage, and in many Cafes, ſhall fter pleaſes, to whom by Virtue of a former be liable farther to luffer the Penalty of Cozen- Contract it entirely belongs. By the Roman Laws, age (4). a Slave could not enter into any Obligation, even with (2) See Mr. Hirtius's Parcemie Jur. German. I. !. C. 49, 50. The ſame Author in his Notes upon this place of our Text, ob- ſerves, that the Maxim takes place chiefly in Conditional Bargains, which by the Roman Law are contracted by a ſingle Agree- ment, but as to other Engagements, 'tis not always true. Whereupon he alledges an Example of a thing ſold to two Buyers, bue deliver'd to the laſt. But ſee what our Author further ſays, 1. 5. c. 5. 5. againſt Grotius, whoſe Principles Mr. Hirtius follows, tho' here he ſays nothing in defence of them. (3) Our Author obferves here, that according to the Roman Laws a Servant can't oblige himſelf to his Maſter, Sed Servus qui. dem non folum Domino ſuo obligari non poteſt, ſed ne quidem ulli alteri. Inſtitut. I. 3. cic. 20. De inutil. Stipulat. s 6. And the Rea- fon is, adds he, That the Maſter has a Right to all the Goods, and profitable Actions, or Labour and Service of his Slave, as he is fo. so that á Slave can'c oblige himſelf to his Maſter, but by the general Engagement he is under as his Slave. (4) Thus Cheats and Tricking is called in the Roman Law, which have not a proper Name; but chiefly that ſore which our Author is ſpeaking of, as when one engages for a thing that belongs to another, or one thing for another, eſpecially if the firſt be of more value chan the laſt. As for Exaniple, If one gives Copper gilt for Silver gilt. See Digeſt. I. 47. tit. 20. Stellionatus, And Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws, &c. Part 1. l. 1. tit. 18. Sect. 3. (a) Gramond. Hiſt. Gall. 1.5. He that is born under a Prince, doth originally engage his Faith and Allegiance to him; and whoſoever artem prs to draw them away, is a moſt unjuſt Invader of another's Rights ; nor will any ſuch Covenant hold good, being made contrary to the Laws and Conſtitution of the Kingdom. He chat gives his Promile againſt his Prince, is by the Ad releas'd from che Obligation. very CHAP. VIII. Of the Conditions of Promiſes. 1. How many ways is a Promiſe made? 1 Vi. An Impoſſible and unlawful Condition. II. What is a Condition? The Addition of Place. III. A Condition refers to the time preſent, or the VII. The Addition of Time. time to come. VIII. The difference between Bargains and Conditional IV. A Condition is either Caſual, Arbitrary or Mixt. Promiſes. Concerning Engagements by Promiſe, this is fara oblige our felves abſolutely to fuch or ſuch a Per- or fimply, and ſome under Condition (1). The Roman tion, till certain Clauſes or Proviſo's are made Lawyers add to this Diviſion, the Determination of good. the Time and Place of their Performance. Vid. In II. A Condition is an Appendage ( 1 ) added fit. B. 3. tit. 16. f. 2. & 5. Or that ſometimes we to ſuch Acts, as are productive of Rights and Obli- Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. 8. $ 1. (1) Our Author himſelf alſo ſpeaks of thele two Circumſtances a little farther. The words in the Inſtitutes are, Omnis ftipu- latio aut pure, aut in diem, aut fub conditione fit --- - Loca etiam inſeri ftipulationi folent. Purè veluti QUINQVE AVREOS DARE SPONDES ? Idque conteſtim peti poteſt. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 2. (1) Sub conditione ſtipulatio fit, cum in aliquem caſum” differtur obligatio, ut ſi aliquid fa&tum fuerit, vel non fuerit , committatur fipulatio, veluti, si TITIOS CONSUL FUERIT FACTUS, QUINQUE AUREOS DARE SPOŃDES? Inſtic , ut fupra, $ 4. We ought alſo to obſerve that there are Tacit Condicions included in an Agreement, which are not expreſſed. As if a perſon felling his Eftate makes a Reſerve of the Year's Profics, this Reſerve ſuppoſes a Condition that there ſhall be ſome Fruits on its Interdum pura ftipulatio ex reipſa dilationem capit, veluti fi id quod in utero fit, aut fructus futuros, aut domum edificari ſtipulatus fit. Digeft. 1. 45. tit. 1. de verbor. obligat, leg. 73. in princip. See what is ſaid above c. 6. 5 2. Further, Mr. Hirtius oh ſerves here, that we muſt diſtinguiſh Conditions properly ſo called, viz. what the Lawyers call a Modus, and what we call a Condition. For ex- ample, I have Land engaged, and I fell ic upon Condition of freeing of it at ſuch a time. the Buyer to have an Adtion againſt the seller to force him to free his Land at the time appointed, or let him into Poſſeſſion. Nam ſi id a&tum eſt, ut omni modo intra Kalendas Julias venditor fundum liberaret, exempta erit a&tio, ut liberet, nec ſub conditione imptio falta intelligetur, veluti ſi hoc modo emptor interrogaverit, Erit mihi fundus emptus, ita ut intra Kalendas Julias liberes? vel ita, intra Kalendás a Titio redimas. Si vero fub conditione emptio fa&ta eft, non poterit azi, ut conditio impleatur . Digeft. I. 18. tit. 1. De contrahend. empt. &c. leg. 41. init. So that ſuch a Claufe does not ſuſpend the Obligation, nor diſannul it, that it has no ef- the dy but only prevents the exaction of the Engagement till it takes place. This ſort of Agreement may be referred to the Laws Conterpreters upon the Digests, 1.35. tit. 1. De Conditionibus & Demonſtrat. &c. Hence it is that Mr. Hirtius calls the like Clauſe confidered in mutual Promiſes and Engagements, Causa finais, propter quam aliquid fit vel praſtatur, which implies, that it is hoc altogether juſt, fince in the Example that I have alledged after him, we may clearly ſee that there is no final Cauſe of mo. In this caſe the Roman Law allows tive, 86 Book III Of tbe Conditions of Promiſes. 66 gations, by Virtue of which their whole Force and muſt be made evident from the Authority of Credi- Efficacy is made to depend on ſome particular E- table Hiſtorians (2), that ſuch an Adventure was vent, proceeding either from Fortune, or from hu- actually perform’d. Again, if I promiſe in this man Pleaſure (2). So that to the true Nature of a manner, I will give ſo much Money, in cafe Condition, theſe two things are requiſite, firſt “ Mavius, who is Travelling abroad, be ſtill alive; that it have the Power of deferring and ſuſpending the other Perſon can then only require the Money, the Force of the Obligation, and ſecondly that the when I have receiv'd certain Aſſurance of Me Event expreſs’d in it do not as yet appear; at leaſt vius's Life. But if we take a cloſer View of theſe that it be at preſent uncertain, as to our Under- Matters, we ſhall find that the above-mention’d Pro- ſtanding. miſes, and the reſt of the ſame Nature, ought to be III. Hence we may conclude, That thoſe additio- interpreted in this Senſe, I will give you ſo much nal Clauſes are not properly Conditions, (though if you prove to me that Cæfar paſs’d the Rhine, or that they ſeem to be ſuch in a Grammatical Senſe) which Mavius the Traveller is now living; and thus they refer to the Time preſent or paſt. For Futurities on- become truly Conditionel ; but then the Condition is ly are dark and obſcure to Mortal Apprehenſions, not the Truth and Certainty of the preſent, or paſt but as for things which are now before us, or have Act conſider'd in themſelves, but the future Proof already gone over our Heads, we have uſually a of it to the promiſing Party. It is certain therefore, clear Knowledge of them; and therefore they can that if the Truth of the Matter inſerted, was known include no power capable of ſuſpending our Af on both ſides, and the Perſons were in earneſt, the fent. And therefore it is given as a Rule in Promiſe is not Conditional but Abfolute. Again, if the Inſtitutions (1), That Conditions which regard both knew the Matter to be Falſe, the Promiſe ſhall the time preſent, or the time paſt, as ſuppoſe paſs for a Jeſt, and conſequently produce no Obli- I ſhould ſay, I will give ſuch or ſuch a Thing, ligation. If a future thing be added which they if Titius has been Conſul , or if Mævius be ſtill alive; knew muſt infallibly come to jaſs, or ſuppoſe, if do either immediately cancel and annul the Obli- the Sun riſe to Morrom, 'tis generally agreed that gation, or elſe do not put it off at all, nor hinder ſuch a Clauſe ought not to be reckon'd a Condition ; it from being pure and abſolute. For if the things in as much as the future Event being already known annex’d for Conditions, are not as they are ſuppos'd to be moſt Certain and Neceſſary, does not delay to be, the Engagement is to no purpoſe; but if they the Obligation, nor hinder it from taking place are ſo, the Promiſe is valid as ſoon as it is made, this very Inſtant. Yet becauſe we ought not and begins abſolutely to oblige. Yet here it muſt be eaſily to preſuine that the Clauſe is addeł for 110 obſerv'd, That a Condition regarding the time pre- Reaſon, it is worth while to conſider, whether in ſent or paſt, may be added to an Obligation, in ſuch a Promiſe, the Particle if be not put for the caſe both or either of the Parties tranſacting, be un- other Particle when (3); ſo that the Engagement certain of the Thing. And Promiſes of this kind ſhall not be Conditional, but only made for a Day ſeem to imply a convenient Space of Delay. In as hence; as ſuppoſe thus, I will give ſuch or ſuch a much as nothing can be demanded by vertue of them, thing to Mórrow when the Sun riſeth. until it ſhall be made clearly apparent to the Pro And thus we find that every Condition properly miſer, that the Matter inſerted as a Condition, has ſo call’d, includes ſomewhat which is at preſent really happen’d; and the Proof of this muſt necef- uncertain, at leaſt to one of the Parties, between ſarily take up ſome time. For Inſtance, a Man un- whom the Buſineſs is tranſacted ; and the Obligation skilld in Hiſtory, may be drawn in to promiſe ano- remains in Suſpence (4), till the thing ſhall hereaf- ther Perſon Ten Pounds, if Cafar ever paſs’d the ter come to paſs, or ihall be demonſtrated by good Rhine. Now here before the Sum can be claim'd, it tive, but only a Stipulation, by which the Seller puts off the Delivery of the thing ſold, till he can redeem it, which he engages to do át a certain time. Theſe ſort of Promiſes may be referred to thoſe which are made for a certain Day, becauſe the time is al- ways prefixed, or which will come ſooner or later, though it be not appointed. Mr. Hirtius maintains with Reaſon, as ſome others do, that where there is a doubt, a Promiſe ought to be thought purely conditional rather than made on a ſure foot, (2) Our Author here includes fully the effect of Conditions, for they nor only ſuſpend the effect of an Engagement, but diſan- nul or change them where they are already. Mr. Daumat in his Civil Laws, &c. Part 1. I. 1. tit. 1. Sect. 4. 56. ſays well, That Conditions are of three forrs, according to the different Effects which they produce. The firſt is, ſuch as accompliſh the En- gagements that depend on them, as when 'tis ſaid the Sale ſhall take place if the Goods be delivered on ſuch a day. The fecond is, ſuch as diffolve a Bargain, as when 'ois faid, in cafe ſuch a perſon comes at ſuch a time, the Hire of the Houſe ſhall be void. The third is, ſuch as neither accompliſh por diffolve an Agreement, only making ſome change in it, as if one agree that in caſe an Houſe that is Lett be refigned to the Tenant withour certain Moveables which are promiſed him, the Hirer ihall have it to much the cheaper. Read the fore quoted Section of Mr. Daumat. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 3. (1) Conditiones que ad præſens aut præteritum tempus referuntur, aut ftatim infirmant obligationem, aut omnino non differunt, veluti, SI TITIUS CONSUL FUIT, vel, sí MÆVIUS VIVIT DARE SPONDES ? Nam fi ea ita non ſunt, nihil vilet ftipulatio, ſin autem ita fe habent, ſtatim valet, Inftit. 1. 3. tit 16. De verbor. obligat. $ 6. See Mr. Bynkerſhoek's Obſervat. Fur. Rom. I. 4. (2) I know not on what our Author grounds himſelf here, fince in the Moment which Men treat, the Fact, either preſent or future, on which the effect of a Promiſe depends, is poſitively true or falſe, the Obligation from that inſtant ſeems either abfo: lutely null or valid, and conſequently, no Condition properly To called can fufpend the Engagement. All that reſults from ſuch a Clauſe is, Thac the Promiſe can't be claimed till the truth of the Fact be proved; for as the Roman Lawyers ſpeak very well , que per rerum naturam ſunt certa, non mor ant ur obligationem, licet apud nos incerta ſint, Inſtitut. I. 3. tit. 16. De verbor. obligat. $ó. Theſe fort of Promiſes pats for Conditional only, when we treat about a matter of fact, of which there is no certainty whether it will be true or no. For then the Uncertainty produces the ſame Effect as if the Clauſe depended upon a future Accidenc. (3) The Latin Conjunction, Si, which can't be expreſſed in our Language, is elegant in the Latin. 14) Quia quæcung fub conditione traduntur, ita demum fieri poſſunt propria peculiaria, ſi conditio conſummat a est. Quintilian Doors clam. 336. Mr. Hirtius, who quotes this Patíage, obferves at the fame time, that the diſtinction made by the Roman Law about this Matter agrees not with the Natural Law. The Lawyers ſay that there is a difference between Engagements upon Condition, and fuch as depend on a Promife at a certain time. In the firſt nothing is due before the thing ſuppoſed exiſts , whereas in the other there is a due from the Moment the Promiſe is made, tho’ the perſon can't demand any thing till the time is come Cedere diem fignis c. 15. ficat CHAP. VIII. Of the Conditions of Promiſes. 87 Evidence, to have already happen'd. When the and Efficacy of the Promiſe lies in ſuſpence ; for it Condition appears true, the Obligation begins to have muſt then be ſuppoſed to have been made conditionally, a pure and abſolute Force; if the Condition fail, the That is, in caſe the Promiſer, ſhould bave it in his Obligation expires with it. Power. Now this Rule we allow to hold good, pro- IV. Conditions are commonly divided into Poli- vided that the other Party knew the thing not to ble and Impoffible. The former are ſuch as make an be at preſent in the power of the Proiniſer. For o- Obligation depend on ſome Event, which may. Na- therwiſe it looks like Knavery, when a Man expects turally or Morally happen. And are again ſubdivid- an abſolute Promiſe, which ſhall begin to bind im- ed into Caſual, Arbitrary and Mixt (1). A Ca- mediately, to put him off with a Conditional one, Jual Condition is ſuch as depends, either on the plea- which cannot take place till hereafter. He adds, if fure of a third Perſon, not obnoxious to our Power the Condition whereby the thing promiſed, may be brought and Authority, or elſe on ineer Chance and Fortune into our Power, be’ it felf in our Power (1), we are in reſpect of us, as ſuppoſe in ſuch a Promiſe as obliged to do whatever is Morally fit and jull , for the this, I will give you Ten Pounds if Caius marries Ti- Performance of it. That is, if I promiſe you any tia; or if it don't rain within theſe three Days, &c. thing, which at preſent it is impoflible to me, but an Arbitrary Condition is ſuch as depends as to its may bị my Pains and Care be hereafter rendred being or not being on the Will and Power of him, poſſible , I am bound to uſe all my endeavours , that to whom a Promiſe is made under that Limitati- I may become able to diſcharge my Engagement (4). on (2). But ſhould a Condition be annexed, de- For Inſtance, a young Student in the Law, promi- pending on the Pleaſure of the Promiſer (3), the ſes a Man to plead all his Cauſes in the Court, if Engagement would be inſignificant ; as if one he arrive at any good skill in his Profeſſion. Here ſhould fay, I will give you Ten Pounds if I think fit. according to Grotius's Rule, the Student is under For the Senſe of ſuch a Speech amounts to no more an Obligation to ply his Buſineſs with his utmoſt than this: I make you an abſolute Promiſe that at Strength and Diligence, that he may make himſelf preſent, and hereafter too, it ſhall be at my Chaice, fit for the Bar. But this will not hold, unleſs the to promiſe abſolutely or not. And therefore the o- Perſon promiſing, has exprefly declared or given fair ther Party can hence require no Right, unleſs the Preſumption, that he will ſet himſelf in earneſt to Offer be afterwards improved to a full and perfect the acquiring ſtrength for the Performance. Other- Engagement; ſince the Condition here inention’d wiſe the Condition may be delay'd in infinitum. We may be perpetually ſtopt, or eluded by the Promi- may obſerve too, That Grotius here uſeth the Term, fer. So that we may reaſonably fay, That what is Conditio Poteſtativa, quite contrary to that Senſe, in perfe&tly in our Power, ought not to be confounded with, which we have above defined it; he makes it to be in or thrown among/t, matters of Chance and Accident. the power of the Promiſer, we in the power of him If the Condition be indeed in the power of the Pro- to whom the Promiſe is directed. miſer, and yet ſuch as he is not able or is not willing Laſtly, A Mixt Condition is that, the fulfilling always to elude, it muſt be enforced by ſuppoſing of which depends partly on the Power of him, who a particular Time, beyond which it cannot be de- receives the Promiſe, and partly on Chance; ferr'd; as if I ſay, I will give you ſuch a Summ of Mo- thus for Inſtance, I will give you a Sum of Mo- ney if I Marry, That is, when I Marry. ney, if you marry ſuch a Gentlewoman. Now, this From what has been hitherto offer’d, we may be is not purely at your Pleaſure; for the Gentle- able to explain more accurately, the Aſſertions of woman may refuſe your Suit, or may die before the Grotius (a) upon the ſame Head. He ſays, That if Match is finiſh’d. the thing promiſed, be not at preſent in the Power of We have only this to add, That a Condition is the Promiſer, but may be hereafter, then the Strength then look'd upon as perform’d, when the other Par- as ficat, incipere deberi pecuniam. Venire diem ſignificat, eum diem veniffe, quo pecunia peti poſſit. Vbi pure quis ftipulatus fuerit, do ceffit, & venit dies ; ubi in diem ceſit dies, ſed nondum venit, ubi fub conditione, neque ceßit, neq; venit dies, pendente adhuc conditi. one, Digeft. 1. 50. tit. 16. De verbor. fignif. leg. 213. Hence they infer, that what Men pay through Miſtake, before the Condi- tion is fulfilled, may be recovered, as if it were not due; and 'tis not ſo in Payments made before the time. In diem Debitor; adeo Debitor est, ut ante diem (olutum repetere non pofīt ſub conditione debitum, per errorem folutum, pendente quidem conditi- one repetitur, conditione autem exiſtente, repeti non poteft, 1. 12. tit. 6. De Conditione indeb. leg. 10. 16. See Laws 17, 18. But Mr. Hirtius thinks, that if we judge by the light of Reaſon only, we may require our Due as well in the laſt as firſt Caſe. For (ſays he) in both, according to the Roman Law, neither of the Parties can recant without the Conſent of the other, before the exiſtence of the ſuppoſed Fact, or the Term agreed on. In both the Obligation deſcends upon the Heirs, in both Caſes there can be no Action at Law. All the difference then that can be is this, That the Condition may fail ſometimes, whereas the Term, either fixed or uncertain, will come certainly. Hence Mr. Hirtius concludes, contrary to the Opinion of many Doctors, that when we promiſe a thing which is not in Nature, and which can't take place, but on the account of a future Engagemene regulated by the Laws, the Promiſe is really Conditional, tho' there be a time fixed; as if a Man promiſes any one the Fruits of a Year, and to give ſuch a Porcion with his Daughter. For it ſuppoſes that there will be Fruit, and that the Marriage will be compleated. Vid. Digeſt. I. 23. tit. 3. De Jure Dotium, leg. 21.& 1. 45. tit. 1. De Verb. Obligat. leg. 63. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 4. (1) We find this Diviſion in the Code, 1.6. cit. 51. De Caducis tollend. S 7. Sin autem aliquid ſub coditione relinquatur, vel cda Suali, vel poteſtativa, vel mixta, quarum eventus ex fortuna, vel ex honor at & perſone voluntate, vel ex utroq; pendeat, &c. (2) Theſe ſort of Conditions, as our Author obſerves here, are alſo called promiſcuous in the Digeſts, 1.35. tit. 1. De CoR. ditionibus do Demonſtrat. &c. leg. II. S 1. (3) Stipulatio non valet in rei promittendi arbitrium collata conditione, Digeſt. 1. 45. tit. 1. De Verbor. Obligat. leg. 17. Illam autem ftipulationem, SIVOLIERIS DARI? inutilem effe conftat, Ibid. leg. 46. & 3. See alſo, the 108 Law, s 1. &1. 18. tit. 1. De contrahenda Emptione, &c. leg. 7. princip. & 1. 44. tit. 7. De Obligat. do A&tion. leg. 8. (4) Probably (ſays Mr. Thomaſius in his Inſtit:* Juriſpr. Divin. 1. 2. c. 7. $ 112.) Grotius had ſome Example in his Mind, as this, I'll marry you if I commence Dostor. From whence Mr. Thomaſius infers, that as he had not a ſtock of Learning great enough to commence Doctor in an Univerſity, a young Man who promiſes Marriage on chat Condition may eaſily diſengage himſelf. (a) Lib. 2.C.11. 1. 8.n. 2. (6) si conditio fit poteftativas ty 88 of the Conditions of Promiſes. Book III. other Party accept of this vile Condition (3), and a- ty concern'd, does himſelf hinder it from being the ſame, as if it were Naturally fo. Should the perform'd (5). V. Impoſſible Conditions (1), are either Naturally ctually fulfil it , how far he may then clain the Per- or Morally" fo; That is, foine inatters by the Nature formance of the Pronife (4), is eaſily to be gather'd of things cannot be done, others by the Laws ought from the preceding Chapter, 9.8. rlot to be done. Such Conditions annex'd (2), elpe In Commonwealths, Proviſion may be made by cially if both Parties knew them to be ſuch, do ac- Civil Ordinances, that in a Promiſe utter'd under cording to the plain and ſimple Conſtruction of the a Condition Naturally impoſſible, eſpecially if the Words, render the Promiſe Negative, and therefore Party to whom it is directed, kuows not that it is Null. In Buſineſs tranſacted between thoſe who Impoſſible, the Condition ſhall be Null, and the live in a State of Natural Liberty, a Condition na- Man reſcued from the Cheat and Deluſion. As for turally impoſible, does plainly thew that the whole thoſe Pacts and Promiſes, to which vicious Condi- thing is void. Only with this difference, that to tions are annex'd (5), the Laws of all Countries moſt deny fome Requeſts, in ſuch a round about way, wiſely declare them void ; leaſt the Contracts of by making the Anſwer run Affirmatively, but private Men Should tend to the Subverſion of the clogg’d , with an impoſſible Condition, is uſually Publick Eſtabliſhment. And thus the Roman Laws , reckond an Affront, when a plain Denial might diſannulld all Impoſſible, Vile or Jefting Conditi not have been taken ill (a). And as to this point, ons inſerted in Wills (6); becauſe it was thought if the Condition be Morally impoſſible, the Caſe is moſt abſurdly unreaſonable, that Men in a Buſineſs (5) The Author ſays here, the other Contracter. (Si per alterum ftet, quo minus conditio impleatur.) But the Law to which he refers us ſhews thae 'ris badly expreſied chro. Inadvertence. This is the Fact. A Man buys a Library upon Cordicion char the Magiſtrates ſhall allow him a place to ſet it in; but he is the Cauſe himſelf why they deny him a place. Hereupon the Law- yers determine that the Seller may force him to take away the Books, and pay the Price agreed on, becauſe the Buyer prevented the Performance of the Condition. Labeo (cribit, Si mihi Bibliothecam ita vendideris, ſi Decuriones Campani locum mihi vendidiſſent ; in quo eam ponerem, & per me ftet, quo minus id à Campanis impetrem, non eſſe dubitandum, quin prafcriptis verbis agi poffit. Ego eti am ex vend to agi poſje puto, quaſi impleta conditione, quum per emptorem ftat, quo minus impleatur, Digeſt. 1. 18. tit. 1. De contra- hend. Emptione, dico leg. 50. Further, it is certain, and it is a Maxim of the Roman Law, That if either of the tivo Contracters , hinder the Accompliſhment of a Condition which 'tis their Intereſt not to be fulfilled, whether the thing depend upon his own Fact or not, the Condition is accounted as fulfilled in reſpect to him, and the other has a full Right to require the performance of his Promiſe. The Lawyers extend this to the Promiſe of Enfranchiſement, and to a Legacy by which a perſon is made an Heir upon certain Conditions ; iníomuch that when the Slave, Legatee or Heir ſo made have performed what is expected on their part, they have gained their Liberty, Legacy and Inheritance. In Jure civili receptum est, quoties per eum cujus intereſt conditio- nem non impleri fiat, quo minus impleatur perinde haberi, ac fi conditio impleta fuiffet, quod ad Libertatem, do Legata, & ad Hæredum inſtituciones perducitur, quibus exemplis ftipulationes quoque committuntur, cum per promiſorem fa&tum effet, quo minus ftipulator condia tioni pararet, Digeſt 1. 50. tit. 17. De Divers, Regul. Jur. leg. 161. See alſo leg. 39. 174. of the ſame Title, and I. 35.cit. 1. De Condit, do Dem. leg. 24. where we muſt read with Hotman, Obſerv. 4. 28. Cujus intereſt conditionem NON impleri. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 5. (1) Impoſſible Condicions are not, properly ſpeaking, true Conditions. For they neither ſuſpend an Engagement, nor diſ- annul and change an Agreement which is already valid. For they either cauſe the Promiſe to be abſolved from the beginning, or cancel the Engagement forthwith, or hinder it coming to an iffue. Before we defined a Condition, we have diſtinguiſhed the different Significations. Titius Obſervat. 237. Further, the Clauſe which contains an Impoſſible Condicion, is either Affira mative or Negacive. Our Author ſpeaks only of the firſt fort. As for the other, 'tis evident that ic abſolves from an Engage. ment, as if we promiſe a thing to any one on Condition that he will catch the Moon in his Teeth, or commit Parricide. See the ſame Mr. Titius Obſerv. 239. We may alſo find ſeveral things about Conditions in General in Mr. Thomaſius's Diſcourle, De Filio ſub conditione, ſi filium probaverit hærede inſtituto, and principally Chap. 2. It is the Ioth in thoſe printed at Leipfick. (2) Sub Impoffibili Conditione fa&tam ftipulationem conſtat inutilem eſſe, Digeſt. I. 44 cic. 7. De Obligat. c AEtion. leg. I $ 11, Non folum ſtipulationes fed etiam cæteri quoq contr 1&tus, veluti emptiones, locationes--quia mea re, quæ ex duorum pluriumve conſenſue agitur, omnium volunt as spe&tetur, quorum proculdubio in hujuſmodi a&tu, talis cogitatio eſt, ut nihil agi exiftiment appoſita ea conditio- ne, quam ſciunt es: impoffibilem, Ibid. leg. 31. See alſo the Inſtitutes, 1. 3 tit. 20 De inutil. Stipul. S. 11. (3) Generaliter novimus turpes ſtipulationes nullius esſe momenti, veluti ſi quis homicidium vel ſacrilegium ſe fa&turum promittat, Digeſt 1.45 tit. i De Verbor. Obligat. leg. 26, 27. Item quod Leges fieri prohibent-veluti ſororem ſuam nupturam fibi aliquis fti- puletur, Ibid. leg. 35 S 1. The ſame Lawyers ſay, with Reaſon, that it hach place, when likewiſe the thing is afterward allow ed by the Laws, becaufe we muſt judge of a Promiſe according to the time it was made in. Nullius momenti fore ftipulationem, perinde, ac fi ea conditio que natura impoſibilis eſt, incerta efet, nec ad rem pertinet, quod jus mutari poteft, & id quod nunc impoffi . bile est, poſtea poſibile fieri, non enim ſecundum futuri temporis jus, ſed ſecundum præſentis debet æftimari ftipulatio, Ibid. leg. 13756 . (4) 'Tis plain, nor. For every Promiſe made on ſuch a Condition is null in it ſelf, inſomuch that none hach Right to require the Accompliſhment. 'Tis another Queſtion, whether we may require a thing actually given by virtue of a Promiſe made on ſuch a Condicion already executed ? See what is ſaid Note 2 upon s 6 of the foregoing Chaprer. (s) See the Texts quored in Nore 3, and Digeſt. 1. 7. tit. 8. De uſu do hibitat leg. 8 S 1, (6) That is to ſay, the Legacies which the Teſtator makes to depend upon ſuch a Condition, were not allowed to be effectual . Sub impoſibili Conditione, vel alio modo fa&tam inſtitutionem fa&tam non placet vitiari,Digeft . I. 28 tit . 7 De Conditionibus, Inftit. leg. I. Conditiones contra Edi&ta Imperatorum, aut contra Leges, vel que Legis vicem obtinent ſcripts, vel contra bonos mores, vél deriſorie aut hujuſmodi, quas Prætores improbaverunt, pro non ſcriptis habentur, at perinde ac ſi conditio Hereditati , five Legato adje&ta non effet, ca- pitur Hereditas Legat umve, Ibid. leg. 14 See Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Nacural Order, Part 2 1.3 rc. Sect. 8 $ 18, &c. Tis eaſie to diſcern the difference as to Validity, which the Laws make here berween Promiſes and Agreements made between Men when they are alive under an Impoſſible Condition, or Diſhoneſt, and the Diſpoſals of a Teſlator attended with the like Condition. In the firſt che condition is inipoſed by the Conſent of both parties, who knowing it, ſaw the Impoſſibility or Tur- pitude of it. They ought to be ſuppoſed to treat in ſport, ſo that if either of them make any account of ir, 'ris ſo much the worſe for him, becaule he knows how things were managed, and could have no reaſon to look upon it as a ſerious Action. See leg. 31. of the D geſts, De Obligat. do Action, quoted Note 2 a foregoing. But 'tis not ſo in Wills. The Legatee has no knowledge of the Teftator's Deviſes, and lo is 10 far from looking upon his Declaracion as a Trifle, that he believes he acted ſeriouſly in his laſt Moments, although the Condition ſeemed to infinuate the contrary, (a) When Miltiades in Corn. Nep. c. 1, 2. ſummond the Lemnians to yield up their Iſland to the Athenian Power, they anſwer'd in a ſcoffing manner, that they'd then ſurrender, when the North-wind, which was directly contrary to Athens, brought him from home to Lemnos. The General took no more notice, but failing by them, pofſefled himſelf of Cherſonelus, and there fix'd his Seat and Command; and ſoon after return'd to Leranos, whither now the North-wind directly carried him, and claim'd their Promiſe ; his Home, as he ſaid, nor being now Athens, bur Cherſoneſus. The Inhabitants nor daring to make Reſiſtance, fairly quitted the Iſland; but it was, non di&to, led ſecunda fortuna adverſariorum capta, nor won by the force of their Word and En. gagement, but by the good Fortune of their Enemy. Such was the Promiſe of Lefdeguier made to Mapheo Barberini about pro- fefſing the Romiſh Religion, which we find Gramond. Hift. Gal. l. 16 p. 708. fo Chap. IX. 89 Of the Miniſters or Agents, &c. fo very ſerious and grave, ſhould be put upon with from his Obligation. But as little Indulgence as trifling and impertinent Clauſes (a). pollible ſhould be granted to this Exception; as VI. It in Promiſes , mention be made of a certain well left Men ſhould abuſe it by applying it to the place, without mention of a certain time, it is taken Principal Articles, as becauſe it is not to be pre- for granted, that ſo much time ſhall be allow'd fum'd, that perſons would clog a ſerious Covenant for performing the Promiſe, as will ſerve to bring with Clauſes impertinent and unneceſſary. Gra- a Manconveniently into the place of Action (1). mond. Hift. Gal. 1. 16. obſerves of the ſecret Arti- VII. But in caſe a limited Time be expreſly ad- cles of Marriage between Charles the Firſt, when ded, this will cauſe that the Obligation ſhall not Prince of Wales , and Henrietta of Bourbon, that exert its Effect till ſuch a Space be expir’d, or that they were added by the moſt Chriſtian King in no Demand ihall be made before the appointed Complement to the Court of Rome; neither Party Day (1). imagining that they were intended to be kept. VIII. It may be convenient in the laſt place to Promiles under a Poteſtative or Arbitrary Condi- examine in what Points theſe Conditional Promiſes dif- tion, do in this agree with Pacts, that in both a fer from Pacts, and in what Points they may be re- Man muſt perform ſomewhat on his ſide, before he ſembled to them. In this then both thoſe kinds of claim the Promiſe or Bargain of the other Party. engagements ſeem to agree, that as the former do But in this they differ, that in the former the per- not bind, unleſs the Condition be made good, fo ſon promiſing does not think it much his Intereſt the latter, when one Party forbears to perform the whether the thing be perform'd or no ; at leaſt he Articles, do by no means oblige the other (1). And does not intend to oblige the other Party to a hence it is a common Remark, that the particular Coinpliance, but leaves him to uſe his own Plea- Heads of a Contract are in the manner of ſo many ſure. But in Pafts, as the Reaſon why I have un- Conditions. Some indeed make one Exception to dertaken any Performance, is the proſpect of fome- our Rule about Fasts; That in caſe any Article what to be done for me by the other perſon; ſo ſhould be added, not for Uſe, but perhaps out of if he fail in his part, I am not only releas'd at pre- Gallantry or Complement, the Non-performance of fent from mine, but I may oblige him by force to ſuch a Matter ihall not releaſe the other Party ſtand to the Agreement. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 6. (!) Loca etiam inſeri ſtipulationem ſolent, veluti CARTHAGINI DARE SPONDĒS?. Qua ftipulatio licet pure fieri videtur, tamen Teipſa babet tempus adje&tum, quo promiſſor utatur ad pecuniam Carthagini dandam, Inſtit. 1. 3 cit. 16 De Verbor. Obligat. S s. See Digeft. I. 45 tit. 1 leg. 73 in princip. & leg. 137 S 2. As alſo Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws, &c. Parc i l. tic. I Sect. 3 $ 6. And Digeſt. Tit. De eo quod certo loco dari oportet, 1. 13 tit. 4. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 7. (1) Id autem quod in diem ſtipulamur, ſtatim quidem debetur, fed peti prius quam dies venerit, non poteſt, Inftit. 1. 3 tit. 16 $ 2. See Mr. Daumat in the place above cited, $ 7. Farther, it is certain that whenever there is no time fixed for the performing, of the thing engaged, the Promiſe is forthwith to be executed, and will admit of no other delay than the Nature of the thing requires. Quotiens autem in obligationibus dies non ponitur, præſenti die pecunia debetur, niſi locus adje&us Spatium temporis inducat quo illo poßit pervenire, Digeft. 1. 45 cit. 1 De Obligat. do Adion. leg. 41 $1. See alſo Lib. so tit. 17 De Diverſ. Reg Jur. leg. 14. And Seneca's Excerpt. Controv. 3, 5. fub fin. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 8. (1) See what is laid Lib. 5 C.11$ 9. (a) Thus Eumolpus’s Will runs in Petronius, “Let all thoſe to whom I have given Legacies, beſides my Children, receive " them upon theſe Terms and Condicions, That they cut my Body in pieces, and eat ic amongſt them before the People. Of the ſame kind is Tireſias's merry Scory in Horace, 1. 2.f. 5, 84, doc. Me Sene, quod dicam, fa&tum eſt. Anus improba Thebis, Scilicet elabi ſi posjet mortua : Credo Ex Teſtamento fic eft elata : Cadaver Quod nimium inſtiterat viventi... Vn&tum oleo largo nudis humeris tulit Heres : Which place the Scholiaft thus interprers, « The old Gentlewoman order'd by will, that her officious Heir ſhould carry her Bo- 5 dy naked, well oil'd, upon his Shoulders to the Grave, with this pleaſant Thought, that ſhe might at leaſt flip from him now " Mhe was dead, though he had ſtuck ſo cloſe to her during her Life, that ſhe could never before eſcape his Importunity. See more on this point in the Civilians, in Lib. 7. tit. 8. D. de uſu do habit. CHA P. IX. Of the Miniſters or Agents concernd in contracting Obligations for other Men. 1. II. We may Promiſe and Bargain for another. | V. How far another may accept a Promiſe for us, How many ſorts of Commiſſions there are? VI. Heirs can't accept a Promiſe for a perſon dead. III . How if a Deputy die before he has finiſhed? VII. Of a Burden annexed to a Promiſe. IV. The difference Letween a Deputy and Mediator. VIII. The General Diviſion of Paets or Bargains. IT is very uſual for us to confirm and ratifie Paets fineſs to explain. This then is certain, that a Man and Promiſes , not immediately by our felves , is oblig’d, not only when he makes known his Con- be obſerv'd in ſuch Proceedings , it is now our Bu- is directed, iminediately from his own Mouth, but alſo M 90 Book III Of the Miniſters or Agents alſo when he ſignifies the ſame to another Man, Matters be inſerted in them, as are diſagreeable to whom he has impower'd to tranſact on his behalf. the Nature of the Affair given in Charge, and luck The Agent in ſuch an Affair is to be look'd on as as we cannot be preſumed to have conſented to (3) a kind of Inſtrumental Cauſe; in as much as he not We have a famous inſtance of ſuch a Cheat in only does all by another's Authority (1), but like- Blanks recorded by Zonaras, Tom. 3. and by Gly. wife acquires no proper Right, brings 10 Obliga- cas, Tom. 4. in Roman. Lacaper. circa princip. The tion on himſelf, referring to the perſon with whom Patriarch Tripho being accus’d of extream Ignorance , he is appointed to treat; but obtains a Right only and as one that was not ſo much as capable of for the perſon who has employ'd him, and to him Writing, to confute the Cenſure, wrote down his indeed he ſtands under an Obligation to manage Name in a fair Paper, before the Judges appointed . his Concerns with Honeſty and Faithfulneſs. For This Paper Theopbanes of Caſarea fiild up with a for- thoſe Actions of another do produce an Obligation mal Reſignation, and ſo brought it to the Emperor ; or a Right in us, and are conſequently to be eſteemd who, as the Plot had been laid, took hence an occaſion ours, for the performing of which we have inveſted to eject the Patriarch. A Latin Poet, as our Au- the other perſon with full power, and have openly thor obſerveş , ſharply reproves the Pope, who by profeſs’d that we will acknowledge them for our ſigning Blank Papers, hath been the Cauſe of a own. But before a third Man can treat to any ef- thouſand Forgeries. fect or purpoſe with ſuch a perſon, 'tis neceſſary he be well aſſur'd that we have choſen and conftitu An pulchrum fatis eft, & fummo Præfule dignitat ted him the Interpreter of our Will, and that we Impreſſas Jigno vacuas emittere chartas, will account whatever he acts as perform’d by our Quas poffit Lator variis inſcrivere nugis, ſelves. On this Foundation depend moſt of the Cum volet & miſeris falfas afingere culpas, abr Rules of the Roman Law concerning Deputations Gunthen. Ligurin. v. 656, againſt the (2) Maſters of Ships for the Facts of their Deputies againſt (3) Merchants, for the Tranſ If I depute a Man with limited Orders, he can- actions of their Factors, and againſt the (4) Maſter not lay an Obligation on me beyond the Bounds of of a Family for the Deed of his Slave, or his Son. his Inſtructions. II. Now we are wont to depute another to Co If any Aſſent be ſent with a double Commiſſion, venant in our Name, either by a general Commif- one Open, to ſhew the perſon with whom he is to fion (1), impowering him to do whatever he thinks tranſact, the other Secret, preſcribing what Steps moſt convenient for our Affairs; or by an expreſs he ſhall take, and how far he ſhall proceed; it and limited Form, preſcribing him both the Sub- may be made a Queſtion, Whether the Agent ſhall ject and the Manner of his proceeding. In the for- oblige his Principal , if he exceed his private and iner Caſe I ſtand oblig'd by whatſoever he has con- fecret Orders, yet ſo as to keep within his open cluded about the bulineſs in hand, Honeſtly, or Commiſion, where the Affirmative ſide ought to be Bona fide. It is neceſſary to add this Reſtriction ; maintain’d (a). For by my open Inftructions I bind for he cannot bind me by what he does treache- my ſelf to the third perſon, with whom the Con- rouſly and with a knaviſh deſign of circumventing tract is made, that I will ratify and make good and abuſing me, in as much as when I conferr'd what my Agent ſhall conclude on. And by my ſuch Authority upon hiin, I muſt be thought to ſecret Orders I bind my Agent not to recede from have fuppos’d his Integrity as an eſſential Condi, ſuch poſitive Terins; in which point if he tranſ- tion. Nay, the acting bona fide, or uprightly and greſs, he ſtands accountable to me for ſo much as I faithfully implies this farther, that what the Suh- loſe by his Miſmanagement. But I am ſtill tied to ſtitute performs, ſhall not derogate from the Honour perform to the third perſon, what was thus granted and Advantage of his Principal ; at leaſt ſo far as in iny Name. For otherwiſe there could be no the preſent poſture of things will bear, For to be manner of Safety in treating by Commiſſioners, it ignorant of theſe Points, is almoſt as groſs a Fault, being ever to be fear’d left their ſecret Direčtions as open Diſhoneſty (2). The ſame muſt be ſaid of ſhould differ from their open Powers; neither could thofe Blank Papers with our Names ſubſcrib’d at there be a more ſpecious pretence made uſe of to the bottom, which we often deliver to our Agents overthrow all Affairs tranfacted by Mediation, and to be fill d'up and turn’d into Inſtruments of Ob- to deceive and abuſe Men with vain Treaties (6). ligation. Theſe ſhall not bind us at all, if any ſuch But it muſt be obſerv’d, we ſuppoſe here, as in the Sect. 2, 3. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. IX. § 1. (1) Urus autem procuratoris per quam necesſarius est, ut qui rebus ſuis ipſi ſuporeje, vel nolunt, vel non poffunt, per alios posſint, vel agere, vel convenire, Digeſt . Lib. 3 tit. 3 De Procuratoribus, leg. 1 $2. Poteſt quis per alium, quod poteft" facere per ſeipsum, Decre; tal. Lib. 6. De Regul. Jur. c. 68. Qui facit per alium, eft perinde ac fi faciat per ſeipſum, Ibid. c. 72. (2) It is called Attic Exercitatoria, which is created of Digeſt. Lib. 14 cit. . 3) AElio Inſtitutoria, lee Digeſt. Lib, 14 tit. 3. Code, Lib. 4 cit. 25. And Mc Daumat’s Civil Laws, doc. Part 1 Lib. I tit. 16 (4) See Inſtit. Lib. 4 tit. 7. Quod cum eo qui in aliena poteſtate eſt, negotium geſtum eſſe dicitur, and Digest. Lib. 15 tit. 4. Quod juſu. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 2. (1) Procurator autem vel omnium rerum, vel unius rei eſſe non poteft, Lib. 3 tit. 3. De Procuratoribus, $ 1. 2) A Procuratore dolum, & omnem culpam, non etiam improvi[um caſum præftandum elle Juris auétoritate manifeſte declaratur , Code, Lib. 4 tit. 35 leg. 13. See alſo leg. 21. and upon this whole Matter, Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws, doc. Lib. I tit. 16 Sect. 1, de. (3) In fine, 'tis certain that a Man is bound by his own Hand, althohe to whom the Blank is committed fills it up other- wile than he intended, provided there be no talle Dealing between the third perſon and him. This appears by the Example which Mr. Hirtius brings of a Man of Buſineſs, who being employed by his Maſter to borrow a thouſand Crowns, took up two his blank Bond; for here was no faule in the Lender, but in him only who imprudently incrufted his Deputy. (a) See Grot. I. 2 c. 5.12. (6) Vid. Memoires touchant les Ambaſſadeurs, p. 582, 583, 588. thouſand upon former Chap. IX. concern’d in contracting Obligations, &c. 90 former Caſe, that the Agent when he thus tranf: Party, my Revocation ſhall ſtand good, although greſſes the Bounds of his private Inſtructions, did the Meſſenger being unacquainted with it, ſhould it not out of a diſhoneſt and treacherous deſign (4). go on in fignifying my firſt Reſolution. But if a III. If we make uſe of a Deputy in tranſinitting Man acts for another in the latter way of Deputa- a Promife to another Man, and the perſon employ'd tion, unleſs the Change of Mind be notified to him, happen to die before he have declar'd our Propoſal it ſhall be void, and his Principal ſhall ſtand oblig’d, to the other, or obtain'd his Affent, it is plain his if he proceed to ſettle the Buſineſs (1), as he was Promiſe may be revok'd (1). For my expreſs Will at firſt coinmiſſion’d. For the Principal when he in this caſe was to contract an Obligation by the choſe to offer his Promiſe by ſuch an Agent, lodg’d Words of this perſon only whom I intruſted with the obliging Power in his Perſon, and not in his Poc- the Affair. And therefore although he may have ket; that is, he intended him not barely for the declar'd his Meſſage to a third Man, whence it may Meſſenger of his purpoſe, but for one that ſhould come to the Ears of the Party to whom it was dire- employ his own Judgment as well as his Bodily Eted, yet this way of communicating the Matter Service in the Affair (2). The fame Diſtinction can lay no Tie upon my Conſcience. For it was the Civilians apply to the Queſtion, Whether a neither my deſign in the leaſt to render my ſelf Grant ſhould hold good, in caſe the Donor die be- oblig’d by the means of this third perſon, nor is he fore it be accepted. Which they affirm, If the per- fo fully acquainted with my Will, as to give ano- fon deputed to carry the Grant were of the former ther any good aſſurance of it. But the Caſe is o- kind, becauſe then nothing would be wanting on therwiſe as to a Bearer whom I intruſt only with the Donor's part. But they deny it, if the Agent's Letters of mine, expreſſing my Pleaſure to a per- was of the latter fort ; becauſe the Donor did not ſon at a diſtance. Though the Bearer die before fully make the Grant, but only order'd it to be he reach the perſon, and the Letters are deliver'd made; or had not yet actually offer'd the thing, by another, yet this is no hindrance to the contra- but only given Commands for its being offer d. cting of a firm Obligation. For here the Letters, Yet ſee Ziegler on Grotius, Lib. 2.C. Ji. f. 17. where and not the Bearer, are the inſtrumental Cauſe of he delivers it as his Judgment, that the Donation the Engagernent; and it ſignifies nothing to either inay be accepted, in caſe the perſon deputed made of the Parties concern’d, by what hands the Deeds offer of it during the Donor's Life. But one would were convey'd and preſented. wonder how the other Party ſhould make any ſtop IV. On inany other Accounts there is great dif or delay at Acceptance, if the Donation be ſup- ference, whether a Man act by my Deputation pos’d to have been thus communicated, Grotius purely as a Meſſenger, and a Bearer of my Opini- fays, that the ſame Rule is to be follow'd in deci- on and Pleafure, or as an Agent and Mediator, ding the Controverſie, Whether a perſon thus acting with a liberty of interpoſing his own Judgment in by a Commiſſion, can bring an Action againſt the fome Points of the Buſineſs. Which Grotius in l. 2. Heir of the Principal or Donor, for Recovery of the c. 11. f. 17. thus expreſſeth in other words, Whe- Charges he hath been at ſince the Donor's Death, ther the perſon be pitch'd on to ſignifie the Promiſe I in executing his Orders (3). In which Caſe the make, or whether be be authorizd to make the Pro- Author of the Books to Herennius, 1. 2. c. 13. in- miſe himſelf. In the former Caſe, if I revoke my forms us, that two Roman Judges gave a quite con- Promiſe before it hath been accepted by the other trary Sentence. (4) That is to ſay, There was no Tricking between him and the third Party, otherwiſe he is to make good the Damages of him whoſe Buſineſs he manages ; but the Engagement it ſelf it nor leſs valid in reſpect to the other Contracter dy virtue of his Orders, which are the Foundation of the Treaty, as I ſpake in the firſt Edition of this work. Nevertheleſs I have obſerved that Mr. Hirtius maintains the ſame thing, and ſends us to his Diſcourſe, De Obligatione mandantis; do mandatarii contemplatu tertii, $ 2. which is in Tom. 3. of his ſmall Tracts and Comments printed in 1700. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTE on $ 3. (1) Si adhuc integro mandato mors alterutrius intervenit, i. e. vel ejus qui mandaverit, vel illius qui mandatum ſuſceperit, folvitur mandatum, Inftit. Lib. 3 cit. 27 $ 10. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on . 4. (1) The Lawyers apply this Law here, Si mandaſem tibi ut fundum emeres, poſtea ſcripiilem ne emeres, tu antequam ſcires me ves tuiſſe , emiſſes, mandati tibi obligatus ero, ut damno afficiaturis qui ſuſcepit mandatum, Digeft. Lib. 17 tic . 1. Mandati vel contra leg. 15: See alſo Lib. , tit. 18 De Officio Præſidis, leg. 17. Clementin. Lib. I tic 4. Chap. De Renunciatione, and Costalius on Digeſt. Lib 3 cit. 3. De Procurat. do Defenſoribus, leg. 65. (2) Mr. Thomaſius in his Jurisprud. Divin. Lib. 2 c. 7 $ 118. ſays, That we muſt diſtinguiſh ſeveral Caſes here, and examine chiefly whether the Revocation of an Engagement be addreſſed to the Meſſenger, or to him to whom we are engaged by his Means? And further, whether the Revocation be ſent before the Promiſe was accepted ? If the Revocation be addreſſed to the Mef- lenger, and he to whom he is to deliver his Commiſſion has accepted the Promiſe before he knew of the Revocation, the Promiſer is obliged to make good his Engagements , tho' he who was obliged to let him know it received the Countermand either before or after the acceptation. And ſo all that can be done is this, if the Meſſenger has given it contrary to order, he may be char- ged with an ill Management of his Commiſſion But if the Revocation be addreffed to him to whom our Engagements are made, and he has accepted the Promiſe before he received the Revocation, we muſt then obſerve whether we had a deſign to engage our ſelves in caſe the Promiſe were once accepted, or we were only ſuppoſed to have notice of an Acceptation ? For it is clear, that we may revoke our Word by means of ſuch a Suppofition. But if he to whom we are engaged has received our Revocation before he accepted our Promiſe, the Engagement is null, whether it be addreſſed to a third perſon or himielf. For in this laſt Caſe there is a Fraud in reſpect of the latter. (3) 'Tis a Rule of the Civil Law, That a Commiſſion is of no Force, when he that gave it is dead before the Execution; and that altho' he has expreſly ordered his Proctor to do ſuch or ſuch a thing after his death, unleſs it be to build him a Tomb, or buy a piece of Ground for that End. This Mr. Noodt has ſhewed very well , againſt the opinion of ſome famous Lawyers , in But if we conſider the Law of Nature, we may decide it by other Principles, viz. by examin- ing whether the Nature of the thing or the Circumſtances do probably niake it appear, that he that gave the Commifîon inten- ded it fhould be executed after his Death. For in this caſe the Proctor ought to execute it , and all perſons concerned ought to Field to it. We muſt alſo ſuppoſe that the Proctor knows of the Death of him that gave the Commiſfion ; for if he were igno- rant of it, whatever he did in that time is valid by the Civil Law, which here follows the principles of Equity. Nam Mandatum Carritur morte [ Mandatoria] ſi tamen per ignwantiam impletum est, competere actionem utilitatis cauſa dicitur, Digeft. Lib. 17. Man- dati vel contra, leg. 6 20 princ. See a' ſo the Inſtitutes, Lib. 3 tit. 27 $ 10. * M 2 V, As his Oblervat. Lib. 2 c. 1, 2, 3, 4; 92 Of the Miniſters or Agents Book III, do not NO V. As we may declare our Conſent to an En- to paſs to a third Man, he who obtains the Proiniſe gagement by an Agent or Miniſter, ſo it is a far- does not ferve his own Intereſt, nor is himſelf con- ther Queſtion, Whether a third perſon may accept cern’d in the Gain. But if I make a Penal Stipula- in our behalf, a Promiſe inade to us by another. tion, that is, if I procure ſuch an Engagement as And here the Diſpute is not about thoſe perſons this , Unleſs you give Seius an Hundred Pound, you whom we have commiſſion'd to make acceptance in Jhall by pay of Puniſhment pay me Fourſcore, I then our Name; for what we do by them we are ſuppo- acquire thus much Right at leaſt, that if you fed to have done our felves , and when we have in- make good the firft Sum on my Friend's account , truſted a Matter to another Man's pleaſure, our I can demand the latter on my own. This Rule Willand Content is included in his. But the Doubt of the Roman Courts ſeems to have been introduced regards only thoſe whom we have not in this man- for the lefſening the Number of Suits. For the ner authorized. And here Grotius obferves (@}Judge might well rebuke the Importunity of fuch « That we ought to diſtinguiſh, Whether he who a Complainant, who ſhould give him and others a “ makes us a Promiſe on behalt of a third perfon, publick Trouble, without being himſelf concern'd “ does addreſs and bind himſelt immediately to us, or intereſted in the Affairs. And though it can- or whether he proiniſes directly to the abſent not indeed be faid to be no advantage to us, when Party, and uſeth us only for Witneſſes of the Act. by our Means we derive a Benefit on a third per- That is, whether the words run thus, I promije you fon, in as much as we thereby oblige him to a that I will give Seius such a thing, and you are Wit- grateful ſenſe of our Service; yet it was thought nefs of this my Reſolution. In the former Cafe, ac- very improper to grant a Man an Aktion for the re- cording to the Natural Senfe and Import of the covery of a thing in another's Name, which that Promiſe, ſo foon as I have accepted it, I acquire a other Party could not demand in his own; and con- Right of taking care that the thing mention'd be fequently to give a Man the privilege of purchafing transferr'd to the third perſon, if he too will accept the Friendſhip of a third perſon at the Charges of it; ſo that the Proiniſer in the inean time cannot a fecond. revoke his Engagement. Yet he to whom the Pro But in the other Caſe, when the Promiſe runs af miſe was immediately directed, may remit it be- ter this manner, I engage, or I declare before you, fore the third Man has declared his Acceptance. that I will give Seius Juch a thing, if you are not The Promile then ſeems on the whole, to amount cominillion'd-by Seius to accept the Offer (2), your to this, I will give Seius ſuch a thing, if you pleaſe. Agreeinent to it will have no Force or Vertue ; And conſequently it is in your Power and Choice, you neither acquire a Right for your ſelf, nor for whether you will tranfer the Promiſe on Seius, or Seius, who does not acknowledge your Aćt for his whether by refuſing the Offer, you will hinder it own. And therefore it ſignifies nothing, whether from coming to him by your Means. And this is the Witneſs here yield his Conſent to the Promiſe all you can do; for if I am abfolutely reſolv’d to or not; ſince it is not directed to his own proper confer the Kindneſs, I may perforin it without perfon. And the Promiſer, in as much as Seius ob- your Mediation or Áthſtance. But if you declare tains no Right by the Witneſſes acceptance of the your Approbation of the Propoſal, I am not then Propoſal, may revoke it without Injury; tho' not at liberty to repent, before the inatter had been always without a breach of Conſtancy and Truth. made known to Seius; and if he joyn his Accep VÍ. It is farther certain, that it any Offer be tance to yours, the Promiſe ihall by the Law of made to a perſon yet living, by Letter, Meſſenger, Nature be good and valid. Indeed the Roman Indeed the Roman or the like, and he happen to die before he has ac- Laws declar'd all thoſe Stipulations to be Null (1), cepted of it, his Heirs cannot accept of it for him; which were made for the Benefit of a third Man, and conſequently that ſuch a Promiſe may fairly without having a Penalty annex’d to them. And be revoked. For the Promiſer ſeems plainly to the reaſon they gave for their Judgment is this, have refer’d the Acceptance to the choice of the de- That the original deſign of inventing Stipulations , ceas'd Party, not to his Heirs. Nor is he preſumed was to enable a Man to obtain fornewhat for his to have thought of this Accident, or to have been own advantage; whereas if the thing promiſed be willing that his Proniſe ſhould ſtand good upon Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 5. (1) The Words are, Alteri ſtipulari_--nemo poteſt. Invent & enim ſunt hujuſmodi ſtipulationes five obligationes ad hoc, ut unuſquiſque adquirat fibi, quod ſua interest. Cæterum fi alii detur, nihil intereſt ſtipulatoris. Planè fi quis velit hoc facere, pænam ſtipulari conve- niret, ut nifi fit ita fa&tum, ut eſt comprehensum committatur, pene ſtipulatio etiam ei, cui nihil intereſt. Poenam enim cum ſtipulatur quis, non illud infpicitur, quid inter ſit ejus, red que ſit quantitas in conditione ſtipulationis . Ergº ſi quis ita ftipuletur, Titio dari nihil agit, sed ſi adjecerit pænam, NISI DEDERIS, TOT AVREOS DARE SPONDES ? Tunc committitur ftipulatie, Inſtit. I. 3 cit. 20 De Inut l. Stipulat. $ 19. (2)Mr. Thomafius in his Inſtit. Juriſprud. Divin. Lib. 2 c. 7 $ 119 obſerves, That we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh whether he whom we take to witnefs have any Inrerett or no, That we give to a third what he accepts in his own Name, altho’ without his Confede; A diſtinction which the Roman Lawyers have not forgotten, and of which they alledge an Example of a Guardian, who making over the Management of the Eſtate of his Pupil to another, engaged that he ſhould manage his Affairs well ; or of a perſon who obliged himſelf to give ſuch or fuch a thing to his Commiſſioner, or of a Debtor, who engaged ſomething for his Creditor, chat he may not be obliged himſelf to pay, what he is engaged to give him, if he do not diſcharge him at the end of a certaia Tern, or to hinder him from ſelling a thing engaged till a certain time. For in this and like Caſes the Engagement is as valid as if the Promiſe had been directly made to him to whom we have promiſed. Sed et fi quis ftipulaturalis cum ejus intereſſet, placuir ftipa: lationem valere. Nam fi is, qui pupilli tutelam adminiſtrare ceperat, ceſſerit adminiſtrationem contutori suo, lo ſtipuletur rem falvam fore, quoniam interest stipulatoris fieri, quod ftipulatus est, cum obligatus futurus fit Pupillo, fi male res geferit, tenet obliga. tio. Ergo do ſi quis Procuratori ſuo dari ftipulatus fit, quod fua intereft, ne forte vel pæna committatur vel prædia diftrahantur, que pien Hori data erant, va'et ftipulatio, Inftit. Lib 3. tit. 20 De Inutil . Stip? $ 19. In fine, this Remark of Mr. Thom afius is delivered in ſuch a manner in the Edition of this work, which I have, which is the laſt printed in 1702. that he ſeems to have falln upon another fort of Promiſe, which is accepted by a third perſon without his Conſent, for having made mention of this after the other, he adds, sed in poſteriori caft, &c. But this, doubtleſs, is a Miſtake in the Impreſſion for Priori; for the Correctors have over paffed a great number of others. (4) Lib, 2 C, II f. 18. pupilli ſuch CHAP. IX. concern’d in contracting Obligations, &c. 93 ti ſuch a Suppoſition. We are often inclined to make tance; before which it does not of Right belong to a Grant to a perſon, to be afterwards by him tranf- him. fer'd to his Heirs, which we are by 110 means dif VIII. The moſt general Diviſion that can be ap- poſed to give to his Heirs immediately, it being a plied to Pucts, ſeems to be this , all of them create very material Point to conſider on whom we be- a Right, but in ſome that Right extends it ſelf to ftow our Favours (1) the common uſe of Mankind, in others it is limit- VII. It may be in the laſt place be enquired, ed to the particular Benefit of certain Perſons. For whether a Man can add a Charge or Burthen to his "the Life of Men would have proved too plain and Promiſe , after the Words have been once deliver- fimple, had they not to the Ordinances of Nature, ed (w). For that he may before annex what Condi- added their own Inſtitutions; by means of which tions he pleaſeth, is true beyond Diſpute. This their Proceedings were regulated, not only with then may be done, ſo long as the Promiſe more Convenience, but with more Comelineſs and yet perfected by Acceptance, nor made irrecovera- Grace. Of this latter kind, the Principal are (1), ble, by the plighting of Faith for his Performance. Speech or Diſcourſe, the Propriety, and the value of For the other Party before he accepts of the Prof- Things, together with Sovereignty or Command; all fer, can adquire no Right to it; and therefore in which preſuppoſe fome Univerſal Palts, Tacit or the mean time, as the Promiſer may, if he thinks fit, Expreſs, by Vertue of which they have been tied utterly withdraw it, ſo he may load and clog it up to certain Forms and Rules. And the introdu- with new Conditions. But when a Grant is compleat- cing and ſettling of theſe Engageinents, was what ed by the Act of both Parties, no farther Terms Nature her ſelf, Juppoſing the increaſe of Mankind can be annex'd to it (1). Vid. Cod. lib. 4. De Do- to a great Nuinber, directed and adviſed; as con- nat. quæ fub modo. ducing in the higheſt degree to the Peace, and to 'Twill be ask'd, What if the Burthen be added the Ornament of hunan Life. Having therefore for the ſake and benefit of a third Perfon; as ſup- finiſh'd our Enquiries about Covenants in general, poſe I ſay, I'll give you ſuch a Sum of Money, pro- we will proceed to examine theſe Inſtitutions, tó vided you´ll ingage to maintain Seius a Tear at the diſcover on what Pacs they are founded, and what Univerſity? We anſwer, that he who binds himſelf Precepts of the Law of Nature, ſuch as we have al- under this Burthen, may recall it ſo long as Scius ready term'd Hypothetical or Conditional, do ariſe has not yet confirm'd the Promiſe by his Accep- from them. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S. 6. (1) The Law is this, Neratius conſultus, an quod beneficium dare se, quaſi viventi, Cafar reſcripſerat, jam defun&to dediffe exiſtima- retur? Reſpondit, non videri ſibi principem, quod ei quem vivere exiftimabat, concepisset defun&to conceſije, quem tamen modum ejfe benes ficii fui vellet, ipſius eſtimationem effe, Digeft. I. so tir. 17 De Diverſ. Reg. Fur. leg. 191. Mr. Barbeyrat's NOTES on S 7. (1) The Words ade, Perfe&ta donatio conditiones non capit. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 8. (1) Mr. Titius in his Obſervat. 141. reproves many things here, of which I thall mencion ſuch only as to me appear well groun, ded, viz. 1. All the Duties of Society, of which our Author treats hereafter, and which flow from thoſe three Generals , which I have ſpoken of above, Chap. 1 § 1 Note 3. and are only the Conſequences applied to divers Objects which are preſented to us in a Civil Life; Conſequences from whence reſult ſuch Maxims, which have a place either without ſuppofing any other thing than the Quality of a Man, or ſuppoſing fome Deed or Humane Eſtabliſhment. So thac the Eſtabliſhments of which our Author ſpeaks make the matter of the Duties of Nacural Right as well Abſolute as Condicional. 2. All the Eſtabliſhments of which our Author treats are not founded upon an Agreement. The Introduction and Uſage of the word in general depends not upon any Agreemenc, either Expreſs or Tacit, if by Agreement we mean an Obligatory Confent. See what is ſaid, Chap. 1. of the follow. ing Book, 95 Note 1. The Property of Goods is not originally founded upon any Agreement, as ſhall be thewo, c. 4. of the ſame Book, $ 4. Note 2. (a) Vid. Grot. 1. 2 C. II f. 19. SAMUEL Samuel Puffendorf LAW of NATURE N A TIONS 90 GN σημαίνειν αλλήλοις, και ο λόγο επι πω δηλόν εςι το συμφέegν, και το βλαβερον, ώςε και το δίκαιον, και τη δικον, τέτο το πρG 94 word OF THE THES A N D 19 202 IDOLA BOOK IV. T Blog ESCU CH A P. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. I. of the Uſe of Speech. XIII. Of Ambiguous Speech. II. Of the Diverſity of Signs. TOXIV. Of Mental Reſervations. III. of the Origin of Speech. XV. How far we may be allowed in ſpeaking fully IV. Words ſignify according to Impoſition. to Infants. V. Impoſition is attended with a Compact. XVI. It is lawful to ſpeak what is falſe, for the VI. This Compact is either General or Particular. Preſervation of others. VII. W bence the Obligation of diſcovering our Mind XVII. How far the Governours of States may be in- to another dulg'd in giving out falfe Reports. VIII. What Truth is, and what a Lye. XVIII. In what manner it is lawful to deceive an ill- IX. Every Untruth is not a Lye ; and therefore not deſigning Curioſity. Criminal. bu XIX. It is lawful to ſpeak falſe to a profeſs’d Enemy. X. Of the Right which is violated by Lying, and XX. Whether a Guilty Perſon arraign'd may deny whence 'tis deriv'd. the Charge. XI. How far Part of the Truth may be honeſtly con- XXI. What the Advocates or Counſel may, in this ceala. respect do for their Client. XII. Simulation in Things how far lawful. HAT Man was deſign’d by Nature for Senſe and Underſtanding of what the Words in. a Life of Society, this alone might be a port. By means of which one may be able to teach ſufficient Argument; That he only of another, one may in the moſt convenient manner all Living Creatures is endued with the command another, and the other apprehend his power of expreſſing his Mind to others by Articu- Commands; without which alliſtance there would late Sounds: A Faculty which, abſtracting from ſcarce be any ſhadow of Society, Peace or Difcit this Social Condition, we cannot conceive to be pline among Men; or at beſt, ſuch only as would of any uſe or advantage to Mankind. "Tis well be in the higheſt degree rude and unpoliſh’d. For obferv’d by Ariſtotle (1), Nature doth nothing in (as the Philoſopher goes on) Voice (or a certain vain, and Man is the only Animal whom ſhe hath in- kind of inarticulate Sound) is no more than an indir veſted with the Privilege of Speech : Not ſuch as con- cation of Pleaſure or Pain, and is therefore to be fifts in the bare Repetition of borrow'd Sounds, like found in other Animals . Nature having in them pro the Talk of Parrots, but ſuch as is joyn’d with a ceeded ſo far as to give them a jenſe of what is agret- Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. 1. S 1. (1) Ουδέν , ως φαμεν, μα τίω ή φύσις ποιεϊ, λόγων και μόνον άνθρωπο έχει των ζώων ή μενών φωνή σε ηδίας και λυπισε επίσης μειον, διό και τις άλλοις έχει ζώοι" μέχρι και τότε η φύσις αυτών ελήλυθεν, ώε αιθανέθαι λυπηρά, και το ήδέως, και τα ท Tole oixiar ij zónev, Ariftot. l'olitic. I. 1 c. 2. able Chap. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. 95 able or diſtaſteful; and an ability of lignifying in ſome reported to have driven the Gracians, in a Tem- fort theſe Affections amongſt themſelves. (Whence it peſt, upon the Rock of Caphareus, to revenge the appears, that the Sounds utter'd by Brutes, of what- Death of his Son Palamedes (b). As likewiſe thoſe foever kind, are determin’d by Nature, not by Cu- other Marks ſet up to guide Ships by Day, and to ſtom and Inſtitution, like Humane Diſcourſe.) But point out the Rocks and Quickfands; together with Speech was given to ſignify farther what was uſeful or the Mercuries, pointing Hands, and other Conve- prejudiciel ; juft or unuft: It being the Prerogative niencies for information of Land-Travellers. And and Property of Men above their Fellow-Creatures , to thus heretofore the Perſians by lighting Fires all have a jenſe of Good and Evil, of Juſtice and Inju- along on the tops of their Hills, uſed in a very lit- flice, and the like ; lince from their Society and Com, tle time to fpread fome Reports or Alarms through munication, proceed the united Bodies of Families and every part of the Kingdom (C). An infinite variety Commonwealths. (a) And ſince that want and Weak- of theſe Signs are met with in Commonwealths em- nefs which particular Men lie under, may by the ploy'd for the acquainting the Subjects with ſome alliſtance of others be conveniently remov'd, and particular Matters. To which Head belong Clocks, yet another cannot apply himſelf to my aid, unleſs Bells, Spears ſet up at Auctions, Buſhes, Signs be- he firſt underſtand what I deſire ; which he may fore Houſes, and the like. In War, the Sound of do moſt readily by means of fome Signs and To- Trumpet, Beat of Drum, Diſcharge of Cannons, kens, and eſpecially by Articulate Words; there- Waving of Colours, &c. And fo too, certain Ge- fore, that the moſt uſeful Inſtrument of Humane ſtures and Motions have been taken up amongſt Life may duly obtain its End, in uniting Men in moſt people to denote ſuch or ſuch intentions of Society; and left by the abuſe of Speech Man the Mind : To go out of the Way, to Riſe up, to ſhould be rendred leſs fociable, than it he were Bow, to Kiſs the Hand, are Signs of Honour and dumb or ſilent, it muſt be ſuppos'd a Precept of Reſpect with the greateſt part of the World. To the Law of Nature, That no Ivian deceive another uncover the Head in the Cereinony of Saluting, or by thoſe Signs which have been inſtituted to expreſs our to pluck off the Shooes in ſome places is interpre- Meaning and our Thoughts. ted as a Mark of Honour, in others of Contempt. II. Now, to trace this Point from its firſt Head, It is in ſome Countries look'd on as reproachful to we muſt underſtand, that the Nature and Ability point with the Finger, to bend the Noſe, to bid, of thoſe Objects which affect our Senſes is fuch, A Fig for one, (fare le fica, as the Italians call it) as not only gives us notice of their own Prefence with many the like. Motions. To take by the or Approach, but likewiſe affords our Reaſon an Beard is in ſome Nations the higheſt Affront, with opportunity of attaining the Knowledge of other others it paſſes for a Token of Veneration; as with things. And this either becauſe there is a Natural the Tartars, with ſome of the Indians, and, as ſome Alliance and Connexion between thoſe Objects and think, with the ancient Gauls (d). 'Tis likewiſe a the things with which they thus bring us acquainted; cominon Practice to expreſs by fome Geſture our or becauſe Beings endued with Senſe and Under- deſire of performing ſuch an Action as would re- ſtanding have, without this Natural Relation, fix'd quire that particular Motion of the Body, by ſuch Notions upon them, as to make them capable which in ſtrange Countries we, after a fort, fup- of repreſenting continually the Images of certain ply our Ignorance of the Language. To affirm a things to the Mind. Hence ariſeth the diſtinction thing by gently bending our Head ; to deny by of Signs into thoſe which are Natural, and thoſe throwing it on our Shoulders; to refuſe by turning which owe their Force and validity to Cuſtom and our Back, are Cuſtoms almoſt univerſally receiv'd. Compact . Of the former kind we are on every As for our pointing out a certain Thing, or Place lide ſupplied with inſtances from the frame of by ſtretching our Hand or Finger towards it, this Nature ; as the Day-break is the ſign of the Sun's perhaps ought to be reckon'd amongſt the Natural, riſing quickly after; Smoak is the Sign of Fire and rather than amongſt the Arbitrary Signs. What the like. By Coinpact Men have impoſed the uſe Diſcoveries may be made by Nods, winks, Moti- and power of Signifying, on certain Things, Acti- ons of the Fingers, or of the Feet, when particular ons and Motions, and above all, on Words, or Ar- Men have once agreed on thoſe ways of Intelli- ticulate Sounds form’d by the Tongue, and alter- gence, is vulgarly known, and need not be farther wards reduced into Letters : And all theſe are inſiſted upon in our preſent Deſign (e). Lucian (f) found to be in uſe, either with ſome certain Per- tells ur of a Famous Artiſt in Nero's Court, who fous, or with the greateſt part of Mankind, cr in expreſs’d the Amour of Mars and Venus as well by general , with all the World. Under the firſt of Dancing, as he could have done by Narration; theſe Claſſes may be ránk'd the Light-Houſes and whom for this rerfon a certain barbarous Prince Nightly Fires on the Coaſts, for the direction of begg’d of the Emperor for an Interpreter . And the Veſſels: By the abuſe of which, Nauplius of old is Sieur De Sancy, the French Ambaſſador at the Otto- (a) Add Iſocrat ad Nicocl. paulo poft princip. Plin. N. H. 1. XI C. 51. Thar Power of explaining our Mind, which hath diſtin- guiſhed us from the Beaſt, hath cauſed another diſtinction between Man and Man, no leſs conſiderable than that between Map and Beaſt. Quintilian is large on this Subject, Inſtitut. Orat. 1. 2. C. 16. Sophocl. Oedip. Colon. p. 310. Edic. H. Steph. The Wiſe Inventions which our Mind conceive Our Speech declares Pling (N. H. !. 76. 1) expreſíc th the neceſity of Speech in a very ſmart Sentence, when he obſerves that, Externus alieno non eft hominis vice; One Foreigner is not a Man to another. Add. Garcilas de la Vega, Comm. Reg. 1. 7 c. 1. 6) Add, 1. 10. D. de incend. ruin . Naufrag. So Lib. 47 tit. 9. (c) Which Cuftom is deſcribed by Barclay in his Argenis, l. 1 sed Polyb. I 10 c. 39, &c. magi ruptias ej epox Teeles, Caſaubon." Epift. 112. Edit. Græv. Jul. African. sesãv, !. 2 c. penule See likewiſe Ferdinand Pinto, c. 61. Where he i peaks of the Horn, which amongſt the Japoneſe every Man keeps in his Houſe for a Signal upon occaſion.' (d) From that place in Livy, 1.5 c. 41. (e) Æſchyl. Agamem. - Barbarian, let your Hand συ" αντί φωνής φραζε κουβαν» χρε: Supply your want of Speech (1) De Sallatione, Tom. I p. 807 Edic. Amſterd. man 96 Of Speech, and the Obligation wbicb attends it. Book IV. ther ; Mr. Creech man Court, gives an account of two Mutes whom Beſides, if others us’d not Words as ſoon, he ſaw there, one by Nation a Turk, the other a How was their Uje, and how their Profit known? Perſian, who by reaſon of their uſing different Or how could He inſtruct the Other's Mind, Signs and Motions, could not underſtand each o- How make them underſtand what was deſign’d? till at length a third Mute was found out, For His, being ſingle, neither Force nor Wit, who was able to perform an Interpreter’s Part be- Could conquer many Men, nor they ſubmit tween the two former. To learn his words, and practiſe what was fit. III. But that which we are chiefly concern’d a- How He perſwade thoſe fo unfit to hear? bout in our preſent Enquiries, is Specch or Diſcourſe, Or how could Savage they with patience bear the moſt common and the moſt uſeful Sign amongſt Strange Sounds and Words ſtill ratling in their Ear?S Men, and introduc'd for the ſake of cominunicating Notions and Thoughts. Of the Riſe of which Dio- dorus Siculus, Lib. 1. p. 8. Edit. Rhodom. through He concludes, That ſince Brute Creatures could his Ignorance of the true Origin of Mankind, gives by different Sounds expreſs different Motions of this Fabulous Account: The first men who were their Mind, born into the World, led a Savage Life, without Cul- ture or Refinement ; going out in Herds to the Paſtures, Quid in hac mirabile tantoperè eſt re, and feeding on the moſt juicy Plants, and thoſe Fruits Si genus humanum, cui vox & lingua vigeret, which plain Nature produced. Beirg infeſted with the Pro vario ſenſu varias res voce notarent (a)? wild Beaſts, Uſe taught them to alijt each other, and Fear compelld then into Society; by means of which Since Organs fit, ſince Voice and Tongue, they grew acquainted, by degrees , with the reſem- By Nature's Gift beſtow'd to them belong; blance of their Shapes and Features . And bav- What wonder is it then, that Men ſhould frame, ing from Confus’d Voice, and without ſignification, ar- And give each different thing a different Name? rii'd by Jlow attempts to pronounce Articulate Words, Mr. Creech. fhewing every thing by Signs, that they had occaſion to objerve, and to communicate ; they at length gain’d The chief Deſign of Lucretius in theſe Argu- ability to inform one another of all Matters by Dil- ments, ſeems to have been to oppoſe Cratylus in courſe. But, inaſmuch as there were many of theſe Plato, who celebrates the firſt Inventor of Words, Communities eſtabliſh'd in different parts of the World, and the firſt Author of the Names of Things, as a and every Man join'd his Words together meerly as it Perſon of the higheſt Wiſdom: An Opinion which happen'd, all did not ſpeak in the Jame manner. And we ſhall examine by and by. And indeed thoſe hence aroſe the number and the variety of all forts who believ'd the firſt Mortals to have crawld out of Languages. Lucretius's Deſcription is exactly of of the Earth, a piece with this. 1. 5. v. 1027, &c. Mutum & turpe pecus, At varios lingua fonitus Natura ſubegit Mittere, & utilitas exprefit nomina rerum ; A Dumb and Dirty Herd, Non alia longe ratione, atque ipſa videtur Protrahere ad geſtum pueros infantia lingus, could not eaſily hit on any other Account. For Cum facit uit digito, quæ fint preſentia, monftrent. 'tis manifeſt, that no Languages are born with a Man, Proinde putare aliquem tum nomina diſtribuiſſe but all are learnt by Uſe and Experience. Whence Rebus, & inde homines didiciſſe vocabula prima, it comes to paſs, that Perſons born Deaf, are like- Defipere eft: nam cur hic poflet cuncta notare wife Dumb. And 'tis look'd on almoſt as a Pro- Vocibus, & varios Jonitus emittere lingua, digy, when ſuch an one is taught to ſpeak; as hath Tempore eodem alii facere id non polje putentur ? been in the preſent Age perform’d on the Brother Præterea, fi non clii quoque vocilus uji of Velaſco, Conſtable of Caſtile; who having been Isiter le fuerant, unde incita notities eft Deaf from his Cradle, was made to ſpeak, to write Utilitatis ? & unde data eft huic prima poteftas, to read, and to underſtand Authors. And an 11- Quid vellet, facere ut ſcirent, animoq; viderent? ſtance of the like wonderful Operationi, Cogere item plures unus victofque' domare long ſince given by Dr. Wallis at Oxford. Nor doth Non poterat, rerum ut perdiſcere nomina vellent ; it look probable, That ſome one Man in the Begin- Nec ratione docere ulla ſuadereq; ſurdis, ning ſhould have fram'd a whole Language, with Quid ſit opus facto: faciles neq; enim paterentur ; an exact Contexture of Words, and a juſt Agree. Nec raiiona ulla fibi ferrent amplius aures ment and Conformity to the Things which they Vocis inaudita Jonitus obtundere fruſtra. were to repreſent. But 'tis the general Opinion of Chriſtians, founded on the Authority of the Holy Kind Nature, power of framing Sounds affords Scriptures , That the firſt Language was by Almigh; To Man, and then Convenience taught us Words ; ty God immediately infus’d (b) into the Original As Infants 110w, for want of Words deviſe Pair, which their Children eaſily learnt, by the Exprelive Signs, they ſpeak with Hands and Eyes; Uſe and Cuſtom of hearing. And that, as for the Their Speaking Hand the want of Words ſupplies. Diverſity of Tongues, this was miraculouſly produ- That One the various names of things contriv'd, ced by the Confuſion at Babel. Yet ſome have And that from Him their knowledge All deriv’d, doubted, whether even the Language which Adam -Tis fond to think: For how could that Man tell? ſpoke, was at firſt compleatly full and perfect , and The Names of Things, or liſp a Syllable, rich enough to expreſs all manner of Conceptions ; And not ancther Man perform't as well ? inaſımuch as the Scripture directly mentions only was not (a} Add. Ding. L.airt. I, 10 p. 754 Edit. Steph. Vitruv. Architect. I. 20.1. (6) See Mr. Le Clerc upon Geneſ. II. 23. and his Remarks upon the Critical History of Father Simon, p. 422. See likewiſe the Preliminary Differtation upon the Bible, by Mr. Dipin, p. 122. Edit. Hulle the we ſhould grant that the Names ſet on Animals, and Barbarians : Which Aſſertion is likewiſe CHAP. