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PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
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PRESENT - DAY EUROPE
ITS NATIONAL STATES OF MIND
r . .
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A. BY
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T. LOTHROP STODDARD, A.M., Ph.D. (Harv.)
Author of “The French Revolution in San Domingo,” Etc.
NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.

1918
5.2%
, º, tº
| Sº I º
Copyright, 1917, by
THE CENTURY Co.
*=n.
Published, May, 1917
PREFACE
This book resolved itself from the first into a
Series of choices. The problem was, how to por-
tray within the limits of a single volume the war
psychology of the various European nations.
That problem was not an easy one. The portrayal
of national states of mind requires treatment dif-
fering radically from that employed in a narrative
of events. The only satisfactory method of por-
traying thought and emotion is the use of direct
evidence—the testimony of the people themselves.
This explains the numerous direct quotations
which will be found in the succeeding pages. No
words of a foreign observer could mirror the
spirit of warring Europe as do the voices of its
sons and daughters crying out from a full heart
in the very hour of trial.
The evidence adduced has been of the most
contemporary and popular character. Speeches,
press-comment, pamphlets, brochures—the words
of and for the moment: these best bespeak the stir-
rings of the national soul. Official utterances,
carefully weighed and craftily spoken as they are,
are never quoted save when they faithfully rep-
resent popular feeling or when they produce a
marked effect upon public opinion.
Lastly, natives alone are permitted upon the
witness stand. For example: in the chapter on
PREFACE
England, only Englishmen speak; in the chapter
On France, only Frenchmen; and so on. What
other Europeans say about England or France
may be discovered in subsequent chapters devoted
to other peoples. The only departures from this
direct-quotation rule are the closing chapters deal-
ing with minor nationalities, where considerations
of space made the employment of this method im-
practicable. -
The great objection to our method is, of course,
precisely this matter of space. But there is no
other way of portraying with equal vividness the
national temper, especially in times of intense emo-
tion. For this reason I have elected to confine
myself to a full presentation of the great currents
of European thought and feeling regarding the
war and future intra-European relations. Many
interesting collateral issues have been thereby ex-
cluded from consideration, and important ques-
tions, such as Europe's attitude toward America
and the Far East, have been perforce entirely
passed over. All this is unfortunate, but I have
preferred to emphasize essentials rather than sac-
rifice clearness to detail.
T. LOTHROP STODDARD.
Brookline, Mass., March 14, 1917.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
XI
BEFORE THE STORM .
ENGLAND .
FRANCE
GERMANY º
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY . . . .
ITALY .
RUSSIA
THE BALKANS
A. SERBIA
B. BUL.GARIA
C. GREECE
D. RUMANIA tº e
TUREEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST
BELGIUM AND HOLLAND
A. BELGIUM .
B. HoLLAND .
SCANDINAVIA
A. DENMARK
B. NoRWAY
C. SWEDEN
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
A. SPAIN
B. PORTUGAL
CONCLUSION .
INDEx
PAGE
. 119
. 145
. 178
. 220
. 223
. 235
. 246
. 254
. 260
. 284
. 284
. 290
. 296
. 302
. 303
. 304
. 308
. 308
. 312
. 314
. 317
PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
BEFORE THE STORM
HE immediate reason for the Great War may
have been a murder, a monarch, a clique, a
policy, or a philosophy. The underlying cause
was unquestionably a militant spirit of unrest.
The preceding decades plainly heralded one of
those great crises in Man's historic evolution, such
as the Reformation and the French Revolution,
which stand forth as periods of “revaluation of all
values.” 3.
The twentieth century dawned upon a worn-
out age, foredoomed to speedy dissolution. The
omens clearly betokened its approaching end. All
the ancient ideals and shibboleths were withering
before the fiery breath of a destructive criticism.
Everywhere the solid crust of tradition cracked
and split under the premonitory tremors of the
impending cataclysm. The old was patently about
to make way for the new.
Many observers saw in all this the symptoms of
decadence. They were wrong. A decadent age
cannot regenerate itself; it must gain salvation
from without. The Roman Empire awaited sul-
lenly the cleansing fire of Barbarism. But twen-
tieth century Europe was in no such supine mood.
3
4 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Never had the race manifested a more superabun-
dant energy. Never was thought more active or
action more intense. A scant half-century had
transformed a semi-rural continent into a swarm-
ing hive of industry, gorged with goods, capital
and men. Its adventurous sons quartered the
solid earth and scoured the seven seas for the
wealth of the outer world. Its no less adventur-
ous intellects invaded the unknown realms of
science and speculation to wring from Nature her
hidden treasures and enrich the mental life.
Never was Europe so wealthy, so eager, so virile,
as on the fateful First of August, 1914.
But—“Man does not live by bread alone.” All
this prosperity, all this mighty edifice of material
well-being, rested upon outworn and insecure
foundations. The stupendous changes of the pre-
ceding half-century had created a mechanical en-
vironment differing not merely in degree but in
kind from that of past generations. Material con-
ditions had radically altered: the idealistic frame-
work had remained fundamentally the same. The
soul of Europe was like a youthful giant pinched
in his swaddling-clothes. The archaic bonds
galled and chafed at every turn. Hence the pro-
found dissatisfaction, the universal unrest. Had
the European been a weakling he would have re-
signed himself in fatalistic apathy, conformed to
the cramping bands of the past, and sunk gradu-
ally into a bloodless mummy like the ancient Egyp-
tian or the citizen of decadent Rome.
However, the twentieth century European was
BEFORE THE STORM 5
no weakling. He was every inch a man, in-
stinct with virile life and resolved to attain a
worthy future. Accordingly, he began to tug and
strain at his swathings, and it was inevitable that
some day he would cast this Nessus’ garment from
him, even though in so doing he should tear the
living flesh from his bones.
It is this revolt against the past, this determina-
tion to throw off cramping limitations even before
the new ideal goals are yet in sight, which gives
the key to recent European history. Everywhere
we see bursting forth increasingly acute irrup-
tions of human energy: a triumph of the dynamic
over the static elements of life; a growing prefer-
ence for violent and revolutionary, as contrasted
with peaceful and evolutionary, solutions, running
the whole politico-social gamut from “Imperial-
ism” to “Syndicalism.” Everywhere we discern
the spirit of unrest setting the stage for the final
catastrophe.
Although a catastrophe was inevitable, its exact
nature was up to the last moment somewhat un-
certain. For instance, it might conceivably have
taken the form of a series of local convulsions
within the various European state bodies. When
the Great War began England was actually on the
verge of civil strife, Russia was in the throes of an
acute social revolt, Italy had just passed through
a “Red Week” threatening anarchy, and every
European country was suffering from grave in-
ternal disorders. It was a strange, nightmarish
time, that early summer of 1914, to-day quite over-
6 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
shadowed by subsequent events but which later
ages will assign a proper place in the chain of
world-history.
However, it is through the weakest spot in the
earth-crust that the pent-up lava bursts its way,
and since the international situation was the most
dangerous point of Europe’s instability it was
here that war’s eruption took place. The story
of the events leading up to the Great War has been
told and re-told ad nauseam, and need not here be
repeated. We recollect all the moves in the dip-
lomatic game. We remember the varied setting
of the historic background: the rivalry of Briton
and Teuton, the feud of Teuton and Slav, the
vendetta of Gaul and German, the Roman dream
of Italy, the Balkan bear-garden, the awakening
East. This book is not a story of current events.
It is a study of Europe’s state of mind. The point
here emphasized is Europe’s incredibly volcanic
psychology when the cataclysm began. The re-
actions of the various European peoples to that
cataclysm will be the subject of the succeeding
pageS.
CEIAPTER I
ENGLAND
O nation was more affected by the prevalent
unrest than England just before the war.
For years past Great Britain had been the scene
of profound political and social disputes that had
more than once threatened the country with armed
strife. The Irish question in particular seemed
fast degenerating into civil war, and during the
opening phase of the great European crisis at the
end of July, 1914, blood was actually flowing in
Ireland between the Irish Nationalists and the
British regular troops.
Indeed, so immersed was the British people in
its internal difficulties that the first days of the Eu-
ropean crisis passed almost unnoticed. Not until
July 29 did the London “Times” urge British par-
ties to “close ranks” and suspend their political
strife in face of the external peril. -
When the full gravity of the international situ-
ation was finally grasped, domestic disputes were
quickly shelved; but even then public opinion was
by no means united on the attitude which England
was to assume. Strong opposition to war devel-
oped both in Parliament and in the country. The
Liberal press emphatically urged the maintenance
of neutrality, and the declaration of war on Ger-
7
8 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
many, August 4, was preceded by three resig-
nations from the Cabinet—Lord Morley, Mr.
Charles Trevelyan, and the labor leader John
Burns.
The cause of Serbia excited no enthusiasm.
Serbia had long been in bad odor with Englishmen,
and the British press did not hesitate to voice most
unflattering opinions. The London “Outlook”
laid the responsibility for the existing crisis flatly
at Serbia’s door. It declared that country to be
“frankly impossible as a neighbor,” and went on
to say: “It must be contended that Serbia has
been receiving an amount of sympathy which is
quite unwarranted by circumstances. The highly
colored portrayals of her as a gallant little nation
fighting against odds in defense of downtrodden
fellow nationals is utter fudge.” A North Coun-
try paper regretted that Serbia could not be
“towed out to sea and sunk.”
Distrust of Russia was widespread. The recent
Russian entente had never been really popular in
England, and the British government’s complai-
sance toward Russian aggression in Persia, Ar-
menia, and the near East generally had alarmed
most Liberal and even some Conservative circles.
A number of anti-Russian manifestos were now
issued, notably one by a group of Cambridge in-
tellectuals, declaring that war against Germany on
behalf of Russia and Serbia would be a “sin
against civilization.” The labor press unitedly
condemned war in the interest of “Russian autoc-
racy.”
ENGLAND 9
War once declared, however, the bulk of public
opinion rallied round the Government in support
and approval. The national temper was, on the
whole, dignified and serious, jingo outbursts being
surprisingly rare. The press voiced a stern, yet
lofty, resolution. The prevailing note was that
this was a “war to end war.” “The British peo-
ple,” declared the London “Times” of August 10,
“are fighting for the cause of an established and
abiding peace,” and on August 16 it remarked, “If
ever there was a war against war, it is the war we
are entered upon to-day.” The London ‘‘Ex-
press” struck a sterner note: “Fighting must
now go on until either Germany’s power to intimi-
date Europe has been taken from her forever or
until Britain has been beaten to her knees and
can fight no more. We are fighting for our own
existence as a great world power.”
Although both resolute and confident, the British
public seemed at first rather dazed. The English
publicist, H. Fielding-Hall, writing in an American
magazine, the “Century,” declared: “It is a war
as passionless as if we were about to fight an earth-
Quake, a whirlwind, or a volcano—the more de-
termined for that. That is our present temper.”
The general opinion was that the war would be a
short one. When Lord Kitchener declared it
would probably last three years he was almost
universally disbelieved. The traditional British
phlegm showed in the current shibboleth, “Busi-
ness as usuall”
Continued opposition to the war was still voiced
10 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
by extreme pacifists and by a portion of the labor
press, while a number of prominent Radicals, al-
though admitting that the struggle could not now
be stopped, severely criticized the Government for
bringing on the war, and urged its circumscription
to definite objectives which would permit an early
pacification. This opposition soon crystallized
into an organization known as the “Union of Dem-
ocratic Control,” which began an ardent propa-
ganda for a speedy and moderate peace. The
point of view of this school of thinkers is best ex-
pressed in an article by the well-known writer, H.
N. Brailsford, in the “Contemporary Review” for
September, 1914. “We are taking a parochial
view of Armageddon,” he declared, “if we allow
ourselves to imagine that it is primarily a struggle
for the independence of Belgium and the future
of France. The Germans are nearer the truth
when they regard it as a Russo-German war. . . .
We are neither Slavs nor Germans. . . . A me-
chanical fatality has forced France into this strug-
gle, and a comradeship, translated by secret com-
mitments into a defensive alliance, has brought
us into the war in her wake. It is no real concern
of hers or ours. It is a war for the Empire of the
East. If our statesmanship is clear-sighted it will
stop the war before it has passed from a struggle
for the defense of France and Belgium into a colos-
sal wrangle for the domination of the Balkans and
the mastery of the Slavs. . . . To back our West-
ern friends in a war of defense is one thing, to fling
ourselves into the further struggle for the Empire
ENGLAND 11
of the East quite another. No call of the blood,
no imperious calculation of self-interest, no hope
for the future of mankind, requires us to side with
the Slav against the Teuton. . . . It lies with pub-
lic opinion to limit our share in this quarrel and to
impose on our diplomacy, when victory in the West
is won, a return to its national rôle of peacemaker
and mediator in a quarrel no longer its own.”
This, however, was not the view taken by most
Englishmen, who were fast coming to consider the
war a life-and-death struggle between England and
Germany. A decade of Anglo-German rivalry had
diffused an immense amount of suspicion and ill-
will among the British people, and the outbreak of
hostilities quickly focused this previously latent,
half-articulate feeling into intense hostility against
England’s chief antagonist. Germany’s initial
successes, British defeats, and tales of Teutonic
atrocities in Belgium, quickly fanned this hostility
to fever heat. Popular sentiment demanded the
utter crushing of “Prussian militarism,”—what
H. G. Wells called “this drilling, trampling fool-
ery” led by Prussian junkers “with a taste for
champagne and frightfulness,’’—and the German
soldiers were generally dubbed “Huns.”
At first this hatred was directed against the
Prussian leaders and military men rather than
against the whole German people. The Kaiser
and the Hohenzollern family were special targets
for abuse which, in some of the popular organs, at-
tained truly extraordinary virulence. Horatio
Bottomley’s penny weekly, “John Bull,” termed
12 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Emperor William “The Butcher of Berlin,” “That
mongrel Attila,” “The fiend of hell let loose
on civilization,” and predicted that he would be
“known to infamy forever as William the
Damned.” Another popular penny weekly, “The
Passing Show,” asserted that the Kaiser “is a
Mohammedan, a Lutheran, and a Roman Catholic
as the humor suits him; but his taste in neckties is
vulgar; his mind is that of a third-rate Hooligan
with three strains of madness in his blood.” Ac-
cording to this paper “the Hohenzollern brood
must be exterminated. For if we leave to a time
of peace the question of the treatment of the Lord
High Hun, he will not only get off cheaply, but may
remain on the throne of Prussia and be succeeded
by a degenerate cracksman, who is neither gentle-
man nor sportsman, as some burglars have been
known to be.”
But the tidings of German unanimity and hatred
of England soon turned the stream of British
wrath against the whole German people. “It is
not a case of a refined and high-minded people
overborne by a single ‘caste,’” exclaimed the
“Pall Mall Gazette” early in October, 1914. “We
are fighting with a nation whose moral level is in-
trinsically low, which has little trace of humane in-
stinct, and still less comprehension of the meaning
of honorable obligation. . . . It is not only her rul-
ers, but her people, who have to receive their les-
son, and there is but one educational process to
which the bully has ever been found susceptible.”
That leading organ of the Anglican church, “The
ENGLAND 13
Guardian,” was equally severe. “There is abso-
lutely no room for magnanimity,” it declared about
the same date. “It is imperative that the disease
of militancy which has laid hold upon an entire
people should be extirpated. It is absurd to say
that conditions of peace must be such that a
proud nation can accept them. We have to do,
not with a proud, but with a criminal, nation. . . .
She must finally be deprived of the power to do
mischief. “Never again” must be the motto of the
Allies when the final reckoning comes.” Even so
normally pacific an organ as the Nonconformist
“British Weekly” exclaimed, “There may be
those who think that German militarism is the gos-
pel of only a few among the German people. For
this we see no reason. Militarism is not a tem-
porary flush of spirit. The color behind it has
been prepared for with persistent assiduity, with
infinite duplicity, with illimitable cunning, for a
long term of years. In fighting the war lords of
Germany we are fighting Antichrist. That arro-
gance must be crushed out with iron heels.” The
noted critic, G. K. Chesterton, declared that the
solution of the Teutonic enigma was that the Ger-
mans were “Barbarians,” “though the Prussians
themselves cannot form a notion of what we mean
—precisely because they are barbarians.”
Some voices, it is true, were raised against
this rising tide of passion. The London “Labor
Leader” deprecated the “efforts being made to
arouse the hatred of British workers against the
workers of Germany,” and added, “Any word
14 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
now spoken by us against the German people will
make our task, and their task, more difficult in the
years to come.” And Dr. Conybeare of Oxford,
in a letter to the New York “Nation,” asserted,
“After all is said and done, the Germans are our
natural allies in Europe; they are, after the Dutch,
the only European race akin to us.” But these
voices were few in number and found no popular
echo.
During the autumn of 1914 the political settle-
ment of Germany after the war was much dis-
cussed, and the idea of resolving the German Em-
pire into its component fragments as these existed
before 1866 found considerable favor. This idea
was, however, scouted by most well-informed stu-
dents of world-politics. “The Teutons are—and
will remain—one united community,” declared
that keen observer, Dr. E. J. Dillon, in the “Con-
temporary Review” for January, 1915. “Those
among the Allies—and their name is legion—who
anticipate a recrudescence of the separatist spirit
which for centuries made Germany a house di-
vided against itself are doomed to disappointment.
Bavarians and Saxons, Schwabs and Prussians,
are all tarred with the same Kultur brush. The
corrosive ideas of the Prussian schemers have
been imbibed and assimilated by all branches of
the German race, including those of Austria, with
whose patriotic sentiments they now blend indis-
solubly.”
The opening months of 1915 saw a distinct
change in the popular mood—a hardening of the
ENGLAND 15
war-temper, a broadening of aspirations, and a
much more realistic attitude. Russian successes
in Galicia and the Carpathians, and the spectacu-
lar attack on the Dardanelles threw Allied pros-
pects into a bright light, and the spring found a
thoroughly optimistic Great Britain.
The realist note was clear. In its leader of
March 8, 1915, entitled “Why we are at war,”
the London “Times” declared frankly: “There
are still, it seems, some Englishmen and English-
women who greatly err as to the reasons that have
forced England to draw the sword. . . . They do
not reflect that our honor and our interest must
have compelled us to join France and Russia, even
if Germany had scrupulously respected the rights
of her small neighbors. Why did we guarantee
the neutrality of Belgium? For an imperious
reason of self-interest. . . . We keep our word
when we have given it, but . . . we do not set up
to be international Don Quixotes, ready at all times
to redress wrongs which do us no hurt.” And on
March 17, the “Morning Post” wrote: “This
country did not go to war out of pure altruism, as
some people suppose, but because her very exist-
ence was threatened. . . . That is what really un-
derlies “the scrap of paper’ and all the talk of
‘German Militarism”!”
The rising war spirit of the nation was equally
plain. “The absurd talk about this being a war
against militarism has now subsided,” asserted
the “Morning Post.” “After all, the British Em-
pire is built up on good fighting by its army and its
16 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
navy; the spirit of war is native to the British
race.” Leading publicists like Archibald Hurd
asserted that this war, far from ending arma-
ments, would increase them even in the event of
an Allied victory. The British Empire must not
only retain its present naval preponderance, but
must also maintain a much larger military estab-
lishment than ever before. Many voices also de-
manded the retention of Germany’s conquered
colonies as necessary for the future safety and
prosperity of the British Empire. Some plans
went even further in their scope. One of the
most ambitious of these was the demand of the
English writer, D. L. B. Castle, for the annexation
of Germany’s North Sea coast, which appeared in
the “National Review” of July, 1915. Recogniz-
ing the impossibility of resolving the German Em-
pire into its political fragments, Mr. Castle as-
serted that England must at all costs prevent a
German war of revenge, which, owing to the rapid
development of submarines, might be fatal to Eng-
land by shutting off her food-supply.
These same months witnessed a further deepen-
ing of the gulf of hatred toward Germany. Just
as the opening period of the war had seen the at-
tack shift from the German leaders to the Ger-
man people, so now the assault was broadened to
include German ideas and cultural achievements.
‘‘I cannot see what is proposed by the German
idea,” wrote Rudyard Kipling to the Paris
“Temps,” “unless it is to march with parade-
step across a series of hells philosophically con-
ENGLAND 17
structed, with the object of self-adoration for the
noise it makes with all its harness. At least the
Arabs offer a choice between Islam and the sword,
but the Boche has only the sword in his philoso-
phy.” “The Germans,” wrote H. G. Wells in
the London ‘‘Daily Chronicle,” “have been made
into a kind of scientifically equipped Zulus.”
Professor A. H. Sayce of Oxford, in the London
‘‘Times,” penned a sweeping indictment of Ger-
man literary ability. Goethe was the exception to
the rule, but Schiller was “a milk and water Long-
fellow,” Heine a Jew who “regarded the Ger-
mans as barbarians,” and Kant “more than half
Scottish in origin.” “On the artistic side,” con-
tinued Professor Sayce, “perhaps the less said
the better. German taste in architecture and
dress is proverbial. A people who have destroyed
the art treasures of Belgium and Eastern France
are outside the pale of civilization. They are still
what they were fifteen centuries ago, the barba-
rians who raided our ancestors and destroyed the
civilization of the Roman Empire. For a thou-
sand years the blight of German conquest hung
over Western Europe, until at last the conquer-
ors perished in internecine conflict or were ab-
sorbed into the older populations, and the Dark
Ages came to an end. We must trust that they
will not return under a new avalanche of Teutonic
barbarism, and that the Germans may resume their
old vocation as the intellectual ‘hewers of wood
and drawers of water” for Western Europe.”
Another English scholar, Sir Clifford Allbutt, does
18 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
not even except Goethe in his critique of German
intellectual ability. Professor E. Ray Lankester
asserted that Germany’s reputation in the field of
scientific research “is due to the irresponsible
gush of young men who have benefited by the nu-
merous and well-organized laboratories of German
universities.” Similar denials of German musi-
cal and artistic ability appeared from English
pens at this same period.
The spring and summer of 1915 saw a further
exacerbation of British public opinion against the
German people. German naval bombardments of
English coast towns, Zeppelin raids, and numer-
ous sinkings of English passenger ships, culminat-
ing in the Lusitania disaster, roused a perfect
wave of fury in England and evoked repeated calls
for reprisal and revenge. Major-General Sir Al-
fred E. Turner wrote in the “Saturday Review”
of September 18, 1915, “No terms can safely be
made with such a people of outsiders, to whom
the quality of mercy is not known, and who, like
all other savages, regard generosity and forbear-
ance as signs of weakness. . . . Germans are only
to be subdued by force and frightfulness, their
own weapons, and it is high time that velvet gloves
should be taken off, as they were when we fought
with the Dervishes of the Sudan, the Zulus, and
the Boxers of China, who were akin in more than
one sense to the Prussians.” “To avenge!”
writes W. S. Lilly in the “Nineteenth Century and
After” of July, 1915, “The words strike the key-
note.” “However the world pretends to divide
ENGLAND 19
itself,” asserted Rudyard Kipling, “there are
only two divisions in the world to-day,+human be-
ings and Germans. And the German knows it.
Human beings have long ago sickened of him and
everything connected with him: of all he does, of
all he says, thinks, or believes. From the ends of
the earth to the ends of the earth they desire noth-
ing more greatly than that this unclean thing
should be thrust out from the membership and the
memory of the nations.” Edward Jenks, in the
July “Contemporary Review,” urges the imposi-
tion of a lasting tabu upon everything German.
“It is the most ancient of all social sanctions, and
still the most terribly effective. If it does not
now as formerly mean actual physical starvation
or death from beasts of prey, it means commer-
cial ruin, intellectual starvation, social extinction.
Let no one think that such a punishment, applied
to a nation, would be a light one. . . . There will
be no appeal from the sentence; no possibility of
condoning it. The ‘Everlasting No' will then take
on an entirely new aspect for its champions, when
the Gorgon face shall be turned inwards, when
those who have made an alliance with the powers
of darkness shall see the thick darkness descend
upon the guarded Brandenburger Tor and the pil-
lared eagles of Schönbrunn.”
This intense wave of anti-German feeling is of
course also accounted for by British exasperation
at the increasingly unfavorable state of affairs
both abroad and at home. Italy’s adhesion to the
Allies in May, 1915, was soon more than counter-
20 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
balanced by a whole series of crushing disasters.
The Austro-German offensive in Galicia, which be-
gan in the early days of June, never slackened till
the Teutons were masters of all Poland, and Rus-
sia’s defeat was only the prelude to Germany’s
great Balkan “drive,” which ground Serbia and
Montenegro to dust, won Bulgaria to the Teutonic
cause, and opened the road to Turkey and the near
East. That rendered the Allied evacuation of
Gallipoli inevitable, and this British disaster was
obviously to be followed by another humiliation
farther east, where the surrender of the British
Mesopotamian army cooped up at Kut-el-Amara
had become merely a question of time. Not even
in the West was solace to be found, for the “big
push” in northern France, kept up for months at
a huge sacrifice of life, had yielded most meager
results. The Allies’ military prospects, so bright
in early 1915, had thus by the close of the year be-
come gloomy in the extreme.
But even the military disasters, taken by them-
selves, did not tell the whole story. Despite a
rigid censorship, the English public was gradually
waking to the fact that these Allied reverses were
due, in part at least, to British “muddling” and
ineptitude. The humiliating failure in northern
France was the logical fruit of Great Britain’s
faulty munitions system. The disasters in Meso-
potamia and at Gallipoli were the results of blun-
dering British strategy. The Balkan collapse
was bound up with short-sighted British diplo-
macy. Obviously, the British governmental mech-
ENGLAND 21
anism was not standing up properly under the
strain of the Great War.
That realization, to be sure, did not come in a
day. It took time to penetrate the armor of Brit-
ish optimism. But the facts were too damning to
be ignored, and a gradual process of disillusion-
ment spread through ever-widening circles of the
British people. Voices began to be raised criti-
cizing the Government's shortcomings, warning
against the consequences of “muddle,” and de-
manding thorough-going reform.
As far back as January, 1915, Austin Harrison,
editor of the influential “English Review,” had
raised a warning note against the easy optimism
which then prevailed. England, he asserted, did
not yet realize the magnitude of her task, “the
terrible nature of the war she is engaged upon,”
while “ink-pot gibes at the Germans” and the
“silly prattle” about cockney valor would never
win victory. From that time on leading organs,
and publicists like Dr. E. J. Dillion, J. Ellis Bar-
ker, etc., began a regular campaign of education
under the slogan “Wake up, England!”
Criticism of the English governmental system
grew continually sharper and more uncompromis-
ing. “The old mechanism of government which
kept the British nation unprepared for the war
is still in daily use unmodified,” wrote Dr. Dillon
in the “Fortnightly Review” of January, 1916.
“While everything and everybody around us is
changed or changing, that remains as it was. . . .
Its action is mischievous, not helpful. It works
22 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
havoc with our best-laid plans, and belies our most
reasonably hopeful forecasts. . . . Our effete sys-
tem of governance, with its roots in a dead past
and its blighting shadow flung across the present
and future of the nation, must be swept away.
The illusions with which it is warping British
thought and sapping British force must be dis-
pelled. . . . Unless that system, together with its
old parliamentary doctrines, its cherished tradi-
tions of liberty, its sharply accentuated individual-
ism, its conservative predilections, and its insular
illusions, be speedily adjusted to the new condi-
tions, much that is precious, not only to the race,
but also to civilized man generally, will be swept
away into history by the Teuton tide of which the
present war is but the first inrush.” In the
“Nineteenth Century and After” of February,
1916, Mr. J. Ellis Barker is equally severe: “The
British Government, as at present constituted, is
not the organization of efficiency, but its negation.
It is an organization similar to that which caused
the downfall of Poland. It is the organization of
disorganization. Amateurs are bound to govern
amateurishly, and their insufficiency will be partic-
ularly marked if they have to run an unworkable
government machine and are pitted against per-
fectly organized professionals.” No mere re-
placement of a Liberal by a Conservative Cabinet
would suffice, for “it is questionable whether an-
other set of amateurs will do better than the pres-
ent one. The fault lies chiefly with the system.
Government by debating society has proved a fail-
ENGLAND 23
ure. It should be abolished before it is too late.”
The warning note grew more insistent as time
went on. “Unless we quicken our movements,”
cried Dr. Dillon in February, 1916, ‘‘damnation
will fall on the sacred cause for which so much gal-
lant blood has flowed. And as yet there are no
signs of any quickening.” And in May, 1916, he
wrote: “We are not winning the war, nor are
we adopting the means to win it. . . . The result
has been to inoculate the nation with the bacteria
of general paralysis. A little while longer, and
we shall be slouching into irreparable disaster.”
The cardinal reform which all these critics de-
manded was the transformation of cabinet gov-
ernment into a dictatorship. “Temporary autoc-
racy,” urged Dr. Dillon, “is what we need during
a struggle like the present. Respect for individ-
ual liberty and parliamentary rights should give
way to considerations of a higher order for the
sake of more momentous issues.”
The reasons for such drastic demands were to
be found not only in governmental inefficiency but
also in certain disquieting aspects of the national
temper. We have already seen how strong had
been the opposition to war in the summer of 1914.
Now this opposition, while it had diminished with
the course of the struggle, had by no means en-
tirely died away. The extremely class-conscious
British labor-unions persisted in regarding the
war as the work of capitalist diplomacy, and labor
leaders like Keir Hardie and Ramsay Macdonald
formally refused to give it their blessing. Also
24 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
radical groups such as the “Union of Democratic
Control” joined the labor opposition in demanding
an early and compromise peace, while extreme pa-
cifists like Bertrand Russell denounced the war on
principle, and refused to assist it in any way,
shape, or manner. Lastly, symptoms of moral
flabbiness and selfish indifference were unmistak-
ably apparent in many circles, particularly in the
lower middle classes. The result of all this was
slacking and shirking in munition factories, dan-
gerous strikes even in such vital industrial
branches as the shipyards and coal mines, and fail-
ure of the most energetic recruiting campaigns to
produce by voluntary enlistment the armies neces-
sary for the further prosecution of the war.
Even appeals like that of Minister Lloyd-George
before the Trade-Union Congress at Bristol in the
autumn of 1915—“I beg you as a man brought up
in a workman’s home, do not set the sympathy of
the country against labor by holding back its might
by regulations and customs when the poor old
land is fighting for its life”—did not produce the
desired effect.
But the second half of 1916 saw an almost start-
ling change in the national consciousness. Stung
to the quick by internal shortcomings and external
failures, England at last roused to the peril, and
before the year was out sweeping legislation had
revolutionized the British governmental system
and radically transformed the whole aspect of
English life. The armies had been filled by com-
pulsory military service, the munitions muddle
ENGLAND 25
had been solved by industrial conscription, and
cabinet government had vanished before an om-
nipotent triumvirate headed by Lloyd-George.
With the opening of 1917 England stood on an
efficiency basis.
It must not be thought that this disheartening
time had caused any perceptible abatement of the
national longing for a decisive victory. Unques-
tionably there was much pessimism and some de-
Spair, but hatred and abhorrence of the German
flamed up as hotly as before. “Unless the Allies
grind to powder the lawless murderers in the red
mill of war,” asserted Dr. Dillon, “the sands of
civilization will have run down.” Writing in
“Blackwood’s Magazine” for August, 1916, Ma-
jor-General C. E. Callwell maintained that Ger-
many must be beaten, crushed, and permanently
kept down, for “the German nation is a nation of
barbarians, a nation without honor, without chiv-
alry, and without shame.” Normally, the victor
may, and often should, grant terms that are not
degrading, “but the Germans can no longer be ac-
counted a civilized race. . . . Paper guarantees
are worse than worthless when they are furnished
by rogues. . . . We are dealing with a wild beast
that has to be caged and that has to be kept in a
cage until it is tamed.” Sir Harry Johnston, in
the English “Review of Reviews” for April, 1916,
wrote that Germany must be “punished to the
full; whether we can accomplish this punishment
in six months, in one year, in ten years, or in
fifty.” And the eminent English philosopher, L.
26 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
P. Jacks, stated in his organ, the “Hibbert Jour-
nal,” “I write with deliberation when I say that
we are fighting hell.”
Such being the prevalent English temper toward
Germany, it was easy to foresee that the peace ru-
mors which at this time began to be bruited abroad
would not meet with a particularly warm recep-
tion from British public opinion. Peace had of
course always been discussed in England—a peace,
that is, based on the postulate of absolute Allied
victory. But as time passed, and Teutonic stay-
ing-power became plainer, peace talk of a different
Sort began. It was clear that Germany could be
crushed, if at all, only after a long war, the for-
mula for which was expressed in the word “attri-
tion.” But this word sounded unpleasant in
many ears, for, as an anonymous wit expressed it,
“it meant that after all the Huns were killed off
there would be a few Allies left.” So the year
1916 saw a genuine discussion of peace possibili-
ties—a discussion quickened by events like the
German chancellor’s olive-branch speech at the
close of the year and President Wilson’s pacific
moves at the beginning of 1917.
The feeling of most Englishmen was evidently
hostile to a compromise peace. British anti-
German sentiment has been so fully analyzed that
a few examples of this majority temper should
suffice. To begin with, Premier Lloyd-George
himself had early taken up a most uncompromis-
ing attitude. Speaking to an American news-
paper man in October, 1916, Lloyd-George said:
ENGLAND 27
“Britain has only begun to fight; the British Em-
pire has invested thousands of its best lives to
purchase future immunity for civilization; this in-
vestment is too great to be thrown away. . . . The
fight must be to the finish—to a knockout.”
Whether or not the British government has since
modified its attitude, certain it is that this official
declaration elicited the warm approval of a ma-
jority of the British press, and no diminution of
that approval is visible in these opening months of
1917. In late December the London “Daily Mail”
remarked: “The Allies know that no peace with
a nation of tigers, and murderers, and statesmen
who regard all treaties as scraps of paper would
be worth the paper and ink. So long as Germany
has not been completely and decisively beaten, no
peace with her can be more than a truce which
she would violate the first moment it served her
purpose.” And the London “Post” asserted:
“There can be no compromise, and the war is
there to prove it. What the German mind is at
present incapable of understanding is the simple
fact that German arrogance, German militarism,
German ambition, German immorality, masquer-
ading as the Higher Good, and German cruelty,
are so intolerable to the civilized nations now in
arms against these horrors that rather than accept
them the Allies prefer death.” And Lord Cur-
zon remarked in mid-January, 1917, “Our spirit
cannot falter, since an inconclusive peace or a
patched-up peace means for us not only humilia-
tion, but destruction.”
28 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
At the same time this uncompromising temper
was by no means universal. The cost of “attri-
tion” was intolerable to many persons, who ex-
pressed their belief that a victory gained by such
means would involve all parties in a common ruin.
Bertrand Russell wrote: “If the war lasts long,
all that was good in the ideals of Germany, France,
and England will have perished, as the ideals of
Spartans and Athenians perished in the Pelopon-
nesian War. All three races, with all that they
have added to our civilization, will have become
exhausted, and victory, when it comes, will be as
barren and as hopeless as defeat.” That an
avowed non-resister like Bertrand Russell should
have thus written is no surprise, but what is of
greater significance is the fact that similar senti-
ments were now expressed by prominent English-
men like Earl Beauchamp, Lord Brassey, and Lord
Loreburn, men not identified with extreme pacifist
circles. Lord Loreburn, in the London “Econ-
omist” of June 10, 1916, expressed his fear that
an “attrition” victory would mean general bank-
ruptcy and “such a destruction of the male youth
of Europe as will break the thin crust of civiliza-
tion which has been built up since the Dark Ages.”
And Lord Loreburn’s point of view was emphat-
ically endorsed by the editor of the “Economist,”
the well-known economic writer, Francis W. Hirst,
who remarked: “The time seems to have come
when rulers will have to consider the true inter-
ests of their subjects or fellow-citizens in this re-
gard, and when the State, which has claimed the
ENGLAND 29
right to exact from the individual his life or his
property, will have to reduce its pretensions and
abate the struggle for glory and prestige, not be-
cause they are worthless and undesirable, but be-
cause a State which had lost its men and its money
could hardly call itself victorious; for after it
had imposed peace as a conqueror, it would be
compelled for years to play second fiddle to other
powers. . . . Of course you want to crush your
enemy in war. Of course you want victory. Of
course you wish your enemy to admit that he is
beaten, and to sue for peace. But equally, of
course, unless you are misled by a false and flimsy
rhetoric, you do not want to destroy the society,
the traditions, the wealth, and the happiness of
your own people. You do not want to see your
allies ruined for the sake of reducing an enemy
to abject despair. So when attrition and ex-
haustion have reached a certain point, you are
willing to discount the future and to take counsel
with the still small voices of reason and common
sense.” The matter was put more pungently by
George Bernard Shaw, who, writing in an Ameri-
can periodical, the “New Republic,” of January
6, 1917, said: “Non-German Europe is not go-
ing to spend the remainder of the duration of this
planet sitting on Germany's head. A head with
the brains of sixty millions of people in it takes
more sitting on than we shall have time for.”
Such pronouncements, however, though numer-
ous and weighty, were those of a minority, and
aroused angry retorts from the bulk of English
30 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
public opinion. In many quarters they were
treated as near-treason and were accused of being
inspired by the machinations of Judaeo-German
“High Finance.” Mr. Hirst's attitude, for ex-
ample, which made a great sensation, cost him his
editorship. Typical of these protests against
compromise is one penned by L. J. Maxse, editor
of the influential “National Review’’: “The
main object of peace should be to crush and per-
manently cripple Prussia, not only because she
wantonly provoked war, but because of the hor-
rors perpetrated wherever a Prussian foot has
trod. The Prussians and their miscreant dy-
nasty are the pariahs and lepers of civilization,
and as such are unfit to be a Great Power. We
might as well enthrone Satan as enable them to
resume their bloodthirsty career whenever it suits
the worshipers of might over right. On this all
genuine Pacifists should be able to agree with all
genuine Militarists. The former desire to pre-
vent the recurrence of war, which can only be
done by destroying the Prussian scorpion. The
latter are no less anxious to prevent the honor-
able profession of arms ever being again de-
graded as in the present war by these cold-
blooded murderers of women and children, air-
poisoners, well-poisoners, savages, besides whose
record all recorded savagery pales. To-day all
our public men, after their wont, shout with the
largest crowd, and the largest crowd is deter-
mined to do justice by Prussia. But we know the
Rt. Hon. Faintheart and the Rt. Hon. Feebleguts
ENGLAND 31
too well to suppose that the mood will last and
that he will remain robust when the Rhine Whine
sets in. Then our bleaters will give tongue and
our “blighters’ will chip in. We shall see the old
Potsdam Press in full working order, devoted
by day and by night to the sacred cause of ‘letting
off the Boche.” Winners, we shall be told, can
afford to be generous. . . . But surely if the Prus-
sians lose it is for them to pay and for the
Allies to receive the milliards? If the process of
payment reduces German Kultur to be a hewer of
wood and drawer of water for the rest of the cen-
tury for European civilization, so much the bet-
ter for the world.” .
Such is the present state of British public opin-
ion toward the question of peace. What are the
real beliefs and intentions of the British govern-
ment we of course do not know, nor for our pres-
ent purpose does it greatly matter. The point to
be noted is that in these opening months of 1917
British public opinion is still predominantly for
war and ready to make the sacrifices necessary
to its continued prosecution.
Naturally every one recognizes that the strug-
gle must end Some time, and this raises the preg-
nant query, “After the war?” But in treating
this vital matter we must carefully delimit the
scope of our inquiry. A full analysis of Eng-
land’s attitude toward European reconstruction
would carry us too far into the realm of specu-
lation. Of course nearly all Englishmen have
very definite ideas as to how the political map of
32 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
Europe should be redrawn, but since the specific
points of that redrawal will be determined by
the valor of armies and the skill of diplomats
rather than by popular passion, extensive discus-
sion of the shifting currents of contemporary
public opinion thereon would be a rather profit-
less undertaking. *
Much more useful is it to understand the de-
gree of popular sympathy or antipathy which
Englishmen to-day feel toward the various Euro-
pean peoples. This is a matter of practical im-
portance. A pronounced trend of public senti-
ment regarding any foreign nation may harden
the decisions of governments and influence
statesmen in the laying out of future policies.
Of course the main line of cleavage runs be-
tween friends and enemies. The war has natu-
rally tended to draw Englishmen ever closer to
their Allies and to sunder them ever more widely
from their foes. This process has, however, not
operated in uniform fashion. Taking first the
popular status of Great Britain’s allies, the out-
standing feature is the profound English sym-
pathy for France. Anglo-French relations had,
it is true, been cordial since 1904, but the heroism
and efficiency of France in the present war have
deepened English liking into an enthusiastic ad-
miration which appears to promise lasting
friendship between the two peoples. Toward
Russia, British feeling has sensibly warmed, and
in some cirêles this rises to genuine enthusiasm.
But English philo-Russian literature bears cer-
ENGLAND 33
tain marks of artificial stimulation, and British
critics accuse the extreme pro-Russian propa-
ganda of Mr. Stephen Graham and others of be-
ing sicklied o'er with sentimentality. For Italy,
British friendship seems rather casual and not
without mental reservations. Belgium has re-
ceived unstinted praise, and the traditional Eng-
lish policy of safeguarding her small neighbor
from foreign conquest has been powerfully re-
inforced by ties of warm popular affection. As
to Serbia, former English dislike has been quite
effaced by the staunch fighting qualities of that
little nation. -
A word about neutrals. Convinced as they are
that they are fighting the battle of civilization,
Englishmen believe that the neutrals should be in
the war “doing their bit,” and since Englishmen
are inclined to ascribe neutrality either to selfish
“profiteering” or to cowardice, the predominant
British attitude tends to be a compound of dis-
like and contempt. Of course political exigen-
cies and a strict censorship suppress the more
violent manifestations, but Kipling’s phrase,
“Damn all Neutrals l’’ undoubtedly expresses the
predominant British feeling.
On its enemies English public opinion is gen-
erally severe, though the degree of bitterness
varies considerably with the specific cases. Tur-
key was from the start condemned to death. Bul-
garia, while usually, accorded political life, is to
be reduced to a negligible quantity. British dis-
like of Austria has waxed greatly with the course
34 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
of time. At the beginning of the war Austria
was regarded with contemptuous disdain as the
senile dupe of Prussian militarism. To-day,
however, many Englishmen regard her guilt as
equal to Germany’s, and accordingly demand her
political extinction, the deposition of Hapsburgs
and Hohenzollerns being held alike necessary to
the future well-being of Europe.
The arch-enemy, however, continues to be Ger-
many, and upon Germany British wrath remains
unwaveringly fixed. The desire to “smash”
Germany is as keen as ever, but the difficulty of
the process is becoming more and more recog-
nized. Most thoughtful Englishmen now admit
that the undoing of German unity is impossible,
and many even forecast a junction of the Aus-
trian Germans with their racial brethren. Since,
however, they fear that defeat will work no
change of heart in the German people, English-
men are greatly concerned with the problem of
averting a German war of revenge, and the gen-
eral opinion seems to be that the only safe
method is to “keep Germany down.” The pop-
ular plans for doing this are of course both mu-
merous and varied. They embrace not merely
military and political safeguards, but also radical
economic measures, such as Allied boycotts of
German goods, commerce, shipping, etc. This in
turn involves the idea of the permanency of the
present “Grand Alliance” and a general pooling
of Allied resources.
English hatred of Germany and English friend-
, , º,
* : * '-
ENGLAND 35
ship for France are, in fact, the two salient fea-
tures of the British state of mind. So pro-
nounced are they that they promise to be import-
ant factors in determining the course of European
life after the war. To be sure, several influential
elements of English thought refuse to contem-
plate a permanent estrangement of the British
and German peoples, but the bulk of British
public opinion plainly believes that any immedi-
ate healing of the breach is impossible. The
eminent English essayist, Edmund Gosse, re-
marks: “I cannot imagine that the passions
which the war stirs up can have any other effect
but of deepening and widening the abyss. I
fancy that at least for a generation no intellect-
ual relations will be possible between France and
England on the one side and Germany on the
other. If I am not mistaken, the neutral nations
will form the only link between the Allies and
Germany after the war.” H. G. Wells, in his
“What is Coming,” undoubtedly strikes a popu-
lar chord when he writes: “The primary business
of the Allies is not reconciliation with Germany.
Their primary concern is to organize a great
league of peace. . . . There will be a bitterness
in the memories of this and the next generation
that will make the spectacle of ardent French-
men, or Englishmen, or Belgians, or Russians em-
bracing Germans with gusto—unpleasant, to say
the least of it. We may bring ourselves to under-
stand, we may bring ourselves to a cold and rea-
sonable forgiveness, but it will take sixty or sev-
36 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
enty years for the two sides in this present war
to grow kindly again. Let us build no false hopes
nor pretend to any false generosities. These
hatreds can die out only in one way: by the pass-
ing of a generation, by the dying out of the
wounded and the wronged. Our business, our un-
sentimental business, is to set about establishing
such conditions that they will so die out. And
that is the business of the sane Germans, too.
. . . That is not to be done by any conscientious
Sentimentalities, any slobbering denials of un-
forgettable injuries. We want no pro-German
Leagues any more than we want anti-German
Leagues. We want patience—and silence. My
reason insists upon the inevitableness and neces-
sity of this ultimate reconciliation. I will do no
more than I must to injure Germany further, and
I will do all that I can to restore the unity of
mankind. None the less is it true that for me for
all the rest of my life the Germans I shall meet,
the German things I shall see, will be smeared
with the blood of my people and my friends that
the wilfulness of Germany has spilt.”
Many Englishmen take an even more pessi-
mistic view. The eminent British scientist, Sir
William Ramsay, for example, believes that no
intercourse whatever with Germany can take
place under a century. “I am afraid,” he writes,
“that the horror of the whole civilized world at
the moral decay of the Germans makes it most
unlikely that international relations with individ-
uals of that nation will be resumed before several
ENGLAND 37
generations have passed. Men of science will
always recognize scientific achievements, inde-
pendent of nationality. But should any attempt
be made to resume friendly relations with Ger-
many and Austria by means of invitations to sci-
entific congresses, we shall certainly all resent
it.”
Indeed, some English thinkers almost despair
of the future and fear a permanent breakdown of
European solidarity and civilization. In April,
1916, the London “Nation” remarked gloomily:
“Europe is now being mentally conceived as
inevitably and permanently dual. . . . We are
ceasing to think of Europe. . . . The normal end
of war (which is peace) is to be submerged in the
idea of a war-series indefinitely prolonged. Soon
the entire Continent will have but one longing—
the longing for rest. The cup is to be dashed
from its lips l For a world steeped in fear and
ruled by the barren logomachy of hate, diplo-
matic intercourse would almost cease to be possi-
ble. . . . In the matter of culture, Modern Eu-
rope would tend to relapse to a state inferior even
to that of Medieval Europe, and to sink far below
that of the Renaissance.” *
These are serious and weighty words on which
we will do well to ponder. There is indeed much
to arouse anxiety for the future of mankind.
And yet before we abandon ourselves to melan-
choly reveries we should remember certain facts.
For one thing, England’s present implacable tem-
per is no new or unprecedented phenomenon in
38 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
the history of British national psychology. To
him who doubts this assertion I recommend a
perusal of Burke’s “Reflections on the Revolu-
tion in France” or the “Letters of a Regicide
Peace.” Assuredly current British cartoons of
the Kaiser are no more virulent and certainly in
better taste than British lampoons on the Cor-
sican a hundred years ago.
Of course the answer to this is that Anglo-
French hatreds took nearly a century to die away.
That is true. But it is also true that the world
moves faster now than ever before. Most of the
Allies of to-day were enemies a generation ago.
A couple of decades hence a turn of Fate’s rap-
idly revolving wheel—pan-Russianism, an awak-
ened Orient, a general rising of the colored world,
or some giant evolution as yet beyond our ken—
may force Briton and Teuton fair into each
other’s arms. Necessity, like politics, makes
strange bedfellows. Who knows?
CHAPTER II
FRANCE
RENCH. national psychology exhibits a strik-
ing contrast between surface variability and
underlying permanence: a combination of mo-
bility and solidity—mobility of thought and feel-
ing with solidity of character. This comes out
strongly in the field of politics. Fickleness for
forms is coupled with instinctive adhesion to tra-
ditional tendencies and policies.
During the generation which followed the
Franco-Prussian War, to be sure, this truth was
somewhat obscured. Eighteen seventy—“The
Terrible Year”—acted like a blow in the solar
plexus. The soul of France was temporarily
paralyzed, and surface variability, freed from its
stabilizer, went almost unchecked, acute factional
broils, materialism, and pessimism long making
France an uncertain quantity in European af-
fairs.
But about the beginning of the present century
France recovered from the shock of 1870 and de-
termined to play a positive rôle in the world.
Two general attitudes toward foreign policy were
visible—both springing from the historic past.
One of these, flowing from the humanitarian
idealism of the eighteenth century and the Revo-
&
39
40 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
lution, sought to make France once more the re-
generative center of mankind by concentrating
French energy upon constructive ideas and social
reform. Aggressive foreign policies and “re-
venge” for 1870 were to be eschewed. An exam-
ple of this party's attitude toward European af-
fairs is Francis Delaisi's book, “The Inevitable
War,” which appeared in 1911. Believing an
Anglo-German war certain, Delaisi saw both
sides courting France—Germany for money,
England for men. His thesis was that France
should aid neither, but should conserve her
strength and emerge the moral arbiter and re-
conciler of Europe. The most prominent figure
of this school in French political life was M.
Joseph Caillaux. The party’s adherents were
mostly drawn from the working classes of the
towns, especially the great labor organization
known as the “C. G. T.” (Confédération Générale
du Travail), and from the peasantry of the
South—the Midi.
At the same time, however, another trend of
French thought had become evident; one based
upon traditions even older in the history of
France. The French have always displayed
strong likings for military prowess and an ex-
pansive foreign policy—especially toward the
Rhine. They have before their eyes the vision
of a glorious past and remember that up to the
formation of German and Italian unity France
was unquestionably the first Power in Europe—
La Grande Nation. Also, for many Frenchmen,
FRANCE - 41
the humiliation and “mutilation” of 1870 was a
perpetual agony. It is therefore not surprising
that the reviving spirit of France expressed it-
self largely in terms of La Grande Nation, re-
venge upon Germany, and the recovery of Alsace-
Lorraine. The Russian alliance and the entente
with England powerfully stimulated this feeling,
while the various colonial disputes with Germany
quickened hostility against the Teutons. The
chief political exponent of “The New France,”
M. Théophile Delcassé, worked frankly for such a
diplomatic isolation and encirclement of Germany
that she would one day be faced with the alter-
native of either disgorging Alsace-Lorraine or be-
ing crushed in a hopeless war. The strength of
the “Patriots” lay among the old nobility, the
army, the bourgeoisie and intellectuals, and the
peasantry of the East and North. Its optimistic
temper is revealed by an abundant literature in
the years preceding the present conflict, a good
example being Colonel Arthur Boucher’s “La
France victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain.”
(1911).
The opening months of 1914 saw France torn
by the struggles of these two parties, complicated
by manifestations of France’s rather factious
parliamentary life such as the Affaire Caillaua.
The temper of “New France” was shown in the
inaugural address of the eminent French writer,
Maurice Barrès, elected president of the Ligue
des Patriotes July 12, 1914, after the death of the
poet, Paul Déroulède. On that occasion M. Bar-
42 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
rès said: “We shall all continue his (Dérou-
lède's) task—the union of all Frenchmen for the
reclaiming of the lost provinces. The first act of
the President of the League of Patriots will be
to salute next Sunday the statue of Lorrainese
Jeanne d'Arc on the very spot where the Saint
of the Patrie poured out her blood, and to bring
flowers of remembrance and hope to the statue of
Strasburg. Vivent l’Alsace et la Lorraine, quand
même!”
Given so much optimistic sentiment, it is not
strange that the rapid German invasion of Bel-
gium and France in what Frenchmen regarded as
a brutal attempt to dominate Europe and crush
France into lasting insignificance, should have
roused the deep patriotism of the French people
to a peculiarly high pitch of exaltation. Before
the German peril France rose as one man to de-
fend the threatened soil of the Patrie.
The quick thrust of the French armies into
Alsace during the opening days of the war evoked
a veritable delirium of joy. The spirit of the
nation was mirrored in the proclamation of Gen-
eral Joffre to the inhabitants of the invaded prov-
ince: “Children of Alsace After forty-four
years of dolorous waiting, French soldiers again
tread the soil of your noble land. They are the
first laborers in the noble work of the revenge!
