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c-op. 9.
(Itambridge #istorical $tries.
EDITED by G. W. PROTHERO, LITT.D.
HoNorARY FELLOW OF KING's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
MODERN SPAIN
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,
C. F. CLAY, MANAGER.
#.Unliſm : FETTER LANE, E.C.
@Iaggots: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.
3Leipzig : F. A. BROCKHAUS.
£eº gork: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS.
330mtbag and (Talcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
All A'ights reserved]

MODERN SPAIN
1815–1898
vº'ſ BY
A.”
…)
H/BUTLER CJARKE, M.A.
late Fereday Fellow of St John's College, and sometime Taylorian
Teacher of Spanish, in the University of Oxford
WITH A MEMOIR BY
the Rev. W. H. HUTTON, B.D.
Fellow and Tutor of St John's College, Oxford;
Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Rochester
CAM BRIDGE :
at the University Press
1906
GENERAL PREFACE.
The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern
Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about
the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one
or two cases the story commences at an earlier date : in the case
of the colonies it generally begins later. The histories of the
different countries are described, as a rule, separately ; for it is
believed that, except in epochs like that of the French Revolution
and AVapoleon I, the connection of events will thus be better under-
stood and the continuity of historical development more clearly
displayed.
The series is intended for the use of all persons anacious to
understand the nature of existing political conditions. “The roots
of the present lie deep in the past”; and the rea/significance of
contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes
z0/ich have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes
it possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in
considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of
modern research. It is hoped therefore that the series will be
useful not only to beginners but to students who have already
acquired some general knowledge of European History. For
those who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography
appended to each zolume will act as a guide to original sources
of information and zworks more detailed and authoritative.
Considerable attention is paid to political geography, and
each volume is furnished with such maps and plans as may
be requisite for the illustration of the text.
G. W. PROTHERO.
CONTENTS.
MEMOIR AND EDITORIAL NOTE . te º o {º e * xi
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY.
Decay of the Cortes, 3; Royal autocracy, 5; The Spanish colonies, 7;
Economical conditions, 9; Godoy and Napoleon, 11 ; The Spanish rising,
13; The Revolutionary Government, 15; The Peninsular War, 17; The
Cortes of 1810, 19; “Liberals” and “Serviles,” 21; The Constitution of
1812, 23; The Conservative reaction, 25; Expulsion of the French, 27.
CHAPTER II.
THE RESTORATION (1814–1820).
Fall of Liberalism, 31; The Declaration of Valencia, 33; The
Tyranny, 35; Wretched condition of Spain, 37; Revolts and punish-
ments, 39; Revenue and expenditure, 41.
CHAPTER III.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD (1820–1823).
The revolt of Cadiz, 45; The King's surrender, 47; The Provisional
Junta, 49; The Cortes of 1820, 51 ; Riego's revolt, 53; The King and
the reaction, 55; The Congress of Verona, 57; Vacillation of the Cortes,
59; The second Cortes, 61 ; Mutiny and change of Ministry, 63;
Intervention of the Powers, 65; The French invasion, 67; The King
carried off to Cadiz, 69; The King restored to power, 71.
vi Contents
CHAPTER IV.
THE DAYS OF CALOMARDE (1823–1833).
Persecution of the Liberals, 73; Royalist dissatisfaction, 75; Sup-
pression of the Apostolic Party, 77; Financial position, 79; Prospect of
an heir, 81: The Pragmatic Sanction, 83; First Regency of Queen
Cristina, 85; The Oath of Allegiance, 87; Don Miguel and Don Carlos,
89.
CHAPTER V.
QUEEN CRISTINA AND THE ROYAL STATUTE.
THE CARLIST WAR (1833–1836).
Policy of the Regency, 93; The Royal Statute, 95; Debates in
Parliament, 97; Military rivalry and disorder, 99; Tomás Zumalacárregui,
IoI ; Carlist successes, Io; ; Foreign intervention, Io; ; Rodil and
Espoz y Mina, Io; ; Valdés and Espartero defeated, Io9; Death of
Zumalacárregui, III ; Ministry of Toreno, I 13; Mendizabal Prime
Minister, 115; Policy of Mendizabal, 117; Mendizabal and the Regent,
I 19 ; Ministry of Isturiz. A dissolution, 121 ; Ferocity of the fighting,
123; Murders on both sides, 125; Change in Carlist tactics, 127.
CHAPTER VI.
THE RISE OF ESPARTERO, THE FIRST
PRONUNCIAMIENTOS. END OF THE
CARLIST WAR (1836–1840).
The Mutiny of La Granja, 131 ; British and French influence, 133;
The Constitution of 1837, 135; The siege of Bilbao, 137; Don Carlos
marches south, 139; Retreat of Don Carlos, 141 ; Conservative reaction,
143; Espartero restores discipline, 145; Rivalry of Espartero and
Narvaez, 147; Fall of Narvaez, I49; Divisions among the Carlists, 151;
Don Carlos and Maroto, 153; The Convention of Vergara, 155; Retire-
ment of Cabrera, 157; General election: Moderado majority, 159;
Interview of Espartero and the Regent, 161 ; Espartero quarrels with the
Regent, 163; Abdication of the Regent, 165.
Contents V11
CHAPTER VII.
ESPARTERO'S REGENCY (1840–1843).
The army: the Church, 169; Espartero made Regent, 171 ; Mistakes
of the Regent, 173; A plot to seize the Queen, 175; Abolition of the
Fueros, 177; Ministerial changes, 179; Catalonia and Barcelona, 181 ;
Revolt in Barcelona suppressed, 183; Decay of Espartero's power, 185;
Espartero withdraws from Madrid, 187; Espartero leaves Spain, 189.
CHAPTER VIII.
TEN YEARS OF CONSERVATIVE RULE (1843—1854).
Olózaga in power, 193; Olćzaga quarrels with the Queen, 195;
Gonzalez Bravo in power, 197; Narvaez in power. Fiscal reform, 199;
The Constitution of 1845, 201 ; Narvaez retires. Isturiz in power, 203 ;
Question of the Queen’s marriage, 205; The French marriages, 207 ;
The Queen and Serrano, 209; Narvaez again in power, 211; Success of
Narvaez, 213; Carlist rising suppressed, 215; Spain and Italy. A palace
plot, 2.17; Fall of Narvaez. Murillo in power, 219; The Concordat of
1851, 221 ; Attempt on the Queen’s life, 223; Ministerial changes.
Repressive measures, 225; Preparations for revolt, 227; Progress of the
revolt, 229; Overthrow of the ministry, 231; Espartero dictator, 233.
CHAPTER IX.
THE BIENNIUM (1854–1856).
Division of the spoils, 237; Departure of Cristina. General election,
239; The Constitution of 1855, 241 ; Law for sale of Church lands, 243;
The Queen accepts the Bill, 245; Decay of Espartero's influence, 247;
Resignation of Espartero, 249; O'Donnell seizes power, 251.
CHAPTER X.
O’DONNELL AND NARVAEZ (1856–1858).
The question of Church lands, 253; The Queen's reactionary policy,
255; Character and policy of Narvaez, 257; Character of O’Donnell.
Narvaez' ministry, 259; Resignation of Narvaez, 261.
viii Contents
CHAPTER XI.
THE LIBERAL UNION. O’DONNELL’S FOREIGN
POLICY (1858–1863).
O'Donnell in power. His methods, 265; Church lands, and Finance,
267; Foreign and Colonial policy, 269; Spain and Morocco, 271 ;
Peace with Morocco, 273 ; Carlist attempt put down, 275; Santo
Domingo and Mexico, 277 ; Decay of O’Donnell's power, 279.
CHAPTER XII.
THE LAST YEARS OF ISABEL'S REIGN (1863–1868).
Resignation of Miraflores, 283 ; Mon’s ministry. Revolution in the
air, 285; Narvaez in power. War with Peru and Chile, 287; Clerical
influences at Court, 289; O'Donnell substituted for Narvaez, 291 ;
Revolutionary attempts of Prim, 293; Narvaez substituted for O'Donnell,
295; New Cortes summoned, 297 ; Vain attempts at repression, 299;
Deaths of O'Donnell and Narvaez, 3or ; The revolutionary manifesto, 303;
Battle of Alcolea. Flight of the Queen, 305; The Revolution and its
results, 307.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE INTERREGNUM AND THE REIGN OF
KING AMADEO (1868–1873).
The junta in Madrid, 309 ; Ministerial programme, 311 ; The
Constituent Cortes, 313; Question of the monarchy, 315; Candidates
for the throne, 317; Amadeo becomes King. Murder of Prim, 319;
Conduct of the new King, 321 ; Opposition to the new régime, 323;
The Carlist princes, 325; Don Carlos Maria and the Carlists, 327;
Premature Carlist rising, 329; Serrano resigns. Zorrilla in power, 331 ;
Liberal victory in the Cortes, 333; Abdication of Amadeo, 335.
Contents ix
CHAPTER XIV.
THE REPUBLIC AND THE RESTORATION (1873–1874).
Constituent Cortes. Republic voted, 339; Anarchy in the provinces,
341 ; Views and policy of Pi y Margall, 343; Order restored in the
South, 345; Castelar as President, 347; Cartagéna and the Carlists,
349; Renewal of the Carlist War, 351 ; Progress of the Carlists, 353 ;
Difficulties of Castelar's government, 355; The Carlists lose their chance,
357; Castelar's gallant efforts, 359; Pavia's coup d'état, 361 ; Pavia
retires. Attitude of Castelar, 363; The Coalition Government, 365;
The siege of Bilbao, 367; Siege of Bilbao raised, 369 ; Serrano's
Government failing, 371 ; Battle of Abárzuza, 373; Advance and retreat
of the Carlists, 375; Sagasta's efforts. Siege of Irun, 377 ; Cánovas and
the Alfonsists, 379 ; Serrano's policy. Alfonsist manifesto, 381 ; Martinez
Campos proclaims Alfonso, 383; Sagasta holds firm, 385; Fall of the
Republic, 387.
CHAPTER XV.
ALFONSO XII (1874–1885).
The Ministry of Regency, 391 ; Attitude of the Carlists, 393 ; Decay
of the Carlist cause, 395 ; Policy of Cánovas, 397 ; Cuba and the United
States, 399; End of the Carlist War, 4or ; Religious toleration, 403;
Constitution of 1876. Fueros abolished, 405; Financial measures. Cuba
pacified, 407; Parliamentary parties. Queen Isabel, 409 ; Alfonso's
marriage. The Queen's death, 41 I ; Ministry of Martinez Campos, 413 ;
Cánovas again in power, 4.15; Cánovas and Cuba. The Opposition, 417;
The Church. Economical evils, 41.9; Cánovas retires. Sagasta in
power, 421 ; General discontent, 423; Change in Sagasta's policy, 425 ;
Republican movements. France and Germany, 427; Cánovas again in
power, 429 ; Agitation in Catalonia, 431 ; Difficulty with Germany, 433;
Death and character of Alfonso, 435.
X Contents
CHAPTER XVI.
THE REGENCY OF QUEEN CRISTINA (1885–1898).
General election. Sagasta in office, 437; Republican revolts suppressed,
439; Good government of the Queen, 441 ; Financial improvement.
The army, 443; Spain and Morocco. Cánovas recalled, 445; Universal
suffrage. Socialism, 447; Financial difficulties, 449; Sagasta takes
office. Republican gains, 451 ; Morocco. Trade. Socialism repressed,
453; Cánovas again in power. Cuba, 455; Martinez Campos and
Weyler in Cuba, 457; American protests. The Philippines, 459:
Character and work of Cánovas, 461 ; Recall of Weyler. War imminent,
463; War with the United States, 465; Spanish defeats. Treaty of
Peace, 467; Results of the war, 469.
BIBLIOGRAPHY . º e tº ge § º: {} * {} 47 I
INDEX º e e & g e * * tº & * 483
MAP.
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL * c & * & de e At end
MEMOIR.
WHEN this book, to which the author had devoted several
years of study and of revision, was completed, and there re-
mained nothing else to write but the preface, it seemed that
there were many years of life and work before him. But this
was not to be ; and the sad task is left to me of introducing
the work by a few words in memory of one of the truest of
friends and the best of men.
Henry Butler Clarke was born at Marchington, Stafford-
shire, of which parish his father was at that time incumbent,
on November 9, 1863. He was the eldest son of the Rev.
Henry Clarke and Helen his wife, daughter of John Leech
of Etwall, near Derby. Much of his boyhood was spent in
the beautiful parish of Rokeby, by the Greta and the Tees,
where his father was for some years rector. He delighted
in the country and the people, and would often talk of them
with intimate knowledge in later years. It was there too that
he made what was to be the chief friendship of his life, with
Mr E. N. Bennett, now Fellow of Hertford College at Oxford
and M.P. for Mid-Oxon, who was a boy of his own age.
Though he was always fond of out-of-door life, and became
an active sportsman in later years, a fair shot, a keen fisher-
man, a zealous ornithologist—with an unusual knowledge of
the bird-life of many lands—and a botanist too, he was always
of delicate health and of a temperament which could never
bear a strain. He was educated privately, and was much
abroad as a boy, living for some time at St Jean de Luz,
C. S. 6
xii Memzoz7.
where his father became chaplain and where he was later
to make his home. There he was for a time taught by the
Rev. Wentworth Webster, the eminent Spanish scholar, who
became his life-long friend ; and there too he made the ac-
quaintance of Mr Lilburn, to whose wife, a Spanish lady,
he expressed his indebtedness when he wrote his history of
Spanish literature. He began to know things Spanish as quite
a young man, was often resident in Madrid, where he came to be
well known in the best society of the capital, travelled all over
the country, and was as familiar with the peasants as with the
old noble class. He spent some time also in Germany.
As he grew stronger, he determined to go to Oxford. “In
1885 (says Mr Bennett) we went up to Wadham, and became
firm friends at once. His linguistic ability was astonishing.
When he matriculated at Wadham he knew very little of Greek
beyond the alphabet; yet in the Honour Moderations list
of 1887 he secured one of the best seconds, gaining six ‘firsts’
on his papers. After Moderations he became deeply interested
in the philosophical work for Literae Humaniores, and he would
have almost certainly been placed in the First Class had he
not been compelled to relinquish the hard work of the Final
Schools by one of those terrible attacks of neurasthenia which
marred the happiness of his life. Such attacks came upon
him at considerable intervals and, in most cases, without any
warning: he might spend a pleasant evening with a few friends
and be in full health and good spirits when we parted, yet on
the following day his whole nervous system would be shattered
and reduced to utter prostration. On such occasions he would
come round to me, and tell me of the frightful suffering he
experienced.”
This terrible illness, which was to be the cause of his early
death, obliged him to give up the Honours course. He was
for some time absent from Oxford, but he took an ordinary
Pass degree at the end of 1889, when I first made his ac-
quaintance by being one of his examiners, an experience over
Memoir xiii
which we often laughed when we became friends. He had
kept up his Spanish studies, and in 1888 he won the Taylorian
Scholarship in that language. Mrs Humphry Ward, who was
One of the examiners on that occasion, wrote sixteen years
later : “I well remember the impression made upon Señor
Lucena [then Taylorian Teacher of Spanish] and myself by
Mr Clarke's work. The field that year, though small, was a
very good one, much better than on a previous occasion when
I was also examiner. But Mr Clarke's work stood out from
the rest as already scholarly and mature, and showing a won-
derfully all-round knowledge of his subject.” It was this interest
in Spanish literature which gained him the acquaintance,
through his old friend Mr H. W. Greene, Fellow of Magdalen,
of Mr A. E. Cowley, now Fellow of Magdalen and Sub-Librarian
of the Bodleian, who returned to Oxford in 1890.
From that time onward a triple friendship formed one of
the chief pleasures of Butler Clarke's life. Bennett, Cowley
and he formed a sort of private club, dining together once
a week during his residence and spending a week or more
together out of Oxford each year, generally just before the
beginning of the October term. “He would sit and talk,”
says one of the survivors, “till any hour, and would talk his
best. Even when the other two talked of fishing and shooting
I was interested in listening. I often think of those long
evenings, when the conversation ranged with absolutely no
restraint over everything in heaven and earth. It was never
frivolous. It was generally very much in earnest but full of
humour, and always illuminated by his unusual powers of
observation and his wide reading and clear thinking. He
had, of course, seen a good deal, known many cities and ways
of men; but what made his experiences so much more in-
teresting than those of the ordinary man was that he seemed
to have got to the bottom of things, and it was of no use to
question his judgment—and there was generally some half-
humorous quotation from Juvenal or Homer, his two favourite
& 2
xiv Memoir
classical authors, to illustrate it. It was when we strayed into
theological or philosophical topics, as we always did sooner or
later, that his peculiar acuteness of mind struck one most.
Though he had read a good deal of philosophy, he never
expressed himself, except with an apology, in the ordinary
formulae. It was as if he had a first-hand acquaintance with
truth and reality.”
His subsequent life seemed to fall into four divisions—the
times he spent with his own family, at Oxford, at St Jean
de Luz, and in travel. I must be content to give a few words
to each. Of the first, I will only say that he had a devoted
father and returned his affection to the full. He always stayed
some part of the year at Torquay, where his father lived from
1894, or travelled with him abroad or in England, or they stayed
together at St Jean de Luz. With his brother too he often
stayed, and frequently went on shooting or fishing expeditions
to Scotland or elsewhere. One of his chief inducements to
visit India in 190o was to see his sister, Mrs Angus Macdonald,
who then lived at Alwar.
At Oxford, though he stayed there little in later years, he
achieved a reputation that was in its way unique. In 1890,
having, I think, previously refused the post, he was chosen
Taylorian Teacher of Spanish. He held the office only a short
time, as it interfered with his residence at St Jean de Luz,
to which he was becoming more and more attached. He was
elected in 1894, after an examination for which many able
men entered, to a Fereday Fellowship at St John's, and from
that time spent some weeks each year in the College. He
was not a man who made many friends; but, as one who first
knew him at this time wrote after his death, “every one who
knew him must really have loved him.”
If he did not care to make many friends, he was extra-
ordinarily generous to those whom he did make. He was
beloved by them, and they touched his interests on many
sides, linguistic, philosophic, and historical. He was one of
Memoir XV
those whom Mr E. A. Freeman found most congenial. The
Fellows of his old College were always his friends: Mr Alfred
Stowe, with whom he had Spanish interests in common ;
Mr Herbert Richards, with whom he had studied philosophy;
Mr Joseph Wells, also his tutor and friend; and the present
Warden, whose companionship on the voyage to India in
190o added much to his pleasure. During his residence in
Oxford, which was not seldom interrupted by illness, he would
study and write, walk for exercise, and spend as much time
as possible with his intimates. After he gave up his post as
Taylorian Teacher, he now and then lectured or read papers
to societies in Oxford. In 1898 he delivered the annual
Taylorian Lecture, choosing for subject the Spanish Rogue-
Story (AVovela de Picaros), and showing not only an intimate
acquaintance with a wide and curious literature, but also a style
which reflected the charm of his personality. In later years he
read, at St John's, papers of much interest on Spanish life.
But he was never really at home in Oxford. The climate
and the life of hurried strain always told on him after a few
weeks; and he returned to the place that he best loved. He
had bought a small property at St Jean de Luz, and built on
it a house overlooking the bay, which he called “Aice-Errota”—
Basque for the windmill that formerly stood there. He bought
land round it, so that he might always have space, and in the
last year added to the house so that he might be able to
entertain a guest or two. A faithful Basque servant waited
on him, and an old woman came in daily to cook. He spent
much of his time in his garden, the progress of which he
would watch and report with zest; and he was a constant
visitor at the house of the friends of his childhood. His illness
seemed to pass away from him when he was at home. “My
much-loved solitude,” he wrote to me, “is the only cure in
which I have any faith.”
“He loved St Jean de Luz very dearly,” writes Mr Bennett.
“There, in the little villa he had built on the hill of Aice-
xvi Memoir
Errota, he spent much of his happy and contented life; and
he always returned to his French home with unfeigned delight
after his visits to Oxford or our journeys together in foreign
countries. How often have I sat with him on his cool verandahl
The blue waters of the curving bay met our eyes in front; on
our left the mighty mass of La Rune raised itself towards the
sky; and, behind us, the peaks of the Pyrenean mountains
stretched far away to the East. Butler had bought a plot
of ground next to that on which Aice-Errota was built, and
he hoped that when we grew old together, I should also build
a little house next door, so that we might see each other
continually and preserve our mutual affection to the close.
We always quoted Horace's words of this delectable home on
the hill above the sea—
ille terrarum mihi praeter omnes
angulus ridet.”
It was at St Jean de Luz that most of his literary work was
done. He devoted himself seriously to the study of Spanish
literature and history. He was for some time a contributor to
the Manchester Guardian on these subjects. He published,
as Taylorian Teacher, a Spanish Reader in 1891, a Spanish
Grammar in 1892, and a History of Spanish Literature in 1893.
He was never satisfied with the Grammar, which had to con-
form to a plan of the publishers of which he did not wholly
approve; but his History of Spanish Literature was a remarkable
book, not only from the intimate knowledge it showed of so
large a field, but from its power and originality in criticism
and appreciation. In 1897 he published a Life of the Cid
Campeador (Heroes of the Nations Series), which was his
first purely historical study. It was based on a thorough
investigation of all the original sources, Spanish, Latin, and
Arabic, and showed that he had the making of an accurate
and sympathetic historian. In the same year he issued a
scholarly reprint in Spanish, Lazarillo de Zormes conforme di
Memoir xvii
Za Edición de 1554, from the unique copy at Chatsworth.
Later, he contributed a chapter to the first volume of the
Cambridge Modern History on “The Catholic Kings” of
Spain (Ferdinand and Isabella), in which he was the first to
make English readers acquainted with the results of modern
Spanish research. For all these he studied closely, and took
extraordinary pains. He learned Arabic, and spent at least
two years working at it alone, till he became—in the judgment
of an expert—“thoroughly master of it.” He collected a large
library of books, many of them very rare, which he selected
with great care for the purpose of future study.
For a time he turned away from the investigation of
medieval history to write the volume which is now published.
The bibliography which is given shows how thoroughly he
worked up the authorities of his subject; and almost all the
books mentioned were in his own library; but he had also
an intimate knowledge, almost unique for a foreigner who was
not a professional diplomatist, of modern Spanish politics, and
he was personally acquainted with not a few of the men who
were prominent in the years of revolution from the times of
Isabella to those of the regent Cristina. Cánovas de Castillo,
of whom he has so much to say in his book, proposed him
for the high distinction of corresponding membership of the
Royal Academy of History, which he greatly valued. He was
also elected a member of the Royal Economic Society of
Madrid; and his work became well known among Spanish
scholars, who spoke of the notable position he had won
amongst writers on Spanish history and literary criticism, of
his erudition and zeal for learning, of his knowledge of Spanish
MSS., and his “perfect mastery.”—as that distinguished scholar,
the Marquis de Laurencin, wrote—“of the structure, inflection,
and Orthography of our ancient Spanish language, which indeed
cannot be attained without long and diligent study of our
national literature and our classics.” English scholars, as well
as Spaniards and Frenchmen, recognised the excellence of his
xviii - Memoir
work. I have before me letters of Mr James Bryce, Professor
Bury, and Mr Edward Armstrong, which show how warmly
his work was praised by those who knew it.
On the book which is now published he had bestowed
very special pains. “Five minutes ago,” he wrote to me, on
May 3, 1904, “I finished the last chapter of my miserable
little History. I laugh when I consider the work it has cost
me.” Though he undervalued his work, he could not really
be forgetful at times of its excellence: “I think my present
book will be good, but nobody but you and one or two others
will know it.” When it was finished, he turned to what he
intended to be the great work of his life. After completing an
edition of the Spanish Gypsy of Middleton (not yet published),
on which he had spent much time and which had interested
him greatly, for a series edited by Professor Gayley of the
University of California, he refused several offers for other
work on Spanish subjects, especially a new translation of Don
Quijóte and other books of Cervantes, and determined to
devote himself to a study of Spanish civilisation between the
fall of the Roman Empire and the establishment of Spanish
power in America. He intended to study widely and deeply,
and take a long time—perhaps twenty years—over the work;
but he approached it with enthusiasm and determination. “I
am full of enjoyment in my new book: it really will allow me
to write about the subjects on which I have read,” was his
modest way of putting it.
He set seriously to work. I have some note-books in
which he had begun to take extracts from Arabic, Latin, and
early Spanish writers; and the kindness of his family has
allowed me to present to St John's College Library a large
number of rare and valuable books which he had bought for
the purpose of his work. He had begun to study with minute
care the difficult problems of early racial and constitutional
history; and he neglected no light which social, ecclesiastical,
or economic history could throw on his main subject. He
Memoir xix
had the continued assistance of his learned friend, Mr Went-
worth Webster, who took the keenest interest in his work, and
whom, as his neighbour at Sare-—only a few miles from St Jean
de Luz—he was able frequently to consult. But it was not
from books and scholars only that he learned. He turned
his Arabic to practical use, and could talk to the Syrians in
their tongue when he was in the East, and to the Jews of
Asia Minor and Palestine in their own sacred Andalusian
dialect. Mr Webster says that Clarke, addressing them thus in
Spanish, was more than once asked if he were a Jew. And I
remember that on our way to India, at Aden, he had interesting
conversations with Spanish Jews.
This kind of first-hand knowledge was to be used for his
great study of Spanish civilisation. Mr Webster says: “His
knowledge of Spain and of things Spanish was far wider than
that of most of those who write about the subject. Some
of his most intimate friends were Spaniards. He was welcome
in Madrid society; but he did not make the mistake of taking
Madrid for Spain. He had travelled through many of the
provinces; he had friends in almost all. Except for a few
miles on the border of Catalonia, he knew the Spanish slopes
of the Pyrenees from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. He
journeyed on foot, or on mule; at one time with contraban-
distas, at another with shepherds, or with carabineros ; and
this, not for the romance of the thing, but to know the
people thoroughly, to get at the real facts of the political
and administrative corruption of Spain. Knowing this, his
sympathy could go out not only to the contrabandistas, and
to the peasantry, but even to the carabineros, whom necessity
forced to the oppression they often loathed. Thus equipped,
and with the materials which he had collected for further study,
the result would have been of rare value.”
In one at least of his journeys about Spain, that in which
he visited the scenes connected with the life of the Cid, where
“in the Sierra Nevada the rich, warm valleys nestle unsuspected
XX Memoir
beneath the snowy peaks,” he had the company of the dis-
tinguished Spanish artist, Don Santiago Arcos, whose drawings
enriched his biography of the national hero. Other journeys
were made with his intimate friends. Mr Cowley says: “Two
trips I particularly remember. One to the south of France,
when we stayed with him for a week at St Jean de Luz and
sat every evening in the verandah overlooking the bay in the
moonlight. Then we went on for a week to Cambo and
played like children on the river. The other trip he and I
took alone; and it was the last. We went up the Moselle,
and I don’t care to talk of it even now. We had made another
plan which fell through, and I feel sure he proposed this so as
not to disappoint me. That was the sort of thing that was
typical of him. He loved nothing so much as doing little
kindnesses—or great ones—to his friends chiefly, but also to all
sorts of uninteresting people. He would take infinite trouble
about such things.”
Mr Bennett, his oldest friend, writes as follows: “We
journeyed together to Palestine in 1898—an experience full
of happiness to us both—and to the Lofoden Islands, and
repeatedly to the south of France and his beloved Pyrenees.
In the Lofodens we lived together in a small wooden house in
the midst of the mountains, and in the last letter he ever wrote
to me—two days before his death—he begged me to take the
lease of the island (Langó) again, as he wished to revisit it
with me in 1905. Clarke was delighted with our open-air life
amid the exquisite scenery of the Lofodens—I never saw him
enjoy life more thoroughly. He was an excellent fisherman
and cast a beautiful line: he would sally out after breakfast and
fish all day, while I either joined him at the lake or went ryper-
shooting. He was a fair shot, but, on humanitarian grounds, as
the years went on, he grew more and more to dislike shooting.
“One year we went together high up the Pyrenees after
the izard—the Pyrenean chamois—and slept at night on beds
of dry leaves in a small shepherd's hut, from which we were
Memoir xxi
ultimately driven down to the plains by a heavy fall of snow.
During this expedition we were on one occasion exposed to
the full fury of a thunderstorm ; and Butler Clarke was
partially stunned by the close proximity of a lightning flash.
On several occasions we stayed at Cambo, of which place he
was exceedingly fond ; and he and I drove over the mountains
to the Monastery of Roncevalles. He delighted in these
Pyrenean forests, and sometimes set off with a muleteer as
his sole companion for a three weeks’ ride along the slopes
of the mountains.”
It was as a reminiscence of this and other journeys that
he wrote the two extremely interesting and vivid papers on
Andorra which I induced him to publish in the Guardian
(July 23 and 30, 1902). They show a remarkable descriptive
power, as well as an intimate and minute knowledge of districts
which are very little known to any except those who dwell in
them. He had planned many other journeys with Mr Bennett,
especially two—a visit to Abyssinia and another journey down
the Jordan valley.
I find a letter of his, very characteristic, written to me
in the last year of his life, which says, “Bennett wants me
to go with him at Christmas to the forests behind Mogador.
I know he will be knocked on the head some day, and I wish
if possible not to be present. Still it is tempting.” In another,
written after a short visit to Italy, he says, “I will not write to
you about Italy. If I did, the letter would be intolerably
long—an unskilful analysis of my own moods. I meditate
more journeys before I get too old. I wonder if you will ever
set out with me again. Where should we go? Tunis and
Morocco P But you hate heathens and I hate towns. Still
I would attempt to acquire some degree of ‘urbanity’ if you
would compromise with ‘heathenesse.’” A delightful letter,
too, I have from Norway, written just a year before his death,
telling of the happy open-air life he was living and of his health
and enjoyment.
xxii Memoir
It was with me that he made what I suppose was the
longest journey of his life. We went together to India, start-
ing in December, 1900, and returning in the following March.
In the previous winter he had had a serious return of his
illness, but now he was very well and very happy. He enjoyed
the long journeys and the wonderful sights of places so different
as Budh-Gaya, Agra, Ahmedabad, Delhi, Gwalior, the ancient
Portuguese city of Goa, and the country life of Rajputana,
where he went for a few days into camp with his brother-in-
law, Mr Angus Macdonald. Greatly though he enjoyed the
native life and character that he saw in the great centres of
Hindu and Muhammadan civilisation, he was certainly happiest
at Darjiling. He fled from Calcutta to stay there a few days
before I went ; and, when I joined him, he showed me how
much he had learnt in the short time, the talks he had
had with men of different race, the valuable curios he had
picked up—he had a wonderful eye for rare objects of art—
and the out-of-the-way knowledge he had acquired. Then we
took together the romantic walk to Tiger Hill, in a vain hope to
see Mount Everest, and watched at dawn the sun colour the
eternal snows of Kinchinjunga. Of the happiness of those
days, of the voyage, the travel, the sights which we enjoyed
together, the long talks, I cannot speak. He was, as every one
knew who travelled with him, unselfish, generous, always keen
to enjoy and to share others' enjoyment. He certainly enjoyed
India to the full, and looked back on it with delight, as when
he wrote to me of “Kim”—of which we afterwards often talked
together—“It is wonderful how vividly it brings up before
one's mind half-forgotten glimpses of roadside and bazaar
scenes,” and wondered what it meant for “those who have
never seen Indian ce-rows and te—rains.”
But he did not neglect his own country. He was familiar
with many parts of the kingdom, from Devonshire and Corn-
wall to Skye, where his last journey was taken with his brother,
only a month before his death. Sometimes his interest in
Memoir xxiii
these home journeys was fishing, sometimes natural history,
especially ornithology, sometimes sketching, of which he be-
came very fond and for which he showed considerable ability,
sometimes the sight of unfamiliar districts, but always most of
all the companionship of his friends. Side by side with the
interest in places and people grew the interest in sides of
literature that were new to him. He began when he was with
me to read two authors of whom I was always talking—Peacock
and Meredith—and we delighted to talk of them together.
English literature widened his knowledge of England. In the
last years of his life he came to be greatly interested in the
Cotswolds. He stayed many times with me at Burford, and
we often wandered together on foot or bicycle over the un-
frequented ways.
Our last journey together, in July, 1904, was over the con-
fines of Oxfordshire and Warwickshire and ended at Malvern.
He had come, ill and over-worked, from the book he had
finished and the new study he had begun; but he seemed
entirely to recover in the bracing air, and he was never more
full of interest in men and things and books. We parted with
many plans of Soon meeting again; and, on August 6, 1904,
he wrote in a book of mine lines he was fond of quoting from
the Poema de Roncesvalles, and applying to my house:
Porta patet omnibus, Sacris et profanis,
Non Solum Catholicis, verum et paganis,
Judaeis, haereticis, otiosis, vanis.
In the bitter August of that year, and at Skye in the worst
of weather, his health failed again. He went to Torquay,
hoping soon to go back to France and recover. But the
terrible illness which had dogged his life returned upon him.
He struggled against it, and concealed from his family, in his
intense desire to save others pain, how much he suffered. He
had during the last year known several instances of mental
decay among those with whom he was acquainted, and had
indeed helped the sufferers with extraordinary self-denial and
xxiv. Memoir
sympathy. But the experience had afflicted him with a terrible
dread of a similar fate. At last and very suddenly his brain
gave way, and he died by his own hand on September 1 o,
1904. Three days later his body was laid to rest, and one
whose greatest happiness had been in his friendship read the
last words over his grave.
His personality was an extremely striking one. I shall
always remember how Professor York Powell, who had a very
high opinion of his ability and his wide knowledge, and with
whom he often had long talks far into the night, whenever he
spoke of him to me—and that always with admiration—would
add, “and such a handsome fellow too !” He was of moderate
height and well built, with an air of distinction that no one
could help noticing, a striking face, fine eyes, and a mass of
thick dark hair, which made him look very unlike an ordinary
Englishman. A sketch of him as a young man, which used
to hang in his rooms at Wadham and which he afterwards
gave to me, made by Mrs Lilburn, with a few touches from
Henri de Neuville, shows something of what he was. His face
was certainly one that could not be forgotten.
His work, not great in bulk, but rich both in achievement
and promise, yet does not give a full picture of the richness of
his mental endowments, the charm of his personality, or the
beauty and depth of his character. Of him it might indeed truly
be said that he had a genius for friendship. To knowledge
and taste and sympathy he added a boyish love of fun and
a delightful “humanity”; but in the deepest things he thought
and felt most deeply. If he would not have expressed himself
in such things in a conventional or orthodox way, the oldest
of his friends, Mr Wentworth Webster, said with perfect truth,
“he was a truly religious man, and thought deeply and earnestly
on religion; and of late years,” he added, “I enjoyed our con-
versations on it, more almost than on literature and Spanish.
But the reticence which he observed on this point should,
I think, follow him in death.” His deepest thoughts were
Memoz," XXV
well known to those who knew him best, and, with the charm
of his society, his beautiful mind, his lovingkindness and his
generosity, will never be forgotten by those whose chief happi-
ness in life it was to be his friends. There are many who will
echo the words of one very near to him : “He was the best
man I have ever known, or ever shall know.”
W. H. HuTTON.
EDITORIAL NOTE.
Shortly before his death Mr Butler Clarke sent to the
Editor the complete manuscript of this book, including the
bibliography, which he had deliberately confined to books
whose value, entirely apart from their reputation, he was
himself ready to attest. The manuscript was left ready for
the press; but it is hardly necessary to say that an author's
revision of a work in proof is really indispensable. It is almost
inevitable that mistakes, printers’ errors and other, will have
crept into the text or been allowed to stand, which the author's
eye would have detected had he been spared to complete his
work. His friends have done the best they could. -
Mr W. H. Hutton has read the book in manuscript and in
proof, and corrected one or two obvious slips. Another of the
author's friends, Señor Don F. de Arteaga y Pereira, Taylorian
Teacher of Spanish in the University of Oxford, has read and
corrected all the proofs. Mr James Fitzmaurice-Kelly has
also kindly read the proofs, and supplied foot-notes on some
passages containing statements or expressing views which
appeared to be disputable. In deference to his criticism as
to matters of fact, one short sentence has been omitted, and
xxvi Editoria/ Note
two or three others slightly corrected. The same distin-
guished scholar has added a few items to the bibliography;
and the Editor has inserted a few more. Otherwise the book
remains practically as it was written. To the three gentlemen
above-mentioned the Editor desires to return his hearty
thanks.
September, 1906.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY.
SHELTERED behind the barrier of the Pyrenees from the
revolutionary storm that was overthrowing the thrones of
Europe, and seemingly uninfluenced by the current of ideas
that produced it, Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth
century differed but little from the Spain of one hundred years
before. Repeated attempts to play a leading part in the affairs
of Europe had brought upon her discredit and loss; her vast
American dependencies, weary of the rigid colonial system, and
looking to the example of their more fortunate neighbours, were
eager to assert their independence. Yet she was still unwilling
to acknowledge, she was in fact unaware, that for two centuries
the life had been ebbing from her mighty empire. Her thoughts
were fixed on the past, her ideals were those of an age long
gone by, her temper was harshly conservative.
A single generation had sufficed to naturalise the Bourbon
dynasty that came in with Philip V (17oo). It had taken up,
and in some respects accentuated, the policy of its predecessors.
True it is that, when the elder branch of the royal family
died out and the younger was imported from Naples, its first
representative, Charles III, was so little acquainted with the
temper of his subjects that he rashly bade them change for
something more like the habit of other lands the broad-brimmed
slouch hats and ample trailing cloaks that gave an air of
murderous gloom to Spanish towns. His attempts at reform
C. S. I
2 Introductory [CH.
in other matters had been met with contemptuous wonder only;
interference with the time-honoured dress, handed down from
the heroes of the sixteenth century “cloak and sword ” plays,
well-nigh cost the meddlesome monarch his throne. Innovators
and reformers indeed like this same King and his minister
Aranda succeeded at most in enlisting a small number of
enthusiastic followers; their spirit failed to penetrate the inert,
self-satisfied mass of the nation. So soon as the effort ceased,
things fell back into their old state; and another was added to
the long list of examples whereby the Spaniard demonstrated
that the ways of his grandfather were even better than those of
his father.
Thus Aranda and Charles III had dreamed of breaking
down the barrier laboriously built by ancestral wisdom to keep
the Chosen People of Spain from contamination by the modern
spirit of enquiry. But Charles III could not change by decree
the ingrained habits of centuries. During his lifetime his work
failed of any perceptible effect; his son and successor, Charles IV,
swept away all trace of it as far as might be. The importation
of any foreign book was punished by very severe penalties. The
only periodicals of Spain (1791) were the Madrid Gazette, a
tiny official sheet, and the police list of Zost and Found. The
Inquisition still existed; but public opinion now enforced rigid
conformity both in Church and State, and was ready unbidden
to avenge the slightest deviation from it. It is true that the
once vast powers of the Inquisition had been limited and
defined; it was bloodthirsty only during its early years, but
almost all the leading statesmen of the “libertine” school of
the eighteenth century were arraigned before it. It reviewed
the conduct of Aranda, Campomanes, Jovellanos, and Florida-
blanca, and censured as it thought fit their public and private
lives. Not even men so powerful as these dared to question its
authority. To have done so would have been to stamp
themselves as unfit to rule over Christian people.
The old liberties and partially developed representative
I] Decay of the Cortes 3
systems of the former kingdoms of Castille, of Aragon, and
of Navarre had been abolished for the most part, or had fallen
into disuse. Those of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia were
formally suppressed early in the eighteenth century in punish-
ment for the part taken by these provinces in the War of
Succession. The Parliaments of Navarre and of the three
Basque Provinces still controlled local affairs, and, watching
jealously over their dearly prized liberties (fueros), had hitherto
resisted the encroaching policy of the Crown. The Cortes of
Castille, once the powerful protector of the rights of the
commons, had sunk to the lowest depths of degradation.
The revolt of the Comuneros against the foreign ministers of
Charles V was an ill-judged attempt to wrest from a young and
a stranger sovereign confirmation of immemorial usages, and to
extend vastly the powers of the commons in Parliament. Its
overthrow at Villalar (1523) so firmly established the absolute
authority of the Crown that for nearly three centuries it was not
even questioned. The Parliament that had controlled supplies,
granted and taken back the Crown at will, and addressed the
Emperor himself as “our hireling,” became the humble
instrument of the royal will. Henceforward its claims were
scornfully disregarded; and rights accumulated by centuries
of active vigilance were ruthlessly overridden. Not only did
kings legislate, substituting for the consent of Parliament the
formula “valid as though promulgated in Cortes”—for this
strong kings had done before Villalar—but they overstepped
undoubted constitutional boundaries in repealing by decree
laws regularly passed and sanctioned. They prescribed the
exact form of mandate or commission to be granted to proctors,
thus rendering them unable to defend opposition to the Crown
by plea of obedience to instructions. They asserted the right
to limit discussion to matters propounded in the royal summons.
They insisted on the secrecy of deliberation; they nominated
President and Assessors. Finally, when the Cortes had
been reduced to unquestioning subservience, the kings ceased
I —2
4. Introductory [CH.
to summon them except for the formal purpose of hearing the
royal will with regard to the succession to the throne. During
the eighteenth century the Cortes of Castille met only six
times. Exempt from direct taxation, the nobility and clergy had
long ceased to attend. So little importance was attached to
Parliament that Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia bore a century
of disfranchisement without protest. The forms of Cortes
observed were unsuited to the actual condition of the realm.
Only thirty-eight cities and towns had the right of representation.
These rights, with only one or two exceptions, dated from the
fifteenth century. Toro, hardly more than a village, had a vote
in the Cortes; great cities of Andalusia had none. At last
even the right of petition was denied to the now merely formal
assembly. When the Cortes, summoned to transact the King's
business with regard to succession, sought to be allowed to lay
their views before him, Campomanes replied in his master's
name that after dissolution the King would consent to receive
such petitions as the several members might wish to present.
The Cortes of 1789, the only Parliament summoned during
the reign of Charles IV, were ordered to petition the King that
he would confirm as laws his decrees already in force. They
humbly obeyed. As to supply, the Cortes had lost all control
over it. The amount and the incidence of taxation, saving
only the privileges of the nobles and clergy, were determined
by the King. Even so far back as 1579 the proctors had
adopted the formula of offering “on their knees” the sums
wrung from them by bribery or intimidation.
Having got rid of his Parliament, the King was in fact
entirely irresponsible. He was assisted, when he required
assistance, by a Council of sixteen members, chosen by himself.
The Council of Castille was generally made up of members of
the royal family, ecclesiastics, great nobles, and a few lawyers.
A kind of Inner or Privy Council nominated from among the
Councillors of Castille was called the Royal Chamber (Cámara
A'eal). It included the Secretaries of State, generally five in
I] Aoya/ autocracy 5
number and attached severally to the departments of Foreign
Affairs, War, Justice, Marine, and Finance. These secretaries
or ministers were popularly known as cozachuelistas or cave-
dwellers, owing to the fact that their offices were situated in
the vaults of the palace. They were thus immediately under
the hands of the master to whom alone they were responsible.
Appointed and dismissed with as little ceremony as officers
of the Household or other servants, they had no legal standing ;
they were merely machines to prepare business for the King's
decision. This in turn was often swayed by a camarilla or
“little chamber,” the favourites and associates of the King, a
motley assemblage of persons, male and female, lay and
ecclesiastical, high and low, bishops and buffoons. The whole
executive and judicial magistracy was appointed directly by
royal warrant, often from among the creatures of the cama-
rilla. The corregidor—originally, as the name implies, a
magistrate ruling in conjunction with the municipal body—
and the captain-general exercised the royal authority in city
and province; they had grasped the whole powers of the once
independent municipal and provincial assemblies. Wherever
the court lodged, all local authority was for the time superseded
by that of the Household judges (alcaldes de casa y corte).
The almost anarchical charters and privileges that had been
granted, as conditions of the reconquest of the land from
the Saracens, lasted in their entirety only until the reconquest
was complete. Then one by one they were taken back,
until the whole land, with the exception of the Basque
Provinces and Navarre, was subjected to a centralisation so
harsh that no power save that of the Church was left to balance
that of the King.
The Church and the great rulers still exercised separate
jurisdiction over their own vassals. Their large estates, held
in mortmain or entail, had since the fifteenth century been a
Source of anxiety, irritation, and envy, to kings and commons
alike. Three-fourths of the land enjoyed partial exemption
6 Introductory [CH.
from taxation because of the noble or ecclesiastical status of
its owners. The remaining fourth was burdened with two-thirds
of the whole direct taxation. The revenues of the Church
were more than double those of the Crown. Throughout the
eighteenth century repeated efforts were made to set free, or
at any rate to check addition to, the enormous inert mass of
property. Partial measures were occasionally approved by the
Curia. For a time property left in mortmain or entail was
taxed by the State fifteen per cent. For a time the law forbade
the transmission of estates subject to these legal restrictions.
In 1807, when Spain had assumed the attitude of champion
of the Pope against Napoleon, permission was granted to
convert to secular uses one-seventh of the landed estates of
the Church. The French invasion prevented the execution of
the measure. The number of those who lived on Church
revenue and claimed ecclesiastical privilege was reckoned, at
the end of the eighteenth century, at nearly two per cent. in
a population of about ten millions. Ecclesiastical courts
claimed jurisdiction in all cases connected even remotely with
the interests of the Church. The very memory of old liberties,
and of the boldness of the commons of a former age in
resisting encroachments by Crown or Church had become
hateful to the ruling classes. In 1806 the laws of Spain were
recodified in the Movisima Recopi/ación. The reformed code
contained no mention of existing but obsolete laws, concerning
the necessity of the consent of the Cortes to the validity of
legislation, the statutory limitation of the powers of the
Inquisition, and the long disregarded principle that supply can
be raised only with consent of Parliament and for valid cause.
Spain's mighty colonial empire had been handed down with
hardly any loss since the time of its acquisition in the sixteenth
century. From California and Florida to the Antarctic Ocean
her dominions were broken only by the Portuguese possession
of Brazil. This huge region was divided into four viceroyalties,
Mexico or New Spain, New Granada, Peru, and Buenos Ayres.
I] Zhe Spanish colonies 7
Guatemala, Caracas, and Chile were ruled by captains-general,
inferior but not subject to the viceroys. The Indies, as they
were still called, contributed from their surplus about two
million pounds a year, one-fourth of the total revenue, to the
Spanish treasury. Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine
Islands were still a source of expense. The viceroys and
captains-general exercised in their several provinces the absolute
powers of the King whom they represented, and were assisted
by deliberative councils modelled on the Council of Castille.
The relations between Church and State were much the same
abroad as at home, except that the kings maintained the right
of nominating to all benefices in the regions where their
ancestors had planted the Faith. The colonies were, in fact,
Greater Spain. During the centuries that had elapsed since
they were peopled from various provinces of the Peninsula,
the predominance of one or other of the ethnological elements
included under the common name of Spaniard, widely varying
environment, and greater or less intercourse with native
American or imported African populations, had produced well-
marked differences of type, differences which still distinguish
the Peruvian (for instance) from the Venezuelan, and the latter
from the Cuban. For nearly three centuries the whole trade
of the Indies had been restricted not merely to Spain and
Spaniards, but to certain privileged ports and to holders of
the royal licence. Charles III took off some of the more
irksome restrictions while endeavouring still to confine the
trade to Spaniards and Spanish ports. But Spain had lost the
power of effectually defending her rights. The privateers,
English, French, or Dutch, hung on the flank of the treasure
fleet as it sailed periodically from Vera Cruz; the smuggler
haunted the creeks of the vast coast-line, and at times turned
pirate and preyed upon a population long unused to initiative
in self-defence. The battle of Trafalgar finally ended the
exclusive Spanish colonial system, and broke down the bridge
between Spain and America.
8 Introductory [CH.
In spite of bad government and disastrous wars, the
eighteenth century was for the most part a period of peace
and prosperity. The Bourbon kings before Charles IV were
prudent rulers. At the end of the reign of Charles III the
national debt amounted only to about twenty million pounds,
or two and a half years’ revenue. The exchequer bills (vales
reaſes) found ready acceptance at par. Before the end of the
next reign the debt had quadrupled and the national credit
declined owing to the war with England and the extravagance
of a madcap favourite. But Spain was still feeling, economi-
cally and socially, the exhaustion of past efforts and losses.
She had lavished her strength as champion of the Church in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The most energetic
part of her population had quitted her to spread the Spanish
race and Spanish civilisation in America. The expulsion of
Jews and Saracens had indeed added religious to political
unity, but it had deprived the land of most important trading,
industrial, and agricultural classes. These evils were aggravated
by a false economic policy. The floods of gold and silver
poured from America had raised prices in the Peninsula to
a level far above that of other European countries. Every
effort was made to retain the precious metals within the
borders of Spain, in the belief that a country full of gold
and silver is a rich country. The export of gold or silver was
forbidden under the severest penalties. The Spaniards were
now too rich as well as too proud to work. Industry sank
to the lowest ebb consistent with the degree of civilisation
then attained. To seek gold abroad, or to starve at home, was
profitable or honourable: to engage in commerce or manu-
facture was to forfeit all claims for generations to the highly
prized distinction of noble blood. Trade too was fettered by
innumerable vexatious restrictions, monopolies, and privileges;
by awkward and oppressive fiscal arrangements; and by
arbitrary interference to check the continual rise of prices in
obedience to economic law. Smuggling was more profitable,
I] Boonomica/ conditions 9
and hardly more risky, than manufacturing. The country
population flocked to the towns ; bread was fearfully dear; the
Government sought the remedy in fixing its price at such a
figure that it was impossible to produce it with profit. Agri-
culture, Spain's one important industry, languished. Vast
tracts once rich in corn, wine, and oil had fallen out of
cultivation; and the great despoblados had been formed. So
unsafe was the country that the tillers of the soil lived—nay,
still live—huddled in large walled villages miles distant from
their fields. Free grants of land failed to keep the peasantry
on the soil which had once supported thousands. The poor,
proud gentry of the country starved in their homes, but made
no effort to improve their lot; the lean, brown ploughman
suffered want in the midst of possible abundance.
The Social tyranny under which the nation laboured was
worse even than the political. The influence of the clergy
suppressed the natural manifestation of innocent gaiety.
Religious observances varied by love intrigue were the only
occupations of the leisured class. Of religion itself the gentler
aspects were thrust into the background. The natural gravity
and austerity of the national character had degenerated into
gloomy harshness. The Spaniards were the Puritans' of
Catholicism. The despotism, religious, political, and social,
that had overspread the land, was acquiesced in by the people.
Spain desired no other lot than that which she enjoyed under
her Bourbon kings. When the foreign invader set her free
she cast him forth from her boundaries by an heroic effort ;
then she carefully sought out the broken links of her old chain
and rivetted them again upon her limbs. The dreary stagna-
tion of national life extended to the arts. The voice of poetry
was hushed or had sunk to a feeble piping. Quintana, who
afterwards sounded the trumpet note that roused the land
* A disputable statement. The Jansenists in France were the real
Puritans of Catholicism ; the Spaniards were the Terrorists. [J. F.-K.]
IO Zntroductory [CH.
against the French, found his first and freshest inspiration in a
compliment to Godoy'. Books were rare and for the most
part trivial. Trivial also were the subjects of the sister arts.
Goya, the painter, and Ramón de la Cruz, the playwriter, have
pourtrayed to perfection the low life of the capital, the pictu-
resque manolos and manolas. Their works, the best of their
age, are most valuable to the social historian. They are
as good as their theme admits. The courtly grace and rich
fantasy of Velazquez and Lope de Vega, the deep spirituality
and refinement of Calderon and Murillo, seemed to have
perished out of the land of their birth. The very handicrafts,
such as those of goldsmith, potter, and weaver, once unerring
in skill and in taste, now produced for a coarser age only the
COarSeSt Wares.
Spain was the last of the continental nations to fall under
the grip of Napoleon. Not until 1808 did he find leisure
to undertake to implant in the Peninsula the principles of
the French Revolution. Thanks to the folly and baseness of
her rulers she was easy to seize ; thanks to the heroic spirit
of her people she was impossible to hold. Before the great
struggle her nominal ruler was Charles IV, a good-natured
man of mean abilities, dominated by his wife, a headstrong
and sensual woman. The King's interests were divided be-
tween the pompous ceremonies of religion, the pleasures
of hunting, and the humble crafts of the locksmith and
clockmaker. The cares of government were left to Manuel
Godoy, an ex-lifeguardsman, who owed to a handsome figure,
a dashing manner, and a certain plausible audacity the
unbounded confidence of the King as well as the criminal
attachment of the Queen. He was the most trusted coun-
sellor. in matters affecting the nation or the royal family—
universal minister, high admiral, commander-in-chief, and
* Strictly speaking this is not the case. Quintana's first volume of
poems was published in 1788, when he was 15. His ode on the Peace was
written in 1795; and the compliment to Godoy is indirect. [J. F.-K.]
I] Godoy and Mapoleon I I
grandee. The “Prince of the Peace” owed his strange-
sounding title to his successful negotiation of the Peace of
Basel terminating the war with France (1795). Without a
rival at court, without principles to control or wit to guide him,
Godoy in all the recklessness of ignorance had set his hand
to statecraft. He gave himself out as a Liberal and a man of
enlightened mind, and undertook reforms social, legal, edu-
cational, and military. Fifteen years of undeserved and un-
interrupted good fortune so swelled his overweening conceit
that at last he ventured to pit his brains against Napoleon's.
Wishing to strike at Portugal, England's ally, the Emperor
entered into negotiation with Godoy in order to secure the
right of passage through Spain for his troops. The Treaty of
Fontainebleau (October 27, 1807) granted the required permis-
sion. It contained a secret clause promising to the Spanish
upstart an independent principality in return for his good
offices. At the same time a family quarrel gave the Emperor
the position of arbiter in the Spanish royal family. Ferdinand,
the heir-apparent, resenting the favourite's insolence, his father's
folly, and his mother's shame, headed a palace plot to compass
the downfall of Godoy. The plot being discovered, Ferdinand
was charged with conspiracy against his father's throne and his
mother's life. He was proved to have written to the Emperor
begging his protection and the hand of a Princess of the
Imperial family. His humiliation was complete when he
found himself forced to cringe to Godoy in order to obtain
pardon from his infatuated father. He proved penitence by
an abject attitude, and by cynical betrayal of accomplices.
These scandals strengthened the hands of the party pledged
to overthrow the Prince of the Peace. The outcome of
his policy brought popular hatred upon him. The French
armies had not even awaited the signature of the Treaty of
Fontainebleau in order to cross the frontier. As they passed
through Spain they seized the strong places in their line of
march. Their menacing attitude was at first regarded with
I 2 Introductory [CH.
amazement, soon with indignation and terror. When the news
reached Aranjuez, the spring residence of the court, the eyes
of the foolish trio were opened; and Godoy resolved to flee
secretly with the King and Queen to America. The secret
leaked out; consternation seized the citizens; the partisans of
the Infant Ferdinand led the mob against Godoy, author of
the mischief. For thirty hours the courtly and gallant youth
of Quintana's panegyric, now grown somewhat pursy, lay con-
cealed in the garret of his own house rolled in a mat. Thirst
compelled him to surrender to the soldiers, who now openly
sided with the mob. He was now in the power of the Infant,
and his life was in danger. In order to save it, his deluded
master abdicated (March 19, 1808). Ferdinand, a Surly and
suspicious young man, already a master of dissimulation, was
King of Spain.
Events now followed with startling rapidity. Before the
end of April, King Ferdinand was on his way to renew his suit
to the Emperor, whom he still considered as his protector.
By the end of the month Godoy too had come to the lure,
and had led Charles IV and his Queen into the net cunningly
spread at Bayonne. A few days later it was announced that
Ferdinand had given back the crown to his father, who in turn
had conferred it on the Emperor. Ferdinand and his brother
formally renounced in the Emperor's favour their right of
succession. In June the crown of Spain was once more
bandied from hand to hand. This time it was placed by
Napoleon on the head of his brother Joseph. The Spanish
royal family were kept in honourable confinement in France.
Godoy, still the delight and consolation of his master, bore
them company. It remained but for the Spanish people to
acquiesce in the results of their political jugglery.
The French troops had been welcomed as their friends and
allies. The seizure of the fortresses had hardly dispelled
belief in the Emperor's good faith. The sudden news that
the Infant Ferdinand was a prisoner in France disclosed at
I] 7%e Spanish rising I 3
once the situation of the royal family and of the nation.
Independence, personal and national, and hatred of foreign
interference, are the Spaniard's leading passions. Ferdinand,
the enemy of the hated favourite, was the darling of the mob.
The citizens of Madrid, seizing such weapons as lay ready to
hand, fiercely attacked the French garrison that occupied their
suburbs (May 2). A The slaughter inflicted upon them by
Murat, first in self-defence and then in retaliation, fired the
whole country. From Asturias to Andalusia, from Aragon to
Extremadura, the people rushed to arms; and the War of
Independence had begun. Ten weeks later England had
renewed the ancient friendship that bound her to Spain; and
Castaños and his levies by their victory at Bailen (July 19)
were encouraged to match their untaught valour against trained
battalions.
The Peninsular War, or War of Independence, the series
of stubborn or brilliant campaigns extending over five years,
whereby the invaders were finally thrust beyond the frontier,
does not come within the scope of this book. It is, however,
absolutely necessary, in order to understand what befell later,
to follow closely the action of Spain when the sudden with-
drawal of the King's authority left her, unused to govern, face
to face with mortal peril. It must be remembered that, with
the exception of the Church, the King was the only authority
that had existed for centuries. All power had been centred
in his hand; he was something more than the mere head of
a graduated scale of magistrates; he was the State.
Not all educated Spaniards belonged to the popular and
patriotic party which declared war to the knife on the invader
and usurper, refused all compromise, and called in the help of
England. Napoleon's attitude had from the first been as
conciliatory as the execution of his designs allowed. His
gigantic figure had fascinated a number of the most enlightened
Spaniards; even beyond the Pyrenees the great Revolution
had made converts; and a minority, by no means entirely
º
I4. Introductory [CH.
made up of contemptible or interested persons, looked to the
conqueror to establish a better order. Their hopes were
defrauded; they cast their lot with the unpopular and losing
side, their memory has been handed down to contempt under
the name of afrancesados (Frenchified).
The Emperor made a show of consulting Spain as to
her fate. He summoned to Bayonne one hundred and fifty
Spanish notables, bishops, inquisitors, grandees, members of
the Councils of State, ministers, and magistrates. A large
number evaded his invitation; some refused it with contumely
and became at once popular heroes. Ninety-one assembled
(June 15, 1808), and submissively received a new sovereign
and a constitution modelled upon the French Constitution.
Intended to attract to King Joseph’s party the friends of
liberty, it created a Parliament of three Estates to meet every
third year. To a Senate of limited number it gave very wide
powers, and entrusted the guardianship of the liberties of the
individual and of the Press. It abolished torture, and pro-
vided for reduction of the number of convents and of the
mass of property held in mortmain and in entail. . Impartially
considered, it was a great step in the way of good and
responsible government; none of its provisions were d priori
unworkable, or, save for her utter lack of political education,
unsuited to Spain.
But the Spanish people cared nothing for its merits or
defects; had it been the best in the world they would have
rejected it. Everything connected with the invaders was
hideous in their eyes. Joseph Bonaparte was really an able
and well-meaning man, of fine presence and affable manners.
In order to conciliate his new subjects he surrounded himself
with Spaniards, and took as his advisers those who would
accept his livery from among the ministers of Charles IV.
But the Spaniards always believed him to be a deformed,
squinting drunkard, malignant when not ridiculous. Force
and flattery availed little with men who refused to believe the
§
I] The Revolutionary Government I 5
testimony of their own eyes in favour of the hated “Intruder.”
Moreover they had started a government after their own heart.
Three centuries of disuse had not completely atrophied the
faculty for self-government once so developed in the cities and
provinces. Whilst Napoleon was deliberating how Spain should
be ruled, Asturias, Galicia, Valencia, Murcia, Badajoz, and
Granada had appointed representative assemblies or Juntas.
The time-honoured Council of Castille had at first attempted
to pick up the power that had fallen from the hands of the
Bourbon kings; it might have headed the struggle with the
invader. But it lost all authority because some of its members
were suspected of sympathy with the French, and because it
opposed the claims of local Juntas. These, whilst intensely
democratic in the south, were enthusiastically loyal. The place
held by their unworthy King in their affection was second only
to that held by their country. So great was their earnestness
that the local jealousies, which had ever hindered organised
resistance to the encroachments of the Crown, were held in
abeyance. Seville fell into rank beside the other cities when
the claim of its Junta to precedence was set aside. All sent their
representatives to the “Supreme Central Junta of Government
of the Kingdom,” which met first at Aranjuez on September 25.
By this time the battle of Bailen had been fought and won;
the Intruder had fled from Madrid; alliance with England
was assured; the heroic citizens of Gerona and Saragossa had
beaten off their besiegers; and patriotic hopes were at their
highest. The -Central Junta, legislative and executive com-
bined, consisted at first of twenty-four and later of thirty-five
members. 2 Though democratic in origin and form, it was
frankly conservative in spirit. The President was the aged
Count of Floridablanca, once minister of the Crown, an ex-
Liberal converted by the excesses of the French Revolution.
Among its most distinguished members were Gaspar Melchior
de Jovellanos, the economist and reformer; Quintana, the
poet, who acted as its secretary; and the Marquis of Astorga,
I 6 Introductory [CH.
who became its President on the death of Floridablanca during
the first month of its existence.
Under the Marquis of Astorga the Junta became somewhat
more Liberal; but Floridablanca's influence had been marked by
abolition of many of the tentative reforms of Charles III, the
recall of the Jesuits whom he had banished, and the appoint-
ment of a new Inquisitor-General. In some respects, however,
the Central Junta was a bold innovator. The name “Cortes”
was not at that time, as it afterwards became, the bugbear of
the absolutist conservative and Church party. Palafox, the
defender of Saragossa, a staunch Royalist, had summoned in
the King's name the ancient Parliament of Aragon to aid in the
struggle on the King's behalf. Encouraged by his example and
by the vague wording of a message sent by Ferdinand from
France, the Junta decreed (May, 1809) the reestablishment of
the Cortes, and their assembly in the following year. The motive
for this step was in part at least the desire of the Junta to
obtain a legal basis for its own authority. For years all initiative
had come from the King. As soon as he was removed it
became questionable what should take his place. One party
in the Junta declared that a Regency was necessary; another
was in favour of returning to the traditional and obsolete Cortes,
giving to the people a share in the government. SThe false
views of history held by their party were destined to have a far.
reaching effect.
The summons to Parliament might well be considered an
innovation; but much more so, and without historical precedent,
was the extension of the summons to the American Colonies.
Wishing to bind them to the fatherland and to secure help in
the great struggle from their abundant riches, the Junta (January,
1809) declared the oversea possessions of Spain an integral part
of the monarchy, with rights to representation in the Junta.
This recognition of citizenship entailed a right of representation
in the Cortes also. It failed to confirm the tottering loyalty of
certain of the colonies; nor were the sums contributed by
I] 7%e AEezzzzzsau/a/- War 17
4.
America to the national defence proportionate to her wealth.
The viceroys were busy maintaining their own authority in
their provinces. The legal status of the Junta and its power to
grant discharge in the King's name were questionable.
In spite of the energy of the Junta, and its efforts to sustain
the patriotic spirit and terrify rich waverers by threats of
confiscation and banishment, the results of the first eighteen
months of the struggle might well have brought despair to the
hearts of the most stubborn patriots. The hopes of Bailen
had been crushed at Ocaña (November, 1809). The Intruder
was back in Madrid, seemingly firmly seated on the throne.
Saragossa and Gerona had fallen, in spite of their heroism.
Catalonia, held down by the firm grip of the prudent Suchet,
was spared, it is true, the horrors of war, but was compelled to
witness, whilst powerless to relieve, the agony of her sister
provinces. The treaty with England guaranteed indeed that
Spain should cede no territory, but its fruits were as yet hardly
seen. The promised army had reached Portugal, but it was
not till 1812 that the allies gained a firm footing in Spain by
the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The approach of
the French had obliged the Junta to quit Aranjuez for Seville.
In January, 1810, the enemy was pouring over the passes; and,
in spite of the protest of the Sevillians against abandonment,
the Junta had once more to flee. This time it took refuge on
the one remaining plot of Spanish ground that could guarantee
its safety. The Isla de Leon, near Cadiz, might be, and was
later, blockaded by land; but it was safe and free on the sea
side, thanks to the fleets of England and Spain. Here the
flying Junta assembled for the last time: its prestige and
authority had left it; failure had made it anxious to be rid of
responsibility. It resigned its powers into the hands of a
Council of Regency composed of Castaños, the victor of
Bailen; Saavedra, President of the Junta of Seville; Antonio
Escaño, a distinguished sailor; and Lardizabal, a Mexican of
Royalist views, supposed to represent the colonies. The fifth
C. S. 2
I 8 Introductory [CH.
member and President was the Bishop of Orense, who had
become suddenly popular owing to his spirited refusal to obey
Napoleon's summons to Bayonne.
The new Government had taken over the powers of the
Junta at a moment of the utmost difficulty and danger. To
military disaster was added lack of men and money. The
expenditure was more than four times the nominal revenue.
The greater part of taxable Spain was in the hands of the
enemy. Nevertheless the country again responded to the call
upon its energies. An army had to be improvised; conscrip-
tion provided 80,000 soldiers; loan, confiscation, and ruinous
taxation produced sufficient funds for carrying on the war.
Amid these patriotic efforts the Regency found time to
abolish the moderate reforms introduced by Jovellanos and
his followers in the late Junta, and to persecute and banish its
more Liberal members.
But the most difficult problem bequeathed by the Junta to
the Regents was that of the Cortes. Whilst sitting at Seville
the Junta had summoned for March, 1810, a Parliament to
meet at Cadiz, not of three Estates, as tradition demanded,
but of two Houses—dignitaries or notables (dignidades), and
proctors (procuradores). To the Regents, who shortly after-
wards took up the government, the time seemed ill-chosen for
experiments with an assembly of undefined powers and
unknown tendencies. For the Cortes as summoned by the
Junta was a quite new institution, having nothing in common
with the old Cortes of Castille save the name. Of the old
Cortes much less was known then than now, but all were
aware that no Cortes of all Spain had ever been held, much
less of Spain and her colonies as was now projected. The
Regents, in fact, had good cause to dread the enthusiasm of the
young Liberals, who, under pretence of a revival, dreamed of
a representative body that should combine the virtues of the
French revolutionary Assembly, the British House of Commons,
and the sixteenth century Cortes of Aragon or Castille.
I] The Cortes of 18 Io I 9
Crowded together with the Regency into Cadiz and the Isla
de Leon, these Liberals were able to bring to bear upon it an
amount of pressure quite out of proportion to their numbers
and importance in the country. The Regents put every
possible obstacle in the way of the proposed Assembly; they
postponed its date, but at last they were obliged to renew the
summons (June, 1810). This time Cortes were called for
the autumn. But already, since the beginning of the year,
important alterations had been made by the committee
appointed by the Junta to regulate the form of the Assembly.
The projected Cortes now consisted of a single elective
Chamber, made up (I) of representatives of the cities and
towns possessing the traditional right of a vote; (2) of repre-
sentatives of the provincial Juntas; (3) of representatives of
each group of 50,000 Souls; (4) of representatives of the
colonies. Four processes were necessary for the election of a
deputy. The parish elected its Junta, which in turn sent repre-
sentatives to the district Junta; the district Junta chose the
provincial Junta; and the deputy was elected from among the
members of the provincial Junta. The franchise in the first
degree belonged to all Spaniards who were householders over
25 years of age. Even in a well-ordered country and in time of
peace the carrying out of so complicated a system for the first time,
would be difficult. ZIn Spain not only was the vast majority of
the inhabitants ignorant of the nature of a vote, but the civil
power was in abeyance, and three-fourths of the land were
occupied by the invader. The election therefore was managed
by a few enthusiasts and a large number of busybodies, who,
without going outside Cadiz, elected themselves/ For, since
no show of election was possible in the districts and cities held
by the French, and since it was impossible for the deputies
summoned from America to arrive in time, it was decided that
at first the places of the missing deputies should be occupied
by natives of the otherwise unrepresented constituencies who
chanced to be present in Cadiz. S
2—2
2O Introductory [CH.
The haphazard Assembly thus formed met first on
September 24, 1810. So far as it represented anything beyond
the private opinions of its members, it represented the views
of the seaboard towns which had elected it, as opposed to those
of the interior. The former were radical, progressive and
industrial; they are now hotbeds of socialism of a crude type;
the latter, agricultural and conservative, would to-day welcome
Don Carlos and his programme'. But the radical tendency of
the Cortes of 1810 was not at first apparent. The Regents
..succeeded in putting one or two matters at least beyond ques-
tion, while the deputies were still an assembly of units of
undefined opinions. Thus they swore to maintain the Catholic
religion, to preserve the integrity of Spanish territory, and to
deliver from his captivity Ferdinand, son of Charles IV, whom,
in spite of the series of abdications and surrenders of the
crown that had taken place, they held to be the rightful King.
No notice was taken of the retractation of the act of abdication
wrung from Charles IV at Aranjuez. After this the Cortes
proceeded to define their own position. They reserved for
themselves legislative power, and handed over the executive
and judicature to the Regents. Their next act was much more
far-reaching; they declared that in the absence of the King
the sovereignty belonged to the Cortes, and they called upon
the Regents to recognise this principle. Though his colleagues
submitted, the Bishop of Orense, President of the Council
of Regency, protested. Perhaps he knew something of
Ferdinand's real character, and the ruthless account he would
demand of those who allowed the royal prerogative to be
diminished. The Bishop's protest was discussed and over-
ruled. The Cortes passed measures to secure their members
against bribery and undue influence, and then, with a levity
ill-befitting their situation within hearing of the artillery of
* A doubtful statement. Carlism seems dead; but in politics, especially
Spanish politics, a prophet tempts Providence. [J. F.-K.]
I] “J.2öera/s’ and “Serv2/es " 2 I
their besiegers, they took for themselves the title of “Majesty,”
and conferred on the Regency that of “Highness.”
Within a month of this first meeting, the two opposite
tendencies which at first had been kept in the background
declared themselves. The occasion was a measure for relieving
the Press of censorship previous to publication. Such a measure
was intensely repugnant to a large number of the deputies.
It seemed to them to open the floodgates of atheism and
anarchy. During this controversy was heard for the first time
the now universal word “liberal,” opposed, in this instance, to
“servile,” the epithet applied by opponents to those whose
views were still limited by the formula “Church and King.”
Finally secular books were set free, but the Cortes decided by
seventy votes against thirty that books on religious subjects
must receive the imprimatur of a bishop before publication.
By this measure the Cortes had rebutted the charge of
libertinism; but the Regents were not satisfied with, the degree
of respect shown for the royal authority. They refused to
sanction the acts of the Cortes, and resigned (October 27, 1810).
They were replaced by a new Council of Regency, consisting
of three members nominated by the Cortes. Two of the
three were absent, and their places were filled by substitutes.
They were persons of no great authority; the Cortes that had
appointed might dismiss them at will; they were the creatures
of the progressive party.
This party had now control of the Assembly; its views
were every day more defined; and it was clear they could not be
carried out so long as the old forms of an absolute monarchy
were maintained. The whole situation of the Cortes was
painfully irregular: their claim to sovereignty rested on no
foundation and was hotly contested. The pretended origin of
their revolutionary aspirations in the crude theories of the
Comuneros must be formulated or abandoned ; and these
aspirations must be embodied in a Constitution. A com-
mission of fourteen deputies was engaged during eight
22 Introductory [CH.
months in drawing up a project to be submitted to the
Cortes.
During this time, the earlier part of the year 1811, the
Cortes and the Regency struggled manfully to meet their
now growing difficulties. The national debt had risen to
24.70,ooo, ooo, and credit was exhausted: the annual expendi-
ture was 24, 12, ooo, ooo, the revenue about a fifth of this
amount. The deficit was supplied, but the sympathies of the
rich and the Church were alienated by a huge war tax on
property and on the salaries of public officers, by appropriation
of the income of vacant benefices, sale of Church plate, and
the institution of State lotteries. Some money was obtained,
too, by the sale of estates confiscated from the disloyal and of
parts of the royal domains. But few had money to buy, and
fewer still would spend it upon property the title to which was
sure to be contested as soon as a change of government took
place.
Against the consequences of such a change the Cortes now
began to try to guard themselves and their work, for they
felt that they were drifting further from the King and from the
system they had been intended to represent. They decided
that all the acts of the King whilst in captivity and all agree-
ments entered into by him were invalid (Jan. 1811). They
formally excluded members of the royal family from the Council
of the Regency. They decreed that no terms should be made
with the enemy unless they secured the complete freedom
of Spain and Portugal. The object of these measures was to
guard against concessions wrung from a King in the power of
the enemy, but by them the King's right to dispose of his
dominions according to his will was set aside. Greater and
bolder innovations were at hand.
On March 19, 1812, in the presence of the Papal Nuncio
and the British and Portuguese ambassadors, the new Con-
stitution was promulgated at Cadiz. Fidelity to it was sworn
by the Cortes, its creators, the Regency, their creatures, and
I 7%e Constitution of 1812 23
the small part of the Spanish nation that understood or
accepted its aims. Supporting revolutionary innovations by
appeals to an imaginary past, and to the thirteenth century
code of Alfonso the Learned, it in fact cut off the new Spain
from all connexion with the old, and deprived the Crown of
all real authority in the land where loyalty to the King had
ever been reckoned as second only to loyalty to the Church.
Most of its provisions had already been rejected by the
Spaniards when offered by Napoleon at Bayonne. They
refused to receive them at the hand of a stranger; they refused
no less when the offer came from Cadiz. Eighteen months
after its promulgation, the Restoration swept away the Con-
stitution and all connected with it. It had never been put to
the test of practice; the Liberals had not yet realised how
fatal to its success was its complicated system of election, its
prohibition of reelection to successive Parliaments, and its
exclusion of ministers from the deliberations of the Chamber.
But it demands examination because of the disastrous attempt
to realise its dreams in 1820, because it is the prototype of a
long series of somewhat similar constitutions, and because
it inspired fanatical devotion and produced martyrs among its
friends and was hated to the death by its enemies. Whilst
their authority did not extend so far as the view from the
blockaded walls of Cadiz, the Cortes of 181o handled and
altered every department of public life, purposing to create
politically a new heaven and a new earth.
A The first article of the Constitution declared that “the
Spanish nation is made-up-of-aſſ Spaniards in both hemi-
spheres,” and went on to assert that “this nation is free
and independent, and cannot be the patrimony of any family
or person.” The third article laid down the principle of
democracy: “sovereignty is vested essentially in the nation,
and for this reason the nation alone has the right to establish
its fundamental laws.” As yet religious liberty is not at-
tempted: “the religion of the Spanish nation is and ever shall

24 Introductory [CH.
be the Catholic Apostolic Roman, the one true faith. The
nation defends it by wise and just laws forbidding the exercise
of any other.” The system of government chosen is a
“moderate hereditary monarchy.” The King at the head
of the executive is irresponsible. He names the ministers:
his decrees are valid only if countersigned by a responsible
minister. The right of making laws is vested in Cortes,
consisting of a single Chamber, together with the King. Each
sixty thousand souls shall be represented by a deputy. The
franchise, together with full rights of citizenship, is conferred on
all Spaniards aged twenty-five years and over; all electors,
however, will, after 1830, be required to be able to write and
read. . The election of a deputy involves four separate pro-
cesses. Firstly the voters of each parish name eleven com-
missioners. Secondly these commissioners elect a parochial
deputy. Thirdly this assembly of parochial deputies elects
a district deputy. Fourthly the district deputies elect a deputy
to the Cortes. A property qualification is imposed on electors
in the third and fourth degrees. The commission or mandate
given by his electors to the deputy must include “full powers
* @ e º 'º e to decide and resolve all that he shall perceive to be
for the good of the Spanish nation within the limits of the
Constitution.” No deputy may hold office under the Crown;
none may be reelected unless after the interval of at least one
Parliament. Parliament must sit three months in each year,
and be renewed every second year. When not sitting, its place
is taken by a Permanent Commission, the duties of which are
to watch over the observance of the laws, and, if necessary, to
reassemble Parliament. The power of taxation belongs to

Parliament, the power of veto to the King; but the veto is
ide when the measure concerned has been thrice
approved by Parliament. A Council-of-State-is-instituted.
Its forty members are chosen by the King from a list of
treble the number prepared by Parliament. The heads of the
administration directly responsible to Parliament are the six
I] 7%e Conservative reacázon 25
Secretaries of State in the departments of Foreign Affairs,
Interior, Colonies, Justice, Finance, and War.< The gºinion
of obedience ceases when the King violates the law. 2Military
service is obligatory. Provision is made for a national militia-
and for municipal government under popular control. Any
alteration in the Constitution is solemnly forbidden until after
the lapse of eight years.
This Constitution was not approved by the Cortes of 1810
until the legality of the Cortes themselves and each one of the
great principles on which their code was founded had been
'fiercely attacked. The debates lasted six months. For refusing
to acknowledge the sovereignty of the people the Council of
Castille was suspended. The Opposition included a majority
of the members of the Supreme Junta, and of the Regents
past and present. Opposition was overridden by enthusiasm
and by persecution. But no sooner was the Constitution
Spromulgated than the reaction set in. The serviles, as the event
showed, were those who best understood the temper of their
countrymen and of their King. They kept up communications
with him in his exile and spared no effort to bring about the
dissolution of the Constituent Cortes. Their term was fixed
by an article of the Constitution enjoining a periodical general
election ; their work ended in the autumn of 1812 ; their suc-
cessors were summoned for October. Meanwhile the old
Cortes resolved to watch over their work and to support the
new régime. They underwent however some modification,
for, as the provinces were liberated and elected their deputies,
and as the colonial representatives arrived, it was found
that their opinions had been entirely misrepresented by the
demagogues who had temporarily supplied their places. The
Progressives had still a majority, but they were opposed with
increasing confidence by a party whose avowed object was to
reestablish everything as it was before the French invasion.
This party won ground with every step the invaders were
'driven back. It welcomed the name of serviles and sighed no

26 Introductory [CH.
less to be rid of the Constitution than to be rid of the French,
TSO- ë King should have his own again. It included
almost the whole of the CIergy; the great quarreſ Between the
**- **.
Church and Tiberatideas, after being held in abeyance by fear
9f subjection to the foreigner, had broken out. The Bishop of
Orense had been banished for resisting innovations; the clerical
members of the Cortes had one by one been joining the
Opposition. The temper of the Liberals was getting more
imperious. A new set of Regents was chosen when those in
power refused to support the majority of Cortes for interfering
with Church affairs (March, 1813). The Nuncio was expelled
for protesting in the name of the Holy See against a law
suppressing religious houses of less than twelve members, and
prohibiting the existence of more than one convent of the same
order in one place. An ecclesiastical tax called the Voto de
Santiago was suppressed ; finally, by a majority of thirty in a
house of one hundred and fifty members, the Inquisition was
abolished and its property confiscated. At the same time the
monuments by which its sentences were recorded in churches
and many honourable families branded with shame were swept
away (February, 1813). Religion, however, was held to be still
in need of the protection of the law; and the place of the
suppressed Holy Office was taken by the tribunal of Defenders
of the Faith. The Cortes were drifting further and further
from the wishes of the nation they affected to represent. As
the Liberal majority became smaller it became more bitter; its
danger spoiled its temper. -
After the battle of Salamanca (June 12, 1812) the Intruder
fled from Madrid. Cadiz was relieved of the blockade ; Anda-
lusia was free. The Constitution was proclaimed in the famine-
stricken capital, where Wellington and the famous guerrillero
El Empecinado had been rapturously welcomed as deliverers.
The seat of the usurping Government, Madrid, had long been
isolated from the rest of Spain. The patriotic naturally shunned
it. Those whose business affairs made it impossible for them
I] Fażu/sion of the French 27
to quit the city were forced to bear almost the whole of the
burden laid upon Spain by the hated foreigner. The collection
of taxes in King Joseph's name in country districts was not to be
attempted, so Cabarrús, the Minister of Finance, and his agents,
turned their whole attention to the citizens. Monopolies, new
taxes on property, rent, and food, exhausted the hoards of
patriots and afrancesados alike. The latter indeed were in a
worse position than the former, for, while they could not refuse
to contribute to the support of the usurping Government, their
property was ruthlessly confiscated whenever the patriots could
lay hands on it. The few existing banks had been ruined by
exactions under the name of loans and by the forced circulation
of cédulas hipotecarias, bonds after the fashion of assignats.
The war had hindered agriculture and extinguished commerce.
So scanty was the food brought into Madrid and so high its
price that twenty thousand inhabitants perished by hunger.
The rejoicings of the famished mob over their supposed
deliverance were of short duration. Once more the French
wave surged southward; and Wellington was obliged to seek
shelter behind the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. In November, 1812,
King Joseph was back in Madrid. His stay lasted six months,
whilst the fate of France was decided among the Russian snows.
The news of the disaster of the Grand Army brought out the
allied forces, British, Spanish, and Portuguese, to complete
their six years' work. Wellington, now generalissimo of the
allied armies, was able to organise the campaign unhindered
by the unruly spirit of the guerrilleros, and the sulkiness with
which Spanish generals sometimes met his ill-concealed con-
tempt. As he approached, the Intruder and his force took
their way northward, escorting a huge convoy of plunder torn
from the churches and palaces of Spain. With the French went
the unhappy train of those who had followed their fortunes
through conviction, timidity, or interest. They dared not
remain in liberated Spain to meet the reckoning of the grim
and half-starved patriots. The battle of Vittoria (June 21, 1813)
28 Introductory [CH. I
turned the retreat into a rout. Before the autumn all Spain
was rid of the invaders except the north-east corner and a few
strong places in the Cantabrian region. Even Soult's furious
campaign failed to save them. In April, 1814, Wellington and
Suchet signed the capitulation and Spanish soil was free again.
It was not only the afrancesados whose fears got the upper
hand as the invaders were thrust back. The Constituent Cortes
dissolved (September 24, 1813). The Permanent Commission
appointed by them according to the directions of the Consti-
tution had but few days in which to exercise its authority.
The ordinary Cortes met on October 1. The single Chamber
still contained a majority of Liberals, but only a small one.
In it appeared for the first time many of the men who became
famous during the revolutionary period that followed, Isturiz,
Martinez de la Rosa, and Canga Argüelles. The Constitution
forbade reelection; but a good many of the deputies to the
famous Cortes of 18 Io reappeared as substitutes representing
districts that had been unable or unwilling to obey the summons.
The new Cortes continued to debate at Cadiz, while no man
heeded them, for it was clear even to the most short-sighted
that their day was nearing its end. The capital, since its
deliverance, had claimed the presence of the Government.
Thither the Cortes took their way (January, 1814). Amid the
joyful preparations made by their most bitter enemies to welcome
the King, the full extent of their danger seems to have presented
itself to them. Some of their last acts were to prescribe the
route to be followed by the King on his return, to prohibit the
exercise of his powers until he had sworn to observe the
Constitution, and to forbid him to enter Spain accompanied
by troops or by foreigners.
132
CHAPTER II.
THE RESTORATION (1814–1820).
IT has been said that old Spain fell with the French
invasion, undermined by the reforms of Charles III. But in
fact it was immediately after the invasion that old Spain gave
proof of most vigorous life by sweeping away as far as possible
all innovations. Old Spain under able leaders fought for the
upper hand throughout the nineteenth century. The Carlists,
its champions, nearly carried the day; even now continual
vigilance and constant compromise are necessary to prevent its
resurrection. The change that had really taken place was the
rise of the Liberal party, an opposition to the all-powerful Crown
and camarilla. The War of Independence had been fought by
the people. A large number of the nobles and clergy, fearful
of confiscation of estates or benefices, had been guilty of
making terms with the foreigners, or of despairing of the
national cause. Mina, El Empecinado, and the other guerril/.
eros, who had begun the struggle in obscure corners of Spain,
were at its end leaders of a democratic army. Their sympa-
thies were with the humble class in which they were born. A
return to the old order meant, for them, a return to obscurity;
'they became Liberals.
Again, the abolition of the old administration, and the
refusal of the Spaniards to obey magistrates appointed by
f'iens, had led to the formation of Juntas. The Juntas had
stood between the people and anarchy; the people of the cities
3O Zhe Restoration (1814–1820) [CH.
had learned to rule themselves. The seaboard towns at any rate
valued self-government, and were unwilling to return to the old
system of exclusion and repression. The barriers of class had
broken down, whilst Spain was engaged in a death-struggle.
No claim of a nobleman to exemption from taxation could be
recognised when money was sorely needed for the patriotic
cause; no private jurisdiction could be allowed to interfere
with that of the Junta. In formally abolishing the privileges of
the nobility the Junta sanctioned actual practice. But the
Juntas had no wish to persecute the former owners of privileges.
Class distinction indeed had never been insisted on in Spain in
such a way as to produce irritation. Rank meets with ready
recognition, but does not claim it. Moreover the dividing lines
between political parties have happily never coincided with
those between class and class, rich and poor. The Radical
parties have always contained some of Spain's noblest blood.
The country folk cared nothing for the brand-new franchise.
Once they were rid of the invader and had got back their King,
they demanded nothing better than to live as their fathers had
lived. They took no share in politics until they were roused
by the cry that the Church and the King were in danger. But
, all over the land the regular habits of agricultural and in-
dustrial life had been lost during the war; barriers had been
broken down, and free thought now jostled bigotry, political
and theological, where for centuries the smallest deviation
from accepted formulas had been most harshly repressed.
The attempt to implant the extreme doctrines of an untried
Liberalism in so unfavourable a climate could not be successful.
The declaration of abstract principles by the Cortes of Cadiz
fell frigidly on ears dulled by the din of arms. But a spirit of
unrest was abroad; it was working in the army, which, at the
end of the war, numbered 18O, ooo men. Among its leaders
none had won a position sufficiently commanding to enable
him to decide which path Spain should take now that she
stood at the parting of the ways. So it came about that the
II] Aa/Z of Zzbera/ism 3 I
restored King, with hardly an effort, by help of the clergy and
the mob, overthrew the democracy that had saved his throne.
His subjects knew nothing of his real character. The brief
public appearance of the pupil of Canon Escoiguiz as plotter
against his father was forgotten. Ferdinand, the exiled prince,
had become the symbol of the national ideal, the name round
which patriotic, loyal, and religious feelings were grouped. It
would not have been possible to convince those who adored it
that Ferdinand had basely fawned upon Napoleon, had ex-
pressed his thankfulness for captivity and insult, and had
actually congratulated the usurper, Joseph, on his accession to
the throne of Spain, and the Emperor on his victories over the
Spanish patriots.
At the end of the year 1813, Napoleon, anxious to with-
draw his soldiers from Spain, obtained Ferdinand's signature
to the secret treaty of Valençay. Ferdinand, in return for
recognition as King of Spain and the Indies, promised that
“the Spaniards who had helped" the Intruder “should suffer
no persecution.” The Emperor pledged himself to surrender
the fortresses held by his troops simultaneously with the
withdrawal of the British. But Ferdinand's signature alone was
not considered sufficient to pledge the Spanish Government.
Accordingly he sent his friend and confidant, the Duke of San
Carlos, to Madrid to obtain from the Regency ratification of
the treaty which would set him free. In this negotiation San
Carlos failed, for Spain had agreed not to come to terms
without the consent of England. Ferdinand's speedy release,
even without treaty, was now assured ; the Regents were
content to await the inevitable result of a situation favourable
to all their hopes.
But San Carlos made use of his visit to Madrid to group
and organise all the forces of reaction. The Liberal element
in the new Cortes was, as has been said, much smaller than in
the former ones. The law forbidding reelection had excluded
many of the most able Liberals. The tendencies shown by
32 The Restoration (1814–1820) [CH.
the late Cortes during the last few months of their existence
had alienated the nobility and clergy. Among the newly
elected deputies were many agents of these malcontents.
Moreover, in view of the impending change, all but the boldest
found cause to conceal sympathy with the reforming party.
The Cortes, however, before adjourning (February 15), whilst
Ordering public rejoicings and thanksgivings to celebrate the
King's return, had gravely set up their paper barrier against
the great wave of popular feeling, and had ordered—in
accordance with Article 173 of their Constitution—that
Ferdinand should not regain his rights as King until he had
sworn to obey the rules laid down by his dutiful subjects for
his conduct. As well might they bid a free man be still until
duly bound.
Unconditionally set free on March 7, 1814, Ferdinand at
Once began to negotiate with the Regency. He did not at
first declare his intention, but temporised until he felt his
position assured. Thus, immediately after his liberation, he
wrote: “As for the reestablishment of Cortes, and all measures
useful to the kingdom which have been taken in my absence,
they shall have my approval in so far as they conform to my
royal purpose.” The wording of this message was purposely
vague; Ferdinand intended by it to evade the obligation of
swearing to obey the Constitution. The deputies, however,
welcomed it with a 7e Deum as an informal recognition of
their authority and their work; they prescribed the manner of
welcome to be given to the returning King, and the route to
be followed by him.
Ferdinand reentered his kingdom by the frontier of Catalonia
(March 22, 1814); and the wild enthusiasm with which he was
greeted by his people at once assured him that all necessity
for subterfuge was at an end. The return of the Weſ/beloved,
the Zong-zuished for, was to the Spaniards the visible guarantee
of their victory in the long struggle, a pledge that their land
would soon be free of the invaders, and of the allies whom
|II] The Declaration of Valencia 33
they hated hardly less. Regardless of the arrangements made
for him, Ferdinand turned aside from the route prescribed, to
visit the loyal citizens of Saragossa. At Valencia the Regents
met him ; and, after receiving from the garrison an oath to
maintain him “in the fulness of his rights,” he proceeded to
make use of the absolute power thrust by their glad subjects
into his hands. On May 4 he signed the famous Declaration
of Valencia, his answer to the claims of the Liberal party.
“Not only do I refuse to swear to observe the Constitution,
or to recognise any decrees of the Cortes, ordinary or extra-
Ordinary... but I declare Constitution and decrees alike null
and void to-day and for ever, as though they had never been,
and could be blotted out from time.” How literally Ferdinand
intended to execute his threat of “bringing back all things
into the state in which they were in 1808” was not at first
realised. For in this same decree he promised that he himself
would summon the Cortes. He formally guaranteed the freedom
of the individual and of the Press, and went on to declare,
“I hate and abhor despotism. The intelligence and culture
of Europe no longer suffer it. Never were the kings of
Spain despots, nor do her good laws and polity give them
such warrant.”
On the night before the publication of this proclamation
in Madrid (May 1o), a foretaste was given of the régime it was
meant to inaugurate, and the King's regard for the liberty of his
subjects. All prominent Liberals present in the capital were
arrested in their beds, and haled off to prison amid the jeers
of a frantic mob that yelled, “Long live the absolute King !
Long live the Inquisition | Down with the freemasons !”
Among those who thus fell into the net were two ex-Regents,
several Secretaries of State, and a large number of deputies.
Before Ferdinand's spies and troops reached Madrid, he had
been enabled to distinguish between the deputies who would
aid to reestablish absolutism and those who would not. The
former had sent him a special and significantly worded address
C. S. 3
t
34 The A’estoration (1814–1820) [CH.
of welcome, beginning pedantically, “It was the custom of the
ancient Persians.” Hence they are known in Spanish history
X
as Persas. On the other hand the King had coldly dismissed
his cousin the Cardinal de Bourbon, President of the Regency,
and had flatly refused to receive a deputation of the Cortes.
Whilst the people showed the scant esteem in which they
held those who had so freely used their name by tearing up from
the street the stones commemorative of the Constitution, this
hatred was gratified in yet another direction by a wholesale
proscription of the afrancesados or /oseſinos. By decree dated
May 3o twelve thousand of them were sentenced to perpetual
banishment. Their numbers included, together with some who
had sought to profit by the misfortunes of their country, not a
few who had been blinded to the claims of patriotism by vague
and splendid visions of universal brotherhood.
The King had now nothing more to fear from those whom
he had marked as his enemies. The army, the Church, the
nobility, and the mob supported him; but his rancour, ingratitude,
and narrow Conservatism had alienated a large number of
moderate men. Unwilling to see the royal power curtailed
to a mere form by a constitution unsuited to the national
character and tradition, these nevertheless saw with regret the
exact reestablishment of each detail of the old complicated and
ineffectual system.
The Councils of State and of Castille reassumed their former
authority; the five secretaries took the place of the seven
ministers; ecclesiastical and entailed property that had changed
hands during the war was returned to its former owners, no
compensation being given to buyers. Local and private
jurisdiction, and the Seignorial rights that weighed heavily on
twenty-five thousand villages of Spain, were revived. The
Inquisition was reestablished; it was harmless, but its very
name was still capable of rousing the fiercest passion.
Municipal and provincial assemblies established by the Cortes
were of course abolished with the rest of their work; and
II] The Tyranny 35