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. 97 the Names which he ſet on living Creatures. As it nius and Diſpoſition, or their principal Affection ; is certainly true of moſt Tongues, that they were yet thoſe very Primitives whence theſe Names were at firſt but very poor, and very plain, but were deriv’d, ſignifie merely at Pleaſure. For Inſtance, enrich'd in time with Copivulners and Elegance: though Adam gave this Reaſon for the Name of As likewiſe that they have in a long courſe of Eve, Becauſe she was the Mother of all Living; yet Years, undergone very fignal Alterations; and that that the Word hava ſhould import to live, is abfo- from their Corruption and Confuſion, many new lutely owing to Impoſition: And though in all Lan- ones have within the compaſs of a few Ages, ſprung guages, Things allied by Nature, are uſually allied up in the World (a). in Name, there being obſerv'd in moft Words of IV. But this is moſt clear and evident, That the this kind, ſome Conforinity of Structure, and which power of fignifying determinately, thus or thus, the Grammarians term Analogy; yet this is by no That is of raing ſuch certain Ideas in our Mind, doth means conſtant and regular, many, Words having not belong to Words by Nature, but ariſeth pure- very particular ways and methods of Variation: ly from the Pleaſure and the Impoſition of Men (1); And even this Analogy it ſelf, inaſmuch as it con- for otherwiſe no Reaſon could be given, why diffe- fiſts in a certain Inflexion and Combination of rent words thould in different Languages, be ap- Words, is it ſelf eſtablith'd by human Appoint- plied to expreſs the ſame thing. Which is like- ment. This is the Judgment of Quintilian him- wiſe true concerning the different Forins and Cha- felf (c); We muſt remember (3), ſays he, That the racters of Letters. St. Auſtin. (de Do&trin. Chriſtian. Rule and Method of Analogy cannot univerſally be 1. 2. C. 24.) hath made this Obſervation on the drawn, fince in many places it is apparently inconfi- Point; That one Letter faſhion'd like a Croſs ſtent with it ſelf : For Analogy was not at the firſt (X) imports one Thing amongſt the Greeks, and Production of Mankind, fent down immediately from “ another amongſt the Latins; not by the Appoint- Heaven, to teach them the due Form of Speech, but ment of Nature, but by the Pleaſure and Conſent was invented after they had accuſtom’d themſelves to “ of Men, in fixing ſuch different Significations ; diſcourſe, and had obferv’d the particular Cadences of " and a perſon who underſtands both Languages, every Word. It is not therefore built upon Reaſon, “ when he would expreſs his Mind in Writing to but Example; nor is it the Law, but the Experiment a Grecian, uſeth this Character differently from and Remark of Speaking ; Analogy being indeed the “ what he doth when he writes to a Roman. Thus Effeet of nothing but Cuſtom. to the Word Beta, under one and the fame Sound In Plato's Cratylus (4), the Opinion of the Perſon “ in Greek, is the Name of a Letter, in Latin, the whoſe Name the Dialogue bears, is to this pur- “ Name of a Pot-herb: And when I ſay, lege, theſe poſe; That every individual Being includes in its Na- “ Two Syllables are by thoſe different People un ture the true Reaſon of its Name, which is vain and “ derſtood in different Senſes. See the Art of abſurd : And that that is not properly the Name of Speaking, by Father Lami, B. 1. c. 14. Edit. Amji. Thing, by which Men agree to call it, by uttering ſuch 1699. Nor is it any Preſumption to the contrary, or ſuch a Portion of their Voice : Which in one that we believe Adam (2) to have given Names to ſenſe may be admitted for true; that is, when ſome the Creatures, not as it tell out by Chance, but particular Men, contrary to common uſe, impoſe with the higheſt Reaſon and Deſign ; ſuch as were odd Names on things for the Deception of others : taken from the peculiar Nature of the Things, and As in the Caſe of Jugglers, Strowlers and Gypſies : fully and accurately expreſs’d their diſtinguiſhing With regard to which, feign’d Names are oppos’d to Properties, ſo as that upon the firſt found of the true; being fix'd Perſons or Things, contrary to Words , the Nature of each Thing might be under- the publick Impoſition. But that there is one and the ſtood ; as Philo the few Reports (l). For although Same true Reaſon of Names, innate alike to the Greeks and ſome other Things, ( for no Man can eaſily falſe. Hermogenes in the fame Dialogue, Thus de- prove this of all,) were ſuch as denoted their Ge- livers his Opinion on the other ſide; I can never Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 4. (1) See the Art of Speaking by P. de Lami, Lib. I c. 14. (2) This is the Opinion of philo the few in the Creation of the World. For Mr. Hirtius quotes another Paſſage here very un- firly, where he treats of the Suitablenets of the Seventy's rendring the Original Hebrew into Greek, as Philo affirms, who ſays, τηat they have found proper Words to exprets the Seafe of the Law of Moles, Και οι σωτρέχοντα τοις πράγμασιν ονόματα Esüesv. From which lant Word Mr. Hirtius might hiave obſerved, that he ſpeaks of more than one perſon, and that it ought not to be tranſlated adinvenit, he found out, but they, ſeeing the Sequel of the Diſcourſe can't otherwiſe be clear. The Paſſage is in the Life of Moſes, Lib. 2. Several of the Rabbins, and moſt of the Chriſtian Interpreters follow Philo's Judgment ; but no shing is worſe grounded. See Mr. Le Clerc on Gen. ii. 19. and F. Malbranche in his Enquiries after Truth, p. 387. (3) The Latin of Quintilian is this, Sed meminerimus non per omnia duci analogia poſſe rationem, cum & fibi ipsi plurimis in locis re- pugnet Non enim cum primum fingerentur homines, Analogia dimiſa cælo formam loquendi dedit, ſed inventa eſt, poſtquam loque- bantur, o notatum in Sermone, quid quoque modo caderet, itaq; non ratione utitur, fed exemplo; nec lex eft loquendi, fed obferuatio, uk ipſam Analogiam nulla alia res fecerit, quam conſuetudo. But here demi ſa is But here demiſa is falſly printed for dimiſa, which is doubtleſs a Fault in the Princing, though it is not fer down among the Errata. (4) Our Author gives himſelf liberty in theſe four firſt Paragraphs of this Chapter to enlarge upon things very evident in them- felves, and well known; and therefore ought rather to be fuppoſed than proved in a work of this Nature; and here is particu- have left it quite out, buc nor daring to allume that Power, have thought it fufficient to let the Reader Know that it is an ufelets Plato's Words are, Ονόμα)G ορθότητα είναι εχάσω των όντων φύσει πεφυκυίαν, και το έναι όνομα ότι αν ήνες συνθέμενοι κα- λοίο, καλώσι, η αυτών φωνής μόeιον επόφθεγγόμενοι αλλα ορθότητα τίνα ονομάτων πεφυκέναι, και έλλησι και βαρβάροις τίω οσαυ- των αστισι, Herm. 0, ύναμαι πιναι ας εςιν ορθότης οιόμαχο, συνθήκης και ομολογία, εκ φύσει όχόσο πεφυκέναι όνομα έδιν εδέναι, αλλα νόμω και έθει των εθισάντων, και καλέντων. (a) Comp. Hebbs's Leviathan, c. 4. (6) This Opinion is ill founded, as Mr. Le Clerc makes appear in his Nores apga Gen. ii. lg. Bce Malebranches Search after Truth, p. 387. (c) Inſtit. Orat. l. 1. c. 6. + N be Digreffion. 98 Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. Book IV. 26 ир , the Theme of Anima? And the to con be perſwaded that there is any other Rule or Standard ſtions or Anſwers, about Reaſons and Derivations, for the Names of Things , than Compact and Conſent : when we are once arriv'd at the firft Element of my Judgment, that the Name which a Man fix- both. Though he afrerwards is very Ingenious to eth on any thing, whatever it be, is true and proper : no purpoſe, in tracing out the Reaſons even of pri- And that if be afterwards alter'd that Name for a mitive Words: And yet after all, when he hath ar- 910ther, the laft is no leſs true and right than the for- gued ſo long, in all Appearance, for Cratylus's O. mer; as 'tis uſual with us to change the Names of our pinion, he at laſt fairly doubts on the whole Mat- Servants: (Which will hold good, provided no Pre- ter. judice be hence done to the Common Agreement.) Sofipater Chariſius (*) (b) the Grammarian thus dif- For nothing Naturally hath ſuch or ſuch an Appélla- courſeth out of Varro, The Latin Tongue is made tion, but derives it purely from the Law and Cuſtom of Nature, Analogy, Cuſtom and Authority. The Na- of Speaking. Wlrat Socrates diſputes on the ſide of ture of Verbs and Nouns is immutable, and delivers Cratylus, doth by no means turn the Cauſe, thus for to us neither leſs nor more than what is receiv’d. Thus Inſtance, when he ſcouts it as an Abfurdity, If I if a Man Should ſay ſcrimbo inſtead of fcribo, be ſhould give the Name of a Horſe to what we commonly would be convinced, not by the power and virtue of call a Man, it would follow, that the ſame thing might Analogy, but by the very Conſtitution of Nature (c). be truly ſtiled, A Horſe and a Man. It may be an. But we muſt confeſs our felves at a loſs to find out ſwer’d, in ſhort, That words of publick Uſe derive this Neceſſity of Nature, unleſs it be ſaid, that the all their Force from publick Impoſition, which pri- Latin Tongue having in it an extraordinary ſweet- vate Perſons ought not, to its Prejudice, to contra- nefs, wonderfully agreeable to the Ear, it muſt dict; as we ſhall fhew more at large hereafter. A- hence come to paſs, that we reject at the firſt hear- gain, That Arguinent of his is no better than a ing, any harth and untunable Conjunction of Let- Fallacy ; If a whole Propoſition may be falſe, there- ters in that Language (d). Arnobius (+) (e) ſpeaks fore a part of it, as suppose, the Noun, or Name of excellently to this point; No way of Speaking, ſays a thing may be likewiſe falſe. For a ſingle Word is he, is by Nature either true and right, or falje and not capable of that Falſity which we ſometimes improper : For what Natural Reaſon can be given, diſcover in entire Propoſitions. The long Diſcourſe he or what Law, in the general Conſtitution of the World, afterwards makes about the Propriety of Terms, will that we ſhould ſay, hic paries, and hæc fella? Since only hold in ſome Derivatives, but not in Primitives . neither do thoſe things admit of different Sexes, ſo as And ſince the ſame things are in different Coun- to be diſtinguiſhed by the Maſculine and Feminine tries expreſs’d by different Words, it likewiſe fre. Genders; nor can the moff Learned Critick infurm quently happens, that words which fignifie the ſame me of the Original Reaſon and Meaning of theſe Terms, thing, have an Etymology utterly diftinct. Thus hic and hæc ; or why the first fould be applied to the Oeds the Greek Name for Gud, is deriv'd' froin Olev Male, and the ſecond to the Female Sex. All this to run; becauſe the Stars which are perpetually proceeds from the Arbitrary Appointment of Man- running their Courſe, were look'd on as Gods by kind. 03 the Ancients : But what Affinity is there in the Grotius (f) rightly rejects the Opinion of thoſe Latin Tongue between Deus and Curro? So Man is who make this to be the difference between Things int Greek term'd évbgwao quafi dvargāv à ©70]e froin and Words, that the latter are naturally the Signs conſidering or contemplating the Objects which he of our Thoughts, the former not. Indeed if the Beholds. But muft we therefore Tay, That Homo meaning of the Aſſertion be no more than this, in Latin comes froin Contemplatio ? The Soul in that Words were inſtituted for no other end, but to Greek is named Yugh from svefúzery to cool or re- be the Signs of our Conceptions, and that therefore freſh: But is refrigeratio in Latin for this reaſon their whole Nature and Eſſence conſiſts in their in any Perſon may be in tracing Etymologies, and af- to them: We ought then by all means to admit it ſigning the Reaſons of Words, yet when he hath as true. But if it be intended in this ſenſe, That gone as high as he can, to the Primitive and Sim- the power of ſignifying ſuch or ſuch a particular ple Terms, he will be forc'd to acknowledge, that Matter inheres Naturally in Words, but not in they are purely owing to Impoſition (a). What Things, the Poſition is falſe and groundleſs. can be more ridiculous, than that of Socrates, when on the contrary it is true, that words Naturally, in the Difputation which we have been ſpeak- and without reſpect to human Impoſition, ſignifie mūp and ideas, he can ſay nothing elſe, but that they Inarticulate Sound as we make uſe of in Sorrow, or owe their Original to the Barbarians? Indeed he in Laughter, which ought rather to be call’d Noiſe , himſelf confeffeth, that there can be no farther Que than Speech. If the ſaid Notion be thus explain’d, And a (*) His Words are, Latinus ſermo conſtat natura, analogia, confuetudine, authoritate; natura verborum nominumq; immutabilis eff, nec quicquam aut plus aut minus tradidit nobis, quam quod accepit. Nam ſi quis dicat ſcrimbo, pro eo quod eft fcribo, tute, fed nature ipfius conſtitutione convincitur. (t) Arnobius's Words are, Nullus fermo nature eſt integer, vitioſus ſimiliter nullus, Quanam enim eft ratio naturalis, aut in mun. di constitutionibus Lex feripta, ut hic Paries dicatur, & hæc Sella? Cum neque ſexus habeant femininis generibus, maſculiniſque diſcretos ; neque quiſquam docere dosti limus me toffet ipſum hic G hac quid fint, aut cur ex his unum sexum virilem deſignet, femininis generibus id quod fequitur applicetur. Humana ifta funt placita. (a) To this we may add the Remark of Quin&tilian, Inſtit. Orat. I. 1 c. 6 p. 64. Edit. Ludg. Bat. Shall it be affirm'd likewiſe that Man took his Name of Homo, becaufe he was, Humo natus, Born of the Earth? As if all Animals had not the ſame Original! Or, as if those Primitive Mortals firſt fet a Name upon the Earth, and then upon themſelves ! (b) Inſtitut. Grammat. I. 1. ex Varrone. (c) we meet with the ſame in Diomedes, 1. 2. (d) vid. Huart. Tryal of Wits, c.in The Reafon alledgʻa by P. Nigidius, to prove that Words fignify according to Nature , in Aul. Gell . I. 10 c. 4. is altogether vain and frivolous. (e) Lib. 1. adverſ. gent. p. 45 Edit, Parif. 1605. (f) Lib. 3c, 11. 8. that CHAP. I. 99 Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. 9. that ſuch is the Nature of Man above all other A- nour. niður. In caſe this Office be omitted by thoſe Su- nimals, that he can fignifie to others the Concep; periors who have fuch a right to perforin it; or in tions of his Mind, and that words were invented caſe many have been inveſted with the ſame Title, to be the inſtruments of Communication, then the it ſhall be lawful for every Perſon to take upon Affertion is true, but not compleat : For it ſhould himſelf ſome term and note of Diſtinction : But as be added, that theſe Diſcoveries are conveyed not 110 Man ought to aſſume another Name (5), when by words alone, but by Nods and other Motions. by ſuch an Act of his, the general End of impo- As we find ſeveral Dumb Perſons who are able to ſing Names may be intercepted and hindred; or expreſs their inward Conceptions after a very fur- when upon this alteration, any damage or preju- priſing and artificial manner. Hence, in the Ro- dice, or any probable Danger and Suſpicion of it, man Law, (a) thoſe who have not the Gift of Speech, is likely to accrue to another Perſon; ſo neither are yet ſuppoſed to ſay thus or thus, By that ſtriv- ought any Man to hide or diſſemble his true Name; ing and ſtraining which they uſe, and that Sound and unleſs in ſuch a Caſe, when by this concealment Inarticulate Voice which is utter'd by them. And 'tis we do not prejudice the Rights of others, and yet a Rule in the ſame Law (b), That Dumb Perfons procure ſome advantage to our felves, or effect our may contract Matrimony, by Mutual Conſent with- deliverance from Loſs or Danger; according to thoſe out Words : That is, it ſhall be ſufficient if they Rules which we ſhall hereafter deliver about the expreſs their Agreement by Dumb Signs. Nay Obligation to ſpeak Truth. Add. Valer. Max. 1. Pliny (c) tells us of ſome Nations of Æthiopia, who c. ult. and 1. 7. c. 3. n. 8, 9, See the Oration of M. had no other Speech amongſt them, beſides theſe Ge- Anton. Majoragius on the fame Subject; and Caſau- ftures and Motions of the Body (d), bon ad Baron. Exercitat. XIII, 1, 13. To the fame Head belong thoſe Marks and Cha V. As all Signs, except thoſe which we call Na- racters which do not denote Voices or Words, but tural, denote ſome determinate thing by Virtue of iminediately the very Things themſelves. And human Impoſition, ſo this Impoſition is attended this, either upon account of ſome agreeableneſs with a certain Agreement, Conſent or Compact, which they bear to the things repreſented; as in Tacit or Expreſs; from the force of which (1), moſt of the Ægyptian Hieroglyphicks; or becauſe the there ariſeth a Neceſſity of applying ſuch a Sign to Impoſition of Men hath inveſted them with ſuch a ſuch a particular Thing, and to none elſe. The Power, as in the Chineſe Characters, by which they like Covenant muſt be ſuppoſed in relation to all expreſs entire Notions and Sentences, thoſe Things which we uſe for Signs, whatever ac- It may not be inconvenient to remark ſomewhat count we follow of the Origin of human Speech. concerning that kind of Impoſition, by which ſuch For although we conceive the Primitive Langua- a peculiar or proper Name is affix'd to Perfons, ges to have been immediately infuſed into Men, Places, and ſome other Things ; the deſign of which yet ſince each Perfon ſeparately enjoy'd his power is, that one Man, one Place, ane City or Country, of Diſcourſe, and could uſe it freely as he pleas’d, may be diſtinguiſhed froin another; and that by by applying any Words to any Things; this Facul- theſe Marks there may be a mutual underſtanding tý would not have obtain’d its proper End and Uſe, between Men, in determining their Words or Acti- unleſs an Agreement had paſs & between Men, that ons. Now as the proper Terms of other things fol- each Party ſhould exerciſe their Talent in the fame low the manner of Appellative, or common Nouns, uniform manner, and conſtantly expreſs the ſame ſo with regard to the proper Names of Men, it is things by the fame Words (2). For ſince he who to be obſerv'd, That the power of impoſing them is placed in a state of natural Liberty, doth not uſually belongs to thoſe who have others under hold his Powers at the beck and controul' of others, their Authority and Government: Thus Parents are but hath the Privilege of uſing them as his own wont to give Names to their Children, Maſters to Judgment ſhall direct, another Perſon would have their Slaves and Vaſſals, and Princes to thoſe of no manner of Right to require of me, that I ſhould their Subjects, on whom they confer any Signal Ho- apply my Powers in ſuch a particular way (3), and (5) Nor Sirname, which may have the ſame effect: For both of them are forbidden by the Roman. Law under pain of ſuffer- ing the ſame Puniſhment, as they who are found guilty of Fraud. Falfi numinis vel cognominis adreveratio pæna fal ſi coercetur, Dig. 1.48 tic, 10. De Lege Cornelia de falſis, &ic. Leg. 13. princ. See the Nores of Dion. Gothofred. on it. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 5. (1) It is more probable, that the ſignification of Words is ſettled by a bare Content, where there is no obligation to conſider it in it felt . For, 1. Men'never mer together to agree upon the preciſe ſignification of Words, or Rules of Speech. It came to paſs inſenſibly, and without any Reflection ; neither was there any Tacir Agreement properly ſo called. We may every day diſ- cera new Words, Expreſfions, and Turns of Speech to come into uſe, which put a new ſenſe upon the Terms already received, And how comes it co paſs that chey are practifed by others ? No Man pretends to lay any Obligarion upon them, farther, than as they ſerve to convey the Truch from one to another in Converſation. 2. If the fignification of Words were ſeccled by any obli. acory Agreement, either Expreſs or Tacit , the leaſt Change, contrary to common uſage, would niake it Criminal, though no Man received any Damage by it, which none will dare to maintain, and which is daily confuted by our uſual Pra&ice, which all own, and which on the contrary ſerves marvellouſly to ſet off and enrich all Languages. This is what Mr. Titius ſays very (2) This proves well enough the neceſſity of a bare Conſtitution, but nor of an obligarory Conſent. The Obligation, which reſpects the uſe of a Word, depends upon other Principles, as will appear from what is ſaid, $ 7, &c. both in the Text and Notes. Whenever we are'obliged to ſpeak and manifeſt our Thoughts clearly, we ought to follow the common uſage, and chuſe the moft ſuitable Terms; but in any other Caſe we may pur a different ſenſe upon Words, which is not uſed, and ſpeak in Terms clear contrary to what we think, which could not be done, if there were any Agreement, either Open or Tacit, which accompanied the Inſtitution of Language. (3) It is in the Latin, the fame Faculties or Po:vers. But good Reaſoning, and what the Author adds, That their Thoughts may be underſtood by that Means, Thew, that he would, or ought at leaſt to have placed that Word at the end of the Sentence, which he ſpeaks at the beginning of the Faculties of Man ia general, although, in my opinion, he expreſſes himſelf unfitly in all near Obſerv, 245. the (6) Lib. 33 tit . 10 D. de Supell. leg. (6) Cap. 25. X. de Sponſa!. (c) N. H. 1.6 c. 30. (d) Add Quintilian, l. 11 C. 3. Inſtit. Prat. Of the Marks or Signs uſed by the Peruvians under their Incas. See Garcilafs de la Vega, 1.6.c. 9. * N 2 no 100 Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. Book IV. no otherwiſe, ſo as to enable him to apprehend my Thoughts and Intentions, unleſs we had before ſet- Uſe may revive the Obſoleteſt Words, tled this Point by ſome Pact between us : The full And baniſh thoſe that now are moſt in Vogue; extent and force of which Pact is this; That altho' Uſe is the Judge, the Law, and Rule of Speech. Signs do not inform us of the Minds of others by My Lord Rofcommon (O). an Infallible, but only by a Probable, Certainty, Men being Naturally capable of Diffimulation and There are, ſłys Sextus Empiricus (c)(1), and were, Diſguiſe. To this purpoſe the Saying of Archida- and ever will be, various Alterations and Revolutions mus in Plutarch ( Apophth. Lacon. p. 219: B. Edit. of Words ; for the Age is fill delighted with Change Wech.) is obſervable: A Sheep always uſeth the Jame and not more in Plants and Animals, than in Speech. Tone (*); but a Man hath the Art of varying his And the famne Author (d) hath this admirable Re- Expreſion and Addreſs, till be carries his Deſign. mark to the ſame purpoſe (3): As in a City or Coun- Moſchus Idyll. 1, v. 8, 9. Kardiogéves, &c. ty, he who is contented to take the Money that com- monly paſſeth, may live under that Government, and The Fouleſt Heart, the Faireſt Tongue : buy and jell, drive Bargains, and Trade without Mo- His Mouth belyes his Mind lsſtation or Hindrance; but he who will not comply with the Coin ordinarily Current, but frames a Nem Yet that which any Perſon hath expreſs'd by theſe kind according to his own Fancy, and offers it in Pay- Signs, ſhall be preſumed to his ſerious purpoſe. ment, is manifeftly out of his Senſes; Jo in Life, he And therefore as to matters of Right, the Effect ſhall who will not follow the common Speech, (like the com- follow the Conſent of the Party, as by Signs de mon Coin) when eſtabliſh'd by Uſe and Cuſtom, but in- clar'd; though perhaps his inward Thoughts and vents a new Language peculiar to himſelf, is not many Reſolutions were really different from theſe out- Degrees remov'd from a Madman. Indeed, That ward Indications (a): For otherwiſe the Uſe and ſuch a Compact is abſolutely Neceſſary, appears Deſign of ſuch General Marks would be utterly from hence; That Men could receive 110 manner of fruſtrated. But the Mutual Communication of good Uſe or Benefit from Speech, unleſs the Parties Offices amongſt Men could not be exercis’d, unleſs ſpeaking were mutually underſtood. We are all they had ſome certain information of the Wants Deaf, ſays Tully (e), in thoſe Languages with which and Wiſhes of each other ; and fince the Condition we are not acquainted. And ſo (f) Ovid complains in of human Nature would not allow this to be con- his Baniſhment, vey'd in any other way than by Signs ſtriking up- on the Senſes; therefore the uſe of thoſe Signs was Barbarus hic ego ſum, quia non intelligor ulli , by fome ſettled Compact to be ratified and circum- ſcribed, that every Perſon might clearly apprehend Not underſtood, I'm a Barbarian here. what Service or Alliſtance was deſired of him by Others (4). We may obſerve farther, That as moſt Tongues VI. This Compact and Agreement about the Uſe are varied by Dialects, fu it often happens that of Signs, and eſpecially of Words, is either Gene- Words of the ſame Tongue have in different Places ral or Special: The former is ſuppos’d to paſs be- different Significations: The Meaning and Impor- tween Men who ſpeak the fame Language, engag- tance therefore of ſuch Words ſhall be determind ing them to expreſs particular Things, and prin- by the Cuſtom of the Place where the Buſineſs is cipally thoſe which belong to daily Intercourſe and tranſacted; unleſs it ſhall appear that the Stranger Commerce, by ſuch certain Words as the Uſe of the hath not yet agreed to quit his own Native Phraſe , preſent Times ihall approve and authorize: For ’tis and to conform to the Idiom of the other Party . this Uſe, And thus too there are ſeveral Words which in ſome Places and Times are look'd on as ſcandalous Quem penes arbitrium eft & jus & norma loquendi, and reproachful, in others not. Of this the Name of Tyrant is a known Inſtance. In the ſame man- And at the Will of which, ner, the Term of Barbarian, which the Greeks and Romans held to be ſo diſgraceful, the Gothic King Multa renaſcentur que jam cecidere, cadentque, Theodoric frequently applies to his own Nation. And Que nunc ſunt in honore vocabula in the Law of the Burgundians, Barbari is very of- (*) The Greek is, Πρόβατον μεν αει την αυτίω φθέγγεται φωνω, άνθρωπG- σε πολλας, και ποικίλας, έως αν το δόξαν επιλέσεις (4) On this Occaſion we may obſerve by the bye, that we find the People of Cuma obtaining leave to uſe the Latin Tongue in common Talk, and to have their sales proclaim'd in it, after their humble Pecition for this Privilege, Liv. I. 40 C. 42. Though generally the Romans appear to have been very ambitious of ſpreading their own Language, without beir.g ſollicited to that pur, poſe. Vid. Valer. Max. I. 2 c. 2 ſ. 2. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 6. (1) His Words are, Και μεν παντοϊαι γένονlαι τών φωνών μεταβολαι, και προς τα αρνασι, και όσαυθις γενήσονται, φιλομετάξολο δε εςιν ο αιών, εκ ές φύτα μόνον, και ζώα, αλλα και ας ρήματα. (5) The Greek is, "Ωσπερ δον πόλει νομίσμα7G ανά προχωρών/G κατα το εγχώριον, ο μέν τέτω τοιχών δύναται και τας ο εκείνη τη πόλει διεξαγωγής απαραποδίσως ποιάθαι, οοε τοτο μεν μη παραδεχόμενα αλλο και η καινόν χαράσων εαυτό και τύτο νομις τεύεθαι θέλων μάταιο καθέςηκεν, έτω κάν τω βίω και μη βελόμενα τη συνήθως παραδειχθείση, καθίσερ νομίσματα, ομιλία τακoλεθών, αλλ' ιδίαν αυτώ τέμνειν, μανίας εγγύς έσιν. (a) Add. Grot, I. 2 c. 41. 3. (6) Horat. A. P. v. 70, &c. Quinctilian, Inſtit. Orat. I, I c.6 p. 6o; ct) The Author's Words Edic. Ludg. Bat. (t) To retain Words that have been long aboliſhed and abrogated, is a Mark of are, Sed abolita atque abro- Inſolence, and of vain Boaſting in things of no Importance. Add. Gell. I. 1 c. 1o. gata retinere inſolentiæ cujuſ- Mathemat . I. 10.3 p. 17 Edit. Genev. (d) Ibid. c 10. (e) Tuſc. Queft. 1.5 0,40. ( Trift. dam eſt, do frivole in parvis El. 10 V. 37. jaitantie. (c) Adver. ten CHAP. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. 101 ten the Style which thoſe People beſtow on thein Thoſe words are grounded on Special Compact, felves. It is here likewiſe worthy to be conſider'd, which either have been inveſted with a peculiar that moſt Terms of Speech beſides their Principal, Signification, different from what they bear in com- a kind of acceſſory (4) or additional Signification, non uſe, or which are utterly unknown to the or- by which we at the ſame time expreſs our Judg- dinary Methods of Speech. Of which kind are all ment, Paílion or Eſteem. And this is the reaſon, thoſe Terms of Art, uſed by Mechanicks and o- that of many words which as to their main Impor- thers; which on account of either the Multiplicity tance exactly fall in with each other, ſome are Op- and Confuſion of Things, or the meer Pleaſure of probrious and Injurious, others not; becauſe this the Authors, have either been invented a-new, or additional Signification is found in ſome and not applied to another Meaning than what they ob- in the reſt. Thus if I give a Man the Lye, I not tain'd in Vulgar Diſcourſe. Now, that no Man only ſignifie that his speech is diſagreeable to his may be deceivd by theſe Terms, amongſt perſons Thought, but farther denote, that he did this with who underſtand the particular Art, the very Na- an ill Intention, and on account of procuring my ture of the buſineſs in hand will be a ſufficient Prejudice or Hurt . And 'tis on the ſcore of this Caution and Security. And amongſt the Unskilful latter Indication that the Words are look'd upon they ought to be explain’d and limited by common as contumelious and injurious. So if I call any Words. Which Explication and Settlement is like- perſon an Impoſtor, or an Ignoramus, I affront him; wiſe neceſſary, when either Artificers differ about becauſe thoſe Names, beſides their proper meaning, the uſe of their Terms ; or when any perſon for include by the Bye, ſomewhat of Contempt and ſome particular Reaſons thinks fit either to coin Reproach: Whereas there are many other Words, new Words, or to fix a new ſenſe on old ones (d). by which I may, without any ſuch Affront or A. Some few perſons in Confederacy may, and often bufe fignifie my ſelf to have been hurt by another, do frame to themſelves peculiar Words and Marks or to thew that another is ignorant of ſome things of things, or put a different fignification on Vul- and which conſequently ſhall only declare the di- gar Terms, ſo as to be underſtood by each other, rect ſenſe, without any ſuch Indication of Diſgrace, and by none beſides. (And how far this Practice is Sometime this additional Mark arifeth, not from lawful, will appear from the Sequel of our Enquiry.) the General Impoſition of Men, but from the Tone In which Point it is enough, if thoſe words or of the Voice, (which is different according as we Marks rightly diſcover my Mind to thoſe, with either teach and admoniſh, or flatter and court, or whom I have thus entred into a particular Cove- chide and reprove,) from the Lines of the Face, nant about their Uſe: And this holds too in other from particular Geſtures, and other Natural Signs, Signs, determin’d by the peculiar Impoſition of which are wont very conſiderably to alter, dimi- certain Men. Amongſt theſe the Principal are the niſh or increaſe, the principal ſignification of Military Tokens and Signals of War of which Words. And thus too a figurative Speech very of Silence it ſelf hath been ſometimes uſed for one. ten denotes fome Paſſion in the Speaker, whereas a Thus in Polyanus (e) the Arcadian General under- plain Expreſſion barely imports the thing aſſerted : taking by Night to furprize the Spartans at the Ufque adeone mori miſerum eft (a)? denotes no more Tegaa, gave his Soldiers no other Sign but this, than if we ſhould ſay barely, non eft ufque adeo mi- That they ſhould kill all who ask'd for any Sign. ſerum mori ; becauſe it includes a Contempt of The Arcadians therefore were ſilent; but the Spar- Death. From the ſame acceſſory Meaning it comes tans not knowing their Fellows in the Dark, and to paſs that ſome Words are accounted obſcene, fo demanding the Word, were ſlaughter'd by the others not ; though as to the main they ſignifie Enemy. And ſo Pammenes in the fame Author (f), the ſame thing ; nay, though the thing be not re- put a Cheat upon his Enemieś by altering the ally in it felt foul or indecent. The reaſon of Signal of the Trumpet, and quite inverting the which Difference ſeems in part to be this ; That ordinary Method and Uſe; commanding his Men fince fome Words expreſs a Thing or an Act more to fall on when a Trumpet founded a Retreat, and loofly and generally, others in a more diſtinct to retire when it ſeem'd to call them to a cloſe Manner, and with particular Circumſtances; there- Engagement. fore he who makes uſe of the latter fort, at the VII. But we muſt carefully obſerve, that al- fame time betrays his Luft, with regard to ſuch a though by this general and ſpecial Compact we Thing or Act, and diſcovers a Satisfaction and Ap- are bound to uſe our Words and other Signs in the probation which a Man of Vertue and Breeding manner that hath been agreed upon ; yet we are would be aſham'd of : Sometime too the Obſcenity not hereby in the leaſt obligʻd to open and diſcover of Words proceeds from hence, that they either de- our Minds to all perſons. To which may be ap- note a Contempt of the thing ſignified, or elſe are plied the Saying of Apollonius Tyanaus (in Philo- uſed only among the baſer People, or towards ſuch Jtrat . l. 4. c. 11. p. 191. Édit. Par. Morel . Àn. 1608.) to whom we owe no Reverence or Refpect (b). Ca- Palamedes invented Letters, not only for the ſake of ſaubon in his Cominent on Perſius (c) hath diſputed Writing, but likewiſe that Men might come to the at large, whether it be allowable to apply Obſcene Knowledge of thoſe things which were not to be writ- Words even to the Reproof and Correction of Vice, ten. But to effect this, it is neceſſary that ano- which is the ordinary Practice of Satyrical Writers. ther Obligation be added, ariſing either from ſome (4) Our Author hath taken all this from the Art of Thinking, Part I. c. 14. where we may find the Reflection better managed. I do not know why he did not quote the Book, ſince he is not ſparing of Citations. (a) Virgil. Æn. 12 v. 646. (6) Vid. Ciceron. Epiſt. ad Famil. IX. 22. (c) Sat. 4 p. 342. (d) Add Bacon's Advancement of Learning, 1.30.4. in the beginning. (e) Stratagem. l. 1 c. II & 1.5C, 16. (f) Lib. 5 c. 16. particular IO2 Of Speecb, and the Obligation which attends it. Book IV. particular Covenant, or from the general Com- preſent to be tranſacted by Speech (1). Thus, for mand of the Law of Nature : Or laftly,, from the inſtance, if I undertake to be an Inſtrucior to any Quality and Condition of the Buſineſs which is at perſon, I am engag’d (by the Contract of Letting and ture. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 7. (1) To explain this Matter diſtinctly, we are to obſerve, that Speech, as all other Actions of an indifferent Nature, is to be governed by three grear Principles of Duty, of which we have ſpoken before, but muſt now repeat them, viz. Religion, Self- Love and Society. I. When we ſpeak to GOD, we muſt always ſpeak the Truth freely. This is evident of it ſelf, though our Author proves it briefly in the beginning of sio. Nor may we ever abuſe our Speech, when we ſpeak to Men, to the Diſho- nour of God. See what I have ſaid after our Author in Nore 2 upon Lib. 2 Chap.4 $ 3. II. When we make use of Speech in behall of our felves, either to ſecure or defend our ſelves, or to procure our ſelves Tome innocent advantage, which neither en. trenches upon the Glory of God, or the Rights of our Neighbour. In this caſe 'eis not only permitted, but exprelly ordained by the Law of Nature, either to ſpeak the Truth, or be ſilent; or to feign and difíemble, as a lawful Defence of our felves, or our innocent Advantage requires. III. The Duties of Society oblige us alſo, either to ſpeak the Truth plainly, or be filent, or feign and diſſemble, it by that Means we can either do good to others, or avere the Danger which threatens them, without de. ing any thing contrary to the Glory of God, or to the Damage of any Man. Thus, as our Author ſpeaks, Lib. 2 c. 3 $ 4. we muſt give Counſel faithfully to them thar deſire it, and ſhew chem the right way, who are out of it. But on the contrary, we muſt be filent in things which may be prejudicial to any perſon when ſpoken, either as to their Perſon, Goods or Reputation, Thus if a Madman running after another with a Sword in his Hand to ſay him, asks us which way he went, we may not only, but we ought to thew him another way than that which the perſon purſued took to ſave himſelf. And I can't think that any Man will dare to maincain the contrary. By the ſame reaſon the wiſe Midwives of Ægypt did very well to find our ſo good an excuſe to Pharaoh, as we may ſee by the Reward God gave them. In thore, the greateſt abuſe of Speech is, without contradi&tion, this, To make it an inſtrument of Damage to another. See $ 15 following. Hence it follows, that Men ought above all things to act fincerely in Bargains, and keep their Word inviolably when they have made a ſerious Engagement. Moreover, ire ought to remember what I have elſewhere obſerv'd, that when the Daries of society and Self-Love are equally concerned, theſe laft ought to be followed, and ſo we may lawfully uſe our Speech for our own advantage rather than any others. This is grounded upon Mr. Titius's Obſerv 248, &c. cho' his Opinion is not a whit the leſs fingular. It is certain, That, as Grotius has obſerved, Lib. 3 C. I, S 9. moſt of the Heathen Philoſophers and Ancient Chriſtians believed with St. Auguſtin, That whatever may be called a Lye, is always unlawful, although that Matter be not well explained, as our Author has done after Grotius. And ſince theſe two famous Works have appeared in the World, very few, who have been converſant in the Study of Natural Right, but have em. braced their Notions. See for example Mr. Thomaſius, Juriſprud. Divin. Lib. 2. c. 8. Mr. Budda'is, Elem. Phil. Praft. Part 2. Sect. 6. $ 3, doc. Mr. Fabricius in a Nore upon the falſe Abdias, which makes a part of the Apocrypha of the New Teſtament; Mr. No dt De Firma emend. doli mali, &c. c. 3. and ſeveral other famous Writers. I might alſo alledge a great Philoſopher of our Time, who had nor occaſion to explain this point in his writings, but he does not treat of it with Authority, wherefore I ſhall come to examine their Reaſons. Thoſe that maintain, That all Speech which is utter'd contrary to our Thoughts, is eſſencially faulty, ought to alledge good Proofs for it, taken either from the Nature of the thing, or from ſome convincing paſſage of Scrip- 1. As to the Nature of the thing, I have no yer ſeen any thing ſatisfactory produced. Our Author proves it well; and I will examine in a few Words the new Hypotheſis of a Modern Author in Nore 2. on 8 10. All that has hitherro been ſaid with any ſhew of Reaſon, may be reduced to theſe two or three Difficulties, which are not hard to be reſolved. The firſt is this, If the Opinion, lay they, that allows Men to feign and diffemble upon certain Occaſions, either in Deed or Word, be once received, all Confidence in one another inuſt be baniſhed from the Earth, and by conſequence all Society deſtroy'd. For a Man can't open his Mouth, or do the leaſt thing, but it will be firſt demanded of him, whether he does not believe, that he may in that caſe do otherwiſe than he thinks. But this Argument ſeems to be built on a Suppoſition entirely falſe, viz. That the Confidence by which our Dealings in this Life are maintain’d, is grounded only on this Perſuaſion, That they who ſpeak, ought to ſay or do nothing but what anſwers exactly to their Thoughts, their own Conſcience being Judge. For Experience and the Knowledge of the World prove the contrary evidently. I own, thar Profeffed Lyars, Natural Difſemblers, Falſe Dealers, or Slaves to vile Intereſt, in a word, all thoſe whoſe Honeſty is dubious, are not proper Objects of our Confidence, and we ought not to truſt them, but with very great Caution, if they ſhew that they believe that one may lawſully ſometimes ſpeak contrary to Truth, or profeſs, that they believe it always allowable. But when we have to do with Honeft Men, we put not the leſs Confidence in them becauſe we know they may uſe an innocent Feint or Diſſimulation, and becauſe we have ſeen them uſed ourſelves in certain Cafes with good Rcaſon for their own particular Advantage, or that of their parents and Friends. As every one is willing to have that Liberty, ſo he readily grants it to others; and he can't refuſe it them, or inpute it to them as a Crime, without being accounted, and that juſtly too, unreaſonable and fooliſhly nice. But, ſay they, the Benefit which may be obtained by a Lye will vaniſh into nothing, if we once reach that a Lye is allowable. For a Lye can be of no advantage but upon this Suppofition, that they to whom we Lye, believe that we do not Lye, and that we make a Conſcience of ſpeaking the Truth. If there be an occaſion offered wherein tis lawful to Lye, 'cis co adminiſter a Medicine to a fick perſon that may fave his Life. But fuppofing that we are taught that Phyſicians are exempted from ſpeaking Truth upon that occaſion, it will happen that they will not be believed, tho they ſpeak Truth; and ſo we ſhall fall into Inconveniencies infinitely greater than thoſe which we endeavour to avoid, by allowing them ſometimes to Lye. Either the fick perſon believes that the Phyſician will nor Lye, of af Jeaſt that he may as well ſpeak the Truth; but how can he believe the firſt, if he knows that upon fuch occaſions he may Lye! And will not the doubt keep him from taking the Medicine preſented to him? To this I anſwer, That all this is made evidency falſe by Experience. Whatever rigid Divines and Caſuiſts may ſay, 'cis certain, that there are a thouſand little Lyes , which almoft all the world believe allowed, and which nevertheleſs fail noe'to produce their effect. When one is in general perſuaded that others are innocent, he is not always upon his guard to examine upon every occaſion particularly, whether the perſon we have heard may not have reaſon to perſuade us that a thing is falſe, which is not. We are not to ready to diſtruſt one another when we have no cauſe of Suſpicion ; and there is ſcarce any Man, who, though he has been innocently deceived by his Phy, lician or Friend, wiil nor nevertheleſs believe them again upon the like occaſion, if they know how to take him aright, and behave themſelves well. He may perhaps doube a while after, but the firſt Impreſſions, and the innocent Artifice, when it has had effect, is ſoon forgotten; but if ſometimes it is not ſucceſsful, it only proves that there were not good Meaſures taken, or that ſome Circumſtances rendred the thing unprofitable, but that proves nor that it was unla iv ful and criminal in it felf. Some object farther, Thar if to ſpeak contrary to a Man's Thought is an action of like Nature with local Morion, and other ourward Actions, which having nothing unlawful in themſelves, may become good or evil, according to the different' Intentions by which they are done, there will be no evil to make uſe of that means for our moſt vile and crifling Intereſts, as if I deGre a Pín when it is neceſſary, or ſtoop to take it up when I ſee it lie upon the Boards of my Chamber, nothing hinders but that I may tellet 1.ye to get it, provided I do no Man any wrong by it. But this Conſequence does not feems to be well drawn. For the uſe of Speech is not only guided by Juſtice, Humanity and Charity, but alſo by Maxims of Prudence. For no wife Man will have re- courſe to the least Di'guiſe, but in caſes of Neceffity. Ler ús hear a pleaſant ancient Writer upon this Subjeét, whom nether Grotius nor our Author have quoted. Ou di mei te to nejpelen özóval Kpeias évend, fsu dovlev, oczys cóuns Torze sãy &res , peuvedo πέλλα, και υδύσευς επεία, την ταυτα ψύχω αρνύμενω-κή νομεν των εταίρων, αλλά περί εκείνων , και άρισε, φίμι, οι αυτό αγέν η χρείας το ψεύδο- περί πολλά και αληθείας τηλεθαι, ήδόμενοι το πράγμα, έλατείζονες έα έθιμία προφάτι αναγκαία 1. fliey are to be excuſed, and Tome commended; as for Example, Tuch as Lye to deceive their Enemy, or theni who make use " I ſpeak not, ſays the Diſcourſer in the Dialogue, of them who lye for their Profit, os of it as a Remedy to eſcape fome great Danger, as Vlyses often did to ſave his Life, or to procure the return of his Compa: “ nions; Chap. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. 103 and Hiring) to explain and communicate to him a perſon with a Commiſſion to ſearch into the all that belongs to that Art or Profeſſion. If I ſend State of ſuch or ſuch an Affair, he is bound by “ nions, but that which ſurprizes me moſt, is to ſee ſome Men, without any advantage to themfelves, to delight more in Lying " than ſpeaking the Truth, and continue in it all their Days without Neceffity. Indeed, when Men Lye in Bravery, and make a Trade of it, they loſe all Credit with the Wiſe. Otherwiſe, though an honeſt Man believes he may innocently, for ſome good Reaſon, by his Diſcourſe and Actions, make another underſtand him of a thing he thinks not, yet he does not therefore neglect a Correſpondence between his Words, and Actions, and Thoughts, as the moſt Natural Ule of the Tongwe, and other outward Motions, so that this Agreement is difturbed againſt his Will, being forced to it by the Conſtitucion of Humane Affairs, and by the Indiſcretion, Imprudence and Malice of the greateſt part of Mankind, at leaſt , if he be not engaged in a thing that brings Trouble, his Candour and Freedom, which are the Character of a truely good Man, will hinder him from ſpeaking or doing any thing which may make his Sincerity and Fidelity be ſuſpected in the leaſt. But there is another thing which ought to keep us from uſing any Equivocation, but with much Reſerve and Circumſpection, which is, that we ought not only to avoid all Evil, but every thing that tends to it. For it is certain, that by Lying, Feigning and Diſlembling upon flight Occaſions, Men ger á habit of Diffimulation and Counterfeiting, which degenerates into a Vice, becauſe it will incline us co be inſincere with thoſe to whom we ought faithfully to diſcover our Thoughts. For this Reaſon it is, that we ought to take very great Care to keep Chile dren from Lying. See montagne’s Eſſays upon this Subject, !. 1. c. 9. and the Treatiſe of Educating Children by Mr. Locke, $ 134, Loc.) becauſe this artifice can ſerve only to hide their Faults, and they are not of Age ſufficient to diſcover the Occafi. ons, when Diffimulation and Counterfeiting is innocent, and ſo they'll come in time not to ſpeak one word of Truth, but always have a Lye ready for the leaſt thing. But as to ſuch as are become Men of Underſtanding, 'tis not to be feared but that they'll be able to fer due Bounds to this Permiſſion of Feigning and Diſſimulation, provided they feriouſly labour to regulace their con- duct by the light of right Reaſon, without which they may abuſe the leaſt diſputable and commonly received Moral Principles, and by which they'll be full of Reverence toward God, Lovers of Juſtice, careful to give every Man his Due, averſe to all frau dulent Dealing, and in a word, a truly good man; and I dare anſwer for him, will never be guilty of any unlawful Diffimulation, and as far as is poſſible, he will ſo order himſelf, that his words and Actions ſhall exactly agree with his Thoughts. I ſay, as far as is poffible , for as the famous Engliſh Chancellor, the Lord Bacon, judiciouſly obſerves, « Serm. fidel.c. 6. Diffimulation “ is a neceffary Conſequence of Silence and Secrecy, (Taciturnitatis) inſomuch that whoſoever will conceal a thing, muft dif. “ femble, do what he can. In truth, Men are too cunning to ſuffer us to remain in a perfect indifference, without ſhewing any “ Inclination to one or other of the things, which they deſire to know. They'll attack you, examine and pump you with a 6 thouſand Queſtions, lo cunning, that unleſs you maintain an obſtinate and ridiculous Silence, you muſt diſcover ſomething of “ your Sentiments; and if you do nothing to diſcover them, they'll make ſuch Conjectures upon your Silence, that it will be all one as if you had ſpoken. You may guard your ſelf a long time by Equivocation, and dark Expreſſions, bur, in a word, there “ can be no perfect Concealment, if ſome degree of Diſſimulation be not allowed, and fo Diſfimulation is nothing elſe but a ne- “ ceffary Dependant upon Silence. To keep a juft Temper, every Man muſt get him a Reputation for Sincerity and Veracity, an " habit of Silence and Secrecy, and an Ability to feign and diſlemble, when it is neceſſary. It is eaſie to anſwer all the other Difficulties raiſed againſt the Opinion of our Author, and to oppoſe greater to the contrary. It ſhall contenr me to obſerve, thae if this laſt be true, thouſands of Actions, which the world accounts innocent, muſt be condemned, and are practiſed every day with deliberation. I do not ſay, by moſt of them who are zealous Defenders of this Opinion, but by all Men generally, we may fay, that the Queſtion comes to this, Whether (for example) a Man may fay, that ſuch a one is not at Home, or find out ſome Trick to free our ſelves from an indiſcreer and importunate perſon? I do not believe that any Man of Senſe will deny himſelf to have committed ſuch Faults, tho' he is forry for them. Nevertheleſs, there is no Medium ; either we muſt condemn our felves for it, or reſign our ſelves to the Indiſcretion, Imprudence, and otten to the Malice of another, by a general Sincerity, and without Reſerve, or we muſt allow a Permiffion to ſpeak and Act contrary to our Thoughts. Further, to Thew the Weakneſs of the Opinion I am now oppoſing, I defire it may be conſider'd, what Abſurdicies they engage themſelves in, who maintain the contrary Opinion: For theſe are three Maxims of St. Auguſtin, which Mr. La Placette approves in Part 1. Moral Eſays, 1. That if all Mankind were at the point of Deſtruction, and 'cwere poſſible to ſave them all by a Lye, the Lye muſt be avoided, and all Mankind perifh. 2. That if by telling a Lye we could prevent one or more of our Neighbours from finning, we ought rather to fuffer our Neighbour to fin, than tell a Lye. 3. If by Lying we could keep our Neighbour from Eternal Damnation, we ſhould father leave him to periſh, chan ſave him by the lofs of Truth. In fine, it is in no wiſe neceſſary to determine, when and how many times we are permitted to Lye, that depends upon Circumſtances, which are infinite, and every Man's Judgment. Here, as in many other Moral Subjects , we can give general Rules only. As often, as they to whom we ſpeak have no right to require of us to ſpeak freely what we think, we do them no Injury if we conceal the Truth from them. And to the diſguiſing of the Truth has nor che principal Property of a true Lye, which is to give them with whom we treat reaſon to complain, that we have not deale ſincerely with them. But it does not follow, that we may always ſpeak or act in a manner different from our Thoughts, when a perſon harh a Right to require the contrary of us. I have alledged the Reaſons that concern our felves above, or che Conſequences of taking too large a Liberty. I own that this Permiſſion may be eaſily abuſed, and therefore the fureſt way is to uſe it as little as poſſible; but a good uſe may be made of it, and in what a bad Cafe ſhall we be, if we muſt condemn and dif- uſe all thoſe things, by which Men take an occaſion to excuſe or juſtifie their Irregularities ? Buc, II. If it be true, as we have fhewed, that the Principles of Natural Right afford nothing to prove, that all Diſcourſe, and in general, every exteriour Sign differing from our Intentions and Knowledge, is criminal of it ſelf.' There is no evidence to prove that the Holy Scriprures condemns it abſolutely, at leaſt, if we may fay (what indeed I don't believe) that the Law which forbids Lying and Diffimula- tion, is a poſitive Law only. Thus we can't alledge any Text, either in the old or New Teſtament, where Lying or Diſfimula- tion is mention’d, but it is accompanied tvith ſome Fraud or Cheat, and by which at leaft fome Duey of Charicy is broken. No- thing is more common in the Writings of the Hebrews and Helleniſts, than to underſtand by Truch, Fidelity in keeping our En- gagements ; and by Lying, Perfidiouſneſs, Deceir , an Injury done our Neighbour, after ſome manner or other. The Reaſon that St. Paul gives for his Exhortation, To'avoid Lying, and speak the Truth every Man to his Neighbour, infinuates plain enough, that he did not extend his Prohibition to Lyes profitable, and altogether innocent. See Velthuyſen De Princ. Jufti Decori, where we may find Reflections which I have omitted. Farther, we may obſerve in the Scripture ſeveral Examples of good Men, who are not blamed for having uſed Diſfimulation, and an innocent Lye. See Mr. Le Clerc on Gen. 12. 13. Moreover, there is one that proves plainly, that it is ſometimes commendable to ſpeak contrary to what we think, and that is, of the Ægyptian Mid- wives mentioned before by the Bye. See Exod. 1, 20, 21. As to my felf, I think an unanſwerable Argument for niy Opinion may be drawn trom it, Tis evidenr, chefe Women' did not ſpeak the Truth to Pharaoh, and if any one doubt of it , he will be convinced, if he reads what Mr. Le Clerc ſays about it in his Remarks upon the 17th Queſtion of his Uncle ; and moſt of our In- ferpreters and Divikes agree with him. Nevertheleſs, God hath greatly rewarded that Lye, and conſequently not only excuſes is, but approves it. For it is an empty Meraphyfical Subclety to ſay, That God rewarded not the Lye, but the act of Mercy, which thoſe wiſe women thewed; as if one and the fame Adion could be good and evil in divers reſpects, or as if a good in- tention could render an Action, in its own Nature evil, good. But if this Example do not ſatisfie, behold another, which will make it plain, that God permirs , yea , reguires Tametimes, that Men ufe an innocent Deluſion, Tis of the Prophet who is ſpo- where King Ahab was to paſs , and cover'd himſelf with a Veil, that it might not be known that he waited for him; when he perceived him coming, he cried out, and implored his Help;' and he tells him how he came in that Condition by an Accident, which he had feigned. He ſays, That being in the middle of the Battle, a cerrain Man brought a Priſoner to him, and charged upon to keep him late upon pain of lite , of paying a Talent; bue while he was bufic up and" totvn, his Prifoner go away. Here- u on the King fends to the Propher that he had condemned himſelf ; and then the l'rophet unveiling himſelf, declared to him My God had ordered him to uſe tuch an artifice, wie. That Ahab might condemn himſelf by judging in the like Caſe. See Mr. Le Clerc's Nores upon the place. Covenant ati 104 Of Speech, and the Obligation wbicb attends it. BOOK IV. unu way of See the Story of Capell. Bafus in Tacit. Ann. 1. 16, Covenant to acquaint me with all the Diſcoveries confifts in a Conformity between Words and Things, and Informations he hath gain’d about that Matter, this Ethical or Moral Truth, of which we are now If I am to exerciſe towards another any Duty of treating, fuperadds the Intention and Obligation of Humanity, which muſt be pertori'd by Speech, it the Speaker: On which Score, he who declares the is manifeft my Words muſt be agreeable to my Truth out of Error or Imprudence, hath barely re- Thoughts and Intentions. If a Man undertake to cited the Logical Truth, but hath not exercis'a to write an Hiſtory (2), he is to deliver nothing the Moral. And he who blabs out any Matter which he knows to be Falfe, by virtue of that ge- without any Obligation in himſelf, or any Right neral Obligation by which we are bound to pro- in the other Party, ought to be eſteem'd rather an mote the Ŭſe and Benefit of others. As we are idle Pratler, than a Speaker of Truth. And hence likewiſe by a common Engagement tied to expreſs 'tis eaſie to gather, what muſt be the Nature of a our Minds by the cleareſt and plaineſt Signs, in all Lye; namely that it is, when our Signs or Words ſuch Caſes, when if we do otherwiſe, we may bring bear a different Senſe from our real Conceptions ; ſome hurt or prejudice on innocent perſons. So, whereas the perſon to whom the Signs were directed , Laſtly, in all Commerce and Buſineſs between Men, had a Right to underſtand, and to judge of thoſe in which, by the Conſent of the Partjes, ſome Right Conceptions; and we on our part lay under an or Obligation is to be produc'd, we are to declare Obligation to make him apprehend our Meaning, our Meaning openly and clearly to the Perſons with I take this to be a more clear and diſtinct whom we deal. For otherwiſe there could be no fhewing the Necellity we ſtand under to declare pofſible way of rightly adjuſting thoſe Concerns. our real and undiſguiſed Intentions, than if I ſhould But, ſince it doth not always fo happen, that I am derive the Sin and the Bareneſs of Lying, barely bound by any of theſe Rules to open my Thoughts from that General Rule of Natural Law, that No to another about any, Affair, eſpecially ſuch as is Man is to be hurt ; as if the whole Nature of a Lye private and particular; it is evident from hence, conſiſted in its power of hurting. For ſtrictly that I am not under an Engageinent to unfold all ſpeaking, we do not hurt another by with-holding my Opinions and Intentions to Men alike, but from him what he hath only an Imperfect Right to thole only which they have a right (either perfect receive ; and yet the Violation of ſuch an Imperfed or imperfect) to underſtand; which Right Suppo- Right is fufficient to conſtitute a Lye. For the ſame ſeth a correſpondeut Obligation on my part : And reaſon Philoſtratus's Notion of a Lye is confus’d and that therefore I may fairly conceal and diffemble unaccurate, when he reports ), That amongit thoſe things, which another hath no Right to know, ſome of the Indians, any Student in Philoſophy and which I my ſelf have no Obligation to dif- who was found guilty of this Vice, was renderd cloſe (a): Nay, 'in ſuch caſes, where no body elſe incapable of bearing any Magiſtracy or Honour, is injur'd in his Right, and where the Advantage Becauſe he had by Lying cheated the Common Society of or the Safety of my ſelf, or of fome other perſon, Mankind. But, as in all Acts by which we recede Cannot otherwiſe be procur’d, it ihall be allowable from Law, Error, Imprudence and Raſhneſs are for me to apply the common Signs in ſuch a man- diſtinguiſh'd from Malice, or Wicked Deſign, fo ner, as to expreſs what is really contrary to my neither is any Man properly ſaid to Lye, but he Judgment. For ſince the Compact about applying who with evil Intention, and pre-conceiva Ma- Signs in ſuch a certain way, bears a regard to o- lice, tells another what is really different from his ther Obligations, which are by the means of theſe Sentimeuts or Reſolutions, either to prejudice Signs to be fulfilld; therefore when thoſe Obliga- to delude him. And hence, he who having been tions ceaſe, there appears no reaſon why I may deceiv’d by another Man, delivers things which not make a different uſe of the Signs, if I injure he himſelf takes to be true, reports a Lye, but is no Man, and at the ſame time have no greater not hiinſelf the Lyar. Yet a perſon, who catch- Convenience of benefitting my ſelf or others. ing up things with too haſty a Credulity, after- VIII. Froin theſe Principles and Fundamental wards diſperſeth them amongſt others, expoſes him- Rules, it is eaſie to underſtand both the Nature of ſelf to the Cenſure of Raſhneſs and Folly. Nay, Truth, which Men are obliged to ſpeak and the ſpreading of another Man's Lye, or of a Mat- profeſs; and the Nature of a Lye, which is ſo ab- ter not certainly known, may in ſome Cafes bring Diſgrace (b)(1). The former then conſiſts in this , fuch a Publication approacheth near to that Tref- That the Signs which we make uſe of, and eſpeci- pafs which the Civilians term culpa lata (d) (2). ally our Words, do in a proper and convenient IX. Having thus difcover'd the true Source, and nianner repreſent our Thoughts to another, who the Genuine Foundation of Truth and of Lyes, we hath a Right to underſtand then; and to whom we may aſſure our felves, that thoſe Authors are mi- are boun:1, either by a Perfect or an Imperfect Ob- ſtaken, who aflert, That a Lye and an Untruth are ligation to diſcover thein: And this to the end, really the fame thing, and that he deſerves to be that he by apprehending our Meaning, may obtain branded with the Name of a Lyar, who ſays any fome Benefit, or may eſcape fome undeſerv'd E- thing differing from his Judginent, and that con- vil, which would have follow'd upon our decei- fequently to ipeak otherwiſe than we think, is in ving himn. So that beſides that Logical Truth, whirh (2) See what our Author has ſaid in his Diſcourſe, De Obligatione erga Patriam, $ 23. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 8. (1) See $ 10. following. See Lib. 3 c. 1 8 4 Nore 2. before going. (a) Æschyl. Cæphor.orgqv 0678, &c. v. 58o.The Art of Silence and of well terni'd Speech. 16) Sophocl. Tracbin. p. 347. Edit. H. Steph. as ir eu. Jego feudã rarbetal, &c. What Face ſo grievous to a Free-born Man As to be callid a Lyar Add Montaigne's Eſſays, 1. 10.91. 2 c. 18. (c) Apollon. Tyan. I. 2, (d) col, doc. or 2 Otterboid 1 to na (2) , 10 boyish of ? its Chap. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. IOS likewiſe belongs the ſleight of the Old Fox in Terence Heautontimor. Act. its own Nature baſe and finful. An Untruth is proclain his Reſolutions, for which reaſon the Ene- when you apply Words in ſuch a manner, as that my is not wont to believe what is given out in this another ſhall conceive from them a Senſe not a- free and ſecure manner, Ageſilaus by this piece of greeable to your inward* Imaginations. But now, Subtlety preváild on the Perfian Nobleman who If the other Party have no Right, by Virtue of oppos’d him, to march his Army quite another which he ought clearly to underſtand my Mean- way than what he had thus publiſh'd that he would ing; and if I do not hereby prejudice any Man take himſelf (/). without cauſe, there ſeems to be no reaſon, why, But as no Man will preſume to condemn the if I find it convenient for me, I may not uſe thoſe wiſe Gravity of Epaminondas (c), who could not Words rather according to my own pleaſure , than bear to utter a Lyė, tho' in jeft? So, on the other the pleaſure of another. Hence every Lye is an hand, it is very weak to believe, that a perſon al- Urtruth, but every Untruth cannot come under the ways incurs a heinous Guilt , when, without inju- Name of a Lye : And if we take Ariſtotle (1) in ring any one elſe, and for the advantage of himſelf this Senſe, when he affirms, That a Lye is in it ſelf and others, he delivers Words differing from his foul and diſgraceful , there will be no need of Gro: real Thoughts . It were therefore to be wiſh'd with tius's Limitation, who explains reb' autè, in it felf, Cicero (5), That all Simulation and Diſimulation were by Generally , or without regard to the Circumſtan- utterly banifd from Human Life , and that Men cés (a). For ſuch an Untruth as eſcapes Cenſure, were arriv'd at ſuch a happy Temper, as that no by virtue of fome particular Circumſtances, ought, one ſhould envy the Goods of another, or plot to on no account, to fuffer the odious Character of a rob hin of them, that no one ſhould abuſe the Lye. And, on the other ſide, that every Lye, pro- Simplicity and Credulity of others to their preju- perly ſo called, is in its own Nature baſe and ſcani- dice or deception: And, Laſtly, that no one ſhould dalous, ſeems to be beyond diſpute. in any inſtance reſiſt the Command of right Rea- It is worth remarking on this Head, that the ve- fon: Such a ſtrict and accompliſh'd perſon Achilles ry ſpeaking what is true inay ſometimes create and pretends to be in Homer (d); it is his Brave De- conftitute a Lye : Which not only happens when a claration, perſon affirins the Truth with the Air and Addreſs of a Lye, and by his (2) Manner, his Geſtures, and his 'Εχθρός και μοι πίνω ομως αΐδαο πύλμαν, Actions, which uſed to be as it were the Life and “Ό,γ έτερον μεν κεύθτι νι φρεσιν, άλλο και βάζει. Soul of Diſcourſe, makes his Hearers believe the contrary to what he delivers ; as Quintilian ſhews Like Hell I hate the Man, whoſe Tongue reveals us how 'tis poſſible to be guilty of a Lye, as well as A different Tale from what his Heart conceals. of a Solæciſm, by a baſe Action, when we ſpeak one thing, and hint another, by a Poſture or a Nod; But ſince he, who is ever freely publiſhing and de- but it chiefly takes place in thoſe, who by a pra- claring his own Concerns, lays himſelf open to the étice of frequent Lying, have depriv'd themſelves Fraud of wicked Men ; and ſince moſt perſons are of all Credit and Belief. Now ſuch perſonis as they inclined rather to be won upon by Artifice and are not eaſily regarded, how willing foever they Shew, than to be convinc'd by folid Plain-dealing; may be to deliver ſerious Truths; ſo they have an therefore it may not be adviſable for us to exclude opportunity of abuſing the diffidence of a Hearer (3), from Human Society, the Art of innocent Diflimu- to his deception and deluſion ; who thinking them lation, till all the Wickedneſs, and all the Folly to be always like themſelves, may eaſily be cheated of Mankind is turn’d into Probity and Wiſdom. by believing quite the contrary of what they averr. Pindar's Remark is excellent to this purpoſe, Nem. The inſtance in the Fable is well known, where the Od. 5. v. 30, &c. Boy ſo often tricked the Countrymmen with a falſe Alarm of the Wolf, that at length when the Wolt (6) Not Truth with open Face and open Heart really appear’d, he could not gain Credit enough Is ſerviceable always, always wife: for their Aſliſtance. Ageſilaus (4) turn’d this Fetch But often 'tis in Life the Nobleſt Art, into a Stratagem of War. For in as much as ’tis To know the prudent Uſe of Silence or Diſguiſe. reckond moſt impolitick in a General openly to Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 9. (1) His Words are, Kab' autó ý tò mis teúdo paviov, xj foxlov, Eth. Nicom. 1. 4. C. 13. (2) According to the Judgment of Quintilian, Inftit . Orar. l. 1. C. 5. In geſtu etiam nonnulli putant idem vitium ineffe, cum aliud voce, aliud nutu, vel manu demonftratur, which is the ſenſe of our Author. (3) 'Twas upon this Principle that the judicious Conduct of John de Vega was grounded, when he advis’d Diego de Mendoza, who ſucceeded him in his Embaffage, I hat he would not find the leaſt Truth in the Miniſters of that Court . Mendoza replied, Then they have met with their Match, for if they tell me one Lye, I'll tell them an hundred. But, ſays Vega, I took another courſe ſometimes, for I anſwer'd their Lyes with as many Truths; and I found that it turned to as good an account : For they never believed me. Thus we ſee how Lyars may be deceived. This is related by John Anton. de Vera in Diſc, 2. concerning an Ambaffador, quoted by Amelot de la Housſaie upon the 13th Letter of Oſat. (4) Here we may add ſome Verſes of Horace, Epiſt.). 1. Ep. 17. v. 55, Nota refert Meretricis acumina, fæpe catellam, Sepe periſcelidem raptam fibi flentis, uti mox Nulla fides damnis, veriſq; doloribus adfit, &c. (s) offic. 1. 3. C. 15. Quod Aquilliana definitio vera est , ex omni vita ſimulatio, diſinulatioque tollenda eſt. Cicero ſpeaks here on- y of Feigning and Difimulation, accompanied with injuſtice and Falle-dealing ; although in the manner our Author exprefles it in the Original, he leems to take the Orator's Words in a general ſenſe, as Grotius has indeed done in 13. of the Chapter often quored. See Mr. Noodt, De Forma emendandi doli mali in contra&tibus admiſſi apud Veteres, c. 2. (6) Pindar's Greek is this, oſ TOLá Treou regdiwr Και το πγαν πολλάκις οι σοφώ- Πο Φαίνουσα πρόσωπον αλάτες ατρακής τατον, ανθρώπων νοήσαι (a) Lib. 3 c. 1 f. g. (b) Xenophon Rer Græcar. I. 3. p. 292. Edit. H. Steph. Cornel. Nep, in Ageſil. c. 3. To this Head 4. Scen. 3. (c) See Cornel. Nep. c. 3. 6. I. † O Theſeus's (d) Iliad. 9. v. 312, 313. 106 Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. Book IV. every C6 Theſeus's Wifh in Euripides, Hippol. Coron, v. 925, in explaining. Some conceive, that ſince both God &c. is but vain and fruitleſs. Though 'tis certain and Men have a Natural Ability to underſtand the at the fame time, that he who makes uſe of theſe Truth,which is obſtructed by the contrary Speeches , practices of Concealment and Cunning, farther therefore they have on this very account, a Right than is neceſſary for his own Defence, renders him- of requiring others to expreſs themſelves in an in- ſelf unfit to be truſted, and uncapable of being telligible manner. Now with regard to Almighty dealt with in any honeſt Affair or Bulineſs ; in as God, the thing is beyond diſpute: For to uſe any much as 'tis impoflible, but that ſuch a perſon muſt kind of Falſity in our Addrelies to him, is not on- be ſuſpected in all that he ſays or does. ly extremely irreverent, as if bare and open Truth The Arguments by which fome attempt to prove were not as prevalent with the Divine Majeſty, as that Untruth is in it ſelf odious and ſinful, Colours and Fictions, but alſo in the higheſt de- are of no weight. They tell us, “ That the Falſe gree fooliſh, ſince God doth not ſtand in need of Speaker defileth and diſgraceth his Tongue, that the Information of Men. And therefore Cain () “ moft Noble Member, by ſuch an abuſe : That he was not only impious, but ſtupid, in endeavouring deprives himſelf of Credit, to the great ſtop and to conceal his Brother’s Murder from God, eſpeci- “ hindrance of many good Offices amongſt Men; ally by fo impudent and ſo rude a Reply. And “ ſince he never fails to gain this amongſt other thus far that of Sophocles (b) will hold good, I hate Advantages, not to be believed though he Jpeak the a Man, who being taken in Wickedneſs, attempts to “ Truth. But this Charge holds good only againſt make his Excuſe. But otherwiſe, this is no good a ſtrict and proper Lye, not againſt fuch Falſities Conſequence; a perſon is naturally capable of un- as Prudence oiten adviſeth and recominends. They derſtanding a matter, therefore he hath a Right to add, “ That to falſifie, argues a Man to be of a underſtand it; nor doth a Phyſical Ability always “ low and abject Spirit; ſince he who could relie infer a Moral. As for that which ſome add to what upon ſolid Plainneſs and Truth, would have no we are now ſaying, That he who hears an Untruth, neen to ſeek Refuge in Tricks and Shifts. But doth yet underſtand the Words; and therefore that thoſe Untruths which are both innocent and unne- Falfe-ſpeaking doth not take away the Right of ceſſary, do not always proceed from meanneſs of Underſtanding; this is nothing at all to the purpoſe . Soul : And ſometimes, amongſt wicked Men, Ho- For ſuch an one underſtands indeed; but he un- neſty and Truth it ſelf cannot be ſupported, but derſtands only a Shadow and Fiction, inſtead of by indirect and artificial Methods. Others are the Truth which he deſires. more fond of this Argument ;“ Speech is given to Others there are which derive that Right which “ be an Interpreter of the Mind; ſince then every is violated by Lying, not from Nature, but from “ Untruth is contrary to this End, it ought like- the Art of Men; that is, from ſome facit Com- “ wife to be eſteem'd repugnant to the Order of pact: For, ſay they, ſince Diſcourſe, and other the “ Nature: And farther, that to have the Tongue like Marks and Tokens were introduc'd by Hu- “ differ from the Mind, quite diſturbs that Har, man Inſtitution, Men at the ſame time laid a mony which ſhould appear in the Powers and mutual Obligation on each other to uſe theſe ſigns “ Faculties of Man. In Reply, we willingly al- in ſuch a manner, as to be able hence to make a low, that Speech is the Interpreter of the Mind; Judgment of the perſon's Sentiinents, with whom but 'tis in ſuch a manner, as that it ought not to they ſhould confer (2): Becauſe, without ſuch an blab out more than the Mind gives it commiſſion Obligation, and if every perſon were allow'd to to diſcloſe, the Mind being to judge what is con- apply Words how he pleas'd, and to hinder others venient to be declared, and what to be concealed. from apprehending his Meaning, this invention of X. We have aſſerted every Lye to be a Viola- Signs had been altogether vain and fruitleſs. This tion of ſome Right; but what kind of Right this is, is the Opinion of Grotius (), on which we inay and how acquired by Men (1), all are not agreed make this Remark, That there is not ſufficient Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 10. (1) Our Author (in s 8. before going) recites the words of Philoſtratus, De Vit. Apoll. Tyan. Lib. 2. C. 12. That among the Indians, if a Student in Philoſophy was taken in a Lye, he was condemned not to be capable of any Office or Dignity, becauſe by Lying he would deſtroy the univerſal Society of all Mankind, as muegmýcvla Biov áuggér. The Reaſon which our Au, thor makes uſe of upon this occafion is very improper to diſcover diſtinctly the Foulneſs of Lying; but he had done becter, if he had ſaid, that Philoſtratus fpeaks nothing of it: For this is one of the places where our Author miſtakes the ſenſe of the Writer he quotes. For theſe are his Words, When any Indian is dead, there is a Magiſtrate appointed to go to the dead “ perſon's Houſe, and enquire how he hath liv’d. If that Magiſtrate Lye, or ſuffer himſelf to be deceived for want of making os an exact Enquiry, the Laws put him out of his office, and render him incapable of all Offices. Becauſe he has repreſented " the Man's Life otherwiſe than it was. This is all Philoſtratus ſays, I. 2.C. 30. (2) Mr. Plecette in his Treatiſe of Lying, c. 6. affirms, That chat which makes a Lye evil, is the Sin commitred, and nor the Original Compact, which is much eaſier to imagine than prove; but a New and Particular Compact, which is made with them to whom we ſpeak, every time we ſpeak to them. For indeed, adds he, when I ſpeak to any Man, I do ewo things, I oblige my Telf to ſpeak what I think, and require that he ſhould believe me. If he to whom I ſpeak believes what I ſay, the Bargaia is not only made but executed on the part of him to whom I ſpake. If I Lye on my part, I break the Treaty L'am making with him, and conſequently I ſin againſt the Law of Nature, which requires, that all Agreements be faithfully executed. When he to whom I ſpeak retuſes to believe what I ſay, and ſo accepts not the Agreement i propound, he ſtill appears to diſcredit my Proceedings, as if I deſigned to make an Agreement which I would not keep. So that whether a Man believes whar 1 ſay,, or not, I am always obliged to ſpeak Truth. But I fear that this New and Particular Compact of Mr. Placette will be more hard to prove than the Original Compact, which he rejects. For in both theſe forts of Agreements the Confent is implied only. There ought to be ſomething to secure it by a clear Conſequence. And ſo it lies upon Mr. Placette to prove that this New and Parti- cular Compact reſults from the very Nature of the Action, which we always do when we ſpeak to any other, (i, e) from the Nature of Speech, conſider'd barely as ſuch. I own, chac the Natural Intention of Speech is to communicate our Thoughts one to another, but it is ſufficient that we do it on all occaſions when any one hath right to require it. The ettablith'd Cuſtom and Good of Society require no more. Farther, as I have already ſaid in Nore 1. Men never pretend to engage to ſpeak always, and to all the world, whatever they have in their mind; ſo that they never reſerve to themſelves a liberty of thewing a contrary in- tencion by their 'Actions or words, and no Man may reaſonably require the like of others. (a) Genef. 4. 9. (b) Antigone. p. 234. init. Edit, H. Steph. (c) Lib. 3 c. 1f. 11. Care Chap. I.1 Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. 107 (1) ’Agroãv, on Tó feudo ex vit7ov 11. Barbeyrac's NOTES on (Clerc to could Care taken in it to diſtinguiſh between thoſe two Sign equivalent to Speech ; yet our Silence may on Obligations, one of which regards the applying another account become Criminal: As ſuppoſe we Signs in general in ſuch a due manner, that ano- hinder by it fome Good which we were obligd to ther may underſtand our Thoughts; and the other procure ; or cauſe ſome Evil, which we were bound engageth us to di cover by thoſe Signs our real to avert. This is what the Poet calls Meaning to ſuch or ſuch a particular perſon ; which two are very different, and proceed from diſtinct -----animumque nefás Scelerare filendo, Sil. Ital. 1. 