For them, what emotion what pride! To carry
through this work they offer their lives; the
French nation is behind them to a man, and in the
folds of their battle flags are inscribed the magic
FRANCE 43
words of Right and Liberty, Vive l’Alsace! Vive
la France!” “At last it dawns !” cried Maurice
Barrès. “The day hoped for during forty-four
years! The red trousers appear on the crest of
the Vosges, and our soldiers reconquer Alsace dis-
tracted with joy!” And on August 10 he wrote:
“It is a morning landscape, a sky of gold, silver
and azure. August, 1914! The bugle resounds
among the hills; the tricolor flag advances among
the vineyards and woodlands; Alsace intones the
Marseillaise. The fetters of Alsace are broken.
Déroulède, we are at Mulhouse ! Vive la Répub-
lique Française!”
This jubilant mood was, however, of short du-
ration. The brilliant sunrise was soon overcast
by clouds. The mighty German tide crashed re-
morselessly through Belgium and surged almost
to the walls of Paris. Yet France stood firm. In
the early days of September, it is true, when
things looked blackest, there seem to have been
a few French politicians who were ready for a
separate peace, but the popular watchword was
everywhere, “Il faut temir!”—“Hold out!”
France held, and the German tide was borne back
from the Marne to the Aisne.
The smoldering hatred for the Teuton flared
up fiercely from the first. To quote two of the
most moderate expressions of this feeling, the
well-known French economist, Paul Leroy-Beau-
lieu, wrote in his organ, “L’Economiste Fran-
çais,” of August, 1914, “Such is the greed of the
German ogre. Is it not quite time that all in-
44 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
dependent countries of Europe united in order
to prevent the establishment of his growing
tyranny and to stop the inroads of a country
which is none other than a beast of prey?” And
the eminent French philosopher, Henri Bergson,
exclaimed: “The struggle against Germany
which is now going on is no more or less than a
struggle of civilization against barbarism. . . .
The German ogre must be placed in such a condi-
tion that it will be impossible for him to devour his
neighbors.”
This feeling was speedily envenomed by the
course of events. The huge death grapple of mil-
lions of fighting men over France’s northern
provinces must under any circumstances have
caused immense suffering and desolation. But
the issue was now complicated by charges of
wholesale German atrocities which the French
government soon formulated in a series of offi-
cial reports that roused horror and fury through-
out the country. The Paris “Temps” called on
the men of France to resist to the death this at-
tack “directed against all human laws by the
coalition of German and Austro-Hungarian bar-
barians raging, in a sort of criminal drunkenness,
and leagued, like the Huns of Attila, to destroy
the invincible supremacy of human civilization.”
The publication of the first official atrocities’ re-
port made a great sensation. Its language was
severe, the preamble stating: “There has never
been a war between civilized nations which has
been of such a savage and ferocious nature. Pil-
FRANCE 45
lage, rape, incendiarism, and murder are the
practices current among the enemy.” The press
comment may be judged by the words of the con-
servative “Journal des Débats.” On January
15, 1915, it said: “We are stricken as though un-
der the blow of a collective dishonor to humanity
by the mere enumeration of all these acts of pre-
meditated bestiality, organized sadism, methodic
rape, which appear as the day’s work of the Ger-
man army.”
The destruction of historic monuments, partic-
ularly the bombardment of Rheims Cathedral,
seemed to rouse as much popular fury as the re-
ported atrocities upon the civilian inhabitants.
“La France” (Paris), of late September, 1914,
thus expressed the nation’s “Public horror and
wrath”: “Can such a crime be pardoned? No,
a thousand times no l Let there be a holy war
that shall conquer at all costs and wipe out
the immoral horde of Potsdam. The glorious
chimes of Rheims will be heard no more, but Nem-
esis will surely come.” And the “Journal des
Débats” of September 25 exclaimed, “After Lou-
vain, after Rheims, what vengeance will not be
permissible to make these barbarians expiate the
shame of being Germans!”
“Barbarians” was, indeed, the word most
often employed by Frenchmen to describe the
Germans, just as the word “Hun’’ was rising into
popularity across the Channel. Insistence was
everywhere laid upon the savage qualities of the
Teutons. In an article entitled “Barbarians: Past
46 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
and Present,” the “Journal des Débats” of Sep-
tember 25, 1914, remarked: “Really, there is
something to be said for the barbarians of old. In
any case, they were infinitely better than their
unworthy descendants; they aspired to become
civilized, whereas the pseudo-civilized barbari-
ans of to-day reveal the mentality of the cave-man
beneath the masque of the pedagogue.”
Many Frenchmen found it hard to believe that
their Frankish ancestors were of Teutonic blood,
and attempted either to deny it or to apologize
for it, ascribing their subsequent improvement to
the saving grace of Latin culture. For example,
the Abbé Stephen Coubé, canon of Orleans, wrote:
“You tell me that the Franks all had German
blood in their veins. It is possible. I say, ‘It is
possible,” because many persons deny this, and
perhaps they are right. But let us admit it, for
the sake of argument. Well! This is an original
sin, which we must confess with humility. But
happily our forefathers were quickly purified in
the baptism of Latin civilization. They thereby
cleansed themselves of the primitive barbarism
contracted in the Hyrcynian forest and de-Ger-
manized themselves so well that the Germans have
denied and cursed them ever since.”
Others, however, asserted positively that
Frenchmen and Germans were not of the same
race. In October, 1914, a writer in the Clerical
organ, “La Croix,” denied that the Prussians
were Aryans. Instead, they were descended from
“certain nameless prehistoric tribes” of non-Eu-
FRANCE 47
ropean origin. Such opinions were not confined
to Clerical writers. In the spring of 1915 the
famous savant Camille Flammarion asserted be-
fore the French Astronomical Society: “All the
evidence tends to prove that this race is in its very
blood the implacable enemy of our laborious and
tranquil civilization which can develop only in
labor and in peace. The present war is another
stage in the struggle of the civilized against the
barbarians, begun more than two thousand years
ago. We are even justified in thinking that this
race differs from our own in origin as well as in
type of evolution. The unity of the human spe-
cies has never been proven. We probably do not
descend from the same race of simians, and fur-
thermore we bear in us the element of Greco-Latin
civilization, which differs sensibly from that of the
Teutons. An abyss separates us, despite certain
crossings and some psychic exceptions. No. Ger-
J TN lo *
mans and Frenchmen do not speak the same in-
tellectual language. They are not the same race.
The vulture, bird of prey, is not of the same race
as the skylark which soars singing into the lumi-
nous azure. . . . This is a question of life or death
for modern civilization. Here is a beast which
must be struck down. Delenda est Carthago!”
Given such a race as the Germans, who were not
merely “barbarians” but ‘‘uncivilizable” barbari-
ans, the presence among them of any true culture
was obviously unthinkable. Accordingly, a wide-
spread demand arose for the sundering of all in-
tellectual and artistic bonds between the two peo-
48 PRESENT-I)AY EUROPE
ples, since such contact would merely corrupt
French culture as it had already been cor-
rupted in the past. Professor Louis Reynaud of
the University of Poitiers wrote a book to prove
that every noteworthy feature in German life was
of Latin, especially French, origin and inspira-
tion. “The sole literary interpreter of the Ger-
man spirit, Maurice Maeterlinck, writes in
French,” remarked M. Maurice Barrès. “I
should never bother my head finding out what the
‘intellectuals’ over the Rhine were thinking.” A
“League for French Culture” was formed, sup-
ported by such eminent littérateurs as M. René
Doumic, for the purification of the national genius
and its future development along genuine French
lines.
For that matter, many persons saw in the war
itself one of the main causes for such a devel-
opment. The war’s regenerative action upon
French life was widely noted. “Ah! How beau-
tiful she is, this France of 1914!” exclaimed Mau-
rice Barrès. “What a universal freshness! It
seems that all souls are become new and simple
again. Before, we had known only the chrysalis.
To-day, France opens her wings!” His idea of
the future is equally optimistic: “How beautiful
she will be after victory, this regenerated France.
It is a new world which begins.” M. Georges Oh-
net wrote in the “Gaulois” of March, 1915: “The
virility of the race, the self-abnegation and devo-
tion of the people, the simple heroism of our sol-
diers, the proud courage of our women, and the
FRANCE 49
prudence of political parties—in a word, the
whole firm and healthy national organism, justi-
fies us in looking forward to a fruitful and magnifi-
cent renaissance.” The well-known Protestant
pastor, Wilfred Monod, in a sermon preached
about this same date at the Oratoire, Paris, said:
“Who will deny that the French people have
passed, during the last months, through one of
those moral crises which can end in a radical and
healing conversion? Let us have the courage to
acknowledge that in more than one respect our na-
tion offered certain alarming symptoms of anemia,
and even of degeneracy. . . . Suddenly the
trumpet sounded ‘To arms l’ Then were mani-
fested in the social organism, with surprising spon-
taneity, those phenomena of defense which appear
in sick persons reacting toward health. . . . The
spectacle was wonderful. Such have been the
fruits of the trial.”
The deep emphasis laid upon “Latinism,” both
as regards culture and blood, accounts for the
spirit of the intense propaganda carried on dur-
ing the first year of the war to sweep in the “Latin
sister.” Italy. This appeal made a profound im-
pression upon Italian public opinion and was un-
questionably one of the great reasons why Italy
joined the Allies in May, 1915. The effect upon
France was electrical. The utterances of her
leaders reflected the popular emotion. On May
25, M. Paul Deschanel, president of the Chamber
of Deputies, announced Italy’s decision as follows:
“To-day, as fifty-six years ago, Italy is with us.
50 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
. . . France salutes fraternally the flight of the
Roman eagles. . . . And now, O glorious dead of
Magenta and Solferino, rise and fire with your gen-
erous breath the two immortal sisters, in justice
forever reunited l’’ To this M. Viviani added:
“In the name of the Government of the Republic, I
salute the Italian ration in its unshakable firm-
ness. . . . In this momentous hour France turns
her gaze and her heart toward that august land of
heroism and of beauty. Sons of the same race,
let our lips utter the cry of our conscience and our
heart—the unanimous, vibrating cry, ‘Vive
l’Italie! Vive la France!’” “It is not for
naught that we have common origins,” said the
“Journal des Débats,” September 10, “that cen.
turies, yea, millenniums, of incessant interchange
have formed the genius of two great peoples; that
they have the same intellectual formation, the
same sensibility, the same qualities and sometimes
also the same defects. Special circumstances may
cause family disagreements; but in critical hours
the family discovers itself and the bonds are re-
knit more solidly than before.”
In a previous chapter we noted the optimistic
spirit of England during the first half of 1915.
This was equally true of France, though French
optimism was of a sterner and more exalted type,
since France was suffering more directly from
the war. Save for a handful of pacifists like Ro-
main Rolland, public opinion was unanimous in
demanding a fight to a finish. Indeed, M. Rol-
land’s pacific utterances drew down upon him a
FRANCE 51
storm of indignation. In his organ “La Revue”
for July, 1915, the distinguished French publicist
Jean Finot furiously denounced all pacifists every-
where and stigmatized pleas for mercy toward the
Germans as practically lése-humanité. Accord-
ing to M. Finot the Kaiser, the Crown Prince and
all the German leaders must be tried, condemned,
and hanged. “What a moral solace for all to be
able to be present at such a spectacle,” M. Finot
concluded. “No Frenchman can now utter the
word “Peace,’” asserted M. Paul Sabatier. “To
use it would be akin to treason. . . . If our sol-
diers go down to the last man, everybody who has
not yet taken up arms will fight to the last car-
tridge, to the last stone of our mountains that we
can hurl against a ‘Kultur’ which is naught Save
worship of the sword and the golden calf.” M.
Gabriel Hanotaux, in the “Revue Hebdomadaire”
of January 2, 1915, asserted that this was not
merely a politico-economic struggle but a genuine
religious war. Germany must therefore be beaten
to her very soul. The sentiment of the northern
provinces was voiced by the “Petit Calaisien.”
(Calais), which said, in April, 1915, “This war
shall continue until the enemies of the Triple
Entente have been crushed into the dust.” M.
Stephen Pichon in his organ, the Paris “Petit
Journal,” thus apostrophized Germany: “You
will have to reimburse the Allies for all the costs
of the war, and this will be an enormous sum.
But this is not all. You will have to pay for the
cathedrals, the museums, the palaces, the huts,
52 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
you bombarded and burned, the butcheries you
committed, for the widows and orphans you have
made. That will make billions and billions that
you will have to pay us. Oh, no! Not at once,
for you could not do that. . . . It will take you a
long time—ten years, twenty years, thirty years.
. . . Until Germany has paid this off, Russian
garrisons will occupy Breslau and Dresden, Eng-
lish garrisons Hamburg and Frankfort, a Belgian
garrison shall occupy Cologne, a French one Cob-
lenz and Mainz. Only after the last penny has
been paid will the Allies withdraw, and even then
not until after they have blown up the last Ger-
man fortress.”
With regard to the future settlement of Ger-
many, French opinion was practically unanimous
in demanding that not merely the German im-
perial form of government but also German po-
litical unity must be destroyed. The superior
population, wealth, and energy of Germany had
pressed so heavily on France that a continuance
of such conditions was deemed intolerable. A
similar fate was decreed for Austria-Hungary,
while Turkey was to be divided up among the Al-
lied Powers, Syria falling to France. A typical
pronouncement is that of the “Figaro,” “The
empires of the barbarians must be shattered.”
At the beginning of the war the destruction of
German unity was generally held to be an easy
task, owing to the supposed survival of Teutonic
separatism. In October, 1914, Maurice Barrès
wrote, “The German power will be broken, di-
FRANCE 53
vided, converted to reason, and the Germans them-
selves, once more become Saxons, Bavarians,
Badenese, Protestants, Catholics, etc., will kiss
our knees as they thank us for having cured them
of their costly collective delirium of pride.”
In face of the patent solidarity of German pub-
lic opinion, however, such optimism quickly van-
ished. Nevertheless, France remained convinced
of the necessity for the destruction of German
unity, and the only result was that popular fury,
hitherto concentrated upon the Prussians, was
broadened to include all Germans. In January,
1915, the French publicist Jacques Daugny wrote
an impassioned article in the ‘‘Nouvelle Revue”
to disillusion “those naïve souls who imagine that
Germany, once purged of the Hohenzollerns, will
become again the patriarchal and romantic land
of Goethe and Schiller. . . . The German soul has
been poisoned forever; it dreams of nothing but
violence and domination. Let us, then, not com-
mit the folly of leaving in the hands of our enemy
the fragments of his sword. Like Siegfried, he
would only reforge it to strike us once more.”
The violence of French public opinion is revealed
by the words of the well-known French author
Onésime Reclus. In his book “Le Rhin Fran-
çais,” published in the summer of 1915, he ex-
claims: “The stinking beast is down! We are
going to divide up its flesh and its bones. We will
make of it [Germany] an insolvent debtor, a
merchant walled off by prohibitive tariffs, an ad-
miral commanding fishing boats, a generalissimo
54 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
with not even a ridiculous national guard under
his orders.”
The implacable temper displayed toward the
German people is strikingly shown by an article
of Louis Léger in the “Revue Hebdomadaire”
for December 18, 1915. M. Léger is a distin-
guished specialist on Slavic affairs, and his article
recommends the lopping off of all eastern Ger-
many for the aggrandizement of powerful Polish
and Bohemian kingdoms under the protection of
Russia. The suggested pruning of Germany’s
eastern frontier is drastic. Slav wedges must be
driven into the heart of Saxony and to within a
short distance of Berlin. The fate of the annexed
German populations is not left in doubt: they
must be incontinently Slavized or exterminated.
“Well!” exclaims M. Léger, “as to the Germans,
who have in the past Germanized so many peoples
—it will be their turn to be Slavized. If they
balk at this metamorphosis they will have just one
thing to do—get out, slink back into Germania’s
bosom, or go settle beyond the seas. Their reign
has lasted long enough. But, though insolent in
success, in adversity they have much suppler
backbones than most people think.” The extir-
pative note comes out clearly: ‘‘ ‘Aus rotten” (“root
them out”) once cried Bismarck of the Poles in
Prussia. Now, in our turn, let us cry “Ausrot-
ten.” . . . All these regions must be de-German-
ized. When a tree spreads a harmful shade we
cut it down; we do more—we tear it up by the
roots. Well, just so must we tear up the Prussian
FRANCE 55
tree by the roots. The regions so long infected
by its shade must be colonized by Poles, Russians,
and Lithuanians. All these peoples are prolific
enough to quickly fill the gaps left by the disap-
pearance of the descendants of the Teutonic
knights whose successors have all too largely re-
venged themselves for the vow of chastity once
professed by their predecessors.”
Such being the French temper toward the gen-
eral post-war settlement of Germany, we are in a
position to appreciate France’s attitude toward
the re-drawing of Germany’s western frontier.
On one point French public opinion is unanimous
—Alsace-Lorraine must return to France. About
that there is absolutely no discussion. This mat-
ter once settled, however, divergent views appear.
Many Frenchmen declare themselves satisfied
with the prospect of regaining Alsace-Lorraine
and aver that the destruction of German unity
would furnish sufficient guarantees against fur-
ther trouble. A notable example of this way of
thinking is the eminent economist Yves Guyot.
But such is emphatically not the opinion held
by another powerful body of French thought,
which demands extensive annexations in western
Germany. These doctrines require our attention.
Of course, the recent trend of the war makes an
Allied conquest of western Germany a very remote
possibility. Nevertheless, Rhineward expansion
is the oldest of French policies, and the acquisi-
tion of the whole left bank of the Rhine (includ-
ing Belgium and Holland) as France’s “natural”
56 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
frontier has been the dream of Frenchmen for
nearly a thousand years. When we remember
the unchanging, even atavistic, character of
French basic thinking, we must realize that such
historic aspirations, once roused, will not easily
sink to sleep again, and that no matter how cruelly
these hopes may be deceived by the present course
of events they will influence French national sen-
timent and foreign policy for a long time to come.
The philosophy of what we may term French
Neo-Imperialism is admirably set forth by that
able specialist on world-politics, Professor Edou-
ard Dria’alt, in his recent book “La France et la
Guerre: Les Solutions Françaises” (1916). “We
may as well say it, since we are at the end of the
nightmare,” he begins. “For a century France
was a conquered nation.” The weight of Water-
loo bore down France's spirit even before Sedan,
and since 1870 the best proof of France’s moral
abasement is the way she fixed her gaze upon Al-
sace-Lorraine, to the exclusion of her older and
wider dreams. “How much more magnificent,
how much more splendid in its imaginative flight,
was the policy of Old France. Our forefathers
had not the “souls of the conquered.” They were
naïve and young. They did not trouble them-
selves with political philosophy, principles of na-
tionalities, etc., they had the faith which moves
mountains—which moves frontiers over moun-
tains. What will give us back the faith of our
fathers?” M. Driault's answer is, “The image
of Ancient Gaul’’; that is, everything west of the
FRANCE 57
Rhine. “Our forefathers remembered it. They
had in their blood, in their very nature, the concept
that Gaul, the image and model of France,
stretched to the Pyrenees, to the Alps—to the
Rhine; that for long centuries the Romans and
Gallo-Romans had given to this admirable geo-
graphical figure a unity of language, institutions,
and culture which has forever given its popula-
tions a common soul. Gaul was then closed to the
Germans, to the barbarians. . . . But during the
century since Waterloo, what a miserable specta-
cle! On the word of historians obsessed by defeat
we have accepted the notion that the final frontier
of France was that of 1789 . . . a false impression,
a pitiable doctrine of resignation l’’ To-day
France is broad awake. But how shall this ad-
mirable spirit be sustained? How shall France
be saved? “She will be saved only if she no
longer has that soul of the vanquished which she
got from Sedan and Waterloo; only if she takes
up again the glorious tradition of Ancient Gaul,
of Royal France, and of the soldiers of the First
Republic.”
The Neo-Imperialists adduce many arguments
for their proposed annexations of German soil.
Some lay stress on strategic necessities, not even
Alsace-Lorraine being held sufficient to prevent
new assaults of the “barbarians.” M. Driault
holds that the safety of all western Europe, in-
cluding England, is at stake. Other writers em-
phasize economic considerations. The vast coal
and iron deposits of western Germany must pass
58 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
under French control, both for the future eco-
nomic prosperity of France and to prevent Ger-
many from amassing new wealth for subsequent
wars of revenge.
The objection that the inhabitants of these re-
gions are Germans is rebutted either by assert-
ing that the principle of nationality cannot be set
up in favor of a people which has trampled the
rights of others under foot, or by asserting that
the populations on the left bank of the Rhine are
not genuine Germans but Teutonized Gauls whose
German veneer would quickly rub off under
French rule. Says M. Driault: “We wish to reës-
tablish the century old traditions of France’s his-
tory, momentarily broken by the Prussian acci-
dent. There is no Prussian ‘right’ to the left
bank of tºe Rhine; there is only a Prussian usur-
pation. We have here a Rhineland, Celtic at bot-
tom and with centuries of Gallo-Roman educa-
tion.” “The occupation of the left bank of the
Rhine by the Germans is the fruit of a long usur-
pation,” writes Paul Marmottan in his “Notre
Frontière Naturel” (1915). “Its territories
were Gaulish. The Rhine is not a German river.”
“We are merely following our most ancient, im-
mutable, and glorious national tradition in claim-
ing the left bank of the Rhine,” asserts Professor
J. Dontenville in his “Après la Guerre” (1915).
While Senator Frank Chauveau in “La Paix et
la Frontière du Rhin” (1915) exclaims, “These
are our necessary limits, traced by nature and by
history. . . . We will have the Rhine frontier.”
FRANCE 59
The easy assimilation of these territories is em-
phasized. “It is in the name of their Latinism
that we reclaim them,” insists Onésime Reclus,
and further remarks, “Do not regard the Cisrhe-
names as pure Germans, but as half Frenchmen,
half-brothers who wish to reënter the family.”
“On these Cisrhenanes, men of a civilization at
bottom identical with our own,” writes Professor
Dontenville, “the charm of our culture, so finely
and delicately superior to Kultur, will soon oper-
ate irresistibly.” “The French nationality, au-
reoled with the prestige of victory,” says M. Dri-
ault, “will radiate as in former days to the
Rhine.” Some writers admit that there will be a
minority among the annexed populations which
will prove refractory to French assimilation.
For such recalcitrants expulsion is widely recom-
mended. “Those Germans who are not pleased
with the new French supremacy may recross the
Rhine,” writes M. Marmottan. “We shall not
stop them.” And Onésime Reclus asserts:
“Never will France have a better occasion of say-
ing to the Germans of Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne,
Aix-la-Chapelle: ‘This is my house; if you don’t
like it, get out!’” M. Reclus is also hopeful as to
the effects of education: “We shall not neglect
the school, as we did too often in Alsace-Lorraine;
especially as it is by the school that the Germans
have been turned into a pack of wild beasts. We
shall teach these people French.”
The final argument of the Neo-Imperialists is
the doctrine of “compensations.” Since all her
60 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
allies will get something by the war, France must
not be left out. “And wel” exclaims Senator
Chauveau, “We, who have suffered the most, Sac-
rificed the most, risked the most: we shall then
have nothing!” “Go tol’’ cries M. Marmottan.
“Are we going to let Germany be divided up with-
out cutting our slice of the cake?”
The annexation of the whole left bank of the
Rhine naturally involves the problem of France’s
future relations with Belgium and Holland. To
be sure, Belgium is frequently offered the terri-
tories lying between her present frontier and the
Rhine, but the same writers invariably claim that
the presence of so many Germans within her body
politic would be too much for Belgian digestion,
so Belgium is expected to refuse. Belgium is,
however, to be consoled at Holland’s expense by
the acquisition of the Maestricht salient, Dutch
Flanders at the mouth of the Scheldt, and Hol-
land’s suzerainty over Luxemburg. The Dutch
are not expected to object, and are offered Ger-
man territory as compensation. The virtual en-
circlement of Belgium and Holland by French
territory would result in a close understanding
between the three nations. Some writers call this
new status “Restored Gaul,” others the “Gaulish
Region.” Perhaps the censorship here hinders
speculation.
The final problem which the French Neo-Imper-
ialists attempt to solve is the attitude which their
projected Greater France is to assume toward the
various Germanic states beyond the Rhine. Most
FRANCE 61
writers think that these should constitute a French
sphere of influence. Some writers believe that
France should take the principal strategic
“bridge-heads” on the right bank, while one Neo-
Imperialist, M. Jacques Daugny, asserts that the
French frontier should go far beyond the Rhine
to the crests of the Black Forest. “Germans
have quite sufficiently told us,” writes M. Daugny,
“that the Rhine is not a frontier. It is, indeed,
merely a marvelous route traced by Nature be-
tween two fertile plains which in reality form
only one whole from the Vosges to the Black For-
est. To be developed in peace, this valley must
know but one master. Our frontier must, there-
fore, follow the crest of the Black Forest, the
watershed between the basins of the Rhine and
the Danube.” -
French Neo-Imperialism is the reflection of the
optimistic period which reached its climax with
Italy’s entrance into the war in May, 1915. How-
ever, the long series of German ...umphs and Al-
lied disasters which began in June gradually
evoked less confident notes from the chorus of
French public opinion. Downright pessimism
was, it is true, sternly repressed by the rigid cen-
sorship, but the sense of strain under which
France was laboring could not be entirely denied
a voice. “The Allies have failed since the
Marne,” wrote M. Gustave Hervé in his organ
the “Guerre Sociale” of early July, 1915. The
paper was at once suppressed, but the words had
been written.
62 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
So profound was the impression made by Ger-
man resisting power that by the spring of 1916 a
new thought-current was plainly visible in French
public opinion. Its cardinal tenet was revealed
in its watchword, “The War after the War!”
Fundamentally, its aim was the same as that
of the Neo-Imperialists: Germany must be
“smashed,” German unity must be destroyed, and
a regenerated France must take a leading position
in the world. Hatred of the Teuton flamed as
hotly as ever within the French heart. “The en-
tire universe will charge the beast that menaces
the universe,” cried Gabriel Hanotaux in the
“Revue Hebdomadaire” of January 3, 1916.
“The chastisement is slow, but it is coming, com-
ing. You have lusted after material well-being,
booty, gold, women; your sadism was to foul the
world with its ‘eugenics.’ You purposed to rape
humanity through terror. Wait! This terror is
coming back upon you. It is you who will trem-
ble, you who will grow pale. Misery and despair
will destroy in you the last vestige of your pride!”
The crushing of Germany thus remained the
cardinal tenet of French thought. Nevertheless,
Tmany Frenchmen began to fear either that Ger-
many could not now be crushed on the battlefield
or that even were her sword shattered in the pres–
ent conflict German energy would quickly amass
fresh wealth and forge new weapons for a subse-
quent war of revenge. The logical conclusion
was that Germany must be permanently kept
down by a standing league of the Allied Powers
FRANCE 63
which should be not only military but also eco-
nomic in character. Similar opinions were of
course being voiced in England, but “War after
the War” projects were received much more en-
thusiastically in France than across the Channel.
For this there were several reasons. To begin
with, France had shown much less resisting power
to Germany’s aggressive economic methods than
had England, and French industry had suffered
severely from German competition in the years
immediately preceding the war. Frenchmen
therefore felt that the elimination of this competi-
tion was necessary for the security of their indus-
trial future. Again, the political destruction of
Germany was in France generally held to be im-
perative, whereas in England the prevailing opin-
ion was that it was impracticable. Lastly, Pro-
tectionist France felt no such wrench as did tra-
ditionally Free-trade England at the prospect of
far-reaching international tariff agreements.
From the very beginning of the war an active
propaganda had been carried on in France for the
permanent exclusion of German economic activity
within the boundaries of the Republic and its col-
onies. Proposals for concerted economic discrim-
ination against Germany by all the Allies thus
found the ground well prepared. The French
press was enthusiastic from the first. In Decem-
ber, 1915, the well-known French writer, Jean
Richepin, announced in the “Figaro”: “The idea
of a commercial league which will continue after
the war a tireless, merciless struggle against Ger-
64 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
man hegemony after breaking it by force of arms,
is one that I most heartily approve. On several
occasions I have treated the subject under the
significant title of ‘The Second War.” I shall per-
severe in this campaign with so much the more en-
ergy now that I perceive the unanimous ardor of
all the Allies in their determination to carry out
this idea. By this means and by this alone will
our victory be completely and absolutely consoli-
dated.” About the same date the “Nouvelliste
de Bordeaux” thus outlined the measures neces-
sary to secure Germany’s economic downfall: “It
is quite possible now to indicate some of the meth-
ods that seem essential: absolute refusal of natu-
ralization to all Germans in the conquering coun-
tries; refusal to allow the establishment of com-
mercial agencies; the stock exchanges of Paris,
London, and Petrograd pitilessly closed to the
stocks from beyond the Rhine. Above all, the
Allies must seize by right of conquest certain ter-
ritories the loss of which will mean to the German
provinces a notable decrease in their economic
wealth.” M. Sancholle-Heuraux, in “La Revue”
for May, 1916, remarked, “At its last congress the
French Socialist party declared that it did not de-
sire the economic ruin of the Central empires.
This idealistic affirmation was a deplorable er-
ror.” The economic conference of the Allied gov-
ernments held at Paris in June, 1916, and its
recommendation for future economic collabora-
tion excited the warm approval of nearly all the
FRANCE 65
French press. A few Free Traders like Yves
Guyot looked askance on principle, and other eco-
nomic writers like Max Hoschiller and Henri
Hauser doubted its practicability, but the majority
opinion ran obviously the other way.
An interesting phase of this trend toward per-
manent politico-economic action against Germany
is the movement known as “Pan-Latinism.”
This movement had been in evidence from the
very beginning of the war. We have already seen
how powerfully French appeals to ethnic and cul-
tural solidarity had influenced Italian sentiment
in the opening months of 1915. But this propa-
ganda had been only a part of a still wider appeal
addressed to the whole Latin world. As early as
February, 1915, a “Pan-Latin” congress had
convened at the Paris Sorbonne, where prominent
representatives of all the “Latin” nations, in-
cluding Latin America and Greece, affirmed the
ethnic and cultural solidarity of the Latin
race and expressed the warmest sympathy
for France. The French attitude was well
expressed in the opening speech of the pre-
siding officer, M. Paul Deschanel, president of the
Erench Chamber of Deputies: “Behold, in our
venerable Sorbonne, the whole Latin family re-
united. . . . A family, one in its magnificent di-
versity. One, because the ancient rivalries be-
tween Latin peoples have no longer any raison
d’être; because their very shadows have disap-
peared; because all our interests are inseparable.
66 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
One, because throughout the ages every effort of
the Hellenic and Latin conscience has been toward
the same ideal: Liberty by Right.”
Pan-Latin sentiment has unquestionably been
of great benefit to France. Besides its effect
upon Italy, it had much to do with the entrance
of Rumania and Portugal into the war on the
Allies’ side. The only refractory member of the
Latin confraternity appears to be Spain, whose
attitude will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.
The philosophy of Pan-Latinism is ably ex-
pounded by the well-known French publicist,
Louis Bertrand, in the “Revue des Deux Mondes”
of September 15, 1916. He regards the Teutonic
peril as a standing menace to Latin civilization no
matter how badly Germany may be defeated in
the present war. For that reason Latin solidar-
ity is an obvious measure of racial and cultural
self-preservation. He urges Latinism’s best
minds to an immediate working out of both theory
and practical details. “In order that it may be
possible, it must be believed in and desired. It
must constitute a faith. Pan-Germanism is, at
bottom, nothing but a mystic will. . . . For four
hundred years, after a long period of hesitation
and resistance, the Mediterranean world accepted
the ‘Pax Romana,” which was nothing but a per-
petual struggle against barbarism. To-day, in
order to continue this struggle, why should the
Western world refuse to accept the “Latin
peace’?” -
Other French thinkers glimpse even broader
FRANCE 67
unions against Teutonism. For example, M. Jean
Finot, in his organ “La Revue” for December,
1915, recommends a lasting Franco-Anglo-Italian
cultural solidarity. “In the great reconstruction
after the war we must, first and foremost, break
with the pretended German civilization, with the
influence of its savants, philosophers, and writers.
Europe must renew the traditions interrupted at
the time of the Renaissance. In the intellectual
and moral domain, all those treasures of which
humanity is so proud have been above all created
by the three peoples to-day, allies and friends:
the English, the French, and the Italians. But
their activity has always lacked cohesion and
unity. The Germans, seizing upon the conquests
of thought and imagination made by those three
peoples, have made the world believe in their spe-
cial genius and their great merits. Being merely
propagators of others’ thought, they have never-
theless made us believe that they were its authors.
. . . Under the beneficent influence of these three
countries, human thought and inspiration have
developed in harmonious fashion.” To carry on
this development, conscious coöperation is neces-
sary for the fulfilment of the “New Renaissance”
which should follow the war. Of course this does
not imply discrimination against other peoples.
But it does imply a virtual “quarantine of the
manifestations of ‘Kultur,” which will doubtless
continue to poison the universe for long years to
come. And just as the security of nations must
be guaranteed against the espionage and militar-
68 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
ism of Germany, so the conscience of peoples must
be defended against the moral contagion of a col-
lectivity which will long retain the evil effects of
the Great War.”
After all this we are not surprised to find most
Frenchmen frankly pessimistic concerning the
problem of future relations with the Teutonic
Powers. A few French thinkers, it is true, like
the pacifist Romain Rolland, assert the absolute
necessity of speedily re-knitting the broken bonds
of European solidarity, and predict that this will
take place. In June, 1915, M. Rolland wrote:
“The fate of mankind is above that of all patriots.
The intellectual ties between the hostile nations
are bound to be restored. Those who differ
simply commit suicide.” But such is not
the opinion of most Frenchmen. Much more
representative of French public opinion were
the words of Paul Sabatier, penned at about
the same time: “It does not seem possible that
these connections can ever be restored. It will
hardly be possible to bridge the gap which has
opened between French and German scientists;
the grief of the conquered race can only widen it.
Mutual hatred is so intense that it is to be feared
that both Germans and Frenchmen will see only
the enemy in the scientists whom they have to
review and criticize.”
At the close of the previous chapter we dis-
cussed the possibility of a fairly rapid subsidence
of the present Anglo-German hatred. Regarding
the future of Franco-German relations, however,
FRANCE 69
we are avowedly pessimistic. The two cases are
radically dissimilar. The English and German
peoples have many common ties of blood, religion,
and culture. This is their first real war with one
another, and the present struggle, though desper-
ate, is being waged at arm’s length, with no inva-
sions of home territory and with few direct in-
juries inflicted upon the civilian populations.
Also, both nations possess a realistic temper open
to compromises and practical solutions.
The French and German peoples, on the other
hand, have never been good neighbors. They
have behind them a record of rivalry and inter-
mittent warfare stretching back beyond recorded
history which has left an evil legacy of mutual
Wrongs and humiliations. For the last half cen-
tury their relations have been of the very worst,
1870 having been neither forgiven nor forgotten.
To all this is now being added the present fright-
ful war with its burden of suffering, destruction,
and death unparalleled in modern history. All
the old Scars have been ripped wide open, and
ideas and aspirations thought long dead stalk
forth into the light of day. The terrible atrocity
charges, whether exaggerated or no, are implic-
itly believed by Frenchmen, who to-day regard
the Germans as irreclaimable savages. The na-
tional temperaments, manners, and customs are
alike antipathetic, while material interests are
generally opposed.
All this betokens a persistence of Franco-Ger-
man hostility into the indefinite future, especially
70 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
when we remember that the French are markedly
traditionalist in their thinking, prone to fixed
ideas, and instinctively averse to sacrifice cher-
ished principles in realist compromise. As things
now appear, nothing short of an imminent peril to
western Europe would draw the two peoples to-
gether.
CHAPTER III
GERMANY
HE outstanding feature of German national
psychology is its extreme complexity. Ger-
man unity is so recent and so federal in type that
there is no cultural or intellectual center which
sets the tone for the whole country as London
and Paris do for England and France. Of course
the war has decisively proved that all Germans are
agreed upon certain fundamentals, such as the
preservation of German unity and the mainte-
ance of the Empire’s territorial integrity, but be-
yond these axioms there is the widest diversity of
aim and outlook, from extreme “Pan-German”
imperialists and absolutist Prussian Junkers to
extreme Social Democrats who deplore war on
principle and oppose all territorial annexations.
Matters are still further complicated by the in-
dividual German’s habit of introspection. The
mystical strain inherent in the Teutonic nature,
the tendency toward self-analysis, and the will-
ingness to look facts in the face no matter how
disagreeable the conclusions, all lead the average
German to react to a particular situation without
much reference to the past. He is restrained
neither by the Latin love of logical continuity nor
by the Anglo-Saxon fear of inconsistency, and he
71
72 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
will therefore talk and act very differently on
different occasions. This comes out strikingly
in the intellectual development of thinkers like
Friedrich Naumann or in the writings of a strong
personality like Maximilian Harden.
The eve of the Great War found Germany full
of unrest. Her astonishing economic transfor-
mation had raised a whole series of internal
problems which were being debated with great
intellectual intensity, while the external political
situation appeared so unfavorable that Germany’s
future was regarded with profound apprehension.
The sense of isolation and impending foreign peril
during the years immediately preceding the war
produced a highly alarmist literature, good ex-
amples being Colonel Frobenius’s “Germany’s
Hour of Destiny” and General von Bernhardi's
“Germany and the Next War.”
Under these circumstances, the effect of the
Austro-Serbian crisis of July, 1914, upon Ger-
many was electrical. German public opinion re-
garded the menace to Austria as deadly and de-
manded that Germany’s one dependable ally
should be supported at all costs. Serbia was not
only thought to be aiming at the disruption of
Austria-Hungary but was considered a mere cat’s
paw of Russian Pan-Slavism and lust of world do-
minion. At the beginning of the crisis the nor-
mally mild-spoken Berlin “Vossische Zeitung”
exclaimed warmly: “The bloody crime of Sera-
jevo was only one link in the long train of assas-
sination and horror by which the revolutionary
GERMANY 73
propagandists in Belgrade were working to pro-
mote the official policy of Serbia.” And a little
later the Berlin “Kreuzzeitung” declared: “No
great Power can allow an insignificant neighbor
to torment and injure it, especially when this
insignificant Power relies on its ability to rattle
the saber of another great Power.” The Teu-
tonic attitude is well set forth in an article by the
eminent German publicist Hans Delbrück, printed
in an American periodical, the “Atlantic
Monthly” for February, 1915, but written during
the early months of the war. Referring to the
“Greater Serbian’” peril for both Austria and
Germany, he wrote: “The danger to the Austrian
Empire which arises from it is very considerable,
not only because Serbia is Serbia, and because
she has partizans in the Hapsburg monarchy it-
self, but because she is the advance guard of the
Pan-Slavic idea and the outpost of mighty Russia.
Nor should we speak of Austro-Hungarian craze
for dominion; it is the instinct for self-preservation
of a great Power, which cannot, without despair-
ing of its own future, tolerate the existence of
the Greater Serbian idea either within its borders
or on its frontiers. A prospective Greater Serbia
would not only sever large tracts of territory from
the Austrian Empire, but would cut her off from
the sea, which in these days means death to a
great Power. The Greater Serbian idea and
Austria cannot exist side by side. Austria would
not only have ceased to be a great Power, but she
would have been dismembered as a state, if she
74 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
had not adopted vigorous measures. For the
same reason it is a matter of course that the Ger-
man Empire should stand at Austria's side. Had
we tolerated the subjugation and dismemberment
of Austria by Russia we should have had to wage
the next war against Russia and France alone.
Under no circumstances could we leave this dan-
ger to our descendants; the preservation of the
Hapsburg monarchy was therefore a vital issue for
the German Empire.”
In those circles which had long held a European
conflict to be inevitable, the prospect of war was
hailed as the best way out of an intolerable situa-
tion. At the end of July the “Militärische Rund-
schau” declared: “If we do not decide for war,
that war in which we shall have to engage at the
latest in two or three years will be begun in far
less propitious circumstances. At this moment
the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready,
moral factors and right are on our side, as well
as might. Since we shall have to accept the con-
test some day, let us provoke it at once. Our
prestige, our position as a great Power, our honor,
are in question; and yet more, for it would seem
that our very existence is concerned.” This,
however, does not represent the viewpoint of the
mass of German public opinion. The German
people as a whole showed no eagerness for war
and approved their government’s reserved atti-
tude until the Russian mobilization made quick
action imperative.
Once the die was cast, however, the entire
\
GERMANY 75
German people rallied round the Government in
a passion of spontaneous loyalty. German una-
nimity is well shown by the following editorial in
“Vorwärts,” the chief organ of the Social Demo-
crats: ‘‘We were always open enemies of the mon-
archic form of government, and we always shall
be. . . . But we have to acknowledge to-day that
William II has shown himself the friend of uni-
versal peace.”
The great reconciler of the traditionally pacifist
Social Democrats was the “Russian Peril.” On
this point the party was absolutely united, save
for a handful of ultra-pacifists like Karl Lieb-
knecht and Rosa Luxemburg. “War in our coun-
try,” declared the Chemnitz “Volksstimme,”
“compels all comrades to unite against the foe.
All must set aside the aims and purposes of their
party, and bear in mind one fact—Germany, and
in a larger sense all Europe, is endangered by
Russian despotism. . . . Germany’s women and
children must not become the prey of Cossack
bestiality; the German country must not be the
spoil of Cossacks; because if the Allies should be
victorious, not an English governor or a French
republican would rule over Germany, but the Rus-
sian Czar. Therefore we must defend at this mo-
ment everything that means German culture and
German liberty against a merciless and barbaric
enemy.” Even so staunch a pacifist as the So-
cialist Deputy, Haase, made in the Reichstag the
following declaration: “Germany is threatened
with annihilation by Russian despotism, and to
76 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
prevent this danger the Government can count on
the support of the Social Democratic party.”
Fear and abhorrence of Russia were well nigh
universal throughout Germany. For several
years past, Russo-German relations had not been
good, while the rising tide of Russian nationalism
had quickened the traditional dread of this mighty
neighbor into deep alarm. Hence the German
people entered the struggle as in a crusade for the
defense of Western civilization against Asiatic
barbarism. The Teutonic attitude is well ex-
plained by the eminent German psychologist, Pro-
fessor Hugo Münsterberg. In his book, “The
War and America,” written in 1914, he asserted:
“Germans know what a German defeat must mean
to the ideal civilization of the world. The culture
of Germany would be trampled down by the half-
cultured Tartars.” And he paints this truly
gloomy picture of the results of Russian victory:
“If Russia wins to-day and Germany is broken
down, Asia must win sooner or later, and if Asia
wins, the achievements of the Western world will
be wiped from the earth more sweepingly than
the civilization of old Assyria. The anti-Asiatic
work will and must appear sinful and treacherous;
it will be obliterated from the globe and the dark-
ness of old will reign again.”
This feeling against Russia in great part ex-
plains the subsequent German attitude toward
England. At the outbreak of the European con-
flict the mass of the German people regarded it as
essentially a Russo-German war and considered
GERMANY 77
themselves the champions of Western culture. In
such a struggle they believed that England must
remain neutral. When, therefore, England joined
Russia, the German people took it as the vilest
treachery to the cause of civilization. The fact
that, despite a decade of Anglo-German rivalry,
many Germans still regarded the English as Teu-
tonic kinsfolk, aggravated England’s shame of
“cultural apostasy” by the guilt of “race-
treason.”
The explosion of popular fury against England
was therefore instantaneous and general. “What
is happening to-day,” asserted Professors Ernst
Haeckel and Rudolf Eucken in a joint manifesto,
“will be inscribed in the annals of history as an
indelible shame to England. England fights to
please a half-Asiatic Power against Germanism.
She fights not only on the side of barbarism, but
also of moral injustice, for it is not to be forgot-
ten that Russia began the war because it was not
willing that there should be thorough expiation of
a wretched murder. It is the fault of England
that the present war is extended to a world war,
and that all culture is thereby endangered. And
why all this? Because she was envious of Ger-
many’s greatness, because she wished at all costs
to hinder a further extension of this greatness.”
Professor Lamprecht declared that the war would
result in the spread of German culture over all
the world, from which only one country would be
excluded—England. “The German world,” he
wrote, “to-day is one. There is only one renegade
78 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
brother. Up and at him! English culture must
be in a bad way indeed when it allies itself with
the Mongolians. . . . Germany is now the pro-
tector of European civilization, and after bloody
victories the world will be healed by being Ger-
manized.” And so convinced an opponent of
Russia as Paul Rohrbach closed his book, “Der
Krieg und die deutsche Politik” (1914), with the
following words: “Russia, with her population
of one hundred and seventy million, must at all
hazards be reduced, and her ability to attack cen-
tral Europe diminished. But the real enemy of
Germany, and not only of Germany but of the
culture and civilization of all Europe—that enemy
is England. Peace with England is impossible
until her power to do harm has been broken for-
ever. . . . Then, and then only, Germany’s future
will be assured. To display leniency toward
England is now but to commit an act of treason
against the future of the German Empire.”
Reports of anti-German outbursts in England
lashed the waves of Teutonic hate to even
greater fury. “Who was it that did conspire to
bring about this war?” queried the eminent dram-
atist, Gerhart Hauptmann, in early October, 1914,
“who even whistled for the Mongolian, for the
Jap, that he should come to bite viciously and cow-
ardly at Europe's heels? It is with great pain
and bitterness that I pronounce the word “Eng-
land.’ I belong to those barbarians upon whom
the English University of Oxford bestowed the
degrees of doctor honoris causa. . . . Haldane,
GERMANY 79
former English minister of war, and with him
numerous Englishmen, undertook regular pil-
grimages to the small barbarian city of Weimar,
where the barbarians, Goethe, Schiller, Herder,
Wieland, and others, have exerted themselves
for the humanity of the whole world.” “It is
a fight between England and Germany to
the bitter end—to the last German if need
be,” declared Herr Witting, head of the
Deutsche Bank, to an American journalist in
late October, 1914. “It is a war of annihilation
between two countries and nations. England has
wanted it, so let it be. We want no quarter from
England; we shall give none. We shall never ask
England for mercy; we shall extend no mercy
to her. England and England alone brought on
this criminal war out of greed and envy, to crush
Germany, and now it is death, destruction, and
annihilation for one or the other of the two na-
tions. Tell your American people that, and say
that these words do not come from a fanatic, but
from a quiet business man who knows the feeling
of his people and who knows what is at stake in
this titanic struggle brought on by that criminal
nation. I tell you that it is a fight to the finish.
God! How we hate England and the English, that
nation of hypocrites and criminals which has
brought this misery upon us and upon the world.
And for what? For greed, greed and envy, to
crush the German nation because she found her-
self decadent and felt her dominance and dom-
ineering in the world endangered. For the
80 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
French there is no feeling in Germany except pity
and regret. We must fight them, of course, but
we have no feeling against France. She was
forced into it. The feeling against Russia is sub-
siding. But against England there is growing
among low and high the most fanatical hatred and
contempt that one nation ever had toward an-
other. Tell America not to be misled by peace
talk. There is not going to be any peace—not
for a long time. We are prepared for three
years. In the end it will develop into a struggle
between England and Germany. The English are
determined to destroy the Fatherland. We have
accepted the challenge.”
Herr Witting seems to have accurately gaged
the German national temper in the autumn of 1914.
To this period belongs the famous popular shib-
boleth, “Gott strafe England!” At this time
also Ernst Lissauer wrote his famous “Hymn of
Hate,” with its implacable closing lines:
“You will we hate with a lasting hate,
We will never forego our hate.
Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy millions, choking down.
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe, and one alone—
England!”
And Lissauer’s hymn was not an isolated phe-
nomenon. It was merely one of a whole poetic
GERMANY 81
cycle, and was by no means the bitterest in tone,
as witness this poem by Heinrich Vierordt, enti-
tled, “Germany, Hate!”:
“Oh, Germany I Hate in cold, in icy blood,
Kill millions on millions of the devilish brood.
Let the bodies heap up mountain high
And the smoke of the flesh ascend to the sky.
“Oh, Germany Hate now, let this be your test—
The bayonet thrust in the enemy’s breast.
Take no one a prisoner, strike every one dead,
And draw round the wastelands a girdle of red.”
This wave of hate seems not to have been con-
fined to the civilian population at home but to
have also affected the armies at the front. In
March, 1915, the “Liller Kriegszeitung,” a sol-
diers’ paper published in the occupied French city
of Lille, contained the following article entitled
“Fire,” by Lieutenant-Colonel Kaden: “‘Gott
strafe England!’ ‘May He punish her l’ This is
the greeting that now passes when Germans meet.
The fire of this righteous hate is all aglow ! You
men of Germany, from East and West, forced to
shed your blood in the defense of your homeland
through England’s infamous envy and hatred of
German progress, feed the flame that burns in
your souls. We have but one war cry—‘Gott
strafe England!’ Hiss this to one another in the
trenches, in the charge; hiss as it were the sound
of licking flames. Behold in every dead comrade
a sacrifice forced from you by this accursed peo-
82 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
ple. Take tenfold vengeance for each hero’s
death!
“You German people at home, feed this fire of
hatel You mothers, engrave this in the heart of
the babe at your breast ! You thousands of teach-
ers, to whom millions of German children look
up with eyes and hearts, teach HATE! unquench-
able HATEl You homes of German learning,
pile up the fuel on this fire! Tell the nation that
this hate is not un-German, that it is not poison
for our people. Write in letters of fire the name
of our bitterest enemy. You guardians of the
truth, feed this sacred HATE! You German
fathers, lead your children up to the high hills of
our homeland, at their feet our dear country
bathed in sunshine. Your women and children
shall starve: bestial, devilish conception. Eng-
land wills it! Surely, all that is in you rises
against such infamy! Listen to the ceaseless
song of the German forest, behold the fruitful
fields like rolling seas: then will your love for this
wondrous land find the right words:–HATE! un-
quenchable HATE! Deutschland, Deutschland
iiber alles l’’
Toward France, on the other hand, as Herr Wit-
ting had remarked, no popular hatred was visible
in Germany. To be sure, there were numerous
half-contemptuous quips at France’s supposed
decadence, but there were also many testimonials
of whole-hearted esteem. “I say it frankly. We
have and we had no hatred against France,” re-
marked Gerhart Hauptmann in October, 1914.
GERMANY 83
“We have idolized the plastic art, sculpture, pic-
torial art, and the literature of that country. . . .
It is to be greatly regretted that Germany and
France could not be political friends. They
should have been, since they are the adminis-
trators of the continental productions of the mind,
and since they are the two great cultured Euro-
pean master-nations. Fate, however, would not
have it so.” “It is one of the most painful neces-
sities in the present situation,” wrote Professor
Heinrich Schrörs of the Catholic University of
Bonn in the “Internationale Monatsschrift” of
October, 1914, “that we have to draw the sword
against nations such as France, with whom we
are united by the highest cultural interests, and
for whose science we have the deepest regard.
We should greatly deplore the humiliation of
France or the impairing of its position as a civ-
ilized nation. If in the present war we could de-
tect any such object on the part of the German
Government, even as a secret tendency, we should
be the first to oppose it.”
Toward Belgium the German public seems at
first to have felt unmixed pity, but later on Ger-
man official assertions regarding the Belgian Gov-
ernment’s unneutral conduct before the war and
its inciting of the Belgian civilian population to a
franc-tireur warfare against the German troops
changed German sentiment to one of hostility to-
ward the Belgian governing class, while reports
of Belgian civilian atrocities committed on Ger-
man soldiers tended to broaden this new feeling
84 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
to include the whole Belgian people. In late
September, 1914, a manifesto of leading German
Protestant theologians thus referred to these
Belgian atrocity charges: “Unnamable horrors
have been committed against Germans living
peaceably abroad—against women and children—
against wounded and physicians—cruelties and
shamelessness such as many a heathen and Mo-
hammedan war has not revealed. . . . Even the
not unnatural excitement of a people whose neu-
trality—already violated by our adversaries—
could under the pressure of implacable necessity
not be respected, affords no excuse for inhumani-
ties, nor does it lessen the shame that such could
take place in a land long ago Christianized.”
Regarding the burning of Louvain, the Berlin
“Vossische Zeitung” remarked: “The art treas-
ures of the old town exist no more. It is true
that art lovers will grieve, but there was no other
way of punishing this population, whose devilish
women poured boiling oil from their windows
upon the passing German soldiers.” And the
“Lokal Anzeiger” hoped the world would “real-
ize that the blame for all the suffering of Louvain
rests with the half-civilized men and women who
live there.”