the captain-general again became the real instrument of
government.
As Secretaries of State, Ferdinand chose those who had
signalised themselves by zeal against Liberals, either during their
tenure of power or after their downfall; San Carlos, who had
arranged the Royalist revolution; Eguia, the fierce soldier who
had given at Valencia the first assurance that the King could
count on the army, and also later had filled the prisons of Madrid
with Liberals; Lardizabal, the Mexican Royalist, the most retro-
grade member of the first Regency. Under these the proscription
ran its course. Delation was encouraged; military tribunals,
making no pretence to impartiality, summarily condemned
suspected Liberals to imprisonment or banishment to African
penal settlements. One man was condemned to death because
he had been elected president of a club at which the murder
of the King had been discussed; in vain he pleaded and proved
that he had refused the position. Another was actually executed
for having organised and led the applause during the public
sessions of the Cortes. Conviction of suspected persons was
obtained on ridiculously inadequate evidence. Those in power,
fearing delation, sought to prove their zeal in the King's cause
by harshest severity to Liberals. The King, through the eyes of
his spies, looked into the sentences of his judges, and at times
revised them, convicting where they had acquitted. Such affairs
as he did not decide personally were referred to the Council of
Castille, which regulated questions of succession to the throne
and granted permission for village markets, acted as high court
of appeal and censor of the Press, and fixed the price of
bread.
Meanwhile Ferdinand himself and his camarilla, the inner
tribunal or counter-ministry, discussed laws and love affairs,
manolas and ministers, with equal freedom in the coarsest of
language over their cigars. The Duke of Alagón, captain of
the King's guards and companion of his nightly flittings,
shared the royal favour with Chamorro, the ex-water-carrier
3–2
36 The Restoration (1814–1820) [CH.
and low buffoon. These and men of the same accommodating
nature were his associates. But Ferdinand, with his father's
disgraceful situation ever before his eyes, never fell under the
influence of a favourite. He never concealed his contempt
for his chosen friends: he never raised them to high office
in the State. When he was pleased with them he showed his
approval by presents of cigars and sweetmeats; when he was
angry he treated them with cynical cruelty and injustice,
banishing them with a jeer to distant provinces to starve
in some tiny ill-paid office. The treatment he bestowed on
his camarilla he extended to his secretaries or ministers. None
was ever safe ; it was noticed that when the King's manner
was peculiarly affectionate he was most dangerous. Though
there were only five secretaryships, thirty secretaries came and
went between 1814 and 1820. Their dismissal generally in-
volved imprisonment or banishment; Ferdinand often gave his
opinion of the person concerned and the reason for his
dismissal in the plainest of language. Thus he characterised
one as “purblind,” another as “inept,” another as “too
clever.” He himself, by an early morning visit, surprised his
Minister of Justice, Macanaz, in bed, and banished him after a
summary examination of the papers lying loose on his writing-
desk. The newspapers were all suppressed with the exception
of the harmless Diary of Madrid and the official Gazette
(April, 1815). Only by strong political influence was per-
mission obtained to publish an inoffensive Guide to Madrid.
Foreign books were seized as far as possible at the frontier;
but they were nevertheless passed secretly from hand to hand,
and the most violently subversive of them found most favour.
A new generation was growing up, schooled by harsh oppression
to a fanaticism in the cause of liberty as exaggerated as that
of their opponents in the cause of absolutism. Their mental
food was the political Utopias of revolutionary doctrinaires,
and the early ravings of the ultra-romantic school. They
had of course no experience of public life ; their crude ideas
II] Wretched condition of Spain 37
could not even be put to the test of debate, for spies swarmed
everywhere.
Abroad Spain stood alone. Her conduct after her
delivery had forfeited the respect and sympathy of her late
allies. Great Britain made diplomatic protest against the
harsh treatment of the Liberals; the Duke of Wellington,
little as he liked their cause, interceded for them. The only
answer given to such appeals was a surly assurance that no
blood would be shed. At the Congress of Vienna Spain was
openly flouted. She was refused the position and vote of .
a first-class Power. No support was given to the claim of
a member of the royal family to the Duchy of Parma. The
district and fortress of Olivenza, near Badajoz, was assigned to
Portugal despite Spain's assertion of right. The slave-trade,
on which the prosperity of a large part of her colonies
depended, was abolished. The small and shabby contingent
under Castaños which she sent to France during the crisis
of the Hundred Days was scornfully sent back to its own side
of the frontier. Indeed the army, like the rest of the public
departments, was starved; and discontent was spreading in its
ranks at home, whilst in America it maintained a hopeless
struggle to repress the young nations there springing into life.
Serious representations had little or no weight with the King.
Appeals to his sardonic humour were at times more effective.
General Castaños appeared before him one winter’s day in the
white duck trousers of the summer uniform. The King asked
the reason for so unseasonable a dress. “Sir,” answered
Castaños, “I have just got my July pay and my July clothes.”
So shrunk and feeble was the navy that the Dutch were paid
for protecting the coast against the Barbary corsairs. In civil
life matters were no better. Seville, Cadiz, and other great
cities were full of merchants ruined by the revolt of the
colonies and the breakdown of the old system of protection.
War had been followed, as usual, by famine; and the roads
swarmed with disbanded soldiers, half beggars and half
38 The Restoration (1814–1820) [CH.
brigands. Even this condition of affairs seemed to the
majority of Spaniards preferable to the new order which the
Liberals had tried to bring in.
But the Liberals, both those at home and those in banish-
ment, as soon as they had recovered from the first shock of
their dispersion, began to plot a return to power by force of
arms. They found supporters in the guerrillero leaders of the
War of Independence; but these men, who had roused the
peasantry against the French, had lost their power so soon as
they dropped the cry of Church and King. When Espoz y
Mina attempted to seize the citadel of Pamplona, the attitude
of his Navarrese fellow-countrymen obliged him to escape to
France. A little later (Sept. 1815) Don Juan Porlier, a
brother-in-law of the Count of Toreno, on coming out of the
prison to which he had been condemned for his Liberal opinions,
proclaimed the Constitution at Corunna. He met with some
degree of support in this Liberal seaboard town; but the neigh-
bouring cathedral city was entirely under Conservative and
clerical influences. The garrison marched out against him :
Porlier's band dispersed, and left him to be dragged off by the
sergeants, whom he had often led against the French, to the
prison of the Inquisition at Santiago. He suffered death as a
felon.
The news of this revolt, headed by a member of a family
well known for its Liberal opinions but distinguished hitherto
by moderation, caused Ferdinand to review his position and
the state to which the country had been reduced. His
so-called friends were everywhere gratifying old grudges under
plea of zeal for his service; his own popularity was rapidly
waning; the prisons were full of Liberals, who for nearly two
years now had been awaiting trial. Ferdinand broke loose
from those under whose advice he had acted since his restora-
tion; he banished Canon Escoiguiz, the guide of his youth,
the deviser of the Aranjuez plot, and the companion of his
exile. Ostolaza, leader of the Royalist opposition in the Cortes,
II] A'evolts and punishments 39
followed Escoiguiz. The ministry of police, a special office
created for the punishment of the Liberals, was suppressed.
The King himself took in hand the matter of the political
prisoners. The attempt to obtain conviction for treason having
failed in more than one court, he roughly divided them into
categories and on his own authority pronounced sentence upon
a batch of fifty of them. Agustin Argüelles and Martinez de
la Rosa were sent for eight years to the wretched penal
colonies on the north African coast; their banishment from
the capital and neighbourhood of royal residences was perpetual.
The Count of Toreno was sentenced in absence to death.
The Liberal ecclesiastics who had sat in the Cortes were con-
fined in their convents or in fortresses. On this occasion
again (Dec. 15, 1815) Ferdinand published his decree only
after it had been executed, and when the untried prisoners
were already on the way to their places of punishment.
This high-handed proceeding brought protests from Great
Britain and from France. To these Ferdinand, having got his
own way, showed some outward deference. At the beginning
of the next year (1816) he appointed a slightly less anti-Liberal
ministry and decreed (Jan. 26) that all political trials should
be concluded within six months. He abolished the military
Commissions which had superseded the civil courts as less
likely to be restrained by scruples from fulfilling the royal will.
He solemnly forbade the use of the words libera/ and servile
as calculated to rouse rancour and evil memories. This
slackening of the bonds was not long maintained ; Ferdinand
was driven to further severities by the discovery of a masonic
plot against his life. The Conspiracy of the Triangle, as it
was called, was hatched in the south, where the freemasons
Swarmed and where all public men, except of the clerical party,
were affiliated to the lodges. They formed a kind of lay
opposition to the Inquisition. The freemasons were no less
ready to undergo martyrdom than the clericals. On this
occasion, though one of the sect had betrayed the plot, the
4O The Restoration (1814–1820) [CH.
utmost severity failed to trace its ramifications. On another
occasion an imprisoned freemason, pretending that he had an
important revelation to make, was led into the royal presence.
Instead of betraying a plot, as had been expected, he poured
out a startling description of the condition of Spain, a glowing
eulogy of the virtues and powers of the brotherhood, and an
exhortation to Ferdinand to join it. He was handed over to
the Inquisition.
* Concerned for his safety, the King again transferred his
confidence from the less strict to the harshest representatives
of the ultra-Royalist party. General Eguía became Minister
for War (June, 1817); Don Carlos de España was sent as
captain-general to Catalonia, General Elio to Valencia. Again
is a Liberal revolt was headed by a veteran of the war. This
time it was Luis de Lacy, ex-Captain-general of Galicia, who,
deceived as to the feeling of the army, put himself at the head
of an ill-prepared rising in Catalonia. But the people proved
indifferent to the cry of Liberty; and the army, in spite of
neglect, was still Royalist. De Lacy was captured by his friend
and companion in arms Castaños. Not daring to execute him
on the mainland, where his popularity was very great, the
magistrates transferred him to Majorca.
The requirements of an expensive though sordid court,
and the necessity for sending reinforcements to America,
created a pressing need for money. None was forthcoming;
and Ministers of Finance resigned one after another, appalled
at the state of the Treasury. The exhausted state of the
country after the war allowed of no further taxation. The
Government of the Restoration, determined to revert in all
things to traditional practice, had abandoned the new sources
of revenue impiously tapped by the Cortes. It was hoped
that one vigorous military effort might open up again the
choked springs of wealth by reestablishing the authority of the
viceroys in the revolted colonies. Some fiscal reform was
urgent; there was but one man to whom it could be entrusted
II] Revenue and expenditure 4 I
with hope of success. The King's need for money proved
stronger than the King's dislike of the financier's politics.
Martin de Garay was made Minister of Finance (December,
1816). Devoting all his ability to the task, he issued in the
following year his report upon the situation. It showed a
revenue of 24.6,ooo, ooo and an expenditure of nearly one-half
more. Of this expenditure nearly two millions were absorbed
by interest on loans contracted for the most part during the
War of Independence. The Royal Household cost about
half a million. The most ruinous charge, however, was the
War Budget. Notwithstanding the notorious inefficiency of
the department, it claimed about two-thirds of the total revenue.
Garay proposed, by suspending payment of interest on part of
the debt, and by reductions on the budgets of the departments
of State, to cut down expenditure to a little over six millions,
and to raise an additional million of revenue, one-third by a
tax on the revenues of the highest officers of State and of the
richest sees and prebends, two-thirds by direct taxation. His
project included a most useful measure—repurchase from the
farmers of the ruinous and vexatious alcabalas or gabelas, taxes
levied on all sales. For a moment these measures gave some
relief to the Treasury; but the money so hardly wrung from
the country was spent in buying from Ferdinand's patron and
protector, the Tsar, a fleet of eight ships of war to convoy
the army collecting for service in America. When the ships
reached Spain, they were found to be so rotten as to be
unseaworthy. The great expedition that was to win back the
colonies was put off. Garay's beneficial reforms never had a
fair trial. Not even his skill and devotion could save him
from the King's suspicion and caprice. Without warning and
without explanation he was torn from his bed and sent into
exile, together with his fellow-ministers Pizarro and Figueras
(September, 1818). He was the ninth Minister of Finance in
two and a half years.
Such senseless tyranny made even moderate men long for
42 The Restoration (1814–1820) [CH. II
change; and signs were not wanting that such a change was
preparing. At Valencia the Liberals conspired to seize their
scourge and tormentor, the cruel but able and energetic Elio
(January, 1819). He saved himself by his vigilance and reso-
lution; and Vidal, the leader of the conspiracy, together with
twelve of his accomplices, paid with their lives the penalty of
failure. At this time the death of his second wife, a woman
of lofty views and lovable character, removed one of the few
good influences about the King. Little more than two years
before (September, 1816), amid great popular rejoicings, he
and his brother Don Carlos had married sisters, their nieces,
Princesses of Portugal. For a time Queen Isabel succeeded in
detaching her husband from his low associates and debauchery.
The Liberals founded great hopes upon her gentle influence,
but it waned before her death. The King was a widower for
the second time and childless. Again the heir-apparent was
his brother, whose wife had borne him a son (Carlos Luis,
born 1818). Don Carlos was rightly regarded as the staunchest
champion of the Church and of absolutism. He and his able
wife, Doña Francisca, gathered round them all the devotees of
these causes, and exercised an ever-growing influence in the
Palace. This influence was hardly interrupted by the King's
third marriage, which followed ten months after the death of his
second wife. Maria Amalia, daughter of Maximilian of Saxony,
was a shadowy creature of delicate tastes. She had no influence
over her husband; she bore him no children; her life was
embittered by his coarseness and brutality. She found her
consolation in gentle piety.
CHAPTER III.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD (1820–1823).
THE downfall of Garay and the death of Queen Isabel of
Braganza were followed by a corresponding increase of
absolutist influence at court. It culminated in the appoint-
ment to the Ministry of Justice (Nov. 1, 1819) of the
Marquis of Mataflorida. He owed his title to the energy
wherewith he had upheld the King's prerogative at Cadiz, and
to the part he played in all Royalist plots against representative
government. The Liberals had cause to fear from him a
renewal of the proscriptions of four years earlier. Mataflorida
had good cause for severity; in five years five revolutionary
attempts to overthrow the Government had been made. The
spies of the Minister of Justice swarmed everywhere, even
in the masonic lodges where the plots were hatched. Spies,
however, were useless when disaffection reached the army.
In the summer of 1819 an army of 22, ooo men lay
round Cadiz awaiting embarkation for America. The ships
bought in Russia to convey the transports proved useless;
and the soldiers passed their days in idleness and growing
discontent. Many had served their time; their discharge was
due; they were wrongfully detained to be sent abroad to an
unpopular and inglorious war. Their private grievance brought
forcibly home to their minds the evils of absolute government.
They remembered the declaration of freedom and of the rights
of the individual, which Cadiz had heard eight years earlier.
44 The Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
Moreover it was felt that the war in America was no ordinary
one, but a hopeless endeavour of a few regiments to maintain
an obsolete rule over young nations entitled to freedom. This
idea and the general discontent were carefully fostered by
agents from America. Among the officers, numerous out of
all proportion to their men, and in the non-commissioned
ranks, freemasonry was general. Cadiz was ever the stronghold
of Liberals; and the Liberal agents were men as able and
active as Antonio Alcalá Galiano and Juan Alvarez Mendi-
zabal, both afterwards famous.
The general in command was Enrique O'Donnell, Count
of la Bisbal; General Sarsfield, also a veteran of the War of
Independence, was present in the camp. These, when sounded
by agents of the malcontents, both expressed sympathy and
gave it to be understood that they would cooperate when the
time for action should come. So far had negotiations gone
that the Count had already been put in possession of the
names of the principal persons implicated, when he suddenly
denounced those who had been led to consider themselves his
associates in disaffection (July 17, 1819). He received the
cross of a military order from the grateful King, but neither
he nor Sarsfield quite escaped suspicion. They were removed
from their command, and the Cadiz army was placed under
the Count of Calderon. An ex-viceroy of Mexico, grown old
and careless, Calderon was quite out of place in the hornet's
nest he had been sent to rule. The conspiracy spread among
the soldiers fostered by the civilians of Cadiz and Seville. The
plot was ripening when, in the autumn, yellow fever fell upon
the army, and it was dispersed in small detachments in the
villages of the district. This dispersal prevented the perfection
of arrangements for combined action, but it did not delay the
meditated rising.
On New Year's Day (1820), in the village of Cabezas de San
Juan, the Constitution of Cadiz was proclaimed by a subordinate
officer, Don Rafael Riego, commander or major of the Asturian
III] The revolt of Cadiz 45
Regiment. He harangued his men, explained the cause in
which their aid was sought, and at their head surprised and
captured the Count of Calderon and his staff. Riego had
acted on his own responsibility. The leader chosen by the
conspirator was Colonel Quiroga, who, when his subordinate
mutinied, was lying in prison for the share he had taken in
the former plot. Next day Quiroga was free, and presented
himself at the gate of Cadiz, hoping to be received with open
arms by his former associates. But Luis Fernandez de Córdova,
a young officer, shut himself up in the citadel with a small body
of loyal troops, and refused all dealings with the mutineers.
Rebellion spread, however, among the other regiments; and
Quiroga soon found himself surrounded by 50oo men. To say
that he commanded them would be to libel the independent
spirit befitting a revolutionary army. The general explosion
that had been expected to follow the first sparks of revolt
failed; the cities of Andalusia remained indifferent; and
Quiroga in turn was blockaded in the Isla de Leon just
outside Cadiz. At the end of the month Riego, making up in
audacity what he lacked in intellect, started inland with a
flying column of 15oo men to seek for the support without
which the movement must speedily come to an end. He failed
utterly; the cities saw him hurry through and heard without
enthusiasm his ravings about liberty. On March I I only
forty-five soldiers still held with him; and he was hotly pursued
by the royal troops on the border of Extremadura. A few
days more and Quiroga's capture would have sealed his fate,
and all would have been at an end, when suddenly news came
that, at the other end of Spain, Corunna had proclaimed the
Constitution and elected a Junta under the Liberal ex-Regent
Pedro Agar (February 21). Vigo, Ferrol and Oviedo followed
suit; next Saragossa, then Barcelona. March was not yet half
over before half Spain was in a ferment. The success of the
revolution was assured when the Count of la Bisbal, com-
manding the troops sent to hold the important strategic position
46 The Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
of Ocaña at the junction of roads to Madrid, Valencia, and
Andalusia, proclaimed the Constitution at the head of his
regiment. Eight months earlier he had broken up the plans
of the revolutionaries and handed them over to punishment;
his treachery this time left the Royalists defenceless.
At Madrid it was realised that resistance was hopeless;
Ferdinand bowed to the storm. His policy was to grant
piecemeal and grudgingly the reforms demanded, and to trust
to the rallying of the Conservative parties to restore his power.
On hearing of the defection of the northern towns (March 3),
he ordered the Council to prepare a list of suggested reforms.
Three days later, when the danger had become greater, he
announced his intention of summoning the Cortes, but without
mentioning date or place. Partial concessions and promises
were however now of no avail to save him from what he dreaded
and hated; but he waited till the troops in the capital were
already breaking out into mutiny and the palace was in danger
from the mob before he declared himself willing to swear to
observe the Constitution. The Gazette of March 6, promising
the immediate assembly of the Cortes, was followed by an
extraordinary number publishing the complete surrender of
the King, “In order to avoid delays that might arise through
questions in Council with regard to the execution of my decree
of yesterday ordering the immediate convocation of the Cortes,
and seeing that it is the general will of my people, I have
determined to take the oath to the Constitution promulgated
by the General and Extraordinary Cortes of 1812.” This
announcement, wrung from Ferdinand only by urgent repre-
sentation of his trusted adviser, General Ballesteros, was
received with the wildest rejoicings and with a gratitude
unwarranted by the fashion in which the surrender had been
made. A crowd surged up to the palace and shouted and
cheered till Ferdinand came to a balcony. The sight of the
least worthy of the kings of Spain produced transports of
delight; it seemed as if the quarrel between him and his people
III] The King's surrender 47
were over. The crowd that cheered and blessed him for his
grudging act represented the middle classes of the citizens, for
to the common folk the words Liberal and Constitutional had
as yet no meaning; their loyalty had not learnt to distinguish,
it consisted merely in obeying the King; and this the Liberals
felt when the reaction overtook them.
So Soon as they found the King tractable, the revolutionary
leaders appointed six delegates to negotiate with him. The
demands imposed were: first that the King should sanction the
restoration of the Town Council of Madrid with the same
members it had contained when swept away at his restoration,
and that he should take an oath to observe the Constitution in
its presence; secondly, that he should accept the advice of
a provisional consultative Junta until the Cortes should meet;
thirdly, that the Inquisition should be abolished. Ferdinand
had no choice but to accept. His cousin, the Cardinal de
Bourbon, Archbishop of Toledo, and late President of the
Regency, was appointed President of the Provisional Junta.
With regard to the Inquisition, the zealots of Madrid had
already taken the matter into their own hands, and had broken
into its prisons in order to set free the martyrs for religious and
political liberty whom they supposed to be there. The vaults
contained vats and casks that smelt of wine: the ceilings were
set with hooks not for torture but for the hanging of hams and
sausages. The only prisoner was a French priest whose
extravagant royalism had culminated in a crazy mysticism.
He was comfortably lodged in an attic. Indeed the Tribunal
had ceased to be formidable except as a party cry.
Pleased with their bloodless victory, the Liberals rushed off
to the Plaza Mayor hard by, to replace in the position it had
once occupied the stone of the Constitution. But, since the
original one had been hacked in pieces at the Restoration,
another was found to take its place under the supercilious gaze
of the huge equestrian statue of Philip IV; and the Liberals
betook themselves to their fantastic gambols around it.
48 The Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
Next day these candid enthusiasts, who professed to repre-
sent the nation, witnessed a still more pleasing show. The
King took the oath administered by the Archbishop of Toledo
in the presence of the Municipal Council and the Provisional
Junta. After the ceremony he appeared on the balcony of
his palace accompanied by his family, and greeted the wildly
cheering crowds with many signs of good-humour and satis-
faction. Then, signalling for silence, he said, in the half-
sneering, half-jocular tone habitual to him, “Well, now you've
got what you want; I have just sworn to the Constitution and
I shall be sure to respect my oath.” This redoubled the
enthusiasm of the crowd, but in obedience to a few words
recommending calm it at once dispersed. The Gazette of
March Io summed up the events of the last few days in words
which only the King himself would have dared to use. “The
wishes of the people and of the army having come to my
notice, I have heard their prayers, and like a tender father
have granted that which my children consider conducive to
their happiness. I have sworn to observe the Constitution,
for which you were sighing, and I shall ever be its stoutest
prop. Let us step out boldly, I at your head, along the
constitutional path!” The King's brother, friend, and adviser,
Don Carlos, was only less enthusiastic; the peroration of his
general order to the army, dated March 14, ran, “Soldiers of
all ranks, let there be but one voice among us, as there is but
one feeling; and in every danger, in every situation, let us rally
round the throne to the noble cry, Long live the King! Long
live the Nation | Long live the Constitution!”
Only men blinded by enthusiasm and drunk with unexpected
good fortune could have been misled by such protestations
coming from such lips. Not even the most fervid Radical was
shocked to find that Don Carlos put the King before the
nation and the Constitution in his proclamation. Indeed
nowhere has loyalty survived so many death-blows as in Spain.
The Liberals of 1820, like the Comuneros three hundred years
III] The Provisional /unta 49
before, were Royalists; they cried, “Hurrah for the King and
Liberty,” just as the Comuneros cried, “Long live the King,
and down with bad ministers and foreigners.” Their favourite
symbol was a picture of Ferdinand hand in hand with a stout
female who was supposed to typify the Constitution. All
parties had felt and resented the senseless and petty despotism
exercised in the King's name by even the most insignificant
public servant; all had felt the galling necessity for conformity,
real or feigned, with the prescriptions of the ultra-religious party.
Thus the Liberal group, which six years before had been so
easily broken up and thrust aside, had greatly increased its
numbers. But it was no longer homogeneous; it now contained
a faction much more radical and rash than the moderate
monarchical group on which Ferdinand's anger had fallen in
1814. These latter had taken up the burden of government
when their country was kingless and in the hands of the
invader; their ideas were crude, but they were unselfish; their
leaders were men of high character with whom a compromise
would have been possible. But the revolutionaries of 1820,
who brought back the constitution-makers from their prisons
and their exile, were conspirators; they had obtained power by
means of a mutiny, the first of a series of pronunciamientos that
for fifty years cursed their country, and of which the tradition,
alas, is not yet extinct. They in turn proved intolerant and
persecutors. It was not possible that the two wings of the
Liberal party should act together for long.
From March till July, when the Cortes met, Spain was
ruled by the Provisional Junta. One of its first measures was
to recommend to the King the choice of a ministry from
among the Liberal leaders of 1812, the doceañistas, so called
from the date, and in order to distinguish them from the new
and violent faction of the exaltados or young Liberals. Fer-
dinand's view of his own position in his kingdom is best
expressed by his homely metaphor, “Spain is a bottle of beer,
I am the cork. Without me it would all go off in froth.”
C. S. . 4.
50 The Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
His policy was, in moments of unusual fermentation, so to order
himself as to relieve pressure by letting out dangerous gases,
whilst waiting for the eruptive forces to work themselves out.
He now accepted with the best grace a ministry made up of
those whom he had ruthlessly persecuted, his “gaol-birds”
(presidiarios) as he used to call them. But these were not
the real leaders of the revolutionary party; they were regarded
as little better than retrograde and apostate by the fanatical
exaltados, who aired their fantastic theories, mistranslated from
the French, in the political clubs.
Nevertheless the ministry obtained the nominal submission
of the army and of the local Juntas that had everywhere
cropped up. They sent too a conciliatory message to the
revolted colonies, but without definite promises of redress of
grievances. The old Councils of State and of Castille were
again abolished and their places taken by a new Council made
up of friends of the new order. The Joseftmos and afrancesados
were invited to return from exile, and their confiscated property
was restored. Persons imprisoned for participation in Liberal
risings, like that of Mina, were of course released. All this
was right, or at all events natural; but a less pleasing spirit was
shown by the persecution of those members of the former
Cortes who had openly favoured Ferdinand's resumption of
absolute power. These Persas, to the number of 7o, were
stripped of their ill-won titles and decorations and confined in
convents under plea that they needed protection from mob
violence. The national militia, a violently Liberal body in
the towns, was made the guardian of the Constitution. The
whole influence of the extremists, indeed, was directed to
forcing the ministry to reproduce the situation of 1814, just
as the Royalists on their return to power had sought to restore
that of 1808. Their influence in secular matters was bad ; in
ecclesiastical matters it was disastrous. That they again
expelled the Jesuits was merely symptomatic of their Liberalism;
Charles III had done the same before; that they revived the
III] The Cortes of 1820 . 5 I
project for secularising Church property was natural, though it
shocked many. But they rendered themselves hateful and
intolerable to the majority of Spaniards when they ordered
the oath of fidelity to the Constitution to be exacted from
individuals, and made banishment and confiscation the penalty
for refusal, protest, or mental reservation. Still worse was the
establishment of Chairs of the Constitution in seminaries, and
the ordinance that the Constitution should be read from
all pulpits, “with explanation of the advantages it brings to
all classes in the State, and refutation of the calumnious
accusations whereby ignorance and malignity have sought to
discredit it.”
Before resigning its powers into the hands of the Cortes
the Junta presented a report setting forth in the strongest
terms the miserable state of the country, the emptiness of the
treasury, the lack of a fleet, anarchy, starvation, and brigandage
at home, abroad the revolted colonies and a hostile Europe.
It was ominous that the minister of the United States was the
only one of the diplomatic body who had offered his congratu-
lations to the new Government. The monarchical powers
regarded with disfavour and alarm this fresh outbreak of the
forces that had shaken the world in the Great Revolution.
In the Parliament that opened on July 9, 1820, the moderate
or doceañista party had a slight majority. This moderate
tendency was shown by the election of the Archbishop of
Seville, deputy for Catalonia, to the Presidency of its single
Chamber. Thirty substitutes to represent the American
colonies were chosen by the colonists present in Spain. Even
Buenos Ayres had its deputy, though for ten years it had been
practically independent. At the inaugural session, as was now
usual on all great occasions, the King was led out to swear to
the Constitution. Ferdinand had become quite hardened to
the ceremony. This time it was carried out with the utmost
solemnity before the ambassadors of the Powers, and the
magistrates and public bodies of the capital. The speech he
4–2
52 7%e Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
pronounced at the bidding of his ministry declared that “his
most ardent longings had been fulfilled with the dawn of the
day that saw him surrounded by the representatives of the
heroic and generous Spanish nation, and witnessed the oath
that bound his interests and those of his family to those of his
people.” Yet it was only a few hours before that Ferdinand's
relations and friends had plotted to carry him off out of the
power of his tormentors; the courage of his bodyguard had
however failed at the moment of danger.
In return for these more than benevolent expressions, the
Cortes solemnly voted that a statue of King Ferdinand, with
civic crown on head, and the roll of the Constitution in hand,
should be erected in the capital. They granted him the title
of “the Great”; an amendment to substitute “the Consti-
tutional” was defeated. Their good-will was not confined to
words alone; they granted a liberal civil list to the King and
his relatives. Moreover they released from prison his zealous
friends the Persas, though without restoring the titles won by
betrayal of the cause of liberty.
But Cortes and ministry had still to meet the daily more
urgent difficulty of the situation. They had to reckon with
their creator, Riego; to show whether he or they were to be
master. Already titles, honours, and promotion had been
lavished upon the army of Andalusia; and the fatal precedent
had been set of rewarding successful mutiny. Riego was now
general in command, and aide-de-camp to the King. Quiroga,
the other ringleader, was Vice-President of the Cortes. Riego's
weak head had been turned by flattery. He gave himself the
airs of dictator and father of his country. Nobody could
doubt the Liberalism of such ministers as the two Argüelles,
Canga and Agustin ; they had been first to recognise how
much the Revolution owed to the army of Cadiz ; but they
were no less convinced that the disbandment of the army was
necessary. When their intention became known, the Governor,
the Provincial Deputation, and the Municipality of Cadiz
III] A’zego's revolt 53
protested. The ministers hesitated; for they feared that Riego
would refuse obedience to a direct order. He yielded to
flattery, and was induced to quit his army by anxiety to lay
his views before the ministry, by the belief that the King was
desirous of making his acquaintance, and by the expressed
wish of the people of Galicia to secure so suitable a patriot
to rule over them as captain-general. On reaching the capital
the hare-brained enthusiast who had raised the devil at Cabezas
de San Juan fell into the hands of the most extravagant of his
admirers, the members of the masonic and Liberal clubs. He
had entered Madrid almost unnoticed ; he was sent outside
the gates again to return in triumph (Aug. 31) to the Town
Hall, where he was solemnly elected President of the Munici-
pality. He interviewed the ministers, and treated them with
cool insolence as his creatures; he had an audience of the
King, and outraged etiquette by reporting the royal words.
So utterly did he and his associates lack humour and dignity
that, in response to cheers in the theatre, they rose in their
places and sang the Hymn to Liberty to which Riego's name was
attached. His speeches had shown the weakness, vulgarity,
and childish vanity of the man to all but the violent and
ignorant democrats. But these, filled with all-consuming zeal,
were getting out of hand, and daily becoming more dangerous
as well as more ridiculous. Cheers for Liberty were succeeded
by curses and insults heaped on all who were known for
moderation. The Hymn of Riego was replaced by the out-
rageous Trägala, perro (Swallow it, dog) in allusion to forcing
the Constitution upon opponents. The country was falling
into the hands of the mob whilst the supposed leaders of
the Radical party, Toreno and Calatrava, were carrying on
a philosophic correspondence with Jeremy Bentham as to
the abstract principles to be embodied in the forthcoming
criminal code. The intolerable nuisance forced them to
act. The political clubs had grown accustomed, when dis-
contented with the ministry, to send it imperious orders to
54 The Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
resign. The Government tardily asserted authority by closing
the clubs, checking the right of association, depriving their
hero, Riego, of his promised captaincy of Galicia, and sending
him off to garrison duty in his native Asturias. The Cortes,
by a majority of two-thirds, supported the necessary show of
firmness. The friends of liberty, self-styled, attempted to
impeach the ministry for illegal treatment of Riego; but the
noisy meetings in the streets ceased and the wordy protests
died away after a crushing defeat of the exaltados in Congress.
A few radically worded resolutions of the House appeased the
outside mob.
But the seeming unanimity of the earlier sessions of the
Cortes was at an end. There were now three parties almost
equally balanced. The centre, moderate Liberal, or doceañista,
and conciliatory party was daily losing some of its small
majority. It was banned and hotly beset by the young
Liberals, the men who would have penalised any omission of
the word “constitutional” from the phrase “Long live the
King.” At the other extreme stood the daily increasing
absolutist and clerical party, profiting by the bitter strife of
the Liberals to organise a counter-revolution. The cry
that the Church was persecuted rallied that large section of
the people which regards political considerations as nothing
when balanced against religious ones. Nor was the cry with-
out justification. The refusal of the clergy to defend the
Constitution had been generally approved, but had been
followed by measures for reducing the number of convents
and for subjecting priests to ordinary courts. The abolition
of entail, mortmain, and fiscal exemptions affected the wealthy,
lay as well as clerical. In obedience to a letter from the Pope,
the King had vetoed the expulsion of the religious orders.
Although in so doing he was making use of a power conferred
by the Constitution, he was terrorised by an organised riot into
assent. He renewed his protest, however, each time a decree
affecting the Church was submitted for his signature; com-
III] 7%e Aºing and the reaction 55
pulsion adorned him with the aureole of a Confessor in the
eyes of the party which about the time began to be known as
“apostolic.” Working at Madrid to deliver the King from his
impious oppressors, the /unta Apostólica soon had agencies all
over Spain, and for a time it acted in conjunction with the
extreme Radical party to overthrow the moderate centre. Its
leader Fray Cirilo de la Alameda, General of the Franciscans,
was in communication with Alcalá Galiano, head of the free-
masons. Within eight months of the revolution, Morales, the
guerrillero, was holding the mountains of Ávila in the name of
the Absolute King; whilst in Saragossa, Corunna, and Madrid
itself the Royalists had given unmistakeable signs of impatience.
So rapidly did events seem tending to change that Fer-
dinand attempted a coup d’état. He had refused to preside
over the closing session of the Cortes, preferring to remain
sulkily at the Escorial, away from the importunities of his
“gaol-bird” ministry, and the hardly less distasteful cheers of
the mob. His own party was growing; the ministry, by its
well-meant attempt to check the extravagance of the clubs, had
disappointed the most energetic, who were at the same time
the most turbulent of its supporters. But Ferdinand, impatient
to be rid of his tormentors, overrated the weakness of the
Moderates when (November 16) he sent autograph orders to
the captain-general of New Castille to hand over his command
to the King's nominee. General Vigodet refused to take his
dismissal; and the King had to endure a scolding for having,
by issuing an order without endorsement of a minister, infringed
Article 225 of the hated Constitution. Worse still, the news
produced a riot in Madrid. Ferdinand was forced to face the
howling mob, who held up before his eyes Lacy's orphan child
and pressed to their hearts with wild gesticulations copies of
their idol, the Constitution. He was obliged to come out
on the well-known balcony and to smile in return for their
execrations. For the first time in history the Spaniards had
lost respect for the royal person. The King's confessor, his
56 The Constitutional Period (1820– 823) [CH.
friends and supposed advisers, were banished from court by
order of the Permanent Commission of Parliament.
Provoked by these events, and by the discovery of other
premature plots to free the King, the hot fit of the constitutional
fever came over the country again, making the exaltados masters
of the situation. The patriotic clubs were reopened; the
captaincy of Aragon was given to the egregious Riego, the
captaincies of Navarre, Extremadura, and Málaga to his
revolutionary friends. After yielding thus far, the irresolute
Government was forced once more to retrace its steps and
check growing anarchy. The strategic positions of the capital
were held by soldiers, whilst the patriotic clubs were again
closed. On the other hand bishops were exiled for publicly
and violently calumniating the new order. They withdrew,
volleying excommunications, mostly to the French frontier,
where Quesada and other Royalists were plotting with the
connivance of Ferdinand, and under the hardly concealed
protection of the French Government. The crowds that
daily assembled before the palace to cheer the Constitution
now did so in order to insult the King. When the bodyguard
ventured to interfere, it was blockaded in its barracks by the
mob, disarmed, and dissolved. The situation was becoming
intolerable; the King complained to the Council of State that
the ministry encouraged demonstrations against him. A month
later (March, 1821), the Cortes prorogued in the autumn
reassembled; and Ferdinand, by order of his ministry, read
before it a speech breathing ardent Liberalism. At the end
of it, however, he added a paragraph of his own complaining
that he was not defended against the mob. After thus
arraigning them before Parliament, he formally dismissed the
ministers, who were already hastening to abandon an untenable
position. He then carried still further his cunning plan of
dividing parties by requesting the Cortes to nominate a new
ministry, and pronounced a panegyric on the retiring “gaol-
birds.” The Cortes refused the invidious task and referred
III] The Congress of Verona 57
the King to the Council of State. By praising them, the Cortes
censured the King ; but, by failing to support them or to
nominate their successors, the Cortes abdicated its power.
The Council of State chose a colourless Cabinet, that showed
its apprehension of coming change by making death the
penalty for conspiracy against the Constitution, the King, or
the Catholic faith.
The Spanish Revolution of 1820 had been followed by
revolutions in Naples, in Portugal, and in Piedmont. The
events foreseen by the Holy Alliance (September, 1815) had
come to pass. It only remained to decide in what manner
Russia, Prussia, and Austria should interfere and suppress, as
they had bound themselves to do, the ill-regulated Liberalism
of the extreme west. The Tsar's plan of marching through
France to the rescue of King Ferdinand raised insuperable
difficulties. But, when the plenipotentiaries of the Alliance met
at Verona (October, 1822), the Congress, under the influence
of Metternich, decided upon intervention. At first France
hung back, fearing to place herself in opposition to Great
Britain. But the revolutionary Government on the other side
of the Pyrenees was a menace to her own restored dynasty.
She accepted the position of mandatory of the Powers in the
cause of monarchy and legitimacy, hoping that a campaign,
if necessary, would attach her army to the fleur-de-lys and
make it forget the republican and imperial tricolour. Lord
Castlereagh refused the aid of Great Britain in compelling
Spain to moderate her Liberalism. Canning, his successor,
lodged a formal protest against the proposed action of the
Powers, declared that the British guarantee to protect Spain
referred to territory and not to any form of government, and
from that time became the peaceful friend of the moderate
Spanish Liberals.
Long before details as to the form of intervention were
decided, the fact that it would come sooner or later was
assured; and this knowledge still further embittered the party
58. The Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
struggle in Spain. The constitutionals, knowing that their
time was short, became persecutors, and banished those who
were suspected of intriguing abroad, chiefly officers and eccle-
siastics. Some of the Royalists had not waited for foreign
help. In the spring of 1821 El Empecinado had to fight a
regular battle at Salvatierra against the soldier-priest Merino,
leader of the Catholics and absolutists of the north. In
Madrid the mob, directed by the clubs, endeavoured not so
much to check reaction, or to prevent reconciliation between
the Liberal factions, as to make government impossible. A
half-mad priest named Vinuesa, a scurrilous adversary of
Liberalism, had been condemned to ten years' penal servitude.
The sentence, though severe, did not satisfy the mob. They
tore him from his prison, tried him in a mock court in the
Puerta del Sol, the most public place in the capital, and put
him to death with brutal outrage. The spread of anarchy was
after this momentarily checked by the appointment of General
Morillo to the captaincy of New Castille. Morillo's impar-
tiality was as well known as the courage he had shown in the
struggle to retain Venezuela for Spain. But affairs moved in a
vicious circle; each excess of the extremists necessarily pro-
voked repressive measures from the responsible ministers;
each time repressive measures were used, the extremists grew
more violent, alleging that the conquests of the Revolution
were being taken back piecemeal by its pretended friends.
The Cortes were prorogued on June 30, after voting the
thanks of the nation and additional pensions to Riego and
Quiroga. They passed also an elaborate law on public educa-
tion, primary, secondary, and university, but set aside no funds
for its realisation. Indeed their chief preoccupation had been
the daily more desperate financial condition of the country.
Lack of money made necessary the reduction of the army,
which consumed more than half the revenue. A Liberal national
militia, three for each four hundred souls, would, it was hoped,
supply the place of the conscripts. Garay’s proposal of a
III] Vacillation of the Cortes 59
direct tax to produce nearly two million pounds a year was
adopted. A large amount of land in mortmain was secular-
ised, as also was half the tithe, amounting to about a quarter
of a million yearly, and belonging in part to laymen. A
French army was waiting fully prepared by the passes of the
Pyrenees; called at first a cordon sanitaire, it became, when
yellow fever died out of Catalonia, a corps of observation.
Its presence emboldened the militant Royalists in Spain, and
those who from their headquarters at Bayonne were in secret
communication with the King. He on his side created every
possible difficulty for his well-meaning ministry. Again he tried
the effect of making an appointment on his own responsibility,
this time to the all-important Ministry for War. He was in-
duced to desist by a threat that the Cabinet would resign,
leaving him in the hands of the exaltados, who now intrigued
with the French revolutionaries just as the Royalists intrigued
with their opponents. When their idol, Riego, by outrageous
vapouring, incurred deprivation of his command in Aragon, they
provoked in Madrid the riot known as the battle of Las Platerías
(September 18, 1821). Its issue was indecisive, and signs grew
more threatening as St Rafael's Day" (October 24) drew near.
Radical demonstrations, prepared in all the large towns,
were forbidden by the Government and prevented in the
capital by show of force. But the governors of Seville and
Cadiz allowed them; and Corunna, Valencia, and Cartagena
nearly broke out in rebellion. Once more the ministry was
reluctantly obliged to assert its wavering authority. The
disobedient governors were recalled, but they refused to obey
and appealed to the mob and to the Cortes, assembled
(September 24) for an extraordinary autumn session. A
Commission of Enquiry censured the governors for their dis-
obedience, and the ministry for its weakness in dealing with
* Because Rafael was the Christian name of Riego; and his “name-day”
was looked forward to as likely to be a time of tumult. [W. H. H.]
6o 7%e Constitutiona/ Period (1820–1823) [CH.
them. The vote was adopted by a majority of two to one in
the Cortes. The King, acting on the advice of the Council,
accepted the resignation of the Cabinet, and put a temporary
one in office pending the approaching general election.
The victory of the extremists at the polls was now assured;
it involved King, ministry, and even the deputies excluded
by the Constitution from reelection, in a common danger.
No moderate men were left to succeed the doceañistas when
the period fixed by law for the dissolution of the Cortes of
1820 approached. Dreading the coming of Riego and his
friends, King and ministers made such preparation as they
might for the evil day. They passed laws to check the licence
of the Press, and to prevent abuse of the constitutional right
of petition. They proposed to close once more the political
clubs, but their scheme was rejected by the Cortes. It had
the effect of bringing the hatred of the mob on its authors,
Martinez de la Rosa and the Count of Toreno. Their houses
were wrecked and their lives in danger from their former
friends. Ten days later (February 14, 1822) the Cortes were
dissolved. They left an enduring mark on Spain by dividing
it into fifty-two provinces or departments after the French
fashion.
The new Cortes, elected amidst the fiercest party strife, were
different from any that Spain had hitherto seen. Not a single
bishop was among the deputies; few were men of title. The
majority were lawyers and journalists. They showed their
principles by taking Riego for their President, and making his
hymn the national anthem. The doceañistas had disappeared
from the Cortes; they reappeared in the ministry. The Con-
stitution forbade reelection; it forbade also the selection of
ministers from among the dignitaries; so the “gaol-birds” were
ready to the King's hand when he sought a President of the
Council. His choice fell upon the one for whom he professed
a half-contemptuous regard, Martinez de la Rosa, “little Rose
the Sweet-stuff maker,” as he jocosely called that honest but
III] - 7%e second Cortes 6 I
somewhat wearisome reformer. The Cabinet undertook the
impossible task of governing without a majority in the Cortes.
The Constitution forbade the presence of the ministers in
Congress. Their spokesman was the somewhat faded patriot
Argüelles; the leaders of the Opposition were Alcalá Galiano
and the young Liberal group under Ángel de Saavedra. Under
such inspiration the Cortes voted statues to the Comuneros and to
the champions of the liberties of Aragon, whom they considered
their political forefathers. Fearing bribery and corruption, they
made it penal for a deputy to enter any building in which a
Government office was situated. They ordered the bishops to
demonstrate in pastorals the conformity of the Constitution to
Holy Writ, and to report monthly to the governors of provinces
on the political attitude of individual priests. Oppressive as
were some of these laws, they were not so violent as had been
feared from the composition of the Cortes that framed them.
The newspapers too that sprang up, so soon as repressive
measures were removed, were mostly moderate in tone. There
was, however, a minority of ever-changing extremist publications,
all short-lived, some witty, some scurrilous, which by pouring
out foul abuse and attributing the worst of motives did much
to corrupt the people and embitter the future. The absolutists
and clericals had no Press. To have expressed their views and
intentions would have brought on them the speedy vengeance
of the exaltados. They plotted in secret and in silence.
In Congress the rules of procedure produced a fierce
wrangle ; and a heated contest took place over a motion to free
property from mortmain and entail. When passed, it was
vetoed by the King; but it nevertheless finally became law by
being returned three times from the House as the Constitution
demanded. By it the accumulation of property by mortmain
was made illegal : half of all entailed estates became the
property of the actual holder and the other half was freed to
his successor. An attempt was made to put in practice the
elaborate rules laid down for self-government by the Depu-
N.
62 The Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
tation in the provinces and the Municipalities in the com-
IIllir 16S.
The King had for the moment abandoned his attempts to
fulfil his wishes by a coup d'état. He had taken up an attitude
of passive resistance, protesting as far as was safe when he
considered the interests of the Church to be affected. Of his
devotion to the cause of the Church there can be no doubt.
Even as a stroke of policy, the combination of the causes
of Catholicism and Absolutism was masterly. He represented
himself to the Holy Alliance as a martyr to the cause of
monarchy. His agents represented to Louis XVIII that he
sought only to govern with a moderate Constitution like the
French Charte. In support of their contention they were able
to point to the fact that Liberals like Toreno and Martinez de
la Rosa supported him against the extremists. The programme
of these Moderates was now indeed reactionary, including, as it
did, an aristocratic senate, removal of all restrictions on the
King's right of veto, abolition of the Permanent Commission of
Cortes, and imposition of curbs on the Press and the political
clubs. But those whom Ferdinand himself regarded as his
true friends were Eguía and the ultra-Royalists plotting and
negotiating at Bayonne, and the armed bands which swarmed
over the provinces bordering on the Pyrenees, and had
appeared even in Castille and La Mancha. Whilst the Cortes
protested to the King against “the slow progress of the
constitutional system” (March 24, 1822), it was lack of com-
bination rather than lack of zeal that prevented the Spanish
Royalists from effecting without foreign aid his “liberation.”
At Aranjuez and at Valencia attempts at revolt were suppressed
by the militia (May 30, 1822). A little later (June 21) the
Apostolic Army of the Faith, commanded by a Trappist monk,
seized the fortified city of La Seo de Urgel, near the frontier of
French Cerdagne. The religious title of their force was not
meant to conceal its political mission; the cause of Church
and King were thoroughly identified. La Seo formed the
III] Mutiny and change of Ministry 63
rallying point of the scattered Royalist bands in Catalonia and
of the Apostolic Junta of the north. Here, under the protection
of France, a Regency was established, consisting of the Marquis
of Mataflorida, the Archbishop of Tarragona, and Baron Eroles
(August 15). It received from King Ferdinand authority to
rescue the altar and the throne. It followed precedent by
declaring null and void all laws and decrees promulgated since
the rebellion of 1820.
Immediately after the capture of Urgel by the Royalists, six
battalions of the Royal Guard mutinied at Madrid and held
the Plaza de Oriente, the square in front of the palace. Then,
leaving two battalions to guard the King and ministers, the rest
of the guards marched off to the royal shooting lodge of
El Pardo, about six miles distant. The King could barely
conceal his delight. When his blockaded ministers tendered
their resignation, he not only refused to accept it but threatened
to hold them personally responsible for events which he chose
to attribute to their fault. Meanwhile the energetic Liberals
prepared to resist the attempt of a single corps to impose their
will on Madrid and on Spain. The Liberals could count upon
the support of some line regiments as well as that of the
militia and the volunteers under Evaristo de San Miguel. All
these were under arms when, on July 7, the guards from
El Pardo tried to surprise the capital. A skirmish in the
streets ended in complete victory for the Liberals; the guards
were cut down, or captured whilst trying to escape to the open
Country.
Far from showing any desire for vengeance on the King,
who had in all probability encouraged the mutiny, the Liberals
laid down their arms at his bidding. They insisted, however,
that the Moderate ministry should give place to a more frankly
constitutional one. Accordingly the resignation of Martinez de
la Rosa was accepted when tendered for the tenth time, and
his place was taken by Evaristo de San Miguel. The Ministry
“of the Seven Patriots” removed from court the friends and
64 7%e Constitutiona/ Period (1820–1823) [CH.
associates of the King; they also refused to allow him to leave
Madrid, knowing that his visits to the Escorial, San Ildefonso,
or Aranjuez, were spent in plotting. The Municipal Council
of Madrid warned the King that his Household was “believed
to be made up of unwearying conspirators against liberty.”
The Council of Castille urged upon him the necessity for
publicly disavowing the rash attempt of the guards; and this
he did, for he never scrupled to sacrifice his friends. Even
Riego was listened to with perfidious good grace when he
forced his most unwelcome good advice upon the King. The
Liberals triumphed noisily : they held a mighty banquet; they
celebrated a public funeral over those who had fallen in
defending Madrid; and they limited their vengeance to the
execution of two soldiers of the guard convicted of murdering
a Liberal officer. The constitutionalists of Valencia however
seized the opportunity of putting to death as a felon their late
governor, General Elio. The charges brought against him
were absurdly weak, and supported by fabricated evidence.
His real crime was his Royalist convictions, his share in the
overthrow of the Liberals in 1814, and his harsh severity to
opponents. He died with a lofty resignation which shamed
even his enemies.
The situation was now clear. The Moderate party, weary
of being treated with distrust and contempt by both Royalists
and exaltados, withdrew from the struggle on the resignation
of Martinez de la Rosa. The two extremes were immediately
face to face. The exaltados held the seals of office and con-
trolled the royal person. The Royalist and Apostolic party in
arms had established an opposition government at Urgel.
The Powers had threatened to avenge lack of respect towards
the King. After a great effort, the Royalist regency was dislodged
from its stronghold by the brave guerrillero Espoz y Mina.
His presence gave heart to the Liberal troops, his approach
terrified the Regents; they withdrew to France (Nov. 28, 1822),
and in their absence Urgel was captured. But, in order to
III] Intervention of the Powers 65
furnish Mina's little army, great districts had been stripped of
troops. Merino the priest harried the plains of Castille ;
Bessières, another Royalist free lance, threatened first Saragossa
and then Madrid. At Brihuega (Jan. 24, 1823) he defeated
the troops sent against him, and captured their artillery. The
capital was panic-stricken by the prospect of falling into the
hands of the ruthless Royalist volunteers.
Meanwhile the fate of Spain was being decided at the
Conference of Verona (October, 1822). The French repre-
sentatives, Montmorency and Chateaubriand, obeying their
private convictions rather than instructions, insisted on the
necessity for intervention. The Duke of Wellington failed to
take up a decided attitude, but dropped hints as to the way
in which the military occupation of Spain might be most easily
effected. After a proposal for corporate action had been
dropped, commission was given to crush the revolution in
Spain (November, 1822). The Powers agreed to withdraw
their ambassadors simultaneously and to lend moral support.
Great Britain declared her neutrality and vainly offered
arbitration.
At the beginning of the new year (Jan. 6, 1823) identical
notes from Russia, Prussia, and Austria ordered Spain to
change her Constitution, threatening punishment in case of
refusal. The French message was less harshly peremptory, but
its meaning was no less clear. In reply to the northern Powers,
the Spanish Government haughtily denied their right to interfere
in Spain's domestic affairs. To France it protested against the
open encouragement given to a faction bent on overthrowing
the established system. For a moment France hesitated; the
Left did its best to prevent war, but the Right under Chateau-
briand triumphed, for the French middle class was Spain's
creditor for many million francs, and was eager to insure her
stable government.
Ten days after delivering their notes, the ambassadors
demanded their passports; and on January 25 King Louis
C. S. 5
66 7%e Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [c
announced to the French Chambers that “a hundred thousand
soldiers under the command of the Duke of Angoulême were
about to march, invoking God and St Louis, to save the throne
of Spain to the descendants of Henri IV, and to bring that
fine kingdom into agreement with Europe.” In vain Canning
disputed the right of one nation to make its political example
a rule for another. In vain he protested that kinship between
reigning families was insufficient ground for intervention. His
advice was disregarded; he abstained from threats, for the ideas
of the Spanish Liberals were as yet too wild and their tenure of
power too insecure to warrant alliance with them. Moreover,
England's interests and sympathies were with the young nations
forming in America; and these regarded the Spanish Liberals as
hardly less their enemies than the Royalists. The United States
had already recognised the Spanish-American Republics. The
Monroe Doctrine was published in the President’s Message,
Dec. 2, 1823.
The news of coming invasion was greeted in Madrid by a
theatrical and hysterical reconciliation between the Liberal
leaders, moderate and extremist. So great an opportunity
for orations on patriotism and national independence was not
wasted by Alcalá Galiano, Saavedra, and Argüelles. Then,
turning to material concerns, the Cortes approved a loan of
24, 1,500,ooo and conscription of thirty thousand men. They
divided Spain into five military districts, appointing Mina to
command in Catalonia, Ballesteros in Navarre, Morillo in
Galicia, Villacampa in Andalusia, and La Bisbal in the
Madrid district. Generals, as usual, abounded ; troops and
money were scarce.
That the Government had but little faith in these most
inadequate preparations was shown by its request to the Cortes
for permission to quit Madrid in case of necessity. The Cortes
agreed; not so the King. With his liberators now near at hand,
he would not accept a measure that prolonged his captivity in
the hands of the Seven Patriots. He also refused to take part
III] The French invasion 67
in the ceremony of prorogation of the Cortes (February 19),
and when, in view of his obstimacy, the ministry sent in its
resignation, he accepted it. But a dangerous spirit was aroused
by the evident resolve of the King to hinder any measures that
might be taken to defend the country against the invaders.
The news of the resignation of San Miguel and his Colleagues
produced cries of “Death to the Tyrant!” and clamours for a
Regency. The Cabinet consented to remain in office, and Once
more to face the insoluble problem.
Still Ferdinand exhausted every device in order to be
allowed to await his deliverers in Madrid. He pretended illness;
he fomented mutiny; and his agents provoked riots. But the
ministers were inexorable; and at last (March 20) he set out for
Seville accompanied by the great officers of State and the
Permanent Commission of the Cortes. Hardly was the
Government established in its new quarters when (April 7)
the overwhelming and splendidly equipped French army
crossed the Bidassoa, on what they considered a military
promenade rather than a campaign. Saragossa, the heroic
city of the great siege, fell with hardly a struggle; and in May
the Duke of Angoulême entered Madrid. It was a rude
awakening for the more ignorant Spaniards. For a legend
had grown up around the great War of Independence. The
younger generation had come to believe that their fathers had
beaten the great Emperor, invincible until he set foot in Spain.
They chose to forget the help lent by England and Portugal
against a part merely of the armies of France. Against Napoleon,
Spain, if not united, was at least less rent by faction. But now
the Spanish refugees under Eroles, Eguia, O’Donnell, Quesada,
and the Count of España, marched with the Duke ; and, when
he reached the interior, he was joined by Royalist irregulars
under Merino and Bessières.
The Liberal generals, with one exception, were overawed or
turned traitors. Ballesteros made no attempt to dispute the
passage of the Pyrenees. The French marched past San
5–2
68 7%e Constitutional Period (1820–1823) [CH.
Sebastian and Pamplona, leaving small detachments to block
these fortresses in accordance with the hints let fall by the
Duke of Wellington at Verona. La Bisbal, instead of defending
the gorges of Guadarrama, published a political manifesto, and,
when deprived of his command by his subordinates, gladly
hurried out of Spain. The main body of his troops withdrew
into Extremadura, but before doing so they humanely left
behind sufficient force to keep off the Royalist guerrilleros from
the capital until the arrival of the French. Thanks to fear of
native champions of the Faith and of absolutism, the Duke
was welcomed with open arms. One of his first cares was to
post French guards over the houses of known constitutionalists.
The Royalists, baffled of vengeance for a time, turned their
fury upon the stones of the Constitution and hacked them
in pieces.
One Spanish city, Corunna, defended itself; but its patriots
disgraced their cause by a brutal massacre of Royalist prisoners.
One Spanish general, Mina, did his duty. The troops he
commanded could not meet the French in pitched battle, so
the old guerri//ero betook himself once more to the tactics with
which he had often baffled armies. Once he actually crossed
the frontier into Cerdagne, but little by little he was driven
back from the mountains until at last he was shut up in
Barcelona. Here he held out until he obtained honourable
terms for his men, and for himself opportunity to withdraw to
England (November 7). A month or more before Mina's
surrender, the French had completed their mission.
Before leaving Madrid for the south, the Duke of Angoulême,
whose action throughout was wise and conciliatory, called upon
the Council of Castille, the highest traditional authority, to
appoint a Regency to govern in the King's name until he
should be free. The Regency gave a foretaste of what might
be expected from its party when restored to power by disband-
ing and blotting from the army list the two regiments that had
ventured to protect Madrid from the half-wild followers of
III] 7%e King carried off to Cadiz 69
Bessières. At the same time it enrolled as royal volunteers all
the irregular bands levied by the King's men, dissolved the
Liberal national militia and declared its members incapable of
holding any public office. The Regency refused to recognise
anything that had happened since March, 1820, and as far as
possible reconstituted the circumstances of that date.
Whilst this was going on in the capital, the Liberal Govern-
ment at Seville passed its time in bickerings and recriminations;
and ministries rose and fell almost daily. Soon the news that
the French were pouring into Andalusia through the pass of
Despeñaperros obliged those about the King to seek a fresh
place of refuge. They chose Cadiz, the home of Liberalism,
with the open sea at its back. But the King refused to quit
Seville; no representations could overcome his obstinacy; and
at last the difficulty had to be met by the most dangerous
constitutional make-believe. On the proposal of Alcalá Galiano
the ministry and the Permanent Commission decided that the
King, by refusing to take measures to avoid falling into the
hands of his enemies, had shown himself to be in a state of
incapacity. But for incapable kings the Constitution provided
that a Regency should act. Accordingly a Regency was
appointed and carried off the King by force to Cadiz
(June 15). Their departure was followed by yells of Viva
/a Aceligion / and Viva el Acey Aſso/uto ſ and Seville welcomed
the French in all gladness as they passed by on their way to
Cadiz. & -
Three days after its appointment, having conveyed the
King to a place of comparative Safety, the Regency restored
to him the limited powers he possessed under the Constitu-
tion, declaring him to be now again in a fit state to exercise
them. On August 16 the Duke of Angoulême arrived before
Cadiz.: the glory of setting free the King had been reserved by
his courtly officers for him. The siege was not a long one :
strong as was its position, the Spanish garrison was no match
for the French force backed by the sympathies of most of Spain
70 7%e Constitutiona/ Period (1820–1823) [CII.
and conscious of fighting under the eyes of Europe. Still,
Something had to be done to save honour; and done it was.
Once more the conscript fathers of Spain deliberated within
hearing of cannon. The Trocadero fort ſell, but still the city
held out. But at the end of September the whole fiction of a
nation in arms defending its King against heated invaders in
the last corner of its territory was suddenly abandoned ; and
Ferdinand received from the Permanent Commission leave to
go where he would. The populace, however, knowing the
temper of their “beloved King,” refused to let him join “the
enemies of his country” until he had promised to pardon such
of his own subjects as were guilty of holding Liberal opinions;
to recognise public debts contracted in his name; to maintain
all officers of the army in the rank they had attained under the
constitutional régime; and to allow the national militia to dis-
perse unmolested to their homes. Ferdinand, in his haste to be
out, promised all that was asked of him : on October 1, 1823,
he accepted the formal resignation of the ministry, and joined
his cousin Angoulême at Puerto de Santa Maria.
From the moment of its appointment, the Regency of
Madrid had lent its aid to the self-constituted “Juntas of Purifi-
cation” in sweeping away the last traces of Liberalism or non-
conformity. That it should condemn to death the deputies
who had momentarily deposed the King was to be expected as
a token of its zeal. But the banishments and imprisonments
intended to prepare the way for Ferdinand's return reached
such a number that the French prince felt bound in honour to
interfere. He gave orders (Aug. 8, 1823) that all unconvicted
prisoners should be set at liberty, and that no further arrests
should be made without the consent of the French military
authorities. But their interference with national independence
—supported by foreign bayonets—caused such an uproar
among the Spanish patriots that the order was withdrawn, and
the Liberals abandoned to their fate. Then Ferdinand himself
came to join in the work of “vengeance.” Forgetful of his
III] The źng restored to power 7 I
flowery phrases about leading his people in constitutional paths,
he declared himself absolute King as soon as he set foot on
shore at Puerto de Santa Maria. Forgetful of his promise
given a few hours before at Cadiz, he sentenced to death the
Regents who for three days usurped his power and by dragging
him to Cadiz added nearly four months to his weary captivity.
He banished for ever from the capital and from the neighbour-
hood of the royal residences all members of the late administra-
tions, and all who had been enrolled in the national militia.
Following the bad example of the Radicals, he sought to use the
pulpit as a means of political propaganda; but now the majority
of the clergy welcomed the missions whose duty it was to
expose the wickedness and error of Liberalism.
The Duke of Angoulême left Spain in disgust. Thanks to
his connivance, the members of the three days' Regency were
already beyond the reach of the King's vengeance. It fell,
however, upon the wretched Rafael Riego, the vain puppet of
the revolution who fancied himself its leader. He had escaped
from Cadiz during the blockade, and had started in pursuit of
a gigantic scheme for rallying Spain to arms in the rear of the
invaders. But the officers to whom he applied either saw the
impracticability of his plan or, bound by the capitulations they
had agreed to, refused to listen to him. His Royalist fellow-
countrymen hunted him through La Mancha, arrested him in the
Sierra Morena, and forwarded him to Madrid to be dealt with
by the Regents. A complete recantation failed to save him.
He died begging the pardon of the Church, the King, and all
Spaniards for the crimes and excesses of his life. His execution
early in November prepared the way for the King's triumphal
return to his capital.
CHAPTER IV.
THE DAYS OF CALOMARDE (1823–1833).
WHEN released, Ferdinand made his confessor, Saez, uni-
versal minister. A month later he appointed a more regular
ministry. Its first President died shortly after appointment.
His place was taken (Jan., 1824) by the Count de Ofalia.
It was under Ofalia that Francisco Tadeo Calomarde became
Minister of Justice. Calomarde's hated name has become
attached to the whole of the ten years that passed between
the French intervention and Ferdinand's death ; it is called the
Calomardean epoch, and remembered as a time of persecution
and proscription, of spy-rule and reckless tyranny. Ferdinand
never forgave the insults which the Liberals had inflicted on
him ; he was constitutionally insensible to pity. Calomarde
was the zealous executor of his vengeance. As though the
facts were not dark enough, a legend has grown up round the
dreaded minister; and incredible stories are told of his hypocrisy,
cynicism, and baseness, Calomarde was an upstart; it was said
that he had been a footman. The truth is that he was the son
of an Aragonese peasant-farmer, and had been sent to the
university by charity. He became an advocate and settled in
Madrid. He sought election to the Cortes of 18 Io, but, failing
to secure it, he became secretary to Lardizabal, the ultra-
Royalist Minister of Justice of the first Regency. As a Persa
he welcomed the King's return, and he suffered persecution
from the Liberals during their brief rule. At its end he came
out of hiding, and his ill-omened figure reappeared behind the
CH. Ivl Persecution of the Liberals 73
French bayonets. He was employed as secretary to the Regency
during the French occupation of Madrid. His zeal against the
fallen Liberals was so marked as to attract the attention of the
King; he was recognised as a man after Ferdinand's own heart,
and for ten years occupied to his master's satisfaction the
Ministry of Justice, exercising a tyranny so harsh as to make
that which preceded the Revolution seem light by comparison.
The Royalists sought to exterminate the Liberals. They drove
into exile all who were able to flee the country, they massacred
many at their first onslaught, and they deliberately hunted
down the rest.
When the Russian and French ambassadors protested
against the ruthless and senseless cruelty the work was already
half done. Satisfied momentarily with the punishment inflicted
upon his late tormentors, Ferdinand published a decree mis-
named an amnesty (May 20, 1824). Most of those who had
taken part in the revolutionary Government found themselves
in one or another of the fifteen categories of exclusions from
its benefits—that is to say, those who were still alive, for the
previous autumn had seen one hundred and twelve executions
in eighteen days, and since then the work of destruction had
been going on. Calomarde it was who, working in conjunction
with the ferocious courts-martial, superseding civil justice,
inflicted death as the penalty for subversive cries, for possession
of a portrait of Riego, for defacing an inscription “Long live
the Absolute King !”, for any matter, however trivial, that might
serve to show that the accused had Liberal leanings. Suspected
persons had to clear themselves by the process known as
“purification.” Summoned before a tribunal that did not even
pretend to be unprejudiced, they were called upon to account
for and justify their acts during the time the King's authority
was in abeyance. All who held or sought public employment
had to undergo purification unless they belonged to the puri-
fiers; from professors of the university to militia-men, none of
those whom delators chose to name escaped.
74 The Days of Calomarde (1823–1833) [CH.
The moderate Royalists, Zea Bermudez and Luis Fernan-
dez de Córdova, at length petitioned for abolition of the courts-
martial, “which daily assume more and more the character of
instruments of fierce and hideous vengeance.” To representa-
tions such as these Calomarde replied by decrees such as that
of October, 1824, expressing the determination “to stamp out
for ever from Spanish soil the last and faintest trace of the idea
that sovereignty can reside elsewhere than in the Royal Person.”
He called upon all public servants expressly to deny “the
absurd principle that the people has a right to change the
established form of government.”
But at last Ferdinand was obliged to give ear to the
repeated remonstrances of his own subjects, backed by the
representations of the diplomatic body. The courts-martial
were closed, and General Aymerich, their ferocious president,
was dismissed from the Ministry for War (June 13, 1825). By
this time the process of undoing and blotting out the past had
gone so far that university degrees and licences to practise
obtained under the Constitutional Government were revoked,
and advocates, doctors, and even veterinary surgeons were called
upon to undergo purification and reexamination.
But each time the rigour of persecution was relaxed the
discovery, or pretended discovery, of some plot served as a suffi-
cient excuse for those whose interest it was to bring back the
Terror. Ofalia had been succeeded (July, 1824) by the more
moderate Zea Bermudez, and the so-called Ten Years' Ministry,
but Calomarde stood as high in the royal favour as before,
and watched with exquisite care over his master's safety. It
was guaranteed by the Royalist volunteers, and by the French
troops, who continued in receipt of Spanish pay, to occupy the
fortresses of the Peninsula. The greater part of the regular
army had been disbanded, partly because economy was urgent,
and partly because many of its officers were suspected and
feared. Even those of the Royal Guard were replaced by boys
so young that a wit posted a notice: “Wanted. A few wet-
Iv] Aoya/ist dissatisfaction 75
nurses to finish off the officers of the Royal Guard.” Special
rigour was shown towards the guerrillero leaders of the War of
Independence, Liberals for the most part as springing from the
people, but guiltless of plotting, and guileless as they were
brave. Mina was safe in France, but the hardly less famous
Juan Martin (el Empecinado) fell an easy prey to the delators.
He died hideously, fighting with the hangman after an almost
Superhuman effort to escape (Aug., 1825). The universities,
and all clubs, political and social, were closed, as hatching-
grounds of plots or centres of bewildering false enlightenment.
Yet they were for the most part harmless enough. The
University of Cervera began its loyal address with the words
“Far from us the dangerous novelty of thinking !”
Indeed, the Liberals were, for the moment, utterly crushed.
The danger now came from the other side, from the Catholic
and Royalist extremists. Ferdinand’s “amnesty” had seemed to
impartial observers to deserve rather the name of proscription-
list, but it gave the greatest dissatisfaction to those who had
brought about his liberation. His refusal to reestablish the
Inquisition caused horror and alarm. Was the King then an
atheist as well as a Liberal P Those who had been his obedient
servants, so long as the word was “Kill and plunder,” mutinied so
soon as they were bidden to hold their hands. The King had
established the Secret Junta of State to enquire into the conduct
of suspects; his faithful subjects, headed by the Bishop of
Osma, went beyond his zeal. They founded and spread all
over the country the “Society of the Exterminating Angel,”
the very name of which is sufficient explanation of its objects.
When he grew weary and refused to sanction their frantic
excesses, they began to look to his brother Don Carlos as the
representative of true religion and sound policy. Most dan-
gerous among the malcontents were the officers deprived of
their commissions by the reduction of the army. Some of
them had been among the most determined enemies of
Liberalism, and had headed revolts to rescue the King; they
76 The Days of Calomarde (1823–1833) [CH.
now considered themselves entitled to every kind of favour by
reason of their uncompromising and loudly expressed views on
political and religious questions. Their disappointment cul-
minated in rebellion in the neighbourhood of the capital
(Aug., 1825). Their leader was Georges Bessières, a French-
man by birth and sometime a republican, who had distinguished
himself as the first to rise against the Constitution in 1820.
Now again the plea of the rebels was that the palace was ruled
by freemasons, and that the Constitution was about to be
proclaimed. Only a few Royalist volunteers chose to believe
it and to take arms. They were captured among the pinewoods
of Cuenca ; Bessières himself, with seven others, was shot by
the King's order. Ferdinand, delighting to make himself the
instrument of the irony of fate, had entrusted the congenial
task of hunting down and destroying his so-called friends to
the Count of España, the harshest and most unbending of
Royalists. Not long afterwards the King was able to show his
impartiality by repressing with equal severity a Liberal rebellion
at Alicante headed by the brothers Bazán.
From this time forward, indeed, there were two revolutionary
parties in the State, the Constitutionalists and the Absolutists;
and Ferdinand's policy was to keep a midway position between
the two. It was not without justification that he represented
to the French ambassador that in upholding absolutism of the
most uncompromising kind he was in agreement with the
majority of his subjects, and that only with difficulty had he
been able to prevent the restoration of the Inquisition. The
discontent expressed by Bessières’ revolt spread after his death.
Complaining that the process of purification was incomplete,
and the Avenging Angel stayed half-way on his course, the
self-styled pure Royalists, the Apostolic party, again attempted
to make the King the instrument of their schemes. From
Manresa, the famous Jesuit shrine in Catalonia, the secret
organisation of a vast conspiracy extended to Valencia on the
one hand, and to Logroño on the other.
IV Suppression of the Aposto/ic Party 77
The priests and bishops who constituted the Superior
Junta of the Principality addressed the King in threatening
tones demanding further proofs of submission to the Church.
The “aggrieved,” who gave their name to the revolt, alleged
that men of sound views and recognised services to the good
cause were turned away to make place for Liberal renegades.
The real grievance was, as before, that Ferdinand had shown
himself independent of the party which sought to use him as a
tool, and after restoring his authority, sought to govern in his
name to their own advantage. The action of the Junta
amounted to flat rebellion ; and as such Ferdinand regarded it.
With his usual cunning he cut the ground from under it by
disproving all the assumptions whereby it sought to justify
itself and gain adherents. Again the Count of España, purest
of Royalists and Catholics, was sent to bring to order those
who sought to give lessons in churchmanship to the clergy and
in absolutism to the King. He himself visited Catalonia, accom-
panied by his Minister of Justice. When he was seen going
whither he would in the company of the pious Calomarde, the
plea that he was not a free agent and that men of sound opinions
could not get a hearing at court broke down. The Count
of España, a fierce martinet and half-insane tyrant even in his
own family, entered on the congenial task of punishment with
characteristic thoroughness and severity. He terrorised the
whole province. Any papers that fell into his hands sufficed
to prove complicity in plots either ultra-Royalist or ultra-
Liberal. Such papers were at times fabricated and put in his
way. The fortress of Monjuich and the other prisons were
filled; the prisoners were tortured; and suicides of the most
shocking character were provoked. The death sentence was
pronounced by courts-martial summarily, but the executions
were carried out with more care. The Count kept the con-
demned in prison until he had collected a dozen or so, he then
had them shot all together. The sight was supposed to strike
terror into evil-doers; it filled the Count with insane delight
78 The Days of Calomarde (1823–1833) [CH.
His severity relaxed on such occasions; he sometimes even
danced in glee. It was perhaps not by accident that the
enquiry into the rebellion and its punishment had been en-
trusted to a madman. It was whispered that many persons
were put to death in order to suppress evidence against others
occupying positions of trust about the King. It is certain that
the amnesty whereby many submissions were obtained was
shamelessly violated. sº
But however deeply involved the party henceforward styled
Carlists may have been in this and other like plots, it is certain
that the prince whose name they had taken was guiltless of
them all. The distinguishing features of his character were
uncompromising frankness and straightforward honesty. He
lived on terms of the most intimate confidence and affection
with his brother. He never concealed his sympathy with the
aspirations of the Apostolic and Absolutist party, but he never
countenanced their methods. Nobody doubted in 1827 that
he would succeed to the throne; but he refrained from all
participation in public affairs until the necessity for asserting
his claim obliged him to protest. He then did so boldly and
publicly.
Ferdinand passed the winter (1827-8) in Barcelona. In
the spring his campaign became a royal progress through the
northern half of his kingdom. Travelling slowly by way of
Aragon, Navarre, and Biscay, he was everywhere welcomed.
He did not reach Madrid till August, when he made his entry
in triumph. It was, as has been remarked, the fourth of his
victories over his own subjects (1808, 1814, 1823, 1828).
Ballesteros, Minister of Finance, enjoyed like Calomarde
the King's favour during the Ten Years' Ministry. But, unlike
Calomarde, he owed his position to valuable services to the
State as well as to the King. He drew up a code of com-
mercial law, appointed consuls to represent Spain abroad,
founded an Exchange, and promoted the first exhibition of
Spanish industries (1828). Ballesteros, too, was the first to
Ivl Financial position 79
present a complete statement of the financial position in the
form of a budget. It showed a disastrous state of affairs.
Not only had the old, complicated, vexatious, and inadequate
system of taxation been brought back with the monarchical
revival, but national credit had been almost annihilated by
the King's refusal to recognise the debts incurred by the
Constitutional Government. Spain, long used to look to her
colonies to provide a considerable share of her revenue, was
left to her own resources. It was only with the utmost
difficulty that Ballesteros raised a loan to meet immediate
demands. The Royalists sought popularity by keeping down
the taxes , their administration was cheap. The court was not
rashly extravagant, though Ferdinand had laid by in foreign
banks about five million pounds, and accepted readily from his
ministers large sums called surpluses, but in reality wrung out
by starvation of the departments of State. The total revenue
was nearly four million pounds; the army alone, though
reduced, demanded more than three millions, chiefly in
pensions. The whole expenditure amounted to about seven
millions, including more than a million and a half for interest
on the debt, now swelled by a large war indemnity due to
France for the services of her army. By careful handling of
existing taxation Ballesteros raised the revenue to five millions
and a half. The deficit of a million and a half was met by
extraordinary taxationX Before the public need the immunities
of the clergy and of the Basque Provinces gave way, but their
pride was safeguarded by the observance of immemorial forms;
thus contributions of these Provinces were a free gift to the
Lord of Biscay. Whilst all public departments suffered from
neglect, the navy, suspected of Liberal leanings, was purposely
weakened so that it nearly disappeared. Smuggling was almost
unchecked, whilst ruinously high import-duties strangled com-
merce without providing a sufficient revenue. Nevertheless
the country was recovering from the exhaustion of the War of
Independence; and prosperity was followed by contentment.
8o The Days of Calomarde (1823–1833) [CH.
Bad as was the government, it suited the majority of those who
lived under it. Those who revolted were a generous and
enthusiastic minority.
The French Revolution of 1830 encouraged Liberals all over
the world, especially the twenty thousand Spaniards exiled
in France and England. Whereas France had hitherto pro-
tected the Spanish Bourbon King, the French legitimists now
began to look to Spain for help. The French Government,
On the other hand, protected the Liberal exiles; and the great
bankers holding the bonds of the Constitutional Government
favoured the party pledged to recognise them. Directed by
Alcalá Galiano, Mendizabal, Isturiz, and Mina, the Liberals
began to gather on the frontier. Ferdinand took fright, and
by recognising Louis Philippe's Government induced him to
refuse asylum to the would-be revolutionaries. The result
was a Series of ill-planned, ill-timed, and abortive expeditions,
in which brave men, deceived by promises of support in Spain,
lost their lives. Thus Mina, Valdés, and Chapalangarra,
who crossed the frontier in arms at the Atlantic end, were
easily beaten off (October, 1830). The like befell San Miguel
and Gurrea in Catalonia. Then Gibraltar became the hatchery
of plot and counter-plot. General Torrijos was inveigled by
agents of the Crown, and chiefly by the military governor of
Málaga, into the belief that his landing would be followed by
the revolt of the garrisons of the coast. Finding themselves
betrayed, he and his fifty-two comrades surrendered. They
met their deaths heroically (December, 1831); but so whole-
sale a slaughter in cold blood, and the treachery employed,
shocked and grieved good Spaniards. The result of these
rash attempts was a partial renewal of the terror of 1824.
Plot-hunting became a craze. Almost any accusation was
sufficient foundation for a death sentence. A Sempstress was
executed at Granáda (May, 1831) for embroidering on a
banner the words Law, Liberty, Equality. At Madrid a
wretched cobbler suffered death for exclaiming “Liberty, where
Iv Prospect of an he?” 8 I
art thou that thou tarriest so long?” A judge who refused to
confirm the atrocious sentence was banished.
Torrijos’ attempt at revolution was the last important one
of the reign. The Liberals had now a hope that the evil days
were coming to an end. In May, 1829, died Ferdinand's
third wife, Maria Amalia, a gentle creature, entirely without
political influence, unable even to check the coarse pleasures
and brutal associations of her husband. Ferdinand now fell
under the influence of his niece, Doña Carlota, the wife of
his brother, Francisco de Paula. The clever Neapolitan,
ambitious of power, so worked upon the imagination of her
jaded and prematurely old brother-in-law that within nine
months of the Queen's death he married Doña Carlota's
sister. Maria Cristina, aged 23 at the time of her marriage
to her elderly uncle, was gay and dashing, as well as beautiful.
It was whispered that she held Liberal opinions; it is certain
that she used her influence to mitigate the harsh intolerance of
her husband’s policy and to disperse the black bands of clerics
who were closing in round his last years. The gloomy and
debauched court became brighter; the change was welcomed
by the King and by all in whom sour sanctimoniousness had
not become second nature. Poets and statesmen alike—
and the two professions were often united—hailed with delight
the advent of gentler influences. The Apostolic party, on
the other hand, were filled with indignation when balls suc-
ceeded religious pomps. Their indignation was followed by
alarm for the future when it was known that Queen Cristina
was about to become a mother. Hitherto they had felt assured
that time—a few months perhaps, a few years at the most—
would give Ferdinand's crown to one more worthy. Even this
had not restrained their impatient zeal; they had plotted and
rebelled despite the commands of Don Carlos. But now it
was no longer merely a question of waiting till Ferdinand's
death. The birth of a princess, the future Queen Isabel
(October Io, 1830), and of her sister a year later, unsettled
C. S, 6
82 The Days of Calomarde (1823–1833) [CH.
hopes that had come to be looked upon as vested interests.
The party that had fomented rebellion in 1824, 1825, and 1827,
in order to give the Catholic and Absolute King lessons in
Catholicism and Absolutism, now maintained that Don Carlos
was still heir to the crown in spite of the birth of females in
the direct line. Ferdinand wished to leave his kingdom to his
daughter, but in view of the resolute though respectful attitude
of his brother he wavered.
The legal and constitutional rights of the question are still
disputed. Though immaterial to those who refuse to admit
Divine Right, they must here be stated; for Don Carlos'
claims thrice devastated Spain with civil war, and till lately
divided her into two hostile camps. Associated as they are
with religion and tradition, they even now, at times of national
weakness and discouragement, shake the land with their appeal
to deep-seated feelings and their eloquent counsel of despair.
As soon as Ferdinand was assured that a child was about
to be born to him, he took measures to Secure the succession
of females in the direct line. Immemorial usage, confirmed
by the great code of the Partidas, recognised the right of
females to the throne of Castille and Leon in default of males
of equally near degree of consanguinity. In fact females are
more privileged in Spain than elsewhere. They inherit grandee-
ships and titles in preference to collaterals, and transmit them
to their husbands as well as to their children. Isabel the
Catholic stands brightest among the nation's glories; her
daughter Juana inherited her mother's throne unquestioned.
But Philip V introduced by decree (May Io, 1713) the Salic
Law as accepted in the Bourbon family. His decree was
sanctioned by the Council of State and of Castille. Nothing
more was required to make it valid, for the consent of the
Cortes was by this time habitually dispensed with.
In 1789 Charles IV took measures to set aside the Bourbon
Salic Law of succession. His reasons are unknown ; he had
four sons alive. At the bidding of his minister, Campomanes,
Iv 7%e Pragmatic Samc/ion 83
the Cortes, assembled for the purpose and acting under oath
of Secrecy, besought him to reestablish the old Spanish law of
the Partidas, thus abrogating the “Act” of Philip V. The
submissive Cortes made the petition as ordered; and the King
replied that he would direct the Council to prepare a decree
in accordance with their resolution. This was done, and only
promulgation was lacking to the complete validity of the
Pragmatic Sanction. But it was never promulgated; for more
than forty years its very existence remained unknown save to
a few. Moreover, at the time of its enactment Don Carlos
was already born. It is on the mystery surrounding this trans-
action, on the fact that the decree was never promulgated, and
that the right it sought to set aside already existed, that the
claim of the elder branch of the Bourbon family is based.
The supporters question the genuineness of the Pragmatic
Sanction, and deny that its effect, if legal, could be retro-
spective. The Constitution of 1812 reverted to the law of
Aartidas; but, as it was abolished at the Restoration, no
argument can be founded upon it.
In March, 1830, more than six months before the birth of
his elder daughter, Ferdinand promulgated the Pragmatic
Sanction of Charles IV. In June of the same year he made
a will bequeathing his crown to the child—son or daughter—
about to be born. In doing so he was establishing no new
precedent; the last of the Spanish Habsburgs had willed
Spain to the first of the Bourbons after the death of the
Bavarian prince whom he had first chosen to succeed. But
Don Carlos publicly protested, and expressed his determina-
tion to assert his right when the time should come. He
refused to take action, as his followers urged him to do, during
his brother's lifetime. His wife, however, and his masterful
sister-in-law, the Princess of Beira, exerted themselves on his
behalf. No sooner was the Infanta Isabel born than these
Portuguese princesses set to work to undermine the influence
of the Neapolitans, the Queen and her sister. The court was
6–2
84 7%e /Jays of Calomarde (1823–1833) [CH.
unevenly divided between the two factions. The Portuguese
Carlists had with them the whole vast influence of the clergy
and had also a most powerful ally in Calomarde. Ferdinand
himself was apathetic, irresolute, and ill.
As his sickness increased, he fell more than ever under the
influence of the dominant court faction. Ferdinand had tried
to bind his brother to the cause of his infant daughter; but Don
Carlos would not hear of compromise, and refused to share the
Regency with Queen Cristina after the King's death. Anxious
as he was to gratify his brother, the prince declared that his
conscience forbade him to forgo his regret. Even the French
and Neapolitan ambassadors, the representatives of her near
relatives, refused to help Cristina, regarding the question as one
to be settled by the Bourbon family law. The King's most
trusted councillors, Calomarde, the Bishop of Leon, and Count
de Alcudia, the Prime Minister, were all attached to the Carlist
cause. Whilst the courtiers openly saluted Don Carlos and his
wife as the coming sovereigns, priests, women, and statesmen SO
worked upon the King that, believing his end to be near, he
revoked the Pragmatic Sanction (Sept. 18, 1832). It seemed
as if the Carlist cause was gained; the Queen, abandoned at
her husband's bedside, had given up the struggle; the King
was supposed to be dead; only confirmation of the news was
awaited for the proclamation of his brother. The Carlists’
plans were complete; the seals of Office, the fortresses, the
centres of civil and military authority, were in their hands.
But palace intrigues were rudely broken up, and the situation
suddenly changed, by the unexpected arrival of the Queen's
sister at La Granja where the King lay sick (September 22).
Doña Carlota forced her way to the King's bedside; Calomarde
stood in her path; she boxed his ears, and he stood aside with
the half-cringing and half-gallant retort, “White hands do no
dishonour".” She gave new courage to Cristina, she rated
* “Las manos blancas no of nden" is the title of one of Calderón's
most famous plays. [J. F.-K.]
Iv First A’egency of Queen Cristina 85
Ferdinand for his weakness, and she tore up the codicil
revoking the Pragmatic Sanction.
Then to the astonishment of all Ferdinand rallied, and,
finding that the Carlist revolt he had been taught to dread had
not followed the news of his death, he revoked his latest act,
and returned to the purpose of securing the throne for his
daughter. Before an assembly of ministers, foreign ambas-
sadors, nobles, and generals he solemnly declared (Dec. 31,
1832) that in the agonies of sickness he had yielded to
treachery and surprise. Calomarde, irrevocably committed to
the Carlist cause, was banished from court. Cristina was made
Regent for the time of the King's illness, with Zea Bermudez,
a firm supporter of the claims of the infant princess, as first
minister. Then, one by one, the Cabinet nominees, promoted
by careful intrigue to the most responsible positions, were
replaced by the leaders of the opposite party. It was clear,
however, that the struggle was only postponed, and must be
renewed on the King's death.
The Apostolic and Absolutist faction had taken its stand on
the Carlist side; it behoved the Queen's friends, the Cristinos as
they are henceforth called, to gain the alliance of the moderate
Liberals. Already Calomarde's removal was taken as an augury
of better days. The Regency began with the reopening of the
universities after a two years' closure, and an amnesty. In its
preamble Cristina expressed regret that she had been unable to
extend its benefits even to those who nine years before had
momentarily deposed her husband and to those who had borne
arms against him. Whilst nearly Io, ooo Liberals returned
from banishment, Calomarde quitted Spain; the autocratic
Bishop of Leon withdrew, fulminating threats temporal and
spiritual, to his see; and the Count of España, the tyrant of
Catalonia, was superseded by General Llauder.
Thanks to the unflinching loyalty of Don Carlos, the
changes in high command were effected without serious dis-
turbance. In Leon, in parts of Catalonia, and in Madrid,
86 The Days of Calomarde (1823–1833) [CH.
some few Royalist volunteers attempted riot. They were
checked without difficulty; and the palace revolution was
complete. The middle class, and the army as a whole,
welcomed the new order of things and were satisfied. The
great body of moderate men had as little liking for the
extreme Radicals as for the Absolutists. Carlist opinions
found support chiefly among the nobility, the higher clergy,
and the peasantry. The town mob, as will be seen, took first
one side and then another, and always ferociously.
At the beginning of the next year (Jan. 4, 1833) Ferdinand
was sufficiently recovered to reassume his powers. He pub-
lished in the Gazette his thanks to the Queen for her able
administration, approved of all she had done, and appointed
her to a seat in the Royal Council. Zea Bermudez remained
at the head of the ministry; concessions to public opinion if
made must be regarded as effects of the King's bounty; there
must be no talk of rights. Already he had been alarmed by
the tumultuous joy that greeted the downfall of Calomarde.
In Cristina's name, Zea Bermudez issued (Nov. 15, 1832) a
warning to those who might be disposed to add a qualification,
such as “limited” or “constitutional,” to the word monarchy;
the sovereign authority must be maintained pure and simple,
“even as Ferdinand had inherited it.” This idea of enlightened
despotism pleased the King. He was not unwilling to see his
people happy, provided they would accept unquestioningly the
exact kind of happiness he offered. Even innovations were
not so distasteful to him now. He sanctioned the creation of
a new ministry, that of Fomento (literally, encouragement), in-
cluding commerce, public works, and education (Nov. 5,
1832). His most pressing care, however, and the one that
partly united him to his people during his last days, was that of
the succession. In view of his brother's attitude, he sought to
obtain the recognition of his daughter by the princes of the
blood and the Estates of the realm. Accordingly he sum-
moned the commons, the nobles, and the clergy in traditional
Iv] The Oath of A//egiance 87
form to swear fidelity to the heir-apparent. The summons
contained the long-forbidden name of Cortes, though it
pointedly asserted “the rights of sovereignty in their im-
memorial fulness, to the right and left of which are only
abysses.”
The ceremony of the oath was carried out with the
magnificence habitual to the Spanish court in the Church of
San Jerónimo del Prado at Madrid (June 20, 1833). Thirty-
eight privileged cities and towns (p. 4) sent each two deputies.
The clergy were represented by bishops and by the generals
of the regular orders; the nobility by grandees, princes of
the blood and titled persons generally, for no mention of
qualification or number had been contained in the summons.
The King's two younger brothers, Don Francisco de Paula, and
Don Sebastian, took the oath as future subjects of their niece.
Don Carlos, pointedly refusing to be present, had retired with
the King's permission to Portugal. When called upon by the
Spanish ambassador to pledge himself to recognise the right
of his niece, he wrote affectionately and dutifully to his brother,
but declared that conscience and honour forbade him to take
the oath. This letter he published both in Spain and abroad.
Ferdinand replied in the same friendly spirit, but forbade Don
Carlos to return to Spain. The two parties that awaited the
King's death as the signal for battle were now clearly marked
off. Those who had refused or evaded the oath of allegiance
to Isabel were Carlists.
Whilst Ferdinand by slight and tardy concessions to
Liberalism was endeavouring to secure the Spanish crown for
his daughter, he was supporting in Portugal the cause of an
uncle against his niece, Conservative against Liberal. Indeed,
at this time, the dynastic position of the two countries was
strangely alike. King John of Portugal, dying in 1826, left two
sons, of whom the elder, Pedro, could not succeed, for Pedro
was Emperor of Brazil. The second, Miguel, claimed the
throne of Portugal against Maria de la Gloria, the infant
88 7%e Days of Calomarae (1823–1833) [CH.
daughter of his elder brother. Miguel, as champion of the
absolutist and clerical party, was recognised by his mother, the
Queen-dowager, by her brother, Ferdinand of Spain, and by
the Conservative party generally. The Regent of Portugal, the
Princess Isabel, rallied round the throne of the child-Queen the
Portuguese Liberals by confirming their Constitution. In so
doing she secured the powerful protection of the British
Government, but brought upon herself the wrath of the Holy
Alliance. Ferdinand, when he found Metternich on his side,
intervened in Portugal on Miguel's behalf, just as Louis of
France had intervened in Spain in 1823. But the Holy
Alliance no longer controlled the policy of all Europe in the
interests of absolute monarchy. France rejected Ferdinand's
claim to act as arbitrator. Great Britain by landing an army
in the Tagus (December, 1826) made the Queen's party for
the time masters of the situation. The Liberals of the whole
Peninsula fixed their hopes on Great Britain, whilst Ferdinand
Sulkily withdrew the army he had gathered on his western
frontier.
But the Miguelistas were only momentarily crushed.
Their prince, nominated as Regent by the Queen's father,
needed no plea for interference. He made use of his position
to strengthen his party, and then with Ferdinand's connivance
tore up the Constitution, drove out Maria de la Gloria, and
declared himself absolute King. As a refugee, and as a symbol
of Liberalism, Maria de la Gloria found sympathy in England;
while Don Miguel's frantic persecutions of the constitution-
alists twice drew down upon him the humiliation of foreign
interference. London and the Azores were the asylums and
rallying places of the Portuguese Liberals. In London they
met the Spanish exiles and prepared to restore their Queen by
force of arms. Don Pedro abdicated the throne of Brazil in
order to fight as a soldier for his daughter's right. Mendizabal,
the cunning financier, and Mina, as well as other Spaniards,
were with him when he landed in Portugal (July 8, 1832),
Iv Don Migue/ and Dom Carlos 89
They were welcomed by such few Liberals as had survived the
proscription; but their courage was greater than their resources,
and soon they were closely blockaded in Oporto. But the
whole situation suddenly and dramatically changed when Sir
Charles Napier, commanding the ships fitted out in England
by the exiles, captured Don Miguel's vastly stronger squadron.
The discomforted Miguelistas, taken in the rear by an expedi-
tion prepared in the Algarve, abandoned Lisbon; and Maria de
la Gloria was proclaimed (September, 1833). Don Carlos was
with his nephew, Don Miguel, at Coimbra; their causes were
so much alike as to be almost identical. Both relied for help
on the traditionalist and clerical party. In vain Ferdinand and
Zea Bermudez sought to prevent an alliance imposed by circum-
stances. They sent the trusted Royalist, Luis Fernandez de
Córdova, as ambassador to Portugal. His mission was to
induce Don Miguel by promises of Spanish help to mitigate
the rigour of his policy, and thus to alienate extremists like his
uncle. But Don Miguel recognised in a policy like that of “the
Exterminating Angel” (p. 75) his one hope of success. The
bait was rejected; Miguel and Carlos made common cause.
In the summer (1833) a Carlist rising took place in Cata-
lonia; all the leaders of the movement of 1827 were again
involved. At Madrid a plot was discovered; the conspirators
were banished. These signs and the King's 'rapidly sinking
health showed that the struggle was imminent, but Ferdinand
and Zea Bermudez still feared their would-be friends more
than their open enemies. When the moderate Liberals began
to arm and organise in order to meet the coming storm they
were disbanded and broken up.
Ferdinand's death (Sept. 29, 1833) removed, according to
his own figure of speech, the cork from the fermenting and
surcharged bottle of Spain. That he injured his country by
setting against its political evolution the traditional virtues of
loyalty to Church and King is certain. That he did so out of
fiendish malice is absurd. His nature was coarse and un-
90 The Days of Calomarae (1823–1833) [CH. IV
sympathetic, his intelligence narrow. He had been soured and
warped in his youth by deceit, humiliation, and suffering.
Though he shrank from no dissimulation, it can hardly be
doubted that a brutal frankness better expressed his nature.
Nobody knew better than he what would be said when, after
closing the universities as seats of dangerous learning, he
endowed a school of bull-fighting at Seville. He dreaded and
disliked superior persons, but he carefully guarded against
rogues who sought to influence him. Though cruel, he seldom
bore malice. It was with a tavern jest upon his lips that he
sentenced an enemy or checked harshly an over-zealous friend.
He took a malicious delight in defeating the intrigues of his
associates. The footing on which he treated them is illustrated
by an anecdote. Through the influence of the housekeeper of
the President of the Council a certain priest was nominated for
a bishopric. Ferdinand substituted another name in the letters
patent, and wrote on their margin, “The mitre of — is for
Don — ; and Doña Inés must forgive us for once.”
Thirty years ago it would have been necessary to protest in
the name of truth against the inhuman monster painted by
Liberals, and entitled Ferdinand VII. Now it is no less
necessary to be on guard lest traditionalists make him pass as
the unselfish and well-nigh heroic defender of the institutions
that made Spain glorious in days gone by. Yet so plainly is
the man's character written in his acts that mistake seems
impossible, and even this short paragraph superfluous.
CHAPTER V.
QUEEN CRISTINA AND THE ROYAL STATUTE.
THE CARLIST WAR (1833–1836).
QUEEN CRISTINA was aged 27 when by her husband's will
she became Regent for her daughter. Surrounded by enemies,
she could trust neither her own nor her late husband's kin.
The party that had strangled the revolution, and had hitherto
been the mainstay of the monarchy, was alienated by Ferdi-
nand's refusal to accept their extreme views on the question
of altar and throne. Part was gathering round Don Carlos,
part sulkily awaited events. Fate and the Queen's cleverness
made Ferdinand’s “gaol-birds,” the proscribed and harried
Liberals, the staunchest supporters of his daughter's right.
Before the King's death was announced, Zea Bermudez
called together the great officers of State, the magistrates of
the capital, and the generals in high command. All had been
carefully selected in view of the crisis; they readily renewed
their pledges of fidelity to the young Queen. Then the capital
and the province were told that Ferdinand, the desired, as he
had once been, was dead. The expected result followed;
within four days the Carlists were in arms at Talavera. The
attempt was quickly crushed; it was not sanctioned by the
Pretender. In a manifesto issued on October I he chose
to assume that his right would not be questioned, and acting
as King de facto, confirmed Zea Bermudez and his colleagues
in their offices. This was accepted by the Cristinos as a
challenge ; on October 17 Don Carlos was outlawed and his
92 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
property confiscated. On November 4 he issued his call to
arms, the call his followers so eagerly awaited, withheld till
now by their prince's strict sense of political and paternal
duty. Even before it came, revolt in the Basque Provinces, in
Catalonia, and in Valencia, had answered revolt in Castille.
Within three months a small but admirably efficient army was
firmly established in the Biscay mountains. Don Carlos was
still in Portugal.
The Blacks, or Cristinos, were slow in gathering their
strength; for, while the Carlists, or Whites, were homogeneous,
the Blacks included the whole range, from Conservatives as
strict as Zea Bermudez, to Radicals of the most pronounced
type. As yet there were no republicans. The Blacks however
held the seals of office and the capital, specially important
under so centralised a system of government. They could
count upon the army, amounting nominally to 50,000 regulars
and double that number of reserves. There were, besides,
I 2, ooo carbineers or frontier guards, and 3ooo sailors, with one
ship of war, three frigates, four brigs, and a few sloops, all in
bad condition.
The declaration of policy published in the name of the
Queen Regent on assuming the powers bestowed by Ferdi-
nand's will shows the hesitating and timorous bearing of her
minister towards his Liberal allies. Zea Bermudez had made
his way as a slave to business of the old cave-dweller type
(p. 5). He loved business for its own sake, while he despised its
rewards. An unselfish and laborious hermit, more interested
in methods than results, his plain coat was unadorned
by the stars and crosses which his inferiors flaunted in the
palace. But he was entirely of the old school; he held that
the duty of a minister was to his master alone, to act as the
mouthpiece of authority. He denied to the people both the
right and the skill to share in the direction of government.
Therefore the manifesto of October 4, 1833, ran, “I will
maintain scrupulously the form and fundamental laws of the
v] Po/icy of the A’egency 93
monarchy, admitting none of the dangerous innovations of
which we already know too well the cost. The best form of
government for a country is that to which it is accustomed.”
It was fortunate for the infant Queen that the majority of
the Council of Government nominated by Ferdinand's will
better realised the situation of Spain than did the Prime
Minister. Thanks to its influence and to that of Cristina's
wisest friend, the Marquis of Miraflores, the Liberals still
remaining if exile were amnestied. Thus Argüelles, Mina,
Isturiz, Alcalá Galiano, and Ángel Saavedra returned, whilst the
Royalist volunteers, the terror of the country, were disbanded,
and the heavy tax that had maintained them was suppressed.
A great wrong was righted by revalidation of the sales of eccle-
siastical, public, or vinculated property carried out during the
constitutional period (pp. 59, 61). In many other matters too
the dawn of liberty brought public ills to light; and the
demands for wide reforms grew daily louder.
Reforms were impossible so long as Zea Bermudez remained
in power; but only after receiving unmistakeable warning did
the Regent dismiss the minister to whose firmness at the time
of the King's death she owed so much. The Marquis of
Miraflores, General Luis Fernandez de Córdova, and other
trusted Royalists had already pointed to the necessity for
change, when the captains-general of Old Castille and Catalonia
reported that it would be impossible to maintain the struggle
against the Carlists unless the Cortes were called and a frankly
Liberal policy adopted. Enlightened despotism could win no
friends to the Queen's side. General Llauder's manifesto,
though not amounting to what was later known as a pronun-
ciamiento, contained the echo of a threat. General Quesada's
more diplomatic representation was drawn up by Salustiano de
Olózaga, a clever young demagogue, whose name frequently
recurs in these pages; his merits and defects are still debated
in Spain, but to foreign eyes he seems one of the most un-
pleasant products of a turbulent and self-seeking age.
94. The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
Zea Bermudez recognised that his ideas were out of date,
and gladly retired. His place was taken (January, 1834) by
Martinez de la Rosa, chosen as the representative of the
moderate Liberals. The policy of enlightened despotism was
definitively abandoned; and Martinez de la Rosa, at the Queen's
command, set his hand to the task of embodying in a charter
a compromise between absolute monarchy and the republican
Constitution of 1812. The romantic age feared nothing.
Martinez de la Rosa, half way through an eventful life, was
still an enthusiast. In 1812 he had been a deputy at Cadiz.
He came back from the consequent period of banishment
Somewhat sobered and became President of the Constitutional
Ministry (1822). After a vain attempt to hold a midway course,
he left Ferdinand to fight alone against the Radicals. He
quitted Spain at the time of the French invasion led by the
Duke of Angoulême, and, like many others of the Spanish
refugees, gained for a time his living by his pen. But even
Calomarde recognised that he was no plotter. He was allowed
to live in retirement at Granáda, until Ferdinand's death re-
called him to public life. A conscientious and versatile man,
tolerant, despite his large remaining stock of illusions, he
proved a good transition minister. His appointment was well
received by the Moderates. It was rightly considered to
amend the manifesto of October 4. All men knew that the
grant of certain liberties would follow ; the older Liberals no
longer demanded that their former idol, the Constitution of
1812, should be restored to them in its entirety.
Martinez de la Rosa more than fulfilled the expectations of
his friends. Following the all-embracing inspiration of that
romantic age, his fertile brain produced simultaneously (April,
1834) a tragedy (Za Conjuración de Venecia) and the Constitution
known as the Royal Statute. Both drama and political code
were slavish copies of French models. The statute was little
more than a translation of the French Charte of 1814, a formal
grant of individual liberty about which in free countries there
v] The Roya/ Statute 95
had never been any doubt. It did not mention the sovereignty
of the people. The Parliament created by it represented only
the rich and the middle class, and was so fenced round with
safeguards of the royal authority as to be almost powerless.
The Parliament was divided into two Chambers, called
Estamentos, for the old-fashioned Castilian words would not
fit the new-fangled institutions. The upper Chamber, that of
the Nobles (Próceres), consisted of the grandees together with
an unlimited number of ecclesiastics, magistrates, soldiers, and
others nominated by the Crown. The lower Chamber, that of
the Proctors (Procuradores), was elective. The precise method
of election was entrusted to Parliament itself; but the rules for
the first formation of the Chamber directed that in each district
a junta of notables should nominate two commissioners. The
commissioners assembled in the capital of the province elect a
proctor or deputy, over thirty years old, possessing an income
of one hundred and fifty pounds, and qualified either by two
years' residence in the province, or by owning in it property to
the value of sixty pounds annually. The duration of a
Parliament was fixed at three years; reelection of proctors
was not forbidden. The Crown chose the meeting-place,
nominated President and Vice-President from a list of five
names, summoned, prorogued, and dissolved the Estamentos at
will. A year, however, must not pass without meeting of
Parliament. Debate was limited to subjects proposed by the
Crown, taxes were voted on its suggestion. Agreement between
the two Chambers and the Crown was necessary to the validity
of Acts.
This colourless document created much disappointment
among real Liberals. Instead of the generous measure of
political freedom they had expected, they found solemn
commonplaces about civil rights which they already possessed.
The only concession was a representative system so complicated
as to be valueless, and, even so, restricted to a small class. The
privilege of the few possessors of the franchise was rendered
96 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
illusory by the creation of a Chamber of Crown nominees to
revise the decisions of the Proctors. The popular contempt
for the Statute was expressed by Mariano José Larra, the
humourist, in the words: “Our statesmen, in order to end the
eternal struggle between People and Kings, attempt a half-
measure which shall give us simile-Kings and simile-Peoples,
Chambers mildly representative, and Tyrants tinged with de-
mocracy.”
r * Hitherto Liberal feeling had been confined to the upper,
middle, and lower middle classes; the crowd had always been
ready at the bidding of agitation to acclaim the Inquisition,
Religion, and the Absolute King, and to execute vengeance
upon so-called freemasons, heretics, and atheists. But now,
in the great towns at least—for the country is to this day as it
ever was—a change had taken place. The floods of Oratory
poured out in the political clubs had overflowed into the streets;
and the untethered mob had conceived a notion of its political
importance and rights not the less lofty because political
tradition and point of comparison were utterly lacking. The
mob, and with it to some degree the rank and file of the
army, from being the tool of the retrograde faction became
the tool of the extreme Radicals. -->
The first manifestation of this change was characteristically
brutal and hideous. The political outlook was gloomy; civil
war had been followed by dearth; then cholera fell upon
Madrid. The friars hinted that these ills were punishments
of Heaven for impious questioning of the authority of Church
and King, and specially for the coercive measures to which
religious associations had been subjected on account of their
Carlist propaganda. But the friars no longer obtained a
hearing; on the contrary it was believed that they had brought
the plague by poisoning the wells. At Midsummer their
convents were broken into by rioters half mad with fear and
rage; and nearly a hundred Jesuits and other regulars were
cruelly done to death (July 17, 1834). A few ringleaders of
v] AJebates in Pazº/iament 97
the brutal mob were executed; the captain-general, who had
done his best but with insufficient forces, was replaced; but
public confidence was Sorely shaken, and numbers of peaceable
citizens quitted Madrid. This befell on the eve of the first
Parliament assembled under the Royal Statute. Hopes founded
on the cautious half-measure of the Moderates fell lower than
eVer.
The Chambers met (July 24, 1834) and proved less
homogeneous than had been expected. Martinez de la Rosa
and his lieutenant Count Toreno had indeed a majority at
first ; but, even in the carefully guarded Upper House, Ángel
Saavedra, the romantic poet, preached democracy. The Lower
House contained a certain number of extreme Radicals, the
exaltados of 1820, and a large body of deputies of undecided
attitude. These soon took their stand in the ranks of the
Liberals, and, dissatisfied with the Royal Statute, took the name
of Progressives. They were led by Lopez, the brilliant orator
and fiery debater, supported by the well-known Liberals,
Argüelles and Alcalá Galiano. Neither of these would have
been eligible had not their constituents provided the income
required by the law. This fact alone was sufficient to show the
insufficiency of the Statute to satisfy Liberal opinion. Martinez
and Toreno soon saw that they commanded no well-drilled
and trustworthy majority, but they boldly undertook to govern,
relying on the article of the Statute that limited discussion to
matters proposed by the Crown. The whole efforts of the
Opposition were directed to the evasion of this restriction.
After folmally and unanimously excluding Don Carlos and
his descendants from the succession, the Chambers debated at
great length a Petition of Rights, the counterpart of the French
Declaration of 1789. This question, still unsettled, was
succeeded by the no less contentious one of the militia,
distinguished hitherto alternately as tool and scourge of the
two extreme parties, according as it was called “National" or
“Royalist.” Again the name was changed; and “Urban” became
C, S. 7
98 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
for a time the official title of the militia reestablished by a law
the effect of which was deferred. Further and still more bitter
dissensions broke out over the proposals of Count Toreno,
Minister of Finance. Even as Ferdinand had refused to
recognise debts contracted by the Constitutional Government,
so now a number of Radicals sought to repudiate the loans
contracted by the Regency of Urgel (see p. 64) and spent on
overthrowing Liberalism by means of French soldiers and
Royalist volunteers. Such a proposal of course shook the
national credit, already at a low ebb. Toreno's policy ex-
tinguished it altogether. A commission had been appointed to
examine the whole financial position and arrange for the con-
solidation of the outstanding debts. The situation revealed was
most serious, but nevertheless the majority of the commission
voted for bravely facing it, and maintaining the national credit by
recognising and trying to pay interest upon the whole. Toreno
however sided with the minority, and had his way. Regardless
of the future, and of the needs of a country at the beginning
of a civil war, he sacrificed everything to immediate reduction
of expenditure. His proposal to “defer interest upon " meant
really to repudiate. It affected the whole of the Interior and
one-half of the Exterior Debt. The Spanish Five per Cent.
Bonds, which had been quoted in London and Paris at 84,
sank to half that price. Spain was deservedly treated as a
fraudulent bankrupt.
Soon military rivalries, the curse of the country for fifty
years, were added to the other troubles. A civil war and a
weak Government had put all power into the hands of the
generals. When General Llauder was appointed Minister for
War, his rival, Quesada, considering himself slighted, began to
conspire with the Radicals. Rumour had it that Llauder owed
his appointment to the Queen Regent, and that she was
plotting with his help the restoration of absolutism. In order
to counteract and defeat this supposed scheme, the Liberals
joined the military malcontents; and a vast counterplot was
v] Mi/itary riva/ry and disorder 99
organised, having its roots in the army. Martinez de la Rosa
was utterly unfit to control the forces of disorder; a single
battalion under a lieutenant was able to dictate terms to him
in the capital. Cardero was the name of the bold subaltern
who (Jan. 18, 1835), emulating Riego, aspired to oblige the
Government to adopt a more Liberal policy. At the head of his
men he seized the Post Office near the Puerta del Sol, murdered
the captain-general who ventured to remind them of their duty,
and held out until they had received assurance that no punish-
ment would follow their efforts on behalf of freedom. The
attempt to shift responsibility and to make a scapegoat of
General Llauder failed to deceive the public. It was well
known that the Minister for War did not lack determination
or energy. He was however forced to resign. Quesada suc-
ceeded him in the favour of the Palace party, and Valdés at
the Ministry for War. Disturbances at Saragossa, Málaga, and
Murcia followed the mutiny at Madrid; only lack of organisa-
tion hindered their success. The feebleness of the Government
became daily more apparent. Martinez de la Rosa was utterly
discredited ; the Royal Statute was treated as a sham. Even
the Queen's popularity, once so great, had been worn out by
continual bickerings, suspicions, and the ever-approaching
danger from the north. For, whilst the two sections of the
Liberal party were recklessly appealing to mob-violence and
intrigue, the Carlists were daily gaining ground, and threatened
to proscribe the very name of Liberal without question of more
or less.
The Carlist War was a confused struggle, carried on generally
in guerrilla fashion by small bodies. It was characterised by
much heroism and much brutal ferocity. Small local, and
even personal, jealousies often overshadowed the great prin-
ciples to which appeal was ostensibly made. Only at great
length can the incoherent military movement, the small and
indecisive actions, the petty rivalries, and often treacherous
intrigues which make up the history of the contest be intelligibly
7–2
IOO The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
described. From this tangle it is difficult to pick out main
threads. To follow them without attention to minor threads
is to receive a false impression. All that can here be done is
to set down the chief events in the order of their happening.
The war may be divided into two main periods—before and
after the first siege of Bilbao (June 18, 1835). It was centred
in two districts, both mountainous, the one comprising the
three Basque Provinces, Biscay, Alava and Guipúzcoa together
with Navarre, the other comprising parts of Catalonia, Valencia
and Aragon.
Although sufficient warning had been given long before
Ferdinand's death, and some preparations had been made to
meet the expected outbreak, a small and energetic minority
under a leader of exceptional skill and ability came near
imposing its will on Spain before the scattered forces of the
opposite party were gathered to resist it. The Basques, through
their deputies, assembled at the sacred oak of Guernica, had
recognised Isabel as heir to her father's throne at the time
of the great solemnity at Madrid (see p. 87). The Parliament
of Biscay was sitting when news of the King's death reached
Bilbao. Carlist agents had carefully fostered the belief that
Liberalism would be unfavourable to the immemorial liberties
of the provinces. Nevertheless the deputies were divided ;
the towns, and even the large villages, were Liberal or Cristino,
the country districts enthusiastically Carlist. The Royalist
volunteers mustered under their recognised chiefs Valdespina
and Zabala. A junta was elected, a fund of £30,000 collected;
and the Carlist deputies and volunteers marched out to rally
their partisans in the capitals of the sister provinces. Vitoria
was divided between Carlists and Cristinos. San Sebastian,
frankly Liberal, sent offers of help to Madrid, but men
trooped out from the villages and the isolated farms to defend
their privileges, fighting under the banner inscribed “God,
Country, King.” The most hardy and stubborn race of the
Peninsula had declared for the Pretender. The question
v] Tomás Zumalacárregui I O I
had to be fought out in a mountain region most difficult for
military movements against men to whom each by-path was
familiar and each farm-house a safe hiding-place.
At Logroño, on the border of Castille, a body of Carlists
was raised by Don Santos Ladron. It entered Navarre, seeking
to seize some strong point as a rallying point for the scattered
bands that had taken the field independently. Santos Ladron's
party was dispersed ; he himself was captured and shot; but
Ferdinand had been dead little more than a month when, with
the exception of Pamplona and the other towns, all Navarre
was overrun by Carlists. Here too, as in Biscay, it was in
defence of their semi-independence, as well as of the Church
and youthful King, that the people rose in revolt. The leader
needed to coordinate and unite the scattered forces and efforts
appeared in Navarre. Tomás Zumalacárregui, a lieutenant-
colonel in the army, had sacrificed his commission to his
political and religious faith. Reserved, stern, disinterested,
brave, and energetic, he was a fine specimen of the noble
Basque race. Birth and character alike fitted him to command,
where local patriotism, distrust of strangers, and an almost
anarchical standard of individual independence are deeply
rooted. At Estella (14 Nov., 1833) the Navarrese junta elected
him to command the Carlists of his native province. His
masterful will at once enforced respect and discipline; he
ventured to reduce the pay rashly promised to the volunteers
at the same time as he introduced among them a harsh
military code. More important still was his creation of a
regular administration under the junta, levying taxes in the
name of King Charles V. In this respect the example of
Navarre was imitated by the other revolted provinces. The
Carlist treasury was supplied by (1) the contributions of the
provinces imposed by their local Parliaments, (2) fines levied
on Liberal families or villages, (3) customs dues collected on
the French frontier, (4) gifts from sovereigns, and from private
persons, in sympathy with the cause.
I O2 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
Very different from Zumalacárregui was the leader of the
Carlists of Castille. Merino the priest, freebooter, and guerril/.
ero of the War of Independence, received a canonry of Valencia
as his reward for services rendered to the cause of absolutism.
But the chapter readily dispensed with the obligation of resi-
dence; and Merino lived in his native Castille on the revenues
of his canonry till 1820, when he again betook himself to the
guerril/ero's life and fought against the Liberals, at first alone and
then in cooperation with the French army. He was now aged
sixty-four, but his temper had not cooled, and continual hunting
had kept him as active and hardy as ever. He was among the
first to revolt; his very name was a war-cry; thousands of
Royalist volunteers marched with him to join the gathering army
at Logroño (November, 1833). The Carlists of Catalonia,
Valencia, Aragon, and Murcia were prevented at first from
concentrating by the activity of General Llauder, captain-
general of the first-named province. Later they found a strong-
hold in Morella and a leader almost equal to Zumalacárregui
in Ramon Cabrera, the seminarist, ready to do or suffer
anything in the cause. Here, as elsewhere, the Carlists pre-
dominated in the mountains only : the coast region, the plains,
and the great cities, like Barcelona, were Liberal. In La
Mancha, Extremadura, and Andalusia, small Carlist bands led
a half-brigand life among the remote villages.
The first to take command against the Carlists of the
north was Sarsfield, general of the army of observation posted
on the Portuguese frontier. Advancing cautiously by way of
Salamanca towards the Ebro, the boundary of the revolted
provinces, he dispersed Merino's hungry horde in Castille.
Their leader fled to join Don Carlos in Portugal. Next,
Sarsfield garrisoned the line of the river from Miranda to
Logroño, joined hands with the Cristino troops occupying
Pamplona, and marched to the relief of the Liberals of Álava
and Biscay. At Vitoria he was met by the Provincial Govern-
ment with protestations of loyalty to the Government of the
v] Car/isſ successes º I O3
Regency; before the end of November he entered Bilbao
unopposed. The Carlist bands had withdrawn into Navarre.
With them went the juntas. The necessity for united Carlist
action became apparent; and in December Zumalacárregui
was appointed to the chief command in the three Basque
Provinces as well as in Narvárre.
Whilst the Carlists secured unity of plan by concentrating
command in a single hand, the Regency, on the contrary,
divided authority, appointing General Valdés to lead the main
body of the army, whilst Sarsfield held independently the
viceroyalty of Navarre. Valdés found an able lieutenant in
Baldomero Espartero, an officer who had seen much service
in Peru. Espartero put Bilbao into a state of defence, and
organised the town militia into an efficient force. The means
at the disposal of the Cristino generals were inadequate to the
task set them. Valdés, when he had occupied the chief
strategic points within his command, had only about nine
thousand men left with whom to operate over a vast extent
of almost impassable and violently hostile country. He began,
however, prudently to hedge in with a line of firli the Carlist
stronghold, the mountain valley of Amescoa, situated on the
watershed between the Atlantic and Mediterranean, in the neigh-
bourhood of Estella, and distant only some six leagues from
Vitoria. From Amescoa the Carlists could threaten the com-
munications with Pamplona, harry the plain of Álava, and, if
necessary, escape by the mountains of Guipúzcoa and Navarre
to the main chain of the Pyrenees by paths impracticable to
regular troops. From Amescoa Zumalacárregui slipped easily
through the meshes of Valdés' half-spread net. He seized the
Government foundry of Orbaiceta on the frontier near Ronces-
valles (January 27, 1834), and, after a foray eastward towards
Aragon, returned stronger than before. He led now an army
of about eight thousand picked men, fairly equipped and
thoroughly trustworthy. These at the word of Command would
disperse, leaving, where an army had stood, a seemingly peace-
IO4 The Cardist War (1833–1836) [CH.
able country thinly peopled by shepherds and peasants. None
failed to reassemble when the roll was called, days, hours, or
weeks after, it might be fifty miles away across the hills. Their
hardihood was proverbial, the length of their marches well-nigh
incredible. They fought in the neighbourhood of their homes ;
and, when the life of the camp became irksome to their in-
dependent spirit, they were allowed to pass a few days with
their families in the upland farms, in order “to change their
shirts,” as they called it. Their officers were patriarchs among
them ; and their country was ruled, as it had been from time
immemorial, by the local juntas.
The Government at Madrid, not grasping the difficulty of the
military situation, grew impatient of Valdés' plan of blockade,
and, listening to the representations of his military rivals, re-
placed him in the chief command by General Quesada, an
intriguer and Liberal neophyte, converted rather by jealousy
than conviction from the service of the palace. Quesada first
tried to obtain the submission of the revolted provinces by
negotiation. But the Carlist creed is by nature rigid, admitting
of no compromise; moreover the hopes of the faction were
good. Zumalacárregui refused to consider any proposal for
peace ; and the war went on. Soon the Cristinos were reduced
to the defensive; and Quesada sought to make up for military
failure by reckless cruelty and insult. He confirmed the bad
practice of treating the Carlists as rebels and outlaws. He
addressed their general in a proclamation as “leader of high-
waymen and bandits”; he declared all Carlists in arms liable
to the death penalty; and he threatened retaliation even upon
women convicted of aiding the cause (April 29, 1834). The
Carlists responded with equal severity and hardly less brutality.
To seize a rich village and to torture the town council became
a favourite Sport, as well as a useful way of obtaining supplies.
The Powers took sides in the dynastic quarrel in Spain, as
in the similar one between uncle and niece, Liberalism and
Absolutism, in Portugal. Great Britain recognised from the
v] Aoreign intervention IO5
first the Liberal Governments of Isabel and Maria de la Gloria.
France, however, anticipated her in recognising the Regency.
The British ambassador was accredited to Queen Isabel; the
French to Queen Cristina. Louis Philippe's own claim to
a Bourbon throne came through a female. Cristina, nearly
related to the House of Orleans, showed herself anxious to
unite her fortunes with those of the monarchy of July. Friend-
ship with Spain was an axiom of French foreign policy.
Above all, the common enemy was the claim of Divine Right
binding together Carlists, Miguelists, and Legitimists s The
United States of America, Sweden, and Denmark followed
France and Great Britain; but the old Holy Alliance, Russia,
Prussia, and Austria encouraged Don Carlos to hope for their
support so soon as he should win a firm footing in Spain.
Sardinia and Naples-protested against the succession of a
female to a Bourbon throne. KThe Portuguese Miguelists were,
.9f course;-also Carlists. hilst the friends of Don Carlos
abroad hung back, those of Isabel drew together. It was
agreed that Don Pedro and Queen Cristina should cooperate
to drive out Don Miguel and Don Carlos; that England
should lend a fleet and France an army if necessary. The
treaty of the Quadruple Alliance was signed in London (April 22,
1834) by Palmerston, Talleyrand, the Marquis of Miraflores,
and the Portuguese envoy.
Already the Spanish º under Rodil, lying prepared
along the western frontier, had entered Portugal in order to
capture the Pretender (April 6). Escaping from the blockade
of Almeida, Don Carlos joined Don Miguel at Evora. But
before the end of May the two princes were so hard pressed
that Don Miguel signed the Treaty of Evora Montes, agreeing
to renounce his claim to a throne in consideration of a pension.
Don Carlos was made of sterner stuff. He refused to negotiate,
and leaving his little force to make such terms as it could,
embarked on a British man-of-war for England.
In Madrid public opinion, thoroughly alarmed by Quesada's
IO6 7%e Carſist War (1833–1836) [CH.
failures, demanded that his place should be taken by an abler
general. The choice fell upon General Rodil, famous for his .
defence of Callao against the Chilian insurgents, and now
recently returned from his successful incursion into Portugal.
Bringing with him some reinforcements, and the even more
Sorely needed supplies, he infused for the moment a better
spirit into the discouraged Army of the North. But at the
same time the enthusiasm of the Carlists was raised to an
almost heroic pitch by the presence of their prince among
them (July, 1834). Don Carlos had secretly left England as
Soon as possible after his arrival, and, crossing France in dis-
guise, presented himself to his delighted followers at Elizondo
in the Baztan valley.
Rodil, at the head of forty-five thousand men, began his
campaign by invading the valley of Amescoa. Zumalacárregui
abandoned it on his approach, withdrawing, as was his habit,
the grain and cattle. The Cristinos suffered severely from
privations, and from the harassing tactics of an almost in-
tangible enemy. This plan having failed to make any impres-
sion on the Carlists, Rodil next fitted out light columns to
pursue the prince. But in this the mountaineers had every
advantage. The famous guide known as “the King's donkey”
(e/ Burro del Rey) carried the prince, on his back when
necessary, into inaccessible places. The Carlists were kept
informed of all movements of the enemy by the watchful
peasantry; the Cristinos were continually baffled by false intel-
ligence, surprised by those they believed themselves to be
pursuing, and harassed without being able to retaliate. Rodil
in despair issued a ferocious proclamation condemning all
Carlists and their abettors to death (August, 1834); he then
betook himself to the slow and cruel expedient of starving the
country. He burnt the watermills that ground the home-
grown maize ; he forbade the introduction of food and its
transit through the country; and he fortified Elizondo so as to
command the head of the rich Baztan valley. The only result
v] A'odi/ and Æspoz y Mina IO7
was to irritate still further the Basque villages. No quarter
was now asked or granted by either side.
Again a change was made, and General Osma took com-
mand of the Cristinos pending the arrival of Espoz y Mina.
Before this took place they were twice heavily defeated at
Alegria in the plains of Álava. More than a thousand men
were killed and wounded ; more than double that number
saved their lives by taking service with the enemy (October,
1834).
Mina was now pitted against Zumalacárregui, Navarrese
against Navarrese. But Mina took command of a beaten and
discouraged army, whilst his opponent was in the full tide of
Success. Moreover age, wounds, and infirmities had put it out
of the power of the famous guerrillero to lead in person a
winter campaign among the mountains. His spirit, however,
was still unbroken. He fortified and garrisoned the Navarrese
villages in order to interrupt the communication of the enemy,
whilst affording rallying places for his friends. He imitated the
policy of the Carlists by ruthlessly levying contributions on all
who did not show zeal in the Cristino cause. Seeing that the
Carlists obtained all kinds of supplies from France, he arranged
for the more effectual guarding of the frontier. A notable
improvement followed; the Cristinos of the north could hold
up their heads even outside the towns. Zumalacárregui felt
the pressure of the Cristino posts, and the curtailment of his
supplies from Bayonne. Finding that even the slightest forti-
fication could successfully resist him so long as he had no
artillery, he turned his attention to founding small cannon
among the hills. Mina had obliged him to abandon the kind
of warfare to which his startling successes were due.
But Mina's plan required time, and no time was given him.
He wished to drive the Carlists to the plains, where regular
troops with cavalry might have the advantage of them. But
the ministers, fearful above all things of an invasion of Castille,
insisted chiefly on the importance of holding the line of the
IO8 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
Ebro. Meanwhile the Radicals, Mina's political friends, were
urging him to do something brilliant, so that his success might
serve as an arm against the Moderates. He refused to alter
his cautious policy, but pressure was too strong for him. Sick
in body and at heart with the jealousy or apathy that denied
him even the most necessary supplies, he handed over his
authority to General Valdés, who thus for the second time
commanded against Zumalacárregui.
The commission of the new commander included instruc-
tions to aid the envoy of the British Government, Lord Elliot,
to bring about an agreement which should secure prisoners of
war from murder, and mitigate the ferocity of the struggle. For
Zumalacárregui had answered Rodil’s proclamation by ordering
all prisoners of whatever grade to be shot (November, 1834);
and civilisation stood appalled at the devastation that had
overtaken one of earth's most lovely regions. The Elliot
treaty was signed (April 27, 1835); and outrages to humanity
ceased for a time in the Basque country.
Valdés had also been charged to report upon the advisability
of demanding foreign aid under the terms of the Quadruple
Alliance. Before deciding on this point he undertook in
overwhelming force the relief of Estella in the heart of the
Carlist country. He succeeded, but only after such difficulties
and losses as to amount virtually to a defeat. He had now
convinced himself that the Cristino armies alone would never
be able to reconquer the northern provinces; his opinion was
confirmed by his divisional commanders; and he sent Luis
Fernandez de Córdova to report it at Madrid.
Meanwhile the Carlists, relieved of the presence of Mina,
whom they greatly dreaded, and grown bold by the acknow-
ledged discomfiture of Valdés, redoubled their activity. They
seized the fortified posts in the Baztan and round Amescoa.
They entered Estella, abandoned by the Cristinos, and made it
their headquarters, the seat of their court (May, 1835). They
cut the high-road between Logroño and the French frontier, and
v] Valdés and Esparſero defeated IO9
they threatened Villafranca. Valdés called out the garrisons
of Pamplona, San Sebastian, and Bilbao to restore his com-
munications. But Espartero, as soon as he left the shelter of
the walls of Bilbao, was defeated and lost 2000 men at
Descarga (June 2, 1835). He wisely abandoned all further
attempt to break through, and retired to defend his head-
quarters, the capital of Biscay. The result of the failure of
Valdés' attempt was the abandonment of everything within the
enemy’s country save Pamplona, Bilbao and San Sebastian.
The Carlists now held possession of the high-road. Villafranca,
Tolosa, and Vergara fell into their hands. Valdés withdrew to
the southern bank of the Ebro and resigned his command.
While general after general returned defeated to Madrid,
Moderates and Radicals devoted their whole energy to their
own quarrel. The Radicals had carried their point with regard
to the reestablishment of the national guard under the name of
Urban Militia, but they had been forced to submit to see the
“patriotic” force placed under the command of officers of the
regular army, and consequently beyond the easy reach of
civilian demagogues. Dissatisfied with their partial victory,
they used every means of harassing the ministry in its thank-
less task. Fermin Caballero, distinguished as a writer on
ºpolitical economy, proposed a vote of Censure contrary to the
rules of procedure established by the Statute. The President
refused to put it to the House. An uproar followed; and the
Radicals appealed to the mob, excited by reckless calumny and
by the news of Carlist victories. The state of the capital made
military precautions necessary; but Lopez, the demagogue,
arose, and in a fervid and tragic oration denounced the ministry
for attempting to overawe with soldiers the representatives of
the nation. The troops were withdrawn and the mob triumphed
noisily. Next Argüelles (known as “the Divine”) asked for
details of the agreement negotiated by Lord Elliot for the
more humane conduct of the war. He insinuated that the
ministers were bent on betraying the national cause by coming
I IO The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
to terms with the Carlists. It was known that Martinez de la
Rosa was looking abroad for help; the Radicals feared that
France would again intervene and give to the Regent and her
ministers victory over both Carlists and Radicals. Martinez
de la Rosa refused to give details of the agreement between
Valdés and Zumalacárregui. The House by a majority of four
insisted; it was a Radical victory. The mob showed its
delight by besetting and half murdering the unpopular ministers.
The attack in the House was renewed ; and Martinez de la
Rosa, no longer able to resist, read out the harmless document
over which so much uproar had been made (May 27, 1835).
To continue the stormy session would have been to court
further defeat. Parliament was prorogued on May 29.
So discouraging were the results of the first attempt to
govern by the Royal Statute that Martinez de la Rosa, its
author, resigned (June 7, 1835), giving as his reason differences
of opinion among his colleagues as to the necessity for calling
in foreign aid against the Carlists. The rest of the Cabinet
followed him, with the exception of Toreno, the historian of
the War of Independence and correspondent of Jeremy
Bentham, who undertook to form a ministry. Luis Fernandez
de Córdova had just brought Valdés' report of the insufficiency
of his army to resist the Carlists. Immediately afterwards
came news of Espartero's defeat at Descarga. Consternation
fell on the capital, but did not abate the animosities of its
politicians.
It was at this point that the Carlists, in the full tide of
success, abandoned the tactics to which they owed their
victories and attacked Bilbao. They urgently needed a sea-
port through which to obtain supplies; they had reason to
believe that Austria, Prussia, and Russia would send them
help if once they could obtain recognition as belligerents.
Possession of a place of the importance of Bilbao would
enforce this recognition, improve their position in the eyes of
the world, and establish their credit in the money-market.
v] ZDeath of Zuma/acárregui
Zumalacárregui was not the author of the fatal plan.
was no longer Don Carlos’ sole adviser. When he sough
to enforce his views he met with opposition in the prince's
court. His haughty temper was galled by the preference
shown at Estella for the advice of new-comers, flatterers, and
intriguers; he resigned his command. He resumed it, how-
ever, in obedience to his prince's orders; and the siege of
Bilbao began on June Io. The Carlist artillery was inadequate;
their leaders knew nothing of sieges. The townsfolk of Bilbao,
having no cause to fear treachery within their walls since the
Carlists were all outside, were confident of their power to resist.
On the fifth day of the siege Zumalacárregui was wounded in
the leg by a musket-ball ; nine days later he died owing to the
unskilful treatment of a village quack.
It was the turning-point of the Carlist fortunes; with
Zumalacárregui all unity of plan and authority was lost.
Jealousy and intrigue ruled court and camp alike. The officers
trained in the school of Zumalacárregui were passed over, and
Don Carlos, acting on the advice of his new ministry, gave the
chief command to Gonzalez Moreno, a man particularly hated
by the Liberals because of the perfidy whereby he had captured
Torrijos four years before (see p. 80). Blunder succeeded
blunder; the siege of Bilbao was abandoned; and Moreno
himself was crushingly defeated by Luis Fernandez de Córdova
at Mendigorria on the river Arga (July 16, 1835).
In Sir Robert Peel's ministry, the Duke of Wellington
directed Great Britain's policy with regard to Spanish affairs.
The Duke did not love the Spanish Liberals; but Martinez
de la Rosa had wisely sent as ambassador to London General
Álava, who had won the great soldier's esteem during the
Peninsular campaigns. Alava succeeded in interesting him in
the war, with the purpose of preventing needless suffering ; the
result was Lord Elliot's mission. In France, Thiers advocated
armed intervention, but Louis Philippe preferred indirect to
direct methods of dealing with the Spaniards, “I know them,”