16. Principles : For in as much as Words borrow their Signification from the Force of Impoſition, we The Soul with ſilent Miſchief to defile. muſt ſuppoſe fome (3) Agreement to have paſſed between Men who ſpeak the ſame Language, that Thus a Watchman who is ſet to give notice of the in cominon uſe they would apply ſuch Signs to Enemies Approach, ſhall incur the fevereſt Puniſh expreſs ſuch things. But the Obligation which ties ment upon Neglect of Information. Polybius (a) (1) me actually to addreſs thoſe Signs to another, or ſays, That an Hiſtorian who profejeth to give an ac- to open my Mind to him about ſuch a certain Affair, connt of Affairs, is no leſs a Lyar, if he ſuppreſs and ariſeth either' from ſome general Command of the conceal what really happen'd, than if he relate what is Law of Nature, or from a particular Covenant, as falje. But in a matter which I am not obliged to has been above explain'd. Hence it appears what declare to another, if I cannot with Safety conceal Judgment we ſhould make of their Notion, who the whole, I may fairly diſcover no more than a deny the Nature of a Lye to conſiſt in the Viola- part. An inſtance of this is uſually given in the tion of a Pact on this Principle, “ That whatever Caſe of Jeremiah, who in the 38th Chapter of his « is conſtituted, not by Nature, but by the Com- Prephecy, v. 25, &c. (b) being conſulted by the pact of Men (eſpecially, Tacit) is to be derived King concerning the iſſue of the Siege, prudently “ and to be valued from the point of Profit, and hides that Particular from the Princes, as the King from that alone. Whereas that Men ſhould under- exprefly order'd him; aſſigning another Reaſon of ſtand all that others ſay, doth not ſeem to be a thing the Conference, which notwithſtanding was alſo ſo very profitable and beneficial . On the contrary, it really true. Here the Prophet told only a part of is much for our Intereſt , that we ſhould have a full the Truth, being no wife obliged to diſcloſe the liberty of covering either with Silence or proper Co- whole . To the ſame purpoſe the Story of Athana lours, ſuch Matters as may be kept ſecret without the fius is produced, who meeting himfelf with thoſe Prejudice of other Men, and with our own Advan- who were ſent to apprehend him, and being ask’d; tage . Here thoſe Points are confounded, which Whether he had ſeen Athanaſius, anſwer’d, That he ought to have been with Accuracy diſtinguiſh'd. saw him lately paſs by this way, and that he was now For in this, That a Man fhould underſtand the gone on Board. For here he was under no Obliga- Thoughts of all others; or that all others ſhould un- tion to betray himſelf. As to the Example of derſtand his, there is indeed no Profit ; nor did Men Abraham in Geneſis 20. 12. ſome queſtion whether by introducing of Speech, lay any ſuch mutual Ob- that moſt Holy Man acted prudently in calling ligation on themſelves. But we have already Sarab his Siſter, and concealing their Marriage : ſhewn how far any perſon is bound to declare hiin- For he knew her Beauty to be ſuch, as might kin- ſelf to another, and how far the other hath a Right dle a Pallion in the Beholders, and at the ſame time o underſtand him. Suppoſing then an Obligation that Unmarried Perſons are reckon’d more capable in us to communicate our Thoughts to ſuch or ſuch of Addreſſes than others (2). Nor, ſay they, was a Man, upon this the other Obligation which at- Abimelech’s Expoſtulation with him unjuſt: And tended the Introduction of Speech falls in, and ex on the contrary, it was moſt inhuman in A- erts its Force, engaging us ſo to apply our Words, braham to ſuppoſe that there was no Piety, or Ho- that the Party may apprehend our Meaning. And neſty in a State, before he arrived to be their In- of this the Profit or Advantage is ſo very great, ſtructor. Others excuſe the Patriarch on this that without it there would be no manner of uſe Argument, That the hope of Life commonly bends the greateſt and moſt ſtubborn Souls, and that XI. Thus much being premiſed, it will not be ſcarce any thing is look'd on as baſe and infamous difficult to judge how rightly thoſe ſeveral Cafes which is undertaken on the ſcore of declining in which the Truth is not preciſe ſpoken, are yet Death. But this point we leave undecided. in common Eſtimation, exempted frum the Chara XII. Grotius diſtinguiſhes likewiſe between thoſe cter of Lyes. And here firſt of all ſome diſtinguiſh Signs which have been invented and determin’d between ſpeaking what is Falſe, and not ſpeaking were cursinns or with a mutual Obligation, and other or diſſembling ſome part of what is True ; affirm- things about which no ſuch Agreement hath paſs’d: ing the former to be unlawful, but the latter to (For no doubt when a Compact hath been made be often innocent. On which point we are to know concerning the uſe of any thing, we are exactly to that although to hold our Tongue cannot properly conform to that ſpecified Uſe.)" And as to the lat- be term’d a Lye, eſpecially if we uſed 10 other ter ſort, he is of Opinion, that 'tis allowable to (3) This is true; but, as is aboveſaid, that Confenc has no Obligation in it felf; and if there were no other Reaſon to lay a Neceflicy upon us to make known our senciments , nothing would hinder but chat every one might fignifie what he pleaſed by all Terms, To that of the two Obligations, of which our Author (peaks, one is only a Condition neceſſary to acquit us of the other. Mr. ix baina 7.200őla regoorlas ir ä сais isdeidrs, 1. 12. c. 7. . hot be his wife , or to put off his Anſwer about his Marriage, till he could get out of Ægypt. Whereas, had he owded her for his wife, he had laid Snares for his own Life to take him off, and get rid of him; becaule he was the only obſtacle that hinde- red the Enjoyment of Sarah. (4) Lib. 12 c. 77.660.B. Edit. Caſdub. Wech. (6) Sce Grot. I. 3 c. I f. 7. + O 2 miſapply to in Speech. od 101 Sow biuo 108 Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. Book IV. LG CG miſapply them, even when we foreſee that the o only juſtifiable when they ſerve for the Inftru- ther Party will thence be led into a falſe Judgment, étion of one committed to our Care; or for the provided either that no farther hurt follow this de avoiding fome pernicious and inſnaring Queſti- ception, or that the hurt which follows it is (ſetting on (b); or for the procuring fome Benefit to our aſide the Confideration of the Deceit) lawful; and “ ſelves, without the Damage of others (c): For when we might fairly have hurt him in an open elfe, if you are under an Obligation to diſcover manner: And to this we willingly ſubſcribe. For your Mind clearly to me, 'tis the fame thing whe- ſince no Agreement, either general or particular, ther you deceive me by a plain Lye, or by a doubt is ſupposd to have paſs’d, which might have laid ful Expreſſion : Eſpecially ſince the latter muſt , to a Neceſſity on me to aprly the thing in ſuch a ſerve your purpoſe, be fo frain’d and contriv'd , manner, and no otherwiſe, to the end that the ſaid that I may lay hold on the more obvious and vul Party might gather my Meaning from it; there- gar ſenſe, whilſt the more abſtruſe and uncommon fore I am preſumed to be left at full liberty as to anſwers to your inward Conceptions : Otherwiſe , its Uſe, ſo long as I hurt no Man injuriouſly, or if both Significations are alike probable, ſcarce any without Cauſe. The Party may thank himſelf for perſon will be fo fupinely negligent, as not to ask the wrong Notion he hath form’d; and attribute it you which way you would be underſtood ? But to to his over curious Impertinence in paſſing Judg- ſpeak ambiguouſly or obſcurely to one whom we ment on other Mens Buſineſs . Whilft I am exerciſing intend to inſtruct, or whoſe Proficiency we would my proper Right I am not always obliged to hinder thus try and examine, is on no account faulty; if another from taking up a falſe Opinion in other re the good End we propoſe may by this mean be {pects harmlefs. For inſtance , if a Man to keep him- better obtain'd, than by more plain and direct Ap- felf from being frighted in the Night, or to have a plication. To this purpoſe is the inſtance in St. John Light always at hand for ſome occaſion, should 6. v. 5, &c.(d). So if I am not obligd to declare ſleep with a Candle in his Chamber ; he is not my Mind at all to ſuch or ſuch a perſon, nothing bound to put it out, how deeply ſoever his Neigh- hinders but that I may as well let him be miſta bour may fanfie that he ſits up at his Buſineſs. The ken, as let him be ignorant, if beſides that Miſtake , Example of our Saviour, Luke 24. 28. is a Caſe of he incur no other undeſerv'd Prejudice. And there no Difficulty. For every Man inay at his plea fore no one will cenſure Athanaſius (1) for the De fure uſe the Geſture there repreſented:1 And no- ception he put on his Purſuers, which we have thing is in common Life more frequent, than to already recited (e). feign our felves in a readineſs to be gone, that It is hence evident, that we ought to interpret we may diſcover whether or no we are welcome Grotius with fome Caution, when he ſays (7) Gueſts : We being ſeriouſly reſolved to depart, un It is requiſite to the general Notion of a Lye , leſs we are follicited and importun'd to ſtay: The “ that what is either ſpoken or written, or by any Caſe of St. Paul in Acts 16. 3. ſeems a Matter of “ Marks and Tokens expreſs’d, cannot otherwiſe higher Confideration (1). But as to the other in “ be underſtood, than in ſuch a ſenſe as is different ſtance alledged by Grotius, of deceiving an Enemy, “ from the intention of the perſon thus declaring . by counterfeiting Flight, Cloaths, Colours, Sails , For in Caſes where a Man is bound clearly to diſ- Arms, and the like; this Practice is allowable be- cover his Meaning, he ought ſo to frame his Ex- yond diſpute; ſince we might lawfully have done preſſions, as that the ſame ſenſe which either the him what Miſchief we could, by the moſt plain Nature of the Buſineſs in hand, or the common and open Means. Uſe and Cuſtom of Speech ſuggeſts, ſhall be like- XIII. It is the Judgment of the fame Author (a), wife agreeable to his real Thoughts: Nor can he, « That we do not always contract the guilt of with the leaſt reaſon, bid the Hearer thank him « Lying, when we uſe an ambiguous Word or Ex- felf for the Miſtake or Damage he ſuffers, only on preflion, which admits of divers Significations, the account of not diving into all the remote Quirks “ either in common Speech, or by the Cuſtom of and Terms of Expreſſion utterly foreign to the pre- Art, or by fome Figure unuſual or not intelligible, ſent Affair; that is , for not being a Conjurer . And * provided our inward Meaning is agreeable to the Remark of Iſocrates (8) muſt be own’d for a any one of theſe Significations ; although we be certain Truth (2), That to uſe ambiguous Sayings in I lieve that the perſon to whom we ſpeak will un- Fudicial Contentions about Bargains , and Matters “ derſtand it in a different ſenſe . But he very of Intereſt and Moment, is ſcandalouſly baſe, and rightly adds, That fuch Equivocal Speeches are fliews a very high degree of Wickedneſs. not rafhly to be approv'd of and allow'd , being liustin osad Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES 01 $ 12. (1) We may be well ſatisfied with whar Grotius hath ſaid about this Matter, which I ſhall ſet down. . St. Paul was not igno- rane that the Jews went this way, that the Command to be circumciſed, which was then aboliſhed, did yet oblige the Poftericy of the Iſraelites, and as even St. Paul and Timothy himſelf were once perſuaded. But this was not in St. Paul's intention, buc his Deſign was thereby to gain a familiar Converfe himſelf with the Jews, and procure it at the ſame time for Timothy. In truth, che very fame Moment that the Divine Law which commanded Circumciſion was abrogated, Circumciſion could no longer be a ſign of the Inſtitution which every one was indiſpenſably to bear. But the Evil, which the Error in which the Jews were for some time, and which chey ought to be deliver'd from, was not to conſiderable as the Good which St. Paul labour'd to draw from it, I mean the Eſtablithment of the Doctrine of the Goſpel The Greek Fathers ofeen give the Name of Oeconomy or Wife Management to this Diſfimulation, doc. See Gataker upon Marcus Antoninus, l. 11. $ 9. Mr. Barbeyrat's NOTES on § 13. 5 (1) See the News of the Republick of Learning, March 1699. 2) ΤΙς Greek is, Oής χρήξει λίρις αμφιβόλοις πρ μεν συμβολαίον, και πλεονεξίας αρνιζόμενον αισχρoν, και πονηρίας και μικρός Pustov. (a) De Æquivocis, l. 3 C. I $ 10 n. 1, 2. (6) Vid. Senec. Troad. v. 597, Gr. (c) 1 Sam. 27. 10. (d) Vid. Grot. ubi fupra. (e) Vid. Theod. Hift . Ecclef. 1. 3. c. 9. (f) Lib.3. C. I . 11 n, s. (6) Panathenaic. 486 Edit. Par . 1621. XIV. Much Chap. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation mbich attends it. iOS XIV. Much more ought we to abhor and deteſt will make an entire Propoſition; which taken in thoſe Mental Reſervations (1), which the wicked that united ſenſe, ſhall not be falſe. As for in- Artifice of ſome Men hath invented, by wreſting ſtance, if I ſay, I am not a Prieſt; keeping this Words to a quite contrary Senſe to what they out- Clauſe in my Mind, ſo as to be under any Obligation wardly and plainly import, and this even in of telling you that I am ; this whole Propoſition ta- Caſes where there was an Obligation to ſpeak the ken together ſtill be true, I am not a Prieſt , ſo as Truth, and in Affertions confirm'd by Oath. The to be under any Obligation of telling you that I am. Effect of which is that a perſon ſeems outwardly to But in as much as Diſcourſe was invented with re- affirm what he inwardly intends to deny, and ſo gard to others, not that every Man ſhould talk to vice verſa . A Practice by which the whole Uſe himſelf; fo the Truth or Falihood of it is mea- and Deſign of Speech is utterly perverted, 10 Man ſur'd according to that which we openly declare being ſure in what ſenſe he ought to take the words to thoſe with whoin we converſe. of another. Nor is the Invention leſs abſurd than XV. That we are not guilty of Lying, tho' we it is pernicious. For ſince Diſcourſe was originally ſpeak a thing which bears a wrong Signification (1), introduced as a Means, of declaring what we con to Children or Perſons out of their Senſes, is gene- ceive in our Minds; and ſince our Thoughts, ſo rally aſſerted; and therefore 'tis thought very al- long as they do not come abroad, are of no manner lowable. The Reaſon allign’d by Grotius (*) is; of Uſe or Effect in Humane Life ; by what Autho- Becauſe fince ſuch Perſons have not the liberty of rity can theſe ſecret Reſerves, fo repugnant to the Judging, they cannot Juffer Injury with reſpect to that common Cuſtom of Mankind, take away that Ef- liberty which they want. This Principle we do not fect which the uttering of Words would otherwiſe take to be ſufficient: For to ſpeak chiefly of the naturally produce ? Thus much indeed is uſual Caſe of Infants, it is plain indeed, that they ſo with us, to annex to a General Expreſſion ſome far want the Faculty of Judgment, as ſimply and Tacit Condition or Reſtriction, taken from the rafhly to catch at any thing, ſpoken or repreſented ſubject Matter, or ſome other Circumſtances; by to them in a wrong manner; not being able by Means of which we dextrouſly adapt our Speech to Reaſoning to diſtinguiſh Truth from Falfhood: the Buſineſs under Debate, and free it from Confu- Yet ſince they make a part of Mankind, and on fion or Inconvenience. But where would be the that account have a Right not to be hurt by others, Reaſon, or where the Subtlety of my Proceeding? as they have likewiſe to receive the common Office If , for inſtance, being ask'd, whether I have done of Humanity, and to be furniſhed with good No- ſuch a thing, I ſwear I have not done it, meaning tions, particularly by their Parents, and thoſe who another thing, or the fame at another time? Or, if have the Care of their Education (b), and are at when a Man deſires Money of me, I tell him, I leaſt capable of apprehending what is eaſie and fa- bave none ; that is, none to give him? Or, if I pro- miliar; we are by all Means to hold, that they miſe that I will give it him; that is, meerly for have thus far the ſame Right with Perſons of ad- Form and Faſhion's fake, ſo as to take it immedi- vanced Age, that what ought to be ſhewn or de- ately again? 'Tis a fooliſh Argument which is ur- clar'd to them, ſhall be propoſed in ſuch manner ged to excuſe ſuch perſons from the Sins of Lying as that they may underſtand it. But for as much and of Perjury, That they do not indeed ſpeak that as through the weakneſs of their Reaſon, and the particular determinate Truth which the Hearers ap- ſtrength of their Paſſions, they have ſcarce any Re- prebend, and which the Words imply, yet they Speak liſh for plain Truths, therefore 'tis convenient to another Truth of a different kind. As if it were at inſtruct them by Fables, and to keep them in Awe all ſatisfactory to my Queſtion, to be told a Truth by falſe Terrors, till ſuch time as they grow weary of any other different kind, and utterly foreign to of Trifles, and are able to apprehend and to value the Buſineſs which I ain now upon : Or, as if a the real Solidity of things. And thus we addreſs Man did at all promote my Purpoſe, or the Rea- to them by Fiétion and Diſguiſe, not to ſport with ſon of my Enquiry, if when I ask of Chalk, he an- their Ignorance, or to procure their Harm; but on- ſwers me of Cheeſe (a).! No leſs ridiculous is that ly becauſe they cannot well be applied to in any other Plea, that if in theſe Caſes we put the open more ſerious Method of Information (2). Strabo is Speech and the Mental Reſervation together, they slot mai Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 14. ok (1) See Mr. Placette in his Treatiſe of Lying, doc. c. 8. DO DIA Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $15. ( For the ſame Reaſon we may invent ſomething falſe to deceive an Infant innocently, and to accommodate our ſelves to its Capacity: As alſo, we may ſo behave our ſelves towards ſuch as uſe feeble Reaſonings, either becauſe they think them well grounded, ſince they are ſuitable to their Underſtandings, or they are pre poffeſs'd, and there is no other way to make them re ceive the moſt profitable Truth. Hence it is, that we find in the New Teſtament ſeveral Texts of the old deliver'd in a ſenſe in which the femos commonly underſtood them, tho’ they did not agree to the Original; and ſeveral Arguments ad hominem foun. ded upon them, or upon other Opinions of the Jews, which were falſe and uncertain. See the Latin Notes of Mr. Le Clerc up- on the New Teſtament, and particularly upon the Epiſtle of the Galatians, and his Parrbafiana, Tom. I. of the firſt Edition, pag. 82. doc. So (*) Grotius's Words are, Quia cum illis non fit Judicii Libertas, non poteft eis circa illam Libertatem injuria fieris (2) Lucretius expreſſeth this by a fine Similitude, 1. 1. V. 935, &c. RTSed veturi pueris abfinthia tetra medentes Phyficians uſe Cum dare conantur, prius oras Pocula circum In giving Children Draughts of bitter Juice Contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore, To make them cake it, cinge the Cup with Sweets Pe puerorum etas improvida ludificetur, To cheat the Lip: this firſt they eager meet, tenus ; interea perpotet amarum Abfinthi laticem, deceptaque non capiatur, And then drink on, and take the bitter Draught, And ſo are harmleſly deceivd, not caught : Sed potius tali fa&to recreata valeſcat. For by this Cheat they get their Health, their Eaſe, So the Mother in Theocritus, Idyll. 15.4.40 Their Vigour, Strength, and baffle the Diſeaſe. Mr. Creeche -έκ άξώ το τέκνον· ωσμω, δεκγei ίππο. You muſt not go, my dear Delight, (a) Add Mr. Pascal's Letters Provincial, Lett. 9. For there are Bug-bears, and the Horfes bice. (6) Add Mat. 18.10. admirable ΙΙΟ Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. Book IV. CC CG J (2) She knew that the four de la Fontaine, and the Diſcourſe of Mr. Buddeus, Entitled, Philoſophus Fabularum Amator, among his Analetta Hi! CC place. atly yo 2017 I. p. 13 admirable on this point (3) (a): “ Not the Poets their Medicines to the Patient's Strength and Con- alone, ſays he, but long before them Publick So- ftitution. Since then 10 Perſon can be ſaid to have < cieties and States made choice of the Art of Fa- had a Right of hearing Words under ſuch a Form bles; and the Lawgivers themſelves, in regard as would have prov'd fatal to him, it cannot be to the common Advantage, when they had firſt properly affirm'd, That there is any waving or re- “ reflected on the Genius and Temper of Rational mitting of Right in the preſent Cafe. And then “ Creatures . For Man is led on with a moſt gree- for the Speaker, ſince he was in his part obliged to dy Deſire of Knowledge ; and our earthly Ac- perform this Office through the mediation of Speech, quaintance with theſe feigned Relations, is the either by the Law of Humanity, or by fome ftri- firſt ſtep this Pasſion makes towards its own Sa- cter Engagement, 'tis manifeft, that he cannot be “ tisfaction. Here Children begin their Informa- bound to apply his Speech in ſuch a manner as tion, and willingly improve their Stock, for the ſhall make it loſe its End and Effect . Therefore fake of communicating it to others. The Reaſon all ſuch feign’d Speeches, as either ſave and protect “ of all this is, becauſe Fables do ever carry fome- Innocence, appeaſe Rage, afſwage Grief, or pro- “ what of Novelty in them, whilſt they report cure any Benefit or Convenience to others , which not common and conſiſtent Things, but what is could not have been obtain'd by direct and open very ſtrange and unuſual. But now whatſoever Expreſſions, are not only to be exempted from the “ is thus new and ſurprizing, and what Men never number of Lyes, but to be applauded as ſo many “ head of before, cannot fail to be ſweet and agree- Inſtances of Wiſdom, Vid. Exod. 1. 17, 19. 1 Sam. “ able: And 'tis this which breeds in them a cove-19, 12, & c. 20. 5. 28, 29. 2 Sam. 14.4, & c. 2 Cor. tous Sollicitude, and an Eagerneſs after farther 9.2, 3, 4. Plin. l. 3. Epiſt. 16. Of Arria, Hor. “ Delight. In caſe the Story be wonderful and pro- Od. 1 3. 11. v. 35, 36. Of Hypermneſtra: digious, this Delight is highly increas’d; which Froita “ is the Bait that tempts the Young Learners to Splendide mendax & in omne virgo Induſtry and Study. It is fit therefore that they Nobilis ævum. “Thould at Firſt be thus caught and inſnar'd with « Pleaſures but when they have attain’d to a more mature Age, they are to be diſciplina and Gallantly falfe, and prais'd in Endleſs Fame. < inſtructed in the Solid Knowledge of Things; Euripid. Phæniſs. v. 998, &c. Sadi Roſar. Perfic . " their Mind and Judgment being now ſtrengthned c. 1. A beneficial Falſity is better than a deſtructive « and confirm’d, and they no longer ſtanding in need Truth. Heliodor. Æthiop. 1 1. c. 3. p. 52. Edit . “ of being flatter'd and humour'd in their Good (b). Ludg. Bat. Feigned Speeches are then good and com- In the ſame manner it is very lawful to apply Fi- mendable, when they turn to the advantage of the Hea- ctions to Perſons out of their Senſes, in all ſuch rer, and do not prejudice the Speaker (1). We have Caſes where they are not capable of apprehending a famous Example of this proceeding in the Story true Reaſon. of (2) Rahab the Harlot, Joſh. 11.4. And though XVI. And indeed, all in General,upon whom we Grotius obſerves on this place, that before the Go- cannot by plain Speech obtain the good end we de- Spel , a Lye which contributed to the preſervation of fign, we may, without the Cenfure of Lying, by "Good Men, was not eſteem'd faulty; and that therefore feign’d Addreſſes, lead into a Miftake, for their this A&t is commended by the Apoſtles, Heb. 11. 31. own Intereſt and Safety. Nor is it needful to draw and James 2. 25. as agreeable to the Times in which it the Reaſon of this Practice from hence; That was perform’d; yet ’tis our Judgment, that the ſame we may 1 preſume, in fuch a Caſe, the other Par- thing may even now be lawfully done, provided ty will not think hard of our Treſpaſs on his Li- no Civil Obligation be prejudiced by it (e). To “ berty of Judginent; nay, That he will give us the fame Head belongs the Caſe of thoſe Comman- “ thanks for the Advantage he receives from it: ders, who in the heat of an Engagement raiſe the “. And therefore what is done with his Conſent and drooping Spirits of their Men by ſome falſe Inſinu- « Approbation, can be no Injury to him. For heation or Report, on the ſtrength of which Encou- had indeed a Right, That our Speech ſhould pro- ragement they may force their way to Victory and care him foine Benefit, or deliver him from fome Safety : Or thoſe, who before a Battle, leſſen and Miſchief; but not that it ſhould produce the quite undervalue the Number of the Enemy. Vid. Cor: contrary Effect; which it would have done, had he nel. Nep. Eumen. C. 3. The like Inſtances are fre- underſtood the plain Buſineſs without Art or Co- quent in all Hiſtories. Xenoph. Apomn, 1. 4. p. 462, lour. And therefore in theſe Cafes, we ought as 463. Edit. Græc. H. Steph. If a General obſerving much to accommodate our Diſcourſe to the Tem- bis Men to be in a Confternation, falfly tells them that per and Condition of the Hearer, as Phyſicians do there are freſh Succours ready at band, for their Re- bib yororonor poorly (3) The Greek is, Και πρωθον ότι τες μύθος ανελέξανθο, έκ οι ποιηται μόνον, αλλά και αι πόλης πολύ πρότερον και οι νομοθέται, σε χρησίμα χάeur , βλάψαντες εις το φυσικόν πείνα τα λογικά ζών. Φιλολίμαν και ο άνθρωπG, προοίμιον και τότε το φιλόμυθος ντεύθεν έν άρχεται τα παιδία ακροάται και κοινωνείν λόγων επί πλείον. "Αιτιον σε όη καινολογία της επιν ο μύθο και τα καθεσικολα Φράζων, αλλ' έπεα παρ' αύτα, λούσε το καινόν, δ μα πρόπρον έγνω της: τύτο δ' αυτό έσιν, και το ποιες φιλειδίμονα. Όταν με προση και το θαύμασον, ο πεφτώδες έπτείνει την ηδονήν, ήπις εσι τα μανθάνειν φίλτρων. Καταρχάς μενών ανάγκη τοιύτοις δε λέασιν χρήθαι πε5ιέσης σε ηλικίας έπί τήν τών όντων μαθησιν άγαν, ήδη διανοίας έβρωμένης, και μηκέπ δεομένης κολάκων, 1. 1 p. 19, aniu( 730 id to erigun Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $15. (1) The Greek 15, Καλόν και πότε και το ψεύος, όταν αφελών τες λόγωνίας, μεν καλαζλάθη τις ακέονlας. the part of a good Citizen in hiding the Spyes of a People who came to invade their Country. See Mr. Le Clerc's Nore upon that 13. George 8) See See the Fables of Æsop, peculiarly recommended by Philoftratus, Apollon. I. 5.c.5. As alfa ftoriæ Philosophica. sid(e) Add Socrat. Ecclef . Hift. I. 3. C. 12. 19 dbA lief; aldsitas Chap. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. . III Shail lief , and by this Stratagem compoſeth their Fears, and Erafiftratus, Phyſician to King Seleucus, in making keeps them'in beart; under what Species of Actious him believe that his Son Antiochus was in Love we reckon it? In all appearance under thoſe that with his Wife, may be admitted into this Number, e juſt and good. In Sophocles (Philo&tet, v. 108, 109.) Vid. Lucian, De Dea Syra. The Conduct of Joſeph when Neoptolemus asks Ulyles , (*) Don't you think is juſtifiable on the like account, who to work his it baſe to affirm a Faljity? His Anſwer is, No, in cafe Brothers to a ſerious Repentance for their Crime the Falſity be a means of Safety. Add Frontin. Stratag. in ſelling him, and to judge how they ſtood affe- 1. 1. c. 11. 1. 2. c. 7. Polyan. 1. 1. C. 33. Stratag. Of cted towards his Father, and towards Benjamin, held Leotychydes, Maxim. Tyrius, Differt. 3. p. 29. Edit them a long tiſne in Conſternation and Suſpence Ludg. The bare telling the Truth is no ſuch brave and by feigned Accuſations (l). Laſtly, that the Fa- comely thing, unleſs it be done to the benefit of thoſe bles of the Poets, by which they inſinuated Truth we are to infruct. Thus a Phyſician often deceives under a taking Diſguiſe, are not to be condemnd his Patients, a General his Soldiers, a Maſter of a for Criminal Falſities, every one will eaſily ad- Ship his Crew, and we cenſure neither of them upon mit (c). And thus far the Saying of Sophocles will this account. For in fome Cafes, a feigned Story doth hold good, Men good, when the plain Truth would do them harm (3). Though I know not whether Ageſilaus's Δοκώ με έδέν ρήμα συν κέρδει κακόν (α). Stratagem of this kind deſerves Commendation; I judge no Speech amiſs that is of Uſe (5). who when he ſaw his Soldiers in ſome Fright and Concern at their being like to be over-power'd by, XVII. The Governors of States may ſometimes the oppoſite Forces, wrote in his Hand the Word tco very lawfully uſe a manner of Speaking not VICTORY; and taking the Beaſt's Liver out ſtrictly true (e); in as much as their Counſels and from the Sacrificer, printed thoſe Letters upon it, Reſolutions, if divulg’d, frequently come to no- and then thew'd it to the Troops, as a Divine Pro- thing, or perhaps turn to the prejudice of the Com- miſe of Succeſs (a). For the ſame Reaſon Phyſici- monwealth. And therefore when bare Silence is ans are not to be accounted Lyars, when they per- not a ſufficient Covering, they may veil their De- fwade a nice or a froward Patient of the Sweetneſs ſigns with feigned Speeches to divert the Curioſity or Mildneſs of what they apply for his Cure. Liban. of inquiſitive Men. Lying, ſays Plato (1) (f), is Declam. 29. p. 664. D. Edit. Pariſ. Morell. We ſee uſeful to Mankind only in the way of Phyſick; and the Phyſicians beguiling their Patient's Appetite with therefore ſhould be allowed to Publick Phyſicians, but harmleſs Deceits. The ſame we ought to practiſe to- ought not to be touch'd by Private Patients. Princes wards thoſe that are in Health, ſo often as ’twould be and Governors (if any Perfons elſe) may be permitted better for thein to be deceiv'd, than to be truly in- to uſe the Same Stratagem (2), either for the Ruin of form’d. (4) Yet I queſtion whether the Artifice of the Enemy, the Preſervation of the Subjects, or any that it may by my (*) The Greek is, Neopr. Ουκ αισχρον ηγα ολα τα ψεύδη λίγων. Uly fes, Ουκ εί το σωθίώαι και το ψεύδο φέρε. (3) The Greek is, Ουδέν και στεμνόν τ' αληθή λέγειν, ει μη έγνοιτο επ' αγαθό τα μαλύντος, έτω και ιατρός νοσένα εξαπατά, και Κρατερός ερατοπεδον, και κυβερνήτης ναυλας ; και δείγον έδεν, αλλα ήδη ψευδG ώνησαν ανθρώπες, και το αληθές έβλαψεν. (4) The Greek 15, Και μεν και της ιατρες δρώμεν τας των καμνόνων επιθυμίας απάσαις αναβάλλονίας ή διπε και πρG υμαι όνας TXTO Tošusy, ota ġ ugætlov, ti s' dange's drãoul TÒ Tagxgx añoad. But our Author, who quores this Paffage, alſo obſerves, be doubted, whether we may uſe that as an innocent Chear, which Erafoſtratus made uſe of to cure the Prince Anti. ochus, who was in Love with his Mother in-Law Stratonice. We may find the Scory in Lucian's Work, De Dea Syriaca, and Mr. Fontinelle's Dialogues of the Dead, both Ancient and Modern, Dial. 5. Our Author a liccle higher alſo diſallows a piece of Craft which Ageſilaus made uſe of to encourage his Soldiers: Without doubt, becauſe it contain’d an Affront to the Deity: . (5) Buc thele Words do not ſignifie what our Author ſuppoſes, following the Latin Tranſlation (not excepting the Oxford Edi. tion in 1705. of the two Tragedies of this poet.) There is nothing that one may not ſpeak innocently, if it tends to our Advan- tage. Mr. Dacier tranſlates them differently, but perhaps to no better purpoſe. He gives us the whole train of the Diſcourſe, to thew us that theſe words ought to have a different Senfe. At length, faith Oreſtes, what evil is it to me if I paſs for Dead, if Ifhew Adions that I am full of life, and I have gain'd an Immortal Name? As for me, I am perſuaded there can be no tad Preſage, where there is lo much Profit. But there may be, as I believe, a better Tranſlation given, more agreeable to o e. ftes's Thoughts, and to the Greek thus, I am perfuaded that no Report can tend to our Diſhonour, and hurt our Reputation, when ſo much Profit may ariſe from it. This appears from what follows. How many of the Sages, who were for a long time taken for Dead, have returned to Life again, and were the more honoured by all the world ? I hope I (ha I have the ſame good luck, and after the Report of my Death is ditperfed every where, I ſhall of a ſudden appear again to my Enemies, &c. In theſe latt Words the Original thus imports, a ne or çhuns a te, &c. From whence it appears , that põua is the ſame as gørin. In fine , We may compare this Expreſſion, piñuel sexov, with a like one in the New Teſtament, Happy are ye, when Men Shall speak all manner of evil (zão cornega põuce) againſt you falfly, Macch. 5, II. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 17. ) The Greek is, 'Aragamois så faüst zsúmuov, as cv paquára eider Süno", % 71 73 74 torstoy ialegas obrtov, idratals Tois da does müav o* anleov iš toi678. We ought to obierve, that Plato treats here of ſuch Lyes only as concern a State, as inpears by what follows, and does by no means condemn ſuch innocent Lyes as private Men uſe one with another. This Philofo. pher at the End of the foregoing Dialogue owns, that there is a profitable Lye, which is not to be hated. As for Example, when of Speaks a falſe thing to ones Enemy, or well to thoſe Friends who agree not, to hinder fome Miſchief. This is a Medicine which we ought to uſe. Here Plato keeps to the Notion of a Medicine, and repreſents the Sovereign and his inferior Magi. frares as to many Publick Phyſicians, who alone confequently may make uſe of a Lye for the Benefit of the State. But he al- Ways ſuppoſes, that in Matters that do not concern the Government, whoever can procure an advantage to another by a Lye, Or fome other innocent Fallacy, he is really a Phyſician to whom it belongs to adminiſter that Medicine, Ti Se dh; to ev teis λόγους ψεύδο, πότε και τι χρήσιμον, ώστε να αξιον είναι μίσος αρ και προς τα τές πολεμίες, και των καλυμένων φίλων , όταν δια Por Leg bus, Lib. 2. & Lib. 11.** Soehnle Grotius had not throughly examined the fence of plafo, when he ſays, That that Philo- fopher ſeems ſometimes to allow, and ſometimes to deny Phyſicians properly ſo called, a liberty to ſpeak contrary to their Thoughts ; and Gronovius, who criticizes on Grotius , does not much mend the Matter, 'affirming, that Plato allows it only to (2) See what our Author ſays in his Diſcourſe, De Concordia Vere Politice cum Relig. Chriſtiana, $ 10. (a) Plutarch Apoth. Lacon. p. 214. E. T. 2. Edit. Wech. (6) Gen. 42, &c. Joſeph. Antiq. Jud. I. 2. C. 3. (c) Vid. Plutarch (d) Electra, v. 61. (e) Vid. Grot, 1. 3. C. 1 $ 15, (f) De Republ. I. 3 p. 611 Edit, Wech, way ४ 34 Magiſtrates and Phyſicians. de audiend, Poet, I I 2 Of Speech, and the Obligation wbich attends it. Book IV. a way for the advantage of the Community : But all third Man, I do not contract the Guilt of Lying in other's ought ſtrictly to abſtain from this Practice. A reſpect of Him, becauſe I have no buſineſs with famous Instance we have in Solomon's Judgment, him, and conſequently he hath no Right to under- 1 Kings 3. 25. And fo Claudius in Sueton (a), brought ſtand my Sentiments. So that if he take up a falſe Woman to own her Son, whom ſhe firſt, on pro- Notion, from Expreſſions applied to another Per- bable Arguments, deny’d, by commanding her to fon, not to himſelf, he is to lay all the blame on marry him. Thus a Father and a Son being ar- his own Curioſity and Impertinence. But leaft raign’d together for Murther of a Prieſt, when it this Poſition ſhould be abuſed to ill purpoſe, we could not be made out which of the two had com are to add as a neceſſary Caution, That 'tis by no mitted the Fact, each refuſing to accuſe the other; mean, allowable for two Perſons to make uſe of Charlemagne, as we are told, gave Sentence of Death ſuch Occaſions as theſe by way of Stratagem to upon them both; upon which, the Father confeſs’d delude or expoſe a Third. For although it himſelt the Murtherer. So, it being a Law in Spain; never ſo true, that this Third Man hath not a per- That in caſe a Female Slave be with Child by her fect Right to know my Judginent, yet the Law of Maſter, ſhe ſhall be iminediately reſtor’d to Li- Humanity and Charity requires that my Speech do berty: Once it happen’d that a Nobleman's Maid not occalion his undeſerved Prejudice. Therefore was diſcover'd to be in this Condition; the Noble- we ought on all accounts to make this diſtinction, niran denied the thing, and the Proofs alledg’d not whether the Third Party overhears our Diſcourſe being evident, King Alphonſo order'd the Child to without his cwn Fault, or whether either out of a be publickly ſold into Servitude ; the News of bulie or a malicious Huinour, he purpoſely intrudes which Sentence inov’d the Father to diſcover himſelf . into our Secrets. And therefore this Allertion chiefly So when Neleus, being about to lead abroad a Colony, holds good againſt thoſe Inquiſitive Goſliping was commanded by the Southſayers to purge his Knaves, who make it their employment treache- Army of all polluted Perfors; he pretended that he rouſly to catch up what other Perſons drop in pri- himſelf had murder'd a Child, and ſo ſtood in need vate Company. Now when we apprehend our of Expiation; and by this means perſuading others felves to be watch'd by ſuch fly Deſigners, and to confeſs themſelves guilty, he left all thoſe be- yet are not inclin’d to be altogether filent, we hind him, whom he had thus convicted of Impu- are wont to diſappoint their bufie Curioſity, by rity (b). Tis a Proverb with the Spaniards, Tell throwing in a ſett of Talk quite impertinent to the a Lye, and you'll get out the Truth. To the fame Affair which we were before debating; or by agree- Head belongs the Diffimulation and Concealment ing to tell ſome Story, which our Politick Eves- about the Sickneſs or Death of Princes, for the pre- dropper hugging as a mighty Diſcovery, may, up- vention of Tumults. Though we are not willing on his communicating it to others, be ſufficiently to extend this Liberty ſo far as to juſtifie the Po- laugh’d at for his Pains; provided neither he nor litick Devices of Numa (c). Nor will the ſame Pri- any Perſon elſe ſuffer any farther damage by this vilege hold at all in the caſe of Promiſes and En- Contrivance. Contrivance. We know very well 'tis a general gagements (d). Duty, not to leſſen the Honour and Reputation of XVIII. But farther, Grotius (e) having thus af- others, nor to ridicule and expoſe them. Yet, as ſerted, “ That every Lye ariſeth from the im- we do not think our felves guilty of any Sin, when pairing of fome Right which one Man may have we diſcover the Miſtake of another, fuppoſing it to underſtand the Mind of another ; concludes to be done without either Bitterneſs or Infolence , “ from hence, That we cannot be charg’d with (things ſo unworthy of Men of Senſe and Breeding) of this Fault (1), when we direct a feigned Dif- although we ſhould hereby rather diminiſh, in ſome courſe to one who is not deceiv'd by it, though reſpect, than improve his Credit : So what ſhould a third Perſon ſhould thence happen to enter- hinder us from correcting a Fault in a Man's Mo- “ tain a wrong Opinion. For 'tis to be ſuppos’d rals, when it proves troubleſome to us, even by that I, and he to whom I addreſs’d my felt , are Sport and Ridicule, that we way incline him to tranſacting fome private Buſineſs, which doth not leave off the Habit ? For to amend and reform o- at all belong to the Perſon who overhears us. thers cannot therefore be judg’d unlawful, becauſe Therefore the Man with whom I ain dealing is it tends to the Diſparagement of their Worth and certainly not deceiv’d with my manner of Speech, Excellency. Thus, ſince 'tis the common Intereſt becauſe he well apprehends my Meaning by it; of Mankind, that each Man ſhould not underſtand juſt as if I ſhould relate a Fable, or uſe an Irony the Secrets of all, it is eſtabliih'd as 'twere by the or Hyperbole to one who krew, how to put the general Conſent of Nations, that (2) ſeal'd Letters right Conſtruction upon the Words. And as for the ihould be open'd by him only to whom they are directed ſeri- (a) Cap. 15. (b) Ælian 1. 8. c. 5. (c) Add Polyan. Stratagem. 1. 2. in Epaminond. n. 6, & 12. Polyb. 1. 16. C. II. (d) Add Bacon's Eff. 6. (e) Lib. 3 C.I$ 13 n. 1. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 18. (1) Some of the Fathers of the Church, as Grotius obſerves, recite here the Cenſure which St. Paul paſs’d on St. Peter, who being at Antioch, withdrew himſelf from the Company of the new converted Gentiles, becauſe he would not offend the Jews, Gal. 2. 11, Goc. For fay St. Chryfoftome and St. Jerome, St. Peter knew very well that St. Paul did not cenfure him in carneft, but did it ſeemingly only to comply with the Weakneſs of the Brethren preſent. But 'tis plain, that St. Paul ſpoke very oufly, and blames St. Peter's Carriage, as attended with inexcuſable Hypocriſy, becauſe by withdrawing from the Gentiles, he gave an occaſion to believe that the obſervation of the Ceremonies of Moſes's Law were abſolutely neceffary to render them ac. ceprable to God; and this is contrary to the End and Deſign of the Goſpel. See the Interpreters on the place. (2) See Mr. H rtius's Diſcourſe, De Commeatu Literarum, 63 in Tom. T. of his Comments, and finall Tracts, where he alſo oblerves, that it has always been taken for a great Incivility and an inhumane Baleneſs, to publiſh the Letters we receive from others, becauſe it may produce ſome Prejudice to the Writer. Upon which occafion it may be reaſonable to rehearſe the brisk Reproof which Cicero gave Marc Antony long ago. He alſo read a Lerrer, which he ſaid he had received from me “ without Humanity; and who knows not what it is to live! For is there any Man, who has convers'd fo little with honeft Meas « O Man Chap. 1. Of Speech; and the Obligation which attends it, II3 directed: Therefore if I find any Perſon intercep- haps the foriner do not hereby ſuffer any particular ting and ſearching my Letters, it can be no Crime Hurt: For indeed to be thus made the Inſtrument if I contrive to let foine Writing fall into his Hands, of deceiving another, is in it ſelf mean and un- which ſhall give hiin no great Satisfaction in the worthy: And as for our part, 'tis the ſame thing, reading. As a greedy Boy who hath got a trick of whether we abuſe a Man immediately by our own plundering the Cupboard, fuffers no Injury, ifamongſt Act, or by the Intervention of ſome Perſon elſe, the other Proviſion he meets with a Bait not very whom we have ſuborn’d for that Service. Though ſweet or favoury. It was a pleaſant piece of De- 'tis an Art which many practiſe; firſt, to cheat ception, that which Herodotus (a) reports of Nito- thoſe whom they intend to make uſe of for the cris or Semiramis, who order’d the following Words cheating of others. Vid. Senec. Thyeſt . v. 320. As to be engraven on her Sepulchre, If any Babylonian Davus obſerves (6), there's a great deal of difference, Prince happens to be in great Diſtreſs for Money, let ex animo, omnia, ut fert Natura, facias, an de indu- bim open this Tomb, and take out as much as he plea- ftria? Whether a Man acts according to real Inten- feth. 'King Darius (3) afterwards removing the tion and the plain Guidance of Nature, or accord- Stone, found no Treaſure, but only this Rebuke, ing to the Affectation of Art and Deſign, Terent. If thou hadft not been inſatiably Covetous, thou wouldji Andr. Act. 4 Scen. 4. Add Gell. 1. 12. C. 12. never have plunder'd Cöfins to enrich thee: Or, as XIX. This is manifeſt, that ſince the Obligation Maximus Tyrius (6) gives the Story, All Curſes fol- to diſcloſe our Mind ceaſeth with regard to Ene- low thee, thou moſt greedy of Mankind; who for the mies, it cannot fall under the Sin of Lying, to give Jake of Gold boji preſum’d to diſturb and violate the them a feign'd Relation (e), to terrify them with Dead (*). To give Credit to ſuch Inſcriptions is falſe Rumours, or any way to procure their Preju- no more an Arguinent of Avarice than Folly. In dice, provided no undeſerved Loſs or Damage en- the Story of Papyrius in Gellius (4) (c); the Sena- fue to a Third Party who is our Friend. For why tors rightly commend the Cauſe of the Young Gen- may not we by Stratagem and Subtlety, and with- tleman's Fiction; that is; the Wit and Secrecy of out endangering our own Perſons, hurt him whom fo unexperienc'd Years; but adjudge the manner we have Licenſe to attack with open Violence ? of it to be a little undutiful and diſreſpe&tful to The Reaſon why ſome have diſdaind this Method his Mother ; eſpecially ſince the Jeft occafion'da of Hoftility (f), was not becauſe they thought any Petition not much to the Honour and Credit of Right to be violated by it, but becauſe among the the Ladies, That one Wife ſhould rather have two moft Fierce and Martial Souls no Action again an Husbands, than one Husband two Wives. Nor Enemy is look’d on as Glorious, but ſuch as carries could I ever prevail with my ſelf to be heartily in it fome ſort of Vigour and force of Body and angry with that Senator in Plutarch (d), who to di- Mind. But what we ſpeak about deceiving and vert his Wife's Importunity in asking about the Se circumventing an Enemy, is by no means to be crets of the Houſe, told her a ſtrange Tale of a extended to any (1) Pacts or Treaties ſet on foot Quail (s), faid to be ſeen fly through the Forum about concluding or intermitting the War. For with a Golden Helmet. Though he ought indeed ſince the Law of Nature commands us to maintain at the ſame time to have taken care that this bab- Peace as far as may be done with Convenience, bling. Dame ſhould not put others into a ground- and to repair any Breach that may happen in it, lefs. Fright by her Report. For then the preſent we muſt ſuppoſe our ſelves commanded at the ſame Miſtake, which laſted but an inſtant, would have time to uſe thoſe Means without which this End been ſufficiently recompenced by the Diverſion and can ne'er be obtain’d. But now Enemies cannot Satisfaction which follow'd it. Now if we are poſſibly come to an Accommodation, unleſs there bound to uſe Caution, that the Perſon whom we be on both ſides an Obligation to the clear Diſco- have juſtly and deſervedly impos’d upon, ſhould very of their Mind, in reference to what is tranſ- not deceive others; much leſs will it be allowable acted between them; and conſequently unleſs their to perſuade one Man of what is falſe, with deſign Mutual Diffidence be remov'd by a Neceſſity and that he may delude a third Perſon; although per- Engagement to ſpeak the Truth in all Articles and as upon a llttle bangle with a Friend to make no ſcruple to publiſh and read the Letters he has received from him before all & the World? Is it nor to baniſh all Friendſhip out of the World, to take away the liberty of Friends writing one to another when they are abſent? How many Trifles do we put into our Letters, which being divulged, will appear ridiculous ? And how many ſerious things, which ought not to be made publick ? At etiam Literas, quas me fibi miſisje diceret, recitavit. Homo, do bumanit atis expers, &* vite communis ignarus! Quis enim unquam, qui paululum modo boriorum conſuetudinem nôfſet ? Literas ad fe ab amico miſ as offenfione aliqua interpofita, in medium protulit, palamq; recitavit ? Quid eft aliud tollere è vita vite ſocietatem, quam tollere amicorum colloquia abſentium? quam multa fica folent else in Épiftolis, qua prolată fi fint, inepte videantur . quam multa feria, neque enim ullo modo divulganda, Philip. 2. 4. See an Example of this indiſcreet Rudeneſs in the News of the Republick of Ler- ters, December 1665, where Mr. Bayle cenfures the Author of the Dialogue between Photinus and Ireneus; doc. which was the tamous Mr. Gautier a Miniſter. (3) This Example ſeems not much to our Author's purpoſe, relating only the manner how Darius was cheated by the Inſcrip- tion which Nitocris Queen of Babylon had caufed to be engraved on her Tomb. For, ſays he, he muſt be a ſimple and covetous Man to believe ſuch an Inſcription. * The Greek 15, Ω παιων ανθρώπων απληκότατε, ός έτλης νεκρά θίγον δι' έρωτά χρύσε. (4) Mo But fome Men ſuſpect it to be more a Fable. See Mr. Thomaſius's Nevi Juriſpr. Rom. p. 126. Bouhours relates this Story alſo in French in his Diſcourſes between Ariſteas and Eugenius, Diſc. 3. concerning a Secret. $5) Our Author calls it a Quail, but the Original is Kógus G, a Lark. Madam Dacier gives us in, is, Do you think that there is but ſmall difference in things done by Natural Inftinet, and on a ſudden, and I cane ſee whac the Paflage here alledged by the Author makes to his purpoſe. For the true Tranflation of them (as fucb as are done by Premeditation and Conſult at ion? Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 19. (1) See what is ſaid, I. 50.98 3. And 1. 8. c. 7, 8. (a) Lib. 1. p.48. Edit. H. Sterh. (b) Diſertat. 10. in fin. Vid. Olearii Itin. Perfic. 1. 4. c. 7. (c) Lib. I. c. 23. (4) De Garrulitate, p. 507. Tom. 2. Edit. Wech. (e) See Grof. I. § c. il. 17, 18. ( ) Vid. Grót. ubi fupra do 1. 2o. + P Conditions 114 Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. Book IV. ώσπες Τρέχοντα εαν και δεσμε, δεν έαν και ξημίας αποτίγονία: έαν 3 φυγής, φεύρνα: έαν και θανάτε, αποθνήσκολα. Ια Gor- Conditions of Peace. And when 'tis afferted as Due: And, Secondly, that fit Puniſhments may Lawful to delude or miſchief an Enemy by any be inflicted for the Correction and Reſtraint, both feignºd Report ; this ought on no account to be car- of thoſe who have dared with wicked purpoſe , ried ſo far as to juſtifie the ipreading of falſe Crimes actually to violate the Rights of others; and of and Imputations, in order to the impairing his thoſe too, who by reaſon of their cold Affection to Honour and Credit. The ſtate of Hoftility doth wards Juſtice, would have proceeded to the fame indeed licenfe me to conceal my Meaning from Commiſſions, did they not dread the ſuffering thoſe my Foe, or by ſcattering falſe News to open my Evils, which they have ſeen fall ſo heavily on way to his Hurt. But he that goes about to charge other Offenders. Now, to decline the Severity of an Enemy with any grievous Crime, and would this Proceſs, ſome think it by no means allowable have his Accuſation believ'd by thoſe who are at to make uſe of falſe Speeches. Firſt, becauſe the peace with him, muſt lay aſide all the Stratagems Judge hath an eſpecial Right to underſtand the and Deceits of War; and ſet up for an Affertor of Truth. Wherefore, neither the Sanctity of the plain Truths ; and therefore with regard to thoſe Magiſtrate, who preſides in the Name of God, nor Perſons who are ſuppos’d to be his Hearers, he is the Neceſſity which the Subject lies under to Obe- to play the part of an Hiſtorian, or ordinary Rela- dience, will give the leaſt place or countenance to tor. Whence, if he voluntarily recede from the Contumacy or Circumvention. Beſides, they ſay , Truth and Reality of things, he cannot avoid the this Permillion appears rather dangerous than need? double Guilt of Lying and Slandering. Again, to ful or beneficial; in as much as conceald Crimes charge an Enemy falily to his Face, is a Mark of do the more Miſchief. Eſpecially if what is deli- a low and impotent Reviler. To return Lyes for ver'd in excuſe, be not only falſe in Faet, but in Lyes, is to imitate the Folly and Vanity of the Theory; every ſuch Untruth being of ill Confe- Adverfàry (a). As for the Notion of Lipfius, in quence, not only conſider'd by it ſelf, but likewiſe his Treatiſe of Politicks (b), who reckoning up the in regard that one Error gives Occaſion and Riſe Perſons towards whom we may be allowed to pra- to an infinite Train of others. Yet the contrary &tiſe Simulation or Diffimulation, joyns Foreigners Opinion is by many preferr’d; who ſay, we ought to Enemies; this ought no farther to be admitted, to diſtinguiſh in every Crime between the Damage than as it is for our Advantage to hide our Deſigns done, and the baſe Guilt or Commiſſion; to the or our Affairs from their Notice. For that we former of which Reftitution properly anſwers, and ſhould by feign'd Speeches procure their Harm or to the latter Puniſhment. By the Law of Nature Loſs, is what Nature it felt will not bear; on ac- every Man ought to make Reſtitution for Damage count of that Nearneſs of Blood by which all Man- occaſion’d by his Fault ; and at the ſame time the kind ſtand related and allied to each other. ſuffering Party ought, upon his Sorrow and Repa- XX. 'Tis a Queſtion of more Difficulty, Whether ration, to admit him to Pardon. Therefore every a Criminal or an Offender arraigud on any, Ac- Guilty Perſon is, by an Obligation ſtrictly fo call'd, count may deny the Fact (1) with which he is bound to be always ready to repair any Damage charg’d, or endeavour to elude the Accufation by he hath caus’d. feign d Arguments, and yet not incur the Guilt of But no Man is tied to offer up himſelf freely Lying. And here we do not ſpeak of the Divine to Puniſhment, and to be an Informer againſt him- Tribunal, in reſpect of which the ſafeſt Courſe is, felf. So that if the Fact be not known, and an to fly immediately to humble Confeſfion, and an open (2) Reſtitution would be a Confeffion of the earneſt imploring of Pardon : Since it would not Guilt, in this Cafe the Reſtitution is to be made be leſs Impiety than Folly, to uſe Excuſes or De- in ſome indirect and ſecret manner. All Puniſh- nials before an Omnipotent Judge. And 'twas on ment muſt be inflicted upon Men againſt their this Principle that Foſhua made the Exhortation Wills; otherwiſe it could never obtain its due End, to Achan, which we have in Joſh. 7. 19, 20. For which is to deter the preſent Offender, and all o- there the Criminal was before detected by the ther Perſons from Sin. But whatever we lay under Hand of Heaven. The preſent Enquiry therefore an Obligation to perform, is to be undertaken by is confin'l to Humane Judgments; which are prin- our own free and voluntary Motion. Since then cipally deſign'd for theſe two Ends and Uſes : Firſt , no Perſon is properly obliged to invite and call that every Man Man may obtain what is his Right and down Puniſhment on his own Head (3) (c), but Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 20. (1) Plato without doubt took the Negative Part here. For he will not allow a Private Perſon to Lye before a Magiſtrate , and ſays, 'tis a greater fault, than for a Sick Man to Lye to his Phyſician, a Scholar co his Mafter, doc. His Words are, Anna πρής γε τοιύτες άχνίας ψεύστώαι, και μείζον αμάρτημα φήσομω, ή κάμνονλι προς Ίαθρον, ή ασκει προς παιδο- Jeibny, migi tev še euro wuslo na dnud TWD uħ thv dalgarv, doc. De Repub. 1. 3. p. 389. Nay, he goes farther, and main- tains, that every one of his own accord is to accuſe himſelf and Relations, that they may ſuffer the Puniſhments which the Law his Words imporc. μ τις υπολάζος κατηρεάν , μάλιστα μεν εαυτό έπειτα 3 και των οικείων, και των άλλων, ός αν αει των φίλων υγχάνη άθικών, και μη αποκρυπεθαι, αλλ' εις το φανερόν άγειν το α- κημα, ένα δω δίκίω, και υγιής γενεθαι, 'Αναγκάζειν και και αυτόν, και τις άλλες μη αποδελιών, άλλα παρέχειν μύσαλα και ανδρείας, for, car si , gia, p. 480. (2) Mr. Thomaſius, who in his Treatiſe, De Juriſpr. Divin. 1. 2.C. 8. $ 85, doc. is of a contrary Judgment to our Author, ob jects, that the Condition of making good the Damage, cauſes , that the crime can't be concealed, as is ſuppoſed; becauſe by & Gent, where he changes his opinion, and ſays, That the guilty Perſon may, either by way of Accommodatiou, or by Friends , ſatisfie the Perſon injured in ſuch a manner, that he hall not know who it was that wrong á him, or if he has ſome knowledge of him, the thing ſhall not be ſo nocorious as to bring him to Puniſhment. (3) 'The words are, Ignoſcendum cenſuerunt Principes, ei qui ſanguinem ſuum qualiteo, qualiter redemptum voluit. (a) Add Mr. Paſcal's Epiſt . 15. cum Annotat. (6) Lib. 4 C.540. 32. (c) Vid. Digeſt. 48. cit. 21. de bonis eorum qui ante ſentent. dc. leg T. muſt, Chap. I. Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. 115 nd Al- make ufe of feign'd Arguments and falſe Colours; muft, indeed, as he is a Man, Naturally abhor it or to embrace the Ingenuity of an Open Acknow- in the higheſt degree ; eſpecially if it tend to Death, ledgment, is a Point which belongs to another kind or ſome other grievous Evil; there appears no rea- of Enquiry, not to that which we are now engag’d ſon why he may not decline it any way pollible, in, and which confines it felf to Matters of ſtrict provided he do not hereby injure a third Party (a). Duty, what a Man is bound to do, and what not (7). Nor can it much conduce to the Intereſt of a Com- Which of theſe two Opinions ought to be choſen monwealth, that after Reparation hath been made rather than the other, any Man will apprehend, for the Dainage, any ſuch Fact, as we nuw ſpeak who hath Judgment enough to weigh the Argu- of , ihould be punilh'd ; that is, a Fact not open ments offer'd on both ſides. 'Tis very remarkable, and notorious, and which conſequently might be that which Haythor reports in his Hiſtory of the diſguis’d or excuſed by ſome Colour or Plea. There Tartars, c.48. That although in other reſpekts they fore, as none but a Fool will deny inanifeſt Faults , are moſt notorious Lyars , yet in two things they ſtrictly lo from what hath been here alledg’d, it ſeems 'al- obſerve the Truth : Firſt, That no Man among them lowable for a Man to wipe off an Imputation by a arrogates to himſelf the Glory of an Exploit which he Falſe Defence. Tho' for a Priſoner to urge Falſe really hath not perform’d: And, Secondly, That who- Opinions, can ſeldom turn to his advantage, the ever ever hath committed a Crime, though ſuch as he knows Court being ſuppos’d well skill'd in Right and E- will coſt him his Life, when examin'd by his Lord, nei quity. A Judge indeed hath Power and Liberty ver conceals the Matter. And amongſt the Japoneſe to get out the Truth by any pollible Means (4) to be diſcover'd in a Lye before the Judge is a Ca- in caſe the Fact be of ſuch Conſequence, that the pital Offence. Safety of the Publick abſolutely requires it ſhould XXI. But 'twill be ask'd, What liberty may the be puniſh’d. And therefore he cannot be tax?d with Council or the Advocate fáirly take in this Čaſe ? Lying, if to bring the Party to a Confeffion, he Our Opinion is, that we ought here to diſtinguiſh make uſe of ſome Stratagem of Fiction : As ſup- between Civil Caſes and Criminal. In the former poſe, by pretending that he hath receiv'd full in- it doth not appear that the Advocate can with a fortation ſome other way, or by threatning that fafe Conſcience hinder the injurd Party from ob- he will proceed to ſuch or ſuch Severities, if the taining his Rigħt as ſoon as poſſibly he may. And Perſon accus'd perſiſt in his Obſtinacy, and the like. therefore in fuch Controverſies, we condemn, as un- But it cannot hence prefently be concluded, that lawful, not only falſe Allegations and feign'd Rea- the Criminal himſelf is bound to own the Charge: ſons, but likewiſe all dilatory Exceptions and De- Becauſe neither doth every Power which denotes murs ; in as much as all theſe are a Let and Hin- the bare exerciſe of ſome Act, infer an (5) Obliga. drance to the one Party from paying what he owes; tion in the Object towards which it is directed : and to the other from receiving what is due to And beſides, there are other ways for the Judge to him (c): But in Criminal Caſes, where the Dif- penetrate into the Buſineſs, as by Arguments and pute regards only the Puniſhment, we judge it Witneſſes, which Witneſſes, when examind about ought farther to be conſider’d, whether the Council the Crimes of others, are obliged, though unſworn, be aſſign?d by the Publick Authority, or by the to declare the Truth, in Obenience to the Com- particular Appointment of the Priſoner. If by the mand of Authority. Farther, Self-preſervation is former, it doth not ſeein allowable for them to much lowance, that 'tis reckond odious to puniſh the fince the Deſign of the Court in deputing them, moft Notorious Offenders, without giving thein a was only, that they might wipe off any Calumny Hearing. g. On whịch account, no Perſon is blained thrown upon the Priſoner, and take care that he for caſting any Veil or Colour over his Fault (6) (b). fuffer no Injuſtice. Which End is ſufficiently an.. The Divine Tribunal and the Hunane are not in fwer'd by a bare Refutation of the Proofs offer’d all reſpects alike; nor doth a Mortal Judge preſide by the Accuſer. But he whom the Priſoner parti- with ſuch Majeſty and Authority as Almighty God. cularly chooſeth and retains to plead in his behalf, And if a Priſoner be not bound to make a volun- ſince he only acts as his Client's Interpreter, may, tary Confeffion, his Denial cannot in the leaſt im- in our Judgment, lawfully uſe the ſame Method of pair that Obedience which he owes to the Civil Defence which the Priſoner might have uſed, had Power . 'Tis true, a Crime which hath been reſo- he anſwer'd for himſelf. He is under a very great lutely and ſtubbornly diſown’d, coinmonly meets Miffake, ſays Tully (1), that fanfies he hath got our with the ſeverer Puniſhment; becauſe free Confef- real Opinion and Authority for all that he meets with Tuon is generally a ſign of Penitence, which much in our Fudiciary Orations. Whatever we deliverd on Jeffens the Malignity of the Offender': Yet whether thoſe Sutjects is to be aferib'd to the Cauſes , and to it be more advantageous cunningly to deny a Fact , the Times, not to the Man, or to the Pleader. And (4) Yet Grotius on Deut. 13. 8. obferves, thắt the Jews were allow'd to uſe Artifice in the Diſcovery of Criminals, only when the Party was accuſed of enticing others to Idolatry (5) There is always fome Obligation, though it is not always ſo far extended as Right. See 1. 30.5 In. 1. And I. 8 c. 3 $4 n. 8. (6) The Words are, Neque enim inaudita cauſa quenquam damnari æquitatis ratio patitur. (7) We may eaſily difcern that our Author embraces the laſt Opinion. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 21. (1) Tully's Words are; Sed errat vehementer, fi quis in orationibus nostris, quas in Judiciis babuimus, authoritates noſtras config- natas fe habere arbitratur. Omnes enim illa orationes cauſarum do temporum ſunt, non hominum ipſorum Lo Patronorum. Nam fi caufa ipfe pro fe loqui pofſint, nemo adhiberet Oratorem, Orat. pro A. Cluentio, cap: 1. In truth, Cicero explains this Maxim but forrily, and extends it to things which our Author approves not of . See Mr. Le Clerc's Queſtions taken out of ferom. Quæſt , 8 $ 14. (a) Yer compare l. 13. D. de cuſtodia do exhibitione reorum. (6) Vid. 1.48. tit. 17. Princ. D. de requir, vel abſent. demande de ( Comp. 1. 9. 9 ult. D. ad L. Cornel. de falſis. Grotii Annorat, in Flor. Sparfionib. + P 2 in 116 Of . Speech, and the Obligation which attends it. Book IV. of a in his Second Book of Offices (2), he maintains, ſome- and preſerve his Sovereign to his utmoſt Ability. times to defend a guilty Perſon, is not contrary to Whereas the deſire or endeavour of theltering a any Duty of Religion. Nor is Juſtice in any great Conſpirator from juſt Puniſhment would be utterly danger of fuffering by this Permiſſion: For, lince inconſiſtent with that Obligation. He proceeds to the Judge is fuppoſed fully to underſtand the Law, urge, What if a Judge ſhould be about to condemu a the Advocate by producing falſe Laws or falfe Au- Man for ſome goud Actions, unleſs we can prove the thorities, is not likely to prevail to any purpoſe: Actions not to have been perform’d, ſhall not the Ora. And he is never credited upon his bare Afferti- tor who appears in his behalf be allow'd the uſe of on, but obliged to produce fufficient proof. Such Means to preſerve this Innocent, and what is And therefore, if a guilty Perfon do by this means more, this worthy and commendable Member of the ſometimes efcape unpunjihed, the Fault is not to be State (2)? But indeed ſuch a Cafe as this can hard- charged on the Advocate, or on the Priſoner, but ly be ſuppos’d. For nothing ought to be honour'd on the Judge, who had not the Wiſdoin to diftin- with the Name of a good Action, but what is a- guiſh between Right and Wrong: Yet Plato (@) greeable to the Laws of the Commonwealth. And would not grant even this degree of Indulgence in it doth not appear how any Man ſhould be brought his Commonwealth. And the Ancient #gyptians into Judgment for ſuch a Performance. Let us held it for a certain Maxim, That the Harangues of imagine therefore, that a Perſon by fome good and the Lawyers very much darken’d and perplex'd the noble piece of Service hath incurr'd the Envy of Law (b).- Eſpecially, fince, as Euripides (c) ob- Wicked Men, and that theſe Wicked Men have ſerves, Truth always ſpeaks plain; and therefore afterwards got poffeffion of the Seat of Juſtice. Here th not ſtand in need of the Windings and Turn- if the Fact were openly known, and an Accuſation ings of Interpreters : Whereas, (*) Unjuft Speeches brought againſt him for it, 'twould fignifie nothing being always fick and weak in themſelves, require ſtrong to diſown it. As 'twould have been idle for Cicero, a good Caufets And Ifocrates amongſt his other Rules the Fact may ſtill be diſſembled with ſome colour to nenionicus, adviſeth him, Never to undertake in and probability, there's no reaſon why an innocent Court the Defence of a Wicked Man · For, ſays he, Priſoner may not be defended by feign'd Arguinents People will think you are inclined to thoſe Practices before a wicked Judge. As for the other inſtance your ſelf, which you defend in others (D). Ford 2 of Quin&tilian, W ben a Man is to diſſuade ſome Un- It is herice evident how far we may admit of dertaking, Fuſ indeed Naturally, and in it Self , but Quintilian's Affertion (3) (d), A Wife Man, ſays he, in the preſent Juncture of Affairs diſadvantageous to is on fome Occaſions allow'd the privilege of Lying: the State (3): There's no need he ſhould endeavour aud-an Orator, if he cannot otherwiſe bring the fudge by falfe Reafons to prove thoſe Juſt Things to be to Reafon and Equity, muft neceſſarily apply himſelf Unjuft; but 'tis fufficient for him to ſhew, that to the moving his affections. And again, That which what may juſtly be done, is not always neceſſary at the firft Propoſal appears ſo harſh and ſtrange, may to be done, and that the Tines now require us to however be maintain's upon reaſonable Grounds; chuſe what is Uſeful and Profitable, rather than namely, that a Good Man in defending a Caufe may what in ſtricnefs may ſeem more Commendable and ſometimes go about to perplex the Truth, and decerve Right; and all this may be urged without receding the Judge (4) (e). But the inſtances which he offers from the Truth. Another Cafe propos’d by Quin- requires a more ſtrict Examination. Firſt ; he af- &ilian is, when an Orator bath good Hopes of the firms, That a Parfon arraign'd for plotting againſt a Criminal's future Reformation (4). And this indeed Tyrant may be defended by falle Allegations (5) (1). niay , prevail with him to be the more willing to And this is built upon the Grecian Hypotheſis, lend the Priſoner all his Parts and Cunning in or- which makes the killing of Tyrants lawful. Other- der to his Deliverance, becauſe he is aſſurd that wiſe, to defend by feigud Arguments, a Perſon twill not be to the prejudice of the Publick, that guilty of Treaſon againſt the Prince to whoin we ſuch a perſon ſhould go unpuniſh’d. But to reſcue have our felves ſworn Allegiance, is therefore un a good Commander from ſuffering for a manifeſt lawful, becauſe every Subject is bound to guard Crime, when his Life is neceſſary for the Honour eligioni, morcon (2) His Words are, Nec tamen habendum eſt Religioni, nocentem aliquandı, modo ne nefarium impiumque, defendere. Vult hoc multi- tado, patitur conſuetudo, fert etiam humanitas. Our Author reflects upon the beginning of this Sentence, and falls thereby into a pleaſant Miftake. For having read theſe words of Cicero, Habendum eſt Religioni, he ſuppoſes him to mean, that 'cis not con- crary to Religion; and ſo ſays of him, Religioni non contrarium tradit; whereas Boys know, that habere Religioni fignifies only, To make a ſcruple of a thing. (*) His Words are, “Ο ε άδικος λόγος Νοσων εν αυτώ, φαρμάκων είται σοφών. (+) The Greek is, Ευώνυμον ας δίκαν τρία έπια διαρκέσει. (4) Iſocrates's Words are, Mnd svi merupă regudri pure regisooo, luhte ourn zoget, NEAS 38 ' xj cutòs tusaīTa nejslev, dia- περ άν τοις άλλοις πράθεση βοηθής. (3) His Words are, Et mendacium dicere etiam ſapienti aliquando conceſſum eft :- do affe&tus, fi aliter ad equitatem perduci Judex non poterit, neceffario movebit Orator. (4) The Latin is, Verum ( illud quod prima propoſitione durum videtur, poteſt afferre ratio, ut vir bonus iu defenſione cauſe velit auferre aliquando fudicii veritatem. (5) The Latin of this long Sentence of Quin&tilian, which our Author examines in the following part of the Chapter, is this , (1) Sit aliquis inſidiatus Tyranno, atque ob id reus: utrumne ſalvum eum nolet is qui à nobis finitur Orator ? an ſi tuendum fufceperit, non tam fallis defendat, quam qui apud Judices malam caufam tuetur? (2) Qund ſi quædam bene falta damnaturus eſt Judex, miji ea non effe fa&ta convicerimus : non vel boc modo fervabit Orator non innocentem modo, fed etiam laudabilem civem ? (3) Quod ſi quedam juta natura, fed conditione temporum inutilia civitati ciemus; nonne utemur arte diændi, bona quidem, fed malis artibus fimili? (4). Ad hoc nemo dubitabit quin fi nocentes mutari in bonam mentem aliquo modo poffint, ficut pore interdum conceditur, Saluos effe eos Republica fit, quam puniri. Si liqueat igitur Oratori, futurum bonum virum, cui vera objiciantur, non id aget, ut ſalvus“ ſit ? Da nunc ut crimine manifesto prematur Dux bonis, do fine quo vincere honeſte Civitas non poffit : nonne ei communis utilitas Oratorem advocabit? (a) De LL.1. 11. Sub fin. (b) Diodor. Sicul. 1. 1 c. 6. (c) Phæniſs. (d) Inftit. l. 11. C. 17. . magisé (e) Inftit. I. 12, C. 1. and CHAP. H. 117 Of an 0 ATH. and Succeſs of the State, the beſt Expedient is, which Tully (f) tells us, was us’d by Antoninus not to have Recourſe to Falſhood and Fiction, the Orator, in his Defence of M. Aquilius (6). but rather to take that plain and open Method no (6) This Aquilius being accuſed of cruel Extortion and Oppreſſion, M. Antony the Orator opened hi Breaſt to ſhew the judges the horrible Wounds he had received in the Defence of the Commonwealth. (f) In Verrem, l. 5. c. 1. circa fin. infot Situbo DHONE 90 UNT Schwinde CHA P. II. Origanu I ainnot Of an O ATH. en tus A D otse I. * The Sanctity of an Oath. XIII. But is not always to be interpreted ſtrictly. II. What art Oath is? XIV. Or without Some Tacit Conditions and Limia III. It muſt be taken only by the Name of God. tations. IV. And according to the Religion of bim that XV. An Oatb is to be explained by the intention of stong ſwears. the Imposer. V. Of the Intention of him that ſwears. XVI. Of an Oath made in another's ſtead to oblige VI. An Oath is an Additional Bond of an Obliga- bim. tion. XVII, How an Heir is obliged by the Oath of the VII. Of Oaths obtained by Deceit. Dead. VIII. Of Oaths, obtained by Fear. XVIII. A Diviſion of Oaths, as, 1. For Confirmation IX. Oaths to perform things unlawful bind not. stis live 2. In bearing Witneſs. 3. Deciſive of a Nor thoſe, which binder a greater good. Controverſie. 4. Suppletory or Clearing, XI . An Oath doth not alter the Nature of thoſe XIX. Whether every breach of an Oath is Perjury Actions to which they are joyned. 50 XX. Of the ways of difpenfing with Oaths. XII. An Oath excludes all Cavils. ho E proceed to examine and ſtate the Nature of lus (2) (b) reports of the Ægyptians, That by their an Oath, which is judg’d to add great Strength Laws Perſons who had forſworn themſelves, were ad- and Confimation to our Diſcourſe, and to all our judg’d to Capital Puniſhment ; as guilty of the two Acts which have any Dependance upon Speech: greateſt Crimes, in violating that Piety which they which though we might have treated of very pro- ow'd to God; and in deſtroying Faith from among perly and conveniently hereafter, when we come Men, the ſtrongeſt Pillar of Human Society. to explain the Enforcements of Pacts and Cove II. An Oath then is a Religious Aſſeveration, by nants; yet we choſe to aſſign it this particular which we either renounce the Mercy, or imprecate place rather than any other, becauſe the Cuſtom of the Vengeance of Heaven, if we ſpeak not the Swearing is usd for the Eſtabliſhment and Security Truth. That this is the Senſe and Purport of Oaths, not only of Covenants, but of bare Aſſertions. (To appears from thoſe Forms of Words in which they which purpoſe it may not impertinently be obſer are commonly expreſs’d, as, So help me God, God ved, that amongſt the Jews no Oaths nor Vows be my Witneſs, God be my Avenger, and other equi- were eſteem'd Obligatory, but ſuch as were openly valent Terms, which amount to much the ſame. deliver'd in (a) Words.) For when a Superior, who hath a Right of Puniſh- An Oath the very Heathens look'd on as a thing ing is appeald to as a Witneſs, his Vengeance is of ſo great Force, and of fo facred Authority, that likewiſe invoked in caſe of Breach of Faith, and they believ'd the Sin of Perjury to be purſued with God who knows all things, being ever a Witneſs, the ſevereſt Vengeance; ſuch as extended it felf to is ever an Avenger. Plutarch, Quæft . Roman. 44. the Poſterity of the Offender, and ſuch as might be obſerves (1), That every Oath terminates in the incurr’d by the bare Thought and Inclination with- Curſe of Perjury; or, that is the Ground and Bot- out the Act. Vid. Grot. 1. 2. c. 13, 5, 1. Philo tom upon which all Swearing depends. In the ſame Jud. de Sacrificiis Abel. & Cain. p. 113. E. Edit. place enquiring into the Realons why the Flamen Genev. Our Aſſertion derives its Force from the Dialis amongłt the Romans was not allow'd to Outh, the Oath from God (1). Thus Diodorus Sicu- ſwear, he delivers himſelf to this purpoſe: Was it 81 Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. II. 1. (1) The Papage of Philo the Jex, which our Author quotes, reſpects the difference between Oaths made by God, and ſuch as are made by Men, which conſiſts in this, Thar an Oach adds a Force to our words, whereas God's Oath takes all its Force from his word. Σε το his words, Και συμβέβηκε την μεν ημετέρων γνώμίω όρκο, ή όρκον αυτόν Θεώ πεπσώθαι. I am nmittaken, if our Author did not think, that Philo meant by theſe laft words, That the Force of Oaths made by men proceeds from the Fear they have of God. The Impropriety of the Latin Tranſlation, conſider'd with the following part of the Diſcourſe, was apparently the Cauſe he ſo un- derſtood it, otherwiſe he could not have quoted this Paſſage, which had been nothing to his purpoſe. (2) Dio forus's Words are, Πρώτον μεν άν κατά των επιόρκων αναλος ήν παρ' αυτοϊς Αίγυπτίους το πρόστιμον, ως δύο τα μέγιστη ποιόν των ανομήμαία, Θεές τε αστένων, την μεγίσω την παρ' ανθρώπους πισίν ανατροσόνων. Γεveral other Authorities Mr. Barbeyra's NOTES on $ 2. (1) The Greek is, ITās ópn Geis na rúgy Texeum of imogxias. See alſo Grotius, Lib. 2. c. 13. S 10. (2) Vid. Grot, in Levitic. 5.4. Numer. 30. 3. Deut. 23. 2;. (6) Lib. 1. c. 77. p. 69. A. Edit. Rhodom. becauſe in Grotius, 1. 