Regarding Allied counter-charges of atrocities
committed by German troops, the German press
entered a sweeping and indignant general denial.
“‘Teutonic Barbarians ! Vandals!’” exclaimed
the “Kölnische Zeitung” scornfully. “Such are
the terms which French and English speaking-
GERMANY 85
trumpets are shrieking into the ears of the world.
After lies comes calumnious opprobrium! . . .
The irony of history, which is now dealing so terri-
ble a blow to English hopes, will also clear up these
lying calumnies against the ‘Teutonic barbarian.”
. . . Two things speak for us: The German good
conscience, and—the convincing might of the Ger-
man fist.” The famous manifesto of the German
intellectuals asserted: “Germany will fight to the
end as a cultured nation, which has the might of
Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant, who are to it just
as holy as its hearths and homes. . . . Can any
one point to an example of our ferocity? But in
the East the earth has drunk the blood of hosts of
women and children slain by the Russians. In
the West dumdum bullets tear open the breasts of
our warriors. Those who associate with Russians
and Serbians and offer to the world the spectacle
of letting loose mongrels and niggers on the white
race have the least right to call themselves de-
fenders of European civilization.” Gerhart
Hauptmann remarked in an angry open-letter to
the French pacifist, Romain Rolland, “The Ger-
man soldier is unsullied by the loathsome and
puerile were-wolf tales which your lying French
press So Zealously spreads abroad. . . . Let the
idle Englishman call us “Huns’; you may, for all
I care, characterize the warriors of our splendid
landwehr as ‘sons of Attila.’ It is enough for
us if this landwehr shatters to bits the ring of its
merciless enemies. Far better that you call us
‘sons of Attila,” cross yourself in fear—and re-
86 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
main outside our borders, than that you indict
tender inscriptions upon the tomb of our German
name, calling us ‘the beloved descendants of
Goethe.” The epithet “Huns’ is coined by people
who, themselves Huns, find themselves disap-
pointed in their criminal attacks on the life of a
Sound and valorous race, because this race knows
how to parry a fearful blow with still more fearful
force. The impotent take refuge in curses.”
For Allied charges of vandalism at the destruc-
tion of historical monuments such as the Rheims
cathedral, the Germans had slight patience. That
works of art should be destroyed was generally
deplored, but that Germany should modify her
campaign because of this was held ridiculous.
“They call us barbarians. What of it?” wrote
Major General von Ditfurth in the “Hamburger
Nachrichten.” “We scorn them and their abuse.
For my part, I hope that in this war we have
merited the title of barbarians. War is war, and
must be waged with severity. The commonest,
ugliest stone placed to mark the burial-place of a
German grenadier is a more glorious and vener-
able monument than all the cathedrals in Europe
put together. Let neutral peoples and our ene-
mies cease their empty chatter, which may well be
compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease
their talk of the Cathedral of Rheims and of all
the churches and all the chateaux in France which
have shared its fate. These things do not interest
us. Our troops must achieve victory. What else
matters?”
GERMANY 87
Toward the subject of the war in general, most
Germans, as we have seen, maintained that it was
a purely defensive struggle forced upon Germany
by a league of malevolent foes. “Undoubtedly
this is the most stupid, senseless and unnecessary
war of modern times,” exclaimed the German
Crown Prince to an American journalist in De-
cember, 1914. “It is a war not wanted by Ger-
many, I can assure you, but was forced on us.”
“We are fighting not only for the intellectual
heritage of our fathers, but we fight for European
culture, its very existence, and its future,” as-
serted Prince von Bülow to the Norwegian publi-
cist, Björn Björnson. “Victory for the German
arms guarantees law and order, prosperity and
civilization, for Europe and the whole world.”
But here and there a bolder note was heard. In
November, 1914, Maximilian Harden thus apos-
trophized German apologists: “Cease your piti-
ful attempts to excuse Germany’s action. No
longer wail to strangers who do not care to hear,
telling them how dear to us were the smiles of
peace we had smeared like rouge upon our lips.
. . . Because our statesmen failed to discover and
foil shrewd plans of deception is no reason why
we may hoist the flag of most pious morality. .
Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken
the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Be-
cause we had to wish it and could wish it. May
the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose
pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours
of lofty experience. We do not stand, and shall
88 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
not place ourselves, before the court of Europe.
Our might shall create new law in Europe. Ger-
many strikes. If it conquers new realms for its
genius, the priesthoods of all the gods will sing
songs of praise to the good war.”
Even more than in France was emphasis laid
upon the war’s deep regenerative effects. In
many quarters German materialism and moral
shortcomings before the war were frankly ac-
knowledged, but nearly all asserted that the open-
ing months of the struggle had wrought profound
changes in the German character. “Gone is all
the worship of Mammon,” exclaimed Professor
Georg Simmel in the “Internationale Monats-
schrift” of November, 1914. “Gone is the fetish
of external success which finds expression only in
money. The self-seeking of individuals and of
classes, to whom the collective whole was but a
chimera, has disappeared. . . . To be sure, these
our failings will reappear in some form or other
in the future. We shall not be angels. But for
the present the causes or the results of cynicism
have been eradicated from German life.” “All
weeping and sorrow, all regret, are swallowed up
by the mighty stream of a new national life which
has gushed forth over our German Fatherland,”
wrote Professor Theodor Elsenhans in the “Illus-
trirte Zeitung” of mid-November, 1914. Dr. Lud-
wig Schüller, in a sermon preached at Cologne
early in 1915, said: “Suddenly the lightning fell.
The war came. The hour of decision for our
people was at hand. Now it was either into perdi-
GERMANY 89
tion or back to the living God. And our people
have chosen the good part. We bowed under the
mighty hand of God. The breaking out of the
war suddenly found a praying people. It was
such a change in the innermost soul of the Ger-
man people as we all have never yet experienced.”
In previous chapters we have already noted the
optimism which prevailed in France and England
during the opening months of 1915. It is, there-
fore, not surprising to discover that the reverse
was true of their opponents, and that German
public opinion at that time showed a tendency to-
ward pessimism. The Germans were abandoning
their hopes of an early, triumphant peace and
were settling down to the prospect of a long war.
Save in extreme Social Democratic circles there
was, it is true, no hint that Germany would accept
any peace except one which offered ample guaran-
tees for future security, but the German press now
frankly admitted that these guarantees could be
won only after a prolonged and desperate strug-
gle. Maximilian Harden, in his organ, “Die
Zukunft,” struck a distinctly pessimistic note
sharply at variance with his bold optimism of the
preceding autumn. “Beat us!” he cried in
February, 1915, “drive us into the sea or into
the Rhine ! Starve us into submission | We shall
die honorably, die standing up with clean arms.
We do not know whether we shall win, but we do
know we shall not end unworthily. We are con-
serving both our confidence and our nourishment
for a very long struggle; yet, in a year we may be
90 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
using thorns and thistles for a time, instead of
bread. We are quieter than in the first torrent of
war's enthusiasm, but not more cowardly; nor are
we to be intimidated. In prayer we are ever joy-
ful, and we still hark to the German maxim:
“Rely only on thyself; then wilt thou never de-
ceive thyself.’ ” Most press comment was, how-
ever, more optimistic. In the Berlin “Tageszeit-
ung,” Count zu Reventlow wrote: “Germans will
do much more than persevere. They will fight un-
til everything complies with their will—a will that
vehemently and without scruple puts all means
into its service by which it desires to arrive at its
aim. Any termination of the war except by Ger-
man victory is unthinkable.”
As may have been inferred from Herr Harden's
words, German public opinion was earnestly dis-
cussing the effects of the Allied naval blockade
which had practically isolated Germany since the
beginning of the war. Even before the war this
matter had been seriously considered, a notable in-
stance being a controversy between Count von
Moltke and the economist Karl Ballod carried on
in the columns of the “Preussische Jahrbücher”
of June and July, 1914. Count von Moltke had
been most optimistic, but Herr Ballod’s reply was
couched in a frankly pessimistic vein. He as-
serted that a prolonged dislocation of Germany’s
industrial system would put back her recent eco-
nomic development two hundred years, and wrote
in regard to the food question, “It is a terrible
self-deception to make out that the German people
GERMANY 91
could get along eleven months in the year with
the grain which they themselves raise for bread.”
Such being the divided state of mind before the
war, the practical confronting of the test naturally
evoked sharp divergences of opinion. The official
view breathed assured self-confidence. “The
war,” wrote Dr. Bernhard Dernburg in the
“American Review of Reviews” for November,
1914, “will bring out any number of devices—
processes that have been too expensive so far in
competition—which will be taken up and made
more perfect. Products will be turned to use that
have never been thought of before. Tike a good
housewife who must get along suddenly upon a
limited stipend per week because some hardship
has befallen her husband, so a nation convinced of
its good cause, and fairly successful in the arts up
to the present, will find its way and be able to buck
up against the humanitarian English proposal of
starving it out.” And this optimism was shared
by much unofficial German public opinion. In late
November, 1914, the well-informed “Frankfurter
Zeitung” remarked: “We breathe freely and fully
as ever. Our provision warehouses are filled, and
in our coffers lie billions of good money which all
of us have given and which is only a small part
of what our people are prepared to give and will
give if the first is spent. Our entire national life
in our besieged land has become one single great
organization—an organization of battle, an organ-
ization of sustenance, of credit, of peaceful work,
and of providence.” “We are well provided with
92 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
the means of living,” wrote the “Vossische Zeit-
ung’’ in March, 1915, “and our financial and indus-
trial armor is as Sound as ever. . . . We may truly
say that there is no crisis.” And Maximilian
Harden asserted breezily, “All twaddle, this star-
vation talk. . . . Female busybodies with an itch
for notoriety tellſ us what a delightful morsel can
be made from the eye and tail of a herring (Gott
strafe England). Eat your mess yourself, you
advertising chatterbox. All this twaddle injures
Germany. Are we in danger of famine? This
fireband was merely meant to inflame the hatred
against England. . . . Hundreds of thousands live
to-day more lavishly than in peace times. They
live even disgustingly well. In peace times the
husband drank or loafed. Now he is with the col-
ors and sends home the pay he cannot use, while
the landlord and many a creditor must wait for
their money. . . . Plenty of employment. Food-
stuffs packed to the ceiling. Cakes enough to
withstand a siege of children. . . . All the streets
are bright. All the cafés are full at 4 P.M. Two
dozen theaters open. Hundreds of movies. Con-
certs, circus. Spring jackets and ‘between-season”
hats. Why, the thing is like a fair. And yet Ger-
man lips prattle about famine!”
Here and there, however, less optimistic notes
were heard. In the late winter of 1914-15, General
von Blume wrote in the Berlin “Allgemeine Zeit-
ung”: “Germany is now confronted nationally by
problems hitherto solved only within the narrow
limits of besieged fortresses. . . . No military
GERMANY 93
success will avail to save Germany unless the men-
ace of starvation is averted.” And the “Köl-
mische Zeitung” remarked, “All depends now on
the proof of who can hold out longer. In any case
nothing else remains for us but to defend ourselves
to the utmost.” “The last months before the new
harvest are upon us,” said the “Frankfurter Zeit-
ung” of late May, 1915; and Professor Harms
wrote in the “Berliner Tageblatt,” “Do not let a
crumb of bread—that gift of God be wasted. Eat
only war-bread. Regard the potato as a means
to assist us to victory. Blush for shame if your
desire for luxuries tempts you to eat pies and
pastry. Look with contempt on those who are
so immoral as to eat cake and so by their greedi-
ness imperil our supply of flour.”
Germans were practically a unit in believing
that the only hope of breaking the English block-
ade was the German submarine fleet. Hence
their government's declaration of a submarine
blockade of the British Isles at the beginning of
1915 aroused general popular enthusiasm. “From
Great Britain's method of warfare of starving
Germany,” wrote the “Kölnische Zeitung,” “we
must conclude that the entire British people is our
enemy, and a submarine war against British mer-
chantmen must be begun and carried through reck-
lessly. . . . We must try to hit the vital point of
Great Britain—namely, her merchant fleet.”
“At last,” exclaimed the “Hamburger Nach-
richten,” “what we have so long hoped for is being
done.” “Great Britain wants war to the knife,”
*
94 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
cried the “Kölnische Zeitung” of late February,
1915. “She shall have it!” In mid-May, Count
zu Reventlow wrote in the “Deutsche Tageszeit-
ung,” “The newspapers of our enemies, as well
as those of neutrals, ought to grasp the simple
logic that the German Empire and its statesmen
and its navy would be exposed to the ridicule and
contempt of the whole world if it did not carry out
this trade war. . . . If this trade war were, out
of fear for the United States, to become a farce,
it would smash beyond repair the prestige of the
German Empire.” “Every means that art and
nature offer to overpower the enemy we shall in-
exorably and unshakenly use,” asserted the
“Hamburger Korrespondenz.” “It is laughable
to suppose that we are under any obligation to
cease our submarine war if England should find it
to her interests to return to the old paths of inter-
national law. No compassion for passengers
should weaken our strong duty.” The German
Government’s compromise with the United States
over the submarine issue was almost universally
regretted in Germany.
Italy’s entrance into the war on the Allies’ side
naturally provoked a storm of wrath in the Ger-
man press. Many German writers had never
ceased to hope that what they held to be the com-
mon aims of Italy and Germany would keep Italy
neutral. “Both peoples have the task of breaking
a path to light and air against the resistance of the
old, possessing Powers,” asserted Dr. E. W.
Mayer in the “Preussische Jahrbücher” of April,
GERMANY 95
1915. “There are geographical and historical re-
lations more potent than ties of institutions or of
blood.” This helps to explain German bitterness
at Italy’s final decision. “If war with Italy
comes,” cried the “Kölnische Zeitung” on the eve
of the crisis, “Germany’s hatred of England will
be nothing compared with her hatred of Italy.
Her treacherous conduct is unparalleled in his-
tory.” The actual rupture evoked not merely fury
but a spirit of grim determination. “This war by
Italy against her former allies,” exclaimed the
“Frankfurter Zeitung,” “is one of the most abom-
inable examples of perfidy that history knows.
We shall now have one more war-zone. Cer-
tainly, that is no light matter, but it will only in-
crease our resolution not to allow ourselves to be
beaten.” And the “Vossische Zeitung” wrote:
“On our part, every word forced from our choking
throats by moral disgust would be too much. Let
us not utter words of complaint, but grind our
teeth and use other weapons than words to the new
enemy.”
After this rather trying period, the uninter-
rupted series of triumphs for German arms which
extended through the entire second half of the year
1915 naturally awakened intense popular enthusi-
asm and hope. Specific discussion of Germany’s
permanent gains was frowned upon by the authori-
ties, but popular expectations could readily be
glimpsed from a reading of the press.
The optimistic note was strong. After the
crushing of Serbia in the autumn of 1915, the Ber-
96 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
lin “Lokal Anzeiger” wrote: “The neutral peo-
ples would be blind indeed if they did not see over
whose standards the goddess of victory is moving.
Nations who, after a fight of fifteen months against
a world in arms, are able with such great certainty
to lead, at a moment’s notice, a new army to vic-
tory, cannot be defeated. This is the truth that
our new victories disclose with absolute clearness
even to the most incredulous.” The Stuttgart
‘‘Tageblatt” thus expressed its ideas as to the end-
ing of the European struggle: “He who wishes
peace, let him make himself feared. True peace is
only the highest form of war. True peace rests
on the power of the strong, the mere sight of whom
is enough to beat the enemy. He is not ready for
peace who fears war, but only he who has nothing
to fear from war. It is such a peace we must or-
ganize; a peace rendered possible by the most
intense exertion of German strength.” “We may
see the red of morning follow the blood and mist
of the twilight,” exclaimed Maximilian Harden.
“If our enemies wish to erect a barrier for all time
between us and the rest of the world,” stated
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in early December,
“I should not be surprised if we arranged our
future accordingly.” And the usually reserved
“Vossische Zeitung” wrote, “As we are the su-
preme people, our duty henceforth is to lead the
march of humanity itself. . . . It would be a sin
against our mission to spare the peoples who are
inferior to us.”
The question of future diplomatic alignments be-
GERMANY -- 97
gan to be widely discussed, and among these there
appeared a certain decrease of hatred against Eng-
land with a correlative increasing coolness toward
France. Of course the popular chorus against
England was still loud and bitter, but in reflective
circles dissenting voices were occasionally to be
heard. In that thoughtful periodical, the
“Deutsche Revue” for August, 1915, an anony-
mous writer handled the question with surprising
frankness. According to his contention, France
and Russia were the traditional constants in the
anti-German coalition, England being only the re-
cent variable. It was therefore Germany’s inter-
est to come to terms with her temporary enemy
instead of trying to placate her natural foes.
“Friendship with England l’’ he continued. “The
word burns German ears and appears impossible
for all time. Ten times rather an understanding
with France, say we. But is not that exagger-
ated? We see to-day only the repellant side of the
English state system and forget that its inner
side has many sound elements with which the
French cannot be compared. We swear the down-
fall of Britain as the Greeks did that of Ilium, but
we keep very still about the rottenness of the
French republic and the dark depths of Russia’s
political immorality; we also keep silence regard-
ing the weighty fact that the service of Mammon
is an ill, not of England alone, but of the twenti-
eth century. In all our present talk there speaks
more the vengeful wrath of embittered hearts
than the cool reason of political heads. One thing
98 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
is certain: Europe can never raise herself once
more on a heap of ruins. . . . The words “Anni-
hilation or Dictatorship,” applied to Great Powers,
are mere foolishness.”
There were also distinct signs of a revulsion
against the cult of hate. As early as March, 1915,
the moderate Socialist Deputy, Haenisch, said in a
public speech: “The firm resolve to hold out and
to win, which must also live in our children, ought
not to become wild hate against enemy nations.
However artistic Lissauer’s “Chant of Hate” may
be, and however valuable as an expression of tem-
per of the moment, it would nevertheless be deeply
deplorable if sentiments expressed in it were to
work themselves into the hearts of our children and
foster long hatred after the war. Far better were
it if they were told of the miseries in East Prussia,
Galicia, Poland, Belgium, and Northern France,
and were filled with deep sorrow at the destruction
of so many young and hopeful lives, of so many
material and ideal values.” “Whoever thinks
that he can help the Fatherland by encouraging
this sort of German hatred may do so at his own
risk,” wrote a Catholic theologian in the Hanover
“Deutsche Volkszeitung” of mid-July, 1915. “On
our side, however, we should be guilty of neglect
if we did not raise a warning voice against it. A
hatred such as is now being preached is unchris-
tian and unworthy of the German nation.” Pro-
fessor Ernst Troeltsch, in the “Frankfurter Zeit-
ung,” asserted: “Hate may at first inspire cour-
age and energy in attack, but in the long run it is
GERMANY 99
bad politics. It leads to a troubled and fantastic
policy of Sentiment which afterward cannot be car-
ried out. . . . Especially is hate a bad counselor
in the case of England. It prevents us from ap-
preciating the position correctly; it leads to an
underestimation of the enemy’s strength, and ren-
ders difficult the renewed and unavoidable contact
after the war. But apart from all this, one thing
is certain: all systematic substitution of our old
German humanity by simple national egotism, all
permanent concentration of our feelings upon an-
tagonism, are dangerous to ourselves.” Profes-
sor Wilhelm Herzog, in “Das Forum” (Munich),
queried: “Did we, and do we, hate England? Is
there any such a hate outside the ranks of profes-
sional lyric poets and other intellectuals of the
same stamp? We hate neither the English, nor
the French, nor the Russian people. We only hate
those who are responsible for the present war.
There are everywhere erratic “idealists’; it is they
who exhaust themselves in sentiments of national
hostility.” And Professor Heinrich Morf, on
opening his course in French philology, uttered
this noble tribute to the spirit of scientific truth:
“You have come together with me here to pursue
a work of peace. . . . When your teacher has
mounted this rostrum and the outer doors of this
auditorium are closed, we must and will compel
our thoughts to turn aside for an hour from what
elsewhere daily and nightly oppresses every heart.
. . . The passions of the day shall not enter here.
We will leave them without. Science demands of
100 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
us this act of self-conquest and self-discipline.
Whoso finds this impossible cannot serve her, and
can find no intimate communion with her soul.
Such an one will remain unsatisfied within these
walls. . . . There will be no change, therefore, in
the scientific character of these lectures. Now, as
heretofore, I will try to school your historic think-
ing to dispassionate conception and judgment of
the things of the past and of foreign lands. Such
scientific labor does not sunder—it unites. It
teaches to perceive, to understand; not to despise.”
During this period the question of German un-
popularity in the world at large was also widely
discussed. The fact of this unpopularity was uni-
versally admitted, but the reasons assigned for its
prevalence varied greatly. Some laid it to the
foreigner's envy of, or inability to comprehend,
the peculiar character and superiority of German
Kultur. “We had too little pride and too much
kindness of heart,” asserted “Der Tag,” (Berlin),
in September, 1915. “We gave ourselves without
reserve and made generous presents from our Su-
perfluous riches. We showed only too plainly our
appreciation of foreign ways and laid too little
stress on our own qualities. This will and must
be changed. We shall never obtain recognition
for Germanism except by national pride and cold
reserve.” Others, however, considered Germans
themselves largely responsible, and dilated upon
national shortcomings such as tactlessness, bad
manners, aggressiveness, and the inferior Social
standing of German sojourners abroad. “In his
GERMANY 101
personal behavior to strangers,” wrote the “Köl-
mische Zeitung,” “the German gives cause for mis-
trust and dislike. . . . If a German of this kind
sees a French regiment marching past at a review
with its normal step and not with the thunder-
clap of the German parade-march, he laughs, and
is so amused that he says what he thinks to his
French neighbor. The same person, when he sees
an English railroad station, remarks upon the dirt,
the stuffy waiting-rooms, the mass of vulgar, col-
ored advertisements, and says to his English com-
panion that he would like him to see one of the
great new German stations that are as clean and
bright as a new pin. . . . So the German gets the
reputation of being a childish braggart.” In an
unusually thoughtful article in the “Preussische
Jahrbücher” for February, 1915, Felix Stahl,
while admitting the above failings as contributary
causes, found the real secret of German unpopu-
larity in the speeding-up process which German
efficiency had produced throughout the entire eco-
nomic world, thus raising the ire of peoples with
assured prospects and satisfied with a less strenu-
Ous pace.
All this need not lead to the conclusion that the
Germans were abandoning themselves to philo-
sophic speculation. On the contrary, the triumphs
of 1915, with their conquests of Poland, Courland,
and Serbia, the winning over of Bulgaria, and the
opening of the highroad to Turkey and the Moslem
East, roused an ever-growing discussion concern-
ing the multitudinous problems of the morrow.
102 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
We have already noted the less hostile attitude
toward England which was becoming manifest in
many quarters. We must now consider the grow-
ing coolness toward France. At the beginning of
the war, it will be remembered, no anti-French
feeling had been visible in Germany. But as time
passed the implacable temper of the French people
with its call for the destruction of German unity,
produced a feeling of exasperation and convinced
many Germans that this irreconcilable foe must
be finally crushed. Typical of this new feeling is
a petition addressed to the imperial chancellor by
a distinguished gathering of German intellectuals
at Berlin in the summer of 1915. “After being
threatened by France for centuries,” reads this
document, “and after hearing the cry of “Re-
vanche' from 1815 till 1870, and from 1871 till
1915, we wish to have done with the French men-
ace once and for all. All classes of our people are
imbued with this desire. There must, however,
be no misplaced attempts at reconciliation, which
have always been opposed by France with the ut-
most fanaticism; and as regards this we would
utter a most urgent warning to Germans not to
deceive themselves. Even after the terrible les-
son of this unsuccessful war, France will still
thirst for revenge in so far as her strength per-
mits. For the sake of our own existence we must
ruthlessly weaken her both politically and eco-
nomically, and we must improve our military and
strategical position with regard to her. For this
purpose, in our opinion, it is necessary radically
GERMANY 103
to improve our whole Western front from Belfort
to the coast.”
The same document gives an insight into Ger-
man public feeling about Belgium. “On Bel-
gium,” it declares, “on the acquisition of which so
much of the best German blood has been shed, we
must keep firm hold, from the political, military,
and economic standpoints, despite any arguments
which may be urged to the contrary. On no point
are the masses more united, for without the slight-
est possible doubt they consider it a matter of
honor to hold onto Belgium. . . . In time also she
may entail a considerable addition to our nation,
if in course of time the Flemish element, which
is so closely allied to us, becomes emancipated
from the artificial grip of French culture and re-
members its Teutonic affinities.” The fate of Bel-
gium had, indeed, greatly interested Germans from
the first. At the very beginning of the war Pro-
fessor Hermann Losch had predicted, “The war
between the three west European Powers will be
fought not only in Belgium, but for Belgium.” In
the spring of 1915, Count zu Reventlow wrote:
“The absolute and permanent withdrawal of Bel-
gium from all British and French influence is a
vital matter for Germany’s future. . . . Belgium
can never again, with the best will in the world,
become independent. A restoration of Belgium to
its former political state is a phantom, a Utopia.”
Annexation of both Belgian and French territory
was, however, hotly combatted by Social Demo-
crats of all shades.
104. PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
And this feeling against annexations in western
Europe was not confined to Socialists; it was
shared by ardent expansionists as well. Many
Germans had now become convinced that a com-
plete Teutonic triumph was impossible. Since
this was so, these people held that Germany must
choose her compensations either East or West.
And while some persons held Western gains the
more important, a larger number believed that
Germany’s true line of expansion lay toward the
east. The crushing of Serbia and the opening up
of the highroad to the Ottoman Empire had at
last realized the great Teutonic dream, “Berlin-
Bagdad,” and the maintainance of this connection
appeared to wide circles of German thought an
imperative necessity. But the retention of Bel-
gium obviously involved a finish fight with Eng-
land. Could Germany hold both Bagdad and Ant-
werp against the world? Would it not be wiser
to surrender Antwerp as the price of English
assent to “Berlin-Bagdad”? This was the opin-
ion of moderate German imperialists of the
“Eastern” School.
Germany’s Oriental hopes had been high from
the first. Turkey’s adherence to the Teutonic
cause in November, 1914, had been enthusiastically
hailed by every section of the German press.
“Over there in Turkey,” wrote the well-known
German publicist, Ernst Jäckh, in a pamphlet pub-
lished at that moment, “stretch Anatolia and Mes-
opotamia: Anatolia, the “Land of the Sunrise';
Mesopotamia, the region of ancient paradise.
GERMANY 105
May these names be to us a sign: may this world-
war bring to Germany and Turkey the sunrise and
the paradise of a new time; may it confer upon an
assured Turkey and a Greater Germany the bless-
ing of a fruitful Turco-Teutonic collaboration in
peace after a victorious Turco-Teutonic collabora-
tion in war.”
German expectations were still further excited
by the Turkish proclamation of the “Holy War”
in mid-November, 1914. “The false moves of
Grey have brought all the Moslems into line,” as-
serted the “Frankfurter Zeitung.” “Indians,
Egyptians, and Persians recognize the English as
foes. The blows that Grey has rained upon the
Moslem world have roused it, molens volens,
from its deep sleep. The two great Moslem
sects, the Shiites and the Sunnites have sunk
their differences and become brothers. No
power in the world can ever again make Turkey
and Persia break away from each other. The
Egyptians, Indians, Chinese, and Africans will en-
ter into a holy league. The Moslems living in
the English and French colonies can no longer be
true to their allegiance, nor can those of the Cau-
casus, Turkestan, and Transcaucasia remain loyal
to Russia. If Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Mo-
rocco, Tunis, and Algeria join themselves to the
two Moslem Powers, Turkey and Persia, can the
Triple Entente continue their war against Ger-
many and Austria?”
Disappointed at that moment, these hopes re-
vived a year later after Serbia’s fall. “Persia is
106 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
beginning to shake the shackles of the Anglo-
Russian treaty,” wrote the “Vossische Zeitung”
in November, 1915. “Persia is beginning to arm
and defend herself. Afghanistan will never go
with Russia and England. In Africa the Senussi
are stirring; their influence extends over Egypt
and Tripoli, including the Hinterland. In Egypt
the English have so far been able to repress ten-
dencies to revolt, but they cannot prevent hostile
agitation from penetrating like a dynamite car-
tridge. In Tunis and Morocco also there are ways
and means of letting the population know of the
French and English defeats at the Dardanelles.
We are only at the beginning of the effects of the
Islamic ferment.”
The scope of German Asiatic aspirations is re-
vealed in an article by the learned Orientalist,
Professor Berhardt Molden, which appeared in
the “Preussische Jahrbücher” for December,
1914. Germany’s aid to Turkey, contends Profes-
Sor Molden, is only symptomatic of her policy to
raise the other Asiatic peoples now crushed be-
neath English and Russian domination. Thus
Germany will create puissant allies for the “Sec-
ond Punic War” which England may well wage
if the present conflict should end in a deadlock.
Therefore, Germany must strive to solidify that
great Central Asian block—Turkey, Persia, Af-
ghanistan, China—all of whose members are men-
aced by the Anglo-Russo-Japanese robber-league.
Only Germany can save the threatened, from
Stockholm to Pekin. Professor Molden urges a
****
****,
GERMANY 107
“Pan-Asian railroad” from Stambul to Pekin.
This would be especially alluring for Afghanistan,
which would thus become one of the great world-
pivots of politics and trade. In fine, “Germany
must free Asia.” This is the keynote of all the
German writings on this point. “To renovate
the East,” such is Germany’s mission, wrote
Friedrich Delitzsch in the “Deutsche Revue” for
January, 1916.
To many Germans the great obstacle to Teu-
tonic ascendancy in the Balkans and Asia was not
so much England as Russia. In fact, the existence
of any sort of “Greater Germany” was considered
menaced by the “Russian Peril.” The fear of
Russia, so prominent at the outbreak of war, had
been temporarily submerged by the flood of hatred
against England, but Russian resilience under the
most shattering blows and Austrian weakness be-
fore Muscovite assaults gradually brought the
Russian danger again to the fore. Of course, cer-
tain reactionary Junkers might regret the old inti-
macy between the Prussian and Russian courts,
and the hotter advocates of a finish fight against
England might recommend generous terms to pur-
chase a Russian separate peace, but most Ger-
mans plainly believed that the Russian colossus
must be definitely broken if Germany were not to
be overshadowed in course of time.
“Can Russia remain a European Power in the
former sense of the word, if our future is to be
secure?” asks the noted German publicist, Paul
Rohrbach, at the beginning of his book, “Russland
108 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
und Wir,” published in the summer of 1915. His
answer is an emphatic “No l’’ He concludes his
book as follows: “There you have present-day
Russia! ‘Scratch a Russian and you find a Tar-
tar” has long been a true proverb. As soon as the
superficial veneer of external civilization peels off,
modern Muscovitism reveals the same wild, bar-
baric traits as it did centuries ago under Ivan the
Terrible. . . . As in Livonia in 1558, so in East
Prussia in 1914 and 1915 ! The Muscovite is a
Muscovite still. Only he who does not know him
can imagine that the Muscovite is capable of living
as a Kultur-nation in lasting communion with the
European world. He cannot do it, for he has an-
other soul. . . . With this state it is very difficult
to conclude a real peace according to the accepted
canons of international law. Reckless barbarity,
criminal lust of conquest, and destruction of all
human culture founded upon freedom are the very
essence of its being. He who thinks about the
peace which is to follow this war must first of all
visualize the inner nature of his Russian opponent.
. . . He who has any regard for the soul and the
future of Germanism and human civilization will
thereupon lay down one inflexible condition: No
compromise peace with Russia!” This conclusion
is heartily endorsed by Otto Hoetsch, Ernst Jäckh,
and other leading German political writers. Karl
Leuthner, in his recent book, “Russischer Volks-
imperialismus” (1916), draws a truly alarming
picture. According to him, the Russian masses
are taking up the old imperialistic programs of
GERMANY 109
Tsars, bureaucrats, and artistic thinkers, and are
“going them one better,” just as the imperialism
of the French revolution surpassed that of Louis
XIV. The liberal, democratic, cosmopolitan op-
position party in Russia was only a superficial cur-
rent engendered by the excesses of Autocracy: it
is fast bowing down to Panslavism's Holy Trinity
—Tsar, Great-Russian People, Orthodoxy. “We
Germans,” concludes Herr Leuthner, “must look
this reality in the face. In the whole realm of
politics there is for us nothing more weighty. Not
the Russian Tsar alone, whose tyranny we ab-
horred, but also the Russian people, for whose
freedom we have waxed enthusiastic, stands with
all the traditional lust of conquest and subjuga-
tion upon our borders. Those whom we believed
spiritually near to us have become our readiest
and bitterest foes. All illusions, all empty hopes
of reconciliation, are shattered. We must prepare
our souls either to undergo the fate involved in
propinquity to a rapacious world-empire, or re-
solve to avert that fate by this war.” These Ger-
man apprehensions have been steadily increased
by the momentous internal changes which have
transpired in the Russian Empire. In the “Preus-
sische Jahrbücher” for November, 1916, Dr. Hans
Delbrück maintains that Russia’s restoration of
her army after the débâcle of 1915, the prohibition
of vodka, and the construction of the Murman rail-
way to the Arctic Ocean in the midst of war, are
such mighty achievements as prove conclusively
that Russia is to Germany a foe far more menac-
110 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
ing than England. General von Hindenburg
seems to have put this feeling in a nutshell when
he remarked during a recent interview, “We hate
the English—the future danger to Germany lies
in the East.”
All this accounts for the German Government’s
reconstruction of Poland, and for German popu-
lar demands for similar action in Lithuania, the
Russian Baltic provinces, and the Ukraine.
Such were the complex thought-currents which
first appeared upon the surface of German na-
tional consciousness during the closing months of
1915. But, as the new year drew nigh, those prob-
lems which had engrossed German thought in the
earlier phases of the war came once more to the
fore. The Allies steadily refused to make peace
on a “war-map.” basis, while the English blockade
drew ever tighter around beleaguered Central Eu-
rope. By the end of 1915, Germany was plainly
feeling the pinch. “While our troops are fighting
like the heroes of the classical ages,” wrote the
“Frankfurter Zeitung” in November, “want is
growing acute at home, where the people are be-
ginning to interpret the miserable existing condi-
tions as the defeat of the Empire. We jeered at
the blockade, but to-day we laugh no longer. The
sinister aspect of things certainly provides no
food for laughter.” A Socialist memorial to the
imperial chancellor read: “In Berlin to-day the
poorer people very rarely see either meat or any
fat food; that means that they are not receiving
enough albuminous nourishment to meet their
GERMANY 111
needs. The complaints we receive from the fam-
ilies of mobilized men are fearful. Their position
is rapidly becoming one of despair.” This food
shortage appears to have reached its climax just
before the harvest in the summer of 1916. Since
then things seem to have been somewhat easier,
though the situation is still far from ideal and
complaints are widespread. For example, in
early January, 1917, the Berlin “Vorwärts” said:
“We are all reasonable enough to look facts in
the face and to bear the inevitable with dignity.
We also know that a German defeat would take
not only the last scraps of butter from our bread,
but take the bread also. But apart from a needy
future after the war, we have only been told that
we have no improvement of rations to expect, and
that on the contrary the difficulties will increase,
especially after Easter.”
Hunger and the Allies’ implacable temper natu-
rally roused a fresh wave of fury in Germany.
“We have not yet succeeded in forcing our ene-
mies to peace,” wrote the “Kölnische Zeitung” in
late 1915. “The hopes of the enemy are still
strong. They are showing more and more arro-
gance. Every man and every woman in Germany
must be impressed by the fact that this war is a
question of life or death. It would be vain to hope
for mercy if our enemies succeed in their plans.
There is nothing left for us but to fight with our
backs to the wall until such victory be achieved
that we can force peace on our foes. In this our
only hope lies—in the grimmest warfare at the
112 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
front, supported by our resistance at home and
by our iron will to hold out. To him who can best
hold his nerves in rein will be the victory.
Successes we have in plenty. What we have
left to do is to dictate peace. Deutschland
iiber Alles l’” The latent desire for peace
showed in comments like that of “Wor-
wärts” at the close of 1916: “If we are going
to drag this war out indefinitely, all Europe will be
bled to death, and America and colored people will
be our heirs. But we want Europe to live. We
see France bleeding white, but we have never hated
her. We want peace for Germany, France, Eng-
land and Russia—peace for the whole blood-
stained world.”
However, the Allies’ uncompromising rejection
of German peace offers at the opening of 1917
spurred the entire German people to desperate
wrath. “Peace talk must now cease,” asserted
the “Tägliche Rundschau”; while the “Kölnische
Zeitung” exclaimed hotly, “We have now learned
that our enemies do not want peace, but war to
the knife; so we must abandon all considerations
and grasp all the means of war at our disposal.”
Raiser Wilhelm undoubtedly voiced the feelings
of his people when he asserted in his proclama-
tion of late January, 1917: “Our enemies have
dropped the mask. After refusing with scorn and
hypocritical words of love for peace and humanity
our honest peace offer, they have now, in their
reply to the United States, gone beyond that and
admitted their lust for conquest, the baseness of
GERMANY 113
which is further enhanced by their calumnious as-
sertions. Their aim is the crushing of Germany,
the dismemberment of the Powers allied with us,
and the enslavement of the freedom of Europe and
the Seas under the same yoke that Greece, with
gnashing teeth, is now enduring. But what they
could not achieve in thirty months of the bloodiest
fighting and unscrupulous economic war they will
also fail to accomplish in the future. . . . Burning
indignation and holy wrath will redouble the
strength of every German man and woman,
whether it be devoted to fighting, to work, or to
suffering. We are ready for all sacrifices.”
This iron mood was accompanied by a sharp re-
crudescence of the former intransigeance against
England. “The majority of our people still have
no conception of the consequences which would
follow if we were defeated, and defeated by such
an enemy as England,” asserted the “Kölnische
Zeitung.” “It is a dangerous mistake to regard
English speeches as vain boasting. . . . For God’s
sake let us not deceive ourselves about England’s
determination so to force Germany to her knees
that she must accept England’s conditions with-
out resistance and be wiped out forever as a com-
petitor in the world’s markets. All classes of that
people are united in this resolve, from the First
Sea Lord to the humblest dock-laborer at New-
castle-on-Tyne. It cannot be too firmly insisted
that such a victory for England would mean an ir-
reparable catastrophe for the German Empire.
Not only would the German Empire be dissolved,
114 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
but our people itself would be seriously threatened
with extinction, especially in view of the Russian
torrent pouring in from the east.”
The logical conclusion was that England must
be crushed, and the advocates of a finish fight
against Britain asserted that her destruction could
be accomplished by means of ruthless submarine
warfare. From the autumn of 1916 on, increasing
pressure was brought to bear upon the German
Government to repudiate its compromise with the
United States and plunge unreservedly into the
fray. “Down with England l’’ cried a popular
pamphlet; “England is not only our most danger-
ous, but also our most vulnerable, enemy, because
an island lives and dies with its shipping. Can we
conquer England on the sea? Yes. The deeds
and experiences of our navy give a sure guarantee
of this.” “If we are to win a victory,” declared
Dr. von Heydebrand, Conservative leader in the
Prussian Diet, at the beginning of 1917, “it is ab-
Solutely imperative to use the weapons which give
us the possibility of winning a victory against the
toughest and strongest adversary—England. . . .
The German and Prussian people will be prepared
to bear the consequences.” And Count von West-
arp, Conservative leader in the Reichstag, as-
serted: “Our utmost strength must now be
thrown into the scales. There is no weapon of
warfare which we dare withhold.” The imperial
chancellor’s announcement of ruthless submarine
warfare at the beginning of February was hailed
throughout Germany with a unanimous shout of
GERMANY 115
joy. “Now our enemies will learn what the
U-boat terror really is,” cried the Berlin “Lokal
Anzeiger”; while the “Börsen Zeitung” exclaimed
defiantly, “Right or wrong: victory !” The rup-
ture with America produced no perceptible effect
in the popular attitude.
Such is Germany’s present war temper. Re-
garding “after the war” problems, it is not sur-
prising to find the widest variety of viewpoints.
In general, we may say that the more bellicose ele-
ments have always maintained that Germany’s fu-
ture attitude toward foreign peoples must be, in
case of victory, the haughty aloofness of the con-
Queror for his inferiors; in case of temporary
stalemate the wrathful aloofness of the master-
folk bracing itself with the will to conquer. A
good example of this militaristic thought school is
an article in the “Liller Kriegszeitung” of late
1916: “Michel, listen! To understand is to for-
give. But nobody understands, nobody wishes to
understand, our nature, our ways, our striving to-
ward good, or our honesty. Hence the irreconcil-
able hostility of the whole world against every-
thing German. Give up, therefore, dear Michel,
the vain and dangerous pursuit of grasping your
enemies’ point of view. Thus only will you suc-
ceed in acquiring the ruthless temper which is
necessary in order to attain victory. . . . Every-
body considers you a “dirty pig,” dear Michel.
You cannot alter that. Then have the courage to
make up your mind about it. . . . It is impossible
for us to come to any understanding with our ene-
116 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
mies throughout this and the following genera-
tion.” Among these prophets of evil there runs
a good deal of pessimism. The noted historian,
Professor Eduard Meyer, in his book, “Germany
and England,” predicts that the present struggle
is only the first of a long series of Anglo-German
“Punic” wars in which modern civilization will
retrograde to a condition of semi-barbarism. Ger-
many will be the victor, but a Pyrrhic victor, for
the colored races, taking advantage of white deca-
dence, will destroy European supremacy.
Other Germans, however, including many lead-
ing intellectuals and the entire Social Democratic
group, take a much more cheerful view. Dr. Hans
Delbrück thinks a perpetuation of present hatreds
impossible. “The various states,” he writes,
“cannot surround themselves with Chinese walls,
but must resume the exchange of merchandise and
ideal values. A nation not doing so would only
harm itself.” The Socialist Deputy, Haenisch,
remarks: “There has even been some talk that in
future German science and art must lead their
own life. . . . This is sheer rubbish. After the
war the nations will be still more dependent upon
one another than before, and without the fructify-
ing influence of foreign countries our national cul-
ture will wither.”
Between these two extreme viewpoints lies an
indeterminate mass of public opinion which has
inclined first to one side and then to the other ac-
cording to the fortunes of war; intransigeant at
the start, more conciliatory during the optimistic
GERMANY 117
second half of 1915, hardening again under the
stress of deferred peace and the rigorous blockade.
One thing, however, can be said: the German
people, though prone to passionate outbursts, is
extremely attentive to the utterances of its politi-
cal and intellectual leaders. And these leaders
are to-day generally avowed realists; “Realpoliti-
ker,” as they pride themselves. It is, therefore,
unlikely that, in the future, Germany will follow a
policy of sentiment or nurse old grudges where
nothing practical is to be gained. Of course, a
humiliating peace would probably inspire a policy
of “revenge,” but the underlying motive for this
policy would be, not so much rancor at the past
as confidence in German ability to upset a settle-
ment dictated by a hostile world. Thus, Ger-
many’s future relations with her present foes
should depend primarily on the actual course of
events. Those nations whom German statesmen
consider a menace to German aims will remain
popular bugbears. Those with whom accommo-
dation is deemed desirable will be looked upon
with popular favor. In all this, sentiment ob-
viously plays a slight part.
Of course, the war has drawn Germany and her
allies increasingly together. For Bulgaria and
Turkey, Teutonic friendship is not without mental
reservations, but with Austria-Hungary the bonds
are extremely close. In this case practical con-
siderations are reinforced by deep-going ties of
sentiment and racial affinity, owing to the Ger-
manic character of the Hapsburg Monarchy and
118 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
the fraternal feelings of the Austrian Teutons.
Most Germans believe that the alliance between
the two empires must henceforth be unbreakable,
and Germany’s ablest thinkers are to-day busy
working out a permanent solution. Typical of
these efforts is Friedrich Naumann’s book, “Mit-
teleuropa” (“Central Europe”). Naumann pro-
poses a “Superstate,” Austro-German in the first
instance, yet so federative in character that all
the minor nations of the Central European zone,
from Scandinavia to Turkey, may ultimately be
included. Here again the realistic note is clear.
With the exception of Austria, sentiment does not
deeply color German speculation regarding future
friends.
CHAPTER IV
AUSTRIA-IBIUN GARY
F German national consciousness may be con-
sidered a diversified unity, Austria-Hungary’s
appears as a dualized diversity. The theory un-
derlying Austria-Hungary’s “Dualist” Consti-
tution of 1867 was that the Germans of Austria
and the Magyars of Hungary should rule their re-
spective halves of the empire and keep the various
minor races in due subordination. But this theory
never worked well in practice. The Germans and
Magyars, though unquestionably the empire's two
leading races, are not in a numerical majority. Of
the twenty-nine million inhabitants of Austria,
only ten millions are Germans (with two millions
more in Hungary), while the Magyars constitute
but ten million of the twenty-one million souls
which make up Hungary’s total population. As a
result, German hegemony in Austria broke down
long ago, while in Hungary Magyar supremacy
has been maintained only at the cost of increas-
ingly dangerous protests from the non-Magyar
nationalities. The last half-century of Austria-
Hungary’s history has, in fact, been the record of
the struggles of its minor nationalities to attain
complete self-realization, either by gaining full
partnership within the empire or by secession to
119 -
120 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
racial kinsmen outside the empire's frontiers.
The consequence has been chronic race friction
which has led many observers to predict the em.
pire’s complete dissolution.
These race problems are of such vital signifi-
cance for an understanding of Austria-Hungary’s
present condition and future prospects that a brief
summary of their status in July, 1914, is necessary.
Despite their complexity, a glance at a race map
of Austria-Hungary reveals a certain fundamental
simplicity. Roughly speaking, the empire divides
into three great race zones, running east and west:
to the north, a broad band of Slavs; to the south,
a shorter and thicker band of Slavs; between the
two, a wide belt of non-Slavs; in the west, Ger-
mans; in the center, Magyars; in the east, a mix-
ture of Germans, Magyars, and Rumanians. This
non-Slavic middle zone fills the broad Danubian
plain and completely severs the Slav belts from
each other. This central position is one of the
great reasons why the Germans and Magyars have
always dominated the empire.
Another reason for Germano-Magyar predom-
inance is the extreme disunion which prevails
among the empire’s Slav peoples. Statistically,
they number nearly half the total population, but
they are sundered from one another not merely
geographically but also by a variety of linguistic,
religious, and cultural barriers which have always
made united action impossible.
The northern Slav belt is composed of the Czechs
of Bohemia and Moravia, the Poles of West Gali-
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 121
cia, and the Ruthenians of East Galicia and the
Bukovina. The Czechs, numbering some six and
one-half millions, are the most solid and progress-
ive branch of the Slav race. Together with their
two million Slovak kinsmen in the neighboring
Carpathian uplands of Northern Hungary, they
constitute a powerful ethnic group. The five mil-
lion Poles of West Galicia represent Austria’s
share of the defunct kingdom of Poland. The four
million “Ruthenians” are merely the western
vanguard of a race group totaling nearly thirty-
three million souls—the so-called “Ukrainians” or
“Little Russians,” the bulk of whom live within
the confines of the adjacent Russian Empire.
The South Slavs, though racially and linguisti-
cally much more homogeneous, are deeply divided
by differences of religion and culture. They oc-
cupy practically the entire southwest corner of the
empire, nearly everything south of the river Drave
being “Yugo-Slav.” The great majority of the
Austro-Hungarian Yugo-Slavs belong to the Croa-
tian branch of the race, and having been civilized
and Christianized from the West, these Croats are
Roman Catholic in religion and west European in
culture. In the southern portion of the Yugo-Slav
belt, however, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
dwell some two million “Serbs”; in blood and
speech closely akin to the Croats, but Greek Or-
thodox in faith and with a culture inherited from
the Byzantine East. The situation is still further
complicated by the presence in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina of some seven hundred thousand Mohammed-
122 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
ans. Bosnia-Herzegovina is indeed a land of re-
ligious and cultural conflict, the balance of its
population being made up of eight hundred and
fifty thousand Orthodox Serbs and four hundred
and fifty thousand Catholic Croats. A final com-
plication is added by the thin fringe of Italian
population which clings to the towns and islands
of the Adriatic coast, thus partially shutting off
the Yugo-Slavs from racial access to the sea.
It is of course universally admitted that the
spark which ignited the present European confla-
gration was the Austro-Serbian imbroglio, and it
is generally recognized that Serbia’s defiance of
her huge neighbor was only a move in the gigantic
political duel between Austria-Hungary and Rus-
sia. But few persons realize how bitter and far-
reaching that Austro-Russian duel was. Its ob-
jectives were not merely Serbia or even the Bal-
kans. They embraced both Russian imperialism’s
determination to annex the Galician Ruthenians
and to erect Czech and Yugo-Slav national states
on Austria-Hungary’s ruins, and Austrian impe-
rialism’s counter-determination to bring all the
Serbs into a Yugo-Slav block beneath the Haps-
burg scepter while erecting Polish and Ukrainian
national states at a mutilated Russia’s expense.
To this Austrian imperialistic school Archduke
Franz-Ferdinand unquestionably belonged. All
this explains the unscrupulous ruthlessness of both
Russian and Austrian policy during the years pre-
ceding the war. It also accounts for the Arch-
duke's assassination.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 123
The murder of Franz-Ferdinand was generally
hailed by Austrians as the beginning of the end.
Serbia’s grandiose dreams, incited as these had
been by Russia, and the success of the Serbian se-
cessionist propaganda among the empire’s Yugo-
Slav populations, convinced most Austrians that
this “Balkan Piedmont” must be crushed at once
if the empire were not to lose its southwestern
provinces as it had lost Italy. If war with Russia
should ensue, Austrians thought it had better be
fought now rather than later on when Austria’s
position might have changed infinitely for the
WOI’Sé.
From the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian
crisis, those natural pillars of the empire, the no-
bility, the army, the bureaucracy, and the Church,
together with the German and Magyar popula-
tions, rallied enthusiastically round the Govern-
ment and the Hapsburg throne. The almost pas-
sionate phraseology of the Austrian ultimatum to
Serbia, so unusual in a diplomatic document of this
nature, was an accurate reflection of the popular
mood. The Viennese press unanimously demand-
ed decisive measures. “The situation between
our Government and that of King Peter has
become intolerable,” asserted the “Neue Freie
Presse.” “Our ultimatum has been the natural
result.” The “Reichspost” urged the Govern-
ment to take decisive measures against the Serbian
foe, “who is as implacable and relentless as he is
dastardly.” The formal outbreak of hostilities
was hailed with jubilation. “When we consider
124 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
the provocations of which Serbia has been guilty
for so many years,” exclaimed the “Tageblatt,”
“the solemn pledges made and broken, the defi-
ance which we have put up with from an unscru-
pulous neighbor whom no kindness can appease,
we experience a sense of relief on this outburst
of War.”
Hungarian sentiment was even more enthusi-
astic. “The whole nation joyfully hastens to fol-
low the call of his Majesty to the flag,” cried Pre-
mier Tisza amid the frantic cheers of the Hun-
garian deputies. “If we had stood these condi-
tions any longer,” exclaimed Count Albert Ap-
ponyi, head of the Opposition, “we would have
reached the point where Europe would have called
us her second ‘Sick Man.’ ” “It is peace and not
war that we want; but a peace which leads to life,
not to death,” asserted the Archbishop of Esz-
tergom, Roman Catholic primate of Hungary.
“There are situations in political life,” said Count
Julius Andrassy, “that can be likened only to the
encircling of Sedan, which demoralizes and van-
quishes the surrounded foe before the first shot
is fired. Such would have been our fate if, after
the continued vexations of years, after the expen-
diture of many millions, caused by Serbia, we
should have continued to submit to the invidious
attacks of Russian-protected Serbia. . . . Had we
waited longer, our self-esteem, our self-trust,
would have been torn to shreds, and so would our
power of resistance, our inner unity, our integ-
rity.” The Magyar press displayed a decidedly
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 125
bitter tone against the enemy. That leading Bud-
apest paper, the “Pester Lloyd,” wrote, “The
Serbian Government will be shown up as a nest of
pestilential rats which come from their territory
over our border to spread death and destruction.”
The broadening of the conflict into a war with
Russia caused no surprise, since Serbia had from
the first been considered merely the cat’s paw of
Russian imperialism. “The true cause of the
war,’’ asserted Count Julius Andrassy, “is the
Eastern ambition of Russia, which is as old as her
position as a great Power, and which has long been
hanging over us like a sword of Damocles.” Dr.