The Carlist War (1833–1836) |CH.
said, “they are neither to be conquered nor governed by
ºtrangers. To-day they are begging us to come ; as soon as we
are there they will hate us and put every hindrance in our
way ” (Guizot). Nevertheless, when Martinez de la Rosa
formally claimed the help promised by the Quadruple Alliance,
the French Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired whether, in
the event of the opposition of the Eastern Powers to France's
intervention, France might rely on the support of Great Britain.
Lord Melbourne was now in power; and Palmerston held the
British Foreign Office. He refused to pledge his Government,
but recommended the concentration of French troops on the
frontier, and more careful insistence on the neutrality of French,
territory. The hint was taken ; and the supplies which the
Carlists had hitherto obtained from the Department of £he
Basses Pyrénées were cut off (June 3, 1835). .
Toreno was more successful than Martinez de la Rosa in
his negotiation with the Allies. His ambassador, Mendizabalº
by skilful management of the finances of the Portuguese
Liberals, had won a great reputation on the London Exchange,
and considerable influence among British politicians. Seeing
that both France and Great Britain sought to undertake the
protectorship of the Liberal-Cristino party, and that each feared
to give the other the advantage of single-handed intervention,
he successfully stimulated their rivalry until they agreed that
each should lend a force to be paid by Spain. A French con-
tingent, taken from the Foreign Legion, rendered good service
by keeping in check the Carlists of the north-eastern provinces.
A British Volunteer Legion, under Sir de Lacy Evans, helped
to relieve Bilbao, now again threatened (September), whilst a
British Squadron blockaded the Carlist coast.
The long war had undermined the popularity of the Regency.
The Royal Statute was now regarded as a worthless compromise
and make-believe. Martinez de la Rosa’s fate had shown the
impossibility of holding a middle course; the struggle was
between the Carlists on the one hand and the Radicals on the


v Ministry of Zoreno II 3
Other; there was no place for the old-fashioned Moderates.
Queen Cristina yielded; Toreno's ministry was a step towards
conciliating the Liberals, or Progressives, the advocates of a
Constitutional monarchy. The clergy, and specially the regulars,
were Carlist; even the Moderates had found them bitter and
uncompromising opponents. Toreno, immediately upon taking
office, declared war upon the Church by expelling the Jesuits
and confiscating the estates of the Society (July 4, 1835).
This step was taken in obedience to a financial as well as to a
political necessity.
Toreno had chosen as Minister of Finance Mendizabal,
whose Basque name, it was whispered, concealed a Jewish
origin. He certainly professed no great respect for the Church.
Long residence in London had broadened his views. He saw
Spain bleeding to death for lack of money wherewith to carry
on the civil war, while the vast estates of the Church lay idle,
seemingly within his grasp. It seemed simple enough to
devote these riches to public purposes and to make other
provision for the maintenance of the clergy. But this question
of the secularisation of ecclesiastical property had been for long
a battle-ground, and was still to cost Spain much agitation and
suffering.
In laying hands on the wealth of the Church, Toreno and
Mendizabal were not acting without precedent. Not to go so
far back as the well-nigh sainted Philip II, or to quote as
authority a Government of such ill-repute among Catholics as
that of 1820, Charles IV had not only applied the goods of the
banished Jesuits to reducing the debt, but had expropriated
charitable institutions, religious guilds, pious foundations, and
benefices under lay patronage, giving in exchange Government
bonds. The assent of the Pope was obtained only after the
deed was done. Later the same King received permission from
the Holy See to sell Church property to the amount of sixty-four
thousand pounds annual revenue; some forty million pounds
worth of real estate, supposed to represent one-seventh of the
C. S. 8
I I4 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
goods of the Church, was allotted to private persons; its
owners received Treasury bonds in compensation. The large
sales of Church property carried out under Joseph Bonaparte
were rescinded at the Restoration; the buyers, left without
compensation for their capital outlay, were obliged to repay
the income or profits received. The wealth of the secular
clergy was still untouched. It was left for the Liberals of 1820
to suppress half the tithe and to levy a heavy fine on the
remaining half. The Pope withdrew his Nuncio; and from
this time forward the Church became the determined enemy
of Liberalism.
As soon as it was known that Toreno and Mendizabal had
broken with the Church, and had decreed the suppression of
all religious houses of less than twelve persons (July 20, 1835),
the Radicals led the mob to the assault on the convents, and
ecclesiastics were massacred at Saragossa and at Reus. At
Barcelona the agitation, beginning in anti-religious riots, soon
became revolutionary. The captain-general was away fighting the
Carlists; and the city fell for some days into the power of the most
violent Radical faction. The military governor was murdered;
the agitation spread to the neighbouring towns. Abandoned
by the central Government, the burgesses undertook to restore
order. The tradesmen, manufacturers, landowners, and officers
of the militia elected a junta representative of all Catalonia. It
declared itself loyal to the throne of Isabel II but opposed to
the Royal Statute ; and it demanded the immediate assembly
of Cortes to revise the Statute and fulfil the aspirations of the
Progressive party. The junta demanded also a large measure
of self-government for the provinces, the right to administer
local revenue and expenditure, the suppression of the regular
and the reform of the secular clergy. In Aragon, Valencia, and
Murcia the revolutionary programme found many adherents.
Toreno stood at the parting of the ways. The British ambas-
sador, Sir George Villiers, afterwards Lord Clarendon, advised
concession and a frankly Liberal policy. The alternative was
v] Mendºzaffa/ Prime Minister II 5
repression, and a further attempt to combat from a half-way
position the extremes, Radical and Carlist. Toreno inclined to
the latter. He summoned the ministers, the members of the
Councils of the Regency and of State, the provincial governors,
and the great magistrates, to a conference under the presidency
of Queen Cristina (Aug. 14, 1835); the majority voted against
concession. As soon as the decision was known, riots broke
out in Madrid. The Government was still strong enough to
repress them, but the danger had been imminent. Had not
General Quesada deserted Olózaga and his fellow-conspirators
at the last moment, the Progressives and the national militia
would have imposed a Liberal policy by force of arms. Martial
law was proclaimed, the mutinous militia was disbanded, the
Progressive leaders prosecuted, and their newspaper, the Eco
de! Comercio, suppressed.
But there was nobody left to carry out a policy of repres-
sion in the provinces; the whole army was fully engaged in
the north ; and the revolution ran riot. After Catalonia, the
cities of Castille, Valladolid, and Salamanca declared against
the Royal Statute and in favour of a more Liberal Constitution.
Andalusia and Galicia followed. Even remote and backward
Extremadura was moved to interest, for Mendizabal, the man
designated by public opinion to lead the Progressives, was at
Badajoz.
Toreno had been in office little more than three months.
Just as he, the most Liberal member of the preceding Cabinet,
had succeeded Martinez de la Rosa, so now Mendizabal,
his Progressive ally and Minister of Finance, succeeded him
(Sept. 14, 1835). Mendizabal had a great advantage over his
predecessors in that he was a convinced Liberal, whereas they
had merely made grudging concessions to ideas naturally
distasteful to them. His ideal was material prosperity and
commercial activity, his bugbear the clergy. His self-confi-
dence was overweening: he counted on the support of the
whole Progressive party, and of the British ambassador, whose
8—2
II 6 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
influence was great among them. He promised recklessly
reconciliation of the whole Cristino party, Moderate and Pro-
gressive; the successful conclusion of the war without further
help from abroad or increase of taxation; a new and satis-
factory settlement of the relations between Church and State;
and the reestablishment of public credit. First of all the
submission of the local juntas had to be obtained. It was
done by flattery, concession, and promises. Captains-general
of pronounced Liberal views were appointed. Mina pacified
Catalonia. Olózaga, so lately a conspirator, became civil
governor of Madrid. Provincial Assemblies for the adminis-
tration of local affairs were instituted by decree. The juntas
were sanctioned as committees of national defence, pending
the election of the Provincial Assemblies. In Spain and
abroad it was believed that Mendizabal had the means as
well as the will to establish a broad Liberal policy, and to
finish the civil war. -
The end of October saw the dissolution of the last of the
juntas and the dispersal of the armed mobs through which
they exercised their authority. An amnesty covered the past;
and the Cortes were summoned for November to revise the
Royal Statute, devise a wider electoral system, and deliberate
on matters touching public credit. Before they met, a decree
had suppressed all monasteries that did not teach, or tend
the sick. All Spaniards between the ages of eighteen and
forty were declared liable to military service. The payment
for exemption was fixed at forty pounds. Numbers availed
themselves of this means of escape from facing the dreaded
Carlists; and the Treasury profited accordingly. One hundred
thousand conscripts, too poor or too patriotic for the subter-
fuge, were added to the army. The urban militia became
once more “national" in official documents.
The Estamentos (or Houses) met (Nov. 16, 1835) amid the
greatest popular enthusiasm. For Mendizabal, as even his
contemporaries observed, while pretending to lead, had “merely
v] Policy of Mendlizaba/ II 7
made himself the instrument for good or evil of the most
democratic and revolutionary of Spanish parties.” But for
the moment even the nobility and middle class as represented
in the Upper House seemed to approve his programme. The
whole financial question was left to his vaunted skill. He was
granted unlimited powers to deal with and alter the system as
he would, to raise and expend as he thought fit the money
necessary to end the war, giving an account of his administra-
tion during a future session. Then discussion opened on the
electoral law, suffrage, and representative government generally.
Direct and indirect voting, property qualifications for voters
and deputies, the extent of electoral districts were hotly
debated or referred to commissions that disagreed. Parties
began to group themselves on the well-known lines; an unex-
pected Opposition was developed ; and Mendizabal found it
necessary to dissolve the Cortes in order to carry out his
promises by decree (January 27, 1836). But by this time the
reaction had set in. The Moderates did not oppose, if they did
not encourage, the campaign of libel carried on against the Jew.
He was accused of being in the pay of England, and pledged
to impose a ruinous commercial treaty on Spain. The Progres-
sives, whom he called upon to strengthen his Cabinet, refused
to join a ministry that had promised so much and seemed
likely to fulfil so little. The Queen Regent was anxious to be
rid of a minister of whose loyalty she was not convinced, and
who had offended her royal temper by half-drunken insolence.
Nevertheless Mendizabal struggled on. His real interest lay
in finance; his great secret was still untried. For, since he took
office, the Gazette had announced that without new taxes
Spanish credit would shortly be raised to the level of that of
the most prosperous countries. So great was the confidence
in Mendizabal's abilities that, regardless of the vagueness and
vastness of his promises, bankers speculated for a rise in
Spanish funds. Meanwhile he was driven to the hand-to-
mouth expedients of his predecessors. By issuing paper to
118 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
the amount of £500,000 he realised about half that sum.
He mortgaged the tobacco and customs revenues and the
quicksilver mines of Almaden for a million. Worse still, he
suppressed interest on a part of the debt left untouched by
Toreno, and sold on his own authority bonds to the value of
three and a half million pounds that had been issued in
furtherance of Toreno's scheme of conversion. Then the
great secret was revealed. The whole estates of the Church
and the communes were to be declared national property, and
were to be sold by auction, their price being paid in certificates
of the national debt.
The Spanish funds were at this time about eighty per cent.
below par ; the whole debt was supposed to amount to about
one hundred and forty millions. Mendizabal's scheme was
not new. Even so far back as 1814 a better thought-out plan
on the same lines had been published by Florez Estrada.
Mendizabal himself experimented on a large scale before
submitting his plan to Parliament. He suppressed further
convents, of nuns as well as monks, and offered their property
for sale. He announced that ecclesiastical claims on private
estate might be discharged at a fixed rate, and payment made
in State paper. The result was vast gains to a few bold specu-
lators, scanty profit to the State, huge frauds at the sales,
worse confusion in the financial departments, and the creation
of titles to real estate which were sure to be called in question.
The reaction set in ; , Mendizabal's evident leaning towards
Great Britain offended France; the French veteran legion
which was fitting out against the Carlists was dispersed. The
man who had promised to end the war without burdening the
nation had proved unable to supply General Fernandez de
Córdova's inadequate army.
The Cortes met on March 22. A new House of Proctors had
been elected to support the ministry. It was enthusiastically
Progressive. Madrid had chosen Olózaga, the Scourge of the
convents. The House of Notables was Conservative as before
v. Mendºzaffa/ and the Aegent I IQ
and determined to undo Mendizabal's work. On the proposal
of Ángel de Saavedra, now Duke of Rivas, it ordered the
ministry to suspend execution of its unauthorised decrees with
regard to the expulsion of the regulars and confiscation of their
goods. In the Lower House unanimity was only apparent;
some who called themselves Progressives were far less Radical
than others. These, offended by Mendizabal's dictatorial airs,
gathered round Isturiz and Galiano. During the debate on
the Address, Isturiz sought to make the ministry responsible
for the foulest crime of the Carlist War, the murder of Cabrera's.
mother (see p. 125). Then he went further, and hinted at mal-
adversion by the President of the Council. Mendizabal so
far forgot his dignity as to fight a duel with his former friend
(April 15, 1836).
The Queen Regent did not conceal her dislike for the policy
and person of the Prime Minister: her conscience was offended
by his treatment of the Church. She began to give public
audiences; it was a means of hearing public opinion otherwise
than through the ministers and of communicating with her
Conservative friends. The Radical ministers held themselves
slighted; they were anxious to have the Regent at their mercy,
a mere tool in their hands. Through Rodil, their Minister for
War, they ordered her to dismiss Generals San Roman, com-
mander of the militia, and Quesada, captain-general of New
Castille, accused by rumour of leanings towards absolutism.
Queen Cristina refused to remove her friends. To have done
so would have been to deliver herself bound to Mendizabal
and the mob. She could rely on San Roman and Quesada
to defend her. Moreover, both were friends of General Luis
Fernandez de Córdova, who now held the chief command
in the north (June, 1835–August, 1836). Córdova might
interpret the dismissal of his friends as an attack upon himself;
he had taken the Cristino side and was loyal to it, but he was
no Liberal; if forced to choose between Carlism and a party
that persecuted the Church, and insulted and browbeat the
I 20 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
Queen, he might still choose the former. If he did so, Isabel's
cause was lost; for Córdova could take with him the majority
of the army. -
Mendizabal was no less eager to escape from the impossible
situation into which he had thrust himself than the Regent
to be rid of him. Nothing had come of all his vast schemes
and promises, the deficit in the budget was greater, the national
credit was lower than ever. Accordingly, when Cristina refused
to appoint Mendizabal's creatures to what was, in fact, the
guard of her person, he made the difference of opinion between
himself and the Regent the excuse for resignation (May 15,
1836). His successor was his late adversary in the field,
Isturiz. -
No great effort and no great skill in statecraft had been
required in order to overthrow Mendizabal's Radical ministry
and to show the hollowness of all its sounding promises. But
to reduce to order the confusion it left behind was utterly
beyond the power of his successor. Isturiz refused all com-
promise and alliance with the supporters of the late ministry.
Taking as colleagues the leaders of the Moderado party, the
Duke of Rivas and Galiano, he promised revision of the Con-
stitution and the termination of the civil war by means of
French help. Now that Spain was no longer ruled by the
violent Radical faction, M. Thiers lent a ready ear to the appeal
of its Government. The opportunity for intervention on behalf
of a dynasty closely allied to the House of Orleans and
governing in accordance with a moderate Constitution was a
favourable one ; and a French legion intended to take the
Carlists in the rear began to gather on the frontier. The pro-
posed revision of the Constitution was a more difficult matter.
The Lower House, or Estamento, elected three months before
to support Mendizabal, contained a strong Radical majority
which utterly refused to believe in the sudden conversion of the
Moderados to more Liberal views. The Radicals wished for
nothing less than the revival of the Constitution of 1812, and
v Ministry of Isturie. A dissolution 121
decided that the ministry should stand or fall according as it
proved submissive or rebellious on the matter. Questions
were asked as to its attitude towards the legislation of 1820–25
abolishing tithes, entails, mortmain, and private jurisdiction;
and, when the ministers sought to evade them by vague and
pompous phrases, a thoroughly Radical resolution was passed,
the members of the late Cabinet voting with the majority.
Military and financial proposals met with no better success.
The demagogue, Lopez, roused the ever-vigilant national
jealousy by representing that the acceptance of the intervention
of France would make a foreign country arbiter of the destinies
of Spain. Seven days after undertaking office, Isturiz' ministry
suffered a crushing defeat; only 29 members supported it
against 79 on the question of confidence. The choice now
lay between dissolution or recall of the Radicals. The two
courses seemed almost equally dangerous; dissolution was
decided upon. At once the agitation, which had till now been
confined to Parliament, spread to the country. The Queen
Regent was attacked for having set a Moderado ministry over a
Progressive Chamber, and having flouted the expressed will of
the nation by a dissolution, meant to secure a majority sub-
missive to the will of the court. She still further compromised
her own position and united her fate with that of Isturiz'
Cabinet by signing a decree of dissolution (May 22, 1836), which
was really a manifesto against the Progressive party. It spoke
of the “blind fury” of the Opposition, and ascribed its action
“not to the love of justice but to the hatred of persons.” Such
policy was calculated to cause the immediate explosion of the
threatened revolution; but the civilians waited upon the army,
whose attitude was still undecided.
August 24 had been fixed for the assembling of a new
Parliament, elected to undertake the promised revision of the
Constitution. But even there lay dangers. The late elective
Chamber had approved a new electoral law to take the place of
Martinez de la Rosa's decree previous to the passing of the
I 2.2 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
Royal Statute. The new law extended the franchise by lowering
the property qualification of electors, and increased the numbers
of the Lower House from 157 to 258; but it had not been
passed by the Upper House, and was therefore technically void.
To revert to the old restrictive decree was clearly impossible;
and the ministry decided to waive the question of strict legality,
hoping thereby to prove their good intentions to the Radicals.
But the Radicals had decided that nothing less than a revolution
would rid them of the last shreds of the Royal Statute; and
they refused to be bound by anything that might be done by a
Parliament illegally constituted. -
Terror of the Carlists was added to other causes of dis-
comfort. Toreno, on coming into power, had given the chief
command against them to General Luis Fernandez de Córdova.
His first task was the easy one of pursuing the dispirited army
on its retreat from Bilbao. Overtaking them at Mendigorria
he inflicted upon them a loss of 2000 men (July 16, 1835).
But he was called off from his victorious march by a second
attack on Bilbao, designed by Maroto, in order to create a
diversion. Bilbao was relieved for the second time (Sept. 7)
by Espeleta, Córdova's general of division, acting in con-
junction with Espartero's brigade from San Sebastian, and the
British Legion under De Lacy Evans, recently landed at Portuº
galete. Only after desperate fighting at Arriggoriaga (Sept. 11)
was Espartero able to rejoin his chief in command. The whole
campaign was indecisive; in the autumn the two armies again
faced each other from opposite banks of the Ebro. Córdova's;
troops, with four-fifths of Spain behind them, were worse sup.
plied than were the Carlists from the resources of their few:
poor provinces. - .
After Zumalacárregui's death, the most able commander left
to the Carlists was Ramon Cabrera, the sometime seminarist.
When, in the spring of 1835, he paid a visit to the little court of
Estella, his proved devotion to the cause and the authority he
had already gained in the north-eastern provinces marked him
v] Ferocity of the fighting I 23
for high command. His cold severity accorded well with Don
Carlos' temper; and he returned with a commission to organise
the Carlist bands in the mountain region where the captains-
general of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia meet. Constant
success, due to skilful leading, made the men of Cabrera's com-
mand every day bolder. They supplied stores and treasury by
holding to ransom rich provincial towns like Segorbe. By
systematic cruelty and faithlessness they sought to cow and
terrify the Liberal troops, and particularly the national militia,
which everywhere hindered their movements and bravely dis-
puted the mastery of the region between the river Guadalquivir
and the lower course of the Ebro. The story of their ferocity
is an appalling one. Quarter was rarely given, even to those
who surrendered under promise that their lives should be
spared. At Rubielos, after the regular troops captured in the
town had been enrolled among the Carlists, seventy-five of the
volunteer defenders were stripped and ridden down by lancers
(Sept., 1835). The Queen's soldiers were hardly less ferocious.
Knowing the fate that awaited them, and rightly distrusting
promises however solemn, they defended their walls to the last.
Families and communes responsible for having furnished recruits
to the Carlist ranks were ruined by fines or massacred. When
Mendizabal came into power, Cabrera was raiding unchecked
in the province of Cuenca; and even Madrid was hardly safe
from his bold enterprise.
In October Don Carlos replaced the incapable Gonzalez
Moreno, Zumalacárregui's successor in the Basque Provinces
and Navarre, by the Count of Casa Eguía, an old officer of
King Ferdinand. The results of the change were soon seen.
All along their blockading line on the Ebro, the Cristinos were
kept restless by the continual threats of an active foe striking
from the centre of their half-circle. The pass of Arbalan on
the high-road to Guipúzcoa and Bayonne was fortified; and
a great effort was made to open communications along the
Pyrenees between the Carlists of Navarre and those of Catalonia.
I 24 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
Bilbao, Guetaria, and San Sebastian were blockaded. Córdova
was forced by public opinion to abandon his lines and advance
to attack Arbalan in mid-winter in order to save them from
being utterly cut off (Jan., 1836). Thanks to the courage of
his French battalions and his generals of division, Narvaez and
Espartero, he broke through ; and, refusing to allow himself to
be distracted from his purpose by Canon Batanero's raid into
the heart of Castille, he fortified in the rear of the Carlists a
line of Navarrese villages from Roncesvalles to Pamplona.
He also armed Liberal households along the frontier, so as to
enable them to resist Carlist exactions. The presence of the
British Brigade allowed Córdova freedom to come to the rescue
of Balmaseda, where his lines had been broken. The successful
sortie of the auxiliaries and dispersal of the Carlist forces
gathering round San Sebastian (May 5, 1836) gave new spirit
to the Liberal population of the northern towns. And indeed
it was needed, for their defenders were rapidly degenerating
into a ragged mob of half-starved marauders more terrible to
friends than to foes.
To no purpose did Córdova repeat his urgent requests for
the Sorely-needed supplies; only patriotism induced him to
withdraw his resignation. His efforts, moreover, were every-
where hindered by the scarcely veiled hostility of the French
authorities, whose sympathies, since the advent of Mendizabal
and the triumph of British diplomacy, were wholly lost to the
Liberals. The Carlists came and went across the frontier
importing arms and supplies unchecked. But, though the
reopening of the frontier afforded some relief, the Basque and
Navarrese provinces were suffering severely from the continual
drain of men, money, and food. Willing as they were, it was
evident that they would not be able to resist much longer the
pressure of four-fifths of Spain. The Provincial Parliament
began to talk of the exhaustion of the country and to grumble
at the ruinous taxation they were forced to impose. Don Carlos
fell more and more under the influence of the dreary waiters
v] Murders on Öoth sides I 25
on Providence known as “the tinsmiths” (hoja/aferos) from
continued repetition of the words “ojalá (* “would to God!”
The discouragement fast spreading in the Basque Provinces
turned the attention of the Carlists to Cabrera, who, now
commander-in-chief of Lower Aragon, was organising the
country under his command, and establishing arsenals and
depôts. Between him and Nogueras, the Cristino commander,
a dismal and terrible rivalry in cruelty extinguished all prin-
ciples of humanity and soldierly honour. At last Nogueras
shot Cabrera's mother (February, 1836). The charge that she
had acted as intermediary in a plot to seize Tortosa was an
afterthought, and was unsupported by evidence. So little
ashamed was this ferocious brute of his act that he declared
his intention “to make Cabrera responsible for the death of his
sisters as he already was for that of his mother, and to shoot
the wives, fathers, and mothers of Carlist leaders five at a time
in revenge for each execution carried out by Cabrera.” Mina
brought eternal disgrace upon a fair name by sanctioning the
hideous murder. Argüelles, the well-tried Liberal, sought to
extenuate if not to excuse Nogueras' act before the Congress.
Some indignation was roused, but it was only momentary.
Mina's resignation was not accepted. Nogueras was sentenced
to banishment; but the matter was soon forgotten, and he
returned to his command. Cabrera in revenge shot six women
hostages, and answered Nogueras’ circular by ordering his
officers to retaliate if possible with greater ferocity. These
were no isolated instances of barbarity. Subordinate officers
followed the example set by generals, and had even less to fear
from publicity. The mob of Barcelona broke into the prison
and massacred all the Carlist prisoners in revenge for murders
Supposed to have been committed by their comrades at San
Lorenzo de Morunys, Jan. 4, 1836. When this Carlist strong-
hold was captured, most of the men believed to have been
murdered were found alive ; but even this did not save the
Carlist garrison from slaughter. Dire indeed was the fate of
I 26 The Carlist War (1833–1836) [CH.
the region of Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon, over which the
war raged. Captured and recaptured, the wretched villages
paid to successive roving bands heavy penalties for supposed
connivance or too ready submission. Undefended villages
were burned ; murder, even poison, was employed as means of
warfare; and private feuds were gratified under the cloak of
political differences.
Don Carlos in the Basque Provinces and Cabrera in his
own district could control their subordinates; but in La Mancha
and on the Pyrenean slopes of Catalonia the Carlists refused
to submit to any central authority. They were brigands cap-
tained by the boldest and most ruthless. The Carlists were not
insensible to the discredit these brought upon their cause ; and
more than one attempt was made to impose discipline. General
Guergué was sent with a body of Navarrese troops, but the
Catalans refused to recognise his authority; and, finding that
their lawless spirit was spreading among his men, he returned
westward at the end of 1835. The command was then given
to Maroto; but he too resigned it after six months, disgusted
with the lack of discipline and horrified at the cruelty he was
unable to repress. On the Cristino side, Mina had been
appointed to the captaincy-general of Catalonia by Mendizabal.
Impaired health prevented him from taking command in the
field; but he showed splendid energy, infused a new spirit in
the flagging cause, brigaded the national guard with the
regulars, and captured the stronghold of Nuestra Señora del
Hort. Though the Carlists defeated his subordinate Aspiroz
at Pelotilló, they became discouraged; and desertion reduced
their ranks from 25, ooo to about half that number.
The glowing despatches in which General Fernandez de
Córdova reported the campaign gave rise to the false hope that
the war was rapidly coming to an end. The general himself
paid a visit to Madrid to consult with Isturiz's Cabinet. He
arranged for the formation of an Army of the Centre under
Narvaez to oppose Cabrera, and a large reserve depôt at Burgos
v] C%ange £n Car/st tactics I 27
to protect Old Castille. After receiving promises of more
regular supplies for his army, he took over the command from
Espartero, whom he had left with strict injunctions to act only
on the defensive. At the same time (June, 1836) the Count
of Casa Eguía was Superseded by General Villareal in the
command of the Carlist armieś; and a new and startling change
in their tactics took place.
Feeling the pressure of want within their own provinces
and eager to achieve Something which should encourage the
courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to more determined
support of their cause, they organised a series of raids into the
heart of Spain. The most brilliant, though not the first of
these, was made by-General Gomez. His object was to rally
the Carlists of Asturias and Galicia ; it was hoped that the
province would rise, as Navarre, Biscay, and Guipúzcoa had
done, as soon as they saw a Carlist force among them. Once
safely past the lines of the Ebro, Gomez met with hardly any
opposition, for the country was well-nigh stripped of troops.
Oviedo, Santiago de Compostela, and Leon, fell into his hands,
furnishing men, arms, and supplies; but the general rising that
had been expected did not take place. Finding his direct
retreat cut off, Gomez turned southward, joined Cabrera at
Utiel, threatened Madrid, and captured a division of the Royal
Guards hard by its gate. He visited Córdova and Almaden,
and reached even distant Extremadura. Everywhere he seized
the arms of the national guard and distributed them to
Carlists. Though followed by a large train of ox-waggons
carrying his booty, he managed to evade pursuit, owing his
safety as much to the ineptitude of his pursuers as to his own
skill. But, whilst with Cabrera he harried the country round
Terez, General Narvaez, a soldier of a sterner stamp, overtook
and defeated them at Majaceite, near Los Arcos (Nov. 25, 1836).
Narvaez was prevented from annihilating their scattered forces
by the mutiny of a brigade of his own troops under General
Alaix. Gomez returned to the Carlist lines at Orduña in
I 28 The Carlist War (183 3–1836) [CH. v
December. In six months he had marched 25oo miles; he
had shown how weak Spain really was; and, in spite of defeat
and a quarrel resulting in separation from Cabrera, he had
brought back a large booty and a force larger than that with
which he started.
In the meantime his comrade, Don Basilio, had accom-
plished a raid hardly less extraordinary. But interesting as
these expeditions are from a military point of view, and great as
was the consternation they spread, they had but little influence
on the course of the war. When Gomez retreated to the
Ebro, the fate of the Carlist cause was being decided beneath
the walls of Bilbao; during his absence Spain had been trans-
formed by a revolution. . -
CHAPTER VI.
THE RISE OF ESPARTERO. THE FIRST
PRON UN CIAMIENTOS. END OF THE
CARLIST WAR (1836–1840).
THE Parliament summoned for August 24, 1836, never
met. Gomez and Don Basilio had shown the futility of General
Córdova's system of blockade on the Ebro. The help of
France so often promised by Isturiz was not forthcoming; the
hopes so rashly raised were dashed. Mendizabal and his
Radicals declared themselves revolutionary; the half-starved
army had broken out into mutiny and was murdering its
Commanders. The great towns refused to be ruled by a court
clique whose incompetence was evident, its honesty question-
able. Isturiz had been in power but two months when the
first mutterings of revolution were heard. Order was with
difficulty restored in Málaga and Córdova when all Andalusia
rose to revive the Constitution of 1812. Saragossa, weakly
ruled by Evaristo de San Miguel, took her fate into her own
hands, elected a junta, and sent envoys to the Army of the
Centre urging it to join the revolution. Narvaez, however,
succeeded in restraining his troops until Madrid fell to the
revolution, and the oath to the Constitution “became a duty
instead of a crime.” Barcelona sent a warning message to the
Queen Regent. Mina, its captain-general, anticipated rebellion
by proclaiming the Constitution. General Fernandez de Cór-
dova, grown weary of failure and mutiny, had already resigned
C. S. * 9
I 30 The Rise of Espartero ſcH.
his command on the Ebro. He was only awaiting its accept-
ance to hand over his authority to Espartero. When the news
of the general rising reached him, he retired into France,
accompanied by the greater part of his staff. But by this time
the Queen Regent had fallen into the power of the revo-
lutionaries.
The court was in its summer quarters at La Granja. Day
by day came news of fresh revolts, everywhere triumphant; for
the national guard and the mob made common cause, and no
troops were at hand to resist them. Still Madrid was held by
a sufficient garrison under an unflinching commander. Relying
upon General Quesada's approved loyalty, the ministry at first
put a bold face on the matter. Queen Cristina published
(Aug. 4) a proclamation recalling her services to the cause
of liberty in the dark days of King Ferdinand's reign. She
declared the revolution to be the work of “an anarchical and
turbulent faction intent on profiting by the misfortunes of the
country in order to defeat the will of the nation and to arrogate
to itself rights that belonged only to its legitimate represen-
tatives, and to outrage the royal majesty.” On the next day
Isturiz appealed to France for such instant help against the
Carlists as should enable him to employ some part of the
Spanish army against the insurrection. Then came news of
the revolt of Badajoz, Valencia, Alicante, Murcia, and Barce-
lona; but still the Queen, misled by the ministry, refused
to be warned and to call the Progressive party to power.
The tidings from the provinces were discussed with feverish
interest by the tiny garrison or guard of honour of La Granja,
consisting of eight companies and four squadrons under the
command of the Count of San Roman. The sergeants,
violent Radicals, were eagerly listened to by their men; and
the little force manifested unchecked its delight at each
advance of the revolution. At last, to the menacing strain
of the Hymn of Riego, it assembled in arms, proclaimed the
Constitution of 1812, with Isabel as Constitutional Queen and
VI] 7%e Mutiny of La Granja I 3 I
her mother as Regent. Bearing the colours and accompanied
by the junior officers, the soldiers demanded an audience in
terms that could not be refused. A deputation, two non-
commissioned officers and a private, were admitted; and
Sergeant Gomez, its spokesman, after kneeling and kissing
hands, set forth the grievances of the land as the spirit moved
him. He censured the Regent's refusal to proclaim the
Constitution in obedience to the clearly-expressed will of the
provinces; he deplored the persecution of Liberals and the
dissolution of the national guard. Some wrangling took place
between the sergeant and the Queen—herself the wife of an
ex-corporal—over the meaning of the word liberty; the royal
lady had by no means the advantage. After three hours of
hesitation, Cristina sought to satisfy her guard by a promise to
submit a proposal for a new Constitution to the forthcoming
Cortes. But the deputation stoutly refused the offer; the
waiting crowds of soldiers outside became impatient, and
broke forth into threats and insulting jeers with regard to
the Regent's domestic affairs. Then Cristina, who alone of the
Court showed no sign of alarm and did her best to preserve her
dignity in her ridiculous and dangerous situation, gave way
and signed a decree of three lines ordering that the Con-
stitution of 1812 should be observed until the Cortes decided
for the future (Aug. 13, 1836).
When news that the Regent was the prisoner of a few
hundred soldiers was brought to Madrid, the Cabinet debated
with General Quesada the possibility of an armed rescue. But
Cristina had ordered that no troops should be sent. The
British and French ministers, moreover, had given their opinion
that all attempts to settle the matter by force of arms must fail,
and that the Queen must submit at least to a change of
ministry. So Mendez Vigo, Minister for War, hurried off with
certain bags of gold to bribe or wheedle the mutinous soldiers
and to receive the royal person from their hands. He returned
to report the utter failure of his mission, and bringing with him
9–2
I 32 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
the extorted decrees appointing Radicals to high commands in
place of Moderados.
The attitude of the capital became momentarily more
threatening; the ministers and their known supporters fled
abroad, or went into hiding, leaving Quesada to die at his
post (Aug. 15). A decree dated the day before his murder
ordered the proclamation of the Constitution throughout
Spain and the rearming of the national guard. At the same
time a new ministry under the presidency of José Maria
Calatrava was nominated. Calatrava, an upright and dis-
interested man, the type of what was then called a patriot,
delighted in the atmosphere of revolution. He and his fellows
triumphed when the royal family, escorted by its captors,
was forced to submit to the degradation of a ceremonial entry
into Madrid, with Sergeant Gomez, the spokesman of the
mutineers of La Granja, riding by the side of the Minister
for War.
It is probable that if Don Carlos had shown a spirit of
concession and conciliation after the revolution of August,
1836, he would have rallied a sufficiently large number of
moderate men to his cause to secure its success. But Don
Carlos cared less for victory than for principle ; he believed
himself to be the chosen instrument of heaven for restoring a
certain form of government in Spain, and he would be King
only through fulfilment of his mission. Moreover the Carlists
now believed they could impose their own terms. Furious at
the treatment she had received, Queen Cristina after the revo-
lution entertained a scheme for the union of the rival dynasties
by the marriage of her daughter to the son of Don Carlos.
Negotiations were actually begun through the court of Naples,
but the Pretender proved unbending as ever. He demanded
as a preliminary that his claim to be the one legitimate King
should be recognised. Until this were conceded, he preferred
the village court of Estella to the court of Madrid. Here
Nuestra Señora de Dolores had been solemnly appointed to the
VI] British and French influence I 33
chief command of the Carlist armies; and Erro, the universal
minister, had to contend against a host of jealousies and
ambitions, though sanctity rather than ability was the title to
advancement. Foreign diplomatists and the leaders of Spanish
parties were alike rebuffed when they suggested any modi-
fication of the extreme doctrines of autocracy and religious
intolerance. The selfish theory that had gathered round
the unselfish leader wanted no accession of eleventh-hour
labourers to share the spoils about to be delivered into their
hands.
Opposed by a resolute foe, and neglected by their weak
and bankrupt Government, the state of the Cristino armies had
gone from bad to worse. Starved, ragged, and mutinous they
welcomed the Constitution whilst Gomez was marching un-
opposed through Spain in the rear. The success of the Radicals
had brought about a decline of French and a corresponding
increase of English influence at Madrid. Sir George Villiers,
the British minister, aided in the agreement whereby Mendi-
zabal and Lopez were included in Calatrava's Cabinet. It was
by his advice that Narvaez was selected, in spite of his political
views, to command the expedition that brought Gomez's raid
to an end at Majaceite. In the autumn Palmerston sent a
British squadron to Bilbao to cooperate against the Carlists.
On the other hand Thiers' policy of armed intervention on
behalf of Moderate principles and a dynasty related to the
House of Orleans was abandoned when his Cabinet fell
(Sept. 6, 1836). His successor Molé declared that French
blood belonged to France. The legion gathered at Pau and
on the point of entering Spain when the mutiny of La Granja
took place was dispersed. Louis Philippe, dreading revolution
above all things, came to an understanding with Metternich.
Austria was pledged not to interfere on behalf of Don Carlos
on condition that no French aid was given to Isabel. In
Spain the Moderados, who had been charged when in power
with subordinating Spanish policy to French influence, now
I 34 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
accused their adversaries of being in the pay of England.
Suspicion that a commercial treaty ruinous to Spanish industry
would be exacted in return for aid given by the British Legion
and squadron did much to weaken the position of Calatrava
and Mendizabal.
Their first measures had been to revive the greater part of
the Radical legislation of the second constitutional period
(1520–1523). A general attack was made upon the property
of the clergy and nobility. It was intended to fill the treasury
whilst gratifying a grudge against classes which had no love
for the Radicals. One thousand nine hundred religious houses
were suppressed, and their property confiscated. Little ad-
vantage resulted to the Treasury, for almost the whole proceeds
of the sales were embezzled. A most unjust law called upon
landowners to show titles to their property; immemorial
possession was declared not to constitute a valid title; and the
result, in most cases, would have been confiscation had not
the action of the law been defeated by the practice of the
tribunals.
The great majority of the Spanish people was still politically
indifferent. The revolution had had its origin in the lower
middle class; and it was this class that was represented in the
Constituent Cortes which met on Oct. 24, 1836. Their position
was little better than that of their predecessors of a quarter of
a century before, for the Carlists, who held many provinces
and threatened the rest, were even more dangerous enemies
than the French invaders. The opening speech from the
throne spoke of war, anarchy, and bankruptcy necessitating
the suspension of payment of interest on the exterior national
debt. The tampering of Toreno and Mendizabal had only
made the financial confusion worse. A project of proscription
against the Moderados failed. The Bill conferring on the
ministry arbitrary and unlimited powers to arrest and banish,
and to confiscate the property of suspects and refugees, was
happily thrown out by the determination of the less militant
VI] The Constitution of 1837 35
Radicals to prevent the inauguration of a French Terror. The
powers of the Queen Regent were confirmed by an almost
unanimous vote.
The Cortes had met in a single Chamber as directed by the
Constitution of 1812. But even those who for years had used
its name as their battle-cry felt that the famous Constitution
was unworkable. An alternative scheme drawn up by the late
ministry lay among the archives; but the new order of things
had made an end of the Moderados and all their works; and
a commission of nine, including Olózaga and Argüelles, was
appointed to devise new fundamental laws for constitutional
and monarchical Spain. Their work, approved by the Cortes
on April 27, 1837, was superior to the Constitution of Cadiz
in that it contained only 77 articles as against the 385 of its
predecessor. It guaranteed liberty of the press and the right
of public meeting and petition. It promised the abolition
of local privileges or fueros. Its declaration with regard
to religion was meant to disprove the carefully fostered idea
that all Liberals were necessarily atheists and sworn enemies
of the Church. “The nation binds itself,” it ran, “to main-
tain the worship and the ministers of the Catholic religion
which Spaniards profess.” The legislature was divided into
two houses, a Senate and a Congress. The nomination of
Senators from lists presented by the electoral bodies was
reserved to the Crown. One-third of the Senate must be
renewed at each general election. In the Lower House, chosen
by direct vote, one deputy represented each group of 50,000
souls. Deputies were no longer forbidden to present them-
selves for reelection. The Permanent Deputation of Parlia-
ment, a sixteenth century device for restraining encroachment
by the Crown, but found by experience to be a useless and
irritating hindrance to the ministry, was abolished. The
sanction of the Crown was necessary to the validity of an Act
by Parliament. To the Crown also was granted power to
summon, prorogue, or dissolve Parliament; but it was ordained
I 36 The A'ise of Espartero [CH.
that, failing the summons, Parliament should assemble auto-
matically each year.
The Constitution of 1837 is rather a working compromise
than an a priori declaration of general principles like its
predecessor of 1812. It is a development and extension of
the Royal Statute rather than a limitation of the extreme
doctrines of 1812. No such moderation had been expected
from the committee that drew it up. It was therefore all the
more welcome. Its recognition of the necessary prerogative of
the Crown and its honest attempt to include within the reformed
state all honest Conservatives found favour with the Moderate
Royalists. Even those who had been so rudely dispersed by
the late revolution accepted its amnesty and returned to work
under it. Martinez de la Rosa, the leader of the doctrinaire
party, waxed fervid in its praise. “The party which has had
no share in framing it,” he declared, “not even a voice where-
with to make itself heard, can say with pride to those who
drew it up, “The work is yours, but the principles it embodies
are ours; they are those Conservative principles which guide us,
and therefore we accept it as our banner.’” Cánovas del
Castillo, the great minister of Alfonso XII, expressed a no less
favourable opinion. “With a Queen,” he says, “who under-
stood and exercised her authority, all that was now wanted
was sufficient force to repress and root out the bad habits of
impatience, pessimism, slander, instability and anarchy.” If
we put at the head of the list corruption writ large, we have
a fair catalogue of the evils that infected public life when
Cánovas himself was in power half a century later.
The first effect of the new Constitution was to divide the
Progressive party. One section of it, the non-Conservative,
thought that the time had come to cry thus far and no farther.
They became Conservatives; and their alliance with the Moderate
party hastened the reaction inevitably following upon revolution.
Meanwhile the thoroughgoing Radicals formed an Opposition ;
and Lopez, their leader, abandoned the ministry. Calatrava's
VI] 7 he siege of Bilbao I 37
Government grew daily more unpopular. The old Constitution-
alists or Doceañistas considered themselves defrauded ; it was
hardly worth while to have brought about a revolution to secure
so colourless a result. The Carlist danger had come nearer
than ever; the Government did nothing to combat, in fact it
depended upon, the “gentle anarchy” (the expression is
Cánovas') that reigned in the provinces. When Calatrava's
Government fell four months after the promulgation of the
Constitution, two weak ministers prepared the way for the
military dictatorship of Espartero ; and Spain, utterly lacking
in civil stability, became the plaything of rival generals. In
order to understand how this came about, it is necessary to
return to the Carlist War.
When General Fernandez de Córdova abandoned the com-
mand in the north on hearing of the success of the revolution,
it devolved upon General Oráa, known and dreaded under the
name of “the Grey Wolf.” He was succeeded, a month later,
by Espartero; and a notable improvement in the situation
of the Cristinos took place. The armies had accepted the
Constitution, and were for the moment undistracted by political
intrigue. The ministry, fully persuaded of the necessity of
vigorously pushing the war, used all means at their command
to forward supplies and money. On the other hand, the
revolution had given fresh hopes to the Carlists. In order
to obtain the loan which they so much needed, and the active
cooperation of their friends at Vienna, Berlin, and St Petersburg,
it was necessary to gain possession of some important city,
and to raise themselves from the position of mere guerrilleros
in the mountains to that of an established government. A
seaport on the northern coast would best serve their purpose.
Refusing to be warned by the failure that had cost them the
life of Zumalacárregui, they again laid siege to Bilbao (Oct. 24,
1836). The townsfolk, bitterly hostile to the Pretender, sup-
ported the slender garrison, enrolling themselves as volunteers
and defending their walls with the utmost gallantry. So strong,
I 38 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
however, were the blockading lines that Espartero, with the
force at his disposal, did not attempt a rescue from the land
side. He concentrated his army at Santander and Castro
Urdiales, and conveyed the greater part of it by sea to
Portugalete. Thence, with the help of the British squadron,
he crossed the river. On Christmas Day, 1836, he defeated
the Carlists at the bridge of Luchana and entered Bilbao.
The much-harassed city received the title of Invincible, well
deserved by its unflinching constancy during the two months'
siege. The actual number of killed among its defenders was
not more than 240. Espartero, created Count of Luchana,
became the most popular and influential man in Spain.
Encouraged by their victory, the Cristino generals decided
to invade Guipúzcoa, the heart of the enemy's country, with
three converging columns—one from Pamplona under General
Sarsfield; another from San Sebastian under Evans, the com-
mander of the British Legion; the third from Bilbao under
Espartero. Their united force amounted to 85,000 men.
Against them the Carlists could bring only about half that
number under the command of the Infant Don Sebastian.
Nevertheless the plan failed disastrously. Sarsfield was blocked
in the passes by the snow. Evans, after breaking out of San
Sebastian by dint of five days' hard fighting, was defeated at
Hernani; and San Sebastian was saved only by the presence
of the British squadron. Espartero, on hearing of the failure
of his comrades, retreated with heavy loss to Bilbao (March,
1837). He rescued himself from the blockade, to which he
had been subjected since his victory at Luchana, by taking ship
to San Sebastian. There he joined Evans; and their combined
forces succeeded in capturing the Carlist lines of Hernani
(May 11, 1837). He next cut their chief line of communication
with France by recapturing Irun at the end of the main road;
and finally, marching through the heart of their country by
Lumbier, he reached Pamplona on June 3.
But by this time the main body of the Carlists was far
VI] Don Carlos marches south I 39
south, and only the remains of their army opposed Espartero
in Guipuzcoa and Navarre. Encouraged by the experience of
Gomez and Don Basilio, Don Carlos had decided to quit his
loyal northern province, join Cabrera in the west, and invade
Spain. Had this plan been carried out whilst Espartero was
engaged before Bilbao, and the country was still reeling from
the shock of the revolution, it would almost certainly have
succeeded. But it was deferred till the middle of May, when
Don Carlos with twelve thousand infantry and sixteen hundred
cavalry under the command of Don Sebastian crossed the river
Arga. In an allocution addressed to his volunteers, he spoke
of the Saracens who had once ruled the land as “less impious
than your contemptible enemies.” With him went a staff of
prospective magistrates and ecclesiastical dignitaries sufficient
for the country he hoped to conquer. At Huesca he defeated
and killed the Liberal general Iribarreri; at Barbastro with
equal forces he gained an advantage over General Oráa.
(June 1); but, by the time he reached Catalonia, he had lost
3ooo of his little army. He was coolly received by the local
juntas, but overwhelmed with demands for favours of all kinds.
His partisans claimed shares in his future kingdom as rewards
for their questionable service. He was, moreover, half starved
in the wild hill-country; and his troops, driven to marauding,
became undisciplined. Baron de Mier, Mina's able successor,
hurried from stamping out the centres of a Republican rising
at Reus to oppose their march. He inflicted a slight reverse
upon them at Grá (June 12); but before the end of the
month they succeeded in joining hands with Cabrera near
Tortosa.
Cabrera, after quarrelling with Gomez in the autumn, had
made his way back with difficulty, and only after suffering a
severe defeat, to his native province. During his absence, his
stronghold of Cantavieja with its foundry, printing-press, stores
and offices had been captured (Oct. 30, 1836). But Cabrera,
defeated and wounded, had rallied his men, recaptured Can-
I4O The Rise of Espartero [CH.
tavieja, and, though opposed by the dreaded Oráa, had again
become strong.
Don Carlos' army, when it reached the Ebro, though still
undefeated, was little better than a band of half-starved fugitives.
It crossed the river in boats brought by land from San Carlos
de la Rápita. Cabrera threw open to it his stores drawn from
the rich garden-lands of Valencia. A few days of rest and
plenty, and the addition of Cabrera's forces, made it more
formidable than when it started on its adventurous march.
Whilst the Carlists wasted their time in a further attack on
Castellon de la Plana, Oráa had concentrated his troops to
cover Valencia. He fell upon the combined Navarrese and
Catalan armies (July 14), and gained some advantage, but
failed to check their advance. At Cantavieja they were received
with wild enthusiasm ; the itinerant military court mustered all
its splendour; and a great ceremony of kissing hands took place.
A month later at Herrera, on the border of New Castille, a
great victory was gained. The Cristino troops lost 90 officers
and 2000 men, whilst their adversaries had only Ioo killed.
Meanwhile a second Carlist expedition, starting from the north
under the command of Zariátegui, had captured Segovia, La
Granja, and Valladolid, and had come in sight of the capital
at Las Rozas (Aug. 12).
The distracted Government, instead of devoting its energies
to supplying its armies, dictated from Madrid military move-
ments which must, if carried out, have brought disaster. Both
Espartero and Oráa refused to obey, and sent in their re-
signations; but both, in view of the primary danger, were
induced again to face the Carlists. The guards outside Madrid
were timid; the ministry took the opportunity of escaping by
resignation (Aug. 17) from the perilous position. Espartero,
now Minister of War, as well as commander of the army
covering Madrid, advanced as far as Daroca (Sept. 1); but
the Carlists slipped by him. Zariátegui's raiders joined the
main body; and on Sept. 12, 1837, Don Carlos occupied the
vil A'etreat of Dom Carlos I4 I
dreary village of Arganda del Rey, whence he could catch a
glimpse of the capital some ten miles distant.
Within Madrid there was a moment of intense anxiety.
The regular troops had marched out with Espartero; only the
much-abused militia was left to defend the walls. No man
knew how many adherents the Pretender numbered within
them, or what would be the effect of his printed proclamation
announcing that “the hour had rung when the conquering arm
of the invincible Don Carlos would break the yoke of a handful
of ambitious cowards steeped in all the most horrible crimes.
The first general of the age, the conqueror of Morella (Cabrera),
will soon occupy the capital; but there is nothing to fear.
All has been carefully arranged by the northern Powers. The
Prince of Asturias (the son of Don Carlos) will occupy the
throne of Spain which his father cedes to him; the daughter
of Ferdinand VII will be his wife; and the august widow will
return to Italy to enjoy that which is hers by right....The days
of the Inquisition and of despotism are gone for ever.”
But Madrid resolutely shut her gates and prepared for
defence. Espartero was hurrying back. The expected rising
within the city did not take place. Discouragement seized the
Carlists; and, after occupying Arganda for a single day, they
withdrew westward. Their generals quarrelled; their retreat
became a rout. Though not overtaken, their army melted
away till only 4ooo of its 12, ooo were left. These reached
the Ebro in deplorable condition (Oct. 24), hotly pursued by
Espartero.
So soon as the Constitution of 1837 had been voted, an
amnesty excluding only Carlists in arms brought back the
exiled Conservatives, Isturiz, Martinez de la Rosa, Toreno,
and Miraflores. Again the Treasury was empty. The nation,
having made itself responsible by an article of the Constitution
for the maintenance of public worship, took over the whole
property of the secular clergy; that of the regulars had already
been confiscated. The suppression of tithes, to date from
I42 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
1838, was voted. In November, 1836, the payment of interest
upon the Exterior Debt was suspended; six months later the
Interior Debt too ceased to bear interest. The revenue (esti-
mated) was 48,500,ooo, the expenditure (actual) 4, 15,700,ooo;
but this total did not include a number of outstanding obliga-
tions carried forward from the last financial year. Sales of
Church property to the amount of 24, 2,570, ooo and the sums
paid for exemption from conscription failed to make good the
deficit. The Government five per cent. bonds sank to 22 ;
the country was bankrupt; yet the war must be carried on.
Lord Palmerston offered a British guarantee on a new loan,
but he asked in return a liberal commercial treaty. This
was hotly opposed by the manufacturers of Catalonia, whose
prosperity has always depended upon rigid protection; and
the scheme fell through. The direct tax on lands and leases
was raised to twenty per cent. of the annual rental; and the
collection of the other taxes was anticipated (August, 1837).
Extremists on either hand were not restrained by the primary
danger of the civil war from active expression of discontent.
Although the new Constitution was the work of Radicals, and
formally accepted by the leaders of the Conservative party,
small republican insurrections at Barcelona and at Reus
betokened the dissatisfaction of the poorer people at finding
themselves excluded from the franchise. On the other hand,
the Catholic party denounced the confiscation of Church lands,
whilst the army disliked Calatrava's Radical policy. Espartero
had not yet attached himself to the Progressive and Radical
party. But he was already distrusted by Queen Cristina, who
throughout the Regency relied chiefly on the Moderados. He
too was dissatisfied with the Cabinet; his name was connected
with the insurrection of the Guards at Pozuelo (August, 1837),
when Don Carlos was far advanced on his march to Madrid.
Events were daily tending to put him into the position of
arbiter. His bravery was extreme, his personal incorruptibility
beyond dispute; the reputation he had founded in America
VI] Conservative reaction I43
had been extended by his victories over the Carlists. His
greatest talent, however, lay in the power of waiting upon
events, and so following public opinion as to appear to lead
it. By promoting sergeants in place of the most refractory
officers and by persuading others to withdraw their resignation,
Espartero restored an unstable discipline among the Madrid
garrison and made himself master of the situation. At the
same time the ministry, surrounded on all sides by difficulties,
resigned, complaining of his hesitating attitude during the
mutiny. After refusing the Presidency of the Council, Espar-
tero became Minister for War; but he resigned after a few
days, for he preferred to appear as Saviour of the country
rather than as a member of a weak Cabinet.
The Queen Regent profited by the confusion to call her
Conservative friends under Bardaji to power, whilst Madrid
faced the Carlists encamped at Arganda. When they withdrew,
the rescue of the capital was added to the list of Espartero's
services to the country; and his popularity increased propor-
tionately. Bardaji succeeded in passing a moderately restrictive
law to curb the Scurrility of the press, which now passed all
bounds in its attacks upon the Regent. He sold the plate and
jewels of the cathedrals and churches to meet the ever-pressing
needs of the war. He restricted the franchise to possessors of
an income of 24, 150 or of property taxed at 24, 2. The Pro-
gressives rallied and overthrew his ministry; but he chose new
colleagues and remained in office. -
The elections of September (1837) marked the progress of
reaction by returning a Conservative majority styling itself the
monarchical-constitutional party. It was pledged to the Con-
stitution of 1837, to the secularisation of Church property, and
to a policy of peace, order, and justice. The leaders of the
Moderado party, Martinez de la Rosa, Toreno, and Galiano,
supported the new ministry presided over by Count Ofalia,
sometime minister of Ferdinand VII. But they did not actually
take office, for some of them were declared enemies of the
I 44 The Rise of Espartero ſcH.
Constitution. Espartero, still commander-in-chief, refused to
pledge himself to Ofalia's policy and again refused the Ministry
for War. It was conferred upon his friend, General Latre.
“It was the first time,” says Cánovas, “that the electors, under
a ministry powerless to influence them, had by means of the
suffrage undone the work of a revolution.”
The Progressives, disheartened and discredited by their late
failure, did not at first oppose Ofalia. For a time it seemed
as if a coalition between the two parties calling themselves
monarchical and constitutional might be brought about. But
the Conservative Congress took up an irreconcilable attitude.
Though all professed unbounded devotion to the Constitution,
not even a vice-presidency was offered to Olózaga or its other
authors. The reactionary Cortes soon began to take back
piecemeal the more liberal provision of the Constitution. By
making over to the Crown the right of nominating mayors or
alcaldes, they tried to defeat the law establishing representative
government in municipalities. They endeavoured to regain
the support of the clergy by reestablishing tithes. Neither
project was carried, but the proposals served to aggravate the
situation, to show the real tendency of the ministry, and to
separate parties. The Progressives became fiercely hostile;
they soon found a powerful champion in Espartero.
The end of the war was the object for which all parties
sighed, and to which the petitions that poured upon the new
ministry were directed. The Carlists were again becoming
strong. Help from France had been promised so soon as
the anti-clerical and revolutionary faction should cease to hold
office. But again Louis Philippe refused his aid to the Spanish
Conservatives, though they claimed it as supporters of his
kinswoman and protagonists against revolution. So bad was
the financial situation, that it was debated by Parliament with
closed doors.
Whilst politicians wrangled in Madrid, Espartero had re-
turned northward (November, 1837), and by unflinching severity
VI] Aspartero restores discipline I45
had restored discipline in the mutinous army. At Miranda
General Ceballos Escalera had been murdered by his own
troops; at Pamplona Sarsfield, a gloomy and taciturn man,
had met with a like fate; Vitoria had been the scene of a
mutiny; at San Sebastian the British Legion clamorously de-
manded its overdue pay. Espartero's methods were drastic,
startling, and dramatic, well-suited to the situation. Ceballos
Escalera was murdered on Aug. 16, 1837. The state of the
army did not allow of the immediate punishment of the guilty
battalion. It was sent into La Mancha; and, when three
months later it returned to Miranda, the murder was already
half-forgotten. Espartero, however, had been awaiting his
opportunity. He paraded the garrison of Miranda, and, by a
series of complicated manoeuvres, surrounded the unsuspecting
battalion, placing his artillery in such a position as to render
its escape impossible. He then rode forward and addressed
the regiments. “Soldiers, last night. I saw in a dream my
comrade General Escalera. There (pointing to the grave-yard
hard by) lies his body; here (pointing to the battalion) are his
murderers.” Immediately the men were disarmed and deci-
mated by lot. A somewhat similar punishment overtook the
murderers of Sarsfield. The army recognised and welcomed
the strong hand. Only Espartero would have ventured to act
thus. As a soldier, he was at times magnificent. The rank
and file, and the non-commissioned officers, were ready to
follow him unquestioningly. That this was the case was felt
by Calatrava, by Bardaji, and by Ofalia. Conscious that a
word from him would be sufficient to overturn them, they
grudged his undue influence. Espartero indeed was over-
weeningly conceited, and loved to make his power felt. Before
finally submitting to him, his enemies endeavoured to set up a
power to counterbalance his.
Cabrera had again become dangerous in the west. Fierce
Carlist bands ravaged the villages of La Mancha unchecked.
All the available troops were away in the north, when General
C. S, IO
I46 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
Narvaez received a commission to form, train, and command
an Army of the Centre. He had greatly distinguished himself
as a general of division under Fernandez de Córdova, and
though he had as yet taken up no decided attitude in politics,
it was well known that the closest friendship united him to the
military chief of the Moderado party. His brilliant victory over
Gomez and Cabrera (see p. 127) had given him a reputation for
skill and daring only second to that of Espartero. He was
held in high favour at Court, and had given valuable help
in the formation of the Cabinet. Coolly energetic, he now
embarked upon a rivalry with Espartero which forms a main
clue to Spanish politics during the next twenty years. Madrid
could afford him neither pay nor equipment for the troops he
was commissioned to raise; but his popularity enabled him to
obtain from Provincial Governments, municipalities, and from
private persons in the still rich cities of Andalusia, the re-
sources he needed; and he soon had under his command a
well-disciplined force of twelve thousand men. He cleared
La Mancha of Carlists by methods so stern that they are still
remembered by the peasantry, though many wars since then
have swept over their plains. Pushing on vigorously towards
the Pretender's provinces, he so shook the confidence of the
Carlists in their leader Guergué that Maroto was summoned
from France to take his place.
Espartero, foreseeing the rise of a dangerous rival, sent in
a protest with a hardly-veiled threat. He complained, not
without reason it would seem, of a vast Moderado plot to put
the somewhat discredited and irresolute, though well-intentioned
general, Fernandez de Córdova, in his place. He declared that,
in furtherance of this scheme, his army was neglected and
starved, whilst that of Narvaez was pampered. Córdova
remained for the moment in the background; but the rivals,
Narvaez and Espartero, threatened resignation unless heartily
supported by the ministry. Espartero actually sent in his
resignation. It was refused; but riots followed in Madrid; and
VI] Kiva/hy of Espartero and Narvaez 147
the Cabinet fell, not because it had lost control of the majority
in Parliament, or because it had forfeited the confidence of the
Crown, but through fear of military sedition.
The Duke of Frias, with a neutral Cabinet, succeeded to
Ofalia's place with its dangers and difficulties undiminished
(Sept. 6, 1836). One or other of the rival generals must be
sacrificed; but it was more than doubtful if Espartero, who was
rapidly assuming the airs of a dictator, would submit. It was
decided to sacrifice Narvaez. He was recalled to Madrid
(Oct. 8), and ordered to the north with his army, to put himself
under the command of Espartero. But Narvaez was not in-
clined to submit tamely to a sentence dictated by his military
enemies the ayacuchos, so-called from the battle in which the
Spanish power in South America perished. They had brought
back from America the worst traditions of discipline; but their
former comradeship in arms was a powerful bond between
them, and they shared their leader Espartero's hatred of the
new man. Narvaez's way north lay through Madrid; and on
October 14 he paraded his forces before the capital. This
demonstration was taken as a threat, the more so as Narvaez,
at the same time, sought authority to raise his reserves to
40,000 men. The decree was actually granted (Oct. 23, 1838).
Narvaez had seemingly triumphed ; but scruples withheld him
from provoking an immediate civil war.
At Madrid Narvaez was equally popular with the Court
and with the Progressive Opposition. The latter had actually
tried to persuade him to seize the capital and overturn the
ministry. When he refused to do so they began to look upon
him with suspicion, though he had won golden opinions from
the leaders of the national militia and other democratic bodies
in the south. The Court party meanwhile was timid ; and the
Queen Regent, in spite of her sympathies, refused to compro-
mise herself in the coming struggle. The ministry was the
plaything and mouthpiece of that one of the two rival generals
who seemed for the moment more powerful.
IO-2
148 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
At Logroño the ayacuchos were assembled in a conference
which resulted in an ultimatum entitled, “A Petition laid before
Her Majesty by his Excellency the Count of Luchana etc. with
regard to the decree of the 23rd of October, by which the
organisation of an army of 40,000 men is determined on.” It
declared that the project involved a mortal blow to the cause
of liberty, and would result in the final triumph of the cause of
Don Carlos. The reasoning, indeed, was of the feeblest, but
its purport was unmistakeable. If the decree of October 23
were maintained, Espartero and the Army of the North could
no longer be counted among the supporters of Isabel II. The
ministry gave way on October 31. Narvaez received a despatch
communicating to him “the deep regret of the Queen Regent
that the failure of his health did not permit him to continue
for the time being at the head of the troops that he had
succeeded in organising, instructing, and disciplining with so
much zeal.” The Army of the Centre melted away; and
Narvaez withdrew sulkily, as the Great Captain had done
centuries before, towards his house at Loja. . .
Narvaez from this time was numbered among the Moderados.
General Fernandez de Córdova, whom the party would have
set up against Espartero, was living in Seville when, a few days
after the events above related, a pronunciamiento led by the
Radical Manuel Cortina, supported by the national militia and
directed against the Government, broke out (Nov. 15, 1838).
Fernandez de Córdova added another to the many existing
proofs of his weakness of character by allowing himself to be
appointed to the presidency of the junta which took the direction
of affairs. Cánovas would have us believe that he fell into a
trap, and that the pronunciamiento was the result of a plot
hatched by the Progressives to compromise him, If so, no
further proof of his unfitness for leadership is needed.
Had Córdova alone been involved, the matter would have
been unimportant; but he succeeded in dragging Narvaez into
the discreditable affair. There was no collusion; only the
VI] Fa/Z of Marvaez I49
desperate appeal of a friend induced Narvaez, who a few days
before had refused to begin a civil war with every chance of
success, to lend his name to an undertaking subversive of all
discipline, and condemned, from the outset, to failure. No
sooner had Fernandez de Córdova taken the rash step of
lending his authority to the pronunciamiento than he saw his
danger and repented. In tragic style, he wrote to Narvaez,
“Come, my friend. Come and succour me; you know that if
I saw you drowning, I should cast myself into the water with-
out stopping to consider that I do not know how to swim.”
Narvaez came to Seville, but he made no effort to infuse
new life into the already moribund insurrection. Espartero's
opportunity had come; his enemies had been the first to
blunder badly, and he took full advantage of their blunder.
Grown used to addressing commands to the ministry,
he peremptorily demanded the punishment of Fernandez de
Córdova and Narvaez for treason. Of their guilt there could
be no question; and they had little reason to hope for mercy.
The weak Cabinet of the Duke of Frias had been swept away
as incapable of bringing the civil war to a close ; and, in its
successor, Alaix, the creature of Espartero and the bitterest
enemy of Narvaez, was Minister for War and leading spirit.
Just two years earlier Alaix had robbed Narvaez of the fruits
of his victory over Gomez by provoking a mutiny in the face
of the enemy. Narvaez had not scrupled to characterise his
action as it deserved. Alaix appointed the Count of Cleonard,
well known for his harshness, to try Narvaez by court-martial at
Valladolid, far from the region where the offence had been
committed and far from Andalusia, where Narvaez was known
and beloved. But neither of the two generals implicated was
brought to trial, Fernandez de Córdova escaped to Portugal,
where he died in 1840. Narvaez took refuge in France. For
three years and a half Espartero was left undisputed master of
Spain. At the end of that time his overthrow was due mainly
to Narvaez. Under Espartero's protection a coalition ministry
I 50 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
carried on affairs while he was engaged in bringing the war
in the Basque Provinces to an end.
Desperate as seemed the plight in which Don Carlos
returned to the northern provinces in the autumn of 1837,
his cause was not yet lost. Uranga, who had been left in
command during his absence, had gained several small victories
though opposed by O’Donnell, already a general of repute. In
Catalonia Urbistondo had fared almost equally well, until the
undisciplined bands drove him from his command. But Don
Carlos, influenced by the most worthless of his adherents,
ascribed his failure to capture Madrid to the fault of his
generals. Persuaded that Don Sebastian, Zariátegui, Elio—
the best of his well-tried officers—had played him false and
were only seeking for an excuse to abandon him, he issued
a proclamation (Oct. 29, 1837) accusing them of treason. The
Carlists were divided into two factions; and only the most
violent and unpractical followed the prince and his camarilla.
Tejeiro, a worthless creature of the Bishop of Leon, became
universal minister and played upon his master's suspicions.
The “traitors” were persecuted and imprisoned. Guergué
was made commander-in-chief in place of Don Sebastian.
Nevertheless the Provincial Governments, in spite of the ex-
haustion of their districts, called upon them for fresh efforts,
and succeeded in raising, in the course of the year 1838, nearly
half a million sterling wherewith to carry on the war. But
Espartero had again taken command of the Cristino army on
the Ebro. In June he regained possession of the important
fortress of Peñacerrada, and defeated Guergué, who attempted
a rescue. At the same time the famous Don Basilio returned
from a foray routed, and with the loss of half his men. Even
in this style of fighting, hitherto so profitable, the Carlists now
met with reverses. The court of Estella became convinced
that a change in the chief command was again necessary; the
policy of suspicion which had driven away the most able men
and had put in their places the “plain, rough men” (brutos), as
VI] Divisions among the Carlists I5 I
they styled themselves, was reversed. But again the choice
of Don Carlos fell awry; he called to the chief command the
man who was destined to betray the cause. Maroto was one
of the disgraced leaders who, for their opposition to the
fanatical but astute brutos and apostolicos, may be called the
Liberal wing of the Carlists. He found an able lieutenant
in Val d’Espina; and, though intrigue was still rife, the position
of the Carlists improved. A victory was gained over Alaix
(September, 1838), while Espartero was busied with his scheme
to overthrow Narvaez. The Cristinos did not, however, feel
themselves sufficiently strong to attack Estella, the Carlist
capital. -
It was during the autumn of the same year that Don
Carlos married his sister-in-law and old friend, the Princess of
Beira, the mother of his able nephew Don Sebastian. From
that time his interest in public affairs seemed to fail; and no
controlling hand checked the factions at his Court. For some
time back the party that sought peace and local privileges
(Paz y Fueros) had been gaining ground. The Carlist motto,
Dios, Patria, y Rey, expresses, in the order of their importance,
the causes for which the Basques and Navarrese fought. They
honestly believed that all Liberals were atheists and freemasons,
the latter a name of dread supposed to imply devil-worship,
black masses, and other hideous and sacrilegious observances.
The victory of the Liberal cause, they were assured, would
mean the persecution or abolition of Christianity. Their re-
ligion was intensely dear to them ; the belief that those who
died for the cause died as martyrs was carefully fostered by
their leaders. It was their strongest motive in their long and
heroic struggle. Next to it came Patria, in the restricted
sense of local autonomy and the cherished privileges to which
they owed the simple prosperity of their valleys. Even the
Catholic Majesty of Ferdinand and Isabel had recognised their
claim to be a “separate nation.” Loyalty to their King, or
rather overlord—for the King of Spain is Lord of Biscay—was
I 52 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
a real, though less powerful motive; but it had been Sorely
tried. Carlos, though an upright and a brave man, was hardly
fitted to call forth enthusiastic personal loyalty. Stiff and
narrow-minded, he was the tool of faction, ever ready to listen.
to interested murmurs against the best of his adherents.
The so-called Liberal government of the greater part of Spain
had not been followed by the disappearance of Christianity;
and in the north the conviction was gaining ground that life
would be tolerable even under Isabel II, provided the Fueros,
the pride and glory of the race, could be preserved. Peace
was ardently desired by the provinces, which for four years
had been devastated by a ruthless war, and in spite of natural
poverty had maintained, with but slight help from abroad,
an army of nearly 40,000 men, a little Court, and a large civil
and military staff. The Provincial Assemblies had already
declared that their resources were at an end, that the utmost
they could do was to find rations; to pay the troops was no
longer possible. The policy of dividing the interests of those
who had hitherto been united under the name of Carlists, and
of leaving to a section of them only the frigid principle of Divine
Right and legitimacy wherewith to adorn their banner, was care-
fully pursued by Isabel's Government. Since 1835, its agent,
Muñagorri, had been at work; and, though at times disavowed
and forbidden to pledge his employers in any way, he had
convinced the Basques that peace and autonomy were attainable,
though not under the King of their device. Muñagorri had
even raised a small body of volunteers to fight against the
Carlists.
After the capture of Peñacerrada, Espartero pushed steadily
forward, treating obstinate districts with severity, but granting
ready amnesty to all who laid down their arms. Meanwhile
he had entered into negotiations with Maroto, his former
comrade in arms, nominally for the exchange of prisoners, but
really with a view to bringing the war to an end (January, 1839).
It is by no means certain what was Maroto's motive or when
VI] ADom Carlos and Maroto I 53
he resolved to betray the cause. Intrigue from the first made
his position well-nigh untenable; but he was determined not to
be set aside as Don Sebastian and others had been. He
seized at Estella three generals and a colonel, leader of the
party opposed to him, and executed them on his own authority,
shooting them in the back as traitors, under plea that they
were plotting a meeting. But the ringleaders, Balmaseda and
Tejeiro, had escaped, and they had possession of Don Carloš'
ear. Maroto was deprived of his command and declared
traitor, “for his perfidious and base abuse of confidence.” He
at once marched on Tolosa, where the prince was quartered,
and exacted confirmation in his command and a declaration
of his “well-tried patriotism and loyalty.” All his enemies
were banished from the itinerant Court. A manifesto gave out
that Don Carlos had been “highly surprised when by fresh
evidence and loyal reports he had been convinced that Maroto
had acted in the plenitude of his legitimate power, and guided
by sentiments of love and fidelity so often proved in the
maintenance of the cause.” No plea of compulsion can excuse
the signature of such a document by a prince who demanded
of his followers heroic self-abnegation. Don Carlos was now
the mouthpiece of Maroto; and Maroto was a traitor. The
cause was lost. - .
In the spring the Cristinos were strong enough to invade
the Carlist provinces. Espartero, now rid of his rival, drove
the disheartened troops of the Pretender from the Carranza
valley. His subordinate Leon recaptured the bridge of Belas-
coain and reopened communication with Pamplona. Espartero
was made Duke of the Victory, and pressed forward, burning
the crops whilst promising easy terms of surrender, until he
crossed the once formidable lines of Arlaban almost unopposed.
A Carlist council of war (May 29) decided that it was impossible
to resist the invasion; that the outposts of Balmaseda, Durango,
and Orduña, must be abandoned ; and that guerri//a tactics
must again be resorted to as at the beginning of the war.
I54. The Rise of Espartero [CH.
Intrigue and mutiny were rife in their ranks. The irrecon-
cilables were distributing pamphlets to prove Maroto a traitor.
The battalion defending Navarre had revolted against his
authority. But, even so, Elío succeeded in beating back Leon
from Estella. Don Carlos sided with the party opposed to
Maroto; but it was impossible to supersede him while more
than half the army obeyed him, and it was even invidious to
declare him a traitor when his adversaries were treating for
peace. A plot to seize and murder him failed.
France and Great Britain offered mediation, though Lord
John Hay refused to make his Government responsible for the
conditions of peace. The terms offered were generous. The
rank and privileges of an Infant of Spain were assured to
Don Carlos. All his officers were granted rank in the Queen's
army equivalent to that which they held in that of the prince.
The real difficulty of the negotiations lay in the clause re-
specting the Fueros. “The captain-general, Don Baldomero
Espartero, promises to use his interest to obtain from the
Government the fulfilment of its offer to pledge itself formally to
propose to the Cortes the confirmation or modification of the
Fueros.” This was felt to be too vague; but it was impossible to
obtain any more definite guarantee. Don Carlos would not hear
of peace; he merely smiled when told by Maroto that neither the
army nor the people would consent to further war. So Maroto
took the matter into his own hands. The prince presented
himself before the battalions, and tried to rally them to his
person; but his reception left him without hope. The Biscayan
commander was the first to accept the conditions of peace;
he was followed by the Castilians and Guipúzcoans. On
Aug. 31, 1839, Maroto came with his staff to Espartero's camp;
Carlists and Cristinos embraced; the Convention of Vergara
was signed; and the war in the Basque Province was at an
end. Of the Navarrese and Alavese some eight thousand
remained faithful, and followed their prince when, on Sep-
tember 14, he reentered French territory with a final anathema
v1] The Convention of Vergara I 55
against “the infamous traitor and treachery that had sold for
foreign gold and recognition of military rank, God, the King, the
Country, and the Fueros.” The verdict of Cánovas del Castillo
is significant. “Equally balanced,” he says, “as were the
conditions of the struggle, victory belonged to the less im-
prudent; and it was a wonder that in this painful rivalry the
Carlists proved in the long run madder and more foolish than
their adversaries. It seems hardly credible that it should have
happened thus amidst pronunciamientos, quarrels of the best
generals, and heated and afterwards irreparable hatred between
extremists or Progressives and monarchical constitutionalists
or Moderates, continually undermining the throne of the
Queen. The peace was not entirely a good one; but it was
useful, perhaps necessary...Some there were who marked that
the enemy had been vanquished, not by force of arms, but by
a treaty very advantageous to the generals, leaders, and officers
of the Carlists, and not, in the last resort, so honourable
for the nation in general as might be wished, on account of
an interpretation given to the article with regard to the fueros of
the Basque Province.”
Even after the Convention of Vergara much remained to
be done in north-eastern Spain. For nearly a year after the
submission of the province, Cabrera struggled on. In January,
1838, he had captured the almost impregnable position of
Morella and made it his headquarters. His factories and
depôts, there safely established, kept his men well supplied with
arms and food. In March of the same year the Carlists came
near capturing Saragossa by a bold surprise. The discourage-
ment of the Basques and Navarrese actually brought an
accession to Cabrera's force, for the most resolute spirits of
the dispersed regiments joined him. The “Grey Wolf,” Oráa,
attacked Morella, but Espartero withheld the necessary troops;
and, after a brave attempt to storm the fortifications (Aug. 17,
1838), the siege was raised. Cabrera, trusting the defence of
Morella to his lieutenant, Negri, had remained in the open
I 56 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
country to harass the enemy and threaten his communications.
Further Carlist victories and hideous massacres of prisoners fol-
lowed. Van Halen, the commander of the Army of the Centre,
retaliated; it became necessary for Great Britain to intervene
for the second time; and an arrangement for the exchange of
prisoners was effected (April, 1839). It has been calculated
that the number of prisoners slaughtered by Cabrera before his
mother's murder was 180. After that crime 730 perished by his
order; and nearly 500 were put to death by his subordinates.
Van Halen having failed like his predecessor, O'Donnell,
Espartero's protégé, was appointed in his stead. Cabrera was
now so hated that a subscription was started in Madrid to
procure his assassination. O'Donnell was obliged to act on
the defensive, for in view of the forward movement that
brought about the Convention of Vergara, all supplies were
sent to the Army of the North. Nevertheless he frustrated
Cabrera's efforts to cause a diversion.
When peace was signed in Guipúzcoa, Cabrera was in a
stronger position than ever. The outposts were being pushed
forward towards Madrid; on the day that Don Carlos crossed the
French frontier Cabrera captured two thousand of the Queen’s
troops at Carboneras. But now the whole Cristino force, freed
by the submission of the provinces, took the field against him
under Espartero. Still he did not waver. He gave permission
to all whose hearts failed them to make their submission while
it was yet time, and he warned those who remained faithful
that they must expect hardships and must be prepared to
suffer willingly the utmost rigour of military discipline. He
set aside the junta that had hitherto cooperated with him, and,
left to his own resources, prepared for a desperate resistance;
but illness overtook him and defeated all his plans. By the
time he was sufficiently strong to take command again his
old lair at Cantavieja had been captured. Concentration of
all his forces failed to save Morella; but Cabrera was still free
and in command of 6ooo men, the flower of an army formed
VI] A'etirement of Cabrera I 57
by years of constant fighting. The operations were now con-
fined to the left bank of the Lower Ebro, for amnesty combined
with séverity against all who harboured Carlists had restored
peace in Aragon, Murcia, and Valencia.
A death as harsh as his life had overtaken the grimly
famous Conde de España in Upper Catalonia. He had de-
stroyed the town of Ripoll and left only a stone inscribed
“There stood Ripoll,” to mark the spot. He terrorised a
great district by executing in the most public manner batches
of prisoners of war or of his own party who had incurred
his displeasure. By such means and by mutilation ruthlessly
inflicted he had reduced the Catalan levies to some form of
discipline; but he was hated by his own men, and it was at their
hands he suffered the fate he deserved. The junta seized him
in the council chamber, and sent him under escort towards the
frontier of Andorra; but his guards had wrongs to avenge. At
night, when they came to the river Segre, they beat down the
fierce old man with a bludgeon, tied a stone round his neck,
and cast him into the river.
Cabrera avenged his death; it was his last effort, for
Espartero at the head of an overwhelming force was already in
sight of Berga. The Carlist officers had for some time been
depositing abroad, in view of exile, the sums levied on their
districts. Further resistance was useless; when defection set
in it became impossible; and Cabrera sullenly bowed to the
inevitable and crossed the French frontier (June 2, 1840).
Two thousand of his men followed him. His farewell to the
troops was the signal for several suicides; two Aragonese
soldiers fought to the death with bayonets in proof of their
friendship, refusing separation. To many of these stubborn
men life without the cause was valueless.
While the Carlists under Cabrera still held the field in
Catalonia, another struggle, less bloody than the former but
scarcely less disastrous for Spain, was preparing. The first
general election held under the Constitution of 1837 had
I58 The Rise of Espartero [CH.
unexpectedly returned a Conservative majority. The new
ministry, whose President was Perez de Castro, but whose
guiding spirit was Arrazola, an ex-professor of the University
of Valladolid, proved itself the willing servant of Espartero by
sacrificing Generals Córdova and Narvaez in the circumstance
already mentioned. In the following spring Parliament was
prorogued; in June, 1839, it was dissolved, in order that a
majority favourable to the ministry might be secured by the
usual means. The Conservatives, foreseeing, defeat, abstained
from taking part in the election; and the new Congress or
Lower Chamber was, with the exception of one member, wholly
Radical. All this had been done in obedience to the powerful
commander of the Army of the North ; for the two rival parties
in the state, the Progressives on the one hand, and the Con-
servative and Court party on the other, were trying to secure
his alliance, and using every means to secure it. But as yet
Espartero had not declared himself; he had followed a purely
personal policy; he was a monarchical constitutionalist like the
rest. So thoroughly was the Queen Regent supposed to be
under his influence that she was said to “believe in God and
worship Espartero.” Soldiers and politicians alike looked to
him for advancement; ministers feared him and waited on his
words; even convinced Liberals had not yet got rid of the delu-
sion that liberty could be conferred by a general at the head of
an army.
The Radical Cortes proved as untractable as the preceding
ones and bitterly hostile to the ministry. It became necessary
to sacrifice the Cortes or the Cabinet. The Queen Regent
looked to Espartero for guidance, but he gave none. Perez de
Castro and Arrazola had deserved Espartero's approval by their
submissive attitude; they represented, moreover, the moderate
Conservatives, among whom Cristina naturally looked for allies,
whereas the Radicals represented by the Cortes had inflicted on
her the insults of the insurrection at La Granja three years
before. She decided to repeat the farce of a general election,
vil General election : Moderado majority I 59
in order to fill the Congress with Moderados, now in alliance
with the ministry. But the Radicals did not take their dis-
missal as quietly as the Conservatives had done. They pro-
tested that the dissolution of a newly-elected Parliament of
decided views was a violation of the spirit of the Constitution;
they warned the nation that the budget had not been sanctioned,
and that taxation was consequently illegal; they appealed to
Espartero, and at last the verdict for which all now waited was
forthcoming. *
Behind the Moderates Espartero ever saw the shadow of
Córdova and Narvaez, whose return to Spain and to command
he had reason to dread. He cast his sword into the balance.
His military secretary, General Linaye, gave to the press a
manifesto censuring the ministry for dissolving the Cortes and
attempting to pass laws incompatible with the Constitution of
1837. Called upon to disavow, he confirmed it by an open
letter to the Regent (Dec. 19, 1839). In face of his threat the
Cabinet abandoned their submissive attitude and sought to
defend themselves. The general election resulted in a Moderado
majority of two-thirds (Jan., 1840); Argüelles, Olózaga, Calatrava,
Cortina, and San Miguel had kept their seats, and had every
reason to be pleased with the course of events which had brought
them so powerful an ally. The situation was now clear; the
ministry, the majority in the Cortes, and the Moderado generals
O'Donnell, Leon, and Córdova in Spain and Narvaez in exile
were matched against the Progressive Radicals and Espartero,
henceforward the champion of the Constitution. The Queen
Regent, now that Espartero had failed her, tried to remain
neutral; but her eventual alliance with the Moderado party was
inevitable.
The opening of the session was stormy. The Progressive
minority fiercely demanded an account for the acts of violence
whereby the ministerial majority had been secured. Madrid,
its municipality and its mob, was with them; the galleries of
the House were invaded; and clamour drowned the speeches.
I6O The A'ise of Espartero [CH.
Once more an attempt was made to conciliate Espartero. A
list of eight names was submitted to him from which to nomi-
nate a Minister for War, but he refused the bait held out by the
Queen Regent, ironically declaring himself “convinced of the
wisdom that marks her determination.” His demand for the
promotion of his faithful henchman Linaye was granted. Three
members of the Cabinet who objected to this further concession
were forced to resign. Perez de Castro, however, and Arrazola
still remained in power.
After discussing the burning question of the endowment of
the clergy, and revising the policy of the revolution by undoing
so far as possible the process of the secularisation of the estates
of the Church, the Cortes turned to the still more crucial dis-
cussion with regard to the municipal law. The importance
of the town-councils lay chiefly in the fact that, as guardians of
the voters’ lists and the whole electoral machinery, they exercised
an all-powerful influence over the return of deputies to Cortes.
Moreover the town-council of to-day was in revolutionary Spain
the junta of to-morrow; and the representative bodies of the
great towns were staunchly Progressive. The aim of the
Moderados was, by enforcing a property qualification on muni-
cipal electors, to give the control to the middle-class or Con-
servative element. They sought also to assign to the Crown
the right to nominate alcaldes or mayors, and to suspend or
dissolve municipalities. Over these proposals the two factions
joined issue. The Moderates represented them as necessary
measures approved by the nation, as expressed by the Conserva-
tive majority in Parliament, whereas the Progressives alleged
that their opponents owed their majority to corrupt means,
and that they purposed to take back piecemeal the liberties
guaranteed in 1837.
While the municipal law was under discussion, the Queen
set out accompanied by her daughters and attended by Espar-
tero's wife, for the baths of Caldas in Catalonia. With her
went also Perez de Castro, President of the Council, and General
VI] /nterview of Æsparſero and the Regent 161
Cleonard, Minister for War. It was intended to combine with
the water-cure for the young princesses an interview between
the Regent and the commander-in-chief, who was now driving
Cabrera towards the French frontier in a final victorious cam-
paign. The interview took place near Lerida (June 27, 1840).
It was not unfriendly in character. Cristina sought to win over
Espartero by adopting his opinions, whilst he urged her to
change her ministry and to refuse to sanction the restrictive
municipal law now passing through the Cortes. It was an
ultimatum politely conveyed.
The submissive attitude of the Queen Regent was dictated
by the circumstances of her private life, which gave those to
whom they were known a great and cruel power over her. A
few months after King Ferdinand's death she had secretly
taken another husband, Fernando Muñoz, a handsome corporal
in the Body Guard, whose promptitude had saved her from a
carriage accident. Muñoz, though of very humble birth—his
parents were small shopkeepers—was a man of naturally good
manners; and when, years after, he was presented as the husband
of the Queen-dowager, his courtly and unassuming bearing
made him a general favourite. But for seven years the marriage
was kept a secret from all but a very few, though six children
were born of it. Cristina, fond of power and fond of money,
had forfeited by re-marriage her legal claim to the Regency and
to the large income allotted to the Regent. This was her
defenceless side, and those who knew it could sway her by
threatening exposure. Espartero was among the number ; but
events were shortly to prove that he overrated his hold over the
royal lady, and that Cristina valued her independence even
higher than her position and her fortune.
For the moment a quarrel was avoided. The Queen,
according to her own account, refused to pledge herself with
regard to the municipal law, but she consented to change her
ministry; and Espartero himself agreed to form a Cabinet as
Soon as he should have brought his campaign to an end. For
C. S. I I
I62 The A'ise of Æspartero [CH.
this three weeks sufficed; and the victorious general joined the
Queen at Barcelona. But in the meantime a change had taken
place. In reply to a demand for an outline of his proposed
policy, Espartero had written, “The state of fermentation of the
chief centres of population of the kingdom, and the justifiable
anxiety of good Spaniards who form the majority of the nation,
demand such reforms in the system of government as shall give
assurance that the Constitution of 1837 shall not be infringed.
...The new Cabinet must begin by a decree dissolving the
existing Cortes, and fixing a date for fresh elections; and it
would be well that these should be the product of free choice,
and that parties should refrain from intrigue to procure the
election of the several factions....The measures (municipal)
proposed to the existing Cortes, and discussed by them, must
be annulled by refusal of the royal assent in order that the
minds of those who consider the Constitution violated by them
may be set at rest. Thus confidence in the august Queen
Regent and affection towards her will be increased. Announce-
ment must also be made of the presentation of other projects
in harmony with the fundamental law of the State....” It was
well-nigh impossible to treat with one who thus disputed the
right of the Cortes to alter or reform the laws of the land, who,
whilst deprecating party-spirit and pressure at elections, de-
manded the dissolution of a duly elected Parliament because
its majority was not of his own way of thinking, and who set
himself up as the sole interpreter of the Constitution.
Barcelona had received the Regent with cheers for Espartero,
and clamours against the proposed municipal law. The
attitude was that of all the great towns, including the capital.
Its captain-general, Van Halen, an intimate friend of Espartero's,
made no secret of his opinion with regard to the burning
question. The attacks of the Scurrilous press and its allusions
to the Regent's private life were more outrageous than ever.
Espartero entered the capital of Catalonia in triumph. Cristina
was in his power; his troops protected her from the mob, which
VI] Esparzero quarre/s with the Regent 163
daily became more violent and clamorous. But she sacrificed
her Conservative friends, whose good-will she believed to be
necessary to her daughter's throne, and became a mere
instrument in the hands of a general who, though unaware,
was himself the tool of an extreme Radical faction. The text
of the municipal law, duly passed by both Houses of Parliament
and wanting only the Regent's signature, reached Barcelona on
the same day as did Espartero. The same evening the docu-
ment was returned duly signed.
The challenge thus given was at once taken up by Espartero.
In a braggart letter appealing directly to revolution, he resigned
all his offices and titles under plea that the Regent had broken
faith with him (July 15). On the advice of the President of
the Council this resignation was refused; and an assurance was
sent to the autocratic general that he still enjoyed the con-
fidence of the Regent. Espartero, however, refused to take back
his word, but he still remained at the head of his troops.
Encouraged by his attitude, if not directly provoked by his
henchman, Van Halen, riots broke out in Barcelona ; and the
Regent was dependent for personal safety on the man who
dictated terms to her. Espartero paraded the streets escorted
by the mob and bidding them be patient, for the Constitution
was safe, “thanks to the immense power of its defenders.”
The ministry, which had only awaited the validation of its
municipal law, having been practically dismissed a month
before by Espartero's appointment on the termination of his
campaign, now resigned. Cristina left Barcelona for Valencia
to put herself under the protection of O’Donnell, who, like
Diego Leon and other Conservative generals, had made formal
offer of his sword in her service.
But the battle was already hot. Madrid “pronounced ” in
favour of Espartero (September 1). Its municipal council,
supported by the national militia, refused to submit to the law
that deprived it of its power. The captain-general, who had
attempted to resist the assembly of the militia, was expelled;
II — 2
I64 The Rise of Espartero [Ch.
the civil governor was imprisoned. The revolution triumphed
without blood. Madrid was acting in concert with other great
cities, determined to defend the privileges bestowed upon them
by the Constitution. A junta was constituted to carry on the
government. It declared itself independent until a satisfactory
ministry should be appointed. It put the capital in a state of
defence and scolded the Queen Regent (September 4), telling
her that “nothing so exposes the dignity of the crown, nothing
so compromises its power, its authority, and its very existence,
as an illegitimate claim to place itself above the law...The
perfidious counsellors of your Majesty...have not hesitated to
put a malicious interpretation upon the clamour of public
opinion, and, abusing our patience and long-suffering, to bend
your Majesty's mind to a system of reaction no longer possible
in Spain.” The Madrid junta was in communication with
similar bodies throughout the land; and negotiations were on
foot for the formation of a central or supreme junta in which
all the local juntas should be represented. It also corresponded
with Espartero, who still lingered at Barcelona, and sent for his
guidance a programme on the fulfilment of which depended its
confidence and favour. It demanded (1) that the Regent
should publicly denounce to the nation her perfidious coun-
sellors; (2) that the whole court should be changed; (3) that
the new municipal law should be annulled; (4) that the Cortes
should be dissolved; and declared (5) that the people should
continue in arms until all these demands were fulfilled.
Espartero, as was his wont, hung back until the cause
which he was supposed to lead was triumphant. To the
message of the junta he sent an indecisive answer, blowing hot
and cold. Manuel Cortina, the energetic Radical leader, started
from Madrid to win him from his wavering to a decided attitude
with regard to the events he had provoked. Meanwhile he
refused (September 7) to obey the explicit order of the Queen
Regent to march against the rebels at Madrid. He answered
her in a rambling and half-insolent letter, renewing his recom-
VI] Aódication of the Aegent I 65
mendations that she should observe the Constitution, dissolve
the Cortes, and select a ministry of six patriots—“patriot” was
a title to which the extreme Radicals laid exclusive claim, and
which they were fast rendering both ridiculous and hateful.
Cristina made some show of yielding, and as a last resort
called upon Espartero to form a ministry. The arrival of
Cortina, however, again swayed him to the other side. The
clever lawyer succeeded in leading him off to join the junta at
Madrid. He was now dictator, for he was at the head of an
army of which the rank and file at least were devoted to the
chief who had often led them to victory; he was President of
the Council with mission to form a Cabinet; and he was at the
same time the real though not the nominal head of the junta.
Led by Calatrava, Rodil, and Evaristo de San Miguel, the
junta aimed at wider measures than mere repeal of the municipal
law, and a change of ministry. It demanded a new Regent or
Regents, and that the forthcoming Cortes should be empowered
to alter the Constitution by abolishing the Senate. Leaving
these Radical proposals for future discussion, Espartero chose a
ministry with Cortina as Minister of the Interior, and set out
accompanied by it to confer with, or rather to impose terms
upon, the Queen Regent at Valencia. Their plan was that all
blame should be cast upon the late minister, whose works
Queen Cristina should publicly abjure; and that a new epoch
should begin by prosecution of those who had mismanaged
affairs in the old.
But, hampered as she was by her secret marriage, and
blockaded in Valencia by the revolution, Cristina refused to
humiliate herself by recantation and by denouncing her friends
at the bidding of rebels. After formally admitting the new
ministers to their offices, she announced her fixed resolve
to abdicate. No remonstrance served to turn her from her
purpose; and the first duty of the new ministers was to draw up
the message announcing the abdication of the Regent to the
Cortes. Over it some disagreement arose, for Cortina wished
*
.
:
I66 The Rise of Espartero [CH. VI
to give the Queen's second marriage as the reason for her
abdication. Cristina, on the other hand, desired to lay the
blame for making her position untenable at the door of the
Radicals, and to justify herself in the eyes of the nation. But
the ministers were naturally unwilling to publish such a
manifesto against themselves; and a compromise was arrived
at. A short and colourless document was drawn up, mention-
ing “the present state of the nation, the delicate nature of my
health, and my inability to yield to the exigencies of some of
the terms.” The poet Quintana, a Liberal of the early days,
was appointed Governor to the young Queen Isabel; and it was
in his charge that Cristina left her daughter when she sailed
for Marseilles (Oct. 17, 1840).
The struggle had been between the legal and constitutional
institutions of the country and the chief of the army, egged on
by a noisy minority. How small was this minority was perceived
only when the defeated party had time to gather. Espartero
the soldier was respectable; Espartero the politician was
contemptible. He was the first, says Cánovas, who consciously
used the Radical programme as a means towards the gratifica-
tion of personal ambition. Riego and the sergeant of La
Granja had been blinded by passion and by ignorance, but
not by ambition or by interest. It was indeed the beginning
of a new epoch.
CHAPTER VII.
ESPARTERO'S REGENCY (1840–1843).
THE revolution had been mainly the work of Manuel
Cortina, now counted among the extreme Radicals, though
so lately he had played a leading part in the unsuccessful
Aronunciamiento that resulted in the banishment of Narvaez
and Córdova (see p. 149). But, though the real workers were
the chiefs of the juntas, Espartero was the hero of the hour.
Without a better qualification than personal bravery and a
kind of ostentatious frankness that delighted the mob, ignorant
and vain, stiff and pompous, he found himself at the age
of forty-seven charged with almost unlimited power for good
or evil. By a strange mixture of awkward obstinacy and
timorous groping for a lead at moments when decision was
most urgently needed, he squandered in three years a fund
of popularity that should have lasted a lifetime. The seething
of revolution brought him to the surface ; but, as soon as a
strong current of public opinion, a current of which he had
overrated the depth and permanence, ceased to support and
guide him, he sank. *
An interim Regency (Oct., 1840–May, 1841) was under-
taken by the ministry which the revolution had imposed on
Queen Cristina. With Espartero at the head it entered on
the difficult task of reducing to order the unruly forces by
which the revolution had been brought about. The country
was studded with juntas; even villages had declared them-
selves independent of the central authority, and had resolved
168 Espartero's Regency (1840–1843) [CH.
not to submit until fantastic political programmes devised by
local wiseacres should be fulfilled. The public service was
utterly disorganised ; the “patriots” had fallen upon the spoils
and pushed their claims with threats and clamour. Comfort-
able Government employment was what they demanded in
reward for their services. Four thousand chose the Post
Office as the scene of their future activities; two thousand
four hundred fancied that their abilities fitted them for hand-
ling public monies in the employment of the Treasury. In
granting or promising appointments, the self-constituted
authorities had not waited for the approval of the central
Government; nor had they limited their action to local affairs,
as did the village junta which, after due deliberation pom-
pously recorded in minutes, made use of its momentary
independence to change its bellringer for one more in
sympathy with the new political conditions of the country.
The first step was to get rid of the inextricable confusion
of local juntas by absorbing them in larger associations. They
were dissolved, while those of the provincial capitals were
confirmed in their functions, and enlisted as aids to the
central Government. Before the end of the year the ministry
found itself strong enough to suppress these also. But this
was not done without provoking a vigorous protest from the
Radical extremists represented at Madrid by the central junta.
These were the fervid spirits who looked to Cortina and his
comrades to carry out, when in power, the policy which they
had advocated when in opposition. The test question was the
abolition of the Senate, now the stronghold of the Conservative
party. But the Government held strictly to the Constitution,
which directed that one-third of the Upper Chamber only
should be renewed at each general election. Many were
alienated by disappointment; and the disruption of the
victorious faction began. The members of the late Cortes
found courage to issue a dignified protest against the charges
heaped upon them.
VII] The army: the Church I69
During the Carlist War the army had increased out of all
proportion to the permanent needs and financial resources
of the country. Its numbers had been still further swelled by
addition to its ranks of the Carlists who took advantage of the
Convention of Vergara guaranteeing them their grade and pay
in the service of their late enemies. The ex-Carlists had
rendered important help in the final campaign against Cabrera ;
to withdraw their commission would have been to violate a
solemn agreement. On the other hand it was not expedient
to favour them at the cost of those who had fought for Queen
Isabel from the first. With the privates the matter was
simpler, for their only wish was to return to their homes. By
disbanding militia and volunteer regiments the soldiers were
reduced from two hundred and forty thousand to a hundred and
fifty thousand. But the burden of the army was still great, and
it continued to drag Spain still further into the depths of
insolvency. Pensions were granted to officers placed by their
own consent upon the retired list. The army, feeling itself
threatened, became a standing menace to the civil authority,
the centre of intrigue, the scourge, and the vampire of Spain.
Something was done to reestablish public credit by formal
recognition of the loans raised by former ministries. To pay
the interest due upon them was not possible; but bonds
bearing nominal interest at three per cent. were issued to
its amount. The Ministers of Finance took possession of the
whole property of the secular clergy; that of the regulars was
already sold, and the proceeds spent. The Constitution of
1837 declared the nation responsible for the maintenance of
public worship and its ministers; ergo the Church had no
longer any need of property, whereas the nation was in Sore
straits. But the parties interested recognised that confiscation
was at least as much an anti-clerical as a financial measure.
The Papal chargé d'affaires, who had held the place of the
Nuncio since the Pope had repudiated the claim of Ferdinand
to bequeath his throne to his daughter, protested indirectly.
I7O AEspartero's Regency (1840–1843) [CH.
His protest was directed nominally against certain administra-
tive measures which he represented as violations of the rights
of the Church. The challenge was taken up and he was
expelled. Pope Gregory XVI then intervened, and in an
allocution (March, 1841) reviewed the conduct of Spanish
Governments towards the Church since the death of the late
King. He declared invalid all measures infringing its ancient
rights and privileges. This was a declaration of war. Opposition
to the Liberal Government became a religious as well as a
political duty to those whose ideal was traditional Spain.
On reaching Marseilles, Queen Cristina published her
wrongs to the world, and specially to the Spanish people,
in the tragic style of the romantic school. At her request her
version of the events that had led to her abdication was
published in the official Gazette; but with it was the antidote
in the shape of a ponderous ministerial refutation. Her near
relationship to the House of Orleans, and the deference with
which she had always treated its head, secured for her not only
a safe retreat but a champion. Louis Philippe could not
invade Spain on his kinswoman's behalf, for he was bound
by the Quadruple Alliance; but he did not conceal his
intention of bringing about her restoration by intriguing in
Spain and by lavish expenditure of French money. He lived
in terror of revolution ; this was an opportunity for combating
it. The Spanish Radicals always looked to Great Britain for
support; and the British Government was the only one that
had not frowned upon the new order. This alone would have
been sufficient to arouse jealousy in Paris; but more far-
reaching schemes were hatching. Isabel was still an infant
when the question of her marriage was already agitating
European courts. If her kinsman, the King of the French,
defended his right against Liberal encroachments, and those of
the Church against freethinkers, he would establish a strong
claim. M. Thiers, who during the latter part of the Carlist
War had helped the Cristinos by neutralising the French fron-
VII] Asparzero made Regent 17 I
tier, was succeeded (Oct. 24, 1840), about the time of the
arrival of the ex-Regent in Paris, by Soult, but the ruling spirit
of the Cabinet was Guizot, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
His policy was to combat British influence at Madrid. The
Spanish Government sent Olózaga as ambassador to France to
break up if possible the dangerous alliance between the King,
the ex-Regent, Guizot, and the banished Spanish Conservatives.
The Cortes had been summoned for March 19, 1841. The
general election was preceded by provincial and municipal
elections under the law saved by the late revolution from
abolition. The Government ostentatiously refrained from
pressure; and indeed pressure was unnecessary, for the tide
was still running strongly in its favour. The provincial and
municipal assemblies showed strong Radical majorities: only
two Republicans and one Conservative, or a total opposition of
three, presented themselves in the Lower Chamber. After
formal recognition of the abdication of the Queen Regent, and
approval of the acts of the interim Government, the question of
a new Regency was considered. There seemed to be but one
solution—Espartero; yet it was only after a fierce wrangle,
lasting two months, that this solution was reached. The
first question raised was as to the number of the Regency—
whether a single Regent, or three, or a commission of five,
should be appointed. Those who did not share the general
belief in Espartero's political omniscience were in favour of
giving him two assessors. Thereupon Espartero suddenly
threw off his cloak of lofty indifference, and, against the advice
of Cortina, the most judicious of his friends, angrily resisted
the proposal, threatening to retire into private life if he should
be unable to agree with the Cortes as to the composition of
the Regency. He was becoming rapidly more egotistical and
autocratic; and he had his way. The question was decided by
the two Chambers voting together; the Upper House contained
about a score of Conservatives; to these and to ministerial
pressure he owed a majority of seventeen. A Regency of one
172 Espartero's Aegency (1840–1843) [CH.
man was voted, but Espartero's undisguised attempt to impose
his will had created a determined Opposition. On the final
issue 179 votes were cast for him, against Io.3 for Argüelles,
and 5 for Cristina (May, 18, 1841). The ministry resigned in
order to free the hands of the new Regent ; they advised that
their successors should be chosen among those who had taken
no active part in the revolution.
Espartero unwisely accepted their resignation, and thus
lost the invaluable aid of Manuel Cortina. After Cortina the
cleverest man of his party was Salustiano de Olózaga, the fervid
orator and cunning manager of majorities. To him Espartero
owed his position as sole Regent; but, puffed up by confidence
in his own powers, he sent Olćzaga to combat the schemes
of the counter-revolution in Paris, and to the general astonish-
ment charged his predecessor in the post with the formation of
a ministry. Antonio Gonzalez's only claim to distinction was
a subordinate part in the revolution; with the exception of
Evaristo de San Miguel, he chose as colleagues men as obscure
as himself. Thus Espartero contrived to disagree with Lopez
and Fermin Caballero as to the number of the Regency, to
sacrifice Cortina and to disappoint Olćzaga, the most influential
men of the party which had made him. The programme of the
new ministry—conciliation, recuperation, friendship with the
Republics of South America, improved public education, reduc-
tion of the army, financial reform, and the sale of national
property—was indeed unexceptionable; but the leaders of the
Progressive party were now in opposition.
Though Queen Cristina's second marriage and consequent
forfeiture of the guardianship of her daughter was not yet
officially announced, her absence rendered it necessary to
supply her place. In order to combat intrigues and at the
same time to gratify a democratic delight in the exercise of
authority over royal persons, the household of the infant Queen
was chosen among those who had no previous knowledge of
the corrupting influence of courts. Argüelles, the Puritan (el
VII] Mistakes of the Regent I 73
Santon), President of the Lower Chamber, became guardian ;
Quintana was confirmed in his post of tutor (Ayo); the Mar-
quesa de la Bélgida, an austere dame, was appointed Lady
of the Bedchamber, and the widow of the democratic
guerrillero Mina, governess. The private virtues of these
persons were as much beyond suspicion as their Liberal
principles; but their company was ill suited to charm a
precocious and self-willed child of eleven. Isabel flouted
and mocked her directors at the bidding of such members
of the old aristocracy as had access to her.
Her mother took the matter more tragically. Urged by
her Moderate friends and supported by Louis Philippe, she
formally protested (July 19, 1841) to the Spanish Cortes and
to foreign Powers against the violence which had driven her
from her natural and legal position at the side of her daughter.
Casting off the caution and respect with which she had hitherto
spoken of Espartero, she compared his conduct with that of
those “who at Valencia outrageously trampled under foot the
laws which they of all men were bound to defend.” Many
ears were open to her words, many hands eager to undertake
the work of counter-revolution. The nobility openly sided
with her; those who still held positions at court resigned ; the
disaffected generals were mustering; all eyes were turned
towards Paris. Cristina's protest was a formal declaration
of war against the new régime. The three months that
followed saw several military insurrections and a most
dramatic attempt to seize the Queen's person. They failed
only through mismanagement; the ill-laid train caused a series
of partial explosions instead of a general one. The course of
events, however, sufficed to show that Espartero, now become a
civilian, was rapidly losing his hold over the army.
If the northern provinces were no longer Carlist, the
country districts at least were strongly anti-Liberal, and could
be roused by a call to defend the Church and the Throne,
especially when artfully combined with the cause of their
I 74 Espartero's Regency (1840–1843) [CH.
privileges. Don Carlos had expressly forbidden his followers
to take part in the movements directed to bring about the
restoration of Queen Cristina and the overthrow of Espartero.
He represented them merely as traps set by the Liberals to
catch the unwary faithful; but, nevertheless, many leading men
of the provinces were implicated when (Sept., 1841) O'Donnell,
freshly returned from an interview with the ex-Regent, attempted
to lead out the garrison of Pamplona to bring about the
restoration. At Bilbao, at Saragossa, and at Vitoria like
attempts were made, but all were unsuccessful; the insurgents
were captured or driven across the frontier. Though the
superior officers were for the most part Royalists, the non-com-
missioned ranks were Liberals, and still devoted to Espartero.
Sergeants have ever played a great part in Spanish military
politics. -
In Madrid the insurrection failed through faint-heartedness
at the decisive moment. Yet its very rashness nearly brought
success. Acting on information received, the ministry had
removed from the capital that part of the garrison which it
most distrusted, and had put in their place regiments on which
it could rely. But Generals Manuel de la Concha and Diego
Leon were not to be deterred. On the night of Oct. 7 Concha
set out with three hundred men of the Regiment of the Princes
to attack the great palace that overhangs the desolate open
country on the extreme west of Madrid. He had expected to
be joined by the Body Guards, but was not so discouraged by
their failure as to desist. He knew that the palace was almost
defenceless; its guard in fact consisted of eighteen men of the
Corps of Halberdiers, a kind of inferior gentlemen-at-arms,
generally old soldiers, whose picturesque uniforms gave bril-
liancy to court ceremonials. Into the court of the palace and up
to the very door Concha and his soldiers passed unquestioned,
but they had not counted with Colonel Domingo Dulce of the
Halberdiers. Half of his little troop fired from the windows of
the palace upon the companies massed below ; half held the
VII] A plot to seize the Queen I 75
great staircase on whose marble lions Napoleon laid his hand
in token that he had conquered Spain. At midnight Leon
arrived, but without the expected reinforcements. He came
indeed to tell Concha that the regular troops faithful to the
Government, together with the national militia, were about to
surround him. At three o'clock in the morning the attacking
party sought to retreat. But it was too late. They were over-
taken by cavalry and dispersed. Concha escaped, but Leon
was captured ; a week later he was shot. In a well-ordered
country the penalty of death would not be considered too
severe for his offence; its only excuse would have been success,
and he had failed. But in Spain the standard of political and
military duty was so degraded that his death was attributed to
cold-blooded revenge ; only his youth—he died aged 31—and
his brilliant exploits as a leader of cavalry in the Carlist wars
were remembered. His death-warrant was the doom of
Espartero's waning popularity.
The rescue of the Queen was due to the energy and resource
of Manuel Cortina, upon whom the command of the national
militia had chanced to devolve on the eventful day. Espartero
had done nothing; and his reputation suffered accordingly.
The failure of their associates and the miscarriage in the north
and in the capital obliged the other leaders of the party that
sought to bring back Queen Cristina to defer their plans.
Projected risings under Narvaez at Cadiz and under Pavia at
Barcelona were postponed. At the latter place and at
Valencia juntas sprang up to resist the counter-revolution.
But so great had been the danger that, if Guizot's Memoirs are
to be believed, the Government had actually contemplated
carrying off the child-Queen to Cuba to put her out of reach
of reckless men like Concha and Leon. Enough had been
done to show that the revolutionary Government neglected
a necessary precaution when it failed to proscribe and banish
the Opposition.
Madrid had been saved by the national militia; and it
1.76 Espartero's Aegency (1840–1843) [CH.
was to them that Espartero's congratulations were addressed.
In their charge he left the capital when he started on the
day following Leon's execution (Oct. 15) to restore order
in the northern provinces. By the Convention of Vergara the
question of the maintenance of the privileges of the Basque
Provinces had been reserved for the consideration of the
Cortes. Espartero had bound himself to secure their favour-
able consideration. Shortly afterwards (Oct., 1839) it was
unanimously resolved by the Cortes that the Fueros should be
preserved “in so far as they were consistent with the constitu-
tional unity of the country”; and that, after consultation with
the local Parliament, such changes should be introduced
as the interests of Spain and the advantage of the provinces
themselves demanded. It was far from being a satisfactory or
definite settlement. The central administration began to en-
Croach upon local privilege; and the Basques began to perceive
that the ancient rights which they had so strenuously defended
were slipping from them. Their resentment was expressed by
participation, despite Don Carlos' prohibition, in the general
conspiracy to overthrow Espartero. Against him they were
particularly incensed, for they had considered his ambiguous
assurances as a guarantee; and the encroachments that followed
seemed a breach of faith.
Whatever may have been Espartero's original views, he
now went north with the intention of punishing the provinces
and of taking full advantage of the opportunity given by
late turbulences. By a decree dated Vitoria (Oct. 29, 1841)
he suppressed without opposition the most important of the
Fueros. Biscay and Guipúzcoa were deprived of the special
magistrate who had hitherto acted as royal assessor to the
local Parliaments. Civil governors were appointed as in the
rest of Spain. The powers of the local Parliaments were
transferred to Provincial Deputations, in accordance with
the Constitution. The municipalities and courts of justice
were made uniform with those of the rest of the kingdom.
VII] Aôo/ition of the Fueros 177
The fiscal frontier of the Ebro was broken down ; and the
Spanish customs dues hitherto collected only at the seaports
of San Sebastian and Pasages were now imposed along the
land and sea frontier. The provinces hitherto bound to
provide only for the defence of their own territory were
subjected to military conscription. Little was left, beyond
public works, education, and the maintenance of the Church,
to assemblies which had asserted their right to refuse or
approve the writ of even the most autocratic King. It was
a step towards the unification of Spain; but it was a step
towards the centralisation that has proved fatal to some of her
best interests. The cost, moreover, was known only thirty years
later when the disaffection of the mountaineers caused another
civil war. It would have been well if part at least of the
liberties of the privileged provinces, instead of being sup-
pressed, could have been extended to the rest of Spain.
Espartero was able to return to Madrid at the end of
November (1841), and was greeted with delirious enthusiasm
as the Peacemaker; but late events had shown that the Regency
was weak, and that its forces were not under control. The
Royalists had been beaten in the first bout and had lost a few
adherents; but the executions carried out had been most
damaging to the party that inflicted them. Its adversaries
burned to avenge the blood of their martyrs; and it was evident
that they would shortly renew the attempt. Meanwhile Queen
Cristina hastened to disavow complicity in the late insurrection.
She refused, however, at the bidding of Olćzaga to condemn
explicitly its aims and methods. Her very disavowal was an
indictment of the Government that had deprived her of her
throne and her daughter, had broken the faith pledged at
Vergara, and so outraged the Church as to bring upon the
nation the wrath of the Holy Father. Such open encourage-
ment to revolt could not be borne in patience by those whose
“odious tyranny” was held up to reprobation. Cristina's
pension was withdrawn; and her expulsion from French terri-
C. S. I 2
178 Espartero's Regency (1840–1843) [CH.
tory was demanded. When Guizot met the request with a flat
refusal, the Government of the Regency protested against the
conduct of France to the ministers of the Powers in Madrid
and appealed to the British Government. Peel was now
carrying on Palmerston's policy of aiding and in part directing
the Regency. The British ambassador, George Williers, was
obeyed in Madrid as an oracle on all that concerned re-
presentative and constitutional government. But Louis Philippe
was bent on picking a quarrel. After lavishing money on
O'Donnell's attempted rebellion, he sent to Madrid a new
ambassador with instructions to flout the Regent by refusing
to present his credentials to any but the infant Queen in
person. Espartero demurred ; the ambassador demanded his
passports; and only a chargé d'affaires was left in Madrid
(Jan., 1842). .
Espartero's following in the Cortes had ceased to be a
majority; and only a vigorous onslaught was needed to over-
turn the ministry. It had carried through some useful legis-
lation, notably the abolition of an obsolete law giving to
Occupiers of dwelling-houses permanency of tenure without
increase of rent unless the owner were prepared to occupy in
their stead for five years. The value of town property doubled;
and the increase of rateable value enabled sorely-needed
municipal improvements to be carried out. Sales of the
Church property continued; but so corruptly and ineptly
were they managed that but little money came into the
Treasury, and the deficit of the budget was not materially
reduced. It was found necessary to farm the stamp duties
and the Salt monopoly for six years. The maintenance of the
clergy, guaranteed by the State, had been charged to the
municipal budget. It was hoped that the taxpayer would be
less clamorous for a large and well-endowed establishment
when the necessary funds came directly from his pocket.
Antonio Gonzalez's ministry had been saved by a very narrow
majority when its general policy and its hesitating and feeble
VII] Ministerial changes I79
action in the face of rebellion had been attacked by the
Opposition under Cortina, Olózaga, Lopez, and Fermin
Caballero (Feb., 1842). Its answer to the speech from the
throne was debated for thirty-four sittings. It fell in May,
when some questionable dealings between the Treasury and
the great banker Salamanca were brought to light.
Espartero, when it was already too late, sought to rally the
disaffected. But their resentment was too deep to be over-
come. The Opposition was divided into three groups, the
several personal followings of Cortina, Lopez, and Olózaga.
The situation might have been saved by winning over one
of these groups; but Cortina and Lopez were again passed over;
and, when Olézaga refused to form a coalition Cabinet, it was
evident that troubles were near at hand. General Rodil
undertook the task at Espartero's bidding, and succeeded in
getting together a ministry of second-rate men, devoted, like
himself, to the Regent. But the Opposition united against him ;
and prorogation was found necessary as soon as an unsatis-
factory budget had been passed and the number of the army
had been fixed at Ioo, ooo regulars and 40,000 reserves.
Regent and ministry alike had become more unpopular both in
the Cortes and in the country at large when the law compelled
them to face Parliament again in the autumn (Nov., 1842).
The election of Olózaga to the Presidency of the Lower House
by a large majority was an act of direct hostility against the
Regent. The session was short and stormy. Disturbances in
Barcelona were fostered by Lesseps, the French consul-general,
acting under the orders of Guizot's Government with a view to
bring about Espartero's downfall and the restoration of Queen
Cristina. For these disturbances the Opposition blamed the
Government. It cost a great effort to secure a vote of confi-
dence; and even so a menacing rider was added recommending
“legal measures" for the pacification of the principality. It
was an indirect condemnation of Espartero's usual high-handed
military methods. Then the Cortes were again prorogued;
I2—2
18o Espartero's Aegency (1840–1843) [CH.
and Espartero set out for Catalonia, accompanied by the
President of the Council. The disturbances at Barcelona
proved the immediate cause of Espartero's downfall; they had
their origin in deep-seated and still operative political and
economic aspirations. A brief explanation of these aspirations
is therefore necessary, and will serve to illustrate the present
position of the region that has been called, not inaptly, the
Lancashire of Spain.
The Catalans no less than the Basques are “a separate
people,” cut off from the rest of Spain by ethnological
characteristics, by language, by tradition, and by industrial
interests strongly contrasted with the agricultural and pastoral
interests of their fellow-countrymen. They are artisans, manu-
facturers, sailors, and merchants, with all the marks of a
progressive race. Their civilisation and their ideals resemble
the French rather than the Spanish type. Their interests are
so often in conflict with those of the rest of Spain that they
feel the union to be a burden rather than an advantage.
Centuries of common gloom and misfortune have not sufficed
to weld them into the nation or to efface the memory of
Aformer independence. They are an active and progressive
people unequally yoked to a backward and Conservative
aggregate. Barcelona resents the misgovernment of Madrid.
In the War of the Spanish Succession, at the beginning of the
eighteenth century, the Catalans took the losing side, and were
punished by the Bourbon dynasty with loss of their remaining
liberties. Sulkily submitting, they turned to their industrial
pursuits, and, thanks to the protected market of the vast Ameri-
can colonies, they grew rich and prosperous. In the War of
Independence they took hardly any part. The French invaders
gave them a better government than they had hitherto enjoyed;
their province was the last to be restored to Spain. It had not,
like the rest of the country, been devastated by the war.
Catalonian commerce suffered from the loss of the American
colonies, but it had still the home market as well as that of
VII] Catalonia and Barcelona I8 I
Cuba; its cottons and woollens clothed nearly all Spain.
Constant communication with foreign countries, and specially
with France, widened the views of the Catalans. Already
democratic by temperament and tradition, they became eager
disciples of the French Revolution. Their political education
advanced apace; instead of lingering like the rest of Spain in
the background, they readily absorb and are eager to practise
the most advanced political and social theories. The above
remarks apply only to the capital, Barcelona. The industrial
centres and the coast towns—for the defence of Gerona against
Napoleon's armies is hardly less famous than that of Saragossa—
and the country districts and mountain regions of Catalonia,
furnished some of the fiercest and most stubborn of those who
sought to revive medieval Spain under the sceptre of Don
Carlos.
The revolution of 1840 was enthusiastically welcomed in
Barcelona; but its results failed to satisfy the strong democratic
and socialist party, the existence of which it revealed for the
first time. This party aspired to nothing less than republican
government, political equality, and local autonomy or relaxation
of the laws which bound its vigorous life to the less highly
developed organism of Spain. For the moment these hopes
had to be laid aside; but those who entertained them were
resolved not to lose the ground already won and to combat
reaction. Accordingly when in October, 1841, Van Halen, the
Captain-general, was obliged to march against O’Donnell at
Pamplona, a junta of citizens was formed to carry on affairs
and watch events. The junta began to pull down the walls
and citadel that hampered the development of Barcelona. It
had long been a favourite scheme with the municipality to free
the city from the congestion of its narrow limits; but the forti-
fications were under the control of the War Office in Madrid,
and no permission to level them had been obtained. So soon
as the abortive insurrection in the Basque Province ended, the
central Government dissolved the junta and ordered the works
182 Espartero's Regency (1840–1843) [CH.
already destroyed to be rebuilt. The city demurred; and it
was only under threat of a visit from Espartero, the Peace-
maker, that it submitted and received back its captain-general.
The agitation continued, however; and a new subject for alarm
and discontent was found in the report that Espartero was
about to enter into a treaty of commerce with Great Britain
ruinous to the textile and other industries of Catalonia. The
report obtained the readier belief because it was a perverted
and exaggerated version of actual facts. Each time the
Liberals came into power a commercial treaty was discussed;
and each time the cry was raised that the Liberals were sold
to England. The scheme proposed by Villiers in 1836 had
been welcomed by Mendizabal ; and the opposition it provoked
had been one of the most powerful causes of his fall. It was
nevertheless renewed four years later; and a commission
under Calatrava drew up the basis of an agreement imposing
an ad valorem duty of twenty-five per cent. On British goods
while corresponding advantages were granted to Spanish wines
and spirits. Even under these terms the Catalans dreaded
competition; and, thanks to false reports fostered by the
intrigues of the Conservatives, the question became a party
one, and roused the fiercest passions in the principality. It
was believed that the commercial treaty was on the point of
being signed in order that British help might save Espartero's
Government, and that its signature would be the doom of
Catalonian prosperity.
During the autumn of 1842 some slight disturbances of
public order caused Van Halen to proclaim a state of siege,
and to arrest the leader of the Republican party. The
national militia took part in the agitation; the citizens rushed
to arms and drove the captain-general, with loss of 3oo men
killed and wounded, to take refuge in the citadel and in
Monjuich, the hated fortress raised by Philip V to control the
turbulent province that so long resisted him. The junta was
again constituted; and this time it did not restrict itself to
v11] A'evolt in Barcelona suppressed 183
merely local affairs. It ordered Van Halen to quit the pro-
vince; it demanded the resignation of Espartero, revision of
the Constitution, a triple Regency, and a Spanish husband for
the Queen. But the rebellion did not spread; even Catalonia
outside the capital remained quiet. Discouragement set in ;
and a junta of more moderate views succeeded the one that
had been elected in the first fervour of revolt. -
Van Halen could now have overcome without aid the
languishing resistance of the city that lay at the mercy of his
forces. Espartero, the Peacemaker, had already been sum-
moned, and was hurrying to Catalonia, burning to disprove the
charge of weakness and irresolution that had been brought
against his conduct during the revolt of the previous year. He
was in his martinet mood ; he scornfully refused the moderate
terms of capitulation demanded by the proud city; he sent
away its deputation unheard. Instead of arguments he brought
up cannon. The city shut its gates; the most violent faction
got the upper hand; a pedlar became head of the fantastic
junta; and all the forces of disorder broke loose. Whilst
respectable citizens were terrorised and plundered by the mob
the city was bombarded (Dec. 3, 1842). More than four
hundred houses were destroyed. Defence was impossible and
was not attempted. Barcelona submitted the next day, and was
condemned to pay a fine of 24, 12, ooo and to repair the citadel
that held it in subjection. Within the next year she suffered
another bombardment in punishment for having questioned the
right of the revolution that overthrew Espartero to inflict upon
her freedom-loving people a reactionary Government. Since
that time a large body of public opinion in the most
enlightened city of Spain has aimed at separation from the
corrupt and ever-changing central authority of Madrid.
The events at Barcelona still further embittered the rela-
tions between Espartero's Government and France. A com-
plaint was lodged in Paris with regard to the unwarrantable
interference of the consul-general Lesseps. Guizot readily
184 Espartero's Regency (1840–1843) [CH.
accepted the opportunity of inflicting humiliation and insult on
the Radical Regency. He first refused to believe the evidence
brought against his emissary, and, when further and conclusive
proofs of his complicity in the insurrection were offered,
exacted their withdrawal, a declaration of their falsity, and
an apology in the Gazette.
Espartero was far too weak to push a diplomatic claim
abroad; he was fast losing his grasp upon Spain. During his
absence in Catalonia the coalition against him was gathering
recruits. It included the disaffected Progressives as well as the
Conservatives and Republicans. It was rumoured that he
purposed to prolong his tenure of power by deferring the legal
majority of the Queen, which would fall in 1844. That such
was really his intention has never been proved. Only the
ayacuchos and a few personal friends now remained faithful to
him; short-sighted as he was, he could hardly hope to impose
his will upon the nation by their help alone. The bombard-
ment of Barcelona, carried out in opposition to the expressed
opinion of the Cortes, was regarded as wanton and unnecessary.
The Peacemaker was coolly received on his return to Madrid;
an effort was about to be made to get rid of a dictator so
uncompromising.
The easiest way to do so was to bring back all his exiled
enemies. A general amnesty was discussed. Espartero saw
the trap and dissolved the Cortes (Jan. 3, 1843). A half-
threatening, half-apologetic manifesto from the Regent, and
pressure shamelessly exercised at the hustings, failed to secure
a majority at the ensuing general election. The united
Opposition outnumbered the partisans of Espartero and
Rodil by thirty votes; and the ministry fell (March 16).
The Lower Chamber elected Manuel Cortina to be its President,
in the belief that he would be at the head of the new ministry.
But both he and Olćzaga refused to undertake the invidious
position with a fluctuating and divided majority. At last,
after a long crisis, Lopez accepted office (May 9). Fermin
VII] Decay of Espartero's power 185
Caballero, a political economist of well-earned reputation, and
Francisco Serrano, a rising general, were among his colleagues.
A programme of amnesty and government without coercion
was published. But in this again Espartero saw an attack
upon himself. The express condemnation of exceptional
measures and martial law was a reflection upon his conduct
at Barcelona. The proposed restoration of Narvaez and the
rest to their military rank meant his speedy downfall. The
exercise of dictatorial power had given him an overweening
conceit; and, relying on the fidelity of the army, he cast off
his usual caution. Obstinately refusing to sanction the pro-
posed amnesty, he brought about the resignation of the Cabinet,
after it had been only a week in existence, under the pretext
that Serrano was openly hostile to himself and his friends.
Serrano had indeed sought to relieve the faithful Linaye of
some of the plurality of commands which he exercised under
his powerful protector. The Lopez Cabinet on withdrawing
protested, truly enough, that it had “not been allowed the
free action required with all the exclusive responsibility of
ministers of the Crown.” Its place was taken by a Cabinet
almost equally short-lived, under Gomez Becerra, with Men-
dizabal as Minister of Finance. -
Face to face with a frankly hostile Parliament, a rebellious
ministry, growing discontent and gathering intrigue, Espartero
had for a moment contemplated abdication. His friends,
however, persuaded him not to accept defeat but to have
recourse once more to prorogation. The new ministry
declined to meet the Chamber under the plea that it required
time to prepare a political programme. When it did so, the
majority of the Lower House refused to recognise its existence.
They held that the Regent had overstepped his prerogative by
dismissing Lopez, and chose to consider Lopez as the duly
appointed minister of the Crown. On May 20, 1843, the
Congress broke up in confusion, amid the dismal echo of
Olózaga's words, “God help our country, God help our
186 Espartero's Regency (1840–1843) [CH.
Queen.” The ministers of the Regent were stoned and chased
by the mob to their homes. The sole encouragement that
Espartero received came from the Senate, which waited on him
in a body to congratulate him and express its confidence.
Taking such comfort as he could from this friendly
demonstration on the part of a body carefully packed with his
own adherents and enjoying but little influence in the country,
Espartero fortified himself in his obstinacy and determined
to treat a disaffected Parliament in the same way as he treated
disaffected cities and battalions. On May 26 he dissolved
Parliament, putting himself still further outside the law, for the
taxes were not yet voted. The revolution was already upon
him. By the end of the month; part of Andalusia had
pronounced against the Anglo-Ayacuchos; and Catalonia,
remembering the bombardment of Barcelona, had risen to
the call of Juan Prim, the soldier-democrat.
Taken singly, these local revolts were not very formidable;
nor were they generally the cause of much bloodshed. Often
the work of a noisy minority, they were not lacking in comic
incidents. On this occasion, for instance, when the pronun-
ciamiento of the citizens drove the captain-general and the civil
governor from Granáda, the command devolved upon a simple
major. Too modest and diffident for the position thus thrust
upon him, he in turn resigned his authority into the hands of
Nuestra Señora de las Angustias, the patroness of the city. She
was forthwith appointed general; and her image was invested
with the sash and bâton of office. The neighbouring city of
Málaga were on this, as on all like occasions, among the
first to revolt. The reason for her turbulence is not far to
seek. The ringleaders of the mob were in the pay of rich
cotton-merchants, who used them, when the chance offered, to
overturn the authorities, in order to run cargoes duty free amid
the general confusion.
But the revolution, though mild in character among
the civil population, was general. It was, in fact, sanc-
VII] Espartero withdraws from Madrid 187
tioned implicitly by the Constitution of 1837. The oath
taken by the Regent ran, “If I act contrary to the good and
profit of the nation, I am not to be obeyed.” An effort at
compromise had been made when it was already too late.
Mendizabal showed an unwarrantable confidence in his
Countrymen when he appealed to them to pay of their own
free will the taxes which he had no legal authority to collect.
Remission of the fine imposed on Barcelona, and a promise
that the much-talked-of amnesty should be granted as soon as
the existing disturbances were quieted were alike disregarded.
Before the end of June only Madrid, Saragossa, Cadiz, Leon,
and Oviedo held out for the Regent.
For many months past a secret society under the name of
the Spanish Military Order had been extending its rami-
fications through the army. Founded in Paris by O’Donnell
and Narvaez with the object of bringing about the overthrow of
the ayacucho faction and the restoration of Queen Cristina, its
associates were everywhere ; and its effects were apparent as
Soon as the troubles began. Resignations of commissions
showered in upon the Government; and the officers who
retained their command were for the most part only watching
events. Now that the crisis had come, Espartero's obstinacy
was not supported by energy. He was sunk in one of the fits
of lethargy to which he was subject. Only when his cause
was already practically lost did he quit the capital, leading the
troops he could muster southward (June 21). A week before,
he had published an apologetic manifesto to the nation,
defending himself against the charge of wishing to prolong
the Regency, and declaring that Isabel's attainment of her
majority would be “the crown of his public life.” “Is it to be
supposed,” he asked, “that I should seek to imitate those who
violently trampled under foot the laws of their land P I have
not their genius, nor does their fatal ambition inspire me...for
Baldomero Espartero, born in private station, brought up in
the service of the liberty of his country and his Queen, will
188 Asparſero's Aegency (1840–1843) [CH.
return to private life satisfied with having fulfilled all his duties;
and his reward will be to have earned the approval of all good
men....On the Constitution I rely, and by its impenetrable
shield I am protected.” Many other declarations of a like
kind followed during the next few days; but no enthusiasm
was aroused. The eyes of the capital were turned towards the
provinces.
Serrano had been welcomed in Barcelona, and had artfully
kept in the background the Royalist and reactionary character
of the revolution, whilst dividing Liberal opinion by proclaim-
ing the Lopez ministry to which he as Minister of War be-
longed. Narvaez and Manuel de la Concha, landing at Valencia,
were received with open arms by the already constituted
“Provincial Junta of Salvation of Valencia.” Concha went
southward to organise the revolution in Andalusia. Narvaez
hurried north along the Roman road, and after a successful
skirmish at Teruel advanced towards the capital. He joined
forces with Aspiroz, commander of the revolted garrison of
Valladolid, and camped before Madrid. At Torrejon de
Ardoz the troops brought by forced marches from Aragon to
oppose them joined their ranks, shouting, “We are all one’;
and on the next day (July 23, 1843) Aspiroz entered Madrid,
after binding himself to observe the Constitution of 1837,
maintain the national militia, and aid in the formation of a
junta. The Queen, liberty, and the Lopez ministry were
proclaimed. Narvaez followed the same evening; and on the
following day came Prim. Narvaez was appointed captain-
general; Prim, with the title of Conde de Reus, became military
governor of the capital.
A message was forthwith sent to Espartero bidding him
cease hostilities, on pain of being declared a traitor to his
country and “incurring the execration of Spaniards and of all
mankind.” For a time he lingered hesitating at Albacete,
near the junction of the main roads. Then with his friend
Van Halen and ten thousand untrustworthy troops he advanced
VII] Aspartero /eaves Spain 189
on Seville and summoned the city to surrender. The message
from Madrid and the news that Saragossa, his chief stronghold,
had gone over to the enemy, saved Seville from the fate of
Barcelona. The bombardment had already begun when the
ex-Regent, pursued by Concha, and deserted by his own troops
with the exception of a few faithful battalions, set out for
Cadiz. But even Cadiz revolted in the face of him who
alleged himself to be the true exponent and representative of
Spanish Liberalism. Espartero was obliged to turn aside with
his rapidly dwindling following to Puerto de Santa Maria.
Here he took ship and employed his last moments before
quitting Spanish shores in drawing up a protest. In fewer
words than was his wont, he made declaration before the
Deputy Grand Notary of the Realm that only against his will
did he commit a misdemeanour provided against by the
Constitution in quitting Spain without the consent of the Cortes.
He claimed however to be still Regent of Spain until the Queen
should reach her majority. A British man-of-war bore him
out of reach of his enemies, to enjoy for a time the applause of
his foreign admirers and the hospitality of the Mansion House
(July 30, 1843).
To Espartero's protest the victors of the hour replied by a
counterblast intended to be the epitaph of his political corpse.
Its violence and utter incoherence show a lack of the calm
that befits a triumph. “The last proof,” it ran, “ of blindness
and ambition given by Don Baldomero Espartero in quitting
Spanish territory obliges the Provisional Government to brand
the new pretender with the stamp of public execration which
the vote of the country had already hurled upon him. Since he
is not content with the bombarding of rich cities, with plundering
public monies, or with the evident design to leave among us
the germs of subversion and disorder, which, though fruitless
and deserving of contempt in the judgment of a heroic people,
prove the barbarous purpose of keeping some Spaniards in
misapprehension and error; the Government, jealous of its
190 Espartero's Regency (1840–1843) [CH. VII
own dignity and the peace of the nation which has proclaimed
it, decrees as follows:—Clause one and only. Don Baldomero
Espartero and all who subscribed the protest of July 30 last
are deprived of all their titles, ranks, offices, honours, and
orders. August 13.”
The accusation of peculation was false. Espartero was
scrupulously honest, and had more than once spent his own
money on what he considered the public cause.
CHAPTER VIII.
TEN YEARS OF CONSERVATIVE RULE (1843–1854).
THE revolution that overthrew Espartero's Regency had
been brought about by an overwhelming coalition of the two
extreme parties, the dynastic Conservatives and the Radicals.
The King of the French lavished money for the restoration
of Queen Cristina; the Holy See thundered against her sup-
planter. The Radicals bitterly resented the siege of Barcelona
and the Regent's disregard of constitutional checks; the Con-
servatives looked upon him as a sacrilegious usurper, the tool
of ayacuchos less scrupulous than himself. There was, however,
no doubt from the first which of the two parties would profit
by his fall. Though they called themselves Liberals, Narvaez,
Concha, Zabala, Serrano, and O’Donnell regarded the Radicals
as enemies; Prim's democratic scruples had been adroitly
silenced by the grant of a title. The coalition took a neutral
name, calling itself “Parliamentary’; but the military and
Conservative wing under Narvaez were the real masters of
the situation. They disarmed the Madrid militia in violation
of the terms on which the capital had opened its gates. They
dissolved the provincial juntas, and thrust Conservatives into
all positions of authority, trust, and profit.
Pompous titles were conferred on the cities distinguished in
the late revolt. Málaga was officially styled “First in the
Perils of Liberty,” Cuenca “The Intrepid’’; and Spain, after
another upheaval, congratulated herself on having, “by her
noble conduct, acquired new claims to the respect of civilised
I 92 Conservative Aule (1843—1854) [CH.
nations.” Officers were rewarded by a step in promotion; and
the rank and file of the army by a remission of two years of
service. Abominable as is the system of thus encouraging
military revolt, it had at least the effect of reducing the over-
grown army. The Constitution was violated by a complete
dissolution of the Senate, which had lately ventured to express
its confidence in Espartero. A still worse scandal was the
dismissal of the magistrates of the High Court, who refused
to recognise the legality of the successful revolution. The
royal household was changed from top to bottom; the ministry
appointed the Duke of Bailen guardian of the Queen in
place of Argüelles, though the appointment was vested by
the Constitution in Parliament. The Radicals soon showed
their chagrin at finding themselves the catspaws of their
political adversaries. Barcelona made formal protest against
the reactionary policy of the Government, and supported it
by a fresh revolt. She received her answer in the form of
another bombardment. Within six months insurrections were
suppressed at Saragossa, Cartagena, Cadiz, Valladolid, Leon,
and Vigo.
Parliament, with a reconstructed Senate, met (Oct. 15,
1843) and elected Olózaga to the Presidency of the Lower
Chamber. The first care was to regularise, as far as possible,
the situation. The State lacked a legal head. Serrano had
pledged himself to call together a central junta to discuss the
appointment of a Regency. But such discussion was full of
danger to the coalition that had made the revolution. A year
only separated the Queen from legal majority at the age of
fourteen. It was prudently decided to forestall ambitions by
anticipating a date. On Nov. 8, 1843, Isabel was declared,
by a majority of 192 over 15 of the two Houses voting together,
to have entered upon the exercise of full power. She took an
oath to observe the Constitution of 1837, with its comminatory
clause, “If I fail to fulfil this my vow in whole or in part,
I must not be obeyed; and all that I have done contrary to
VIII] O/62aga in power I93
it shall be null and void.” The ministry now resigned after
an experience unprecedented even in those days. Nominated
by Espartero, it had resigned and been replaced. A revolution
had declared it to be still in existence. It had then deprived
Espartero of the Regency, and pronounced him guilty of mal-
adversion of public monies. By a most illegal fiction it was
credited with continuous existence, whilst the Cabinets had
risen and been swept away, and juntas had declared themselves
independent or supreme. Elected to carry out a Radical
policy, it became at last the tool of reaction. The President,
nevertheless, was an honest man; he had done his best to
reconcile forces that he could not control. Its farewell was
not without pathos. “On us fell the task of governing in
turbulent and perilous times; and, despite our will, we had
to transgress the law, so that we—least of all men—are fitted
to inaugurate an epoch of strict justice such as our principles,
the throne, and the situation require.” The retiring ministry
received the thanks of Cortes “for having reconciled Spaniards.”
How hollow was that reconciliation was soon to be seen.
For her first ministry, Isabel took the advice of Lopez; and
her choice fell upon Salustiano de Olćzaga, once her tutor,
and now President of Congress. His knowledge of the royal
household was supposed to fit him to counteract the schemes
of the reactionary camarilla led by the Marchioness de Santa
Cruz, Lady of the Bedchamber. Olózaga, though pronounced
Radical, sought to preserve the coalition of the “Parliamentary”
party by taking two members of its opposite wing, Serrano and
Joaquin Frias, into his Cabinet. But the Conservative and
Court party had consented to his appointment only because
they were not yet strong enough to throw over their allies;
and no real cooperation between parties so utterly divided in
aims was possible. The Conservatives or Moderados, roughly
speaking, were the richer classes and the nobility, with the
exception of the Carlist faction. Against them were ranged
the Progressives or Radicals—the people, or rather the small
C. S. I 3
I94 Conservative Rule (1843–1854) [CH.
section of the town population that took an active interest
in politics. So long as the Progressives could maintain dis-
cipline in their ranks they were sure of remaining in power.
When their dissensions reached a certain pitch they were
ousted by the well-drilled Oligarchy, which generally counted
in its ranks the chiefs of the army. It is to be noted that
the Conservatives, though they branded their adversaries as
revolutionaries, were hardly less scrupulous in their appeals
to military revolt. The weakness of the Conservatives, on the
other hand, lay in the fact that they depended on the support
of a violently retrograde and anti-popular party, whose views
were reflected by the arbitrary acts of Narvaez and the absolutist
schemes of Gonzalez Bravo rather than by any constitutional
formula, however colourless. The Church and the Court were
always scheming to thrust them over the line into intolerance
and autocracy.
From the first, Olćzaga's proposals for amnesty, con-
firmation of the acts of Espartero up to the time that he had
quitted Spain, and rearming the national militia, were fiercely
opposed. The Cabinet was weakened at the outset by the
secession of Serrano, the handsome young general who enjoyed
the highest favour at Court. The reconstituted Senate was
decidedly Conservative; the Lower House contained, besides
the personal enemies of Espartero such as Concha, Serrano,
Ros de Olano, Aspiroz and the rest of the generals, the leaders
of the old Moderado party, Xavier de Burgos, Martinez de la
Rosa, Mon, and their destined successors, Cándido Nocedal,
Bravo Murillo, Donoso Cortes, and Luis José Sartorius. To
these were added Gonzalez Bravo and his independent young-
Spanish party; and the whole formed an Opposition in face
of which it was hopeless for Olózaga to attempt to carry out
a Liberal policy. He was treated, moreover, with studied
disrespect by the royal household; but, in spite of this
accumulation of difficulties, he determined not to be ousted
without a struggle.
VIII] O/62aga quarrels with the Queen I95
Accordingly he prepared, without the knowledge of his
colleagues, a decree for the dissolution of the Cortes, intending
to use it such time as the attitude of the Chambers should
oblige him to do so. This decree he submitted to the Queen
in a private audience on the evening of Nov. 28, 1843, and it
received her signature. But if Olćzaga fancied that he had
thus outwitted his opponents he was sorely deceived. Next
morning Isabel declared that her signature had been extorted by
personal violence exercised upon her by the President of the
Council. The scene, according to her solemn declaration, read
before the Cortes three weeks after its occurrence, was as
follows: “On the night of the 28th of last month, Olózaga
presented himself before me and proposed that I should sign a
decree dissolving the Cortes. I answered that I was unwilling to
sign it, among other reasons because these Cortes had declared
me of age. Olózaga insisted, and I again refused to sign the
decree. I rose and turned to the door which is on the left
of my desk. Olćzaga placed himself in front of me and bolted
that door. I turned to the opposite door; and Olózaga again
came before me and bolted that door also. He caught hold of
my dress, and obliged me to sit down. He seized my hand,
and forced me to sign. After that he left, and I withdrew to
my apartments.”
This was the statement of a wilful, capricious, and spoilt
child of thirteen, surrounded by persons hostile to the minister
affected. Against it must be set not only Olózaga's solemn
oath, but also the fact that the persons in an adjoining room
heard no noise. Moreover, General Dulce, Isabel's erstwhile
defender against Leon and Concha, swore that, when Olćzaga
left the room, the Queen followed him to give him a box of
bonbons for his daughter; and this Isabel did not deny.
Whether Isabel lent herself to the scheme of a palace party
bent on ruining Olózaga, or whether the minister so far forgot
himself as to compel the child-Queen by violence, will probably
never be known. Olćzaga never varied in his denial, nor did
I 3–2
I 96 Conservative A'ule (1843–1854) [CH.
Isabel in her statement. Those who profited by the astounding
and unseemly charge were the Court party. It was impossible
to give the lie to the Queen, or to Set aside her statement.
Public opinion was inflamed against Olózaga by scandals of
the most atrocious kind; it was said that he had abused his
position as tutor to obtain a wicked influence over the child.
On the day following his alleged violence he was summarily
dismissed from office. Impeached before the Cortes, he made
an eloquent and vigorous defence, but he could not hope for a
favourable verdict. He went into hiding and shortly afterwards
fled the Country, whereupon proceedings against him were
abandoned.
Olózaga was succeeded in the Presidency of the Council
by Gonzalez Bravo, an evil product of a bad age. He had
begun life as the editor of a scurrilous newspaper, which by
shameless libel and still more dangerous innuendo had helped
to stir up the revolution that drove Queen Cristina from
Spain. Afterwards, as a politician, he made his way to the
front, leading a compact faction holding the balance between
parties and seeking to make government impossible except on
its own terms. The daring adventurer was a man of consider-
able ability; and the party that sought to bring about a clerical
and Royalist reaction showed wisdom when they took as their
instrument the former scourge of the Court. In power he
proved himself an uncompromising upholder of the principle of
authority, and the humble servant of his former victim, Queen
Cristina. He began by proroguing Parliament (Dec. 27). It
never met again, for prorogation was followed by dissolution;
and Gonzalez Bravo carried out the programme of the Court
party by means of decrees. Attempts at insurrection following
upon Olózaga's dramatic fall gave him an excuse for disarming
the national militia. Cortina and Narvaez, who ventured to
raise their voice against him, were imprisoned. A decree
undid the work of the revolution of 1840 by depriving the
municipalities of the wide powers conferred upon them. In
VIII] Gonzalez Bravo in power I97
their place commissions were nominated by the ministry to
govern the communes. Control of the police was given to
paid magistrates under civil governors appointed by the central
authority. A commission of enquiry had valued at 24,8o,ooo
the amount of national property, in jewels and other valuables,
carried off by Queen Cristina when she abdicated. Gonzalez
Bravo gave her back her liberal pension, together with arrears
from the time at which it had been declared forfeited. He
moreover created her husband, Muñoz, whom as editor he had
outrageously insulted, Duke of Rianzares and grandee. The
expectations of the birth of yet another scion of the Muñoz-
Bourbon family detained Queen Cristina in Paris until the
spring, so she was unable at first to share in the triumph over
her old enemy, Olózaga ; but she took a large share in the
direction of politics, whilst arranging that her second family
should be richly provided for.
Gonzalez Bravo won a title to the gratitude of all who live
or travel in Spain by creating the civil guard, a constabulary
formed of picked men, horse and foot, armed with carbine
or rifle, sword or bayonet, and revolver. This fine corps has
rendered life and property as safe in Spain as in most European
countries. By activity and free use of its arms it has stamped
out organised brigandage. It is respected by all, and beloved
by all but evil-doers. Repeated revolutions have ever found it
on the side of law and order. When unable to control, it has
always moderated disorder. Its picturesque uniform is a
welcome sight on the broad Sunny plain, in the crowded
streets, or in the mountain pass. -
Gonzalez Bravo had lent his name to the subversive policy
of persons who chose for the moment to remain in the back-
ground. He had revoked Olózaga's decree recognising honours
and titles conferred by Espartero; he had appointed to the
most profitable positions in the State men whose only claim
was their usefulness to their party; he had suspended the sale
of the lands of the Church without, however, venturing to annul
I98 Conservative Rule (1843—1854) [CH.
the sales that had already been effected. But, willing tool and
jade as he was, the time soon came when he was no longer
needed; it was thought well that a man of more authority
should take his place. Accordingly, when Queen Cristina
returned to Madrid, he was rewarded for his services by the
appointment of ambassador to Portugal; and Narvaez, the stern
and upright disciplinarian, took his place (May 2, 1844).
Narvaez never ceased to call himself a Liberal; but his task
in life was to check the excess of party rule, and chiefly of that
party to which he professed to belong. He took Mon, Pidal,
and Armero for his Ministers of Finance, Interior, and Marine,
and was joined later by Martinez de la Rosa at the Foreign
Office. With these respectable assistants he prepared to
enforce a moderate Conservative Government, whilst keeping
in check the clerical and autocratic Court party.
Efficient administration and financial reform were more
than ever needed. Towards the former the newly-created civil
guard proved a powerful help. Mon devoted his energy and
ability to the Treasury. He found a floating debt amounting
to £25,000,ooo and met it by issuing three per cent, bonds.
A year's pay was owing to the whole of the public services; the
pensions granted recklessly by successive Governments were
even farther in arrear. The permanent excess of expenditure
over revenue was more than two million pounds annually in
normal times; and normal times were rare indeed in Spain.
The suppression of the tithe, of which about one-half belonged
to the State, had diminished already slender resources, whilst a
further burden had been assumed in the maintenance of the
clergy, costing somewhat over a million each year. Hitherto
there had been collected with infinite expense, irritation, and
peculation more than one hundred distinct taxes, some of them
local, some of them almost unproductive. Castille paid more
than twice as much as the privileged provinces of the north.
Mon reformed the whole fiscal system ; a great part of his
work survives until the present time. Taxes were evenly
VIII] Narvaez in power. Fisca/ reform 199
distributed and reduced to five chief headings: (1) a tax
on agriculture; (2) a tax on urban rents, manufactures, and
commerce; (3) an Octroi duty; (4) a tax on land-registration,
mortgages, and successions ; (5) customs dues. The profits
of the Post Office, lottery, tobacco and other State monopolies
made up the total of the still inadequate national income. The
two first taxes produced somewhat more than three millions
annually, the octroi more than half this amount. The whole
revenue, calculated at 24,6,500,ooo a year, left a nominal
surplus for payment of interest upon the debt. But in fact
there was still a large deficit. Nevertheless large public works
were undertaken with money borrowed at a high rate of
interest. Mon’s fiscal reform, useful and necessary as it
undoubtedly was, proved most unpopular. The town popula-
tion was irritated by the rise of prices consequent upon the
octroi duties. The first care of each popular revolution has
been to sweep them away, the unpleasing task of each strong
Government to reimpose them as a necessary source of
revenue. Hardly a month passes without some disturbance
arising from their collection; they are often the cause of
bloodshed.
In the new Cortes which met in the autumn (1844) the
Opposition, in the Lower House, was represented by one
member. The Progressive party had refused to present
candidates for election. They alleged that they were terror-
ised, illtreated and insulted. Adopting a means of protest
hardly justified by the most extreme wrongs, they withdrew
from public affairs, and conspired in Madrid as well as in
London, Paris, and Lisbon. The apparent unanimity of the
country was indeed due to the pressure upon electors. In
many districts only a small proportion of the enfranchised
understand, value, or exercise their right. Voters are often
overawed or elections decided by some fraudulent trick which
when discovered is generally greeted with laughter. But,
besides this, Spain in 1844 was weary of revolution, excitement,
2OO Conservative Rule (1843–1854) [CH.
and uncertainty; the strong hand was welcomed; and ideas that
J ten years earlier would have been branded as servile were
openly avowed. A real reaction against the excesses of an
ill-understood Liberalism had set in, and its effects lasted ten
years; it seemed an eternity of rest after such agitation as the
country had undergone.
Even Espartero abandoned the hope of another revolution
in the near future. He added, however, to the manifesto in
which, on Isabel's fourteenth birthday, he formally abandoned
the position from which he had been summarily expelled, a
significant promise that he would be ready when the country
should need him. Meanwhile he was the centre, if not the
director, of the plots of the excluded and banished Radicals.
But under Narvaez's rule conspiracy and revolution were no
longer safe roads to success. In a little more than a year he
shot two hundred and fourteen persons for political offences.
The downfall of Olázaga, and the Radical secession, provoked
small insurrections even as far afield as Cuba and the Philip-
pine Islands; but they were put down with a strong hand.
Undiscouraged by the fate of former Constitutions, the
ministry laid before the Cortes a project of revision. It
ascribed the disastrous anarchy of the last few years to defects
in the Constitution of 1837; its “reform * proved to be a
general and formal reversal of the Liberal principles enun-
ciated after the revolution of that year. The clause asserting
the sovereignty of the people was so modified as to lose all
significance. On the other hand, the declaration that Catholicism
is the religion of the State was accentuated. The nomination
of all senators was entrusted to the Crown; the office was
made a life one ; and two hundred bishops, grandees, generals,
bankers, and magistrates were appointed. The Lower House
was still elective; but a property qualification was imposed, and
the duration of the dynastic mandate extended from three to
four years. The national militia, the ultimate foundation of
the power of the Radicals, was not directly suppressed; but the
VIII] The Constitution of 1845 2O I
clause that rendered its enrolment obligatory in every province
was dropped and the matter left to local authorities who would
not be likely to cultivate such a hotbed of revolt. The
question of municipal and provincial government was reserved
for the decision of the Cortes. They shirked responsibility,
deputing the ministry to legislate by decree on this once
all-absorbing question, with ample powers to coerce refractory
local assemblies. The press laws were made much more
vigorous, editors of newspapers being compelled to find bail
to the amount of 24, Iooo for their good behaviour. A new
law decreed that the Regency, when necessary, should be
undertaken by the next of kin to the sovereign instead of by
a commission appointed by the Cortes. One important clause,
in view of the Queen's age and the tendencies of the nearest
relative, was that which empowered her to choose a husband
- without the authorisation of Cortes. This Constitution was
promulgated in May, 1845, and like its predecessors and
successors is known by the date of its legal enactment.
Though detested by the Radicals, it has had the warm
approval of some of those who have had most experience
of the task of governing Spain. Among its admirers was
Cánovas del Castillo, who reproduced it with but few modifica-
tions on the accession of Alfonso XII.
Abortive Liberal revolts still continued; but the Government
of Narvaez was now felt to be so well established, and to
have given such proof of its anti-Liberal policy, as to deserve
recognition of the Holy See. After years of estrangement the
Vatican was far from demonstrative, or eager in its desire for
reconciliation. It was only by the most roundabout paths and
after numberless slights that the Spanish agent at Rome was
able to make it known that his Government was ready to submit
to terms in return for recognition of the rights of the Queen,
and of the validity of the sales of Church property. These
sales had been denounced as impious if not sacrilegious. The
Pope demanded the immediate return to its owners of that
V
2O2 Conservative Aºule (1843—1854) [CH.
part of the unsold lands of the Church calculated to produce
an annual income of about 24,300,ooo, or less than a quarter
of the sum required for the maintenance of the clergy. With
regard to the form in which the deficit should be made good
difficulties arose, so radical as to delay for six years longer
the agreement desired by both parties. After the revolutionary
upheaval of Europe, the Papal negotiators were much less
exacting; but in 1845 they demanded nothing less than that
the Church should again be placed on a footing of inde-
pendence. A concordat prepared in May by the Spanish
agent provided that the incomes of the clergy should be
derived from a fund granted as the absolute property of the
Church and should not take the form of salaries paid by the
State. In other respects this scheme encroached upon the
ancient rights of Spanish kings to nominate to sees and
benefices. To this Narvaez and Martinez de la Rosa, his -
Minister for Foreign Affairs, refused to agree. But by entering
upon negotiation the Pope had in part recognised the right
of Isabel.
Useful as Narvaez's repressive and disciplinary government
undoubtedly was, it could not fail to be unpopular. The
legislation was all in the direction of further centralisation, and
was, for the most part, carried out by decree. The country,
recovering from its exhaustion, was becoming prosperous; but
under such a system it was impossible for the Radicals to
remain content. It was ever the aim of Conservative Govern-
ments rather to win over the Carlist, clerical, and traditionalist
faction, than to satisfy the moderate Liberals. In this Nar-
vaez's ministry was partially successful. His evident desire for
reconciliation with Rome was guaranteed by his negotiations
and by the suspension of Sales of Church lands. But there
was a corresponding loss on the other side. Curtailment of
popular liberties by the new Constitution and repressive decrees
had alienated a section of the party that had brought him into
power. The Liberals had begun to rally: in the first Parliament
VIII] Marvaez retires. Isturiz in power 203
elected under the new franchise, Madrid, Saragossa, and Cadiz
were represented by Progressive deputies. The majority of
the Lower House desired a strict application of the consti-
tutional system, and declared that the necessity for government
by decree had now ceased. Disagreements arose within the
Cabinet over schemes for the marriage of the Queen with the
Count of Trapani, her maternal uncle; and Narvaez abandoned
the Presidency of the Council to the Marquis of Miraflores
(Jan. I2, 1846).
Though the new Cabinet, including Arrazola, Topete, and
Isturiz, professed to carry on the policy of its predecessor, and
relied on the same class for support, the fall of Narvaez was
rightly considered as a victory for the Queen-mother and the
Court party. This party called in Narvaez only in times of
danger, for he treated palace and clerical intrigue in the same
autocratic fashion as Radical plots. It was hoped that the
courtly marquis would be found more submissive to gentle
influences. But Miraflores, as his memoirs show, soon learnt
that the young Queen was wilful and capricious at times, while
at others she was merely the mouthpiece of a dangerous
faction. He was moreover unable to manage the daily more
self-assertive Cortes; and in the middle of March, 1846, Narvaez
again took the leadership. Owing to the unconcealed disfavour
with which he was now regarded at court he quitted it again
after three weeks, but during this time he had prorogued the
refractory Chambers, and had taken upon himself the odium
of a decree conferring upon the ministry wide and undefined
powers “to combat without truce moral and material anarchy,”
and to punish the publication of matter calculated to bring
discredit on the Crown. His successor was Isturiz, once a
Liberal. Mon, Pidal, and Armero, pronounced Conservatives,
took office under him. The Court party sought to get rid of
its masterful protector by appointing him ambassador to Naples.
Narvaez refused the post, but retired to France, where he had
many friends. -
2O4 Conservative Rule (1843–1854) [CH.
April was taken up by the suppression of a military mutiny
in Galicia, where subversive cries were coupled with the names
of Espartero and Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, the Queen's
cousin, a hot-headed young prince, who sought by parading
extreme Liberal views to push his candidature for the position
of King-consort. The Liberal rising in Galicia was not an
isolated movement; in Madrid and Málaga a simultaneous
attempt had been planned. Though the Galician insurgents
were subdued without great effort by General Manuel Concha,
and the plot miscarried at Madrid and Málaga, the symptoms
showed a real danger. Everywhere there were whisperings of
a royal favourite and an intellectual power behind the throne.
The cry for a “free Queen” had been uttered; and a parliamentary
party, styling itself “Puritan * and demanding the repression of
corrupt influence, was growing under Pacheco and Pastor Diaz.
For years the question of the Spanish marriages had been
agitating the courts of Europe. The Powers chiefly concerned
were France and Great Britain. France relied on the powerful
interest of Queen Cristina. Her kinsman Louis Philippe had
earned her gratitude. To him she owed her triumphal return
to Spain, and the rich pension which was scarcely less dear
to her than political power. In return she proposed to marry
her two daughters to his sons, the Dukes of Aumāle and
Montpensier. This arrangement would place Spain entirely
under the influence of France. In deference to the wishes
of the British Government, and the terms of the Quadruple
Alliance, which bound the two countries to common action in
the Peninsula, it was abandoned, or at least not openly pushed.
Great Britain, on her side, ceased to urge the claims of Leopold
of Saxe-Coburg, cousin of Queen Victoria and of the Prince
Consort. In 1843, when Queen Victoria met the King of the
French at the Chateau d’Eu, it was agreed that Isabel should
be allowed to marry a Bourbon descendant of Philip V, and
that after the birth of an heir to the throne of Spain her
sister should be at liberty to marry an Orleans prince. Mean-
VIII] Question of the Queen's marriage 2O5
while, Austria and Prussia favoured the candidature of the
Count of Montemolin, Don Carlos the Second, or, as the
legitimists would have it, Carlos VI, the recognised head of
the party since his father's abdication (May, 1845). It was
hoped that, if he became King-consort, the monarchical
principle would be strengthened in Spain and the risk of
another civil war evaded.
In 1844 the King of the French married his second son,
the Duke of Aumāle, to the Princess of Parma. The project
of a marriage between the duke's younger brother and Isabel's
sister, the Infanta Maria Louisa, was still entertained. It looked
as if Queen Isabel would be compelled to marry the Count of
Trapani, her mother's brother. But nearer at home ambitions
were working. Queen Cristina, during her husband's illness,
had owed the preservation of the crown to her sister, Doña
Carlota. She and her sister had quarrelled; but Doña Carlota
still hoped that the wish of the Spaniards for the marriage of
their Queen to a native prince would give the throne to one or
other of her two sons. The elder, Enrique, Duke of Seville, a
dashing young sailor, had, it was supposed, favourably impressed
his precocious cousin. But he threw away his chance by over-
doing his part. In his eagerness for popularity he adopted
views so Radical as to be hardly compatible with monarchy.
He was implicated in the Galician insurrection; and his cousin,
instead of marrying, was obliged to banish him.
A dark scheme was now agreed upon between the Queen-
mother and the King of the French. Isabel should marry
Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz, brother of the banished
Duke of Seville; and at the same time her sister, Maria Louisa,
should marry the Duke of Montpensier. It was believed that
Isabel's union with her effeminate and feeble cousin precluded
all chance of succession, and that then the throne of Spain
would fall to the children of her sister. That so wicked an
agreement should have been entered into by a mother, and
abetted by statesmen of the highest position, seems well-nigh
2O6 Conservative A'ule (1843—1854) [CH.
incredible. The fact, however, rests on indisputable evidence.
Isabel's happiness weighed as nothing against the advancement
of the Orleans family. Her scandalous life is partially excused
by her mother's fiendish betrayal. In order to carry out the
scheme, it was necessary to brave the displeasure of the British
Government and to violate agreements. The King of the
French pleaded that Great Britain, by pushing the candidature
of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, had virtually released him from
his engagement to postpone the marriage of his son with the
Spanish Infanta until an heir should be born to her elder sister.
Lord Palmerston ordered Sir H. Bulwer, the British ambassador
at Madrid, to protest against the proposed marriage of the
Queen by every means in his power; but the two weddings
were celebrated simultaneously on the Queen's sixteenth birth-
day (Oct. Io, 1846) with all the splendour of the Spanish court.
Isabel's marriage to a native prince was popular with her
subjects; but her sister's marriage to the son of the King of the
French was regarded with suspicion. The Count of Monte-
molin took the opportunity of again publicly asserting his
claims to the throne. The exiled Duke of Seville refused to
recognise any claim resulting from the Duke of Montpensier's
marriage. A more important consequence was the termina-
tion of the agreement which, since the outset of the Carlist War,
had bound Great Britain and France to concerted action in
Spain. France had gained a great diplomatic victory; the
additional bond between her reigning family and that of Spain
was expected to prove a source of strength to both, and to
make French influence Supreme beyond the Pyrenees. Great
Britain showed her displeasure by championship of the Liberal
cause and by protests almost amounting to threats of interven-
tion against retrograde policy.
The King" was a Carlist at heart; he actually wrote to the
* The husband of a Spanish woman takes her rank, if it be superior
to his own. Consequently Don Francisco de Asis was called el Rey in
VIII] The French marriages 2O7
Count of Montemolin offering to give way if Montemolin
himself would marry their common cousin. Montemolin,
however, confident in his right, refused any settlement which
did not bring with it explicit recognition of his sole title to
the throne. King Francisco de Asis grouped round him the
clerical and absolutist faction of the court, and continually
intrigued to further their views and ambitions. But the Liberals
had at the Queen's side an equally powerful advocate in General
Serrano, whose influence was founded upon a singularly hand-
some person, soldierly courage, and Courtly manners. His
dignified bearing concealed an ambitious but shallow mind.
His energy was fitful; in times of crisis he was irresolute; but
he was for years the instrument through whom the Spanish
Liberals resisted their opponents’ preponderance at Court. He
played a great, perhaps a useful, but not a creditable, part
in Spanish history for nearly thirty years.
Shortly after the Queen's marriage a general election took
place. The new law imposed annual payments of 244 in
direct taxation as qualification for the franchise; and payment
of 24, Io in direct taxation or proof of an income of 24, 120
as qualification for the office of deputy. From these restric-
tions, however, the liberal professions were exempt. Confident
that such conditions must result in the return of a Conservative
Lower House, Pidal, Minister of the Interior, relaxed the
pressure usually exercised by the Government; and forty
Radical Progressives were returned. Among them were the
well-known figures of Cortina, San Miguel, Mendizabal, and
Olózaga. The last was returned by two districts. He crossed
the frontier to take his seat, but was seized and imprisoned at
Pamplona and, after a time, banished. The new Chambers
proved hostile to the ministry; and Isturiz resigned (Jan., 1847).
He was followed by a new Conservative coalition under
Spanish; but politically he was only the Queen's consort. To call him
King, simply, gives the wrong impression that he was in much the same
position as William of Orange in England. [J. F.-K.]
2O8 Conservative Aule (1843—1854) [CH.
Sotomayor, and including Bravo Murillo and Seijas Lozano.
Some efforts were made towards economic reforms; and a new
ministry, distinct from that of the Interior, was created to
supervise commerce, public works, and education. Entitled at
first the Ministry of Commerce, it has since been known as the
Ministry of Fomento (encouragement), and carries Cabinet
rank. The first occupant was Roca de Togores, better known
as the Marqués de Molins, a diplomatist and writer of high
reputation.
But public attention was unhappily centred on the Court;
the King and the Queen had disagreed shortly after marriage and
had separated. Whilst they wrangled, Serrano's influence with
the Queen was permanent. Working in concert with Bulwer,
the British ambassador, now in high favour at Court, and with
Salamanca, the sporting banker, the golden calf to whom all
Spain at that time bowed down, he created such difficulties
that Sotomayor decided to remove him from the Court by
nominating him head of a military commission in Navarre.
He refused the appointment, and appealed to his right as
a senator to justify his breach of discipline as a soldier. The
ministry was driven to the necessity of prosecuting him for
insubordination. But the Queen decided the question by
dismissing the ministry that had ventured to interfere with
her favourite.
Sotomayor and his colleagues had used every endeavour to
stay the scandal; they had even refused entry to the palace to
persons whose influence they considered objectionable. The
same disagreeable duty devolved upon their successors,
Francisco Pacheco and his Puritans. When the Queen quitted
Madrid for the summer, the King-consort remained behind.
His feeble and tortuous brain, or his interested advisers, had
suggested to him a plan by which he might turn his wife's
misconduct to account and make himself the real King of
Spain. Isabel, about to become a mother, could be terrorised.
She was indeed immensely popular, especially with the lower
VIII] 7%e Queen and Serrano 2O9
Orders of the capital, whose compliments, grotesque and at
times obscene, she received with a winning smile when she
drove abroad ; but the Crown was rapidly being brought into
contempt. The King's Cabal, contemptible as it was, was a
real source of danger. The Queen-mother refusing to coun-
tenance the scandal—a direct result of her heartless political
intrigue—had retired in wrath to France; the reckless young
Queen was left to her own caprice for guidance. A plan for
challenging and shooting Serrano after fixing on him a pre-
tended private quarreſ was actually discussed by serious men.
The ministry ordered the King consort to reside outside the
capital when ungºtempanied by the Queen ; but no reconcilia-
tion was effected; The Radicals were profiting by the scandal
to spread agitation in the country. A sop was thrown to
them in the shape of the pardon of Olózaga, who now took
his seat in the Cortes. Then for a time public attention
was called off from the Court by the movement of armies.
Portugal had fallen into anarchy; and the authority of its
ueen, combated on One side by the Radicals and on the
er by the partisans of Don Miguel, the legitimist Pretender,
s wrecked. It was restored by Spanish troops under
nuel Concha, acting in concert with a British squadron.
e mandate of the Quadruple Alliance to interfere in the
irs of her neighbour gratified the pride of the Spanish
bn, and helped it for the moment to forget its own
appy condition. Concha carried out his delicate mission
such a way as not to offend Portuguese pride, and was
arded with the title of Marqués del Duero (July, 1847).
is slight success, with its feeble gleam of glory, strengthened
beco's ministry and gave it heart for more serious work.
lonia had fallen again into revolt and anarchy. A famine
desolating the land ; and the starving peasants, incited by
agitators, readily seized the chance of booty offered by enlist-
ment in the Carlist ranks. The abdication of Don Carlos the
First had given to the party a new leadership marked by fresh
C. S. I 4