1. c. 13. $ I. 118 Of an OAT H. Book IV. as ap- the , as right to Reli Oath 27.10 , becauſe an Oath is a kind of Torture, or the only Thoſe who_eſcape your Juſtice, leave to the Vengeance Force that may be applied to the Souls of free Subjects :3 of the Gods; but thoje on whom you can lay hards , Whereas the Prieſt ought to be exempt from all Vio- neper configu over to Providence, without puniſhing Gath terminates in the Curſe of Perjury: Whereas all judge it to be I in Mind as in Body: Or becauſe every them your ſelves . And for this reaſon we ſhould an Abſurdity in the Civil Law (e), Curfing is Ominous and Unlucky; which is the Reaſon when, on the contrary, it allows a Woman to fwear that the Prieſts are forbidden by the Laws to uſe Im- that ihe is not with Child. This Caution will precations towards others? And indeed the Conduct of pear to have the more weight, if we conſider that the Athenian Prieft was commended, who-being or the too frequent uſe of Oaths doth in many Per- der'd by the People to devote Alcibiades with the uſual fons much impair the Reverence due to thein. It Ceremonies, refus’d, alledging, That his Buſineſs was was an excellent Leffon which Pythagoras (3) gave to preſide in good / iſhes , not in bad. Or, was it, be- his Scholars ; Very rarely and very hardly to be. cauſe the guilt of Perjury might turn to be the Dan- brought to an Oath, but if they had once ſworn, moff ger of the Publick, if an impious forfworn Wretch inviolably to obſerve it. Nor is Iſocrates's Precept were to offer Vows and Prayers in bebart of the State , on the fame Subject to be deſpis’d; Never Swear , and to perform the Offices of Religious Worſhip? Nor ſays he, on the account of Money, though you could and Aſurance ; ind than their lofing all Title to the Protection draw upon your self a double Imputation of Perjury and that God is invok'd as a Witneſs in , d'Alliſtance of Providence. Yet when we ſay with fome, and of Avarice with others (F). But 'tis juſt and pay the moſt ought on account to be hence'inferr'd, that an gious Reverence to Oaths, fo is it vain Prefumption Teſtimony of God; to expect or deſire that their Truth or Falihood as if God hi himſelf gave ſhould be evinced by an immediate Miracle; as if racity of the Swearer en te which ſeeins to be the God were oblig'd to exerciſe his Judicial Office, at Opinion (a nilcient and an 'Omnipotent Beingiwa na md me the pleafure and Humour of Men. And yet this to be was a Superſtition which very much obtain'd of both a Witneſs or Guarantee, and likewiſe an old, not only amongſt the Heathens, but in the Ig- Avenger, we therefore preſume upon the Truth of norant and Barbarous Ages amongſt Chriſtians what is deliver’d, becauſe we cannot conceive any themſelves. Sophocles (8) () plainly ſpeaks of the Perſon to be arriv'd at ſuch a pitch of Impiety, as Fiery Ordeal ; lightly to ſtir up the Divine Vengeance againſt himſelf. · And hence Perjury appears to be a moſt "Hμεν δ' έτοιμοι και μύδρες αίρι χερούν, inonſtrous Sin, in as much as by it the Και συ διέρπιν, και Θρες ορκωμοτών. Wretch Thews, that he at the ſame time conteins that he is a daring Villain towards. God, Tu tread the Flames, and by all Heaven to ſwear. and a ſneaking Coward towards Men (b). Théo TOV Scope and Meaning of Oaths is likewiſe ſuggeſted by 'Tis Remarkable what Phil . Baldaus in his Trea- the End for which they have been introduc'a : And tiſe of the Idolatry of the Indians (i) reports of the that is, that Perſons might be the more firmly en- Malabars, That amongſt them, the Perſon who is , to gag’d to declare the Truth, or to perform their take a Purgative Oath, bath his Three firịt Fingers Promiſes, by the juſt Awe and Dread of the Divi- dipt in Melting Butter, and then wrapt up in Leaves nitý, infinite in Knowledge, and infinite in Power ; which three Days after are uncoverd to ſee the Effect , whoſe Wrath they thus invite down upon their Others are order'd to ſwim over a River between Col- own Heads, if they knowingly deceive: Whereas chis and Cranganor, full of Grocadiles: Others to perhaps there would not have been Force and Secu- reach an Apple out of a Pot ſtuft with Serpents, and rity enough in the Fear of Men, whoſe Strength by the Succeſs of theſe Attempts a Judgment is made of they might faniſie themſelves able to baffle or to de- their Innocence (k). cline ; or whoſe Diſcovery they might hope to e And indeed if we would confeſs the Truth, Oaths ſcape (c). For in Caſes where the Party with whom either infer or preſuppoſe the Diffidence, Unfaith- we tranſact, if he deceive us after his bare Word or fulneſs, Ignorance and Impotency of Mankind. Proiniſe, cannot posſibly lie conceal'd, nor avoid For what need would there be of ſuch Engagements, Humane Puniſhment, it ſeems fuperfluous to put if we could ſecurely rely on the Faith and Conſtan- him to his Oath. 'Tis the Advice of Demoſthenes (d), cy of others ; or if there were no Examples extant he forfworn 9 cellár what we do? (2) See Mr. Placette's Treațiſe about an Oath, Lib, 1. C. 1. (3) His Words are, Σπανίως μεν ομνύναι, χρησαμένες και τοϊς όρκοις πάντως εμμένειν. (a) De Obligat. Jurament. Prelet. 1. f. 6. 7 (C) Lucian Phalar. I. p. 731. Edic. Amft. may perhaps be an eaſie matter to decetve Men, but "tis impoſſible to lie conceal d'from God, Plin, 1. 4. Epift . 25 Edic. Men of wicked Inclinaţious take confidence and Encouragement from that Refle&tion, quis fciet? Who will ever known Add. Demonic . Add. Valer. Max. I. 2 c. 10 1. 2. ext. They are the true! Men, qui colendo fidem jurant, who have no other Oath than to keep their Word without Swearing. Vid. Curt. I. 7 c. 8 n. 29. Edit. Cellar. 10:43 In Sophocles, Oedip. Colon, Oedipus thus beſpeaks Theſeus, p. 293. I'll not require an Oach as from the Wicked. Theſeus replies, Oaths could not force more than Word ſhall pay. Epi&t. Enchir. C. 44Go Simplic, in loc. Vid. Not. Gror. in Matth. 5. 34. (8) Antigon, v.259. (b) See Dr. Potter's Græcian Antiq. I. 2. c. 6. (i) see the Forms of Exorciſms in Marculph. Cap. (*) See likewiſe Bern . Varen. Deſcrip: Japon. c. 18. G Fodoc. Schouten. in Deſcript. Regn. Siam. where he gives an act count of their Judicial Proceedings. Eufeb. in Stob. Serm. 27. TV's the Advice of many mén, that we ſhould Arilly make good what we ſwear : But I think it no leſs a Duty of Religion to conſider well before we wear. Add. Grot. in Matth. c. 5. V. 34. 910cc my ult. of CHAP. II. Of an OATH I 19 , ( of Perfidiouſneſs; or if we had ſtrength enough to an ill Cuſtom, to apply Oaths as the Supplemental compel Perſons to make good what they owe Ornament of Speech. Laſtly, what Occaſion would the Judge have to en But that which was moſt in uſe by the Ancients, quire the Truth of Sworn Witneſſes, unleſs he were was to ſwear by thoſe things which each Perſon ignorant of it himſelf? And from this Principle i held moſt dear, or ſet upperinoft in his Veneration thould draw the Reaſon of that Speech of the Em- and Efteem. So Aſcanius in Virgil, peror Frederick in the Poet (a). Per caput hoc juro, per quod pater ante folebat ; Juramenta petis, Regem jurare minori Æn, IX. v. 300. Turpe reor. Nudo jus & reverentia verbo By this my Head; my Father's Oath before. Regis ineſe Jolet, quovis juramine major. So we every where read of Perſons ſwearing by Doſt thou deſire an Oath, it is below their own Life and Soul, and by the Life and Soul A Prince to Subjects ſuch Reſpect to ſhow. of thoſe Friends who ſtood firſt in their Affcétions. The Sacred Awe that guards a Prince's Word; And the Lovers thought themſelves very Religious Hath ſtronger Tyes than ſtricteſt Oaths afford, in ſwearing by the Bright Eyes, the Sweet Lips, the Golden Trelles of their Miſtreſs (f). All which Not only to have Faith and Honeſty kept up invi- Speeches are by no means to be interpreted in this olably in the World, is in the higheſt Manner the ſenſe; either that thoſe things were invoked as Intereſt of Princes; but likewiſe becauſe 'tis unbe- Witneſſes and Avengers of Falihood, as Apuleius (8) coming their Majeſty, to ſeem liable to the leaſt amongſt others believed ; nor that they were cited fufpicion of Perfidiouſneſs, Falſhood, or Deceit. to give Teſtimony under the Notion of belonging Thus we are told, that amongſt the old Peruvians to God, and expreſſing ſomewhat of the Divinity, Oaths were not at all in uſe; but the Perſons who namely, his Truth, Goodneſs and Power, and which were to give their Teſtimony, barely promiſed they the Perſon thus ſwearing hereby acknowledgeth, would confeſs the Truth to the Ynca (6). that he enjoys by God's Mercy; and that he is un- III. Since GOD alone is of (1) Infinite Know- willing to loſe by God's Juſtice, as if he ſhould ledge, and of Infinite Power, the Abſurdity is ma- ſay, I ſwear by my Life; that is, by God to whom ! nifeſt of Swearing by any thing which we do not owe my Life, which is the Opinion of many, and look upon as Divine; in ſuch a ſenſe as to invoke particularly of Biſhop Sanderſon (h). But they on- it for a Witneſs of our Speech, and for an Avenger ly thus invok'd GOD himſelf , delíring that if they of our Perjury. Hence as it was uſual for the Hea- ſwore falfly, he would be pleas'd to puniſh their thens to ſwear by the Stars, becauſe they judgʻd Crime in thoſe things eſpecially, for which they them to be fo many Deities; fo for a Chriſtian to were moſt nearly and tenderly concern’d (i). Thus imitate thein in that Practice; would be a Mixture it was the ordinary Cuſtom of the Athenians, in of Impiety and Folly. As for thoſe Forms attri- their folemn Oaths to devote themſelves and their buted to foine of the Ancients, as that of Socrates (2), Family to Deſtruction, if they deceivd; and on the by a Dog, by a Gooſe, (whatever Porphyry (c) pre- contrary to beg all Happineſs from the Gods on tends to the contrary) and by the Plane-Tree, that themſelves and Friends, if they ſwore truly; as iš , be(d), we are to eſteem them meerly Jocular. They And they firmly believ'd, that the Violation of {wore by theſe, as Apollonius (e), not as by Gods, ſuch Engagements would draw down the Anger of but to avoid Swearing by the Gods ; when by the Heaven upon the Heads of others, as well as upon practice of the generality of Men it was grown into their own. Pliny (1) tells a Story of one Regulus, Of 28 de sol Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 3. (1) What Confuſions, Abſurdities and Contradictions the Notions of the Heathens were! Theſe two Attributes of the Deity, which are che Foundation of an Oath, were ſo well known to theni; as to give a grear Force to that Act of Religion. They be- lier'd that God was preſent in all places, and ſaw all things, the moſt ſecret Thoughts of the Heart not being excepted. "This appears, for Example, by this Fragment of the Comedian Philemon, who takes the air for Jupiter. 'Ego do Osš 'svégzov, sind maytex8. I'm ev'ry where as a God ought to be, “Ο 5 παρών άπαναχύ, And fo know all things neceſſarily. Παντ' ξ ανάγκης οίδε, πανταχύ παρών. Stob. De Rerum Nat. Tir. 3. Collect. Cler. And ſo in the Prologue of Plautus's Amphitryo, Mercury chus ſpeaks Utrum fit, annon, Voltis? Sed ego ſtultior, I know your Minds, for I am God, Quafi neſciam vos velle qui Divus ſciem, And can't be ignorant of your Thoughts. Teneo, quid animi veſtri Super hac reſciet. Sce Lucian in Chronolol. Tom. 2. p. 614. Aš to Gods Omnipotence, thefe Verſes of Ovid are ſufficient to alledge, Immenfa eft, finemque potentia Cæli. God's Power's immenſe, and has no Bounds: Non habet : ego quicquid Superi voluere, pera&um eft. Whare'er che Gods will have done, muſt be perform d. (2) See Menage upon Diogenes Laertius, Lib. 2. $ 40, where he hath amaſſed together many things relating to this matter. I shall fuffice at preſent to relate the words of Philoftratus, of which our Author quotes only a part. rigos Taira é só mówv, izvili rus žen , Luxpirn "Asuvaię, myönles, at mange , pipar, is Táv müva, tiv xiva , toho mad72001, Srbs te mira , L QUVU" éx oivórros, e tev, anda fios , výdtexväs copos dousu ys taitd, 6x ais Seos, an iva us Feis auru. (a) Gunter. Ligurin. I. 3. v. 510, doc. (b) De la Vega, Comment, Reg. 1. 2. c. 3. (c) Lib. 3. regi aroxñs. (d) Vid. (e) In Philoſtrat. I. 6 c. 9. (f) Ovid Amor. 1. 3. El. 3. 13, 14. Perque ſuos i!lam nuper jurajſe recorder, On her own Eyes and mine a Curſe the laid; Perque meos oculos; & doluere mei. And mine have (marced for the perjur'd Maid. (b) De Jurament. Obligat. Prele&t. i Sect. 4. Per caput ipſe suum folitus jurare, tuumque By his own Head how often would he ſwear, Quod fcio, non illi vilius ejſe fuo. (k) Add Antiphon. Orat. 15. And yours, not leſs the Darling of his Care? (1) Lib. 2 Epiſt. 20 n. 5, 6. who j balog 300 Atheneum Deipnofoph. I. 9. c. 2. (8) De Deo Socrat. (i) Ovid. Triſt. I. s. El. 4. 45, 46. I 20 Book IV. Of an OAT H. who made a gainful Trade of Perjury, in relation out of his own Mouth may fall iipon their Head; Truth, to Wills and Teſtaments ; that, giving a Viſit to if he declares Truth ; Falfhood, if he Speaks fally. à fick Lady (Verania Wife to the famous Piſo) and i hatſoever therefore a Perſon names in his Oath, whe perſuading her that by his Aſtrological Obſervati- ther bis Children, his own Life or Safety, or any thing ons he forefaw the ſhould recover: The Lady be- elfe, he devotes and binds it over to Almighty God. ing eaſily credulous under ſo great an apprehenſion And hence, altho' Philo the few is juſtly to be of Danger, call’d for her Will, and ſet down Re- prais’d for condemning raih and prophane Swear- gulus for her Heir; but ſoon after falling into Ex- ing, yet we can by no ineans approve of his Do- tremities, ſhe dy'd with this Exclamation againſt etrine, when he delivers hiinſelf fo loofly, as in the her Deceiver ; O wicked and perfidious! O worſe than following Terms (c): If, ſays he, the Exigency of perjur d Villain, who forſwore himſelf by the Life Affairs neceſſarily requires an Oath, it is more bě and Safety of his own son! The Reflection which coming to ſwear by the Health or the proſperous Age Pliny makes on the thing is this, Regulus ufeth this of our Father or Mother, if alive ; or by their Hap- Stratagem not more frequently than wickedly; whilft vy Memory, if they are dead. For their Act of pro- he imprecates the Wrath of the Gods, whom he every ducing their Children into Life from nothing, makes day deceives, upon the Head of the unfortunate them the Images and Repreſentatives of the Divine Youth (a). Nature (4). They too deſerve Commendation, who as And hence too we may gather the Meaning and often as they are urged to ſwear, by delaying and befi Deſign of thoſe Oaths, which were heretofore made tating, Strike an awe, not only into the Speétators, but by the Life, the Genius, the Safety of Princes; into thoſe very perſons who require the Oath at their which we are told are ſtill cuſtomary amongſt the Hands. For 'tis a Cuſtom with ſome, when they have Perſians, and are eſteemed more ſtrict and ſacred, pronounced the firſt Words of the Form, So help me, than thoſe in which the Name of God is immedi- to leave off abruptly, adding what they pleaſe beſides ately invoked. For they did this , not as thinking in their Mind and Thoughts. For the Sentence may there was any Divinity in their Princes, whilft be filld up by Jubjoining not only the Higheſt, or alive, nor as imprecating their Diſpleaſure if they the Creator of all things, but the Earth, the Sun, ſpoke falſe; but becaule many of them either in the Heavens, or the World. Nor do I ſee any ex. good earneſt , or at leaſt in Flattery, intended here- cuſe that can be brought to juſtifie that Oath of by to fhew, that they preferr’d their Prince's Safe- the Chriſtian Soldiers recited by Vegetius (d), which tý to their own; and therefore look'd upon it carries in it too groſs an exceſs of Reverence to- as a more horrid Perjury to devolve the Wrath of wards the Emperors. They ſwear, ſays he (5), by God upon Him, than upon Themſelves(3). So that the God, and by Chriſt , and by the Holy Spirit, and by ſenſe of thoſe Proteſtations was properly this ; So the Emperor's Majeſty, which next to God is to be may my Prince be happy and ſafe, as I perform what I loved, and to be worſhip’d by Mankind. For when now Promiſe ; that is, unleſs I fulfil my Engagement, our Prince hath been once inveſted with the Title of I deſire the Divine Judgments may light upon my Auguſtus, we are to pay to him as to a Preſent and Prince's Head. St. Auguſtin (b) [peaks very perti- Mortal God, faithful Devotion and moſt watchful Ser . nently to this purpoſe. What elſe, faith he, is that vice. For though we ſhould grant the following which we call (Jurare) to ſwear, but (Jus reddere) to Clauſe, A Civil or a Military Perſon then ſerves pay the Due or Right; to God, if we ſwear by God; God, when he faithfully loves him who reigns by God's to our Children, if we ſwear by them? And what Appointment and Authority; yet this is by no means Right do we owe to our own Safety, to our Children, a Reaſon why they ihould ſwear by the Majeſty of or to our God, but the Right of Love and of Truth, the Emperors in the ſame manner as by the Name not of Treachery and Falſhood? When any Man ſays, of God. Nor is it to be ſuppoſed that common By my Safety, he pawns and engageth bis Safety to Soldiers ſhould be capable of ſo much Subtlety as to Providence, for the truth of what he affirms; when he diſtinguiſh the Word (by) in the fame Form into Jays, By my Children be configns over his Children as two different Senſes, one as apply'd to God, ano- so many Pledges to God; defiring, that whatever comes ther as ſpoken of the Emperor. This is certain (3) Hence it appears, ſaith our Author, that ſuch Perſons were with Reaſon puniſhed very rigorouſly, who were perjur'd, af- ter they had ſworn by the Head, Throne or Health of the Prince, becauſe they believed, that by ſuch an Oath they expoſed that Sacred Perſon, upon whoſe Safety the whole Kingdom depended, to Divine. Vengeance. See whar Herodotus lays of the Scythians, Lib. 4. and Zoſimus, Lib. 5. In the Capitularies of Charles the Great Men are forbid to ſwear by the Life of the King or his Children, Lib 3. C. 42. See the Digeſts, l. 12 cit. 2 De Jurejur. &c. leg. 13 86. (4) Philo's Words are, "Άξιον επαινών και τες, οπότε βιασθείεν ομνύναι , το μέλλον και βράδυreaν και αποκωϊν έμπαινίας NG- μόνον τις δρώσιν, αλλά και τους φesκαλεμένοις εις τον όρκον, ειώθασι και αποφθεγξαμήνοι τοσέον, να τον, ή μα τον, μη δεν φεσ λαμβάνοντες, προφέστι τ αποκοπής, τεχνών όρκον και γενόμενον· αλλά και προσλαξέτω τις, ο βέλοιτο, μη με το ανωτάτω και πρεσβύ Tatev cudu's ai trov, cada gör, varov, ástegs, seg.vóv, tiv oiue tanta xóspior. See the Interpreters upon St. Matthew, 5. 34, and Ariſtophanes's Rana, where Mr. Spanhemius quotes this Paflage of Philo, De Spectaculo, for De Legibus Special. (s) The Hiſtorians Words are, Furant autem fer Deum, & per Chriſtum, & per Spiritum fan&tum, & per Majeftatem Imperatoris , que fecundum Deum generi humano diligenda eſt calenda. Nam Imperatori, cum Auguſti nomen accepit, tanquam præſentido corpo- Tali Deo, fidelis eſt preſtanda devotio, do impendendus pervigil famulatus. Deo enim vel privatus, vel militans fervit, cum fideliter eum diligit, qui Deo regnat autbore. (a) Lyfias Orar. adverf. Diagiton. " I am ready with a well aflured Mind, whenever you pleaſe to require it, to ſwear by to the lives of theſe my Children, and of chofe which I have lince had by a ſecond Bed.' And I am not yet arrivd at fo del- perate a degree of Miſery, nor ain ſo unreaſonably covecous of Money, as that I ſhould be willing to devore my family to a Curſe, only that I may leave them a Maintenance ; or by an unnatural wickedneſs to rob my Father of his Eftate. And here likewiſe it may be remarked by the Bye, thac the Banjans in India, who fer the higheſt Value and Reſpect on their Cows, eſteem it a mort Sacred Oath to hold a Knife near the Cow, and ſay, if what I affirm bº falſe, or, it I do not performing Bargain, may tbe Com te struck through with this Knife, Pietro della Valle Itin. part 2. Epift. 1. (6) Citata Grotio in Flor. Sparí. ad l. 23 D. de Jurejur. (c) De ſpecial. legib. (d) De re militar. I. II c. 5. from CHAP. II. I 21 Of an 0 ATH. On ſwear by the Fortune of the Emperor was accoun- Abuſes of the Name of God, ariſing from an ill Ha- obnoxious to were thought hereby to make hiin his Dath the Condition of his obtaining ſuch or ſuch Hanc ego magnanimi (polium Didimaonis, haftam Ovid De Remed, Amor, v. 783, 784. Add. Grof. I. 2 c. 131, II. from Eufebius's Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory (6) (a), that to Expreilions, as not properly Oaths, but prophane ted one of the Marks of abjuring Chriſtianity a which bit of being too poſitive and vehement in Talk. therefore St. Polycarp reſolutely refus’d to the laſt. From what hath been offer'd it is clear, That And fo too , it may be juftly, queſtion d whether we Execrations, although ſtrictly taken ; as when a ought to approve of that Oath preſcribd by Charles Man barely lays Curſes, or imprecates Miſchief Gorzega, to his New Order of Knights , in the Form on himſelf or others , they are not Oaths; yet following ; Ifwear by the Immortal God, and by the are on all Accounts to be reckond part of an Aneient. Nobility which I profess (). Hence likewiſe Oath, as they reſpect any, Affertion or Promiſe, it appears, That the Ancients had good reaſon for which they are added to bind (k). And this is puniihing with the utinoft ſeverity Perſons who had to be extended likewiſe to thoſe Prayers or forſworn themſelves by their Princes Life or Safety; Wiſhes by which a Man makes the performance of inaſınuch they the a in Ælian, (l) So and preſervation is yet ſo cloſely connected to the may I crack may I crack Timofias's Skull. Thus we find Julian publick Security (c). Thus we find the Scythians'in to encourage his Army, conſtantly ſwearing (as the Herodotus (d), as often as their King happen'd to be Hiſtorian ſpeaks) (m) not by the Graces, but by Sick, making ſtrict enquiry whether any of the Sub- the Greatneſs of his commenc'd Exploits ; So So may I jects had ſworn falſly by the Royal Throne; and bring the Perſians under the Yoak ; So may I relieve the if fuch a Perſon was diſcover’d, he ſuffer'd Death weak Condition of the Roman World. As Trajan is for his Perjury. In Zozimus (e) the Roman Magi- reported ſometimes to have confirm d his Speeches, ſtrates declar'd they could not accept of the Propo- by adding, So may I fee Dacia reduc’d into the form of a fals of Alaric, though fair and juſt , becauſe they Province ; Su may I lay Bridges over the Danube and had ſworn by the Life of their Prince, that they Euphrates (n). 'Tis remarkable in the Patanes, a Peo- would never conſent to a Peace with the Invader. ple of Indoſtan, that they are ſo extravagantly Proud, If their Oath had been dire&ed to God, they ſay, they as to uſe for an Afleveration, May I never come to might poſibly have wav'd it in this necejfity, relying be a King in Dehli , if I don't make good my Pro- on the Divine Mercy for the pardon of Jo Impious a miſe. And hence too it appears what Interprerati- Grime ; but ſince they had bound themſelves by the Life on we ought to put on thoſe Oaths which we meet of the Emperor, they thought it abſolutely unlawful for with in Scripture, when even good and pious Men them to break through ſo folemn an Engagement. In ſwear by ſome Created Thing (O). That amongſt the Capitulary of Chartes the Great, (f) we find a the Jews of the latter Ages, nothing was more com- Prohibition againft ſwearing by the Life of the King, mon than Oaths (8), By the Head, by the Heaven, by on of his Sons. As to the Civil Law, Ulpian doth the Earth, by the Temple, by the Gold of the Temple, not deny it to be an Oath, when a Man fwears by by the Altar, by the Gift upon the Altar, is evident his own Safety (7); but ſays, it is not valid, unleſs from St. Matthew 23. v. 16. &c. Where our Savia it were expreſly propos’d to him in thoſe particular our reproves them ſeverely for their prophane Abu- Terms (6) Becauſe Oaths being taken for the Be- ſes, and impertinent Cavils in this Matter. The nefit and Security of him that requires them; there- vai to d orñaleov in Homer (P), Didymus thus ex- fore Cuſtom makes it neceſſary they ſhould be forin'd pounds, We are to know, ſays he, That in (wearing in the Words which he propoſeth, ſo that they may by the Sceptre, they ſwear by God himſelf, the great fully bear his Meaning and anſwer his Deſign (b). Governour and Controuller of Kingdoms (). Yet O- Whereas if the Party who is to ſwear might chufe vid hath given us another fort of an Explication : his own Words, he would have an opportunity by inſidious or equivocal Expreſſions, to evade the force Nam ſibi quod nunquam tačkam Briſeida jurat of his Obligation. Another Reaſon for Ulpian's Af Per ſceptrum ; fceptrum non putat eſe Deos (~). fertion may be, becauſe, ſuch Speechees and Prote- ftations continually lofing ſomewhat of their Reve Who by his Sceptre ſwore Briſeis free, rence by daily Uſe, no can be bound to let the Trite Ne'er took the Wood to be a Deity. Form of another Party (with which he often lards his Diſcourſe when he doth not think on’t,) pafs We learn from Procopius (S), that the Perſians, in for a ſerious and folemn Oath. And Mr. Hobbes the latter Times of that Nation, uſed to ſwear by (1) is in the Right, when he cenſures theſe Cuſtomary Salt. And in one of the Byzantine Hiſtorians, we (6) I have recited the Paſſages of Origen and Tertullian about this Matter in my Notes upon Dr. Tillotſon's 22d Sermon, which though a fhort one, contains a ſtrong Confutation of ſuch Chriſtians who abſolutely condemn the uſe of all Oaths, (7) The Words of the Civil Law are, Qui per salutem ſuam jurat, licet per Deum jurare videtur (refpeétu enim Divini Numinis ita jurat) attamen fi non ita ſpecialiter jusjurandum ei delatum est, jurasje non videtur : & ideo ex integro folenniter jurandum est, Digeft, 1. 12. tit. 2, De Jurejurando, &c. Leg. 33. (8) As the Heathens did. See Mr. Baron Spanhemius upon Ariſtophanes's. Plutus, v. 129. (a) Lib. 4 c. 14. (b) Gramond. Hiſt . Gall. 1. s. p. 154 init Edit. H. Steph. (c) Vid. Grote in Sparſ. Flar. ad leg. 23 D. de jurejur. (d) Melpomen (e) 1. 5 in fine. (1) Lib. 3. C. 42. (6) Add. 1. 3 f. 41. 4 1. 5 princ. d. t. (b) Comp (i) Leviath. c. 14. (m) Ammian. Marcellin. I. 24 C. 5. (k) Comp. Ziegler ad Grot. 1. 2 c. 13 f. 1o. (1) V. H. 1. 12 C. 9. (n) Add Grot. ad Genes. Chap. XXIV. v. 2. (6) Vid. Geneſ. 42. 15. 2 Sam. 14. 19. 2 Kings 2. 4, 6. () Iliad cl, V. 234. (q) This place of Homer is thus imicated by Vale- This Spear the Spoils from ſtout Didimaon won, Que neque jam frondes, virides nec proferet umbras, Which ne'er ſhall bud, or form a ſhady Crown, Ut ſemel eſt excuſſa jugis do matre perempra, Since from its dying Mother rudely torn Fida miniſteria G duras obit horrida pugnas; On Bloody Services it hath been born, Teſtor, & boc omni dugor tibi nomine fii mo. I. 3. Comp. Virgil. Æn 12. v. 206. (Faithful in rough Encounters!) here I call To bind my Oath, whilſt I engage for all, (S) De Bell. Perfic. I. 1 c. 3. Liv. I. 22 c. 38 ab ipit. I Sam. 25. 26. 1 Kings 2. 23. tius Flaccus, Q find I 22 Of an 0 ATH. Book IV wrote And 10, ther Words, or under any other Titles, than what find Mahomet the Turkiſh Emperor adjuring by Bread he ſhall by no Means ſtand bound, who not think. and Salt, his Vizier Bajazet (a). Soud ing himſelf to fwear, hath happen’d to utter Words IV. To proceed: That part of the Form in Oaths which imply an Oath; or who hath barely recited under which God is invok'd as a Witneſs, or as an the Form; or who being by Virtue of ſome Office, Avenger, is to be accommodated to the Religious appointed to give other Perſons their Oath, tells Perſwafion (1) which the Swearer entertains of God: them how they ſhall fpeak after him (e). In this It being vam and infignificant to coinpel a Man to Cafe Lucian's Saying will hold good, we are not to ſwear by a God whom he doth not believe, and conſider his Mouth, but his Heart (f). It was vain therefore doth not reverence. And no one thinks therefore in Cydippe to fanfie her ſelf Religiouſly ob- himſelf bound to the Divinen the Divine Majeſty in any o- ligd, by reading the Oath which Acontius had upon the Apple. And fo ideed Ovid (3) are agreeable to the Doctrines of his own Religi- hath taught her to argue, on, which in his Judgment, is the only true way Que jurat, mens eft ; nil conjuravimus illa. of Worſhip. And hence likewiſe it is, That he Illa fidem di&tis addere fola poteſt . pondo who ſwears by Falſe Gods, yet ſuch as were by him Conſilium prudenſquc animi fententia jurat, accounted True, ſtands oblig’d; and if he deceives, is really Guilty of Perjury. Becauſe whatever his Si tibi nil dedimus præter fine pectore vocem, Et nifi judicii vincula nulla valent, peculiar Notions were, he certainly had ſome ſenſe Verba ſuis fruftra viribus orba tenes. of the Deity before his Eyes; and therefore by wil- Non ego juravi; legi jurantia verba, &c. fully forſwearing himſelf, he violated, as far as he was able, that Awe and Reverence which he The Mind muſt ſwear; with that we never ſwore; ow'd to Almighty God (b). Yet when a Perſon Yet that alone can add a binding Power. requiring an Oath from another, accepts it under a Oaths are the Act of Wiſdom and of Thought; (2) Form agreeable to that Worſhip which the Words give the Thread, but Judgment ties the Swearer holds for True, and he himſelf for Falſe, [Knot he cannot in the leaſt be ſaid, hereby to approve of Since all we ſaid an Empty Sound we prove, that Worſhip. Thus a Chriſtian when he admits of Sound without Senſe hath loſt its Force to move the Oath of a few, doth on no account ſubſcribe to We did not take, we did but read the Form, &c.(1). his Opinion, who denies the one only True God, But 'twould be moſt ſenſeleſs and abſurd, If a the Maker of Heaven and Earth, to be the Father Man deſigning to ſwear, or at leaſt pretending ſuch of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt. Yet I doubt whether the a Deſign, ſhould yet refuſe to be tyd by what he Example (3) of Laban in this Cafe, alledg’d by Gro- ſays; and fhould urge in Excufe, that when the tius (c), from Gen. c. 31. V.53. comes up to the Pur- Oath was adminiſter'd to him, his Intention was poſe; for the God of Abraham, and the God of Na- barely to recite the Formal Words, but not to lay bor, and the God of the Fathers, was the Living and any Obligation on his Conſcience (b). Not ſo much True God (d). (if we conſider the immediate Reaſon,) becauſe Ob- V. But farther, it is requiſite to the Force and ligation is the neceffary Effect of an Oath, and in- Obligation of an Oath, that it be taken with deli- feparable from it; as becauſe otherwiſe the whole berate Thought, and real Deſign. And therefore uſe of Oaths, nay and the whole Method of engag- so - Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 4. (1) Divus Pius, jurejurando, quod propria ſuperſtitione juratum eſt, Standum reſcripſit, Digeſt. Lib. 12. tic. 2. De jurejurando, &c. leg. 6. SI. Our Author adds, that s 3. of the ſame Law is not contrary to this he has cited, no more than the deciſion of the Canon Law, Cauſ: 22. Queſt. s. Further, as Gronovius obſerves in his Notes upon Grotius, Hiſtory furniſhes us with Examples of ſuch Heathens as have been puniſhed for their Impiecies committed againſt their falſe Gods, ſuch as Cambyſes in Juſtin. I. 1. 9. The Gauls, who robb’d the Temple of Delphos, ibid. l. 24. 8. Pyrrhus and a Roman Garriſon, Liv. 29. 18. Seč Mr. Bayle's Thoughts on a Comet, Art, 118. (2) Mr. Placette in his Treatiſe of an Oath, 1. 1. C. 13. diſtinguiſhes here between, requiring an Infidel to ſwear by his falſe Gods, and propoſing an Oath barely to him. In the firſt he is induced to commit an Act of Idolatry, which can never be allow. ed; but in the other he tempts him not to Idolatry, though he has reaſon to believe that he will commit the Sin in doing what is required. The Reaſon is, becauſe that he requires is innocent, for 'eis not unlawful to ſwear. But if he adds any thing Cri- minal to what is required, he does it of his own accord, without being determined or induced by him who propoſed the Oath . If it were otherwiſe, no Man that hath an urgent occafion for a Sum of Money, which no body will lend him at reaſonable_In: tereft, could be permitted to borrow it of an Uſurer, whom he knows very well will not lend but ac exorbitant Uſe, loc. This is what is ſaid, but to me this diſtinction of Mr. Placette ſeems not neceffary. To require an Oath of a Heathen is in my opin nion the ſame thing as to defire him to ſwear by his falſe Gods. He can't fwear but by the object of his Religious Worſhip; and if he ſwears by any thing elle, no Man will take it for an Oath. The truth is, though an Oath confider'd in ic ſelf is a Religious 'Ac, yet in common dealing it ought to be lookd upon as no more than a Civil Act. 'Tis a Security that is required, and the force of ic depends upon the Impreſſion that the fear of God makes upon Mens Minds, which imports no more, than that he that ſwears, calls the true, or ſome false God to witneſs, provided we fwear not lightly and without neceſſity. I com: pare it to Naaman's Action, who eo difcharge his office, went into the Temple of Rimmon, and bowed himſelf there, to ſupport his Maſter the King of Aſſyria, which the Prophet Eliſha did not diſallow. See 2 Kings 5. 18. and Fof. 23. 7. where the If raelites are forbidden to Twear by other Gods, which refers to the reſt of the Canaanites, with whom they were to have no Con- verſe, left they ſhould be won co ſerve and worſhip their Gods, to which they were coo much diſpoſed. (3) This Example is very well apply'd. It is very clear from Joſh. 24. 2. That Terab the Father of Abraham, and Naber the Father of Terah ſerved ftrange Gods. See Mr. Le Clerc upon that place in Geneſis, and on c. 14.33. of the ſame Book. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 5. (1) We may find the like Adventure in Anton. Liberalis Metamorpb. chap. I. (a) Ducas. Hiſt. Byſant. c. 22. (6) Juvenal. Sat. 15. 37, 38. -Numin 1 vicinorum Each calls the other's God a ſenſelefs Stock, Odit uterque locus ; cum folos credit habendos His own Divine, though from the ſelf-fame Block. Eje Deos quos ipſe colit. Add.1.12 t. 2.1. 5 1. 1. De Jurejur . which is not contradicted by S 3. d. 1. &c. or the Deciſion of Canon-Law, Queft : Cauf, 22, (c) Lib. 2 C. 131. 12. (d) Add. Juf. Can. 16 Queſt. 1 Cauf. 22. (C) Add. l. 446.71.3 f. 2. D. de Obligat do Action. (f) Pro Laps. inter ſalutand. (8) Epiſt. Heroid. 21 V, 135, Loc. (1) See Grot. 1.2 C. 13 1.2, 3. ing Mr. Tate. CHAP. II. Of án 0 ATH, 123 KA Uſe and ti ing each other by mutual Signs would be banifhd Doctor's Degree conferr'd on him in the Schools , is out of Human Life ; if any Perſon might be able nevertheleſs a Doctor, though we ſhould ſuppoſe by his ſecret Intention to hinder an Action from ob that he who pronounc'd the Form of his Promotion, taining ſuch an Effect as it was firft inſtituted to thought all the while of dignifying an Aſs. But if produce. Therefore, whatever your inward Purpoſe a Player upon the Stage inveſt another with the might be, you ſhall certainly be bound by your Habit and Formalities of that Degree, he ſhall be Oath, when both the Party to whom you ſwore, ap- juſt as much a Doctor as he was before. Ipfa ftatim prehended this to be your Meaning and Deſign, and ſcena rem fi&tam effe teftatur, as Quin&tilian (6) ob- you your ſelf when you utter'd the Words, evidenc'd ſerves on a like Occaſion ; The Place firews the Acti- by all outward Tokens, that you were in Earneſt, on to have been Infignificant. and not in Jeft. And 'tis indeed a downright Con- 'tis an idle Queſtion, Whether a Perſon be oblig’d, tradiction, to deſire to take an Oath, and yet not who deliberately utters the Words of an Oath, yet to be oblig'd by the Oath; to deſire to promiſe, with an Intention not to ſwear? For if he barely and not to be bound by your Promiſe; to deſire to rehears’d the Words without any farther Purpoſe, utter Words in a ſerious Manner, and yet not to 'tis plain he hath neither ſworn nor is oblig'd. But been aſſign’d them by the coinmon Agreement of that is, when he who ſpoke the Words, gave all Men. Thus 'twas groſly ridiculous for the Milancje Proofs of his real Deſign to ſwear, and the other to tell Frederick the Firſt, We ſwore indeed, but we Party underſtood him in that Senſe, no doubt but did not promiſe to keep our Oath (a). And 'tis much the Oath is properly taken, and the Obligation con- to the fame Effect , what Father Paul reports in his tracted, whatever ſecret Drift the Swearer might Hiſtory of the Council of Trent (b); That during entertain in his own Mind (2). od the Vacancy of the Holy See, the Cardinals are wont VI. We ought likewiſe carefully to obſerve, That to draw up a Form confifting of ſo many Heads , for Oaths do not of themſelves, produce a new and pe- the Reformation of the Papal Government, which each culiar Obligation (1), but are only applied as an ad- of them ſwears he will exactly obſerve, in caſe the Ele- ditional Bond to an Obligation in its Nature Valid Cion fals on him. Though the Experience of all Ages before. For whenever we fwear, we always fup- teſtifies , that not one of them ſo Jands to the Engage- poſe fome Matter, upon Non-performance of which, ment , inaſmuch as immediately after their being choſe , we thus imprecate the Vengeance of Heaven. But Popes, they declare, that either they could not be tied now this would be to no purpoſe (2), unleſs the O- by any ſuch Bonds; or that their very Inveſtiture with miſſion of the thing ſuppos’d, had been before un- that Dignity quite releaſes them from the Obligation, lawful, and conſequently unleſs we had been before If therefore any Perſon ſhall pretend that he took an obligʻd. Though indeed it frequently happens, that Oath with ſuch a prepoſterous Deſign,the Excuſe ſhall we comprehend in one Speech both the principal avail nothing towards reverſing what he promisd, Obligation, and the additional Bond of the Oath; but ſhall paſs for meer Trifling. We may illuſtrate as for Inſtance, if I ſay, So God be my Helper, as I the Caſe by a like Inſtance: A Perſon who hath his ſhall pay you an Hundred Pounds. And yet it doth , See whar (2) Except Oaths extorted by fone up juſt Fears batiskai unjuft si DHUO Mr. Barleyrac's NOTES on $ 6. (1) Grotius, Lib. 2. c. 13. $ 14. fuppoſes on the contrary, that every Oath by which we engage our felves to do or not do any thing to another, contains a double Promiſe ; the one reſpecting the perføn that took the Oath, and the other the God by whom we (wear; and that one of theſe Promiſes may oblige, though the other does not. Mr. La Placetie, who had been once of pur Author fays, s.8. Moreover, we often ſwear to do things wherein God is not at all concerned, and ſometimes with which he is diſpleaſed. For it is ridiculous to ſay that we have promis’d a thing to any Man, who has no Intereſt by it, or which will be no advantage to him, becauſe it diſpleaſes him. Laſtly, Promiſes become void in themſelves, when they are not accepted. If then an Oath confirms a Promiſe made to God directly, it can't be of force, till we know that God accepts it; and how can we be aſſured of this, that God accepts a thouſand Promiles confirmed by an Oath, if they have no reſpect at all to his Service ? what then is there in an Obligatory Oath, more than a bare Promiſe made to the perſon who is ſworn to? Mr. La Placette finds nothing that can give us a better Notion of this , than Treaties of Warranty fo common among Princes. Two Men, ſays hie, make a Bargain, bur one fufpects the other will break it ; to affure himſelf of the contrary, he propounds taking of an Oath, Loc. to take God for the Warranty of the Agreement, and conſents, that in caſe he breaks ic , God ſhall declare againſt him, and punith his Perfidiouſneſs . I thought when I read theſe words, that he had been of our Author's Opinion, which ſeems to be a Conſequence of it, and I thought when I put out the firſt Edition of this work, I had given three good Reaſons for my Opinion, as may appear from the Extract made of them by Mr. Bernard in the News of the Republick of Lecters, June 1701. but i now fee, that Mr. La Placette ftill maintains, That Oaths may be of Force and Obligatory, although the Promiſes added to them be Buil. This he pretends to prove in the End, but the Reaſons he brings are weak, and not to the purpoſe, as I ſhall thew here- after. And we may eaſily forelee thac he can produce nothing facisfactory in this matter, and agreeable to his own Principles . He rejects the Opinion of a double Promiſe included in an Oath, becauſe we can have no certainty that God accepts an infinite number of things indifferent in their own Nature, to which we engage our felves by Oath. But then he ought to be fure that God will be the Warranty of the Oath taken, after the ſame manner, as the Prince who is Warranty in a Treaty, ought to agree to it . For here is no Revelation, and I defie Mr. La Placette and all the rigid Caſuiſts to prove that God will be Warranty in an Engagemeur otherwiſe invalid, at leaſt, that it is his Will, that the Holineis of an Oath may ſecure to the wicked Man the be- nefic of his Extortion. Accorđing to Mr. La Placette, Fraud diſpenſes with keeping an Oath, and why may not Violence have (2) This Reafon does not appear to be good, or at leaft, is not well expreſs’d. For as the Author faýs a little after, and $ 19. it happens ordinarily, that we engage our felves and ſwear at the ſame time, otherwiſe we can't conceive of an Obligation ance- cedent to an Oath, and valid without any dépendance upon that Religious A&. The Notion of an additional Bond, which the Author mencions above, is fufficient to prove what he maintains. Men engage not themſelves by fwearing, but ſwear to confirm their Engagements. An Oath in reſpect of the Obligation we take on us, is as Modes and Accidents are to the Subſtance, with out which they can't fubfift. So that from the Moment that the Engagement to which we have called God to witnels , includes ſomething that makes it null in it felt; an Oath loſeth all its Force, and we ſwear only with the Mouth, as all thoſe apparently do from whom a Promiſe by Oath is extorced either through fear of Death, or ſome other great Dangerous (a) Radevic. 1. 2: c. 25. Add. Grot. ad Matt. 5. V. 33. (6) Lib. 1. Add. l. 5. p. 358. Edit. Gorinch. 1658. (c) Declam. 342. 91018 Q. 2 the ſame effect ? 79 not I 24 Of. an 0. AT H. Book IV. will puniſh the Violation of Promiſes, not confir'd fuppofal of ſuch or ſuch a Condition? But neither not follow, that an Oath is unneceſſary or fuperflu- nevertheleſs made ? Certainly, not the Party to- ous, becauſe it is thus added to an Obligation be- wards whom the Oath was addreſs’d: For how is it fore firm and good in it felt. For although all poflible he fhould be able rightly to diſcern what Men, except Downright Atheiſts, believe, that God mind the other perſon would have been of, upon by Oath ; yet they believe at the fame time, and can the Perſon who ſwore give a full Deterinination with good Reaſon, that thoſe Wretches will feel a of this Difficulty, ſince we are not wont to be e more levere Vengeance, who have in expreſs Terins qually pleas’d with the ſame things propos d at dif call'd down the Wrath of God upon themſelves, and ferent Times , or at the ſame time in different Man ſo far as in thein lies have thut themſelves out from ners. It ſeeins probable therefore that even ſuch all Hopes of Merty; whilſt they engag’d in Wick an Oath is not valid ; at leaſt, ſo far as it is found- edneſs with ſo full a Purpoſe and Deſign, as to ed upon Miftake. Yet if the Party who inade it, ſhew, that they valued not the Diſpleaſure of him thinks he ſhall pay ſome kind of Regard to the Ho- who is able to beſtow the greateſt Goods, and to nour of God, in not receding from it altogether, he inflict the greateft Evils. Whence we may con- ought to judge by the Condition of his Affairs, how clude, That thoſe Acts which were before attended far he may conveniently go in the Performance , with ſome inward Flaw hindring any Obligation And whilft we are ſpeaking of this Cafe, it will not to ariſe from them, cannot be rendred obligatory be improper to make a Reflection or two on the even by the Addition of an Oath. As neither can Oath which Foſius perform'd to the Gibeonites a prior Obligation truly valid, be diſannuld by a (b). Where we may firſt obſerve, That the Subtle fubſequent Oath, or the Right which it gave anio- ty uſed by that people was not Culpable, nor did ther Perſon, be revers’d. Thus for a Man to ſwear fall under the Notion of a Lye ſtrictly lo term’d , that i he will not pay a juſt Debt can be vo Preju- For who will blame a Man for endeavouring by dice to the Claim of the Creditor. on ob er fome Fiction of Speech to preſerve his Life froin an -SIS as beilgas Tino 99 TUD miaised isik Enemy bent upon his Deſtruction ? Nor, properly DIVII. And hence too it follows, That ſince in Pro- fpeaking, was this Stratagem the Cauſe of any Da- miſes and Pacts, Confent grounded upon Miſtake, is mage to the Iſraelites : For what doth a Man loſe not Effećtual towards producing an Obligation, by being hinder'd from ſhedding the Blood of ano- therefore an Oath is not binding, in caſe it be evi- ther Perſon, whom he may nevertheleſs ſpoil of all dently made out, that the Perſon who fwore fup- his Poffeffions, and drag into perpetual Servitude , posid ſome Matter to be otherwiſe than it really fo weaken'd and diſarm’d, as to be incapable of fu- proves to be; and which if he had not thus ſup- ture Oppoſition or Reſiſtance? The whole Point pos’d, he would not have taken the Oath: Eſpeci- therefore turns upon this Queſtion, Whether or 10 ally, if his Miftake was caus’d by the Deceit of the it was the expreſs Command of God, that they Party to whoni he ſwore. For here the Point ſup- ſhould kill all and each of the Inhabitants of Ca- pos'd was in the Nature of a Condition, which fail naan, without Diſtinction ; even ſuch as ſhould vo- ing, all that was built upon it falls of courſe. Thus luntarily Submit to their Yoke, and from whom they if a Perſon brings me ſome very welcome News could apprehend no Danger hereafter? If this be ab- from a remote Place, in Conſideration of which I folutely affirm’d, Foſhua's Oath was void. For then, folemnly ſwear to reward him; in caſe I afterwards the only uſe of it would have been to evade a Divine find his Relation to have begrotinus.com ads, If it be to puniſh him if he did not break his Command. to have been Falſe, my Oath ſhall Injunction: That is, foſhua would have invok'd God doubtful whether a Man would not have ſworn altho’ Nor can it be urg'd, that Joſhua was therefore wil- he had not been thus Miſtaken, then he ſhall ſtand to ling to keep his Oath, leaſt it ſhould ſomewhat a- bis Oath. Becauſe Simplicity and plain Meaning are bate the Awe and Reverence towards the Divine the moſt agreealle attendants of Oaths, and all Tricks Majeſty, in thoſe Nations, to ſee him break a Co- and Evafions are ſtrictly to be baniſh'd from them: venant which he had call'd God to atteſt. For the And likewiſe, becauſe the Promiſe was not built on Inconvenience in this reſpect would have been the that Miſtake only, though ſuch a falſe Prospect might ſame, had he neglected to put the Divine Command be tbe Occaſion of its being exprejs’d in larger Terms in Execution. Grotius (c) therefore is of Opinion But this doth not clearly ſettle the Caſe; for who that the Order in Deut. 7. 2. and 20. 16. is to be ſhall be the judge whether in this caſe, abftracting underſtood with this Limitation (1), unleſs any Peo- from the Miftake, the Promiſe would have been ple ſhould ſubmit upon the firſt Summons ; which he won isod.OTI DHE 12 10 og 901 102wom 900 2moda on babba audimore et doorld to bas -- lisr les stogaus oro ci sont bat (a) Lib. 2 c. 13 ſ. 4 n. 1. (6) Fofh9. (C) Ibid. Sintang 2343 boobs von Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 7. (1) Ja chis Hypothefis there is more difficulty. For when Foſhua knew how things were, he ſtill certainly determined to re- ceive the Gibeonites, not to treat with them as Équals, and make them his Allies, but as Tributaries, or at leaſt as Slaves to the Chil. dren of Irael. So that he could nör difpenſe with his Word, though an Oath had no intervened in the League concluded with them. But Mr. Le Clére has fully proved, that Grotius is miſtaken in his Notion, and confures him chus. The Law exprefly exa ceprs the Seven Nations of the Canaanites from the number of ſuch as they ought to offer and give their lives, if they would yield at diſcretion. See Deut. 20.15, 16. Farther, there is a great difference between a Law which orders the Deſtruction of a People for fear, thae if they are ſpared, they will enſnare their Conquerors into Idolatry, and a Law, that orders the Deſtru- &tion of all, at leaſt every one of them that does noc voluntarily become tributary, and embrace the Religion of their new Maſters. If the laſt had been Moles's Meaning, he would have deliver'd himſelf clearly in ſome of the places where he mentions the Cana. anites. This Macter ought to have been taughe the Hebrews carefully, yet we do not find any Footſteps of an Exception to that ſevere Order given by God in ſeveral places to ſlay che Seven Nations of Canaan with the edge of the Sword, and make no Treaty with them. Again, the Vow which the Hebrems calla Cherem, was of that Nature, that he that had vow'd' it could not redeem it, but it muſt be deſtroy'd, see L:v. 27. 29. Now it appears from ſeveral places, that the Seven Canaanitiſh Nations ought to be look’d upon as ſuch, as may be ſeen in the Law mention'd, Deut. 7.2. The Examples alledg’d by Grotius do not prove the contrary. For, 1. The Hiſtory of Rahab is a particular inſtance, from whence no Conſequence can be drawn. 'Tis no wonder if the Hebrews, to whom the fiad done fo confiderable a piece of Service, ſpared her; and ſo much the more, becauſe ſhe did it 590 urgeth before CHAP. II. Of an 0 ATH 125 Punave had no Commerce with them, nor value their Word. Our הרומן 0.231 VOTO Jariw or che ſo as we are treat. urgeth many Reaſons to confirm. Mr. Selden like- had deſign’d to Deſtruction, they had been left in wile has ihewn at large (a), That the utter Slaughter Poſſeſſion of their Goods and Liberties (c). But on and Extirpation of thoſe People, was rather a Per- account of the Deception they had usºd, he inſiſts million to the Iſraelites than a Command. And o- ſtrictly upon his Words; and, as it appears, left thers think this the more Probable, becauſe the Rea- them nothing but their Life and neceſſary Mainte- ſon aſſign'd for that Commiflion againſt the Canaanites nance ce (d). was, partly left the Iſraelites ſhould imitate their VIII. But what we are to think of Oaths extort- Idolatry, being then ſtrangely prone to foreign Su- ed by unjuft Fear? Surely the Perſon who by means perſtition and partly left the ancient Inhabi- of this Fear procur'd is no tants, if left in any conſiderable Numbers, ſhould leſs obliged to releaſe the Promiſe thus violently gain Strength to turn out their New Gueſts; eſpe- obtain'd, than if no Oath had been added to con- cially in caſe they were allow'd to live with them firm it . Therefore there appears no reaſon, why upon equal Terms (b). This Danger therefore be (1)Compenſation ſhould not be adınitted in this caſe , ing once furonounted, they judge it would have in oppoſition to the claim of the Injurious Party; been no Fault to admit Tone to Mercy and Fa- according to the Rules laid down by us, when we vour ; eſpecially ſuch as ſhould abjure their idola- treated of the general Subject of Fear. Indeed 'tis trous Worſhip. However this were , 'tis plain that the Opinion of Grotius (e) that , If either the Words Foſhua, upon diſcovery of their Fraud, interpreted of the Oath do not reſpe& the Man, by conferring any his Oath in a more ſtrict and ſevere Senle . They Right upon him; or if they do refpečt him, yet Jo as had profeſs’d themſelves the Servants of the Iſrae- that ſomewhat may be oppoſed to his Claim, then the lites, a Phrafe conion with the Eaſtern Nations, and effe&t of the Oath ſhall be this ; That the Man fhall ob- had deſir'd a League. Foſhua had promis’d thein tain no Right, but that the Swearer jhall nevertheleſs League with them, ſtand to his Oath, by virtue of his Obligation to Al- according to their Petition: And by this Agreement, mighty God. And he urgeth as an Inſtance, the caſe (had they prov'd ſuch as they pretended ; that is, of one, who by ſome unlawful Fright or Terfor, none of the Number of thoſe Nations which God hath forced a Promiſe froin another. But if we od sa rabozu i umo before they had declared War againſt her Country. 2. ?Tis certain that Solomon contented himſelf to make che Remnant of the Canaanites tributary to him, 1 Kings 9. 20, 21. But the Law, which order'd the Deſtruction of that People , did not extend to their Pofterity; it is enough to ſuppoſe that it reached to them only, over whom God made them victorious in Foſhua's time, or after, till they were well lectled, and in poffeffion of as great an extent of Ground as was neceſſary. So that if any of the Ca- naanites eſcaped into the Neighbouring Countries, as the Text above quoted ſeems plainly to prove, and they afrer fell into the Hands of the Iſraelites or their Poſterity, they ought not to play them withouc Mercy. 3. As to what is ſaid in the Book of Fosbya, chap. 11. v. 19, 20. That there was no Town of the Seven Nations of the Canaanites that would make Peace with the Iſraelites, becauſe God had hardned their Hearts, ſo that they fought againſt Iſrael, that he might deſtroy them utterly with- out Thewing them any Mercy. 'Tis not meant, as Grotius tells us, that the yſraelites were obliged to ſpare them which yielded to them at diſcretion, but that through the influence of Divine Providence all the Seven Canaanitiſh Nations, excepe the Gibeo; nites , agreed together to fight, and would not ſubmit to the Hebrews, who would not have had the Courage to have put them all to the Sword without Mercy, as Divine Juſtice had reſolved to puniſh them, had they laid down their Arms and opend their City-Gates to the Conquerors. Theſe are Mr. Le Clerc's Reafons, to which I freely affent. But if this be ſo, what ihall we ſay to Joſhua's Oath. As for me, I can ſee no Reaſon but we may ſay, that his Oath was raſh and null in it ſelf . "The Sacred Hiſto rian ſeems to grant che first, when he ſays, v. 14. That they did not asl Counſel at the Mouth of the Lord, (i. e.) of Urim and Thummim. in truch, fince he ſuſpected ſomething, as appears from Verſe 7. he ough to have been cautious how he engaged himſelf by Oath in a Matter of fuch Conſequence, and in a manner run the hazard of oppoſing Gods Command, which being To formal and abſolure, the Artifice of the Gibeonites had been ſoon diſcover'd, and then Joſhua's and the Elders of Ili ael's Oath had been of no Force. For all the World agrees that an Oath engaging us upon a thing unlawful is of no Force, fee $ 9. follow- ing. Nevertheleſs we ſee that Joſhua thought himſelf obliged to keep his Oath. 'Tis poſſible that God by ſome poſteriour att might ratifie this Oath, though the Holy Scripture, which omits many Circumſtances, ſpeaks nothing of this Ratificacion. The ſevere Puniſhment which God laid on the Ifraelites and Pofterity of Saul for ſlaying the Gibeorites, 2 Sam. 21. 1, &c. may give ground to ſuch a Conjecture, although the Action of Saul was otherwiſe inhumane and cruel, becauſe, as I ſay with Mr. Le Clerc, the Law which order'd the Deſtruction of the Iſraelites was not in being. But be that as it will, it is certain, that a Superiour bidden by thoſe Laws, and ſo the Oath does not render them effectual of themſelves. See Grotius, Lib. 2. c. s: $ 14, n. 9. and $ 16. and c. 13. $ 20. n. 4. and what our Author ſays S 19. following. Nor is it hard to diſcover why God would ratifie Foshua's Path. The Breach of fo folemn a Promiſe made with an Oath, which is accounted by all people in the World a moſt facred and inviolable Act, would have doubtleſs begac an ill Opinion both of the Iſraelites and God himſelf with all the neighbouring Na. , Author pretends that the ſame inconvenience will follow upon our Neglect to execute an abſolute Order of God, buț in vain, becauſe it is not in the leaft to be feared, that the Neighbours would make any ſuch Reflection. They might think it ſtrange, that the Iſraelites ſhould treat the People they conquer'd with ſo much Rigour, but they could never be offended in the leaft to fee that Rigour mitigated by the San&ity of an Oath. See what I have ſaid in the firſt Edition of this work. But Mr. Le Clerc fays, That the Iſraelites did ill in nor informing themſelves fully of the place from whence the Gibeonites came, although theſe innocent Arts to ſave their Lives ; but he believes that they did not inſert that Clauſe in the Treaty, bue it was made upon the fuppoficion, that the Gibeonites were a People who dwelt at a great diſtance, upon which account it was null. But the Iſraelites not infilting upon chat, and having directly ſworn that chey would do them no harm, they were obliged to keep their Word, which they hid confirmed with an oach, and fo much the more, becauſe it engaged them to do Tay to their Law, as he proves by the ſame Reaſons that Grotius had uſed. To this Action of the Iſraelites we may Sentence of Publius Syrus, which thews that we do well to keep our Word, though we have committed a Fault in giving te. confutes his own Reaſons, for I hear, that while I am writing this Comment (in 1709.) he has reprinted that firkt Esiam in peccato, read præftatur fides. v. 192. We muſt look into Mr. Le Clere's new Edition of the Pentateuch, to fee how lie uſeful Work on the Old Teſtament. Avdio 01195M 1699905 Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 8.8. (1) See what is ſaid on Lib 3. c. 6. $11. n. 6. As to the Queſtion it felf, we Thall find in Mr. Muelen's Comment on Grotius, Tom. 2. p. 487. the Reaſons brought on cach fide, tho what is ſaid by our Author may be fuficient for any Man of Judgment. (a) Lib. 6. c. 15. (e) Ibid. Sect. (6) Sec judg, 1. 34. 2. 2. 3.5, 6. () 1 Kings 20. 4. (d) Add. Ambroſ, Off. 1. 3. C..10. 14. would laſt might uſe any les we may apply Part of that т 2711 10 YT I 26 Of an OATH. Book IV. warden gaun my neglect of my Oath ſhould leſſen the Awe giſtrate or by calling in the aſſiſtance of the Ma- Man who in thing would truly ſettle this point, we ought to diſtin- he hath eſcaped the Danger, to treat the Divine guiſh between the different Kinds and Natures of Name in a ſlighting or irreverent Manner, which Oaths. Firſt, for thoſe words which are directed not to before was the cauſe of his Deliverance; if any Man, Man, but to God; as it I ſay either alone, or be- be- we fay, on theſe Conſiderations, is reſolv'd to part fore Witneſſes, I ſwear to God that I will give Seius with the Sum thus promisd, it ſeems not only to be thus or thus (a). Here the Oath hath the Nature more ſafe and expedient, but likewiſe more accepte of a Vow, by which I promiſe to God that I will able to God, that he Thould rather convert it to perform ſomewhat in reſpect to his Honour; and Pious Uſes, than to the maintaining of the Wretch conſequently by which I intended to transfer a Right in his Villainous Courſes. And this method of pro- on God, and not on Man. The caſe is quite other- ceeding, is the more juſtifiable and ſecure in Go- wiſe in Oaths which are directed to Men, or in which vernments, where all Oaths of this kind are by the I promiſe a Man ſomewhat, calling God to witneſs . Municipal Laws declared void (2). The Examples For here the Obligation ſeems altogether to expire, alledg’d by Grotius to the contrary, will to thoſe if it appear that the Perſon to whom the Promiſe who rightly conſider things, appear not at all to was made, lay under fome Fault which render'd reach the Purpoſe. 'Tis ſtrange that Matthæus the him uncapable of receiving it. Thus in a Promiſe Civilian (b) ſhould in his Diſcourſe on this point, to a Thief, I neither directed the Engagement to- commend the Act of Julius Cæfar, Who being taken in regard to the Honour and Glory of the Divine the Money, but afterwards putting to Sea, took them Name, pay the Man what was mention’d . And and brought them to Execution. For Plutarch (©), though we ſhould grant never fo freely and abſo- Velleius (d), Sueton (e), and Polyanus (f ), who all tell lutely, that even ſuch an Oath hath likewiſe the the Story, do none of them mention a word about force of a Vow: Yet ſince a Vow binds not unleſs any ſuch Oath : And Matthaus ſeems in this to fol it be accepted by God, how ſhall I be ſure that 'tis low the Notion of thoſe who fanſie that a Perſon conſiſtent with the Divine Pleaſure and Approbati- thus compell’d to ſwear, may ſatisfie his Oath by on, that I, an innocent Perſon, ſhould rob my ſelf Paying, juſt for the preſent, what he promisd; yet of my Goods, to beſtow them on an ungodly Vil- ſo as that it ſhall be lawful for him immediately lain, only to put him into a way of making ſome after to recover what he gave, either by his own his is no , . but a vain piece of Su- and Reverence of God in ſuch a Wretch, whọ by perftition; it being the ſame thing not to pay, and his very Profeſſion and way of Living, ſhews how immediately to take back what we paid. Tully af- much he values God and Religion. Yet if there ſerts (8), That it is no Fraud to withhold from a dal to the Weak, and that he may not ſeem, now may not ſeem, now (3), for this Reaſon, Becauſe a Robber is a common (2) This is thus decided by a Conſtitution of the Emperor Frederick II. inſerted in the Code, Lib. 2. tit. 28. si adverſus veno ditionem, Leg. 1. per vim autem, vel per juſtum metum, i. e, nor by a juſt Fear, but by ſuch a Fear as is ſufficient to move a perſon not very timorous . Extorta etiam a majoribus (Sacramenta] (maximè nè querimoniam maleficiorum Commiforum faciant) nullius mo- menti esſe jubemus. The Poet Gunther alſo makes mention of a like Conſtitution of the Emperor Barbaroffa in his Ligurinus, v. 793, doc. be furamenta metu, mortiſque dolore coatta, Oaths took on Force, or fear of Threatned Fate; Precipue ne quis multis nocitura loquendo And chiefly thoſe forbidding to relate Publicet, aut in se crudeliter a&a queratur, . ,57200 Os banco Deſigns of Pul Deſigns of Publick Harm, or to complain Nullius meriti, vel ponderis esse jubemus. Of cruel Wrongs, we here revoke as vain. Our Anthor quotes theſe Verſes at the End of the next Chapter. See Feud. Lib. 2. tit. 53.5 3. (3) Mr. La Placette in his Trearife of an Oach, 1. 2. C. 21. takes our Author's Words in a wrong ſenſe. Theſe are his Words, He makes Cicero ſay, Thar there is a Fraud in keeping theſe ſort of Promiſes. Whereas theſe are Mr. Puffendorff's Words, Cicero quoque, Predoni pa&tum pro capite pretium, fine fraude non afferri aſſerit. Where the whole Connexion of the Diſcourſe ſhews, that there is no appearance of any ſuch Imputation to Cicero by our Author, but that he fairly relates the Opinion of that famous Orator. For he ſays not, non fine fraude afferi, ſed line fraude non afferri ; which is very different, and comes up exactly to the ſenſe of Cicero's Words, which are, și predonibus paftum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nulla fraus eſt, ne ſi juratus quidem id non feceris, &c. Mr. La Placette after he has made this Miſtake, infers from it what our Author never did, and of which none ought to ſuppoſe him guilty withoue very great Reaſon, ſuppoſing that through Careleſsneſs it had been ill expreſs'd, as it happens to him ſometimes; he infers, I ſay, from thence, that Mr. Puffendorff ſeems to affert, that a Traveller can't in conſci. ence to ſave his Life, either promiſe Thieves the Sum that they demand of him, or pay it them; and that 'tis an Offence againſt the Publick to do either of them. So that this Oath is finful, and we ought not to make it; fince no Man may lawfully oblige himſelf to that which he can't do without a Sin. And ſo upon ſuch Occaſions a good Man ought rather to ſuffer himſelf to be kill'd, than promiſe a Shilling to ſuch Thieves as offer to ſpare his Life, provided he'll oblige himſelf to do a thing which is in his power. i am of Opinion, that Thieves trouble nor themſelves, whether it be in their power or no to perform the Promiſe which they have extorted, with or without an Oath. In fine, there is not the leaſt thing in our Author, which can give ground to ſuſpect any ſuch Nocion as he attributes to him, nor can ic be inferred from his Principles, but by ſuppoſing the thing in queſtion. He atfirms, that a Man is not bound to keep a forced Oathy bue he elſewhere leaves him at liberty to obſerve it, or not, as he ſees fit, and ſo makes it a matter of Prudence; and though he believes he can't keep it withoue offending - gainſt the Publick, yet ic follows not, that he may never do it, becauſe he ſuppoſes (to ſpeak properly) that it is no true Oath, and as he makes no Engagement with the Thiet, who had no right to require or accept ic, fo he called nor God to witneſs and ſo 'tis paſt all Contradiction, thar he only ſwore with his Mouth. Mr. La Placette after theſe weak Reaſonings, concludes nevertheleſs with this ſharp Cenfure, See how the Liberties which the Enemies of ſevere Morality propound, do uſually end They carry Severity and Rigour much farther, than they do when they accuſe of caſting good souls into 'Deſpair. Bur I'll referr it to any judicious Man to examine whofe Books have done more harm and leſs good, whether thoſe who are of our Au- thor's Judgment, or thoſe Moral Divines who are full of Myſteries, Scholaſtick Notions, and Metaphyſical Impulſes to the highe eſt degree, and impracticable Maxims. Mr. La Placette affirms alſo, That to maintain that a forced Oath doth nor oblige, do great Miſchief to Society, by making Pyrates and Banditri deſperate, and hinder them from coming to any Treaty. But he may affure himſelf that they'll neither read this Author's nor his own works. They depend more upon the Fear which fuch Men have of falling into their hands again, than upon the Obligation which lies upon them indiſpenfibly to keep their Word of Oath. See what is ſaid upon the Corſairs of Barbary, 1. 8. c. 4. 5 5. following. As for the Treaties in which we engage our ſelves to an Enemy or Conqueror through Fear, we ſhall ſpeak of char, 1. 8. c. 8. (a) Add Paul . Servit. de Inquifit . p. 55, 56, 57. when he diſtinguiſheth berween an Oath directed to God, and an Oath gi- (6) De Criminibus, tit. de perjur, 1. 5. (c) In ejus vita init. (d) Chap. 41, 42. 6) Lib. 8. c. 23. (8) Offic. 3. 30. a 17 butt ven to Men. (e) Chap. 4. & 74. Enemy CHAP. II. Of an OATH. I 27 ' Enemy to all Mankind, to whom no Faith can be en- guage, yet being pacified by the Interceffion of Abi- gaga, with whom no Covenant can be tranſacted. For gail, he thanks God, that he hath been thus hindred which he is cenſured by Grotius (a), who obſerves from a more ſinful Performance of a ſinful Engage- That although a Robber hath no Title to thoſe com- inent. And fo Alboinus was no doubt in the Right, mon Rights which the Law of Nations hath eſta- for retracting a Vow which he had made to cut off bliſh'd between Enemies, in a fair and open War, all the Inhabitants of Pavia, upon their refuſing Communion fo far as the Law of Nature extends; invoke the Divine Vengeance upon any Action (f), one Precept of which it is, That Covenants be faith- but ſuch as God himſelf hath, under a ſevere Pe- fully obſerv'd. And yet there are not wanting Ar- nalty, forbidden. To do otherwiſe would be to a- guments which mnight be urgʻd in Tully's Defence (4), buſe the Awe and Reverence which we owe the Di- As, That ſince a Kobber is a common Foe to all vine Majeſty, in making it, as it were, a means of Men, or fuch an one as without any precedent In- affronting hiin. And the deſign of introducing jury or Provocation ſpoils and murthers all that fall Oaths amongſt Men, was, that they might add into his Hands, and conſequently makes it his ve- Strength to good Actions, not that they might af- ry Profeſhon to break and diſturb that Society which ford Excuſe and Protection to bad. Dionyſ. Hali- GOD hath ordain'd amongſt Men; therefore he carn. I. 11. p. 694. Edit. Lipf. (2). The Gods would ought to receive 110 benefit froin any ſuch cominon bave us make uſe of Covenants for juf and honeſt De- Bond, (as Oaths-are,) invented by Men to knit figns, not for thoſe that are Vicious and Unreaſonable. themſelves more firmly together, after the Divine The very Alcoran forbids Men to ſwear unlawfully Appointment hath inade thein Sociable Creatures. ($); as ſuppoſe, That they will never come near And that a way of Life, which declares for Atheiſin, their Wives: And injoins any Perſon who hath hap- ought not to be admitted to any Gain or Advantage pen’d to make ſuch an Oath, to fet a Slave at lie from Religion. As, on the other ſide, the Oaths berty by way of Expiation, before he preſumes to and Proteſtations of ſuch Villains are little regard- break it. And here is made a Queſtion, Whether ed or relied on by Wiſe Men (b). And we find the a Man falling amongſt Thieves, and being by them Pander in Terence (c), reckoning it amongſt the ne- compellid to ſwear that he will for ever keep Silence, ceſſary Accompliſhments of his Art, to have the and as far as in him lies, provide for their Security, knack of Perjury. Nic. Machiavel. Hiſt. Florent. be bound to ſtand to his Oath? To which we are When Religion and the fear of God are once ex- inclined to anſwer in the Negative; in caſe his Si- tinet , the Conſequence is, that Men regard and obſerve lence be likely to prove the occaſion of expoſing their Oaths, only fo far as ſuits with their advantage; many other Perſons to Danger. For as to his own afing them not with an intention of performance, but as part he might lawfully enough ſuffer the Villains tô Means and Inſtruments of deceiving with greater eaſe; eſcape with Impunitý (3); but not if their ſafety and thinking themſelves to have won the more Praiſe was to be follow'd by the Murther and Ruin of ma- and Glory, the leſs trouble, and the greater Security ny innocent Men. And we might apply to a they have met with in bringing about their Knaviſh Perſon under theſe Circumſtances the Saying of A- Deſigns. teius Capito to Tiberius in Tacitus, Sane lentus in fuo IX. It is farther requiſite in order to the Vali- dolore effet ; reipublicæ injurias ne largiretur ; So far dity of an Oath, that the Obligation be lawful, as he was concern’d himſelf, or, in regard to his own which it is added to confirm (1). Therefore a Pro- particular Grievance, he might be as merciful as he miſe tho' ſworn to, ſhall be of no Force or Effect, if pleas’d; but he ought not to forgive the Injury done to the Subject of it were a Matter either repugnant to the Commonwealth. Ann. III . C. 17. In Gunther. Li- the Natural or Divine Law, or to any Human Law, gurin. 1. 8. ubi Supra. Frederick makes the follow- (if the Party lives under Civil Government,) in- ing Ordinance. conſiſtent with the Natural and Divine (d). The Example of David is moft illuſtrious in this Cafe Juramenta metu mortiſve dolore coacta, ); who having in his Paflion ſworn to deſtroy Pracipue, ne quis multis nocitura loquendo the Houſe and Family of Nabal, for denying him a Publicet, aut in ſe crudeliter alta queratur, reaſonable Kindneſs in abuſive and ſlanderous Lan Nullius meriti vel ponderis eſſe jubemus. w With the Linieten which out Author makes above, Lib.3.c.659, and 11. about the end. (4) With the Limitation which our Author makes above, Lib. 3. c. 6 $ 9, and 11. about the end. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 9. (1) Tis in this ſenſe that we may allow the common maxim co be true, That an Oath that ought not to be made, ought noe to be kept; for if the thing to which we oblige ourſelves be good or indifferent in it felf , the Oath is valid and obligatory, whether we fin or not in making it. Here are two Examples which will clear this Matter. A Man obliges himſelf by Oath never to ſwear all his Life, nevertheleſs some time after he ſwears, and by this ſecond Oath obliges himſelf to reſtore ſomething he has borrowed. Doubtleſs he fins by making the ſecond Oath, which he ought not to have done, but yet is bound to keep it. Another borrows, and ſwears he will reſtore what he has borrowed, having yet no deſign to do it. He commits an horrible sin by it, but will any Man fay he is nor obliged to perform his Oath?'The Maxim by which he acts is not true, but in reſpect to luch Oaths by which he engages himſelf to do ſome wicked Action, or forbear ſome good one, which he ought to do. This is shac Mr. La Placette fays, 1. 2. c. 5. of his Treatiſe of an Oath. (2) See the Comment of Mr. Le Clerc upon this story. Mr. Hirtius obſerves here, that David was not yet a King, and the Tefuſal of ſuch a Service did not authorize him to uſe thoſe Methods with the Refuſer. He was not in extreme Neceflity, and if he had, chat was not cauſe fufficient to revenge himſelf in that terrible manner. (3) The Greek is , eci ys emi ng nasa rj Sonalaus meegaaußersare quafory oworogiass, óx it' derxegis, rj adress. See what Mr. Buddaus ſays about the Cath that Hamilcar made his Son Hannibal to wear when he was a Child, That he never ſhould have Peace or Amity with the Romans, Spec. Juriſprud. Hift. 68, &c, among his Sele&ta fur. Nat. & Gent. (2). Lib. 2 c. 13 f. 15 &1.3.619 f. 2. (b) See what has been ſaid in 1. 3. c. 6. towards the end. (c) Adelph. Act. 2. Scen. I. *.35; (d) See the Paſſages collected out of the Fathers by Gratian, Cauf. 22. Quæft 4. See Grotius, Lib. a c.13 1.6. (C) 1 Sam. 25 (1) See Grotius, I. 2 c. 13 f. 7. (8) Paul Warnefrid, de Geſt, Longobard. 12. c. 27. Add. I. s. C. 40. in (h) Cap. de Diſputat. Qaths fin. Æn. Sylv. Hift. Bchem. C. 18. 128 Of an OAT H. Book IV. U (c) Vid. Grot. 1. 2 c. 131. 7 & notas fuas ad Matth. 15. 4, &c. Sel. (See the Paſſage of Gun- A do stolteoretid bortiossuind toyug lution, wiſely anſwer'd, (e), I did not conſider that be Oaths took on Force, or fear of threatned Fate; my firji Vow ſtood in need of a much greater Vow to And chiefly thoſe forbidding to relate or 6 mont bind and confirm it (f). Dyd batrities Deſigns of publick Harın, or to complain one -- XI. Laſtly, That Oaths do not alter the Nature ito Of Cruel Wrongs, we here revoke, as vain. rot and Subſtance of thoſe Promiſes and Pacts to which BELAIDI ront rogo to atrestidis n out do they are joyn’d (1), is fufficiently evident. Thus 01 X. But to go farther, although the thing promis’d an Oąth about a thing abſolutely impoflible, is not be not in it ſelf unlawful, yet the Oath Thall be obligatory ; though the Party is guilty of a very invalid, in caſe it hinders any greater Moral heinous: Sin, in thus rafhly abuſing the Divine Good (1), or if we are by it withheld from diſcharg; Name i So an Oath added to a Promiſe which was ing any Duty of Humanity or Piety fa) -1 And before Conditional, doth by no means render it ab- under this Head we may rank thoſe Oaths by which folute. - For the Oath which ſuppoſeth ſuch a Con- Men tie themſelves up from bdiſcovering and com- dition, doth no leſs ſtand and fall with that Con- municating to others any Honeſt Art, tending to dition, than the bare Promiſe would have done b). I Thus too oo an Oath, as or others who are already privy to the Secret (2)well as any other Promiſe, ceafeth and expires up- can fufficiently ſupply the Needs of Men in this on Failure of the Quality which the perſon held " Particular; and upon ſuppoſal that my diſcovery when he fwore, and with regard to which alone the cannot prejudice and endamage the Party, who Oath was made. For inſtance, a Magiſtrate, when required the Oath from me. Such an Oath we he leaves his Office, is no longer bound by the find in Lucian [Tragopodag.] Tom. 2. p. 118. in fin. Oath which he took at his Admnidion. And on the Edit. Amft. The Sacred Oath of Silence which I have other ſide, the Subjects owe no farther Obedience taken, ſuffers me not to declare what you deſire. To to a Magiftrate, who hath either quitted his Dig- which is added the Command of my dying Father, en- nity, or been fairly depriv'd of it; though no ſuch joyning me never to diſcloſe the force of this Compo- Releaſe be exprelly and in formal manner granted fition. Plin. N. H. 1. 25. c. 1. It adds some kind of them. For thus much is implied in the very Na- Strength and Authority to our Knowledge when we re ture of the Affair (8). So likewiſe, it is no leſs re- fuſe to communicate it to others. The Reafon of all quiſite to Promiſes confirm'd by Oath, than to others which is, becauſe we owe all our Proficiency in which are not ſo confirm’d, that they be accepted good and uſeful Things to Almighty God, and are by the other Party. And he who obtains a Right each of us bound to carry our Endeavours to the by any Covenant, may equally releaſe the perfor- higheſt degree that we are capable of attaining : So mance of it, whether it was ſworn to or not. In that 'tis not in our power to abridge ourſelves of the ſame manner we are to judge from the Nature this Liberty, or by our own Acts to abſolve our of Covenants, whether an Ac undertaken con- Conſciences from a Duty enjoyn'd by the Law of trary to Oath be only unlawful, or whether it be God. Oaths of this kind were not uncommon a- likewiſe yoid and ineffectual (h). For unleſs the mongſt the Jews, which are inſiſted on at large by Swearer did by his Promiſe diveſt himſelf of his other Authors (). Thus too we judge that Oath Right, and confer it on another, though he after- to have been invalid, which Narſes in Paulus Dia- wards give the thing to a third Perſon, yet the A& tonus (d) requir’d of an old Man who had dug up a ſhall be valid. If a Man, for inſtance, hath ſworn quantity of Gold, engaging himn never to acquaint that he will leave ſuch a thing in Legacy to any any perſon with his good fortune. And the old Party, and afterwards ſells it to another Party, the Man was in the right, when upon the Death of Sale ſhall not be void, though the Seller is per- Narfes he diſcover'd the Treaſure to Tiberius the jur'd (2). Thus, if a perſon, who in the Life-time Emperor. And in this reſpect the caſe of a Vow of his Parents, hath promis’d them upon Oath, that is the ſame with that of an Oath: For neither is a he will never marry ſuch a particular Woman, ſhall Vow to be look'd on as good and valid, not only nevertheleſs after their Deceaſe take her for his if it be unlawful, but if it be filly and impertinent. Wife; the Man indeed will be guilty of Perjury, The Spartan who had ſworn to throw himſelf head- but the Marriage ſhall ſtand good and firm, un- long down the Promontory Leucate, when he be- leſs the Municipal Laws ordain the contrary. Far- held the dreadful height, turn’d back at the pro- ther, an Oath added to a Promiſe or Pact ſhall de- ſpect ; and being reproach'd for his want of Reſo- rive its Force and Efficacy either from Natural or Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 10. (1) Moſt of the Examples alledged by Grotius and Puffendorff confiſt of things abſolutely uplawful, as Mr. Thomaſius very well oblerves , Juriſpr. Divin. Lib. 2 c. 9. $ 20. In truth every one is neceffarily obliged to honour and help his father and Mother and although no Man hath right to require our Service rigorouſly, the Law of Humanity lays an Indiſpenfible Obligation on us to do all the good we can to another. And ſo no Man may directly Iwear with a good Conſcience that he will forſake his father or Mother in their Need, to do no Kindneſs to ſuch or ſuch a Man, &c. We may then ſuppoſe here, I think, this caſe, that a of Man may do a thing innocent and permitted in it felf, yet he can't well diſcharge himſelf of it, without purcing himſelf out the way of doing ſome other Duty; or a thing good and laudable in it felf, buc joyned with ſomething better, which lays a grea- ter Obligation upon him, as our Author ſpeaks in ſeveral places. As for Example, every Man is free to give his Eſtate to whom he pleaſes; but ſuppoſe any one imprudently ſwears to give of it to any one who has no need of it, or to the Poor, a Sum from which he can't diſengage himſelf with Reputation, without entrenching upon his Duty to fuch perſons as are more nearly related to him, and whom he is obliged to maintain. In this Cale an Oath is altogether void. (2) See Mr. Placette's Treatiſe of an Oath, l. 2. c. jo. § 183, &c. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 11. (1) See Cujacius's Obſerv. 22. (2) That is to ſay, adds Mr. Hirtius, ſuppoſing we have had no good Reaſons to revoke our Promiſe. (a) See Grot. I. 2 c.13 1. 7. (b) Vid. Matt. 25. 27. den de J. N. & G. ſecund. Hebr. l. 7. c. 2. Conſtantin. Empereur in Babakam, c.9 ſ. 20. Gratian, c. 22. Cauf. 22. Quæſt . 5: (d) Lib. 18. Add. Gratian. c. 2. Diſtinct. 13. (e) Vid. Plutarch. Apophtheg. Lacon. in fin. therus above-mencioned. (8) Add. Grot. d. 1. f. 18. (b) Vid. Grot. ubi fupra f. 19. from Chap. II. I 29 Of an O ATH. from Civil Law, according to the Nature of that prefum’d, that the Minor had fuffer'd fome Damage Proiniſe or Pact. For the Oath hath not in it ſelf in the Tranſaction, on account of his weak and unex- a power of -cauſing that which otherwiſe produced perienc'd Judgment, which lays him open to the only a Natural Obligation, to produce likewiſe a Circunvention and Treachery of others. But if Civil; unleſs the Municipal Laws interpoſe parti- there appears no ſuch Damage, no Reaſon can be cularly in the Matter. As neither can it change given why the Act ſhould be difannull’d. This be- the species of an Act : A bare Donation, for in- ing premis’d, we affirm, That if a Covenant or Itance, cannot by the Addition of an Oath be turn’d Promiſe made under Oath be in no other Reſpect into a Chargeable Contract, nor vice verſa. And here Faulty, it cannot be revers’d on this bare Score, we fall in with the coirmon Queſtion, Whether a That it was made by a Minor,provided he was capable Contract confirm’d by Oath, in which the Swearing of underſtanding the Buſineſs in Hand. But if the Party is remarkably prejudiced, may be revers’d, and other Party was guilty of any Deceit; or if, with- the Party reſtor’d in full to what he loft? Grotius (a) out any fuch Deceit, the Minor happens to fuffer takes the negative Párt, adding for a Reaſon, That any ſignal Prejudice, only through Infirmity of although, in this caſe, we may perhaps owe the Man Age, the Oath ſhall not hinder him from petition- nothing, or however leſs than is required, yet we are ing either to have the Bargain revers’d, or at leaſt bound to perform our Oath to God : Which Argument amended to his Advantage. For in this caſe, the we juſt now conſider'd and rejected. The Expoun- Youth who ſwears to the Contract, fuppoſes it to ders of the Roman Law handle the fame Queſtion be free from all Defect, and the other Party pre- at large, in their Obſervations upon Lib. 2. Tit. 27. tends as much. This then is, as it were, the Con- C. Ji adverſus vendit : and the Authentick ſubjoin’d: dition on which his Oath is founded, and upon Fai- which inany Civilians, and eſpecially thoſe of the lure of which it comes to nothing. The Caſe is French Nation, cenſure as unjuft. To the Refcript different if a Youth, without any Deceit, in the of Alexander they anſwer (3), That it doth by no Perſon with whom he deals, hath knowingly and means contain a general Deciſion, but was directed deliberately given more than the Purchaſe was wholly to a particular Cafe. For the matter ſtood thus ; worth. For then the Buſineſs was a mix'd Act, The Emperor was petition’d here by a Souldier, who made up partly of a Contract, and partly of a Do- muſt conſequently be a Man of ripe Judgment, be- nation. It is unneceſſary to add, as a general Re- ing in his Eighteenth Year; and yet be alledg’d mark, that a Perſon ſubject to the Power and Au- no extraordinary Loſs or Damage, but only his De- thority of another, cannot oblige himſelf farther than fect of Age. Now the Contract, which this Perſon he is, by that Authority, allow'd (d). If he ex- hai made and confirm'd by an Oath, that Religi- ceed theſe Bounds, the Governour may, if he thinks ous Prince would on no Account evacuate : and fit, declare the Buſineſs to be Void, whether ſworn his Pious Caution had no leſs a Precedent than Her- to or not: cules himſelf; who, as the Hiſtorian (1) Reports, XII. Yet in as much as Oaths are made by the never ſwore but once in his Life. And then as for the Invocation of the Divine Majeſty, whom no Man Authentick, they fay it was extorted by Force from can can fraudently deceive, and whom no Man can the Emperor Frederick, by Pope Honorius III. who ſecurely mock and deride; they ought to be allow'd reſus’d to grant him his Iinperial Crown on any o- this Effect; that, on their Account, all Tricks and ther Terms: and that Frederick had reſolv’d to al- Cavils ſhall be excluded from every Buſineſs which ter it, but was prevented by Death. The Reaſon they are added to confirm (1). Hence the Roman why (4) the Pope ſhould infift on obtaining that De- Cenſors juftly condemn’d the Subtlety of that Cap- cree, is eaſie to be diſcover'd, by all thoſe who are tive; who having obtain'd leave to depart from the acquainted with the Policy of the Roman Court (€). Enemy's Camp, giving his Oath to return, when We, for our Parts, muſt think it neceſſary to the he was got a little way, ſtept back, on the Pre- clear Determination of the Point, firſt of all to ob- tence of having left ſomething behind him, and ſerve, that thoſe Pacts, in which there appears a then fix'd himſelf at Rome, as if he had fulfillid very conſiderable Inequality, thoſe which depend what he ſwore (2). The Fallacy of Dercyllidas de- on any Deceit, Fraud, or unjuſt Fright, and thoſe ſerves a Cenſure no leſs fevere, who beſieging the which are ſtruck without Thought and Deliberation, Tyrant of Scepſis, folemnly ſwore to him, That if he have all of them a Natural and Intrinſick Defect, would come out to a Parly, he ſhould immediately return and are therefore ſuch as the Law of Nature enjoins into the City, The Tyrant coming out on his Pro- ſhould be either revers’d or corrected. But that the miſe, Dercyllidas commanded him on Pain of Death, Party's being under the Age of Five and Twenty, to ſét open the Gates, and then told him, Nom í is not ſufficient, of it ſelf, to render the Covenant give you leave to return into the City, and I intend defective. Though thus much indeed may fairly be too with my Army, to bear you Company (e). For (3) The Refcript of Alexander in this, Imp. Alex. A. Florentino Militi. Si minor annis viginti quinque emptori prædii cavifti nullam de catero te eſſe controverfiam fa&urum, idq; etiam jurejurando corporaliter præftito ſervare confrmåſti, neque perfidis, neque perjurii me autorem tibi futurum ſperare debuiſti. 'The Netv Conftitution of Frederick is , Sacramenta puberum ſponte fatta ſuper contra&ibus re- rum fuarum non retra&tandis inviolabiliter cuſtodiantur, Code l. 2. cit. 28. Si adverfus venditionem. (4) This has afforded the Clergy a Means to gain to themſelves, under a pretence of Religion, the Eftates of Children under Age, viz. Boys at 14 Years, and Girls at 12. Mr. Barbeyrat's NOTES on § 12. (1) The Oath makes the Cheat the more Criminal; but indeed every Action done without an Oath excludes alſo all vain Sub- tleries. See what is ſaid upon the Paragraph following. (2) For the Fraud heightens, and doth not take away the Perjury. Fraus enim aftringit, non diſolvit perjurium, Cicero de Ofc. 1. 3. c. 32. (a) d. 1. (6) Plutarch Quæft . Rom. 28. (c) That this Law is not obſerv'd in France, we have the Teſtimony of Mornay, ad d. l. See likewiſe Augusto Barboſa ad d. i. Grænewegen. de LL. abrogat. . 2. Polyen. Stratag. 1.2.6.6. The wicked Shuffling of the Locrians is likewiſe to be condema'd, as we find it reported by of R Fraud, Polyb. l. 12. C. 4. Tis a barbarous Story, that which Ælian (f) tells fhould fanſie their Oath to expire, by which they 130 Of an 0 ATH. Book IV : WITH warn was Fraud, as Tully obſerves (a), doth not looſen Perjury, the latter, that he did not take it; who are both to but bindit ftronger than before . Thus Harry Stephens, be judg’d guilty of Perjury. It was a moſt grofs in his Preliminary Treatiſe to his Apology for He- Evaſion of the Turkiſh Emperor Solymam, when rodotus (b), is very pleaſant on the common Sophiſn having ſwore to (3) İbrahim Baſa, that he would of the Tradeſmen, when they ſwear they cannot rever hurt him while he lid'd, he order'd him to be afford a Thing under ſuch or ſuch a Price, unleſs kill'd in his Sleep, as if he were not then to be they defign to loſe by it; obſerving that in this reckon’d amongſt the Living. On the other Hand, Conduét they have always an Eye to the Proverb, the Ancients extol the Conſtancy of Q. Metellus A Tradeſman loſeth when he doth not get. I know Numidicus (i), for refuſing to ſwear to the Law pro- not whether we are to rank under this Head, the poſed by Saturnius ; though Marius the Conful and A&t of the Ceunt de la Fountain, who in the Battle at others, endeavour'd to perſwade him to a Compli Rocroy, was carried in a Chair ; having bound hin- ance, by telling him, That the preſent Neceſities of ſelf by Oath, Never to fight againſt the French on the Commonwealth would juſtifie bim in taking the Oath , Foot, or on Horſe-back (c). Or that of Pope Alex- and that he might decline the Force of it by this Secret ander the Seventh, who having, at his Admiſſion Reſerve, That he ſwore to the Law, provided it were to the Papal Dignity, ſworn that He would never a Law; that is, if it were duly propos'd and enact- receive his Kinſmen in Rome, ( di non recivere i ſuoi ed. Whereas it would be eaſie for him afterwards parenti in Roma) by the Advice of the Jeſuits, to ſhew that it was indeed no Law, being made in made uſe of this Evaſion ; he receiv'd his Relations the time of Thunder, when by the Rites of their firſt at the Caſtle of Gaudolf, and then brought Religion, they were forbidden to tranſact any Bu- them with him into the City (d). Or what fineſs in the Aſſemblies of the People. Yet that Tavernier reports (e) of the Dutch Agents of their good Man chofe rather to go into Baniſhment , Eaſt Indian Coinpany ; who before they leave Hol- than to inake uſe of this Shift; knowing that when land, engage themſelves by Oath, never to drive Perſons ſwore to a Law, they muſt, at leaſt in Pre- any Trade on their own private Account, but to tence and Appearance, acknowledge the manner reſt ſatisfy'd with the Salary allow'd them by the of its Enactinent to be Right and True. But we Publick. Yet when they once arrive at the Indies, think Lycurgus to have been over Solicitous, when many of them Marry, and ſuffer their Wives to he order'd his Aſhes to be thrown into the Sea, for carry on that forbidden and clandeſtine Traffick fear if they ſhould be brought to Sparta, the People of Cleomenes the Spartan, That making Archonides had bound themſelves not to repeal his Laws till privy to his Deſign on the Kingdom, he ſwore to he ſhould return Home. For the bringing back of him, If his Enterprize ſuccceded, mevta our tñ ouzi a Dead Body can with no Propriety be look'd on xepan agentev, that he would do nothing without his as the Return of the Perſon to whom it be- Head. But having ſecured the Government he cut longs! (k). off his Friends Head, and kept it in a Veſſel of Ho XIII. Yet on the other ſide, the interpretation of ney, and before he undertook any Buſineſs, turn d Oaths is not always to be extended, but ſometimes towards the Veſſel, and declar'd his Refolutions. to be made in the cloſeſt and narroweſt Senſe, if Aryandes , in Polyanus (8), treating with the Barce- the Subject Matter ſeem to require it (I); as fup- ans, brought their Commiffioners to a Trench, which poſe we ſwore to the prejudice of another, and con- he had contrivd for that Purpoſe, lightly cover'd firm'd in this folemnly manner not Promiſes, but with Earth and Wood, and there ſwore to them, Threats, which are not in themſelves capable of That he would obſerve the Articles of Agreemnt, conferring any Right on another (1); the cominon as long as the Earth continued. And preſently after Inſtance of which Caſe is the Example of the Iſraelites throwing down the Trap, ruih'd upon the City, .in Judg. XXI; who having ſworn not to give their when under no Suſpicion of Violence (h). To the Daughters to the Benjamites, afterwards perſwaded faine Caſe belongs the common Inſtance of Two them to ſteal themſelves Wives, and interceded for Rogues, one of which ſteals a thing, and the other thein with the Virgins Fathers. For 'tis one thing hides it; the former ſwearing that he hath it not; to give, and another thing, not to reſume, what hath trol (3) Our Author unfitly impures this co Ibrahim. See the Continuers of Chalcondylas upon Solyman II. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 13. (1) It is certain, that we ought to reſtrain the ſenſe of the Words of an Oath, as the Nature of the thing requires, but that is not peculiar to an Oath, ſingle Promiſes and Agreements neceſſarily require it. As for the Examples which our Author alledges, they have moſt of them a ſhew of Subtlety, either wicked, unprofitable and fuperftitious. It is not ſufficient to give the Words of an Oath a ſenſe that may rigorouſly be put upon them, we muft alſo fee, if in the Circumſtances in which they were pronounc'd that ſenſe is ſuitable and agrees with the intention of him that ſwears, and him to whom the Oath is made. If it be not ſo, and the ſenſe in which the Terms are taken contains nothing that can render it null, I don't know how any can ſecure themſelves from Perjury by putting another ſenſe upon them, which was not thought on in taking the Oath; but it in following the ſenſe ' they are capable of it, and we may without fcruple diſpenſe with keeping a like Oath in any manner. See Mr. Titius Obſerv . 273. who ſends us to Mr. Thomaſius's Inſtit. Juriſpr. Divin. l. 2. c. 8. $ 50, &c. where he maintains the ſame thing againſt our Author, as I have ſeen my felt, fince the first Edition of that work, but 'tis the 11th and not the 8th Chapter. î tħall ſpeak of (a) Off. 3, ubi ſupra. Serm. 28. of Lydia. Tacitus Ann. XII. Rhadamiſtus, as if he would pretend to be mindful of his Oath, doth nor uſe his Sivord or his Poyfon againſt his Uncle or Siſter ; but, as they lay upon the Ground, ſtiftes chem with a load of heavy Garments Chapa (c) Benj. Prioli Hift. Gall. l. 2. (d) Il. Nepotiſm. Rom. part 1. 1. 3. ) , Cij v. H. 1. 12. c. 8. (8) Lib. 7. c. 34. Stratag. (h) Yer Herodotus, Melpom. cir. fin. attributes this Action to the Perſians. (i) Vid. Appian. I. 1. de Bell. Civil. p. 368. Edit. H. Steph, Plutarch in Mario. (k) Vid, Plutarcha Lycurg, Juſtin. l. 3. c. 3. (7) See Grot, 1. 2. C, 13., . 5. . been CHAP. II. 131 Of an 0 ATH. been forcibly taken (2), And there was the more Superior in cancelling the Laws, to be different reaſon for inſiſting thus cloſely on the Words of the from that (5) of repealing them by their own free Act. Oath, becauſe it had been Cruelty to extinguiſh a Thus Agamemnon in Euripides, refuſeth to punith whole Tribe (3), though for the moſt heinous Of Polyinneftor of Thrace (d), in regard that he was the lence; and perhaps they had in their Oaths, excep- Friend and Allye of the Grecians (6),yet he promiſeth ted this very, Cale (a). In Ammianus Marcellinus Hecuba not to hinder her froin taking any Revenge (0 ), Athanaricus the Gothick Judge and Commiſſion on him by her own Force, and on her own Ac- ner for the Treaty of Peace, alledging, that he was count (e). Thus the Knaviſh Servant in Terence (f); bound by a dreadful Curſe, and by the Commands begging the Maid to take the Child which he had of his Father, ort" Never to treadſ upon the Roman in his Arms, and to lay it at his Maſter's Door, be- Ground, and no Arguments proving fufficient to ing deinanded, Why he could not do’t without Ar- move him to the contrary, it being likewiſe dif- fiſtance? Anſwers, Becauſe if my Maſter makes me « honourable for the Emperour to paſs over to him; ſwear that I did not lay it here by my ſelf, I may « the Wife Heads found out this Expedient, to have do it with a ſafe Conſcience. But Davus was in our “ the Emperour and the Judge meet in their Boats Opinion, but a very poor Caſuiſt, it being in this about the midſt of the Rivers (the Danube,) and reſpect the ſame, to perform a thing by ones felf , thence to ſettle the Articles of Agreement be- or by another.' The Emperor Aurelian, when he “ tween their People on both ſides (4). So when the found the Gates of Thyan ſhut, ſwore in a Rage, RomansLivy ) requir'd the Achaans to repeal That he would not leave in it one Dog alive (7) (8). A- fome Decrees which they had made, the latter urg'd lexander the Great having reſolv'd to deſtroy the own Excuſe, That they were engaged by Oath City Lampſacus when Anaximenes came to peti- not to do it. But Appius the Roman Commillioner tion him on the behalf of the City, immediately in the Affair, telling thein, He would by all means ſwore, He would do nothing which Anaximenes ſhould n to undertake that willingly, which other. deſire. Anaximenes took the advantage of the Oath, wile they would be brought to by Compulſion : They and deſir'd him to deſtroy Lampſacus, (8) (b) Antigo- were fo terrify’d, as only to requeſt, That the Ro- nus on account of a ſtrange Dream which he had (1) mans would give themſelves the trouble of making what fully deſigning to kill Mắthridates, and diſcovering Alterations they thought fit, and not bring the Achæ- the Matter to his Son Demetrius, after he had forc'd ans under the Curſe of Perjury. Here, we ſee, they him to ſwear that He would never Speak of it; Deme- look”d on the Caſe of not oppoſing a formidable trius being concern’d for the Life of the Young in their adviſe them 10 (2) But as Mr. Vander Muelen has alſo obſerved in his Comment upon Grótius, Tom. 2. p. 472. if at the time that the Iſrao elites ſwore they had been demanded what they meant by nor giving their Daughters in Marriage, could they ſincerely fay, chae they intended thereby to hinder them from taking them, and the rather becauſe without any prejudice to their Oath, they were free to adviſe the Benjamites to have recourſe to luch an Expedient, and afterwards to intercede for them to the Fathers of the Virgins they had taken away? We may add, that theſe ſort of Oaths, which give no Right to any perſon, are properly ſpeak- ing Vows. Now what affurance can we have that God accepts them ? And on the contrary, ought we not to ſuppoſe that he re. jects them, ſince they only proceed from a principle of Hatred and Animoſity? In a word, all Minacory Oaths have two eſſen. cial Marks, which render them null, the firſt is, Thar ſo long as there is any knowledge of them in the Perſon againſt whom any thing is threarned to be done, or not, he always hopes that they'll not be performed; the other iş, That theſe ſort of Oaths are always made raſhly and without Confideration, for they either proceed from Hatred next to Madneſs, or ariſe from ſuch a Mo- tion of Choler, as cauſes a Menacing, with an Oath of ſuch as we are not angry with, becauſe we love them, and would make them ſenſible chat they have committed things that have provoked our Indignation In all theſe Caſes we ought to beg God's Mercy for thoſe unwarrantable Paſſions, with which we have ſuffered ourſelves to be tranſported, and for the Raſhneſs we have been guilty of in uſing his Holy Name, as if he ough to authorize our Paſſions and weakneſſes, but we are not obliged to keep ſuch Oaths, and we often fin much more in execucing our Threarnings with Rigour. (3) Mr. La Placette in his Treatiſe of an Oath, l. 2. c. 9. maintains, That it is impoſſible to prove with the leaft Solidity, that theſe Oaths are evil. There was indeed, ſays he, a great deal of Severity in this Treatment, but we muſt alſo own, that it was deſerved. This Deciſion certainly is not moderate, if we conſider the Nature of the thing determined, for it authorizes ao Action very harſh, or rather extremely cruel, but as to the Deciſion ir felf, it feems to me, that to qualifie it fingly with Mode- ration, is a Term very ſweet and pleafing. It is not necetlary that I ſhould prove this, bue, ſend the Reader to the Hiſtory ic ſelf, and to Mr. Le Clere's Commentary upon it. (4) If the Peace could not have been concluded unleſs Athanaricus had went into the Romans Country, he had been diſcharged of his Oath by this only, that caſes of Neceſity are always excepted. (5) We muſt ſay the ſame thing in this Example as in the preceding. Otherwiſe all publick Deliberations may be revoked, when it is neceflary for the good of the State, there being nothing in which this Condition is not Tacitly included. (6) In this Example there is no Oath, and the Explication of Agamemnon's Words helps not the Marcer. (7) This of keeping Oaths is to burleſque them. The Hebrews have a Proverbial Expreſſion ſomething like this of Aure- lian, which is-to make them pafs under the Edge of the Sword, underſtanding it of Men and nor of Beaſts, alchough the Words properly taken belong only to Dogs. See i Sam. 25. 22. and what Mr. Le Clerc ſays of it againſt Bochartus. The truth is, the Emperors Oath was null. See what I have ſaid in Note 2. And ſo was Alexander's for the fame Reaſon, when Anaximenes beg. ged the contrary to what he wiſhed for. (8) As the Propoſition of Etearchus was wicked, it is clear that Themiſon's Oath was null, and that he ought not to keep it in the ſenſe that the Tyrant took the Words, but alſo that he did wrong in putting the Virgin into the Sea, although he reſolved to pull her out again; for he could not be ſure that the Cords would not break, or that he ſhould not do her fome Miſchief in throwing her into the Sea. way (a) Add. Joſeph. Archeol. V. 2. & Ambrof. OM. I. 3. c. 14. (b) Lib. 27. c. 4. (0) Lib. 39. C. 37: (d) Hecub. y. 869,&c. (e) Add: Polyb. Excerpr. leg. 8 circ. fin. () Andr. Art. 4. Scen. 3. (8) Aurelian was but juſt in interprecing his Threats, according to the ſtricteft rense, when he commanded his Men to run up and down, and kill all the Dogs they inet with, Flav. Popisc. Aurelian, c. 23. Add. Valer. Mar. 1. 7.c. 3. Sect. 4. inter. extern. (1) When Ete archus in Herodotus (Melpom) 171, 172. Edic. H. Steph. had obliged Themifon by Oath to Sinift him in any Service he Thould command, and afterwards orderd him to throw his Daughter into the Sear;' Themifon, tying the young Lady to Ropes, let her down amongſt the waves, but preſently Pulld her up again without harm. (i) Vid. Appian. de Bello Mithridat. p. 176. Edic. H. Steph. 5.1.1970m + R2 Princes 132 Of an 0 ATH. Book IV bi So char Demetrius might without any Ambages have delivered Mithridates from the Danger he was in. frince took him once aſide from the Company, and XIV. In like manner an Oath doth not exclude aying nothing to him (9), only wrote with his any tacit Conditions or Limitations properly ati- Javelin in the Duſt, ſo as to be obſerv'd by him, ſing from the Nature of the Subject . As ſuppoſe I Fly Mithridates (a). To the ſame Head belongs that have given a Perfon his Option to deſire of me Inſtance which Sueton (b) gives of Cajar's great Cle- whatever he pleas'd ; if his Requeſt ſhall be either mency of Nature; That having ſworn to crucifie unjuſt or abſurd, I am not tied by my Engagement, the Pirates by whom he had been taken, he orders For he that makes an indefinite Grant to another, them firſt to be ſtrangled, and then faſtned to before he knows what he will ask, preſuppoſeth thał the Croſs. Of the like kind was David's Oath of Safety the other Party will petition for what is Honelt to Shimei , 2 Sam. XIX. 23. notwithſtanding which, what is Morally Poffible, what is not Ridiculous, on his Death-bed, he commands Solomon, to take and what is not miſchievous either to himſelf, or due care that ſuch a wicked Rebel ſhould not die to any beſides (1).1 'Twas a good Caution of Phoebus a peaceable Death; 1 Kings II. 9. For David's Pro- to his Raſh Son, 4 of TOT VOTO Atisortor"? miſe of Pardon was made only in his own Name. Nor The ait to be protbus H oH W * did he here, properly, enjoin Solomon that he ſhould Ne dubita, Dabitur (ſtygias juravimus undas) drag the Man to Puniſhment for his old Crime, but Quodcunque optůris; ſed tu fapientias opta (e). dr only that he 1hould diligently watch fo notorious a Villain, and by no means ſpare him, if taken in I've ſworn by Styx, doubt not, I'll not refuſe a ſecond Fault. And Solomon acted with great Wif Whate're you ask, but with more Wiſdom chuſe. don (c), in obliging fo turbulent and fo implaca- ble an Offender to live in the Royal City under Such a Cafe as this gave occaſion to that noted Say- his Eye, for fear he ſhould engage in new Treaſons, ing of Hippolytus in Euripides (f), which Tully fo threatning him with Death upon his Diſobedience much commends, si gaãoó' ou concox' i 3 qpör árásuolo in this particular; which Condition Shimei himſelf My Tongue hath (worn, my Mind unſworn remains . gladly approved of, and accepted. Nor did it fall for it ſeems he had ſworn to the Nurſe, that he out without the ſpecial direction of Providence, would keep ſecret whatever ſhe diſcover'd to him, that being caught tranſgreſſing this Command, he But when the made a Propoſal of Adultery and In- ſuffer'd the juſt Reward of his former, as well as of ceft with his Mother-in-Law Pha dra, he denies that his preſent Guilt. Add. Montaign's EfT . 1. 1. c. 7. his Oath oblig'd hiin to conceal fo foul a Villany, Perhaps we ought to allow a place under this fa- Though the Poet makes him fo fcrupulous as to re- vourable Head, to the Action of Mary Queen of cede from this Judgment, and to keep cloſe the Mat- Hungary, Wife to the Emperour Sigiſmund, who ter in regard to his Oath (3), Nicomachus in Q. Cur- having promiſed Indemnity to Hervatus, Governor tius, (%) makes the ſame Exception, refolutely denying of Croatia, by whom ſhe had been taken, and very that he had given bis Oath in confirmation of the Par- hardly uſed; upon the Recovery of her Liberty ricide, or that any tye of Religion ſlvould be able to is ſaid to have put her Husband upon revenging the binder bim from déclariug fo barbarous a Treaſon. Injury; alledging, That she had no power to engage For it is indeed one part of the Duty and Obliga- for him, though ſhe might for her ſelf. Bunfin. rer. tion of a Subject, not to hide any Deſigns that he Hunger. 1. 3. c. 2. I know not whether we may put ſhall obſerve to be carrying on againſt the Perſon in the ſame rank the Act of Timoleon recorded by or the Government of his Prince. So Tully (Off . 1) Polyanus; he was engaged in purſuit of Milarchus (a) It may ſo happen, that the performance of a a promiſe the Tyrant, an iinpious Wretch, who had cheated or an Engagement ſhould be prejudical to the Party to many Perſons out of their Lives, by ſwearing to whom it was made. For if Neptune, as we have it in preſerve them, and afterwards deſpiſing his Oath. the Story, had not made good what he promiſed to The Tyrant made an Overture of coming in Per- Theſeus upon Oath, Theſeus had not lost his Son Hip- ſon to Syracuſe to take his Tryal, provided Timoleon polytus. The Death of his Son being one of the three would not be his Accuſer : Timoleon ſwore he would Wiſhes , which, in his Paffion, he put up to Neptune . not; and on theſe Terms Milarchus came to Syracuſe: (Comp. Euripid Hippolyt . Coron. v. 315.) Thule Timoleon bringing him into the open Aſſembly, ad- Promiſes therefore are not to be kept, which would be dreſſed him in the following manner, I will not accuſe burtful to the Perſons whom, in promiſing, Tou deſign'd you, for ſo I covenanted beforehand; but I'll command to ſerve . Add. Diod. Sic. 1. 4.c. 65. And thus to you inſtantly to be executed. For he who bath decsivºd ſo Herod ought not to have ſold the Head of John the many to their Ruine, mayjuſtly be thus deceiv’d himſelf. Baptiſt to his Daughter-in-Law, for a Dance; be- (9) This Expedient was ſuperfluous, and could not have preſerved Demetrius from Perjury, if the Oath had been valid. But every one is indiſpenſibly obliged, as much as in him lies, to avert the Evil from others wich which they are threarned unjuſtly. All this Mr. de Sacy has ſpoken in his Treatiſe of Friendſhip, p. 110, &c. upon the Queſtion, whether a Man may break his Oath to diſcover to his Friend a Secret of thar Nature, that he hazards his Life if he hides it from him? All that this ingenious Author has ſaid upon this Subject, taking the Negative part, is void and of no force. The Reaſons which he himſelf alledges for the Affirmative are ſufficient ro ſhew that his Determination is extremely wrong. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S. 14. (1) Our Author cites this Paſſage out of Ovid's Metamorphoſes, 1. 2. V. 101, 102. but it is ſo far from eſtabliſhing, that it con- tradías our Author's Principles. Phebus ſuppoſes here, and the fequel of the Story proves it plain enough, That an Oath made by the waters of Styx was inviolable, although the performance of it was fatal to him, for whole fake it was made. This is con- trary to Reaſon, and the Syſtem of the Author. (3) Curtius's Words are, Quibus juvenis (Nichomachus] auditis, se vero fidem in Parricidio dediffe conftanter abmit, nec ulla, ut ſcelus tezat, poffe conftringi. (a) Plutarch. Demet. (b) jul. c. 74. (c) Verſ. 36, doc. (d) Stratag, 1, 5,0.12. n. 3. V, IOT, 102, (5) Hippolyt. v. 6.12. (8) Lib.6. c. 7. 8.7. GDA (e) Ovid Metamorph. 1. 2. cauſe CHAP. II. Of an ( ATH. 133 Grant; when Evaſion. The cauſe , ſince there can lie no Obligation to what is of Perjury, when being conſcious to themſelves of the umlawful; in ſuch a General Promiſe, this Conditi- Wickednejs with which they were chargd, they trem- on ought to have been underſtood, If The deſir'd any bled and faulterd in their Oath, changing the Words thing which he night lawfully perform (a). We with 'mueb Artifice and Slight. So Úlyfes and Dion find King Solomon not adhering to his Indefinite medes in Di&tis Cretenfis (e), like true Maſters of liis Mother ask'd a Favour which was Sophiſtry and Guile, fware to the Trojans, That they likely to turn to the prejudice of his Go Govern- would ſtand by the Agreement they had ſettled with ment (4), 1 Kings II. 20, &c. There is a very re Antenor : By which Agreement they meant the Ar- markable Story in Diodorus Siculus (6) which bears ticles for betraying the City, which Antenor and fome relation to the point now under Debate: "Xer- they had adjuſted. As for that Form us d in ad- xes being Warınly engagºd-in profecuting a new miniſtring Oaths amongſt the Romans, ex animi ſui Expedition againſt Greece, deſired Themiſtocles , ſententia, according to their Judgment and Opinion, a who was then in his Court, to be his Guide and it is 110t ſo to be expounded, as if Oaths receiv'd « Director in the War. Themiſtocles conſented, up- all their Force and Validity from the Notion which * on condition the King would ſwear, never to at- Men form'd of them in their Mind; but to ſhew, tack the Grecians without him. A Bull ' being fa- thoſe that ſwore ought to perform fo folemn an AC * crifica, and the Oath taken with the uſual so- in the moft ferious Manner, and with the inoſt real « lemnitý, Themiſtocles took a Cup of the Blood, Intentions (1), not in the way of Diffimulation, of and drinking it off, immediately expired. And Fi&tion, or of Sport. This too was an uſual Form of by this means diverted Xerxes from his Reſolution. the Queſtions put by the Cenſors; as for Inſtance, But here if Xerxes had no other Reaſon to alter his ex animi tui fententia babes uxorem? Have you a Wife, Purpoſe, he need not have been deterr’d by his anſwer me according to your real Mind? Which a Roman Oath, in which Themiſtocles's Life was a Condition Knight once anſwering with this Cavilling Jeft, I fuppos’d; it being no more than if he had promis'd have a Wife, according to my Mind, not according to that Grecian Captain never to undertake any thing your Mind, incurr’d the Penalty of a Fine for his againſt his Countryinen, whilſt he liv’d, without indiſcreet Wit. Cicero in his Academical (f) Que- his Counſel and Alliſtance. So that upon his Death, ftions, endeavouring to prove that human Know- the force and virtue of the Oath died with him (5). ledge can reach no higher than Probabilities , in a XV. Although the Invocation of the Divine Naine very elegant manner alledgeth this and other the like in Oaths, is to be adjuſted according the Perſwafi- Cuſtoms as Proofs of what he aſſerts. This is evident, on of the Perſon who ſwears, yet the whole Propo- ſays he, in the diligent Caution of our Anceſtors, who ſition ſhall bear that Senſe which he who requires firſt required Men to wear only according to the beſt the Oath proteſteth to underſtand it in (e). For 'tis of their Judgment; and then told to Ithe Party who on his account chiefly that the Oath is taken, and took the Oath, that he ſhould be rendred guilty by it, not on the Swearer's: And therefore it belongs to only , if he knowingly deceiv'd. As likewiſe, when him too, to ſettle the Form of Words, and he ought they order'd a Witneſs to ſay no more than that he to do this fo plainly and clearly, as both to ſignifie thought, ſuch or ſuch a Matter, though perhaps he had how he underſtands them himſelf , and to bring the ſeen it with his Eyes; and pronounc'd a Faet which the Swearer to acknowledge that he apprehends his worn Fudges had examin'd and determin’d, not to be, Meaning. And to conclude the Buſineſs, the Swearer but only to feem, or to appear thus or thus. "Tis a is to pronounce the ſame Words openly and diſtinct- Remark of the fame Author (2) 1. That what is ly, fo as to leave no poflible Room for Cavil or Sworn agreeable to the Mind and Intention of him ; ſpeaks of (d), in vain declined to attempt the Guilt but what is not, may without Perjury be omitted. That 2. 24. (4) The Promiſe was nor granted with an Oath. Solomon did not ſwear, till having refuſed his Mother's Petition, he on the contrary declared, that what Bathſheba came to do, ſhould coſt Adonijah his Life. The Rigour of this Prince is very had to be excuſed, being againſt his Brother, whoſe evil Deſigns he might have prevented another way. See Mr. Le Clerc upon · Kings , (5) The Roman Lawyers ſay, That if a Man has promiſed with an Oath to appear before a Judgment.Seat, and is prevented by ſome lawful Reaſon, he is not perjur’d. Qui jurato promiſit judicio fifti, non videtur pejeraffe, fi ex concesſa causa hoc deſeruerit, Digeft . 1 2. tit. 8. Qui ſatis dare cogantur, &c. Our Author here criticizech upon the Reflection which Homer makes upon the Oath of He&tor, by which that Trojan Hero had promiſed to Dolon to give him the Horſes and Chariot of Achilles. Kai smogson a to ura, &c. He ſwore and was perjur’d, ſays the Poet. But our Author ſays, He&tor (wore only under this Tacit Condition, If we take the Horſes and Chariot, and if you return from the Battle ſafe and found. So that he underſtands by the Wordée opxo, perjur'd, an Oath that did not take effect. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 15. (1) Our Author quotes this from his Memory, and does not tell us where he had it. He has it from Aulus Gellius, where he of whom he ſpeaks was not a Roman Knight, but a captious Fellow. Moreover, the laſt Ediçion of Mr. Gronovius reviewed by the MSS. relates the jeſt after a different manner, ſo that it had nothing offenſive for the Cenſor to puniſh, for he that made this unfeaſonable Jeſt ſaid only, that he had a good Wife, but not to his Humour, for his Anſwer was, Habeo equidem, inquit, uxoretig Sed non bercle ex animi mei sententia, vid. Cicero de Orat. I. 2.c.64 & Juft. Lipſius Var. Lect . 1. 1. C. I. In fine, a famous Law- yet very unfitly concludes from this Paffage of A. Gellius, That Women were ſubject to the Reproof of the Cenſors. See Mr. Tho- mafaus's Diſcourſe, De Judicio Seu Cenfura morum, c. 2. $12, &c. (2). Cicero's Latin is , Quod enim ita juratum est, ut mens conciperet fieri oportet, id (ervandum eft quod aliter, id fi non fece- moftro, id non facere perjurium est. Grotius and our Author have followed the ordinary Editions in the first Words , which import, wat mens deterentis conciperet fieri oportere. But ſeeing the Manuſcripts acknowledge che Word deferentis, which is not there, as Aldus Minucius teſtifies, the fequel of the Diſcourſe inews plain enough, as I think, that ic is a Gloſs which has been thruſt into the Text by forne body that did not attend to Cicero's Reaſoning. The Example which is found in the following Words will not permit us to doubt but that he treats of him that ſwears , and not of him that impoſeth the Oath. A Corſaire svithoue doubc intends to pay what he has promiſed with an Vath, or why doth he livear? "Tis then mens jurantis, and not mens deferensis, in this place. (a) Matth. 14. 6, &c. () Lib. 5. (6) Lib. II C. 58 p.48 A. Edic, Rhodom. 0) Lib. 46. 47 sub fin. dl. 3 c. 29 de offic. (c) See Grof. I. 2 c. 13 . 3 , 2, (d) Hiſt. 4 c.41. is, 134 Of an 0 AT H. Book IV. 2011 18 14 and Persractice,) according to your real Sentiments ſuch an Oath ſome other Party obtain'd a perfect ben with it. But when the Oath hath given no is, if a Man happens to miſunderſtand the Party in the manner we before deſcrib’d. For it is who puts him to his Oath, ſo as to ſwear in a diffe- much more to invoke God as a Witneſs, in the rent Senſe from what the other conceives, he is not midſt of thoſe Sacred Rites; which, not without perjur'd by Non-performance : For ſince the other ſome kind of Pious Horrour, ſignifie the Divine Perſon had a contrary Meaning, he muſt be ſup: Preſence ; than to write ſo many Words on Paper , pos’d not to have accepted of this Propoſal made which never bluſſbeth. And 'tis a Material Conſide upon Oath by the Juror; and without Acceptance ration, that Evidences thus given in Writing at a there ariſeth no Obligation from a Promiſe. 2. For diſtance, are by the Lawyers themſelves termd Te- it is not, as Tully goes on, always Perjury to Jwear ſtimonia coca (a), Blind Teſtimonies. what is falſe ; that is , to affert by Oath thro ſome XVII. Laſtly, It is a Queſtion uſually diſcuſs’d Miſtake what is really otherwiſe; But you are then on this Head, Whether or no, and how far an Heir perjur'd, when you fail in making good what you is bound by the Oaths of the Perſon to whom he Imore, ex animi tui fententia, (as the Form is in our fucceeds? In which Caſe this is certain, that if by common ) a dioni mood SC0201 XVI. It hath been a Diſpute amongſt ſoine of our or in part out of the Goods of the Deceas’d; then which ſhould bind the abſent Party? On which one a perfect Right, and the Obligation it ſelf was Point our Judgment is this : As a Perſon may in his founded barely in the Piety, Fidelity or Conſtancy Abſence contract an Obligation, fince Conſent may of the Juror, then it's plain that the Heir doth not as well be ſignify'd in Writing, as viva voce; ſo ſtand bound, inaſmuch as he doth not repreſent a- there ſeems no Reaſon why an Oath likewiſe may nother, as to thoſe Obligations which terminate ul- not be expreſs’d in the ſame manner. Which, alter timately and ſolely in the Perſon Deceas’d. Thus it hath been once ſolemnly recited, ſhall as fully for Inſtance, if a Man hath ſworn or vow'd with oblige, as if the Party were there preſent, and had an Oath, That he will faſt once every Week; That taken it by word of Mouth. Yet before it hath be will continue in Celibacy five years; or, That he been rehears d in this folemn Manner, it ſeems al- will undertake a Pilgrimage to the Holy Land; if he lowable to revoke it ; ſo that a Perſon who retracts die before he hath fulfill'd his Engagement, his Heir an Atteſtation which he made upon Oath at a Di- ſhall by no means be tied to perform it. But the Itance, before it be convey'd to the place for which Caſe is different, if a Perſon hath been Hei: ex- it was deſign'd, ought not to be look'd on as per- preſly under ſuch a Condition. So likewiſe if a jur’d. But in the common Proceedings of Courts Man hath fworn, to give an Hundred Pounds yearly in this Affair, there ſeems to be ſomewhat not ve to the Poor for Ten Tears to come; and dies before ry proper or convenient, as that the Proctors who the time is expir’d, his Heir ſhall be free from the read the Inſtrument, uſe ſuch a Poſture and Cere- Obligation ; unleſs the former Grant conferr’d on mony, as if they were to ſwear in their own Name, certain Perſons a Right of demanding the ſaid Sum. and that, for fear they ſhould ſeem to be themſelves For he who makes a Promiſe, and doth not withal obliged, they change the concluding Clauſe of the give the Party a Right of challenging it as his Due, Oath after this manner, So help him God. Whereas intends to engage his own word only, and not his it might be e fufficient barely to recite the Oath of Eſtate; and therefore upon his Deceaſe, the Obli- the abſent Party, as it lies in the Writing. How- gation ſhall not in the leaſt affećt his Poffellions ever, ſince it hath been with good Reaſon, or his Heir, unleſs an eſpecial Injunction to their ceiv'd Cuſtom of moſt Nations to render Oaths more Purpoſe were added in the Will. Grotius (b) ob- Sacred and Auguſt by the Ceremonies of Religion, ſerves farther, That if ſuch a Promiſe confirmºd by and by ſome Sign of Devotion, to ſet the Awe and Oath was in ſome refpečt Faulty, ſo as to produce a Reverence of the Divine Majeſty more ſenſibly Right, not in regard of Man, but of God only, then before the Eyes of the Juror, as by Sacrifice, by the Heir shall not be charg’d with the Performance . approaching to the Altar, and the like Acts of Wor- Which we allow, if it be ſuppos’d that the Party fip; therefore we are Opinion, that if the Matter who ſwore, reſolv'd either out of a Point of Honour, be of very important Concern, the abſent Party or a Scruple of Conſcience, to fulfil ſuch a defective ought to be put to his Oath, with the uſual Solem- Oath, which he might, if he pleas’d, have utterly vity, in the place where he lives; eſpecially ſince evacuated, by alledging fome Deceit, or ſome Fear the Caſe requires a Corporal Oath (2); which Name unlawfully caus’d. For otherwiſe the Queſtion is we cannot give to an Oath expreſsd and convey'd inſignificant ; we having above ſhewn that the Ju- up his ai vissa stola de venit si voln Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 16. (1) Our Modern Law cal's it, jurare in animam alterius. Mr. Hirtius recites here a Paſſage out of a Letter of William the Good King of Sicily to Henry II. King of England, written in 1176, where that Prince ſays, That all his Time it has been a Cuſtom in his Realm and among his Anceſtors, not to ſwear himſelf, but it is all one to life up our Hand, or cauſe another co life Hand for us in our preſence. Quum únum & idem putemus Sacramentum, quod vel manu propria fit, vel in anima jubentis do preo fentis juratur. That the Ancient Romans ſometimes ſwore after this manner, appears by an Example which Mr. Hirtius alledges of an Oath which Anthony made to Pompey by the Ambaffadors he ſent to him, Dion. Hiſt. Lib. 49. Tit. Livius alſo tells us, That C. Valerius Flaccus not being able to ſwear himſelf, his Brother L. Valerius Flaccus ſwore for him by the allowance of the Se- nate and People, who eſteem'd ſuch an Oach good, and for the advantage of him for whom it was made. Plebeſa; ſcivit, ut pelle inde eſſet, ac fi iple Ædilis juraffet, Lib. 11. c. so. ult. See what the Expoſitors of the Civil and Canon Laws ſay about Oaths taken by a Proxy. *(2) Juramentum Corporale, or, as it is called in the Code, juramentum corporaliter proſtitutun. See the Law cited about this Mareer, $ 11. f. 3. and 1. 2. tit. 43. Si minor ſe majrem, &c. leg. 3. in fin. Tis an Oath that a Man takes himſelf with che ordi- nary Formalities. (a) Vid. leg. Wijogoth. l. 2. tit. 4.C. 5. (6) Lib. 2.6. 13. 1. 17. solat ror Chap. II. Of an OATH 135 Perſon; but the Deſign of the for himſelf is not in this Cafe effectually oblig’d. Brutus, of old, impos’d on the People to the con- But what if the Heir neglects to perform a Promiſe trary. Which will appear yet more evidently, if or Covenant under Oath made by the Deceas’d, we conſider, that this Oath conferr'd a Right on ņo ſeems reaſonable to anſwer in the Negative. Forly to lay a Reſtraint on the Liberty of their Will, that which in ſtrict Speech we call an Oath, or the that they might not think of reſtoring that Form Invocation of the Divine Vengeance fuperadded to of Government which had prov'd fo Unfortunate a Common Engagement, paffeth no farther than the to them. By which means they might indeed bind Perſon of him who Swears (1). Since we cannot themſelves, never to ſet up a Monarchy in Rome ; ſay that the Heir put a Slight on the Reverence due at leaſt, ſo long as the publick Safety could be to the Divisie Majeſty, becauſe it was not he who preſerv'd without it. For in this caſe the very Per- call?d God to Witneſs: And therefore he ſhall be ions who took the Oath, muſt be ſuppos’d to be re- Chargeable only with breach of Truſt. It alters the leas’d from it; becauſe then the Neceilities of the Matter, if the Oath were taken by a whole People: State, which is conceiv’d incapable of ſubſiſting It being the Judgment of many, That a People without a ſingle Governour, render the Matter or whilſt they remain ſuch, are by their publick Oaths Subject of the Oath Unlawful. But their Potterity, put under perpetual Obligation. Which Opinion unleſs they repeated the Oath, could not be tied by nevertheleſs ſeems to us not altogether Clear and it: as well becauſe their Anceſtors had no Authori- Deciſive: For an Oath and the breach of it affects ty thus to impofe arbitrarily upon them; as becauſe only the Natural Will, or the Will of particular the Conſent of Poſterity was wanting, as at preſent Men, and reacheth the compound Body, or Moral we ſuppoſe. Nor is it any Argument to the contra- Perſon, only by Communication from each Indi- ry to urge, that a Nation is reckond the ſame, tho? vidual. The People therefore, as a Moral Perfon, the particular Members who compos’d it are all cannot invoke the Wrath of God upon them- chang'd. And that therefore the Acts of paſs’d Ge- felves; but this is done by thoſe fingle Natural Per- nerations ſeems juſtly enough to be attributed to fons, of whom the Community was made up. And the preſent. For the Acts of former Ages can then conſequently upon the Violation of a Promiſe or only be imputed to the latter, when ſome other Par- Pact made by Oath in the Name of the State, thoſe ty obtain’d any Right as the neceſiary Conſequence Perſons only ſhall be guilty of Perjury who Cor- of thoſe Acts. But in ſuch things as reſult to the porally fwore to the Buſineſs , if they are now con- whole Body from the Actions of particular Mem- fenting to the Omiffion of it; but the reſt ſhall be only bers, the Deſcendants in a People do not always. re- branded with the Mark of ordinary Perfidiouſneſs (2). preſent the Progenitors. As though a People have And for this Reaſon we ſhould be unwilling to ac- been heretofore eminent for Martial Glory , yet cuſe the Spartans of Perjury, in receding, after ſo their lazy and degenerate Race can claim no Share many Ages, from Lycurgus's Inſtitutions : Or, the in their Triumph, or in their Fame. Yet ſtill the Romans, in caſe they had inveſted the Caſars with cafe would be quite otherwiſe, if ſuch an Oath as the Title of Kings, notwithſtanding the Oath which we are ſpeaking of hath been ſolemnly renewed by 7100091 (2) Mr. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 17. (:) Bodin, de Republ. I. 5.c. ult. concludes hence very unfitly, Thar Princes are not obliged to ſtand to the Treaties made by their Predeceffors, though confirmed by Oaths, as Grotius has obſerved, De Jur. Bell. & Pac. 1. 2 c. 16 16 n. 4. For, Fays be very well , Nothing hinders but that the Promiſe may oblige the Heir, though the obligation of an Oath be purely Peflonal . Upon which Gronovius affirms, That a Prince and his Succeffor being one Perſon, becauſe they both repreſent the People, an Oath binds the Succeflors; but what I ſhall ſay with our Author in the following Note, will make it appear chac the Repreſen- tation falls only upon the Engagement, and not upon the Oath that attends ir. Hirtius declares here againſt the Nocion of our Author, and much depends upon the Authority of Grotius, which yer ſeems to make nothing for him. For this Great Man treating upon the Agreements made with rebellious Subjects, ſays, Lib. 3. 6, 19.9 8. n. 1. That they may be confirmed by Oath, not only by the King and Senate, but alſo by the Body of the State, as Lycurgus and Selon made, the one the Lacedæmonians, the other the Athenians, to ſwear to obſerve their Laws, and, THAT THEIR OATH MIGHT NOT LOSE ITS FORCE BY ANY CHANGE OF PERSONS, they order'd it to be renewed every Year. In this laft Caſe, ſays Grotius, we can't break our Word, when the Publick Good requires it , for the Eftare may recede from içs Right, and the Terms of the Treaty may be ſo clear as to admit of no Exception. Either I am much miſtaken, or theſe words fuppoſe the clear contrary to what Mr. Hirtius infers from them, as appears from thoſe words which I have written in Capital Letters, eſpecially it we compare them with the places quoted in the Margin of this Paragraph, viz. Grot. 1. 2. C. 13. 8 6.& 1. 3. C.19.55. In ſhort, Grotius does not ſpeak at all of the Poſterity of them with whom the Treaty was concluded, at leaſt , he will have us know that the Obligation of an Oath has as much force upon Pofterity, as the Promiſe to ir anne xed.' The Reaſon of Mr. Hirtius is no whic ſtronger. He ſays, a People may be ſworn, as a People. Be it ſo, yet the People which is to day is not the ſame it was an hundred Years ago, it is only thought ſo, by reaſon of the Perpetual Succeſſion of New Citizens, who fill up the place of thoſe who are dead, or have left their country, and the Continuation of the Government. So that he comes under the real Engagemenes of his Anceſtors, by which he hath acquired a true Right, and which are by Nature perpetual, and nor into that which muſt be looked upon as purely Perſonal. Now ſuch is the Oath here. In a word, the People that is to day hath no ether relation to the people that liv d an hundred Years ago, than an Heir has to a dead perſon, whoſe Promiſes con- firmed by an Oath (as Mr. Hirtius holds are co be performed, noe upon account of the Oath, bue upon the account of the Pro- miſc . For an Oath is only a thing accidental, a fimple Confirmation of an Engagement, which were not leſs kind of a Religious formality, which hath no other effect, than to affure him more of our Fidelity, with whom we reſolve to keep our Word. The Example which Mr. Hirtius brings of the Iſraelites, who about 150 Years after the Death of Joſeph made good what that Patriarch had made their anceſtors to twear, viz. to carry his Bones out of Ægypt into the Land of Promiſe. This Example, fays I, proves only, that the Iſraelites did think themſelves obliged to perform the Promiſe of their anceſtors, but there is nothing that inſinuares, that if they had not done it , they had been guilty of Perjury. We may ſay the fame of the Murder of the Gibeonites , ſuppoſing that Saul did it under a pretence that the Oath of foshua was null. But Mr. Le Clerc has Well obſerv'd, that that Prince had another Pretence. See 70% . 21.1, 2.. As to Oaths which give no Right to a Perſon, as when 2 People having made a Law, ſwear ever after to obſerve it, it is clear that theſe are Vows which have no Force any farcher than as ve may preſume that God accepts them, ſo that as no Perſon can oblige himſelf, but as he judges it for his advantage, afterward abrogate ie if they find je prejudicial to the End for which it was eſtablithed; for that exception is included in all En- angements which concern them only that enter into them, and we may believe that God no farther requires the conſtant formance of Vows. See Lib. 1. c. 6 $ 6. and Lib. IV. Chap. VI. $ 15. a foregoing. Pofterity, per 136 Of an OAT H. Book IV. Pofterity, each particular Man engaging for himſelf. XIX. It hath been generally the Cuſtom to make But in regard to theſe publick Obligations, Sopho- uſe of Promiffory Oaths in publick as well as in cles's Advice (3) might paſs for a general Rule; private Cauſes, and perhaps more frequently than was neceſſary (1). Concerning which, Authors have Let notbing thus be ſworn beyond recall; obſerv'd, That ſome of them are taken to intro- For Men are frail, and human Thoughts will change. duce an Obligation, and are calld Promiſſory in Antigon. p. 230. Specie : Others are added to confirm fome Act al- ready in Being. Which Diſtinction is not to be And 'tis no trivial Remark that which Joan. La- underſtood as if every Oath were not acceſſory to bardée makes in his Hiſtory of France (a), That the another Obligation ; but becauſe ſome Promiſes in Leagues of Monarchs are more firm and ſacred, than clude an Oată in the Compaſs of the faine Propoli- thoſe made by Republicks, or Popular Governments: tion; as when one ſays, I ſwear to do ſo or join Becauſe when one Perſon only engageth his Faith, he is your account : Whereas many times the principal Buſi- ſtruck with a more Religious Concern fºr the Obſerva- fineſs is expreſs’d in a different Sentence from the tion of it, than “can affect each Man in a Multitude, Oath which confirms it. Now 'tis rightly obſervd where every one conſiders that but a little of the Pub- by the Expoſitors of the Roman Law, and is no lick Faith, if any at all, comes to his ſhare : By which more than we have already prov'd, That all Oaths Means all are eaſily induc'd to recede from the com are void which Men apply to ſtrengthen any Buſi- mon Engagement. neſs in it ſelf unlawful or vicious (2), and which XVIII. The Two Principal Eyes to which Oaths tends either to the impairing of the publick Good, may be, and commonly are applied, are, either to or to the Prejudice of a Third Perſon, though at the ſtrengthen and confirin a Promiſe by ſuch a folenn ſame time there are ſome ſort of Tranſactions which Act of Religion; or to open a way to the clearing are, of themſelves, in Civil Cogniſance, Invalid, fome Fact, which is at preſent doubtful and cannot and yet are rendred good and effectual by the Ad- be conveniently made out any other way. And dition of an Oath (3). The reaſon of which is 'tis in this Senſe we ought to interpret Ariſtotle's becauſe they are not defective in their own Nature , Definition of an Oath, when he ſtiles it (1), an un- but only capable of being caſily turn’d to the harm of demonſtrable Aſſertion made with an Appeal to the the Party, who thus by ſwearing to them ſhews his full Divinity; that is, an Afleveration, not demonſtra- Conſent and Approbation. For ſince any Man may ted by any Arguments, but credited purely on Ac- wave a Privilege or Favour not deſign’d for his Be- count of the Piety and Religion of the Swearer. nefit, he who thus refuſeth to lay hold on the Inva- For when the matter may be prov'd by Evident and lidity of the Affair, and peremptorily proceeds to Convincing Reaſons, 'tis not fair or regular to have the confirming it by an Oath, is preſum'd to have recourſe to Oaths. On the other hand, when Oaths conſider'd very ſeriouſly whether it makes for his are to decide a Cauſe, no ſearch is made after other Intereſt or not. Proofs (2). Why Oaths are admitted only in deter XX. Aſſertory Oaths or ſuch as are applied to the mining matters of Fact, not matters of Law or Deciſion of Controverſies, not to be terininated by For we cannot ſwear Other Proofs, are taken either by the Party con- whether a Thing be done well or ill, but bare- cern'd in the Buſineſs, or by a Third Man: Thoſe ly whether it were done or not done. Which who ſwear to the Facts of others, are term'd Wit- being once known; the Court may proceed upon neffes (1), whoſe Honeſty, and Fidelity, unleſs by the Points of Right and Law, by infallible Eviden- ſome probable Token render'd Suſpicious, are with ces and Rules. "As for the Oath which the Judges Juſtice allow'd a very great Weight and Sway ; it be- themſelves take, it is not Affertory but Promiſſory; ing well ſupposºd, that no Man of any Religion or for they engage by it, That they will give Sentence in Goodneſs will expoſe himſelf to the Divine Venge- the Caſe before them, as Juſtice and Equity ſhall di- ance, for the Affair of another Perſon: Yet is it a wife rect. And this Diviſion of Oaths into Promiſſory Conſtitution in moſt Civil Gavernments, not lightly and Aſſertory, may comprehend them all, with re to admit Perſons to give Evidence in the Cauſe of gard to the two Ends or Uſes but now mention'd. others, engag’d to thein by nearneſs of Birth; which (3) The Greek is, "Avas, Restoran dives' á Trölla tayo Yeder 28 vi zivota tlu grapeli. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 18. (1) The Greek is, 'Ogxós ész Meta Joias na ega ýtsas pdors ára tódex10. (2) See § 21, 22, following. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 19. (1) Theſe ſort of Oaths are either unjuſt or rath for the moſt part. To make them innocent, we ought moſt certainly to know that the Deed or omiſſion to which we are obliged, is allowable or innocent, whether it be a thing that depends on us, and is in our power; and we ought to examine whether it will not bring us into ſome danger, though inconfiderable, of offend- ing God, and breaking his Law, and if there be a neceffity of Swearing. See the Treatiſe of Mr. Placette, 1. 2. c. 4. & 25. (2) The Words of the Law are, Secundum itaque predi&tam regulam, qua ubicunq; non fervari fa&tum lege prohibenti cenfuimus, certum eft nec fipulationem hujuſmodi tenere, nec mandatum ullius eſse momenti, NEC SACRAMENTUM ADMITTI, Cod. l. 1. cit. 14. De Legibus, doc. leg. 5. § 1. See alſo the Digeſts, l. 2. c. 14. De Pa&tis, leg. 7. 816. & 1.30. tit. 1. De Legat. leg. 113. $ 4. (3) 'Tis a Maxim of the Canon Law, That every Oach ought to be performed, which can be kept without any prejudice to our Eternal Salvation. On this accopne the Engagements of a Woman, the Promiſes of a Minor, and other Acts which are null by the Civil Law, are valid by the Pope's Sentence, upon the account of the Oath which is joyn’d with them. See the Decretals , 1. 2. tic. 24. De furejurando, c.9. 28. & § 11. n. 3, 4. above. But Mr. Thomaſius obſerves with reaſon in his Fundam. Fur. Nat. do Gent. 1. 2. c. 9. $9, 6c That it is contrary to che Nature of an Oath, which, as our Author ſufficiently proves, is only an Aco ceflory to our Engagements, and that the Roman Clergy would by it uſurp a Power to correct the Civil Law, and the ſentences of the Judges, as alſo hinder that the Promiſes and Donacions made to the Church, ſhould not be weaken' by fuch juſt Ex- cepcions. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 20. (1) See l. 5 c. 13 S 9. following. (a) Lib. 6 p. 329 Comp. Anton. Matth. de Crimin. tit. de Perjurio, n. 15. is CHAP. II. 137 Of an ( ATH. is ſo ſtrong a Motive to Affection and Love: It Contract or Agreement which ſhall be Burthenſome being conlider'd that ſuch Perſons might eaſily fuf- to me (4). Whereas , in Court, when the Oath is of fer their Paſſion to gain the Afcendant of their Re- fer'd by one Party, the other ſhall not decline it, ligion (2). Nor was it altogether without Reaſon, unleſs upon very weighty Reaſons ; but ſhall either that the Romans of old requir'd Witneſſes of Wealth take it himſelf , or return it to his Adverſary. That and Subſtance, eſpecially in difficult and impor- is when the Judge conceives the Claim not to be tant Cauſes (3). Groundleſs, and yet there is no full Evidence of the XXI. But a Man may likewiſe in his own Bufi- Matter ready at hand; then if one of the Parties neſs, when 'tis his Intereſt to do ſo, ſolve the Dif- thinks fit to refer the Buſineſs to the Conſcience of pute by Oath, and this either by Agreement of the the other, the Judge may fairly look on him as Con- Parties (1), or by order of the Judge: For when a vict, who neither dares in this Religious manner Controverſie ariſeth concerning fome Due demand. to deny the Debt, nor yet, in Return, challenge ed by one Man, and denied by another, the Clai- the other to affirm it with the like Solemnity. For mant may challenge the other Party to his Oath, this ſtarting and boggling can be attributed to promiſing to let fall the Suit, if he fwears the thing nothing but to his inward Conſciouſneſs of the not to be owing which is requir’d: And if the Per- Debt; becauſe if he pretend to fear that Men ſhould fon thus challeng'd be doubtful whether he can ſwear think he ſwears only on the account of Gain, 'tis clearly and peremptorily to the Matter, as ſuppoſe eaſie for him to avoid this Suſpicion, by returning the Debt was transferred to himn from another, then the Oath to the Claimant ($). if he is afraid that he may return the Oath to the Claimant, engaging the other will be perjurd (6), why doth nọt he to pay if he ſhall fwear it is his Due (2): And this ſwear himſelf? Yet Plato in his Laws (a) admits of giving and returning of the Oath between the Par- an Oath, only in Suche Caſes where, according to ties, may be made either in Court, or out of Court; the Judgment of Men, no Advantage can be got by yet with this difference, that out of Court I am for wearing ; but where any Profit may be reap d from not neceſſarily oblig'd to take the Oath when of- the Perjury, there he orders that the Procejs all be fer'd me, becauſe it implies a Contract (3); by manag’d without Oaths. means of which I ſhall, upon my refuſing, become XXII . And laſtly, In ſome Caſes, when other a Debtor : But now no Perſon, who is not inveſted Proofs are not ſufficient (1), the Judge may put the with an Authority over me, can compel me to a Party to his Oath, though he do not deſire it; and (2) The Latin of the Digeſts is, Teſtium fides diligenter examinanda eft. an amicus ei fit, pro quo teftimonium dat. Dig. 1. 22. tit. s. De teſtibus, leg. 3. See the following Law... (3) An locuples, vel egens fit, ut lucri cauſa quud facile admittat, ibid. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 21. (1) So the Roman Law directs, Maximum remedium expediendarum litium in uſum venit jurisjur andi religio: qua vel ex pa&tione ip foram litigatorum, vel ex auktoritate fudicis deciduntur eontroverfia, Digeſt. Lib. 12. tit. 2. de Jurejurando, &c. See Daumat's Civil Laws in the order of Nature, Part 1. 1. 3. tit. 6. Sect. 6. (2) The Roman Law ſpeaks thus, Alterum itaque eligat reus, aut folvat, aut juretaDatur dutein et alia facultas reo, ut, ſi malit , referat jusjurandum ; e fi is, qui petet, conditione jurisjurandi non utetur, f udicium ei Prætor non dabit : &quiffime enim hoc facit, cum non deberet diſplicere conditio jurisjurandi ei, qui detulit, Digeſt. ibid. leg. 34. 80, 7. Manifeſte turpitudinis de confeffio. nis eſt, nolle nec jurare, nec jusjurandum referre, ibid. leg. 38. (3) 'Tis a kind of Tranſactation ſay the Roman Lawyers (very well) Jusjur andum (peciem tranfa&tionis continet, Digeſt. ubi ſupra, (4) But when we have once accepted an Oath, we can't refer it. Jusjurandum, quod ex conventione extra judicium defertur; re- ferri non poteſt, Ibid. leg. 17. And in the very moment that the Oath is taken, the controverſy is at an end, ſo that either of the Parcies cannot retort ; whereas, when an Oath is taken by the order of the Judge, we may require a Review of the former Proceedings, averring, that he hath new Matter to produce, and that he will only inliſt upon that. Admonendi ſumus, interdum etiam poſt jusjurandum exa&tum permitti conſtitutionibus principum, ex integro cauſam agere, fi quis nova inſtrument a ſe invéniſe dicat, quibus niinc ſolis ufurus fit Quod fi alias inter ipfos jurejurando tranfa&tum fit negotium, non conceditur eandem caufam retractare; Ibid. leg. 31. See Mr. Titius's Oblervation in Lauterb. 338 (5) Nevertheleſs, Plato, as our Author obferves here, allows not an Oath in all affairs of Intereft , and where Perjury may be an advantage in the Judgment of Men. See l. 12. of the Laws of this Philoſopher, p. 948. Edit. Steph. (6) This is a nice queſtion, whether an Oath may be required of a perſon, when we have reaſon to believe that he will ſwear fally? We ſpeaka noc here of a Judge, for as Mr. La Placette ſpeaks very well in his Treatiſe of an Oath, l. 1. C. 13. The Laws in certain Caſes order an Oath to be adminiſter'd, and he muſt conform himſelf to them withour troubling himſelf abouc the manner how they who take the Oath, can do it . They alſo ſuppoſe, without doubt, that ſome conſiderable Intereſt is con- cerned. This being allow'd, I am of Mr. Thomaſius's Opinion, who ſays, that this Queſtion is more curious than profitable, In- fit . Juriſpr. Divin. I. 20. 9. ' For we cannot be certain that any one reſolves to forſwear himſelf ; for though he have often ſworn fally, he may have repented, and may reſolve never again to commit ſuch a foul Crime deliberately; but it he threatens to do it, we may believe, that he does it, that we may not put him upon ſwearing. I may add, That there are Men who are inclinable enough to do great Wickedneſſes, and yet dare not ſwear, either through ſome Tcruple of Conſcience, or through i know not what monſtrous prerence of Piety, which they make after their way, tho they are tree, as they think, to accommo- date themſelves to another's Intereſt as far as they can without falling into ſuch enormous Crimes as incenſe the Deity. Further, is willing to clear himſelf by Oath, is it not almoſt the fame thing, as if he had twora fålly, ſince he is willing to do it? Mr. La Placette owns, that what ſuch a perſon adds to his horrible diſpoſition by ſwearing actually fallly, is ſo ſmall a thing as is noć to be regarded, yet he determines, that an Oath ought not to be adminiſterd in ſuch a Caſe, for fear of provoking God's Anger, and offending our weak Brethren. But the fear of Scandal does not indiſpenfibly require that a Man ſhould loſe his Goods with: out trying all ways poffible to recover them, if it be a thing of Conſequence, as we ſuppoſe here it is. Beſides, the Scandal is leſs, if we declare the Reaſon why we will have the Party tworn. As to God's Anger, that is not ſo much excited by the ouc- ward Act, as by the inward Difpofition, which in this caſe is ſuppoſed full and entire, and is looked upon as the Act. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 22.9 (1) In bone fidei contra&tibus, necnon [etiam] in cæteris caufis; inopia probationum, per Judicem jurejurando cauſa cognita res decidi oportet. C. Lib. 4. 1. 1. De rebus creditis jurejurando, Leg. 3. This Law is ordinarily quored, as if it meant that a jadge may ada miniſter an Oath when there is an halt proof on the side of one of the Parties, as for Example, but one witneſs, who may not be credited, though he be a Senator. But Mr. Noodt has we! The'wed in his Probabilia Juris; 1. 3. c. 6. thac inopid probationum, 1. C.want of Proofs, is when there is ſuch Proofs on both ſides, that the Judges know nor how to determine. For when a little matter would weigh down the Balance, we ought not rathly to adminiſter an Oath. See Digeft, l. 12. tit. 2. leg. 31, where (4) Lib. 12. p. 937. C. Edit. Wech. Fein. # $ this leg. 2. 2102 is, in dubiis caufis. 138 Of an ( ATH. Воок IV. . this either that he may poſſeſs himſelfof fome Right, Authors, who are of opinion, that perſons in theſe or clear himſelf from the Suſpicion of fome Fact . Circumſtances, may be abſolv'd from the Sin of Per- But here it muſt be obſerv'd, that 'tis never the jury, by ſubmitting to the Penalty of the Law. For Cuſtom to offer theſe Oaths, when either Capital Pu- unleſs when the Obligation was firſt entred upon , niſhinent, or any grievous Inconvenience, muſt be it was exprefly left to the choice of the Perſon, ei the conſequence of confeſſing the Truth. For, be- ther to perforin what he promis’d, or at a certain ſides, that it looks very hard to bring a Man into Price to purchaſe the liberty of doing the contra- fo dangerous a Neceſſity, on the account of an un- iy (b), the Puniſhinent ſhall by no means render certain fact, as that he muſt either deeply wound him clear from the Crime(1); as we ſhall make out his Conſcience, or incur fome very conſiderable Da- more at large hereafter. Thus he who hath fuffer'd mage; little truſt is to be given to an Oath thus a Whipping for Thievery, is no leſs a Rogue (2) , exacted, the Minds of Men being always ready to than if he had never felt the Laſh. entertain this Hope, That God Almighty may again XXIV. What is uſually canvaſs’d amongſt Authors be appeas’d, whoſe Mercy even the Perjur'd Sinner about the Diſpenſations, and relaxations of Oaths is not forbidden to implore! 'Tis a good Remark and of Vows, may be wholly determin’d by the fix- of Libanius (2), He who deſpairs of all other Means,and ing two Principles or Rules. The firſt, That a Per- hath but one Remedy left, which is not to be obtain’d ſon, who in regard both to his Actions and his Pol- otherwiſe than by Lying ; will certainly dare to change feflions, is under the Government of another , can one Danger for another ; knowing the preſent Miſchief diſpoſe of nothing to his Governor's Prejudice; and which is before his Eyes to be unavoidable ; but, as for if any ſuch diſpoſal be made, it ſhall be lawful for the future Evil , often flattering himſelf, that he hall the Governor to revoke it. The other is, That he be able, by Worſhip, Sacrifices, Gifts and Oblations, who is inveſted with ſuch Authority over any Per- to bribe Heaven into a Pardon. But for an account fon, may, as he ſhall think convenient, retrench of theſe ſeveral kinds of Oaths, the Writers on the and confine any Rights, which the Party under his Civil Laws are to be conſulted at large (3). Direction hath already obtain’d; and inuch more Queſtion ſtill remains to be reſolv’d, ſince it is appears, that the Acts of Superiors are not of fuffi- uſual in Civil Governments to bind Men by cient force to hinder the Performance of an Oath, Oaths to the faithful diſcharge of their reſpective ſo far as it was truly Obligatory: That is, an Oath Truſts and Employments, whether he is always to not defective in it felf, and made about a thing be deem'd guilty of Perjury, who hath neglected which the Juror may diſpoſe of at his Pleaſure, can- any one part of this Duty? Where the Controverſie not be diſannull’d by a Superior. Thus the Roman is not about thoſe Oaths which regard ſome peculiar (c) Senate could not revoke the Oath which Regulus A&; as, when a Man gives his Evidence, denies made to the Carthaginians, engaging him to return: a Truſt, forfakes a particular Promiſe, and the like: Though indeed in this particular Caſe, there was a- (For he who violates theſe, ought, no doubt, to be nother Reaſon; inaſınuch as Regulus was now in a branded a as forſworn.) But about ſuch in which the Condition of Slavery under his Conquerors, and there- Party y binds himſelf to many Things together: As fore the Romans had loſt all their Power and Au- when Perſons are admitted to any Office, to be dif- thority over him. But when the Subject of the Oath chargʻd by different Performances. And here there is any Thing or Action falling under the Diređti- ſeems to be no reafon why we ſhould fcruple to on of the Superior, it ſhall then borrow all its take the Affirmative ſide, in caſe the Breach was force from the Superior's Conſent, either Tacit or made againſt Knowledge, and with deliberate Wick- Expreſs; and he may, if it diſpleaſe him, declare edneſs. Only, that there are different degrees of it Null and Void. Nor is there the leaſt danger Perjury, as well as of other Crimes. For as he is of Perjury to be fear'd, when an Oath is thus re- reckon'd leſs guilty, who hath tranſgreſs'd a Law or vers’d. Since the Perſon under Government ought two, than he who hath at once renounc'd all Civil to have preſuppoſed his Governor's Approbati- Government, or hath committed Treaſon againfton as a neceſſary Condition. Nor doth the Su- his Prince ; ſo he who hath violated the whole fum perior fin in thus cancelling, what the other hath of his Duty, contracts a inore heinous and aggrava- ſworn; becauſe he only exerciſeth his Right in hin- ting Perjury, than he who hath broken only a dring the Inferior from acting in Prejudice of his part (a). Nor ought we to give any heed to thoſe (2) Libanius's Greek is, "Orº 3' ta mer änna eniyasal, es uno dei metai nó? G, őv 8x ist nii tevorire fuori xey. To1&TO Tonga κίνδυνον ανταλλατόμως κινδύνο" ή και εν οφθαλμοίς άφυκτον ειδώς, υπες και εκείνα πολλάκις αυτόν απατών ως και θυσίαις, και θεραπείαις, και ευχάις, και ιερείοις , και καλλι αναθημάτων, συγγνωμόναι αν κατασκευάσει τις θεές» έπειτα σε με την δικήν μίλλει ηγείται, το και το δεινόν ευθυς εφισάναι ελάττω και η επικουμένης, την έπω παρέσαν κρίνει, κατ' αυτόν και χρόνον .. (3) Such is the Oath called Furamentum calumnia, or de Calumnia, which conſiſts in this according to the Roman Law, that boch Parties ſivear when they enter their Action, that they act honeſtly, (i.e.) the one, that he believes his Demand well ground. ed, and the other, that his Defence is juſt, and that neither of them deſign to find out Tricks and Evafions to hinder or delay an equitable Determination. See Cod. I. 2. tit . 59. De Jurejurando propter calumniam dando, and the Novel 49. c. 3.8 1. But fince this Oath is often an occafion of Perjury either to the Plaintiff or Defendant, and fometimes to both, it is with much reaſon baniſh'd moft Courts. Another fort of Oath famous in the Roman Law is Juramentum in litem, when the value of a Debt is re- ferred to the Oath of the Creditor, and the Debtor is not allowed the ſame privilege, becauſe he is a perſon not to be credited, or is guilty of ſome grofs fault . See Digeſt . I. 12. cic. 3. de in litem jur ando, & Cod. I.'s . tit. 53. Mr. Thomafius in his Differtation, De pretio affe&tionis in res fungibiles non cadente, reprinted ac Hall in 1707, ſpeaks many curious things on this Subject, and which may rectifie che Notions of our Modern Lawyers. » Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 23. (1) See Lib. 8. c. 3. $ 4. at the end. (2) See Lib. 2. c. 9. $ 6. above. ve (a) Yet add Sanderſon de Oblig. Jurament, prælect. 3. f. 18. (6) See the Articles of Marriage between Charles Prince of Wales and Henrietta, in Gramond. Hift. France, B. 16. Artic. 23. (c) See Gros, I. 2. c. 13. 1. 20. n. 1, 2. juſt CHAP. II. 139 ' Of an O ATH. juſt Prerogative. And 'tis the ſame thing as to the ken in Adultery with his Son-in-Law, though he Nullity of the Oath, whether the Superior prohi- had before ſworn never to put her away. The Em- bits alí Oaths on ſuch certain Subjects before hand, peror declaring, That the Oath could nut be so far or whether when they have been already inade, he extended, as to reach the preſent Caſe, where the Wife forbids their Performance. Though, in the former by So Infamous a Crime had rendred her ſelf unwor- Caſe the Inferior incurs a very heinous Guilt, in thy of cohabiting any longer with her Husband. Af- thus rafhly prefuming to ſwear againſt the Prohibi- terwards the Chriſtian Emperors very frequently de- tion. The Father, by the Jewiſh Law, Numb. legated the Bishops to preſide and to determine in XXX. 4, &c. was allow'd to revoke the ſworn Vows the Affair of Diſpenſations ; that if any Scruple of his Daughter, whilft under his Direction; the ſhould happen to ariſe, the opinion of their Sancti- Husſband of his Wife, the Maſter of his Servant, if ty and Goodneſs might ſatisfie the Minds of leſs they thought Convenient : For otherwiſe, the Par. Intelligent Judges. Yet it is too notorious how ex- ties here who were to live in Obedience, might by travagantly fome Eccleſiaſticks, and eſpecially he fwearing and vowing, have render’d the Power of who pretends to be the chief of that Order, the Bi- their Governours wholly uſeleſs. Nay, Leo Muti- ſhop of Rome (3), have ſtretch'd this Privilege, and nenſis (a) Reports, That if any perſon had entred on what a Flood of Miſchiefs hath overſpread the Chri- an Oath or Vow of what kind foever, and afterwards ftian World, from its Abuſe. And indeed, ſince upon good Reaſons repented of it, and if it did not we are to proceed by the Principles of Law in de- lead to the Prejudice of a third Party, the reaſon of termining what kinds of Oaths may be releas’d, and bis retracting having been produc'd and approv’d, be for what reaſons, I know not why the Clergy ſhould might by one Rabbin, or three other Men, te abſolu'd. affume more Authority in this point, than the Meni Another way there is by which the effect of an In of the other Profeſſion. ferior's Oath may be made depend on the pleaſure And farther, ſometimes when an Oath cannot be of his Superior ; namely, if the Superior ſo conſti- made void on the ſide of the Swearer, the force and tute and ordain, that what the Inferior ſhall ſwear, efficacy of it may yet be ſtop'd by the Superiority of in ſuch a particular Cafe, Ihall not be valid till it the Party towards whom the Oath is directed and who hath receiv'd his Approbation. And thus in the Ci- obtains a Right upon it; either by taking this Right vil Law, under the Head of Oaths, it (V) is inſerted from him, or by forbidding him to make uſe of it as a neceſſary Caution, That the Right of Superiors in receiving what the other hath ſworn to pay. And is always excepted in the Caſe of Swearing : Or, that this may be done either in the way of Puniſhment, all Oaths are to be conſtrued with a Salvo to that or on account of the Publick Advantage, by virtue Right. Now it is evident in all theſe Inſtances, of the Superior's Prerogative. In which caſe the that the relaxation of an Oath can only be made Swearer is free from all danger of Perjury, becauſe by him who is inveſted with Authority over the he is not the occaſion of the Non-performance ; Swearer, and with ſuch Authority, as implies and he is releas’d from all neceſſity of fulfilling in it this degree of Power. And therefore it his Oath by the Party, who either in a direct, or was of old very properly claim'd and executed by, in a more eminent and extraordinary Manner ac- the Roman Emperors: As appears from l. ult. I). ad quir’d a Right by virtue of it (d). To conclude, municipalem (2), where Antoninus and Verus diſpenſe a Prince, who upon juſt Reaſons diſpenſeth with an with a certain Perſon's Oath, who having ſworn never Oath, doth not commit the leaſt Sin, in thus hin- to come into the Aſſemblies of his Order, was after- dring an Act which was folemnly undertaken with wards created Duumvir : Becauſe a Subject cannot the Invocation of the Divine Majeſty, from pro- by any Oath of his, with-hold his Service, when ducing its Regular Effect: Though the Subject may requir'd by the Commonwealth. And ſo Tiberius, fonetiines incur a Guilt, by raihly uſing the Name in Sueton (c), granted a Roman Knight the Power of God to confirm an Act, which he ought to have of being divorced from his Lady, whom he had ta- known was prejudicial to the Right of his Superior. (2) The Latin is, Imperatores Antoninus & Verus reſcripſerunt gratiam ſe facere furisjurandi ei qui juraverat, ſe ordini non inter- futurum, do poſtea Duumvir creatus effet, Digeft . I. 50. cit. I. ad municipalem, do de incolis, leg. 38.. (3) Șce Mr. La Placette's Treatiſe of an Oath, I. 2. C. 24. It is evident, that an Oath is one of thoſe things by which the Clergy have moſt eflectually advanced their temporal Intereſts, and encroached upon the Rights of the Magiftrate. Before the Emperors were Chriſtian, an Oath was never required of Witneſſes. 