Dumba, Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the
United States, undoubtedly voiced the prevailing
Austrian opinion when he wrote in the “North
American Review” for September, 1914: “The
war between Austria-Hungary and Russia may
well be said to be the outcome of conflicting civili-
zations and conflicting aims. The controversy be-
tween the Dual Monarchy and the Serbian King-
dom is only an incident in the greater struggle
between German civilization as represented by
Austria-Hungary, and Russian aspirations as rep-
resented by Serbia, the Russian outpost on the
southern frontier of the Dual Monarchy. . . . The
Serbian Kingdom is the torpedo which Russia has
launched at the body of Austria.” Hungarian
opinion tended to give the war an even broader
interpretation. “Pan-Russianism, that is the
word!” exclaimed the “Revue de Hongrie” (Bud-
apest). “No 1 The present war is not, as certain
126 PRESENT_DAY EUROPE
persons assert, a war of Slavism against German-
ism. It is a war of a great part of civilized Eu-
rope against Russian autocracy and Serb terror-
ism. . . . If the Triple Entente (in which the em-
pire of the Tsars holds a preponderant place),
should win in this war, it would mean the Euro-
pean sluice-gates open to Muscovite autocracy, to
Cossack militarism, to all sorts of political and
religious heresies. The dyke once broken, it
would be the end of European civilization.”
Such was the temper of the governing classes
and of the German and Magyar populations. The
attitude of the minor nationalities varied greatly,
but on the whole it proved the insight of those ob-
servers who had maintained that the empire was
not in the hopeless internal situation asserted by
the prophets of Austrian dissolution. Unques-
tionably there was much disloyalty among certain
racial groups. The Serb element of the Yugo-
Slavs, in particular, appears to have been honey-
combed with secessionism, and even among the
Croats many malcontents were discovered. Some
of these escaped abroad, notably the Croat deputy,
Hinkovitch, and these exiles presently founded the
“South Slav Committee” in London, to influence
Entente public opinion.
But the bulk of the Croat population remained
loyal. The Croats, though desirous of Yugo-
Slav unity, generally wished it in the “Austrian”
sense; i.e., the supremacy of the Croat over the
Serb element in any future Yugo-Slav state. Such
a solution had, it was believed, been the dream of
AUSTRIA-HUN GARY 127
Franz-Ferdinand, and the Archduke’s murder by
Serbian fanatics accordingly roused a wave of
indignation throughout Croatia. Croat mobs
marched through the streets crying, “Death to the
Serbs!” Serb shops were sacked and Serb lead-
ers roughly handled. The Croat deputy, Dr. Sus-
tersics, voiced the feelings of the great majority
of his people when he declared: “Grand Duke
Francis Ferdinand was bound to come to this end,
especially as he was the friend of the southern
Slavs. Imperialistic Serbia saw with alarm the
rise of this potent personality, this knight “with-
out fear and without reproach,” who showed both
the will and the power to promote peaceful rela-
tions between the southern Slavs and the Haps-
burg dynasty.” The Croats thus entered the war
against their Serbian kindred in a far more loyal
frame of mind than would have been possible un-
der any other circumstances.
Turning now to the northern Slavs: the Czechs
displayed neither the indignant loyalty nor the
bitter Secessionism of the Yugo-Slav populations.
The prevailing temper among the Czechs was a
lukewarm or sullen aloofness. The fierce strug-
gles which had long raged in Bohemia between the
Czechs and the large German minority constantly
protected by Vienna had engendered widespread
Czech resentment against the Austrian Govern-
ment. Russian propaganda had of course made
the most of this golden opportunity, and for some
years previous to the war a genuine secessionist
party had existed among the Czechs, with the erec-
128 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
tion of a Czch-Slovak national state under Russian
protection as its goal. But these extremists were
comparatively few in number, and drastic govern-
ment measures at the outbreak of war quickly
broke up their party organization. Some of their
leaders, like Professor Masaryk, escaped abroad;
others, such as Dr. Kramar, were imprisoned. A
few were shot for high treason. The most serious
result of Czech discontent was the poor spirit
shown by Czech troops, whole regiments surren-
dering to the enemy with practically no resistance.
On the other hand, there existed a fairly strong
loyalist minority which disliked the thought of
Austrian disruption and feared the results of Rus-
sian victory. Typical of Czech loyalist press com-
ment are the words of the ‘‘Hlas Naroda.”
(Prague): “The crime of Serajevo revealed, as
by a lightning flash, the monarchy’s deplorable
situation. . . . But, at one stroke, all dissension
disappeared. In vain did the enemy make ad-
vances to the non-German nationalities.” “We
are all glad to assert the close union of nationali-
ties. . . . All the nationalities are defending the
throne and the empire,” declared the “Hlásyz
Hane” of Prossnitz. “We belong voluntarily to
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,” said the
“Cesky Dennin” of Pilsen, “that monarchy be-
neath whose protection the Czech people has ar-
rived at its present maturity.” -
The attitude of the second north Slavic group,
the Poles, was not left for a moment in doubt.
Almost without exception, the Austrian Poles
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 129
proved loyalist to the core. For many years the
Poles of Galicia had enjoyed complete local self-
government and full cultural liberty—a situation
doubly appreciated by contrast to the depressed
condition of their kinsmen under Russian and
Prussian rule. Galicia was full of Polish refugees
from Russian persecution. The Austrian Poles,
therefore, hailed the war as a crusade for the
liberation of their race from Russian domination.
The exiles at once raised several Polish legions,
20,000 strong, which, under their gifted leader,
Josef Pilsudski, fought with fanatical bravery
against the Russian troops.
The attitude of the Austrian Poles comes out
strongly in the manifesto of the National Polish
Committee issued at the beginning of the war:
“Should Russia keep Russian Poland, and add
Galicia and Posen thereto, Europe would be ex-
posed to the infiltration of Russian despotism and
Byzantinism. If, on the other hand, Poland is
torn from Russia, it will mean a guarantee for
the progressive expansion of Western civilization
toward eastern Europe, as well as protection
against the introduction of Cossack principles into
modern life. . . . Let no one accuse the Poles now
fighting in the legions side by side with the Aus-
trian armies of being unfaithful to their historic
traditions. Russia was Poland’s arch-enemy in
the past, and will be in the future. It is precisely
their part in Western civilization and the national
individuality of their country that the Poles are
now defending against the Russians, contemmers
130 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
of the one and persecutors of the other.” In an
appeal addressed to Poles throughout the world,
the noted Polish poet, George Zulawski, wrote:
“We stand to-day by Austria, and do not doubt
for a moment her goodwill. Let the Grand Duke
Nicholas juggle with promises never meant to be
kept; we know how we are treated here. After
having lost our liberty we have found in this mon-
archy, the most liberal in Europe, shelter and pro-
tection. We are full-fledged citizens; we enjoy
here the liberty of autonomy and of our national
advance. We like to consider past deeds, for they
are the best securities for the future. . . . To-day,
God has entrusted the honor of the Polish nation
to us Polish volunteers, and we will return it into
the hands of God alone.” “The historic mission
of the Poles throughout the whole course of Polish
history,” wrote Professor Josef Buzek in the
“Oesterreichische Rundschau” of September,
1914, “consists in the protection they have af-
forded as foreposts of the Occident to the Western
civilization founded upon the principles of the
Catholic Church, against attack by the Byzantine
Orient. . . . A similar task has been allotted by
God to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the
present world-war the Poles will take up once more
their historic mission in closest union with Austria-
Hungary. Their struggle will concern the driving
of the hereditary Russian foe from Polish
ground.” .."
So strong was Polish fear and hatred of Russia
that the outbreak of war and the example of their
AUSTRIA-HUN GARY 131
Galician kinsmen swept even the Prussian Poles
into the stream, notwithstanding the bad relations
which had existed between Poles and Germans for
many years. Accordingly, most of the Prussian
Polish leaders endorsed the pastoral letter of
Monsignor Likowski, archbishop of Gnesen and
primate of Poland, issued August 9, 1914, which
accused Russia of being the provoker of the war
and the persecutor of the Catholic Church, and ex-
horted the Poles to fight valiantly for the king of
Prussia—“for it is he who will free from the yoke
our oppressed brethren beyond the frontier.”
Almost identical was the attitude of the third
group of Austria’s northern Slavs—the Ruthen-
ians. For many years the Ruthenians of East-
ern Galicia had regarded their province as a
“Piedmont”—the nucleus of a future Ukrainian
national state carved out of South Russia; much as
the Serbs had regarded Serbia as the nucleus for
a future Yugo-Slav state carved out of Southwest
Austria-Hungary. To the Ruthenians, there-
fore, the war appeared as a golden opportunity,
and the extent of their hopes can be judged from
the words of the proclamation issued by the
Ukrainian National Committee, composed both of
Ruthenians and exiles from the Russian Ukraine.
“Unless the Ukrainian provinces are separated
from Russia,” runs this manifesto, “even the most
crushing defeat for that country will be but a
feeble blow, from which Czarism would recover
in a few years, to take up again its ancient rôle of
a disturber of the peace of Europe. Only a free
132 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Ukraine, which should be supported by the Triple
Alliance [i.e., the Central Powers], could form,
with its extensive domain, reaching from the Car-
pathians to the Don and to the Black Sea, the
necessary protective wall between Europe and
Russia, a bulwark that would defeat forever the
greed for expansion on the part of Czarism, and
free the Slavic world from the baneful influence of
Pan-Muscovitism.”
Such optimistic notes were, however, quickly
stilled by the crushing series of disasters that now
overtook the Hapsburg Monarchy. The failures
in Serbia, the Russian conquest of Eastern Galicia,
and the destructive Cossack raids into Northern
Hungary, spread consternation and alarm through-
out the empire. The disloyal rejoiced, and only
the severest military repression prevented sedi-
tious disturbances among the Serbo-Croats of the
south and in Bohemia. The Entente press was
full of rumors that Austria-Hungary meditated a
separate peace, but such rumors seem to have been
without serious foundation. Undoubtedly the em-
pire was pessimistic, but it was a pessimism of
desperate resolution, not of abject despair. The
Magyars, to whom rumor had assigned the leading
peace rôle, breathed, as a matter of fact, only de-
fiant fury. At the end of 1914, the “Pester
Lloyd” exclaimed hotly, “Let our opponents un-
derstand once and for all: We are going to hold
out to the end, and we have not for a single mo-
ment meditated a separate peace with any one.”
In the “Revue de Hongrie” for March, 1915,
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 133
Count Albert Apponyi sketched out various bene-
fits which victory would confer upon Hungary.
“But,” he added, ‘‘these are the problems of to-
morrow; and for us there will be no to-morrow if
we do not resolutely accomplish our present task
—to conquer. All possibilities are open to us if
we succeed; all are closed if we succumb. If Mus-
covite aggression wins, it is the end of our his-
toric mission; if it breaks before our energy, it is
that mission’s apotheosis.”
At first sight, one might have thought that
Italy's declaration of war upon the empire in
May, 1915, would have greatly accentuated the
prevailing gloom. As a matter of fact, it did more
than anything else to solidify patriotic feeling and
rouse Austria to fresh exertions. The whole em-
pire quivered with furious wrath and scornful con-
tempt for Italy, the “traitor” nation. Emperor
Franz-Joseph’s proclamation to his people, with
its stinging words—“Perfidy whose like history
does not know”—was an accurate reflection of the
popular emotion. “If war be indeed only a con-
tinuation of political policy with different means,”
wrote that leading Austrian publicist, Freiherr von
Chlumecky, in the “Oesterreichische Rundschau,”
“then Italy can point to the fact that, free from
all scruples of political faith and morality, she has
consistently pursued a course in the world war
which she followed in peace for many years. To
be at once Austria’s ally and her most malignant
foe—that has for decades been Italy’s policy. . . .
Italy dares the war, not so much for territorial ag-
134 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
grandizement as for the realization of the aim she
pursued in peace as well with all the means at her
command—to hurl Austria from her position of a
great Power. . . . Against this design, however,
the whole Empire will rise to defend itself as one
man. Austrian blood is not easily stirred, but now
when we are threatened by cowardly brigands with
a dagger thrust in the back, now will our wrath
rise to a mighty flame, and all Austria echo the cry,
‘Down with the traitors!” Now we know where to
find our most malignant foe, who wore the mask of
friendship, and when she had grown great by our
favor and that of Germany, turned out to be an ac-
complice of our enemies. No Austrian will ever
forgive this, no Hungarian will ever forget it. Re-
venge for a breach of faith unexampled in history
—that will continue to be the watchword; and we
shall not rest, nor our children, or children’s chil-
dren, if that be necessary, until a people devoid of
all political and moral loyalty shall have paid a
heavy penalty for the crime committed against our
sovereign and our country !”
Hungarian opinion equaled Austrian in its fury.
“We are persuaded,” exclaimed the “Revue de
Hongrie” of June, 1915, “that the Italian Govern-
ment’s breach of plighted faith will be stigmatized
by posterity, and that without distinction of na-
tions. But, in awaiting this, we Hungarians, who
formerly fought for Italian independence under
Garibaldi, will take care that the infamy of Sa-
landra and his ilk, who seek to revive the epoch of
the Borgias, shall not pass unavenged. We shall
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 135
not wait for history to punish them; we shall
charge ourselves with that duty.”
Much more significant, however, was the attitude
of the Slavs. Italy’s avowed intention to seize,
not only Italian-speaking Trentino and Trieste,
but also large tracts of territory inhabited by a
Serbo-Croat population, roused all the Austrian
Slavs to wrathful indignation. Even the Czech
press warmed to unwonted interest and loyalty.
“The peoples of Austria-Hungary,” asserted the
“Hlas Naroda” of Prague, “prefer war with Italy
to a boughten peace, precarious and uncertain.”
“Because of the perfidy of Italian policy,” wrote
the “Cech” (Prague), bitterly, “a war to-day
breaks out which is just another raid of the brig-
ands of the Abruzzi.” And the “Proudy” of
Olmütz exclaimed defiantly, “One more or less;
what does it matter!”
. It was, however, the Serbo-Croats of the South
who manifested the hottest indignation. “Not an
inch of Austro-Hungarian territory to these per-
fidious ‘Allies’l” exclaimed the ‘‘Hrvatska” of
Agram. “The solid fists of the Croats and
Slovenes will be plenty strong enough to smash
any Italian attempt to grab our littoral.” “There
is not a Croat, not a south Slav,” asserted the
“Obzor” (Agram), “who, in this moment when
Italy falls in arms upon our country, does not
swear solemnly to defend with his heart's blood
Croatia and the south Slav territories from
Italian invasion.” “We pray with all our heart
for the crushing of Italy and the complete failure
136 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
of its vile speculations,” wrote the “Hrvatski
Pokret” (Agram), “and we are convinced that
our Croatian and Slovene soldiers will have a good
big share in bringing this about.”
Very interesting was the attitude of the Austrian
Italians. These people, numbering about 800,000,
are divided into three geographically separate
groups: the Trentino district of South Tyrol; the
Istrian region at the head of the Adriatic, center-
ing about the city of Trieste; and the isolated
colonies of the islands and port towns of the
Dalmatian coast. The longing of Italian “Ir-
redentists” to “redeem” these race brethren by
incorporating them into the kingdom of Italy was
undoubtedly shared by a majority of the Austrian
Italians, and the Austrian military authorities had
to take sharp measures to check disloyalty.
Nevertheless, the loyalist minority was larger
than is generally supposed, and on this occasion
did not fail to express their sentiments. In
Trentino, loyalist addresses were signed by lead-
ing notables, including five Italian members of the
Tyrolese Provincial Diet, while the “Risveglio”
of Trent asserted: “No one has ever solicited
Italy’s intervention. This war serves particular
interests which are absolutely opposed to the in-
terests of Italian Tyrol.” In Istria, Reichsrat
deputy Bugatto, of Gorizia, wrote, in an address
entitled, “Italy tramples upon Italian Honor’’:
“That part of the Italian collectivity which forms
an independent state, and which therefore ought to
protect the good name of Italianism, to-day covers
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 137
this good name with eternal shame. Become blind
or mad, Italy commits the crime of treason, ex-
poses herself to the danger of a disastrous war,
renders inevitable the ruin of Italian citizens, of
Italian lands. Never had we expected such an
ignominy; never was such dolorous injury done our
national pride. . . . All that we can do is to declare
in the face of Italy and the world that the Italians
of Austria condemn and spurn Italy’s action. . . .
Italians of Austrial Let us veil our faces in
shame!” In Dalmatia, “Il Dalmata” of Zara
wrote: “The Dalmatians of Italian speech de-
clare in this solemn hour that they will make every
Sacrifice asked of them. . . . Dalmatian fidelity is
traditional. We have inherited it from our fath-
ers, and we will give a new proof of it by attesting
our loyalty both to Emperor Francis Joseph and
to the institutions of the Austro-Hungarian state.”
The Italian declaration of war proved to be for
Austria the traditional darkest hour before the
dawn. A fortnight later began that great Austro-
German “drive” against the Russian armies,
which never slackened till Galicia was reconquered
and all Russian Poland lay within the Teutonic
grasp.
The joy of the Poles can be imagined. After the
fall of Warsaw, the “Nowa Reforma” of Cracow
wrote: “That which to-day fills Polish hearts is
something far beyond the bounds of ordinary
human delight. Entire generations of Poles have
not been permitted to experience this sentiment,
which only a Pole can understand. The solid walls
138 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
of our prison have crumbled into dust. They have
been cast down by the mighty breath of civiliza-
tion.” The “Czas” said: “Russia to-day suf-
fers a hard and merited chastisement. The loss of
Warsaw is the first step in her downfall.” The
Ruthenian press joined in this chorus of jubila-
tion, which was further swelled by the voices of
the loyalist Czechs. The “Hlas Naroda” of
Brünn wrote: “All the peoples of our monarchy
are to-day filled with enthusiasm. The Czech na-
tion turns grateful eyes upon its valorous sons
who, with the other Austro-Hungarian nations,
bring liberty to the Polish nation. Not, be it
noted, the liberty promised by the false friends of
Slavism at Petersburg, nor the liberty of the
Chinovniks of Moscow, but a liberty based upon
civilization, morality, and conscience. The Rus-
sian despotism reaps the first-fruits of the seeds
which it has sown.” The “Lidone Noviny” re-
marked: “Under Russian rule, the Poles knew
only servitude. Equally lamentable is the fate of
the Ukrainians. Under the pretext of liberating
the Balkan states, the empire of the Tsars wished
only to engulf them in its tyranny. It even allies
itself with the Italians—those declared adversa-
ries of Slavism—in order jointly to enslave the
Slovenes and Croats.”
As in Germany, so in Austria-Hungary, the
second half of the year 1915 saw a flood of discus-
sion concerning the problems of the morrow.
Even more than in Germany was the question of
Austro-German future relations debated, the over-
AUSTRIA-HUN GARY 139
whelming verdict being that the present alliance
should be made permanent and unbreakable.
Eminent Austrian writers like the economist
Eugen von Philippovitch and the historian Dr.
Friedjung, and Hungarian writers like Eduard
Pályi, warmly endorsed the “Central Europe”
idea. Most Austrian-Germans appeared more
interested in the political than in the economic
connection. In a public address delivered in
February, 1916, Prince Alois Liechtenstein said:
“Austria-Hungary will firmly and forever remain
faithful to the alliance with the German Empire.
Leaning upon the German Empire and covered by
it, our fatherland came into existence and has
grown great. . . . We German-Austrians are the
pledge, the indestructible link of the alliance of
the two states.” Dr. Weisskirchner, mayor of
Vienna, remarked in the autumn of 1915: “After
the battles in which the Germans of the empire
and the sons of the Danubian Monarchy have
fought side by side, we wish the political alliance
to become closer, and we desire that an economic
agreement of the two Central empires should
facilitate our victory after and in the peace.”
And Cabinet Minister Dr. Franz Klein asserted:
“A closer union will have to be concluded as a
guarantee for the security of both states. Those
citizens of Austria whose sympathies are else-
where will have to put up with it.”
Hungarian opinion showed some shrinking at
the prospect of a “Central Europe” so obviously
under Teutonic hegemony. Nevertheless, the
140 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
ever-present Slav peril has reconciled most Mag-
yars to the prospect. The Hungarian Premier,
Tisza, has formally recognized its necessity, and
another Magyar leader, Count Andrassy, re-
marked at the close of 1915, “The natural ally of
the Hungarians is the German element in Austria,
and behind them, the German Empire.” In fact,
the Magyars seem to be even more cordial toward
the Germans of the Empire than toward the Aus-
trian-Germans.
Another much debated question has been the
future status of Poland. All parties agree that
no Polish territory must return under Russian
domination. “Poland will never be given back
to the Russians,” asserted the Vienna “Neue
Freie Presse” in the summer of 1916. “Russia
must never again rule in Warsaw; and history
must not move backwards.” Most Austrian
Poles desire an autonomous Polish state, includ-
ing both Russian Poland and Galicia, under the
Hapsburg scepter. In this, both the Austrian-
Germans and the Magyars heartily agree. The
Germans, especially, are utterly opposed to a
simple incorporation of Russian Poland within the
present Austrian political system, since this would
swing the parliamentary balance definitely in
favor of the Slav elements. The great reason why
Galicia was not formally added to the Polish state
set up by the Austro-Germans in Russian Poland
in the autumn of 1916 is the unsettled status of
the Ukrainian question. It must never be forgot-
ten that Eastern Galicia is not Polish but Ukrain-
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 141
ian in nationality, and that if the Austro-German
armies should overrun Southern Russia as they
have Russian Poland, the establishment of a
Ukrainian national state would become a matter of
practical politics. In that case Galicia would be
divided on race lines, the western portion falling
to Poland, the eastern part going to the new
Ukrainia. Such is evidently the Austrian plan.
Whether it ever materializes depends upon the
fortunes of war.
In Austria-Hungary, as in Germany, the optimis-
tic wave of later 1915 gradually ebbed during the
opening months of the ensuing year. The Allied
blockade hit both empires severely, and in Austria
especially the food shortage was becoming acute.
The growing pessimism was sharply accentuated
by the Russian “drive” which began in June, 1916,
and popular apprehension reached its climax with
Rumania’s Sudden attack at the beginning of Sep-
tember. This naturally brought up the question
of the three million Rumans of Transylvania and
Eastern Hungary. The Hungarian Government’s
persistent attempts to “Magyarize” these popula-
tions had made much bad blood, and there can be
little doubt that a majority of the Hungarian
Rumans desired annexation to the neighboring
kingdom of Rumania. At the same time, this se-
cessionist feeling seems to have been of a rather
passive character, militant disloyalty being rare.
‘It was also partially counteracted by a traditional
attachment to the Hapsburg dynasty and by wide-
spread fear of Russia. Many Rumanians felt that
142 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
they formed the eastern link in the German-
Magyar-Ruman race-dyke which sundered the two
halves of the Slav ocean, and dreaded lest a Rus-
sian victory might mean the drowning of all three
races beneath the Pan-Slav waves. Typical of
such apprehensions is the open-letter of the Tran-
Sylvanian Ruman author, Emil Isac, to friends in
the kingdom of Rumania who wished to join the
Allies and attack Austria-Hungary. Writing in
the spring of 1915, M. Isac says: “You reproach
me with having denied my Latin origin by attack-
ing Russia. I would have you know that it is pre-
cisely to defend Latin culture that I act thus. . . .
We should recognize that Rumania, by its geo-
graphical situation at the gateway to the Balkans,
is as great an obstacle to Russia’s ambitions as is
Germany or Austria-Hungary. . . . Do you really
wish us to sign our own death-warrant? . . . I de-
clare to you frankly that I would rather make a
pact with the devil than an alliance with autocratic
Russia.” Such sentiments probably explain the
surprisingly lukewarm reception accorded the
Rumanian armies during their invasion of Tran-
sylvania in September, 1916.
The speedy expulsion of these invaders and the
subsequent overrunning of Rumania itself by the
Austro-Germans did much to dispel the gloom
which had fallen upon the empire during the sum-
mer of 1916. The death of the aged Emperor
Franz Joseph produced no bad effects upon public
confidence. His death had long been anticipated,
and his youthful successor, Charles Francis
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 143
Joseph, was generally popular. Of course, Aus-
tria-Hungary is suffering acutely under the strain
of war; far more so, indeed, than its German ally.
Nevertheless, there is no popular cry for “peace at
any price,” and Austrian determination to fight to
the end has been greatly strengthened by the En-
tente’s plan for European reconstruction an-
nounced early in January, 1917. This program
involves the practical destruction of Austria-Hun-
gary, and the Austro-Hungarian press has defi-
antly stated that such proposals can be answered
only on the battle-field.
This threat of national disruption has thrown
Austria-Hungary more absolutely than ever into
Germany’s arms. It is, therefore, certain that a
Teutonic victory, and perhaps even more a gen-
eral stalemate, would see a firmly knit “Central
Europe,” dominating the Balkans and closely al-
lied to Turkey and Bulgaria. Such is the solution
dictated by Austria’s vital interests, and such the
outcome especially desired by the Austrian-Ger-
Iſla]].S.
Toward present enemies the Austro-Hungarian
attitude differs sensibly from the German. In
Austria-Hungary there is no real hostility against
either England or France. The wrath of the Aus-
trian-Germans is concentrated on Italy, while the
old Magyar hatred of Russia has been still fur-
ther exacerbated. Neither of these hatreds will be
easily allayed. They are bound up with conflicts
of interest, with instinctive racial antipathies, and
with sentimental considerations—which last sway
144 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Austro-Hungarians much more than Germans.
Assuming that Austria-Hungary survives, its
most pressing problems will undoubtedly be in-
ternal. We have seen that the empire met war's
test surprisingly well and that there was much
more patriotic feeling than most foreign observers
had imagined. At the same time, the internal
situation is still serious and the outlook by no
means rosy. In the preceding pages we have
shown that there are respectable loyalist minori-
ties among even the most disloyal of the empire’s
racial elements. But we do not wish to leave the
impression that disloyalty has been eliminated.
On the contrary, a majority of the empire's Serbs,
Czechs, Rumans, and Italians are still probably
at least passively disloyal, though voiceless under
the censorship, while the Croats were converted
only through hatred of Italy.
Now all this is well known to the ruling Ger-
mans and Magyars, who are, therefore, to-day in-
censed against the “traitors” and predisposed to
wreak summary vengeance after the war. But
any wholesale reprisals would sharpen race preju-
dices, and might drive the present loyalist minori-
ties into the secessionist camp. In that case, the
empire’s condition would be worse than before. It
is plain that much coolness, tact, and judicious
forgetfulness will be needed in the years to come.
CHAPTER V
ITALY
TALY is, in many respects, a land of violent
contrasts. This is certainly true of its politi-
cal life, which resembles one of those curious
apartment houses of its great cities where wealth
ostentatiously flaunts itself on the first-floor front
while poets starve in the garrets above and vicious
poverty festers in the cellars below.
In fact, modern Italy shows certain disquieting
signs of fragility. Italian political unity was ef-
fected in 1870, but Italian moral unity was not
thereby completed. The Pope absolutely refused
to recognize the new state of things, and his de-
mand for a restoration of the papal state (which
would of course involve the undoing of Italian un-
ity), was supported by a minority of pious Cath-
olics throughout the peninsula. Another irrecon-
cilable element were the Republicans, who con-
tinued to dream the dreams of Mazzini, denounced
the Savoyard Monarchy, and asserted that a re-
public was the only way to achieve lasting Italian
unity. Finally, there were the Anarchists, more
numerous in Italy than in any other European
country, who condemned all established forms of
government.
|Up to the last few years, it is true, the Italian
145
146 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
political edifice was not seriously endangered.
The irreconcilable groups were so mutually antag-
onistic that they could never combine for united
action, and all political power was in the hands
of the upper and middle classes, entrenched be-
hind a limited parliamentary franchise. Had
these classes used their power wisely, Italian
moral unity would probably have been long since
attained. Unfortunately, they employed their
privileged position to exploit the poverty-stricken
lower classes, while their parliamentary repre-
sentatives (a virtual caste of political war horses),
invented the system of trasformismo, a sublimated
‘‘pork-barrel” which ate the heart out of Italian
political life and disgusted everybody with the
whole existing régime. So angry became the cry
of discontent that the governing class reluctantly
granted the popular panacea of universal manhood
suffrage in the year 1912.
The first parliamentary elections held under uni-
versal suffrage in 1913 revealed the extent of the
latent dangers which menaced the existing political
and social order. All the extremist parties made
astonishing gains. And these parties were more
numerous than of yore. Besides the old irrecon-
cilable Catholic, Republican, and Anarchist groups,
two new extreme parties now came to the front:
the Revolutionary Socialists or “Syndicalists”
and the “Nationalists”—partizans of a jingo im-
perialism. Both were recent political phenomena.
The Syndicalists were a late offshoot of Orthodox
Marxian Socialism. Repudiating the Marxist doc-
ITALY 147
trine of social regeneration by peaceful evolu-
tionary methods, the Syndicalists preached a vio-
lent social revolution. Their progress had been
extremely rapid, and by 1914 they had gained con-
trol of the great Italian labor organization, the AS-
Sociazione Generale del Lavoro. In working alli-
ance with the older revolutionary groups (the
Republicans and the Anarchists), the Syndicalists
were to show their power in alarming fashion on
the very eve of the European war.
The rise of the Nationalist party had been no
less meteoric—and startling. Of course there had
always been a moderate imperialist group known
as the “Irredentists,” whose program had been
the “redemption” of Italic lands by annexation
to Italy, especially the Italic districts of Austria-
Hungary. But about the beginning of the present
century a school of Italian thinkers evolved a body
of doctrine which went far beyond the old irre-
dentist aspirations. This new doctrine called it-
self “Nationalism,” but was in reality a subli-
mated imperialism. Unlike the Irredentists, who
had practically limited their hopes to Austrian
Trentino, Istria, and Dalmatia, the Nationalists
frankly urged the annexation of French Corsica,
Savoy, Nice, and Tunis; English Malta; and Swiss
Ticino. And that was not all. Irredentism had
aspired to Adriatic dominion. A Nationalist
watchword pronounced: “The Adriatic is bitter:
the Mediterranean not less bitter!” In fine, the
Nationalist goal was a revived Roman Empire
dominating the entire Mediterranean basin, where-
148 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
in the half-million surplus Italians now annually
forced to seek alien lands might transform region
after region into new Italies. The Tripolitan War
of 1911 (preeminently a Nationalist undertaking),
had electrified Italian public opinion, which had
thereafter been steadily nationalized. The Na-
tionalists had always been uncompromising in
their methods. At the time of the Tripolitan War
they had not hesitated to threaten revolution if
the Government refused to sanction their impe-
rialistic designs.
A final illustration of Italy’s unstable political
equilibrium had been furnished by the famous
“Red Week” of June, 1914. A “General Strike”
proclaimed by the Syndicalists had terrorized the
peninsula, and in many districts of Central Italy
the whole fabric of society had temporarily broken
down, with the red flag of anarchy waving over
Ancona and surrounding towns. Students of Ital-
ian affairs were seriously alarmed, as competent
a critic as Professor George B. McClellan observ-
ing, “The strike was a grim warning to the Gov-
ernment and to the nation that under favorable
conditions it is quite possible that a minority of
the people may destroy the whole social and po-
litical fabric of modern Italy.”
Such was the volcanic state of Italian national
psychology at the outbreak of the Great War. It
is, therefore, not surprising that the Italian Gov-
ernment, despite its alliance with the Teutonic
Powers, declared Italian neutrality and adopted a
waiting attitude. The Government was obviously
ITALY 149
watching to see not only how the war would go
but also how Italian public opinion would crys-
tallize.
This crystallization was, however, of a most com-
plicated character. The old constitutional middle-
class groups which still controlled the parlia-
mentary machine (“Conservatives,” “Liberals,”
‘‘Radicals,” etc.), took their cue from the Govern-
ment and adopted no positive attitude one way
or the other.
Of the extremist parties, the Nationalists took
a similar position. In fact, during the first weeks
of the war, they inclined toward the Teutonic Pow-
ers. The Nationalists had always emphasized
their uncompromising “realism.” A few months
before the war, the Nationalist leader, Federzoni,
had stated, “Our party holds a purely realist and
integral valuation of international relations, in ab-
solute antithesis to the sentimental tendencies of
the old Radical and Republican irredentism, which
looked to the abandonment of the Triplice and the
rapprochement of Italy with the parliamentary
Powers of the West.” And at the beginning of
1914, he stated in an address before the Catholic
University Circle of Rome: “I observe that the
Catholics are favorable to the alliance with the
empires of Central Europe and sympathetic to-
ward Austria. That is too naïve a viewpoint. It
springs from a superficial and partizan admiration
for the neighboring monarchy because it is tradi-
tionalist and hierarchical. For precisely opposite
reasons, our Democrats are often anti-Triplician
150 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
and gravitate toward Republican, Masonic, and
Radical-Socialist France. We repudiate all these
a priori. Nationalism, in regard to the system of
alliances, is inspired only by the positive interests
of Italy, without regard to the preferences which
its party members may feel for the internal physi-
ognomy of this or that state.” During the month
of August, 1914, most Nationalists thought that
Germany was about to win a sweeping victory.
Accordingly, they tended plainly to favor active
aid to the Central Powers in order to earn a claim
to the Italic possessions of England and France.
After the German check before Paris in early Sep-
tember, however, and especially after Austria’s
revelation of her military weakness in Galicia, the
Nationalists rapidly changed front.
Signor Federzoni’s utterances in early 1914 are
of peculiar interest. They forecasted accurately
both the attitude of the Italian Government and
the lines of cleavage of Italian public opinion dur-
ing the early stages of the European War. The
head of the Italian Government, Premier Salan-
dra, at once announced the line of Italian policy.
That line was “Sacred Egoism”: In other words,
a policy of pure realism guided solely by national
self-interest. The line-up of the various political
parties also rapidly became clear. The Catholics
and Conservatives were pro-German and pro-
Austrian. The Republicans, Radicals, and Syn-
dicalists were strongly pro-Ally, with the Nation-
alists plainly veering in the same direction. The
great Liberal bloc, which controlled the Chamber
ITALY 151
of Deputies, was for strict neutrality. This was
also true of the Marxian or Regular Socialists,
though a minority tended to become increasingly
pro-Ally. Since this early line-up is of such vital
importance for an understanding of succeeding
events, the party attitudes must be considered in
detail.
The Catholics, although avowedly sympathetic
toward the Central Powers and not disinclined to
see Italy ranged actively on their side, were for
temporary neutrality, and their neutralism in-
creased in fervor as the strength of pro-Ally feel-
ing in other parties made any question of an Ital-
ian attack on the Entente Powers less and less a
matter of practical politics. This neutralist atti-
tude was definitely adopted at the party congress
held at Milan, September 24, 1914. Addressing
the congress, the Catholic leader, Signor Meda,
said: “To aid France, we should have to declare
war on Germany. But what pretext should we
invoke? How has Germany harmed us? We are
still her ally. . . . To march against Austria, we
must have something with which to reproach her.
What? Austria has not troubled the Balkan equi-
librium except in so far as her operations against
Serbia made this necessary. It is not said that
she wishes, after the war, to keep or occupy posi-
tions which would displease us. Neither will the
recalling of past wrongs suffice. If we intend to
provoke her to march against us and thereby per-
mit us to conquer Trent and Trieste, that would
be a disloyal and dangerous war which the great
152 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
bulk of the country does not want.” And the con-
gress itself voted the following resolution: “In
this historic hour Italy’s rôle is to exercise an
equilibrating mission which all the belligerent POW-
ers will appreciate. Indeed, there may be reserved
for Italy a peace-making mission more lofty and
glorious than military victory. The Catholics
decide to adhere with entire confidence to Italy’s
declaration of complete neutrality; they see in it
the surest means of safeguarding the country’s
interests and those of civilization, amid the politi-
cal and economic rivalries of the present hour.”
And on November 5, 1914, that leading Catholic
organ, the “Unità Cattolica,” declared that if
Italy declared war on Austria, the Catholics would
march “without enthusiasm, without energy, with-
out being able to say “God is with us”; but like
victims to the slaughter.” The sentiments of the
Conservatives were much the same as those of the
Catholics, though more restrained on account of
their Government affiliations.
Besides this definite party feeling there was a
good deal of loose anti-Ally bias discernible here
and there in the currents of general public opinion.
Many imperialists feared France as the main ob-
stacle to their Mediterranean ambitions. England
came in for considerable sharp criticism. In the
“Mattino” of Naples, the well-known Italian jour-
nalist, Scarfoglio, wrote: “Germany has con-
quered the commercial markets of the world; Italy
the labor markets. What the traveling-salesman
does for Germany, that the peasant and Workman
ITALY 153
do for Italy. What a magnificent prospect for
these two creative nations if they should collabo-
rate in their work of civilization Unfortunately,
there is in our midst a pro-British prejudice which
opposes this collaboration. An absurd prejudice,
for Italy owes nothing to England. Rather has
she been duped by England, like so many other
peoples.” Early in 1915, another Italian writer,
Signor Bandini, remarked: “What English Lib-
eralism aims at, what it will certainly carry out
if it is successful in the present war, is the com-
pression of European non-English races within the
boundaries of Europe; and within those bound-
aries, the suppression of any nationality which
might show signs of possessing native energy cap-
able of breaking through the imposed bonds and
of endangering English exclusive possession of
the world at large. Only obstinate, cowardly opti-
mists can fail to see that the ultimate consequence
of this English triumph would be the slow death
of all European non-English nations.” And a
little later, the “Corriere d’Italia” (Rome),
wrote: ‘‘We write whole books on German mili-
tarism, but we never think or speak of English na-
valism. And yet, for us, the latter is much more
dangerous, because whenever it is a question of
the Mediterranean, Italy’s principal vital inter-
ests are at once put in jeopardy.”
This anti-Ally and pro-German section of Italian
public opinion, though influential, was not numer-
ous. The mass of the Italian people was unques-
tionably for strict neutrality. The two political
154 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
exponents of Italian neutralism were of course the
Liberals and the Regular Socialists. The Liber-
als represented in the broadest sense the Italian
middle classes—shopkeepers, factory owners, inde-
pendent farmers, business men, professional men,
etc. These classes were keenly responsive to
economic arguments, and most of such arguments
made for continued peace. It was obvious that
Italy was conserving her resources while her neigh-
bors were wasting theirs in war, and furthermore
that after the war a neutral Italy, with unimpaired
capital, untouched factories, and intact working-
staffs, would have a great advantage in the inevi-
table scramble for the disorganized markets of the
world. Typical of this viewpoint is an article in
that leading Italian periodical, the “Nuova Anto-
logia,” of December, 1914. “Our material inter-
ests and the lives of our countrymen are not risked
in the bloody venture of battles,” it states with
evident satisfaction, “and we have reason to hope
that the indispensable continuity of our national
labor will not be interrupted. . . . We have no
lack of laborers to raise and reap our crops, to till
and sow our fertile fields; almost all our factories
are still in operation, and slowly but surely the
delicate strands of credit, so rudely snapped asun-
der by the outbreak of the world-war, are being
re-knit. . . . Neutrality, therefore, has proved an
effectual defense for our economic interests against
greater and worse evils, and from a political stand-
point it has procured for us the signal advantage
of inducing many foreigners justly to estimate
ITALY 155
the worth of Italian friendship and of Italian
power.” And in January, 1915, another writer
remarked in the same periodical: “Very few
among us believe that our land could embark in a
War without undergoing grave financial and eco-
nomic disturbances; it is enough for us to reflect
upon what has already happened, even after our
wise declaration of neutrality.”
As for the Regular Socialists, they maintained
unwavering fidelity to their anti-militarist Marx-
ian principles. Their party manifesto, dated Sep-
tember 22, 1914, read: “Workers! The pre-
texts with which some are trying to lead you to
the slaughter are not worth the cost of life and
treasure which war entails. . . . Proclaim that
Italy, the only great European Power outside the
struggle, hereby declares its mission of mediator
between the belligerents. In the name of the In-
ternational, in the name of Socialism, O Proletari-
ans of Italy, we invite you to maintain and accen-
tuate your irreconcilable opposition to war.”
Although the mass of the Italian people was
thus for neutrality, a large and rapidly growing
minority had from the first stood squarely for
intervention in favor of the Allies. That this was
so was due mostly to widespread sympathy for
France. To Italian Republicans, Radicals, and
many Socialists, the Anti-Clerical, Radical-Social-
ist French Republic was a cherished ideal which
must be supported at all costs if liberty were not
to give place everywhere to Prussian absolutism.
The Italian Republicans proved the faith that was
156 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
in them by promptly raising a large “Garibaldian
Legion” which fought heroically on the battle-
fields of France.
At the same time, these political reasons were
powerfully reinforced by instinctive promptings
of racial and cultural solidarity. We have al-
ready noted the able “Pan-Latin” propaganda
waged by French littérateurs and journalists to
gain Italy to the Allied cause, but one reason why
it succeeded so widely was the fact that many
Italians met it half way. As an Italian Radical
leader, Signor Fera, remarked to a French jour-
nalist early in 1915: “All Italians recognized
from the start that the war was in reality a strug-
gle of two civilizations, of two states of mind.
Italy could not fight for a civilization antipathetic
to her own. That is why public sentiment is with
us so hostile to the Austro-German bloc.” At
about the same date, Professor Giulio Natali drew
great applause from a Genoese audience when he
remarked: “In Italy the great majority is Fran-
cophile. To feel that sentiment is not to forget
our real interests: it is simply—and our people
has intuition—to defend our civilization, Latin
civilization. Rome and Paris are the fatherlands
of all free and intelligent men.” As early as Sep-
tember, 1914, the noted Italian poet, Gabriele
d’Annunzio, had uttered a burning appeal to his
fellow countrymen, exhorting them to stand by
the “Latin sister’s” side. “Nature herself,” he
cried, “makes Italy one with France. Upon both,
as upon all the Mediterranean peoples, is laid the
ITALY 157
duty of Sustaining the supreme struggle against
an imminent menace of servitude and extinction.’’
And at a banquet held in Paris early in January,
1915, he said: “I announce to you a certainty, to
me as inevitable as the coming of spring or the
Sun's entrance into the sign Aries—the certainty
of our war; that war which I have preached for
twenty-five years.” At the “Pan-Latin” con-
gress held at the Paris Sorbonne, February 12,
1915, the eminent Italian historian, Guglielmo
Ferrero, remarked: “For us all, children of .
Greece and Rome that we are, and bound to France
by the sacred ties of language and culture, there
arises a grave matter of conscience. . . . In this
terrible struggle, blood, sacrifice, long tenaeity,
will be required. Can we let France bear alone
to the end this terrible and glorious task from
which the genius of our race will come forth grown
young once more?”
As the war went on, anti-German sentiment be-
came more manifest in Italy. “In the Germanic
imagination,” wrote Guglielmo Ferrero in the
“Secolo” (Milan), “there is something mon-
strous, unbalanced, excessive, which recalls the
Indians, the Persians, the Assyrians, the Babylon-
ians, and the other Eastern peoples; something
which leads the Germans to exaggerate to absurd-
ity every principle however sacred and vital in
itself.” German destruction of works of art in
Belgium and Northern France evoked angry pro-
tests throughout Italy, while German methods of
warfare called forth bitter condemnation. “They
158 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
punish the cathedrals because they are a force;
the belfries because they are a symbol; the monu-
ments because they are not German,” exclaimed
Luigi Barzini in the “Corriere della Sera” of mid-
December, 1914. “Every land which guards jeal-
ously the treasures of its civilization should trem-
ble before these proceedings of destruction, be-
fore this new fashion of making war.” “If de-
cisive events do not occur before long,” wrote
Ettore Janni, “scientific barbarism will be the
outstanding characteristic of the present war.
And for this, Germany will be responsible. It
was she who initiated it. . . . But—how short-
sighted of Germanyl Ordinarily, the aversions
and even the hatreds engendered by war are of
short duration. But this time Germany has
transgressed too far the limits permitted by war's
necessities; she has shown an absolute contempt
for all law, for all sentiment of humanity. She
has glorified as a supreme virtue the fact of re-
nouncing every virtue. She seems to have nailed
Jesus anew upon the cross. . . . Of the princi-
ples of civilization, she has made a litter for the
horses of her Uhlans. All this it will be difficult
to forget; and, so long as men remember, it will
be difficult not to act toward Germany in accord-
ance with these exasperating memories. Germany,
who, after the war, can have no hope other than
the dissolution of the present league against her,
is doing everything possible to cement this league
for the future. . . . Europe may form a circle of
hell such as even Dante could not have dreamed.
ITALY 159
. . . The blind leaders of Germany are exciting
the whole world against their country. Those
who formerly kept pensive silence to-day shout
the war-cry of assault and extermination. The
force of hate has banished weariness; the desire of
vengeance thrills those who faltered. They have
given to Europe the terrible soul of a justiciar.”
By the early spring of 1915, Italian sentiment
had thus undergone a marked change. The mass
of the nation was still for neutrality, but the ac-
tive pro-Germans had almost disappeared. They
were now neutralists, while many who had been
neutralists at the start of the war had become
partizans of Italian intervention on the Allies’
side. A similar shift had been going on inside
the Italian Cabinet, several neutralists having
been displaced by men of more pro-Ally com-
plexion. This was notably true of the new Italian
minister for foreign affairs, Baron Sydney Son-
nino, Scotch on the distaff side and of known pro-
British sympathies. As early as November, 1914,
the semi-official “Tribuna” (Rome), had re-
marked editorially: “This is not a war of gov-
ernments, but of nations—of races. It may last
for a year or years. Therefore Italian neutrality
is a transitory condition, due to circumstances
which may change at any moment. There is thus
necessity for military, economic, and diplomatic
preparation on the part of the Government, and
of moral and political preparation on the part of
the public.”
|Under these altered circumstances it is not
160 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
strange that the strong imperialistic tendencies
latent in wide circles of Italian thought crystal-
lized with extreme rapidity. The old Irredentist
hatred of Austria and desire to annex the Italic
regions of the eastern Adriatic littoral flamed up
hotly in vehement demands for war against the
“hereditary foe.” The Italian public was daily
reminded that the Adriatic—“Our Sea”—had
been a Roman and a Venetian lake, that the pres-
ent opportunity for satisfying Italy’s “vital”
aspirations might never again recur, and that the
Italians of the East Adriatic shore were so rap-
idly yielding before the combined pressure of the
Austrian Government and awakening Slavism
that quick action was imperative if those lands
were not to be lost to Italianism forever. “With-
in fifty years,” asserted Guglielmo Ferrero, “the
Slavic language will be the speech of Trieste and
the Istrian cities, unless we conquer Istria; and
every memory of Italy will fade from those lands
which since the days of Augustus have always
been Latin. It would be like unmaking the his-
tory of Italy. . . . It is very difficult in these days
for the Italian language to conquer new terri-
tories. So much the more is it our duty to see
that none of the territories in which Italian is
spoken shall to-day forget it. We shall be over-
whelmed with shame if we allow the speech of our
fathers to be corrupted, little by little, by a new
people.” That important Milanese journal, the
“Corriere della Sera,” urged the Government
“to achieve the unity of our country, to gain pos-
ITALY 161
session of frontiers which will permit us to be
pacific with dignity, to rid our Adriatic of the
domination of an enemy—an essential and eternal
enemy; a domination which to-day makes us
strangers without security in that sea which
touches most vitally our national life.” And in
February, 1915, the “Popolo d’Italia” of Milan
wrote: ‘‘We wish the end of maritime Austria.
Austria has no sea. Neither has Hungary. That
Sea, to-day Austrian, is an Italian sea. Hun-
gary’s Adriatic outlet is a usurpation. . . . Let
Austria be a great Switzerland; and just as Swit-
zerland does not claim Genoa, so let Austria-Hun-
gary not pretend either to Trieste or Fiume.”
Of course, most Italians recognized that the
Italic population of the Eastern Adriatic was con-
fined to the coast towns and littoral, the hinterland
being Yugo-Slav. In fact, the Italian element in
the province of Istria is about 45 per cent., while
in Dalmatia it is only 3 per cent. But the Italian
claim was that the whole culture and civilization
of these regions was Italian; that the Adriatic
Slavs possessed no true national consciousness of
their own; and that the apparent national con-
sciousness of this folk—due to artificial Austrian
stimulation—would quickly yield to Latinism
once the Adriatic Slavs were under Italian rule.
The Serbian claim to these coasts and the possi-
bility of a Yugo-Slav Empire planted solidly on
the Adriatic angered and alarmed Italian public
opinion. English and French approval of Yugo-
Slav aspirations caused deep consternation, and
162 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Italian publicists hastened to lay their side of the
question before the Allied peoples. In the “Lon-
don Nation” of April 3, 1915, the well-known Ital-
ian journalist, Arundel del Rè, made light of re-
cent Slav gains in Istria and about Trieste at the
expense of the Italian element. “With reference
to the Slovene advance,” he wrote, “the problem
is due mainly to political causes. Left to them-
selves, the Slovenes and the Italians would freely
intermingle, and the former would inevitably be
absorbed by the latter.” Regarding Dalmatia
he is even more positive. “I do not know what
constitutes a claim to nationality,” he wrote on
February 6, 1915, “unless indeed it means the sum
total of the spirit, the culture, the intellectual and
artistic manifestations of a people, and the con-
tinuity of its tradition. On these grounds I can-
not see how Serbia can lay claim to Dalmatia.
Not only does it historically belong to Latin civili-
zation, of which it is the outpost across the Adri-
atic as well as the national boundary, but the ar-
chives of the Dalmatian coast towns, their laws, in-
stitutions, culture, and language are Italian, just
as much as are those on the other side of the Adri-
atic. . . . Dalmatia not only is essentially a part
of Italy, but it is important to her strategically
if she is to remain mistress of the Adriatic. . . .
How have the Serbo-Croats acquired a numerical
advantage in Dalmatia? Merely through a forced
and unnatural immigration and persecution pro-
voked deliberately by Austria with the purpose of
destroying and suffocating the Italian element.
ITALY 163
That this has resisted so long, and, though out-
numbered, still dominates the spirit and the cul-
ture of Dalmatia, is in itself a proof of its right
to existence and domination.
Turning to the Italian press, we find widespread
condemnation of proposals to be content with the
acquisition of Istria, either as the result of a
peaceful agreement with Austria or in conse-
quence of a successful war. The imperialists
were a unit in demanding Austria-Hungary’s
whole east Adriatic coast, no matter what the ob-
jections of the Yugo-Slavs. Particularly signifi-
cant is the following editorial of the semi-official
“Giornale d’Italia”: “The result of this system
would be a slight improvement of our Adriatic
position, thanks to the acquisition of Trieste and
Pola, but the general strategic position at sea
would continue to be difficult for us if that sea
should belong, not only to us but also to an inde-
pendent Croatia and to a Greater Serbia—two
states which would probably be in the orbit of
Russia. What would happen, then, would be, no
longer a great Austrian naval power, but two
small states under the tutelage of a formidable
naval and military power—Russia. Now, Italy's
principal objective in the Adriatic is to settle once
and for all the politico-strategic questions of a sea
which commands our eastern coast, and such a
problem can be solved only in one way: by eliminat-
ing every other navy. From the economic point
of view Italy desires the greatest liberty and will
put no difficulties in the way of economic outlets
164 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
for the populations of the east Adriatic hinter-
land. But from the military viewpoint, Italy can-
not give way an inch. In the Adriatic (Austria
having disappeared), there must be neither port,
nor submarine, nor torpedo which is not Italian.
Otherwise, the present difficult situation would be
perpetuated and would even grow more grave
with the course of time.” That the Italian Gov-
ernment was preparing for all eventualities was
definitely shown by its occupation of the Albanian
port of Valona (Avlona), at the close of 1914. In
fact, Albania was another region insistently
claimed by Italian public opinion.
But these were by no means the limits to Italian
expansion, as the imperialists saw it. The Na-
tionalist viewpoint was ably set forth by Deputy
Giuseppe Bevione in a series of articles printed in
the great Turin organ, “La Stampa,” toward the
close of 1914. Assuming that Italy must join the
Allies, Signor Bevione asserted that the war must
end with the Adriatic wholly an Italian sea. The
only way to accomplish this was the occupation of
Albania and the conquest of Austria’s Adriatic
coast, thus forestalling an invasion by the Serbs
and confronting Europe at the peace congress
with the logic of an accomplished fact. Other-
wise, Russia, through her Yugo-Slav tools, would
gain that Adriatic predominance so vital to Italy.