2 I O Conservative A'u/e (1843—1854) [CH.
energy. For a moment it was held in check by the hope
of the submission of Spain to Carlist rule under the cloak of a
royal marriage. When this failed, revolt was again encouraged
and loosely organised ; undisciplined bands roamed the coun-
try. At first they abstained from levying blackmail and seized
only public money, or exacted the taxes due to the Government.
But the capture and execution of one of their leaders, the
priest Tristany (May 17, 1847), together with other severities
exercised against them, soon gave a more bitter character to
the struggle. In the autumn the neºgreated Marqués del
Duero took command, but even wiłºść
against less than a tenth of his fores:bººp to restore
order. It is true that he sought to effº d § *
persuasion than by severity; but by this tiſſeº
was complicated with organised resistance to coſić
ription, and
by the economic question that had so often disturbed Catalonia.
Salamanca, the banker, now led the councils of the ministry,
and had revived the proposal for a commercial understanding
with Great Britain. Already the customs tariff had been
lowered for certain manufactures; and the Catalans, in fa
of a competition they considered ruinous, were dismissi
their workmen. The Marques del Duero was relieved of
half-accomplished task; and General Pavia, his predecess
again took command. By calling the whole of the inhabita
to arms he was able in January, 1848, to restore soule s
blance of order.
The insurrection in Catalonia, and the ever-increasi
feeling against Serrano, at length alarmed the Queen ; a
she recalled Narvaez from Paris to face a very danger
situation. On his advice, amnesty was granted to all
were willing to swear allegiance to the Queen and fid
to the Constitution. Espartero was made a senator. Olóżs
had come back; even the once brilliant Prince of the Peace
was invited to return to his native land; he preferred however
to end his life as a frequenter of the sunny benches of the
ſº