'Twas Conſtantine that made the Formality neceſſary. See Mr. Thomaſius's Diſcourſe, De Fide Juridica, C. 2. 8 61, doc. and in his Fundam. fur. Nat. & Gent. I. 2. c. 9. 93. After the uſe of Oaths was introduced into the greateſt part of the Affairs of Life ; and as the Clergy took upon them the right of judging of the Validity of Oaths, they by that means took upon them the Cognizance of almoſt all Civil Cauſes. We know that the Pope has aſſumed the Authority of dilannulling Treaties moft ſolemnly ſworn to, as Eugenius IV. did in favour of Ladiſlaus King of Hun- sary, to Sultan Amurath Il, and to abfolve all Subjects from the Oath of Allegiance made to their lawful Sovereigns. In a word, the Clergy have omitted nothing in this reſpect, no more than other things to ſtrengthen and increaſe their Power under the bame of Spiritual, which they have extended to the utmoſt, and accordingly have lefſen'd the Temporal, which they have left regret to Magiftrates and Princes, (a) De ritibus Hebræorum, par. 2. c. 4. f. 4. (b) Vid. Jul. Can, c. 19. Add. tir 55. 1. 2 feudorum. (c) Tiber. 35. (d) Comp. Grof, loc. cit. sect. 20. n. 3. & ad Mat. 5. 37. with S2 C H A P. 140 Of the Power of Mankind over Things. Book IV. bile ISOL] Ozóne t is to be reproved, - CHA P. III. robod tistih OVUN301019 tur Cal} } sinh Big worden alle aid Of the Power of Mankind over [the] Things (of the World.] bidid mo 1. The greateſt part of the Law is employed about IV. Some doults about killing and eating Living worldly Things. quare nu Creatures. II. Man uſes other Creatures by Gods Ordination. V. . Which yet is maintained. III. Man does no injury by deſtroying Vegetables. VI. The abuſe of our Right over Living Creatures & Tomo lo hormon 9 S UCH is the Conſtitution of Man, that it can- for any thing beſides to make an Addition to his not be preſerved by its own Internal Subſtance, Happineſs; therefore this Goodneſs inclin’d him to but needs continually to take in the afliſtance of be bountiful and gracious to his Creatures, and to certain Things from without, as well for its Nou- give them the privilege of uſing cach other for their riihment and Support, as for its defence againſt thoſe' mutual Benefit. But Man eſpecially hath in fo extra- many Enemies which ſeek to ruin and diſſolve its ordinary a manner tafted of the Divine Favour, that Frame. Again, a great part of what the World af- all other Creatures are by a Common Strain of Spech, fords, turns another way to the Service of Mankind, ſaid to have been at firſt made for his Uſe and Ser- in rendering Life more commodious and more eaſie . vice. Though this Right of God over all things Hefiod. Op. & Dier. 1. 2. 304. For Riches are the Soul is very different from the Right of Men to the of feeble Men (1). Now with regard to theſe Matters, fame Poſſeſſions. So that the Reaſoning of Dio- a Multitude of Buſineſs and Tranſactions paſs be- genes the (a) was falſe and vain, when he thus ar- twixt Men, and large Occaſion is adminiſtred to gued, All Things belong to the Gods; Wiſe Men Controverſies and Strifes : And left the Common are the Friends of the Gods; all Things are commor Peace of Mankind ſhould be diſturb’d by luch Dif- amongſt Friends ; therefore all things belong to Wiſe putes, as the Law of Nature hath with due Cauti- Men. Yet it is too bold and arrogant a Pretenſion on provided, ſo the Civil Ordinances of moſt Na- in fome Authors, whilſt they tell us, That ſhould tions are in this reſpect found moſt careful and fo- any thing fail of turning to the advantage of Man- licitous. For the full illuſtration of which Subject, kind, it muſt follow, that ſuch a thing was created we ought firſt of all to enquire, by what Right it in vain; and that 'tis hence apparent, that the is that human Race clain the diſpoſal of other whole World is the common Poſſellion of human Creatures, whether Animate or Inanimate; for their Race, and what they may (if thus taken as a ge- Uſe, their Conveniency, or their Pleaſure, as like- neral Body,) not unjuſtly term their own. This wife on what Principle this power is founded, in re- was Ariſtotle's Miſtake ; If then, ſays he, Nature fpect both of the Creator, and of the Creatures (1) makes nothing imperfectly, and nothing in vain, ſhe themſelves, which Man not only uſeth, but very muſt, of neceſſity, have made all theſe things for the often perverts, embezils and deſtroys. fake of Men. Lucian (c) delivers himſelf to the II. It is therefore beyond Diſpute, that Almigh- fame Purpoſe; Had not Men been created, the confe- ty God, inaſmuch as he is the Maker and the Pre- quence of the Omiſion had been no leſs than this, That ſerver of all Things, doth likewiſe hold, as it were, all the Grace and Beauty of the reſt of the World , an Originary and Super-eminent Property over all, bad fhone without a Witneſs or Beholder ; and that and they belong fo ftriétly to him, as that no one the Gods themſelves had deſpis’d their own Wealth, as can pretend to the leaſt Right in them, without not worth the enjoying (2). But certainly the great his Permisſion or Conſent. Concerning which do- Frame of the Univerfe might, in all appearance, minion or Property of Almighty God, Philo the Jeup have been inore compendiouſly erected and adorn’d , (lib. de Cherubim) p. 97. Ed. Genev. treats at large, had it been the Intention of its Author, to make and with regard to that Superior Right, calld the nothing but what ſhould in ſome reſpect or other Right which Men hold over Things (1), Yufructua- ſerve the Occaſions of Men (d) (3). And it was not ry only. Yet becauſe he himſelf ſtands in need ill faid of Seneca, Nimis (è) nos fufpicimus fi digni of no Foreign Succour, and becauſe it is not polli- Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. 3. § 1. (1) See Gronovius's firft Nore on Grotius, l. 2. c. 1. $ II. The Greek of Hefiod is, Χρήματα και ψυχή πέλεται δολοίσι ζεστοίπ. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 2. (1) Seneca uſes the ſame Expreſſion, as Mr. Hirtius has obſerved, Vſufru&tus noſter eſt, cujus tempus ille arbiter muneris ſui tema perat, Conſol. ad Marc. c. Io. As for that paſſage of Euripides which Mr. Hirtius joyns to it, beſides that the Notion is much the ſame, our Author quotes it in the next Chapter, SI, (2) See an Engliſh Treatiſe written by Mr. Boyle, cal'd a Diſcourſe concerning the final Cauſes of natural things, the Extrakt be found in the univerſal Library, Tom. 9. p. 63. And alſo a Treatiſe, De Origine Mali, written by Dr. King Bi- ſhop of Londonderry, and ſince Archbiſhop of Dublin. (3) Montaigne in his Eflays ſpeaks ſomething like this, 1. 2. c. 12. He makes me to underſtand by his Diſcourſe upon what Foundations theſe great Advantages are built, which he prides himſelf to have over the Creatures. "He perſwades himſelf that this admirable Architecture of the World, conſiſting of the Celeſtial Arch, bedeck'd with the inexcinguiſhable Lights of the Sun and Stars moving ſo ſwiftly above our Heads, the prodigious Fluxes and Refuses of the vaſt Occan, were at firſt created, and have continued to many Ages for our Convenience and Service. Mr. Bayle alſo in his Thoughts about a Comer, P. 226. cices ano- ther partage of Seneca, where the Philoſopher ſays, that the Cares of Providence do indeed extend to us, and we have a part ic, but their end is more confiderable than our Preſervation. Et quanquam majus illis (Soli, Lune, Show ceteris cæleftibus] propo. fitum ſit majorq; a&tus ſui fruétus, quam fervare mortalia, tamen in noftras quoque utilitates à principio rerum premiſſa mens est, do is ordo mundo datus, ut appareat curam noftri non inter ultima ejſe habitam, De Benefic. 1. 6.c. 23. (a) Apud Diogen. Laert. 1. 61.37 ubi vid. Menag. (b) Po'itic. l. 1 c. 8 p. 304 C. Edic. Pariſ. (c) Prometh p. 181 tit. 1. Edit. Amſt. (d) See the Honourable Mr. Boyle's Diſſertation concerning the final Cauſes of Natural Things. See Archbiſhop King's Treatiſe de origine Mali, c.41.a f. s. (e) De Ira, 1.2.C.27. Add Churron de la Sageſſe, 1. 1 c. 40. n. 3,4, 5. 21175010 ON of which may nobis 141 Gen. 9. 3. Selden de J. N. & G. Sec. Heb. 1. 7. C. 1. בדו . of infinite CHAP. III. Of the Power of Mankind over Things. nobis videmur, propter quos tanta moveantur : We are lawiul for them to do, with regard to Terreſtrial too much taken with the admiration of our own Na- Animals. ture, if we fanfie our ſelves-worthy to have all theſe III. If in the next place, we conſider this Power Glorious Works move only on our account. Yet let of Mankind, with relpect to the things themſelves, this be as it will , thus much is evident ; That Man whether Animate or Inanimate, which Men uſe and makes his advantage of other Creatures, by by the waſte, and deſtroy, that no Injury is hereby offer'd Grant and Litence of Heaven : As we may appre- to thoſe Creatures, may clearly be evinc'd, as well hend from this eaſie Argument, That without the from the Nature of Man, as from the Grant and uſe of thoſe Things, human Life could not be pre- Allowance of God. For it can on ne account ſečin fervåd, for which Service, fome of them do, as it probable, that a Maker of infinite Goodneſs, and . Since then God Almighty hath conferr’d on Man the on Man, the Principal of Earthly Creatures, or Privilege of Life, he is at the fame time ſuppos'd that he ſhould not be able to preſerve himſelf with- to have allow'd him the uſe of every thing necef- out injuring others, and conſequently without the fary for the keeping and maintaining of that his perpetual Commiſſion of Sin (1). To which, if we Gilt . The faine (a) Truth is confirmd by the Au- add the expreſs Licenſe of God, that muſt remove thority of the Holy Scriptures, which exprefly men- all Doubt and Scruple, which might otherwiſe have tion God's inveſting Man with Power and Domini- riſen, eſpecially about the Slaughter of Animals. on, not only over Vegetables, but over every Liv- And if there appear any Cruelty or Barbarity in ing Thing, produced either in the Air, in the ſuch a Practice, it is fufficiently taken off, by this Earth, or in the Sea (b) (c). Yet this Conceſſion one Conſideration, That their Divine Author hath hath not the force of a Command, but only the appointed theſe his Creatures to ſuch a Condition, Allowance or Indulgence of a Privilege, which a- and to ſuch a Service in the World; and hath grant- ny Perſon may uſe fo far as he thinks fit, but is not ed to Men ſuch an Authority over them, which if bound to exerciſe it at all Times, and upon all Oc- they exerciſe (whether by the Deputation, or only caſions. For otherwiſe Man would offend againſt by the Permiſſion of God,) they certainly do no the Divine Law, ſhould he neglect any Animal Injury. Now as for Vegetables, and other things go free, or ſhould he let any opportunity deſtitute of Senſe, there ſeems with regard to them, of bringing the ſame Creature again under his to be no more of Difficulty in this point; it being Subjection ; which no Man in his Wits will af- impoſſible to diſcover that they ſuffer any hard firm (4). But ſtill this Power of Man over Brute Treatinent, or unjuſt Hurt, when they are conſum'd Creatures is of a different Nature from that Domi- by Men; eſpecially, ſince they muſt neceſſarily Pe- nion or Sovereignty which is exercis'd over Men: riſh, and be deſtroy'd (2), either by Beaſts or by the Becauſe Brutes are not capable of any Correſpon- ſpeedy turn of the Year, and the Change of the dent Obedience, ariſing from the Obligation; and Seaſons ; and farther, ſince many of them had never becauſe this is a much more abſolute Sway, than been produc'd without Humane Pains and Endea- that with which Men govern each other . The Di- yours. The Superſtition of the Egyptians in abſtain- vine Prohibition to the Jews from feeding on ſome ing from certain Pot-herbs, is not of weight enough certain Animals, doth by no means retrench or im- to give us any ſtop in the preſent Determination (8). pair the Right of Men over Beaſts; the Reaſon of IV. But then, as to living Creatures, which are that Injunction ſeeming to have been taken from endued with a Senſe of their own Being, and cannot Phyfick (5). Mr. Selden (d) reports it , as the O- leave it without Pain and Trouble, the point ap- pinion of the Ancient Rabbins, That Adam was for- pears in ſome meaſure Dubious to many who have bidden to eat any manner of Fleſh, (God having conſider’d the Liberty of Men againſt Brutes, only commanded hiin to feed on the Herbs of the Field (e); on the Principles of Reaſon. For, from God's al- but that Noah afterwards was diſpens’d with in this lowing the firſt Man to have Dominion over other Particular, by the Grant in Gen. IX. 3. Yet ſo as Animals, it doth not preſently flow as an evident to be ſtill under an Obligation to abſtain from Conſequence, that he was at the ſame time inveſted Blood, and from any Joint or Limb of any Crea- with fo wide a Commiſſion, fo infinite a Licenſe, as ture taken from it whilſt alive (f). The fame Au- that he might ſlay them even for unneceſſary U- thor adds , That the Blood of Fiſhes was excepted ſes (h): For Man hath Dominion too over Man, from the Prohibition : Nay, That they might eat and yet cannot in the leaſt pretend to any ſuch Li- theſe Creatures alive, as Oyſters , &c. or fuch of cenfe as this againſt his Fellows. Nor could Men them as died by Chance ; neither of which it was have complaind, that the Divine Goodneſs was ſpa- ſenſe. earthly Creatures. (4) This Remark of our Author's ought to be placed at the end of this Paragraph, where it will much better agree with the (3) This is not to be doubted, although other Authors, and particularly Mr. Fleury in his Treatiſe of the Manners of the Iſra- elites, ſpeaks of it. The Iſraelites had not a better Conftitution, nor a more vigorous Health than the other Nations, who eat of fuch fores of Food as they abſtained from. It ſeems that the Prohibitions of the Law were grounded upon mere politick Rea- cons , ſo far as concerned their particular Notions, Opinions, and the Conſtitution of their commonwealth. See Mr. Le Clerc's Note upon Levit . 11. 2. and Grotius, De Verit. Relig. Chrift. 1.5.99. But be that how it will, whatever Motive we attribute to the Legiſlator, as this Law was only poſitive, it in no wife deſtroys the Natural Right which Man has over the Beaſts and all other Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 3. (1) Here is a great Diſorder in this part of our Author's Diſcourſe, and therefore I have tranſpos’d ſome Sentences, and puc shem in a more natural Order, treating firſt of Vegetables, and then of Beaſts. (2) Our Author ſpeaks very pleaſantly here in all his Editions, by other Beafts, as if the Beaſt Man did not ſpend and deſtroy the Vegetables, the other Bearts would. And Mr. Hirtius has overlook'd this great Miſtake in his Edition of 1706. (2) Add. Arrian. Epiftet. 1. 1. C. 16. ab initio. (b) Gen. 1, 28, 29. (c) See Pſalm 115. 16. (1) De J. N. & G. Sec, (8) See Gen. 1. 29. (f) Add. Deuteron. 12. 20. (3) Vid. Diodor. Sic. I. 1. C. 89. (b) Add Grot, ad Heb. 1.7.c. 1. ring LC 66 Cc ૮૮ ſharp, and divided from each other, that ſo by, cho 142 Of the Power of Mankind over Things. Book IV. ring towards them, or had made an ill Proviſion for out againſt their own Kind; and thoſe who had ta- their Neceſſities, though they ſhould have been de ken a delight in deſtroying the Harmleſs Race of nied a Power over the Life of Aninals; at leaſt of Dumb Creatures, made it their next ſtep to murther ſuch as did not threaten any Hurt or Danger to the weak and defenceleſs Men. Diogenes Laertius in his Life of Men : Inaſmuch as the work of thoſe Crea- Life of Pythagoras (d) reports that Philoſopher to tures in cultivating the Earth, together with what have forbid the killing of Animals (2), xowvòv Singon comes froin tliein otherwiſe, as Milk, Eggs, (ſuch as i wie ezórowy tugais. As enjoying the ſame Common Right are not Neceſſary for the Propagation of the Species) of Life and Soul with our ſelves . This indeed as Wool, and the like, might have been ſufficient to the Hiſtorian goes on,) - fuſtain Men in a tolerable way of Living, Nor did reafon of his commanding his Followers to abſtain from God by commanding Men to ſacrifice them, as a all Living Creatures, was, That he might exerciſe and Token of Divine Worſhip, confer any Power or train Men 14 in a more eaſie method of Food, by means Privilege of turning them at pleaſure into Food. of which they might always have ready at band a large For ſuch things as are lawful to Mankind only by Proviſion of Meat, requiring no Fire to dreſs it; and feme peculiar Command of God, may ſtill remain as much Drink as they bad plain Water. For this way unlawful, except in that particular Cafe. Hence of Suſtenance he thought moſt proper to produce Health it was that many of the ancient Philoſophers utter- of Body, and Quickneſs of Mind (3). Though ly diſapprov'd of this Practice. For, why ſhould Lucian (in fomnio jeu Gallo), p. 174. tit. 2. bring- Man on the bare account of ſuperfluous Pleaſure, rob" ing in him under the Shape of a Cock, makes him an harmleſs Animal of that Life which it enjoys by give this Reaſon of his Opinion: I conſider, ſays the Gift of the ſame Common Creator? Eſpecially, “he, that it the Precepts I ſet on foot were com- fince even the Example of the fierceſt Wild-beaſts, mon, and ſuch as many had deliver'd before, I of Lyons, Wolves, and other Devourers of Fleth,“ ſhould not be able to prevail with the World, will do them 10 Service, if urg'd in their Excuſe. to look upon me as any extraordinary Perſon; but For theſe are ſo fram’d by Nature, as not to be able " the more ſtrange and unuſual the Doctrine ſhould to ſupport Life, without feaſting on Blood, and tu “ be which I offerd, the more new and ſurprizing loath and reject that common Proviſion afforded by “ I ſhould appear, and gain the more Admiration. the Earth. Whereas Men are not under the like " Add. Jo. Scheffer. de Philofoph. Ital. c. 14. Caſe of Neceſſity; receiving very commodious Nou « Plutarch in Grill. Man, with a craving. Appe- riſhment from other Food, and being oblig'd to pre tite, drawing all things to himſelf, trying all pare Fleſh by dreſſing or ſeaſoning it, before they things, taſting all things, as being ſtill ignorant can make it agreeable to their Digeſtion. We “ of his own Nature, or what is agreeable to it, is hear indeed of fome barbarous Nations, which make “ the only Creature in the World that lives in ge- uſe of no Fleſh or Fiſh but what is Raw, and ſup- “ neral upon every thing which comes to his Hands . port themſelves with that ; as Rochefort (a) reports Firſt, He uſeth Fleſh; without the Excuſe of Want of the Coaſts on Davis's Streights. But the ſame or Neceſſity, when he might at any time gather Author tells us (L) of the Inhabitants of the Pro- “ other Food from the Seeds and Plants , with an in- vince of Paſto in Peru, That they eat no manner of “ exhauſtible and never failing Store. But through Fleſh; and that if deſired but only to taſte any, their “ Luxury and Diſdain of his proper and neceſſary Anſwer is, They are not Dogs. “ Proviſion, he follows ſtrange and polluted Diet , Others have obſerv’d, in relation to the preſent " in the Slaughter of Beaſts, exceeding the moſt Enquiry, that whereas thoſe Animals which natural “ Savage Creatures in Fierceneſs and Cruelty: For ly feed on Fleſh, have their Fore-teeth oblong, their Fore-teeth oblong, “ Blood and Slaughter, and Fleſh are the proper « Suſtenance of the Kite, the Wolf and the Dragon, ſing them with a deeper Stroke, they may grind and “ as Fiíh and Spoon-meat are of Men. The ſame ſeparate the Prey ; Man's Teeth are ſhort, join'd“Author in his Second Oration about the eating of one to the other, and ſpreading round, after the man “ Fleſh, among many other things, offers what fol- ner of thoſe Animals which live on Herbs and “ lows: At firſt they fed, perhaps, on ſome wild Fruits: And that on this account we are neceſſitated “ or hurtful Animal; then on Birds and Fiſh; 'till to make uſe of Knives for dividing the Fleſh we their Appetite thus taught and accuſtom'd, pro- eat; whilſt the Creatures which eat this as their Na- . ceeded to the Ox that labours in our Service; to tural Food, ſtand in no need of ſuch Aſliſtances or “ the Sheep that cloaths and adorns us; to the Inventions: That thus we ſee Children by the bare watchful Cock that guards our Houſe. Hence, impulſe of Nature, loving Fruit beyond all other u by degrees, adding Strength and Force to their Proviſions, and preferring Apples, Cherries and Nuts, “ inſatiable Deſires, they broke out into the Mur- to the moſt exquiſite Dainties of Fleſh; becauſe in “ther of their Brethren, and the Miſeries of Blood them Nature is not yet corrupted, nor their Appe- “ and War. tites debauch'd by ill Cuſtoms of Eating (c). It is farther evident, that the fierceneſs and cruelty of Aratus Phanom. Men, having been firſt excited, encourag'd and har “ The faithful Ox, accuſtom'd to the Plough, den'd by the Slaughters of Beaſts, afterwards broke " Defil'd the Table. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 4. (2) Pythagoras's Greek is this, Τειν δε το φονεύειν άπαχρέυων, με όπ ε άπεια των ζώων κοινον δίκαιον ημίν έχείνων ψυχs- και τόδε μεν ήν το πρόσχημα το δ' αληθές των εμψύχων, απηγόρευεν άπλεται συνασκών, και συνεθίζων εις ευκαλίαν βία τες αν θρώπες , ώςε ευπορίας αυτούς είναι τας τροφας, άπυρα προσφερομένοις, και λιγον ύδωρ πίνειν, εντεύθεν ή και σώματα υγείας, και Luzős osuti ta mieziveatral. See alſo Pythagoras's Speech in Ovid's Metam. 15. Fab. 2. v. 75, &c. Grot, ad Gen. 46, 34. Plate Timeo circ. fin. (1) Here is an heap of very needleſs Quotations, which teach us only what divers perſons and people have thought of the oila of Meats. As the Author quotes them all at length, they make a large page in the Original, and form a confus’d Chaos, Traoſlation with. (a) Deſcript. Antillar. par. 1. C. 18 (b) Part 2, C.IT (C) Vid. Anton. le Grand. Inftir. Philof. Cartes. Part 6. Art. 3. (d) Lib. 8. Sect. 13. CC I would not fill my Add. CHAP. III. Of the Power of Mankind over Things. 143 16 « Add. Plin. 1. 7. C. 45. & Val. Max. l. 8. c. 1. inter “them only becauſe our extravagant Greedineſs damnatos, n. 8. " and Luxury is ſupplied by their Deſtruction. « Sueton. Domitian, cap. 9. Ælian. V, H. lib. 5: Porphury (a) is very prolix in attempting to ſhew, Dio Chryfoft. Orat. 64. 592. Edit. Morell, that abſtinence from Fielh is in the higheſt manner cap. 14. « Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. 2. the Duty of Philoſophers, who place all their Hap- « Nicol. Damafcenus reports of the Phrygians, That pineſs in God, and in the Imitation of the Divine it was a Capital Crime amongſt them to kill a la- Nature. Amongſt a great number of Arguments , bouring Ox, or to ſteal any. Inſtrument of Agri- the Subſtance of which hath been for the inoſt part “ culture. So Aloys Cadamujt in his Voyages, C. 57: already deliver'd, he endeavours to demonſtrate, 60. tells us, That the People of the Kingdom of That áll Souls endued with Senſe and Memory, « Calecut thew the like facred Veneration to Oxen. are likewiſe Partakers of Reaſon; and that ſince we " And the Nomades, as Diodor. Sic. relates, lib. 3; may diſcover thius inuch in other Animals , we ought cap. 32. pag. 165. Ed. Rhodom. gave the Bull and to extend our Juſtice to them, which conſiſts prin- “ the Cow, as likewiſe the Ram and the Ewe, the cipally in offering no hurt without due Cauſe: And « Naine of Parents, as affording the daily Support that we have a convincing Evidence of the Reafon « of Life. Strabo l. 15. p. 490. obferves of the of Brutes, in their being capable of Madneſs and “ Brachmans , that they eat the Fleſh of thoſe Crea- Deftraction. To this time, the Benjans in Cambay, tures only, which do not allift Mankind in their believing the Souls of Men to remove, at Death, “ Works. Varenius, Defcript. Japon. c. 23. reports into the Bodies of Beaſts, never harm any Living “ inuch the fame of the Japoneje; who are ſaid Creature, nor dare to turn them into Food: Nay, they « likewiſe to profeſs an Averſion to Blood, and no have Hoſpitals erected on purpoſe, for the reception “ leſs to Milk, which they take to be nothing elſe of diſeaſed and maimed Birds (6). Phil. Baldæus ini 6 but white Blood. his deſcription of the Iſland Ceilon (c) reports, That “ We may here likewiſe by the way, remark, the Bramines, even when converted to Chriſtianity, “ what is urg'd in Plutarch’s Sympofiac. 1. 4. c. 4. to keep their old Method of Living ; and that if they prove that Fiſh are the moſt proper Diet. For, be encounter'd with that Text of Scripture, To the “ ſays he, as to the Creatures which live with us Clean all things are clean, they reply in another, upon the Earth, ſuppoſing them to have no other that, The Kingdom of God is not in Meat and Common Rights with Mankind, yet at leaſt they Drink : that they have been ever accuſtom’d to their receive the fame Nouriſhinent, they breath, and light and eaſie Diet, and find themſelves very well upon waih, and drink as we do; and when we kill it. Thus the whole Nation of the Apalchite, of old, them, their piteous Cries make us bluſh for our never taſted Fleſh or Fiſh, 'till they learnt this Cu- Cruelty: Beſides, that the greateſt part of them ſtom from the Europeans (d). are made familiar to us, by dwelling and feeding V. But, though in theſe Arguments and Authori- “ fo near. Whereas on the contrary, the Race of ties ſo much ought juſtly to be commended, as “ Sea-Animal is utterly ſtrange to us, is born and makes for the Encouragement of Temperance and « bred, and lives as 'twere in another World; nor Frugality, and for the hindering the finer Spirits from are we reſtrain’d from killing thoſe Creatures by being obſtructed, and as it were mir'd up with too " their Cry, by their Afpect, or by any Service groſs Feeding; yet, that the killing and the eating " that they can do us. For they can indeed be no of Animate Creatures is really not Sinful, may be way uſeiul in our Buſineſs, not being able ſo much fufficiently made out on the bare ſtrength of Rea- as to live in our Element. Our Earth is a kind fon : And the main Evidence ſeems to be this, That of Hell to them; they die almoſt as ſoon as they no mutual Right or Obligation paſſeth (1) between « touch it. On the other fide, the Pythagoreans , Men and Bruites, nor ought to paſs by the Direction were more averſe to eating Fiſh than any other of Nature (e). For we neither find that the Law Animals; the Grounds of which Opinion are exa- of Nature by virtue of its abſolute Authority, com- min’d at large by the fame Author, Sympoſ. 1.8. mands us to maintain Friendſhip and Society with c. 8. So likewiſe Xiphilin, reports, That the Ca- Brutes; nor are they capable of ſuſtaining any Ob- ledonians never taſted Fiſh; nay, though they ligation towards Men ariſing from Covenant. From " had them in great Plenty, Epig. Dion. in Sever. which Defect of all Common Right, there follows, as "One of the Reafons there given is this, That o- it were, a State of War, betwixt thoſe, who both “ther Animals deſerve their Death at our Hands, are able to hurt each other, and are upon very pro- “ by ſome way or other doing us Miſchief, where- bable Grounds ſuppos’d to be willing. And in this se as the Filh neither hurt us, nor are able to hurt State each Party hath liberty to do to the other, 4 us. That amongſt other Animals , ſome ought ne- with whom he is thus engagd in Hoſtility,whatſoever ceſſarily to be kill'd, left by inultiplying too faſt, he thinks conducive to his own Intereſt and Con- they ſhould rob Men of their Suſtenance, as Cun- venience. Yet ſuch a ſtate of War, in which Men hereas (again) the Fiſh, being ſtand towards Brutes is very different from that born, as it were, in another World, give us no which fonetimes ariſeth from Men's Claſhing a- "Occaſion to hurt them : But we are ſet againſt mongſt themſelves : Inaſinuch that the Latter is « suarit Oy do Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 5. (1) See I. 2.C.3.5 2. before going, and Grotius, 1. 1. c. 1. $ 11. Cicero has a paffage alſo from whence this Conſequence feems to be drawn, Homini nihil juris effe cum beftiis. Præclare enim Chryfippus, cætera nata este hominum caula do Deorum, eos autem communitatis, da ſocietatis suæ, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem ſuam poffunt fine injuria. The fame Author alſo has another paf- lage , ſhewing the Right that Man has over Beaſts and other Creatures . Itaque ad hominum commoditates, & uſus, tantam rerum ubertatem natura largita eſt , ut ea que gignuntur, donat a conſulto nobis non fortuito nata videantur, nec ſolum ea quæ frugibus, atque baccis, terre fætu profunduntur , fed etiam pecudes, quod perspicuum fit, partim ele ad ufum hominum, partim ad fru&tum, partim ad zeſcendum procreatas, De Legibus, l. 1. c. 8. (a) Lib. 4. mgì nexñs, (6) Add Abrah. Roger. de Bramin. par. I c.1 & 18. (c) C. 47 (d) Rochefort deſcript. sa- (e) Cicero de Finib. bonorum do malorum. 1. 3. 6. 29. neither tillar. p. 2. c. 8. 144 of the Power of Mankind over Things. Book IV. even neither univerſal, nor perpetual, nor extends it felf Harmleſs Beaſts would be otherwiſe expos’d an eafie promiſcuouſly to all manner of Licenſe againſt each Prey to the Violence and to the Hunger of the Wild other (2). As for the Fiercer Animals, they give and Ravenous, their Condition is rather better'a evident Proofs of their being plac'd in this Hoſtile than impair’d by that high degree of Power, which State, whilft upon every Advantage and Oppor- Men exerciſe over them; which in affording them tunity they are ready to exerciſe their Violence a- a conſtant Proviſion of Food, doth, as it were, pay gainſt Men; and he that would have us fpare them the price of their Like, and likewiſe protects theſe, doth at the ſame time require us to put then them againſt the Aſſaults of their Savage Ene under fiercer Circumſtances, and a more ſecure Con- mies (3). Now, what hath been here ſupposed , That dition than our ſelves. And then the inore mild there is no Coinmon Right uniting and equally af and gentle Creatures do not offer themſelves to the fećting Men and Brutes, others have long ſince de Service of Men, by virtue of any, Obligation, but monftrated (!), Which too is the reaſon, (as we may as they are either bribed by Food, or conſtrain’d here add by the way,) why Property obtains its by Force; upon Removal of which Inducements , Force and Effect only againſt other Men, and not they will return to their Natural Liberty, and ſome in like manner againſt Brutes ; inaſmuch as they, of them will be ſo hardy as to aſſault and encoun- when they devour what we poſſeſs, cannot be faid ter Man. Again, others increaſe ſo prodigiouſly, to do us an Injury, Thus God, in the Lan that 'tis neceſſary for us to retrench their Number, guage of Scripture, (e) Feeds the Birds (4), leſt we ſhould be our felves reduc'd to a narrow when they conſume the Corn produc'd by our Toil and inconvenient Dwelling (a). 'Tis to no pur- and Labour. Yet the Owner of Beaſts may fome poſe denied by fome, that the Lawfulneſs of hurt times do us Injury or Damage, when they break in ing and of eating Brute Creatures, may be inferr’d and deſtroy our Harveft; for not keeping them from this Defect of common Right between them with a ſtricter Care. In one reſpect indeed, and in and Men: Becauſe (ſay theſe Authors ) though no a very wide Senſe, the Beaſts themſelves inay be Injury be done to the Brutes, yet we injure the Creator ſaid to have the ſame Right with us; when, by the of them, ( unleſs we are ſure of his Conſent) as like- fame Right (as it were ) by which they invade our viſe their owners or Proprietors. But this Objecti- Poſſeſſions by the ſame we drive them from thence. on is vain and idle : For that very Conſideration, VI. Yet that the Abuſe of this Power, and eſpe- that the Divine Creator hath not eſtabliſh'd a Right cially ſuch as is attended with fooliſh Cruelty and common to Men with Brutes, is a ſufficient Evi- Barbarity, deſerves to come under cenſure (1), is dence that he ſuſtains no Injury, when they are beyond diſpute. For, as it is the Intereſt of parti hurt by Men; becauſe he himſelf was pleas’d to or- cular States, that no Perſon ſquander away, or waſte dain this State and Condition between the former and ſpoil his Poſſeſſions; ſo it turns to the preju- and the latter. And, as to the other part of the Ob- dice of the Univerſal Society of Mankind, and to jection, 'tis a different Queſtion1 , Whether Man can the diſhonour of GOD, the giver of fo great Gifts, do any Injury to a Brute? And whether by the In- to confuine them idlely and wantonly, without pro- tervention or Occaſion of a Brute, he may injure moting any Benefit or Advantage of Life. Thus another Man? The firſt is only denied by what we GOD was pleas’d eſpecially to command the Fems, are now aſſerting, and not the fecond: Nor will it To allow their Cattle a Reſt from all Work, on the be impertinent to the Argument in hand, to add Seventh Day (d). Plutarch (e) tells us, The Athe this farther Remark, That ſince the Tame and nians inflicted a Penalty on a certain Perſon who had (2) From this Place to the end of this Paragraph I have been obliged to tranſpoſe almoſt all the Sentences of the Original, upon the account of the extreme Careleſsneſs of the Author in purring in ſome Additions. (3) 'Twill be proper here to put in two Reflections made by Mr. Le Clerc in his Phyficks, 1. 4. C. 12 S 15. The Beaſts which we kill would die of themſelves in a few Years, and when they die, their Soul dies as well as their Body, ſo that chey looſe no. thing, by Death. It is certainly a piece of Cruelty to deprive thoſe Beings, that have ſenſe of a thing which they are ſenſible they have a loſs of, and which may be a Grief to them, but not to deſtroy a Being, which has no fenſe after its Deſtruction. So that the Man that kills another, ought to be puniſh’d for his Cruelty, becauſe Mens Souls ſurvive their Bodies, and paſs into an Eſtate, where they lament their deprivation of Life. But Beaſts being once dead, feel nothing; becauſe their Soul periſhes at the ſame time, in what manner ſoever it be done. 2. It is Cruelcy to ſeparate from the Body of a living Creature, a Nature that hath ſenſe, and is profitable to another ſo long as it is united to the Body, as it happens when a Man is ſlain, whoſe loſs is an Injury to the Society of which he is a Member. But 'cis no Cruelty to ſay a living Creature, which is of no uſe to another but when 'cis dead, and would do Miſchief while it lives. For 'tis evident, that if no Beaſts were flain, their great Number would be noxious to Man. All theſe Reaſons prove beyond contradiction, that Man doth Beaſts no Injury by ſaying and eating them. Bur it may be alſo not unprofitable to fhew, after Archbiſhop King, De Origine Mali, c. 4. Sect. 5 s 5. That Beaſts can't complain, that they were appointed by the Creator to be Food for Men. God gave them Life upon that condition, and they had never been, had it not been for that. Wherefore they ought, if they had fenfe enough, to praiſe their Creator of whom they hold it, becauſe it is better to enjoy Life and Senſe for ſome time, than to be always a lump of Matter, and void of all perception. Beſides, Beaſts enjoy preſent Satisfaction always, without remembring what is paſt, or diſquieting themſelves with what's ro come; and after all they ſuffer leſs by being killd, than they would if they died of a Diſeaſe or old Age. (4) See Note 1. on Paragraph 4. of the following Chapter. una Ball Boot: Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 6. (1) Marcus Antoninus ſpeaks to this purpoſe in this fine paſſage of his Reflections, Tois wiv erózais Scóors iš ne.9008 Trogiquan, και υποκειμένοις, ως λόγον έχων, λόγων μη έχεσι, χρώ μεγαλοφρόνων, και εευθέρως, τοϊς ανθρώπους, ως λογών έχει, χρώ κοινωνικός, 1.6.c. 22. (i.e.) uſe all Creatures, and all other things nobly and freely as a Man who hath Reaſon ought to uſe ſuch things as have none. As for Men, uſe them according to che Laws of Society, as Men of Reaſon ought to be uſed. See allo Sad. der in the Religion of the ancient Perfians put out by Mr. Hyde, Porc . 38. In hort, the abuſe of that power which Men have over Beaſts, is the more criminal becauſe it often tends to the prejudice of Men. Hence it is that the Laws of Triptolemus forbid the killing of any Creatures, whoſe Labour we make uſe of. Porphyr. de abſtinen. 1.4.5 22. And it was a Capital Crime among the Phry : gians, as Nicolas Damafcenus teftifies. (a) See Exod. 23. 29. Deut. 7. 22. Add Gaſſend. Syntagm. Epicuri, par. 3. c. 2. & 7. (6) See Lib. 2 c. 3.1, 2 & Grot. 1.1 (c) Mat. 6. 26. (d) Exod. 20. 10. 23. 12. Deut. 5. 14. 25.4. Num. 22, 28, 32. Prov. 12. 10. Comp. Deut. 20. 19. Rom. 8. 19, doc, (e) Orac. 1. de Uſu Carn. C. 1 1. II. I Cor. 9.9. frip2 CHAP. IV. Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. 145 firipd a Ram of his Skin whilft alive (2) And the ſign’d them. Comp. Deut. XXII, 6, 7. agreeable to Followers of Pythagoras, as Porphyry obſerves, made which is that of Phocylides, Gentleneſs and Mercy towards Beaſts the Introdu- duction to Love and Pity towards Men, l. 3. The Neſts whole Family you muſt not ſeize, C. 20. P. 125. Ed. Cantab. de Abftinentia. Nor was But leave the Dain a future Brood to raiſe. the Advice of the Chineſe Philoſopher, Mentius, al- together amiſs, That the King ſhould give no Perſons The Action of Alexander Severus (3) (recorded by leave to uſe Nets with ſmall Maſhes ; that by this means Lampridius, c. 22.) is likewife worthy to be men- the greater Fiſh only ſhould be taken, and the leſſer have tiond on this occaſion. When the People of Rome, power to eſcape ; which ſufficiently growing up in the complain’d to him of a great Dearth and Scarcity, following fears , would afford a fupply at all times, and he ask'd them, by a publick Officer , what kind of for all Perſons . As likewiſe, that none ſhould be al- Meat was dear; and finding by the common Cry low'd to kill Hens, Porkers, or other Animals, before that Beef and Pork were the Subject of the Coin- they were come to their full growth; that they might plaint, he did not lower the Price, but order'd that the more eaſily give a full and conſtant Proviſion of none ihould kill a Cow or Heifer, a Sow or Sucking Fleſh. Whence it became a Cuſtom amongſt the Chi- Pig : And by this means within a Year, or leſs than nefe, never to kill any Living Creatures, till they had two Years, there was ſuch Plenty of both Sorts, that attair’d that pitch and maturity, which Nature had af- from Eight-pence the Pound, they came to Three- pence. (2) The Greek is, Οι 3 Πυθαγόρειοι των προς τα θηρία πραότητα μελέτίω εποιήσανθο το φιλανθρωπι και φιλόικλίρμωνΘ, Porphyr. de abſtinen. I. 3. C. 20. See Mr. Le Clerc's Comment. on Gen. 9 4. and what I have ſaid in my Treatiſe of Gaming, l. 3 c. 5 S 7 (3) This Example is not much to the purpose, becauſe ir reſpects an Expedient which Alexander Severus made uſe of upon a particular occaſion, wherein it does not appear that there was any abuſe. CHAP. IV. Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. I Property and Community are moral Qualities. VIII. The Opinion of the Ancients about the Original II. What is Property and Community. of Dominion or Property. III. That it has no place, but where there are more IX. Grotius's Judgment confider'd. Men than one. X. XI, XII, XIII. The Arguments of thoſe who deny IV. It proceeds immediately from an Agreement a- the Community of Goods uſed among the An- cients. Of the Ancient Community of Goods. XIV. In what Senſe Dominion is ſaid to be by Natural VI. By what degrees Men departed from it. Right. VII. That it was profitable to Mankind. XV. How far Infants are capable of Property. mong Men. THAT this Power of Mankind over Things e allowing to another Principle: of which, before ver began to take effect in relation to other we proceed to treat, it ſeems neceſſary to premiſe, Men ; ( for no Human Property ought to be op- that Property and Communion are Moral Qualities, pos’d to the Tranſcendent Right of GOD;) (a) (i) which do not affect the Things themſelves, as to that this Indefinite Right was converted into their intrinſick Nature, but only produce a Moral Dominion (2), by virtue of which ſuch or ſuch a Effect with regard to other Perſons : And that theſe Thing belongs to one Perſon, and to none elſe, is Qualities, as all others of the fame Kind, derive their or, Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. 4. $ 1. (1) Euripides's Words are, Ούτι τα χρήμα' ιδία κάκωται Pegτου, Men poffeſs nothing of their own, but are Τα των Θεών, και έχονlες επιμελόμεθα The Stewards of the Goods, which co their Care "Όταν δε χρήζωσ',αυτα αφαιρέντα πάλιν. The Gods commit, and take away when they ſee fit. Sec Lev. 25. 23. Pfal. 24. 1 (a) Vid. Euripid. Phoeniff. v. 558, doc. Add, Levit. 25. 23.. (2) Men by the Conceſſion of the Creator and Supreme Sovereign of the Univerſe have naturally a full power to make uſe of the Creatures, as they fee fit, according to the ſtrength of their Reaſon. It there had never been but one Man in the World, as Adam was alone for a little time, the effect of his Power had been reduced to this, That nothing had been done contrary to the will of the Creator , by diſpoſing of what had been preſented to him according to his Humour. Bur Mankind began to frame and perpetuate themſelves trom Generation to Generation, from the moment that they became more than one Man, fince by Na- Ture one had not more power than another over the Beaſts and inanimate Creatures. Every one acquir'd a Right, by virtue of which another ought to permit him to enjoy, as well as himſelf, all thoſe things which their Creator had granted them the uſe for take it from him, but fuppofing it to be of that Nature, as not to be conſumed by the uſage, he may appropriate it to him- Ielf ſo long as he has occation for it ; and others do him an Injury, if they would make uſe of it in their turn. So long as there poffefs themſelves of nothing but what was for prefent use, and here we may believe that all their Cares and Claims were boun- and Teck oue ways to render their lives more conmodious and agreeable, there was no way left to live in that.Community ; but Men muſt fix upon femething, and was juft, chat what was gorren by Labour and Induſtry hould be made ſuch a Property, that + T a DO 146 Book IV Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. 1 their Birth from Impoſition. And therefore itis an things themſelves derive ſome kind of Extrinſical idle Queſtion, Whether the Property of things ariſe Denomination. And this appears fufficiently evi . from Nature or from Inſtitution? Since we have dent from hence; that the Right dying with the plain evidence that it proceeds from the Impofiti- Perſon, the things ceafe to be appropriated, with- on of Men; and that the Natural Subſtance of things out any change in their Subſtance, or in other Na- ſuffers no Alteration, whether Property be added tural Qualities and Affections. to thein, or taken from then. IN to roibA T Now the force of Property is ſuch, that we may - II. In the next place we ought with due accura at our pleaſure diſpoſe(2) of the things which we hold cy to weigh and examine what Communion is, and by this Right, and may keep any other Perſon what Property or Dominiona The Term Communion from the uſe of them; unleſs he hath obtain’d from is taken either negatively or poſitively. In the us, by Covenant, a particular Right to this pur former manner things are laid to be Common, as con- poſe: And that therefore whilſt they continue ours , fider'd before any Hunane Act or Agreement had de- they cannot after the ſame manner, and in clared them to belong to one rather than to another. whole (3), be anothers. I ſay, after the ſame mana In the fame fenſe, things thus conſider'd, are ſaid to be ner; for, neither as there is no reaſon to the contra No Body’s, rather negatively than privatively, i.e. ry, fo Cuſtom informs us, that the ſame thing may that they are not yet affign'di to any particular Per- belong to ſeveral Perſons at once, according to their fon, not that they are incapable of being ſo allign’d. different ways of holding or owning it. Thus the They are likewiſe teri'd res in medio quil'iiſvis ex- Commonwealth, the Landlord and the Tenant, by pofitæ, Things that lie free for any Taker. But in Copy or Leaſe, may be ſaid each of them to have the poſitive Signification of the Word, Common the Property of the ſame piece of Ground; the firſt Things differ from appropriated only in this Reſpect, an Eminent Property (4); the ſecond a Direct (s), and That the latter belong to one perſon only, the for- the laſt an Uſeful (6). It was added likewiſe, in mer to many Perſons together, though in the very whole (b); for many Perfons may even in the ſame ſame mnamer. To proceed, Property or Dominion, way, hold the faine thing, yet not in whole, but is a Right by which the very Subſtance (1), as it were each according to his determinate Share. As is the of a Thing, So belongs to one Perſon, that it doth not, caſe in thoſe Goods which are, without Diviſion (7), in whole, belong, after the same manner, to any other. poffefs’d by many together, who all happen to have For we take Dominion and Property to be the very the ſame kind of Propertywith regard to the ſame thing. fame. Though ſome affirm the Right as ſeparated Sometimes we conceive Property to be divided in- from the Uſe and Profit to be Property, and as join'd to ſeveral Parts; or, (if any one likes this Exprelli- with the Uſe and Profit to be Dominion; which ne on better) to admit of ſeveral Degrees. For thus vertheleſs is a difference that doth not perpetually 'tis frequently diſtinguiſh’d into Plenary and Dimi- hold. Some again are over-nice, whilſt by Proper- nutive. The former is either join’d with what they ty they underſtand the Thing it felf, under that call Eminent Property, in which manner Civil States, Quality by which it belongs to me, and to none or the Heads and Governors of them poſleſs their beſides; and by Dominion a Right to diſpoſe of the Goods ; or elſe disjoin’d from it, and term’d Vulgar ſaid Thing as I pleaſe, which flows from Property by which a private Man enjoys a full Power of dif- in the manner of an Effect; fo that the Dominion poſing of his Goods, except fo far that the Uſe of ſhall be lodgà in the Perſon, but the Property ſhall them be not under the Direction of the Municipal ſeem rather to inhere in the Thing (a). In which Laws. Diminution of Property may be made ſeve- Diſtinction it is fallly fuppos'd, that Dominion is as ral ways, as that the bare Exerciſe or Adminiſtra- it were the Effect of Property; whereas if a Man tion of it ſhall be reſtrain’d; or that the Profit and at all neceſſary thus to divide them, the Advantage of it ſhall be leſſen’d? Or laſtly, That reverſe of this is rather true. For the Right, ſtrict- ſomewhat ſhall be cut off from the very Property ly ſpeaking, inheres in the Perſon, from which the it ſelf. The firſt happens (8), when by Covenant , us a No- no other might have to do with it without his Permiſſion. Wherefore every one poſſeſſed himſelf of certain things with a deſign to keep them always, and not to part with them unleſs it be by diſpoſing of them to whom they think fit, either alive or dying, at leaſt declaring openly not to abandon them, and leave them to the firit Occupant. Thus the property of Goods was firſt elta- bliſh’d, of which the Mark of Diſtinction is, That others are always excluded, whereas when all things were common, others were not excluded from the things of which every one was poflefled but for a little time, (i. e.) as long as they were actually in uſe. Then where Civil Societies formed, the Rights of Property were ſettled, and order'ä divers ways according to the Laws agreed on. Thus have I given, as I think, in a few Words, a clear and exact notion of this Marter, about which our Author en- Jarges much, and yet reaſons obſcurely; and which has long been perplex'd with vain Subtleties . if we joyn this with Note 4 of Paragraph 4. we thall have Principles fufficiene to judge well of it, and to rectifie che Notions of other Authors, who have it6$ Note Barbeyrac's 6 . (1) See Nore 2. of the precedent Section, where you'll find a more natural and exact Definition. Our Author gives tion of a particular Property, rather than a general one, conſider'd in oppofition to an univerſal Community of Goods. (2) So ſays the Civil Law, Nam fuæ quidem quifque rei moderator, atque arbiter, doc. Cod. 1.4. tit. 35. Mandati, &c. leg. 25: (3) So the Civil Law ſpeaks, Et ait Celfus filius, duorum quidem in folidum dominium, vel poseſionem eſſe non posſe, Digeſt. 1. 13. cit. 6. Commodati vel contra, leg. S. $15. (4) See Lib. 8 c. 5 1. 7. 5) Our Author explains in the next Line, what is nieant by direct and uſeful Property, as the Modern Lawyers diſtingeifh . In ſhort, Uſeful Property imports a greater Right than disect Property, and is rather a Right Perſonal than Real, as Mr. Titius obſerves in his Jus Privatum Romano German. &c, which was publiſh'd in 1709. Lib. 3. C. II. §. 3. (6) See Chap. 8. $ 3. following. (7) So the Civil Law ſpeaks, Nec quenquam partjs corporis dominium esſe, fed totius corporis pro indiviſo pro parte, dominium habere, Digeft. I. 13. tit. 6 Commod. vel contra, leg. 5. $15. (8) See the Inſtitutes, l. 2. cit. 8. Quibus alienare licet, vel non licet. (a) Vid. Ziegler ad Grot. I. 2 c. 2 ſ. 1. (6) Plures eandem rem in folidum poßidere non poffunt, D. 1.4. tit. 2.D: acquirenda vel admittenda pole Nione, leg. 3. 1.5. 911 or CHAP. IV of the Origin of Dominion or Property. 147 or by Teſtament, or by the Command and Autho- Common, as the word Common is taken in its latter rity of Law, on account either of the Condition of Signification, implying that the ſame thing is by the Perſons, or of the Quality of the Things, or for the ſame kind of Dominion held by ſeveral Men, fome other Juſt Cauſes, the Alienation of Poffeffions without being divided, or parceli'd out amongſt is either prohibited, or confin'd within certain Li- them. And this Communion differs froin Property, mits (9), yet ſo as that 10 Right to the ſaid. Poffef- ſtrictly fo called, only with regard to the Subject in fions, is hereby deriv'd upon others: Add Theo- which it is terminated and lodg’d, a proper or ap- phraſtus's Will'in Diog. Laert: 1,5:251; The Adi propriated thing, belonging to one perſon alone, a vantage of Property is lefſen'd, if either the full common thing to ſeveral, but not with regard to the Uſe and Enjoyment of my Goods is in the Hands of manner or the vertue of the Dominion ; for many another , without Loan or Hire; or otherwiſe if I Perfons have the ſame Right over a common thing, am bound to allow another ſome particular Uſe of as a ſingle Perſon hath over a proper thing; and them, by way of Service. Laſtly, The Property it as the Propriety of a thing appertaining to one only, felf is then retrench'd, when we grant to another, excludes all others from an equal Right in the fame beſides the full Right of uſing and enjoying what thing, fo a common thing excludes all others but is ours, a Right likewiſe of alienating it after a cer- thoſe to whom it is ſaid to be common. Now fince tain manner and ſuch a right too as is in ſome neither o theſe Commoners hath a Right extending fort perpetual . In which cafe, he who retains the it ſelf to the whole thing, but only to a part of it, Property, though thus abridg’d and holds a ſuperior though fuppos’d to remain undivided; it is manifeſt Power over the Poffeffion, is ſaid to have a Diree that no one Perſon can, by his own Right, diſpoſe Property; and he who, together with the Right of of the thing entirely, but only according to his uſing and enjoying, partakes likewiſe of the Pro- fixth Proportion (15) And that if any Relolution perty in the manner before deſcrib'd, is faid to have is to be taken, any Bargain to be inade about the an Uſeful Property in the Poſſeſſion thus granted to whole, the Conſent and Act of each commoner is him (a). Where we may obferve, by the way, what neceſſarily required. Ziegler (c), Felden ( d), and Limitation ought to be added to that common Rule Bæcler (e), in their Obfervations on Grotius, have with the Lawyers, What is already a Man's own, can't all confounded Negative Communion with Poſitive: become more his own (10). Whence they conclude, On account of which Miſtake, many Arguments that no Pawn (11), no Charge, no Bargain of Buy- have been thrown away to no purpoſe, in diſcuſſing ing, or of letting to Hire can poſſibly ſtand, when this point; as will appear hereafter. What Seneca made to him who is already the Proprietor of the hath deliver'd about the ſeveral kinds of Commu- thing thus diſpos’d of. As likewiſe if a Teſtator nion, may not be impertinent to our preſent Sub- happens to bequeath to the Legatee what was his ject (f). I hold all things, ſays he, in common with own before, the Act is void and fruitleſs (12). And a Friend (16), not as I do with a Sharer, ſo that ſo too, that no one can (13), to any purpofe, ftipu- one part ſhould be mine, and another late or bargain for a thing that will be his own but as Children are common to their Father and without any ſuch Conditions, with other the like Mother, who , ſuppoſing the Children to be two, Caſes. All which are true, unleſs it ſo happen, that are not ſaid to have each one, but each both. The a Diminutive Property ſhould, by any of theſe means, Knight's Seats belong to all of that Order, yet be advanc'd to a greater degree of Plenitude (b) .in them, by taking Poffefion of a place, I appropri- Farther, ſince the ſame thing may be poffeſs'd ei- ate it to my ſelf. And if I reſign this place to ano- ther in whole by one, or elſe by many (14), with ther Perſon, though he had an equal Right to it, yet it out falling under a Diviſion; ſo that each Perſon, ſeems to be my Gift. Some things belong to some Men according to his Determinate Share, ſhall have an under a certain Condition. Thus, again, I have a place equal Right in it; hence it comes to paſs that things in the Knight's Seats, not to ſell , not to let out, not to are, in this reſpect, diſtinguiſh'd into Proper and make my Home, but barely to fit in whilft I am a Spea part his (9) Seneca's Words are, Non eſt argumentum ideo aliquid tuum non elle, quia vendere non potes, quia conſumere, quia mut are in de- terius aut melius. Tuum enim eſt etiam quod ſub tege certa tuum eſt. (10) Quod proprium est ipſius (Legatarii) amplius ejus fieri non poteft , Inſtit. 1. 2 tit. 20 de Legatis, 1.10. See alſo l. 4 tit. 6 de (1) Neque pignus, neque depofitum, neque precarium, neque emptio , neque locatio rei ſua confiftere poteft, Digeſt, li so tiſ. 17, De Divers. Reg. Juris, l. 45. (12) Sed fi quis rem Legatarii ei legaverit, inutile eft legatum, Inftit . I, 2 tit, 20 . 10. See alſo Cod. 1. 6 çit. 37 de Legatis, leg. 13. And Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order, Part . 2 1. 4 cit. 2. Sect. 3 $ 8, doc. 30 (13) Nemo rem fuam futuram, in eum cafum, quo fua fit, utiliter ftipulatur, Inftit . 1. 3 tit. 20! De inutilib: Stipulat, f. 22. (14) So the Civil Law ſpeaks, Seruus communis ſic omnium est, non quali ſingulorum totus, fed pro partibus utique indivifis, ut ine toilet rougis partes babeat quam corpore, Digeft . as tit. 3: De Stipulat. Seruorum, leg. s. "See allo lib. 31 de Ltgatis Fideicom. (15) Thus the Civil Law commands, Nemo ex fociis plus parte ſua poteft alienare, et ſi totorum bonorutn focii fint, Digeſt. 1. 17 tit: 2. Pro Socio, leg. 68 prin. See Cod. Lib. 3 tit. 38. Communi dividendo. modo Patri Matrique communes Liberi Junt ; quibus cum duo funt, non finguli Jingulos habent, fed finguli binos... femDeinde pluribus 2406) Seneca's Latin is, Non enim mihi fic cum amico communia omnia funt, quomodo cum focio, ut pars med fit, pars illius, fed quod modis communia sunt : Equeſtria omniqm Equitum Romanorum ſunt : in illis tamen locus meus proprius, quem occupavi. Hoc fi cui celli, quamvis illi communi recefferim, tamen aliquid dediffe videor . Quædam quorundam ſub certa conditione funt. Habeo in Equeſtris bus locum, non ut vendam, non ut locem, won ut habitem, in hoc tantum ut Speftem. Propterea non mentiar, fi dicam me häbere in eque. Aribus locum, ſed cum in theatrum venit, la plena (unt Equestria G jure habeo locum illic, quia federe mihi licet, & non habeo, quia ab bis, cum quibus jus mibi loci commune eſt, occupatus eft. 2010W Seriile (a) Comp. Struvi. Syntagm. Exerc. 17. 55, Coc. Seneca de Beneficiis, 1. 7. C. 12. It's no Argument that a thing is not your own becauſe you cannot ſell or ſpend it, becauſe you cannot change it for better or for worfe. For that likewiſe may be truly talld your own, which is your own under certain Terms and Conditions. (b) As Lucilius in the Anthologia, 1. 2. jeſts (mardly on eie old Mifer Hermecrates, in feigning that he had ſet down himſelf in his will as Heir to his own Goods. (c) Add Grot. I. 26.2 L. I ab init. (d) d. l. 1. 2. (e) d. 1. p.47. (1) De Benef. 1. 7. c. 13. + T 2 Hator, 00.000 Book IV Peculiar (3), and fo 25 oderminate in ; pohon. which I 148 of the Origin of Dominion or Property. Etator. It will be no Falſity then, if I ſhould ſay, I IV. But farther, it ought no leſs carefully to be have a place in the Knight's Seats , yet if they happen obſerv’d, that the Grant of Almighty God, by which to be full when I come into the Theatre, I both have he gave Mankind the uſe of earthly Proviſions, was a place there by Right, becauſe I am allow'd to uje not the immediate Cauſe of Dominion, as this is die them; and I have not a place, becauſe it is already pof- rected towards other Men, and with relation to Jefs d'by thoſe who had a common Right to it with my them takes Effect; (which is evident likewiſe from Jelf. hence, that even Brutes (1), by the Divine Periniſ III. From what hath been offer’d, 'tis evident that fion, uſe and conſume the Fruits of the Earth, and as well poſitive Communion, as Propriety, doth yet they are certainly incapable of Dominion :) But imply the Excluſion of others from the thing thus that Dominion neceſſarily preſuppofeth ſome Hu- ſaid to be either Common or Proper, and conſe- mane Act (2), and ſoine Covenant either Tacit or quently doth preſuppoſe more Perſons in the World Expreſs. GOD indeed authoriz’d Mankind to ap- than one. As then, if there were but a ſingle Man ply to their Service and Convenience the Earth, upon Earth, it could by no means be faid, that with the Product of it, and the Living Creatures things were appropriated to him: So thoſe things, upon it; or, he gave Man an indefinite Right to all from the uſe of which no Perſon is excluded, or theſe Poſſeſſions : But ſtill it was left to their own which belong no more to any one, than to another, Choice and Diſpoſal, what Manner, what Degree, are to be ftiled common, in the former, not in the what Extent they would fix to this Power: That is latter ſenſe of the Word. And thus it appears in whether they would circumſcribe it with certain what reſpect we may attribute the Dominion of Bouirds, or leave it unconfin’d; as likewiſe whether things to Adam, whilſt he yet ſtood alone in the they would allow each Perfon a Right to all things, World. Namely, although by reaſon of the vaſt or only to one and the fame determinate part of Extent of the Earth, and his ſmall Occaſions, he things; or whether they would allign to every par- needed to apply to his Service but a very inconfi- ticular Man his own Portion, with which he ſhould derable Portion of things; yet ſuppoſing him to reſt contented, and pretend no Right or Clain to have had Inclination, and likewiſe Ability and Con- any thing beſides. Ambrof. off. 1. 1. c. 28. Nature venience, to turn all that God had given him to his pour’d out all things in common to all Men: For own uſe, there was no Right of others to oppoſe ſo God commanded the whole Stock of things to be or hinder him. Therefore the Right of Adam over produc'd, that Men ſhould have a general Supply things, was of a different kind from that Dominion of Suſtenance, and ſhould hold the Earth as a gene which is now ſettled amongſt Men: We may call ral Seat. Common Right therefore was the Work it an indefinite Dominion (1), not formally poſſeſs’d, of Nature; Private and Peculiar Right, the Work but abſolutely allow'd ; not Actual, but Potential of long Uſe and Poffeflion. Add. Selden. de F. N. It had indeed the ſame Effect which Dominion now & G. Seo, Heb. 1. 6. C. I. ?Tis in vain therefore to obtains ; that is, the uſing things at Pleaſure, yet diſpute whether God conferr’d the Dominion over was it not Doininion, ſtrictly ſpeaking, by reafon things on our firſt Parents, as the repreſentatives of that there was no other Perſon againſt whom this all Huſnane Race; or whether he gave it them as afterwards increaſe. And thus on the whole, whilſt Right, ſhould hold the Lordfhip of the whole World , Adam was the only Man, things in reſpect of him and that all other Mortals ſhould owe their private were neither proper nor common. For Community Dominion to their Bounty and Favour. For that ſuppoſeth a Partner in the Poſſesſion ; and Propriety Divine Grant only confirm d Men in a fuller Affu- denotes an Excluſion of the Right of others to the rance of the Goodneſs of their Maker towards them, thing enjoy'd . So that neither of thein can be un- and fatisfy'd them that 'twas his pleaſure, they derſtood, 'till the World was furniih'd with more ſhould diſpoſe of other Creatures for their own Uſe than one Inhabitant. and Service. But it was left to the Reaſon of Men (1) The Author expreſſes himfelf very ſcholaſtickly here, ſaying, Quod quis vocare poſſit dominium indefinitum, non formaliter , Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Ś be ſhadow poffel- fing with Property, rather a true and actual Property Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Ş: 4. (1) I wonder our Author ſhould in this place in this place make uſe of to weak a Reaſon. For he himſelt obferves in more than one place, that Beaſts ace not capable of any Right or Obligation, neither among themſelves, or with others, nor is there any Law for ſo that thoʻin one fenfe God permits the Beaſts to uſe what is for their Convenience, yet 'cis not fuck a real Grant, as has the Nature of Right , and in that reſpect we can no more fay, that God wills (for example that the Birds lhould eat the Fruits and Corn where-ever they find it, than that God would have a Bear or a Lion to pull that Man in pieces , who (2) An humane Right: Igrant, that is to ſay, taking poffeffion, by virtue of which every one acquires a particular Right over that which before he had only a common one. But Contracts are neceffary, when a thing is to be parced, of which ſeveral have pofleffion at the ſame time. (3) An Engliſh Knight, named Robert Filmer, maintains it with a great deal of Heat, and makes uſe of it to prove the abſo- lure Power which he attributes to Sovereigns, and which, as he pretends, has come down by Succeffion from the Authority of Adam, whom he makes the firſt Sovereign. He chiefly inſiſts on this Texs, Gen. 1. 28. where God ſays to our firſt Parents , In: creaſe and multiply, and repleniſh the Earth, and ſubdue it, and have Dominion over the Fip of the Sea, over the Fowls of the air, and over every Beast that moveth upon the Earth. But Mr. Lock, who has confüred that Book in an Engliſh Work, of which we may find an Extract in the Univerſal Library, Tom. 19. anſwers judicioully, 1. That in theſe Words God gives Adam no Power bue over the Beafts. 2. That he gave him no property over theſe living Creatures to poffefs chem as his own, but as in a commod Right with all Mankind. This the Author proves at large frona diverſe parallel Paſſages of the Holy Scripture, and parcicularly by che very Grant that God repeated to Noah and his sons. The Text in Pſalm 115. 16. is not anſwer'd, God, faith the Pfal . miſt, hath given ihe Earth to the Children of men, which, according to the Hebrew Scile, is to Men in general, or to Mankind. Treatiſe of Government, l. 1. C. 4. ID 3. Our Author Should in call di to of any Man Pe blig'de by God himſelf, 5 gacher'd in a Wowor when my makes CHAP. IV. Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. 149 to determine what Meaſures ſhould be taken to pre- Men are enjoin'd to make ſuch an Appropriation of vent any Difford that might ariſe amongſt then things, as that each Man ſhould be allotted his par- from the Exerciſe of this Right. But we can by no ticular Portion, divided from the Shares of others. means ſay, That there was any univerſal Rule and Though the Law of Nature doth indeed ſufficient- fore things were rendred neither proper nor common Exigencies of Humane Society; yet ſo as to refer it in , Command of God: But this Matter was afterwards only fome particular things , or whether they would adjuſted by the Diſpoſal of Men, according as the poſfefs fome things without bringing them to a Di- Peace of Humane Society ſeem'd to require. Whence, viſion, and leave the reſt as they found them, only thoſe Authors muſt needs be under a Miſtake, who forbidding any particular Man to challenge them to deliver themſelves in fo groſs Terms as theſe : The himſelf alone. Hence too, the Law of Nature is Diviſion of things belongs to the Law of Nature; ſuppos'd to approve and confirm all Agreements that is, it doth not only receive its Riſe and Founda- made by Men about the Poffeffion of things, pro- tion from Nature, ſo as afterwards to be turn'd into vided they neither imply a Contradi&tion, nor tend Law by the Conſent of Mankind; but Nature her ſelf to the Diſturbance of society. Therefore the Pro- frames and compleats this Law by her own AX and Au- perty of things flow'd immediately from the Compact thority. And again, The Diviſion of things is one of Men, whether tacit or expreſs . For although af- Command of the Decalogue ; that is, une Head of the ter the Donation of God, nothing was wanting but Law of Nature. For he that ſaid, Thou shalt not for Men to take Poffeſfion; yet that one Man's ſeiz- ſteal, in effect ſaid, Let there be a Property and Di. ing on a thing ſhould be underſtood to exclude the flinction of things; let every one hold what is his own, Right of all others to the ſame thing (4), could not and not covet what is anothers (a). For there is no proceed but froin Mutual Agreement. And though Precept of Natural Law to be di cover’d, by which Right Reafon mov'd and perſivaded Men to intro- font (4) No, in no wiſe. Ic is certain on the contrary, that the immediate Foundation of all particular Right, which has to a thing, which was before common, is the firſt pofleffion. This was the moſt ancient way of Acquirement. And indeed, when ſeveral chings are given in general to a number of Men, which exiſt noc at the ſame time, and who neither can nor wilt poſſeſs all things in common, and ſuch are Men of all Times and places, the intention of the Donor doubtleſs is, That thoſe who come firſt ſhall gain a perſonal Right to thoſe things that they have goccen, excluſive of the Precenſions of all others, without any conſent of theirs need ful to be given. All taking pofleffion, according to the will of the Donor, hach in it an effectual Vir- tue to make the firſt Occupant appropriate to himſelf lawfully any thing before held in common, provided he cakes no more than he needs, and leaves enough for others. This is what Mr. Titius ſays judicioully, Obferv. 278. n. 2. in which he was prevenced by Mr. Lock, who in his excellent Treatiſe of Civil Government, has among other things ſearched to the bottom with much Curlofity and Solidity into the mander how the Property of Goods is acquired. Take, in ſhort, his Judgment how Men may pofleſs in divers parts, what God gave then in common, and enjoy it without any Agreement made between them, who have the ſame Natural Righe. God, who gave Man the Earth, and all things in ic for his subſiſtence and Convenience, intended, with e double hihat khe chandise put them to fuch an uſe, as would be moſt advantageous to their Life, and moft conformable to the and the Beaſts which are broughc up by the Care of Narute only, unleſs he appropriate co himſelf, ſome way or other, ſome of theſe Fruits and Animals. If it were a Crime to take the leaſt thing which is given in common, before we had the conſent of all others who had any Right, we might perilh a thouſand times with Hunger in the midſt of Plenty. When a Maſter of a Family provides a diſh of Meat for his children or Servants, he does not divide to each of them a part, but what each of them fairly takes, belongs to him, although before none of them had more Right than others, and although none of them had an allowance given them to take this or that porcion. Farther, reeing every one is the only Maſter of his Perſon and Actions, the Labour of his Body and Work of his Hands entirely and ſolely belong to him, as his own proper Goods. So that all that he has derived from the ſtate of Nature by his Labour and Induſtry, what he has gorcen by his Pains, belongs to him only, and others Man who on căn’i precend to them, unleſs there does not remain enough of the ſame things, or as good, among thoſe that are common. A his ownBut Bat it ? them, or when he carries them home, or when he lays them up ? 'Tis plain, that nothing but his labour in gathering them, can make them his own. Quod omnibus naſcitur, induſtriæ præmium est, Quintil . Declam. 13. 'Tis our Labour that diſtinguiſhes theſe Fruits of the Earth from other common Goods, and which adds ſomething more than the common Mother of all Men, I mean Nacure, hath beſtow'd. See Plautus in his Rudens, and Felix's Naufragium, A& qu Scene 3.-7.33, doc. By the fame Reaſon, the Graſs that a Man's Horſe hath eaten, the Turf which his Servant has cur, the Dirch he hath digged, and the Water which he hath drawn, become his own Goods and Inheritance, without the confent of any other. 'Tis the ſame at this day with the Seag which we have kill?d, the Fiſh we have taken, the 'Ambergriſe or Pearls which we have fifh'd up, and the Hare which we have hunted down, in the places where Hunting and Fiſhing are allow'd to every body, or in them that belong to no body, as the vaſt Ocean. So that ſo many Acres of Ground as a Man can Till and Sow, and whole Fruits he can ſpend for his Mainte, nance, belong properly to him, and he hath a Right to incloſe that ſpace with Hedges, Ditches, Walls, or after any other manner, without any Man's permiſſion. And this is the rather true, becauſe the Creator himſelf, in giving the Earth to Men in.common, hath commanded them to labour, and has put them into ſuch a Natural State, that they are neceffitated not to be idle Buc ir doch not hence foilów, that we may gacher as many Fruits, cake as many Beaſts, or poſſeſs our felves of as many Acres of land, or, in a word, appropriate to ourſelves as many Goods as we pleaſe For the ſame Law of Nacure which hath given every one a particular Right to the things the hath given, by his Labour and Induſtry, ſeparate from the ſtate of Commu. nity wherein they were, the fame Law, I fay, has ſer certain Bounds to our Right. God hath given all things abundantly, 1 Tim. 6.17. Why? to enjoy them. This is the Voice of Reafon confirmd by Revelation. Wherefore the Property of Goods ac- quir'd by Labour malt be regulated by the good Usage which may be made of them for the Neceffity and Convenience of Life. See what our Author days, c. 6.9 3. Following it se paſs the bounds of Moderation, and we take what others have occaſion for, without doube we ſeize on chać which belongs to others; eſpecially, it having got any thing fuperfluous, we leave not ſuf- ficient to relieve their Neceſſities, and ſupply them with things convenient and ſatisfying. We muſt not ſuffer any thing which God hath created for the service of Man, to periſh or become uſeleſs. If we conſider with attention the abundanee of Natural Proviſions which have been a long time in the world, the ſmall number of thoſe who can ufe them, and for whom they are apa pointed, and how htele a Man can appropriate to himſelf with the exclufion of others, eſpecially it he keep himſelf in the juſt pounds preſcribed by Reaton, we muſt be obliged to acknowledge, that the Propriety of Goods to eſtabliſh'd would not produce the Icart Diſputes and Quarrels. We may ſee this diſcourſed at large in the work of Mr. Locky Lib. 2. C. 4. Moreover, Mr. Van der Muelen hath airo confuted our Author in his Comment upon Grotins, I. 2. $ 1. p. 56. (4) Vid. Bucler. ad Grat. in prafat. p. 9. duce are he dreſſes 150 of the Origin of Dominion or Property. Book IV. duce diſtinct Properties, yet this doth not hinder, to others with this reſerve and reſtriction, Unleſs I but that they might derive their Riſe and Original am unable otherwiſe to compaſs my own Preſerva- from Humane Covenant. tion. My Calamity doth not give me a V. Thus much being premis’d, it is manifeft, that things to which I had none before ; but the extremity antecedently to any Actor Agreement of Men, there of my danger makes that Condition ceaſe, under which was a Corimunion of all things in the World ; not I gave up my firſt Right. For the fame Reaſon, it is ſuch as we have before term'd a Poſitive, but a Ne- lawful in War to ſeize the Goods of the Enemy: Be. gative Communion : That is, all things lay free to cauſe all Compacts being diſſolv’d (4), the Original Right any that would uſe them, and did not belong to one returns. He adds, p. 110. That before the ſettling of more than to another. But ſince things could af- Covenants, forf Occupancy did not by its own force con ford no Service to Men, were we not allow'd to lay fer any Right . Becauſe firſt , in whatever Necefitous hands at leaſt on Fruits and Products of them, and Condition. I was plac’d, I could then have no • Right to ſince this would be to no purpoſe if others might recall theſe Goods to my own Uſe; this privilege taking lawfully take from us, what we had before actually place only in Goods which I voluntarily refign’d to my mark’d out for our own Uſe: Hence we apprehend Neighbour : But there are not many perſons to be met the firſt Agreement that Men made about this point, with, who would allow ſuch a Prerogative to things thus to have been, that what any Perſon had ſeiz'd out acquired. of the common ſtore of things, or out of the Fruits Which Reafou might be thus propoſed in clearer of thein, with deſign to apply to his Private Occa- Terms. fions (1), none elſe ſhould rob him of. This (a) may If firft Occupancy of it ſelf conferr'd a Right ex- be illuſtrated by the Caſe of Beaſts, amongſt which clufve of all others, it would follow, that even iň a Caſe none can claim a peculiar Right to any thing above of Neceſty, Goods thus attain’d, could not be made others (2); but each ſatisfies his Appetite with what uſe of by any other perſon than the Poffeſor : Because he firſt meets with in his way: And if any of them the Right of Neceſſity follows from an Exception added hath been ſo provident as to lay up a Stock for fu- to the firft Compact about the diviſion of Goods ; but ture uſe, the reſt are under no Obligation to for- we before ſuppoſed that no ſuch Compaš had paſsà a- bear invading and plundering it: Inaſinuch as no bout things which came into Mens poffefion by theſe Agreement can have paſs’d amongſt thein, which Means. It being then abſurd and unreaſonable , that a might lodge the chief Right to any thing in the Perſon reduc'd to Extremity, ſhould not be allowed to firſt Taker. uſe what another hath by Occupancy made his The Author of the Treatiſe de Principiis jufti & follows, that the Right by virtue of which Occupancy decori (b) hath advanc'd ſomewhat on this Subject, fixetb a Property, is likewiſe owing to Covenant. Tho' which may ferve to ſet it in a fuller Light. He Jup; this Argument is at the beſt but very feeble (5). poſeth beforehand, that Man may lawfully po leſs and He proceeds Secondly to affirm, That there is in afe Creatures void of Reaſon, and thence infers, that Nature no more reaſon why Men flvuld defire a Right fince Men are by Nature Equal, all muſt have an E- from the firft Occupancy of things (6), than from the qual Right to the Creatures (3), there being in reſpect firft diſcovery of them with the Eye. Therefore the of the Creatures themſelves no Rule aſigning one part difference muft ariſe from the Infitution of Men, or- to me, and another to my Neighbour : What remains daining, that the Right to a piece of Land, for in- then, but that the diftin&tion and diviſion of Goods muſt ſtance, ſhould be in him who firſt took poffeffion of it, bei deduc'd from Compact? But foraſmuch as all Hu- not in him who fam it before others . Thirdly, he mane Inſtitutions and Ordinances are made with the ſays, Let us ſuppoſe two Men, one jwift, and one lowe exception of extreme Neceffty, therefore when ſo de pe- of Foot, 'tis evident what an ill match'd Couple we rate a Caſe happens, the Primitive Right to all things have here, as to the Buſineſs of acquiring Property; revives: Becauſe in the Common Agreement for the and by conſequence, that the Right by which he who firji Diviſion of Things , every one is ſuppos’d to have re. Jeizeth the thing, in this Cafe, ſhould be the true Owner nonic'd his Right to thoſe Things which were allotted of it, is not borrum'd from Nature, but from. Implicit OWN ; at anco e Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 5. (1) This Agreement is in no wife neceſſary, as may appear from what has been ſaid in the preceding Note. The Roman Lawyers do not ſuppoſe any even in that Law, to which our Author reters them, and whereas to fhew, chat Property of Goods did begin by taking poffeffion, they ſay, there remains to this day fome footſteps of it in things which yer remain common, which belong to the firſt Occupant. Dominiumque rerum ex natur ali posſeffione cepiffe Nerva filius ait, ejufque rei veſtigium remanere, de bis, que terra, mari, cælo capiuntur, nam bæc protenus eorum fiunt, qui primi posseflionem eorum apprehenderent, Digert . 