But besides all this, Italy must take part with the
Allies in all future Balkan and Near Eastern oper-
ations, thus earning permanent possession of
Rhodes and the Ægean islands now occupied by
ITALY 165
her troops since 1912, as well as a full share of
Asia Minor in any partition of the Ottoman Em-
pire. “We trust,” said the “Rassegna Nazio-
male” (Rome), in the spring of 1915, “that there
will be reserved for us, in the Mediterranean, in
the AEgean, and in Asia Minor, a share propor-
tionate to the requirements of our position.”
And an Italian writer remarked in the English
“Edinburgh Review,” “There is only one land
wherein Italy can still hope to found colonies of
Italian laborers, and that is Asiatic Turkey.”
Toward Austria, as might be imagined, the Ital-
ian press was taking an increasingly menacing
tone. This first quarter of 1915 was the period of
the Italian Government’s long dicker with the
Central Powers over cessions of Austria’s Italic
territories, and the Italian semi-official papers in
particular were not slow to inform the Teutonic
Powers of what might be expected in case of re-
fusal to comply with Italy’s demands. Early in
March, the “Giornale d’Italia” wrote: “The
time has come to make clear to the people that
the present state of things cannot last indefinitely.
Italy cannot emerge from the terrible European
crisis as she is to-day. She must, therefore, be
ready, for it would be suicide to let this crisis
pass without improving her frontiers, realizing
her aspirations, raising her prestige, and assur-
ing her future. Action is life.” And a month
later it remarked, “Italy will do what her inter-
ests counsel, and while we do not take it upon us
to predict even the near future, we are in a posi-
166 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
tion to affirm that she will reach her goal at any
cost.”
When we review such semi-official press utter-
ances as the above, together with the numberless
imperialistic incitements to war like those already
quoted, it is difficult not to believe that the Sa-
landra Cabinet had already made up its mind on
intervention, and that it was using the negotia-
tions with the Teutonic Powers as part of a clever
combinazione to extract the largest possible con-
cessions from the Allied Powers with whom par-
allel negotiations were going on at the same time.
One thing is certain. On April 25, 1915, a whole
week before Italy took her first warlike step by
denouncing the Triple Alliance with Austria and
Germany, the Salandra Government signed an in-
strument with the Allied Powers. The exact con-
tent of this document has never been divulged,
but the semi-official Italian press has asserted pos-
itively that it realized Italy’s Adriatic aspirations
while holding open the door in the Near East.
All this tends to explain the inner significance
of the great political crisis which preceded Italy’s
entrance into the European War at the end of
May, 1915. If the Government had indeed deter-
mined upon war, it was to carry its point only
after a hard struggle. For, despite the growing
current of pro-Ally feeling and the rising imper-
ialistic tide, neutralism was still strong in Italy.
The commercial and industrial classes, whether
factory owners, shopkeepers, or business men,
were generally averse to war, and the same was
ITALY 167
true of the Catholics and the Socialistic workmen.
So strong, in fact, appeared this neutralist bloc
that as ardent an interventionist as Guglielmo
Ferrero admitted in the early spring of 1915,
“Italy hesitates, and while she sides with the
coalition, while she desires that England, France,
and Russia may be victorious, she leans more to
neutrality and peace than to intervention and war.
The majority hope and desire that Italy may
watch the terrible conflict with folded arms, to the
end.” And in his indignant pessimism he con-
cluded menacingly: “I do not know what may
happen on that day when, in the midst of a Europe
rent by war and restless in the face of such ruin,
the Italian people become persuaded that the mon-
archy, by the mistakes of its foreign policy, has
prevented Italy from taking the Italian provinces.
It is even possible that the monarchy's last hour
will strike.”
The neutralists were, however, to show their
strength in dramatic fashion. The Government’s
denunciation of the Triple Alliance treaty on May
3 had seemed to assure war, and the interven-
tionists were already shouting victory. But at
this eleventh hour there entered the arena Gio-
litti, the maestro of Peninsular politics, the “Ital-
ian Clemengeau,” who for more than fifteen years
had held the parliamentary chamber in the hollow
of his hand and upset cabinets at his will. Gath-
ering behind him all the varied forces of neutral-
ity, Giolitti dashed into the lists waving the ban-
ner of peace. “Italy can have from Austria im-
168 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
portant and sufficient concessions without making
war,” was his rallying cry. Austria had, indeed,
just offered Italy the Trentino, the west bank of
the Isonzo, special privileges and full cultural
guarantees for all Italians left under Austrian
rule, and a free hand for Italy in Albania. With
these Austrian offers Giolitti declared himself
satisfied, and added that were Italy to conquer all
those territories to which the war-party aspired,
their numerous Slav and German inhabitants
would saddle Italy with “a problem of inverse ir-
redentism worse even than has been the German
problem of Alsace-Lorraine.” To break with her
allies of nearly thirty years on such grounds
would be an act of shameless perfidy which would
leave Italy diplomatically bankrupt in the alliance
market of the world. Even if victorious, the
strain on Italy’s finances and the disorganization
of her industrial life would put back her economic
progress for a generation. “If Italy goes to
war,” concluded Giolitti, “the results, whatever
the outcome, are bound to be most sad.” These
were telling arguments, and so powerful was the
influence of Giolitti’s personality that the Cham-
ber showed unmistakable signs of bowing once
more to the maestro’s will.
But the interventionists, now openly supported
by the Government, wrought no less desperately
for war. A host of fervid orators headed by Ga-
briele d’Annunzio inflamed the public against Aus-
tria and intoxicated it with memories of imperial
Rome. Typical of this campaign was d’Annun-
ITALY 169
zio's speech from the Garibaldi monument at the
Quarto, Genoa: “To-day, gentlemen, your vic-
torious will stands armed and ready for the fray.
In looking at you and contemplating you, Italy
reveals herself to me as a virgin land, just as it
appeared to Achates, and as it was when for the
first time there rang across the Tyrrhenian Sea
the rapturous melody of her divine name. To-
night, before the dawn, many of you will set out
for the land that shines from afar. Your hearts
are messengers of faith, ah, pilgrims of love!
The same fire that kindled youth that night at the
rock of Quarto flames anew in your breasts. If
it be true, as I swear it is, that we Italians have
relighted this fire on the altar of Italy, then take
fagots from it in your hands and blow upon
them. Shake them, brandish them wherever you
go, and, my young companions, thus sow the fire
of war all about you and be the intrepid firebands
of Greater Italy. . . . Sow the fire, that by to-
morrow the souls of all shall be enkindled, and
the voices of all a clamor of flame for Italy |
Italy I’’ g
Equally typical of the war-party’s denuncia-
tions of the neutralists is this speech by d’Annun-
zio upon his arrival at Rome on the 12th of May:
“Since three days, I do not know what odor of
treason begins to suffocate us. No, no! We will
not be a museum, a hotel, a winter resort, a
horizon painted in Prussian blue for international
honeymoons! . . . Sweep away, Sweep away all
this filth l Cast into the sewers all putrified
170 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
things! Long live Rome without shame! Long
live great and pure Italy.”
The Government was now determined to force
the issue, for on May 13th the Salandra-Sonnino
ministry resigned, and immediately thereafter a
wave of pro-war demonstrations swept over Italy.
At first these demonstrations merely roused the
neutralists to scornful or angry contempt. “Il
Mattino” of Naples, one of the leading news-
papers of Southern Italy, scored “the forty or
fifty thousand fools or rascals who wish to hurl
into the abyss the country and the thirty-six mil-
lion Italians who do not want war, having every-
thing to lose and nothing to gain from such a
criminal adventure.” The Socialists were es-
pecially determined. They organized counter-
demonstrations throughout Northern Italy which
paraded the streets shouting: “Down with the
Ministry! We want no war!” The chief Social-
ist organ, the “Avanti,” of Milan, exclaimed in a
vitriolic leader of May 16: “What signs of deca-
dence and moral baseness! In Milan we must
witness callow youths parade in triumph the ex-
pelled or deserters of all parties. In Rome the
mob of hirelings fed from the bureaucratic trough
gets itself drunk on the ear-splitting harangues
of Gabriele d’Annunzio. And what harangues!
Incitements to crime in all its forms. D’Annun-
zio as leader and inspirer of the national con-
sciousness! Shame brings the blush hot into the
cheeks. Truly, the most fearful disillusionments
are in store. This bacchanalia of the patriots
ITALY 171
symbolized by d'Annunzio is only the outward
sign of long-standing ills. And if now the war
does come; if sorrow, want, and suffering settle
down upon our land and aggravate still further
the sad lot in which our poor working-folk groan;
the people will have to bear all the consequences.
The poet will have long since crossed the Alps
once more, to enjoy comfortably and carnally
among foreigners the fruits of that calculated
frenzy of his which pushed into the blood-bath the
Italian people.”
However, after a couple of days of the pro-war
demonstrations, the peace party began to lose its
nerve. The Government did nothing to check the
mobs and afforded the neutralists no assurance of
police protection. Giolitti, threatened with death,
hastily left Rome. On May 16 the King invited
Salandra to resume office. This was decisive.
The war-party celebrated with frenzied enthusi-
asm and the neutralist opposition went completely
to pieces. On May 23, Italy formally declared
war on Austria-Hungary.
One of the chief effects of Italy’s entrance into
the war was a further strengthening of Italian im-
perialistic aspirations. Typical of the wide hori-
zons now glimpsed by many Italians is the follow-
ing article by Senator Alessandro Chiappelli
which appeared in the ‘‘Rassegna Nazionale” at
the close of 1915: “The sphere of action of a
great nation like Italy should not be con-
fined to the difficult and glorious task of
winning the territory on the Adriatic. The
172 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
war that is being fought out to-day on the
European continent will find its realization in
Africa and in Asia, as well as in the eastern Med-
iterranean, for the conquest of the trade routes
and the markets of the world. Neither would
domination over the Adriatic alone resolve this
difficult problem for us, because it would open for
us but few trade routes, even should we conquer
the whole Dalmatian coast. . . . Our allies would
in the meanwhile plant their flags on new and ex-
tensive colonial territory, and would open up for
their own exclusive advantage new commercial
outlets, so that when peace has been signed we
would indeed find ourselves masters of the re-
deemed districts and in control of the Adriatic,
but as though imprisoned in a land-locked lake;
better off, indeed, as to frontiers, but in the midst
of victorious nations grown stronger through the
war. And already, as I have said, this has to some
extent been realized. The German domains in
Africa and Asia have almost all fallen under the
Sway of England, France, or Japan, thus aug-
menting their already rich colonial possessions.
It is small consolation that in the case of England
and France we have to do with democratic and
liberal peoples. For, although incontrovertible
reasons make the civilized world willing to accept
English maritime supremacy while it would ex-
clude German supremacy, it is just as true that
the slave is no less a slave if his master is humane
instead of brutal and violent.”
Such utterances show that Italy does not see
ITALY 173
things quite eye to eye with her allies. The dif-
ference in viewpoint comes out most sharply in
the various Balkan problems. To begin with,
England, France, and Russia all wish to see a
powerful Yugo-Slav state possessed of the whole
Adriatic coast from Istria to southern Albania.
Italy, however, wishes nothing of the kind, and
Italian writers have warned their allies frankly
that Italy will tolerate no such settlement, but
will hold her partners strictly to their promises
made at the time of Italy’s entrance into the war.
As the Italian publicist, Antonio Cippico, re-
marked in the London “Fortnightly Review” of
August, 1915, “Dalmatia and Istria have never,
either in geography or in history, belonged to
the Balkans. Secluded by nearly impervious
mountain-chains, they will be, as they have always
been, the natural bridges between Italy and the
Balkan peoples, between the Western civilization
and the East.” The “restoration” of these lands
to Italy, asserts Signor Cippico, “is not territor-
ial aggrandizement, for Italy is recovering what
she has been mistress of for twenty centuries.”
And he concludes with this very plain speaking to
his English readers: “Any further discussion of
this matter, based on more or less inaccurate in-
formation, can only be of harm to the united cause
of the Allies. . . . Anybody daring to discuss or
proposing to violate the agreement between Italy
and the Entente, which has brought Italy into the
war on the side of the Allies—would prove to be an
enemy not only of Italy, but of his own country.”
174 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
As regards Greece, also, the Italian attitude dif-
fers from that of the Western Powers. For some
years previous to the war, Italy and Greece were
on distinctly bad terms owing to politico-economic
rivalries in the Balkans and the Near East.
Greece’s failure to join the Allies has given Ital-
ian publicists full rein to display their anti-Greek
feelings, and numerous have been the drastic pro-
posals against the recalcitrant Hellenes. Many
Italians feel that their troops should at least oc-
cupy the Greek province of Epirus and the Ionian
Islands, notably Corfu, which Italian Nationalists
have long termed “Isola nostra”—“Our Isle.”
Toward Bulgaria, however, Italians refuse to
entertain the bitter feeling displayed by the other
Allied Powers since her adhesion to the Teutonic
cause in the autumn of 1915. Italian writers are
continually advocating considerate treatment of
Bulgaria and urge fresh attempts to win her to
the Allies’ side.
In fact, what most Italians would apparently
like would be Italy firmly planted in the Balkans
from Istria to Albania, joining hands with an en-
larged and friendly Bulgaria, and thus holding
both Greece and Serbia firmly in check. This is
of course diametrically opposed to the intentions
of her Allies, England, France, and Russia, and
may yet be the cause of serious complications in
any attempted Balkan settlement should the Al-
lies be victorious.
France is, indeed, the only one of her present
allies for whom Italy feels any deep-going cor-
ITALY 175
diality. Anglo-Italian friendship is not without
mental reservations on both sides, while toward
Russia there is merely an Italian official warmth
which has no roots in popular sentiment. Against
the “hereditary foe” Austria, the traditional en-
mity has waxed greatly during the war, and this
feeling is enhanced by the knowledge that Austria
is thirsting for vengeance against “traitorous”
Italy. Anti-German sentiment has slowly in-
creased, and since Germany seems irrevocably al-
lied to Austria, it is difficult to see how the former
Italo-German good-will can be restored.
The war-temper of Italy has differed widely
from that of either England or France. At the
time of Italy’s entrance in the European conflict,
the nation, as we have seen, was by no means
unanimous for war, and this division of sentiment
has persisted to the present day. As soon as the
die was cast, it is true, active opposition disap-
peared and all parties tendered the Government
their formal support. But this support was in
some cases a regretful bowing to stern necessity.
Many of the former partizans of neutrality still
believe that Italy’s action was a mistake. The
Socialist deputies in the chamber have often op-
posed the Government’s measures, the Catholics
are lukewarm, and the Giolittian press has main-
tained an attitude of reserved criticism. The bad
economic conditions prevailing in Italy, including
financial stringency, industrial depression, high
food-prices and an acute shortage of coal, have
caused much suffering and pessimism, while the
176 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
mediocre success of domestic war-loans shows that
the moneyed classes are not opening their purse
strings.
Another factor tending to dampen popular en-
thusiasm has been the absence of any striking mili-
tary or naval success. Despite exceedingly heavy
losses the Italian armies have not yet broken the
iron girdle of Austria's land defense, while the
Italian navy has suffered seriously, with few tan-
gible results. The irredentist lands are still “un-
redeemed.”
All this is not without significance for Italy’s
domestic future. The Government openly advo-
cated Italian intervention and is primarily re-
sponsible for the present situation. If the Allies
win and Italy achieves her desired objectives, well
and good. The Government will then have justi-
fied itself and will undoubtedly be accorded gen-
eral popular approval. But should the war end
even in a stalemate with no rewards commensu-
rate to Italian suffering and sacrifice, there will be
trouble. The irreconcilables, especially the revo-
lutionists, are still there. The Republicans may
have entered the war as a crusade for liberty incar-
nated by France, but the Syndicalists and An-
archists were animated by very different motives.
Unlike Marxian Socialism, Syndicalism believes
in foreign as well as class war. In 1911 the Syn-
dicalists, much to the scandal of orthodox Social-
ists, supported the Tripoli expedition on the
ground that war of any kind tends to quicken
that spirit of violence indispensable to Syn-
ITALY 177
dicalist aspirations. The Syndicalists are to-
day plainly fishing in troubled waters. Even
victory would leave Italy impoverished and
burdened with debt—excellent for Syndicalist
propaganda, while Italian disappointment or
disaster would so discredit the ruling régime
as to offer Syndicalism a golden opportunity.
The Syndicalists showed their strength in the
“Red Week” of June, 1914. If ever their day
dawns, they will use it—for they have no scruples.
CHAPTER VI
RUSSIA
HE outstanding feature of the decade of Rus-
sian history lying between the Revolution
and the European War is the growth of Russian
imperialism. This movement, whose complex
character is as yet insufficiently appreciated, is of
capital importance for an understanding both of
Russia’s present position and of Europe’s pros-
pects in the years to come.
When the great Revolution broke out in the
autumn of 1904, Russia stood at a momentous
crossroads in her history. The disastrous Jap-
anese war had exposed with terrible clearness the
shortcomings of the old absolutist, bureaucratic
régime. Every one was crying for reform, and in
this universal ferment the Russian Intelligentsia
sprang forward as self-appointed champions of
the New. This Intelligentsia occupied a very spe-
cial position in the semi-Oriental, caste-like hier-
archy of Russian society. Its ordinary transla-
tion, “The Intellectuals,” would much better be
rendered, “The Civilized.” The Intelligentsia
was, in fact, the ensemble of those persons
from all the regular social classes who believed
themselves “enlightened” in contradistinction to
“those who do not know.” Their creed consisted
178
RUSSIA 179
of two articles: hatred of the ruling régime, and
boundless faith in their ability to regenerate and
“civilize” their country.
The Intelligentsia were not very numerous, but
their political importance in 1904 was out of all
proportion to their numbers. It was they who
had hitherto constituted the sole opposition party
in Russia. It was their fighting wing, the Nihil-
ists, which had waged truceless war against the
bureaucracy in the darkest hours of absolutism.
Accordingly, now that the whole country was at
last stirring against absolutism and bureau-
cracy, the discontented everywhere looked to the
Intelligentsia as the natural leaders toward the
better morrow.
Thus was the Intelligentsia “clothed with a lit-
tle brief authority.” But the Russian Revolution
is the story of the Intelligentsia’s lamentable fail-
ure. They were tried and found wanting. The
reason was that their program was a purely neg-
ative and destructive one. A mere ensemble of
individuals from all classes, they possessed no set-
tled, positive philosophy, and on their first attempts
at constructive measures they fell apart like a
rope of sand. Also, the old régime found a man
—P. A. Stolypin—whose iron hand bent Russia
once more to the yoke of established order and
authority. In less than three years the Revolu-
tion was over.
Of course, Russia had not simply returned to
the old groove. “Revolutions never move back-
wards”—and Russia had been through a real rev-
180 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
olution. Henceforth she was obviously going to
move both fast and far. The question was,
whither? And that question had already been an-
swered by the Revolution’s outcome. If the Intel-
ligentsia had won, Russia would probably have
followed a path of external peace and internal lib-
eral reform. However they might differ over
details, the Intelligentsia were usually disciples
of West European culture and believers in West-
ern institutions. They were also opposed to the
old bureaucratic centralization and “Russifica-
tion” of the empire’s non-Russian peoples.
Their ideal, however vague, was a parliamentary,
federalized Russia, avoiding foreign adventures
and with internal liberty for all. -
The significance of such a possibility for Rus-
sia’s future becomes doubly apparent when we
realize that, as a result of the Revolution’s uni-
versal quickening, the great peasant mass was at
last awakening to political consciousness and pre-
paring to play its part in the national life. Ob-
viously, the peasant would adopt as his own the
dominant political philosophy of the day, and so
enormous was his mass that his political conversion
must decide Russia’s political Orientation for
many years to come. If the Intelligentsia had won
the Revolution they would have converted the peas-
ants to their political philosophy and Russia would
have been pledged to internal, Westernizing re-
form and external peace. But fate willed it oth-
erwise. The Intelligentsia went down in discred-
ited failure, and the strong arm of P. A. Stolypin
RUSSIA 181
thrust Russia past the crossroads into the path
of aggressive imperialism.
Imperialism had of course always been in the
blood of Russia's rulers and statesmen. It was
thus that a petty princedom on the banks of the
Moskva had swelled into a mighty empire cover-
ing one-seventh of the land surface of the globe.
To the Muscovite Tsars, “Holy Russia” had for
centuries been the “third Rome,” destined to con-
quer and absorb the whole earth. As the above
terms indicate, this imperialistic concept had a
religious as well as a political complexion, being
fully shared by the Russian orthodox clergy. It
was also the faith of the middle classes and most
of the nobility. Muscovite imperialism is well
summed up in the words of the late M. Pobiedo-
nostsev: “Russia is not a state: it is a world!”
Although Russian imperialists agree in the ulti-
mate objective of world dominion, they differ as
to the path they should follow. Russian imper-
ialism is therefore divided into what is known
as the “Western” and “Eastern” schools. The
former maintains that Russia's first duty is to
free and unite the whole Slav race, seat herself
at Constantinople (“New Rome”), and thereafter
purge and absorb the “rotten West.” The latter
holds that Russia’s primary duty is toward Asia.
Herself more than half Asiatic, Russia’s immedi-
ate mission is to awaken Asia from its deathlike
stupor to a new, Russian life. It is the alternat-
ing ascendancy of these two imperialistic schools
which gives the key to Russian foreign policy.
182 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
At the beginning of the present century the
Eastern school was at the helm. The persuasive
teachings of Prince Ukhtomsky, Yushakov, and
others, had converted Tsar Nicholas II to East-
ernism. Accordingly, Russian policy looked to-
ward Asia, while the Balkans were neglected and
Russia's western borders secured by cultivating
good relations with her western neighbors, Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary. Then came the Jap-
anese war, which heartily sickened Russians of
Eastern adventures, while the ensuing Revolution
drove all thoughts of foreign policy temporarily
from men's minds.
But not for long. By 1907 the Stolypin re-
action enabled Russia to look abroad once more,
and her gaze now fixed itself upon the Balkans and .
the Near East. She found the ground well pre-
pared. In June, 1903, a dynastic revolution in
Serbia had replaced the Austrophile King Alex-
ander by the Russophile Peter Karageorgevitch,
and the Serbians, a people small in numbers but
with great ambitions, offered themselves as will-
ing allies in any Russian “forward” policy to-
ward the West. The Austrian imperialists saw
what was coming, and their annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1908 dashed Serb ambitions and
defied Russian Pan-Slavism at one and the same
time. Russia, still weak from her recent misfor-
tunes, swallowed her wrath but vowed vengeance.
From that moment the great Austro-Russian duel
was on, both parties openly preparing for war
and seeking to undermine the other's position by
RUSSIA 183
every means in their power. The most unscrup-
ulous methods were used, especially as regards
rival propagandas among disaffected domestic
elements.
And the Austrian propaganda found within the
Russian borders much fertile soil. The rising
tide of Muscovite imperialism had caused a rapid
growth of “Nationalist” sentiment among the
“Great Russians.” The Great Russians, who
form the real racial cement of the Russian Em-
pire, number only seventy millions of the em-
pire’s one hundred and seventy million inhabit-
ants. Before the Revolution, when the yoke of
autocracy pressed equally upon all, many Great
Russians had made common cause with the non-
Muscovite nationalities, and these latter had ex-
pected from the Revolution a decentralized fed-
eralism which should ensure them local autonomy
and cultural life. But the Great Russians, now
admitted through the Duma to a share in direct-
ing the empire's destinies, promptly became Na-
tionalists and took up the old bureaucratic pro-
gram of “Russifying” the minor nationalities.
Furious at this disappointment of their dearest
hopes, the minor nationalities fell into Sullen dis-
affection. The thirty million “Little Russians”
of the Ukraine, in particular, lent a willing ear to
Austrian promptings to sedition and separatism.
But this merely increased the anger of the Rus-
sian imperialists, who sharpened their Russifica-
tion program and pressed their military prepara-
tions. And these preparations were directed
184 PRESENT_DAY EUROPE
#
against Germany as well as against Austria-
Hungary. In 1908 Germany had shown her
determination to back her Austrian ally to the
last, and she was now openly rejuvenating Tur-
key, the ultimate prey of Muscovite Western im-
perialism. This provoked the bitterest anti-
German feeling in Russia, and the years preceding
the European War witnessed a Russo-German
press campaign of truly extraordinary virulence.
As the Russian publicist, Paul Mitrofanov warned
the Germans in June, 1914, “The road to Con-
stantinople now goes through Berlin. Vienna has
become a secondary factor.” The Russian Gov-
ernment was preparing feverishly for any eventu-
ality. The Duma voted huge army increases in
1913 and a network of new strategic railways was
begun all along the German border. Russia was
to be fully prepared by 1916.
Western imperialism, under the masterful head-
ship of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch,
thus dominated the councils of the empire, and
even Intelligentsia leaders like Peter Struve and
Paul Miliukov were going with the tide. Never-
theless, the voice of the Eastern school was by no
means stilled. Just as the Western Pan-Slavists
had backed the Serbian revolution at the very
height of the Japanese war, so the Easterners now
warned against plunging Russia into a European
Armageddon and urged an understanding with
the Teutonic Powers and reconcentration toward
Asia. Such was the theme of Baron Rosen’s fa-
mous “Secret Memoir” of early 1914, such the
RUSSIA 185
advice of General Kuropatkin and of publicists
like Michael Pavlovitch and Prince Kotchubey.
Throughout the opening months of 1914 there was
sharp clashing between the two schools. Then
came Serajevo and the Great War.
The outbreak of hostilities caused an outburst of
popular enthusiasm and a general rallying of op-
position forces round the Government and the
Tsar. During the early part of 1914 there had
been a good deal of political discontent and social
unrest, but most of this disappeared in the wave
of patriotic loyalty which now swept the country.
A prominent leader of the Intelligentsia, V. Na-
bokov, wrote in the Petrogad “Ryetch”: “The
imperial manifesto invites us to forget our in-
ternal conflict. . . . Uniting with all those to
whom the life of our country is dear, we do not
give up a single one of our slogans, do not forget
a single one of our idealistic problems, do not
abandon a single one of our positions. . . . But
we are filled with the consciousness that above
individual political ideals . . . stands one thing
. . . the life and greatness of the Fatherland. At
present it is in danger. And all of us, her sons,
are needed by her wholly, without reserve. All of
us, without regard to political faith and sect, each
one in his place . . . will serve to the full extent of
our strength and ability.” The only discordant
notes were those of the extremely class-conscious,
revolutionary Laborites and Social-Democrats,
who refused to indorse the war and stood sullenly
aloof.
186 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Such voices were, however, lost in the thunder-
ous chorus of loyalty and enthusiasm. The liberal
“Russkoye Slovo” of Moscow cried: “Rise, ye
great Russian people ! History is calling you to
perform a great feat before which all that the
world has ever seen will pale. . . . The road will
be difficult, the sacrifices will be heavy, but the
recompense will be great.” Germany was every-
where stigmatized as the arch-enemy. The noted
imperialist organ, “Novoye Vremya,” asserted
furiously: “The breeding-place of international
violence will be crushed by the gigantic strength
of the Northern people, the life of nations will
enter upon the course of justice and humanity.
. . . In all Europe since the time of Prince Bis-
marck there has been only one center of militar-
ism—Berlin.” And its brilliant leader-writer,
Menshikov, pronounced that, as a result of the
war, all Eastern Germany must become Slav to
the very gates of Berlin. Among the peasantry
the war was thoroughly popular. The traditional
hatred for the Niemetz—the German—flamed up
hotly, and the peasant reservists marched joyfully
to crush the “impious” Westerners, “the Devil's
spawn,” who had dared assail “Little Mother
Russia” in such sacrilegious fashion.
The early stages of the war did much to con-
firm this Russian optimism. The disasters in
East Prussia were forgotten in the glorious tid-
ings of the Austrian collapse at Lemberg and the
overrunning of all eastern Galicia by the Russian
armies. At last that nest of Ukrainian separat-
RUSSIA 187
ism which had weighed so intolerably upon Mus-
covite public confidence was in the Russian grasp !
The drastic “Russification” of the Ruthenians
which now began was but the Government’s an-
swer to insistent popular clamor. Numerous
plans were sketched out for the summary partition
of both the Central Empires. “It is highly de-
sirable for Russia,” wrote Menshikov in the
“Novoye Vremya,” “to surround herself with
buffers, with a network of political organisms,
harmless to Russia yet capable of opposing re-
sistance to others’ aggressions. If we succeed
in making Germany and Austria into Balkan-like
groups of peoplets, then we can at last sleep safe
o’ nights about our western border.”
In Russia, as in other countries during the early
months of the struggle, great stress was laid upon
the war’s regenerative effects. The good results
of the Government’s prohibition of drink were es-
pecially emphasized. “Our country is passing
through an epoch fraught with the greatest sig-
nificance,” wrote K. Voboryov in the Petrogad
“Ryetch.” “The spiritual elevation the people
have experienced since the declaration of war,
added to the sobriety that began at the same time,
has wrought a profound change in the life of the
country right before our eyes. The stoppage of
drink has revolutionized the Russians psycholog-
ically, economically, and socially. The results
of the change are already apparent throughout the
empire, especially in the villages. The Russian
village in this brief period has been so transformed
188 . PRESENT DAY EUROPE
that it is unrecognizable.” “There is great hope,”
wrote Menshikov in the “Novoye Vremya,” “that
if the experiment in involuntary temperance con-
tinues as successfully as in the past months, the
Government authorities may gather sufficient cour-
age to put an end to this inveterate public evil.
Oh, what a great, saving deed that would bel. It
would be more than throwing off the Tartar yoke,
or the abolition of serfdom; it would be the de-
struction of the devil’s power over Russia. . . .
We do not yet know what the Russian nation is
as a Sober nation. . . . From time immemorial has
alcohol been poisoning our blood. What will our
future be, then, if our Government shall under-
take the pious feat and actually sober the
people?”
Turkey’s entrance into the war on the Teutonic
side in November, 1914, was greeted by Russia
with a general shout of glee. Ever since the be-
ginning of the war influential circles of Russian
public opinion had demanded that Russia should
in any event obtain Constantinople and the Straits
as part of the prize of victory, and Turkey’s ac-
tion was therefore hailed as a welcome means of
satisfying Russia’s age-long aspirations. What
these aspirations were was readily discernible
from a survey of the Russian press. Even before
the formal rupture with Turkey, the “Petrograd
Bourse Gazette” had, in October, 1914, conducted
an inquiry on the topic: “The Sick Man is dy-
ing. What shall be done with his heritage?” To
this question a few voices, such as Professor
RUSSIA 189
Alexeiev of Moscow, had recommended that the
Straits be placed under international control, with
Constantinople a free city. But the great major-
ity had asserted that Constantinople and the
Straits must pass entirely under Russian con-
trol, while many had also asserted that Russia
must obtain complete Balkan Supremacy. For
example, Professor Kotliarievsky of Moscow con-
tended, “The Straits must and shall belong to us.”
And the “Bourse Gazette” itself remarked edi-
torially: ‘‘We are the natural heirs of European
Turkey. We must at last become a Balkan
Power. The growth of Russia to a Balkan Power
must be accompanied simultaneously by the con-
clusion with the other states of the Peninsula of
a customs union and a military convention on the
model of that by which Prussia, after 1866,
founded the Germanic Confederation and later
transformed it into the German Empire. . . .
Only such a task is worthy of Russia and of the
sacrifices which this war will entail.”
These sentiments were naturally intensified by
Turkey’s entrance into the war. The Tsar ac-
curately reflected the feelings of his subjects when
he stated in his war manifesto: “Together with
the whole Russian people, we firmly believe that
Turkey’s insensate intervention in the war will
hasten the to her—fatal course of events and
will open out to Russia a way to the solution of
those historical problems on the shores of the
Black Sea bequeathed by our ancestors.” And
the “Novoye Vremya” exclaimed exultantly:
190 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
“The war with Turkey must be considered desir-
able, however inconvenient it may be to divert a
part of our forces from the main front, because it
gives us the opportunity of settling, with one
Supreme effort, the ‘Eastern Question.” .
There has never been in the past, and, may be,
never in the future will there be, such a happy
combination of circumstances for the liquidation
of Turkey, at least as a European Power. This
occasion must be utilized, no matter how difficult
and what its cost. If we win, there will spread
before us the grand prospect of realizing the great-
est and perhaps the ultimate ideals of the Slav
races.” -
Russian public opinion took Anglo-French ut-
terances about an internationalization of the
Straits with very bad grace. In March, 1915, the
well-known publicist, Prince Eugene Troubetzkoi,
wrote in the “Russkaya Vyedomosti” of Mos-
cow: “Our allies, like our enemies, should know
the Russian popular point of view. There is only
one solution of the problem which corresponds to
our national interests: Constantinople and the
Straits must become Russian. Any other solu-
tion is inacceptible for us.” And in April, 1915,
the influential congress of nobles passed the fol-
lowing emphatic resolution: “The congress, con-
vinced with the Russian people that the world-
war will end by the complete victory of Russia
and her glorious allies, thinks that one of the in-
evitable results of this victory must be the acquisi-
tion of Constantinople by the Russian Empire.
RUSSIA 191
In the popular conscience there lies profoundly
rooted the conviction that the Russian Tsar is
alone predestined by the Will of God to plant the
Cross on Saint Sophia and restore in its ancient
splendor the altar of the Universal Orthodox
Church.” “To Russia a free outlet to the Medi-
terranean is an absolute necessity,” asserted the
‘‘Novoye Vremya.” “She has waited for it for
centuries and she can wait no longer. Constan-
tinople must be Russian, and it will make no differ-
ence if England and France are the first in seizing
it.”
Such was Russia's hopeful mood in the spring
of 1915. With her armies breasting the Carpa-
thian mountain crests overlooking the Hungarian
plain, and her Western Allies hammering at the
Dardanelles, a happy ending to the war seemed
almost in sight. One of the few clouds upon the
popular horizon was a certain disappointment at
the general loyalty of the Austrian Slavs. Many
Russians had apparently expected that the Aus-
trian armies would disintegrate at the mere sight
of the Russian standards. Accordingly, the stub-
born Austrian defense on the Carpathians and at
the Dunajec caused some disagreeable surprise in
the Russian press. “The Austrian Slavs,” wrote
the “Birzhevia Vyedomosti” ruefully, “have
fought very well against us, and do so still. The
cause of their attitude is, in our opinion, very
simple: they do not wish to be delivered by us Rus-
sians.” But this, after all, was merely the tra-
ditional fly in the ointment. In the spring of
192 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
1915, Russian public opinion was thoroughly op-
timistic and expectant of speedy victory.
Into this confident optimism broke the great
Austro-German “drive” which never slackened
till it had torn Galicia and Russian Poland from
the Muscovite grasp and had conquered Courland
and Lithuania as well. The Russian press made
no attempt to minimize the seriousness of the sit-
uation. In July, 1915, the “Russkoye Slovo” re-
marked: “We must not light-heartedly shut our
eyes to the significance of the successes of our
stubborn enemy and console ourselves with the
usual phrases about the losses suffered by them
and about the worthlessness of the territory lost
by us. It is much better to weigh the situation
created and not blind our eyes to the possible con-
sequences of our ill success.” And a month later
the “Novoye Vremya” wrote: ‘‘We must look
at things soberly. To defeat the Germans is no
longer a luxury which we could afford to deny
ourselves if we wished. Under our present condi-
tions victory is a necessity which we must purchase
at whatever cost, for without it there will be no
Russia. The Germans would gladly make peace
with us in order to protect their rear, but they
would demand impossible cessions of territory, an
enormous war-indemnity, and a humiliating com-
mercial treaty. Such a peace would place in serf-
dom an empire of one hundred and eighty million
Russian people.”
But the deepest causes of discouragement
RUSSIA 193
sprang from within. The Russian people knew
that German genius was not the sole reason for
Russian failure. There were ugly charges of gov-
ernment inefficiency, wastefulness, graft, and
downright treason. These charges involved the
highest quarters. The very minister of war,
Soukhomlinov, was presently put on trial and dis-
graced.
And this was not all. Many Russians felt that
the ruling régime was deliberately using the war
to rivet unrelieved autocracy upon the empire
once more. Even before the war all the liberal
elements had been protesting against the Govern-
ment’s increasingly arbitrary measures, and these
liberal protests had been steadily sharpened by
the subsequent course of events. At the outbreak
of hostilities the Government had, it is true, issued
a ringing proclamation urging forgetfulness of
domestic issues in the common cause of the threat-
ened Fatherland. But the Government’s subse-
quent actions had shown that it, at least, did not
propose to forget. Almost its first move had been
to gag the entire Russian radical press, while all
non-Russian newspapers throughout the empire
except a few Conservative Polish organs had been
suppressed at a blow. In regions like Finland and
the Ukraine, “Russification” was speeded up in
the most ruthless fashion, the last local liberties
being relentlessly swept away. Revolutionists
like Vladimir Bourtzev, hastening home from exile
in response to their country’s call, were thrown
194 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
into prison, while the entire group of labor
deputies in the Duma was incontinently shipped
off to Siberia.
All this naturally evoked a rising wave of angry
discontent. Of course the iron censorship long
checked even the faintest mutterings in the Rus-
sian home press, but Russian papers printed
abroad told startling tales. Most significant of
the growing unrest was the movement known as
the “Dread of Victory.” Just as in the Japanese
war, many radicals began to fear that a Russian
triumph would rivet the chains of despotism for-
ever upon their country. As early as October,
1914, the Russian Socialist leader Lenin wrote in
the “Sotzial Demokrat” of Geneva, Switzerland:
“In the actual state of affairs it is impossible,
from the point of view of the international pro-
letariat, to say which would be the lesser evil
for Socialism—an Austro-German defeat, or a
Franco-Russo-English defeat. But for us, Rus-
sian Social-Democrats, there can be no doubt that,
from the point of view of the toiling masses of all
the Russian peoples, the lesser evil would be a
defeat of the Tsarist monarchy, which is the most
reactionary and the most barbarous of govern-
ments, and which oppresses the largest number of
nationalities and the largest mass of population
in Europe and Asia.” And in February, 1915, he
wrote: “We say: Yes, we hope for the defeat of
Russia because it will facilitate the internal vic-
tory of Russia—the abolition of her slavery, her
liberation from the chains of Tsarism.” The Rus-
RUSSIA 195
sian Social Democrats certainly proved the faith
that was in them. There was continual shirking,
striking and sabotage in Russian munitions fac-
tories, and it was notorious that many town regi-
ments did not fight well.
It is true that this positively seditious attitude
was confined to the working-folk of the towns.
Most of the Intelligentsia were for the war, while
the great peasant mass was heartily in favor of
the struggle against the German. Nevertheless,
the Government’s internal policy caused wide-
spread dissatisfaction and pessimism. In April,
1915, the “Novy Mir,” a radical paper published
in New York city, which possessed good sources
of information, painted a decidedly gloomy pic-
ture of political conditions within the Russian Em-
pire. “When the war was declared,” it wrote,
“voices were heard from all sides urging the ne-
cessity of “ceasing the strife.” ‘United Russia’—
such was the slogan. It still remains the slogan
even now, but its falseness is already felt by many.
The point is, the strife has been ceased by one
side, but the other does not even think of stop-
ping; on the contrary, it is on its guard more than .
ever. . . . Meanwhile, the oppression is quite
merciless. One thing is clear—the enthusiasm is
rapidly declining.”
If such was the situation in the spring of 1915,
it is easy to imagine the effect of the summer's
disasters upon public opinion. Indeed, so loud be-
came the cry of discontent that the Duma was con-
voked at the beginning of August. But Liberal
196 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
demands for sweeping investigation and reform so
alarmed the ruling régime that in mid-September
the Duma was hastily dissolved and the Govern-
ment reorganized in more reactionary fashion than
before. “Victory first: reform after l’’ was the
official slogan; a sentiment heartily endorsed by
the reactionary press. The “Petrogradskiya
Wyedomosti” wrote: “The legislative chamber
has adopted utterly unacceptable slogans which
have nothing to do with the problems of the
quicker and better mobilization of the country for
the achievement of victory, which undermine the
confidence in the authorities appointed by the
Tsar, and create among the population restlessness
and mental anarchy. As in the days of the revolu-
tionary Dumas, the representatives in this one be-
gan to threaten the Government and public order
with street demonstrations. Political passions are
being aroused and . . . the unity so necessary to
the country is being destroyed. The Government,
which has manifested extreme benevolence toward
the participation of all political parties in the
work of victory . . . cannot remain indifferent
and nonresistant to the destructive program in
which the so-called ‘progressive forces’ have en-
gaged.” And the Clerical “Kolokol” (Petro-
grad), after vigorously condemning any reform
agitation, asserted, “In the higher governmental
spheres . . . there is not the least thought of giv-
ing “radical” concessions.”
By wide circles of Russian thought, however, the
dismissal of the Duma was keenly felt. Despite
RUSSIA 197
the iron censorship, expressions of dissatisfac-
tion could not entirely be restrained. “The pro-
rogation of the Duma,” wrote the “Russkoye
Slovo,” “cannot but produce a most painful im-
pression.” The Conservative “Kievlanin” re-
marked pessimistically: “And so, those who have
remained indifferent, who saw nothing and heard
nothing, have pushed aside those who have been
So responsive to the needs of the army, whose
hearts bled for it. . . . Nothing can be added to
this. The Government has assumed a terrible re-
sponsibility. God grant that it may never regret
this step.”
Russian papers printed abroad were much more
outspoken. “This means,” wrote the New York
“Novy Mir,” “that the Russian Government will
continue to rule as hitherto, with the nagaika and
the knout, disregarding the people’s representa-
tives and the demands of the various Russian or-
ganizations and societies. As until now, the Gov-
ernment will continue to kill every manifestation
of popular self-activity. . . . As hitherto, it will
imprison or send to Siberia all those who dare
to express dissatisfaction. It will continue to per-
secute the Poles and the Armenians, and to stir
up the dark, ignorant masses against the Jews.
It will continue its policy of fanning the flame of
race hatred by pitting one nation of the empire
against another.”
Whether caused by the prevailing pessimism or
due to other factors, the wave of social regenera-
tion so pronounced at the beginning of the war
198 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
was now obviously on the wane. This was par-
ticularly true of the drink question. Although
the sale of intoxicants was legally forbidden, the
illegal distilling and sale of spirituous liquors
was spreading at a prodigious rate. Most of this
“moonshine” liquor was of distinctly inferior
quality, and its consumption, together with crude
substitutes like furniture polish, flavoring ex-
tracts, and even wood alcohol, was seriously im-
pairing the health of the people. Delirium tre-
mens, deaths from alcoholic poisoning, and kindred
ills, were shown by official reports to be rapidly
increasing. In the spring of 1915, Dr. Novoselski
wrote in the “Russki Vratch” (Petrograd):
“The constant rise in the mortality figures, which
bears testimony to the growing numbers of con-
Sumers of different substitutes for vodka, shows
that these are used, not only by confirmed drunk-
ards, but generally by those classes who, before the
prohibition law, used to drink moderately.” A
writer in the “Petrograd Ryetch” painted this de-
cidedly gloomy picture of conditions in Western
Russia: “The sun of sobriety has set before it
reached the zenith. The first two months, drunk-
enness was not really noticeable. In the villages
the fact that the law came into force at the busy
season contributed largely toward abstinence from
drink. In the cities isolated cases of the use of
poisonous imitations of alcoholic beverages ended
so deplorably that there was a fair prospect of get-
ting rid of incurable drunkards. But here the field
Work came to an end, the organism partly adapted it-
RUSSIA 199
self to the harmful imitations, partly adapted them
to itself, and ‘life entered upon its normal course.”
The village folk had hardly time to wear out the
boots in which they marched after the coffin of
‘the monopoly’ when tens of thousands of illicit
liquor distilleries, factories of all kinds of strong
drinks, came into existence. It must be said that
the fight against the producers of such drinks is
being waged energetically. . . . But, in the place
of those suppressed, new ones spring into exist-
ence, and, besides, the manufacture of alcoholic
beverages is being practised in private dwellings.
. . . There also come reports that the village folk
are becoming addicted to gambling, and that a
passion for it is seizing the whole mass of peas-
antry. In short, everything points to the fact that
the sobering of the people cannot be accomplished
by the simple discontinuance of the traffic in
liquor.”
In the upper classes also, the stern enthusiasm
of the early days seemed to have yielded to a less
Spartan mood. Writing in the Petrograd “Lye-
topsis” in the summer of 1916, the noted Russian
author, Maxim Gorky, remarked caustically upon
the current wave of extravagance and high living.
“Making big fortunes without any effort,” he
wrote, “these rogues display an almost patholog-
ical yearning for pleasure and dissipation. The
theaters and restaurants are full to overflowing.
The jewelers are doing a roaring trade. There
are some people who console themselves by the
reflection that a similar orgy reigns both in the
200 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
countries of our enemies and in those of our
friends. These people should remember the wise
Russian saying: “A fool in a strange family is
good fun; a fool in your own—a disgrace.’”
It was during the period of depression and dis-
content at the close of 1915 that voices began to
be heard calling for peace. Outside of Russia, this
peace movement has been usually termed “pro-
German.” That, however, is a very inadequate
explanation. Unquestionably there are zealous
pro-Germans in Russia, especially at the imperial
court and among officials of Baltic Province Ger-
man extraction. But these ‘‘hyphenates” are in-
fluential only because their feelings happen to
coincide with the aims of powerful circles of genu-
ine Russian opinion.
These Russian peace advocates fall into several
distinct categories. In the first place, most Re-
actionaries and many Conservatives have never
liked their country’s alliance with liberal England
and Radical-Socialist France. These people are
not generally “pro-German.” As a matter of
fact, many of them hold Germans in personal
detestation. Nevertheless, they have long believed
that an understanding with the conservative Teu-
tonic Powers would be Russia’s best safeguard
against a “Red” revolution which might plunge
the backward, polyglot empire into hopeless chaos
and disintegration. The rising tide of popular
discontent which we have already noted simply
confirmed both their fears and their convictions.
Accordingly, they began boldly to speak their
RUSSIA 201
minds. A good example of this plain speaking is
an utterance of M. Maklakov (minister of the in-
terior at the outbreak of the war), before the con-
gress of the “Right” (Conservative party), at
Nizhni Novgorod in December, 1915. On that oc-
casion M. Maklakov declared amid loud applause:
“I am quite at a loss to understand why Russia
ever went to war with Germany. Both states de-
pend upon each other, and their historical de-
velopment shows that they must live in close
friendly relations.”
Another powerful element favoring a speedy
end of the war is Russian “big business”—the
great financial and industrial magnates of the em-
pire. Russia’s industries are recent, hot-house
growths, created by Count Witte’s protective sys-
tem and dependent upon high tariff walls for con-
tinued existence. Furthermore, the Russian home
market is still too backward to absorb even their
present output. In order to ensure its present
prosperity and future development, therefore,
Russian industry feels that it must secure fresh
protected markets and believes that such mark-
ets are to be gained only by acquiring new pro-
tectorates and “spheres of influence” in Asia.
Once such Asiatic fields are safely inside the Mus-
covite tariff wall, Russian industrial magnates
see priceless markets for their output, while Rus-
sian finance sees limitless profits in government
contracts and concessions for the development of
vast untouched natural resources. The regions
especially desired for exploitation are Persia,
202 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Mongolia, and Interior China. Toward the ac-
quisition of Persia and Mongolia, the Russian Gov-
ernment had, in fact, already taken long strides
shortly before the outbreak of the European War.
It is thus easy to realize the anger of Russian
“big business” at the spectacle of national en-
ergies lavished on a Western war which an un-
derstanding with Germany would have conserved
for the conquest of the fabulous East.
Russian “big business” therefore forms one
wing of the Eastern school of Russian imperial-
ism. We have already seen how insistent the
Easterners were becoming on the eve of the Eu-
ropean War. The disastrous course of the strug-
gle naturally gave them a splendid chance to say,
“I told you so,” and they were not slow to take
advantage of their opportunity. Henceforth, the
Russian peace party was to form a constant fac-
tor in the background of contemporary Russian
life, thus far unable seriously to influence the
course of events but ready under favorable cir-
cumstances to play a leading part. Their most
notable achievement was the Russo-Japanese
agreement of July 3, 1916.
Meanwhile, the Western imperialists, most of
the Intelligentsia, and the middle classes and peas-
ants, remained zealous for war. But fresh disap-
pointments were in store. By September, 1915,
it is true, the great Austro-German “drive” into
Russia was obviously at an end. Yet the victori-
ous Teutonic legions were already massing for
another campaign—a supreme effort to blast
RUSSIA 203
through Serbia and open a road to Turkey and
the Near East. For Russia this was an alarm-
ing prospect. It was primarily for the Balkans
and Constantinople that she had entered the war.
With both these points firmly in the Teutonic
grasp, her hopes might be indefinitely postponed.
At the beginning of the European War, Russia’s
Balkan hopes had run high. Serbia was of
course with her from the first. Greece and Ru-
mania both seemed ready to fall into line. It
looked almost like a new “Balkan League” bring-
ing a million fresh bayonets to the Allies and deal-
ing death-blows to Turkey and Austria-Hungary.
So, at any rate it appeared to Russian eyes. In
the optimistic spring of 1915 M. Sazonov, minister
of foreign affairs, had thus mirrored the Russian
point of view: “A most happy day will dawn
for us when the Balkan League is reëstablished,
the League of the Orthodox Balkan States. Rus-
sian diplomacy is bending all its efforts to con-
vince the Balkan nations of the necessity of mak-
ing certain sacrifices for the sake of a higher aim.
The Balkan nations must not forget the burdens
which Russia has always borne and is bearing for
their good. We are participating in this war in
the name of the well-being and existence of one
of the Balkan nations. Therefore sacrifices must
be made by the Balkan peoples, too. No matter
how painful that may be to them now, the results
will compensate a hundredfold for all the sacri-
fices, and will yield ample fruit for their common
good.”
204 PRESENT_DAY EUROPE
Yet time passed, and the Balkan League did not
materialize. The stumbling-block was obviously
Bulgaria. Furious at her recent humiliation in
the Second Balkan War of 1913 and inconsolable
over lost Macedonia, Bulgaria refused to move an
inch unless her national aspirations were first sat-
isfied—a thing which her Serbian, Greek, and
Ruman despoilers unanimously declared impossi-
ble. Russia sharply reminded Bulgaria of her
“duty to Slavism,” but this Turanian cuckoo in
the Slavonic nest merely answered tartly, as she
had on previous occasions, that she did not care a
fig for Slavism except in so far as Slavism co-
incided with Bulgarian national interest.
Thereupon adjuration gave place to threats,
and Bulgaria was given plainly to understand how
a victorious Russia would deal with a “Slav” na-
tion which should be guilty of “race-treason.”
“I have begotten thee: I will kill thee!” ex-
claimed the “Novoye Vremya,” quoting the words
of the Tolstoyan hero. And a little later it wrote:
“Bulgaria cannot remain neutral at a moment
when the ‘ancient oppressor of the Christian faith
and all Slav peoples’ has dared to raise a hand
against the liberator. . . . The guilt of Bulgaria
before Russia is great, but Russia will not remem-
ber evil; she will even forget everything if the
rulers of Bulgaria will now, even at this late hour,
lead their people on the only road which lies be-
fore them. But should Bulgaria commit such a
hideous deed as to side with the Turk, her political
existence would cease after the victorious conclu-
RUSSIA 205
sion of the war by Russia. Bulgaria is now given
a last opportunity to realize her national hopes.”
Equally menacing was the attitude of the
“Ryetch,” which wrote: “Turkey is the enemy
of Russia. Greece, like Serbia, may any day be-
come the ally of Russia. If Bulgaria will continue
to consider herself a friend of Turkey and an
enemy of Greece and Serbia, what will she be
with regard to Russia? . . . Upon the answer to
this question—and a prompt answer at that—de-
pends Bulgaria's whole future and national as-
pirations.” -
Bulgaria’s answer was not long in coming, but it
was of a nature quite the opposite of that awaited
by the Muscovite press. Among this stubborn
Bulgar folk, smarting under past wrongs and
fanatically resolved to risk life itself in the at-
tainment of national hopes, Russian threats
merely awakened defiant fury. Accordingly, the
Austro-German “drive” into Serbia in the
autumn of 1915 saw Bulgaria throw off her neu-
trality and link her destinies with those of the
Teutonic Powers. There followed the utter ship-
wreck of Russia’s Balkan expectations. Greece
refused to stir, Rumania did not move, and Ser-
bia, abandoned to her fate, fell prostrate in the
dust. Before the menace of Teutonic howitzers,
the Anglo-French armies abandoned their precari-
ous foothold at Gallipoli. Russia’s dream of a
speedy entry into Constantinople had vanished
into thin air.