VIII] Marvaez again in power 2 I I
public gardens of Paris. But Narvaez did not take office
immediately. Salamanca, the banker, had dazzled the Court
by brilliant promises and ostentatious luxury. All he touched
seemed to turn to gold; the public fortune was entrusted
to him. Narvaez refused to enter his Cabinet ; it fell after
a few weeks, leaving behind it a general suspicion that
Salamanca had used political power to push his private
fortune. In October, 1847, Narvaez was given a “free hand
to seize the stick and strike hard.” It was his own expression,
and accurately, if brutally, expressed the needs of the country.
His Cabinet, as finally constituted, included Sartorius, as
Minister of the Interior, Sotomayor as Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and Bravo Murillo. The General himself took the
Presidency of the Council as well as the Ministry of War.
Discipline was everywhere needed, but chiefly at Court; and
it was with the associates of the Queen that Narvaez began.
Serrano and his supposed rival for the royal favour were
expelled. A reconciliation between the Queen and her hus-
band was negotiated by the Nuncio. The return of Queen
Cristina from Paris gave to the palace the respectability it
lacked. The Marquis of Miraflores, as Governor of the
Royal Household, guaranteed good behaviour or at least
consideration for the Queen's reputation.
It was fortunate indeed that a man so strong as Narvaez
was at the helm when the crash came in France, and the
Orleans dynasty fell before the revolution of February, 1848.
The Montpensier marriage, brought about for the purpose of
securing the protection of France, now became a source of
weakness. Cordial cooperation between the new republic and
the highly-centralised and somewhat reactionary monarchy
fostered in Spain by Louis Philippe could not be hoped for.
The Radical party had already the sympathy of the British
Government; its extreme faction hoped that the general
revolution would spread to Spain. But the number of
Republicans was small; and the Liberal leaders, Cortina,
I4–2
2 I 2 Conservative ſºule (1843–1854) |CH.
Madoz, and Mendizabal, were even more opposed to the
extremists of their own party than Narvaez. A peculiarity
of the situation was that Narvaez' dictatorship was carried
on under Liberal and Constitutional forms though, as a
Prussian minister remarked, “There is no Government less
Liberal than that of Spain. All the men who compose it
make a mockery in private of the words “liberty' and ‘con-
stitutional safeguards,’ but they never cease to proclaim them
as holy in their speeches and official declarations.”
Political ignorance and indifference were so general that
Spain was ready to accept Narvaez' assurance that she already
enjoyed Liberal government. In order to save a discredited
dynasty, the Liberal leaders cooperated with Narvaez. With a
patriotic view to avoiding civil war from the Carlists on the
one hand and the Republicans on the other, the Chambers
granted him permission to govern by martial law and to raise
two million pounds to meet the emergency. Narvaez pro-
rogued Parliament on March 23 ; ten days later he dissolved
it, and prepared to ride out the storm alone.
The dissolution was the signal for riots in Madrid; but they
had been foreseen, and were easily suppressed. Sentences of
death pronounced by Council of War were wisely commuted;
and the ringleaders were banished to the Philippine Islands.
The British ambassador, Sir H. Bulwer, was suspected of
abetting the attempted revolution ; his recall was demanded,
but was refused. On April 9, 1848, he delivered a threatening
note, pointing out that Isabel owed her crown to the Liberals,
and demanding that Cortes should be summoned and that
government by martial law should cease. The publication of
this note in a Radical newspaper was a gross breach of
diplomatic etiquette, and, in view of the circumstances, a
direct incitement to revolt ; but still the Spanish Government,
out of deference to Great Britain, forbore. Early in May
another insurrection in the capital, this time a military
conspiracy promoted by the versatile financier Salamanca,
VIII] Success of AWarvaez 2 I 3
had to be suppressed. Its object was to bring back Espartero
and the Liberals to power. Some dozen executions followed;
and again Sir H. Bulwer's name was connected with the
agitation, not only in Madrid but in Andalusia also. Though
the evidence was not quite conclusive, the British ambassador
received his passports on May 17. The excuse given for his
expulsion was that his conduct had made him so unpopular
that the Government was unable to make itself responsible
for his safety. The letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs
was couched in apologetic terms; but Great Britain supported
her envoy by expelling the Spanish ambassador, Isturiz, and
breaking off diplomatic relations. This quarrel with the
recognised fountain-head of Liberalism had most important
consequences. Narvaez' spirited refusal to submit to dic-
tation from abroad flattered the national pride and gave him
the popularity he lacked. Austria and Prussia held that by
incurring a quarrel with Great Britain the Spanish Govern-
ment had given proof of attachment to Conservative principles
and must be accepted as an ally in the struggle against
revolution. At last they recognised Isabel’s right to the
throne which she had occupied for fifteen years ; at the
same time full diplomatic relations with the Holy See were
renewed.
The crisis had been a sharp one; but Narvaez' determined
attitude had saved the situation. While Madrid was given up
to riot, Liberal bands in Catalonia had proclaimed the Duke
of Seville. His turbulence made it necessary to deprive him
of his rank as Infant of Spain and in the army. Don Carlos
had called his followers to arms. The northern provinces
obeyed; Extremadura and Andalusia were infested by lawless
guerrilleros. It was the country folk who now, as before,
followed the Pretender; and again they showed the stubborn-
ness that has ever distinguished the slowly roused energies of
the peasant from the easily excited and easily quelled tur-
bulence of the towns. Cabrera entered Spain through
2 I 4 Conservative Aºuſe (1843–1854) [CH.
Cerdagne; and his arrival (June, 1848) produced a panic
at Barcelona. But he was no longer the Cabrera that
Catalonia and Valencia knew. Years of residence abroad,
and perhaps marriage with an Englishwoman, had changed
him. He had dropped his old views with regard to the
absolute rule of the Church and King. He declared that
the time for despotism, the Inquisition, and the rule of friars
had passed away. The new Carlism was a protest against
social corruption and the scandals of the Court. Cabrera
pleaded earnestly for humane conduct of the war; he urged
that Spain needed true liberty.
But the word liberty was an abomination to Carlists of the
old stock; and many of them looked upon its new disciple
with suspicion. Nor were the Radicals likely to accept his
definition of liberty, though for a time they shared his attempt
to overthrow the throne. Another cause of his failure to
provoke a struggle as obstinate as the former One was the
report that he and his master had accepted the financial help
of Great Britain, and had pledged themselves to grant the
much-dreaded commercial treaty. This report was founded
on nothing more solid than the marked civility with which
Don Carlos had been received in London after the rupture of
diplomatic relations with Spain.
Simultaneously with Cabrera's appearance in Catalonia,
General Alzáa took command of the Carlists in the Basque
Provinces. His plan to seize some strategic point to which the
scattered mountaineers might rally failed utterly. The vigilance
of the Government frustrated his attempts to surprise Tolosa
and Plasencia. Alzáa was captured and shot (July 3, 1848).
Cabrera held out for eight months in north-eastern Spain. His
army increased from 4ooo to about Io, ooo men. General
Pavia, and after him Fernando Fernandez de Córdova, failed
to capture or drive him across the frontier. General Concha
was more successful. The Maestrazgo, the scene of Cabrera's
former exploits, was kept down with a ruthless hand; and the
v111] Carlist rising suppressed 2 I 5
war was confined to the region north of the Ebro. Ceaseless
military activity scattered the Carlist forces; ready pardon was
granted to those who quitted their ranks. Irritated by failure,
and provoked by his opponents, Cabrera soon ceased to practise
the humanitarian methods which he had advocated. His native
fierceness was exasperated by fears of assassination ; more than
one treacherous attempt upon his life had been made. But his
raiding, blackmailing, and severities towards those who, after
making their peace with the Government, had the misfortune
to fall into his hands had become intolerable. Moreover,
towns of over 15oo Souls were no longer allowed to plead
compulsion for having received the Carlists and contributed
to their ranks and funds. They suffered a 50 per cent. in-
crease of taxation, and, warned by their example, others took
courage to resist. When Don Carlos himself was captured
by the French police and expelled, about 4ooo of Cabrera's
followers claimed the promised amnesty. He himself abandoned
hope and crossed the frontier (April, 1849).
Narvaez' dictatorship, with martial law and closed Houses
of Parliament, had lasted nine months, when the Queen's speech
on the opening of Cortes (November, 1848) congratulated the
country on the way in which the revolutionary crisis had been
met, administrative reforms that had been carried out, and
prosperity fostered by a strong Government. The feeling of
confidence created by the recognition of the Powers encouraged
the Conservative Cabinet to take up once more Spain's tra-
ditional position as protector of the Holy See, and to attack
abroad the revolution which at home it had successfully re-
sisted. The conciliatory attitude with which Pius IX began
his pontificate had given to Spain the chance of long-wished-for
reconciliation. But the truly Christian wish of the Pope to
make Catholicism compatible with Liberalism had only hastened
the Italian revolution and brought about the downfall of his
feeble temporal power. Driven from his capital and hard
pressed, he appealed to France, Austria, Spain, and Naples to
2 I 6 Conservative A'u/e (1843—1854) [CH.
restore him to his throne and the political independence which he
considered necessary for the free exercise of his spiritual powers.
It was Pidal who, as head of the Spanish Foreign Office,
arranged for the concerted action of the Catholic Powers. On
May 1, 1849, a Spanish Squadron brought about the sub-
mission of Terracina and handed it over to a Neapolitan army.
Three weeks later Pidal announced the intention of his
Government to send an expedition against the Roman Republic.
The project was approved by a majority of 155 over 17 dis-
sentient votes in the Lower House. A small but well-equipped
Spanish force was blessed by the Pope at Gaeta. Its co-
operation in the capture of the Eternal City was refused by
the French ; and it undertook the inglorious work of overawing
the country districts. The Italians mocked the humble part
played by the Spanish general bearing the illustrious name of
the Great Captain. The maintenance of his troops continued
to burden the Spanish budget till April, 1856, when Pius IX, no
longer a Liberal Pope, formally thanked the Spanish nation for
his restoration. At home, however, the Spanish Government
gained largely in popularity by the championship of the Church.
A palace plot was attended with more ridicule than danger.
King Francisco, now living at peace with his wife, had suc-
ceeded after much intrigue in suppressing the office of Governor
of the Palace. Once rid of its occupant, the Marquis of Mira-
flores, he hoped with the aid of his camarilla to rule not only the
palace but Spain. His clerical satellites, and still more worthless
lay favourites, continually urged the Queen to assert her au-
thority. Even Narvaez was not considered sufficiently well
disposed towards the Church ; he certainly interfered with the
exercise of the royal prerogative as understood by courtiers.
It was resolved to get rid of him by a coup d'état. Accordingly,
on the eve of the meeting of Parliament (Oct. 20, 1849), the
official Gazette announced to the astonished capital a change
of ministry, and published a list of nobodies, mere creatures
of the royal household, as successors to Narvaez and his col-
VIII] Spain and Italy. A palace plot 2 17
leagues. Next day the Gazette gave notice, without comment,
that the former Cabinet had been reinstated in office. Nothing
further was heard of the “Lightning Ministry” (Ministerio Relám-
pago). Narvaez had hurried them off to their homes “to rest,”
as he sardonically expressed it, “from the fatigues of office.”
Nevertheless the power that had brought into brief being the
Lightning Ministry continued to sway the Court, though for
the moment Fray Fulgencio, a half-frantic monk, and Sor
Patrocinio, a nun who had been punished by her religious
superiors for counterfeiting stigmata, were relegated to their
convents. King Francisco's petulant and childish escapade
was punished by deprivation of the post of Intendant of the
Royal Patrimony, which gave him control of large sums.
After this arbitrary and unconstitutional but necessary
assertion of his authority, Narvaez continued to rule for fourteen
months in comparative peace. Certain changes were made in
the Cabinet. Bravo Murillo, succeeding Mon at the Ministry
of Finance, made an honest attempt at reform. The diplo-
matic quarrel with Great Britain had given the death-blow
to Spanish credit abroad. To revive it was impossible. It
remained only to face the situation, and call upon the country
to undergo the sacrifice necessary to bring about some sort
of balance between revenue and expenditure. The Queen led
the way by abandoning a claim for £900,ooo due to her.
Bravo Murillo declared himself unable to pay the arrears due
to many officials; he refused even to guarantee the future, or
to present, as his predecessors had done, a fallacious budget.
He ceased to juggle with the paper currency and the con-
solidated and floating debts. He did not shrink from exposing
the disastrous financial system pursued for so many years, and
its appalling results. This in itself was beneficial ; but un-
fortunately Bravo Murillo did not continue in office long enough
to inaugurate a better system. His project for economy in
all departments was opposed by Narvaez, unwilling or unable
to consent to reduction in the budget of the Ministry for War,
2 I 8 Conservative Aºule (1843–1854) [CH.
The Ministers of Marine and the Interior also refused to
curtail the expenses of their departments. Bravo Murillo re-
signed (November, 1850). His successor brought back the
ruinous plan of mortgaging future revenue. -
In July the Queen bore a son ; but the apparently healthy
child died within an hour of its birth. The Montpensier
faction was suspected of procuring its murder within the
royal chamber. Its life, of course, entailed failure of the
wicked scheme to which Isabel's happiness had been sacrificed.
It is said that Isabel’s hatred of her sister dated from this
time, and that she never allowed the duchess or any of her
friends’ faction to approach her children. The enormity, even
more than the risk, of such a crime seems to disprove it; but
the fact that it was believed and set down in contemporary
memoirs is shockingly significant.
Sartorius had secured the election of all the ministerial
candidates, with the exception of twelve, to the Cortes that met
in October, 1851. On account of their supposed unanimity
they were nicknamed the Family Congress; but Chambers,
Court, and Country alike had grown weary of the strong hand
that controlled them. Narvaez' characteristic impatience of
contradiction had grown upon him ; even friendly representation
he received with violent outbreaks of temper; and those who
were most anxious to work with him found it well-nigh impos-
sible to brook his haughty imperiousness. The retirement of
Bravo Murillo had crippled the ministry. The Queen-dowager,
though she owed everything to Narvaez, opposed him with a
stubbornness equal to his own, and seized the opportunity to
increase his unpopularity. In January, 1851, he resigned.
The results of Narvaez' retirement are summed up by
Andrés Borrego, annalist of the turbulent age in which he
played a second-rate but respectable part. “Since 1843,” he
says, “the Moderado party had become accustomed to follow
the Duke of Valencia (Narvaez) by any road he might choose
to lead them. It had surrendered its principles to a man.
VIII] Fall of Narvaez. Murillo in power 219
The man disappeared and nothing was left.” It was indeed
impossible to find anybody of like authority to replace him ;
but the choice of the Queen, directed by her mother, fell at any
rate on an honest politician. The late Minister of Finance,
Bravo Murillo, belonged to the dynastic party which aimed at
limiting the power of the elective Chamber ; and it was among
this party that he chose his colleagues. For himself, he took
the Ministry of Finance as well as the Presidency of the
Council, and determined to carry out the reforms he had
prepared whilst he belonged to the late Cabinet. Steady oppo-
sition, however, obliged him to dissolve the refractory Cortes
(April, 1851); at the same time he made some changes in
his Cabinet; and the Marquis of Miraflores became Minister
for Foreign Affairs. The election was managed in the usual
way; and its result was the return of a neo-Catholic, Conser-
vative, and Royalist Chamber devoted to the ministry. Already
all important posts were held by its friends. General Fer-
nando Fernandez de Córdova had replaced O’Donnell as
inspector-general of cavalry. The embassy in Paris was held
by Donoso Cortés, the prophet of the new Catholicism, who
had acquired a reputation for almost supernatural wisdom by
interpreting without acknowledgment the doctrines of Joseph
de Maistre to his admiring countrymen. It seemed as though
nothing need be feared from the once-formidable Progressives,
but that the ministry, professedly devoted to altar and throne,
might safely undo the work of many revolutions.
Bravo Murillo's financial reforms were accepted without
question. They consisted roughly of cutting down liabilities
to the possibilities of resources. It was laid down as an axiom
that no new debts must be incurred, and no promises of
payment made beyond those that were capable of fulfilment.
The three per cent. loans were recognised in full; but the four
and five per cent. loans suffered a reduction of interest and of
capital. Seventy-four million pounds of the debt were classed
as “deferred ” until better days. In spite of the arbitrary
22O Conservative A'ule (1843—1854) [CH.
nature of these “reforms,” and the storm of protest they raised
abroad, their evident honesty created on the whole a favour-
able impression. It was more advantageous to receive pay-
ment, however small, than merely to have interest added to
capital as bonds that could never be redeemed. Eight hun-
dred thousand pounds a year were assigned to the foreign
creditors of Spain.
More important still was the Concordat with the Holy See,
signed in October, 1851. Though violated by successive
revolutions, and constantly modified in a more liberal direc-
tion, it is still the basis of the relations between Church
and State. In its original form it was a complete surrender
by the State after eighteen years of painful disagreement.
It may be well to recapitulate here, though they have been
mentioned under the years in which they befel, the successive
steps in the quarrel. At the outset of Isabel’s reign the
Church, whilst preferring to observe a neutral attitude in
the dynastic dispute, had placed its power at the service of
Don Carlos. In 1834 the Spanish Government had retaliated
by suppressing convents guilty of giving aid to the Pretender,
and all religious houses containing fewer than twelve persons.
The property of the suppressed convents was confiscated ; the
temporalities of sees whose occupants had joined the Pretender
were seized; and orders were sent to the bishops to prevent the
priests under their charge from encouraging rebellion. In
1835 the Jesuit Order was suppressed. In 1836, a Radical
ministry being in office, the whole of the regular orders
were declared illegal, and their property was confiscated. Ex-
ceptions were made in favour of the missionary, teaching, and
nursing orders. In 1837 the tithe was suppressed; and the
property of the secular clergy was taken over by the State,
which made itself responsible for their maintenance. During
the years 1838–1840 the Conservatives, seeking reconcilia-
tion, promoted schemes for reendowment of the Church.
In the latter year the Progressives swept away their work. In
VIII] The Concordat of 1851 22 I
1845 a settlement had been attempted; but the demands of
Rome were such that they were refused by Narvaez in spite of
his eagerness to secure the recognition of Queen Isabel. A
new Pope, a European revolution, and Spain's efforts on
behalf of Pius IX, produced a more conciliatory spirit. In
1847 an apostolic delegate was sent to Madrid. Next year
a commission was appointed to study the bases of a Con-
cordat. In 1849 the submissive Cortes granted to the ministry
authority to conclude a Concordat without previously sub-
mitting its terms to themselves. Thus, after years of struggle,
the decision of a question that had radically divided Spaniards
was abandoned to a ministry of avowed retrograde tendencies.
The result was as follows.
The chief clauses of the Concordat agreed upon provided
* , ) that the Catholic religion, to the exclusion of all others,
remains the sole religion of Spaniards, and shall ever be main-
tained as such; (§ 2) that education, public and private, shall
conform to the doctrines of the Church; (§ 3) that bishops
and other ministers of religion shall be aided by the public
powers in their efforts against the wickedness of those who
seek to pervert the Faith, and in suppressing harmful books;
(§ 4) that they shall enjoy full ecclesiastical freedom as
defined by canon law; (§ 38) that the endowment of the
Church shall consist of the property restored to it by the
law of 1845, of the funds raised by the sale of indulgences
under the bull of Holy Crusade, of the revenue of the master-
ships and commanderies of the medieval orders of religious
knighthood, and of the proceeds of a tax on rural and urban
property sufficient for the proper maintenance of the Church
and collected by the State tax-gatherers; and that the property
of the Church not included in the law of 1845 shall be sold and
the proceeds handed over to the clergy in three per cent.
bonds; (§ 41) that the Church shall have full authority to
acquire and hold property both real and personal in the
future.
222 Conservative Rule (1843–1854) [CH.
Some ancient dioceses were abolished, and some new ones
created, in accordance with the needs of the population. The
orders of St Vincent de Paul and St Philip Neri were permitted
to found religious houses in Spain. In return for all these
concessions, the Pope recognised in carefully guarded language
the validity of sales of Church property previous to the
date of the above Concordat. The moral validity of these
sales was however purposely left ambiguous; the faithful must
settle the question with their own consciences. The main-
tenance of the clergy, charged on the budget, was fixed at
about one million and a quarter sterling a year; salaries
ranged from that of the Archbishop of Toledo, 24, 18oo, to that
of a village priest, 24, 22 a year. Thus the Church became
once more independent of the State; education was handed
over to its charge ; and the Spanish Crown gave up many
ancient rights. Yet there were still many who would have
gone still further, taking back the Church lands from the
buyers and restoring the tithe.
The confiscation of the estates of the Church proved
without doubt in the end an economic good. It freed well-
nigh one-third of the real estate from stagnation. But the
sum that came into the Treasury was ridiculously small.
Frauds on a very large scale were committed ; insecurity of
tenure—for it was known that the Carlists, if victorious, would
annul the sales—together with the scarcity of money, kept
prices low. Four or five years’ purchase of a very low rental
was the average amount realised. Haste to realise profit
caused much deforesting and further increased the aridity of
rural Spain. When at last the sales were completed, the
number of landowners had vastly increased ; but mal-
administration, coupled with fraud, had frittered away a
capital that would, as Mendizabal had seen, have sufficed
to pay the National Debt.
The Cortes were sitting, and the policy of the Government
was under discussion, when the news of Louis Napoleon's
VIII] Attempt on the Queen's life 223
coup d'état threw Madrid into a state of wild excitement. The
sittings were suspended ; the budget was approved without
discussion; and Bravo Murillo, made reckless by fear, gagged
the press and imprisoned without trial all who ventured to
question his autocratic methods. The army showed signs
of restlessness; Generals Prim and Ortega were removed from
the capital. Minister after minister resigned; but still the
President clung to office, and reconstructed his shattered
Cabinet.
For a moment public attention was withdrawn from politics
by an attempt on the Queen's life. Her eldest daughter and
namesake was born on Dec. 20, 1851. On February 2 of the
following year the Queen was about to proceed in state to
the Church of Atocha to give thanks for her safe delivery,
when she was stabbed, in the midst of her Court, in the grand
corridor of the palace. The would-be murderer was a priest
named Martin Merino, more than sixty years old. A man
of pure life, charitable and witty, he had become crazed with
Liberal doctrines, disordered vanity, and bilious disease. He
suffered death for his crime. Isabel, though severely wounded,
would have saved his life; she was ever merciful. The rumour
that, before his death, he implicated persons in high positions
was officially denied. No shadow of evidence has ever been
produced to connect Merino's crime with the plot to give
the throne of Spain to an Orleans prince.
The Queen's danger and courage revived for a moment her
popularity; but it was soon drowned again in a storm of
scandal. Railway speculation was at its fiercest. The
Government granted concessions and guaranteed six per cent.
interest. The Queen-dowager and her husband were known
to have made large sums by corrupt use of influence. The
work of government became daily more difficult, and Bravo
Murillo's methods more arbitrary. When the Cortes met
(Dec. 1, 1852), the ministerial nominee for the Presidency
of the Chamber was defeated by Martinez de la Rosa.
224 Conservative Aºule (1843—1854) [CH.
Armero and Miraflores had quitted the Cabinet during the
SUIII) IQ61.
Bravo Murillo felt that power was slipping from him, but
nevertheless he issued (Dec. 2) his proposal for revision of the
Constitution. Frankly reactionary, it aimed at extensions of
the royal prerogative and further limitations of the franchise.
Even Pidal, a leader among Conservatives, declared it to
imply complete abolition of the representative system. The
Moderado committee described it in a manifesto as calculated
to destroy the whole fabric of the Constitution, to rob the
nation of the safeguard of an annual budget, to give to the
ministry power to legislate without cooperation of the Cortes,
to render the discussions of the Cortes secret by closing the
doors of the Houses, and to prevent the amendment by
Parliament of ministerial bills. Public discussion of this
project was forbidden.
Even at the palace the danger of this attempt to rival
Napoleon's coup d'état was seen ; and Cristina opposed it.
Narvaez was called in for consultation; but Bravo Murillo
sent him to examine the military archives at Vienna. But by
this time the Moderado committee, Concha, O'Donnell, Rivas,
Mon, Pidal, and San Luis, were working with the Progressives
under Mendizabal and Olózaga to overthrow a ministry
without adherents. Bravo Murillo had dissolved the Cortes
immediately after presenting his great proposal; he had
forbidden meetings of electors and had threatened that
“though he wore but a tail-coat, he would hang generals
in their own sashes.” But he was incapable of fulfilling his
bold words; he stood alone against the Court, the Moderados,
and the Progressives; and he was forced to resign (Dec. 14, 1852).
The projected reform of the Constitution was, in fact,
little more than an attempt to codify and legalise actual
practice; but Spain was swayed by words rather than by facts.
The Liberal forms must be maintained; and the Court re-
nounced its dangerous alliance with Bravo Murillo, not
VIII] Ministeria/changes. A'epressive measures 225
because it disapproved of his aims, but because his methods
were too straightforward. His successor, General Roncali,
took two other generals into his stop-gap ministry. The
scheme for extending the authority of the Crown was not
abandoned; but it was deemed prudent to make some con-
cessions at first to Liberal opinion. Accordingly the severity
of the decrees that controlled the press was relaxed; and
a promise was given that no alteration in the Constitution
should be made without the assent of the new Cortes.
They met on March 1, 1853. The ministerial majority in
favour of reform numbered 250; the Opposition mustered 44
Moderates and 19 Progressives. According to Spanish ideas
the return of so large an Opposition was well-nigh a victory, for
O'Donnell, Serrano, Mon, Pidal, Ros de Olano, and the rest
represented a formidable body of public opinion. The minis-
try had raised a loan at nine per cent. guaranteed upon the
revenues of Cuba; they had appointed a new batch of Senators
pledged to support them ; but their arrangements for long
tenure of power proved useless. In the midst of the discussion
of their somewhat colourless proposal for constitutional reform
General Concha made a fierce attack on the railway conces-
sions, in which Salamanca and Queen Cristina were implicated.
Parliament was at once prorogued; and the ministry which had
been unable to protect those in high places was dismissed
(April 12, 1853).
The succeeding Cabinet of nobodies under the influence
of Queen Cristina and the nominal leadership of General
Lersundi disappeared in September, leaving even less trace
of its existence. Dangers were growing thick when the ex-
journalist Sartorius, now Count of San Luis, was called to
power. He made a bold effort to save the tottering throne,
first by concession, and when that failed, by repression of
a kind to which even Spain was unaccustomed. He began
by recalling Narvaez, conferring commands on Some of the
Opposition generals, and reopening the Cortes. But the question
C. S. I5
226 Conservative Rule (1843—1854) [CH.
of the railway concessions was brought up again. The Opposi-
tion made honesty its watchword; and San Luis had a desperate
cause to defend. A proposal in the Senate that railway con-
cessions should be granted only by Parliament, and not as
heretofore by decree, was recognised as an indirect attack on
the Queen-dowager; and San Luis was obliged to oppose a
reasonable and necessary reform. The ministry was defeated;
the Cortes were prorogued ; and compulsion was resorted to.
All functionaries who had voted with the Opposition were
dismissed; many senators were deprived; Generals O’Donnell,
Serrano, Zabala, and the brothers Concha were banished ; the
budget was passed by decree. A forced anticipation of
taxation roused indignation to its highest pitch.
Distrust and alarm grew daily; the wildest schemes, even a
pan-Iberian kingdom, were discussed. The gagged newspapers
of Madrid issued (Dec. 29, 1853) a blank sheet to indicate
that they were prevented from expressing or directing opinion.
The Queen was living in retirement awaiting her confinement;
it is said that San Luis carefully concealed from her the state
of public feeling. Nevertheless on Jan. 13, 1854, eight days
after the birth of her child, a manifesto was laid before her
bearing the signature of many senators, deputies, grandees,
officials, and men of wealth and position, in fact the whole
Liberal party. It pointed out that for years past the budget
had not been submitted to the Cortes as the law directed ; that
meetings of the Cortes were rendered futile by prorogation
following immediately upon opposition ; that the deficit in the
public accounts was ever growing; and that the railway con-
cessions had given rise to scandals. The reopening of the
Cortes with a view to the redress of these evils was de-
manded.
The reply given to this petition was the proclamation of
a state of siege in Madrid, and the banishment of all leaders of
the Opposition to the colonies or abroad. The result was
inevitable. Constitutional methods had failed; and the coming
VIII] Preparations for revolt 227
revolution was directed by men of high character and position.
Its military leader was General O’Donnell, who owed his
advancement and his title of Count of Lucena to success
in the Carlist War. Hitherto he had not been reckoned
among Progressives; he had opposed Espartero, and had
aided in the restoration of Queen Cristina. He had been
governor of Cuba and, later, inspector-general of infantry
under Narvaez. This post he had held till 1851, when he
joined the Opposition in the Senate. He was now in hiding in
Madrid. His most active and able lieutenant was the civilian
Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, statesman and historian, whose
opinions have been so often quoted in this book.
Whilst the plans of the conspirators were maturing, and
Cánovas was recruiting adherents in all classes of society,
a military revolt broke out in Saragossa. Energetically
repressed, it served only to put the Government on its guard.
Police precautions were redoubled, but the ground was every-
where undermined ; the authorities were powerless against the
nation. On April 26, 1854, appeared at Madrid the first
number of a mysterious newspaper calling itself The Bat (E/
Murciélago). Within its black-edged border it contained state-
ments, in the plainest of language, of facts that had hitherto
been whispered only. Dropping vague accusations it charged
Salamanca, the Duke of Rianzares, his wife, the Queen-
dowager, and San Luis himself, with corruption, mentioning
times, circumstances, and the sums involved, with a precision
that could hardly fail to carry conviction. The Bat was
secretly printed, by whom was never discovered ; copies of
it were sent to the Queen and the ministers. On June 4 Isabel
herself was attacked. “Her faithful subjects,” said The Bat,
“Sorrow because her name cannot be pronounced without
contempt, some are thinking of Pedro V (the King of
Portugal), some of Montpensier.” A week later appeared
the last and most scandalous number of all. The Queen's
favourite was named; and the steps of his promotion were
I 5–2
228 Conservative Rule (r343—1854) [CH.
carefully reviewed. A scheme of Queen Cristina's to increase
her fortune with connivance of the Treasury was exposed.
Fear fell upon Madrid; everybody was waiting for the crash
to come. The Queen was at La Granja; and a portion of the
garrison had been enlisted in the cause of the revolution.
June 15 had been fixed; but the explosion was postponed,
in order that its organisation might be more complete, till
June 28. On that morning General O’Donnell met General
Dulce’s cavalry brigade, leaving the capital to exercise beyond
the suburbs, and called upon it to join him to overthrow the
ministry. The soldiers acclaimed him ; none took advantage
of the permission to withdraw formally granted to any who
disapproved of their enterprise. Having made their pronun-
ciamiento, and being joined by volunteers from Madrid, the
troops marched to Alcalá de Henares, the university city a few
leagues distant. Thence their leader addressed to the Queen
a demand for a change of ministry, the assembly of Cortes,
and abandonment of the forced loan. Meanwhile revolutionary
pamphlets were distributed broadcast; and the agitation was
fostered in Madrid by Cánovas and his assistants. The Queen
and San Luis hurried back.
Isabel's first plan was to ride out to the revolted troops and
recall them to their allegiance. This bold scheme might have
succeeded, but it involved a great risk; and, even if the soldiers
submitted, the ministry must be sacrificed. Instead a state
of siege was proclaimed; the insurgent generals were outlawed;
and the Queen reviewed the portion of the garrison that
remained faithful. She placed herself under its protection
and sent it out under General Blaser, the Minister for War, to
fight the rebels. O'Donnell refused an offer of pardon con-
ditional upon giving up General Dulce; and the opposing
forces met at Vicálvaro on the outskirts of Madrid (June 30,
1854). The action was neither bloody nor decisive. Blaser
had artillery but no cavalry; O'Donnell had only cavalry; but
his success was sufficient to induce many waverers to join the
VIII] Progress of the revolt 229
cause. Next day he marched to Aranjuez, so as to keep open
his communications with the south, the quarter from which he
expected reinforcements. Though he failed to seize Toledo,
and Blaser followed him close, he was so well assured of
success that he replied to another conciliatory message by
stating conditions which he knew that the Queen could not
accept.
Hitherto the Radicals of Madrid had remained quiet,
awaiting the issue of the struggle between the two wings of
the Conservative party. The declaration of the generals, that
they would not lay down their arms until the ministry had
been dismissed and public opinion satisfied by conformity to
the principles of liberty, justice, and morality, had been too
vague to rouse enthusiasm. It was left to Cánovas to win them
over to the revolution by the “Programme of Manzanares.”
Issued in the name of O'Donnell and his fellow-generals, its
purport was clear and its proposals definite. “We desire,” it
ran, “the preservation of the throne, but without camarilla
to dishonour it ; we desire the exact fulfilment of the funda-
mental laws and their improvement, especially in the matters of
representation and the press; we desire that taxation be
rendered less heavy by strict economy; we desire that in civil
and military appointments seniority and good Service should
have weight ; we desire to save the provinces from the cen-
tralisation that is eating them up, by giving them the self-
government necessary for the preservation and increase of
their special interests; and, to guarantee all, we desire, and
will place on a firm footing, the national militia.” The last
clause, addressed to the Radical mob, changed the character
of the revolution. Madrid rang with cries of “Death to the
ministers Death to Queen Cristina | * The great towns
were electing juntas ; it was clear that this was no longer
a mere military revolt, to be appeased by a change of ministry.
But it was not until July 17 that San Luis realised his position
and resigned.
23O Conservative Aºule (1843—1854) [CH.
His fall was greeted with rapture; the Hymn of Riego was
played at the bull-fight after an interval of eleven years; bells
were rung; the reviving national militia built barricades; the
mob wrecked the houses of Queen Cristina, San Luis, and his
colleagues. General Fernando Fernandez de Córdova, hastily
appointed President of the Council, failed to restore order;
and for ten days the capital was in the hands of the rioters.
The late ministers, the camarilla, and the Court favourites fled
or went into hiding; the Queen was prevented from following
their example by the representations of the foreign ambassa-
dors. Bad news came from the provinces. Valladolid,
Barcelona, and Saragossa had joined the revolution. It was
clear that only by yielding could the Crown be saved.
Immediate assembly of the Cortes and liberty of the press
were promised. Córdova was replaced by Rivas, but con-
tinued to hold the ministry for war. The Marquis of Perales,
a trusted Liberal, was made governor of Madrid. Brigadier
Garrigé, a revolutionary Officer captured at Vicálvaro, was
pardoned and promoted. He went about among the barri-
cades to stay the fight between the soldiers and the citizens
who were storming them. On the 19th a junta of “Safety,
Armament, and Defence of Madrid" was elected. It was
recognised by the Queen; it included a number of respectable
citizens; and its president was General Evaristo de San Miguel,
a recognised leader of the Liberal party since 1820.
The declared objects of the junta were “to give a success-
ful direction to the popular movement, to restrict bloodshed,
and to save the institutions trampled on by the most barbarous
and unheard-of tyranny.” By proclamation “it immortalised
the great deeds that had saved liberty and public morality.”
It redeemed O’Donnell's promise to his troops by granting the
discharges and promotions. It decreed the suppression of the
Council of State, really an independent body, but supposed
to be guilty of Conservative leanings; it ordered all public
monies to be paid into the account of the junta. San Miguel
VIII] Overthrow of the ministry 23 I
was now Captain-General of New Castille and Universal
Minister pending the arrival of Espartero. The insurrection,
intended to merely overthrow an unpopular ministry, had
shattered the fabric of the State. San Miguel and his junta
formed but a feeble barrier between the Queen and the mob.
Espartero was appointed President of the Council; and
immediately the fighting in the streets ceased. It had not
been very fierce, for the Madrid mob is not bloodthirsty. The
army reckoned 23 killed and 125 wounded, the citizens 7o
killed and 3oo wounded. They now fraternised on the 284
barricades that obstructed the streets, “stout pedestals of
liberty,” as they were styled by a newspaper of the time.
Comic incidents had been innumerable. A bull-fighter named
Pucheta, the doughty leader of the patriots of Lavapiés, the
Seven Dials of Madrid, commanded three thousand men and
presided over an opposition junta. He seized the powder
magazine and dismissed the carbineers who guarded one of
the gates of the city. After relieving their feelings by execu-
ting a deservedly unpopular officer of police, the astute patriots
found means to turn their position to profit. They started an
office and reaped a rich harvest by granting safe-conducts in
the name of the people to those whom fear impelled to leave
Madrid. The reigning favourite was among those who paid
the tax. San Luis, the autocratic minister, had gone forth
attired as a valet.
When the Radicals adopted the Programme of Manzanares
all eyes turned to Logroño, where the ex-Regent was living in
retirement. But the Queen's summons found Espartero no
longer at home. He had already plunged into the revolution
by accepting at Saragossa the presidency of a junta whose
programme was even more revolutionary than that of Man-
zanares. On July 26 Barcelona made its pronunciamiento; and
its governor, Concha, Marqués del Duero, in order to save
bloodshed, took the presidency of the junta. Seville had
already joined the revolution. General Blaser, finding himself
232 Conservative Rule (1843–1854) [CH.
no longer obeyed, handed over his authority to the next of
rank, whereupon his troops joined their late opponents under
O'Donnell. Espartero was now in a position to dictate terms.
It is believed that he might have made himself King of Spain
at this time. But, after hesitating for some days, waiting,
according to his wont, upon events and receiving assurances
from the Queen that his intervention would be accepted with
due submission, he came to Madrid.
He received a delirious welcome. Met by the junta, he
answered its complimentary address with foolish vanity:
“Men of Madrid, you have summoned me to establish for
ever the liberties of our land. Here I am ; and if the enemies
of our most holy liberty would snatch it from us, with the
sword of Luchana I will put myself at your head, at the head
of all Spaniards, and will show you the way to glory !” He
entered the capital standing in an open landau and spreading
his arms abroad as though he would fold in one embrace the
thousands of noisy patriots who seethed around him. A
foreign acquaintance relates that he underwent a kind of
transfiguration, “his heavy form and dark complexion seemed
to leave him. Friends and foes alike were seized with an
indescribable emotion. Suddenly he had been invested with
the dignity of an inspired spirit sent to save Spain from
the rack of civil dissolution.” Thus he was drawn in a kind
of juggernaut procession to the palace to be received by the
Queen.
Until his arrival Isabel was, in fact, the prisoner of the
revolutionaries. They had not laid down their arms or quitted
their barricades gay with the portraits of the people's general,
and, after her submission, of the Queen. Her proclamation
regretting “the deplorable mistakes that had caused absurd
distrust of me,” and praising the sacrifices made in the cause
of liberty, had been received with distrust or derision. In
order to escape from one bondage she was obliged to enter
into another hardly less injurious to her dignity. Her
VIII] Espartero dictator 233
interview with Espartero lasted only a few minutes, for the
patriots, who kept watch and ward over the palace, howled
for the reappearance of their chief. Already she had promised
that her whole household should be changed and that Con-
stituent Cortes should be convoked. She now made over
all her powers to Espartero to do as he thought best.
Espartero had no plans. To all questions as to his pro-
posed course of action he gave but one answer, “Let the
will of the nation be fulfilled.” This phrase, which for a
time served to cloak his irresolute time-serving, soon became
a subject of mockery. A man who knew his own mind was
coming to share his triumph. O’Donnell reached Madrid
a day after Espartero. He too was welcomed by the junta;
and his first care was to pay his respects to the hero of the
hour. Their embrace, in sight of the multitude, was supposed
to betoken the fusion of the two parties, the Parliamentary-
Conservative and the Progressive, that had made the revo-
lution. For the moment O’Donnell was obliged to content
himself with the second place. Refusing the governorship of
Cuba and the Foreign Office, he claimed the War Office,
in which he could make his power felt. The revolution
which had imperilled the throne, and for which he had com-
bated hitherto, had resulted in a manner widely different
from his hopes and expectations; but O’Donnell could be
patient and dissemble. His object was to regain the con-
fidence of the Queen and to get rid of Espartero, whose
advancement he had unwittingly served. It took him just
two years to do it.
Thus fell, rotted from within, the party which under
Narvaez and Bravo Murillo had governed Spain for ten
years. It had stood the shock of the European revolution
of 1848, crushed Carlist rebellion, and braved the displeasure
of Great Britain; it had quieted consciences by the Concordat,
and gratified Spanish pride by intervention in Portugal and
Italy. The methods, it is true, were harsh; but Spain revived,
234 Conservative Rule (1843—1854) [CH. VIII
and her prosperity increased under its strong hand. The
project of constitutional reform was intended to formulate
the necessary prerogative of the Crown and to rally the
Conservatives, who had hitherto been Carlists, to the dynasty.
Bravo Murillo failed to see that the only safe basis for the
throne outside a military dictatorship was the good-will of
the Progressives. Two short ministries followed, whilst
parties were so broken up that it was impossible to find a
foundation for a durable Cabinet. Then came San Luis,
whose adoption of the Opposition programme served only
to alienate his own party. His attempt to govern in oppo-
sition to the Cortes, the army, and the country, collapsed
before the cry of dishonesty. A revolution made by Con-
servatives made the chief of the Progressives arbiter.
CHAPTER IX.
THE BIENNIUM (1854–1856).
THE melodramatic embrace of O’Donnell and Espartero
inaugurated an abortive Liberal Union, or coalition of the
moderate and the advanced Liberals. The party overthrown
by the revolution, the party which but a few days before had
been seemingly all-powerful, had, as was usual in like circum-
stances, utterly disappeared. Its leader had fled; its rank and
file had gone over to the enemy; those who so lately had
struggled to make themselves conspicuous were now most
anxious to escape attention until their connexion with a lost
cause should have slipped from the short memory of a troubled
age. Meanwhile the victors of the hour were neither satisfied
nor unanimous. The revolution planned and carried out by
the Moderates had turned to the advantage of the Progressives
and their leader, Espartero, who, coming at the eleventh hour,
had been thrust by the sovereign people into the first place.
Only he could lay the Lord of Misrule, who in the shape of
Pucheta triumphed in the streets of the capital. Writing many
years later, Cánovas del Castillo summed up the situation with
his usual lucidity and with rare frankness. “The Progressives,”
he says, “had unexpectedly and rapidly passed from the
position of half-hearted auxiliaries to that of victorious leaders.”
The Moderates had indeed overthrown and put to flight the
Court and clerical faction; but by resorting to intrigue, sedition,
and military revolt they had forfeited their chief title to respect
as well as the confidence of the Queen. The result had been
236 The Biennium (1854–1856) [CH.
to place in power a party scarcely less odious to them than the
late ministry.
The first task to which the new Government turned its
attention was the division of spoils. In the civil service a
complete change of office-holders was at once carried out. A
most disturbing and dangerous element in Spanish social and
political life is formed by the cesantes, ex-office-holders, de-
prived of their livelihood so long as their party is out of power.
Starvation makes them unscrupulous as to the means they
employ to bring back to power those on whom they depend.
The prospect of hard times makes their opponents equally
unscrupulous as to the means by which they prolong the days
of salaried idleness in public employment. On this occasion
the cesantes had been languishing for years, while others, not
more worthy, fattened on the budget. At length they were
gratified by a heroic effort on the part of their superiors to
compensate them for their notable activity in the cause of the
revolution by entering, as nearly as possible, an eleven-year-old
list of public servants.
The army, too, claimed fulfilment of promises made to
secure its support in a moment of danger. Promotion was
given to all officers who had helped the cause ; it signified no
more than the additional annual charge of some millions of
reals on the already overloaded budget. But, now that the late
foes had discovered that from the first they had all been fight-
ing in the sacred cause of liberty, it was invidious to make
distinctions; so all alike were promoted. The same generous
course was pursued towards the rank and file, whose political
perceptions had been quickened by the prospect of a remission
of two years of enforced service. Thus the army which had
deserved so well of the country lost half its private soldiers, but
was strengthened by a corresponding increase in its already
large establishment of colonels and generals. Dulce, Echagüe,
Ros de Olano, Serrano, Infante, and Manuel Concha received
“the just reward of their services” in the shape of high military
Ix] Zivision of the spoils 237
commands at home. José Concha went as Governor-General
to Cuba. When all this was settled, there remained the many
“supreme” provincial juntas that had sprung up at the call of
those who now found themselves invested with the responsi-
bilities of government. The juntas had made full use of their
“supremacy”; they had legislated on matters involving the
widest principles, as well as on those of purely local interest;
and their efforts had produced a crop of thirty-eight new
generals. Roughly to abolish the juntas and their works would
be to risk another and a still more violent demonstration of its
rights by the sovereign people. It was wisely decided to
temporise, and to let the local politicians enjoy a little longer
the delirious delights of independence. So proclamation was
made in the Queen's name to the juntas, commanding them not
to hinder the new executive, but to continue their patriotic
labours in cooperation with it, enlightening it with their councils
until such time as the Cortes should decide to what uses the
people's victory should be turned.
A still more difficult question, and one on which the Liberal
union was nearly wrecked at the outset, was that which con-
cerned the Queen-mother. Her corrupt influence had been
cited as the abundant justification of disloyalty; against her
The Bat had piled up its Scurrilous charges, representing her as
a rapacious and shameless Jezebel. The patriots had readily
believed the story; and, now that Queen Cristina was in their
power, they not unnaturally demanded that her many crimes
should be punished. But this seemingly obvious course led
directly to one of two dangers. If Queen Cristina were put
upon her trial before the Cortes, and the charges were proved
against her, there was reason to fear that the blow might bring
down the tottering throne. If, on the other hand, the charges
were not proved, they might overwhelm those who had brought
them ; and suspicion might be aroused that motives other than
pure zeal for public and private morality had influenced the
leaders of Vicälvaro. The most ready way out of the difficulty
238 The Biennium (1854–1856) [CH.
would be for Queen Cristina to escape abroad. But the
excited mob, fearful of losing its intended victim, declared that
justice must be done, and that he who aided the ex-Regent to
quit the country would be “the first to cast filth upon the
splendid banner hoisted by Manzanares and Saragossa.” This
threat came from a powerful body of extreme Radicals pledged
to secure effective sovereignty of the people, a single tax,
abolition of conscription and of capital punishment, and a
national militia. But, even if the ministry had been willing to
take the risk of connivance at Cristina's flight and to break
their solemn promise “not to let her go by day or by night
furtively,” this path was barred ; for Cristina would not “go
furtively.” She had saved her life, her family, and her jewels
by cool daring. A revolution was no new incident in her life;
she refused to quit Madrid otherwise than with the dignity
befitting her rank. So the ministers were obliged to take
formal leave of her before she set out for Portugal, accompanied
by a guard of honour.
A howl of baffled rage went up from the patriots when they
found that their intended victim had marched out with flying
colours. The leaders of the Radical clubs, with the noble
demagogue Orense at their head, accused Espartero of be-
traying the popular cause ; and for a few hours it looked as
if Madrid would appoint leaders from among the extreme
Radicals to carry out its will. Repression would have been im-
possible for the “barn-door fowl” and the “peacock,” as Espartero
and O’Donnell were aptly nicknamed. They held power by the
grace of the mob; and those who had made could unmake them.
To the “peacock” at least the humiliation of submission to such
a tribunal was distasteful; nevertheless it had to be undergone.
The presidents of all the popular political clubs were invited to
the Home Office to lay their wishes before the assembled
ministers. The mob sulkily dispersed, pacified in some degree
by what it considered a proper demonstration of respect by the
ministers to their masters. Cristina's pension was for the
Ix] Departure of Cristina. Genera/e/ection 239
second time withdrawn, and her property confiscated. She
lost but little, for, profiting by experience, she had safely lodged
the bulk of her large fortune in Paris.
The revolution had not been democratic in the French
sense of the word. No country is less troubled by class
jealousies than Spain, where a perhaps overwhelming sense of
personal dignity has at any rate the corresponding advantage of
freeing its possessor from the galling consciousness of social
inferiority. Every popular movement since 1810 had numbered
among its adherents members of the old nobility; commoners
who fought in the cause of liberty incurred no reproach when
they accepted a title as part of the reward of their services.
But the radical differences of opinion that divided the coalition
now in power were apparent as soon as it became necessary
to decide whether the Constitution of 1837 (Progressive) or
that of 1845 (Moderate) should be the law of the land. The
Government reserved this question too for the decision of the
sovereign people; and intrigues filled up the interval before the
meeting of the Constituent Cortes (Nov. 8, 1854). A single
Chamber elected by universal suffrage must decide once more
the fate of Spain.
The Government ostentatiously refrained from pressure
during the elections, in order that the real will of the country
might be ascertained ; but the result proved only that the
majority was profoundly indifferent to the question which kept
the capital and some provincial towns in a fever of agitation.
In many electoral divisions the number of voters was ridicu-
lously small. The extreme Radicals had tried to leave the
question of the monarchy open, hoping that the election might
turn to the advantage of Espartero. But Espartero lacked
ambition, or perhaps nerve, to grasp the crown which was more
than once within his reach. He discouraged his followers who
wished to make him dictator or first consul, and allowed the
maintenance of the monarchy to be put beyond question by
the terms of the summons to Parliament. It was opened by
24O The Biennium (1854–1856) [CH.
Queen Isabel in person. She read a clever speech written
by Pacheco to suit a most difficult situation. Her voice,
tremulous at first, gathered strength as she went on ; and her
peroration was greeted with applause that showed that she was
still very dear to her people. The most significant sentences
were, “Recent events cannot be blotted out, nor disappear from
the page of time. But, though our hearts be still oppressed,
and our eyes still tearful, at the recollection of our disasters
and misfortunes, let us draw from them example and teaching
for the political life that is now opening before us. Perhaps
we have all done wrong; from to-day we will do better.”
The assembly to which this speech was addressed com-
prised a United-Liberal majority. The leaders were the two
brothers Concha, Serrano, San Miguel, Ros de Olano, and
Dulce among the generals, Cortina, Madoz, Rios Rosas, and
Pacheco, civilians. Taking the Programme of Manzanares as
the basis of its principles, it declared for the sovereignty of the
people, the throne of Isabel II, a citizen militia, and fiscal
reform. The party was supposed to include all but the
extremists on either hand. It was easy to foresee that the loose
bond of general principles would give way immediately the
Unionists were called upon to choose between the living
realities, O'Donnell and Espartero. Each had already the
nucleus of a personal following. The Progressives pure and
simple were grouped, to the number of about fifty, under
Salustiano de Olćzaga ; Progressive and Esparterist were in
those days convertible terms. The bond that held the Moderates
to the allegiance of O’Donnell was somewhat more lax; but he
could be sure of the support of the Ultramontanes under
Cándido Nocedal and Alejandro Castro when opposing any
Radical measure. Outside these more or less clearly defined
factions stood a group of some two dozen democrats, many of
them avowed Republicans, among them Estanislao Figueras,
member for Tarragona and afterwards first President of the
Spanish Republic. This was the tiny band of twenty-three
IX.] The Constitution of 1855 24. I
that voted against the maintenance of the monarchy when it
was carried at an early session by the overwhelming majority
of 206. On this occasion Prim, who afterwards overthrew
Isabel's throne, declared himself its champion and defender.
“I am,” he said in his usual braggart style, “as I have always
been, an upholder of the Constitutional Monarchy. My love
for Queen Isabel the Second is as it was in the days when
I fought for her on the field of battle and in the rostrum....
Note well my words against the day, should it ever come,
when the bullets are flying between us.”
The Chamber thus composed chose Espartero for President;
but the office, incompatible with that of President of the
Council, which he already held, finally fell to the vigorous
Liberal, Madoz. In an éarly session Salustiano de Olózaga
tried to tear off from the deputies their transparent uniform of
United-Liberalism and to show them as followers merely of one
or other of the rival generals. He proposed a vote of censure
upon the ministry for having failed to secure the objects aimed
at by the late revolution, excluding Espartero by name. But
Espartero, with his usual good faith, elected to stand or fall
with his colleagues, and hotly opposed the motion. It was lost
by a large majority; and the alliance had still eighteen months
to run. When it broke up, it left O’Donnell and not Espartero
at the head of affairs.
Controversy as to the adoption of one or other of the Con-
stitutions, with which the country had experimented since the
Royal Statute, ended by the resolution to draw up yet another
which should represent exactly the principles for which war
had so lately been waged. Accordingly a commission was
named, including Salustiano de Olózaga and Modesto Lafuente,
the historian, to draw up a project to be submitted to the
Constituent Cortes. The commission hurried on its labours;
it had a variety of models to choose from ; and by January,
1855, it was ready with its scheme.
Its first article declared that all public powers emanate from
C. S. I6
242 The Biennium (1854–1856) [CH.
the sovereign people—a proposition sure to commend itself to
the assembly for which it was intended. The next article,
however, dealt with highly controversial matter, by laying down
that “the Spanish nation undertakes to maintain and protect
the worship and the ministers of the Catholic Religion, which
the Spaniards profess.” It went on to enact that no persecu-
tion should be suffered by nonconformists, unless their non-
conformity was “manifested by acts contrary to religion.”
Wording so loose left the matter practically in the hands of
the tribunal called upon to define “acts contrary to religion”;
but the clause was supposed to involve the principle of religious
liberty, a principle abominable to the majority of Spaniards.
The question was hotly debated for fifteen days. Very few
deputies ventured to raise their voices in favour of thorough
liberty of conscience: the Progressives were whole-hearted in
their opposition to it. Articles guaranteeing the liberty of the
press and abolition of the death penalty for political offences
met with less opposition. For suspension of the constitutional
guarantees—the favourite weapon of unpopular ministries—a
special law of Parliament was made necessary instead of a mere
decree as heretofore. The scheme proposed, moreover, that
the Cortes should consist of a Senate of life-members nomi-
nated by the Crown, and a House of Deputies elected for three
years (by constituencies of 50,000 Souls). This, however, was
modified in accordance with the minority report presented by
Olózaga ; the Senate was made elective, its members being
subject to a property qualification and appointed for twelve
years instead of for life. It was enacted that one session at
least should take place in each year; and that, when the Cortes
were not sitting, their place should be taken by a Permanent
Commission. Provincial deputations and municipal assemblies
were created for local government. The law demanded that
taxes should be sanctioned by Parliament before collection;
and that the Cortes should fix each year the number of
recruits needed for the army.
Ix] Alaw for sale of Church Zand's 243
That this Constitution resembles the Radical one of 1837
much more closely than the Moderate one of 1845 shows that
the Progressive majority was still preponderant in the Consti-
tuent Cortes. But with the creative effort their strength
seemed to be exhausted. They were afraid of their own work,
and, after solemnly accepting the Constitution, they turned to
debating whether the Constitution should be promulgated at
once or should be withheld for a time. Thus reaction overtook
them ; without violent effort, a few short months undid the
pretentious but utterly unsubstantial structure raised in 1854.
The Constitution of 1855 was still-born ; it was never put into
practice.
The Constituent Cortes had not reached the end of their
first session when the inevitable collision between the Queen
and the Liberals who had saved the throne occurred. In May,
1855, a Bill was passed intended to settle once for all the
question of vinculated property. Often as it had been decided
to take over the property of the Church, reaction had hitherto
always come in time to save a part of it. This had been the
case in 1814, in 1823, and notably in 1843. The property
already sold represented a value of fifty-seven million pounds;
the part that still remained was estimated at a still larger sum.
With it were now included communal lands, and the vast
estates owned by the religious orders of chivalry, by guilds, by
charitable institutions, and by pious foundations endowed for
the everlasting welfare of souls. A new law provided that this
huge mass of property should be sold by auction in small
parcels so that the poorer classes might buy. Great facilities
were granted for payment. Only ten per cent. of the total
amount was demanded at the time of the sale; then eight per
cent. for each of the two following years; then for two more
years seven per cent. ; the remaining three-fifths of the price
was secured by a mortgage of six per cent. spread over a period
of ten years. By payment of a not exorbitant rent the peasant
would in fifteen years become owner of his farm. In so far as
I6—2
244 The Biennium (1854–1856) [CH.
it took over the property of the Church this was no new
measure ; but the powerful party that regarded as sacrilegious
and subversive the guarantee of the impending Constitution
that no Spaniard or foreigner should be persecuted for his
opinions so long as they were not manifested by acts contrary
to the religion of the State, could hardly be expected to agree.
Moreover it had now something more than the old traditional
arguments to rely upon. Further spoliation of the Church
would be a flagrant violation of the Concordat solemnly made
between the Spanish nation and the Pope only four years
before. Against the plea that the Church had no further need
of estates now that the nation had undertaken to maintain its
worship and ministers, it might reasonably be urged that neither
was the Constitution in force, nor could those interested rely
upon the promises of a Government which was already taxing,
as pensions, the endowments guaranteed in the latest agreement
between Church and State.
When Espartero presented himself at Aranjuez, bringing
with him the Bill for the royal signature, Queen Isabel met
him with a steady refusal to sign. She had consulted the
Nuncio and had been persuaded that by carrying out what the
ministers represented as merely a necessary formality she would
imperil her soul. “I would rather abdicate,” she passionately
declared, “for then I should prove at least that I can sacrifice
myself for my faith; and God will count it in the balance for
the pardon of my sins.” Matters had now reached a deadlock.
While the ministry saw that it might become necessary to
declare the throne vacant since the Queen had refused her
consent to a measure duly passed by Parliament, the clerical
party was discussing the possibility of carrying off their royal
champion to the Basque Provinces, where she would certainly
be regarded as a martyr to the best of causes. Another Carlist
and religious war, as well as a complete break with Rome,
must result from the Queen's steadfastness in refusal. But at
length, after several conferences with the ministers on the one
Ix] The Queen accepts the Bil/ 245
hand and her spiritual advisers on the other, Isabel gave way
and signed the Bill, making a protest, as vigorous as was
consistent with safety, against the violence done to her con-
science. Nobody questioned the sincerity of her letter to the
Pope declaring that consent had been wrung from her only by
irresistible pressure, and that she would welcome the earliest
opportunity of undoing the impious deed.
Even after their champion had given way the clerical party
resisted the execution of the law. The bishops who protested
were exiled. The Pope broke off diplomatic relations; and
the Spanish ambassador left Rome declaring that, should his
Holiness refuse to listen to representations, “the ambassador
must regret the fatal blindness which would place the worthy
successor of St Peter in the position of enemy to a nation
which had ever counted its Christianity and Catholicity as its
chief glory.” In Spain attempted riots had to be suppressed;
and the appalling report that the crucifix in the Church of San
Francisco in Madrid had sweated blood was discredited only
after exposure of the crucifix itself to the gaze of the people, and
punishment of the authors of the false prodigy. Again it was
necessary for the Government to make its authority felt within
the Palace; and Sor Patrocinio was expelled, together with a
dozen other worthless members of the camarilla, in spite of a
ridiculously theatrical threat of armed resistance from the
King-consort.
Having momentarily checked Court and clerical intrigues,
the Government was free to face a difficulty from the opposite
quarter. High prices and the introduction of machinery had
provoked grave social and economic troubles, not only in
industrial and commercial centres like Barcelona, Saragossa,
and Valencia, but also in Old Castille, where crops and farm
buildings were burnt by the hungry peasantry. The national
militia had made itself conspicuous on almost every occasion
of disorder as the upholder of the popular cause against the
executive. Under the leadership of turbulent demagogues,
246 The Biennium (1854–1856) [CH.
freed from all restraint by the events of the past year, the
citizen army was fast making itself sole arbiter between class
and class. Interference was urgently necessary but was full of
danger. While the Progressive majority in the Cortes held to-
gether, it was useless to appeal to them to alter the constitution
of a force that was supposed to guarantee liberty. Accordingly
the ministry was forced to act in opposition to the known views
of the Cortes within a year of a revolution intended to sweep
away all hindrance to immediate execution of the clearly
expressed will of the majority. A decree suspended the
compulsory enrolment of every citizen of full age in the
militia ; individuals were left to decide whether they would
join or not; while provincial governors, creatures of the
ministry, became judges of their fitness. This so-called inter-
ference with the bulwark of freedom raised a tumult; five
members of the ministry resigned. The objectionable decree
was recalled; but the vacant portfolios were given to followers
of O’Donnell, and the Conservatives had gained a step.
The majority in the Cortes was still Progressive. After
replacing the moderate regulations for municipalities and pro-
vincial assemblies by the anarchical enactments of 1821; after
abolishing the octroi, the most productive but most unpopular
tax, and resorting to a forced loan in order to make up the
deficit ; after granting rewards and pensions to all who had
suffered for attempting revolution since the Radicals were last
in power eleven years before, and deciding that Liberals in
Government service should be allowed to count for seniority
and pensions years passed without employment, it suspended
its sittings (July 15, 1855). Many deputies went off to the
Paris Exhibition to repose after passing ninety-one laws, of
which at least half were made in the interest of individuals or
coteries. When they met again in October, Espartero was still
President of the Council; but all real power was rapidly slipping
from his grasp. He was the sole Progressive in the Cabinet
containing not only his rival but men as masterful as Alonso
Ix] Decay of Æspartero's influence 247
Martinez, a young lawyer, then at the outset of his long
political career. O'Donnell had taken advantage of Espartero's
inactivity to thrust his friends into every department of the
administration. He had cunningly regained his footing in the
Palace. A few hollow protestations of devotion had sufficed to
persuade the unwary Queen that the man who had brought
upon her so many dangers and humiliations was really her
best friend, eager to help her to shake off the bondage of the
self-righteous Liberals by whom she had been obliged to
violate the dictates of her conscience.
An organised campaign of ridicule and persistent belittle-
ment of Espartero speedily made an end of whatever authority
was left to him. His rough appearance, his lack of manners
and education, his pompous simplicity, and the childish
vanity, the love of applause that kept him continually
posturing before the patriots with his mouth full of bom-
bastic phrases, made him an excellent butt to the Padre Cobos
and other popular journals. Hiding a deep political purpose
under the comic mask they laughed away the results of the
revolution of 1855. The tendency of events provoked by
O'Donnell perhaps escaped the dull wits of Espartero ; but the
leading Radicals were not so candid or so blind. Olózaga, as
has already been mentioned, had done his best to break up the
one-sided alliance, while the Progressives were still strong
enough to act alone. He had withstood the Moderates in the
commissions of Finance and Revision of the Constitution, but
had failed because Espartero, refusing to see his own danger,
opposed him. So, too, Orense's attempt to make O'Donnell
responsible for disorders at Saragossa resulted in an over-
whelming vote of confidence in O’Donnell and a corresponding
increase of his influence. His followers included the most
respected politicians, Concha, Cortina, Rios Rosas, and
Collado. These formed the centro Aarlamentario, the most
stable group in the Chamber. Espartero's friends of the
centro progresista were still numerous; but their chief dis-
248 The Biennium (1854–1856) [CH.
couraged them by repeatedly disavowing their victories and
allowing himself to be supplanted everywhere. Nevertheless
the Constituent Cortes remained Progressive to the end; it was
not by an adverse vote that Espartero was fated to go out
of office for the last time. When the retirement of Alonso
Martinez made necessary a reconstruction of the Cabinet, and
the Progressive element was strengthened by the introduction
of Escosura and other Radicals, the deputies approved by I52
against 57 voices. O'Donnell's power had its foundation in
the Palace, not in the House of Representatives.
Famine had provoked agrarian riots round Valladolid and
other centres of Castille. Escosura, Minister of the Interior, was
sent to make enquiry and to suggest a remedy. His report
proved to be a Progressive manifesto. It was intended to
provoke a crisis; and in it O'Donnell recognised an indirect
attack upon himself. He and Escosura were old enemies; the
Progressives were not less eager than the Moderates to rule
alone. O'Donnell's plans were carefully laid, even his Cabinet
was prepared and awaiting to take office. The Queen's help
had been promised for the coup d'état. Accordingly Escosura's
challenge was taken up ; and O’Donnell informed the President
of the Council that it was impossible for a Cabinet to include
differences of opinion so wide as those that separated him
from his colleagues at the Home Office. Escosura had warned
Espartero of approaching danger, and had urged him to
appoint men on whom he could rely to the chief military
commands about the capital. But Espartero was convinced
that O’Donnell would attempt nothing without the consent
and approval of the Queen, who had only lately assured him
“that she would never forgive the trick played upon her
by O’Donnell and Dulce in 1854.” Accordingly, after a
sincere but unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the dissentient
members of the Cabinet, Espartero betook himself in all
confidence to the Queen and besought her to decide the
matter at issue. For himself he sought only to evade the
Ix] A'esignation of Espartero 249
responsibility of choice, and the consequent enmity of rejected
politicians. The three were received in audience together; and
Espartero, as President of the Council, explained the causes of
the disagreement between O’Donnell, the Minister for War,
and Escosura, the Minister of the Interior. He besought the
Queen to use her influence to save the Cabinet from the loss
of either of these two indispensable members. “If either of
them quits me,” he said, “I must resign too.” The Queen
then addressed O'Donnell, asking if no compromise were
possible. On receiving a negative answer she went on to say
that, being reluctantly obliged to choose, she accepted the
resignation of the Minister of the Interior. Escosura at once
turned to quit the council-chamber. “I will go too,” ex-
claimed Espartero. “O’Donnell will not desert me,” rejoined
the Queen; and the Duke of the Victory found himself outside
the door and no longer President of the Council (July 13,
1856).
O'Donnell had played a daring game, relying on Espartero's
irresolution. His Cabinet was already formed, and was actually
assembled when the expected news of Espartero's resignation
reached it. It contained Cantero, Pastor Diaz, Rios Rosas,
and Collado ; Alonso Martinez awaited a portfolio. Its
first act was to proclaim a state of siege throughout Spain.
There was a moment of wild excitement and uncertainty.
The national militia, some sixteen thousand strong, took arms
unbidden, and held for two days the centre of the capital
against the regulars under Serrano and Concha. The Cortes
were not sitting; but the Permanent Commission, twelve hours
after the announcement of the change of ministry, gathered
ninety-three deputies in the Congress House. Of these
eighty-one—among them Sagasta and Salmeron, later the
leaders of two divisions of the Radical party—passed a
resolution declaring the new ministry unworthy of the con-
fidence of the country. This resolution was forwarded by
a deputation to the Queen. But the deputation was refused
25O The Biennium (1854–1856) [CH.
admission to the Palace and treated as seditious by Rios Rosas,
the new Minister of the Interior. Indeed the resolution was
informal, if not illegal, for the eighty-one stalwart deputies did
not form a quorum. O'Donnell had been careful not to give
time for the Permanent Commission to summon the absent
deputies. Then another proposal was made, Calling upon
Espartero to take measures to defend the inviolability of the
Cortes; but Madoz, the President, refused to put it to the
House. While bombs were bursting in the immediate neighbour-
hood, a few devoted deputies still sat on, awaiting Espartero,
who never came. The officers of the national militia reported
that the cartridges of their men were spent ; they were bidden
to give up the useless struggle. At last the session was
declared closed, after notification that the date of the next
meeting of the Congress would be announced to each deputy
at his private address. The Constituent Cortes of 1855 never
met again.
Espartero never showed himself so utterly unfit for com-
mand as upon this, the last but one of the great opportunities
of his life. He had been warned by Escosura and could
easily have forestalled the plotters by changing the headquarter
staff of the army. His conduct was that of a coward. He
showed himself in the streets before fighting had actually
begun, and called for cheers for the national independence,
which was not threatened. Then, leaving his party to struggle
on or to lay down their arms without orders and without hope,
he went into hiding only to withdraw some days later un-
molested to his home at Logroño. He pleaded afterwards
that he was convinced that the Queen was so deeply involved
in the coup d'état that its failure would entail the fate of the
dynasty. That such was his conviction is quite credible; at
least he was guilty of allowing hundreds of lives to be lost for
want of a word of warning. So on the afternoon of July 15
and on the following day a desultory fight went on in the
streets of Madrid. The citizen militia lost heart and was
Ix] O'Donne/Z seizes power 25 I
everywhere worsted. On the 17th fighting was at an end; the
militia had dispersed; and the Provisional Deputation, for some
time the centre of resistance, had submitted to a decree of
suspension.
In the great provincial towns the course of events was
much the same as in the capital. The military commands
were in the hands of O’Donnell's officers, prepared to crush
any popular outbreak. This was not effected without a sharp
struggle at Saragossa; at Barcelona, where the killed and
wounded were reckoned at five hundred, the fight raged in
the streets for two whole days. But before the end of July
Spain had submitted to her new masters; and the biennium, the
two restless years following on the battle of Vicălvaro, was
being rapidly forgotten. O'Donnell was far from rancorous.
Nobody was punished for having taken up arms against him ;
the amnesty speedily proclaimed was a real one, and not,
as was often the case, a proscription of persons excluded by
name from its provisions. O'Donnell hoped to share his
power in amity with the Palace; he wished to appear to
the Queen as her rescuer from Radicals and atheists, and to
the people as their saviour from San Luis and his fantastic
absolutism. The people, short of money and cynically scep-
tical of politicians, allowed him to hold power and to keep the
peace for five years; but the Queen had not forgotten. As
Fernando Garrido, the reformer, put it: “O’Donnell attained
power by revolution, violence made the Queen accept him ;
when he tore the arms from the hands of the revolution he
himself was left defenceless.”
CHAPTER X.
O'DONNELL AND NARVAEZ. (1856–1858.)
RIOS ROSAs, the new Minister of the Interior, was the
working politician of O’Donnell's ministry. A Liberal, but a
Liberal of a very different type from his predecessor Escosura,
he immediately dissolved the Provincial and Municipal Coun-
cils, and modified their constitution so as to check their semi-
independent power. At the same time he restricted the liberty
of the press, and abolished the national militia throughout the
kingdom. The preamble to the decree enforcing this most
necessary reform demonstrated—as, indeed, it was easy to
demonstrate—that this turbulent force had ever been a source
of weakness, danger, and disorder. On September 2 followed
the dissolution of the Constituent Cortes, to which, as Rios
Rosas scathingly remarked, “Heaven denied the gifts of
wisdom and moderation.” Their principal work, the Con-
stitution of 1855, was still incomplete. No part of it had
been promulgated, so it did not need abrogation.
The Constitution of 1845 was reenacted ; but, far from
regarding it as a perfect work to be guarded with superstitious
jealousy against innovation, the ministry expressly declared the
Queen and the Cortes competent “to correct its errors, fill the
voids which experience has shown to exist, and shut the door
on dangerous and abusive interpretations, thus fortifying the
representative principle and, as far as is humanly possible,
drying up the sources of deplorable strife.” These words
introduced an “Additional Act” complementary to the original
CH. x] The guestion of Church lands 253
enactment of 1845. Though promulgated without the consent
of Parliament, it was distinctly more Liberal in its provisions
than the Constitution which it supplemented. It created an
elective Senate, and enjoined trial by jury for press offences,
the reelection of deputies on receiving office or pension from
the Crown, sessions of Cortes for at least four months of each
year, and the presentation of the budget within eight days of
the opening session. Published in the Gazette of September 15,
1856, it disappeared a month later during the temporary
eclipse of its creator, O'Donnell.
By the Additional Act O'Donnell sought to prove himself
still a Liberal and to rally round him all but the irreconcilable
Esparterist Progressives, preparatory to initiating a policy of
reconciliation and toleration. But it soon became evident
that the Queen proposed to exercise her newly-regained
power in accordance with her own judgment, and that in
accepting O'Donnell, when the choice lay between him
and Espartero, she had intended merely to use him as a
stepping-stone. There can be little doubt that, in abetting
O’Donnell's plot against Espartero, her real purpose had been
to save for the Church the remainder of its wealth. The
ministry was aware that this question was a test by which
it must stand or fall in the Queen's estimation. It was im-
possible to evade the danger; for the Treasury had been left
empty by the late Government, and there was no other source
whence the sorely needed funds could be raised. A cunning
trick was however devised to gain the royal assent to the
principle of confiscation. The whole estates of the Church
and of religious and charitable institutions were already by law
public property; but sales were suspended. Cantero, the
Finance Minister, proposed that 4,600,ooo should be raised by
further alienations for the pious purpose of restoring churches
falling into decay. But Isabel saw that the whole pri ciple of
the rights of the State over the property of the Church was
involved. She declared that, “now that she had power, she
254 O'Donnell and Narvaez (1856–1858) [CH.
was responsible.” She flatly refused her consent, and insisted
that the decree of confiscation should be formally rescinded
instead of being merely held in abeyance as hitherto.
O'Donnell was forced to submit ; on September 23 the new
order was published, as the Queen demanded. Cantero was
sacrificed and resigned, warning his colleagues that they would
soon follow him, but with the difference that, whereas he had
retired of his own free will, they would be dismissed with
disgrace.
Then followed the taking-off of the embargo from the
property of Queen Cristina, and Narvaez' return to Madrid.
O'Donnell found himself overwhelmed in the tide of reaction
that had given him his opportunity against Espartero. But up
to the last moment he was deceived by the Queen's cordial
attitude towards him. The court ball on the Queen's birthday,
October Io, was the occasion for a hint so broad and so public
that he could not fail to take it. He was received with chilling
disfavour; the Queen hung on Narvaez' arm and lavished
flattering attention on her trusty ex-minister. Wishing to
ground his resignation on something more weighty than a
personal slight, O'Donnell next day demanded immediate
execution of the law concerning ecclesiastical property and
other measures from which he knew the Queen to be averse;
and, being met with calculated stubbornness, he resigned
(Oct. 12, 1856). He had thought to build his power on Isabel's
gratitude for her deliverance from the anti-clerical party; but
Isabel knew how little disinterested had been his action. She
could not forget Vicălvaro ; she believed the widely-circulated
story that O’Donnell, when her crown hung in the balance,
had tossed a coin and so decided whether he should take side
for or against her. The net result of the events of 1856 was a
considerable increase of the Queen's power.
With O'Donnell fell the Additional Act or Appendix to the
Constitution. It was abolished, as it had been imposed, by
decree, being declared, with unconscious humour, uncon-
x] The Queen's reactionary policy 255
stitutional, and illegal as wanting the consent of the Cortes. It
was the second Constitution in succession that had gone into
the waste-paper basket untried and unlamented. The Moderate
Constitution of 1845 was declared to be still in force without
necessity for reenactment; for, as usual, all that had taken place
during the revolutionary period was ignored as though it had
never been. Even promotions and orders promised by Gene-
ral Blaser to the army with which he marched out to Vicălvaro
were formally confirmed. The Royal Council, a body noto-
rious for its Conservative opinions, was reconstructed after
the traditional model, the ecclesiastical element in it being
strongly marked. Municipal and provincial self-government
was curtailed to such a degree as to be merely illusory. So
convinced was the ministry of its strength that it ventured to
reimpose the unpopular Octroi tax and to gag the press by
a stringent law.
This last measure was the work of Nocedal, the new
Minister of the Interior, who has left his name subjoined to
that of Narvaez on the ministry of which he was the leading
spirit. His ascendancy was due to the violence with which he
held the opinions that for the moment dominated him. From
a Liberal he had become a champion of absolutism and of views
far more pronounced than those which had been unsuccess-
fully advocated by Bravo Murillo. He was, moreover, a
leader of the fashionable Neocatholic or Ultramontane party,
a party that, having misread scraps of history and formed a
pleasing but utterly unreal picture of bygone national glories,
sought to reconstruct, two centuries later, the conditions to
which they erroneously believed those glories to be due. It
has been shown by Juan Valera, the most impartial critic of
his own country, that the means advocated by the party were
the very means to which more enlightened students of history
have attributed Spain's decline, namely, centralisation and
enforced uniformity in Church and State.
Nocedal’s opinions were held, though with less violence,
256 O'Donnell and Marvaez (1856–1858) [CH.
by his colleagues Pidal (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Urbistondo
(War), Lersundi (Marine), and Seijas Lozano (Justice). Narvaez,
who held the Presidency of the Council without portfolio,
might well be described as the one Liberal of the ministry.
As Mazade, the French historian of the Spanish revolutions,
has said, “the struggle was no longer between Moderate con-
stitutional principles on the one hand, and Progressive or
revolutionary principles on the other; it was from this time
forth between Conservative opinion or opinions slightly tinged
with Liberalism, and opinions of which the absolutist character
could not be mistaken, opinions which had long waged and
have never ceased to wage resolute war against all the ideas
and all the habits of the parliamentary régime. This was the
real danger; and this it was that put Spain upon the direct
path to new revolutions at the very moment at which she was
emerging from a revolution.” In little more than two years
the ascending scale from Radicalism to high Conservatism
had been followed: from anarchy to Espartero—Espartero with
O’Donnell—O’Donnell alone—Narvaez and Nocedal. Another
step and we have Gonzalez Bravo attempting to wield a power
almost too heavy for Narvaez ; this step, deferred for twelve
years, cost Isabel her throne.
Though Narvaez was called, and believed himself to be,
a Liberal, Isabel had gained a sincere coadjutor in her pro-
posed work of combating Liberalism and restoring the Church
to its ancient splendour. The characters of the three generals
who for twenty-five years alternately swayed Spain were as
widely different as their aims and methods. Now that it is
possible to distinguish between the men and the causes they
represented, it can hardly be doubted that Narvaez was the
best man, perhaps also, indignantly as the title would have
been denied to him during his lifetime, the best patriot of the
three. He stood for old-fashioned Spain—in so far as old-
fashioned Spain was not Carlist—for the party that refused
to break with the past at the bidding of a noisy minority. For
x] Character and policy of Marvaez 257
it must not be forgotten that the Spanish Liberals were ever
a minority. The artisans of the great commercial and sea-
board cities, and their sons, the non-commissioned officers of
the army, had largely grasped the principles of democracy and
were animated with all the zeal of neophytes. But the indus-
trial and commercial population is outnumbered eight or nine
times by the agriculturists. Dwellers in the smaller towns and
villages, the ploughmen of the plains and the herdsmen of the
Sierras, the owners of the land and the clergy, were either
indifferent or sincerely attached to tradition. They were still
as though the French Revolution had never been. Utterly
lacking in organisation and in political education, they took no
part in elections or in rebellions; the weight of their numbers
and their worth were never felt in the struggles that went on
around them.
It is for this reason that Narvaez' policy is generally repre-
sented as opposed to the general will and interests of his
Countrymen, and that he has been regarded as a mere servant
of the Court and the Church. It was because of the inactivity
of this huge mass that he was forced repeatedly to give place
to his shifty rival O'Donnell, and to Espartero, who cloaked
a half-conscious ambition under hollow phrases and was guided
by an intermittent belief in his own mission. Narvaez' char-
acter was upright and unbending, his methods straightforward,
and his integrity unquestioned. He took up the responsibili-
ties of office and laid them down with equal simplicity. In an
age of treason and mutiny he maintained the standard of
loyalty and of military honour. Even those who reject his
cause admit that it counted among its upholders the best men
of the time ; among them Narvaez is certainly worthy of a
place. Nature made him a disciplinarian; and the times called
for sharp methods. One of those stories that impress a truth
by gross exaggeration tells how, when bidden on his deathbed
to forgive his enemies, he replied that he had no enemies, for
he had shot them all. Yet, though lacking O’Donnell's rigid
C. S. I 7
258 O'Donnel/ and Narvaez (1856–1858) [CH.
self-command, he was no cruel martinet. Personal vengeance
was gratified by none of the innumerable executions carried
out by his orders. Only extreme laxity of view with regard to
political crime would question their justice.
It was to Narvaez that men turned when the fabric of the
State seemed to be breaking up. His short, stiff, alert figure and
brusque military manner were as far removed from O’Donnell's
graceful form and courtly bearing as from Espartero's under-
bred and slovenly appearance and embarrassed address. For
Espartero's political influence it is hard to find any explanation.
He shared with the vast majority of his countrymen great
personal courage; he was a lucky rather than a great soldier.
His victories he owed rather to popularity with the rank and
file than to skilful strategy. He was a commonplace man with
a good heart and a spark of genuine enthusiasm for the cause
of the humble and the oppressed. He continually mistook
the path of personal ambition for that of public duty, but he
did so honestly. For his intellect was confused ; it was lack
of definite purpose and failure to grasp means, as much as
constitutional irresolution, that led him to squander so fruit-
lessly the unexampled powers for good or evil that chance had
thrust into his hands. He was not a rancorous enemy, nor
was he a thoroughly trustworthy friend. He was a creature
of spasmodic emotion, broken by long fits of lethargy, a waiter
on events, a self-deceived man. Espartero rose by making
himself the servant of the mob, Narvaez by obedience to an
earnest though limited sense of duty, O'Donnell tortuously by
intrigue and open-eyed pursuit of self-aggrandisement. A
hard-headed, frigid man of the world, impatience led him to
make, in the Revolution of 1854, the mistake fatal to his good
name. The words “loyalty” and “discipline * sounded ill in
the mouth of one who had so betrayed his trust. One step in
political dishonesty led to another. He gave a Judas kiss
to Espartero and straightway proceeded to worm his way back
into the confidence of the Queen. He overthrew his allies by
x] Character of O'Donneſ/. Narvaez' ministry 259
the aid of the camarilla against which he had conspired,
trafficking in mutiny and treason. He was one of the ministry
that trampled on the lately-executed Concordat and broke off
diplomatic relations with the Holy See. He made his peace a
few years later by bearing a taper in a procession led by Sor
Patrocinio.
Narvaez' retrograde ministry lasted one year (Oct., 1856–
Oct., 1857), and honourably distinguished itself by a severely
honest administration. Under it conspiracy was not tolerated
through fear of reprisals. Imprisonment or banishment on
mere suspicion were the rough methods employed for keeping
the peace, but they were effectual. In fact the country even
went beyond the will of its new masters in submissiveness.
The Cortes elected to support them contained only five
Progressives. Never had a fallen party more completely
disappeared. Though sure of the servility of their over-
whelming majority, the ministry made no pretence of
respecting the prerogative of the Cortes. They flouted Parlia-
ment by usurping its functions. Thus, within a few days of
its meeting, they hired troops by decree. Presided over by
Martinez de la Rosa, and using Liberal forms, the Cortes
reconstructed the Senate, strengthening the aristocratic and
hereditary element in it, and voted stringent measures
abolishing the modified liberty enjoyed by the press. With
regard to religion the Queen had won her battle ; and the
words of her speech contain a note of triumph. “In accord-
ance with the terms of my royal promise, and the exigencies of
my religious sentiments, the Concordat with the Holy See
has been reestablished in its full force and vigour, and other
measures have been taken to restore to the Church that liberty
wherewith its Divine Founder endowed it, and which has ever
been respected by the religious Spanish nation and by my
royal ancestors.” It is needless to point out the falsity of
this statement. All but the weakest kings had sought with
more or less success to assert authority over the Church; and
I7—2
26o O'Donnel/ and AWarvaez (1856–1858) [CH.
Parliaments had petitioned, as long as Parliaments worthy of
the name existed, against its excessive wealth, its independent
jurisdiction, and its encroachment upon the civil power.
The Cortes were too nearly unanimous to be roused by the
above-mentioned legislation. The case was far different when
the events that led to the fight of Vicálvaro were debated.
The discussion arose out of the petition of a deputy, a general
of strong loyalist views, for permission to impeach all who
had been concerned in the late rebellion. O’Donnell's reply
to this attack was a fu quoque addressed to the President of
the Council. He was able to show that Narvaez had been
cognisant of the pronunciamiento before it took place, and had
been guilty of something like a breach of faith in failing to
support it. Narvaez was unable or perhaps unwilling to rebut
the charge. He explained that he had always been a Liberal,
that he had considered it his duty to shake off the yoke of
San Luis, but that he had stopped short of the Programme of
Manzanares (p. 229), considering it disloyal and revolutionary.
Such a position seems nowadays tenable; but in the Cortes
of 1856 Narvaez was held to have come badly out of the
encounter, to have defended himself by sophisms. This much
at least must be admitted—he was guilty of inconsistency in
demolishing the work he had inadvisedly styled heroic.
When the excitement raised by these recriminations died
away, the proceedings of the Cortes lost all interest; the lassi-
tude of exhaustion followed the political fever of the last three
years. It was a time of commercial and industrial activity;
railroads had opened up new sources of wealth, and the
ministry followed the trend of public attention. Instead of
wrangling over the sections of a Constitution that could hardly
outlast the Chamber that made it, they set themselves to study
the social and economic position of the people with a view to
improvement. A careful scheme of educational reform was
prepared; lack of funds prevented its execution. An Academy
of Moral and Political Sciences was incorporated, and took
x] A'esignation of Narvaez 26 I
rank alongside of the already existing Academies of Language
and of History. An agricultural show was held in Madrid for
the first time, with a view to introducing methods and imple-
ments less primitive than those that still hamper throughout
the larger part of Spain the most conservative of industries.
No sooner was tranquillity restored and the hope of its
continuance well grounded than the strong hand that had
made it possible was impatiently shaken off. Narvaez was
respected both by the Queen and by the nation, but his
services were of a kind that seldom attract gratitude. To
Isabel he told disagreeable truths in blunt language; she was
glad to be rid of him as soon as she had paid off her grudge
against O’Donnell and no longer feared immediate danger from
the Radicals. She took as her excuse the necessity of con-
cession to public feeling, roused by the harsh repression of
a Republican rising in Andalusia and demanding a minister
more respectful of constitutional forms. Isabel, in fact, had
now reason to be apprehensive for the personal popularity
which had hitherto never left her, and had more than once
saved her throne. Her political mistakes and rumours as to
her private life had gone far to quench the fervid loyalty
cherished during seven years of war against the Carlists,
and later confirmed by the Queen's genuine love for her people
and for all things Spanish, her confidence in their good-will,
her sympathy with suffering, and the frank simplicity of her
manner. Fearing that the expected birth of another child
(Alfonso XII, born Nov. 28, 1857) might again let loose
the flood of scandal, she sought to humour her subjects by
a change of ministry. Narvaez, personally disinterested as
ever, resigned with good grace.
Bravo Murillo refused to undertake to form a Cabinet
unless allowed to carry out his favourite scheme of con-
stitutional reform. But constitutional reform involved inter-
ference with forms and words much more potent to rouse
indignation than facts and institutions. So the Queen's
262 O'Donnell and Warvaez (1856–1858) [CH. x
choice fell upon the somewhat obscure General Armero;
under him Martinez de la Rosa and Mon accepted office
(Oct. 15, 1857). But this ministry proved too Liberal for
the Cortes elected to support Narvaez and Nocedal. Meeting
on January Io, 1858, they chose Bravo Murillo as their
President. The debate on the speech from the throne
showed that Armero could not command a majority; and
he resigned after having stopped a gap for three months.
His successor, Isturiz, fared little better, though he tried to
win the confidence of the Cortes by giving a portfolio to their
President, Bravo Murillo. By midsummer the way was clear
for O'Donnell's return to power.
CHAPTER XI.
THE LIBERAL UNION. O’DONNELL’S FOREIGN
POLICY. (1858–1863.)
EveR since he had made way for Narvaez two years before,
O'Donnell had been preparing his own return ; he was deter-
mined that this time his tenure of office should not depend
merely upon the caprice of the Queen. He succeeded in
gathering into one vast party all who would be satisfied to take
as their watchword “Dynasty and Constitution”; and, when
Isturiz resigned, there was no alternative but to send for him.
He took for 1 mself the Ministry for War as well as the
Presidency of the Council; and, choosing colleagues on whose
fidelity to himse, he could rely, he commenced in June, 1858,
a ministry that 'ar outlasted any since the days of King
Ferdinand. O’DC nell himself was a more skilled politician
than either Esparte, o or Narvaez, but he would scarcely have
been so successful in retrieving his past mistakes and in
withholding the Queen from self-destruction for so many
years, had he not had at his elbow Posada Herrera, known
to his contemporaries as “the Great Sophist,” who had carried
over his portfolio of Minister of the Interior from Isturiz'
Cabinet. An adversary truly said that no choice was now left
outside O’Donnell's party or revolution, for so wide was the
ministerial net spread, so few and simple were its principles,
that only the Carlists and the Democrats on either hand, and
their political kinsmen the Absolutists San Luis, Pidal, and
264 7%e Ziberal Union (1858–1863) [CH.
Gonzalez Bravo, and the extreme Progressives Olózaga, Madoz,
and Sagasta, were excluded from sharing in its success.
The secret of their success was that the Liberal Union had
no policy. The great questions of the balance of power
between the democracy and the Crown, the due representation
of each class and interest, and localised against centralised
government, were shelved; and Spain benefited by the pause in
the struggle that had been agitating her for nearly forty years.
O'Donnell governed under the Constitution of 1845; but he
did not pretend, as its creators had pretended, that it em-
bodied the results of political wisdom. He promised that the
Cortes should have an opportunity of accepting or rejecting
the Additional Act, and of introducing such other modifica-
tions as might be necessary. The Cortes did not meet until
O'Donnell had assured his position. When he took office at
the end of June, the Cortes elected in March of the previous
year to support Narvaez' ministry stood prorogued. They
were not reassembled. A new ministry required new Cortes;
and the responsibility of their formation was left to the “Great
Sophist,” Posada Herrera, who by the use he made of his
opportunity gained the additional title of “the Great Elector.”
In the Lower Chamber of the Cortes that met on Dec. 1, 1858,
the Government, of course, had its majority, a majority that
could make light of any opposition ; but Posada Herrera had
not made the usual mistake of depriving those who stood out-
side his fold of all chance of airing their views constitutionally.
He was aware that a unanimous House broke up speedily into
groups led by private interests; that, when the Opposition was
not represented, it was generally plotting revolution outside;
and that nothing gave stability to a party like the necessity for
holding together in the face of attack. Accordingly, whilst
careful to secure the return of the leaders of his own party,
Posada Herrera was no less careful to secure the return of the
leaders of both the Radical and the ultra-Conservative Oppo-
sitions. To the latter were allowed some thirty seats, to the
x1] O'Donnel/ in power. His method's 265
former about twenty. At the same time the Progressives were
conciliated by the nomination of some of their number to seats
in the Senate ; many also accepted administrative posts. The
Cortes thus formed received from the crown as President of
the Senate Manuel Concha, the Marqués del Duero; the
Lower House elected Martinez de la Rosa, the survivor of the
struggles of King Ferdinand's days, a man who, in his gradual
drift from Radicalism to Conservatism, had temporarily ap-
proved every intervening shade of political doctrine.
No sooner did the Cortes meet than the admirable result
of Posada Herrera's arrangement was seen ; at times the two
Oppositions would combine for an attack upon the Government,
thus putting the Liberal-Unionists upon their mettle ; more
often the two neutralised each other; occasionally they attacked
one another with a fury even greater than that which inspired
the onslaughts on the ministry; and O’Donnell, with a smile
upon his face, would call upon his adversaries to respect the
rulés of fair fight, and the decencies of debate. The Pro-
gressives under Olózaga, Sagasta, and Salmeron led the attack
by angrily calling the Government to account for illegal revision
of the electoral lists, carried out, as they said, in the interests
of the party in power. O'Donnell hardly troubled to answer
their arguments or to contest their facts; he was known to have
declared that when his time came for post mortem examination
he would certainly not be found to have succumbed to over-
anxiety to observe the strict letter of the law. Moreover,
however defective were the electoral lists after they came from
the hands of his agents, they were certainly less so than before
the revision. The Moderates, on the other hand, led by
Gonzalez Bravo, twitted O’Donnell with allusions to Vicălvaro;
and he retaliated by cross-questions as to their attitude with
regard to the revision of the Constitution proposed by Bravo
Murillo, a source of disaster and stone of stumbling to the
party.
But the ministry was occupied in something more serious
266 7 he Liberal Union (1858–1863) [CH.
than these Parliamentary jousts. Secure in the support of
Chambers so skilfully chosen and managed that they held
together as none of their predecessors had ever done, for the
full legal period of five years, it settled once for all the great
question of the estates of the Church. So long as these
remained unsold, the Radicals could obtain a hearing for dark
stories of clerical intrigue; to tear them from the Church against
its will was to offend the conscience of the Queen and of a large
part of the nation. It was evidently a case for compromise.
The circumstances of the Holy See, surrounded by dangers and
difficulties, rendered it more accessible than usual to the idea
of compromise. Already, at the opening of the Cortes, the
Queen had been able to announce that his Holiness had
recognised the validity of sales already carried out. Eight
months later Rios Rosas had effected an agreement, according
to which the remaining estates of the Church should be sold
with the consent of the Pope, and the proceeds handed over in
inalienable 3 per cent. bonds to the Church. The Concordat
of 1851, which had been shamefully infringed by the Liberal
administration of the Biennium, now came again into force.
Spain was held to have given sufficient proof of repentance to
deserve again the favour of the Holy See. Sor Patrocinio,
with her following, reappeared at Court; and the Jesuits were
put in possession of the noble convent of San Marcos at Leon.
O'Donnell, sometime a member of the most anti-clerical
Government Spain had known, and signatory of the Pro-
gramme of Manzanares, took part along with the Queen, against
whom he had rebelled, in religious processions. The net result
of this reconciliation was to secure for the Liberal Union the
toleration, if not the enthusiastic adherence, of the great body
of devout Catholics, and to put into its hands a huge capital in
return for its depreciated 3 per cent. bonds.
The fact that men so widely separate in opinions as
Martinez de la Rosa, Prim, Isturiz, Cortina, and Mon accepted
employment under the Liberal Union might be cited as proof
XI] Church lands, and Finance 267
of its catholicity and toleration; but it was far otherwise in-
terpreted by honest men who stood outside it. They declared
that it lived by libelling those who opposed it, “that it pro-
duced nothing, but served only to deceive the hopes of the
simple-minded, to give a refuge to the weary, and a prey to the
greedy.” Alcalá Galiano wittily likened it to the “Happy
Family’’ shown in fairs, the cage containing cat and mouse,
wolf and lamb, and other naturally hostile and desperate beasts
living in peace imposed by punishment and reward. But to
admit that the Liberal Union was eclectic in men and principles,
that it was opportunist, waiting on events and avoiding when
possible burning questions, that it did not attempt to settle
anything permanently, is not to condemn it. That it gave
Spain a period of rest, allowing men to pursue their business
uninterrupted by an uncertainty as to who would be the rulers
and what the laws of to-morrow, constitutes a title to gratitude,
if not to respect. It is true that O'Donnell governed with a
packed majority in the Cortes; but this was one degree better
than governing by decree. It is also true that those who
followed with their eyes shut got honours and rewards, while
those who ventured to oppose him were liable to persecutions,
like that of Esteban Collantes, founded on misrepresentation;
but Narvaez had banished and imprisoned on mere suspicion.
Even during the disturbed period that followed the Carlist
War the prosperity of the country had been increasing; now
the rate of increase was greatly hastened. Between the years
1848 and 1864 Spanish commerce more than trebled; in the
latter year it amounted to thirty-five millions sterling. Many
railways were built; public works were undertaken ; and banks
were founded. Nevertheless the matter in which the Liberal
Union most notably failed was its administration of the public
finances. The agreement with the Holy See allowed the
remainder of the estates of the Church to be sold on much
higher terms than had been obtained when the title given was
liable to be questioned by a retrograde Government. But the
268 The Liberal Union (1858–1863) [CH.
huge sums then realised faded away, leaving hardly any per-
ceptible effect; the country was not less embarrassed or more
lightly taxed than before. The budgets of 1859 and 1860
showed a surplus as usual, but it was entirely fictitious ; the
floating debt had mounted to seven million pounds; the taxes,
direct and indirect, were crushing; the Government spent
recklessly the monies deposited in the State banks. Only a
very small proportion of the sums lavished was devoted to
matters of permanent utility or profit; by far the larger part
went to pay for military expeditions abroad.
After a brief sitting in 1859, public attention was almost
wholly withdrawn from the Cortes, for O'Donnell, tolerated by
Royalists in the belief that he alone could stay Revolution, and
by Liberals in the belief that he was the only safeguard of the
representative system, had hit upon the masterly idea of turn-
ing the minds of his countrymen from controversial questions
by committing them to a series of adventures beyond the seas.
These resulted in small gain of honour, and much waste of life
and money; but they had the important result of rousing
patriotic enthusiasm, and making the Spaniards feel, after years
of civil strife, that they were still one nation holding in common
glorious traditions and undeveloped powers.
In 1857 General Armero had signalised his fleeting ministry
by placing 15oo Spanish soldiers under the orders of the
French Admiral sent to avenge hideous murders of French
and Spanish missionaries in Cochin China. When O’Donnell
succeeded Armero, he continued his policy. The little corps
of Spaniards, dependent for the most part on their French
allies for transport, fought throughout the Annamite War with
the valour they have ever shown when well led. At the end of
the war, France had laid the foundations of her eastern empire;
while Spain received a small share of the war indemnity, and
an assurance that her missionaries would in future be respected
(1862). O'Donnell, though severely criticised for embarking
on a rash colonial policy, followed up the venture with an
XI] Poreign and Colonia/ /o/icy 269
expensive and unsuccessful attempt to occupy and develope the
Spanish West African possessions, Fernando Po, Annobon,
and Cape San Juan.
These two expeditions, however, are far from being the
most important of those undertaken by O’Donnell. The
threat of intervention by the United States in Cuba had
necessitated the strengthening of the Spanish army. On the
outbreak of war in Italy, imperilling the throne of a prince
closely related to the Spanish Bourbons, a further increase was
made ; and a fine force of Ioo, ooo men was available. Spain
protested against the dethronement of the Prince of Parma, but
did not venture to interfere to prevent it. Employment was
found for the troops in a war against Morocco.
The greatest men of Spain have believed that “the natural
frontier of Spain towards the south is not the narrow strait that
joins the two seas, but the chain of the Atlas, correlative to the
Pyrenees.” In times of national well-being this dream of a
great African empire, and of conquests over the Moslems, is
revived. After the days of the great Cardinal Jiménez de
Cisneros, it was in abeyance until Floridablanca, in the reig of
Charles III, dreamed again the same great dream. But t →
resources at his disposal were utterly inadequate to the under-
taking. Spanish statesmen were dragged along by the current
of European politics. Spain possessed on the north African
coast Ceuta, Melilla, and other small stations used chiefly as
penal settlements, fishing ports, and centres of a trade mainly
contraband. The relations between the Spanish garrisons and
settlers on the one hand, and the Kabyles, their neighbours, on
the other, are always strained. The Africans by insolence, by
pilfering, and by refusing to recognise a frontier or a neutral
zone, give a permanent excuse for war. Among them the
authority of the Sultan of Morocco is hardly recognised; yet
any attempt to punish them throws the whole of Moslem
North-West Africa into a ferment of religious and political
excitement.
270 The Liberal Union (1858–1863) [CH.
In 1859 the Moors and the Spaniards were on even worse
terms than usual. The Moors, accusing the garrison of Melilla
of trespassing upon their lands for the purpose of collecting
firewood, retaliated by harrying and illtreating individuals and
small parties, and by destroying Spanish outworks on debatable
land round Ceuta. O’Donnell seized the opportunity of em-
barking Spain upon a crusade; for it is as a crusade that a
campaign against the Moslem is regarded. A memory of old
wrongs still lingers. Hatred of the infidel lies deep in Spanish
blood. So late as 1898 a Spanish general, unable to suffer the
traditional enemies of his race and faith as honoured guests on
Spanish soil, struck the envoy of the Sultan of Morocco in
the streets of Madrid'. So, too, in O’Donnell's day it was no
political plan, or desire for territorial aggrandisement, that
roused high and low when an ultimatum was sent to the
Sultan, but merely the wish that the crescent waving in sight
of the tierra de Maria Santísima might be replaced by the
cross, and further blood be shed in a quarrel of a thousand
years. -
Secure of the whole-hearted support of the nation,
O'Donnell made the Sultan's Government responsible for the
acts of its unruly subjects. Instead of entering upon negotia-
tions, such as Moslem diplomacy loves to prolong for years,
he demanded that within a delay of ten days the frontier
marks should be replaced, that the Moorish subjects guilty of
aggressions should be punished, that the Spanish flag should be
saluted, and that the clause forbidding the fortification of Ceuta
should be erased from the existing agreement between Spain
and Morocco. The answer of the Moorish Court was most
conciliatory. It yielded on every point except the fortification
of Ceuta. With regard to this most serious matter the Shereefian
Court declared itself unable to decide while its Sultan lay
* The explanation in the text is charitable. Prosaic people in Madrid
at the time said the officer was tipsy. [J. F.-K.]
XI] Spain and Morocco 27 I
dying. The Sultan died; and his successor obtained a further
delay whilst he besought the good offices of the Powers to stay
the storm that was about to break upon him. France declared
her neutrality; Great Britain offered mediation. The point at
issue might have been satisfactorily arranged had not O'Donnell
been set upon war. Seeing this to be the case, Lord John
Russell exacted a promise that Spain would seek no territorial
aggrandisement, and that, if in the course of operations Tangier
should be occupied, it should be given up as soon as peace
was signed. Unable and unwilling to draw back after his
formal challenge to the Moors, O’Donnell concealed from his
countrymen the humiliating fact that he had been obliged, at
the bidding of a foreign Power, to give up all eventual ad-
vantages of the war before it actually broke out. Sharp
punishment inflicted on the coast towns by a Spanish squadron
would now have been all that honour and interest demanded;
but this was no longer sufficient to satisfy public opinion, care-
fully inflamed by the press. The invasion of Morocco was
decided upon ; war was declared (Oct. 22, 1859); and Tangier,
Tetuan, and Larrache were blockaded.
Having thus provoked war, O'Donnell was unwilling that
another should have the credit of victory; he himself took
command of the expeditionary force. His plan was to collect
troops under shelter of the guns of Ceuta, which possesses a
good landing-place, and then to march along the coast-road to
Tetuan, accompanied and supported by a squadron bearing
supplies. He believed that this would prove easy, and that the
capture of Tetuan would be followed by unconditional sub-
mission. Cut off from the rest of the Moslem world by the
French in Algiers, the Moors could receive no help from
outside. Their troops had only valour to make good their
deficiency in training and armament. The Spanish force, on
the other hand, consisted of 40,000 men carefully chosen, full
of enthusiasm and well equipped; but it took them two months
to reach Tetuan, nine leagues distant from their starting-point.
272 The Liberal Union (1858–1863) [CH.
The coast-road proved to be a mere bridle-path impassable for
artillery until a large amount of labour had been expended upon
it by the sappers. No sooner did the troops leave the shelter
of Ceuta than they were fiercely attacked by the Moorish
irregulars. The first division was checked; the second was
opposed by the Sultan's regular forces, which had now come up.
After fifteen skirmishes the Spaniards were still in sight of their
landing-place. Yet on every occasion they had shown great
eagerness to fight, and courage in facing difficulties. It was
not the enemy, brave as he was, that prevented them from
breaking through. The season was mid-winter; storms fell
upon the wild coast, turning the camping-grounds and the
newly-made roads into lakes and rivers of mud. The regular
supply of food from the squadron failed, for no boats could
brave the surf upon the coast. Every mile of road won had to
be fortified and guarded against the vigilant and active enemy.
Cholera and dysentery attacked the invaders; and their available
force was reduced to little more than 15, ooo men. The battle
of Castillejos (Jan. 1, 1860) cost them six hundred men; and it
was only by the rashest daring that Prim broke through the
Moorish hordes. A fortnight later the remains of the Spanish
army struggled round the lofty cape and down into the valley
in sight of Tetuan. The weather had calmed; and the squadron
with supplies and reinforcements was off the coast opposite to
them. It was evident that, had the mouth of the river by
Tetuan been chosen as a landing-place, instead of Ceuta, all
their losses and hardships might have been avoided.
Between the Spaniards and the city lay the Moorish army
commanded by Muley el Abbas, brother of the Sultan. But,
now that the Spaniards enjoyed something like equality of
position, the defending force hardly proved an obstacle. Muley
el Abbas was defeated; his camp as well as the city of Tetuan
fell into the hands of the Spaniards, whose victory cost them
eight hundred men. When the Moorish army withdrew to the
defile guarding the road leading from Tetuan to Fez and the
XI] Peace with Morocco 273
interior, their general sent to ask on what conditions peace
would be granted, or in his own words, “to speak of the things
that Allah had been pleased to put between the Spaniards and
the Moors.” O’Donnell demanded the whole of the territory
occupied by his army from Ceuta to Tetuan, including the city
itself; an indemnity of £2,000,ooo; the opening of the city of
Fez to Spanish missionaries; the admission of a Spanish lega-
tion to the Moorish capital ; and a treaty of commerce. The
Moors indignantly refused to cede territory; and fighting was
renewed. It culminated in the battle of Wadi-Ras (February 23),
in which the Spaniards captured, at a cost of one thousand
three hundred men, the defile leading to Fez. Then at length
Muley el Abbas recognised that he was beaten, and came in to
the Spanish camp to discuss terms.
O'Donnell's position was most difficult. He had just
received news of a Carlist rising in Spain; the Moorish army
was still formidable; to follow it into the interior would be
dangerous; even if by insistence he forced the Sultan to cede
the coast territory, he was debarred from retaining it by his
promise to Great Britain. So the Moors found his demands
diminished instead of increasing after his victory of Wadi-Ras.
He insisted that Tetuan should be left in his possession
temporarily, on a pledge for the payment of the indemnity.
The other clauses of the agreement remained as they stood
before the earlier negotiations were broken off. On these
terms peace was signed (April 26, 1860). The six months’
campaign had cost 7ooo lives, cholera being the cause of death
in more than two-thirds of the cases. For these losses, and for
the money spent, Spain obtained, it is true, no adequate
material return ; but she obtained what was much dearer to her,
a taste of the intoxication of success and a belief in her own
fitness for great undertakings.
After the failure of their attempt to profit by the agitation
consequent upon the Revolution of 1854, the Carlists had
apparently abandoned the hope of success by force of arms.
C. S. 18
274 7%e Zióeral Onion (1858–1863) [CH.
As usual, the extravagances of the Progressives and particularly
their ruthless-spoliation of the Church had swelled the ranks of
the Traditionalists. These nearest to the Queen had been so
terrified by the Revolution that they ceased to fear the opposite
danger, and sought the alliance of the Carlists in order to show
a united front against the “anarchists” and “atheists.” Under
the guidance of King Francisco de Asis, troubled throughout
his life by conscientious doubts as to his consort's rights to her
throne, negotiations were undertaken in the hope that the two
branches might be fused by a marriage. To secure this end
the King was prepared to urge his wife's abdication. Under
cover of negotiations the Carlists enjoyed a kind of semi-official
recognition and protection. They profited by it to spread their
organisation. The “Supreme Royal Commission,” with secret
agents in all influential circles, succeeded in obtaining for its
adherents many posts of trust and authority. But, while the
general public was hoping that the Carlists would follow the
lead of the Pope and acknowledge the rights of Isabel, and while
Isabel herself was going beyond the bounds of permissible
concession in her desire for conciliation, the Carlists and their
prince remained irreconcilable as before and eager to profit by
the weak indulgence shown to them. Accordingly, when the
main part of the army was away in Africa, and the Court of
Madrid was lulled into security by the friendly discussion of
the rival claims, they determined to make a dash for power.
Their chosen instrument was young General Ortega, Captain-
General of the Balearic Islands. A secret adherent of the
cause, he was indicated for command in a dangerous enterprise
by personal valour, a handsome person, and the “resolve to
perform some great and bold deed in which he would lose his
life or make his name famous” (his own words). Under the
mistaken belief that the presence of the Carlist prince on
Spanish soil would provoke a general rising, and relying on
promises of support from many influential persons, he landed
with the three thousand five hundred troops under his com-
XI] Carlist attempt put down 275
mand at San Carlos de la Rápita, near Tortosa (April 2, 1860).
With him came, preceded by the usual manifesto to the Spanish
nation, Don Carlos Luis, Count of Montemolin, the eldest son
of the first Don Carlos. Since his father's formal abdication
(May, 1845) the Count of Montemolin had been recognised by
the party as leader and king.
The rash venture ended disastrously. Ortega had been led
to expect that he would be met by the news of rebellion in
the capital and in half the provinces. But those who had so
boldly promised were waiting for victory before declaring their
sympathies; no rising took place. When Ortega's little force
learned for what purpose they had been brought to Spain they
not only refused to march, but, following the example of one of
their officers, cheered lustily for the Queen. Ortega refused to
add ridicule to disaster; he paid for the mistake with his life.
Montemolin and his brother Fernando remained in hiding for
a fortnight; after enduring much discomfort, and some actual
hunger, they were captured, together with the old and staunch
Carlist Elio, and all papers relating to the conspiracy of which
their adventure was the outcome. •
Neither Queen nor ministry was inclined to severity.
An extraordinary piece of good fortune had put the Pretender
into their power; he himself seemed abundantly willing to
recognise his own failure. He was not made of the same
unbending stuff as his father ; and, when he obtained his
liberation by a solemn renunciation of his claims, it seemed
that the Carlist danger was ended. He wrote, moreover, to
his cousin, begging her pardon for what he had done, and
imploring clemency toward those who had compromised them-
selves in his cause. He desired that he and his brother might
be allowed to quit the country and “to enjoy in peace the
seclusion of home.” So humbled was the prince who had
lately rejected the advances of the royal family and refused
to compromise his claims even by a marriage which must
eventually bring the crown into his line. Examination of the
18–2
276 The Zibera/ Union (1858–1863) [CH.
captured papers showed that many influential people were
implicated in the projected rising. To punish them would
have been to show the strength of a party, now (it was hoped)
disbanded and disarmed by the abdication of its leader.
A general amnesty was published (May 1, 1860); and even
General Elio was pardoned.
If the Morocco war brought no profit to Spain, it had
at any rate increased O’Donnell's popularity and strengthened
his authority. He was soon ready to start again on fresh
adventures. The year 1861 gave him two opportunities, and
he seized them both. The first presented itself in a way
especially grateful to Spanish pride. The state of Santo
Domingo had grown weary of the attempt to govern itself
and sought protection against its neighbour and bitter enemy
Haiti. It now applied for readmission to the Spanish
monarchy. The repentant republic was reincorporated by
decree (March 19, 1861); and vast hopes were aroused that
this was but the firstfruits of kinship, and that the nations
which Spain had so prodigally sown might still be gathered
in to her. But mismanagement on the Spanish side and bad
faith on the other prevented any such result. A swarm of
functionaries from Cuba swooped down upon the island, and
treated it almost as a conquered country. Only a faction had
called in the Spaniards, and that merely with the object of
securing allies. All now united in making war upon the
masterful intruders. For four years Spain continued her efforts;
and then, after having spent in vain the lives of ten thousand
soldiers and a sum of four million pounds sterling, she
abandoned Santo Domingo to its chronic and grotesque dissen-
sions (May, 1865).
In Mexico the triumph of the Liberal and native faction
under the wise Indian Juarez had brought about in 1860 a
temporary pause in the long-continued civil war. In view of
the exhausted state of the Treasury, the Congress resolved to
suspend payment of interest upon the Exterior Debt for two
XI] Santo Domingo and Mexico 277
years. The interests of the foreign bondholders in Spain,
France, and Great Britain were thus injured. These countries
had moreover other claims against Juarez' Government for
losses and injuries suffered by their subjects during the war.
When, therefore, separate protests were disregarded, they
decided upon united action (Oct., 1861), agreeing previously
among themselves to refrain from territorial acquisition, and
from interference “with the right of the Mexican nation to
choose freely its own form of government.” A Spanish
squadron joined the French and British. ships in Mexican
waters; and a Spanish contingent, under General Prim, seized
San Juan de Ulloa. Juarez entered into negotiations, which
resulted in the speedy break-up of the alliance against him
(April, 1862). For it became at once apparent that France
entertained designs far wider than the satisfaction of claims to
monetary compensation. The Empire needed the popularity
derived from a successful foreign war. Great Britain sought
only redress. Spain for a time hoped that the Mexicans would
change their republic into a monarchy, and demand of its royal
family an occupant for their throne; but the scheme was not
seriously pushed. Engaged in their great civil war, the United
States looked with extreme disfavour on the interference of
European Powers in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. In
deference to the great Republic, the British and Spanish con-
tingent withdrew after receiving promise of full satisfaction
for their claims (April 9, 1861). France was left alone to set
up, with the feeble help of the anti-republican Mexicans, the
tragic throne of the Emperor Maximilian. General Prim had
given explicit warning that without the protection of foreign
bayonets a stranger prince could not rule in Mexico. Napoleon
was inclined to visit on Spain his displeasure at the failure of
his schemes. So far did the quarrel go that the ambassadors
on either side were withdrawn. O’Donnell would have made
a scapegoat of Prim; but the Queen intervened, and by publicly
commending him made it impossible for her first minister to
disavow Prim’s action.
278 The Liberal Union (1858–1863) [CH.
After three years the Liberal Union began to show signs of
breaking up. The packed majority, hitherto so unquestion-
ingly obedient, manifested signs of insubordination. The wise
measure of taking General Zabala, a pronounced Liberal, into
the Cabinet, failed to conciliate the party to which he belonged.
For O'Donnell fell daily more under the influence of the
Court, until he was twitted in Parliament as the submissive
proselyte of the Absolutists, accepting penance at the hands
of Sor Patrocinio. In the Lower House an independent group,
that might easily become an Opposition, obeyed Rios Rosas
and Alonso Martinez. This tendency, already marked in the
autumn session of 1861, became much more strong in the
following spring when Cánovas del Castillo and the Marqués
del Duero ceased to support the ministry. In the summer
Queen Isabel made a progress through the southern provinces
of her kingdom ; and the warm welcome prepared by officials
was reechoed by many who were not paid for demonstrations
of loyalty. The royal progress showed at any rate that the
republicans and democrats were still a small minority, even in
the provinces in which their doctrines had been most favour-
ably received. Encouraged by this success, O'Donnell, before
the end of the year, challenged a vote of confidence. It was
carried by 166 votes against 77; but this, in an assembly which
had four years before been entirely unanimous, was held to be
a premonitor of defeat.
O'Donnell's loss of popularity was due partly to the burdens
imposed upon the country by his foreign policy, a policy which
had served for a time to distract public attention from the
Sores of the body politic at home, but brought no other
advantage. The progressive wing of the Liberal Union was
sarcastic over O'Donnell's supposed recantation of that part
of his political ideal which he had held in common with
them. But most of all he had provoked public opinion by
seemingly gratuitous cruelty in a suppression of a harebrained
agrarian riot among starving people. Andalusia is a land of
large estates, half-developed and left by absentee owners to the
XI] Decay of O'Donnell's power 279
management of harsh and grasping bailiffs. The labourers are
distributed in isolated cortijos, great blocks of buildings com-
prising the unused country-house of the owner, the humbler
lodging of his dependents, and the stables for the cattle, often
under a single roof. Living thus, the labourers are incapable
of organisation; but the dwellers in the country-towns, driven
desperate by over-taxation and the shrinkage of local industries,
turned their eyes to this misused wealth, and, maddened by the
crudest doctrines of socialism, began to clamour for the division
of the land. They found a leader almost as ignorant as them-
selves in Pedro Alanio, a horse-doctor, who took possession of
the undefended town of Loja and assembled around him a
clamorous mob of about 8ooo men. As soon, however, as troops
appeared, the rioters, for the most part quite unarmed, sub-
mitted without an attempt at resistance. Nevertheless the
authorities, not content with the execution of six of their
number, condemned four hundred to penal servitude in Africa.
This local revolt, attributed to the teaching of democrats,
served as a pretext for the suppression of all associations having
as their object the increase of wages, for jealous prying into
the purposes and working of clubs and guilds, and for the
prohibition of all literature of a socialistic or inflammatory
nature.
In view of the growing difficulties of his position, O’Donnell
reconstructed his Cabinet, retaining of his former colleagues
only Vega de Armijo, whom he believed to be necessary to
him. The others resigned, so as to allow their chief to
strengthen, if possible, his following in Parliament, at Court,
and in the country. Pastor Diaz and Serrano, Duke of
la Torre, took office. But the feeble policy of the new
ministry failed to rally the party; and its heterogeneous com-
position soon showed in radical differences of opinion. Pastor
Diaz was the first to quit. A more important loss was that of
the Queen's favour. The ministry had thought fit to demon-
strate the reality of the Liberal sentiments of which they
28o 7 he Liberal Union (1858–1863) [CH. XI
continually made parade by proposing to recognise formally
the new kingdom of Italy. Immediately the camarilla was up
in arms; and O’Donnell learnt that years of strict conformity
to the views of the clerical party had left him their servant
rather than their master. The Queen was put forward to
oppose the ministry, and intrigued to create difficulties for it,
with the special purpose of getting rid of Vega de Armijo and
the Minister of Marine, Ulloa. O’Donnell saw that the time
for resignation had come. He had lost the Queen's support by
trespassing upon the only department of politics on which she
held really strong views, respect for the claims of the Holy See;
the majority in Parliament had got quite beyond control; and
the Queen, by withholding her consent to a dissolution, had
refused to allow him to recruit a more submissive flock. The
country was growing restless; after five years of adventurous
foreign policy it was neither stronger nor weaker; after five
years' submission to the guidance of one man, no single
question of those that agitated it had been brought nearer to
a solution, nor had the long-standing animosities cooled. The
end of the opportunist coalition, from which sprang the Liberal
Union, came when O’Donnell resigned (Feb., 1863).
CHAPTER XII.
THE LAST YEARS OF ISABEL'S REIGN. (1863–1868.)
ISABEL followed the constitutional custom in consulting the
leaders of all the political parties before choosing her new
President of Council. From the Progressives, Cortina and
Madoz, she heard the real truth as to the political situation.
She was warned as to the extreme danger of government on
non-party lines. The country, misrepresented by Parliaments
really nominated by a colourless ministry, was deprived of the
legal means of expressing a healthy opposition; the sovereign,
when a ministry fell through lack of union due to selfish
interest, and not to political considerations, was left without
an alternative of choice. Disregarding their good advice, and
persisting in her refusal to dissolve the Cortes, Isabel called to
power the Marquis of Miraflores, a devoted servant of the
dynasty, a moderate Conservative, but committed to no views
calculated to rouse either violent opposition or violent
enthusiasm. It was a continuation of O'Donnell's policy of
excluding both of the two real parties, the Moderates and the
Progressives, from office. Miraflores showed a most con-
ciliatory spirit. The usual complete renewal of the whole
staff of public servants was for once not carried out. The
nation was informed of the benevolent intentions of its new
rulers, of their wish for an honest and economical adminis-
tration, and of their resolve to govern in strict obedience to the
Constitution. But no amount of fair words, even though they
carried with them the evidence of their speaker's good faith,
282 Last Years of Isabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
could secure a majority in an assembly constituted as was that
which the Queen had refused to dissolve. A great number of
deputies had remained faithful to the Liberal Union and its
leader; even those whose insubordination had weakened
O'Donnell refused to support his successor. Miraflores was
forced to prorogue the long-lived Cortes of 1858 (May 6, 1863).
Before deciding whether he should face them again, he sought
to bind the remnant of the United-Liberal deputies to himself
by taking Alonso Martinez and another of their leaders into his
Cabinet. In order to provide an extra seat, he created a new
Cabinet office, the Ministry of Overseas (Colonial). Even thus
he failed to evade the necessity for dissolution; and, moreover,
the Cortes were approaching their legal term. The general
election was fixed for October (1863); and Miraflores approached
it in what was considered a fair and honourable, nay, even a
generous fashion. Acknowledging that his sympathies marked
him as a Conservative, he frankly offered to allow the election
of a number of Progressives sufficient to form an Opposition.
The rejection of this offer by Olózaga opened a new epoch
in Spanish politics. The Progressives not only refused to assist
the ministry in its plan of reviving artificially the two great
parties, but, provoked by a circular prohibiting the presence of
persons not possessed of the franchise at political meetings,
the whole of the Radical and Democratic groups withdrew
from constitutional opposition. In justification of their con-
duct the Progressives published a manifesto to the nation.
In it Olózaga, Prim, Madoz, Sagasta, Ruiz Zorrilla, and other
well-known Liberals scornfully refused to lend themselves to
the “ridiculous make-believe of an election,” whereby successive
ministries contrive “that all Spain that has a voice in such
matters votes, as one man, the condemnation of their opponents,
and gives to the ministry a unanimous Congress to make use
of as it shall think fit.” The manifesto went on to declare that
the Constitution was violated, liberty outraged, the right of
public meeting denied even at election time. The name of the
XII] A'esignation of Miraflores 283
Queen was not once mentioned in this long document ; its
signatories declared that, while resolved to respect the law, they
did not reject the name of revolutionaries, “if by revolutionaries
are meant the enemies of a tyrannous faction.” The Democratic
group under Orense, Figueras, and Castelar issued a like protest.
Neither they nor the Progressives abandoned this attitude of
threatening aloofness until Isabel's throne had fallen. The
grievances alleged were very real, but they were not new. The
verdict of the most impartial of the Spanish writers in this
time is that only very extraordinary circumstances could warrant
so revolutionary an attitude. Miraflores had done nothing to
provoke it. On the contrary, his conduct, according to the
strange political code then in force, had been conspicuously
fair.
The Parliament, elected without contest, and consequently
without enthusiasm, soon broke up into violently hostile groups,
bound to their leaders by ties utterly unconnected with political
principle. The speech from the throne sought to disarm
criticism by hollow flattery addressed to all parties, and by
equally hollow promises of a rapidly approaching political
millennium. It also introduced the slight and unimportant
constitutional reforms to which the ministry stood pledged.
Their rejection by the Congress was sufficient to discourage
Miraflores from a further attempt to deal with so abnormal a
situation; he resigned Jan. 15, 1864. It was indeed impossible
to govern in face of the personal hostility of the Liberal Union
and the disdainful disapproval of Narvaez. Moreover the
Moderates had changed from lukewarm supporters to fierce
enemies. They were aggrieved by a more Liberal constitution
of the Senate; they held, too, that a dangerous laxity was shown
when the sentence of penal servitude pronounced upon certain
Protestant propagandists was reduced to one of banishment.
Rios Rosas and the Marqués del Duero refused to court defeat
at the hands of those who had turned out Miraflores. Arrazola
proved more bold and made the attempt. But, even after the
284 Last Years of Isabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
prorogation of the hostile Cortes, the deadlock remained, for
it was impossible to govern without the support of either
Narvaez or O'Donnell. All who played a part in public affairs
were followers of one or other of these military chiefs, or had
withdrawn with the Progressives and Democrats.
Arrazola’s ministry languished for six weeks, and took as
pretext for its resignation the Queen's refusal to sanction a dis-
solution of a Parliament only a few months old (Feb. 29, 1864).
Already the attitude of the Radicals and Democrats was caus-
ing some uneasiness; but Isabel had contrived to retain the
friendship, in appearance at least, of Prim, their most dangerous
leader. There was not much reason to fear a conspirator who
still looked to the sovereign for the means of gratifying a vast
ambition. The harsh Catalan was now hardly so enthusiastic
in his devotion to the person of the Queen as when he made
the statement of faith cited above (p. 241), but he, at any rate,
refrained from attacking the monarchy, as did his fellows,
or the Queen's conduct. There can be no doubt that, on
Arrazola’s fall, Prim expected to be called upon to form a
ministry and to lead back the Radicals from their secession.
When he found himself passed over, he was no longer a
constitutional opponent, but the bitter enemy of the Queen.
It is said—and nobody who is familiar with the manners pre-
valent in the Spanish Court under her Catholic Majesty,
Isabel II, will reject the tale as incredible—that, as Prim retired
one day from the royal presence after confidential discussion
of matters of high policy, fooled and flattered to the top of his
bent, he caught sight in a mirror of his sovereign, with protruded
tongue, directing towards his back the gesture wherewith bold
urchins mock their dominie. Prim had all the morbid pride of
the parvenu, and would not readily forgive contempt for his
growing importance.
Having lightly made an irreconcilable foe of the man who
held her fate in his hands, Isabel turned again to the opposite
party. Mon became President of the Council; but behind the
XII] Mom's ministry. Revolution in the air 285
Cabinet stood O’Donnell directing it by means of his clever
associate, Cánovas del Castillo, who had a seat in it. For a
time, under the revived influence of the Liberal Union, the
monarchical parties worked smoothly together. The Liberal
Union was indeed rapidly losing all right to the first part of its
title and closely allying itself with the retrograde party. Thus
supported, Mon’s ministry lasted six months. It settled once
more the ever-recurring question of constitutional reform by
adopting the Constitution of 1845 in its entirety; it promised
to do away with corrupt influence at elections, to fortify the
constitutional authority of the Congress, and to modify the
harsh law that rendered the press either dumb or servile. It
carried out, moreover, some useful and necessary social legisla-
tion. But attention was no longer fixed on the ministry and the
Cortes. Revolution was in the air; and all were awaiting the
moment when the Radicals could renounce their promise to
keep within the limits of the law, and, having retired from the
hustings, should reappear on the barricades.
- That such was their intention was made clear at a banquet
held in Madrid (May 3, 1864), when Olézaga declared that the
party no longer obeyed Espartero, who had proved himself unfit
for leadership by hesitating before “traditional obstacles” now
to be swept away. It was clear that by traditional obstacles the
throne was meant. O'Donnell advised stern repression as the
fitting answer to such a challenge. Thrice during the summer
revolution was on the point of breaking out; but the appoint-
ment of the civilian Olózaga to lead the Progressives had
thrown out of gear the revolutionary organisation in the army,
where Espartero's personal following was still strong. While
recommending that avowed enemies of the monarchy should
be put outside the law to be banished or imprisoned as the
ministry should think fit, O'Donnell was unwilling that the
odium entailed by such severity should attach to his own name.
Accordingly, when, by the help of his well-disciplined band, he
had brought about the fall of the Cabinet, he advised the Queen
286 Zast Years of /sabel's ſeign (1863–68) [CH.
to send for Narvaez, the one man who, in an age that regarded
treason as a venial offence, did not fear to visit it with the
penalties of the law, or, when the law was weak, to assume the
responsibility of punishment. Narvaez can hardly have failed
to see that the result, if not the purpose, of O'Donnell's action
must be to discredit him ; but he did not hesitate to come to
the rescue of the throne. He took as his colleagues Arrazola,
Córdova, Alejandro Llorente, and Gonzalez Bravo (Sept. 14,
1864). O'Donnell promised support; and the new ministry
began by declaring itself Liberal—a declaration sufficiently
belied by its composition—by publishing an amnesty, relaxing
the harsh press-law and remitting fines owing for its infringe-
ment. By these concessions it was hoped that public opinion
would be reassured. But again the Progressive Radicals and
Democrats abstained from taking part in the general election;
their manifesto published before the meeting of the Cortes
(Dec. 22, 1864) made it plain that they refused to have any
dealing with the Queen's Government.
The Cortes were asked to sanction the abandonment of
Santo Domingo. It was a humiliating admission of defeat; and
the Queen, always intensely patriotic, delayed it as long as
possible; but it was now full time to abandon so worthless
a cause. Unfortunately, this formal condemnation of
O'Donnell's foreign policy did not put an end to its results.
Spain's intervention in the West Indies and in Mexico had
spread alarm and irritation throughout Spanish America. Peru
had special reasons for discontent. Her independence had
never been fully recognised; and Spain still maintained a
number of claims against her dating from the time when she
was ruled by a viceroy. A diplomatic agent sent (Jan., 1864)
with a Spanish squadron to obtain satisfaction for private
grievances acted in the most aggressive manner, seizing the
Islas Chinchas, the vast guano deposits of which furnish a large
part of the revenue. The diplomatic body protested; but the
Spaniards remained in possession, disclaiming any intention of
xII] Narvaez in power. Warwith Peruand Chile 287
permanent occupation, but holding the Islands as a guarantee
for the satisfaction of their claims. Peru yielded and paid three
million dollars on condition that her islands should be restored
and her independence at length recognised (Feb. 2, 1865).
By this time other South American republics, feeling them-
selves threatened, and sure of sympathy in Europe, had made
the quarrel their own, prepared for war, and promised help to
Peru. The Spanish admiral, Pareja, peremptorily demanded
of the Chilian Government an explanation of its hostile attitude
and presented an ultimatum. War broke out; and the Chilians
gained a slight and accidental advantage by the capture of the
Spanish gunboat, Virgen de Covadonga (Nov., 1865). Admiral
Pareja, on hearing of the loss, blew out his brains; while among
the Chilians and Peruvians patriotic enthusiasm rose to the
highest pitch. But the little fleet of the two republics was
unable to hold the sea against the overwhelming Spanish force.
It took refuge under the batteries of Valparaiso; and Mendez
Nuñez, Pareja's successor, unable to get at it, cruelly bombarded
the city under the eyes of the foreign squadrons. Unable to
obtain supplies and coal in hostile waters, he made known his
plight to his Government. He was ordered to strike some
great blow for the honour of Spain before sailing for home.
Acting on these instructions he attacked Callao (May 2, 1866),
and withdrew wounded after a fierce battle in which both sides
claimed a victory. No peace was signed ; the only result of
Spain's attempt to browbeat her former colonies was the revival
of old hatreds along the Pacific coast.
These unprovoked and unnecessary wars had brought
Spanish credit to the lowest ebb. The accumulated deficit
of the ordinary budget had reached the sum of ten millions
sterling; the deficit of the extraordinary budget stood at a like
amount. London and Paris, already deeply involved and
disgusted at such reckless wastefulness, refused further help.
Heavy drafts had already been made upon the savings and
deposit banks. An issue of mortgage bonds at eighty-eight
288 Last Years of Isabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
failed; a forced loan, taking the usual form of anticipation of
taxation, had to be resorted to. It cost fourteen million pounds
to realise six millions. Nevertheless the ministry determined
to draw up a full statement of public debts and assets and to
consolidate. There still remained unsold a large amount of
national property taken over from the Church and the com-
munes, besides the vast estates of the Crown. The Queen
consented to alienate two-thirds of her estates; and the minis-
terial newspapers overflowed with laudation of her gracious
generosity (Feb., 1865). But a quite new light was cast upon
the whole transaction when Emilio Castelar, the “great tribune”
of later days, then a rising pamphleteer and Professor at the
University, pointed out that, far from sacrificing herself, the
Queen would gain immensely by the proposed scheme. It was
easy for a Professor of History to show that the royal patrimony
had never been considered as the private property of the
sovereign, but rather one of the main sources of public
revenue. An improvident ministry, Castelar showed, was about
to squander this vast national capital, to make a present of a
quarter of its value to the Queen whilst leaving to her the most
desirable of the Crown domains. The Court clamoured for
Castelar to be deprived of his professorial chair: the Rector of
the University refused, and was removed from his post. The
students of the University proposed to serenade the bold men
who had withstood the ministry. The necessary permission
was granted ; when, however, it became clear that the Home
Office had allowed what was really a demonstration against the
ministry, the permission was withdrawn. But the students
persisted in their proposed procession; crowds collected and
were dispersed only by cavalry charges. Many were wounded,
and several lives were lost. The municipality and the Pro-
vincial Council were superseded for openly expressing their
disapproval of the action of the ministry. The memory of
the Night of St Daniel (April, 1865) hastened the coming
Revolution.
XII] Clerical influences at Court 289
When Narvaez became President of the Council, Queen
Cristina returned to Madrid. The ingratitude with which she
had been treated by the Liberals did not blind her to the risks
incurred by her daughter in following the political guidance
of scandalous favourites, or of those who persuaded her that
duty to the Church admits of no consideration of expediency.
More than once ministers had to intervene to remove from
Isabel's side secretaries who had gained undue influence.
On the other hand stood the clerical band. Mention has
already been made of the half-cunning and half-crazy nun, Sor
Maria de los Dolores Patrocinio. A more regular influence
was that exercised in the royal councils by Fray Cirilio de la
Alameda, Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo and general of the
Franciscans. His political antecedents suffice to indicate his
opinions. A person of some authority at the Court of
Ferdinand VII, he had later fought for the Church and
Absolutism as a member of the Council of Don Carlos. He
had followed the Pope in acknowledging Isabel and had dis-
avowed the rash attempt made at San Carlos de la Rápita by
his former associates. His entire devotion to the interests of
the Church and his Order made him a most dangerous guide.
Hardly less influential was the Queen's confessor, Father Claret.
His revivalist sermons, combining the narrowest doctrine with
the most awful denunciations, sent a pleasant shudder through
the ladies of the Court. The presence of these pious folk
about the Palace and their vast influence over the Queen were
clearly dangerous. Isabel had been repeatedly warned, but
she sought to atone for private feelings by submission to those
who professed to have her highest interests at heart. Whatever
their other faults, they were not, like most of her lay advisers,
guided by obvious selfishness and ambition. Thus the
camarilla stood behind the throne, outlasting all ministries.
Each in turn railed against its undue influence when out of
power; some tried to get rid of it; but no party could hold
office for long without sharing power with it and flattering its
C. S. I9
290 Last Years of Isabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
members. That Isabel the Queen was too often the mouth-
piece of monks and nuns, whilst Isabel the woman scandalised
Europe by the irregularity of her private life betokens no
hypocrisy. She was not only frank, generous, high-spirited,
confiding, and forgiving, but unaffectedly pious also, as piety
was understood by those who formed her ideas. Her utter
ignorance blinded her to the essentials of public duty; she
inherited the private vices of her grandmother and her father ;
her bringing-up had been such as to endanger even the best
and purest nature; but she risked her crown for conscience’
sake, and certainly she would have sacrificed herself for the
good of her subjects. The world laughed when Pius IX
conferred upon her the emblematic Golden Rose. Yet in
most respects she was probably as worthy to wear it as any.
Even the masterful Narvaez, in spite of his honest deter-
mination to keep his independence and to govern with the
Consent and approval of the Cortes, found himself after a
month or two dependent upon the retrograde group which took
its cue from the camarilla. Now that the Radicals abstained
from taking part in elections, the usual pressure upon voters
had been somewhat relaxed; and the number of deputies, mere
creatures of the ministry, was somewhat less than usual.
Narvaez' Liberal programme had had the effect of defining a
strong ultramontane and Conservative group in the Congress.
This group sold its support only on conditions. But com-
promise alienated the other wing ; the Liberals began to desert.
In nine months Narvaez had forfeited the allegiance of the
central Liberal group represented by men of the type of
Alejandro Llorente, and had won in return the approval of
Nocedal and San Luis. Persuasion now gave place to coercion.
The press, which had been abusing a partial freedom, found
itself bound hand and foot. Fine and suspension punished
“intended misdemeanour” (delito frustrado), that is to say,
opinions expressed in unpublished articles submitted to
previous censure. This measure was followed by a circular
xII] O'Donne/Z substituted for AVarvaez 291
directing governors of provinces to punish all attacks on the
foundations of political and social order “which common sense
in all countries and constitutional legislation in Spain have
placed beyond the reach of controversy.” Even before the
riots of St Daniel's Night, Narvaez' majority in the Congress
had been reduced to twenty-nine by the secession of the centre
under Alonso Martinez, Cánovas del Castillo, and Francisco
Silvela. After the riots the Queen called in O’Donnell. She
feared to share Narvaez' intense unpopularity and to face
the fury of her capital, gagged but by no means reduced to
impotence by the arbitrary supersession of its provincial and
municipal assemblies. Prim had indeed failed to raise the
country when he landed in disguise at Valencia in June. His
associates had succeeded no better at Pamplona and Saragossa;
but the situation was known to be one of extreme danger.
The army, though still perplexed by Espartero's retirement
from militant politics and by the new anti-monarchical
Radicalism, was seething with discontent. To get a unanimous
Parliament of enthusiastic loyalists was easy; yet everybody
knew that the opposite party was daily becoming more powerful
and more audacious.
Narvaez having been sacrificed to popular outcry, O’Donnell
(June 29, 1865) took Cánovas del Castillo, Alonso Martinez,
Posada Herrera, and Zabala into his Cabinet, and once more
sought to entice the Radicals from their abstention by offering
places in the ministry and in the Chambers. But the wiles
of “the great sophist” failed, as did also an attempt to cut the
ground from under them by adopting some of the articles of
their programme. The harsh press regulations were relaxed ;
the property qualification for electors was reduced by half, with
the result of doubling the number of those who possessed the
franchise; the suspended municipality of Madrid was restored;
and the kingdom of Italy was recognised. This last measure
brought upon O’Donnell's Cabinet the fierce hostility of the
clergy. Father Claret and Sister Patrocinio rebuked even their
19–2
292 Zast Years of Isabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
royal patroness for her consent, however unwilling, to formal
friendship with the usurpers of the dominions of the Holy
Father. They were sent into honourable banishment in con-
vents of their Orders. This show of Liberalism, while it failed
to win over the Radicals, so thoroughly alienated the Moderates
that they too were on the point of withdrawing from partici-
pation in public affairs. Meanwhile Prim and Castelar took
advantage of the relaxation of police supervision to make
inflammatory speeches in Madrid. The discipline of the army
was known to be undermined; but the extent of its disaffection
was miscalculated by the Revolutionaries. Prim, impatient to
be rid of the “traditional obstacles,” twice more produced
partial and unsuccessful risings. The summer wore away with
cholera and unrest at Madrid, whilst the Court amused itself
with scandalous levity in cool retreats on the Cantabrian coast
and in the Guadarrama mountains. e
The new Cortes were opened by the Queen in a speech
breathing idyllic calm (Dec., 1865). Even sober citizens were
convinced that Isabel's government and the welfare of Spain
were incompatible when she spoke the foolish words put into
her mouth, “setting, one and all, before our eyes the public
good as our sole aim, taking the nation's opinion as our
guide, the law as our rule, and invoking the name of God,
there will never fail us, as we hope, that cordial understanding
between the powers of the State which establishes peace and
progress in the present and ensures prosperous and happy
days for future generations.” In January, 1866, while Spain
was humiliated by the inglorious results of the wanton war
with Chile and Peru, and was passing through a great com-
mercial crisis provoked by the withdrawal of foreign capital
in anticipation of the coming Revolution, Prim put himself at
the head of two regiments that had made their pronunciamiento
at Villarejo near Madrid. But the movement did not spread
as he hoped. Pursued by Zabala, the Minister of War, he
withdrew into Portugal, being careful in his retreat not to
XII] A'evolutionary attempts of Prim 293
render his party unpopular by requisitioning villages or allowing
plunder. From Portugal he issued an impudent manifesto
declaring that “the hindrances that obliged him to rest for a
while would soon cease to exist.” The allusion was perhaps
to the monarchical principles of Espartero, who, though
formally deposed, was still recognised by the old school of
Progressives as their leader. Prim himself later declared that
he had thought that a small show of force would have sufficed
to bring about a bloodless revolution and to save property and
the dynasty from terrible dangers. But no such homoeopathic
system sufficed to cure. Enquiry showed that the abortive
rising had adherents throughout the army, and that only
almost incredible blundering and cowardly hesitation on the
part of officers involved had prevented it from becoming
general. -
A short lull followed, during which the Cabinet demanded
of the Chambers extraordinary powers, military and financial,
to meet the coming crisis. A bill of indemnity by anticipation
was passed ; and for the last time negotiations were undertaken
to induce the Radical leaders to reconsider their position. It
is stated on the best authority that they were about to accept
the offer of a ministry under Lersundi, a complete amnesty, and
a general election without ministerial pressure, when O’Donnell,
who had not been consulted, defeated the scheme by sending
Lersundi to Cuba as Governor. So Prim and his assistants,
Moriones and Sagasta, betook themselves again to remaking
their shattered and half-abandoned plans.
Then came another and a still more peremptory warning,
the mutiny of the sergeants of artillery in the barracks of
San Gil at Madrid (June 22, 1866). The mutiny sprang from
a purely military grievance, but was artfully turned to political
ends by Prim. While in other branches of the army privates
could rise by long or brilliant service to commissioned rank, in
the artillery it was not so. The corps had always been
exclusive, maintaining a much higher standard of discipline
294 Last Years of Isabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
and efficiency than the infantry or cavalry. Its officers, from
general to subalterns, claimed to be of noble, or at least of
gentle birth. At the head of the non-commissioned ranks
stood the first sergeants (primeros sargentos), a survival of
medieval organisation, many of whom were grey-haired veterans
well educated in the scientific details of their profession. They
possessed a vast influence over their men, with whom they
lived in barracks, whereas the officers were quartered or lived
with their families outside. On more than one occasion
removal of the disability to rise in their own corps had been
promised to the first sergeants. But the officers devoted to
their aristocratic tradition hotly opposed the change. The
Sergeants, bitterly resenting their disappointment and rightly
attributing it to the haughty exclusiveness of their officers,
listened to the revolutionary propaganda carried on by civilians
like Sagasta or soldiers like Moriones. Finally they decided
on mutiny, and after shooting down their officers marched with
thirty cannon to attack the Ministry of the Interior.
Madrid was saved by the coolness and bravery of the
officers in high command. It happened that Serrano, Echagüe,
the brothers Concha, Quesada, and ROS de Olano, as well as
O’Donnell, Zabala, and Narvaez himself, were in Madrid. All
showed the greatest energy. General Chacon, at great personal
risk, recalled his regiment to discipline; waverers were over-
awed; and the tide was turned against the mutineers. Zabala
met and drove them back; Serrano and others cleared the
streets. Narvaez was somewhat severely wounded. Sixty-six
executions followed. This severity horrified the public. It
is said that O'Donnell declared in private that the blood would
mount to the Queen's chamber and drown her. Yet these
men had murdered their officers, and in a rash attempt to seize
the ministers had caused the loss of eight hundred lives. A
similar mutiny broke out at Gerona, but it met with no
support; and the survivors with difficulty reached the French
frontier. Prim, the organiser of both attempts, appeared on
XII] AWarvaez substituted for O'Donne/Z 295
the Bidassoa, but was prevented from entering Spain by the
news of their failure.
It was a tradition that bloodshed in the capital should be
followed by resignation of the ministry, however blameless.
Accordingly, after proclaiming martial law, O'Donnell resigned,
as Narvaez had resigned after the riots of the year before.
Narvaez took his place. Once more a carefully-planned
insurrection had failed; and again its failure was due to lack of
obedience. Prim had ordered the Madrid conspirators not to
move until Valladolid, Burgos, Miranda, San Sebastian, and
Catalonia had made their pronunciamiento. But the Spanish
Cabinet, warned by the French police, had taken the precaution
of breaking up the suspected regiments. The over-eagerness
of the artillery sergeants, whose military grievance was much
dearer to them than any political programme, had defeated its
own object, had justified the imposition of martial law, and had
brought about the return to power of the avowed Moderates,
“the light-horse of absolutism.” But the Radicals had no
cause for discouragement. Fvery day added to the numbers of
those who held revolution to be not only justifiable but necessary.
Two years more, and the men who had been most active in
crushing the revolt of the artillery sergeants would lead the
attack upon the throne. Men of strong monarchical views were
at the time making common cause with Republicans and
Democrats to sweep away the “traditional obstacle.”
The Court and the middle class of Madrid welcomed the
strong hand of Narvaez when he came into power for the last
time (June 10, 1866). Under him order was secure as long as
it was humanly possible to preserve it. But discipline hardly
brings popularity or gratitude to the disciplinarian. The
Spanish Liberals were quite in earnest when they cried out
against it as tyranny. Yet Narvaez was no uncompromising
Absolutist. He would have lived content and done his duty
under any system strong enough to secure good order. He
ever showed respect for genuine Liberal sentiment. He even
296 Zast Years of Isabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
called himself a Liberal; and, if he was repeatedly obliged to
punish, it was because he dealt with an irreconcilable party.
Even now, at the last, he tried conciliation and aided the escape
of many who had forfeited their lives by participation in
rebellion. But soon the attitude of opponents and the clamour
of supporters alike sent him back to his favourite plan of a six
months' dictatorship to drill Spain into a fitting mood to profit
by the liberty she demanded. His ideas were shared and his
methods approved by the Minister of the Interior. Gonzalez
Bravo did not, however, like Narvaez, claim to be called a
Liberal. Acting in perfect harmony they gagged the press,
suspended representative assemblies in the provinces and
municipalities, filled the towns with spies, and banished their
opponents one by one. They announced their intention to
bring back morality and religion into the scheme of teaching,
in other words to suppress lay education. The Constitution
directed that the Cortes should meet at least once in each year.
They had now been prorogued since July, 1865. The extra-
ordinary powers granted to O’Donnell had been taken over by
Narvaez. They would lapse with the reassembly of the Parlia-
ment that conferred them. Narvaez showed no inclination to
lay down his dictatorship. The year 1866 was drawing to an
end when the deputies present in the capital petitioned the
Queen against the reckless illegality of the Government. The
petition lay in the House of Congress, and had already received
many signatures, when (Dec. 28) Count Cheste, the captain-
general, broke in, insulted the President of Congress, Rios
Rosas, and cleared the House. He then issued a circular
threatening those whose names were found on the petition.
Rios Rosas and many others, among them Cánovas del Castillo,
were banished. This means of reaching the ear of the Queen
having failed, it was decided to make use of General Serrano.
As a grandee, he had the right of entry to the Palace; as
President of the Senate, the right to speak in the name of the
representative assemblies. But neither this nor his former
XII] AVezv Cortes summoned 297
intimacy with the Queen availed him. He was banished to
the Balearic Islands.
Even Narvaez and Gonzalez Bravo could not govern in-
definitely without a Parliament. They resolved, however, not
to reassemble the one that had made so unseemly a claim to
independence. New Cortes were summoned for March 30,
1867. The decree convoking them declared that the Con-
stitution had hitherto been misunderstood, but that the Cortes
would now apply it “in a manner more in keeping with the
sentiments of the nation and would give back its ancient force
to the prerogative of power.” “The time has come,” it said,
“for Spaniards to be governed in accordance with the spirit
of their history and the feelings that make up their essential
character.”
The new Lower Chamber contained only four members of
the constitutional (United Liberal) Opposition, though the
Count of San Luis and Nocedal captained semi-independent
groups. The Marquis of Miraflores was nominated President
of the Senate; and Serrano was allowed to return from his
banishment to occupy his seat. The decree imposing martial
law was revoked. Successive ministries obstinately shut their
eyes to the dangers that surrounded them, or at least to the
permanence of their dangers; and, each time some ill-timed
effort of the revolutionaries was crushed, they acted as though
the crisis was over. It is true that the army had given its
formal adhesion to a kind of retrograde pronunciamiento,
curiously illustrative of the military and political manners of
the time. Captain-General Narvaez sent a circular forbidding
soldiers to take sides in political questions; every regiment
acknowledged the circular by protesting its complete devotion
to the Government of Prime-Minister Narvaez.
Though some Democrats and Republicans under Castelar
and Pi y Margall kept a separate organisation, others had voted
side by side with the Progressives at a Conference held at
Ostend (Aug., 1866). The programme adopted by the main
298 Last Years of /sabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
body of the malcontents was sufficiently definite, though
expulsion of the Bourbons was kept somewhat in the back-
ground for fear of alienating officers scrupulous as to their oath
of allegiance. But it was not only Republicans, Democrats,
and Progressives who despaired of finding a peaceful issue
from an intolerable situation. The Liberal Union now figured
so largely among the exiled conspirators that it was thought
advisable to offer to O’Donnell the leadership of the whole
enterprise. Prim declared himself willing to abdicate and to
serve under him ; but O’Donnell refused to commit himself.
In the Lower House of the new Cortes Cánovas del Castillo
gave solemn warning as to the danger of repressing all legitimate
expression of public opinion. Gonzalez Bravo, answering him,
made no apology for the policy of the Cabinet. Things have
reached such a point, he argued, that compromise is no longer
possible ; the battle of Armageddon is upon us. “Does this
House imagine,” he said, “that the ministry is unaware of the
ineluctable responsibility it is incurring? I know that the votes
of the two Chambers do not absolve us from that deadly
responsibility; and that not only we, but others also, shall be
overwhelmed if a time should come when the raging force of
revolutionary passion is let loose....The day the tide of revolu-
tion returns, nobody and nothing of that which makes this
country what it is will escape.” It was a challenge, and a bold
one, to the nation from the throne and the ministry. Each
day their isolation increased; even the royal family was falling
away. The Duke of Seville, brother of the King-consort,
published his sympathy with the exiled Liberals, avowing that
he would rather live abroad poor and obscure than submit to
constant and irritating police supervision. He was punished
by deprivation of his rank and orders. The Duke of Mont-
pensier, too, joined the party of the future; his warning and
protest still further alienated the Queen. Her loose and
Bohemian Court stood condemned before the almost sancti-
monious respectability of her brother-in-law's household.
XII] Vain attempts at repression 299
Meanwhile the Government was increasing its already large
stock of repressive weapons. A decree conferred on provincial
governors and on mayors power to expel on mere suspicion
persons whom they held to be dangerous. Newspapers were
made liable to suspension if guilty of thrice submitting to the
censor matter that he considered’ objectionable. Publication
in a newspaper of certain clauses of the Constitution under
which the country was supposed to be ruled, unaccompanied
by comment, was considered as a manifesto of disaffection.
So a clandestine press sprang up; and E! Relâmpago (The
Lightning-flash) equalled the scurrility of El Murciélago of
twelve years before. It gave to the world the generally-believed
story that the Queen was helpless in the hands of the camarilla
and her husband, held in terror by threats to disclose autograph
letters affecting the legitimacy of her children. Even the
foreign press broke silence when, on the reconstruction of
Narvaez' ministry, Marfori, the latest favourite, was transferred
from the civil governorship of Madrid to the Ministry of
Marine.
Whilst the submissive and almost unanimous Chambers—
unanimous because Senators who voted against the Government
were at once expelled—were passing votes of confidence, and
approving all the stringent decrees of O’Donnell and Narvaez,
the plans of the revolutionaries were again approaching Com-
pletion. Their organisation was somewhat better than before;
but once more it broke down when put to the test. In
August (1867) the signal was given ; and Prim appeared at
Valencia. No longer seeking to win the army through its
generals, as Espartero had done, he addressed his pleading to
subalterns and non-commissioned officers and privates. To
the rank and file he promised abolition of conscription. But
this promise at once divided the army. The officers, seeing
their position threatened, helped the civil authorities; Prim's
enterprise failed. His lieutenant, Moriones, met with no
better success in Catalonia. With a small band of followers he
3OO Zast Years of Isabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
manoeuvred successfully to avoid capture. But the rebellion
did not spread; and he retired again behind the shelter of the
French frontier. In many other districts, notably at Bejar,
simultaneous assemblies of malcontents in arms took place.
Yet, as soon as armed resistance had ceased, the ministry
regained confidence, and, believing its victory to be as complete
as it had been easy, pardoned all concerned. Perhaps this
seeming magnanimity sprang from fear of treasured rancour,
and the fierce revenge of a successful Revolution.
O'Donnell had abdicated the leadership of the shattered
Liberal Union, and refused the advances of the Progressives.
But Dulce, his successor, was in communication with Prim.
Serrano and Admiral Topete were negotiating with the Duke
of Montpensier, who hoped, by dethroning his sister-in-law, at
last to fulfil the purpose of his life. But so long as O'Donnell
lived, and refused to join the extremists, there remained a hope
that a middle course might be found which would satisfy
moderate men without raising the dynastic question. O’Donnell
had taken part in Revolutions, both Conservative and Liberal ;
but, his ambition once satisfied, his practical sense and strong
will had been directed to combat both extremes. His some-
what sudden death at Biarritz (Nov. 5, 1867) removed one of
the two barriers that stood between the throne and Revolution.
O'Donnell dead, and Espartero finally withdrawn from politics,
Narvaez alone remained of the three generals who figure so
largely in the blood-stained history of the middle of the
nineteenth century. He, too, died within six months of
O'Donnell; and the throne which he had so often saved did
not outlast him for half a year. As champion of a bad woman
and a bad Queen he was pledged to a worthless and corrupt
cause. But he was the noblest and most disinterested of the
party that produced the best men and best Spaniards of the
time. It was his misfortune to live when the Conservative and
old-Spanish element in the nation was radically divided by the
dynastic question. Most of those who might otherwise have
xII] Deaths of O'Donne// and Marvaez 301
been his staunchest supporters in his long struggle against the
forces of disorder were pledged to the Carlist cause. .
Queen Isabel either failed to understand or artfully ignored
her danger. When the Cortes reassembled (Dec. 27, 1867) she
congratulated the nation on “the success of a policy as
energetic as it was far-seeing and wise.” She summoned to
Narvaez' place the man she thought most suited to carry on
his policy. Gonzalez Bravo was a man of strong views and
great courage. But the arms that Narvaez had successfully
wielded were too heavy for his hands; he sought to make up
for lack of authority by violence; where Narvaez was severe,
Gonzalez Bravo was bitter. The situation demanded a soldier;
but Gonzalez Bravo declared that, though a civilian, he could
play the dictator, and would make generals bend their gaudy
backs before his plain coat. He seemed to be determined to
make his countrymen feel the weight of their chains.
A few days after Narvaez' death Isabel's last Parliament
stood prorogued. For the past year it had been so thoroughly
convinced of its utter insignificance in the struggle which had
begun that two-thirds of its members had ceased to attend.
They knew that the really significant announcements and
declarations of policy were made not by ministers in the Con-
gress, but by Sagasta, editor of Za Iberia, the newspaper of the
united Democratic, Republican, and Liberal parties. Gonzalez
Bravo seemed anxious to hasten on the struggle and to bring
his adversaries to a trial of strength. He recklessly inaugurated
his dictatorship by banishing all leaders of the Liberal Union
who still remained in Spain. Generals Serrano, Dulce, Zabala,
Córdova, and Echagüe started for the Canary Islands. On
their way through Cadiz, the Unionist generals entered into
communications with the local revolutionary committee, and,
more important still, obtained promise of aid from Admiral
Topete, commander of the Atlantic Squadron. Topete and
most of his officers were moderate Liberals; to the general
grievances against the ministry they added a peculiar one as
302 Last Years of /sabel's Reign (1863–68) [CH.
sailors; the Navy Estimates had been ruthlessly cut down by
Gonzalez Bravo, at his wits' end for money. Still unsatisfied
with the solitude his “senseless outrage" had made around the
throne and the ministry, Gonzalez Bravo decided that the royal
family must feel the weight of his hand. He banished the
Duke of Montpensier and his wife, the Queen's sister. The
Duke retaliated by issuing from Lisbon a protest which was in
fact, though not in form, a justification of the coming Revolution.
He had long ago incurred the penalty against which he pro-
tested and spent large sums in aid of the vast conspiracy. All
parties were agreed that Isabel's throne must fall; they were
content to postpone the question as to what should take its
place. The Duke, like others, hoped that the cataclysm would
turn to his advantage. The Republicans and Democrats, too,
had their solution ready. Even the Carlists proved willing to
further their ends in an alliance with the Liberal mammon
of unrighteousness. Negotiations went so far that Sagasta
journeyed to England to consult with Cabrera. But during
their interview fundamental differences of opinion cropped
up, and rendered agreement impossible. Sagasta returned to
Belgium without seeing Don Carlos; once more the honesty
of the Carlists triumphed over its need of a powerful alliance.
Admiral Topete and his four frigates gave to the Revolution
not only the nucleus of a force, but means of coming and going
and of communication through the open door of Cadiz. It
was decided to act at once. A first plan, according to which
the garrison of Ceuta was to revolt and be brought across to
Spain by the squadron, was abandoned; and the honour of
making the pronunciamiento was reserved for the sailors. Prim,
Sagasta, and Ruiz Zorrilla reached Gibraltar in disguise
(Sept. 16), and were secretly conveyed on board Topete's
ships. Two days later the booming of guns announced that
the admiral had proclaimed from the bridge the sovereignty
of the people. The sailors, with their allies ashore, took
possession of Cadiz without bloodshed. A few batteries of
XII] 7%e revolutionary manifesto 3O3
artillery refused to join the pronunciamiento; but their numbers
were too small to allow them to attempt resistance.
Meanwhile the banished generals were on their way back
from the Canary Islands. They reached Cadiz on the day
following the admiral's pronunciamiento. At once a conference
was held to discuss plans. Topete, as straightforward as he
was brave, demanded help to enable him to carry out his
engagements to the Duke of Montpensier. According to him
the only way in which “the people” could legitimately and
wisely make use of the liberty he had proclaimed was by con-
ferring the crown on that astute prince. But the others, more
cunning, postponed the sharing of spoils until after the victory.
They drew up, however, a manifesto, entitled “Spain with
Honour,” and addressed, “To all Liberals, to the richer classes,
lovers of order, upholders of the liberties of the individual,
ministers of the altar whose aim it is to choke all the springs
of vice and bad example, to the whole people, and to the
appreciation of Europe.” The rest of the document bore signs—
scarcely less equivocal than the strange cross-classification—
of the excitement under which it was composed. Its declara-
tions were vague, for the views of Serrano, Prim, Sagasta,
Topete, and the others whose signatures it bore, varied widely.
They agreed, however, that scandals must cease; “that the
person charged with the observation of the Constitution should
not be its irreconcilable enemy; and that the considerations
which decided the most important questions should be such
as could be named before mothers, wives, and daughters.”
They announced that a new Government, founded on uni-
versal suffrage, would unite and represent all the vital forces
of the nation and inaugurate an era of social and political
regeneration.
Without further progress towards decision of the vast
question they had raised, the leaders of the revolution separated.
Topete was left to cooperate with the junta that had taken the
direction of affairs at Cadiz. Prim sailed away eastward with
3O4 Last Years of /sabel's Reign ( 186 3–68) [CH.
the revolted squadron to raise the cities of the Mediterranean
seaboard. Serrano went inland to Seville, which had followed
the example of Cadiz and made its pronunciamiento. He
undertook to gather and organise the military forces of the
rebellion in order to meet the troops that would be sent against
them. Success, however, seemed assured from the first.
Málaga, Granáda, and Huelva welcomed the rebellion; the
coast towns, both Atlantic and Mediterranean, were stirring.
That many more regiments would come over was certain.
Even guardships on the Cantabrian coast deserted the Queen
and steamed away to join their comrades. The Duke of Mont-
pensier formally offered his services; but they were respectfully
declined by the revolted generals “for important political
reasons.” Queen Isabel was at San Sebastian when the news
from Cadiz reached her. She saw that the affair was serious;
she was not convinced that it was desperate. Gonzalez Bravo,
her minister, was not lacking in spirit; he did not fear to face
the dangers he had foreseen and in a great measure provoked.
But it was no time for civilian leadership. He therefore gave
up the Presidency of the Council to the Minister for War,
General José Concha, Marqués de la Habana. Concha
divided the command of the army between four generals, his
brother Manuel, Marqués del Duero; Pezuela, Conde de
Cheste; Pavia, Marqués de Novaliches; and Calonge.
In Calonge's district Santander and Santoña had made
pronunciamientos. Santander was retaken. Barcelona and
Saragossa, generally the first in revolts, remained quiet for
a time under Pezuela. Novaliches had been sent forward to
hold the line of the Guadalquivir, or, failing that, the passes of
Sierra Morena. His was by far the most difficult position;
the force at his disposal, about Io, ooo men, was notably
insufficient for the task set it. On September 26 he was in the
valley of the Guadalquivir between Andújar and Córdova.
His plan was to seize the Bridge of Alcolea, the recognised
key to the position ever since St Ferdinand's days, and then to
XII] Battle of Alco/ea. Flight of the Queen 305
march on Córdova by both banks of the river. Meanwhile
he left a small detachment of his troops to keep open the
passes of Sierra Morena in his rear. On the eve of the attempt
to seize the bridge, he received a letter from Serrano, warning
him against opposing the clearly-expressed will of the nation by
disputing the passage of the liberating army. But Novaliches
was too good a soldier to be turned from his purpose by the
letter, or by the arguments of its bearer, Lopez de Ayala, the
scribe of the revolutionary party and author of the manifesto
“Spain with Honour.” He replied that his command had been
conferred upon him by the established authorities, and that he
intended to do his duty. But, while his words were bold, his
action was feeble and hesitating. He allowed the enemy to
seize the bridge of Alcolea, and thus leave the Royalist troops
cut in two by the broad and rapid river. The engagement
began by a skirmish between the smaller division of Novaliches'
troops occupying the right bank, and a force about equal in
number. Here the revolutionaries had the advantage; but,
when Novaliches, with the main body, attacked the bridge
itself, the superiority of his artillery told heavily in his favour.
His men, however, lacked enthusiasm. Their spiritless assault
was easily beaten off; and Novaliches himself was wounded.
The losses on either side were equal, about 8oo men. The
Royalist wounded remained on the field, for the troops sent to
bring them in went over to the enemy. At nightfall Novaliches
fell back on both banks (Sept. 29, 1868) and left the way to
the capital open before Serrano. On the same day Madrid
made its pronunciamiento. The two armies on the Guadal-
quivir united ; and Serrano followed precedent by promising
his late opponents rewards and remissions of service equal to
those guaranteed to his own men.
On September 30, Queen Isabel crossed the Bidassoa into
France, exclaiming, “I thought I had struck deeper roots in
this land.” Her throne had fallen in a single skirmish. Her
reign had been a period of almost uninterrupted anarchy, amidst
C. S. 2O
306 Last Years of Isabel's A&eign (1863–68) [CH.
which political theories became merely war-cries. Self-seeking,
envy, or revenge often affords the only clue to its tangled history.
The Church and the army, the two organisations that alone
resisted disintegration, alternately swayed the distracted country.
But not even they were united. By the Carlist split the Church
had lost half her power; in the army the commissioned officers
were for the most part men of Moderate views, whilst the non-
commissioned and privates were, like the class from which they
sprang, Radicals. On Isabel fell the sins, political and private,
of her ancestors for two generations, her grandfather's folly,
her father's cynical brutality and reckless opposition to the
spirit of his age. The division of the royal family into two
bitterly hostile factions had undermined Spain's chivalrous
loyalty to the person of the sovereign. The scandals of Isabel's
Court and her faithlessness in political matters extinguished it
altogether. She had the disadvantage of being left in early youth
without experienced male relatives to guide and advise her.
Her nearest kin, with the exception of her brave and able, but
capricious and avaricious mother, were Don Carlos and his
brothers, and the scheming Duke of Montpensier. Her un-
manly husband was of no account, except as the tool of the
camarilla. -
The enthusiastic Liberal movements of 1812 and 1820 had
indeed attained their object, in that they finally broke down
absolutism; but its place was taken by an evil no less great, the
tyranny of ministers. The representative system, implanted on
a soil unprepared for it, was from the first, as it is to-day,
a hollow sham, the tool and stalking-horse of a faction or
an individual. Jostled by the noisy crowd of political charlatans
and self-seekers, or still sunk in the ignorance and apathy of
ages, the majority remained voiceless amid the contending
cries, or ceased, after a brief struggle, to try to understand or to
obtain a hearing. From their apathy they were occasionally
roused by appeals to their most deeply-rooted prejudices. The
charges that did most harm to the Liberals were those of
XII] The A’evolution and its results 3O7
atheism, heresy, freemasonry, favouring of foreigners and foreign
institutions. The repetition of these charges brought persecu-
tion; and it was persecution that made the Liberals, or at least
a section of them, anti-religious and anti-monarchical at last.
They became persecutors in turn ; and even the most worthy
among them resorted at times to means that no end, however
praiseworthy, could justify. Their weakness lay in the fact
that their only consistent supporters were the town mobs,
the elements of disorder. The Liberals, it cannot be too
often repeated, were a small minority in the nation. The
repression and persecutions carried on by the Conservatives
are explained, if not justified, by the fact that Spain, as a whole,
if it could have been stirred to thought and action, would have
belonged to them or to the Carlists. The Liberals had perhaps
the better cause and the more generous enthusiasm. The
Conservatives ranged against them the better men and tradi-
tion. Political morality sank to an almost incredibly low ebb.
Public good was utterly lost sight of ; often its very pretence
was dropped. Shocking as are the facts, they fall far below
the monstrous accusations recklessly bandied from side to side
without arousing indignation amongst those by whom they
were believed, nor protest from those against whom they were
directed. Above the warring factions stood the Court and the
camarilla, alternately butt, arbiter, victim, protector, executioner,
and protégée, till at last the factions united to overthrow one
stronghold of the corruption that still curses Spain.
2O—2
CHAPTER XIII.
THE INTERREGNUM AND THE REIGN OF
KING AMADEO. (1868–1873.)
QUEEN ISABEL quitted Spain half-frantic with grief, refusing
to believe that the verdict of Alcolea was final and that she
would return no more to misrule the land. She honestly loved
her people, and she did not realise that she had forfeited the
enthusiastic affection that had so often greeted her in Madrid
and in the great provincial cities. She was aware that she had
been betrayed by Serrano and Montpensier; she knew nothing
of the vast body of public opinion behind them. At the
frontier she was met by an offer of hospitality from the
Emperor Napoleon, who was at Biarritz, and was in fact on
the point of becoming her guest when the revolution overtook
her. She accepted the Castle of Pau as a temporary residence,
and was welcomed as her train passed Biarritz by the Emperor
in person. A few miles further on, at Bayonne, she was met
by Gonzalez Bravo and other members of her last ministry;
and a proclamation solemnly affirming her right was drawn up.
“With my eyes turned towards my country,” said the deposed
Queen, “I hasten to formulate before God and before men
an explicit and solemn protest. The violence that has forced
me to quit Spain must in no respect prejudice the integrity of
my rights.”
In Madrid the Revolution had been carried out with
little disturbance of public order. The Queen, it may almost
be said, had no political friends; and her private ones were
CH. XIII] The junta in Madrid 3O9
people of little influence and less courage. Not a single
general made offer of his services to restore her throne. The
Marqués de la Habana saw that resistance was hopeless, and
finding his opinion confirmed by a council of war, handed over
the capital to the charge of the Captain-General of the district,
his brother, Marqués del Duero. He resigned his civil powers
to a junta hastily elected to carry on the government. In it
figured representatives of all the parties, Republican, Demo-
cratic, Progressive, and United-Liberal, that had made common
cause against Queen Isabel and Gonzalez Bravo. The President
was Madoz, and its military chief Ros de Olano. After solemnly
declaring that the Bourbon family had forfeited all right to
the throne of Spain, it sent assurances to Prim and Serrano
that it regarded its functions as merely provisional, and was
prepared to resign them as soon as a more regular authority
was ready to take its place. Nevertheless it attempted to
lay down the future course of their authority by promising, in
the name of the Revolution, universal suffrage, freedom of
worship, of teaching, and of the press, the right of public
meeting, decentralisation by means of delegation of powers to
municipal and provincial assemblies, trial by jury in criminal
causes, equality of all citizens before the law, inviolability of
dwellings, and abolition of capital punishment. Some local
juntas went even beyond this ambitious list of proposed reforms
and announced abolition of conscription and of taxation.
Serrano was the first of the leaders to reach the capital.
He was welcomed by the mob and by the junta and became
Universal Minister pending the arrival of his fellows. A
graceful concession to a strong body of public opinion was his
formal offer of the leadership to Espartero. It was merely
formal, for Espartero's life had been passed in the attempt to
discover a modus wivendi between Isabel's government and
the Radicals; now that one of the two terms of his problem
was eliminated he was utterly at a loss. Phlegmatic by tempera-
ment, he was now sunk in the weariness of age. He replied to
3 IO /nterregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
Serrano's offer by recommending his favourite nostrum, the
Constitution, regardless of the fact that the Constitution was
monarchical, and that the streets were blazing with posters
announcing “the everlasting downfall of the spurious Bourbon
race.” The concluding words were, “Those who conceived
and have initiated and carried out this Revolution are those
who ought to form the Provisional Government; and the rest
ought to lend their support whilst respecting and defending the
fundamental laws which the nation in virtue of its sovereignty
has made.”
After spreading or confirming the Revolution at Valencia,
Tarragona, and at Barcelona, Prim joined Serrano in Madrid.
A Cabinet was formed ; Serrano took the Presidency, Prim
the Ministry for War, Topete the Navy, and Sagasta, the
wisest head among them, the Home Office. Places were also
found for Ruiz Zorrilla and Adelardo Lopez de Ayala, who
had deserved well of the Revolution. On October 19, Loren-
Zana, Minister for Foreign Affairs, forwarded to the repre-
sentatives of Spain abroad a long and wordy discourse on the
causes and aims of the Revolution, for, as he justly remarked,
“the fall of a monarch, and the perpetual exclusion of her
descendants from the throne, brought about by a Revolution that
writes upon its banner the declaration of the most advanced
principles of modern Liberalism, are phenomena deserving of
mature study, and lessons which neither kings nor peoples can
afford to neglect.”
The circular was followed (October 25) by the publication
of the ministerial programme. It was, as circumstances
demanded, a general statement of Liberal principles, and
gave no guidance as to the future form of government.
Serrano congratulated the nation on the overthrow of “a
power whose unconcealed opposition to the spirit of the age
had been a drag upon all progress; over it the Government
out of self-respect would cast the merciful veil of silence.” He
went on to declare that the Revolution had established universal
XIII] Ministerial programme 3 II
Suffrage, and assured the principles of liberty of conscience,
of teaching, of the press, of association, and public meeting.
Financial reform and better husbandry of the nation's resources
were promised. A wise forethought extended these advantages
to the colonies, “the provinces beyond the sea which have
the right to intervene with their intelligence and vote in the
arduous political, administrative, and social questions under
discussion. Thus founded on liberty and credit Spain may
peacefully proceed to the definitive establishment of the form
of government that shall be found most suitable to her essential
condition and proved needs, and that shall provoke the least
amount of distrust in Europe.” The juntas, the ministry
announced, had one and all kept silence with regard to the
monarchy, and “had not included in the discredit attaching
to the dynasty the lofty principle which that dynasty repre-
sented”; if, however, the Provisional Government proved wrong
in its forecast and the decision of the Spanish people were
unfavourable to the reestablishment of the monarchical form
of government, the vote of the sovereign nation would be
respected. In conclusion the juntas were bidden to nominate
provincial and municipal councils to take over their powers
until such time as the newly enforced suffrage could be exer-
cised. The national militia was reestablished under the name
of Volunteers of Liberty.
The Revolution of 1868 came nearer than any previous
one to uniting the nation in a common purpose. So long as
its work was merely destructive all were agreed. But, when
the time came to reconstruct, it was evident that views as to
the ultimate purpose of the great upheaval differed widely.
Still it was clear that the Royalists commanded a large
majority. The verdict of the Constituent Cortes, summoned
for February, had really been anticipated. In the preceding
November a manifesto signed by the majority of the revo-
lutionary chiefs already spoke of “the monarchy we are about
to establish by our votes,” thereby deciding the question in
312 Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
the only way conceivable to most Spanish minds. It is true,
however, that the proposed monarchy would be but a pale
shadow of the late one. It was to be “a monarchy springing
from the rights of the people and consecrated by universal
suffrage, symbolising the sovereignty of the nation, implying
and consolidating all public liberties, personifying in fact the
rights of the citizen, those rights which are superior to all
authority and to all institutions; a monarchy which destroys
root and branch the claims of Divine Right and the Supremacy
of a family over the nation; monarchy surrounded by demo-
cratic institutions; popular monarchy.”
At this time the Republicans too published the programme
of their aspirations; but, except in one or two large provincial
towns, such as Tarragona and Valladolid, their numbers were
too small to allow them to hope for its immediate realisation.
In Cadiz, Málaga, and other towns, the failure of the Revolu-
tion to bestow immediate peace and plenty, in accordance
with the promises of its promoters, caused socialist risings.
The Duke of Montpensier, full of zeal, hurried from Portugal
to show himself among the soldiers sent to restore order. His
services were, however, declined ; and he was ordered by the
Provisional Government to recross the frontier.
In the elections the Radicals had everywhere the upper
hand. It was unnecessary for the executive to exert pressure
on behalf of ministerial candidates ; the mob took upon itself
the duty of terrorising the Opposition. Many Conservatives,
including a section of the clergy, stout loyalists, but unable
to fight or pray for the restoration of Queen Isabel, transferred
their allegiance to Don Carlos. A few Republicans were
elected, among them Emilio Castelar, returned by Saragossa.
These, with one or two Moderates, bold friends of the fallen
dynasty, and one or two avowed Carlists, made up the Opposi-
tion in the Constituent Cortes. The majority called itself
Liberal or Radical; the name Progressive disappeared, for it
connoted Liberal principles under the Bourbon dynasty. The
XIII] 7%e Constituent Cortes 3 I 3
leader of the majority was General Prim ; so long as he lived
he kept the utopians, republicans, socialists, and democrats in
check. For himself he chose the part of king-maker without
at first realising its difficulty. When Castelar demonstrated
that exotic royalty could never take root in Spain, it was easy
for Prim to rejoin, a fortiori, that a Republic had still less
chance of success. Both arguments were obviously good ;
both experiments were, however, about to be tried.
The first act of the Constituent Cortes was to confirm the
ministry, hitherto regarded as merely provisional, and to confer
on its President, Serrano, the title of “Chief of the Executive
Power.” Then, at the outset, a difficulty arose with regard to
the army. “Every successive minister,” declared a wise and
impartial contemporary, “had used it for the purposes of his
own personal ambition and had left in it a swarm of super-
fluous officers, who owed their grades to personal or political
services more or less illegal...... owing to the enormous
number of promotions Squandered among the supporters of
General Prim the officers had risen to the proportion of one
to seven.” Abolition of conscription had been freely promised;
it had, in fact, been the cry most effective to rally the people to
the Revolution. But the attitude of the Republicans of the
south and the Carlists of the north made it impossible, as
Serrano said, to grant this most desirable measure for the
present. The Government needed thirty-five thousand men;
conscription was the only way to get them. From this
moment the popularity of Revolution faded among the
important class for which Liberalism meant no taxes and
no conscription.
A commission was next appointed to draft a Constitution
to be submitted to the Constituent Assembly. It completed
its work in less than a month; its scheme contained nothing
original. The clauses indeed seemed to have been gathered
piecemeal from all the various Liberal Constitutions since that
of 1812. Spain was declared a strictly limited monarchy, the
314 Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
real power being vested in a Parliament of two Chambers. The
commission did not take upon itself to define exactly the rights
and powers of kings and Parliaments; nor were these the matters
that excited the strongest feeling. It was over the question of
religious toleration that parties joined issue; in this respect, at
any rate, the Spanish nation was not prepared to adopt the
most advanced Liberal doctrines. A petition, praying that no
other than the orthodox Roman Catholic worship should be
allowed, gathered, it is said, three million signatures. But the
Radicals were not to be deterred from their purpose of
“cutting off the secular arm of the Church.” A measure
guaranteeing freedom of worship was forced through the
Assembly; and civil marriage was legalised (May 24, 1869).
The jury system was adopted, and individual liberty solemnly
guaranteed. The new Constitution was voted by a majority of
214 against 55 votes. The promulgation (June 6) was the signal
for riots at Seville, Málaga, Saragossa, Valencia, and Alicante.
For, while its declared neutrality in matters of religion offended
many and swelled the gathering Carlist groups, a still larger
number, advanced Radicals of the industrial towns, declared
its provisions ridiculously inadequate. They insisted upon the
necessity of a new and more drastic revolution, declaring that
the overthrow of the Bourbons had resulted merely in the
establishment of a new form of tyranny. An old mistake was
repeated; and the number of justly aggrieved Catholics was
swelled by a renewed attempt to exact from the clergy an oath
of fidelity to the abhorred Constitution.
The Constituent Cortes having voted in favour of monarchy,
Serrano changed his title from Chief of the Executive Power to
Regent. Prim took the presidency of the ministry, almost
unchanged except for the addition of Manuel Silvela. A
little later Ruiz Zorrilla too joined it; and the Cortes stood
prorogued (July 15). The situation was most dangerous and
most abnormal. The lawless condition of the country called
for the strong hand of authority; but repression was combated
XIII] Question of the monarchy 3 I 5
by the Republicans. They formed federal unions to resist
so-called oppression and to further their extreme but ill-defined
views. Thus, while the noble demagogue, Orense, Marquis of
Albaida, was preaching Republican utopianism to eager listeners
along the northern coast, Castelar was doing the same with
only slightly less extravagance among his constituents in
Aragon, and Pierrad found his socialistic doctrines welcome
among his Catalan countrymen. Revolts at Cadiz and Málaga
expressed the active discontent of the south. The Carlists were
arming and mustering ; the country was breaking up.
The Constituent Cortes, elected to choose the form of
government most suitable for Spain, had chosen monarchy; but
they had no power to elect a king. Nevertheless they decided
to do so, for there stood the empty throne waiting to be filled.
So Serrano, the Regent, and Prim, the President of the Council,
began in the autumn of 1869 to search for an occupant. The
search lasted for more than a year. Meanwhile Spain was a
monarchy without a monarch, under a Regent without authority
and a disregarded Constitution. The Constituent Assembly
was without guidance, hesitating and discredited ; the revolu-
tionary enthusiasm had cooled; the country was restless and
expectant. Isabel's government had left a deficit of twenty-five
millions and somewhat less than four shillings in cash. The
party that had sought popularity by abolishing the hated
octroi duty had been obliged to reimpose it; the party that had
promised freedom from conscription had levied an exception-
ally heavy blood-tax. The middle way became daily more
difficult to follow; some joined the Carlists, others the
Federalists. Though a formal decision had been reached, the
balance still hung between King and Republic ; some proposed
to add to the Regent's power so as to make him dictator;
others to limit his powers by giving him Prim and Topete
aS a SS6SSOTS.
Of the possible candidates for the throne three were
Spaniards. Alfonso, son of Queen Isabel, was the most
316 Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
obvious, but he was still a child. Moreover, the memory
of his mother's misrule was too recent; and the perpetual
exclusion of the Bourbon family from the throne had been
solemnly voted and repeatedly reaffirmed. This law excluded
also Prince Alfonso's uncle, the intriguing Duke of Mont-
pensier. Years of careful trimming of sails and double dealing
had availed him only to clear the way for another. Perpetual
plotting and supposed participation in many schemes as dark
as that which brought him to Spain had rendered him un-
popular. His indecent haste to profit by the errors and
misfortunes of his kindred had been marked. Serrano and
Topete were pledged to make him king and had made use
of his money. But Montpensier found that he and his agent
had been the tools of a still more skilful plotter, Prim. When
the matter came to a vote only 27 out of a total of 31 I votes
were cast in his favour. But by this time he was more than
ever disliked. In revenge for outrageous libels he had killed
in a duel (March, 1870) the Duke of Seville, brother of Isabel's
consort, and his own kinsman.
The third Spanish candidate, Espartero, Duke of Victory,
was the most unkingly man in Spain. Petitions begging him
to save the country poured into Logroño, disturbing strangely
the half patriarchal, half middle-class life into which the
victorious general had withdrawn. It is notable that the
Catalans, whose capital he had ruthlessly bombarded, were
particularly eager to be ruled by Don Baldomero the First.
He might have been King of Spain or president of an
Aragonese republic had he so willed it. The Duke of Mont-
pensier, when he saw himself rejected, offered to support
Espartero; he had still grudges to gratify even after he had
laid aside ambitions. In May, 1870, the Provisional Govern-
ment assured Espartero that they had no official candidate and
would remain neutral whilst the nation made its choice. But
Espartero refused to come forward. His memory deserves
respect; for, though he often took arms against Isabel's
XIII] Candidates for the throne 3 I 7
government, he was never disloyal to the Queen, nor sought
to increase his own power by allowing her to forfeit unwarned
her claims to political and personal consideration. He would
not supplant her in the end.
The three Spanish candidates being put aside, it was left
to the king-makers to search abroad. The Pan-Iberians, a
small party, regardless of the teaching of centuries, proposed to
offer the crown to King Luis of Portugal, supposing that if he
accepted he would abdicate his own throne. But he refused
the perilous adventure, and delighted his subjects by declaring
his intention to die as he had been born, a Portuguese. Then
the Pan-Iberians turned again to his father, Ferdinand of Saxe-
Coburg, King-dowager of Portugal and cousin of Queen
Victoria and of Prince Albert. He had already once refused,
declaring his honour pledged to support the claims of the
Duke of Montpensier. On the second occasion the Spanish
Provisional Government and the Emperor Napoleon urged him
to accept. He expressed his willingness, subject to the approval
of the Powers and election by plebiscite of his future subjects.
The latter condition he afterwards withdrew, substituting for it
election by three-fourths of the votes of the Constituent Cortes
and a formal guarantee that Spain and Portugal should ever
remain separate and independent. Prim suggested the inser-
tion of a clause making the eventual union of the two countries
subject to the consent of both nations. But by this time the
question of the succession of a Portuguese king to the Spanish
throne and the consequent relegation of the proudest of nations
to the second place, had raised such a storm in Portugal that
negotiations were broken off, after many months of bargaining
(July, 1870). The candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohen-
zollern-Sigmaringen, supported by Prussia and opposed by
France, was incidentally the cause of the great war of
1870–71 and the fall of the Second Empire. The prince
withdrew before the war broke out. Bismarck sought alliance
with Spain; but Prim refused to entangle his distracted country.
318 /nterregnum and Æeign of Amadeo [CH.
The nation, or the wirepullers in obedience to whose
promptings it figured, had taken a year or thereabouts to
decide that monarchy was the form of government best suited
to Spain. Another year had slipped by; the autumn of 1870
had come; and the throne still stood empty. The Cortes were
wrangling over minor or personal questions, whilst the country
was going from bad to worse. Industry and commerce had
shrunk to the narrowest limits; the Carlists were armed and
organised, the Federalists everywhere active; the administration
had utterly broken down. Parties which had taken no share in the
Aronunciamiento of Cadiz and the battle of Alcolea, Democrats
and Republicans, now began to urge more strenuously their
views. A direct challenge in the House failed to draw from
them an explicit disclaimer of participation in the schemes of
anarchists and utopian demagogues. Necessity for a decision
of some kind, however unpromising, caused Prim to turn in
the last resort to the princes of the House of Savoy, sons,
brothers, and nephews of the King of Italy. The Duke of
Genoa refused the crown of Spain; but Amadeo, the second
Son of Victor Emmanuel, accepted it. The ministry, anxious
to reassure Amadeo, exercised pressure to secure his election
by a strong majority of the Constituent Cortes. But only 191
votes out of a total of 311 were cast in his favour (Nov., 1870).
The minority votes included 63 for a republic, 27 for the Duke
of Montpensier, I for the Duchess, 8 for Espartero, 19 blanks,
and 2 votes for Alfonso, son of the ex-Queen. His mother
had abdicated; and the boy's hand had been kissed in recogni-
tion of his sovereignty by his grandmother and the chief
Royalists in Paris (June 25, 1870). Relieved of a discreditable
connexion, the remains of the old Conservatives united with
the few staunch loyalists, Cheste, Gasset, San Luis, and
Lersundi, to form the party of the future. Leagued with
Republicans, Carlists, and Progressives, they undertook the
easy task of rendering all Amadeo's attempts to win the
confidence and affection of his new subjects unavailing. The
XIII] Amadeo becomes King. Murder of Prim 319
first cause of his unpopularity was his parentage. The
selection of a member of the reigning family of Italy, the
impious usurpers of the temporal dominions of the Holy See,
the family that had profited by revolution and the overthrow of
long-established thrones, shocked the conscience and roused
the most deep-seated prejudices of Catholic and Conservative
Spain. Even without this disadvantage it would have been
well-nigh impossible for a stranger, however painstaking, to
win the loyalty of the Spanish people.
The Constituent Cortes prepared to dissolve, for their task
was now at an end. In a fortnight the necessary business was
got through, the chief matters being a new civil list, provision
for immediate financial needs, and slight modifications in the
electoral law. Then all attention was fixed on the Commission
which offered the crown to the young prince at Florence. Its
spokesman was Ruiz Zorrilla, the man to whose passionate
interference Amadeo's fall was eventually due. Born an orator
and profiting by an almost unexampled opportunity, Ruiz
Zorrilla, spokesman of a nation, made his offer in a noble and
touching speech. Amadeo made a modest and fitting answer.
He promised that the Spaniards should at least be able to
say of the King they had elected that single-heartedness ever
raised him above the strife of parties, and that he had no
aspirations other than the concord and prosperity of the land.
He did his best to fulfil his pledge; but ill-fortune dogged
his steps from the outset. To Prim his election was chiefly
due; and to Prim he looked for effectual support and guidance
amid the dangers by which he knew his path would be beset.
Prim died assassinated on the very day that Amadeo landed in
Spain (Dec. 30, 1870). On the snowy night of Dec. 27 he
left the House of Congress in his brougham, and turning from
the dark and narrow Calle del Turco into the Calle de Alcalá,
the main thoroughfare of the capital, he fell into a carefully-
prepared ambuscade. A cab blocked the way; armed men
approached from either side; one of them drove the muzzle of
32O Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
his gun through the closed windows of the brougham, and
calling upon Prim to prepare for death fired into his body.
The murderers were never brought to justice; the affair is
still unexplained. Of those who could throw light upon it
Some were made away with in gaol and others imprisoned for
life, cut off from all communication with the outside world.
It seems certain that this was no act of private vengeance; but
it is impossible, amid the many who thought to profit by his
death, to point with any approach to certainty to the guilty'.
Public opinion, however, ever ready to ascribe dark deeds to
the Duke of Montpensier, laid this crime too at his door,
regarding it merely as an addition to the series of sudden
deaths of those who stood between the throne and the husband
of Ferdinand the Seventh’s younger daughter.
With Don Juan Prim was removed the strongest will in
Spain. He was worshipped by the populace, who, exaggerating
the humility of his birth and calling him the son of a butcher,
regarded it as a guarantee of his fidelity to their cause. He
was feared by his enemies and also by his associates for a
certain grimness of temper, concealed beneath the outward
mien of “a pious and sympathising undertaker.” His reckless
daring in Morocco and at home had won for him the enthusi-
astic admiration of the private soldier. The election of a
foreigner to the Spanish throne obscured his popularity for the
moment. Had time been given him to recover his influence,
his strength would undoubtedly have sustained for a while
Amadeo's throne. The real ruler of Spain would have been
the vigorous Catalan Soldier, creature and victim of a turbulent
age. Public spirit and personal ambition were so mingled and
confused that the men of that time hardly knew which of the
two they obeyed; nor can their children do more than guess.
Amadeo was met at Cartagena by Topete, who had hastily
* See, however, Paul Angulo's pamphlet, Les Assassins du Maréchal
Prim et la politique en Espagne (Paris, 1886). [J. F.-K.]
XIII] Conduct of the new King 32 I
taken Prim's place, accompanied by Generals Concha and
Zabala. On the second of January of the eventful year 1871
he entered his snow-covered capital. His first visit was to the
Atocha, the royal church of Madrid; it was partly a thanks-
giving for his accession, partly a visit of respect to the remains
of General Prim. The crowds that lined the streets were
drawn together by curiosity only. No enthusiasm on the part
of his new subjects encouraged the stranger at the outset.
Left to his own resources at the age of twenty-six years,
King Amadeo did his best to fulfil conscientiously the office of
a constitutional monarch in a country little fitted for such a
form of government. Affable, painstaking, well educated, he
had travelled over most of Europe and had given proof of
personal courage when wounded at the head of his regiment in
battle with the Austrians. Knowing nothing of Spain, a
foreign King with a Republican Constitution, he repeatedly
declared that he would reign only over a willing people. This
was interpreted as a sign of weakness and gave encouragement
to the faction sworn to drive him from Spain. Disaffection
took a form that neither courage could vanquish nor good-will
disarm. The nobility not only abstained from appearance as
a corporate body at Amadeo's Court, but seized every oppor-
tunity of heaping slights on him and his wife. Their grand-
fathers had not shown themselves so scrupulously patriotic
when Napoleon thrust upon them his brother and a ready-
made Constitution. Some officers of the army and navy
ostentatiously refused the oath of allegiance; and again
Amadeo erred on the side of mercy, declining to take notice
of a public challenge to his right. Coming after dictatorships,
veiled under Parliamentary forms, but rising and falling by
force of arms, his government seemed insipid, even as the
studied plainness of his dress and behaviour were thrown into
shadow by the strutting splendour of the revolutionary heroes.
Amadeo's election had been brought about by a coalition
of every shade of opinion between the extremes of Carlism on
C. S. 2 I
322 Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
the one hand and Republicanism on the other. The new King
sought to give permanence to the coalition by charging Serrano
to form a ministry including Sagasta, Ruiz Zorrilla, and MartOS,
the Radical leaders. For a moment only, differences of opinion
seemed to be sunk in eagerness for the public good. The
first disappointment was the result of the general election.
In spite of the efforts of the ministry, the first Parliament
(April 3, 1871) contained a strong anti-dynastic Opposition.
Its two wings, Carlist and Republican, entered into an unholy
alliance, and, profiting by the violent dissensions of their
opponents, worked unremittingly, at first by constitutional
means only, to bring about Amadeo's fall. Though the
ministry had a majority, the Republicans proposed in Congress
to annul the election of the King. The Carlists gave their
casting vote in a contested division over the law regulating
associations, political and religious. Many days were passed
in discussion of abuses invalidating the late elections; many
more over a proposal to revise the Constitution. When at
last the response to the address from the throne was voted,
it was adverse to the ministry; and Serrano retired (July 25,
1871).
The experiment of government by a coalition had failed
in the face of a united and resolute Opposition. Accordingly
it was decided to revert to the party system. Ruiz Zorrilla,
the most Radical member of the late Cabinet, was bidden
to form a ministry, for it was still hoped that the parties which
had so lately elected the King would abstain from quarrelling
in the face of the enemy. These hopes were not justified.
The Radicals were split into two bitterly opposed sections
under Ruiz Zorrilla and Sagasta respectively. No reconcilia-
tion was possible; Sagasta was becoming less violently Radical
and Zorrilla more so. Their decision to separate their forces
decided the fate of the Liberal-Monarchist party; each section
was at the mercy of the Carlist-Republican alliance. Sagasta
was elected to the Presidency of the Chamber in opposition to
XIII] Opposition to the new régime 323
Zorrilla's nominee; and Zorrilla at once retired (Oct., 1871).
Amadeo was at a loss to find a man of any authority to accept
the thankless office of President of the Council. Espartero
refused to be drawn from his retirement; Sagasta declined ;
finally the choice fell upon a person of secondary importance.
None but the most disinterestedly patriotic motives induced
Admiral Malcampo to accept a responsibility to which he
- declared himself unequal. Though Serrano and Topete put
their experience at his service, he failed to navigate for more
than six weeks the stormy Parliamentary sea. A vote of
censure brought his cruise to an end. Parliament was
adjourned until the ministry could be reformed under a
stronger leader. Sagasta now became President; and Mal-
campo took office under him as Minister of Marine, Topete as
Minister for the Colonies.
Sagasta saw the impossibility of carrying on the Govern-
ment in the face of an anti-dynastic majority vowed to
obstruction. He dissolved Parliament, reconstituted his
ministry, taking in the turbulent turncoat Romero Robledo,
then at the outset of his erratic career, and prepared to strain
every nerve to save the throne. He published a programme
under the headings of Liberty, the Constitution of 1869, the
Savoy dynasty, and the integrity of the national territory. The
last clause referred to menacing representations made by the
Government of the United States with regard to the deplorable
state of Cuba. The election took place in April (1872). The
Carlist and Republican Opposition worked together to overthrow
by their votes the foreign King; Sagasta on his side strove reck-
lessly to save the situation. He succeeded indeed in securing
a majority favourable to the dynasty; but, in order to do so,
he had been obliged to abandon his usual prudence, to add
bribery to pressure, and to make use of the means of govern-
ment which he had so often and so eloquently condemned.
It was in protest against this make-believe of representative
government, the corrupt influence of the administration on
2 I —2
324 /nferregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
electors, and the trickery resorted to by those in charge of
the urns, that the Progressive party had withdrawn from all
constitutional means of making their opinion felt during the
latter years of Isabel's reign. But now all limits had been
overstepped by the prefects and their subordinates, in order to
secure at any cost the return of ministerial candidates. When
the Cortes met, Sagasta was questioned as to the employment
of a sum of £20,000 which had disappeared from the Colonial
Office. His enemies suggested that it had been embezzled ;
but the attitude of the ministry left no doubt that the money
had been spent on the elections. The Congress, though it
owed its election to Sagasta's unscrupulousness, declared itself
the champion of the purity of public life. In view of its
attitude Sagasta resigned (May, 1872). Serrano again became
President of the Council. Topete acted as his representative
in Madrid, for Serrano was absent in the north fighting against
the Carlists.
O'Donnell had fancied that by Montemolin's renunciation
(see p. 275) they were free of the danger that had overhung
Spain for thirty years; they betrayed a strange ignorance of the
party with which they were dealing. No sooner was Monte-
molin safely back at Cologne than he annulled his formal
abdication by a still more formal and solemn repudiation
(June 15, 1860). It runs thus: “Seeing that the deed
executed at Tortosa...... had its origin in exceptional and
extraordinary circumstances, and that, drawn up in captivity
and signed under restraint, it lacks all the essentials of
legal validity and therefore is illegal, and not to be ratified ;
and seeing that the rights to which it relates cannot belong to
any other than him who holds them in accordance with the
fundamental law from which their binding force is derived ;
and that by this law the person on whom they devolve is
bound to exercise them in due time and place; acting by the
advice of eminent lawyers consulted and in obedience to the
negative opinion repeatedly expressed by my most faithful
XIII] The Carlist princes 325
Servants, I hereby retract the aforesaid deed of Tortosa of the
23rd of April of the present year and declare it null and void.”
Don Fernando, too, signed a like retractation of his promise to
refrain from taking part in any scheme against the authority of
Queen Isabel (p. 275). It was a pretty piece of casuistry. Is not
the renunciation of a divine right a sort of contradiction in terms,
as well as a sacrilegious trafficking in holy things P And is not
the case still stronger when pressure amounting to compulsion
can be pleaded ? On these difficult questions the legitimist
party both in and out of Spain was for a time divided. Its
chief, the Comte de Chambord, gave his opinion flatly against
the Count of Montemolin, and expressed a doubt as to whether
it would be possible to find among the genuine and faithful
holders of tradition priest or layman to justify the retractation.
But even nearer his own royal person Montemolin's right
to play fast and loose with his word was disputed. The
Infant Don Juan, a younger son, had anticipated the retracta-
tion by publishing (June 2, 1860) his claims to the rights
renounced by his two brothers”. “The renunciation of his
rights to the throne of Spain made by my brother Carlos Luis
(Montemolin)...... compels me to assert the rights of my
family and my own to the throne of my ancestors. Though
determined to maintain these rights, and the principle of legiti-
macy in which they are rooted, I shall not allow them to owe
their triumph to an appeal to arms or to further outpouring of
l Carlos IV m. Maria Luisa Teresa d. of Philip of Parma
4. daughters Fernando VII Carlos daughter Francisco de Paula
m. 4th wife Maria m. Francisca de |
Cristina Fernanda Asís d. of João VI F-–-—--——
d. of K. of Sicilies of Portugal Francisco, Enrique,
Duke of Asís Duke of Seville
F-—
Isabel Fernanda Carlºs Luis Fernando Juan
m. Francisco m. Duc de Montemolin
de Asís Montpensier F--- —l
Carlos Maria Alfonso
Jaime