1. 41. tit. 2. De adquirenda aut admittenda posseſſione, leg. 1. There is alſo a place in the Inſtitutes, which I ſhall quote, c. 9. 99. n. 9. from whence it will appear, that according to the Notion of the Roman Lawyers, Poffeffion is all chat transfers property by virtue of the intention of him who gives any thing to many in common.es (2) See $ 4. Note 1. aforegoing. De doutora agarri bor (3) This is true, bur they have it only for their uſe. All that follows from this Equality of Right is, that no Man oughe to poffefs himſelf of ſuch a great quantity of Goods, that there remain not ſufficient for others . See Nore 4. upon $ 4 aforegoing. (4). This is noc it, but the true Reaſon is the ſtate of War, where two are Enemies the one to ghe other. And indeed ſuppo ſing that they who have had each theit Goods in Property, ſhould come of a ſudden co ſuffer them to be common by an unani- mous Conſene, and without ceaſing to be friends, every one may after this take what is convenient, and none have right to de prive others of what they are pofleffed for their uſe. Thus Velthyſen argues upon the falfe principles of Hobbes. Hou bude no(5) The Right and Privileges of Neceſficy are not ſo bounded as to difpente with fuch Duties, as ſuppoſe an Agreemene in certain Caſes. They alſo make exceptious to ſeveral Natural Laws, which in no wiſe depend upon Humane Agreements. (6) The Reafon of it is very clear, and 'cis chis, That he declares thereby an intention to ſee apart ſuch a thing for his uſe, or to appropriate ic to himſelf, as he may by virtue of his common Right to uſe it, which without that would become uſeleſs to any Man. The meer fight of a thing can't have the ſame effect, becauſe we ſee many things without any deſign of caking them to our felves only. But if at the ſame time we perceive a thing fift, and we diſcover any ways an intention of reſerving it to ourſelves, others may no more pretend to it, than if we were actually ſeized of it. See what is ſaid on c, 6. So chae 'cis not neceffary to ſtay to prove, chat che third and laſt reaſon of Velthuyſen are of po force. (a) To this belongs 1. 41.6. 2. D. de acquir. vel admittenda poff. l. 1. (6) Velthuyſen. p. 100, doc, Covenant CHAP. IV. Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. 151 Covenant or Agreement. He might have ſaid more about a thing ſhould have an equal Right to it with briefly, upon Suppoſition that all Men had original- another, by whoſe Induſtry it was either firſt rais’d, ly an equal power over things, we cannot appre or exactly wrought and fram’d, to render it of far- hend how a bare Corporal Ax (4), ſuch as Seizure is, ther Service. It was highly conducive then to the fhould be able to prejudice the Right and Power Common Peace, that immediately upon the Multi- of others, unleſs their "Conſent be added to confirm plication of Mankind, Properties ſhould be appoint- it: That is, unleſs a Covenant intervene. What ed in moveable Things, eſpecially ſuch as require the fame Author diſputes farther; That (a) in the the Labour and Improvement of Men, and in thoſe Primitive State one Man might have brought the whole Innmoveables which are of immediate and necefla- World under his Subjection, is vain and idle, and is ry Uſe, as Houſes, for Inſtance; ſo that the Sub- confuted by Mr. Hobbes himſelf (b). ſtance of them ſhould belong either ſeparately to VI. To proceed, Men left this Original Negative particular Perſons, or to ſuch a number of Men as Communion, and by Covenant fettled diſtinct Pro- had by peculiar Covenant agreed to hold them in perties, not at the ſame time, and by one ſingle the way of Poſitive Communion. Farther, although A&t, but by ſucceilve Degrees, according as either there appears ſome reaſon in theſe Things, why they the Condition of Things, or the Number and the ſhould rather belong to ſome than to others, yet Genius of Men ſeein'd to require. Thus the Sey- the Dominion or Property of them, ſuch as implies thians of old appropriated only their Cattle, and the the excluſion of all Perſons beſides, was to be con- Furniture of their Houſes; leaving their Land in firm'd at leaſt by tacit Compact (1): And this tacit its Primitive Communion (c). Indeed the Peace Compact involv'd a tacit Cellion of the reſt of Man- and Tranquility of Mankind, for which the Law of kind; intimating, that whatever had been allign'd Nature appears eſpecially concern’d, gave no ob- for any ones Private Share, they would rever chal- fcure Intimation, what would be moſt convenient lenge any Right or Title to, upon pretence of its for Men to appoint in this Affair. For that each receiving its Matter, or its Nouriſhment froin the Man ſhould retain an equal power over all Things, Earth, the Common Habitation of Men. As for or that the Univerſal Proviſion ihould be laid in thoſe Immoveables which Nature produc’d, without Common, ready for the promiſcuous uſe of every the concurrence of Humane Induſtry, that is, Lands, Perſon, was not conſiſtent with the ſafety and quiet of ſince they were ſo widely extended, as abundantly Humane Race ; eſpecially after they were multipli- to ſatisfie the ſmall number of the firſt Men; ed into conſiderable Numbers; and had cultivated much of them was from the beginning taken into and improv'd the Method of Living. Becauſe (d) Poſſeſſion, as Men thought convenient for their pre- there could not but ariſe almoſt Infinite Claſhings, ſent Occaſions; the reſt being left in its Natural and from (e) the deſire of many Perſons to the fame Negative Communion, to be poſſeſs’d by any Per- Thing, which was not able to ſatisfie them all at fon that ſhould afterwards think fit to uſe it. Here once ; it being the Nature of the greateſt part of therefore (2) we muſt conceive a Covenant to have what the World affords , to be incapable of ſerving paſs’d to this Effect; that thoſe Lands which had more than one Man at the ſame time. As for the been aſſign'd to particular Men by the expreſs A- preciſe Order, and the particular Cauſes of Things greement of the reſt, or ſuch as the reſt were ſup- paiſing into Properties, I conceive we may thus pos’d to have reſign'd all their Title to, by permit- come to an apprehenſion of them. Moſt things of ting a ſingle Perſon quietly to enjoy, and by taking immediate uſe to Men, and which are applied to to themſelves other Lands in the ſame manner, the ends of Nouriſhment and Cloathing, are not by ſhould belong to the Manurers and Improvers of bare unaſlifted Nature produc'd every where in to them: And that what remain'd ſhould paſs into great abundance, as to yield a plentiful ſupply to the Property of thoſe who would afterwards fix up- all. As often therefore as two or more ſhould want the ſame thing which could not content them all VII. That the ſettling diſtinct Properties turn’d together ; and ſhould endeavour to ſeize and ſecure to the real Benefit and Advantage of Men, when it for themſelves , ſo often there inuft ariſe a moſt grown more Numerous, may he illuſtrated from the probable occaſion of Quarrels and Hoſtilities. A- fame Arguments which Ariſtotle (f) brings tɔ over- gain, many things ſtand in need of Humane Labour throw the Platonick Communion of Goods. Though and Culture, either for their Production, or to fit indeed his Deſign was to refute a Poſitive Commu- and prepare them for Uſe. But here, it was very nion; whereas our Enquiry proceeds about the Rea. inconvenient that a Perſon who had taken no painis fons inclining Men to quit that Communion which fo on it. (7) It is available by virtue of the Intention of the Creator, who has given Men this common Right, that they may make uſe of it. And every one ought to think, that it belongs to him to do no prejudice to the Rights of any other, who in their curn may one way or another plead che privilege of the firſt Occupant. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 6. (1) By what I have ſaid in the foregoing Noces, we may ſee that there is no need of any Renunciation, either Expreſs or Tacit . This may fuffice to rectifie the attentive Reader in underſtanding all that our Author in the following part of this work builds upon that falſe Principle, without which I thould be obliged to enlarge my Notes to no purpoſe every moment to correct it. (2) Our Author doth here by the Bve criticize upon an Expreſſion of the Jewiſh Hiſtorian Joſephus, l. 1. c. 3. where he ſays, That Cain was the firſt that fet bounds to Lands, "opes to zas ngãrGkteto, p. 7. in which he deſerves, ſays our Author, noe to be believed more, than in what he ſays in the fame place, That Cain barbarouſly uſed and infolently treated all thoſe thac dwele with him ; that he gather'd great Wealth by Rapine and Violence , and that he cheriſha Companies of Thieves. For how can ſuch things be attributed to the eldeſt Son of the firft Man and firſt woman, from whence all Mankind are deſcended. See Becler's Differtation, entitled, an Exercitation upon Fl. Joſephus's Antiq. Jud. Lib. 1. c. 2 printed in 1701, and what is ſaid, S 1o. ec, about the primitive Community of Goods. (a) Ibid. & 103. 166. (b) De Cive, c. 1. f. 11. (s) Juſtin. I. 2, c. 2. (d) Vid. Digeft. 1. 8. cic. 2. De ſervitut. předior. (e) Vid. Hibbes de Cive, c. 1, 1.6. (f) Polit: l. 2. c. 5. p. 316. Ed. Pariſ. terbanor. leg. 26. AU we 152 Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. Book IV. we have already ſhewn to the Negative (a) (1). If diſcover the Falſity of that Vulgar Saying (6), Meun ſays he, Men labour'd in common, and laid up all they and Tuum are the cauſe of all the Wars and Quarrels got in one Heap, out of which they were freely to take in the World. For on the contrary the Diſtinction for their Support, 'tis impoffible but that Heats and of Meum and Tuum was rather introduc'd to pre- Quarrels flould ariſe from the Inequality which muſt vent all Contention. Hence Plato, LL. 1. 8. p. 214 be obſerv'd between Some Men's Getting and Spend- Ed. Wech. calls the Meer-flone (7), the Boundary of ing (2). In general (as he well remarks) the living Friendſhip, and Enmity, confirmºd by Oath, and a together, and upon the same Stock and Maintenance, prov'd of by the Gods. Of the Sacredneſs of the is grievous and uneajie. Which is the Reaſon that we Landmark, ſee likewiſe Deut. XIX. 14. Fob XXIV. are never ſo bighly diſpleas’d with other Perſons, as 2. L. 27. t. 21. D. de Termino moto. Collat. leg. Mo- with our Servants and Family Dependants, who are Jaicar um cum Rom. tit. 13. Paul. Sentent. II. 16. V. continually under our Eye. But now upon the intro 22. Frontinus de re agrar. Let every one keep his ducing of Property, all theſe Complaints are filenc'd (3), opn Bounds and not diſturb thoſe of other Men: for every one grows more Induſtrious in improving his pe- therefore was the Mark-ſtone ſet up, litem ut difcer- culiar Portion; and Matter and Occaſion is supplied neret agris, to end the Quarrels of the Field. for the Exerciſe of Liberality and Beneficence towards. But that infinite Field of Holțilities and Strifes, a others. It were better therefore that Goods ſhould be riſeth only from hence (8), That the Avarice of made proper as to the Poſſeſſion (4), and ſhould be Common Men is ever aiming to break through thoſe Bounds only in the Uſe. Again, To confder a thing as our of Meum and Tuum, which have been by Law or own, raiſeth the Plea] ure we take in enjoying it (b). To Covenant eſtabliſh'd' (c). gratifie and aſſiſt a Friend, a Gueſt, or a Companion, VIII. Though what hath been here deliver'l ſeems fills us with ſenſible Satisfaction and Delight; and this plain and evident, yet we think it not impertinent we cannot do, unleſs we have a ſeparate Share of Good to examine more largely the Opinions of ſome An- things to our ſelves. Beſides, since there are few things cient and fome Modern Writers on this Subject . A. which can be made ule of ly all Men at once, when mongſt the former, Diodorus Siculus (d) reports, That many Perſons ſhould happen to let their Mind on the the firſt Earth-born Men led a wild and irregular Same Object, which could not ſuffice them together, Lifs, went out in Herds to ſeek their Food, which they muſt of Neceſſity fall out, were not the deſired Ob- conſiſted of the moſt juicy Herbs, together with ſuch ject already aſign'd to a particular Owner. It muſt be Fruits as the Trees Spontaneouſly produc'd : But not confeſs’d theſe Reaſons did not weigh ſo much with knowing how to bring their Proviſion together, and to Sir Thomas Moor and Campanella, as to hinder them lay up a Store for future wje, many periji'd during the from ſetting up a Communion of Goods, the former Winter, purely through the Inclemency of the Air, in his Utopia; the latter in his Realm of the Sun: and partly through want of Suſtenance; 'till by degres It being much more eaſie to fanſie perfect Men than gaining Inſtruction from Experience, they began to to find them (5). But farther, we may hence too retire into Caves in the Cold Seafon, and to reſerve Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 7. (1) The Greek is, Και δεν ταϊς απολαύσει, και αν τις έρρις μα καινομένων ίσων, αλλ' ανίσων, αναγκαίον έγκλήμαθα γίνεται προς τις απολαύονίας με ή λαμβάνοντας πολλά, όλίγα και πονώντας, τους ελάτίω μεν λαμβάνει, πλείω 5 πονέσιν. (2) The Greek is, “Ολως και το συζω, και κοινονείς των ανθρωπικών πανιων χαλεπον, και μάλιςα των τοιέτων: δηλεσι δ' αι των συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι χεοον δοί πλείςοι διαφερόμενοι εκ ταϊς οντισι, και εκ μικρών προσκρέοντος αλλήλοις. έτη και θεραπόνων το. τοις μάλισα προσκρέομεν, οίς πλείσα προσχρώμα.δε προς τις διακονίας τας εγκυκλίες. (3) So Αriftotle exprefes it, Αι μεν γ επιμέλειαι διηρημεναι, τα εγκλήματα προς αλλήλες εποιήσασι μάλλον δε επιδώσεσιν, ως Teisision excise 70903d gevorles. This is well exprels'd in a Law of the Cockt, Naturale quippe vitium, negligi quod communiter Pidetur ; utque ſe nihil habere, qui non totum habeat, arbitretur : denique ſuam quoque partem corrumpi patiatur dum invidet aliens, Lib. 1o. tit. 34. Quando do quibus quarta pars, doc. leg. 2. in princip. (4) And again, Φανερον τοίνυν όη βέλτιον είναι μεν ιδίας τας κλήσεις, τη δε κλήσει ποιείν ποινας a de xej reg's jcbrary αμύθιον, όσον διαφέρει το νομίζουν ιδίονπ--- αλλα μην και το χαρίσασθαι, και βοηθήσαι φίλοις, και ξένοις, ή ετέροις ήδισον» ό γί- velce no xuoews idias žons. 'Epicurus (to uſe Mr. Bayle's words in Hift. Diction.) would not imitate Pythagoras, who caught, that among Friends Goods ought to be common. (Diog. Laert. 1. 10. $ 11.) He found it out, that ſuch an Etabliſhment betray'd Diffidence; he lik'd better that things ſhould remain on the ſame foor, that every one mighe voluntarily contribute to the Wants of others when there was a neceſſity. He atlures himſelf, that this Notion comes nearer Perfection, than to maintain a Commu- nicy of Goods, and we can't ſufficiently admire the Union of Epicurus's Followers, and the Goodneſs by which they aſſiſted one another, while every one remaind Maſter of his own Eſtate. See Cicero de finib. bonorum do malorum, l. 1.C.20. (5) An univerſal Community of Goods, which might have place among Men perfectly juſt and free from all irregular Paf. fions, can’e but be unjuſt, chimerical, and full of Inconveniencies among Men ſo diſpos'd as we are. For che Agreement which isobí ervable ſometimes among the Members of cercain particular Communicies, can't be drawn into a conſequence for an univere fal Society of all Nations, and people ; nay, noe ſo much as of a Village, or ſome other place, which contains ſeveral Families of different Conditions, and made up of a number of unequal perſons. See Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order, Part 2. iu the Preface, $ 2, and the Diſcourſe of Ulric Obrecht, De Communione, which is the firſt of the Collection publiſh'd in 1704. Strasburg. To this we may add what Mr. Bruyere (in Charalt. penuit. du dern chap.) ſays, Thac if Men a bound with Goods, and no body in this caſe live by his Labour we ſhall want Neceflaries and Conveniencies. If there be no Wancs, chere will be no Arts, Sciences, Invention, nor Mechanick Trades. Farther, an equality of Poſſeſſions and Riches would fecele the like in Conditions, baniſh all Subordination, reduce Nen to a ſtate of ferving themſelves and nor helping one another, render Laws frivolous and uſeleſs, introduce an univerſal Anarchy, and bring in Violence, Injuries, Maſlacres and Impunity. The reſt of the Character is pleaſant to read, but too long to be inferred whoie in this place. See alſo Quintil. Declam. 261. (6) Quiet a vita iis qui tollunt, Meum, Tuum. Publ. Syr. Sentent. v, 620. (1) Prato’s Words are, Euregon aidov óei Sovta qinidy, rý ex@egy, (8) Lyfias's Words are, Διαφέρεται σε προς αλλήλες εκ των τοιύτων μάλις', αν οι μεν των αλλοτρίων επιθυμώσιν, οι δε εν των όνον εκπιπλασι. (a) To which add Ariſtophan. Concionatr. p 716. (6) Juvenal Sar. 3. Eft aliquid quocunque lcco, quocunque receļu, 'Tis ſomewhat to be Lord of ſome ſmall Ground, Vnius leſe Dominum feciſſe lacerte. In which a Lizard may at leaſt curn round. (c) Lyſias Orat. 17. De Nicie bonis publicatis, chap. 4. The main Cauſes of Dilentions among Subjects are, that some cover other Mtenis Poleſions, whilſt ſome again, are robb’d of their own, (d) Lib. i. ac Mr. Dryden. a ſufficient Chap. IV. Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. 153 was “ Fas erat ; in medium quærebant, a ſuficient Stock of ſuch Fruits as were fit for keep Nor had they yet begun [Scene ing : Some new Advantage or Improvement being eve To fence their Towns with Walls, but Nature's my day added to Life (a). This Hypotheſis concern Lay a free Road: The Univerſal Store ing the Origin of Mankind, though falſe, being Supply'd Mankind; at large they liv'd and fed. taken for granted granted, it follows, that Men in The willing Earth her fruitful Boſom ſhook, the beginning liv'd upon the Supplies of Nature, Rich with diffuſive Plenty- te in common; afterwards ſettling by Covenant the pit CW VE TO Visit to you DOBRA Property of Houſes, and of Fruits treaſur'd up for Again in his Hippolytus, Act. 2. V.525, &c. furure Service, till by ſlow Advances the Appropriate of ation of Land was introduc'd. To the ſame pur- OS Prima quos mixtos deis ohtrigin of poſe is frequently alledg’d what Juſtin (b) relates of Profudit atas, nullus his auri fuit Saturn (1), King of the Aborigines, who, he tells Cæcus cupido; nullus in campo facer 0912 remarkable for exact Juſtice, As that no Diviſit agros arbiter populis lapis , iss. Los Perſon under his Reign, liv'd in a Condition of Slate- ve siqmora ohir STORE ry, or held any private Poſeſfon; but all things, like The firſt good Race of Men, , an one univerſal Patrimony, lay undivided, and in com- Companions of the Gods and mixt with Heaven, mon to all. The Authorities of the Poets are like. Not blindly led by Avarice and Gold, obro wiſe produc'd in great Numbers, where they de- Forebore to fix the Conſecrated Stones fcribe the happy ſtate of their Golden Age. Virgil . To bound the Fields, and judge between the Swains, Georg. 1. 125, . BOOK Thus 'tis one of the Alterations which Ovid, Met. be Ante Jovem nulli ſubigebant arva coloni; 1. V. 135, &c. deſcribes in the Iron Age, Nec ſignare quidem, aut partiri limite campum MU 0 Fas erat : in medium quærebant; ipfaque tellus Communemq; prius, ſeu lumina ſolis & auras, - Omnia liberius, nullo pofcente, ferebat (c). Cautus humum longo fignavit limite me for (d). Before Fove's Reign none vext the peaceful Ground, Then firſt the wary Swain inclos’d his own ; Which only Turfs and Greens for Altars found. All cominon was before, as Air or Sun. No Fences, parted Fields, nor Marks, nor Bounds, Diſtinguiſh'd Acres of litigious Grounds: Theſe (2), and the like Poetical Relations, La- But all was Common, and the Fruitful Earth &antius (e) interprets in the following manner : Was free to give her unexpected Birth. A Mr. Dryden. 6 Nec fignare quidem aut partiri limite campum Tibull . Eleg. 3. B. 1. 41, &c. Illo non validus ſubiit juga tempore taurus, That is, God Almighty gave the World in common to Non domito frenos ore momordit equus. Men, that they ſhould live freely together, not that fu- Non domus ulla fores habuit ; non fixus in agris rious Avarice ſhould claim the whole Store to it ſelf, Qui regeret certis finibus arva lapis. or that any one ſhould want what was produc'd for the ſake of all. This Saying of the Poet we ought not No ſturdy Ox did to the Yoke fubinit, to take ſo ftri&tly, as to imagine that in thoſe Times No broken Courler champ'd the galling Bit there was no private Pofeffion; but in a Figurative No Door the fearleſs Cottager conceald, Senſe, ſo uſual in thoſe Compoſitions ; giving us to un- And the wide Earth was but a common Field.derſtand, that men were ſo generous and liberal, as 756 path กรย not to ſhut up to themſelves the Fruits of the Earth, or Senec. O&av. V.402, &c. Act, 2. lie hovering over a conceald and ſeparate Store ; but that they admitted their poorer Neighbours to the Cingere aſſuerant ſuas common Enjoyment of what they had gotten by their Muris nec urbes, perviuin cunétis iter. own Pains. But indeed as no ſenſible Perſon will Communis uſus omnium rerum fuit: let the Poet perſwade him, that theſe primitive Et ipſa tellus læta fæcundos finus Mortals had omnia in medium quæfita, or a poſitive Communion of Goods; fo the Reaſon which Lactan- tius afſigns to thoſe Expreſlions, doth not in our Pandebat ultro. syilad. 90 979010 Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 8. (9) Juſtin's Words are, Italie cultores primi Aborigines fuere, quorum rex Saturnus tante juftitia fuiffe traditur, ut neque ferviens fub illo quiſquam, neque quicquam private rei habuerit, sed omnia communia do indiviſa omnibus fuerint , veluti unum cunctis patrimonium effet. 10 (2) La&antius's Words are, Quippe cum Deus communem omnibus terram dediffet, ut communem degerent vitam, non ut rabida, 6 furens avaritia fibi omnia vindicaret, nec ulli deeffet, quod omnibus nafceretur. Quód Poete di&um (viz. Virgili in bis verſibus, nec telligamus tam liberales fuiffe homines, ut natas fibi fruges non includerent, nec ſoli abfconditis incubarent, Jed pauperes ad communio . nem proprii laboris admitterent. en sports aan (a) Plin. N. H.1. 23. Procem. de Arborib. Pomona urgetħ this in her own Honour and Defence, “ That the firft Food of Men was owing to Trees; and that this taught them to look upright towards Heaven : Nay, that they might ſtill find a Suſtenance from the lame Scores, without Corn and ocher Products of the Earth. (6) Lib.43. c. I. (6) See this place illuſtrated by (d) Macrob. Saturn, 1. C. 8. “ The Romans appointed the Temple of Saturn to be their Treaſury, for " diſtinct Poflellions or private Eſtates, as this reaſon, becauſe during the time of his Reign in Italy no Robbery was committed : Or, becauſe under him there were no Nec ſignare quidem aut partiri limite campum Conherefore it was thought convenient to lodge the common Treature under his Protection, in whoſe Reiga all things had been (e) liftit, lo s.c.s. U Judgment Seneca, Epift. 90. 107 common to all Men, 154 Book IV. Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. would be to Plenty, and Luxur inclinable they of Juſtice to diſtinguiſh between Things Common and have been, were not a whir bercer than thoſe of the following Ages. See his Notes upon Hefiod's Theogonia, v. 211, and what (6) Tully's Words are, Deinde juftitia munus eft, ut communibus ut atur quis pro communibus privatis ut suis. Sunt awk padliones Judgment appear Satisfactory: For as on the one lide, Men were not then perhaps greatly enclin'd Contentique cibis uallo cogente creatis, to Covetouſneſs, being yet ignorant of Wealth, and Arbuteos fætus, montanaque fraga legebant, on finding an eaſie Supply of Food from Nature's Carnaque & duris hærentia mora rubetis, Store, whilſt they remain a Strangers to Delicacies Et qua deciderant patulå Jovis arbore glandes (c). and Éxceſs; ſo, on the other side, we do not ſee what matter they could have for Bounty, when there Content with Food which Nature freely bred, i was no Occaſion to fcrape up Treafure. Tis a good On Wildings and on On Wildings and on Strawberries they fed co14 i Cornels and Bramble-berries gave the reſt on to a right Underſtanding of the whole Fable of the - And falling Acorns furniſh'd out a Feaft. Golden Age ; that the Diſpoſitions of Ruſtick and to atrisi tillas teclu bigbails vitri Mr. Dryden. barbarous People make themalinoft Natural Friends at a to Eaſe and Lazineſs, and Enemies to Labour. That There's a Famous place produc'd on this Head from the more rude and ſimple way of Life any Per- Tully's Firſt Book af Offices , C. 7- (0) Tis the part are , , and them accordingly. Now nothing and Splendor which cominoply require much In- is private by Nature, but as it becomes ſo, either by duſtry and Pains (a). And that laſtly, tis the ge- Ancient. Pofleffion, as rappropriated by the firſt Occu- neral Vice of Old Perſons, to commend the Times pant, or by Conquest, upon the Right of Arms; or elſe of their young and flouriſhing Dayș, to deſpiſe, for by Law, agreement, Condition, or Lot. Hence.com the moſt part, preſent things, and what they ſee the Names of the Arpinate and the Tuſculan Lands . before them z extolling whatever comes mark'd with And in like manner are Private Polleffions fettled and the Advantages of Age, And that therefore it ſeems deſcribd. Since therefore the Things which Nature very probable, thoſe rude and ignorant Men, when made.common, have by this means been turn d into the Legiſlators compell’d them to a Life of Manners Property, let every Man quietly enjoy his Lot : Who- and of Induſtry (3), might be very uneaſie under the ever covets more than this, ſhall be deem'd to have vio- Change, and frequently ſend out a Wiſh for their lated the Law of Humane Society. Acorns and their Idleneſs. From which Complaints of their Old Sires, Poſterity might frame their Horace is ſometimes brought in, giving his Judg- Dreams about the Golden Age. This Conjecture ment amongſt the reſt. is ſtrengthen’d by the Character which Saluft. (b) (4) gives of the Aborigines, the People of thoſe primitive Nam propria telluris berum natura neque illum, Times, They were, ſays he, a Clowniſh Race of Men, Nec me, nec quenquam ftatuit : nos expulit ille ; without Laws or Government, tied up to no Or Order or Illum aut nequities, aut vafri inſcitia juris; Rule. And Ovid (5) himſelf placeth the Happi Poftremùm expellet certè vivacior bares. T neſs of the Golden Days chiefly, in this That Men Nunc ager Umbreni ſub nomine, nuper Ofelli oll obey'd Faith and Honeſty without Law, and fear'd Di&tus erat; nulli proprius; ſed cedet in uſum no Punifhment; becauſe no Civil Societies were yet Nunc mihi, nunc aliis, L. 2. Sat. 2. v. 129, &c.) eſtabliſh'd. (3) Mr. Le Clerc has throughly proved, that the Men chat lived in the Times, when the Golden and Silver Ages were ſaid to he has extracted out of it himſelf in an Article added to his Memoirs, De Trevouw in March and April 1701. Tom. 1. 7 (4) Saluſt's Words are, Cumque his [Trojanis) Aborigines, genus hominum agrefte, fine legibus, fine imperio, liberum atq; ſolutum. (5) This Poet makes the Felicity of the Golden Age partly to conſiſt in this, That they had neither Laws nor Puniſhments , but every one was free, in theſe Lines . Aurea prima ſata eſt atas, que, vindice nullo, Sponte fua fine lege fidem redtumque colebant. Pena metuſque aberant. becauſe nulla natura, ſed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, aut vi&toria, ut qui bello pofiti ſunt, aut conditione, forte. Ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas Arpinatum dicatur, Tuſculanus Tuſculanorum, fimilifq; eft privatarum poffeffionum defcrip- tio. Ex quo, quia ſuum cujufq; fit, eorum quæ fuerant natura communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quiſque teneat, ex quo fi quis fibi appe- tet, viol abit jus humanæ focietatis. But Mr. De Bynkerſhock in his Treatiſe, De Dominio Maris, printed in 1703. Chap. 1. believes, That about the middle of this Paffage there is a Corruption, which he thus amends, aut lege, PACTIONE, CONDITIONE, ex quo fit ut ager FORTE Arpinas Arpinatum dicatur. Upon this ſuppoſition, the Tranſlation muft be, Or Laws and Compa&ts, whence ic is that the Country of Arpinas, for example, belongs to that City, be. The reafon why this Author changes forte into forte, and puts it in another place, is, becauſe the parting of Goods made by Lot always ſuppoſes an Agreement publick or private. He mighe likewiſe have faid, That Cicere, who often uſes words ſynonymous, and is not very exaci in his Divifions, would, afe ter he had ſpoken of Covenants in general, add ſome particular kind, as he knew is very common in the beſt Latin Authors. But then ſtill there will a doubt remain, whether in Ciceros Days the word FORTE was uſed in the ſenſe, for example, as the Roman Lawyers uſe it now. Nor is the Law which Mr. Bynkerbock quotes here very ſuitable in my opinion ca eſtabliſh that ſense, for there "cis nifi forte , an expreffion very common, in which the laſt word is not likely to ſignifie, verbi gratia, Digeft. I. 7. cic . T. De ufu fru&tu, &c. leg. 9.97 (a) Add Montaign's Effays, l. 1. c. 30. (b) Catilinar. Bell. ab init. Add the Character given of the ſame People by Dion . Halicarn. l. 1. p. 8, boc, Edit. Lipf. (e) mer. 1.1V. 103, Ge As for what follows about the perperual Spring, the ſpontane ous production of the choiceſt Fruits, and the Rivers overflowing with Milk and Nectar, 'tis no truer than that extravagant Rant of Pberecrates, Πόταμοι μεν αθαρης, και μέλανα ζυμε πλέον, *** The Rivers run with Oatmeal and Black Broach, Ο Δια των πνοπων τον θηλυγέντες ερρέον of Murmuring, when new-bak'd Biskecs ſtopp'd their ſpeed. Αυταίο μυείλεσι, και ναφών ερυφή, Links and Hot Sauſages in Fiſh-pools ſtood, Φύσκαι δε και ζέοντες , αλλάντων τόμοι παρα να ήταν η And fitted Oyfters skimm'd the wealthy Stream. Τους ποταμοίς σίζοντες εκεχυνθ' άνθ' υτράκων, - Fowls nicely dreſs’d, ſerv'd up themſelves, and flew "Όται κιχλάι και ανας μας πρυμέναι περί το στόμα About Mens Mouths, ſtill courting them to feaft. 'Επετίνη' αντις ολέσαι καταπιάν. See Atheneus, 1. 6. c. 19. and Pollux's Onomaſticon, 1. 6.$ 58. . autem privata megille មុនគេ។ Nature CHAP. IV. Of the Origin of Dóminiòn or Property. 155 51 Nature, nor him, nor me, nor any made (b) in which we ſhall paſs over what he delivers The Proper Maſter of the Stage we tread. contrary to the receiv'd Doctrine of the Church, as He turns out me; and him fome Vile Deceit, ſuſficiently refuted by other Hands. He tells us then, Ora Dull Head at Law ſhall ſend to ſhare my Fate. That God confer'd on Mankind a Right in General to At leaſt he one day, muft, with all his care, things of this inferior Nature, both immediately upon Yield to the ſtronger Vitals of his Heir. Creation of the World, and again upon the repairing Ofellus lately gave the Farın its Name, of it after the Flood. This we allow in the follow- And now Umbrenus : None of Right may claim ing Senfe, that God impower’d Mankind to uſe The Property; the Uſe is paſſing ſtill; theſe Earthly Things, in a General Manner ; that And all are Fortune's Tenants at her Will. is,without determining whether they ought to poſſeſs, either under Diviſion, or in Common, all, or only Tanquam ſome things; but leaving this whole Matter to the Sit proprium cuiquam, pun&o quod mobilis hora Judgment and the Choice of Men, to ſettle it ac- Nunc prece, nunc pretio, nunc forte Supreme cording as they ſhould think moſt convenient for Permutet dominos, & cedat in altera jura. the publick Peace and Welfare. But we ought by Sic quia perpetuus nulli datur ziſus, & heres no means to ſuppoſe, that any poſitive Communi- Haredem alterius, velut unda ſupervenit undam, on was at the beginning inſtituted by Divine Ap- Quid vici profunt aut horrex ? L. 2. Ep. 2. v. 171, pointment; from which Men afterwards departed (&c. by their own Decree; for, on the contrary, with regard to Almighty God, things were rather laid, As if the Treacherous World had ever ſhown as a Free-Stock, to be us'd in any Service that Men A thing we might preſume to call our own! ſhould apply them to. Amongſt whom, ſo long Since in one flecting point of Time, convey'd as the very Subſtances of things were not aſſignd By Grant or Sale, to Force or Fate betray’d, to particular Perſons, we muſt conceive this Tacit New Lords it may enrich, new Titles wear : Compact to have prevailed, That every Man ſhould And thus, ſince none are fix’d, but Heir to Heir take for his Occafions whatever he pleas’d, eſpeci- Succeeds, as Wave to Wave; in vain we learn ally of the Fruits, and ſhould conſume what was in its To lengthen out a Street, or croud a uſeleſs Barn. Nature conſumable. And ſuch a Univerſal uſe of things ſupplied, in ſome fort, the room of Proper- We have an Epigram of Lucian in the Athologia, ty; and what any Perſon had thus taken for him- Tom. 2. p. 838. inuch to the fame purpofe : 'Tis a felf, none could deprive him of, without Injuſtice. Farm that ſpeaks (9). Now as the Simile borrow'd from the Theatre, which Grotius produceth, fitly enough illuſtrates this Mat- Once Achemerides I ſerv’d, and now ter (c) (1), ſo his other Inſtance of the Aborigines Menippus, and to thouſands more ſhall go : is not applicable, as Fuftin deſcribes them (d). For Each vain Poffeffor cheats himſelf a while, the Hiſtorian's Words repreſent ſome poſitive Coin- But Fortune is the Miſtreſs of the Soil. munion, quite different from the Primitive; as if that whole Country was indeed the poſſeſſion of the The ſame Author hath told us as much in Proſe. People, but not yet divided into private Eſtates ; Nature (10), ſaith he, hath made us Lords and Pro- whilſt Men reſted fatisfied with the Fruits produ- prietors of nothing; but obtaining by Law and Succef- ced without their Aſliſtance, ſuch as the vaſt extent fron the uſe of things, for an uncertain Period, we paſs of the Lands and Woods afforded them in great a- for the dirgo xpóvode do rótas, the Temporary Maſters or bundance, their Number being as yet inconſidera- Poffeſors of them ; and when the appointed Term is ő- ble: But that they gathered theſe Fruits into a Com- ver, then another receives them from our Hands, and mon Store doth not ſeein probable. Thus far Gro- enjoys the ſame Name and Title . But indeed theſe tius (e) is in the right, that were the firſt Negative kind of Speeches refer rather to the Inſtability of Communion to continue, without diſturbing the ge- Fortune and of Humane Poſſeſſions, than to the Ori- neral Peace, Men muſt' live with great plainneſs ginal of Property (a). and fimplicity, contented to feed on what they IX. We proceed to examine Grotius's Opinion; found, to dwell in Caves, and either to go Naked, S 9. (9) The Greek is this, 'Αγρός Αχαιμενίδε γινόμω ποτέ, νύν δε Μενίππε Και πάλιν δξ ετέρα βήσομαι ας έτερον. Και δέκανα έχαν με ποτ' ώει, και πίλιν έτG- Οίηται, είμαι και όλως. έδενα αλλα τύχης. (19) In Nigrino, natura quidem nullius rei Domini ſumus, lege autem, & per füccefionem ulum earum in tempus incertum adquiren- tes, onszexesvior storitet, temporarii poffeffores habemus ac poftea quam terminus ille conſtitutus præterierit, tunc rursus alius eadem accipiens nomine illo fruitur. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on (9) The Compariſon is taken out of Cicero de finib. bonorum de malorum, 1. 3. c. 20. Sed quemadmodum theatrum, quum commune fit, vede tamen dici potest , ejus eje eum locum, quem quifque occuparit , fic in urbe mundove communi non adverſatur jus, quo minus Author alſo refers us to a paffage in Arrian's Diſcourſe on Epigletus, where we find the fame Thought, upon the occaſion of that Philoſophers Saying, That all Women by Nature are common, till the Laws aſſigned to every Man his own, "Ay,, to gredi legn εκ έσι κοινόν των πολιτών και ότι ένα καθίσωσιν, όλων, αν σου φανή, έκβαλε ένα αντώνέτω και γυναίκες φύσει κoιναι όταν δε όνο- the end. This Example might prove to our Author, that there is no need of any Agreement to acquire a particular Right in thac have a Right as well as he to take the firſt vacant place. But of this I have ſpoken enough in the Notes before going. () As Tully, for the ſame reaſon, affirms, prediorum nullam eſse gentem, That Eſtates are not enſured to Families and Kindred (6) Lib. 2. c. 2. f. 2. (c) Vid. Arrian. Epi&tet. I. 2. C. 4. (d) Lib. 43. C. 1. (e) Lib. 2. C.2. in pro Balb. c. 25. in fin. 1. 1. 2. 4. + U 2 OT at: Maſs. And where- for the getting of the Fruit, or afterwards in the Con- vanced : Man receiv'd indeed, by the Divine Do- an ed to keep for his ownload 156 Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. Book IV. or to cover their Bodies with the Barks of Trees, import either that which being undivided, and hav- and the Skins of Beaſts : Whereas, if they grew more ing its Property fix'd in many together , affords a inclined to a Life of Elegance and Refinenient, the Cominon Service to each Perſon; or that which be Conveniencies of which muſt be acquira by Dili- ing in no inanner appropriated, lies free for the gence, there was a neceffity of introducing diftinct promifuous Uſe of all. But then they exclude Properties . But when he adds, That this Communi- from the Primitive State of Things, not only the on might have lafted, had Men lid under the In- former Communion; ( which is 110 more than we fluence of an Eminent Charity and Friendſhip to- have done,) but likewiſe the latter, and ſo deny wards each other; He confounds Negative Commu- that things were in the beginning expoſed as a ge- nion with Poſitive; ſuch as was obſerved by the neral Store, void of Property in every kind ; and Effenes of old, (a) by the Primitive Chriſtians in- therefore (which is the confequence of this) that habiting Jeruſalem, and by thoſe who now follow Properties ſprung originally from Diviſion, and an Afcetick Life (1): For this can neither be con- from firſt Pofleflion. The Reaſon they lay down is ſtituted nor kept up, except amongſt a few Perfons, to this purpoſe; Whatever Right that was, which ei- and thoſe endued with ſingular Modeſty and Good- ther in Kind or Degree the firſt Man enjoy'd over o- neſs . When Men are ſcattered into different pla- ther Creatures, he receiv'd it all in that very manner ces, and fixed at a diſtance from each other, 'twould from his Creator. If therefore be receiv'd a bare be a fooliſh Labour to gather all the Proviſion into Power of uſing, without any Jettled Property, bis De- one Heap, and to diſtribute it out of the Common Scendants could not afterwards ufurp a Property, with- of People, many muft of neceſſity be found, who fire, and of arrogating that to themſelves, wbich their through Injuſtice and Avarice, will refuſe to main. Maker had forbidden there to aſſume. The Anſwer tain a due Equality, either in the Labour required to this is cafie, from what hath been formerly ad- ſumption of them. Plato inſinuates as much as this(c), nation, a Right to things, but ſuch a Right as was when he makes only Deities, and the Sons of Deities Indefmite, General, and Indifferent, neither re- Meinbers of the Republick where he would have this ſtrain’d to Property,. nor to Coinniunion ; and fuck Communion abſolutely obtain. But 'tis idle to be as Men might reduce, as it were, into any parti- lieve, that when Men were divided into numerous Fa- cular Form, according as Reaſon or Neceflity ſhould milies, they neither actually eſtablish’d, or had any adviſe. Whence it is alſo clear, that the Primitive deſign to eſtabliſh ſuch a Communion (d). Laſtlý, Communion did not denote a bare Ufus fru&tus, but It's a true Remark of Grotius, (e) That things were Men were at their liberty to quit it by Agreement, at firſt turn’d into Property, not by the bare Act of and to eſtabliih either Property or Poſitive Com- ; very poſſible that many his Poſterity could not exerciſe it, under that For- ſhould be Competitors for the ſame thing. There mality. Neither doth that Divine Grant expreſs'd was need therefore of ſome External Act (2), or of in Holy Scripture, deſcribe any determinate man- formal Seifin, which that might be capable of pro- ner of Property, but only an indefinite Right of ducing a Moral Effect, or an Obligation in others applying things to ſuch Úſes as ſhould be agreea- to forbear what each Man had thus taken for his ble to the Wiſduin, and to the Occaſions of Men; peculiar, muft neceſſarily have depended on the which Right may be exercis'd full as well in a Ne- force of fone precedent Covenant : When things gative Communion, as in a Poſitive. Beſides , 'tis which lay together in Common were to be parted not fair thus to conclude; Men receiv'd a Right to amongſt many, then the Buſineſs was tranſacted by things from the Donation of God, therefore Property Expreſs Covenant. But a Tacit Covenant was ſuffi- did not firft ariſe from Occupancy and Diviſion. For cient, when Men fix'd a Property in things which this Donation of God only gave Men full ſecuri- the firſt Dividers had left for waſte (3). For we ty and Satisfaction that 'twas conſiſtent with the muſt fuppoſe them to have agreed, that whatever Divine Will they ſhould conſume on their Neceffi- in the Primary Partition had not been afſigned to a- ties, the Works of their Coinmon Maker. But Pro- ný particular Owner, Ihould belong to him who perty, ftri&ly ſo called, ought to have produca firſt took pofleſſion of it. this Effect, in relation to other Men, that none elſe X. Amongſt the other Moderns, many, as to the ſhould invade what had been adjudg’d to one par- Origin of Property, eſtabliſh a quite contrary Noti- ticular Poſſeſſor. And here certainly there was on. Let us take the pains to ſee what ſtrength need of fone Humane Act and Agreement, that their Arguments afford. They acknowledge then others might know what belong’d to every diftin&t u. (2) An External, I grant, but not always an Adual and Corporal Poffeffion, properly Yo calld, as Mhall appear by what is ſaid c. 6. much leſs an Antecedent Agreement, as I have ſhewed above. (3) This firf Parring or Diviſion of Goods, which our Author ſuppoſes, is a meer Chimera. Mankind never met together to regulare and order, what every one for the future ſhould poffefs as his own, out of thoſe Goods, which were before common. They pofleffed themſelves of them by infenfible degrees, one got one thing, another another ; ſome to day, others to morrow; ore after this manger, another after that. All that can be faid is, that thoſe who invaded a Country all at the ſame time, or fe were inclined to poffefs chemſelves of it, for example, did agree lometimes to part it among them for Peace-ſake, and to cure themſelves a peaceable poſſeſſion of what fell to them. Sometimes alſo ſeveral perſons agreed together, that one go and ſearch one Coaſt and another another, where to provide for and fettle themſelves. (a) of whom amongſt other Authors, ſee Phil. Jud. in his Book infcrib’d, that every Good Man is free. Hifi. Sin. 1. 5. c. 34. (C) LL. l.'s p. 847. Edic. Wech. (d) Add 70. Strauch, differt. de Imper. Maris, a 1. 1. 8. (e) Vbi ſupra, n. 5. ſhould (6) Add Martin appro CHAP. IV. of the Origin of Dominion or Property. 157 , , appropriated before. A Theatre is erected by the fore he is actually poffeffed of it. And without State for the Common Uſe of the Subjects: But that ſuch a Fiction (1), the Dominion would no inore in the time of the Show, this or that Perſon ihould belong to a Man in an Inheritance before actual obtain a particular Seat, of which others ought not Entrance, than it doth in a Donation before Ac- to deprive hiin, is owing to ſome corporal Act , that ceptance. And hence too, amongſt Perſons who live is , to his firſt ſeiziug upon it. Nay, each Perſon, only under the direction of the Law of Nature, may with the conſent of the Publick, acquire a Seat which is for the moſt part unacquainted with theſe which he ſhall hold by a perpetual Right. Thus, Fi&tions introduced by Civil Conſtitutions, there will before any Hunane Aa had paſs’d capable of in- be no admittance given to any Poteftative Poffelaar troducing Property, every thing inuſt be conceiv'd as oppoſed to Actual ; nor will the bare Right and to have lain Free and Common (in a Negative Senſe) Power of acquiring Poffeffion, obtain the Name of to all; that is, not to have appertained to one ra- Poffeffion it ſelf (a). Anita ther than to another. But when Diviſions were eſta XI. Many have thought fit to appeal to the Au- bliſh'd by Expreſs , or Poſſeſſions confirm’d by Ta- thority of Scripture in this point; whence they have çit Covenant, then things paſs out of this Negative ſuppos'd that it may be made evident, that there Communion, into ſettled Properties. never was any ſuch Communion as we have aſſerted, If any will come fo low as to affert, That by the in the World. They tell us, That the Univerſal Maſs Dominion which God conferr’d on Men antecedently of things paſs’d immediately to Adam, by virtue of the to any Acts of theirs, is meant only a Potential Domi- Divine Donation, ſo that he held it as his own proper nion, or a Power of taking and poßefing; and confe- and entire Pofeſion. The force of which Propriety was quently no more than a Dominion, in actu primo; ſuch, that it not only excluded all others from the U- from which they paſs’d on to Poleſion, and from Pof- niverſal Poſeſfon which he enjoy’d, but likewiſe from Jelion to Dominion, in actu fecundo : Theſe Men the Right of taking to themſelves any one particular differ from our Opinion in Words only, not in Senſe. thing : Infomuch that even his Children could claim Yet in this reſpect they are not ſufficiently accu no Property, ſo long as they continued in the Family rate, that call the Power of entring upon things, of their Father, unless be convey'd ſomewhat to them Dominion in acłu primo ; and the Right which fol- in the manner of a peculiun, or ſeparate Stock : lows Poffeffion, Dominion in a&tu ſecundo. For the That they became Proprietors, firſt , by poleſhing that Power of acquiring any Right and the Rightit ſelf now fbare which be aſigned them, when diſmiſi'd from un- habitually inhering, yet without Operation or Exer- der his Tuition, and afterwards, upon his Death, by çile, are different things. As'tis quite another caſe dividing his Store amongſt themſelves (1). They ex to be a Muſician Potentially, and not to uſe the Art, plain their Notion in this manner: The Form of when the Habit of it hath been fully attain'd. Nor God's Grant conferr'd a Right only on the Primitive is their Potential Dominion very aptly illuſtrated Pair, before they had Children. Therefore either the by the Example they bring of Inheritances ; the Property of things was given to Adam and Eve orie Dominion of which, upon the Teftator's Death, paf- ginally, ſo that their Deſcendants were to derive from Seth out of the Habit, or Power, dire&tly and imme- them aŭ their Title to any Pofeſion; or elſe the whole diately upon the Heir, without the Formality of taking World was, in the Perſon of Adam, beftom'd in coma Poleſion. For, beſides that to paſs, out of a Habit, mon on aú Mankind. The latter of theſe as it im- or, out of Power, is by no means the ſaine thing ; plies ſeveral Dificulties, ſo it is particularly repuga there is always a Fiction of Civil Law conceiv'd to nant to the Right of Occupancy, which obtains only interpoſe in the Caſe which they alledge. 'Tis the in things void of a Poffeffor. For if the entire Maſs Rule of Nature, that in the transferring of Domi- was given to all Mankind, it doth not appear, bow a ninn from one to another, it ſhall be requiſite for particular perſon could by ſeizing any thing to himſelf, the former Perſon to tender what is thus convey'd, convert it into his diſtinct Property, excluſive of Hus and for the latter to accept and receive it. But in mane Race in general, or, ſo as to hinder Men from aſnuch as the Laws have conſented, that the Will making any Pretenſions to it by virtue of their com- of the Teſtator ſhall remain uncertain and change- mon Right. For ſuch is the Nature of things which çret till after his Deceaſe; they therefore hold, as Shares, that every fingle Atom of their Subſtance is no twere in ſuffence, the Will of the deceas'd Perſon leſs common, and no leſs undivided, than the whole ; importing the conveyance of Goods on his Heir , 'till ſo that if any private Man apply it to himſelf alone, ſuch time as the Heir ſhall have ſignified his Acr he is an Injurious Robber of the Community . But ceptance ; or, (as ſome may chuſe to expreſs it) they now, they who defend a Primitive Communion, confeſs bring back the Heir's Acceptance to the Moment that the first Occupants of things did by that A& ac- in which the Teſtator expired, his will being then quire ſuch a diſtinêt Right over thoſe things , as exclud- properly fix'd and ſettled, ſo that from that time ed the Right of all others to the ſame. What Reply the Goods are conceivd to paſs immediately to may be made to all this, is evident from the Aller- the Heir , as deliver'd to him. This Fiction pro- tions already confirm'd (1). The Divine Donation duceth fo far the Effect of Dominion in the Heir , conferred on Mana Right of applying other Creatures as that he inay challenge the Inheritance, even be- to his uſe; which Right was indifferent to Poſitive Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 10. () So the Civil Law ſpeaks, Omnis hered.tas, quamvis poſtea adeatur, tamen cum tempore mortis continuatur, Digeft. 1. 50. tit. 18. De divers, Regul. Juris, leg. 138. See c. 9. § 2. following Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 1]. Mr. Hirtius obſerves here, that this permiffion which was given to Adam, and renewed to Noah, does make no mention any thing but living Creatures, as I have already oblerved above $ 4. No:e 3. out of Mr. Lock, of whom it appears from other places , that Mr. Hirtius had ſeen the Treacife of Civil Government in the French Tranſlation which was printed in 1691. (b) Comp. Ziegler. ad Grot. I. 2. 6. 2. f. 2. Communion, of (a) Vid. Strauch. de imp. mar. c. 1, 158 Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. Book IV. Communion, or to Property ; being of neceſſity to Property in thoſe things, which either afford an im. be turn’d into one of theſe before it could take any mediate uſe, not capable of being divided amongft Effect with relation to other Men. And therefore many; as Cloaths, Cottages, and ſtores of Provili- when others add further, That the Common or Pub- on a ready gather'd by particular Men; or which lick Dominion of Mankind over things was given by require Induitry and Improvement to make them fit God, under Condition, that they fhoulå parcel it out, for Service; as Houfhold Goods and Inſtruments, cold confitute it private ; for which reaſon, it neither Cattle, and Fields (2). By degrees, what remain's can, nor ought to be conceiv'd without a reſpect and ten- was brought under the ſame Condition ; according dency towards Private Dominion, ſo to be eſtabliſhed as as either the Inclination, or the number of Men di- was agreeable to a Rational and a Social Nature: This rected and adviſed. Thus the Paſturage continued we may without any inconvenience interpret on our a great while in its Firſt and Common State; till fide. That is, God by his firſt Grant plac'd things upon the abundant Increaſe of Cattle, Quarrels ati- in a Negative Communion : But ſince that was una- ling, the Diviſion of this likewiſe was made ne ble to procure the ſafety and peace of Society, when cellary to Peace and Concord. As for that part of Humane Race was multiplied, and Life began, by the Argument, That the Right of Occupancy cannot the Arts of Induſtry, to be poliſh'd and improv'd, be admitted, where Poljefon belongs to a General Bu. Men eaſily apprehended that 'twas the Divine Plea- ay; this will hold good againſt thoſe who pretend ſure they ſhould introduce diftin& Properties. In any politive Communion to have been the Primi- order to the actual Settlement of which, it was re tive State of Things; in which indeed no private quiſite that ſome Tranſactions and Agreements of Perſon can take any thing to himſelf, excluſive of Men ſhould precede. For that a thing ſhould be the whole Society. But the primitive Condition in appointed by the Will of God, and yet ſhould not which we have plac'd things, is equally diſtant from be introduced but by fome antecedent Compact of politive Communion, and fron Propriety in the Men, ought not to be look'd on as an inconſiſten- itrict ſence of the Word : And we alſert, that be cy: As it is certainly none, that God would have tore Occupancy can produce Doninion, it is necef- Mankind propagated by Marriage, not by uncer- fary, that some Compact, (a Tacit one at leaft ) tain Luſt; and yet Marriage is not actually con- ſhould have been firſt ſettled to that Effect. tracted between particular Perſons without ſome XII. Others form their Scripture Account of the Covenant paſſing before. Farther , ſince poſitive Origin of Dominion in this manner : That God gave Coinmunion and Property both imply a relation to our firſt Parents that Common Dominion which be de- other Men, it can with no manner of accuracy be ſigns for all Men in General, to be held undivided; ſaid, That all created things were proper to Adam; inaj much as the Primitive Pair repreſented the Person but only thus , That he held the Dominion of all of all Humane Race: In which Sense it may ſtill right- things , not Formally , but Permiſively; inaſmuch as ly enough be ſaid, That the Dominion of the World, or there was then no Right of any perſon elſe to in- of the things in the World, as they are capable of paling terfere with his , and to hinder him from converting into Property, belongs to Mankind. But this Common every thing to his own Uſe, had there been occaſi- Dominion doth not exclude Private, ſince we neither on. When God was pleas’d to give him a Dear Part can nor ought to conceive it without a refpe&t and ten- ner and Companion, they agreed to hold this Inde- dency to private Dominion , ſo to be conſtituted as finite Right over things without dividing it; as be- ſhould be agreeable to a Rational and a Social Na- ing united to each other in the ſtricteſt Band of So- ture. But in Adam the latter of theſe Dominions ciety: For which Reaſon, many Nations at this Day met in Conjunction with the former, excluding his Chil- obſerve a Communion of Goods between the Huſ- dren without any previous Celion or Surrendry (a). Now, band and the Wife. Nor was there any need of ſe- as to this Account, we will make no Quarrel about parate Properties, ſo long as Adam's Children being words; that is, we allow the Name of common Do- vet in their Minority, were to be maintained by their minion to what we our ſelves have rather choſe to Father, and made but one Houſe. For though in call a Right of uſing the Creatures, inherent in the uſe of things, they were at that time obliged Men by virtue of the Divine Conceſſion; provid- to conform to their Father's Pleaſure, yet this pro-ed this common Dominion conſider'd by it felf, be ceeded not from his Dominion (ftriétly ſpeaking) ſuppos’d to obtain no Effect between Man and Man. over the Things, but from his Paternal Power and On which Point we have before affirin'd, that Men Authority over the Perfosis. Therefore the Property might have reſted fatify'd with that Right of uſing of things caine then to be diſtinct, when by Con- things as they lay in common; and that 'twas not fent of the Father the Sons fell into ſeparate Families; necellary ſeparate Dominions ſhould immediately which Separation was undoubtedly owing to the E- be introduc'd, ſo long as Men were yet few in num- mulation between Brothers; and to another good ber, and follow'd a limple unimprov'd way of liv. Reaſon, that every one's own Induſtry might be his ing; but when their Race was conſiderabły multi- own Advantage ; as the Idleneſs of others might be plied, and when Induſtry had advanc'd the Conveni- a Puniſhment only to themſelves. Nor muſt we be- encies of Life, then the neceſſary Regard to the Pre- lieve that the whole World was preſently ſhar'd out fervation of Society recommended the Diſtinction amongſt that finall Number of Perſons; or that all of Properties; yet to as that things did not paſs all things were turn’d into Property by one Act, and at once into this Condition, but ſucceſſively, accord- at one time. But it was ſufficient at firſt to fix a (2) It appears from the Sacred Hiſtory, that in Abraham's Time Men went from one place to another with their families, Ser: vants and Flocks, which were their Riches. We alſo ſee that Patriarch followed that Cuſtom in the Land, wherein he was a Stranger. So that at that time great part of that country was common, and when there was not room enough in one place to feed the Flocks of divers perſons, they parted by common Agreement, as Abraham and Lot did. "Tis alſo obſerv'd, chat the moſt ancient Inhabitants of Greece lead ſuch a wandring Life, about which conſult the Hiſtorical Explication of the Fable of Ceres by Mr. Le Clerc in his Bibliothec, Univerſal. Tom. 6. p. 104, 105. (a) Vid. Becler, ad Grot. d. l. ing CHAP. IV. Of the Origin of Dominion or Property . 159 very negligent Aſſertion. "Becanife as every Order and Me private Dominion over all thiugs, before his Sons of the ſame Right, depended on his Game Exerciſe bericht pas mera ing as the occaſional Methods of Peace and Agree- The Right of primitive Communion was ſufficient ment ſeem?d to demand. But that Adam held a for his turn; and as for them, they in had left him, to ſet up Families of their own, is a dance, So that Adam's private Dominion then be- bus gan when he diſmiſſed his Sons froin under his Tui- For Firſt, Private Doninion always takes its Rife tion, and gave them leave to ere&t ſeparate Fami- from fomne Humane Act; therefore, Adam could not lies for themſelves. have ſuch a Dominion over thoſe things, which he XIII. Let us conſider too the Arguments of thoſe was fo far from having taken Pofleſſion of, that they who maintain that this primitive Communion was im did not ſo much as fall under his Knowledge. poſſible (b). They ſay, That ſuch a Communion sièz- That place of the Civil-Law (1), L.3. $ 1.D. de ad- ther could have been, nor ought to have been, in the pollefs ; one part of the Earth, ſhould be fuppos?d to have Order of po selling those things, the Dominion of which taken Poffeffion of the whole world. If any one God had granted to Mankind, agreed in an an especial perlifts in giving the Name of Property to that manner to that ſtate in which the Vertue of abſtaining Right from what anothers, deſeru'd to bear an honoura Grant of their Creator , then we might admit what ble Name. Whence the Decalogue as it eftabliſheth the theſe Authors lay down, That Property was the Cauſe Duty of forbearing the Goods of others, ſo it ſecures of Occupancy and Diviſion; or that it was therefore every one in the Enjoyment of a certain and ſeparate Lawful for Men to challenge things to themſelves Popelion. To this we anfwer, by laying hands upon them, and by parting them Firſt, That we can have no ſuch clear Evidence into ſeparate Shares, becauſe God had given them a what kind of Life (with reſpect to theſe external general Commisſion to apply other Creatures to Things,) Men would have led, had they continued in their own Uſe. But if we take the word Property their firſt ſinleſs Condition; and conſequently whe- in its ſtrict and general Senſe, as it denotes the Ex- ther the Community, or the Propriety, of things cluſion of all others from a particular thing alrea- would have been moſt ſuitable to that State. dy allign’d to one; then 'tis altogether true, that But farther ; We may venture to make it a Ques Diviſion and Occupancy are the Cauſes of Property. ſtion, whether it be not a higher Degree, a greater Farther , Adam's Children, whilſt they yet continu- Perfection of vertue to enjoy quietly a common Pro- ed part of their Father's Family, were bound in- viſion, and to deſire no particular Advantage above deed to obey his Pleaſure in regard to their ufe of the reſt who have the fame Title to it, than to ab- things; yet this, as was before obſerv'd, proceeded ſtain from the diſtinct Portion of others? not from the Force of any private Dominion in Laſtly, Whatever we are to ſay as to the Eter Adam, but from the force of his paternal Power. nity of the Law of Nature, thus much is cer- For whilft they were young and helpleſs, he was ob- tain; That there's no Neceſſity every Object of ligd to maintain them. And when they were ca- that Law ſhould have always exiſted (1), many of pable of doing fome Service, ſtill the ſame pater- them proceeding, in the courſe of time, from the A- nal Authority required both that in uſing the com- greements and Inſtitution of Men : Thus the Law mon Store they ſhould be guided by their Father's againſt Murther had no Object, whilft Adam was Directions, left they ſhould incur any Miſchief by the only perſon in the World, nor the Law againſt Intemperance; and likewiſe that ſuch things as they Adultery, whilſt none of his Sons were arriv'd to had either gather'd from a ſpontaneous growth, or Man's Eftate; nor the Law againſt Theft, before had produc'd by their own Induſtry, they ſhould the diviſion of things; nor the Law againſt bear- deliver into the hands of their Father, to be giving Falſe-witneſs , before the Judicial Proceſſes were ven out as he ſhould think fit: And he, ſo long as introduc’d; nor the Law againſt coveting the Houſe, he enjoy'd this Right, was bound to provide Necef- the Man-ſervant, or Maid-ſervant, of others, whilft faries for his Children, even after they were arriv'd they lodg’d. in Caves, and e'er Servitude was eſta- at Maturity, as time and occaſion ſhould require. bliſh’d; nor laſtly, The Law of honouring Parents, And hence, it any one of his Sons ſhould, for in- before Éve was a Mother (c). They proceed to tell us, ſtance, contrary to his Prohibition have privately That neither was ſuch a Community poſſible in the ſtate of feafted with too much Greedineſs on ſome particu- Men after the Fall: Firſt, Becauſe we can't ſo much lar Fruit, the Youth had been by no means guilty as form any Notion of it in our Mind : For Grotius up to gather Proviſion for the Suſtenance of a young might conſume anything that was conſumable . But ſuch Brother, and the Party thus employ'd had either de an Exerciſe of the General Right Jerri'd then inſtead vour'd it himſelf, or laid it up fecretly for his fu- of Property: for what any one had thus ſeized, none ture ufe, he deſerv'd Correction, not for Theſt, but elſe could take from him without Injury. Therefore for violating the Charge which his Father laid up- this Notion eſtabliſheth a Property in Community , and on him. During this Period therefore, neither A- conſequently implies a Contradi&tion; the only end and ef dan nor his Children had any private Dominion : fect of Property being this, That one perſon ſhould not Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 12. (1) This Law will be quoted, c.9. $ 7. 1. 7. following. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 13. (1) See I. 2. c. 3. a foregoing s 22. 24. and the Author's Preface of his Abridgement of the Duties of a Man and Citizen, s 8, 9. in the French Tranflation printed at Amſterdam in 1707. (a) Vid. 1. 41. tit. 2. D. de acquirend. vel admittend. poffes (h) Vid. Boecler. ubi ſupra. (c) Sce above, I. 2. c. 3. f. 22. rob 160 Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. Book IV. 3 a a 3 what it has con rob and plunder another. But here they vainly pre- ther are we who are utterly baniih'd the primitive tend a difficulty where there is none: For antece- Communion, nor thoſe barbarous Nations which dently to any Humane Act, and to the uſe of any ſtill retain many Foot-ſteps of it, guilty, in this thing in the World, when the bare Caſe is thus, reſpect, of a Breach of the Law of Nature. Thus That each thing belongs no more to one Man than too, what they add hath little Difficulty: After to another, and confequently belongs alike to nei- the Fall, ſay they, Men could not live without Law, Commu- their Service: Since in the latter Caſe, by virtue tu aſign and diſtribute particular Poffeffions. But ſince of a previous Covenant, whatever any Man hath all Laws do not preſuppoſe ſeparate Dominion, why ſeized for his private Uſe, becomes his Property. might not thoſe others be obſerv'd ſo as to altogether abſtain from the a Life of Society under that qualified Communion uſe of things. Hence in this qualified Communion, Though it muſt be confeſs’d, that before the Divifi- as we may call it, the Subſtances of things belong on of Properties, a very few Heads of Law might to none, but their Fruits become matter of Property, have been ſufficient for the Government of Man- when gather’d. This Notion of Community temper' kind. Therefore when Servius in his Obſervations with ſuch a degree of Property, may we think be on Virgil (a), reports it as the Reaſon why Ceres was eaſily apprehended by Perlons of no very Nice or by the Ancients calld Legifera (2), and her Rites Philoſophical Heads. To give a plain Inſtance: Theſmophoria, becauſe ſhe is Jaid to have been the Foun- The Acorns were his that took the Pains of getting dreſs of Laws; inaſmuch as before the Invention of thein, but the Oak had no particular Owner. Thus Corn, Men wandred about without Law or Government much being laid down, the way is the better clear’d which wild Condition was taken off after Corn came in- towards anſwering what they farther object. They to uſe, and after Laws had been inſtituted upon the Di- pretend that ſuch a Cummunion could not poſrbly laſt viſion of Land. This account ought not to be one Moment of time, that it was contrary to the Hu- admitted without ſome Limitation. Indeed a mure mane or Rational Nature, Savage and Unſóciable ; and pompous Train of Laws became needful after Pro- conſequently is capable of affording no other uſe than prieties were fixed, Men being ruledbefore by a ſmall that from it, as a feign’d Hypothefis, may be fivewn the number of Ordinances; yet Communion conſider'd Neceſity of a diftin&t or private Dominion in a Civil by it felf, doth not render Life altogether lawleſs State, and unſociable, but only inore ſimple and unpo- It's true, this Communion conſider’d, preciſely in liſh'd ; and as it were, not well ſetled and compact- it felf, and before any Application and Exerciſe of ed, As for Platonical Community, it hath nothing it, could not ſubſiſt, unleſs Men could have always to do with the Caſe before us; it being profeſſedly walk'd naked, and liv'd without eating. Yet why poſitive, and extended not only to Goods, but to it ſhould not ſubſiſt when thus qualified with a Wives and Children. mixture of Property, there was nothing to hinder; whilſt the number of Men was yet few, and their XIV. We may hence diſcover in what ſenſe we Life plain and unrefined. It is certain however, are to take that Aſſertion laid down by fome Au- that the more Mankind was multiplied, and the thors, That Property and Dominion belongs to the Law more Life was improv’d, the greater Neceſſity there of Nature, ftri&tly ſo called, and which is written in was of appropriating more things than before. Hence the Minds of Men. Where 'tis to be obſerv'd, that thoſe People lead but a rude and barbarous Life, this Exprefſion, ſuch or ſuch a thing belongs to, or who make the neareſt Approach to the Primitive is of, the Law of Nature, hath a different Meaning , Communion; thoſe, ſuppoſe, who live on Herbs, according as it's ſpoke either of any expreſs or im- Roots, Fruits of chance growth, and what they take mediate Command, or elſe of ſome Cuſtom or In- in hunting and in fiſhing, and who claim no other ftitution eſtabliſh'd in Humane Life. In the firſt Eftate and Wealth than a Cave with its wretched ſenſe it imports, that the Law of Nature enjoins Furniture. Farther, when we aſſert that all things the doing, or the not doing of ſuch a Matter : In were, by Nature, negatively Common, we don't the ſecond, That ſound Reaſon adviſeth the Recep- mean that the Law of Nature commands Men per- tion and Settlement of ſuch a thing amongſt Men , petually to preſerve ſuch a State; but that things froin the general Conſideration of a ſocial Life. For if conſider'd antecedently to any act of Men, were as for thoſe Cuſtoms or Regulations which are intro- fo diſpoſed, as that no one Perſon could claim them duc'd for the particular Advantage of ſeparate Com. rather than another. On the other ſide, in affirm- monwealths, ſuch are ſaid to proceed from Civil or ing that Men left this Communion upon the Advice Poſitive Law. When therefore 'tis demanded whe- and Direction of Reaſon, we pretend not that it was ther or no Property owes its Original to the Law of neceſſary all things ſhould be appropriated in the Nature, the latter Senſe of the Word is to be regard- ſame Moment; but according as the Temper or Con- ed, and not the former. That is, inaſmuch as a fo- dition of Men, the Nature of the things themſelves, cial Life is the very Foundation of Natural Law, and the difference of place required, and as was and ſince it is at the ſame time fufficiently evident judg'd moſt convenient for the cutting off all man- from the Temper and Genius of Mankind, that in ner of Quarrel or Diſſention. And therefore, nei- a great Multitude, where all join their Endeavours W 101 (2) Legifere Cereri.] Leges enim ipfa dicitur inveniffe. Nam & facra ipſius Theſmophoria, (.e.) legum latio vocantur. Sed boc ideo fingitur, quia ante inventum frumentum à Cerere, pafim homines fine lege vagabantur, qua feritas interrupta eft, invento ufu frus mentorum, poſtquam ex agrorum diſcretione nata ſunt jura, Servius ad Æneid. 4. v. 58. See alſo, Callimachus's Hymn. in Cerer. v. 19 and Baron Spanbemius's Comment on it, as alſo the Hiſtorical Explication of the Fable of Ceres by Mr. Le Clerc in Tom. 6. of his Bibliothec. Univerſal. p. 106. (a) Æn. 4. 58. towards CHAP. IV. 161 Of the Origin of Dominion or Property. towards improving Life with various Inventions, ferent. For though here likewiſe, to make a thing the Peace and Beauty of Society could not be kept paſs to me from another, 'tis in the common and re- up without diftin&t Dominions of things; fuch. Domi- gular courſe requir'd, that I have an Underſtand- pions were therefore ſettled ; and this very rightly and ing able to judge of what is done (1), and to fhew agreeable to the Aim of Nature's Laws, Humane Af: by Signs proceeding from Real Intention, that I fairs plainly requiring it to be done. And after this am willing to receive ſuch a thing, and to keep it Eftabliſhment, the fame Law commands the Obfer- to my ſelf; yet 'tis the receiv’d Practice of all ci- vance of every thing that may conduce to the End viliz'd Nations, to permit Children in their moſt for which theſe private Dominions were erected: tender Age, and even before their Birth (a), to re- Yet was there no expreſs and determinate Com-ceive and to retain a Property deſcending to them. mand of the Law of Nature, by virtue of which all And this is no more than what Natural Reaſon and things ought to be brought under Property, imme- Equity adviſed; inaſmuch as the things which Meri diately the Origin of Mankind, or in all uſually appropriate, belong to the Uſe and Service places alike; but Property was gradually in- of Life, and are no lefs neceſſary for Infants than troduced, according as it appear’d requiſite to the for grown Perſons ; nay indeed ſomewhat more ne Common Peace. But the Precept of Nature about ceſſary for the former; who by reaſon of their Weak- abſtaining from what is anothers, then firſt began to neſs in Body and Mind, cannot ſo well provide for exert its Force, when at length, Men by mutual their own Occaſions . In Infants therefore a preſu- Agreement had mark'd out, and appointed what med Conſent is judg’d equivalent to a formal Ac- ſhould belong to others, and what each Perfon ſhould ceptance, it being taken for granted, that no one claim as his own. Before this time it lay conceald, will refuſe what conduceth to his Benefit : Yet on (as it were virtually or potentially,) in that general Decent which enjoins us to ftand to our Covenants, feffiomm tenfy that I motaturity of Judgment, the Pof- and not to injure the Right of our Neighbour. Nor is could be conferr'd upon them. The general Cuſtoms it any Abſurdity to affirm, that the Obligation we of Nations in their Favour, might allow them to lie under, not to invade the Goods of others, is hold, but not to uſe any thing by their own Diſpo Coeval with Humane Race? And yet that Diſtin- fal (6). However, left their Right ſhould by this ction of meum and tuum was afterwards ordained. means come to nothing, Humanity farther required, Thus we are often bound to yield Obedience betore that Perſons of Years and Diſcretion ſhould act as we know what will be enjoin'd: As when we have their Repreſentatives, in the Management of their an Obligation in general to follow the Directions Goods, till they are capable of underſtanding it thema of fome certain Perſon in all things that he ſhall felves. This Management is either committed to hereafter require us to perform; or when we may, a certain Perſon by him who transfers the Goods up- ſuppoſe ſeveral particular Commands to be implied on them; or, in Civil States, the Matter is ſettled in ſome general Rule (1). by Direction of the Laws, and of the Magiſtrates XV. "Îis needful in this place to add a word or or, where or, where both theſe Proviſions are wanting, near- two concerning the Subject of Property; on which neſs of Blood, or of Habitation, or the bare Law Head the principal Queſtion is, Whether thoſe are of general Kindneſs , recommends the good Office to capable of being Proprietors, who have not the uſe fit Hands (?). But all Perſons who have engag’d of Reaſon, as Infants and delirous Perſons ? Now themſelves in this Cafe, by what means foever they here it is certain, that neither of theſe can original came to be intruſted with it, are oblig?d to diſcharge ly acquire the Property of any thing, or make it it with the utmoft Fidelity; in regard to that ten- their own by taking immediate Poflellion of it. The der Age, inſufficient for its own Guidance and De- Reaſon is, becauſe in this Method of acquiring Pro- fence. Therefore Hefiod ranks in the ſame Claſs of perty, the Intention of the Acquiſitor is neceſſary, Sinners, him that hath hurt a Stranger, or one that fignifying that he will for the future hold ſuch a fued to him for Protection; him that hath dèfil’d thing as his own; and he ſhould at the ſame time be his Brother's Bed him that hath uſed rigorous Treat- able to underſtand, that ſuch an Act is effectual to- inent toward an Ancient Parent ; wards the creating a Right in him. But this cannot be ſuppoſed in the Perſons of whom we ſpeak. Yet "Ος τε ττυ αφραδίης αλιταίνεται ορφανά τέκνα. ει as to the obtaining the Property of ſuch things as Op. & Dier. 1. 1. v. 330. Edit. Cleric.!?. are deriv'd upon them froin others, the caſe is dif- And him whoſe Fraud the Orphan's Hope beguiles; wer SW 8 AT DW Tranwa Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 14. maila and is the thief (1) See l. 1. c. 6. & 2. aforegoing.com & 2200 wat nonton it. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on § 15. Amp Oechosko sritiw herinnen (1) See l. 1. C. 1. $ 7. aforegoing, and 1. 