The closing months of 1915 witnessed the nadir
206 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
of Russian dejection. The brilliant capture of
Erzerum in February, 1916, and the subsequent
seizure of Trebizond, did much to restore self-con-
fidence and hope. With all Turkish Armenia
firmly in Muscovite hands, the Russian press began
to talk of a speedy mastery of the Near East.
After the capture of Trebizond, the “Petrograd-
skiya Vyedomosti” asserted confidently: “We
may consider one of our enemies finished. The
taking of Trebizond has so disorganized the Turk-
ish defensive that all that remains for her is to lay
down her arms and ask for mercy. . . . Turkey’s
hour has struck, and it is not improbable that she
will in the near future entirely disappear from
the map.”
The extent of Russian hopes in the Near East
may be judged from the claims now put forth in the
Russian semi-official press to virtually all Asiatic
Turkey, most of Persia, and an outlet to the In-
dian Ocean on the Persian coast. This was obvi-
ously an attempt to reconcile the Eastern imperial-
ist school to a continuance of the war, since the
acquisition of Asiatic Turkey and Persia might
well induce the Easterners to forego their Mon-
golian and Chinese aspirations. The Persian
question, in particular, had long been actively dis-
cussed in the Russian press. As early as the
spring of 1915, the Petrograd “Novoye Zveno”
had asserted: “The Persian question must be
solved simultaneously with the French. The
name of Russia and the sacred right of her clients
must be sacred and inviolable in Iran. This must
RUSSIA 207
be established not on paper but in reality. If the
Persians are not capable of understanding it them-
selves, the fate of Turkey must overtake them.”
A year late, this rather vague talk had hardened
into definite demands. In the early summer of
1916, that leading Russian economic thinker, Pro-
fessor Miguline, wrote in the “Novy Ekonomist”:
“Russia must secure corresponding material com-
pensations for the losses which she has incurred.
It is time to give up finally her quixotic policy.
Russia has lost enough power and blood for for-
eign interests and for foreign freedom. There is
still a great deal too much talk to-day about the
liberation of oppressed nationalities as the chief
object. . . . But where can Russia obtain corre-
sponding compensations? Not on the Western
frontier. Russia must, therefore, have an outlet
in Southern waters. She must secure the freedom
of the Dardanelles, and an access to the Mediter-
ranean not only by sea but by land. We must
come to an arrangement with Great Britain to
have an outlet to the Persian Gulf. England and
Russia must act together in Asia as in Europe.
There must be no more talk of any “area of con-
flict” between the two countries. Asia Minor,
Mesopotamia, Northern Persia, and the neutral
zone of Persia must all be ceded to Russia. When
Russia occupies the Dardanelles, Alexandretta,
and the Persian Gulf, she will protect for England
the way to India and to Egypt instead of threaten-
ing it.” Such utterances, of which Professor Mig-
uline's is merely typical, are symptomatic of the
208 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
distinct cooling of Anglo-Russian cordiality which
has been taking place for the past year.
It must not be thought that Russian public opin-
ion was centering its interest exclusively upon the
Near East. Russia’s Western problems were also
much discussed, particularly the problem of Po-
land. For some years previous to the war the
Western imperialists had been striving to effect a
Russo-Polish reconciliation on a Pan-Slav basis,
and many Conservatives in Russian Poland,
headed by the Polish thinker, Roman Dmowski,
had met them half way, offering to give up the
dream of Polish independence and accept local
autonomy under the Tsar if Russia would agree
to effect the annexation of Austria’s and Prussia’s
Polish provinces to Russian Poland. To Roman
Dmowski and his followers Germanism was the
great stumbling-block to Polish reunion, and it was
to them that the Grand Duke Nicholas’s proclama-
tion of August 14, 1914, was especially addressed.
The Polish Conservatives reciprocated in the most
cordial fashion, their party manifesto expressing
the hope “that the blood shed by the sons of Rus-
sia in the struggle against the common enemy will
cement the friendship of the two Slav races.”
And the Polish Conservative group in the Russian
Duma stated: “Please God, Slavism, under the
supremacy of Russia, will deal the Teutons such a
blow as was dealt them at Grünwald five hundred
years ago by Poland and Lithuania. May the
blood we shall spill and the horrors of a war which
for us is fratricidal lead to the reunion of the
RUSSIA 209
three portions of the sundered Polish people.”
The intensity of anti-German feeling among Polish
Conservatives may be judged from the following
open-letter of Professor Wincenty Lutoslawski:
“The Prussians are Germanized Slavs, the mor-
ally worst of their race, who have denied their
ancestors through fear of force and have now
themselves become the exponents of force.
Gurkhas are noble troops of an ancient race who
are glad to fight with such barbarians. . . . The
Prussians are Northern Janizaries and are filled
with the spirit of Islam—fury of destruction,
predatory greed, breach of faith. . . . The parti-
tion of Poland will be annulled after the war—
we shall obtain not only all our lands that we
possessed in 1771, but also Silesia and Pomerania
and East Prussia. These we shall righteously
govern, and in a single generation all the Ger-
manized Poles who dwell therein shall reawake to
their national consciousness.” By this party the
loyalism of the Galician Poles was severely repro-
bated, and they were accused of treason to the
cause of true Polonism.
|But the other Polish parties showed no such
enthusiasm for the Russian side. The popular
groups were especially cool. They greeted the
Grand Duke's proclamation with eloquent silence,
and later on even ventured to issue a manifesto
declaring that in their opinion Nicholas’s procla-
mation was merely a strategic document, and that
there was no other solution for the Polish question
than the erection of Poland into a neutral buffer
210 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
state. This was apparently the opinion of many
Polish Conservatives as well. Count Charles
Potulicki, president of the “Pro Polonia” Com-
mittee, issued a statement maintaining that for the
future peace of Europe there must be an inde-
pendent Polish state as a barrier between Pan-
Slavism and Pan-Germanism. “Placed between
Russia and Prussia—those two incarnations of ex-
pansive, aggressive nations,” he wrote, “the Poles
have always been, and always will remain, refrac-
tory alike to the blandishments of Pan-Slavism and
the threats of Pan-Germanism.”
The effect of Poland's attitude upon Russian
public opinion was a varied one. At first, the
strong Pan-Slav and anti-German statements of
the Polish Conservatives were taken to represent
the sentiments of the whole Polish people and
naturally evoked great enthusiasm. Popular sub-
scriptions were started throughout Russia to aid
the numerous Polish refugees fleeing before the
early Teutonic invasions of Russian Poland, and
the Russian press asserted that these were but the
outward tokens of lasting Russo-Polish fraterni-
zation. “When we saw how all classes of Polish
society united for the defense of our common wel-
fare,” wrote the Petrograd “Ryetch”; “when we
saw with how firm a belief in the coming of the
promised future our Polish brothers advanced to
meet it, we could not help feeling that that some-
thing so dismal and fatal which has separated us
for so long is now melting, that the misunderstand-
ings and prejudices of the past are disappearing,
RUSSIA 211
and that we are becoming nearer and dearer to
each other, not only in thought, but also in feel-
ing.”
In Russian Poland, however, this Muscovite en-
thusiasm aroused a certain amount of uneasiness.
Many Poles feared lest the Russians were misread-
into Polish approval of the struggle against Ger-
manism an abandonment of Polish ideals and a
readiness to be absorbed into the stream of Rus-
sian life. Such persons did not fail to disabuse
the Russians of their error. For example, the
Warsaw “Dziennik Polski” remarked warningly:
“Old sins cannot be blotted out by an outburst of
compassion nor by the most generous financial as-
sistance. Russian patriots take too superficial- a
view of our sympathy with the Russian army if
they see in it a proof of our union with the Rus-
sian people. . . . The Poles are fighting for Rus-
sia in this war, but they have not changed their
fatherland. A Russian victory would be in the
interest of Poland, and the present conduct of the
Polish nation is influenced by the hope of future
autonomy. Russian publicists must not see in it
any proof of a desire for union with Russia.”
Such utterances, especially when coupled with
the bitterly anti-Russian attitude of the Austrian
Poles, rapidly cooled the warmth of Russian en-
thusiasm for their Polish relatives. Meanwhile,
in Poland, a corresponding process of disillusion-
ment was going on. In his proclamation of
August, 1914, the Grand Duke Nicholas had made
many promises such as, “A United Poland under
the scepter of the Russian Tsar, . . . free in her
212 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
religion, free in her language, and free in her self-
government.” But as month after month passed
by and no modification of the existing oppressive
régime materialized, the Poles began to clamor
for a redemption of the Russian promises, recit-
ing their heavy sacrifices and asserting that these
merited an immediate reward. But all that the
Russian authorities could be induced to grant was
a restricted measure of municipal self-government,
while the Russian imperialist press told the Poles
that this concession—which was not to take effect
till 1916—was all that Poland could expect in the
immediate future. “About further reforms,”
wrote the “Novoye Vremya” in the spring of
1915, “it will be time enough to speak in the days
when the general hopes of victory over the com-
mon enemy are crowned with complete success.”
Among the Poles this produced lively dissatisfac-
tion and pessimism. One of the Polish deputies
to the Duma wrote dejectedly in the Petrograd
“Ryetch”: “The Duma in general has not shown
any interest in the Poles. But what individual
political groups have expressed augurs little good.
In September they framed a project of a real
political union; in October they spoke about Polish
autonomy with legislative chambers; in Novem-
ber about the possibility of administrative self-
government; and in December they already found
that “more or less’ self-government must suffice.”
So things stood when, in the summer of 1915,
the Austro-German armies expelled the Russians
from Poland and took possession of the country.
RUSSIA 213
Under the circumstances, it was scarcely surpris-
ing that the invaders met with little popular op-
position and were even greeted with some sporadic
enthusiasm. The Teutons’ strenuous endeavors
to reorganize Poland and their wide concessions to
Polish national feeling, culminating in their formal
establishment of a Polish state in the autumn of
1916, aroused much uneasy comment in Russia.
In the summer of 1916 the Moscow “Russkoye
Slovo” admitted frankly: “In the Polish cities
self-government. has been introduced; the Polish
language is used in the courts to a very great ex-
tent; Polish children are studying under a na-
tional educational system, at the head of which is
the University of Warsaw; Polish cultural and
educational institutions which had been closed by
the Russian authorities have renewed their activi-
ties. The Germans are trying by every means to
win the Poles over to their side, and they have
chosen the right course for it.” After the Aus-
tro-German proclamation of a restored Polish
state the noted Russian Liberal, W. A. Maklakov,
wrote in the Petrograd “Ryetch”: “I know not
how the Poles will regard the new act. But, in
any event, it will be hard for us to blame them.
... We must recognize that we are guilty of
much, that we ourselves helped the Germans to
deceive the Poles. Our guilt is in the fact that
after the Grand Duke’s manifesto we behaved as
if desiring to show that it should not have been
taken seriously. We not only did not begin to
elaborate the plans for the future restoration of
214 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Poland, but even forbade the use of the word
autonomy in this connection. We covered our-
selves with eternal shame by our administration
of the region. We allowed an opportunity to pass
us which can not be returned.” Other Russians,
however, did not display such broad generosity.
A second writer in the same journal sternly warned
the Poles of the consequences of “treason.”
“Those Poles,” he wrote, “who from the very be-
ginning of the war banded themselves together of
their own free will into Polish legions and fought
side by side with the Germans against the French,
English, Belgian, Serbian, and Russian soldiers,
are traitors to the cause of democracy and human-
ity. And should Poland's independence be
bought, in the case of German victory, at the price
of such treason, then—finis Poloniae!” -
So stands the Polish question at this present
hour. The solution of the thorny problem obvi-
ously depends primarily upon the fortunes of
War.
This Russian uneasiness over the Polish ques-
tion was only one phase of the gathering cloud of
gloom and pessimism which overshadowed the em-
pire toward the close of 1916. The hopeful feel-
ings evoked by the conquest of Turkish Armenia
in the spring, reinforced by the successful Galician
“drive” in June, and still further strengthened by
Rumania's adhesion to the Allies at the beginning
of September, were rudely dissipated by Ru-
mania’s rapid collapse under the powerful Teuton
counterstroke. Public confidence was still further
RUSSIA 215
undermined by the internal situation. The Intel-
ligentsia and the workingmen of the towns were
increasingly exasperated by the Government’s re-
actionary measures, while the war-party was
alarmed by the growing activity displayed by the
partizans of a separate peace, especially during
the premiership of Boris Stürmer.
So loud grew the cry of discontent that the
Duma was again summoned, and after stormy
scenes Premier Stürmer was forced to resign at
the end of November, 1916. How serious was the
crisis may be judged from Russian press comment
which not even the censorship was able wholly to
keep down. For example, the Moscow “Russkiya
Wyedomosti” wrote: “We do not live in a time of
political crisis in the ordinary sense of the word,
but in a time much more serious—a crisis which
touches the whole life of the empire. . . . The
Government does not believe in the same measures
as do the people. In this lies the greatest internal
danger. This cannot go on longer. Without
harmony between the Government and the country
we cannot be victorious or preserve our internal
life from disorder. Only a public-spirited and
responsible ministry will be able to hold back the
empire from the precipice.”
The fall of Premier Stürmer was unquestionably
a Liberal victory. But the tragi-comedy of the
year before was soon repeated. Encouraged by
their success, the Liberal groups in the Duma pro-
ceeded to further attacks on the ruling régime,
while terrorism also made its appearance, notably
216 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
in the assassination of the mystic reactionary
Gregor Rasputin. The political weakness of
Russian Liberalism was now, however, again
shown. The Conservatives and Reactionaries
quickly closed ranks and without encountering
any effective opposition installed a new cabinet
under Prince Golytzin, a reactionary of the purest
water. The present Government is apparently
the most reactionary in years. Its probable policy
may be gaged from the oft-quoted saying of Pre-
mier Golytzin: “The Duma will keep quiet as
soon as it gets a beating.” How Russian Liberal-
ism regards the new Government is shown by the
caustic comments of the New York “Novy Mir.”
Toward the end of January, 1917, this radical or-
gan wrote: “It seems to us that the appointment
of Golytzin is the end of all attempts at deception.
By this act the ruling Russia threw a challenge
to the popular masses. A notorious reactionary,
an open enemy of the people and of any progres-
sive movement, Golytzin will not be able to put on
even temporarily a mask of virtue. He will be
from the first day an enemy with whom the people
will have to struggle fiercely. That this will be
so, his first declaration shows: “Everything for
the war, everything for victory. We cannot now
think of internal reforms.” Clear and outspoken
No hope for the alleviation of the condition of the
one hundred and seventy millions of Russia's pop-
ulation which is groaning under the yoke of con-
stables, district police captains, governors, and
plain untitled but dread personalities. As before,
EUSSIA 217
the people will be robbed; as before, the people
will helplessly starve.”
Such is the state of affairs in Russia to-day—a
situation obviously uncertain and capable of vio-
lent fluctuations. For the world at large, the mat-
ter of immediate importance is the question of a
Separate peace. Here, however, party lines are
much mixed. The Imperialists, who include
nearly all the upper and middle classes besides
Such special categories as the army, the bureau-
cracy, and the Church, continue to be sharply
divided into the Western and Eastern imperialist
Schools: the predominant Westerners resolved on
war to the knife, the powerful Eastern opposition
urging withdrawal from the war and an under-
standing with the Teutonic Powers. The Intel-
ligentsia, embracing most Liberals and a few Rev-
olutionists, are strongly for continued war, both
out of hatred of Prussianism and liking for the al-
liance with the Liberal Western Powers. The
revolutionary workingmen of the towns are
divided, some following the Intelligentsia, others
desiring peace in order to start an immediate rev-
olution and dreading lest a Russian victory might
so increase the Government’s prestige that a suc-
cessful revolution would be thenceforth impossible.
The peasants are still mostly for war through
hatred of the Niemetz (the German) and fanatical
hopes of gaining Constantinople, the Orthodox
“Holy City.” Under these tangled circum-
stances, prediction is impossible. Very likely the
outcome will depend upon the course of the pend-
218 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
ing military operations. Allied successes in the
coming campaign would naturally entrench the
war-party in its hold upon the Government and
keep Russia in the European struggle. Allied dis-
asters might so strengthen the peace-party that
they would come to power and engineer a Russian
withdrawal from the war.
Assuming that Russia escapes revolution and
emerges from the war without serious territorial
losses, what will be the Russian popular temper
toward foreign nations? This also is a complex
question. The Intelligentsia are, and will con-
tinue, warmly cordial toward England and France.
But the Intelligentsia form only a fraction of the
Russian people, and the prevailing popular senti-
ment is an increasing dislike of all foreigners.
France, to be sure, is regarded with a slightly
patronizing sympathy, “Poor little France” being
a common phrase. But pro-English feeling, never
widespread in Russia, is rapidly decreasing all the
time. The great imperialist classes unite in dis-
like and distrust of Britain. The Westerners feel
that she will certainly oppose those acquisitions
of Asiatic Turkey, Persia, and an outlet on the
Indian Ocean on which they have set their hearts
fully as much as upon Constantinople; the East-
erners know she will try to block that partition of
China foreshadowed by the recent treaty with
Japan. Hence, Britain is regarded as a future
enemy. &
The current English cult of things Russian is
viewed with cynical amusement. Toward the
RUSSIA 219
close of 1916 the noted Russian journalist, M,
Zhukovski, wrote in the “Russkoye Slovo’’:
“Once again the deluge has come; all England is
flooded with books about Russia. It has rained
not 40, but 440 days, and the downpour still goes
On; and who shall say what will happen if this phe-
nomenon continues? Here, for instance, we read
of ‘Glorious Russia'; in another book about “Con-
temporary Russia’; elsewhere of “Armed Russia’;
here is ‘Friendly Russia,” and so on they go. No
one in the world has ever been so infatuated with
us as the English are at present.”
Regarding future relations with Germany, it all
depends upon whether one takes the long or the
short view. To-day, many influential sections of
Russian opinion desire peace and understanding
with the Teutonic Powers. But any lasting Russo-
German friendship is impossible. The two peo-
ples are utterly unsympathetic by nature and re-
gard each other with mutual hatred and contempt.
Those very Easterners now so ardently working
for a Russo-German entente wish it solely in order
to safeguard their western border, keep down do-
mestic disaffection, and thus concentrate Russia’s
energies for the mastering of Asia. That done,
they would eagerly join their imperialist comrades
against the “Rotten West.” Upon the brow of
Russian imperialism burns ever Pobiedonostsev's
trenchant dictum: “Russia is not a State: it is a
World!”
CHAPTER VII
TELE BALKANS
HE Balkan peoples are victims of a com-
mon mania, the “Great Idea.” The “Great
Idea” means the “reunion” of all the members of
a particular Balkan race into a single state, and
since these races are widely scattered and inter-
mingled, the political union of any one of them
would imply the erection of a powerful “empire,”
dwarfing all the others to a position of hopeless
inferiority. The realization of this fact makes
all the Balkan peoples ready to fight each other’s
imperialistic aspirations to the death.
The driving power behind these aspirations
comes from the peculiar circumstances of Balkan
history. In the Middle Ages the Balkan peoples
fought one another much as they do to-day, and
during this long period each of them gained a
transient Balkan supremacy. Then came the
Turkish conquest, which involved them all in a
common ruin. For centuries they lay helpless
beneath the Turkish yoke. But Turkish dominion
bore within itself the seeds of its own dissolution.
Most terrible of conquerors, the Turks were the
poorest of assimilators. They remained a mere
Asiatic army camped on European soil and never
succeeded in Ottomanizing or Islamizing their
220
THE BALECANS 221
Christian subjects. Therefore, when the Turkish
flood began to recede from the Balkans about a
century ago, the old landmarks reappeared virtu-
ally unchanged and the Christian Balkan peoples
resumed their old national lives once more. -
They “resumed” their national lives. Note
that well. It is the key to the whole story. The
Balkan peoples are not “young,” as most Western
observers think. They are very old; in fact, so
many Rip Van Winkles aroused from a long sleep
with all their medieval racial characteristics and
national aspirations virtually unchanged. For
them the last five centuries have been a dream—
or a nightmare. One thing only do they remember
—their glorious pasts; and they are each deter-
mined that their special past shall live again. Of
course they clothe their thoughts in modern speech
—‘‘rights of nationalities,” “race unity,” etc.;
but the basic ideas are those of the medieval long
ago. This comes out clearly in their rival claims
to Balkan dominion. Because a province belonged
to a certain medieval Balkan empire it must go
to the particular state which to-day bears the
same name, and since some districts have belonged
to all those empires in turn, the rival claims form
a veritable Gordian knot severable only by the
sword of war. Truly, among these peoples “a
thousand years is but a day”!
The arrested development of the Balkan races
shows not only in their national aspirations but
also in the whole popular temper. Among the
educated Élite, to be sure, there are as cultured
222 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
gentlemen as any in the world, but the popular
masses are thinly veneered barbarians with the
virtues and vices belonging to that stage of human
evolution. Generally good-natured, honest and
hospitable in peace times, these primitive natures
are yet capable of volcanic outbursts of boundless
fanaticism and savage cruelty. Also, these trans-
formations occur with a suddenness and intensity
unknown among more developed peoples.
All this gives the key to the inner significance of
the great Balkan upheaval of 1912–13. In 1912 the
Christian Balkan states at last succeeded in com-
bining against the hereditary Turkish enemy. But
no sooner was the battle won than the victors quar-
reled hopelessly over the spoils. There followed
the Second Balkan War—a ferocious race-struggle
which resulted in the despoiling and humiliation
of Bulgaria, hitherto the leading Balkan nation, by
the other Balkan peoples. The Treaty of Bucha-
rest which put an end to the war was an attempt
permanently to kill Bulgaria's aspirations and
to surround her with a ring of aggrandized and
watchful enemies. To this end, Serbia, Rumania,
and Greece concluded an anti-Bulgarian entente,
while Greece and Serbia signed a special treaty
mutually guaranteeing each other’s Macedonian
possessions against Bulgarian attack.
The so-called “Peace” of Bucharest was thus no
peace. It was merely a whetting of knives. In
anticipation of the next war, all parties began to
consolidate their recent territorial gains by the
process known as “extirpation.” This process
THE BALKANS 223
consisted in the rooting out of hostile racial minori-
ties from the freshly conquered territories, thus
attempting to make race lines correspond to politi-
cal frontiers and to assure the fanatical loyalty
of the whole future population within any given
state border. The ruthlessness with which these
readjustments were conducted scandalized the out-
side world and enormously envenomed Balkan
race hatreds. The wretched victims of “extirpa-
tion” streamed into their respective motherlands
by the hundred thousand and there sowed broad-
cast the seeds of fury and revenge. Each Balkan
people swore to crush the accursed foe and erect
its special “Great Idea’’ upon his ruin.
Such was the miasma of unslaked hatreds and
gnawing desires which poisoned the Balkan pen-
insula at the outbreak of the European War.
Since these terrible conditions were so largely re-
sponsible for the occurrence and course of Arma-
geddon, it will be necessary to examine the various
Balkan peoples in detail.
A. SERBIA
Serbia is emphatically a land of great expecta-
tions. Its people, a primitive race of Swineherds
and small yeomen, do not appear exactly “empire-
builders” to the casual eye. Yet the Serbs are a
most curious compound: they are pig-raisers and
poets at one and the same time. Preéminently do
they possess the “Slav” temperament—mystic,
dreamy, rather inefficient under normal circum-
stances yet capable of fanatical energy beneath the
224 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
spur of an idea. And the Serb idea—the inevitable
“Great Idea” of a Balkan people—is certainly
grandiose enough. Its kernel is that “Empire of
Stephen Dushan” which bowed the Balkans be-
neath Serb hegemony five hundred years ago.
But, like kindred Balkan aspirations, the Serb
Great Idea clothes itself in the modern doctrine of
nationality. And the Serb sees his race brethren
both widely scattered through the Balkan penin-
sula and occupying the whole southwest portion
of Austria-Hungary as well. Hence, the Serb
great idea is a Pan-Serb or “Yugo-Slav” Empire
which shall not only revive the Balkan hegemony
of Stephen Dushan but shall also absorb all those
Serb, Croat, and Slovene populations of Austria-
Hungary which never knew Dushan’s sway.
Such has long been Serbia's ambitious dream.
But, like their Russian cousins, the Serb imperial-
ists although united on the ultimate end, disagreed
as to the means. The hope of absorbing Austria-
Hungary’s Yugo-Slav provinces was so remote
that many Serbs believed in cultivating the good-
will of their mighty northern neighbor and thus
gaining Austria's assent to possible Balkan acqui-
sitions at the expense of the declining Ottoman
Empire. This was the “Austrophile” doctrine
which inspired Serbia’s foreign policy under the
Obrenovitch kings, Milan and Alexander, down to
1903.
In 1903, however, this Austrophile policy came
to a dramatic end. King Alexander then fell be-
fore a military conspiracy which placed upon the
TEHE BALKANS 225
throne Peter, head of that rival Karageorgevitch
dynasty which had struggled for supremacy with
the Obrenovitch throughout modern Serbia’s
troubled history. And Peter represented the sec-
..ond school of Serb imperialism which looked to
Russia as Serbia’s protector and hoped for the
speedy realization of a Pan-Serb Empire built
upon Austria-Hungary’s ruins. This school’s im-
mediate inspiration of course came from the Rus-
sian Pan-Slavists, who saw in Serbia the chosen
instrument of Russia's Balkan supremacy. The
1903 revolution had Russian backing, and the ap-
pointment of M. Hartwig, the stormy petrel of
Muscovite diplomacy, as Russian minister to Bel-
grade, betokened what might be expected in the
near future.
Alarmed at the prospect, Austria did everything
possible to break Serbia’s rising spirit, but this
merely intensified anti-Austrian feeling and drove
the Serbs still closer into Russia’s arms. There-
upon Austria threw down the gauntlet by annexing
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the treasured “first step”
of Serb imperialism. Serbia was wild with dis-
appointed fury, but beneath the German ultimatum
Russia had to counsel submission. Henceforth,
however, the Austro-Serbian feud was avowedly to
the death. The Serbs made no concealment of
their determination to disrupt Austria for the
erection of a Pan-Serb Empire, while Austria but
waited the chance to destroy her irreconcilable foe.
The seditious Pan-Serb propaganda carried on in
Austria's Yugo-Slav provinces became an increas-
226 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
ing menace to Austria’s future, and it was a fa-
natical Pan-Serb secret society, the “Narodna Od-
brana,” which encompassed Archduke Franz-
Ferdinand's assassination at Serajevo.
The frenzied condition of Serbian public opinion
during the years preceding the European War
becomes clear from Serbian press-comment and
utterances of representative Serbians at that time.
On October 8, 1910, the second anniversary of Aus-
tria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
Belgrade “Politika” wrote, “Europe must take
note that the Serbian people still thirst for re-
venge.” And the “Mali Journal” exclaimed be-
tween black mourning borders: “The day of ven-
geance must arrive! The feverish efforts of Ser-
bia to organize her army are a token of this
accounting to come, as is the hatred of the Serbian
people for the neighboring monarchy.” In April,
1911, the “Politika” wrote: “The annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina has once for all shattered
even the semblance of friendship between Serbia
and Austria-Hungary. This every Serbian feels.”
In this same year M. Protitch, a prominent Serb
politician, declared in the Serbian parliament:
“Peace and good relations will never exist between
Serbia and Austria-Hungary until the latter shall
have renounced all pretensions of being a great
Power and shall have resigned itself to being the
Switzerland of the East.” While a little later the
noted Serbian diplomat, Chedo Mijatovitch, de-
clared: “The national Serbian program, to the
realization of which all parties in Serbia are work-
THE BALKANS 227
ing, comprises the annexation of all territories in-
habited by Serbians, whether belonging at this
moment to Austria or to Turkey.”
Serbia’s double triumph in the Balkan wars
naturally roused Serbian ambitions against Aus-
tria to an even higher degree. In the spring of
1913, the “Balkan” (Belgrade) wrote: “War be-
tween Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable.
We have dismembered the Turkish Empire; we
shall likewise rend Austria asunder.” And in
October, 1913, the “Piemont” exclaimed: “Ser-
bian soldiers have vowed that they will proceed
in a similar way against the ‘Second Turkey’ as
they have by God’s help dealt with the Turkey of
the Balkans. They take this pledge, confident that
the day of vengeance is approaching. One Turkey
has disappeared. The good God of Serbia will
grant that the ‘Second Turkey' shall also disap-
pear.” “Serbia incites the Austro-Hungarian
Serbs to revolution,” admitted the “Zastava” of
April, 1914; “Austria has lost all rights of exist-
ence,” asserted the “Pravda” of the same date;
while in their Easter issues, most Serbian papers
joined in expressing the common hope that their
“unliberated, conquered, and oppressed brethren
may soon celebrate a glad resurrection.”
Very instructive in this connection is the testi-
mony of the celebrated English traveler, Mary E.
Durham. Writing in the “London Nation” of
April 10, 1915, Miss Durham, who probably knows
Serb lands more intimately than any other West-
ern observer, writes thus of her experiences in
228 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Serbia and its twin Montenegro during the Balkan
wars: “They (the Montenegrin officials) cer-
tainly most explicitly stated that it was the inten-
tion of the Serb peoples to set Europe on fire, and
that they should begin in Bosnia. But this was not
an isolated case. Peter Plamenatz, minister of
foreign affairs, told me frequently that the Serbs
made a great mistake in not fighting Austria in
1908. It was a common boast that Cattaro could
be taken in twenty-four hours. The assault by the
Serbs on the Austrian consul at Prizren was at
the time represented to me as a direct attack on
Austria, and Austria was greatly jeered at for
being afraid to go to war then. Serb as well as
Montenegrin officers talked freely about their next
war (which was to be with Austria). Marching
to Vienna and setting Europe on fire were some of
their favorite topics of conversation.”
Such being the desperate and fanatical state of
Serbian public opinion, the effect of the Serajevo
tragedy can be imagined. To be sure, the Ser-
bian Government prohibited the use of violent
language, but Serbian press comment teemed with
thinly veiled exultation and covert Sneers at Aus-
tria’s “hopeless” plight. It is also not surprising
that Serbia, backed up by Russia, rejected Aus-
tria’s ultimatum.
The long-expected war with Austria excited gen-
eral enthusiasm. The only regret, expressed in
certain circles, was that the war could not have
been temporarily postponed. “We Serbians,”
wrote Chedo Mijatovitch in a message to the Eng-
THE BALKANS 229
lish public in late August, 1914, “did not wish for
this war at present. After two bloody wars we
wanted peace and rest to recuperate: time to or-
ganize newly annexed countries, to create and
train an army of 600,000 soldiers. We wanted at
least five years.” To most Serbians, however, the
presence of Russia, England, and France as their
allies presaged certain and speedy victory.
Serbia was still further heartened by the striking
failures of the Austrian invasions during the au-
tumn of 1914. Curiously enough, their first ap-
prehensions arose, not from the menace of their
foes, but from the conduct of their allies. The
Entente's negotiations with Italy in the spring of
1915 and Italian demands for Austria-Hungary’s
Adriatic coast aroused anger and alarm in Serbia.
The Serbian Government conceded Istria to Italy,
despite the Slovene hinterland of Trieste, but Ser-
bian public opinion unanimously demanded all the
remaining Austro-Hungarian coast, both as essen-
tially Yugo-Slav country and as the indispensable
sea-frontage for the projected Pan-Serb Empire.
Italian claims to Dalmatia were scouted with es-
pecial indignation. The Allies’ secret agreement
of April 25 with Italy, concluded without Serbia’s
knowledge or assent, evoked ill-suppressed wrath.
On June 20, 1915, the Serb Premier Pashitch de-
clared in parliament that “the question of Dal-
matia would be settled after the war,” thus serving
formal notice that his government did not pro-
pose to give the April agreement its assent. M.
Pashitch's utterance acquired added significance
230 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
from an article published in the official Serbian
organ “Samouprava’’ about this same time.
“Dalmatia,” stated this obviously inspired ar-
ticle, “is not Italian. It is geologically, historic-
ally, and ethnologically Serbo-Croatian. If Italy
wishes to share fraternally with Serbia the Adri-
atic Sea on the shores of which live 700,000 Slavs
as against 18,000 Italians, Serbia will be greatly
pleased and will not fail to cultivate what the
ancient Italian civilization shall have left behind
as a heritage. But Serbia will not consent to hav-
ing this Slav land pass from Austrian domination
to another domination—that of Italy.”
The tone of non-official journals was even more
emphatic. “Italy has decided to make traffic of
her sympathies and sell her warlike coöperation,”
wrote the Belgrade “Politika” acidly. “The cry,
‘What am I offered?” alone inspires Italian policy.
. . . The saddest thing in this whole business is
that we are to serve as the object of the bargaining.
England and France, who, in the name of the
Triple Entente, carried on the negotiations with
Italy, consent to concessions at the expense of Ser-
bia and of South Slavism. Serbia asks no aid of
Italy. She does not need to. All the more is she
not ready to cede an inch of Yugo-Slav territory.
If the Triple Entente is reduced to calling for
Italian assistance, let it pay the necessary price
out of its own pocket. It possesses territories
enough of which it can dispose. Let it not violate
others’ rights. Savoy, Corsica, Malta, Tunis, Al-
geria, Asia Minor, and Egypt could serve perfectly
THE BALKANS 231
well as compensation for Italy. We are perfectly
convinced that this Italian policy of extortion is
not in the least agreeable to the Triple Entente and
that the latter would agree only against its will to
such compensations extorted by force. We are
also persuaded that Italy would one day bitterly
regret it. . But it is only right and just that he who
believes that he must grant compensations should
take them out of his own property. We have no
need of Italy. Consequently, we wish to make no
sacrifice for an assistance that we do not request.
Istria and the Dalmatian coasts are Slav and will
remain Slav. Any attempt to upset the estab-
lished order might give rise to new complications
and new conflicts of incalculable extent. Let the
Triple Entente and Italy take that for certain l’’
This categorical refusal to yield Italy even Trieste
represented a powerful body of Serbian public
opinion, and did much to still further envenom
Serbo-Italian relations.
The dispute with Italy was by no means settled
when Serbia’s sensibilities were still further ruf-
fled by another move of her allies. The summer of
1915 witnessed the Entente’s persistent attempt
to win Bulgaria to its side, but Bulgaria at once
answered that the price for her aid would have
to be that supremely desired land of Macedonia for
which Bulgaria had fought the Balkan Wars and of
which she considered herself foully robbed at the
Peace of Bucharest. The Bulgarian thesis was
that the Macedonians were thoroughly Bulgar in
blood and speech, and that Bulgaria could never
232 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
rest until these race brethren were reunited to the
motherland. The justice of this contention was ac-
knowledged by influential sections of British and
French public opinion which urged their Govern-
ments to put pressure on their Serb ally to sat-
isfy Bulgaria’s aspirations and thus assure a re-
constituted Balkan League which would ensure
Austria's speedy collapse and thereby richly re-
ward Serbia’s sacrifice by giving her all southwest
Austria-Hungary.
This line of reasoning, however, did not in the
least appeal to Serbian predilections. Serbia
flatly denied that the Macedonians were Bulgars,
asserting that they were true Serbs, temporarily
misled by Bulgarian propaganda but now fast be-
coming good Serbs under Serbian rule. Further-
more, most Serbians claimed that Macedonia was
vital to the political and economic future of their
country. In fact, they believed that all Mace-
donia should have gone to Serbia right down to
Salonika and the AEgean Sea, and only the feud
with Bulgaria had prevented a quarrel with the
Greeks over the possession of Salonika and the
lower Vardar Valley. The full extent of Serbian
aspirations came out clearly in the arguments
which Serb writers now adduced in the foreign
press to convince their Western allies of the jus-
tice of their contentions. In the Paris “Revue
Hebdomadaire” of April 10, 1915, the Serb pub-
licist, J. Cvijic, asserted: “Our country is com-
posed of two great valleys, the Morava and the
Wardar, which cut across the Balkans from north
THE BALKANS 233
to south, from Belgrade to Salonika, without any
distinct partition line. This gives to Serbia the
Seal of an almost perfect geographical unity.”
And a little later, a prominent Serb politician,
Costa Stoyanovitch, wrote in the “Nuova Anto-
logia” (Rome): “Macedonia does not even be-
long to Bulgaria geographically, while with Serbia
it forms a geographical unity. The valley of the
Vardar, the principal Macedonian river, is only the
continuation of the Serbian valley of the Morava.
Thus it is the main line of communication between
the Danube and Salonika. . . . Hence, for Serbia,
the cession of Macedonia is not equivalent to part-
ing with a contiguous province, without the pos-
session of which she could continue undisturbed
her national life. . . . In fact, this province, not
only because of its resources and its economic
value, but also because of its geographic position,
is the most important Serbian province.”
Despite these Serbian contentions, the Entente
Powers did urge Serbia to promise Bulgaria, not
all Macedonia but the districts west of the Wardar
River. However, even this relatively slight con-
cession aroused bitter opposition in the Serbian
press. The “Novosti” (Belgrade) exclaimed de-
fiantly: “Serbia prefers to disappear as a state
rather than accept such a renunciation of its lands.
That is what the Government should declare to the
Entente instead of convoking the Skupshtinal”
The Serbs were, however, not called upon to
make this sacrifice. Bulgaria rejected the pro-
posed compromise as utterly inadequate, and when
234 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
in September, 1915, the Austro-Germans began
their great Balkan “drive” Bulgaria joined the
Teutonic Powers and struck savagely at the hated
Serb foe. The Serbians resisted with the cour-
age of despair, but the odds were too great and the
struggle was soon over. The flower of the Serbian
people fell in battle or perished during the awful
retreat across the snow-clad Albanian Mountains.
Only a hardy remnant reached the waiting Entente
ships on the Adriatic shore and were carried away
into exile. Before the year was out tiny Montene-
gro also fell, and the Serb states had disappeared
from the roster of the world’s nations.
Whether they will reappear depends upon the
fortunes of war. Should the Teutonic Powers
maintain their present Balkan grip, it is unlikely
that an independent Serbia will ever be restored.
The most probable outcome at this writing appears
to be a straight partition between Austria-Hun-
gary and Bulgaria, Bulgaria taking the mixed
Serbo-Bulgar populations of Macedonia and south-
ern Serbia, Austria-Hungary taking the pure
Serb populations of the north. In that case, with
forbearance and constructive statesmanship, the
still plastic Serb stock would in all probability ulti-
mately fuse with the closely kindred Bulgarian and
Croatian cultures.
Of course all this is cruel tragedy for the Serbs
—but it is the way of the world. For many years
Serbia frankly aspired to be the “Balkan Pied-
mont” and worked to disrupt Austria-Hungary in
order to build from its ruins a great Yugo-Slav
**
THE BALKANS 235
Empire. For both states the issue was thence-
forth one of life and death, and in such implacable
duels the loser must pay the ultimate forfeit.
B. BTLGARIA
Modern Bulgaria is one of the most extraor-
dinary phenomena of human history. Although
the Bulgarians played a leading part in Balkan
politics during the Middle Ages, building up two
powerful empires, the Turkish conquest of the Pen-
insula bore harder upon the Bulgars than upon any
other Balkan people. So thoroughly was the na-
tional organization destroyed that forty years ago
the Bulgarians were an obscure population of
wretched serfs, exploited to the limit of human
endurance, whom the world had so completely
forgotten that many Western travelers passed
through their land without becoming aware of their
existence. -
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 freed the Bul-
gars from the Turkish yoke and restored their
national entity. In less than ten years Bulgaria
was the most powerful Christian Balkan state, and
this primacy she steadily increased down to the
late Balkan Wars.
This almost miraculous creation of something
out of nothing implies a very unusual national
character, and a brief study of Bulgarian national
psychology reveals the secret of Bulgarian success.
One thing is clear from the first: the Bulgarians
are not true Slavs. Your typical Slav, whether
he dwell on the Russian plains or the Serbian hills,
236 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
is an idealist, prone to lose sight of hard facts
in day dreams. Capable of great accomplishments
when under the stimuli of his enthusiasms, in or-
dinary times the Slav is an easy-going, improvi-
dent, open-handed person, essentially likable, but
lacking that practical characteristic—efficiency.
How different the Bulgarian | Restrained, sober,
dour; with occasional outbursts of passion, but
usually taking even his pleasures sadly; intensely
practical and hard-headed; without a trace of mys-
ticism; frugal to the point of avarice; so solicitous
about the future that this frequently becomes an
obsession; above all, possessed of a dogged, plod-
ding, almost ferocious energy translating itself
normally into unremitting labor—such is the folk.
“The Bulgar on his ox-cart,” says the national
proverb, “pursues the hare—and overtakes it.”
This individual character-sketch omits one trait
possessed by Bulgarians in preeminently high de-
gree—capacity for sustained team-play. Now im-
agine this people fired by the typical Balkan Great
Idea, and you begin to understand how Bulgaria
rose from nothing to Balkan primacy in less than
ten years.
And that Great Idea? It was, first, the reunion
of the whole Bulgarian race from the Black Sea to
the Albanian Mountains, and from the Danube to
the AEgean. Then, invincible in its dominant cen-
tral position, this “Big Bulgaria” would force the
other Balkan peoples to acknowledge its hegemony.
Finally, a united Balkan Christendom would expel
the Turk from Europe and seat a new Bulgarian
THE BALKANS 237
Empire at Constantinople, always significantly
known to Bulgarians as “Tzarigrad,” the “City of
the Tsars.” Grandiose almost to absurdity ap-
peared this ideal of the devastated little peasant
state created in 1878 by the Congress of Berlin.
But, if Bulgaria’s dreams were great, her waking
hours were long, and all were given up to strenu-
ous endeavor and rigid self-denial. These high
hopes became part of the national consciousness.
They braced every Bulgar to gigantic efforts. The
way Bulgaria pinched and starved herself for
near forty years to create proportionately the
greatest war-machine in the world showed this
folk to be possessed of a somber power and fero-
cious energy which made the goal seem less im-
practicable. -
Then at last the hour seemed to have struck. In
the Balkan wars Bulgaria cast the die—and lost.
Not from lack of courage or fighting ability, but
through a league of all her Balkan neighbors egged
on by her traditional friends, Russia and France.
The moral effect was terrible. The foreigner can
hardly realize the half-insane fury which then set-
tled down in those morose, half-savage hearts.
Forced to sit idly by and watch the hated Serb
root out Macedonian Bulgarism by one of the
most ruthless persecutions known to history, their
strong-man’s agony grew, and grew, and knew no
rest. How the Serb was regarded is shown by this
popular Bulgarian war-song composed just after
the Peace of Bucharest: “We took your hands
as brothers, but hell lurked in your hearts! Invet-
238 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
erate brigands, who have trampled under foot
honor, altar, and good-name; you have despoiled
us without shame! You have soiled the temple of
our country ! Inhuman demons, hiding crime in
your Souls; you are the creatures of wickedness
and fury! We remember all, and savagely shall
we avenge your Satanic plans, your accursed
envy l’”
“Wengeance!” That was the watchword.
“Wengeance and victory!” From Tsar Ferdi-
nand down to the humblest peasant boy, the Bul-
garian people made no secret of their determina-
tion to tear up the Bucharest treaty and seize
Macedonia at the first opportunity, or die in the
attempt. The first step was a reconciliation with
the hereditary Turkish foe. Before the year 1913
was out, a close Turco-Bulgarian entente had
cleared the way for future action.
Then came the European War. How Bulgarian
popular sympathies would go was perfectly clear
from the first. Serbia, the arch-enemy, was fight-
ing the Entente’s battles. Greece, the well-hated,
and Rumania, the abhorred, were Entente sympa-
thizers. Russia and France, the false friends,
made up two of the three Entente Powers. How,
then, could Bulgarian patriots wish for Entente
success? Russian talk of “Pan-Slavism” and ap-
peals to the “Little Brothers of the South” were
laughed to scorn. The Bulgarians knew well who
was Serbia’s sponsor, and knew equally well who
had egged on Rumania to stab them in the back
in the Second Balkan War. Long before the Eu-
THE BALKANS 239
ropean struggle, most Bulgarians had renounced
not only Russia but their very Slavism as well.
“Call us Huns, Turks, Tartars, but not Slavs1”
cried a prominent Bulgarian shortly after the
Peace of Bucharest. And in November, 1913, the
great patriotic organization “Narodni Savetz,”
headed by Premier Radoslavov, had passed this
resolution: “The Bulgarian people must break
with this ideal, so false and fatal for us—the ideal
of Slav fraternity.” Many Bulgarians recalled
with pride their partial descent from Finno-Turk-
ish nomads who had conquered the primitive Bul-
garian Slavs more than a thousand years before,
and the famous Bulgarian poet, Cyril Khristov,
had set the fashion by calling himself a “Tartaro-
Bulgar.” Therefore, when the European War
broke out, Russian advances were rejected with de-
fiance. “Slavism is a fatal barrier to our power
and our national enthusiasm,” stated Dr. Ghen-
nadiev’s organ “Volia” in late August, 1914. “It
is high time for us to shed that error and stop
preaching such a lie.” -
Bulgarian resentment likewise leaped up hotly
against France. France had shown herself more
hostile to Bulgaria than had Russia during the
Second Balkan War, and it was an open secret that
M. Delcassé, French minister of foreign affairs,
had advocated the permanent ruin and partition of
Bulgaria in order to erect a more powerful Serbia
and Rumania against Austria and a Greater
Greece against the Levantine aspirations of Italy.
All this the Bulgarians remembered, and their
240 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
anti-French feeling expressed itself in strictures
like that indited by Professor Petkov of Sofia Uni-
versity in the early autumn of 1914. In this bro-
chure, Professor Petkov wrote: “An heroic
struggle is unfolding before our eyes: the healthy
and powerful German culture battles with the rot-
ten French culture which, condemned to death,
tries to drag down with it all the peoples of Eu-
rope. Present-day France is nothing but a dis-
gusting sewer which taints the air of Europe. The
healthy German culture has revolted against her,
for Germany wishes to conquer a free field for its
development. On the other side, German culture
has to struggle energetically against Russian bar-
barism which, for ten centuries, has tended solely
to become the powerful despot and oppressor, as
well by its own peculiar development as by the
progressive development of others. At the pres-
ent hour, France, intellectually degenerate and
depopulated, struggling against the powerful Ger-
man culture, has for ally Russia, barbarous and
benighted.”
The strong pro-German sentiments expressed in
Professor Petkov's pamphlet were typical of the
great mass of the Bulgarian people. Tsar Ferdi-
mand and the Bulgarian Government, to be Sure,
maintained an attitude of even-handed neutrality,
but Bulgarian public opinion made scant conceal-
ment of its sympathies. At the outbreak of the
war, the noted Bulgarian poet, Cyril Khristov, ded-
icated an impassioned ode “To Germania,” end-
ing: “Ah! How I love to see thee march victo-
THE BALKANS 241
riously forward to the conquest of that place in
the world which is thy due !” “For us, one thing
is certain,” exclaimed the Sofia. “Trgowinski
Vjestnik” exultantly in the autumn of 1914, “the
two powerful allies, Germany and Austria-Hun-
gary, are invincible!” In the Christmas, 1914,
number of the Vienna “Reichspost,” M. Momt-
chilov, Vice-President of the Bulgarian Parlia-
ment, wrote: “A strong Bulgaria is indispensa-
ble for Austria-Hungary. Every Bulgarian knows
that Russia, in seeking to occupy the Dardanelles,
becomes thereby, ipso facto, the enemy of Bulgaria.
At this critical hour the Bulgarian Government is
energetically sustained by the people, which ac-
claims with enthusiasm the Austrian and German
victories and sees in them the hope of its own
existence. The Bulgarian people to-day desires an
unconditional rapprochement with the great Cen-
tral Powers, it thirsts for their high ‘Kultur,” and
sincerely desires the harmonizing of their political
and economic interests. Russia’s efforts to gain
us by her rubles has failed. The Pan-Slavist com-
edy may still serve the gentlemen at Petrograd as
an excuse for sumptuous banquets, but for us it
has gone out of fashion. If, notwithstanding,
Russian policy should dare to violate our neutral-
ity, then Russia would run upon our bayonets.”
Russia's determination to get Constantinople
roused deep anger and alarm throughout Bulgaria.
Most Bulgarian papers asserted that this would
mean the death of Bulgarian independence, and
a prominent Bulgarian politician wrote boldly to
242 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
the Petrograd “Novoye Vremya”: “Sazonov's
declarations on the subject of the Straits and Con-
stantinople have profoundly agitated all Bulgarian
patriots. Each of us would sacrifice his life rather
than permit Russia to seize Constantinople. All
Bulgaria would resist as one man this scheme of
Russian chauvinism. In fact, we consider that our
duty is to range ourselves on the side of the Turks
to defend Constantinople against the expansionist
ambitions of Russia.”
Under these circumstances, Russian menaces,
instead of cowing Bulgaria, merely fanned the ex-
isting Russophobia to even fiercer flames. The
great Austro-German “drive” against Russia
which began in June, 1915, roused the undisguised
jubilation of the Sofia press. The semi-official
“Kambana,” usually so moderate in tone, wrote:
“Russia, which longs to extend her domination
over Constantinople and the Straits, cannot permit
a big Bulgaria to arise in the Balkans. She in-
tends to make Bulgaria a Russian province. For
this reason we denounce as high treason the at-
tempts made by certain persons among us to favor
Russian influence. Russia must take her hands off
the Balkans and devote her energies to Asia. It is
to this end that the German and Austro-Hungarian
armies are fighting to-day. Therefore, let us hail
their efforts with enthusiasm and wish them a
decisive victory. The hour is propitious for con-
juring forever the Russian peril which threatens
our existence.” And after the fall of Warsaw the
famous Bulgarian military critic, Vasili Angelov,
THE BALKANS 243
wrote: “Every true Bulgarian must rejoice in
the collapse of the Russian armies. The joy we
now feel is as keen as was our grief when, two
years ago, Orthodox Russia treacherously loosed
against Bulgaria a pack of wolves to rend us.
May God aid the brave Austro-Hungarian and
German hosts to beat the Russian armies into the
dust and hurl them into their own swamps, so that
they may never again disquiet Europe and the
Balkans by their savage and rapacious instincts.”
Such being the state of Bulgarian public opin-
ion, it is not strange that Entente efforts to win
Bulgaria to the Allied cause ended in failure. In
fact, it is probable that the Bulgarian Government
had already decided upon its future course of ac-
tion, though it cleverly maintained its neutrality
until the proper moment for action arrived. That
moment came when the Austro-German “drive”
into Serbia began in September, 1915. There-
upon Bulgaria threw off the mask, leagued herself
with the Teutonic Powers, and struck Serbia down.
The great bulk of the Bulgarian people greeted
their Government’s decision with frank satisfac-
tion. “Since the interests of Bulgaria coincide
with the interests of the Central Powers,” wrote
the “Kambana,” “the enemies of Austria and
Germany are the enemies of Bulgaria also. An
alliance between Bulgaria and the Central Powers
will realize our aspirations more than any other
alliance. We are too weak to fight the Great Pow-
ers. But with the diplomatic and military aid of
Germany and Austria-Hungary we can very easily
244 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
and successfully fight against the little states
which have so criminally robbed us.” This popu-
lar satisfaction was greatly enhanced by the sub-
sequent course of events. A few short autumn
weeks saw Macedonia, the promised land, wholly
in Bulgaria's grasp, saw the hated Serb prostrate
in the dust, saw Bulgarian armies pouring through
the Albanian hills and halting only on the distant
shores of the Adriatic Sea. Such triumphs this
sober folk had fashioned only in its wildest
dreams. And still further Bulgarian triumphs
were in store. Rumania’s adhesion to the Allies
in September, 1916, enabled Bulgaria to settle ac-
counts with another one of her Balkan enemies.
The Silistrian province, filched away in 1913, was
swiftly reconquered, and Bulgarian regiments tri-
umphantly entered the Rumanian capital, Bucha-
rest.
These things have all tended to draw Bulgaria
still closer to her allies. In the Summer of 1916,
the President of the Bulgarian Parliament thus
elucidated the deep-going roots of Teuton-Bulgar
solidarity: “Our evolution against Russian in-
fluence would in all probability have come to ma-
turity earlier if Germany had paid more heed to
us and less to Turkey. But she at last discerned
where her interest lay and became our close friend.