(v. Sánchez y Casado, p. 690.)
326 Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
the noble blood of Spaniards. I await events confident in the
Divine Providence, and in the wisdom and patriotism of my
countrymen. Order will be established; and with order will
come national prosperity in harmony with the light and
progress of the age.” Whatever may have been the intention
of Don Juan when he wrote the last phrase, it was regarded by
the stalwarts of the party as the introduction of the abominable
thing into the sanctuary. A man who could thus tamper with
Liberal doctrine was manifestly unfit to lead traditionalists.
Don Juan had on other occasions been guilty of like unguarded
language; he was now regarded by some merely as a madcap,
by others as a dangerous heretic. Montemolin, however, dealt
gently with his erratic brother, trying to win from him an
admission that the manifesto had been issued under a mis-
taken belief in the validity of the renunciation. But Don
Juan stoutly refused to withdraw; and Montemolin in a fresh
manifesto sought to justify his own conduct. The whole
Carlist party was rapidly becoming embroiled when death
suddenly came to cut the knot. Montemolin, his wife, and
his brother Fernando all died within a fortnight (Jan., 1861).
Three almost simultaneous deaths happening so unexpectedly
and so opportunely for certain interests could hardly pass
without suspicions of foul play. But there was nothing what-
ever to warrant such suspicions; the two princes succumbed to
an infectious fever.
No one was left to question their brother's right to inherit
their claims. But Don Juan had not only abandoned all the
principles of the party ; he more than once urged his cousin,
Isabel, to accept his submission. Nevertheless, it was difficult
for a party founded upon Divine Right and primogeniture to
set the reprobate aside. But Don Juan had a son, Don Carlos
Maria (b. 1848), of a very different temper from his own.
Brought up among the most uncompromising members of the
party, the boy, when he approached manhood, demanded of his
father an explanation of his attitude with regard to the family
XIII] /Jon Carlos Maria and the Carlists 327
claims. Don Juan did not vouchsafe an answer; and the
matter was left undecided until unmistakeable signs of Queen
Isabel's approaching downfall made a recognised leader im-
peratively necessary to the party. Accordingly, at a meeting
held in London (July 20, 1868), Don Carlos Maria was greeted
as King, his father's submission to the usurping Government
being taken as equivalent to abdication. But Cabrera, the
most conspicuous and able man connected with the cause,
was not present at the meeting; nor could any promise of
cooperation in the projects there discussed be obtained from
him. Don Carlos Maria, who now took the title of Duke of
Madrid, was formally recognised by his renegade father.
Thereafter he gathered round him in Paris an unwieldy
council. Its discussions ranged at large over the conditions
and prospects of the party, but disposed of no more solid
capital than the promises, so often forfeited, of adherents. Its
appeal for funds addressed to the Legitimist party in Spain
and abroad failed. Nevertheless the cause was far from
extinct.
When Isabel joined Don Carlos in exile, the cousins met
with a view to coordination of claims and common action.
Whilst negotiations were going on Don Carlos checked, to the
best of his ability, the over-eagerness of his followers. Nothing,
however, came of the conferences except, as is believed, a
considerable contribution from Queen Isabel's private purse
towards the Carlist funds. Then followed further efforts to
raise money and to obtain the cooperation of Cabrera. At
length he accepted the command urged upon him, subject to
the condition that he alone should decide the moment for
action, and the form it should assume. But not all Don
Carlos' councillors were so prudent; and he himself, as befitted
his youth, was eager for action. In July, 1869, he hurried
secretly to the Catalan frontier by Figueras, and actually
crossed it in disguise, only to find his partisans in the district
utterly unable to perform what they had promised. He
328 Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
returned disappointed but not discouraged to Paris. Cabrera
took a serious view of the matter, and, protesting against the
rash direction of the party, withdrew to his English home.
Shortly afterwards, out of heart with the cause, and distrusting
those who had his master's ear, he resigned the leadership on
the plea of failing health.
Then followed another manifesto from the Prince, promising,
as is the wont of such documents, the advent of a golden age,
the reconciliation of the most sharply opposed tendencies and
interests, and prompt solution of all social and political
questions under the auspices of legitimate monarchy. Never-
theless, as soon as Cabrera withdrew, the affairs of the Carlists
fell into deeper confusion ; Don Carlos himself became aware
how necessary were the authority and experience of his wilful
follower. Accordingly he commanded and besought Cabrera's
return to active participation in his plans. Again he yielded,
though only after imposing more stringent conditions than
before. It was at Cabrera's suggestion that Don Carlos
promised a Constitution and Cortes to the nation. But the
main body of the party had not enjoyed Cabrera's opportu-
nities of studying the working of representative institutions;
and, when at Bordeaux he set forth his new-found way of
reconciliation between Divine Right and democracy, his words
sounded almost blasphemous in the ears of the impatient
chiefs. The unpopularity incurred by his ill-timed champion-
ship of liberty was increased by Cabrera's declaration of belief
that the slender resources of the party were “spent on anything
rather than on its interests.” To retain the spokesman of
such disagreeable truths was very difficult for a Prince whose
cause depended on popularity and who must perforce at times
shut his eyes to acts of indiscipline and worse. Cabrera, in
fact, became more exacting after each concession to his views.
He arrogated to himself the right of choosing his Prince's
advisers. On the first hesitation to submit to his dictation he
again resigned, this time definitively. It seemed as though he
XIII] Premature Carlist rising 329
had been merely seeking an excuse for abandoning a cause
irreconcilable with his changed convictions. Perhaps he
shrank from beginning a civil war as cruel as that in which
he had played so ruthless a part twenty-five years earlier.
Cabrera having definitively quitted the party, Don Carlos
held a general assembly at Vevey (April 18, 1870) and
formally took the leadership into his own hands. Discussion
was avoided, for the Carlists differed radically as to the policy
most suited to their conditions. Regardless of the empty
Treasury, and untaught by bitter experience, the party of action
relied on the promises of secret sympathisers. Against their
view Cándido Nocedal ably argued that negotiations with the
leaders of the Republican party and the army would give a
more certain result ; that every day was telling in his favour;
and that, if he would but wait, Don Carlos would become King
of Spain by force of circumstances. But youth and high spirit
inclined Don Carlos to listen to the party of immediate action.
The Vevey meeting resolved to do nothing until the Constituent
Cortes defined the situation. The incidents of Amadeo's
election, the narrow majority by which it was secured, the
murder of Prim, the indifference of the people, and the haughty
aversion of the nobility, were all rightly interpreted by Nocedal
as favourable symptoms. This alliance with the Republicans
was bearing the fruit he had expected ; never had so many
Carlist deputies been returned as to the first Cortes of Amadeo's
reign. It seemed as though the Carlists would win by consti-
tutional means. It was probably this danger that caused
Sagasta to abandon his habitual prudence in the elections of
April, 1872, and to stifle all opposition, regardless alike of
political morality and of the immediate consequences to
himself. By so doing he furnished the Carlist war party with
an unanswerable argument. What hope, they argued, have
we of success by legal means when elections are scandalously
falsified, and we are playing against loaded dice? Reports,
too, from local leaders agreed that delay was undermining the
33O /nterregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
spirit of the party, and that immediate action was necessary in
order to prevent its dissolution. In face of these representa-
tions, Nocedal was forced to stifle his better judgment, though
the Treasury contained only 24, 16 in cash, and preparations
were still incomplete, neither arms nor uniforms being ready
for volunteers. He countersigned Don Carlos' order, dated
Genoa, April 14, 1872, for a general rising on April 2 I. The
Prince promised that he himself would be the first at the point
of danger. The war-cry was “Down with the foreigner l’
That the rebellion failed utterly was due to an almost
incredible lack of organisation. Promises were not fulfilled ;
lists of resources proved illusory. Don Carlos joined his
partisans in the field (May 2), coming, as he said, “to
encourage the brave, hearten the lukewarm, and strike terror
into traitors.” But by this time the fate of the ill-timed venture,
made through over-confidence in the promises of timid turn-
coats, was sealed. Serrano hurried up to the north to take
over the few battalions hastily equipped by Zabala, Minister
for War. Two days after Don Carlos set foot in Navarre, his
few ill-armed and hungry volunteers were surprised and routed
at Oroquieta by General Moriones. On the following day
Don Carlos, who had narrowly escaped capture, recrossed the
French frontier. A display of force was sufficient to avert the
danger in Biscay; only in Catalonia, where it had first broken
out, did the rebellion still smoulder when the Convention of
Amoravieta was signed (May 24, 1872). It guaranteed pardon
on laying down arms to all persons implicated ; even deserters
from the regular army retained their rank. That the Provincial
Assembly of Biscay and the Carlists in arms gladly accepted
such terms is not surprising, for, as they explained in a
manifesto, they had been deceived by promises of support
into a rebellion foredoomed to failure, and had been deserted
in the field by those who had urged them on. But that
Serrano, in King Amadeo's name, established the fatal
precedent of impunity for rebels is not so easily explained.
XIII] Serrano resigns. Zorri//a in power 331
Perhaps Amadeo hoped to conciliate the Carlists. If so, he
was deceived; the Convention of Amoravieta was interpreted by
the Carlists as a show of weakness and a direct encouragement.
It is possible also that the Government, aware of the vast
number of prominent persons implicated, and feeling its own
weakness, sought excuses to evade the duty of punishment.
That the Carlists were not really defeated or discouraged,
and that they accepted the Convention of Amoravieta only in
order to gain time, was perceived by those who best understood
the problem and who stood in the position of greatest danger
and responsibility—the Liberal deputies of Biscay, Guipúzcoa,
Navarre, and Álava. Accordingly, when Serrano returned to
Madrid, expecting to be welcomed as a victor, he was assailed
by the Radicals under Ruiz Zorrilla and the Republicans under
Castelar for having betrayed his trust by granting ridiculously
easy terms to a routed but still determined faction. So violent
was the agitation in the press against him, so threatening the
attitude of the provinces, that he asked for suspension of the
constitutional guarantees in order to enable him to carry on
the Government. To grant his request would be to admit
failure, and to return to the old bad ways of sheltering the
royal authority behind a dictator. Amadeo refused extra-
ordinary powers; and Serrano resigned after a nominal ministry
of less than three weeks. Once more the sorely-tried King
appealed in vain to Espartero to exercise again his well-known
skill as saviour of his country. Then it was found necessary
to call in the Radicals, who for the moment represented the
largest section of public opinion. Their leader, Ruiz Zorrilla,
daily more violent, had resigned his mandate as deputy and
quitted the capital. Only with the utmost reluctance did he
obey the King's command and form a ministry amid the
turmoil of a crisis dynastic and financial as well as political
(June 14, 1872). The most active Liberals outside Sagasta's
group, Martos, Montero Rios, Echegaray, and Gasset, took
office under him. They published a long list of proposed
332 /nterregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
reforms and entered into alliance with the Republicans, from
whose tenets their own were now distinguished by a very
narrow line. But, even with their support, Ruiz Zorrilla's party
was in a minority in both Chambers; it was found necessary
to adjourn Parliament preparatory to a dissolution. Meeting
informally, the majority of the two Houses protested against
the approaching dissolution as wilfully stifling the expressed
will of the nation; they explained, moreover, that, the budget
not having been approved, collection of taxes would be illegal.
Disregarding this challenge, Ruiz Zorrilla pursued his plan of
“making liberty the means of saving liberty.” He promised
rashly religious freedom and abolition of conscription; and he
reinstated the municipal councils suppressed a year before.
Having given this sop to his excited followers, Ruiz Zorrilla pre-
pared to carry on the government till the new Parliament met
On Sept. 15. Meanwhile the Carlist rebellion still smouldered
in Catalonia; and all men knew that another and a formidable
outbreak would not long be delayed. On the other hand
several leaders of the revolution of 1868, including the Duke
of Montpensier, were now working for the restoration of the
Bourbons in the person of Isabel's son, Alfonso.
On the night of July 18 King Amadeo and his wife
narrowly escaped assassination by an armed band in the
streets of Madrid. Of their assailants one was killed by the
police and another was captured; but the instigators were not
discovered ; vague rumour added another to the list of atroci-
ties ascribed to the Duke of Montpensier. The outburst of
horror and indignation provoked was mistaken as symptomatic
of a growing affection for the foreign King. But the cheers
that greeted him during his summer visit to the northern
provinces expressed nothing more than admiration of his
unostentatious courage. These cheers, moreover, had quite
died away by the time Don Amadeo returned to his capital to
face the meeting of a new Parliament. Everybody had fore-
seen that the Liberal extremists, being in power, would likewise
XIII] Ziberal victory in the Cortes 333
be victorious in the elections. But the manner and extent of
their victory astonished and somewhat disconcerted even
themselves. Only seven of their opponents were returned.
The chief public men of the day, Sagasta, Serrano, Rios
Rosas, Cánovas, Topete, and Alonso Martinez were left
without seats. Of the hundred and ninety-one deputies who
less than two years before had voted the crown to Don
Amadeo only forty-six were found in the new Congress. The
unseated members now regretted that they had submitted
themselves to this farce of election instead of enforcing their
protest by formal withdrawal, as certain of their number had
proposed.
The Cortes were opened (Sept. 15) by a long speech from
the throne. The voice was that of Amadeo; but the words were
those of Ruiz Zorrilla, and the proposed measures were essen-
tially Radical. Abolition of conscription was again promised,
as a concession to extremists. The proposal had the effect of
irritating the army and increasing its distrust and hatred of the
Liberals, whilst the Carlists were encouraged to believe that
the country would be allowed to fall defenceless into their
hands. Equally disastrous to the popularity of the ministry
was its policy of granting a liberal measure of reforms to Cuba.
The Opposition outside Parliament—for within no Opposition
existed—started the cry that the Radicals at home were leagued
with their disloyal brethren in the colonies, and that the result
of concessions would be disintegration of the national territory.
This belief was of course fostered by those to whom reforms in
the Spanish Indies and the abolition of slavery meant loss.
These, aided by those honest persons who, mistaking illiberality
and exclusiveness for patriotism, are always ready tools, founded
the National League, to resist colonial reform. The National
League, in its turn, was the tool of the factions who were
attacking the throne through the ministry. Besides alienating
the army and the planters, the message alluded to the out-
standing differences with the Holy See in a manner offensive
334 Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH.
to sincere Catholics. It announced, in fact, though in perfectly
respectful terms, that the ministry had no intention of yielding
the points over which diplomatic relations had been broken
off. These were connected with arrears in the payment of the
clergy guaranteed under the Concordat. The clergy had just
cause of complaint; and the few who were not Carlists became
fiercely hostile to the Savoy dynasty. Thereupon the ministry
devised a clever trick; they proposed to transfer the taxation
necessary for the maintenance of the clergy from the central to
the communal and municipal budgets, judging that the money
would be grudgingly given by peasants and burgesses, and that
its recipients would suffer in the popular estimation. While
the Conservatives were actively intriguing, the Republicans on
their side were becoming daily more importunate. They saw
that the future lay between themselves and the Carlists, and,
growing impatient, they rose in arms at Ferrol and rioted in
Madrid.
But the fall of Amadeo's throne was not due to any great
clash of general principles. A mere departmental squabble,
raised by obstinacy on both sides to a great question of state,
furnished his excuse to retire from a position which from being
painful had become intolerable. On the advice of Ruiz
Zorrilla he had conferred the Captaincy-General of the Basque
Provinces on General Baltasar Hidalgo, a firm and useful
supporter of the ministry. But Hidalgo was shunned and
banned by his brother officers, and particularly by those of
his former corps, the artillery, because he had sided with the
sergeants in their murderous mutiny at the barracks of San
Gil (June, 1866). The artillery refused to serve under him.
When he arrived at his headquarters, the officers of the corps
took no part in the formal welcome by the military and civil
authorities. Hidalgo wished to punish this breach of etiquette;
the ministry hesitated and decided on a half-measure. They
transferred him to Catalonia, hoping that, as few artillery
officers were serving in that province, the appointment would
XIII] Abdication of Amadeo 335
pass unchallenged. Encouraged by this concession, the dis-
Contented officers declared themselves still unsatisfied ; their
grievance had been taken up by politicians as a useful arm
against Ruiz Zorrilla and the King. When the Minister for War
refused to submit to further dictation, a general resignation
of commissions followed. The action of the officers is
rendered inexcusable by the fact that they were guarding
the lines of the Ebro in face of the Carlist enemy. The
ministry accepted the resignations; and the Cortes supported
it by a large majority (Feb. 7, 1873). The corps was formally
dissolved; its cannon were taken over. Non-commissioned
officers were promoted to fill some of the vacancies.
This decision had been taken in opposition to Amadeo's
expressed opinion. He fulfilled his formal duty as consti-
tutional King by signing the decree embodying it, and seized
the opportunity of laying down his uneasy and thankless
crown. On February 12 he quitted Spain. A message to
the Cortes gave his reasons for resigning “the great honour
which the Spanish nation had conferred upon him.” He had
hoped in vain to find powerful support in facing the dangers
and overcoming the difficulties which he knew to exist. Spain's
misfortunes, he said, were the work of Spaniards. He was “at
length convinced that further efforts on his part would be
useless.” His conduct indeed throughout the two long years
of his martyrdom had been irreproachable. He had never
attempted to overstep the rigid limits set by the Constitution
to his authority, and he had never shirked the duties it imposed
upon him. But his goodness was of a frigid kind; he had not
learnt to love the country of his adoption, nor had he made
any friends in Spain. He quitted the country amid the gibes
of his former subjects. Amadeo appealed to no passion, so he
failed to secure the devotion even of a party. If he received a
disinterested welcome from any, it was from the timid and
peace-loving souls who look to their King to save them from
civil anarchy, and who offer in return a ready obedience. Such,
336 Interregnum and Reign of Amadeo [CH. XIII
however, are the last to undertake the corresponding duty of
protecting their protector or boldly making their voices heard
in opposition to a noisy minority. In believing that the Spanish
nation as a whole was really eager for political reform, decen-
tralisation, popular government, and severe checks on the
influence of the clergy, Amadeo was mistaken. Moreover,
the best measures would have been grudgingly received at the
hand of a foreigner. For a time he sought to win his new
subjects by moderation, patience, self-suppression, and an
almost feverish eagerness to interpret and obey the slightest
indication of the popular will. As soon as circumstances
obliged him to assert his will, he fell. He was never more
than King of a Parliamentary majority, and that in a Parlia-
ment which misrepresented in an unusual degree the real
views of the nation.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE REPUBLIC AND THE RESTORATION. (1873–1874.)
As soon as the abdication of the King became known, the two
Chambers of the Cortes met and coalesced, illegally calling them-
selves the National Assembly. They then proceeded further
to violate the Constitution by taking over the powers assigned
during an Interregnum to the Ministry. Finally, the irregular
Assembly hastily decided upon a Republic by a majority of 258
against 32, a result the more astonishing when it is considered
that when elected only four months earlier they professed them-
selves monarchical with but few dissentients. Thus, the very
day on which Amadeo left Madrid, four of his late ministers
were already holding office under a Republic. Formal prºclama-
tion of the new order was deferred until the soverlign people
should have approved in Constituent Cortes of *.ie action of its
representatives. Accordingly the Ministry unosen directly by
the National Assembly called itself merely provisional; and its
president took the title of President of the Executive Power.
The first holder of the office was Don Estanislao Figueras,
lawyer, doctrinaire, dweller in utopias, and philanthropist, with
no experience of affairs and little force of character. Under
him was ranged a heterogeneous coalition, of which the leading
spirits were avowedly Republican; that is to say, they included
their ill-defined ideals of polity under a common name. How
widely these ideals differed was seen in the successive experi-
ments in government made later by three of them, Pi y Margall,
C. S. 22
338 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
the Federalist; Salmeron, the Unitarian Republican ; and
Castelar, who was reduced at the last to invent for himself the
name of Possibilist. Martos was elected President of the
National Assembly, amidst lusty cheers for the Republic,
integrity of the national territory, and a Spanish, that is to say,
an unemancipated Cuba. Figueras read telegrams from the
provinces, by which it appeared that, with the exception of an
unimportant scuffle at Seville, the sudden change in the
destinies of Spain had provoked no disturbance.
This was the more satisfactory as grave doubts had arisen
as to the manner in which the army in the north would accept
the sudden transference of its allegiance. General Domingo
Moriones commanded in the Basque Provinces and Navarre;
he was respected by his own troops and feared by the Carlists.
Though urged to refuse obedience to an order sent by an
irregular authority, he was too good an officer to be led into
sedition in the face of the enemy. When his successor, Pavia,
reached Vitoria, he quietly handed over his authority. General
Gaminde, the commander in Catalonia, was, like many other
officers, an Alfonsist, and would have been glad to strike a
blow for the Restoration. But his troops, like most of the
inhabitants of the Principality, were ardently republican ; the
Republic was pledged to abolish obligatory military service.
Gaminde, finding his authority no longer respected, emigrated
to France with the majority of his staff. While this danger
from the Captain-General still threatened, the whole civil
administration also was changed. Room was thus made for
supporters of the new order, charged with the all-important task
of working the electoral machinery so that the country should
appear to welcome enthusiastically the accomplished fact. To
such good purpose did they act that, when the Constituent
Cortes—the sixth of the century—met, they chose as President
the noble demagogue Orense, Marquis of Albaida, and decided
by 2 Io votes against 2 that Spain should be a Republic. The
victory appeared as complete as it was easily won. All Spain
xiv) Constituent Cortes. A'epublic voted 339
seemed agreed. Nothing, however, could be further from the
truth. Less than a third of the nation had taken part in the
election of the Constituent Cortes. The northern provinces,
with exception of the towns, were in the hands of the Carlists.
Andalusia was given up to an anarchical debauch. Catalonia,
cut off from land communication with the rest of Spain by the
Carlists, was acting as an independent State. Civil war was
raging; the army was clamouring for immediate discharge ; and
its officers were known to be disaffected. The Treasury con-
tained nothing but the unbalanced accounts of a huge deficit;
and the people claimed abolition of taxation as the firstfruits
of the Republic.
Before the meeting of the Constituent Cortes, a contest
between Ministry and National Assembly had nearly resulted
in a counter-revolution. The Assembly, led by its President,
Martos, had set up itself as an authority independent of the
Ministry, its creature. With difficulty it had been dissolved;
but it had left behind it a Permanent Commission of Parlia-
ment to hamper all actions of the Government and pass votes
of censure on its members. The Government was Federalist,
the Permanent Commission Unionist. The latter rallied a
number of Radicals anxious to check the disintegrating process
everywhere going on. Their plan was to overthrow the Ministry
and leave the United-Liberals in power with Serrano at their
head. They found a leader in Salmeron and a champion in
the Captain-General, who offered to enforce obedience to the
authority of the Cortes. On the other hand, Pi y Margall,
Minister of the Interior, armed the police, the Federal volun-
teers, and the troops on which he could rely. Before this
show of force the conspirators lost heart; their leaders failed
to support them publicly. The Federal mob stormed the
Congress House. Thanks to the exertions of Castelar and
others no lives were lost. Nothing further was heard of the
rmanent Commission.
For the moment the Federalists had the upper hand. The
22 — 2

340 Æepublic and A’estoration (1873–1874) [CH.
Constituent Cortes, immediately after voting the Republic,
charged their leader, Pi y Margall, with the Presidency of the
Executive Power and the responsibility of choosing a Ministry.
How heavy this responsibility was and how critical the state of
the country had been explained by the late President. Figueras
showed how vividly he realised the dangers which he had
depicted by fleeing the country without the formality of resign-
ing. Pi y Margall, still unshaken in his idea of a Federal
Republic, named his colleagues and submitted the list to the
Cortes. But the Cortes rejected the list, withdrew the power it
had just conferred, and named the ministers itself. Doubtless
they were good Federalists, but their names are little known.
Neither Contreras, nor Roque Barcia, nor Carvajal, nor
Castelar, who was still reckoned as belonging to the advanced
wing, was found among them. The first and principal clause
of Pi y Margall's programme appealed for union to save the
Republic, and insisted upon the necessity for enforcing disci-
pline in the army. As for his proposals for separation of
Church and State, free and obligatory education, Cuban
reforms, and a new Constitution, they rang hollow in the ears
of men intensely anxious for the preservation of the foundations
of civilised society now seriously threatened. Indeed the state
of the country was appalling ; civil government was at an end ;
and Spain was falling to pieces whilst the Republicans wrangled
over their differences.
So long as the work in hand was merely destructive, it was
possible for the Federalist, Pi y Margall, to cooperate with the
Socialist Roque Barcia, the utopian Castelar, the United-Liberal
Salmeron, the military Opportunist Pavia, and the constitutional
Radical Serrano. These, again, could unite with Catalan
Separatists to Overthrow Amadeo's weak throne; but, when each
Section began to practise the doctrines of its creed, the result
was chaos. Decentralisation, local autonomy, and complete
freedom for the individual were the aims of the Revolutio.
Four months only had elapsed since a Government plec

xiv) Anarchy in the provinces 34. I
to introduce them had sprung from a fever fit of enthusiasm.
During three months the Carlist rebellion had spread; and
the Liberal towns beyond the Ebro were left dependent on
their courage and local resources. The army that lined the
southern bank of the Ebro, without regular pay, rations, or
supplies, was rapidly becoming a ragged and half-starved
band of mutineers, incapable of facing the enemy and living
as banditti on the districts they were supposed to defend. In
Catalonia even worse had befallen. So soon as the Republic
was proclaimed, the separatists prepared to proclaim the Inde-
pendent State of Catalonia. The troops were easily won over
to the cause ; they showed how readily they had learnt to hate
“ tyrants’ and “oppressors” by shooting their officers and
demanding their own discharge. Its land communications cut by
the Carlists, the great commercial city was left to defend itself
against its “protectors.” Whilst the press and the Ministry were
deliberating on the breaking-up of Spain into thirteen semi-
independent states, Valencia likewise anticipated their decision,
raised its junta to supreme authority, declared its port free,
established a fiscal frontier, and made preparations to defend
its walls against interference by the central authority. Catalonia
and Valencia, however, preserved some traditions of local
government, and, thanks to them, never fell into anarchy as
did Andalusia,
The southern provinces, which had returned to Amadeo's
last Parliament seventy Radical-Socialist members, welcomed
the advent of the Republic by outbreaks of Savage anarchy.
The political ideal of the Andalusian demagogues was the Swiss
Federation ; under the name of cantonalismo they preached
disintegration to ready ears. Málaga, the centre of the new
itical creed, as soon as Spain had decided against monarchy,
up a republic or canton of its own. It drove out the civil
kthorities, armed its “volunteers of liberty,” disbanded and
issed its garrison, abolished customs-dues and their
Collectors the carbineers, and opened negotiations with




342 A'epublic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CII.
Madrid for federation on a basis of equality. It then gave
itself up whole-heartedly to a civil war between the rival
republican leaders, Carvajal and Solier. Seville, Cadiz, and
other cities were seized by the same frenzy, its symptoms only
differing locally. At Alcoy the mob was ferociously blood-
thirsty. At Granáda its pranks were ludicrous rather than
terrible. The citizens of Seville, led by their junta, took
possession of the arsenal, armed their walls, and then marched
out to impose Federalism upon their neighbours. They had
abolished individual property.
Cartagena, one of the most violent, proved also the most
stubborn of the revolting cities. The soldiers fraternised with
the mob ; a deputy and a general, Contreras, led them. The
forts and artillery depôt fell into their hands, with several
hundred cannon. The armour-clad squadron joined them,
increasing their power for harm and making them safe from
attack on the sea-side. Closely watched by British ships of
war, the ironclads, manned by undisciplined desperadoes,
steamed up and down the coast spreading the doctrines of the
Revolution, sometimes, as at Alicante, using cannon as the
mouthpiece of their propaganda. In most cities the Social
movement was marked by bitter hostility to the Church and
army. In the country districts, cursed by Zatiſundia, absentee
landlords, grasping agents, and by the number of holidays
enforced by the Church, it was communistic; parish assemblies
enthusiastically abolished property in law.
Madrid, so often the centre of disturbance, now seemed the
one sane city in all Spain. But the authority of its Govern-
ment hardly extended beyond its walls. The available troops
consisted merely of a few thousand men, for the army of the
north could not be withdrawn from the lines it held so fee
against the increasing forces of the Carlists. The garrisons
the south had joined the mob, had been driven out by it,
had accepted discharge at the hands of the self-constit
cantonal authorities. The volunteer battalions, recruite




XIV.] Views and policy of Pi y Margal/ 343
the Republican Government to replace the conscripts, proved
not only ruinously expensive but insubordinate and useless in
the field. Even the most ardent reformers admitted that
abolition of enforced military service had proved a failure.
As centres from which to reconquer the southern half of the
country, Pi y Margall held only the capital, the arsenal of Cadiz,
and Córdova, the meeting-place of the main lines of communi-
cation. But even of these slender resources he was unwilling
to make use. He had won his way by singleness of purpose,
guileless honesty, and devotion to an ideal of humanity far
different from that existing at present upon earth. Even the
facts before him failed to rouse him wholly from his dream.
He admitted the necessity for order and discipline, but was
unwilling to enforce them by the only means available. His
plan was to coax mutinous soldiers back to obedience, and to
make them in turn peaceful missionaries of the golden age now
dawning so strangely. Federalism had been his panacea for
the perennial ills of Spain; but he failed to recognise its
workings in the fantastic excesses of the cantonalist south.
Federation, he said, should come from above, not from below ;
should be granted by the central Government after due con-
sideration of number and frontiers, and not torn piecemeal
from the body of the country by crazy provincial and parochial
enthusiasts. In order to initiate this orderly process, Piy Margall,
as President of the Republic, recommended that the central
power should be strengthened. He did indeed send troops to
Córdova to cooperate against the stiff-necked authors of the
hideous outrages at Alcoy, but he undertook no sharp and
stern measures such as the times required. An excess of
scruples and not a lack of courage withheld him. This even
his enemies recognised, but the country had need of a stronger
hand.
The extreme section of the Republican party, the Federalist,
had to tame the beast it had let loose. It gave way to the Re-
publican Centre, or Unitarian party, under Salmeron. Already
344 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
the swing of the pendulum was evident, though only five
months and a few days had passed since Amadeo's abdication.
Pi y Margall resigned because the Cortes were veering round
towards a more conservative policy; having fallen out with his
colleagues as to the proper means of pacification, he was unable
to reform his Ministry.
Don Nicolás Salmeron, third President of the Spanish
Republic, if we are to count the fugitive Figueras, announced
himself for energetic repression of disorder preparatory to
inaugurating reforms. In order to effect this repression he was
obliged to employ the senior officers of the army, who were one
and all anti-Republican. But the state of the country left no
choice. Conscription was reverted to ; mutinous regiments
were disbanded; and the squadron in the hands of the Cartagéna
cantonalists was declared piratical and outlaw. The generals
recommended that the artillery should be completely re-
organised and the cavalry increased. But all this would be
the work of time. For the moment the small available force
must be employed where it could effect most with least danger
to itself. e
The credit of the first effort to restore order in the south
is generally given to Castelar; but it was Salmeron who during
his two months’ Presidency began the great work. It was he
who sent Martinez Campos to drive out the junta of madmen
and rogues who terrorised the orderly citizens of Valencia ;
and, still more important, it was he who sent General Pavia and
his little army to reconquer Andalusia, telling him that if he
could but persuade a soldier to fire at a cantonalist public
order was saved. Pavia's soldiers did fire; and Salmeron's
words proved true. Leaving Madrid in July (1873) with about
a thousand men in three trains, Pavia evaded the insurgents
holding the pass of Despeñaperros on the direct line to
Andalusia by going round by Ciudad Real. He arrived just
in time to save Córdova from the cantonalists of Granáda and
Málaga, disarmed its national guard, and more than doubled
xiv) Order restored in the south 345
his little force by incorporating the garrison and artillery.
Then he hurried on, fearing always lest delay should spread
insubordination from the contaminated troops of Andalusia to
his own men. Three days after his arrival at Córdova he
reached Seville, where the cantonalists, relying on the artillery
they had seized in the arsenal, determined to make a stubborn
resistance. But they foolishly allowed Pavia to detrain his
troops unmolested in full sight of their walls, to march round
unopposed to the further side, and to take possession of the
railway to the south. Thus cut off from the neighbouring and
friendly states of Málaga, Cadiz, and Granáda, the fall of Seville
was merely a matter of time. Pavia, however, had no time to
waste. He attacked the strong positions of the enemy, but was
driven back; and more than once his little army nearly despaired
of being able to make its way past the forts and through the
holders of the barricades into the city. Pavia and his officers
knew that failure meant the instant dissolution of their force.
They infused some of their spirit into their men. In default of
gunners their sixteen fieldpieces were served by cavalry officers.
Five days’ fighting and a loss of three hundred men made them
masters of the city. The moral effect was very great. Cadiz
made no resistance; Granáda submitted on Pavia's appearance.
There remained, however, the two chief centres of agitation,
Málaga and Cartagéna. Against the former he was preparing
to march when he was stopped by orders from Salmeron.
Although, when the danger was most pressing, Salmeron had
been obliged to trust the pacification of the south to a soldier,
it was contrary to his feelings and principles; he hoped that,
now that an example had been made, the remaining cities would
submit without further bloodshed. Over and above their
humanitarian scruples, Salmeron and the Republicans were
influenced by rooted distrust of the military class, to which so
much of Spain's sufferings was due. They feared a soldier-
dictatorship, set up by a few resolute battalions, in the weakened
State,
346 Åepublic and A’estoration (1873–1874) [CH.
Pavia, finding himself suddenly checked in the midst of his
excellent work, sent in his resignation and retired to Córdova,
whence he sent his officers to explain the position of affairs to
the hesitating Ministry. He pointed out that the military
measures taken against Seville, Cadiz, and Granáda could be
justified only by impartial application to all, and chiefly to
Málaga, the ringleader. The lack of firmness betrayed by the
sudden arrest of his southward march had already been followed
by its natural consequence, a renewed outbreak of cantonalism.
But Salmeron would not yield. Carlists and Alfonsists, now
allied against the Republic, were gathering on the French
frontier, negotiating with Serrano and preparing rebellion in
Madrid. He feared to alienate the Republicans. The Cortes,
however, were of a different mind; the project of a Federal
Constitution had been defeated. The Federalists deserved no
mercy; they had recklessly provoked a second civil war when
all the energies of Spain ought to have been employed against
the Carlists. Stern action was needed. So long as Salmeron
showed energy, the Cortes supported him; when he refused to
go further, they put in his place Emilio Castelar. Salmeron's
Presidency had lasted less than two months.
When Castelar took office (Sept. 8, 1873), the history of the
Republic was already a long and bloody one; yet the Republic
itself was not seven months old. To Castelar those seven
months had been a time of bitter disappointment. Brought to
the test of brutal fact, his cherished theories had broken down;
and now the apostle of gentleness, the declared foe of blood-
shed, violence, and militarism, was obliged “to sacrifice his
principles in order to preserve his country and liberty.” As
soon as he accepted the Presidency, the Cortes prorogued their
sittings until the beginning of the new year, and left the
champion of all the liberties alone to enforce his authority at
the point of the bayonet, and to make head against two civil
wars. Castelar's courage was known; but the way in which he
faced circumstances so widely different from his highly-coloured
XIV.] Caste/ar as President 347
oratorical visions of a republican millennium was not expected.
Once thoroughly aroused from his dream, he set himself sternly
to reconquer half Spain, determined to establish the Republic
“so soon as Spaniards have agreed as to the grounds that
divide them least.” His first measure was to order Pavia to
advance again. Málaga was restored to Spain (September 14)
without bloodshed. Her fantastic volunteers sought leave to
work off in battle against the Carlists the hot blood that had
hurried them into a civil war within their own canton. They
travelled only as far as Madrid; insubordination made it
necessary to disarm and send them home. That Pavia had
succeeded with so little fighting in reconquering Andalusia was
chiefly due to the Civil Guard. This splendid constabulary,
though cut off from the capital, had not wavered ; it alone in
the name of law and order withstood the shock of that wild
political and social upheaval. No sooner had Pavia finished
the work for which he was sent than he was deprived of his
command. Castelar indeed was hardly less averse than
Salmeron from extraordinary military measures; he hastened to
revive the normal authority of the Captains-General, trusting
to them to reorganise the still seething districts. Pavia was
offered the Captaincy-General of New Castille; but, dis-
contented with the treatment he had received, he at first
refused it.
The sudden suspension of military measures was again
interpreted as an abandonment of the policy of coercion, and
had a bad effect upon the cities still in revolt. In Cartagena
the powers of disorder had run a wilder riot than even in
Málaga. The convicts released by the mob were more reckless
and fiercer than their liberators. Their resistance, too, was
more determined, for to them defeat meant exile or return to
gaol. Before Castelar became President, their means of doing
harm had been curtailed by the loss of the greater part of
the squadron. After terrorising the neighbouring coast towns,
bombarding and levying blackmail under the eyes of the
348 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
commanders of the foreign squadrons, the Federal ships had
been declared pirates by the Republican Government. There-
upon the British fleet, acting as police of the seas, took
possession of them and brought them to Gibraltar after turning
their crews of desperadoes ashore. Still Cartagéna remained
obstinate, trusting to the great strength of her fortifications
and the abundance of cannon and warlike stores. Contreras,
general of the canton, actually ventured as far as the bridge
of Chinchilla and defeated the feeble force sent against him by
Pi y Margall. Salmeron sent General Martinez Campos, who
early in August had delivered Valencia from the mob. But
with only about two thousand troops and a few mortars he was
unable to undertake anything more than preliminary siege
works. These had no effect, for the rebels had the open sea
behind them and still retained some frigates. Castelar collected
a stronger body of troops, properly equipped and provided with
cannon. General Lopez Dominguez, its commander, was
greatly favoured by chance. The rebel ship Tetuan was acci-
dentally burned; the artillery posts blew up; the ironclads
restored by the British Government took part in the blockade;
and Cartagena surrendered (Jan. 13, 1874) after a tremendous
bombardment. The ringleaders escaped to Orán'. Castelar
was no longer in office to receive the credit due to the success
of his arms.
Forced by the responsibility of power to abandon his policy
of peace at any price, the ex-professor and inexhaustible coiner
of sounding phrases had set his hand to army reform with
characteristic thoroughness. Abolition of conscription was one
of the few matters on which Republicans of every shade were
united. Yet Castelar levied the heaviest blood-tax ever im-
posed upon Spain. The 120,000 men required could be
* One of them was Roque Barcia, eminent as a man of letters. It was
largely through the personal assistance of the late Charles Austin, then
correspondent of the Times, that he escaped in disguise. The author and
I heard the dramatic tale from Austin's lips. [W. H. H.]
XIV.] Cartagena and the Carlists 349
recruited only in certain provinces, while the north was in the
hands of the Carlists and the south still in rebellion. The
army became his chief care, the immediate and necessary
instrument of the regeneration of Spain. In order to rearm,
equip, and pay it, the salaries of civil servants and the stipends
of the clergy were allowed to fall into arrear. No interest was
paid upon the National Debt. Important commands were
given to generals of approved skill, regardless of their political
opinions. The sedition of the artillery officers had left the
most indispensable and most technical corps of the army under
the command of promoted Sergeants without authority and
without theoretical knowledge. To improvise a new body of
officers was impossible. Castelar sacrificed Hidalgo to the
just prejudices of his former associates, and reorganised the
artillery under its own officers. It was a complete surrender to a
section of the army guilty of an act of insubordination; but it is
impossible to question its wisdom or to grudge admiration for
the resolution with which Castelar thrust down his pride and
cut off his prejudices. Even so, the reduction of Cartagéna
cost the country an enormous effort; and the troops along the
Ebro barely held their own.
In order to understand the position of the Carlists at the
time of Castelar's dictatorship (September—December, 1873) it
is necessary briefly to review the fortunes of the party since
the agreement of Amoravieta put an end to the rash rising in
Navarre. It was not to be hoped that the efforts of a great
party would be terminated in a mere skirmish like the affair of
Oroquieta, or that a most stubborn race, influenced by a bitterly
hostile clergy, could be reconciled by a few soothing declara-
tions. The clemency of the agreement of Amoravieta amounted
to culpable weakness on the part of those who granted it. As
such it was regarded by those responsible for maintaining order
in the north; the irreconcilable Carlists looked upon impunity
as an encouragement to revolt. One good effect, however, for
the Liberal cause this famous agreement had—it set the
350 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
Carlists quarrelling among themselves. Those who had laid
down their arms and accepted the proffered amnesty were
treated as cowards and traitors by the more stalwart. The
result was confusion, rendered worse by the unpopularity of the
Prince's private secretary and trusted adviser, Arjona. So
fierce did the quarrel become and so keenly did Don Carlos
support his confidant that he dissolved the Basque-Navarrese
junta, the central organisation of his party, with scant recog-
nition of its past services, and accepted the resignation of his
Commandants-General in the Basque Provinces and Navarre.
The party was breaking up when Arjona was induced to
resign, and the command was given to Dorregaray (Feb. 7,
1873). Seven months only had passed since the Convention of
Amoravieta when Don Carlos again appeared upon the frontier
eager for another attempt. Scattered bands were already
rising unbidden to combat in his name. The first of these
was the notorious crew of desperadoes recruited and com-
manded by the fierce priest Santa Cruz. They already infested
the mountains of Guipúzcoa, and had made themselves hated
by Carlists and Liberals alike by murders, incendiarism, and
blackmail. They brought discredit on the cause by beating
peaceful citizens to death and wrecking trains, until outlawed,
attacked, and dispersed by the Carlists themselves. Alluding
to them, the Deputation of Biscay denounced “the assemblies
of outlaws who commit all sorts of crimes.” The Deputation
of Guipúzcoa recruited volunteers to fight against them. These
deputations, elected partly by the towns, contained many
Republicans and other Liberals; but even their Carlist members
were reluctant to implicate the party in another abortive rising,
for they were assured that it would be punished by the loss of
the remaining Fueros. Moreover, the regular Carlist forces
during this second war showed themselves anxious to avoid the
cruel excesses of the previous one. Don Carlos’ orders were
strict. He showed his earnestness by punishing disobedience;
and, if his men were at times led to commit acts condemned in
xiv) Aenewa/ of the Carlist War 35 I
civilised warfare, it was almost always in retaliation. Excepting
Santa Cruz, and a few others whom they repudiated, the Carlists
proved correct and often chivalrous adversaries. Santa Cruz
being already in the field, and many others eager to follow,
Don Carlos was induced to give the order for a general rising
in Navarre and the Basque Provinces.
In Catalonia guerrilla warfare had never ceased, though
towards the end of the year 1872 only about 3000 volunteers
were left in the field. After the defeat of Oroquieta and the
momentary pacification of the Basque Provinces, Don Alfonso,
brother of the Pretender and Commander of the Principality,
stubbornly kept the war alive. But, though he strove to con-
ceal it, he was dissatisfied with his command. The Catalan
guerrilleros were unruly and insolent, fierce and brutal. The
discredit of their too frequent excesses attached to their com-
mander, even though by supplication and threat he did his best
to check them. Many of the so-called Carlists were little
better than brigands living at free quarters. Their greatest
success consisted in blackmailing towns of third-rate im-
portance. The cause was becoming unpopular, and its
adherents were deserting, when Don Carlos hit upon a plan to
win the enthusiastic support of those who until now had been
indifferent. By a manifesto issued from his hiding-place
(June 16, 1872) he promised to give back to the ancient
kingdom of Aragon–Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia—“the
ancient privileges (Fueros) which a century and a half ago my
illustrious ancestor Philip V thought fit to erase from the page
of the liberties of our country.” This startling proclamation
failed to produce the hoped-for effect. The people had quite
forgotten how their privileges had been lost in a gallant struggle
against a foreign king. Those who were better taught in
history doubted the opportunity and the legality of the measure.
Mockers made merry over liberties granted by the stroke of a
pen that must necessarily start at the approach of a French
gendarme. Nevertheless, when Dorregaray's call to arms
352 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
rekindled the war in the Basque Provinces, Catalonia, too,
again bestirred herself.
The call to arms was issued during Amadeo's reign, and
contrary to the advice of Don Carlos' most far-seeing counsellor.
Nocedal's plan of rendering government impossible until Spain
in despair should throw herself at the feet of his master was
working even better than he could have hoped. He saw the
time approaching when the Republic would be proclaimed.
The Republicans would then be called upon to fulfil their pledge
of abolishing conscription; the army would disappear; and, left
face to face with anarchy, “the shopkeepers of Madrid would
call in their legitimate king to safeguard their tills.” And
indeed it seems not unlikely that such would have been the
course of events if the Carlists had not given timely notice
of danger. The order for a general rising was not at first
obeyed with enthusiasm in the Basque Provinces. The elective
bodies were, as has been said, hostile; arms were so scarce
that the volunteers were drilled with sticks instead of rifles; the
failure of the last year had had a chilling effect; many felt
themselves in conscience bound by the terms of the Convention.
Moreover, a more liberal spirit was spreading; the towns had
proved that it was possible to be a good Spaniard, and a good
Christian, nay a good Basque or a good Biscayan, without
being a Carlist.
No very active measures were at first taken against the
roving bands. The eyes of all were fixed on Madrid, where the
King's abdication was imminent and its consequences incalcu-
lable. When it came and was immediately followed by the
proclamation of the Republic, the army at Catalonia became a
mutinous band of brigands. The army of the north hesitated
a moment and then accepted Pavia as its commander. He
kept down its discontent by leading it against the enemy and
keeping it in perpetual movement; but its exertions were
rendered almost useless by the superior mobility of the Carlists,
and by lack of artillery and supplies. The Carlists on their side
xIv] Progress of the Carlists 353
strained every nerve to get money and arms and to increase
their numbers. In defiance of the liberties of which they were
the declared champions, they called out the whole male popula-
tion of Guipúzcoa between the ages of eighteen and forty years
(April, 1873). This usurpation of the powers vested in the
Deputation was excused on the plea that the meeting of the
Deputation was impossible, the Carlists having hitherto no fixed
headquarters. But, in spite of infringements of jealously-
guarded rights, in spite of ruthless exactions from friend and
foe alike, in spite of the murders and forays of Santa Cruz, the
numbers of the Carlists increased, and their armament and
discipline improved. A victory was all that was needed to
give confidence to the bevies of grave, long-limbed mountain
lads fighting for the cause of God, fatherland, and King, pro-
tected by the miraculous scapulary of the Sacred Heart, bearing
the words, “Stop, bullet!” The success obtained by Dorregaray
near Pamplona gave him the title of Marquis of Eraul, from
the name of the village around which the action took place
(May, 1873). Two months later the Carlists felt themselves
sufficiently strong to defend their King. The enthusiasm re-
awakened by his presence carried them forward in an irresistible
rush; and after an unsuccessful attempt, heroically resisted, they
captured Estella, a strategic point of the utmost importance
and endeared to them by memories of failure and success
during the former war (August 24). Then the small towns of
Navarre, Guipúzcoa, and Biscay began to fall one by one, until
only San Sebastian, Tolosa, and Bilbao, together with a few
strategic points, were left to the Liberals. Though the for-
malities prescribed by the ancient ritual could not be fulfilled
on account of the disturbed state of the country, Don Carlos
provisionally swore, under the oak tree of Guernica, to observe
the liberties of his lordship of Biscay.
In Catalonia, too, the cause was victorious. Here the war
was cruel, confused, and tumultuary. Leaders like Santa Cruz
were common and were not condemned by public opinion.
C. S. 23
354 Repub/ic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
Don Alfonso spared no effort to suppress lawlessness and
ferocity and to bring offenders to justice. But his task was
rendered impossible by the unruly nature of the Catalans and
by the provocations of the Liberals. The troops had indeed
cast off all discipline ; respect for the rules of civilised warfare
could not be expected from men who had murdered their
officers and pillaged the towns they were sent to defend.
Ripoll was surprised by the Carlists but was recaptured. Berga
fell into their hands, giving them many prisoners and much of
warlike stores. Puigcerdà, fiercely attacked, owed its safety to
its valour. At Alpens the guerrillero Savalls captured 8oo
troops and the dead body of their commander, General
Cabrinetti (July 9). In face of such a series of disasters the
Liberal generals could do nothing. The chief commands and
the Ministry for War, conferred too often for political rather than
military reasons, changed hands several times during the first
months of the Republic. General Nouvilas, Pavia's successor,
found that officers dismissed as incapable returned promoted
from Madrid, provided they were good Republicans. Receiving
notification that a million pesetas wherewith to pay his half-
starving troops were awaiting him at Vitoria, he hurried thither,
only to find the pay-chests empty. He resigned in disgust.
The Carlists were now masters of the country between the
French frontier and the Ebro. They had an army of 8ooo well-
trained and enthusiastic men, and they began to establish their
lines along the right bank of the river as their fathers had done
in the last war. Continual forays, sometimes into the heart of
the rich kingdom of Valencia, sometimes far out on the plain
of Castille, prevented the concentration of the troops of the
Republic for a united effort. Moreover, Cartagéna still held out;
and its reconquest rightly took precedence of all other military
operations. In Castille itself, in La Mancha, Andalusia, and
Leon, Carlists were sufficiently numerous to keep the local
authorities in continual anxiety and to make the presence of
troops, sorely needed elsewhere, necessary. No less serious
XIV] Difficulties of Castelaz’s government 355
than lack of troops was lack of money. The Federalists refused
taxation; the whole burden of supporting the State, like that of
defending it, had to be borne by the loyal provinces. Ten
months of the Republic saw six finance ministers succeed one
another; each after a hasty glance at great deficiencies retired
in dismay. The annual deficit exceeded the nominal revenue.
The creditors of Spain trusted Castelar somewhat more than
his predecessors, even though he made no pretence of paying
the interest on the debt; but the help they gave was grudging
and the interest demanded ruinous. Lowell, the wise and witty
ambassador of the United States, wrote, “There exists in Paris
a mysterious corporation, called the Bank of Paris, which con-
ducts the financial operations of the Spanish Government.
The process is said to be this: the Government, having obtained
authorisation, applies to the Bank of Paris to place the loan.
It deposits in the vaults of the Bank a sufficient quantity of its
own bonds on hand to serve as security for the Bank in the
operation. The Bank puts the loan on the market, and gets
its commission. It rehypothecates the hypothecated bonds,
and gets a commission. It buys the bonds on its own account
and pays itself a commission for the sale. It sells them again
to its own customers, being thus forced reluctantly to pocket
another commission. To sustain the weight of the loan in a
dull market it is forced to borrow money from itself at a high
rate of interest; and every such ingenious operation results in...
another commission. The sum that comes to the Government
is profoundly unknown....”
The Liberal cause would indeed have been desperate had
not the Carlists on their side blundered at the moment of
their greatest advantage. They had succeeded in blockading
the Liberal towns within their territory; the country folk
were enthusiastic for the cause; they were strongly established
in a central position, from which they could choose their
point of attack or hurry to resist threatened invasion. The
Provincial Deputation, though they could not raise large sums
23–2
356 A'epublic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
of money, could and did find food for the volunteers. The
lack of arms had been to a great extent supplied by the
capture of Eybar and Plasencia, important manufactories of
rifles. Large consignments also were landed on the coast
by ships flying English and French flags. The foundries
of Azpeitia produced rough but fairly satisfactory cannon.
Hospitals, military schools, factories for uniforms, and military
depôts had been established. Naturally adapted for self-
government, the Basques never allowed their provinces to
fall, as Catalonia fell, into anarchy. The Carlist authorities
were the first to demand the punishment of Santa Cruz for
attacks on the railway after declaration of its neutrality, and to
resist his claim to impose a passport upon travellers. The
Carlists were convinced that their cause was sacred; they were
taught that a Liberal is one whose cynical indifference to
religion, honour, and morality in this world will surely bring
upon him damnation in the next. No fabled pacts between
freemasons and devils were too grotesque for belief. The
Carlists, on their side, were a religious brotherhood as well as a
militant force. Neglect of confession was a symptom of con-
tamination amid the pure flock; important operations were
subordinated to observance of the great Church festivals; men
and officers daily recited the rosary publicly and together. The
cause was further sanctified by the solemn anointing of the
prince at Loyola, the shrine of the greatest Basque saint
(Nov. 7, 1873). All this had been so, or but little different,
during the old war; but the belief had exercised no restraining
influence; and the Carlists were taught neither to expect nor to
exercise mercy. The new policy was to win over rather than
to exterminate the enemy; quarter was freely given; and often,
when small and isolated forces defended themselves bravely in
hopeles positions, the Carlists drew off from the attack, saluted
and passed upon their way.
But the cause was sorely hampered by local jealousies; the
separatist tendency that appeared as cantonalism in the south
xiv) The Carlists /ose their chance 3 57
divided the northern provinces too. All were ready for the
sacrifice, but eager to see that their neighbours underwent it first;
each province became suspicious when troops other than native
camped on its soil, and churlishly refused to the strangers the
help due equally to all Carlists. The levies of each province
lost enthusiasm as they passed out of sight of their native hills,
and desertion was often the consequence of home-sickness.
A series of small victories had been won; but no real leader
like Zumalacárregui had come to the front.
When Don Carlos joined the volunteers (July, 1873),
Pi y Margall, the most unwarlike of men, was at the head of a
weak and divided Ministry; the Liberal army, hating Federalism,
was wavering in its allegiance; a bold forward move might have
carried the lately blessed banners to Madrid. Five months
had passed, five months it is true of almost uninterrupted good
fortune and of steady organisation. Estella had been taken;
Moriones, driven back in a pitched battle at Monte Jurra
(Nov. 9, 1873), with difficulty had succeeded in bringing relief
to the hard-pressed town of Tolosa. The Carlists could move
almost unhindered from western Biscay to Catalonia; their
own success astonished them. But now Castelar had taken
the place of Pi y Margall. The south had been won back ;
the fall of Cartagena set free a large body of veteran troops;
the artillery had been reorganised; a fresh army was being
formed. The Carlists had missed their chance. It was late
when they decided upon their supreme effort; and they struck
not at the heart of the country but at the outlying seaport of
Bilbao. Traditionalists in everything, they went to wear out
their enthusiasm and shatter their battalions against the barrier
which had almost contemptuously withstood their fathers.
Whilst combating in arms the Carlists and Cantonalists,
Castelar sought to check the extreme Republicans and to
conciliate the Conservatives, or such part of them as was not
wholly irreconcilable. Circumstances and sad experience
drove him daily towards a more central position. He still
358 A'epublic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
professed himself a Radical, but his acts would not have been
different had his doctrines been moderately Conservative. He
had never adopted the anti-religious cry of the violent Radicals,
and he now entered into negotiations with the Vatican with a
view to more cordial relations. In fulfilment of functions taken
over from Catholic kings, he nominated one archbishop and
two bishops; they were afterwards duly installed by Pius IX.
Later in life he often smilingly called attention to the fact that
the prelates who owed their mitres to so unholy an influence
were by no means more unworthy than their fellows. Those
who considered anti-clericalism essential to the Liberal creed
were shocked; but they were not numerous in Spain. Many
more were reassured on seeing that the denominations of a few
secularists were not allowed to carry more weight than the
convictions of the immense majority.
Castelar was successful too in reestablishing diplomatic
relations with foreign Powers which had held back, failing to
find amid the Federal confusion a responsible central authority.
The United States of America had been the first to welcome
the sister Republic; and it was with the United States that the
only serious foreign complication of the Republican period befell.
Rebellion in Cuba was now endemic ; and the Americans had
come to look upon the conveyance of arms and ammunition to
the victims of bad government as meritorious. In any case,
whether their filibustering expeditions obeyed philanthropy or
profit as their motive, they looked to their Government for
protection against the feeble and remote authority of Spain.
Accordingly, when passengers and crew alike of the captured
Virginius were treated as pirates by an angry Spanish captain,
and what had been considered a venial matter was punished
capitally, indignation in the Eastern States demanded im-
mediate war. The Governments on both sides wisely adopted
a more moderate tone. It is to the credit of the Americans
that they did not make use of their opportunity to trample on
Spanish weakness. It is to Castelar's credit that the righteous-
XIV.] Caste/ar's gal/ant efforts 359
ness of his cause did not blind him to the madness of refusing
the apology demanded; amid his gathering difficulties he did
not seek apotheosis by ruining his country in a hopeless war in
defence of the point of honour.
Castelar's splendid effort to reestablish law and order, far
from disarming, roused fierce antagonism, and nowhere fiercer
than among those who called themselves Republicans. Under
him the Republic had become unitarian, centralised, and
Conservative; it had in fact dropped half of its destructive
programme. So Federals and Cantonalists, doctrinaires under
Salmeron, and social democrats under Roque Barcia, deter-
mined to overthrow him. The monarchical Liberals (Alfonsists)
on their side were not yet ready to take the field. For a
moment when Spain seemed destined either to break up or to
accept Don Carlos they hastily prepared to offer their way out
of the dilemma. Negotiations were begun with Serrano and
other generals of known Royalist opinions. At any rate the
party could have paralysed the Government by an appeal to
the army, where the Republic had few or no friends. But for
the moment their candidate for the throne was too young; and,
when Castelar's dictatorship brought the assurance that the
country no longer needed a forlorn hope to save it from the
extreme parties, the Royalists were glad to be able to defer
their schemes. They, no less than the Carlists, hoped to be
welcomed by the exhausted country when the fantastic episode
of the Republic should end, as it began, in confusion and blood-
shed. Carefully disciplined by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo,
they could bide their time whilst daily now the cunning
trimmers of politics, the Francisco Silvelas and Romero
Robledos, crept from the weather-beaten Republic eager to be
among the first to welcome the Restoration. .
But the Cortes were still Republican ; and, as the time for
their meeting drew near, it was clear that Castelar would be
betrayed by those who had left him to wrestle, as dictator, with
a well-nigh desperate situation. Castelar gone, the powers he
360 A'epublic and Æestoration (1873–1874) [CH.
had exercised would revert to the Radical and Federal majority,
who bitterly resented the sharp lesson inflicted upon their
friends in the south. Castelar would be made to pay dearly
for having ventured to save his country; and the whole of his
work would be undone. Aware of the danger that lay before
him he determined to face it, disregarding advice either to
prorogue further or boldly to dissolve the Cortes and obtain a bill
of indemnity from a Chamber of his own nominees returned by
a sham election. He had already sacrificed too many of his
principles to expediency; he would not base his power even to
do good on an unworthy trick, and he replied with pompous
honesty, “I will not risk one tittle of legality. On the second
of January I shall present myself before the Chamber. I shall
explain my conduct, and, if beaten, shall retire in bitterness of
soul to bewail in my home the misfortunes of my country.”
But there was in Madrid one man determined, as he
pleaded later, “to make use of a situation in which he alone
had power to check another outburst of anarchy.” Don
Manuel Pavia was a confused thinker; he expressed his
thoughts in language so involved that he was often misunder-
stood when most bent on making his meaning plain. His
memoir, published in defence of his conduct, is rambling and
perplexing to an extraordinary degree. But in action he was
prompt and resolute. The means on which he relied for
preventing the return to power of a party that had already
proved itself incapable of commanding respect or obedience
was the 3ooo troops of the garrison of Madrid. Dissatisfied
with the abrupt termination of his campaign against the Can-
tonalists (see p. 347), Pavia had at first refused the Captaincy-
General of New Castille, but later had accepted it. When the
time of danger approached, he solemnly promised Castelar the
support of the army against the turbulent deputies. But
Castelar was the last man to cast a sword into the scale.
Indeed he attached little meaning to the vague words of the
Captain-General, refused his offer of services, and mistook his
XIV.] Pavia's coup d'état 36 I
dark hints for mere expressions of good-will. Then Pavia
determined to save him against his wish. The leaders of the
Conservative party had promised in general terms to aid his
endeavour to secure better government; but for the execution
of his plan he depended on himself alone, taking nobody into
his confidence.
The Cortes met on the fateful second of January, 1874.
The Captain-General was waiting hard by and informed by
messengers of events within the House; the troops were
confined to quarters. As had been foreseen, a fierce and general
attack was made upon Castelar. The “Great Tribune,” as his
compatriots loved to call him, frankly admitted the perilous and
disastrous state of the country, but he defended his harsh
remedial measures with all the energy and eloquence of which
he was capable at his best moments. Nevertheless, it was clear
from the first that the vote would go against him. By the time
the resolution of want of confidence was put to the uproarious
House, Pavia had occupied the strategic points of the capital in
such a way as to be able to crush any interference on the part
of the national militia and the mob. Excitement in the
Congress was at its highest ; bowing to the vote of censure, the
President of the Republic was about to execute his threat of
retiring to weep at home over the misfortunes of his country.
Discussion raged as to his successor ; peals of heated oratory
rang over the heads of the stormy assembly; denunciations
were thundered forth, but none heeded. As the votes for the
election of a new President were being counted, in walked an
aide-de-camp and asked to speak with Don Nicolas Salmeron,
President of the Congress. His message was startling, and of
a conciseness most unfamiliar in that House. “He begged to
inform his Excellency that the Captain-General requests the
deputies to evacuate their Chamber.” He added that the
Captain-General could allow only a short time for the fulfilment
of his orders. When Salmeron communicated this message
to the House, the fury of the deputies knew no bounds; they
362 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
betook themselves once more to their wordy warfare, but the
direction of their denunciations was changed. A vote of
thanks to Castelar and of confidence in his policy is said to
have been carried by acclamation. Pavia was outlawed with
such solemnity as men concerned for their personal safety
could command. The deputies then resolved to die in their
places rather than yield obedience to the insolent order. But
the appearance of a few files of the Civil Guard and the echo of
a shot or two through the lobbies brought them to a better
mind. They hastily quitted the benches which they had a few
minutes before determined to defend with their life-blood, and
walked home unmolested through the chilly streets of the
unconscious capital. Everything had been done with military
exactitude. When the diplomatic body quitted the gallery from
which they had witnessed the strange scene, they were escorted
by a general and two aides-de-camp ; the troops saluted and
presented arms on their passage. There was none of the noise
and babble which generally accompanied a Revolution ; hardly
a spectator, for the hour was late even for Madrid.
But Pavia's plan was not merely to overturn a Government
that had not been lucky enough to please him. He proposed,
as his memoir explains, to hand over the government “not to a
party or flag of any kind but to a real coalition from which
should spring a ministry of conciliation and public safety.” He
excluded from political consideration, that is to say from his
strangely-planned coalition, only Carlists and Cantonalists.
These, in his opinion, by their appeal to arms had forfeited their
claim to be heard. In pursuance of this scheme he called a
meeting of the heads of parties and the Captains-General
present in Madrid to form a Government. At the same time
he deigned to explain to the superior officers of the army and
to the representatives of foreign Powers that his object in thus
thrusting himself forward had been “the preservation of his
country and of liberty.” Then the “one day blossom " (for
de ten dia), as he was nicknamed, considered his duty at an end,
XIv] Pavia retires. Attitude of Caste/ar 363
and withdrew well-satisfied to contemplate his patriotic work.
He could have retained, at least for a time, the position of
dictator, which he had so easily seized, but he refused to offer
himself as a candidate for office. He hoped that wise men
would approve his action, but he was aware “that in the eyes
of the many, the fools, it amounted to political suicide.”
In the simplicity of his heart, the high-handed and dis-
interested saviour of his country was shocked and disappointed
to find that his unceremonious clearing of Congress was not
immediately followed by a period of idyllic peace and concord.
Nobody had been more taken by surprise than Castelar. Both
feeling and policy compelled him to disavow the action of his
champion, and to refuse his invitation to the conference from
which a regenerated Spain was to spring. Antonio Cánovas
del Castillo, too, in the name of the rapidly-growing Alfonsist
party, declined to undertake government-making at the military
word of command ; the time for the Restoration had not yet
come. Nevertheless, the Coalition Ministry was formed, though
the abstention of Castelar and of Cánovas del Castillo left its
base narrower than Pavia had hoped. The Royalists having
refused to push their cause prematurely, the Republic, now
become Unitarian and Conservative, continued. Francisco
Serrano, Duke of la Torre, was elected President of the
Republic as well as of the Council of Ministers. Zabala
accepted the Ministry for War; Topete the Navy; Echegaray
Finance ; Martos Justice ; and Sagasta, who represented the
practical brains of the ill-assorted party, the Foreign Office.
Under Republican forms, it was a transitional Government, a
half-military and half-civil dictatorship.
Serrano had already failed once as a leader. When the
Revolution of 1868 placed him at the head of affairs, he allowed
Prim to take the whole direction out of his hands and proved
merely a hindrance to his masterful coadjutor. The resolution
which he ever showed in the field deserted him at once in
politics.
364 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
Indeed, the state of the country was calculated to appal
even a stronger intellect, and justified the first measures of the
new Government—suspension of the Constitution, dissolution
of the Constituent Cortes, and postponement of a general elec-
tion until the country should be sufficiently pacified. In Cuba
80,000 Spaniards were carrying on the seemingly interminable
struggle against the Separatists. At Cartagena the red flag of
anarchy still floated. Two hundred thousand troops were
under arms to oppose the Carlists, who nevertheless were now
masters of three provinces. The Treasury was empty, commerce
at a standstill. No taxes could be raised in the rebellious
districts. Only with the greatest difficulty could inadequate
supplies be raised for the army. Beyond the Ebro the towns
that still held for the Liberals, Pamplona, San Sebastian, and
Bilbao, were daily harder pressed. The stop-gap Government,
Republican only in name, had no real friends. Throughout
Spain the nobility, the clergy, and the richer classes, as well as
the whole female population, were Royalist, either Carlist or
Alfonsist. The latter party, by the Pact of Cannes (Jan. 15,
1872), had come to an understanding with the Duke of Mont-
pensier, promising him the Regency if the young prince should
come to the throne before attaining his eighteenth year. Their
hope was that Carlists and Republicans would fight till their
exhaustion left the moderate Royalists masters of the situation.
But for this it was necessary that neither Republicans nor
Carlists should gain a striking success in the field. Even far-
sighted men believed that the reduction of the northern
provinces might have given a new lease of life to the Republic;
whilst the fall of Bilbao or a victory on the Ebro might have
been followed by the immediate triumph of the Carlists.
Serrano's friends dreamed for him a position like that of
Marshal Macmahon in France, the perpetual Presidency of a
Government using Republican forms. But Serrano was neither
cunning nor active enough to maintain the position into which
lucky chances, and a refined demeanour coexisting with coarse
xIV.] The Coalition Government 365
moral fibre, had thrust him. His tenure of office began
brightly enough with military and diplomatic successes; his
Government was recognised by the Powers as more promising
of stability than its predecessors; Cartagena fell before the guns
of his nephew, Lopez Dominguez, during the first fortnight of
his presidency. But the reconciliation and reorganisation which
were to have sprung from the coalition seemed as far off as ever.
The Cortes were not sitting; the constitutional guarantees had
been suspended; the Government had full powers to defend
itself against obstructive opposition with the avowed object of
prolonging an intolerable state of disorder and uncertainty.
But its utter lack of energy encouraged the Royalists in their
unpatriotic agitation. It was no longer necessary to plot in
secret. The Alfonsists paraded their forces and conspired
unchecked against Serrano's rule; their newspapers carried on
an active propaganda; their agents walked the streets with
officers in high command and whispered with sergeants, and
corporals. All men were persuaded that the Republic could
not last—it was just one year old—and all were hastening to
prepare for the coming change and to make friends with the
party of the future.
The end of the Cantonalist revolt and of the riots in
Barcelona had set free a large body of troops for employment
against the Carlists. Serrano was jealously afraid that, while
he lingered in Madrid, the glory of crushing the insurrection in
the north would fall to one of his rivals. He was weary of
watching without being able to prevent elusive danger, caused
by the spread of Royalism. He nominated Zabala, Minister
for War, to replace him in the Ministry; and, while the unstable
coalition on which his power depended still held together,
started northward to take over the command (February 27).
General Moriones, commander of the Liberal forces, had under
him about 45,000 men. With these he was obliged not only
to hold the lines of the Ebro but also to garrison and keep
open occasional communications with Irun, San Sebastian,
366 A'epublic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
Tolosa, Vitoria, and Pamplona. These towns, though situated
in the heart of the Carlist country, continually harried or
blockaded, and ill-supported by successive Governments, re-
peated the history of the earlier war by holding out unflinch-
ingly in the Liberal cause. Thus Moriones was never able to
concentrate more than about a third of his troops for even the
most necessary operations; he was continually outnumbered
by the Carlists striking from the centre against his long, weak
line of circumference.
In January, while Madrid was recovering from its astonish-
ment at Pavia's single-handed pronunciamiento, the Carlists
invested Bilbao. For some months before its communications
with the sea at Portugalete had been threatened, while the
Carlists were furbishing up old cannon and casting new
ones for a siege. Nevertheless, nothing had been done to
strengthen the feeble fortifications of the invicta villa ; and
General de Castillo, its commander, had only about 1800
regular troops when the seizure of the mouth of the river
Nervion cut him off from the sea. At the same time a force of
Carlists, outnumbering his own by nearly ten to one, appeared
on the heights around the city. Though the bravery of its
commander and the spirit of its Liberal volunteers were well
known, the Madrid Government took alarm; for, strictly invested
as it was, the fall of Bilbao could be only a matter of time.
Moriones was ordered to start to the rescue in mid-winter from
the important railway junction of Miranda. With difficulty he
succeeded in getting together some 20,000 ill-provided troops;
of these he was obliged to detach almost a third to guard com-
munications. At Somorrostro he found himself face to face
with a superior force occupying a position of great natural
strength and carefully fortified. To attempt to outflank the
position was useless, to break through nearly hopeless; but
Moriones had been ordered to make the attempt. So on
February 25 he led II, ooo men, well aware of the desperate
nature of their undertaking, to assault the trenches of San
XIV.] The siege of Bilbao 367
Pedro Abanto. The attempt cost 1200 men; the survivors
withdrew dispirited but still formidable. Moriones telegraphed
to the Government, “Send reinforcements and another general
to take over the command.... I keep my positions at Somor-
rostro and my communications with Castro.” The latter part
of the message was most important. Portugalete being in the
hands of the enemy and communications of the Liberal army
through Vitoria to the south threatened, Castro Urdiales, to the
west of Portugalete, was the only way open for supplies to reach
the now blockaded army, or for its embarcation, should that
become necessary. But the Carlists, busy celebrating their
victory, neglected to take full advantage of it; Moriones was
allowed to entrench himself undisturbed. The commandant of
Bilbao received without flinching the news of the failure of the
force sent to his relief. It came in the form of a message
from the Carlist general, the Marquis of Valdespina, with the
hint that Bilbao must now hope for no help from the outside.
General de Castillo replied, “As you are a gentleman, I trust
your news; and, as I am the same, I go on fighting.”
Such was the state of affairs in Biscay when Serrano
arrived to take over the command. The extreme danger of
Bilbao, and the disastrous results that must follow its loss,
rendered instant action necessary; but Serrano had no wish to
court the defeat to which he had sent Moriones open-eyed.
The victory had roused Carlist activity all over Spain ; the
danger of another Federal outbreak was not yet past ; so the
garrisons of the interior and of the south could not be entirely
depleted. But, when Serrano, a month after Moriones' failure,
again renewed the attempt, his chances of success were much
better. It was at the head of 27,ooo men and 7o cannon that
he attacked the Carlist lines. His forces were not sufficient to
outflank the formidable positions of the Carlists ; General
Elio faced him with 17,ooo men, and had left behind him
sufficient troops to repel any attempt at a diversion on the part
of the garrison of Bilbao. On March 25 and the following day
368 A'epublic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
Serrano's attack was merely tentative; but it cost 9oo killed
and wounded. On the third day the whole forces on either
side were hotly engaged. Serrano's plan was by a frontal
attack to cut the Carlists in two, and to hold them between his
army, Bilbao, and the warships blockading the mouth of the
river Nervion. The battle was a stubborn one; positions were
repeatedly stormed and retaken. At the end of the day the
Liberals had lost 2000 men and their adversaries well-nigh as
many; the two armies still occupied the positions from which
they had fought three days before; and the Liberals were not in
condition to renew the attack. It was in fact a great victory
for the Carlists; and their hopes rose high of taking Bilbao
before the Liberals could raise sufficient troops to relieve it.
Serrano's telegram, telling of his failure and pointing out
that Bilbao was doomed unless another whole division of
trustworthy troops could be sent, roused Madrid to the gravity of
the situation. Then and not till then was made the effort that
earlier would have sufficed to end the war. Zabala and Sagasta,
the military and civil heads of the Government, saw that all
other risks must be taken if only the present danger could be
averted. In frantic haste the cities of the south were stripped
of their already reduced garrisons. Untried battalions were
equipped for active service; their ranks were stiffened with
constabulary and frontier-guards, old and steady soldiers. The
whole resources of the well-nigh exhausted country were placed
at the disposal of the army in the north. Spain realised that
her fate was about to be decided in a single cast.
The troops were sent by rail to Santander, thence by sea to
Castro Urdiales, the port so prudently kept open by Moriones.
From Castro they had but a short way to march to join the
main body at Somorrostro. At the end of April Serrano's
army numbered 33, ooo. He had also the skilled advice of the
best soldiers; he had summoned to his aid even the generals
whom he knew to be working for the restoration of monarchy,
Concha, Echagüe, and Martinez Campos. By doing so he
XIV.] Siege of Bilbao raised 369
knowingly put himself into their power; but it was no moment
for circumspection, and he rightly trusted the untarnished
honour of Concha and his great authority to delay the execution
of their scheme. Nevertheless, the Liberal camp at Somorrostro
was a nest of intrigue. General Echagüe even went so far as
to propose that Concha should receive Martinez Campos with
a deputation of officers to represent the necessity of at once
proclaiming Alfonso XII. It was believed that such a
proclamation would have the effect of attracting many old
soldiers of Queen Isabel now serving in the Carlist army. But
Concha would not listen to such treasonable sophistry. He
held that the Restoration should be proclaimed by the civil
authority, not by the army, and above all not by an army in
face of the enemy. His first duty was to defeat the Carlists;
after that he was prepared to insist upon a hearing for his
political views. Thus he held in check the others who did not
share his political scruples nor the delicacy of his military
honour. It was Concha who (May 1, 1874), directing the
operations of the third division, turned the left flank of the
Carlist lines and obliged them, without striking a blow, to
abandon the siege on which so many of their hopes were
centred. They withdrew in perfect order, taking all the
cannon they had used in the siege. But they were dispirited
by their failure when on the point of success; and they dis-
trusted their leaders, among whom jealousy and faction were
hardly less rife than among the Liberals.
While the Carlists wrangled over the first principles of
their cause, and the awful charge of sympathy with Liberal
ideas drew forth the retort of “apostolic obscurantism,” the
Liberals had now nearly 40, ooo troops sufficiently equipped
and flushed with lightly-won success. All these could be
employed against the retreating Carlists, for no disturbances
had followed the depletion of the garrisons of the south. But
Serrano did not follow up his advantage at once and put an
end to the war. As usual when affairs seemed to be approach-
C. S. 24
370 A'epublic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
ing a crisis, occult influences were at work. The danger of
Carlism is its elusiveness, its stronghold the hearts of women
and of priests ; it appeals to feeling, not to reason, it is a
religion, not a political formula. Those who fight against it
seem ill at ease; they are not sure they do not fight against a
holy cause. Most thinking Spaniards are Carlists in certain
moods, at certain ages. Over and above its open and avowed
adherents, the cause has a host of secret sympathisers. Were it
to triumph to-morrow, three-fourths of the nation would be
ready to declare, not utterly untruthfully, that a long-cherished
hope had been fulfilled. Welcoming martyrdom and strength-
ened by persecution, its spirit disarms those who are sent
against it. The Carlists had a definite cause, an object, and a
plain way to reach it. The Republican officers knew not but
that their success might strengthen a party whose mottoes were
far more alien than God, Country, and King.
The Carlists had twice beaten back their adversaries from
Somorrostro, and had retired unbeaten. Their hopes began to
revive, and they remade their shattered plans. At Madrid
Sagasta was calling for Serrano to rally his friends. The
coalition Cabinet, Pavia's rough handiwork, had held together
only so long as the national danger was most pressing. General
Concha took over the command of the Army of the North,
while Serrano, President of the Republic and Commander-in-
Chief, hurried to the capital. As deliverer of Bilbao he was
received with some applause. He gave the credit for his
success to the man who really deserved it, the Minister for
War, Zabala, who had collected, armed, and sent forward the
necessary troops. But the applause of the streets soon died
away; and Serrano was left face to face with the uncompromising
Republicans, complaining that he had shown little vigour
against the Carlists, still less against the Alfonsists. Deserted
by these, he formed a Cabinet of men who had lost hope and
faith in the Republic, but were patriotically willing to carry on
the government until the expected change took place. Per-
xiv) Serrano's Government failing 37 I
suasion and pressure were necessary to induce the most
capable to accept the invidious position. Only after long
reluctance did General Zabala consent to form a ministry; only
after failure did he succeed in doing so. Two well-known men
became his colleagues—Alonso Martinez, Minister for Justice,
and Sagasta, the clever wire-puller at the Ministry of the
Interior. The weakness of the Republic was painfully evident;
the Alfonsists became even bolder than before, certain now
of speedy triumph. Serrano lacked character to play grace-
fully and skilfully a losing game. Still the new Ministry showed
a bold front. Sagasta began the process euphemistically known
as preparing the elections. His programme spoke of maintaining
the conquests of the Revolution, and carrying on the great work
of the reorganisation (May 13, 1874), while the press of almost
every shade waged a furious campaign against the President.
Sagasta's efforts at repression by means of fines and seizures
only hastened the now inevitable catastrophe. The Republic
had turned persecutor; the number of those who longed for a
change increased.
Serrano, blundering heavily among his difficulties, allowed
himself to be drawn into a controversy over his conduct.
Least of all men could the ex-favourite of Queen Isabel claim
merit as the means of his advancement or consistency as the
badge of his public life. The words he used and the principles
he invoked in his eagerness to defend his pre-republican career
were ambiguous or inconsistent with the position of President.
By declaring himself convinced of the right of the army to
interfere in politics when its chiefs are convinced that the
Government fails to represent the will of the people he sought
to excuse his conduct in 1868, but succeeded only in leaving
his actual position without moral defence when the now daily
expected pronunciamiento should come.
It was to the Carlist arms that the Republic owed a six
months’ extension of its ebbing life. The real arbiter of the
situation was General Concha, Marqués del Duero, commander
24–2
372 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
of the Army of the North. He at least could bring clean hands
and an untarnished record to the service of the Royalist cause.
His conduct whilst serving the Republic had merited the
esteem in which he was held. He made no secret of his
opinions, but he would not overthrow the Republic by means
of an authority the Republic itself had conferred; the enemy
against whom he had been sent must not profit by dissensions
in his own camp. For these reasons he had refused to make a
pronunciamiento before Bilbao, and had restrained less scru-
pulous officers who saw only the golden opportunity with its
certainty of success. Serrano's return to Madrid left Concha
free to choose his opportunity. His plan was to shatter the
Carlists' power by the capture of their stronghold at Estella, and
then at the head of his veterans to call upon Serrano to convoke
the Cortes. The avowed Royalist sympathies of an army
victorious over the Carlists would make the proclamation of
Alfonso XII a certainty. It was a violent resolution; but the
state of the country seemed to justify it. Serrano himself
defended the right of the army to insist on fulfilment of the
national will. It was not possible to maintain that the Republic,
a year after its inception, represented the will of anything
more than a small and daily narrowing minority.
Victory was a mere incident in Concha's plan, a necessary
preliminary to the main action; but the whole was wrecked
before Estella. With Serrano's departure the momentary
energy of the Government died away. The necessary supplies
and reinforcements were forwarded so slowly that at Madrid it
was believed that the Ministry had no real wish to end the war.
The hopes of the Carlists revived; and, although Concha left
Bilbao sufficiently garrisoned and provisioned, they renewed
their blockade as soon as he had quitted the neighbourhood.
Bilbao, however, was no longer really in danger. Marching by
way of Vitoria to the neighbourhood of Estella, Concha
deployed his troops for the great surrounding movement
intended to capture the Carlist army or to force it to undertake
XIV.] Battle of Abdirzuza 373
a difficult and dangerous retreat through the passes. The
Carlists awaited him steadily with 20,000 men. Their main
position was the heights around the village of Abárzuza, the
centre of Concha’s half circle. Only great superiority of
numbers, armament, or spirit could justify an attack on such a
position. Concha's army had no advantage in any one of these
respects. The convoys were stuck fast in the passes; the attack
was made by half-starving men (June 25–27, 1874); and the battle
was already lost when Concha was himself killed. The Liberals
had lost nearly Iooo men; their discomfiture was complete.
A storm covered their retreat. The Carlists did not grasp the
extent of their victory. At Madrid the news of Concha’s
death and the failure of his gambler's venture produced con-
sternation. The disaster affected the party that had prepared
the Restoration even more than the Republican Government.
All their plans hung on the assumption of a great victory; all
had to be remade and postponed. The rout of Abárzuza
weakened the Republic, but for the moment it shattered the
Royalists, leaving their cause in the hands of meaner, more
impatient, and more selfish men than the Marqués del Duero.
Only a genius for command enabled Cánovas del Castillo to
hold back intriguing generals, eager, regardless of the state of
Spain, to win the reward due to him who should first proclaim
the King.
It was thought that Serrano would again take command of
the northern army and try to raise its spirits, dashed by
undeserved defeat and the death of its most trusted general.
But he remained in Madrid perplexed, fascinated, and helpless,
among his gathering difficulties. Failing Serrano, Domingo
Moriones would have been welcomed by the soldiers. Under
Serrano, they were sure of supplies; under Moriones, of skilful
and energetic leading. The Carlists had good reason to
remember his rapid and unexpected movements, his forays,
requisitions, and severities. But, as usual, politics took pre-
cedence of military considerations; Moriones was a Liberal
374 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
of too marked a type for the Government that continued to
call itself Republican. He was maintained in his divisional
command in Navarre, whilst the chief command was taken
by General Zabala, Marquis of Sierra Bullones. As Minister
for War in troubled times, and as President of the Council
when nobody else dared occupy the post, Zabala had done
invaluable service; but prudence was his characteristic; he
was not the man to restore self-confidence to a discouraged
army by a series of dashing, if small successes. Warned by
Concha's fate, he devoted himself to organisation, concen-
tration, and accumulation of supplies. The summer wore away;
and, after three months, Zabala was superseded before he had
completed the hoarding process preparatory to the forward
movement. Moriones, on his side, led forays into the territory
of the Carlists; but they retaliated with much more striking
success. Four thousand of them broke through the lines of
the Ebro and harried Catalonia on the right bank. Further
down its course the Ebro was no longer a barrier to them. .
The Carlists had conceived an almost overweening confidence
in their powers since they had won a pitched battle at Abárzuza.
When their prince hurried from Guipúzcoa to congratulate the
defenders of Estella, he received outside its walls 20,000 men
ready for any enterprise, and inspected some hundred cannon.
Besides, these Carlist forces held in check the garrisons of
the Basque and Navarrese towns, and bombarded Guetaria
and Hernani in the neighbourhood of San Sebastian. But
for a time the chief centre of their activity was Catalonia.
There Don Alfonso, brother of Don Carlos, held a nominal
command over the fierce bands that burned, destroyed, and
plundered, robbed and requisitioned in the name of the cause.
The news of Pavia's unceremonious dispersal of the Con-
stituent Cortes had set the Liberals of Catalonia fighting among
themselves; and, while the troops were employed against rioters,
the Carlists seized Vich (January, 1874), and captured General
Nouvilas and the whole of the force with which he was
XIV.] Advance and re/reat of the Carlists 375
hurrying to the relief of Olot (March). In the autumn they
surprised Urgel, a cathedral city, Occupying a strong position,
backed by the Andorran valleys. In the provinces of Urgel
and Gerona their supremacy was hardly disputed; they accepted
battle in the open when offered and were generally successful.
Encouraged by their success, they pushed on far beyond the
Ebro. Teruel narrowly escaped falling into their hands.
Almost unopposed they reached Cuenca, in the heart of
Castille, and distant only twenty-two leagues from Madrid.
The garrison was a weak one, but, knowing that small mercy
was to be expected from the Catalans, it held out in hope of
relief for forty-eight hours before surrendering (July 15). Don
Alfonso was powerless to fulfil the terms of capitulation.
Murders and looting, which even his wife's intervention could not
prevent, warned other cities to look well to their defences, and
other garrisons to hold out to the last. Spain lay open before
the raiders; Madrid was panic-stricken ; but they penetrated no
further; they would not submit to discipline or even act to-
gether for long. Falling back as an armed mob towards the
Ebro, they were overtaken and routed at Alcora and Teruel.
After this experience, Alfonso despaired of making the Catalan
Carlists obey the rules of civilised warfare. Dissatisfied, more-
over, with his brother's decision to divide the command in the
north-eastern provinces, he obtained permission to quit Spain
(October, 1874). At the same time the command of the
Liberal army in this district passed into the hands of General
Jovellar, whose activity gave order and security to provinces
worn out by lawlessness and plunder.
The frontier departments of France were to the Carlists
an inexhaustible storehouse, and occasionally a refuge. Money
or credit insured their welcome in all the towns from Bayonne
to Montpellier. As buyers of arms, ammunition, food, and
stores, they greatly enriched the traders. The French police
and customs-house officials connived at their operations. It
is hardly too much to say that the closing of the frontier would
376 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
have brought the war to an end in three months. But, when
Serrano made bold to protest to the authorities of the neigh-
bouring Republic against breaches of neutrality, MacMahon
studied to make his rebuff the more harsh. He replied in
effect that France could not undertake the whole police of
the frontier, nor superintend successive swarms of Spanish
immigrants. The Conservative French Republic had no sym-
pathy for the Spanish democrats, uneasy neighbours, unable
to keep order at home, and holding power by so precarious
a tenure that it was useless to enter into any agreement with
them ; still less did they please MacMahon and his Cabinet,
who were not Republicans at heart. It is now known that the
Comte de Chambord was secretly in France, and endeavouring
to interview MacMahon ; but he was too honest to betray his
trust. Serrano then approached Germany, whose friendship
with Spain seems to be part of her permanent policy. Germany
expressed sympathy, but was unable to help. *
In Madrid the Royalists were rapidly recovering from the
dislocation of their plans. Everybody was hastening to make
his peace with the party of the future before it was too late.
Zabala, the best servant of the Republic, quitted the Ministry to
join its opponents. Alonso Martinez followed. Such men were
not mere turncoats. They had believed the Republic possible—
the loosely united provinces seemed to afford an unrivalled
opportunity for Federal Government—but the experiment had
proved disastrous, and they were not too proud to change their
opinions. It is indeed hard to believe that in the autumn of
1874 any statesman hoped or wished for the continuance of
the eighteen-month-old Republic. But some were so impli-
cated in its fate, such earnest believers in that form of govern-
ment, or so unwilling to admit their mistake, as to serve it to
the last. Among these was Sagasta, whose best qualities
showed out in adversity. Struggling bravely on, he accepted
the Presidency of the Council (August 4), and formed a
Ministry of his own and Serrano's personal friends. In Sep-
XIV.] Sagasta's efforts. Siege of /run 377
tember he sent General Laserna to take over from Zabala the
command in the north. At this time Spain was supporting
about 375,000 soldiers. Of these the Cuban war still employed
75,000 men. Fifty thousand were required to garrison the
part of the Peninsula which was nominally at peace. The
Army of the Centre, holding lines from Albacete to Valencia,
and on as far as the frontier of Catalonia, numbered 40,000 :
the Army of Catalonia, 30,000 : the army along the upper
Ebro and the garrisons of the Liberal towns in the revolted
provinces amounted to 80,000. The expense was 4,400,ooo
monthly. But besides all these, Spain supported some Ioo, ooo
Carlists in three bodies, established generally in the Maestrazgo
or mountain district north of Valencia : in upper Catalonia,
backed by the Pyrenees about Andorra: and in Navarre and
the Basque Provinces. The latter was always the centre of
their power. Estella served them as capital; Don Carlos had
his headquarters at Tolosa, cutting the road and railway from
Madrid to Bordeaux and Paris.
After Don Alfonso's retirement the chief interest of the
war shifted to the little town of Irun, the frontier railway
station of Guipuzcoa, Liberal in the midst of a fervidly Carlist
country. Though the Carlists went and came as they would
over the low passes into the department of the Basses-Pyrénées,
the possession of the railway head would have been of great
advantage to them, while its loss would have been a serious
blow to their adversaries. Irun contained the principal customs-
house of northern Spain. Once established there, the Carlists
must necessarily come into direct relations with the French
authorities; and their status as a Government must be recognised.
The insignificance of the garrison seemed to insure success;
artillery was brought up to the heights above the little town; and
in October Don Carlos in person took command of the besieging
force. But the Carlists have always failed when they have
abandoned guerrilla tactics; and even Irun, little more than a
village, proved too strong for them. Their operations were
378 A'epublic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
carried on in a desultory manner, although success depended on
promptitude, for Laserna was bringing a part of his forces from
Santander by sea to San Sebastian to relieve the brave little
garrison. Irun was never hard pressed. The Carlists made
no attempt to hinder Laserna's march over the twelve miles
of mountain country that separate San Sebastian from Irun.
They withdrew (Nov. 11, 1874), discredited in the eyes of their
French sympathisers, who had been witnesses of their power-
lessness. So discouraged were they that they abandoned their
foundry and stores at Vera, a few leagues above Irun.
But lack of provisions and bad weather hindered Laserna
from following up his advantage. The Carlists retook posses-
sion of their abandoned stores, and shortly afterwards again
became aggressive in the neighbourhood of Hernani, south of
San Sebastian. In November, Don Alfonso, son of Queen
Isabel, attained his sixteenth year and came of age ; for at
sixteen the Kings of Spain attain their majority. This event
was of no small importance to the Royalist party, for it set
them free from their pledge to make Montpensier Regent if the
Restoration should take placeWhile Alfonso was still a minor.
Nothing would have been more unpopular than the Regency
of a man distrusted as an intriguer, and after so many years
still hated as a foreigner. On the occasion of his birthday
Don Alfonso received an address from the majority of the
grandees, acknowledging him as King. Organising committees
or juntas worked for him in Madrid under Cánovas del Castillo,
seconded now by the zealous neophyte Romero Robledo.
Alfonsist clubs existed in all the towns, and carried on a
successful propaganda among the middle class. The workmen's
clubs, however, did not fulfil the hopes of their founders; the
people were still Republican, Carlist, or indifferent. The
existing Government was indeed Republican only in name;
but the very name roused the fiercest animosity, particularly
among the clergy; a Republic, they asserted, is the enemy of
morality and religion,
XIV.] Cánovas and the A/fonsists 379
The provincial governors sent in alarming reports of the
spread of the movement, for plot it could not be called, seeing
that it was carried on in the light of day and in the public
press. The reports were ignored or treated with ridicule at
the central offices in Madrid, where, however, many of the
heads of departments had the best of reasons for knowing
their truth. If at any time a little energy in repression was
shown, it was directed solely against the Radical extremists.
So sure were the Alfonsists now of their strength that they
fretted at the tardiness of their leaders. But Cánovas held
them back. He wished to see the comedy of the Republic
played out; given a little more time, he thought, the experiment
would end in a way that would serve as a warning for all ages.
The Restoration, he insisted, should be the outcome of the
will of the majority clearly expressed in Parliament; not of a
pronunciamiento prolonging the bad traditions of the last forty
years and leaving the country again at the mercy of the general
or generals who set themselves up as its saviours. He hoped
first for the end of the Carlist War, then for the disbandment
of the huge armies that were eating up the land, and finally
for Constituent Cortes to set aside quietly all that had been
done since the frenzy of 1868. Perhaps Cánovas had forgotten
the Programme of Manzanares and The Bat newspaper, his
own most effectual contributions to the overthrow of the dynasty
he was now labouring to restore. At least he must have
believed that his countrymen had made vast strides in political
discipline and self-control since those not very distant days.
The Restoration was waiting a final and decisive victory in
the north; it seemed as though it would never come. After
the relief of Irun, Laserna led the troops back by sea to
Santander and thence to their old quarters on the Ebro. No
attempt was made to break through by the main road and
railway, cutting the discouraged Carlists in two. Orders were
received to act only on the defensive. Some show was made
of preparing to resist an invasion of Castille, which was never
380 Åepublic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
threatened. Whilst men believed that Serrano was reserving
for himself the glory of the final victory, the truth was that
the Government, daily expecting an explosion, had neither
men nor money to send to its hungry, tattered, and dissolving
armies. Moriones stood sulkily to his Navarrese lines from
Lodosa and Tudela on the Ebro northward, to Olite and
Tafalla. The blockaded garrisons of Pamplona, Vitoria, Bilbao,
and San Sebastian made no movement. The Carlists gathered
heart. Again they called upon their exhausted land for fresh
supplies of men and money; again they requisitioned and
harried the Liberals who had the misfortune to be their
neighbours. They gave out that Laserna had been obliged
to retire from Irun by enormous losses inflicted on his forces.
The snow fell early in the mountains; and it seemed as if
all military operations were at an end for the eventful year
of 1874. Then suddenly Serrano woke up from lethargy into
feverish activity. He would not allow the Republic to die
of inanition without one more effort to end the civil war.
Though he felt the ground mined beneath him, he ventured
to banish a few well-known Royalists to the Canary Islands;
others went into hiding. Serrano was not so blind as to
believe that the Restoration could be hindered by the police,
but he insisted upon respect for the truce until the common
enemy should no longer be formidable. He did not, like
Cánovas, anticipate the decision of the nation; he offered no
solution, but he abandoned and surrendered the rags of the
Republic. In a circular to the provincial governors (Nov. 26),
he denounced not the Royalists as a whole, but “a fraction
of the party called Alfonsist, which, neglecting the counsels of
reason, deaf to the appeal of patriotism, though it sees its
country bleeding to death in terrific civil strife, preferring its
own particular and factious advantage to all considerations
of unselfishness and public good, deserting the honourable
paths in which some members of the party would have it walk,
not only adheres to its plan of opposing the Ministry—for this
XIv] Serrano's policy. A/fonsist manifesto 381
the Ministry itself would hold justified—but, blinded by passion,
is agitating the country and hindering the generous and patriotic
policy of a Government that imposes no solution, but demands
only that political questions be deferred until the public enemy
be defeated.” -
The Army of Catalonia was under General Lopez Domin-
guez, Serrano's nephew; the Army of the Centre under General
Jovellar, his creature and dependent. On December 8 Serrano
himself declared his purpose of immediately taking command
on the Ebro. Two days later he was at Logroño. He refused
the hospitality of the little home where old Espartero was
awaiting in middle-class comfort the end of his agitated life.
Serrano was impatient to move on ; and for a moment his
eagerness seemed to communicate itself to the army, weary
with long waiting. Oblivious of the lack of necessary supplies,
it looked forward without dismay to a winter campaign among
the mountains. But the snow continued to fall, blocking the
passes and throwing up an impassable rampart in front of the
Carlists. After an interview with Moriones at the junction of
railways from Navarre to Castille and the Basque Provinces,
Serrano reluctantly recognised that, sorely as his political
situation needed immediate victory, it was unattainable until
spring came and further reinforcements reached him. Furlough
was granted until December 30 to a large number of officers
and men desirous of spending Christmas in their homes.
Serrano had postponed his final effort until it was too late;
he had disarmed when the enemy was upon him.
Early in December the newspapers published a manifesto
dated from Sandhurst, where Don Alfonso was receiving a
military education. But, long before its issue, it had been
known in Spain. In form it was the Prince's answer to a letter
treating of the state of Spain and the prospects of the Royalist
cause. But the hand of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo was
shown in its studied moderation, its appeal for reconciliation,
and its ideal of a Restoration brought about by civil rather
382 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
than military influences. “Only the establishment of consti-
tutional monarchy,” said Don Alfonso, the wise youth, “can
put an end to oppression and uncertainty, and to the cruel
disorders from which Spain is suffering. All men of good will,
whatever their political antecedents, will soon be on my side,
knowing that they have nothing to fear from a young and
unprejudiced monarchy to which union and peace are the
breath of life. I shall ever be a good Spaniard, a good Catholic
like my ancestors, and like the men of my own day a Liberal.”
While publishing his challenge, the official leaders of the party
continued to insist that none other than legal means of effecting
their purpose would be used; and that the end of the civil war
must be reached before the country could declare its will with
regard to the questions raised. Serrano had appealed for a
patriotic truce during his absence; and for a few days it was
respected. That it was broken before the month was out was
not the fault of the civilians working for the Restoration.
They did their best, but failed to check the hot-headed and
selfish military leaders of their party.
The soldiers were eager to take advantage of a military
situation that they knew to be favourable to them. A victory
might follow on a thaw ; its result might be an access of
popularity, prolonging Serrano's power for an indefinite time.
Even now foreign diplomatists and financiers considered his
position improved by his sudden resolve to end the war. A
number of important commands were now in the hands of
Royalists. Indeed, among the officers of high rank there was
only one declared Republican, Domingo Moriones, and two,
Lopez Dominguez and Loreca, whose opinions were doubtful.
It only remained for one more unscrupulous than the rest to
betray the trust of the Liberals and cover himself with glory
by being the first to proclaim the King. The honour and profit
accruing from a claim thus established were shared by two men.
Martinez Campos lighted the carefully prepared train, without
consulting Cánovas and the others who had been at pains to
xiv) Martínez Campos proclaims A/fonso 383
lay it. The even less honourable part of traitor within the
Government camp was played by Primo de Rivera. Still
young, he had been wounded at Somorrostro and made
lieutenant-general on the field of battle. His dashing courage
and soldierly bearing attracted Serrano's attention. He him-
self had been a soldier of the same superficial type in his
youth. Under Serrano's protection Primo de Rivera rose
rapidly till he became Captain-General of New Castille. This
position, including the military guardianship of the capital,
often, in revolutionary times, made its holder arbiter of the
fate of Government and Constitution.
Early in December, Sagasta, the civil head of the Ministry,
and Bedoya, the Minister for War, received information that
Martinez Campos, already signalised as an ardent Royalist, was
preparing a pronunciamiento to be issued by the Armies of the
North, the Centre, and Catalonia. Primo de Rivera, ordered to
arrest him in Madrid, evaded compliance by pledging his honour
to the implicated general's innocence. Martinez Campos left
Madrid in disguise and betook himself to the Army of the
Centre. Here everybody, including the General-in-Chief, Jo-
vellar, were Royalists. But even those who were for immediate
action were unwilling that the pronunciamiento should be made
by any other than an officer in high command. Jovellar and
Laserna, however, hesitated ; and Quesada refused to teach
treason or to appeal to the political passions of an army in
face of the enemy. So Martinez Campos, himself a junior
general, and a man of more boldness than wit, led the way.
The prudent and patriotic schemes of Cánovas del Castillo
were roughly broken by the hasty action of a tactless blunderer.
A mile outside Murviedro, the Saguntum of the famous siege,
Martinez Campos harangued the 2000 men holding the junc-
tion of the Roman coast-road with that running northward to
Saragossa. The officers, prepared for the melodramatic scene,
applauded him whilst he expounded to the astonished men
the advantages of a restored monarchy, peace, continuation of
384 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
the traditions of glory, union, and a flag. Then they swore
“to defend with the last drop of their blood the flag raised
in face of the misfortunes of their country as a happy omen of
redemption, peace, and greatness” (Dec. 24, 1874). Among
them was one just man, an old captain, and a declared Royalist.
He had the courage to rebuke the soldier politicians by refusing
their ill-worded oath, denying that the regeneration of the
state could spring from the corruption of the army.
Now that the mischief was out, those who would rather
have delayed the pronunciamiento were forced to abide by it.
Jovellar, the commander-in-chief, and Azcárraga, the chief of
his staff, accepted the words of Martinez Campos as those of the
army at large, and sent Orders to divisional officers to declare
for the King. The defender of Bilbao, now General del Castillo,
had a more rigid sense of duty. He was ready to welcome
the monarchy when its time should come, but he considered
rebellion in the face of the enemy a bad beginning. As com-
mander of Valencia, a day's march from Murviedro, Castillo
prepared to resist the pronunciamiento. But his protest was
disregarded by his own officers; and his superior, Jovellar,
entering the city at the head of the revolted troops, ordered
him off to Madrid.
When news of the revolt at Murviedro reached the capital,
Sagasta, in Serrano's absence, again took into the Cabinet's
confidence the Captain-General. Primo de Rivera expressed
himself utterly astonished at the action of Martinez Campos;
he declared that he considered himself bound to make good
the defection of the man whose loyalty he had guaranteed.
Taking such comfort as they could from his assurances, the
ministers telegraphed to Serrano, urging him to return at once
to the capital with troops for the northern army. At the same
time they sent to Logroño to fetch the soldiers. Serrano
promised to send troops to restore order, and expressed con-
fidence in the trustworthiness of the army under his command;
but he did not return. On December 3o the Madrid Gazette
XIV.] Sagasta hoſa's fºrm 385
announced that “some troops of the Army of the Centre, obeying
Martinez Campos and Jovellar, had raised in the face of the
enemy the factious banner of Alfonso of Bourbon.” “It is the
sacred duty of the Government,” the notice continued, “to
punish with all possible rigour a rebellion...which can but serve
the ends of Carlism and mob rule, and would moreover dis-
grace us in the eyes of the civilised world.” The preoccupation
expressed in the last clause as to the judgment of expectant
Europe continually appears in the appeals of Spanish statesmen;
the world's approval is guaranteed or at least invoked at times
on strange vagaries. The provincial governors throughout Spain
were ordered to report on the feeling of their districts; their
answers were carefully worded, so as not to compromise the
writers, whatever the issue of events; many were properly
delayed in order that political trimmers might have time to
gauge the set of public opinion. But, on the whole, the belief
of the Government in its ability to check the revolt seemed
justified. It had still two armies to oppose to that of the
centre: the northern under Serrano and Moriones, and that of
Catalonia under Lopez Dominguez. Madrid, under Primo
de Rivera, was believed to be quite safe; indeed, since the
fall of Isabel, the capital had distinguished itself as the pattern
of order and good behaviour. The dissentient Liberals rallied
round the Ministry; Castelar, on behalf of the Unitarian Re-
publicans, offered help, as did also Ruiz Zorrilla and Eche-
garay on behalf of the Radicals. So Sagasta showed a bold
front. The Royalists expressed astonishment at Martinez
Campos’ precipitate action; their newspapers for the most
part blamed and disavowed him. Those which approved
were suspended. The editor of the Epoca, the mouthpiece
of the central committee, and Cánovas del Castillo, its ac-
knowledged chief, were arrested. -
But any illusions that Sagasta and his fellow-ministers
entertained were dispelled by the defection of the man whose
C. S, 25
386 Republic and Restoration (1873–1874) [CH.
fidelity was most necessary to them. Presenting himself at the
Ministry for War at five o'clock on the morning of December 30,
General Primo de Rivera, in his uniform of Captain-General,
informed his official superior that the garrison of the capital had
declared for the pronunciamiento, and that resistance by the civil
power was useless. The Minister for War was sent to visit the
barracks and ascertain the temper of the troops. He repeated
that “the officers were resolved to maintain order and discipline,
but were not disposed to combat the movement begun by
Martinez and Jovellar.” At nightfall, when the Cabinet met
to discuss the news, a further development had taken place;
and Bedoya announced that the Captain-General was “de-
termined no longer to delay his public and solemn adhesion
to the cause of Don Alfonso.” The Ministry, obliged to
negotiate with a declared rebel, called upon Primo de Rivera
either to make his pronunciamiento and take the Government
forcibly into his own hands, or to restrain the garrison under
his command until the arrival of Serrano, the titular head of
the State. Primo de Rivera guaranteed their good behaviour,
provided no regiments from the north accompanied Serrano.
But Serrano contemptuously refused to put himself under
the protection, or rather into the power, of a traitor. He bade
the Ministry fight if they could do so with any chance of
success, but if not, to hand their resignation to the Captain-
General. Again, they expressed their readiness to strike a
blow if Serrano could come at once to their assistance. But
by this time rebellion was working in the Army of the North.
Serrano was obliged to confess his powerlessness, and the long
series of telegraphic messages between Madrid and Logroño
ended with the farewells of his Cabinet to Marshal Serrano,
Duke of la Torre, last President of the not yet two-years-old
Spanish Republic.
Meanwhile the Captain-General was becoming more
peremptory. Under plea that the police was being concen-
XIV.] Pa/Z of the Republic 387
trated and arms distributed to Liberal volunteers he threatened
to seize Madrid. Sagasta sent a dignified answer to his
insolent message, and at nine o'clock at night held a last
Cabinet council at the Ministry for War. Troops surrounded
the building ; the Captain-General announced a deputation of
officers seeking audience of the ministers. He himself entered
the council chamber at its head, announced that the garrison
had declared for the King, and that a new Government was on
the point of being nominated. Sagasta, protesting, resigned
and withdrew.
In the north the Republic had employed officers of
Royalist sympathies, partly because Republicans were rare in
the army, and partly in the delusive hope that the Royalist
officers might still be won over. One Republican officer there
was, and he an able one, holding high command. It was
Moriones that Serrano chose to command the division which
he purposed to send to Madrid. For himself he decided to
stay with the army, so as to prevent, if possible, its defection,
and to hinder the Carlists from taking advantage of conflict
among their opponents. But, though Serrano was popular with
the rank and file, his authority ceased as soon as the news of
the revolt in the south spread through the camp. The staff,
the junior and the non-commissioned officers, united in their
determination not to march against Madrid, flatly refused to
obey orders. The artillery officers, now used to playing a
part in politics, led the way. A deputation of them waited
upon General Laserna and informed him that the corps was
desirous for the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in the
person of Don Alfonso. Laserna held a meeting of the
senior officers. The decision was quickly reached and com-
municated to the Commander-in-Chief and President of the
Republic. It ran as follows: “The officers of the northern
army, like their comrades at Madrid, declare that they will
maintain order and discipline, but refuse to march against
25–2
388 Republic and Restoration (1873–74) [CH.XIV
their fellow-soldiers.” Serrano replied, somewhat gratuitously,
that he would not try to compel them. He telegraphed to
Primo de Rivera that he would stay at his post until relieved.
Laserna took over his authority, and on December 31, 1874,
Alfonso XII, “the pledge of liberty, order, and regeneration,”
was proclaimed to the Army of the North. Six years and three
months, perhaps the most troubled in Spain's history, had
passed since Isabel quitted San Sebastian.
CHAPTER XV.
ALFONSO XII. (1874–1885.)
THE pronunciamiento that brought about the Restoration
was the last of the century. The people, as usual, acquiesced
in its results. Revolutions indeed and counter-revolutions
had been so many during the past sixty years, that the most
violent political upheavals did not extinguish the hopes of
those whom they momentarily overwhelmed. The indifferent,
the ignorant, and the religious accepted results in a fatalistic
spirit, seeing in political convulsions the work of unknown
forces or punishment for the backslidings of their once Catholic
nation.
This time, however, it chanced that Revolution afforded
a solution acceptable to the majority. A moderate Constitu-
tional Monarchy afforded a kind of central position amid the
bewilderingly diverse aspirations of contending parties. The
Republicans, most of them sincere and able men, were ashamed
and discouraged by the events of their brief and stormy
experiment. Whilst continuing to cherish their ideal, they
admitted the impossibility of its realisation: one by one they
joined the Liberal wing of the monarchical party. Their
influence had been all-important in moderating the policy of
the Crown and saving it from the domination of its self-styled
best friends, the retrograde absolutist and ultramontane party.
After its violent oscillation towards Republicanism it might
have been expected that the political pendulum would have
reached its antithesis, Carlism. That it did not do so was
390 A/fonso X/Z (1874–1885) ſchi.
due perhaps to Don Carlos' over-eagerness to enter into
possession of his kingdom. Nocedal’s policy of offering the
dilemma of intolerant and anti-clerical Liberalism and moderate
Carlism, whilst making all compromise impossible, must have
been successful if adhered to. The very shopkeepers of
Madrid needing protection would have bowed to authority
rather than suffer anarchy, and Spain would have cast herself
at the feet of her legitimate King. But Don Carlos had not
been content to await events; at the time of the nation's trial
he had added to its burdens that of a civil war. His appeal
was addressed to a faction only ; his cause was identified with
the unfair privileges and exemptions of certain provinces. His
proclamations were sources of dissension. He now disavowed
reactionary aims, and thus offended many of his adherents,
whilst Liberals refused to accept assurances from such a source.
His attitude was condemned as selfish and unpatriotic. One
of Spain's reasons for welcoming Don Alfonso was the wish
for a Government strong enough to drive out Don Carlos.
Cánovas' tolerant policy welcomed all without insisting
upon formal recantation. He chose to consider as friends all
who would accept constitutional monarchy or use only legal
means to combat it. He had no wish to divide Spaniards
again into victors and vanquished; he invited the cooperation
even of those who looked upon Don Alfonso's throne as a
merely temporary and provisional structure. The Republican,
whilst helping to defeat the Carlist and restore the shattered
basis of civil life, might still remain a Republican. Cánovas
himself had good reason to desire that the past and its
methods might be forgotten in the present and its results. An
echo of the turgid violence of the Programme of Manzanares
would have spoiled the harmonies of his plea for moderation;
behind the figure of Cánovas protecting the throne of the
stripling prince might arise the figure of Cánovas hounding on
the Revolution against the dynasty.
So Soon as the news of Martinez Campos’ pronunciamiento
xv) 7%e Ministry of Regency 39 I
reached Madrid, a provisional council was formed with Cánovas
at its head. It comprised Primo de Rivera, Count de Cheste,
Quesada, and Romero Robledo, three soldiers and two civilians.
Its authority was derived from a commission given by Prince
Alfonso in the previous August. A meeting of Alfonsists
held on the night of Dec. 3o was attended not only by
recognised members of the party but by a host of well-known
men eager to make their peace in time. Whilst some urged
long and faithful service, others could point to an opportune
turn of coat as a claim to consideration. The Gazette over-
flowed with protestations of loyalty to the new King from those
who forty-eight hours earlier had telegraphed their determina-
tion to uphold the Republic with their last breath.
First of all results must be secured and services rewarded.
The Revolution had the inestimable advantage over former ones
that it left the Government with a civil instead of a military
head. Martinez Campos was merely a blunderer who had
fired a train laid by skilled hands. He was set aside ; the
Captaincy-General of Catalonia overpaid his services. Serrano's
nephew Lopez Dominguez, of whom the Royalists were some-
what afraid, was superseded in the command of the Army
of the Centre by Quesada. The Army of the North under
General Laserna had telegraphed acceptance of the new
négime (Dec. 31). On the same day a Ministry of Regency
was formed, to govern until the King's arrival. Cánovas was
its President, Francisco de Cárdenas its Minister of Justice;
their colleagues were Castro, Jovellar, Molins, and the violent
and factious Romero Robledo. The King on arrival confirmed
its powers. But whatever the list of the Cabinet, Cánovas,
whether he presided over it or not, ruled Spain as he would for
six years. During the first two he held extraordinary powers
under a suspended Constitution; he used them only against
conspiracy and armed rebellion.
When Alfonso reached Barcelona (Jan. 9, 1875), the world
had already recognised that the latest pronunciamiento had
392 A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
increased the stability of the nation; and the funds had risen
four per cent. Catalonia Smiled upon him ; so glad was
Valencia to see the King that she fancied a “natural innate
majesty” in the stunted, plain, and underbred-looking youth.
The people of Madrid took but little part in the elaborate
official welcome (Jan. 14). Notification was sent to the
Powers of the accession of Alfonso, by the grace of God and
the will of the nation King of Spain. By the end of February
all had recognised him, though Protestant Governments
hesitated a little, fearing for the principle of religious liberty.
Castelar indeed prophesied that, just as his own party owed its
downfall to its extreme and irreconcilable Left, so Cánovas
must either become the slave of the extreme Right or under-
mine his position by forfeiting its support. But Cánovas was
fully prepared to meet the difficulties of the situation. He
allowed nobody to outbid him for the support of the Church ;
and he showed the possibility of reconciling ardent Catholicism
with the reforms of 1848. Don Alfonso had obtained the
blessing of the Pope on his accession, and had solemnly
undertaken all the obligations of the State entailed by the
confiscation of the estates of the Church. At the same time
he announced that freedom of worship would be secured,
“as in the most civilised lands.” It was manifestly inconsistent
to guarantee at the same time religious liberty and faithful
observance of the Concordat that specially provided against it;
but, in its laudable desire for reconciliation, the Government
of the Restoration was lavish of promises. When sufficiently
strongly established, it could disown such as it should be
unable or unwilling to fulfil. The Vatican was induced by
the pledges given to prefer the tangible guarantee of Don
Alfonso's Government to vague and vast promises dependent
upon a problematical Legitimist Restoration. Accordingly, to
the dismay of the Carlists, the Pope followed the example of
the Powers and recognised Queen Isabel's son (May 3, 1875).
The work of reconciliation was meanwhile proceeding
xv) Attitude of the Carlists 393
apace. Within three months of the Restoration, Serrano was
received in special audience by the King. Even before this,
Cánovas and Sagasta had met and arranged for benevolent
opposition if not for cooperation. The one thing wanted was
victory in the north ; and even this was not long in coming.
The Carlists, numbering about twenty-four thousand, were
opposed by double their number. In spite of hesitation and
divided counsels, Castelar's efforts and Serrano's campaigns
had told. The provinces were becoming exhausted. The
Carlist juntas supplied food only with difficulty; the pay of
the soldiers was no longer forthcoming. Dissension and the
failure of the chief plea under which the war had been under-
taken did more to bring it to a close than lack of supplies
or defeat. The Carlist contention was that a numerically
insignificant faction had imposed on Spain a series of atheist-
ical and anarchical Governments, beginning with the Cortes
of 1810 and ending with the Republic of 1873. But, now that
Don Alfonso had been welcomed, had given pledges of his
religious convictions, and had been blessed by the Pope, only
the strictest school of legitimists could contend that it was
their duty to fight for Don Carlos.
There remained from the Carlist motto Dios / Patria / Rey/,
the question of country, or the Fueros, gradually detaching
itself from the cause of a particular branch of the Bourbon
family, and from the never-ending controversy between Church
and State. With this too Don Alfonso dealt in his proclama-
tion to the revolted provinces and colonies at the beginning of
his reign. “If you are fighting in the cause of Royalism, I am
the representative of the dynasty to which your fathers swore
fidelity. If you are fighting for the Catholic Faith, I am a
Catholic King, and will right the wrong done to the Church.
You yourselves love liberty; you cannot deprive Spaniards of it.
Lay down your arms, and you shall see the prosperity of Cuba
revived, and shall forthwith enjoy the advantages that were yours
during thirty years under my mother's sceptre. Before begin-
394 A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
ning battle I offer you peace” (Jan. 22, 1875). The offer then
made was in fact that of renewal of the Convention of Vergara,
Complete amnesty, and confirmation of the local privileges.
This proclamation assumed that many Carlists were fighting
only against Revolution or Republic, and would gladly take
service with the son of their former Queen. But nobody took
advantage of its offer. The Carlists could neither be per-
suaded nor bribed ; they remained sulky and defiant. Even
the offer of compensation for losses during the war caused no
wavering in their impoverished and half-devastated country.
It was perhaps better for Spain that the fight should be
fought out and the Fueros finally abolished, than that further
compromise should contain the germs of future wars.
His attempted reconciliation having failed, Don Alfonso
joined the army on the Ebro, and reviewed a fine veteran
army of 40,000 men. He accompanied Moriones when
(Feb. 6, 1875) he raised the long blockade of Pamplona and
captured Puente la Reina. The hopes of the young King
might have been fulfilled, and the war ended in a single
brilliant campaign, had not Laserna been heavily defeated on
his way to join a combined attack on Estella. The war had
still a few months to run before the King could be led
in triumph by his victorious army through the submitted
provinces. In the meantime his presence and the responsi-
bility for the guard of his person amid the hazards of a
guerrilla campaign were hindrances to his generals. After a
fortnight with the army, he returned to Madrid; and bullets
from ambushed Carlists sang over his train as it steamed
southward. Passing Logroño he stopped to pay his respects
to the aged Duke of the Victory. The old soldier gave him a
warm welcome and a lecture upon the duties of constitutional
kings. The visit was considered of good augury, it showed
that no narrow and jealous policy was intended; constitution-
alists had not been taught to expect so much politeness from
the throne.
xv) Pecay of the Car/ist cause 395
When the King quitted the army, the effort that freed
Pamplona died away. The strength which had made the
effort possible had been furnished by Castelar; the monarchy
was subsisting on the hoarded stores of the Republic. Castelar
had indeed bettered in every respect the position of the army;
but now its magazines were again empty, its ammunition shot
away, and its uniforms worn out. Many of the soldiers, too,
had earned their discharge ; a new army in fact was needed to
end the war. On the other hand, discouraged and weary, and
attributing their late defeats to treachery, the Carlists were
beginning to desert. But Don Carlos answered Don Alfonso's
proclamation with expressions of contemptuous pity for his
misguided cousin. To show his well-founded reliance on his
men, he published in his own Gazette the advantageous terms
of surrender offered from Madrid. Nevertheless, among the
Carlists the process of disintegration was going on during the
lull in the fighting. The most startling symptom was the
recantation of Cabrera. Grown more humane and more
tolerant by experience of a gentler civilisation, he acknow-
ledged Don Alfonso and urged his former comrades to make
the peace. The most dreaded and able of the Carlists since
Zumalacárregui, the last to yield during the former war,
opened on the French frontier a kind of conciliation office.
His example failed to bring over any large body of those in
arms; but his action spread alarm and suspicion. If Cabrera
despaired of the cause and deserted it, who could be trusted P
During the summer the last Carlist strongholds south of
the Ebro fell; and Martinez Campos captured La Seo de
Urgel with a thousand of its brave defenders. While the
chief part of his army took refuge in France or melted away,
Dorregaray, the district commander, joined the Navarrese
Carlists. The war was becoming localised in the Basque
Provinces and at the same time more bitter. The army of
the Ebro continued its traditional practice of raids and skir-
mishing with a battle twice a year, after which the victors
396 Alfonso A // (1874–1885) [CH.
always failed to follow up their advantage. The Carlists
confiscated the goods of their enemies; the Alfonsists retaliated
by banishing thirteen thousand families whose head or son
served the Pretender. They ruinously fined private persons as
well as corporations suspected of Carlist sympathies; they
burnt the crops, and allowed their troops to forage over the
rich plains of Álava and the Rioja. Don Carlos protested
vehemently; but the conduct of his own men was no longer
beyond reproach. While the Carlists threatened San Sebastian
and besieged Guetaria and Hernani, the Madrid Government
inflicted useless suffering by bombarding from the sea the
little Catalan ports that held out against it. The threats uttered
by either side were still more fierce than the acts com-
mitted.
General Quesada, now commander-in-chief, had restricted
the movements of the Carlists and cut off the Navarrese from
easy communication with the Biscayans and Guipúzcoans by
occupying the line of railway from Vitoria to Pamplona. But
with the force at his command he would be unable to hold it
for long; and one hundred thousand conscripts between the
ages of eighteen and twenty were called out (Aug., 1875) to
end the war. -
By this time the former Republicans had for the most part
changed their name in order to indicate their changed policy
or opinions. They were now Constitutional Monarchists. With
Sagasta at their head, they confirmed their acceptance of Don
Alfonso's rule by attending in a body a banquet at the Palace
(June 17, 1875); it was one revolutionary party the less. The
Alfonsists were not strong enough to legalise their position by
obtaining the recognition of the Cortes; but the matter was full
of difficulty. At the outset, the question of suffrage, restricted
or universal, arose. The leaders desired to bring back the
Constitution of 1845 with its restricted suffrage; but it could
be formally reenacted only by the Cortes. The Constitution
formally valid for the moment was the Republican one of
xv) Policy of Cánovas 397
1870; and, if pretence of legality were to be maintained, the
Cortes must be summoned in accordance with its provision
for universal suffrage. Cánovas chose boldness as the best
policy, feeling confident of his power to induce the Cortes
thus elected to submit to such modifications as he thought fit.
Three of his ministers held that suffrage should be restricted
until the Cortes should decide, thus denying the legality of the
Governments since the fall of Queen Isabel. Cánovas now
resorted to what became his favourite expedient. He resigned
(Oct., 1875) and put in a stop-gap Ministry to carry out his
policy, whilst he proudly announced that he would not head
a party Government after being at the head of a coalition of
all right-thinking men. The effect was that Cánovas from the
outside was able to criticise his own work in the light of
events, claiming any measures he thought worth attributing to
himself; a model of judicious fairness, unwilling to decide
debated questions by the weight of his authority, and ready at
the least hint to lay down power.
The stop-gap on this occasion was General Jovellar. On
him fell the duty of repudiating the pledges given by Cánovas
to the clerical party at the crisis of the Restoration. Cánovas
had indeed bought the favour of the Holy See for his King by
informally promising a great increase in the budget of public
worship, payment of arrears, and repeal of the law recognising
the right of private exercise of religion other than the Roman
Catholic—in fact the virtual restoration of the Concordat of
1851. This was impossible of fulfilment in the existing state
of public feeling; and Cánovas manfully supported his catspaw
Jovellar in rejecting the exaggerated claims of the clericals.
Thanks to his aid, the more Liberal opinion in the Ministry
triumphed with regard to the suffrage question also. The
crisis had been a dangerous one. The Ultramontane leader,
Alejandro Pidal, denied Cánovas' right to the name of Con-
servative. The Nuncio wrote to the bishops citing the clauses
of the Concordat that established the Roman Catholic to the
398 A/fonso X/Z (1874–1885) [CH.
exclusion of all other religions, and guaranteed the Church
against the “malignity of men’’ and “attempts to pervert the
faith.” He protested that both the spirit and the letter of this
Concordat had been violated; and he called upon the faithful
to secure its fulfilment. It was a bold attempt to take advan-
tage of the weakness of the lately restored throne to give effect
to an agreement that from the first had been a dead letter.
Jovellar refused to be bound by the Nuncio's version of
Cánovas' informal promises or to accept the Ultramontane's
interpretation of the disputed clauses of the Concordat.
After supporting the more Liberal wing of the monarchical
party in the matters of suffrage and ecclesiastical encroach-
ment, Cánovas once more found himself ranged against the
Conservative Right, which Castelar had prophesied would
either enslave or dispense with him. The Liberals looked
upon the Carlists as public enemies with whom no compromise
was possible, and to whom not even terms of surrender might
be offered. The Conservatives and Ultramontanes or Neo-
Catholics, on the other hand, had ever Carlist leanings.
Catholic and Royalist themselves, they regarded the old
Catholics of the historic type and Legitimists as much nearer
akin to themselves than the ex-Republicans with whom they
were now associated. They were sincerely desirous of finding
a basis for agreement with those who in troubled times had
defended the principles they held in common. That Cánovas
shared their admiration for the steadfastness of the northerners
is abundantly evident from his writings and speeches; but he
knew that Spain could not be safe until Carlism was crushed;
and this could be only when its brave adherents were ebliged
to admit defeat. That the Carlists would have accepted any
compromise is unlikely ; that none was offered is due to
Cánovas. It was the Alfonsists who refused the armistice
proposed by Don Carlos in order that Spain might be able
to meet with united front the threat of foreign intervention
in Cuba.
xv.] Cuba and the United States 399
In November, 1875, the Government of the United States
complained in a note to the Powers of the continual anarchy
of the island, and attributed its revolt to misrule, slavery,
official corruption, and unscrupulous use of Cuban resources
to supply the deficit of the Spanish treasury. Spain did
not deny the charges; indeed they had all been set forth
by the “Centro Hispano-Ultramarino,” an association formed
(1872) for the purpose of preserving union with the colonies
by eliminating grievances. Jovellar's Government rejected
Don Carlos' proffered armistice and refused further communi-
cations with him. It accepted the remonstrances of the
United States in a friendly spirit; it attributed the length
of the war to topographical difficulties and promised its
speedy conclusion, to be followed by grant of all liberties
and inauguration of reforms. Here again, though Jovellar
was the ostensible head of the Government, the reply was
obviously made by Cánovas, who now defined his policy of
exacting submission as a preliminary to redress. This policy
he maintained unflinchingly. He now reminded the United
States of the strict neutrality of Spain during their great civil
war; he denied that Spain had given any pretext for recog-
nition of the Cuban insurgents as belligerents; and he promised
redress to American citizens injured by the war. President
Grant, accepting his explanations, declared (Dec. 7, 1875)
that “he failed to find in the insurrection conditions that
would take it out of the category of mere rebellion....To
accord belligerent rights would therefore be unwise, premature
and indefensible as a matter of right.” The end of his
message, however, contained a definite threat : “I shall feel it
my duty, should the hope of a satisfactory adjustment, an
early restoration of peace, and the removal of further causes of
complaint be disappointed, to recommend to Congress at some
not remote period during the present session what may then
seem necessary.”
At the end of the year 1875, Cánovas formally reassumed
4OO A/fonso X/Z (1874–1885) [CH.
the power which he had chosen nominally to renounce during
three eventful months. His faithful henchman Jovellar, ready,
like Don Quixote's servant, to use to the best of his ability any
tool that might be thrust into his hand, went to join the Army
of the North. On November 21, 1875, a public thanksgiving
in the cathedral of Barcelona marked the freedom of Cata-
lonian soil from Carlists in arms. A large body of troops
hitherto employed in the north-eastern provinces were now
poured into the Basque Provinces and Navarre, where the war
was localised. The Armies of Catalonia and the Centre were
united under Martinez Campos, and became the Army of the
Right. It marched westward along the Pyrenees to cooperate
with the Army of the Left, formerly of the North, under
Quesada. The two together outnumbered the Carlists by four
to one ; 150,000 soldiers were narrowing the half circle that
forced them upon the sea and the frontier. Both sides were
now assured that the decisive moment had come ; but the
Carlist leader still maintained a hopeful tone. Writing to
General Elio from Estella on Jan. 16, 1876, Don Carlos said :
“the critical moment which your experience had foreseen,
and for which my heart longed, has arrived.” Six weeks later
the writer was a refugee in France. The final campaign
was planned by Martinez Campos. He himself invaded
the revolted provinces through eastern Navarre; Quesada
marched to meet him through Álava and Biscay; whilst at
the third angle of the triangle was Moriones with the garrison
of San Sebastian, ready to give a hand to either. Despite the
efforts made to shut him in, Moriones turned the blockading
Carlist lines, thanks to his command of the sea, and relieved
Guetaria (Feb. 6).
The simultaneous movements of Martinez Campos and
Quesada began on Feb. 15. Don Alfonso went north to be
compensated for his disappointment of the year before, and
nominally took over the supreme command. When, in charge
of Quesada, his chief of the staff, he reached Tolosa (Feb. 21),
xv.] And of the Carlist War 4OI
the campaign was virtually at an end. What little fighting
there was had fallen to the lot of Martinez Campos' army.
So hopelessly outnumbered were the Carlists that they were
obliged to abandon each position on the approach of the
enemy or submit to be cut off. Seeing the situation to be
desperate, the representatives of Guipúzcoa withheld further
supplies. Desertions set in and ruined the bold plan of the
Carlist commander, Count Caserta, for making one great struggle
to break through the narrowing lines of the invaders before it
was too late. On February 19 Primo de Rivera captured
Monte Jurra after a mere skirmish and entered Estella, since
August, 1873, the stronghold of the Carlists. On the same
day Martinez Campos, pushing along the frontier, took Peña
Plata above Elizondo and joined hands with Moriones at
Vera. On the last day of February, 1876, Don Carlos, accom-
panied by a Castilian battalion only, crossed the frontier by
St Jean Pied de Port. An amnesty was proclaimed to all who
would lay down their arms before March 15; its benefits were
afterwards prolonged. The Carlist War was at an end; but the
Carlists had suffered no great military disaster. They still
believed themselves equal to the struggle against the rest of
Spain; and a whole generation passed away before their
provinces became resigned to equality with their neighbours
south of the Ebro.
Thirteen months after Don Alfonso’s accession his first
Cortes met and gave legal sanction to his rule. Cánovas'
bold resolution to allow election by universal suffrage had
proved fully successful. Castelar, recognising a wish to act
fairly and to keep all good Spaniards within the State, had
prevented the Republicans and Radicals from revolutionary
abstention. But in the new Cortes Castelar himself and one
other found themselves the only Republicans. On the
other hand Cánovas' conciliatory policy was proved to be
working favourably by the reelection of 17o deputies who had
served in the Cortes of the Republic and the Interregnum.
C. S. 26
4O2 A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
The whole Opposition did not number more than about forty;
the legislative body pronounced with virtual unanimity in
favour of the restored monarchy. Many disputed questions,
however, were left for settlement by the Cortes, notably the
new Constitution, including the religious question, the status
of the Carlist provinces on the termination of the war, the
affairs of Cuba, and, most pressing of all, the financial problem.
Spain was indeed insolvent when the Cortes met and had
two ruinous wars on hand. One at least was soon ended.
March 19 saw the King's triumphal entry into his capital
after his short and easy campaign. It seemed as if happier
days were at hand. Deputies from Cuba and Puerto Rico
took their seats in the Cortes; an announcement that the
liberation of 76, ooo slaves would mark the end of the war
now rapidly drawing to a close in Cuba gave promise of rest
in the unhappy island.
On March 27 (1876) Cánovas introduced his proposed
Constitution. It was a skilful attempt to restore the funda-
mental laws of 1845 whilst preserving, as far as possible, the
Radical forms of 1870. Having gracefully conceded a point
by allowing the first election of the new reign to be carried
out by universal suffrage, he had now no difficulty in imposing
a property qualification on electors. He abolished, too, the
jury system, which formed part of every Radical programme,
but for which Spain was still manifestly unfit. He carefully
limited the rights of public meeting and association and the
powers of municipal and provincial councils. The result, of
course, was centralisation; but the Liberals, with their experi-
ment in cantonalism still before their eyes, uttered no protest.
Parties both in and out of the Cortes joined issue on clause II
of the Constitution—that about religion. This attempt at com-
promise with clerical leanings runs as follows: “The Roman
Catholic religion is the religion of the State and shall be
exclusively maintained by it; within the limits of Christian
morality freedom of worship shall be lawful; but no public
xv.] A'eligious toleration 4O3
manifestations other than those of the Church shall be
allowed.” It might have been expected that the Liberals,
anxious to punish the clergy for their share in the Carlist
War, would have opposed this clause; but the Cortes accepted it
by a majority of 22 I over 33. It was the clerical party that felt
aggrieved by a relaxation of the intolerance clause. Cánovas,
seeing that to govern against the will of the clergy was
impossible, had made the utmost concession he could ; yet
Pidal, the leader of the Catholic party in the Senate,
denounced his arrangement as “a crime against the nation,
morality, and religion.” In answer to such invective Cánovas
could only cite the toleration accorded by Catholic kings to
Moslems at the time of the reconquest, and the disastrous
effects that followed the repeal of the Edict of Nantes.
The Pope wrote to the Archbishop of Toledo with regard
to the disputed clause, that it violated every obligation of truth
and of the Catholic Faith. “It annuls illegally the Concordat
between the Holy See and the Spanish nation, exposes the
State to the charge of wrong, and opens a door to error, error
which is but a precursor to a long succession of ruinous evils
to the nation so long and true a lover of Catholic unity.”
This letter was published by the newspapers without the
consent of the Government. It was a direct challenge, for the
rulers of Spain had ever maintained their right to supervise
papal messages before permitting their publication. The Pope
also wrote to congratulate the ladies of Madrid who had
petitioned against toleration. These incitements to a Jehad
were repeated from every pulpit. The work of pacification
was almost undone by those who should have been Cánovas'
most active helpers. The Nuncio withdrew; threats of
religious penalties caused the retirement of one member of
the Cabinet. Castelar's prophecy seemed near fulfilment; but
Cánovas withstood the clerical dictation. Congress voted the
tolerance clause (May 12, 1876) by a majority of almost three
to one; and four days later the Senate, after receiving assurance
26—2
4O4. Affonso X/Z (1874–1885) [CH.
that with this exception the Concordat would be fulfilled,
accepted it by an equally decisive majority. But while
formally resisting the extreme claims of the Church, Cánovas
was ready to give up the substantial fact for which the
Liberals contended. The law-courts took back what the
legislature had conceded. The clause was so interpreted that
an advertisement of Protestant schools became a “public
manifestation” against the State religion. Excommunication
was incurred by all who ate with heretics, “looked kindly
upon them, or dared to say or write a word in their defence.”
The other provisions of Cánovas' Constitution—still opera-
tive with some modifications and known as the Constitution of
June 30, 1876—aimed at compromise. Spain was declared a
Constitutional Monarchy. Legislation was vested in “the
Cortes with the King.” The legislative Chambers were of
equal authority. The Senate was a mixed one, made up of
eighty senators in their own right, princes of the blood royal,
grandees, presidents of the great councils, archbishops, and
captains-general. To these were added one hundred senators
nominated by the Crown, and one hundred and eighty elected
by the municipal and provincial assemblies, the universities,
and taxpayers of the highest class. One half of the elective
senators are renewed every fifth year. Congress is elected by
districts of 50,000 souls; the franchise was restricted (until
1890) to taxpayers of certain classes. The whole number
of deputies amounts to 431. Provision is made for the repre-
sentation of minorities by list-voting in the larger towns.
Dissolution must be followed by the assembly of a new
Chamber within three months. The King summons, pro-
rogues, and dissolves the Cortes. Both Houses meet
every year. Congress names its own President; the Senate
is presided over by a nominee of the Crown. Ministers can
be impeached by Congress before the Senate. The King is
irresponsible; but his decrees must be countersigned by a
responsible minister. Local government is carried on by
XV Constitution of 1876. Fueros abolished 405
Ayuntamientos or municipal councils of from five to thirty-five
members in each commune, and by provincial deputations
like the French Conseils Généraux. The powers of the local
elective bodies over taxation and administration are con-
siderable. The Ayuntamientos elect their alcalde or mayor,
except in Madrid and a few other large towns, where the
nomination belongs to the Crown.
The new Constitution was applied to the Basque Provinces
equally with the rest; and their privileges and exemptions
were swept away. Cánovas has left it on record that he
would have preferred to extend local liberties to other pro-
vinces rather than to abolish them. But the injustice of
their existence in certain provinces only, and these provinces
rebellious, was intolerable. The offer rejected by the Basques
in January, 1875 (see p. 393), was not renewed. At the end
of the war King Alfonso announced from his camp at Somo-
rrostro (March, 1876) the abolition of the Aºueros. The law of
October, 1839, made shortly after the Convention of Vergara,
gave to the Cortes the power, after consulting with the repre-
sentatives of the provinces concerned, to alter the Fueros in so
far as they were inconsistent with national unity. This law
had remained a dead letter until Cánovas revived it in order to
avoid legislation involving discussion of highly controversial
matter. In the Senate only twenty-four members were found
to vote for the total abolition of the Fueros. But Cánovas took
the complete union of the provinces to the Crown for granted.
He refused to discuss, either in the Cortes or in his conference
with the commissioners of Biscay, Guipúzcoa, and Álava,
anything more than certain shreds of fiscal and administrative
authority to be ceded, subject to the good behaviour of the
provinces. The alterations made were embodied in the law of
July 21, 1876. The Basques became liable to the “service of
arms when the law summons, and to contribute in proportion
to their wealth to the costs of the State.” To this arrangement
the Basques refused their assent. On this subject they were
4O6 A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
united, the Liberals of the towns being hardly less attached to
the privileges under which they enjoyed a government greatly
superior to that of the rest of Spain than were the Carlist
agriculturists.
The delegates summoned to discuss the question (May,
1876) met Cánovas' abolitionist proposals by a non possumus
and were dismissed. When the law was passed, the local
governments refused to cooperate with the newly constituted
authorities in making it effective. The provinces were violently
agitated; but the presence of an army of occupation made
resistance hopeless. Extraordinary juntas and conferences
between delegates of the three sister provinces were forbidden.
The Foral Deputations were abolished; and their place was
supplied by Provincial Deputations nominated in the first in-
stance by the civil governors (April–Dec., 1877)". These proved
less stubborn, and negotiated with the central Government
to preserve the freedom of their country from the dreaded
presence of the alien taxgatherer. Subject to good behaviour,
they were allowed to raise their taxes in the form best suited
to them and through their own officers. The provinces are
now periodically assessed at amounts supposed to represent
their fair contribution to the State, under the headings of
agricultural, industrial and mining dues, salt dues, stamp dues,
octroi, &c. Their “agreements’ with the central Government
are made for ten years. They raise also their own contingent
to the army, and have the right of redeeming their conscripts
with the public money at such rates as may be fixed for the
whole kingdom. These slight privileges the Basques jealously
retain, not without hope of extending them at some future
time. They chose to give in the old form as a “free donation ”
the extra taxation made necessary by the American war. The
cost of levying taxes in their provinces is one-tenth of the cost
* The Provincial Deputations are recognised public bodies, established
by law, with considerable powers as to financial administration. [J. F.-K.]
Financial measures. Cuôa facifted 407
Mere in Spain. The ancient civil codes of the provinces
breserved. The men of the generation that fought for
arlos are passing away; but their sons still keep before
es the ideal of the Fueros. Meanwhile their efforts are
}d to making the administration of their provinces a
for the rest of Spain.
pain at the Restoration was ruined. Since 1868 two
dred and sixty millions sterling had been added to her
t. The reduced three per cent. loan stood at 11%; no
terest had been paid since 1874. The army alone, costing
twenty-six millions, annually absorbed within one million
pounds the whole revenue. Mr Phipps, the British Com-
missioner, reported (1877) that fully one-third of the property
liable to taxation was fraudulently concealed, whilst “a few
English, French, and Spanish bankers advance money to Spain
on Conditions as disastrous to the Treasury as they are dis-
creditable to themselves.” Unable to meet the claims of the
creditors, Salvatierra, the Minister of Finance, proposed an
arrangement. He promised payment in full from 1877, and
offered in the meanwhile to those who would accept it in full
discharge of their claims one-third of the interest due, without
reducing their nominal capital. The creditors, glad to receive
something, however slight, more than promises, accepted ; but
so often had the future been pledged that no confidence was
created. In order to meet even the reduced interest of the
first year the greatest sacrifices had to be made. The war tax
remained ; land tax and octroi dues were increased ; and the
salaries of all officials, including the clergy, were taxed to a
quarter their amount.
All the men and money that could be mustered were now
devoted to ending the war in Cuba. At the opening of his
first Cortes, Don Alfonso stated that since his accession 32, ooo
soldiers had been poured into the island. Shortly afterwards
A 6oo, ooo were raised on the security of the Cuban customs;
and in October, 1877, Martinez Campos set out with fourteen