4. c. 12. following sto. cranit 10.2001 ord van (2) on this occation we may mention the Law of Charondas, (recorded by Diodor. Sit. I. 12, c. 15. p. 81. Edit. Rhodom. which affigns the Goods of Minors to the Care of the Kindred by the Father's ſide, bue their Perſons and the Buſineſs of their Educa- too to the Kindred by the Mother. Judging it probable, thac the latter, to whom the Inheritance could not deſcend, would make no attempt on the Life and Safety of their Wards; and that the former would have no opportunity for any Deſign againſt their perſons ; and yet at the ſame time would be very diligent in managing their Fortunes, becaufe after their Death, whether Natural or Caſual, the Eftare would fall to themſelves. Si So alfo Publius Syruszos Male fecum agit eger medicum qui heredem facit. amati si boiled sa tatua He chat makes an heir of his Phyſician, Dirgenes Laet. (in Solon) gives us a Law of Solon's much to the fame purpoſe ; ordaining, That no Guardian (hould cohabic with a the Mother of his Ward, and that he thould be incapable of the Guardianſhip, to whom the Eftate fell upon che . Minor's De ccaſe. See alſo Menage upon this Paffage of Diog. Laert. 0.07 14, boki ebaolo antes (a) vid. l. 7. 6. 26. D de Statu himinum, 1. 3. D. Si pars hæed. petatur. (6) Gal. 46 te sien on the testirqova sodelosh neskog 210 Supa ziedidlo a sintom ឯង Plato 162 Book IV. Of the Object of Dominion or Property. Propriety Plato (3) in his Books of Laws (lib. 11. p. 972.) 1. 3. 1. 6. where they endeavour to prove, contrary calls Orphans, The greateſt and moſt ſacred Charge: to his Judgment, that Infants have a Where he likewiſe offers many Conſiderations about in their own Goods, not only in reſpect of the firt the Duty of Guardians. Yet that a Man ſhould fu- Act, or Right of Poffefling, but alſo in reſpect of ſtain this Office and Truſt without reward, or with the ſecond Act, or adminiſtration of their Goods Expence, Humanity and Equity do not always re- by themſelves; for ſay they,“ The Guardians have quire. Grotius and his Commentators, viz. Bæcler, only the bare Management of the Right and Ziegler anl Felden may be conſulted farther on this « Goods of another. In all appearance this conteſt Subject, in their Obſervations upon Grotius, B. II. is about words only, (3) His Words are, Ilaegneta.J'xn xeyisn, ry isgometu, where are alſo divers other chings of the Duties of Guardians. See allo Mr. Daumat's Civil Laws in their Natural Order, Part I. l. 2. tit. I, and the Interpreters of the Digeſts, I. 26. tit. 1, &c. By the Civil Law a Guardian who was convicted of unjuſt Dealing was expos’d to Diſgrace, if he was guilty of wilful Knavery, but if it appear'd that his fault proceeded from Negligence only, though groſs, he was not, as Mr. Noodt very well proves in his Probabilia furis, l. 1. C. 13. againſt the common Opinion of the Doctors, who affirm'd, that the Puniſhment was to be inflicted on boch alike. CH A P. V. Of tbe Object of Dominion or Property. What is requir'd to make things our own. ! VI. Reaſons againſt all Property on the Sea. II. Things conſumed in their uſe are in vain made VII. What the uſe of the Sea is. our own. VIII. What parts of the Sea are made a Poffeffion. III. A thing become our own ſhould be capable of IX. The main Ocean can't be in any Mans Domini- keeping IV. The uſe of ſome things made our own is common X. How far Navigation and Commerce on the Sea ons. to all. is free. V. The Divine Grant is not contrary to our Do- minion over the Sea. W E are in the next place to enquire into the ally exerciſed ; 'twould be in vain for you to claim Object of Property, or to examine what things that as your own, which you can by no means hin- are capable of coming ng under that Condition. Now der others from ſharing with you. to give a thing this Capacity, we judge theſe two II. Yet ſome things there are, which though very Qualifications to be neceſſary (1). Firſt, That it beneficial to Mankind, yet by reaſon of their vaft be able to afford fome uſe to Men, mediately or im- Extent, are inexhauſtible, ſo that all may enjoy mediately; by it felf, or by its connexion with ſoine- them together, and yet no Man ſuffer in his parti- what elſe : And Secondly, That it be fome way or cular uſe. To appropriate things of this Nature , other ſo far under the power of Men, as that they would be malicious and inhumane: And on this may faſten on it, and keep it for their Occaſions. account 'tis uſual to attribute an exemption from And farther, ſince Property implies a Right of exclu- Property (1), to the Light and Heat of the Sun (2), ding others from your Poffeffion, which Right would to the Air , to the running Water, and the like (4) be altogether inſignificant, if it could not be effectu- (3). Although ſince Nature by denying Men Wings, Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on Chap. 5. § 1. (1) It is very hard to bring an Example of any thing altogether uſeleſs, as Mr. Thomafius obferves in his Juriſprud. Divin. 1. 2. c. 10.$ 123. It is ſufficient, in my opinion, that we find ſome pleaſure in poffeffing, and ſo all that we enjoy is ia fome meaſure uſeful. I think then, that this Condition ought to be omitted as fuperfluous. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 2. (1) Cujacius in his Obſervations, l. 10. c. 7. brings two Examples, the one of the ſhadow of the Plane-tree, the other of the Air; upon which a Tax was laid. The one is found in Pliny, 1. 12. c. 1. The other is in Cedrenus, who relates it of Michael Pas leologus. See Mr. Selden's Mare Clauſum, c. 21. 10 (2) Nothing hinders nevertheleſs but we may appropriate theſe things to ourſelves in ſome manner, as to ſuch an extent as is contained within our ownLands. Our Author himſelf falls voluntarily upon the subject of running Waters, 1. 3. c. 3.9 4. But we muſt ſay, that by the Laws of Humanity we are oblig'd not to deny any Man the lawful uſe of theſe things, Titius Obſerv. 287. See alſo Mr. Thomafius's Inſtit. Juriſprud. Divin. I. 2. c. 10. S 127. Lobſerve alſo, that our Author follows that Notion in his Elements, Juriſprud. Univerſal. p. 84. See alſo $ 4. following. (3) Petronius's Words are, Quid autem non commune eft, quod natura optimum fecit. Sol omnibus lucet. Luna innumerabilibus comitat a fideribus etiam feras ducit ad pabulum. Quid aquis dici for moſius poteft in publico tamen manant, c. 100. See Ovid Meta- morph. VI. 349. The Roman Lawyers ſay poſitively, that theſe ſort of things are common by Natural Righe. Naturali jure com munia ſunt omnium hæc, aer, aqua profluens, & mare, & per hoc littora maris, inftit. 1. 2. cit. 1. De rerum divif. &c. S 1. They alſo call them publick, in the ſame ſenſe, tho’ they ordinarily make a diftin& kind of them. See Mr. Noodt's probabilia furis, l. 1. (a) Petron. “ Is there any one of the moſt excellene Works of Nature, which ſhe hath nor made common to all the World? « The Sun ſhines with an univerſal Tofluence. The Moon, attended with her numberleſs train of Stars, lights the very «s their food. What is there in Nature more bright and beautiful than the Waters? Yer they flow for publick uſe. Latona thus pleads in Ovid, Metam. l. 6. v. 349. Quid prohibetis aquas ? uſus communis aquarum eft ; What Rudeneſs Water for my Uſe denies, Nec folem proprium natura, nec aera fecit. Whoſe endleſs Score the Common Word ſupplies? Nec tenues undas ; ad publica munera veni. Nor Light nor Air did Heaven create for One, C. 7, 8. beaſts to Nor Gentle Streains : I crave a Publick Boone hath CHAP. V. Of the Object of Dominion or Property. 163 hath made the uſe of the Earth neceſſary to their IV. Laſtly, we farther diſcover, that the uſe of uſing the Light ; hence it comes to paſs that ſome ſome things is confin’d, as it were, within narrow Perlons may be utterly debarr’d from the latter ; Limits, and cannot admit of Shares ; the appropri- as Criminals, as for inſtance, in their Dungeon. In ation of which was highly expedient to the peace like manner, ſince the air is in ſome places more of Mankind. clear and pure than in others, in this reſpect the va Again, There are things, which as they afford lue of a place may be inhanced. As we ſee Men us different Uſes, inay in regard to fome Uſes be who allow pleaſure any ſhare in their choice, very ſpent and exhauſted, and yet in regard to other Uſes highly regard the proſpect of Buildings, or of yield a never-failing abundance. Now, as on the Lands, and eſpecially of the former : For which one fide, there is no reaſon why ſuch things as thoſe reaſon thoſe Services (4) have been introduc'd (a), ſhould not be brought under Property; fo on the o- of not raiſing a Building higher ; of Lights , and of ther ſide, the Law of Kindneſs and Humanity for- not hindring Lights ; of Proſpects , and not of hin- bids us to deny the inexhauſtible Uſe of then to any dring Proſpects. So though on other accounts no perſon that in a friendly and peaceable manner de- one will pretend to fix a Property in the Wind (5), fires it. But if any thing could be found inexhau- yet we may appoint a Service or Duty of not inter- ftible in all its Uſes , 'twould be abſurd not to leave cepting the Wind to the prejudice of our Mills (6). that in its Primitive Comınunity. Indeed in a po- III. We are likewiſe to obſerve, That as the Sub- ſitive Communion, if the Object be ſufficient to ſtances of thoſe things which Men have Dominion ſerve all, when dívided, nothing hinders but that over are compos’d of different kinds of Matter, fo we may divide it; if it would not be thus fufficient, each thing is taken and poſſeſs d in that way which 'tis beſt to poffefs it ſtill without Diviſion : But that the condition of its Nature admits: For the more a thing lying in common to Mankind, and ſuffici- cloſely any thing can be confin’d, and as it were ent for the promiſcuous Uſe of all (1), ſhould be ſhut up, the more eaſily will it produce the effects ſhared out into diſtinct Parts, is certainly repugnant of Property againſt the Claims of others. And con to Reaſon. The Earth is of ſuch a magnitude as to fequently the more capable a thing is of being guard- ferve the Occaſions of all People in all Uſes to ed from unjuft Invaders, the greater Security we pro- which they can apply it, yet it would not thus miſe our ſelves in the Property of it. Yet, as we ſerve them, were it poffeſs’d without Diviſion, by are not immediately to conclude a thing exempt fo vaft Bodies of Inhabitants as it now contains : from Property, becauſe it cannot without fome trou- Becauſe it could never afford them Suſtenance, un- ble be kept from other Hands ; fo in caſe a thing leſs manur'd and improv’d. Therefore there is be in fo wide a manner ſpread and diffus’d, as that plainly this particular Reaſon why the extent of the either 'tis morally impoſſible it ihould fall under Earth ſhould not hinder its being divided; and yet any method of keeping, or that it cannot be kept the ſame reaſon would make the diviſion of the O- without much greater charges than the Fruits and cean appear a ridiculous Abſurdity (-). Advantages of it would countervail, it is not to be V. Indeed all other things have little difficulty ſuppoſed that any Perſon deſires to fix a Property in this point; but as to the Sea, whether or no that which can bring hin nothing but burthen and ex- be capable of Property, hath been diſputed by the pence in defending it (1). Though to render a thing greateſt Genius's of the preſent Age. Ön which con- capable of being appropriated, it is not ſtrictly ne- troverſie 'tis eaſie to remark, that many of the Wri- ceffary that we ſhould incloſe it, or be able to in- ters engaged in it, were more guided by their Affe- cloſe it within artificial Bounds (2), or ſuch as are ction to their Country, than by their regard to different from its own Subſtance; 'tis ſufficient if Truth. Yet by theſe, and by others who have the compaſs and extent of it can be any way deter- ſhewn themſelves more dif-intereſſed and impartial, min’d. And therefore Grotius hath given himſelf the whole Subject hath been ſo fully diſcuſs’d, that a needleſs Trouble, when to prove Rivers capable 'tis hard to ſay any thing that others have not al- of Property he uſeth this Arguinent, (4) That although ready offer’d. We may therefore be allow'd to uſe they are bounded by the Land at neither end, but uni more brevity on the Queſtion before us; the Au- ted to other Rivers, or the Sea, yet 'tis enough that thors (1) who have throughly canvaſs’d it, being the greater part of them, that is, their Sides are in- ſo univerſally read. This then is manifeft, that the cloſed. ſame Divine Grant which firſt gave Man a Right will (4) The Author will treat of this, c. 8. $ 6. following. (5) See 1. 5. c. I. $ 5. following. (6) See Mr. Thomaſius's Diſcourſe, entitled, Non ens aétionis forenſis contra ædificantem ex emulatione, $ 28. Mr. Titius treats in general of the Right of Mills, in his Jus Privatum, Romano-German. I. 18. c. 16. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 6 3. (1) We cannot when we will. The Will alone doth not ſuffice here ; we muſt beſides this be inclinable to get the poffeffion of the thing, and moreover, the thing it ſelf muſt be of ſuch a nature, as to be poffeſs'd in fome manner or other. We ſeize upon a thing, that we may poffefs it ; and nothing is more ridiculous, than to pretend to pofleſs what we can't either hold, nor preſerve in any fort .. (+) The Bounds of a thing made our Property, are the fame with thoſe of Poffeffion. Whatever a Man is ſeiz'd of, it be- longs to him ſo far as he hath poffeffion of it, and how far he is actually poffefſed of it, is eafie to determine. See Mr. Bynker- Shock, De Dominie Maris, c.9. p. 59, 70. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 4. This Reaſon is of force only when a thing is joyned with an impoffibility of poſſeſſing it. For on this account alone, that a thing is in fo great an abundance, that whatever quanţity we take of it, others have enough ſtill remaining, it follows on the other side, that we may appropriate as much as we will, or can poffefs, ſince every one may do the ſame in their turn, and no Man looleth any thing. I am ſurpriz'd that our Author made noc chis Remark. Mr Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 5. (1) The moſt confiderable are Grotius in his Book, entitled, Mare Clauſum, and Selden in his Book, entitled, Mare Liberum. A few Years fince Mr. Bynker ſhock publith'd a Diſcourſe, which I have quoted leveral times betore, in which, tho'cis ſhort, this Matter is treated of, in my judgment, more exactly, and with more Elegancy than it was ever yet. It was prínred in 1703. joyn’d to a Commentary upon the Law of Rhodes, De fa&tu. (a) See hereafter, c. 8. f. 6. (b) Lib. 2. 6, 3. 1.7. (c) Comp. Ziegler ad Grot. I. 2. c. 2. 1. 3. + X 2 of 164 Of the Object of Dominion or Property. Book IV. Uſes, ſufficient for all Men in all parts. Becauſe of aſſuming the Sovereignty of the Earth, includ- Winds and Tide. The River is one thing, and the ed likewiſe the Sea. The Commiſſion as well runs, Stream or Currant another : And in the fame man- have Dominion over the Fiſhes of the Sea, as over ner the Sea is conſider'd diſtinctly froin the Waters the Beaſts of the Land. And we cannot conceive a- which it contains. The vaſt extent of the Sea doth ny Supremacy and Rule over Animals, without a by no means render it impoſſible to be kept, and Right of uſing the Element which they inhabit, ac, therefore doth not altogether hinder it from com- cording as the Nature of it will allow. Indeed ing under Property. For we may abridge others of mention is likewiſe made of the Fowls of the Air, the uſe of the Sea, either by Forts upon the Shore, yet ſince we cannot move and ſupport our ſelves in where it toucheth our Territories in narrow Creeks , that Eleinent alone, therefore we are unable to and Streights; or by Ships of War, which are able exerciſe Dominion over the Air any farther than to perform the fame Service on the Water, as Ca- we can reach while we ſtand upon the Earth. But ſtles and Forts on the Land. Though it cannot be on the Sea we ſtretch our Empire much farther, by denied, but that for one People to keep the whole the means of Ships, now brought to their higheſt Ocean, is morally impoſſible: Nor would it be Perfection ; which are not only ſerviceable in tranf- worth their while to maintain Fleets in all Parts , porting Burthens, but likewiſe carry Mars through for the defence of it againſt all others who ſhould the Kingdoms of Neptune in a far more dreadful deſire to ſhare with them in the Uſe. Now 'tis Array than he is attended with when he rageth by great folly to covet what one can't keep; eſpecial- Land. No one is now ſo ſuperſtitious as to join in ly when by ſuch a purſuit we do not aim at the New the Poet's Scruple. ceflities of Life, but at the Gratification of vain Ambition, and of needleſs Avarice. For though o- Nequicquam Deus abfcidit therwiſe the Defect of Natural Ability doth not Prudens Oceano diſſociabili preſently extinguiſh a Moral Capacity, yet inaſ- Terras, fi tamen impie much as the Latter, by reaſon of the Corruption Non tangenda rates tranfiliunt vada. 1951 of Mankind, is almoſt inſignificant, Prudence ad- viſeth us, to graſp at 110 inore than we can well In vain did Nature's wiſe Command, ſecure our ſelves in the enjoyinent of. Grotius's Divide the Waters from the Land, Limitation on this point feems Superfluous, when If úaring Ships, and Men profane he remarks (a). That Rivers or part of the Sea may Invade th' inviolable Main. L. 1. Od. 3. 21, &c. be appropriated upon ſuppoſition that either the former Mr. Dryden. or the latter are but inconſiderable in refpe&t of the Land; or however, are not ſo large, but that when Nor doth the Sea appear to have any privilege a compared with the Land, they may only ſeem to have bove the Earth, by virtue of which Men ought leſs the proportion of a part to the whole. For let us to apply it to their Occaſions and Uſe. However, conſider a People ſeating themſelves on the ſide of ſince the Donation of God doth not immediately a vaſt River, on a long and narrow Slip of Land; conſtitute fuch Dominion as ſhall take effect againſt here the River will by no means be inconſiderable the Claims of others; therefore it was left to the in compariſon with the Land; and yet we don't choice of Men, whether they would appropriate the imagine that this would hinder it from a capacity Sea likewiſe, as they had done the greateſt part of of Appropriation. Thus there are Kingdoms, which its Primitive State, belonging no more to one Per- Appendages . the Land, or whether they would let it remain in in extent are far exceeded by their Provinces and ſon than to any beſides. The Moral Reaſon which theſe Authors urge to VI. The Queſtion is, therefore, Whether any prove the Sea incapable of becoming Property, is thing particular may be diſcover'd in the Sea, which taken from this Confideration, that the uſe of it is ſhould hinder it from being an Object of Proper- inexhauſtible (3), and therefore fufficient for the ty? This fome have undertaken to affirm, partly promiſcuous Service of all. So that 'twould be vain upon Natural, and partly upon Moral Reaſons. and impertinent to attempt the Diviſion of it into Amongſt the former they have alledg’d the Flui- ſeparate Portions and Shares. Which Argument we dity of the Sea ; that (1), according to the Com- would indeed acknowledge to be the Itrongeſt that inon Nature of all Liquid Bodies, the parts of it can be produced in the preſent Caſe, were it once are held together by no proper Bands; whereas made appear that the Sea, is with reſpect to all its and terminated. To which others make anſwer, That the appropriation of things was introduced on no Fluidity conſider'd in it ſelf is no Bar againſt Pro- other account but to preſerve the peace of Humane perty : And beſides, that the Sea is not without its Society. And ſince one effect of it is this, That he Limits(2), being ſurrounded by the Shore, and that who againſt his will invades and ufurps my Pecu- it is a work of no ſuch great difficulty to confine liar , really doth an Injury to me, which I might the ſeveral parts and tracts of it within ſtricter juſtly revenge in a hoſtile manner; therefore thole Bounds. It Inay be added, that as Rivers are not who ſhould have deſired to turn a thing into Proper the leſs capable of Property, becauſe they paſs away ty, which whilft expos’d to Coinmon Uſe , was not in a perpetual Stream, fo neither is the Sea, on ac- likely to breed any Quarrel amongſt Men, ought to count of its being driven about by the force of the have been look'd upon not as promoters of the Peace fuota 1 1 id Mr. Barbeyrat's NOTES on 6 6. (1) See Mr. Selden's Mare Claufum, c. 21, 22. (3) As for Example, the Rocks which appear above Water, the Banks of Sand, the Capes, which are one over againſt the other, the Ies Scatrered up and down in diverſe places. (3) See $ 4. n. 2. aforegoing and Mr. Bynkerſhock's Treatiſe, c. 9. p. 68. (a) Lib. 2. c. 3. f. 7, 8. 2001 Dior of Chap. V. Of the Object of Dominion or Property. 165 haufted; ployd (0) Luffers vallo foi of Mankind, but as Perſons who brought in new of Veſſels. For which Reaſon it muſt needs be a occaſions of breaking and diſturbing it. But whe- diſadvantage to any People, thus feated, that other ther the Sea be thus inexhauſtible in all its Parts, Nations ſhould have free accefs to their Shore with with reſpect to every Uſe, will be made more evi- Ships of War, without asking their leave, or with- dent, if we examine more diſtinctly the particular out giving ſecurity for their peaceful and inoffen- Services which it affords. ſive Paflage. But we cannot, with any Accuracy (2), VII. The uſe of Bathing and of drawing Water determine in general how large a ſpace of the Sea is indeed inexhauſtible; but then this is of no great ought to be allow'd for ſuch a Defence, in reſpect Conſequence, and extends no farther than to the In- of which it may be for the Safety and Intereſt of habitants of the Shore. The Sea-water is likewiſe the Borderers to claim a diſtinct Dominion over it. ſerviceable for the making of Salt : But this ad- Yet certainly it would argue a very unreaſonable vantage as well as the forner is confin’d to thoſe Fear and Jealouſie, ſhould any Kingdom barely on Farther, as to the con- this account deſire to extend their Sovereignty over venience of Navigation, the Sea is inexhauſti- the Seaſon for ſome hundreds of Leagues together. But then beſides theſe, there are o- luſtrate this: The particular Communities look on it ther Ules, part of which are not altogether inex- as the higheſt Honour to make a valt extent of Defart hauſtible; and part may prove an occaſion of da- round about them, waſting all the Confines of their mage to Maritime Countries, whoſe Intereſt will Neighbours: this they reckon the ſureſt mark of an ex- not admit that the Sea ſhould every where lie pro- traordinary Valour, that the former Borderers have miſcuouſly free to all. Of the former kind is Fiſh- retired, and been driven to a greater diſtance, and ing, as likewiſe the gathering of any thing which that none dare ſeat themſelves in Jo formidable a Neigh- grows in the Water. As for Fiſhing, though it be bourhood. And then befides, they thought themſelves abundant Sea, than in Lakes the ſafer this Policyhaving taken away all fear of Rivers ; yet 'tis manifeſt that it may in part be ex- ſudden Incurſions, de B. G. I. 6. However we fee and that if all Nations ſhould deſire ſuch by what hath been offer'd, that there may be ve- a Right and Liberty near the Coaſts of any parti- ry weighty Reaſons for a People fo far to appro- cular Country, that Country muſt be very much priate to themſelves ſome part of the Sea, as to ob- prejudic'd in this reſpect; eſpecially ſince 'tis very lige all others to acknowledge the uſe of the ſame uſual that ſome particular kind of Fiſh, or perhaps part, as a permiſſion froin them, and an Act of Boun- ſome more precious Cominodity, as Pearls, Coral, ty and Favour. Amber, or the like, are to be found only in one part VIII. But ſince all Dominion capable of produ- of the Sea, and that of no conſiderable extent. In cing any Effect againſt the Claims of others, takes this Cafe there is no reaſon why the Borderers ſhould its riſe from fome Act of Men ; therefore how far not rather challenge to themſelves this Happineſs the Bounds of any People ought to reach on the Sea, of a wealthy Shore or Sea, than thoſe who are feat- is to be diſcover'd either from their own Right of ed at a diſtance from it: And other Nations can Pofſeflion, or from their Treaties with their Neigh- with no inore Juſtice grudge or envy them ſuch an bours. This Iſocrates (in his Panegyr. p. 111. Ed. Advantage, than they can be angry that, Pariſ.) boaſts that the Athenians by their Articles of Peace with the King of Perfia, had obliged him Non omnis fert omnia tellus. not to come beyond Phaſelis with his Ships of War . India mittit ebur, molles fua thura Sabai, &c. (c) (a) Yet ſuppoſing the inatter to be dubious, and that there are no clear Memorials to be found of ſuch Acts as All ſorts of Goods their ſeveral Countries know, might prove the Oecupancy to be real which is al- Ebon's only will in India grow, ledg’d; what preſumptions are to be male in this And Frankincenſe on the Sabean Bough. Caſe we may underſtand from the following Re- Mr. Dryden. marks. In the beginning then whilſt we were yet ignorant of Navigation, it is not probable that the An Uſe of the latter kind it is, that the Maritime People which had taken poſſeſſion of any Territories, Countries are guarded and defended by the Sea, as extended their Dominion farther than to the Neigh- a Rampart, Hence the Duke of Somerſet, Prote&tor bouring Shore . For inaſmuch as the Fiſhing-Trade of England, under Edward the Sixth, in an Epiſtle was yet but poor and barren, for want of Boats , and to the Scots, which we find in Sleidan's Commenta- the utmoſt advantage they could make was to pick up ries, (e) tells them, Oceano claudimur undique tan- the Shell-Fith which were left by the Tide, or to An- ዓ encloſed with the Ocean, as with the ſtrongeſt Wall and in this reſpect ſuffer from their Neighbours ; who be- Bulwark. And we may with much more Juſtice be- ing neceffitated to make their approaches by Land, ſtow on the Sea that Name of csáverov reizos (1), might be repuls’d with little difficulty. Nay, after an Immortal Wall , than Ifocrates (f ) compleinented Invention of Shipping, muſt Nations for a confide- the River Nile with it . Yet this defence is not al- rable time, left each other at full liberty to fiſh together certain and ſecure. It hinders indeed any where they pleas’d: Becauſe they imagin' that an Expedition on Foot, but lies open to the approach Employment of fo great labour and hardſhip would od ISO Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S 7. (1) A firm and everlaſting Wall. (2Mr.de Bynkerſhoek in his Differtation, c. 2. fays, that ſo much of the Sea may be thought to be ſeized from the Land, as which the States General of the United Provinces gave the Captains of their ships in 1641. to falute as they pals'd the Coaſts of any foreign Prince, that they may know that they are within Canon-ſhot, near the places of that Coantry, (*) Vid. I. 23.1. 1. D. de Servitut. pred. ruſtic. (b) Vid. 1. 8.c. 3. D. de Servit. pred. ruſtic. (c) See Pliny, 1. 9. C. 15. of (d) Vid. Virgil. Georg. I. 1, v. 57, &c. (e) Lib. 20, () Encom, Bufir. the happy Shore about Byzanti uin. not 166 Of tbe Object of Dominion or Property. Book IV. not engage ſuch a numerous Train of Followers, as It doth not ſeem neceſſary that particular Nations that any publick Diſturbance ſhould be apprehend- ſhould make out the preciſe time when they ob- ed from their Diſputes and Contentions. And whilft tain’d the Dominions of ſuch or ſuch parts of the Hoftile Heats were yet unknown, the Sea was a fuf- Sea, by taking Poſſeſſion of it : But, inaſmuch as ficient Defence without other Aſliſtances. And af- the Exerciſe of this Dominion may not at all times terwards when they began to build Ships of War , be of Uſe and Advantage, 'tis enough if they then Men were contented a long while to appropriate on- perform’d any Act of Sovereignty, when the inte- the Havens and Bays, leaving the other parts of reſt of the Commonwealth ſeem'd to require it: the Sea in their Primitive Community. This ino- Nay, in our Judgment, it might be no Abſurdity to deration embolden’d the Pirates to carry on their affirm, that when Naval Forces are once brought Profeſſion with greater Liberty, whilſt they were into common uſe, the parts of the Sea, ſo far as of Opinion, That 'twas a leſs heinous breach of the they ſerve only for a Defence or an Appendage, General Peace, to commit theſe outrages in places do without any ſpecial corporal Act, paſs imme ſubject to no Juriſdiction. At length, when they diately under the Dominion of that people whoſe had found out the benefit of Merchandice, and the Shores they waſh (b). For in this reſpect the Sea conveniency of fo ſhort a Paſſage by Water for is to be look'd on as an Increment of the Land, as Goods and Traffick, ſome Governments ſeated near the adjoining Moors and Fens are reckond the In- the Streights or Narrow Seas, challeng’d to them- crement of a City. Now, as in the Occupancy, or ſelves a Property in them, that by requiring Toll the taking Poffeffion of Innmoveables, it is not ne- and Cuſtom (2), they might come in for a ſhare in ceſſary that our Body ſhould touch each Part, but the Gain, or that their Towns might be frequented the touching of one part only is conceiv'd to create by the Trading part of the World. After this, o a Property over the whole; ſo when a People have ther parts of the Sea were likewiſe brought under ſeiz'd on one particular Region incloſed within ſet- Subjection, either on account of their great plenty tled Bounds, ſtill under the Notion of taking all the of Fiſh, or becauſe this was a neceſſary Expedient void ſpace about that they ſhall afterwards have Oc. for the ſecurity of the bordering Provinces. caſion for, though at firſt they have no Deſign to Yet in theſe times they ſcarce exerciſed any o- enlarge, or exerciſe their Dominion farther than ther Right of Sovereignty, beſides the giving out thoſe Bounds, as not thinking what lies beyond to Injunctions, that all who paſs’d within ſuch Bounds be of uſe or ſervice to them; yet when they corne ſhould abſtain from all Harm and Violence, that no at length to find, that there is a neceility of adding Piracies ſhould be there committed, and no Veſſels ſuch a void ſpace to their preſent Poffeffions, their of War enter without Periniſfion. Thus when bare Intention and Reſolution ſhould ſeem fufficient the Lacedemonians, in Thucydides (a), had convey'd to extend their Sovereignty over it, as a Part or fome Forces to Epidaurus, by Sea, the Argives in an Appendage of their Empire. Eſpecially when it Embaſſy to the Athenians complain’d, that they ha- once appeard that other Nations had thus ſtretched ving promis’d by League not to grant the Enemies their Command over the Void Sea: Whence 'tis a of Argos Paſſage through their Dominions, had ne, fair Preſumption, that the reſt of the World pre- vertheleſs ſuffer’d then to fail by unmoleſted. And tend not that they ſhould be behind with them in accordingly the Athenians interpreted this Act of this Advantage (*) (5). From which Confiderati- the Lacedæmonians as a breach of Peace. We ſee it ons it is manifeft, that in theſe times, when Ship- is now the receiv'd Cuſtom, in order to the Acknow- ping is brought to its higheſt Perfection, it is pre- ledgment of this Sovereignty, that Foreign Veſſels, ſum'd, that as they paſs by any Fort on the Shore, or any Ship ed with Navigation (6), are Lords of the Sea, where of War belonging to the Prince,who at preſent carries it toucheth their own Shore, ſo far as it may be as Mark and 0 of Reſpect. places (a) Lib. 5. c. 56. Edit. Oxon. (6) Comp. Ziegler. ad Grot. I. 2.C. 3. f.11. (*) In all the Editions of the Original the word eum is wanting, which makes our Author very difficule to be underſtood. (2) See Grotius, l. 2. c. 3. $ 14. (1) Mr. Bynkerſboek in his Diſcourſe, c. 5. near the end, maintains, Thar that is not always an acknowledgement of the Sove. reignty of that perſon, to whom that Reſpect is paid, over that part of the Sea wliere it is done. As for Example, ſays he, The States-General in their Treaties of Peace made in the Years 1654, 1662, 1674, and 1684, obliged themſelves to lower their Top-fail to the Ships of the King of England in all the Northern Seas as far as Cape Finiſter, but that was only, becauſe according to the Law of Nations all Republicks ought to give place to a Crown'd Head, and to thoſe that repreſent him. In ſhort, che Cuftom of ſaluring the Veſſels of ſuch Nations to whom they are inferiour, in one manner or other, is not ſo new as our Author would infinuate, for we find in Appian, as Juſtus Lipſius has long ſince obſerved, Ele&. 1. 23. p. 729. That Mark Anthony and Domitius Ænobarbus meeting one another, the firſt Sergeant of Anthony, thinking himſelf obliged according to the cuſtom, cry'd out, that he ſhould lower his Standard, which was then usd inſtead of a Maft, (xe Jeaño oruçãoy) to pay his Homage to his Maſter. De Bell. Civil. 1. s.p. 118. (5) When our Author ſays, That they may without taking a new Poffeffion, ſeize on a thing which they had before neglected, as a thing of no Profit, it is not to be underſtood, that they have called to 'mind ſome new Reaſon, which of it felf renders it neceffary to acquire that which before they had not troubled themſelves to make a Property of. Thus, fince the invention of Cannon, the Sea, which adjɔyns to a Country, hath upon that account been thought to belong to the Lord of the Country, as far as a Cannon can ſhoot. But yet there muſt be a formal Act of taking Poffeffion neceſſary, without which every one may look upon thoſe Seas and Lands to be common, becaufe they do not appear pofieſſed by any, for why may nor he who finds them con- venient for him, leize on them? As for all that ſpace of the Sea which can't be defended from the Land, Mr. Bynkerſhoek chioks none can make themſelves Maſters of it farther than they fail, with a deſign to appropriate it to themſelves , and he adds, That they can't preſerve the Property of what they have ſeized on, but by connant failing, and having always a Fleet abroad. Hence it was that the Romans heretofore, when their Empire extended through Europe, Africa and Aſia, were Maſters of the Mediter- ranean Sea, becauſe they always kepr four Fleets a foot; the firſt at the Pore of 'Miſene, the ſecond at Ravenna, the third at Free jus, and the fourth at Byzantium or Conftantinople. They commanded allo that part of the Ocean that is between England and the Continent, as well becauſe they poſſeſs’d the Lands on both ſides, as becauſe they had a Fleet in the Engliſh Channel. But according Chap. V. Of the Object of Dominion or Property. 167 places where there is Convenience of Landing (7). than if it were peculiarly ſubject to one. The Fiih- In like manner the Gulphs and Channels, or Arms ing Trade is of no very great Conſequence in the of the Sea, are, according to the regular courſe, main Ocean; and ſince you do but vainly call a fuppoſed to belong to the People with whoſe thing, Your own, when 'tis morally impollible to Lands they are encompafled. But in caſe different hinder others from uſing it promiſcuouſly with Nations border on the ſame Channel, the Sovereign- your ſelf; we cannot think any State would find ty of each ſhall be conceiv'd to reach into the mid- it tantamount, to maintain Fleets in all parts dle of the Water, from every part of their reſpective of the Sea, only to ſecure the Fiſhing againſt Shore; unleſs either all the States have agreed by Interlopers. But what if a particular Nation, ei- Covenant to uſe the whole Water promiſcuouſly a- ther through Ambition and the Vanity of being ſti- mongſt themſelves, and to exerciſe a general undi- led Lords of the Ocean; or prompted by Avarice, vided Sovereignty over it, againſt Foreigners: Or and the hopes of drawing to themſelves all the Ad- elfe, if one particular People have obtain'd a Domie vantages of Navigation and Trade, ſhould claim the nion over the whole by Pact, or by the Tacit Con- Ocean as their peculiar Poſſeſſion ? Eſpecially if ceilion of the reſt, or by the Right of Conqueſt, or they urged by way of Title, That they were the becauſe they firſt fix'd their Station near it, and im- firſt who entred upon the uſe of it with Sails and mediately took it into full Poſſeſſion, exerciſing Acts Shipping, and that they poſſeſs Lands in every Con- of Sovereignty againſt the People of the oppoſite tinent round it : And that, ſince the Sea was origi- Shore. In which latter Cafe, nevertheleſs, the o- nally a void ſpace, he who before the reſt attemp- ther Neighbouring States, their Fellow Borderers ted to fix a Uſe and Occupancy in it; might there ſhall be ſuppoſed to be Lords of each of their par- by acquire a Property excluſive of all others. To this ticular Ports, and of ſo much of the Sea, as the con we anſwer, That Men have indeed a Privilege of venient acceſs to the Shore requires. Of the Effects making Waſte places their own, by firſt ſeizing of the Sovereigrity (if it may be fo term’d) over upon them: But then they are always to remember, the Sea, Vid. Alberic. Gentil. Advocat. Hiſpan. l. 1. that God gave the World not to this nor to that c. 8. & 14. and Selden mar. clauf. 1. 2. C. 20, 21, 22. Man, but to humane Race in general; as likewiſe To which we may add, by the way, what Dr. Cham- that all Men are by Nature equal. Wherefore, that berlain takes notice of in his Preſent State of Eng- tacit Covenant between the firſt Introducers of Pro- land, pag. 1. C. 4. That Perfons born under Shipboard perty, affigning the Right of thoſe things which did upon Seas which are ſubje&t to the Engliſh Dominion, not fall under their prime Diviſion (1), to the Per- are accounted Natives of England, and have no need fons who Nould firſt take Pofieſſion of them, can of Naturalization, as others born without the Realm. by no means be extended to ſuch an Object, which IX. But what ſhall we ſay of the main Ocean, if one ſhould hold alone, he might oppreſs all others which ſpreads it ſelf between thoſe vaſt Continents with moſt unjuſt Slavery, or might intercept fome of Europe, Africa, America, and the unknown Sou- moſt important Advantages, which would otherwiſe thern Coaſts? Was this ever brought under Property, accrue to all Nations in common. Inaſmuch as ſuch or doth it ſtill remain in its primitive State, free a Cafe as this could not enter into the Imagination and common to all the World? As for the prodigi- of thoſe primitive Diviſors. As then no one would ous extent of it, this however doth not abſolutely deſerve Cenſure for taking out of a common Store render it incapable of being appropriated. Yet whatever is Neceſſary for his own Occaſions, tho we inuſt confeſs, the Domnion of it would not be in order to future uſe; fo he is not to be endur'd, only unprofitable, but unjuſt; ſhould either any who out of a vain and ſenſeleſs Greedineſs, ſhould one Nation challenge it all to themſelves, or ſeve- lay claim to more than he could ever ſpend, and ral States divide it into ſo many Shares, excluding ſhould deſire infinitely to enlarge his own Domini- all the reſt of Mankind. Navigation, or the Con- on, for no other Reaſon, but to debar others from venience of Water-paſſage, is a thing which fuffers the uſe of thoſe good things which Nature affords: no Damage by being enjoy’d; on the bare Account There can then no probable Ground or Colour be of which, the Appropriation of the Sea is needleſs alledged why any one People ſhould pretend to and fuperfluous, ſince Men may fail no leſs com- the Dominion of the whole Ocean, ſo as by virtue modiouſly, were the Sea common to all Nations, of this Right to aim at excluding all others from according to Mr. Bynkerſhoek, there is no part of the main Ocean, nor of any Sea inclos'd with Land, that belor.gs to any Power farther than he can command it from the shore, becauſe there is no Power in actual Poffeffion after the manner we have before. mentioned. As to the queſtion of Fact, I will nor meddle with it. Our Author may be conſulted about that. As for the mac- ter of Right, alcho', as I ſhall ſhew hereafter, I do not reſt altogether in the Opinion of that learned and judicious Lawyer, who lays it down for a general Maxim, That without regard had to the Laws of Kingdoms, Property is always excinguiſh'd with the actual Poffeffion, yet I think he hath reaſon to maintain it in reſpect to the Sea, and other things of like nature, which remain ſuch as Nature has produced them. As the Induſtry of Man has added nothing but the bare Poffeffion, it follows, that from the very moment that Pofleſſion is left in any manner, the things are, and may be look'd upon as quite abandoned. As for exam- ple, fuppoſe there be a great excent of Land unoccupied, which are nor encompafled on any ſide with the Lands of any State, though they are near, if the Maſter of the Country takes no care to Till them, or ſecure them; or if he has ſometimes done it, does diſcontinue it, any Man may ſeize it as well as he, eſpecially if the Neighbours have reſigned all their Right to him ; and in this caſe alſo the Renunciation of theſe laſt can't be drawn into conſequence for others who would ſettle there, ſo long as they are not actually polieſſed. By a much ſtronger Reaſon we muſt acknowledge the neceſſity of a continual Poffeffion in re- fpe&t of the Sea, which, excepting a little diſtance from the shore, is much leſs in uſe both in it felf, and by all the care that Man can take to make it profitable in any manner, wherefore nothing but inſatiable Avarice, and a prodigious diſregard to the quality of all Men by Nature, can ſuggeſt ſuch vall Precenſions, and ſo difficult, not to ſay impoſſible, to maintain. See $ 9. (7) Bodinus de Republ. I... c. ult. on the Authority of Baldus affirms, That bý a kind of common Right enjoy'd by all Princes of Maritime Countries, the parcicular Sovereign may command and controul thoſe who approach within sixcy Miles of his short. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 9. (1) It is not neceſſary to have recourſe to the intent of the Agreement, which, as I have ſhewed above, is a meet Chimera. The impoſſibility of ſeizing upon the main Ocean, and preſerving a non-interrupted Poffeſfion, is fufficient to prove the Ridicu- louſneſs and Injuſtice of these proud Pretenſions. Scc $ 8.0.6. before going. And Mr. de Bynkerſhoek's Diſcourſe, c. 7. failing following 168 Of the Object of Property. Book IV. failing there. Not one of thoſe Reaſons which firſt be, becauſe the Law of general Kindneſs and Hu- moved Men to the Settlement of Property, doth af- manity requires it. Whence it follows, that no So- fect the main Sea. To make it fit for Navigation, vereign can hinder the Nations which border on the there is no need (in regard to the Sea it felt,) of main Sea, and are not under his Government, from the Pains and Induſtry of Men. The winds labour maintaining a Trade with each other; unleſs he no more to drive all the Fleets in the World, than have by Covenant obtain’d ſuch a Right, as either a ſingle Veffe). Nor do thoſe Tracts which the that fomne particular State is bound, on his account, Keels plough up, make the way rougher to thoſe to exclude ſome certain People from all Coinmerce that follow them. As for the Paſſage to the other with them ; ( of which kind was the Contract be- Continent, this is not rendered leſs convenient to tween the Dutch Eaji-India Company, and the Em one Nation, though another uſeth the ſame Road. peror of Ceylon (a); or that fome whole Nation have "And to have been the firſt Travellers through any ſurrendred up to him their Right of a Sailing to ano- place, doth by no means give a People the Domi- ther (1). For ſince I may, at my pleaſure, either nion of it, or prohibit others froin turning it to the retain or alienate my Goods, eſpecially ſuch as re- fame Advantage. It is a moſt imprudent Plea to gard rather the Superfluities of Pleaſure than the urge, That any o one State by intercepting the Naval Neceflities of Life, there is no reaſon but that I may Affairs of all others , may be able to draw to it ſelf on ſome certain Conſiderations oblige my ſelf to dif- the whole Profit of a Sea Trade, which Intereſt all Per- poſe of them to one Perſon, and to none beſides . Jons ought induſtriouſly to purſue. As if all the reſt And this indeed is one proper effect of Liberty, that of Mankind out to be oppreſs’d by a moſt unjuſt Men may by Covenant give up their Rights be- Monopoly, to gratifie the inſatiable Avarice of a tween themſelves; though no ſuch Covenant ſhall ſingle Government: Or, as it all others muſt volun- be allowed, if really prejudicial to a Third Perſon , tarily turn Slaves, becauſe the wicked Ambition of Hence likewiſe, as a Prince may juſtly ordain, that one Prince or State lufts after the Sovereignty of the no Goods, of the Growth or the Manufacture of his whole World. Such hath been the Bounty of Pro- Dominions, ſhall be exported by Foreigners, unleſs vidence towards Mankind, as to give an abundant by ſuch as have obtain'd this Privilege, either upon Supply of all things uſeful to their Neceflities. But Covenant, or by free Grant; (though the Law of as to the manner poſſeſſing theſe things, Reaſon en- Nature doth not at all oblige him to ſtrike ſuch a joins Men to uſe ſuch Moderation in it, as to reſt Covenant, or to make ſuch a Grant, unleſs ſome Na- contented with the Acquiſition of ſo much as is like- tion abroad be reduced to ſuch Extremnity, as that ly to ſuffice for the Service of themſelves and of without this Liberty of Commerce, they muſt ne- their Dependants. Nor doth the faine Principle for- ceſſarily Perifh: So if a People of Europe, for In- bid them to be concern’d for the future, provided ſtance, have appropriated any Country in Africk, they do not, either by Envy or Avarice hinder o or the Indies, by ſuch means, and in ſuch manner thers from gaining a Needful Maintenance and Re- as the Cuſtom of Nations inakes effecual towards lief. If any y one carries his Purſuits further, and the acquiring Dominion; they may with like Ju- ſcrapes up ſuperfluous Stores, to the Injury and Op- ftice, if they think fit, cut off from others all Pál- preſſion of others, it can be no fault in the reſt, if , ſage thither on account of Traffick, or not allow it , when Opportunity ſerves, they engage in a timely but under certain Conditions, or ſome ſettled Bur- Enterprize of reducing him to Řeaſon. thens and Duties. And this we now fee in every X. From what we have obſerv’d, it is clear, that Day's Practice : Nor doth it appear to be in any re- to fail the Ocean in a peaceful manner, both is and ſpect repugnant to Natural Reaſon. For that Li- ought to be the free Privilege of all Nations: It is, berty of Commerce, on which ſome ground ſuch high becauſe no one People have attain'd ſuch a Right Pretenſions, doth not hinder but that a State may over the Ocean, as will juſtifie them in ſhutting out allow more Favour to its own Subjects, than to all others from the fame Benefit: And it ought to Strangers. OD DICHT Mr. Barbeyrat's NOTE on S 10. (1) See 1.3.3 $6,9, 11. above. (a) Vid. Philipp. Balda. deſcript, oræ Malabar. & Coromand. c. 10. & 22. CH A P. ng buonglibat ke ATEC 2004't not to be destreslo 27002 en charge of our date le 21TCH 41119, MBO 29b1927 99019 019 Volontaron yhtegit Sailio CHAP: VI. 169 Of Occupancy.uy apto 1. CH A P. VI. TUY bers van Rosie tenginuo set it as an SOM OM DET COTA 110.) sviten is to con il LF2 Of Occupancý. yola satico emi la solitario Moordig by DJOB 2 storey 90: to ser solo The ſeveral ways of acquiring Dominion. VIII. When things occupie things occupied dre underſtood to be ima movable. II. The Original Methods of acquiring it. 27 III. Occupancy is gain’d in whole, or by parcels. IX. When they are they are movable. T 910 lo not IV. The Poleſion of Moveables depends on the dif- X. Whether a Wild Beaſt becomes mine ds foort as poſal of the chief Governour. I have founded it. In jome places the catching of Wild-Beaſts is al- XI. Whether the Fiſh are ours, that are in our Ponds, Shio "lowed to every one. XII. Things left become immediately the firft Occu- VI. In other places 'tis the privilege of great Men pants. XIII. Of Treaſures. But VII. Whether he that hunts contrary to the Law, hås XIV. Of Poleſſons obtain'd by War. a Property in the Beaſt he takes. T follows in courſe, that we conſider the ſeveral Again, The Originary way of acquiring Property I ways of acquiring Dominion (1), which, after (2) is either ſimple and abſolute, as when we obtain Grotius's Judgment (a), may conveniently be divid- Dominion over the Subſtance and Body of a thing: ed into Originary and Derivative. The former are Or only primitive and with reſpect, as when we add thoſe by which the Property of any thing was firſt to a thing already our own, fome further Improve introduced : The latter thoſe by which a Property ment and Increaſe. already ſettled paſſeth from one Man to another. Dari VOT7 V. 07 We only. SSW (ES ſuch Mr. Barleyrac's NOTES on Chap. 6. $ 1. (1) Before we proceed farther, we muſt here deterinine a Queſtion which Mr. Bynkerſhoek has given us an occaſion to examiné. That able Lawyer maintains, that by the Law of Nature, Property, which begins with a Corporal Poſſeſſion, ends with it alſo. According to him, that ſame Moment that a thing is out of our power, it becomes common. And if for a long time there has been an uſage that every one remains a Proprietor of his own Goods, although he keeps not the Corporal Poffeffion of them ; this is the effect of Civil Laws, and of the Agreement of the Members of every State. Inſomuch, adds he, That if a thing be- longing to any Man be found in a ſtrange Country, he being abſent, and not ſecuring it, it belongs to the firſt Occupant, provi- ded there be nor ſome particular Treaty between the two States, by virtue of which they ought to be look'd upon as Friends, for if they are only engaged not to make War upon one another, this Agreement leaves every ones Nacural Right intire to ſeize upon that which is not in the poſſeſſion of the former Owner. Mr. Bynkerſhoek alledges here the Authority of the Roman Law, and a Paflage of St. Auſtin quoted in the Canon-Law; but ſince he creats there only of the light of Reaſon, I will not ſtay to examine whether thoſe Pallages are well apply'd or no, as a German Lawyer affirms, who endeavours to confute the firſt Chapter of a Dutch Lawyer, De Dominio Maris. It was Mr. Titius, who in 1704. the Year after Mr. Bynkerſhoek's Book was publiſh'd, main- raind a publick Diſputation at Leipfick, De Dominio in rebus occupatis ultra poffeffionem durante, a Diſcourſe which I never ſaw, but the Author himſelf gives us the Abridgemant of it in his Jus Privatum Romano-Germanicum, &c. I. 3. c. 6. As to the Quoca. tons of the Civil Law, i ſhall only obſerve, that the Roman Lawyers did not agree perfectly among themſelves about the continu- ance of the Right of Property, as Mr. Noodt has proved, that they differed in the manner of getting Pofleffion, Probabilia furis, 1. 2.C. 6. As for the Proofs taken from the thing it felf, Mr. Titius, as above delivers himſelf briefly chus: 1. That the Hypo- theſis of Mr. Bynkerſhoek deſtroys all ſorts of Right, and particularly reduces Property to nothing. For of what uſe can thar Right be which is extinguiſh'd by the Act with which it is acquired. 2. That there is no plauſible Reaſon to be given why great force ſhould be attributed to Poffeffion, if the continuance of Right and Property depends fully and abſolutely upon it. 13. Laſtly, As to humane Rights, perpetual Políeffion is impoſſible, and ſo we ought not to believe that it is neceſſary to preſerve them. From whence he concludes, that to follow the Maxims of the Law of Nature, we muſt on the contrary ſay, That Property being once admitted, continues always, though there be no Poffeffion; eſpecially if the conſent of the Proprietor himſelf, or the Civil Laws do not order it otherwiſe. Theſe Reaſons in my Judgment prove fufficiently what they were intended tor, but we muſt explain them a little, and add what is wanting to them. I ſay then, that ſince Property has its original from taking Pofleffion, it doth not follow that the Right to acquir'd ceaſes, when there is no Poffeffion. The intention of Nature in making all things common to Man is, that every one ſhould uſe and diſpoſe of what he has gotten according to his own plea. Iure, till he leaves it, and permits it a-new, to be ſeized by the firſt Occupant, without which this Righe will be of little uſe. so that Poffeffion is nothing elſe but an indiſputable mark of the Will to retain what a Man has ſeized. To authorize us then to look upon a thing as abandon'd by him to whom ic belong’d, becauſe he is not in Poffeffion, we ought to have ſome other Reaſons to believe that he has renounced his perſonal Right to it. Now, as I have obſerv'd in Note 6.9 8. of the forgoing Chapter, we may preſume this in reſpect to thoſe things which remain ſuch as Nature has produced them, eſpecially ſuch as are very numerous, Or are of a vaſt extent; tho” Mr. Titius does not make that diſtinction, and maintains, that one may be Maſter of the Sea, altho he be not in Poffeffion.' But as for other things , which are the Fruits of humane Induſtry, which are either produced by Nature, ornare put into a new form, or are tanied, or åre hunted out of their Holes ; all this is done with great Labour and Contrivancé ufua'ly, and it can't be doubted but every one would preſerve his Right to them, till he makes an open Renunciation; and ſo they ought to be looked uport as his , though he does not keep them ever after, or he loſes the Poſſeſſion by ſome Accident, may cafily happen, and is almoſt unavoidable. In the main, there is nothing but what is juſt in this Claim, as may appear from what is ſaid, c. 4 $4.1.4. of this Book. And Mr. Bynkerſhoek owns, That the firſt Men left nothing common but what they could not diflinctly poſſeis . Their Covetoufneſs and deſire of having was ſo great, that to expreſs it, the Fable of Clambering up into Heaven was invented, c. 2. p. 10. Can we then believe that Men of this Temper would conſent that the Right of Pro perty hould be always excinguiſhed with Corporal Poffeffion, which can never be without interruption ? Having thus taken li- berty to ſpeak my Thoughts about Mr. Bynker Phoek's Principle , I Thall declare my Indignation againſt what Mr. Titius (as above, 92 s.) has diſcourſed 18 boldly. He ought in his firſt Lecture of that Diſcourſe to have confider'd the Worth of the Author, (3) This Diviſion may alſo agree with Acquiſitions derivative. See what is ſaid upon the following Chapter, $ 1. Further, tie mult diftinguith alſo the manner of acquiring Property, into Natural and Civil. Natural Acquiſition is thae which is made him that transfers the property, and of him that obrains it, as to ſuch things as belong to any Civil Acquiſition, is that which eather transfers a Property with the content of the particular owner, and requires fomething more than the murval Content of We find the like Diviſion in the Inſtitutes, Quarundam enim rerum Dominum nancifcimur jure natka quarundam zero jure civili, 1. 2 tit. I SII. See chap, 10 § 1 n, i and c. 12 SIN, I following. which Parcies. Titius's Obſerv. 290. (4) Lib, 2 c. 1, do HY 11 We 170 Book IV. Of Occupancy. II. We have ſufficiently made it appear in our for- mer Remarks (a), that after Men came to a Reſolu- In medio eft fcelus pofitum Occupanti. tion of quitting the Primitive Communion (1), upon the Strength of a previous Contract they allign'd to In Tacitus, H. 1. 5. 1. in fin. Multi quos urbe each Perſon his hare out of the general Stock, ei ; Italia Jua quemq; Spes acciverat occupandi principem ther by the Authority of Parents, or by univerſal adhuc vacuum. Conſent, or by Lot, or ſometimes by the free Choice In Pliny, 1. 4. Epift. 15. In ea civitate in qua omn- and Opinion of the Party receiving. Now 'twas at nia quaſi ab occupantibus aguntur, quæ legitimum the ſame time agreed, that whatever did not com tempus expe&tant, non matura ſed fera ſunt. under this grand Diviſion, ſhould paſs to the firſt III. In Relation to the Occupancy of (1) Immova. Occupant (b); that is, to him who, before others, bles, eſpecially of Lands, we are carefully to ob- took bodily Poffeſſion of it (2), with Intention to ſerve and diſtinguiſh, whether it be made by one keep it as his own. Hence, when Grotius (c) af- Perſon only, or by many in Conjunction. One Man firms, That Original Acquiſition, anciently whilj}'twas is then adjudgʻd to be the Occupant of Land, when in one place, might he tills and manures it , or when he encloſeth it be made by Diviſion alſo, whereas now it can be made with ſettled Boundaries and Limits : Yet ſtill with only by Occupancy: The words ought to be explain’d this Proviſo, that he graſp at no more than what in the following Senſe. When Mankind firſt began upon a fair account, ſeems tenable by one Fami to ſeparate into many Families, diftinét Dominions ly, however enlarg d and multiplied. Should one were ſettled by Diviſion: After this Diviſion, he is Man (for Inſtance) be, with his Wife, caſt upon ſaid originally to acquire a thing lying void and with a deſart Iſland, fufficient to maintain Myriads of out a Poffeffor, who happens to be the moſt early, Oc- People ; he could not without intolerable Arrogance cupant of it; i.e. he who lays hold on ſuch a thing challenge the whole Iſland to himſelf upon the Right before others, or gets the ſtart of them in putting in of Occupancy, and endeavour to repulſe thoſe who his Claim to it. Thus the word is uſed in (3) Seneca, ſhould land on a different part of the Shore. Thyeſt , v. 202. & 203. Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on $ 2. (1) We have ſhown in c. 4. $ 4. 0. 4. That the firft Occupyer makes himſelf a Property by that only, without fuppofing any Agreement, either Perſonal or Common, ſo that taking Poffeffion was in it ſelf the only way of getting an Original Property, as well from the beginning as at this Day. Quod enim nullius eſt, id ratione naturali occupanti conceditur, Tay the Lawyers, Digeſt . 1.41. tit. 1. leg. 3. princip. But it ſeveral perſons feize upon one thing in common without an Owner, and pare ie alike, that Diviſion will then be in relation to every one of thoſe who make up that Multitude, the Original Title of their Acquiſition, i.e. the immediate Foundation of that particular Right, which he hath acquired, by what hath happend to him, and to which he had before only a common Right. Mr. Titius's Obferv. 291. on Puffend. (2) What our Author means by, Qui primus eadem corporaliter apprehendiffet animo, &c. He will explain himſelf in $ 8, 9. Yet we may obſerve with Mr. Titius, that taking Poffeffion actually (Occupatio) is not always abſolutely neceſſary to acquire a thing that belongs to no body. 'Tis only a means to let all others know, that we have an intention to appropriate ſuch a thing. In- deed, that which properly makes the Right of the firſt Occupyer, is that he makes known to others his deſign to ſeize upon a thing. If then he declares his Will by ſome other Ad, as ſignificative, or if others have openly renounced it with reſpect to him the Righe which they had to any thing, which belong'd no more to him than to them, he may then acquire the Original Pro- perty without any actual Poffeffion. Obſerv, on Puffend. 292. and in Lauterb, 11o. We may alſo add, that he muſt be inclined to take what he declares his deſign co ſeize on, otherwiſe the boundlefs Covetouſneſs of molt Men will render his Right unprofica- ble to others, and be a Foundaron for perpetual Diſputes and Quarrels. In fine, the Notion which I have laid down concerning the exterior Act, which is neceſſary to ſeize on a thing, ſo that we may acquire ſuch a Right co it as may exclude the Claims of all others; this Notion, I ſay, is not altogether new. I learn from Mr. Noodt, Probabilia furis, l. 2. c. 6. That among the Anci. cars, as alſo the old Roman Lawyers, there were ſeveral of the moſt famous who were exactly of the ſame Opinion, tho' none cook notice of it before this judicious and quick-fighted Lawyer. (3) This Grammatical Remark, that the Latin word occupare, i.e. to occupy or poſſeſs, often fignifies prevenire or to prevenc others, might have been ſpared by our Author, Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on 3. (1) We muſt put among Immoveables, firſt of all, Space, which is in its own Nature altogether immoveable. We may divide it into Common and Particular. The firſt is publick places, as Markets, Temples, Theatres, great Roads, doc. The other is that which is perpendicular under the Sun, from a particular Pofleffion of Lines drawn, as well from the Center of the Earth to the Surface, as from the Surface to the Heaven. Every one hath a Right to raiſe a Building under the Sun, as high as he will, and nothing may hinder him but that he may carry it in a direct Line as far as the Orb of the Moon, and likewiſe as much from thence, if we may ſuppoſe that Planet habitable. But if we may dig as deep as we will, we muſt not go farther than the Center of the Earth, becauſe what is beyond, in reſpect of us belongs to the Antipodes, although the Civil Laws of ſome Countries give to the King's Treaſury whatever is found in the Lands of private Men, at any depth greater than the Plough.ſhare reaches. We muſt alſo farther obſerve always that perpendicular Lines may be drawn from the ſurface of the Sun, as well upwards as down. wards, and ſo as my Neighbour may not lawfully raiſe a Building, which by any way may anſwer directly to my Sun, although it be not at all ſupported, bue born upon Beams laid in an Horizontal Line. So likewiſe neither can I in my curn raiſe a Pyramid whoſe Sides and Foundation extend beyond my ſpace, eſpecially if there be no Agreement about it beween my Neighbour and my ſelf. After Space comes the Subſtance of the Earth, which we call the Ground, ſuch as the places for Building, Meadows, Fields and Vineyards. We may next account for chings immoveable, whatever flicks faſt to the Surface of the Earth, either by Nature, as the Trees, or by Man's Labour, as Houſes and other Buildings; although theſe ſort of things may be ſever'd and be come Moveables. Such are alſo not only Wind-mills, whoſe Foundation is faſtend to the Earth, but alſo Water-mills; for tho' they may be carried about, they can't be made uſe of without ſome Anchor or Stake, which is firſt fixed in the Ground. What- ever alſo is faſtned to Houſes or other Buildings, as what is joyned together with Iron, Lead, Plaiſter, or otherwiſe for a perpe. tual Continuance, is alſo reputed immovable. Things moveable are conſequently all things that are ſeparated from the Earth and Warer, whether they have been looſened from it, as Trees falln or cut down, Fruirs falln or gather’d, Stones dug out of the Quarries, or are naturally ſeparated as living Creatures. There are two ſorts of things Moveable, the one ſuch as live and move of themſelves, and they are call'd Living Moveables, or Living Creatures; others are inanimate, and may be called Dead More ables. I have taken all this partly out of the Elements of Juriſpr. Univerſal of this Author p. 87, 88. and partly out of the Civil Laws of Mr. Daumat. Prelim. tit. 3. Sect. 1, 3, 4, &c. The Roman Lawyers often call Immoveables, Res, que soli funt. Labeo Scribit , edi&tum ædilium Curulium de venditionibus rerum eſſi, tam earum, quæ foli fint, quam earum, que mobiles, Digeft . l. 21. tit . 1. De Ædilitio Edi&to, &c. leg. 1. $ 1. It would be too long for me to recite here the other Paſſages of Lawyers to Thew particularly what things they comprehend under the Name of Immoveables. (a) Chap. 5.1. (6) Quod enim Nullius eſt, id ratione Naturali Occupanti conceditur, Digeft . I. 41.6, 1. leg. 3. princip. (c) Ubi fupra. But aut fe moventes, CHAP. VI. 171 Of Occupancy. ibid. c. 45. p. 320. D. O nic () , p. B. But when any number of Men jointly poſſeſs Inimetata quibtis jugera liberas theinſelves of a Tract of Land, this Occupancy is Fruges, & Cererem ferunt, wont to be made either by the Whole, or by Par Nec cultura placet longior annua ; cels (a). Defun&tumque laboribus The former happens, when Men in an united Bo Æquali recreat forte vicarius (f). dy ſeize on ſome deſolate Region, encompaſs’d with certain Bounds, either by Nature or by Humane Ap The Rovers of the Scythian Plains, pointment . The ſeveral Parcels of which Region Whom peaceful Want inur’d of ol are either granted to the particular Members of the To wheel their Houſes in their Wains, Community, to take and to hold as each ſhall think And Gétants ſtiff with Native Cold, fit; (a Method but rarely practiſed ) or what ſeems In folid Happineſs outvie inore convenient for the Prevention of Quarrels and The Pomp and Pride of Italy. Diſputes, are allotted to every Perſon by pub Urimeaſur'd Lands free Plenty yield, lick Deſignation. For that a promiſcuous Occu And Ceres loves to ſhift the Scene, pancy is apt to breed Confuſion, we inay obſerve . A ſingle Harveſt loads the field, froin that Deſcription which (b) Livy gives us of A ſingle Year confines her Reign: Rome, Forma urbis erat occupate magis quam diviſe And if the Farmer weary grow, kmilis ; Such was the Appearance of the City, as if it His honeft Second takes the Plough. had been firſt poDeſs'd rather by Occupancy than by a regular Diviſio31. Tacitus and Cafar will furniſh us IV. As for this Occupancy in general, or by the with Inſtances. The former reports of the Ancient whole, we are farther to obſerve, that it confers Germans, to this purpoſe (c); Such a number of Men on the Community, as ſuch, a Dominion over dwelling together, (for Grotius reads Vicos, not Vices) all things contain’d within the Tract which they occupy or polèfs ſuch a Portion of Lands which they thus poffefs, not only Immovable, but likewiſe afterwards parcel out into private Shares, according Movable Goods and Animals; at leaſt it gives them tutbe Worth aad Eſteem of particular Perſons; the vaft, ſuch a Right of taking the latter kind, as excludes extent of the Country making theſe Partitions eaſie and all others from the fame Privilege. And ſuch an prafticable . They change their Arable Ground every univerſal Dominion as is here defcrib’d, is ſo very Year, and are never at a loſs on this account. So like- different from the Dominion of private Men, that wife Cæfar tells us of the Suevi (d), They have an hun- the latter may be transferr'd to a Stranger or Alien, dred Cantons, from each of which they draw every Tear whilſt the former remains ſafe in the Hands of the a thouſand Men for the Camp-Service; the reſt keep at Community (8) (1). Nor is it neceffary that all bome, and till the Ground for themſelves, and for their things which are firſt occupied in this General way, abſent Friends. The next Tear they relieve each other; ſhould be afterwards divided amongſt particular and those who ſerv'd in the Army return to take care of diſtinct Proprietors. Therefore if in a Region thus the Land; and thoſe who tarried behind lift them- pofſeffed, any thing ſhould be found which is not ſelves for the War. Thus, they never interrupt ei- aſcertain'd to a private Owner, it muſt not prefent- ther the Buſineſs of Husbandry, or the uſe and Diſ- ly be look'd on as void and waſte, ſo that any one Per- cipline of Arms. But there is no ſuch thing as ſepa- ſon inay ſeize it as his Peciliar; but we muſt ſup- rate or private Fields known among them; nor are poſe it to belong to the whole People (h). And the they allowed to inhabit any one place longer than the fame Rule may (in our Judginent) be extended to Space of a Tear. And again (e) fpeaking of the Ger- ſuch deſolate Iſland as lie in any Sea under the Do- mar Nations in common; No Perſon, ſays he, hath minion of a particular Common-wealth (i); or fuch any certain Quantity of Land, any ſettled or proper as though they do not now appear, yet happen to Boundaries . But the Princes and Magiſtrates every riſe afterwards in the ſame place, of which we find Tear aſign the ſeveral Tribes their Reſidents, in ſeveral Examples recorded by Pliny. Now in the what place, and to what extent they judge convenient ; diſpoſal of ſuch things as theſe, the People take dif- and, the Tear after, force them to remove to a ferent Methods: Sometimes the profits of them are new Seat. The deſign of which Inſtitution was, laid up in a publick Stock, to be taken out again no doubt, sto preſerve the Ancient Simplicity for publick Utes, ſometimes all the Subjects, fome. of Life , ſo unacquainted with Avarice and with tiines thoſe only of a certain Order or Degree; and Luxury. We find Horace alluding to this Cuſtom. ſometimes Foreigners too are allow'd to hold and enjoy them, as Tenants of the State . Yet in all Caſes, whatever Right private Perſons obtain over theſe things, depends on the Appointment of the (Quorum plauſira vagas rite trahunt domos, ). IT whole Community. But there is ſome difference, u Vivunt, & rigidi Gete : sing as to this point, between Immovables and Mova- Hub Mr. Barbeyrar's NOTES on $ 4. a se te archabowo 1 pril (1) Dio's Greek is, ‘H za 29. of módsos, a riai šlir littor töv xerimuivar éve so weiós ési muhimu sausão See alſo 1. 8. c. S. $ fora (a) See Grot. I. 2 c. 2 ſ. 4. (b) Lib. s. in fin. (c) German. C. 26. (d) De B.G. 1. 4. C. 1. 1(e) Lib. 6. c. 22. on o 310, 311. attributes to the Vacc cans a more 'trict kind of Communion, The Nation of the Vacceans, ſays he, divide their i Land yearly ingo ſo many Partitions in order to the tilling it: The Fruie and Product they bring into a common stock, out of which they allign every Man his Share. If the Country Men imbezil any part, it is a Capital Crime. See likewiſe, 1. 5 c. 45 So too the Apalchite labour for the common, and each Houlholder according to the number of his Family, received every full 6) Die Chryfoftom, Orat . 31 in Rbodiac. « The whole Country belongs to the Civil State; yet chis doch not in the leaſt hinder, but that every Man is Lord of his own Pofleffions. (h) Vid. Grot. I. 2 c. 2 f. 4. (i) Vid. Plin. N. H. 1. 9. c. 12. SIDAB 4 Y 2 bles, Lib. 3. Od. 24. Od. 24. L. 9.9 , &c. es 1919 307 -31.10H lowing. SKO OF 5 10 h 10 172 Of Occupancy. Book IV. bles, The former, in regard that they lie in open of defolate Regions ; which the Supremne Governors view, and cannot be forc'd out of their place, are may hinder any of their Subjects from entring upon . by virtue of that Univerſal or General Occupancy Such a Prohibition cannot indeed prejudice For immediately ſuppos’d to belong to the People, ſo far reigners (1), who by taking poffeffion of thoſe Regiong as concerns the Body and Subſtance of them. But now may, make them their own: But it will be a ſtop. as to movable things (2), fome of theſe are ſo fra- to the Subjects of the reſpective Governors, fo that med or diſpoſed, as that the Region may indeed be none of them ihall acquire the ſaid things, but thoſe the Seat of their Production ; and yet there is need ei- only who have obtain'd a Grant and Commiflion fo ther of labour in finding or gathering them, as Me- to do. For in ſome places private Men are al. tals in the Bowels of the Earth, Jewels , Pearls and low'd more of theſe Advantages , and in ſome leſs , the like, ſcatter'd about the Shores and other places : according as the Rulers in every State have judg'd Or elſe of particular care in taking and ſecuring convenient. By the Jewiſh Cuſtom, as Mr. Seldent them, that they may not afterwards get out of our (1) informs us, Whatever was found in defolate places , Hands; as Beaſts, Fiſh and Fowl, Men having no or in ſuch as were void of the Dominion and Culture Power over theſe things, ſo as to uſe them at their of private Perſons, became the Property of the Ocen- Pleaſure, before they are found or taken ; it follows, pant; as Graſs , Fruit , Wood, and the like. Alſo the that a People by themſelves in this general poſſef- Fiſh, whether in Salt or Freſh Water, and the Wild ſing manner of the Seat where they are to be met Beaſts and Birds : Tet no one was permitted to Hunt or with, do not properly acquire a Dominion over to Hawk in another Man's Ground : Though even there, them, but only a Řight of obtaining ſuch a Domi- if he had once taken any Game, it was his own. But nion hereafter, by particularly taking and ſecuring to rob the Parks and Ponds was utterly unlawful . The thein. Hence, for Inſtance, we cannot rightly ſay, Roman Lawyers talk much to the fame purpoſe , That the Wild Beaſts of any Country, which ſtill For thus Gaius (2), All Animals taken on the Land, remain in their Natural Freedom, are the Property on the Sea, or in the Air, that is, Wild Beaſis, Birds , of the Prince: But the Prince alone hath the Right and Fiſhi, belong to thoſe who take them : For what is of taking them, inaſmuch as he is Lord of the Soil yet no Body's, Natural Reaſon aſhgns to the first Oc- where they run; and he may communicate this cupant. On theſe and the like places the Expo- Right to others in what degree, and under what re- fitors of the Civil-Law obſerve, that under the Term ſtraints he pleaſeth. Therefore he who is Sovereign Fera, are comprehended all Living Creatures , which of the reſpective Lands or Waters, may grant a Nature hath endued with an unlimitted Power of Right of taking and appropriating things of this ſtraying up and down about their proper Elements; Nature, either promiſcuouſly to all Perfons, or to ſo as to take in likewiſe which have been tamed none but his own Subjects; or ſtill only to his Sub- by the Uſe and Company of Men. Though per- jects of ſuch a Quality: Or, laſtly, he may, if he haps the diſtinction between Wild and Tame Crea- thinks fit, reſerve the privilege wholly to himſelf. tures might be thus better expreſs’d; that the for- For though the things themſelves be not yet, in mer are more averſe to Humane Society, take ſtriet Speech, under Dominion, yet foraſinuch as greater delight in enjoying their boundleſs Liberty, the Act of appropriating them cannot be account and cannot, without great difficulty, be accuſtomed pliſhed without uſing ſome other things which are to live with us; nor may we, after all, depend ve- ſubject to Dominion; as ſuppoſe the Earth, or the ry ſafely on their Fidelity : Whereas the latter are Water; it follows, that he who hath the Sovereign- quite different in each of theſe reſpects. Yet ’tis a ty of the latter things, may by a Decree to this a Saying of Grotius (c), That the Reaſon why ſome purpoſe, prohibit others from uſing them, as means Creatures fly and avoid us, is not the want of Mildneſs of acquiring the former (a). Obseront peronto per and Gentleneſs on their ſide, but on our's: Which he b.V. Hence it is apparent, that it depends on the grounds on the obſervation of Travellers; that in Will of the Sovereign, and not on any Natural and the moſt remote parts, where Men had ſcarce ever, Neceſſary Law, what Right the private Members or very rarely caine before, Birds have been found, of a State ſhall enjoy, as to the gathering of Mova- which offer'd themſelves freely to be taken. Some bles not yet poſſeſs'd, as to Hunting, Hawking, Fiſh- may rather chuſe to form the diſtinction by ſaying, ing, and the like. Nay, and as to the Occupancy That Wild Creatures have Naturally a more intra- (2) This diſtinction is founded upon a falſe Notion of taking poſſeſſion, See $ 2. n. 2 above. The truth is, we may make our ſelves a Property in things moveable, as much as immoveable, becauſe they are often additional to them. See Mr. Thomafius's fu. riſprud. Divin. 1. 2.C.10 $ 147, doc. Our Author to maintain his Principles runs himſelf into manifeſt Abſurdities, See § 7. n. 3. following. ematea SIGN CHE Mr. Barbeyrac's NOTES on S. 5. (1) Our Author doubtleſs means a deſert Country, bordering upon a Kingdom, but taken into it. For every thing that is encompafled with ſomething already occupied, muſt alſo be ſo eſteemed, and conſequently others cannot pretend to it. So chat I can't ſee why Mr. Hirtius, an exact Author, 'ſhould fuppoſe the contrary. 'Tis not a ſequel of Mr. Puffendorffºs falſe Hypothe- fis concerning the Foundations of the Right of Property. For the Agreement which he ſuppoſes neceſſary to make one Maſter of a thing, extends it ſelf in his Judgmens to every thing that has a neceflary dependance on it, which appears plainly by what I have faid above about the Sea, c. 5. s 8. But as it may be the Interelt of a State to keep its Members from ſeizing any Lands without its Juriſdiction, by their own Authority, the Author here obferves upon this occafion, and expreflech ie in this manner: Sovereigns may likewiſe, &c. which makes it plain enough to underſtand. It is certainly a thing much more confidera- ble to ſeize upon a large extent of Ground, than to take a few Deer or Fiſh; ſo that this is ill plac'd, if he crears of which belongs already the State in general. (a) The words of the Civil Law are, Fere igitur beſtie, og volucres, bo piſces, eg omnia animalia que mare, cælo da terra naſı cuntur, fimul atque ab aliquo capta fuerint , jure' gentium ftatim illius eſſe incipiunt. Quod enim ante nullius est, id naturali ratione occupanti conceditur, Inftit. l. 2. tit. 1. De rerum diviſione, & adquirendo ipſarum Dominio, $ 12. Concerning Fill there is an ele- gane paſſage in Plautus Rudens, A&t. 4. Seen. 3. v. 32, 'de. Ecquem effe dices, &c. • Can you ſay that any one of the Filh bes longs to me, whilſt in its own Element? Yec thoſe which I catch are my own, and I reckon them amongſt my proper 46 No one lays hands on them to challenge them from me; no one claims a ſhare in the Booty. I fell them all fairly in the opea Marker as my honeſt Store. Though the Fiſherman was ſomewhat out when he applied this argument to the Bag of Money. (*) Comp. Grof. de 2 c 2 f.5&c. 3 f. 5 & 19. (6) DE J. N. & G. Sec. Heb. I. 6 C. 4. (C) Hift. Belg. 1. s. SHT 00.210 bar Goods,