Austria has never ceased to be that. We, the di-
rectors of Bulgaria’s policy, were well aware, when
the great war broke out, that we would take a
hand in it. But we had to wait, because we were
not ready, and because we were exhausted by the
THE BALKANS 245
Second Balkan War. Besides, we were so foolish
as to wait and see what the results of the first
campaign would be, although it was certain that,
be they what they might, we would never take
sides with the Entente. If the fortune of war had
decided otherwise than it did, we would simply
have waited for Germany’s revenge to take part
in it by her side with all our strength.”
Bulgarian public opinion heartily favors the
Teutonic plan of “Central Europe.” In the early
autumn of 1916, the “Narodni Prava” (Sofia)
wrote: “This scheme interests Bulgarians very
particularly. During the Russophil phase they
made an attempt to ally themselves economically
with the Entente Powers, but they soon perceived
that they were on the wrong track and that their
interests linked them naturally to the Central Em-
pires. For the Russians have no industries, and
our raw stuffs can find no markets in their coun-
try, whereas we have German industry at our
doors, which can absorb all our produce and work
for us cheaply. It is probable that the Sobranje
will shortly be called upon to vote a law depriving
for all time the subjects of the Entente states
from access to Bulgarian markets.”
All this shows how irrevocably Bulgaria has
linked her destinies with those of the Central Pow-
ers. For her there is, indeed, no turning back.
With the exception of Italy, the Entente nations
have vowed vengeance, and an Entente triumph
would spell Bulgaria’s reduction to permanent
impotence if not her complete annihilation. But
246 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
even supposing the Allies willing to leave Bulgaria
her frontiers of 1913, this would mean the relin-
quishment of Macedonia to a restored and power-
ful Serbia. It would also mean Bulgarian ac-
quiescence in a Russian annexation of Constanti-
nople, with the consequent nipping of Bulgaria
between these two aggrandized and vengeful Slav
Powers. To Bulgaria, at present enjoying the re-
alization of her dearest hopes, such a future would
be worse than death. Respecting Macedonia, es-
pecially, Bulgaria’s attitude is exactly that of a
she-bear standing over her newly rescued cubs.
She will face national death rather than abandon
her Macedonian children. This hard, dour, indom-
itable folk has deliberately chosen the path of tri-
umph or downfall.
C. GREECE
Greece is prečminently the home of the “Great
Idea.” The aspirations of the other Balkan peo-
ples never stray much beyond the Peninsula, but
the Hellenic hope is truly imperial in its far-flung
horizons. Heir to perhaps the most glorious of
human pasts, the modern Greek burns to emulate
his ancestors and fervently awaits the advent of
a mighty morrow.
The Hellenic Great Idea is a revival of the glor-
ies of ancient Hellas and the medieval Byzantine
Empire, incarnated in a new Greek Empire seated
at Constantinople which shall embrace the Balkans
and Asia Minor and win back the whole Near East
to Hellenism. The intensity of these Greek aspi-
THE BALKANS 247
rations has been strikingly portrayed by Professor
Andreades of the University of Athens. Writing
of the Greek longing for Constantinople, he says:
“For the Greeks, Constantinople is the ‘Polis,”
‘Urbs,’ ‘The City,” which, from Constantine the
Great to Constantine XI (A.D. 323–1453), unit-
ing the Hellenic cities and provinces into a nation,
permitted them alone to survive among all the na-
tions of Antiquity. It is the true historical cap-
ital of Hellenism.”
In 1914 the hopes of the Greeks flamed high. So
extraordinary had been their successes in the pre-
ceding years that further steps toward the reali-
zation of the Great Idea seemed reasonably as-
sured. Of all the parties to the late Balkan wars,
Greece had come off the best. With a minimum
of loss, Hellas had doubled its territory and had
almost doubled its population. Salonika and Ka-
valla, after Constantinople the richest of Balkan
prizes, were in Hellenic hands, and the “Great
Greek Island,” Crete, had been finally reunited
to the motherland. The internal situation also
promised well. Greek finance was at last upon a
sound footing, while factionalism, that historic
curse of the folk, had been at least temporarily
subdued. Under the twin guidance of a popular
monarch and an able statesman, the Greek people
looked unitedly forward to a happy future.
True, the horizon was not entirely free from
clouds. The very amplitude of Hellenic interests
involved corresponding perplexities. To the
north lay the dark lower of the Bulgar, brooding
248 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
over his wrongs and dreaming of revenge. To the
east simmered a chronic feud with the Turk, re-
calcitrant at the loss of his AEgean isles and
alarmed at the aspirations of his numerous Greek
subjects in Asia Minor for reunion with the Hel-
lenic homeland. Even the Greco-Serbian alliance
was a mariage de raison, concluded through fear
of the common Bulgar foe and capable of tragic
dissolution if ever Serb yearnings for Salonika
should get the upper hand. With two of the great
European Powers, also, Greece was not upon the
best of terms. Russian designs upon Constanti-
nople imperiled the ultimate goal of the Hellenic
Great Idea, while even more troublesome for the
immediate future was the state of Greek relations
toward Italy. Ever since Italy’s seizure of
Rhodes and the AEgean Archipelago of the Dode-
kanese in 1912, Greco-Italian relations had been
strained, and since this was but one phase of a
rivalry which extended over both the southern
Adriatic and the whole Levant, Greco-Italian rela-
tions showed every prospect of becoming worse in
the years to come. Still, Greece's hopes so out-
weighed her anxieties that the summer of 1914
found Hellas in an optimistic mood.
The outbreak of the European War evoked a
wave of pro-Ally feeling throughout Greece. For
Russia there was naturally but little sympathy,
but for the other two Entente Powers, France and
England, the Greek people felt an almost filial
veneration, the traditional Philhellenism of the
Western Powers having laid the Greeks under a
THE BALKANS 249
deep debt of gratitude. Furthermore, their Serb
ally was fighting on the Entente side. Toward
Germany there was no antipathy and some liking,
but Austria had never been Greece’s friend, while
Turkey and Bulgaria, obviously potential allies of
the Teutonic Powers, were Greece’s bitterest foes.
For all these reasons, therefore, the hearts of the
overwhelming majority of the Greek people were
with the Allies, and the popular enthusiasm was
patently shared by the powerful Greek Premier,
Eleutherios Venizelos.
Until February, 1915, Greece was little affected
by the war. In that month, however, the Anglo-
French fleet began its bombardment of the Dar-
danelles, and the Allies, confident in their hold
upon Greek sympathies, asked the Hellenic Gov-
ernment to furnish an army to supplement the
naval attack. Premier Venizelos and a majority
of the Greek people favored compliance with the
Allies’ demands, especially since these were
coupled with glowing if rather indefinite promises
of territorial rewards in Asia Minor. King Con-
stantine, however, together with most of the Greek
generals and statesmen, declared that the sending
of an adequate army to the Dardanelles would so
weaken Greece’s northern border as to invite a
Bulgarian invasion, and accordingly refused to
grant the Allies’ request.
This refusal was a great shock to Allied antici-
pations. The Entente Powers had counted upon
Greek assistance almost as a matter of course,
and this unexpected upset to their plans aroused
250 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
both astonishment and indignation. In France
and England the Greeks were accused of base
ingratitude and even of pro-Germanism. This
greatly alarmed the Greeks. To many Hellenes,
the favor of the Western sea-powers was for
Greece literally a matter of life and death which
must on no account be lost. Therefore these per-
sons, including Venizelos, asserted that Greece
must throw herself unreservedly into the sea-pow-
ers’ arms, trusting to their gratitude to reward
her devotion and chancing temporary risks. To
others, however, notably the King and the army
leaders, the possibilities of a Turco-Bulgarian in-
vasion were so terrible that they considered that
war must at all costs be avoided unless the Allies
should transport to the Balkans an army adequate
for the protection of Greece. Should Greece now
throw in her lot with the Allies and then be left
unsupported at the crucial hour, her doom was
sealed.
This difference of opinion rapidly split the
Greek people into two increasingly hostile fac-
tions, one headed by Venizelos, in favor of join-
ing the Allies; the other, headed by the King,
clinging to neutrality. Matters were rendered
still worse by the fact that the lines of cleavage
ran sharply according to geographical situation
and economic interest. The islands and port
towns, which were prospering greatly by the war,
yet whose prosperity was of course entirely at
the mercy of the sea-powers, were for Venizelos
and war. The peasantry everywhere showed it-
THE BALKANS 251
self averse to fighting and supported the King in
his neutralist policy. Macedonia in particular,
exposed as it was to the full brunt of all possible
foreign complications, was almost solid for peace.
Thus the Greek people divided, not by individuals
but by communities, and the old Greek spirit
of local faction soon did the rest. Before long
Hellenic solidarity had vanished in bitter partisan
strife.
These dissensions were still further envenomed
by the conduct of the Allies. Greece’s failure to
live up to their expectations had made the En-
tente Powers all the more anxious to win over
Bulgaria, and in early August, 1915, the Allies
went so far as to offer Bulgaria certain Macedon-
ian districts belonging, not only to Serbia but to
Greece as well. This astounding diplomatic action
aroused mingled terror and anger in Greece. All
Greeks, without distinction of party, maintained
that the integrity of both the Greek and Serbian
frontiers of Macedonia was an absolute necessity if
Salonika was to be safeguarded against the Bul-
garian peril. Yet here were the Allies, without
so much as a “by your leave,” offering Bulgaria
the very things which Greece considered vital to
her existence; territories of which, so far as Greek
Macedonia was concerned, they had not the slight-
est right to dispose. However, the two Greek par-
ties construed the matter in very different fash-
ions. The Venizelists asserted that this was only
one more proof of what Greece had to expect by
defying the Entente Powers and urged instant
252 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
junction with the Allies to avert worse misfor-
tunes. The Royalists, on the other hand, main-
tained that this was convincing evidence that the
Allies regarded Greece as a mere tool to be used
and then thrown aside, and concluded that Greece
could on no account trust herself blindly to such
unscrupulous Powers. So great was their de-
Spairing rage that many Royalists began to look
toward Germany as a possible savior, and Greek
newspapers commenced to use language which
would have been unthinkable a year before. “The
English are despots, despite their pretended love
of liberty!” cried the “Nea Himera” of Athens.
“This infernal plot against the territorial integ-
rity of Greece: behold the work of England!”
exclaimed the ‘‘Embros.” While the “Nea
Alithia” of Salonika wrote: “After Serbia, it is
the turn of Greece. Now that Russia and Italy
have sufficiently proved their voracious appetites
to the detriment of our interests, it seems to us that
it is high time to ask ourselves if Greece really
ought to seek a place among the Entente Powers.
Frankly, no: for where the wolves gather, there
lambs who wish to live had better stay away. The
small nations, particularly Greece, should there-
fore turn their eyes toward Germany, the enemy
of Russia and Italy, those two implacable foes of
Hellenism.”
The Austro-German “drive” into Serbia in Sep-
tember, 1915, brought the Greek internal crisis
to a head. Premier Venizelos prepared to stand
by Serbia, but King Constantine, declaring that
THE BALKANS 253
in the absence of adequate Allied support Greece
would thereby merely share Serbia’s inevitable
fate, refused to enter the war. Venizelos resigned,
and the King thereafter dissolved the Venizelist
Parliament and appointed a neutralist ministry to
take charge of the country.
Things now went rapidly from bad to worse.
The Allies, realizing that they had nothing to hope
from the Royalist Government, proceeded to vio-
late Greek neutrality at will, seizing the greater
part of Greek Macedonia and using the Greek
islands precisely like Allied territory. The Royal-
ist Government, sinking into furious despair, be-
came more and more Germanophile, actually turn-
ing over a Macedonian border fortress to the Ger-
mans in May, 1916. The domestic schism ended
in civil war, Venizelos fleeing from Athens in the
autumn of 1916 and establishing a revolutionary
government at Salonika under the Allies’ protec-
tion. The Greek islands mostly declared for
Venizelos, and Greek Macedonia, being under Al-
lied rule, naturally followed suit, but continental
Greece stood by the King.
This, however, meant that the Venizelist revolu-
tion had failed, and since the embittered Royalists
were now frankly looking to the Germans, the
Allies regarded them as open enemies, to be dealt
with as such. The Teutonic conquest of Rumania,
however, made the crushing of the Royalists a dan-
gerous matter. The Allies therefore attempted to
accomplish their purpose by a gradual disarma-
ment of the Greek forces, backing up their de-
254 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
mands by a naval blockade of Greece which threat-
ened that sterile land with starvation. Such is
the situation which still persists after several
months of the blockade. Formal war between
Greece and the Allies has been avoided, although
Severe armed clashes have taken place. Greece
is reduced to the direst extremity, many persons
having actually died of hunger. Nevertheless,
Ring Constantine still refuses to disarm, and the
mainland Greeks continue to support their sov-
ereign. How the crisis shall end it is at present
impossible to foretell, nor for the general Eu-
ropean situation does it greatly matter, Greece
having ceased to be of any considerable political
or military importance.
But, however matters turn out, and however
the war shall end, the plight of unhappy Greece
remains deplorable. The future of Hellenism, so
bright a scant three years ago, is to-day en-
shrouded in impenetrable gloom. To-day, Greece
has virtually ceased to exist as an independent,
self-sustaining nation. Half her territory is in
foreign hands, and, what is even worse, her sons
are split into irreconcilable factions whose fanat-
ical hatreds inhibit national solidarity and may
yet forfeit the entire Hellenic race-heritage.
D. RUMANIA
In many ways Rumania differs fundamentally
from the other Balkan states. Serbia and Bul-
garia are basically peasant democracies, with no
large cities or industrial centers and with prac-
THE BALEANS 255
tically no social stratification. They are thus na-
tions of small yeomen, intensely self-conscious and
able to make their voices heard in the management
of their respective countries. Greece, though so-
cially more complex, is politically much the same.
All Greeks, whether townsmen, sailors, fisherfolk,
or peasants, are keenly alive to the questions of
the day and determined to have their say in the
guidance of Hellas’ destinies.
In Rumania, however, this is far from being the
case. Rumania is socially still in the Middle Ages.
Its scheme of life is positively feudal in character.
At the apex of the social pyramid stands a class
of high-born landed proprietors, known as
“Boyars’’; beneath lies a great peasant mass,
poor, uneducated, often mere landless agricultural
serfs upon the great Boyar estates. A middle
class hardly exists. What in Rumania passes by
that name consists of a recent mushroom-growth
of officials, professional men, and numerous as-
pirants for those coveted posts and preferments.
In the economic life of their country the native
Rumanians take little part. Merchants, manu-
facturers, bankers, shopkeepers, even the skilled
artisans, are nearly all foreigners of various kinds.
As in the medieval Europe, the numerous Jews
form a caste apart, largely parasitic in character,
persecuted and despised.
Another peculiarity of Rumania is the extraordi-
nary rôle played by its capital city. It used to be
said that Paris was France. It is certainly true
that in most things Bucharest is Rumania. Large
256 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
as all Rumania's other towns put together,
Bucharest, with its 350,000 people, prides itself
upon being a center of light and leading in an ocean
of benighted rusticity—“The Paris of the East.”
Here live the great aristocratic families, people of
the highest refinement, who prefer the gay, mod-
ern life of the capital to the monotony of their
huge estates, abandoned to foreign or Jewish over-
Seers. Hither flock all the bright young men who
wish to carve out a career in the political, profes-
Sional, or literary worlds. -
Under these circumstances we must be very
careful to understand what is meant by Rumanian
“public opinion.” Especially in foreign politics,
this means the opinion of the landed aristocracy
and the educated Élite of the towns, particularly
Bucharest. Here the Rumanian peasant simply
does not count. Accustomed from time immemo-
rial to do the Boyars’ bidding, he leaves such ab-
struse matters to the birth and brains of Bucharest.
Only one thing vitally interests him—land. He
wants land for himself and his extremely large
family; he wants to be freed from his oppressive
dependence upon the Boyar and his harsh foreign
overseer; he wants to get out of the clutches of
the Greek, Jew, and Armenian peddler-usurers
who infest the countryside and suck his very life-
blood whenever his improvident habits lure him
into debt. Only ten years ago a terrible peasant
rising threatened Rumania with social dissolution.
High above this volcanic discontent, Bucharest
plays the game of politics with temperamental
passion and artistic abandon. There are more
THE BALKANS 257
politics to the square inch at Bucharest than in
any other city in the world—which is saying a
great deal. Also, Rumanian politicians have
palms unusually receptive to concrete “argu-
ments”—which is saying even more. Altogether,
it is safe to say that Rumania's actions are de-
termined more by “politics” and less by popular
feeling than any other country in Europe.
Examining the viewpoint of the one portion of
the nation whose opinion does carry any weight
with the ruling politicians—the educated Élite of
Bucharest, we find its attitude singularly complex.
The educated Rumanian is inspired by the normal
Balkan “Great Idea”—the reunion of the entire
race into a “Greater Rumania,” hegemon of the
Balkans and arbiter of its destinies. The idea is
far-reaching, for the population of the present
kingdom of Rumania numbers less than eight mil-
lion souls, whereas the Ruman race totals fully
fourteen millions. The union of this extremely
prolific folk within the bounds of a single state
organism would make Greater Rumanian almost a
first-class Power. -
But the path of Greater Rumania is beset by
formidable difficulties. Very few of the “unre-
deemed”. Rumans dwell in the small Balkan states
to the south; the vast majority live under the rule
of Rumania’s mighty neighbors to east and west
—two millions in the Russian province of Bes-
sarabia, three and one-half millions in the Austro-
Hungarian provinces of Bukovina and Transyl-
vania. Since neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia
258 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
would voluntarily surrender these provinces,
Rumania’s sole chance is to seize territory from
one or the other during a moment of Austrian or
Russian weakness. Furthermore, little Rumania
would obviously have to ally herself with one of
her giant neighbors in order to dismember the
other.
For this reason the European War, which so
aroused Rumanian irredentist hopes, divided
Rumanian imperialists into two camps, one urg-
ing a Russian alliance, the other a league with Aus-
tria-Hungary. The problem was, however, com-
plicated by the disagreeable fact that should
Rumania be so unlucky as to pick the losing side,
the winner would probably overrun even the pres-
ent Rumania and do away with it altogether.
Thus torn between their hopes and fears, the
Rumanian imperialists promptly split into a vio-
lent pro-Ally faction under the leadership of M.
Take Jonescu, and an equally violent pro-Teutonic
faction headed by MM. Carp and Marghiloman,
which factions long battled to sweep Rumania into
the war on their particular side.
Rumanian propagandist literature is both copi-
ous and picturesque, but to quote from it would
serve no useful purpose because it does not repre-
sent ultimate realities. Rumania’s decision was
determined, not by the pressure of public opinion
but by the secret machinations of great nobles and
prominent politicians, and the activity of these
Rumanian leaders was, in turn, largely determined
by clandestine pressure from the rival Great
THE BALECANS 259
Powers, including the wholesale use of bribery and
corruption.
The inside story of Rumania’s entrance into the
war cannot now, if ever, be told. The important
point to be noted is that the conduct of her armies
after intervention revealed with ominous clearness
the unhealthy bases of Rumanian national life.
The Rumanian military machine creaked badly
from the start and ultimately went to pieces. The
officers’ corps, loaded down with political generals,
could not lead; the commissariat was full of graft;
and the peasant soldiers, poverty-stricken and in-
terested only in land reform, fought without en-
thusiasm.
However the war shall end, Rumanian imperial-
ism has been dealt a blow from which it may never
recover. During his long reign the late King
Carol, by his diplomatic ability and dynastic Com-
nections, gave Rumania a political importance not
warranted by intrinsic facts. The bubble of
Rumanian prestige has now been pricked by the
sharp sword of war. Should she recover full in-
dependence, Rumania will have to rebuild her shat-
tered state edifice upon far sounder and healthier
foundations if she ever aspires to attain the posi-
tion which she claims as her just due.
CHAPTER VIII
TURE EY AND THE MOSLEM EAST
OR many years competent observers have
noted the awakening of the Moslem world.
Like all serious movements the roots of this revival
go deep into the past, a few keen eyes having dis-
cerned the first stirrings half a century ago. But
the tide began running swiftly only after the
Russo-Japanese War. The indirect consequences
of this triumph of a non-European people over a
first-class European Power have already been pro-
digious and are still by no means at an end.
The moral quickening of the Japanese victories
was felt in every part of Asia and Africa, but the
stimulus to the Moslem world was particularly
great. For Islam was already in full ferment.
In part this was due to profound regenerative
causes too complex for brief analysis, but in still
larger measure it was caused by the hostile pres-
sure of the conquering West which had long been
subjecting ever new domains of Islam to its im-
perious will. Fear of Christian Europe was the
basis of that “Pan-Islamic” propaganda which
threatened the West with a “Holy War.” +.
The decade between the Russo-Japanese conflict
and the European War greatly increased the ten-
sion between the Moslem and Christian worlds.
260
TURREY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 261
Just at the moment when Islam was thrilled with
new self-confidence and hope, Christendom re-
doubled its aggression upon Islam. In that dec-
ade, two out of the four remaining Mohammedan
states—Morocco and Persia—were devoured by
the insatiable West. Only remote Afghanistan
and Turkey survived, and Turkey emerged battle-
scarred and mutilated by the loss of its Balkan
provinces and Tripoli.
The downfall of Persia evoked especially bitter
lamentation in Islam. For Persia is of much
deeper import to Islam than might at first sight
appear. The broad belt of the Moslem world,
stretching from Morocco to China, here narrows
to relatively slender proportions, and most Mos-
lems hold the Iran Plateau between Caspian Sea
and Persian Gulf to be the vital bridge joining
the two halves of Islam. It is true that the Per-
sians are Shiite heretics, but the old bitterness be-
tween Sunnite orthodoxy and Shiism has been
much softened of late by the growing feeling of
Moslem solidarity against the European peril.
Although Islam included all Europeans within
the compass of its dislike, its anger was especially
focused against those nations which formed the
“Triple Entente” during the years preceding the
great war. Russia had always been considered
Islam’s arch-enemy. France, the conqueror of
Moslem North Africa, was Russia’s close ally.
England, once popular throughout Islam, had been
suspect ever since the seizure of Egypt, and had
become widely hated through her entente with
262 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Russia and the Anglo-Russian strangling of Per-
sia. Germany, on the other hand, had shown con-
sistent friendliness toward Islam. Alone among
the European Great Powers, Germany owned no
Moslem territory. The German Kaiser had on
several occasions solemnly declared himself the
friend and protector of the Moslem world.
Lastly, for over twenty years German soldiers
and engineers had been laboring to endow Turkey
with the modern technical equipment and organi-
zation necessary for her survival.
It is therefore not surprising that when the
European War broke out Moslem sympathies, par-
ticularly in Turkey, tended toward Germany.
These sympathies were, to be sure, quite relative.
The first natural impulse was a grim satisfaction
at this death-grapple of Europe, which Moslems
were inclined to consider a judgment of Allah
upon European arrogance and greed. Thus, the
Constantinople “Tanine,” the most serious Turk-
ish newspaper, remarked concerning the Euro-
pean Powers: “They would not look at the evils
in their own countries or elsewhere, but interfered
at the slightest incident in our borders; every day
they would gnaw at some part of our rights and
our sovereignty; they would perform vivisection
on our quivering flesh and cut off great pieces of
it. And we, with a forcibly controlled spirit of
rebellion in our hearts and with clenched but pow-
erless fists, silent and depressed, would murmur
as the fire burned within: ‘Oh, that they might fall
out with one another! Oh, that they might eat
TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 263
one another up!’ And lo! to-day they are eating
each other up, just as the Turk wished they
would. Whatever people may say, there is in the
nature of things an essential justice that will at
last come to light. To the benighted and the vic-
tims of injustice it brings a smile on the face and
a joyous lightening of the heart.”
Notwithstanding this impartial undercurrent of
sentiment against all Europeans, most Turks felt
that their one chance of survival lay in seizing
this golden opportunity of Europe's schism by
striking in on the Teutons’ side. They knew that
the Entente Powers had long since condemned
Turkey, like Persia, to death. Entente guaran-
tees of Ottoman “integrity” in return for Otto-
man neutrality were greeted with jeering scorn.
What had such “guarantees” meant to Morocco
or Persia? What had Europe’s solemn pledge
of Ottoman “integrity” availed Turkey two years
before at the opening of the Balkan wars? Were
not Russian newspapers even then openly dis-
cussing the inevitable partition of the “Sick
Man’s” heritage? To Jehannum with the per-
jured Giaour's lying words!
Not that the Teuton was trusted overmuch.
The Teuton was a Giaour like the rest. But an
intact Turkey was to the Teuton’s interest. The
Teuton wished to maintain Turkish unity in order
to develop and exploit it all. After Turkey should
be reorganized and strong, perhaps the Sons of
Othman, like the Japanese, could show the Euro-
pean the door. In any case, that was the only
264 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
chance. The other way lay certain and speedy
death. So, at the beginning of November, 1914,
Turkey took the plunge, defied the Entente Pow-
ers, and entered the great war.
This decision excited the wild enthusiasm of the
Constantinople press. “To arms for the mighty
conflict l” cried the “Ikdam.” “We shall march
gloriously onward, sure of our purpose and con-
fident of its achievement. While we know that
all Moslems, far and near, are with us, yet we
Moslems are not alone. We have other friends,
friends who are already champions and victori-
ous in war. With them we fight side by side.”
The Entente Powers were each the object
of separate condemnation. Regarding Russia’s
longing for Constantinople, the “Ikdam” re-
marked: “This Russian dream is no new thing;
it is a plan carefully concocted years ago. While
the best way to treat so absurd a hope is to laugh,
it is impossible for a Turk not to be irritated by it.
Yet we need not worry ourselves about Russia’s
designs. Turkey, relying on the help of God, on
the strength of her army and navy, on the devo-
tion and self-sacrifice of her people, will render
impossible the realization of any such dream.”
Britain was also handled without gloves. In
an article entitled “Hypocritical England,” the
“Tanime” wrote: “Ever since the Balkan War,
in dealing with the Moslem world, England has
covered her face with a veil of hypocrisy. To-
day the mask has fallen from the face of our
enemy; we know where we stand. . . . England
TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 265
pretends that we are taking up arms under pres-
sure from Germany, instead of recognizing the
fact that we are fighting to avenge all Moslems
for the oppression that England has imposed upon
them. Away with hypocrisyl God is with the
good. We shall, we must, win.”
Neither did France escape Turkish condemna-
tion. “This war,” asserted the “Tanine,” “has
opened a chasm between Turkey and France which
can never be filled, and for this we have small
regret. Turkey and France will remain enemies
when the war is ended. For we now know that the
ideas we have had concerning French civilization
were wrong. We now see that French civilization
is destitute of vigor, sincerity, and justice; that
it is noisy and assuming, but inefficient; that on
such a civilization a nation cannot build its hopes
for a prosperous future. We have learned this
in the present war, and any hope the French may
cherish of a renewal of friendship with us is vain.
We shall remain enemies.”
Germany was of course warmly praised. Sheik
Abdul-Aziz Tchawisch, rector of Saladin Univer-
sity, Medina, explained the bases of Moslem pro-
Germanism when he wrote in the “Deutsche Re-
vue”: “For many years I and my friends have
pondered over the problems of Islam, and we have
realized how sorely we have had to suffer under
the domination of the Latin, Anglo-Saxon, and
Slavic races. It was therefore necessary for us to
ally ourselves with a people on a high plane of cul-
ture whose political and economic interests ran
266 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
parallel to our own. To this end we could choose
no better people than the Germans, for their
friends are our friends, their foes the foes of
Islam. Hence it comes about that Germans and
Moslems mutually supplement each other.”
The proclamation of the “Holy War” in mid-
November, 1914, swelled the tide of Turkish en-
thusiasm to its flood. A general rising of the
whole Moslem world was confidently expected,
and the Entente Powers were represented as reel-
ing under their death-blow. “The help of the
illustrious Prophet,” cried the Sultan in a public
announcement, “will certainly ensure our success
and the utter overthrow of our enemies.”
These confident hopes were, however, not des-
tined to be realized. The proclamation of the
Holy War did undoubtedly excite a certain degree
of unrest throughout the Mohammedan world. In
Egypt the already smoldering discontent against
British rule was fanned to a still more dangerous
heat,and certain wild regions, such as the Indian
northwest frontier and remote corners of the
north African Sudan, broke into open war. But
the great mass of orthodox Moslems outside of
the Ottoman Empire refused to heed the call. The
fact that the Commander of the Faithful was in
close alliance with two Christian Powers chilled
their ardor and invested the “Holy War” with
altogether too political a complexion. The sixty
million Indian Moslems, from whom such great
things had been expected in Stambul, turned out
to be indifferent or even hostile. A leading Indian
TURREY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 267
Mohammedan, the Aga Khan, declared: “This is
not the free will of the Sultan, but the will of the
German officers and other non-Moslems who have
forced him to do their bidding. If Germany suc-
ceeds, Turkey will be a vassal of Germany. The
Kaiser’s resident will be the real ruler and will
control the holy cities.” And that influential
Moslem organ, the “Amrita Bazar Patrika” (Cal-
cutta), asserted: “In view of the present aspect of
war in Europe, let it be generally known that at
this critical juncture it is the bounden duty of the
Mohammedans of India to adhere firmly to their old
and tried loyalty to the British Raj.” The Ameer
of Afghanistan maintained a strict neutrality,
even assisting the British in quieting the insurgent
tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier. There has
undoubtedly been grave unrest in India since the
beginning of the war, but it has been caused, not
so much by Moslems as by Hindu terrorists whose
revolutionary activities had disturbed India for
years previous to the European struggle.
The failure of the “Jahadd” caused keen dis-
appointment among the Turks. At first they
maintained their faith in its ultimate success.
“Of course,” argued the Constantinople “Tasfiri
Efkyar,” “an instant general response to the call
of service in the Jahadd could not be expected.
Time must be allowed for the call to reach dis-
tant places and for the reply to come back. The
message of the Khalif has to cross deserts and to
find entrance into the hearts and innermost
thoughts of the faithful. Some cheering echoes
268 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
are coming back already. The call has to find its
way from mosque to mosque, from village to vil-
lage; the people are scattered, and to unite them
in a great enterprise takes time. If patience is
needed for a response from distant parts of the
Ottoman dominions, how much more of patient
waiting is demanded for the full effect of the call
to be realized all through the Moslem world? Our
enemies may exult over this delay and build their
hopes upon it. How delusive those hopes are the
near future will amply prove.” This prophecy,
however, remained unfulfilled. In Tripoli, to be
sure, the Sennussi dervishes from the Sahara
did excite a general insurrection which drove the
Italians back upon the coast, but elsewhere the
rigorous precautions of the European authori-
ties sufficed to keep the fanatical minority in
check.
Disappointed in their expectations of a general
uprising of the Moslem world, the Turks centered
their hopes upon Egypt and Persia. In both
these lands there was indeed reason to expect
serious trouble. Egypt had always been restive
under British rule. The Islamic fanaticism of the
people was powerfully supplemented by a strong
“Nationalist” independence movement among
the intellectuals which had filled Egypt with
chronic unrest and had recently required the iron
hand of Lord Kitchener to keep down. Further-
more, the ruling Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, was
frankly Anglophobe, and, finding himself at Con-
stantinople at the outbreak of the European War,
TURREY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 269
he refused to return to Egypt and threw in his lot
with the Turks. -
England was frankly alarmed at the situation.
The Suez Canal was a vital link in Britain’s chain
of empire, and most Englishmen admitted that
should a Turkish army enter Egypt, the country
would be in a blaze. The Copts or native Chris-
tians, to be sure, were zealously loyal to British
rule and a loyalist minority existed among the
Mohammedans, many of whom dreaded a return
to the corrupt old Turkish régime. England acted
quickly, replacing the absent Khedive by his
cousin, Hussein Kamel, who was proclaimed an
independent Sultan under British protection. The
Egyptian loyalists received these drastic measures
with apparent satisfaction. Their leading organ,
“Al Mokattam” (Cairo), wrote at the end of 1914:
“The Egyptian nation, at this juncture, receives
the change in the status of Egypt with satisfaction
and gratitude, knowing that it is in the interests
of the country and of future generations.” And
another loyalist organ, “Al Moayyad,” thus
scored the Ottoman summons to the “Holy War”:
“Turkey’s interference in the present conflict was
an uncalled-for foolishness, and by her action Tur-
key has forfeited her right to the Khalifate. Nor
is Turkey’s claim to the Khalifate justifiable.
Why should the Turk, that old Mongoloid de-
scendant of Othman, usurp the Khalifate from
the hands of the true descendants and successors
of Mohammed?” -
These loyalist utterances did not, however, rep-
270 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
resent the bulk of Egyptian public opinion, which
was unquestionably Pan-Islamic and eager for the
end of British rule. At the outbreak of the Euro-
pean conflict, before Turkey’s entrance had com-
pelled the British to adopt extreme measures, not
even a rigorous censorship could entirely suppress
the virulence of the native press. For example,
in mid-August, 1914, the influential paper, “Esh-
Sha'ab,” successor to the recently suppressed “Al
Alam,” wrote, “The life of the Holy Khalifate and
of the entire Moslem world depends on the sacri-
fice which the valiant Turkish army will offer.”
And shortly afterwards it wrote: “Moslems have
no hope except that the nations of Christendom
should rise against each other. As for us, who
are of the Faith, let us stand aloof and watch. But
let us not forget that the triumph of Germany is
more in the interest of Islam than the triumph of
the Slavs.” For this utterance “Esh-Sha’ab”
was permanently suppressed, and when Turkey
entered the war the British authorities did away
with the whole native press save a few chosen
loyalist organs.
However, Egyptian discontent was merely
driven underground. The Egyptian army was so
untrustworthy that the British dared make no use
of it, but practically interned it for the duration
of the war. The Turkish raids on the Suez Canal
aroused suppressed popular emotion, and the
Turkish Sultan’s proclamation to the Egyptian
people, smuggled into Egypt despite British vig-
ilance, undoubtedly made a considerable impres-
TURE EY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 271
sion. “To my dear Egyptians,” ran this docu-
ment. “You know how England took over the
direction of the country. It was a perpetual grief
to me to see you suffering under the English
tyranny, and I awaited a favorable moment to put
anend to that state of things. I thank the Almighty
for having vouchsafed me the happy occasion of
sending one of my Imperial armies to deliver your
beautiful country, which is a Moslem heritage. I
am certain that, with the aid of God, my imperial
army will succeed in delivering you from the
enemy and his interference in your affairs, and in
giving you your autonomy and your liberties. I
am certain that love of their country will lead my
Egyptian Sons to take part in this war of libera-
tion with all the zeal of which they are capable.—
Mehmed V.”
The Egyptian Nationalist attitude was clearly
set forth by a manifesto of its leader, Mohammed
Farid Bey, issued from his place of exile at Geneva,
Switzerland, at the beginning of 1915. He pro-
tested hotly against “the new illegal régime pro-
claimed by England the 18th of last December.
England, which pretends to make war on Germany
to defend Belgium, ought not to trample under
foot the rights of Egypt, nor consider the treaties
relative thereto as “scraps of paper.” The nation
received this change with very bad grace, and
awaits with impatience the arrival of the Ottoman
army of liberation. . . . The Egyptians await with
calmness, albeit with impatience, the happy out-
come which will put an end to the subjection of
272 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
their beloved country and the usurpation of Hus-
sein Kamel. He and his accomplices will then
receive the punishment which they deserve.”
However, the English defense of the Suez Canal
withstood all Turkish assaults, and Egypt, flooded
with British troops, lapsed into sullen silence.
In Persia, Turkish efforts were crowned with
much more tangible success. The Anglo-Russian
coup of 1911 had brought Persian independence
virtually to an end. Persia was thenceforth di-
vided into a Russian “sphere of influence” in the
north, a British sphere in the south, and a “neu-
tral” zone between. This state of affairs had,
however, by no means received the assent of the
Persian people. The national revival previous to
1911 had been intense, and this dashing of the cup
of liberty from their parched lips had plunged the
Persian patriots into a condition of despairing
rage which made them ripe for any sort of violent
action.
All this was well known to the Turks, who built
far-reaching hopes upon the prevalent Persian un-
rest. No sooner had Turkey entered the war than
columns of light troops were thrown across the
Persian frontier, while numerous Turkish and
German emissaries under the able leadership of
the German minister to Persia, Prince Henry of
Reuss, sowed disaffection throughout the country.
So widespread was the popular response to this
Turco-Teutonic action that for a time it looked as
though Persia would flame into a national insur-
rection from end to end. Despite heavy Russian
TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 273
and British forces hastily thrown into Persia large
sections of the country rose in revolt, while the
Turkish invasion continued to gain ground.
This naturally excited high hopes at Stambul.
The scope of Turkish expectations may be judged
from the proposals for a Turco-Perso-Afghan
Triple Alliance earnestly discussed by the Turkish
press at the beginning of 1915. “Among the
learned and enlightened classes at Teheran the
idea of a Triple Alliance of Western Asia is gain-
ing acceptance and strength,” wrote the “Tanine.”
“This alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanis-
tan will, of course, be federated with the Triple
Alliance of Europe—Germany, Turkey, and Aus-
tria-Hungary. That this idea is most welcome
not only to the Khalifate but also to all centers of
Moslem influence goes without saying. We have
long expected this development. The proposal
is sure to gain strength as it is brought to the
serious and urgent attention of the statesmen of
the parties concerned. . . . In our times neither
religious nor racial ties are essential for the con-
traction of an alliance. Community of interest is
the one indispensable thing. The interests of
Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan are identical, as
we have so often shown in detail before. United
and federated with the Central Powers of Europe,
they will wield a commanding influence in West-
ern Asia and make a conspicuous contribution to
the world’s progress. They are from olden times
related one to the other in religion and language,
and their alliance is a logical necessity. We must
274 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
repeat that it is based, not on community of re-
ligion but upon identity of political and economic
interests, vital needs which must be satisfied; but
we may admit that, as far as Persia is concerned,
religious differences are negligible.” “Germany
and Austria,” said the “Sabah,” “have promised
to assure the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and
also our sovereignty in Egypt and Cyprus. The
Austro-German press applaud the idea of a Turk-
ish-Persian-Afghan alliance. . . . Germany limits
her policy to economic questions. Such a policy is
compatible with the rights of the Asiatic nations
to existence, independence, civilization, and prog-
ress: and this brings about a community of interest
between the Triple Alliance and the Asiatic Pow-
ers. The policy followed by the two groups of
Powers explains the reason for the profound ha-
tred that the Asiatic nations feel against the Pow-
ers of the Triple Entente.”
The one cloud upon the horizon was the Shah’s
hesitation to declare himself openly for the Turco-
Teutons, thus throwing the weight of the Persian
Crown into the wavering scales. This soon intro-
duced a warning note into Turkish appeals. In
May, 1915, the “Tanine” wrote: “When the war
opened, for Persia to enter the lists against the
two great Powers, England and Russia, would
have been stark rashness and blindness. They
would have taken frightful vengeance for her folly.
She was forced to remain neutral. But she has
the duty of showing that she has the desire and the
right to live as a nation. If she wishes to pre-
TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 275
serve her national existence when this war ends,
she cannot forever remain neutral in this mighty
strife of nations. This pressure upon her to take
part in the war increases day by day. The en-
lightened Persians know this as well as we do.
England and Russia have planned to divide Persia
between them. She is a big, sweet morsel all ready
for them to swallow. If these Powers are victori-
ous in the war, then Persia will be wiped off the
map, her national existence will be finished, for we
know how weak peoples fare at their hands in
Such a case. The one hope of Persia’s salvation is
for her to join us and our allies without delay, for
events up to the present time give ninety chances
in a hundred of the final victory remaining with
Germany and her allies.” And in the late sum-
mer of 1915, the “Tanine” asserted: “Nations in
the condition Persia is now in are not saved by
diplomacy. In all friendliness we tell our neigh-
bors and co-religionists that there is one and only
one way of salvation. When this war ends, the
present map of Europe and that of Western Asia
will be changed. If Persia then hopes to begin a
period of prosperity, she must now demonstrate
her worthiness for such prosperity. This war
will one day end, and around a table, where con-
ditions of peace will be agreed upon, will meet the
representatives of those peoples whose sons in
thousands, yes, millions, have been sacrificed. If
Persia hopes for decisions from the men at that
table that will mean life and peace for her, she
has one thing to do to-day: With the watchword,
276 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
“Liberty or Death,” she must throw herself into
the breach, and, with us, trample down the foe.”
The Persian Government was, however, not des-
tined to adopt any such heroic resolutions. Torn
between the veiled threats of the Turco-Teutons
and the even more outspoken menaces of the
Anglo-Russians, the boy Shah and his timid coun-
selors fell into a state of terrified irresolution
and ended by following the traditional Persian
custom of doing nothing at all. The result was
what might have been expected. Both sets of
Powers poured fresh troops into Persia, and be-
neath the battling combatants and their rival prop-
agandas unhappy Persia sank into complete an-
archy. The mass of the Persian people was un-
questionably hostile to the Anglo-Russians and
friendly to the Turco-Teutons, but Anglo-Russian
bribery and intimidation swayed many high-placed
Persians to the Entente side.
Thus Persia continues to the present hour—a
fiercely contested battleground of rival foreign
Powers and domestic factions. The one thing
certain is that the land itself is falling into an
ever-deepening slough of anarchy and ruin.
Up to the spring of 1916, Turkey remained in an
optimistic mood. And, despite the failure of the
Holy War, the disappointment in Egypt, and the
indecisive operations in Persia, the Turks had
good grounds for their optimism. The flurry of
alarm at the Anglo-French attack upon the Dar-
danelles which began in March, 1915, soon gave
place to exultation over the invincible obstinacy
TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 277
of the Turkish defense. The “Tanine” boasted
that Turkey had “destroyed the myth of English
sea-power,” and went on: “These Turks, de-
spised by all the world, heroically dared to bare
their breasts in defense of their country’s fort-
resses against the attack of her enemy. The Eng-
lish fleet was, in two days, to silence the forts and
overthrow the Ottoman capital, and so wipe off
the Ottoman name from the map ! How different
the result l The weak, insignificant Turks proved
more than a match for proud Britannia, and all
the world wondered. We boldly faced this enemy
of humanity and all her threats, and proved all
her boasting vain. First and most we now re-
joice, but we have also set an example to be fol-
lowed by all those suffering oppression under
British rule. For us the fear of English domina-
tion, trembling before her absolute power, is a
thing of the past. Let others follow our exam-
ple !”
The collapse of Russian resistance before the
Austro-German “drive” into Poland which began
in June, 1915, greatly intensified the enthusiasm
of the Turkish press. After the fall of Warsaw,
the “Tanine” wrote: “Russia is defeated. This
we see clearly everywhere and in all respects. It
is not a retreat. It is a rout. The distressing
plight of the Russian army as their fortresses
fall one after another is like an orchard whose
overripe fruit covers the ground. The fear of the
pursuing Germans drives them in headlong flight,
in universal panic, into the interior of Russia.
278 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
Cities and towns are deserted. Terror and anx-
iety reign in Petrograd, in Moscow, in all the chief
cities of the empire. The evidence of utter defeat
is overwhelming.”
Turkish delight grew even sweeter when the
Teuton’s autumn Balkan “drive” annihilated
Serbia, won over Bulgaria, and opened direct com-
munication between Constantinople and, Berlin.
In Turkish eyes the war was as good as over.
“While the Quadruple Entente watches the com-
plete loss of all its trump cards,” wrote the
“Hilal,” “the new Quadruple Alliance has just
accomplished its object—the junction of its allied
armies. This junction not only makes the Alli-
ance invincible in the Balkans, but it puts it in a
position to threaten the world-power of proud
Albion. England is perfectly well aware of the
lot that is to be hers in the very near future. . . .
Since the war must end where it began, there can
be no further doubt that we have already entered
the last phase of the general war.”
These rejoicings were, however, premature.
Grand Duke Nicholas's sudden spring upon Erze-
rum in February, 1916, dealt Turkish optimism a
heavy blow, and the subsequent fall of Trebizond
and the overrunning of Turkish Armenia by the
Russian armies diffused an air of gloom over
Stambul which not even the surrender of General
Townshend's British Mesopotamian army at Kut-
el-Amara could entirely dispel. The economic
situation was also far from good. The strain of
prolonged war and the Allied naval blockade were
TURE EY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 279
producing acute famine conditions in many parts
of the empire.
The Russian conquest of Turkish Armenia
brought an old problem of Asiatic Turkey once
more prominently to the fore. The Armenians,
though greatly reduced by the massacres of Ham-
idian days, were still an important element in the
population, and their position on the Russo-Turk-
ish border gave them opportunities for revenging
themselves upon their Moslem foes which had
seriously disquieted the Ottoman Government
since the beginning of the war. Russia had clev-
erly made the most of this situation. In Novem-
ber, 1914, the Russian Government had issued a
ringing proclamation urging the Armenians to rise
against their Turkish masters and promising them
freedom. The large Armenian population of Rus-
sian Transcaucasia had enthusiastically supported
Russia, and the “Catholicos” or head of the Ar-
menian Church, who resided in Transcaucasia, had
warmly espoused the Russian side.
All this had produced a deep impression upon
the Armenians under Ottoman rule, and Turkish
Armenia was soon seething with unrest. The agi-
tation was, however, destined to cause the most
deplorable results. At the beginning of the war
the Turks had apparently tried to gain over the
Armenians by inspiring them with fear of falling
under Russian domination. In November, 1914,
the Constantinople “Ikdam” thus adjured the Ar-
menians: “Even if Russia were to take our East-
ern provinces, it would not be to make them auton-
280 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
omous under Armenian rule, but merely to add
them to the Russian Empire. They will make the
Armenians just a cat’s paw for their own designs,
and for this there is ample evidence.”
But the Armenians’ Russophile sentiments soon
became clear, whereupon the traditional Turkish
antipathy for the Armenians flamed up hotly as in
the past. Taking advantage of this mood, cer-
tain high-placed Armenian-haters like Talaat Bey
persuaded their colleagues to take drastic action.
The Turkish Government’s decree ostensibly pro-
vided for the removal of the Armenian population
from the Russian border provinces to the interior
of the empire, but the ruthless manner in which
these orders were carried out precipitated one of
the most appalling tragedies in human history.
Allowing for all possible exaggerations, hundreds
of thousands of Armenians must have already per-
ished. Nevertheless, Turkish public opinion sanc-
tions these measures. As a prominent Turkish
leader, Halil Bey, remarked toward the close of
1916: “I will say that the loss to the Ottoman
Empire through the deportation of the Armenians
has been immense. The Armenian is able and in-
dustrious, and therefore valuable in the economic
scheme; but what could be done? We were at war,
and therefore obliged to employ every means to
make secure our position, which was betrayed so
basely through our confidence.”
Wastly more serious for Turkey was another in-
ternal difficulty—Arab disaffection. The Arabs
are not, like the Armenians, a scattered border
TURE EY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 281
folk; they are as numerous as the Turks them-
selves and occupy very much more than half the
total area of the empire. No Ottoman Turkish
population is found east of Asia Minor, the inhab-
itants of Syria and Mesopotamia as well as of the
Arabian Peninsula being mainly of Arab blood.
Now Arab and Turk had never gotten on well to-
gether. Their racial temperaments were too in-
compatible. Still, down to comparatively recent
times, their common Islamic faith had united them
against the Christian world whatever the state of
their domestic relations. But ever since the
“Young Turk” Revolution of 1908, the rift be-
tween the two races had been widening with alarm-
ing rapidity. The Young Turk ideal had been a
unified Ottoman state, based upon the unques-
tioned supremacy of the Turkish language and
culture, and they had accordingly started in to
“Ottomanize” all the non-Turkish races of the
empire. But this had roused the Arabs to mutin-
ous wrath, for the Arabs considered the Turks
their mental inferiors and despised Turkish cul-
ture, or rather declared that such a thing did not
exist. Furthermore, they themselves were devel-
oping a “nationalist” movement looking to po-
litical separation from Turkey and the founding
of a great Arab Empire. Even before the great
war, Turkey’s Arab provinces were full of sep-
aratist unrest. -
Turkey’s entrance into the European struggle
and the proclamation of the Holy War did, it is
true, rally many of the Arabs against the Euro-
282 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
pean foe. But a considerable disaffected minor-
ity remained, and these malcontents were steadily
swelled by Turkish tactlessness and severity. The
upshot was a revolt of the Grand Shereef of Mecca
in the summer of 1916 which quickly brought
Turkish rule throughout Arabia to an end. The
Shereef proclaimed Arabia’s independence and
courted the friendship of the Entente Powers.
This was a body blow to the Turks. Their loss
of the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, gravely
damaged their prestige throughout Islam, while
the Arab populations of Syria and Mesopotamia
might also burst into flame. The Stambul press
made no secret of its alarm. The authoritative
“Tanine” wrote: “Interest compels us to use
force and reconquer the Arab countries at the
point of the sword. Let us not be hampered by
gentle scruples, because they are of no avail, and
because the Arab revival is imminent.”
But Arabia has not been reconquered, and the
Arab revolt continues to threaten Turkey’s hold
upon her possessions to the east of Asia Minor,
already menaced as these are by the British in
southern Mesopotamia and by the Russians in
the Armenian north.
Thus the year 1916, which opened so brightly
for the Turks, closed in a gloom which none of
the events of early 1917 have been able to dispel.
Of course the Turks realize that the present strug-
gle is for them prečminently one of life and death.
The Entente Powers have formally announced
their fixed determination to partition the Ottoman
TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 283
Empire, and Entente victory would certainly re-
duce Turkey to a small and insignificant state upon
the Asia Minor plateau, if it did not extinguish
Turkish national life altogether.
The Turks are therefore increasingly dependent
upon their Teutonic allies. Their political future
is thus not particularly bright, menaced as they
are with utter destruction on the one hand and
close subordination on the other.
For that matter, the prospects of the whole Mos-
lem East are in complete flux, and no certain out-
come can be predicted at the present hour. Pos-
sibly in the remoter future a sustained revival of
the Eastern races together with Europe’s relative
weakening through internecine war may enable the
whole Moslem world to throw off the Western
yoke. But this is venturing too far into the realms
of speculation.
CHAPTER IX
BELGIUM AND HOLLAND
T is interesting to speculate upon what might
have been the future of the Low Countries
had the “Kingdom of the Netherlands,” estab-
lished by the Vienna Congress of 1815, remained in
existence. This union of Holland and Belgium
created a state which was almost a first-class
Power in the Europe of that day, and when we
consider the subsequent progress of both coun-
tries, it is highly probable that their united
strength would have averted their recent misfor-
tunes.
However, a united Netherlands was not to be.
In 1830 the Belgians revolted against their Dutch
king and set up for themselves. Thenceforth the
history of the two neighbors was to have little in
common. Accordingly, we must consider sepa-
rately their reactions to the European War.
A. BELGIUM
When the German invasion of August, 1914,
dramatically thrust everything else into the back-
ground, Belgium was facing an acute domestic
problem—the Flemish-Walloon nationality ques-
tion. Belgium is compounded of two race-ele-
ments—the French-speaking Walloons of the east-
284
BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 285
ern provinces and the Teutonic Flemings, who
inhabit the low-lying plains of the north and west.
The Flemings slightly outnumber the Walloons,
but the Walloons have long played the leading
rôle in Belgian national life owing to the superior
cultural attraction of their mighty kinsman and
neighbor, France. This French influence had been
greatly strengthened by the generation of direct
French rule over Belgium from 1793 to 1814. The
Flemish element could do little to stem the Gallic
tide. A small people, speaking a dialect of Dutch,
their culture could not compare with that of the
race which had for centuries given the tone to
European civilization. In fact, at the beginning
of the nineteenth century, the Flemish upper
classes were largely Gallicized.
All this explains the Belgian rising of 1830.
That revolution was the work of the Walloons,
who saw the despised Flemish culture reviving
under Dutch rule. The Walloon dream was the
complete Gallicization of the Flemings and the
welding of Belgium into a homogeneous Gallic na-
tion closely connected with France. In 1830 they
wanted a French king, and only the determined
veto of foreign Powers prevented the seating of a
French monarch upon the Belgian throne. Al-
though disappointed in this, the Walloons suc-
ceeded in giving the new Belgian state a thor-
oughly French complexion, Flemish occupying a
decidedly subordinate position in every depart-
ment of the national life.
This settlement, however, contained within itself
286 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
the seeds of future trouble. The nineteenth cen-
ture was preéminently the “Era of Nationalities,”
and before long the nationalist leaven began work-
ing among the Flemings in truly dynamic fashion.
In 1830 the Flemish element had been almost in-
articulate, but twenty years later a cultural revival
began which has progressed steadily down to the
present day.