408 A/fonso X/Z (1874–1885)
thousand troops to end the wearisome campaign, against
only eight or ten thousand strong. It was known t
new commander believed that ample liberties, admini
reforms, a lower tariff, and a considerable degree
government must be granted if Cuba were to be save
Spanish Crown. Accordingly he was welcomed by the N
loyalists, and found no difficulty in entering upon negotia
with the insurgents. Within a year he proudly annoul
that the war was at an end, and Spain, after many years,
peace. But in Cuba at least the peace was a hollow on
bought and not imposed. So eager was Martinez Campos to
obtain the formal submission of the rebels that, using flattery
instead of force, he had forfeited their respect. He had by
his concessions, and by total disregard of their views, roused
the bitter resentment of the Loyalists. By agreeing to re-
cognise the freedom of escaped slaves serving with the rebels
he rendered imperative the liberation of those who had
remained true to their masters and to the Government. The
Loyalists and United-Liberals complained that the result of
their sacrifices on behalf of the mother-country was their
abandonment and ruin. Cánovas, daily more dependent upon
the Conservatives, was forced to accept their views and to
declare against the concessions of Martinez Campos. When
Cánovas disavowed engagements entered into by his emissary,
another and a great grievance was added to the Cuban list;
and the separatists increased in number and influence. Neither
were the rebels beaten nor the Loyalists satisfied. The struggle
that had cost Spain Ioo, ooo lives was ready to break out as
soon as the Peacemaker turned his back. The Peace of
El Zanjon (Feb. 28, 1878) was no peace.
When the Cortes reassembled (Nov., 1876), the consti-
tutional guarantees were restored in all the provinces except
those of Catalonia. Indeed so strongly was the Government
established that it could make light of threats of revolution.
It actually allowed the publication of the Republican-Socialist








xv.] Parliamentary parties. Queen /sabel 409
manifesto issued in Paris by Ruiz Zorrilla and Salmeron (Aug.,
1876). Cánovas' wise policy of leaving the door open to the
leaders of the Revolution of 1868 was producing excellent
results. Though autocratic with his followers, he was, so long
as not provoked beyond endurance, forbearing towards oppo-
nents. Sagasta, Vega de Armijo, Alonso Martinez, and
Camacho now headed the Monarchical Radicals, whose aim
was to bring back by constitutional means a great part of
the Constitution of 1869. They were ready to alternate with
Cánovas in office when the time should come to practise his
plans for a make-believe of party government. A year or two
only were wanted to confirm these ex-Republicans in their
monarchical faith and to fit them for “the orderly succession of
parties.” Occasionally, as in April, 1877, the irritation of the
Opposition mounted high ; they struggled in their gentle
bonds, resented Cánovas' half-contemptuous toleration, and
complained to the King of his high-handedness. They
threatened to withdraw and to expose the sham of the
Constitutional parties; but usually they were content to pursue
not over eagerly their ideal of religious freedom, universal
suffrage, liberty of the press, and unhindered discussion of
all political opinions. They made great victories out of small
mercies, and triumphed noisily when the King was induced to
censure an alcalde who had compelled Protestants to accept
Roman Catholic baptism (Oct., 1877). -
For a time public opinion was occupied by reported dis-
sensions in the Palace. Queen Isabel had hardly seen her
son safely seated on the throne when she began to interfere.
Returning to Madrid (Oct., 1876), she was soon engrossed in a
wrangle with the Treasury over items and arrears in her
pension. Had her activities been restricted to her private
interests, no harm would have been done; but her connexions
and her associates induced her to take up a strong attitude with
regard to the religious question. While Cánovas was nearly
overwhelmed by the dangerous power of the Ultramontanes,
4 IO A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
Isabel wrote to assure the Pope that all her influence with her
son should be used to bring about a settlement satisfactory to
his Holiness. Cánovas ventured to remonstrate with the ex-
Queen on her interference. Queen Isabel published part of
her correspondence with her son’s Prime Minister in the Paris
Aigaro; whereupon the whole was given by the Ministry to the
Spanish press, and the nation put into a position to judge the
controversy. Identity of religious aspirations had brought
Queen Isabel into relation with the wife of Don Carlos; she
was cultivating the friendship of certain generals conspicuous
for their activity in the Restoration. Don Alfonso's marriage
disturbed his mother's schemes for alliance with the Carlist
branch of the Bourbon family, while it revived an ancient
feud between the two daughters of Ferdinand VII. In
December, 1877, the nation learnt that the King was betrothed
to his first cousin, Mercedes, the second daughter of the Duke
of Montpensier. The marriage was recognised as one of
affection and not of policy. Spaniards rejoiced that they
would have a Queen born and bred in Spain. Congress
approved the marriage by a majority of three hundred and
nine against four. Only one man, Moyano, chose to utter in
Parliament the terrible charges brought by public opinion
against the bride's father. Cánovas replied only by invoking
the strange statute of moral limitations conveyed in the phrase
“Let bygones be bygones.”
Rejoicings over the royal wedding and the pacification
of Cuba opened the year 1878. With peace, reviving pros-
perity, and confidence, a moderate Government, and a still
popular King, Spain promised herself a brighter future. The
rejoicings had hardly ended when Queen Mercedes died of
fever at Madrid (June 27), before entering her nineteenth
year. The King was overwhelmed with grief. He never in
fact seemed to recover his interest in life. For the rest of his
reign he did his duty, nobly on great occasions, perfunctorily
on common ones, but he was restless; his conduct was irregular;
xv.) Affonso's marriage. The Queen's death 41 I
his high spirits gave place to a hard, dry, half-cynical humour.
Queen Mercedes was followed to the grave by two of the great
figures of the preceding generation. Her grandmother, Queen
Cristina, died in retirement at Havre, her public services of
half-a-century before utterly forgotten. Forgotten too, though
he received the honours of a public funeral, was the Duke
of the Victory, Prince of Vergara, Baldomero Espartero, who
troubled Spain for so many of his eighty-six years of life.
Except a few irreconcilable Carlists and Republicans, hardly
anyone now refused to recognise that Spain at present could
hope for no better government than that of the Restoration.
Castelar, betaking himself to paradox, had announced that
“Liberal ends must be sought by Conservative methods,” and
that “revolution was anti-Liberal.” Statesmen could now
assume a certain degree of independence, assured that the fate
of the dynasty was no longer bound up with that of a
particular Cabinet. The time was approaching when a change
of Ministry must take place in order that the nakedness of
dictatorship might retain the decent rag of Constitutional
pretence. Early in 1878 Cánovas' Ministry was slightly
shaken by the refusal of some of its supporters to vote its
candidate for the Presidency of Congress. But the crisis
was tided over, and the session was taken up with the dis-
cussion of non-party questions, such as agriculture and
commerce, before almost empty benches. It was proved
that Spanish exports were decreasing, and that of what was
left more than five-sixths were carried in foreign ships.
Barcelona, pleading poverty, begged for time to pay her
taxes and for permission to raise a huge loan to be spent
on public works. Nothing came of the Parliamentary dis-
cussion beyond the suggestion that efforts should be made
to bring about friendly and profitable relations with South
America. Meanwhile a neighbour's loss was to prove Spain's
temporary gain.
Phylloxera was devastating the vineyards of France. At
4 I 2 A/fonso X // (1874–1885) [CH.
first no cure was found; and, when later it was proved that
American vine-stocks could resist the disease, years were needed
to uproot and replant the vines and bring the vineyards to
their former productiveness. In the meantime the exporters
of Bordeaux were obliged to find a substitute for their own
vintages in order to prevent their trade from deserting them.
The Spanish wines, that hitherto had been used by them only
in small quantities for mixing, now became all-important.
Prices doubled and trebled; and the development of the
supply gave a powerful stimulus to agriculture. Emboldened
by increasing exports, Spain concluded a treaty of commerce
with her neighbour; but she failed to take advantage of her
opportunity to supplant France as the world's wine-merchant.
The Spanish wines were retailed under French names.
The spring session of 1879 showed further disintegra-
tion of the majority. The Centre, hitherto Ministerial, was
fusing with the Left. The question of the duration of the
Cortes arose. The Liberals maintained that, the existing
Cortes having been elected previous to the new Constitution,
their mandate would terminate at the end of three years, as
directed by the Constitution of 1869. The Ministerialists
contended that five years was the legal term ; and the King
ruled in their favour. It was decided, however, not to delay
much longer a general election, which would afford opportunity
for consulting the chiefs of all parties. The Cortes of the
Restoration were indeed worn out. Cánovas loved to keep
burning questions in the background and to employ his
oratory on the non-contentious or the obvious; but even he
lamented that the Cortes discussed a new and restrictive
Press Law rather with the impartial languor befitting academic
debate than as a question of actuality.
In March (1879) Cánovas again thought fit to get rid for a
time of his responsibilities. He had two good reasons for
retirement; his party was breaking up by reason of his inability
to meet the claims of individual rapacity; and Martinez Campos
xv) Ministry of Martinez Campos 4 I 3
had come back from Cuba. Some said that Cánovas was
jealous of the blundering soldier who had thrust himself into
the first place at the Restoration, and now returned acclaimed
by a certain party as the Pacificator of Cuba. But Cánovas
had excellent reasons other than jealousy for wishing to
dissociate himself from the action of his subordinate. He
saw how easily the Cuban Loyalists would show that the
vaunted agreement of El Zanjon was a capitulation in the
disguise of a convention, giving to rebels in arms representation
in Cortes, full local and municipal liberties, and administrative
and fiscal reform. Moreover, Martinez Campos had recognised
on his own authority a Cuban debt of 244,000,ooo. Such a
surrender was sure to be unpopular as soon as its import was
understood; so Cánovas left its author to defend it before the
Cortes, promising to give support as a private member. He
advised the King to call to power a Liberal-Conservative ministry
under Martinez Campos. Martinez Campos, in turn, urged
the King not to withdraw his confidence from Cánovas, but he
took office (March 7, 1879). The Ministers of Marine, Com-
merce, and Finance carried over their portfolios from the
preceding Cabinet. Martinez Campos himself took the War
Ministry, Silvela the Home, and Molins the Foreign Office.
The new ministers declared themselves the continuers of
Cánovas' policy. They sent a circular to the provincial
governors directing them to allow full liberty of public meeting
in view of the general election of April, and the free expression
of all opinions except such as attacked the King or the army.
Only the Federal Republicans withdrew from the poll.
Castelar's little band of posibilistas joined Sagasta's Liberals.”
The result was the election of 17o ministerialists, 15o followers
of Cánovas and Romero Robledo, and an Opposition number-
ing about I Io, but broken up into many groups. In the
Senate the ministerial majority was six to one. Martinez
Campos’ Cabinet was left, so far as Congress was concerned,
at the mercy of Cánovas, who now graciously renewed his
4 I4 A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
promise to support its so-called Liberal-Conservative policy of
retrenchment and reduction of the army. Continuing the
overplayed farce, Martinez Campos declared himself a loyal
follower of Cánovas, but he notably failed to make him
accept responsibility for his convention. During the first
session (June 1–July 26, 1879) measures were carried by
large majorities; but Sagasta's attack on the “disgraceful and
accursed peace" reached Cánovas through Martinez Campos.
The latter in his florid style defended a transaction which had
stopped the wound from which Spain was bleeding to death.
He denied the obvious truth that, sent abroad by the party
that insisted on submission as a preliminary to negotiation, he
had allowed to be extorted from him all that the rebels had
hoped from victory.
Martinez Campos had recommended immediate and un-
conditional emancipation of slaves. A Commission appointed
to examine the matter advised the gradual extinction of slavery
and the immediate abolition of corporal punishment for slaves.
Their owners were to be obliged to clothe, feed, teach, and
pay the slaves for four years, after which one-fourth of their
number would be freed each year. But the question that
really agitated the Loyalists of Cuba was not emancipation so
much as compensation; and, to secure this, Martinez Campos’
law for immediate emancipation must be defeated. Accord-
ingly the recommendations of the Commission were accepted
by the Senate and sent down to the Lower House. Campos
failed also to secure the economic and administrative reforms
which he had promised to the Cubans. Here again he was
supported by the Liberal wing of his party and opposed by the
Conservative Centre. The Finance Minister declared that the
proposed modification in the colonial tariff would involve a
deficit which he was unwilling to face. His resignation was
followed by that of others; his colleagues and Martinez
Campos quitted office (Dec. 7, 1879). Acting, as always, on
Cánovas' advice, the King called in Posada Herrera; but he
xv.] Cánovas again in power 4I 5
declined, giving as his reason his inability to secure the
support of the Constitutionalists under Sagasta and Serrano.
Lopez de Ayala, President of Congress, likewise declined.
Indeed the offer made to them was a hollow one ; had they
accepted it, they would have been in the hands of Cánovas.
The history of the Parliamentary alliances and battles since
the Restoration is suspect throughout by reason of their
insincerity. The victory was often arranged beforehand
between the rival leaders; the apparent and avowed object
of the struggle was not the real one. Instead of great principles,
narrow party or personal interests guided policy; the Parlia-
mentary show was kept up in order to conceal from the simple
the rule of a dictator; those were indeed deluded who fancied
that Governments were made and unmade by the results of
debates in Congress.
Having disavowed Martinez Campos’ concessions and forced
his opponents to admit their impotence by challenging them to
undertake the government, Cánovas again formed a Cabinet.
He chose to keep the Cuban question before the nation. The
Reform Bill that had been the ostensible cause of the fall of
Martinez Campos’ Ministry had, he said, been badly drawn up.
Its failure was due to its faulty form. He himself approved
its principles, and would carry out in a less invidious manner
its provisions for putting Cubans and Spaniards on the same
footing with regard to public burdens. This was intended as
a Sop to the Catalan manufacturers; but, if it meant that the
Cuban market was to be closed as before, it amounted in fact
to a rejection of the principles which Cánovas professed to
adopt. He pronounced, too, in favour of gradual emanci
pation of slaves.
How much more importance was attached to forms and
manners in debate than to its subject-matter was shown when
Cánovas failed to give a polite reply to a searching question
asked in Congress with regard to the late crisis. Immediately
the Opposition was in an uproar, claiming apology as for
4I 6 Alfonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
an insult. The President failed to calm them; Cánovas merely
denied that his attitude had been insulting. On December 17
I 24 members ceased to attend the House, and justified their
withdrawal in a manifesto to their constituents. The majority,
however, gave a vote of confidence to the Government; and
for once public opinion condemned abstention on account of
the frivolity of its pretext. The change from Republic to
Monarchy had caused no such uproar.
Shortly before Martinez Campos resigned, King Alfonso
married Maria Cristina, daughter of the Archduke Ranier
of Austria (Nov. 29, 1879). The wedding took place amid
the gloom of a great national disaster; and the funds set
aside for public rejoicings were spent to relieve sufferers
from floods which in Murcia and Orihuela destroyed more
than five hundred lives and many million pounds’ worth of
property. The King visited the scene of the disaster and,
as ever on such occasions, showed cool courage and real
feeling for suffering.
In January (1880) the minorities returned to their places
in Congress, Cánovas having given an assurance that he had
no intention of insulting them. In spite of the optimistic
view taken by the military authorities, the news from Cuba was
again threatening. The rebels had laid aside their arms only
because their demands had been granted by Spain's envoy.
Now Cánovas refused to ratify the convention and taunted the
separatists with disloyalty. Answering a Cuban Senator he said,
“Face to face with traitors, the Government can follow only
one line of conduct. If they wish for war they shall have it.
I have nothing to add.” So harshly did he review Martinez
Campos’ conciliatory policy that the breach between the two
became complete. Martinez Campos alleged to all who cared
to listen that he had been tricked and betrayed. He took
up the attitude of the blunt and honest soldier, the tool of
the designing statesman. Seceding with his following from
the Centre, the Liberal dynastic party, he joined on the Left
xv. Canovas and Cuba. The Opposition 417
the Opposition groups under Sagasta and Posada Herrera.
It should be noticed that Cánovas, in refusing Campos’ reforms,
pitted his own & priori views against those of most who had
experience of the island. Concha and Pavia believed reform
to afford the only hope of preserving the union. But Cánovas
feared Catalan manufacturers and rich slave-owners in Spain
more than distant insurgents. The Finance Minister, by
accusing the Opposition of refusing the funds necessary to
crush the rebellion, roused so much indignation that he had
to resign (March 15, 1880). The fact that a new Cuban loan
of ten millions sterling at eight per cent, was covered three
times over in Spain and rose at once to Io2 proved that
confidence in the future was still strong.
The Liberals were trying to bring back the party struggle
from Colonial to Spanish ground and to political as opposed
to personal aims. A programme, signed by 274 public men,
set forth the Democratic and Progressive view. It advocated
a liberal interpretation of the Constitution of 1876, freedom of
worship, of the press, of public meeting and teaching, universal
Suffrage, decentralisation, universal military service, retrench-
ment and financial reform, an irremovable judicature, and
assimilation of Cuba to the home provinces. This manifesto
was followed by fusion of the groups led by Martinez Campos
and Posada Herrera with the Dynastic Liberals. The meeting
of the united party, presided over by Sagasta, was attended
by forty-five senators, one hundred and thirty deputies, and,
perhaps equally important, four captains-general, and sixteen
generals. For Spain this was a most formidable Opposition.
Dangerous, too, was its contention that its policy was thwarted
by the King, the creature and mouthpiece of Cánovas, and
that the Ministry lived on the crown “like ivy on an oak.”
It called on the King to adopt a more Liberal policy. Cánovas
shrewdly twitted the coalition or fusionists with addressing to
the King arguments that had failed to persuade the electorate.
Before the Cortes adjourned (June 23, 1880) he received an
C. S. 27
418 A/fonso X/Z (1874–1885) [CH.
overwhelming vote of confidence. Martinez Campos' thunder-
ing attack was too obviously inspired by personal resentment
to succeed. In many provinces the Liberals took no part
in the autumn municipal elections. They were the first held
under the new law; and the Carlist Provinces had returned
Opposition candidates. This result from a Conservative district
was interpreted as a challenge, though it may well have re-
presented the fact that only the Liberal townsfolk exercised
their right to vote. The policy of conciliation hitherto
pursued with regard to the former privileged provinces was
dropped by Romero Robledo, the rash and hot-tempered
occupant of the Home Office. He withdrew by decree
(Oct., 1880) the agreement on which the no longer dangerous
but highly-valued remains of autonomy depended, and forbade
the use of the Basque language in the pulpit. Fortunately for
the provinces and for Spain, the ill-judged decree assimilating
the Basque Provinces in every respect to the rest of Spain was
never carried out.
As the moment drew near when it would become necessary
to call the Liberals to office, the Liberals themselves became
less pronounced in their Radicalism. Castelar, in a flowery
address to imaginary followers, had told the world that
Canovas' obstinacy in holding office was the one provocation
to revolution left. The posibilist leader took his stand upon
“the extreme Right of Democracy, and from his latest position
refused the fellowship of Communists and Federals.” His
programme, differing little from the Sagasta-Campos one,
ended with a condescending tender of the olive branch to
the Church. “It would be no small matter,” he said, “if we
succeeded in allaying certain religious anxieties and attracting
to our side the most enlightened of the clergy....In any case
I cannot imagine a more inopportune moment than the present
for a quarrel with the Church....Only by living amid advanced
democracies can one understand to what a degree religious
faith can consolidate true liberty.” A month or two later
xv.] The Church. Economical evils 4 IQ
Castelar, in a letter to Emile de Gérardin, assumed the credit
for having changed Spanish democracy from revolutionary to
legal and pacific.
The activity of the Opposition increased as the session
drew near (Dec. 30, 1880). But, as soon as they tried to
define their line of action, they fell to wrangling over their
differences; and the fusion was nearly dissolved. The King's
speech was full of confidence except when it touched upon
finance. It called upon the country for fresh sacrifices, but
was silent as to the corruption and unfairness that made them
necessary. The taxation fell most hardly upon the poor,
whilst those who had wealth or influence escaped it partially
or wholly. It was reported to Congress (April, 1880) that
173, ooo landed properties were seized for arrears of taxes.
These were all small peasant holdings which bore the public
burden, whilst fraudulent classification exempted large estates.
Every form of peculation and abuse flourished, and still
flourishes. The President of the Supreme Court declared
before the Senate (June, 1876) that the expense of raising
the taxes absorbed more than a third of their amount. This
is because the taxes must be wrung from the needy and
defenceless, whilst the collector is glad to pass over the rich
man to whom he perhaps owes his place or to come to an
arrangement advantageous to taxer and taxed but ruinous
to the State. The people of the south were driven to
emigrate in yearly increasing numbers to Algiers and Tunis, and
those of the north to America, leaving wide tracts of Spanish
soil untilled. Industries and manufactures such as are carried
on are for the most part in the hands of foreigners. All
except the simple and rough articles of daily use are imported,
for the Spanish potter, weaver, and smith have lost their skill.
Except for two short periods, during which he chose to
escape responsibility and to criticise the work of his agents
from an independent position, Cánovas had held office
uninterruptedly for six years, or ever since the Restoration.
27—2
42O A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
It was time that a change should be made; but neither
Cánovas himself nor the Cortes seemed disposed to make it.
The Address was voted in the spring session of 1881 by a
majority of 144 in a House of 274 ; it was noted, however,
that many former supporters of the Ministry did not vote.
Cánovas' foreign policy, and his leanings to German friendship
rather than French, were sharply criticised. More threatening
was the speech of Alonso Martinez accusing the Crown of
inherited prejudice against the Liberals, the rebels against the
thrones of Fernando VII and Isabel II. He hinted that
Cánovas' overbearing attitude might again provoke revolution.
Both attacks, however, failed. When a vote of censure was
proposed for unnecessary and unjustified prohibition of a
democratic banquet, it was lost by nearly four to one. It
was the King who at last turned out the Cabinet, despite its
majority in the Cortes. Whether it was done by the advice
or with the consent of Cánovas belongs to the yet unwritten
secret history of the time. A further classification of the debt
as privileged and deferred was proposed. Cánovas announced
that, in order to undertake it, he must continue in office
eighteen months longer. But, in view of the growing irritation
of the Liberals, this would be unsafe ; the President of the
Council must be taught to play the Parliamentary game
according to the rules he himself had laid down. The King
called in Sagasta, who took office with Vega de Armijo
(Foreign Affairs), Camacho (Finance), Alonso Martinez
(Justice), Martinez Campos (War), and four other fusionists.
Whatever may be thought of Cánovas' methods, there can
be no doubt that the state of Spain improved greatly under his
rule. The two great problems he had to face were the inter-
ference of the army in politics, the bad tradition coming down
from Riego's successful mutiny, and the irreconcilable attitude
of the Church towards all Governments that ventured on
independence. Six years had brought the conviction that
the era of pronunciamientos was closed; and in that time
XV] Cánovas retires. Sagasta in power 42 I
a working agreement between Church and State had been
attained.
When the Liberals published their programme, it was found
to differ so little from that of their predecessors as to justify
the suspicion that the object of their impatience had been
rather place than reform. Absolute freedom of election ;
maintenance of existing taxation with greater economy in
expenditure ; commercial and industrial development; liberty
So far as consistent with monarchy—none of these were items
that would have been out of place in a Conservative manifesto.
The “orderly succession of parties” devised by Cánovas had
now in fact begun. Each in turn enjoyed power and patron-
age under the tacit understanding that it should when the time
came make room for the other. Neither seriously criticised
the other's administration, for were they not all honourable
men P Burning questions were kept as much as might be
in the background. When Liberals were in office, names
differed; but things went on much the same. The Liberalism
of the Ministry of 1881 was shown by amnesty to a few
political exiles, pardon for press offences, and the reinstate-
ment of some university professors, despite clerical protest, in
the chairs which they had lost through doubtful orthodoxy.
Still the change was welcomed. When the municipal
elections took place (April, 1881), the ministerial majority
was as large as usual, though the pressure exercised had
been distinctly less. The Carlists and Republicans had
increased their representation at the expense of the Con-
servatives. The Cortes stood adjourned until new function-
aries could be appointed to manage an election. They were
dissolved (June 26), and in September the new Chambers
met. Sagasta's majority was three to one in Congress, and
even more in the Senate. But the lot of the Ministry was
not an easy one. The Left wing of their party was continually
claiming fulfilment of Liberal pledges, while, on the other
hand, Cánovas stood ready to accuse his opponents of anti-
422 Alfonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
monarchical views. This accusation it was difficult for
ex-Republicans to rebut. The Radicals split on the question.
A small party, under Ruiz Zorrilla, frankly accepted the charge
and aimed openly at revolution; but the majority, under
Castelar and Martos, calling themselves Dynastic Democrats,
supported Sagasta, urging the while reform and a democratic
policy on the Crown.
The first Liberal budget brought in by Camacho proved
a success; it actually showed a small surplus. This was
devoted to further conversion of the debt. Interest on
the three per cent, and six per cent. loans was reduced to
one and two per cent. respectively; but, now that it seemed
likely that the reduced interest would really be paid, they rose
respectively to 22 and 42. Camacho's financial proposals
included gradual reduction of customs-dues to fifteen per
cent, ad z/a/ozem.
Freed from the responsibilities of office, Cánovas sought to
regain the confidence of the religious party. He supported an
amendment to the Address, wherein Pidal proposed to censure
the Government for failing to defend the independence of the
Holy See. The Government, however, made bold to declare
that it would disregard Papal interference, should any occur,
with regard to the proposed legalisation of civil marriage. The
bishops were again doing their utmost to provoke a rupture
between the Liberals and Rome.
Pan-Iberianism, or at any rate very close union with the
kindred nation to the west, had always formed part of the
aspirations of Spanish Liberals, and had always brought danger
and discredit upon its advocates. The opening of the Madrid-
Cáceres-Lisbon Railway (Oct., 1881) was made the occasion
for a meeting of the Kings of Spain and Portugal. Speeches
were uttered advocating customs union and political alliance,
and joint action abroad. The union of the two dynasties by
marriage was hinted at. As neither Za Zöeria, Sagasta's news-
paper, nor the Portuguese official organs denied these inten-
xv.] Genera/ discontent 423
tions, the meeting was perhaps arranged so that a feeler might
be put forward. If so, the feeler had speedily to be withdrawn.
Spain remained indifferent; but Portuguese susceptibility, ever
resentful of the nearer approach of her neighbour, was roused ;
and the Portuguese ministry that had advocated closer political
relations fell.
The return of a nominally Liberal Government to power
had roused fresh hopes in the Radicals in accordance with
promises given by Sagasta's party whilst still in opposition.
But, after the Ministry had held power for three months and
done nothing to redeem its promises, it became clear that
Sagasta's inclinations now led him to depend upon the more
Conservative wing of his party. After breaking with his more
Radical supporters, he held office for a year and a half;
but Romero Robledo maliciously pointed out that the Liberal
Ministry had been obliged to suspend or prosecute no less
than 1500 municipalities in 27 provinces. The situation was
not without danger. The Constitutional Republicans and
Dynastic Radicals joined Serrano and united to oppose the
Government which had so bitterly disappointed them. The
real Democrats were on the point of revolt. The authority of
the Government rested upon compulsion only. The Catalans
were rendered furious by its insistence on pushing through
a new commercial agreement with France in the face of
continued opposition of the Conservatives and the Radical
Protectionists. The bill authorising gradual reduction of
tariffs spread alarm still further; and a state of siege was
imposed in Catalonia. Madrid was hardly less discontented.
The tradesmen refused to pay the new industrial and com-
mercial tax. Finally their submission was brought about by
Sagasta's conciliatory attitude and a careful playing upon
the rival interests and jealousies of Madrid and Barcelona,
consumers against producers.
A secret Society known as the Mano AWegra, and bent
on securing its socialistic ends by murder and arson, was
424 A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
spreading in the agricultural southern provinces. On the
other hand, the Clericals had organised for the summer a
pilgrimage to Rome, which was in reality a Carlist and Ultra-
montane demonstration. With difficulty did the Government
obtain a declaration from Rome of its political insignificance
and the substitution of the Bishop of Teruel for the Carlist
Nocedal as its leader. Luckily for the peace of Don Alfonso's
reign, the Carlists fell to quarrelling among themselves. On
the name-day of their Prince (Nov. 5) the two divisions sent
separate congratulations, and one actually spoke of rescuing
the lawful King from “his shameful captivity in the hands of
Nocedal’s faction.”
When the Cortes adjourned (July 10, 1882), it was clear that
the Ministry was much weakened. The Liberal Opposition,
headed by Serrano in the Senate and Moret in Congress,
had become bolder. There seemed to be reason in its plea
that there was room within the monarchy for a more Liberal
policy than that of Sagasta. This combination of Radicalism
and loyalty won the King's approval; and he openly favoured
the new party, whilst the Conservatives promised it their help,
at least in so far as should be necessary to overthrow the
Ministry. It had been hoped that the Republicans too would
join; but the hope was not fulfilled. Calling itself the Dynastic
Left, the new coalition adopted Sagasta's unfulfilled programme
and sought to restore the Constitution of 1869 with the modi-
fications indispensable to fit it to a monarchy. Twice the
Dynastic Left was beaten, once when it opposed Posada
Herrera, the ministerial candidate for the Presidency of
Congress, and took as its candidate General Lopez Dominguez,
and again by a still larger majority on a motion for revision of
the Constitution. But Sagasta won the second of these
victories only by accepting the reforms proposed by Serrano
in the Senate—civil marriage, reduction of taxation, and
freedom of the press and of worship. The attacks of the
Liberal dissentients were driving Sagasta to a more definitely
xv.] Change in Sagasta's poſicy 4.25
monarchical policy. His objection to the Constitution of
1869 now was that it failed to afford adequate protection
to the throne.
On Sagasta fell the weight of the reaction and disappoint-
ment that necessarily followed the excitement and high hopes
of the Restoration. It has often been pointed out that during
this and the following period it was generally the Liberals and.
not the Conservatives who were obliged to resort to unusual
measures of police and martial law in order to check riot
or revolt. But to attribute this necessity, as some do, to
the encouragement given by the Liberals to disorder or to
their harshness in repression is unfair. Cánovas ruled as long
as he deemed prudent or could do so with credit; he resigned
only when the situation became dangerous and difficult, and
discontent was about to break bounds. Then and not till
then was Sagasta or some other called in to pacify those whom
his opponents chose to call his political followers. But by this
time Sagasta was hardly more akin to the extreme Radicals
than was Cánovas himself. He was in fact called by the
Radicals the fated destroyer (hombre funeste) of the Liberal
party.
A difference having arisen between two of his colleagues,
Sagasta reconstructed his Cabinet (Jan. 7, 1883), losing in the
process the services of his able Finance Minister, Camacho.
During the following month he was obliged to put down with
a high hand the Mano AWegra and Tribunal Popular. These
anarchical secret societies preached the doctrine that no man
can acquire a claim to the labour of another, and enforced
their condemnation of individuals by murder and arson. They
were spread over Andalusia, but flourished chiefly in the
neighbourhood of Cadiz and Jerez de la Frontera. Rumour
exaggerated the number of their adherents and the criminality
of their methods. The rich landowners fled to the great
towns for safety, babbling of fifty thousand sworn conspirators
against society directed from Geneva, The Government acted
426 Affonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
with vigour; and the arrest of some three hundred persons
broke up the associations. It was proved before the law-
courts that their aims were social and not political. Sagasta's
energy in defence of menaced property won for him the
confidence of the wealthier classes.
A more serious matter than that of the Mano Megra was
..an attempted pronunciamiento at Badajoz (Aug. 5, 1883).
Led by a colonel, one infantry and one cavalry regiment
declared for the Republic, the Constitution of 1869, and
abolition of conscription and octroi. They seized the civil
governor and other magistrates; but when no reinforcements
joined them they lost heart, and, to the number of about one
thousand, crossed the Portuguese frontier. Already a strong
force had been sent against them by the very man on whom
they called to lead the revolution they had begun. It is not
clear how they got the belief that Martinez Campos would
favour a Radical revolt. The movement was not an isolated
one. The garrison of Badajoz, when it mutinied, believed that
the north and Valencia as well as the rest of Andalusia had
already taken arms. Simultaneous agitation was apparent
from Biscay to Catalonia and south as far as Cadiz. Ruiz
Zorrilla's emissaries had been working in the army. The
leaders of all the Liberal groups publicly condemned the
appeal to violence and revolt; and Castelar, alluding to the
fact that the cry of the Republic had been raised, announced
that the Federal Constitution had perished in the flames at
Cartagena. About one hundred and forty officers implicated
in the attempt were cashiered. The King visited the fortified
places of the northern provinces in order to restore confidence.
Ruiz Zorrilla's expulsion from France was obtained.
In the Cortes an attempt was made to divide parties on
religious lines. The point raised was the form of oath ad-
ministered to the deputies. It was resolved that conscientious
objectors to religious forms should be allowed to make
affirmation; but the feeling shown during the discussion was
xv.] A'epub/ican movements. France & Germany 427
so strong that the Government, after consultation with the
Nuncio, dropped its Civil Marriage Bill in order to avoid
further cause of offence. On religious as well as secular
questions Sagasta's attitude was no longer such as to satisfy
the new school of Radicals and the Dynastic Left. Lopez
Dominguez, Balaguer, Moret, Martos, and Montero Rios
fiercely disavowed him as a renegade.
In the summer of 1883 an unimportant commercial
agreement with Germany was concluded. Ever since the
Restoration, both political parties had sought the friendship of
Germany rather than that of France; and France, brooding
over her defeat, was deeply resentful. When the German
Emperor invited King Alfonso to the autumn manoeuvres of
1883 he accepted, in spite of Cánovas' warning of the danger
incurred. The King had a passion for soldiering, and was
flattered by the tone of the invitation. Paris gave him a cold
official reception as he passed through ; and the magnificence
and warmth of his welcome at Homburg increased his ad-
miration and liking for Germany and his inclination towards
the Triple Alliance. He hoped by its aid to obtain the
recognition of Spain as a first-class Power, and to take a lead
in the Mediterranean and North Africa. The French press had
long been girding at Spain's attitude towards Germany; it chose
to suppose that the commercial agreement was a preliminary to
political alliance. When news arrived that the King of Spain
had accepted the colonelcy of a Uhlan regiment quartered
at Strassburg and had worn its uniform, the irritation became
fiercer than ever. It was carefully fostered by agitators, in
order to stir up difficulties for the Republic and particularly
for Jules Ferry. When, on his return from Germany, Alfonso
reached the Northern Station at Paris, he was met with an
organised hostile demonstration (Sept. 29, 1883). It was
renewed when he went in the evening to dine with President
Grévy at the Elysée. The King behaved throughout with
great coolness and dignity. He resolved, however, to quit
428 A/fonso X/Z (1874–1885) [CH.
Paris at once. But next day (Sunday) the President called and
begged him to distinguish between the French nation and
a part of the Parisian mob. Alfonso was induced to delay
his departure till the Monday morning. His return to his
capital was a triumph. Spaniards forgot their differences, and
all alike resented the slight put upon the King. Carlists
and Republicans joined in the spontaneous welcome. There
followed some talk of a diplomatic rupture, but wiser counsels
prevailed; and the incident closed when France agreed to
the publication of an attenuated version of Grévy's personal
explanation in the Madrid Gazette.
The Liberal Ministry seized the opportunity to resign.
Vega de Armijo, to whose policy with regard to Germany the
question was largely due, pronounced the French apology
insufficient. Martinez Campos supported him ; and Sagasta
made way (Oct. Io, 1883) for the Dynastic Left led by Posada
Herrera. The best-known members of the new Cabinet were
Lopez Dominguez (War Office) and Moret (Home Office).
This change of Ministry was perhaps, as has been represented,
the result of a plot to show the impotence of the Dynastic
Left for government. The Cortes were not dissolved; so the
Cabinet was at the mercy of Sagasta's majority or what re-
mained of the Fusionists. Posada Herrera adopted a meek
attitude; he begged the place-holders not to resign as was
usual on such occasions. Thereby he disappointed his own
Swarm of office-seekers without gaining the gratitude of those
who profited. At Sagasta's bidding he withdrew his ambitious
programme of universal suffrage, constitutional revision, civil
marriage, and Habeas Corpus; and nothing further was
heard of the Constitution of 1869. Its elective Senate and
its Cortes, with power to choose or depose the head of the
State, were still considered dangerous; but, as for universal
suffrage, even Cánovas had withdrawn his objection to it,
cynically alleging that he had never commanded so docile
a majority as that elected by universal suffrage after the
xv) Cánovas again in power 429
Restoration. Before the Cortes opened (Dec. 15), it was agreed
that no contentious measures should be proposed. When
Sagasta became President of Congress, all knew where the
real power was situated. So Conservative was his opening
speech, that even the Right applauded it. Meanwhile in the
Senate, Serrano, its President, was making a Liberal speech.
Despite his care to avoid offence, given or taken, it became
impossible for Posada Herrera to remain in office when
Sagasta and his Fusionists carried an alternative reply to the
Address by a majority of 221 against 126. Whilst the Ministry
prated of constitutional reform and universal suffrage, Sagasta
in mere wantonness carried an amendment that neither the
circumstances of the country nor public opinion demanded the
one or the other. Posada Herrera resigned (Jan. 17, 1884).
The Cortes were resolved into their native elements; the
impossibility of fourth parties had been demonstrated; and
the Dynastic Left returned piecemeal to Sagasta's fold.
To such a situation there was but one issue; Cánovas was
again called to office. So well prepared was he that he
submitted at once a full list of his Cabinet to the King. All
were experienced politicians. Elduayen took the Foreign
Office, Quesada the War Office, Romero Robledo the Home
Office, Pidal Public Works and Commerce (Fomento), and
Silvela Justice. But, in spite of the reputation of its members,
Cánovas' last Cabinet under Don Alfonso was not successful.
Cánovas' temper was becoming even more imperious. He was
daily less regardful of the shams which he himself had set
up; his management of elections was to the highest degree
shameless and cynical ; his finance was full of mistakes and
Scandals; the atmosphere was heavy with corruption. The
Catalans, by whose favour he held office, insisted upon
rigorous protection. A dispute with Germany led to a
dangerous diplomatic quarrel, from which could come neither
credit nor profit. The shadow of the King's failing health
drew ever nearer.
43O A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
On taking office, Cánovas closed the Cortes. Instead of the
usual elaborate programme, he issued a mere note indicating
Liberal measures together with enforcement of order and of
respect for institutions. The press was rigorously pruned by
the Censor. Nevertheless the Liberals decided to adopt the
half-benevolent attitude known in Spanish politics as moderate
opposition. Perhaps a pact was already made in view of
the coming crisis; in any case public opinion supported the
Government in suppressing wanton incitement to revolt.
The general election (April 27, 1884) gave the Ministry
295 deputies, leaving to Sagasta and his Fusionist-Constitu-
tionalists 45, to Serrano's Dynastic Left or Reformers 26, to
the Ultramontane group II, and to Castelar three faithful
followers. The Carlists and the Republican groups, under Pi
y Margall and Ruiz Zorrilla, had abstained from voting,
avowedly in order to protest against illicit pressure, but
probably in order to conceal their weakness. The means
whereby the unusually clean sweep had been made at the
election were indeed familiar, but they had been awkwardly
employed. In places where the Opposition was strongest,
Ministerial candidates had been brought out at the head of
the poll; where hardly anybody voted, the urns were found to
be full of voting-papers. An unusual amount of resentment
was aroused; and Cánovas, sure of his position, allowed it free
expression. Addressing the Conservative deputies on the eve
of the opening of the Cortes, he advocated toleration of all
non-revolutionary parties. Criticism of the Ministry, however
harsh, would be allowed; but a hedge of respect must
surround the throne. He ended with a stern threat against
breakers of the peace.
The warning was not unneeded. Several small mutinies
had taken place, and their instigators had generally escaped
unpunished, thanks to an ill-directed mercy, when Cánovas
resolved to make examples of two officers whose case showed
peculiar recklessness. It happened that both were Catalans;
xv) Agitation in Catalonia 43 I
and immediately all local influence was brought to bear in
order to save them ; not because they deserved pity, but
because they were natives of a particular province. Alfonso
was ever disposed to mercy, and perhaps he saw on this
occasion a prospect of winning for himself a little Sorely-needed
popularity. He would gladly have gratified his petitioners,
among whom was Victor Hugo ; but Cánovas insisted upon the
death-penalty. Assuming to himself all responsibility, he re-
torted on the petitioners with splendid effect. “The Ministry
over which I have the honour to preside has respectfully
pointed out to His Majesty that it cannot continue to govern
if the principle is established that only sergeants, corporals,
and private soldiers are subject to the full rigour of the
Military Code. The obligations of generals and officers are
greater than those of private soldiers; and, though it is natural
that those who make light of army discipline and public order
should claim indulgence for them, I confess that to do so
seems to me not to become peaceful folk who so easily take
alarm at the least disturbance.”
Agitation in Catalonia was increased by a proposal to
change the civil code of the province. The Government,
whilst professing all respect for ancient and deeply-rooted
institutions, declared that the codification of local usages was
necessary, particularly in the matters of inheritance and land
transfer, “lest a humble registrar should take upon himself
the function of legislator.” But the Catalans knew that the
proposed interference was part of a wide scheme of unification
of civil codes and further centralisation. They sent a com-
mission under a Conservative President (March 10, 1885) to
protest to the King against the charges of separatism and
disloyalty so often brought against them. They had, they
said, no desire to weaken the bonds of national union,
but they held that the best way to invigorate national life
was to encourage the spontaneous activity of the provinces.
Catalonia's admirable local administration had been taken
4.32 A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
away, to be replaced first by administration on a Castilian
model and then by a copy of the French system. The
language had been suppressed; judges and witnesses now
spoke different tongues. The Civil Law, the foundation
of the robust and moral Catalan family life, was now
threatened. By forty years of untold labour Catalonia had
founded national industries; and now the central Government
proposed to strangle them by commercial treaties. The King
pronounced in favour of local institutions and of protection.
The proposed commercial agreement with Great Britain, in
which the Catalans foresaw their ruin, was dropped when
Spain insisted that wines up to thirty degrees of alcoholic
strength should be admitted on payment of one shilling a
gallon.
Party politics now bulked less largely than before. Sagasta
still spoke of “bringing into the Constitution of 1876 the
principles of 1869°; but the attention of the House was
divided between alternate banter and recrimination. In the
Senate the Count of Casa Valencia summed up the position
of the divided Liberal party (May, 1884). Its two branches,
he said, had a common father: one sprang from the union of
Serrano with Sagasta; the other from the union of Serrano
with Martos. So long as both mothers lived union was
impossible. Spain contained too many pretty women for the
peace of domestic life, and too many eminent statesmen for
the peace of public life. When the Marquis de Novaliches
Congratulated Serrano, his conqueror at Alcolea, on serving
Isabel's son, Serrano retorted that of all who figured in public
life there was none but had rebelled some time or other.
The presence of Pidal in the Ministry was a perpetual
challenge to the anti-clerical party. His speech in favour of
the Pope's claim to temporal power was censured at home, and
provoked a diplomatic protest from the Italian Government.
Spain sent assurances that the speech had been badly reported.
Even by these exertions Pidal did not escape the goad of the
xv) Difficulty with Germany 433
extremists on his own side. Whilst the Liberal Opposition
fretted against his retrograde tendencies, the bishops attacked
him for his unfriendly attitude towards the Holy See (Jan., 1885).
The Pope himself checked the attempt to stir up discord and
provoke a diplomatic rupture. At the request of the Spanish
Government he ordered his champions to moderate their zeal
on his behalf.
During the winter, earthquakes devastated large districts of
the south. In the province of Granáda alone 54oo dwellings
were destroyed and nearly 700 lives lost. The King visited
the afflicted districts, and distributed relief funds (Jan., 1885)
in fearful weather. In the summer, cholera fell upon the
central and southern provinces, and deaths numbered 14oo
daily; over Ioo, ooo persons perished. Again King Alfonso
braved the danger. He appealed to the Ministry to sanction
his journey to the plague centres. But Cánovas, fearing
for the King's life, refused to consent to his danger, and
threatened resignation. Not to be turned from his charitable
purpose, Alfonso proposed to replace Cánovas by Sagasta or
Serrano; but they too tried to dissuade him. His journey at
last took the form of an escapade. Rising early and leaving a
note to explain his absence to the Queen, he drove with one
attendant to the station and took the train to Aranjuez (July 2).
His act was greeted with the applause it deserved; but it failed
to revive, except momentarily, the King's popularity.
In September, whilst cholera still raged, Spain found herself
dangerously near a war with the Power on which both parties
had fawned ever since the Restoration. The commander of
a German gun-boat hoisted his flag on the Caroline Island
of Yap, in the presence of a Spanish squadron. Spain's
traditional claim to the whole group had never been rendered
effective by occupation, whereas Germany owned a long-
established factory in the island. The matter was of no
commercial or strategic importance to Spain, but the press
held the national honour too dear to let such an opportunity
C. S. 28
434 A/fonso XII (1874–1885) [CH.
slip. Public opinion exacted that the Spanish sailors who had
been present should be tried by court-martial for neglecting to
resist. An indignation meeting of 150,000 people was held in
the Prado. On Sept. 4, 1885, the mob attacked the German
Legation, tore down its flagstaff and escutcheon, and burnt
them in the Puerta del Sol. The Emperor William seems to
have had a liking for King Alfonso, and his attitude was most
forbearing. Germany accepted Spain's apology for the insult
to her Minister; she proposed the Pope as mediator, and
allowed the Spanish flag to be hoisted at Yap pending his
sentence. Cánovas wisely accepted the offer, disregarding the
castigations of mischief-makers in France and Italy; and the
difference was settled by a compromise. For a moment the
danger had been great. Failure to defend the national honour
would have certainly brought about the downfall of the dynasty.
Castelar's newspaper called the arrangement “a shameful rout
for Catholic Spain.”
The municipal elections of May, 1885, showed that Liberalism
still ruled in the capital; but the united effort to which the party
owed its local victory soon died away. Sagasta, Moret, Lopez
Dominguez, Pi y Margall, and Salmeron could work momentarily
together when inspired by hatred of Romero Robledo. So
strong was the popular hatred against his insolent high-handed-
ness, that the whole Ministry in which he held the Home Office
was endangered. Romero offered to resign in order to save
his colleagues; but Cánovas knew that the heterogeneous
forces momentarily united in attack would soon split up. The
Ministry decided to stand or fall together. By the end of June
the Liberal leaders were again seeking the programme which
should disunite them least. Romero Robledo quitted the
Cabinet for private reasons.
The end of the reign was at hand. On Nov. 24, 1885, the
King's illness was officially announced: next morning he was
dead. He was aged twenty-eight, and had reigned eleven
years. The real state of his health had been carefully kept
xv) Death and character of A/fonso 435
secret, though suspicions had been entertained in Madrid
since he withdrew to the suburban palace of El Pardo on the
last day of October. Few people, however, knew that the
end was so near. The announcement of the King's death
caused a fall of 13 in the Spanish funds. It is said that
persons in high position, who had received timely warning,
profited largely by dealings in state-guaranteed loans.
Though the two great parties had tacitly agreed to take
all blame to themselves and to give all praise to the King, his
popularity had utterly failed some years before he died. Yet
he was active, brave, unassuming, and generous; he really
loved Spain, and he seized every chance of making himself
loved. But he never developed any individuality; at times
he was stubborn, at others flippant or cynical. He believed
neither in himself nor in his office. He had an adventurer's
bringing-up, and was never firmly seated on his throne. His
culture gave him a certain superiority over the young men of
his country; but his foreign education and mean appearance
were heavy disadvantages. He had imbibed in Austria •
Teutonic love of soldiering; he set the fashion towards English
in preference to the equally manly and more picturesque
Spanish sports. After his first wife's death his life became
irregular. He tried to unite a life of duty with one of pleasure;
and his weak constitution soon wore out. During eight and a
half years of his reign Cánovas was in power; it was because
the King never became strong enough to stand alone.
28—2
CHAPTER XVI.
THE REGENCY OF QUEEN CRISTINA. (1885–1898.)
KING ALFONSO left a widow, the Austrian Archduchess
Maria Cristina, and two infant daughters; the Queen was
about to give birth to another child. To her courage and
tact, and to the no less admirable self-suppression of the
Counsellors of her late husband, are to be attributed the peace-
ful beginnings of the Regency. At the outset a kind of Truce
of God was agreed upon, pending the birth of the child. The
leaders of all parties had been summoned to El Pardo to
fiscuss the situation by the deathbed of the King, and to save
the dynasty if possible. The ministers, the Presidents of Senate
and Congress, the ex-Queen Isabel, and her daughter, the
Infanta Isabel, Martinez Campos, Novaliches, and, in fact, all
who could influence public opinion, were present. The generals
guaranteed the good behaviour of the army. An immediate
change of Ministry was decided upon with new Cortes to
Support Sagasta. This done, the excitement of further elections
was as far as possible to be avoided, while a Liberal, tolerant,
and conciliatory policy would attach the people to the throne.
In the meantime topics calculated to rouse hot feelings should
be avoided, while the Parliamentary show was to be kept up.
The agreement amounted in fact to this, that to sham
measures a sham opposition should be made, while Cánovas
and Sagasta alternated in a limited dictatorship.
The Cortes accepted the bargain and agreed to support
Sagasta's Ministry till after the general election. Sagasta's
CH. XVI] Genera/e/ection. Sagasta in office 437
Cabinet contained Moret, Gamazo, Camacho, Alonso Martinez,
and Montero Rios. With a little patching it lasted five years.
Lopez Dominguez refused a portfolio, but promised help from
outside. Cánovas was elected President of Congress un-
opposed. An amnesty was granted to political offenders; and
seven hundred sentences against the press were annulled.
One man only refused to be bound by the truce. Romero
Robledo sought to turn Cánovas' renunciation to his own
advantage. Declaring that Cánovas, by resignation, had
forfeited the leadership of the Conservative party, he led away
into secession about a third of it (Dec., 1855). Instigated by
interested persons, the ex-Queen Isabel and her eldest daughter
seemed for a moment disposed to push their claims to the
Regency; but Alfonso's widow took the oath peaceably (Dec. 30,
1885). -
Romero Robledo's disloyalty to his party hastened the
necessity for the general election. The Cortes were closed
(Jan. 5, 1886), and dissolved two months later. The results
of the election were actually given by a newspaper in the con-
fidence of the Government before the election itself took place;
and, needless to say, the official forecast was accurately fulfilled.
In Congress Sagasta had 3 Io supporters, of whom about a
quarter belonged to Democratic or other groups; the Opposition
of 121 deputies fell roughly under six headings. Half belonged
to Cánovas; the rest ranged from Republican to Carlist. The
Republicans were broken into four sections, following respec-
tively the opinions of Castelar, Salmeron, Pi y Margall, or
Ruiz Zorrilla. Castelar refused to join a provisional scheme
for common action; his latest definition of a posibilista was
“one who desires a Republic not made up of Radicals, but
as a bar to Radicalism.” The Carlists, on the King's death,
had shown signs of restlessness; but these had died away in
face of the strong support given to the Regency by the Powers
and the Vatican. For, though Sagasta had promptly dropped
Pidal's reactionary educational policy, it was impossible to
438 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
pretend that the Church was in danger. Queen Cristina's
devotion to religion was obvious. In fact, a great religious and
Ultramontane revival was following the active propaganda of
Jesuit refugees settled on Spanish soil. The only revolutionary
opposition besides the Carlist came from the little group under
Ruiz Zorrilla ; the most troublesome was that under Romero
Robledo, who, refusing to recognise the scruples that held back
the best of his contemporaries, carried on a fierce campaign in
his newly-started paper. He found for a time allies in Lopez
Dominguez and the Dynastic Left, discontented with the
number of seats allotted to them at the election. So long,
however, as Cánovas and Sagasta agreed, it mattered little
how the subdivisions plotted or grouped themselves.
The Cortes met on May Io; and the debate on the Address,
a useful Safety-valve, was kept open until July 3. The session
lasted till July 30. Pregnant with dire results was the rejection
by a majority of 227 against 17 of a proposal brought forward
by Cuban deputies recommending the immediate adoption of
reforms for the island. No party can evade responsibility for
this almost unanimous decision; even Castelar's posibilistas
voted with the majority (June 30, 1886). A month later a
commercial modus wivendi with Great Britain was concluded.
It provided that Spanish wines under thirty degrees of alcoholic
strength should be admitted on payment of a duty of one
shilling a gallon. The vinegrowers were delighted; but the
manufacturers overwhelmed the Ministry with protests against
the slight concessions made. In view of dangers at home, and
in deference to the advice of the Powers, the active foreign
policy whereby King Alfonso had sought to raise the status of
Spain was abandoned. Meanwhile all cause for the dread of
revolt that had momentarily united the dynastic parties seemed
to have passed away after a series of small outbreaks. A
small band of civilian Republicans had seized a fort at Cartagena
(Jan. 11, 1886), and, after killing General Fajardo, who called
upon them to surrender, had made their escape by sea. This
xv.1] A'epublican revolts suppressed 439
revolt was part of a large plan extending to several seaports,
Cadiz and Ferrol among them ; but, except at Cartagena, the
conspirators were overawed by the preparations of the Govern-
ment.
The next revolt, also Republican in character, was more
formidable, in that its scene was the capital and its leader an
officer in high command. General Villacampa had persuaded
one infantry and one cavalry regiment to acclaim the Republic
in the San Gil Barracks (Sept. 19, 1886). The main part of
the garrison, however, refused to join him ; the men were
disarmed, the leaders fled; by the next morning the danger was
over. Villacampa and six subordinates were condemned to
death, eighty-three rank and file to imprisonment for life.
The whole nation clamoured for mercy; and the Queen Regent,
although the mutiny had cost the lives of a general and a
Colonel, gladly yielded, and secured the good-will of her subjects
by exercising her prerogative of pardon. She was undoubtedly
well-advised. The execution of General Ortega had done more
than anything else to undermine Queen Isabel's popularity.
But the Minister for War, Jovellar, could not be expected to
feel the humanitarian motives that momentarily united the
Republican leaders, or to tolerate a practice so subversive of
discipline. Two other ministers followed his resignation; and
Sagasta, after abolishing the last vestige of slavery in Cuba,
took the opportunity of reconstructing his Ministry (Oct. 9,
1886). His new one contained four of his former colleagues;
but its tendency was less markedly Liberal than before; only
three places in it were held by Democrats. The influence of
Alonso Martinez had increased ; the majority in Cortes was
shaken. Some talked of a new Liberal party formed by a
coalition of the malcontents with Lopez Dominguez' Dynastic
Left. But the Dynastic Left was coquetting with Romero
Robledo's Liberal-Conservatives; and the negotiations failed.
Warned by the two attempts of the past year, the Ministry
took steps to lessen the danger of a military pronunciamiento.
440 Regency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
The most important of these was the abolition of the rank of
Żrimero sargento (cf. p. 294). Placed midway between officers
and men, the Sergeants had too often sought promotion by
means of mutiny. Even now the Government was half afraid
of them. In order to prevent the danger of combined resistance
by 1800 bold men of great influence with the rank and file, the
proposed step was kept secret until the last moment; and the
decree was telegraphed suddenly and simultaneously to every
garrison in Spain (Oct. 28, 1886). At the opening of the next
session (Nov., 1886), Sagasta again announced the millennium
of reform, a jury system, and civil marriage, but did nothing to
bring party questions to an issue. The King had been born six
months before (May 17); but the truce of the two great parties
still held good; indeed it was actually extending its influence.
Castelar, by a thoroughly deserved eulogy of the Queen Regent,
showed that he had no longer the will—he had certainly not
the power—to overthrow her Government. He promised his
support to Sagasta. The central committee of the Republican
party could no longer shut its ears to his palinode. The
common organisation was dissolved; and the party became
divided into Conservative, or merely theoretical; and advanced,
or revolutionary and practical Republicans. For the moment
the latter had the majority. To them belonged, formally at
least, the small group of philosophic Republicans, chief among
whom stood Azcárate and Costa, whose high-minded action
and reasoned enthusiasm leavened the lump of Spanish
Republicanism, and saved it from the charge of noisy vulgarity
and self-seeking. Any party in any land might be proud of
such adherents. They have defied and disproved the old taunt,
noscitur a sociis.
The frequent changes made in the Cabinet during Sagasta's
long ministry were made rather in order that personal claims
might be recognised and services rewarded than in obedience
to political exigencies. Sometimes a more democratic element
was introduced; and the scheme for civil marriage or universal
xv.1] Good government of the Queen 44 I
suffrage was revived or advanced a stage. The law instituting
universal suffrage, indeed, was actually passed just before
Sagasta's resignation (July 4, 1890). A year before it had been
included in the ministerial programme; but in January (1890)
Sagasta, being in one of his periodical difficulties with his
own party, resigned. The only alternative was Cánovas; but
Cánovas was unwilling either to promote or to oppose universal
suffrage, or to take office while the question was undecided.
He aided Sagasta to reconstruct his Cabinet, and succeeded
to power only when the affair was settled. The suffrage was
granted to all Spaniards aged 24, after two years’ residence
in an electoral division. Cánovas had prophesied that universal
suffrage would change neither the well-known political methods
nor their results. .
When her husband died, Queen Cristina was utterly
unknown to the Spaniards. She had taken no part in public
life; she had formed few friendships. It was whispered that
she was frigid and haughty; incredible tales were told of her
erudition; she was known to hate the bull-fight. Her widow-
hood, the cares of her delicate infant son, and her exercise of
the Regency, showed her devoted unselfishness, her excellent
heart, her calm wisdom, her strong convictions, and her tolerant
spirit. For a sovereign to be popular in Spain is difficult since
Isabel betrayed the hopes of the nation; for a foreigner to be
popular is perhaps impossible; but Cristina won everywhere
respectful admiration, and, from the finer class of minds, loyal
devotion. Men who had thought to use her as their tool
became her servants; men whose guiding principle had been
hatred of kings were attracted to her Court. When the sudden
and severe illness of the baby King threatened Queen and
mother alike, all Spain shared her anguish ; and all Spain
rejoiced in her son's recovery. Parties had united to save the
dynasty for the country's sake; they now desired to save it for
its own. With the exception of Ruiz Zorrilla's small and fanatical
following, the Radicals had ceased to rail. Only from the royal
442 Regency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
family did the Regent experience steady opposition. Well kept
as are the secrets of Courts, it seems that at least one conspiracy
was made to drive her from the country. Early in 1888 the
ex-Queen Isabel quitted Spain by request; she had been the
catspaw of the ambitious about her. The Duke of Montpensier
was sufficiently strong to disregard an order to remain abroad.
A year earlier the Duke of Seville, a cousin of the late King,
had been sentenced to eight years' confinement for insulting
the Regent. He aggravated his offence by writing an outrageous
letter from his prison in the Balearic Islands, whence he made
his escape and published his democratic aspirations in a
Gascon provincial newspaper.
Spain's prosperity was increasing. Her vintages were
abundant during the years of phylloxera in France; and the
profits of the vinegrowers were very large. Finance ministers
sought to equalise their budget and to meet the huge debt left
by civil and colonial wars. Oppressive as was the taxation, it
was increased instead of being more fairly and evenly dis-
tributed; and Spain showed a power of bearing her financial
burden that astonished even those who knew her best. Granted
peace, though seemingly starving, she grows rich. Budgets
formed to conceal rather than to explain the situation always
resulted in a deficit acknowledged or unacknowledged. For
the year 1885–6 it was three millions sterling. The following
year it threatened to be more ; and a great effort was made.
A stamp tax of one per cent. was imposed upon the coupons
of the Exterior Debt; the tobacco monopoly was farmed for a
large sum. Every call for money brought the Protectionists
and Free Traders into collision, the former urging that still
heavier port dues should take the place of taxes and octroi.
In 1889 an attempt was made to separate urban from rural
interests, and to win the latter for the Conservative and
Protectionist party by taxing imported corn.
During the same year, whilst the popularity of Sagasta's
ministry was at a low ebb, a rumour spread that Cuba was to be
XVI] Financia/ improvement. 7 he army 443
sold. No such intention was acknowledged by the Government;
but indignation was allayed only when a pompous announcement
was made that no amount of wealth could purchase the smallest
parcel of Spanish territory. Before the end of Sagasta's long
ministry, revenue and expenditure were not indeed equalised;
but the deficit was much reduced; the interest payable on the
debt had been slightly lowered; and its capital had been
reduced one-half by conversion of loans long unpaid. The
arrears due to public servants and pensioners, which had once
amounted to eleven millions sterling, had now been reduced
to a million and a half. Economy and good government alike
demanded that the army should be decreased and made aware
of its subordination to the civil power. All efforts in this
direction were insolently resisted by the generals. Flaunting
their services to the dynasty, men like Primo de Rivera, Daban,
and Martinez Campos, “the Spanish Caesar,” sought to make
it the plaything of the army. When guilty of acts of insub-
ordination, if their high command was insufficient to protect
them, they took refuge in their inviolability as senators. The
quarrel broke out over the proposals made by a new and
energetic Minister for War (June, 1887). Cassola wished,
whilst abolishing the system of pecuniary redemption and
enforcing conscription even on priests, to break the military
spirit. The generals' opposition found a fitting spokesman in
Primo de Rivera. He criticised in the Senate the minister's
scheme, and practically defied the civil power to remove him
from his position of Inspector-General of Infantry. Sagasta,
rising to the occasion, announced to the House his supersession.
This was a preliminary skirmish only. That Cassola’s
scheme was unwelcome to the army generally may be inferred
from Lopez Dominguez' opposition to it. To carry it through
in its entirety would be dangerous, if not impossible. Already
something had been done to secure subordination, when
Sagasta seized the opportunity afforded by a Cabinet crisis
(June 14, 1888) to rid himself of both the reformer Cassola
444 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
and of Martinez Campos, who united the leadership of the
military opposition with the military governorship of the
capital. Sagasta, whilst shaking off its author, still professed
his intention of carrying out Cassola’s scheme. The soldiers,
on the other hand, were demanding that cases in which the
army and press were involved should be tried by court-martial.
A dangerous spirit was shown when staff-officers assaulted in
public the editor of a military newspaper that had dared to
differ from their opinions (Nov., 1888). For a moment the
proposed changes were dropped; but two months later, at the
opening of a new session, when the agitation had calmed down,
Sagasta announced his intention of reducing the army and the
war estimates. The generals retaliated by blocking proposals
for Cuban reforms; but Sagasta had his way (March, 1889).
The Revolution that made Brazil a Republic found a faint echo
in Spain; and soldier-politicians sought to frighten the Regent
into calling them to power and entrusting them with the task
of precautionary repression. Luckily Cánovas, no less than
Sagasta, was hostile to the power that had desolated Spain
for half-a-century, and aided in crushing the dangerous intrigue.
The irritation of the generals now seized upon the most flimsy
excuses for its exhibition. When a resolution in favour of
arbitration with regard to Cuba was proposed, they chose to
interpret it as an attack on the army. The soldier deputies
and senators talked loudly of the necessity for restoring the
army to its former political influence. One general declared
that the Government encouraged the foreign press to speak
disrespectfully of Spanish generals; another sent a challenge
to Sagasta.
A gratifying symptom of the confidence now felt by the
Powers in Spain's stability was afforded by her admission to
their counsels with regard to Morocco. In March, 1887,
Spanish susceptibility had been wounded by the action of the
French and her suspicions roused by a proposal for rectification
of the frontier in North-west Africa. Moret, the Minister for
XVI] Spain and Morocco. Cdnovas recalled 445
Foreign Affairs, showed himself awake to the importance of
the matter, and prepared to push the Spanish claim to a voice
in any decision that might be reached. The press, French
and Spanish, was doing its best to inflame the warlike spirit;
but the Spaniards were soothed by the friendly reception
accorded by the Sultan to their mission. In the autumn of
the same year Spain notified to the Powers her intention of
increasing her African garrisons in view of the troubles that
might arise should the Sultan's illness end in death. She had
collected an expeditionary army on her Southern coast. Great
Britain had sent ships to Morocco, and had urged the other
Powers to do likewise, when the Sultan's recovery and a con-
ciliatory message from France dispelled the gathering danger.
It was the Moors who appealed to Spain to reassemble the
Conference which, in 1880, had fixed the political relation of
their country. Moret's invitation to a Conference in order to
secure better government beyond the Straits was accepted by
all the Powers, including the United States. They showed
their satisfaction by numbering Spain among themselves;
whereupon her legations in London, Vienna, Berlin, and
Rome were raised to the status of embassies.
The small groups into which the Liberal party was split up
sold their allegiance for place; but Sagasta could not find means
to satisfy so many mercenaries. His followers, too, were cross-
divided on the question of Protection or Free Trade. After
forming a new Cabinet in January, he resigned (July, 1890),
partly in order to avoid defeat and partly in fulfilment of his
understanding with Cánovas. The great crisis of the vacant
throne had been passed; the orderly succession of parties now
again demanded a change of ministry. There was, moreover,
now another force to be reckoned with. The Queen Regent
had grown used to her position, and showed herself fully
capable of wielding the powers granted to her by the Con-
stitution; her sense of right and duty were strong, and her
political instinct was keen; it was she who recalled Cánovas
446 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
to power. With him returned some well-known figures to the
ministerial bench—Villaverde (Justice), Azcárraga (War), and
Silvela (Interior). Romero Robledo's secession had not yet
put him into a position to impose himself upon his former
colleagues; his mischief-making was for the present to be
carried on outside the Cabinet. -
The two monarchical parties were daily becoming more
nearly akin in principle ; and a change of ministry entailed but
little change of policy. Sagasta, when in office, dropped that
part of his opposition programme which had been addressed
specially to the Radicals. Cánovas, though he professedly
took office to check the overhasty Liberal march of the last
four and a half years, was much less arbitrary and dictatorial
in his methods than before, and less submissive to the exigencies
of the Conservative wing of his supporters. The licence he
had to combat was not political so much as military and social.
The soldiers who had turbulently defied Sagasta thought
perhaps to have their way, now that their former fellow-
conspirator in the cause of royalty was in power. But Cánovas
gave them only assurances of sympathy with their aims, while
withdrawing all real power from hands so rash as those of
Martinez Campos.
Sagasta, shortly before his resignation, had established
universal suffrage (May, 1890). To Cánovas, who had always
opposed the measure, fell the duty of setting in motion the
ponderous engine. The commission nominated to superintend
its working contained many Liberals; and these took umbrage
at the rough and ready way in which Cánovas' provincial
governors proposed to carry out the impending election. They
appealed to the Ministry to restrain its agents, and, receiving
little satisfaction, became an Opposition organisation. Mean-
while Sagasta was away in the north declaiming against his
successor's evident determination to work the new law by the
old methods. In spite of this special agitation, results showed
how right had been Cánovas' forecast that universal suffrage
xv.1] Universal suffrage. Socialism 447
would not bring any Radical or dangerous change. The
election gave to the Ministry 289, to Sagasta 70, and to the
Republicans 30, out of a total of 433 seats, or about the same
proportion as had been considered decent under the old
system. The Opposition in the Senate did not exceed 20.
The Carlists, offended by the friendly attitude of the Nuncio
towards the Government, had held aloof from the polls.
Sagasta was rewarded with the Golden Fleece (Jan. 22, 1891)
for refusing to create a real danger by allying himself with the
groups of the extreme Left, Socialist, Democratic, Federalist,
and Republican, dwelling outside the constitutional border.
It was in this direction that the danger lay. Now that
universal suffrage was won, political questions had almost
ceased to agitate the country; but socialism and communism
of a militant type were spreading in the industrial centres; and
there still remained a small group of real Republicans. Cánovas
tried to entice back these groups within the law. He offered
an amnesty to Ruiz Zorrilla and his associates; but they proudly
refused it unless accompanied by restitution of rank and
honours. Fears of a communistic rising checked the activity
of the more moderate Liberals; and the two extremes of the
party drifted further asunder. A small revolt and attempt to seize
Jerez was repressed by the civil guard (Jan. 9, 1892); and four
executions followed. Bilbao, in the midst of a miners’ strike,
afforded a hotbed for extreme socialism ; but General Loma
by skilful negotiation succeeded in dividing the strikers. Riots
took place in Cadiz ; but the headquarters of Radical agitation
was Barcelona. February, 1892, saw the first case of the bomb-
throwing which later gave the city so evil a notoriety. The
Cortes took alarm, and increased the severity of the laws with
regard to anarchist outrages and the doctrines that provoke
them (March, 1892). In April the discovery of a plot to blow
up the Congress gave the Ministry a pretext for locking up
agitators in the capital until Labour Day, May 1, should be
past. The agitation and resentment were increased by the
448 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
ruthless and barbarous methods employed at Barcelona.
Persons to whom rumour attributed advanced opinions were
arrested and imprisoned without trial. It has been repeatedly
stated on oath that tortures were applied to wring confessions
from prisoners in Montjuich, and on the hulks at sea. In the
autumn of 1893 Martinez Campos was wounded at Barcelona
by an anarchist bomb ; and another thrown in a theatre to
avenge an execution killed twenty persons.
The stimulus given to Spanish production and exportation
of wine by the failure of the French vineyards died away, as the
immunity of American vines from the disease was established
and French vineyards again became productive. When Cánovas
revoked by decree all Sagasta's measures lowering tariffs, and
denounced all treaties of commerce containing a most-favoured-
nation clause, the Protectionist majority of the Cortes of 1891
heartily approved. Spain imports about one-third of her
necessary supply of corn. Cánovas hoped by imposing a duty
on imported corn to give a new impulse to agriculture and to
win the support of the Conservative country districts, now
suffering severely from the altered conditions of the wine trade.
In the autumn of 1891 France raised the import duties. A huge
quantity of Spanish wine was hurried across the frontier just
before the new regulation took effect; but the common wine
left in Spain became almost worthless; and Spain's total exports
of wine suddenly shrank to a quarter. The consumption of
high-priced sherries fell off in England. The long-established
cattle trade between Corunna and the south-western English
ports was killed by American competition ; and the grazing
districts of Galicia and Asturias suffered no less than the wine-
growing south. Since the end of the eighteenth century, Spain,
in spite of her undeveloped soil, has imported corn in increasing
quantities. So inferior is the quality of her olive-oil that it
sells for less than half the market price of the better-manu-
factured oils of Italy and France. While its quantity is
insufficient to supply the home market, mineral, palm, and
xv.1] Financia/ difficulties 449
Cocoa-nut oils are imported. Even the mining industry failed to
add as it ought to the national prosperity, for its profits went at
that time entirely, and still go largely, into the pockets of foreign
Capitalists. Agriculturists, gladly adopting Cánovas' suggestion,
clamorously demanded protection to recoup them for a bad
harvest. Owing to unrest in Cuba, exports had fallen off in
other trades also ; prices began to rise; the currency was choked
with paper; and gold was at a premium of nine per cent.
Cánovas was face to face with a most difficult political and
economic problem. So early as November, 1891, Romero
Robledo had succeeded in bringing his former chief to terms.
The successful free-lance, as well as Cánovas' rich friend
Elduayen, were included in the reconstructed Cabinet, whilst
Silvela, Romero's rival, was thrust out. The Cabinet lost
heavily in public esteem by the change, which Cánovas explained
(Jan. I 1, 1892) as the result of Conservative concentration.
After casting this most transparent dust in the eyes of the
envious, he proceeded to throw open the abyss of bankruptcy
that yawned before the country, admitting that the neatly-
balanced budgets had been framed to deceive, and that for the
last fifteen years, or ever since the Restoration, the annual
deficit had amounted to about two and a half millions sterling.
All this had gone to swell the floating debt. Expenditure had
been consistently and grossly underestimated; almost every-
thing saleable had been sold. Cánovas had nothing better to
propose than the reduction of the expenses of his own depart-
ment by fifteen per cent. He invited his colleagues to follow
his example to the extent of ten per cent. It was rumoured
abroad that the Exterior Debt was about to be taxed ; but
Cánovas refused to cut himself off from all help from abroad
by breaking faith with the bond-holders. In such circum-
stances it proved impossible to find anybody willing to take
over the Ministry of Finance. Villaverde having refused, it
was put into commission of the whole Cabinet. The budget
was thrust through by ministerial pressure in all-night sittings;
C. S. 29
450 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
}
not even the fallacious quoting of a gold loan in terms of the
depreciated paper currency balanced it. The President of the
Congress called upon the Opposition to discuss the financial
situation in a friendly spirit; but both Sagasta and Piy Margall
refused to help to hush up the matter or to consent to a further
loan (July, 1892). A debate on the position of the Spanish
Transatlantic Company, the creation of Cánovas' friend and
colleague, Elduayen, and its relations with the Government, was
pressed till Romero Robledo's temper, naturally short and
violent, gave way; his chief was obliged to apologise to the
House for his behaviour. Shortly before, the railway companies
had been allowed to raise their fares contrary to the under-
taking contained in their concessions. Everybody was asking
who gained by the change. The worst feature of Cánovas'
Ministries was the atmosphere of stock-jobbing that ever hung
about them.
At the municipal elections held in the autumn (1892) the
Government had the usual huge majority; not one elector in
four had voted. The Ministry had in fact entirely lost the
popularity and authority with which it started. The army was
still restless; a project for giving the Regency to the Infanta
Isabel was being advocated by interested persons; riots made
the proclamation of a state of siege necessary in the capital
and in several large towns. Cánovas, failing to keep discipline
among his own party, was attacked by Sagasta for the feebleness
of his administration. When ugly facts were brought to light
with regard to the municipality of Madrid, Cánovas could
neither sacrifice the persons involved in the seemingly well-
founded charge of peculation, nor take the responsibility for
smothering the loudly demanded enquiry. Silvela, fighting as
ever against corruption, his country's worst enemy, opposed the
Ministry, with the result that Cánovas resigned (Dec. 8, 1892).
Sagasta returned to power with a Cabinet that made up in
parliamentary experience what it lacked in unanimity. Montero
Rios, Lopez Dominguez, Moret, and Gamazo were among his
xvil Sagasta takes office. Republican gains 451
colleagues. Castelar's little following had promised neutrality.
The most successful event of the year was the commemoration
of the discovery of the New World by a splendid exhibition of
Spanish art, and of records and memorials more or less closely
connected with the discovery. The occasion evoked a good
deal of kindly feeling between the mother-country and her
former colonies; but nobody wise enough to turn it to their
mutual profit was at hand. The King of Portugal visited
Madrid; and the press discussed Pan-Iberianism.
The new Ministry required new Cortes; and Sagasta's
Minister of the Interior took at the general election 250 out of
456 seats. The handsome allowance of 135 was made to the
Opposition of all shades. The remaining seats were divided
among the neutral or independent groups, the undecided, or
those that awaited a bidder. But the electorate of the capital
at least was now too well educated to submit to be the play-
thing of the administration. The Republicans, jealously watching
the polls, captured six out of the eight seats of Madrid. Pi y
Margall, Salmeron, and even Ruiz Zorrilla were returned to
Congress. So unusual a symptom of insubordination alarmed
the Government; and they decided (May 1, 1893) to postpone
the forthcoming municipal elections until after such revision of
the voters’ list as would render a Republican majority in
Madrid impossible. Radical feeling inflamed by the municipal
Scandals was running high. The Socialist deputies, twenty-one
in number, betook themselves to obstruction. The sittings of
Congress were declared permanent; and the debate on the
proposal was closed only after eleven amendments had been
disposed of in fifty-four hours (May 12, 1903). Finally the
Ministry had its way; and the elections were carried out under
new lists. The Republicans held noisy meetings of protest,
and passed resolutions expressing their determination to with-
draw from participation in the election ; but the Government
could now afford to disregard them. -
This danger was followed by another. When Gamazo, the
29–2
452 Åegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
Minister of Finance, brought in an honest budget, it nearly
provoked a revolution. His proposals to impose fresh taxation
and to reduce the sums allotted to the several ministries were
equally unpopular. The northern provinces were thrown into
a ferment of indignation by a scheme to increase their annual
contribution by eighty thousand pounds; and riots took place
at San Sebastian, the summer residence of the Court. In such
matters the utmost prudence was required; and the Scheme of
retrenchment had to be dropped by consent of the Opposition
in view of the uproar it had occasioned. Permission was
granted to the Government to issue bonds to the amount of
thirty millions sterling in order to consolidate the floating
debt (July, 1893); the Bank of Spain, which guaranteed the
loan, took the excellent security of the tobacco monopoly.
Attention was diverted from the unsatisfactory and even
dangerous situation at home by aggressions of the Riff Moors at
Melilla (Oct., 1893). Instantly the crusading spirit was roused;
all Spain fell into fervid agreement; and 243,500,ooo were
raised to fit out an army of 25, ooo men under 29 generals,
among whom Martinez Campos took Supreme command.
Cowed doubtless by these preparations the Sultan submissively
disavowed his unruly subjects, promised an indemnity, and
consented to a frontier commission. A treaty was signed by
Martinez Campos (May 4, 1894). Little real satisfaction had
been given, but national honour was satisfied. When the
Moorish envoys came to Madrid to ratify the agreement, their
chief on his way to the Palace was struck in the face by a
Spanish general unable to contain himself in beholding the
traditional foe on Spanish soil. For this quixotic outrage Spain
paid by an apology and by important concessions with regard
to the indemnity and frontier agreement (Jan., 1895).
When the Cortes opened (April 4, 1894), Sagasta appealed
to the Opposition for moderation in accordance with the tacit
agreement between the parties that only under great provocation
should matters calculated to rouse real feeling be approached.
xv.1] Morocco. 7 rade. Socialism repressed 453
Criticism of the political methods common to both were a
breach of the understanding. Cánovas promised indulgence
on condition that financial reform were seriously undertaken.
Yet in this matter the Liberals had been less to blame since
the Restoration than the Conservatives. As soon as any
relaxation of the import dues that burdened trade was proposed,
Cánovas, with his eye on Catalonia, fiercely opposed it. He
was now (June, 1894) obstructing a commercial agreement with
Germany. As Spain refused to receive foreign manufactured
goods in exchange for her produce, her trade remained un-
developed ; dependent on France, England, and Germany for
all but the simplest and coarsest articles, she was forced to pay
for them in gold, and the premium rose to 21% per cent. A
Commission of twelve Ministerialists, six Conservatives, and
six members of the Producers' Union was nominated to devise
the tariff most advantageous to Spain; but, while it deliberated,
the Conservatives introduced a Protectionist resolution and
defeated the Government upon it in Congress. The Minister
of Finance resigned. Sagasta's appeal for at least a working
agreement was disregarded ; the country suffered from un-
certainty; and commerce was harassed by varying and vexatious
regulations.
So confident was the Government that danger was no longer
to be apprehended from the Carlists that it shut its eyes to the
presence of Don Jaime de Bourbon, son and heir of Don Carlos,
on Spanish soil. Travelling hastily and incognito in the autumn
of 1894, he visited some of the most famous cities of the
kingdom of his fathers, and became acquainted with the most
faithful followers of the cause. No public demonstration, of
course, was possible; but there were no signs that the discontent
provoked in the northern provinces by additional taxation
was likely to redound to the advantage of the Carlist cause.
On the other hand, the capital and great industrial centres were
terrified by rumours of anarchist activity. The Government
caught the scare; and the repressive laws were made still harsher
454 Regency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
than before. Holders of advanced opinions, though peaceable
citizens, might if they fell into the hands of the police be treated
like wild beasts. Professing to rally round him a “Monarchical”
party pledged to a definite colonial and economic policy, and
absorbing the groups captained by free-lances, Cánovas was in
reality making ready to oust Sagasta and to take his place as a
rigid Protectionist and opponent of all concessions to Cuba.
On both of these questions Cánovas had the country with him;
and Sagasta, already surrounded by difficulties and unwilling
to abandon his principles of colonial reform and partial com-
mercial freedom, resigned. His immediate reason was the
attitude of the army. A Republican newspaper having
published some outspoken criticism of military affairs, its office
was broken into and its editor maltreated. So strongly did
their comrades side with the offending officers that they made
a fair trial of the case impossible. The question became a
party one ; it was brought before the Cortes; and many
politicians sought to win the favour of the soldiers by abusing
the press. Finally the matter was referred to a court-martial
instead of to a civil tribunal with a jury, as the law directed.
The hopes founded on Martinez Campos, the soldier-Liberal,
were disappointed; he, like his fellows, blew hot and cold.
Sagasta resigned because the leaders of the army refused to
insist upon the maintenance of discipline.
Cánovas took office (March 22, 1895) and held it till the
time of his death (Aug., 1897). During this period all other
interests were swallowed up in that of Cuba. In the thirty last
years of Spanish rule one hundred and fifty thousand Spanish
lives, and one hundred and thirty millions sterling of Spanish
money, were wasted in the cruel struggle. The pledges given
by Martinez Campos in 1879 had been openly disregarded.
The Vote of Congress in 1886 (p. 439) had proved to the
world how vain was Cuba's hope to obtain redress by legal
means. Cuba was still a protected market for dear and bad
Catalan goods, ruthlessly plundered by a corrupt adminis-
xv.1] Canovas again in power. Cuða 45.5
tration. Its large, half-caste, and negro population fiercely
resented their social and political disabilities. Alternate
policies of bullying and cajolery had made the reformers into
separatists, and the separatists into patriots. The sympathies
of the citizens of the United States were with them. The
responsibility for refusing reform cannot be laid wholly at the
door of the Conservative party in Spain. The vast majority of
Liberals were indifferent or hostile to Cuba's claims. The loss
of her immense possessions on the mainland of America had
failed to teach Spain that colonies must be governed, firstly for
their own good, and then for the good of the nation at large,
and not for the selfish ends of a corrupt ruling class. Honour-
ably distinguished from the rest are Gamazo and Maura, who,
in 1893 and 1894, had earnestly advocated reform. But the
wealthy and highly-organised Spanish and United-Liberal party
in the island had the ear of the Government; and the nation
unhesitatingly believed those who called themselves Loyalists
and their adversaries rebels and traitors. When Sagasta found
the repeated warnings of his reforming colleagues irksome, he
threw them over. Abárzuza replaced Maura at the Colonial
Office (Nov., 1894); and it was decided that something must be
done. Faith in the efficacy of words was not yet lost. Maura's
bill, eviscerated and useless with the essential clauses left out,
was brought in and contemptuously passed; and it was thought
that enough had been done. Any matter nearer home, the
attitude of the army towards the Radical press, the squabble
with Morocco, and the fate of the vanished battleship, A’eina
Aegente (March, 1895), were enough to call off attention from
Cuba. But the news from the island was more and more
threatening; and Sagasta, just before laying down office (March,
1895), had decided to send reinforcements to the garrison.
Cánovas gave Cuba the first place in his programme. His
policy never varied; he insisted that the colony must first
submit, and that then, and not till then, would reforms con-
sistent with Spain's sovereignty be granted. In pursuance of
456 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
the first item in this programme an army of thirty thousand
men was ready to start. The command was offered to Martinez
Campos, who had at the last crisis refused to take office. Self-
confident as ever, and forgetful how his actions had been
disavowed and his concessions branded as surrenders six years
before, he crossed the Atlantic once more (April, 1895). His
plan was to keep the rebels employed in the bush and open
country, while he introduced such reforms as would, he
hoped, backed by military pressure, induce gradual sub-
mission.
To support him and provide reinforcements, 25, ooo addi-
tional troops were mobilised in Spain, and a battalion added to
each regiment. But Spain was becoming weary of the con-
tinual drain of men and money to Cuba; such soldiers as
returned told dreadful tales of privations and hardship; high
prices fostered the widespread discontent and unrest. Their
focus was, as usual, Barcelona. Order was restored and all
manifestations of opposition ruthlessly crushed by General
Weyler, a Narvaez of a smaller growth, who made his name a
terror not so much to evil-doers as to all whom the suspicions
of the police might connect with revolutionary ideas. Again
arrests were made wholesale; and again the tales of torture in
Montjuich were readily believed. +
Concurrent with the agitation of Barcelona was that caused
at Madrid by the revelations of municipal peculation. Silvela
joined Sagasta in assailing Cánovas' policy of sheltering persons
convicted of embezzlement. A party, headed by the Marquis
of Cabriñana, was resolved not to let the matter be hushed up
in the usual way. After a monster demonstration in Madrid
(Dec. 9, 1895) the Ministry resigned, but only in order to get
rid of an unpopular mayor, and of its cynical Minister of
Justice, Romero Robledo. Cabriñana's fate is a warning to
patriots and would-be reformers. Despite a plain case and
popular feeling on his behalf, he was condemned (Jan., 1897)
for libel on the Mayor of Madrid. Refusing to recognise
xvi.] Martinez Campos and Weyder in Cuôa 457
public spirit as his motive, his own class repudiated him as a
dangerous busybody.
Martinez Campos remained in Cuba only eight months,
long enough, however, to convince him that he could not
conquer the island. He was not allowed to negotiate with the
insurgents. Accused of misrepresenting the real state of affairs
in the island, and hooted in the streets of Madrid, he in turn
tried to throw the responsibility for his failure on those who
had sent him with tied hands on a hopeless quest. In the
appointment of his successor, the redoubtable General Weyler,
the Government showed that it had resolved to be done with
half-measures. Full of energy, Weyler sailed within ten days of
his appointment (Jan., 1896), eager to put in practice his plan
of reducing the insurgents to submission, strictly blockading
the coast against filibusters, and ravaging all the country he
could not control. He obliged all the Cubans to declare for
or against him, and concentrated the Loyalists within his lines.
The rest of the inhabitants he drove into the bush and con-
tinually harried until only a third of the island was left to them.
But Weyler's ruthless measures only roused the deep-seated
resentment of the United States. The Committee on Foreign
Affairs allowed a motion to be submitted to Congress calling
upon the Government of the Republic to mediate. The
American minister at Madrid protested against Weyler's
cruelty.
The Spanish Government began to weaken, to seek to evade
responsibility for its general's methods, and to promise reform.
Since the previous summer Spain had begun to prepare for
war, borrowing money at exorbitant rates and overhauling her
rusty armaments. The matter rested with Cánovas; the Regent
and the majority of the nation trusted him implicitly; and his
political opponents put no hindrance in his way. The general
election of April, 1896, had been carried out even more
arbitrarily than usual. No great question of home policy sharply
defined the two parties; Conservatives and Liberals were cross-
458 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
divided by the Cuban question; the Republicans were at war
with the Socialists. Cánovas had a submissive majority
sufficient to allow him a free hand in the colonies. He can
have cherished no illusions as to the result of war with the
great Republic, yet he kept deliberately upon a course that
must sooner or later infallibly lead to war. He refused, how-
ever, to hasten it by Submitting to the exigencies of General
Weyler. A Spanish court-martial had condemned certain
filibusters, American citizens, to death. Weyler sent them to
Spain with the threat to resign his command unless the sentence
were carried out. Cánovas, as well as Weyler, knew that the
execution would have brought down upon them the Republic
in arms. The filibusters were imprisoned and afterwards
pardoned. -
All the energies of the Government were turned to finding
money to meet the cost of the present and the impending wars.
An informal and emergency budget was brought in (Aug.,
1896). The Government proposed to obtain funds by sale of
monopolies, by increasing the Octroi dues, and by mortgaging
the quicksilver mines of Almaden, the most valuable national
asset. The opposition made to these proposals was merely
formal; permission was given to pledge the national credit and
mortgage taxes not yet due. Amid an outburst of patriotic
feeling a loan of twelve millions sterling at five per cent. with
the guarantee of the customs was subscribed three times over
in the country.
The end of the year brought news of the death of the
insurgent leader, Antonio Maceo, and reports of the warning
uttered by President Cleveland in his message to Congress
(Dec. 7, 1896). The President pointed out that the money
interest of the United States in Cuba had doubled since the
so-called pacification of the island by Martinez Campos in
1878: Spain had refused the good offices of the Republic; but
the American people would not stand by for ever to see Cuba
ruined in a cruel and hopeless struggle. Cánovas rejoined by
XVI] American protests. 7%e Philippines 459
challenging the right of foreigners to interfere between Spain
and her colony, but he published in the Gazette (Feb. 6, 1897)
a substantial list of reforms for Cuba, including an autonomous
representative assembly. Unfortunately the submission of the
insurgents was made the condition of the grant. The Spanish
Liberals, now at length awake to the gravity of the situation,
demanded in vain that the grant should be made uncon-
ditionally. Romero Robledo, on the other hand, condemned.
what he called a surrender to rebellion.
The insurrection in Cuba was echoed by insurrection in
the Philippine Islands, the one remnant of Spain's empire in the
Pacific. Whereas in Cuba it was due to corrupt administration,
in the Philippines it arose from the preponderance of the Church
and its interference in secular affairs. The friars had set up an
unauthorised Government; their “paternal authority “ had re-
duced the natives to a condition of serfdom intolerable to those
subjected to it, now that education had spread, and travelled
Filippinos were able to contrast the condition of their islands.
with that of other lands. A most difficult campaign against
the brave half-breeds and natives had produced no satisfactory
result. General Polavieja' was superseded by General Primo
de Rivera, who claimed brilliant successes and reported the
immediately forthcoming pacification of the archipelago. A
loan of two millions sterling, secured on the customs of the
Philippines, was raised to finance so good a general. Apart from
these colonial loans, the extraordinary war expenditure now
amounted to more than four million pounds. To meet it an
increase of all indirect taxation by one-tenth, a monopoly of
alcohol, and a first claim on colonial revenues were suggested ;
but no formal decision was reached. The Government had
permission to impose taxes by decree, that is to say, to raise
money by any means that might suggest themselves.
* An amazing personage who has never won a battle and never failed
to lose one ; but still a favourite at Court. [J. F.-K.]
460 Regency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
In June Cánovas suddenly resigned on the question of
confidence. The Liberals, who now advocated conciliation
and the grant of necessary reforms in Cuba, thought that the
time had come for trial of their policy. But Cánovas believed
to the end that he could evade the impending war with the
United States, and save at the same time the dynasty, the
colonies, and Spain's honour. Whatever his plan was, he
persuaded the Queen Regent of its efficacy; and she recalled
him to power. Some indignation was shown by the Liberals,
who considered themselves tricked and slighted; but a patriotic
compromise was reached in a conference between Cánovas and
Sagasta. Cánovas' plan died with him. On Aug. 8, 1897,
he was assassinated at Santa Agueda, a little watering-place in
the Basque Provinces, by an Italian anarchist. The deed was
done in revenge for the cruel treatment of the Barcelona
anarchists. A series of outrages had culminated in June,
1896, when bombs thrown at a religious procession killed eight
persons. Again terror and vengeance appeared where stern
justice was needed. A law making the propagation of anarchist
doctrines and concealment of plots punishable by death was
hurriedly enacted. Montjuich was filled again with prisoners
and confessions were extorted by the police. Five executions
had been carried out in May; but still the bombs exploded, and
the Italian was sent on the easy mission to assassinate the man
whom the anarchists held chiefly responsible for their sufferings,
merited and unmerited. Not until more than two months
after Canovas' murder were the suspected anarchists who were
languishing untried in Montjuich set free.
It would be unfair to try Cánovas by the principles of
his Radical youth. His most brilliant period was when, after
Isabel's fall, he led the party of the Restoration through the Inter-
regnum, the reign of Don Amadeo, and the Republic, to final
triumph. The defects of his character came out in power. He
was sceptical in the general outlook, cynical in method, and at
times flippant. Brought up in the worst of political schools, he
xv.1] Character and work of Cánovas 46 I
seemed incapable of conceiving political morality. Insensible
himself to the temptations of smaller minds, he made weakness
and venality his means of government. He organised corrup-
tion, hoping by it to attain the public good. The atmosphere
of bribery, self-seeking, and stock-jobbing hung over his
Ministry; in five years he distributed 1276 titles and orders.
The representative system, as worked by him, was merely part
of a whole system of deception and make-believe; he contrived
that the Chambers should have no real control over the
Ministry. Amid the quagmire of politics he found the one
firm spot, and founded his power on the Conservative and
Catholic class. To rule Spain against the will of the clergy
had been proved impossible; it is to Cánovas' credit that he
saved the monarchy from falling entirely into their hands. It
was not his fault that the monarchy was not strong enough to
stand alone. His avowed creed was that “Politics is the art of
applying in every epoch of history that part of the ideal that
circumstances render possible.” Thus he was an opportunist,
really supple, though affecting inflexibility. Abroad he aimed
at alliance with Portugal, recovery of Gibraltar by exchange or
purchase, expansion in north-western Africa. But Spain under
his rule was too distracted to pursue such a policy. He main-
tained the independence of Spain, whilst the Triple Alliance
on the one hand and France on the other sought to entice her
into a one-sided agreement. Cánovas deserved the gratitude
of his country in that he put an end to the epoch of pronuncia-
mientos, restored a dynasty that seems now again well-rooted,
and ended the Carlist War without allowing any one general to
attain a position above the law. The Spain of to-day owes
much to his large-minded and statesmanlike treatment of
political opponents. He smoothed the path for all who would
support the monarchy, and welcomed where a smaller man
would have been jealous of their cooperation. His obstinacy
with regard to Cuba left a disastrous heritage to Spain. But
perhaps he was right in supposing that surrender would have
462 A'egency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
thrown power into the hands of the self-styled patriots, the
self-constituted guardians of the national honour; and that they
would have hastened to avenge Spain's impotence abroad on
the dynasty, thus destroying the work indissolubly associated
with the name of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo.
When Cánovas died, war with the United States was well-nigh
certain; but still one more effort was made to avert it. For a
while General Azcárraga took the power that dropped from the
murdered man's hand, and used it to check disorderly faction
during the first moment of uncertainty. But Romero Robledo
and Silvela, the deputy leaders of the Conservatives, were
irreconcilable; and Sagasta returned to office (Oct. 4, 1897).
Already the new American minister at Madrid, General
Woodford, had secured the recall of General Weyler and the
discontinuance of his system of pacification by devastation and
famine. He had given notice to the Spanish Government that
the war must cease. As soon as Sagasta's Cabinet was formed,
General Woodford demanded a statement of its intentions with
regard to Cuba. The answer was given in friendly terms; a
complete reversal of policy was promised. General Blanco was
about to be sent out to take General Weyler's place, with full
powers to grant autonomy under the Spanish flag. The Cuban
exiles were allowed to return. Spain called upon the United
States to aid her to put an end to filibustering; she alleged the
impossibility of fixing a date for the complete pacification of
the island.
In fulfilment of the promise thus made, Moret's bill, grant-
ing autonomy to Cuba and Puerto Rico, was passed by the
Cortes at their autumn session (Nov. 25, 1897). It was to
take effect from the beginning of the new year ; but it came
too late to conciliate either the Cuban insurgents or the United
States. Loyalists and rebels alike rejected its provisions; the
former received General Blanco with hostile demonstrations at
Havana (Jan., 1898). Meanwhile Weyler, whom Blanco had
replaced, was trying to avenge his recall upon the Government.
xvi.) Reca/Z of Wey/er. War imminent 463
In virtue of his efforts to retain the close market of Cuba
for the Catalan manufacturers, he posed as the champion of
national industry. Refusing to quit the ship that brought him
home at Corunna, where she first touched Spanish shores, he
went round to Barcelona, where interest in the retention of the
colonies was strongest. Thanks partly to precautions enforced
under a rigorous state of siege, his reception was disappointing
to him ; and he betook himself to another form of agitation.
He sent to the Queen Regent and published in the newspapers
a protest against President MacKinley's reflections upon the
conduct of the war. For this breach of discipline he was tried,
but acquitted, the court-martial finding that he was guilty of no
offence specified in the military code (Jan. 7, 1898).
For a moment it looked as if General Weyler could carry the
army with him ; and so uncertain were his political principles
that fears were felt lest he should declare himself a Carlist or a
Republican, after making pronunciamiento against the Govern-
ment that had deprived him of his command. Romero
Robledo, his civilian ally, had declared himself and Weyler to
be the only two men capable of handling the Cuban difficulty
in a manner worthy of Spain. Luckily, the Conservatives
rejected them both, and, making Pidal leader of the party,
sought to bring about the reunion of Silvela and his following
with the main body. But Weyler's affairs were soon forgotten
among more weighty matters. President MacKinley's message
to Congress (Dec. 6, 1897) announced that the time had not
yet come for intervention or for recognition of the belligerent
rights of the Cubans. But the American people was being
lashed to fury by the lying exaggerations of the yellow press.
It took the mobilisation of the Spanish fleet as a threat.
Any story of Spanish cruelty, venality, or cowardice was
believed. A private letter from the Spanish minister was
stolen in the post; its contents, adverse and slighting remarks
upon the Government of the Republic and its President, were
given to the press. Far from apologising for this diplomatic
464 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
outrage, the Americans demanded that the Spanish minister
should be recalled, and Satisfaction made in the official Gazette
for his private opinions. The Spanish Government made
excuses; and the incident was declared closed (Feb. 14,
1898). *
On the following night the United States cruiser, Maine,
which, under plea of protecting American citizens, had been
watching events in Cuba since January 25, was destroyed by
an explosion in the port of Havana, and 266 of her crew
perished. The American consul reported that the explosion
was due to a submarine mine; the Spaniards denied it, and
offered to assist enquiry into its causes. The United States
refused their help ; and its commission reported that the
explosion took place outside the ship. A Spanish commission
reported that it took place inside through ignition of the
Maine's ammunition. *.
On both sides of the Atlantic the contrary reports provoked
the greatest excitement. Spain demanded the verdict of an
impartial tribunal upon the causes of the explosion. The
United States refused to question the judgment of its experts.
A conference between General Woodford and Sagasta led to
no result. The affair was now in the hands of the “patriots”
on either side; and war was inevitable. Since the beginning
of the year the Americans had been making ready for it.
Congress had voted ten million pounds for national defence.
The French Republic and the Pope offered mediation in vain.
The Queen Regent of Spain, by seeking direct communication
with General Woodford, showed that she was willing to risk even
the throne of her son for the sake of her adopted country. On
April 1 the Presidentreported that Spain had sent an unsatisfactory
reply to his message demanding an armistice in Cuba, abandon-
ment of the system of concentration, and proper distribution of
relief funds subscribed in the United States. On April 11 he
asked Congress for permission to use the army and navy to
put an end to the war in Cuba for the sake of humanity, peace,
xv.1] War zwith the United States 465
and American interests. Nine days later Congress granted the
desired powers, declared the Cubans a free people, and called
upon Spain to evacuate the island. At the same time it dis-
claimed all intention of acquiring territorial rights. General
Woodford had already received his passports when this
declaration of war was delivered. A state of war existed
virtually from the 21st of April. Hostilities lasted less than
four months. They proved an unbroken series of disasters for
Spanish arms. The Powers had urgently sought to avert war;
all, with the exception of Great Britain, showed sympathy with
Spain's misfortunes.
The Spanish Cortes, elected in March, were summoned
to provide funds for a war, the issue of which was hidden only
from the ignorant or wilfully blind. A national subscription
had been opened by the Queen Regent with a gift of a million
pesetas; it never reached half-a-million sterling, and at least
forty millions were needed. Fresh taxation was imposed;
railway concessions were sold ; and the mines of Almaden again
mortgaged. On the proposal of General Martínez Campos, a
bill was passed indemnifying the Government for anything it
might do for the national cause. Don Carlos issued a mani-
festo promising that, should Spain be in danger of humiliation,
he would pluck the arms from hands unworthy to wield them
and would put himself at her head.
A large but ill-provided and disorganised Spanish army
was already in Cuba, a considerable force in the Philippine
Islands; and three Spanish Squadrons were on the sea. Admiral
Cámara commanded the reserve Squadron at home, Admiral
Cervera the Atlantic Squadron off the Cape de Verde Islands,
and Admiral Montojo the Pacific squadron off the Philippine
Islands. Montojo's Squadron, hopelessly outmatched, was
destroyed in Manila Bay (May 1, 1898) by the American
Pacific squadron under Admiral Dewey. The victors lost only
seven men wounded ; they landed, captured the arsenal at
Cavite, and blockaded Manila, while Aguinaldo, leader of the
C. S. 3O
466 Regency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
native insurgents, attacked on the land side. When the
disastrous news reached Spain, Admiral Cámara set out to the
rescue with the reserve fleet, but he was recalled from the
mouth of the Suez Canal. The situation in the Philippines
was recognised as hopeless for the Spanish arms; the Squadron
might be wanted nearer home; and, moreover, Spain had no
coaling station between her coast and the islands. The two
American Atlantic squadrons, under Admirals Samson and
Sebley, began the blockade of the Cuban coast at the outset
of the war and bombarded the defences of Matanzas. On
April 27 Admiral Cervera, Spain's main hope, sailed against
them from the Cape de Verde Islands. Admiral Samson,
believing that the Spaniards were making for Puerto Rico,
advanced to meet them, but, failing to find them, put back to
Havana, after bombarding San Juan.
Meanwhile Cervera had coaled at Curaçao, and reached
Santiago de Cuba on May 19. For more than a week he lay
hid, but on June 1 he was blockaded by the united American
squadrons. Their attempt to imprison him by sinking a collier
in the narrow channel failed, but they watched him day and
night, whilst American troops to the number of about 22, ooo
landed at Guantamo, 40 miles east of Santiago, and put them-
selves in communication with the insurgents. In the two small
land battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill (July 1), both sides
showed great gallantry. The Americans were victorious and
drove back the Spaniards, but they lost about 1500 men. Their
army was small and their position most precarious. Fever had
broken out among them; their supplies were running short; but,
showing a bold front, they began to bombard Santiago. Cervera
could now no longer remain inactive in the harbour. Well
knowing the fate that awaited him, he steamed suddenly out
and turned westward, running the gauntlet of the American
fire (July 3). All his ships were sunk, burned, run ashore,
or captured. The Americans lost one man; their Spanish
prisoners numbered sixteen hundred. A fortnight later General
xvil Spanish defeats. Treaty of Peace 467
Toral surrendered Santiago to an inferior force, stipulating for
the repatriation of himself and his 23, ooo troops".
Some outcry for peace had already been heard in Spain
when the Cortes were closed, June 25. News of Cervera's fate,
and the fall of Santiago, together with a report that an American
Squadron was about to visit the Spanish coast, opened the eyes
of such as still cherished illusions as to the military situation.
The Americans had already gained possession of a great part
of Puerto Rico, when, after consulting the leaders of the
Constitutional political parties, Sagasta, through the good
offices of France, made overtures for peace (July 22, 1898).
He proposed as its basis an agreement as to the political status
of Cuba; but President MacKinley refused to accept the
limitation of the points at issue. He claimed that the difference
with regard to Spain's treatment of her colony “had become
transformed and enlarged into a general conflict between two
great peoples.” He demanded the immediate evacuation of
Cuba ; surrender of Puerto Rico and other small West Indian
Islands to the United States in lieu of war indemnity; posses-
sion of Manila, pending settlement of the status of the Philippine
Islands. To the last clause Spain demurred, but she was
forced to accept it; and the preliminary agreement was signed,
August 12. Romero Robledo and General Weyler protested
against what they called the unpatriotic surrender, and would
have made their country's position still worse by obstinacy in a
hopeless struggle.
When the American and Spanish Commissioners met in
Paris to arrange the Treaty of Peace (Oct. 1, 1898), the two
contested points were the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands
and the Cuban debt. The Spaniards contended that the debt
was attached to the island, and that its change of government
did not affect its liability. The Americans insisted that the
* The Spaniards were alleged to have 250,000 troops in Cuba; but
this was evidently a gross exaggeration, [J. F.-K.]
30–2
468 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898) [CH.
debt had not been contracted by Cubans, but wrongfully and
forcibly imposed by Spain and spent for the most part in
fighting against Cuba's legitimate aspiration for freedom. The
Spaniards were forced to submit and to take over the debt.
Manila had been captured by the Americans two days after the
preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon and in ignorance
of their terms. The Spaniards demanded possession of the
city and the archipelago. But a strong feeling for annexation
had shown itself in the United States; the people refused
to resign their conquest; and accordingly their President
announced that “he could see but one plain path of duty, the
acceptance of the archipelago.” The Spanish commissioners
demurred on the ground of the provisional treaty, and the fact
of the capture after its signature. They were met by an
ultimatum or final proposal which they were bound to accept
or to face a renewal of the war. The United States paid four
millions sterling for the Philippine, Sules, and Marianne Islands.
The treaty signed Nov. 28 was ratified Dec. 10, 1898. The
United States bought later Spain's only remaining possessions
in the Pacific, the Caroline Islands, for £800,ooo.
To Spain the chief immediate result of the war was an
enormous increase of her debt. Under Canalejas' scheme the
Exterior Debt had been reduced since 1882 from 78 to 41
millions sterling. But, by consolidation of a yearly deficit of
about three millions, the Interior Debt had swelled enormously.
Spain was now obliged to take over more than Ioo millions
of colonial and war loans; and her Interior Debt rose to
270 millions of four per cents. and sixty millions of five per
cents. Her note issue had increased from thirty to fifty millions
during the war. Gold had risen to a premium of one hundred
per cent. But Spain valiantly resolved to avoid bankruptcy at
any cost. She taxed the coupons of her interior loan twenty
per cent, whilst letting the exterior go free for the sake of her
credit. She paid her native creditors in depreciated currency,
and mulcted the salaries of officials and clergy. Little by
xv.1] A'esults of the War 469
little her efforts were recognised ; and her credit is im-
proving. -
The loss of the last remnant of her great colonial empire
did not really weaken or impoverish Spain; but the ridiculous
ease with which her navy was overwhelmed humiliated her.
She knows now that many years of discipline, recuperation,
and reform must pass before she can aspire to be counted
among the Powers. Her thoughts and resources, instead of
being dissipated abroad, are concentrated upon development
within her narrowed borders. The rising generation breathes
freely, relieved of the dread of enforced military service in
fever-stricken Cuba, and from further additions to the burden
imposed by the never-ending war. The Catalan manufacturers
lost the close market which they had believed to be essential
to their existence; but enough employment was still left to
their industry in supplying a home-market fenced round with
protective regulations of the most stringent kind. For many
years Spain's colonies had been a drag on the nation, a benefit
only to a corrupt official class. Stripped of troops and arma-
ments, the country had been left apparently at the mercy of
Carlists and Republicans; but none took advantage of the
common misfortune. Castelar, indeed, sacrificed a reputation
for fine feeling by attacking the Queen Regent in a foreign review.
His article was suppressed in Spain; but its author was left
unmolested by special request of the injured lady. The great
disaster that had been expected to endanger the dynasty did
not even cause the downfall of the ministry. But Sagasta, on
whom had fallen the expiation of years of misgovernment, and
chiefly the faults of his political opponents, resigned. He had
faced the inevitable—for Spain would never have admitted her
weakness unless defeated—open-eyed and unshrinking; he
was unpopular because associated with painful memories. The
calm and impeccable Francisco Silvela gathered together the
remnants of Cánovas' party, and started his country on the
painful path of reconstruction and reform.
470 Aegency of Queen Cristina (1885–1898)[CH. XVI
Spain's hope of peace and prosperity depends on the
purification of her administration, on the limitation of the
activities of the Church to their proper sphere, on the creation
of a feeling of confidence which shall allow better terms to
be made with the national creditors, and shall set free for
agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprise the huge
capital now absorbed by state loans. Then, and not till
then, will the most profitable Spanish enterprises be worked
by Spanish capital and to Spain's advantage; then will Spain's
most essential industry, agriculture, turn its energies to supplying
the permanent home-market, selling Spanish goods under
Spanish names, instead of looking to the adventitious needs of
its neighbours as its mainstay, and sending out wines and oils
that are the raw material for skilled manufacture. Then will
labour turn to its task, undiscouraged by the knowledge that
a hungry and corrupt governing class has ever an eye to its
slender profits. Spain will be able to laugh at those who,
standing on either hand, urge upon her a theocracy or a
commune. But many things are still to be done before
honest Republicans cease to rail, and honest Carlists to hope.
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INDEX.
Abárzuza, Buenaventura, colonial
minister, 455
Abārzuza, battle of, 373
Agar, Pedro, leader of the junta at
Corunna, 45
As ºldo, General, attacks Manila,
405
Alagón, Duke of, captain of the
King's Guards, 35
Alaix, Isidro, General, commands
troops against the Carlists, 127,
I5I ; minister for war, 149
Alameda, Fray Cirilio de la, Arch-
bishop of Toledo, leader of the
Junta Apostólica, 55; salary of,
222; his influence at Court, 289;
receives a letter from the Pope,
4O3
Alanio, Pedro, leader of the riot in
Andalusia, 279
Alava, Miguel Ricardo de, General,
Spanish ambassador to London,
III
Alcalá Galiano, Antonio, Liberal
agent, 44; head of the freemasons,
55; leader of the opposition, 61 ;
preaches patriotism, 66; declares
the King to be incapable of govern-
ing, 69; leader of the Liberal
party, 8o; returns from exile, 93;
Supports the Progressives, 97,
I 19; member of the ministry, 12o;
supports the ministry of Count
Ofalia, 143; his views on the
Liberal Union, 267
Alcolea, battle of, 305
Alcora, battle of, 375
Alcoy, mutiny at, 342
Alcudia, Count de, prime minister,84
Alegría, battle of, Io'ſ
Alexander I, Tsar, sells ships to
Ferdinand, 41
Alfonso XII of Spain, candidate
for the throne, 315; acknowledged
King by the royalists in Paris, 318;
attains his majority, 378; issues a
manifesto,381-382; declared King,
388; arrives in Spain, 391 ; his
accession, 392; issues a proclama-
tion, 393; takes command of the
army of the north, 4oo: triumphal
entry into Madrid, 402 his mar-
riage, 4 Io; a widower, ió. ; has
difficulty in forming a n inistry,
414–415; marries Maria Cri. “ina of
Austria, 416; called upon to , dopt
a more liberal policy,417; dism. Ses
the ministry, 420; has an interv, w
with the King of Portugal, 42: ;
favours the opposition, 424; visits,
the German Emperor, 427; acceſſ is
the colonelcy of a Uhlan regiment,
th.; in Paris, ió.; returns to Madrid,
428; his clemency, 43 I ; visits the
plague centres, 433; death of,
434; his character, 435
Alfonso XIII of Spain, born, 44o
Alfonso, Don, heads the Carlist
risings in Catalonia, 351, 354,
374; leaves Spain, 375
Alliance, the Holy, 57, 62, 88
Alzáa, General, commands the Car-
lists in the Basque Provinces, 2 I4;
shot, ib.
3I—2
484
Index
Amadeo of Savoy, candidate for
the throne of Spain, 318; becomes
King, 319; enters Madrid, 321 ;
his conduct, ib.; failure of his
attempt to rule with a coalition
ministry, 322; pardons the fol-
lowers of Don Carlos, 331; refuses
extraordinary powers to Serrano,
ió.; narrowly escapes assassination,
332 ; opens the Cortes, 333; re-
signs the crown, 335; estimate of
his reign, 335-336
Amoravieta, convention of, 330–33 I
Andalusia, anarchy in, 278-279, 339,
341–342; order restored in, 344–
345, 347
Angoulême, Duke of, heads the
French invasion of Spain, 66–71
Angustias, Nuestra Señora delas, 186
Annamite war, the, 268
Aranda, Abarca de Bolea, Count
of, minister of Charles III, 2
Argüelles, Agustin, banishment of,
39; urges the disbandment of the
army, 52; returns to Spain, 93;
supports the Progressives, 97 ;
attacks the ministry, Io9; pleads
the cause of Nogueras, 125; helps
to draw up the constitution of
1837, 135; member of the Cortes,
159; candidate for the regency,
172; guardian of Queen Isabel,
173; deprived of office, 192
Arjona, secretary of Don Carlos
Maria, 35o; resigns office, 26.
Armero, Francisco, General, minister
of marine, 198; member of the
ministry, 203; resigns office, 224,
262; president of the council, 262 ;
sends troops to Cochin China, 268
Army, state of, in 1840, 169; in
1842, 179; in 1854, 236; in 1862,
269; in 1873, 349-341; in 1874,
348-349, 377; in 1875, 395 ;
proposed reform of the, 443
Arrazola, Lorenzo, member of the
ministry, 158, 160, 203; president
of the council, 283; resigns office,
284
Arrigoriaga, battle of 122
Aspiroz, General, defeated by the
Carlists, 126; commands the re-
volted garrison at Valladolid, 188;
member of the government, 194
Astorga, Marquis of, president of
the junta, 15–16
Asturias, Prince of, to marry Isabel,
I32, I4 I
Aumale, Henri, Duke of, to marry
Isabel, 204 ; marries the Princess
of Parma, 205
Austria, orders Spain to change her
constitution,65; supports the claim
of Don Carlos, Io;; agrees not to
send help to him, 133; favours a
marriage between Isabel and the
Count of Montemolin, 205; re-
cognises Isabel as Queen, 2 I 3 ;
supports the cause of Pius IX,
2 I5
Ayala, Adelardo Lopez de, Scribe
of the revolutionary party, 305;
member of the ministry, 3 Io;
refuses to form a ministry, 415
Aymerich, General, dismissed from
office, 74
Azcárate, Gumersindo, leader of the
republicans, 440
Azcárraga, Marcelo, General, de-
clares for the King, 384; minister
for war, 446; president of the
council, 462; resigns office, ib.
Badajoz, captured by the allies, 17;
revolt in, 426
Bailén, battle of, 13
Bailén, Duke of, appointed guar-
dian of the Queen, 192
Balaguer, Victor, opposes Sagasta’s
clerical policy, 427
Ballesteros, General, chief adviser
of Ferdinand, 46; appointed com-
mander in Navarre, 66; overawed
by the approach of Don Carlos,
67; minister of finance, 78; his
budget, 79
Balmaseda, Juan Manuel, General,
I53
Barbastro, battle of, 39
Barcelona, inhabitants of, 180–182;
Andea:
junta elected at, 45; riots in, I 14,
163, 179, 182-183, 192, 2 14, 251,
447, 456
Barcia, Roque, excluded from the
ministry, 34o ; plots the overthrow
of Castelar, 359
Bardaji, Eusebio, president of the
council, 143; jealous of Espartero's
power, I 45
Basilio, General, supports the cause
of Don Carlos, 128–129, 150
AEat, the (el Murciélago), news-
paper, 227 -
Batanero, Canon, 124
Bayonne, council of, 14
Bazán, Pedro, leader of the Liberal
rebellion, at Alicante, 76
Becerra, Gomez, president of the
council, 185
Bedoya, General, minister for war,
383; supports the cause of Don
Alfonso, 386
Beira, Princess of, supports the
claim of Don Carlos, 83; marries
him, I 51
Bélgida, Marchioness of, lady of
the bedchamber to Isabel, 173
Bentham, Jeremy, 53
Bessières, George, leads the rising
against the constitution of 1820,
65, 69; joins the French forces
under the Duke of Angoulême,
67; death of 76
Bilbao, siege of (1833), Ioo, IoS,
.."; ... 137-138 ; (1874),
57, –3
Biš. ë. * la; see O’Donnell,
Enrique
Bismarck, Count, seeks an alliance
with Spain, 317
Blanco, Ramón, General, deputy to
Cuba, 462
Blaser, Anselmo, General, minister
for war, 228; his success at Vicăl-
varo, 229; resigns command, 233;
his promotions to the army con-
firmed, 255
Bonaparte, Joseph, crowned King
of Spain, 12; his choice of ad-
visers, 14; leaves Madrid, 15, 26;
485
returns, 17, 27; leaves Spain,
26.
Borrego, Andrés, 2 18
Bourbon, Cardinal de, Archbishop
of Toledo, dismissed from the
regency, 34; appointed president
of the Madrid junta, 47; ad-
ministers the oath to Ferdinand,
4.
Bravo Murillo, Juan, member of the
Cortes, 194; joins the Conser-
vative coalition, 208 ; member of
the ministry, 2 I I ; minister of
finance, 217 ; resigns office, 218,
224; president of the council, 219;
financial reforms of, 219–220 ;
his arbitrary methods, 223–224 ;
proposes a revision of the con-
stitution, 224; dissolves the Cortes,
ið; ; refuses to form a ministry,
261
Brazil, revolution in, 444
Brihuega, battle of, 65
Bulwer, Sir Henry, British ambas-
sador to Madrid, protests against
the Spanish marriages, 206; in
favour at Court, 208; suspected
of abetting revolution, .212 ; ex-
pelled, 2 13
Burgos, Javier de, General, mem-
ber of the Cortes, 194
Caballero, Fermín, proposes a vote
of censure against the ministry,
Io9 ; quarrels with Espartero,
172; leader of the opposition,
179; member of the ministry, 185
Cabarrás, Francisco, Count of,
minister of finance, 27
Cabrera, Ramón, commander of
the Carlists, Io2, 122, 327; his
raids, I 23, 125, 127, 145; recap-
tures Cantavieja, 139; joins with
the forces of Don Carlos, 14o;
his campaign against Espartero,
155-157, 161 ; avenges the death
of the Count of España, 157; his
campaign in north-eastern Spain,
2 I 3–2 I5; fails to form an alliance
with the revolutionary party, 302;
486 Andea:
resigns his command, 328; re-
cantation of, 395
Cabriñana, Marquis of, condemned
for libel, 456
Cabrinetti, José, General, 354
Cadiz, conference of, 303; revolt
in, 44–45, 315, 447-448; siege of,
26, 69–70, 302
Calatrava, José Maria, leader of the
Radicals, 53; president of the
council, 132; loses power, I 34;
jealous of Espartero, 145; mem-
ber of the government, 159;
member of the Madrid junta,
165; his commercial treaty, 182
Calderón, Count of, commander of
the Cadiz army, 44; captured, 45
Callao, battle of, 287
Calomarde, Francisco Tadeo, minis-
ter of justice, 72; his early life,
2b.; his harsh measures, 73–74;
visits Catalonia, 77; refuses to
acknowledge the Pragmatic Sanc-
tion, 84; banished from Court,
5)
Calonge, Eusebio de, General,
commander of the revolutionary
army, 3O4.
Camacho, Juan Francisco, leader of
the monarchical Radicals, 409 ;
minister of finance, 420 ; his
budget, 422; resigns office, 425;
member of the ministry, 437
Cámara, Admiral, commands the
Spanish reserve squadron, 465;
sails to Cuba, 466; recalled, ió.
Campomanes, Pedro Rodriguez, his
conduct censured, 2 ; minister of
Charles IV, 4
Canga Argüelles, José, urges dis-
bandment of army, 52; spokesman
of the Cortes, 61 ; preaches pa-
triotism, 66
Cannes, pact of, 364
Canning, George, protests against
foreign intervention in Spanish
affairs, 57, 66
Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio,
favours the constitution of 1837,
136; his verdict on the general
election of 1837, 144; his unfitness
for leadership, 148; his verdict on
the Carlist war, 155; on Espartero
as a politician, 166; favours the
constitution of 1845, 20 i ; recruits
adherents for the revolution in
Madrid, 227–228; puts forth the
demands of the rebels, 229; sums
up the results of the revolution,
235; ceases to support the ministry,
278; directs Mon’s ministry, 285;
banished, 296; opposes the policy
of Narváez, 298; defeated in the
general election, 333; refuses office
in the coalition ministry, 362 ;
commands the forces at Bilbao,
366; prevents the generals from
proclaiming Alfonso King, 373;
supports the cause of Alfonso in
Madrid, 378; delays the restora-
tion, 379 ; acts as Alfonso's ad-
viser, 381 ; his patriotic schemes
undone, 383; resists the pronun-
ciamiento, 384 ; arrested, 385;
his policy, 390-393, 4or, 409,
415, 430–432, 436–438, 447–448;
president of the council, 391, 399,
415, 429, 445, 454; resigns office,
397, 412, 420, 437, 450, 460; his
influence over Jovellar's ministry,
398–399 ; introduces the constitu-
tion of 1876, 402–406; withstands
the opposition to his clerical policy,
403; opposes the concessions of
Martínez Campos in Cuba, 408,
417; remonstrates with the Queen,
4 Io; his reasons for resigning
office, 413 ; refuses to ratify the
treaty of El Zanjón, 416; upholds
the religious party, 422 ; warns
Alfonso, 427; withdraws his objec-
tion to universal suffrage, 429;
threatens resignation, 433; elected
president of Congress, 437; dis-
trustful of the generals, 444; carries
out measure for universal suffrage,
446; his financial schemes, 449–
450 ; leader of the opposition,
453; opposes Gamazo’s financial
schemes, ib. ; his Cuban policy,
Ander 487
455-456; assassinated, 460; esti-
mate of his life, 461–462
Cantavieja, capture of, 139-140, 156
Cantero, member of the ministry,
249; minister of finance, 253;
resigns office, 254
Cárdenas, Francisco de, minister of
justice, 391
Cardero, subaltern, heads a revolt
against the government, 99
Carlist war, the : (First War) rise
of the Carlist party, 78; outbreak
of war, 91, 2 13, 320, 350-35 i ;
strength of the opposing forces,
92, Ioo; events leading up to,
1oo; troops raised in Navarre,
I or ; in Castille and other
provinces, Ioz ; movements of
Cristinos, Ioz—I of ; successes of
the Carlists, Io9, 139–140, 155–
156; their united action, IoA:
cruelty of Quesada, 2b. ; foreign
intervention, IoS, I 12.; treaty of
the Quadruple Alliance, ib. ;
Rodil’s campaign, Ioff; Mina's
campaign, Io?; siege of Estella,
Io8; Valdés' campaign, io9; siege
of Bilbao, I Io—I I I, 122, 137–138,
366–369; battle of Mendigorría,
I I I ; Córdova's campaign, 123-
124; Cabrera's raids, I 23, 214;
barbarities on both sides, 1 25;
lack of discipline among the
Carlists, 126; change of tactics,
127–128; invasion of Guipúzcoa,
138; failure of Don Carlos to take
Madrid, 14 f ; discipline restored
among the Carlists, 145; dissension
in the Carlist ranks, 150–15 I, 154,
157; negotiations for peace, I 52;
Espartero's campaign, 153, 161–
162; peace signed at Vergara, I 54;
at Guipúzcoa, 156; Don Carlos
captured, 215; failure of the
attempted rebellion of 1860, 274–
276; (Second War) battle of
Oroquieta, 33o ; convention of
Amoravieta signed, ib.; capture of
Estella, 353; forays of the Carlists,
354; Carlist blunders, 355–357;
Castelar's efforts, 358–359; battle
of Abárzuza, 373; the Carlists
harry Catalonia, 374-375; siege of
Irun, 377–379; Carlists reinforced,
38o; Serrano's final effort, 381 ;
failure of Alfonso’s attempt at
reconciliation, 394; fall of Carlist
strongholds, 395; forays on both
sides, 396; IDon Carlos proposes
an armistice, 398; Martínez Cam-
pos' campaign, 4oo–4of ; amnesty
proclaimed, 401
Carlos, Don, champion of the Church
and of absolutism, 42, 75; his
loyalty to Ferdinand, 78; refuses
to acknowledge the Pragmatic
Sanction, 83; refuses to share the
regency after Ferdinand's death,
84; to take the oath of allegiance
to Princess Isabel, 87; supports
the claim of Don Miguel to the
throne of Portugal, 89 ; acts as
King de facto, 91 ; outlawed, ió. ;
his call to arms, 92; joins Don
Miguel, Io;; goes to England, ib.;
returns to Spain, Ioff; takes com-
mand in the Basque Provinces,
I 26; his obstinacy, 132; marches
south, 139; joins with Cabrera's
forces, 14o ; fails to capture
Madrid, 141; accuses his officers
of treason, 15o; his marriage, 151;
the tool of faction, 152; takes up
the cause of Maroto, 153; opposes
him, 154; refuses to accept terms
of peace, İb.; crosses to France,
I 56 ; opposes the movement to
reestablish Queen Cristina, 174;
abdication of, 209; invited to
return to Spain, 2 ro; calls his
followers to arms, 2 13; captured
and expelled, 2 15
Carlos VI; see Montemolin, Carlos
Luís, Count of
Carlos de España, Don, captain-
general of Catalonia, 4o; his
loyalty to Ferdinand, 48
Carlos María, Don, son of Don Juan,
326; acknowledged King by the
Carlists, 327; takes the title of
488
Indea:
Duke of Madrid, ib.; collectstroops
in Paris, 327; issues a manifesto,
328; holds a general assembly at
Vevey, 329; orders a general
rising, 330, 351 ; routed at Oro-
quieta, ib.; returns to France, ió.;
swears to observe the liberties of
Biscay, 353; anointed at Loyola,
356; takes up arms, 357; reviews
the troops at Estella, 374; com-
mands the forces at Irun, 377;
results of his over-eagerness, 390;
answers Alfonso's proclamation
with contempt, 395 ; protests
against the forays of the Alfon-
sists, 396; proposes an armistice,
398; his hopefulness, 4oo; takes
refuge in France, 4or ; promises
help in the war with Cuba, 465
Carlota, Doña, influences Ferdimand,
81 ; comes to La Granja, 84 ;
destroys the codicil revoking the
Pragmatic Sanction, 85; arranges
a marriage between her son and
Isabel, 205
Caroline Islands, purchased by the
United States, 468
Cartagena, revolt in, 342, 438–439;
siege of 347–348, 354, 357, 365
Carvajal, José de, excluded from the
ministry, 34o; republican leader,
342
Casa Valencia, Count of, member
of the Senate, 432
Caserta, Count, commander of the
Carlist troops, 4ol
Cassola, Manuel, minister for war,
443; introduces a scheme for army
reform, ib.; deprived of office, 444
Castaños, Francisco Javier, General,
defeats the French at Bailén, 13;
member of the council of regency,
17; commands the contingent sent
to France, 37; puts down the
revolt of Luis de Lacy, 4o
Castelar, Emilio, opposes the finan-
cial schemes of Narváez, 288 ;
makes inflammatory speeches in
Madrid, 292; leader of the demo-
crats, 297; member for Saragossa,
312; condemns the monarchy,
313; preaches republican ideas in
Aragon, 315; protests against the
convention of Amoravieta, 33 I :
excluded from the ministry, 34o;
president of the republic, 346,
357; restores order in the South,
347–348; resigns office, 348, 363;
his scheme for army reform, 349;
refuses Pavia’s help, 360; attacked
by the Cortes, 361 ; Saved by
Pavia's coup d'état, 361-362 ;
refuses to hold office in the coali-
tion ministry, 363; makes efforts
to strengthen the republican party,
358-359; offers help to the minis-
try, 385; his prophecy, 392 ; his
fair-dealing, 4o i ; his attack on
Cánovas, 418; leader of the dy-
nastic democrats, 422 ; condemns
the revolt of 1883, 426; leader of
the republicans in the Cortes, 437;
promises support to Sagasta, 440;
attacks the Queen Regent, 469
Castille, Cortes of, decay of the,
3–4; council of, composition of
the, 4; loses its authority, I 5;
suspended, 25; reassumes its
authority, 34–35; abolished, 5o;
reconstituted, ib. ; advises the
King, 64
Castillejos, battle of, 272
Castlereagh, Lord, refuses British in-
tervention in Spain, 57
Castro, Alejandro de, leader of the
Ultramontanes, 240
Castro, Perez de, president of the
council, 158, 160; member of the
ministry, 391
Catalonia, disfranchisement of, 4;
Carlist rising in, 89, 327–330,
351–354, 396; the inhabitants of,
180–181; revolt and anarchy in,
181-183, 209–21o ; favours the
candidature of Espartero, 316;
riots in, 374-375, 431–432; wel-
comes Alfonso as King, 392 ;
Carlist troops withdrawn from,
4oo; opposes the commercial
treaty with France, 423
Index
Ceballos Escalera, General, murder
of 145
Cervera, Pascual, Admiral, com-
mands the Spanish Atlantic
squadron, 465; sails against the
Americans, 466; killed, ió.
Chacón, Gonzalo, General, 294
Chambord, Count of, condemns
the retractation of the Count of
Montemolin, 325; secret agent
in France, 376
Chamorro, favourite of Ferdinand,
35
Chapalangarra, General, 8o
Charles III of Spain, reforms of,
I, 2, 7
Charles IV of Spain, reforms of, 2;
irresponsibility of, 4; weakness
of, Io; abdication of, fö. ; con-
fiscates Church property, 1 I 3-1 14
Charles V, Emperor, 3
Charles, Count of Molina, brother
of Ferdimand, renounces his claim
to the throne, 12
Charlotte, Queen Dowager of Por-
tugal, 88
Chateaubriand, François René, Vis-
count, French representative at
the Congress of Verona, 65
Cheste, Gonzalez de la Pezuela,
Count of, insults the president of
Congress, 296; appointed to com-
mand of army, 3o4; opposes the
election of Amadeo of Savoy as
King of Spain, 318; member of
the provisional council, 391
Chile, war in, 287
Chinchas Isles, taken by the Span-
ish, 286
Church property, bill to regulate
the sale of, 243–244; confiscation
of, 14, II.3, 14, I 18, 134, I42,
143, 169, 178, 201–202, 220-222
Cisneros, Jiménez de, Cardinal, 269
Ciudad Rodrigo, capture of, 17
Civil Guard, creation of the, 197
Civil List, in 1816, 41; in 1828, 79
Claret, Father, the Queen's con-
fessor, 289; rebuked by her, 291
Cleonard, Count of, holds a court-
489
martial, 149; minister for war,
I6 I
Cleveland, Grover, President of the
United States, on the Cuban
question, 458
Collado, Mariano Antonio, supports
O’Donnell, 247; member of the
ministry, 249
Collantes, Esteban, persecuted, 267
Commercial treaty between Great
Britain and Spain, 182, 21 o, 432,
438; between Germany and Spain,
427, 453; between France and
Spain, 412
f º
Concha, José Gutierrez de la,
Marquis of la Habana, banished,
226; Governor-General of Cuba,
237; member of the Cortes, 24o;
minister for war, 304; president
of the council, ib. ; resigns office,
309; advocates reform in Cuba,
4 I 7
Concha, Manuel de la, Marquis of
Duero, General, attacks the palace
of Madrid, 174; escapes, 175 ;
organises the revolution in Anda-
lusia, 188; pursues Espartero,
189; opposes the Radicals, 191 ;
member of the Cortes, 194, 240;
Suppresses revolt in Galicia, 204;
supports the cause of the Queen
of Portugal, 209; unable to re-
store order in Catalonia, 2 Io;
his success against the Carlists,
2 I 4; opposes Bravo Murillo, 224;
attacks the railway concessions of
Salamanca and Cristina, 225;
banished, 226; president of the
junta of Barcelona, 231 ; reward-
ed for military service, 236; sup-
ports O’Donnell, 247; leader of
the regulars at the revolt of
Madrid, 249; president of the
Senate, 265; ceases to support
the ministry, 278; refuses to form
a ministry, 283; takes command
against the revolutionaries, 3o4;
appointed captain-general of
Madrid, 309; welcomes Amadeo
of Savoy as King of Spain, 320;
&
49C
Index
assists in the relief of Bilbao, 368
–369; commands the army of the
north, 37 of marches towards Es-
tella, 372; killed at the battle of
Abárzuza, 373
Concordat of 1851, the, signed,
220–222 ; restoration of, 266,
397
cºntion, the, of 1812, 22, 23–
26, 38, 44-46, 129-13o; of 1837,
135–136, 168–169; of 1845, 200–
201, 224, 252-253, 254-255, 264,
285; of 1855, 241–243; of 1869,
3.13–314; of 1876, 402-405
Contreras, Juan, General, excluded
from the ministry, 34o ; heads the
mutiny at Cartagéna, 342, 348
Córdova, Fernando Fernandez de,
General, commands the troops
against Cabrera, 214; appointed
inspector-general of cavalry, 219;
president of the council, 230;
resigns office, ió.; minister for
war, 7%. ; banished, 3o I
Córdova, Luis Fernandez de, Gene-
ral, his loyalty to Ferdinand, 45;
petitions for the abolition of the
courts-martial, 74; ambassador
to Portugal, 89 ; supports the
dismissal of Zea Bermúdez, 93;
commands the army in the north,
1 19; his efforts to strengthen his
position, 124; his tactics, 126–
127; resigns his command, 129;
retires to France, I 3o ; leads an
insurrection against Espartero,
148; accused of treason, 149 ;
death of, 25.
Cortes, in 1810, 18–25; in 1812, 25,
26, 28; in 1813, 28; in 1814, 31–
32; in 1820, 51–52, 54–55; in
1821, 56–60; in 1822, 60–62, 66–
67; in º in 1835, I 16
– 17; in 1836, I 18–122, 134–135;
in 1837, 135–136, 143-144; in
1839, 158–160; in 1840, 159–
163; in 1841, 171, 173, 178; in
1842, 179, 184 ; in 1843, 184–
186, 192-193, 195–196; in 1844,
199–201; in 1846, 203; in 1847,
207, 212; in 1848, 215; in 1851,
2 18–219 ; in 1852, 223-224; in
1853, 225–226; in 1854, 239-243,
246, 248; in 1856, 259-261; in
1858, 264—265, 282; in 1863, 282
–284, 286; in 1865, 292; in 1867,
297–299, 301; in 1869, 312-314;
in 1870, 318–319; in 1871, 322;
in 1872, 323-324, 332–334; in
1873, 335, 337-34o, 346; in 1874,
361, 364; in 1876, 4o I-404, 408,
412; in 1879, 413–417; in 188o,
419–421 ; in 1882, 421–424; in
1883, 429–43o ; in 1884, 430–
438; in 1886, 440; in 1890, 446–
448; in 1892, 45o; in 1893, 45 I ;
in 1894, 452, 454; in 1896, 458;
in 1897, 462; in 1898, 465–467
Cortina, Manuel, heads the pronun-
ciamiento against the government,
148; member of the government,
159; influences Espartero, 164–
165, 207, 24o; carries out the
revolution of 1840, 167; leader
of the Radical extremists, 168;
advises Espartero, 171 ; with-
draws his support from, 172 ;
rescues the Queen, 175; leader
of the opposition, 179; president
of the Lower Chamber, 184; im-
prisoned, 196; opposed to ex-
tremist views, 212; member of
the ministry, 266
Corunna, the constitution proclaim-
ed at, 38; junta elected at, 45;
massacre of royalist prisoners at,
68
Costa, Joaquin, leader of repub-
licans, 440
Cristina, Queen; see María Cristina
Cruz, Ramón de la, play-writer, Io
Cuba, threatened intervention of
the United States in, 269; re-
forms granted to, 333; rebellion
in, 358, 364; threat of foreign
intervention in, 398; anarchy in,
399, 455-456; sends deputies to
the Cortes, 402; war in, 407-408,
464–466; peace made, 408; bill
for abolition of slavery introduced,
Ander
414–415 ; slavery abolished in,
439; projected sale of, 442–443;
state of, in 1895, 454–455 ; Mar-
tinez Campos’ campaign in, 457;
order restored in, ib. ; United
States intervene between Spain
and, 458; reforms for, 459; au-
tonomy rejected, 462; war about,
462-467; negotiations for peace,
467–468
Cuenca, surrender of, 375
Dabán, Antonio, General, opposes
army reform, 443
Denmark, supports the claim of
Isabel, IoS
Descarga, battle of, Io9
Dewey, Admiral, commands the
American Pacific squadron, 465
Piary of Madrid, newspaper, 36
Dolores, Nuestra Señora de, 134
Donoso Cortés, member of the
Cortes, 194; Spanish ambassador
in France, 219
Dorregaray, General, commands the
Carlist troops, 35o, 351 ; created
Marquis of Eraul, 353; joins the
Navarrese Carlists, 395
Duero, Marquis of; see Concha,
Manuel de la
Dulce, Domingo, Colonel, defends
the palace at Madrid, 174; pre-
sent at Isabel’s meeting with
Olózaga, 195; joins forces with
O’Donnell, 228; rewarded for
military service, 236; member of
the Cortes of 1854, 240; leader of
the Liberal Union, 3oo; banish-
ed, 3o I
Echagüe, Rafael, General, rewarded
for military service, 236; banish-
ed, 3or ; helps at the siege of
Bilbao, 368; proposes the resto-
ration of the monarchy, 369
Echegaray, José, minister of finance,
363; offers help to the ministry,
285
Eğ, Count of Casa, General, se-
cretary of state, 35; minister for
49 I
war, 4o; his friendship for Ferdi-
nand, 62; heads the Spanish
refugees, 67; commands the Cris-
tinos, 123; deprived of command,
127
El Caney, battle of, 466
Elduayen, José de, minister for
foreign affairs, 429 ; member of
the ministry, 449; establishes the
Spanish Transatlantic Company,
45O
El Empecimado; see Martin, Juan
Elío, Francisco Javier, General, ap-
pointed captain-general of Valen-
cia, 4o ; plot to seize, 42 ; death
of, 64
Elío, Joaquin, General, accused of
treason, I 5o ; supports the cause
of Don Carlos, 154, 367; cap-
tured, 275; pardoned, 276
Elliot, Lord, British envoy, IoS
El Zanjón, peace of, 408, 413
England; see Great Britain
Enrique, Don; see Seville, Duke of
Eroles, Baron, member of the
council of regency, 63; leader of
the refugees, 67
Erro, member of the ministry, 133
Escaño, Antonio, member of the
council of regency, 17
Escoiguiz, Juan, Canon, banished, 38
Escosura, Patricio de la, minister of
the interior, 2.48 ; quarrels with
O'Donnell, ió. ; dismissed from
office, 249; warns Espartero of
his danger, 250
España, Count of, leader of the
refugees, 67; executes justice for
Ferdinand, 76–78; deprived of
command, 85 ; death of, 157
Espartero, Baldomero, Duke of Vic-
tory, commands troops against
the Carlists, Io9, 124, 130, 150,
I53, 157; defeated at Descarga,
Io9 ; deprived of command, 127;
commands in the north, 137 ;
relieves the garrison at Bilbao,
138; minister for war, 14o ; res-
cues Madrid, 141, 143 ; distrusted
by Queen Cristina, 142; cham-
492
Indea:
pion of the Progressives, 144;
restores discipline, 145 ; opposes
Narváez, 146–147; his triumph
over, 148; negotiates with Ma-
roto for peace, 152; his influence
over the Queen, 158; the cham-
pion of the constitution of 1837,
159 ; refuses to be conciliated,
16o ; his interview with Queen
Cristina, 161 ; agrees to form a
ministry, ib.; joins the Queen at
Barcelona, 162; his triumph, 163,
165; refuses to obey her order,
164; forms a ministry, 165, 231 ;
his personal ambition, 166; re-
duces the country to order, 167–
168; resists the proposal of more
than one regent, I 71 ; appointed
regent, 172 ; loses his hold over
the army, 173; plot to overthrow,
174 ; restores order in the north,
176; returns to Madrid, 177 ;
refuses to allow the French am-
bassador to interview the Queen,
178; seeks to rally the disaffected,
179; reduces Catalonia to sub-
mission, 180, 183; losing power,
184, 187; dissolves the Cortes,
184, 186; contemplates abdica-
tion, 185; leaves Madrid, 187;
issues a manifesto, 187—188 ; be-
gins hostilities, 188–189 ; resigns
office, 189, 249 ; censured by the
government, 189-190; directs the
plots of the banished Radicals,
200 ; appointed Senator, 2 lo;
revolution to restore, 213 ; his
entry into Madrid, 232; his
policy, 233; accused of betraying
the popular cause, 238; refuses
the dictatorship, 239; supported
by the Progressives, 240; opposes
Olózaga's motion, 241; presents
the bill for the sale of Church
lands, 244; losing power, 246–
247; tries to reconcile O’Donnell
and Escosura, 248; his cowardice,
25o; his character, 258; refuses
the leadership of the Madrid
junta, 309; refuses to be a can-
didate for the throne, 316; refuses
to form a ministry, 323, 331 ; his
interview , with King Alfonso,
394 ; death of, 41 I
Espoz y Mina, leader of the demo-
crats, 29; escapes to France, 38;
Success of his campaign against
the regency, 64–65; appointed
commander in Catalonia, 66; his
tactics, 68; leader of the Liberals,
8o ; accompanies Don Pedro to
Portugal, 88; returns to Spain,
93; commands the Cristinos,
Io? ; abandons the command,
Io8; pacifies Catalonia, I 16;
Sanctions the murder of Cabrera's
mother, I 25 ; proclaims the con-
stitution of 1812, 129
Evans, Sir George de Lacy, helps to
relieve Bilbao, I 12, 122; defeated
at Hermani, 138
Evora Montes, treaty of, Io;
Fajardo, General, death of, 438
Ferdinand VII, plots the downfall
of Godoy, 1 I ; renounces his right
of succession, 12; a prisoner in
France, ió.; recognised as King,
31 ; negotiates with the regency,
32; his return to Spain, ib.; signs
the declaration of Valencia, 33 ;
tyranny of 34–37, 39; banishes
his advisers, 38–39; appoints a
new ministry, 39 ; in need of
money, 4 I ; becomes a widower,
42 ; marries María Amalia of
Saxony, ib.; swears to observe
the constitution of 1812, 46, 51;
agrees to the demands of the
Liberals, 47; takes the oath, 48;
accepts the ministry recommended
by the junta, 5o; expels the reli-
gious orders, 54; his coup d’état,
55; dismisses the ministry, 56;
his high-handedness resisted by
the ministry, 59 ; resists the ex-
tremists, 6o ; vetoes a motion to
free property from mortmain and
entail, 61; his devotion to the
cause of the Church, 62; refuses
Index
to accept the resignation of the
ministry, 63; refuses to allow the
ministry to quit Madrid, 66; visits
Seville, 67 ; removed by force to
Cadiz, 69; restored to power, ió.;
agrees to the conditions imposed
upon him, 7o ; declares himself
absolute, 7 I ; appoints a new
ministry, 72 ; refuses the royalist
demands, 75 ; suppresses rebel-
lion, 76; puts down the Apostolic
party, 77 ; makes a royal pro-
gress through northern Spain, 78;
his exchequer, 79; induces France
not to support the Liberal exiles,
8o; marries María Cristina, 81 ;
promulgates the Pragmatic Sanc-
tion, 82–83, 85 ; illness of, 84;
revokes the Pragmatic Sanction,
ib.; his recovery, 86; attempts
to secure the succession of Isabel,
87; supports the claim of Don
Miguel to the throne of Portugal,
88–89; death of, 89 ; his charac-
ter, 9o
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, King
Dowager of Portugal, candidate
for the Spanish throne, 317
Fernando, Don, takes part in the
Carlist rising, 275; retracts his
promise to give up his claim to
the throne, 325; death of, 326
Ferrol, junta of 1820, 45; riots in, 334
Ferry, Jules, 427
Figueras, Estanislao, exiled, 41 ;
votes against the monarchy, 240;
president of the Executive Power,
337; leaves the country, 34o
Florez Estrada, Alvaro, I 18
Floridablanca, Count of, censured,
2 ; death of, 16
Fontainebleau, treaty of, I I
France, protests against the proceed-
ings of Ferdinand VII, 39; agrees
to arbitrate between the royalist
and revolutionary parties, 57 ;
orders Spain to change her con-
stitution, 65; invades Spain, 67–
71 ; refuses to acknowledge Fer-
dinand’s claim to interſere in the
493
Portuguese succession, 88; recog-
mises the regency of Queen Cris-
tina, Io; ; signs the treaty of the
Quadruple Alliance, ib.; refuses
supplies for the Carlists, 1 12 ;
sends a contingent to check the
Carlists, I I 2, 12o ; abandons her
policy of intervention, 133; re-
fuses help to the Spanish Con-
servatives, 144 ; offers mediation,
I54 ; refuses to expel Maria Cris-
tina, 178; arranges a marriage
between Maria Louisa and the
Duke of Montpensier, 206; fall
of the Orleans dynasty in, 21 1 ;
helps to restore Pius IX to his
throne, 215–216; lays the founda-
tions of her eastern empire, 268;
refuses intervention in the war
with Morocco, 27 I ; enters into
an alliance against Mexico, 277;
attempts to annex Mexico, ib.;
opposes the candidature of I’rince
Leopold for the throne of Spain,
317 ; concludes a treaty of com-
merce with Spain, 412; jealous
of Spain's attitude towards Ger-
many, 427; proposes the rectifi-
cation of the north-west African
frontier, 444; offers mediation
between the United States and
Spain, 464
Francisca de Asis, wife of Don
Carlos, 42 ; her influence over
him, 83 ; saluted as the coming
sovereign, 84
Francisco de Asis, King of Spain,
marries Isabel, 205–206; sepa-
rates from her, 208; forms a cabal
against her, 209; reconciliation
with her, 21 1 ; tries to use the
royal prerogative, 2.16; deprived
of the post of Intendant of the
Royal Patrimony, 217 ; seeks an
alliance with the Carlists, 274
Francisco de Paula, Don, brother
of Ferdinand VII, 81 ; takes the
oath of allegiance to Isabel, 87
Frias, Joaquin Fernandez de Velasco,
Duke of, president of the council,
494
Index
I47; resigns office, 149; member
of the ministry, 193
Fulgencio, Fray, monk, 217
Gamazo, Germán, member of the
ministry, 437; minister of finance,
45o ; his budget, 452 ; resigns
office, 453 ; advocates reform in
Cuba, 455
Gaminde, General, resigns his com-
mand in Catalonia, 338
Garay, Martín de, minister of
finance, 41 ; his financial schemes,
41, 59
Garcia de Polavieja, General, com-
mands troops against the Philip-
pines, 459
Garrido, Fernando, on O’Donnell's
accession to power, 251
Garrigó, Brigadier, pardoned, 230
Gasset, Eduardo, opposes the elec-
tion of Amadeo of Savoy as King
of Spain, 318
Genoa, Duke of, refuses the crown
of Spain, 318
Gérardin, Emile de, 419
Germany, seeks an alliance with
Spain, 317; sympathises with the
republic, 376; concludes a com-
mercial agreement with Spain,
427 ; quarrels with Spain about
the possession of the island of
Yap, 433–434
Gerona, fall of, 17; mutiny at, 294
Godoy, Manuel, complimented by
Quintana, Io; his negotiations
with Napoleon, I I ; surrender of,
I 2
Gomez, Miguel, General, leader of
the Carlists, 127; his tactics, 127–
I29, 133; acts as spokesman of
the mutineers of La Granja, 131–
I 32
González, Antonio, president of the
council, 172
González Bravo, Luis, member of
the Cortes, 194, 265; president of
the council, 196, 3o I ; his policy,
196–198; resigns office, 198, 304;
appointed ambassador to Portu-
gal, 198; joins the Conservative
coalition, 208; excluded from
office, 264; minister of the in-
terior, 296; challenges the ma-
tion, 298; his dictatorship, 301–
302; welcomes Isabel at Bayonne,
308
Goya, Francisco José, painter, Io
Granada, earthquake in, 433
Grant, President, demands the re-
storation of order in Cuba, 399
Great Britain, withdraws her friend-
ship from Spain, 37; protests
against Ferdinand VII’s proceed-
ings, 39; refuses help to Spain,
57; offers arbitration, 65; supports
the claim of Maria de la Gloria to
the throne of Portugal, 88; sends
an army under Sir Charles Napier,
89; supports the claim of Isabel
to the throne of Spain, IoA ;
signs the treaty of the Quadruple
Alliance, IoS ; refuses to pledge
herself to support French inter-
vention, 1 12 ; sends help to the
Cristinos, I 12, 133; offers media-
tion, 154 ; intervenes for an
exchange of prisoners, I56; dis-
cusses a commercial treaty with
Spain, 182, 432 ; discusses the
question of the Spanish marriages,
204–205; condemns the retrograde
policy of France, 206; sends troops
to restore order in Portugal, 209;
breaks off diplomatic relations
with Spain, 21.3; offers mediation
in the war with Morocco, 271 ;
enters into an alliance against
Mexico, 277 ; concludes a com-
mercial treaty with Spain, 438;
sends troops to Morocco, 445;
refuses to sympathise with Spain's
misfortunes in Cuba, 465
Gregory XVI, Pope, upholds the
rights of the Church, 17o
Grévy, President of French Re-
public, entertains Alfonso, 427–
428
Guergué, General, tries to enforce
discipline among the Carlists,
Index
126; commander-in-chief of the
Carlists, 146, 15o
Guetaria, siege of 396; relief of, 4oo
Guide to Madrid, newspaper, 36
Guipúzcoa, invasion of, 138; peace
signed at, 156
Guizot, François, French minister for
foreign affairs, 171; his policy, ib.;
refuses to agree to the demands of
Spain, 178; exacts an apology
from Espartero's government,
183–184
Gurrea, leader of the revolt in
Catalonia, 8o
Gutierrez de la Concha ; see Concha
Habana, Marquis of la; see Concha,
José
Hay, Lord John, 154
Hernani, battle of, 138; siege of,
Herrera, battle of, 14o
Hidalgo, Baltasar, General, captain-
general of the Basque Provinces,
334; transferred to Catalonia, ib.
Hort, Nuestra Señora del, 126
Huesca, battle of, 139
Hugo, Victor, 43 I
Independence, the war of ; see
Peninsular War
Infante, Facundo, General, rewarded
for military service, 236
Inquisition, the, work of, 2; abo-
lished, 26, 47; reestablished, 34
Iribarreri, General, death of, 139
Irun, siege of 377–378
Isabel, Infanta, birth of, 223
Isabel, Princess, regent of Portugal,
Isabel, Queen of Spain, birth of, 81 ;
succeeds Ferdinand, 91 ; pro-
claimed Queen, 130; schemes for
the marriage of, 132, 141, 203–
205; left in charge of Quintana,
166, 173; failure of the plot to
seize, 175; begins to rule, 192;
chooses her ministry, 193; quarrels
with Olózaga, 195; recognised by
the Pope, 202 ; marries Francisco
495
de Asis, 206; separates from him,
208; dismisses the ministry, ib. ;
her popularity, 209; recalls
Narváez, 2 Io; reconciliation with
her husband negotiated, 21 i ;
abandons her claim for money,
217 ; gives birth to a son, 2 18;
attempt to murder, 223; receives
a manifesto from the Liberal party,
226; attacked in The Bat, 227;
refuses O’Donnell's demands,
228 ; recognises the junta of
Madrid, 230; interviews Espartero,
232 ; makes over her powers to
him, 233; opens Parliament, 240;
refuses to sign the bill for sale of
Church lands, 24.4; accepts it,
245; favours O’Donnell, 247–248;
dismisses Escosura, 249 ; her
clerical policy, 253–254, 259, 266;
favours Narváez, 254 ; dismisses
him, 261 ; seeks an alliance with
the Carlists, 274, 327 ; makes a
progress in the south, 278; with-
draws support from O’Donnell,
28o ; makes an enemy of Prim,
284 ; agrees to give up two-thirds
of her estate, 288 ; under the
influence of favourites, 289; her
character, 290 ; recalls O’Donnell
to power, 291 ; makes a speech
to the Cortes, 292 ; ignores her
danger, 301; receives news of the
revolution, 3o4; retires to France,
305; estimate of her reign, 306;
accepts the hospitality of Napo-
leon, 308; interferes with the
government, 409–4 Io; present at
Alfonso's deathbed, 436; claims
the regency, 437; leaves Spain,
442
Isabel of Braganza, Queen of Spain,
death of, 42
Isturiz, Francisco Javier de, leader
of the Liberals, 8o; returns from
exile, 93, 141; leader of the Pro-
gressives, I 19 ; president of the
council, 120, 203, 262 ; appeals
to France for help against the
Carlists, 130 ; resigns office, 132,
496
Index
207, 263; expelled from England,
2 I 3
Italy, war in, 215–216, 269
Jaime de Bourbon, Don, visits Spain,
453
Jerez, revolt at, 447
Jesuits, expulsion of, 50, II 3, 220 ;
restored to their possessions, 266
John, King of Portugal, death of,
8
Melchor de,
of the
7
Jovellanos, Gaspar
censured, 2 ; member
junta, 15
Jovellar, Joaquín, commander in the
north-east, 375; in the centre,
381, 383 ; declares for Alfonso,
384; member of the ministry,
391 ; president of the council,
397 ; his policy, 399; resigns
office, 4oo, 439; joins the northern
army, 4oo; minister for war, 439
Juan, Don, younger son of Don
Carlos, claims the Spanish throne,
325; refuses to withdraw or explain
his claim, 326, 327
Juárez, Benito, President of the
Republic of Mexico, 276–277
Lacy, Luis de, leader of the rising
in Catalonia, 4o
Ladrón, Don Santos, heads the
Carlists, IoI ; captured and shot,
2ö.
Lafuente, Modesto, draws up the
constitution of 1855, 24.I
La Granja, insurrection at, I 30–13 I
Lardizabal, Miguel de, member of
the council of regency, 17 ; secre-
tary of state, 35
Larra, Mariano José, expresses his
contempt for ‘The Royal Statute,’
96
Laserna, General, takes command
in the north, 377, 391 ; goes to
the relief of Irun, 378-379; re-
fuses to declare for a monarchy,
383 ; receives a deputation, 387 ;
rules in place of Serrano, 388 ;
defeated by the Carlists, 394
Latre, General, minister for war,
I44
Leo XIII, acts as mediator between
Spain and Germany, 434; offers
to mediate between Spain and the
United States, 464
Leon, Bishop of, Ferdinand's ad-
viser, 84; withdraws from Court,
5
León, Diego, General, fights against
the Carlists, 153–154; leader of
the Moderado party, 159; supports
the cause of Cristina, 163, 174;
captured and shot, 175
Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern-
Sigmaringen, candidate for the
Spanish throne, 317
Leopold, Duke of Saxe-Coburg,
wishes to marry Isabel, 204
Lersundi, Francisco, General, pre-
sident of the council, 225; resigns
office, 225, 26 I; minister of marine,
256; governor of Cuba, 293;
opposes the election of Amadeo
as King, 318
Lesseps, French consul-general at
Barcelona, 179; fosters insurrec-
tion, I79, 183
Lightning Flash, the (el Relámpago),
newspaper, 299
Linares,General, censures the govern-
ment, 159; receives promotion,
16o; deprived of commands, 185
Llauder, Manuel, General, minister
for war, 98; resigns office, 99 ;
opposes the Carlists, Ioz
Llorente, Alejandro, leader of the
Liberals, 290
Loma, José Maria de, General,
suppresses strike at Bilbao, 447
Lopez Dominguez, General, re-
duces Cartagéna to submission,
348, 365; commands the army of
Catalonia, 381, 385; deprived of
command, 391 ; candidate for the
presidency of Congress, 424; op-
poses Sagasta’s religious views,
427; minister for war, 428; loses
office, 436; refuses to be a mem-
ber of the ministry, 437; opposes
Ander
army reform, 443; member of
the ministry, 450
López, Joaquín María, leader of
the Progressives, 97; denounces
the ministry, Io9; opposes French
intervention, 121 ; member of the
ministry, 133; resigns office, 136,
185; quarrels with Espartero, 172;
leader of the opposition, 179;
president of the council, 184;
helps the Queen to choose her
ministry, 193
Lorenzana, Juan Alvarez de, minister
for foreign affairs, 31o
Most and Found, newspaper, 2
Louis Napoleon; see Napoleon III
Louis XVIII of France, receives a
deputation from Ferdinand, 62;
sends troops to help his cause, 66
Louis Philippe, objects to armed
intervention for Spain, I I I ; fears
revolution, 133, 17o; refuses help
to the Spanish Conservatives, 1.44;
supports the cause of Queen Cris-
tina, 170–171, 173, 204; refuses
to acknowledge Espartero as re-
gent, 178; his marriage schemes,
204–206; interviews Queen Vic-
toria at Chateau d’Eu, 204; down-
fall of, 21 I
Louisa Maria, wife of Charles IV,
IO-I 2
Lowell,James Russell, United States
ambassador in Madrid, 355
Lucena, Count of ; see O’Donnell,
Enrique, Count of La Bisbal
Luis, King of Portugal, refuses the
Spanish throne, 317 ; attends the
opening of the Madrid-Cáceres-
Lisbon Railway, 422 ; visits the
Madrid Exhibition, 451
Macanãz, Melchor Rafael de, minis-
ter of justice, banished, 36
Maceo, Antonio, death of, 458
MacKinley, William, President of
the United States, his message
to Congress, 463; declares war
with Spain, 464; offers terms of
peace, 467
C. S.
497
MacMahon, Maurice, Marshal, Pre-
sident of the French Republic,
364; refuses help to the Spanish
democrats, 376
Madoz, Pascual, member of the
Cortes, 240 ; president of the
Cortes, 241; excluded from office,
264; president of the Madrid
junta, 309
Madrid, isolation of, 26–27 ; arrest
of Liberals in, 33; junta appointed
in, 47, 309; mutiny in, 55, 63, 99,
I 15, 146, 163–164, 174, 188, 212–
213, 226, 231, 249-251, 292-294,
334, 439, 450, 460 ; French occu-
pation of, 67–68; oath of alle-
giance to Isabel taken at, 87;
Carlist plot discovered at, 89 ;
outbreak of cholera in, 96; at-
tacked by the Carlists, 141, 143 ;
banquet at, 285; supports the
cause of Alfonso, 379, 386, 392 ;
exhibition in, 45 I
Madrid-Cáceres- Lisbon Railway,
opening of the, 422
AZadrid Gazette, newspaper, 2
Majaceite, defeat of Carlists at, I 27
Malaga, revolution in, 341–342; re-
duced to order, 347
Malcampo, José, Admiral, president
of the council, 323; resigns office,
323, 324; minister of marine, 323
Manila, blockaded, 465; fall of, 468
Manila Bay, battle of, 465
Mano AWegra (secret society), 423–5
. Manzanares, Programme of, 229 ;
adopted, 231
Marfori, Carlos, minister of marine,
299
María Amalia, Queen of Spain,
marries Ferdinand, 42 ; death of,
81
María Cristina, Queen of Spain
(daughter of the King of the two
Sicilies), marries Ferdinand, 81 ;
her influence over him, 83 ; tries
to secure the succession for her
daughter, 84; appointed regent,
85; appointed to a seat in the
Royal Council, 86; difficulty of
32
498
Aazdea:
her position, 91 ; dismisses Zea
Bermúdez from power, 93 ; losing
popularity, 99 ; allows Toreno to
form a ministry, I 13; presides
Over the conference to discuss the
repression of revolution, 115; mis-
trusts Mendizabal, I 17 ; opposes
his policy, I 19-12o ; issues a
manifesto, 121 ; publishes a pro-
clamation, 130 ; signs a decree
ordering the observation of the
constitution of 1812, 131 ; nego-
tiates a marriage between Isabel
and the Duke of Asturias, 132 ;
her powers confirmed, 135; mis-
trusts Espartero, 142 ; calls the
Conservatives to power, 143; re-
fuses to take part in the struggle
between Narváez and Espartero,
147; under the influence of
Espartero, 158, 163; allies with
the Moderates, 159; tries to con-
ciliate Espartero, 16o; her private
life, 161 ; goes to Barcelona, 162;
orders Espartero to march against
the rebels of Madrid, 164; orders
him to form a ministry, 165;
abdication of, ió. ; sails for Mar-
seilles, 166; receives protection
from Louis Philippe, 170–171 ;
outvoted for the regency, 172;
demands the right to protect
her daughter, 173; declares war
against Espartero, 173–174; dis-
avows complicity in the Madrid
insurrection, 177; her pension
withdrawn, 177, 239; pension
restored, 197; returns to Madrid,
198, 2 I I ; her marriage schemes,
204–205; retires to France, 209;
opposes Narváez, 218; corruption
of, 223, 227–228; opposes a re-
vision of the constitution of 1845,
224 ; attacked for implication in
railway concessions, 225; attacked
by the opposition, 226; ques-
tion of the punishment of, 237 ;
leaves Madrid, 238; acknow-
ledges Alfonso as King, 318;
death of, 41 I -
María Cristina, Queen of Spain
(daughter of the Archduke of
Austria), marries Alfonso XII,
416; character of, 436; becomes
regent, 437 ; her devotion to
religion, 438; pardons the re-
volutionaries in Madrid, 439 ;
popularity of, 441 ; her character,
445; recalls Cánovas to power,
445, 460 ; tries to evade war with
the United States, 464; sub-
scribes to the war fund, 465
María de la Gloria, claims the
throne of Portugal, 88; takes
refuge in England, ib. ; pro-
claimed Queen at Lisbon, 89
María Luisa, Infanta (daughter of
Ferdinand VII), marries the
Duke of Montpensier, 204–206;
banished, 302
Maroto, Rafael, General, leader of
the Carlist troops, 122, 146,
151; resigns his command, 126;
refuses to give up his command,
I 53; accused of treason, I53–154;
signs the convention of Vergara,
I 54
Martín, Juan (El Empecimado),
leader of the democrats, 29; of
the royalists, 58; death of, 75
Martínez, Alonso, member of the
cabinet, 248, 282, 437; resigns
office, 248, 283, 37 I ; ceases to
support the ministry, 278; de-
feated in the general election of
1872, 333; minister of justice,
37 I, 420; joins the royalists,
409 ; his influence, 439
Martínez Campos, Arsenio, Marshal,
restores order in Valencia, 344; in
Cartagena, 348; helps to relieve
Bilbao, 368–369; acts the traitor,
383; declares for a monarchy, ib.;
excluded from the ministry, 391;
captures La Seo de Urgel, 395;
commands the Army of the Right,
4oo; his campaign against the
Carlists, 401 ; restores order in
Cuba, 4oz–408, 456; his conces-
sions, 408, 454; president of the
Index
council, 413; defends the treaty of
El Zanjón, 414; recommends the
abolition of slavery in Cuba, İb. ;
resigns office, ib. ; joins the op-
position, 416–417; his attack on
Cánovas, 418; minister for war,
420; commands the forces sent
against Badajos, 426 ; summoned
to Alfonso’s deathbed, 437; op-
poses Cassola's scheme for army
reform, 443; deprived of office,
444; wounded at Barcelona, 448;
commands against the Riff Moors,
452; proposes to indemnify the
government, 465
Martínez de la Rosa, Francisco de
Paula, banished, 39; president of
the council, 60, 94; supports
Ferdinand, 62; resigns office, 63,
I Io; his early career, 63; his
political code, 95; commands a
majority in the Cortes, 97; his
inability to restore order, 99;
negotiates with the Powers, I 12;
approves the constitution of 1837,
136 ; returns to power, 141 ;
supports the Ofalia ministry, 143;
member of the Cortes, 194;
minister for foreign affairs, 198,
202; votes against the ministerial
nominee for the presidency of the
Cortes, 223; president of the
Cortes, 259; member of the minis-
try, 262; president of the Lower
House, 265
Martos, Cristino, president of the
National Assembly, 338; minister
of justice, 363; leader of the demo-
crats, 422 ; disavows Sagasta for
his religious views, 427
Mataflorida, Marquis of, minister
of justice, 43; member of the
regency, 63
Maura, Antonio, colonial minister,
455; deprived of office, 26.
Melbourne, Lord, prime minister,
II 2
Melilla, revolt in, 452
Méndez Nuñez, Admiral, commands
the ships sent against Chile, 287
499
Mendez Vigo, minister for war, 131
Mendigorría, battle of, 1 II, 122
Mendizabal, Juan Alvarez, Liberal
agent, 44, 8o ; accompanies Don
Pedro to Portugal, 88 ; ambas-
sador to England, I 12 ; his diplo-
macy, 26. ; minister of finance,
I 13, 185; confiscates the property
of the Church, I 14 ; president of
the council, I 15; his policy, I 16–
I 18, 134, 182, 187; loses power,
I 19; resigns office, I 20; member
of the ministry, 133; member of
the Cortes, 207 ; opposed to
extremist views, 212 ; works to
overthrow Murillo, 224
Mercedes, Queen of Spain, daughter
of the Duke of Montpensier,
marries Alfonso, 4 Io; death of,
ió.
Merino, Jerónimo, soldier-priest,
leader of the Catholics, 58;
harries Castille, 65; joins the
French army, 67 ; commands the
Carlists in Castille, 1 oz ; joins
Don Carlos in Portugal, ib.
Merino, Martin, plots the Queen’s
death, 223
Metternich, Clement Wenceslaus,
Count, Austrian statesman, his
influence at the Congress of
Verona, 57; supports Ferdinand,
88; agrees to a compromise with
Louis Philippe, I 33
Mexico, war in, 277
Mier, Baron de, commander of the
Cristinos, 139
Miguel, Don, claims the throne of
Portugal, 87; declares himself
King, 88 ; makes common cause
with Don Carlos, 89; signs the
treaty of Evora Montes, Io;;
opposes the Queen's authority,
209
Miraflores, Marquis of, advocates
reform, 93 ; signs the treaty of the
Quadruple Alliance, Io; ; returns
from exile, 141 ; president of the
council, 203, 281 ; resigns office,
203, 224, 283; governor of the
32–2
5OO
Ander
royal household, 211 ; dismissed
216; minister of foreign affairs,
219; creates the Ministry of Over-
seas, 282 ; president of the Senate,
297
Molé, Count Louis-Mathieu, 133
Molins, Mariano Roca de Togores,
Marquis of, minister of commerce,
208; member of the ministry, 391;
minister for foreign affairs, 413
Mon, Alejandro, member of the
Cortes, 194; minister of finance,
IQ8, 203; resigns office, 217, 285;
works to overthrow Murillo, 224;
sides with the opposition, 225;
member of the ministry, 262, 266;
president of the council, 284
Monroe Doctrine, the, 66
Monte Jurra, battle of, 357
Montemolin, Carlos Luís, Count of,
birth of, 42 ; projected husband
of Isabel, 205; asserts his claim
to the throne, 207 ; rising in
favour of, 275 ; retracts the deed
of Tortosa, 325; death of, 326
Montero Rios, Eugenio, disavows
Sagasta for his religious views,
427; member of the ministry,
437, 450
Montmorency, M., French repre-
sentative at the Congress of
Verona, 65
Montojo, Patricio, commander of
the Pacific squadron, 465
Montpensier, Antoine, Duke of,
marries the Infanta Maria Louisa,
204–206; joins the Liberals, 298;
banished, 302; offers his services
to therevolutionaries, 3o4; ordered
to Portugal, 312 ; candidate for
the throne, 316; offers to support
Espartero, ib.; accused of the
assassination of Prim, 320 ; sup-
ports the cause of Alfonso, 332;
promised the regency, 364; refuses
to remain abroad, 442
Morales, Francisco Ramón, General,
55
Morella, the Carlist stronghold, Ioz;
siege of 155-156
Moreno González, Vicente, com-
mands the Carlists, 1 II; deprived
of command, 123
Moret, Segismundo, leader of the
Liberal opposition in Congress,
424; disavows Sagasta for his
liberal views, 427; minister for
home affairs, 428 ; his hatred of
Romero Robledo, 434 ; member
of the ministry, 444, 450 ; his
policy in Morocco, 445
Morillo, Pablo, General, captain-
general of New Castille, 58; com-
mander in Galicia, 66
Moriones, Domingo, General, leader
of the revolutionary party, 293,
299, 300 ; defeats the Carlists at
Oroquieta, 330; resigns his com-
mand, 338; defeated at Monte
Jurra, 357 ; in command of the
Liberal forces, 365; goes to the
relief of Bilbao, 366–367 ; his
popularity in the army, 373;
commands the troops in Navarre,
374; defends the Navarrese lines,
38o ; interviews Serrano, 381 ; a
declared republican, 382 ; com-
mands the troops sent to Madrid,
387 ; raises the blockade of Pam-
plona, 394 ; heads the garrison of
San Sebastian, 4oo; joins Martínez
Campos, 401
Morocco, Spanish relations with,
269-27 I ; war with, 271-273;
danger of French interference in,
444; appeals to Spain to re-
assemble the conference of 1880,
445; Riff Moors rise in, 452 ;
comes to terms with Spain, ió.
Moyano, Claudio, 4 Io
Muñagorri, political agent, 152
Muñoz, Fernando, Duke of Rian-
zares, marries the Queen Regent,
161 ; created Duke of Rianzares,
197; corruption of, 223-227
Murat, Joachim, General, 13
Murviedro, revolt at, 384
Napier, Sir Charles, commands the
forces sent to Portugal, 89
Andea:
Naples, sends help to Pius IX,
2 I 5
Napoleon I, his dealings with Fer-
dinand, 6; invades Spain, I 1 ;
makes his brother Joseph King,
12; his conciliatory attitude to-
wards Spain, 13; draws up a mew
constitution, 14; makes terms
with Ferdinand, 31
Napoleon III, coup d'état of, 223;
offers hospitality to Isabel, 30.8;
supports the election of Ferdinand
of Saxe-Coburg to the throne of
Spain, 317
Narváez, Ramón María, General,
commands forces against the Car-
lists, 124, 126–127, 129, 133; rise
of, 146; refuses to fight under
Espartero, 147; resigns his com-
mand, 148; accused of treason,
I49; banished, ió. ; excluded from
the Cortes, I 58; returns to Spain,
I59; supports the cause of Cris-
tina, 175, 188; founds the Spanish
Military Order, 187; the strong-
hold of the Conservatives, 191,
194; opposes Olézaga, 196; presi-
dent of the council, 198, 21 1, 256,
286, 295; his policy, 200–203; re-
signs office, 203, 218, 26.1, 291 ;
retires to France, ió.; recalled, 2 Io;
prorogues the Cortes, 212 ; his
determined attitude, 213; plot
to dismiss, 216 ; opposes Bravo
Murillo's schemes, 217 ; ambas-
sador to Vienna, 224 ; recalled,
225; his character, 257–259; de-
fends himself against O’Donnell’s
charge, 26o; his coercive methods,
290 ; wounded, 294; his dictator-
ship, 296; death of, 3oo
National Debt, in the 18th century,
8; in 1811, 22 ; in 1835, I 18;
in 1840, 169; in 1844, 198; in
1851, 219 ; in 1859, 268; in 1873,
349 ; in 1874, 407; in 1881, 422 ;
in 1890, 443; in 1893, 452 ; in
1898, 468 ; proposed suspension
of payment of interest on, 41, 98,
I 34; L 42
5OI
National League, the, formed to
resist colonial reform, 333
Negri, Lieutenant, 155
Nocedal, Cándido, General, member
of the Cortes, 194, 297 ; leader of
the Ultramontanes, 240; minister
of the interior, 255; member of
Don Carlos’ assembly at Vevey,
329-33o
Nogueras, Cristino, 125
Nouvilas, Ramón, General, minister
for war, 356; resigns office, ib. ;
captured by the Carlists, 374
Novaliches, Marquis of; see Pavia,
Don Manuel
Ocaña, defeat of Spanish at, 17
O'Donnell, Enrique, Count of La
Bisbal, afterwards Count of .
Lucena, General, deprived of com-
mand, 44; proclaims the consti-
tution of 1812, 46; commands the
Madrid district, 6o; leader of the
refugees, 67 ; deprived of com-
mand, 68; opposes the Carlists,
I5o ; commands the army of the
centre, I 56; opposes Espartero,
I59; takes up the cause of the
Queen Regent, 163, 174, 181, 187;
works to overthrow Bravo Mu-
rillo, 224 ; on the side of the
opposition, 225; leader of the
Madrid revolution, 227–229 ;
created Count of Lucena, 227; his
entry into Madrid, 233; minister
for war, ib. ; supported by the
Ultramontanes, 240 ; increase in
his influence, 247; quarrels with
Escosura, 248; refuses a com-
promise, 249 ; president of the
council, 249, 263, 291 ; over-
throws Espartero, 25o ; seizes
power, 251 ; rallies the Liberals
round him, 253 ; forced to give
way on the question of Church pro-
perty, 254; resigns office, ió. ;
his character, 258-259 ; charges
Narváez with breach of faith, 26o;
adopts the constitution of 1845,
264; his attitude towards the
5O2
Index
Cortes, 265; adopts the clerical
policy of Isabel, 266; his policy,
267–269 ; demands satisfaction
from Morocco for acts of hos-
tility, 270 ; declares war, 271 ;
his terms of peace, 273; sends
help to the people of Santo Do-
mingo against Cuba, 276; takes
part in the Mexican war, 277 ;
his cruelty towards the Andalu-
sians, 278-279; reconstructs his
cabinet, 279; resigns office, 28o;
directs Mon’s ministry, 285; ad-
vises the recall of Narváez, 286;
refuses to lead the malcontents,
298; death of, 3oo
Ofalia, Count of, president of the
council, 72, 143; deprived of
office, 74; supports Espartero,
I 45
Olivenza (district of), assigned to
Portugal, 37
Olózaga, Salustiano de, opposes the
policy of the regency, 93, I I 5 ;
civil governor of Madrid, 1 16;
member of the Cortes, I 18, 159,
209; draws up the constitution
of 1837, 135, 144; ambassador
to France, 171–172 ; refuses to
form a coalition cabinet, 179, 184;
president of the Lower House,
179, 192 ; president of Congress,
193; his policy, 194; quarrels
with Isabel, 195; resigns office,
196; banished, 207 ; pardoned,
209; opposes Bravo Murillo, 224;
leader of the Progressives, 240,
265, 285; draws up the con-
stitution of 1855, 241 ; presents a
report, 242; excluded from office,
264; refuses to form an opposition,
282
Oporto, blockaded, 89
Oráa, General, commands the army
of the north, 137 ; defeated by
Don Carlos, 139 ; concentrates
his troops, 14o ; at the siege of
Morella, 155
Orense, Bishop of, president of the
council of regency, 18; protests
against the proposal of the Cortes,
20; banished, 26
Orense, José María, Marquis of
Albaida, leader of the Radical
Club, 238; preaches republican-
ism, 315
Oroquieta, battle of 330
Ortega, Jaime, General, removed
from Madrid, 223; commander
of the Carlists, 274 ; death of,
275
Osma, Bishop of, supports Ferdi-
mand, 75; commander of the
Cristinos, Io'7
Ostend, conference at, 297
Ostolaza, royalist leader, 38
Pacheco, Francisco, forms the Puri-
tan party, 204; president of the
council, 208; writes the Queen's
speech, 240
Palafox, José de, General, summons
the Parliament of Aragon, 16
Palmerston, Lord, signs the treaty
of the Quadruple Alliance, Io; ;
sends troops against the Carlists,
I 33 ; tries to negotiate a commer-
cial treaty, 142 ; protests against
the Spanish marriage, 206
Pamplona, blockaded, 394
Pareja, Admiral, presents an ulti-
matum to Chile, 287
Parma, Prince of, dethroned, 269
Parma, Princess of, marriage of, 205
Pastor Diaz, Nicomedes, forms the
“Puritan' party, 204; minister,
249; resigns office, 279
Patrocinio, Sor María de los Do-
lores, expelled from Court, 217 ;
reappears, 266; her influence at
Court, 289; rebukes the Queen, 291
Pavia, Don Manuel, Marquis of
Novaliches, General, heads the
rising in Barcelona, 175; restores
order in Portugal, 2 Io; commands
troops against the Carlists, 214;
against the revolutionary forces,
3o4–305; takes command in the
Basque Provinces and Navarre,
338; restores order in Andalusia,
Index
344-345, 347; resigns his com-
mand, 346–347; commands the
northern army, 352 ; offers Cas-
telar the support of the army, 360;
his coup d'état, 361-362; forms a
coalition ministry, 362; urges re-
form in Cuba, 417 ; congratulates
Serrano, 432 ; summoned to Al-
fonso's deathbed, 437
Pedro, Emperor of Brazil, 87; ab-
dicates the throne, 88
Peel, Sir Robert, policy of, 178
Pelotillo, battle of, 126
Peñacerrada, capture of, 152
Peña Plata, capture of, 4or
Peninsular War, outbreak of, 13;
success of the allies, 17; Welling-
ton's campaigns, 27; end of, 28
Perales, Marquis of, appointed go-
vernor of Madrid, 23o
Peru, war in, 286–287
Philippine Islands, the, insurrection
in, 459 ; ceded to the United
States, 468
Pidal, Pedro José, Marquis of, minis-
ter of the interior, 198, 203; ex-
tends the franchise, 207 ; sends
help to Pius IX, 2 16; opposes
the revision of the constitution,
224 ; sides with the opposition,
225; minister of foreign affairs,
256; excluded from office, 263
Pidal y Mon, Alejandro, son of the
above, leader of the Ultramon-
tanes, 397, 403; minister of public
works, 429 ; proposes to censure
the government, 422; his clerical
policy, 432–433 ; leader of the
Conservatives, 463
Pierrad, Blas, socialistic preacher,
I5
Pſi. IX, driven from Rome, 215;
restored to power, 2.16; breaks oft
diplomatic relations with Spain,
245; confers the ‘Golden Rose’
on Isabel, 290 ; reestablishes
cordial relations with Spain, 358;
acknowledges Alfonso, 392 ; pro-
tests against the ecclesiastical
policy of Cánovas, 403
5O3
Pi y Margall, Francisco, republican
leader, 297; minister of the in-
terior, 339; president of the
council, 340, 357; his policy,
343; resigns office, 344, 357; his
hatred of Romero Robledo, 434;
refuses to support Cánovas' finan-
cial schemes, 450 ; member of
Congress, 451
Pizarro, member of the ministry, 41
Platerias, Las, battle of, 59
Polavieja, Garcia de ; see Garcia
Pope, the ; see Gregory XVI, Leo
XIII, and Pius IX
Porlier, Juan, death of, 38
Portugal, King of; see John and
Luis -
Portugal, Queen Dowager of; see
Charlotte
Portugal, question of the succession
to the throne of, 87–89; signs the
treaty of the Quadruple Alliance,
IoS; anarchy in, 209–2 Io; opposes
the succession of a Portuguese
King to the throne of Spain, 317;
suspicious of Spain's proposal for
a closer union, 423
Posada Herrera, Juan, minister of
the interior, 263; forms Cortes
of 1858; 246–265; declines to
form a ministry, 415 ; leads the
opposition, 4 17 ; candidate for
the presidency of Congress, 424 ;
president of the council, 428; his
policy, 26. ; resigns office, 429
Pragmatic Sanction, the, 83–84
Prim, Juan, Count of Reus,
General, leads the revolt in Cata-
lonia, 186; governor of Madrid,
188 ; created Conde de Reus,
191 ; removed from Madrid, 223;
votes against the monarchy, 241;
member of the ministry, 266;
takes part in the war against
Morocco, 272 ; against Mexico,
277 ; opposes Isabel, 284; in-
cites rebellion, 29.1–292, 295,
3o4; retires to Portugal, 293 ;
returns to Spain, 294; offers to
serve with O’Donnell, 298; fails
5O4
Index
to excite a rising in Valencia, 299;
takes part in the revolution of
1866, 302; signs the revolution-
ary manifesto, 303 ; minister for
war, 3 Io; leader of the majority
in the Cortes, 313; president of
the council, 314 ; tries to restore
the monarchy, 315, 318–319; re-
fuses an alliance with Germany,
317 ; assassination of, 319; esti-
mate of his work, 320
Primo de Ribera, Fernando, Mar-
quis of Estella, plays the part of
traitor, 383-384; captain-general
of Madrid, 385 ; his defection,
386; declares for the King, 387;
member of the council, 391 ; cap-
tures Monte Jurra, 4o I; opposes
Cassola’s scheme for army reform,
443; deprived of office, 443; his
campaign in the Philippines, 459
Prussia, orders Spain to change
her constitution, 65 ; supports
the cause of Don Carlos, Io; ;
favours a marriage between Isabel
and the Count of Montemolin,
205; recognises Isabel as Queen,
213; supports the candidature of
Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-
Sigmaringen to the throne of
Spain, 317
Pucheta, bull-fighter, 231, 235
Puerto Rico, sends deputies to the
Cortes, 402 ; autonomy granted
to, 462 ; ceded to the United
States, 467
Quadruple Alliance, treaty of the,
IoS, 209
Quesada, Jenaro de, General, re-
fuses to declare for a monarchy,
383 ; commands the army of the
centre, 391 ; commander-in-chief,
396; commands the army of the
left, 4oo; minister for war, 429
Quesada, Vicente Jenaro de, Gene-
ral, supports the cause of Ferdi-
mand, 56; leads the refugees, 67;
conspires against Llauder, 98; in
favour at Court, 99; commands
the Cristinos, to 4; his cruelty,
ib. ; deprived of command, Ioſ ;
deserts Olázaga, I 15 ; supports
the Queen Regent, I 19 ; death
of, I 32
Quintana, Manuel José, poet, 9, 15,
166, 173
Quiroga, Antonio, Colonel, ring-
leader of the mutiny at Madrid,
45; vice-president of the Cortes,
52; receives increase of pension,
58
Ranier, Archduke of Austria, 416
Reus, Count of; see Prim, Juan
Revolution of 1868, the, preparations
for, 299–302 ; capture of Cadiz,
302; revolutionary manifesto, 303;
both sides gather forces, 3o4;
battle of Alcolea, 305; flight of
Isabel, ió. ; results of, 3 II
Rianzares, Duke of; see Muñoz,
Fernando
Riego, Rafael del, Major, pro-
claims the constitution of Cadiz,
44; heads the revolt in Cadiz,
45; general in command and aide-
de-camp to Ferdinand, 52; com-
mands the garrison in Asturias,
54; captain-general of Aragon,
56; increase of pension, 58; de-
prived of command in Aragon,
59; president of the Cortes, 6o;
advises the King, 64; his execu-
tion, 7 I
Rios y Rosas, member of the Cortes,
24o; supports O'Donnell, 247;
minister of the interior, 249, 250;
his policy, 252, 266; leader of the
opposition, 278; refuses to form
a ministry, 283 ; president of
Congress, 296; defeated in the
general election, 333
Rivas, Duke of ; see Saavedra,
Ángel de
Rodil, José Ramón, General, com-
mander of the Spanish army in
Portugal, I of ; of the Cristinos,
Ioé; minister for war, I 19; mem-
ber of the Madrid junta, 165;
Index
president of the council, 179;
resigns office, 184
Romero Robledo, Francisco, minis-
ter, 323, 39 I, 449 ; Supports
Alfonso, 378; minister for home
affairs, 429; resigns office, 434,
456; his disloyalty, 437; leader
of the opposition, 438; excluded
from the ministry, 446; his un-
seemly behaviour, 450 ; deputy
leader of the Conservatives, 462;
allies with Weyler, 463; protests
against the surrender of Cuba, 467
Roncali, General, president of the
council, 225
Ros de Olano, Antonio, General,
member of the Cortes, 194; in
the opposition, 225; rewarded
for military service, 236; member
of the United-Liberal party, 240 ;
military chief of Madrid, 309
Royal Chamber, the (Cámara Real),
composition of, 4
Royal Statute, the, 94–96; unpopu-
larity of, 99, I 12, I 14-1 16
Rubielos, massacre at, 123
Ruiz Zorrilla, Manuel, takes part
in the revolution of 1860, 302;
member of the ministry, 3 Io,
314; supports the candidature of
Amadeo for the throne of Spain,
319; fails to form a ministry,
322–323; president of the council,
331; his influence over the King,
333-334; leader of the Radicals,
385; issues a manifesto, 409;
republican leader, 422, 430, 437;
expelled from France, 426; re-
fuses an amnesty, 447; member
of Congress, 451
Russell, Lord John, intervenes in
the war with Morocco, 271
Russia, sells ships of war to Spain,
41 ; supports Ferdinand in the
revolution of 1820, 57; orders
Spain to change her constitution,
65; supports Don Carlos, IoS
Saavedra, Ángel de, Duke of Rivas,
president of the Seville junta, 17;
505
leader of the opposition, 61 ;
preaches patriotism, 66; returns
from exile, 93; preaches demo-
cracy, 97; created Duke of Rivas,
I 19; member of the ministry, 120;
works to overthrow the ministry,
224; president of the council, 230
Saez, president of the council, 72
Sagasta, Práxedes Mateo, member
of the permanent commission,
249 ; excluded from office, 264;
leader of the Progressives, 265 ;
preaches revolution, 293; editor
of La /beria, 3o I ; negotiates with
the Carlists, 302; takes part in
the revolution of 1868, ió.; signs
the revolutionary manifesto, 303;
minister for home affairs, 3 Io;
quarrels with Ruiz Zorrilla, 322;
president of the Chamber, ib.; pre-
sident of the council, 323, 376,
420, 436, 441, 450, 462 ; resigns,
324, 387, 428, 441, 445, 454, 469;
defeated in the general election,
333; minister for foreign affairs,
363; sends troops to the relief of
Bilbao, 368; urges Serrano to
rally his friends, 370; minister of
the interior, 371; receives infor-
mation of Martínez Campos’
treachery, 383 ; urges Serrano to
return to Madrid, 384; prepares
to check revolt, 385; heads the
monarchists, 396, 409 ; disap-
proves of the peace of El Zanjón,
414 ; refuses to support the
ministry, 415; leader of the opposi-
tion, 417; his conciliatory attitude
towards Madrid, 423 ; obliged to
accept Serrano's reforms, 424 ;
reconstructs his cabinet, 425, 440–
441; breaks up the Secret Societies,
426; elected president of Con-
gress, 429 ; his hatred of Romero
Robledo, 434; commands a ma-
jority in the Cortes, 437; abolishes
slavery in Cuba, 439; his policy,
440; establishes universal suffrage,
44.1 ; carries out Cassola's scheme
for army reform, 444; disclaims
506
Index
Cánovas' method of establishing
universal suffrage, 446; presented
with the Golden Fleece, 447; op-
poses Cánovas' financial schemes,
45o; appeals to the opposition
for moderation, 452 ; his appeal
disregarded, 453; condemns Cá-
novas' policy, 456; interviews
General Woodford, 464; makes
overtures for peace, 469
St Daniel’s Night, riots of, 288
St Philip Neri, order of, 222
St Vincent de Paul, order of, 222
Salamanca, battle of, 26
Salamanca, José de, banker, his in-
tegrity questioned, 179; in favour
at Court, 208; president of the
council, 2 Io; proposes a commer-
cial treaty with Great Britain, ib.;
resigns office, 21 1 ; incites revo-
lution in Madrid, 212 ; implicated
in railway concessions, 225;
charged with corruption, 227
Salmerón, Nicolas, member of
the permanent commission, 249;
representative of the Progressives,
265; leader of the permanent
commission, 339; of the unitarian
party, 343; president of the re-
public, 344; restores order in the
South, 344–345; resigns office,
346; works to overthrow Caste-
lar, 359 ; communicates Salme-
ron's message to the deputies,
361 ; issues a manifesto, 409; his
hatred of Romero Robledo, 434 ;
leader of the republicans, 437;
member of Congress, 451
Salvatierra, battle of, 58
Salvatierra, minister of finance, 407
Samson, Admiral, commands the
American Atlantic squadron, 466
San Carlos, Mariano Joaquin, Duke
of, visits Madrid, 31 ; secretary
of state, 35
San Gil, mutiny in the barracks of,
293-294
San Juan Hill, battle of, 466
San Luís, Count of ; see Sartorius,
Luís José
San Miguel, Evaristo de, president
of the council, 63; resigns office,
67; leads the revolt of the Liberal
exiles, 8o ; ruler of Saragossa,
129; member of the Cortes, 159,
207, 240; member of the Madrid
junta, 165; member of the minis-
try, 172; president of the junta,
23o ; captain-general of New Cas-
tille, 23 I
San Román, Count of, General,
commander of the militia, I 19 ;
of the garrison at La Granja, 130
Santa Cruz, Manuel de, priest,
leader of the desperadoes, 350 ;
punished for attacks on the rail-
way, 356
Santa Cruz, Marchioness of, lady
of the bedchamber, 193
Santiago, siege of, 466–467
Santo Domingo, war between Cuba
and, 276; abandoned by Spain,
286
Saragossa, fall of, 17 ; junta elected
at, 45; capture of, 67 ; revolt in,
227
Sardinia, supports the claim of Don
Carlos to the Spanish throne, IoS
Sarsfield, General, deprived of the
command of the Cadiz army,
44; commands troops against the
Carlists, Ioz, 138; murder of,
I45
Sartorius, Luis José, Count of San
Luis, General, member of the
Cortes, 194; minister of the in-
terior, 21 1 ; influences the elec-
tions, 2 18; works to overthrow
Murillo, 224; president of the
council, 225; opposes the railway
concessions, 226; charged with
corruption, 227; resigns office,
229; excluded from office, 262 ;
member of the Cortes, 297; op-
poses the election of Amadeo, 318
Sebastián, Don, brother of Ferdi-
nand VII, takes the oath of alle-
giance to Isabel, 87 ; commander
of the Carlist troops, 138; ac-
cused of treason, 1.5o
Index
Sebley, Admiral, commands the
American Atlantic squadron, 466
Seijas Lozano, joins the Conserva-
tive coalition, 208; minister for
justice, 256
Serrano, Francisco, Duke of La
Torre, General, minister for war,
185; takes part in the revolution
of 1840, 188; leader of the Libe-
rals, 191, 207 ; calls together a
junta, 192; member of the minis-
try, IQ3, 279 ; Secession of, 194;
refuses to leave the Court, 268;
expelled from Court, 2 1 1 ; sides
with the opposition, 225; banished,
226, 297, 3or ; member of the
Cortes, 240, 297; leader of the
regulars at the revolt of Madrid,
249; takes the side of the mal-
contents, 3oo; signs the revolu-
tionary manifesto, 303; raises
troops, 3o4; wins the battle of
Alcolea, 305; leader of the Madrid
junta, 309; president of the coun-
cil, 3 ro, 322, 324, 370 ; his pro-
jected reforms, 3 ſo—31 1 ; takes
the title of regent, 314; tries
to restore the monarchy, 315;
pledges himself to put Montpen-
sier on the throne, 316; resigns
office, 314, 322, 331, 371; supports
Malcampo’s ministry, 323; takes
command against the Carlists,
33o ; attacked because of the
terms of the convention of Amo-
ravieta, 33 I ; defeated in the
general election, 333; allies with
the Carlists, 346, 359, 372; presi-
dent of the republic, 363-365; com-
mands the northern forces, 365,
385; fails to relieve Bilbao, 367–
368; hastens to Madrid, 370; ex-
cuses his conduct, 371 ; overcome
by difficulties, 373; complains of
breaches of neutrality on the part
of the French, 376; asks help from
Germany, ib.; makes a final effort
to end the civil war, 38o ; takes
command on the Ebro, 381; de-
mands a truce, 382 ; promises
5O7
troops to restore order in Madrid,
384; powerless to delay the resto-
ration of the monarchy, 386; dis-
obeyed by the army, 387; resigns
his command, 388; received by
the King, 393 ; opposes the minis-
try, 415, 423; proposes reform,
424; president of the Senate,
429; his retort to the Marquis de
Novaliches, 432
Seville, siege of, 189, 342, 345
Seville, Archbishop of, president of
the Cortes, 51
Seville, Don Enrique, Duke of
(cousin of Isabel), leader of the
rising in Galicia, 204; banished,
205; refuses to recognise the claims
of the Duke of Montpensier, 206;
deprived of his command, 2 13 ;
joins the Liberal party, 298; killed
in a duel, 316
Seville, Duke of (cousin of Alfonso
XII), escapes from prison, 442
Sierra Bullones, Marquis of ; see
Zabala, Juan de, General
Silvela, Francisco, condemns Câno-
vas' policy, 456; leader of the
Conservatives, 462 ; president of
the council, 469
Silvela, Manuel, member of the
ministry, 314; minister for home
affairs, 413 ; minister of justice,
429; minister of the interior,
446; deprived of office, 449; op-
poses the ministry, 450
Slave trade, the, abolished at the
Congress of Vienna, 37; bill for
the abolition of, in Cuba, 414 ;
abolished by Sagasta, 439
Solier, republican leader, 342
Sotomayor, Marquis of, president
of the council, 208; minister for
foreign affairs, 21 I
Soult, Nicolas, Marshal, his cam-
paign in Spain, 28; member of
the ministry, 17 I
Spain, at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, under the Bour-
bon dynasty, I-2; decay of the
Cortes of, 3–4 ; royal autocracy,
508
Andea:
4–5; jurisdiction of the Church,
5–6; recodification of the laws
of, 6; colonial empire of, 6–7;
economic condition of, 8–9; so-
cial condition of, 9–10 ; invaded
by Napoleon, Io-1 1 ; Joseph
Bonaparte crowned King of, 12 ;
Peninsular War in, 13–15, 17,
26–28; financial condition of, 22,
40–41, 79, 98, II 7-II 8, 14 I-142,
I44, 198, 217, 223, 287–288, 315,
355, 402, 497, 442-443, 449–450,
458–459, 468; Conservative reac-
tion in, 25–26; effects of the war
on, 27; rise of absolutism in,
33–36; isolated position of, in
1814, 37; anarchy in, 58–59 ;
129-131, 168–169 ; refuses to
allow the intervention of the
Powers, 65 ; divided into five
military districts, 66; French in-
vasion of, 67–71; signs the treaty
of the Quadruple Alliance, to 5;
desires peace, 152; concludes a
commercial treaty with Great
Britain, 182, 438; sends troops
to restore the authority of Isabel
in Portugal, 209–2 Io; supports
the cause of Pius IX, 2 15–216;
Social and economic troubles in,
245–246; improved condition of,
267–268; protests against the de-
thronement of the Prince of Par-
ma, 269; sends help to Santo
Domingo against the Cubans, 276;
enters into an alliance against
Mexico, 277 ; abandons Santo
Domingo, 286; condition of, in
1866, 306–307 ; in 1870, 318; in
1873, 339–344 ; in 1874, 364;
sends troops to Cuba, 407-408;
condition of, in 1878, 410–41 I ;
concludes a treaty of commerce
with France, 412; condition of,
in 1880, 419 ; resents a closer
union with Portugal, 423; fails
to bring about a commercial
agreement with Great Britain,
432 ; concludes a treaty of com-
merce with Germany, 427; quar-
rels with Germany about the pos-
session of the island of Gap, 433–
434; condition of, in 1890, 442–
443 ; admitted to the confidence
of the Powers, 444-445; agricul-
tural condition of, 448–449; raises
troops to quell the Riff Moors at
Melilla, 452; makes a treaty with
the Sultan, 26.; proposes a com-
mercial agreement with Ger-
many, 453 ; refuses to allow the
United States to interfere in the
Cuban question, 459 ; calls upon
them to help to pacify Cuba, 462;
war declared with the United
States, 464; loss of her colonial
empire, 468; effect of the Cuban
war on, 469
Suchet, Louis Gabriel, Marshal, pre-
serves order in Catalonia, 17 ;
signs capitulation, 28
Sules Islands, ceded to the United
States, 468
Sweden, supports the claim of
Isabel to the throne of Spain, Io;
Talleyrand, Charles Maurice, Prince
de, signs the treaty of the Quad-
ruple Alliance, Io;
Tarragona, Archbishop of, member
of the council of regency, 63
Tejeiro, General, 15o, 153
Terracina, Submission of, 216
Teruel, skirmish at, 188; attacked
by Carlist troops, 375
Teruel, Bishop of, 424
Tetuan, siege of, 27 1–272
Thiers, Adolphe, advocates French
intervention in Spain, I I I, 120,
I33; loses office, I 7o
Toledo, Archbishop of; see Alameda,
Fray Cirilio de la, and Bourbon,
Cardinal de
Topete, Juan Bautista, Admiral,
member of the ministry, 203 ;
supports the claim of the Duke
of Montpensier to the Spanish
throne, 3oo, 303, 3 Io; commander
of the Atlantic squadron, 301 ;
takes possession of Cadiz, 302;
Andea:
minister of marine, 3ro, 363;
Supports the claim of Amadeo
to the throme of Spain, 320 ;
president of the council during
Serrano's absence, 324; minister
of the colonies, 323; defeated in
the general election of 1872,
333
Toral, General, forced to surrender
Santiago, 467
Toreno, Count of, sentenced to
death, 39 ; leader of the Radical
party, 53 ; supports the King
against the extremists, 6o, 62 ;
commands a majority in the
Cortes of 1834, 97 ; minister of
finance, 98 ; president of the
council, I Io; obtains help from
France and Great Britain against
the Carlists, 1 12 ; confiscates the
property of the Church, I 13–114;
calls a conference to discuss the
repression of revolutionary riots,
II 5; loses office, ió. ; returns to
power, 141 ; leader of the Mode-
rates, I 43
Torre, Duke of la ; see Serrano,
Francisco
Torrijos, José María, General, takes
part in the revolution of 1830,
80–81 ; death of, 8o
Trapani, Count of, to marry Isabel,
2O3, 205
Triangle, Conspiracy of the, 39
Tristany, Benito, execution of, 21 o
Ulloa, minister of marine, 28o
United States, the, supports the
claim of Isabel, IoS ; threatensin-
tervention in Cuba, 269; condemns
the interference of European
Powers in Mexico, 277 ; acknow-
ledges the republic in Spain, 358 ;
accuses Spain of causing anarchy
in Cuba, 399 ; helps to settle
the difficulties in Morocco, 445;
sympathises with Cuba, 445, 457–
458; sends help to the Cubans,
463; prepares for war, 464; de-
clares war with Spain, 465
5O9
Uranga, General, commander of the
Carlists, 150
Urbistondo, Antonio de, commander
of the Carlists, 15o ; minister for
war, 256
Urgel, La Seo de, capture of, 62–
64, 395
Valdés, Cayetano, General, takes
part in the revolution of 1830, 8o ;
minister for war, 99 ; commands
the Cristinos, Io9, 108; his plan
of blockade, Io; ; deprived of
command, Ioa ; relieves Estella,
Io8; resigns his command, Io9
Valdespina, Marquis of, General,
leader of the royalists, Ioo, 151,367
Valençay, secret treaty of, 31
Valencia, anarchy in, 341 ; con-
spiracy of, 42 ; declaration of, 33 ;
order restored in, 344
Valencia, Duke of ; see Narváez
Valera, Juan, critic, 255
Valparaiso, bombarded, 287
Van Halen, Antonio, General, com-
mands the army of the centre,
I56; captain-general of Barcelona,
I62; provokes riots in, 163; fights
against O’Donnell, 181 ; declares
Barcelona to be in a state of
siege, 182, 183; attacks Seville, 188
Vega de Armijo, Marquis of, mem-
ber of the ministry, 279; leader
of the monarchical Radicals, 409;
minister for foreign affairs, 420;
resigns office, 428
Vergara, convention of, 154, 169,
176; renewal of the, 394
Verona, Congress of, 57, 65
Vicălvaro, battle of, 228
Vich, seized by Carlists, 374
Victoria, Queen of England, inter-
views Louis Philippe, 204
Victory, Duke of; see Espartero,
Baldomero
Vidal, leader of the Liberal con-
spiracy at Valencia, 42
Vienna, Congress of, 37
Vigodet, Gaspar, General, captain-
general of New Castille, 55
5 IO
Index
Villacampa, Pedro, General, appoint-
ed to command in Andalusia, 66;
heads the revolt in Madrid, 439 ;
pardoned, ib.
Villareal, General, 127
Villaverde, minister of justice, 446;
refuses the ministry of finance,
44
viès, Sir George, afterwards Lord
Clarendon, British ambassador to
Madrid, I 14 ; his scheme for
defeating the Carlists, 133, 182;
his influence, 178
Vinuesa, Matias, priest, 58
Vittoria, battle of, 27
Wadi-Ras, battle of, 273
Wellington, Duke of, his campaign
against Joseph Bonaparte, 27;
intercedes for the Liberals, 37;
British representative at the con-
ference of Verona, 65 ; intervenes
to put an end to the Carlist war,
I I I
Weyler, Valeriano, General, restores
order in Barcelona, 456; reduces
the Cubans to submission, 457–
458 ; recalled, 462 ; offers his
services to Spain, 463 ; protests
against the surrender of Cuba,
6
wäm I, Emperor of Germany,
entertains Alfonso, 427; accepts
Spain's apology for the insult to
her minister, 434
Wine trade, the, importance of, 412;
decrease in, 448
Woodford, Stewart, General, Ameri-
can minister at Madrid, 462 ; re-
called, 465; interviews Sagasta,
464
Yap (Caroline Islands), Germany
lays claim to, 433, 434.
Zabala, Juan de, Marquis of Sierra
Bullones, General, royalist leader,
Ioo; member of the Liberal party,
191 ; banished, 226, 301; member
of the ministry, 278; minister for
war, 292, 330, 363; puts down
the mutiny in Madrid, 294 ; Sup-
ports the candidature of Amadeo
for the throne of Spain, 320 ;
averts the fall of Bilbao, 368;
receives praise for his efforts,
37o ; commands the northern
army, 374 ; resigns office, 376
Zariátegui, General, commander of
Carlists, 14o ; accused of treason,
I SO
Zeff Bermúdez, Francisco, petitions
for the abolition of the courts-
martial, 74; president of the coun-
cil, ib.; supports the claim of Isabel
to the Spanish throne, 85, 91; up-
holds the despotism of the King,
86; supports the claim of Don
Miguel to the throne of Portugal,
89; his character, 92; dismissed
from office, 93
Zumalacárregui, Tomás, commander
of the Carlists, IoI, Io; ; refuses
to negotiate for peace, Ioa ;
withdraws from Améscoa, Ioff;
strengthens his position, Io; ;
issues a proclamation, ſo8; death
of, I I I
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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