The Flemings’ first effort was to win back their
Gallicized upper class brethren, and these, con-
temptuously dubbed “Franskiljons” and treated
as renegades, succumbed more and more to popu-
lar pressure and increasingly abjured their ac-
Quired Gallicism. The Flemings’ ultimate object-
ive was the full recognition of their language and
culture as the absolute equals of French.
Here, however, they met with the most deter-
mined opposition. The Walloons were resolved
to Gallicize Belgium and refused to surrender the
privileged position which they had acquired in
1830. The result was a chronic race-struggle
which for more than half a century perturbed Bel-
gium's internal life. This struggle was further
embittered by religious considerations, most of the
Flemings being ardent Catholics, whereas the Wal-
loons were steadily going over to free-thinking
laïcism.
Despite the Walloons’ best efforts and privi-
leged position, the Flemings steadily gained
ground. The census of 1910 showed the latter’s
undoubted numerical superiority. In that year
2,800,000 persons spoke only Flemish, 2,500,000
BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 287
spoke only French, while less than 800,000 spoke
both languages. And, be it noted, nearly all the
bilinguals should be accounted Flemings in blood,
since Walloons usually refuse to learn the “in-
ferior” tongue. The fact that so small a per-
centage of the Flemings had any knowledge of
what was practically the state language showed
the failure of Gallicization and encouraged the
Flemings to redouble their efforts for complete
political and cultural equality.
Yet the Walloons refused to admit their defeat
and clung doggedly to their privileges. They
were, however, pessimistic as to the future, some
even fearing an ultimate Flemish ascendancy. To
such a fate they declared they would never submit,
preferring in that case Belgian disruption in favor
of an independent Walloon state or annexation to
France. But this further embittered the Flem-
ings, who declared that they would either obtain
their “rights” or join their Dutch cousins in
a “Great Netherland.” Some Flemings even
sought German aid in this struggle of “Teuton-
ism’s vanguard” against the encroaching Latin
tide.
Such was Belgium’s disturbed condition in July,
1914. In fact, certain Belgian writers have as-
serted that, but for the European War, Belgium
might have gone to pieces within a comparatively
short time.
The German invasion wrought a dramatic
change. Both races rallied round their country’s
flag and fought desperately against the common
288 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
enemy. The subsequent hardships and humilia-
tions suffered under German rule appear to have
effaced race lines and engendered a common pa-
triotic longing for freedom.
The chief cloud upon the horizon of future Bel-
gian Solidarity is the attitude of the exiles. Those
Belgians who remained at home seem to have
pretty well forgotten their intestine quarrels.
But at the time of the German invasion hundreds
of thousands of Belgians fled the country. Like
most exiles, these people have ever since then done
little save brood over their troubles and dream
of the morrow. As a result of this rather morbid
occupation many exiles have developed a fanatical
temper which may cause serious trouble in a re-
stored Belgium.
The exiles have sorted themselves largely ac-
cording to their special racial and cultural predi-
lections; the Walloons and “‘Franskiljons” go-
ing to France, the Flemings to Holland. Amid
these congenial surroundings their respective
sympathies have been heightened while their antip-
athies have been intensified. The Walloons have
developed an uncompromising hatred of every-
thing “Teutonic,” and many of them exultantly
declare that one result of the war will be the ex-
tinction of the Flemish movement and the estab-
lishment of a thoroughly French Belgium in close
communion with France. The Walloon exiles also
tend to be hostile to Holland for maintaining her
neutrality instead of joining against the Germans.
Many have been strongly affected by the French
BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 289
“Neo-Imperialist” movement and foresee a
“Greater Belgium,” enlarged not only by German
districts between Belgium’s present eastern bor-
der and the Rhine but also by several Dutch prov-
inces, notably Dutch Flanders and the mouth of
the Scheldt, the Maestricht salient, Luxemburg,
and even Dutch Limburg. -
All this, however, rouses the ire of the Flemish
exiles, who, in the hospitable atmosphere of Hol-
land, have still further developed their proclivi-
ties toward a “Great Netherland.” They reject
hotly the Walloons’ projects for a Gallicized Bel-
gium and a partition of Holland, and they ardently
desire a close understanding between the Dutch
and Belgian nations.
Such an understanding is being consciously or
unconsciously furthered by the policy of the Ger-
man rulers of Belgium. The Germans are doing
everything possible to encourage Flemish self-
consciousness, notably by the establishment of a
Flemish university at Ghent—a thing for which
the Flemings had vainly agitated for many years.
The German motive has probably been to reconcile
the Flemings to German rule, and in this the Ger-
mans will undoubtedly fail, no Flemings save a
few “Teutonist” fanatics having the least desire
to become Germans. Nevertheless, the Germans
are steadily quickening Flemish national con-
sciousness and are fast placing the Flemish ele-
ment in a favored position akin to that enjoyed
by the Walloons previous to the war. If, after
the war, the Walloon exiles should try to put
290 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
through their program of general Gallicization
and aggression against Holland, the present unity
of the Belgian people in Belgium will end in sud-
den and disastrous fashion. *
It is to be hoped that when the war is over the
lessons of adversity will have taught the exiles to
forget their present dreams in the joy of restored
national life and in aspirations for a harmonious
morrow. Otherwise, Belgium’s future will be
anything but a happy one.
B. HOLLAND
In Europe’s tragedy few episodes have been
more admirable than the quiet way in which the
Dutch nation has kept its poise and maintained a
dignified neutrality under circumstances which
might well have demoralized a far more powerful
and better situated people.
For of all the neutral nations in the present
struggle, none save Greece is so hard placed as
Holland. A forlorn islet of peace in a roaring
flood of war, her position is indeed deplorable.
Environed by contending armies and embattling
fleets, her merchantmen pick their homeward way
through mine-fields and submarines to bring her
the food that will keep from starvation her dense
population and the hundreds of thousands of Bel-
gian refugees now destitute objects of her bounty.
The mobilization of her entire army ever since the
outbreak of the European War has added another
heavy burden to her already overstrained re-
sources. Holland is to-day living almost exclu-
BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 291
sively upon her savings. These are indeed con-
siderable, but Holland's needs are great, and her
main sources of wealth, lying not at home, but
abroad, are failing one by one. The wealth of
Holland is proverbial, yet few persons realize
that by nature she is one of the poorest countries
in the world. Virtually without coal, iron, timber,
or stone, unable to feed her dense population by
her own agriculture, Holland lives primarily upon
her rich colonies, her merchant marine, and the
vast transit trade between the German Rhineland
and the outer world. This last is of capital im-
portance. What the Nile is agriculturally to
Egypt, that the Rhine is commercially to Holland.
The pulsing throb of Germany’s main trade-artery
is the index of Dutch economic life. Now that this
artery has almost ceased to beat, only Holland's
capital and credit stand between her and ruin.
Yet in this tragic hour Holland rises with a
proud courage which once more proves her “the
little nation with a great heart.” On the out-
break of the European War she took her stand
upon the firm rock of strict neutrality, and neither
menace nor cajolery has moved her a hair's
breadth from that determination. At times the
pressure has been great, but Holland has stood
firm. Her resolve is not of yesterday. As she
builds her dikes, so she has long been raising her
ramparts of neutrality against that cataclysm
which wise men have seen gathering these many
years. Despite the annoyance of her neighbors,
she steadily perfected her defensive armaments,
292 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
and at the outbreak of the present war Holland
was well prepared against attack from both land
and sea. -
This firm basing of Holland’s policy upon the
principle of unswerving neutrality and determina-
tion to prevent their beloved land from becoming
a cockpit of war rendered the Dutch better pre-
pared to meet the mental shock of war than any
other European people. The Dutch knew exactly
what they intended to do long before the dread
eventuality actually came to pass, and the enthu-
siastic adhesion of every shade of Dutch public
opinion to Queen Wilhelmina’s neutrality procla-
mation at the beginning of August, 1914, showed
that the Queen had voiced her people’s will. The
desire to keep Holland at peace is as strong to-day
as it was three years ago, no political group
evincing the slightest inclination toward war. In-
terventionists, like the cartoonist Louis Rae-
maekers and his paper the “Telegraaf,” are
merely the exceptions which prove the rule.
The bait of German territory held out by Allied
publicists in attempts to rouse interventionist sen-
timent in Holland has fallen on deaf ears; the
Dutch are a self-contained folk with no desire for
European expansion save possibly a union with
the Flemings, and the entrance of hosts of recal-
citrant Germans into the Dutch family circle, even
if one excludes the danger of a German war of re-
venge, would be both disturbing and displeasing
to Holland’s well-ordered domestic life.
If we turn from the field of self-interest to that
BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 293
of sentiment, we arrive at the same pacific conclu-
sion. Holland is not pro-anything except pro-
Dutch, nor distinctly anti-anything save foreign
intervention. Certain British publicists have as-
serted that the Dutch were sympathetic to Ger-
many, but this is untrue. There are, of course,
strong natural ties between the Dutch and German
peoples. Nearly related in blood and speech, in-
tellectual and social intercourse is very close, es-
pecially in university circles, while most educated
Hollanders read German books, magazines, and
newspapers as a matter of course. Economic re-
lations are also extremely intimate. The vast
Rhine transit trade is, we have seen, Holland's
chief source of prosperity, Germany is her best
customer, and there are more Germans domiciled
in Holland than all other foreigners put together.
It is, therefore, not strange that the Dutch upper
and middle classes are friendly to Germany in a
general way, while those aristocratic, conservative
circles represented by ex-Premier Kuyper are un-
doubtedly pro-German in the political sense.
But with the mass of the Dutch people this
last is far from being the case. Holland is em-
phatically a land of individualism, which in the
lower classes verges upon license and an unreason-
ing aversion to any sort of official regulation of
private affairs, coupled with an intense dislike of
whatever savors of “militarism.” The Dutch
and German peoples thus differ widely in tempera-
ment, and though the Dutch are not positively
anti-German, there is a latent incompatibility of
294 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
temper which inhibits sympathetic feeling. The
flood of Belgian refugees has increased these es-
tranging tendencies. The sight of so much suf-
fering and the practical identity of blood and
Speech between the Dutch and the Flemings, who
form the vast majority of the refugees in Holland,
have done much to transform negative dislike of
Germans into positive antipathy.
Nevertheless, if Holland is not pro-German, she
is emphatically not pro-British. In the soul of
nearly every Hollander lies a deep-seated rancor
against England. No nation has suffered more at
English hands than Holland, and the Dutch have
not forgotten England’s destruction of their mari-
time and colonial greatness. This latent hostility
was sharply fanned by the Boer War, which roused
in Holland a flood of wrathful grief and sullen
suspicion, since kept alive by a whole series of
unfortunate incidents. England’s alliance with
Japan caused lively apprehensions for the Dutch
East Indies. The bullying tone of many British
publicists urging Holland to join the Allies and
threatening her with all sorts of penalties if she
does not, has been deeply resented by a proud and
independent people. Lastly, England’s wholly
illegal strangling of Dutch trade and commerce,
forcing Holland under threat of starvation to that
humiliating limitation of sovereignty, the “Neth-
erlands Overseas Trust,” has infuriated Dutch
commercial and maritime circles. Anti-British
feeling in Holland would be even stronger than it
is to-day were it not for Germany’s equally fla-
º BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 295
grant violations of Dutch rights by her U-boats
and Zeppelins.
However, despite strong feeling against both
their great neighbors, the Dutch have displayed
noteworthy self-control. At the very beginning of
the war the Government appealed for moderation
in speech and in the press, and forbade anything
likely to raise popular passions, such as partizan
demonstrations, the display of belligerent flags,
and even the exposure of foreign “war” post-
cards in shop windows. The Dutch people, appre-
ciating the danger of partizan recrimination, have
seconded their Government’s efforts in admirable
fashion. Their task was the easier because Dutch
sentiments toward the belligerents are rather neg-
ative than positive in character; a decisive victory
for either side is regarded as fraught with peril
to Holland’s future, and a stalemate would un-
doubtedly be the outcome most popular in the
Netherlands.
Holland is to-day the most genuinely “neutral”
country in the world. She may yet be forced into
the war, but it will not be from lack of effort to
keep out.
CHAPTER x
SCANDINAVIA
NE of the most noteworthy episodes of the
twentieth century has been the “Scandi-
navian Revival”—the reawakening of the three
Scandinavian nations, Norway, Sweden, and Den-
mark, to self-conscious national life and hope in
a brighter morrow.
By the world at large it has been, and still is,
quite the fashion to regard the Scandinavian states
as belonging to that category of “little nations”
whose day is over; whose very existence, indeed,
depended upon mutual jealousies of greater
neighbors or sentimental consideration for a he-
roic past. That Scandinavia could ever develop
within itself such renewed national energy as
might assure its independent future, probably oc-
curred to few persons unfamiliar with Scandina-
via’s somewhat obscure internal history.
This, to be sure, is not strange. A generation
ago most Scandinavians held similar opinions.
Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth cen-
tury the prevailing note in Scandinavia’s political
thought was a pessimistic acceptance of national
insignificance, a desire to be let alone, a tendency
to seek safety in external guarantees rather than
self-defense. Sweden continued stunned by the
296
SCANDINAVTA 297
Russian conquest of Finland in 1809 and con-
sumed her surplus energies in chronic bickerings
with Norway, culminating in the violent separa-
tion of 1905. For Denmark, also, the nineteenth
century was a time of loss and sorrow, Denmark
losing Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia in 1864.
Amid those clashing imperialisms of world em-
pires which marked the closing decades of the
last century, the lot of the Scandinavian peoples
appeared at first sight to offer little save vain re-
grets for a dead past.
Nevertheless it was during just this period that
the foundations of the Scandinavian revival were
laid. These foundations were in the first instance
economic. A century ago Scandinavia was pro-
foundly poor. Sweden, with her cold, frost-bound
soil, could never hope greatly to extend her culti-
vable area. Denmark, though possessed of rich
farm-land, was very small and had suffered
greatly from the Napoleonic wars. Norway was
but a strip of barren mountains. However, all
three peoples proceeded resolutely to the devel-
opment of what they had, and the economic
tendencies of the nineteenth century presently
brought into play latent resources unknown or
unutilizable before. Rapid steamship and railway
transportation gave Denmark an inexhaustible
market for her farm and dairy products in Eng-
land and Germany. These same transportation
facilities unlocked Sweden’s vast mineral wealth,
carrying iron ore and timber from her remote
mountains to the seaboard and thence to the outer
298 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
world. In Norway the steamship developed the
Arctic fisheries and bore to her remotest fjords
annual freights of tourists with their welcome
tithes of gold. Furthermore, for Sweden and
Norway, electricity presently wrought as great a
miracle as had steam. The myriad torrents and
waterfalls of these mountain lands became sources
of wealth as well as things of beauty; and, already
richly dowered with iron as they were, this “white
coal” gave Sweden and Norway the second pre-
requisite of modern industrial life. Soon fac-
tories sprang up everywhere, and changed Sweden
from an agricultural to an industrial land, with
Norway following close suit. Lastly, as befitted
the sons of the Vikings, all three peoples remem-
bered the open sea, Norway especially building up
a great merchant-marine. In fine, by the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, the poor and back-
ward Scandinavia of former days had been trans-
formed into one of the most prosperous regions
of the earth, striding forward daily in wealth
and population.
The mental and spiritual consequences of all
this were as obvious as they were inevitable. The
Scandinavian peoples ceased to gaze sadly back-
ward into the past. Furthermore, as they looked
upon their works, they felt a growing pride in
themselves and in their type of civilization. It
was their intelligence, their virile energy, which
had transformed these apparently unpromis-
ing northlands into realms of prosperity and
plenty. It was their character which had made
SCANDINAVLA 299
them pioneers in the solution of many vexed po-
litical and social problems. It was their genius
which had produced masterpieces of literature
and music gratefully acknowledged by the entire
world. These achievements, together with a glor-
ious past, convinced the Scandinavians that theirs
was a race soul of rare endowment, whose rich
promise must be preserved and developed to the
full. Accordingly, the old pessimism disappeared
before a vigorous, optimistic nationalism. Littér-
ateurs and Savants no longer professed cosmopol-
itan doctrines: instead they became consciously,
aggressively Swedes, Danes, Norwegians. Even
those who realized the somewhat narrowing effects
of such intensive development of the national
consciousness asserted that neither cosmopolitan-
ism nor the predominance of any of the great
world cultures could be tolerated if these small
nations were to develop freely their peculiar
individualities. &
It was with such high hopes for their material
and spiritual future that the Scandinavian peo-
ples looked out over the new century. But, as
they gazed, they grew troubled. While they were
busied laying down the bases of national revival,
the outer world had been moving fast. Huge em-
pires had spread over the face of the earth, near-
ing, clashing, striking bright friction-sparks with
every clash. Everywhere economic and colonial
rivalries were becoming keener, race hatreds
growing deeper. Europe already suffered from
that ominous malaise which heralded the present
300 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
world war. A hungry, predatory spirit was
abroad. It was an evil day for the “little peo-
ples.” The Scandinavians felt their danger and
scanned the horizon for latent perils.
Two dangers patently menaced the future peace
of the Scandinavian peoples: Germany on the
South, and Russia on the east. From the stand-
point of Scandinavian unity against aggression,
this duality of danger was unfortunate. A single
peril threatening all alike would have driven these
kindred peoples forthwith together. As it was,
Denmark alone felt herself menaced by the Ger-
man, whom Sweden and Norway considered a
possible counterpoise to Russian aggression;
while this same Russia was to Denmark a poten-
tial ally against her German neighbor. For this
reason the current of national revival, though
psychologically identical in all three countries,
had such diverse external stimuli that it branched
into separate channels.
Yet whosoever the potential foe might be, the
paramount issue in all three countries was whether
or not to arm against him. Accordingly, through-
out Scandinavia the years preceding the great war
witnessed a vigorous “preparedness” campaign.
The political line-up was everywhere the same.
On the side of preparedness stood the Conser-
vatives, heirs of the proud, aristocratic tradition
of national honor, together with the younger gen-
eration in all classes of society imbued with the
self-confident optimism of the new time. Against
preparedness were the old-line Liberals, exponents
SCANDINAVIA 301
of mid-nineteenth century cosmopolitanism, and
the Orthodox Socialists with their dogmatic pacif-
ism and exclusive devotion to internal reform.
At first the prospects of preparedness did not
look overbright. The adoption of universal man-
hood suffrage throughout Scandinavia in the open-
ing years of the twentieth century had enfran-
chised the Socialist masses, and a prompt Liberal-
Socialist alliance had placed pacifist cabinets in
power in every Scandinavian country. But the
great international crises which shook Europe
between 1905 and 1914 gradually convinced Scan-
dinavian public opinion that foreign perils were
nigh, while the cynical disregard of right and
justice displayed by all the Great Powers in their
treatment of weak nations from Morocco to China
discredited the Liberal faith in international guar-
antees and drove home the grim truth that the
most inoffensive people can find safety only in
the strength of its own right arm. The pacifists
fought hard, but the patriotic tide was irresisti-
ble, and the outbreak of the great war found all
the Scandinavian countries reasonably well pre-
pared.
The first impulse of the Scandinavian peoples
after the outbreak of the European War was to
concert measures for the maintenance of their
neutrality and for defense against possible ag-
gressions of their giant neighbors. The warmest
sentiments of Scandinavian unity were voiced in
all three countries, and this unitary feeling ex-
pressed itself in acts such as the meeting of the
302 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
Scandinavian monarchs at Malmö and the Swed-
ish-Norwegian pledge not to fight against each
other under any circumstances.
Unfortunately this era of good feeling has been
somewhat marred by the divergent sympathies
and antipathies entertained in the various Scan-
dinavian countries toward the European com-
batants. What these divergent sentiments are we
will now examine in detail.
A. DENIMARK
In Denmark the national psychology closely re-
sembles that of Holland, the overwhelming ma-
jority of the people being for strict neutrality and
the resolute avoidance of entanglement in the war.
As in Holland, aristocratic and army circles and
many of the intellectuals are pro-German, whereas
the popular masses, extremely individualistic and
ultra-democratic, are instinctively unsympathetic
toward Prussian conservatism and “militarism.”
Of course Schleswig-Holstein is not forgotten,
and there is an “interventionist” group which
listens eagerly to Allied offers of the “lost prov-
inces” as a reward for Danish aid. But this party
is very small and has slight political weight.
Most Danes declare that they would refuse
Schleswig-Holstein even if pressed upon them by
the victorious Allies. The provinces are over-
whelmingly German, only 150,000 out of their
1,700,000 inhabitants speaking the Danish tongue.
The entrance of all those recalcitrant Germans
SCANDINAVIA 303
into the Small Danish nation would, it is asserted,
make Danish political life unworkable even if the
probability of a German war of revenge were by
Some miracle to be entirely excluded. The utmost
to which most Danes aspire is the annexation of
the 150,000 Danes of North Schleswig, who dwell
compactly in a few small districts just south of the
present Danish border. And even so, Danes gen-
erally say that they would receive these districts
only as a free gift from Germany, their forcible an-
nexation being not worth the future perils to which
Denmark would be thereby exposed.
B. NORWAY
Norway is predominately pro-Ally. A few in-
tellectuals, notably Sigurd Ibsen and Björnstjerne
Björnson, are strongly pro-German, but tradi-
tional economic and cultural ties with the Western
Powers incline the Norwegian people toward
England and France. Russia is frankly feared,
her longing for the warm-water harbors of the
Norwegian North exciting universal suspicion and
dread. But most Norwegians believe that only
England and France can stay Russia’s hand, and
they therefore feel that Anglo-French friendship
must at all costs be retained. Moreover, Nor-
way’s great merchant-marine and general eco-
nomic life are entirely at the Western sea-powers’
mercy. England’s high-handed regulation of Nor-
wegian shipping and commerce has, it is true,
awakened some indignation, but this resentment
is more than counterbalanced by the deep anger
304 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
roused at the ruthless sinking of Norwegian ships
by German submarines. So bitter is the resent-
ment at Germany’s U-boat campaign that some
Norwegians have advocated armed intervention
on the Allies’ side. Most Norwegians, however,
oppose the abandonment of neutrality except in
case of a direct violation of Norwegian territorial
integrity.
C. SWEDEN
Sweden’s attitude differs radically from that of
the other two Scandinavian nations. The Swedes
are an intensely proud people with a glorious
past and a keen sense of honor. The tone of
Swedish social life is set by an unusually fine
aristocracy, and despite recent industrialization
the backbone of the nation is still a sturdy class of
independent peasant farmers akin to the old Eng-
lish yeomen. Swedes never forget that through-
out the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries their
country was a Great Power, and they recall with
kindling hearts the days of Gustavus Adolphus
and Charles XII. Indeed, unlike the other minor
states of western Europe, Sweden has never
settled down to the “little nation” point of view.
Even the Dutch, with all their patriotism, have
renounced all thought of increased authority in
the world. Sweden, on the other hand, has never
ceased to consider herself the predestined leader
of a powerful Scandinavian North.
The great bar to all such dreams is Russia, the
traditional foe of Sweden, the destroyer of her
SCANDINAVLA 305
former Baltic Empire, the brutal ravisher of Fin-
land—a country considered an integral part of the
Swedish fatherland rather than a Swedish depend-
ency. Ever since the “Russification” of Finland
in 1899 the old hatred of Russia has sharpened into
downright terror at Russian designs upon Swed-
en's national life. Before 1899 Finland, as an
autonomous Grand Duchy, made an ideal buffer
state, but to-day this friendly buffer has been
transformed into a huge Russian intrenched camp,
and since the beginning of the war Russia’s forti-
fication of the Åland Isles has established a Rus-
sian naval base only a few hours’ easy sailing
from Stockholm.
In her despairing terror, Sweden has turned
more and more to Germany as her only possible
savior from the menacing shadow of the Bear.
Accordingly, the European War evoked an out-
burst of anti-Russian and pro-German feeling
throughout Sweden. Noting with joy German as-
sertions that the war could end only when the
Russian colossus had been permanently crippled
and thrown back upon Asia, many Swedes began
to call for Sweden’s entrance into the war by
Germany’s side, thereby improving a unique op-
portunity to win back Finland and assure Swed-
en's future for all time. This movement, known
as “Activism,” attracted men from all political
parties and social classes, several prominent So-
cialists even supporting the “Activist” cause.
Its main strength, however, came from the aristoc-
racy, the army, the intellectuals, and Conservative
306 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
circles generally. The bulk of the old-line Liber-
als and Socialists were, as might have been ex-
pected, for neutrality and peace. Strong pro-
Ally sentiment was conspicuous by its absence.
The mainspring of Activism was, as we have
seen, fear and hatred of Russia. But before long
Activism was further aided by the rapidly grow-
ing popular hatred of England. From the very
beginning of the war Great Britain had used her
sea-power in decidedly high-handed fashion, in
flagrant disregard of neutral rights and suscepti-
bilities. To all this most neutral nations sub-
mitted with more or less bad grace. Not so
Sweden. British naval arrogance had touched the
Swede’s tenderest spot—that keen sense of dignity
for which he has always stood ready to make any
sacrifice. Alone among neutrals Sweden an-
swered British encroachments with retaliation in
kind, seizing British mail-bags and laying an em-
bargo on Swedish exports to England. British
threats evoked defiance, while British appeals to
Swedish self-interest merely called forth angry
scorn. Typical of the Swedish attitude are the
protests of the Swedish press at British proposals
for a regulative organization for Swedish imports
similar to the ‘‘Netherlands Overseas Trust.”
Such recognitions of British usurpation might be
“well enough for Dutchmen and Americans,”
said the Swedish papers, but they hardly com-
ported with Sweden’s honor. These controver-
sies with Great Britain are as yet by no means
ended, and they have awakened in Sweden a hatred
SCANDINAVLA 307
of England equaled nowhere else in Europe save
in Germany.
Sweden is thus to-day overwhelmingly pro-Ger-
man and anti-Ally. Her future attitude will prob-
ably depend upon the course of the war. Should
victory incline toward the Entente Powers,
Sweden will almost certainly remain neutral, for
she knows what her fate would be if she defied
the Allies and was then left alone with the Rus-
sian Bear. But if the Germans should break fur-
ther into Russia, especially toward Petrograd and
the Gulf of Finland, Sweden would burst into such
a passion of Activist emotion that she would al-
most certainly put her fate to the test and “go
in” against the hereditary foe.
CELAPTER XI
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
ESPITE their geographical propinquity, the
national psychologies of the two Iberian
peoples have so little in common that separate
treatment will throughout be necessary.
A. SPAIN
Spanish political life strongly resembles that of
Italy. , There is the same artificiality of the par-
liamentary régime, the same administrative cor-
ruption, the same popular disillusionment, and
finally, similar, irreconcilable party oppositions to
the existing state of things.
Spanish parliamentarism was from the first a
sickly growth. Despite specious constitutional
forms and phrases, all real power is lodged in a
caste of professional politicians who have erected
a system even more oppressive and corrupt than
Italian transformismo: the system known as
caciquism. Caciquism is a sublimated and nation-
wide Tammany Hall. The system is worked by a
knot of big bosses (caudillos) at Madrid and is
enforced by a swarm of local bosses known as
caciques, who “make” the elections as Madrid
commands and take their pay in local offices,
power, and plunder. When the country cries too
loud a safety-valve is found in an electoral change
308
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 309
of parties, but the relief is a sham, for both the
great Spanish parties—“Conservatives” and
“Liberals”—play the game of rotation in office to
perfection and hand over the treasury to each
other at the precise psychological moment. The
only result of a Spanish “election,” therefore, is
the coming to power of an alternate gang of
caudillos and caciques zealously imbued with the
Jacksonian maxim, “To the victors belong the
spoils.” -
All this is well known to the Spanish people,
which accordingly takes no interest in politics
and views the kaleidoscopic shifts of “ins” and
“outs” with a cynical and sullen indifference.
Irreconcilable protestors against the ruling
régime exist, but the Spanish people fears them
even more than its present, masters. These ir-
reconcilable parties are the Carlists and the Re-
publican-Socialists. The Carlist program is the
restoration of the Pretender to the throne of Spain
and the reëstablishment of absolutism in both
church and state. The Republican-Socialists dif-
fer considerably among themselves, but their as-
pirations tend towards ultra-radical proletarian
rule and church disestablishment in favor of an
atheistic laïcism. To the average Spaniard both
these alternatives are abhorrent. He, therefore,
prefers to endure his present ills rather than in-
voke a cure which would probably prove worse
than the disease.
Since Spanish politics are thus widely divorced
from popular support, it is unnecessary to con-
310 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE
sider the Liberal and Conservative party atti-
tudes toward the European War in an analysis of
the Spanish national state of mind. Only the
Carlists and Republican-Socialists reflect any gen-
uine body of public opinion.
One other peculiarity of Spanish national psy-
chology must be noted. When we speak about
Spanish “public opinion,” we must be careful to
state what public opinion. In fact, there is no one
national public opinion in the ordinary European
sense, because the various racial elements which
make up the Spanish nation have never wholly
fused and their diverse ethnic peculiarities ac-
cordingly tend to align popular sentiment by prov-
inces on different sides of a given question. These
provincial differences are very considerable. For
example: Catalonia is far more akin to Southern
France than it is to Castile.
Nevertheless, certain popular tendencies do ex-
ist which cut across all the national strata. There
is a universal popular discontent with the ruling
régime and a keen desire to cure the political
plagues which eat the heart out of the country
and render any sound national revival impossible.
This translates itself into a hatred of “militar-
ism” and of ambitious foreign policies. Even the
recent modest expeditions to Morocco were dead
against the popular will and at one time threatened
to provoke a revolution. Of course there are
Spanish imperialists, but these are mostly ambi-
tious politicians who find scant popular echo.
Such being the state of Spanish national psy.
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 311
chology, the outbreak of the European War
naturally evoked a general call for strict neutral-
ity. The irreconcilable parties, to be sure, took
up extreme attitudes on opposite sides. The Re-
publican-Socialists, like their Italian brethren, be-
came ardently pro-Ally through love of the Radi-
cal-Socialist French Republic. The Carlists
emulated the Italian Catholics in their strong
pro-Germanism. The province of Catalonia was
generally pro-French in accordance with its racial
affinities. Most of the Spanish imperialists were
pro-German. The dreams of Spanish imperial-
ism are the annexation of all Morocco, the recov-
ery of Gibraltar, and the absorption of Portugal.
The great barrier to the realization of these as-
pirations is Anglo-French opposition. Teutonic
agents hastened to whisper that Spain could real-
ize her hopes as the reward for assistance to Ger-
many.
But these very partizanships tended to confirm
the mass of the Spanish people in their neutral-
ist determination. Whatever the irreconcilables
champion is thereby suspect. As for the imperial-
ists, the Spanish people have learned by bitter ex-
perience that foreign policy merely spells fat pick-
ings for politicians and gross mismanagement,
ending in national humiliation. No legitimate
Spanish interest was jeopardized by the war, and
no forward policy was possible in the deplorable
state of Spanish political life. Accordingly, the
voice of Spain told the Government in no uncer-
tain words to keep out of trouble.
312 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
As to Spanish popular sympathies, they seem on
the whole to be mildly pro-German. England and
France are Spain's traditional enemies. Ger-
many, on the other hand, has in recent years been
gaining rapidly in Spanish popular favor. Ger-
man economic penetration has been extraordinary
and welcome. There are probably nearly 100,000
Germans in Spain to-day, and they generally get
on well with the people. Furthermore, the Span-
iards admire Germany, not so much for her mili-
tary prowess as for her all-round efficiency—the
direct antithesis to the sloth, wastefulness, and
corruption which keep Spain down. Patriotic
Spaniards have taken Germany as the model for
that political and social regeneration so vital to
their country. But these sympathies are strictly
platonic: they imply no disposition to ally Spain
with Germany or to make war on the Entente
Powers.
Thus Spain remains neutralist to the core. Ex-
tremists may clamor for intervention and poli-
ticians may weave fine-spun schemes of imperial
policy: the heart of Spain remains fixed upon in-
ternal reform and dreads the lure of grandiose
foreign dreams.
B. PORTUGAL
The dominant fact in Portuguese national life
is the connection with England, existent since the
Middle Ages and defined by the Methuen Treaty
of 1703. It is this English connection which alone
has preserved Portugal from absorption by Spain
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 313
—a fate unutterably dreaded by the Portuguese
people.
The European War thus found Portugal from
the first aligned solidly with the Entente Powers.
In accordance with treaty obligations the Por-
tuguese Government promptly offered England
its aid, and though Portugal did not enter the war
until 1916, it rendered the Entente valuable serv-
ices in its African and Asiatic colonies.
This action of the Government was heartily en-
dorsed by the Portuguese people. Portuguese
public opinion was virtually unanimous for the
Allies. Portugal was therefore from the first
practically with the Entente Powers, the rupture
with Germany being a mere formality regularizing
previously existing facts.
CONCLUSION
UR Survey of present-day Europe is at an
end. The varying currents of its war psy-
chology have been analyzed. What is the out-
standing feature of that analysis? The answer
must be: Its infinite complexity.
And, be it here remembered, our study has
sought unity rather than diversity; its aim has
been a portrayal of high lights rather than a pho-
tograph redundant of detail. Only the main prob-
lems have been touched, while many a minor is-
sue has been dismissed with a word or passed over
altogether in silence. Lastly, unity of vision has
permitted us to include within our purview only
the reciprocal relations of the European peoples,
although we should never forget that Europe
forms but a part of a vaster whole—the world—
and that its future is indissolubly linked with those
of America, Africa, and the East. Yet even thus
simplified, how involved the web of destiny which
Fate has woven for Europe’s children!
One lesson, at least, shines clear from out the
gloom: the futility of simplicist solutions. De-
spite our natural shrinking, we must recognize
that the Great War is a normal phase in human
evolution. Europe’s agony is the inevitable tra-
vail of birth—the birth of a new age. That new
314
CONCLUSION 315
age must evolve normally according to those basic
laws of life which we so imperfectly understand.
How futile—perchance how dangerous, then—are
present efforts to sooth Europe’s anguish with the
nostrum of a phrase; or, with the petty yardstick
of a formula, to plot the evolutionary pathway of
the morrow. How absurd to assign Europe's ills
to a single cause, such as “secret diplomacy,”
“Prussian militarism,” “British navalism,” or
“Pan-Slavism,” and then, having verbally de-
molished this poor bogey, to announce the advent
of the Golden Age.
No, no! Life is not so simple as all that. This
cataclysm was not the work of any man or set of
men. Its incidents may have been within human
control. Its substance was the inexorable legacy
of the past. The ultimate reality of the great war
thus reveals itself as merely a doffing of the old
and a putting on of the new.
What, then, of the future? We cannot tell. A
little we may venture, but not much. Some
streams of tendency run fairly clear. We may,
therefore, predict that, if their course remain un-
changed, certain results will follow. But will they
thus remain? The warp of human destiny is
woven upon one loom, and the threads are inter-
twined in wondrous fashion. Who can say that
some hidden strand may not suddenly appear and
change the pattern in strange wise?
This may seem a most unsatisfactory conclu-
sion. But is it not the truth? Our finite minds
here wrestle with infinity. To weigh the present
316 PRESENT DAY EUROPE
and take counsel of the past is wise: so only may
we pierce a little the mists ahead. But to read
the future clearly and afar—that is beyond our
human understanding.
INDEX
A
Abbas Hilmi (Khedive), 268–
269
Abdul-Aziz Tchawisch, 265–
266
Activism, 305–307
Adriatic, 147, 160–167, 171–
172, 229–231
AEgean Islands “Dode-
kanese”)
Afghanistan, 105–107, 273–274
Africa, 105–106, 172, 260, 266,
314 -
“After the War,” 31–38, 62–70,
115–118
Åland Isles, 305
Albania, 164, 174, 234
Alexeiev (Professor), 189
Algeria, 105–106, 230
Allbutt, Sir Clifford, 17–18
Alsace-Lorraine, 41–43, 57
America, 94, 114–115, 314
Anatolia, 104
Anarchists, 145–146
Andrassy, Count Julius, 124,
140
Andreades (Professor), 247
Angelov, Vasili, 242-243
Apponyi, Count Albert, 124,
133
Arabia, 280, 283
Armenia, 206, 278–280
Armenians, 197, 250, 278–280
Asia, 76, 106–107, 172, 181–
182, 184, 201–202, 207, 260
Asia Minor, 165, 230, 246, 249,
283
Atrocities, 44–45, 83–86, 157–
159
Attrition, 26, 28–29
Austria-Hungary, 33–34, 37,
52, 55, 72–74, 117–118, 119–
(see
144, 147, 149, 160–168, 17%al
182—187, 191, 224–229, 234–
235, 244–246, 257–258
Austrian Germans, 119, 123–
124, 139–140, 143
B
Balkans, 10, 20, 107, 143, 173–
174, 189, 203–205, 220–259
Ballod, Karl, 90–91
Baltic Provinces, 110
Bandini (Signor), 153
Barker, J. Ellis, 21–23
Barrès, Maurice, 41–43, 48, 52–
53
Barzini, Luigi, 158
Beauchamp (Earl), 28
Belgium, 10, 15, 17, 33, 55, 83–
84, 103–104, 284–290
Bergson, Henri, 44
Bºard (General Fr. von),
2
Bertrand, Louis, 66
Bessarabia, 257
Bethmann-Hollweg
lor), 96
Bevione, Giuseppe, 164
Björnson, Björn, 87
Black Sea, 189
Blockade, 90–95, 110–115
Blume (General von), 92–93
Bohemia (see “Czechs”)
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 121–122,
225–229
Bourtzev, Vladimir, 193
Boyars, 255
Brailsford, H. N., 10–11
Brassey (Lord), 28
British Empire, 15–16
Bucharest (City of—), 255–256
Bucharest (Treaty of—), 222,
239
Bugatto (Deputy), 136–137
(Chancel-
Pukovina, 257
3.18
INDEX
Bulgaria, 33, 117, 143, 174,
204–205, 231—233, 235–246,
247–248, 254–255
Bülow (Prince von), 87
Buzek, Josef, 130
C
Caciquism, 308–309
Caillaux, Joseph, 40
Callwell (Major-General C.
E.), 25
Carlists, 309, 311
Caspian Sea, 261
Castle, D. L. B., 16
Catalonia, 310
Catholic Party (Italian), 145–
146, 150–152, 175
Caucasus (see “Transcau-
casia”)
Central Europe (see “Mitteleu-
ropa”)
Chauveau, Frank, 58–60
Chesterton, G. K., 13
Cºpelli Alessandro, 171–
172
China, 105–106, 202, 206, 261
Chlumecky (Freiherr von),
133–134
Cippico, Antonio, 173
Civilization, 28–29, 33, 37, 47,
66, 76, 78–79, 85, 108, 116,
126, 129–130
Constantine (King), 249–253
Constantinople, 181, 188–191,
205, 217, 241–242, 246—247,
264
Conybeare (Dr.), 14
Copts, 269
Corfu, 174
Corsica, 147, 230
Crete, 247
Croats (see “Yugo-Slavs”)
Curzon (Lord), 27
Cvijic, J., 232—233
Czechs, 120–121, 127–128, 132,
135, 138
D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 156–157,
168–171
Dalmatia, 135, 137, 147, 161–
167, 173, 229–231
Daugny, Jacques, 61
Decadence, 3–4, 24
Delaisi, Francis, 40
Delbrück, Hans, 73–74, 109–
110, 116
Delcassé, Théophile, 41, 239
Democratic Control (Union
of-), 10
Denmark, 297, 300, 302–303
Dernburg, Bernhard, 91 .
Deschanel, Paul, 49–50, 65–66
Dictatorship, 23
Dillon, E. J., 21–23, 25
Ditfurth (Major-General von),
86
Dmowski, Roman, 208
Dodekanese, 164–165, 248
Dontenville, J., 58–59
Doumic, René, 48
“Dread of Victory,” 194–195
Driault, Edouard, 56–60
Drink, 187—188, 198–199
Dumba, C. T., 125
Durham, Mary E., 227–228
E
East (Near-), 20, 206–208, 246
Eastern question, 190
Egypt, 105–106, 207, 230, 261,
268–272
Elsenhans, Theodor, 88
England, 5, 7, 38, 63, 67–69,
76–82, 97–99, 105–107, 113–
114, 143, 152–153, 172, 175,
200, 207–208, 218–219, 248–
249, 252, 261, 264–265, 272–
276, 294–205, 303–204, 305–
307, 311, 312–313
Eucken, Rudolf, 77
“Extirpation,” 222–223
F
Federzoni (Deputy), 149–150
Fera (Signor), 156
Ferrero, Guglielmo, 157, 167
Finland, 193, 297, 305
Finot, Jean, 51, 67–68
Flammarion, Camille, 47
Flemings, 103, 284–290, 292,
294
France, 10, 15, 17, 20, 32, 39–
70, 82–83, 97, 102–103, 143,
150, 152, 172, 174, 200, 218,
INDEX
319
Hauptmann, Gerhard, 78–79,
82–83, 85–86
Hauser, Henri, 65
Hervé, Gustave, 61
Herzog, Wilhelm, 99
Heydebrand, Dr. von, 114
High finance, 30
Hindenburg (Field-Marshal
von), 110
Hirst, Francis W., 28.
Hoetsch, Otto, 108
Hohenzollern dynasty,
30, 34, 53, 122
Holland, 55, 60, 284–285, 289,
290–295
“Holy War,” 105–106, 260, 266–
269, 282-283
Hoschiller, Max, 65
Hungary (see “Magyars”)
IHurd, Archibald, 16
Hºrn Ramel (Sultan), 269,
27]
11–12,
I
237, 239–240, 248–249, 261,
265, 285, 288–289, 303-304,
31.1—312
Franz-Ferdinand (Archduke),
122–123, 127, 226
Franz-Joseph (Emperor), 133,
142
French Neo-Imperialism, 56–62
Fried jung (Dr.), 139
Frobenius (Colonel), 72
G
Galicia, 20, 120–121, 129, 137,
186, 209 -
Gallipoli, 20, 205, 276–277
Gaul, 56–60
Germanism (Pan–), 71, 210
Germany, 9–38, 43–48, 51–70,
71–118, 139–140, 157–160,
172, 175, 182–187, 192–193,
200–202, 208–209, 217-219,
240–245, 253–254, 262, 265–
267, 270, 272-273, 287–289,
292–295, 300, 302–303, 305–
307, 311–312, 313
Ghennadiev (Dr.), 239
Giolitti (Ex-Premier),
168, 171, 175
Golytzin (Prince), 216
Gorky, Maxim, 199–200
Gosse, Edmund, 35
Graham, Stephen, 33
Great Britain (see “England”)
“Great Idea,” 220–224, 236–
237, 246–248, 257–258
“Great Netherland,” 287, 289
Greece, 65, 113, 174, 203–204,
233, 239, 246—254, 255
Guyot, Yves, 55, 65
H
Baeckel, Ernst, 77
Haenisch (Deputy), 98, 116
Halil Bey, 280
Hanotaux, Gabriel, 51, 62
Hapsburg Dynasty, 34, 141
Harden, Maximilian, 72, 87–
88, 89–90, 92, 96
Harrison, Austin, 21
Hartwig, M. de, 225
Hate (Cult of), 80–82, 98–100,
111–113, 115
167–
Imperialism, 5, 40–42, 108–
110, 125–126, 160, 171–172,
178–185, 202–203, 217–219,
224–225, 246–248, 310–312
India, 105, 207, 266–267
Intelligentsia, 178–181,
202, 217–218
Intervention, 166–171
Ireland, 7
Irredentism, 147–148
Isac, Emil, 142
Islam, 105–107, 122, 260–283
Italy, 5, 19, 33, 49–50, 61, 65–
67, 94–95, 122, 133–137, 143,
145–177, 229–231, 239, 245,
248, 268
195,
J
Jäckh, Ernst, 104–105, 108
Jacks, L. P., 25–26
Jahadd (see “Holy War”)
Janni, Ettore, 158–159
Japan, 78, 172, 202, 260, 263
Jenks, Edward, 19
Jews, 197, 255–256
Joffre (General), 42–43
Johnston, Sir Harry, 25
Jonescu, Take, 258
INDEX
R
(Lieutenant-Colonel),
Kaiser Wilhelm II, 11–12, 38,
51, 112–113
Khristov, Cyril, 239, 240–241
Kipling, Rudyard, 16–17, 18–
19, 33
Flein, Dr. Franz, 139
Kotchubey (Prince), 185
Kotliarievsky (Professor), 189
Kultur, 30, 51, 67–68, 77–79,
100
Kuropatkin (General), 185
Kut-el-Amara, 20, 278
L
Labor, 8, 10, 23–24, 40, 185,
194
Lamprecht, Karl, 77–78
Lankester, Sir E. Ray, 18
Latinism, 46–47, 49–50, 59,
156–157, 161
Latinism (Pan-), 65–66, 156–
157
Leger, Louis, 54–55
Lenin, 194–195
Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul, 43–44
Leuthner, Karl, 108–109
Liebknecht, Karl, 75
Liechtenstein (Prince Alois),
139
Likowski (Mgr.), 131
Lilly, W. S., 18
Lissauer, Ernst, 80
Lithuania, 110, 192
Lloyd-George (Premier), 24-
25, 26–27 -
Loreburn (Lord), 28
Lusitania disaster, 18
Luxemburg, Rosa, 75
M
Macedonia, 222, 231–234, 238–
240, 244-246, 251–252
McClellan, George B., 148
Magyars, 119–120, 124–126,
132–135, 139–141, 143
Maklakov, V. A., 213–214
Malta, 147, 230
Marmottan. Paul. 58–59
Mayer, E. W., 94–95
Meda (Deputy), 151–152
Mediterranean Sea, 147–148,
152–153, 207
Mehmed V (Sultan), 270–271
Menshikov, 186–187, 188
Mºpotamia, 20, 104, 278, 281-
8
Methuen treaty, 312
Meyer, Eduard, 116
Miguline (Professor), 207
Mijatovitch, Chedo, 226–227,
228–229
Militarism, 11–13, 15, 30, 34
Miliukov, Paul, 184
Mitrofanov, Paul, 184
Mitteleuropa, 118, 139–140, 143,
245
Mohammed Farid Bey, 271-272
Mohammedans (see “Islam”)
Molden, Bernhardt, 106–107
Moltke (Count von), 90
Momtchilov, M., 241
Mongolia, 202, 206
Monod, Wilfred, 49
Montenegro, 228
Moravia (see “Czechs”)
Morf, Heinrich, 99–100
Morocco, 106, 261, 263, 310
Moslems (see “Islam”)
Münsterberg, Hugo, 76
N
Nabokov, V., 185
Narodna Odbrana, 226
Narodni Savetz, 239.
Natali, Giulio, 156
Nationalism, 146–150
Naumann, Friedrich, 72, 118
Near East, 20, 206–208,246
Neo-Imperialism (French), 56–
62
Neutrality, 148–149, 151–155,
159, 166–171, 175, 250–253,
293, 295, 310–312
Neutrals, 33
Nice, 147
Nicholas II (Tsar), 182, 189
Nicholas Nicholaievitch (Grand
Duke), 184, 208–209, 278
Niemetz, 186
Norway, 298, 300, 303—304
Novoselski, Dr., 198–199
INDEX
321
O
Ohnet, Georges, 48–49
P
Pacifism, 10, 30, 39–40, 50–51
Pályi, Eduard, 139
Pan-Germanism, 71, 210
Pan-Latinism, 65, 66, 156–157
Pan-Slavism, 72–73, 109–110,
125–126, 141–142, 182, 190,
208–211, 238—239, 241
Pashitch (Premier), 229
Pavlovitch, Michael, 185
Peace, 26–31, 51–52, 96, 111–
113, 143, 192, 200–202, 217–
218
Persia, 105–106, 201–202, 206–
207, 261, 272-276
Persian Gulf, 207, 261
Petkov (Professor), 240
Philhellenism, 248
Philippovitch, Eugen von, 139
Pichon, Stephen, 51–52
Pobiedonostsev, C., 181
Poland, 20, 110, 120, 128–131,
137–138, 140–141, 192–197,
208–214
Portugal, 66, 312–313
Posen, 129, 131
Protitch, M., 226
Prussia (see “Germany”)
R
Radoslavov (Premier), 239
Ramsay, Sir William, 36–37
Rasputin, Gregor, 216
Re, Arundel del, 162–163
Reaction, 196–197, 216–217
Reclus, Onésime, 53, 59
“º Week” (The-), 5, 148,
1
Regeneration, 48–49,
187—188, 197–200
Republicans, 145–146, 150, 155–
156, 176, 309–311
Reuss (Prince Henry of), 272
Reventlow (Count Ernst zu),
90, 94, 103
Revolution, 177, 179–180, 194–
195, 200
88–89,
Reynaud, Louis, 48
Rheims Cathedral, 45, 86
Rhine, 40, 55–61, 291
Richepin, Jean, 63–64
Rohrbach, Paul, 78, 107–108
Rolland, Romain, 50–51, 68, 85
Rosen (Baron), 184
Rumania, 66, 141–142, 244,
254–259 -
Russell, Bertrand, 24, 28
Russia, 5, 8, 10–11, 15, 32–33,
72–80, 97, 107–110, 122–127,
129–133, 140–141, 143, 163–
164, 175, 178—219, 225, 237–
239, 241–246, 257–258, 261,
264, 272-280, 300, 304–305
Ruthenians (see “Ukraine”)
S
Sabatier, Paul, 51, 68
Salandra (Premier), 150
Salonika, 232—233, 247, 251
Savoy, 147, 230
Sayce, A. H., 17
Sazonov, Sergius, 203
Scandinavia, 296–308
Scarfoglio, 152–153
Schleswig-Holstein, 302—303
Schrörs, Heinrich, 83
Schüller, Ludwig, 88–89
Senussi, 106, 268
Serajevo, 72, 185, 226, 228
Serbia, 8, 33, 72–74, 95, 122–
132, 161–167, 174, 182, 184–
185, 203–205, 223–235, 237,
238, 246, 249, 254–255
Shaw, George Bernard, 29
Shiites, 105, 261
Simmel, Georg, 88
Slavism (Pan–), 72–73, 75–76,
109–110, 125–126, 141–142,
182, 190, 208–211, 238–239,
241
Slavs, 10–11, 54–55, 120–122,
191, 223–224, 231, 235–236
Solidarity (European), 37
Sonnino, Sydney, 159
South Slavs (see
Slavs”)
Spain, 66, 308–312
Stahl, Felix, 101
“Yugo.
322
INDEX
Starvation, 89–93, 110–111
Stolypin, P. A., 179–180
Stoyanovitch, Costa, 233
Straits (The), 188–191, 207,
249
Struve, Peter, 184
Stürmer (ex-Premier), 215
Submarines, 93–94, 114–115
Sudan, 266
Sunnites, 105, 261
Sustersics (Deputy), 127
Sweden, 296–298, 300
Syndicalism, 5, 146–148, 150,
176–177
Syria, 52, 281
T
Tabu, 19
Talaat Bey, 280
The Straits, 188–191, 207, 249
Ticino, 147
Tisza (Premier), 124, 140
Transcaucasia, 105
Transylvania, 141–142,
258
Trasformismo, 146, 308
Trentino, 135, 136, 147
Trieste, 135–136, 160–161, 229–
231
Tripoli, 105, 148, 176, 268
Troeltsch, Ernst, 98–99
Troubetzkoi (Prince Eugene),
190
Tunis, 105, 147, 230
Turkestan, 105
Turkey, 20, 33, 52, 104–107,
117, 143, 188–191, 204–208,
220–221, 227–244, 248, 260–
283
Turner, Sir A. E., 18
Tyrol, 136
257–
U
Ukraine, 110, 121–122, 131–
132, 138, 140–141, 183, 186–
187, 193
Union of Democratic Control,
10, 24
United States of America, 94,
112, 114–115
Unity (German), 14, 16, 34,
52–65, 71
tºº, 3–6, 72, 145–148, 176–
V
Venizelos, Eleutherios, 249–253
Vierordt, Heinrich, 81
Viviani, Rene, 50
Woboryov, K., 187
W
Walloons, 284–290 .
War (after the), 31–38, 62–
70, 115–118
Warsaw, 137–138
Weisskirchner, Dr., 139
Wells, H. G., 11, 17, 35–36
Westarp (Count von), 114
Wilhelm II (Kaiser), 11–12,
38, 51, 112–113
Wilson, President Woodrow,
26
Y
Yugo-Slavs, 121–127, 135–136,
161–167, 224–231
Z
Zulawski, George, 130

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